Court Opinion

ID: 9580979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:10:49.436993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:38.378439
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(dissenting).
A majority of this court has imposed a six-month suspension of respondent’s license to practice law for failure to timely file his tax returns and for false certification on client security questionnaires. I do not disagree with the determination that respondent violated rules of professional conduct nor is the sanction imposed inconsistent with the many suspensions imposed on lawyers for similar misconduct in the past. I believe, however, that the six-month suspension is excessive.
The majority opinion repeats our often-stated rule that the purpose in imposing sanctions is to deter other lawyers, assure the public that we will maintain the ethics of the profession and reflect our view of the attorney’s fitness to practice law. In the seminal case involving a failure to file income tax returns, we stated that “[t]he ultimate issue before the commission was the fitness of respondent to practice his chosen profession.” Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Kraschel, 260 Iowa 187, 194, 148 N.W.2d 621, 625-26 (1967). In contrast, the majority in this case emphasizes the first two purposes of the sanction at the expense of its third and most important goal.
In the past we have relied heavily on deterrence as a justification for the sanction of suspension. In 1985 we observed: “As our cases will indicate, we are determined to continue to impose sanctions and, if necessary, to end tax violations by members of the profession, to increase the periods of suspensions.” Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Jones, 368 N.W.2d 157, 157 (Iowa 1985). We repeated this admonition in Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Piazza, 389 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Iowa 1986) and in Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Matias, 397 N.W.2d 514, 515 (Iowa 1986).
This effort to eradicate this type of violation has been disappointing. Upon careful reflection, I believe that we must reexamine our dogmatic reliance upon the penalty *462of suspension for the violation of failing to file timely tax returns.
We first examine what has occurred since 1967 when we decided Kraschel. In Kraschel while we recognized that not all jurisdictions have held that a lawyer’s failure to file timely tax returns was an act of moral turpitude, we chose to say that it was. 260 Iowa at 197, 199, 148 N.W.2d at 627, 628. While I do not challenge the fifty-one decisions following Kraschel which used the same reasoning to find ethical violations,1 I do question the imposition of a suspension as a matter of course in all fifty-two cases. Many of these cases involved tax fraud, criminal prosecution and other problems which justified the suspension. It is clear, however, that we have come to the point where a mere willful failure to file timely returns triggers the penalty of suspension, and the only issue now is the length of that suspension. This practice abandons our approach of viewing these discipline cases individually and ignores the ultimate issue of the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.
It is apparent that our tough approach has not stopped lawyers from filing untimely returns. According to my unofficial count, from 1967 through 1983, we heard and imposed the sanction of suspension in twenty-three cases; from 1984 through 1989, we heard and imposed a suspension in twenty-nine cases. During the first period the average number of cases was less than one and one-half per year, while in the last five years, during and after our warnings of an increase in the length suspension, the number averaged nearly five cases per year. Admittedly, we do not know if this type of violation would have • increased if our sanction had been less severe. It is also highly probable that the additional enforcement provided by our Client Security and Attorney Discipline Committee has added to the number of cases in recent years. If our purpose was to wipe out or nearly wipe out this form of misconduct, we have not met this goal.
It is obvious that our heavy policing of untimely tax filings is motivated, in part, by the shared embarrassment which all lawyers suffer when they see or hear in the news of the prosecution of lawyers and other tax preparers for failing to file returns. This dovetails with our concern about the public perception of lawyers. As times have changed and the complexity of the law increased, bar members have specialized and a greater number of them no longer prepare tax returns. The public is aware that many lawyers have no expertise in tax matters, whether in preparing a client’s return or their own. Nevertheless, the public is not impressed with a lawyer, tax preparer or public official it knows does not file timely tax returns.
Our concern with how the public perceives our profession is flawed in a case such as this where it had no way of knowing that respondent had not filed his tax return until this proceeding made it public. Apparently state and federal tax authorities did not find that respondent’s conduct warranted notifying the public by commencing a criminal action.2 While the pub-*463lie may favorably regard our ferreting out of lawyers and sanctioning them, this policy is inappropriate when the lawyer’s misconduct arises from personal activities rather than professional life.
The preeminent issue is whether respondent’s conduct was so improper that it casts doubt on his fitness to practice law. In analyzing the severity of failing to file a timely tax return, I believe we need to look at the individual circumstances surrounding the conduct. Respondent’s corporate law firm withheld taxes from his wages; consequently, most of his taxes were prepaid. He filed his 1984, 1985 and 1986 returns well past the due date, but he did pay the taxes that were due and had the funds to pay them at all times. No one accuses respondent of attempting to evade or avoid the payment of his taxes. Rather, he was negligent and careless, giving unreasonable answers to explain the late filings.
Respondent’s untruthfulness in answering the questions on the client security form and a possible lack of candor in explaining his tax problems are more serious matters. I do have some sympathy for respondent’s answering the questions on the form. He is required to file the client security form, and if he answers other than yes on the tax questions, he is going to be investigated. After fifty-two suspensions, I am certain that he knew what the outcome would be. This provides a strong temptation to lie. While this does not excuse his untruthfulness, it places his conduct in perspective. I believe we must determine how seriously this act affects his ability to serve the public as a lawyer.
When we look at respondent’s fitness to practice law from the perspective of his practice, it is clear that he was serving his clients well. He has an unusually high income which suggests that he has devoted time to his practice and that his clients are satisfied with his legal services. He has contributed to his community and taught at his law school. But for his untimely tax filings and his dishonest answers, the record indicates a lawyer extremely fit to practice his profession.
We know that lawyers are prosecuted for traffic offenses, drunk driving and possession of controlled substances. These matters seldom proceed to disciplinary hearings. I fail to see where respondent’s conduct is more reprehensible than these other offenses. If his filing difficulties do not involve the evasion or avoidance of his tax liability and do not affect his ability to handle his legal business, I seriously question whether this affects his fitness to practice law to the point where we should suspend his license. While respondent was untruthful concerning his personal tax returns, he did not deceive anyone while conducting legal business. There is no suggestion in this record that respondent is not completely trustworthy in the conduct of his law practice. While I do not approve of respondent’s dishonesty, especially in his answers to an official committee of this court, I am more concerned about lawyers who are untruthful while representing clients or otherwise handling legal business.
Other sanctions or conditions placed on his continued right to practice law would be more appropriate. A six-month suspension for this type of misconduct makes sense only if we conclude that the public is at risk from the errant lawyer. This is not the case here. The wrong committed by respondent did not endanger his clients. They, too, will suffer along with respondent, his law firm and his family by the imposition of a long suspension.
We also should consider the effect that a suspension will cause on the individual lawyer in determining the merit of the sanction. A self-employed lawyer is not salaried and cannot turn his income on and off like a water spigot. It takes ability, time and effort to produce a steady income in a law practice. The requirement that a lawyer dispose of all of his files and cases and turn his clients over to someone else negates the previous time and effort required to build a practice. It often takes months or years to return to a presuspension in*464come. I would speculate that a six-month suspension will cost a nonsalaried lawyer much more than his yearly income. A six-month suspension is a financially devastating sanction.
In summary, I cannot agree that the imposition of a six-month suspension is in line with the reasoning behind the imposition of the penalty. We are merely following a long line of cases without stopping to consider the individual respondent’s conduct to determine whether the sanction is required. We should fashion a lesser and more innovative sanction that would protect the public while serving as a deterrent to lawyers as well as not devastating the respondent financially.

. In the interest of brevity I have not cited all of the cases that have been decided since Kraschel. Most of the cases before 1987 have been summarized in Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Crawford, 351 N.W.2d 530, 531-32 (Iowa 1984) and Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Davison, 414 N.W.2d 97, 99-100 (Iowa 1987). Since Davison we have decided the following cases: Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Summa, 416 N.W.2d 690 (Iowa 1987); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Belay, 420 N.W.2d 783 (Iowa 1988); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Bertelli, 422 N.W.2d 175 (Iowa 1988); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Houser, 423 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1988); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Ramey, 424 N.W.2d 435 (Iowa 1988); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Morris, 427 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa 1988); Committee on Professional and Conduct v. Jackson, 429 N.W.2d 122 (Iowa 1988); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Jay, 430 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 1988); Committee and Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Jones, 441 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1989); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Clauss, 445 N.W.2d 758 (Iowa 1989); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. McMillen, 449 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1989).

. It is interesting to note that in the first twenty-three cases referred to previously, fifteen involved criminal prosecutions while of the last *463twenty-nine cases, only three had a criminal component.