Court Opinion

ID: 9720133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:17:10.786381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:13.452664
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, J.
(concurring). The appeal board adopted the referee’s findings that the claimants were disqualified under the statute (MCLA § 421.29 [8] [a] [Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.531(8) (a)]), they being persons directly involved in a labor dispute in the same establishment in which they were employed. In disagreeing with this finding as a conclusion of law, I am compelled to reiterate the caution first advocated in my dissenting opinion in Graham v. Fred Sanders Company (1968), 11 Mich App 361, at p 377, wherein I stated that the administrative agency’s appeal board is the final fact-finder under the statute and the courts are bound to accept those factual findings and the permissible inferences drawn therefrom. In that same dissent, I emphasized that there was, and believe that there still is, respectable authority which urges, but does not mandate, that courts adopt the conclusions of law drawn by those administrative agencies in light of their peculiar expertise with the subject. Cf. Levinson v. Spector Motor Service (1947), 330 US 649, 672 (67 S Ct 931, 943; 91 L Ed 1158, 1173). But unlike the majority opinion in Graham, supra, which failed to expressly delineate one employee *632establishment from the other and thus denied us clear guidelines for future decisions, the opinion of my colleagues in this case does sufficiently distinguish the different work establishments as required by statute. Further, a review of Northwest Airlines v. MESC (1966), 378 Mich 119, dispositively supports that, as a matter of law, a like decision be rendered in this case. Therefore, I join my colleagues and concur in reversing and remanding for entry of judgment consistent with their opinion.