Court Opinion

ID: 9884062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:33:28.52276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:34.883050
License: Public Domain

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 128. {dissenting). The majority identifies several circuit court decisions that it concludes are error. Majority op., ¶ 2. For the purposes of this dissent, I will assume, without deciding, that the circuit court did err.1 When I examine those assumed errors under the standards for determining whether they were harmless, I do so based on the actual testimony from Lionel Anderson's trial for first-degree sexual assault of a child. The majority employs similar harmless error standards; however, it applies them to abstract principles, not to the concrete facts of this case. This is where we differ. I conclude that *731all errors, in light of the actual testimony, were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, irrespective of which harmless error test is employed. Accordingly, because I would affirm the court of appeals decision upholding Anderson's conviction, I respectfully dissent.
I. DISCUSSION
¶ 129. The errors described in the majority opinion range from discretionary decisions of the circuit court, to ignoring statutory directives, to constitutional concerns. However, as the majority opinion states, all of Anderson's claims of error are subject to harmless error analyses. Majority op., ¶¶ 112-25.
A. Harmless Error
¶ 130. We have explained that for an error to affect the substantial rights of a party and warrant reversal, it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the result of the proceeding would not have been the same absent the error. State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. We have concluded that this test is based on Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶ 44-46. It is also asserted that the test was established in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 51 (Crooks, J., concurring). We have earlier articulated the test for harmless error as "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed" to the outcome. State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). We explained that a "reasonable possibility" under Wisconsin law is the equivalent of "reasonable probability" in United States Supreme Court parlance. Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 41. The specific wording of the test has been a *732matter of dispute on this court for some time. Id., ¶ 52 n.1, (Crooks, J., concurring); see also State v. DeLao, 2002 WI 49, ¶ 59 n.10, 252 Wis. 2d 289, 643 N.W.2d 480 (recognizing a coalescence of varying standards for harmless error, but determining that under the specific facts of the case, it did not matter which standard was applied to the specific error in the case); see also Hannemann v. Boyson, 2005 WI 94, ¶ 57, 282 Wis. 2d 664, 698 N.W.2d 714 ("In other words, if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational juiy would have [rendered the same verdict] absent the error, then the error did not contribute to the verdict" and is harmless (internal quotes omitted)).
¶ 131. The result of the harmless error analysis in this case does not turn on how one phrases the test; either phrasing will yield the same result. The majority opinion agrees that the same result will be reached regardless of which phrasing of harmless error is employed. Majority op., ¶ 116. I reach a different conclusion about harmless error than the majority opinion does because a harmless error analysis is a fact-driven analysis, and the majority opinion eschews the facts.
¶ 132. The majority opinion reaches its conclusions about harmless error without reviewing the actual testimony that the jury heard, but instead, discusses the effect of the errors in terms of abstract principles. However, a jury's verdict is driven by the facts it hears. Therefore, I discuss the claimed errors in light of the actual testimony that was presented to the jury in the courtroom and in the jury room, as well as the testimony the jury requested but did not hear during deliberations.
*733B. Claims of Error
1. Testimony requested by the jury during deliberations
¶ 133. The majority opinion does not conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in permitting the jury to see the child's videotape testimony after it began deliberations. Majority op., ¶ 29. Instead, it concludes it was error to permit the jury to see the child's videotaped interview in the jury room, rather than in open court. Id.
¶ 134. As a starting point, I note that when a jury has questions about testimony presented in the courtroom, "the jury has a right to have that testimony read to it, subject to the discretion of the trial judge to limit the reading." Kohlhoff v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 148, 159, 270 N.W.2d 63 (1978). Permitting the jury to review evidence in the jury room, without some other aggravating circumstances, is not an erroneous exercise of discretion, even when the evidence favors one of the parties, which most evidence does. State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 260-61, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988).
¶ 135. In Jensen, the circuit court permitted Jensen's confession to go to the jury during its deliberations, which was claimed to be an erroneous exercise of discretion. Id. at 258. In examining the claimed error, we overruled State v. Payne, 199 Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929), which had established a per se rule against sending a defendant's confession to the jury room.2 *734Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 259. We replaced the per se rule with a list of factors under which this type of claimed error should be evaluated: (1) whether the testimony would aid the jury in its consideration of the case; (2) whether the defendant would be "unduly prejudiced" by jury access to this evidence during deliberations; and (3) whether the evidence would be subject to improper use by the jury. Id. at 260. Later in Jensen, we explained that even if we had not chosen to overrule Payne, we would conclude that providing the defendant's confession to the jury during deliberations was harmless error, by examining the same three factors set out above. Id. at 262.
¶ 136. Because I have assumed all alleged errors are actually errors for the purposes of this appeal, I examine the three Jensen factors for harmless error in regard to playing the videotape in the jury room. First, the videotape would aid the jury in its deliberations. It would permit a review of the facts told by the child that relate to sexual assault, as the child told them soon after the assault had occurred. Second, Anderson was not "unduly prejudiced" by the jury's review of this testimony, simply because it favored the State. Most evidence favors one party or another. That Anderson's conviction had a "credibility element" to it is no different than was present in Jensen where we permitted the confession to go to the jury room and said, "The issue was credibility — the credibility of the defendant, of the police officers and of the complainant." Id. at 261. Third, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the *735location where the jury saw the videotape affected its verdict. The circuit court carefully instructed the bailiff that he was to be present when the videotape was shown and that he was to permit the jury to see the videotape only one time. Anderson does not contend that the bailiff did not follow these instructions. There- • fore, the jury did not improperly use the videotape.
¶ 137. Furthermore, the videotape was carefully introduced by the social worker who conducted the videotaped interview of the victim. The social worker testified about the interviewing technique she used and her conversations with the child. She concluded that the child was not "suggestible"; that the child understood the difference between a truth and a lie; and that the child had promised to tell the truth. The social worker explained:
Q: [D]id you use the Step-Wise protocol when you interviewed M?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: In the report phase, did you test whether or not she would correct you when you made a mistake?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you find?
A: That she did.
Q: And what about her willingness to say, I don't know, when she didn't know the answers to the questions?
A: She specifically, when I asked her how old her mom was, said, I don't know.
Q: What did you conclude from that?
*736A: That she wasn't going to go along with everything I said. She was not suggestible.
Q: Did you ask her open-ended questions when you got to the disclosure phase from— about the abuse?
A: Yes.
Q: And she was able to answer open-ended questions?
A: Yes. Not extensively. She was only eight. She gave information at that level, yes.
Q: Did you videotape your interview of M[]?
A: Yes.
Q: [D]id M[] demonstrate that she knew the difference between a truth and a lie?
A: Yes, she did.
Q: Was she able to accurately give answers to the hypothetical questions you posed to her?
A: Yes.
Q: Did she understand that there were consequences to lying?
A: She named three different negative consequences for lying.
Q: Did she indicate she knew it was important to tell the truth?
A: Yes.
Q: And did she promise you to tell the truth?
A: Yes, she did.
*737¶ 138. After the social worker had testified about the process she employed when interviewing the child, the videotaped interview was played in open court. It contained the following questioning of the eight-year-old child by the social worker:
Q: So it sounds like you had a problem with your dad. Were you in your mom's room with your sisters?
A: No. In the kitchen.
Q: What happened in the kitchen?
A: He called my name and, uh, I said 'what' and he said 'are you gonna do my thing' and then he made me do it.
Q: He made you do it? Where were you when he made you do it?
A: In the kitchen.
Q: Oh, okay, so you were in the kitchen when he made you do it?
A: Mm-hmm.
Q: Okay. So, when he called you it sounds like you were with your sisters?
A: Mm-hmm.
Q: In what room?
A: My mom's room.
Q: Okay. So it sounds like your dad called you, he said do you wanna do it, you said no, he made you do it in the kitchen, and then you went back to your sisters in your mom's room, your mom came home from Kmart, you looked at what she bought, and then you went to bed.
*738A: Mm-hmm.
Q: Tell me what else you remember about that.
A: Well, um, I forgot.
Q: When you said he asked you if you wanted to do it, what did he say? Tell me exactly his words if you can remember.
A: 'Do you want to play with my tail' and I said 'no' and that's all.
Q: Okay. So he would say 'do you want to — ' He said 'do you want to play with my tail'?
A: Mm-hmm.
Q: And you said 'no.' And then what happened right after that?
A: He pulled down his pants and made me do it.
Q: He pulled down his pants and made you do it? Okay. Tell me what he made you do.
