Court Opinion

ID: 9945901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 19:04:42.638603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:13.935483
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24 Starflinger v. KBC Capital CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PETER STARFLINGER,                                                   D081172

         Plaintiff and Appellant,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-
                                                                     00023394-CU-CO-CTL)
KBC Capital, LLC,

         Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
         Klinedinst, Greg A. Garbacz, Benjamin C. Wohlfeil and Robert M.
Shaughnessy for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Finch, Thornton & Baird, Louis J. Blum, David S. Demian and
O. Thomas Barajas for Defendant and Respondent.
         Peter Starflinger appeals from a judgment in the lawsuit he filed
against KBC Capital, LLC (KBC) alleging that KBC breached a contract to
sell a commercial office building to him. Starflinger’s operative complaint
sought both damages and specific performance. However, after a jury
delivered a verdict in favor of Starflinger and awarded damages for KBC’s
breach of contract, the trial court denied Starflinger’s request for an equitable
bench trial on the issue of specific performance, explaining that Starflinger
had “elected his remedy” of damages and that it would “amount to an
unnecessary expenditure of part[y], counsel, and court resources” to consider
the issue of specific performance. Starflinger contends that the trial court
erred in entering judgment without considering his request for specific
performance, and he asks us to reverse the judgment and remand to the trial
court to conduct a bench trial on the issue of specific performance.
      We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to decide Starflinger’s
request for specific performance. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment, and
we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                       I.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    The Real Estate Transaction
      KBC owns a two-story commercial office building in San Diego (the
Property). Starflinger and KBC entered into a real estate purchase and sale
agreement (the Purchase Agreement), in which KBC agreed to sell the

Property to Starflinger.1 Subsequently, an option agreement (the Option
Agreement) gave Starflinger until June 1, 2017, to decide to complete the
transaction according to the terms of the Purchase Agreement. Starflinger
paid $300,000 in consideration for the Option Agreement, and those funds
were released from escrow to KBC. Consistent with the June 1, 2017
deadline in the Option Agreement, an amendment to the escrow instructions

1     More specifically, the Purchase Agreement was first entered into
between KBC and Southwest Group in June 2016, but on October 3, 2016,
Southwest Group assigned all its rights under the Purchase Agreement to
Starflinger.

                                       2
stated that if Starflinger did not close escrow by June 1, 2017, the escrow
would be cancelled. Among other things, the Purchase Agreement required,
as a condition of closing, that KBC provide certain documentation to
Starflinger.
      Due to what Starflinger characterized as a delay by KBC in providing
documentation needed to obtain financing, Starflinger requested in April and
May 2017 that KBC agree to an extension of the applicable deadlines. KBC
did not agree to an extension. Instead, on May 31, 2017, KBC notified
Starflinger that unless escrow closed within five business days of June 1,
2017, it would be deemed terminated. Escrow did not close by that date, and
the real estate transaction was not completed.
      One other piece of background information is relevant to understanding
the context in which this litigation arose. During the period covered by the
Option Agreement, an entity that Starflinger intended as a future tenant at
the Property was in the process of attempting to obtain a conditional use
permit from the City of San Diego to allow operation of a retail cannabis
business at the Property. The conditional use permit was initially approved
by a hearing officer on May 24, 2017. However, on July 20, 2017 (after KBC’s
cancellation of escrow for the Purchase Agreement and the initiation of this
litigation), the city’s planning commission reversed that decision and denied
the conditional use permit. Starflinger contends that KBC’s actions that
gave rise to this litigation were motivated by a desire to back out of the
Purchase Agreement so it could try to sell the Property at a higher price to a
different buyer in light of the increased value of the Property associated with
a cannabis-related conditional use permit.

