Court Opinion

ID: 9550291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:33:33.069015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:20.531455
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD, J.
I dissent.
There is no substantial evidence to justify the rescission of Gregory Powell’s parole date. The majority, however, say that substantial evidence is not necessary; any evidence will do to uphold the decision of the Board of Prison Terms (BPT). Since substantial evidence is legally defined as evi*907dence that will persuade a reasonable person, the majority’s decision means that evidence which would persuade only the unreasonable is sufficient to deprive a prisoner of his grant of parole. This is a holding with which I cannot agree.
But in this case even the majority’s insubstantial evidence test fails. The evidence here does not show any misconduct or psychological deterioration after the parole date was fixed, but at best raises doubts about Powell’s health and career plans. Such doubts may justify postponing parole until they are resolved, but cannot justify rescission. One cannot help but suspect that the BPT’s decision here is not the product of impartial adjudication, but an emotional reaction to the prospect of parole for a once notorious prisoner whose notoriety was revived by the showing of a movie depicting his crimes.
The BPT is the administrative agency authorized to grant parole and fix release dates. (Pen. Code, §§ 5075 et seq., 3040 et seq.) Under the indeterminate sentence law (ISL), the BPT exercises wide discretion in fixing an inmate’s term and setting his parole date. While a prisoner eligible for parole has the right to apply therefor and to have his application duly considered, he has no right to a parole at any fixed time or at all. The decision to grant or deny parole is committed entirely to the judgment and discretion of the BPT. (In re Schoengarth (1967) 66 Cal.2d 295, 300 [57 Cal.Rptr. 600, 425 P.2d 200]; see In re Stanworth (1982) 33 Cal.3d 176, 181 et seq. [187 Cal.Rptr. 783, 654 P.2d 1311]; In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 651-653 [122 Cal.Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384]; People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 538 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390].) The only limitations placed upon the BPT’s authority are that it must file a written definitive statement of its reasons to deny parole and that it may not in fixing the term and denying parole impose an excessive sentence disproportionate to the offense, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under our state Constitution. (In re Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d 639, 651 et seq.; In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 273 [113 Cal.Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97].) Under the determinate sentence law (DSL), the BPT’s discretion has been narrowed to some extent, but it still remains broad. (See In re Stanworth, supra, 33 Cal.3d 176, 180 et seq.)
In 1977, the BPT granted Powell a June 1983 parole release date. The record showed that although Powell had attempted escapes and engaged in other misconduct, his conduct had changed dramatically when he was released from death row to the general prison population. He not only complied with the regulations but became an exemplary prisoner. There were numerous favorable prison staff reports concerning his work handling money and managing the prison canteen, dealing with incidents of hostility *908by other inmates, and dealing with the media under stressful questioning. By fixing the parole date six years in advance, the BPT provided for continued monitoring of Powell’s conduct. That monitoring revealed that there was no misconduct and that Powell’s conduct continued to be outstanding. While some might feel that the enormity of Powell’s crimes required more than 20 years incarceration as punishment, it was within the BPT’s discretion to determine that 20 years was appropriate punishment. The BPT’s 1977 determination must be upheld as valid, and may be rescinded only on valid grounds.
The BPT may rescind a parole date but only for cause. (Pen. Code, §§ 3041.5, 3041.7; In re Fain (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 295, 302 [188 Cal.Rptr. 653]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2450.) Section 2451 of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations enumerates matters which must be reported to the BPT and which are grounds for rescission. Subdivision (a) lists assorted disciplinary conduct such as assaults and attempted escapes. Subdivision (b) specifies: “Psychiatric Deterioration. Any prisoner whose mental state deteriorates to the point that there is a substantial likelihood that the prisoner would pose a danger to himself or others when released and who is within 90 days of release shall be reported to the board.” Subdivision (c) provides: “Any new information which indicates that parole should not occur. Examples include: an inability to meet a special condition of parole, such as failure of another state to approve an interstate parole; information significant to the original grant of parole was fraudulently withheld from the board; or fundamental errors occurred resulting in the improvident granting of a parole date.”
