Court Opinion

ID: 9749580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:51:47.838075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:54.093461
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I must strongly dissent to the majority’s approval of the voice identification of the appellant. I believe that the circumstances surrounding Singer’s identification of the appellant were a violation of appellant’s rights under the fourteenth amendment. Consequently, I would reverse his conviction since his indictment and conviction were a result of this tainted identification.
First, I believe that a restatement of the relevant facts is necessary. After Marino’s arrest he was taken to room 708A in Philadelphia City Hall and engaged in conversation with a codefendant and the arresting-officer. He was advised of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Although Marino willingly participated in the conversation, he was unaware that *255the complaining witness and Sergeant McLellan, another arresting officer, sat on the other side of a five foot tall partition in the same room with an open space above it. But Sergeant McLellan knew that Marino was on the other side of the partition before any identification was made. In addition, the complaining witness himself knew precisely why he was there. He testified that he was in that room “for identification purposes.”
After fifteen or twenty minutes of conversation involving appellant, the complaining witness jumped up and stated: “That’s the voice on the phone [which had threatened him]. Whoever is over there is the voice on the phone.” Thereupon, Sergeant McLellan asked Marino to come out and talk again in the presence of the complaining witness. The latter then made a second identification which he stated was based solely on hearing Marino’s voice.
The majority opinion states “No questions were asked about, or reference made to, the crimes with which he [appellant] was charged.” While it is true that nothing so blatantly suggestive was included in the conversation, it is clear that Marino was discussing truckers’ strikes with the other parties; Singer, the complaining witness, knew that the person who threatened him was affiliated with the Teamsters’ Union. In addition, the majority implies that appellant’s voice was identified from several other voices, all of which were unknown to Singer. In fact, Singer was well acquainted with the two other voices, the codefendant’s and the arresting officer’s. Thus the only voice which Singer could identify as the unknown “voice on the telephone” was the one which was unfamiliar to him. Finally, the majority concludes that “his [Singer’s] identification was a spontaneous act.” The majority would lead us to believe that Singer was casually sit*256ting in this adjoining room when he suddenly and without any prompting or other suggestive circumstances heard the voice of his unknown caller in the next room. But such an innocent interpretation of the facts surrounding the identification is belied by the record, which clearly indicates that Singer knew he had been brought to City Hall “for identification purposes.”
In Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F. 2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966), cited with approval by the Supreme Court of the United States in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967), it was held that there was a denial of due process when a voice identification was made where only one voice was submitted for identification in an atmosphere that itself suggested the defendant was the guilty suspect. The Palmer court said “A state may not rely in a criminal prosecution ... on an identification secured by a process in which the search for the truth is made secondary to the quest for a conviction.” In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1933 (1967), the Supreme Court emphasized the inherent evils attendant to an identification which is not carried on with the utmost safeguards. “A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pre-trial identification. . . . Suggestion can be created intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways. And the dangers for the suspect are particularly grave when the witness’ opportunity for observation was insubstantial and thus his susceptibility to suggestion the greatest.”
It is my view that this same denial of due process took place under the circumstances of this voice identification. All of the various factors outlined above *257created a suggestive atmosphere leading to only one possible result—Singer’s identification of appellant. Marino’s discussion of truckers’ strikes, the fact that Ms was the only unknown voice to Singer, and that Singer knew he was supposed to make an identification, hardly created an identification procedure free of improper suggestion. This is exactly the type of confrontation so necessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identity that was condemned in Stovall v. Denno, supra.
The second identification also violated the standards established in Palmer, supra, first, because it was the product of the initial tainted identification. Second, Marino was directed to speak by the police so that he could be identified. Hence, the second “voice” identification was not the product of happenstance, but rather of willful police design. Finally, Marino’s appearance no doubt colored what appeared as merely a voice identification. The witness knew that the person who threatened him was known as the “Big Man.” Marino, who is a heavy set individual, was asked at the time of the second identification to appear in the presence of the complaining witness. It is clear that Marino’s size could have influenced the witness and swayed his judgment.
I therefore conclude that the atmosphere in which the first and second voice identifications were made was improperly suggestive and violated Marino’s constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment. Such an unconstitutional procedure compels a reversal of this conviction.
Accordingly, I dissent.