Court Opinion

ID: 9527317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:29:35.8221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:42.673808
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority ruling that the credibility of a witness, who testified before the grand jury and gave a statement inconsistent with the testimony given by her at the trial, may not be impeached by her prior inconsistent statement constitutes, in my opinion, a backward step in the administration of justice. It is unsound, and I find no support for the ruling in the Code of Criminal Procedure or the jurisprudence here 1 and little elsewhere.2
To begin with, the impeachment of the witness in the instant case by her prior inconsistent statement before the grand jury is authorized by R.S. 15:493 (re-enacted by Act 311 of 1966) which provides that the credibility of a witness may be impeached “* * * by proof of any statement made by him contradictory to his testimony, * * *” upon laying a proper foundation therefor. No exceptions are contained in this statute and, when the majority holds that it does not apply to testimony given before the grand jury, it effectually rewrites the law.
In the second place, the narrow interpretation given Article 434 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is unrealistic. For it takes no more than a casual reading of that article and the kindred articles concerning grand juries, together with the reporter’s comments thereon, to make it perfectly clear that the 1966 code liberalizes, instead of restricting, inquiry judicially or otherwise with relation to testimony given by witnesses before the grand jury after indictment and the conclusion is inescapable that the secrecy of grand jury proceedings was not intended to apply to witnesses giving, after the grand jury session is ended, an account of their own (as distinguished from other witnesses) testimony before the grand jury. Article 434, after providing that all persons having confidential access to grand jury proceedings shall keep secret the testimony of witnesses, states: “However, after the indictment, such persons may reveal statutory irregularities in grand jury proceedings to defense counsel, the district attorney, or the court, and may testify concerning them.” It also declares that such persons having confidential access concerning grand jury *401proceedings may disclose testimony given before the grand jury, “* * * at any time when permitted by the court, to show that a witness committed perjury in his testimony before the grand jury.” And the article continues, by providing in its last sentence that “A witness may discuss his testimony given before the grand jury with counsel for a person under investigation or indicted, with the district attorney, or with the court.”
Thus it is seen that the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure, far from placing roadblocks to prevent impeachment of a witness at the trial by his prior inconsistent statements made before the grand jury, has provided an avenue for inquiry whereby the prosecution, the defense and the court may examine the testimony of grand jury witnesses or irregularity in the proceedings in any proper case and may even discuss with a witness his testimony before the grand jury. Obviously, these exceptions were inserted in Article 434 to promote justice by subordinating the rules for secrecy of the grand jury proceedings, after an indictment has been returned, to the higher goal of promoting justice — a quest for truth which is the primary function of the judicial process.3
The majority further opines that State v. Johnson, 220 La. 170, 56 So.2d 143 (1951), a case on all fours with the one at bar wherein an opposite conclusion was reached, “* * * was impliedly overruled by the decision in State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 94 So.2d 25 [1957].” I take issue with this statement for the question for decision in the Revere case had nothing whatever to do with the question presented and decided in the Johnson case. In State v. Revere the question was whether an in*403vestigator of the district attorney’s office, who had been administered an oath of secrecy and operated a machine which recorded the testimony before the grand jury, was an authorized person in the grand jury room and whether his presence in the grand jury room constituted a valid ground for quashing the indictment. The court ruled in the affirmative and quashed the indictment, a conclusion with which I did not agree, citing jurisprudence to the contrary in the dissent. That decision has since been corrected by Article 433, subd. A (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that a person sworn to record the proceedings of a grand jury may be present at its sessions. In any event, the ruling there is not authority for the question presented in this case or the Johnson case.
The statements quoted from State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484 (1969), do support the majority ruling herein, and I readily acknowledge that their significance escaped my notice at the time I subscribed to the opinion. Nonetheless, I believe the rationale for the conclusion is incorrect, albeit the result reached may well have been placed on the ground that the question propounded there by defense counsel (“Did you tell the Grand Jury the same thing you’re telling this Court here today?”) was too general to form the proper predicate for impeachment of the State’s witness under R.S. 15:493 and, hence, objectionable.
Finally, it is to be noted that the ruling of the majority finds little support in the decisions of our sister states or in the federal courts. Since the grand jury system in this country stems from the common law of England, it would seem that citations of authorities from other American jurisdictions would be pertinent and helpful to the Court’s conclusion. Yet, not a single authority is cited although there is a wealth of jurisprudence in point.
The Johnson case, as research will show, is sustained by our prior jurisprudence (see State v. Thompson, 137 La. 547, 68 So. 949 [1915]) and by the overwhelming authority in cases from other jurisdictions. For it is the law elsewhere that testimony given by a witness on the trial of a case may be discredited by his prior inconsistent testimony before the grand jury. See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 594c, p. 576, 577; 38 C.J.S. Grand Juries § 43, p. 1060-1063; 38 Am.Jur.2d, Grand Jury, Sec. 41, p. 987; Annotation 127 A.L.R. 285; and VIII Wigmore on Evidence, McNaughton’s Revision (1961), Sec. 2362, p. 736.4
*405I respectfully dissent.

