Court Opinion

ID: 9680953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:41:37.972188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.553195
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Judge,
dissenting.
As I understand it, the majority opinion reasons as follows: (1) the Court of Appeals held that a trial court cannot dismiss a case without the prosecutor’s consent unless the reason for dismissal is one of several on an exclusive list of reasons, (2) the Court of Appeals held that the reason for dismissal in this case was not on that exclusive list, but (3) the list set out by the Court of Appeals is not in fact exclusive, therefore (4) the case must be remanded to determine whether the reason for dismissal is one that empowers the trial court to dismiss the case without the prosecutor’s consent. I believe the inquiry in (4) is one that we ourselves should conduct at this juncture. The Court of Appeals decided that the Department of Human Services payment arrangement was not the type of error that permitted a trial court to dismiss the cause without the prosecutor’s consent. We are properly in a position to review that decision. Although the reasoning supporting that decision may include a misstep, we may nevertheless review the decision without remanding the case first to correct a flaw in the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. See Cain v. *44State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264-265 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)(disagreeing with Court of Appeals substantial compliance analysis but deciding the issue of harm); Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(disagreeing with Court of Appeals repudiation of affirmative links analysis without a remand); Jamail v. State, 787 S.W.2d 880, 384 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853, 111 S.Ct. 148, 112 L.Ed.2d 115 (1990)(Court of Appeals opinion did not adequately address grounds raised by appellant, but this Court addressed those grounds without a remand);1 Dorsey v. State, 709 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex.Crim.App.1986)(dis-agreeing with Court of Appeals’ reasoning regarding attitudes of victim concerning the defendant’s punishment). While we may remand to a Court of Appeals to re-analyze a case after pointing out flaws in its reasoning, we need not do so.
And in this case, we should not do so. Whether the complained of prosecutorial misconduct permits a trial court’s dismissal of the indictment is an issue that will almost certainly be addressed by this Court regardless of the Court of Appeals’ disposition of the issue on remand. Moreover, appellant has a second ground for review that was granted. If the State prevails on remand on the first ground, the second ground will necessarily be granted on a subsequent appellant’s petition. Neither the State nor the appellant are served by delaying the disposition of this ease.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment insofar as it overturns the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment. The majority is correct in saying that the list given by the Court of Appeals is not exclusive; nevertheless, most errors, constitutional or otherwise, do not authorize a trial court’s dismissal of an indictment, with prejudice, without the State’s consent. “[Tjhere is no general authority, written or unwritten, inherent or implied, which would permit a trial court to dismiss a case without the prosecutor’s consent.” State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Statutory violations confer authority to dismiss an indictment with prejudice only where the statute so provides. See Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 32.01 and former Article 28.061 (1996)(dismissal for failure to bring prosecution within grand jury term);2 Article 51.14 (Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act). Some constitutional violations, by their nature, confer authority on the trial court to dismiss when dismissal is necessary to protect the constitutional right. Two classic examples are the right against double jeopardy and the right to a speedy trial.
But most constitutional violations do not require such a drastic remedy. “[Rjeversal of the conviction and ... the provision of a new trial free of prejudicial error normally are adequate means of vindicating the constitutional rights of the accused.” United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 268, 102 S.Ct. 3081, 3084, 73 L.Ed.2d 754 (1982)(ellipsis inserted). Dismissal with prejudice is a drastic remedy “rarely seen in criminal law, even for constitutional violations.” Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 368, 114 S.Ct. 2291, 2307, 129 L.Ed.2d 277, 300 (1994)(Blackmun, J. dissenting). Remedies should be tailored to remove the harm caused by the constitutional violation. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366-367 and 366 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668-669 and 668 n. 2, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981).
Moreover, some types of error or misconduct, constitutional or otherwise, cannot be remedied in a defendant’s criminal trial but must be remedied through other means, For example, disciplinary rule violations are not grounds for reversal of a conviction; any remedy for such violations must -be sought through processes provided by the State Bar. House v. State, 947 S.W.2d 251, 252-253 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman does not call for dismissal of the indictment, if the discrimination did not affect the composition of the grand jury and the foreman’s duties were only ministerial. Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 346, 104 S.Ct. 3093, *453097, 82 L.Ed.2d 260 (1984). And, some violations of the Fourth Amendment are not covered by the exclusionary rule. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995)(exclusionary rule does not require suppression of fruits of arrest on warrant that had been quashed where court employees failed to notify law enforcement that warrant had been quashed).
In the present case, appellee contends that the policy of the district attorney’s office of accepting compensation for prosecuting welfare cases violates Texas Government Code 41.004 and her constitutional rights to Due Process and Due Course of Law.3 None of those bases are sufficient to authorize the trial court’s dismissal of this cause. The statute contains no provision authorizing a dismissal with prejudice for its violation. In fact, the statute does not purport to confer any rights upon criminal defendants, but is by its nature a rule of ethical conduct for prosecutors; violations of the statute can be addressed through State Bar grievance procedures or criminal prosecution of the offending individuals. See Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 8.04(a)(12); Texas Penal Code § 39.02(a)(1). The present statutory violation is simply not the kind of violation that requires any remedy for a criminal defendant, much less the drastic remedy of dismissal with prejudice.
As for appellee’s constitutional claims, I believe they are patently without merit. Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation only if it significantly compromises the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3108-3109, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987)(improper question). See also Hobby, 468 U.S. at 345, 104 S.Ct. at 3097. The conduct in question simply does not rise to that level. While ethically questionable (and illegal), financial reward to the prosecuting office for commencing an otherwise meritorious prosecution does not render the defendant’s proceedings fundamentally unfair. And, that defendant still has the benefit of screening by a grand jury that is uninfluenced by financial concerns. Moreover, even if the compensation system created fairness concerns, to show a due process violation, appellee would have to show that the compensation scheme in some way influenced the decision to prosecute, and no evidence in the record supports that conclusion.4 Hence, I would hold that the compensation scheme does not present a ground for dismissing the indictment.
Moreover, even if the compensation scheme created a due process violation, less drastic remedies would adequately address the concerns raised. The trial court could order a dismissal of the indictment without prejudice and require the State to obtain an indictment only after waiving any compensation from the Department of Human Services. “Dismissal without prejudice is not a toothless sanction: it forces the Government to obtain a new indictment if it decides to reprosecute, and it exposes the prosecution to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.” United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 342, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 2422, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988)(interpreting federal speedy trial act). Requiring the State to obtain a new indictment without the influencing effect (to the extent that any exists) of the compensation scheme would be more than sufficient to cure any prejudice suffered by appellee. A dismissal with prejudice is simply constitutional overkill.
Hence, I would address the dismissal issue on its merits and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Then I would address appellee’s second ground for review concerning her motion to suppress.5 Because the Court fails to do so at this time, I must respectfully dissent.
HOLLAND, J., joins this dissent.

. Jamail was overruled on other grounds by Hardie v. State, 807 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

. The requirement that a prosecution be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with Article 32.01 has been repealed. See current Article 28.061.

. I do not perceive any conceptual distinction between the federal and State constitutional provisions in the present case. Hence, I subsume appellee’s Due Course claim in the Due Process discussion of this opinion.

. The only evidence shows the contrary.

. Because this is a dissent to the Court’s disposition on ground 1, I see no point in addressing ground 2 at this juncture, and I express no opinion as to its likely resolution.