Court Opinion

ID: 9772916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:33:04.738452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.240371
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I would have no trouble with this case had appellant been charged and convicted of attempting to receive stolen property under § 564.011, RSMo 1978. See State v. Hunt, 651 S.W.2d 587 (Mo.App.1983) (involving a sting operation). The legislature did abolish the legal impossibility defense for attempt offenses, and a person can be convicted of attempting to receive stolen property when the property is, in fact, not stolen. I do not believe that the legislature intended that the same facts could constitute an offense under both § 570.080 and § 564.011 nor do I believe that the legislature intended creating two different degrees of punishment for the same acts, depending solely upon which statute the prosecutor may choose to file.
I would either re-transfer this case as improvidently transferred, or in the alternative, adopt the opinion of the court of *428appeals, which follows, as the opinion of the Court.
“Defendant, Jay S. Sweeney, appeals from his conviction in a jury trial of receiving stolen property and sentence of five years’ imprisonment. Defendant raises seven points on appeal. We need only address his first point, which claims the State failed to make a submissible case because the property the defendant received was, in fact, not stolen. We reverse and order the defendant discharged.
“Defendant was charged as the result of a “reverse sting” operation conducted in May, 1982. A police officer, posing as a dealer in stolen goods, went to defendant’s place of business for the purpose of selling a Rolex Presidential watch to him. The officer had borrowed the watch from a local jewelry store. The officer told the defendant that the watch had been stolen in Chicago. In May 11, 1982, the defendant paid the officer $1000 for the watch. An expert testified the watch had a retail list price of $9000 and a wholesale price of $5000.
“The dispositive issue is whether defendant can be guilty of the completed crime of receiving stolen property where the property in question was not stolen. The State argues the defendant is guilty of receiving stolen property relying on the language of § 570.080, RSMo (1978), which provides that a person commits the offense if he receives the property of another “knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has been stolen.” (Emphasis added.) The contention is that since the defendant believed that the watch was stolen he is guilty of the completed crime. We disagree.
“The contention of the State is that § 570.080 does not require the property to be stolen, because the requirement is not as clearly stated as it was in the predecessor statute to § 570.080. Section 560.270, RSMo (1969) (repealed 1979) provided:
Every person who shall buy, or in any way receive, with intent to defraud, any property that shall have been stolen from another, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall, upon conviction, be punished. ...
“That section was replaced by § 570.080 which provides:
A person commits the crime of receiving stolen property if for the purpose of depriving the owner of a lawful interest therein, he receives, retains or disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has been stolen.
“Court decisions since the new statute became effective have required that the property must in fact be stolen to support a conviction for the completed offense. State v. Hurd, 657 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Mo.App.1983); State v. McCoy, 647 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Mo.App.1983). The instruction for this offense also states the requirement that the property be stolen. MAI-CR2d No. 24.10.
“A reading of § 570.080 as a whole, including the title and comments therein, supports the defendant’s argument that this element of the offense is still required. The title of the statute is Receiving Stolen Property. (Emphasis added.) Section 570.080.2(3) makes admissible evidence that a defendant “acquired the stolen property for a consideration which he knew was far below its reasonable value.” (Emphasis added.)
“The State points out that § 570.080 was derived from Model Penal Code § 223.6. State v. Sours, 633 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Mo.App.1982). It then cites to the Comment in the Model Penal Code which states: “There is no requirement in § 223.6 that the property in fact have been stolen; it is sufficient if the actor believes that the property probably has been stolen.”1 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Official Draft and Revised Comments, Vol. II, at 239 (1980). *429Section 223.6, in pertinent part, provides that a person is guilty of the offense if he receives property of another “knowing that it has been stolen or believing that it has probably been stolen.” The State argues that since this language is similar to that of § 570.080, the Missouri statute does not require the property be stolen.
“The provision of the Missouri statute that the State relies on was enacted to relieve the State of proving that a defendant knew in fact that the property was stolen. Under the new statute, it is sufficient for a conviction that the State prove, directly or circumstantially, that the defendant believed the stolen property was stolen. Further evidence that this change in language is directed at the mental element of the crime is found in § 570.080.-2(1)(2)(3), which permits circumstantial proof of the knowledge or belief. These provisions were not part of the predecessor statute, § 570.270. These provisions indicate an attempt to make it easier to prove the mental element.
“The Comment to § 570.080 states:
The state can make its case by proving that the defendant knew the property had been stolen or believed it probably had been stolen. The second is a lesser burden, but is justified because it corresponds more closely to reality. The fence “knows” the property was stolen in the sense that he has good reason to believe it was stolen. By putting the standard in terms of belief as well as knowledge, the section avoids the problem of a juror putting too restrictive a meaning to “know.”
§ 570.080, Y.A.M.S. (1979), Comment at 701. The Comment says nothing about eliminating the requirement the property be stolen.
“The leading Missouri case on point is State v. Hunt, 651 S.W.2d 587 (Mo.App.1983). In Hunt, the defendant was charged with and convicted of attempting to receive stolen property, to-wit, television sets. The television sets were in fact not stolen. Citing § 564.011, RSMo (1978), the court rejected the defense of legal impossibility in attempted crimes, and stated: “If the condition of the televisions had been as defendant supposed, the crime would have been completed.” Hunt, 651 S.W.2d at 589. The obvious implication is since the television sets were not stolen, the crime could not have been completed. See also State v. Sample, 673 S.W.2d 61 (Mo.App.1984).
“Since § 570.080 requires the property be stolen, it would be legally impossible for the defendant in this case to be guilty of the completed crime. Missouri has eliminated legal (and factual) impossibility as a defense to attempt crimes, § 564.011.2, RSMo (1978), but there is no similar statute eliminating legal impossibility as a defense to completed crimes. One reason § 564.-011.2 was enacted was to prevent exoneration of a defendant where attempt liability should be imposed. § 564.011, Y.A.M.S. (1979), Comment at 388.
“We therefore hold that a person who receives property that is not stolen but which he believes to be stolen may be guilty of an attempted crime, but cannot be convicted of the completed crime of receiving stolen property. In view of our holding, we need not address the other points raised by defendant on appeal.”

. It might be noted that the Comments to the Model Penal Code add that "[n]ormally, such questions, must be analyzed in terms of whether the purported receiver can then be convicted of attempt, and the issue turns on the attitude of the jurisdiction toward ‘impossibility’ as a defense to attempt.”