Court Opinion

ID: 9787423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:16:22.653372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.775875
License: Public Domain

McFarland, C.J.,
dissenting: I strongly disagree with the majority on its analysis of the multiplicity issue and its decision to vacate the aggravated kidnapping conviction and remand for re-sentencing on kidnapping.
The majority opinion states: “[I]t is necessary to set forth in some detail the law in Kansas with regard to multiplicity. This has been a highly confusing subject in Kansas law, and our prior cases have not always been clear.” 272 Kan. at 142.
I agree that our recent pronouncements on multiplicity have been confusing. However, I believe the majority opinion succeeds only in chiseling the confusion onto stone tablets.
The majority opinion states:
“The concept of multiplicity in Kansas comes from two sources. The first is die traditional ‘common-law’ concept. This exists where the State attempts to use a single wrongful act as the basis for multiple charges and is based on die merger of the charges. State v. Garnes, 229 Kan. 368, 372, 624 P.2d 448 (1981). This concept has been a part of Kansas law since at least our decision in State v. Colgate, 31 Kan. 511, 515, 3 Pac. 346 (1884), wherein we stated: ‘[U]pon general principles a single offense cannot be split into separate parts, and the supposed offender be prosecuted for each of such separate parts, although each part may of itself constitute a separate offense.’ The test for whedier die offenses merge and are, dierefore, multiplicitous is whether each offense charged requires proof of a fact not required in proving the other; if so, tiien die offenses do not merge and are not multiplicitous. Games, 229 Kan. at 373. Offenses also do not merge if they are committed separately and severally at different times and at different places. 229 Kan. at 373.
“The defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping and either one of the rape convictions or die aggravated sodomy conviction are not multiplicitous under die traditional ‘common-law’ multiplicity concept, as both rape charges and die aggravated sodomy charge require an element not found in die aggravated kidnapping charge. See State v. Chears, 231 Kan. at 163 (holding that aggravated kidnapping and sodomy were not multiplicitous, even diough sodomy was used to supply the element of bodily harm required for aggravated kidnapping); State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375, 389-90, 312 P.2d 832 (1957) (holding that rape, even diough supplying die essential element of bodily harm required for first-degree kidnapping, was a separate and distinct offense, and the offenses were not multiplicitous).”
The majority opinion then concludes that K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d), in the form in effect at the time of the offenses, adds “another layer *150to the traditional merger test for multiplicity.” The pertinent portions of K.S.A. 21-3107 are as follows:
“(1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one crime under the laws of this state, the defendant may be prosecuted for each of such crimes. Each of such crimes may be alleged as a separate count in a single complaint, information or indictment.
“(2) Upon prosecution for a crime, the defendant may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included crime, but not both. An included crime may be any of the following:
(a) A lesser degree of the same crime;
(b) an attempt to commit the crime charged;
(c) an attempt to commit a lesser degree of die crime charged; or
(d) a crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved.”
K.S.A. 21-3107(1) allows an individual to be charged with multiple violations arising from a single transaction when the same conduct may establish the commission of more than one crime. State v. Perry, 266 Kan. 224, 968 P.2d 674 (1998). This statute is limited by K.S.A. 21-3107(2) wherein a defendant maybe charged with multiple violations arising from a single transaction, but he or she may be convicted of the crime charged or an included crime, but not both. The statute then defines what an included crime is. It is important to look closely at the four categories of included crimes in K.S.A. 21-3107:
(2)(a) A lesser degree of the same crime: The most common of degree crimes are the four homicide statutes: murder in the first degree, K.S.A. 21-3401; murder in the second degree, K.S.A. 21-3402; voluntary manslaughter, K.S.A. 21-3403; and involuntary manslaughter, K.S.A. 21-3404. The only element they have in common is a dead person for whose death the defendant is culpable. The degrees of homicide do not build upon each other. For example, involuntary manslaughter is a reckless unintentional killing under certain specified circumstances and is not a crime necessarily proven in a higher degree of homicide. By including degrees of the same offense in the definition of included crimes, a defendant cannot be convicted of two degrees of homicide for one death. This is not an elements test — rather (2) (a) states different degrees of a crime are included crimes.
