Court Opinion

ID: 9792070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:22:37.405633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.437522
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
On rehearing, the court adheres to the opinion heretofore filed herein on August 11, 1960, and to the remand to the Washington State Bar Association for further investigation and action; withdrawing, however, any suggestion relative to a vacation of the order for admission to practice. We have decided to adopt the suggestion of the amici curiae (the Honorable John J. O’Connell, Attorney General of the State of Washington, and the Honorable George Neff Stevens, Dean of the University of Washington Law School) that we amplify and clarify our remand relative to the procedures- to be followed.
The charges against Mr. Arthur Eber Sherman, Jr., and the facts in relation thereto are adequately stated in *8the opinion filed on August 11, 1960, to 'which we adhere, and. will not be repeated. We do, however, think it timely to state specifically what we have heretofore implied but not clearly articulated, ie., that a disciplinary proceeding is a special proceeding, neither civil nor criminal, incident to the inherent power of the court to control its officers and is sui generis.
- We have, concededly, had some difficulty in describing the exact nature of such proceedings, but have pointed out that they present “problems which are without completé analogy in the consideration of other legal proceedings.” In re Little (1952), 40 Wn. (2d) 421, 430, 244 P. (2d) 255.
 A disciplinary proceeding is on each occasion an inquiry into the fitness of a member of the bar, in the light of his conduct, or condition, to continue in the practice of the law. Decisions in disciplinary matters are not precedents for any other class of cases. Such a proceeding is conducted through the agency of the Washington State Bar Association in accordance with the State Bar Act (Laws of 1933, chapter 94; RCW, chapter 2.48) and the rules adopted by this court.
The expense of all investigations leading to the institution of such proceedings and of the proceedings themselves is carried by the Washington State Bar Association. The court is most appreciative of this and of íhé time and effort of individual members of the bar (as members of the Board of Governors, of local administrative committees, and of trial committees) in maintaining the high ethical standards of the profession; but we are painfully conscious that upon this court alone rests the duty and the grave responsibility of adjudging whether or not there has been professional misconduct and of taking the appropriate disciplinary action. Burns v. Clayton (1960), 237 S. C. 316, 117 S. E. (2d) 300. The proceeding in this court is not in the nature of an appellate review, as that term is generally understood. The responsibility of decision, in situations where the interests of both the public and the attorney (charged with misconduct) are concerned, being ours, we *9would be remiss if we did not insist that the record before us be amplified by the exploration of any facet of the case which might have a bearing on the ultimate determination. In the present case, the mental competency of Mr. Sherman seems to this court both relevant and material.
We approve of and adopt the recommendation of amici curiae: that a determination be made in accordance with Rule for Discipline of Attorneys 7 K (2) (effective January 2,1961) as to whether Mr. Sherman is mentally capable of conducting a proper defense at this time. If he is not, then further proceedings are to be in accordance with Rule 7 K.
If he insists that he is presently mentally competent, in spite of a defense of mental incompetence at the time of the conduct complained of, and the panel conducting the hearing does not have reasonable cause to believe that Mr. Sherman is of unsound mind to the extent that he is incapable of conducting a proper defense to the formal complaint against him, then neither Rule 7 K nor any other provision of the present Rules for Discipline of Attorneys is applicable.
Likewise, at the suggestion of amici curiae and for the guidance of the panel hearing this matter and also the Board of Governors, we indicate our present acceptance of the following propositions:
A. Mental irresponsibility is a complete defense to conduct of an attorney which would otherwise warrant disciplinary action: (1) if such conduct was the result or the consequence of mental incompetency; and (2) if the mental condition which was responsible for such conduct has been cured so completely that there is little or no likelihood of a recurrence of the condition. The burden of proof of this defense, in all of its aspects, is upon the respondent attorney.1
*10B. If the respondent attorney is able to carry the burden of proof as to his mental irresponsibility at the time of the conduct of which complaint is made, but is unable to prove recovery to the extent indicated in “A” and the court has reason to believe that such recovery is possible, he will be suspended until such time as he can prove such recovery— otherwise, he shall be disbarred.2
With the foregoing amplification and clarification, this matter is remanded to the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar Association for further investigation and action.

In support of this rule see: In re Durham (1952), 41 Wn. (2d.) 609, 251 P. (2d) 169; Cane v. State Bar of California (1939), 14 Cal. (2d) 597, 95 P. (2d) 934; In re Breding (1933), 188 Minn. 367, 247 N. W. 694; In re Manahan (1932), 186 Minn. 98, 242 N. W. 548; In re Freedman (1959), 7 App. Div. (2d) 447, 184 N. Y. S. (2d) 199; In re Gould (1957), 4 App. Div. (2d) 174, 164 N. Y. S. (2d) 48; In re Creamer (1954), 201 Ore. 343, 270 P. (2d) 159; Theard v. United States (1957) 354 U. S. 278.

In support of this rule see: In re Durham, supra (note 1); In re Chmelik (1938), 203 Minn. 156, 280 N. W. 283; In re Breding, supra (note 1); In re Freedman, supra (note 1); In re Dubinsky (1938), 256 App. Div. 102, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 387; In re Creamer, supra (note 1).