Court Opinion

ID: 9640404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:05:29.791622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:29.554712
License: Public Domain

COMBS, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from Part II of the majority opinion, insofar as it directs an instruction on retrial that specific awards have heretofore been made for loss of affection and companionship.
*675Pursuant to a fundamental principle of jurisprudence, it is the function of this Court to decide only cases and controversies properly before it. The issue as to the instruction was not properly presented. The only appeal from the trial court’s judgment was taken by the present appellees. No complaint was made as to the instructions, nor did Turfway cross-appeal seeking a modification of instructions in the event of retrial of the issue appealed, i.e., one specific element of damages.
I am wary of a procedure whereby a party may inject into our discretionary review an issue initiated by a separate concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals’ opinion made no direction concerning the present question, as it was not in issue there, and indeed had not been presented to the trial court.
If as the majority of this Court believes a court has inherent power to depart from the general rule if injustice appears likely (ante at 672), that power should first be exercised within the sound discretion of the trial court, not from this Bench when no issue has been joined below.
I further believe that, if the issue is to be decided, the majority has decided it the wrong way. It strikes me as somewhat hypocritical to pledge our troth to the jury system, and in the same breath to voice our expectation that the jury will not perform as instructed by the court. A jury instructed to determine nothing but damages to future earning capacity, based on evidence relevant to that issue, would, we ought to presume, measure nothing more than that element of damages. Awards previously made to other parties for other damages, having no relevance to the issue, ought not to be a factor in the jury’s deliberations.
LEIBSON, J., joins in this separate opinion.