Court Opinion

ID: 9849812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:46:52.62983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:26.436829
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 42. {dissenting). This case raises the question whether a challenged prospective juror is objectively biased on the basis of her employment in the district attorney's office that is prosecuting the case.
¶ 43. The right to a trial by an impartial jury lies at the very heart of due process.1 When a prospective juror is employed by an attorney in the case to be tried, the situation is "so fraught with the possibility of bias that we must find objective bias regardless of the surrounding facts and circumstances and the particular juror's assurances of impartiality."2 The employee is, I conclude, objectively biased under the law and should, on objection, be struck for cause from the jury.
*593¶ 44. Accordingly, I conclude that the circuit court erroneously refused to strike for cause the challenged juror, an employee of the Milwaukee County District Attorney, in this criminal case prosecuted by the Milwaukee County District Attorney's office.
¶ 45. I agree with the defendant that the circuit court's failure to disqualify the challenged prospective juror for cause is prejudicial error. The State agrees that if the circuit court erred, the error was prejudicial. I therefore dissent.
¶ 46. In determining whether a prospective juror manifests objective bias, the circuit court must determine "whether the reasonable person in the individual prospective juror's position could be impartial."3 The primary concern in the objective bias analysis is whether the parties are provided with a fair trial.4
¶ 47. The majority opinion declines to find objective bias in the current case, reasoning that the relationship between the assistant district attorney prosecuting the case and the challenged prospective juror was "little more than a distant acquaintance."5
¶ 48. I agree that the challenged prospective juror is, in the instant case, not closely related to the assistant district attorney prosecuting the case. The challenged prospective juror worked in a different office, in a different community, and on different types of cases than the assistant district attorney prosecuting the case. Moreover, the assistant district attorney had no direct supervisory authority over the challenged juror.
¶ 49. Nevertheless, the assistant district attorney and the challenged prospective juror do share the same *594ultimate superior, the Milwaukee County District Attorney. The Milwaukee County District Attorney is named as counsel along with the assistant district attorney on the court documents.
¶ 50. The distant degree of acquaintanceship relied upon by the majority opinion neither addresses nor diminishes the challenged prospective juror's perception of the risk of an adverse employment action. Certainly, a reasonable person under the circumstances might perceive the possibility of the employer being unhappy with his or her vote as a juror.6 An objectively reasonable person might (intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or subconsciously) give the edge to the employer in light of ties of economic interests and loyalty.7
¶ 51. The risk of an employee sensing economic pressure to side with his or her employer is too great to rely on the prospective juror's representations of his or her ability to he unbiased. In addition, an employee may feel loyalty toward his or her employer and the positions the employer takes. An employee may reasonably *595wish to be a "team player" or may perceive peer pressure from coworkers to side with their employer. In contrast, an employee might be biased against an employer.
¶ 52. While a prospective juror may be able to disclaim bias, it will too often be impossible for employees to completely eliminate the influence of an employer who, in essence, keeps a roof over their head and food on their table. These concerns are precisely why a case-by-case analysis of subjective and objective bias in this type of case is not satisfactory, and a bright-line rule is required.8
¶ 53. I conclude that an objectively reasonable person in the place of the challenged prospective juror would not ordinarily be able to separate his or her economic and loyalty interests from the determinations he or she would be required to make as juror. An employee of a district attorney's office should therefore be struck as a juror for cause when that office is prosecuting a case.
¶ 54. As Justice O'Connor recognized in her concurring opinion in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1982), some situations (which she labeled as "extreme"), including employment with the prosecuting agency, would justify a bright-line rule excluding the prospective juror:
While each case must turn on its own facts, there are some extreme situations that would justify a finding of *596implied bias ... [including] a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency.... None of our previous cases preclude the use of the conclusive presumption of implied bias in appropriate circumstances.
