Court Opinion

ID: 9956650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 18:00:47.073715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:44.221430
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14322    Document: 40-1     Date Filed: 04/02/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14322
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       DOUGLAS VILLEGAS,
       a.k.a. Loko,
       a.k.a. Loco,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14322

                  D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00507-LMM-JEM-1
                          ____________________

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Appellant Douglas Villegas appeals his total sentence of 161
       months following his conviction for conspiracy to possess with in-
       tent to distribute heroin and at least 50 grams of methampheta-
       mine. Villegas argues that the government breached his plea agree-
       ment by recommending that his sentence be served consecutively
       despite orally promising at the plea hearing that it would take no
       position on the issue. Villegas also argues that the district court
       erred in imposing a consecutive sentence because it did not con-
       sider the mitigating factor of his personal growth during incarcer-
       ation. Villegas further argues that his district court counsel ineﬀec-
       tively assisted him, acting more as a prosecutor than as a zealous
       advocate. Having read the parties’ briefs and reviewed the record,
       we aﬃrm Villegas’s sentence.
                                         I.
              Villegas’s plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. An
       appeal waiver does not bar a defendant’s claim that the government
       breached the plea agreement. United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794
       F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2015). We ordinarily review de novo
       whether the government breached a plea agreement. United States
       v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022). However, when a
       defendant did not raise an alleged breach of the plea agreement
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       22-14322               Opinion of the Court                          3

       before the district court, we review for plain error. Id. We ﬁnd
       plain error only when (1) an error has occurred, (2) the error was
       plain, (3) the error aﬀected the defendant’s substantial rights, and
       (4) the error seriously aﬀected the fairness of the judicial proceed-
       ings. Id. at 1319. If all factors are established, we may exercise our
       discretion to correct the error. Id. at 1319-20.
               A defendant’s substantial rights are aﬀected if the error “af-
       fected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. at 1319.
       (quotation marks omitted). In challenging a sentence, this requires
       the defendant to show that there is a “reasonable probability” that
       his sentence would be diﬀerent. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398
       F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005); Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267,
       1276 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that the party challenging the error
       bears the burden of proof ). “[W]here the eﬀect of an error on the
       result in the district court is uncertain or indeterminate—where we
       would have to speculate—the appellant has not met his burden.”
       Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1301.
              The record indicates that Villegas fails to meet the burden of
       plain error in establishing that the government breached his plea
       agreement. We need not determine if the government’s recom-
       mendation for a consecutive sentence, even though it was with-
       drawn, constituted breach because the third element of plain error
       review—that such a breach aﬀected Villegas’s substantial rights—is
       not met. See Malone, 51 F.4th at 1319. The district court’s clear
       statements on the record strongly indicate that it would have im-
       posed a consecutive sentence regardless of the government’s
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14322

       opinion on the matter. The district court stated that it wanted to
       ensure that Villegas be punished separately for his federal crimes,
       and it acknowledged that might not happen with a concurrent sen-
       tence. Furthermore, the Sentencing Guidelines, although not
       mandatory, provide that a district court impose consecutive sen-
       tences when the instant oﬀense was committed during a defend-
       ant’s term of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a). Thus, in the
       absence of a reasonable probability that his sentence would have
       been diﬀerent, Villegas has failed to demonstrate plain error based
       upon the government’s alleged breach of the plea agreement. See
       Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1299; Malone, 51 F.4th at 1319.
                                         II.
               We review the imposition of a consecutive sentence for
       abuse of discretion, and the resulting sentence must be reasonable.
       United States v. Covington, 565 F.3d 1336, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 2009).
       Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we must examine “the to-
       tality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the
       statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.”
       United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
              A district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to af-
       ford consideration to relevant factors that were due signiﬁcant
       weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac-
       tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
       proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
       2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). The proper factors for
       considering whether a sentence is unreasonable are set out in
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       22-14322                Opinion of the Court                           5

       18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and include the nature and circumstances of the
       oﬀense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need
       to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and the
       need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend-
       ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
       conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(6).
               “The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a
       matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”
       United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation
       marks omitted). The district court may “attach great weight” to
       any single factor or combination of factors. United States v. Over-
       street, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
       Further, when determining the defendant’s sentence, a district
       court is “free to consider any information relevant to [the defend-
       ant’s] background, character, and conduct.” United States v. Tome,
       611 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
       “[A]n acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered
       the defendant’s arguments and the factors in [§] 3553(a) is suﬃ-
       cient” to indicate that the district court properly considered the rel-
       evant factors. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir.
       2005), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
       127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
             The record demonstrates that Villegas’s claim fails on the
       merits because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                         22-14322

       imposing a consecutive sentence on Villegas. 1 The district court
       stated that it considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors, including
       Villegas’s personal history, deterrence, and incapacitation. The dis-
       trict court had the discretion to attach great weight to the need to
       punish Villegas for the commission of the instant oﬀense, particu-
       larly because of the provision in the Sentencing Guidelines recom-
       mending consecutive sentences for such oﬀenses committed dur-
       ing incarceration. See Clay, 483 F.3d at 743; Overstreet, 713 F.3d at
       638; U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a).
               We “will vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable
       only if we are left with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the
       district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
       § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
       of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
       States v. Woodson, 30 F.4th 1295, 1308 (11th Cir.) (quotation marks
       omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,143 S. Ct. 412 (2022). Because
       the district court considered all the proper factors and did not con-
       sider any improper ones, and in the absence of a clear error of judg-
       ment in weighing those factors, the district court did not abuse its
       discretion. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.
                                              III.

       1 Thus, because Villegas’s claim fails on the merits, we need not address

       whether the claim is barred by his appeal waiver. See United States v. St. Hubert,
       909 F.3d 335, 346 n.7 (11th Cir. 2018), abrogated on other grounds by United States
       v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 859, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2025 (2022).
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       22-14322               Opinion of the Court                         7

               The merits of a claim of ineﬀective assistance of counsel
       present a mixed question of law and fact that we ordinarily review
       de novo. Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir.
       2005). For claims of ineﬀective assistance of counsel, a convicted
       defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deﬁ-
       cient and that the deﬁcient performance prejudiced the defense.
       Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064
       (1984).
              However, our precedent “require[s] the district court to have
       the opportunity to examine ineﬀective-assistance claims before”
       we review them. United States v. Padgett, 917 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th
       Cir. 2019). Accordingly, we have held that, “except in the rare in-
       stance when the record is suﬃciently developed, we will not ad-
       dress claims for ineﬀective assistance of counsel on direct ap-
       peal.” United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008)
       (alteration accepted) (quotation marks omitted). Rather, the
       proper venue for a federal defendant presenting an ineﬀective-assis-
       tance claim is a collateral attack presented in a § 2255 proceeding
       where necessary evidence on the performance and prejudice
       prongs of Strickland can be presented. Id.
               We conclude that the record is not suﬃciently developed for
       us to adjudicate Villegas’s claim of ineﬀective assistance of counsel.
       See id. Any such claim Villegas wishes to raise would best be raised
       in a § 2255 motion, where he would have the opportunity to
       properly request an evidentiary hearing on his claim. See id. Thus,
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       8                     Opinion of the Court                22-14322

       we decline to consider Villegas’s claim of ineﬀective assistance of
       counsel.
            Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-
       ﬁrm Villegas’s sentence of 161 months’ imprisonment.
             AFFIRMED.