Court Opinion

ID: 9652750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:31:19.828973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:53.853007
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
While I agree with the majority that the rationale justifying allowance of a Terry stop founded upon reasonable suspicion (as opposed to probable cause) implicitly assumes that further investigation is possible, I do not see any need in the present matter to make such investigative potential a specific element of the constitutional test, particularly as this case does not implicate the issue. See Majority Opinion at 92-95, 960 A.2d at 114-16 (affirming that additional evidence can be obtained in an investigative stop for suspicion of DUI). See generally United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (developing that a Terry stop of a vehicle is justified so long as the officer harbored an objectively reasonable suspicion that the driver violated the law, in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop). The majority proceeds under the supposition that certain vehicle violations cannot be investigated further by stopping the vehicle; however, notwithstanding the majority’s recitation of various circumstances as set forth in Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 270 (Pa.Super.2005) (referencing driving at an unsafe speed, running a red light, and driving the wrong way on a one-way street), there are many instances in the case law where the driver makes an inculpatory statement to the officer following the stop. Such statements—assuming they *104are voluntary—may be relevant to the investigative purposes of the stop. Accordingly, I join the result reached by the majority but dissociate myself from its discussion of limitations on an officer’s “legitimate expectation of investigatory results.” Majority Opinion at 92, 960 A.2d at 115.