Court Opinion

ID: 9904220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:25:19.542611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.082421
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                  FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                  DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

KAREN L. DENNEHY,

            Appellant,
v.                                       Case No. 5D22-287
                                         LT Case No. 2021-CA-63
VISHWANATH SRINAGESH, OCALA
EYE, P.A., AND OCALA EYE SURGICAL
CENTER, INC.,

          Appellees.
________________________________/

Opinion filed August 19, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Marion County,
Robert W. Hodges, Judge.

Dock A. Blanchard, of Blanchard,
Merriam, Adel, Kirkland & Green,
P.A., Ocala, for Appellant.

Thomas E. Dukes, III, and Stacey J.
Carlisle, of McEwan, Martinez, Dukes
& Hall, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

EVANDER, J.

      Karen Dennehy appeals the dismissal of her complaint for medical

malpractice with prejudice. Because the dismissal should have been without

prejudice, we reverse.
      Dennehy, acting pro se, initiated suit against Vishwanath Srinagesh,

Ocala Eye, P.A., and Ocala Eye Surgical Center, Inc., (“Appellees”) after a

cataract surgery performed by Dr. Srinagesh allegedly left Dennehy with

various visual acuity issues. Prior to suit, Dennehy submitted purported

corroborating expert opinion affidavits to Appellees. Appellees filed a motion

to dismiss Dennehy’s complaint, attacking the sufficiency of those affidavits.

      Dennehy filed her complaint within the limitations period applicable to

her claim, but that period expired before the hearing on the motion to dismiss.

At that hearing, the court took the motion under advisement.

      Thereafter, Appellees submitted a proposed order providing that

Dennehy’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Dennehy filed objections

to the proposed order arguing, inter alia, that Appellees had waived the

requirement of written medical corroboration by failing to provide Dennehy

with legible copies of her medical records as required under section 766.204,

Florida Statutes (2020). That statute provides, in relevant part:

              (1) Copies of any medical record relevant to any litigation
      of a medical negligence claim . . . shall be provided to a claimant
      . . . at a reasonable charge within 10 business days of a request
      for copies, . . . .

              (2) Failure to provide copies of such medical records, or
       failure to make the charge for copies a reasonable charge, shall
       constitute evidence of failure of that party to comply with good
       faith discovery requirements and shall waive the requirement of
       written medical corroboration by the requesting party.

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      The trial court subsequently granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss with

prejudice, finding that the corroborating expert witness affidavits were legally

insufficient and, as a result, Dennehy “failed to timely comply with presuit

before the statute of limitations expired, which is a fatal defect to her claims.”

      Dennehy, through newly retained counsel, filed a motion for rehearing,

once again raising the argument that Appellees had failed to comply with their

presuit obligation to provide her with medical records and, thus, had “waive[d]

the requirement of written medical corroboration.” Dennehy’s motion for

rehearing concluded with the statement that “the case should have been

dismissed without prejudice to allow Dennehy to properly amend her

Complaint to assert specifically and expressly” a violation of section 766.204.

The trial court summarily denied the motion for rehearing and this timely

appeal followed.

      On appeal, Dennehy does not challenge the trial court’s determination

that the corroborating expert witness affidavits were legally insufficient. Nor

does Dennehy challenge the trial court’s dismissal of the original complaint.

Dennehy does, however, contend that the trial court erred in dismissing her

complaint with prejudice. We agree.

      Ordinarily, “a dismissal with prejudice should not be ordered without

giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the defective pleading, unless it is

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apparent that the pleading cannot be amended to state a cause of action.”

Kairalla v. John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Found., 534 So. 2d 774, 775

(Fla. 4th DCA 1988). “Where a party may be able to allege additional facts

to support its cause of action or to support another cause of action based on

a different legal theory, dismissal with prejudice is an abuse of discretion.”

Kaplay v. Borchers, 714 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (emphasis

added).

      Here, Dennehy timely raised the argument that she may be able to

allege additional facts to support her cause of action. The record before the

trial court was insufficient to support the conclusion that it would be futile to

afford Dennehy an opportunity to amend her complaint—particularly given

that Dennehy had not abused the opportunity to seek to file an amended

complaint. See Cent. Fla. Inv., Inc. v. Levin, 659 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1995) (“A dismissal with prejudice should not be ordered without giving

the party offering the defective pleading an opportunity to amend unless it is

clear that the pleading cannot be amended so as to state a cause of action.”).

Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing Dennehy’s complaint with

prejudice.

      On remand, the trial court is directed to afford Dennehy leave to amend

her complaint.

                                        4
    REVERSED and REMANDED.

COHEN and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.

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