Court Opinion

ID: 9582266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:24:22.538323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:35.632765
License: Public Domain

Hunt, Justice,
dissenting.
Where the underlying default judgment exceeds the policy limits, *332the measure of compensatory damages for the insurer’s wrongful refusal to defend includes the following:
Decided June 22, 1989
Reconsideration denied July 13, 1989.
(a) The policy limits as per the contract, and
(b) Damages directly caused by the failure to defend, such as, attorney fees and other costs of defense incurred by the insured, and that portion of the judgment exceeding the policy limits which, but for the failure to defend, would not have been awarded in the underlying action.
See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Wood &c., 187 Ga. App. 471, 475(2) (370 SE2d 765) (1988) rev’d on other grounds, 258 Ga. 800 (375 SE2d 221) (1989); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 66 Ga. App. 826, 833 (2) (19 SE2d 377) (1942).
In this case the policy limits were $100,000. The underlying judgment was $667,000, for a wrongful death and personal injuries. The jury in the present case awarded $667,000, plus the costs of defense, and bad faith penalties. The only possible basis for the award of $667,000 was the erroneous charge of the trial court. The record on appeal reveals absolutely no evidentiary support for an award in excess of the policy limits plus costs of defense. Kemp offered no evidence to demonstrate the judgment would have been less had Leader defended.1 He offered no such evidence because he contended, and the trial court apparently agreed, Leader was automatically liable for the amount of the default judgment, $667,000, which he referred to as “liquidated damages.” I respectfully submit this was an erroneous analysis of the measure of damages. Because this analysis was so fundamental to the trial and to the jury instructions I do not believe it could be cured by other portions of the trial court’s charge nor by response of the jury to written interrogatories. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Bell join in this dissent.
*333Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd & Cadenhead, Harold N. Hill, Jr., E. Clayton Scofield III, G. Terrell Davis, Dickey, Whelchel, Brown & Readdick, Terry L. Readdick, John E. Bumgartner, for appellant.
Jack Hutto, William H. Glover, Jr., Karen M. Krider, for appellee.
David M. Leonard, 0. Elizabeth Bell, Terry R. Howell, John M. Hyatt, amici curiae.

 In a claim of this sort the policyholder could show, for example, that the damages awarded by default were excessive in some respect, or even that a liability defense existed which, if pursued by the insurance company, would have resulted in no award of damages. Actually, the carrier’s motion for directed verdict should have been granted as to this aspect of the damages. I disagree with the majority that this motion was not properly stated to raise this issue.