Court Opinion

ID: 9908397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 17:08:58.417327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:10.761949
License: Public Domain

J-S23033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 OUTERLIMITS TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO NEW             :        PENNSYLVANIA
 FRONTIER ELECTRONICS, INC.               :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
 COZEN O'CONNOR                           :
                                          :
                    Appellee              :        No. 169 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
                      Civil Division at No(s): 2018-01947

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 8, 2023

      Appellant, Outerlimits Technologies, LLC, successor in interest to New

Frontier Electronics, Inc., appeals from the order entered in the Bucks County

Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of

Appellee, Cozen O’Connor. We affirm.

      The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. In

the early 2000s, Appellant engaged Appellee to represent it in a lawsuit

involving a competitor.     Thereafter, Appellant routinely requested legal

assistance from Appellee to secure patents and trademarks and for other

intellectual property matters. In 2014, Appellant realized that it had executed

numerous flawed contracts that resulted in financial losses and the loss of

intellectual property rights. Appellant attributed the flaws in these contracts
J-S23033-23

to Appellee.

       On December 1, 2018, Appellant filed a complaint in assumpsit against

Appellee, alleging legal malpractice premised on a breach of contract. The

complaint indicated that Appellant did not have a written contract with

Appellee.    Nevertheless, Appellant alleged that the parties engaged in “a

course of dealing” wherein Appellant expected “competent and knowledgeable

services in exchange for [Appellant’s] payment of said services.” (Complaint,

filed 12/1/18, at ¶16). Appellant averred that “[t]hrough a series of contracts

and over a period of years, unbeknownst to [Appellant], [Appellee] failed to

perform their contractual duties regarding their representation of [Appellant]

as contracted.” (Id. at ¶17).

       On January 3, 2019, Appellee filed preliminary objections alleging, inter

alia, Appellant failed to state a breach of contract claim. On April 17, 2019,

the court overruled the preliminary objections. Appellee filed an answer and

new matter on May 14, 2019. Following discovery, Appellee filed a summary

judgment motion on July 15, 2022.                On November 9, 2022, the court

conducted oral argument. At the conclusion of oral argument, the court took

the motion under advisement. The court granted summary judgment in favor

of Appellee on November 17, 2022. This appeal followed.1 On December 21,

____________________________________________

1 The notice of appeal in the certified record is dated December 15, 2022, but

the prothonotary did not docket the filing until January 13, 2023. On March
24, 2023, this Court directed Appellant to show cause as to why the appeal
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely filed its Rule

1925(b) statement on January 10, 2023.

       Appellant now raises two issues on appeal:

          Were [Appellee’s] alleged failures to follow specific client
          requests sufficient to support an action for breaching
          specific contract terms?

          Was [Appellee’s] failure to provide competent legal services
          in general sufficient to support an action for breaching the
          contract to provide professional services consistent with
          those expected of the profession at large implicit in every
          attorney-client relationship?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       Appellant’s issues are related, and we address them together. Appellant

contends that “[a]n attorney who fails to follow specific instructions from their

____________________________________________

should not be quashed as untimely. Appellant filed a response arguing that it
timely e-filed the notice of appeal on December 15, 2022, but the
prothonotary improperly rejected the filing with the explanation “other must
be mailed in with proper fees.” (Response, filed 4/10/23, at 2). Even if the
prothonotary rejected the notice of appeal due to an improper filing fee,
Appellant asserted that the filing should still be considered timely filed as of
December 15, 2022. (Id. at 3) (citing First Union Nat. Bank v. F.A. Realty
Investors Corp., 812 A.2d 719, 723 (Pa.Super. 2002)). In support of its
assertions, Appellant’s response included copies of emails, dated December
15, 2022, wherein the prothonotary’s office: 1) acknowledged that it had
received Appellant’s filing; and 2) rejected the filing. (Id. at Exhibits A and
B). Under these circumstances, we conclude there was a breakdown in the
operations of the court, and we treat the appeal as timely filed. See Nagy v.
Best Home Services, Inc., 829 A.2d 1166, 1168 (Pa.Super. 2003) (excusing
delay in filing notice of appeal because of breakdown in court’s operations;
prothonotary failed to time-stamp and docket timely, albeit flawed, notice of
appeal).

