Court Opinion

ID: 9701810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:38:59.643661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:29.918182
License: Public Domain

Schkeibek, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division opinion of Judge Crane. 133 N. J. Super. 114 (1975).
The question simply put is whether on a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, it is proper to determine what the judge who signed the search warrant relied upon when a stenographic transcript of the proceedings before him or his written summary of the evidence is not available. Put another way, should evidence be suppressed which was obtained in accordance with a search warrant issued upon sworn testimony which constituted *573probable cause although no stenographic transcript or written summary of the proceedings existed.
In addition to considering the affidavit or affidavits presented to him by law enforcement officers before deciding whether a search warrant may issue, a judge may also hear and rely upon oral testimony. Until at least January 1963, our rules neither explicitly or implicitly required a transcript or written summary of evidence used in a warrant' proceeding. The use of oral testimony to ascertain what had transpired before the judge was sanctioned and directed by this Court. State v. Macri, 39 N. J. 2501 (1963). Courts have consistently held that non-recorded oral testimony may supplement an otherwise insufficient affidavit to demonstrate that there is probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. United States v. Hill, 500 F. 2d 315, 320-321 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. den. 420 U. S. 931, 95 S. Ct. 1135, 43 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1975); United States ex rel. Gaugler v. Brierley, 477 F. 2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973); Campbell v. Minnesota, 487 F. 2d 1, 4-5 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Berkus, 428 F. 2d 1148, 1152 (8th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Pugach v. Mancusi, 411 F. 2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.) (by implication), cert. den. 396 U. S. 889, 90 S. Ct. 172, 24 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1969); Sherrick v. Eyman, 389 F. 2d 648, 651-652 (9th Cir.), cert. den. 393 U. S. 874, 89 S. Ct. 167, 21 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1968); Commonwealth v. Milliken, 450 Pa. 310, 300 A. 2d 78, 80-81 (1973); Oliver v. State, 46 Ala. App. 118, 238 So. 2d 916, 921 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970).
Ueither the United States nor the Hew Jersey Constitutions mandates that the testimony taken before the issuing judge be recorded or summarized in writing by him or anyone else.
The Fourth Amendment requires only that the judicial officer issuing a search warrant be supplied sufficient information, under oath or affirmation, which would support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant’s issuance. [United States ex rel. Gaugler v. Brierley, 477 F. 2d at 522].
*574This position is sound and in harmony with views previously expressed by this Court. See State v. Petillo, 61 N. J. 165, 173-174 (1973), cert. den. 410 U. S. 945, 93 S. Ct. 1393, 35 L. Pd. 3d 611 (1973); State v. Burnett, 43 N. J. 377, 388 (1964). Other than being under oath, the manner or method of preserving or recording that information is not constitutionally mandated.
Our rules contemplate that the oral testimony presented at the probable cause hearing be recorded or summarized in writing by the judge. B. 3:5—S and B. 3:5-6. B. 3:5—3 reads in pertinent part:'
An applicant for a search warrant shall appear personally before the judge who must take his affidavit or testimony before issuing the warrant. The judge may also examine, under oath, any witness the applicant produces, and may in his discretion require that any person upon whose information the applicant relies appear personally and be examined under oath concerning such information. If the judge is satisfied that grounds for granting the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe they exist, he shall date and issue the warrant identifying the property to be seized, naming or describing the person or place to be searched and specifying the hours when it may be executed. * * *
R. 3 :5-6 provides:
The judge who issued the warrant shall attach thereto the return, inventory and all other papers in connection therewith, including the affidavits and a transcript or summary of any oral testimony, and file them with the county clerk of the county wherein the property was seized. All warrants which have been completely executed and the papers accompanying them, including the affidavits, transcript or summary of any oral testimony, return and inventory, shall be available for inspection and copying by the defendant as provided in R. 3 :13-3 and by any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure upon notice to the county prosecutor for good cause shown.
The prophylactic purposes of these rules, namely, to record accurately what transpired before the issuing judge and to afford the defendant an opportunity to examine that record, are salutary. Nevertheless, we should not blindly adhere *575to those requirements, particularly when we know: (1) what evidence was submitted to the judge; (2) that the evidence was sufficient to constitute probable cause; and (3) that to ignore those facts frees a guilty person simply because of a procedural rule, not because of any constitutional basis. Our rules have been designed to provide fair procedures which ensure just determinations. For that reason R. 1 :l-2 states that “[u]nless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice.”
