Court Opinion

ID: 9487198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:10:50.437587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:08.926017
License: Public Domain

TACHA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. I have no quarrel with the basic framework the majority uses to analyze the ex parte communication between judge and juror at issue in this case. I disagree, however, with the outcome under that framework.
Whether an ex parte communication with a juror has prejudiced a defendant is essentially a factual determination to be made by the trial judge. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119-20, 104 S.Ct. 453, 456-57, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983). Normally, in making such a determination the trial judge should hold a full hearing. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). “However, deviating from this preferred approach does not necessarily mean a trial is tainted by ... error that warrants granting a mistrial.” United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1525 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991).
While the judge did not hold a full Rem-mer hearing in this case, he did gather counsel and other parties with knowledge of the ex parte contact in his chambers. He explained the nature of the contact and counsel had the opportunity to question him. Further, both parties had the opportunity to brief the issue in the context of defendant’s motion for a new trial. The juror in question did not directly participate in any hearings, but she submitted an affidavit to the trial court. I also find it very significant that it was the trial judge himself involved in the ex parte communication.
It seems to me that there is a fundamental difference where an ex parte communication occurs between a juror and a trial judge as opposed to between a juror and a third party. If the trial judge himself is involved, the determination of prejudice will be that much easier for him to make, and the quantum of proof required of the government to meet its burden of showing that no prejudice occurred may be lessened. As the trial judge here said in denying defendant’s motion for new trial: “The court is, of course, intimately familiar with the nature and content of the ex parte contact.” We have no reason to presume that a trial judge will be anything other than diligent in making the determination of prejudice whether he was involved in the ex parte communication or not.
In this case the trial judge found that his contact with the juror involved only his helping to calm her down in a way that, in his judgment, did not prejudice the juror. Again, this is a determination to which we owe deference and there is nothing to indicate that something more problematic occurred.1 The admissible portions of the ju*1487ror’s affidavit, which was before the trial judge, do not contradict the judge’s version of events and do not, in my opinion, raise questions of prejudice in light of the judge’s comments on the matter. The juror said only: “During my private meeting with the judge referred to above, I told the Judge that I could not return to the court room and publicly state the verdict.... The Judge responded by indicating that he understood how I felt.”
We cannot ignore that “[tjhere is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.” McDonald, 933 F.2d at 1524. The fact that the following sounds redundant proves the point: The judge himself must to some extent be the judge of whether such ex parte contacts are prejudicial. Admittedly, the procedure followed by the trial judge in this case was not ideal. Nonetheless, deferring to the trial judge’s determination as to prejudice, I would affirm the defendant’s conviction.
APPENDIX (from Record Vol. IV1)
[*3] THE COURT: Let’s go on the record, Counsel. This is CR-93-159 that I’m going to refer to, United States of America versus Timothy Scisum.
And at the Court’s request, I have asked you to come here so the Court may make a record of a matter that I feel is appropriate to have a record of. I’ve asked counsel, Mr. Paul Warner and Mr. Kevin Sundwall, Mr. Warner, Assistant United States Attorney, Mr. Sundwall, Special Assistant United States Attorney, who represented the United States in this case, and Mr. Robert Copier, who is counsel for Mr. Scisum, to be present.
And I’ve also asked Mr. Jim — is it James or Jim?
MR. PHELPS: I go by Jim.
THE COURT: James Phelps, the marshal in charge of the jury in that case, to be here and Ms. Lois Wallberg, who was my court clerk, to be present with the reporter.
I did call Alpha Reporting and asked if Ms. Sue Pearce could be here, since she was the reporter on the case, I just thought maybe for continuity, but she does work for Alpha Reporting. And we have Ms. Karen Mura-kami present with us, and they, of course, work very closely, so I don’t see any problem in continuity here of the record.
The reason I wanted you here is to tell you of an [*4] incident that occurred after the jury announced that they had their verdict. I was in chambers robing up and getting ready to go on the bench when Mr. Phelps, the marshal, came in and advised that one of the jurors was very emotionally distraught out in the hall outside of the jury room, crying and — I don’t remember if he said she wanted to talk to me or he thought it might be appropriate that I visit with her to find out, you know, what the emotional problem was.
Now, have I stated that accurately, Jim?
MR. PHELPS: That’s right.
THE COURT: Do you remember—
MR. PHELPS: There was a second she didn’t say anything, but she was very emotional. She was crying and I could tell — she had first asked if she could leave the building.
I told her she couldn’t, she needed to stay here.
She said, “Do I have to go back into the courtroom?”
I said, “Yeah, you will.”
And that’s when she really started to cry. And I brought her to you, “I think you better go talk to the judge.”
