Court Opinion

ID: 9422708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:04:03.010717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:38.519280
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Goldberg,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,
concurring in the result.
I concur in the judgment and in the holding of the Court that since “Moore has not... proved his case ...,” the decision below must be reversed. Supra. I do not, however, agree that Moore stated a cause of action arising under § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156,29 U. S. C. § 185 (a). It is my view rather that Moore's claim must be treated as an individual employee’s action for a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation — a duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract but from the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 141 *352et seg. See Syres v. Oil Workers Int’l Union, 350 U. S. 892, reversing 223 F. 2d 739; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192. Cf. International Association of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U. S. 682.
The complaint does not expressly refer either to § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act or to the National Labor Relations Act as the source of the action. Since substance and not form must govern, however, we look to the allegations of the complaint and to the federal labor statutes to determine the nature of the claim.
The opinion of the Court correctly describes Moore’s complaint as alleging that the decision of the Joint Conference Committee dovetailing the seniority lists of the two companies violated Moore’s rights because: (1) the Joint Committee exceeded its powers under the existing collective bargaining contract in making its decision dovetailing seniority lists, and (2) the decision of the Committee was brought about by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of fair representation.
Neither ground, it seems to me, sustains an action under § 301 (a) of the L. M. R. A. A mutually acceptable grievance settlement between an employer and a union, which is what the decision of the Joint Committee was, cannot be challenged by an individual dissenting employee under § 301 (a) on the ground that the parties exceeded their contractual powers in making the settlement. It is true that this Court, in a series of decisions dealing with labor arbitrations, has recognized that the powers of an arbitrator arise from and are defined by the collective bargaining agreement.1 “For arbitration,” as the *353Court said in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582, “is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Thus the existing labor contract is the touchstone of an arbitrator’s powers. But the power of the union and the employer jointly to settle a grievance dispute is not so limited. The parties are free by joint action to modify, amend, and supplement their original collective bargaining agreement. They are equally free, since “ [t] he grievance procedure is ... a part of the continuous collective bargaining process,” to settle grievances not falling within the scope of the contract. Id., at 581. In this case, for example, had the dispute gone to arbitration, the arbitrator would have been bound to apply the existing agreement and to determine whether the merger-absorption clause applied. However, even in the absence of such a clause, the contracting parties — the multiemployer unit2 and the union — were free to resolve the dispute by amending the contract to dovetail seniority lists or to achieve the same result by entering into a grievance settlement. The presence of the merger-absorption clause did not restrict the right of the parties to resolve their dispute by joint agreement applying, interpreting, or amending the contract.3 There are too many unforeseeable *354contingencies in a collective bargaining relationship to justify making the words of the contract the exclusive source of rights and duties.
These principles were applied in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330. There the union and the employer during a collective bargaining agreement entered into a “supplementary agreement” providing seniority credit for the pre-employment military service of veterans, a type of seniority credit not granted in the original agreement. Id., at 334, n. 6. Huffman, on behalf of himself and other union members whose seniority was adversely affected, brought suit to have the supplementary provisions declared invalid and to obtain appropriate injunctive relief against the employer and the union. There was no doubt that Huffman and members of his class were injured as a result of the “supplementary agreement”; they were subjected to layoffs that would not have affected them if the seniority rankings had not been altered. Despite the change in rights under the prior agreement, this Court held that the existing labor agreement did not limit the power of the parties jointly, in the process of bargaining collectively, to make new and *355different contractual arrangements affecting seniority rights.
It necessarily follows from Huffman that a settlement óf a seniority dispute, deemed by the parties to be an interpretation of their agreement, not requiring an amendment, is plainly within their joint authority. Just as under the Huffman decision an amendment is not to be tested by whether it is within the existing contract, so a grievance settlement should not be tested by whether a court could agree with the parties’ interpretation. If collective bargaining is to remain a flexible process, the power to amend by agreement and the power to interpret by agreement must be coequal.
It is wholly inconsistent with this Court’s recognition that “[t]he grievance procedure is . . . a part of the continuous collective bargaining process,” United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S., at 581, to limit the parties’ power to settle grievances to the confines of the existing labor agreement, or to assert, as the Court now does, that an individual employee can claim that the collective bargaining contract is violated because the parties have made a grievance settlement going beyond the strict terms of the existing contract.
I turn now to the second basis of the complaint, viz., that the decision of the Joint Conference Committee was brought about by dishonest union conduct in breach of its duty of fair representation. In my view, such a claim of breach of the union’s duty of fair representation cannot properly be treated as a claim of breach of the collective bargaining contract supporting an action under § 301 (a). This is particularly apparent where, as here, “[n]o fraud is charged against the employer . . . .” Ante, at 343.
This does not mean that an individual employee is without a remedy for a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation. I read the decisions of this Court to hold that *356an individual employee has a right to a remedy against ,a union breaching its duty of fair representation — a duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract but implied from the union’s rights and responsibilities conferred by federal labor statutes. See Syres v. Oil Workers Int’l Union, supra (National Labor Relations Act) ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, supra (Railway Labor Act); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, supra (Railway Labor Act); Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., supra (Railway Labor Act). Cf. International Association of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., supra (Railway Labor Act). There is nothing to the contrary in Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195. In that case the gravamen of the individual employee’s § 301 (a) action was the employer’s discharge of employees in violation of the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement. No breach of the union’s duty of fair representation was charged. To the contrary, the union supported the employee’s suit which was brought as an individual suit out of obeisance to what the union deemed to be the requirements of Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U. S. 437.
The remedy in a suit based upon a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation may be extended to the employer under appropriate circumstances. This was recognized in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., supra, where the Court extended the remedy against the union to include injunctive relief against a contract between the employer and the union. There the employer willfully participated in the union’s breach of its duty of fair representation and that breach arose from discrimination based on race, a classification that was held “irrelevant” to a union’s statutory bargaining powers. The Court observed:
“[I]t is enough for present purposes to say that the statutory power to represent a craft and to make con*357tracts as to wages, hours and working conditions does not include the authority to make among members of the craft discriminations not based on . . . relevant differences.” Id., at 203.
The Court distinguished classifications and differences which are “relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract . . . such as differences in seniority, the type of work performed, [and] the competence and skill with which it is performed, . . .” Ibid. Where the alleged breach of a union’s duty involves a differentiation based on a relevant classification — in this case seniority rankings following an amalgamation of employer units — and where the employer has not willfully participated in the alleged breach of the union’s duty, the collective bargaining agreement should not be open to the collateral attack of an individual employee merely because the union alone has failed in its duty of fair representation. We should not and, indeed, we need not strain, therefore, as the Court does, to convert a breach of the union’s duty to individual employees into a breach of the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union.
I do not agree with the Court that employer willfulness was claimed in this case by “[t]he fair inference from the complaint” that Dealers “considered the dispute a matter for the union to decide.” Ante, at 343. Nor can I agree that willfulness could be predicated on the rationale that since “the award had not been implemented at the time of the filing of the complaint,” Dealers was “put . . . on notice that the union was charged with dishonesty and a breach of duty in procuring the decision of the Joint Committee.” Ibid. Dealers may indeed have been neutral when the case was presented to the Joint Conference Committee but the Court overlooks that the employer-party to the collective bargaining contract was the multiemployer unit whose representatives — acting on behalf of both Dealers and E & L — fully participated in the Joint Com*358mittee’s decision resolving the dispute.4 Furthermore, an employer not willfully participating in union misconduct should not be restrained from putting a grievance settlement into effect merely by being “put ... on notice” that an individual employee has charged the union with dishonesty. Such a rule would penalize the honest employer and encourage groundless charges frustrating joint grievance settlements. Finally, it is difficult to conceive how mere notice to an employer of union dishonesty can transform the union’s breach of its duty of fair representation into a contractual violation by the employer.
In summary, then, for the reasons stated, I would treat Moore’s claim as a Syres-Steele type cause of action rather than as a § 301 (a) contract action. So considering it, I nevertheless conclude, as the Court does, that since “there was no fraud or breach of duty by the exclusive bargaining agent,” ante, at 351, Moore is not entitled to the relief sought.
I have written at some length on what may seem a narrow point. I have done so because of my conviction that in this Court’s fashioning of a federal law of collective bargaining, it is of the utmost importance that the law reflect the realities of industrial life and the nature of the collective bargaining process. We should not assume that doctrines evolved in other contexts will be equally well adapted to the collective bargaining process. Of course, we must protect the rights of the individual. It must not be forgotten, however, that many individual rights, such as the seniority rights involved in this case, in fact arise from the concerted exercise of the right to bargain collectively. Consequently, the understandable desire to protect the individual should not emasculate the right to bargain by placing undue restraints upon the contracting parties. Similarly, in safeguarding the individ*359ual against the misconduct of the bargaining agent, we must recognize that the employer's interests are inevitably involved whenever the labor contract is set aside in order to vindicate the individual’s right against the union. The employer’s interest should not be lightly denied where there are other remedies available to insure that a union will respect the rights of its constituents. Nor should trial-type hearing standards or conceptions of vested contractual rights be applied so as to hinder the employer and the union in their joint endeavor to adapt the collective bargaining relationship to the exigencies of economic life. I have deemed it necessary to state my views separately because I believe that the Court’s analysis in part runs contrary to these principles.