The majority fail to recognize that, in contrast to its broad discretion to grant or deny parole, the BPT’s discretion under the ISL in redetermining sentence and in rescinding parole has been limited. Thus in In re McLain (1960) 55 Cal.2d 78, 87 [9 Cal.Rptr. 824, 357 P.2d 1080], the court concluded that “good cause” must exist for an order redetermining sentence and rescinding parole and a convicted person’s liberty may not be made to turn upon mere whim, caprice, or rumor. (In re Fain (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 376, 394 [135 Cal.Rptr. 543]; In re Spence (1974) 36 Cal. App.3d 636, 639-640 [111 Cal.Rptr. 782].) Although McLain held that notice and hearing were not required for redetermination of sentence or for rescission of parole (55 Cal.2d at p. 85), subsequent cases have imposed notice and hearing requirements.
In Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [33 L.Ed.2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593], it was concluded that parole revocation involved a conditional liberty interest and that due process required procedural protections in parole revocation proceedings, including written notice of the claimed violations of *909parole, and opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and a neutral hearing body.
In In re Prewitt (1972) 8 Cal.3d 470 [105 Cal.Rptr. 318, 503 P.2d 1326], we held that the Morrissey procedures were applicable in parole rescission proceedings as well as parole revocation proceedings. We reasoned: “Although the proceedings of which petitioner complains were not for revocation of parole but for rescission of an unexecuted grant of parole, we can perceive no significant distinction between the deprivation of the right to conditional liberty enjoyed by a parolee after release and the deprivation of the right to achieve such liberty after a grant thereof but before the date fixed for release. In either event the parolee has been deprived of a valuable if limited right to be free (see Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 482 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 494-495]; People v. Vickers, supra, [8 Cal.3d] p. 451 [105 Cal.Rptr. 325, 503 P.2d 1313]), and the same or substantially the same protection must be accorded him in effecting that deprivation. An inmate, accordingly, is entitled to a hearing which substantially conforms to the Morrissey procedures on the question whether an order granting parole should be rescinded as improvidently granted.” (8 Cal.3d at p.474.)
In parole revocation proceedings the substantial evidence rule has been applied (In re Gomez (1966) 64 Cal.2d 591, 595 [51 Cal.Rptr. 97, 414 P.2d 33]; In re Carroll (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 22, 30-31 [145 Cal.Rptr. 334]), and in accordance with the reasoning of Prewitt, we should adopt the same rule for parole rescission proceedings. The potential deprivation of an inmate’s right to obtain conditional liberty precludes any lesser standard than a substantial evidence test.
The primary authority relied upon by the majority, Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445 [86 L.Ed.2d 356, 105 S.Ct. 2768] and its reliance on Wolfy. McDonnell (1973) 418 U.S. 539 [41 L.Ed.2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963], require application of the substantial evidence test. Shortly after our decision in Prewitt, supra, 8 Cal.3d 470, the United States Supreme Court recognized in a situation somewhat analogous to the rescission of parole that a prisoner’s liberty interest is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment liberty to entitle him to minimum protections “to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” (Wolf v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. 539, 557 [41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951].) In Wolf, the court was concerned with disciplinary proceedings resulting in the deprivation of a prisoner’s good time credits, a liberty interest substantially equivalent to that involved in a rescission of parole. The court reasoned that the interest in liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property. (Id. at pp. 557-558 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 952].)
*910In Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 472 U.S. 445, the court reaffirmed the view that revocation of good time credits involves an important liberty interest. The court also held that revocation does not comport with the minimum requirement of procedural due process unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record. (472 U.S. at p. 454 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 364].) Pointing out that the requirements of due process are flexible depending on a balancing of interests, the court held that the prisoner’s interest must be accommodated in the distinctive setting of a prison where the disciplinary proceedings take place in a closely, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and where the institutional needs include assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners, avoiding burdensome administrative requirements that might be subject to manipulation, and preserving the disciplinary process as a means of rehabilitation. (Id. at pp. 454-455 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 364].) Recognizing that prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly charged atmosphere, and “prison administrators must often act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent circumstances,” the court concluded that fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process clause does not require a standard of review greater than some or any evidence, an insubstantial evidence standard. (Id. at p. 456 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 365].)
