Court Opinion

ID: 9953691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 17:01:52.049629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:44.597779
License: Public Domain

IN THE

    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

                            JIE CAO, ET AL.,
                           Plaintiffs/Appellants,
                                     v.
                 PFP DORSEY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL.,
                        Defendants/Appellees.

                          No. CV-22-0228-PR
                          Filed March 22, 2024

          Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
               The Honorable Daniel G. Martin, Judge
                         No. CV2019-055353
             AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED

             Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
                       253 Ariz. 552 (App. 2022)
                              VACATED

COUNSEL:

Eric M. Fraser (argued), John S. Bullock, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix,
Attorneys for Jie Cao and Haining “Frazer” Xia

Charles E. Markle, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Phoenix, Timothy J. Berg
(argued), Brett C. Gilmore, Fennemore Craig, P.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for
PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC and Dorsey Place Condominium Association

Shawna M. Woner, Stephanie K. Gintert, Woner Hoffmaster Peshek &
Gintert, PC, Scottsdale; Matthew E. Price, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington,
DC, Attorneys for PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC

Edith I. Rudder, Nicholas C. S. Nogami, Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado &
Bolen, LLP, Tempe, Attorneys for Dorsey Place Condominium Association
        CAO, ET AL. V. PFP DORSEY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL.
                          Opinion of the Court

Timothy Sandefur, Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation at
the Goldwater Institute, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Goldwater
Institute

Jonathan A. Dessaules, Ashley C. Hill, Dessaules Law Group, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Homeowners

James T. Braselton, Vail C. Cloar, Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Papago Springs, LLC, and Mahdere Gebreyesus
Desta and Gary and Allien Stoloff

Quinten T. Cupps, Vial Fotheringham, LLP, Mesa, Lynn M. Krupnik,
Timothy J. Krupnik, Krupnik & Speas, LLC, Phoenix, Robert M. Diamond,
Reed Smith LLP, McLean, VA, James C. Martin, Ted A. Hages, Reed Smith
LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Community
Associations

Kathryn D. Valois, Pacific Legal Foundation, Palm Beach Gardens, FL,
James M. Manley, Pacific Legal Foundation, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus
Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation

Andrew T. Fox, Austin C. Yost, Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix,
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Eric Buckeye, Peter Sczupak, Rekha Tataria,
Mukesh Tataria and Amy Wautier

Derek Debus, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Cato Institute

                            _______________

JUSTICE BOLICK authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES
LOPEZ, BEENE, MONTGOMERY, and KING joined.
                       _______________

JUSTICE BOLICK, Opinion of the Court:

¶1          Petitioners Jie Cao and Haining Xia (the “Xias”) are former
condominium unit owners who object to the forced sale of their unit by
their condominium association (the “Association”) following dissolution of
the condominium. We hold that the Arizona Condominium Act, A.R.S.

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                           Opinion of the Court

§ 33-1201, et seq. (the “Condominium Act”), which authorized and
governed the sale’s execution, does not violate the eminent domain
provision of the Arizona Constitution as applied to the Xias. The
Condominium Act was incorporated into the condominium declaration
(the “Declaration”) to which the Xias agreed, and the Declaration also
provided for partition of the property upon dissolution. However, we also
hold that under these circumstances, the Condominium Act required the
sale of all property, rather than individual units as occurred here.

                              BACKGROUND

¶2           In 2007, a developer completed construction of Dorsey Place
Condominiums (“Dorsey Place”), a single building comprised of ninety-six
units. The developer recorded the Declaration, which established Dorsey
Place’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions. Article 2.1 of the Declaration
“submit[ted Dorsey Place] . . . to the provisions of the Condominium Act
for the purpose of creating a condominium in accordance with the
provisions of the Condominium Act.” The Declaration defined the
Condominium Act as “A.R.S. § 33-1201, et seq., as amended from time to
time.”

¶3             As pertinent here, A.R.S. § 33-1228 (2018) 1 provided
requirements and procedures for terminating a condominium.                In
particular, § 33-1228(C) provided “[a] termination agreement may provide
that all the common elements and units of the condominium shall be sold
following termination. If, pursuant to the agreement, any real estate in the
condominium is to be sold following termination, the termination
agreement shall set forth the minimum terms of the sale.”

