Court Opinion

ID: 9534789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:42:46.280187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:32:35.545800
License: Public Domain

WARREN, P. J.,
specially concurring.
I agree with the majority that the trial court had jurisdiction in this case. However, because I believe that jurisdiction is not proper under ORCP 4D but is proper under ORCP 4L, I cannot join in the majority opinion.
The majority is correct that this action involves an alleged injury to property in Oregon arising out of defendant’s action or omission out of state. It is wrong in concluding that defendant’s Oregon activities constitute “service activities * * * carried on within this state by or on behalf of the defendant[.]” The “service activities” that the majority claims defendant carried on in Oregon are that defendant: (1) sent to Oregon from Florida a letter confirming the transaction; (2) sent to Oregon from Florida a building order and invoice form; and (3) sent to Oregon from Florida a congratulatory letter welcoming plaintiff to its network. All of those “activities” were related to consummation of the contract. I fail to see how merely sending confirming letters or memoranda can constitute the additional requirement of “service activities” sufficient to support jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist.
The majority reaches the correct result, however, because Oregon can lawfully exercise jurisdiction under *90ORCP 4L.1 That rule provides that courts of this state have jurisdiction
“[n]otwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirement of sections B. through K. of this rule, in any action where prosecution of the action against a defendant in this state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.”
When considering whether the courts of this state can exer: cise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant on the basis of a single act, we consider three criteria:
“First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or of causing important consequences in that state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the consequences in the forum state of the defendant’s activities. Finally, the activities of the defendant or the consequences of those activities must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.” State ex rel White Lbr. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or 121, 127, 448 P2d 571 (1968).
Accord: Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US 462,105 S Ct 2174, 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985).
Columbia argues that Island Packet purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in Oregon by entering into a dealership agreement with Columbia. Further, it argues that Island Packet caused important consequences in Oregon by inducing it to send $2,000 from Oregon to Florida.
In Burger King Corp. u. Rudzewicz, supra, the Supreme Court stated:
“Jurisdiction is proper * * * where the contacts proximately *91result from actions by the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State. Thus where the defendant ‘deliberately’ has engaged in significant activities within a State, or has created ‘continuing obligations’ between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there * * *.” 471 US at 475. (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.)
I conclude that the mailing of $2,000 by Columbia to Florida, without more, would not constitute “important consequences” sufficient to meet the requirement. However, agreeing to enter into a dealership relationship, which I infer would include “continuing obligations,” is enough to show that Island Packet purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in Oregon.
Next, the cause of action must arise from consequences in the forum state of the defendant’s activities. This means that “there must be at least one contact with the forum state which is substantively relevant to the cause of actionf.]” State ex rel Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or 296, 302, 657 P2d 207 (1982). Columbia’s action is for breach of a contract to provide a yacht. Island Packet’s alleged breach of that contract caused Columbia to lose profits in Oregon, because Columbia was forced to obtain a yacht for its retail customer from another builder as a substitute for the yacht that it alleges Island Packet had promised to provide. Accordingly, the second requirement is met.
Finally, the consequences of Island Packet’s activities must have a substantial enough connection with Oregon to make jurisdiction in this state reasonable. State ex rel White Lbr. v. Sulmonetti, supra, 252 Or at 127. “[WJhere a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that [the exercise of] jurisdiction [would be] unreasonable.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudezewicz, supra, 471 US at 477. Island Packet has not presented any reason why the exercise of jurisdiction in Oregon would be unreasonable, and I see none.
Accordingly, I concur only in the result reached by the majority.

 I also question the majority’s exclusive reliance on ORCP 4D for jurisdiction. Despite our past reliance on the language of State ex rel Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale, 294 Or 381, 384, 657 P2d 211 (1982), that, “if a case falls within [ORCP 4B through K], there is no need to litigate more involved issues of due process,” e.g., Lenhardt v. Stafford, 101 Or App 400, 403, 790 P2d 557 (1990), a closer reading of Hydraulic Seruocontrols leads me to conclude that that language is dictum. Accordingly, I think that, even if the majority is right that the facts of this case fall within ORCP 4D, we nonetheless must consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction is within the limits of due process. See Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Machinery Co., 913 F2d 758, 760 n 1 (9th Cir 1990). I disagree with the majority’s statement that “[defendant does not make that argument here.” In its brief, defendant argues that jurisdiction is not proper under any of the provisions of ORCP 4 on which plaintiff relies. It then argues that, “[furthermore, any jurisdiction must comport with due process.”