Court Opinion

ID: 9569786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:17:25.856235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:02.215759
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
This is a story about an industrious young man, Mario Sanchez (“Sanchez”), who was born into poverty in La Palma, Mexico, and forced by circumstances to drop out of ninth grade to help support his mother, father, and five siblings. Sanchez worked at a restaurant as a dishwasher and a preparer of food, and then at a warehouse. In April 1988, when Sanchez was twenty-two years old, he entered the United States without inspection in search of a better life. He found a job in Oakland, California operating the large metal press machine at a scrap metal company, worked hard, and saved his money. Five years later he took three weeks off work and returned to his hometown in Mexico to marry his sweetheart. He paid a “coyote” $1,000 to help him and his bride Ana cross the border.
Mario and Ana Sanchez established a home in Oakland in 1993. They have three U.S. born children, Oswaldo, Isidoro, and Mario Jr., now aged six, twelve, and fourteen years respectively. At the time the IJ made his decision, the children were nine months, six years, and nine years old. The IJ noted that Isidoro and Mario Jr. were “doing quite well ... in school,” and that Mario Jr. was enrolled in his school’s “gifted and talented children” program. Sanchez also testified that Mario Jr. and Isidoro had earned medals in school mathematics competitions.
Both Mario and Ana Sanchez work full-time. Together they earn an annual income of around $40,000. Sanchez has a steady and consistent employment history. For thirteen years Sanchez worked for the scrap metal company in Oakland. In 2001, Sanchez found a better job as a forklift operator.
Sanchez paid his income taxes every year from 1988 until his marriage in 1993. Since they were married, the Sanchezes have paid their income taxes every year. They provide their family with medical insurance. They live in a duplex that they own jointly with another relative. A letter from Sanchez’s parish priest at St. Elizabeth Parish in Oakland tells us that Sanchez “has attended our Church services since year 1988,” and that Sanchez “is a good and hardworking person.” Although Sanchez pled guilty to a DUI in 1991, two years before he was married, he has not been arrested since then. For the past sixteen years, the Sanchezes have been working hard to provide their three American-born children with a good life in the United States. They also take care of Sanchez’s ailing, diabetic father, a lawful permanent resident, who lives with them.
In 2000, Sanchez wished to legalize his status in the United States, so he sought help from two immigration attorneys, John Ricci (“Ricci”) and Frank Sprouls (“Sprouls”). These attorneys advised Sanchez to first file an application for asylum on the basis of economic discrimination.1 *1037Ricci appeared before the IJ in June of 2000 and withdrew the baseless asylum application prepared by his law firm. Ric-ci told the IJ that he wished to file an application for cancellation of removal. The IJ then continued the matter.
Sadly, like many other unsophisticated petitioners, Sanchez hired attorneys who have poor records before the state bar and our court. California State Bar records cited Ricci twice for “Discipline, probation; no actual suspension]” and once for “Public reproval with/duties.” Sprouls, who represented Sanchez before the BIA and our court, has a record of misconduct before the Ninth Circuit. In 2005, Sprouls “was on probation for numerous ethical violations in immigration matters.” See Granados v. Keisler, 252 Fed.Appx. 851, 853-54 (9th Cir.2007) (citing In re Sprouls, No. 05-80025 (9th Cir.Sept. 23, 2005)). In his February 2005 investigation of Sprouls, the Ninth Circuit Appellate Commissioner found that Sprouls violated his duties as an attorney by engaging in many instances of “deficient conduct.”2 Report and Recommendation of the Appellate Commissioner, adopted in In re Sprouls, No. 05-80025 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2005). In a number of cases the Appellate Commissioner determined that Sprouls’s deficient conduct “had the potential to injure his clients.” Id. Furthermore, in 2007 our court found that Sprouls provided ineffective assistance of counsel to another client in Granados v. Keisler.3 See Granados, 252 Fed.Appx. 851, 853-54.
In the case before us, the IJ found that Sanchez met all the requirements necessary to grant his petition for cancellation of removal except one: “Unfortunately [Sanchez] is barred from claiming good moral character,” because “he has paid a coyote to bring his wife into the United States illegally.”4 The IJ therefore denied Sanchez’s application for cancellation of removal, and the BIA affirmed.
On appeal to this court, we held that under the reasoning of Moran v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir.2005), Sanchez was entitled to cancellation of removal because Congress intended for the family unity waiver to apply in circumstances where, an alien has helped “smuggle” his spouse into the country. Thus, the majority held that Sanchez possessed the requisite “good moral character,” and granted his cancellation of removal application. I agree with *1038the reasoning of Moran and the holding of the three-judge panel in this case.
Instead of following the logic of Moran, the majority struggles through a labyrinth of complex statutory interpretation to conclude that Congress intended that people like Sanchez be deemed to have “bad moral character.” With simple common sense, though, one should easily conclude that the opposite is true. Indeed, if we tried to explain the majority’s complex interpretation of Congress’s statutes to members of Congress themselves, I submit that many would be amused.
How can we possibly say members of Congress intended that a man who married his hometown sweetheart, brought her here for a better life, worked hard for twenty-one years to provide for his three children, bought a home, attended church regularly, and cared for his ailing father is a man of bad moral character? Most would say, instead, that this is the story of a good man making every attempt for himself, his wife, and his three American citizen children to live the American dream. In our nation’s history, millions of immigrants have done the same. How can we condemn this behavior as “bad moral character” after honoring this dream since the birth of our nation?
Instead, I find the reasoning of Moran v. Ashcroft to be much more compelling. Moran held that a petitioner for cancellation of removal who assisted another alien to enter this country illegally generally does not meet the good moral character requirement for cancellation of removal. Moran, 395 F.3d at 1093. But we further held that under the family unity waiver5 “the statutory scheme governing the requirements for cancellation of removal preserves eligibility for individuals whose involvement in ‘alien smuggling’ is limited to helping their own family members, including spouses and children.” Id. at 1090 (emphasis added).
The Moran court found that because the alien-smuggling provision and its exceptions 6 are written with regards to “inadmissibility” rather than “cancellation of removal,” courts must translate the alien-smuggling inadmissibility provision and its exceptions into the language of cancellation of removal. Id. at 1093. The Moran court explained that such a translation “requires that we replace references to admissibility, applications for admission, and adjustment of status with references to cancellation of removal.” Id. (citing Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649, 652 (9th Cir.2004)). According to Moran, the family unity waiver rule in the context of cancellation of removal would therefore read:
The alien ... does not fail the good moral character requirement for cancellation of removal where the Attorney *1039General exercises discretion to waive the applicability of [the alien-smuggling provision]. Such discretion may be exercised “for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest,” to waive the applicability of the alien-smuggling provision to the good moral character determination of an applicant for cancellation of removal who “has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only an individual who at the time of such action was the alien’s spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law.”
Id. at 1094 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(ll) (cross-referenced by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(iii))). This makes perfect sense.
Indeed, by establishing a “family unity” waiver, Congress has shown that it wants to help immigrant men and women maintain their marriages and families. Congress has further demonstrated in the specific context of cancellation of removal that the family unity waiver applies. When stating the requirements of “cancellation of removal,” Congress included the definition of “good moral character.”7 In the definition of “good moral character,” Congress referred to the alien-smuggling provision and its exceptions, including the family unity waiver.8 Why should we disregard the explicit intent of Congress, as the majority asks us to? The majority finds an exception barring the family unity waiver in the case of cancellation of removal, but Congress has never stated that such an exception exists.
In short, I agree with the Moran court’s reasoning and the holding of the three-judge panel’s opinion that the family unity waiver applies to Sanchez, and that we should grant his application for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, I dissent.