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client breaches specific contractual duties.” (Id. at 17). Appellant asserts

that it requested that Appellee “include specific terms” in an intellectual

property transfer agreement. (Id. at 18). Appellant further asserts that it

asked Appellee to “provide specific advice” about Appellant’s rights under the

agreement during the negotiating and drafting process.         (Id.)   Appellant

claims that Appellee agreed to these requests, but Appellee did not comply.

As such, Appellant maintains that Appellee “failed to follow the specific terms

required by [Appellant] and therefore breached the contract to provide legal

services.” (Id. at 23).

      Significantly, Appellant relies on Gorski v. Smith, 812 A.2d 683

(Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 692, 856 A.2d 834 (2004), for the

proposition that a failure “to provide legal services in a manner consistent with

the profession at large” is a sufficient basis for a breach of contract claim.

(Id. at 16). Appellant acknowledges our Supreme Court’s decision in Bruno

v. Erie Ins. Co., 630 Pa. 79, 106 A.3d 48 (2014), which held that contract

claims are barred where the “gist of the action” sounds in negligence.

Appellant insists, however, that Bruno does not apply here and Appellee’s

failure to follow specific client instructions constitutes a breach of contract.

On this basis, Appellant concludes the trial court erred in granting the

summary judgment motion. We disagree.

      Our Supreme Court has clarified our role on appellate review in this case

as follows:

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        On appellate review, an appellate court may reverse a grant
        of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or
        an abuse of discretion. But the issue as to whether there
        are no genuine issues as to any material fact presents a
        question of law, and therefore, on that question our
        standard of review is de novo. This means we need not
        defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals. To
        the extent that this Court must resolve a question of law,
        we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the
        context of the entire record.

Valley National Bank v. Marchiano, 221 A.3d 1220, 1222 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 307, 997 A.2d 1152,

1159 (2010)). Our scope of review is plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa.

407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct.

2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002).

     In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment,

        [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing
        all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists
        a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the
        light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts
        as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must
        be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is
        no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that
        the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
        law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the
        existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be
        resolved against the moving party.

        Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly
        implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of
        action.    Summary judgment is proper if, after the
        completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including
        the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will
        bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce
        evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense
        which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted
        to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine

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           issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the
           cause of action or defense, which could be established by
           additional discovery or expert report and the moving party
           is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary
           judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports
           summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are
           undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to
           make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.

           Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s
           conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.

Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

         “[A]n action for legal malpractice may be brought in either contract or

tort.”    Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa.Super.

2007) (quoting Garcia v. Community Legal Services Corp., 524 A.2d 980,

982 (Pa.Super. 1987)).

           In Pennsylvania, an individual who has taken part in an
           attorney-client relationship may sue his attorney for
           malpractice under either a trespass or assumpsit theory,
           each of which requires the proof of different elements. In a
           trespass action alleging legal malpractice concerning a civil
           matter, the plaintiff must establish three elements in order
           to recover: (1) the employment of the attorney or other
           basis for duty; (2) the failure of the attorney to exercise
           ordinary skill and knowledge; and (3) that the attorney’s
           failure to exercise the requisite level of skill and knowledge
           was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. These
           elements must be proven by a preponderance of the
           evidence. An attorney will be deemed “negligent” if he or
           she fails to possess and exercise that degree of knowledge,
           skill and care which would normally be exercised by
           members of the profession under the same or similar
           circumstances.

Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208, 212 (Pa.Super. 1997), appeal

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denied, 549 Pa. 716, 701 A.2d 577 (1997) (internal citations omitted).