*1488THE COURT: So then I think when Mr. Phelps talked to me about it, I said, “Well, you know, it’s improper that I talk to her about the case.”
[*5] But he advised me of her emotional distress.
And I said, “Well, maybe I should find out, you know, if there’s something that I can do to see if she can become composed.”
And so she sat here with me in chambers. She was very emotional. And I got some Kleenex for her and asked her to be calm. And, you know, I advised her that I must not have her relate to me anything about the deliberation, the verdict, what decision the jury has made.
She said that she would not want to go into the courtroom and face the Defendant and, as I remember, look at the Defendant. I’m not exactly sure as to the exact wordage.
And I said, “Well, it is necessary that the jury assemble and that we receive the verdict with the jury assembled.”
And she said, as I recall, “Do I have to say anything or are they going to ask me anything?”
And I said, “There is the requirement that my clerk pole [sic] the jury and that — so that I’m satisfied that the verdict is unanimous.”
And she was, again, very emotional.
I asked her if she would go into the rest room, I have a private rest room here in my chambers, and see if she could compose herself.
[*6] She wanted me to tell her what she should do.
And I said, “It’s improper for me to tell you what you should do.”
When she went into the rest room Ms. Wallberg was out in the clerk waiting area. I asked Ms. Wallberg, being a lady, if she would greet her when she came out of the rest room and see what she could do to calm her down, if she could become composed so she could go into the courtroom.
Ms. Wallberg did walk her down the hall. And I understood from Ms. Wallberg that she showed her her office and gave her an aspirin.
And about that time, I think that’s when she came back, I heard — I had seen her at the doorway of my chamber area leading into the clerk’s office, and she said, “I’m okay. I’m ready to go in.”
And that was the extent of my contact with her. But I wanted you, Counsel, to know of her emotional distress and my contact with her in that regard.
And I don’t know, Lois, have I accurately stated everything when I was with her?
THE CLERK: Yes.
I took her down — she needed to walk and she was sort of still teary-eyed, so I took her down the back corridor down by Judge Anderson’s and took her into the clerk’s office and showed her the area where I worked. And I [*7] asked her, I said, Would you like an aspirin?”
She said, “Oh, I’ve got a headache.”
So I gave her a Tylenol and some water.
And then we proceeded to come back out, but by then I gave her some Kleenex and she seemed to calm down.
I told her about my years of service with 27 years and that I had served on a jury with Aldon Anderson for six months and the jurors had been very friendly and get reunited. Almost every year they have their pictures taken together.
I never talked to her about the ease at all. And then just to calm her down and that, to talk to her, but that’s about it. I didn’t say anything.
MR. WARNER: Can I clarify a point? As I understand it, this all occurred after the foreman had announced to Marshal Phelps that a verdict had been reached.
*1489THE COURT: Right. The marshal came in, advised me they had reached a verdict.
I, then, called Lois and instructed her to contact you attorneys.
And I was in the process of robing up. In fact, I think I had my robe on, as I remember it, and that’s when Mr. Phelps came in and advised me that this juror — did I mention her name? It was [A.C.], Juror Number 2, and that she was in the hall very emotionally — appearing to be [*8] very emotionally upset and crying.
MR. WARNER: I understand also, again, for clarification, Your Honor, that pursuant to Rule 606, neither Mr. Phelps nor Ms. Wallberg nor yourself ever had any discussion with her respective to the deliberative process?
THE COURT: My concern, when Mr. Phelps came in I think I did say to Mr. Phelps — you know, he asked if something— that, you know, he thought I should be aware of the fact she was out in the hallway crying and emotionally upset and if there was something that he thought that I should do to see if, you know, what the problem was. He didn’t know whether she was ill or whether she was — what the situation was.
And so I said, “Well, you know, I have some reluctance because I must not talk to her at all about the case, but certainly if there’s something I can do to assist her, if there’s some problem health-wise or otherwise I would be pleased to find out what that is.”
But before I even let her talk to me, I said, “Now, you must not tell me anything about the deliberative process or the decision of the jury. This is something that I cannot talk to you about. But is there something that I can do to address what your problem is?”
And that’s when she said she did not want to go into the courtroom, she did not want to face the Defendant. [*9] She was — just appeared to be — to be very traumatic. I gave her a Kleenex and asked her if she would step into the rest room and see if she could compose herself.
MR. WARNER: Thank you.
THE COURT: And I thought it right, Counsel, that you should be aware of this.
MR.. COPIER: Did she offer any explanation for why she did not want to return to the courtroom?
THE COURT: Not really, that the process had been very emotional for her. I don’t know if she said that in those words, but it was very — it was just — it was obvious to me that it was — and, you know, I have, in other eases, experienced jurors weeping in the jury box when the verdict is taken. I know it is often emotional to them.

. We must defer to the trial judge's finding of fact regarding prejudice unless it “Iack[s] even ‘fair support' in the record.” Rushen, 464 U.S. at 120, 104 S.Ct. at 456 (alteration in original). We note that "[t]he absence of a contemporaneous recording [of the ex parte communication] *1487will rarely deprive the finding of 'even fai[r] suppor[t]’ in the record.” Id. (alteration in original).

. Transcript pagination is indicated thus: