Court Opinion

ID: 9368248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 15:07:41.878672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:08.454639
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Whitfield, 2023-Ohio-240.]

                                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                       :
                                                     :
       Appellee                                      :   C.A. No. 29442
                                                     :
 v.                                                  :   Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 1185
                                                     :
 CALEB WHITFIELD                                     :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                     :   Court)
       Appellant                                     :
                                                     :

                                                ...........

                                                OPINION

                                      Rendered on January 27, 2023

                                                ...........

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee

CHARLES M. BLUE, Attorney for Appellant

                                               .............

TUCKER, J.

        {¶ 1} Caleb Whitfield appeals from his conviction following a jury trial on charges

of aggravated vehicular homicide, two counts of vehicular assault, failure to comply with

the order or signal of a police officer, and resisting arrest.
                                                                                           -2-

       {¶ 2} Whitfield contends the trial court erred in failing to dismiss his indictment on

speedy-trial grounds. He challenges his convictions as being based on legally insufficient

evidence and being against the manifest weight of the evidence. He also argues that the

trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior juvenile adjudication

and in refusing to allow him to introduce certain relevant evidence. Finally, he asserts that

the cumulative effect of the foregoing errors deprived him of a fair trial.

       {¶ 3} For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that no speedy-trial violation

occurred. With the exception of a specification accompanying the vehicular assault

charges, we find that Whitfield’s convictions were based on legally sufficient evidence

and were not against the weight of the evidence. The State did present legally insufficient

evidence to support a specification for having a suspended driver’s license. As for

Whitfield’s evidentiary challenges, the record demonstrates harmless error. We also see

no cumulative error depriving him of a fair trial.

       {¶ 4} The trial court’s judgment will be reversed insofar as it entered a judgment of

conviction and sentenced Whitfield on two counts of vehicular assault as third-degree

felonies, rather than fourth-degree felonies; the matter will be remanded for resentencing

on those counts. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

                                          I. Background

       {¶ 5} The present appeal stems from a high-speed police pursuit of a stolen vehicle

that ended in a fatal accident. The primary issue at trial involved the identity of the driver

when the accident occurred.

       {¶ 6} The stolen vehicle, a black Ford truck with darkly-tinted windows, was taken
                                                                                        -3-

from a Sunoco gas station on June 23, 2020, when the owner left the engine running

while he went inside to make a purchase. Two days later, a detective saw the truck when

on patrol. The detective followed it and waited for additional patrol cars to respond. At

one point, officers boxed in the truck and ordered its occupants to exit the vehicle. The

driver of the truck responded by backing up, hitting a police cruiser, and fleeing on North

Dixie Drive. A high-speed chase ensued, reaching speeds of nearly 100 miles per hour.

While attempting a turn, the truck rolled and crashed into a vacant house, coming to a

stop upside down.

      {¶ 7} Officers saw Whitfield exit an open driver’s side door and run from the crash

site. Two other occupants of the truck, Jelani Shackelford and Joseph Hespeth, were

seen crawling through the broken rear window. A fourth occupant, Rodnesha Thompson,

was found hanging upside down in the passenger seat secured by a seat belt. Whitfield

ignored orders to stop running and was taken into custody after a detective deployed a

Taser. All four occupants of the truck were transported to the hospital. Shackelford and

Hespeth were diagnosed with serious injuries, including multiple broken bones.

Thompson died from her injuries while at the hospital. Whitfield, the least injured of the

occupants, left the hospital of his own accord and against medical advice.

      {¶ 8} At trial, a sergeant with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s office testified that

he had overheard Whitfield admit to hospital staff that he had been driving the truck.

Immediately after the accident, Shackelford and Hespeth were uncooperative and did not

answer investigators’ questions. Police subsequently lost contact with them, and they

could not be located prior to Whitfield’s trial. A forensic scientist with the Miami Valley
                                                                                           -4-

Regional Crime Laboratory testified that at least three DNA profiles were found on the

truck’s steering wheel. Whitfield could not be excluded as the source of one of the profiles.

According to the forensic scientist, one in every 415 African American individuals could

be part of the profile from which Whitfield, an African American, could not be excluded.

       {¶ 9} Whitfield testified in his own defense. He stated that Hespeth had been

driving the truck, Thompson was in the front passenger’s seat, he was in the driver’s-side

rear seat, and Shackelford was in the passenger’s-side rear seat. According to Whitfield,

Hespeth was taking him to sell some marijuana, which he had with him in a fanny pack.

Whitfield did not remember making any statements to hospital staff about being the driver

of the truck.

       {¶ 10} Based on the evidence presented, a jury found Whitfield guilty of

aggravated vehicular homicide, two counts of vehicular assault, failure to comply with the

order or signal of a police officer, and resisting arrest. With regard to a specification

accompanying the aggravated vehicular homicide and vehicular assault charges, the jury

also found that Whitfield had been driving without a valid driver’s license at the time of the

accident.

       {¶ 11} The trial court made statutory findings for consecutive sentences and

imposed an aggregate prison term of 17 to 21 years. It also imposed a lifetime driver’s

license suspension on the most serious charges.

                                            II. Analysis

       {¶ 12} Whitfield advances the following five assignments of error:

       I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY OVERRULING
                                                                                         -5-

      APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE BASIS OF SPEEDY TRIAL

      GROUNDS.

      II.   APPELLANT’S      CONVICTIONS        ARE     NOT    SUPPORTED           BY

      SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE

      DOUBT AND ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE

      EVIDENCE.

      III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE

      APPELLANT       BY    PERMITTING       THE    STATE     TO    ATTACK         HIS

      CREDIBILITY WITH A JUVENILE ADJUDICATION.

      IV. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL

      RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE BY EXCLUDING RELEVANT

      EVIDENCE.

      V. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS SET FORTH HEREIN

      DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR

      TRIAL.

                                        A. Speedy Trial

      {¶ 13} In his first assignment of error, Whitfield raises a statutory speedy-trial

issue. He argues that no tolling event or other reasonable and necessary continuance

extended the speedy-trial deadline. Given that his trial occurred beyond that 90-day

deadline, Whitfield reasons that he was entitled to dismissal of the indictment.

      {¶ 14} The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio
                                                                                          -6-

Constitution. This constitutional mandate has been codified in R.C. 2945.71, which

designates specific time limits for bringing a defendant to trial. As relevant here, a

defendant charged with a felony must be brought to trial within 270 days of arrest. R.C.

2945.71(C)(2). Each day that a defendant is held in jail in lieu of bail counts as three days

when computing this time. R.C. 2945.71(E). This means a defendant held in jail must be

brought to trial within 90 days of arrest.

       {¶ 15} Speedy-trial time may be tolled by certain events delineated in R.C.

2945.72. Compliance with the speedy-trial statutes is mandatory, and they “must be

strictly construed against the state.” State v. Cox, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008-03-

028, 2009-Ohio-928, ¶ 12. “The rationale supporting speedy-trial legislation is to prevent

inexcusable delays caused by indolence within the judicial system.” State v. Sanchez,

110 Ohio St.3d 274, 2006-Ohio-4478, 853 N.E.2d 283, ¶ 8. “Review of a speedy-trial

claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, we defer to the trial court’s

factual findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but we review the

application of the law to those facts de novo.” State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d 179, 2020-

Ohio-5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 15.

       {¶ 16} In the present case, Whitfield was held in jail upon his arrest. He did not

waive his right to a speedy trial. Therefore, he was required to be brought to trial within

90 days unless one or more sufficient tolling events occurred. Whitfield’s speedy-trial

clock began on August 19, 2021, when he was arrested on his indictment. His trial

commenced on February 22, 2022, which was beyond the 90-day time limit.

       {¶ 17} Whitfield acknowledges that he requested a seven-day continuance of
                                                                                             -7-

proceedings from September 8, 2021, to September 15, 2021. Speedy-trial time was

tolled for those seven days pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H), which extends time for “[t]he

period of any continuance granted on the accused’s own motion.” Whitfield also filed a

request for discovery, which tolled speedy-trial time for a “reasonable” period. State v.

Belville, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3879, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 19-20. But the parties’

real dispute concerns the trial court’s setting of an initial trial date outside of speedy-trial

time and its subsequent rescheduling of that trial date after appointing new counsel to

represent Whitfield.

       {¶ 18} On September 16, 2021, the trial court held a hearing to discuss a trial date.

During the hearing, the trial court explained that it was “impossible” to set a trial date for

Whitfield any earlier than December 20, 2021. While acknowledging that this date was

beyond the statutory speedy-trial deadline, the trial court noted that R.C. 2945.72(H)

authorized tolling speedy-trial time for any “reasonable continuance” ordered by the trial

court sua sponte. The trial court then noted the existence of a “tremendous backlog” of

pending trials due to a prior COVID-19-related suspension of jury trials in Montgomery

County. The trial court stated that it sometimes still had four or five jury trials scheduled

for the same week and that it had approached other judges about taking Whitfield’s case.

The trial court advised Whitfield that all of the judges’ dockets were full and that it simply

could not set his trial date earlier than December 20, 2021. As a result, the trial court

found a continuance of his trial until that date to be reasonable under R.C. 2945.72(H).

The trial court memorialized its determination in an entry and order filed that same day.

       {¶ 19} Thereafter, on October 8, 2021, Whitfield’s attorney filed a motion to
                                                                                         -8-

withdraw as counsel, citing “an irreconcilable breakdown in communication between client

and attorney.” The trial court held an October 13, 2021 hearing on the motion and granted

defense counsel permission to withdraw. During the hearing, the trial court advised

Whitfield that it would appoint new counsel to represent him. The trial court then added,

“I’m going to vacate the jury trial, because there’s no way new counsel can be prepared

within that period of time.” The trial court journalized an entry appointing new counsel for

Whitfield on October 14, 2021. One of the parties also sought and obtained a continuance

from October 13, 2021 until October 20, 2021, but the record fails to make clear which

party made the request. Whitfield’s newly-appointed counsel subsequently sought and

obtained another continuance from October 20, 2021 until October 27, 2021.

       {¶ 20} The trial court held a scheduling conference on October 27, 2021. During

that hearing, it advised Whitfield’s new attorney that his appointment had caused the

December 20, 2021 trial date to be continued. The trial court, the prosecutor, and defense

counsel then agreed that February 22, 2022 was the next available date that would fit

everyone’s schedule. Defense counsel nevertheless objected to the new date to preserve

a potential speedy-trial argument. The trial court responded by stating:

              Well, I explained to Mr. Whitfield upon his request for a new attorney

       that the jury trial would have to be set aside. I explained that to him. And I

       explained to him that you needed time to get up to speed. And due to the

       Court’s calendar, it may be several months before we would set the retrial.

       That was all explained to him before the Court granted the motion to appoint

       new counsel.
                                                                                           -9-

              So that will be the trial date set in this matter * * *.

Transcript Vol. I at 17.

       {¶ 21} The next meaningful docket entry was an “Order of Appearance” filed on

October 29, 2021. The order set a final pretrial date of February 16, 2022, and a new trial

date of February 22, 2022.

       {¶ 22} On February 9, 2022, Whitfield moved to dismiss his indictment on statutory

speedy-trial grounds. His entire substantive argument was as follows:

              In this case, the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial has clearly been

       violated. Prior to the Defendant’s speedy trial deadline expiring, the Court

       sua sponte continued his trial date to December 20th, or for 95 days. The

       Court’s basis for the continuance was that it had cases set prior to the

       Defendant’s speedy trial deadline that prevented it from bringing the

       Defendant to trial before the deadline. However, the Court did not

       specifically cite any of the cases that were set within that time frame. In

       addition, it is well known that many cases set for trial are settled before trial

       or continued. The Court did not leave open the possibility that this could

       occur and allow the Court to timely bring the Defendant to trial. The Court

       also had the option of waiting until the Defendant’s speedy trial deadline

       approached so that it could try and schedule the Defendant for trial prior to

       the deadline. Simply continuing the Defendant’s case for 95 days, or 32

       days past his speedy trial deadline, was unreasonable.

