Court Opinion

ID: 9735625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:26:03.472169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:12.733771
License: Public Domain

Daly, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to agree with the majority of the court in their conclusions. In my opinion, there is no ambiguity in the language used in either paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of the arbitration agreement. In the first of these it is provided: “All of the differences existing between the parties . . . are hereby referred for hearing *198and decision to a three man board . . . .” In the second it is provided: “If one of the arbitrators named by the parties hereto dies, resigns, or for any reason is unable to act, the party appointing him shall name his successor within three days. Both parties have the right of substitution of their respective arbitrators at any time without in any way affecting the proceedings.” The majority opinion rests upon the proposition that the words “at any time” are ambiguous. The differences between the parties were referred “for hearing and decision to a three man board.” The existence of the board, according to the agreement of the parties, continued from the time of the selection of the third arbitrator until the time of the decision. Consequently, since the words “at any time,” when given their ordinary meaning, are clear and definite, they are capable of precise application to the determination of the time when a party shall name a substitute arbitrator. Trumbull Electric Mfg. Co. v. John Cooke Co., 130 Conn. 12, 16, 31 A.2d 393.
The words “at any time” permitted the party naming the substitute arbitrator to do so within the three-day period, at any stage of the proceedings before a decision was made. To read the agreement otherwise would be to give effect, not to the intention clearly and definitely expressed in it, but to the conclusion reached by a majority of the court as to the intention they believed the parties had. Courts of law must allow parties to make their own contracts, and they can enforce only such contracts as the parties actually make. When a written contract is clear and unequivocal, as is the one in this case, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone. A meaning cannot be given to it other than that expressed, whether it is wise or *199unwise, reasonable or unreasonable. The court cannot read into the contract words it does not contain. Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Chase Brass & Copper Workers Union, 139 Conn. 591, 595, 96 A.2d 209; Lakitsch v. Brand, 99 Conn. 388, 393, 121 A. 865; Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218, 223. “Where a contract makes provision for a certain contingency, it is not for a court to import into the contract some other and different provision for the same contingency.” Straus v. Kazemekas, 100 Conn. 581, 593, 124 A. 234; Whitaker v. Cannon Mills Co., 132 Conn. 434, 440, 45 A.2d 120.
In addition, the majority opinion appears to be based, at least in part, upon the proposition that FitzGerald resigned after the three arbitrators had considered a tentative draft of a proposed award and after the case had been “practically decided.” There is no support for this in the facts found by the trial court.
The two members of the board who purported to make a decision after FitzGerald’s resignation were entitled to exercise only such power as the agreement of the parties authorized. Indeed, the basic test of the validity of an award lies in its conformity to the agreement providing for the submission to arbitration. American Brass Co. v. Torrington Brass Workers’ Union, 141 Conn. 514, 521, 107 A.2d 255; Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Chase Brass & Copper Workers Union, supra, 594. The two arbitrators had no authority to deprive the plaintiff of the right, given by the agreement, to name a successor arbitrator within three days from the time when FitzGerald resigned. In my opinion the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award.
In this opinion Alcokh, J., concurred.