Court Opinion

ID: 9444242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:04:00.642566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.533677
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/3/23 Kinfoussia v. Hamade CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 GUY MICHEL KINFOUSSIA,                                       B320550

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. SQ007632)
           v.

 BASMA HAMADE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Rolf Michael Treu, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
      Law Offices of Rosenthal & Associates and Lisa F.
Rosenthal for Defendant and Appellant.
      Pamela Rae Tripp for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ___________________________
      A father subject to a French judgment governing custody of
his daughter obtained a restraining order and child custody
orders in California under the Domestic Violence Protection Act
(DVPA; Fam. Code § 6200 et seq.)1 based on California’s
temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA; § 3400 et seq.).
Prior to the expiration of the five-year period of the California
orders, at the father’s request, the California court renewed the
orders for another five years. The mother appeals from the
renewal order, contending that the trial court violated her
constitutional right to due process by precluding live testimony
and evidence. We find no abuse of discretion has been shown
concerning the presentation of evidence. The mother further
contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
the UCCJEA to issue the original orders and the renewal order
as to the child. We conclude that the trial court had temporary
emergency jurisdiction to issue the original orders, but the
UCCJEA does not provide for the renewal of orders issued under
the court’s emergency jurisdiction. We modify the renewal order
to apply solely to the restraining order for the protection of
Father, and as modified, we affirm.

           FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Initial Custody Determination and Change in Home State

     Appellant Basma Hamade (Mother) and respondent Guy
Michel Kinfoussia (Father) married in France on October 20,

      1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code,
unless otherwise stated.

                                2
2007. Shortly afterward, Father obtained a job in California and
moved to the United States, while Mother remained in France.
Their daughter C.-A.K. was born in France in May 2008.
       The parties divorced in France in 2010. The divorce
judgment provided that parental authority would be exercised
jointly. The child would reside with Mother, but Father had free
access and accommodation rights. Father agreed to pay monthly
child support.
       The child lived with Mother in France until she was seven
years old, but often stayed with her maternal grandmother.
Mother’s health deteriorated between 2013 and 2015. Mother,
grandmother, and the child decided Father should be entrusted
with custody.
       In September 2015, Mother provided Father with a
handwritten note stating that she and Father had decided the
child would live with Father in the United States until further
notice, and as a result, Father would no longer pay alimony until
their child returned to Mother’s custody.
       In October 2015, Mother and Father filed a joint
application in the French court to modify the divorce judgment.
The parties requested the habitual residence of the child be fixed
in the United States in California, with free access and
accommodation rights to Mother upon notice to Father. The
parties agreed Father would no longer pay child support until
such time as the child returned to France to live with Mother.
The reason provided for the request was that the child had
expressed a desire to live with Father, and with Mother’s
consent, had changed her residence to live with Father for an
indefinite period, unless the child expressed a desire to return to
live with Mother in France.

                                 3
      In October 2015, Mother brought the child to the United
States. She told Father that she could not care for the child due
to her own mental health issues. Father agreed to care for her,
enrolled her in school in California, and the child was happy.
      On March 11, 2016, Mother appeared at the hearing in
France on the joint application to modify the divorce judgment,
but Father could not attend. Father wrote a letter to the French
court attempting to give written authority to Mother to act on his
behalf at the hearing. The French court issued a ruling that day
dismissing the proceeding based on Father’s failure to appear in
person.2

      2 Mother’s translation of the March 11, 2016 order, entitled
“Order of Dismissal,” states that the French court ruled, in
pertinent part: “Whereas at the hearing [Father] did not appear
nor was he represented, and [Mother] appeared alone; [¶]
Whereas by letter received at the Clerk’s Office on March 9, 2016,
[Father] indicated that he could not attend the hearing of
March 11, 2016; [¶] Whereas the court notice of November 4,
2015 indicated the mandatory presence of both parties at the
hearing to get a court-certified agreement, the parties having
completed a joint request form on October 1, 2016; [¶] Whereas it
is therefore appropriate to declare the case abandoned; [¶] FOR
THESE REASONS [¶] WE DECLARE the dismissal of the
lawsuit; [¶] WE NOTE the termination of the proceedings and
the relinquishment of jurisdiction; [¶] WE LEAVE the costs to be
borne by the plaintiffs.”
       Father’s translation of the March 11, 2016 court order,
entitled “Waiver Order,” states that the French court ruled, in
pertinent part: “Whereas at the hearing [Father] has not
presented or represented, that [Mother] presented herself; [¶]
Whereas by letter received at the registry on March 9, 2016,
[Father] indicated that he could not attend the hearing on
March 11, 2016; [¶] Whereas the convocation on November 4,

                                4
      A few months later, in July 2016, Mother filed a criminal
complaint in France against Father for abduction of a minor by a
parent outside the national territory.
      On November 4, 2016, Mother traveled to Los Angeles.
Father dropped off the child at Mother’s hotel so they could visit.
The child’s smart watch had GPS tracking. After about ten
minutes, Father noticed Mother and the child left the hotel, but
he assumed they were going to dinner. Father grew concerned
when he saw Mother and the child were at Los Angeles
International Airport.
      The child called Father from the airport. She said Mother
had taken her to the airport with three strangers who claimed to
be her uncles. During the conversation, one of the men grabbed
her phone from her. Father immediately contacted the police.
The child escaped from the men and notified an Air France agent
that she was being abducted. The agent also called the police.
Father and the police successfully intervened. The police
recovered a passport that Mother caused to be issued for the child
without Father’s knowledge under the false pretense that the
original passport had been lost.

2015 indicated the compulsory presence of the both parties to the
hearing to confirm an agreement, parties who have completed a
joint application form on October 1, 2016; [¶] Whereas it is
therefore necessary to declare perfect the waiver of the affair; [¶]
FOR THESE REASONS [¶] DECLARES perfect the waiver of the
1st Instance Introduced; [¶] FIND the extinguishment of the
proceeding and the divestment of the Jurisdiction; [¶] LEAVE
costs borne by applicants[.]”

                                 5
Domestic Violence Restraining Order

       On November 18, 2016, Father filed a request in California
for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Mother
seeking protection for himself and protection for C.-A.K. as a
family member in his household (case No. SQ007632). He noted
that the parties had a divorce judgment in France and provided
the case number. He asked for personal conduct orders enjoining
Mother from harassing them and a stay-away order.
       Father attached a request for child custody and visitation
orders. He stated that the parties shared joint legal and physical
custody under the French order, but he feared for his the child’s
safety and wanted sole legal and physical custody, with no
visitation by Mother. The child had lived with Father in
California since 2015. Father also filed a request for an order
preventing Mother from traveling with their child without his
permission or a court order. He declared that he did not give
notice of the request for a DVRO to Mother, because he was
afraid for his child’s safety.
       The trial court issued a temporary restraining order that
day. The protected persons were Father and C.-A.K. The court
issued a child custody and visitation order that found the child’s
country of habitual residence was the United States. The court
concluded there was a risk that Mother would take the child out
of California without Father’s permission. The court ordered
legal and physical custody to Father, with no visitation to
Mother.
       The court also ordered no travel with the child. Mother
was required to notify the embassy or consulate of France of the
temporary DVRO and provide proof of notification to the court

                                6
within 10 days. The order stated that the court had jurisdiction
to make child custody orders under the UCCJEA and The Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq).
       Mother was personally served in France with the request
for a restraining order. On December 12, 2016, a hearing was
held on the request for a restraining order.3 Father was self-
represented, but Mother did not appear. Father testified, and he
provided a copy of the French divorce judgment. The court had
also received a declaration filed by the child’s maternal
grandmother.
       The court noted that an order made by the California court
providing sole legal and physical custody to Father, with no
visitation for Mother, would be a change from the French divorce
judgment. The court relied on the evidence that Father
submitted stating the parties agreed for the child to come to
California and live with Father, and Mother could visit her. The
court found the child had been living in California with Father
for more than a year.
       The court explained to Father that although custody could
be awarded in connection with the DVRO, the order would have
an expiration date. The DVRO was considered a temporary order
compared to the proceedings in France. Father needed to register

      3 Father included the reporter’s transcript for the
December 12, 2016 hearing in his appendix on appeal. In
Mother’s reply brief, she notes that the trial court did not have
the benefit of this transcript in connection with the renewal
proceeding, but she has no objection. On the court’s own motion,
we take judicial notice of the reporter’s transcript for the
December 12, 2016 hearing filed in Father’s appendix.

                                 7
the French divorce decree in California in order to enforce the
judgment and modify it. Otherwise, Mother could go back to the
French court and get an order to have the child returned to her
custody based on the French judgment.
      The court stated, “Since the order that I issued on
November 18th included custody orders involving your daughter,
I’m making those same orders now, and they will be part of this
more permanent order.” The court entered a restraining order
protecting Father and C.-A.K. for a period of five years. Mother
was enjoined from harassing or contacting them, and ordered to
stay 100 yards away except brief, peaceful contact with Father
and the child as required for court-ordered visitation in the
French judgment.
      The court also entered a child custody and visitation order
giving sole legal and physical custody of C.-A.K. to Father, with
no visitation to Mother. The form for the order contained a pre-
printed statement that the court found it had jurisdiction to
make child custody orders under the UCCJEA, but the court did
not check a box on the form to provide the child’s country of
habitual residence.

Events Following DVRO

      Mother violated the restraining order by sending
unsolicited emails and text messages to the child and Father.
For example, in June 2017, Mother sent an email to Father
stating, “Until my last breath I will not let you go [Father]. Note
that in your head.”
      In July 2017, an arrest warrant was issued for Father
pursuant to the criminal proceedings in France, charging him

                                 8
with abducting a child from the person with custody and keeping
the child outside of France. In May 2018, police in Brazil
escorted Father and the child from a plane and questioned them
for hours based on the criminal proceedings in the French court.
Reentering the United States after a different trip with child in
June 2018, Father was hand-cuffed, searched, and questioned for
hours due to the warrant.
      In March 2018, Mother sent an email to Father stating,
“Continue playing deaf and continue to pretend you are
[un]touchable. You do not even have an idea about what is going
to happen to you in very little time my poor. [sic] You make me
sad. I will have warned you enough. Too late for you now.
Courage. Really, courage.”
      Mother sent an email to the child stating, “Hello my
daughter. I give you big kisses and I remind you that I love you
very much even though your daddy takes us away from each
other but that has lasted enough. It’ll be finished soon. That is a
promise.” The child responded from Father’s account that she
wanted to stay with her father, and Mother would respect her
wishes if Mother really wanted what was good for her. Mother
accused Father of sending a fake message and added, “You are
ridiculous but it isn’t important you will pay the high price and
not with me. [sic]”
      Father appeared in the criminal case in France, where he
provided testimony and supporting documentation. In January
2020, the French criminal court found the parents had mutually
agreed the child would leave France to join Father in the United
States. Father had a set address in California that Mother knew,
so Mother was aware of the child’s place of residence at all times.

                                 9
Father was acquitted of all charges of wrongfully withholding the
minor child.

Request to Renew Restraining Order

      On November 24, 2021, in the California court, Father filed
the request to renew the restraining order after hearing in case
No. SQ007632, which is the order at issue on appeal. He asked
the court to renew the DVRO and associated orders because
Mother had violated the order and he was afraid Mother would
abuse him in the future.
      Father submitted his supporting declaration in lieu of
personal testimony. He also provided the French divorce
judgment, the joint application in the French court to modify the
divorce judgment that was ultimately dismissed for failure to
appear, the California court orders made in connection with the
original domestic violence proceeding, the findings and judgment
in the criminal proceedings in France, email messages from
Mother with translations, email messages from the child to
Mother expressing in detail that she wanted to live with Father,
and the child’s written work stating the most important lesson
that she has learned is to distrust strangers, such as strangers
claiming to be uncles.
      Mother received notice of the request to renew the
restraining order, but did not file a written response. The parties
appeared with their attorneys for a hearing on the renewal
request on December 15, 2021. No reporter’s transcript of the
proceedings has been included in the appellate record. The court
found case number SQ007632 was related to another family law
proceeding between the parties, Superior Court case number

                                10
SD035883. The court designated case number SD035883 as the
lead case, and transferred case number SQ007632 for all further
proceedings. By stipulation of the parties, the hearing was
continued to February 7, 2022.
      A hearing was held on February 7, 2022. No minute order
or reporter’s transcript for the proceedings on February 7, 2022,
have been included in the record on appeal. At a subsequent
hearing, however, the trial court read portions of the February 7,
2022 minute order into the record. On February 7, 2022, on the
court’s own motion, the request to renew the restraining order
was continued to April 8, 2022. The minute order stated that
subject matter jurisdiction remained at issue in the renewal
proceeding.
      In February 2022, Mother filed a brief challenging
California’s subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings. The
brief was replete with statements of fact that had been
adjudicated to be false by both the French court and the
California court.
      Father filed a responsive brief on the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction arguing that the court had jurisdiction under
various provisions of the UCCJEA. He also argued that the
French court’s March 11, 2016 order relinquished jurisdiction
over custody, even though the child had lived in the United
States for less than six months, there was no dispute between the
parties, and Father later told the California court that he was
subject to a French custody order. He attached several
documents, along with translations.
      He included an email from Mother dated September 18,
2015, in which she explained the steps that the parties needed to
take to withdraw the child from her French school and enroll her

