Court Opinion

ID: 9915798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 17:03:19.392857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:59.765887
License: Public Domain

SECOND DIVISION
                               MERCIER, C. J.,
                         MILLER, P. J., and HODGES, J.

                     NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                     physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                     days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                                https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                      January 8, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1703. COMPTON v. THE STATE.

      MILLER, Presiding Judge.

      Alexander Braden Compton entered an Alford1 plea to one count of theft by

receiving stolen property. Compton challenges this conviction, arguing that it should

be vacated because the trial court did not resolve the conflict between his claims of

innocence and guilty plea at the plea colloquy and did not sufficiently ascertain the

factual basis for the underlying theft charge. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

      The record shows that Compton was charged by accusation with one count of

theft by taking of a value greater than $5,000 (OCGA § 16-8-2) and one count of theft

by receiving stolen property of a value greater than $5,000 (OCGA § 16-8-7).

      1
          North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Compton agreed to enter an Alford plea to the theft by

receiving stolen property charge, and the State agreed to nolle pros the theft by taking

charge. As part of the plea agreement, Compton filed an “Affidavit - Plea of Guilty,”

through which Compton represented that he understood the charges, that he did not

want the trial court to read the accusation at the colloquy, and that he did not want the

court to “explain anything therein” to him. Compton further represented that he

understood the potential sentencing ranges, that no one had threatened or coerced him

into pleading guilty, and that he understood the various constitutional rights that he

was waiving by pleading guilty.

      At the plea colloquy, the trial court questioned Compton as to whether he

reviewed the plea affidavit with his counsel, whether he understood the form, and

whether the answers on the form were true and correct, and Compton responded

affirmatively. The trial court confirmed with Compton that he understood the

constitutional rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty and that he discussed the

matter with his counsel. The trial court also confirmed that Compton understood the

charges against him and that he was aware of the relevant sentencing ranges. The trial

court further confirmed that Compton was not under the influence of any drugs or

alcohol and that no one had threatened or coerced him into pleading guilty. The trial

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court then asked the State to outline the factual basis for the charges, to which the

State responded that

      a Codes [sic] Enforcement Officer came to what essentially is a mobile
      home or a tiny home and found the Defendant living there. He did not
      own that tiny home. And there is a dispute as to whether he had
      permission to be living in that tiny home. And the tiny home itself was
      moved from its original location.

      The victim in this case says that the tiny home was supposed to be in a
      separate location. So the theft by receiving is that he did – the State
      would show that he did receive this mobile home or tiny home knowing
      that it was not his.

The trial court asked Compton if he was entering an Alford plea because there was

a substantial likelihood that he could be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if the

case proceeded to trial, and Compton responded, “Yes. That’s correct.” The trial court

found that there was a factual basis for the guilty plea and that the plea was freely and

voluntarily entered, and the court then accepted the plea and sentenced Compton to

ten years’ probation. This appeal followed.

      In his sole claim of error, Compton argues that his conviction should be

vacated because the trial court did not resolve the conflict between his claim of

innocence and his decision to plead guilty by failing to ascertain the factual basis for

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the theft charge. We conclude that the trial court fully complied with its duty to

ascertain the factual basis supporting Compton’s crime, and so we affirm.

      When a defendant challenges the validity of a guilty plea, the State has
      the burden of showing that the plea was made intelligently and
      voluntarily. And the State may satisfy its burden to show that a plea was
      knowingly and voluntarily made by demonstrating on the record of the
      guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood the rights being
      waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic
      evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and
      knowing. . . . [W]hen it comes to an Alford plea, the trial court “may
      accept a guilty plea from a defendant who claims innocence if the
      defendant has intelligently concluded that it is in his best interest to
      plead guilty and the court has inquired into the factual basis for the plea
      and sought to resolve the conflict between the plea and the claim of
      innocence. Furthermore, the voluntariness and intelligence of an Alford
      plea is judged by the same standard as a routine guilty plea: whether the
      plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
      courses of action open to the defendant.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rios v. State, 358 Ga. App. 359, 359-360 (855

SE2d 372) (2021).2

      2
         Compton argues at length that the manifest injustice standard set out in
Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.12 does not apply in this case because Compton (1)
did not file a motion to withdraw his plea in the trial court; and (2) entered an Alford
plea. Because we conclude that the trial court did not violate Rule 33.9, we do not

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      “Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, judgment should not be

entered upon such plea without such inquiry on the record as may satisfy the judge

that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9. “[T]he

requirement that a factual basis be shown for a plea is to protect against someone

pleading guilty when that person may know what he has done but may not know that

those acts do not constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 367 (1) (b) (695 SE2d 591) (2010).

This rule “does not require that guilt be shown beyond a reasonable doubt” during a

plea colloquy; instead, “the court must merely satisfy itself subjectively that the

pleader knows both what he has done and that those acts constitute the crime with

which he is charged.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robertson v. State, 287

Ga. App. 271, 271-272 (2) (651 SE2d 198) (2007); see also Oliver v. State, 308 Ga.

652, 654 (1) (842 SE2d 847) (2020) (“The rule requires nothing more than that the

trial court make itself aware of the factual basis of the plea.”) (citation omitted).