                                       3
B.    Starflinger’s Lawsuit

      On June 27, 2017, Starflinger filed a complaint against KBC.2
Starflinger also filed a lis pendens on the Property. Against KBC, the
operative second amended complaint (SAC) alleged breach of contract, breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, specific performance,

and declaratory relief.3 According to the SAC, “KBC either intentionally
delayed, or failed to provide, necessary documentation in its exclusive
possession which affected [Starflinger’s] ability to procure financing and close
escrow.” The SAC alleged both that (1) Starflinger was “damaged in amount
of no less than $300,000, which is the amount [Starflinger] put into escrow
that was released to KBC”; and (2) Starflinger “has an inadequate remedy at
law in that the Property is unique and the Purchase Agreement and Option
Agreement allow for Starflinger to purchase the Property.” Accordingly, the
SAC’s prayer for relief included the following: “1. General and special
damages against Defendants in an amount of at least $300,000 which will be
shown according to proof at trial; [¶] 2. For a declaration that KBC is

2      Starflinger also sued one of KBC’s principals, William Luke Gaskins.
The jury found against Starflinger on his sole cause of action against Gaskins
for intentional inference with contractual relations based on the affirmative
defense of the “manager’s privilege.” (See Huynh v. Vu (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194.) Starflinger has not raised any argument
challenging the judgment entered with respect to Gaskins, and we
accordingly understand Starflinger’s appeal as directed solely to the
judgment in favor of KBC.

3     Although specific performance is a remedy for breach of contract rather
than a separate cause of action, the SAC followed the approach of identifying
specific performance and breach of contract as two different causes of action.

                                       4
obligated to sell [Starflinger] the Property; [¶] 3. For specific performance
requiring KBC to sell the Property to [Starflinger].”
      On January 15, 2022, three days before trial began, counsel for
Starflinger sent an email to counsel for KBC raising logistical questions

about the trial of the equitable claim for specific performance:4
      “As we discussed after the status conference on Friday, we are
      considering seeking bifurcation of the equitable claim for specific
      performance and having that tried to the court first. A[s] you
      know, generally, equitable claims get tried before legal claims.
      Also, from an efficiency perspective, this may also avoid or
      narrow the jury time.

      “The question is whether to bifurcate that equitable claim, try it
      first, and then if that resolves the issues, we may not need a jury
      trial for the remaining issues. We plan to discuss this with the
      court on Tuesday during the pretrial hearings, and obviously the
      court has the discretion to control the order of proof without our
      input, but nevertheless, having a common plan or agreement
      might be helpful.

      “I know you raised the issue of perhaps KBC being more inclined
      to do this IF Mr. Starflinger were to waive the jury entirely so
      that, any remaining breach of contract claims, if specific
      performance is denied, are tried to the judge. We are discussing
      this issue with Mr. Starflinger over the weekend and will be
      prepared to discuss that with the court on Tuesday, IF that is
      something your client would consider, which you were not certain
      of.

4      “A suit to recover damages for breach of contract is an ‘action at law in
which a right to jury trial ordinarily exists.’ . . . Because specific performance
is an equitable remedy, there is no constitutional right to jury trial on that
remedy.” (Darbun Enterprises, Inc. v. San Fernando Community Hospital
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 399, 409, citations omitted (Darbun).)

                                        5
      “We are looking for ways to truncate the trial and avoid the
      delays and exigencies associated with [COVID] and a 17 day jury
      trial, which could lead to mistrial, etc. This would seem to be in
      your client’s interests as well, as I doubt he wants to try the case
      twice or pay for two trials if that can be avoided.”5

      Counsel for KBC responded later the same day: “I discussed this with
[my client] yesterday. We do not think bifurcation is appropriate nor is there
a way to bifurcate. We are not agreeable to a bench trial.”
      Three days later, during the January 18, 2022 hearing on motions in
limine, counsel for Starflinger reminded the trial court that Starflinger was
seeking a ruling from the trial court on the equitable remedy of specific
performance. Specifically, in the course of ruling on one of the motions in
limine, the trial court commented that “we’re going to need to have a fairly
sophisticated jury” and cautioned counsel that, even though the parties had
the right to a jury, it was easy for a jury to get confused in “transactional”
cases. Counsel for Starflinger replied, “We’ve had some discussion about this
issue. There is one cause of action, to be clear, which is for the Court, and
that’s the specific performance, which is the equitable cause of action. We
had some discussion about maybe trying to bifurcate that, but we haven’t
come to a conclusion about how to do that efficiently.” No further discussion
on the subject is reflected on the record during motions in limine or prior to

trial. The trial court began jury selection the next day, January 19, 2022.6

5     The January 14, 2022 status conference that counsel referred to in his
email was not reported. We accordingly have no record of what, if anything,
the parties discussed with the trial court regarding the manner in which the
claims for specific performance and for damages would be tried.

