Court Opinion

ID: 9961340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 16:06:57.403918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:38.607076
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                          Steven C. Clear,
                                                                             FILED
                                         Appellant-Defendant
                                                                        Apr 18 2024, 9:17 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                     v.                  Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

                                          State of Indiana,
                                           Appellee-Plaintiff

                                             April 18, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                            24A-CR-170
                             Appeal from the Shelby Superior Court
                            The Honorable David N. Riggins, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                         73D02-1603-F6-114

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                         Chief Judge Altice and Judge Felix concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-170 | April 18, 2024     Page 1 of 5
      Bradford, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   In 2018, Steven Clear was convicted of Level 5 felony operating a vehicle while

      intoxicated (“OWI”) and sentenced to an eleven-year term of incarceration. On

      January 16, 2024, Clear filed a verified petition for additional credit time, which

      the trial court denied the next day. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On May 30, 2018, after having been convicted of Level 5 felony OWI, Clear

      was sentenced to an eleven-year term of incarceration. On January 16, 2024,

      Clear petitioned for additional credit time. In his petition, Clear asserted that

      he had successfully completed “the Last Mile vocational education program”

      and was therefore entitled to additional educational credit time pursuant to

      Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.3(b).1 Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 3. The trial

      court denied Clear’s petition on January 17, 2024.

      Discussion and Decision

      1
        Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.3(b) provides that a person may earn educational credit if they meet the
      following three criteria: (1) is in credit Class I, Class A, or Class B; (2) demonstrates a pattern consistent with
      rehabilitation; and (3) successfully completes a qualifying technical- or vocational-education program,
      substance-abuse program, literacy and basic life-skills program, reformative program, or individualized case-
      management plan.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-170 | April 18, 2024                                      Page 2 of 5
[3]   Although Clear styled his request below as a verified petition for additional

      credit time, we have previously concluded that such a request “should be

      treated as a petition for post-conviction relief.” Wilson v. State, 785 N.E.2d

      1152, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

              Post-conviction procedures do not afford the convicted an
              opportunity for a super-appeal. Rather, they create a narrow
              remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions that
              must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction
              rules. Petitioners must establish their grounds for relief by a
              preponderance of the evidence. A petitioner who has been
              denied post-conviction relief appeals from a negative judgment.
              Therefore, the petitioner must convince the court on review that
              the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a
              decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. In
              other words, the defendant must convince this Court that there is
              no way within the law that the court below could have reached
              the decision it did.

      Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[4]   Clear argues that remand is necessary because the trial court denied the State

      the opportunity to respond to his petition when it denied his petition the day

      after he had filed it. In support, Clear points to Section 4 of Indiana Post-

      Conviction Rule 1, which provides that “[w]ithin thirty (30) days after the filing

      of the petition, … the [S]tate … shall respond by answer stating the reasons, if

      any, why the relief prayed for should not be granted.” Clear also cites to our

      decision in Wilson, in which we considered similar facts before concluding that

      the trial court had abused its discretion by denying Wilson’s petition seven days

      after it had been filed and “remand[ed] the case to the trial court with
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-170 | April 18, 2024           Page 3 of 5
      instructions to give the State a reasonable time to file an answer.” 785 N.E.2d

      at 1155. We do not find Wilson to be dispositive in this case, however, because

      Clear’s petition does not establish that he had exhausted all administrative

      remedies before filing his petition in the trial court.

[5]   When a request for educational credit time is denied, “a person must exhaust

      his administrative remedies within the [Department of Correction (“DOC”)]

      before appealing to a court because determinations altering credit time are the

      responsibility of the DOC.” Stevens v. State, 895 N.E.2d 418, 419 (Ind. Ct. App.

      2008); see also Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 982–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

      In Members, we concluded that

               because Members is challenging the DOC’s denial of his
               educational credit time, his grievance is with the DOC. He must,
               therefore, exhaust all of his administrative remedies with the
               DOC before resorting to the judicial system. Inasmuch as
               Members has failed to exhaust his available remedies within the
               DOC, the post-conviction court lacked subject matter
               jurisdiction[2] to entertain his education credit time complaint[.]

      851 N.E.2d at 983.

      2
        In the years since Members was handed down, Indiana courts have re-classified a failure to exhaust
      administrative remedies as a procedural default rather than a jurisdictional event. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v.
      Robertson, 19 N.E.3d 757, 760 (Ind. 2014), amended on reh'g, 27 N.E.3d 768 (Ind. 2015) (“We summarily
      affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion holding that the exhaustion of administrative remedies
      under AOPA is a procedural error and does not implicate the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.”).
      However, regardless of how the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is classified as the result is the
      same. One must exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-170 | April 18, 2024                                      Page 4 of 5
[6]   Similar to the situation in Members, the record in this case does not establish

      that Clear has exhausted his administrative remedies. At most, the record

      demonstrates that as of February 16, 2024, Clear’s request for additional

      educational credit time was pending in the DOC’s administrative process. As

      the matter remained pending in the DOC’s administrative process and no final

      decision as to whether Clear was entitled to additional educational credit had

      been made by the DOC when Clear filed his petition, Clear had not exhausted

      his administrative remedies as of that date. Clear has failed to convince us that

      the trial court erred in denying his petition as the evidence does not lead

      unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the trial

      court. See Wilson, 785 N.E.2d at 1153.

[7]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

      Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.

      APPELLANT PRO SE
      Steven C. Clear
      Greencastle, Indiana

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Theodore E. Rokita
      Attorney General of Indiana

      J.T. Whitehead
      Deputy Attorney General
      Indianapolis, Indiana

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-170 | April 18, 2024             Page 5 of 5