Court Opinion

ID: 9576927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:30:05.986751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:43.876768
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge.
Appellant Macon-Bibb County Hospital Authority, d/b/a Medical Center of Central Georgia, brings this appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding appellee, the representative of the Estate of Annie Whipple, $100,000 for injuries the decedent sustained to her hand while receiving intravenous chemotherapy treatment as a cancer outpatient at appellant hospital. There was evidence that Mrs. Whipple experienced pain and suffering as a result of the extravasation of mutamycin from her vein into the soft tissue of her hand. She underwent surgery on her hand by Dr. Ron Freeman, a plastic surgeon, and treatment for pain by Dr. John Brown, a psychologist.
Appellant argues that the jury verdict was excessive and that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of Dr. Brown and *196in failing to give a requested charge. We affirm.
1. Appellant contends it was error for the trial court to permit John Brown, a psychologist, to testify as an expert that the injury Mrs. Whipple sustained to her hand affected her survivability. “Generally speaking, nothing more is required to qualify a witness as an expert than to show that, through education, training, or experience, he has special knowledge concerning the matter of science or skill to which his testimony relates.” Queen v. McDaniel, 178 Ga. App. 504, 505 (343 SE2d 783) (1986). Dr. Brown’s qualifications included an undergraduate and a graduate degree in psychology and a doctorate in counseling; membership in various professional organizations; and four years of practical experience at the Macon Pain Clinic assisting individuals in managing chronic pain. The testimony of Dr. Brown, who had treated the decedent at the Macon Pain Clinic, illustrated the psychological effect of the injury on the decedent’s life. “It is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge as to whether a witness has such learning and experience in a particular profession as to entitle him to be deemed prima facie an expert. [Cits.]” Anderson v. State, 178 Ga. App. 355 (3) (343 SE2d 411) (1986). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing Dr. Brown to testify as an expert.
2. Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that Dr. Schnell and Dr. Smith, the physicians treating the decedent’s cancer, were independent contractors. Appellant requested the court to instruct the jury: “The defendant Medical Center of Central Georgia is not legally responsible for the acts and doings of Dr. Ron Freeman, Dr. James Smith or Dr. Fred Schnell as these doctors are independent contractors and not agents or employees of the hospital.” Instead, the trial court submitted to the jury the question whether the relationship between the hospital and the doctors was that of employer and employee, or employer and independent contractor.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the trial court’s jury charge was proper. The evidence showed that Mrs. Whipple was a patient of appellant hospital and not a private patient of Dr. Smith or Dr. Schnell. Drs. Smith and Schnell staffed the cancer clinic, a unit of the hospital, every Thursday and were paid an hourly rate by appellant for their services. The evidence presented a question of fact for the jury as to whether the doctors were employees of the hospital or independent contractors. Hollingsworth v. Ga. Osteopathic Hosp., 145 Ga. App. 870 (245 SE2d 60) (1978). “The court’s instruction to the jury should be looked to as a whole, and if the applicable law is stated accurately and fairly, in such manner as to work no prejudice, then this court will not consider a challenge to the wording of isolated segments. [Cits.]” Georgia Kraft Co. v. Laborers’ Intl. Union, 170 Ga. *197App. 581 (3) (371 SE2d 602) (1984). We find that the trial court’s instruction to the jury was clear and accurate. Furthermore, appellant’s request was not adjusted to the evidence in this case since it included therein that the court charge the jury that Dr. Freeman was an independent contractor. Dr. Freeman treated Mrs. Whipple’s hand after she sustained the burns. There was no evidence or issue in this case that he was negligent, nor was he ever called as a witness at trial. “In order to reverse for failure to give a requested charge, the charge so requested must be entirely correct, accurate and adjusted to the pleadings, law and evidence, and not otherwise covered in the general charge. [Cits.]” Id. at 585. Since appellant’s requested charge was not adjusted to the evidence presented, the trial court correctly refused to give the charge.
3. In its third enumeration of error, appellant contends that the jury verdict of $100,000 was excessive. Appellant argues that since Mrs. Whipple’s medical expenses amounted to $7,600.85, the remainder of the verdict, $92,399.15, was awarded for pain and suffering, and that amount is excessive. “The law fixes no measure for damages for pain and suffering except the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors. In the absence of plain proof that the verdict was the result of prejudice or bias this court will not interfere. There was no direct proof of prejudice or bias here. The verdict will not be set aside under the evidence presented. [Cits.]” Hightower v. McIntyre, 170 Ga. App. 269 (3) (316 SE2d 849) (1984).

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., concurs. Beasley, J., concurs specially.