Court Opinion

ID: 9689615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:41:18.489917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:48.487669
License: Public Domain

EUGENE A. EURDICK,
Supreme Court Commissioner, concurring specially.
In addition to the reasons assigned by Justice Pederson for holding that it was not error to refuse to give Plaintiff’s Requested Instruction No. 10 concerning res ipsa loqui-tur, I shall add another.
Strictly speaking, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a “rule” of evidence the judge applies, where there is a motion for a directed verdict, in determining whether or not the claimant has proved a prima facie case against the defendant. In applying the rule as developed under the criteria of the cases, the judge merely determines whether or not the jury could draw the requisite inference of negligence in a case lacking direct evidence of negligence. This does not mean, however, that the jury should be instructed on the doctrine at all.
In discussing the evolution of this rule, Professor William L. Prosser observed that: “A small minority of the courts, however, uniformly give res ipsa loquitur a greater effect than that of a mere permissible inference from the evidence. . . . Actually this enlarged procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur is fast disappearing from the courts, as recent decisions in many jurisdictions have swung over to the view that there is as a general rule no more than a permissible inference which merely gets the plaintiff to the jury. There was at one time considerable support for the position that where the action is by a passenger against his carrier, res ipsa loquitur is given increased procedural effect, in the form of a presumption, or even a shifted burden of proof; but except in Alabama and Oklahoma there appears to have been a retreat from this distinction. There may perhaps be other such relations, such as that of physician and patient, where special conclusions are called for. Apart from such instances, however, remarkably few jurisdictions now treat res ipsa loquitur as anything more than a simple matter of circumstantial evidence.” Prosser, Torts, Sec. 40, p. 234 et seq. (3d ed. 1964).
The Washington supreme court appears to be a forerunner among courts in putting res ipsa loquitur in proper perspective.
In Chase v. Beard, 346 P.2d 315 (Wash. 1960) the court discusses the origin and purpose of the rule and concludes, as do I, that “its primary purpose is to withstand the challenge of the defendant’s motion for a nonsuit.” The Court concluded by saying “There was no necessity for any instruction.”
This view was followed by the Washington court in Ball v. Mudge, 391 P.2d 201 (Wash.1964) and in Zukowsky v. Brown, 488 P.2d. 269 (Wash.1971). In the latter case, the Washington court, at page 279, refines the application of the rule as follows:
“Res ipsa is properly treated the same as other circumstantial evidence in instructions to the jury. The remaining *228question is whether, instead of or in addition to these instructions, the so-called ‘res ipsa instruction’ should be given. We are of the opinion that such instructions should not be given. To do so is to emphasize one particular inference over others which may be, and usually are, in the case. When added to other, general instructions which inform the jury of what they may or should do with the evidence before them, such particularized instructions are unnecessary and redundant. We agree with the statement that ‘in keeping with the modern thinking on the subject, giving slanted or formula instructions should be avoided wherever possible. They should be given only where a general instruction would clearly be inadequate or would confuse or mislead the jury’.”
Accordingly, I would limit the holding of Bergley v. Mann’s, 99 N.W.2d 849 (N.D.1959) to the facts of that case — that the instruction given by the trial court with respect to res ipsa loquitur was an erroneous and prejudicial statement of the law. An adequate instruction on circumstantial evidence is all that is needed or is proper.
SAND, J., and SMITH, District Judge, concur.