Court Opinion

ID: 9758875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:53:48.037325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:57.277788
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,

dissenting:

I am of the opinion that the statute is a valid exercise of the police power. Therefore, I would reverse.
As noted in the majority opinion, cases are legion in Maryland holding that the wisdom or expediency of a law adopted in the exercise of the police power of the State is not subject to judicial review. Such statutes will not be held void if there are any considerations relating to the public welfare by which they can be supported. Therefore, the statute carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality.
The test has been expressed for the Court in a number of different ways, all basically adding up to the same thing. The version of Judge Barnes in A & H Transp. Inc. v. Baltimore, 249 Md. 518, 240 A. 2d 601 (1968), was:
“The courts look, when a legislative action is challenged, to any set of circumstances that may justify the action.” (Citing cases.) Id. at 523, footnote 2. (Emphasis added.)
In Pitts v. State Bd. of Examiners, 222 Md. 224, 160 A. 2d 200 (1960), Judge Henderson said:
“The adequacy of the legislative scheme is for the Legislature to determine, and there is a strong presumption in favor of constitutionality. Reasonable doubt in its favor is enough to sustain it. Magruder v. Hall of Rec’ds Comm., 221 Md. 1, 6, 155 A. 2d 899.” Id. at 227. (Emphasis added.)
Judge O’Donnell put it yet another way earlier this year in Salisbury Beauty Schools v. St. Bd., 268 Md. 32, 300 A. 2d 367 (1973):
“If any state of facts reasonably can be conceived *124that would sustain the constitutionality of the statute within the exercise of the police power, the existence of that state of facts as a basis for the passage of the law must be assumed.” (Citing cases.)/!, at49.
In Brooks v. State Board, 233 Md. 98, 111, 195 A. 2d 728 (1963), and Allied American Co. v. Comm’r, 219 Md. 607, 616-17, 150 A. 2d 421 (1959), Chief Judge Bruñe and Judge Hammond, respectively, referred for the Court to Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 75 S. Ct. 461, 99 L. Ed. 563 (1955), and the comment there of Mr. Justice Douglas for that Court:
“It is enough that there is an evil a.t hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.” Id. at 488.
In Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 S. Ct. 57, 73 L. Ed. 204 (1928), the Court held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute which restricted ownership of pharmacies or drugstores to registered pharmacists. I find it interesting in the context of this case to note that Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandéis, two of the more liberal members of the Court at that time, dissented. Mr. Justice Brandéis concurred in the Holmes dissent which said in part:
“The Constitution does not make it a condition of preventive legislation that it should work a perfect cure. It is enough if the questioned act has a manifest tendency to cure or at least to make the evil less. . . .
"... I think . . . that the police power as that term has been defined and explained clearly extends to a law like this, whatever I may think of its wisdom, and that the. decree should be affirmed.” Id. at 115.
In Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U. S. 220, 69 S. Ct. 550, 93 L. Ed. 632, 10 A.L.R.2d 945 (1949), the Court upheld a South *125Carolina statute which provided that life insurance companies and their agents might not operate an undertaking business and undertakers might not serve as agents for life insurance companies. A unanimous Court held Liggett was not authority for invalidation of the South Carolina act. Against arguments that there was no evil to be corrected by the legislation and that the Court should “call the statute arbitrary and unreasonable,” Mr. Justice Murphy said for the Court:
“Looking through the form of this plea to its essential basis, we cannot fail to recognize it as an argument for invalidity because this Court disagrees with the desirability of the legislation. We rehearse the obvious when we say that our function is thus misconceived. We are not equipped to decide desirability; and a court cannot eliminate measures which do not happen to suit its tastes if it seeks to maintain a democratic system. The forum for the correction of ill-considered legislation is a responsive legislature.
“We cannot say that South Carolina is not entitled to call the funeral insurance business an evil. Nor can we say that the statute has no relation to the elimination of those evils. There our inquiry must stop.” Id. at 224.
In Williamson, Mr. Justice Douglas said for a unanimous Court:
“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236; Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U. S. 525; Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U. S. 220; Day-Brite Lighting, *126Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421. We emphasize again what Chief Justice Waite said in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 134, ‘For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.’ ” Id. at 488.
