Court Opinion

ID: 9609045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:21:44.740485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:48.430575
License: Public Domain

VOLLACK, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority holds that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, and affirms the court of appeals on that basis. Because I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion, and further believe that the defendant’s plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered, I respectfully dissent.
I.
At the providency hearing, the district court advised Chippewa that the minimum sentence he could receive was four years, if mitigating circumstances were found. The defendant was also advised that the maximum possible sentence was twenty-four years, if aggravating circumstances were found. Thus, when the defendant entered his guilty plea, he was aware that he could be sentenced up to twenty-four years imprisonment. After the providency hearing, the district court discovered in a presen-tence report that the defendant was on parole for another felony at the time of this offense, and was subject to sentencing in the aggravated range pursuant to section 18-l-105(9)(a)(II), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Because of the defendant’s parole status, the district court was required to impose a sentence in the range of twelve to twenty-four years. The defendant actually received a sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment.
The effect of the majority’s holding is to mandate a technical advisement under Crim.P. 11, requiring the trial court to specifically advise the defendant that if he were on parole, on probation, on bond, under confinement, or an escapee at the time he committed an offense, his sentence would mandatorily be greater than the presumptive range under section 18-1-105(9)(a)(II), 8B C.R.S. (1986). I dissent because I believe the advisement given in this case adequately informed the defendant of the consequences of his plea.
A.
A defendant’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. A plea of guilty should not be set aside if “the defendant understood the nature and the ele*612ments of the crime with which he was charged as well as the possible penalty when he entered the plea of guilty, and that the basic requirements as to whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made were met.” Bradley v. People, 175 Colo. 146, 149, 485 P.2d 875, 876-77 (1971). If these requirements are met and a factual basis exists for the plea, the plea should not be set aside. People v. Hutton, 183 Colo. 388, 391, 517 P.2d 392, 393 (1973). Although a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, a plea can be withdrawn if the defendant makes a showing that denial of the request will subvert justice. People v. Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547, 559 (Colo.1981). For example, a motion to withdraw a plea is appropriately granted when the defendant was surprised or influenced into entering a guilty plea, or where his plea “was entered by mistake or under a misconception of the nature of the charge” or through “fear, fraud, or official misrepresentation.” People v. Chavez, 730 P.2d 321, 327 (Colo.1986). See, e.g., Goff v. State, 498 So.2d 1035 (Fla.App.1986) (When defendant received a jail sentence rather than probation, due to his prior criminal record, the court held that the defendant “knew or should have known of his own prior record at the time he entered the plea.... Any failure to communicate was [the defendant’s], not his counsel’s or the state’s, and any misunderstanding of the facts was caused by Goffs silence and not by any official misrepresentations or miscalculations.” Id. at 1036); State ex rel. Reece v. Campbell, 551 S.W.2d 292 (Mo.App.1977) (A defendant is appropriately permitted to withdraw a guilty plea if he has reasonably relied on the sentencing judge's statement: “ ‘if I do not give you probation, I would probably sentence you to five years in the penitentiary,’ ” and was actually sentenced to twenty-five years. Id. at 299 (emphasis in original)).
The particular facts presented here do not render the trial court’s ruling an abuse of discretion. Chippewa’s plea was not induced by a “false promise of minimum punishment,” rendering the plea involuntary. Id. (quoting State v. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535 (1880)). In fact, the defendant was repeatedly advised by the trial court that the prosecution had requested imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range, and that even if the prosecution requested a sixteen-year sentence, the trial court could still give a sentence of twelve to twenty-four years. “Post-plea apprehension regarding the anticipated sentence, even if it occurs well before sentencing, is not sufficient to compel the exercise of judicial discretion to permit withdrawal of the plea of guilty.” People v. Hunt, 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 104, 219 Cal.Rptr. 731, 736 (1985).
The result would be different if a defendant is misinformed as to the possible maximum sentence. If a defendant were subject to a longer maximum sentence than the term stated at his advisement, his plea would not be knowingly entered. No such problem is presented where, as here, the advisement states the correct maximum sentence and the defendant is sentenced within that range.
There was no mistake or misapprehension as to the nature of the charge in this case; there was no fear, fraud, or misrepresentation causing the trial court’s ruling to be an abuse of discretion. Having concluded that the facts underlying this motion to withdraw do not present an abuse of discretion by the trial court, I would address the question of whether the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
B.
To meet due process requirements, entry of a guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary. People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37, 39 (Colo.1983). At a providency hearing, the defendant must understand the critical elements of the crime and the consequences of a guilty plea. People v. Wade, 708 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Colo.1985). Crim.P. 11 requires that the defendant “understand the possible penalty or penalties.” Crim. P. 11(b)(4), 7B C.R.S. (1984) (emphasis added). A “formalistic recitation by the trial judge at a providency hearing is not a constitutional requisite.” People v. Canino, 181 Colo. 207, 211, 508 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1973). A guilty plea must meet constitu*613tional muster, and a reviewing court looks to the record as a whole to determine whether a defendant’s guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. “[T]he entire record, including the portion relating to the Crim. P. 35(b) hearing [motion to vacate plea-bargained guilty pleas], must be examined.” People v. Moore, 636 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Colo.App.1981). One of the factors appropriate for consideration is a defendant’s criminal history. Id. at 1293.1
