Court Opinion

ID: 9899735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 16:10:28.065314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.772868
License: Public Domain

J-S32004-23

                                2023 PA Super 239

 RACHEL MARIE MOYER                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant             :
                                          :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 RYAN PATRICK SHAFFER                     :   No. 422 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered January 4, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s):
                                22-15501

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.:                          FILED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023

      Appellant, Rachel Marie Moyer, appeals from the January 4, 2023 order

that dismissed with prejudice the second petition for protection from abuse

(“PFA petition”) that Appellant filed against Appellee, Ryan Patrick Shaffer,

pursuant to the Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-22).

Upon review, we vacate and remand.

      The relevant procedural history follows. On August 24, 2022, Appellant

filed an initial PFA petition against Appellee, which the trial court ultimately

dismissed without prejudice on September 6, 2022, after Appellant failed to

appear at a scheduled hearing regarding the petition.

      On November 16, 2022, Appellant filed a second PFA petition, including

the same allegations of abuse averred in the first PFA petition. On the same

day, the trial court conducted an ex parte hearing, granted Appellant a

temporary PFA order, and scheduled a final hearing.
J-S32004-23

       On January 3, 2023, after several continuances, the trial court held a

final hearing on Appellant’s second PFA petition.      Appellee made an oral

motion to dismiss Appellant’s second PFA petition because it averred identical

allegations to Appellant’s first PFA petition, which the trial court previously

dismissed.     The trial court dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice,

concluding on the record that “in order to have a new petition filed there has

to be new allegations so that we are not continuing to reargue the same

allegations over and over again. . . [Appellant] did have an opportunity to

appear on [September 6, 2022] and she voluntarily chose not to pursue her

petition. I am dismissing the [second PFA] petition.” N.T. Hearing, 1/3/23,

at 11.    On January 4, 2023, the trial court issued an order dismissing

Appellant’s second PFA with prejudice.

       On January 30, 2023, Appellant timely appealed.1 The trial court did

not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. On May 10, 2023,

the trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
____________________________________________

1 On January 4, 2023, the same day that the trial court dismissed Appellant’s

second PFA petition, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. On January
6, 2023, the PFA court ordered the parties to submit briefs and scheduled a
hearing on the motion. On February 7, 2023—34 days after the trial court
dismissed Appellant’s second petition—the court granted reconsideration, held
a hearing on the merits, and denied Appellant’s second PFA petition. Because
Appellant had filed a timely notice of appeal from the January 4, 2023 order
and the trial court did not expressly grant Appellant’s motion for
reconsideration within 30 days of the January 4, 2023 order, the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to grant reconsideration, conduct a hearing, and issue
an order denying Appellant’s second PFA petition on the merits. See Pa.R.A.P.
1701 (explaining that after an appeal is taken, the trial court may no longer
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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J-S32004-23

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       1.     Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by treating
              [Appellant]’s case as if the previous filing had been
              dismissed with prejudice[] when it had been dismissed
              without prejudice?

       2.     Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
              dismissed the [PFA] petition without holding a timely
              hearing?

Appellant’s Br. at 7 (reordered for ease of disposition).

       In a PFA action, this Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for

an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050,

1053-54 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc).             A trial court does not abuse its

discretion for a mere error of judgment; rather, an abuse of discretion is found

“where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not

applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

proceed in the matter unless, inter alia, an order expressly granting
reconsideration of such order is filed in the trial court within 30 days);
Cheathem v. Temple University Hosp., 743 A.2d 518, 520-21 (Pa. Super.
1999) (a trial court must expressly grant reconsideration within the time
allowed for filing an appeal, in order to toll the time for taking an appeal; an
order fixing a hearing date does not toll appeal period because it does not
expressly grant reconsideration). Accordingly, the trial court’s proceedings
and orders issued after Appellant filed the January 30, 2023 notice of appeal
constitute a legal nullity, which this Court will not consider in our analysis of
the instant appeal.

                                           -3-
J-S32004-23

      In her first issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred as a matter

of law when it applied the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to

dismiss Appellant’s second PFA petition.     Appellant’s Br. at 12.   Appellant

argues that because the first PFA petition was not adjudicated on the merits

and was dismissed without prejudice, neither doctrine barred the claims in

Appellant’s second PFA petition. Id. at 12, 14-19. We agree.

      “Application of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel is a

question of law requiring de novo review and the scope of review is plenary.”

K.D. v. E.D., 267 A.3d 1215, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      “The doctrine of res judicata applies to prevent litigants from bearing

the burden of re-litigating the same issues with the same parties, and to

promote judicial economy.” E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 521 (Pa. Super.

2020) (citation omitted).    Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the re-

litigation of a previously litigated claim or cause of action when the following

elements are the same across both actions: the identity of (1) the thing sued

upon; (2) the cause of action; (3) persons and parties to the action; and (4)

the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being sued. K.D. v. E.D., 267

A.3d at 1224. Essentially, “[u]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment

on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit on the same cause of

action[.]” Wilmington Tr., Nat'l Ass'n v. Unknown Heirs, 219 A.3d 1173,

1179 (Pa. Super. 2019) (emphasis added).         “The dominant inquiry under

those elements, then, is whether the controlling issues have been decided in

                                     -4-
J-S32004-23

a prior action, in which the parties had a full opportunity to assert their rights.”

E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d at 521 (citation omitted)

      Collateral estoppel, also referred to as issue preclusion, is a broader

concept than res judicata and “operates to prevent a question of law or issue

of fact which has once been litigated and fully determined in a court of

competent jurisdiction.” Vignola v. Vignola, 39 A.3d 390, 393 (Pa. Super.

2012) (emphasis added and citation omitted). Collateral estoppel applies if:

         (1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to one
         presented in the later case; (2) there was a final judgment
         on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is
         asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior
         case; (4) the party or person privy to the party against
         whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair
         opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding
         and (5) the determination in the prior proceeding was
         essential to the judgment.

E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d at 521 (emphasis added and citation omitted).

      As explained above, both res judicata and collateral estoppel require

that an initial action result in a final judgment on the merits before either

doctrine can be applied to bar a second action raising similar claims or issues.

Instantly, Appellant’s first PFA petition was not adjudicated on the merits.

Rather, it was dismissed without prejudice because Appellant failed to appear

at the hearing. As such, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel

do not apply to bar Appellant’s second PFA petition and the trial court erred

as a matter of law when the court dismissed Appellant’s second PFA petition

with prejudice.

                                       -5-
J-S32004-23

       In her second issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred when it

failed to hold a hearing on Appellant’s second PFA petition. Appellant’s Br. at

13-14. We agree.

       The PFA Act states unequivocally: “[w]ithin ten business days of the

filing of a petition under this chapter, a hearing shall be held before the court,

at which the plaintiff must prove the allegation of abuse by a preponderance

of the evidence.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a) (emphasis added). This Court has

held that under the PFA Act, evidentiary hearings are mandatory because the

statutory use of the word “shall” mandates that a trial court conduct such a

hearing. Burke ex rel. Burke v. Bauman, 814 A.2d 206, 208 (Pa. Super.

2002). Accordingly, we agree that the trial court erred when it failed to hold

an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s second PFA petition.

       In conclusion, because Appellant’s first PFA petition was not adjudicated

on the merits, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply

to bar her from raising the same claims or issues in her second PFA petition.

Thus, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed

to conduct an evidentiary hearing as required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a) and

dismissed Appellant’s second PFA petition with prejudice.         We, therefore,

vacate the order and instruct the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing

on Appellant’s second PFA petition.2

____________________________________________

2 We are cognizant of the fact that
                                  the trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on February 7, 2023, and ultimately denied Appellant’s second PFA
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -6-
J-S32004-23

       Order vacated.         Case remanded with instructions.    Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/17/2023

____________________________________________

petition on the merits. However, as discussed above, the trial court was
without jurisdiction to do so.      Therefore, the evidentiary hearing and
subsequent order denying the second PFA petition are both legal nullities. As
such, we are constrained to order a new hearing and disposition on the merits.

                                           -7-