Court Opinion

ID: 9964230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 14:13:41.178727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:14.438979
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Derrick Douglas,                           :
                           Petitioner      :
                                           :
             v.                            :
                                           :
Pennsylvania Parole Board,                 :   No. 1107 C.D. 2022
                        Respondent         :   Submitted: March 8, 2024

BEFORE:      HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                                       FILED: April 29, 2024

             Derrick Douglas (Douglas) petitions for review of a decision of the
Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board) mailed September 23, 2022, affirming the
rescission of a grant of automatic reparole. Also before us is the Application for
Withdrawal of Appearance (Application to Withdraw) filed by David Crowley,
Esquire (Counsel). For the reasons that follow, we grant Counsel’s Application to
Withdraw, and we dismiss Douglas’s petition for review (Petition) as moot.

                                   I. Background
             In 2018, Douglas pleaded guilty to numerous offenses, including
robbery and terroristic threats, and was sentenced to three to six years’ incarceration.
Certified Record (C.R.) at 1 & 3. Douglas’s maximum sentence date was March 9,
2024.   Id. at 3.   In March 2021, the Board paroled Douglas from the State
Correctional Institution (SCI) at Greene to Keystone Correctional Services, Inc.
(Keystone). Id. at 5-6 and 9. In August 2021, the Board detained Douglas following
an incident at Keystone, for which he was charged with a technical parole violation
in the form of “unsuccessful discharge from Keystone” and the summary offense of
“Harassment/Acts to Annoy.” Id. at 13-15 & 20. Douglas was arrested and
transported to SCI Smithfield. Id. at 14-16. Douglas waived his right to a panel
hearing, opting instead for a hearing before an examiner. C.R. at 27. Douglas also
waived his right to preliminary, violation, and detention hearings and his right to
assistance of counsel at those hearings. Id. at 28. Further, Douglas admitted that he
violated the terms of his parole through his unsuccessful discharge from Keystone.
Id. at 29. The waiver forms stated that Douglas waived his rights of his own free
will and without promise, threat, or coercion. See id. at 27-28.
              The Board recommitted Douglas as a technical parole violator to serve
six months’ “backtime.”1 C.R. at 34, 41 & 44. By decision recorded August 30,
2021 and mailed September 1, 2021, the Board explained that Douglas would be
automatically reparoled without further action of the Board on February 16, 2022,
pending resolution of any outstanding criminal charges and provided Douglas did
not commit a disciplinary infraction involving assaultive behavior. Id. at 45. The
Board informed Douglas that he “remain[ed] under the jurisdiction and control of
the Department of Corrections [(DOC)]” and that the Board’s decision “[would] not
take effect until [he had] signed the conditions (PBPP-11), and the release orders
(PBPP-10) [had] been issued.” Id. Douglas filed an administrative remedies form

       1
          “[B]acktime is that part of an existing judicially[]imposed sentence which the Board
directs a parolee to complete following a finding, after a civil administrative hearing, that the
parolee violated the terms and conditions of parole . . . .” Martin v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
840 A.2d 299, 303 (Pa. 2003) (citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted).

