Court Opinion

ID: 9650011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:19:27.299683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:17.057936
License: Public Domain

*587Justice LONG,
concurring.
I am in accord with the Court’s disposition of this case and with its reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-l(b). I write separately to address State v. Merritt, 247 N.J.Super. 425, 589 A.2d 648 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 336, 598 A.2d 893 (1991), and State v. Clark, 352 N.J.Super. 130, 799 A.2d 679 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 545, 810 A.2d 65 (2002), two decisions interpreting cognate language in the burglary statute.
The burglary statute provides in relevant part:
Grading. Burglary is a crime of the second degree if in the course of committing the offense, the actor:
(1) Purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts, attempts to inflict or threatens to inflict bodily injury on anyone; or
(2) Is armed mth or displays what appear to be explosives or a deadly weapon.
Otherwise burglary is a crime of the third degree. An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing” an offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit an offense or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
[N.J.S.A 2C:18-2(b) (emphasis added).]
The underscored language was at the heart of Merritt, supra, in which the defendant participated in the burglary of a residence that netted seven guns, one of which was loaded. 247 N.J.Super. at 428, 589 A.2d 648. After he was convicted of second-degree armed burglary, the defendant argued that the guns “were simply proceeds of the theft and that he was not ‘armed’ because he did not use or intend to use firearms in connection with the offense.” Id. at 428-29, 589 A.2d 648. The Appellate Division disagreed, concluding that the defendant could be found guilty of burglary while armed with a deadly weapon because the stolen guns were in his possession and accessible to him during the burglary. Id. at 431, 589 A.2d 648.
Following Merritt, the Appellate Division decided State v. Riley, 306 N.J.Super. 141, 146-48, 703 A.2d 347 (App.Div.1997), and there addressed the “armed with a deadly weapon” language in a robbery case. There, the defendant, who had a folding knife in his pocket, struck the victim and took his money. Id. at 144-45, 703 A.2d 347. In resolving the issue of whether the defendant was *588“armed with a deadly weapon,” Judge Pressler, writing for the panel, recognized the two broad categories established by N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-l(e): (1) firearms, and (2) “every other material object that can be used or intended to be used in such a way as to cause death or serious bodily injury.” Id. at 146, 703 A.2d 347. Of the latter category, she said:
[T]he character of this class of objects as deadly weapons is, in every case, entirely circumstantial—that is, did a particular defendant possess a particular object at a particular time and in a particular situation with the intention of using it as a weapon. These distinctions and definitions have, moreover, been recognized as integral to the structure of the Code’s approach to weapon crimes. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. 370, 571 A.2d 1286 (1990); State v. Wright, 96 N.J. 170, 475 A.2d 38 (1984); State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 475 A.2d 31 (1984); State v. Blaine, 221 N.J.Super. 66, 533 A.2d 980 (App.Div.1987).
Id. at 147-48, 703 A.2d 347.]
Thus, under Riley, the use or intended use of items that have both legitimate and illegitimate purposes is the critical path to the determination of deadliness. See also State v. Brown, 325 N.J.Super. 447, 454, 739 A.2d 975 (App.Div.1999) (finding that evidence that knife was available to defendant, without evidence of intended use as weapon, does not suffice to show that weapon was “deadly weapon”), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 76, 747 A.2d 285 (2000). The majority here subscribes to that analysis, as do I.
Subsequently, the Appellate Division decided State v. Clark, supra, in which the defendant pleaded guilty to burglary of a dwelling. 352 N.J.Super. at 132-36, 799 A.2d 679. At the plea hearing, he admitted that at the time of the burglary he had a folding knife in a case on his belt, but contended that “it wasn’t a weapon.” Id. at 135-36, 799 A.2d 679. After the judge imposed a sentence for armed burglary, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea as providing an inadequate factual basis insofar as his allocution did not establish that he intended to use his folding knife as a weapon. Id. at 136-37, 799 A.2d 679. Notwithstanding Riley and Brown, the panel in Clark affirmed the trial judge’s denial of the motion, because it concluded that “armed” for purposes of the robbery statute is different than “armed” for purposes of the burglary statute:
*589The obvious purpose of the Legislature in enacting the armed burglary provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2, ie., “armed with ... a deadly weapon,” as a crime of higher degree than simple burglary was to deter the commission of burglaries while so armed in order to protect potential victims from greater risk of injury when an implement that could be used as a deadly weapon is involved. Viewed in that light, the statute manifestly establishes as an element the mere possession of such an implement during a burglary. On that basis, the holdings of Brown and Riley are distinguishable. We held in both Brown and Riley that the mere presence of a knife on the defendant’s person, which was not used as a weapon, could not elevate a robbery from second degree to first degree because the purpose of the robbery grading distinction was to establish a difference where the weapon had been used to commit the crime.
[Id. at 138-39, 799 A.2d 679 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).!
In my view, Clark was wide of the mark on several levels. First, it overlooked the fundamental principle of statutory construction that teaches us that where the Legislature uses the same language more than once in a statute, the same meaning will be ascribed to each usage unless the Legislature has specifically indicated otherwise. See Oldfield v. N.J. Realty Co., 1 N.J. 63, 69, 61 A.2d 767 (1948) (“[T]he general rule is that where a word or phrase occurs more than once in a statute, it should have the same meaning throughout, unless there is a clear indication to the contrary....”). There is simply nothing to suggest that the Legislature’s use of the term “armed with a deadly weapon” was intended to mean different things in different parts of the Code of Criminal Justice.
More importantly, Clark misconceived the holdings of Riley and Brown, which do not stand for the proposition that the “armed” component of armed robbery requires more than immediate access to a deadly weapon. Indeed, the issue in Riley and Brown was not whether the mere presence of a deadly weapon will satisfy the “armed” element of armed robbery; the issue was whether an object that is not per se a deadly weapon satisfies the “deadly weapon” component when it is neither used nor intended to be used as a deadly weapon. Under Riley and Brown, proof of actual or intended use is required when the alleged weapon is not a firearm.
*590The difference in outcome between Merritt (where the defendant stole firearms during a burglary and had no intention of using them as weapons but was convicted of armed burglary) and Riley and Brown (where the defendants earned knives during a robbery with no intention of using them as weapons, and were held not to be subject to conviction for first-degree armed robbery) is not that Merritt involved burglary and Riley and Brown, robberies. The critical difference is that Merritt involved firearms, whereas Riley involved an ordinary folding knife and Brown, a kitchen knife, implements that boy scouts, teachers, chefs, and ministers carry for entirely benign and legitimate purposes. As the Riley court explained:
[ I ]n State v. Merritt, ... relied on by the trial judge in denying defendant’s motion to acquit him of first-degree robbery, we held that a defendant who stole firearms during the course of a residential burglary could be found guilty of armed burglary simply by reason of having those firearms in his possession during the course of committing the burglary. We reasoned that mere possession of those firearms met the statutory element of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2b(2) of being armed with a deadly weapon because they were accessible for use by defendant while committing the crime whether or not he actually used or intended to use them. We fully concur in that reasoning but nevertheless think it clear that this case is different. Firearms are per se deadly weapons. Here, the implement with which defendant may be regarded to have been armed can be deemed to have been a deadly weapon—the other half of the “armed with a deadly weapon” formulation—only if the implement was, in fact, a deadly weapon. And this implement—the pocketknife—can only be found to have been a deadly weapon if it was used or intended to be used as such.
[ 306 NJ.Super. at 149-50,703 A2d 347. ]
Merritt, Riley, and Brown are seamlessly congruent approaches to the armed-with-a-deadly-weapon language in the robbery and burglary statutes. They stand for the proposition that, where the potential weapon is not a firearm, a defendant cannot be considered to have been “armed with a deadly weapon” unless he had immediate access to the item and an intent to use it in a way that is “capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-l(c) (defining deadly weapon). To the extent that Clark suggests otherwise, it continues to confuse our jurisprudence and should be disapproved. It is for that reason that I have penned this separate opinion.
*591Justice RIVERA-SOTO joins in this opinion.
For affirmance—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS—7.
Opposed—None.