Court Opinion

ID: 9385145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 22:03:16.994728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.209768
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/5/23 Garcia v. CCS Companies CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 EFRAIN GARCIA et al.,
                                                                                             F083403
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 15CECG03847)
                    v.

 CCS COMPANIES,                                                                           OPINION
           Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. D. Tyler
Tharpe, Judge.
         Efrain Garcia and Ofelia Garcia, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
         Pollak, Vida & Barer, Daniel P. Barer and Anna L. Birenbaum for Defendant and
Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
       Efrain and Ofelia Garcia (plaintiffs) appeal from a judgment entered against them
after the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant CCS
Companies (CCS). The trial court concluded the undisputed facts showed the statute of
limitations on plaintiffs’ claim of malicious prosecution ran prior to the filing of this
action. We conclude CCS met its burden of demonstrating the expiration of the
limitations period and plaintiffs failed to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact on
that point. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Plaintiffs sued CCS and Gary Rosenberg, alleging deceit, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs alleged Allstate Insurance
Company (Allstate), through its attorney Rosenberg, sued them for subrogation after an
accident involving a vehicle that plaintiffs had already sold. Allstate and Rosenberg
continued to pursue the action even after plaintiffs provided documentation showing their
prior sale of the vehicle. As a result, Efrain Garcia’s wages were garnished, both
plaintiffs’ driver’s licenses were suspended, and a lien was placed on their home. The
subrogation action was later dismissed. On or about April 23, 2014, during subsequent
litigation in federal court, plaintiffs obtained documents indicating CCS hired Rosenberg
and pursued the subrogation action on behalf of Allstate. This was plaintiffs’ first
knowledge of CCS’s involvement.
       Apparently, after multiple demurrers, the only remaining claim in this case was the
malicious prosecution cause of action against CCS. CCS moved for summary judgment,
asserting, among other things, that the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ cause of action
against it expired before the complaint in this action was filed.
       CCS’s motion for summary judgment presented these facts: On January 4, 2003, a
driver insured by Allstate was involved in an accident with a Ford motor vehicle. The
police report identified plaintiffs as the registered owners of the Ford vehicle, but they
told the police that they had sold the vehicle. CCS, on behalf of Allstate, retained
attorney Rosenberg and sued plaintiffs for subrogation. On November 14, 2011, the
subrogation action was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. In 2012, plaintiffs sued

                                              2.
Allstate for malicious prosecution, and Allstate removed the action to federal court. On
June 21, 2012, Allstate filed a motion in federal court that included a declaration
explaining that Allstate had retained CCS to pursue the subrogation case against
plaintiffs, and CCS handled the subrogation case. On June 5, 2013, Allstate filed another
motion in federal court, and presented the same declaration again. At the trial in federal
court, the court granted Allstate’s motion for directed verdict and entered judgment
against plaintiffs on April 7, 2015. Plaintiffs filed their complaint against CCS on
December 21, 2015.
       CCS argued the two-year statute of limitations on a cause of action for malicious
prosecution began to run when the underlying subrogation action was dismissed on
November 14, 2011. Even if the late discovery rule applied, plaintiffs learned of CCS’s
involvement in the matter, and the statute began to run, at least by June 21, 2012, when
the declaration explaining CCS’s involvement was filed in the federal court action.
Because both dates were more than two years before the filing of this action in December
2015, CCS asserted the expiration of the statute of limitations barred this action.
       Plaintiffs opposed the motion. The trial court found the expiration of the statute of
limitations barred plaintiffs’ action, granted CCS’s motion, and entered judgment in favor
of CCS.
                                        DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       Summary judgment is properly granted when no triable issue exists as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)1 In moving for summary judgment, a “defendant … has met his
or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that
one or more elements of the cause of action … cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to the cause of action.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the moving
defendant has met its initial burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a

