Court Opinion

ID: 9791611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:14:30.941532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:37.226945
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I am unpersuaded by the court’s conclusion that Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (no violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination when evidence derived from a wholly independent source), and Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (no violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel when evidence would have been inevitably discovered regardless of violation), compel application of the doctrine of inevitable discovery to the statutory grant of immunity provided in 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5). See Op. at 834. The immunity granted by 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5), coextensive with the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment, is very broad.1 The doctrine of inevitable discovery is incompatible with the mandate that an immunized report and information derived from the exploitation of an immunized report is not admissible in a criminal proceeding against the declarant. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals that so holds.2
At the outset, it is important to know what evidence Hazelwood sought to suppress.3 Hazelwood filed separate motions relating to the admissibility of evidence. One motion asserted essentially that all evidence supporting the charges against him was derived from the exploitation of his immunized report, and hence was inadmissible. Dismissal of the charges was the remedy Hazelwood sought. Another motion, based on the same theory, sought suppression of the result of a blood alcohol test taken while Hazelwood was still aboard the Exxon Valdez. A third motion, again based on the same theory, sought suppression of four specific statements:
The first statement was made in a radio call to the Coast Guard and reported that *835the defendant was having some trouble with the third mate. The second statement was made in response to a question by Department of Environmental Control (DEC) investigator, Joe LeBeau. LeBeau asked the defendant what the problem was that caused the grounding, and the defendant replied, “You’re looking at it.” The third statement was a similar remark made in response to a similar question by Trooper Fox. The fourth statement is an interview of the defendant conducted by Coast Guard Chief Warrant Officer Mark Delozier, contained in state’s exhibit 69.
Order, State v. Hazelwood, No. 3AN-S89-7217 Cr./7218 Cr. (Alaska Super., December 18,1989). These four statements were made before or during the government agents’ initial boarding of the Exxon Valdez.
The court of appeals noted that “[h]ere, the superior court found, and the state has effectively conceded, that the evidence against Hazelwood was in fact obtained ‘by the exploitation of Hazelwood’s report that the Exxon Valdez ran aground and was leaking oil.” Hazelwood v. State, 836 P.2d 943, 953 (Alaska App.1992). The court does not dispute that this was the only source of the evidence which the State proposed to use against Hazelwood: his “single radio transmission made shortly after the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef.” Op. at 831. This transmission was given pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5):
Any person in charge of a vessel ... shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any discharge of oil ..., immediately notify the appropriate agency of the United States Government of such discharge_ Notification received pursuant to this paragraph or information obtained by the exploitation of such notification shall not be used against any such person in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury or for giving a false statement.
It is also important to keep in mind the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution that are implicated in this case. The Fourth Amendment addresses searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment addresses the privilege against self incrimination:
No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ...
U.S. Const, amend. V. The Sixth Amendment addresses the right to assistance of counsel:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to the assistance, of counsel for his defense.
U.S. Const, amend. VI. These rights apply in different ways and may be violated at different stages of the government’s involvement with a citizen.
Violations of Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights are “fully accomplished” at the time of the offending government conduct. _ See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 1753, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (Fourth Amendment); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (Sixth Amendment).4 They may occur even though no formal criminal charges are filed against the citizen. If formal charges *836are filed, the remedy for such violations may be the exclusion of evidence obtained thereby. However, in Nix the Supreme Court accepted the inevitable discovery doctrine as an exception to the exclusionary rule for violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.5
In contrast, a violation of the Fifth Amendment is not “fully accomplished” until the compelled evidence is used against the citizen at trial:
The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial. The Fourth Amendment functions differently. It prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” whether or not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial, and a violation of the Amendment is “fully accomplished” at the time of an unreasonable governmental intrusion.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (citations omitted). Evidence admitted at trial over a valid assertion of the privilege against self incrimination violates the privilege. Thus exclusion of the evidence both effectuates the constitutional right and prevents the constitutional violation.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that there is a predicate for application of the exclusionary rule: “It is clear that the cases implementing the exclusionary rule ‘begin with the premise that the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity.’ ” United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) (emphasis added). However, Hazelwood does not rely on a claim of any illegal governmental activity prior to the State’s effort to introduce compelled evidence in the criminal proceeding.6 Exclusion of Hazelwood’s immunized report and information derived from the exploitation thereof is not mandated by an exclusionary rule, but by the Fifth Amendment *837itself: “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal ease to be a witness against himself... .”7
I agree with the court’s interpretation of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) and its conclusion regarding the independent source doctrine. See Op. at 829-831. The use of evidence derived from a wholly independent source would not violate Hazelwood’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination, as it would not be derived from the exploitation of Hazelwood’s immunized report. However, information derived in fact from the exploitation of Hazelwood’s immunized report violates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination and must not be admitted in evidence. Whether a citizen is afforded a constitutional right should not depend in the first instance on whether a trial court determines that evidence derived from the exploitation of an immunized statement would or would not have been inevitably discovered.8

.The scope of immunity articulated in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964), has not been narrowed. Murphy, commented on with approval in Nix, recognized the independent source doctrine, reaffirmed in Kastigar.
Furthermore, one court has noted that the specific federal statute in question requires that "prosecution be based on evidence other than notification or information obtained by exploitation of such notification." United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 491 F.2d 315, 318 (6th Cir.1974) (addressing 33 U.S.C. § 1161(b)(4), which was later codified as 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5)). The court emphasized the policy underlying the statute:
If [a person] ... is denied protection from prosecution based solely on such reporting ... in cases where it might be difficult after passage of time to trace the source of a discharge, there would be incentive ... to withhold reporting a spill.