        A legal malpractice claim based on breach of contract,
        involves (1) the existence of a contract, (2) a breach of a
        duty imposed by the contract, and (3) damages. With
        respect to a legal malpractice claim based on breach of
        contract, this Court has stated the following:

           [T]he attorney’s liability must be assessed under the
           terms of the contract. Thus, if the attorney agrees to
           provide … her best efforts and fails to do so, an action
           in assumpsit will accrue. An attorney who agrees for
           a fee to represent a client is by implication agreeing
           to provide that client with professional services
           consistent with those expected of the profession at
           large.

Dougherty v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, 133 A.3d 792, 796 (Pa.Super. 2016)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

     “In general, courts are cautious about permitting tort recovery based on

contractual breaches.” Johnson v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 2023 PA Super 181,

*3 (filed Sept. 26, 2023) (quoting Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 339

(Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 695, 897 A.2d 458 (2006)).

        In keeping with this principle, this Court has recognized the
        “gist of the action” doctrine, which operates to preclude a
        plaintiff from re-casting ordinary breach of contract claims
        into tort claims. The conceptual distinction between a
        breach of contract claim and a tort claim has been explained
        as follows:

        Although they derive from a common origin, distinct
        differences between civil actions for tort and contractual
        breach have been developed at common law. Tort actions
        lie for breaches of duties imposed by law as a matter of
        social policy, while contract actions lie only for breaches of
        duties imposed by mutual consensus agreements between
        particular individuals…. To permit a promisee to sue his
        promisor in tort for breaches of contract inter se would

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         erode the usual rules of contractual recovery and inject
         confusion into our well-settled forms of actions.

         However, a breach of contract may give rise to an actionable
         tort where the wrong ascribed to the defendant is the gist
         of the action, the contract being collateral. The important
         difference between contract and tort claims is that the latter
         lie from the breach of duties imposed as a matter of social
         policy while the former lie from the breach of duties imposed
         by mutual consensus. In other words, a claim should be
         limited to a contract claim when the parties’
         obligations are defined by the terms of the contracts,
         and not by the larger social policies embodied by the law of
         torts.

         “Gist” is a term of art in common law pleading that refers to
         “the essential ground” or object of the action in point of law,
         without which there would be no cause of action. The “gist
         of the action” test … is a general test concerned with the
         “essential ground,” foundation, or material part of an entire
         “formal complaint” or lawsuit.

Hart, supra at 339-40 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

      The gist of the action doctrine “maintain[s] the conceptual distinction

between breach of contract claims and tort claims[.]”       McShea v. City of

Philadelphia, 606 Pa. 88, 96, 995 A.2d 334, 339 (2010) (quoting eToll, Inc.

v. Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa.Super. 2002)).

“[M]erely because a cause of action between two parties to a contract is based

on the actions of the defendant undertaken while performing his contractual

duties, this fact, alone, does not automatically characterize the action as one

for breach of contract.” Bruno, supra at 103, 106 A.3d at 63.

         The general governing principle which can be derived from
         our prior cases is that our Court has consistently regarded
         the nature of the duty alleged to have been breached, as
         established by the underlying averments supporting the

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        claim in a plaintiff’s complaint, to be the critical
        determinative factor in determining whether the claim is
        truly one in tort, or for breach of contract. In this regard,
        the substance of the allegations comprising a claim in a
        plaintiff’s complaint are of paramount importance, and,
        thus, the mere labeling by the plaintiff of a claim as being
        in tort, e.g., for negligence, is not controlling. If the facts
        of a particular claim establish that the duty breached is one
        created by the parties by the terms of their contract—i.e., a
        specific promise to do something that a party would not
        ordinarily have been obligated to do but for the existence of
        the contract—then the claim is to be viewed as one for
        breach of contract. If, however, the facts establish that the
        claim involves the defendant’s violation of a broader social
        duty owed to all individuals, which is imposed by the law of
        torts and, hence, exists regardless of the contract, then it
        must be regarded as a tort.

