Court Opinion

ID: 9412824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 18:01:38.722939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:35.505596
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10360   Document: 00516841273     Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/01/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                            ____________ FILED
                                                                  August 1, 2023
                             No. 22-10360                         Lyle W. Cayce
                            ____________                               Clerk

   Otis Crandel, as dependent administrator of, and on behalf of Billy
   Wayne Worl, Jr., Emily Garcia, James Matthew Garcia,
   and Jared Andrew Garcia, individually, the Estate of Brenda
   Kaye Worl, and Brenda Kaye Worl’s heirs-at-law; Billy
   Wayne Worl, Jr., Individually,

                                                     Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                 versus

   Dalena Hall; Cari Renea McGowen,

                                                 Defendants—Appellees,

                         consolidated with
                           _____________

                             No. 22-10361
                           _____________

   Otis Crandel, as dependent administrator of, and on behalf of Billy
   Wayne Worl, Jr., Emily Garcia, James Matthew Garcia,
   and Jared Andrew Garcia, individually, the Estate of Brenda
   Kaye Worl, and Brenda Kaye Worl’s heirs-at-law; Billy
   Wayne Worl, Jr., Individually,

                                                     Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                 versus
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   Vegas Hastings; Daniel Piper,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                      USDC Nos. 1:21-CV-75, 1:21-CV-75
                   ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, Circuit Judge:
          This opinion is rendered contemporaneously with the opinion for the
   appeal in 22-50102, Edmiston v. Borrego. The two opinions concern the
   suicide by two pretrial detainees in two Texas jails and, inter alia, failure-to-
   protect claims. Moreover, the same counsel for plaintiffs appear in each
   appeal.
          For the challenge at hand to four defendants’ being awarded summary
   judgment based on qualified immunity, primarily at issue is whether they
   possessed subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide by detainee
   Brenda Kaye Worl. The two jailer-defendants and two officer-defendants
   filed two separate summary-judgment motions; and the resulting two
   contested judgments were entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 54(b) (“[T]he court may direct entry of final judgment as to one
   or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly
   determines that there is no just reason for delay”.).
          This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of Worl’s death while
   in pretrial detention in the Callahan County, Texas, Jail. Plaintiffs’ challenge
   to the adverse summary judgments includes contesting evidentiary rulings.
   Plaintiffs fail to show the requisite genuine dispute of material fact for
   whether the four defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
   suicide; therefore, they fail to show a constitutional violation. And, even if

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   the court abused its discretion in sustaining defendants’ evidentiary
   objections, any error was harmless.         Accordingly, the two summary
   judgments based on qualified immunity are proper. Therefore, the two Rule
   54(b) judgments are AFFIRMED.
                                          I.
          Plaintiffs assert claims against Dalena Hall, Cari Renea McGowen,
   Officer Vegas Hastings, and Officer Daniel Piper for failing to protect Worl,
   in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (The claims against these four
   defendants for bystander liability were also dismissed based on qualified
   immunity.)
          Plaintiffs also claim under § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social
   Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that the jail-suicide-
   prevention policies of Callahan County and City of Clyde, Texas, caused a
   violation of Worl’s constitutional rights. Those claims are not at issue in
   these two consolidated appeals.
                                         A.
          The following recitation of facts is, unless otherwise noted, based on
   the summary-judgment record, including, inter alia:           party affidavits,
   depositions, reports, the Officers’ body-cam videos, and jail-surveillance
   video. Along that line, to the extent minor differences exist between the
   affidavits and depositions, the latter controls. E.g., S.W.S. Erectors v. Infax,
   Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1996). Additionally, we give weight to the
   extensive videos from the Officers’ body-cameras and the jail-surveillance
   cameras. These provide compelling summary-judgment evidence regarding
   the four defendants’ interactions with Worl.
          At 10:13 p.m. on 2 April 2019, Callahan County dispatch received a
   911 call from Worl, charging domestic abuse by her husband. Hall, a jailer-

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   dispatcher with the Callahan County Jail, received the call and dispatched
   Clyde, Texas, Police Officers Hastings and Piper (the Officers). (As shown
   in the Officers’ body-cam videos, two other unidentified officers were also at
   the Worls’ home that night. These two officers are not parties in this action.)
           The Officers arrived at the scene at 10:17 p.m., and Worl and her
   husband, Billy Worl, spoke with them. It appeared to the Officers that the
   incident involved conduct by both parties. Billy Worl stated, as documented
   in Officer Hastings’ report, and as recorded in his body-cam video, that the
   couple had “drank a couple boxes of wine”; and the Officers noted he
   smelled of alcohol and Worl appeared to be intoxicated.
           Due to jail-capacity concerns—there was only room for one of the
   Worls—the Officers arrested Worl for assault, partially due to her behavior
   at the scene after they arrived and because she had two prior arrests for
   assault. Officer Hastings transported Worl to the jail for booking; Officer
   Piper followed to observe.
           After arriving at the jail a few minutes after 11:00 p.m., one of Worl’s
   hands slipped out of her handcuffs as she waited to be booked. Instead of
   securing her hand, McGowen, also a jailer-dispatcher with the jail, removed
   the handcuffs. Officer Hastings then escorted Worl to the booking area,
   where Hall attempted to begin the booking process.
           Worl was uncooperative and refused to answer questions, including
   those     for   the    jail’s   “Screening         Form   for       Suicide   and
   Medical/Mental/Developmental          Impairments”.       Officer     Piper   and
   McGowen assisted Hall and Officer Hastings.
           After the four defendants attempted to persuade Worl to comply, it
   was decided that it would be best to allow Worl to calm-down before
   continuing. McGowen conducted a pat-down of Worl, confiscating her coat,
   shoes, and an eyeglass lens she had felt in Worl’s coat pocket. McGowen

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   then, in the presence of Officer Hastings, asked Worl whether she had ever
   attempted suicide; in response, she presented her arms and said, “I don’t
   know. Have I?”.
          McGowen, with Officer Hastings “observ[ing] from the adjacent
   hallway”, then placed Worl in the jail’s visitation room at 11:33 p.m.
   McGowen, in her affidavit, explained: because Worl was “brought in on an
   assault charge and because of her behavior”, “it was not safe to place [her]
   in a cell with another inmate”; and, because the jail was then at full capacity,
   Worl was placed in the visitation room. In her deposition, McGowen
   expanded on this, explaining that Worl was placed in the visitation room so
   “she wouldn’t be out in the open just to run around”; and that she could not
   be placed in a cell with another inmate because “[s]he might be combative
   with the other inmate”.
          The visitation room is a small area used to permit detainees to
   converse with visitors who sit outside the room in the hallway, on the other
   side of the two observation windows. Detainees speak with visitors through
   telephones mounted on the room’s wall. The room includes a bench, two
   small tabletops, and two mounted telephones—one of the telephone’s cords
   appears longer than the other.
          Worl was not observed constantly. At 11:45 p.m., 12 minutes after she
   was placed in the visitation room, Hall checked on Worl through a viewing
   window and observed her crying as she sat on the visitation-room bench.
   Two minutes later, at 11:47 p.m., McGowen checked on Worl. From the
   viewing window, McGowen could see only the top of Worl’s head.
   McGowen returned to the dispatch office to retrieve a key to the room. Once
   she entered it, she discovered Worl on the floor with her head facing down.
   McGowen “gently lifted [Worl’s] head back” and discovered one of the
   telephone cords wrapped around her neck. She removed the cord.

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            McGowen then yelled for Hall to contact emergency medical services
   (EMS). Hall paged EMS at 11:48 p.m. and the Callahan County Sheriff at
   11:52 p.m. Officers Hastings and Piper performed CPR on Worl until EMS
   arrived at 12:00 a.m. EMS obtained a pulse and transported Worl to the
   hospital, where she was placed on life support. She died the next day (4 April
   2019).
                                          B.
            This action was filed in March 2021. Defendants’ two summary-
   judgment motions (one for the two jailers, the other for the two Officers),
   based on qualified immunity, were granted in March 2022. In doing so, the
   district court sustained objections to plaintiffs’ summary-judgment evidence.
            In granting summary judgment, the district court concluded: “there
   [was] no evidence before the Court, beyond speculative evidence, to raise a
   genuine issue of material fact as to whether [defendants] appreciated that
   Worl was a suicide risk or that the phone cord would likely be an instrument
   of suicide”; and that Worl was “intoxicated, belligerent, uncooperative, and
   refused to answer questions related to mental health and suicide risk” was
   insufficient to make defendants subjectively aware of a substantial risk of self-
   harm.
            The court ruled defendants’ objections regarding, inter alia,
   authentication and hearsay, were meritorious. In the alternative, even if it
   considered the exhibits, they did not “raise a genuine issue of material fact as
   to deliberate indifference” by defendants.
            A summary-judgment order and a Rule 54(b) judgment were entered
   in March 2022 for each of the two motions in favor of the two jailers and two
   officers in their individual capacities. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). (The
   court’s summary-judgment orders did not address plaintiffs’ bystander
   claims, but the claims were dismissed in the court’s 54(b) judgments,

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   providing that “Plaintiffs’ claims asserted against [defendants] in their
   individual capacit[ies] are” dismissed.)
                                          II.
          Primarily at issue in this appeal are the failure-to-protect claims
   against jailer-dispatchers Hall and McGowen and Officers Hastings and
   Piper (defendants).     Following addressing that issue, we turn to their
   sustained objections to plaintiffs’ summary-judgment evidence.
                                          A.
          Pursuant to the two-part test, discussed infra, plaintiffs generally
   claim genuine disputes of material fact exist for whether the jailers and
   Officers: subjectively knew Worl was at substantial risk of serious self-harm;
   and failed to appreciate the risk by knowingly placing unsupervised Worl in
   the visitation room containing a telephone cord, a commonly known obvious
   ligature. Because they fail to show genuine disputes of material fact regarding
   defendants’ subjective knowledge of Worl’s substantial risk of suicide,
   defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the failure-to-protect claim.
          It follows that, because the failure-to-protect claims fail, no violation
   exists for bystander claims against the jailers and Officers. See Joseph ex rel.
   Est of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 343 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting bystander
   liability requires, inter alia, that officer “knew a fellow officer was violating
   an individual’s constitutional right”). Therefore, we address only the
   failure-to-protect claims.
          A summary judgment is reviewed de novo. E.g., Estate of Henson v.
   Wichita Cnty., 795 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is
   proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
   material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”. FED.
   R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is

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   such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”.
   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
          Ordinarily, our court “must view the evidence in the light most
   favorable to the party resisting the motion”. Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701
   F.2d 397, 407 (5th Cir. 1983). When, however, defendants, as in this
   instance, assert qualified immunity, the burden of proof shifts to plaintiffs to
   “rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the
   official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law”. Brown
   v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).
          “Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct
   violates a clearly established [statutory or] constitutional right.” Converse v.
   City of Kemah, 961 F.3d 771, 774 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mace v. City of
   Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiffs maintain, solely for
   the purpose of preserving the issue for further review, that qualified
   immunity should be “abolished or modified so that it is inapplicable here”.
   For this appeal, we proceed with the qualified-immunity doctrine intact.
          Again, when defendants assert qualified immunity, “a plaintiff
   seeking to overcome qualified immunity must show: (1) that the official
   violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
   established at the time of the challenged conduct”. Id. (citation omitted).
   We have discretion to elect which prong of this two-prong analysis to address
   first. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
          As stated, “[t]o overcome the officials’ qualified immunity defense
   Plaintiffs must first demonstrate that each official violated [Worl’s] statutory
   or constitutional right”. Converse, 961 F.3d at 775. “[T]he Fourteenth
   Amendment protects[, inter alia,]pretrial detainees’ right to medical care and
   to ‘protection from known suicidal tendencies’”. Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d
   320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Garza v. City of Donna,

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   922 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2019)); see also Converse, 961 F.3d at 775 (“We
   have repeatedly held that pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment
   right to be protected from a known risk of suicide.” (emphasis added)).
            Where the claimed violation of that right turns, as in this instance, on
   an official’s alleged acts or omissions, the question is whether the official
   “had gained actual knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide and responded
   with deliberate indifference”. Converse, 961 F.3d at 775 (emphasis added)
   (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d, 633 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
   It is undisputed that “[d]eliberate indifference is an extremely high standard
   to meet”. Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir.
   2001).
            Accordingly, an “official will not be held liable if he merely ‘should
   have known’ of a risk”. Converse, 961 F.3d at 775 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
   511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Rather, to satisfy this high standard, plaintiffs
   must show the official: was “aware of facts from which the inference could
   be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists”; and “also [drew] the
   inference”. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). An official with such
   knowledge then “shows a deliberate indifference to that risk ‘by failing to
   take reasonable measures to abate it’”. Id. at 776 (quoting Hare, 74 F.3d at
   648).
            Plaintiffs, however, maintain this court should instead apply the
   objective-unreasonableness standard the Court adopted in Kingsley v.
   Hendrickson for claims of excessive force (not failure to protect) by officers against
   a pretrial detainee. 576 U.S. 389 (2015). But, we are bound by our rule of
   orderliness. E.g., Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir.
   2008) (“It is a well-settled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness that one panel of
   our court may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening
   change in the law, such as by statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court,

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   or our en banc court.”). This rule renders this assertion meritless. See Cope
   v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 n.7 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining Kingsley “did not
   abrogate [this court’s] deliberate-indifference precedent”), cert. denied, 142
   S. Ct. 2573 (2022); Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419
   n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Because the Fifth Circuit has continued to rely on Hare
   and to apply a subjective standard post-Kingsley, this panel is bound by our
   rule of orderliness.”).
          Regarding qualified immunity’s second prong, for a right to be
   “clearly established” it must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable
   official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right”. Est.
   of Bonilla v. Orange Cnty., 982 F.3d 298, 306 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft
   v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Critically, “[c]ourts must not ‘define
   clearly established law at a high level of generality’”; rather, we must
   undertake the inquiry “in light of the specific context of the case”. Cope, 3
   F.4th at 204 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).
          Pursuant to our above-discussed discretion to elect which of the two
   qualified-immunity prongs to consider first, we begin with the first. For the
   reasons that follow, there was no violation of a statutory or constitutional
   right. Therefore, we do not reach the second prong (whether clearly
   established).
          Again, for the first prong, and to prevail against summary judgment
   for the claimed violation at hand, plaintiffs must establish a genuine dispute
   of material fact for whether Hall, McGowen, Officer Hastings, or Officer
   Piper “(1) had subjective knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm and
   (2) responded to that risk with deliberate indifference”. Id. at 210 (citation
   omitted); Callahan, 623 F.3d at 253. In the context of detainee suicide, the
   requisite substantial risk of serious harm must be specific; plaintiffs must
   allege defendants “were aware of a substantial and significant risk that the

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   detainee might kill himself”. Cope, 3 F.4th at 207 (alteration omitted)
   (citation omitted).
            When, as here, multiple government actors are defendants and assert
   qualified immunity, we “evaluate each [actor’s conduct] separately, to the
   extent possible”. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir.
   2012).
            Because plaintiffs, for the reasons discussed infra, fail to establish
   genuine disputes of material fact regarding defendants’ subjective knowledge
   of a substantial risk of suicide, whether defendants responded with deliberate
   indifference does not come into play.
                                           1.
            For the jailers, plaintiffs generally maintain genuine disputes of
   material fact exist for their subjective knowledge of Worl’s substantial risk
   for serious self-harm, including suicide. They contend the conduct of both
   Hall and McGowen raise genuine disputes of material fact showing they
   subjectively understood the risk.
            Regarding such genuine disputes vel non, we consider whether
   anything concerning Worl led Hall or McGowen to form the requisite
   subjective knowledge of a substantial risk, specifically a risk of suicide. E.g.,
   Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Cope, 3 F.4th at 207–08 (official witnessed decedent
   attempt suicide day before incident in question); Converse, 961 F.3d at 776,
   778–79 (official was present when decedent was pulled off bridge while he
   attempted to jump and where official heard decedent express he should have
   jumped and would make another attempt to do so when released); Hyatt v.
   Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 178 (5th Cir. 2016) (even though decedent stated he
   did not want to commit suicide, official knew decedent suffered from
   depression, had recently attempted suicide, and his wife believed him to be
   suicidal).

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          Both Hall and McGowen noted Worl’s intoxication and lack of
   cooperation. That they recognized that Worl may have been intoxicated and
   observed her defiant demeanor is insufficient, however, to create a genuine
   dispute of material fact on whether they formed the requisite subjective
   knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305
   (explaining even if detainee was intoxicated, it “would not indicate [official]
   inferred she was a suicide risk”).
          Regarding the lack of mental-health screening, plaintiffs emphasize
   that the jailers’ failure to conduct the screening shows a genuine dispute of
   material fact that Worl needed to be treated as suicidal. This assertion also
   fails. Our court has acknowledged there is no independent constitutional
   right to mental-health screening. E.g., id. at 307 (quoting Taylor v. Barkes,
   575 U.S. 822, 826 (2015)) (“No decision of this Court establishes a right to
   proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols.               No
   decision of this Court even discusses suicide screening or prevention
   protocols.”). (Additionally, even if plaintiffs could assert a right to suicide
   screening, “evidence of inadequate screening . . . would not raise an issue of
   deliberate indifference without additional evidence that [the jailers] knew
   that [Worl] was in fact at risk for suicide”. Id. at 305.) Even if Worl’s refusal
   to cooperate should have alerted Hall and McGowen to a substantial risk of
   suicide, the summary-judgment record does not show a genuine dispute of
   material fact for whether they actually perceived that risk. Converse, 961 F.3d
   at 775–76.
          Absent additional, independent evidence that the jailers believed Worl
   was at risk for suicide, failure to screen does not establish a genuine dispute
   of material fact for the jailers’ subjective knowledge regarding Worl’s risk of
   suicide. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305. We turn to the conduct by each
   of the two jailers.

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                                           a.
          Hall, as dispatcher on duty, received the 911 call shortly after 10:00
   p.m. regarding a domestic disturbance between the caller, Worl, and her
   husband. She dispatched the two Officers to the Worls’ home.
          In preparation for Worl’s booking, Hall, according to her deposition,
   began entering Worl’s information into the intake system and obtained
   background information on her. This background information included a
   check through the Texas Health and Human Services Commission’s
   Continuity of Care Query (CCQ) system “to determine if Worl had
   previously received state mental healthcare or had a known intellectual or
   developmental disability”. The CCQ check came back as “no match”.
          Once Worl arrived at the jail, Hall, in her deposition, described her as
   “uncooperative and vocal” and “[a]lmost in a combative state”. She further
   explained in her deposition that, although the Officers told her Worl had been
   drinking, she did not observe anything leading her to independently believe
   Worl was intoxicated.
          Hall, in the presence of the Officers, unsuccessfully attempted to book
   Worl. Later, McGowen joined them in attempting to complete the booking
   process. Hall observed McGowen: advise Worl that, if she would not
   cooperate, she would be placed in the visitation room; and then confiscate
   items from Worl. Hall was not present when Worl was placed in the room.
          Hall, according to her affidavit, “never heard Worl make any
   statements to indicate she intended to harm herself, nor was [she] aware of
   any such statements to anyone else”; and, based on her observations, she
   “did not believe Worl was engaging in suicidal behavior or had mental health
   issues”. Plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that Worl
   did or said anything to show Hall that she was suicidal or intended to harm

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   herself or that Hall otherwise drew that inference. E.g., Converse, 961 F.3d at
   776, 778–79; Hyatt, 843 F.3d at 178.
           Because plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
   regarding Hall’s subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide, they fail
   to show a violation by Hall of Worl’s statutory or constitutional right.
   Therefore, Hall is entitled to qualified immunity.
                                           b.
           McGowen, as Hall described in her deposition, was the jail’s “acting
   supervisor” on duty on 2 April. During her shift, the Officers, via radio,
   notified her that: they had arrived at the jail; and a female, later identified as
   Worl, was being brought in. After the Officers arrived, but prior to Worl’s
   being taken to booking, “Worl advised [Officer Hastings] she slipped her
   hand out of her handcuff”. McGowen then spoke with Officer Hastings
   regarding McGowen’s removing Worl’s handcuffs as they could be used as a
   weapon. Officer Hastings then escorted Worl to booking; McGowen
   returned to the dispatch office.
           A few minutes later, as stated in her affidavit and confirmed in her
   deposition, she “heard Worl raising her voice”; went to the booking area to
   determine whether Hall needed assistance; and Hall “advised [her] that
   Worl was not complying and was refusing to be booked in or to answer any
   questions”, including the questions regarding the mental-health screening
   form.
           When Worl continued to be noncooperative, McGowen conducted a
   pat-down of Worl, confiscating her coat, shoes, and an eyeglass lens she had
   felt in Worl’s coat pocket. She instructed Worl that she would be placed in
   a holding cell (visitation room) until she could calm down and comply with
   the booking process. Prior to placing Worl in the visitation room, and in the
   presence of Officer Hastings, McGowen asked Worl if she had ever

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   attempted suicide. In response, as stated in McGowen’s deposition, Worl
   “shook her arms at [her] and said, ‘I don’t know. Have I?’”
          McGowen, in her affidavit, stated she “did not observe any injuries,
   scars or markings on Worl’s wrists or arms and took [Worl’s response] as an
   attempt by Worl to show [her] she had not attempted suicide”. McGowen
   then, with Officer Hastings, placed Worl in the visitation room at 11:33 p.m.,
   and returned to the dispatch office.
          McGowen, in her affidavit, stated that, during the time Worl was in
   the jail, she “never heard [Worl] make any statements to indicate she
   intended to harm herself, nor was [she] aware of Worl making any such
   statements to anyone else”. Pursuant to her prior training intended to assist
   her in recognizing inmates who are potentially suicidal or who may need
   mental-health assistance, and based on her observations of Worl, McGowen,
   as stated in her affidavit, “did not believe Worl was engaging in any suicidal
   behavior or had mental health issues”.
          Regarding McGowen’s questioning Worl about whether she had
   previously attempted suicide, her response was vague and insufficient to
   establish a genuine dispute of material fact for whether McGowen was
   subjectively aware of a risk of suicide. E.g., Converse, 961 F.3d at 775.
   McGowen’s actions, including her conducting a pat-down, do not create a
   genuine dispute of material fact that those actions amounted to anything
   more than general jail protocol.
          Because plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
   regarding McGowen’s subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide,
   they fail to show a violation by McGowen of Worl’s statutory or
   constitutional right. Therefore, McGowen is entitled to qualified immunity.

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                                         2.
          For the two Officers, plaintiffs generally maintain that genuine
   disputes of material fact exist regarding the Officers’ subjective knowledge
   of Worl’s substantial risk for serious self-harm, including suicide. They
   contend the conduct of Officers Hastings and Piper create genuine disputes
   of material fact for whether they subjectively understood that risk.
          As discussed supra, and regarding such genuine disputes vel non, we
   consider whether anything concerning Worl led the Officers to form the
   requisite subjective knowledge of a substantial risk, specifically a risk of
   suicide. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Cope, 3 F.4th at 207–08; Converse, 961
   F.3d at 776, 778–79; Hyatt, 843 F.3d at 178.
          Officers Hastings and Piper were dispatched to the Worls’ home in
   response to the 911 call. The Officers spoke with both Worls to determine
   the situation. When, as seen in his body-cam video, Officer Piper asked Billy
   Worl whether Worl had any history of mental health, he responded no.
   However, when questioned whether she had any “mental health disabilities,
   like bipolar”, he responded “yes, but in the past”.
          Plaintiffs claim that, instead of taking Worl to the jail, the Officers
   were required by Texas Health and Safety Code § 573.011(a)(1) to transport
   her to a mental-health-treatment facility. In doing so, plaintiffs contend the
   Officers acted with deliberate indifference; however, they fail to show
   genuine disputes of material fact regarding the Officers’ subjective
   knowledge requiring such response. They assert Officer Hastings was aware
   of the procedure and could have utilized it.
          The summary-judgment record does not show a genuine dispute of
   material fact that either Officer perceived a substantial risk of suicide. And,
   to the extent plaintiffs contend the Officers were required to take Worl into
   custody under Chapter 573, that procedure is permissive, not mandatory. See

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   TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 573.001(a) (“A peace officer, without a
   warrant, may take a person into custody . . . .” (emphasis added)).
          Regarding the lack of mental-health screening at the jail, plaintiffs
   maintain: the Officers knew the screening form had not been completed; and
   such knowledge creates a genuine dispute of material fact for whether Worl
   should have been treated as suicidal. As discussed supra, this assertion fails.
   Although our court has acknowledged there is no constitutional right to
   screening, even if Worl’s refusal to cooperate should have alerted the
   Officers to a substantial risk of suicide, the summary-judgment record does
   not create a genuine dispute of material fact they perceived that risk. E.g.,
   Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 307 (quoting Taylor, 575 U.S. at 826); Converse,
   961 F.3d at 775–76.
          Absent evidence that the Officers formed the opinion that Worl was
   at a risk for suicide, knowledge that she was not screened does not establish
   a genuine dispute of material fact for the Officers’ subjective knowledge
   regarding Worl’s risk of suicide. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305. We
   turn to the conduct by each of the two Officers.
                                         a.
          Officer Hastings, the arresting officer that night, explained in his
   deposition that he formed the opinion Worl was intoxicated because he was
   told she and her husband had consumed two boxes of wine. After arresting
   Worl, Officer Hastings transported her in his patrol vehicle.
          Upon arriving at the jail, as shown in Officer Hastings’ body-cam
   video, Worl told him she was “happy to be [t]here”, and she thanked him for
   getting her out of the situation at her home. He escorted her to the booking
   area, where she was, as he described in his deposition, “irritated” when
   asked questions; he was unsuccessful in attempting to calm her down.

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          When they failed to complete the booking process, McGowen placed
   Worl in the visitation room while Officer Hastings observed. The Officer
   stated in his deposition that he did not recall McGowen’s confiscating items
   from Worl, but conceded it is standard practice to do so because detainees
   can harm themselves with certain items. He further recounted Worl’s
   presenting her arms to him and McGowen in response to being asked
   whether she had previously attempted suicide, but noted that he did not see
   any scars and that it wasn’t clear why she was presenting her arms.
          Officer Hastings’ forming the opinion that Worl was intoxicated and
   uncooperative does not create a genuine dispute of material fact for whether
   he formed the required subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide.
   E.g., id. at 305. Evidence does not show Worl did, or said, anything explicitly
   or implicitly to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that Officer
   Hastings drew the inference she was a substantial risk of suicide.
          Because plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
   regarding Officer Hastings’ subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
   suicide, they fail to show a violation by Officer Hastings of Worl’s statutory
   or constitutional right. Therefore, Officer Hastings is entitled to qualified
   immunity.
                                          b.
          Officer Piper, the assisting officer on the scene that night, described
   in his deposition Worl’s state at her home as “belligerent” and “[n]ot
   responding to [the Officers], yelling, and screaming, not wanting to give [the
   Officers] what she needed to tell [them], arguing with other officers”. (As
   noted, two unidentified officers were also there.) In his deposition, he further
   explained that, although Worl was argumentative, he did not believe she was
   combative in a physical sense. He believed she was intoxicated and stated he
   could smell alcohol. He also stated in his deposition that Worl said, “she was

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   too drunk”; and he agreed that an intoxicated individual may not act
   rationally.
          Although not referenced by either party, our review of the summary-
   judgment record, specifically the body-cam videos, revealed that, upon the
   Officers’ arriving at the Worls’ home, Worl stated in Officer Piper’s
   presence: “I don’t care if I die tonight” and “I’m tired of this”. Worl was
   turned away from Officer Piper when she made these statements.
          Despite her statement’s being muffled, it is well established that video
   recordings are given a presumption of reliability and significant evidentiary
   weight because “[a]n electronic recording will many times produce a more
   reliable rendition . . . than will the unaided memory of a police agent”. United
   States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971). Accordingly, where testimony
   conflicts with video evidence, our court must view the “facts in the light
   depicted by the videotape”. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007); see
   also United States v. Vickers, 442 F. App’x 79, 86, 87 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2011).
          Even assuming Officer Piper heard these statements, it does not alter
   our analysis. The statements fail to create a genuine dispute of material fact
   that Officer Piper had actual knowledge of a risk of suicide or was “aware of
   facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
   serious harm exist[ed]” and that he “also [drew] the inference”. E.g.,
   Converse, 961 F.3d at 775. Worl made these statements when the Officers
   first arrived at the Worls’ home, at a time when Worl was not aware that she
   was going to be taken to jail. Considered in context, Worl’s statements and
   tone appear to be directed at her frustration with her very distressing living
   situation. Moreover, that plaintiffs do not mention this interaction suggests
   they do not believe it is evidence regarding suicide propensity.
          At the jail, Officer Piper assisted in attempting to book Worl; and he
   remembered talking to her to explain that, if she was noncompliant, they

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   would have to wait for her to become sober before she could be processed.
   He did not assist in placing Worl in the visitation room.
          Although Officer Piper conceded in his deposition that he formed the
   opinion Worl was intoxicated, and he agreed that an intoxicated individual
   may not act rationally, this is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of
   material fact that the Officer formed the requisite subjective knowledge of a
   substantial risk of suicide. Likewise, his observing her noncompliance does
   not create genuine disputes of material fact. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at
   305. The summary-judgment record does not show Worl did, or said,
   anything explicitly or implicitly to create a genuine dispute of material fact
   that Officer Piper drew the inference she was a substantial risk of suicide.
          Because plaintiffs fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
   regarding Officer Piper’s subjective knowledge of a risk of suicide, they fail
   to show a violation by Officer Piper of Worl’s statutory or constitutional
   right. Therefore, Officer Piper is entitled to qualified immunity.
                                         B.
          In their responses in opposition to the two summary-judgment
   motions, plaintiffs attached exhibits for the summary-judgment record. In
   reply, defendants objected, albeit briefly, to many of those exhibits. In each
   of its two summary-judgment orders, the court in a brief note sustained the
   objections, ruling they were meritorious.
          Preserved challenges to evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of
   discretion. E.g., Caparotta v. Entergy Corp., 168 F.3d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1999).
   “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous
   view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”
   Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Axon Pressure Prods., Inc., 951 F.3d 248, 256
   (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Evidentiary rulings are “subject to the
   harmless error doctrine”; therefore, even if the court abused its discretion,

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   “the ruling will be reversed only if it affected the substantial rights of the
   complaining party”. Adams v. Mem’l Hermann, 973 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir.
   2020) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 103(a); Perez v. Tex. Dept.
   of Crim. Just., Inst. Div., 395 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2004) (“An erroneous
   evidentiary ruling is reversible error only if the ruling affects a party’s
   substantial rights.”).
          The exhibits at issue generally contain research, as plaintiffs describe,
   regarding “widespread knowledge of jail suicides by telephone cords in the
   corrections community and the public generally”, including expert reports,
   scholarly and news articles, and media depictions addressing telephone cords
   as ligatures.
          Even assuming the court abused its discretion, the contested exhibits
   concern only defendants’ knowledge regarding the risk of telephone cords as
   ligatures; they do not bear on defendants’ subjective knowledge regarding
   whether Worl was a substantial suicide risk. Accordingly, the court’s
   sustaining defendants’ objections did not affect plaintiffs’ substantial rights.
   Therefore, this assumed error was harmless. Perez, 395 F.3d at 210.
                                         III.
          For the foregoing reasons, the two Rule 54(b) judgments are
   AFFIRMED.

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