Court Opinion

ID: 9755197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:30:03.210775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:04.773981
License: Public Domain

BOOKER T. SHAW, Judge.
Lear Corporation and its insurer, Zurich North America Insurance Company (collectively Appellants), appeal the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission finding that an injury sustained by Timothy Miles during a break-time basketball game on Lear’s premises was compen-sable because Miles was paid while engaging in the activity. Appellants contend that the Commission erred because (1) the injury did not arise out of Miles’s employment, (2) the injury was caused by his participation in a voluntary recreational activity and therefore not compensable, pursuant to section 287.120.7 RSMo,1 and (3) the exception under sub-paragraph (b) of the statute does not apply to render the injury compensable because Miles was not paid for playing basketball. The Commission’s decision is affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
The relevant facts are undisputed. Miles was hired as a union employee at Lear’s Wentzville plant in February 2000. The collective bargaining agreement governing the terms of Miles’s employment provided for one 30-minute unpaid break, during which employees were free to leave the premises, and two 15-minute paid breaks during which they were required to remain on-site in order to resume work promptly. While on breaks, some employees and managers often played basketball in an asphalt area on Lear property just outside the building. The balls, goal, and 3-point line had been there since any witness could recall. On February 19, 2004, Miles injured his knee while playing basketball during a paid break.
The Commission concluded that Miles’s injury was compensable because (1) it arose out of and in the course of his employment in that the basketball games were a regular incident of employment, and (2) although Miles was engaged in a voluntary recreational activity for which benefits are generally forfeited, his injury fell within an exception to that rule because he was paid while participating.
Discussion

Standard of Review

An appellate court shall only review questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand or set aside an award only if the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers, the award was procured by fraud, the facts found by the Commission do not support the award, or there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award. Section 287.495.1. While the court defers to the Commission on issues of fact, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Dubose v. City of St. Louis, 210 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Mo.App. E.D.2006). Appellants present two questions of law.2

Arising Out of Employment

Section 287.120.1 holds an employer liable, regardless of fault, when an em*67ployee sustains an injury “arising out of and in the course of his employment.” An employee has sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of employment “where an employee’s acts were reasonably incidental to commencement of employee’s work and were also for the benefit of the employer.” James v. CPI Corp., 897 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Mo.App. E.D.1995). The benefit to the employer need not be tangible or great. Id.
“Arising out of’ and “in the course of’ are two separate tests. Simmons v. Bob Meats Wholesale Florist, 167 S.W.3d 222, 225 (Mo.App. S.D.2005). Appellants acknowledge that Miles’s injury occurred “in the course of’ his employment but deny that it “arose out of’ his employment. An injury arises out of employment if it is a “natural and reasonable incident thereof,” or, in other words, “when there is a causal connection between the nature of the employee’s duties or conditions under which he is required to perform them and the resulting injury.” James at 94.
The parties dispute the prece-dential value of Seiber v. Moog Automotive, Inc., 773 S.W.2d 161 (Mo.App. E.D.1989), where an employee was injured while playing basketball on her employer’s premises during her unpaid lunch break. This Court found that the employer had acquiesced to the activity in that it had become a regular incident of employment. The following year, the General Assembly added paragraph 7 to section 287.120, creating a forfeiture of benefits for voluntary recreational activities. Appellants assert that the amendment precludes all Seiber-like claims. We disagree. It merely shifts the burden onto the employee to establish compensability under one of the exceptions. The amendment was enacted “to enable employers to limit their liability for recreational injuries that otherwise would have been incidental to the employment." Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 468, 471 (Mo.App. W.D.2001) (citing Wilson v. Monsanto, 926 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo.App. E.D.1996)). (emphasis added) So the scope-of-employment analysis remains central, and Seiber is still instructive. We are not persuaded by Appellants strained attempt to create a significant factual distinction in the level of employer acquiescence in the two cases. Seiber’s employer furnished the court and ball at the union’s request, only allowed the activity during unpaid breaks, and was otherwise indifferent to employees’ participation. Lear furnished (albeit passively) the court and ball, even allowed the activity during paid breaks, and was otherwise indifferent.
Other pre- and post-amendment precedent further supports a conclusion that Miles’s activity was incidental to his employment. In James, the claimant was injured while feeding a parking meter outside her place of employment. This Court found that the “activity was of incidental benefit to employer because parking was necessary to the claimant’s employment. A causal connection existed between the conditions under which claimant was required to perform her duties and the resulting injury.” Id. at 95. Similarly, in Bybee v. Ozark Airlines, 706 S.W.2d 570 (Mo.App. E.D.1986), an employer had a practice of allowing its employees to use company tools for personal use on company premises during breaks. Where an employee was injured in the parking lot while repairing his car, this Court found that the activity provided an incidental benefit to the company because its practice encouraged employees to remain on-site. In Cox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 534 (Mo.1996), the Supreme Court found compensable an injury that incurred while an employee was returning to work from a trip to a convenience store during his paid *68break, reasoning that “activities for the comfort or convenience of the employee are considered incidental to employment when they occur within reasonable limits of time and place because they benefit the employee and thereby indirectly, benefit the employer.” Id. at 537.
Appellants’ reliance on Wilson is misplaced. In Wilson, we found that an employee’s off-site solo bicycle ride during a partially paid break was not incidental to his employment. “[A] healthier, happier employee is ... not the type of benefit that invokes the mutual benefit doctrine.” Id. at 50. Here, by contrast, Lear requires its employees to remain on company premises during their paid breaks to promote punctuality in resuming work. Allowing employees to play basketball on-site furthered that objective and also supported positive collective morale. Because Lear received an incidental benefit, the activity arose out of and in the course of Miles’s employment. Point denied.

Exception under Sub-Paragraph (b)

Paragraph 7 of section 287.120 relieves an employer of liability for injuries that an employee incurs as a result of participation in a recreational activity, subject to three exceptions. At the time of Miles’s injury, the statute provided as follows:
Where the employee’s participation in a recreational activity or program is the proximate cause of the injury, benefits or compensation otherwise payable under this chapter for death or disability shall be forfeited regardless that the employer may have promoted, sponsored or supported the recreational activity or program, expressly or impliedly, in whole or in part. The forfeiture of benefits or compensation shall not apply when:
(a)The employee was directly ordered by the employer to participate in such recreational activity or program;
(b) The employee was paid wages or travel expenses while participating in such recreational activity or program; or
(c) The injury from such recreational activity or program occurs on the employer’s premises due to an unsafe condition and the employer had actual knowledge of the employee’s participation in the recreational activity or program and of the unsafe condition of the premises and failed to either curtail the recreational activity or program or cure the unsafe condition.
Miles asserted theories of compensability under both sub-paragraphs (b) and (c). The Commission’s decision relies on sub-paragraph (b) and does not discuss evidence or provide analysis relating to sub-paragraph (c), so we do not opine on the latter. The Commission concluded that Miles’s injury fit within exception (b) in that he was paid wages while participating in the activity that caused it.
Appellants criticize the Commission for its plain meaning interpretation of the statute, asserting that the legislature really meant to provide compensation only when employees are paid for participating in a recreational activity. In essence, Appellants would have this Court interpret the statute other than in accordance with its plain and unambiguous meaning. “We interpret the workers’ compensation law according to the general rules of statutory construction.” Frazier v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 869 S.W.2d 152, 156 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). “Our primary goal is to ascertain the intent of the legislature by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms used.” Id. We will not create an ambiguity in a statute, where none exists, in *69order to depart from a statute’s plain and ordinary meaning. Premium, Standard Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Tp. of Putnam County, 946 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Mo. banc 1997). In other words, where a statute’s plain meaning is clear, courts must resist the urge to divine a legislative intent that confers some other meaning. As we recognized in Seiber, any unintended consequences are best resolved by the legislature, not the judiciary.3
Appellants’ further reliance on Wilson under this point is again misplaced. Appellants emphasize our observation in Wilson that no pre-amendment case law allows for compensation for an off-site recreational injury simply because the employee was being paid when it occurred. Wilson at 50. But in Wilson the court did not even reach the question of whether exception (b) applied because the activity did not arise out of and within the scope of employment. In other words, because benefits were not “otherwise payable” under paragraph 7, there was no reason to consider the exceptions.
Workers’ compensation law was “intended to place upon industry the losses sustained by employees resulting from injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and, consequently, the law should be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose and humane design. The law is intended to extend its benefits to the largest possible class.” James v. CPI Corp., 897 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Mo.App. E.D.1995) (citation omitted).
Guided by the foregoing instruction, the Court concludes that the Commission did not err in its plain meaning application of section 287.120.7(b). Point denied.
Conclusion
The decision of the Commission is affirmed.
LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, P.J. concurs.
KURT S. ODENWALD, J. dissents in separate opinion.

. All statutory references are to RSMo 2000.

. Appellants actually assert three points, but its second point regarding proximate causation is undisputed. Miles acknowledges that his injury was caused by participation in a voluntary recreational activity, and the Commission’s decision confirms it. This Court need not address the point.

. We appreciate the dissent’s concern that a strict construction of the statute could lead to inconsistent results. But this court's role is to interpret a law as the legislature promulgated it, not to unilaterally rewrite the law to conform to our perception of how the legislature should have written it. If lawmakers truly meant “for” rather than "while,” then they can amend the statute accordingly. Such action is within their authority, not ours.