Court Opinion

ID: 9765905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:24:21.242202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:16.622079
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I cannot agree that the negligent acts of a plumber constitute an “accident” under the terms of the insurance policy at issue here, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s erroneous conclusion that American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company is responsible for paying for the damages caused by the plumber’s defective work in this case.
Under the commercial general liability policy at issue here, claims that do not arise out of an “occurrence” as defined by the policy are not covered under the policy. An “occurrence” under the policy is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated *753exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” (Emphasis supplied.) Although the term “accident” is not specifically defined in the policy, it is axiomatic that an “accident” cannot result from “intentional” behavior, as “ £[a]ccident’ and ‘intention’ are ... converse terms [, and] courts have generally held that where an act is intentional, it does not constitute an ‘accident’ as that term is defined in an insurance policy.” (Citations omitted.) Owners Ins. Co. v. James, 295 FSupp.2d 1354, 1363 (III) (B) (2) (N.D. Ga. 2003). See also OCGA § 1-3-3 (2) (“ ‘Accident’ means an event which takes place without one’s foresight or expectation or design”). Thus, based on the plain language of the insurance contract in this case, coverage would only be provided “for injury resulting from accidental acts, but not for an injury accidentally caused by intentional acts.” (Emphasis in original.) Owners Ins. Co., supra, 295 FSupp.2d at 1364 (III) (B) (2) (analyzing insurance contract language identical to the language at issue in the instant case). See also Hathaway Dev. Co. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 274 Fed. Appx. 787, 791 (III) (D) (11th Cir. 2008) (because “subcontractors’ work on the projects was ‘an injury accidentally caused by intentional acts’ . . . [i]t d[id] not constitute an accident under the [insurance policy with identical language to the policy at issue in the instant case], and therefore any damage resulting from that work [was] not covered”) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied).
Decided March 7, 2011.
Garrett L. Pendleton, Locke, Lord, Bissell & Liddell, J. David Hopkins III, for appellant.
Craig N. Cowart, for appellee.
Here, the plumber did not conduct his work by “accident.” His work was done intentionally. As a result, the injuries caused by the plumber’s intentional acts would not be covered under the express language of the insurance policy relating to “accidents.” Owners Ins. Co., supra; Hathaway Dev. Co., supra. By holding otherwise, both the Court of Appeals and the majority here have improperly stretched the meaning of the insurance policy language beyond the plain terms of the agreement to include insurance against negligent acts as well. Payne v. Twiggs County School Dist., 269 Ga. 361, 363 (2) (496 SE2d 690) (1998) (“[Unambiguous terms in an insurance policy require no construction, and their plain meaning will be given full effect, regardless of whether they might be of benefit to the insurer, or be of detriment to an insured”) (footnote omitted). Because I cannot go along with such an unauthorized departure from the plain terms of the insurance agreement, I must respectfully dissent.
*754Cokinos, Bosien & Young, Patrick J. Wielinski, amicus curiae.