Court Opinion

ID: 9645451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:25:16.360733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:28.508654
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
In our original opinion we reversed the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment foreclosing appellant’s mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens, including the sum of $450 as attorney’s fees. Appellees in their motion for rehearing take issue in general with our judgment holding appellant’s liens valid and ordering foreclosure in any amount, but in particular they contend that it was error to include attorney’s fees in the judgment of foreclosure.
We agree with appellees. The amount of an attorney’s fee may not be included in a judgment of foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien unless the parties have entered into a written agreement so providing, or unless there is statute providing for a lien to secure payment of an attorney’s fee. 57 C.J.S. Mechanics’ Liens § 353, pp. 1037-1038.
Appellant cites Art. 2226, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St., as statutory authority for the allowance of an attorney’s fee for labor *430done or material furnished. The cited statute does, indeed, make provision for the allowance of a personal judgment for attorney’s fee, but it does not provide for a lien to secure payment. And we know of no statutory authority which does provide for such a lien under the circumstances here presented to us.
Appellant also cites us to the case of Lipscomb v. Adamson Lumber Co., 217 S.W. 228, 230-231 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1919, no writ). However, in that case there was a written contract providing for a mechanic’s lien to include an amount for attorney’s fee. Since the property in question was not a homestead * the court held that there was no objection to including the amount of the attorney’s fee in the foreclosure.
There are other cases not involving a homestead in which a foreclosure judgment was held to be proper though it included the amount of an attorney’s fee; but in every instance, so far as we have been able to determine, there was a written mechanic’s lien contract which provided for attorney’s fee. West End Town Co. v. Grigg et al., 93 Tex. 451, 56 S.W. 49 (1900); Summerville v. King, 98 Tex. 332, 83 S.W. 680, 682 (1904); White et ux. v. Dozier Const. Co., 70 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1934, no writ); Kleiner v. Eubank, 358 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1962, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Zorola v. Bishop & Son, 401 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.). We have not been cited to a case and we know of none which holds that foreclosure of an affidavit mechanic’s lien may include an allowance for an attorney’s fee.
We have not found a Texas case exactly in point, but we believe our view finds some support in the following: Hennemuth v. Weatherford, 278 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco 1955, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Galbraith-Foxworth Lumber Co. v. Long, 5 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1928, writ ref’d); Breckenridge City Club v. Hardin, 253 S.W. 873, 876 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1923, no writ); D. June 6 Co. v. Doke, 35 Tex.Civ.App. 240, 80 S. W. 402, 406 (San Antonio 1904, writ ref’d); 38 Tex.Jur.2d 667.
For another reason the judgment for attorney’s fee cannot be allowed to stand. We find no evidence in the record in the form of affidavits or otherwise that $450 is a reasonable amount as attorney’s fee. In the absence of such evidence the court is not authorized to make a fact finding as to the amount to be allowed as a fee. Great American Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Tex.Sup., 1966).
The motion for rehearing will be overruled to the extent that the judgment of the trial court is reversed and rendered foreclosing a mechanic’s lien for $461.91 principal for material and labor furnished plus 6 per cent interest per annum from December 1, 1964 on the real property sold by Patty to Robert W. Barnes, Jr. and wife, Jeanette R. Barnes, as described in plaintiff’s petition; and reversed and rendered foreclosing the mechanic’s lien for $1,368.-03 plus interest from December 3, 1964 at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the real *431property sold by Patty to Everett C. Morgan and wife, Olive M. Morgan, as described in plaintiff’s petition.
The motion for rehearing will be sustained to the extent that the judgment for foreclosure will include only the above named amounts and will not include a judgment for attorney’s fee.
The personal judgment against Patty will be affirmed.
Reversed and rendered in part and affirmed in part.

 The authorities are in agreement that under the Constitution of Texas, Art. 16, Sections 37 and 50, a mechanic’s lien against a homestead does not secure and cannot include that part of the judgment allowing attorney’s fee even if the written mechanic’s lien contract so provides. This is made clear in those cases which allow foreclosure of a written contractual mechanic’s lien including an attorney’s fee against property not a homestead. See also Stricklin v. Southwestern Reserve Life Ins. Co., 234 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana 1950, writ ref’d); Anderson v. Hirsch et al., 112 S.W.2d 535, 541-542 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1937, writ ref’d); Mathews et ux. v. Texas Building & Loan Ass’n, 48 S.W. 744 (Tex.Civ.App., 1899, writ ref’d). However, that question is not before us in this ease as it is undisputed that at the time the labor was performed and the material furnished the properties involved were not homesteads.