Court Opinion

ID: 9379231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 06:08:28.915506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.972927
License: Public Domain

REVERSED and REMANDED and Opinion Filed March 13, 2023

                                             S   In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                           Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                        No. 05-22-00286-CV

                            RYAN, LLC, Appellant
                                    V.
                 NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
                        OF PITTSBURGH, PA, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court
                                 Dallas County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-05755

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and O’Neill1
                                 Opinion by Justice O’Neill

           Appellant Ryan, LLC appeals the trial court’s take-nothing judgment in

favor of appellee National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA

(National Union), which the trial court entered after granting National Union’s

motion for summary judgment and denying Ryan’s partial motion for summary

judgment. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand.

   1
       The Hon. Michael J. O’Neill, Justice, Assigned.
                       Factual and Procedural Background

      Ryan is a global tax services firm that provides clients with a range of tax

advisory and consulting services. Its principal place of business is in Dallas, Texas.

Sean Weaver was employed by Ryan as a director in its Transaction Tax Practice

Group in Arlington, Virginia, between 2011 and 2015. The Transaction Tax Practice

Group specialized in analyzing transactions of major corporations to identify

transactions that resulted in the overpayment of sales and use taxes to state and local

taxing authorities. When overpayments were identified, Weaver, along with the

employees he supervised, submitted refund claims to state and local authorities on

the clients’ behalf. The clients paid Ryan a professional fee for these services based

on a percentage of the refunds recovered. Ryan then paid commissions or bonuses

to its employees based on the amount of professional fees it received.

      In a scheme to secure higher commissions for himself, Weaver submitted

fraudulent tax returns on behalf of some of Ryan’s clients to the Virginia Department

of Taxation, the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, and the State of Florida.

This occurred between October 2011 and December 2014. As a result, Ryan’s

clients received refund amounts to which they were not entitled, Ryan received

professional fees to which it was not entitled, and some of Ryan’s employees,

including Weaver, received bonuses or commissions to which they were not entitled.

      In December 2014, Ryan’s internal procedures uncovered irregular activities

in Weaver’s work, which prompted further investigation and led to the discovery of

                                         –2–
Weaver’s scheme. Weaver was immediately terminated, and Ryan notified the

affected clients and relevant authorities. Ryan determined that it had paid Weaver

$346,612 in unearned commissions due to Weaver’s scheme. Weaver admitted he

acted alone and, ultimately, he pleaded guilty to mail fraud and money laundering

and was sentenced to seventy-one months (almost six years) in federal prison.

       Ryan had previously purchased an insurance policy from National Union,

titled “Management Liability, Professional Liability, Crime Coverage and Kidnap

and Ransom/Extortion Coverage for Private Companies.” The policy was effective

from September 1, 2014, through September 1, 2015. After Ryan discovered

Weaver’s scheme, Ryan filed a claim with National Union seeking to recover its

losses under the Crime Coverage Section.2 Ryan sought coverage for amounts that

fall into five categories of losses: (1) $2,091,566 in bonus and commission

compensation paid to Weaver and other employees; (2) $3,934,083.85 spent on

internal employee labor and expenses to investigate Weaver’s fraud; (3) $777,243.59

paid to outside vendors for assistance with forensic analysis and data hosting needed

to investigate Weaver’s fraud; (4) $1,095,140 paid to the Texas Comptroller to

resolve Ryan’s potential liability for the improper refund amount the Comptroller

issued to one of Ryan’s clients and that needed to be repaid; and (5) $3,129,227.47

in lost professional fees that Ryan either waived or paid back to its affected clients.

   2
     According to a June 30, 2017 letter sent by National Union to Ryan, National Union paid Ryan over
$7 million under its Professional Liability coverage.
                                                –3–
      National Union denied Ryan’s claim on April 27, 2017, stating that there was

no coverage under the policy for the losses suffered by Ryan. However, National

Union did offer, “under a complete reservation of rights, to reimburse Ryan for the

net loss it incurred in connection with the commissions paid to [Weaver].”

      Ryan filed suit against National Union asserting claims for breach of contract

and violations of Chapters 541 and 542 of the Texas Insurance Code. See TEX. INS.

CODE ANN. §§ 541.060 (listing unfair settlement practices, such as making

misrepresentations, failing to make a good faith effort to settle a claim, failing to

promptly provide a reasonable explanation for denial of coverage, or refusing to pay

a claim without conducting a reasonable investigation); 541.061 (listing ways

insurer can misrepresent an insurance policy); 542.058 (providing for damages when

insurer fails to promptly pay insurance claim). National Union moved for summary

judgment on both no-evidence and traditional grounds, arguing that it was entitled

to judgment as a matter of law because: (1) Ryan could not meet its burden of proof

to establish that coverage existed under the policy; specifically, Ryan could not

prove there was a “theft” because there was no “taking” of Ryan’s property by

Weaver; (2) Ryan could not meet its burden to prove that the purported “money,

securities, and other property” was covered because Ryan did not own the money

and any repayment or return was not an actual loss but instead a disgorgement; (3)

Ryan could not prove there was any direct loss from the alleged “theft” and, plus,

the indirect loss exclusion barred Ryan’s recovery of income it failed to earn but

                                        –4–
expected, payment obligations owed to third parties, and payments made to

investigate Weaver; (4) because Ryan could not establish coverage, it could not

recover on its statutory violation claims under the insurance code; and (5) even if

Ryan established coverage, Chapter 542 did not apply because the policy was a

fidelity bond, exempting it from the prompt payment requirement, and Ryan had no

evidence that National Union violated the insurance code. Ryan moved for partial

summary judgment seeking judgment that Weaver’s actions did constitute a “theft”

and that Ryan’s losses resulted “directly from” Weaver’s theft.

      On March 2, 2022, the trial court denied Ryan’s motion for partial summary

judgment without further explanation. Subsequently, the trial court granted National

Union’s motion and entered a take-nothing judgment in its favor. This appeal

followed.

      On appeal, Ryan presents the following issues for our review: whether the

trial court erred in granting National Union’s traditional and no-evidence motions

for summary judgment, and in denying Ryan’s cross-motion, as to (1) the existence

of coverage under the policy; and (2) Ryan’s claims under Chapters 541 and 542 of

the Texas Insurance Code. Within its first issue, Ryan presents the following

questions: (a) did Weaver commit “theft” through is scheme to secure inflated bonus

payments by submitting fraudulent tax returns?; (b) were Ryan’s losses a direct

result of Weaver’s theft?; and (c) did the indirect loss exclusion bar coverage?

                                        –5–
                    Summary Judgment Standard of Review

      We review a summary judgment de novo. Trial v. Dragon, 593 S.W.3d 313,

316 (Tex. 2019). When a motion for summary judgment contains grounds for both

a traditional summary judgment and no-evidence summary judgment, we generally

consider the no-evidence ground first. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598,

600 (Tex. 2004). However, “purely legal issues can never be the subject of a no-

evidence motion for summary judgment.” Harrill v. A.J.’s Wrecker Serv., Inc., 27

S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).

      Here, the parties agreed that their cross-motions would be limited to legal

issues and that any remaining discovery regarding fact issues would be conducted

after resolution of the cross-motions. The discovery conducted prior to the cross-

motions was limited to information needed by the parties to address the key legal

issue of whether there was coverage under the policy.             Therefore, in this

circumstance, we decline to address National Union’s no-evidence motion first and,

instead, look to whether the trial court erred in granting National Union’s, and in

denying Ryan’s, traditional motions for summary judgment regarding whether there

was insurance coverage.

      A traditional motion for summary judgment requires the moving party to show

that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84

(Tex. 2018). If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant

                                         –6–
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84. We take evidence

favorable to the nonmovant as true, and we indulge every reasonable inference and

resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, 589

S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2019).

                         Insurance Coverage for “Theft”

      In an insurance coverage dispute, the insured initially bears the burden to

establish coverage under the policy at issue.        Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v.

Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex. 2010). Therefore, we

first turn to whether Weaver’s actions constituted a “theft” under the Crime

Coverage section of the policy, which the parties disputed in their competing

motions.

      When interpreting an insurance policy to ascertain the parties’ intent, we

construe the policy according to general rules of contract construction. Id. at 126.

We first look to the language of the policy itself. Id. We examine and consider the

entire policy in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions so that

none will be rendered meaningless. Id. “We give terms their plain, ordinary, and

generally accepted meaning unless the instrument shows that the parties used them

in a technical or different sense.” Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d

118, 121 (Tex. 1996). Thus, when a policy defines its terms, those definitions

control. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life Inc., 370 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex. 2012).

                                        –7–
      We are also mindful of other courts’ interpretations of policy language that is

identical or very similar to the language at issue, as “[c]ourts usually strive for

uniformity in construing insurance provisions” that “are identical across the

jurisdictions.” RSUI Indem. Co. v. The Lynd Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2015)

(quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d

517, 522 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam)).

      Ambiguity does not exist simply because the parties disagree over a term’s

meaning and present different interpretations of the agreement. Dynegy Midstream

Servs., Ltd. P’ship v. Apache Corp., 294 S.W.3d 164, 168 (Tex. 2009); DeWitt Cnty.

Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. 1999). If a policy term is

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we must resolve that

uncertainty in favor of the insured. Evanston, 370 S.W.3d at 380.

      Here, the Crime Coverage Section of the policy at issue provides for coverage

of “Employee Theft,” which is defined as follows: “The Insurer will pay for loss of

or damage to Money, Securities and Other Property resulting directly from Theft

committed by an Employee, whether identified or not, acting alone or in collusion

with other persons.” “Theft” is defined as “the unlawful taking of Money, Securities

or Other Property to the deprivation of the Insured.” And “Money” is defined in

relevant part as “currency, coins and bank notes in current use and having a face

value.”

                                        –8–
      Ryan argues that, at the very least, there was a theft when Weaver took

commissions from Ryan that he did not earn. The parties do not dispute that Weaver

was paid commissions to which he was not entitled and that such commissions are

“money” as defined by the policy. However, the parties do not agree that Weaver

committed a “theft” as defined by the policy. National Union maintains that Weaver

did not unlawfully take money from Ryan but that, instead, he started a chain

reaction that caused money to improperly flow from the taxing authorities to Ryan’s

clients, to Ryan, and then to Weaver and other employees. In support of its

argument, National Union points to the fact that Weaver was not convicted of theft

but was instead convicted of mail fraud and money laundering.

      While the policy defines theft as “the unlawful taking of Money . . . to the

deprivation of the Insured,” the policy does not define “unlawful” or “taking,” so we

must give those terms their plain, ordinary meaning. Merriam-Webster defines

“unlawful” as “not lawful,” “not morally right or conventional,” “not authorized or

justified by law,” and “contrary to or in defiance of the law.” Unlawful, MERRIAM-

WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unlawful. It defines

“taking,” in relevant part, as “to get into one’s hands or into one’s possession,

power, or control.”     Taking, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/taking. Black’s Law defines “take” as “[t]o lay hold of; to

gain or receive into possession; to seize; to deprive one of the possession of; to

assume ownership” and “[t]o obtain or assume possession of a chattel unlawfully,

                                        –9–
and without the owner’s consent.”              Take, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,

https://thelawdictionary.org/take/.

      National Union relies on Tesoro Refinancing & Marketing Co. LLC v.

National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 96 F. Supp. 3d 638 (W.D.

Tex. 2015) (order), aff’d on other grounds, 833 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2016), for support

of its contention that there was no theft and, thus, no coverage under the Crime

Coverage Section. The crime coverage policy concerning employee theft at issue

here was the same language at issue in Tesoro. Id. at 645. Tesoro sold fuel to a

petroleum distributor on credit. Id. at 641–42. The petroleum distributor’s credit

balance grew to approximately $45 million and raised concerns. Id. at 642. Tesoro

believed that, due to the concerns, its credit manager falsified letters of credit and

presented them to Tesoro and its auditors to alleviate any concerns by making Tesoro

believe the account was adequately collateralized when it was not. Id. at 642–43,

648. Eventually Tesoro discovered that the most recent letter of credit was invalid

and stopped selling fuel to the petroleum distributor. Id. at 643. Tesoro submitted

an insurance claim to National Union under its employee theft coverage, which

National Union denied. Id.

      In interpreting what “unlawful taking” meant, the district court relied upon

dictionary definitions, as well as definitions in the Texas Penal Code. Id. at 647–48;

see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (“A person commits an offense [theft] if he

unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.”).

                                        –10–
Ultimately, the court found that “the plain meaning of ‘unlawful taking’ under Texas

law is the act of seizing or otherwise exercising control over an article such that

possession or control of the article is transferred without the owner’s authorization

or consent.” Id. at 648. Based on the plain meaning of “unlawful taking,” the court

concluded that Tesoro’s manager did not commit theft because he never seized or

exercised control over the fuel sold to the petroleum distributor. Id. at 648–49.

      Ryan argues that applying Tesoro’s plain meaning of “unlawful taking” to the

facts here does not support National Union’s argument because Weaver did seize or

exercise control over Ryan’s money when he took $346,612 in unearned

commissions. We agree.

      National Union also argues that Weaver’s taking of the commission payments

was not unlawful because Ryan consented to pay him. However, Ryan’s President

of U.S. Operations testified by affidavit that had Ryan known Weaver was

submitting fraudulent claims, Ryan would not have consented to pay Weaver

bonuses that resulted from his scheme. Ryan points us to Whitney Equipment Co.,

Inc. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. of America, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (W.D.

Wash. 2020) (order), as an example of how employee theft can occur when an

employee manipulates financial data to trigger the employer’s bonus policy, which

results in the employee receiving a bonus she did not earn. The district court

                                        –11–
explained the meaning of “theft,” which was defined in the policy with language

almost identical to our definition here,3 as follows:

        The average person purchasing insurance would read this definition to
        include [the employee’s] conduct. [The employee] set out to enrich
        herself at [the employer’s] expense, intentionally manipulating the
        company’s financial data to “earn” payments to which she had no right.
        Although her scheme was more complicated than reaching into the till
        to grab some cash or turning in a fraudulent vendor receipt to pocket
        the money, if the contract terms are given their fair, reasonable, and
        sensible construction, [the employee] intentionally and unlawfully took
        [the employer’s] money.

Id. at 1226. We agree that an “unlawful taking” includes taking by deception.

        National Union argues that Whitney is distinguishable from this case because

Weaver did not take from Ryan or set out to enrich himself at Ryan’s expense.

National Union maintains that Ryan did not own the money at issue here; the taxing

authorities did. And, thus, if Weaver took from anyone, he took from the taxing

authorities, not Ryan.

        In addition to the policy providing that the definition of “Theft” is “the

unlawful taking of Money, Securities or Other Property to the deprivation of the

Insured,” the policy also provides that the property covered is limited to property

“[t]hat the Insured owns or leases” or “[t]hat the Insured holds for others whether or

not the Insured is legally liable for the loss of such property.” Ryan argues that

National Union waived its argument that Ryan did not own the money it paid Weaver

    3
     The Travelers policy defined “theft” as “the intentional unlawful taking of Money . . . to the Insured’s
deprivation.” Whitney, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1225.
                                                   –12–
because National Union failed to plead it as an affirmative defense. Assuming

without deciding that National Union preserved this argument, we conclude that

Ryan owned the money at issue and, thus, Weaver took the commission payment to

the deprivation of Ryan.

       It is undisputed that Ryan paid employees, including Weaver, commissions

and bonuses based on professional fees it received or it expected to receive.

However, the fact that the amount paid was based on professional fees Ryan believed

it earned but paid back or waived due to the discovery of Weaver’s scheme does not

change Ryan’s ownership rights to the money it paid Weaver. Ryan had care,

custody, and control of the money it paid Weaver and caused such money to be

transferred to Weaver from Ryan. Therefore, when Ryan paid Weaver his $346,612

commission, Weaver took from Ryan money Ryan owned and money Weaver knew

he did not earn.

      We conclude that the $346,612 paid to Weaver was an unlawful taking by

Weaver to the deprivation of Ryan and, thus, there is coverage under the Employee

Theft provision of the policy. We decline to address the remaining questions

presented and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We reach this decision due to the fact that the trial court could not have

entered final judgment on Ryan’s breach of contract claim or its claim that National

Union violated Chapters 541 and 542 of the Texas Insurance Code if it found that

coverage existed. Therefore, the trial court should be given an opportunity to first

                                       –13–
decide what standard should apply to determine whether Ryan’s remaining alleged

losses were losses “resulting directly from” Weaver’s theft of $346,612 and, after an

adequate time for discovery, what alleged losses meet that standard or are barred by

the indirect loss exclusion. Because we have concluded that there is coverage under

the policy, the trial court should also be given an opportunity to consider the parties’

arguments concerning the alleged statutory violations.

                                     Conclusion

      We sustain Ryan’s first issue as it pertains to whether there was coverage

under the Employee Theft provision of the Crime Coverage policy. Having found

that Weaver committed theft by unlawfully taking $346,612 in commissions, we

reverse the trial court’s take-nothing judgment in favor of National Union and

remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                                            /Michael J. O’Neill/
                                            MICHAEL J. O’NEILL
                                            JUSTICE, ASSIGNED

220286F.P05

                                         –14–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

RYAN, LLC, Appellant                           On Appeal from the 191st Judicial
                                               District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00286-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-05755.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice O’Neill.
NATIONAL UNION FIRE                            Justices Pedersen, III and Goldstein
INSURANCE COMPANY OF                           participating.
PITTSBURGH, PA, Appellee

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is REVERSED, and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     It is ORDERED that appellant RYAN, LLC recover its costs of this appeal
from appellee NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH, PA.

Judgment entered this 13th day of March 2023.

                                        –15–