6     The record does not reflect any express decision by the trial court about
the order of trial for Starflinger’s legal claims and equitable claims, but

                                        6
      The jury returned a verdict on March 1, 2022. In its special verdict, the
jury found in favor of Starflinger on his breach of contract cause of action and

awarded damages in the amount of $300,000.7 The jury found (1) Starflinger
and KBC entered into a contract; (2) Starflinger did all, or substantially all,
of the significant things that the contract required him to do; (3) all the

“when severable legal and equitable causes of action or issues are present in
a single proceeding, the trial court generally has authority to determine in
what order the matters should be heard.” (Nationwide Biweekly
Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279, 317.)
“[A]lthough a trial court retains discretion regarding the order in which the
issues should be tried, the governing California cases express a preference
that the equitable issues be tried first.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, “it is fully
within a trial court’s discretion to have a jury try the legal issues first.”
(Darbun, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 409, fn. 4.) Regardless of which type of
issue is tried first, “the first fact finder may bind the second when
determining factual issues common to the equitable and legal issues.”
(Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 156.) Where, as here, “the trial
court holds a jury trial first on any legal issues, the court is bound by the
jury’s factual findings when it considers any equitable issues.” (Orange
County Water Dist. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252,
355, fn. 52.)

7     The jury’s damage award of $300,000 appears to be based on the
$300,000 that was released from escrow to KBC. The jury rejected
Starflinger’s argument that it should award damages in a higher amount.
Starflinger’s argument for a higher damages award was based, in large part,
on the contention that if escrow was not cancelled, his future tenant, who was
seeking the conditional use permit to operate a cannabis business at the
Property, would have had standing to file a successful court proceeding to
challenge the planning commission’s decision to deny the conditional use
permit. Starflinger argued that the Property would have had a greatly
increased value with the conditional use permit in place (an increase ranging
from $500,000 to $3.2 million), which the jury should factor into its damages
award. Starflinger further argued that the jury should award (1) $980,000
for 56 months of lost rent on the Property, and (2) $140,000 in prejudgment
interest.

                                        7
conditions required for KBC’s performance did not occur, but that the
required conditions were waived; (4) KBC failed to do something that the
contract required KBC to do, KBC did something that the contract prohibited
KBC from doing, or KBC breached the implied promise of good faith and fair
dealing; and (5) Starflinger was harmed by KBC’s breach of the contract.
      Immediately after the verdict was read and the jury was excused,
counsel for Starflinger raised the issue of the remaining claim for specific
performance. “So I just want to remind the Court we have a remaining cause
of action for specific performance, which is completely equitable. It’s—
obviously, it’s 4:38 so we’re not getting to that today. I think it’s something
that can be briefed on the papers.” Counsel for Starflinger therefore
suggested that the court set a future status conference on the issue. Counsel
for KBC asked to be heard on the matter and stated, “So it’s [KBC’s] position
they need to make an election of remedies now. I just want to go on record
our belief is—it’s defense’s position that plaintiffs need to make the election
now whether they’re going to pursue specific performance or stick with the
legal remedy or make that on the record if they choose not to. I suppose I’m
taking the position that it’s at their risk.” Counsel for Starflinger disagreed:
“My understanding of the case law is we need to make that election prior to
judgment, and so I think we’re not at judgment yet. We’re also at 4:40. So I
could turn and say, ‘Let’s start a bench trial,’ but I don’t think that would
have much use at this point in time.” The trial court resolved the issue by
setting a status conference for a later date.
      In preparation for that status conference, Starflinger submitted a brief
setting forth his proposed procedure for deciding the specific performance
claim: “[Starflinger] requests that Court, sitting in equity, hold a bench trial
to resolve the remedy of specific performance. [Starflinger] believes that the