Under the substantial evidence test, the basic rule is that the evidence is sufficient if the determination made on the basis of it is one that could be made by reasonable people. (See, e.g., 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Extraordinary Writs, § 265, p. 892.) A lesser test obviously suggests approval of some determinations which would not be made by reasonable people.
Wolf v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. 539, and Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 472 U.S. 445, do not support the majority’s insubstantial evidence test but require the substantial evidence test here. Under those cases, it is clear that the justification for permitting review on the basis of an any evidence or insubstantial evidence test is the distinctive setting of prison disciplinary proceedings involving exigent circumstances. It follows that when such considerations are absent the ordinary substantial evidence standard must be applied as it is in property cases. Although a discipline issue of possible sexual misconduct was originally part of the instant proceedings, the issue was excluded by the BPT. The remaining issues and the findings of the BPT are not based on disciplinary matters and do not involve exigent circumstances warranting departure from the substantial evidence rule. The latter rule should apply to the issues remaining before the BPT to avoid the danger of arbitrary action inconsistent with the statutes and administrative regulations limiting the BPT’s authority to rescind parole. The potential *911loss of the constitutionally protected liberty interest, absent exigent circumstances which are not involved here, requires we observe the rule of law and require the BPT to act reasonably, only on the basis of substantial evidence.
I turn then to an evaluation of the evidence offered and the findings of the BPT. The BPT ordered rescission of parole because it found sufficient doubt had been raised by the Sutton report regarding Powell’s ability to refrain from further violent acts to warrant rescinding his parole. Although recognizing that the Yandell and South reports were supportive of release, the BPT pointed out that the reports stated that psychiatric prediction of future violence is severely limited and that Dr. South felt that any prediction in Powell’s case would be speculative. The panel rejected Dr. South’s statements to the effect that Powell would handle stress not too differently from other men released on the streets because Dr. South was unable to predict with certainty that Powell would be able to maintain psychiatric improvements under stress. The BPT concluded that public protection mandated more extensive testing and psychiatric intervention prior to release.
Thus, the BPT in the present proceeding relied upon the Sutton report. The Sutton report relied largely upon the Gravitt letter and its implications of sexual misconduct. Those allegations led the Sutton report not only to question Powell’s stability but also the stability of his family relationship. Because the BPT previously rejected the claims of misconduct and in the instant hearing excluded consideration of the sexual misconduct allegations involved in the Gravitt letter, the rescission may not be based on those allegations.
As we have seen, under Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. 471, and Prewitt, supra, 8 Cal.3d 470, the inmate is entitled to be heard and to present witnesses and documentary evidence. To hold that the BPT could exclude from consideration the alleged issues of sexual misconduct and then rescind parole based on evidence as to those issues would violate the due process rights guaranteed by Morrissey and Prewitt.
Although recognizing that the BPT refused to consider the allegations of sexual conduct and subsequently dismissed the issues relating to sexual conduct, the Attorney General argues that reliance on the Sutton report was not thereby precluded. While other parts of the Sutton report might properly be relied upon by the BPT, the portion relating to sexual conduct could not properly be given any weight.
“Those parts of an opinion that are based in whole or significant part on matter that is not a proper basis must be excluded upon objection, though *912the expert may testify to that portion of the opinion which is based on proper matter. (Evid. Code, § 803.)” (People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 90 [211 Cal.Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189].) Coleman recognized that opinions based on hearsay are admissible and that hearsay may be admissible in some cases to explain the opinion and to cross-examine the expert. (Id. at pp. 90-92.) Accordingly, the fact that the Sutton report was based on reports of others does not preclude its admission or preclude reliance upon it.
