Court Opinion

ID: 9768947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:58:49.089622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:17.180613
License: Public Domain

HENLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
My disagreement with the principal opinion on the double jeopardy question is not based on the suggested theory that the municipal court conviction was procured by collusion with the municipal judges and attorney. Rather, my disagreement is based on the proposition that the defense of double jeopardy is a shield behind which a defendant may take refuge, not a weapon to be used to enforce a defense actively sought and obtained by him to avoid the effect of a more serious charge.
“The prohibition against double jeopardy is a doctrine or concept designed to restrain the sovereign power, and to prevent the government from unduly harassing an accused. It is designed to protect an individual from being subject to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense; and the idea underlying the doctrine is that the state, with all its resources and power, should not .be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby * * * compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity * * *22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 238, p. 620; Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-199, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959). See also: State v. Cole, 48 Mo. 70 (1871). In other words, it is designed to help equalize the position of government and the individual. It is not designed for use by one who, to establish absolution from a felony charge, actively solicits and secures his own conviction of a less severe charge; in this case, that of violating a municipal ordinance, a charge which had lain dormant for months without an information having been filed until he began to push those who could resurrect it.
There can be no doubt that relator1 actively and persistently sought his conviction of the Bridgeton municipal ordinance violation in time to establish for himself a double jeopardy defense against the more serious charge he knew was pending against him. The sole and only action taken on behalf of the city in connection with the municipal ordinance violation, not taken at the request and insistence of the relator, was the filing of the unverified complaint by the arresting officer on the evening of the offense. All other action taken was the result, directly or indirectly, of relator’s request, which, according to the first letter to the municipal judge, was for the purpose of resolving that matter promptly so that “it would relieve Mr. Weaver of the felony charge now pending against him.”
*69In these circumstances, I would hold that the defense of double jeopardy is not available to relator in the felony charge pending against him in St. Louis county.
I also disagree with the holding of the principal opinion that prohibition is an appropriate remedy in this case. I would not sanction what amounts to interlocutory review of rulings of the trial court in criminal cases, primarily because the delay it fosters hinders effective administration of justice. Clearly, the trial court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the criminal proceeding out of which this action arose, jurisdiction of the person of relator, and jurisdiction to rule on relator’s motion to dismiss that charge. Appeal is an adequate remedy in this case. State, ex rel. Meador et al. v. Williams, Judge et al., 117 Mo.App. 564, 92 S.W. 151 (1906). I would hold that prohibition does not lie.
I would discharge our provisional rule.

. Defendant in the case of State v. Weaver, No. 346304, pending in the circuit court of St. Louis county, in which he was charged by information pursuant to § 564.440(3), RSMo 1969 with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (DWI), a felony since the information charged that he had been charged with and convicted of two prior DWI offenses (October 1, 1972, and January, 1973).