Court Opinion

ID: 9953505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 13:15:02.15582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:00.361350
License: Public Domain

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT                                                                        CIVIL DIVISION
Windsor Unit                                                                             Case No. 24-CV-00903
12 The Green
Woodstock VT 05091
802-457-2121
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Windsor County Republican Committee, Lynn Baldwin,
August Murray, Peggy Dionne, Earl Dionne, and Andrea Murray
      Plaintiffs

v.

State of Vermont Republican Party, Paul Dame,
and John MacGovern
        Defendants

                            Decision on Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

        Vermont’s major political parties “organize biennially.” 17 V.S.A. § 2301. This means that,
every two years, the state chair schedules a date for party members “to meet in caucus in their
respective towns,” 17 V.S.A. § 2302(a), at which time the party voters in each town elect a town
committee, 17 V.S.A. § 2304(a)(1), which is then responsible for meeting and electing delegates to the
county committee for the ensuing two years, 17 V.S.A. § 2305(a)(2).
        The state chair then schedules “a date for the first meeting of each county committee,” 17
V.S.A. § 2309(a)(1), at which time the assembled delegates in each county are responsible for meeting
and “elect[ing] their officers and perfect[ing] an organization of the county committee for the ensuing
two years,” 17 V.S.A. § 2309(b)(1), and electing delegates to the state committee. 17 V.S.A. § 2310.
“Within 72 hours” of this meeting, the chair and the secretary of the county committee are responsible
for providing the state committee with certain information, including a copy of the notice of the
meeting, and “a certified list of the names of . . . the officers of the county committee.” 17 V.S.A.
§ 2311(a). After the state committee has conducted some additional business, 17 V.S.A. § 2312, the
state chair files a certificate with the Vermont Secretary of State “stating that the party has completed
its organization for the ensuing two years and has substantially complied with the provisions of this
chapter.” 17 V.S.A. § 2313(a)(1). At that point, each county committee is “considered organized.” 17
V.S.A. § 2311(b).
        In this case, plaintiffs have filed a verified complaint alleging that the first county committee
meeting of the Windsor County Republican Party was held on October 18, 2023. At that meeting,
plaintiffs allege that John MacGovern and August Murray “were elected together by unanimous
consent” as chair and vice-chair. It appears from the filed documents that these names were sent by the
county committee to the state committee pursuant to 17 V.S.A. § 2311(a), and that the state chair
Order                                                                                          Page 1 of 4
24-CV-00903 Windsor County Republican Party et al v. State of Vermont Republican Party et al
subsequently filed the certificate that had the effect of “organiz[ing]” the county committee, 17 V.S.A.
§ 2311(b). Plaintiffs contend, however, that the manner of electing the chair did not conform to the
county committee bylaws, and was therefore “null and void.”
       Various political disagreements then emerged between Mr. MacGovern and other members of
the county committee. Plaintiffs allege that the next meeting of the county committee, held on
December 14, 2023, descended quickly into chaos, resulting in Mr. MacGovern leaving the meeting
before it adjourned. After Mr. MacGovern left, the vice chair ran the meeting. The remaining
committee members then revised the minutes from the October 18th meeting to assert that “[t]here was
not a voice vote taken or a motion of acclamation to declare Mr. MacGovern as county chairman and
the voting moved on to the vice chair position without disposition.” In other words, the remaining
committee members revised the minutes to assert that no vote for chair was ever held. The remaining
committee members then adopted two separate resolutions censuring Mr. MacGovern and scheduled
the next meeting of the county committee for the purpose of “holding an election for county chairman
and any vacant positions.”
        The next meeting was held on January 6, 2024. It appears that Mr. MacGovern did not attend
the meeting, believing it to have been unauthorized. At the meeting, the assembled delegates purported
to elect Lynn Baldwin as chair of the county committee and August Murray as vice chair of the county
committee. The assembled delegates then proceeded to conduct a variety of otherwise-routine
business.
        Since then, both Mr. MacGovern and Ms. Baldwin have held themselves out as the county
chair, and both have taken actions in that role, including constituting their own executive committees,
organizing additional towns, conducting committee events, and recruiting candidates for election. In an
apparent effort to calm the controversy, the state committee passed a resolution on February 6, 2024,
recognizing Mr. MacGovern as the chair and ordering the county committee to recall its officers and
hold a new organizational meeting. Plaintiffs contend that the state committee was not authorized to
act in this manner. Plaintiffs also assert that the organizational meeting is scheduled for March 16,
2024, but that the meeting will be chaotic because both purported chairs will be present, and that the
result of the organizational meeting will be that there will be “two sets of officers claiming
authorization to govern the Windsor County Republican Committee.”
       Plaintiffs seek an ex parte temporary restraining order “cancelling” the March 16th
organizational meeting.
        An ex parte restraining order is an extraordinary departure from the principles of procedural
due process because it represents the intervention of the court without providing the opposing party
with advance notice of the request or an opportunity to be heard. 11A Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure: Civil 3d § 2951. A temporary restraining order should not be granted without
prior notice to the other party unless the right to relief is clear and the plaintiff establishes through
“specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury,
loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be
heard in opposition.” Vt. R. Civ. P. 65(a); Committee to Save the Bishop’s House v. Medical Center
Hospital of Vermont, 136 Vt. 213, 218 (1978); Vermont Democratic Party v. Republican Governors
Ass’n, No. S1285-04 CnC, 2004 WL 5460796 (Vt. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2004) (Norton, J.). Here, for the

