Court Opinion

ID: 9623593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:37:17.255802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:49:27.857183
License: Public Domain

MOSK. J., Dissenting.
No doubt Montesquieu, Locke, and Madison will turn over in their graves when they learn they are cited in an opinion that does not enhance liberty but deprives a number of simple rights to a group of Latino youths who have not been convicted of a crime. Mindful of the admonition of another great 18th century political philosopher, Benjamin Franklin, that “[t]hey that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety,” I would, unlike the majority, in large part affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I.
On February 26, 1993, the City of San Jose (hereafter the City) filed a complaint in the superior court seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against 38 named and 100 unnamed individuals who were purportedly “validated” as active members of 1 of 2 street gangs, Varrio Sureño Locos (VSL) and Varrio Sureño Treces or Varrio Sureño Town (VST). The *1133complaint seeks to restrict their activities in a four-block residential area known as “Rocksprings.”1
The complaint alleged that for more than 12 months, defendants “occupied” and “used the area commonly known as ‘Rocksprings’ ... in such a manner so as to constitute a public nuisance in accordance with Civil Code [sections] 3479 and 3480 . . . .” The “regular and continuous activities” alleged to constitute the public nuisance included: “homicide and attempted homicide, shootings, assault and battery with a vast array of weapons, vandalism, graffiti, sale and use of illegal narcotics, arson and theft . . . [and] blocking of free ingress and egress to the street. ...” Defendants were also alleged to “have broken lights on private property, have shot at windows of buildings, have shot at rival gang members and innocent persons; have engaged in fights with other gangs and gang members; have caused, encouraged and/or participated in the drinking of alcoholic beverages by juveniles; have used loud profanities amongst each other and directed at other neighbors; have caused, encouraged, or participated in the use, possession and/or sale of illegal drugs; have confronted, intimidated, annoyed, harassed, challenged and provoked the residents of the neighborhood by their activities and have placed the residents of the neighborhood in fear of their safety, lives and property.”
The City submitted declarations from the San Jose Chief of Police, police officers, neighborhood residents, and others describing the gangs and detailing specific incidents in Rocksprings and elsewhere involving defendants. They explain that the VSL/VST gangs have approximately 150 to 200 members, most of whom are Latino youths between the ages of 14 and 23 who claim allegiance to Southern California (hence “Sureño,” which is Spanish for “southern”) or Mexico. The gangs claim as their insignia the number 13, the letter “M," and the color blue; they typically mark their turf *1134with graffiti and tags that include the gang initials and variations on the number 13. The gangs lack a “structural hierarchy”; membership is “very fluid” and such that “many of its members did not know one another.” Although their organization is loose and informal, gang members reportedly often cooperate with each other in drug selling and other illegal activities.
According to the declarations, drug dealing, fighting, and graffiti were constant problems in Rocksprings and occurred at all hours of the day and night. Gang members threatened and intimidated residents. For example, a gang member warned a nine-year-old girl who had told police officers where some drugs were hidden that he would cut her tongue out if she ever again talked to the police. In another incident, gang members threatened a Rock-springs resident and vandalized her property after she called the police to report that some gang members had urinated in her garage. The declarations also stated, however, that fully 86 percent of the reports of criminal activity in Rocksprings do not indicate that they are related to VSL or VST gangs: only 12 percent of the reports are believed by the City to be gang related and 2 percent were deemed “possibly gang-related.”
Moreover, under the City’s criteria for “validating” VST and VSL members, no history of criminal or disruptive activity in Rocksprings or elsewhere is required for an individual to be identified as a Sureño gang member. Indeed, an individual may be so identified simply if he or she “admits” to gang membership, or merely was seen in association with another purported gang member on two occasions and wore clothing associated with the gang—including such ordinary apparel as baggy trousers and blue or black shirts or pants.
On February 26, 1993, the superior court granted the City’s request for a temporary restraining order and issued an ex parte order to show cause, setting the case for further hearing on March 10, 1993. Five defendants appeared at the hearing. The superior court left the temporary restraining order standing against those defendants and issued an order granting a preliminary injunction against the remaining defendants. On May 28, 1993, six additional named defendants moved to set aside the orders.2
The superior court conducted a hearing on June 28, 1993. It issued an order granting a preliminary injunction against 11 defendants, enjoined from *1135performing, “directly or indirectly,” certain specified acts within the Rock-springs neighborhood.3
*1136Defendants appealed from that order. The Court of Appeal concluded that “insofar as this injunction reaches no further than the Constitution allows, it can properly be used to abate gang-related criminal activity as a public nuisance.” Determining that many of the provisions were unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, or prohibited too much ordinary and innocuous conduct, it struck paragraphs (a), (e), (i), (m), (n), (o), (q), (r), (s), (v), (w), and (x) in whole and paragraphs (c), (k), and (1) in part. As modified, it affirmed the order granting the preliminary injunction.
