Court Opinion

ID: 9733396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:06:08.247245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:40.961565
License: Public Domain

KIRSCH, Judge,
dissenting.
The intent element necessary to prove sexual misconduct with a minor must typically be proved inferentially. From the actor's conduct, we infer the natural and usual consequences to which such conduct usually points. See Bowles v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind.2000). The requisite intent can be inferred from intentionally touching a child's genitals or breasts. Kirk v. State, 797 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). Sexual gestures and comments may also constitute sufficient evidence of intent. J.J.M. v. State, 779 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)
Here, there was no such touching, no such gesture, and no such comment. Rather, we have only the touching itself. Although as my colleagues note, the touching occurred while Smith was closing out sexually related material on the computer, he was closing out the material at the specific request of LK. and M.G. As he was doing so, Smith touched L.K.'s leg, stomach and bathing suit strap. Such touching may have been intended by Smith to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires or those of LK. It may have been intended to test LK. or groom her for sexual contact. It may have been Smith's crude attempt to be affectionate or flirtatious. Or, it may have been an innocent, albeit inappropriate, display of affection. We do *1040not know. In the absence of legitimate inference, we can only speculate as to what Smith's intention was. I do not believe that speculation can constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.