Court Opinion

ID: 9387760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 21:01:12.78842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:15.373697
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-6447

        JONATHAN ANTHONY LEE TORRES,

                             Plaintiff - Appellant,

                      v.

        NATHAN BALL, Sergeant, Buncombe County Sheriff Office, individual capacity;
        DANE R. ONDERDONK, Deputy, Buncombe County Sheriff Office, individual
        capacity; TIMOTHY R. TAYLOR, Deputy, Buncombe County Sheriff Office,
        individual capacity,

                             Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:19-cv-00094-MR)

        Argued: March 9, 2023                                            Decided: April 17, 2023

        Before DIAZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ARGUED: Zachary L. Sanders, Sophie Spears, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
        OF LAW, New York, New York, for Appellant. Michael A. Ingersoll, WOMBLE BOND
        DICKINSON (US) LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Daniel
        S. Harawa, Daniel J. Cook, Student Counsel, Federal Appellate Clinic, NEW YORK
        UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, New York, New York, for Appellant. Curtis W.
        Euler, BUNCOMBE COUNTY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellees.
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        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               Jonathan Anthony Lee Torres (“Appellant”) appeals the district court’s order

        granting summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Nathan Ball (“Ball”), Deputy Timothy R.

        Taylor (“Taylor”), and Deputy Dane R. Onderdonk (“Onderdonk”) (collectively

        “Appellees”) on Appellant’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims stemming from a traffic stop that

        ended with Appellant’s arrest. Because Appellant had several outstanding arrest warrants,

        the Buncombe County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”) issued an Attempt to Locate (“ATL”)

        notice to law enforcement, informing officers to be on the lookout for Appellant. Prior to

        initiating the traffic stop, Sergeant Ball received a tip from a confidential informant that

        Appellant was driving a dark green Honda with dark-tinted windows and could be located

        at a specific address.

               The district court determined that the traffic stop was lawful because Sergeant Ball

        had reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant was driving the target vehicle. But

        Appellant argues that the tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to support a finding of

        reasonable suspicion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the totality of the

        circumstances, including the fact that Sergeant Ball knew Appellant had multiple

        outstanding arrest warrants and corroborated significant features of the informant’s tip,

        support a finding of reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the initial investigatory stop.

               Therefore, we affirm.

                                                      I.

               On February 26, 2018, Sergeant Ball, an officer with the BCSO, received an ATL

        regarding Appellant. The ATL stated that Appellant had two outstanding warrants for

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        breaking and entering and larceny-related crimes in Buncombe County and “9+

        outstanding warrants” in nearby Henderson County. J.A. 97. 1 The ATL also listed

        Appellant’s last known address as 45 Edwards Road, Fairview, North Carolina.

               During the February 27, 2018 BCSO Command Staff Meeting, Sergeant Ball was

        provided a photo of Appellant and informed that he was a person of interest with several

        outstanding warrants, including two arrest warrants in Buncombe County for breaking and

        entering and larceny after breaking and entering. Shortly after the meeting, Sergeant Ball

        used Buncombe County’s record system to verify Appellant’s two outstanding warrants in

        that county. Sergeant Ball also reviewed Appellant’s lengthy criminal history, 2 noting that

        it included charges and convictions for crimes such as assault with a deadly weapon,

        carrying a concealed firearm, intimidating a witness, communicating threats, and

        possession of drugs. As a result of Appellant’s criminal history, Sergeant Ball believed he

        “needed to use caution” if he had to arrest Appellant. J.A. 91.

               In an effort to locate Appellant, Sergeant Ball spoke with a confidential informant

        (“CI”) who, according to Sergeant Ball, “ha[d] provided [him] with reliable information in

        the past.” J.A. 91. The CI told Sergeant Ball that Appellant had been staying at 130 Flat

        Top Mountain Road, Fairview, North Carolina, and drove a dark green Honda Accord with

        dark tinted windows. Thereafter, when not responding to calls for service, Sergeant Ball

               1
                   Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

               Buncombe County records confirmed that Appellant had been charged with over
               2

        one hundred separate offenses over an 18-year period and had been arrested dozens of
        times.

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        attempted to locate Appellant by frequently checking the two addresses -- 45 Edwards

        Road (provided by the ATL) and 130 Flat Top Mountain Road (provided by the CI).

               On March 3, 2018, at approximately 3:00am, Sergeant Ball drove past 130 Flat Top

        Mountain Road and saw a dark green Honda Accord (the “Vehicle”) -- the same make,

        model, and color vehicle that the CI said Appellant was driving -- parked in the driveway

        with the trunk open. Sergeant Ball also noticed a male subject walking near the Vehicle.

        Believing that the Vehicle would not leave 130 Flat Top Mountain Road if a patrol car was

        in sight, Sergeant Ball drove toward Old Fort Road, parked in another driveway, turned off

        his headlights, and watched the Vehicle. A few minutes later, the Vehicle passed Sergeant

        Ball’s position and Sergeant Ball pursued. The Vehicle turned left on to Old Fort Road

        and then turned into a private driveway at 714 Old Fort Road. According to Appellant, he

        and his fiancée stopped to return an “amp” to a friend on their way to Appellant’s apartment

        in Hendersonville, North Carolina. J.A. 186.

               “Fearing a foot chase,” Sergeant Ball activated his body camera. J.A. 93. Sergeant

        Ball testified that, at this time, he believed Appellant was driving the Vehicle and had

        multiple outstanding felony arrest warrants. When the Vehicle was about halfway up the

        driveway, Sergeant Ball turned on his cruiser’s blue lights, called in the traffic stop, and

        reported the Vehicle’s license plate information. The Vehicle continued to the end of the

        driveway before coming to a full stop. Sergeant Ball exited his police cruiser, drew his

        firearm, shined his flashlight at the Vehicle, and loudly ordered the driver to show his

        hands. Sergeant Ball testified that his weapon remained pointed at the ground and that he

        never pointed his weapon at the driver or passenger. Appellant, however, claims that

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        Sergeant Ball pointed his weapon toward Appellant while ordering Appellant to show his

        hands. Although the weapon is not visible on the body camera footage, the sound of

        Sergeant Ball unholstering his firearm is audible.

               As he approached the Vehicle, Sergeant Ball testified that he recognized Appellant

        as the driver. Appellant immediately complied with Sergeant Ball’s instructions, first

        poking his hands outside of the car window before exiting the Vehicle and laying stomach-

        down on the ground. While on the ground, Sergeant Ball handcuffed Appellant and

        searched his pockets for weapons. Sergeant Ball then instructed Appellant to roll onto his

        side and asked Appellant whether he had any outstanding warrants. Appellant replied, “not

        that I know of.” J.A. 369 [Ball Body Camera at 2:27–2:30].

               After sitting Appellant upright, Sergeant Ball received a call back from dispatch

        informing him that the Vehicle Appellant had been driving was reported stolen. Sergeant

        Ball then conducted another pat down search and discovered two cellophane wrappers

        containing a white powdery substance in one of Appellant’s pants pockets. Based on his

        training and experience and the texture of one of the substances, Sergeant Ball believed

        one wrapper contained methamphetamine and the other contained heroin.

               When Appellant asked why he was pulled over, Sergeant Ball responded that

        Appellant had outstanding warrants and that the Vehicle Appellant had been driving was

        stolen. 3 Appellant denied that the Vehicle was stolen. Sergeant Ball then searched

               3
                In his affidavit in support of Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, Sergeant
        Ball emphasized that the Vehicle being stolen was not the basis for the traffic stop because
        Sergeant Ball did not learn it was stolen until after Appellant was already in custody.

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        Appellant’s person again, after which he called in Appellant’s full name and date of birth

        to confirm Appellant’s outstanding warrants. Sergeant Ball then explained to Appellant

        that he had several outstanding warrants in Buncombe County and “eight maybe”

        elsewhere. J.A. 369 [Ball Body Camera at 6:10–6:20].

              Shortly thereafter, deputies Taylor and Onderdonk arrived on the scene. The

        deputies searched the Vehicle and found drug paraphernalia, including two glass pipes with

        apparent drug residue and rubber tourniquets. Deputy Onderdonk collected the evidence

        and turned it over to Sergeant Ball for processing. Meanwhile, Sergeant Ball arrested

        Appellant on the two outstanding warrants for felony breaking and entering and felony

        larceny after breaking and entering. Sergeant Ball then took Appellant to Deputy Taylor’s

        patrol vehicle. Sergeant Ball instructed Deputy Taylor to take Appellant to a detention

        facility and charge him with possession of a stolen vehicle, possession of

        methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

              Deputy Taylor took Appellant to the Buncombe County Detention Facility. There,

        Detective Aaron Lawson served Appellant with the outstanding warrants for breaking and

        entering and larceny after breaking and entering. Based on the information provided by

        Deputy Taylor, a magistrate judge issued criminal warrants for possession of a stolen

        vehicle, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia in

        connection with the March 3, 2018 stop.

