Court Opinion

ID: 9819306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:22:15.662856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:20.993346
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: Whatever one’s views of affirmative action in the filling of new positions, it seems clear that affirmative action cannot justify taking existing jobs, for example, from whites so that they may be given to African-Americans, taking existing jobs from women so that they may be given to men, or vice versa. Would we tolerate a situation where all male employees of the City were discharged, so that females could have the opportunity to show their qualifications for those jobs, even if those male employees “were given an equal opportunity” to get their jobs back? The majority says that the fact that petitioner was removed from his position and the job was reposted “to create a hiring practice that was clearly free from charges of sexual discrimination does not mean the position was eliminated because of his sex.” 298 111. App. 3d at 1109. The majority seems to be saying that reverse discrimination, or discrimination with a good motive, cannot be discrimination. I do not understand why that is so. Two wrongs do not make a right. The Department found the “evidence did not indicate petitioner was offered the position of fire inspector.” 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1103. The Department was clearly wrong, according to the chief legal counsel: “Evidence from the Department’s investigation showed that [cjomplainant was offered the position of fire inspector and accepted it.” 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1104. The chief legal counsel went on, however, to say that the City reevaluated the position, modified it to be consistent with (unnamed) national standards, and that the evidence did not indicate that petitioner was demoted because of his sex. The majority states that “[tjhere is no evidence that petitioner was demoted or denied the fire inspector position as a result of the threats of these women,” and seems to suggest that the union may have been the reason for whatever happened to petitioner. 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. The majority elsewhere, however, tells us that the facts are uncontested and sets out the following chronology: (1) Maupin and Salzman submitted applications; (2) petitioner was interviewed and acknowledged as the only candidate; (3) Maupin and Salzman, who were not interviewed, questioned the fairness of the position to women because of the fire-suppression-only requirement; (4) Ernestine Jackson, the assistant to the mayor in charge of EEOC matters, raised the issue with the city manager; and (5) “the posting was closed and then reopened to include all City employees.” 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1103. These uncontested facts are not simply some evidence, they are overwhelming evidence. It is clear what happened in this case. The questions in this case are whether petitioner was demoted (did he have the position and then later not have it), whether that demotion was made on account of his sex, and whether demotion on account of sex was justified in the circumstances of this case. It was improper for the Department to refuse to consider the issue of justification by pretending there was no evidence petitioner had accepted the position or that his sex had nothing to do with the job being taken away from him.