Court Opinion

ID: 9736248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:48:46.508122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:05.304887
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). This case arises out of the alleged sale of cocaine to Terry Saldana, a Michigan state trooper. Defendant Matthews and his codefendant Andres Perez were jointly tried *65before a jury and convicted of delivery of between 225 and 650 grams of a mixture containing cocaine. Matthews and Perez were each sentenced to a term of 20 to 30 years imprisonment. Another codefendant, Namir Zaiber, who allegedly setup the transaction, was convicted of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine following a separate bench trial before the same judge who presided over Matthews’s and Perez’s jury trial. Zaiber was sentenced to a term of 4 to 20 years imprisonment.
Defendant Matthews raises three issues on which I feel his conviction should be reversed.1 First, I would reverse defendants conviction because of the error made in the prosecutor’s closing argument, even though defendant did not specifically object to the error. Defendant vigorously attacked the veracity of Officer Saldana throughout the trial. In closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to bolster the officer’s credibility:
"If you disbelieve the testimony of this officer, when you leave here, you should not only acquit the defendants in this case, but you’d better get on your phone to your congressmen and to anybody who is represented with the state police and say, 'We’ve got one bad apple. He’s lying to try to put somebody into jail’. I would expect nothing less than an acquittal if you do not believe the testimony of this officer.”
The prosecutor essentially argued that the officer should be fired if he lied to secure a conviction and that it was the jury’s duty to seek the removal of the officer if they acquitted defendant. This comment was highly prejudicial and was not based *66on any inference from the evidence.2 I do not believe that a cautionary instruction could have cured this error which resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, I feel that the lack of an objection does not preclude appellate review.3 Officer Saldana’s testimony was vital to the people’s case and there was a sharp conflict between his testimony and that of defendant’s. Considering these circumstances, I feel that it was reversible error to argue that the jury had a duty to seek Officer Saldana’s dismissal if they acquitted defendant.
1 also feel that the prosecutor’s attempt to show that Officer Saldana had a good reputation for truthfulness went beyond the limits of MRE 608.4 The character witness, another police officer, testified that as far as he was concerned, and from what he heard from others, Officer Saldana was fair, truthful and honest. Evidence of a witness’s reputation as to honesty is not admissible to show that a witness had a good reputation for truthfulness. Calkins v Ann Arbor R Co, 119 Mich 312; 78 NW 129 (1899); Leonard v Pope, 27 Mich 145 (1873). The prosecutor’s character witness, therefore, erred in testifying that Officer Saldana was honest. I also believe that this witness’s personal opinion about Officer Saldana’s credibility does not fall within the scope of permissible character testimony. People v Ellerhorst, 12 Mich App 661, 671; 163 NW2d 465 (1968).
Finally, I believe it was reversible error for the prosecutor to elicit testimony that defendant was laid off from his job at Chrysler at the time the *67alleged sale of cocaine occurred. In People v Johnson, 393 Mich 488, 496; 227 NW2d 523 (1975), the Supreme Court stated:
"Obviously neither proverty nor unemployment is an element of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon. Either a poor man or a rich man may be either guilty or innocent of carrying a concealed weapon. Likewise whether a man is employed or unemployed is not proof or partial proof of carrying a concealed weapon. Neither does defendant’s poverty or unemployment affect his testimonial credibility in this case. In short, these things neither in law nor in logic are evidence of defendant’s guilt or innocence or his tendency to lie or tell the truth.”
Likewise in the instant case, defendant’s unemployment was not an element, the prosecutor needed to prove to establish the crime of delivery of cocaine. Since this case was basically a credibility contest, I feel that the prosecutor’s question resulted in manifest injustice.5 The evidence of defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming and this evidence of defendant’s unemployment might well have persuaded the jury that defendant committed the crime to raise money.
Considering these three errors, I would reverse defendant’s conviction._

 I feel that defendant’s issue regarding entrapment presents a close issue for reversal, but in light of the three other issues I discuss, which present clearer examples of reversible error, I do not discuss the merits of defendant’s claim of entrapment.

 A prosecutor may properly argue that a police officer’s testimony is credible if the argument is based on permissible inferences based on evidence admitted at trial. People v Kedziora, 125 Mich App 150; 336 NW2d 460 (1983).

 People v Jancar, 140 Mich App 222; 363 NW2d 455 (1985).

 I agree with the majority that defendant made Officer Saldana’s character an issue at trial.

 Defendant raised his objection to this question at the close of his case. Since the objection was not timely, appellate review is precluded unless manifest injustice would result from a failure to review this issue. The majority argues that defendant hinted that he was employed at the time of the alleged sale. Defendant presented testimony that he knew his codefendant because they worked for Chrysler and had been with Chrysler for 10 years. I do not think this opened the door to allow the prosecutor to introduce this irrelevant evidence.