Court Opinion

ID: 9480632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:54:12.662756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:48.940977
License: Public Domain

FLAUM, Circuit Judge,
joined by BAUER, Chief Judge, WOOD, Jr., CUDAHY, RIPPLE and KANNE, Circuit Judges, concurring.
John Varhol won a jury verdict against Amtrak for $237. Immediately after the court discharged the jury, counsel for Va-rhol informed the district judge that he wished to file a post-trial motion for a new trial. With no objection from Amtrak, the court gave him 21 days. The next day, the court entered the jury verdict. On the twenty-first day, Varhol filed a motion for a new trial in accordance with the court’s order.
In its reply, Amtrak responded with Rules 59(b) and 6(b). Rule 59(b) provides 10 days for motions for new trials and Rule 6(b) prohibits the district court from extending that time. Under these rules, the motion was not timely despite the court’s purported extension of time. At the hearing on the motion, the court stated to Va-rhol’s counsel that “to the extent you find yourself in a problem, it certainly is my fault, not yours.... I certainly did not intend to have you lose any appellate right by giving you twenty-one days within which to file post-trial motions.”
Varhol’s counsel was an experienced state trial lawyer. In Illinois state court, the trial judge can extend the time for a motion for a new trial. 110 Ill.Stat. K 2-1202(b). Varhol’s counsel should have refamiliarized himself with the Federal Rules before the trial, but when the court granted 21 days to file the motion without objection from opposing counsel, Varhol relied on the judge’s knowledge of the Rules. Varhol’s counsel made an error, but it was a human error and not a procedurally fatal error. An experienced district court also made the error.
Our decision in Eady v. Foerder, 381 F.2d 980 (7th Cir.1967), was designed to deal with this precise situation. “Eady holds that when a judge extends the time within which to file an application for a new trial, and counsel relies to his detriment on that extension, the ‘unique circumstances’ of this reliance allow the court to dispose of the motion before it.” Bailey v. Sharp, 782 F.2d 1366, 1368 (7th Cir.1986) (per curiam). If Eady is good law, then the trial court could hear the motion for a new trial and we can consider the merits of Varhol’s damages arguments.
Eady has survived twenty-three years virtually without criticism except from those who would overrule it today. It has been favorably commented upon by scholars and was approved by this Court only four years ago. Bailey, 782 F.2d at 1368. It is consistent with the Federal Rules, Supreme Court precedent, and the principles of justice. Logic and the principles of stare decisis demand that we not overrule it and we do not. Eady remains the law of this Circuit and, therefore, we can reach the merits of Varhol’s damages claim.
At first glance, Eady seems to conflict with the plain language of the Rules. Rule 6 flatly prohibits extensions of the 10-day time period to file a motion for a new trial. Textile Banking Co. v. Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 849 (7th Cir.1981). This rule is, in some sense, jurisdictional, in that it places a limit on the district court’s power to entertain a motion for a new trial. See, e.g., Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1259 (7th Cir.1988). On this basis, Judge Manion and the judges who join him would overrule Eady. He reasons that the district court has no power to hear the motion; Eady, he concludes, impermissibly allows the court to do so.
But Judge Manion's syllogism does not lead to his conclusion. He claims that: (1) the district court was without power to extend the time; thus (2) the motion for the new trial was untimely and outside the *1569court’s jurisdiction; and, therefore, (3) the court did not have the authority to consider the motion. Step (3), however, is not compelled by steps (1) and (2). Consider the same syllogism applied to personal jurisdiction: the court has no power under the Constitution over certain individuals; proceedings over those individuals are outside the court's jurisdiction; so the court can never hold proceedings where those individuals are subject to the power of the court. That conclusion is simply not correct: Under the Constitution, courts may lack jurisdiction over certain individuals, and they may lack the power to extend their jurisdiction affirmatively to those people, but, under certain circumstances, they are permitted to hear cases involving those individuals. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1). Judge Man-ion’s logic leads to a similarly erroneous conclusion when applied to statutes of limitation. Like Rule 59(b), courts are not free to extend statutes of limitation, but, in certain circumstances, they can hear cases where the complaint was filed after the statutory deadline. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c); see also Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 132 F.2d 829, 832 (7th Cir.1943); American Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1537 (11th Cir.1983).
With subject matter jurisdiction, of course, the limits on power are absolute. If there is no subject matter jurisdiction, nothing the parties do can give the court power to hear the case. Subject matter jurisdiction is not, however, necessarily the appropriate approach to the 10-day time deadline of Rule 59(b). Subject matter jurisdiction is controlled by a statute explicitly labeled as such. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq. Neither Rule 59 nor Rule 6 are styled as jurisdictional. Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction is informed by concerns for federalism. No such concern is present here. And Judge Manion offers no good reason for treating the time limit of Rule 59(b) like subject matter jurisdiction.1 The Rules say nothing on their face about the nature of the jurisdictional restriction of the Rule 59(b) time limit other than that the district court may not extend it. Had Congress intended the 10-day time period to be interpreted like subject matter jurisdiction, it could have said so; yet it was silent. Rule 59(b) can be followed to its letter, read as jurisdictional, and yet be treated like personal jurisdiction.
Given that the nature of the jurisdictional deadline of Rule 59(b) can logically fall anywhere on this continuum, I believe there are good reasons for affirming Eady’s, interpretation. Rule 1 requires that the Rules “be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. As Professors Wright and Miller have noted, Eady is consistent with this mandate because it serves these interests. See 4A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1168, at 504-05 (2d ed. 1987).
Justice is served by applying Eady to the present case. Varhol was informed by the judge that the time deadline could be extended and he relied on the deadline in good faith. Amtrak did not raise any objection at the time. If Amtrak was as uninformed as Varhol, then the incentive for knowing the Rules to which Judge Manion alludes is not created by giving Amtrak the benefit of both parties’ mistake. Alternatively, Amtrak knew the rules all along, and attempted to gain an advantage by keeping silent while Varhol erroneously relied on the judge and then springing the deadline on him once it was past. “The Federal Rules [however,] reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” *1570Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Justice is served by allowing Varhol to proceed with his motion; he relied in good faith on a statement of the district judge.
Moreover, Eady is consistent with the history of the Federal Rules. As one noted scholar and jurist has noted, “[t]he advent of the Federal Rules swung the courthouse door open. They permitted the full development of public law cases and the prompt consideration of the merits. Parties could no longer rely on clever maneuvers, but were required to make their best cases on the merits and face a dispositive ruling or a trial.” Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1901, 1920 (1989); see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 48, 78 S.Ct. at 103. When enacting the Rules, “the rulemakers wanted to escape the rigidities and technicalities that had attended the development of procedural codes.... ” Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U.Pa.L.Rev., 1969, 1975 (1989); see also Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1015 (1982); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U.Pa.L.Rev. 909 (1987). Eady fulfills this promise: it avoids an overly rigid interpretation of the Rules and encourages courts to reach the merits of the dispute.
Eady takes a middle course between treating the time deadlines like personal jurisdictional limits and subject matter jurisdictional limits on power.2 Unlike personal jurisdiction or statutes of limitation, Eady-does not allow parties or the district judge to waive the time deadlines voluntarily. This middle course provides an appropriate balance between the institutional concerns of finality and uniformity and the concern for individual justice in a given case. The courts as a whole have an interest in finality of judgments beyond that of the individual parties and the parties should not be able to subvert this. Moreover, justice is achieved through the evenhanded application of the Rules. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Corp., — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 456, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989); Hallstrom v. Tillabrook County, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 304, 311, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989); Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). By refusing to permit parties to waive the 10-day time limit voluntarily, Eady comports with these principles. Yet, neither uniformity nor the institutional interest in finality compel a subject matter jurisdiction-like approach to the Rules. Cf. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). By not treating the time deadline like subject matter jurisdiction, Eady is able to provide justice in a limited set of cases to individuals whose potentially valid substantive claims would be barred by an unyielding interpretation of the procedural rules. Eady, therefore, provides an equitable balance between possible applications of Rule 6.
Moreover, Eady is consistent with the manner in which the Supreme Court has interpreted time deadlines under the Rules. *1571Primarily, Eady is in accord with the mandate that we read the rules for their plain meaning. Pavelic, 110 S.Ct. at 460. Rule 69(b) on its face is nothing more than a limitation period. It “set[s] a definite point in time when litigation shall be at an end.” Browder, 434 U.S. at 264, 98 S.Ct. at 561. Neither Rule 69(b) nor Rule 6(b) say anything about waiver on their face. Eady, therefore, does not conflict with the plain meaning of the Rules.
Eady is also consistent with Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 84 S.Ct. 397, 11 L.Ed.2d 404 (1964) and Harris Lines v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 83 S.Ct. 283, 9 L.Ed.2d 261 (1962). We recognized in Amax Coal v. Director, OWCP, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 892 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.1989), that Eady “derive[d] from the analogous decisions in Harris Lines and Thompson where the Supreme Court recognized an equitable exception to the requirement that notices of appeal be filed on time — when counsel relies on the trial court’s assurance that the time to file the notice of appeal has been extended, either by its discretionary power to do so under FRCP 59(a) or by erroneously attempting to extend the time for filing post-trial motions which toll the time for filing notice of appeal.” Id. at 581 n. 5 (citations omitted). I agree with Judge Manion that Eady is not compelled by Thompson, but I believe that it is ’ consistent with it. Both cases recognize room for equity in the Rules where a party relies on a representation by the district judge. Thompson excuses precisely the same mistake as Eady: a mutual mistake by the district court and the parties about the power of the court to extend the time for a Rule 59 motion. Moreover, Thompson confirms that the time periods in the Rules should not be interpreted like the rules governing subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge Manion attempts to distinguish Thompson by noting that in Thompson a mechanism exists for achieving the outcome that the district court was trying to reach, so where the district judge could have reached the same end by a proper procedure, we should not penalize the parties where it did so through an improper procedure. This argument proves too much, however, as Judge Manion himself points out that the trial judge could have created a de facto 21-day filing deadline in our case by simply withholding the formal entry of judgement for 11 days. There is, therefore, a mechanism for achieving the same end. Judge Manion also attempts to distinguish Thompson by stating that Thompson merely covers cases of mutual mistake by the district court and the parties, but that in our situation, there should be no mutual mistakes because the district court has no power to hear an untimely motion. Yet Thompson involves the same mistake as Eady. The mistake in Thompson cannot be excusable and the mistake in Eady inexcusable. The only difference between the cases is that they deal with the effects of the same mistake on different courts. Yet I discern no principled reason for guarding the jurisdiction of trial courts more jealously than that of appellate courts.
Eady has also stood the test of time. It has survived over twenty years of trouble-free life. ' Judge Manion’s rationales for rejecting Eady existed in 1967 when the case was decided and no new or compelling reasons have been advanced for discarding it at this date.3 Judicial restraint counsels *1572that absent new reasons, we not reach out to overrule old precedent.
In sum, Eady is consistent with a plain reading of the Rules, including Rule 1, which, like Rule 6(b), is an act of Congress which we cannot ignore. It is supported by Supreme Court precedent, the history of the Rules, and the principles of stare deci-sis. Eady, therefore, remains the law of this Circuit.
Under Eady, we can reach the merits of Varhol’s appeal on the denial of the motion for a new trial. An order denying a motion for a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the district court and, on review, the district court will not be overturned “except where exceptional circumstances show a clear abuse of discretion.” Forrester v. White, 846 F.2d 29 (7th Cir.1988). In determining whether to grant a new trial, the district court must decide if the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
The district court denied the motion because it found that the evidence established that Yarhol’s injuries were due to the normal symptoms and progression of multiple sclerosis. The same injuries Varhol claims were the result of the accident — leg problems, dizziness, and headaches — could have been symptoms of multiple sclerosis which Varhol contracted in 1960. The jury was entitled to consider the probability that Va-rhol’s injuries resulted from a pre-existing disease. See Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 973 (7th Cir.1983). Given the mitigating evidence, I cannot say that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. I conclude, therefore, that the district court’s decision not to grant a new trial should be affirmed.

. Judge Manion urges that his reading of Rules 6 and 59 does not depend on treating them as subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Manion infra at p. 1573. He advances the notion that his suggested result "flow[s] naturally” from a reading of the Rules. I must take exception with this conclusion. As a logical matter, there is no reason that the time deadlines of Rule 6 and 59 should not be r.ead like statutes of limitations, personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or anywhere in between. None of these approaches and their resultant consequences "flow naturally” from a reading of the Rules; they are all policy choices that must be informed by the structure, purposes, and history of the Rules.

. It is argued that the approach of this concurrence might require the overruling of Bailey because Bailey takes a subject matter jurisdictional approach. Judge Manion infra at p. 1573, n. 1. (Needless to say, with an evenly divided Court, Bailey, like Eady, cannot be overruled.) This suggestion is hard to fathom as what is advocated herein is the reaffirmance of Bailey. Moreover, while advancing new and hopefully compelling reasons for upholding both Bailey and Eady, nothing in the proffered logic contradicts those cases. Bailey contains dicta to the effect that once the 10-day time period of Rule 59(b) expires, recourse lies in appeal, but it then goes on to reaffirm the Eady exception to this broad statement. By taking this middle ground, Bailey does not approach the Rules as if they stated limits on subject matter jurisdiction. Even if it were the case that the quoted sentences are inconsistent with the approach of this concurrence (which they are not), the sections of Bailey quoted by Judge Manion are dicta and are not contained in the section of Bailey discussing Eady. It appears a stretch, at the least, to suggest that a decision is overruled because the underlying logic of a subsequent case conflicts (which it does not) with a possible interpretation of two sentences of dicta in the prior decision.

. Judge Manion is correct that I am offering new reasons for upholding Eady. Judge Man-ion infra at p. 1576. The fact that a decision has become stronger over time once we have had an opportunity to evaluate it is, however, an argument for upholding the decision, not reversing it. My point about stare decisis is that Judge Manion offers no new reasons for overruling Eady and, as the judge wishing to change the law, he should shoulder that burden. Respectfully, I can find nothing in his concurring opinion advancing a reason that was not present when Eady was decided (such as an amendment to the Rules or the Supreme Court overruling Thompson) and, therefore, I believe that the burden is not carried.
Moreover, Eady is not inconsistent with Hutson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 289 F.2d 726 (1961) and Nugent v. Yellow Cab Co., 295 F.2d 794 (1961). Both those cases hold that district courts cannot extend time under Rule 59(b). Eady holds that when the district court inadvertently does so and counsel relies on the court to its detriment, equity demands that we allow the court to hear the Rule 59 motion. I *1572believe that these decisions are consistent in the same way that Eady is consistent with a strict reading of Rules 6 and 59, as outlined in my opinion. At most, Eady creates an exception to the rule in those cases, not a wholesale overruling, which is the course Judge Manion would take today. Moreover, even if Eady overruled those cases, the fact that this Court once overruled a decision is not grounds for displacing the principle of stare decisis, the mandate that we leave decisions in place absent new and compelling reasons for overruling them.
Finally, Eady does not stand alone. See Bailey, 782 F.2d at 1368, Amax Coal, 892 F.2d at 581 n. 5, Mayer v. Angelica, 790 F.2d 1315, 1338 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037, 107 S.Ct. 891, 93 L.Ed.2d 843 (1987), and Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 898 (7th Cir.1983) (en banc) (Swygert, J., concurring), for cases citing Eady with approval. The Third Circuit has adopted a similar rule in the context of motions for a reduction of sentence. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 603 F.2d 438, 442 (3d Cir.1979) (per. curiam) (motion for reduction of sentence filed beyond the 120-day deadline can be considered if the parties relied on the district court). Noted scholars have commented favorably on Eady. See, e.g., 4A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1168, at 504-05 (2d ed. 1987). That we have not had to invoke Eady between 1967 and today stands testament only to the apparent competence of the district courts in complying with Rule 6, and is not an implied criticism of Eady.