However, an expert opinion obviously is not entitled to any weight insofar as it is based on factual assumptions which are false. Although the record may not establish that there was no sexual misconduct as a matter of law, under the circumstances of the instant case the Gravitt letter must be deemed totally discredited. The allegations contained therein had been rejected by the deputy warden when after an investigation he removed the report from the file. Twice the BPT investigated those charges and rejected them. In the instant proceeding, although originally providing that the alleged sexual incidents would be inquired into, the BPT in the midst of the hearing announced that they would not be considered, and its order dismissed the sexual allegations. By excluding the issue of the truth or falsity of the sexual allegations, the BPT precluded any reliance on those matters by it or by experts.
Apart from the sexual matters, there is nothing in the Sutton report which would warrant rescission of parole. The majority rely on the neurological test recommendation and the employment report. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 906.) The employment problem conceivably might warrant some delay until other plans are established, but it did not warrant rescission.1 Similarly, at most, neurological reevaluation might warrant a delay until the results were obtained. The reevaluation did not warrant rescission; only negative results could do so. The Sutton report did not assert that there was brain atrophy or that it was likely there was brain atrophy. It only noted a 20-year-old report of possible brain atrophy and that there had been no followup testing. Dr. South disagreed with the recommendation for further testing, noting the absence of any symptoms over so many years. In addition, it should be pointed out that Dr. Sutton indicated general agreement with Dr. *913Yandell’s favorable report claiming that the difference in viewpoint was based on the additional information, which was the Gravitt report and the employment plan.
I conclude that the record is devoid of any competent evidence to show any disciplinary misconduct (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2450, subd. (a)), or any psychiatric deterioration following the granting of the parole date (id., subd. (b)). There is no proper evidence showing disciplinary conduct or psychiatric deterioration. Further, the record is devoid of any substantial new evidence as to prior conditions warranting rescission. Accordingly, whether we apply substantial evidence review or an insubstantial or any evidence review, there is no basis for the rescission of parole.
It should also be pointed out that the BPT applied an erroneous standard in rejecting the Yandell and South reports. The BPT rejected them because the doctors were unable to predict with certainty that Powell would be able to maintain psychiatric improvements under stress. Application of that standard would mean that inmates who committed violent crimes could never be paroled because, while psychiatrists may give opinions as to the lack of likelihood of future violence (see People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1026-1029 [245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342]), they have recognized the inaccuracy of attempts to forecast future violent behavior. (See People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 768 et seq. [175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446].) Application of the certainty standard would furnish a shield for the BPT to act arbitrarily, aware that orders rescinding parole could never be overturned. While it is true that the BPT must consider the violence potential of parolees, the required guaranties of certainty of nonviolent behavior impose too high a standard.
Reasonable people can disagree whether given the enormity of Powell’s crimes the 20-year incarceration was a sufficient penalty. The BPT concluded in 1977 that this was sufficient penalty, recognizing Powell’s exemplary conduct and fixing the parole date six years in advance during which Powell would be observed to determine whether he engaged in any improper conduct, whether his exemplary conduct continued, and whether there was any psychological deterioration. The BPT’s 1977 determination was valid and must be upheld. His exemplary conduct continued, and there is nothing in the record apart from the discredited Gravitt letter, which the majority does not rely upon, to indicate any misconduct on Powell’s part or any psychological deterioration. The television program depicting Powell’s crimes may have furnished a reason to scrutinize Powell’s conduct, but it does not furnish grounds for rescinding the parole date. In the absence of any evi*914dence, substantial or insubstantial, to show that Powell engaged in improper conduct or that there was psychological deterioration, we can only speculate whether the television program was the basis of the BPT’s action in rescinding parole. In any event, it is clear that in rescinding parole, the BPT acted contrary to the statutes and administrative regulations regulating its authority.
I would affirm the order of the superior court.

 In addition, it should be recognized that the employment report had additional defects. The Sutton report’s objection to the employment plan was based on two matters, first family instability based solely on the Gravitt letter—a matter which .must be rejected as shown above. Thus, the Sutton report insofar as it criticized Powell’s engaging in a business with his wife must be rejected. Second, Powell had not received any vocational training in prison and had little work experience prior to prison. However, the report entirely ignores the prison records of Powell’s extensive experience in prison of handling money and managing the prison canteen and of working for the prison administration. Apparently, the file available to Dr. Sutton did not include the prison staff reports.