Court Opinion

ID: 9570028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:19:28.576947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:41.562658
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I concur in the majority’s opinion, except as to the issue involving the propriety of enhancing defendant’s sentence under the New Mexico habitual criminal statute based upon a prior Texas criminal proceeding which was ordered dismissed and the conviction set aside by the Texas court. Defendant contends that the trial court improperly enhanced his New Mexico sentence as an habitual offender relying upon an invalid prior Texas conviction. See NMSA 1978, § 31-18-17 (Repl.Pamp.1990). At the habitual criminal proceeding, defendant introduced an exhibit consisting of an order from a Texas court discharging him from probation and setting aside the Texas conviction which was relied upon by New Mexico authorities to enhance his sentence in the present case. The exhibit shows that the Texas court found that because defendant had “satisfactorily completed one-third or two years of his probationary period, and * * * complied with all the terms and conditions of said probation”: [T]hat the Judgment of Conviction heretofore entered against the defendant in this case be, and the same is hereby set aside, the indictment dismissed, * * * and the defendant is hereby released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the Judgment of Conviction in this cause, and the arrest entry in this offense [shall] hereby be expunged. [Emphasis added.] As evidenced by the language of the order quoted above, the Texas court expressly directed that the judgment of “conviction” be set aside. Thus, when the New Mexico court sought to subsequently enhance defendant’s sentence under the habitual criminal statute, the Texas “conviction” relied upon by the prosecution here had been vacated. The majority opinion emphasizes that pri- or decisions of this state relating to our habitual criminal statute draw a distinction between a final judgment and sentence in a criminal case and a “conviction” adjudicating guilt, reciting that since defendant was initially adjudged to be guilty of a felony in Texas nothing “suggests that defendant’s conviction should not be used under New Mexico’s habitual-criminal offender statute” to enhance defendant’s sentence in this state. I think this analysis is at odds with the Texas judgment and ignores the fact that the order of the Texas court had not just discharged defendant from probation but expressly set aside defendant’s Texas “conviction” and ordered that the criminal indictment against him be dismissed. Thus, the effect of the majority opinion is to expand the interpretation of our state’s habitual criminal statute to hold that a defendant’s “conviction” in another state amounts to a binding “conviction” for purposes of enhancement of his sentence in New Mexico, even where the foreign “conviction ” relied upon by this state has been ordered to be set aside in Texas and is no longer final. In my view, use of a vacated Texas “conviction” to enhance defendant’s New Mexico conviction is inconsistent with State v. Burk, 101 N.M. 263, 680 P.2d 980 (Ct.App.1984), and leads to an incongruous application of New Mexico law and attempts to breathe life into a Texas conviction which Texas courts have directed be set aside. Padilla v. State, 90 N.M. 664, 568 P.2d 190 (1977), relied upon by the majority, is distinguishable from the present case. There, defendant was convicted of a felony in a prior New Mexico criminal proceeding and a deferred sentence was imposed. Following completion of probation the case was dismissed. The court held that the term “conviction” as used in the deferred sentencing statute was a finding of guilt and did not include the imposition of a sentence. In the instant case the finding of guilt was ordered set aside by the Texas court. In Texas, a prior probated sentence entered by a Texas court pursuant to an adjudication of guilt is not available to enhance punishment for a subsequent offense unless the defendant’s probation has been revoked. Dominque v. State, 787 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Ct.App.1990) (prior probated sentence entered by Texas court is not a final conviction and thus is not available to enhance punishment for a subsequent offense unless probation has been revoked); Rodgers v. State, 744 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Ct.App. 1987) (burden is on state to make a prima facie showing that any conviction relied upon for enhancement of punishment became final prior to commission of the present offense). This court has previously recognized that Section 31-18-17(A)(2)(a) requires that a conviction be rendered by a court of that state. State v. Burk. In Burk, a Texas court issued an order of probation following the entry of a guilty plea. This court looked to Texas law to determine the effect of the Texas proceeding for purposes of New Mexico’s habitual offender statute and affirmed the trial court’s decision not to enhance the defendant’s sentence. Id. The Burk court noted that because no adjudication of guilt was entered by the Texas court, the court’s action in deferring proceedings was not a “conviction” for purpose of this state’s habitual criminal statute. Id., 101 N.M. at 265, 680 P.2d at 982. The record reflects that the Texas criminal conviction relied upon by the state in the instant case as a basis for the enhancement of defendant’s New Mexico sentence was dismissed by the Texas court and his arrest record was ordered expunged. Absent a showing that our state legislature, in adopting the provisions of this state’s habitual criminal statute, Section 31-18-17, intended that a prior conviction incurred in a sister state and subsequently ordered set aside, may nevertheless serve as the basis for enhancing a sentence imposed upon defendant in New Mexico, I would apply the rule of lenity. See State v. Keith, 102 N.M. 462, 697 P.2d 145 (Ct.App.1985) (statutes authorizing a more severe punishment upon conviction of a subsequent criminal offense are penal in nature and strictly construed; doubts about the construction of penal statutes are resolved in favor of the rule of lenity). Thus, I believe that enhancement of defendant’s sentence in the present case based upon the Texas conviction that was subsequently set aside did not constitute a final judgment of conviction for purposes of enhancement of defendant’s sentence under the provisions of Section 31-18-17 and exceeds the scope of our habitual sentencing act. I would affirm defendant’s convictions but would remand the case for resentencing.