      A trial court may glean the factual basis for a plea from facts put on the
      record at the guilty plea hearing, or the court may learn the factual basis
      from parts of the record outside the plea hearing so long as the court
      makes clear on the plea hearing record that it is relying on those other

reach the question of whether the manifest injustice standard applies.

                                           5
      parts of the record and so long as those parts are included in the record
      for appeal.

(Citation omitted.) Bielen v. State, 265 Ga. App. 865, 866 (1) (595 SE2d 543) (2004).

      “A person commits the offense of theft by receiving stolen property when he

receives, disposes of, or retains stolen property which he knows or should know was

stolen unless the property is received, disposed of, or retained with intent to restore

it to the owner.” OCGA § 16-8-7 (a). “A person convicted of [theft by receiving

stolen property] shall be punished as for a misdemeanor except [i]f the property

which was the subject of the theft was at least $5,000.00 in value[,]” in which case

the punishment shall be “by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten

years and, in the discretion of the trial judge, as for a misdemeanor[.]” OCGA § 16-8-

12 (a) (1) (B).

      Here, although the accusation itself was not read into the record at the plea

colloquy, Compton represented on his plea affidavit that he understood the charges,

that he did not want the trial court to read the accusation at the colloquy, and that he

did not want the court to “explain anything therein” to him. At the plea colloquy, the

trial court again questioned Compton as to whether he was aware of the nature of the

charges against him, and he responded that he was so aware. The trial court then

                                           6
asked the State to provide a summary of the facts behind the charge, and the State

provided the factual proffer listed above. Compton argues, however, that the factual

proffer provided by the State failed to establish the value of the stolen property and

failed to establish that Compton did not have the intent to restore the stolen property

to the owner. Because there is no indication that the trial court reviewed anything else

in the record before accepting the guilty plea, Compton argues that the trial court

failed in its duty to ascertain the factual basis for the underlying charge and that his

plea was therefore not knowing and voluntary.

      We disagree, however, because we conclude that the State’s factual proffer set

out sufficient facts from which the trial court could satisfy itself subjectively that the

acts constitute the crime with which Compton was charged. First, as to the intent

element, the State’s factual proffer alleged that Compton was “living” in the mobile

home in a location separate from where the home was supposed to be located, which

reasonably implies that Compton had no intention of returning the home to its rightful

owner. See Pender v. State, 311 Ga. 98, 104 (1) (a) (856 SE2d 302) (2021) (“A lack

of intent to restore the property to its rightful owner can be demonstrated by direct

evidence or inferred from the circumstances.”); Ingram v. State, 268 Ga. App. 149,

150 (1) (601 SE2d 736) (2004) (evidence was sufficient to show defendant lacked

                                            7
intent to return a trailer to the owner when he kept it and used it for two months

without making any attempt to contact the police or the owner).

      As for the value of the stolen property,3 we conclude that the State’s allegation

that Compton possessed a stolen “mobile home” or “tiny home” was sufficient to

indicate to the trial court that the value of the stolen property was at least $5,000. In

so doing, we again note that a trial court did not need to hear evidence showing

beyond a reasonable doubt that the stolen property was worth at least $5,000 but that

instead “the court must merely satisfy itself subjectively that the pleader knows both

what he has done and that those acts constitute the crime with which he is charged.”

(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Robertson, supra, 287 Ga.

App. at 271-272 (2). The trial court could have reasonably concluded from the

circumstances that a “mobile home” or a tiny home” which was in good enough

      3
        We note that “[w]hile value is not an element of the crime of theft by
receiving stolen property, it is relevant in order to distinguish between a felony and
a misdemeanor for purposes of sentencing.” (Citation omitted.) Campbell v. State,
275 Ga. App. 8, 10 (3) (619 SE2d 720) (2005). Generally, “[i]n order to establish the
proper measure of value under OCGA § 16-8-12, the State must prove the fair cash
market value either at the time and place of the theft or at any time during the receipt
or concealment of the property. . . . Examples of other evidence combined with the
purchase price to support valuation include condition of the property, use history, and
photographs.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Carswell v. State, 362 Ga. App.
662, 663-664 (869 SE2d 621) (2022).

                                           8
condition for Compton to be “living” in was worth at least $5,000. Cf. Summers v.

State, 356 Ga. App. 72, 74 (1) (a) (846 SE2d 236) (2020) (noting that a factfinder

“may draw from their own experience in forming estimates” of the fair market value

of “everyday objects” “with which the average person [would have] some knowledge

and experience in terms of their value and market characteristics”) (citation omitted).

We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that there was a factual basis to

support the defendant’s crime. See Tate, supra, 287 Ga. at 366-367 (1) (b) (factual

proffer was sufficient to show a factual basis for the defendant’s crimes even though

there were several contradictory accounts of what occurred). Compare Clinton v.

State, 359 Ga. App. 303, 306 (2) (857 SE2d 283) (2021) (a manifest injustice

occurred where the record showed that the defendant’s relationship to the victim was

not one covered by the incest statute, and so there was “no possible factual basis” to

support an incest conviction).

      Compton has therefore failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred by

accepting his Alford plea, and so we affirm Compton’s theft by receiving stolen

property conviction.

      Judgment affirmed. Mercier, C. J., and Hodges, J., concur.

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