Court Opinion

ID: 9571323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:49.513979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:00.939856
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring specially) — I am in agreement with the majority to the extent that it seems to abandon the “conclusive, definite, certain and beyond all legitimate controversy” burden of persuasion test of Jennings v. D’Hooghe, 25 Wn.2d 702, 172 P.2d 189 (1946), Bicknell v. Guenther, 65 Wn.2d 749, 399 P.2d 598 (1965), and Arnold v. Beckman, 74 Wn.2d 836, 447 P.2d 184 (1968).
The D’Hooghe standard of proof strongly suggests that the judges who make and apply our decisional law have indulged in an assumption that no honest people question the sanctity and the validity of formally executed wills, and that anyone who does so deserves to lose in the courts. Indulgence in such a delusive and unreliable assumption, and application of the extreme D’Hooghe standard of proof, have, I think, resulted in an almost cavalier disregard of claims and rights of litigants based upon asserted agreements or contracts to convey property or to devise by will. The D’Hooghe standard of proof, together with the formidable “dead man’s” statute, RCW 5.60.030, has too long served to protect formally executed wills with almost un-breachable legal armor and a very nearly absolute legal defense. This, in my judgment, cannot be justified on grounds of policy, equity, or common sense.
I have some doubts about the “high probability” standards established by the majority as the burden of persuasion to be assumed by a will contestant. The majority states that “the trier of fact must be convinced to a high probability that all required elements are truly fact.” Under this revised standard, what will happen if the trial judge is convinced, but only to a moderate probability? Apparently he will be required to decide against the contestants al*650though he is convinced it is more likely than not that an oral contract to devise actually did exist. It seems to me such a result will be frustrating, both to trial judges and to basic principles of justice.
In effect, the majority’s standard of “high probability” raises the judgmental probability required to find the existence of a contract to devise above the level of 50 per cent which would obtain if a “preponderance of the evidence” standard were applied. In so doing, the “high probability” standard creates a kind of judgmental “vacuum” — an area of assessed probability in which the trier of fact can feel it is more probable than not that an oral contract to devise exists, but still be unable to give effect to that contract. The existence of such a vacuum is inconsistent with the greatest possible number of reasonably accurate trial determinations. It is justified only where a strong and pervasive social policy firmly and convincingly suggests that avoidance of results of a particular kind (such as finding an innocent person guilty of a crime) is more important than maximizing reasonably accurate determinations. Such a policy should exist only where a decision against a particular party carries with it connotations of moral culpability, as in a criminal prosecution or (perhaps) a tort suit for fraud. In my best judgment, such a compulsive social policy is not justified and certainly should not be applied in will contests.
Rather than applying a standard which prevents the trier of fact from giving effect to a contract which it believes to exist, I think a standard should be applied which attempts to ensure that the belief of the trier of fact is based on “substantial and reliable evidence.” In other words, the trial judge should find the existence of an oral contract to devise where he is convinced by substantial and reliable evidence that it is more probable than not that the contract did exist.
In the instant case, the trial court applied the “beyond all legitimate controversy” — D’Hooghe test — in holding against the appellants. As I read it, the majority opinion voids this *651severe and extreme burden of persuasion standard and replaces it with a less extreme and considerably more reasonable “high probability” test. In the traditional case-by-case developmental process of attempting to improve and attune the law more nearly to existing mores and recognized social practices and needs, perhaps it can be said that “half a loaf is better than none,” relative to improvement in the law and the administration of justice. While, as indicated hereinbefore, I would go further than the majority in ameliorating the harsh and obstructive standards of D’Hooghe and Beckman and would prefer to remand for a full and new trial, nevertheless for the reasons indicated, I do concur in the results reached in the majority opinion.
Wright, J., concurs with Finley, J.