Court Opinion

ID: 9590809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:58:33.263872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:44.957348
License: Public Domain

FABE, Justice,
with whom BRYNER, Justice joins, dissenting.
I. INTRODUCTION
I disagree with the court’s conclusion that Paul Morino alleged facts sufficient to require a modification hearing. Our decision in Gaston v. Gaston1 clearly suggests that a minor visitation change of one day per week, in place for ten months, is not a substantial change of circumstances that would entitle a movant to a hearing. Additionally, the court’s ruling runs contrary to the goals of Alaska’s family law by discouraging parties from amicably resolving disputes through experimentation with informal visitation agreements. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Morino Did Not Allege a Substantial Change of Circumstances Sufficient to Justify a Modification Hearing.
As the court points out, we should affirm the denial of a visitation modification hearing when “the facts alleged, even if proved, cannot warrant modification ... or ... are so general or conclusory ... as to create no genuine issue of material fact.”2 The court also acknowledges that a movant, in order to be entitled to such a hearing, must allege both a change in circumstances and that the change affects the best interests of the child.3 Although I agree with this two-pronged test for entitlement to a hearing, I disagree with the court’s ultimate conclusion that Morino demonstrated a substantial change of circumstances.
The change in circumstances that Morino alleges here is the experimental visitation arrangement itself.4 In holding that such an *431arrangement does constitute a substantial change of circumstances, the court reasons that, “at some point, informal or de facto modifications ... should be formalized.”5 But the court does not define this threshold, except to say that “experimental changes lasting only a few months should not qualify as a change in circumstances,” whereas changes of a “lengthy duration, especially when they are such as to change child support payments when given de jure status, should qualify.”6 By using such language, the court implies that changes lasting for more than “a few months” should automatically be considered of sufficient duration to trigger a modification hearing. Such a standard would be undesirable for several reasons.
First, such a rule would be inconsistent with our recent opinion in Gaston v. Gaston.7 In that case, the parents signed a custody agreement allowing them to change the arrangement after one year and providing for automatic mediation in case of disagreement.8 Nine months into the agreement, the Gastons adopted an informal modified visitation schedule, much like the one in this case. When the mother wanted to end the arrangement one year later, the father disagreed and sought mediation. We upheld his right to mediation under the original agreement.9
In footnote 4 of Gaston, after describing the policy of Alaska’s family law favoring out-of-court dispute resolution, we suggested that, but for the unique facts of the case, we would not have allowed the moving parent to come back into court:
Alaska’s family law encourages custodial parents to be flexible in experimenting with visitation schedules, and in most cases parents should feel free to end such experiments if they conclude that they are not working.... Our decision in this case that Susan should not be able to revoke her agreement to a change in the visitation schedule without entering mediation is based on the unique language of the custody agreement she and Samuel signed.[10]
This language indicates our recognition that a one-year — and, by implication, a ten-month — de facto change in visitation that is minor in nature would not constitute a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to trigger a modification hearing. Although we did not have occasion in Gaston to reach the change of circumstances issue, the court today offers no reason for sending a conflicting message by setting the threshold duration at “a few months” rather than at least one year.
Second, the court conflates two different legal standards by stating that a material change sufficient to modify child support should also qualify as a substantial change sufficient to modify custody or visitation.11 Whereas determination of a material change under Rule 90.3 calls for a straightforward assessment of changes in the parties’ financial status or support burden, a determination of a substantial change for modifying custody or visitation requires a broader inquiry into social, physical, and emotional aspects of the change and their effect on the children’s welfare. Although these standards may not be in tension in any given case, we should avoid creating a presumption that a significant change in either parent’s financial obligations necessitates revisiting the original visitation or custody order.
More fundamentally, the duration of an informal arrangement should not be the sole, or even the primary, factor in a court’s decision to modify an original court order based on the existence of the arrangement. Of course, certain de facto changes in visitation or custody may be “substantial” and may *432justify modification. But when making such a determination, we should look not only to duration but also to such crucially relevant factors as the magnitude of any effect on the children and the nature and quality of the schedule change. Thus, whereas evidence of a minor experimental adjustment for ten months to a year (such as in this case and Gaston), without additional allegations, would not constitute a substantial change, a more significant shift, such as changing a child’s residence during the school week, may be sufficient even if lasting for a few months, assuming the change was in the child’s best interests.
B. The Court’s Ruling Will Discourage Amicable Out-of-Court Resolution of Visitation and Custody Disputes and Will Punish Parties for Agreeing to Compromise.
By declaring that an informal visitation agreement of any more than a few months may trigger a hearing, the court sends a message to custodial parents that they may be dragged back into court if they choose to compromise.12 In doing so, we risk encouraging unnecessary litigation and discouraging post-divorce cooperation between parents.
In codifying the change in circumstances doctrine, the Alaska legislature found that “it is in the best interests of a child to encourage parents to implement their own child care agreements outside of the court setting.”13 Children have a better chance of emerging intact from divorce if the parents are generous to each other with respect to visitation matters. As one commentator explains:
Research shows that children are the “innocent victims of family breakdown and the more intense the parental conflict following separation, the more likely that the children will be torn apart by a conflict of loyalties over their parents.”[14]
As a result, we should avoid fashioning a rule that would discourage one parent from granting the other additional visitation out of fear that such a change could precipitate a modification hearing.
We also should not encourage unnecessary hearings in cases involving change of visitation or custody. Such hearings force the custodial parent to pay attorney’s fees, call witnesses, and incur the expense of psychologists and other experts. Professor Janet Weinstein notes the counterproductive effect of unnecessary litigation on all parties:
Rather than teaching parents to communicate and collaborate effectively after divorce for the benefit of their children, [the adversarial system] builds higher walls_ Further, the process is disem-powering, as it forces the parties to place their fates in the hands of their attorneys and the court. In the process, the family’s resources are expended and depleted with no beneficial outcome for the child or the parents.[15]
The court’s opinion acknowledges that Alaska’s family law encourages out-of-court compromises and experiments with respect to visitation arrangements.16 Nonetheless, the court argues that children’s best interests are generally served by conforming child support payments to reflect “actual practice.” 17 This observation is undeniably true, but it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the children’s interests are best *433served by formalizing the de facto arrangement. For example, Morino’s child support payments would just as much conform to reality if the court chose to follow the original order, which is exactly what Swayman attempted to do.
While it is important that trial judges give parties an opportunity to be heard before ruling on disputed custody matters when such parties make sufficient factual allegations,18 this is not such a case. We also must be aware that, while allowing the adversarial process to continue unnecessarily after the court issues a custody order may be cathartic for the parents, it only hurts the child.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Morino failed to allege a substantial change of circumstances, the superior court was correct in denying a modification hearing. The majority’s approach, which considers any de facto agreements of more than “a few months” to constitute a substantial change of circumstances, places undue emphasis on the duration of the arrangement and is in tension with our analysis in Gaston. Moreover, the court’s ruling will discourage parents from being generous with each other in custody matters and, to that extent, runs counter to the goals of Alaska’s family law and the needs of Alaska’s children of divorce. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. 954 P.2d 572 (Alaska 1998).

. Op. at 428 (quoting C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375, 378 (Alaska 1998)).

. Op. at 429 n. 3. The court’s recognition of the "best interests of the child” requirement is not entirely consistent with its earlier statement that "[a] movant who demonstrates a change in circumstances is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the modified visitation would be in the child’s best interests." Op. at 428 (citing A.H. v. W.P., 896 P.2d 240, 244 (Alaska 1995)). Our prior cases confirm that the determination of whether a change is "substantial” necessarily involves an inquiry into whether and how the change affects the best interests of the children. As we wrote in C.R.B. v. C.C.:
When a parent moves to modify custody, the court must "consider" the motion, but need not hold a hearing if it is plain that the facts alleged in the moving papers, even if established, would not warrant a change. The moving parent must show changes that affect the child's welfare, reflect more than a mere passage of time, and overcome our deep reluctance to shuttle children back and forth between parents.
959 P.2d at 381 (emphases added) (citations omitted).

.Morino argued in his motion for hearing that: The "change of circumstances” that has arisen here is the parties’ de facto adoption of a *431visitation schedule in September 1996 under which Paul has the children overnight at least three days each week. Such a move by the parties is certainly a significant change of circumstances.

. Op. at 429.

. Op. at 429.

. 954 P.2d 572 (Alaska 1998).

. See 954 P.2d at 572.

. See id. at 575.

. Id. at 574 n. 4 (emphases added).

. See Op. at 429 ("[C]hanges of a lengthy duration, especially when they are such as to change child support payments when given de jure status, should qualify [as substantial].”) (emphasis added).

. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Jacobs, 102 Ohio App.3d 568, 657 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ohio App.1995) (reversing referee’s decision to modify visitation, preferring "to encourage the amicable resolution of parental disputes in visitation matters rather than penalize those who have made efforts to compromise").

. Ch. 88, § 1(b) SLA 1982. See also Garbling v. Garding, 767 P.2d 183, 185 (Alaska 1989).

14. Christy L. Hendricks, The Trend Toward Mandatory Mediation in Custody and Visitation Disputes of Minor Children: An Overview, 32 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 491, 495 (1994) (citation omitted).

. Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of the Child and the Adversarial System, 52 U. Miami L.Rev. 79, 133 (1997). See also id. at 124 ("Litigation costs drain resources which could otherwise be used for the children’s needs.”).

. See Op. at 429 (quoting Gaston, 954 P.2d at 574 n. 4).

. Op. at 429.

. See, e.g., Acevedo v. Liberty, 956 P.2d 455, 456-57 (Alaska 1998) (reversing lower court’s denial of modification hearing because movant’s relocation to another city constituted a substantial change of circumstances as a matter of law).