Court Opinion

ID: 9643169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:21:08.432865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:57.874180
License: Public Domain

KING, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
It is important to understand that this case arose as a result of long-standing disagreements between a mother and her adult son who was then living with her. On October 9, 1992, as a means of dealing with the problems associated with this relationship, the mother filed a petition for judicial hospitalization of the son pursuant to D.C.Code § 21-541 (1997 Repl.). In seeking this relief the mother was attempting, in essence, to find a way to have her son stop bothering her. Her frustrations are painfully expressed in her statement accompanying the petition, which is quoted in full by Judge Ruiz on page four of the majority opinion.
The filing of the petition has been followed by nearly five years of legal wrangling resulting in the majority opinion holding that the son is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the question whether the petition is supported by probable cause. Any resolution in favor of the mother in this proceeding, if she is entitled to receive it, is necessarily going *373to come some time in the future. However, the mother is no longer interested in pursuing the petition because while this matter was pending she found another way to achieve what she has always sought, i.e., the means to keep her son away from her. On May 10, 1994, as she later explained in her remand motion, the mother obtained a civil protection order (“CPO”) pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-1001 (1997 Repl.) to “protect herself and her residence from [her son].” On May 31, 1995, expressing her satisfaction with the relief accorded by the CPO, the mother moved to remand this ease to the trial court to permit her to withdraw the petition for judicial hospitalization. She repeated that request in a statement in lieu of a brief filed on the same date.
Although a motions panel of this court denied the remand motion, we are free to decide that issue anew. Kleinbart v. United States, 604 A.2d 861 (D.C.1992). In my view we should now grant the mother’s request and remand the ease to the trial court to allow her to withdraw the petition. Because, as the mother has undoubtedly discovered, the CPO process is less cumbersome than the judicial hospitalization procedure, and because the mother is satisfied with the protection accorded by the CPO, withdrawal of the petition is virtually certain to end the matter. We must keep in mind that we are dealing with people with everyday problems and it is their interests that are at stake here. We should give consideration to those interests instead of reaching out to decide a major constitutional issue because the son’s attorney and amicus want us to decide that issue. See ante at 366 n. 13.