Court Opinion

ID: 9648469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:22:26.144786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:01.477006
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court on the ground that the legislation challenged in this proceeding violated the prohibitions of Sections 21 and 23, Mo. Const, art. Ill, thereby making it unnecessary to reach the questions of due process, equal protection and impairment of contract.1
The practice of taking a bill that appears doubtful of passage and combining it with a bill or bills reasonably assured of passage and passing the resulting bill under a broad and general amended title is one of the most expeditious and effective legislative *933strategies. It is also one of the most deceptive. This is the precise practice that Sections 21 and 23 seek to prohibit.
It is no secret that since courts began holding that Blue Cross-type hospital and medical service plans were not insurance,2 almost every session of the General Assembly has been faced with bills seeking to regulate Blue Cross as an insurance company. In my opinion, H.B. 127, 82nd General Assembly, effectively accomplishes via the back door that which could never be accomplished via the front door, i.e., legislative— judicial conversion of Blue Cross into a regulated insurance company. I remain firmly convinced that courts must strictly enforce Sections 21 and 23 of art. Ill of our Constitution if we are to maintain “the integrity of and public confidence in both the legislative process and our system of judicial review.” Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 7 (Mo. banc 1984) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
Most who deal with third party payment of hospital and medical services are aware that Blue Cross-type plans have fought a last ditch battle to contain rising hospital and medical costs. Simply stated, they have done so by reason of their unique contract with their members which enabled them to offer and hold out to participating hospitals and physicians the offer of direct payment of pre-agreed fees for services, leaving the non-participating and the higher chargers to fend for themselves in collection of their charges. My concern now is where in insurance law or regulations or standard insurance contracts will there be found any authorization to so resist rising medical costs. More likely, such action would be viewed as vexatious delay in the payment of insurance claims.
I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

. The principal opinion appears to rely on Missouri Dental Board v. Alexander, 628 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. banc 1982) as authorizing any impairment of the contracts herein under the police power. It was there stated that "The record is void of any evidence that appellants are parties to any executory contracts entered into prior to enactment of these statutes and affected by enactment of these statutes. Article I, § 13 prohibits the state from enacting statutes which impair the rights of parties to any existing contract.” Id. at 652. If anything, it would seem to suggest the contrary.

. See Jordan v. Group Health Association, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C.Cir.1939); California Physicians' Service v. Garrison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1945); Commissioner of Banking & Insurance v. Community Health Service, 129 N.J.S. 427, 30 A.2d 44 (1943); State ex rel. Fishback v. Universal Service Agency, 87 Wash. 413, 151 P. 768 (1915). See generally, Annot. 167 A.L.R. 322 (1946).