Court Opinion

ID: 9717680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:08:39.223767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.695724
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, specially concurring: Although I agree that the result reached in this case is correct, I disagree with much of the reasoning stated in the majority opinion, and for that reason, I specially concur. Application of the no-fault dissolution-of-marriage statute in this case violates no principles of either the Illinois or United States constitutions. There is no retroactive legislation involved here. All the court is doing is applying the law which is applicable at the time the case is decided. When the law is changed, either during trial or during appeal, each court which decides a case must apply the law in effect at the time its decision is rendered (United States v. Schooner Peggy (1801), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)103, 110, 2 L. Ed. 49, 51) unless so doing interferes with a vested right (Hogan v. Bleeker (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 181, 187; People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer (1939), 371 Ill. 367) or violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers by interfering with the final decision of a reviewing court of this State (In re Marriage of Cohn (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 190, 204). In this case, Mr. Semmler filed his petition for no-fault dissolution of marriage on July 2, 1984, one day after the no-fault provision became effective. There is no question that the new statute applies. Inclusion in the required statutory two-year separation period of time before July 1, 1984, is not retroactive. The statute does not reach backward in time and declare that decrees of dissolution entered before July 1, 1984, can be allowed on grounds contained in the new statute. It simply states that as of July 1, 1984, in the case of a contested dissolution, parties who have been separated for two years are eligible for no-fault dissolution. This court has previously upheld similar provisions involving antecedent time periods. In In re Marriage of Logston (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 266, 284, the court held that a statutory provision governing the collection of maintenance arrearages was to be applied to arrearages that accumulated before the effective date of the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 706.1). In In re Support of Matt (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 330, 335, the court relied on Logston to hold similarly that the identical provision of the Non-Support of Spouse and Children Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, pars. 1107.1(A)(1)(a), (A)(2)) also applied to arrearages which accumulated before the effective date of that act. The situation in this case is analogous. Separation periods which occurred before July 1, 1984, are to be considered in calculating eligibility for no-fault dissolution of marriage. In this case, the legislation at issue does not deprive anyone of any vested rights and does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers by interfering with any prior decision of a reviewing court. Mrs. Semmler’s claim that our reversal of the circuit court’s judgment deprives her of a vested right is in error. There is no common law right to dissolution of marriage; dissolution is entirely a statutory creation. (Strukoff v. Strukoff (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 53, 60.) What the legislature creates, the legislature can amend or even withdraw, as long as so doing does not interfere with a vested right. No individual has a vested right to the continuation of any existing statutory scheme. Cf Schlenz v. Castle (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 196, 208 (a taxpayer has no vested right in the continued existence of a taxing statute). For these reasons, I concur in the reversal of the circuit court judgment and the remand in this case.