Court Opinion

ID: 9649015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:40:40.638313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:07.111636
License: Public Domain

Justice LAMB,
concurring.
I join the majority but write separately, first, to express my agreement with Mr. Justice Castille that flexibility in the application of the Frye standard is required, particularly in those instances where scientific consensus is the product of proprietary research. Additionally, in my view, the dichotomy *572suggested by the majority between general acceptance of methods and general acceptance of conclusions will often prove to be, as it was in this instance, less helpful in practice than the clarity of its exposition would suggest.
The majority, in discussing the proper application of the Frye standard, states that “the proponent of the evidence [must] prove that the methodology an expert used is generally accepted by scientists in the relevant field as a method for arriving at the conclusion the expert will testify to at trial.” Majority Op. at 1045. In the next sentences, the majority cautions that “[t]his does not mean, however, that the proponent must prove that the scientific community has also generally accepted the expert’s conclusion” and generalizes that “[w]e have never required and do not require such a showing.” Id. at 1045.
Thus,, in the majority’s view, consensus as to the expert witness’s conclusion is not required for admissibility but the proponent of that conclusion must establish consensus that the witness’s method is appropriate “for arriving at the conclusion ...” Id. In this case, the majority concedes that the methods employed by the witness were, in fact, unobjectionable in themselves.1 However, the evidence was properly excluded under Frye because these methods were not shown to be “the accepted methods ... for reaching a conclusion as to whether Doritos remain too hard and too sharp as they are chewed and swallowed to be eaten safely.” Majority Op. at 1047.
It is clear from the majority’s discussion that evidentiary admissibility under Frye requires evidence' of a scientific consensus the nature of which encompasses elements of the proffered conclusion as well as of the method used to reach that conclusion. As so understood, I am in agreement with this analysis. Similarly, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997), a city electrician with lung cancer brought suit against the manufacturers *573of the toxic substances (including polychlorinated biphenyls— PCB’s) he alleged were instrumental in causing or promoting his illness. Epidemiological studies as well as those involving animal models were offered by the electrician in resisting the manufacturer defendant’s motion for summary judgment but the trial court held this evidence to be inadmissible. The United States Supreme Court agreed with this ruling, notwithstanding general scientific acceptance of the methods employed by the plaintiffs expert witnesses and the plaintiffs reliance on the statement in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), that the “focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” The Court reasoned in Joiner that “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.” 522 U.S. at 146, 118 S.Ct. 512.
With the caveat that conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another, I am in agreement with the majority’s analysis in this case. Indeed, while a full explanation of the reasons are beyond the present necessities, I submit that in the usual case, consensus by the relevant scientific community that a particular methodology is appropriately employed to reach a particular conclusion, will also imply a consensus as to the conclusion itself. This relationship between methodological consensus and agreement with the result thereby obtained is a function of characteristics of the scientific method itself including the essential traits of objectivity, operationalism,2 verifiability3 and replicability.4

. A portion of the Superior Court’s opinion is excerpted for this purpose in which the methods employed by the plaintiffs’ witness are described as, possibly, "as old as the pyramids” and involving no "novel or new scientific principles...." Majority slip op. at 7.

. Operationalism is the philosophical doctrine underlying the scientific method that the meaning of a proposition consists of the operations involved in proving or applying it.

. Verifiability refers to susceptibility of a proposition to being tested (verified or falsified) by experiment or observation. A scientific proposition cannot be true (or meaningful) unless it is verifiable.

. Replicability refers to the ability of different scientists using the same methods of observation or experimentation to achieve the same results. As applied to scientific propositions, it is the state or property of being experimentally replicable. A scientific hypothesis cannot be confirmed unless the methods of confirmation can be replicated.