Court Opinion

ID: 9955987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 22:02:33.272259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:28.858022
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 P. v. Rogers CA4/2

                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E080419

 v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. RIF100702)

 MELISSA SUE ROGERS,                                                      OPINION

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John M. Monterosso,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Lynne

McGinnis and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorney Generals, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                              1
       Defendant and appellant Melissa Sue Rogers petitioned the trial court for

resentencing on her first degree murder conviction due to defendant not being the actual

killer. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6.)1 In a prior opinion, this court reversed the trial court’s

denial of defendant’s petition. On remand, the trial court again denied defendant’s

petition. Defendant contends the trial court erred. We affirm.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.     CRIMES AND CONFESSION

       Defendant, Anthony Brown (Brown), and J.H.2 planned to steal money from a 99

Cent Store. In November 2001, the three entered the store. Defendant carried a sawed-

off shotgun. Defendant pointed the shotgun at the victim, who worked at the store.

After Brown took money from the victim, he directed defendant to “slit [the victim’s]

throat, because [the victim] would be able to identify them.” Defendant slashed the

victim’s throat “[f]rom ear to ear” with a steak knife, but he did not immediately die.

Rather, the victim fought Brown, who then stabbed the victim and ordered defendant to

shoot the victim. Defendant walked over to the victim, pointed the shotgun at him, and

pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire. Brown took the shotgun from defendant and

shot the victim’s chest, killing the victim. Defendant confessed to the police that she

aided in murdering the victim.

       1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

       2 J.H. was a minor at the time of the crimes; hence the suppression of his name.

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       B.      INFORMATION, PLEA, AND SENTENCING

       In April 2002, in an information, the Riverside County District Attorney charged

defendant with premeditated murder. (§§ 187, subd. (a) & former 189 [eff. Jan. 2000].)

The prosecutor alleged the special circumstance that the murder occurred during a

robbery (§ 211), thereby qualifying defendant for life in prison or the death penalty.

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) The prosecutor further alleged that defendant personally

used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and was the principal in a felony while another

principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).

       In December 2002, defendant pled guilty to first degree murder (§§ 187, subd.

(a) & 189) and the enhancement of personally using a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).

The stipulated sentence was 10 years plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life. The

trial court sentenced defendant as stipulated by the parties.

       C.      PETITION

       In December 2019, defendant petitioned to be resentenced. (§ 1170.95.) On her

form petition, defendant did not mark the box next to the line reading, “I did not, with

the intent kill, aid, abet, . . . or assist the actual killer in the commission of murder in the

first degree.” Additionally, defendant did not mark the box next to the line reading, “I

was not a major participant in the felony or I did not act with reckless indifference to

human life during the course of the crime or felony.” (Emphasis in the original.)

       D.      FIRST RULING AND APPEAL

       The trial court denied defendant’s petition, and this court reversed. This court

concluded: “On appeal, Rogers argues the trial judge erred by accepting the

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prosecution’s representation of the facts at the prima facie stage and by failing to give

her the opportunity to brief the issues. The People correctly concede this was error. We

therefore reverse and remand for the trial judge to determine whether Rogers is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing on her petition by conducting a proper prima facie review,

with the benefit of briefing from the parties.”

       E.     HEARING ON REMAND

       On remand, defendant’s trial court attorney said, “I don’t know why we’re here.

I don’t know why the court of appeal did what they did.” The trial court said

defendant’s petition could be summarily denied because she failed to declare that she

lacked the intent to kill. However, the trial court believed that the problem could be

fixed, so the petition “would come back.” Therefore, the trial court issued an order to

show cause and immediately held the evidentiary hearing. The prosecutor immediately

submitted on his written opposition, which argued defendant “aided and abetted murder

with intent to kill.” The reporter’s transcript of defendant’s preliminary hearing was

attached to the prosecutor’s opposition. Defendant’s trial counsel said he had read the

prosecutor’s opposition and immediately submitted without presenting an argument.

       The trial court found there was “overwhelming evidence, of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt that [defendant] harbored the specific intent to kill.” The trial court

noted that defendant was “the one who sliced the throat of the victim,” and denied

defendant’s petition for resentencing.

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                                      DISCUSSION

       A.     ACTUAL KILLER

       Defendant contends the trial court and prosecutor erred by labeling defendant as

the actual killer. The trial court said, “I find that there is a great argument where she’s

an actual—she may not have been the one who finally issued the thing that caused the

victim to stop breathing, but she slashed his throat, and that was indeed a life-

threatening injury. So there’s an argument that she is a cause of the person’s death.”

       After that statement, the trial court went on to find that defendant was a major

participant in the murder and that she acted with the intent to kill. In order to be granted

relief under section 1172.6, defendant needed to show she “could not presently be

convicted of murder.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Express malice murder, i.e., a killing

with manifest intent to kill (§ 188, subd. (a)), was not removed from the Penal Code.

Because the trial court found defendant aided and abetted with the intent to kill she does

not qualify for relief under section 1172.6. Therefore, any error in the comments about

defendant theoretically qualifying as an actual killer is harmless.