                               11
in school in the United States, as well as the legal documents
they needed to file to give Father full custody. He included a
handwritten note from Mother dated September 29, 2015, to the
child’s school in France, informing the school that the child would
no longer be attending as of October 1, 2015, because she would
be living in the United States.
       Mother filed a reply. She attached the declaration of a
French attorney in lieu of personal testimony, who explained the
history of the legal proceedings in France. When Father did not
appear for the hearing on March 11, 2016, the French court
dismissed the filing without prejudice. Legally, there was no
change of custody from the original orders contained in the
divorce judgment. Contrary to Father’s interpretation of the
March 11, 2016 order, the French family court never relinquished
any subject matter and territorial jurisdiction over the child and
her parents. The attorney stated that Mother intended to obtain
handwriting experts to establish that documents she purportedly
wrote and signed were forgeries. Furthermore, she intended to
obtain an expert to testify that her email and icloud accounts
were hacked, and she denied sending the September 2015 email.
       On April 8, 2022, a hearing was held on the request to
renew the restraining order. Mother’s attorney stated that a
French attorney was ready to testify that France never
relinquished jurisdiction over custody determinations and the
California court never acquired it for purposes of issuing the
original restraining order.
       The trial court found that jurisdiction in California was
appropriate. Mother had the opportunity to contest jurisdiction
at the time of the original proceeding and chose not to avail
herself of that. Father’s concerns were legitimate and had a

                                12
reasonable basis. The court extended the restraining order for an
additional five-year period.
       Mother’s attorney argued that Mother had a due process
right to oppose the request to renew the restraining order,
present testimony, and have a hearing on the issues. The court
asked Mother for an offer of proof of the factual basis in
opposition to the renewal request. Mother’s counsel argued that
the original allegations against Mother in 2016 and the
allegations afterward were inaccurate. She asserted that Father
had testified in the French criminal proceedings that the mutual
agreement of the parties was temporary, that Mother never tried
to kidnap the child, and that the child was going back to France.
In addition, Father’s requests for a change of custody had been
denied by the French court. The child was not in danger from
Mother, and there were no allegations of abuse to Father.
Mother argued that the evidence would show, through French
interpreters and witnesses in France who were prepared to
testify, that the allegations forming the basis of the 2016
restraining order and afterward were inaccurate. Mother had a
handwriting expert to testify that Father’s evidence was based on
forged documents.
       After Mother’s offer of proof, the trial court concluded that
it had subject matter jurisdiction and granted the request to
renew the restraining order for five years. On April 11, 2022, the
court entered an order renewing the DVRO and associated orders
for five years. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the
renewal order.
       On March 6, 2023, the trial court entered a stipulated
agreement of the parties regarding custody and visitation under

                                13
the lead case number, SD035883.4 The agreement acknowledged
the existing restraining order. The parties agreed that except for
certain visits described in the agreement with specific
parameters that the parties agreed to observe, “the restraining
order shall continue to remain in full force and effect. Any
further visit(s) not specified herein including any contact between
[Mother] and [the child], outside of a therapeutic settling, shall
be mutually agreed to in writing between the parties.” The
agreement continued in relevant part: “i. The Court has
jurisdiction over the minor child because no other state has
assumed jurisdiction, and [California] is an appropriate forum;
[¶] ii. The Country of habitual residence of the minor child is the
United States of America.” The parties also agreed that Father
has sole legal custody of the child.

                          DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

      On appeal, we review the trial court’s renewal of a DVRO
under the abuse of discretion standard. (Rybolt v. Riley (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 864, 874–875.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780)
      Whether the trial court, in exercising its discretion, applied
the appropriate legal standard to an issue is subject to our
independent review. (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
1457, 1463.) “ ‘ “If the [trial] court’s decision is influenced by an

      4 Father’s request for judicial notice of the stipulation and
order, which was filed with this court on April 3, 2023, is granted.

