Court Opinion

ID: 9635675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:59:10.835911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:32.360711
License: Public Domain

RUDMAN, J.,
with whom CALKINS, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 14] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 15] According to Civil Rule 66, contemptuous conduct includes but is not limited to “disorderly conduct, insolent behavior, or a breach of peace, noise or other disturbance or action which actually obstructs or hinders the administration of justice or which diminishes the court’s authority.” M.R. Civ. P. 66(a)(2)(A)®. We have made it clear that a judgment of contempt must be supported by evidence that “the contumacious conduct ‘actually obstructed the administration of justice.’ ” State v. Holland, 1997 ME 42, ¶ 4, 691 A.2d 196, 198 (quoting In re Bernard, 408 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Me.1979)). In the past, we have upheld a summary conviction of contempt “if it can ‘clearly be shown’ that [the] defendant engaged in a wilful and actual obstruction of the administration of *614justice that presented an overriding need for immediate punishment.” Id. (citing State v. Campbell, 497 A.2d 467, 472 (Me.1985)). This logic compels a similar result when we review a conviction of contempt based on an act asserted to have diminished the court’s authority.
[¶ 16] It goes without argument that a judge’s power to summarily punish contemptuous behavior is instrumental in maintaining civility and decorum in a courtroom. This authority, however, carries with it the potential for abuse. The United States Supreme Court has warned that although the summary contempt power is “indispensable” in protecting “the dignity of the court ..., its exercise is a delicate one, and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.” Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925). We have described the summary contempt proceeding as an “anomalous situation [with] the function of judge, jury and prosecutor combined in a single individual.” In re Bernard, 408 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Me.1979). Moreover, we recognized that because of the unique nature of these proceedings, they should be “strictly guarded by the courts.” Id.
[¶ 17] A court’s use of its summary powers is limited to situations which require immediate action to control and maintain the order and dignity of the court. Id. Thus, conduct that warrants the use of this power will often arise unexpectedly and without warning. Upon the exercise of this power, our rules require the court to issue a written order which fully explains the circumstances that necessitate its use. M.R. Civ. P. 66(b)(2). The written order must: “(A) specif[y] the conduct constituting the contempt; (B) certif[y] that the conduct constituting contempt occurred in the presence of the court and was seen or heard by the court; (C) contain[ ] the sanction imposed.” Id.
[¶ 18] The importance of the court’s written order cannot be overstated. The trial transcript may not provide an accurate account of the contemptuous conduct, and may not adequately reflect the atmosphere of the courtroom in the wake of the disturbance. The court, however, is in an excellent position to provide a proper description of the obnoxious behavior which demanded punishment, and the overall effect of that behavior on the proceedings before the court. Furthermore, “[t]he requirement of a specific recital of the conduct that constitutes [summary] contempt avoids compelling the appellate court to infer from a transcript the basis of the contempt.” State v. DeLong, 456 A.2d 877, 882 (Me.1983). We have also stressed that “[b]ecause there are no fact-finding procedures designed to reveal the truth, the findings of the court must be taken as true, undisputed, and complete.”6 Holland, 1997 ME 42, ¶ 5, 691 A.2d 196, 198 (emphasis added). It is for these reasons that the court’s written order constitutes the record we review on appeal. See Alexander v. Sharpe, 245 A.2d 279, 288 (Me.1968) (“[O]nly the filing of the certificate can establish a record of what facts the Justice found to be contemptuous.”); see also DeLong, 456 A.2d at 882 (“[T]he purpose of the rule [requiring a written order from the court] is to provide a basis for appellate review.”).7
