Court Opinion

ID: 9775803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:09:27.477115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.771158
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Justice, dissenting. Today, this court has determined that three improper questions by the prosecution amounts to prosecutorial misconduct and results in accumulation of error necessitating reversal. This, in spite of the fact that accumulation of error was not raised by appellant as a ground for reversal. Let us examine and discuss the sequence of the objections to the issues raised within the framework of this three day trial. The first instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct arose early in the trial when the prosecutor asked Lt. Mike Adams “ [w] ere you aware of any complaints against Mr. Dillon about his treatment of women, particularly threatening, to plant drugs on them in exchange for sex?” This was the prosecution’s first attempt to elicit testimony from a witnesses about improper behavior by appellant toward other women. Appellant objected to the question on the basis it was leading and asked for a mistrial. The court sustained appellant’s objection, but denied his motion for a mistrial. Upon denial of his motion for a mistrial, appellant asked that the jury be admonished to ignore the question. The court refused to instruct the jury to disregard the question saying “I’m not going to over-emphasize it, but... I’m going to sustain your objection to the leading question.” Appellant contends a mistrial should have been granted, but if a mistrial was not necessary, the trial court should have admonished the jury to disregard the question. Appellee argues appellant suffered no prejudice because the witness never answered the question and the instruction by the court at the end of the trial to the jury that “arguments, statements and remarks made by attorneys are not evidence and are to be disregarded if they have no basis in the evidence” cured any possible prejudice. We have stated many times that the trial court has wide latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial and we will not reverse the decision of the trial court except for an abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party. Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991). I fail to find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial nor do I believe the denial of a mistrial resulted in manifest prejudice to appellant. The question was never answered by the witness and there was, therefore, no evidence before the jury about appellant threatening to plant drugs on women in exchange for sex. See Bussard v. State, 295 Ark. 72, 747 S.W.2d 71 (1988). However, the refusal of the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the question is a separate issue. Trial courts have wide discretion in evidentiary questions. Hubbard v. State, 306 Ark. 153, 812 S.W.2d 107 (1991). In denying appellant’s requested admonition, the trial court said “I’m not going to overemphasize it, but. . . I’m going jto sustain your objection to the leading question.” While the requested admonishment should undoubtedly have been given, thfe failure to give the admonishment is not reversible error in this instance. We have held that it may be proper not to give an instruction because it may call undue attention to the evidence. Kellensworth v. State, 275 Ark. 252, 631 S.W.2d 1 (1982). Additionally, appellant objected at trial only on the basis the question was leading, not that the question was prejudicial. Bussard, 295 Ark. 72, 747 S.W.2d 71. The question was not answered, the trial court sustained the objection, and appellant did not inform the trial court that he wanted the admonition because the question was prejudicial. This was also the prosecuting attorney’s first attempt to elicit this improper information. Under these circumstances, I cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in not giving the requested admonition to the jury. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Chief Deputy Jerry Bradley whether he was aware why appellant had resigned from the Conway Police Force. The witness replied he had no direct knowledge of why he resigned. The prosecutor then asked “[y]ou have no direct knowledge, but you are aware that it’s because he forced sex on — ” at which point appellant objected. The trial court sustained the objection. The prosecutor then continued to question the witness about whether he knew if appellant had resigned from other police departments and whether he knew the reasons for these resignations. The witness admitted knowing appellant had resigned from two other police departments, but did not know the reasons and did not know of appellant’s resignation from yet two other police departments. The prosecutor’s last question to the-witness was “[a]nd are you aware that these were all forced resignations?” Appellant objected to this question, a bench conference was held where appellant moved for a mistrial, which was denied, but the prosecutor was reprimanded and instructed not to “do that anymore. . . . You’re that close to it.” Appellant then asked for and received an instruction to the jury to disregard the question. Appellant argues the entire line of questioning was improper and prejudicial because it put appellant in the position of defending other sexual crimes or acts other than the one at hand. At trial, appellant did not object on this basis and only objected on the basis that the witness had no direct knowledge of the reason for appellant’s resignation and