Court Opinion

ID: 9956925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:07:50.495199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:58.886750
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                                APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

                                                         SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                         APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                         DOCKET NO. A-1930-22

Estate of ALICE TRAINOR, by
and through LINDA LACERDA, as
administrator of the Estate of
ALICE TRAINOR, and LINDA
LACERDA, individually and on
behalf of all heirs of Estate of
ALICE TRAINOR,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ACTIVE DAY OF BRICK,
SENIOR CARE CENTERS OF
AMERICA, INC., d/b/a ACTIVE
DAY, ADSC HOLDINGS, INC.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________

                   Submitted March 12, 2024 – Decided April 3, 2024

                   Before Judges Enright and Whipple.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2138-21.

                   Law Office of Patrick Trainor, LLC, attorneys for
                   appellants (Patrick Trainor, on the briefs).
              Parker, McCay, PA, attorneys for respondent (J.
              Brooks DiDonato and Ashley A. Varghese, on the
              briefs).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiffs—the Estate of Alice Trainor, by and through Linda Lacerda as

Administrator and Lacerda individually and on behalf of all heirs of the

Estate— appeal from a January 20, 2023 order granting summary judgment to

defendant, Active Day of Brick, Senior Day Care Centers of America, Inc.,

d/b/a Active Day, ADSC Holdings, Inc. We affirm.

      Decedent, Alice Trainor, was living with vascular dementia while she

was attending adult day health care services at defendant's Active Day of

Brick's facility. On January 7, 2020, 89-year-old Alice began walking toward

the bathroom at defendant's facility, when another participant in the day

program attempted to help her.        Kellie Piaskowski, defendant's activities

manager, intervened, returned the other participant to her seat, and then

assisted Alice in proceeding toward the bathroom. Piaskowski stated in her

deposition:

              I was attempting to guide Alice to the bathroom. I had
              my hand, like open palm on her back, and I had my
              other hand under her arm. Under like her elbow. Like
              that. So I was attempting to like guide her.

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                   We had not taken—you know, we were nowhere
            near the bathroom. We were in what is considered the
            activities/dining room.        Alice was kind of like
            shuffling her feet a little bit . . . .

                 She tripped over her feet. They got kind of like
            bundled, kind of bunched up, and she fell flat down.
            And she banged her face onto the floor.

      Alice was transported by ambulance to Ocean Medical Center, where she

was treated for a contusion on her forehead with a superficial stellate

laceration, a contusion near her left eyebrow, an abrasion on the bridge of her

nose, and tenderness in her right shoulder and cervical spine. She was treated

and released to rest at home with her daughter.        After being seen by her

primary physician, Alice received no further medical treatment for her fall

injuries and returned to Active Day about a week later. After a few weeks,

Alice was found unresponsive at home and taken to the hospital where her

condition deteriorated. Alice was sent home for hospice care on February 18

and passed away at home on March 15, 2020. The death certificate listed her

cause of death as respiratory failure due to congestive heart failure.

      Plaintiffs filed suit on August 19, 2021, raising claims of simple

negligence. In particular, the complaint alleged that defendant had a duty to

provide Alice with a safe environment but failed to do so, resulting in Alice's

sustaining severe injuries to her face, head, and body. Other counts asserted

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negligent hiring and negligent staffing of the facility. The Estate also asserted

a survivor's claim and a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

      Plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to add a claim of wrongful

death, but the motion was denied as untimely. Defendant moved for summary

judgment, arguing plaintiffs' claims failed because they had no medical expert

to support them. The trial judge granted summary judgment on January 20,

2023, finding plaintiffs had not provided an expert medical opinion asserting

any causal relation between the alleged negligence and the injuries Alice

suffered. This appeal followed.

      We review a ruling on summary judgment de novo, applying the same

legal standard as the trial court. Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017).

Thus, we consider, as the trial judge did, "whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one -

sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Surplus Ins.

Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (quoting Brill v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)). Summary judgment

must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories[,]

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party

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is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Templo Fuente De Vida

Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (quoting R.

4:46-2(c)).

      Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to

defendant. They argue defendant maintained a 30-to-1 ratio of patients to

staff1—well in excess of the state-mandated ratio of 9-to-1 and the Medicaid

required ratio of 5-to-1. Citing Tierney v. St. Michael's Med. Ctr., 214 N.J.