              Shortly after Appellant’s arrest, Sergeant Ball created a “case synopsis” for the

        prosecutor regarding Appellant’s possession of a stolen vehicle, possession of

        methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia charges. J.A. 30. Sergeant Ball

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        also had drug samples from the two packages found on Appellant’s person sent to the state

        laboratory for testing.

               On November 7, 2018, Appellant’s possession of methamphetamine charge was

        dismissed because the state laboratory never tested the substance. On March 12, 2019,

        Appellant entered into a plea agreement with the State of North Carolina. Appellant agreed

        to plead guilty to two counts of being a habitual felon, two counts of possession of a

        Schedule I controlled substance, and one count each of possession of a Schedule II

        controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, resisting a public officer, felony

        breaking and entering, and felony larceny after breaking and entering. As part of the plea

        agreement, the State agreed to dismiss several charges, including charges for possession of

        heroin, possession of Schedule II fentanyl, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of

        a stolen motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Appellant was sentenced to

        20 to 33 months of imprisonment for felony breaking and entering and felony larceny after

        breaking and entering and 50 to 72 months of imprisonment for the remaining convictions,

        to be served concurrently.

               On March 27, 2019, Appellant filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

        against Sergeant Ball, Deputy Taylor, and Deputy Onderdonk, raising several federal and

        state constitutional claims. Specifically, Appellant alleged that (1) he was stopped without

        probable cause or reasonable suspicion; (2) he was unlawfully arrested; (3) he was

        unlawfully searched when Sergeant Ball reached into his pocket before conducting a pat

        down; (4) the Vehicle was unlawfully searched; (5) Sergeant Ball used excessive force

        when seizing Appellant because Sergeant Ball yelled commands and pointed his gun at

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        Appellant during the stop, despite Appellant complying with Sergeant Ball’s directions and

        making no attempt to flee; and (6) Appellant was unlawfully charged and falsely

        imprisoned for 24 days because the charges stemming from the traffic stop were eventually

        dismissed. 4 Although Appellant referenced other bases for his claims, in reviewing the

        complaint for frivolousness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the district court grouped

        Appellant’s claims into three categories: (1) Fourth Amendment claims surrounding the

        traffic stop and subsequent searches; (2) an excessive force claim; and (3) a malicious

        prosecution claim. Appellant has not challenged the district court’s interpretation of his

        claims.

               On June 15, 2020, Appellees moved for summary judgment.                    Appellant

        subsequently filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that included Appellees’

        discovery responses, BCSO policies, Sergeant Ball’s investigation report, an event report,

        the warrants for Appellant’s arrest, Sergeant Ball’s case synopsis and body camera footage,

        Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his person or the Vehicle on March 3,

        2018, and other court documents.

               On March 13, 2021, the district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary

        judgment and denied Appellant’s cross-motion. The district court determined that the

        initial traffic stop was lawful because Sergeant Ball had “reasonable suspicion to believe

               4
                 In the complaint, Appellant also alleged that his fiancée was unlawfully searched,
        but the district court dismissed this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because
        Appellant lacked standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations on his fiancée’s behalf.
        Order Re: Pl.’s Compl. at 8, Torres v. Ball, No. 1:19−cv−00094 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2019;
        filed Sept. 18, 2019), ECF No. 6.

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        that [Appellant] had multiple outstanding arrest warrants and was driving the Honda in

        question.” J.A. 332. 5

               Appellant filed this timely appeal.

                                                      II.

               We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Griffin v. Bryant,

        56 F.4th 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2022). A district court shall grant summary judgment only if

        “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

        is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But “[o]nce a [party]

        makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the

        [opposing party] to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

        Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson v.

        Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When both parties file motions for

        summary judgment, as here, we apply the same standard of review to both motions,

        considering “each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either [side]

               5
                 Appellant’s formal Opening Brief fails to separately press his claims for excessive
        force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, arguing only that those
        claims should be reconsidered on remand if the initial stop is deemed illegal. Nor does
        Appellant address his state law claims or the issue of qualified immunity. Though
        Appellant argued several of these issues in his pro se informal brief, “we treat the formal
        brief as definitive of the issues for review and, applying the normal rule of waiver, consider
        only those issues, unless an inspection of the record indicates that failure to consider other
        issues might result in grave injustice.” Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 593 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994);
        see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5), (a)(8). Perceiving no such “grave injustice” here, we
        limit our review to the issues raised in the Opening Brief.

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        deserves judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.

        2003).

                                                     III.

                 The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures

        extends to investigatory stops “that fall short of traditional arrest.” Wingate v. Fulford, 987

        F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

        However, “[f]or investigatory stops, the balance between the public interest and the

        individual’s right to personal security tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause.”

        Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “if police have a reasonable

        suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was

        involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry 6 stop may be

        made to investigate that suspicion.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).

                 When assessing the constitutionality of traffic stops, we employ a two-prong

        analysis:    First, we “assess whether the articulated bases for the traffic stop were

        legitimate.” United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 648–49 (4th Cir. 2016). “Second, we

        examine whether the actions of the authorities during the traffic stop were reasonably

        related in scope to the bases for the seizure.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

                 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth
                 6

        Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when a
        police officer stops a suspect on the street and frisks him without probable cause to arrest,
        if the police officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has committed,
        is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

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                                                      A.

               Whether an officer’s suspicion is legitimately “reasonable” and “articulable”

        depends on the totality of circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)

        (noting that reasonable suspicion involves the “totality of the circumstances—the whole

        picture”). “[F]actors which by themselves suggest only innocent conduct may amount to

        reasonable suspicion when taken together.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321

        (4th Cir. 2004).

               We evaluate an officer’s justification for an investigatory stop on an objective basis.

        See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). “[I]f sufficient objective evidence

        exists to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, a [Terry] stop is justified regardless of a police

        officer’s subjective intent.” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008).

        In cases where an informant’s tip supplies part of the basis for reasonable suspicion, courts

        must ensure that the tip possessed sufficient “indicia of reliability.” Florida v. J.L., 529

        U.S. 266, 270 (2000).

                                                       1.

               Here, Appellant argues that “material inconsistencies” regarding the CI’s tip

        preclude a grant of summary judgment for Appellees. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 23. To

        support this argument, Appellant points to two differences between Sergeant Ball’s

        description of the CI’s tip in his case synopsis and his description of the tip in his affidavit

        in support of Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The case synopsis states that the

        CI told Sergeant Ball that Appellant “had been frequenting 130 Flat Top Mountain [Road]”

        and “was operating a dark green Honda car with dark tinted windows.” J.A. 122 (emphasis

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        supplied). But, in his affidavit, Sergeant Ball testified that the CI told him that Appellant

        “has been staying at 130 Flat Top Mountain Road” and “has been driving a dark green

        Honda Accord with dark tinted windows.” Id. at 91 (emphasis supplied).

               We find that this matter of semantics does not create a genuine issue of material fact

        for two reasons. First, Appellant has failed to identify any meaningful difference between

        describing someone as “staying” at a particular location and “frequenting” that same

        location.   To be sure, the word “staying” may suggest that one has been sleeping

        somewhere overnight, while the word “frequenting” may suggest something more akin to

        habitual daytime visits. But both terms indisputably indicate that the person described can

        likely be found at the given address because that person was physically present at that

        location on more than one occasion in recent days.

               Next, we acknowledge that whether the CI identified a specific model (i.e., an

        “Accord”) of car plays a role in evaluating the vagueness and genericness of the tip. See,

        e.g., United States v. Gondres-Medrano, 3 F.4th 708, 717 (4th Cir. 2021) (acknowledging

        that “outlandish, vague, or contradictory” tips may defeat probable cause even when

        provided by reliable informants). But, unlike Sergeant Ball’s affidavit, the case synopsis

        was not sworn testimony nor was it ever considered to be a complete and detailed account

        of the events at issue. By definition, a “synopsis” is “[a] brief or partial survey; a summary

        or outline.” See Synopsis, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Thus, a case synopsis

        is not meant to serve as an exhaustive description. So, it is neither surprising nor materially

        inconsistent with his initial case synopsis that Sergeant Ball’s affidavit provides additional

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        information and details about the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s stop, including

        more detailed information about the informant and the contents of the tip.