It is against this background that this statute should be evaluated.
A statute similar to ours was upheld by a three judge court in Patterson Drug Company v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969).1 This case apparently was not appealed to the Supreme Court. Judge Butzner there said for the court:
“A few prescriptions, but nevertheless a significant number, cannot be filled from drugs available in manufactured form, so the medicine must be compounded by the pharmacists. Some pharmacists, probably a minority, systematically monitor prescriptions by family records to avoid allergic reactions or the simultaneous use of antagonistic drugs, of which the patient’s doctor may not be aware. Although monitoring is not completely effective because of the mobility of customers and the availability of nonprescription drugs which may be antagonistic, it is a benefit to the public.
“From the evidence we find that dispensing prescription drugs affects the public health, safety and welfare. And we conclude that the state’s classification and regulation of pharmacy as a professional practice is not arbitrary or invidious.” Id. at 824-25.
As is conceded in the majority opinion, another similar statute was upheld against attack on constitutional grounds in Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N. J. Super. 326, 225 *127A. 2d 728 (1966). I regard what Judge Mintz said there as relevant here. He stated:
“In concluding that pharmacy is a profession, I am not unmindful of the fact that over 90% of the prescriptions dispensed are pre-compounded; that is, the pharmacist’s function is to count the tablets called for by the prescription and transfer them from the container furnished by the manufacturer into the bottle ultimately dispensed to the purchaser. As will hereinafter appear, however, the role of the pharmacist goes beyond that of the sale of a commodity. In filling a prescription the pharmacist often aids the physician by informing him of the properties and effects of various drugs. If the prescription calls for a generic compound, he chooses the particular brand to be dispensed. Additionally, he may ‘monitor’ each prescription as to dosage, and possibly determines whether the prescribed drug may be antagonistic to another previously prescribed for the patient by another physician.
“Since pharmacy is a profession, the practice of which affects the public health and welfare, the Legislature in the exercise of its police power may enact such legislation as it deems appropriate to safeguard the public interest, and ban practices tending to unseemly competition which lower standards of service. Abelson’s, Inc. v. New Jersey State Board of Optometrists, [5 N. J. 412 (1950)].” Id. at 338.
“Though the primary responsibility for drug prescription rests with the physician, the pharmacist plays an ancillary but important role in insuring that the proper drug and dosage are provided. Accordingly, the pharmacist is required to maintain records of all prescriptions. N.J.S.A. *12845:14-15. Thus, if the customer frequents one pharmacy for all of his prescription needs, that pharmacist is in a position to check his records and thereby determine if a prescription is in any way antagonistic or contra-indicated by his previous prescription record. The Legislature may have concluded, that this important function of pharmacists would be impaired if they were permitted to advertise. The Legislature may have determined that ‘cut rate,’ ‘discount’ or promotional advertising in any way would encourage the patient to seek the pharmacy offering the drug at the cheapest price. As a result of ‘price shopping’ the pharmacist presumably would not be in a position to effectively determine,. by reference to his prescription records, if a particular drug is antagonistic to one previously prescribed, possibly by another physician.
“It was urged that the patient’s records are reviewed by the pharmacist only for the purpose of checking prices on prescriptions previously filled for the customer. Perhaps that may be the practice of many pharmacists, but there may be infrequent instances where a pharmacist does ‘monitor’ the prescription for the purpose of possibly detecting the prescription of an antagonistic drug. Infrequent as such occasions may be, they may justify the enactment of chapter 120. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, supra, 348 U.S., at p. 487; 75 S.Ct. 461.
“Plaintiffs argued that no evidence was presented to indicate that a pharmacist who advertises prescription drugs at a discount would in any way have a lesser duty to ‘monitor’ a prescription. True, the duty to ‘monitor’ may still exist, but the ability to do so effectively might be impaired if the customer tended to ‘shop’ for his prescription needs.” Id. at 341-42.
*129See also Annot., Drugs — Prohibiting Advertising of Prices 44 A.L.R.3d 1301(1972).