                                        8
current record provides more than adequate support for this remedy but
suggests that the court hear briefing on the papers and then schedule a day
of additional trial testimony to the extent that either party believes that
additional evidence must be offered in support of this equitable remedy.
[Starflinger] anticipates that the presentation of evidence will take one full
day.”
        At the status conference, KBC took the position, for the first time, that
Starflinger was barred from seeking a ruling on specific performance from
the trial court because he had already elected his remedy of damages “by
proceeding with the legal matters to and through the jury verdict,” and there
were “also some equitable rules that would bar an election of remedies at this
time.” Accordingly, KBC proposed that the parties proceed by first “just
brief[ing] the issue of elections of remedy.” KBC explained that if, after that
briefing, the trial court determined that specific performance was still a live
issue in the case, “I think we need a couple of days of evidentiary hearing,
maybe two to three days, maybe a little less, and then closing briefing on
that. [¶] But I do think there are a couple of issues that were not fleshed out
before the jury that need to be explored a little further upon the equitable
remedy.”
        Although Starflinger disagreed with KBC’s proposed approach, the trial
court stated, “I kind of like the idea of starting with the election of remedies,
but just do it by way of briefing. And then maybe . . . after I’ve had a chance
to review the briefs, then maybe I’ll schedule an argument for a little bit so
you guys can argue the briefs. [¶] And then depending on the ruling on that,
then we deal with the specific performance, however we’re going to handle it.”
In response, KBC commented that, in the event the trial court decided to
consider the merits of the specific performance claim, “we’re going to need at

                                         9
least a two to three day evidentiary hearing. Things may change, but the
way I look at the evidence that did come in and the evidence that didn’t come

in, there needs to be a couple more days of testimony.”8
      The trial court concluded, “Okay. Well, let’s do this. Let’s at least start
with the election of remedies briefing.” The trial court explained, “I may or
may not rule right then on the election of remedies. I may take a day or two
to think about it after the argument. Just depends. [¶] But once I rule on it,
then we would have to schedule—I mean, we’d talk about it at that time . . . ,
what we’re going to do as far as are we going to just brief it or are we going to
need, actually, an evidentiary hearing. And then we can schedule
something.” Near the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for Starflinger asked
for clarification: “So the briefs due on April 18th are only regarding the issue
of the election of remedies and whether we can elect specific performance
. . . .” The trial court responded, “Exactly.”
      The parties then submitted briefing as the trial court had directed. In
its opening brief, KBC presented three separate grounds for its contention
that the trial court should not proceed to rule on the merits of Starflinger’s
claim for specific performance. First, KBC argued that Starflinger “elect[ed]
his legal remedy of contract damages by presenting that case to a jury,
seeking a verdict from that jury, and receiving a verdict from that jury[.]”
Second, KBC contended that Starflinger had “repeatedly perjure[d] himself”
during trial by testifying that he exercised the option pursuant to the terms

8     At the eventual hearing on whether the specific performance claim
should go forward, KBC increased its estimate to seven days of additional
proceedings, stating “I think we’re easily in here for seven court days on the
next go-round.” At that same hearing, Starflinger stated that one or two days
of additional proceedings would be required.

                                        10
of the Option Agreement, and that the trial court should “deny an equitable
remedy to a claimant who repeatedly perjure[d] himself on a key issue to

determination of the action[.]”9 Third, KBC contended that because
Starflinger “took seven weeks of the jury’s time to pursue a $3.9 million
award while intending his specific performance remedy as a back-up if that
tactic did not pan out,” the trial court should “exercise its equitable discretion
to deny an equitable remedy to Starflinger so as not to condone, encourage,
and reward gamesmanship that result[ed] in an extreme waste of court and
jury resources[.]” KBC argued that “[a]ny of these issues constitute
independent grounds to refuse a hearing in equity.”
      Starflinger’s opening brief did not comply with the trial court’s directive

to discuss the election of remedies issue,10 but Starflinger’s reply brief

thoroughly focused on that issue.11 Specifically, Starflinger’s reply brief
responded to each of the three grounds upon which KBC contended that the

9      KBC specified at the hearing on the election of remedies issue that this
“unclean hands” argument was different from any unclean hands argument
that it would raise as an affirmative defense if the trial court concluded that
it should entertain the merits of the specific performance claim.

10    Starflinger’s opening brief focused on the merits of his claim for specific
performance.

11     In its reply briefing, KBC noted that Starflinger’s opening briefing had
improperly discussed the merits of the specific performance claim rather than
the election of remedies issue that the trial court had directed the parties to
brief. KBC stressed that “[t]he Court asked the parties to provide briefing on
whether Starflinger may pursue the equitable remedy of specific performance
despite having already pursued the legal remedy of damages to jury verdict,”
and argued that Starflinger’s briefing on the merits of the specific
performance claim “should be disregarded in its entirety as it is completely
off-topic.”

