Court Opinion

ID: 9795334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:26:26.160228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:28:07.794348
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
The concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Moreno concludes that the lying-in-wait special circumstance, as this court has construed it, does not perform the narrowing function *215required by the federal Constitution’s Eighth Amendment to distinguish from other murders those killings that are so heinous as to warrant the death penalty. At one time I expressed similar concerns. (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1146-1147 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55] (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Since then, however, I have come to the conclusion that the lying-in-wait special circumstance does not violate the federal Constitution. (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 145-147 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400] (cone. opn. of Kennard, J.).) On this point, therefore, I disagree with Justice Moreno. But I share his view that the trial court in this case erred in instructing the jury that to find true the special circumstance allegation of lying in wait, it need only find that the lying in wait continued for the length of time necessary “to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.” Because that error was prejudicial, this court should vacate the lying-in-wait special circumstance found by the jury in this case.
Under California’s death penalty law, murder intentionally committed by lying in wait is a special circumstance warranting the death penalty, but those who commit premeditated and deliberate murder are not subject to the death penalty unless there is also a special circumstance finding. This distinction suggests that when the voters in 1978, through the power of initiative, enacted California’s death penalty law, they regarded murder by lying in wait as more heinous than premeditated murder, and they intended to define murder by lying in wait in a manner that differed significantly from premeditated murder. To give effect to that distinction, this court in People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244], held that the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires “a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act.” (Id. at p. 557, italics added.) A murder committed after a substantial period of watchful waiting demonstrates a degree of callousness and coldbloodedness exceeding that of an “ordinary” premeditated killing, where the murderer’s requisite reflection and consideration of consequences may occur in a very short time. (See People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1127 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498] [“Premeditation and deliberation do not require much time [citation], for ‘ “[t]houghts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ”].)
Thereafter, in People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992], this court upheld a jury instruction stating that the waiting period required for the lying-in-wait special circumstance “ ‘need not continue for any particular period of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.’ ” (Id. at pp. 433-434.) As Justice Moreno’s concurring and dissenting opinion in this case points out, Sims undercuts this court’s earlier requirement in People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 557, that the period of watchful waiting be “substantial.” (Conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, at pp. 219-220.)
*216In Sims, I wrote separately, disagreeing with the majority’s discussion of three issues unrelated to lying in wait, a topic that my separate opinion in Sims did not address. (People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 467-471.) On reflection, I now conclude that the Sims majority was also wrong in departing from this court’s earlier holding in People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 557, that the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires a “substantial” period of watchful waiting. I therefore agree with Justice Moreno (cone. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, at pp. 224-225) that the trial court here erred by giving the same jury instruction that this court upheld in Sims: that to find the lying-in-wait special circumstance true, the jury need only find that the defendant waited for a period of time sufficient to show “a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.” I hasten to add that the giving of that jury instruction in this case- was understandable in light of its express approval by the majority in Sims. For the reasons given by, Justice Moreno (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, at pp. 225-226), the error requires reversal of the jury’s special circumstance finding of lying in wait, but it does not require reversal of the judgment of death because the jury found the existence of another special circumstance.