Court Opinion

ID: 9633395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:45:53.166373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:34.464129
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
This is an action of mandamus against the Pierce County auditor and the members of the Pierce County Canvassing Board established by RCW 29.62.020. *425The complaint prays for judgment directing defendants to certify that
the Tacoma School District No. 10 special levy and the County-City expansion bond issue have passed by reason of the votes cast in the election of November 4, 1969
In general, the crux of plaintiffs’ contention is that certain sections of the Washington State Constitution and its implementing statutes, requiring that certain propositions presented to the electorate must have the assent of three-fifths of those voting are in violation of the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the trial court dismissing their action with prejudice.
We affirm.
The facts are these:
November 4, 1969, Pierce County voters were asked to consider two proposals: the Tacoma School District No. 10 special levy and the County-City Building expansion project bond issue. In the school district election, 53.4 per cent of the voters favored the levy; in the county-wide County-City Building bond election, 52.3 per cent of the voters cast ballots in favor of the measure. Thus, both propositions failed to meet the 60 per cent approval required by law.
It is contended that the 60 per cent majority requirement gives each negative voter greater voting power than 'an affirmative voter; that it, therefore, debases the vote of an affirmative voter and is offensive to the principle of “one man, one vote.” It is, of course, contended by plaintiffs-appellants that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution requires that the assent of a simple majority of those voting is sufficient to approve the levy for the school district and to authorize issuance of bonds for the County-City Building expansion project.
Although the judgment from which this appeal is prosecuted determines that two Washington constitutional *426provisions and four statutes1 are not in violation of the equal-protection clause of amendment 14 of the federal constitution, it is sufficient, for the purpose of deciding the questions presented on this appeal, to discuss only one— Const, art. 7, § 2 (amendment 17) — the 40-mill tax.
Amendment 17 of our constitution provides that all taxes levied on real and personal property shall not exceed 40 mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation (port and public utility districts excluded); that the specific limitation imposed by law may be exceeded only by a taxing district when it is authorized to do so by a majority of at least three-fifths of the electors voting upon the excess levy. The number of persons voting must constitute not less than 40 per centum of the total number of votes cast in the taxing district at the last preceding general election.2 For research purposes, the full text of amendment 17 is set forth as Appendix “A” to this opinion.
Before analyzing the judicial decisions upon which plaintiffs-appellants base their argument, we deem it helpful to an understanding of this opinion to state our stand upon two issues — independent in one sense, a part of the same overall picture in another.
First: When an American citizen qualified to exercise his right of suffrage goes to the poll, he may make use of his right of franchise in one of two capacities. He may be participating in the democratic process by which we select our representatives in our republican form of government; or he may be acting in his legislative capacity by voting for *427or against a proposition submitted by initiative, referendum, recall, or required by the statutes and state constitution. He is taking part in the legislative-decision process of making law.
Second: Certain writers, legal commentators, and some judges, in opinions, have murmured the recently popularized phrase, “one man, one vote” and offered it as a nostrum for all political questions. From it, as an erroneous major premise, they reach the conclusion that the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places its mandatory blessing upon the proposition of majoritarianism; and that every issue of American government requires that its determination be made by a vote of 50 per cent of those voting, plus one. Not only is their assumed premise wrong historically, but, carried to a logical conclusion, would open a Pandora’s box of governmental ills that would grind the teeth from the gears of government.
•With these distinctions in mind, we turn to the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, starting with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962). In Baker, the court held that a justiciable issue was presented when it was alleged that the voting rights of individuals had been debased by the malapportionment of Tennessee legislative districts; thus, a vote in one district was worth less than a vote in another district because of geographic location.
Later cases in the United States Supreme Court presented the same problem of gross inequality of voting weight, either because of geographic malapportionment, or because of invidious distinctions in the system of electing representatives.
Illustrative are: Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821, 83 S. Ct. 801 (1963) (involving Georgia’s county-unit system of counting votes for statewide officials, United States Senators, and Congressmen); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481, 84 S. Ct. 526 (1964) (debasement of individual voting rights by malapportionment of state congressional districts); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964) (debasement of *428individual votes resulting from malapportionment of the legislatures of Alabama and five other states); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 13 L. Ed. 2d 675, 85 S. Ct. 775 (1965) (a state may not exclude a member of the armed forces from the voting franchise; “ ‘[fjencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169, 86 S. Ct. 1079 (1966) (constitutionality of Virginia poll tax); Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474, 20 L. Ed. 2d 45, 88 S. Ct. 1114 (1968) (voting rights debased by malapportionment of county precincts); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 23 L. Ed. 2d 583, 89 S. Ct. 1886 (1969) (New York statute, which excluded anyone not a real property owner or a parent of a child in school from a school district election, held unconstitutional); Cip-riano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 23 L. Ed. 2d 647, 89 S. Ct. 1897 (1969) (unconstitutional to exclude one not paying property tax from voting on the issue of municipal revenue bonds).
Weaving its way through these decisions, we find a thread of consistency helpful to the solution of the problems before us.
In the well considered opinion of Bogert v. Kinzer, 93 Ida. 515, 465 P.2d 639 (1970), the court having discussed the opinions we have identified, summarized:
Votes cast in the process of selecting representatives in government may not be debased to the end that one person’s vote is worth more than another’s because of geographic location. Persons may not be denied the right to vote for their representatives in government because of distinctions which are “invidious.” . . .