¶4            Under the Declaration, unit owners acted through the
Association. Article 2.7 of the Declaration provided that each unit owner
would have one vote in the Association for each unit owned. Article 6.1 of
the Declaration provided:

1 The parties dispute which version of § 33-1228 applied to the Dorsey Place

termination. The court of appeals held the version of § 33-1228 that became
effective in 1986 applied. Cao v. PFP Dorsey Invs., LLC, 253 Ariz. 552, 556–58
¶¶ 18–24 (App. 2022). For the reasons below, we disagree. Accordingly, all
references to § 33-1228 refer to the version that became effective in 2018,
unless otherwise noted.
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                          Opinion of the Court

      The Association shall have such rights, powers and duties as
      are prescribed by the Condominium Act, other applicable
      laws and regulations and as are set forth in the Condominium
      Documents together with the [sic] such rights, powers and
      duties as may be reasonably necessary in order to effectuate
      the objectives and purposes of the Association as set forth in
      this Declaration and the Condominium Act.

¶5           In January 2018, the Xias purchased unit 106 at Dorsey Place.
Pursuant to the Xias’ warranty deed and the Declaration, the Xias took
ownership to the unit subject to the Declaration. In November 2018, PFP
Dorsey purchased ninety units at Dorsey Place. Other individuals,
including the Xias, owned the remaining six units.

¶6            In April 2019, the Association held a meeting to discuss
terminating the condominium. At the meeting, the Association presented
unit owners with a termination agreement that provided for the sale of “all
portions of and interest in [Dorsey Place] not already owned by PFP
[Dorsey], to PFP [Dorsey], upon termination of the Condominium.” The
termination agreement stated that PFP Dorsey would pay fair market value
for the purchased property.

¶7             The termination agreement stated PFP Dorsey had obtained
an independent appraisal of the fair market value of the property to be
purchased that would be made available to unit owners, and the appraisal
would become final unless a unit owner disapproved. The agreement
explained that if a unit owner disapproved of PFP Dorsey’s appraisal, the
disapproving unit owner could obtain an independent appraisal of their
unit. If the unit owner’s appraisal differed from PFP Dorsey’s appraisal by
five percent or less, then the unit owner’s appraisal would become final as
to their unit. If the unit owner’s appraisal differed from PFP Dorsey’s by
more than five percent, then the disapproving unit owner could either
accept PFP Dorsey’s appraisal value or submit the matter to arbitration.
The Xias did not obtain an independent appraisal.

¶8           PFP Dorsey was the only unit owner that signed the
termination agreement. Article 13.4 of the Declaration provided, “the
Condominium may be terminated only by the agreement of Unit Owners
of Units to which at least ninety percent (90%) of the votes in the
Association are allocated.” Because PFP Dorsey controlled 93.75% of the
Association’s votes, the Association ratified the termination agreement.
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                          Opinion of the Court

Subsequently, the Association recorded a warranty deed transferring title
of the Xias’ unit to PFP Dorsey. PFP Dorsey took possession of the Xias’
unit, changed the locks, and disposed of the Xias’ personal possessions.

¶9            The Xias filed a claim against the Association and PFP Dorsey
alleging civil trespass, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust
enrichment, and wrongful recording. Cao, 253 Ariz. at 555 ¶ 9. The Xias
sought ejectment, imposition of a constructive trust, and to quiet title. Id.
The Xias argued that the sale of their unit violated § 33-1228(C), and,
alternatively, that § 33-1228 was unconstitutional because it authorized a
taking of private property for private use. Id. The Association and PFP
Dorsey filed separate motions to dismiss, arguing the Xias failed to state a
claim for which relief could be granted because the sale complied with
§ 33-1228. Id. ¶ 10. The superior court granted the Association and PFP
Dorsey’s motions. Id. The Xias appealed this dismissal. Id. ¶ 11.

¶10           The court of appeals reversed the superior court’s order
dismissing the Xias’ claims. Id. at 560 ¶ 37. On appeal, the Xias argued that
§ 33-1228 was unconstitutional because it authorized a taking of private
property for private use, and that the Association and PFP Dorsey violated
§ 33-1228(C) because it prohibited the forced sale of less than an entire
condominium. Id. at 555 ¶ 13.