              In addition, assuming arguendo that the Trial Court’s continuance to

       December 20th was reasonable, it only extended the Defendant’s right to a
                                                                                            -10-

       speedy trial by 32 days. The Trial Court did not set the Defendant’s trial

       within those remaining 32 days. As of the date February 8, 2022, 50 days

       have elapsed since December 20th and, therefore, the Defendant’s right to

       a speedy trial has been violated.

Defendant’s February 9, 2022 Motion to Dismiss at 3.

       {¶ 23} The trial court overruled Whitfield’s motion to dismiss in a February 18, 2022

decision. Reiterating its earlier explanation about ongoing coronavirus-related docket

congestion and a subsequent continuance necessitated by Whitfield’s request for new

counsel, the trial court found no speedy-trial violation.

       {¶ 24} On appeal, Whitfield primarily challenges the trial court’s setting of a

December 20, 2021 trial date based on docket constraints. He asserts that the

suspension of jury trials in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court was lifted in

December 2020 and argues that COVID-19 “cannot remain a basis for denial of statutory

speedy trial rights well after the pandemic.” With regard to the subsequent continuance

related to Whitfield’s request for new counsel, he does not challenge or even address the

merits of the trial court’s decision to order a continuance to allow new counsel to become

acquainted with the case. Whitfield argues only that the trial court failed to journalize an

entry containing reasons justifying this continuance.

       {¶ 25} Upon review, we find Whitfield’s speedy-trial challenge to be unpersuasive.

With regard to the initial December 20, 2021 trial date, the trial court made a detailed

record explaining why it was impossible for Whitfield to be tried within the speedy-trial

deadline and why a short continuance beyond that deadline was necessary. In addition

to explaining itself on the record during a hearing, the trial court incorporated its reasoning
                                                                                          -11-

into a timely journal entry.

       {¶ 26} Addressing a similar situation, this court recently upheld a trial court’s sua

sponte tolling of speedy-trial time based on docket congestion attributed to the lingering

impact of the coronavirus pandemic on jury trials. In State v. Hart, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 29252, 2022-Ohio-4550, the trial court tolled a defendant’s speedy-trial time from

October 21, 2020 until January 19, 2021, citing docket congestion and the recent

appointment of new counsel to represent the defendant. Id. at ¶ 85. Thereafter, the trial

court filed another tolling entry on January 12, 2021, tolling speedy-trial time until June

28, 2021. In support, the trial court cited a new temporary emergency order suspending

jury trials in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court through March 27, 2021, as well

as an Ohio Attorney General’s opinion and Ohio Supreme Court guidance limiting in-

person meetings, and the fact that Montgomery County remained under a level three

COVID-19 public emergency. Id. at ¶ 86. In finding no speedy-trial violation, we held that

the trial court had fully explained and justified these continuances. Other Ohio courts also

have recognized the reasonableness of coronavirus-related tolling due to docket

congestion even after Ohio’s declaration of emergency officially expired on June 30,

2020. State v. Beal, 2021-Ohio-3812, 179 N.E.3d 754, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.); see also State v.

Hairston, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20844, 2006-Ohio-2669, ¶ 15 (“It is well settled that

docket congestion may be grounds for a reasonable continuance under R.C. §

2945.72(H), provided that the trial court gives a timely explanation for its action.”).

       {¶ 27} Here the trial court timely set forth detailed justifications for establishing a

trial date roughly a month beyond the speedy-trial deadline. Its reasons included the
                                                                                            -12-

impossibility of trying Whitfield sooner due to a crowded docket based on real challenges

facing the judicial system in the wake of the global pandemic. Because the trial court’s

tolling of speedy-trial time to accommodate a December 20, 2021 trial date was

reasonable in both purpose and length, we find no statutory speedy-trial violation based

upon it.

       {¶ 28} With regard to the subsequent continuance until February 22, 2022,

Whitfield’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court failed to journalize an entry

reciting its justification for the continuance. This argument fails for at least two reasons.

