Court Opinion

ID: 9725036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:26:14.353584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:09.286488
License: Public Domain

Opinion
PARAS, J.
These three original proceedings, each seeking a writ of habeas corpus, were consolidated for hearing. Because they present identical issues, we have on our own motion consolidated them for decision. (See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 482, p. 4437.)
*163The question presented is whether a felony sentence must be enhanced because of a prior prison term when the subject crime is committed during the parole period of the prior offense and there is a concurrent reimprisonment for the parole violation. Petitioners, each of whom has had his sentence so enhanced, contend Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (g), as interpreted by the First District, Division Two court in People v. Cole (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 854 [155 Cal.Rptr. 892], bars enhancement because their prior terms were not “completed” when the new sentences and enhancements were imposed.
Penal Code section 667.51 mandates enhancement of a prison term because of prior prison terms. Sentences for specified violent felonies (subd. (c)) are enhanced by three years when the prior term was also for a violent felony and the defendant has been free of prison custody for less than ten years (subd. (a)). Petitioner Jessup had his sentence so enhanced. Other felonies bring about one-year enhancements if five years have not passed since a prior prison term was served. (Subd. (b).) Petitioner Yitela’s sentence was so enhanced for two prior terms and petitioner Moore’s sentence for one.
Subdivision (g) defines a “prior separate prison term” as: “a continuous completed period of prison incarceration imposed for the particular offense alone or in combination with concurrent or consecutive sentences for other crimes, including any reimprisonment on revocation of parole which is not accompanied by a new commitment to prison, and including any reimprisonment after escape from such incarceration.”
The subdivision has been considered in other Court of Appeal opinions. In People v. Cole, supra, the defendant’s prison sentence for assault with a deadly weapon was enhanced because of a prior arson conviction and a later prior conspiracy and pimping conviction. The appellate court ordered the one-year enhancement for the arson conviction stricken on the grounds that defendant was reimprisoned on that conviction after parole revocation, and concurrently sentenced for the conspiracy and pimping offenses. (Id., 94 Cal.App.3d at pp. 865-866.) The court read subdivision (g) to exclude from the enhancement provisions prior prison terms in which parole violation reimprisonment is accompanied by a new prison commitment for another crime.
*164The Cole court’s interpretation of the statute was rejected by the Fourth District, Division Two in People v. Espinoza (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 59 [159 Cal.Rptr. 894] (hg. den. Feb. 7, 1980). The Espinoza court read subdivision (g) as an attempt to prevent imposition of two enhancements when reimprisonment follows a parole violation. Thus one enhancement is proper where the parole violation is also prosecuted as a new offense.
Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, we agree with the Espinoza court as to the meaning of subdivision (g). As noted in Espinoza (99 Cal.App.3d at p. 70), the Cole court may not have been dealing with the question presented in Espinoza and here. In any event, we adopt the Espinoza holding and decline to follow Cole. The construction for which petitioners argue under Cole would result in enhancement for prior terms within the statutory limits only when probation has been successfully completed. This absurd result is contrary to our understanding of the legislative intent. (People v. Espinoza, supra, at pp. 73-74.)
The petitions are denied and the orders to show cause discharged.
Regan, Acting P. J., concurred.

 All statutory references henceforth are to Penal Code section 667.5 unless otherwise indicated.