¶ 55. My conclusion is consistent with the statutes and case law of other jurisdictions.
¶ 56. Many states have statutes requiring employees of counsel to be struck for cause when they are prospective jurors in a case in which their employer is involved.9
¶ 57. Similarly in many jurisdictions, case law establishes a strong policy against allowing employees of law firms or prosecuting agencies to serve on a jury in which their employer is involved.
¶ 58. In United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2000), for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a 15-year employee of the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois, which was conducting the prosecution, was impliedly biased and should have been *597excluded for cause.10 The Seventh Circuit distinguished United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936), and Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950). In both Wood and Dennis, the jurors were not employees of the office prosecuting the case, but rather employees of other offices of the United States government.11
¶ 59. It is useful to compare Polichemi to the instant case. The U.S. Attorney's office for the Northern District of Illinois currently has over 300 employees, including 161 Assistant U.S. Attorneys, in two offices serving 18 counties.12 It is unclear how many staff are employed by the Milwaukee County District Attorney, *598the prosecuting agency and employer of the challenged juror in the instant case, but there are approximately 125 assistant district attorneys.13 There is nothing in the Polichemi opinion indicating that the juror in that case was any closer to the prosecuting Assistant U.S. Attorney than the challenged juror in the instant case was to the prosecuting assistant district attorney.
¶ 60. Polichemi reflects and is consistent with the policies of over one hundred years of case law from various jurisdictions.14
¶ 61. Some state courts, like the majority opinion, have rejected a rule excluding prospective jurors based only on their employment relationship with counsel.151 disagree with the reasoning in these cases.
*599¶ 62. Because the challenged prospective juror has financial and loyalty ties to his or her employer, the juror cannot be expected to make an unbiased decision. A bright-line rule excluding an employee of a district attorney's office as a juror guarantees the criminal defendant his or her constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury and also protects prospective jurors from the unenviable position of deciding cases prosecuted by their employers.
¶ 63. The bright-line rule I propose is narrow. I do not propose a rule excluding all government employees from serving on a jury in every case involving the government.
¶ 64. Further, the rule I propose is not a categorical exclusion of all employees of a district attorney's office from serving on a jury. Employees of a district attorney's office may serve on civil juries if the district attorney's office is not involved as counsel in the case. Moreover, nothing in the rule I propose would prohibit an employee of a district attorney's office from serving on a jury in a criminal case prosecuted by a district attorney for another county.16
¶ 65. Although this court has been reluctant to do so, we have created bright-line rules to exclude prospective jurors when such rules were necessary. In State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992), the court *600held that prospective jurors related to a state witness by blood or marriage up to the third degree of consanguinity are "impliedly" biased and must be struck for cause.17 Discussing Gesch in a later case, the court observed that "Gesch is unique. In most circumstances ... the conclusion that an individual is objectively biased requires some view of the facts and circumstances surrounding the voir dire and the case, as well as the prospective juror's answers.... However, Gesch remains an example that some relationships are so fraught with the possibility of bias that we must find objective bias regardless of the surrounding facts and circumstances and the particular juror's assurances of impartiality."18
¶ 66. This rationale applies just as forcefully, if not more so, to employees of the prosecutor's office as it does to family members.
¶ 67. For the reasons stated, I conclude that, because the challenged prospective juror was an employee of the Milwaukee County District Attorney's office that was prosecuting the case, she was objectively biased and should have been struck for cause.
¶ 68. The error was prejudicial. I would reverse the defendant's conviction and remand the matter to the circuit court for a new trial.
¶ 69. I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. PROSSER and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion.

