Court Opinion

ID: 9839668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 18:07:56.84542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:57.238912
License: Public Domain

J-S15021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DEVON TROY STARR                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1424 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 30, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
              Criminal Division at No: CP-06-CR-0000039-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED: SEPTEMBER 13, 2023

       Appellant, Devon Troy Starr, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County on August 30, 2022,

after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder, criminal attempt to commit

murder, and related offenses.1          Appellant contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions and that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence. Following review, we affirm.

       Appellant’s convictions arise from a shooting that killed Albert Pena-Pena

and injured Leo Larios in the City of Reading, Berks County, on the evening of

____________________________________________

1 The jury found Appellant guilty, in his capacity as an accomplice or
conspirator, of first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a); criminal attempt
to commit first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.SA. §§ 901(a)-2502(a); four counts
of aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1) and 2702(a)(4); and two
counts of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
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August 18, 2020.     Appellant was arrested and charged in relation to the

shooting. The case against Appellant and his co-defendant, Joewel John Keita,

proceeded to trial beginning on June 28, 2022 and concluding on July 1, 2022.

Following the return of guilty verdicts against both men, the trial court

sentenced both to, inter alia, life sentences without the possibility of parole

for first-degree murder. Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which were

denied on September 15, 2022. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant

and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant asks this Court to consider two issues:

      A. Were the facts on record [sic] legally insufficient to support an
         inference beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
         subjectively intended to promote or facilitate a violent assault
         on the victims and that he objectively committed any overt
         act, such as aid or attempted aid, in pursuance of that assault?

      B. Did Appellant’s convictions go against the weight of the
         evidence, where, inter alia, the testimony of the
         Commonwealth’s main witness was so self-contradictory,
         intuitively and demonstrably mendacious, as to be of nugatory
         evidentiary weight; the police’s inexplicable failure to
         investigate myriad alternative culprits fatally vitiated their
         arbitrarily focused case against Appellant; and the verdicts, in
         view of the three of four paltry and equivocal circumstances on
         which they were based, were truly shocking to the conscience?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (emphasis in original).

      Having reviewed the trial transcript and the evidence admitted at trial,

we find the trial court aptly summarized the facts of this case as follows:

      On August 18, 2020, Leo Larios and Albert Pena-Pena were in the
      1200 block of Church Street in the City of Reading, Berks County,
      Pennsylvania.   As they were loading a speaker into a red

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       Volkswagen Jetta, Mr. Larios noticed two people walking toward
       them on Church Street. One person was walking in the street,
       and the other person was walking on the sidewalk. Mr. Larios
       described the man on the sidewalk as Black and stocky, testified
       that he was wearing glasses and a hoodie, and stated that he had
       a face covering from his nose to his chin. Mr. Larios testified that
       the person in the street was wearing a hoodie, sweatpants,
       reflective shoes, and ski mask. Mr. Larios testified that he
       recognized the man on the sidewalk as Joewel Keita,[2] but that he
       did not initially tell that to any police officers because he did not
       want to be labeled as a snitch.

       After Mr. Larios and Mr. Pena-Pena finished loading the speaker
       into the vehicle, Mr. Larios got into the driver’s seat and Mr. Pena-
       Pena got into the passenger’s seat. As Mr. Larios was pulling out
       of the parking space, he heard shots fired from behind them. Mr.
       Larios was shot twice in the back of the head. Photographs of his
       injuries were admitted into evidence[.] Mr. Pena-Pena was also
       shot in the head and died as a result of his injuries.

       Mr. Larios testified that he encountered Joewel Keita once or twice
       on the street and that the two of them had exchanged messages
       on Facebook. On August 20, 2020, Criminal Investigator Daniel
       Cedeno of the Reading Police Department presented two photo
       lineups to Mr. Larios. Mr. Larios testified that he recognized the
       Appellant, Devon Starr, in the lineup . . . as someone he knew,
       but that he did not see the Appellant on Church Street on the night
       of the shooting. Mr. Larios testified that he recognized Joewel
       Keita in the lineup . . . as the man who walked past him on the
       sidewalk on the night of the shooting. Mr. Larios testified that he
       initially told C.I. Cedeno that he was not sure it was Joewel Keita
       even though he was sure because he did not want to be a snitch.

       Mr. Larios testified that he grew up with the Appellant and that he
       helped him file for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance. Facebook
       messages that Mr. Larios and the Appellant exchanged were
       admitted into evidence[.]       In the messages, the two men
       discussed filing for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, among
       other things. The Appellant complained multiple times about how
____________________________________________

2 Mr. Larios testified that as the man on the street walked by Mr. Larios, the

man said, “What’s up?” Mr. Larios “recognized” Joewel Keita’s unusual
“squeaky” voice. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), Trial, 6/28/22, at 195.

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       long it was taking for him to get the money, accused Mr. Larios of
       stealing the money, and threatened Mr. Larios. Mr. Larios testified
       that the Appellant also threatened him in person at a Turkey Hill
       prior to the shooting. Mr. Larios testified that the Appellant was
       the only person he was having problems with at the time of the
       shooting, and that after the shooting, he did not hear from the
       Appellant again.

       Following the shooting, Criminal Investigator Joseph Snell of the
       Reading Police Department was dispatched to the hospital where
       Leo Larios and Albert Pena-Pena were being treated. C.I. Snell
       looked through the belongings that were collected from the two
       men. C.I. Snell observed that Leo Larios had a cell phone, a large
       sum of money,[3] and a wallet with a Social Security card that
       belonged to Brent Starr, who is the Appellant’s brother. C.I. Snell
       was familiar with Brent Starr and knew that he was incarcerated
       at the time. C.I. Snell thought that it was unusual that Brent
       Starr’s Social Security card was in the possession of Leo Larios, so
       he asked C.I. Daniel Cedeno to listen to Brent Starr’s telephone
       calls from the jail.

       One of the numbers that Brent Starr called was 610-741-4602,
       which C.I. Snell subsequently learned was Joewel Keita’s cellphone
       number. The first time Brent Starr called the number was on June
       26, 2020, and the last time Brent Starr called the number was on
       August 21, 2020, which was the date that Joewel Keita was
       arrested. There were two calls placed on August 19, 2020 that
       appeared to be related to the shooting that occurred in the 1200
       block of Church Street. C.I. Snell seized a cellphone that matched
       the number 610-741-4602 when he took Joewel Keita into
       custody.

       C.I. Snell obtained video surveillance footage from 1026 Pear
       Street that was recorded on the night of August 18, 2020.[4] The
       footage depicts a man wearing a t-shirt with a knit cap rolled up
____________________________________________

3 C.I. Snell stated that the money was initially seized as evidence but was later

returned to Mr. Larios “[b]ecause he had paystubs to prove that he was
working and that was money that he got from employment.” N.T., 6/29/22,
at 568.
4 C.I. Snell testified that the Pear Street address is approximately three-

quarters of a mile from the scene of the shooting. N.T., 6/30/22, at 646.

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       on his head whom C.I. Snell identified as the Appellant. The
       footage also depicts a man wearing a Puma sweatshirt and glasses
       with a handgun on his right hip whom C.I. Snell identified as
       Joewel Keita. Still images of the video were admitted into
       evidence[.]

       C.I. Snell also obtained video surveillance that was recorded on
       the night of August 18, 2020 that showed the same two men
       walking onto the 1200 block of Church Street.[5] C.I. Snell
       testified that he interviewed the Appellant in October of 2020 after
       Appellant had been arrested. The Appellant admitted that he was
       wearing a ski mask on the night of August 18, 2020 in the 1200
       block of Church Street and that he ran back to Pear Street after
       shots were fired. The Appellant also confirmed the Facebook
       message that he sent to Leo Larios and admitted that he
       threatened Mr. Larios in person.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 1-4 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

       In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence

supporting his convictions. Specifically, he contends that the evidence was

insufficient to demonstrate subjective intent to “facilitate a violent assault on

the victims” and that he “objectively committed of any overt act” with respect

to the assault.

____________________________________________

5 Surveillance video obtained from 1239 Church Street showed the individual

who was wearing the Puma sweatshirt fire shots at the Volkswagen Jetta
before running south on Church Street. It also showed the individual wearing
the ski mask run in the same direction after the shots were fired. N.T.,
6/29/22, at 388-89, 392-93. Surveillance video and still shots taken from the
video obtained from Pear Street depicted the same two individuals leaving
from 1026 Pear Street at approximately 10:20 p.m. and returning there at
approximately 11:00 p.m. N.T., 6/30/22, at 641-45. The affidavit of probable
cause reflects that police responded at 22:54, i.e., 10:54 p.m., to a report of
shots fired in the 1200 block of Church Street. Affidavit of Probable Cause,
Commonwealth Exhibit 17, p.2., N.T., 6/30/22, at 970.

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      When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, which

presents a question of law, we are guided by the following well-settled

standard of review.

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

      This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is
      circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the
      evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable
      doubt. Although a conviction must be based on more than mere
      suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish
      guilt to a mathematical certainty.

Commonwealth v. Brockman, 167 A.3d 29, 38 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(quotations and citations omitted)).

      We first note that surveillance footage presented to the jury established

that Joewel Keita, not Appellant, fired the shots that injured Larios and killed

Pena-Pena. Although Appellant did not fire the shots, he was convicted based

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on his role as Keita’s accomplice.      “An ‘accomplice’ is an individual who

‘knowingly and voluntarily cooperates with or aids another in the commission

of a crime.’” Commonwealth v. Hall, 867 A.2d 619, 630 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Carey, 439 A.2d 151, 158 (Pa. Super 1981)).

See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(c)(1) (“A person is an accomplice of another

person in the commission of an offense if . . . with the intent of promoting or

facilitating the commission of the offense, he: (i) solicits such other person to

commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in

planning or committing it[.]”).

      The fact that Joewel Keita fired the shots and was convicted of first-

degree murder and attempted murder does not bar the conviction of Appellant

as an accomplice for those crimes or for aggravated assault. “An accomplice

is equally criminally liable for the acts of another if he acts with the intent of

promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense and agrees, aids, or

attempts to aid such other person in either planning or committing that

offense.” Commonwealth v. Schoff, 911 A.2d 147, 161 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      The crimes of which Appellant was convicted included first-degree

murder   and    attempted    first-degree   murder,   aggravated   assault,   and

conspiracy.    The trial court began its analysis of Appellant’s sufficiency of

evidence challenge by providing the statutory definitions for first-degree

murder, aggravated assault, and conspiracy.

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       With respect to first-degree murder, by statute, “[a] criminal homicide

constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional

killing.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 8 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a)).

“To find a defendant guilty of first-degree murder a jury must find that the

Commonwealth has proven that he or she unlawfully killed a human being and

did so in an intentional, deliberate and premeditated manner.” Id. (quoting

Schoff, 911 A.2d at 159). “The mens rea required for first-degree murder,

specific intent to kill, may be established solely from circumstantial evidence.”

Id. (quoting Schoff, 911 A.2d at 160). Further, “[s]pecific intent to kill can

be established through circumstantial evidence, such as the use of a deadly

weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth

v. Montalvo, 956 A.2d 926, 932 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1186

(2009)).6

       “A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1) attempts to cause

serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly

or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the

value of human life; [or] (4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly

causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon[.]”            18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2702(a)(1) and (4). “Because direct evidence of intent is often unavailable,

intent to cause serious bodily injury may be shown by the circumstances

____________________________________________

6 While it likely goes without saying, the head is a vital part of the body.   See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Mattison, 82 A.3d 386, 392 (Pa. 2013).

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surrounding the attack.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa.

Super. 2007) (citation omitted). “In determining whether intent was proven

from such circumstances, the fact finder is free to conclude ‘the accused

intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions to result

therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rosado, 684 A.2d 605, 608

(Pa. Super. 1996)).

      Finally, with regard to criminal conspiracy,

      A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to
      commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its
      commission he:
         (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or
         one or more of them will engage in conduct which
         constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to
         commit such crime; or
         (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the
         planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or
         solicitation to commit such crime.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). “Circumstantial evidence may provide proof of the

conspiracy. The conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding

such conduct may create a web of evidence linking the accused to the alleged

conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schoff, 911 A.2d at 160 (citation

omitted). Further,

      [a]n agreement can be inferred from a variety of circumstances
      including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties,
      knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the
      circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal
      episode. These factors may coalesce to establish a conspiratorial
      agreement beyond a reasonable doubt where one factor alone
      might fail.

Id. (citation omitted).

