Court Opinion

ID: 9958114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 08:11:31.362066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:52.317567
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________

           No. 02-22-00268-CR
      ___________________________

MANUEL JONATHAN PATTERSON, Appellant

                     V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

   On Appeal from the 372nd District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
         Trial Court No. 1726314R

    Before Kerr, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In two issues, Appellant Manuel Jonathan Patterson asks us (1) to modify the

trial court’s three judgments to correctly reflect that the trial court—not the jury—

assessed his punishment and (2) to delete the trial court’s “found true” enhancement-

paragraph finding in each judgment. We will sustain Patterson’s first issue but

overrule his second, and we will affirm the judgments as modified.

                                   I. Background

      In a single indictment, the State charged Patterson with four counts:

continuous sexual abuse of a child; aggravated sexual assault of a child; and two

counts of indecency with a child by contact. The indictment also included a

enhancement paragraph alleging that Patterson “was finally convicted of the felony

offense of burglary of a habitation” in Tarrant County Criminal District Court

Number Three on December 8, 2009.

      Patterson elected to have the trial court assess his punishment, and he pleaded

not guilty to each count. A jury acquitted Patterson of continuous sexual abuse of a

child but found him guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child and on both counts

of indecency with a child by contact.

      During the punishment trial, Patterson pleaded true to the enhancement

paragraph as alleged in the indictment. The trial court ensured that Patterson

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understood his plea’s consequences 1 and accepted his plea. After hearing the

punishment evidence, the trial court assessed Patterson’s punishment at 45 years’

confinement for aggravated sexual assault and 12 years’ confinement on each of the

indecency-with-a-child-by-contact offenses. When the trial court sentenced Patterson,

it made no finding on the enhancement paragraph. The following day, October 28,

2022, the trial court held a “supplemental” sentencing hearing and found the

enhancement paragraph to be true.

      Each of the three judgments—which were entered on October 27, 2022, the

same day that Patterson was sentenced—states that the jury assessed Patterson’s

punishment and that the trial court found the enhancement paragraph to be true. 2

Patterson has appealed and asks us (1) to modify each of the judgments to reflect that

the trial court assessed his punishment and (2) to delete the trial court’s finding in

each judgment that the enhancement paragraph is true because the trial court erred by

      1
        Aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony, carries an applicable
punishment range of five to 99 years or life in prison, see Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 12.32(a), 22.021(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), (e), and indecency with a child by contact, a
second-degree felony, carries an applicable punishment range of two to 20 years in
prison, see id. §§ 12.33(a), 21.11(a)(1), (c), (d). Patterson’s previous final felony
conviction, if found true, would increase the punishment range for aggravated sexual
assault of a child to 15 to 99 years or life in prison and the punishment range for
indecency with a child by contact to that of a first-degree felony. See id. § 12.42(b),
(c)(1).
      2
       The trial court signed an acquittal judgment on the continuous-sexual-abuse-
of-a-child count.

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holding a supplemental sentencing hearing the day after he was sentenced. The State

agrees. We address each issue in turn.

                              II. Judgment Modifications

       In Patterson’s first issue, he points out that the judgments incorrectly reflect

that the jury, not the trial court, assessed his punishments. We have the power to

modify a trial court’s judgment to make it speak the truth when we have the necessary

information to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–

28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App.

1992); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d).

Here, the record reflects that the trial court assessed Patterson’s punishment for each

offense. We thus sustain Patterson’s first issue, and we will modify the judgments to

state that the trial court, not the jury, assessed Patterson’s punishment. See Badger v.

State, No. 02-18-00475-CR, 2019 WL 5089761, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct.

10, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying judgment

to reflect that the trial court, not the jury, assessed punishment); see also Marin v. State,

No. 05-19-01160-CR, 2021 WL 4726521, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 11, 2021, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

             III. The Trial Court’s Enhancement-Paragraph Findings

       Patterson’s second issue challenges the trial court’s “found true” enhancement-

paragraph findings. Patterson argues that the trial court erred by holding a

supplemental sentencing hearing to find the enhancement paragraph true the day after

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he was originally sentenced. See State v. Aguilera, 165 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005) (explaining that a trial court retains plenary power to modify a defendant’s

sentence if the defendant timely files a new-trial motion or a motion in arrest of

judgment or if the modification (1) is made on the same day as the original sentencing;

(2) occurs before the court has adjourned for the day; (3) is made “in the presence of

the defendant, his attorney, and counsel for the state”; and (4) “the modified sentence

is authorized by statute”). He contends that without a new-trial motion, the trial court

lacked authority to sua sponte make those findings or to modify Patterson’s sentences

the day following sentencing. See id. He thus asks us to delete the “found true”

enhancement-paragraph finding in each judgment.

      Although the State agrees with Patterson, we are not bound by any agreement

or concessions by the parties on a legal issue. See Oliva v. State, 548 S.W.3d 518,

520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). When, as here, the trial court assesses a defendant’s

punishment, the court is not required to read the indictment’s enhancement paragraph

to the defendant or make an oral finding on the record concerning the enhancement

paragraph. See Garner v. State, 858 S.W.2d 656, 659–60 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993,

pet. ref’d); see, e.g., Cuellar v. State, Nos. 07-20-00057-CR, 07-20-00058-CR,

2020 WL 5931048, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); Davis v. State, No. 05-14-01374-CR, 2016 WL 310093, at

*6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). “Although it is preferred that trial courts read the enhancement

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paragraphs orally and find them to be true or not true on the record, a trial court does

not err by not doing so.” Seeker v. State, 186 S.W.3d 36, 39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing Garner, 858 S.W.2d at 660); see, e.g., Cuellar,

2020 WL 5931048, at *3; Davis, 2016 WL 310093, at *6. A trial court does not err by

failing to announce its enhancement findings in open court prior to sentencing so

long as it appears from the record that the court found the enhancement true and

entered the sentence accordingly. See Meineke v. State, 171 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing Garner, 858 S.W.2d at 660); see,

e.g., Cuellar, 2020 WL 5931048, at *3–4; Davis, 2016 WL 310093, at *6.

      Here, Patterson pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph, and the trial court

accepted his plea, assessed his punishment at 45 years’ confinement for aggravated

sexual assault and 12 years’ confinement on each of the indecency-with-a-child-by-

contact offenses, and sentenced him accordingly. All three sentences were within the

enhanced punishment range for each of the offenses.3 See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§§ 12.32(a), 12.33(a), 12.42(b), (c)(1), 21.11(a)(1), (d), 22.021(e). The trial court’s

written judgments reflect that the trial court found the enhancement paragraph true.

Because the trial court did not err by failing to orally pronounce its enhancement

findings in open court when sentencing Patterson, the trial court’s findings in its

      3
       We note that the sentences were also within the unenhanced punishment
range for each offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32(a), 12.33(a), 12.42(b), (c)(1),
21.11(a)(1), (d), 22.021(e). Reforming the judgments to delete the findings of true
would not shorten the length of Patterson’s sentences.

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written judgments were not in error. See Seeker, 186 S.W.3d at 39 (“Under these

circumstances, in which the trial court has no duty to make an oral finding of true or

not true on an enhancement paragraph, we hold that the finding of true recited in the

written judgment of conviction is not inconsistent with the trial court’s oral silence

concerning the finding.”); see also Epps v. State, Nos. 05-07-00040-CR, 05-07-00041-

CR, 05-07-00042-CR, 2007 WL 2446546, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 17, 2007, no

pet.) (not designated for publication) (“Because the trial court had no duty to make an

oral finding of true or not true on the enhancement paragraph, we conclude the

finding of true recited in the written judgment of conviction is not inconsistent with

the trial court’s oral silence concerning the finding.”). We thus decline to delete the

enhancement-paragraph findings and overrule Patterson’s second issue.

                                   IV. Conclusion

      Because we have sustained Patterson’s first issue, we modify the trial court’s

judgments on Count Two, Count Three, and Count Four to reflect that the trial court

assessed Patterson’s punishment. Having overruled Patterson’s second issue, we

affirm the trial court’s judgments as modified.

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                               /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                               Elizabeth Kerr
                               Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 4, 2024

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