First, Whitfield did not raise it below in his speedy-trial motion. Nowhere in his motion did

he argue that dismissal on speedy-trial grounds was required because the trial court failed

to journalize an entry explaining the basis for establishing a February 22, 2022 trial date.

Second, a trial court is required to journalize such an entry only when it sua sponte

continues a trial date. In such a case, it must issue a journal entry ordering the

continuance and setting forth its reasoning prior to expiration of speedy-trial time. State

v. King, 70 Ohio St.3d 158, 162-163, 637 N.E.2d 903 (1994).

       {¶ 29} Here the trial court set forth its justification for continuing Whitfield’s trial

date to February 22, 2022 during a hearing, not in a journal entry, and it separately

journalized the new-trial date. Nothing more was required, however, because the trial

court found a delay until February 22, 2022 to be necessitated by Whitfield’s motion for

new counsel. That tolling event was attributable to Whitfield’s own actions and was not a

sua sponte act by the trial court. See Belville, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3879, __

N.E.3d __, at ¶ 30 (recognizing that “King dealt with the requirement that when a trial
                                                                                          -13-

court sua sponte continues a trial date beyond the speedy-trial period, it must issue a

journal entry setting forth the continuance and the reason therefor prior to the expiration

of the speedy-trial period”). Any period of delay necessitated by a defendant’s own motion

automatically acts as a tolling event. Id. at ¶ 31.

       {¶ 30} For the foregoing reasons, we see no error in the trial court’s overruling of

Whitfield’s motion to dismiss the charges against him on statutory speedy-trial grounds.

The first assignment of error is overruled.

                B. Legal Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of Evidence

       {¶ 31} In his second assignment of error, Whitfield challenges the legal sufficiency

and manifest weight of the evidence to sustain his convictions. In particular, he contends

the State failed to prove that he was driving the stolen truck at the time of the accident.

He also claims the evidence did not support a finding that he had a suspended license.

       {¶ 32} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶ 33} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When

a conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an

appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
                                                                                          -14-

inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in

the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A judgment should be

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “only in the exceptional

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20

Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

       {¶ 34} With the foregoing standards in mind, we reject Whitfield’s legal-sufficiency

and manifest-weight arguments predicated on the State’s failing to prove he was driving

the truck. Joseph Solomon, a sergeant with the Montgomery County Sheriff’s office,

testified that he heard Whitfield admit to hospital personnel that he was driving the truck.

This testimony alone, if believed, was legally sufficient to support a finding that he was

the driver. But the State presented additional evidence supporting an inference that

Whitfield was the driver. Following the accident, Whitfield was seen exiting the driver’s

door of the overturned vehicle, Hespeth and Shackelford were seen crawling out the

broken back window, and Thompson was found in the front passenger’s seat. In addition,

Whitfield could not be excluded as the source of a DNA profile found on the truck’s

steering wheel, and only one in every 415 African American’s could be a source of the

profile. Finally, the driver’s area of the truck sustained the least damage, and Whitfield

unquestionably suffered by far the least serious injuries of the four occupants.

       {¶ 35} In light of the foregoing evidence, we believe a rational trier of fact could

have found that Whitfield was driving the truck at the time of the accident. We also are
                                                                                           -15-

unpersuaded that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of

justice. This is not an exceptional case in which the evidence weighed heavily against the

convictions predicated on Whitfield’s being the driver of the truck.

       {¶ 36} As noted above, however, Whitfield also challenges the legal sufficiency

and manifest weight of the evidence to support a specification accompanying his two

vehicular-assault convictions. The specification, which is found in R.C. 2903.08(C)(2),

elevates vehicular assault from a fourth-degree felony to a third-degree felony if “at the

time of the offense, the offender was driving under a suspension imposed under Chapter

4510 or any other provision of the Revised Code.” A “suspension” is defined as the

permanent or temporary withdrawal of a driver’s license or the privilege to obtain a

license. R.C. 4510.01(H).

       {¶ 37} Here the parties stipulated that Whitfield “did not have a valid driver’s

license.” In fact, the record reflects that he never has had a driver’s license. But the State

presented no evidence whatsoever that Whitfield was driving under a license

“suspension” at the time of the accident. He simply was driving without a license, which

is insufficient to support the specification under R.C. 2903.08(C)(2).1 We note too that

the jury’s verdict forms for the vehicular-assault charges included a finding that Whitfield

was driving without a license, not that he was driving under a suspension. This finding

1  The vehicular-assault specification under R.C. 2903.08(C)(2) differs from the
aggravated-vehicular-homicide specification under R.C. 2903.06(B)(2)(b)(i), which
applies if the offender was driving under suspension or was driving without a valid driver’s
license. The fact that the aggravated-vehicular-homicide specification covers both driving
under suspension and driving without a license whereas the vehicular-assault
specification covers only driving under suspension makes clear that the legislature
intended to distinguish the two situations.
                                                                                          -16-

was insufficient to enhance the offense-level of the two vehicular-assault convictions.

       {¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, we agree with Whitfield that the specification

accompanying his vehicular-assault convictions was based on legally insufficient

evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. The two third-degree-felony

vehicular-assault convictions will be reversed, and the case will be remanded for the trial

court to impose those convictions as fourth-degree felonies and to resentence Whitfield

accordingly.

       {¶ 39} The second assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part.

                        C. Admission of Juvenile Adjudication

       {¶ 40} In his third assignment of error, Whitfield contends the trial court erred in

allowing the State to use a juvenile adjudication to challenge his credibility. This argument

concerns the disclosure of a prior burglary offense committed when Whitfield was a minor.

       {¶ 41} On cross-examination, Whitfield volunteered that he “had been in and out”

of juvenile detention and for that reason had not seen Jelani Shackelford very often. The

prosecutor then inquired whether Whitfield had a prior felony for burglary. Defense

counsel objected just as Whitfield simultaneously responded that the burglary had

occurred when he was 14 years old. The trial court held a sidebar at which the prosecutor

argued that it could cross-examine about the burglary because it was a “crime of

dishonesty.” The trial court agreed, ruling that the prosecutor could establish Whitfield’s

admission to burglary as a juvenile without getting into the facts of the offense. Therefore,

the trial court allowed Whitfield’s affirmative response to stand. The prosecutor then

moved on, eliciting an admission from Whitfield that he had “other felonies” on his record
                                                                                            -17-

as an adult. The trial court subsequently instructed the jury that it could consider

Whitfield’s prior offenses only to test his credibility and to determine the weight to be given

to his testimony.

       {¶ 42} On appeal, Whitfield contends Evid.R. 609(D) and R.C. 2951.357(H)

collectively prohibit evidence of a juvenile adjudication to be used for impeachment

purposes. For its part, the State concedes that the admission of testimony about his

burglary adjudication was error. 2 Nevertheless, the State contends Whitfield did not

specifically object to cross-examination on the basis that the burglary involved an

inadmissible juvenile adjudication. The State claims the sidebar addressed whether

burglary was a crime of dishonesty, not whether a juvenile adjudication was admissible

to impeach Whitfield. Therefore, the State maintains that we are limited to reviewing for

plain-error. Alternatively, the State suggests that the admission of testimony about

Whitfield’s burglary offense was invited error.

       {¶ 43} Upon review, we agree that the trial court’s admission of testimony about

the burglary adjudication for general impeachment purposes was erroneous. Under

Evid.R. 609(A)(3), evidence of conviction of a crime of dishonesty generally is admissible

to attack the credibility of a witness. Offenses committed by a minor, however, specifically

are addressed by Evid.R. 609(D), which provides that “[e]vidence of juvenile adjudications

is not admissible except as provided by statute enacted by the General Assembly.” The

pertinent statute, R.C. 2151.357(H), provides that evidence of a juvenile adjudication “is

not admissible to impeach the credibility of the child in any action or proceeding.” Thus,

2 See Appellee’s Brief at 16 (“Even though the testimony about Whitfield’s juvenile
conviction was error, it did not rise to the level of plain error and did not prejudice him.”).
                                                                                             -18-

this court has recognized that the evidence rules and Revised Code “prohibit the use of

a juvenile adjudication for purposes of general impeachment of a witness’s credibility.”

State v. Demoss, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2001-CA-5, 2002 WL 360581, *4 (March 8,

2002); see also State v. Goodwin, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 99 CA 220, 2001 WL 1740065,

*4 (Sept. 24, 2001) (“Where the submission of the juvenile adjudication is done merely to

disclose that the adjudication exists in order to denigrate the former offender’s general

credibility, the juvenile adjudication is inadmissible.”); State v. Taylor, 12th District Fayette

No. 2018-11-021, 2019-Ohio-3437, ¶ 33 (“[D]efense counsel sought admission of

Watkins’ adjudication to show that Watkins was lying, that is, solely to impeach his

credibility, which is the exact purpose for which such evidence is inadmissible under R.C.

2151.357(H) and Evid.R. 609(D).”).

       {¶ 44} The more difficult issue involves determining the proper standard of review.

Contrary to the State’s argument, the invited-error rule does not apply. The prosecutor

improperly questioned Whitfield about having a prior felony for burglary. The question

itself was improper because the burglary involved a juvenile adjudication when Whitfield

was 14 years old. Defense counsel objected just as Whitfield started to answer the

question. Under these circumstances, we fail to see how Whitfield “invited” the trial court’s

erroneous evidentiary ruling.

       {¶ 45} The State also asserts that plain-error review applies because defense

counsel did not object on the grounds that a juvenile adjudication is inadmissible.

According to the State, defense counsel argued only that burglary was not a crime of

dishonesty. The complete nature of defense counsel’s objection is impossible to
                                                                                         -19-

determine, however, because seemingly-relevant portions of counsel’s remarks during

the sidebar have been transcribed as “(indiscernible).” Defense counsel does appear to

have questioned whether burglary is a crime of dishonesty, which it is. See State v. Lamp,

7th Dist. Columbiana No. 20 CO 0001, 2021-Ohio-2354, ¶ 63.

       {¶ 46} But even if we assume that defense counsel also objected to the admission

of Whitfield’s testimony about the burglary offense because it was a juvenile adjudication,

the trial court’s error in admitting the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

At trial, Whitfield himself admitted that he actively had been engaged in selling

methamphetamine and marijuana. He also acknowledged on cross-examination that his

adult record included multiple “other felonies.” In light of these admissions of criminal

activity by Whitfield, he was not prejudiced by an isolated reference to his juvenile

adjudication. Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.

                               D. Exclusion of Evidence

       {¶ 47} In his fourth assignment of error, Whitfield claims the trial court deprived

him of his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding relevant evidence. This

argument concerns his attempt to cross-examine a detective about drugs being found in

a fanny pack that appeared to have been ejected from the overturned truck.

       {¶ 48} On direct examination, the detective testified that the fanny pack appeared

to have fallen out of the truck when it rolled. The detective added that the contents of the

fanny pack included identification bearing Whitfield’s name. On cross-examination,

defense counsel asked whether any illegal substances were found in the fanny pack. The

State objected, arguing that the case was not a drug case and that the presence of illegal
                                                                                          -20-

substances was irrelevant. Defense counsel responded that the presence of drugs in

Whitfield’s fanny pack would rebut an inference that he fled the scene on foot because

he had been driving the truck. Defense counsel theorized that Whitfield may have fled on

foot because he knew drugs were in the fanny pack. Therefore, the presence of drugs

could negate an inference of consciousness of guilt of vehicular homicide and vehicular

assault as the reason for his running. The trial court sustained the State’s objection,

declaring the presence of drugs in the fanny pack to be “irrelevant.”

       {¶ 49} “[T]he admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of the trial

court, and a reviewing court should not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence of an

abuse of discretion that has created material prejudice.” State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d

412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 62. Here the trial court acted unreasonably, and

thereby abused its discretion, in finding evidence about the presence of drugs in the fanny

pack to be irrelevant. Whitfield’s attempted flight from the scene of the accident potentially

supported an inference of consciousness of guilt of vehicular homicide and vehicular

assault. In other words, it potentially supported an inference that he had been driving the

truck, which was the primary issue in the case. One way for Whitfield to rebut that

inference was to provide an alternative explanation for why he ran. The presence of drugs

in the fanny pack supplied that alternative explanation, enabling Whitfield to argue that

he fled on foot because of his drug possession, not because he had been driving.

Therefore, the presence of drugs in the fanny pack was relevant, and the trial court acted

unreasonably in finding otherwise.

       {¶ 50} Despite the foregoing conclusion, we are convinced that Whitfield was not
                                                                                          -21-

materially prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling. Although defense counsel was not

permitted to cross-examine the detective about the contents of the fanny pack, Whitfield

testified in his own defense and told the jury what was in the pack. He explained that

Hespeth was driving him to a location to sell marijuana at the time of the accident.

Whitfield testified that the marijuana had been in his fanny pack. Although cross-

examining the detective may have corroborated Whitfield’s testimony, the jury did hear

about drugs being in the fanny pack.

       {¶ 51} We note too that the State’s initial closing argument did not even assert an

inference of consciousness of guilt arising from Whitfield’s attempted flight on foot. The

State only mentioned his running after the accident as evidence to support a resisting-

arrest charge. Defense counsel first raised the issue of inferences arising from Whitfield’s

attempted flight from the accident scene in his closing argument. In particular, defense

counsel suggested that Whitfield may have gotten out of the car and fled on foot because

he was in possession of marijuana. Defense counsel specifically argued that Whitfield’s

attempted flight was not proof that he had been driving the truck. In response to this

argument, the State argued in rebuttal that Whitfield ran because he had been driving the

truck and knew he was in trouble. Notably, however, the State did not dispute Whitfield’s

claim about being in possession of marijuana. In fact, the State stressed Whitfield’s

testimony admitting that he was a drug dealer. Finally, we note that the trial court’s

instructions to the jury did not include a specific instruction about inferring consciousness

of guilt from flight.

       {¶ 52} Based on our review of the record, we believe Whitfield adequately
                                                                                           -22-

presented his argument about running from the accident scene because he was in

possession of marijuana. We are convinced that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling

precluding cross-examination of the detective regarding the contents of the fanny pack

did not materially prejudice Whitfield’s defense. The trial court’s error in disallowing the

cross-examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the fourth

assignment of error is overruled.

                                    E. Cumulative Error

        {¶ 53} In his fifth assignment of error, Whitfield raises a claim of cumulative error.

He contends the errors alleged above, when considered in combination, deprived him of

a fair trial.

        {¶ 54} It is true that separately harmless errors can violate a defendant’s right to a

fair trial when they are aggregated. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 397, 721 N.E.2d

52 (2000). To find cumulative error, we first must find multiple errors committed at trial.

Id. at 398. We then must find a reasonable probability that the outcome below would have

been different but for the combination of separately harmless errors. State v. Thomas, 2d

Dist. Clark No. 2000-CA-43, 2001 WL 1103328, *9 (Sept. 21, 2001).

        {¶ 55} In our analysis above, we found that the trial court erroneously applied a

specification for driving with a suspended license. That discreet error affects the felony

level of Whitfield’s two vehicular-assault convictions. We fail to see, however, how that

error could have impacted any other aspect of his trial.

        {¶ 56} The only other errors we found above concerned the trial court’s allowing

the introduction of evidence about Whitfield’s prior juvenile adjudication and disallowing
                                                                                               -23-

cross-examination of a detective about the contents of the fanny pack. Even when

considered in the aggregate, we are unpersuaded that these two evidentiary rulings

deprived Whitfield of a fair trial. Accordingly, his fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                                       III. Conclusion

       {¶ 57} Having sustained Whitfield’s second assignment of error in part, we reverse

the trial court’s judgment insofar as it entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced

Whitfield on two counts of vehicular assault as third-degree felonies. Those convictions

are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing on those counts

as fourth-degree felonies. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                       .............

WELBAUM, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.