Court Opinion

ID: 9756081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:06:28.717042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:14.584116
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
dissenting.
Although the- majority has both correctly defined the question presented by this appeal and accurately identified the controlling principles, it has misapplied those principles and, in so doing, has reached an erroneous result. As the majority recognizes, “[t]he issue presented by this appeal is whether the police may constitutionally conduct a warrantless search of an automobile when the driver is stopped on a public highway and arrested pursuant to a lawful arrest warrant.” Ante at 349. The controlling principles, as acknowledged by the Court today, are those regarding searches incident to lawful arrests, as enunciated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969). Ante at 349. The conclusion that must be reached in applying these principles to the factual setting of the instant case, however, is that the search in question here was incident to a lawful arrest and was thus undeniably constitutional. I therefore dissent.
The circumstances of Welsh’s arrest were neither complex nor ambiguous. The State Police had a warrant for his arrest for various gambling-related offenses and information that he would be visiting a particular bowling alley on that day. When Welsh emerged from that bowling alley, entered his small *357foreign car with his two- or three-year-old son, and proceeded to drive away, the State Police officers immediately followed in their vehicles and directed him to pull to the side of the road. After reading the arrest warrant to defendant, the officers ordered him out of his automobile, handcuffed him, and placed him in a police cruiser. The presence of defendant’s young son, however, raised valid concerns in the minds of the officers as to the most advisable method to transport defendant to the police station. The officers determined that “instead of . transporting him back to [the] Princeton [State Police barracks] for processing,” it was preferable for them to “allow [Welsh] to drive his [own] car back down there where it wouldn’t create a problem to his son.” Prior to allowing defendant to reenter his automobile, however, the police conducted a limited search of the portions of that vehicle that would be within the immediate control of the driver thereof. It was during this limited search that the envelope containing cash and betting slips was discovered under the dashboard of the vehicle.
No one disputes the reasonableness or the validity either of the arrest of defendant Welsh or the arrest warrant under which that arrest was effected. See ante at 350; 167 N.J.Super. 233, 235 (App. Div. 1979). Moreover, even though Welsh remained under arrest, because of the “problem” created by the presence of his two or three-year-old son, the decision by the arresting officers to allow defendant to drive his own car to the State Police barracks was reasonable under the circumstances and constituted proper police procedure in such a situation.
There is no suggestion finding any support in the record or in the determination of the trial judge that the decision of the police officers to allow Welsh to drive his own vehicle, with his son, to police headquarters was in any sense contrived or pretextual. Obviously, had Welsh been allowed to drive his automobile to the police station, he would have been under custodial authority while driving; he would not have been free simply to drive away or escape from police control. Hence, any characterization of defendant as not being “under arrest” while driving under such restrictions and for the sole purpose of presenting himself *358at the police station to complete the arrest procedures would be totally unrealistic.
It is in this context that the search of Welsh’s car took place. The principles governing this warrantless search are those involving searches incident to lawful arrests. This doctrine was clearly stated and explained in Ghimel as follows:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control’-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. [Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d at 694.]
These principles are applicable to searches of automobiles, as the majority correctly acknowledges. Ante at 354; State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 8, (1980).
The search here of Welsh’s automobile prior to his reentry therein fits readily within the boundaries delineated by Chimel As noted, at the time of that search, defendant was under arrest for several offenses, including gambling and conspiracy felonies. Viewed objectively, therefore, the arresting officers could legitimately have believed that either destructible evidence of those crimes or weapons were secreted in the vehicle. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 & n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1724 & n. 13, 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 178 & n. 13 (1978); State v. Snow, 77 N.J. 459, 463-465, (1978); cf. State v. Patino, supra, 83 N.J. at 20 (Schreiber, J., dissenting) (the dispositive factor is “the totality of the circumstances”); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 54, 58 (1979) (Sch? ibi. T., dissenting); id. at 71 (Handler, J., dissent-in? 1
■' iore;:-ver, th; granting to Welsh of permission to drive his • a-- ^mobile to the police station because of the unforeseen *359presence of his young son, a situation not created by the arresting officers, constituted reasonable police procedure and did not in any way negate the fact that defendant was to remain under arrest even while so driving. The search of those portions of the vehicle that would have been within the immediate control of defendant thus constituted a reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest permissible under the Chimel exception. See State v. Wausnock, 303 A.2d 636, 637 (Del.Sup.Ct. 1973) (“the applicable standard of care is not to be measured solely at the moment of search when driver and passenger were outside the automobile; it is to be measured, also, as of the time when they may have been permitted to return to the automobile”); 3. W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.4 at 136-137 (1978).
In the analogous situation in which an individual upon leaving his or her vehicle is properly “frisked” or searched under the “stop and frisk” doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905 906 (1968), but not arrested, courts have upheld as proper a reasonable, limited search of the individual’s vehicle since “defendants would have returned to their vehicle and, had there been a weapon, the weapon would then have been within the reach of the defendants.” State v. Brown, 160 N.J.Super. 227, 234 (Law Div. 1978); accord, State v. Wausnock, supra 303 A.2d at 637; State v. Darling, 393 A.2d 530, 532-533 (Me.Sup.Jud.Ct.1978); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass. 266, 272, 366 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1977).
Further, the limited search of Welsh’s automobile did not exceed the permissible scope of the warrantless search standards enunciated by Chimel. The only areas of the vehicle actually searched were those that would have been within the immediate control of the driver thereof, specifically, under the dashboard. This is obvious from the fact that the officer discovered the envelope merely by reaching under the vehicle’s dashboard. Also, the fact that the police here changed their plan for transporting Welsh after discovering under the dashboard the envelope which apparently contained evidence of gambling ac*360tivities does not retroactively impugn the propriety of the search, which was reasonable when made. See ante at 350 351, 355-356.
The majority’s focus upon the fact that Welsh was handcuffed in a police car during the actual search of his automobile is misdirected. The search was being conducted at that moment not to secure or sanitize areas within Welsh’s control or immediate reach; he was at that time effectively “neutralized.” Cf. State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575, 587-588 (1980) (inventory search). Rather, it was undertaken in anticipation of allowing Welsh to drive his automobile, presumably without handcuffs. See ante at 355. Since the arrest here was valid and the decision to allow defendant to reenter and drive his own car was also reasonable police procedure under these circumstances, a Chimel -type warrantless search, i. e., a search incident to a lawful arrest, would be entirely proper absent any showing of pretext on the part of the police officers. See United States v. Griffith, 537 F.2d 900, 904-905 (7 Cir. 1976); United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1125-1126 (D.C.Cir.1975); State v. Smith, 140 N.J.Super. 368, 373 (App.Div.1976), aff’d o.b. 75 N.J 81 (1977).
In the instant appeal, no convincing evidence of connivance or pretext on the part of the arresting officers has been demonstrated. The trial court in this respect credited the uncontradicted testimony offered by the State in support of the reasonableness of the search. There is thus no basis for a conclusion that the arrest of Welsh was defective or improper. I do not view any time lag between the issuance of an arrest warrant and the actual arrest itself as presumptive evidence of bad faith on the part of the police officers. The majority apparently does not share this view. See ante at 352, 353. I therefore disagree with the apparent finding made by the majority that a showing of such pretext has here been made. Ante at 355, 356; see 167 N.J.Super. at 236. In fact, the majority’s approach itself is somewhat pretextual. It attacks the reasonableness of the arrest solely as an expedient to impugn the reasonableness of the search of defendant’s automobile conducted as a constituent element of the arrest. As pointed out, however, there is no evidential basis for concluding that any of the arrest procedures employed here were unreasonable.
*361Since the facts presented by the instant appeal clearly constitute a search incident to arrest as defined by Chimel, I would make no finding as to the State’s companion claim that this warrantless search was also permissible under the “automobile exception” to the general rule as set out in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283, 69 L.Ed. 543, 549 (1925).
In conclusion, I agree with the assessment of the trial judge that “wisdom would dictate that [the arresting officers] search the vehicle first to see if there was contraband in it before allowing [defendant] to get back in it,” here defining contraband to include either weapons or destructible evidence.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division, thus reinstating the judgment and sentence of the trial court.
Justices SULLIVAN and SCHREIBER join in this opinion.
For Affirmance-Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices PASHMAN, CLIFFORD and POLLOCK-4.
For reversal-justices SULLIVAN, SCHREIBER and HANDLER-3.