. Except in State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d 484 (1969).

. See 38 Am.Jur.2d Grand Jury, Sec, 41, pp. 988, 989.

. In citing the comments, especially comment (b), under Article 434, the majority erroneously conclude “ * * * that the redactors of the Code of Criminal Procedure recognized the broader scope of the secrecy obligation under the new Code * * And, for substantiation of this deduction, the opinion quotes from the first portions of the reporter’s comments (b) but fails to include the following:
“The secrecy required of a witness appearing before the grand jury does not preclude the witness from discussing his knowledge of the facts of a case with defense counsel, or with anyone else. Furthermore, the article expressly permits the witness to discuss his testimony given before the grand jury with those having a legitimate interest in that testimony, i. e., defense counsel, the distriet attorney, or the court. The secrecy required of a witness serves to restrain him from disclosing matters which he learns by being present at the grand jury meeting, such as (1) what offenses are under investigation, (2) which persons are under investigation, and (3) the names of persons who have been, or will bo, called to testify. The scope of the witness's obligation of secrecy is also stated in the oath required of the witness. Art. 440. As thus stated, the witness’s obligation of secrecy affords a large measure of protection to grand jury proceedings Zmi does not curtail a defense attorney's discovery of facts concerning the case." (Italics mine)

. This section of Wigmore contains an excellent discussion on the reasons why the testimony of a witness at the trial of a case may be discredited by prior inconsistent statements ho gave before the grand jury which returned the indictment. The text states:
“The witnesses and the complainants appearing before the grand jury must bo guaranteed temporarily against com*405pulsory disclosure of tlieir testimony and complaints because otherwise the state could not expect to secure ample quantity of evidence for the information of the grand jury. The secrecy is the state’s inducement for obtaining testimony. The policy is analogous to that of the privilege for informers in general * * *.
“The privilege, therefore, is not the grand juror’s for he is merely an indifferent mouthpiece of the disclosure. Nor is it entirely the state’s, for the state's interest is merely the motive for constituting the privilege. The theory of the privilege is that the witness is guaranteed against compulsory disclosure ; the privilege must therefore be that of the loitness, and rests upon his consent.
“But obviously the secrecy that is guaranteed is only temporary and provisional. Permanent secrecy would be more than is necessary to render the witness willing. Moreover, it would go too far by creating an opportunity for abuse, since a corrupt witness would be able to utilize it for perjured charges. This much is now universally conceded.
“But what are the limits of this temporary secrecy? The answer is, on principle, that it ceases when the grand jury has finished its duties and has either indicted or discharged the persons accused:
“(1) If the grand jury indicts I) on W’s testimony, it is plain that secrecy is no longer of any avail, for W will be summoned as a witness at the trial and will be compellable to testify. If he tells the truth and the truth is the same as he testified before the grand jury, the disclosure of the former testimony cannot possibly bring to him 'any harm (in the shape of corporal injury or personal ill will) which his testimony on the open trial does not equally tend to produce. If on the other hand his testimony now is inconsistent with that before the grand jury, the privilege ought not to apply. The need for the evidence in the criminal prosecution of D exceeds any injury that would inure to the witness-grand jury relation.
“(2) If, on the contrary, the grand jury, after hearing W’s testimony, nevertheless discharges D, there may now be a motive for W to desire secrecy, as when on a subsequent trial it is desired to impeach W as a witness by showing his biased utterances against D before the grand jury. But here the privilege ought also to cease for another reason, namely, that the chance that such a disclosure will be called for is too small a contingency to have any effect a priori, in l-endering W unwilling to make complaint or give testimony before the grand jury; W naturally will have expected that D would be indicted. Moreover, when W is summoned on a civil trial involving the same matters as the criminal charge and it is desired to impeach him by his former testimony, all motive for secrecy ends for the same reasons noted in paragraph (1) supra. Furthermore, in the other rare contingencies in which his testimony before the grand jury might become relevant * * *, justice requires in any case that W should not be exempted from disclosure.
“There remain, therefore, on principle, no cases at all in which, after the grand-jury’s functions are ended, the privilege of the witnesses not to have their testimony disclosed should be deemed to continue.
“This is, in effect, the law as generalise accepted today. It is, however, not usually stated in such a broad form. *407The common phrase is that disclosure may be required ‘whenever it becomes ■necessary in the course of justice.’ E>is-regarding a few local exceptions, this is in practice no narrower a rule than the one above deducible from principle.”