Court Opinion

ID: 9834042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:15:22.031532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.178231
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In the motion for rehearing, the questions of the authority of Goudelock to make the contract discussed in the main opinion, and of nudum pactum, are raised.
It is not shown in this record where the principal place of business of the products company was located. The record suggests a Dallas house, a San Antonio branch, and an Oklahoma ICJity house. Goudelock, with whom the alleged contract was made, was the manager of the Oklahoma house for the appellee products company, and made the contract with the dock company for the transportation of the 800 bales of cotton from Port Aransas to Germany. He testified that he accidentally heard of the withdrawal of the shipment from Aransas Pass, and then went to Corpus Christi, and from thence to Aran-sas Pass; but from the testimony of Lee it is inferable that he was sent to Aransas by the company to attend to the trouble. It is also inferable from the record that the Dallas and San Antonio houses participated in the matter of the diversion.
On August 21st, a telegram was sent to the Southern Products Company at San Antonio, Tex., as follows:
“Scrivener & Clark instruct us to divert your Bremen cotton to Galveston, stating that they will take care of the differential between Port Aransas and Galveston.”
The Southern Products Company at Dallas, Tex., telegraphed to the dock company that-their insurance policy did not cover risk on transshipments by water from Port Aransas Pass to Galveston, advising the dock company that they must provide for extra insurance, which latter company answered, conceding the suggestion. Whether this telegram was sent prior or subsequent to the writing of the letter by Scrivener, the manager of the dock company, copied in the original opinion, embodying the agreement upon which the case was reversed is not shown. This letter explicitly stated that “this will confirm conversation to-day with Mr. Goudelock,” etc., and relative to the diversion, closes, “this is done with the understanding that we are to accept your claim for the difference in transportation costs,” etc.
[3] It is argued that the contract between the dock company and the products company had been breached, and, the damages having accrued, an agreement for a less sum than the amount appellee would in law have been entitled to, would be the payment of a smaller sum for a larger amount, and hence without consideration.
The dock company, in law, was not required to transship the particular cotton from Galveston. It was outside the contract. It was, of course, when the original contract was breached, subject to the payment of all consequential damages on account of said breach. When they solicited the diversion of this cotton and the same was accepted by the products company for the purpose of reshipment from Galveston, the parties had the: right as a part of the contract of diversion, before said agreement was actually conclud*919ed, to provide for and measure 'the character and quantum of damages to he paid on account. of the breach of the old contract.
We think, as applied to the particular items discussed in the main opinion, the case as to those features at least should have gone to the jury, and the motion for rehearing is overruled.