Court Opinion

ID: 9593364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:21:56.261348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:20.805281
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice, Candler, Presiding Justice, and Cook, Justice,
dissenting. The provisions of Code Ann. § 30-101 (Ga. L. 1956, p. 405; 1960, p. 1023) are jurisdictional. In divorce cases where there is (1) no issuable defense, and (2) no written demand for a jury trial, a jury verdict is void and a judgment based upon that verdict is likewise void for want of jurisdiction. The record showing no issuable defense was filed to the suit and no written demand for a jury trial, the verdict of a jury rendered October 13, 1961, and a decree entered reciting that it was based upon that verdict and dated the same day, shows that the decree is void on its face for want of jurisdiction, and under Code § 110-709 it is a mere nullity and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to the parties. The Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. VII (Code Ann. § 2-3907; Const, of 1945) provides in such a case that the judge alone has jurisdiction to render a verdict and judgment, and he was not given jurisdiction to render a decree based solely upon the void verdict. This want of jurisdiction rendered the decree void. Kantzipper v. Kantzipper, 179 Ga. 850 (177 SE 679); Eagan v. First Nat. Bank, 212 Ga. 212 (91 SE2d 499). Want of jurisdiction is never a mere irregularity. Though the judge had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, this did not confer jurisdiction to render an unlawful and unconstitutional decree in the case. In *374the condition of the case the jury had no jurisdiction to render a verdict, and the judge had no jurisdiction to enter a decree based upon that void verdict. The jurisdiction of the judge to enter a decree was restricted to a decree based upon hisi finding of fact and not a jury verdict. In the Kantzipper case the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, but this court held in headnote 1, that “The court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment for permanent alimony at the appearance term.” Likewise in the Eagan case the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, yet it was held that, “A judgment for permanent alimony rendered by a court” without a verdict of a jury was beyond the court’s jurisdiction and was void. If as there ruled the absence of a verdict of a jury when the law required it rendered the judgment void for want of jurisdiction, it must follow that here the judgment based solely upon a jury’s verdict when the Constitution and statute forbid a verdict is likewise void for want of jurisdiction.
Since the motion to set aside a subsequent decree for divorce and alimony rendered by a judge without a jury, there being no issuable defense filed and no written demand for a jury trial, is based solely upon the existence of the decree of October 23, 1961, the motion was without merit, and it is the opinion of the dissenters that the court did not err in the judgment of June 3, 1965, overruling the same.