 E. g., United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U. S. 564; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593.

 The Court states that “In its brief filed here Dealers does not support the decision of the Joint Committee.” See ante, at 343, n. 3. The Court overlooks, however, that Dealers throughout the litigation has acknowledged that it is a part of the multiemployer unit, which is the employer party to the collective bargaining agreement and that the employer representatives on the Joint Conference Committee acted honestly and properly on behalf of the employer members including Dealers. See infra, at 357.

 The contract in this case specifically envisioned such a result. Section 5 of Article 4 provided that:
“In the event that the Employer absorbs the business of another private, contract or common carrier, or is a party to a merger of lines, the seniority of the employees absorbed or affected thereby *354shall be determined by mutual agreement between the Employer and the Unions involved. Any controversy with respect to such matter shall be submitted to the joint grievance procedure . . . .”
Section 2 of Article 7 also provided that:
“(d) It is agreed that all matters pertaining to the interpretation of any provision of this Agreement, whether requested by the Employer or the Union, must be submitted to the full Committee of the Automobile Transporters Joint Conference Committee, which Committee, after listening to testimony on both sides, shall make a decision.”
Moreover, as the Court itself points out, other provisions stated that it was “the intention of the parties to resolve all questions of interpretation by mutual agreement” and that the employer agreed “to be bound by all of the terms and provisions of this Agreement, and also agrees to be bound by the interpretations and enforcement of the Agreement.” Ante, at 339.

 See note 2, supra.