The City sought review of the Court of Appeal’s decision only as to two provisions: paragraphs (a) and (k). We granted 4
II.
We review an order granting a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. (Hunter v. City of Whittier (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 588, 595 [257 Cal.Rptr. 559].) “Ordinarily an appeal from the granting of a preliminary injunction involves a very limited review of the [superior court’s] exercise of discretion concerning two factors: (1) the likelihood that plaintiffs will ultimately prevail and (2) the interim harm plaintiffs will sustain if the preliminary injunction is denied compared to the interim harm defendant will suffer if the injunction is granted pending a final determination of the merits.” (Ibid.) Thus, an appellate decision usually does not constitute a final adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy; it merely determines whether the superior court abused its discretion based on the record before it at the time of the ruling.
Of course, questions underlying the preliminary injunction are reviewed under the appropriate standard of review. Thus, for example, issues of fact *1137are subject to review under the substantial evidence standard; issues of pure law are subject to independent review. (Bullock v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1094 [271 Cal.Rptr. 44] [‘“the standard of review [for issues of pure law] is not abuse of discretion but whether statutory or constitutional law was correctly interpreted and applied by the trial court.’ ”].)5 This case presents several issues of pure law, principally: (1) whether injunctive relief under public nuisance provisions for gang-related activity was preempted by the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (hereafter the STEP Act), codified at Penal Code section 188.20 et seq,; (2) whether, as a matter of law, certain conduct could be abated as a public nuisance; and (3) whether certain provisions of the preliminary injunction were impermissibly vague or restrictive of protected First Amendment rights.6
As to the remaining issues—including the likelihood that the City will succeed in establishing that specific conduct of the VSL/VST gangs constitutes a public nuisance and that individual defendants were properly enjoined—we review for abuse of discretion.
III.
As a threshold matter, defendants contend that the STEP Act is the exclusive means of enjoining criminal street gangs, preempting general public nuisance statutes. They are wrong. The act, by its express provisions, is not the exclusive remedy for abating gang activity constituting a public nuisance.
Under the STEP Act, a building or place used by members of a criminal street gang for specified illegal activities constitutes a nuisance per se: *1138“Every building or place used by members of a criminal street gang for the purpose of the commission of [specified] offenses . . . and every building or place wherein or upon which that criminal conduct by gang members takes place, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented, and for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or private nuisance.” (Pen. Code, § 186.22a, subd. (a), italics added.) The Legislature has provided, however, that “[n]othing in this chapter shall preclude any aggrieved person from seeking any other remedy provided by law.” (Id., § 186.22a, subd. (d).) The act thus plainly contemplates additional remedies to abate criminal gang activities, including those under our general public nuisance statutes.
The City expressly sought relief not under the STEP Act, but, instead, under the general public nuisance statutes.7 Accordingly, we need not determine whether some or all of the conduct enjoined would also fall within the scope of the act or whether any of the defendants could be enjoined under its provisions.
IV.
The City contends that all of the conduct described in paragraphs (a) and (k) of the preliminary injunction order was properly abated by the superior court as a public nuisance. Defendants claim that none of the conduct could be so enjoined. Neither is correct. As the Court of Appeal correctly concluded, some, but not all, of the conduct could not unreasonably be abated under our general public nuisance statutes.
Civil Code section 3479 defines a public nuisance as: “Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” Civil Code section 3480 provides: “A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” A public nuisance is subject to a civil action for abatement, and may, as here, be “brought... by the city attorney of any town or city in which such nuisance exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 731.)
*1139The act or condition to be abated may consist of criminal or noncriminal conduct, but the equitable remedy exists only “where the objectionable activity can be brought within the terms of the statutory definition of public nuisance.” (People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal.2d 872, 879 [118 P.2d 472].) “[E]quity is loath to interfere where the standards of public policy can be enforced by resort to the criminal law, and in the absence of a legislative declaration to that effect, the courts should not broaden the field in which injunctions against criminal activity will be granted.” (Id. at p. 880; accord, Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (1956) 47 Cal.2d 11, 19 [300 P.2d 831].)8
Nor may an injunction “go . . . further than is absolutely necessary to protect the lawful rights of the parties seeking such injunction.” (People v. Mason, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 354.) Rather, it is “important for the trial court to limit the scope of the injunction, taking only those measures which would afford the People the relief to which they are entitled.” (Ibid.; see also Anderson v. Souza (1952) 38 Cal.2d 825, 840-841 [243 P.2d 497] [“ ‘Injunctive process ought never to go beyond the necessities of the case.’ ”].)
In addition, of course, our general public nuisance statutes “must be enforced in such a way as to operate in a constitutional fashion.” (People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 55.) In *1140particular, “restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment rights [citation] must be drawn with a narrow specificity calculated to prevent repression of expressive activities as to which restriction is constitutionally forbidden.” (In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 155 [65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273]; see Burton v. Municipal Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 684, 696 [68 Cal.Rptr. 721, 441 P.2d 281] [invalidating restrictions on operation of motion pictures]; City of Indio v. Arroyo (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 151, 158-159 [191 Cal.Rptr. 565] [sign ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to noncommercial wall mural].)
“The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech [citation], or even expressive conduct [citation], because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.” (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 382 [112 S.Ct. 2538, 2542, 120 L.Ed.2d 305].) The presumption of invalidity applies with particular force to injunctions. “Injunctions . . . carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances” and therefore require “a somewhat more stringent application of general First Amendment principles.” (Madsen V. Women’s Health Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, 764-765 [114 S.Ct. 2516, 2524, 129 L.Ed.2d 593].) Accordingly, an injunction restricting speech or other expressive conduct must be content neutral and “burden no more Speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” (Id. at p. 765 [114 S.Ct. at p. 2525]; Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1009, 1019-1024 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 898 P.2d 402].)
An injunction restricting constitutionally protected activity must also be sufficiently clear to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness under the due process clauses of the United States and California Constitutions. (U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) Vague injunctions, like vague laws, “ ‘ “offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be’ prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” ’ ” (Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567-568 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 341, 853 P.2d 507].) The provisions of an injunction “ ‘ “should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohibited thereby and what may be done without violating its *1141provisions, but it cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 568.)
Finally, an injunction restricting constitutionally protected activity must be narrowly tailored to withstand challenge on the ground of overbreadth. “[A]n overbreadth challenge implicates the constitutional interest in due process of law. (U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, subd. (a), 24.) The overbreadth doctrine provides that ‘a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’ [Citation.] [^D . . . [^0 Nevertheless, a facial overbreadth challenge is difficult to sustain. . . . ‘[Application of the overbreadth doctrine . . .is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed . . . sparingly and only as a last resort.’ [Citation.] Consequently, to justify a conclusion of facial overbreadth, ‘the overbreadth of a [restriction] must not only be real, but substantial as well . . . .’” (Williams v. Garcetti, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 577.)
V.
I turn now to the individual provisions of the preliminary injunction that are at issue here.
a.
I agree with the Court of Appeal that the following provisions of the preliminary injunction should be sustained, because they restrict gang-related conduct that the superior court not unreasonably found was likely to be proved on the merits to constitute a public nuisance in the Rocksprings neighborhood: paragraphs (b) (public consumption of alcoholic beverages or drugs); (d) (fighting in the public streets); (f) (spray painting or otherwise applying graffiti to public or private property); (g) (trespassing on or encouraging others to trespass on any private property); (h) (blocking free ingress and egress to the public sidewalks or street or to any driveways leading or appurtenant thereto in Rocksprings); (j) (discharging firearms); (p) (demanding entry into another person’s residence); (t) (littering in any public place or place open to public view); and (u) (urinating or defecating in any public place or place open to public view). The record includes allegations and supporting declarations concerning the prevalence of these activities by VSL-VST gang members in Rocksprings. The activities also readily fall within the statutory definition of a “nuisance” as “[a]nything which is injurious to health, ... or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable *1142enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any . . . public park, square, street, or highway” (Civ. Code, § 3479) and as a “public nuisance” as “one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons . . . .” (id., § 3480.) That some or all of these activities may also constitute criminal violations does not limit the superior court’s power to grant a preliminary injunction in this case.
b.
As to the remaining provisions of the preliminary injunction, as stated above, the City only contests the decision of the Court of Appeal regarding paragraphs (a) and (k). Unlike the majority, I agree with the Court of Appeal that the sweeping prohibitions of the former do not withstand scrutiny, and that the latter provision must be stricken in part.
Paragraph (a) enjoins “[standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public with any other defendant herein, or with any other known ‘VST’ ... or ‘VSL’ . . . member.” It applies without any requirement or condition that a defendant or his associate be engaged in any illegal activity or misconduct related to the alleged public nuisance.
