Court Opinion

ID: 9556110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 06:09:36.547535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:29.721522
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed August 14, 2023

                                      In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00301-CR

         TRAMON LEONTRA MONTRELL WILLIAMS, Appellant
                             V.
                 THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
                            Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. F-2076304-I

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel
                           Opinion by Justice Molberg

      Appellant Tramon Leontra Montrell Williams appeals his conviction for

murder, for which he was sentenced to ninety-nine years’ confinement in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice’s Institutional Division (TDCJID) and a $10,000

fine. He argues the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction, on

the theory that no rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he

was the person who shot and killed the victim. Based on the record before us, we

conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction, and we affirm

the judgment in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
                                             BACKGROUND
        On August 1, 2020, a music video was filmed in the Deep Ellum

neighborhood of Dallas. Alonte Hickem, one of the individuals at the scene, was

shot five times and died as a result of the shooting.

        Williams was charged by indictment for committing the murder of Hickem.

The indictment alleged that on or about August 1, 2020, in Dallas County, Williams

“did unlawfully then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of

ALONTE DEMIR BROADUS HICKEM, an individual, . . . by SHOOTING

[HICKEM] WITH A FIREARM, a deadly weapon” and further “did unlawfully then

and there intend to cause serious bodily injury to [Hickem] . . . and did then and there

commit an act clearly dangerous to human life, to wit: by SHOOTING [HICKEM]

WITH A FIREARM, a deadly weapon, and did thereby cause the death of

[HICKEM], an individual.”                 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2).1 Also,

although not included in the indictment, the State filed a notice of intent to enhance

Williams’s punishment range with evidence of a prior felony conviction for the

offense of engaging in organizing criminal activity.

        Williams entered a plea of “not guilty” to the indictment and pleaded “not

true” to the enhancement. A jury decided the guilt/innocence and punishment

phases, found him guilty of the offense as charged in the indictment, found true the

    1
     Texas Penal Code § 19.02(b) states, in part, that “[a] person commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally
or knowingly causes the death of an individual; [or] (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits
an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.”
                                                    –2–
enhancement paragraph, and assessed punishment at ninety-nine years’ TDCJID

confinement and a $10,000 fine.

      The trial court pronounced sentence, noted the affirmative finding that a

deadly weapon was used in the commission of the offense, and entered judgment in

accordance with the jury’s verdict. Williams filed a motion for new trial that was

overruled by operation of law and timely appealed.

                                      ANALYSIS
      When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d

893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).

      The factfinder is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to be

given testimony. See Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

We may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our

judgment for that of the factfinder. Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 178 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume

that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that

determination.” Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

      In conducting our review, we consider “all evidence in the record of the trial,

whether it was admissible or inadmissible.” Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767

                                          –3–
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citations omitted); see also Powell v. State, 194 S.W.3d

503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“[A] reviewing court is permitted to consider all

evidence in the trial-court record, whether admissible or inadmissible, when making

a legal-sufficiency determination.”).

      In Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016), the Court explained:

      Sufficiency review essentially addresses whether “the government’s
      case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the
      jury.” . . . . On sufficiency review, a reviewing court makes a limited
      inquiry tailored to ensure that a defendant receives the minimum that
      due process requires: a “meaningful opportunity to defend” against the
      charge against him and a jury finding of guilt “beyond a reasonable
      doubt.” . . . . The reviewing court considers only the “legal” question
      “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
      prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
      elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. at 243 (internal citations omitted). In other words, “All that a defendant is entitled

to on a sufficiency challenge is for the court to make a ‘legal’ determination whether

the evidence was strong enough to reach a jury at all.” Id. at 244 (quoting Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319).

      In this case, in his sole issue, Williams argues “the evidence is legally

insufficient to prove that Tramon Williams is the person who shot and killed Alonte

Hickem.” An eyewitness who testified she saw the person who shot Hickem testified

she did not see the shooter in the courtroom and that she could hardly see the

shooter’s face because he had on a face mask and a hood.

      But as the State notes in its brief, the jury had other evidence from which it

could reasonably infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Williams committed the
                                      –4–
offense. Multiple video clips of the scene before, after, and during the shooting were

admitted, and from these videos, the eyewitness identified who she saw shoot

Hickem. Williams’s fingerprints were located on the right rear interior door handle

of a blue SUV that left the scene moments after the shooting, and the jury heard that

the person driving that SUV identified Williams from a photo lineup. The jury also

heard that at the time of his arrest, Williams possessed the same gun from which the

five cartridge casings found at the crime scene were shot, and he was wearing the

same type of shoes as those worn by the person who jumped into the blue SUV and

demanded that the driver take him away on the day of the shooting.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude

a rational trier of fact could have found could have found the essential elements of

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including that Williams was the person who

shot and killed Hickem. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (legal sufficiency standard);

Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 (same).

                                   CONCLUSION
      We overrule Williams’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                           /Ken Molberg/
220301f.u05                                KEN MOLBERG
Do Not Publish                             JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

                                         –5–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

TRAMON LEONTRA MONTRELL                      On Appeal from the Criminal District
WILLIAMS, Appellant                          Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. F-2076304-I.
No. 05-22-00301-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice
                                             Molberg. Justices Pedersen, III and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Miskel participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 14th day of August, 2023.

                                       –6–