Court Opinion

ID: 9366614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 15:04:28.218903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:53.939701
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                      Court of Appeals
                        NO. 2019-CA-0981-MR

EMILIE FOJAN                                            APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE JEREMY M. MATTOX, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 17-CI-00617

SCOTT MALLORY AND
MALLORY FARMS OF KENTUCKY, LLC                          APPELLEES

AND                    NO. 2019-CA-0982-MR

SCOTT MALLORY AND
MALLORY FARMS OF KENTUCKY, LLC                CROSS-APPELLANTS

                APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE JEREMY M. MATTOX, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 17-CI-00617

EMILIE FOJAN                                    CROSS-APPELLEE
                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: DIXON, JONES, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: The Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Emilie Fojan, and the

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Scott Mallory, own adjacent thoroughbred horse farms

in Scott County, Kentucky. Fojan sued Mallory and his farm, Mallory Farms of

Kentucky, LLC (collectively referred to herein as “Mallory”), after one of

Mallory’s stallions broke through the fence dividing their farms and allegedly

injured Fojan’s horses. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in

favor of Mallory and dismissed Fojan’s complaint “in its entirety, with prejudice.”

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s ultimate judgment in

favor of Mallory.

                                         I. BACKGROUND

               Fojan’s and Mallory’s thoroughbred horse farms are adjacent to one

another. At the time of the incident giving rise to the underlying suit, one of the

paddocks on Mallory’s farm housed a large, grey teaser stallion.1 On the morning

of September 2, 2017, Fojan awoke to perform her usual farm chores. As she was

walking to her barn, she saw Mallory’s teaser stallion in one of her paddocks with

1
 As described in Fojan’s brief, “[a] teaser stallion is a male horse that is used to determine
whether a mare is in heat and, thus, ready to be bred.” Appellant’s Brief at 3.

                                                -2-
her mare, Pilaf. According to Fojan, Pilaf was in season and the teaser was trying

to mate with her. Pilaf’s four-month-old foal, Pilaf ’17, a colt, should have been in

the paddock with his dam, but he was not there.

             Fojan tried to remove the stallion from the paddock herself, but the

task was too difficult for her to accomplish alone because the stallion, who was

quite intent on remaining with Pilaf, was not wearing a halter. At that point, Fojan

fetched her farm hand for help and telephoned Mallory to come and get his

stallion. Around this same time, Fojan found Pilaf ’17 outside the paddock looking

shaken and beaten up with scrapes and bruises about his body.

             After seeing to the foal’s safety, Fojan’s attention returned to

removing the stallion from her farm. For around ninety minutes, Fojan, Mallory,

and the farmhand tried to cajole and corral the stallion back to Mallory’s farm,

during which time the stallion charged an all-terrain vehicle Fojan was driving.

The vehicle was damaged, but luckily, Fojan did not suffer any physical injury.

Eventually, the three were able to return the stallion to Mallory’s farm.

             A few months after the incident, Fojan filed suit against Mallory in

Scott Circuit Court. In addition to Pilaf ’17, Fojan alleged that Mallory’s stallion

injured three of her other horses during his rampage: a two-year-old gelding in

training, Optimal; and two yearlings, Matilda ’16 (a filly) and Pilaf ’16 (a colt).

                                          -3-
As amended, Fojan’s complaint alleged claims for strict liability pursuant to

Kentucky’s fence-breaking statutes, KRS2 256.080 and KRS 256.090, and

common law negligence. She requested compensatory damages for the diminution

in the horses’ values, lost breeder’s awards, care and upkeep for horses she alleges

she was not able to sell due to the alleged injuries, and emotional distress.

                On March 20, 2019, in response to both parties’ motions for summary

judgment, the trial court entered a partial summary judgment order. The trial court

ultimately determined that there were disputed issues of material fact regarding

liability under the fence-breaking statutes and negligence. However, it determined

that Fojan’s damages were limited to any diminution in value to Pilaf ’17 and

Matilda ’16 and her emotional distress.