. Sanchez’s application for asylum, prepared by his immigration attorneys, stated the basis for his claim as: “I have lived in the United States for over ten years. I would be subject to discrimination, harassment and economic deprivation by the ruling powers. I come from a poor background, along with my family I would be denied economic opportunities.”

. The Appellate Commissioner found that Sprouls's deficient conduct included "filing and knowingly maintaining a frivolous action,” "negligently failing to file a response to [a] motion,” "filing frivolous and misleading brief[s],” "negligentQy] failing] to respond to the court's orders,” “negligently failing to file an opposition to the respondent's motion to dismiss,” "failing] to act diligently on behalf of his client,” "failing] to respond to court orders and failing] to prosecute the petitions,” "filfing] late briefs in seven petitions for review,” and filing five "[¡Identical [defective [b]riefs” on behalf of different clients. Appellate Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, adopted in In re Sprouls, No. 05-80025 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2005).

. In Granados we held that "[t]he deficient performance of Sprouls in the proceedings to reopen Granados’s case before the IJ and the BIA is plain on the face of the administrative record and rises to the level of a due process violation because Granados was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” Granados, 252 Fed.Appx. at 853. "Sprouls presented an incomplete and grammatically flawed motion to reopen, faded to comply with any of the Losada requirements for an IAC claim, failed to investigate or elicit material facts relevant to Granados's individual case, failed to provide a translated version of the motion to reopen to Granados, and on his own initiative included false statements of fact.” Id.

.The IJ also noted that, "[t]he court need not reach into the issue of discretion. But if I do, then I will find that I will exercise my discretion in [Sanchez's] favor.”

. The text of the family unity waiver reads as follows:
The attorney general may, in his discretion for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest, waive application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(E) of this section in the case of any alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of removal, and who is otherwise admissible to the United States as a returning resident under section 1181(b) of this title and in the case of an alien seeking admission or adjustment of status as an immediate relative or immigrant under section 1153(a) of this title (other than paragraph (4) thereof), if the alien has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only an individual who at the time of such action was the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(l 1).

. The alien-smuggling provision is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i), and the exceptions are found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(ii) and (iii), and § 1182(d)(l 1).

. When defining the requirements for cancellation of removal in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, Congress expressly included the good moral character definition found in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3).

. See supra note 6.