¶11           Initially, the court of appeals determined § 33-1228 was
unconstitutional on its face. Id. ¶ 15. Nevertheless, the court of appeals
held § 33-1228 was applicable to the Xias by consent because the
Declaration incorporated the Condominium Act. Id. at 556 ¶ 17, 558 ¶ 24.

¶12            Having determined § 33-1228 applied to the Xias, the court of
appeals went on to address which version of § 33-1228 applied. Id.
at 556–58 ¶¶ 18–24. When the Xias purchased their unit, the 1986 version
of § 33-1228 was in effect, but after the Xias purchased their unit, a 2018
amendment to § 33-1228 went into effect. Id. at 556–57 ¶ 21. The 2018
amendment changed subsection (G) of § 33-1228 to include relocation fees
in unit owners’ respective interests and provide a process for unit owners
to challenge the fair market value assessment of a condominium association
in the event of a pending termination and sale of the condominium. Relying
on Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), the court of
appeals held the 2018 amendment to § 33-1228 could not apply to the Xias
without separate consent. Id. at 557 ¶ 22. The court of appeals reasoned

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                           Opinion of the Court

that although the Declaration purported to incorporate the Condominium
Act “as amended from time to time,” the 2018 amendments to § 33-1228
were unforeseen and substantial. Id. As such, the 1986 version of § 33-1228
applied to the Xias. Id. at 558 ¶ 24.

¶13            Additionally, the court of appeals held that the Association
and PFP Dorsey complied with § 33-1228(C), even though the termination
agreement provided for the sale of less than the entire condominium. Id.
at 559 ¶ 31. The court reasoned that although § 33-1228(C) permitted the
forced sale of an entire condominium, the statute also allowed the forced
sale of less than an entire condominium. Id. at 558–59 ¶¶ 29–30.

¶14            The Xias petitioned this Court for review. We granted review
on the following issues: (1) whether § 33-1228 authorized the taking of
private property for private use in violation of article 2, section 17 of the
Arizona Constitution, either on its face or as applied in this case; (2) whether
§ 33-1228(C) required all of the common elements and units of a
condominium to be part of a sale if any common elements or units of the
condominium are to be sold pursuant to a condominium termination
agreement; (3) whether the terms of an unconstitutional statute are
enforceable as to the contracting parties if a contract incorporates the statute
by reference; and (4) whether subsequent statutory amendments are
incorporated into a condominium declaration if the condominium
declaration incorporates the statute by reference. These are important
issues of statewide concern. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section
5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

                                DISCUSSION

¶15           We review the constitutionality and interpretation of statutes
de novo. See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509 ¶ 7 (2017); State v.
Holle, 240 Ariz. 300, 302 ¶ 8 (2016). We also interpret questions of law,
including contract interpretation, de novo. See, e.g., Powell v. Washburn, 211
Ariz. 553, 555–56 ¶ 8 (2006).

¶16          This case presents interrelated issues involving eminent
domain, contract, and statutory provisions concerning the division of
common interests in property. The Xias assert that § 33-1228(C), which
governed the sale of condominium units following termination, is
unconstitutional under article 2, section 17 of the Arizona Constitution both

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                           Opinion of the Court

on its face and as applied to them. The Xias argue in the alternative that if
we construe the statute to require the sale of all of the common elements
and units, it would largely ameliorate the problem. We address the discrete
challenges to the forced sale in turn. 2

                          I.      EMINENT DOMAIN

¶17            Article 2, section 17 provides in relevant part that “[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for private use.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17. This
provision provides significantly greater protection against takings for
private use than does the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. Compare Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–90 (2005) (upholding the taking of a
working-class neighborhood to facilitate amenities related to a private
business), with Bailey v. Myers, 206 Ariz. 224, 227 ¶ 12 (App. 2003) (“Taking
one person’s property for another person’s private use is plainly
prohibited . . . .”).