Id.

. It remains my view that a case should be decided on as narrow a ground as possible. Therefore, I would not have addressed the constitutional issues until first addressing whether the evidence supported application of or exceptions to any exclusionary rule. Abood v. League of Women Voters of Alaska, 743 P.2d 333, 345 n. 3 (Alaska 1987) (Compton, J., dissenting); Deubelbeiss v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 689 P.2d 487, 491 (Alaska 1984) (Compton, J., concurring). The court of appeals chose to approach the case differently, and thus it is necessary to address the issues as the court of appeals has arranged them.

. The issue in this case is not whether Hazel-wood himself is immune from prosecution, but whether evidence derived from the exploitation of Hazelwood’s immunized report is admissible ' 'in a .prosecution against him. The issue also is not whether the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, and resultant spillage of oil, would have been inevitably discovered. The answer to that question is too obvious to need comment.

. Nix and its predecessor, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), involved the "Christian burial speech.” Williams was charged with abducting a young girl in Des Moines, Iowa, but was arrested in Davenport, Iowa. Although the police agreed not to question Williams en route to Des Moines, a detective told Williams he wanted to give Williams something to think about "while we're traveling down the road.... I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered.” In response, Williams asked the detective about the search for the girl, whether the police had found specific items of the girl's clothing, and why the detective thought they would pass near where the girl was buried. Williams then attempted to assist the police in locating items of the girl's clothing, and eventually led them to the place where she was buried. The trial court denied Williams' motions to suppress evidence relating to or resulting from his statements. His convic*836tion was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court. In Brewer, Williams’ conviction was set aside on the basis of a clear violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court observed that
[wjhile neither Williams’ incriminating statements themselves nor any testimony describing his having led police to the victim's body can constitutionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams....
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 406 n. 12, 97 S.Ct. at 1243 n. 12 (emphasis added). This comment foreshadowed the Supreme Court's decision in Nix. It is noteworthy that the police were searching for the abducted girl before Williams made any statements and led the police to her body. In the case before us, the government was not looking for anything respecting the grounding of the Exxon Valdez until Hazelwood made his immunized statement.

. The Supreme Court's rationale is rooted in history. It represents a pragmatic balancing of the integrity and fairness of a criminal proceeding on the one hand, and law enforcement's interest in obtaining reliable evidence on the other:
More than half century ago, Judge, later Justice, Cardozo made his seminal observation that under the exclusionary rule "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.” Prophetically, he went on to consider "how far reaching in its effect upon society” the exclusionary rule would be when "the pettiest peace officer would have it in his power through overzeal or indiscretion to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes most flagitious.” Someday, Cardozo speculated, some court might press the exclusionary rule to the outer limits of its logic — or beyond — and suppress evidence relating to the “body of a murdered” victim because of the means it was found. Cardozo's prophecy was fulfilled in Killough v. United States, 114 US App DC 305, 309, 315 F.2d 241, 245 (1962) (en banc). But when, as here, the evidence inevitably would have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.
Nix, 467 U.S. at 447, 104 S.Ct. at 2511 (citations omitted).

. The government's statutory mandate is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” The superior court described implementation of this mandate as follows:
Polluting is generally always a crime. However, legislative bodies have balanced the need to abate and lesson [sic] pollution against the need to present all probative evidence in a criminal proceeding, and the balance has resulted in providing immunity to a polluter, in order to achieve regulatory goals.
*837Memorandum Decision and Order, State v. Hazelwood, No. 3AN-S89-7217 Cr./7218 Cr. (Alaska Super., December 29, 1989). It is noteworthy that no activity taken by the government in furtherance of its statutory mandate would have been restricted in the least by the exclusion of compelled evidence in the criminal proceeding against Hazelwood.
This point is relevant to the court’s misplaced conclusion that the inevitable discovery doctrine is “essentially a variation on the independent source rule.” Op. at 832. Although the Nix Court stated that the inevitable discovery doctrine is "functionally similar” to the independent source doctrine, Nix, 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. at 2509, the functional similarity is limited to the fact that "exclusion of evidence that would be inevitably discovered would also put the government in a worse position, because the police would have obtained that evidence if no misconduct had taken place." Id.

. In Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he exclusionary rule, ... when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth.” Id. at 601, 95 S.Ct. at 2260.

. It is difficult to conceive how Hazelwood’s oral statements — specific pronouncements occurring at specific points in time — -ever could have been "inevitably discovered.” Statements he made during the onboard investigation were used against him in a criminal proceeding. I do not know how it can be said that the government agents would have inevitably discovered these oral statements. It is one thing to make the tortured sequence of factual inferences — would have, would have, would have — leading to the conclusion that government agents would have arrived at the Exxon Valdez at about the same time as they did, with or without Hazelwood’s initial immunized report. It is quite another to conclude that the agents would have asked Ha-zelwood the same questions and would have been given the same answers.
The practical problem with applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to oral statements made by Hazelwood simply highlights the fundamental analytical problem in applying the doctrine to information derived from the exploitation of an immunized statement. The government actually used "information obtained by the exploitation” of an immunized statement to convict the person compelled to make the statement. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5). This violates the statute and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. Its use is not made any more permissible by musings about what hypothetically might have happened if the government had not used information derived from the exploitation of an immunized statement.