Court Opinion

ID: 9386311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 00:00:27.435185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:05.494094
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40593         Document: 00516707705             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/11/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                                        FILED
                                                                                      April 11, 2023
                                        No. 21-40593                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk

   David George Rodriguez,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Virgil McMullen, Senior Warden; Kendrick Demyers,
   Major,

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 3:18-CV-432

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Appellant David George Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) appeals the final
   judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of Appellee Virgil
   McMullen (“McMullen”). For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM
   the district court’s judgment.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-40593       Document: 00516707705             Page: 2      Date Filed: 04/11/2023

                                        No. 21-40593

                                      I. Background
          Rodriguez is an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
   (“TDCJ”). In 2016, Rodriguez was a G-2 level prisoner incarcerated in the
   Stringfellow Unit, in Rosharon, Texas. Rodriguez enjoyed certain privileges
   as a G-2 prisoner, including living in the dorms and working as a leather
   worker in the unit’s craft shop. In 2016, the craft shop supervisors decided
   that prisoners would no longer be permitted to shower after working in the
   craft shop. Rodriguez filed an I-60 complaint with Warden McMullen asking
   that shower privileges be restored. McMullen investigated and addressed the
   issues to Rodriguez’s satisfaction. Rodriguez alleges that following the
   resolution of his I-60 complaint, one of McMullen’s subordinates, Captain
   Graham threatened to take punitive actions against Rodriguez for filing the I-
   60 complaint. Rodriguez then filed a Step 1 Grievance—a formal
   complaint—regarding Graham’s threats.
           On December 9, 2016, McMullen received a tip, through offender
   correspondence, that Rodriguez possessed a cell phone. 1 During the
   subsequent investigation into this tip, Rodriguez admitted to having had
   access, direct or indirect, to a cell phone two months prior. This admission
   was sufficient for a disciplinary case to be filed against Rodriguez, and a
   disciplinary hearing was held. At that hearing, Rodriguez was found guilty of
   possessing a cell phone and was demoted to G-5 status by the three-person
   Unit Classification Committee. This demotion led to Rodriguez’s transfer
   off the Stringfellow Unit to the Allred Unit, because the Stringfellow Unit
   does not house G-5 prisoners.

          1
              Rodriguez contends that the filing of charges against him must have been
   retaliatory because the tip was received after he had already been searched for the cell
   phone.

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          Rodriguez filed the present complaint against McMullen on
   December 17, 2018, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he was
   retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment rights through the
   administrative grievance procedure. In July 2021, a two-day jury trial was
   held. At no time during the trial did Rodriguez make a motion for judgment
   as a matter of law under Rule 50. The jury found that Rodriguez had failed to
   prove that McMullen filed false disciplinary charges against Rodriguez for
   the purpose of retaliating against him for the exercise of his first Amendment
   right to complain to prison officials. On July 21, 2021, the district court
   entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. Rodriguez appeals that verdict.
                                 II. Legal Standard
          “Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence must be raised in a
   Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law before submission
   of the case to the jury.” United States ex rel. Wallace v. Flintco, Inc., 143 F.3d
   955, 960 (5th Cir. 1998). Where Rodriguez failed to raise a Rule 50 motion
   for judgment as a matter of law, we consider the sufficiency of the evidence
   under a plain error standard, reversing “only if the judgment complained of
   results in a ‘manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Id. at 963–64. On plain error
   review “the question before this Court is not whether there was substantial
   evidence to support the jury verdict, but whether there was any evidence to
   support the jury verdict.” McCann v. Tex. City Refining, Inc., 984 F.2d 667,
   673 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). “If any evidence supports the jury verdict,
   the verdict will be upheld.” Flintco, Inc., 143 F.3d at 964 (citing Polanco v.
   City of Austin, 78 F.3d 968, 974 (5th Cir. 1996)).
                                   III. Discussion
   A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
          Rodriguez argues that the jury verdict is not supported by sufficient
    evidence. Because Rodriguez failed to make a Rule 50(a) motion at trial, we

