Court Opinion

ID: 9632122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:03:43.351731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:08.922168
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Kelley
dissenting:
Because of the urgent need for an answer to the question posed by this lawsuit, I have not had the time since the adoption of the majority opinion to research the matter to the extent I would like to.
We are here concerned with the application of a provision of the state constitution which attempts to give a civil service examination grade preference to those “who served in the armed forces of the United States in times of war.” XII, Sec. 14.
“Times of War” is defined as including, “the period of the Spanish-American War; the period of the Philippine Insurrection; the period from April 6, 1917, to November 11, 1918, both dates inclusive; the period from December 7, 1941, to the date proclaimed by the congress or president of the United States as the end of the war declared by the United States on December 8, 1941, both dates inclusive; and the period of any war in which the United States may hereafter engage.” (Emphasis added.)
The veteran’s preference section was adopted by the people on November 7, 1944, prior to the cessation of hostilities of World War II. The people of Colorado did not anticipate the “police action” in Korea or the unpleasantness in Viet Nam. They were only concerned with “any” war.
The majority opinion relies on Pyramid Life Insurance Co. v. Masch, 134 Colo. 70, 299 P.2d 117. The death of the insured occurred during the Korean “engagements.” The court, in affirming a lower court decision, held that the complaint stated a claim on which relief could be granted. In doing so, this court refused “to take judicial notice that the engagements of United States troops in *354Korea constituted ‘war.’ ” Death of the insured, under the terms of the policy, “while in military service * * * in time of war,” limited the company’s liability to the return of the premiums.
The policy was issued January 17, 1941. Although this was eleven months prior to Pearl Harbor, it was almost two years after the start of the Hitler skirmishes in Europe. Under these circumstances, it would have been a simple matter for Pyramid to have employed language broad enough to have included the so-called undeclared wars, in order to have limited its liability.
The same guidelines, in my opinion, should not be applied in interpreting a covenant between all of the people of the state and the relatively small portion of the people who serve the country in times of military conflict by whatever name it may be called, as those which are applied to an insurance contract. The contract is between private citizens; it is unilaterally prepared, though bilaterally executed. Courts, in general, construe the terms of contracts of insurance against the company whenever an ambiguity exists.
In interpreting a constitutional provision adopted by the people, the court should, if possible, interpret it in a way that will carry out the intent of the people. I do not feel that the majority opinion has applied this standard in its approach to the problem.
The majority equate “in time of war” (which is the language of the constitution) with “declared war,” simply because the section 14 enumerates certain military engagements which have been labeled by Congress as “Wars.”
The majority opinion fails to note that on September 2, 1958, Congress enacted Public Law 85-857, 72 Stat. 1105 (Title 38 U.S.C.A.) .which in the section on “definitions” provides:
“The term ‘period of war,’ means the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean conflict, and the period beginning on the date of any *355future declaration of war by the Congress and ending on a date prescribed by Presidential proclamation or concurrent resolution of Congress.” (38 U.S.C.A. § 101 (11)).
Concededly, the quoted language does not rise to the dignity of a declaration of war, ex post facto, it certainly is an acknowledgment that the Korean conflict was “a period of war,” rather than a police action.
An enlightening and well reasoned decision having more in common with the problem at hand than the Pyramid case is Miele v. McGuire, 53 N.J. Super. 506, 147 A.2d 827 decided January 13, 1959. The case involved the New Jersey Veterans’ Tenure Act, which provided that no person holding a position or office under the government of the state or of any county, municipality or board of education, who has served in the armed services of the United States in any war of the United States and who has been honorably discharged, shall be removed from office except for good cause after an impartial hearing. The veteran was discharged without being charged and no hearing was afforded him. The New Jersey court pointed out that:
“Under our present membership in the United Nations, a declaration of war by the Congress is no longer necessary in order to commit our armed forces to combat. The United Nations Charter, 59 Stat. 1031, to which the United States subscribes, provides for a Security Council. Article 42 of the charter empowers the Security Council to take action with air, sea or land forces to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 43 of the charter provides that all members of the United Nations shall undertake to make available to the Security Council armed forces to maintain international peace and security. The United States did make a force available in 1950, when the Korean conflict broke out. The United States, having been called upon by the Security Council as a member of the United Nations, was required to accept the responsibilities it had agreed to undertake *356through its membership or to repudiate Articles 42 and 43 and abandon the whole purpose of the United Nations. Pursuant to this request under Article 43 to contribute armed forces and other assistance to maintain international peace and security, the United States called several million of its citizens, including a large number who had already served in World War II, into service. Plaintiff was one of those who served. It would be difficult to convince those citizens and their families, particularly where death and injuries occurred during the Korean conflict, that this was not a war in every sense of that word. Lack of a formal declaration of war did not mitigate the suffering of the wounded nor the sorrow of the families of the dead.”
Professor Beale in an article in 9 Harvard Law Review, pages 406, 407, states:
“War, in law, is not a mere contest of physical force, on however large a scale. It must be an armed struggle, carried on between two political bodies, each of which exercises de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory, and commands an army which is prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war. It requires, then, on the part of insurgents an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a state, though not yet recognized as such. The armed insurgents must act under the direction of this organized civil authority.”
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153, the United States Supreme Court said:
“Of course, a state of war may in fact exist without a formal declaration.”
President Truman, on December 16, 1950, declared that a state of “national emergency existed” because of the Korean conflict.
On April 8, 1952, in another Presidential proclamation, the following words appear:
“Whereas American fighting men and fighting men of other nations of the United Nations are now engaged in *357deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea, and forces of the United Nations are stationed elsewhere overseas for the purpose of participating in the defense of the Atlantic Community against aggression; * * *”
Conceding that Presidential proclamations do not rise to the dignity of Acts of Congress, we cannot shut our eyes to the realities of the situation in favor of strict legalisms when construing the meaning of a constitutional amendment.
The New Jersey court in Miele v. McGuire, supra, concluded that:
“Under these circumstances, it must be concluded that the United States was at war during the Korean conflict * *
Another pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court is pertinent to this discussion. In Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 75 S.Ct. 403, 99 L.Ed. 463 (1955), a case involving a claim of draft exemption by a conscientious objector, the court said:
“We believe that Congress had in mind real shooting wars when it referred to participation in war in any form — actual military conflicts between nations on earth in our time — wars with bombs and bullets, tanks, planes and rockets.”
I am convinced that the voters of Colorado had the same thing in mind when they said, “Five points shall be added to the grades of candidates receiving a passing grade who served in the armed forces of the United States in times of war * * *.” Surely the constitution uses the term “war” in its generic sense and not the technical sense ascribed to the term in the insurance policy in the Pyramid decision. I believe that the voters of Colorado recognized that war can be declared by deeds as well as words.
It is my belief that a gross inequity exists when the benefits of public laws discriminate as between members of the same class — those who have served the United States in times of war.