                As limited by the partial summary judgment orders, Fojan’s surviving

claims were tried before a Scott County jury in March 2019. The jury’s verdict,

which was rendered through answers to a series of interrogatories, was as follows:

(1) the fences on Fojan’s property were lawful; (2) the fences on Mallory’s

property were lawful; (3) Mallory’s stallion broke the lawful fences on Fojan’s

property; (4) Mallory’s stallion did not cause injury or damage to Fojan’s horses

while on her farm; (5) Mallory did not fail to exercise ordinary care nor was any

failure on Mallory’s part to exercise ordinary care a substantial factor in causing

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                          -4-
any injuries to one or more of Fojan’s horses; and (6) Fojan failed to exercise

ordinary care, and her failure to do so was a substantial factor in causing injury to

one or more of the horses on her farm. Most confusingly, despite having

determined that Mallory did not breach his duty to exercise ordinary care, the jury

assigned fifty percent of the “total fault” for Fojan’s damages to Mallory. The jury

then determined that neither Pilaf ’17 nor Matilda ’16 suffered any loss of value as

a result of the incident on September 2, 2017, but it awarded Fojan $75,000 for her

emotional distress.

             After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court and counsel

immediately conferred at the bench in an attempt to interpret the jury’s findings:

             MALLORY’S COUNSEL: It seems like you’ve got –
             they said no on negligence. Then they said yes on strict
             liability, but they only order[ed] pain and suffering,
             which means – there’s not – there’s no strict liability for
             – we’ll talk about that down the road, but that’s what
             they did. They said – just as we described, they said they
             both had lawful fences and they said that – that looks like
             strict liability attaches, but they’d said no on the
             negligence. They apportioned it. I don’t know how they
             – that’s the part I’m not understanding.

              FOJAN’S COUNSEL: What is it, there’s additional –
             oh, they said that he did not fail to exercise the ordinary
             care –

             MALLORY’S COUNSEL: Right, but they –

             FOJAN’S COUNSEL: – but they still apportioned it. So,
             it’s –

                                          -5-
MALLORY’S COUNSEL: That’s the –

FOJAN’S COUNSEL: – an inconsistent verdict.

MALLORY’S COUNSEL: That’s the part –

THE COURT: That’s what I was –

MALLORY’S COUNSEL Well, you – they should
never have gotten to that page.

FOJAN’S COUNSEL: Yeah –

THE COURT: But the problem is the way the
instructions were written, they perceived [] – it did not
contemplate them in not finding him – once they found
that he didn’t –

MALLORY’S COUNSEL: It should have stopped.

THE COURT: It should have stopped.

MALLORY’S COUNSEL: Well, and I think it
effectively did stop if they – if you go past instruction –
if it’s inconsistent with the previous one, the subsequent
instruction doesn’t matter, because they should have
never got to that point.

FOJAN’S COUNSEL: But I think as a total it’s an
inconsistent verdict and, I mean, that’s their verdict.

MALLORY’S COUNSEL: Yeah, I mean, I don’t think
there’s anything we can do about that now.

FOJAN’S COUNSEL: No.

MALLORY’S COUNSEL: You don’t – I agree with you
at that point. We just deal with it down the road.

                             -6-
             THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything, any motions
             regarding the jury or anything like that or [am I] free to
             discharge them and thank them for their service?

             FOJAN’S COUNSEL: I – I think you – I think you can
             discharge. And of course, either one or both of us will
             have various motions –

             MALLORY’S COUNSEL: Yeah, sure.

             FOJAN’S COUNSEL: – dealing with this. But that’s an
             odd – I mean, a very odd verdict.

             THE COURT: Okay. Do you all want a copy of it to
             take with you?

             FOJAN’S COUNSEL: Yeah.

             MALLORY’s COUNSEL: Yeah, please.

(Record (R.) at 1856-58.) After the jury’s verdict, the trial court entered a

judgment in favor of Mallory, denying Fojan the emotional distress damages

awarded by the jury. In doing so, the trial court concluded:

             although the jury concluded that [Fojan] suffered
             emotional distress, the jury previously concluded that
             [Mallory] was not guilty of negligence or a violation the
             duty to exercise ordinary care, thus there was no basis to
             impose damages against the Defendants for these
             damages as K.R.S. 256.080 does not apply to emotional
             distress damages. As the jury did not find for [Fojan] on
             general negligence claims against [Mallory], [Fojan’s]
             claim for emotional distress is not recoverable.

