Court Opinion

ID: 9857322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:30:03.667448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:27.581554
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority today holds that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to consider either appellant’s claim of insufficient evidence or whether the trial court erroneously denied her pretrial motion to suppress. In my dissent to Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) (Clinton, J., dissenting), I point out that the Texas Constitution, and not this Court, grants jurisdiction to the courts of appeals, and that claims of insufficient evidence fall outside the ambit of Tex.R.App. Pro., Rule 40(b)(1). Not raised in Lyon, but briefed and argued in the instant cause, is the question of whether a court of appeals may permit an appellant to file an amended notice of appeal in order to meet the requirements of the “but clause” of Rule 40(b)(1). The majority cites Jones v. State, 796 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) as authority for the proposition that “[a] defendant may not be permitted to amend a notice of appeal out of time.” Op. at 47. Jones was a bare majority *48opinion which does, indeed, stand for that proposition. Because I believe that Jones was wrongly decided, and that it should be overruled, I dissent.
There is no need here to rehash my argument in Lyon that the courts of appeals’ jurisdiction is plenary once invoked. However, as I also noted in Lyon:
“That a court is vested with appellate jurisdiction ... does authorize it to exercise appellate power. Rule 40(b)(1), while not a jurisdictional limitation, may serve as a procedural bar to certain issues in certain circumstances. Which issues? ‘Non-jurisdictional defeet(s) or error(s) that occurred prior to entry of the plea.’ Rule 40(b)(1), supra. Which circumstances? Causes in which proper, timely notice has not been given, i.e., notice which does not state ‘that the trial court granted permission to appeal or [which] specifies) that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial.’ Id.”
Lyon, at 742 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Such an issue and such a circumstance are presented by this cause. While appellant complains of an error that occurred before the entry of her plea, she did not give notice that states the alleged error was raised by written motion prior to trial. Thus her complaint is proeedurally barred by operation of the “but clause” of Rule 40(b)(1).
Appellant argues, however, that she should have been given the opportunity to amend her defective notice of appeal. I agree.
In Jones, as noted ante, this Court held that, while Rule 40(b)(1) is not jurisdictional, it is a restrictive statute not subject to Tex. R.App.Pro., Rule 83. Jones, 796 S.W.2d at 186-87. The defendant in Jones had failed to give the specific notice required by the “but clause” of Rule 40(b)(1). Id., at 185. The court of appeals heard his complaint nonetheless, finding that “appellant promptly filed an amended notice of appeal fully complying with Rule 40 after the State pointed out this procedural default in its brief.” Jones v. State, 762 S.W.2d 330 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988). Citing to Rule 83, the court held that “appellant promptly corrected the defect in procedure after it was called to his attention. The appeal is properly before this Court.” Id.
We reversed, despite precedent supporting the court of appeals’ holding. Jones, 796 S.W.2d at 187. We discounted our decision in Miles v. State, 842 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (appeal bond sufficient notice of appeal under Rule 40(b)(1)), as dicta. Id. And we distinguished the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985), as inapplicable. Id. Miles was, indeed, dicta,1 but the Court’s distinction of Evitts was specious.
The Jones Court wrote:
“Appellant argues [that Evitts ] is authority for us sanctioning the Court of Appeals’ decision to waive the defect in his notice of appeal. We find Evitts to be distinguishable. In Evitts, the defendant filed a timely written notice of appeal, but failed to file a ‘Statement of Appeal’, which is designed to assist the Court of Appeals in processing the records of an appeal. In Evitts, the [Supreme] Court specifically points out that compliance with that rule ‘is not jurisdictional.’ Evitts, supra, [469 U.S. at 389, 105 S.Ct.] at 832. In the instant case, compliance with Rule 40(b)(1) is necessary for a defendant to avoid statutory restrictions on his right to appeal.”
*49Jones, 796 S.W.2d at 187. I am at a loss to see to see how this in any meaningful way distinguished Evitts. It was not distinguished by the fact that the appellate rule in question in Evitts was “not jurisdictional,” whereas our rule is a “statutory restriction.” Only a page earlier in Jones we held that compliance with Rule 40(b)(1) was “not ... jurisdiction^.” Id., at 186. Nor is Rule 40(b)(1) distinguished by the fact that the rule in Evitts was “designed to assist the Court of Appeals in processing the records on appeal.”2 It is not on the basis of Evitts, however, that I would revisit Jones. Evitts, in fact, may not be controlling.3 I would instead acknowledge that Jones was a poorly reasoned opinion in which this Court ignored the plain meaning of its own appellate rules.
It is for deficiencies of this sort that Tex. R.App.Pro., Rule 88 was intended. Rule 83 provides:
“A judgment shall not be affirmed or reversed or an appeal dismissed for defects or irregularities, in appellate procedure, either of form or substance, without allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend such defects or irregularities.”
Furthermore, Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 2(b) provides that “in the interest of expediting a decision or for other good cause shown, a court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals may suspend requirements and provisions of any rule in a particular case.”
Nowhere in either today’s majority opinion, or in Jones, does this Court offer a reason why Rule 83 does not apply to cases such as the one sub judice. Today, the majority simply asserts that “[a] defendant may not be permitted to amend a notice of appeal out of time. See Jones, 796 S.W.2d at 187.” In Jones, the Court merely distinguished Miles and Evitts, and then wrote:
*50“We hold that the Court of Appeals in the instant case should not have entertained appellant’s appeal of nonjurisdictional matter. Tex.RApp.P. Rule 83 does not cure this defect.”
Id. Both opinions, on this issue, are bereft of analysis. See id, at 187-90 (Teague, J., dissenting). These rules, taken together on the plain face of their language, should permit the court of appeals to hear this appellant’s complaint. Perhaps this is inadvisable. Perhaps rules 2(b) and 83 — given their elevation of substance over procedure — do not rightly belong in our rules. I hardly think so, of course. But if that were so, then this Court should amend the rules, not interpret them out of existence.4
At least one court of appeals has noted the discrepancy between the rules we promulgate and the decisions by which we interpret them. In Moreno v. State, 866 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.], 1993), the First Court of Appeals faced a situation similar to the cause sub judice. There, the defendant was appealing from a plea of guilty, complaining that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. The defendant had failed, however, to file a notice of appeal that comported with the requirements of the “but clause” of Rule 40(b)(1). Citing to Jones, supra, the court of appeals found that “[t]he language of rule 40(b)(1) is ‘unequivocally mandatory.’ ” Moreno, 866 S.W.2d at 661. The court thus refused to consider the defendant’s complaint on its merits.
It did so reluctantly, however. Chief Justice Oliver-Parrott, in an opinion joined by Justices Mirabal, Wilson and Hedges, asked us to use our rule-making authority to “abolish the requirement in rule 40(b)(1) that a notice of appeal state that the trial court granted permission to appeal or specify ‘that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial.’” Moreno, 866 S.W.2d at 662 (Oliver-Parrot, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice opined that the “but clause” of Rule 40(b)(1) “serves no useful purpose.” Id. Justice Duggan, in a separate concurring opinion, correctly noted the purpose underlying the “but clause”, viz: “to provide the appellate court with a concise statement of the basis on which appellate jurisdiction is invoked.” He asked us to “permit reasonable out-of-time amendment of the notice of appeal under Tex.R.App.Pro. 83.” Moreno, 866 S.W.2d at 663 (Duggan, J., concurring). And in a dissenting opinion, Justice Cohen opined that the court of appeals was free to follow its own lead in construing the requirements of Rule 40(b)(1), given this Court’s propensity for saying one thing one day and another thing the next. Moreno, 866 S.W.2d at 663 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
I sympathize with Justice Cohen’s dissent. See the discussion of Miles and Evitts, supra. And if he is correct that Rule 40(b)(1) is not serving the purpose noted by Justice Dug-gan,5 perhaps it should be written out of our appellate rules. However, as noted ante, this is not the proper forum for such a revision. The concerns expressed by the court of appeals in Moreno — that appellants are being *51needlessly subjected to the “death penalty” of dismissal for a trivial sin of omission — can be adequately met by our rules as written. We need only revisit Jones and allow appellants to amend defective notices of appeal pursuant to both Rule 88 and Rule 2(b).
Because the majority ignores the plain language of our own appellate rules, and because it does so without any apparent reason (other than to deny the appeal of a defendant without reaching the merits of that appeal), I dissent.

