Court Opinion

ID: 9602361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:53:33.253887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:02.905962
License: Public Domain

Bell, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur in all of Divisions 1 and 3 of the opinion of the court, but I respectfully dissent as to Division 2 and the judgment.
In Division 2 the majority of this court addresses the appellant’s contention that “[i]t was error to permit the appellee to testify over timely objection and motion in limine, as to the amount of money the appellant was paying her as alimony and child support pursuant to a temporary order . . . , which payment was an increase over the amount of the order the appellee was attempting to modify.”
In answer to that contention, the majority holds as follows: “[T]he payments pursuant to the temporary order were not a part of the appellee’s income at the time the counterclaim for an increase in permanent alimony was filed, and represent only the court’s opinion as to her temporary needs — which is prejudicial to the jury’s determination of her permanent alimony needs. This was reversible error, requiring a new trial.” Id. at 367.
I disagree with the foregoing holding, because it conflicts with an existing decision of this court. Clifton v. Clifton, 249 Ga. 831 (1) (294 SE2d 518) (1982). In Clifton, id. at 832, a jury trial was held to determine the amount, if any, of alimony and child support to be awarded to the wife. On appeal, the husband alleged that “the trial court erred in allowing the wife to introduce evidence of temporary alimony pay*369ments made by the husband.” Id. at 831. The husband argued that “the fact he was making temporary alimony payments implie[d] to the jury that the wife [was] entitled to permanent alimony.” Id. at 832.
After noting that only the amount of the payments, and not the fact of the temporary alimony award, had been presented to the jury, this court held that evidence of the amount of temporary alimony payments “was properly introduced to provide the jury with evidence of the husband’s assets and earnings to aid it in determining the amount of alimony to be awarded.” Id.
Here, the following testimony is at issue:
“Q. All right. What does your total income from all sources consist of at this time?
“A. About $1400 a month from my salary.
“Q. Take-home pay?
“A. Yes. And six hundred dollars a month in — $475 a month for child support and $125 a month in alimony.”
As this testimony shows, the jury was not told that appellee had received a temporary increase in support — only the amount of the temporary award was testified to by the appellee. I would therefore hold that the appellee’s testimony was proper under the rule of Clifton, supra, 249 Ga.
Knox v. Knox, 139 Ga. 480 (3) (77 SE 628) (1913), which is relied upon by the appellant and cited in the majority opinion, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Knox this court held that, by virtue of an instruction to the jury informing the jury that the court had granted temporary alimony and attorney fees, the trial court imper-missibly informed the jury what view it took of the question whether the wife was entitled to any alimony. Id.
In the present case, the fact that the court had awarded temporary support in an amount in excess of the existing amount of permanent support was not expressly disclosed to the jury. Although the jury could have inferred that the increase in support was due to a temporary order, such an inference was not inevitable. The jurors may have inferred, for example, that the parties had privately agreed to a temporary increase in support in order to avoid the expense of attending a temporary hearing and obtaining a court order. At any rate, inasmuch as appellee’s testimony did not constitute an express disclosure of the existence of a court-imposed temporary increase in support payments, the jurors’ determination of appellee’s permanent needs was not prejudiced by any intimation of the court’s opinion as to appellee’s needs.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the appellee’s testimony was admissible, and I would affirm the judgment.
*370Decided January 7, 1986 —
Reconsideration denied January 28, 1986.
Dailey & Groover, Lewis M. Groover, Jr., for appellant.
Jones, Ludwick & Malone, Taylor W. Jones, Kathleen V. Duf-field, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Weltner joins in this dissent.