                                       11
trial court should not consider Starflinger’s claim for specific performance.
Among other things, Starflinger argued that (1) an election of remedies is not
required until entry of judgment unless the defendant has suffered prejudice;
(2) there was no merit to KBC’s assertion that he had unclean hands because,
among other things, the jury did not find that he testified untruthfully about

exercising the option12; and (3) he had not engaged in gamesmanship by
proceeding on his damages claim before the jury. Both in disputing that he
engaged in gamesmanship and in arguing that KBC suffered no prejudice
from having the question of damages decided first, Starflinger pointed out
that, prior to trial, KBC rejected his proposal that the parties agree to
bifurcate the trial of the equitable and legal issues and that the equitable
issues be tried to the court before the jury trial. Starflinger made clear in the
declaration accompanying his briefing that he was still seeking the remedy of

specific performance and that he intended to purchase the Property.13

12    Starflinger argued that the jury’s finding that he did “all, or
substantially all, of the significant things that the contract required him to
do” should be understood as a finding that he did exercise his option to
purchase the Property, as he testified. KBC, in contrast, supported its
contention that Starflinger had testified untruthfully about exercising the
option based on the jury’s finding that “all the conditions that were required
for KBC’s performance” did not occur.

13    Starflinger stated, “I request a Court order granting me the remedy of
specific performance—i.e., that KBC be ordered by the Court to convey the
Property to [Starflinger] pursuant to the terms of the parties’ contract for the
sale of the Property and account for its use of the Property since the date of
breach of June 1, 2017. I continue to demand that KBC convey the Property
to me immediately. [¶] . . . Assuming the Court gives such an order,
assuming KBC complies with it by timely and fully turning over all the
documents, and assuming the documents indicate that the Property has at
least as much value as I believed when I signed the [Purchase Agreement], I

                                       12
      The trial court held two hearings on the election of remedies issue. At
the beginning of the first hearing, at which it primarily addressed scheduling,
the trial court summarized the issue before it: “We are discussing kind of the
second phase of the trial, which is the issue of whether specific performance
is still a viable cause of action, whether it should or should not go forward.”
(Italics added.)
      The trial court issued a ruling on June 21, 2022, which endorsed two of
the three arguments advanced by KBC for why the specific performance
claim should not go forward. Although the trial court expressly declined to
decide, in relation to KBC’s assertion of unclean hands, “whether

[Starflinger’s] testimony amounted to perjury,”14 the trial court concluded
that Starflinger was not entitled to claim the remedy of specific performance
for two reasons. First, the trial court concluded that Starflinger had already
elected the remedy of damages. Second, the trial court determined that
Starflinger should not be granted relief from that election because he had
engaged in gamesmanship by first proceeding with a jury trial in which he
sought a significant award of damages. Specifically, after summarizing

will be ready and willing to further perform my additional obligations under
the contract, including paying the balance of the purchase price of $3,225,000
(which is $2,925,000). After I receive full and complete documents from KBC,
I will need approximately 60 days to close on the purchase of the Property.”
(Italics omitted.)

14     Although not reaching the issue of whether Starflinger’s testimony
amounted to perjury and therefore supported a finding of unclean hands,
immediately after declining to reach that issue the trial court commented,
“[t]he Court does find that [Starflinger’s] testimony lacked candor and
credibility.”

                                       13
KBC’s arguments and the case law upon which KBC relied, the trial court
explained those two rulings in the following comments:

      “The Court . . . agree[s] with [KBC’s] proposition and above cited
      cases that [Starflinger] took a risk in choosing remedies, and a
      further bench trial would constitute a waste of judicial resources
      by [Starflinger] engaging in undue and prejudicial legal
      maneuvering.

      “The above-cited cases support the Court’s belief that
      [Starflinger] elected his remedy and to give [Starflinger] a second
      ‘bite of the apple’ would violate due process, be prejudicial to
      [KBC], and amount to an unnecessary expenditure of part[y],
      counsel, and court resources. Finally, the Court was never of the
      impression following the Jury trial that Starflinger really wanted
      to purchase the property but instead pursued vast damages for
      what he perceived as an egregious breach of contract.

      “The Jury’s verdict did not validate [Starflinger’s] contentions
      and was in the end a minor damages award.

