Court Opinion

ID: 9454127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:37:01.919284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:58.855576
License: Public Domain

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result):
Coupling the Federal Trade Commission’s statutory call “to prevent * * * unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce”1 with its statutory license “[t]o make public * * * such portions of the information obtained by it * * * as it shall deem expedient in the public interest,”2 the court finds “authority in the Commission, acting in the public interest, to alert the public to suspected violations of the law by factual press releases whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that a respondent is engaged in activities made unlawful by the [Federal Trade Commission] Act which have resulted in the initiation of action by the Commission.”3 This, the court seems to hold, the Commission may do without prior hearing, with almost complete immunity from subsequent judicial alteration,4 and irrespective of the magnitude of the injury to business relations *1317inflicted thereby.5 Since I concur less completely in the court’s rationale than in the result it reaches in this case, I take this opportunity to state my views.
I
When the Commission informed appel-lees of the denial of their request that no news release pertaining to the filing of the complaint be issued, it proffered this explanation:6
“The issuance of a complaint by the Federal Trade Commission is a matter of public interest. The fact that a complaint has been issued, as well as the contents of the complaint, are ‘public information’, within Section 1.132 7 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice. A complaint is a pleading in an adjudicative proceeding, and as such is not considered confidential, either as a matter of law or practice or for reasons of public policy. Since complaints fall within the category of public information, the objective of the Commission’s Office of Information, in issuing factual news releases, is to provide, a means whereby such public information is made available, simultaneously and on an orderly basis, to the bar, industry members, the press, and interested members of the public.”
If my understanding of the court’s opinion and the Commission’s justifying statement is correct, they present diverging views as to what the Commission had in mind when it promulgated.the release that precipitated this lawsuit. The court says the release was designed as a warning to that segment of the public with which appellees were or might be dealing.8 The Commission, on the other hand, without any suggestion of so special or confined a purpose, tells us that the release was more broadly conceived as a vehicle facilitating dissemination to the public at large of newsworthy information already in the public domain.9
This difference I mention at the outset because it is fundamental in terms of the nature of the problem with which we are confronted. “The effective functioning of a free government like ours depends largely on the force of an informed public opinion.”10 Relatively few matters attract more readily the interest of the people than what government is doing for the people. News releasing by the agencies of government has become a standard technique in the operations by which the people are kept knowledgeable as to governmental affairs.11 Press releases by public of*1318ficials, we have said, “serve a useful if not essential role in the functioning of the democratic processes of government.” 12
An incidental and wholesome consequence of general publicity of proceedings challenging the fairness and honesty of particular commercial practices may well be the generation of a desirable if unnecessary measure of public caution in dealings with those identified with such practices.13 Publicity, or the specter of publicity, may also, in a very practical way, achieve on its own a degree of informal regulation by deterring those who otherwise might be tempted to take liberties with the law.14 But beyond these factors is the consideration that the business of an important governmental agency is everybody’s business. The people want to know, and are entitled to know, what goes on in government,15 and the thirst for information is not limited to those who may have or may contemplate a direct commercial relationship with the subject of governmental concern at the moment. The activities of the Federal Trade Commission constitute news, and any restriction upon its machinery for public accessibility to that news must be taken for what it really is.16
II
We dealt with the public nature of the Commission’s adjudicative proceedings in E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC.17 There the Commission filed a complaint charging Hughes with unfair trade methods and false and fraudulent advertising. Hughes sought an injunction, in one respect quite similar to that which our ap-pellees were awarded, “restraining the Commission from making the complaint public and from taking any testimony in public and from making public the transcript of the testimony.”18 Hughes alleged as the ground for injunctive relief, in much the same vein as our appellees did, “that, because of the announcements in trade journals of the issuance by the Commission of its complaint, appellant’s business has been injured and that the taking of testimony in public will aggravate and increase the injury, * * ” 19
We noted that Hughes’ case was “confined to the assertion that the Commission has no right to determine to hear evidence in public; that until its final determination its function is wholly in*1319quisitional, and is therefore necessarily secret.”20 In response, we pointed to the Commission’s rules opening to public inspection the papers in the case and specifying that hearings on complaints should be public,21 provisions to which we affixed the stamp of our approval.22 And, distinguishing the disclosure of information statutorily protected, we deemed legally innocuous the notoriety associated with pendency of the administrative proceeding:
“Doubtless on such a hearing as is here provided the Commission has discretion, on a showing that such a hearing would disclose trade secrets or other data in itself destructive of the business under investigation, to do whatever is proper and necessary to avoid these consequences, but where, as is here alleged, the possibility of loss is founded wholly on the public knowledge that an investigation has been ordered, no good reason exists or can be shown why the public hearing should not continue.” 23
Our appellees do not press on so broad a front as did Hughes. They do not vie 'for sealed records or nonpublic hearings in the adjudicative proceeding. They do say that the Commission may not enhance the attendant publicity by a news release — a proposition promotive of rather curious results. Thus, while the papers on file in the proceeding constitute a public record, the Commission could not attract public attention to the record. While an enterprising reporter might flush out newsworthy information from the public docket, the Commission could not focus the attention of the press upon that information. And while individual citizens could, for informational purposes, themselves examine the Commission’s public records and attend the public proceeding, the Commission could not assist affirmatively in the transmission of the same information to them through regular news channels. I turn now to consider whether the restriction for which appellees contend is required either by the Act or by the Constitution.
Ill