                                 *    *    *

        Notably, and of relevance to the case at bar, our prior
        decisions … underscore that the mere existence of a
        contract between two parties does not, ipso facto,
        classify a claim by a contracting party for injury or
        loss suffered as the result of actions of the other party
        in performing the contract as one for breach of
        contract. Indeed, our Court has long recognized that a
        party to a contract may be found liable in tort for negligently
        performing contractual obligations and thereby causing
        injury or other harm to another contracting party[.]

                                 *    *    *

        Consequently, a negligence claim based on the actions of a
        contracting party in performing contractual obligations is
        not viewed as an action on the underlying contract itself,
        since it is not founded on the breach of any of the specific
        executory promises which comprise the contract. Instead,
        the contract is regarded merely as the vehicle, or
        mechanism, which established the relationship between the
        parties, during which the tort of negligence was committed.

Id. at 111-14, 106 A.3d at 68-70 (internal citations and footnote omitted)

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(emphasis added).

      In Gorski, supra, on which Appellant primarily relies, the Gorskis were

real estate developers who retained Attorney Jenkins to negotiate a land sales

agreement with a buyer named Iacobucci.         In the agreement, the Gorskis

warranted that they had obtained approval from governmental authorities so

that Iacobucci could obtain building permits to construct residential units on

the property.      After the parties signed the agreement, however, the local

sewer authority would not approve Iacobucci’s request for subdivision of the

property without the developer paying for certain upgrades to the local

pumping station.       Iacobucci argued that the Gorskis should pay for the

upgrades because they warranted that they would deliver a fully approved

subdivision.    In turn, the Gorskis asked Attorney Jenkins to initiate legal

proceedings to release them from the land sales agreement.             Iacobucci

countersued for breach of contract, and the court ruled in favor of Iacobucci

in both actions.

      The Gorskis then sued Attorney Jenkins for breach of contract and

negligence in connection with the land sales agreement and the subsequent

trial involving Iacobucci.    Before trial commenced, Attorney Jenkins died.

Lawrence Smith, Attorney Jenkins’ executor, was substituted as a defendant.

At trial, the jury found Attorney Jenkins was negligent in his negotiation of the

land sales agreement and in representing the Gorskis against Iacobucci. The

jury also found that Attorney Jenkins breached his contractual obligation to

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provide effective legal representation in connection with the negotiation of the

land sales agreement.

      On appeal, Mr. Smith argued that a breach of contract claim can only

be maintained “when the attorney fails to follow a specific instruction of the

client.” Gorski, supra, at 691. This Court responded:

         [E]very contract for legal services contains, as an implied
         term of the contract, a promise by the attorney to render
         legal services in accordance with the profession at large.
         Thus, when an attorney enters into a contract to provide
         legal services, there automatically arises a contractual duty
         on the part of the attorney to render those legal services in
         a manner that comports with the profession at large.
         Hence, a breach of contract claim may properly be premised
         on an attorney’s failure to fulfill his or her contractual duty
         to provide the agreed upon legal services in a manner
         consistent with the profession at large.

Id. at 694. Because the evidence established that Attorney Jenkins failed to

make the Gorskis fully aware of their obligations under the agreement prior

to their having signed it, Attorney Jenkins failed to fulfill “his contractual

obligation to the Gorskis to provide legal services in a manner consistent with

the profession at large.” Id. at 696.

      Twelve years after this Court’s decision in Gorski, our Supreme Court

decided Bruno.      The Brunos had purchased a home and acquired a

homeowner’s insurance policy from Erie Insurance Company (“Erie”).          The

policy obligated Erie to pay up to $5,000.00 for damage caused to the property

by mold. The rider also required that Erie pay the costs of testing for mold

and, if mold was present, its removal. In October 2007, Mr. Bruno discovered

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mold on the property and filed a claim with Erie, which sent an adjuster and

an engineer (“Rudick”) to inspect the property.     The adjuster and Rudick

informed Mr. Bruno that “the mold was harmless and that they should

continue tearing out the existing paneling [and] that health problems

associated with mold were a media frenzy and overblown.” Bruno, supra at

84, 106 A.3d at 51. The adjuster subsequently refused payment of the claim.

     Based on the assurances of the adjuster and Rudick, the Brunos

continued to live in the home.       In January 2008, after suffering severe

respiratory ailments, the Brunos had the mold tested at their own expense,

and they discovered that the mold was toxic.         Thereafter, the Brunos

demanded that Erie pay out their claim, which it did in April 2008. Next, the

Brunos filed a complaint against Erie, Rudick, and the prior owners of the

property. The complaint included a negligence claim against Erie and Rudick.

The Brunos alleged:

        Erie engaged in the following negligent acts and omissions
        which caused them damage and injury: failure to recognize
        the nature and severity of the mold problem at the
        premises; misleading [the Brunos] concerning the nature of
        the mold problem in general and as it related to their health
        and home; minimizing the dangers and consequences of the
        mold infestation when it knew or should have known
        otherwise; and the creation or exacerbation of a dangerous
        condition.

                                 *     *      *

        Additionally, in count 10 of their complaint, the Brunos
        raised a claim against Rudick for professional negligence,
        alleging, inter alia, that it was negligent for: delaying and
        then improperly conducting mold testing of the Bruno home;

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         failing to properly read, interpret, and analyze the test
         results; delaying the reporting of the test results to the
         Brunos; failing to recognize and report to the Brunos the
         danger to their health and to the premises created by the
         mold; and minimizing the dangers and consequences posed
         by the mold infestation, when it knew or should have known
         otherwise.

Id. at 86-87, 106 A.3d at 52-53 (internal record footnotes, citations, and

quotation marks omitted).

      Erie filed preliminary objections, which the trial court sustained. The

court determined that the gist of the action doctrine barred the Brunos from

bringing a negligence claim against Erie where the claims emanated from a

breach of Erie’s contractual obligations. The court reasoned that “[b]ut for

the insurance policy, Erie would owe [the Brunos] no obligation as defined by

larger social policies embodied by tort laws[.]” Id. at 87, 106 A.3d at 53. On

appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the Brunos’ negligence claim.

      Our Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded the case for

further consideration. The Court held that the Brunos’ claim sounded in tort,

and it emphasized

         the substance of the Brunos’ allegations is not that [Erie]
         failed to meet [its] obligations [to investigate the claim
         made by the Brunos under their policy]; rather, it is that
         Erie, during the course of fulfilling these obligations through
         the actions of its agents, acted in a negligent manner by
         making false assurances regarding the toxicity of the mold
         and affirmatively recommending to the Brunos that they
         continue their renovation efforts, which caused them to
         suffer physical harm because of their reasonable reliance on
         those assurances.      Consequently, these allegations of
         negligence facially concern Erie’s alleged breach of a general
         social duty, not a breach of any duty created by the

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          insurance policy itself. The policy in this instance merely
          served as the vehicle which established the relationship
          between the Brunos and Erie, during the existence of which
          Erie allegedly committed a tort.

Id. at 116, 106 A.3d at 71.

       Instantly, the trial court found that the gist of Appellant’s action sounded

in tort, and it granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee:

          Appellant argued that the facts of the instant matter are
          similar to the facts in Gorski, and as such an action in
          assumpsit is appropriate. However, it is not settled law.
          Numerous courts have reviewed Gorski in conjunction with
          Bruno’s gist of the action analysis and questioned whether
          Gorski remains valid law:

              [C]ourts generally agree that the gist of the action
              may bar contract claims if the true nature of the duty
              breached is in tort. [...] Although not supplying
              concrete precedent, the non-precedential decisions
              clearly show a trend of incorporating Bruno and
              rejecting Gorski’s reasoning, and trial courts have
              cited the non-precedential opinions as persuasive.[2]

                                       *       *    *

          In this matter, Appellant claimed that when a client
____________________________________________

2 Our research confirms the trial court’s averment regarding this Court’s
embrace of Bruno in its recent, non-precedential decisions. See Corliss v.
Lee A. Ciccarelli, PC, 272 A.3d 457 (Pa.Super. 2022) (unpublished
memorandum) (noting Bruno Court held that language used in complaint
determines whether case is brought in tort or breach of contract; Bruno
departed from previously decided cases, which ostensibly allowed allegations
of both tort and breach of contract together in civil actions); Johnstone v.
Raffaele, 241 A.3d 479 (Pa.Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum)
(observing that “gist of the action” doctrine was not involved in Gorski; as
stated in Bruno, contract claim arises from promise to do something specific
that is not otherwise generally required of attorney). See also Pa.R.A.P.
126(b) (stating non-precedential decisions of Superior Court filed after May 1,
2019 may be cited for persuasive value).

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         identifies a particular issue of concern to counsel, and
         counsel fails to adequately address that concern, this
         incompetence amounts to a breach of a contractual
         provision.   Looking to Appellant’s complaint, Appellee
         assisted in negotiating licensing agreements for Appellant,
         and in those agreements there existed a flaw that failed to
         protect Appellant’s interests.

                                  *      *     *

         Appellee’s shortcomings constitute a failure to exercise the
         requisite skill and knowledge that is expected of all
         attorneys. Therefore, while Appellee failed to adhere to the
         general standard of care lawyers owe to every client,
         Appellee did not breach a specific contractual provision or
         promise. In line with Pennsylvania caselaw, an action in
         assumpsit simply was not available to Appellant. As such,
         any genuine issue of fact as to whether an implied contract
         existed is immaterial because, regardless, Appellee failed to
         adhere to a generalized standard of care.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 2/7/23, at 8-11) (internal citations, quotation

marks, and some capitalization omitted).

      Here, we cannot say that the court erred in its application of the gist of

the action doctrine. We emphasize that the substance of the allegations in

the complaint confirms that Appellee’s purported failure to exercise the

requisite level of skill and knowledge was the basis for Appellant’s request for

damages.    See Fiorentino, supra.           Specifically, Appellant averred that

Appellee “never presented … a contract related to [Appellee’s] services as they

related to … assisting [Appellant] in securing patents, trademarks and other

related intellectual property issues.”       (Complaint at ¶13).    Appellee led

Appellant “to believe that [Appellee] had experience in the transactions

contemplated when in fact [Appellee] had little to no experience in such

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transactions.” (Id. at ¶18). Appellant asserted that Appellee “failed to advise

Appellant as [to] what portions of the contracts and transactions contemplated

would have or might have a negative impact upon [Appellant].” (Id. at ¶26).

Likewise, Appellant alleged that Appellee “failed to actually read, review and

advise the contracts contemplated in their entirety,” and Appellee “failed to

advise [Appellant] of the differences of the laws of New York and Pennsylvania

as they apply to mergers and acquisition contracts.” (Id. at ¶¶27, 30).

       These averments support the trial court’s conclusion that an action in

assumpsit     was    unavailable     to   Appellant.   See   Dougherty,   supra;

Fiorentino, supra.         Rather, the alleged contract merely served as “the

vehicle” to establish the relationship between the parties, during the existence

of which Appellee allegedly committed a tort. See Bruno, supra. On this

record, the court did not err in concluding that that the gist of the action

sounded in tort.3      See Hart, supra. We conclude that the court properly

granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment.              See Valley National

Bank, supra; Chenot, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

3  Further, we note that different statutes of limitations apply to tort and
contract actions. An action sounding in tort is subject to a two-year statute
of limitations, whereas a contract claim is subject to a four-year statute of
limitations. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5524, 5525. Here, it appears that Appellant
filed its complaint beyond the two-year limitations period for a tort action, but
within the four-year period for a breach of contract action. Nevertheless, we
reiterate that the facts do not support a breach of contract claim against
Appellee.

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Date: 12/8/2023

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