      “The request for an equitable bench trial on the issue of specific
      performance is denied.” (Emphasis and capitalization omitted.)

      The trial court entered judgment on August 16, 2022. The judgment
recited the jury’s verdict and explained that “[s]ubsequent to the jury verdict,
the Court received briefing from [KBC] and [Starflinger] regarding
[Starflinger’s] request for a further bench trial on equitable relief. . . . On
June 21, 2022, the Court issued its order denying equitable relief.” The
judgment awarded $300,000 in damages to Starflinger, but it specified that
Starflinger had not prevailed on his “causes of action for specific performance
and declaratory relief.”

                                        14
      Starflinger appeals from the judgment, challenging the ruling on the

claim for specific performance.15

                                        II.
                                  DISCUSSION
A.    The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal
      The resolution of this appeal turns to a large extent on how to
understand the trial court’s June 21, 2022 ruling on the specific performance
claim. As we will explain, Starflinger contends that the trial court
erroneously declined to proceed with the merits of the specific performance
claim and that its ruling was based on its application of the election of
remedies doctrine. KBC, in contrast, contends that the trial court reached
the merits of the specific performance claim, and we should therefore apply a
deferential standard of review in affirming that ruling. We begin by
examining the parties’ very different views of the trial court’s June 21, 2022
ruling.
      1.    Starflinger’s Characterization of the June 21, 2022 Ruling
      As Starflinger summarizes his contention in this appeal, “the trial
court erroneously . . . concluded that because the parties tried the legal issues
first, Starflinger had made an election of remedies that prevented him from
pursuing his remaining equitable claims.” Starflinger argues that “[t]he trial
court had a duty to resolve the remaining equitable claims following the
conclusion of the bench trial. . . . It failed to do so when it followed inapt case
law and wrongly decided there was an election of remedies despite the lack of
a judgment, and the lack of any adverse impact upon KBC.” Starflinger asks

15    KBC filed a cross-appeal, which it subsequently dismissed.

                                        15
that we “set aside the judgment and return this matter for a bench trial on
specific performance.”
      2.    KBC’s Characterization of the June 21, 2022 Ruling
      KBC, on the other hand, contends that the trial court’s ruling did not
depend on the election of remedies doctrine. KBC states that the trial court
entered “judgment on the merits . . . denying Starflinger specific
performance.” (Italics added.) This merits-based ruling was purportedly
based on the trial court’s conclusion that “Starflinger was not credible, never
really wanted the property (i.e. could not meet the ready and willing element)
and was wasting court resources (i.e. unclean hands).” According to KBC,
instead of declining to reach the merits of the specific performance claim, the
trial court merely decided that it would not hear additional evidence because
“[a]fter a lengthy jury trial, the record contained all the information
necessary to decide the elements of entitlement to specific performance.”
KBC contends that “the decision to deny a hearing” did not “turn on the
election of remedies, but rather the futility of a further hearing where the
trial court had the evidence required for its ruling.”
      KBC argues that because the trial court issued a ruling on the merits of
the specific performance claim, but without issuing a formal statement of
decision, the trial court’s ruling is “subject to the doctrine of implied findings”
and must be evaluated under a substantial evidence standard of review.
(See Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 983 [explaining doctrine
of implied findings].) KBC asks that we affirm the trial court’s purportedly
merits-based ruling by implying a finding, based on substantial evidence in
the record, either that (1) “Starflinger was not ready and willing at all times
to buy the [P]roperty” and thus failed to satisfy all the elements needed for
specific performance (italics omitted); or (2) “Starflinger acted with unclean

                                        16
hands by: ([a]) submitting a false affidavit and perpetuating that testimony
at trial; and/or ([b]) by gamesmanship in testing his preferred remedy of
damages with specific performance as a fallback position.”
      KBC does not attempt to argue that if, as Starflinger contends, the trial
court based its June 21, 2022 ruling on the election of remedies doctrine and
therefore did not reach the merits of the specific performance claim, the trial

court’s ruling was legally justified.16 Similarly, KBC acknowledges that the
doctrine of unclean hands would not justify a ruling dismissing the specific
performance claim prior to considering the merits. Citing to Fladeboe v.
American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 57, KBC
acknowledges that “[a] court that concludes a litigant has acted with unclean
hands should not simply dismiss the action, ‘but should adjudicate the merits’
of the defense with the equitable cause of action.” (Italics added.)
B.    The Trial Court Did Not Reach the Merits of the Specific Performance
      Claim but Instead Relied on the Election of Remedies Argument
      Advanced by KBC
      Based on our review of the trial court proceedings, Starflinger has
correctly characterized the trial court’s June 21, 2022 ruling. The trial court
did not rule on the merits of Starflinger’s claim for specific performance
because it concluded that Starflinger was bound by his election of a damages
remedy.