A: He made me get down on my knees and suck it.
Q: He made you get down on your knees and suck it?
A: Mm-hmm.
Q: Okay. And then what happened?
A: And that's all.
Q: Okay. And tell me about the sucking part.
A: It was black and it was pink inside and it was hairy on the bottom.
*739Q: What was?
A: His tail.
Q: His tail was black, and pink on the inside, and hairy on the bottom? Okay. What does a tail do?
A: Pee.
Q: Do you call that part on a boy — or a man— something besides a tail?
A: In the front?
Q: Mm-hmm.
A: Um— a dick.
Q: A dick? Okay.
Q: So, it sounds like your dad had you kneel down and suck on his tail?
A: Uh-hmm.
Q: Okay. Tell me what that was like.
A: Mm— nothing. It was nasty and yellow stuff came out of it.
Q: It was nasty and yellow stuff came out of it? Okay. And where did the yellow stuff go?
A: In my mouth.
Q: And what happened then?
A: I went to the bathroom and spit it out.
*740Q: Where?
A: In the bathroom.
Q: Where in the bathroom?
A: In the toilet.
¶ 139. The majority opinion next claims that it was error to permit playing the videotape while not providing a reading of the child's in-court testimony and Anderson's in-court testimony, both of which were requested by the jury. Majority op., ¶ 2. One of the reasons that the majority opinion concludes this was not harmless error is because the child, in her trial testimony, "on direct examination, she did not recite the allegations stated in the videotaped interview." Majority op., ¶ 8.
¶ 140. The majority opinion's representation at ¶ 8, misstates the contents of the child's testimony. The child's testimony recited the same facts in the courtroom as she did in videotaped testimony. I briefly quote from the child's courtroom testimony to demonstrate the overwhelmingly convincing nature of that testimony, which was consistent with her videotaped allegations of sexual assault:
Q: ... What caused you to leave the room?
A: He was calling my name.
Q: And he's Lionel?
A: Yes.
Q: And when— Do you know how far away that room is from where he was?
A: Yes.
*741Q: How far away is it?
A: Two feet.
Q: Two feet. And what room were you called to?
A: The kitchen.
Q: And what's in the kitchen?
A: Table.
Q: What kind of table?
A: Glass.
Q: Is that table still there today?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Yes. When you say, Uh-huh, you mean yes, right?
A: Yes.
Q: And what were you asked to do?
A: Suck the thing.
Q: Suck his thing, okay. And how— Were you standing up?
A: On my knees.
Q: Was he standing up?
A: No.
Q: What was he doing?
A: Sitting down.
*742Can you describe the thing for me? &
Black and pink. <j
Black and pink. Where is it pink? o’
Inside. <
Inside. How— I mean, do you have to pull anything back? o1
Uh-huh.
Yes?
Yes.
Can you be more specific as to where it is pink?
On the inside.
Okay. Do you remember how long the thing was?
No.
No. Okay. Can you tell us anything else about the thing?
It was black on the outside. <!
Okay. And anything else? O’
No. <
Okay. And when you had to suck on his thing, did he do anything else to you? O’
Some stuff came out. <U
Some stuff came out. What stuff? O*
Yellow. <3
*743Q: Yellow. Like yellow— like this yellow or a different yellow?
A: Light.
Q: Lighter?
COURT: Like this? So the record is clear, Mr. Smith is holding up a legal pad.
Q: I didn't hear your answer?
A: It was lighter.
Q: Lighter. And does it taste like anything?
A: No.
Q: No. What did you do after that?
A: Went to the bathroom and spit it out.
Q: This happened three times?
A: Twice.
As can be readily determined by reviewing what the jury heard in the courtroom, the child's testimony in court repeated in detail the same allegations she made previously.
¶ 141. The majority argues that showing the videotape in the jury room was error, when combined with other factors, one of which was failing to read the victim's trial testimony:
In the present case, the lack of a record of communications between the circuit court and the jury and the circuit court's erroneous exercise of discretion in deciding not to read to the jury all or part of the defendant's and victim's testimony as requested by the jury when the jury had access to the victim's videotaped interview in *744the jury room were prejudicial errors, combining "to contribute to the verdict obtained."
Majority op., ¶ 117 (emphasis added). However, as the undisputed facts show, reading the child's courtroom testimony to the jury would have been of no benefit to Anderson. If anything, Anderson benefited when the circuit court did not fulfill the jury's request to have the child's courtroom testimony read to it.
