Court Opinion

ID: 990802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:27:06.572632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:42.232848
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                     No. 96-4043
SCOTTY ANTOINE DAVIS, a/k/a
Antoine Davis,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Graham C. Mullen, District Judge.
(CR-95-34-MU)

Submitted: August 27, 1996

Decided: November 12, 1996

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark T.
Calloway, United States Attorney, Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, Marlene Bishop, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Scotty Antoine Davis pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988). Davis was
sentenced to serve 211 months imprisonment to be followed by four
years supervised release. He appeals, asserting that the federal gov-
ernment lacked the jurisdiction to charge a violation of the Firearms
Owners' Protection Act because Congress exceeded its Commerce
Clause powers by enacting § 922(g)(1). We affirm.

In North Carolina on January 18, 1995, Davis possessed a Ruger
9mm semi-automatic pistol and several 9mm caliber cartridges, with
which Davis twice shot Jeffrey Kevin Moore following an alleged
altercation.* (JA Vol II at 6). The government determined that the
pistol was manufactured in Connecticut or Arizona and the ammuni-
tion was manufactured in Minnesota.

Davis's challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is based
upon the recent United States Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 63 U.S.L.W. 4343 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1995)
(No. 93-1260). He claims that Congress exceeded its Commerce
Clause powers in enacting § 922(g)(1). In Lopez, the Supreme Court
invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V), a provision
in the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, making possession of a
firearm within 1000 feet of a school a federal offense. Lopez, 63
U.S.L.W. at 4343.

The Court struck down the conviction in part because the statute
"contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-
_________________________________________________________________
*There is some dispute as to whether or not the shooting was done in
self-defense. But the district court stated that even if the shooting were
in self-defense, the imposed sentence would not be effected.

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by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects inter-
state commerce." Id. at 4347. Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, the
statute in question in this case, § 922(g), does contain such a jurisdic-
tional element because it applies only to firearms having "an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 4347.

Provisions criminalizing possession of firearms under the Com-
merce Clause have continually been upheld. When addressing a num-
ber of federal firearm provisions, including § 922(g), this court has
held that "[t]he federal statute criminalizing the possession of a fire-
arm by a felon [18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West Supp. 1995)] does not
violate the Commerce Clause because sufficient nexus exists between
the harm of firearms and interstate concerns." United States v.
Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir. 1995).

The Supreme Court has held that for § 922(g)'s predecessor statute
there was "no indication that Congress intended to require any more
than the minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in
interstate commerce." Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563,
575 (1977). This minimal connection with interstate commerce is suf-
ficient to allow Congress to assert its broad regulatory powers in the
area of firearm possession. See id. Because the government offered
proof that both the pistol and the ammunition were manufactured out-
side the State of North Carolina, the state of possession, Davis's argu-
ment must fail and his conviction and sentence be affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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