Court Opinion

ID: 9750598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:09:46.823685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:01.909650
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent as the majority’s holding — barring Appellant’s claim on the basis the notice was untimely — fails to give due consideration to the “mistake or *300other reasonable cause” provision of KRS 342.200. In my opinion, such a restrictive view disregards the General Assembly’s mandate that “all statutes of this state shall be liberally construed” to accomplish “the intent of the legislature.” KRS 446.080(1). “This principle of protecting the interests of the injured worker is a basic tenet of workers’ compensation law.” Ronald W. Eades, 18 Ky. Prac., Workers’ Comp. § 1:3 (2010-2011). Instead, the majority’s holding furthers a policy that forces workers to report every bump and bruise posthaste in order to preserve a possible right to appropriate remuneration. This is a substantial disincentive for honest workers (who self-treat minor work-related injuries), and instead forcefully channels them into litigious positions.
Like thousands of workers in this Commonwealth, a heightened risk of physical injury is implicit in Appellant’s work. Thus, the majority’s attempt to emphasize the unreasonableness of not initially reporting this incident due to the circumstances (he was “struck ... with sufficient force to knock him to the ground”) is misplaced. Appellant is an industrial laborer, working near a chute that expels crates of milk. In some lines of work, being physically knocked down during work might be an extreme occurrence. Here, however, the reality of the situation is that Appellant was struck by a crate which caused a minor welt, not even enough to make him quit working.
And as this welt later became a bruise, Appellant acted reasonably in self-treating what appeared to be a trivial injury. Moreover, he continued to work. Unfortunately, the bruise did not heal as expected, forcing him to seek medical treatment, which expectantly necessitated his filing a claim.
Now, with hindsight, his claim is denied on the grounds that his notice of the injury was untimely. Yet, KRS 342.200 provides in this regard, that:
Want of notice or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to proceedings under this chapter if it is shown that the employer, his agent or representative had knowledge of the injury or that the delay or failure to give notice was occasioned by mistake or other reasonable cause.
(emphasis added). Furthermore, KRS 446.080(1) provides:
All statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature, and the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall not apply to the statutes of this state.
See also, Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Ky.1983) (“All presumptions will be indulged in favor of those for whose protection the enactment was made.”).
Quite clearly, Appellant is not a doctor, and he did not reasonably foresee the serious nature of what appeared to be a minor injury. And though he mistakenly believed he did not need medical treatment, given the bruise’s appearance — not to mention life’s normal experiences with bruises — his mistake was reasonable.
In my opinion, the present case is similar to Little, wherein we held that KRS 342.200 did not bar the claim because, “[t]he employee’s failure to give more adequate notice of a specific injury was because of his mistaken personal diagnosis and want of better knowledge.” Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Little, 357 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Ky.1962) (emphasis added).
Little involved a workers’ compensation claim filed approximately two years after the accident and nine months after the *301employee’s death. Like Appellant’s injury, the employee in Little suffered bruising and abrasions, but “was not aware of the serious nature of his injury.” Id. Later complications resulted in his death; however, we held that the failure to report the specific injury was not a bar. Based on Little, Appellants understandable delay in reporting his claim should also be excused by KRS 342.200’s “mistake or other reasonable cause” exception.
However, the majority focuses primarily on whether Appellant gave notice to his employer “as soon as practical” as mandated by KRS 342.185(1). As quoted, the three-fold purpose of the 342.185(1) requirement is: “(1) to enable the employer to provide prompt medical treatment in an attempt to minimize the worker’s ultimate disability and the employer’s liability; (2) to enable the employer to make a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the accident; and (3) to prevent the filing of fictitious claims.” Trico County Development & Pipeline v. Smith, 289 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Ky.2008). Yet here, none of these purposes are furthered by barring Appellant’s claim.
First, the ALJ specifically found that “it is unlikely that if [the employer] had received immediate notice of the injury-producing bruise it would have directed [Appellant] to any particular medical treatment that would have warded off the [unexpected] open sore that developed from the bruise.” Thus, the first purpose of KRS 342.185 — prompt medical treatment which minimizes employer liability— would not have been served. -Next, the second and third purposes, prompt investigation and prevention of fictitious claims, are not present, as there is not even a hint that the injury resulted from a non-work related cause (i.e. horseplay) or that Appellant fabricated his claim. To the contrary, the ALJ found that “[Appellant] presents with [sic] a sympathetic case.”
Therefore, under the “greater latitude” appellate standard when reviewing mixed questions, I would hold that the ALJ’s findings “were [not] supported by evidence of probative value.” Purchase Transp. Services v. Estate of Wilson, 39 S.W.3d 816, 817-818 (Ky.2001) (quoting the appellate standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact). Appellant mistakenly diagnosed his work-related injury as minor, and reasonably attempted to treat the bruise. I simply cannot support a holding that penalizes a worker who attempts to self-treat what started out as a simple bruise by barring his workers’ compensation claim. Moreover, such a holding does not comport with the liberal statutory construction directives and creates a system that mandates every employee immediately report each minor injury or risk forfeiting his workers’ compensation claim.
Thus, I agree with Senior Judge Lambert’s dissent in the Court of Appeals, and share his concern that the majority’s holding will inundate industrial employers with trivial complaints, and I therefore dissent.
CUNNINGHAM and NOBLE, JJ., join.