                                               2
challenging the Board’s decision, asserting that the Keystone staff “violated [his]
First Amendment rights to freely express [him]self” and “wrongfully discharged
[him] and, further, that the decision to recommit him lacked substantial evidentiary
support. Id. at 61 (citing U.S. Const. amend. I).
              In October 2021, Douglas was charged with three misconducts at SCI
Rockview. C.R. at 47. Douglas pleaded guilty to the misconduct charge of being
present in an unauthorized area, but he denied the misconduct charges of threatening
an employee or an employee’s family with bodily harm and refusing to obey an
order. Id. at 47-48. The DOC held a misconduct hearing on October 6, 2021, after
which the hearing examiner accepted Douglas’s guilty plea regarding the first
misconduct charge and concluded that “[a] preponderance of evidence” supported
the two remaining misconduct charges. Id. at 48. Douglas appealed to the Program
Review Committee, which sustained the hearing examiner’s decision, concluding
that “there was sufficient evidence to support the decision” and deeming “the written
report . . . more credible than [] Douglas’[s] version of events.” Id. at 49.
              On November 4, 2021, Counsel represented Douglas at a panel
revocation hearing.2 C.R. at 65.         On November 22, 2021, the Board issued an
Automatic Reparole Rescission Report rescinding Douglas’s February 16, 2022
automatic reparole date and establishing Douglas’s eligibility for reparole on or after
October 3, 2022, subject to his pending recommitment as a convicted parole violator.
Id. at 51-55. By decision recorded November 22, 2021 and mailed December 2,
2021, the Board rescinded the reparole portion of the August 30, 2021 Board action.
Id. at 56; see also id. at 57-58 (Order to Recommit). Douglas’s March 9, 2024

       2
        Counsel stated in the “no-merit” letter filed in conjunction with his Application to
Withdraw that the November 4, 2021 panel revocation hearing was related to Douglas’s conviction
for summary harassment. “No-Merit” Letter at 3.

                                              3
maximum date remained unchanged. Id. at 56-57. The Board instructed Douglas
regarding his ability to appeal within 30 days of the mailing of the decision pursuant
to the Board’s administrative remedies process. Id. By decision recorded November
23, 2021 and mailed December 2, 2021, the Board recommitted Douglas as a
technical and convicted parole violator to serve a total of six months’ backtime. Id.
at 59. The Board stated that it relied on evidence in the form of a certified copy of
the court record proving Douglas’s conviction for the offense of harassment and
Douglas’s acknowledgment of his conviction. Id. at 59. The Board awarded
Douglas credit for time spent at liberty on parole and once again informed him of
his right to appeal the Board’s decision. Id. at 59-60.
              In December 2021, Counsel filed an administrative remedies form on
behalf of Douglas. C.R. at 64. Counsel explained that he

              represented [] Douglas at a panel revocation hearing on
              November 4, 2021 and entered his written appearance. On
              December 20, 2021 he received [a] . . . 2 page pro se
              administrative appeal from his client. Due to DOC
              restrictions on visitation[,] counsel [was] unable to timely
              meet with his client to discuss the document he [had]
              received. It appears that [] Douglas is not complaining
              about the November 23, 2021 recommitment decision
              from the panel revocation but is aggrieved by the
              November 22, 2021 decision . . . which rescinded his ACT
              122[3] release date from an earlier recommitment as a

       3
         Counsel presumably references the Act of July 5, 2012, P.L. 1050, No. 122 (Act 122),
which provided for various amendments to the Prisons and Parole Code (Parole Code), including
the following addition:

              A technical violator recommitted to a [s]tate correctional institution
              . . . shall be recommitted for one of the following periods, at which
              time the parolee shall automatically be reparoled without further
              action by the [B]oard:

                                                4
               technical parole violator due to an intervening prison
               misconduct.[4] He apparently wanted to challenge the
               forfeiture of his statutory right to release and was told he
               could not. He challenges this decision as violative of his
               due process rights.

               Due process requires a counselled evidentiary hearing
               prior to the rescission of parole release once vested. Lord
               v. [Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole], . . . 580 A.2d 463 ([Pa.
               Cmwlth.] 1990). Per Board policy[,] however, when
               rescission is based on the acquisition of a prison
               misconduct the DOC misconduct hearing obviates the
               need for a Board evidentiary hearing. The policy violates
               due process as those accused of prison misconducts are not
               provided with an attorney at that misconduct hearing. This
               exact issue is currently before the Commonwealth Court
               in Niheim Miller v. Parole Board, 9 CD 2021.[5] Miller
               was submitted on briefs on July 28, 2021.

C.R. at 65. The administrative remedies form completed by Douglas, referenced by
Counsel, includes Douglas’s assertion that “on 12/3/21 [he] was giv[e]n a request
slip asking to appeal the decision giv[e]n by [the Board],” but that “they [sic] stated

                      (i) For the first recommitment under this subsection, a
                      maximum period of six months.

61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(d)(3)(i).

       4
          Counsel stated that he “was not given a copy of the decision recorded 11/22/2021.”
Certified Record (C.R.) at 64. However, Counsel subsequently asserted in his “no-merit” letter
that he reviewed the certified record. Nevertheless, this Court notes that Counsel omitted mention
of the November 22, 2021 order of the Board in the recitation of facts contained in the “no-merit”
letter.

       5
          See Miller v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 9 C.D. 2021, filed December 22, 2021).
Unreported memorandum opinions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008 may be cited for
their persuasive value. See Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures 210 Pa.
Code § 69.414(a).

                                                5
[he could] not appeal the decision giv[e]n by the Board.” C.R. at 66. Douglas
contended that the inability to appeal was “a direct violation of [his] constitutional
right to be able to appeal any decision giv[e]n to [him] under the 14th Amendment”
and “the right to Due Process,” and requested “an opportunity to appeal.” Id. at 66-
67 (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
             By decision mailed September 23, 2022, the Board affirmed its
decisions mailed September 1, 2021 and December 2, 2021, recommitting Douglas
as a technical parole violator and rescinding Douglas’s automatic reparole rights due
to misconduct. C.R. at 73. The Board concluded:

             First, to the extent [] Douglas contests the recommitment
             decision recorded on August 30, 2021, the record reveals
             that on August 16, 2021, supervision staff presented to him
             a notice of charges and hearing indicating that he was
             being charged with violating condition #7[] (unsuccessful
             discharge from Keystone . . .), in violation of his parole.
             On August 16, 2021, Douglas signed a form waiving his
             right to [a] violation hearing and counsel, and admitted to
             the veracity of the violation charged in the notice. The
             waiver/admission form he signed specifically indicate[d]
             that he chose to take said action of his own free will
             without promise, threat or coercion. This document also
             gave Douglas ten calendar days to withdraw the
             waiver/admission. As there is no indication that Douglas
             withdrew his waiver/admission within that grace period,
             the above facts show that his waiver/admission was
             knowing and voluntary. Thus, the Board was authorized
             to recommit Douglas based on the waiver/admission.

             Next, the Prisons and Parole Code[ (Parole Code), 61
             Pa.C.S. §§ 101 – 7301,] provides that automatic reparole
             does not apply to technical parole violators who commit
             disciplinary infractions [constituting] assaultive behavior.
             61 Pa. C.S. § 6138(d)(5). Because Douglas incurred a
             qualifying misconduct under the statute, the Board acted
             within its authority by rescinding automatic reparole in

                                          6
              this case. Moreover, the Board acted within its discretion
              by taking this action without conducting an additional
              evidentiary hearing because Douglas was already afforded
              due process to challenge the misconduct at issue in the
              hearing held at the institution. There is no reason for the
              Board to re-litigate those facts.

              ....

              Accordingly, the appeal panel finds no grounds to grant
              administrative relief and AFFIRMS the Board decisions
              recorded on August 30, 2021 (mailed 9/1/2021) and
              November 22, 2021 (mailed 12/2/2021).

C.R. at 73-74.
              As noted above, Douglas’s maximum date of March 9, 2024 was not
extended at any time. C.R. at 56-57.
              On October 12, 2022, Douglas filed his Petition, contending that “the
Board erred in rescinding [his] automatic reparole date under Act 122 without an
evidentiary hearing or other counseled opportunity to confront the Board’s allegation
that he committed misconducts.” Pet. for Rev. at 3, ¶ 6. Further, Douglas asserted
that “[a]s an alleged parole violator has a due process right to counsel and a hearing
prior to the rescission of the grant of parole, the Board erred in concluding that the
institution’s providing [him] with an uncounseled misconduct hearing satisfied due
process.” Pet. for Rev. at 3, ¶ 7.
              In June 2023, Counsel filed the Application to Withdraw and
accompanying “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927
(Pa. 1988).

