Court Opinion

ID: 9638245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:38:40.985266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:05.152879
License: Public Domain

CHASE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
When it is so clear as it is upon this record that the appellant never presented himself for induction but only for debate, the time he chose in the morning to do that and to state anew his conditions upon service seem to me utterly beside the point on this appeal. That being so, whether that choice of time was wholly his own or to some extent controlled by the conduct of his mother that morning was immaterial and so treated on the trial as I shall try to demonstrate. With all deference, I must say that the mandate of 28 U.S.C.A. § 391 has been ignored by making the flimsiest of technical errors, if errors they were at all, bear the burden of relieving a stubbornly guilty man, at least temporarily, of the consequences of his guilt; and of putting the government to much unwarranted trouble, delay and expense.
The appellant did testify in complete refutation of what were made the decisive facts proved on trial by the evidence against him and submitted as such to the jury. His real trouble is not trial error but his inability to make the jury believe his testimony. I quote what he testified he said to Miss Mathews who was the clerk in charge at the headquarters of the local draft board when he got there belatedly that morning in response to the notice to report. “ * * * —I told her that I had put all my affairs in order with the priest and everything, and I had no more objections, as long as it would not be all right with the Army authorities, that I am willing to go in with the rest of the American boys without any objections whatsoever. So, the idea was then, she says to me, if I still thought the same way as I did previously as to going overseas to kill people, sir; and I told her, I says I still thought that way, but I would be willing to forget the whole thing, because there is just more than the private man’s opinion involved now; it is the matter of safeguarding the country. And I said, ‘I am willing to go without any objections.’ Then she told me I should come back that night, sir, and consult with the F. B. I. She told me that evening the F. B. I. Agent would be at the Draft Board to consult with me on my problem previous to my induction into the Army.
“Q. Did you tell her that morning that you could not fight against the Axis Powers? A. No, sir, I did not.
“Q. Did she say anything to you about going over to the induction center that morning? A. She told me it would be no use for me to go to the induction center. She said I should wait before my induction, to talk to the F. B. I.”
*423Miss Mathews denied on redirect examination that she ever mentioned the F. B. I. to the appellant and on her direct examination she had already testified as follows as to what occurred when the appellant appeared at the local draft board on the morning in question; that of November 24, 1942.
“Q. Did you have a talk with the defendant? A. Yes, sir, I did.
“Q. Can you recall exactly, or if you cannot recall the exact words, in substance what was the talk you had with the defendant? A. Well, I naturally asked him would he go down for induction, and he said, ‘No.’ I asked him why. He said he still was under the opinion that he has expressed to the Local Board in a previous hearing — that he would not fight against Germany, Italy and Japan. He figured that the United States has stabbed Italy and Japan in the back and he definitely refused to serve.
“Q. Miss Mathews, that is the conversation that took place at 10:30 a. m. ? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did he tell you that he was ready for induction? A. No, sir, he did not.
“Q. You are certain of that? A. I am positive.
“Q. Did you advise the young man to come in later, in the evening, and have a talk with the local appeal agent? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Were you present that evening when the defendant came to the Draft Board? A. Yes, sir, I was. * * *
“Q. Has he at any time since November 24, 1942, presented himself to the Draft Board for the purpose of being inducted into the United States Army? A. No, sir, he has not.
Immediately thereafter her cross examination began as follows:
“Q. Miss Mathews, on the morning that this young man came to the Draft Board for induction, had all the other boys gone over? A. Yes, sir, they had.
“Q. Well, is it customary, is it usual for some of the boys to go late and you send them over afterwards ? A. They have been, but they have all been willing to serve.
“Q. I did not ask you that. I asked you solely is it a custom in your Board, if a boy is late, that you send him over to Grand Central, anyway, by himself? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You had done that on previous occasions? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You did not do that on this occasion, did you? A. I could not send a man if he refused.”
Miss Mathews was corroborated to a large extent by the circumstances shown and by other witnesses and the appellant was correspondingly discredited. The decisive facts having been well proved beyond a reasonable doubt were clearly submitted to the jury as such in the judge’s charge. In that charge appellant’s tardiness in appearing that morning was given no emphasis. The charge began with a broad statement of the issue as follows: “I shall not deliver a long charge, because the issue of fact, the fundamental, critical issue of fact in the case, is very simple. The question is whether this defendant, having received a notice from the Local Draft Board acting pursuant to the Selective Training and Service Act, to report for induction * *' * unlawfully, willfully and knowingly failed and neglected to report for such induction at the time and place fixed in said notice.”
The court then charged the jury as to the applicable law in its relation to the evidence and only once mentioned the undisputed fact that the appellant did not appear on time that morning. Then he did so only to point out that when “he did appear some time' later” he testified that he did not refuse to be inducted and the chief clerk testified that he did refuse. There was not the slightest intimation that the time of day when he refused to serve or didn’t so refuse was of any consequence. And to leave no doubt-that the real issue of fact he was submitting to the jury was not one of promptness in reporting on the hour for induction but of refusing to report for that purpose at all, the very last words of the judge to them were— “The issue is therefore very simple. That is, in sum, the proof of the Government on the question of failure to report on the day in question for induction and his state of mind at the time when he did report at ten o’clock or thereabouts.
“On the other hand, he says that he did not refuse to be inducted. Well, it is for you to determine where the truth lies.”
This, of course, was but a reflection of the real issue of fact which the record *424otherwise shows had been made crystal clear to the jury.
And with that so plain, why it can be thought that the exclusion of appellant’s trial excuses for being late could have made any difference in the verdict is simply beyond my comprehension. If the jury believed, as it certainly did and as the evidence abundantly proved, that this man refused to be inducted in accordance with the law, of course that refusal was deliberate — the result of much time for consideration — and was therefore willful. If it can be thought that his tardiness was additional evidence of his willful flouting of the law and of its administration that much at most merely brought more coals to Newcastle. To show that so much was excusable would have left the remainder as adequately black as before. It was to prevent reversals merely for technicalities not affecting any substantial right of a party that § 391 of Title 28 U.S.C.A. was enacted and that statute is but one sufficient reason why this judgment should be affirmed.