Court Opinion

ID: 9911415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 20:10:45.65921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:45.698663
License: Public Domain

J-S36015-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 NORMAN JACKSON                             :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :     No. 2052 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 9, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0005467-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED DECEMBER 19, 2023

     Norman Jackson appeals from the judgment of sentence of three to six

years of imprisonment, followed by two years of probation, resulting from his

convictions   for   strangulation,   recklessly   endangering   another   person

(“REAP”), and simple assault. We affirm.

     The relevant facts are as follows:

     On or about May 12, 2019, [Appellant] damaged the door and
     forced his way into the home of P.K., [Appellant’s] former
     girlfriend and mother of his minor child. Upon entering the home,
     [Appellant] grabbed P.K. by her neck, pushed her to the ground,
     and kicked her in the head and back repeatedly about twenty
     times. [Appellant also] punched P.K. as he kicked her in the back
     and head. As [Appellant] attacked P.K., he yelled that he was
     “going to kill her.” When [Appellant] allowed P.K. to get up, he
     forcefully escorted her upstairs by firmly holding her by her neck.
     During this time, P.K. was unable to breathe due to [Appellant’s]
     grip around her neck. [Appellant] then instructed her to get a
     knife. Once P.K. obtained the knife, [Appellant] ordered her to
     stab him[,] which she refused. [Appellant] then grabbed P.K. by
     her neck again and threw her to the floor at which time he
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      resumed kicking her in the head and back. As a result of the
      attack, P.K. suffered head trauma, facial swelling, a knee injury
      and facial bleeding. The attack on P.K. by [Appellant] continued
      until P.K.’s mother and two children arrived at which time
      [Appellant] fled.

      [Prior to trial, the] Commonwealth sought to admit the following
      specific incidents of alleged abuse as other acts evidence
      admissible under Pa.R.E. 404(b). First, P.K. alleged that on or
      about April 27, 2012, [Appellant] repeatedly kicked and punched
      P.K. while she was holding their baby daughter, striking both P.K.
      and the child. P.K. contacted the police and made a report of the
      assault. Second, on or about March 3, 2013, P.K. attempted to
      remove [Appellant] from her home to no avail. When [Appellant]
      persistently refused to leave, P.K. sprayed mace in [his] face.
      After washing his face, [Appellant] became very angry and threw
      P.K. to the ground, picked her up to throw her down again and
      then dragged her across the floor. P.K. contacted the police
      following this incident, but [Appellant] was never charged with this
      alleged assault. Third, P.K. alleged [Appellant] pushed P.K. to the
      ground and hit her numerous times with a closed fist on or about
      March 10, 2013. The Philadelphia Police Department was again
      contacted and made a report of the domestic assault. During one
      of the listed prior assaults, P.K. was hospitalized with a fractured
      skull.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/27/23, at 1-3 (cleaned up).

      The trial court permitted the inclusion of the evidence highlighting the

previous abuse, “as it goes to the nature of the relationship and the history of

the case.” N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/12/20, at 12. Appellant proceeded to a

bench trial, where he was convicted of the above offenses and sentenced as

hereinabove indicated. This timely appeal followed, and both Appellant and

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises one issue for

our review:

      Did not the lower court err and abuse its discretion when it allowed
      the Commonwealth to present evidence of other acts by Appellant,
      where the evidence was stale and primarily used to show a

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      propensity for violence towards the complainant and where the
      prejudicial effect of such evidence far outweighed any probative
      value?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up).

      The sole question proffered by Appellant challenges the admissibility of

evidence. Our standard of review in such cases is well-settled:

      The trial court has discretion over the admissibility of evidence,
      and we will not disturb such rulings on appeal absent evidence the
      court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not a mere
      error in judgment. Rather, discretion is abused when the law is
      overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised [is]
      manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias
      or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of the record.

Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 316 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(cleaned up).

      Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other

bad acts, i.e., his previous assaults of P.K., because the evidence was

primarily used to show a propensity for violence. See Appellant’s brief at 13.

Under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or other acts” is

inadmissible to demonstrate a defendant’s criminal propensity.           Pa.R.E.

404(b)(1); see also Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 665 (Pa.

2014) (observing that evidence under Rule 404(b)(1) is “inadmissible solely

to show a defendant’s bad character or propensity for committing criminal

acts.”).   Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible when used for another

purpose, such as demonstrating “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

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plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E.

404(b)(2).

      Our courts also recognize a res gestae exception for prior bad acts

evidence, which permits “the admission of evidence of other crimes or bad

acts to tell the complete story [of the case].” Hairston, supra at 665. Under

res gestae, evidence of distinct previous bad acts may be proper where it is

“part of the history or natural development of the case[.]” Commonwealth

v. Brown, 52 A.3d 320, 326 (Pa.Super. 2012). The purpose of the exception

is to ensure that “the case presented . . . [does] not appear in a vacuum.”

Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 139 (Pa. 2007).

      Whether the evidence is admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b)(2) or the

res gestae exception, such evidence is subject to the limitations of Pa.R.E.

403, and may therefore be admitted “only if the probative value of the

evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2); see

also Brown, supra at 326. In conducting this analysis, a reviewing court will

weigh certain factors, including “the strength of the other crimes evidence,

the similarities between the crimes, the time lapse between crimes, the need

for the other crimes evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof of the charged

crime, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to

overmastering hostility.” Id. at 325 (cleaned up).

      Appellant argues that the other bad acts evidence is inadmissible

because the instances of Appellant’s prior abuse of P.K. were unconnected to

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the instant case and were too remote in time to be admitted. See Appellant’s

brief at 22, 26-27. The Commonwealth asserts that the earlier assaults were

admissible because they were pertinent to “the natural development of the

facts of the case” and “the history of the case.” Commonwealth’s brief at 9

(cleaned up). The trial court agreed, opining that the past instances of abuse

by Appellant were admissible to portray the history of the relationship between

Appellant and P.K. that led to the events in this case. See Trial Court Opinion,

1/27/23, at 8-9.

      Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting this evidence.    We have held that “[e]vidence of prior abuse

between a defendant and an abused victim is generally admissible to establish

motive, intent, malice, or ill-will.” Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241,

252 (Pa.Super. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d

893, 906 (Pa. 2002) (concluding that prior bad acts evidence of domestic

abuse was admissible “to demonstrate the chain or sequence of events that

formed the history of the case.”). Critically, Appellant’s earlier attacks on P.K.

were not introduced to show Appellant’s propensity for violent and abusive

behavior. To the contrary, the prior domestic assaults provided insight into

the history of Appellant’s relationship with P.K., illustrating his longstanding

ill-will and malice toward her as motivation for the charged conduct. See Ivy,

supra at 252.

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       Plainly, despite Appellant’s contentions that the previous attacks were

so dissimilar that they were inadmissible, the introduction of the prior assaults

was an important means of outlining the context, history, and development of

Appellant’s hostility toward the victim that culminated in the serious incident

of abuse in the instant case. Phrased differently, “[t]he challenged evidence

shows the chain or sequence of events which formed the history of the case,

is part of the natural development of the case, and demonstrates Appellant’s

malice and ill-will toward the victim.”1 Commonwealth v. Ganjeh, 300 A.3d

1082, 1091 (Pa.Super. 2023).

       Moreover, the other bad acts were not so unduly prejudicial as to divert

the trial court’s attention “away from its duty of weighing the evidence

impartially.” Id. Significantly, the testimony of the victim regarding these

incidents was not of the character that “tended to convict the appellant only

by showing his propensity to commit crimes.” Commonwealth v. Brown,

186 A.3d 985, 993 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). Rather, as indicated above,

it illuminated Appellant’s past relationship with the victim and provided

important context about the case at bar. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of

discretion on the part of the trial court in permitting this evidence to be

introduced.

____________________________________________

1 Further, concerning Appellant’s argument that the evidence was too remote

in time to be considered, we note the well-established principle that “there is
no specific timeframe that dictates the applicability of the [res gestae]
exception.” Commonwealth v. Green, 76 A.3d 575, 584 (Pa.Super. 2013).

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     For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this

claim, and we have no cause to disturb his judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 12/19/2023

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