               Further, none of the other attributes of the target vehicle -- i.e., a dark green Honda

        with dark tinted windows -- changed between the case synopsis and affidavit. Thus, while

        “Accord” may be more specific than “car,” the case synopsis and affidavit are neither

        incompatible nor inconsistent. Instead, it appears from the record that Sergeant Ball’s

        affidavit effectively clarifies and supplements his previous case synopsis rather than

        contradicting it. And “an apparent dispute is not ‘genuine’ within the contemplation of the

        summary judgment rule unless the non-movant’s version is supported by sufficient

        evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find the fact[s] in his favor.” Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48

        F.3d at 818 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because

        Appellant relies solely on challenges to Sergeant Ball’s credibility and has submitted no

        independent evidence to support his claims, Appellant has not met his burden of

        establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to the contents of the CI’s tip.

               Therefore, we proceed with our analysis accepting that at the time Sergeant Ball

        initiated the investigatory stop, the uncontroverted record evidence establishes the

        following: Sergeant Ball received an ATL indicating that Appellant had two outstanding

        arrest warrants in Buncombe County; in a BCSO meeting the next day, Appellant was

        discussed as a person of interest and a photo of Appellant was shown; Sergeant Ball

        verified Appellant’s warrants in Buncombe County’s record system at least four days prior

        to Appellant’s arrest; a CI that had provided Sergeant Ball “with reliable information in the

        past,” J.A. 91, told Sergeant Ball that Appellant was staying at 130 Flat Top Mountain

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        Road and was driving a dark green Honda Accord with dark tinted windows; and while

        investigating, Sergeant Ball saw a male suspect near a dark green Honda Accord at the

        address provided by the CI.

                                                       2.

               It is undisputed that Sergeant Ball did not confirm Appellant’s identity until after

        he had initiated the traffic stop. However, when police “have been unable to locate a person

        suspected of involvement in a past crime,” and “have a reasonable suspicion . . . that a

        person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony,”

        they may “briefly stop that person, ask questions, or check identification.” Hensley, 469

        U.S. at 229.

               The tip Sergeant Ball received in this case was a key factor among the broader swath

        of information and circumstances known to Sergeant Ball at the time of the traffic stop.

        Appellant argues that the tip “lacked sufficient indicia of reliability” to support reasonable,

        articulable suspicion. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 31. Appellant’s argument centers largely

        on his contention that the CI’s tip was an anonymous tip and that Sergeant Ball failed to

        obtain the corroboration necessary for anonymous tips. But there is a difference between

        a purely anonymous tip from an ordinary citizen-informer and a tip from a confidential

        police informer. And here, Sergeant Ball testified that he knew the CI and that the CI had

        previously given him reliable information. Thus, Sergeant Ball “relied not on an unknown

        informant but one whom he knew and who had provided reliable information in the past.”

        United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2002).

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               It is well established that a known, reliable informant “is entitled to far more

        credence than an unknown, anonymous tipster.” Bynum, 293 F.3d at 197 (first citing

        Florida, 529 U.S. at 270; and then citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47

        (1972)). Although it would have been preferable if Sergeant Ball “had expressly stated in

        his affidavit the basis for his statement as to his informant’s reliability, he did at least swear

        . . . that he was relying on a known and proven confidential source, not a never-known,

        never-verified tipster.” Id. And “corroboration can confirm the reliability of an informant

        who is known (rather than anonymous) but whose credibility is unknown to the officer.”

        Gondres-Medrano, 3 F.4th at 716. “[W]here a tipster is shown to be right about some

        details, he is probably right about other alleged facts, . . . justifying reliance on the

        anonymous tip.” Id. at 715.

               For example, in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), the Supreme Court

        addressed a known informant with no indication that prior information relayed by the

        informant had proven reliable. Id. at 146. There, while on patrol duty, a police officer was

        approached by a known person who informed the officer “that an individual seated in a

        nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist.” Id. at 144–45. The

        officer approached the vehicle to investigate the informant’s report and tapped on the

        occupant’s window. Id. The occupant rolled down the window and the officer reached

        into the car and removed a fully loaded revolver from the occupant’s waistband. Id. at 145.

