Court Opinion

ID: 9737692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:32:23.232921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.762483
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KNECHT, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority opinion it was not an abuse of discretion to admit evidence of defendant’s purchase and use of cocaine. This evidence arguably supported the State’s murder-for-drug-money theory, and the trial judge appropriately exercised his discretion. Defendant should have the same latitude in presenting evidence to support his theory of the case. Evidence that someone other than the defendant may have committed the offense is relevant and admissible when a close connection is demonstrated between the third person and the commission of the offense. (People v. Maberry (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 250, 263, 549 N.E.2d 974, 982; King, 61 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 377 N.E.2d at 859.) It is properly excluded if it is remote or speculative. (Howard, 147 Ill. 2d at 143, 588 N.E.2d at 1060; People v. Ward (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455, 463 N.E.2d 696, 702.) Defendant should have been permitted to introduce evidence which allegedly linked a third person to the victim’s murder. His offer of proof shows a patron of the Twenty Grand Tap was ejected from the tavern just hours before the murder. The victim asked this patron to leave because of a confrontation between the patron and two other customers. While the patron did not argue and did not appear upset, he was ejected. On the early morning of April 6, just a few hours after the crime was discovered and before any information had been released to the media, two police detectives sought out the patron at his home. When advised there had been trouble at the tavern, the patron responded, “I wouldn’t hurt Bill Whalen. Bill Whalen is my buddy. What did I do?” Police sought out the patron precisely because he had had a drunken encounter with another customer and had been ejected from the tavern. They found him fully dressed and awake. The detectives thought this was unusual because of what they knew about his habits. The patron then responded in a manner which suggested he knew Bill Whalen had been harmed. This evidence tended to show someone other than defendant committed the murder. None of the cases cited by the majority address the issue presented here. The offer of proof goes beyond establishing a possible motive for someone else to murder Bill Whalen. The majority infers the patron was not affronted by the ejection because he had been ejected before, and there was an amicable relationship between the patron and the victim. This analysis ignores the fact the patron had been at the scene of the crime just hours before the murder, was ejected from the tavern by the victim, was a regular customer who would know the closing routine, and responded to a police visit by denying he would ever hurt Bill Whalen at a time when only the authorities, and the guilty party or a witness, would know Bill Whalen had been murdered. This interpretation of the evidence, which defendant is entitled to suggest, is not extraneous or irrelevant. I am confident the State could have presented evidence to undercut this theory on rebuttal, just as the evidence already presented during its case in chief would likely have overcome this theory. The point is, defendant ought to be given the chance to advance the theory, and he was denied that chance. The importance of this error is enhanced by the exclusion of defendant’s expert witness because of late disclosure. The trial judge carefully considered this issue and even suggested a continuance as a practical solution. The majority relies on the refusal of a continuance as a waiver of the issue. The record suggests defendant was offered the use of Dr. Zelde's testimony in exchange for a continuance, but the issue is not whether we understand the court’s suggestion, but whether defendant understood the offer and its consequences. The compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution ensures a criminal defendant “ ‘the right to the government’s assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.’ ” (Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 810, 108 S. Ct. at 652, quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987), 480 U.S. 39, 56, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40, 56, 107 S. Ct. 989, 1000.) The majority rejects defendant’s argument that just as waiver of a sixth amendment right to counsel must be made knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily, waiver of his right to compulsory process and to present witnesses in his defense must be made knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily. The right of a defendant to present evidence “stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth Amendment rights.” (Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U.S. 14, 18, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 1023, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923.) A constitutional protection can be waived only if it is made knowingly and intelligently. People v. Lester (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1058, 519 N.E.2d 1127, 1129; People v. Jackson (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 750, 758, 433 N.E.2d 1385, 1391. The record does not show defendant understood he was being asked to weigh the right to a prompt trial with the right to present a witness on his behalf. For an issue this important the trial court could and should have explicitly stated to both defendant and his attorney that defendant’s expert would be permitted to testify only if the case were continued; and if the defendant did not agree to a continuance, then the court would not permit his expert to testify. The preclusion of defendant’s expert would have been proper had the court clearly presented the alternatives to defendant and he then elected to proceed to trial and reject a continuance. The alternatives were not clearly presented and this record does not show waiver. If there was no waiver, then defendant’s arguments on the preclusion of his expert witness should be addressed. The less severe sanction of a continuance was available but was not properly explained to defendant. The likely testimony of the expert would have challenged the reliability of the bloody palm print comparison and was thus material to the outcome of the case. Since the State intended to establish defendant’s presence at the scene by the palm print, a defense expert’s challenge to the reliability of its palm print comparison would not necessitate reworking its entire trial strategy. The trial judge granted the State’s motion to bar the expert’s testimony, but nothing in the record suggests the trial court found that defense counsel wilfully violated the rules of discovery to gain an advantage. Considering these factors, as relied on by the majority citation to Enoch, I believe the preclusion of the defense expert witness was too drastic in these circumstances. I would reverse and remand for a new trial and accordingly dissent on this issue.