 State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 724, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999) (discussing State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992)).

 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.

 Id. at 715.

 See majority op., ¶ 40.

 1 recognize that the juror is likely protected from official adverse employment action by civil service rules and is protected from retaliatory action by statute. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 103.87 (2003-04) (prohibiting disciplinary action when an employee testifies in a trial); Wis. Stat. § 230.90 (2003-04) (formerly § 895.65) (prohibiting retaliation by a government employer). An employee may nevertheless harbor a fear of adverse employment consequences if he or she decides a case against the employer's position.

 "It need not be assumed that any cessation of that employment would actually follow a verdict against the government. It is enough that it might possibly be the case; and the juror ought not to be permitted to occupy a position of that nature to the possible injury of a defendant on trial, even though he should swear he would not be influenced by his relations to one of the parties to the suit in giving a verdict." Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 197 (1909).

 See, e.g., Alaska R. Crim. Proc. 24(c)(10) (2006) (a juror is subject to challenge for cause if he or she is the "employee ... of one of the attorneys"); MCR 2.511(D)(9) (2006) (Michigan, same); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-20-13.1(4) (2006) (South Dakota, same).
Other state statutes create grounds for striking a potential juror for cause when the juror is an employee of a party. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-33-304(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (providing grounds to strike for cause if the juror is employed by defendant or complainant); Idaho Code § 19-2020(2) (2006) (same); Iowa R. Crim. E 2.18(5)e. (2005) (same); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3410(2)(b) (2005) (same); Minn. R. Crim. E 26.02(5)(1)6. (2006) (same); Ohio Crim. R. 24(0(12) (2006) (same); Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.220(3) (2006) (same).

 United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000).

 Id
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), because the challenged juror in that case was an applicant for a job with the office of the prosecuting attorney, not an employee. Polichemi, 219 F.3d at 704-05.
This court has rejected a bright-line rule of exclusion based on government employment. State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 482, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990) (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 149 (1936)) (" We think that the imputation of bias simply by virtue of governmental employment, without regard to any actual partiality growing out of the nature and circumstances of particular cases, rests on an assumption without any rational foundation.'").
In McGeever v. State, 239 Wis. 87, 96-97, 300 N.W. 485 (1941), the court held that there is no bright-line rule excluding former part-time employees of a district attorney's office from serving on a jury in a case prosecuted by the same district attorney's office. Because McGeever addressed past employment, it is inapplicable to the instant case.

 Website of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, "About Us" page, http://www.usdoj.gov/ usao/iln/aboutus/index.html (last visited June 21, 2006).

 Website of the Milwaukee County District Attorney, http://www.county.xnilwaukee.gov/display/router.asp7DocID=7715 (last visited June 21, 2006).

 See, e.g., People v. Terry, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 729, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (deputy district attorney should have been struck for cause "because this very case is being prosecuted by his boss"); Beam v. State, 400 S.E.2d 327, 328 (Ga. 1991) (secretary in appellate section of district attorney's office prosecuting trial should have been struck for cause based on perception of bias); State v. Kauhi, 948 P.2d 1036, 1041 (Haw. 1997) (court shall imply bias when prospective juror is deputy prosecuting attorney employed in same office as the prosecutor trying the case); Block v. State, 100 Ind. 357, 363 (Ind. 1885) (deputy prosecuting attorney impliedly biased because he was employee and subordinate of prosecuting attorney); Randolph v. Commonwealth, 716 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Ky. 1986) (secretary for prosecuting attorney impliedly biased as a matter of law and therefore must be struck for cause), overruled on other grounds by Shannon v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1988).

 See, e.g., Lowe v. State, 384 So. 2d 1164, 1171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (employment by the district attorney did not impute bias as a matter of law); State v. Cox, 837 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Mo. *599Ct. App. 1992) (child support enforcement investigator not automatically excluded as juror even though prosecutor was her superior); Roubideaux v. State, 707 P.2d 35, 36 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (administrative assistant in district attorney's office not automatically excluded as juror).

 For example, had the challenged juror in the instant case lived in Waukesha, my proposed rule would not have prohibited her from serving on a criminal jury in a case prosecuted by the Waukesha County District Attorney.

 State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 662, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992). The court now says that such prospective jurors are "objectively biased."

 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 724 (discussing State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992)).