Court Opinion

ID: 9398707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 21:01:23.079708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:35.569369
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-13651    Document: 47-1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023    Page: 1 of 37

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-13651
                           ____________________

        SOUTH RIVER WATERSHED ALLIANCE, INC.,
        JACQUELINE ECHOLS,
                                                     Plaintiffs-Appellants,
        versus
        DEKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-04299-SDG
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court               20-13651

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               In 2010, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
        (“EPA”) and Georgia Department of Natural Resources (“GDNR”)
        sued DeKalb County for violating the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).
        To resolve this suit, the parties agreed to—and the court entered—
        a consent decree in 2011. Eight years later, South River Watershed
        Alliance, Inc. (“South River”) and Jacqueline Echols sued DeKalb
        County for failing to follow the decree and violating the CWA.
                The CWA authorizes citizen suits for enforcement
        purposes, but such suits are not allowed when an “[a]dministrator
        or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or
        criminal action . . . to require compliance with the standard,
        limitation, or order[.]” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
        Thus, this case turns on whether the 2011 consent decree—along
        with the ongoing efforts of the EPA and GDNR to require
        compliance—constitutes diligent prosecution. If so, South River’s
        suit is barred; if not, South River’s suit is good to go.
               The district court determined that South River’s suit was
        barred by the diligent prosecution bar. On appeal, South River
        argues for the opposite result and requests injunctive relief to
        ensure DeKalb County’s compliance. After careful consideration,
        and with the benefit of oral argument, we agree with the district
        court that South River’s suit is barred by § 1365(b)(1)(B).
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        20-13651              Opinion of the Court                      3

                               I.     Background
              South River is “a non-profit membership organization” that
        advocates “to protect and restore the water quality and
        biodiversity” of the South River and Chattahoochee River
        watersheds. Co-plaintiff Echols is a South River member who
        enjoys these watersheds for their “aesthetic, recreational,
        ecological, and biological values.”
               DeKalb County owns and operates a wastewater collection
        and transmission system. According to its National Pollutant
        Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits, DeKalb
        County is required to collect, transport, and treat wastewater
        before discharging it into surface waters. South River—despite the
        presence of a consent decree from an earlier government action
        against DeKalb County for its CWA violations—sued DeKalb
        County for violating the CWA by repeatedly spilling wastewater,
        including untreated sewage, into surface waters.
              A. 2010 Litigation and Consent Decree
               In December 2010, the EPA and GDNR filed a complaint
        against DeKalb County alleging that, since 2006, DeKalb County
        had spilled untreated wastewater—in what are called “sanitary
        sewer overflows”—on hundreds of occasions. Many of these
        overflows resulted in the discharge of untreated sewage into the
        South River and Chattahoochee watersheds. In May 2011, the
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       20-13651

        district court allowed South River to intervene in the government
        action. 1
                Over South River’s objections, in December 2011, the
        district court approved a consent decree executed by DeKalb
        County, the United States, and the State of Georgia. United States
        v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., No. 1:10-cv-4039-WSD, 2011 WL 6402203

        1 DeKalb County argues that South River is barred by res judicata from
        asserting its claims in the instant appeal because South River properly
        intervened in the 2010 litigation and South River could have raised the present
        issues in the prior litigation. “Under res judicata, also known as claim
        preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars the parties to a prior action
        from re-litigating a cause of action that was or could have been raised in that
        action.” In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). We
        have noted that,
                [i]n the Eleventh Circuit, a party seeking to invoke the doctrine
                [of res judicata] must establish its propriety by satisfying four
                initial elements: (1) the prior decision must have been
                rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there must
                have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) both cases must
                involve the same parties or their privies; and (4) both cases
                must involve the same causes of action.
        Id. This case, however, does not involve “the same parties or their
        privies,” nor “the same causes of action.” Id. With respect to the third
        element, while South River may have intervened, South River was not
        a party to the consent decree. See Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Westrope,
        730 F.2d 729, 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (“A consent judgment is binding only
        upon those parties consenting thereto.” (quoting Botz v. Helvering,
        134 F.2d 538, 545 (8th Cir. 1943))). And as to the fourth element, the
        claims in the instant suit could not have been raised in the 2010 suit
        because the new claims are based on DeKalb County’s CWA
        violations after the entry of the 2011 consent decree.
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        20-13651                 Opinion of the Court                           5

        (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2011). The stated objectives of the consent
        decree are for DeKalb County “to use its best efforts to prepare and
        implement all plans, measures, reports, and construction,
        maintenance, and operational activities . . . to achieve the goals
        of: (1) full compliance with the CWA, the [Georgia Water Quality
        Control Act], and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and (2)
        the elimination of all [sanitary sewer overflows].” The decree
        requires DeKalb County to pay a one-time civil penalty of
        $453,000: $226,500 to the United States and $226,500 to the State of
        Georgia. It also requires DeKalb County to expend at least
        $600,000 on remedial measures benefiting areas impacted by prior
        discharges.
               The consent decree contains numerous provisions requiring
        DeKalb County to remediate its wastewater collection and
        transmission system. For example, the consent decree requires
        DeKalb County to implement a comprehensive program “to
        ensure effective [c]apacity, [m]anagement, [o]perations and
        [m]aintenance” of the sewer system. The consent decree
        establishes timelines for DeKalb County to develop and submit
        certain programs and plans to the EPA or GDNR 2 for review and
        approval. These programs include an emergency response plan
        and a sewer mapping program to provide DeKalb County with

        2The consent decree requires submission to “EPA/EPD.” As defined by the
        consent decree, EPA, of course, refers to “the United States Environmental
        Protection Agency,” and EPD refers to “the [GDNR] Environmental
        Protection Division.”
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                    20-13651

        better information about its sewer system.            The sewer
        rehabilitation plan requires DeKalb County to identify “priority”
        areas 3 requiring immediate improvement, submit to EPA/GDNR
        a rehabilitation program for those areas, and rehabilitate those
        areas within a specified timeframe. DeKalb County is also required
        to identify “non-priority” areas. 4 These areas are subject to
        assessment and rehabilitation under a separate program that does
        not have a specific deadline for completion.
               The consent decree contains other notable provisions, such
        as those requiring DeKalb County to develop a “computer-based
        dynamic hydraulic model” 5 with a lengthy set of requirements and