The Act commands the Commission “[t]o gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate from time to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of” unexempted corporations “engaged in commerce.”24 It also authorizes the Commission “[t]o make public from time to time such portions of the information obtained by it hereunder, except trade secrets and names of customers, as it shall deem expedient in the public interest.” 25 Its legislative history attests amply a congressional purpose to create an independent agency empowered not only to investigate and adjudicate, but also to convey the informational fruits of its labors to the American public.26
When this litigation was at the administrative level, the Commission had by rule classified as public information “[t]he pleadings, transcript of testimony, exhibits and all documents received in evidence or made a part of the record in adjudicative proceedings (ex*1320cept evidence received in camera),”27'' and had provided that “[additional information concerning the activities of the Commission is released from time to time through the Commission’s Office of Information.” 28 For a half-century, the Commission had pursued a policy of issuing news releases upon the initiation of adjudicative proceedings and at important points during the course of such proceedings.29 This consistent practice, involving as it does an administrative interpretation of the statute under which the Commission functions, is entitled to peculiar weight,30 particularly where, as here, it has been made known to and acquiesced in by Congress.31 I conclude that, all circumstances considered, the Commission is fully authorized to make available to news media, in the public interest, factually accurate summaries of significant developments in the adjudicative proceeding it instituted against appellees.32
Congress did not, however, confer upon the Commission an unqualified license to propagate the intelligence it garners in the course of its operations. Not only did it prohibit the disclosure of “trade secrets and trade names of customers” but, by providing for publication of “such portions of the information. * * * as it shall deem expedient in the public interest,” it articulated two preconditions to divulgence of information of any other type. The first is a judicious exercise of administrative discretion preceding a resolve to publish,33 a point underscored by the Act’s legislative history.34 The second, incorporated in the decisional standard provided, is expedience of the disclosure in the public interest.35 Thus the propriety of an informational release to news media is not established necessarily and automatically by the institution of a complaint proceeding, albeit one directed toward alleged false advertising and deceptive commercial practices.36 And both the discretional function and the Commission’s determination in terms of the public interest clearly require adequate consideration and suit*1321able weighing of any damage to private property which widespread publicity of unadjudicated charges may be calculated to produce.37
I perceive no basis, however, on the record for interfering with the Commission’s observance of its regular practice of periodic news releases during the course of the administrative proceeding against appellees. In justification of its decision to publicize the filing of the complaint, the Commission pointed to the fact that the public was interested in its adjudicative proceedings and to the further fact that the complaint it had filed was a public document.38 The objective of this release, it said, “is to provide a means whereby such public information is made available, simultaneously and on an orderly basis, to the bar, industry members, the press, and interested members of the public.” 39 This was, then, an administrative determination, in conformity with long standing policy, to facilitate the dissemination to the public through usual news media of newsworthy information already open to the public. There is nothing in the record to suggest that substantially the same considerations did not underlie the Commission’s proposal to issue additional releases as the proceeding progressed.40
There is no hint that the course the Commission contemplated was a manifestation of discrimination against appellees.41 What the Commission wanted to do in this case it had been doing consistently and uniformly over a period of several decades in all adjudicative proceedings42 Nor is there any indication that the Commission at any time envisioned a press release that would be anything other than a fair, accurate summary of the developments imparting news value to the event to be reported.43
The record is skimpy as to some of the transpirations prior to the time appellees came to the District Court.44 From what can be gleaned, however, there is no basis upon which it can fairly be held that the Commission was remiss in its statutory responsibilities.45 Appellees *1322presented to the Commission a petition incorporating their grievance and their request, and presumably the facts they deemed to support it. The Commission, “[ajfter careful consideration” of the request in the light of specified public interest factors, found “no reason for deferring the issuance of an appropriate news release” concerning the filed complaint.46 If I am to abide appellees’ interpretation, implicit in their arguments here, that this evinced a Commission resolve to pursue its standard news releasing policy as to subsequent administrative developments, I must accept it also as an appraisement that, for similar reasons, the public interest would be served by doing so.
Congress committed the guardianship of the public interest to the Commission, and it was for it to make the determination which appellees later subjected to judicial scrutiny. Constitutional considerations aside, the Commission’s action could properly be overturned only if it were beyond its statutory powers or if it were proven to be arbitrary.47 I think the Commission had the necessary authority, and the record does not support a conclusion of arbitrariness.48 Unless constitutionally infirm, that action should have been permitted to stand.
*1323IV
Appellees’ constitutional plea is an effort to equate Commission preparation of the prehearing news releases it dispenses with prejudgment of the administrative issues yet to be heard. It appears that all releases are cleared by a Commission attorney and the Commission’s chairman, and are then distributed by the Commission’s Office of Information. The gist of appellees’ contention, which the District Court respected, is that such a release, once made, presents an insurmountable obstacle to objectivity.
This position lacks the support of judicial opinion. While occasionally, on particular facts, a predecisional release has been criticized for the outside appearances it created,49 no case seems to reflect the view that the practice works a deprivation of due process, and the few cases addressing the question have held that it does not.50 Still others have sustained such releases without allusion to due process,51 apparently for lack of sufficient merit to induce presentation of the point or to entice its judicial treatment.
Like my colleagues, I am unpersuaded by appellees’ argument, particularly as it must be related to the circumstances of this case. From all that appears, the only person with adjudicative responsibilities who performs any activity with reference to news releasing is the Commission’s chairman, and he only checks proposed releases for accuracy. So minimal a participation in a strictly factual summary of pending charges hardly produces a subjective impact so inimical to fairness as to tender a due process issue.52

. Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, § 5(a) (6), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6).

. Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, § 6(f), 15 U.S.C. § 46(f), quoted more fully in the text at note 25, infra.

. Supra p. 1314.

. The only matters intimated by the court’s opinion as possible subjects of judicial *1317inquiry are knowing falsity of the Commission’s charging allegations, discrimination in its news releasing policies, and unfair or inaccurate sunmmarization of its complaint. See supra p. 1314 and note 10.

. Supra pp. 1314, 1315-1316.

. So far as the record discloses, this was the only statement by the Commission elucidating the basis upon which it made or contemplated any news release affecting appellees.

. See the court’s opinion supra p. 1312 at note 8.

. Supra p. 1314.

. This interpretation gains additional support from the Commission’s general practice respecting the issuance of news releases in adjudicatory proceedings. Such releases are made not only when the complaint is filed, but also at several subsequent points during the course of the proceeding, including the filing of qn answer, the issuance of the hearing examiner’s initial decision, and final adjudication by the Commission. This practice seems to accord more with a policy of informing the public as to what is going on before the Commission than with a policy of alerting the public to preferred but unadjudicated charges of conduct vio-lative of the Act.

. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 577, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959) (concurring opinion).

. This is well known, and the widely used press release is no stranger to the judiciary. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, supra note 10; Kukatush Mining Co. v. SEC, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 29, 309 F.2d 647, 649 (1962); Glass v. Ickes, 73 App.D.C. 3, 117 F.2d 273, 132 A.L.R. 1328 (1940), cert. denied 311 U.S. 718, 61 S.Ct. 441, 85 L.Ed. 468 (1941); Mellon v. Brewer, *131857 App.D.C. 126, 18 F.2d 168, 53 A.L.R. 1519, cert. denied 275 U.S. 530, 48 S.Ct. 28, 72 L.Ed. 409 (1927). See also the cases cited in notes 49 to 51, infra.

. Glass v. Ickes, supra note 11, 73 App.D.C. at 8 n. 9, 117 F.2d at 278 n. 9.

. Publicity focusing directly upon potentially harmful products or services is a method frequently employed to warn members of the public. See, e. g., Kukatush Mining Co. v. SEC and Glass v. Ickes, both supra note 11.

. See Rouke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U.Chi.L.Rev. 225 (1957). See also SEC v. Harrison, 80 F.Supp. 226, 229 (D.D.C.1948), appeal dismissed 87 U.S.App.D.C. 232, 184 F.2d 691 (1950), vacated 340 U.S. 908, 71 S.Ct. 290, 95 L.Ed. 656 (1951).

