Court Opinion

ID: 9540659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:18:38.650395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:09.362834
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON, specially concurring: I concur in the result but not in the judgment. Both the author of the court’s judgment and the dissent overlook the fact that the Act specifically and expressly leaves open the door for equitable remedies. For reasons that I cannot fathom, both overlook the last line of section 30, the section of the Act that defines “unlawful acts.” 815 ILCS 513/30 (West 2006). In fact, both the judgment and the dissent quote the entire section but omit the last line. For clarity’s sake, I will quote the section in its entirety: “Unlawful acts. It is unlawful for any person engaged in the business of home repairs and remodeling to remodel or make repairs or charge for remodeling or repair work before obtaining a signed contract or work order over $1,000 and before notifying and securing the signed acceptance or rejection, by the consumer, of the binding arbitration clause and the jury trial waiver clause as required in Section 15 and Section 15.1 of this Act. This conduct is unlawful but is not exclusive nor meant to limit other kinds of methods, acts or practices that may be unfair or deceptive.” (Emphasis added.) 815 ILCS 513/30 (West 2006). The portion of the section that was omitted by both the judgment and the dissent is highlighted. Although the legislature declares that “this conduct is unlawful,” the legislature then immediately states that this declaration is “not exclusive nor meant to limit.” Thus, the enforcement provided by the Act is “not exclusive nor meant to limit.” The legislature specifically stated that its declaration does not affect “other kinds of methods, acts, or practices that may be unfair or deceptive,” such as, for example, what may be the unfair and deceptive acts of the real estate attorney in this case. If other deceptive acts are not affected by the Act, then presumably the court’s ability to address them is not “limited” either. The expressly nonexclusive nature of the Act thus leaves the door open to equitable remedies, such as the quantum meruit claim in this case. In addition, there is no indication in the Act that the legislature intended to provide either a cause of action or an affirmative defense to a private party As Justice Freeman has previously observed, it is still an open question whether the legislature intended to create rights that consumers could enforce. MD Electrical Contractors, 228 Ill. 2d at 309 n.5 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Burke, J.). The express language of the Act provides only for “enforcement” by “[t]he Attorney General or the State’s Attorney of any county in this State.” 815 ILCS 513/35 (West 2006). For the foregoing reasons, I agree that the Act does not bar plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim.