Court Opinion

ID: 2963418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:09:29.765909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:00.111766
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          July 17, 1995     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                     ____________

          No. 95-1027

                                   ARTHUR J. LEARY,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                        JOHN H. DALTON, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                     ____________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The  opinion of  this  court issued  on  June 14,  1995,  is

          amended as follows:

                    On page  9 of the opinion delete  the last six lines of

          the  carryover  paragraph  starting  with "See  also  Lussier  v.
                                                     ___  ____  _______

          Runyon,."
          ______

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1027

                                   ARTHUR J. LEARY,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                        JOHN H. DALTON, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                       [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
                                          ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            J. Joseph McKittrick, with whom  McKittrick Law Offices  and Karen
            ____________________             ______________________      _____

        B. Hoffman were on brief for appellant.
        __________

            Michael M.  DuBose, Assistant  United States  Attorney, with  whom
            __________________

        Jay P.  McCloskey,  United  States  Attorney, and  David  R.  Collins,
        _________________                                  __________________

        Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee. 

                                 ____________________

                                    June 14, 1995

                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.   Plaintiff-appellant
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
                              ____________________

            Arthur  J. Leary, a civilian employee of the Portsmouth Naval

            Shipyard ("Shipyard") and the United States Navy, was removed

            from  government service for "excessive unauthorized absence"

            after  he was  denied requested  leave for  the time  that he

            spent  in  jail  following   his  arrest  for  driving  while

            intoxicated.  After exhausting administrative remedies, Leary

            filed  suit  in  the  United States  District  Court  for the

            District of Maine against defendant-appellee John  H. Dalton,

            Secretary  of the Navy.  Leary's complaint alleged that he is

            an  alcoholic   and,  therefore,   an   "individual  with   a

            handicap"1 within  the meaning  of the Rehabilitation  Act of

            1973,  29 U.S.C.      701-797b  ("Act"),  and that  the  Navy

            discriminated  against  him  in   violation  of  the  Act  by

            terminating his  employment on  the basis of  his disability.

            Leary appeals  the  district court's  order granting  summary

            judgment in favor of the Navy.  After carefully reviewing the

            record and considering Leary's arguments, we affirm.      

                                    I.  Background
                                    I.  Background
                                        __________

                      Beginning October  1, 1984,  Leary was  employed by

            the Navy as a  WG-10 electrician in Shop 97  at the Shipyard.

            Between  1985  and 1989,  Leary  received  numerous incentive

                                
            ____________________

            1.  In 1992, the Rehabilitation Act was amended to substitute
            the  term  "disability"  for  "handicap."    The  regulations
            promulgated under  the Act,  however, continue to  employ the
            term "handicap."

                                         -2-
                                          2

            awards  and  was "Suggestor  of  the Month"  in  March, 1989.

            Leary became  a Union Shop Steward in March, 1988 and rose to

            the rank of Chief Steward for his shop area in January, 1989.

            On his  last performance appraisal, covering  the period June

            1, 1988 through May 31, 1989, he received a rating of "highly

            satisfactory."  

                      On  August  26, 1989,  while  off  duty, Leary  was

            arrested  by state police  in Concord,  New Hampshire,  for a

            second  offense of driving  while intoxicated,  driving after

            license revocation, possessing marijuana, possessing cocaine,

            transporting   a  controlled  drug,   resisting  arrest,  and

            assaulting a police  officer.  Leary was  incarcerated in New

            Hampshire at the Merrimack County Jail, subject to a  $10,000

            cash bail.  Unable to  make bail, Leary remained incarcerated

            until September  13, 1989.  When he  failed to report to work

            on August 28,  1989, without having either requested leave in

            advance or notified his supervisor of his  absence, Leary was

            placed on unauthorized leave  status ("Z leave").  As  of the

            date  of  his arrest,  Leary had  accumulated 129.5  hours of

            earned  annual leave.   On  August  29, 1989,  Leary's sister

            called  Richard   Lavoie,  Temporary  Service   Shop  General

            Foreman, to  request on  Leary's  behalf that  he be  granted

            earned  annual leave to cover the  period of his absence.  On

            August  30,  1989, Leary  himself  called  Lavoie to  request

            emergency annual  leave during  his  incarceration.   Leary's

                                         -3-
                                          3

            request  was  denied and  he was  informed  that he  would be

            carried on Z leave status  until he returned to duty.   Leary

            returned to  the Shipyard after twelve  consecutive work days

            of unauthorized absence.   Upon his  return, he appealed  the

            denial of his request for  emergency annual leave through the

            union  grievance  process,  but   after  a  hearing  and  due

            consideration  by  Shipyard  management,  the  grievance  was

            denied.  