. Cross, The Peoples’ Right to Know 197-247 (1953).
The so-called “Freedom of Information Act,” Pub.L. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), effective July 4, 1967, as incorporated by Pub.L. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) into 5 U.S.C. § 552, while not bearing directly on the issue presented in this case, evidences a clear congressional purpose to open the information possessed by federal administrative agencies to the general public on much the same basis that it is accessible to litigants in agency proceedings.

. In passing on the propriety of the Commission’s action here drawn into controversy, we are confined to the grounds the Commission invoked. See American Trucking Ass’n v. United States, 364 U.S. 1,13-14, 80 S.Ct. 1570, 4 L.Ed.2d 1527 (1960); Unemployment Compensation Comm. of Territory of Alaska v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143, 155, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943).

. 61 App.D.C. 386, 63 F.2d 362 (1933).

. Id. at 387, 63 F.2d at 363.

. Ibid.

. Ibid.

. Ibid. The rules operative when the Commission denied appellee’s request were to the same effect. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.132 (e), 3.16(a) (1967).

. E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 17, 61 App.D.C. at 387, 63 F.2d at 363.

. Id. at 388, 63 F.2d at 364.

. Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 46(a).

. Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, § 6(f), 15 U.S.C. § 46(f). My interpretation of this provision, like the court’s supra pp. 1313-1314, is that it includes adjudicative proceedings. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 649-651, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950).

. See S.Rep.No. 597, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 30 (1914); H.R.Rep.No. 533, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4, 8 (1914); H.R.Rep. No. 1142, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914).

. 16 C.F.R. § 1.132(e) (1967). See note 21, supra.

. 16 C.F.R. § 1.132(g) (1967). See note 21, supra.

. See the court’s opinion supra p. 1310 at note 3.

. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 11, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945); Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933).

. See Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 483, 83 S.Ct. 1373, 10 L.Ed.2d 491 (1963); Helvering v. R.T. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 115, 59 S.Ct. 423, 83 L.Ed. 536 (1939); Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 269, 273, 53 S.Ct. 337, 77 L.Ed. 739 (1933). See also the court’s opinion, supra p. 1314.

. The statutory authorization “[t]o make public * * * such information” clearly suffices. See Kukatush Mining Co. v. SEC, supra note 11, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 30-31, 309 F.2d at 650-51.

. See American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 71 App.D.C. 259, 262, 110 F.2d 117, 120 (1940). See also E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 17, 61 App.D.C. at 387, 63 F.2d at 363.

. “All such investigations may hereafter be made upon the initiative of the commission, within constitutional limitations, and the information obtained may be made public entirely at the discretion of the commission.” H.R.Rep.No. 533, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1914). And see note 26, supra.

. See American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, supra note 33, 71 App.D.C. at 262-63, 110 F.2d at 120-121.

. See R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 43, 48-49, 299 F.2d 127, 131-32, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911, 82 S.Ct. 1257, 8 L.Ed.2d 404 (1962); American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, supra note 33, 71 App.D.C. at 262-263, 110 F.2d at 120-121; American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, 68 App.D.C. 77, 80, 93 F.2d 236, 239 (1937); E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 17, 61 App.D.C. at 388, 63 F.2d at 364.

. Compare American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, supra note 33, 71 App.D.C. at 260 n. 1, 261, 110 F.2d at 118 n. 1, 119, where considering a section providing that the agency “may, * * * make available to the public the information contained in” documents submitted by a registrant of securities “only when in its judgment a disclosure of such information is in the public interest,” we viewed the section as “a means of avoiding the infliction of hardships in particular cases where full disclosure would more likely result in harm to the registrant than in benefit to the public.” And see E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 17, 61 App.D.C. at 387, 63 F.2d at 363, where, speaking to the fact that the Act does not specify that the Commission’s adjudicatory hearings must be public, we pointed out that “[djoubtless Congress considered that there might be occasions when it would be unjust to a person or corporation proceeded against to require public hearings and left the decision in such cases to the board.” See also R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, supra note 36, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 48-49, 299 F.2d at 131-132; Halsey, Stuart & Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 212 Wis. 184, 248 N.W. 458, 461 (1933). And see note 48, infra.

. Supra p. 1317.

. Supra p. 1317.

. See the text infra at pp. 1321-1322.

. Cf. B. C. Morton Int’l Corp. v. FDIC, 305 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1962).

. See the court’s opinion supra p. 1310 at note 3.

. Cf. B. C. Morton Int’l Corp. v. FDIC, supra note 41.

