Court Opinion

ID: 9908518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 23:02:15.897125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:13.499619
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/8/23 P. v. Garcia CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H050749
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. 149923)

             v.

 ANGEL ZETINA GARCIA,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                         THE COURT1
         Angel Zetina Garcia appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6.2 Counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and Garcia subsequently filed a supplemental brief
on his own behalf. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the order.
                            I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
         In 1993, a jury convicted Garcia of first degree murder. (§ 187.) The jury found
true the allegation that Garcia personally used a firearm during the commission of the
offense. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury further found true the special circumstance that

         1
          Before Greenwood, P. J., Grover, J., and Lie, J.
         2
          All statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated. Garcia
filed his petition under former section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95
was renumbered section 1172.6 with no substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
For clarity, we will cite to current section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.
        3
          The underlying facts are not relevant to the issue raised on appeal.
Garcia committed the murder while lying in wait. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The trial
court found true the allegations that Garcia had previously been convicted of a serious
felony and a prior felony for which he served a term of imprisonment, and sentenced him
to a term of seven years, consecutive to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
(§§ 667, 667.5, subd. (b), 1192.7.) We affirmed the conviction in People v. Garcia (Apr.
28, 1995, H011822 [nonpub. opn.]).
       In 2022, Garcia filed a petition pursuant to section 1172.6, stating that he was
entitled to resentencing under the ameliorative changes set forth in Senate Bill No. 1437.4
The trial court appointed counsel to represent Garcia, and both sides submitted written
responses. The prosecution opposed the petition, contending that Garcia was not eligible
for relief under section 1172.6, for two reasons. First, the jury found that Garcia
committed the murder intentionally while lying in wait, and a person convicted of
intentional murder is not eligible for relief. Second, the testimony at trial strongly
suggested that Garcia was the actual killer, thus precluding him from relief under the
statute. In his reply, Garcia objected to the trial court engaging in any factfinding at the
prima facie stage. Relying on People v. Lewis (2011) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis), Garcia
pointed to portions of the prosecution’s opposition that “analyze[] various [trial]
transcripts and seems to invite the Court to engage in such factfinding.” He argued that
such factfinding “is not a proper legal basis to find a failure to establish a prima facie
showing.” Garcia otherwise submitted on his original petition.

       4
        Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended “the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted
with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) “Senate
Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the
former law to seek retroactive relief.” (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708
(Strong).) That procedural mechanism is set forth in section 1172.6.

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       After a hearing, the trial court denied Garcia’s petition without issuing an order to
show cause. In the order, the court sustained Garcia’s objection to the prosecution’s
argument based on the trial transcripts, holding that the prosecution’s analysis of the
transcripts was “not a proper legal basis to find a failure to establish a prima facie
showing.” Nevertheless, the court held that Garcia was ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law. Relying on jury instructions and the verdict forms, the court explained that
Garcia was “convicted of malice murder (not felony murder, or murder under the [natural
and probable consequences] doctrine, or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.)[.]” In addition, “[b]eyond
the fact that the jury was not given felony murder or [natural and probable consequences]
instructions, the jury found [Garcia] committed his murder intentionally while lying in
wait . . . . This finding required, among other things, that ‘the defendant intentionally
killed the victim.’ . . . Those who intend to kill are not eligible for section 1172.6 relief
because malice has not been imputed.” The trial court denied Garcia’s petition at the
prima facie stage. Garcia timely appealed.
       On appeal, counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to the procedure set forth in
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pages 231-232. We notified Garcia that he could file a
supplemental brief on his own behalf, and that failure to do so would result in dismissal
of the appeal as abandoned. (Id. at p. 232.) Garcia filed a timely supplemental brief on
August 8, 2023. Having reviewed the supplemental brief, we conclude that Garcia does
not raise an arguable issue on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
                                      II. DISCUSSION
       In his supplemental brief, Garcia contends that in denying his petition at the prima
facie stage, the trial court impermissibly engaged in factfinding in violation of Lewis. In
Lewis, the Supreme Court held that while a trial court may rely on the record of
conviction to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing for relief
under section 1172.6, it “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of

                                              3
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation].” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971-
972.)
        Garcia does not raise an arguable issue on appeal. An issue is arguable if it has a
reasonable potential for success, and, if resolved favorably for the appellant, the result
will either be a reversal or a modification of the judgment. (People v. Johnson (1981)
123 Cal.App.3d 106, 109.)
        The trial court did not engage in factfinding in violation of Lewis. In considering
the parties’ responses to Garcia’s petition, the trial court sustained Garcia’s objection to
the prosecution’s argument that was based on the trial transcripts, and agreed with Garcia
that “the Court cannot engage in factfinding or the weighing of evidence and assessment
of credibility at the prima facia[sic] [stage] of these proceedings.”
        Instead, the trial court relied solely on the record of conviction, including jury
instructions and verdict forms from the underlying trial, to conclude that Garcia was
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (People v. Jenkins (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 924, 935 [record of conviction includes “the charging document, verdict
forms, closing arguments, and jury instructions”].) Those documents establish that in
convicting Garcia of first degree murder and finding true the special circumstance that
Garcia committed the murder while lying in wait, the jury necessarily found that Garcia
“intentionally killed the victim.”
        At Garcia’s jury trial, the court instructed the jury: “To find that the special
circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder while lying in wait, is true, each
of the following facts must be proved: [¶] 1. The defendant intentionally killed the
victim, and [¶] 2. The murder was committed while the defendant was lying in wait.”
The jury found this special circumstance to be true.
        The lying-in-wait special circumstance finding requires “an intentional murder.”
(People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 278.) This differs from the offense of first degree
lying-in-wait murder as set forth in section 189, which does not require that the

                                               4
perpetrator act with an intent to kill. (See People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
1257, 1262-1263 (Maldonado).) In Maldonado, the court distinguished between the
lying-in-wait special circumstance and lying-in-wait murder, holding that a defendant
convicted of being an aider and abettor to the latter may be eligible for relief under
section 1172.6 because the jury could convict such a defendant of murder under a theory
of imputed malice. (Id. at pp. 1262, fn. 3, 1266-1267.)
        Maldonado does not apply here because Garcia was convicted of first degree
murder with a lying-in-wait special circumstance, which required a finding that he
“intentionally killed the victim.” Those who act with the intent to kill, as the jury found
true of Garcia, are not eligible for relief under section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 710 [Senate Bill No. 1437 relief is unavailable if the defendant “acted with the intent
to kill”].)
        Because Garcia raises no arguable issue in his supplemental brief, we affirm the
trial court’s post-conviction order.
                                       III. DISPOSITION
        The order denying Garcia’s resentencing petition is affirmed.

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