Court Opinion

ID: 9706145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:32:43.566326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:19.675756
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
¶ 11. dissenting. The Court bases its reversal on the assumption that since defendant and his counsel learned of the charges “within six days” before the jury draw, they were not ready to go to trial.
¶ 12. In fact, the record does not support that conclusion. Defendant, who had been represented throughout, knew of the charges for over two years and had been arraigned on them. A second arraignment, after the charges had been dismissed without prejudice and then reinstated when the principal witness was available, would have accomplished nothing the first one did not.
¶ 13. The Court is obviously suspicious that defendant’s trial counsel was incompetent and rendered ineffective assistance to his defense. Yet the record discloses no factual determination that counsel did anything wrong or that any failing of counsel made any difference to the outcome. The Court’s recitation of “facts” are mostly allegations by defendant, which were never put to the test of litigation. While this case may provide a basis for a post-conviction-relief proceeding, the Court has dispensed with one because it “infers” -without any fact finding at the trial level that the lack of arraignment was prejudicial.
¶ 14. At this juncture on this record we have no way of knowing what happened during the course of the prosecution and defense. The Court assumes defendant was woefully defended based on colloquies outside the *275context of a fact-finding hearing. In fact, we know nothing about the fairness of the trial itself that produced the conviction.
¶ 15. In short, I believe this Court has jumped the gun and denied the State an attempt to defend against the ineffective assistance of counsel claims alleged by defendant. No testimony under oath was given by anyone on this issue. If a post-conviction proceeding had been allowed to unfold, there may, or may not, have been the need for second trial.
¶ 16. I would affirm.4 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Amostoy joins in this dissent.

 The defendant’s remaining claims are without merit. Given the outcome of this appeal, there is no need to discuss them in this dissent.