Court Opinion

ID: 9671147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:31:56.237055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.325765
License: Public Domain

*963On Rehearing
LE BLANC, Justice.
The issues presented in this case have been fully stated in the original opinion, the same as they had been stated in the opinion of the trial judge and that of the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit. In the original opinion it is stated that “we have carefully read this record, and we conclude that the findings of fact of'both the trial court and the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit are correctly stated.” We agreed with those findings and concluded, as both those Courts had, “that the proximate cause of the accident was the deceased’s suddenly shooting out from the pavement and running across the highway in front of the oncoming car” and that such action on his part “constituted contributory negligence.” Notwithstanding this conclusion a rehearing was granted to give further consideration to the case. This we have done and after having carefully reread the testimony, remain convinced that our former decision is correct.
We were influenced in granting the rehearing by the urgent appeal of counsel to reconsider the testimony relating to the excessive speed of the car which caused the accident, as reflected by the skid marks and the imprint of certain alleged heel-marks found on the paved surface of the highway on the following morning. Another contention that had previousy been made with regard to the violation of the statutory limit of twenty-five miles per hour in travelling through unincorporated villages was also strenuously pressed again.
With regard to this last point reference is made in counsel’s brief to the fact that several witnesses stated that the accident happened “in Cut-Off” and that both the District Court and the Court of Appeal found that the accident happened “within the village of Cut-Off in Lafourche Parish.” We have again carefully examined the written reasons of the trial judge and find no mention by him as to the locality of the accident being a village. Whilst it is true that mention is made by the Court of Appeal that it occurred in the “village of CutOff” we find that expression in the very beginning of the opinion in a general statement concerning the nature of the suit. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the locus of the accident was in a village or in an unincorporated village. The report of the investigating State Highway officer would indicate otherwise for in it he refers to the locality as “residential district — there being a few houses and a couple of stores at that point around Cut-Off.”' The “village” of Cut-Off, we would think, would be, according to the record, at a point further south where there is a Church, a moving picture theatre and also a barroom.
We do not think therefore that we would be justified in holding that the accident occurred within the limits of an unincorporated village where the twenty-five mile *965speed limit prevails, LSA-R.S. 32:223, and to hold the driver of the car guilty of the violation of any other regulation we have to look to the general provision of the statute, LSA-R.S. 32:227, which prescribes that “In addition to the specific speed limitations of this Chapter, no person shall operate any vehicle upon the highways of this state at other than a reasonable and proper speed under the circumstances, or at a speed endangering the persons or property of others.” LSA-R.S. 32:223 which fixes the maximum speed of a motor vehicle within any town or unincorporated village at twenty-five miles per hour also fixes the maximum speed of such vehicle upon the highways of the State outside of any town or village not incorporated, at sixty miles per hour.
Besides the surmise of counsel for plaintiffs that the defendant car may have ■been travelling at a speed in excess of seventy miles there is no testimony nor is there anything else in the record to show that his speed ever reached the maximum of sixty miles per hour, and to hold that he was guilty of reckless driving under that provision of the statute we would have to hold that that wasn’t “a reasonable and proper speed under the circumstances”. From the record, as presented, we cannot see what circumstances existed at the moment to make a speed of less than sixty miles unreasonable and improper. There was no other traffic on the highway at the moment, the night was clear, the car lights properly illuminated the highway, the highway ran straight and its surface was dry and contained no defects.
The excessive speed and reckless driving relied on by plaintiffs is based entirely on 'the skid marks which appeared on the highway on the morning following the accident. These, according to the State Police officer’s report, extended a distance of one hundred and twenty-five feet from the point where the brakes of the automobile must have been applied. Counsel for plaintiffs fix the point from where the brakes actually were applied to the point of impact as being sixty-two feet, according to the skid marks. They contend however that by allowing time for the normal reaction of the driver and the application of the brakes, the distance was greater than this and by a method of calculation which they employed, they point out that the speed of the car was in excess of seventy miles per hour. Such speed, it is contended, made it impossible for the driver to control the car before reaching the deceased who in the meantime must have been seen by him as he came upon the paved portion of the highway.
In connection with this contention it occurs to us in the first place that the immediate place of the impact is not so well established as counsel say it is. They establish it by reference to certain marks on the highway which they say are the heel-marks of the shoes worn by their deceased father. These, identified by them as smudges, were discovered on the morning following the *967accident when they also observed the skid marks and yet, although they carefully pointed out the skid marks and gave other information to the investigating officer on that morning, apparently they did not call his attention to any smudges and if he observed anything like them he did not consider them of any importance since he makes no mention of them either in his report or in his testimony.
The calculations made by counsel are based on certain other assumptions and involve split seconds or fractions of seconds, all of which make them rather speculative in character. But even though it be conceded that all of these things point to some negligence on the part of the driver of the car, it is impossible to overlook the negligence of the deceased which, if not the proximate cause of, very definitely contributed to this unfortunate accident. His negligence, of course, consisted in his having left a place of safety as he stood on the shoulder of the highway and suddenly venturing on the paved portion to go across in the face of the oncoming car which he was bound to have seen had he been the least bit observant.
As pointed out in the written opinion of the trial judge which received the approval of the Court of Appeal and of this Court, the testimony of Kimble, the driver of the car and of Mrs. Gravolet who occupied the front seat, which is to the effect that they were almost on the deceased when they saw him dart from the darkness on to the highway is confirmed by that of the only other witness who was present. This was the fifteen year old girl, Ouida Adams, whose testimony is discussed at length in the opinion of the district judge, part of which is reproduced in the original opinion of this Court. This young lady readily apprehended the danger which confronted the deceased for she called to him to “watch out” when she realized that he wanted to cross the road. If he heard her, he did not heed the warning. Assuming that he did not, it is obvious that he had the same opportunity of sensing and realizing the situation that she had and why, in face of the apparent peril he started across the highway at that moment is a question that is left unanswered by the record in the case. His doing so constituted such negligence on his part as to bar the plaintiffs from recovering damages on account of his resulting death.
The original opinion disposes of the contentions made relative to- the rule of “the last clear chance” which had been invoked on behalf of the plaintiffs.
For the reasons stated our former judgment and decree are now reinstated and made final.
FOURNET, C. J., dissents for the reasons this day assigned.
PONDER, J., dissents.
HAMITER, J., dissents with written reasons.