Court Opinion

ID: 9475627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:33:22.574513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:49.919421
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur with respect to the claims against Coca-Cola Company and Midwest Machinery Movers, I dissent with respect to the claim against Local 710 of the Teamsters Union. I believe that summary judgment was inappropriate because issues of material fact remain to be decided. Thus, I would reverse and remand for further factfinding on equitable tolling or estoppel.
I agree with the majority on the retroac-tivity of DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). See, e.g., Landahl v. PPG Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir.1984). Therefore, the six-month statute of limitations applies, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294, and we must determine whether the drivers’ complaint was timely filed. The undisputed dates relevant to this determination are the December 15, 1982 Joint Area Council (JAC) meeting and decision and the July 28, 1983 filing of the drivers’ complaint. In the absence of any other allegations, the district court and the majority here clearly would be correct. The drivers filed their complaint more than seven months after the JAC rendered its decision and the statute of limitations would bar the complaint.
The district court and the majority rely upon Freeman v. Local Union No. 135 Teamsters, etc., 746 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir.1984), to dispose of the drivers’ complaint as untimely. Freeman held that the union had no duty to challenge the arbitrator’s award, id. at 1321-22, and that the date of the arbitrator’s decision was the date when the plaintiff knew or should have known that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Id. at 1319. Thus, once there is a final decision, the six-month period begins to run. Id.
Without more, Freeman would dictate the outcome in this case. The majority chides the drivers for ignoring Freeman. Admittedly, neglecting that case was an unwise choice because it allowed both the district court and the majority here to construe this as a Freeman question. However, the drivers do not argue, as the Freeman appellants did, that the Union breached its duty by not challenging the JAC decision in court. Instead, they have two distinct arguments. First, they assert that the Union breached its duty of fair representation in failing to argue their case vigorously at the JAC meeting. Second, they assert that the statute of limitations should not bar their claim because the Union’s statements “lulled” them into sitting on their rights. As a result, they delayed for *1330two months in reliance upon the Union’s statements that it would file suit for them. This is an estoppel argument, separate from the claim of unfair representation at the JAC meeting. Thus, while the JAC’s decision would normally begin the running of the statute, here the drivers raise factual issues about whether they were misled into sitting on their rights. This distinguishes the drivers’ case from Freeman.
The majority refuses to consider the drivers’ argument for suspension of the statute of limitations. While the drivers’ barely adequate brief deserves the majority’s criticism, I do not find it so defective as to preclude consideration of their “lulling” argument. The majority characterizes the drivers’ argument as one for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and then discards the argument as not squarely raised. I believe, however, that the drivers have at least raised an equitable estoppel argument, if not an equitable tolling argument, by the language of their briefs and the drivers’ affidavits.
Equitable tolling applies in cases where the plaintiff is ignorant of the action because the defendant has fraudulently concealed it. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584-85, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946). Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, applies when the plaintiff knew of the existence of the cause of action, but the defendant’s conduct caused him to delay in bringing his lawsuit.1 “Estoppel arises where one, by his conduct, lulls another into a false security and into a position he would not take [otherwise]....” McWaters & Bartlett v. United States, 272 F.2d 291, 296 (10th Cir.1959). The language of “lulling” appears in numerous equitable estoppel cases. See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 233, 79 S.Ct. 760, 762, 3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959); Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334, 344, 16 S.Ct. 512, 516, 40 L.Ed. 721 (1896); Cerbone v. International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 768 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir.1985); City of Bedford v. James Leffel & Co., 558 F.2d 216, 218 (4th Cir.1977).
The majority criticizes the drivers for not squarely raising their equitable issue. While I would much prefer a brief that clearly asserts “tolling” or “estoppel” and thoroughly argues the facts in support of these theories, I believe that the drivers’ brief at least raises the issue for our determination by using the language found in the equitable estoppel cases. In both the initial brief and the reply brief, the drivers assert that they were lulled into inaction. For example, the drivers claim:
It was not until mid-February, 1983 that the drivers discovered that they “had been had” upon the union’s announcement to them that it was through with the matter. See O’Brien Affidavit (R. 573) and Stewart Affidavit (R. 580). They had been lulled into a false sense of security by the union’s representation on December 15, 1982 that the union expected to lose the grievance presented to JAC, but that the matter would be taken to litigation to establish the right to follow their work. See O’Brien and Stewart Affidavits, supra.
Appellants’ Reply Brief at 4 (emphasis added). O’Brien, one of the drivers, stated that it was not until mid-February that the Union’s business agent told him that the Union had abandoned their claim and that they should hire their own lawyer. Record at 575.2 While the drivers did not file an *1331exemplary brief, they have mustered an argument that we recognize as a plea for equitable relief from the running of the statute. Rather than raising the issue merely to dismiss it, we should address it.
In considering the equitable issue, however, it becomes apparent that we must remand for further factfinding.3 The drivers lost below on summary judgment. Summary judgment is only appropriate “when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 597 (7th Cir.1986). We view the record and any reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. Also, we must accept as true all the evidence of the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “While cases involving statute of limitations defenses frequently lend themselves to summary disposition, a court should not grant summary judgment for the defendant if there is a viable issue of fact as to when the limitations period began.” Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir.1985) (citing Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 494 F.2d 168, 171 (10th Cir.1974); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2734, at 421 (2d ed. 1983)). Because summary judgment is such an extreme remedy, it should not be granted unless the non-moving party cannot prevail under any discernable circumstances. EEOC v. Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d 853, 857 (8th Cir.1978).
Here, summary judgment was inappropriate. The drivers raised a factual issue about whether the Union’s business agent, Alex Kern, made representations until mid-February that caused them to delay in filing suit. They referred to the affidavit of O’Brien. Record at 573-75. On a motion for summary judgment, we must accept as true O’Brien’s assertions that Kern continued to mislead him about help from the Union. This affidavit, along with the brief's allusions to “lulling” and “misrepresentations in bad faith,” allow us to infer that the Union may have impeded the drivers’ pursuit of a legal remedy.
Unfortunately, the record is unclear about what exactly the Union’s business agent said, when he said it, and who relied upon his statements. The district court only allowed discovery on the statute of limitations question and denied the drivers’ request to depose Union president John Kellehan and Union business agent Alex Kern. When, as here, the record reveals a genuine issue, the parties should at least be allowed to offer additional evidence on the point. See United States Shoe Corp. v. Hackett, 793 F.2d 161, 166 (7th Cir.1986).
The Union may yet prevail upon a showing that none of the alleged misrepresentations were made. At this point, in the *1332absence of further factual proceedings, we cannot decide the issue. We should at least, however, recognize that a factual issue remains and remand for further proceedings. This is not a case where the appellants waived an issue by not raising it in the lower court. This is also not a case where the parties failed to argue an issue on appeal. While this is a case where the appellants’ briefs were superficial, marginally researched, and poorly argued, as pointed out above, the drivers did manage to argue “lulling.”
Although we may seek to educate and discipline lawyers for their shortcomings in egregious cases, we must also be mindful that the clients suffer when a court declines to consider inartfully drafted briefs. Thus, in a borderline case such as this, where the issue was at least raised, we should reach the issue and decide it if possible. Here, we cannot decide the issue without further factfinding. Reviewing the record and taking all reasonable inferences in favor of the appellants, material issues of fact remain regarding possible misrepresentations or misleading statements by the Union’s business agent. Thus, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings on the issue of possible equitable tolling or equitable estoppel.

. “Estoppel principles are applicable in actions arising under federal law." Hass v. Darigold Dairy Products Co., 751 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.1985) (citing Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 59, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 2223, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984); Jablon v. United States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1067-70 (9th Cir.1981)). In Hass, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been accepted in labor cases. 751 F.2d at 1099. Furthermore, the hallmark of the doctrine " 'is its flexible application ... to avoid injustice in particular cases.’ ’’ Id. at 1100. (citing Heckler, 467 U.S. at 59, 104 S.Ct. at 2223).

. Although mid-February was still within the six-month statute of limitations, the drivers allegedly delayed for two months in reliance on the Union’s statements. Equitable estoppel could suspend the running of the statute until the drivers knew that the Union had abandoned them. In Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 *1331F.2d 1067 (7th Cir.1978), we held that the defendant could be equitably estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense. Id. at 1071. In Bomba, the defendants continued to assure the plaintiffs that their demands would be met until four months before the statute of limitations ran. Id. at 1069. At that point, the defendants reneged on their initial assurances. Id. More than a year later, well beyond the statute of limitations period, the plaintiffs filed suit. Id. The drivers here filed only one month outside of the six-month period. If the drivers can show on remand that the Union delayed their filing of suit, they may also have a case that merits the application of equitable estoppel. See also Walker Mfg. Co. v. Dickerson, Inc., 560 F.2d 1184, 1187 (4th Cir.1977), appeal after remand, 619 F.2d 305 (4th Cir.1980) ("If the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until the acts or representations, causing plaintiffs delay, had ceased.”). If equitable estoppel applies, the statute of limitations would not bar the drivers’ claim against the Union.

. The majority expresses concern over deciding an issue not presented by the parties. This concern is misplaced, however, in light of the fact that I do not suggest we decide the equitable issue. I merely recognize the appellants’ argument as one for equitable relief and contend that an unresolved issue of material fact remains. Thus, any decision on the equitable issue would be for the district court to make after further factual development of the record and further adversarial proceedings.