                                          7
                                           II. Discussion
               Before reviewing the merits of Douglas’s appeal, we must first decide
Counsel’s Application to Withdraw. Under our Supreme Court’s holding in Turner,
court-appointed counsel seeking withdrawal adequately protects an inmate’s rights
where he presents a “no-merit” letter detailing the nature and extent of his review,
listing each issue the petitioner wishes to have raised, and explaining why each issue
is meritless. 544 A.2d at 928. A “no-merit” letter must include substantial reasons
for concluding that the inmate’s arguments are meritless. Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d
956, 962 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). If this Court, after its own independent review, agrees
with counsel that the petition is meritless, counsel will be permitted to withdraw.
Id.; Adams v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 885 A.2d 1121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).6

       6
          “It is worth noting that frivolousness is a slightly higher standard than lack of merit; an
argument may be meritless, but not frivolous.” Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 960 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2009) (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, . . . 574 A.2d 558, 562 ([Pa.] 1990)). “[C]ounsel is not
permitted to withdraw” pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), “unless the appeal
is wholly frivolous, but . . . counsel is permitted to do so [under Turner] if the case lacks merit,
even if it is not so anemic as to be deemed wholly frivolous.” Zerby, 964 A.2d at 960 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 722 (Pa. Super. 2007)). Further, as this Court has
explained,

               [i]n a case where there is a constitutional right to counsel, counsel
               seeking to withdraw from representation of a petitioner in an appeal
               of a determination of the Board should file an Anders brief. This
               arises where the petitioner raises a:

                       colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the
                       alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is
                       at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter
                       of public record or is uncontested, there are
                       substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the
                       violation and make revocation inappropriate, and
                       that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to
                       develop or present.

                                                   8
                     A. Technical Requirements for Withdrawal
              First, Counsel must satisfy the technical requirements for withdrawal
of representation by (i) notifying the inmate of the request to withdraw; (ii)
furnishing the inmate a copy of a “no-merit” letter in compliance with Turner; and
(iii) advising the inmate of his right to retain new counsel or raise any points he may
deem worthy of consideration. See Craig v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 502 A.2d
758, 761 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985).
              Here, Counsel provided Douglas with a copy of his “no-merit” letter.
See “No-Merit” Letter at 9. This Court thereafter issued an order notifying Douglas
of his right to retain new counsel or file a brief on his own behalf. Cmwlth. Ct.
Order, 6/7/23. Counsel served Douglas with a copy of the order. See Certificate of
Serv., filed 6/13/23. Accordingly, Counsel complied with the technical requirements
set forth in Craig. See Smith v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 724
C.D. 2016, filed Mar. 3, 2017)7 (explaining that by serving a copy of the court’s
order, counsel notified the petitioner of the right to seek new counsel or file a brief
on his own behalf); see also Adams.

              Gagnon [v. Scarpelli], 411 U.S. [778, 790 (1973)]. Such claims
              would only arise in appeals from determinations revoking parole. In
              an appeal from a revocation decision, this Court will apply the test
              from Gagnon, quoted above, and, unless that test is met, we will
              only require a no-merit letter.

Hughes v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 977 A.2d 19, 25-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). We note that this
Court has evaluated applications for withdrawal from representation of inmates challenging the
rescission of a grant of automatic reparole in accordance with the requirements of Turner. See,
e.g., England v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 960 C.D. 2020, filed July 16, 2021); Randolph
v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 586 C.D. 19, filed January 15, 2020).

       7
         Unreported decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008 may be cited as
persuasive authority. See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                               9
                     B. Substantive Requirements for Withdrawal
               Next, we consider whether Counsel engaged in a sufficient review,
addressed each issue Douglas wished to have raised and explained why those issues
are meritless. See Turner, 544 A.2d at 928. Douglas argues that the Board erred in
rescinding its grant of automatic reparole without first providing the opportunity to
participate in an evidentiary hearing with assistance of counsel, or some “other
counselled opportunity” to challenge the misconduct charges, insisting that the
“uncounseled misconduct hearing” did not obviate due process concerns. Pet. for
Rev. at 3, ¶¶ 6-7. Counsel counters that an appeal of a technical violation after one
has waived the violation hearing and admitted to the violation is frivolous. “No-
Merit” Letter at 4 (citing Cadogan v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 571 A.2d 3, 5 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1990)). Counsel also points out that, contrary to Douglas’s assertion in his
administrative remedies form, the Board decision rescinding the grant of automatic
reparole advised Douglas regarding his ability to appeal that rescission. See id. at 5.
Further, Counsel emphasizes that Douglas filed an administrative remedies form and
the Board accepted and ruled upon his administrative appeal. Id. Moreover, Counsel
asserts that in waiving the right to a violation hearing, Douglas forfeited the ability
to dispute the misconduct allegations and relieved the Board of the obligation to
produce evidence that Douglas “was at least somewhat at fault” for the discharge
from Keystone. Id. (quoting Hudak v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 757 A.2d 439, 442
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)).
               Counsel further contends that after the filing of Douglas’s December
2021 administrative appeal, this Court held in Miller8 that an inmate has no due
process right to a hearing where a grant of parole remains unexecuted at the time of

       8
           Counsel failed to identify Miller as a non-binding unpublished decision in the “no-merit”
letter, instead citing the table citation of 271 A.3d 543 for the case.

                                                10
rescission by the Board. Id. at 6. Counsel also cites this Court’s subsequent holding
in Henderson v. Pennsylvania Parole Board, 277 A.3d 633 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022), that
a recommitted technical parole violator may not collaterally attack a DOC
misconduct determination and, further, that a DOC misconduct hearing and the
ability to appeal therefrom adequately protects an inmate’s due process rights, as
there is no protected liberty interest in an unexecuted grant of parole. Id. (citing
Henderson, 277 A.3d at 633-34). Regardless, Counsel insists that Douglas’s status
as a convicted parole violator renders the automatic reparole provision of Section
6138(d)(3) of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(d)(3), inapplicable. Id. at 7.
Counsel maintains that the Board may require a convicted parole violator, such as
Douglas, to serve his maximum sentence. Id.
               We conclude that, as evident from the preceding analysis, Counsel’s
citation to the certified record, and relevant authorities throughout the “no-merit”
letter, Counsel engaged in sufficient review and adequately explained why
Douglas’s appeal is meritless. See Turner, 544 A.2d at 928. Accordingly, we
proceed to an independent review of the issues raised by Douglas. See Zerby, 964
A.2d at 960 (explaining that where counsel satisfies the technical and substantive
requirements for withdrawal, the reviewing court “must then conduct its own review
of the merits of the case”).9

       9
          “We are [] mindful that [as] this is not a parole revocation order that [Douglas] seeks us
to review, [but] rather . . . an order rescinding a previous Board order granting parole, . . . our
review of [the] order is severely limited.” Johnson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 532 A.2d 50, 52
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (citing Reider v. Pa. Board of Prob. & Parole, 514 A.2d 967 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1986); LaCamera v. Pa. Board of Prob. & Parole, 317 A.2d 925 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974); cf. Reider,
514 A.2d at 972 (granting the Board’s motion to quash, “hold[ing] that the Board’s refusal to grant
a parole [was] not reviewable by this Court,” as it was “wholly a matter of the Board’s discretion,”
and, therefore “simply not subject to judicial review”); LaCamera, 317 A.2d at 927 (quashing
inmate’s appeal from Board’s denial of parole on the basis that “[p]arole, being a matter of

                                                11
                                   C. Independent Review
               We observe, at the outset, the expiration of Douglas’s maximum
sentence date on March 9, 2024. As this Court has explained,

               generally, a case will be dismissed as moot if there exists
               no actual case or controversy. Fraternal Ord[.] of Police
               v. City of Phila[.], 789 A.2d 858 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). The
               existence of a case or controversy requires

                       (1) a legal controversy that is real and not
                       hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that
                       affects an individual in a concrete manner so
                       as to provide the factual predicate for a
                       reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal
                       controversy with sufficiently adverse parties
                       so as to sharpen the issues for judicial
                       resolution.

