Court Opinion

ID: 9377033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 18:00:56.072628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:11.276016
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-5081     Document: 010110821846       Date Filed: 03/06/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 6, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-5081
                                                   (D.C. No. 4:21-CR-00118-CVE-1)
  KEVIN TYLER FOSTER,                                         (N.D. Okla.)
  a/k/a Kevin Taylor Foster,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Kevin Tyler Foster pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in Indian Country.

 The district court sentenced him to a prison term of 540 months (45 years), which

 was the agreed-upon sentence in Foster’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. He now appeals despite the appeal waiver in his plea

 agreement, and the government moves to enforce that waiver, as permitted by United

 States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

       Foster’s counsel filed a response to the government’s motion, stating she

 engaged in a “full consideration of the record” and concluded “that opposition to the

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-5081    Document: 010110821846         Date Filed: 03/06/2023     Page: 2

 Motion would be frivolous.” Resp. at 1; see also 10th Cir. R. 46.4(B) (governing

 such responses). The court therefore allowed Foster to file a pro se response, see id.,

 which he did.

       Our first question when faced with a motion to enforce an appeal waiver is

 “whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver.” Hahn, 359 F.3d

 at 1325. Here, the only exception to the appeal waiver is “a sentence that exceeds the

 statutory maximum.” Mot. to Enforce Appellate Waiver, Attach. 1 (Plea Agreement)

 at 3. The statutory maximum for second-degree murder is life imprisonment. See

 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b). Obviously, 540 months does not exceed that. We find,

 therefore, that this appeal does not escape the scope of the waiver.

       We next ask “whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his

 appellate rights.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. This requires us to examine (1) “whether

 the language of the plea agreement states that the defendant entered the agreement

 knowingly and voluntarily,” and (2) whether there was “an adequate Federal Rule of

 Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.” Id.

       The language of the plea agreement contains the required statement. See Plea

 Agreement at 3. Moreover, after setting out the scope of the appellate waiver, the

 agreement further states “that counsel has explained [the defendant’s] appellate . . .

 rights; . . . and . . . the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights as set

 forth above.” Id. at 4. The agreement then requires a signature specifically affirming

 this statement, and Foster signed. Id.

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Appellate Case: 22-5081    Document: 010110821846       Date Filed: 03/06/2023     Page: 3

       The Rule 11 colloquy was also adequate. The district court confirmed Foster’s

 ability to understand the plea agreement and the current proceedings (indeed, Foster

 possesses a master’s degree). And, specifically as to the appeal waiver, the district

 court had the following exchange with Foster:

              THE COURT: . . . [T]he plea agreement in your case
              contains an extensive waiver of appellate and post-
              conviction rights. Did you read that provision?

              THE DEFENDANT: I did.

              THE COURT: And let me summarize it here because there
              are important rights that you’ll be giving up. The plea
              agreement provides that you’re waiving the right to
              directly appeal your conviction and sentence, except a
              right to appeal from a sentence that exceeds the statutory
              maximum, which is not going to happen in this case given
              the statutory maximum is life imprisonment. You’re
              also—so you’re waiving your right to appeal your
              conviction. Do you understand?

              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

              THE COURT: . . . Do you understand that by entering into
              this plea agreement and entering your—your plea of guilty
              today, that you’ll be giving up and limiting your rights to
              appeal and collaterally attack your conviction and
              sentence?

              THE DEFENDANT: I do.

 Mot. to Enforce Appellate Waiver, Attach. 2 at 13.

       Foster claims in his pro se response that, “[w]hile I may [have] signed that

 [referring to his appeal waiver] my attorney didn’t advise me I was doing this.

 I would [have] never agreed to a plea agreement that did so.” Letter dated Feb. 1,

 2023, at 1. He therefore appears to argue that he did not knowingly agree to the

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Appellate Case: 22-5081    Document: 010110821846         Date Filed: 03/06/2023   Page: 4

 appeal waiver. In light of the overwhelming evidence recounted above, we reject this

 claim. We find that the waiver was knowing and voluntary.

       Finally, we ask “whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of

 justice.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. We have reviewed the record and can locate no

 latent argument that might satisfy this high standard.

       In sum, we find this appeal falls within Foster’s appeal waiver and no other

 Hahn factor counsels against enforcement of the waiver. We therefore grant the

 government’s motion to enforce the waiver and dismiss this appeal.

                                             Entered for the Court
                                             Per Curiam

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