Court Opinion

ID: 9351737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-03 15:00:14.252951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:22.961133
License: Public Domain

20-1612
   Jaryal v. Garland
                                                                             BIA
                                                                        Sponzo, IJ
                                                                     A208 617 571
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
   New York, on the 3rd day of January, two thousand twenty-
   three.

   PRESENT:
            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
            STEVEN J. MENASHI,
            EUNICE C. LEE,
                 Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   ANIT JARYAL,
            Petitioner,

                       v.                                  20-1612
                                                           NAC
   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
            Respondent.
   _____________________________________

   FOR PETITIONER:                     Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY.

   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
                                       Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad,
                                       Assistant Director; Carmel A.
                                   Morgan, Trial Attorney, Office of
                                   Immigration Litigation, United
                                   States Department of Justice,
                                   Washington, DC.

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

       Petitioner Anit Jaryal, a native and citizen of India,

seeks review of a decision of the BIA affirming a decision of

an   Immigration      Judge   (“IJ”)       denying   his   application      for

asylum,       withholding     of   removal,     and    relief      under    the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).              In re Anit Jaryal, No.

A 208 617 571 (B.I.A. Apr. 22, 2020), aff’g No. A 208 617 571

(Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. June 6, 2018).               We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

       We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions

“for    the    sake   of   completeness.”        Wangchuck    v.    Dep’t    of

Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                    We review

factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of

law de novo, see Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir.

2014),    and     “the     administrative       findings     of    fact     are

conclusive       unless     any    reasonable    adjudicator       would     be

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compelled   to     conclude      to       the   contrary,”   8   U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).       An asylum applicant has the burden to

demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future

persecution.       8    U.S.C.    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);        8   C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b).

  A. Past Persecution

    Contrary to Jaryal’s position, the IJ provided sufficient

analysis for judicial review.             See Poradisova v. Gonzales,

420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005).             The IJ explained that the

two beatings Jaryal suffered at the hands of members of a

rival political party did not rise to the level of persecution

because he was not hospitalized, he described the scratches

and scrapes resulting from the beatings as minor, and he did

not suffer permanent injuries.             Jaryal does not articulate

why this analysis is insufficient.               Moreover, the agency

reasonably concluded that this harm did not rise to the level

of persecution.     See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820,

822 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasizing importance of context and

upholding agency’s conclusion that minor beating by family

planning officials that occurred before an arrest by the

police and that caused only minor bruising, required no formal

                                      3
medical attention, and had no lasting physical effect did not

rise to the level of persecution); cf. Beskovic v. Gonzales,

467 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that a “minor

beating . . . may rise to the level of persecution if it

occurred in the context of an arrest or detention” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

    Jaryal argues that the IJ erred by requiring him to

demonstrate permanent injury and hospitalization and relies

on Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2006), to

argue that his physical abuse constitutes persecution.          But

Edimo-Doualla held that the absence of permanent injury does

not necessarily preclude a finding of persecution, not that

all physical abuse constitutes persecution.       Id. at 283.   And

Jaryal’s past harm is not comparable to Edimo-Doualla’s, as

Edimo-Doualla   was   detained       by   government   authorities,

deprived of food and water, forced to bathe with water mixed

with urine, beaten with a cane and the flat side of a machete,

forced to jump on gravel, beaten with a wire while naked, and

suspended from a beam by his arms.         Id. at 279–80; see also

Beskovic, 467 F.3d at 226 (reiterating that the “difference

between harassment and persecution is necessarily one of

                                 4
degree . . . assessed with regard to the context in which the

mistreatment occurs” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)(emphasis in original)).

  B. Future Persecution

    Because Jaryal did not establish past persecution, he

had the burden of demonstrating a well-founded fear of future

persecution, which in part requires showing that his fear is

objectively      reasonable.            8 C.F.R.        § 1208.13(b)(2);

Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004).

A fear is objectively reasonable “even if there is only a

slight, though discernible, chance of persecution,” Diallo v.

INS, 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2000), but a fear is not

objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the

record and is merely “speculative at best,” Jian Xing Huang

v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005).

    Jaryal argues that his fear of future harm is objectively

reasonable, but he focuses on whether he will be harmed,

without addressing the agency’s conclusion that he failed to

establish     that    such   harm   would   rise   to    the   level   of

persecution.         Jaryal argues that the IJ ignored country-

conditions evidence that similarly situated individuals are

                                    5
persecuted in India, but he does not cite country-conditions

evidence to support that argument.          Review of the record has

not revealed evidence that members of his political party,

the Mann Party, are targets of political violence from other

parties.     Thus, on this record, the agency did not err in

concluding that Jaryal failed to establish an objectively

reasonable    fear   of    future   harm   rising    to   the    level   of

persecution. 1

     The   agency’s       determination    that     Jaryal      failed   to

establish the well-founded fear of future harm rising to the

level of persecution as required for asylum also resolves

Jaryal’s claims for withholding of removal and CAT relief,

which require the same or more severe harm.                See Lecaj v.

Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3) (withholding requirement that “life or freedom

would be threatened”); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2) (“Torture is

an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not

include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

or punishment that do not amount to torture.”).

1
  Jaryal asserts that the agency should have shifted the burden to the
Government to prove that he does not have a well-founded fear of
persecution. However, the burden shifts to the Government only if the
applicant establishes past persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
                                    6
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

                            FOR THE COURT:
                            Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                            Clerk of Court

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