¶18           In addition to prohibiting government-executed takings for
private use, article 2, section 17 prohibits the legislature from authorizing
private individuals to take property for private use, except for some
enumerated exceptions not implicated here. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co.
v. New Keystone Copper Co., 16 Ariz. 257, 260–62 (1914) (“In authorizing the
taking of private property for private use, the legislative department of the
government is therefore limited to the purposes named in the
Constitution.”); see also Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 149 (2021)
(stating government action—for example, through a regulation—that
“results in [the] physical appropriation of property” violates the federal
Takings Clause); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 361 (2015) (holding a
regulation violated the federal Takings Clause). The Xias contend that the
Association could not have involuntarily sold their unit absent
§ 33-1228(C), which therefore renders the statute unconstitutional on its
face or as applied to them.

¶19           We have no cause to resolve the constitutionality of
§ 33-1228(C) in other instances because the Association’s power to forcibly
sell the Dorsey Place units in this case emanated not from that statute but

2 As we conclude that § 33-1228(C) is not unconstitutional, as applied to the

Xias, and thus not facially unconstitutional, we do not address the third
question on which review was granted relating to whether an
unconstitutional statute may be incorporated into a contract by reference.
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                           Opinion of the Court

from contract—specifically, the Declaration that all unit owners signed and
to which their property interests were subject. “[P]arties are generally free
to contract on whatever terms they choose.” Zambrano v. M & RC II LLC,
254 Ariz. 53, 56 ¶ 1 (2022). Among the terms to which they generally may
agree is a waiver of constitutional rights. See State ex rel. Polk v. Hancock, 237
Ariz. 125, 128–29 (2015); CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC, 236 Ariz.
410, 411 ¶ 6 (2014).

¶20            Article 13.4 of the Declaration provided that the
condominium may be terminated by the agreement of unit owners
comprising at least ninety percent of the votes. No one disputes that
occurred here. Although the Declaration did not otherwise expressly
provide for the disposition of ownership interests following termination,
Article 2.1 stated that the property was “submit[ted] . . . to the provisions
of the Condominium Act for the purpose of creating a condominium in
accordance with the provisions of the Condominium Act.” The Declaration
referenced the Condominium Act no fewer than thirty-six times, and
specific provisions were also repeatedly referenced. The Condominium
Act’s presence was so ubiquitous that one could not even skim the
Declaration without noting it. Hence, the Condominium Act’s applicability
here is a consequence of a clear contractual agreement to incorporate the
statute by reference that the parties to the Declaration were at liberty to
make. See, e.g., Indus. Comm’n v. Ariz. Power Co., 37 Ariz. 425, 431 (1931).

¶21            The Condominium Act provided a statutory default process
for condominium terminations and for disposing of ownership interests in
the event of termination. § 33-1228. Under the Condominium Act,
termination resulted in title to a unit being vested either in the Association
if a sale occurred, or in all unit owners as tenants in common if a sale did
not occur. § 33-1228(D)–(E). Thus, the termination of the condominium as
a whole was what resulted in the transfer of title to a specific unit from the
unit owner. See § 33-1228(E) (“While the tenancy in common exists, each
unit owner and the unit owner’s successors in interest have an exclusive
right to occupancy of the portion of the real estate that formerly constituted the
unit owner’s unit.” (emphasis added)). The Xias signed up for this
possibility by agreeing to the terms of the Declaration and buying a unit
subject to the Condominium Act.

¶22         Importantly, § 33-1228(J) provided that most of the statute’s
provisions—including subsection (C), the locus of the Xias’ complaint—“do

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                            Opinion of the Court

not apply” if the declaration “contains provisions inconsistent with these
subsections.” In other words, condominium owners were free to contract
around most of the Condominium Act’s provisions. The Dorsey Place
Declaration emphatically did not. 3

¶23            For the foregoing reasons, because the Xias and other unit
owners agreed to follow the Condominium Act, including § 33-1228(C)’s
terms regarding a termination agreement, we do not address the
constitutionality of the Condominium Act. In short, the Condominium Act
did not effect a taking of the Xias’ property.

               II.    SALE OF THE ENTIRE CONDOMINIUM

¶24           The Xias argue that if the sale was permissible, § 33-1228(C)
required that all of the common elements and units be sold, including the
units belonging to PFP Dorsey. Here, the Association sold to PFP Dorsey
only the six units it did not already own.

¶25           Section 33-1228(C) provided in full: “A termination
agreement may provide that all the common elements and units of the
condominium shall be sold following termination. If, pursuant to the
agreement, any real estate in the condominium is to be sold following
termination, the termination agreement shall set forth the minimum terms
of the sale.”