16     KBC’s respondent’s brief touches on the election of remedies issue in a
footnote. In that footnote, KBC states that “even though this appeal does not
turn on election of remedies, it is worth noting that no authorities actually
support the proposition that an election of remedies may be made at any time
prior to entry judgment where the remedies are mutually exclusive.” (Italics
omitted.)

                                       17
      As we have explained, KBC advocated that the trial court decline to
decide the specific performance because “Starflinger made a clear,
unequivocal election of remedies by not asking the Court to hear his specific
performance claim first.” Accepting KBC’s argument, the trial court ruled
that (1) Starflinger “elected his remedy”; and (2) it would not give Starflinger
relief from that election, which it characterized as giving Starflinger “a
second ‘bite of the apple,’ ” because doing so “would violate due process, be
prejudicial to [KBC], and amount to an unnecessary expenditure of part[y],
counsel, and court resources.” On that basis, it “denied” Starflinger “an
equitable bench trial on the issue of specific performance.” (Emphasis and
capitalization omitted.) The trial court plainly did not reach merits of the
specific performance claim.
      KBC takes one part of the trial court’s ruling out of context to suggest
that the trial court did decide the merits of the specific performance claim.
Specifically, KBC points to the trial court’s statement that it “was never of
the impression following the Jury trial that Starflinger really wanted to
purchase the property but instead pursued vast damages for what he
perceived as an egregious breach of contract.” KBC views this statement as
pertaining to the requirement that “to obtain specific performance, a buyer
must prove not only that he was ready, willing and able to perform at the
time the contract was entered into but that he continued ready, willing and
able to perform at the time suit was filed and during the prosecution of the
specific performance action.” (C. Robert Nattress & Associates v. Cidco (1986)
184 Cal.App.3d 55, 64.) However, when the context of the statement is
considered, we have no doubt that the trial court was not commenting on the
merits of the specific performance claim; rather, it was explaining that

                                       18
Starflinger had, in fact, elected damages as remedy since he did not “really
want[ ]” the Property.
      In sum, the record does not support KBC’s contention that the trial
court ruled on the merits of Starflinger’s specific performance claim. Instead,
the trial court decided that Starflinger would not be permitted to go forward
with his specific performance claim because he had already elected the
remedy of damages.
C.    The Trial Court Erred in Ruling That Starflinger Was Barred from
      Obtaining a Decision on His Specific Performance Claim Because He
      Already Elected the Remedy of Damages
      We next consider whether, as Starflinger contends, the trial court erred
in ruling that he was foreclosed from proceeding with his specific
performance claim because he had already elected the remedy of damages.
      There is no dispute that “a party may not obtain both specific
performance and damages for the same breach of contract, either in single or
multiple actions.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888,
905.) Thus, although the SAC sought both an award of damages and an
order of specific performance, at some point Starflinger would be required to
elect between those two inconsistent remedies.
      “Ordinarily a plaintiff need not elect, and cannot be compelled to elect,
between inconsistent remedies during the course of trial prior to judgment.”
(Roam v. Koop (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1039 (Roam), italics added.)
“Indeed, one line of authority declares that an election should not be
compelled prior to satisfaction of judgment, unless the plaintiff has gained
some other benefit that would make it inequitable to permit continued
pursuit of an otherwise available remedy.” (Denevi v. LGCC, LLC (2004)
121 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1221 (Denevi).) Case law specifically allows a plaintiff
to take to trial both the remedy of specific performance and the remedy of

