Court Opinion

ID: 9725759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:09:06.684116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:19.472235
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING JUSTICE LORENZ delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant asserts that this court has overlooked a number of facts and arguments in affirming his conviction. We considered all of the arguments of the parties and the entire record in this case, as we are duty bound to do in every case. Yet, in the interests of justice and finality, we address these alleged oversights. In his petition for rehearing, defendant states that this court “failed to note that Morris was shown [the lineup] photo immediately before identifying Rodriguez as the shooter.” (Emphasis in original.) On the contrary, this court noted, “At trial, Morris identified defendant from a photograph of a lineup, and after asking defendant to remove his eyeglasses, identified him at counsel table.” (Emphasis added.) We believe that our statement is the more accurate one. Moreover, we agreed with defendant that the identification was suggestive, but held that in these circumstances, defendant was not denied due process. Defendant argues that Foster and Moore require reversal, but we adhere to our analysis of these cases.  Defendant maintains that our reliance on People ex rel. Biassick v. Callahan (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 330, 279 N.E.2d 1, is misplaced, because Blassick addressed the contention that the accused could avoid in-court identification, whereas defendant in the present case made no such argument. This distinction is not borne out by the record, which reveals that defense counsel made precisely this argument at trial: “What I’m going to ask the court to do is preclude. I see no reason and I see it to be highly prejudicial at this point in time if they ask him ‘Do you see anywhere in court the fellow you saw running through here?’ or ‘Does that look like the guy you identified?’ Because there has been no identification procedure here. He’s sitting with me here next to the counsel table. He’s obviously the Defendant. I don’t know if he’s seen other photos or not at this time. And they should be precluded from asking that question ***.” After the assistant State’s Attorney suggested that Morris be shown a lineup photo, defense counsel reiterated: “The motion is still that he should be precluded because an identification at this point is highly suggestive and overwhelmingly prejudicial.” This same argument was rejected in Blassick, and our opinion on the issue covers defendant’s position at trial as well as his new argument in this court.  Defendant argues strenuously that this court “completely failed to address or mention four other examples of improper comments by the prosecutor.” Not true. This court stated, “Defendant complains of other comments, but we deem any error to have been waived by defendant’s failure to object contemporaneously and his failure to specify such comments in his post-trial motion. [Citation.]” Of the four additional remarks, two were fairly innocent when read in context. Defendant claims that the prosecutor vouched for Morris’ credibility by stating: “You’ve also got to believe the State’s Attorney’s Office, he doesn’t want to say it, but you have to believe it that we are in on it, that the police are in on it, that we made Danny Morris come in here and he didn’t want to and identify him.” In context, the prosecutor argued that Santana made a positive identification of a person known to her; that she was either lying or telling the truth, but was not mistaken; and that if she was lying, then the State’s Attorney’s Office, the police and the other witnesses all participated in the frame-up. It is abundantly clear that the prosecutor was pointing out the implications of the defense theory in the case, and was not vouching for the credibility of any of the witnesses. Defendant argues that the prosecutor speculated on what he (defendant) would do if acquitted by saying: “Today is the day it catches up to him for creeping around the gangways and the alleys of our city with a gun, for stalking his victims, for killing two innocent people indiscriminately without mercy, without concern, whether it’s a girl or a boy, a young man or an old man, and then for scurrying off into the night to do it again.” It appears to us that this comment was aimed at defendant’s conduct at the time of the crime, and did not amount to a prediction of the consequence of an acquittal.  Defendant also argues that the prosecutor dwelt on the seriousness of the crime when he said, “[TJhis case, ladies and gentlemen, is the worse [sic] crime I have ever seen as a prosecutor.” We note that the quoted remark followed a similar comment by defense counsel, to wit: “What happened to those two kids is the most brutal, disgusting, senseless, ugly crime that was ever committed.” We do not condone the prosecutor injecting his personal assessment or professional judgment of the severity of a crime into the trial, but we think it is unrealistic to hold the prosecutor to a standard of sterile analysis in response to defense counsel’s touching show of humanity. Defendant argues, with some merit, that the prosecutor evoked sympathy on behalf of the victims, their mother, and prosecution witnesses. The prosecutor stated: “You know, did he [defendant] ask Theresa or Joe, ‘Would you like to live maybe a few more years?’ Did he ask them, you know, ‘would you like someday to grow up and marry and fall in love and have kids?’ Did he think about that when he did it? Did he say, ‘well, maybe you’d like to have you know, a few more moments of life. Kiss your mother goodbye, say goodbye to your brother.’ Did he care? Don’t forget, don’t let the crime get lost in the garbage on the side. You can’t forget and don’t forget what he did to that woman. Three people died that night, and you know it. Her life is over, his mother’s life is over. She will never bee [sic] the same again. It is over. She will carry this her whole life, and I want you to be angry with him because you should be.” Although the comment is inflammatory and improper, the main body of our opinion notes that the issue in the case was identification, and the resolution of that issue turned on the credibility of the three identification witnesses. In our view, it is likely that the jury was outraged by the nature of the crime and sympathetic to the victims and their mother long before any of the closing arguments. The jury was instructed to decide the case based on the evidence, and not on the basis of counsel’s arguments or their individual sympathies. We trust that the jury followed instructions, and we adhere to our opinion that improper comments were not a material factor in defendant’s conviction.  Finally, defendant states that this court failed to discuss his argument that it makes no sense for the legislature to exempt minors from an extended term, but to subject them to natural life imprisonment. It is true that we focused upon the death penalty and mentioned extended-term sentencing only in passing. We take this opportunity to address defendant’s argument. An extended-term sentence may be imposed upon an offender if he or she was previously convicted of the same or a more serious felony; if the offense was accompanied by wanton cruelty; if the crime was committed against a relatively helpless person; or if the offense involved multiple sexual assault of the same victim. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(b).) A natural life sentence may be imposed for murder accompanied by certain aggravating factors, and a term of natural life must be imposed where an offender is found guilty of more than one murder or is adjudged a habitual criminal. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 1005 — 8—1(a)(1), (2).) In view of the overlap in circumstances warranting enhancement, reasonable minds could differ as to the consistency of exempting minors from extended terms but not from natural life terms. However, due process does not mandate complete legislative consistency. A statute is a proper exercise of police power so long as it is “reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare.’ ” (People v. Bradley (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 410, 417, 403 N.E.2d 1029, quoting Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co. (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 152, 159, 128 N.E.2d 691.) The legislature has placed multiple murder and habitual criminality in a separate category from other crimes, and the legitimacy of this distinction cannot be questioned from a public safety standpoint. We cannot say that it is irrational for the legislature to have mandated a greater punishment for these crimes, and the refusal to exempt minors from such punishment seems to us reasonably designed to remedy the perceived threat of multiple murder. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument. Affirmed. MEJDA, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.