There is a similarity, as I see it, between this statute and the numerous statutes prohibiting advertising relative to eyeglasses. This similarity was mentioned in Supermarkets. The majority opinion notes that the Maryland Board of Pharmacy also saw a similarity, a similarity that does not seem to be distinguished in that opinion. See Annot., Price Posting — Requiring — Prohibiting 89 A.L.R.2d 901, 935-949 (1963). The problem of advertising by dental laboratories, likewise related, is treated in Annot., Prosthetic Dentistry — Regulation 45 A.L.R.2d 1243, 1251-53 (1956).
In Williamson an Oklahoma statute was applicable to opticians, but not to sellers of ready-to-wear glasses. As Mr. Justice Douglas put it, the practical effect of the law was that “no optician [could] fit old glasses into new frames or supply a lens, whether it be a new lens or one to duplicate a lost or broken lens, without a prescription.” The district court rebelled at the notion that a State could require a prescription from an optometrist or opthalmologist “to take old lenses and place them in new frames and then fit the completed spectacles to the face of the eyeglass wearer.” (Emphasis in its opinion, 120 F. Supp. at 135.) It found that through mechanical devices and ordinary skill the optician could take a broken lens or a fragment thereof, measure its power, and reduce it to prescriptive terms. It concluded that this provision of the law arbitrarily interfered with the optician’s right to do business. The Supreme Court reversed upon this point.
In Williamson the statute also made it unlawful “to solicit the sale of . . . frames, mountings ... or any other optical appliances.” The district court conceded that under Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 55 S. Ct. 570, 79 L. Ed. 1086 (1935), regulation of advertising relating to eye examinations by the State was permitted, being “rationally related to the public health and welfare.” It held, however, that regulation of the sale of eyeglass frames intruded “into a mercantile field only casually related to the visual care of the public” and restricted “an activity which in no way can *130detrimentally affect the people.” In reversing upon that point, Mr. Justice Douglas said for the Court:
“An eyeglass frame, considered in isolation, is only a piece of merchandise. But an eyeglass frame is not used in isolation, as Judge Murrah said in dissent below; it is used with lenses; and lenses, pertaining as they do to the human eye, enter the field of health. Therefore, the legislature might conclude that to regulate one effectively it would have to regulate the other. Or it might conclude that both the sellers of frames and the sellers of lenses were in a business where advertising should be limited or even abolished in the public interest. Semler v. Dental Examiners, supra. The advertiser of frames may be using his ads to bring in customers who will buy lenses. If the advertisement of lenses is to be abolished or controlled, the advertising of frames must come under the same restraints; or so the legislature might think. We see no constitutional reason why a State may not treat all who deal with the human eye as members of a profession who should use no merchandising methods for obtaining customers.” Id. at 490.
See also Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Exam. in Optometry, 374 U. S. 424, 83 S. Ct. 1759, 10 L.Ed.2d 983 (1963). A New Mexico statute forbade the advertisement “by any means whatsoever ... of any prices or terms on eyeglasses, spectacles, lenses, frames or mountings . . . .” It was upheld against the attack of a newspaper and radio station whose areas of service included a portion of the State of Texas. The newspaper and radio station were enjoined from accepting or publishing within New Mexico the advertising of a Texas optometrist found to be in violation of the New Mexico law. The Court rejected their contentions that the statute was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce and that it was in a field preempted by the Federal Communications Act.
*131In Bedno v. Fast, 6 Wis. 2d 471, 95 N.W.2d 396 (1959), the court upheld the validity of a statute making it unlawful to advertise any definite or indefinite price or credit terms on eyeglasses or frames. The court said:
“The language of sec. 153.10, Stats., in no way indicates that proof of fraud is necessary to spell out an offense under its price-advertising prohibition. The practice which the statute is intended to protect the public against is that of filling a prescription to meet the price rather than the needs of the patient. To permit price advertising on the part of those who deal with the human eye, even truthful advertising, is to leave the door open for the unscrupulous practitioner to lure and to defraud unsuspecting members of the public. In [Ritholz v.] Johnson, [246 Wis. 442, 17 N.W.2d 590 (1945)], this court relied heavily upon Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners (1934), 148 Or. 50, 34 Pac. (2d) 311, 294 U.S. 608, 55 Sup. Ct. 570, 79 L.Ed. 1086, where the court stated that the question was whether the kind of advertising prohibited afforded the unscrupulous practitioner a means of perpetrating fraud and deception upon his patients. It was there recognized that although there is nothing harmful in itself in merely advertising prices, there could be no doubt that unethical practitioners do resort to price-advertising methods to lure the credulous to their offices for the purpose of fleecing them.” Id. at 477-78.