                                 14
erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an
unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not
properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.]” ’ ”
(In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 116.)
       The trial court’s finding that California has jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA is reviewed for substantial evidence.
(Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1286.) “When
conducting a substantial evidence review, we must review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the ruling or
judgment being reviewed, and indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the family court’s findings. [Citation.]” (Id. at
pp. 286–1287.) Statutory interpretation, however, is a question
of law that we review de novo. (Ibid.)
       “ ‘Failure to comply with the procedural requirements of
the UCCJEA is subject to harmless error analysis.’ [Citation.]
That is, the party challenging the ruling of the lower court ‘must
show it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the
appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the
error.’ [Citation.]” (A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
504, 517.)

Statutory Scheme Governing DVRO Proceedings

      The DVPA authorizes the court to issue a restraining order
to prevent acts of domestic violence and abuse, if an affidavit or
testimony shows to the court’s satisfaction reasonable proof of a
past act or acts of abuse. (§ 6300, subd. (a).) After notice and a
hearing (§ 6340, subd. (a)), the court may issue an order enjoining

                                15
a party from, among other things, harassing, contacting, or
disturbing the peace of another party (§ 6320, subd. (a)).
       Personal conduct, stay-away, and residence exclusion
orders issued after notice and a hearing may have a duration of
up to five years. (§ 6345, subd. (a).) “These orders may be
renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five or more
years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court, without a
showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order.”
(§ 6345 subd. (a).) The duration of any other orders, however,
including custody orders, is governed by the law related to those
specific subjects. (§ 6345, subd. (b).)
       If the restrained party contests the renewal of the DVRO,
the petitioning party has the burden to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the party still has a reasonable apprehension
of future abuse. (Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 510.)
The protected party does not need to introduce evidence of
abusive conduct after the original order became effective because
that would require the protected party to show the initial order
was ineffectual in order to justify an extension. (Id. at pp. 510–
511.) Evidence of additional acts of domestic violence or
violations of the original restraining order may be relevant to
whether the protected party has a reasonable fear of future
abuse, but such evidence is not required to renew the restraining
order. (In re Marriage of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 525, 539.) The trial court considers the evidence and
the findings underlying the initial order in appraising the risk of
future abuse, but principles of issue preclusion and estoppel
preclude the restrained party from challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the initial order. (Ritchie v. Konrad
(2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.)

                                16
Due Process for Renewal of Domestic Violence
Restraining Order

      The sole issue that Mother raised in opposition to the
request to renew the DVRO was her challenge to the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Mother contends the trial
court denied her due process rights by refusing to allow live
testimony and the presentation of evidence at the hearing, as
well as an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against her. We disagree.
      The trial court may issue a DVRO based solely on affidavits
and has discretion to exclude oral testimony. (In re Marriage of
Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1499.) The authority to
exclude oral testimony, however, does not override the due
process requirement to provide a hearing under section 6340. (In
re Marriage of D.S. and A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 935.)
The trial court’s exercise of its discretion to exclude oral
testimony in connection with an application for a DVRO should
be informed by the due process right to have a meaningful
opportunity to be heard that is consistent with the nature of the
case. (Ibid.)
      In In re Marriage of D.S. and A.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
p. 935, the appellate court found the trial court failed to provide a
meaningful hearing in the context of a request for a DVRO
because the court did not make any inquiry of the parties, who
were self-represented, or allow an opportunity for cross-
examination on disputed issues. The appellate court concluded
that the judicial officer’s role in a DVRO hearing with self-
represented litigants was different than an adversarial
proceeding where the parties were represented by counsel; the

                                 17
trial court in a domestic violence proceeding could not rely on pro.
per. litigants to know the proper procedural steps, raise
objections, ask relevant questions of witnesses, and otherwise
protect their due process rights. (Ibid.)
       Assuming that a restrained party has the same due process
rights in connection with renewal of a DVRO, we conclude
Mother had a meaningful opportunity to be heard in this case.
Both Father and Mother submitted declarations and evidence to
the trial court in advance of the hearing in lieu of live testimony.
A hearing was held, the parties were represented by counsel, and
the trial court inquired of the parties about several issues. The
court allowed Mother’s counsel to make an extensive offer of proof
as to the evidence that Mother sought to present. The offer of
proof concerned many facts and issues that were irrelevant or
had been previously litigated in connection with the original
DVRO, which Mother was precluded from contesting due to
principles of issue preclusion and estoppel. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying oral testimony in the context
of this case, and Mother was not deprived of her due process right
to be heard on the material issue before the trial court.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

