Court Opinion

ID: 9709005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:37:49.278406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:45.323931
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: Application of the relevant principles of law to the facts of this case persuades me that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants. It is well settled that the right of a movant to summary judgment must be free from doubt. The attachments supporting the motion should be strictly construed and must leave no question as to the movant’s right to judgment; conversely, counteraffidavits should be liberally construed. The purpose of summary judgment is not to try an issue of fact; where reasonable persons could arrive at different results, questions cannot be determined as a matter of law. Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co. (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 981, 986, 360 N.E.2d 440. In this case, reasonable persons could arrive at different results regarding the question of defendants’ liability. The duty to use ordinary care to avoid a collision is reciprocal, and both parties have a duty to use every precaution to avoid a collision. (Waldron v. Hardwick (1968), 99 Ill. App. 2d 36, 41-42, 240 N.E.2d 772.) One must still exercise due care to prevent injury to oneself and others and to avoid a collision with a driver proceeding down the wrong side of the road; indeed, courts have repeatedly upheld judgments apportioning negligence even though one driver was wholly or partially on the wrong side of the road. (See Balfour v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 140, 145, 452 N.E.2d 46, and cases cited therein.) Here, Trooper Ashe’s testimony that plaintiff’s decedent’s truck blew a tire and crossed the road does not conclusively establish absence of fault on the part of defendants’ vehicle, in view of the other evidence in the record. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the affidavit of Martin Tate submitted by plaintiff is not strictly conclusionary, as an affidavit stating that a collision was “unavoidable” was held to be in Santschi v. Gorter (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 394, 396-97, 379 N.E.2d 1383; rather, Tate’s affidavit states the specific facts that the accident happened entirely off the roadway, and would not have occurred had defendant Russell stayed within the confines of his own lane. Moreover, Walling v. Lingelbach (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 244, 357 N.E.2d 530, on which the majority relies heavily, is not controlling, as the accident in that case occurred on damp pavement and in fog (65 Ill. 2d 244, 246, 357 N.E.2d 530), neither of which was present here. In view of the content of Tate’s affidavit, and the strict test which must be met in order for the granting of summary judgment to be appropriate, I would reverse the judgment here and remand for further proceedings.