               Dow Chem[.] Co[.] v. [U.S.] Env[’t] Prot[.] Agency, 605
               F.2d 673, 678 (3[]d Cir. 1979). A controversy must
               continue through all stages of judicial proceedings, trial
               and appellate, and the parties must continue to have a
               “personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit. Lewis v.
               Cont[’l] Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-[]78 . . . (1990)
               (quotation omitted). Courts will not enter judgments or
               decrees to which no effect can be given. Britt v. Dep[’t]
               of Pub[.] Welfare, 787 A.2d 457 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). An
               exception to mootness will be found where (1) the conduct
               complained of is capable of repetition yet likely to evade
               judicial review; (2) the case involves issues of great public
               importance; or (3) one party will suffer a detriment in the
               absence of a court determination. Horsehead Res[.]
               Dev[.] Co[.], Inc. v. Dep[’t] of Env[’t] Prot[.], 780 A.2d
               856 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
Mistich v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 863 A.2d 116, 119- 20 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).

administrative discretion and determination, is non judicial and not subject to judicial review under
the law of Pennsylvania as now existing”).

                                                12
               Whether an issue has become moot implicates a threshold question of
justiciability. See Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers Ass’n, 901
A.2d 991, 1002 (Pa. 2006) (holding that “[m]ootness poses a question of
justiciability”); see also Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 917
(Pa. 2013) (stating that “[i]ssues of justiciability are a threshold matter generally
resolved before addressing the merits of the parties’ dispute”).10
               Here, in 2018, Douglas received a maximum sentence date of March 9,
2024. C.R. at 3. The Board paroled Douglas in March 2021 but recommitted him
several months later on the basis of a technical parole violation and his conviction
for a summary offense. See id. at 47-49 & 59. In September 2021, the Board
informed Douglas that he would be automatically reparoled without further action
of the Board on February 16, 2022, pending resolution of any outstanding criminal
charges and provided he did not commit a disciplinary infraction involving
assaultive behavior. Id. at 45. The following month, Douglas committed an
assaultive misconduct. Id. at 47-49. Accordingly, the Board rescinded its grant of
automatic reparole. Id. at 51-56. The Board awarded Douglas credit for time spent

      10
           As our Supreme Court has explained,

               [i]n contrast to the federal approach, notions of case or controversy
               and justiciability in Pennsylvania have no constitutional predicate,
               do not involve a court’s jurisdiction, and are regarded instead as
               prudential concerns implicating courts’ self-imposed limitations.
               See Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, . . . 972 A.2d 487, 500 n. 5 ([Pa.]
               2009); Rendell [v. Pa. State Ethics Comm’n], 983 A.2d [708,] 717
               & n. 9 [Pa. 2009]. Justiciability questions are issues of law, over
               which our standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is
               plenary. Council 13, [Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. & Mun. Empl., AFL-
               CIOI v. Commonwealth,] 986 A.2d [63,] 74 n. 10 []Pa. 2009).

Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 917.

