Court Opinion

ID: 9567905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:52.792937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:22:32.096258
License: Public Domain

Hunt, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree with the majority that the Anti-Mask Act may be construed to be constitutionally permissible. I disagree, however, that this court is authorized to construe the act to impose criminal liability where the mask-wearer merely knows or reasonably should know that his conduct (in wearing a mask intended to conceal his identity) will give rise to a reasonable apprehension of intimidation, threats, or impending violence. Criminal liability should be imposed only where he *677intends to intimidate or to threaten or to create an environment for impending violence.
It is a long-standing rule that criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. Palmer v. State, 260 Ga. 330, 331 (393 SE2d 251) (1990); Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770, 775 (2) (257 SE2d 182) (1979); Balkcom v. Before, 219 Ga. 641, 642 (2) (135 SE2d 425) (1964). A reading of the Anti-Mask Act, with its Statement of Public Policy, shows the act is intended to deter threats and intimidations by persons or groups of persons wearing masks. Yet the act itself contains no requirement of mens rea connecting the mask-wearer with the conduct to be deterred (threats or intimidations).5 In reading an element of mens rea into the act,6 I believe we are required, under the rule that criminal statutes be strictly construed in favor of human liberty, to choose that most beneficial to the defendant — actual intent. Thus, I would construe the Anti-Mask Act, with its Statement of Public Policy, to require an actual intent on the part of the mask-wearer to threaten or intimidate.7
I am authorized to state that Justice Bell joins in this special concurrence.

 I agree with the majority that if such an element of mens rea is not read into it, the act would improperly prohibit the expression of ideas (here, symbolic speech); would be over-broad and vague; would violate freedom of association; and would violate equal protection. In Division 2, the majority properly treats the vagueness and overbreadth claims separately, as they are distinct. The vagueness doctrine, which requires that a statute’s meaning be determinable, is a feature of due process. Overbreadth, on the other hand, lies within the ambit of the First Amendment, so that a law is overbroad if it purports to prohibit not only acts which may be prosecuted, but also acts which are immune to regulation under the First Amendment. See Low, Jeffries & Bonnie, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 2d, p. 73 (1986).

 The Model Penal Code contains four types of culpability, not including strict liability: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. See generally LaFave & Scott, 1 Substantive Criminal Law, p. 300, § 3.4 (1986).

 While a conviction under this standard may be more difficult than one under the standard set by the majority (although either standard involves questions of fact for the fact-finder and would ordinarily be proved by circumstantial evidence), we do not have authority to read the act to encompass a wider range of conduct.