Court Opinion

ID: 9404528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 13:00:41.734815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.058477
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11560    Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 06/23/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11560
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        AUBRINA BOWENS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        ESCAMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
        JOHN KNOTT,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00532-CG-B
USCA11 Case: 22-11560      Document: 26-1         Date Filed: 06/23/2023   Page: 2 of 11

        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11560

                             ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Plaintiﬀ Aubrina Bowens appeals the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment in favor of Plaintiﬀ’s former employer, the Es-
        cambia County Board of Education (“the Board”), and the Board’s
        Superintendent, John Knott (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiﬀ
        asserts against Defendants claims for race discrimination and retal-
        iation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
        2000e (“Title VII”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. No reversible error has
        been shown; we aﬃrm.
                                             I.
               Plaintiﬀ (a black female) was hired by the Board in August
        2016 as a non-tenured, probationary teacher. At that time, the Es-
        cambia County school system included three Alternative Programs
        for teaching students outside of the regular school setting: (1) the
        COMPASS program, designed for adjudicated students or students
        with mental health issues that prevented them from thriving in a
        regular classroom; (2) the STAR program, a pilot program for drop-
        out-prevention; and (3) the Alternative School, a school site where
        students with disciplinary issues were assigned temporarily in lieu
        of expulsion or suspension. When Plaintiﬀ was hired, the
        COMPASS and STAR programs were housed at the Escambia
        County High School and the Alternative School was housed in its
USCA11 Case: 22-11560      Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 06/23/2023      Page: 3 of 11

        22-11560               Opinion of the Court                          3

        own building. Plaintiﬀ was assigned to teach English Language
        Arts at the Alternative School.
               At the end of the 2017-18 school year, the Board -- upon
        Knott’s recommendation -- decided not to renew the contracts for
        the non-tenured teachers then-assigned to the three Alternative
        Programs. The non-renewed teachers included Plaintiﬀ, Ashley
        Knowles (a white female), Farrah McGill (a white female), and Ter-
        rence Hall (a black male). The Board also removed the remaining
        two tenured teachers from their assignment with the Alternative
        Programs: Yolanda Walters was reassigned to a teaching position
        at the high school and Kellie Steele (a white female) resigned her
        employment with the school system.
               For the 2018-19 school year, the Board combined and re-
        structured the three Alternative Programs, including moving the
        location of all programs to the building that had previously housed
        the Alternative School. The Board posted the open teaching posi-
        tions for the restructured programs. Plaintiﬀ knew about the job
        postings; she did not apply for any of the available positions.
        Knowles was rehired to teach English Language Arts.
               Plaintiﬀ later ﬁled this civil action. Plaintiﬀ alleged that the
        Board’s non-renewal of her teaching contract was motivated by un-
        lawful race discrimination and retaliation.
               The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
        judgment. The district court determined that Defendants had
        identiﬁed a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the non-re-
        newal of Plaintiﬀ’s contract and determined that Plaintiﬀ had failed
USCA11 Case: 22-11560      Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 06/23/2023     Page: 4 of 11

        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11560

        to show that Defendants’ proﬀered reason was a pretext for race
        discrimination. About Plaintiﬀ’s claim for retaliation, the district
        court concluded that Plaintiﬀ failed to establish a prima facie case
        because she had not shown that she had engaged in statutorily-pro-
        tected activity. The district court also determined that Plaintiﬀ had
        failed to show that Defendants’ legitimate, non-retaliatory reason
        was pretextual.
                                             II.
               We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment. See Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th
        Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence,
        viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents
        no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter
        of law in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 836-37.
               As an initial matter, the district court cited to and applied
        correctly the pertinent summary-judgment standard. Contrary to
        Plaintiﬀ’s assertions, nothing evidences that the district court en-
        gaged improperly in weighing the evidence or in making imper-
        missible credibility determinations.
              A. Race Discrimination
                Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
        on the basis of an employee’s race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
        Both Title VII and section 1981 “have the same requirements of
        proof and use the same analytical framework.” Standard v. A.B.E.L.
        Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Plaintiﬀ bears the
        ultimate burden of proving -- by a preponderance of the evidence
USCA11 Case: 22-11560         Document: 26-1        Date Filed: 06/23/2023   Page: 5 of 11

        22-11560                  Opinion of the Court                         5

        -- that Defendants discriminated unlawfully against her. See Craw-
        ford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 975 (11th Cir. 2008).
               To survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiﬀ as-
        serting a claim for unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII
        “must present suﬃcient facts to permit a jury to rule in her favor.”
        Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019)
        (en banc). A plaintiﬀ may satisfy her burden in three ways: (1) by
        presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent; (2) by satisfy-
        ing the McDonnell Douglas 1 burden-shifting framework; and (3) by
        presenting “a ‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that
        warrants an inference of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 1220,
        n.6.; see Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.
        2011) (addressing the “convincing mosaic” standard).
                Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiﬀ must
        ﬁrst establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates a
        presumption of unlawful discrimination against the employee. See
        Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220, 1222. The employer may then rebut that
        presumption by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
        for the adverse employment acts. Id. at 1221. The burden then
        shifts to the employee to produce evidence suﬃcient to create a
        genuine issue of material fact that the employer’s articulated rea-
        sons are a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
               Here, the district court concluded that Plaintiﬀ established a
        prima facie case of race discrimination. An employee establishes a

        1 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
USCA11 Case: 22-11560          Document: 26-1          Date Filed: 06/23/2023          Page: 6 of 11

        6                           Opinion of the Court                        22-11560

        prima facie case of discrimination by showing four elements: “(1)
        that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was subjected to
        an adverse employment action, (3) that she was qualiﬁed to per-
        form the job in question;” and (4) that she was treated less favora-
        bly by her employer than “similarly situated” employees outside
        the protected class or was replaced by someone outside her pro-
        tected class. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220-21; Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ.,
        381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004) (listing the prima facie elements
        for discriminatory discharge). That Plaintiﬀ satisﬁed the ﬁrst three
        elements is undisputed. About the fourth element, the district
        court determined that the evidence -- viewed in Plaintiﬀ’s favor --
        showed that Plaintiﬀ had been replaced by a person (Knowles) out-
        side Plaintiﬀ’s protected class. 2
               The burden then shifted to Defendants to articulate a legiti-
        mate, nondiscriminatory reason for deciding not to renew Plain-
        tiﬀ’s contract. Defendants contended that, beginning in March
        2018, they developed concerns about whether suﬃcient funding
        would be available to continue the Alternative Programs for the
        2018-19 school year. In the light of this uncertainty, Defendants

        2 The district court determined, however, that Plaintiff was unable to estab-
        lish a prima facie case on grounds that she was treated less favorably than was
        a similarly-situated person outside her protected class. Plaintiff raised no chal-
        lenge to this determination in her initial appellate brief. To the extent Plaintiff
        seeks to raise this argument for the first time in her reply brief, that argument
        is not properly before us. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,
        683 (11th Cir. 2014) (declining to address an argument raised for the first time
        in a reply brief).
USCA11 Case: 22-11560      Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 06/23/2023     Page: 7 of 11

        22-11560               Opinion of the Court                        7

        decided (1) not to renew the contracts for any non-tenured teacher
        assigned to the three Alternative Programs, and (2) to consolidate
        and restructure the Alternative Programs as a cost-saving measure.
                Once Defendants identiﬁed a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
        reason for the employment decision, the burden shifted back to
        Plaintiﬀ to demonstrate “that the reasons given by the employer
        were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.”
        See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
        banc). When -- as in this case -- the employer’s “proﬀered reason is
        one that might motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must
        meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot
        succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” See
        id. at 1030. To satisfy her burden of showing pretext, the employee
        must demonstrate “‘weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
        incoherencies, or contradictions’ in the employer’s rationale.” See
        Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1055-56 (11th Cir. 2012). Plaintiﬀ has
        failed to do so.
               Plaintiﬀ contends that Defendants’ proﬀered reason is con-
        tradicted by evidence that the State Department of Education
        made a verbal commitment to provide three years of state funding.
        The record demonstrates, however, that the State’s verbal commit-
        ment applied only to funding the STAR program: not all programs.
              Undisputed evidence demonstrates that -- when Defendants
        made the complained-of employment decision (non-renewal) in
        May 2018 -- Defendants had no guaranteed source of funding to
        continue operating all three Alternative Programs the following
USCA11 Case: 22-11560      Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 06/23/2023      Page: 8 of 11

        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11560

        school year. Defendants presented evidence that the mental
        healthcare provider that had partnered with the Board in running
        the COMPASS program in the past had expressed doubt about its
        continued involvement for the 2018-19 school year. Absent that re-
        lationship, the Board would have been unable to secure funding for
        the COMPASS program. Meanwhile, the Alternative School was
        funded largely by local (not state) funds in amounts that varied
        from year to year.
               As purported evidence of pretext, Plaintiﬀ also points to a
        statement made by Amy Cabaniss (an administrator who oversaw
        the Alternative Programs) that Cabaniss was unaware that the Al-
        ternative School had been in danger of closing. This statement --
        limited to the Alternative School site -- is not inconsistent with evi-
        dence showing that Defendants (1) were concerned about the over-
        all funding available to operate all three Alternative Programs for
        the 2018-19 school year and (2) believed it was necessary not to re-
        new the contracts for existing non-tenured teachers and to restruc-
        ture the programs.
               On this record, Plaintiﬀ’s evidence failed to show that De-
        fendants’ proﬀered reason was so implausible, inconsistent, or in-
        coherent that a reasonable factﬁnder could infer that the reason
        was not the true reason and was, instead, a pretext for unlawful
        discrimination.
              We also reject Plaintiﬀ’s contention that she demonstrated
        unlawful race discrimination under a “convincing mosaic” theory.
        “A ‘convincing mosaic’ may be shown by evidence that
USCA11 Case: 22-11560       Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 06/23/2023      Page: 9 of 11

        22-11560                Opinion of the Court                         9

        demonstrates, among other things, (1) ‘suspicious timing, ambigu-
        ous statements . . ., and other bits and pieces from which an infer-
        ence of discriminatory intent might be drawn,’ (2) systematically
        better treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the
        employer’s justiﬁcation is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City,
        934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019). In this case, Plaintiﬀ has failed
        to produce evidence suﬃcient to demonstrate that Defendants’
        stated reason for not renewing Plaintiﬀ’s contract was pretextual:
        she cannot satisfy her burden of showing unlawful discrimination
        under a “convincing mosaic” theory.
               B. Retaliation
                Apart from prohibited discrimination, employers are also
        barred from retaliating against an employee because of the em-
        ployee’s opposition to an employment practice made unlawful un-
        der Title VII or section 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Chapter 7
        Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2012). We
        apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to retalia-
        tion claims based on circumstantial evidence. See Brown v. Ala. Dep’t
        of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010).
                To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII
        or section 1981, a plaintiﬀ must show that she engaged in statuto-
        rily protected activity and that she suﬀered a materially adverse em-
        ployment act that was causally related to the protected activity.
        Chapter 7 Tr., 683 F.3d at 1258.
               The district court committed no error in concluding that
        Plaintiﬀ engaged in no statutorily-protected activity. The record
USCA11 Case: 22-11560      Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 06/23/2023     Page: 10 of 11

        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11560

        shows that Plaintiﬀ, before her contract was not renewed, had
        voiced complaints about the timing of her pay increase upon earn-
        ing her master’s degree and complaints about her assigned duties
        compared with the job duties assigned to Steele. None of Plaintiﬀ’s
        written complaints mentioned race or racial discrimination. And
        nothing evidences that Plaintiﬀ’s written or verbal complaints oth-
        erwise indicated Plaintiﬀ was contending that she was being treated
        diﬀerently because of her race. Absent any allegation about dis-
        crimination based on a protected ground, Plaintiﬀ’s grievances al-
        leging unfair treatment were not statutorily-protected conduct. See
        Coutu v. Martin Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir.
        1995) (“Unfair treatment, absent discrimination based on race, sex,
        or national origin, is not an unlawful employment practice under
        Title VII.” (emphasis in original)).
                Plaintiﬀ also says she engaged in protected conduct when
        she complained that her son (a student in the Escambia County
        school system) had been the target of racial discrimination. Plain-
        tiﬀ’s complaints about her son, however, were not made in opposi-
        tion to an employment practice made unlawful under Title VII or to
        discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts in vio-
        lation of section 1981. Cf. Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold
        Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that “not every act
        by an employee in opposition to racial discrimination is protected”
        and that “[t]he opposition must be directed at an unlawful employ-
        ment practice of an employer”).
USCA11 Case: 22-11560     Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 06/23/2023     Page: 11 of 11

        22-11560               Opinion of the Court                        11

                Even if Plaintiﬀ could make out a prima facie case of retalia-
        tion (which she has not), Defendants have oﬀered a legitimate, non-
        retaliatory reason for not renewing Plaintiﬀ’s contract: uncertainty
        about funding. As we have already discussed, Plaintiﬀ has failed to
        present ample evidence that Defendants’ stated reason was pre-
        textual.
              AFFIRMED.