Court Opinion

ID: 9734112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:25:39.883093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.739009
License: Public Domain

WHELAN, J.
I dissent.
The narrow issue is whether an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy was properly construed as a matter of law liberally in favor of the insurer and strictly against the insured.
The rule heretofore recognized has been to the contrary. (Brinkmann v. Liberty Mut. etc. Ins. Co., 63 Cal.2d 41, 45 [45 Cal.Rptr. 8,403 P.2d 136].)
There should be no question that the phrase “commercial automobile” in the context of the exclusionary clause of the policy has both a broad and a more restricted meaning. The existence of such broad and narrow meanings was recognized in Hendricks v. American Employers Insurance Co. (1965) [Ct. of App. of La.] 176 So.2d 827, 832, where it is said: " Commercial has many meanings and in the instant case the lower court construed the provisions in the light most favorable to the insured and adopted the narrower meaning as defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed., 1960). We agree with the trial judge’s finding and the rationale upon which it is based and hold that in this policy ‘commercial automobile’ means an automobile used in the transporting of goods for sale or exchange ...”
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in Youngwirth v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. (1966) 140 N.W.2d 881, 885, gave the following definition of “commercial automobile”: “. . . any self-propelled motor vehicle designed for use principally upon *389public roads in the transportation of people or property for hire.” (See also note in 18 A.L.R.2d 719.)
In Hardee v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. (1961) [La. Ct. of App.] 127 So.2d 220, the court said, at page 222: ". . . this truck is to be considered as a ‘ commercial automobile’ in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term, whether the modifying adjective is regarded as used in narrow sense of pertaining to transactions limited to the purchase and sale or exchange of goods or whether it is regarded as used in the broader sense of referring to enterprises having financial profit as the primary aim. ’ ’
The policy considered in Kirk v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. (1961) 254 N.C. 651 [119 S.E.2d 645, 648], contained its own definition of commercial automobile. The court said there: ‘ ‘ The truck in question was . . . a ‘ commercial automobile ' according to the policy definition. ’ ’
The policy under scrutiny here contains many definitions but does not define " commercial automobile. ’ ’1
The juxtaposition of “livery conveyance” with “commercial automobile” suggests a narrower definition for the latter phrase than of an automobile used in a profit-making enterprise; otherwise, there would be no need for the use of the words “livery conveyance” which also denotes a vehicle used in a profit-making enterprise.
Nor do I think the Vehicle Code, section 260, definition of “commercial vehicle” governs, since it has to do with vehicles “of a type required to be registered under” the Vehicle Code. (See Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn. v. Hudman (1964, Tex.) 385 S.W.2d 509, 513, where a similar problem was considered.)
Our Supreme Court has recognized that there are broad and narrow definitions of the word “commerce.” (State of Cali*390fornia v. Tagami, 195 Cal. 522, 526-527-528-529 [234 P. 102].)
The question whether a certain type of vehicle falls within an exclusionary clause of an insurance policy has sometimes been held to be a matter of fact. (Gaumnitz v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 134, 138 [37 P.2d 712].) Here, the parties seem to have been in agreement that the matter should be decided as a matter of law. In either event, the judgment should be reversed.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 4,1967. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The insuring clause under which plaintiff’s claim, is made is found under the heading ‘ ‘ Insuring Agreement IV, ” “ Coverage 5. ’ ’ There is a set of “Definitions—Insuring Agreement IV” which precedes immediately the ‘ ‘ Exclusions—Insuring Agreement IV ’ ’ in which is found the exclusionary clause under examination. " Automobile ’ ’ is defined in language that excludes “(1) a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for use principally off public roads, except while actually upon public roads, or (2) a land motor vehicle or trailer while located for use as a residence or premises and not as a vehicle, or (3) any vehicle while being used for racing, or (4) any military vehicle. ’ ’
Elsewhere in the policy there are definitions of “automobile”; “private passenger automobile”; “utility automobile,” which is an “automobile of the pick-up body, sedan delivery or panel truck type with a load capacity of 1,500 pounds or less”; and “trailer.”