Court Opinion

ID: 9793207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:44:26.752209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:56.757834
License: Public Domain

DIMOND, Senior Justice,
concurring.
This court has committed itself to the proposition that, subject to exceptions not relevant here, evidence of insurance is precluded in negligence cases — the reason for the rule being either irrelevance or undue prejudice.1 At the same time, the court permits “good faith” questioning whether any prospective juror has an interest in, or connections with, any insurance company.2
It seems doubtful, or at least debatable, whether the rule precluding the evidence of insurance in negligence cases any longer has much to recommend its retention. The fact that we permit counsel to question jurors about their possible interest in or connection with any liability insurance company becomes little more than an adroit method by plaintiff’s attorneys to convey to the jury the idea that insurance is involved in the case.3 Furthermore, the almost universal enactment of motor vehicle financial responsibility laws in the states of our nation, as is the case in Alaska,4 and the fact that most automobile drivers, including jurors, probably have liability insurance coverage on their vehicles, will tend to cause a jury to believe that if a defendant is worth suing as a result of an automobile accident, he or she is probably covered by a policy of liability insurance.5 See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 83, at 549 (4th ed. 1971); C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 201 at 481 (2d ed. 1972). See also 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 282(a) (3rd ed. 1940).6
The reason for not revealing the fact of insurance is to prevent the possibility of the jury being influenced by the fact that such a defendant has a “deep pocket.” When contrasted with an injured individual, jurors may well be inclined to award a more generous verdict if they believe the defendant is well able to pay the sum without incurring deprivation. This human consideration, however, is present whenever an injured individual sues a large corporation. *1089When, as here, the one which handles the defense of the litigation and will be eventually responsible for paying the judgment is an insurance company, there would appear to be no more reason for attempting to hide that fact from the jury than in a case where General Motors Corporation is the defendant. Merely for the purpose of being candid with the jury, the charade that insurance is not involved should be discontinued in this type of litigation.
What I have said above has particular application to a suit like the one at hand, where a child, represented by her father, has brought an action for damages against her mother. Eliminating the factor of insurance for the moment, it seems to me that it would be incomprehensible to a jury to see the courts permitting such actions, which would seem to have the inevitable effect of irreparably destroying family harmony and domestic peace and tranquility. But if there is insurance involved, then that problem is of little or no consequence.
In Hebel v. Hebel,7 we held that an un-emancipated minor has a right of action against her mother for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the parent’s negligent driving. And we stated further that
although the existence of liability insurance does not create liability its presence is of considerable significance here. To persist in adherence to family-harmony and parental-discipline-and-control arguments when there is automobile insurance involved is in our view unrealistic. If there is insurance there is small possibility that parental discipline will be undermined, or that the peace of the family will be shattered by allowance of the action.8
Jurors on the whole are intelligent persons. They are aware of the widespread existence of requirements of automobile liability insurance. When they see the courts permitting a minor to sue his parents for large sums of money for negligence arising out of an automobile accident, I submit they assume that liability insurance is involved, for the chances of such a suit absent liability insurance would be indeed remote. And the point made by plaintiff’s attorney, in being permitted to ascertain whether any prospective juror has an interest in or connection with an insurance company, is not lost on the jury. If they still remain unconvinced that liability insurance would be used to pay damages for the benefit of the injured child, it is unlikely that they will assess damages to the child’s mother in excess of one million dollars, as the jury did in this case. The real defendant in such a case, the jury must assume, is the insurance company and not the mother.9
As a practical matter, that is essentially what such an action is all about. In a suit against the mother brought by a child, the insurance company is a real party in interest. I submit that this fact should be honestly faced and that the presence or absence of liability insurance should be divulged to the jury in cases such as this one. It is time to remove from the law the fiction that a child suing her mother for vast sums of money really intends to burden her mother with a resulting judgment, and to collect on the judgment from whatever assets the mother might have.
To the extent that this separate opinion does not conflict with any portion of the majority opinion, I concur in the latter and agree that the judgment should be affirmed.

. Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 266 (Alaska 1975), opinion on rehearing, 548 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Alaska 1976). See Rule 411, Alaska R.Evid.

. See part I of the majority opinion in this case, and also City of Kotzebue v. Ipalook, 462 P.2d 75, 76-77 (Alaska 1969).

. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 83, at 549 (4th ed. 1971).

. The Alaska Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, AS 28.20.010-.640, states in its declaration of purpose:
Declaration of purpose. The legislature is concerned over the rising toll of motor vehicles accidents and the suffering and loss inflicted by them. The legislature determines that it is a matter of grave concern that motorists be financially responsible for their negligent acts so that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents may be recompensed for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon them. The legislature finds and declares that the public interest can best be served by the requirements that the operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident respond for damages and show proof of financial ability to respond for damages in future accidents as a prerequisite to his exercise of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle in the state.

. If jurors will almost inevitably assume that a defendant in a motor vehicle accident has liability insurance, and an inference that insurance is available is raised by the opposing party, then elemental fairness would dictate that a defendant who has no insurance be allowed to show that fact. See C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 201 at 482 (2d ed. 1972).

. Probably the leading exponent of the view that revelation of insurance is permissible was taken by the Florida Supreme Court in Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So.2d 421 (Fla.1971). That case stands for the proposition that revealing the existence of an insurer as a real party in interest justifiably reflects the true fact that there is financial responsibility. However, the Florida legislature in 1976 passed Fla.Stat. 627.7262, which specifically provided that no motor vehicle liability insurer be joined as a party defendant in an action to determine the insured’s liability. A year later, this statute was extended to liability insurance carriers generally. See Fla.Stat. 768.045.
On the other hand, Louisiana has a statute which allows the injured party the right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy. Such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and the insurer jointly. See La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 22:655.

. 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1968).

. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1968) (footnote omitted).

. The defendant should be entitled to an instruction indicating that the fact of insurance has been revealed so that the jury may be aware of the real parties in interest in the litigation. In addition, the jury should be further instructed that the fact of insurance should not enter their deliberations, as far as the determination of liability is concerned, since insurance is irrelevant to that issue.