                      By letter  dated  October 3,  1989, Leary  received

            notice  of  the Navy's  proposed  action to  remove  him from

            government service for the  following reasons: (i) his arrest

            on  August 26, 1989 on the  charges set forth supra; (ii) his
                                                          _____

            failure to report to work on August 28, 1989, and his failure

            to  request leave in advance  or to notify  his supervisor or

            shop  officials as to the  reason for his  absence; and (iii)

            his unauthorized absence during  the period August 28 through

            September  13,  1989.   On October  19,  1989, Leary  and his

            representatives met with Gary Alamed, Administrative Officer,

            to  make  an oral  reply to  the  proposed action.    At this

            meeting, and  apparently for  the first time,  Leary made  it

            known that he had problems with alcohol and drugs and that he

            considered  himself  to be  protected by  the  Act.   He also

            stated that he was  seeking help for these problems  from the

            Shipyard's  Employee Assistance  Program.   By  letter  dated

            December  4, 1989,  Leary received  notice of  the Shipyard's

                                         -4-
                                          4

            decision  to  remove him  from government  service, effective

            December 11, 1989, for excessive unauthorized  absence during

            the period August 28, 1989, through September 13, 1989.

                      On December 21, 1989, Leary filed an appeal of  the

            Navy's  decision with  the  Merit  Systems  Protection  Board

            ("MSPB"), in which he alleged discrimination on the  basis of

            a  disability and reprisal for  his union activity.   He also

            claimed  disparate  treatment,  alleging  that   other,  non-

            disabled employees had been granted leave  for incarceration.

            On  April   9,  1990,  after  an   evidentiary  hearing,  the

            Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") sustained the Navy's action.

            With respect to Leary's claim  of discrimination on the basis

            of  a   disability,  the  ALJ  found   that,  although  Leary

            established  that he  was disabled  due to  alcohol and  drug

            dependency, the unauthorized absence for which he was removed

            was  neither caused by, nor  entirely a manifestation of, his

            disability.  Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Leary failed

            to establish a prima  facie case of disability discrimination

            under the  Act.   The ALJ  also concluded  that there was  no

            support for  Leary's claim  of disparate  treatment, finding,

            inter alia, that  the employees alleged to  have been granted
            _____ ____

            leave for incarceration  were not similarly situated  because

            they  were assigned  to different  shops and  supervisors, or

            because they were absent for fewer than five consecutive days

            and  therefore did  not run  afoul of  Navy leave  policy, or

                                         -5-
                                          5

            because  the supervisor  granting  leave was  not aware  that

            leave was requested to cover jail time.

                      By  final order  dated January  10, 1992,  the MSPB

            denied  Leary's petition  for review  before the  full Board.

            Leary  thereafter sought  review of  the final  MSPB decision

            with  the Equal  Employment Opportunity  Commission ("EEOC").

            On  August 19, 1993, the  EEOC affirmed, finding, inter alia,
                                                              _____ ____

            that,  although  his problems  with  alcohol  and drug  abuse

            constituted a disability covered by the Act, Leary had failed

            to establish a sufficient causal nexus between his disability

            and his  termination to  make out a  claim of  discrimination

            based on disability.  

                      On September  24, 1993, Leary filed  a complaint in

            the district court alleging  discrimination under the Act and

            disparate treatment.  On  April 28, 1994, the Navy  moved for

            summary judgment.   The motion was  referred to a  magistrate

            judge,  who,  on September  19,  1994,  recommended that  the

            motion  be  granted  on  the  ground  that  Leary  failed  to

            establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Act.

            On  October  3,  1994,  Leary  filed  his  objection  to  the

            magistrate  judge's Recommended  Decision.    On October  26,

            1994, the district court, having made a de novo determination
                                                    __ ____

            of all matters adjudicated  by the magistrate judge, affirmed

            the Recommended Decision and granted summary judgment for the

            Navy.

                                         -6-
                                          6

                               II.  Standard of Review
                               II.  Standard of Review
                                    __________________

                      We  review a  grant  of summary  judgment de  novo,
                                                                __  ____

            evaluating the  facts and  inferences that may  reasonably be

            drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the  nonmoving

            party.  Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, F.S.B., No.
                    _________    ___________________________________

            94-2220, slip op.  at 7  (1st Cir.  May 15,  1995).   Summary

            judgment is appropriate only  if "the pleadings, depositions,

            answers to interrogatories, and admissions  on file, together

            with  the affidavits, if any,  show that there  is no genuine

            issue  as to any material  fact and that  the moving party is

            entitled to a judgment as a matter  of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P.

            56(c).   A  material  fact is  one  "'that might  affect  the

            outcome of the  suit under the  governing law.'"   Morrissey,
                                                               _________

            No.  94-2220, slip  op.  at 8  (quoting  Anderson v.  Liberty
                                                     ________     _______

            Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  An issue of material
            ___________

            fact  is genuine "if the  evidence is such  that a reasonable

            jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."  Id.
                                                                   ___

                      The  nonmoving party  "may not  rest upon  the mere

            allegations or denials of  [its] pleading, but . . . must set

            forth  specific facts showing  that there is  a genuine issue

            for trial."   Fed. R.  Civ. P. 56(e);  Coll v. PB  Diagnostic
                                                   ____    ______________

            Systems, Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1121 (1st Cir. 1995).      
            _____________

                                   III.  Discussion
                                   III.  Discussion
                                         __________

                      Leary  makes two  arguments on  appeal.   First, he

            contends that  the  district  court  overlooked  two  genuine

                                         -7-
                                          7

            issues  of   material  fact:    whether   his  disability  --

            alcoholism  -- "manifested  itself  as, or  resulted in,  the

            actions which led to his consequent incarceration and absence

            from  work," and  therefore  constituted the  reason for  his

            termination; and  whether, with  regard to his  allegation of

            disparate treatment,  other non-disabled Navy  employees were

            granted  leave for  their periods  of incarceration,  or were

            merely   reprimanded  (rather  than   terminated)  for  their

            conduct.  Leary argues  in the alternative that the  district

            court  should  have applied  a  "but for"  test  to determine

            whether he was terminated because of his alcoholism.

                      We  begin by  ironing  out  a  procedural  wrinkle.

            Although  the district court decided this case under   504 of

            the  Rehabilitation   Act,  29  U.S.C.      794  (prohibiting

            disability  discrimination  by   non-federal  recipients   of

            federal funds), Leary actually  invoked   501 of the  Act, 29

            U.S.C.    791, in his  complaint.  Section  501(b) imposes an

            affirmative   duty   on   every  "department,   agency,   and

            instrumentality . . . in the executive branch" of the federal

            government   to  provide  adequate   hiring,  placement,  and

            advancement opportunities for individuals  with disabilities.

            Some circuits view   501, accordingly, as the exclusive right

            of  action  for  federal  employees  who   suffer  disability

            discrimination in the course of their direct employment.  See
                                                                      ___

            Johnston  v. Horne, 875 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v.
            ________     _____                                 _______

                                         -8-
                                          8

            United States Postal  Serv., 861 F.2d  1475, 1478 (10th  Cir.
            ___________________________

            1988),  cert.  denied, 493  U.S.  811  (1989); McGuinness  v.
                    _____  ______                          __________

            United States  Postal Serv.,  744 F.2d  1318, 1321  (7th Cir.
            ___________________________

            1984).   Other circuits,  ours included, have  permitted such

            claims to be brought under both   501 and   504.   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            Taub v. Frank,  957 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir.  1992) (deciding a  
            ____    _____

            504 suit by a  federal postal employee and setting  forth the

            elements of a prima facie case under that section); Little v.
                                                                ______

            FBI, 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that federal employee
            ___

            sued employing agency under  both   501 and    504); Smith v.
                                                                 _____

            United States  Postal  Serv., 742  F.2d  257, 260  (6th  Cir.
            ____________________________

            1984); Prewitt v.  United States Postal Serv.,  662 F.2d 292,
                   _______     __________________________

            304 (5th Cir. 1981).

                      The  differences between  the two  sections may  be

            significant in some cases  (though not this one, as  we shall

            explain).  Not only is it unclear whether the right of action

            under    504 overlaps with that in   501, it is also unclear,

            in  light of  recent  amendments to  the Rehabilitation  Act,

            whether  the  two  sections   require  the  same  showing  of

            causation.  As amended in 1992, both sections now incorporate

            the  liability standards  of Title  I of  the Americans  with

            Disabilities Act  of 1990 ("ADA"), 42  U.S.C.    12111-12117.

            See 29 U.S.C.    791(g), 794(d).  Section 504 alone, however,
            ___

            continues  to   require  a  showing   that  the   plaintiff's

            disability was  the sole  reason for the  defendant's adverse
                                ____

                                         -9-
                                          9

            action.    See 29  U.S.C.    794(a) ("No  otherwise qualified
                       ___

            individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of
                                                      ___________________

            her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,
            _____________________

            be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to  discrimination

            under  any program  or activity  receiving  Federal financial

            assistance or under any program or activity conducted  by any

            Executive agency  or by  the United States  Postal Service.")

            (emphasis added).  The precise relationship between the ADA's

            liability standards and the  sole causation test is not  well

            settled.    And, to  compound these  difficulties, it  is not

            obvious whether  the 1992  amendments apply to  Leary's suit,

            which  accrued and  was administratively  pending  before the

            amendments took effect.

                      We therefore regard the  applicability of   504 and

            its sole causation test in this federal employment suit as an

            open question; but  one that we need  not reach here.   Leary

            agrees on appeal that his claim arises  under   504, and that

            he bears the burden  of demonstrating that he was  terminated

            "solely by reason of"  his disability.  More  importantly, we

            think that the judgment for the Navy should be affirmed, even

            assuming in Leary's favor that disability discrimination need

            only be  a reason,  as opposed  to the  sole reason,  for his

            termination.

                      In  any claim  under  the Rehabilitation  Act,  the

            plaintiff  must first  establish that  s/he has  a disability

                                         -10-
                                          10

            covered  by  the Act.   The  governing regulations  define an

            "individual  with  a [disability]"  as  one  who  "(i) Has  a

            physical or mental impairment which substantially limits  one

            or  more of such person's  major life activities;  (ii) Has a

            record  of such an impairment; or (iii) Is regarded as having

            such  an  impairment."   29 C.F.R.    1614.203.   It  is well

            settled that alcoholism is a disability within the meaning of

            the  Act.2  See, e.g.,  Cook v. Department  of Mental Health,
                        ___  ____   ____    _____________________________

            Retardation & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1993); Little,
            ____________________                                  ______

            1  F.3d at 257; Fuller v. Frank,  916 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir.
                            ______    _____

            1990).   For the purposes  of this appeal,  the Navy concedes

            that Leary  is an  alcoholic and  is therefore  an individual

            with a disability.

                      Leary  must  also show  that  with  respect to  his

            employment, he is a "qualified individual with a [disability]

            who,  with or without  reasonable accommodation,  can perform

            the essential functions of the position in  question . . . ."

            29 C.F.R.    1614.203(a)(6)  (implementing 29 U.S.C.    791).

            See  also  29 U.S.C.    794  (protecting only  the "otherwise
            ___  ____

            qualified  individual with a disability").  In this case, the

                                
            ____________________

            2.  We note that the  statute was amended in 1990  to exclude
            (for purposes of    793  and 794 as these sections  relate to
            employment) from the term "individual with a disability" "any
            individual who is  an alcoholic whose current  use of alcohol
            prevents such  individual from  performing the duties  of the
            job in  question  or  whose  employment, by  reason  of  such
            current alcohol  abuse, would  constitute a direct  threat to
            property or the safety of others."  29 U.S.C.   706(8)(C)(v).

