Court Opinion

ID: 9825916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:20:16.090522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:29.353524
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING. Hart, C. J. We adhere to our ruling that the defendant’s ownership of the car, coupled with proof that the driver at the time of the accident was in the regular employment of the defendant as salesman and had general charge of the car, raises a presumption that he was acting within the scope of his authority. In this connection it may be stated that there is a distinction between presumptions of law and presumptions of fact, which is clearly and fully stated in Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 5 (2d ed.) § 2491. To illustrate, we have a statute making railroads responsible for all damages to persons and property done or caused, by the running of'trains, and proof of the injury under the statute makes a prima facie case for the plaintiff. It is a presumption of law based upon public policy as declared by the Legislature. The presumption thus raised by law does not of itself possess probative weight. Hence, when evidence is introduced rebutting the presumption, it may be overcome, and where the evidence of the basic facts is undisputed, the legal presumption will disappear, and no longer exist. The presumption with which we are dealing in the present case is not a legal presumption, but is an inference or presumption of fact. Its existence is called into being by proof introduced on the subject and not by any statute dealing with the question. This being so, the opposing’ evidence must be weighed by the jury for the reason that under art. 7, § 23, of our Constitution, the jury is the judge of the facts proved. The rule is stated in 6 Labatt on Master and Servant, (2d ed.) § 2281A, as follows: “A servant may be presumed prima facie to have been acting in the course of his employment, wherever it appears, not only that his master was the owner of the given instrumentality, but also that, at the time when the alleged tort was committed, it was being used under conditions resembling those which normally attended its use in connection with the master’s business.” In the present case, the evidence showed that the negligence of the driver of the automobile was the proximate cause of the accident, and the undisputed evidence showed that the driver was regularly employed by the defendant and was intrusted with the use and care of the automobile. The declaration of the driver on the afternoon before the injury was made on a week day, at a time and place where his duties called him. His statement tended to show that he was acting in the course of his employment, and was admissible to show that he was acting within the real and apparent scope of his authority; and not for the purpose of establishing his agency, which had already been established by undisputed evidence. It was admissible as tending to show that he was acting within the course of his employment as if he had sold goods or collected accounts on that day and his employer had claimed that he was not acting within the course of his employment. Therefore, the petition for rehearing will be denied.