The court responded to the attack on the constitutionality of the statute by saying:
“Plaintiffs’ argument that they are merely merchants has no merit. We cannot see that eyeglasses are any more merchandise than dentures. Both are prepared according to the needs of the individual. ‘Furnishing glasses as much *132affects the public health as does furnishing dentures,’ this court said in Ritholz v. Johnson, supra, page 453. In fact, it seems to us that a person’s health may be more gravely endangered by wearing improper glasses than by wearing improper dentures.
“Articles such as clothing or shoes are merchandise, purchased by the consumer for comfort and warmth. Eyeglasses are worn for correctional purposes. The customer himself knows whether a suit or a pair of shoes fit him and will serve the purposes for which he intends them; and if they do not, he suffers no harm. But he must rely on the word of the optician or optometrist that the glasses sold to him contain the proper correction for his vision; and if the correction is wrong he may very well sustain lasting injury to his eyes. This is clearly a matter of public health.” Id. at 479.
The fact that the modern drugstore is a retail establishment really has no bearing upon the validity of this statute. Prescription drugs may constitute “consumer goods,” as the majority refers to them, but I believe “the man in the street” would not regard them as “consumer goods.” Whether they are or are not consumer goods in my opinion is irrelevant, however. It may be, as the majority opinion says, that prescription drugs constitute only about 11% of the sales volume of chain drugstores. I suspect, however, that if one eliminated from that base the department stores, supermarkets, or whatever one wishes to call them that have a prescription counter in one corner, the relationship of prescription drugs to total sales volume would be much higher, but that, too, is irrelevant.2 What is *133relevant is whether there is a constitutionally valid, rational basis upon which the statute in question may be rested.
The majority apparently believes that the effect of advertising will be to educate the public as to which store has the lowest prices. If advertising can so educate the public, then it follows that there should be an increase in business on the part of stores with the lowest prices. Bearing in mind that every given action usually brings a reaction and that self-preservation is one of the first laws of nature, I see one rational basis for the statute set forth in Supermarkets. The New Jersey court said:
“In further relating the statute to the protection of the public health and welfare, it may be observed that discount price advertising may encourage smaller retailers to buy unusually large quantities of drugs in order to take advantage of cheaper prices for such purchases, and thus meet the competition of the larger outlets. As a result, otherwise potent drugs may remain on the shelf for an extended period of time, during which they may deteriorate and ultimately be sold to the customer. Dr. Friend testified that little is known about the problems of drug deterioration, but that the situation poses a prime concern in the profession. Hence, if the statute at all deters such buying practices, its relation to the public interest is manifest.” Id. at 342.
The majority states that the ban on advertising prescription drug prices imposes a burden on senior citizens because they are unable to conduct any investigation “such *134as by reading advertisements” to learn the available prices for drugs. It apparently believes that by permitting advertising the public will be benefited. The thought that there can be advertising which will provide a meaningful basis for comparing prices in my opinion is, to borrow the words of Lord Denman, “a delusion, a mockery and a snare.” 3 It certainly would be no exaggeration to say that the prescription department of the average drugstore carries more than a thousand separate items of prescription drugs. To effectively compare prices one would need to know, in addition to the compound, the strength, the manufacturer, and the form of dosage in which the medicine is being prescribed — a lot different and a lot more complicated than comparison shopping for chickens, apples, canned tomatoes, shoes, or even a lady’s handbag. Advertising just cannot make available to the public a rational basis for comparison of prices between one store and another. Short of a computer print-out, I fail to see how a sound basis for comparison of prices can be found. The General Assembly might well have concluded just that and prohibited advertising for that reason.