¶26           We read statutes to effectuate the plain meaning of the terms
to which the legislators agreed, in their broader statutory context. In re
Riggins, No. CV-23-0123-CQ, 2024 WL 974058, at *2 ¶ 12 (Ariz. March 7,
2024). If a provision is ambiguous, we may look to extrinsic sources, such
as statutory history. Rasor v. Nw. Hosp., LLC, 243 Ariz. 160, 164 ¶ 20 (2017).

¶27             We begin with the foundational property law principle that,
ordinarily, one party may not sell another’s property. See, e.g., Buehman v.
Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 375 (1941) (“One of the principal elements of property
is the right of alienation or disposition.” (citation omitted)); 26A C.J.S. Deeds
§ 277 (2024) (“A landowner cannot convey by deed a greater interest in
property than she possesses.”).

3   The Xias have raised no contract defenses before us.
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¶28            The source of the Association’s power to take and sell the
Xias’ unit derived from the first sentence of § 33-1228(C), which stated that
“[a] termination agreement may provide that all the common elements and
units of the condominium shall be sold following termination.” (Emphasis
added). “All” means all—not less than all. Although “may” is permissive,
Garcia v. Butler, 251 Ariz. 191, 194 ¶ 13 (2021); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 112 (2012), “may”
modifies “provide,” not “all.” Hence, the effect of the permissive “may”
was to authorize conduct that otherwise could not lawfully occur. The
words that follow, read as a whole, are what was authorized: selling all of
the property.

¶29           Likewise, we apply the surplusage canon: we attempt to read
statutes so that no language is rendered devoid of meaning. City of Tucson
v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, 552–53 ¶¶ 31–34 (2005); Scalia
& Garner, supra, 174 (providing that, under the surplusage canon, every
word in a statute must be given effect, and “[n]one should be ignored”).
The court of appeals’ reading of the first sentence of § 33-1228(C) could have
been accomplished by authorizing that a termination agreement “may
provide that common elements and units of the condominium shall be sold
following termination,” omitting the words “all the.” Our interpretation
gives meaning to those words.

¶30             Nor do we read the reference to the sale of “any real estate”
in the second sentence, in light of the first, to have independently
authorized the sale of less than the entire property. The second sentence’s
reference to the sale of “any real estate” accounted for two circumstances.
The first circumstance was where a termination agreement provided for the
sale of an entire condominium over a unit owner’s objection. As discussed,
a condominium association derived its power to do so from the first
sentence of § 33-1228(C). The second circumstance occurred where a
termination agreement provided for the sale of an entire condominium or
only part of a condominium with the consent of all the unit owners whose
property was to be sold. A condominium association derived its power to
effect a sale under this circumstance not from the first sentence of
§ 33-1228(C), but from contract law. Thus, the second sentence of
§ 33-1228(C) did not grant condominium associations the additional power
to sell less than all of a condominium over a unit owner’s objection.

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¶31           Again, applying the surplusage canon, we note the term “all”
means “the whole amount, quantity, or extent of; as much as possible; every
member or individual component of.” All, Meriam-Webster available at
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/all#dictionary-entry-1
(last visited Mar. 13, 2024). The term “any” means “one, some, or all
indiscriminately of whatever quantity.”           Any, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any (last visited Mar. 13,
2024). Thus, the term “all” encompasses “any.” By interpreting
§ 33-1228(C) to have required the sale of an entire condominium if any
portion was to be sold over a unit owner’s objection, we give meaning to
both terms.

¶32             Other subsections of § 33-1228 support our interpretation. In
particular, subsections (D) and (E) provided two scenarios: termination
with and termination without sale of the property. Subsection (D)
authorized a condominium association to contract for the sale of the
condominium on termination, but only if a supermajority of unit owners
agreed to the sale. § 33-1228(D). “If any real estate in the condominium is
to be sold following termination, title to that real estate on termination vests
in the association as trustee for the holders of all interest in the units.” Id.
(emphasis added). If the condominium association was selling less than the
entire condominium, there would be no reason to require a supermajority
of unit owners to agree to the sale or for the condominium association to
take title to the property and act as trustee for all unit owners rather than
only for the owners affected by a partial sale. The Xias also correctly point
out that the language in subsection (D) that established the Association as
trustee for the individual unit owners was consistent with a requirement
requiring sale of all property. In selling the entire condominium instead of
specific units, the Association as trustee would have a greater incentive to
maximize the sale price for the entire property because all unit owners
would be equally affected by the sale. See, e.g., Forest Guardians v. Wells, 201
Ariz. 255, 262 ¶ 23 (2001); 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 526 (2023) (“[T]he trustee
should secure competitive bidding and surround the sale with such other
factors as will tend to cause the property to sell to the greatest advantage.”).