*151(2)(b) An attempt to commit the crime charged: This is self-explanatory. For a single act, a defendant could not be convicted of, for example, burglary and attempted burglary.
(2)(c) An attempt to commit a lesser degree of the crime charged: Again, this is self-explanatory. For a single act, a defendant could not be convicted of, for example, aggravated burglary and attempted simple burglary.
(2)(d) A crime necessarily proven if the crime charged were proven: This category is the elements test — not some new “layer to the traditional test for multiplicity,” as stated in the majority opinion. These included crimes are offenses that build on each other by the addition of an element. For example, aggravated kidnapping is kidnapping with the added element of bodily harm to the victim. Aggravated robbery is robbery with the added element of the perpetrator being armed with a dangerous weapon or the infliction of bodily harm on the victim. More than two crimes may build on each other, such as battery, battery on a law enforcement officer, aggravated battery, and aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer. In determining whether a crime is necessarily proven when the charged crime is proven one looks to the elements of the crimes. In my example previously set forth, regardless of the particular facts of a case set forth at trial:
(a) If aggravated kidnapping is proven, kidnapping has been proven;
(b) If aggravated robbery is proven, robbery has been proven;
(c) If aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer is proven, then battery on a law enforcement officer and aggravated battery have also been proven.
The charging instrument is the key to determining whether one crime is necessarily proven by proving another.
As Justice Larson, speaking for the court in State v. Webber, 260 Kan. 263, 283, 918 P.2d 609 (1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1090 (1997), stated:
“The Fifth Amendment guaranty against double jeopardy provides constitutional protection against multiple prosecutions for the same offense and multiple punishments for the same crime. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 23 L. *152Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969). ‘Multiplicity exists if tire State uses a single wrongful act as die basis for multiple charges. Charges are not multiplicitous if each charge requires proof of a fact not required in proving the odier.’ State v. Baker, 255 Kan. 680, Syl. ¶ 2, 877 P.2d 946 (1994).
“We have held that conspiracy and aiding and abetting another offense are not multiplicitous. State v. Hobson, 234 Kan. 133, 139, 671 P.2d 1365 (1983). Each offense requires proof of a element not required by the odier: ‘Conspiracy requires an agreement to commit a crime, while aiding and abetting requires actual participation in die act constituting die offense.’
“Shari argues Hobson is distinguishable because in her case die jury must have relied on the same conduct to find bodi an implicit agreement and her actual participation. Hobson directly addresses diis argument: ‘In the trial of a criminal case [multiplicity] does not depend upon whedier die facts proved at trial are actually used to support conviction of both offenses charged; radier, it turns upon whether the necessary elements of proof of the one crime are included in the other.’ 234 Kan. 133, Syl. ¶ 3.”
The majority opinion concludes that the aggravated kidnapping conviction is multiplicitous with either one of the rapes or the aggravated sodomy convictions. This is as far removed from the elements test as one can get as the crimes share not a single element. Note: Bodily harm is not an element of rape or aggravated sodomy although it is an element of aggravated kidnapping. The majority rests its multiplicity conclusion on the fact that the bodily harm element of aggravated kidnapping was satisfied by one of the three sex crime convictions.
Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to describe how, in our law, rape, by itself, came to satisfy the element of bodily harm.
As far back as 1957, in State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375, Syl. ¶ 4, 312 P.2d 832 (1957), we adopted the California rule that “forcible rape itself’ constituted bodily harm for satisfaction of that element of aggravated kidnapping, holding:
‘Where a defendant is charged with rape in one count and kidnapping in the first degree in another count, both growing out of one comprehensive plan, it is held drat die defendant is properly charged under G. S. 1949 21-449, with kidnapping in die first degree — there being no defect in die charge on the ground diat rape supplied the element of bodily harm required in proof of kidnapping in die first degree.”
