Court Opinion

ID: 9720293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:24:45.174446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:15.502104
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in my colleagues’ opinion insofar as it recognizes appellant’s right to challenge the constitutionality of the Minnesota conviction by mandamus against the department in a California court. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds the Minnesota conviction invalid and reverses the trial court’s denial of the petition. I quite agree with the majority that a driver who leaves California does not leave behind his federal constitutional rights, and I further agree that in testing the constitutionality of out-of-state convictions we refer to federal constitutional rights and are governed by the United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting these rights. I respectfully part company with my colleagues, however, when they hold that applying such federal authority, appellant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his Minnesota conviction was obtained in violation of those rights. In effect the majority holds that unless the record expressly reflects a specific waiver of appellant’s right to confront his accusers, federal law deems that his plea of guilty is not intelligent and voluntary, citing Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709].
But Boykin does not so hold. Boykin recited the major three constitutional rights that the accused waives by his plea of guilty and held that the waiver of these rights cannot be presumed from a silent record;1 the “silent *1499record” therein revealed that “the judge asked no question of petitioner concerning his plea,2 and petitioner did not address the court.”3 Moreover, Boykin did not prescribe any procedure as to how the defendant’s constitutional rights must be waived; instead it indicated only that the waiver of rights must appear in some way in the record. As our California Supreme Court observed in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 130 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449]: “The quoted language [in Boykin], while not establishing precise guidelines, makes clear that a plea of guilty cannot stand unless the record in some manner indicates a free and intelligent waiver of the three enumerated rights necessarily abandoned by a guilty plea and an understanding of the nature and consequences of the plea.” (Italics added.) It follows that a strict requirement that in a guilty plea procedure each of the three constitutional rights must be specifically enumerated and the specific waiver of each must appear upon the face of the record is not a federal constitutional requisite; it is only one interpretation of Boykin made by some state courts, including California. That contrary interpretations are reasonable was even conceded in In re Tahl itself: “There are at least two plausible interpretations of Boykin. First, it may be sufficient that there are statements and facts in the record from which a reasonable presumption could be drawn that a defendant has been apprised of and has voluntarily waived his rights, and has intelligently pleaded guilty. . . . [fl] [T]he second possible interpretation of Boykin: that each of the three rights mentioned— self incrimination, confrontation, and jury trial—must be specifically and expressly enumerated for the benefit of and waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea. . . .” (Id., at pp. 130-132.)
While California and many other states adopted the second stringent test, it is clear that such rigid interpretation of Boykin is neither required nor followed by the United States Supreme Court and the federal cases. Under the latter authorities, which control the present case, the specific articulation of Boykin rights is not necessary as long as the record reflects that the guilty plea was entered by the accused understandingly and voluntarily.4 The examples illustrating this point are numerous.
Thus, in Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742 [25 L.Ed.2d 747, 90 S.Ct. 1463], the United States Supreme Court, citing Boykin, upheld a guilty plea as voluntary and intelligent even though the defendant had not *1500been specifically advised of the three rights discussed in Boykin. In clarifying Boykin the court stated: “The requirement that a plea of guilty must be intelligent and voluntary to be valid has long been recognized. . . . The new element added in Boykin was the requirement that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.” (Id., at p. 748, fn. 4 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 756], italics added.)
In North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 [27 L.Ed.2d 162, 91 S.Ct. 160], the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that Boykin merely required that the plea be voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and underlined that neither Boykin nor due process requires a listing (and for that matter an explicit waiver) of the defendant’s constitutional rights. As the court remarked: “The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” (Id., at p. 31 [27 L.Ed.2d at p. 168].)
The federal cases are in accord with the principles set out above. For example, in Wilkins v. Erickson (9th Cir. 1974) 505 F.2d 761, the defendant launched a collateral attack against his conviction by contending that the guilty plea was invalid because he was neither advised nor did he waive his constitutional rights enumerated in Boykin. The Ninth Circuit rejected defendant’s contention and relying primarily on Brady and Alford held that Boykin does not require specific articulation of the three constitutional rights in a state proceeding. (Id., at p. 763.) And most recently, in Gonzales v. Grammer (8th Cir. 1988) 848 F.2d 894, the defendant sought to set aside his guilty plea on similar grounds. In reply, State of Nebraska contended that the plea was not vulnerable to attack for a failure to enumerate the defendant’s rights because the Nebraska state law did not require an express articulation of Boykin rights prior to entry of a guilty plea. While the court held that under the circumstances of the case the waiver was invalid, it agreed with the state by pointing out that under Brady, Alford, and a great number of federal cases, a line-by-line recitation of constitutional rights at a plea proceeding is not required by Boykin or due process and that the main test of the validity of the plea is whether the plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. (Id., at pp. 897-898.) Finally, in Stacey v. Solem (8th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 1048, the defendant complained that his guilty plea was legally ineffective because (a) the trial court failed to apprise him that by accepting the plea he waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to confront witnesses, and (b) he failed to specifically tell the court that he understood his rights and waived them. The reviewing court disagreed in emphasizing that “ ‘Boykin does not require the express articulation and waiver of these three rights at the time the plea is entered,’ ” citing Todd v. Lockhart (8th Cir. 1974) 490 F.2d 626, 628, footnote 1, and that *1501“ ‘there is no constitutional requirement that the trial court employ a particular litany to validate the guilty plea.’ ” (Citing Rouse v. Foster (8th Cir. 1982) 672 F.2d 649, 651; Stacey v. Solem, supra, 801 F.2d at p. 1050.) Consistent therewith, the court applied the Brady-Alford standard and held that the plea remained valid because the evidence established that the defendant was adequately informed of his rights and the totality of the circumstances showed a voluntary and intelligent waiver on his part.
Pursuant to such applicable federal authority, the Minnesota court herein was well justified in sustaining the validity of the Minnesota conviction based upon appellant’s guilty plea. The court’s findings show that prior to the entry of the guilty plea appellant completed and signed an acknowledgement of rights form in Minnesota. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1497, fn. 8.) As explained in State v. Rau (Minn.Ct.App. 1985) 367 N.W.2d 613, 616, the acknowledgement of rights form advises the defendant, among others, of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to jury trial. By signing the form appellant thus acknowledged that he had been made aware of the rights he waived by entering his guilty plea. The court findings further indicate that at his court appearance, prior to entry of the formal plea, appellant was further advised of a number of constitutional rights and voluntarily waived them. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1497, fn. 8.) Since this record clearly demonstrates that appellant’s plea was voluntary and intelligent, the plea must be upheld under applicable federal law, even if appellant was not specifically advised of and did not expressly waive his right to confront witnesses at the time of his court appearance. Therefore, I would affirm the order denying the petition.
The petition of real party in interest Department of Motor Vehicles for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 16, 1989. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

“Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. [Citation.] Second, is the right to trial by jury. [Citation.] Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers. [Citation.] We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.” (Boykin v. Alabama, supra, at p. 243 [23 L.Ed.2d at pp. 279-280]; fn. omitted.)

To a capital crime.

Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at page 239 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 277].

“It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” (Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 242 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 279], italics added.) “[T]here was reversible error ‘because the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his plea of guilty.’ ” (Id., at p. 244 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 280], italics added.)