Court Opinion

ID: 9686483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:50:56.887269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:19.292461
License: Public Domain

*311Sawyer, J.
(concurring). I reluctantly concur.
I agree with the majority that the Supreme Court’s decision in People v Cain, 409 Mich 858; 294 NW2d 692 (1980), which adopted the dissenting opinion by Judge (now Justice) Cavanaugh in People v Cain, 94 Mich App 644; 228 NW2d 465 (1980), controls the case at bar and that reversal is, therefore, required. Nevertheless, I write separately to express my displeasure with such a mandated result in the instant case and to urge the Supreme Court to reexamine whether error requiring reversal always occurs when a court officer communicates ex parte with a jury during deliberation.
While I cannot disagree with the proposition that an invasion into the jury room must be looked upon with great concern and should not be ordinarily permitted and, when it does happen, reviewed with great skepticism, I cannot agree with the proposition that such an invasion can never be considered harmless. The rigid rule of requiring reversal whenever there is any contact with the jury, without inquiring into the question of prejudice to the defendant, serves no legitimate interest of justice. The absurdity of such a rule was articulately pointed out by Judge M. G. Harrison in People v Kent, 157 Mich App 780, 791-792; 404 NW2d 668 (1987), in which this Court found no necessity for reversing a conviction on the basis that a court clerk took the jury’s meal orders before deliberations1:
Broad rules of law designed to address especially egregious situations on occasion became petrified without additional analysis over periods of time. It makes little sense to have a rule so absolute that *312the potential result is reversal of an otherwise errorless trial because of an insignificant contact with a jury which does not even raise the concern of those who were present during the proceedings. Those who promulgate such rules would do well to consider the consequences of reversal of convictions where, despite clear instructions to the contrary, a juror suddenly appears at a secretary’s desk and makes a request for water or to call a babysitter, or a juror knocks at the door and verbally requests certain exhibits, or a note is sent to a judge indicating how the voting stands. Is a court officer, when taking a jury to a meal, prohibited from verbally indicating the spending limits?
Little enough confidence exists today in our institutions without further perpetuating its erosion by an automatic rule applied to court personnel who are under oath to obey the law where nothing more is revealed than an incidental contact unrelated to the case itself. The judicial system must demonstrate some confidence in those who are entrusted with its well-being and, in fact, have little interest in the outcome of a matter, when there is no showing of prejudice (or, after scrutiny, even a hint of such).
Admittedly, the contact in the case at bar was not as innocuous as in Kent. Rather than taking meal orders, the court officer in the case at bar delivered the trial judge’s message to "keep on working” in response to the jury note it could not reach a decision. Certainly such a breach of the sanctity of the jury room demanded investigation, and I would agree that a court should be liberal in finding prejudice to defendant arising from the contact in order to insure that his right to a fair trial was preserved. However, the right to a fair trial does not mean that a defendant is entitled to a perfect trial.
In the case at bar, defendant has not demonstrated to my satisfaction that he was prejudiced *313by the trial court’s message to the jury to "keep on working.” Absent such a showing, I would vote to affirm the conviction. It is only the rule of stare decisis which prevents me from doing so. See People v Mitchell, 428 Mich 364, 369-370; 408 NW2d 798 (1987).
I find it regrettable that the citizens’ tax dollars must be wasted on giving a defendant another trial when he has received a fair trial the first time. I find it unconscionable that the victim must be put through another trial in futile reverence to a rule which serves no useful purpose. It is little wonder that victims may be reluctant to come forward when our justice system places upon them the burdens of following such absurd rules. As Judge Harrison pointed out, such results as we are compelled to reach today only serve to deepen the erosion of public confidence in our judiciary. Therefore, while I am constrained to vote for reversal, I urge the Supreme Court to reverse us and restore some common sense to the system.

 The defendant’s conviction was reversed, however on other grounds.