Court Opinion

ID: 9479580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:22:24.734323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:07.996346
License: Public Domain

MARQUEZ, District Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. Because I do not agree entirely with the reasoning used to reach that result, I file this concurring opinion.
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Watson challenges the ex post facto constitutionality of the 1981 amendments to California’s Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL).
At the time Watson committed his crimes, California law provided for “periodic review” of prisoner parole suitability, with no statutory requirement regarding the frequency of such review. The DSL took effect in 1977, providing that each inmate’s prospects for parole would be evaluated annually. In 1981, the DSL was amended to create an exception to the annual review requirement. The amendment provided that inmates convicted of more than one offense involving the taking of life (such as Watson) could have their parole suitability hearings delayed by the California Board of Prison Terms for up to three years, provided that the Board made certain written findings. In 1983, the Board delayed Watson’s hearing for three years pursuant to the 1981 amendments. Watson argues that the 1981 amendments are unconstitutional under the Ex Post Fac-to clause of the U.S. Constitution.1 He does not challenge the findings made by the board justifying their actions.
The majority correctly recognizes that federal courts entertaining ex post facto claims under the U.S. Constitution must undertake a two step analysis to determine whether the challenged statute is constitutional. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). First, we must determine whether the challenged statute is retrospective. If it is, then we must determine whether it “disad*1099vantages” the offender whom it affects. Id.
A retrospective statute is one which changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date. Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965. The majority concludes that 1981 DSL amendment is retrospective because it “establishes a time table for parole eligibility hearings for defendants like Watson who committed their crimes before its enactment.” Because this amounts to changing the legal consequences of Watson’s crimes, I agree with the majority that the 1981 DSL amendment is retrospective.
However, I part company with the majority in its treatment of the second part of the Weaver analysis, to wit, whether the 1981 DSL amendment disadvantages Watson.
In concluding that the 1981 amendment does not disadvantage Watson, the majority states, “The key ex post facto inquiry is the actual state of the law at the time the defendant perpetrated the offense.” At the time Watson committed his crimes, California law provided for periodic review of parole suitability. In determining that Watson was not disadvantaged by the 1981 DSL amendment, the majority compares that statute to “periodic review”.
While it appears to be a correct statement of law that we must look to the law as it actually existed at the time Watson committed his crimes (the majority cites United States v. Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir.1989), United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987), and Hayward v. United States Parole Comm’n, 659 F.2d 857, 862 (8th Cir. 1981) for this proposition), to do so ignores the realities of this case.
The California legislature declared that some portions of the 1977 Determinate Sentencing Law were retrospective. All California state prisoners who did not have parole dates set and who were incarcerated as of July 1, 1977 were entitled to annual review. In Re Jackson, 39 Cal.3d 464, 216 Cal.Rptr. 760, 761, 703 P.2d 100, 101 (1985), In Re Bray, 97 Cal.App.3d 506, 158 Cal. Rptr. 745, 747, (1979). Because Watson was imprisoned and had received no parole date as of July 1, 1977, the DSL entitled him to annual review.
Retrospective legislation changes the legal effect of an act previously committed. Weaver, supra 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965. The DSL changed the legal effect of Watson’s crimes in that it entitled him to annual parole suitability review instead of periodic review. The California Supreme Court subsequently found that the legislature clearly intended the DSL to apply retrospectively. Bray, supra 158 Cal.Rptr. at 747.
The California Supreme Court has stated that the DSL was retrospective2 and that it therefore was the law “in effect” at the time Watson committed his crimes.3 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal courts applying the federal ex post facto clause must accept the meaning [emphasis added] of state laws as determined by the state’s highest court:
“This Court, in applying the ex post facto prohibition of the Federal Constitution to state laws, accepts the meaning ascribed to them by the highest court of the state.”
Lindsey v. State of Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 400, 57 S.Ct. 797, 798, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937). Therefore, Lindsey requires us to accept the meaning which the California Supreme Court has ascribed to the DSL: that it is retrospective and that it was the law “in effect” at the time Watson committed his crimes.
The cases cited by the majority for the proposition that we must compare the 1981 amendment to “periodic review” are distinguishable because none deals with the situation where the law existing at the time the offense was committed is later modified *1100retrospectively. When the 1977 DSL was enacted retrospectively, it became, for our purposes, the law in existence at the time Watson committed his offense. Therefore, our ex post facto analysis must compare the 1981 amendment to the 1977 DSL rather than to periodic review. By comparing the 1981 amendment to periodic review4, the majority fails to respect the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 1977 DSL, as we must do under Lindsey. It is primarily for this reason that I cannot join in the majority opinion.
When the 1981 amendment is compared to the 1977 DSL, I feel that the 1981 amendment does not disadvantage Watson. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that mere procedural changes do not violate the ex post facto prohibition5. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298-99, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), Miller v. Florida 482 U.S. at 430, 433, 107 S.Ct. at 2451, 2452-53 (1987). The U.S. Supreme Court has defined procedural changes, for ex post facto purposes, as those which do not affect the crime for which the defendant was indicted, the punishment prescribed therefore or the degree of proof necessary to establish guilt. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589-90, 4 S.Ct. 202, 210, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884). The Court adopted a similar definition in Dobbert, supra, 432 U.S. at 294, 97 S.Ct. at 2298.
The 1981 DSL amendment merely changed the frequency with which Watson’s parole suitability would be determined. It did not affect the crime for which Watson was indicted and convicted, the punishment prescribed therefore, or the degree of proof necessary to establish his guilt. Under Hopt and Dobbert, therefore, the 1981 amendment was merely procedural. Furthermore, the 1981 amendment did not alter the factors to be considered in determining parole suitability.
A change in the law which alters a substantial right can violate the ex post facto provision “even if the statute takes a seemingly procedural form”. Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at 29, n. 12,101 S.Ct. at 964, n. 12. Doubtless, Watson’s right to parole is “substantial”. However, because of the procedural safeguards included in the 1981 amendments, I do not feel that Watson’s right to parole is affected. Before a prisoner’s annual parole suitability hearing can be postponed, the Board is required to make written findings giving reasons for the refusal to set a parole date and for the postponement of annual review. Jackson, supra, 216 Cal.Rptr. at 768-69, 703 P.2d at 109. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has indicated that these procedural safeguards will be strictly enforced. In Jackson, although the court found the 1982 amendments to be procedural only and therefore not subject to ex post facto attack, it held that the Board had not suffi*1101ciently stated its reasons for denying Jackson annual review.
Because Watson was not disadvantaged by the 1981 amendment to the DSL, his ex post facto claim fails. Although I agree with the majority’s holding that Watson’s claim fails, I do not agree with its legal reasoning.
I concur.

. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, § 9.

. Jackson, supra 216 Cal.Rptr. at 761, 703 P.2d at 101.

. "[I]t is evident that, in respect of the retroactive portions of the DSL, its effect was ... as if the DSL were the law at the time they committed their offenses." In Re Bray, supra 158 Cal.Rptr. at 749.

. The majority states "The Jackson court erred, however, in concluding that because the legislature intended all defendants to have the benefit of the DSL irrespective of the dates of their crimes, 'for ex post facto purposes, this case [must] be analyzed as if annual parole were in effect at the time respondent committed his offense’." The majority further states, “[I]t is not for California to say that ‘for ex post facto purposes’ the DSL magically became the law in effect at the time Watson perpetrated the crimes.”
Although the majority cites no case law whatsoever as to why it is not within the province of the California Supreme Court to declare that the DSL was the law in effect at the time Watson committed his crimes, I presume it is because "A decision of the Supreme Court of California, construing the Constitution of the United States, while entitled to great respect, is not binding upon the federal courts,” quoting Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir.1965).
The flaw in this argument is that the California Supreme Court’s decision that the DSL was the law in effect at the time Watson committed his crimes was not an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, but rather, an interpretation of the meaning of a state law (Lindsey, supra). As such, Smayda is inapposite. Because this is a decision falling within the scope of Lindsey, we are required to embrace it.

. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, the distinction between substance and procedure is often a difficult one to make. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2453, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987).
Further reflection has convinced me that our original decision, reported at 859 F.2d 105 (1988) and holding that the 1981 amendments were unconstitutional as applied to Watson, was in error. That opinion has been recalled.