                                               13
at liberty on parole, and his March 9, 2024 maximum sentence date remained
unchanged. See id. at 56-57 & 59. No evidence of record suggests that Douglas has
been charged with or convicted of any additional crimes that could extend his
maximum sentence date. In fact, it appears that Douglas is no longer in the custody
and control of the Commonwealth.11 As Douglas’s maximum term has expired, any
judgment entered in the instant appeal would be without effect. See Mistich, 863
A.2d at 119; see also Graves v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 823 C.D. 2022,
filed Jan. 9, 2024), slip op. at 6 (dismissing as moot a petition for review challenging
the Board’s recalculation of the petitioner’s maximum sentence date, concluding
that, in light of the expiration of the petitioner’s maximum term, “[a]ny judgment
entered would be without effect” as “[t]he mere passage of time [] resolved the issue
of the date of [the] [p]etitioner’s release”).
                 Further, though capable of repetition, the issue raised by Douglas in his
Petition would not evade review; indeed, this Court has squarely rejected the
assertion that due process requires the Board to hold a separate evidentiary hearing
before rescinding a grant of automatic reparole on the basis of an assaultive
misconduct where, as here, the grant of parole has not yet been executed.12 See
Henderson, 277 A.3d at 638 (holding that the Board’s rescission of its grant of
automatic reparole on the basis of the inmate’s assaultive misconduct pursuant to
Section 6138(d)(5)(i) of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(d)(5)(i), in the absence
of a counselled hearing did not violate the inmate’s due process rights, where the

       11
            See https://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2024).

       12
          Likewise, Douglas’s “case [does not] involve[] issues of great public importance,” nor
will “one party [] suffer a detriment in the absence of a court determination.” Mistich, 863 A.2d
at 119.

                                                  14
Board issued its rescission decision before the inmate’s automatic parole was
executed);13 see also Miller, slip. op at 8-9 (concluding that the Board did not violate
an inmate’s due process rights by rescinding its grant of automatic reparole pursuant
to Section 6138(d)(5)(i) of the Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(d)(5)(i), without first
holding a counselled hearing, where the inmate’s automatic parole was not yet
executed). Thus, the expiration of Douglas’s maximum term has rendered moot his
appeal from the Board’s rescission of its automatic grant of reparole. See Himchak
v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1466 C.D. 2021, filed Nov. 17, 2023), slip op.
at 7 (dismissing as moot a petition for review challenging the Board’s rescission of
its prior grant of automatic reparole due to the petitioner’s commission of an
assaultive misconduct, where the petitioner’s maximum term had expired and no
evidence of record indicated that the petitioner was under the custody and control of
the Commonwealth); Johnson v. Pa. Parole Bd., 300 A.3d 525, 528 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2023) (concluding, “it is well settled that the expiration of a parolee’s maximum
term renders an appeal from [a] Board[] revocation order moot”).

                                       III. Conclusion
               For the foregoing reasons, we grant Counsel’s Application to
Withdraw, and we dismiss Douglas’s Petition as moot. See Gonzalez v. Pa. Parole
Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 924 C.D. 2022, filed Apr. 10, 2024), slip op. at 3-4 & 7-8
(granting counsel’s application to withdraw and dismissing petition for review as
moot, where the expiration of the petitioner’s maximum carceral term rendered moot

       13
          The Henderson court further explained that “any process that [the inmate] was due with
respect to his disciplinary infraction that took place at the [prison] was provided through the
grievance procedure that [the inmate] could pursue with respect to those disciplinary proceedings.”
Henderson, 277 A.3d at 637.

                                               15
his challenge to the Board’s recalculation of his maximum sentence date); Dunell v.
Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1154 C.D. 2022, filed Nov. 17, 2023), slip op. at
5-6 (same); accord Tarr v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1296 C.D. 2022,
filed March 11, 2024), slip op. at 6 (quashing petition for review as untimely filed
and granting counsel’s application to withdraw).

                                      ___________________________________
                                      CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                        16
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Derrick Douglas,                       :
                       Petitioner      :
                                       :
           v.                          :
                                       :
Pennsylvania Parole Board,             :   No. 1107 C.D. 2022
                        Respondent     :

                                    ORDER

     AND NOW, this 29th day of April, 2024, the Application for Withdrawal of
Appearance submitted by David Crowley, Esquire, is GRANTED. The Petition for
Review filed by Derrick Douglas on October 12, 2022 is DISMISSED as MOOT.

                                     ___________________________________
                                     CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge