Court Opinion

ID: 9709878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:56:42.929011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:52.300826
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I might not have reached the same decision as the trial court in this instance, but I am reluctant to reverse the trial court in a matter in which there is not clearly a “right” or a “wrong” solution. In addition, I write separately to note my concern with the majority’s analysis which appears to imply that because Cathy’s move and remarriage may not alone be sufficient to compel a change of custody, they are no longer to be considered. Standing alone they may not be sufficient, but they surely remain a part of the mix of circumstances to be considered with the other existing circumstances in reaching a decision.
Cases involving factual precedents are of limited value. Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607 (N.D.1992) and Delzer v. Winn, 491 N.W.2d 741 (N.D.1992), are significant but not controlling. They serve only to point out the obvious, i.e., the same factors do not necessarily deserve nor receive the same weight in each case. The factor which may be controlling in one instance may not be as significant in another instance. Blotske involved a change of custody by the trial court because of the interference by the custodial parent with the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent. We reversed. Two of the justices concurred in the result because “visitation problems are ‘better remedied at first by resort to a more rigid visitation schedule, rather then a change of custody.’ ” 487 N.W.2d at 612 (Vande Walle and Johnson, JJ., concurring specially). Chief Justice Ralph Erickstad concurred in the result noting his concern that the majority opinion “has over emphasized the importance we have previously accorded the continuity of the custodial parent child relationship.” 487 N.W.2d at 613 (Erickstad, C.J., concurring in the result).
Delzer produced the opposite result from this court, i.e., we reversed a court order changing custody because the positive changes in the noncustodial parents life did warrant a change of custody interrupting the continuity and stability of the present custodial arrangement. Two Justices signed the majority, one Justice concurred specially, and two Justices dissented.
If these cases are illustrative of anything, it is that this court should not attempt to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, even if we disagree with the result, where the trial court has reached a reasoned decision that does not rely on impermissible factors. I recognize that such an approach may make the trial court’s decision nearly nonreviewable. Perhaps that is the way it should be where we have no opportunity to view the parties and there is no clearly “right” or “wrong” solution.
Finally, insofar as the preference of the child is concerned, I adhere to my position that judges should not “trivialize the preference of a 13-year-old child” to remain with a parent in a city where he has lived all of his natural life, and where he is close to extended family. Novak v. Novak, 441 N.W.2d 656 at 659 (N.D.1989) [Vande Walle, J., concurring specially]. Despite my concern in that case, I concurred in the result affirming the trial court’s decision, recognizing that “the preference is not controlling.” Id. We should also recognize *590here that no one factor is controlling and affirm the trial court.