      In her briefs on appeal, Mother did not raise any argument
contesting renewal of the DVRO for the protection of Father. We
do not consider contentions that Mother raised for the first time
at oral argument. (Palp, Inc. v. Williamsburg National Ins. Co.
(2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 282, 291.)
      Mother contends, however, that the California court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to issue or

                                18
renew the DVRO and associated custody orders as to the child.
We conclude the trial court had temporary emergency jurisdiction
to issue the original orders, but did not have jurisdiction to renew
the DVRO or custody order as to the child.

      A. UCCJEA Jurisdiction Generally

      The UCCJEA provides the exclusive method for
determining subject matter jurisdiction in child custody disputes
involving other jurisdictions. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 310.)5 The UCCJEA ensures that only one state has
jurisdiction to make “child custody determinations,” including
orders for custody or visitation. (§ 3402, subd. (c); In re Marriage
of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1015, 1037
(Fernandez-Abin).) A “child custody proceeding” is any

      5 The issue of whether the UCCJEA confers “fundamental”
subject matter jurisdiction is unsettled. (Compare In re
J.W. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 353, 364–367 [holding the
UCCJEA does not govern fundamental jurisdiction] and In re
L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 728, 741–742 (conc. opn. of Moor, J.)
with In re Marriage of Kent (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 487, 491–492,
495–496 [parties’ stipulation for California court to modify North
Carolina court’s custody and support order was insufficient to
establish modification jurisdiction under the UCCJEA] and A.M.
v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 352, 354–355
[concluding mother who did not object to family court’s
continuing jurisdiction under section 3422 at the outset of the
proceeding did not forfeit jurisdictional challenge on appeal].) We
need not address in this case whether the UCCJEA confers
fundamental subject-matter jurisdiction or simply contains
mandatory jurisdictional rules because we conclude the trial
court had authority to issue the original orders in this case.

                                 19
proceeding in which custody and visitation are at issue with
respect to a child, including a proceeding for protection from
domestic violence. (§ 3402, subd. (d).) The UCCJEA serves as
the basis for subject matter jurisdiction as to custody issues,
while the DVPA is the procedural vehicle to invoke the subject
matter jurisdiction authorized by the UCCJEA. (Fernandez-
Abin, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038.) We “treat a foreign
country as if it were a state of the United States[.]” (§ 3405,
subd. (a).)

      B. Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction to Issue 2016
         DVRO and Custody Orders

      It is undisputed in this case that the initial child custody
determination was made in France; the California court did not
make the first child custody determination concerning the child.
Other than the temporary emergency jurisdiction provisions of
section 3424, a California court cannot modify a child custody
determination made by a court of another state unless certain
conditions are present. (§ 3423) Relevant to this case, the
California court could not modify the French judgment unless
California was the home state of the child under section 3421,
subdivision (a)(1), and either the French court determined it no
longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 3422
or was an inconvenient forum, or one of the courts determined
that the child and both of her parents were no longer residing in
France. (See § 3423.) There was no evidence presented to the
court in November 2016 that the French court found it was an
inconvenient forum or no longer had jurisdiction, and since

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Mother continued to reside in France, the conditions to modify
the French child custody order were not met.
       However, California courts have temporary emergency
jurisdiction “if the child is present in this state and . . . it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the
child . . . or parent of the child, is subjected to, or threatened
with, mistreatment or abuse[.]” (§ 3424, subd. (a).)
       If there is a previous child custody determination that is
entitled to be enforced, or a child custody proceeding in another
state having jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, any order issued by
the California court under its emergency jurisdiction “must
specify in the order a period that the court considers adequate to
allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the
state having jurisdiction under [s]ections 3421 to 3423, inclusive.
The order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is
obtained from the other state within the period specified or the
period expires.” (§ 3424, subd. (c).)
       In addition, when a California court that has been asked to
make a child custody determination learns another state with
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA made a child custody
determination, section 3424, subdivision (d), requires the
California court to “immediately communicate with the other
court.” Similarly, if a California court exercising jurisdiction
under the UCCJEA learns a child custody proceeding has been
commenced in, or a child custody determination made by, a court
of another state under that state’s temporary emergency
jurisdiction, the California court must “immediately communicate
with the court of that state to resolve the emergency, protect the
safety of the parties and the child, and determine a period for the
duration of the temporary order.” (§ 3424, subd. (d).)