Super. 27, 30 (App. Div. 1986), plaintiffs argue that, because of the extreme

imbalance between patients and caregivers, the finder of fact can rely on the

theory of res ipsa loquitur to infer defendant's "lack of due care" and,

therefore, negligence. The trial judge rejected the argument unequivocally,

saying "[t]his is not . . . under any stretch of the imagination, it's not res ipsa

loquitur."

      Plaintiffs argue medical causality is not in question, and a jury does not

need an expert to determine whether defendant's 30-to-1 patient-to-staff ratio

was a gross deviation from the standard of care. We disagree.

1
   The ratio of patients to staff at defendant's facility at the time of Alice's
accident is a fact in dispute, but it is immaterial to plaintiffs' claim, as will be
discussed below.
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      "The fundamental elements of a negligence claim are a duty of care

owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant,

injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach, and damages."

Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479, 487 (2020) (quoting Robinson v.

Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208 (2014)). "Ordinarily, negligence is . . . 'a fact

which must be proved and which will never be presumed,' . . . [but t]he

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where applicable, is a method of circumstantially

proving the existence of negligence." Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,

157 N.J. 84, 95 (1999) (quoting Meny v. Carlson, 6 N.J. 82, 91 (1950) and

citing Tierney, 214 N.J. Super. at 30). "Res ipsa loquitur is not a theory of

liability; rather it is an evidentiary rule that governs the adequacy of evidence

in some negligence cases." Ibid. This theory allows a finder of fact to infer

the defendant's lack of due care only when the three elements of the doctrine

have been satisfied: "(a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence;

(b) the instrumentality was within the defendant's exclusive control; and (c)

there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the

plaintiff's own voluntary act or neglect."        Ibid. (quoting Bornstein v.

Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 269, (1958)).

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      To satisfy res ipsa loquitur, then, plaintiffs would need to demonstrate

that an 89-year-old falling while being assisted by a caregiver "itself ordinarily

bespeaks negligence"; the environment was within "defendant's exclusive

control"; and "there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was

the result of [Alice's] own voluntary act or neglect."       See ibid.      The first

element is not readily met under this record and plaintiffs' theory of the case.

Plaintiffs assert an excessive ratio of patients to staff suggests Alice was not

receiving sufficient attention at the time of her accident and attempt to dispute

defendant's contention she was receiving staff assistance before her fall.

Regardless of the overall ratio of patients to staff that may or may not have

been present at the time of Alice's accident, however, there is no evidence in

the record to support an inference contradicting Piaskowski's sworn testimony

she was assisting Alice when she fell. Furthermore, the scenario suggested by

plaintiffs, that of an 89-year-old falling while walking unassisted, does not

"ordinarily bespeak[] negligence"; it is unlikely that, even with assistance,

such an accident would "ordinarily bespeak[] negligence." On this record, the

third element would be difficult to satisfy as well, for similar reasons.

      Finally, even when successfully proven, res ipsa loquitur only fills a gap

in plaintiffs' negligence case with respect to a breach of the duty of care, not

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with respect to the causal relationship between a purported breach and the

injury suffered. The causal relationship is what the trial judge correctly found

wanting here, though:       "[U]nder no circumstances [is] it appropriate or

permissible to allow a lay jury [to] make a determination as to medical

damages suffered by [Alice] without the benefit of medical testimony." Here,

the jury would have no fact-supported means of judging whether defendant's

purported short-staffing or Piaskowski's helping of Alice was the proximate

cause of Alice's injuries. Even if plaintiffs were able to satisfy all the elements

of res ipsa loquitur, the deficiencies in their negligence claim would still not

be cured. Thus, the trial judge correctly proclaimed, "under any stretch of the

imagination, it's not res ipsa loquitur."

      Plaintiffs' second argument, that no affidavit of merit is required, was

not raised to the trial judge and, therefore, need not be addressed by us. See

State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 404 (2004). Moreover, the argument is irrelevant,

as the trial judge never stated an affidavit of merit was necessary.

      In faulting plaintiffs for failing to provide expert testimony as to

causation of Alice's injuries, the trial judge was not referring to a procedural

requirement such as the affidavit of merit.      See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. The

court, instead, found plaintiffs had failed to put sufficient evidence in the

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record that would permit a reasonable jury to decide the case in plaintiffs'

favor. The trial judge concluded a lay jury is insufficiently knowledgeable of

the specifics of elder care and assistance to competently determine whether

any purported short-staffing or Piaskowski's helping Alice to the bathroom was

the cause of Alice's injuries. Lacking expert testimony to that effect, the trial

judge determined defendant must prevail as a matter of law.

      Affirmed.

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