Court Opinion

ID: 9819478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:26:10.496079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:56.903359
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: The majority have affirmed the judgment of the Will County circuit court convicting the defendant, Francisco Goné, of aggravated discharge of a firearm. In affirming, they rejected Goné’s claims that (1) he was denied due process when he was required to wear a stun belt without a prior “manifest necessity” hearing, and (2) plain error resulted from the court’s erroneous instruction to the jury, and his request for a new trial. On the issue of the jury instruction, the majority agree that the instruction given by the court was, in fact, erroneous, but, relying on the supreme court’s reasoning in People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005), find that there was not plain error because the evidence was not so closely balanced that the mistake “severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187, 830 N.E.2d at 479. Because I believe that the evidence against the defendant is not closely balanced and that the pertinent supreme court decisions compel our rejection of this claim by defendant, I concur. I do not, however, believe People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 856 N.E.2d 349 (2006), compels our rejection of the stun belt claim. For that reason, I dissent on that issue. In Allen, the supreme court placed a significant element of the burden of ensuring a fair trial not on the court and the attorneys— where, in my opinion, it clearly belongs — but on the defendant, and has thereby created a trap for the unwary and the procedurally ignorant. Thus, if the defendant or his attorney is not savvy enough to buck the “policy” of putting stun belts on all felony defendants by raising a specific objection in court, he has “waived” what the supreme court has recognized as a clear constitutional due process violation. Despite that aspect of its holding in Alien, the court has also told us that a defendant who is shackled during trial without justification has not only been deprived of due process, he has also been denied a fair trial. The trial judges of this district have long known that due process requires a Boose hearing before a prisoner can be shackled (or otherwise restrained) for his trial because the supreme court told them so 30 years ago. People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977). Despite this knowledge, we get case after case where trial courts reject the supreme court directive in favor of acceding to the internal policy of some sheriffs to put stun belts (or other restraints) on all felony defendants. Our responses to what I believe to be a clear dereliction on their parts has been to reward them with tortured, internally inconsistent decisions that exculpate their wrongful conduct. This court has found — and continues to find — that a retrospective hearing is sufficient to vindicate a wrong that has already happened, knowing full well that a court that has deliberately violated Boose will find some way to justify its failure to actually evaluate, before trial, the need for the defendant to be shackled. To do otherwise necessitates the expenditure of the time, effort, and money to ensure the defendant will receive a fair and constitutionally sufficient trial. This case is a perfect example. The trial court found — post trial and post due process deprivation — that because the defendant was charged with a serious offense (although he was still presumed innocent of that offense when the trial began), because he was young and physically fit, because witnesses outside the courtroom (of whom the defendant was not one) were volatile, because he had eluded capture for two years, it was reasonable to believe that he would try to escape or would endanger persons in the courtroom during the trial. He, therefore, needed to wear a stun belt. In point of fact, the defendant was, as the trial judge expressly acknowledged, “polite and respectful of the court during the proceedings; he sat at counsel table between his attorneys.” 375 Ill. App. 3d at 391. It makes no difference that “he stood, sat and walked without difficulty; the stun belt was not noticeable under the loose-fitting shirt [he] wore; *** and it did not appear that he had any difficulty communicating with his attorneys.” 375 Ill. App. 3d at 391. It is still the law of Illinois as articulated by our supreme court that if a defendant is shackled during trial without justification, his right to a fair trial has been denied (People v. Mien, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 346, 856 N.E.2d 349, 353 (2006); People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005); In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33, 37, 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977)), and he must be retried. There is nothing in defendant’s trial conduct to suggest that the stun belt was ever necessary and that he was not restrained without justification. It is, I think, a fair inference that the trial court did not even consider, prior to trial, whether the defendant was being properly restrained. It simply did what the supreme court forbade in Boose and permitted defendant to be restrained at trial without a prior determination that such restraint was necessary. It also did what we forbade in People v. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 808 N.E.2d 1089 (2004), and blindly complied with the “standard policy” of the Will County sheriff to place stun belts on defendants in felony trials, thereby allowing someone other than the judge to dictate the constitutional propriety of defendant’s trial. It is also wholly irrelevant, based on the supreme court’s analysis in Allen, that “no stun belt had ever been activated while it was being worn by a defendant.” 375 Ill. App. 3d at 391. The “evil” to be avoided is standing unnecessarily restrained at trial in violation of due process and of the presumption of innocence, not merely receiving a shock — unpleasant and potentially lethal as that may be. I believe that the supreme court’s analysis in Allen authorizes reversal of defendant’s conviction under the particular facts of this case. Having said all of this, I would also suggest that the root of this problem that we confront time and time again is the current “standard policy.” I believe the procedural aspects of all these cases could be eliminated with a simple policy change — a change that is consistent not only with Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 856 N.E.2d 349, but also with Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 362 N.E.2d 303, Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 830 N.E.2d 467, and Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33, 364 N.E.2d 72, and our decision in Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 808 N.E.2d 1089. The policy I propose enforcing is that every defendant steps into the courtroom without restraints unless the sheriff or the State specifically requests leave of court to restrain him or her. The required response to this request should be a Boose hearing at which the State bears the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant poses a danger that warrants his being restrained. That procedure is both inherent in and explicitly articulated and implicitly mandated by the cases cited above. Such a policy is fully compliant with the federal and state constitutions and prior validated supreme court precedent, comports with general notions of fairness in the courts, and does not violate Allen. It also has the benefit of obviating the need for highly suspect retrospective hearings on the propriety of having already denied defendant due process and the potential need for expensive and inconvenient retrials. This court should direct the circuit court of Will County (and all of the courts of this district) to change whatever current policy is being followed that requires a defendant to be restrained at trial without a Boose hearing. We should not, however, need to do this since the supreme court has, in fact, already mandated such a policy. In Allen, the court stated: “Here, as in Martinez, the trial court never made a Boose analysis; it simply deferred to the judgment of the sheriff. We agree with the Martinez court that this abdication of the trial court’s responsibility is not acceptable. ‘The court must rigorously control its own courtroom procedures and, consistent with the mandates of due process, protect the rights of the parties and the public.’ Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1004. Indeed, the type of policy adopted by the Will County sheriff, requiring all custodial felony defendants to wear stun belts while in court, was frowned upon by this court almost 30 years ago in Boose. < «*** [pjfoe trial judge must make the decision to use physical restraints on a case-by-case basis. The court cannot adopt a general policy of imposing such restraints *** unless there is a showing of necessity on the record. ***” ’ (Emphasis added.) Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 268, quoting People v. Duran, 16 Cal. 3d 282, 293, 545 E2d 1322, 1329, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625 (1976).” (Emphasis added.) Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 348-49, 856 N.E.2d at 354. It seems abundantly clear to me that the supreme court has forbidden the exact policy on which the Will County court has relied to justify its failure to hold a Boose hearing for the purpose of making a determination of the need for restraint of defendant Francisco Goné. I believe it is our job to enforce that mandate by highlighting its existence to the circuit courts and sanctioning its violation.