        3As of 2018, the priority areas for remediation included approximately 838
        miles of sewer line, representing 31% of the sewer line in DeKalb County’s
        wastewater collection and transmission system. According to South River’s
        amended complaint, DeKalb County has acknowledged that it will not meet
        the deadline for rehabilitating priority areas, and indeed, the deadline has
        passed.
        4 The non-priority areas represent the remaining approximately 69% of
        DeKalb County’s sewer line. South River alleges that in 2017 and 2018, “there
        was a greater volume of sewage spilled in non-[p]riority [a]reas than in
        [p]riority [a]reas.”
        5 According to the amended complaint, “[a] sewer system hydraulic model is
        a mathematical model of a fluid introduced into a wastewater sewer at various
        rates and pressures. It is used to provide an understanding of the hydraulic
        behavior of the system under variable conditions so utilities can make
        informed decisions concerning planning and capital improvements.” A
        dynamic hydraulic model is more accurate than a steady-state model, which
        holds “certain parameters” constant and uses less data.
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        20-13651                 Opinion of the Court                             7

        a 2017 deadline. 6 Additionally, it requires that DeKalb County pay
        prospective penalties for noncompliance and failure to timely
        complete any of the specified remedial actions. For example, for
        each day DeKalb County fails to meet the priority area
        rehabilitation deadline, it will be charged anywhere from $1,000 to
        $3,000 per day.
               The consent decree also includes a disclaimer: the United
        States and the State of Georgia do not “warrant or aver in any
        manner that the County’s compliance with any aspect of this
        Consent Decree will result in compliance with provisions of the
        CWA.” It also states that it “may be terminated when [DeKalb
        County] has satisfactorily completed performance of its
        compliance” and “fulfilled all other material obligations of this
        Consent Decree.” Finally, the consent decree provides that “[t]he
        Court shall retain jurisdiction over this case until termination of
        this Consent Decree, for the purpose of resolving disputes . . . or
        effectuating or enforcing compliance with the terms of this
        Consent Decree.” To date, the consent decree has not been
        terminated.
             In May 2020, the United States and the State of Georgia
        moved to reopen the 2010 litigation. They agreed to certain

        6 In2015, DeKalb County proposed (and the EPA approved) the use of a static
        model instead of a dynamic one because the static model could be developed
        and implemented more quickly. The parties to the consent decree agreed to
        this change, but did not seek court permission. However, this change was
        memorialized in the court-approved 2021 modifications to the consent decree.
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                        20-13651

        modifications to the consent decree: an extension of the deadlines
        for the priority areas, the implementation of a new dynamic
        hydraulic model that DeKalb County will use for better
        management of wastewater, the addition of 103 additional priority
        work projects, and the payment of additional fines for failure to
        meet the original deadlines. The district court approved the
        modifications in September 2021. 7
                B. Procedural Background
                In July 2019, South River mailed DeKalb County a notice
        letter, as required under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), setting forth its intent
        to file a citizen suit under the CWA. 8 Two months later, South

        7During the public comment period for the proposed modification, South
        River raised the same concerns that it puts forth in this appeal.
        8 DeKalb County argues that South River did not provide sufficient pre-suit
        notice under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) because South River’s notice lacked
        specifics about “DeKalb’s alleged system deficiencies; . . . the requirements of
        DeKalb’s MS4 Permit; . . . [and] for spills that occurred after the filing of this
        lawsuit.” This argument lacks merit. Section 1365 requires pre-suit notice
        before a citizen suit under the CWA. See id. The CWA’s pre-suit notice
        provision states:
                No action may be commenced—
                (1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section—
                        (A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
                        alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in
                        which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged
                        violator of the standard, limitation, or order . . . .
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        20-13651                   Opinion of the Court                                9

        River filed a complaint against DeKalb County in the Northern
        District of Georgia asserting one count of CWA violations under
        § 1311, which prohibits the non-compliant discharge of pollutants,
        and § 1342, which outlines the requirements for compliant
        discharges under the NPDES permit system. South River sought
        broad injunctions requiring DeKalb County to “cease the discharge
        of wastewater into waters of the United States . . . except in
        compliance with NPDES Permits,” “take all actions necessary to
        cease the illicit discharge of sewage spills,” and “comply with all
        terms and conditions of coverage under its NPDES Permits.” The
        complaint also requested monetary relief—civil penalties for
        violations of the CWA and litigation costs and reasonable
        attorney’s fees for South River.
               In March 2020, DeKalb County moved to dismiss South
        River’s amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
        12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively,

        Id. South River sent several DeKalb County officials a notice of its intent to
        sue on July 15, 2019, specifying DeKalb County’s violations for discharging
        pollutants in violation of the terms of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Under our
        precedent and EPA regulations, the notice must include, inter alia, sufficient
        information for the recipient to identify “the specific [CWA] standard,
        limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the activity alleged to
        constitute a violation, the person or persons responsible for the alleged
        violation, the location of the alleged violation, [and] the date or dates of such
        violation.” See 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a); Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, Inc. v.
        Tenn. Valley Auth., 502 F.3d 1316, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007). South River met
        these requirements by identifying DeKalb County’s sewage spills by structure,
        cause, source, and date.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                    20-13651

        under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
        can be granted. DeKalb County argued that the district court had
        no jurisdiction to hear the claim because the consent decree and
        the EPA’s enforcement of it establishes “diligent prosecution” that
        bars the claim under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), which states, “[n]o
        action may be commenced . . . if the Administrator or State has
        commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action
        in a court of the United States . . . to require compliance with the
        standard, limitation, or order . . . .” 9 South River argued that its
        claim was not barred by the diligent prosecution bar because the
        consent decree did not “require compliance” with the CWA. That
        is, because the consent decree did not require repairs in non-
        priority areas, DeKalb County could comply with the consent
        decree while still failing to comply with the CWA. South River
        also pointed to DeKalb County’s admission that it would not meet
        the consent decree’s deadline for priority-area rehabilitation as
        further evidence of non-compliance with the CWA.
               The district court determined that the diligent prosecution
        bar is not jurisdictional and, therefore, Rule 12(b)(6), rather than
        Rule 12(b)(1), governed. The district court then concluded that