                                         -11-
                                          11

            "essential function[]"  is showing up for  work as scheduled,

            unless  leave is  authorized.   Finally, regardless  of which

            section of the Act applies, Leary must show at a minimum that

            his disability was a reason -- if not the sole  reason -- for

            his discharge.

                      Leary fails  to establish either the  second or the

            third  element of his  claim.  It  is the Navy's  policy that

            leave  will  be granted  only for  bona  fide reasons  -- for

            example,  a  serious  accident or  illness  or  death  in the

            employee's  immediate family,  or  other  circumstances  over

            which  the  employee  has no  control.    The  Navy does  not

            consider incarceration to be a  bona fide reason for granting

            leave of  any kind.  To grant leave to employees serving time

            in jail, says the Navy, is to violate the public's confidence

            in  the Navy and its  personnel, the maintenance  of which is

            one of the  "Bedrock Standards of  Conduct for Department  of

            the  Navy  Personnel."    Accordingly,  the  Human  Resources

            Department  of the Shipyard uniformly advises supervisors and

            employees that it  is never appropriate  to approve leave  of

            any kind to cover the period of an employee's incarceration.

                      The Navy defines  excessive unauthorized absence as

            unauthorized  absence  for more  than  five  consecutive work

            days.   According  to  the Navy's  "Schedule of  Disciplinary

            Offenses and Recommended Remedies for Civilian Employees," an

            employee's   excessive   unauthorized   absence   --   twelve

                                         -12-
                                          12

            consecutive  work  days, in  Leary's  case --  may  result in

            disciplinary  action ranging from  reprimand to removal, even

            for a first offense.  It appears, then, that Leary was placed

            on unauthorized leave status, denied leave for incarceration,

            and  discharged for  excessive unauthorized  absence,  all in

            accordance with established Navy policies.

                      Even  assuming that  Leary's  incarceration  was  a

            "manifestation" of his alcoholism, cf.  Teahan v. Metro-North
                                               ___  ______    ___________

            Commuter R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1991) (assuming a
            _______________

            causal  relationship  between employee's  alcoholism  and his

            absenteeism), cert. denied,  113 S. Ct. 54 (1992),  we reject
                          _____ ______

            the argument that Leary should have been allowed to draw upon

            his accrued annual leave  as a "reasonable accommodation" for

            his disability.   First,  Leary does  not dispute  the Navy's

            contention that he neither advised the Navy of his alcoholism

            nor sought accommodation  of any kind until after he returned

            to  duty following his incarceration.   So far  as the record

            shows,  the Navy  denied Leary's  initial requests  for leave

            without knowing the nature  of the incident that  resulted in

            his incarceration.  We have  said, in the context of a    504

            suit, that an institution "can be expected to respond only to

            what it knows  (or is  chargeable with knowing)."   Wynne  v.
                                                                _____

            Tufts Univ. Sch.  of Medicine,  976 F.2d 791,  795 (1st  Cir.
            _____________________________

            1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1845 (1993).
                   _____ ______

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      Second, even if Leary had given the Navy sufficient

            notice  of  his  need  for  accommodation,  the  Act  neither

            prevents  employers  from  holding  "persons  suffering  from

            alcoholism  .  . . [to]  reasonable  rules  of conduct,"  nor

            protects  alcoholics  from  the  consequences  of  their  own

            misconduct.  Little, 1 F.3d at 258 (quoting 43 Op. Att'y Gen.
                         ______

            No.  12,  1977  WL  17999  at  *1).    See  also  Copeland v.
                                                   ___  ____  ________

            Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1149 (3d Cir. 1988)
            _________________________

            ("a  police department  is  justified in  concluding that  it

            cannot properly  accommodate a  user of illegal  drugs within

            its ranks  . .  . ."),  cert. denied,  490 U.S.  1004 (1989);
                                    _____ ______

            Wilber v.  Brady, 780 F.  Supp. 837, 840 (D.  D.C. 1992) (the
            ______     _____