                                21
       “ ‘[E]ven though emergency jurisdiction is intended to be
short term and limited, [a court] may continue to exercise its
authority as long as the risk of harm creating the emergency is
ongoing.’ [Citation.]” (Fernandez-Abin, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1041.)
       We agree with Father that the California court had
temporary emergency jurisdiction to issue the 2016 DVRO and
the associated custody orders on the day that they were entered.
Father and the child were present in California when the orders
were made. The California court was aware of the French
judgment governing custody. The court explained to Father that
the California orders were temporary as compared to the French
custody orders, as well as the steps that Father needed to take to
modify the French custody orders. Mother’s contentions
concerning the 2016 orders are both untimely and moot. She did
not challenge the length of the DVRO, its application to the child,
the associated custody orders, the underlying facts, or the
California court’s failure to communicate directly with the French
court at the time the orders were made or for almost five years
thereafter. Because we conclude below that there was no
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to renew the order, the 2016
orders for the protection and custody of the child have expired,
and any issue that Mother could have raised in a timely
challenge concerning the duration, the facts supporting
emergency jurisdiction, or the communication with the French
court is moot.

                                22
     C. 2021 Renewal Order

      We agree with Mother that the trial court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to renew the order as to the child.
      As stated above, the DVPA authorizes renewal of personal
conduct, stay-away, and residence exclusion orders. (§ 6345
subd. (a).) The statute explicitly states, however, that the
duration of any other orders, including custody orders, is
governed by the law related to those specific subjects. (§ 6345,
subd. (b).)
      Section 3424, subdivision (c), of the UCCJEA provides that
any order issued pursuant to California court’s temporary
emergency jurisdiction “remains in effect until an order is
obtained from the other state within the period specified or the
period expires.” The UCCJEA does not provide for renewal of an
order made in a child custody proceeding under the court’s
temporary emergency jurisdiction. The renewal of the orders as
to the child must be reversed.
      On appeal, Father contends that the trial court had
jurisdiction to renew the California orders, because after they
were issued, the French criminal court confirmed Father properly
had custody of the child. We disagree with Father’s analysis.
The finding of the French criminal court that Mother and Father
mutually agreed the child would live with Father in the United
States, thereby acquitting him of child abduction, was not
equivalent to a French family court order finding that France no
longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction or was an
inconvenient forum. On this record, there is no evidence that the
California court had jurisdiction in 2021 to modify the French
custody determination under section 3423.

                               23
      Nothing in this court’s disposition, however, is intended to
foreclose proceedings in California governing custody of the child
that are consistent with the UCCJEA. At oral argument,
Mother’s attorney represented that Mother will not be seeking to
gain primary custody of the child, who is over 15 years old and
has lived in the United States for many years, but rather to
establish a relationship with her through visitation.

Motion to Dismiss the Appeal

      On April 3, 2023, Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s
appeal in this appellate court on the ground that the stipulated
order entered by the trial court on March 6, 2023, made the
issues on appeal moot. We disagree. The stipulated order states
that except for the visitation described in the agreement, the
restraining order shall continue to remain in full force and effect
and Father has sole custody. The parties’ agreement merely
stated the existing circumstances under the restraining order and
did not forfeit Mother’s pending appeal of the jurisdictional issues
underlying the restraining order. The parties’ agreement also
stated that the California court has jurisdiction because no other
state has assumed jurisdiction. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred
merely by the consent of the parties. (Schneer v. Llaurado,
supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1287.) The evidence showed the
French court assumed jurisdiction over custody in the divorce
judgment. Moreover, the fact that the California court had
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination in 2023 did
not mean the court had jurisdiction to enter the renewal order in
2021. “Subject matter jurisdiction over a child custody dispute

                                24
either exists or does not exist at the time the petition is filed[.]”
(Ibid.) Father’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot is denied.

                           DISPOSITION

       The April 8, 2022 order is modified to apply solely to Guy
Michel Kinfoussia as the protected person, striking the portions
of the restraining order for the protection of C.-A.K. and
associated custody orders, and as modified, the April 8, 2022
order is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties are to
bear their own costs.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                             MOOR, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

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