Court Opinion

ID: 9965114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 18:00:36.295333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.103105
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60436           Document: 64-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/01/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                                                                                   FILED
                                   No. 23-60436
                                                                                  May 1, 2024
                                  ____________
                                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
Raymond Pitts,                                                                     Clerk

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Waffle House, Incorporated,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Mississippi
                            USDC No. 3:23-CV-408
                  ______________________________

Before Dennis, Southwick, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Plaintiff-Appellant Raymond Pitts, proceeding pro se, sued his former
employer, Defendant-Appellee Waffle House, Inc., alleging violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his
complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Finding no error, we
AFFIRM.

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-60436           Document: 64-1          Page: 2       Date Filed: 05/01/2024

                                       No. 23-60436

                I. Factual and Procedural History
        According to the complaint, 1 Plaintiff worked at various Waffle House
restaurants beginning in 1997. Most recently, he worked as second shift
supervisor at a Waffle House in Jackson, Mississippi. While working at the
Jackson location, Plaintiff was dismayed to observe coworkers failing to
comply with company protocols and engaging in flagrant criminal acts on the
job. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that he once saw another employee
brandishing a semi-automatic firearm. Plaintiff filed a complaint with
corporate management, but nothing was done. Plaintiff also allegedly
witnessed theft, drug sales, credit card fraud, and firearm sales. His
complaints to management about those issues likewise went unheeded.
Plaintiff alleged that upper management even told his coworkers that he was
“snitching.”
        Plaintiff alleged that around the time of his complaints to
management, a manager began scheduling Plaintiff for excessive amounts of
overtime, including seventeen-hour shifts, and penalized Plaintiff when he
declined a shift at another Waffle House. And while management allegedly
pressured Plaintiff to recruit new employees, it responded negatively when
he requested that they hire retirees or individuals with disabilities.
        In response to what he deemed a “hostile work environment,”
Plaintiff became stressed and frustrated and asked to be transferred to
another Waffle House. That request was denied. Instead, employees
allegedly harassed him with telephone calls and made visits to his home to
pick him up for work.

        _____________________
        1
          We accept Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Meador
v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc.,
540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)).

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 Case: 23-60436          Document: 64-1          Page: 3      Date Filed: 05/01/2024

                                      No. 23-60436

        On March 13, 2023, Waffle House terminated his employment.
Plaintiff called the company’s corporate office but was unable to learn any
details about his termination except that it was for “insubordination.” The
real reasons, Plaintiff alleged, were his demands for better treatment and
compliance with company policies. On June 26, 2023, Plaintiff sued Waffle
House in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
While Plaintiff’s complaint did not contain specific claims, he headlined it
“Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended,” included the specific
allegation that he was “discriminated against by retaliation due to my
promotion of company policies,” and cited two federal cases concerning
Title VII discrimination and retaliation.
        On August 4, 2023, the district court granted Waffle House’s motion
to dismiss with prejudice for failure to state a claim and entered final
judgment. 2 The court construed Plaintiff’s complaint as containing a claim
for retaliation in violation of Title VII. But because Plaintiff did not allege
that he suffered retaliation based on grounds covered by Title VII—that is,
he did not allege he had suffered retaliation related to race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)—the district court
ruled his retaliation claim failed. Further, the district court denied Plaintiff
the opportunity to amend his complaint, explaining that any attempt to do so
would be futile because no Title VII violation could result from the
circumstances that Plaintiff described. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal to us.

        _____________________
        2
           The district court did not specify whether it was dismissing the case with or
without prejudice, but “a dismissal is presumed to be with prejudice unless the order
explicitly states otherwise.” Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 n.8
(5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Our conclusion that Plaintiff’s case was dismissed with
prejudice is buttressed by the district court’s denial of leave to amend and entry of final
judgment.

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                                  No. 23-60436

                       II. Standards of Review
       We review an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de
novo. Meador, 911 F.3d at 264 (quoting Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 338). We accept
Plaintiff’s version of the facts as true and view those facts in the light most
favorable to him. Id. (quoting Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 338). Because Plaintiff
represents himself, we hold his complaint to a less strict standard than we
would if it were written by a lawyer. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–
21 (1972) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint still must satisfy the
requirement that we impose on all complaints in federal court: It must
contain enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. In
re S. Scrap Material Co., L.L.C., 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
       The denial or grant of leave to amend a complaint is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 211 (5th
Cir. 2016) (citing Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 853, 873 (5th Cir.
2000)). Generally, it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to dismiss a
pro se complaint with prejudice without first giving the plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his complaint to remedy any deficiencies. Bazrowx v.
Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Moawad v. Childs, 673 F.2d
850, 851–52 (5th Cir. 1982)). It is not an abuse of discretion to deny a pro se
party leave to amend, however, where the plaintiff has already pleaded his
“best case.” Id. (citation omitted).
                             III. Discussion
                                       A.
       The district court reasonably construed Plaintiff’s pro se complaint as
containing a single claim for retaliation under Title VII, based on Plaintiff’s
attempts to enforce Waffle House company policy. It would have been

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Case: 23-60436         Document: 64-1       Page: 5     Date Filed: 05/01/2024

                                   No. 23-60436

reasonable for the district court to interpret Plaintiff’s complaint as
containing a hostile work environment claim under Title VII as well.
       To state a Title VII retaliation claim, Plaintiff was required to allege,
inter alia, that he engaged in activity protected by Title VII, namely
“opposition to discrimination based on ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.’” Brown v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 406 F. App’x 837, 840 (5th Cir.
2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). Likewise, to state a Title VII
hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff was required to allege, inter alia,
that the complained-of harassment was based on his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Johnson v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. &
Mech. Coll., 90 F.4th 449, 455 (5th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s
complaint does not allege that any actions by Waffle House or its employees
had to do with his or anyone else’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
He has failed to state retaliation and hostile work environment claims under
Title VII.
       Construing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally, the district court also
considered whether Plaintiff stated a claim for wrongful termination under
Mississippi state law. Under Mississippi law, an employee who is
“‘discharged for reporting illegal acts of his employer’” may sue the
employer for damages. Crawford v. Bannum Place of Tupelo, 556 F. App’x 279,
284 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting McArn v. Allied Bruce–Terminix Co., Inc., 626
So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1993)). As the district court noted, the complaint does not
plausibly allege that the criminal violations Plaintiff witnessed “had
something to do with” Waffle House’s business, an element required to
succeed on such a claim in Mississippi. Jones v. Fluor Daniel Servs. Corp., 959

                                        5
 Case: 23-60436           Document: 64-1           Page: 6       Date Filed: 05/01/2024

                                        No. 23-60436

So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 2007). The district court did not err in finding that
Plaintiff’s complaint fails Rule 12(b)(6)’s pleading standard. 3
                                              B.
        The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice and
found that any amendment would be futile. Generally, a pro se litigant should
be offered an opportunity to amend his complaint before it is dismissed with
prejudice. Bazrowx, 136 F.3d at 1054 (citing Moawad, 673 F.2d at 851–52).
Granting leave to amend is not required, however, if the plaintiff has already
pleaded his “best case.” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff gives no indication
that he did not plead his best case in his complaint. He also does not explain
what facts he would have added in an amended complaint or how he would
have overcome the deficiencies found by the district court if he had been
granted an opportunity to amend. See Shope v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 283
F. App’x 225, 226 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Shope does not allege what facts he
would include in an amended complaint. Therefore, Shope has not shown
that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his complaint.”)
(citing Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1993)); Goldsmith v. Hood
Cnty. Jail, 299 F. App’x 422, 423 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s
dismissal of pro se complaint when litigant failed to “explain what facts he
would have added or how he could have overcome the deficiencies found by
the district court if he had been granted an opportunity to amend”). Plaintiff

        _____________________
        3
            Plaintiff additionally argues that Waffle House’s Corporate Disclosure
Statement, filed in the district court, contains a false representation because it does not list
the U.S. Government as one of Waffle House’s owners. That issue has no discernible
bearing on the district court’s dismissal order—the subject of Plaintiff’s notice of appeal—
so we lack jurisdiction to reach it. See Pope v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 937 F.2d 258, 266 (5th
Cir. 1991).

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Case: 23-60436       Document: 64-1       Page: 7   Date Filed: 05/01/2024

                                No. 23-60436

has therefore failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing his complaint without granting him leave to amend.
                           IV. Conclusion
       For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
judgment. Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel and for federal
protection are DENIED.

                                      7