        9 DeKalb County also argued below that South River lacked standing, failed
        to provide sufficient pre-suit notice, was barred by res judicata, and was
        unlawfully attempting to sue to enforce the consent decree as a third party.
        We address standing in Part A of the discussion section, res judicata in
        footnote 1, and pre-suit notice in footnote 8. The unlawful enforcement issue
        is not argued on appeal.
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        20-13651                   Opinion of the Court                              11

        South River’s claims addressed the same CWA violations that
        formed the basis of the 2010 government suit that resulted in the
        consent decree, and, after affording the government a “heavy
        presumption of diligence,” held that the diligent prosecution bar of
        § 1365 applied and granted DeKalb County’s motion to dismiss.
        South River appealed.
                                     II.     Discussion
               “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to
        dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim,
        accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
        construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
        McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (quotations omitted). 10 “We also review issues of statutory
        interpretation de novo.” United States v. Zuniga-Arteaga, 681 F.3d
        1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).
               A. Standing

        10 Because no party disputes either the authenticity or importance of the public

        records attached to DeKalb County’s motion to dismiss—including charts
        cataloging some of its rehabilitation programs, copies of its correspondence
        with EPA regarding the imposition of civil penalties, and copies of annual
        reports from the DeKalb County Department of Watershed Management—
        we will consider them too. See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir.
        2002) (“[A] document attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered by
        the court without converting the motion into one for summary judgment only
        if the attached document is: (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (2)
        undisputed.”).
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13651

              DeKalb County argues that South River and Echols lack
        standing to sue. DeKalb County’s main contentions are that South
        River has not been injured by DeKalb County’s CWA violations
        and that, even if it has been injured, the injury is not redressable.
                 “The judicial power of the federal courts is limited by Article
        III of the U.S. Constitution. We may exercise jurisdiction only over
        ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Greater Birmingham Ministries v.
        Sec’y of State for State of Ala., 992 F.3d 1299, 1316 (11th Cir. 2021)
        (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). To satisfy Article III’s case or
        controversy requirement, which is “the irreducible constitutional
        minimum of standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking,
        demonstrate that he has suffered injury in fact, that the injury is
        fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury
        will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (quotations
        omitted). This injury must be concrete. TransUnion LLC v.
        Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021).
               We turn first to DeKalb County’s challenge to the injury
        suffered by South River. 11 An organization has standing to redress
        an injury suffered by its members without showing an injury to the
        association itself. See Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 772 F.3d 1335,
        1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (“In order to sue on behalf of its
        members . . . the rule in this Circuit is that organizational plaintiffs

        11 There are two ways to establish standing for organizational plaintiffs—the
        diversion-of-resources theory and the associational standing theory. Arcia,
        772 F.3d at 1341. In this case, South River argues it has associational standing.
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        20-13651               Opinion of the Court                        13

        need only establish that at least one member faces a realistic danger
        of suffering an injury.” (quotations omitted)). To establish
        standing to enforce the rights of its members, an organization must
        show that (1) “its members would otherwise have standing to sue
        in their own right,” (2) “the interests at stake are germane to the
        organization’s purpose,” and (3) “neither the claim asserted nor the
        relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
        the lawsuit.” Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
        Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).
                South River meets the first requirement of associational
        standing—i.e., its members would have standing to sue in their
        own right—because its members use the South River and
        Chattahoochee watersheds for recreation and aesthetic enjoyment
        and are injured when those uses are limited due to pollution. See
        id.; Glynn Env’t Coal., Inc. v. Sea Island Acquisition, LLC, 26 F.4th
        1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2022) (“An individual can meet her burden of
        establishing that injury at the pleading stage by attesting that [s]he
        uses . . . an area affected by the alleged violations and that h[er]
        aesthetic . . . interests in the area have been harmed.” (quotations
        omitted)). Moreover, “the rule in this Circuit is that organizational
        plaintiffs need only establish that at least one member faces a
        realistic danger of suffering an injury.” Arcia, 772 F.3d at 1342
        (quotation omitted); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555
        U.S. 488, 498 (2009). Here, South River satisfied our requirement
        by identifying one specific member, plaintiff Echols, who has
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                     20-13651

        suffered a cognizable injury because she has used the South River
        and Chattahoochee watersheds less due to pollution.
                 As to the second requirement of associational standing—i.e.,
        the “interests at stake are germane to the organization’s
        purpose”—South River’s interests in this litigation qualify because
        it is a nonprofit membership organization with the goal of restoring
        the water quality of the Chattahoochee and South River
        watersheds. Arcia, 772 F.3d at 1342.
                Finally, South River meets the third requirement of
        associational standing—i.e., that “neither the claim asserted nor the
        relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
        the lawsuit”—because South River is seeking civil penalties,
        injunctive relief, and litigation costs, not damages. 12 Id.; see United
        Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517
        U.S. 544, 546 (1996) (“‘[I]ndividual participation’ is not normally
        necessary when an association seeks prospective or injunctive relief
        for its members [however] such participation would be required in

        12 In their amended complaint, South River seeks an order requiring DeKalb
        County to “pay civil penalties for violations of the CWA.” Civil penalties are
        paid to the government unlike damages that would be paid to South River’s
        members. Compare Damages, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
        (“Money claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for
        loss or injury.”), with Penalty, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
        (“Punishment imposed on a wrongdoer, usually in the form of imprisonment
        or fine; especially, a sum of money exacted as punishment for either a wrong
        to the state or a civil wrong (as distinguished from compensation for the
        injured party’s loss).”).
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        20-13651                Opinion of the Court                        15

        an action for damages to an association’s members . . . .”).
        Accordingly, South River and Echols have suffered an injury in fact
        for purposes of standing.
               We next turn to DeKalb County’s redressability argument.
        DeKalb County contends that the remedies South River seeks are
        already provided for in the consent decree and the court cannot
        unilaterally modify its terms. “Redressability is established,
        however, when a favorable decision ‘would amount to a significant
        increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that
        directly redresses the injury suffered.’” Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d
        1241, 1260 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S.
        452, 464 (2002)). At the motion to dismiss stage, the burden to
        prove redressability is “relatively modest.” Bennett v. Spear, 520
        U.S. 154, 171 (1997).
               The water quality of the Chattahoochee and South Rivers
        would likely be improved if the court implemented an injunction
        requiring DeKalb County to take additional steps to cease the
        discharge of wastewater and comply with its NPDES permits and
        the CWA. Although DeKalb County is correct that the court
        cannot unilaterally modify the terms of the consent decree, the
        court could impose other requirements to deal with the CWA
        violations. Accordingly, South River and Echols have adequately
        demonstrated for purposes of the motion to dismiss stage that a
        favorable decision would redress their injury. Spear, 520 U.S. at
        171.
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                     20-13651

              Because South River has demonstrated injury, causation,13
        and redressability, we conclude that South River has Article III
        standing.
               B. Jurisdiction
               We now proceed to a second threshold question—this
        Court’s jurisdiction over this suit. The district court held that 33
        U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B)’s diligent prosecution bar is not
        jurisdictional. DeKalb County argues that the diligent prosecution
        bar is jurisdictional and that the district court should have
        dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
        jurisdiction rather than under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
        claim.
               DeKalb County did not file a cross-appeal to raise this issue,
        but we “have an independent obligation to determine whether
        subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge
        from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
        “We review de novo a district court’s determination of whether it
        has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Gupta v. McGahey, 709 F.3d 1062,
        1064–65 (11th Cir. 2013).

        13Because causation is plainly apparent, it was not contested below or in this
        appeal. Nonetheless, we assess causation and conclude that South River’s
        injury (i.e., pollution in the South River and Chattahoochee watersheds) is
        “fairly traceable” to DeKalb County’s actions (i.e., polluting those rivers in
        various ways). Greater Birmingham, 992 F.3d at 1316.
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        20-13651               Opinion of the Court                        17

               In examining § 1365(b)(1)(B)’s diligent prosecution bar, “we
        must begin, and often should end as well, with the language of the
        statute itself.” United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th
        Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quotation omitted). Courts must look to the
        plain meaning of the statute, and “presume that a legislature says
        in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
        there.” Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Cherokee Mining, LLC,
        548 F.3d 986, 990 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v.
        Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)).
                 Importantly, in the jurisdictional context, the Supreme
        Court has warned courts about the ill effects of “drive-by
        jurisdictional rulings.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511–14. The Supreme
        Court has “urged that a rule should not be referred to as
        jurisdictional unless it governs a court’s adjudicatory capacity, that
        is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.” Henderson ex rel.
        Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011). Courts such as
        ours should not confuse jurisdictional rules with “claim-processing
        rules” that “promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring
        that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified
        times.” Id.; see also Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. __, 143 S.
        Ct. 870, 876 (2023) (emphasizing the difference between “mundane
        claims-processing rule[s]” and “procedural bar[s] with
        jurisdictional consequences” (quotation omitted)).
               To determine whether a statutory rule is jurisdictional, we
        look for a clear statement from the legislature. Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
        515–16. “[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  20-13651

        coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as
        nonjurisdictional in character.” Id. at 516; see also Henderson, 562
        U.S. at 436 (“[W]e look to see if there is any clear indication that
        Congress wanted the rule to be jurisdictional.” (quotations
        omitted)). Rather than looking for “magic words,” courts should
        look at the provision’s context and the Supreme Court’s
        “interpretation of similar provisions.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436.
        “When a long line of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions left
        undisturbed by Congress has treated a similar requirement as
        jurisdictional, we will presume that Congress intended to follow
        that course.” Id. (quotations and internal citation omitted).
                Following the analytical framework laid out in Arbaugh, in
        Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010), the
        Supreme Court evaluated whether a provision “requir[ing]
        copyright holders to register their works before suing for copyright
        infringement” was jurisdictional. The Court concluded that the
        provision was not jurisdictional because (a) it was “not clearly
        labeled jurisdictional,” (b) it was “not located in a jurisdiction-
        granting provision,” and (c) not all statutory conditions requiring
        action before filing a lawsuit are “jurisdictional prerequisite[s].” Id.
        at 166.
               Similarly, in Henderson, the Supreme Court determined
        that a statutory requirement—requiring veterans to “file a notice
        of appeal with the Veterans Court within 120 days”—was not
        jurisdictional. 562 U.S. at 431. The Court first looked to the
        provision for any “jurisdictional terms or refer[ences],” and
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        20-13651               Opinion of the Court                        19

        determined that there were none. Id. at 438. Next, the Court noted
        that the time limit was located within a subchapter entitled
        “Procedure,” which was especially probative because a separate
        provision within that same subchapter was captioned “Jurisdiction;
        finality of decisions” and did not mention the time limit for appeals.
        Id. at 439–40. Accordingly, the Court held that the provision “does
        not have jurisdictional attributes.” Id. at 441.
               Subsection (b) of § 1365, which is entitled “Notice,” states
        that “[n]o action may be commenced” if the EPA administrator or
        a state “has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or
        criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to require
        compliance with the standard, limitation, or order . . . .” 33 U.S.C.
        § 1365(b)(1)(B). Clearly, the diligent prosecution bar in subsection
        (b)—under the “Notice” heading—is not labeled as jurisdictional
        which is important because Congress labelled subsection (a)
        “Authorization; [j]urisdiction,” but chose not to label the diligent
        prosecution bar in the same way. See id. § 1365(a); Henderson, 562
        U.S. at 439–40. Accordingly, because Congress deliberately located
        § 1365(b)(1)(B) outside the jurisdiction-granting provision, we
        must treat the notice requirement as nonjurisdictional. See 33
        U.S.C. § 1365(b); Henderson, 562 U.S. at 439–40; Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
        at 516 (“[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on
        coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as
        nonjurisdictional in character.”).
               Looking to our sister circuits to see how they have answered
        this question, opinions are split. While the First, Third, and Fifth
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        20                          Opinion of the Court                       20-13651

        Circuits have expressly held that the diligent prosecution bar is not
        jurisdictional, 14 the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held
        that 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) is jurisdictional. 15 Most of the
        jurisdictional-side cases predated Arbaugh, however.              See
        Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Am. Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 208
        (4th Cir. 1985); Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro.

        14   See Cebollero-Bertran v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 4 F.4th 63, 72 (1st
        Cir. 2021) (“For these reasons, we agree with the district court that the CWA’s
        diligent prosecution bar is a mandatory claims-processing rule that does not
        implicate subject matter jurisdiction.”); Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc.
        v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 123 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that the
        diligent prosecution bar of the Clean Air Act [which is identical to the CWA’s
        diligent prosecution bar] is not a jurisdictional limitation.”); La. Env’t Action
        Network v. City of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737, 749 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e hold
        that the diligent prosecution bar is a nonjurisdictional limitation on citizen
        suits.” (quotation omitted)).
        15   Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Am. Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 208 (4th Cir.
        1985) (explaining that § 1365(b)(1)(B)’s “statutory bar is an exception to the
        jurisdiction granted in subsection (a) of § 1365, and jurisdiction is normally
        determined as of the time of the filing of a complaint”); Friends of Milwaukee’s
        Rivers & All. for Great Lakes v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. (“Friends
        II”), 556 F.3d 603, 606 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The Act strips the courts of subject
        matter jurisdiction over citizens’ suits where the State has timely commenced
        judicial or administrative enforcement actions.”); Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem.
        & Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1298 (10th
        Cir. 2005) (referring to § 1365(b)(1)(B) as a “jurisdiction-stripping provision”).
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        20-13651                   Opinion of the Court                              21

        Sewerage Dist. (“Friends I”), 382 F.3d 743, 754–55 (7th Cir. 2004); 16
        Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers Int’l Union v.
        Cont’l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285, 1298 (10th Cir. 2005). As such,
        and because they align with our text-based inclination above, we
        follow the well-reasoned post-Arbaugh opinions of the First, Third,
        and Fifth Circuits. See Cebollero-Bertran v. P.R. Aqueduct &
        Sewer Auth., 4 F.4th 63, 72 (1st Cir. 2021); Grp. Against Smog &
        Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 123 (3d Cir. 2016);
        La. Env’t Action Network v. City of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737,
        749 (5th Cir. 2012).
               Simply put, because Congress has not clearly stated that the
        diligent prosecution bar is jurisdictional and other indicators of
        meaning also indicate that the provision is nonjurisdictional, we
        hold that § 1365(b)(1)(B)’s diligent prosecution bar is not
        jurisdictional. Thus, the district court was correct in evaluating the
        diligent prosecution bar under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than Rule
        12(b)(1).

        16 Of note, this case returned to the Seventh Circuit three years after the 2006
        Arbaugh decision. 546 U.S. at 500. In Friends II, the Seventh Circuit did not
        change its determination that the diligent prosecution bar was jurisdictional in
        light of Arbaugh. 556 F.3d at 606. The Seventh Circuit only mentioned the
        jurisdictional nature of § 1365(b)(1)(B) in passing because the state’s actions
        were commenced after the citizen suit was initiated (i.e., the diligent
        prosecution bar would not have been triggered anyway). Id.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                20-13651

              C. Diligent Prosecution Bar
              The district court undertook a “two-part inquiry” to
        determine whether South River’s case was barred by the diligent
        prosecution bar:
              First, a court must determine whether a prosecution
              by the state (or the EPA Administrator) to enforce the
              same “standard, order, or limitation” was pending on
              the date that the citizens’ suit commenced. Second,
              if the answer to the previous question is affirmative,
              a court must also determine whether the prior
              pending action was being “diligently prosecuted” by
              the state [or EPA] at the time that the citizens’ suit
              was filed.
        See, e.g., Ohio Valley Env’t Coal., Inc. v. Maple Coal Co., 808 F.
        Supp. 2d 868, 883 (S.D. W. Va. 2011). In answering those
        questions, the district court determined that the consent decree
        already addressed the “standard, order, or limitation” that South
        River sought to enforce with its citizen suit and that the
        prosecution of the consent decree was diligent enough to bar South
        River’s citizen suit. We have not adopted this two-part framework
        before, but because the test stems directly from the statutory
        language and proves helpful in breaking the question into its
        component parts, we follow suit.
               We address the first step of the analysis (i.e., whether there
        is prosecution by the government to enforce the CWA) by noting
        that South River has not argued that the EPA and GDNR are not
        prosecuting. Rather, South River has focused on step two by
        arguing that the existing consent decree does not constitute
        “diligent prosecution” because the decree’s requirements are too
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        20-13651                    Opinion of the Court                                23

        relaxed to qualify as “diligent.” Accordingly, we do not belabor the
        point—we think it clear that the EPA and GDNR have been
        prosecuting the consent decree to enforce the CWA.17
              We now move to step two and consider whether the
        government’s prosecution has been “diligent” enough.
               We begin step two by answering a threshold question that
        affects the rest of our analysis: What level of deference, if any,
        should we apply in determining whether the government’s
        prosecution has been diligent? South River argues that the level of
        deference the district court applied—a “heavy presumption of
        diligence”—is contrary to the plain meaning of § 1365(b)(1)(B).
        DeKalb County, however, argues that a “heavy presumption of
        diligence” is appropriate because of the “intended role of the State

        17 Step one also considers whether the government’s prosecution addresses the

        same standard or limitation that the citizen suit seeks to remedy. Ohio Valley,
        808 F. Supp. 2d at 883 (“First, a court must determine whether a prosecution
        by the state (or the EPA Administrator) to enforce the same ‘standard, order,
        or limitation’ was pending on the date that the citizens’ suit commenced.”
        (emphasis added)). We agree with the district court that the issues South River
        raises in its instant suit overlap completely with the issues covered by the
        consent decree. That is, South River alleges that DeKalb County is violating
        the CWA by continuing to spill sewage at unacceptable rates—which is exactly
        what the consent decree seeks to remedy: “The express purpose [of the
        consent decree] is for [DeKalb County] to use its best efforts . . . to achieve the
        goals of: (1) full compliance with the CWA . . . and (2) the elimination of all
        [sanitary sewer overflows].” To the extent that South River argues the
        consent decree has been insufficient and that the EPA and GDNR have fallen
        short, we consider that argument under step two (whether prosecution has
        been “diligent”).
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        24                         Opinion of the Court                        20-13651

        as the primary enforcer of the [CWA]” and “the fact that courts are
        not in the business of designing, constructing or maintaining
        sewage treatment systems.”
               The district court, agreeing with DeKalb County, applied a
        “heavy presumption of diligence” to find that the government was
        “diligently prosecuting” the civil action, such that South River’s
        action was barred by § 1365(b)(1)(B). The district court’s “heavy
        presumption of diligence” standard originated in a 1986 district
        court case from Connecticut involving § 1365, which held that
        “[t]he court must presume the diligence of the state’s prosecution
        of a defendant absent persuasive evidence that the state has
        engaged in a pattern of conduct in its prosecution of the defendant
        that could be considered dilatory, collusive or otherwise in bad
        faith.” Conn. Fund for Env’t v. Cont. Plating Co., 631 F. Supp.
        1291, 1293 (D. Conn. 1986). 18
               The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth
        Circuits all grant varying degrees of deference, ranging from a low
        of “some deference” to a high of “presumed” diligence. See
        Cebollero-Bertran, 4 F.4th at 74 (“The CWA’s diligent prosecution
        bar emphasizes the primacy of government agencies in enforcing

        18 The district court’s decision does not explain the origin of this presumption,
        but later courts have attempted to piece together its underpinnings. See, e.g.,
        Friends I, 382 F.3d at 760 (“We surmise that this presumption is due not only
        to the intended role of the State as the primary enforcer of the [CWA], but
        also to the fact that courts are not in the business of designing, constructing or
        maintaining sewage treatment systems.” (internal citation omitted)).
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        20-13651                Opinion of the Court                         25

        clean water standards. . . . We grant considerable, although not
        unlimited, deference to the agency’s plan of attack.” (quotation and
        internal citation omitted)); Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v.
        Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 1991) (directing the
        district court to grant “some deference to the judgment of the state
        authorities”); Grp. Against Smog, 810 F.3d at 130 (“We note that
        the government’s prosecution is entitled to great deference.”);
        Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cnty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cnty., Md., 523
        F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008) (“A CWA enforcement prosecution
        will ordinarily be considered diligent if the judicial action is capable
        of requiring compliance with the Act and is in good faith calculated
        to do so, and as the Association acknowledges in its opening brief,
        diligence is presumed.” (quotations omitted)); Friends I, 382 F.3d
        at 760 (“We recognize that diligence on the part of the State is
        presumed.”); Karr v. Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007)
        (“In sum, our evaluation of the EPA’s diligence is quite deferential.
        Citizen-plaintiffs must meet a high standard to demonstrate that it
        has failed to prosecute a violation diligently.”). We agree with our
        sister circuits that some level of deference is appropriate, but our
        conclusion is rooted primarily in the Supreme Court’s observations
        about the role of citizen suits.
                In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
        Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987), the Supreme Court
        instructed that citizen suits are meant to “supplement rather
        than . . . supplant governmental action.”         In other words,
        “[p]ermitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the [CWA]
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                 20-13651

        could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for the citizen
        suit.” Id. Accordingly, permitting citizen suits and federal courts
        to second-guess the enforcement decisions of the EPA and state
        environmental agencies would be improper. See id. Digging in
        further, the Supreme Court has explained how citizen suits could
        undermine ongoing executive enforcement actions:
               Suppose . . . that the Administrator agreed not to
               assess or otherwise seek civil penalties on the
               condition that the violator take some extreme
               corrective action, such as to install particularly
               effective but expensive machinery, that it otherwise
               would not be obliged to take. If citizens could file
               suit, months or years later, in order to seek the civil
               penalties that the Administrator chose to forgo, then
               the Administrator’s discretion to enforce the [CWA]
               in the public interest would be curtailed considerably.
               The same might be said of the discretion of state
               enforcement        authorities.           Respondents’
               interpretation of the scope of the citizen suit would
               change the nature of the citizens’ role from interstitial
               to potentially intrusive. We cannot agree that
               Congress intended such a result.
        Id. at 60–61.
               Stated differently, “when the EPA chooses to enforce the
        CWA through a consent decree, failure to defer to its judgment
        [could] undermine agency strategy.” Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197. For
        this reason, “[i]t would be unreasonable and inappropriate to find
        failure to diligently prosecute simply because [the defendant]
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        20-13651                 Opinion of the Court                            27

        prevailed in some fashion or because a compromise was reached.”
        Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 380 (8th Cir.
        1994). In sum, because we must follow the Supreme Court’s
        instruction as to citizen suits and we agree with our sister circuits’
        well-reasoned decisions, we analyze “diligence” with at least some
        deference to the judgments of the EPA and GDNR.19
                With the deference question answered to the extent
        necessary, we now determine diligence in this case. As a starting
        point, we note that the diligent prosecution bar “does not require
        government prosecution to be far-reaching or zealous; ”rather, “[i]t
        requires only diligence.” Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197. Accordingly, in
        examining diligence, we look to see “whether [the consent decree]
        is capable of requiring compliance with [the CWA]” and “is in good
        faith calculated to do so.” Friends I, 382 F.3d at 760. And, critically,
        diligence is in no way tied to whether the government could have
        been more aggressive in its negotiations with the polluter. See
        Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 523 F.3d at 459 (“[A] citizen-plaintiff cannot
        overcome the presumption of diligence merely by showing that
        the agency’s prosecution strategy is less aggressive than he would
        like or that it did not produce a completely satisfactory result.”).
               We turn first to the consent decree itself because the terms
        of the decree are the building blocks of our analysis. The consent
        decree’s express goal is for DeKalb County to achieve “full
        compliance with the CWA” and eliminate all its sanitary sewer

        19 Because  we hold, infra, that the EPA and GDNR are diligently prosecuting
        a civil action to require compliance even with the lowest level of deference
        recognized by our sister circuits—“some deference”—we need not decide
        exactly what level of deference is required under the statute.
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        28                     Opinion of the Court               20-13651

        overflows. The provisions of the consent decree—from the
        penalties imposed on DeKalb County to the requirements that it
        implement various programs to stop future overflows and
        rehabilitate affected areas—support those goals. Indeed, the
        district court only approved the consent decree because it was
        capable of remedying DeKalb County’s CWA violations: “The
        Consent Decree addresses and substantially resolves violations of
        the CWA . . . by [DeKalb County] and is calculated to bring
        [DeKalb County’s] sewer infrastructure into compliance with the
        CWA.”
               The consent decree’s goals alone are not enough, however,
        and we must also examine whether the EPA and GDNR have been
        diligent in overseeing the consent decree and requiring DeKalb
        County to live up to its end of the bargain. Ohio Valley, 808 F.
        Supp. 2d at 883 (“Second, [at step two,] a court must also determine
        whether the prior pending action was being ‘diligently prosecuted’
        by the state at the time that the citizens’ suit was filed.”). We
        conclude that the EPA and GDNR have done more than enough
        to meet the diligence threshold.
               First, we conclude that the EPA and GDNR have been
        diligent as evidenced by their continued penalization—according
        to the terms of the consent decree—of DeKalb County for
        noncompliance. See Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 523 F.3d at 461
        (considering the fact that a consent decree imposed “a daily fine”
        for the county’s failure to comply with certain requirements as part
        of its conclusion that there was diligent prosecution). When it
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        20-13651                  Opinion of the Court                            29

        initially entered into the consent decree, DeKalb County had to pay
        a large civil penalty to the EPA and GDNR.20 More important to
        showing the government’s continued diligence, however, is the
        fact that each year, from 2012 to 2018, the EPA and GDNR have
        assessed penalties totaling nearly one million dollars against
        DeKalb County for its reported spills. 21 The EPA and GDNR have
        been diligent in monitoring DeKalb County’s progress and
        assessing sizeable fines to compel DeKalb County to comply with
        the consent decree.
               South River disputes that the consent decree’s penalty
        mechanism shows diligence because there is an economic
        incentive for DeKalb County to avoid remedying its CWA
        violations. That is, South River contends that it is cheaper for
        DeKalb County to merely pay the fines than invest in sound
        infrastructure. This argument is exactly the type of argument
        foreclosed by § 1365(b)(1)(B) because it second-guesses the
        compromise negotiated by the EPA and GDNR. See Ark. Wildlife,
        29 F.3d at 380 (“It would be unreasonable and inappropriate to find
        failure to diligently prosecute simply because . . . a compromise

        20In addition to its upfront penalty payment, the consent decree required
        other large-scale expenditures from DeKalb County including at least $600,000
        on a supplemental environmental project.
        21 Further, the modifications to the consent decree also include that
        “EPA/[GDNR] have determined that it is appropriate to assess, and [DeKalb
        County] agrees to pay, an additional civil penalty which addresses [DeKalb
        County’s] failure to implement the Consent Decree obligations in accordance
        with the original Consent Decree and the Spills from its WCTS through 2019.”
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        30                        Opinion of the Court                    20-13651

        was reached.”). Here, for example, the EPA chose to grant lower
        penalties in exchange for increased reporting requirements and
        other concessions from DeKalb County, and a citizen suit would
        interfere with that decision. See Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 523 F.3d at
        461 (“As we have noted, [concessions or exchanges for other
        obligations are] precisely the type of discretionary matter to which
        we should defer.”). Finally, as we emphasized previously,
        “[s]ection 1365(b)(1)(B) does not require government prosecution
        to be far-reaching or zealous,” but rather “requires only diligence.”
        Karr, 475 F.3d at 1197 (emphasis added). Whether South River
        agrees with the amount of the annual fines levied against DeKalb
        County is inconsequential because it is clear that the EPA and
        GDNR have been diligent in monitoring DeKalb County and
        imposing penalties for its noncompliance.
               Second, we draw on the consent decree’s terms that provide
        for the court to retain jurisdiction 22 and spell out the proper dispute
        resolution framework because we have seen the EPA and GDNR
        use these terms to diligently modify the consent decree. See Grp.
        Against Smog, 810 F.3d at 129–30 (finding diligent prosecution
        when a consent decree contained similar provisions—including a
        continuing jurisdiction provision and a provision allowing the

        22 Specifically, the consent decree provides that: “The Court shall retain
        jurisdiction over this case until termination of this Consent Decree, for the
        purpose of resolving disputes arising under this Consent Decree or entering
        orders modifying this Consent Decree, pursuant to Sections XII and XIX, or
        effectuating or enforcing compliance with the terms of this Consent Decree.”
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        20-13651                  Opinion of the Court                             31

        government to “seek court intervention in the event of continuing
        violations”—because the “principal enforcement mechanism[s]”
        were in place so that a citizen suit would have been improperly
        duplicitous). While South River argues that the modifications to
        the consent decree—specifically the modifications to the hydraulic
        modelling requirements—show a lack of diligence, we reach the
        opposite conclusion.23 See Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 523 F.3d at 461
        (“As we have noted, [concessions or exchanges for other
        obligations are] precisely the type of discretionary matter to which
        we should defer.”). By engaging with DeKalb County throughout
        its pursuit of a better hydraulic model,24 the EPA and GDNR made

        23Similarly, further evidence of diligent prosecution arose in 2020, when the
        United States and Georgia filed a motion to reopen the case. The government
        did so to “apprise the Court of significant developments in this case, in
        anticipation of possible actions consistent with the Court’s retained
        jurisdiction . . . of the Consent Decree.” The parties agreed to modify the
        consent decree to increase the number of projects required of DeKalb County
        and the amount of penalties owed. Under the modification, DeKalb County
        must pay an “additional civil penalty” for failure to comply with the original
        consent decree schedule, complete 103 additional priority work projects, and
        implement a new program to ensure the wastewater system has adequate
        capacity to manage wastewater flows. These increased penalties and remedial
        programs show an ongoing and diligent effort by the EPA and GDNR to
        prosecute DeKalb County for its violations of the CWA.
        24 Relatedly, South River also argues that the EPA and GDNR are not
        diligently prosecuting because they have allowed modifications to the
        hydraulic model required under the consent decree so as to “delay [the
        modeling process] by a still unknown number of years.” Even if we were to
        assume that South River’s argument does not suffer from the same problem
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        32                        Opinion of the Court                     20-13651

        certain tradeoffs that it felt were best in order to speed up the repair
        process. To the extent that modelling accuracy was a casualty in
        the negotiations (as South River argues), we are unable to conclude
        that implementing a less accurate system more quickly, on the one
        hand, is better than implementing a more accurate system that
        would take longer to implement, on the other. And, in any event,
        such a technically-dense determination is far outside our bailiwick
        as federal judges.
              Third, and critically because the burden is on South River to
        overcome the deference we afford to the government in this
        context, we find the rest of South River’s arguments unpersuasive.
        We address them in turn.
              According to South River, the consent decree does not
        require “compliance” with DeKalb County’s NPDES permits or
        the CWA because the consent decree imposes no timeline or
        deadline requiring DeKalb County to stop the spills or repair the
        sewer system in non-priority areas. 25 But there is no such

        as its other arguments (i.e., the EPA and GDNR have discretion—especially
        given the technical complexity in this context), this consideration would not
        weigh heavily enough in South River’s favor to overcome the combination of
        (a) the deference afforded to the government and (b) the numerous examples
        of the government’s diligence that we have already considered.
        25 The parties agree that non-priority areas encompass most of DeKalb
        County’s sewer lines and are subject to a rehabilitation program that does not
        have a specific deadline or timeline for completion, unlike the priority areas
        that had an initial deadline of eight and one-half years. The consent decree
        covers the same non-priority areas at issue here.
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        20-13651                  Opinion of the Court                             33

        requirement in statute or case law. A mere lack of a date-certain
        compliance deadline is not dispositive because the consent decree
        contains other ongoing compliance requirements: DeKalb County
        must report all spills quarterly, semi-annually, and annually, and
        pay hefty fines for spills in both priority and non-priority areas. See
        Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 523 F.3d at 461 (determining that the
        “absence of a final compliance deadline” did not indicate a lack of
        diligence in part because the consent decree had other
        requirements such as “immediate compliance with the thermal
        limitation” and “daily fine[s] for its violations”). The ability to
        designate some areas as priority with a deadline and some as non-
        priority 26 without a deadline is the type of discretionary decision
        that deserves deference.
               Finally, South River argues that a consent decree can bar a
        citizen suit only when it “is stringent enough to prevent sewage

        26 South River also points to boilerplate language in paragraph 95 of the
        consent decree as evidence that the EPA did not intend the consent decree to
        require DeKalb County’s compliance in non-priority areas. Paragraph 95
        states, “The United States and the State do not, by their consent to the entry
        of this Consent Decree, warrant or aver in any manner that the County’s
        compliance with any aspect of this Consent Decree will result in compliance
        with provisions of the CWA . . . .” South River’s argument is not persuasive.
        Setting aside the fact that the language is boilerplate language, we cannot
        conclude that paragraph 95 is a better indication of the consent decree’s
        purpose than the language defining the decree’s purpose to be achieving “full
        compliance with the CWA.” At absolute best, the goal provision and
        paragraph 95 offset one another which is not enough to move the needle in
        South River’s favor.
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        34                     Opinion of the Court                 20-13651

        spills and other [CWA] violations.” However, the authority South
        River cites for this rule—Friends II—states something different. In
        Friends II, the Seventh Circuit explained that “a diligent
        prosecution analysis requires more than mere acceptance at face
        value of the potentially self-serving statements of a state agency
        and the violator with whom it settled regarding their intent with
        respect to the effect of the settlement”; instead, courts must
        “engage[] in a substantive analysis of whether the [settlement
        between the state and violator] was capable of requiring
        compliance with the [CWA] and was in good faith calculated to do
        so.” 556 F.3d at 606 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
        Friends II does not state that a consent decree can bar a citizen suit
        only if it prevents all future CWA violations. Rather, it stands for
        the proposition that the consent decree must be capable of
        requiring compliance. The consent decree in the instant case
        satisfies this standard because its express goal is “full compliance
        with the CWA,” its requirements support that goal, and—as
        explained above—it has been diligently prosecuted by the
        government.
                                 III.   Conclusion
               At bottom, South River wants the current consent decree
        discarded in favor of a more muscular alternative. The fact that
        South River disagrees with the prosecution strategy undertaken by
        the EPA and GDNR, however, is not enough to prove that the EPA
        and GDNR have failed to diligently prosecute DeKalb County’s
        CWA violations. To the contrary, the record shows that the EPA
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        20-13651              Opinion of the Court                    35

        and GDNR have been diligent which means that South River’s suit
        is barred under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). Accordingly, we affirm
        the district court’s grant of DeKalb County’s motion to dismiss.
              AFFIRMED.
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        20-13651               Newsom, J., Concurring                          1

        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring:
               I concur in the Court’s judgment and join the majority
        opinion. A brief word about the Clean Water Act’s so-called
        “diligent-prosecution bar”: In relevant part, that provision states
        that “[n]o [citizen-suit] may be commenced . . . if the [EPA]
        Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
        prosecuting a civil . . . action in a court of the United States . . . to
        require compliance with” any of the Act’s requirements. 33 U.S.C.
        § 1365(b)(1)(B). As the majority opinion explains, the sole basis for
        South River’s contention that § 1365(b)(1)(B)’s bar doesn’t apply
        here is that the government’s conduct of its civil-enforcement
        action hasn’t been “diligent.” South River hasn’t argued that, at
        the time it filed its citizen suit, the government was not, in the
        statute’s terms, “prosecuting a civil . . . action in a court of the
        United States” at all.
                Speaking only for myself, I’ll just say that if South River had
        made that argument, I think it’d be a close question, at least as a
        matter of statutory interpretation. Section 1365(b)(1)(B) is framed
        in the present tense: “is diligently prosecuting.” At the time South
        River filed its citizen suit in September 2019, the government’s
        civil-enforcement action had already gone to judgment, a consent
        decree had been entered, and the “[c]ivil [c]ase [had been]
        terminated.” Doc. 39, United States v. DeKalb County, No. 1:10-
        CV-4039. The threshold § 1365(b)(1)(B) question would then turn
        on whether the government’s ongoing enforcement of its consent
        decree constituted present “prosecuti[on]” or whether, instead,
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        2                    Newsom, J., Concurring               20-13651

        prosecution and enforcement are different things—i.e., whether,
        perhaps, one prosecutes a case in order to obtain a judgment and
        then, having gotten it, proceeds to enforce it. I can see reasonable
        arguments going both ways.
               In any event, it’s neither here nor there because South River
        hasn’t made the “is . . . prosecuting” argument, but rather has
        focused solely on whether the government’s prosecution has been
        “diligent.” The Court correctly concludes that it has been.