The provision is impermissibly vague. Who is a “known” VST or VSL member? And by whom is such membership “known”? (See Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1939) 306 U.S. 451, 458 [59 S.Ct. 618, 621, 83 L.Ed. 888] [expression “known to be a member [of any gang]” unconstitutionally vague]; Farber v. Rockford (N.D.I11. 1975) 407 F.Supp. 529, 532 [phrase “known to be [narcotic addict or prostitute]” impermissibly requires court to “indulge in conjecture as to how reputation might be ascertained”].) In the absence of any specific definition of gang membership, neither police officers nor courts are provided with a consistent standard for determining when a violation of the injunction occurred.
Thus, even if we were to accept the City’s argument that the only reasonable construction of the prohibition is that it requires a defendant to know that the person he or she is standing, sitting, driving, walking, driving, gathering, or appearing with is a gang member, it remains susceptible to arbitrary enforcement. Without a definition of gang membership, how would a defendant know when he or she was violating the injunction? It is also unclear how a police officer would know whether or not a defendant knows that he or she is engaging in these activities with a gang member. Under the City’s construction, a defendant could be arrested and prosecuted for walking down the street or simply appearing in public with another person, based *1143on a police officer’s mere supposition that such defendant “knew” he or she was in the company of a “known” gang member. As the Court of Appeal recognized: “it is apparent a defendant could be engaged in one of the activities prohibited in paragraph (a) with a person not known to him or to her but known to police as a gang member, and suffer penalties for refusing to obey the injunction as a result. This is a classic case of vagueness.”
Apart from these fundamental vagueness problems, the prohibitions under paragraph (a) go “further than is absolutely necessary to protect the lawful rights of the parties seeking such injunction” (People v. Mason, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 354) by penalizing much ordinary and lawful activity that does not fall within the statutory definition of a public nuisance. The prohibitions are not only sweeping, but absolute: They apply without regard to the defendant’s intent or to the circumstances. In my view, a defendant may not be subject to a contempt sanction for merely walking in, driving through, or “appearing” in the Rocksprings neighborhood in the company of any “known” gang member without causing any disruption. Such everyday conduct is not “injurious to health, . . . or . . . indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property” (Civ. Code, § 3479); nor does it affect “at the same time an entire community or neighborhood” (id., § 3480).9
The City asserts, and the majority apparently agree, that the associational rights of the members of the loosely formed VSL and VST gangs are not “worthy” of constitutional protection; they argue that only “intimate” and “expressive” associations are entitled to such protection. Although I, too, deplore gang violence, I am unwilling, despite the apparent nature of the Sureño gangs, to conclude that their members do not also engage in innocent intimate or expressive conduct. Moreover, the cases on which the majority rely, principally Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609 [104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462], and Dallas v. Stanglin (1989) 490 U.S. 19 [109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18], are not in point. The preliminary injunction directly impairs the kinds of everyday intimate and expressive association with friends and relatives that have traditionally been subject to constitutional protection.
*1144Paragraph (k) enjoins “[i]n any manner confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or battering any residents or patrons, or visitors to ‘Rocksprings’, or any other persons who are known to have complained about gang activities, including any persons who have provided information in support of this Complaint and requests for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction.” Conduct or speech that is physically threatening, harassing, intimidating, or assaultive may constitute a public nuisance and is not constitutionally protected. The superior court did not abuse its discretion, therefore, in imposing restrictions against “intimidating, harassing, threatening . . . assaulting and/or battering residents or patrons, or visitors to ‘Rocksprings.’ ”
Although the terms “harassing” and “intimidating” are not specifically defined in the preliminary injunction, I disagree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that they are too vague. Their meaning is sufficiently definite in the context of paragraph (k) as modified. I understand them to refer to behavior that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. I note that courts have frequently affirmed provisions of injunctions enjoining “intimidating” or “harassing” others. (See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1013 [anti-abortion protesters enjoined from harassing persons entering a clinic]; In re Coleman (1974) 12 Cal.3d 568, 571 [116 Cal.Rptr. 381, 526 P.2d 533] [union members enjoined from committing “acts of harassment or intimidation”]; M Restaurants, Inc. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. Culinary etc. Union (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 666, 672 [177 Cal.Rptr. 690] [defendant unions enjoined from “threatening and/or committing acts of intimidation and physical violence”].)
The remainder of the provision, however, is too vague to withstand due process challenge. Activity in Rocksprings that consists of “[i]n any manner confronting, . . . annoying, . . . challenging, [or] provoking” others may include so much ordinary social behavior—and so much that depends on the individual sensibilities of those who might feel annoyed, challenged, or provoked—that it impermissibly invites arbitrary enforcement. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Coates v. City of Cincinnati (1971) 402 U.S. 611, 614-616 [91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688-1689, 29 L.Ed.2d 214]: “The city is free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging in countless other forms of antisocial conduct. . . . FJ0 . . . The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its exercise may be ‘annoying’ to some people. If this were not the rule, the right of the people to gather in public places for social or *1145political purposes would be continually subject to summary suspension through the good-faith enforcement of a prohibition against annoying conduct. And such a prohibition, in addition, contains an obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement against those whose association together is ‘annoying’ because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow citizens.” (Fns. omitted; see also H-CHH Associates v. Citizens for Representative Government (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1193, 1221 [238 Cal.Rptr. 841] [prohibition against “approaching” mall patrons overbroad because it “encompass[es] lawful, as well as unlawful, activity”].)
I also conclude that the phrase “persons who are known to have complained about gang activities” is too imprecise and must be stricken from paragraph (k). The City concedes as much. It is, in any event, superfluous: defendants are prohibited from threatening or assaulting any other person in Rocksprings, i.e„ all “residents, patrons, or visitors.”10
VI.
The preliminary injunction names specific individuals; it is not directed against the VSL/VST gangs generally. Defendants contend that the superior court erred by enjoining six persons who have not been shown to be directly and substantially responsible for the public nuisance. The City counters that all six defendants were properly enjoined. Analogizing this matter to cases involving injunctions directed against unions and political organizations, it argues that “had [it] obtained a preliminary injunction against the VSL/VST street gangs to abate the public nuisance the gang created in Rocksprings, there is no question that injunction could have been made to bind the members of the gang as a class.”
Neither is persuasive. I reject defendants’ argument that an individual could properly be subject to the preliminary injunction only if he or she engaged in all of the enjoined conduct or was otherwise responsible for the public nuisance. I also reject the City’s argument that each one of these defendants was properly enjoined because the superior court could have enjoined the VSL/VST gangs as a whole. They beg the question whether the gang members could properly have been enjoined as a class. Unlike the unions in Watsonville Canning & Frozen Food Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1242 [224 Cal.Rptr. 303], or the anti-abortion organizations *1146in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., supra, 512 U.S. 753, the VSL/VST gang is a loose affiliation of hundreds of individuals, many of whom may never have participated in any of the activities constituting the public nuisance. Indeed, it is likely that many of them either live in Rock-springs themselves or have friends and relatives who do.
As the City concedes, an individual may be “validated” as a VSL/VST gang member simply because he or she wears gang colors (including “neutral” colors like khaki, black, white, and blue) and is seen in the company of other “validated” gang members. I would agree with the Court of Appeal that, absent any showing that an individual “validated” as a gang member is likely to commit acts constituting a public nuisance in Rocksprings, he or she may not properly be subjected to the injunction, at least to the extent that it enjoins ordinary and innocent conduct within the Rocksprings neighborhood. (See People v. Green (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 692, 699 [278 Cal.Rptr. 140] [mere membership in a street gang is not a crime]; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 920 [102 S.Ct. 3409, 3429, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215] [individuals could not be enjoined merely because they belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence; to impose liability by reason of association alone, it must be shown that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and the named individual held a specific intent to further those goals].)11
Under our general nuisance statutes, “[a] judgment prohibiting a defendant from doing that which neither past acts nor present intent indicates he is likely to do unless prevented by a court of equity, is an erroneous exercise of equitable jurisdiction.” (People v. Robin (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 885, 887 [133 P.2d 436].) The mere facts that a defendant “admitted” gang membership to a police officer or others or was seen associating with gang members or wearing gang colors or insignia, do not indicate that he or she has, or will in the future, engage in conduct amounting to a public nuisance. In my view, individual defendants may be subject to the preliminary injunction only if the City establishes a likelihood that it will succeed on the merits of its claim that he or she actively participated in the activities constituting a public nuisance, or had a specific intention to do so.
The City presented evidence of conduct by each of the named defendants in and around the Rocksprings area.
*1147As to one of the named defendants, Blanca Gonzalez, the evidence consisted solely of a police officer’s statement to the effect that she was the driver of a car that was circling up and down the street in a purportedly Norteño-dominated neighborhood—apparently not Rocksprings. On that occasion, she was dressed in a black top and black jeans, consistent with members of Sureño gangs; she told the police officer that she belonged to the VST and VCT (also known as “Varrio Coionio Treces”) gangs. On another occasion, a police officer on patrol in Rocksprings entered into a conversation with Gonzalez and another young Hispanic woman, after they drove up to an address in the Rocksprings neighborhood. Gonzalez told him that she did not live in Rocksprings and that she was a member of the VSL gang.
None of this alleged conduct establishes a likelihood that the City will succeed on the merits of its claim that Gonzalez has participated in conduct amounting to a public nuisance in the Rocksprings neighborhood or elsewhere, or that she has any specific intention of doing so.
The record also fails to support enjoining Miguel Moreno or Rafael Ruiz. Although both at one time “admitted” gang membership, neither was adequately shown to have engaged in conduct amounting to a public nuisance in or around Rocksprings. Moreno was merely “identified” by an unknown party as having been involved in a drug offense in Rocksprings. Ruiz was identified by a police officer responding to a citizen call concerning a drug transaction as loosely matching a description of one of the participants.
Defendants also argue that the superior court erred in naming three other gang members, Jorge Gonzalez, Eberardo Cervantes, and Miguel Lopez. I disagree. As the Court of Appeal not unreasonably concluded, an adequate showing was made for the purposes of ordering preliminary injunctive relief against them. All three not only freely admitted that they were active gang members, but they participated in conduct in and around Rocksprings amounting to a public nuisance.12 I would therefore sustain the Court of Appeal’s determination that these defendants were not unreasonably restrained.
In sum, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent that it sustained paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (h), (j), (p), (t), and (u) and *1148struck paragraph (a). I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent that it struck the terms “harassing” and “intimidating” from paragraph (k).
Conclusion
The majority would permit our cities to close off entire neighborhoods to Latino youths who have done nothing more than dress in blue or black clothing or associate with others who do so; they would authorize criminal penalties for ordinary, nondisruptive acts of walking or driving through a residential neighborhood with a relative or friend. In my view, such a blunderbuss approach amounts to both bad law and bad policy. Justice Black warned in Jay v. Boyd (1956) 351 U.S. 345, 367 [76 S.Ct. 919, 931, 100 L.Ed. 1242]: “Unfortunately there are some who think that the way to save freedom in this country is to adopt the techniques of tyranny.” The majority here appear to embrace that misguided belief. Accordingly, I dissent.

The City “validates” as a criminal street gang an association of three or more persons with a common name or symbol whose members collectively or individually engage in a pattern of criminal conduct, as defined by Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (f). It does not, however, adhere to the statutory definition of a gang member. (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a) [gang member defined as “[a]ny person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.”].) Instead, to “validate” specific gang members, the City merely reviews police records to identify individuals who admit membership in a gang to a peace officer, probation officer, juvenile hall or youth ranch employee, or who meet two or more of the following conditions: wear clothing or tattoos indicating gang affiliation or use gang hand signs; are named by two or more members of a gang as a member; actively participate in a gang crime; are identified by a reliable informant as a gang member; or are observed associating with gang members two or more times. Using similar broad criteria, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department has estimated that 47 percent of all African-American males between the ages of 21 and 24 are actual or suspected gang members. (Reiner (1992) Gangs, Crime and Violence in Los Angeles, p. 121.)

The six defendants submitted declarations in support of the motion to vacate, including explanations of why certain defendants failed to attend the hearing on the order to show cause. Some of the defendants described their family and other ties to the Rocksprings neighborhood; a few also stated that they had never been—or were no longer—Sureño gang members.

The superior court did not prepare a written statement of decision. The order granting the preliminary injunction enjoins defendants Carlos Acuna, Jose Bravo, Eberardo Cervantes, Martin Davila, Blanca Gonzalez, Jorge Gonzalez, Juan Pineda Hernandez, Miguel Lopez, Miguel Moreno, Flavio Quinonez, and Rafael Ruiz from the following acts:
“(a) Standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with any other defendant herein, or with any other known ‘VST’ (Varrio Sureño Town or Varrio Sureño Treces) member;
“(b) Drinking alcoholic beverages in public excepting consumption on properly licensed premises or using drugs;
“(c) Possessing any weapons including but not limited to knives, dirks, daggers, clubs, nunchukas [sic; nunchakus], BB guns, concealed or loaded firearms, and any other illegal weapons as defined in the California Penal Code, and any object capable of inflicting serious bodily injury including but not limited to the following: metal pipes or rods, glass bottles, rocks, bricks, chains, tire irons, screwdrivers, hammers, crowbars, bumper jacks, spikes, razor blades; razors, sling shots, marbles, ball bearings;
“(d) Engaging in fighting in the public streets, alleys, and/or public and private property;
“(e) Using or possessing marker pens, spray paint cans, nails, razor blades, screwdrivers, or other sharp objects capable of defacing private or public property;
“(f) Spray painting or otherwise applying graffiti on any public or private property, including but not limited to the street, alley, residences, block walls, vehicles and/or any other real or personal property;
“(g) Trespassing on or encouraging others to trespass on any private property;
“(h) Blocking free ingress and egress to the public sidewalks or street, or any driveways leading or appurtenant thereto in ‘Rocksprings’;
“(i) Approaching vehicles, engaging in conversation, or otherwise communicating with the occupants of any vehicle or doing anything to obstruct or delay the free flow of vehicular or pedestrian traffic;
“(j) Discharging any firearms;
“(k) In any manner confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, challenging, provoking, assaulting and/or battering any residents or patrons, or visitors to ‘Rock-springs’, or any other persons who are known to have complained about gang activities, including any persons who have provided information in support of this Complaint and requests for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction;
“(1) Causing, encouraging, or participating in the use, possession and/or sale of narcotics;
“(m) Owning, possessing or driving a vehicle found to have any contraband, narcotics, or illegal or deadly weapons;
“(n) Using or possessing pagers or beepers in any public space;
“(o) Possessing channel lock pliers, picks, wire cutters, dent pullers, sling shots, marbles, steel shot, spark plugs, rocks, screwdrivers, ‘slim jims’ and other devices capable of being used to break into locked vehicles;
“(p) Demanding entry into another person’s residence at any time of the day or night;
“(q) Sheltering, concealing or permitting another person to enter into a residence not their own when said person appears to be running, hiding, or otherwise evading a law enforcement officer;
“(r) Signaling to or acting as a lookout for other persons to warn of the approach of police officers and soliciting, encouraging, employing or offering payment to others to do the same;
“(s) Climbing any tree, wall, or fence, or passing through any wall or fence by using tunnels or other holes in such structures;
“(t) Littering in any public place or place open to public view;
*1136“(u) Urinating or defecating in any public place or place open to public view;
“(v) Using words, phrases, physical gestures, or symbols commonly known as hand signs or engaging in other forms of communication which describe or refer to the gang known as ‘VST’ or ‘VSL’... as described in this Complaint or any of the accompanying pleadings or declarations;
“(w) Wearing clothing which bears the name or letters of the gang known as ‘VST’ or ‘VSL’;
“(x) Making, causing, or encouraging others to make loud noise of any kind, including but not limited to yelling and loud music at any time of the day or night.”

Thus, as it indicated in written and oral argument, the City did not challenge the Court of Appeal’s determination that the following conduct, inter alia, was improperly enjoined: possession or use in Rocksprings of such everyday items as beepers, pens, spray paint cans, nails, screwdrivers, or any “sharp objects capable of defacing private or public property”; “encouraging” or “participating” in the use or possession of narcotics; “engaging in conversation, or otherwise communicating with the occupants of any vehicle”; using communicative hand signs or signals describing or referring to the gangs; wearing clothing bearing the name or letters associated with the gangs; climbing trees or walls or “passing through” fences. The City impliedly concedes that the Court of Appeal correctly struck these provisions of the injunction as enjoining more conduct than was necessary to abate the nuisance and on constitutional grounds.

“[The] issue can arise, for example, when it is contended that an ordinance or statute is unconstitutional on its face and that no factual controversy remains to be tried. If such a question of pure law is presented, it can sometimes be determinative over the other factor, for example, when the defendant shows that the plaintiff’s interpretation is wrong as a matter of law and thus the plaintiff has no possibility of success on the merits. [Citations.] Even where the question of law is not entirely determinative, it may be appropriate for the appellate court to express its opinion in order to clarify or narrow the issues for trial.” (Hunter v. City of Whittier, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 595-596; see, e.g., Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 287-290 [219 Cal.Rptr. 467, 707 P.2d 840].)

Defendants contend that de novo review of the entire record is required because the superior court’s order affects their First Amendment rights. (See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group of Boston (1995) 515 U.S. 557, _ [115 S.Ct. 2338, 2344, 132 L.Ed.2d 487].) As Hurley explains, however, “[t]he ‘requirement of independent appellate review ... is a rule of federal constitutional law,’. . . which generally requires us to ‘review the finding of facts by a State court. . . where a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts, . . .’” (Ibid., italics added.) That is not the case here; as will appear, our inquiry is limited to the facial validity of certain provisions of the injunction under the United States Constitution.