Where proof of the prior testimony before the issuing judge can be reconstructed at the subsequent hearing without invalidating any constitutional principle, there is no constitutional or other justification for construing court rules to impose an absolute irrefragable duty under all circumstances to make a transcript or written summary. As a matter of sound judicial policy and' in accordance with R. 1 :l-2, the recordation or written summary of the evidence implied by R. 3 :5—3 and R. 3 :5-6 may be dispensed with if an injustice results.
Furthermore, the judge’s inadvertent failure to make a written summary of the testimony, which is otherwise satisfactorily established, may be considered a minor irregularity that should not devitalize the search. R. 3:5-7(d) may well contemplate an omission of that type. It provides that “[i]n the absence of bad faith, no search or seizure made with a search warrant shall be deemed unlawful because of technical insufficiencies or irregularities in the warrant or in the papers or proceedings to obtain it, or in its execution.”
In this case, suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of the warrant hinders enforcement of the law without sufficient justification. The matter was presented to the judge on a Friday night between 10:30 and 11:30 p.m. at his home. A court reporter was not available. Unfortunately, the judge is deceased so that his notes or summary, if he made any, and his testimony are unavailable. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, held approximately three and *576one half months later, the detective, whose affidavit had been acknowledged by the judge, testified to the additional information he furnished that night. His credibility has been attested to by the trial judge who heard the.motion to suppress. He found and concluded that the substance of the affidavit and testimony was sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The defendant does not insinuate or imply that the trial judge’s evaluation of the detective’s testimony was incorrect. In fact, the detective had been subjected to searching cross-examination and the record supports the trial judge’s findings. To disregard those findings is not warranted. State v. Johnson, 42 N. J. 146, 163-164 (1964).
Since probable cause had been demonstrated to the issuing judge, the defendant suffered no prejudice aside from the inconvenience of filing the motion to suppress. No claim of bad faith has been made against the State. The trial has been held and the defendant convicted on the basis of competent evidence. Under all these circumstances, the transcript or written summarization requirement of our rules should be relaxed so that the ends of justice may he served and B. 3:5-7(d) recognized. The establishment of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant should not be annulled because of failure to satisfy a ministerial formal requirement. State v. Clemente, 108 N. J. Super. 189 (App. Div. 1969), certif. den. 55 N. J. 450 (1970); State v. Harris, 98 N. J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1968), certif. den. 51 N. J. 396 (1968); State v. Parsons, 83 N. J. Super. 430, 445 (App. Div. 1964); State v. Cymerman, 135 N. J. Super. 591, 597-598 (Law Div. 1975).
In State v. Karris, supra, the defendant unsuccessfully sought to suppress evidence because the affidavit upon which the warrant was based had been lost and therefore was not filed as required by the rule. The court commented:
The rule requiring the filing of the affidavit is directory only. It was adopted in order to facilitate the administration of justice. It *577may not be used to frustrate that objective. The failure to comply with that rule does not automatically result in the invalidity of an affidavit or a warrant otherwise lawful. A wrongdoer should not benefit by the suppression of incriminating evidence simply because those documents have been lost. [98 N. J. Super, at 504-505].
It should be emphasized that the prosecutor’s burden is substantially simplified on a motion to suppress hearing if a transcribed or summarized record of the oral testimony is available. But in those occasional instances where these rules have not been followed and probable cause is established at a later properly conducted adversarial hearing, with all its attendant safeguards for establishing the truth, then suppression of relevant incriminating evidence distorts and frustrates the fact-finding process. Our procedural rules were not created to bury the truth.
Some five years ago, this Court in State v. Bisaccia, 58 N. J. 586, 589 (1971), commented:
* * * On a motion to suppress we deal with evidence of guilt, and the purpose of the litigant is to conceal that evidence to the end that he will escape conviction notwithstanding his guilt. Hypothetically there could be some case in which the evidence sought to be suppressed would falsely suggest guilt, but a judge would be short in realism if he did not understand that the evidence he is asked to suppress is evidence of guilt and that the judgment of not guilty which will ensue will likely be false. To justify so serious an insult to the judicial process, some compensating gain should be incontestable.
The policy enunciated then is equally applicable today.
I would affirm.
F\or affirmance in part and reversal in part—Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman and Clieeoed and Judge Coneoed—6.
For affirmance—Justice Scheeibee—1.