Court Opinion

ID: 9721906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:12:14.823201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:24.700400
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, J.
(dissenting). I dissent in this case because the majority, expanding upon the reasonable requirements contained in sec. 343.15(2), Stats., has overlooked the impact of their decision upon the rationale for the settlement of cases as set forth in Pierringer v. Hog-er, 21 Wis.2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963). The plaintiff in this case executed a Pierringer-type release that, according to its terms, released the driver, Jimmy Zollicof-fer; the owner of the vehicle, Dorothy Laurence; and the American Family Insurance Company (the owner’s insurer) , of: *205ties herein released are found to be liable to me/us as a consequence of the above accident.”
*204“. . . that fraction, portion or percentage of the total cause of action of claim for damages I/we now have or may hereafter possess against all parties responsible for my/our damages which shall by trial or other disposition, be determined to be the sum of the fractions, portions, or percentages of causal negligence for which the par-
*205At the same time, the release expressly reserved:
“. . . the balance of the whole cause of action or any other claim of whatever kind or nature not released which I/we may have or hereafter have against any other person or persons arising out of the above accident.”
The effect of a Pierringer release is that it shields the settling defendant from a potential claim for contribution by the nonsettling party (defendant) thus allowing those who choose with full knowledge and deliberation to compromise their claim to buy their way out of the lawsuit. At trial, the primary inquiry is to determine the percentage of causal negligence attributable to the non-settling defendant — in this case Brooksie Zollicoffer, the sponsor of her son, Jimmy Zollicoffer, (sec. 343.15(2), Stats.). Although the settling defendants (Jimmy Zol-licoffer, Dorothy Laurence and American Family Insurance Co.), by virtue of the Pierringer release, are no longer parties to the action, their negligence, if any, must be considered only for the purpose of allocating the causal negligence between the plaintiff and the settling and nonsettling defendants. As this court stated in Pierrin-ger v. Hoger, supra:
“The issue between the plaintiff and the nonsettling defendant, which should be framed by an amendment to the pleadings, is the percentage of causal negligence, if any, of the nonsettling defendant, but such percentage of negligence can only be determined by a proper allocation of all the causal negligence, if any, of all of the joint tort-feasors and of the plaintiff if contributory negligence is involved.” (Emphased supplied.) Id. at 192-193.
Thus, the negligence of the defendant is not judged in a vacuum; instead, a determination is made as to each and every party involved in the accident — the plaintiff, settling defendants, etc. A Pierringer release in effect *206states that the consideration for which the release was granted will serve to satisfy whatever percentage of negligence is found to be attributable to the settling parties at trial. It is in effect a gamble: the plaintiff surrenders a portion of his cause of action without knowing in advance how large or small the share he has given away will be — perhaps even the entire cause of action. The effect of the plaintiff’s gamble on the nonsettling defendant (s) has been well documented. Peiffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 51 Wis.2d 329, 187 N.W.2d 182 (1971). With the execution of a Pierringer release, the plaintiff has been satisfied to the extent of the negligence of the settling defendant (s). Thus, all that the nonsettling defendant will be liable for is the amount of damages proportionate to the percentage of negligence attributable to him. In other words, he will only be required to pay his “fair share” of the damages caused — no more, no less.
A prime example of how the nonsettling party’s liability is to be determined is expressed in the case of Peiffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra. In Peiffer, the plaintiff executed a release identical to the one in the case at bar except that it involved a specific reservation of rights against the driver of the automobile involved in the accident and the driver’s insurer. The plaintiff argued that this particular reservation entitled him to seek recovery for whatever portion of the cause of action he chose to pursue against the nonsettling defendant, possibly even the whole of the judgment, if he so desired. The court rejected this contention, holding that the plaintiff had been satisfied to the extent of the negligence of the settling defendants at the time he executed their release thus, his recovery against the nonsettling parties was limited to that “unsatisfied percentage of the damages — the percentage attributable to the nonsettling tort-feasor . . . .” Peiffer, supra at 335. In other words, Peiffer stands specifically for the point that the nonset-*207tling defendant is responsible only for the percentage of negligence that is not attributable to the settling defendants.
As basic and well-understood as the above principles may be, their application to the present case along the lines mandated by the majority presents problems. According to Pierringer, at the trial against the nonsettling defendant, Brooksie Zollicoffer, (sponsor of the minor driver, Jimmy Zollicoffer) a determination must be made as to the percentages of negligence attributable to each of the parties involved in the accident. Then, as per the Peiffer decision, the nonsettling defendant would be responsible only for that amount not satisfied by the previously released defendants — the “unsatisfied percentage of the damages.”
However, in the case at bar there exists no unsatisfied percentage of the plaintiff’s cause of action. When Leon Swanigan (plaintiff) executed the release involving Jimmy Zollicoffer, Dorothy Laurence and her insurer he in effect released all the parties to the action who were actively negligent and all those who could have been responsible for a percentage of the total negligence.1 The amount satisfied by the released defendants in fact equals 100%, thus leaving nothing to be assigned to the non-settling defendant, Brooksie Zollicoffer. Therefore, according to the procedure of Pierringer and the rationale of Peiffer, it is impossible to hold the nonsettling defendant liable for any damages. To rule otherwise would be to violate the firmly established principles set forth in Pierringer and Peiffer and render their continued value as precedent worthless.
*208The majority, in its effort to afford the plaintiff full compensation, has announced a rule that confounds the law relating to the effect of a Pierringer release. As stated before, the execution of every release of this type is a gamble. The plaintiff is releasing a part of his cause of action without being sure of whether or not he is getting his money’s worth. But as in every gamble, there is also a risk of loss. This is not the first time that a plaintiff has settled for less than his case would conceivably have been worth with a favorable jury verdict. With a jury trial, you always take a chance. You may be either a king or a pauper when the judge gavels the next case.
In any event, the rule of Peiffer remains the same: the nonsettling defendant is responsible only for that portion of the causal negligence attributable to him. Where, as in this case, the plaintiff released all of the parties whose causal negligence contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries, the nonsettling defendant cannot be held liable because of the execution of the release.

 The discussion herein dismisses any negligence that could be attributable to Maria Busalacchi, as her negligence, if any, is not at issue in this case.