                                      19
damages, before making an election between them. (Brandolino v. Lindsay
(1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 319, 324–325 [in an action for specific performance or,
in the alternative, for damages for the breach of an agreement to sell land,
the plaintiff obtained a bench trial on specific performance, followed by a trial
for damages, before electing a remedy].)
      The doctrine of the election of remedies, which KBC relied upon in the
trial court, refers to a situation in which a plaintiff is deemed to have
irreversibly elected a remedy. “If a plaintiff has unequivocally and
knowledgeably elected to proceed on one of the remedies he is pursuing, he
may be barred recourse to the other. . . . The doctrine of election of remedies
acts as a bar precluding a plaintiff from seeking an inconsistent remedy as
the result of his previous conduct or election. In California the doctrine is
theorized on the principle of estoppel. . . . ‘Whenever a party entitled to
enforce two remedies either institutes an action upon one of such remedies or
performs any act in the pursuit of such remedy, whereby he has gained any
advantage over the other party, or he has occasioned the other party any
damage, he will be held to have made an election of such remedy, and will not
be entitled to pursue any other remedy for the enforcement of his right.’ ”
(Roam, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1039–1040, citation omitted.) Because
“ ‘[t]he doctrine of election of remedies is but a specific application of the
equitable doctrine of estoppel, . . . it has been frequently held that a change in
remedies does not bring about an election of remedies unless the change
involves a prejudice to the opposing party.’ ” (California Golf, L.L.C. v.
Cooper (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1065–1066 (California Golf); see also
Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Marina View Heights Dev. Co. (1977)
66 Cal.App.3d 101, 137 (Glendale Fed.) [“the doctrine of election of

                                        20
remedies . . . operates only where pursuit of alternative and inconsistent

remedies substantially prejudices the defendant”].)17
      Here, the election of remedies doctrine would bar Starflinger’s specific
performance claim only if the record shows that Starflinger “unequivocally
and knowledgeably elected to proceed on one of the remedies he [was]
pursuing,” and thereby caused substantial prejudice to KBC. (Roam, supra,
41 Cal.App.3d at p. 1039.) But the record does not reflect any unequivocal
and knowledgeable election by Starflinger. As we have explained, an election
was not required prior to judgment. (Ibid.; Denevi, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1221.) Further, Starflinger consistently asserted throughout the litigation
that he remained intent on pursuing his claim for specific performance.
Shortly before trial Starflinger proposed to KBC that the specific performance
claim be decided first, in a bifurcated proceeding—a proposal that KBC
rejected. Next, during motions in limine Starflinger expressly reminded the
trial court that “[t]here is one cause of action, to be clear, which is for the
Court, and that’s the specific performance, which is the equitable cause of
action.” Finally, immediately upon the conclusion of the jury trial,
Starflinger reiterated that the court still had to make a ruling on the claim
for specific performance. Starflinger took no action that could reasonably be
described as “unequivocally and knowledgeably” electing to proceed solely on

17    Case law observes that “[t]he doctrine of election of remedies has been
much criticized and is falling into disrepute. A person should be entitled to
change his alternative remedies until one of his inconsistent rights is
vindicated by satisfaction of judgment or by application of the doctrines of res
judicata or estoppel.” (Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1985) 169
Cal.App.3d 90, 101; see also Glendale Fed., supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 138
[“Election of remedies is a harsh doctrine and is currently looked upon with
disfavor by courts and commentators.”].)

                                        21
his claim for damages to the exclusion of his claim for specific performance.

(Roam, at p. 1039.)18 The election of remedies doctrine accordingly does not
apply here. The trial court erred in failing to reach the merits of Starflinger’s
claim for specific performance.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed, and this action is remanded with directions
that the trial court hold further proceedings on Starflinger’s claim for specific
performance. Starflinger is awarded his costs on appeal.

18     In light of the counsels’ pretrial email correspondence and Starflinger’s
statement to the trial court during motions in limine, it would not have been
reasonable for KBC to have understood Starflinger to have chosen to proceed
solely on his claim for damages before the beginning of the jury trial. Indeed,
at the conclusion of the jury trial, KBC took the position that an election was
required at that time, implying that KBC understood no such election had
already been made. We accordingly have no occasion to consider whether
KBC suffered prejudice due to any choice by Starflinger to proceed solely on
his claim for damages, as Starflinger never made such a choice. (California
Golf, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [prejudice to the opposing party is
required for a plaintiff to be estopped from selecting an inconsistent remedy
that is different from a remedy previously elected].)

                                       22
                              IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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