In People v. Lacey, 723 P.2d 111 (Colo.1986), we ruled that a sentence was not illegal when the trial court had incorrectly advised the defendant as to the possible minimum sentence.2 The defendant in Lacey was correctly informed of the possible maximum aggravated sentence of eight years, but the court misstated the possible minimum sentence. The court advised the defendant that he could receive a two-year sentence when the minimum sentence was actually four years, due to his parolee status. We affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial court, finding that the defendant had received adequate notice of possible enhanced sentencing. Id. at 112. I would apply the same reasoning to the facts here: Chippewa was correctly advised as to the maximum possible sentence of twenty-four years, even though the minimum as stated by the judge later proved incorrect. The fact that his status as a parolee altered the minimum possible sentence does not render his plea involuntary.
Based on the transcript of the providency hearing, I believe the defendant had sufficient knowledge of the possible penalties to which he was subject. “[A] record of a providency hearing demonstrating compliance with Crim.P. 11 should be deemed supportive of the conclusion that the defendant did enter his or her guilty plea voluntarily and understanding^.” Wade, 708 P.2d at 1370.
The record also demonstrates that defense counsel discussed with his client the possibility of mandatory sentencing, although it is not clear from the record whether defense counsel knew of Chippewa’s status as a parolee.3 See People v. Cabral, 698 P.2d 234, 237 (Colo.1985) (two factors in deciding validity of a guilty plea are that defendant had competent counsel, and that counsel had discussed the charges and effect of the guilty plea with the defendant). The defendant’s extensive criminal record and his discussions with his attorney about mandatory sentencing should be viewed in the context of the judge’s advisement on the record. I believe that these factors lead to the conclusion that the defendant’s plea was knowingly and intelligently made.
II.
The district court did not have the pre-sentence report at the time of the providen-cy hearing. Without being advised by defense counsel or the prosecution, the trial court could not have known of the defendant’s parolee status. The trial court did not know of the presence of specific aggravating circumstances at the time of the providency hearing. The standard procedure in criminal proceedings is to first hold a providency hearing, at which the defendant’s guilty plea is accepted and he is advised of the penalty range. The next stage is the court’s receipt of a presentence report which provides the court with informa*614tion regarding the particular defendant’s criminal history, his marital, psychological, medical, and family history, and other pertinent information. The third and final stage is a hearing at which the defendant is actually sentenced. It is not until this stage of the proceedings that the court has access to specific information which determines the existence or absence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
“The court must be concerned with reality and not ritual.” People v. Lesh, 668 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Colo.1983), on appeal after remand, 720 P.2d 999 (Colo.App.1986) (citing People v. Canino, 181 Colo. 207, 211, 508 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1973)). While it may be the better practice to advise the defendant in a general manner of the aggravating factors of section 18-1-105, I do not believe that the trial court’s failure to do so in this case renders the defendant’s guilty plea involuntary or uninformed. “[F]orm should not prevail over substance.” People v. Cushon, 650 P.2d 527, 528 (Colo.1982). See Wilson v. People, 708 P.2d 792 (Colo.1985) (guilty plea held valid where defendant was sentenced to penal institution, rather than being placed in the state hospital, even though trial court did not expressly advise him at providency hearing that he could be incarcerated). By its language, Crim.P. 11 does not require the specific advisement which the majority has, in effect, required here. See People v. Adrian, 701 P.2d 45 (Colo.1985) (Guilty plea held valid, even though advisement was “not as specific as it should have been” because it did not advise the defendant that he could be confined to a state prison; defendant “was advised in substance, although not in form.” Id. at 48); see also People v. Cuskon, 650 P.2d 527 (Colo.1982) (Trial court’s acceptance of a guilty plea upheld because the record revealed “a substantial adherence to the requirements of Crim.P. 11,” and to hold otherwise would be “an unduly strict interpretation” of the rule, unwarranted by the record. Id. at 529).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON and Justice ROVIRA join in this dissent.

. See Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503 (Del.1969) (Where defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea as involuntary, the Delaware Supreme Court noted, along with other considerations: ‘It is quite apparent that he knew what he was doing. Furthermore, his long criminal record, which includes charges of murder and manslaughter, supports this conclusion.” Id. at 504.)

. At arraignment and at sentencing, defense counsel advised the trial court that the defendant had been on probation at the time of the commission of the offense. Defense counsel also told the court that he had advised the defendant that ‘"since he was on probation at the time of the commission of the offense, in all likelihood, if the court were to impose a sentence, it would have to be in the aggravated range.”’ Id at 112.

.Defense counsel told the trial judge: "We had one other disposition in this case that included mandatory sentencing where I explained to Mr. Chippewa had the Court been facing mandatory sentencing he would have had to give more than the top end of the sentence. That is not true in this case.”