Court Opinion

ID: 9712432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:53:47.578812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.154300
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the determination of my colleagues to not apply Louisville Cement Co. v. Mumaw (1983) 4th Dist. Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 1219, insofar as it holds that a duty to exercise reasonable care may be fulfilled by either removing the dangerous condition or by a warning. I do not, however, agree that the case is distinguishable on grounds that the defect here was patent. The parties to this appeal agree and concede that the defect was latent. As a corollary to this proposition, I disagree that the case may be resolved by holding Howard guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. By resort to photographs and other matters of evidence concerning the appearance and location of the high tension lines, the majority usurps the function of the trier of fact. It makes a disposi-tive, ultimate factual conclusion which was not made by the court below and did not constitute a basis of the judgment. By doing so, I believe the correct decision has been compromised and made unduly complicated.
The majority acknowledges that the high tension lines constituted a danger to persons attempting to ascend to the roof. The majority likewise acknowledges that the defendant invited plaintiff to ascend to the roof for the purpose of making repairs. However, the majority absolves defendant of any duty on grounds that it did not have control over the wires and that the danger was apparent. The decision today is premised in part upon the fact that Howard's employer had knowledge of the danger equal to that of defendant. I do not view this as a viable basis for the affirmance.
In my view, the basic issue is not, as posed by the majority, whether warning to the supervisor fulfills a duty to warn the employee if such duty exists. The duty is to exercise reasonable care. That duty may or may not be fulfilled by a warning. In any event, there is no duty to warn independent of the duty to exercise reasonable care. The issue is no more and no less than whether defendant exercised reasonable care.
My concurrence in the affirmance is premised solely upon my conclusion that as *210a matter of law, under these cireumstanc-es, defendant's warning to Howard's supervisor met the requisite standard of reasonable care.