Court Opinion

ID: 9662188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:02:07.373778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.609511
License: Public Domain

Cynar, J.
(dissenting). I must dissent in this case for two reasons. The first reason is that the facts indicate that the Webers’ license was not revoked as the majority states; it was simply not renewed. In its letter to the Webers dated March 14, 1980, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) stated: "[Y]our application for [sic] solid waste disposal area license submitted September 18, 1978, is hereby denied”. The unequivocal meaning of this letter is that on receipt of this notice the Webers no longer held a license under the garbage and refuse disposal act, 1965 PA 87, MCL 325.291 et seq.; MSA 14.435 et seq. (Act 87). The majority *707notes that the Webers sought renewal of the license, the parties’ joint exhibits show that the Webers applied for renewal of the license in 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978, and Act 87 provides for renewal of disposal licenses. These facts make it inconsistent to treat the DNR’s decision not to renew the license as an attempted "revocation” of the license. Neither the DNR nor the other appellees have offered a satisfactory reason why this letter should not be given its intended effect, i.e., refusal to renew the license.
The majority suggests that the letter should not be given its intended effect because the Webers were denied procedural due process. The majority relies on Rogers v State Board of Cosmetology, 68 Mich App 751; 244 NW2d 20 (1976), lv den 397 Mich 849 (1976). However, the case must be distinguished. The facts of Rogers indicate that the Court was dealing with the revocation of a license, not renewal of a license as in this case. Because we are dealing with a renewal, it is my opinion that the less stringent due process standard announced in Bundo v Walled Lake, 395 Mich 679; 238 NW2d 154 (1976), applies. I am satisfied that the requirements of Bundo have been met. Therefore, the license was not renewed and the Webers no longer held a license.
This brings me to my second and perhaps more important disagreement with the majority. Because the license under Act 87 was not renewed, the Webers were thus required to comply with the Solid Waste Management Act, 1978 PA 641, MCL 299.401 et seq.; MSA 13.29(1) et seq. (Act 641), which replaced Act 87. The Webers and the DNR had to comply with the construction permit provisions of Act 641, including the important public hearing subsections which provide the public with *708an opportunity to voice its views on the proposed landfill.
The majority does not feel the construction permit provisions apply because the Webers held an approved license under Act 87 and thus fell within the compliance timetable provisions of Act 641. MCL 299.414(2); MSA 13.29(14X2) and 1982 AACS, R 299.4302(1). These provisions permit licensing of existing landfills without the proceedings required for granting construction permits to new landfills. However, it is clear that the Legislature only intended to exempt previously constructed landfills from the permit application provisions. The parties agree that no construction of the landfill has begun and no waste has been received on the property. Furthermore, 1982 AACS, R 299.4104(c) defines a new facility, inter alia, as one "proposed for construction” and requires that a construction permit be obtained. Merely holding a license under Act 87 which was not renewed does not create an existing landfill under Act 641. The legislative and administrative schemes set out in Act 641 and the rules promulgated pursuant to Act 641 give no indication that an unconstructed future landfill should avoid the public notice and hearing requirements of the construction permit process. The Webers’ proposed but unconstructed site does not qualify as an existing landfill, and they must thus comply with the construction permit provisions of Act 641.
For the above reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion.