Court Opinion

ID: 9851876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:20:51.74657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:18.481007
License: Public Domain

Justice NEWBY
dissenting.
As a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees under N.C.G.S. § 50-16.4, the majority determines the statutory language “for the benefit of such spouse” requires the dependent spouse to have a personal financial obligation to her attorney. Since I am not convinced the General Assembly intended this result, I respectfully dissent.
The General Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. § 50-16.4 with the goal of “enabling] the dependent spouse, as litigant, to meet the supporting spouse, as litigant, on substantially even terms by making it possible for the dependent spouse to employ adequate counsel.” Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 473, 263 S.E.2d 719, 724 (1980). The statute, which furthers the legislature’s purpose by authorizing fee-shifting in appropriate circumstances, reads:
At any time that a dependent spouse would be entitled to alimony pursuant to G.S. 50-16.3A, or postseparation support pursuant to G.S. 50-16.2A, the court may, upon application of such spouse, enter an order for reasonable counsel fees for the benefit of such spouse, to be paid and secured by the supporting spouse in the same manner as alimony.
N.C.G.S. § 50-16.4 (2005) (emphasis added).
Indisputably, defendant meets the threshold requirements of being a dependent spouse with inadequate financial means. See Hudson, 299 N.C. at 473, 263 S.E.2d at 724. The only question is whether the trial court “may” award reasonable fees when the attorney is providing pro bono services.
Finding the statute to be “clear and unambiguous,” the majority effectively holds N.C.G.S. § 50-16.4 sanctions fee shifting only when a *633dependent spouse is financially “obligated” to counsel and will receive a direct pecuniary benefit from the award. I believe this restrictive reading imposes a requirement not anticipated by the legislature. Under this approach, even attorney’s fees paid by a friend or family member would not form the basis of an award, because the dependent spouse would not directly benefit from payment of the attorney.
Yet, the phrase “for the benefit of such spouse” could be read in other ways. A more natural reading is that the phrase “for the benefit of’ is synonymous with “on behalf of.” Hence, I believe the General Assembly employed the phrase as it is often used in reference to payments made to third parties on behalf of or for the benefit of others. See generally William C. Burton, Legal Thesaurus 572-73 (2d ed. 1992) (listing “behalf,” “accommodate,” and “advantage,” among others, as synonymous with “benefit”). Given this reading, “for the benefit of’ simply indicates the legislature’s decision to allow attorney’s fees to be paid directly to counsel, a non-party, on behalf of the dependent spouse. This interpretation is consistent with the portion of N.C.G.S. § 50-16.4 that allows for collection of attorney’s fees “in the same manner as alimony” by the non-party attorney. Id. § 50-16.4.1
Likewise, a broader reading of the term “benefit” is warranted because a pecuniary benefit is but one of many possible benefits. See generally Black’s Law Dictionary 166-67 (8th ed. 2004) (defining benefit as an “[advantage; privilege” and providing definitions for six different types of benefits including “pecuniary benefit”). As part of the vast group of North Carolinians who cannot afford legal representation, see generally N.C. Legal Servs. Planning Council, North Carolina Statewide Legal Needs Assessment (2003), available at http://www.lri.lsc.gov, defendant derives direct benefit from fee-shifting statutes that increase the amount of pro bono representation in the market. Moreover, defendant, who may again find herself in need of legal representation, has developed an attorney-client relationship with her pro bono counsel. Allowing an award in this case may permit the relationship to continue for subsequent litigation involving matters such as collections, child custody, or unrelated issues.
*634Fee awards to pro bono counsel also benefit dependent spouses by allowing attorneys rather than dependent spouses to assume the risk that fees will not be awarded. The lawyer can retain the possibility of payment under the statute, while relieving the dependent spouse of the additional stress of potential responsibility for legal bills. In addition, a dependent spouse may not wish to receive “charity” and may sense a moral obligation to repay the attorney. The fee award would free the spouse of this concern. Thus, even when the attorney does not undertake additional pro bono representation, the dependent spouse receives a benefit.
This disparity of interpretation is understandable in view of the different definitions of “benefit.” See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 123 (William Morris ed., New College ed. 1979). The majority embraces the concept of “[a] payment or series of payments to one in need.” Id. (definition 3). I prefer the broader definition: “Anything that promotes or enhances well-being; advantage.” Id. (definition 1).
At best the statute is ambiguous whether “for the benefit of’ requires the dependent spouse to receive a direct pecuniary benefit, demands only that the dependent spouse be advantaged, or merely indicates that payments can be made directly to counsel. “[Wjhere a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction must be used to ascertain the legislative will.” Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (1990). Additionally, if a statute is remedial in nature, seeking to “advance the remedy and repress the evil,” it must be liberally construed to effectuate the intent of the legislature. DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 430 n.2, 358 S.E.2d 489, 493 n.2 (1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
On the one hand, determining that the phrase sanctions payments directly to pro bono counsel permits attorneys to accept additional pro bono work, furthering the legislative purpose by enabling more dependent spouses to meet their supporting spouses on equal footing in litigation. On the other hand, concluding that the phrase requires that the award provide a direct pecuniary benefit to the dependent spouse hinders the legislature’s goal by limiting the amount of work that will originally be taken on a pro bono basis.
Certainly, public policy considerations weigh in favor of such awards. Without the threat of fee-shifting, supporting spouses have less incentive to settle cases in which their spouses are represented *635by pro bono counsel. Supporting spouses will also be tempted to provide dependent spouses with little or no support before litigation, because a destitute spouse is more likely to face a choice of pro bono counsel or no counsel at all, with either option benefitting the supporting spouse.
In its brief to this Court, amicus curiae contends there is a “direct link between the urgent need to provide people of modest means with access to the civil justice system and statutes such as [N.C.G.S.] § 50-16.4,” which are designed “not just to level the playing field[, but to] open the gates to the field.” I agree. Unfortunately, our decision today will reduce the availability of legal counsel to dependent spouses, effectively closing the gates. Because N.C.G.S. § 50-16.4 does not preclude benefitting dependent spouses by providing fee awards to pro bono counsel, neither should we.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.

. This view is also consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that fees should be awarded based on their fair market value, not their cost to the client. See generally Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. E. 2d 891, (1984) (calculating fee awards to nonprofit legal service organizations based on fair market value).