1      All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                                3.
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense
thereto.” (Ibid.)
       “We review de novo the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment.
[Citation.] The court’s stated reasons for granting summary judgment are not binding on
us because we review its ruling, not its rationale. [Citation.] On appeal, this court
exercises its independent judgment in determining whether there are triable issues of
material fact and whether the moving party therefore is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” (Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1168.)
II.    Merits of CCS’s Motion
       The statute of limitations applicable to a malicious prosecution cause of action is
two years. (§ 335.1; Stavropoulos v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 190, 197.)
A cause of action for malicious prosecution “ ‘accrues at the time of entry of judgment in
the underlying action in the trial court.’ ” (Stavropoulos, at p. 197.) In their opening
brief, plaintiffs concede that the underlying subrogation action, which they allege was
maliciously prosecuted against them, was dismissed in November 2011. Thus, the
limitations period for filing their action expired in November 2013. This action was not
filed until 2015. Consequently, absent some reason for late accrual of the cause of action
or tolling of the limitations period, plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the expiration
of the statute of limitations.
       Plaintiffs seem to argue that, because they were not aware the subrogation action
was pursued by CCS, rather than Allstate, the statute of limitations on their claim against
CCS did not commence to run until they discovered that fact. Thus, they appear to
invoke the discovery rule.
       “Under the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must bring a cause of action within the
limitations period applicable thereto after accrual of the cause of action. The general rule
for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time when the cause of
action is complete with all of its elements. An exception is the discovery rule, which
postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to
discover, the cause of action, until, that is, he at least suspects, or has reason to suspect, a

                                               4.
factual basis for its elements.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 389.) A
plaintiff discovers the cause of action when he or she at least suspects a factual basis for
its elements; that is, when he or she “at least ‘suspects … that someone has done
something wrong’ to him [or her] [citation], ‘wrong’ being used, not in any technical
sense, but rather in accordance with its ‘lay understanding’ [citation].” (Id. at pp. 397–
398.) The statute of limitations begins to run “once the plaintiff ‘ “ ‘has notice or
information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry .…’ ” ’ ” (Jolly v. Eli
Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110–1111.)
       “[T]he plaintiff may discover, or have reason to discover, the cause of action even
if he [or she] does not suspect, or have reason to suspect, the identity of the defendant.
[Citation.] That is because the identity of the defendant is not an element of any cause of
action. [Citation.] It follows that failure to discover, or have reason to discover, the
identity of the defendant does not postpone the accrual of a cause of action .…” (Norgart
v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 399, fn. omitted.)
       By 2012, plaintiffs suspected someone had done something wrong to them. This
is clear, because they filed a malicious prosecution action against Allstate, the plaintiff in
the subrogation action filed against them. Thus, even if the discovery rule applied to
their claim, and their cause of action did not accrue until they discovered the facts of that
claim, the cause of action accrued no later than 2012, more than two years before this
action was filed. Plaintiffs’ lack of knowledge that CCS was involved and potentially
liable, that is, their lack of knowledge of the identity of a potential defendant, did not
postpone the commencement of the limitations period. Accrual of their cause of action
was not postponed until they learned, during the federal litigation, that CCS was involved
in maintaining or controlling the litigation of the subrogation action.
       Plaintiffs had the opportunity to name unknown defendants as Doe defendants in
their action against Allstate that was removed to federal court. (See § 474.) After
learning the identity of an unknown defendant through discovery in that litigation, they
could have amended their complaint to substitute the actual name of the defendant for a
Doe defendant (see ibid.) and pursued the claim. The newly identified defendant would

                                              5.
have been “considered a party to the action from its commencement so that the statute of
limitations stop[ped] running as of the date the original complaint was filed.” (GM Corp.
v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.) Although plaintiffs apparently
represented themselves in their prior action against Allstate, “[a] party proceeding in
propria persona ‘is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no
greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (First American Title Co. v.
Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.)
       We conclude the two-year period for bringing the malicious prosecution cause of
action against CCS expired before plaintiffs filed this action in December 2015. The trial
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of CCS.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. CCS is entitled to its costs on appeal.

                                                                                  HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

SMITH, J.

MEEHAN, J.

                                              6.