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      As the trial court appreciated:

      An explicit or formal agreement to commit crimes can seldom, if
      ever, be proved and it need not be, for proof of a criminal
      partnership is almost invariably extracted from the circumstances
      that attend its activities. Thus, a conspiracy may be inferred
      where it is demonstrated that the relation, conduct, or
      circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts of the co-
      conspirators sufficiently prove the formation of a criminal
      confederation. The conduct of the parties and the circumstances
      surrounding their conduct may create a web of evidence linking
      the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 7 (quoting Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103

A.3d 1, 43 (Pa. Super. 2014) (additional citation omitted)).

      Viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to

the verdict winner, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to

find every element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. As the trial

court cogently observed, “Appellant’s threats to Leo Larios, the video

surveillance footage, and the fact [Appellant] was present at the scene of the

shooting wearing a ski mask in the middle of August, and his admissions to

C.I. Snell were all indicative of his guilt.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 9.

Appellant’s sufficiency argument fails.

      In his second issue, Appellant argues that the verdicts were against the

weight of the evidence. This issue was properly preserved in Appellant’s post-

sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3) (“A claim that the verdict was

against the weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a

motion for a new trial . . . in a post-sentence motion.”). “A motion for new

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trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence,

concedes     that   there    is   sufficient   evidence   to   sustain   the   verdict.”

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).7

       As this Court reiterated in Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077

(Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc):

       The law pertaining to weight of the evidence is well settled:

          The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the
          finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the
          evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
          A new trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in
          the testimony and must have a stronger foundation than a
          reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. Rather, the
          role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding
          all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight
          that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the
          facts is to deny justice. On appeal, our purview is extremely
          limited and is confined to whether the trial court abused its
          discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock its
          conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim
          consists of a review of the trial court's exercise of discretion,
          not a review of the underlying question of whether the
          verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate
          court may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to
          the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Id. at 1090 (quoting Commonwealth v Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citations omitted)).

____________________________________________

7 In his brief, Appellant suggests that a weight of evidence argument concedes

that “there might have been legally sufficient evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at
54 (citing Commonwealth v. Hunter, 768 A.2d 1136, 1143 (Pa. Super.
2001)). However, Hunter does not suggest that there might have been
sufficient evidence. In fact, Hunter quotes the above language from Widmer
stating that a weight challenge concedes that there is sufficient evidence to
sustain a conviction.

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      The thrust of Appellant’s weight challenge relates to the credibility of

Mr. Larios and to what Appellant considers the “slipshod nature” of the

investigation. However, as this Court has recognized:

      “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact,
      who is free to believe all, none[,] or some of the evidence and to
      determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v.
      Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation marks
      and quotation omitted). Resolving contradictory testimony and
      questions of credibility are matters for the finder of fact.
      Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa. Super.
      2000). It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment
      for that of the trier of fact. Talbert, supra.

      Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
      trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying the weight challenge
      raised in the lower court; this Court does not review the
      underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight
      of the evidence. See id.

         Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and
         see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the
         gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced
         by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s
         determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
         evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting
         or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that
         the verdict was or was not against the weight of the
         evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the
         interest of justice.

      Id. at 546 (quotation omitted). Furthermore, “[i]n order for a
      defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence,
      the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the
      verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” Id. (quotation marks
      and quotation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 311 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(alterations in original).

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      With respect to both the credibility of Mr. Larios and the investigation

conducted following the shooting, counsel—and especially counsel for

Appellant’s   co-defendant—conducted       a   thorough   and    effective   cross-

examination of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, challenging not only the

credibility of Mr. Larios but also the criminal investigators’ purported failure to

consider other “culprits,” collect evidence, and order DNA testing on cigarette

butts and other items observed near the scene of the shooting. Nevertheless,

the trial court rejected Appellant’s weight of the evidence challenge and

concluded that

      while no eyewitness placed the Appellant at the scene of the
      shooting, the evidence [as summarized in the court’s analysis of
      the sufficiency of evidence issue], including the Appellant’s
      admission, was more than enough for the jury to conclude that
      the Appellant was guilty of crimes that were charged. There was
      nothing shocking about the jury’s verdict.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/22, at 10.

      We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting

Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim. Because the verdict was not “so

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice,” we shall not

disturb the court’s ruling.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/13/2023

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