. This may have been an inevitable byproduct of a decision by appellees to pitch the main battle in the judicial rather than the administrative arena. But see FCC v. Schrieber, 381 U.S. 279, 290-291, 85 S.Ct. 1459, 14 L.Ed.2d 383 (1965).

. On the basis of the Commission’s prior investigation it found “reason to believe” that appellees were in violation of the Act and, acting purportedly in “the interest of the public,” it resolved to lodge a complaint. The investigation, as distin*1322guished from the adjudicative proceeding on the complaint, was properly conducted ex parte. Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787, 788-789 (7th Cir. 1944); Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258, 262 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied 305 U.S. 614, 59 S.Ct. 73, 83 L.Ed. 391 (1938); see also Administrative Procedure Act, § 6(b), 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and no opportunity to contest the decision to bring the complaint was required. The preliminary determination implicit in “reason to believe” that the Act has been infringed is but the statutory prerequisite to the filing of the complaint which launches the adjudicative process. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950). The effectuation of any forthcoming administrative order must await not only an administrative hearing on the charges made in the complaint but also any desired judicial review of the final administrative decision. “ [N] o hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final administrative order becomes effective.” Id., at 598, 70 S.Ct. at 872. See also Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, supra note 11, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 30, 309 F.2d 650; R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, supra note 36, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 47-48, 299 F.2d at 131-132.

. With the explanation quoted supra p. 1317.

. See American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, supra note 33, 71 App.D.C. at 262, 110 F.2d at 120; E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. SEC, supra note 17, 61 App.D.C. at 387-388, 63 F.2d at 363-364. See also R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, supra note 36, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 49, 299 F.2d at 133.

. Appellees’ countervailing claim is of injury to their businesses by the publicity. While their petition is not in the record, I am willing to assume that they confided their apprehensions to the Commission and, by the same token, must assume that the Commission gave them due consideration, yet I would not conclude that the Commission’s decision to make news releases was without rational foundation. The public interest in being informed of government business is strong. The pleadings and as well the proceeding remained open to the public. The Commission’s proposal was to release information, not only upon initiation of the proceeding, but as the major events therein unfolded, irrespective of whom they favored. While private injury belongs on the scale when discretion is exercised, see note 37, supra, an administrative decision within legal bounds is not vitiated simply because such injury may follow. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra note 45, 339 U.S. at 599-600, 70 S.Ct. 870; Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm., 306 U.S. 56, 61-62, 59 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed. 483 (1939); Kuka-tush Mining Corp. v. SEC, supra note 11, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 31 n. 2, 309 F.2d at 651 n. 2; R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, supra note 36, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 47-48, 299 F.2d at 131-132; American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. SEC, supra note 33, 71 App.D.C. at 262-263, 110 F.2d at 120-121; Heller Bros. Co. v. Lind, 66 App.D.C. 306, 307-308, 86 F.2d 862, 863-864 (1936). And see particularly E. Grif-fiths Hughes, Inc. v. F.T.C., supra note 17, 61 App.D.C. at 388, 63 F.2d at 364, quoted supra p. 1319.

. See N. Sims Organ & Co. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 968, 82 S.Ct. 440, 7 L.Ed.2d 396 (1962); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEO, 267 F.2d 461, 468-469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 361 U.S. 896, 80 S.Ct. 200, 4 L.Ed.2d 152 (1959) .

. See N. Sims Organ & Co. v. SEO, supra note 49, 293 F.2d at 81; Bowman v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 363 F.2d 81, 86 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, 271 F.2d 752, 757-758 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied 362 U.S. 970, 80 S.Ct. 954, 4 L.Ed.2d 901 (1960) .

. See, e. g., Kukatush Mining Oorp. v. SEC, supra note 11. See also United States v. Diapulse Mfg. Corp., 262 F.Supp. 728 (D.Conn.1967).

. Compare Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, supra note 50, 271 F.2d at 757-758. Nor can I accept appellees’ theory, assuming its constitutional relevance, that the releases would be taken as external manifestations of prejudgments by the Commission. See the eases cited supra notes 50 and 51. Moreover, the press release the Commission succeeded in issuing displayed prominently this note:
“A complaint is issued whenever the Commission has found ‘reason to believe’ that the law has been violated and that a proceeding is in the public interest. It is emphasized that the issuance of a complaint simply marks the initiation of a formal proceeding in which the charges in the complaint will be ruled upon after a hearing and on the record. The issuance of a- complaint does not indicate or reflect any adjudication of the matters charged.”
The Commission tells us that its present practice is to incorporate such a notice in all news releases.