Additionally, we have repeatedly held that rape constitutes bodily harm for aggravated kidnapping purposes. See State v. Coberly, *153233 Kan. 100, 106-07, 661 P.2d 383 (1983); State v. Barry, 216 Kan. 609, 618-19, 533 P.2d 1308 (1974); Sharp v. State, 203 Kan. 937, 942, 457 P.2d 14 (1969); State v. Ayers, 198 Kan. 467, 471, 426 P.2d 21 (1967); Brown, 181 Kan. at 389-90; PIK Crim. 3d 56.25 (1999 Supp.), Notes on Use. I believe this longstanding precedent is both significant and important. A rape victim may suffer objectively demonstrable bodily harm from the force used to overcome her resistance to the accomplishment of the sex act, which can satisfy the bodily harm element of aggravated kidnapping. However, the rule that rape alone constitutes bodily harm for purposes of proving that element of aggravated kidnapping means that the proof of bodily harm does not depend upon the particular facts of the physical damage done by the act of rape itself. Evidence of trauma and tears to the body need not be introduced. Such evidence is also unnecessary for a rape conviction. Our cases have held, therefore, that it is unnecessary to separately prove the bodily harm element of aggravated kidnapping where a rape has occurred, as all rapes are to be considered bodily harm for purposes of aggravated kidnapping. The same reasoning applies to aggravated sodomy as supplying the bodily harm element of aggravated kidnapping.
With this in mind, it is necessary to analyze the majority opinion’s conclusion that K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d) added “another layer” to the elements test. In my opinion, as previously discussed, this is wholly erroneous. K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d) is the traditional elements test.
The majority opinion cites State v. Warren, 252 Kan. 169, 180-82, 843 P.2d 224 (1991), and State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 255, 970 P.2d 42 (1998), in support of its “another layer” conclusion. In analyzing these two cases, one cannot avoid discussing the infamous State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365, 757 P.2d 724 (1988), which spawned them. This dissent is not the time or place for an in-depth look at the ill-conceived Fike decision and the great harm and widespread confusion it caused in what had been a comparatively well-stated body of law relative to lesser included offenses. Inasmuch as a trial judge had a duty to instruct on all lesser included offenses whether or not requested to do so by the defendant, the post-Fike confusion as to what was or was not a lesser included offense ere*154ated many problems. In essence, Fike interpreted K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d) to expand the law of lesser included offenses in such a manner that, on the particular evidence introduced at trial in a particular case, virtually any crime could conceivably be a lesser included offense of the charged offense. The result was rather like a complex slalom ski event where most of the course markers have been removed. The situation was so bad that the 1998 legislature sought to erase Fike from the face of the earth by the elimination of K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d), adding in its place K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-3107(2)(b). For purposes of comparison, both versions are set out here:
K.S.A. 21-3107:
“(2) Upon prosecution for a crime, the defendant may be convicted of either die crime charged ór an included crime, but not both. An included crime may be any of the following:
(a) A lesser degree of the same crime;
(b) an attempt to commit the crime charged;
(c) an attempt to commit a lesser degree of die crime charged; or
(d) a crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved.”
K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-3107:'’
“(2) Upon prosecution for a crime, die defendant may be convicted of eidier die crime charged or a lesser included crime, but not both. A lesser included crime is:
(a) A lesser degree of the same crime;
(b) a crime where all elements of the lesser crime are identical to some of the elements of the crime charged;
(c) an attempt to commit the crime charged; or
. (d) an attempt to commit a crime defined under subsection (2)(a) or (2>(b)."
Extensive hearings were held by the 1998 legislature in which many judges and attorneys testified as to the various problems resulting from Fike. The general tenor thereof is well illustrated in the written testimony of James W. Clark, Executive Director of the Kansas County and District Attorney Association, which starts out: “Fike is a Four-lettered Word.” Minutes of the Senate Judiciary Committee, January 27, 1998, Attachment 6-1.