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24-CV-00903 Windsor County Republican Party et al v. State of Vermont Republican Party et al
following reasons, the court is not persuaded that the plaintiffs’ right to relief is clear, nor that
immediate and irreparable injury will result before the defendants can be heard in opposition.
        First, there are constitutional dimensions to a political party’s “decisions about the identity of,
and the process for electing, its leaders.” Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 229 (1989); Price v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2008). For
this reason, courts exercise “great caution and restraint” when confronted with challenges involving
internal disputes of political parties, especially when there are “deliberative channels within the party”
that are “available to address alleged conflicts.” Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin,
450 U.S. 107, 125–26 (1981); O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972), Mohn v. Bucks County
Republican Committee, 259 A.3d 449, 456–59 (Pa. 2021); Cochran v. Supinski, 794 A.2d 1239, 1248
(Del. Ch. 2001); Fitzgerald v. Reardon, 576 A.2d 183, 185 (Del. Ch. 1990). In this case, the court finds
it significant that the state committee has already issued a resolution regarding the controversy. At a
minimum, the constitutional interests involved disfavor judicial intervention without at least providing
the state committee with notice of the proposed action and an opportunity to be heard.
        Second, the identity and alignments of the parties are not clear from the complaint. Plaintiffs
are identified as five individual party members and also the county committee itself, though there is no
attached resolution authorizing these plaintiffs to bring suit in the name of the county committee.
Plaintiffs do not address the significance of the apparent facts that the names of “the officers of the
county committee” have already been sent to the state committee, nor that plaintiffs’ control of the
county committee does not appear to be recognized by the state committee. 17 V.S.A. § 2311(a)–(b).
Likewise, it is not clear whether the March 16th organizational meeting is being conducted by any of
the individuals or entities who are named as defendants—it rather appears from the verified complaint
as though the organizational meeting is being held by the county committee, or at least another
iteration of the county committee. At a minimum, again, there is not a clear basis for ex parte judicial
intervention, nor a clear identification of whose conduct, exactly, would be the subject of the proposed
restraining order.
        Third, the verified complaint and the supporting evidentiary materials do not provide a clear
understanding of the factual circumstances or applicable rules. Plaintiffs assert in their verified
complaint that Mr. MacGovern was elected as chair of the committee on October 18th “by unanimous
consent,” but the supporting minutes describe the election differently. Plaintiffs also assert that the
election, by whatever means, was contrary to the county-committee rules, but the copy of the rules
submitted as evidence contains the following notation at the end of the document: “Note: these are the
old by-laws from 2002.” As such, it is not clear to the court what exactly happened, nor whether it has
been provided with a copy of the bylaws that applied to the election that was held on October 18th,
2023. Cf. 11A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2952 (discussing the
evidentiary quality of the materials needed to support a request for an ex parte restraining order).
        Finally, there is still time for defendants to be heard before the March 16th organizational
meeting. A hearing is being scheduled by the court, and a copy of the hearing notice will be provided
to plaintiffs. It is plaintiffs’ responsibility to serve the hearing notice, together with a copy of this
decision and the other required materials, “upon all parties . . . in the manner provided by these rules.”
Vt. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).

Order                                                                                          Page 3 of 4
24-CV-00903 Windsor County Republican Party et al v. State of Vermont Republican Party et al
       For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the court’s conclusion is that the issues presented by
the complaint and the motion for injunctive relief are better addressed after providing all named parties
with notice of the request and an opportunity to be heard.

        Electronically signed on Monday, March 11, 2024 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).

                                                                    H. Dickson Corbett
                                                                    Superior Court Judge
                                                              Vermont Superior Court
                                                                     Filed o3 11 24
                                                                       Windso/r nit

Order                                                                                          Page 4 of 4
24-CV-00903 Windsor County Republican Party et a1 V. State of Vermont Republican Party et a1