It must be remembered that there is nothing to prevent a given store from advertising a drug below its normal selling price in an effort to entice into the store those persons who might have prescriptions for such drugs which they have had filled elsewhere at higher prices — and making up for that reduction by raising other prices. For a substantial period of time it was a known fact in the poultry industry on Delmarva that certain supermarkets, to lure customers into their respective stores, were offering “specials” on chicken at a price often below the cost of production to the processing plant. The General Assembly might well have reached a similar conclusion and decided that drugs necessary for the health of our people should not be used for “bait” advertising. In Ritholz v. Johnson, 246 Wis. 442, 17 N.W.2d 590 (1945), the statute under consideration, among other things, made it unlawful to advertise any definite price on *135complete eyeglasses. The court upheld the validity of the statute, reversing a trial court. One portion of its opinion makes interesting reading and indicates my fears are not completely without foundation:
“We do not have to rest the constitutionality of the statute wholly upon the dentist case, [Modern S. Dentists v. State Board of D. Examiners, 216 Wis. 190, 256 N. W. 922 (1934)]. The evidence in this case shows that the advertising used by the plaintiffs actually does operate to defraud the public. The customers of plaintiffs are mostly poor persons. The plaintiffs by their own testimony aim to advertise where their advertisements will reach ‘workers, foreigners and negroes’ particularly. They use the advertisement as a lure or bait, or as they call it ‘an inducement’ to draw such persons to their stores. The general nature of their advertising is shown by the photostatic copy of an advertisement printed herewith. Note the following in the photostat: ‘$12.00 value $3.88;’ ‘at the low price of only $3.88;’ ‘get the glasses you need at prices you can afford;’ ‘no extra cost;’ ‘FREE;’ ‘no extra charge.’ This on its face is dishonest advertising. It manifestly aims and tends to mislead the public within the rule of Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, supra, and Commonwealth v. Ferris, 305 Mass. 233, 25 N.E.(2d) 378, and is therefore fraudulent advertising.” Id. at 448.
All of the cases I have read regard the pharmacist as a professional person. It is true, as the majority states, that much of the business carried on in the average drugstore is ordinary retailing. However, that with which we are here concerned is the professional part of the business. In Semler the Court had under consideration an Oregon statute forbidding a number of advertising activities on the part of dentists including advertising prices and “advertising by means of large display, glaring light signs, or containing as a part thereof the representation of a tooth, teeth, bridge work *136or any portion of the human head . . . The Court said the challenger claimed:
“that the statements in his advertisements were truthful and were made in good faith; that by these methods he had developed a large and lucrative practice; that through long training and experience he had acquired ability superior to that of the great majority of practicing dentists; that he had been able to standardize office operations, to purchase supplies in large quantities and. at relatively low prices, and thus to establish a uniform schedule of charges for the majority of operations; also that he had made contracts for display signs and for advertisements in newspapers, and had entered into other engagements, of which he would be unable to take advantage if the legislation in question were .sustained, and, in that event, his business would be destroyed or materially impaired.” Id. at 610 of 294 U. S.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said for the Court:
“The State court defined the policy of the statute. The court said that while, in itself, there was nothing harmful in merely advertising prices for dental work or in displaying glaring signs illustrating teeth and bridge work, it could not be doubted that practitioners who were not willing to abide by the ethics of their profession often resorted to such advertising methods ‘to lure the credulous and ignorant members of the public to their offices for the purpose of fleecing them.’ The legislature was aiming at ‘bait advertising.’ ‘Inducing patronage,’ said the court, ‘by representations of “painless dentistry,” “professional superiority,” “free examinations,” and “guaranteed” dental work’ was, as a general rule, ‘the practice of the charlatan and the quack to entice the public.’
“We do not doubt the authority of the State to *137estimate the baleful effects of such methods and to put a stop to them. The legislature was not dealing with traders in commodities, but with the vital interest of public health, and with a profession treating bodily ills and demanding different standards of conduct from those which are traditional in the competition of the market place. The community is concerned with the maintenance of professional standards which will insure not only competency in individual practitioners, but protection against those who would prey upon a public peculiarly susceptible to imposition through alluring promises of physical relief. And the community is concerned in providing safeguards not only against deception, but against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous. What is generally called the ‘ethics’ of the profession is but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards.” Id. at 611-12.
It seems to me that the General Assembly might well have concluded that in the operation of the professional portion of a drugstore advertising of prices should be forbidden as one of the “practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous.” 4
In my judgment there is yet another valid, rational basis for the statute which the General Assembly might have had in mind, i.e. “monitoring,” mentioned in both Supermarkets and Patterson. It is not sufficient to say that the physician is better able than the pharmacist to monitor, that this is the *138physician’s basic responsibility. We hear much today of the need and necessity for fail-safe mechanisms. Prescription drugs directly affect the health and physical well being of our people. Can we, therefore, correctly label as arbitrary a legislative desire that there be a second possible check against prescription of antagonistic drugs or drugs to which an individual might have an allergic reaction? I think not.
It is true, as said in Patterson, that “monitoring is not completely effective because of the mobility of customers and the availability of nonprescription drugs which may be antagonistic.” In this day of specialization in the medical field, where an individual may conceivably be under the care of more than one physician at a time without a single physician’s being in full charge, a prescribing physician may not necessarily be aware of all medicine being taken by an individual. Approximately a year ago I witnessed monitoring in action. When presented with a prescription, an alert, conscientious pharmacist noted from his record that the patient was allergic to a certain type of drug. He then called the prescribing physician before filling the prescription. Fortunately, in that situation the physician had already taken the known allergy into consideration and was of the opinion that the particular drug would have no adverse effect. Under other circumstances, however, the action of the pharmacist might well have prevented disastrous results. Therefore, I am of the opinion that, as put in Patterson, monitoring “is a benefit to the public.” Surely this would be a rational basis upon which the action of the General Assembly might have been rested.
We must not lose sight of the fact that ours is the judicial, not the legislative, function. It might well be that as legislators we would not enact a law such as this. We are not legislators, however; we are judges. As I have pointed out, we have said that reasonable doubt in favor of a statute is enough to sustain it and that when a legislative action is challenged the courts look to any set of circumstances that might justify the action. As previously mentioned, in Salisbury Beauty Schools we said earlier this year:
“If any state of facts reasonably can be conceived *139that would sustain the constitutionality of the statute within the exercise of the police power, the existence of that state of facts as a basis for the passage of the law must be assumed.” Id., 268 Md. at 49.
I am of the opinion that any one of the hypotheses I have set forth above might have been a basis for the passage of the law and that any one of them would constitute a valid basis for the exercise of the police power. Accordingly, I would reverse the action of the trial judge.

. It is noted that the Attorney General of Maryland submitted a brief there as amicus curiae.

. The majority by footnote referred to “American Druggist, May 29, 1972, at 17” as authority for its 11% figure. Page 17 of American Druggist on that date refers to a speech by the president of Kroger Company, a . midwest grocery chain said to be the third largest in the country. Kroger is referred to as "the parent company of the 460-unit SupeRx Drug store chain.” The reference to sales volume there appearing is, “Twenty-two percent of the chain’s volume, he said, comes from Rx business, as compared to the national average of 11% for all chain drug stores.” The *133speaker said his chain sold “garden hose and motor oil — just like many other drug stores . . . .” If his figure of 11% for the prescription business of “all chain drug stores” is accurate, then it surely follows that the relationship of prescription business to total sales in non-chain drugstores, the common, ordinary pharmacy that does not sell “garden hose and motor oil,” is much higher.
Stores with prescription departments, which stores are a long way from the common conception of a drugstore, were discussed in Giant of Md. v. State’s Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 517-18, 298 A. 2d 427 (1973), and Patuxent v. Ades of Lexington, 257 Md. 398, 263 A. 2d 584 (1970).

. O’Connell v. The Queen, 11 Clark and F. 155 (1844).

. American Druggist, May 29, 1972, at page 17 carries a direct quote from the President of Kroger Company, “parent company of the 460-unit SupeRx Drug store chain,” where he said, “It is not proper or ethical to advertise prescription drug prices and we do not favor this.”