¶33           Subsection (E) provided, “[i]f the real estate constituting the
condominium is not to be sold following termination, title to all the real
estate in the condominium vests in the unit owners on termination as
tenants in common in proportion to their respective interests.” § 33-1228(E)
(emphasis added). If PFP Dorsey is correct that subsection (C) permitted a

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sale of less than the whole condominium on termination, and subsection
(D) required an association to only hold title for the parts to be sold, then
“all the real estate in the condominium” could not be vested in the unit
owners as tenants in common, as required by subsection (E). Subsections
(D) and (E) are only given full effect if subsection (C) is interpreted as
having solely authorized a sale of the entire condominium upon
termination.

¶34            Finally, this interpretation is supported by the Arizona
legislature’s modifications to the Uniform Condominium Act, on which
§ 33-1228 is based; the Uniform Law Commission’s (the “ULC”)
commentary to the Uniform Condominium Act; and the ULC’s recent
amendment and comment to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership
Act, which replaced the Uniform Condominium Act. “[W]hen a statute is
based on a uniform act, we assume that the legislature intended to adopt
the construction placed on the act by its drafters. Commentary to such a
uniform act is highly persuasive unless erroneous or contrary to the settled
policy of Arizona.” UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Craig, 200 Ariz. 327, 332
¶ 25 (2001) (cleaned up).

¶35           The Condominium Act is a modified version of the Uniform
Condominium Act. See 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 192, § 3 (1st Reg. Sess.).
At the time the legislature adopted the Condominium Act in 1985, § 2-118
of the Uniform Condominium Act provided:

      (c) In the case of a condominium containing only units having
      horizontal boundaries described in the declaration, a
      termination agreement may provide that all the common
      elements and units of the condominium shall be sold
      following termination. If, pursuant to the agreement, any real
      estate in the condominium is to be sold following termination,
      the termination agreement must set forth the minimum terms
      of the sale.

      (d) In the case of a condominium containing any units not
      having horizontal boundaries described in the declaration, a
      termination agreement may provide for sale of the common
      elements, but may not require that the units be sold following
      termination, unless the declaration as originally recorded

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      provided otherwise or unless all the unit owners consent to
      the sale.

Unif. Condo. Act § 2-118(c)–(d) (Unif. L. Comm’n 1980).

¶36           In a comment, the ULC explained these sections dealt “with
the question of when all the real estate in the condominium . . . may be sold
without unanimous consent of all the unit owners.” Id. cmt. 5 (emphasis
added). The answer under the Uniform Condominium Act was “yes” when
the condominium had horizontal boundaries and the termination
agreement provided for a sale.

¶37           Arizona rejected different treatment for condominiums with
horizontal boundaries and those without, and instead extended the
Uniform Condominium Act’s forced-sale power to all types of
condominiums. In doing so, the legislature did not change the nature of
the power, which was to sell the entire condominium without the consent
of all unit owners if the termination agreement provided for a sale.

¶38           In 1984, the ULC combined the Uniform Condominium Act
with other model legislation, to create the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act. The 1984 Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
included § 2-118(c) & (d) from the Uniform Condominium Act.

