Court Opinion

ID: 9843727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:42:33.740657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:53.665577
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
[¶ 29] Recall that:
This is a case of a grandmother and her grandchild who have never lived in North Dakota. When the child’s parents could not or would not care for her, her grandmother took her in. The grandmother’s husband, although not the child’s grandfather, welcomed the child and treated her well. The grandmother, but not her husband, was given temporary legal custody of the child. There was talk of adoption and some steps were taken, but the grandmother’s husband did not adopt the child, nor did the grandmother adopt the child. The parental rights of the child’s natural mother and natural father were never terminated. When the marriage of the grandmother and her husband was coming to an end, the grandmother, instead of seeking support from the child’s par*323ents, sought a declaration that her husband had “equitably adopted” the child and was therefore obligated to pay child support.
Johnson v. Johnson, 2000 ND 170, ¶ 54, 617 N.W.2d 97 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). After being rebuffed by the trial court, the grandmother had much of her wish granted by the majority, and the case remanded.
[¶ 30] In my lengthy dissent in Johnson, I pointed out the extensive errors of the majority. A few of the identified problems were dealt with in the trial court on remand, but the fundamental misuse of judicial power remains: there is no retreat by the majority from its invasion of legislative territory; the misapplication of an intestate probate doctrine to “adoption” and child support continues; and, the principles of comity are still ignored, as are the “inconvenient” facts that if “equitable adoption” occurred, it occurred in Kentucky or New Jersey, governed by the laws of Kentucky or New Jersey, but neither Kentucky nor New Jersey recognize such “equitable adoption.” Id.
[¶ 31] The majority seeks to rehabilitate its opinion in Johnson by implying that Antonyio Johnson agrees that equitable adoption occurred, and by a quotation out of context.
[¶ 32] Antonyio Johnson does not concede that equitable adoption occurred. Rather, as his attorney stated at oral argument, an appeal on the issue would be pointless to this Court as presently constituted.
[¶ 33] The majority continues its “now-you-see-it, now-you-don’t shell game,” saying both that “equitable adoption” is and is not adoption. Johnson, 2000 ND 170, ¶ 56, 617 N.W.2d 97 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). “But the problem for the majority is that if ‘equitable adoption’ is adoption, it has not occurred. If it is not adoption, then the majority cannot impose a child support obligation on the grandmother’s former husband.” Id.
[¶ 34] The majority, at ¶ 4, repeats the out-of-context quotation in Johnson: “the doctrine of equitable adoption % an equitable remedy to enforce a contract right and, therefore, it is not intended to create the legal relationship of parent and child, with all its attendant consequences, and does not effect a legal adoption.’ ” As I pointed out in my previous dissent, the majority omits the next sentence and the important context:
As noted by the vast majority of authorities, equitable adoption is a remedy used only for intestate succession. The majority states, at ¶ 9, “The doctrine is an equitable remedy to enforce a contract right and, therefore, it is not intended to create the legal relationship of parent and child, with all its attendant consequences, and does not effect a legal adoption” (citing 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption § 53 at 930 (1994)). The very next sentence of the source, omitted by the majority, states, “The need for the doctrine arises when the adoptive parent dies intestate; the doctrine is invoked in order to allow the supposed-to-have-been adopted child to take an intestate share. It is not applicable where the decedent dies testate.” 2 Am.Jur.2d, Adoption § 53 at 930 (1994) (citations omitted). The majority, at ¶ 9, suggests the term equitable adoption “bears almost no relationship to a statutory legal adoption.” Rather, the theory is used as “an equitable remedy to enforce a contract right and, therefore, it is not intended to create the legal relationship of parent and child, with all its attendant eonse7 quences.” Id. However, as noted above, in every instance in which equitable adoption was applied by this or other courts, the deceased or equitable parent *324must always, as a condition precedent, have had a parent-child type relationship with the person seeking to enforce a purported contract right.
Johnson, 2000 ND 170, ¶¶ 160-61, 617 N.W.2d 97 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
[¶ 35] Only because Antonyio Johnson does not appeal, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[¶ 36] Dale Sandstrom