Court Opinion

ID: 9557461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:50:27.878007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:51.775139
License: Public Domain

CALLISTER, Justice.
This is a consolidation of two petitions to review an order of the Public Service Commission granting the application of Barton Truck Line, Inc. to amend its certificate of convenience and necessity, No. 1127. The order increases the authority of Barton and would permit it to render local service to intermediate points between Salt Lake City and Ogden, Utah.
Plaintiffs, Union Pacific Railroad Company, Union Pacific Motor Freight Company and Consolidated Freightways, Inc., assail the Commission’s order in its entirety, contending that the Commission acted arbitrarily. These plaintiffs have for many years had the authority to transport com> modities generally in the area involved.
Salt Lake Transfer Company and Ash-worth Transfer, Inc. assail the order of the Commission, contending- that the Commission arbitrarily refused to exclude exr plosives from Barton’s increased authority. These two plaintiffs have had authority to transport household goods, commodities requiring specialized service or equipment, explosives, and some other items.
Prior to this application, Barton held two overlapping certificates of convenience and necessity. No. 1127 authorized the transportation of commodities generally, except livestock, between Salt Lake City and *124Ogden, and intermediate points, on the one hand and points west of Grantsville on the other hand. No. 1074 permits the transportation of commodities generally, including explosives, between Salt Lake City on the one hand and Tooele City and certain other points in Tooele County on the other hand.
The Commission had previously ruled that these two certificates, considered together, would not permit service by Barton between Ogden and intermediate points north of Salt Lake City limits on the one hand and points east of Grantsville, such as Tooele, on the other hand. It is conceded that the order now under review would authorize this service as well as local service between Salt Lake City and Ogden.
As previously enunciated by this Court,1 we will not disturb the findings of the Commission if supported by substantial evidence and are reasonable in view of the evidence.
The record of the hearing before the Commission is somewhat voluminous and permits only a general characterization of the evidence presented.
Barton presented evidence relating to its present operations, equipment, facilities, and financial ability. The evidence sustains the Commission’s finding that these were satisfactory.
Numerous shippers testified, in behalf of Barton’s application, as to their dissatisfaction with the existing carrier facilities and to the inconvenience experienced by reason of inadequate service. Also that many shipments were damaged. Nearly all of this testimony was directed at Wasatch Fast Freight, a trade name division of Consolidated.
The results of a survey were admitted into evidence indicating that the population of Davis County was increasing more rapidly than in any other county in the state and that increased business activity could be expected.
Consolidated introduced evidence to the effect that it had recently expended a considerable amount of money in acquiring new equipment and terminal facilities for Wasatch in order to improve its services. It presented an analysis of its 1958 claim experience which indicated that Wasatch handled 144,881 shipments and received only 1.063 claims, for a 99.27 per cent claim-free record. The Commission found that,, while the percentage was small, over 1,000' claims within one year indicate a somewhat unsatisfactory or inadequate service. The Commission further made a finding that there were instances of delay by Wasatch in both pickup and delivery of shipments and erroneous delivery of shipments.
*125The transportation of general commodities between Salt Lake City and Ogden, including service to intermediate points, is handled in part by Union Pacific Railroad by rail and also by its wholly-owned subsidiary, Union Pacific Motor Freight Company. The latter company operates on railroad billing and at railroad rates. Its rights are supplemental, auxiliary to, and co-ordinated with the operations of the railroad.
On December 29, 1958, the Bamberger Railroad, which for many years transported general commodities between Salt Lake City and Ogden, and intermediate points, ceased doing business and sold to Union Pacific a part of its property. Union Pacific did not, however, acquire any of Bamberger’s transportation rights.
Union Pacific, while conceding it has no vested right to serve shippers formerly using Bamberger facilities, contends that it is ready, willing and able to handle the Bamberger traffic without depriving those shippers of a single day of service. It argues that there is no need for an additional motor carrier to handle the freight of Bam-berger shippers, and that there is no evidence in the record that Union Pacific could not adequately serve these shippers.
If Bamberger’s cessation of business were the only basis for the Commission’s order, the argument of Union Pacific would have considerable merit, for as we read the record there is no evidence that Union Pacific could not adequately handle the shippers who formerly used Bamberger’s services.
However, the Commission’s findings are directed at the adequacy of the highway, rather than railroad, transportation. It stated in its finding No. 4:
“ * * * The truckline company [Union Pacific Motor Freight] is intended to operate as a railroad service only which should not affect, any more than the former rail service affected, the adequacy or inadequacy of highway motor transportation between Salt Lake and Ogden. This fact justifies, the conclusion that there is traffic formerly handled by Bamberger in excess of that which other carriers handled prior to December, 1958, and the increase in population in the Salt Lake-Ogden area with the possible future increase in business development gives weight to the suggestion that additional motor carrier service is and will be necessary in the interests of the public.”
In its finding No. 13, the Commission further found:
“ * * * The evidence shows instances of delay by Wasatch in both pickup and delivery of shipments and delay in processing claims resulting, in some instances, in shippers discontin*126uing the use of the Wasatch service. The evidence also shows delays in pickups until after the shippers’ five o’clock closing time necessitating the holding of employees for service at overtime wages. There have been instances of erroneous delivery of shipments to persons other than consignees and difficulty by other carriers in making interline arrangements with Wasatch of Salt Lake. This general course of conduct, coupled with claims for damaged or lost shipments, undoubtedly accounts for the 1,063 claims registered with the company for the year 1958. All these facts, coupled with the retirement from the highway transportation field of Bamberger Electric, persuades the Commission that public convenience and necessity justify the issuance to applicant of the authority for which it makes application.”
After a careful review of the record it appears that the Commission’s findings, that the existing motor carrier service was inadequate and that additional service was in the public interest, are supported by substantial evidence and are reasonable in view of the evidence. However, we do not take the same view with relation to the matter of explosives.
At the hearing Barton amended its application to ■ exclude therefrom the transportation of household goods, commodities in connection with the transportation of which special service is required in preparing said commodities for shipment, or in setting up after delivery, which service is not regularly furnished by common carriers at regular line rates or by common carriers of-specialized commodities at regularly published rates, and it also excluded commodities in bulk. This amendment excluded the commodities transported principally by Ashworth and Salt Lake Transfer, with the exception of explosives.
In the presentation of its case, Barton' did not offer any evidence concerning the transportation of explosives. At the conclusion of Barton’s case, Ashworth and Salt Lake Transfer moved to dismiss the application as to the transportation of explosives on the ground that there was no evidence showing any need, present or prospective, for this type of service. The Commission properly denied this motion.
Where, as here, there is an application to transport commodities within an accepted classification, such as “commodities generally,” the applicant need not, in the first instance, demonstrate a need for. the transportation of every conceivable item encompassed by the classification. A contrary view would impose an almost impossible burden upon the applicant.2
*127Ashworth and Salt Lake Transfer both introduced testimony relating to their transportation of explosives between Salt Lake City and Ogden and intermediate points as well as between Hill Field and points in Tooele County. It appeared that these two carriers were highly competitive for the hauling of explosives and both claimed that the existing service was adequate. Barton offered no evidence to rebut this testimony.
At the close of the hearing, Ashworth and Salt Lake Transfer moved to exclude explosives from the amended certificate and the Commission denied the motion.
Realizing the limits of this court to review the orders of the Commission, nevertheless, if in relation to the facts before it, the Commission acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the order is without authority and must be set aside.3 Whatever the minimum quantity and quality of evidence necessary to justify administrative action, orders issued in the complete absence of factual support are clearly arbitrary, capricious and void.
While in the first instance an applicant is not required to prove the need for the transportation of every item in a classification, nevertheless, when the need for the transportation of a particular item is challenged and evidence offered in a support thereof, the applicant must then introduce evidence rebutting the challenge.
A search of the record reveals nothing upon which to base the conclusion that the addition of Barton’s services will in any way add to public convenience and necessity with regard to explosives. As the record now stands, Ashworth and Salt Lake Transfer are rendering an adequate service in the transportation of explosives. Before additional service is authorized by the Commission, the applicant must show that the existing service is not adequate and convenient and that his proposed operation would eliminate the inadequacy and inconvenience.4
There being no facts within the record to justify inclusion of explosives in the amended certificate, the order of the Commission, in this respect is arbitrary and capricious.
Although we express no disapproval of the order as applied to commodities other than explosives, we are empowered only to affirm or set aside the action of the Commission. It follows that we cannot modify by correcting the erroneous feature of the order, but must set it aside in its *128entirety.5 This result is dictated by the wording of our statute.6 Furthermore, it has the merit of conformity with our construction7 of similar provisions8 for this Court’s review of Industrial Commission awards.
Order set aside. No costs awarded.
HENRIOD, J., concurs.
McDONOUGH, J., concurs in the result.

. Salt Lake-Kanab Freight Lines, Inc. v. Robinson, 9 Utah 2d 99, 339 P.2d 99; see also Sec. 5dr-7-16, U.C.A.1953, and cases annotated on this question.

. Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Public Service Comm., 2 Utah 2d 23, 268 P.2d 990.

. Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011.

. Mulcahy v. Public Service Comm., 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298, 305.

.73 C.J.S. Public Utilities § 64, p. 1171; California Portland Cement Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 49 Cal.2d 171, 315 P.2d 709; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 374 Ill. 60, 28 N.E.2d 97; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n, 379 Ill. 403, 41 N.E.2d 481; Illinois Commerce Comm. v. New York Central R. Co., 398 Ill. 11, 75 N.E.2d 411; State v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 229 Minn. 312, 39 N.W.2d 752; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. State, Okl., 301 P.2d 228; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184.

. Sec. 54-7-16, U.C.A.1953: “* * * upon tli1 hearing the Supreme Court shall enter judgment either affirming or setting aside the order or decision of the commission. * * * ”

. Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 93 Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077; see also, Administrative Action in Utah, 6 Utah Law Review 406, 409.

. Sec. 35-1-85, U.C.A.1953.