¶39          In 2021, the ULC amended the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act to combine subsections (c) and (d). Unif. Common Int.
Ownership Act § 2-118(c) (Unif. L. Comm’n 2021). In combining the
subsections, the ULC mostly retained the language that applied to
condominiums with horizontal boundaries, except it provided that a
termination agreement “may provide for the sale of some or all of the
common elements and units.” Id. (emphasis added). The comment to the
amendment characterizes the change as “substantive” and states that the
new language, unlike the prior version, “allows for the sale of some but not
all common elements and units.” Id. cmt. 6. The amendment and comment
demonstrate that the Uniform Law Commission understood the prior
language, which Arizona substantially adopted and applied to all
condominiums, permitted only the sale of an entire condominium over a
unit owner’s objection. The amended language has not yet been adopted
in Arizona, despite the legislature recently amending § 33-1228.
Regardless, the Uniform Law Commission’s understanding of § 2-118(c)’s

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         CAO, ET AL. V. PFP DORSEY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL.
                           Opinion of the Court

operative language, which § 33-1228(C) adopted, is consistent with our
interpretation.

¶40          For all these reasons, we construe § 33-1228(C) as having
authorized only a sale of all condominium property if the termination
agreement provided for a sale. Thus, the forced sale of the Xias’ unit alone
rather than as part of a sale of all common elements and units of the
condominium was impermissible under § 33-1228(C).

             III.    WHICH STATUTORY VERSION APPLIED

¶41           The Xias argue that if the Declaration intended the reference
to § 33-1228 as a contractual term, as we find here, subsequent amendments
to the statute apply only if they fall within unit owners’ reasonable
expectations. The Xias do not argue that the termination and sale here were
governed by amended statutory terms falling outside their reasonable
expectations. Instead, they raise the point as illustrating the difficulties
with deeming the statute a contractual term.

¶42            Ordinarily, when a contract incorporates a statute by
reference, it imports only the statutory language in effect at the time of the
contract, but the parties are free to agree to incorporate future changes. 11
Williston on Contracts § 30:23 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2022) (“[C]hanges
in the law subsequent to the execution of a contract are not deemed to
become part of [the] agreement unless its language clearly indicates such to
have been [the] intention of [the] parties.”); Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan.
Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416 (1983) (suggesting that where a term
incorporates present and future state and federal law, parties are deemed
to agree to contract alteration by state price regulation and no federal
constitutional Contract Clause violation occurs).

¶43          Here, the parties expressly incorporated into the Declaration
the Condominium Act “as amended from time to time.” Nonetheless, the
court of appeals applied the pre-amended version of the Condominium
Act, holding that incorporating the statutory amendments was
impermissible under this Court’s decision in Kalway. See Cao, 253 Ariz.
at 558 ¶ 24.

¶44          In Kalway, we invalidated certain amendments to covenants,
conditions, and restrictions adopted pursuant to a provision that allowed
amendments by majority vote of homeowners, holding that a homeowners’
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         CAO, ET AL. V. PFP DORSEY INVESTMENTS, LLC, ET AL.
                           Opinion of the Court

association “cannot create new affirmative obligations where the original
declaration did not provide notice to the homeowners that they might be
subject to such obligations.” 252 Ariz. at 538 ¶ 14. We concluded that
“allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter
the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed.”
Id. ¶ 15.

¶45           Had PFP Dorsey exercised its power to amend the
Declaration, Kalway may have been applicable. But the Declaration is
unamended. Rather, the statutes that are expressly incorporated into the
Declaration by reference were amended, and that possibility of statutory
amendment was expressly anticipated. Such amendments do not implicate
the concerns of self-dealing that apply when parties to a contract attempt to
alter contract terms to the detriment of other parties; and no claim was
raised here that the statutory amendments impaired contractual obligations
in violation of article 2, section 25 of the Arizona Constitution. Hence, the
2018 version of § 33-1228, which was in effect when the condominium was
terminated, applied.

                             ATTORNEY FEES

¶46           The Xias seek attorney fees on a variety of bases. Article 13.15
of the Declaration provides for attorney fees if a unit owner who “employs
an attorney . . . to enforce compliance with or recover damages for any
violation or noncompliance with the Condominium Documents” prevails
in the action. Likewise, A.R.S. § 12-341.01 authorizes courts to award
attorney fees for actions arising out of contract.

¶47           Under these provisions, we award the Xias reasonable
attorney fees for amounts expended to enforce the Declaration. However,
as the eminent domain challenge was unsuccessful, the Xias may not
recover attorney fees attributable to those claims.

                              DISPOSITION

¶48          We vacate the court of appeals’ decision. We affirm the trial
court except as to the issues encompassed in Part II of this Opinion, and
remand to that court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

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