asking the witness about the reason prejudiced appellant. Since appellant did not argue that the entire line of questioning was improper below, we should not consider this argument on appeal. Bussard, 295 Ark. 72, 747 S.W.2d 71. In any case, a mistrial is only to be granted where any possible prejudice cannot be removed by an admonition to the jury. Porter v. State, 308 Ark. 137, 823 S.W.2d 846 (1992). Additionally, “we have held, with rare exceptions, that an admonition to the jury to disregard improper, and even prejudicial matters cures such mistakes.” Lackey v. State, 283 Ark. 150, 154, 671 S.W.2d 757, 759 (1984) (Hays, J., dissenting). The trial court has wide latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial and we do not reverse the decision of the trial court except for an abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party. Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991). I fail to see an abuse of discretion or manifest prejudice in this instance. Appellant objected to the prosecution asking appellant about his prior suspension from the Pulaski County Sheriffs Department on the basis that it did not go to truthfulness and no foundation had been laid. On appeal, appellant argues the failure of the prosecutor “to demonstrate that the ‘bad acts’ about which she inquired were probative of truthfulness” prior to asking the question constituted prejudicial error. The following sets out the prosecution’s conduct and appellant’s objections in this area: [PROSECUTION]: [Y]ou testified on direct that you’ve been a police officer with the Pulaski County Sheriffs Department for seven and a half years. Right? [APPELLANT]: Yes. [PROSECUTION]: But during that seven and a half years, that wasn’t the first time you were suspended, was it? [APPELLANT]: No. [PROSECUTION]: You’d been suspended before for taking a woman to — [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I want to object. (THEREUPON, counsel for the State and counsel for the Defense approached the bench and conferred with the Court, out of the hearing of the jury, as follows:) [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, she may ask him if he was suspended, but she may not bring up this other. It has nothing to do with truthfulness or untruthfulness which is what those rules require before she could do any cross examining about this. [PROSECUTION]: Your Honor, under the Rule, it says we can cross examine him about acting as a police officer for seven and a half years. If he feels it’s not relevant to this case, we can contribute this to the witness’ credibility. In opening he said, I will prove it because he has worked for long standing as a police officer. That’s an exact quote from the opening statements, I believe. It places his own character into issue seven and a half years later, when we THE COURT: You may ask him if he has been suspended and then ask him what for. If it goes to truthfulness, I’ll allow it. [PROSECUTION]: Okay. (THEN, in the hearing of the jury.) [PROSECUTION] CONTINUING: Have you been suspended before? [APPELLANT]: Yes. [PROSECUTION]: What was it for? [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, at this time, I’d like to state that unless it has [to] do with truthfulness or untruthfulness, I would object to the question. THE COURT: Well, you see, I don’t know. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Well, then no proper foundation has been laid for the question. THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. [PROSECUTION] CONTINUING: What was it for? [APPELLANT]: I’d have to refer to the letter of suspension. I believe it was for not remaining quiet in school and misuse of a department vehicle. [PROSECUTION]: Misuse of a department vehicle? What did you misuse it for? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I object. That has nothing to do with truthfulness or untruthfulness. (THEREUPON, counsel for the State and counsel for the Defense approached the bench and conferred with the Court, out of the hearing of the jury, as follows:) THE COURT: Do you have proof as to what he’s been suspended for? [PROSECUTION]: Yes, I do. THE COURT: Well, ask him those specific questions that deal with truthfulness or untruthfulness, and using a vehicle improperly would not go to that. I’ll just give you a little hint. (THEN, in the hearing of the jury.) [PROSECUTION]: Your Honor, may we approach? THE COURT: Do you think we could work some of these things out if we’d take about a ten minute break so that you don’t have to continue coming up, back and forth? The jury and I would like to get through with this trial sometime. Let’s take about a ten minute break, ladies and gentlemen, and be back at five after 2:00. (THEREUPON, Court was in recess until 2:05 p.m. during which time the following proceedings took place, in chambers:) THE COURT: All right. Let’s see if we can work out what you want to ask so that you don’t have to have every question you ask have an objection to it and coming up to the bench. [PROSECUTION]: Yes, Your Honor, I will be glad to do that. I have two more questions. One is, do you remember telling Lisa Craig Short’s parents that you did not know where she was when, in fact, she was in your hotel room? THE COURT: How are you going to prove that... if he says no? Aren’t you stuck with that then and are you going to bring the girl and her parents in to testify to that? [PROSECUTION]: No, Your Honor. First of all, I don’t believe he has opened the door on direct examination for me to do that. I do have the material from the Conway Police Department that details it, Ms. Craig’s statements. Also, Ms. Craig is .in the audience, but I would not call her as a witness. THE COURT: Then you propose to ask that question? Are you going to object to that? [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: When she asks it, Your Honor, I will make a motion for a mistrial. THE COURT: I probably will grant it if you ask that question. All right. What is your next question? [PROSECUTION]: The other question will probably be in the same vein. I just want to make sure, did he instruct a twelve year old to deceive her parents as to where she was. THE COURT: Aren’t those questions sort of like do you still beat your wife? [PROSECUTION]: Your Honor, they are prior incidences of — THE COURT: (Interposing) Well, that is fine if you can back those up and prove them, then that is proper, but just to ask them and have no proof of it is not only improper, it is not fair. Is that the only two other questions you have left? [PROSECUTION]: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Let’s don’t ask those. On appeal, appellant argues the failure of the prosecutor “to demonstrate that the ‘bad acts’ about which she inquired were probative of truthfulness” before she asked appellant why he had been suspended constituted prejudicial error. Questions about specific instances of a witness’s prior conduct are permissible on cross-examination if they relate to truthfulness. Ark. R. Evid. 608(b). In interpreting Rule 608 we have adopted a three-fold test of admissibility: 1) the question must be asked in good faith, 2) the probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect, and 3) the prior conduct must relate to the witness’ truthfulness. Mackey v. State, 279 Ark. 307, 315-16, 651 S.W.2d 82, 86 (1983). This entire colloquy indicates that the prosecutor did not ask the question in good faith. The trial judge told the prosecutor she could ask those questions which related to truthfulness. The prosecutor knew the prior instances of bad conduct by appellant which she was attempting to introduce did not relate to appellant’s truthfulness. With this knowledge, she asked the improper questions. It is error to ask questions which are not probative of truthfulness. Divanovich v. State, 271 Ark. 104, 607 S.W.2d 383 (1980). However, we do not reverse for error without a showing of prejudice. Hamm v. State, 304 Ark. 214, 800 S.W.2d 711 (1990). Appellant contends it is “clear” he was prejudiced. I do not agree. The question whether appellant was “suspended for taking a woman to —” was not answered. Appellant’s objection to the question was sustained. Appellant did not ask for an admonition to the jury to disregard the question. Since appellant did not request an admonition, which would have cured any potential prejudice, he cannot now complain that he was prejudiced by the question being asked. Appellant’s answer that he was suspended for “not remaining quiet in school and misuse of a department vehicle” is not prejudicial. It is not probative of truthfulness, as the trial judge noted, but it does not prejudice appellant. Since there has not been a showing of prejudice, I would not reverse. The majority cites as authority for its decision Harris v. State, 264 Ark. 391, 572 S.W.2d 389 (1978), in which we found a motion to suppress a search warrant was erroneously denied. We concluded that even though none of the errors in the search warrant, standing alone, would require suppression, the pervasiveness of the errors contained in the search warrant necessitated suppression. The Harris case is simply not applicable to the case at bar. The majority also relies on State v. Soares, 815 P.2d 428 (Hawaii 1991), which was reversed because of numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct, none of which, standing alone would have required reversal. There, the prosecutorial misconduct began during voir dire and permeated the trial. This Hawaiian case does not “approximate[] the case at bar” as the majority concludes. The case at bar involved only three instances of a prosecutor attempting to elicit improper testimony from the witnesses over a three day trial. While I agree with the majority that the prosecutor was overzealous and this conduct was improper, I think it falls short of prosecutorial misconduct. In closing, I note that the cases in which we have reversed for cumulative error involved much more egregious instances of improper conduct and the issue of cumulative error was specifically raised on appeal. In Alexander v. Chapman, 289 Ark. 238, 711 S.W.2d 765 (1986), we reversed where there were 28 objections by appellant to leading questions, appellee was admonished repeatedly by the trial judge and the objections were repeatedly sustained, but appellee’s conduct was not stopped. Appellant in Chapman even asked that the testimony be stricken because of the excessive use of leading questions, but the trial judge determined that striking the testimony was too harsh a sanction. In Ronning v. State, 295 Ark. 228, 748 S.W.2d 633 (1988), we said ten instances of leading questions during a lengthy trial with an evident attempt by counsel for the state to comply with the judge’s directive to avoid leading questions did not require reversal. In this case, there were only three instances of improper questions presented for our consideration during a three day trial, there is no indication the trial judge was unable to control the prosecutor’s actions, and the issue of cumulative error was not raised by appellant either below or on appeal. Hays and Glaze, JJ., join in this dissent.