*615[¶ 19] Pelletier, the Attorney General, and the Amicus all direct their attention to the requirement that the conduct must obstruct or hinder the administration of justice. Our analysis would be the same were the conduct alleged to have diminished the court’s authority. The question is not whether we conclude that Pelletier’s shirt was vulgar and disrespectful; clearly it was. Nor is the question whether we conclude that such attire has no place in a court of law and potentially could have obstructed or hindered the administration of justice or diminished the court’s authority. Instead, the real issue is whether Pel-letier’s actions actually effected those results. To determine this, we look to the trial court’s order and should not speculate. In the present case, there is nothing in the court’s written order to support a finding that such a disturbance did occur or that the court’s authority was diminished. Had the court noticed any actual disruption in the courtroom resulting from Pelletier’s shirt, or that the court’s authority was diminished, it should have clearly noted it in its written order. Instead, the court simply determined that Pelletier’s conduct “was obviously done with the purpose of disturbing or hindering the court process and showing outward disrespect for the court and was disorderly conduct and insolent in nature.” State v. Pelletier, No. CR-01-737 (Me.Dist.Ct.12, Sko., Apr. 18, 2001) (Clapp, J.). Because the court’s findings failed to describe how Pelletier’s conduct actually caused a disruption in the courtroom or diminished the court’s authority, there is no basis for us to affirm the judgment.
[¶ 20] The purpose of M.R. Civ. P. 66(a) “is to present to a reviewing court a full and clear statement of the facts out of which the contempt arose so that that court may determine whether the action of the committing court was within its jurisdiction and whether its action was just or arbitrary.” Alexander v. Sharpe, 245 A.2d at 288. A conviction of contempt should not rest on presumptions or inferences, nor on facts which did not occur in the presence of the court. State v. Alexander, 257 A.2d 778, 781 (Me.1969). The Court presumes that Pelletier’s purpose “was to taunt, to test, to insult, and to demean the court and its authority.” Ante, ¶ 5 (Court’s opinion). Our prior jurisprudence has specifically and repeatedly stated that it is improper for a reviewing court to engage in presumptions and inferences. The Court suggests that Pelletier’s response to the trial court’s inquiry was “an obviously false response indicating further disrespect.” Ante, ¶ 9 (Court’s opinion). The trial court, however, made no such finding or conclusion. The law simply requires a trial court to explicitly include within its findings of fact the effect which an allegedly contemptuous act has on the court and its proceedings. This requirement is not onerous. See In re Steinberger, 387 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Me.1978) (affirming a summary conviction of contempt when the trial court found that offensive speech and tone of voice “were insulting to the Court and represented a challenge to the integrity of the Court”); State v. Alexander, 257 A.2d at 780 (affirming a summary conviction of contempt when the trial court wrote, “I found [the offensive language and conduct] contemptuous of the Court, degrading to the administration of justice and disrupting to the orderly procedure of the Court”).
[¶ 21] The Court suggests confusion on the part of the parties. The Court is being generous. The parties’ sole argument presented to us questioned the existence of courtroom disruption or disruption in the administration of justice. Neither Pelletier, the Attorney General, nor the Amicus argued that Pelletier’s actions diminished the authority of the court. The Court *616today makes that argument sua sponte. The Court bases its decision on presumptions and assumptions.
[¶ 22] Our prior jurisprudence has made it clear that our role is limited to a review of the trial court’s written order. Contrary to the Court’s assertions, its holding today actually weakens the trial court’s authority. The Court’s willingness to overlook our previous requirement that the trial court issue sufficient findings is an invitation for extensive appellate review of summary contempt proceedings. The Court’s eagerness to review the entire record and to make its own findings rather than requiring the trial court to issue sufficient findings on its own will result in future summary contempt cases coming to this Court for what is essentially de novo review.
[¶ 23] It would not have been difficult for the trial court to have said either that Pelletier’s actions disrupted the court’s proceedings, or that his actions actually diminished the court’s authority. The trial court did neither. Its order is deficient on its face.8
[¶ 24] I therefore would vacate the judgment of the District Court.

. Although State v. Holland is directly concerned with summary contempt under M.R.Crim. P. 42(a), the court’s analysis can equally be applied to summary contempt under M.R. Civ. P. 66(b).

. The affidavits filed by the Amicus are not part of the record subject to our review.

. Although not raised by Pelletier, the Attorney General, or the Amicus, and not commented upon by the Court, I note that the trial court failed to follow the dictates of either M.R. Civ. P. 66 or M.R.Crim. P. 42 in a number of respects. Specifically, the trial court failed to "allow the alleged contemnor an opportunity to be heard in defense and mitigation” as required by both rules, and failed to "orally inform the alleged contemnor of the accusation of contempt and its basis” as required by M.R.Crim. P. 42.