Court Opinion

ID: 9525006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:59:09.704833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:33.784712
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, specially concurring: I agree that the dismissal orders of the trial court should be affirmed, but I do not agree that Prest v. Sparta Community Unit School District No. 140 (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 569, 510 N.E.2d 595, should be repudiated in the process. I would hold the decision in Prest to be controlling as to whether a cause of action grounded on premises liability should be recognized here. In Prest, a student was seriously injured when he fell against a concrete riser adjacent to the gymnasium floor where he was participating in a physical education class. Section 24 — 24 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 122, par. 24 — 24) grants teachers immunity from liability as to those “matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children.” The court in Prest quite properly held that the duty of providing reasonably safe premises for school programs and activities was a separate and different function from the functions concerning discipline, supervision, and instruction where statutory immunity has been held to attach. Further, the supreme court of Illinois in Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323, held that section 24 — 24 is limited to negligence arising out of the teacher-student relationship in matters relating to the teacher’s personal supervision and control of students. Gerrity involved allegations that defendant had furnished an inadequate, ill-fitting, and defective football helmet to a student who, as a result, suffered a serious injury during a varsity football game. The court ruled that immunity did not attach and stated: “[Pjublic policy considerations argue rather strongly against any interpretation which would relax a school district’s obligation to insure that equipment provided for students in connection with activities of this type is fit for the purpose. To hold school districts to the duty of ordinary care in such matters would not be unduly burdensome, nor does it appear to us to be inconsistent with the intended purposes of sections 24 — 24 and 34 — 84a of the School Code.” (71 Ill. 2d at 52-53, 373 N.E.2d at 1326.) The majority in the case at bar would distinguish the furnishing of sports equipment from the furnishing of sports premises, but like the court in Prest, I would not do so. I also cannot agree that Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705, is authority for not recognizing premises liability in the case before us. There were no allegations of unsafe premises or equipment in Kobylanski, but rather the cause of action was predicated upon negligent failure to instruct and supervise physical education students in gymnastic exercises to be performed upon the trampoline and rings. Thus, Kobylanski involved allegations of negligence arising out the teacher-student relationship, and, as held in Gerrity, section 24 — 24 clearly applies to such situations. Although I am persuaded that a cause of action for premises liability does exist in school injury cases, I would hold that neither the complaint nor the amended complaint alleged a valid cause of action in this case. The negligence alleged was the failure to keep the field used by physical education classes “in a reasonably safe condition, free from dangerous conditions due to dangerous contours.” Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action. Therefore, I agree that this cause should have been dismissed.