Court Opinion

ID: 9943152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 19:03:42.401211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:15.891735
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 P. v. Garcia CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No.B325385
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 2016017314)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Ventura County)

v.

JESUS PEDRO GARCIA,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       Jesus Pedro Garcia appeals an order denying his motion to
strike a prior prison term enhancement (former Pen. Code, 1
§ 667.5, subd. (b)), for his 2016 conviction for carjacking (§ 215,
subd. (a)), under the resentencing provisions of section 1172.75.
At the time Garcia filed his motion, he was serving a seven-year
consecutive sentence for a 2019 conviction for assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury by a prisoner. (§ 4501, subd.
(b).) We conclude, among other things, that: 1) the trial court had
jurisdiction to decide the merits of the resentencing issue, and 2)

         1   All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
the court did not err because Garcia’s 2019 sentence did not
include a prior prison term enhancement. We affirm.
                               FACTS
        In 2016, Garcia pled guilty to carjacking (§ 215) and he
admitted to the imposition of a prior prison term enhancement.
(Former § 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to an
aggregate prison term of four years – a three-year sentence for
the carjacking count and a consecutive one-year sentence for the
former section 667.5, subdivision (b), prior prison term
enhancement.
        In 2019, Garcia committed an offense while in prison. He
pled guilty to assault with force likely to produce great bodily
injury by a prisoner. (§ 4501, subd. (b).) He was sentenced to a
seven-year term to be served consecutively to the term of his 2016
conviction.
        “Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020
Reg. Sess.) . . . amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison
term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent
offenses.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380.)
“Enhancements based on prior prison terms served for other
offenses became legally invalid.” (Ibid.) “The amendment was to
be applied retroactively to all cases not yet final on January 1,
2020.” (Ibid.) Thereafter, the Legislature enacted section
1172.75 (former section 1171.1, added by Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3;
renumbered section 1172.75 by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12), which
provides a procedure for the Secretary of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to create a
list of prisoners who are “currently serving a term for a judgment
that includes” a prior prison term enhancement to allow the court

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to provide retroactive sentencing relief. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b);
Burgess, at p. 380.)
       On June 16, 2022, pursuant to section 1172.75, CDCR
circulated a list of prisoners who were serving terms that
included prior prison term enhancements. Garcia’s name was on
that list.
       Pursuant to a procedure devised by the Ventura County
Superior Court, the district attorney and the public defender, the
trial court scheduled hearings after the CDCR placed Garcia’s
name on the list to comply with section 1172.75.
       Pursuant to this procedure, the district attorney filed a
brief in opposition to resentencing claiming the current sentence
Garcia was serving was for his 2019 conviction which did not
contain a prior prison term enhancement. He argued Garcia was
ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 because it
applies to prisoners “currently serving a term for a judgment that
includes” an invalid enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).)
Garcia’s counsel filed a responsive brief. He claimed Garcia was
eligible under the statute. His brief included a partial label that
it was a “petition for resentencing.”
       On November 3, 2022, the trial court held a hearing to
determine whether to strike the prior prison term enhancement
for Garcia’s 2016 conviction. At that time Garcia was serving a
sentence for his 2019 conviction. The court ruled it would not
strike the enhancement because Garcia was serving a sentence
for his 2019 in-prison offense which did not include a prior prison
term enhancement.

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                            DISCUSSION
                    The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction
       The Attorney General contends the trial court lacked
jurisdiction because Garcia filed a prohibited freestanding
“petition for resentencing,” and such petitions are not authorized
under section 1172.75.2 He claims this appeal must therefore be
dismissed. We disagree.
       Section 1172.75 invalidates “prior prison term
enhancements” except for sexually violent enhancements that are
not applicable here. (People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
440, 447.) “But section 1172.75 does not authorize appellants to
file a petition or a motion to strike the unauthorized
enhancement[].” (Ibid.) Instead, the Legislature provided an
exclusive procedure whereby CDCR initiates the resentencing
procedure by preparing a list of potentially eligible prisoners who
have prior prison term enhancements that is sent to the court.
(Id. at pp. 447-448.) “ ‘[A] “freestanding motion [or petition]
challenging an incarcerated defendant’s sentence is not a proper
procedural mechanism to seek relief.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 448.)
       The Attorney General’s claim that Garcia filed a prohibited
freestanding petition for resentencing is not correct. Here the
CDCR initiated the statutory procedure by circulating the
required list with Garcia’s name as a prisoner who had a prior
prison term enhancement. Thereafter, the trial court scheduled a
hearing to determine whether to strike the enhancement
pursuant to a procedure authorized by the district attorney, the
public defender, and approved by the superior court. This
approved procedure was established to comply with section

      2 We grant the People’s motion to augment the record and

Garcia’s motion to augment the record.

                                4
1172.75. The Attorney General’s claim that Garcia initiated a
prohibited freestanding petition is refuted by Ventura County
Deputy District Attorney Michelle Contois who, in an agreed
statement with the public defender, stipulates, “The Garcia
matter was calendared in accord with this agreed upon procedure
and was not an unauthorized freestanding petition.” (Italics
added.)
      Moreover, the Attorney General’s claim that Garcia filed an
unauthorized petition is based on part of the label of the
document Garcia’s counsel filed. On November 1, 2022, Garcia’s
counsel filed a “petition for resentencing and reply to
prosecution’s opposition.” (Italics added.) We look to the
substance of that document “rather than its label.” (Malott v.
Summerland Sanitary Dist. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1110.)
This document was only a brief in response to the People’s
October 5, 2022, “opposition” to resentencing. The statute does
not preclude the parties from filing briefs to guide the court on
whether to strike the enhancement. (§ 1172.75.)
      At the November 3, 2022, hearing, the trial court ruled this
was a matter properly scheduled “for resentencing.” The district
attorney asked the court to exercise its authority under section
1172.75, subdivision (c), and rule that Garcia’s prior prison term
enhancement did not fall within the statutory resentencing
provision. The People, now represented on appeal by the
Attorney General, may not change position and now contend the
court lacked the authority to act. (People v. Castillo (2010) 49
Cal.4th 145, 155.) The court’s authority to rule on whether to
strike the enhancement is authorized by statute. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (c).) The claim that the court lacked jurisdiction is without
merit.

                                 5
      Did the Trial Court Err by Not Striking the Enhancement?
        Garcia contends the trial court erred by not striking the
prior prison term enhancement. He claims: 1) he was serving one
aggregate sentence composed of his original 2016 sentence and
the consecutive sentence for the 2019 conviction for his offense he
committed in prison; and 2) because he had only one aggregate
sentence, it included the prior prison term enhancement imposed
for the 2016 conviction, and the statute required the court to
strike it.
        But we rejected this claim in Escobedo. (People v.
Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.) We held “ ‘ “the term
for an in-prison offense” ’ ” begins “ ‘to run at the end of the
prison term imposed for the original out-of-prison offenses.’ ”
(Ibid.) Consequently, Garcia had two separate sentences – one
for his 2016 conviction and one for his in-prison 2019 conviction.
“ ‘ “[T]he term for an in-prison offense does not become part of the
aggregate prison term imposed for those offenses which were
committed ‘on the outside.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “The latter term starts
to run at the end of the prison term imposed for the defendant’s
original ‘outside’ offense.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, Garcia’s “ ‘consecutive
sentence for his . . . in-prison offense is not merged or aggregated
with his original term for the . . . out-of-prison offense. Instead,
the two terms are treated as separate terms, with the term for
the in-prison offense beginning only when [the defendant]
completes the term for his out-of-prison offense.’ ” (Ibid.)
        At the time of the resentencing hearing, Garcia had
completed his sentence for his 2016 offense. He was serving a
sentence for his 2019 in-prison offense, and because his sentence
did not contain a prior prison term enhancement, the trial court

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did not err by not striking the enhancement imposed for his 2016
offense. (People v. Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 452.)
                           DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                               7
                  Michele M. Castillo, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

      Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, William M. Quest,
Deputy Public Defender, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Allison H. Chung, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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