Court Opinion

ID: 9897050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:06:18.32165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:12.063651
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                              Appellant,

                                     v.

                            EVELYN BARONE,
                                Appellee.

                            No. 4D2022-2487

                           [November 8, 2023]

  Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Deborah Carpenter-Toye, Judge; L.T.
Case No. 21-009514MU10A.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Paul Patti, III,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Gordon Weekes, Public Defender, and Sarah Sandler, Assistant Public
Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

   The State appeals a nonfinal order granting a motion to suppress field
sobriety exercises (FSEs) in a misdemeanor prosecution for driving under
the influence (DUI). The State argues law enforcement may compel field
sobriety exercises based on reasonable suspicion alone, and the trial court
erred in requiring probable cause, resulting in the suppression of evidence.
We agree and reverse.

   I. The Facts

   In the early morning hours, two officers observed the defendant speed
past two marked police vehicles, drift into another lane of travel, and
correct herself. The officers stopped the defendant for speeding.

   The arresting officer testified he immediately smelled alcohol when the
defendant opened the window. He also noticed the defendant’s eyes were
glossy, her speech slurred, and she had trouble locating her license and
proof of insurance. She told the arresting officer she was driving home
from a friend’s house and had consumed one drink. The defendant was
unsteady on her feet when asked to exit the vehicle.

   The arresting officer asked the defendant if she would do roadside
sobriety exercises, and she said yes. When the arresting officer asked her
to begin the first exercise, the defendant asked, “Why do I have to do that?”
The arresting officer told her that they needed to be sure she was “okay to
drive.”

    The arresting officer’s body camera footage was admitted and played at
the hearing. The arresting officer first asked, “So, what I would like to do
is just ask you a few questions and have you do a few roadside sobriety
exercises, so I can make sure you’re okay. Would you be willing to do
that?” The defendant answered, “Yeah.”

   The arresting officer then asked the defendant to stand behind her car,
so he could begin the roadside sobriety exercises. She asked, “Why do I
have to do that?” The arresting officer answered, “I’m asking you to do
some roadside sobriety exercises.” She said, “I get it . . . Like why?” He
told her, “Because I can see signs of impairment. You’re slurring your
speech; I smell an odor of alcohol; the way you were driving.”

   In the final exercise, the arresting officer asked the defendant to close
her eyes and estimate thirty seconds. After a minute had gone by, the
arresting officer walked behind her and placed her in handcuffs.

    After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the arresting officer
observed signs of impairment and had reasonable suspicion to detain the
defendant and ask her to perform the exercises as part of the DUI
investigation. But the trial court concluded the arresting officer needed
probable cause to “compel” the defendant to conduct the exercises. The
trial court focused on the arresting officer’s words that the defendant
“needed” to do the exercises—i.e., her consent was required.

   The trial court granted the motion to suppress. From this order, the
State now appeals.

   II. The Analysis

    We generally review an order on a motion to suppress under “a mixed
standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s factual determinations but
reviewing de novo its application of the law to the facts of the case.” State
v. T.M., 248 So. 3d 172, 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Because the State raises
a legal issue, our review is de novo.

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    Courts have inconsistently applied either reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to determine the legality of law enforcement’s actions in
conducting FSEs. See Amar V. Patel & Krysten A. Pogue, Walk & Turn,
Finger to Nose, One Leg Stand: Oh My! How Florida Courts Have Defined
Field Sobriety Exercises, 26 St. Thomas L. Rev. 285 (2014) (discussing
extensive conflicts in caselaw). Here, the trial court found the officers had
reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant but needed probable cause
to “compel” the defendant to undertake the FSEs. In this latter decision,
the trial court erred.

    The proper standard for a law enforcement officer to request FSEs is a
reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed a law violation. If an
officer has reasonable suspicion a defendant has committed a DUI, the
defendant can be required to perform FSEs, and consent is immaterial.
State v. Johnson, 361 So. 3d 911, 913–14 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023), notice
seeking discretionary review filed, No. SC2023-0978.

    As the trial court correctly found, the arresting officer had a reasonable
suspicion to temporarily detain the defendant for a DUI investigation and
ask her to conduct the FSEs. See State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703–04
(Fla. 1995) (recognizing an officer was authorized to request the defendant
to perform FSEs where the officer had reasonable suspicion that a DUI
was being committed); State v. Castaneda, 79 So. 3d 41, 42 (Fla. 4th DCA
2011) (same); see also Origi v. State, 912 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
(“[L]aw enforcement may temporarily detain a driver for a DUI investigation
based upon a reasonable suspicion. The purpose of such investigation is
to determine whether probable cause exists for a DUI arrest.”).

   As a practical matter, the idea that an officer can “compel” the FSEs is
inaccurate. An officer cannot compel a driver to cooperate in performing
FSEs. But the Florida Supreme Court has held that a driver’s refusal to
submit to the exercises can be admissible at trial to show consciousness
of guilt. Taylor, 648 So. 2d at 704. An officer needs only a reasonable
suspicion of a DUI to temporarily detain a driver and ask him or her to
perform FSEs.

    The trial court’s ruling in this case, and rulings in other conflicting trial
court decisions, have applied a Fourth Amendment analysis to require the
State to demonstrate the defendant voluntarily consented, which would
provide an exception to the search warrant requirement. See, e.g., State
v. Lynn, 11 Fla. Law Weekly Supp 798b (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. June 15, 2004)
(citing Smith v. State, 753 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (discussing
the consent exception to the warrant requirement)).

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   The defendant’s consent, however, is irrelevant to whether the
temporary investigative detention is supported by a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Florida’s
Stop and Frisk Law, section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2022). See also
Johnson, 361 So. 3d at 913–14; State v. Liefert, 247 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1971) (holding that whether the defendant had consented to the
physical sobriety tests was immaterial where the officer had “sufficient
cause” to believe the driver was intoxicated). Indeed, our supreme court
and we have previously held that roadside FSEs are analyzed under the
“reasonable suspicion” standard for an investigative stop. See Taylor, 648
So. 2d at 703–04; Castaneda, 79 So. 3d at 42.

   For these reasons, we reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate
the order granting the motion to suppress and enter an order denying the
motion.

   Reversed and remanded.

GROSS, MAY and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

                           *         *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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