With this in mind, let us look at State v. Warren, 252 Kan. 169. In Warren, the issue was whether convictions of aiding and abet*155ting aggravated robbery and aiding and abetting aggravated battery were multiplicitous because the element of force required by each was satisfied by the same act of force, i.e., knocking the elderly victim down. Although no issue of a lesser included offense was involved, the court made reference to the lesser included offense rationale of Fike. Fike held that 21-3107(2)(d) added a new prong to the elements test for lesser included offenses. The court in Warren did not adopt the second prong of Fike into the law of multiplicity. In fact, it cited the traditional elements test for multiplicity. Specifically, it stated:
“In State v. Mason, 250 Kan. 393, 827 P.2d 748 (1992), the defendant raised a multiplicity argument, cited K.S.A. 21-3107(2), and cited three cases applyingthat statute. The State relied upon K.S.A. 21-3107(1). This court discussed the two-prong Fike test, including more recent applications of it, and then held: ‘Multiplicity does not depend on whether the facts proved at trial are actually used to support the convictions of both offenses; rather, multiplicity turns on whether the necessary elements of proof of the one crime are included in the other.’ 250 Kan. 393, Syl. ¶ 3. It was concluded that the charges were not multiplicitous under K.S.A. 21-3107(2).” 252 Kan. at 177.
The two offenses were ultimately held to be multiplicitous. Later, State v. Rinck, 256 Kan. 848, 850, 888 P.2d 845 (1995), incorrectly stated that the Warren court had used the second prong of Fike to find the convictions multiplicitous.
In State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, the defendant was also convicted of aggravated battery and aggravated robbery. The victim was shot twice. There was no effort to separate the two shots and attribute one to one crime and one to the other. The opinion thus treated the two shots as one act of force and reached the same result as Warren. It should be noted that both Warren and Vontress are distinguishable from the case before us. In each, both crimes had an element of force and the same force was used in both to satisfy that element.
In State v. Mincey, 265 Kan. 257, 264, 963 P.2d 403 (1998), we stated unanimously and unequivocally:
“Because die Warren court discussed the similarities between die concepts of multiple convictions and lesser included offenses, die Court of Appeals and Mincey mistakenly assumed that Fike had expanded the traditional element test to determine if convictions are multiple punishments for the offenses.”
*156Fike is the case that added a second prong to the traditional elements test based on K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d). In Mincey, we held the traditional elements test had not been expanded.
The majority opinion leaves the impression that K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d) represents a development adding a new “layer” to the traditional elements test for multiplicity. This is not supported by the record.
Interestingly, the K.S.A. 21-3107 provisions first appeared in our statute books as a part of the general Kansas Criminal Code revision of 1969 and have remained therein verbatim until the 1998 amendment was enacted to erase Fike. It was not until Fike came along in 1988 that it was held that the 1969 codification had en-grafted a new prong to the elements test for lesser included offenses. Now, over 32 years after K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d) was enacted, the majority opinion holds the same statute added “another layer” to the traditional elements test for multiplicity. This defies all logic.
Before closing, it is appropriate to quote another excerpt from the Fike 1998 legislative hearing. In response to a request from James Clark, the KCDAA Executive Director, as to what Paul Wilson, a Kansas University School of Law professor and a member of the committee who drafted the 1969 Criminal Code Revision remembered as to K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d), Professor Wilson responded in pertinent part:
“Congratulations on your appointment to tire Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Criminal Law Revision. I am sure that your contribution will be a significant one. You will find diat among die incidents of your service is that thirty years from now some eager and perceptive youngster will be asking what you meant when you drafted somediing diat you have totally forgotten and haven’t die slightest idea what you intended odier than what you said.
“I have no recollection of the discussion or circumstances that produced K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d). Obviously it was not controversial or a matter in which die committee members had a great amount of interest. If that had been the case, I probably would have remembered. It is my present thought diat we intended only to clarify what we believed to be die then existing law. We did not intend to alter or enlarge die included offense concept. Perhaps our drafting was inept or our dunking unduly simplistic, but I diink we had in mind only the idea expressed in part one of die court’s two step analysis. It is witii the utmost respect and deference diat I suggest that die supreme court, aided and abetted by lawyers who *157practice before it, may have been a party to making a simple proposition complex.” Minutes of die Senate Judiciary Committee, January 27, 1998, Attachment 6-8.
Professor Wilson was so right. Thirty-two years after the enactment of the legislation in question, the majority has discovered that K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(d) created a new layer to the traditional elements test for determining multiplicity and has done to the law of multiplicity what it did to the law of lesser offenses.
The elements test herein is the appropriate test. Neither rape nor aggravated sodomy are crimes necessarily proven when aggravated kidnapping is proven. I would affirm the convictions.