       B.     DEFENDANT’S PRESENCE

       Defendant contends the trial court erred by holding the evidentiary hearing

without her being present or waiving her presence. Defendant had a right to be present

at the evidentiary hearing on her petition. (People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46,

58.) Defendant did not attend the hearing, and there is no record of defendant waiving

her presence. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred.

                                              5
       “If a [defendant] was not present at [an evidentiary] hearing, the reviewing court

must determine ‘whether his [or her] absence was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ ” (People v. Quan (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524, 536.) Defendant asserts the

error is prejudicial because if she were present then she could have corrected the

prosecutor’s misstatement that defendant killed the victim. The trial court knew that

defendant did not fire the shot that killed the victim. The trial court said, “[S]he may

have not been the one who finally issued the thing that caused the victim to stop

breathing, but she slashed his throat, and that was indeed a life-threatening injury.”

Thus, defendant’s presence would not have impacted the trial court’s correct

understanding that Brown—not defendant—fired the fatal shot.

       Defendant contends the error is prejudicial because if she were present then she

could have testified that she lacked the intent to kill, hence her infliction of non-fatal

wounds. Defendant slashed the victim’s throat from “ear to ear,” pointed a shotgun at

the victim, and pulled the trigger. In light of those facts, if defendant testified that she

only intended to assault the victim, those self-serving statements would not have caused

the petition to be granted. No reasonable finder of fact would have found that defendant

lacked the intent to kill.

       Defendant asserts that if she were present, then she could have testified about

Brown’s mental control over her.3 Section 1172.6 provides relief for people who could

not be convicted of murder due to changes in the law related to felony murder and the

       3 At the time, Brown was engaging in sexual activity with J.H., who was a minor
and male.

                                              6
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) It is not a means to

seek relief for a defense of mental duress. Therefore, such testimony would have been

irrelevant.

       Defendant asserts the evidence of her mental state would have been relevant to

her status as an aider and abettor. Defendant was charged with premeditated murder.

“[D]uress cannot, as a matter of law, negate the intent, malice or premeditation elements

of a first degree murder,” therefore duress cannot “negate the requisite intent for one

charged with aiding and abetting a first degree murder.” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35

Cal.4th 264, 290.)

       In sum, the error of defendant not being present is harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless error standard].)

       C.     POLICE REPORTS

              1.     PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The trial court judge was familiar with the facts of the case because he

resentenced defendant’s codefendant, J.H., on remand from his appeal. During

defendant’s hearing, the trial judge said that, when preparing for J.H.’s resentencing, the

judge had read “a lot of the police reports.”

              2.     ANALYSIS

       Defendant contends the police reports utilized in J.H.’s resentencing hearing

should have been excluded from defendant’s hearing. Defendant asserts we should not

find the issue forfeited because that finding will lead to an argument of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

                                                7
       For the sake of judicial efficiency, we will assume there was error and move to

the issue of prejudice. There is nothing indicating that the trial court’s understanding of

the facts was incorrect: Defendant slashed the victim’s throat, pointed a shotgun at the

victim, pulled the trigger, and the shotgun did not fire. The facts are confirmed by the

preliminary hearing transcript. (People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 988 [“In

cases where the conviction resulted from a guilty plea rather than a trial, the record of

conviction may include the transcript of the defendant’s preliminary hearing testimony

when the transcript ‘reliably reflect[s] the facts of the offense for which the defendant

was convicted’ ”].) Therefore, any error in the trial court having read the police reports

was harmless.

       D.     KNIFE USE

       Defendant contends the trial court erred by relying on evidence concerning

defendant slashing the victim’s throat because the enhancement allegation of personal

use of a knife was dismissed as part of defendant’s plea agreement. Defendant is

mistaken. The knife enhancement was alleged in the complaint, and the trial court held

defendant to answer on all charges, but the knife enhancement was not alleged in the

information. Therefore, there was no knife-use enhancement to be dismissed following

defendant’s plea.

       Nevertheless, if defendant were correct about a knife enhancement being

dismissed as part of her plea agreement, we would reject her contention to the extent she

is asking us to review the trial court’s reasoning. (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th

1266, 1295, fn. 12 [“ ‘we review the ruling, not the court’s reasoning’ ”].) To the extent

                                             8
she is asserting the trial court relied on improper evidence, that objection was not

preserved in the lower court. By submitting on the basis of the preliminary hearing

transcript, defendant forfeited her evidentiary objection. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a);

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434.)

       However, if the issue were preserved and if we were to conclude the evidence

should have been excluded, then the error was harmless because the intent to kill is also

supported by defendant pointing a shotgun at the victim and pulling the trigger. If the

knife evidence were excluded, then the order denying defendant’s petition would not

change due to defendant aiding and abetting the murder with the intent to kill. (See

People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 968 [evidentiary error is reviewed under the

standard requiring defendant to “ ‘ “show it is reasonably probable a more favorable

result would have been obtained absent the error” ’ ”].)

                                       DISPOSITION

       The order is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                       MILLER
                                                                               Acting P. J.

We concur:

FIELDS
                                  J.

MENETREZ
                                  J.

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