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    must consider Rodriguez’s current challenge to the sufficiency of evidence
    under the plain error standard. See McCann, 984 F.2d at 673. Accordingly,
    we must determine whether any evidence supports the jury’s verdict that
    McMullen did not file false disciplinary charges against Rodriguez in
    retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights through the
    administrative grievance procedure. We hold that evidence does support the
    jury’s finding.
          Evidence was presented to the jury that undercut Rodriguez’s claim
    that McMullen possessed the requisite retaliatory intent. First, Rodriguez
    wrote that his concerns regarding the shower policy, which was the alleged
    basis for the retaliation, were “appropriately and professionally handled by
    Senior Warden McMullen.” Second, Rodriguez testified that despite filing
    multiple previous complaints with McMullen “[m]e and him have not fallen
    out yet.” This testimony, from Rodriguez, is evidence that McMullen
    lacked the requisite retaliatory intent.
          Additionally, McMullen testified that he received a tip, through
    offender correspondence, that “[o]ffender Rodriguez had cellphones and
    K2.” McMullen further testified that in the course of investigating that tip,
    Rodriguez admitted that “two months prior that he had a cellphone and he
    was using it do legal work on.” This evidence supports the jury’s
    determination that the disciplinary charges filed against Rodriguez were
    based on his own conduct and admissions and not in retaliation for
    exercising his First Amendment rights. Thus, we find that evidence does
    support the jury’s verdict and no plain error was made.
          B. Jury Instruction 6
          Rodriguez posits that the district court gave improper jury
    instructions. A properly objected-to instruction is reviewed for abuse of
    discretion. See United States v. Daniels, 281 F.3d 168, 184 (5th Cir. 2002). In

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    Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1993), we set forth a two-part
    test for challenges to jury instructions. First, the challenger must
    demonstrate that “the charge ‘as a whole creates “substantial and
    ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its
    deliberations.’” Id. at 276 (quoting Kyzar v. Vale Do Ri Doce Navegacai, S.A.,
    464 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1972). Second, even if the jury instructions were
    erroneous, we will not reverse if we determine, based upon the entire record,
    that the challenged instruction could not have affected the outcome of the
    case. Id. at 276–77. We consider whether the instruction, taken as a whole,
    “is a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly instructs jurors as
    to the principles of law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.”
    United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 950 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting
    United States v. Stacey, 896 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1990)). Trial judges are
    afforded “wide latitude in fashioning jury instructions.” Bender, 1.F. 3d at
    276. “The instructions need not be perfect in every respect provided that
    the charge in general correctly instructs the jury, and any injury resulting
    from the erroneous instruction is harmless.” Rogers v. Eagle Offshore Drilling
    Servs., Inc., 764 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Kyzar 464 F.2d at 285).
    “In assessing whether evidence sufficiently supports a particular jury
    instruction, this Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
    may be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    Government.” United States v. Cessa, 785 F.3d 165, 185 (5th Cir. 2015)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
          Rodriguez asserts that the district court committed reversible error in
    Jury Instruction 6 by instructing the jury that:
          In weighing the credibility of a witness, you may consider the
          fact that he or she has previously been convicted of a felony.
          Such a conviction does not necessarily destroy the witness’s

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          credibility, but it is one of the circumstances you may take into
          account in determining the weight to give his or her testimony.

          “[A] district court ‘may not instruct the jury on a charge that is not
    supported by evidence.’” United States v. Cessa, 861 F.3d at 135 (quoting
    Cessa, 785 F.3d at 185 (5th Cir. 2015)). First, Rodriguez argues that
    Instruction 6 lacked a proper evidentiary predicate. We disagree. Rodriguez
    testified that he was—and had been for years—an inmate in the TDCJ as
    did his witness Mariano Castillo (“Castillo”). Rodriguez’s testimony
    primarily centered on his status and experience as a prisoner. This evidence,
    and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence, when
    viewed in the light most favorable to the government, support the
    government’s claim that Instruction 6 had a proper evidentiary predicate.
          Rodriguez further argues that Jury Instruction 6 was improper
    because it was not properly limited. Rodriguez contends that the instruction
    should have stated that his criminal history could “only” be used for the
    purpose of weighing his truthfulness. Jury Instruction 6—the Fifth Circuit’s
    Pattern Jury Instruction 2.12—was properly limited by stipulating that the
    jury could consider Rodriguez’s prior felony conviction “in weighing the
    credibility of a witness.” Accordingly, Rodriguez has failed to show that the
    absence of the word “only” from Jury Instruction 6 created “substantial and
    ineradicable doubt” as to whether the jury had been properly guided in its
    deliberations. See Bender 1 F.3d at 276–77 (internal quotations removed). In
    sum, we find that there is no reversible error as the alleged instruction
    “could not have affected the outcome of the case.” Id. at 277 (internal
    quotations removed).
                                     IV. Conclusion
          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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