Court Opinion

ID: 9950795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:02:58.627325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:55.707235
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B325633

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                 BA083688)

 SAUL RODRIGUEZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert C. Vanderet, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
       Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant and appellant Saul Rodriguez appeals from the
trial court’s summary denial of his Penal Code section 1172.6
                   1
(former § 1170.95) resentencing petition without appointing
counsel. The Attorney General concedes the trial court erred by
not appointing counsel, but argues the error was harmless
because defendant, as the actual killer, is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. On this record, where defendant was convicted of
first degree murder under a theory allowing imputed malice, we
cannot conclude the trial court’s error was harmless.
       During defendant’s trial in July 1994, the jury was
instructed on the felony-murder theory of liability for first degree
murder: “Every person who unlawfully kills a human being with
malice aforethought or during the commission of a robbery, a
felony inherently dangerous to human life, is guilty of the crime
of murder . . . . The unlawful killing of a human being, whether
intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the
commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree
when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such
crime.” (CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.21.) For the special circumstance
allegation, the jury was instructed to make a true finding if “[t]he
murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of a robbery” and “in order to carry out or advance
the commission of the crime of robbery” with the requirement
that defendant is the actual killer or an aider and abettor with
the intent to kill crossed out. (CALJIC Nos. 8.80.1, 8.81.17.)
       Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with a true
special circumstance finding that he committed the murder while

1
      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                  2
engaged in a robbery within the meaning of section 190.2(a)(17),
second degree robbery, and attempted murder. A personal use of
a firearm allegation pursuant to section 12022.5(a) was found
true as to all counts. Defendant was sentenced to 31 years 4
months to life in prison. This court affirmed the judgment on
direct appeal. (People v. Saul Rodriguez (March 10, 1997,
B098677) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On August 30, 2022, defendant filed, and parties do not
dispute, a facially sufficient resentencing petition. In the form
petition, defendant requested the trial court to appoint counsel to
represent him. On September 8, 2022, the court summarily
denied the petition, reasoning defendant was “the actual killer of
the victim and was convicted by the jury of first-degree murder.”
The trial court did not describe which portions, if any, of the
record upon which he relied for his conclusion. Counsel was not
appointed and no prima facie hearing was held.
       Under section 1172.6, after receiving a facially sufficient
petition, counsel shall be appointed upon the petitioner’s request.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)-(3).) Petitioners “are entitled to the
appointment of counsel upon the filing of a facially sufficient
petition [citation] and . . . only after the appointment of counsel
and the opportunity for briefing may the superior court consider
the record of conviction to determine whether ‘the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) The
prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, and the
petitioner may file a reply. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The trial court
shall then “hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.)

                                 3
       Failing to appoint counsel for a petitioner at the prima facie
stage is reviewable for prejudice under the state-law harmless
error standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957-958, 973-974.) On appeal, the
petitioner has the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable
that if [he or she] had been afforded assistance of counsel his [or
her] petition would not have been summarily denied without an
evidentiary hearing.” (Id. at p. 974.)
       The Attorney General concedes the trial court erred when it
failed to appoint counsel for defendant as requested. He
contends, however, that the error was harmless. We disagree.
Here, jurors arrived at a first degree conviction without
indicating the theory of liability on which it relied. They were,
however, given instructions on the felony-murder theory that
permits imputing malice. The true finding of the special
circumstance allegation here does not necessarily pinpoint
defendant as the actual killer (see People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, 20 (CALCRIM No. 730 robbery-murder special
circumstance instruction not requiring defendant personally
killed victim creates possibility defendant is not the actual killer);
cf. People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 53-54 (where
felony-murder instruction was given, defendant is ineligible for
relief because special circumstance robbery instruction under
CALJIC No. 8.80.1 required defendant to be the actual killer)),
and neither does the true finding of the personal use of a firearm
allegation (see People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1120
(finding of personal use of a firearm does not automatically prove
defendant was the actual killer); People v. Berry (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 332, 335 (same).) Nevertheless, the trial court
summarily determined, without explanation, that defendant was

                                  4
                                                     2
the actual killer and thus ineligible for 1172.6 relief. Without
appointment of counsel and subsequent prima facie hearing,
defendant was deprived of the opportunity to put forth, by way of
briefing or oral argument, any factual or legal theory in support
of his petition, and to present his argument on why the conviction
record is insufficient to show he was the actual killer.
Accordingly, we find the error in failing to appoint counsel
prejudicial.

2
      In his opening brief, appellant indicates the trial court
reviewed an incomplete record – the information, verdict forms,
abstract of judgment, and probation report – and the Attorney
General does not disagree.

                                5
                          DISPOSITION
       The order summarily denying defendant’s section 1172.6
petition is reversed, and the matter is remanded for appointment
of counsel. The trial court shall hold a new eligibility hearing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), and to the extent necessary,
conduct an evidentiary hearing. We express no opinion on the
ultimate resolution of the petition.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           LEE, J.

We Concur:

             BAKER, Acting P. J.

             KIM, J.

     Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

                                 6