Court Opinion

ID: 9659730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:53:40.850809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.175359
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
STRUTZ, Chief Justice.
The defendant has filed a petition for rehearing, pointing out that the trial court did not delay two days after verdict before passing sentence, as required by law.
Section 29-26-01, North Dakota Century Code, provides that after veidict of guilty, the court must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment. Section 29-26 02 then goes on to provide that the time appointed to pronounce judgment must be at least two days after the verdict, ;i the court intends to remain in session so long, or, if not, at as remote a time as can be allowed reasonably.
The record in this case discloses that the trial judge was from another judicial district and that this case was the last case to be tried at that term. It also shows that the defendant’s counsel did request a later time to be set for sentencing, to which the court replied that ordinarily, if the court remains in session, it will allow a number of days subsequent to verdict before pronouncing judgment, but since this was the last case to be tried at the term, the court would pass sentence immediately. This, urges the defendant, was error.
The court clearly advised the parties that it did not intend to remain in session for two days after the verdict because this was the last case to be tried. It must be remembered that the judge was not in his own district and would have no further duties to perform. In State v. Riley, 26 N.D. 236, 144 N.W. 107 (1913), this court held that where sentence has been pronounced less than two days after verdict, there is a presumption that the court did not intend to remain in session for two days after verdict, and in the absence of a showing by the defendant that the court actually did remain in session for two days or more after verdict, the passing of sentence before the expiration of such time was not error.
*294The defendant in this case did object to the passing of sentence without such two days’ delay. But since the judge was sitting in a district other than his own and there was no further business for him to perform, we hold that the passing of sentence without waiting two days comes within <e statutory exception which provides th; t such two-day delay must be observed ot ''if the court intends to remain in s< . ■■ so long.”
' '■ re the court clearly pointed out that ■o not intend to remain in session, it ■ .. error to pass sentence on the de- : without delaying for two days after
The defendant also asserts that our decision in this case has overruled State v. Murphy, 17 N.D. 48, 115 N.W. 84 (1908). From what we say in the opinion, we believe Murphy is not applicable to the facts of this case.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
TEIGEN, ERICKSTAD, KNUDSON, JJ., and C. F. KELSCH, District Judge, concur.
PAULSON, J., deeming himself disqualified did not participate; C. F. KELSCH, District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, sitting in his stead.