        The gun had not been visible to officer from outside the car, but it was in precisely the

        place indicated by the informant. Id. Because the officer knew the informant, the

        informant exposed himself to possible criminal prosecution or other consequences for

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        giving false information, and part of the tip was immediately verifiable at the scene, the

        Court held that the tip carried enough indicia of reliability to establish reasonable suspicion

        and justify the officer’s stop, even though the Court questioned whether such a tip could

        establish probable cause. Id. at 147.

               Likewise, in Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014), the Court found that an

        anonymous tip justified a traffic stop even where officers did not observe a single driving

        infraction. Id. at 400–01. There, a 911 dispatcher received a tip from an anonymous caller

        who reported that a pickup truck had just run her vehicle off the road. Id. at 395. The

        caller provided details about the make, model, color, and license plate of the vehicle as

        well as the direction the truck was traveling and nearest highway mile marker. Id. Two

        officers found the truck 20 miles down the road and followed it for five minutes. Id. The

        officers decided to stop the truck even though they did not see the driver make a single

        driving error. Id. When they approached the truck, the officers smelled marijuana and

        discovered 30 pounds of marijuana in the bed of the truck. Id. The driver and passenger

        of the truck moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth

        Amendment because it was based solely on an anonymous tip and the officers lacked

        reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 396. Because the anonymous caller

        provided details about the vehicle’s make, model, color, and license plate; made the call to

        911 (which could subject the caller to prosecution if she made a false report); and was

        “under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event” (making the call less likely to

        be preplanned), the Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck

        and investigate whether the driver had run another vehicle off the road. Id. at 400, 403–04.

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               Here, the CI provided Sergeant Ball with details about the make, model, color, and

        a specific feature -- dark tinted windows -- of the vehicle Sergeant Ball could find

        Appellant driving. The CI also provided Sergeant Ball with a specific address where he

        could locate Appellant. It is undisputed that Sergeant Ball observed someone walking

        around a parked dark green Honda Accord with tinted windows in the driveway of the

        exact address provided by the CI.

               Moreover, Sergeant Ball had been looking for Appellant since the BCSO issued an

        ATL for Appellant just a few days earlier. Sergeant Ball also knew Appellant had an

        extensive criminal history as well as several active outstanding warrants, including two in

        Buncombe County for felony breaking and entering and felony larceny after breaking and

        entering.   The corroborating aspects of the tip sufficiently establish the informant’s

        reliability, and the totality of the circumstances provided Sergeant Ball with sufficient

        justification to conduct an investigatory stop for the purpose of determining whether

        Appellant was the Vehicle’s driver. 7 See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229 (noting that law

        enforcement interests are stronger where suspect is wanted for felony offenses “or crimes

        involving a threat to public safety”).

               7
                Additionally, because it is a crime in North Carolina to make a “false, deliberately
        misleading, or unfounded report” to law enforcement in order to interfere with the law
        enforcement agency or “hinder or obstruct” an officer performing their duties, see N.C.
        Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-225 (2022), the CI might have faced criminal liability if their report
        was wrong.

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                                                        3.

               Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Sergeant Ball’s reason for conducting the

        investigatory traffic stop -- to ascertain the identity of the driver -- was legitimate and that

        he had reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant was the driver.

                                                      B.

               Lastly, we conclude that Sergeant Ball’s actions after the stop were reasonably

        related to the scope of the stop. See Palmer, 820 F.3d at 649. After conducting a traffic

        stop, the officer must employ “the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or

        dispel [his] suspicion in a short period of time.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). Here, Sergeant Ball had viewed a photograph of Appellant in

        the days leading up to Appellant’s arrest and could recognize Appellant on sight. The

        record reflects -- and the body camera footage confirms -- that, after stopping the Vehicle

        and exiting his police cruiser, Sergeant Ball immediately approached the driver’s side of

        the Vehicle and confirmed his suspicion that the driver was indeed Appellant, the fugitive

        he was looking for. Accordingly, the record supports the district court’s determination that

        Sergeant Ball had reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial traffic stop.

                                                      IV.

               For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order granting Appellees’ motion for

        summary judgment is

                                                                                          AFFIRMED.

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