Court Opinion

ID: 9681045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:43:04.763701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.961109
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
In my view, the record disclosed no abuse of discretion, but, rather, indicates substantial support for the trial court’s action.
The majority opinion, in this kind of situation, would seek to bind trial judges with a set of formal rules akin to those imposed by a Jackson-Denno hearing.1 This is not the meaning of the Texas cases, Gray v. State, 99 Tex.Crim. 305, 268 S.W.2d 941 (1924) and Moore v. State, 535 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), relied upon by the majority. Those cases discuss the standard which the trial court must meet when it permits a defendant to appear handcuffed before a jury. They hold there must appear a clear demonstration of the reasons by the court for such action. Thus, our duty in the appellate review becomes simply to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion after a thorough study of the entire record.
The trial judge here was the same one who heard evidence about the attempted escape from the Atascosa County jail. He was the same judge who ordered the removal of appellant and his co-defendant brother to the Corpus Christi jail for security reasons after an evidentiary hearing. The evidence showed that appellant had made threats of violence and of escape, that two attempts had been made while appellant and his brother were in that jail to dig out through the wall of the 10-man cell where they were confined; that “homemade” and factory made knives and weapons were confiscated from that same cell, and one of the knives was located under appellant’s mattress in his bunk; that an informant advised the Sheriff of Atascosa County of the Gammage brothers’ plans to escape and threats of violence. This was the trial judge who removed the case to another county on a motion for change of venue. At the hearing to determine whether to permit the restraint of appellant and his co-defendant before the jury, the Sheriff of *318Karnes County indicated he and his deputies were apprehensive concerning security in the courtroom. He requested the use of legirons as well as handcuffs and stated that he would position other deputies at the exits and about the courtroom. He expressed concern for the safety of the occupants of the courtroom. In his ruling the trial judge stated,
“Now, and, here again to both defendants, the Court is trying to be as fair as it knows how to be, and the Court is directing the Sheriff, and I will ask that you be allowed to wear civilian clothes with a coat to lessen any damage that is necessary, but the Court feels like that based upon the record in this cause, both in .Atascosa County and in Karnes County, and as already a matter of record, and the nature of the charges, that the Court will direct that both Defendants, that the Sheriff will be allowed to keep handcuffs on them, but all other restraints will be removed ....
... I will ask that when the jury is— when the jury is recessed that the Defendants remain until the jury retires to the jury room and then they will be brought in here for the use of the restroom, or whatever, conference, or otherwise. That the officers be directed to have as little contact with the witnesses or jurors as possible during the progress of this trial.”
All courts agree that no justification need be shown by a sheriff for shackling a prisoner between the jail and the courtroom, for this is an accepted security measure. Moore, supra, at 358. However, when the jury sees the defendant in handcuffs in the courtroom, “the harm that a defendant suffers is that his constitutional presumption of innocence is thereby infringed.” Moore, supra, at 358. This is not to say that the procedure may never be practiced.
It becomes necessary to distinguish Moore, supra. In the instant case the venue hearing, the escape attempt hearing, and, finally, the hearing to determine whether to permit the procedure, all produced reasons suggesting precautionary measures be taken. In Moore there was no hearing of any kind, and no reasons ever shown in the record for the extraordinary procedure of displaying the defendant before the jury in handcuffs. Further, when objections were made in that case, they were coupled with a motion to dismiss the panel and draw another panel.
In Gray, supra, 268 S.W.2d at 950, it is written:
“. .. it is only when the record brings the case clearly within one of the rare exceptions that we would consent for a conviction to stand. Before a judge should permit a case to proceed under such circumstances, he should be very sure of his ground.”
Not surprisingly, two of the “rare exceptions” noted in Gray, supra, 268 S.W.2d at 949 are “to prevent escape ..., or to prevent him from injuring bystanders or officers of the court .... ” Presumably only one of these reasons will suffice.
In another case upon which the majority opinion relies to hold there has been an abuse of discretion in the instant case, Walthall v. State, 505 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Crim.App.1974), the sheriff brought that defendant into the courtroom manacled in full view of the jury which was to try him. But the distinguishing feature of Walthall is the sheriff there testified that the defendant had never given him any trouble and had never attempted to escape from him, and the record failed to show that the sheriff feared the defendant would harm himself or another. How different from the instant case.
Whether we agree with the testimony of the Sheriff of Atascosa County and the Sheriff of Karnes County, or whether we believe the Sheriff of Karnes County “overreacted” in stating the need for security, is not the question before this court. The only question is whether the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the trial to proceed with the appellant handcuffed before the jury. The trial court is the domain of the trial judge, and a ruling of abuse of discretion by this court is, and should be, rare.
*319Finally, the acquittal of appellant’s co-defendant also charged with attempted capital murder, and also handcuffed before the jury, cannot be dismissed lightly. The record amply and affirmatively reflects sufficient reasons for the appellant to be viewed by the jurors in handcuffs and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting such action.
Therefore, I dissent, and would affirm the judgment.

. A determination by the trial judge of the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession prior to its admission in evidence is a constitutional and statutory requirement, and such determination must distinctly appear in the record. McKittrick v. State, 535 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 593 (1964).
See Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 38.22(6) (Vernon 1977) provides, in part:
... If the statement has been found to have been voluntarily made and held admissible as a matter of law and fact by the court in a hearing in the absence of the jury, the court must enter an order stating its conclusion as to whether or not the statement was voluntarily made, along with the specific finding of facts upon which the conclusion was based, which order shall be filed among the papers of the cause ....