            Rehabilitation Act is not  designed to "insulate [individuals

            with disabilities]  from disciplinary actions which  would be

            taken against any employee regardless of his status").  As we

            have  observed,  government entities  have  the discretionary

            authority  to determine  what policies  are necessary  to the

            execution  of their  assigned  missions.    "It  is  not  the

            function   of    the   federal   courts   to   evaluate   the

            appropriateness of  agency employment  standards but  only to

            safeguard   against   'arbitrary,  capricious   or  otherwise

            unlawful'  standards."    Taub,  957  F.2d  at  10  (citation
                                      ____

            omitted).   The  Navy's no-leave-for-incarceration  policy is

            none  of  these,  given  the importance  of  maintaining  the

            public's confidence in the integrity of the armed forces.

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      We hold that the Navy may  reasonably apply its no-

            leave-for-incarceration  policy  to  all  of  its  employees,

            disabled and non-disabled alike.  Because the  Rehabilitation

            Act  does not  require otherwise, Leary  is not  a "qualified

            individual  with   a   [disability]"  who   with   reasonable

            accommodation could have fulfilled the "essential function[]"

            of attending work as scheduled.  29 C.F.R.   1614.203(a)(6).

                      From our discussion above, it  follows that Leary's

            disability  was not a reason  for his termination.   The Navy

            placed  Leary on  unauthorized  leave status  before he  ever

            sought to connect  his incarceration to his alcoholism.   The

            record leaves us with no doubt that the Navy  applied its no-

            leave policy  to Leary without regard to  his disability, and

            ultimately discharged  Leary because and only  because of his

            excessive unauthorized absence.  

                      Leary, however, argues that  there is a question of

            material fact  as  to whether  there  is a  sufficient  nexus

            between his  disability and the behavior that resulted in his

            removal to establish  that he was  discharged because of  his

            disability.     Disregarding  arguendo   Leary's  failure  to
                                          ________

            establish  that   he  is   a  qualified  individual   with  a

            disability,  and  his  failure   to  rebut  the  Navy's  non-

            discriminatory justification for his discharge,  and focusing

            our inquiry solely on  the chain of events that  preceded his

            removal, we find any causal nexus insufficient as a matter of

                                         -15-
                                          15

            law to establish  a reasonable  inference of  discrimination.

            We would reach the same  conclusion even if we were  to apply

            the "but for" test of  causation that Leary appropriates from

            our  "mixed  motive" labor  relation  cases.   See  Coletti's
                                                           ___  _________

            Furniture, Inc. v.  NLRB, 550 F.2d 1292 (1st Cir. 1977).  The
            _______________     ____

            fact  is that,  notwithstanding his  alcoholism and  alcohol-

            related conduct,  Leary would not have  been incarcerated and

            placed in need of  emergency leave had he  been able to  make

            bail.  Leary's own brief states that "[h]e was incarcerated .

            . . because  he was unable to  post a . .  . cash bail."   It

            cannot be argued that  the circumstances of incarceration and

            inability  to  make  bail  are  uniquely  or  even  specially

            associated  with Leary's  disability.   Whatever relationship

            may exist between  his alcoholism and the  events giving rise

            to  this case, Leary has not shown facts sufficient to defeat

            summary judgment  with  respect  to his  claim  that  he  was

            removed  from   government  service  on  the   basis  of  his

            disability.

                      Leary also argues that there is  a genuine issue of

            material fact as to whether other non-disabled Navy employees

            were  granted   leave  for   incarceration  or   were  simply

            reprimanded rather than removed for unauthorized absence.  He

            refers to two  employees who requested leave  periods of five

            days  or less, and a third  employee whose eighteen-day leave

            request was denied,  although he was  not discharged.   These

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                                          16

            cursory submissions do not  set forth "specific facts showing

            that there  is a genuine issue  for trial."  Fed.  R. Civ. P.

            56(e).  

                                   IV.  Conclusion
                                   IV.  Conclusion
                                        __________

                      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district 

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            court's order granting  summary judgment  for the  defendant-

            appellee.

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                                          18