. The court of appeals in Miles, as did the court of appeals in Jones, granted an appellant the opportunity to amend a notice of appeal that did not comply with the requirements of the "but clause” of Rule 40(b)(1). Miles, 842 S.W.2d at 279. The State then petitioned this Court to review that decision by the court of appeals. We dismissed the State's petition, holding that it was improperly attempting the appeal of an interlocutory order. Id. In doing so, we observed in a footnote:
"The record in this cause reflects appellant filed an appeal bond with the trial court on April 6, 1989. The bond is in writing and shows the desire of appellant to appeal from the judgment of the trial court. We find the bond is sufficient to constitute a notice of appeal under Tex.R.App.Pro. 40(b)(1).”
Id., at 279 n. 1.
Because we dismissed on other grounds, the footnote was not necessary to the resolution of the case. However, I find it hard to imagine "stronger” dicta than our flat statement of the law in that footnote.

. As this unanimous Court noted in Lemmons, ”[o]ne function of these rules is to provide timely advance notice to the appellate court that an appeal has been perfected, enabling it to anticipate it prospective felony caseload for internal planning purposes.” Lemmons, 818 S.W.2d at 63.

. While the Jones Court failed to distinguish Ev-itts factually, Evitts is distinguishable by its posture on appeal. Jones was heard by this Court on appellant’s petition for discretionary review from a direct appeal. Jones, 796 S.W.2d at 184. Evitts was heard by the United State's Supreme Court on a state's petition from a federal district court order granting habeas corpus relief. Ev-itts, 469 U.S. at 391, 105 S.Ct. at 833, 83 L.Ed.2d at 826. In Evitts, the Supreme Court held that "the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the demands of Due Process.” Id. at 393, 105 S.Ct. at 834, 83 L.Ed.2d at 827. And it found that the Kentucky courts’ refusal to hear a defendant’s appeal on procedural grounds failed to live up to that standard. Id. at 397, 105 S.Ct. at 837, 83 L.Ed.2d at 831. In doing so, however, the Supreme Court noted:
”[T]he Commonwealth of Kentucky itself in other contexts has permitted a post-conviction attack on the trial judgment as 'the appropriate remedy for frustrated right of appeal,' Ham-mershoy v. Commonwealth, 398 S.W.2d 883 (1966); this is but one of several solutions that state and federal courts have permitted in similar cases.”
Id. at 399, 105 S.Ct. at 838, 83 L.Ed.2d at 832 (footnote omitted).
That, of course, is the system we have in Texas. See Rodarte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 781, 785 n. 4 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1992) ("The appropriate vehicle for seeking an out-of-time appeal from a final felony conviction is by writ of habeas corpus pursuant to article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”). And it is a system used with some frequency. On November 17, 1993, for example, this Court handed down ten unpublished decisions. Of those, three granted out-of-time appeals to habeas applicants alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. See Ex parte Pursche, No. 71,767 (Tex.Cr.App. delivered Nov. 17, 1993) (unpublished); Ex parte Magee, No. 71,770 (Tex.Cr.App. delivered Nov. 17, 1993) (unpublished); Ex parte Rodarte, No. 71,772 (Tex.Cr.App. delivered Nov. 17, 1993) (unpublished); see also Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
Of course, just because a certain procedure is appropriate in a constitutional sense does not mean it is the best procedure, or even fair. The appellant below has been sentenced to prison, and the court of appeals has refused to even review her claim that the evidence used against her was obtained in violation of law. It did so because appellant’s lawyer did not include in her written, timely notice of appeal a statement that is clearly indicated by the record on appeal, viz : that she complains of the trial court’s error in ruling on her written pre-trial motion. It is simply not efficient to say to a criminal defendant, "Sorry, your lawyer did not use the magic words. Come back here as an applicant for habeas corpus relief; you have a good argument for ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal and you may obtain an out-of-time appeal. By the way, you are not entitled to state-appointed counsel in a habeas proceeding, so make sure you use the right words when you come back.”

. The majority has not been content with ignoring rules 83 and 2(b). In its haste, both in the instant case and in Davis, supra, to bar the appellants therein from complaining of the sufficiency of the evidence used against them, the majority judicially rewrites Rule 40(b)(1) as well. Faced with plain language adverse to its holding, the majority expediently changes the words.
Tex.R.App.Pro. 40(b)(1) provides:
“[I]n order to prosecute an appeal for a nonjurisdictional defect or error that occurred prior to entry of the plea the notice shall state that the trial court granted permission to appeal or shall specify that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial.”
The majority finds that "[a] plain reading of Rule 40(b)(1) supports [its] holding” and, in the next breath, opines that "[t]he relevant portions of Rule 40(b)(1) should be read as follows:
"... .in order to prosecute an appeal for a (1) nonjurisdictional defect [occurring before or after the plea], or (2) error that occurred prior to entry of the plea, the notice shall state that the trial court granted permission to appeal or shall specify that those matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial.”
Op. at 46 (emphasis added).

. Justice Cohen writes, "In the almost seven years since the requirement was enacted, I have never seen the presence or absence of this information on a notice of appeal used for any purpose, except to dismiss an appeal.” Moreno, 866 S.W.2d at 664 (Cohen, J., dissenting).