Court Opinion

ID: 9760877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:21:12.111307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:18.222006
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, J.,
concurring in result.
But for one paragraph in the majority opinion, ante at 181-182, which unfortunately — and unnecessarily in this case— breathes life into the cadaver of the “consumer expectations” test for a design defect, I join in the Court’s disposition of this appeal. I continue to adhere to my views on that subject as set forth with “vox clamantis in deserto” (Mark 1:3) in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 178, 190 (1979) (concurring opinion), to this effect: using consumer expectations as a gauge for determining defect limits liability to those situations in which the consumer deems the product unsafe. This is contrary to a fundamental basis of strict liability because the consumer simply does not have adequate information to know what to expect. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 466, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
Were that trifling gaffe my sole concern, I probably would not be moved to write. More troublesome however, is Justice *189Schreiber’s reading of the majority opinion, particularly his assertion that today’s decision takes Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191 (1982), a step farther along an intolerably extreme path. I share Justice Schreiber’s thinly-disguised discomfort with Beshada; and if I believed for one moment that our decision today advanced Beshada’s exotic theory, I would jump ship. It does not, so I do not.
State-of-the-art evidence is implicitly included in the factors employed in the risk/utility analysis adopted in Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., Inc., 76 N.J. 152,172-75 (1978), whose use is reaffirmed today, ante at 181-183.1 Whereas Beshada foreclosed the use of state-of-the-art as a defense to a design-defect-warning case, today’s majority opinion could scarcely be more únambiguous in pointing out that state-of-the-art evidence is just one type of proof that may be relevant on the central issue of defect and that it may, in certain instances, support a judgment for defendant. Ante at 183.
That leads indirectly to a lingering concern on a different aspect of the case, and that is the respective function of judge and jury in the handling of the risk/utility analysis. Would that I could persuade my colleagues to return to Judge Conford’s lucid treatment of the subject in Cepeda, as follows:
Dean Wade suggests that before determining whether the case for liability should be given to the jury the trial court should give consideration to whether a balanced consideration of the following factors did not preclude liability as a matter of law:
[Thereupon, the seven risk/utility factors.]
If the case is sent to the jury, since it would not always be appropriate for the court to include in the instructions to the jury all seven of the factors mentioned above, Dean Wade suggests the following model instruction:
“A [product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to persons [or property] that a reasonable prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had actual *190knowledge of its harmful character would not place it on the market. It is not necessary to find that this defendant had knowledge of the harmful character of the [product] in order to determine that it was not duly safe.”
Subject to substituting the Section 402A language, “defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” for the Wade-preferred “not duly safe,” we approve and adopt this instruction for incorporation into a charge in an action against a manufacturer for strict liability in tort based upon the design defect of a product. Such a charge would be usefully amplified by the judge calling to the attention of the jury for their consideration any of the Wade factors mentioned above going into the risk/utility analysis for which there is specific proof in the case and especial significance * * *. [76 NJ. at 173-75 (citation and footnote omitted).]
Despite that recommended charge’s many virtues — not the least of which, by any means, are its crisp simplicity and clarity — it was rejected in Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 177; see 81 N.J. at 183-84 (concurring opinion). I hasten to give reassurance that I do not here propose to take up the cudgels once again in behalf of the “defective condition unreasonably dangerous” language of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), having long since despaired of nudging this Court in the direction of the “modern, enlightened trend of the law on this subject * *." Freund v. Cellofilm, 87 N.J. 229, 248-51 (1981) (concurring opinion). Rather I suggest we should salvage what we can from the unsettled state of our law in the area of how risk/utility should be treated by judge and jury, to the end that trial judges will know what they should decide as matters of law and what they should give to the jury in design-defect-strict-liability cases.
The Model Jury Charge discusses the matter as follows:
Where the claimed design defect is not “self-evident,” the trial judge may frequently become engaged in a two-step process:
1. Depending upon the facts of the case, the trial judge may be required to make an initial determination as to whether or not as a matter of law liability should be imposed upon the seller-manufacturer for violation of a duty to the injured consumer. [Suter] [81 N.J.] at 172, 177. In making this evaluation the judge should apply the appropriate “risk-utility” factors set forth in Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Company, Inc., 76 N.J. at 173-174.
2. Once the trial judge determines that the case should be submitted to a jury, the appropriate “risk-utility” factors should be given to the jury. Suter, 81 N.J. at 171 — 72; Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 173-74. [Model Jury Charges, Products Liability, No. 5.27, May 1980.]
*191On the other hand the materials distributed to every state-court judge at the last annual session of the New Jersey Judicial College approach the problem this way:
i Role of the Court (Risk/Utility Analysis)
[The] risk/utility factors are not, standing alone, matters of proof or defense. These are the factors for the trial court to consider in determining whether the plaintiff has met its burden of proof in presenting a prim a facie case, to wit, that a manufacturer, deemed to know the harmful propensities of its product, violated its duty not to place a defective product into the stream of commerce. As a practical matter, it is.to be reasonably anticipated that one or more of the factors would be raised by either side in the course of either proving or defending against the claim.
ii Role of Jury
Depending upon the proofs, some factors which may be considered by the jury-in deciding the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct include (1) the technological feasibility of manufacturing a product whose design would have prevented or avoided the accident, given the known state of the art; and (2) the likelihood that the product will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury. See Cepeda, supra, 76 N.J. at 174. Suter, at 171-72.
Although the considerations for the jury are somewhat comparable to those of the trial court, their decisional functions differ. The court decides what protection should be given and the jury is concerned with reaching a just result as between the parties. Suter at 173.
Note that the jury is not making a risk/utility analysis. It is considering two, or possibly three of the several factors quoted in Cepeda and incorporated by reference in Suter’s explanation of the Court’s role.
[W. Dreier and H. Goldmann, Products Liability Law in New Jersey: A Practitioner’s Guide (N.J. Inst, for Continuing Legal Educ. 1982).]
Although neither the Model Jury Charge nor the Practitioner’s Guide is considered binding authority, our trial judges of course consult them. Their respective positions may not be irreconcilable but neither do they fit neatly together. Particularly, one must wonder what it is that the Practitioner’s Guide would have the jury do with the risk/utility factors if not make *192a risk/utility analysis to determine whether the product suffers from a design defect. I would lay the confusion created by the Practitioner’s Guide comment directly at Suter’s doorstep. (In fairness to the authors, they disclaim adoption of the position in the Practitioner’s Guide as their own.)
My own preference would be to return to the Cepeda charge, set forth earlier in this opinion. If the Court wishes to substitute something Suter -like for “defective condition unreasonably dangerous” — and I acknowledge that that appears to be the Court’s wish — then that transposition could be managed easily. My instinct is that with such a charge, we would make life easier for judges and jurors and bring some needed stability to our products liability law. The Court does not today undertake to spell out a recommended charge, but I do not disagree with its treatment of risk/utility as far as it goes. I therefore join in the majority opinion with the single reservation expressed at the beginning of my concurrence.

The third and fourth factors embody state-of-the-art considerations:
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.