Defendants concede that the City did not purport to seek injunctive relief under the STEP Act, but invoked the general public nuisance provisions; they argue, however, that the superior court erroneously purported to rely on the provision. We will uphold a judgment if it is correct for any reason “ ‘regardless of the correctness of [its] grounds . . . .’ ‘It is judicial action and not judicial reasoning which is the subject of review ....’” (United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 925, 933 [266 Cal.Rptr. 231], fn. omitted.)

That both criminal and noncriminal conduct can be enjoined as a public nuisance is clear under our statutory and case law. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 3369 [“Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted ... to enforce a penal law, except in a case of nuisance or as otherwise provided by law.”]; Pen. Code, § 186.20 et seq. [STEP Act]; id., § 11225 et seq. [Red Light Abatement Law]; People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater (1976) 17 Cal.3d 42, 49,53 [130 Cal.Rptr. 328, 550 P.2d 600] [exhibition of obscene books]; Nathan H. Schur, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 18-19 [“ ‘Conduct against which injunctions are sought in behalf of the public is frequently criminal in nature. . . . [That] will not prevent the intervention of equity where a clear case justifying equitable relief is present . . . .’ ”]; People v. Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d 872 [gambling house]; Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334, 341 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 377] [pollution of water]; Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 644 [222 Cal.Rptr. 293] [blocking right of way]; People v. Mason (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 348, 353 [177 Cal.Rptr. 284] [noise emanating from bar and restaurant]; Vedder v. County of Imperial (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 654, 661 [111 Cal.Rptr. 728] [fire hazard].) The City contends that the Court of Appeal’s decision “relied substantially upon the premise that courts can enjoin only criminal, as opposed to noncriminal, conduct as a public nuisance.” Not so. The Court of Appeal did not apply any such general rule; it merely concluded that the specific noncriminal conduct included within the superior court’s order could not be appropriately enjoined under general public nuisance statutes. It did err, however, to the extent it held that all criminal conduct constitutes a public nuisance. Even if it were correct that, as it states, “ ‘[a] public nuisance is always a criminal offense,’” (italics added) the inverse is not true. (See Pen. Code, §370; Rest.2d Torts, § 821B, com. d, p. 89.)

As one court has observed: “The right to walk the streets, or to meet publicly with one’s friends for a noble purpose or for no purpose at all—and to do so whenever one pleases—is an integral component of life in a free and ordered society. [Citations.] This right is rooted in the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression and association, as well as . . . the Fifth Amendment’s protection of fundamental liberty interests under the doctrine of substantive due process.” {Waters v. Barry (D.D.C. 1989) 711 F.Supp. 1125, 1134; see also Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 358 [103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859, 75 L.Ed.2d 903] [law prohibiting wandering the streets at night without identification implicated “consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of movement”].)

In paraphrasing paragraph (k), the majority repeatedly mischaracterize it as only forbidding defendants from intimidating or otherwise challenging Rocksprings residents or other persons who gang members know have complained about their conduct within the neighborhood. It is not so limited. Rather, it expressly prohibits threatening, intimidating, harassing, or assaulting any Rocksprings resident for any reason.

Use of the word “gang” has a tendency to strike fear in the hearts of countless persons. The trial court and now a majority of this court have succumbed to that somewhat irrational fear. The Court of Appeal is to be commended for looking at the issue dispassionately and objectively. Some of these defendants have not been convicted of, or even charged with, any crime. Yet they are, under the injunction, deprived of a number of personal rights generally reserved to all free citizens—including the right to walk or drive through the Rocksprings neighborhood with a “known” gang member even for an innocent purpose.

Thus, Jorge Gonzalez was stopped in connection with a gang-related disturbance in Rocksprings and admitted to police officers that he was a gang member; he was also found in possession of cocaine and marijuana after his car was stopped by a police officer near Rocksprings; Eberardo Cervantes was observed selling illegal drugs in Rocksprings and prosecuted for possession for sale and sale of marijuana and cocaine; Miguel Lopez was observed selling narcotics in Rocksprings and was found to be in possession of marijuana. The question whether the superior court erred in naming five other defendants, Carlos Acuna, Jose Bravo, Hassan Martin Davila, Juan Pineda Hernandez, Flavio Quinonez, is not before us; it was neither ruled on by the Court of Appeal nor raised in the petitions for review.