(R. at 1175.) Fojan subsequently moved the trial court for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, to set aside the judgment and grant a

                                         -7-
new trial. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal and cross-appeal

followed.

                                           II. ANALYSIS3

                              A. Partial Summary Judgment

                Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR4 56.03. The

movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of

material fact in dispute.

                The party opposing the motion then has the burden to present, “at

least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material

fact for trial.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky.

1991); Watson v. Landmark Urology, P.S.C., 642 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Ky. 2022). “A

party responding to a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot merely

rest on the allegations in its pleadings.” Versailles Farm Home and Garden, LLC

v. Haynes, 647 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Ky. 2022) (citing Continental Cas. Co. v.

3
  We have elected to address the issues in a slightly different order than presented by the parties
in their briefs.
4
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                                -8-
Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 281 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Ky. 1955)). “[S]peculation

and supposition are insufficient to justify a submission of a case to the jury, and

that the question should be taken from the jury when the evidence is so

unsatisfactory as to require a resort to surmise and speculation.” O’Bryan v. Cave,

202 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Yates,

239 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Ky. 1951)).

             Fojan asserts the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to

Mallory with respect to her claims for the injuries she alleged to Optimal and Pilaf

’16. At the time of the September 2017 incident, Optimal was two years old and in

race training on Fojan’s farm. While Fojan claims Optimal was injured by

Mallory’s stallion during the incident, the horse did not treat with a veterinarian

that fall for any injuries associated with the incident. In November 2017, Optimal

began training at the Thoroughbred Training Center in Lexington, Kentucky, and

later that month was transferred to Evangeline Training Center in Carencro,

Louisiana, where he remained until March 2018 when he returned to Kentucky to

continue his training at Keeneland Racetrack. While in Louisiana, Optimal began

developing fluid on his knee; however, no expert has testified that the fluid

retention is related to any injury the horse might have received as part of the

September 2017 incident.

                                         -9-
             Pilaf ’16 was a yearling at the time of the incident. While Pilaf ’16

did not receive any medical treatment for injuries allegedly received as a result of

the incident, he was examined by Dr. Robert Cook, D.V.M., in mid-October 2017

in preparation for the yearling sale later that month. Dr. Cook reported no

abnormalities, and Pilaf ’16 was entered in the sale as planned. He was sold to

Rockingham Ranch for $40,000, with Fojan retaining a 20% interest. Shortly after

the sale, Pilaf ’16 was sent to South Carolina. As noted by the trial court, since

Pilaf ’16 left Kentucky, there has been no evidence of defects in his current

condition.

             As related to causation with respect to Optimal and Pilaf ’16 the trial

court concluded that it would be impossible for Fojan to prevail at trial without

resorting to speculation. The court explained:

             There is far too great a passage of time and too many
             potential intervening events to proceed based solely on
             circumstantial evidence. In absence of expert medical
             proof and the inapplicability of circumstantial evidence
             summary judgment is granted regarding claims related to
             these horses.

(R. at 906.) We agree with the trial court’s conclusion in this regard and adopt it as

our own.

             Next, we consider whether the trial court correctly rejected Fojan’s

claim for diminished breeder’s awards as related to the four horses at issue. We

agree with the trial court that the evidence was entirely too speculative to present

                                         -10-
to the jury. Pedigree alone cannot predict a horse’s success at the racetrack. These

were very young, unraced horses. As the trial court concluded, “Fojan’s claimed

damages for breeder’s awards are entirely speculative upon something that was yet

to happen, never happened, and has in no way been proven likely to happen.” (R.

at 910.) Based on the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court appropriately

granted Mallory partial summary judgment with respect to Fojan’s claim for lost

breeder’s awards.5

               Fojan next argues that the trial court also incorrectly determined that

she could not seek damages related to aftercare of horses she was unable to sell due

to the alleged injuries by the stallion, notably Pilaf ’17, who she claimed was

rendered lame and unable to race. As explained in more detail below, because the

jury found that the stallion did not injure any of Fojan’s horses, this question is

moot, and we decline to address it in any further detail.6

5
  Whether such damages might be available under a different set of facts, for example, if the
horses already had established and successful racing careers, is not an issue before this Court,
and not one that needs to be decided at this time.
6
  Nevertheless, we note that we do not disagree with the trial court’s analysis that the proper
measure of damages for the horses, items of personal property, is the diminution in their value.
“It is the law in this Commonwealth that the proper measure of damages for injury to personal
property is the difference in the fair market value of the property before and after the [incident].”
McCarty v. Hall, 697 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Ky. App. 1985) (citations omitted).

                                                -11-
                               B. Emotional Distress

             Before addressing the remaining issues Fojan raises concerning the

instructions and the jury’s verdict, we must first consider the single issue raised by

Mallory’s cross-appeal regarding Fojan’s claim for emotional distress. According

to Mallory, Fojan’s claim for emotional distress damages should never have

reached the jury in the first instance because Fojan failed to put forth any expert

proof to support the claim.

             The proof necessary to support an emotional distress claim has been

an evolving and sometimes confusing area of our jurisprudence. In Osborne v.

Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Ky. 2012), the Supreme Court abandoned the

traditional impact rule for emotional distress damages, holding that, going forward,

cases seeking recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress should be

analyzed according to “general negligence principles.” Id. However, the Court

limited recovery to cases where the emotional injury is “severe” or “serious.” The

Court further held that “a plaintiff claiming to have suffered severe or serious

emotional distress damages must present expert medical or scientific proof to

support the claimed injury or impairment.” Id. at 18.

             Following Osborne, most courts required expert proof any time a

plaintiff sought to recover damages for emotional distress. Keaton v. G.C.

Williams Funeral Home, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 538, 544-45 (Ky. App. 2013). In

                                         -12-
Indiana Insurance Company v. Demetre, 527 S.W.3d 12 (Ky. 2017), the Kentucky

Supreme Court confronted the question of Osborne’s reach when emotional

distress damages are being sought pursuant to a statute and not simply as part of a

common-law negligence claim.

             Ultimately, the Court determined that the Osborne rule applied only to

common law intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Stated

differently, the Court held that Osborne’s requirement of expert testimony does not

apply to emotional distress damages claimed as part of statutory or contractually

based causes of action. Id. at 36.

             Accordingly, we hold that Osborne’s requirement of
             expert medical or scientific proof is limited to claims of
             intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
             Our conclusion is due in part to the recognition that
             claims for emotional damages grounded in breach of
             contract or violation of statute, such as those alleged by
             Demetre in the case at bar, are less likely to be fraudulent
             than those advanced under a free-standing claim of
             intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
             To evaluate whether emotional damages are appropriate
             in those cases that do not allege the free-standing torts of
             intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,
             we have historically relied on our trial courts and the jury
             system to evaluate the evidence and determine the merits
             of the alleged claims. See Curry [v. Fireman’s Fund, Ins.
             Co., 784 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Ky. 1989)] (“Throughout the
             history of Anglo-American law, the most important
             decisions societies have made have been entrusted to
             duly empaneled and properly instructed juries. Decisions
             as to human life, liberty and public and private property
             have been routinely made by jurors and extraordinary
             confidence has been placed in this decision-making

                                        -13-
             process.”); Goodson [v. American Standard Ins. Co., 89
             P.3d 409, 417 (Colo. 2004)] (“[T]he jury system itself
             serves as a safeguard; we routinely entrust the jury with
             the important task of weighing the credibility of evidence
             and determining whether, in light of the evidence,
             plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of proof.”). We see
             no compelling reason to depart from this view.

Id. at 39.

             The claim at issue in Demetre was based on an alleged violation of the

Kentucky Consumer Protection Act and the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices

Act. As noted by the Court “damages for anxiety and mental anguish” are

recoverable in an action for statutory bad faith. Id. Therefore, because Demetre’s

statutory cause of action permitted recovery for emotional distress damages, he did

not have to resort to proving entitlement to those damages through a free-standing

negligence claim and did not have present expert testimony as required by

Osborne. Id.

             Here, while Fojan alleged a statutory cause of action predicated on

Kentucky’s fence-breaking statutes, the statutes relied on by Fojan only allow

recovery for certain kinds of property damage. See KRS 256.080 (“If any

livestock enter into any land over or through a lawful fence, the owner or manager

of the livestock shall for the first trespass be liable to the owner or occupant of that

land for damages to his or her trees, grass, grain, crops, livestock or land as he or

she may have sustained by the entry of the livestock, and for every subsequent

                                          -14-
trespass by the livestock of the same owner, double damages.”) (emphasis added).

Unlike the statutes at issue in Demetre, the fence-breaking statutes do not allow for

recovery of emotional distress damages. Fojan’s recovery for emotional distress

hinges on her ability to demonstrate free-standing negligence; emotional distress

damages predicated on a negligence claim fall squarely within Osborne’s rule

requiring expert medical or scientific proof to support the claimed injury or

impairment. Because Fojan had no such proof, the trial court erred in allowing

Fojan’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress to reach the jury.

             Because emotional distress was the only category of damages the jury

awarded as part of Fojan’s negligence claim, the internal inconsistencies with

respect to interrogatories two and four are moot. Therefore, although we disagree

that the trial court should have allowed the Fojan’s claim for emotional distress

damages to reach the jury in the first instance, we agree with its ultimate decision

not to award Mallory any damages for emotional distress.

                                  C. Strict Liability

             The next issue we must resolve is Fojan’s argument that the trial court

erroneously instructed the jury regarding the number of horses at issue in the strict

liability interrogatories. She asserts Interrogatory No. 1(D), which asked the jury

whether “[t]he teaser stallion caused injury and damage to Emilie Fojan’s horses,”

likely caused the jury to believe it could not find for her unless it found both horses

                                         -15-
were damaged, rather than only one horse. In its order denying Fojan’s post-

judgment motions, the trial court asserted that Fojan did not call the court’s

attention to the asserted significance of the “both horses” language, and so the

objection was not preserved. Further, the trial court reasoned that even if the

objection was preserved, the jury unequivocally found in Instructions 5 and 6 that

neither horse sustained damages warranting recovery.

             We agree with the trial court’s reasoning on both points. Our civil

rules are clear:

             No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to
             give an instruction unless he has fairly and adequately
             presented his position by an offered instruction or by
             motion, or unless he makes objection before the court
             instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which
             he objects and the ground or grounds of his objection.

CR 51(3). Although Fojan submits that her tendered instruction, using the

language “one or more of her horses” preserved the claim of error, we disagree.

“[A] tendered instruction will not fairly and adequately present the party’s position

as to an allegation of instructional error when . . . the minor differences between

the language of the tendered instruction and the instruction given by the trial court

would not call the trial court’s attention to the alleged error[.]” Sand Hill Energy,

Inc. v. Smith, 142 S.W.3d 153, 163-64 (Ky. 2004) (footnotes omitted); see also

Norton Healthcare, Inc. v. Disselkamp, 600 S.W.3d 696, 709-11 (Ky. 2020). In

Sand Hill Energy, the Kentucky Supreme Court quoted with approval the former

                                         -16-
Court of Appeals in its pithy summary of the rule: “The instruction tendered by

him does not point up the claimed error; thus he is not in a position to complain

now.” Sand Hill Energy, 142 S.W.3d at 164 n.20 (quoting Miller v. Quaife, 391

S.W.2d 682, 684 (Ky. 1965)).

             We agree with the trial court that Fojan’s proffered instruction,

without further comment or objection prior to the court’s version being

disseminated to the jury, was insufficient to preserve this specific objection.

Furthermore, the trial court correctly ruled the jury later determined damages to

each horse individually, showing that Fojan’s concern regarding the court’s use of

plural “horses” in Interrogatory 1(D) was unfounded. We discern no error.

             Lastly, Fojan argues a new trial should be instructed on KRS 256.090,

arguing that the statute applies strict liability to owners of livestock when they

have been put on notice that there have been previous escapes. Because Mallory’s

horses had escaped his property on one previous occasion, Fojan argues the jury

should have been instructed on KRS 256.090 in addition to KRS 256.080.

             The jury in this case determined that Fojan’s property and Mallory’s

property were both enclosed by lawful fences. By its own language, KRS 256.090

does not apply in cases where livestock trespass on enclosed land. Additionally,

since the jury determined the stallion did not cause any injury to Fojan’s horses

while on her property this issue is moot.

                                         -17-
                              III. CONCLUSION

          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/                  BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLEE:                        CROSS-APPELLANTS:

Richard M. Rawdon, Jr.                 Darrin W. Banks
Georgetown, Kentucky                   Paintsville, Kentucky

                                     -18-