Court Opinion

ID: 9719407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:51:30.868949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:06.969501
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: When waiver or estoppel is relied upon to nullify the effect of the limitation period involved in this case, the one relying on these defenses has the burden of proving them and must present evidence to support his position. The record must reflect the evidence from which the court can determine whether the Commission’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. I do not dispute the principle stated in the last paragraph of the majority opinion that the resolution of disputed questions of fact is primarily the function of the Industrial Commission. Gubser v. Industrial Com., 42 Ill.2d 559, cited in the majority opinion for that proposition further states that the function of this court is limited to a determination of whether the findings of the Commission are against the manifest weight of the evidence. This does not mean that a court must accept and put its stamp of approval upon every finding by the Industrial Commission. A court clearly has the duty to review the record to see whether or not the determination of the Commission Is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. It is also true that the Industrial Commission has the power and the authority to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. However this does not authorize the Commission to speculate or conjecture as to what transpired. In this case the evidence simply shows that the representatives of the respondent’s insurance carrier discussed the petitioner’s claim with him and did not inform him that the limitation period was about to run. This is not evidence which will support the defenses of waiver or estoppel. There is no evidence that the limitation period was ever mentioned at this visit, nor is there any evidence that these representatives of the insurance carrier in any way intimated that the insurance carrier would waive the limitation period. In fact there is no evidence in the record that any representations of any kind were made. The petitioner testified. If there were representations made to him by the insurance company which caused him to delay filing his claim he could easily have recited these facts for the record. All that the record indicates is that after the insurance carrier was advised by the petitioner that he needed some additional surgery, two representatives from the company came to his home and took a written statement from him. Upon this meager evidence the majority of this court holds that it is appropriate for the Industrial Commission to speculate that some representations were made to the petitioner which caused him to delay filing his claim. It may well be that something was said or done on this visit that caused the petitioner to delay. But, if so, why did he not so testify? As this record now stands it is exactly the same as the record in Schumann v. Industrial Com., Docket No. 46780, which has also been decided by this court today and in which this court stated, “Claimant has failed to establish any misrepresentation or statement by *** a representative of the insurance company, upon which he relied to his detriment. ” Since the record is devoid of any such evidence, the finding of the Industrial Commission in favor of the petitioner constitutes nothing more than speculation and is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. I would therefore reverse the decision of the circuit court which confirmed the finding of the Industrial Commission. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this dissent.