¶ 142. Notwithstanding the testimony in the record, the majority opinion repeats and repeats that failing to read the child's in-court testimony contributed to its view that it was prejudicial error not to read the child's courtroom testimony. Majority op., ¶¶ 112, 117, 119-21. The majority opinion ties this claim of error to the principle of "credibility." Majority op., ¶¶ 118-21. It implies that if the child's in-court testimony had been read to the jury during deliberations, the jury may not have believed the child. Majority op., ¶¶ 121, 123. However, there is absolutely no factual support in the record for this conclusion.
¶ 143. Just like Sergeant Joe Friday in a long forgotten television sitcom, I say look at the facts. If the child's in-court testimony had been read, it would have made the videotaped testimony even more powerful. Therefore, I conclude that if the circuit court erred, it surely was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 144. The other trial testimony that the jury requested at the same time it asked to have the child's in-court testimony read was Anderson's. Again, in order to determine whether this unfulfilled request is or is not harmless error, it is necessary to examine Anderson's testimony. There is no other way to determine the potential effect it could have had if it had been read to the jury.
*745¶ 145. Anderson's testimony was practically void of information that would have weighed in the jury's deliberations. We quote the portions of Anderson's testimony that relate to the charge of first-degree sexual assault of a child:
Q: Okay. You've heard, Mr. Anderson, the accusations that M[] has made against you? You've been here yesterday and today?
A: Yes.
Q: And I'm going to ask you, Mr. Anderson, did you ever touch M[] in a sexual manner?
A: No.
Q: Did you ever call her out of the room— out of a room where she was watching something with her sisters—
A: No.
Q: —to have her perform oral sex on you?
A: No.
Q: Has your penis ever been in her mouth?
A: No.
Q: What color is your penis, Mr. Anderson?
A: Huh?
Q: What color is your penis?
A: Brown.
Q: Brown?
A: Yes.
*746Q: Any pink on it?
A: No.
As the State points out, Anderson's testimony presented only a flat denial, without elaboration, to the State's strong case. It was of such an unpersuasive nature that it would have had no effect on the jury's verdict if it had been read in the jury room.3 There was nothing in it except Anderson's brief denial, which the jury surely knew was in his testimony because without Anderson's denial of the charges, there would have been no need for a jury trial.
¶ 146. The majority's explanation for the harm of this error relates to the jury's weighing the child's credibility and Anderson's credibility, and what the majority opinion characterizes as the undue influence of the victim's videotaped testimony where credibility was at issue. Majority op., ¶ 119. The majority opinion also asserts that the jury wanted to have the child's and Anderson's in-court testimony read to it because "the jury was obviously having difficulty sorting it all out." Majority op., ¶ 121. This is pure speculation. It is *747equally plausible that two jury members were arguing whether Anderson fled to Kentucky or to some other state to avoid prosecution. No one knows why the jury asked to have the child's and Anderson's courtroom testimony read. However, what is clear beyond refute is that reading Anderson's and the child's in-court testimony to the jury would not have changed this verdict.
¶ 147. In my evaluation of Anderson's concerns about what testimony was, and was not, provided to the jury during its deliberations, I am persuaded that if all the testimony the jury requested had been read to it, the following factors prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, nevertheless, Anderson would have been convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a child: (1) the child's in-court testimony contained a detailed account of the sexual assault, told in words a young child would choose; (2) the child's in-court description of Anderson's ejaculation, the color of the ejaculate and what she did with it, would not be knowledge an eight-year-old child would have, absent sexual assault; (3) the child's description of the particulars of the sexual assault in the videotaped testimony was consistent with her in-court testimony; and (4) Anderson's complete lack of á substantive defense, except to say he did not do it, offered no reason why the child should not be believed. Accordingly, I conclude that if there were error in these discretionary decisions of the circuit court, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Judge's ex parte jury communications
¶ 148. The majority concludes that the circuit court judge's communications with the jury outside the presence of Anderson and counsel is prejudicial error. Majority op., ¶ 126. Although the majority contends that a record-less ex parte communication between the *748judge and jury can deprive the reviewing court of the ability to assess its effect, it acknowledges that such is not always the case. Majority op., ¶ 81 n.53.
