Court Opinion

ID: 9760156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:41:29.019814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:08.568978
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
(dissenting).
I can not agree that this court should have one rule for the state and a different rule for the appellant, under the same circumstances.
Here, in a bill of exception, the trial court recognized as improper the argument of state’s counsel by sustaining the appellant’s objection and withdrawing that argument from the jury’s consideration.
In the face of the bill of exception complaining that the argument so made and withdrawn was so obviously harmful that the effect thereof could not be withdrawn from the jury’s consideration, the trial court made this certificate referring to the argument, viz.:
“When in truth and in fact said remark., were so prejudicial and inflammatory same could not be cured.”
The trial court having noted appellant’s exception to the qualification appended, the bill of exception is to be appraised without the qualification.
So here is a bill of exception wherein the trial court certified that argument was made by counsel for the state which was so erroneous that he withdrew it from the jury’s consideration and instructed the jury not to consider it. After having withdrawn the argument, the trial court certified that the prejudicial and harmful effect thereof could not be cured. Thus the trial *250court certified that prejudicial and harmful error was committed against the appellant upon the trial of the case.
It is no answer to that situation to say that the certificate of the trial court was not true or that he was mistaken therein, or that to accept the trial court’s certificate as true would be to reverse this conviction upon a mere technicality.
The trial court was present and presided over the trial; he heard the argument; he deemed it improper and hurtful to the appellant; and he certified that the harm done to appellant by the argument was not cured by withdrawal thereof.
This court has no authority to say that the trial court did not know what he was doing when he signed the bill of exception and thereby made the certificate of error.
This court appears to have no trouble in accepting and strictly enforcing a certificate in a bill of exception when it is against the appellant. As evidence of such fact, I need but call attention to the uniformity with which this court, without reservation, has enforced against the appellant the trial court’s qualification to a bill of exception. See 13A, Texas Digest, Criminal Law, Key 1111 (3) for authorities.
If it be right and proper to hold the appellant strictly to the bill of exception and the certificate contained therein, the same rule ought to apply to the state. Any other rule would be discriminatory.
But such is not recognized here, for according to the majority opinion in this case the state is not held to the certificate of error in the bill of exception referred to.
There was a time when this court gave to certificates of error against the state the same strict following as it did certificates against the appellant. I call attention to the case of Roberts v. State, 115 Texas Cr. Rep. 431, 27 S.W. 2d 159. In that case, as here, the error certified in the bill of exception related to the harmful and prejudicial effect of argument of state’s counsel. As there pointed out, the bill of exception certified as follows:
“ ‘And defendant’s reputation not having been put in issue by the defense, such statement or argument was not warranted by the evidence adduced and not in the record and was highly *251prejudicial to defendant, and was calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors against defendant, and it was not responsive to, nor warranted by any statement or argument made by counsel for the defendant.’ ”
Speaking through Judge Lattimore, here is what the court said in that case relative to such certificate in the bill of exception :
“We cannot understand how a trial judge can certify in a bill of exceptions that the matters therein set forth as those stated in an argument were not warranted by the evidence; were not in the record; were highly prejudicial to defendant; were calculated to inflame the minds of the jury against the defendant — and yet not grant a new trial and save the expense and delay incident to an appeal.”
In the instant case the certificate of the trial court as contained in the bill of exception referred to is, to all practical purposes, the same. Here, instead of overruling the objection that the argument was manifestly improper and outside of the record, the trial court sustained appellant’s objection, thereby holding that the argument was subject to the objection.
, That the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the argument is shown by the bill of exception which certifies that the trial court said:
“ * * And, of course, that remark — I have been requested to instruct you to disregard it, and I do ask you to disregard it because it is out of the record * * *.’ ”
After sustaining the objection to the argument and after having withdrawn the same from the consideration of the jury, the trial court further certified that the argument was so prejudicial and inflammatory that it could not be cured.
The holding in the Roberts case directly supports appellant’s contention, here, that the trial court has certified prejudicial error in the bills of exception. Other cases supporting the holding are: Reeves v. State, 117 Texas Cr. Rep. 279, 35 S.W. 2d 713; Lemons v. State, 127 Texas Cr. Rep. 235, 75 S.W. 2d 878; Traylor v. State, 120 Texas Cr. Rep. 277, 47 S.W. 2d 310; Roberson v. State, 131 Texas Cr. Rep. 60, 95 S.W. 2d 443; Hart v. State, 135 Texas Cr. Rep. 565, 122 S.W. 2d 193; and Smith v. State, 136 Texas Cr. Rep. 53, 123 S.W. 2d 655.
*252The words of judge Hawkins in the Traylor case, supra, express my views here:
“With that certificate regarding the argument, this court has no option, but must reverse the judgment, even in the absence of a statement of facts. If the trial judge thought the argument was as bad as certified, a new trial should have been granted, and the expense and delay of an appeal avoided.”
Another bill of exception shows that appellant sought a mistrial as a result of a statement or remark by the trial court during the trial of the case. The motion for mistrial was overruled.
That bill of exception contains the following certificate:
“And be it further remembered that after the court refused to declare a mistrial for the remarks made by the court, that the counsel for the defendant excepted to the failure to the court to declare a mistrial and said remarks were so manifestly improper that their effect could not be withdrawn from the jury * * *.”
What I have said touching the other bill of exception and the certificate of error contained therein applies to the above mentioned certificate of error. "
Thus we have two bills of exception in this case wherein the trial court certified that prejudicial error was committed upon the trial of this case.
I am not unmindful of the recent cases in which this court refuses to be bound by a certificate of error by the trial court in a bill of exception, as pointed out in the concurring opinion. Those cases are wrong; they should never have been announced. The earlier cases announced the correct rule and ought to be followed.
To my mind, it is unthinkable that this court will accept the certificates of a trial court when they favor the state and are against the appellant and refuse to accept a certificate which is in favor of the appellant and against the state.
When a trial court makes a certificate in a bill of exception, it is binding on this court and ought to be enforced with inflexible fidelity.
I dissent.