Persons may not be denied the voting right in other decision making elections when such denial results in a fencing out without a rational basis. There must be a reasonable relationship between the interest or non-interest of a group and its being granted or denied the vote. . . . Race is not a reasonable relationship upon which to base a denial; ownership of property or parent*429hood are not sufficient criteria of interests in school board elections having overtones of other decision making; ownership of property is not a sufficient criteria of interest in a revenue bond election when non-property owners will utilize and pay for the services, but property ownership is a sufficient criteria in an election to determine the issuance of general obligation bonds.
We believe and hold that nowhere in the lines of cases is there even a hint that the constitutional and statutory provisions in the case at bar, which allegedly “debase” the vote of plaintiffs-respondents, are offensive to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.
We subscribe to the summary of the Idaho Supreme Court.
Counsel have directed our attention to several decisions of lower courts in other jurisdictions treating with the problem involved. We need not discuss them.
Two decisions, however, involving the same issue we have before us have been decided by the highest appellate court of two states: West Virginia (Lance v. Board of Education, ........ W. Va. ......., 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969)), and Idaho (Bogert v. Kinzer, 93 Ida. 515, 465 P.2d 639 (1970)).
Lance holds that the West Virginia constitutional three-fifths’ vote requirement necessary to validate the bonded indebtedness of political subdivisions is repugnant to the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.3 Bogert holds to the contrary.
After a thorough analysis, we agree with the Supreme Court of Idaho:
We do not adopt, but specifically reject, the language and the reasoning of the West Virginia Court.
Amendment 17 of our constitution was adopted by the people of this state November 7, 1944, by an overwhelming majority vote. Its adoption culminated an uninterrupted series of enactments by initiative and referendum over a *430period of more than 10 years, all of which embody the requirement of a 60 per cent affirmative vote for relief from the 40-mill limit. The ultimate purpose of this legislation and of the Seventeenth Amendment was to limit taxes against property and reallocate a portion of the burden of state taxation to other forms of taxable incidents. This is a constitutionally permissible purpose.
On at least seven occasions the voters of this state concluded that at any special election where a 60 per cent affirmative vote could be obtained, the objective of the 40-mill law to permit excess levies only on a clear showing of need by the taxing district would have been convincingly demonstrated to the voters. This policy decision prevents the wholesale circumvention of the property tax limit desired by the people.
In amendment 17 there is no classification of voters. No one is excluded from voting because of lack of some qualification. He may vote as he pleases for or against the proposition presented. If there be a classification by requiring a 60 per cent majority, it is a choice made by the voter himself in voting for or against the particular proposition; it is not the result of a discrimination established by the amendment.
We believe there is a rational basis for the 60 per cent requirement and that its purpose is directed to a constitutionally permissible end. No one is excluded from voting as he chooses; amendment 17 does not deny any person equal protection of the laws.
The forgoing opinion was prepared by Justice Weaver prior to his retirement and is adopted by the undersigned.
The judgment is affirmed.
Hunter, C. J., Finley, Hamilton, Hale, Neill, McGovern, and Stafford, JJ.
Appendix A
Art. 7, § 2 Forty Mill Limit. Except as hereinafter provided and notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, the aggregate of all tax levies upon real and personal property by the state and all taxing districts now existing or hereafter created, shall not in any year *431exceed forty mills on the dollar of assessed valuation, which assessed valuation shall be fifty per centum of the true and fair value of such property in money: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall prevent levies at the rates now provided by law by or for any port or public utility district. The term “taxing district” for the purposes of this section shall mean any political subdivision, municipal corporation, district, or other governmental agency authorized by law to levy, or have levied for it, ad valorem taxes on property, other than a port or public utility district. Such aggregate limitation or any specific limitation imposed by law in conformity therewith may be exceeded only
(a) By any taxing district when specifically authorized so to do by a majority of at least three-fifths of the electors thereof voting on the proposition to levy such additional tax submitted not more than twelve months prior to the date on which the proposed levy is to be made and not oftener than twice in such twelve month period, either at a special election or at the regular election of such taxing district, at which election the number of persons voting on the proposition shall constitute not less than forty per centum of the total number of votes cast in such taxing district at the last preceding general election;
(b) By any taxing district otherwise authorized by law to issue general obligation bonds for capital purposes, for the sole purpose of making the required payments of principal and interest on general obligation bonds issued solely for capital purposes, other than the replacement of equipment, when authorized so to do by majority of at least three-fifths of the electors thereof voting on the proposition to issue such bonds and to pay the principal and interest thereon by an annual tax levy in excess of the limitation herein provided during the term of such bonds, submitted not oftener than twice in any calendar year, at an election held in the manner provided by law for bond elections in such taxing district, at which election the total number of persons voting on the proposition shall constitute not less than forty per centum of the total number of votes cast in such taxing district at the last preceding general election: Provided, That any such taxing district shall have the right by vote of its governing body to refund any general obligation bonds of said district issued for capital purposes only, and to provide for the interest thereon and amortization thereof by annual levies in excess of the tax limitation provided for herein, and Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall also be subject to the limitations contained in Article VIII, Section 6, of this Constitution;
(c) By the state or any taxing district for the purpose of paying the principal or interest on general obligation bonds outstanding on December 6, 1934; or for the purpose of preventing the impairment of the obligation of a contract when ordered so to do by a court of last resort.

Const. art. 7, § 2 (amendment 17), the 40-mill limit; RCW 84.52.052— authorizing excess levies; RCW 84.52.056— excess levies for capital purposes; Const. art. 8, § 6 (amendment 27), limitation on municipal indebtedness; RCW 39.36.020 — limiting municipal indebtedness; RCW 28-.51.020 — bond election regulations.

The total number of persons voting on each of the propositions under consideration in the instant case exceeded the requisite 40 per cent of the votes cast in the county and school district at the latest preceding general election. The validity of this electorial condition is not an issue in this case. We do not decide the issue. Nothing in this opinion is determinative or even suggestive of a solution to the problem.

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review Lance.