¶ 149. I agree that a judge's communication with a jury during deliberations outside the presence of the defendant and counsel is error; however, it is not structural error that requires reversal. State v. Burton, 112 Wis. 2d 560, 570, 334 N.W.2d 263 (1983). The majority opinion does not describe facts that it concludes show that the judge-juiy communication prejudiced Anderson. Instead, it relies on the principle that what the court said in response to the jury's questions cannot be ascertained with certainty and therefore, this lack of verbatim record determines that the error was not harmless. Majority op., ¶ 118. However, this stated rationale causes the majority opinion to overrule Burton, which specifically concluded that ex parte communications between the circuit court and the jury are not structural errors requiring reversal:
We continue to believe, as we said in Havenor, that communication between judge and jury outside the open courtroom and outside the presence of the defendant and defense counsel constitutes error, but we do not readopt the Havenor rule that such error constitutes automatic grounds for reversal for the same reasons that this court earlier abandoned the rule. . . . We hold that communication between a judge and a jury, while the jury is deliberating, outside the courtroom and outside the presence of the defendant and defense counsel constitutes constitutional error, if the defendant has not waived the constitutional right to be present. The court must consider whether the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 569-70 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
*749¶ 150. In addition, the evidence on which the jury-made its determination was so overwhelmingly in support of the State's case that it is almost impossible to ascertain what the judge could have said that would have meaningfully augmented the convincing evidence in favor of the State's case. Furthermore, the judge's on-the-record description of the communications between him and the jury demonstrate that the exchanges did not implicate the quality of the child's or Anderson's in-court testimonies. See majority op., ¶ 19. And, while it is beyond dispute that the circuit court should have required the bailiff to retrieve the notes between the jury and the court from the wastebasket where the jury said it had discarded them, the lack of those notes does not make the circuit court's communications with the jury prejudicial. To conclude that it does, would require us to treat this error as structural error requiring reversal, and as I have explained above, that would require overruling at least 23 years of precedent. Burton, 112 Wis. 2d at 570. Therefore, given the circuit court's explanation of those communications, I conclude that the failure to make or preserve a verbatim record of statements from and to the jury was also harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. CONCLUSION
¶ 151. When I examine those assumed errors under the standards for determining whether they were harmless, I do so based on the actual testimony from Lionel Anderson's trial for first-degree sexual assault of a child. The majority employs similar harmless error standards; however, it applies them to abstract principles, not to the concrete facts of this case. This is where we differ. I conclude that all errors, in light of the actual testimony, were harmless beyond a reasonable *750doubt, irrespective of which harmless error test is employed. Accordingly, because I would affirm the court of appeals decision upholding Anderson's conviction, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 152. I am authorized to state that Justice JON E WILCOX joins in this dissent.

 The claimed errors that the majority opinion relies on are: permitting the videotape of the victim's testimony to be played in the jury room, rather than in open court, not acceding to the jury's request to have the child's courtroom testimony and Anderson's courtroom testimony read in the jury room, answering two questions from the jury without Anderson and counsel being present, failing to direct the bailiff to retrieve the two jury questions and the court's written answers from the wastebasket where the jury deposited them so there would be exact statements of what was said. Majority op., ¶ 2.

 The majority opinion relies heavily on Franklin v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 717, 247 N.W.2d 721 (1976), for its conclusion that the jury should not have been permitted to view the videotape in the jury room. However, Franklin is based on State v. Payne, 199 Wis. 615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929), which we overruled in State *734v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 259, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988). Accordingly, Franklin's conclusion that it is error to permit a showing of a videotape in the jury room, without some other aggravating circumstances not present here, is no longer good law.

 We list the remaining information offered in Anderson's testimony, which along with the quoted transcript text, constitutes the sum total of possible information the jury could have gained from having his testimony read to it: he and his wife were in the process of a divorce, he had a fourth grade education, he did farming work in Louisiana after leaving school, he then lived and worked in Milwaukee, he and his wife had been foster parents to three kids, his wife had confronted him about the alleged sexual assault, his wife subsequently asked him to leave the house, he then went to a cousin's house in Milwaukee, he left the cousin's house and went to Kentucky, he did not read or write well, he was arrested for these charges in Kentucky, he had not talked with the victim or her sisters about any inappropriate conduct.