Court Opinion

ID: 9839443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 15:00:59.940305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:04.849374
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12905    Document: 44-1     Date Filed: 09/13/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12905
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       USA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JOVON MONTELL HOLLOWELL,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00239-JPB-JKL-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12905            Document: 44-1   Date Filed: 09/13/2023   Page: 2 of 7

       2                           Opinion of the Court              22-12905

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               JoVon Hollowell, proceeding pro se, appeals his convictions
       for dealing firearms without a license and making false statements
       to a federally licensed firearms dealer. Hollowell argues that the
       court did not have jurisdiction over him because he is a citizen of
       the Cherokee Nation rather than the United States, citing the Ma-
       jor Crimes Act.1 He also contends that he was not tried by a jury
       of his peers, as the jury did not consist of his fellow tribal members.
       We hold that the District Court had jurisdiction, and we affirm
       Hollowell’s convictions.
                                            I.
               On June 15, 2021, a federal grand jury charged Hollowell in
       a three-count indictment. Count one charged Hollowell with deal-
       ing firearms without a license, in violation of
       18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), and 924(a)(1)(D). Counts two and
       three charged Hollowell with making false statements to a feder-
       ally licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6)
       and 924(a)(2). The indictment alleged that Hollowell violated the
       statutes in Clayton County, Georgia, which is in the Northern Dis-
       trict of Georgia. Following a hearing, the District Court permitted
       Hollowell to represent himself pro se with standby counsel.

       1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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       22-12905               Opinion of the Court                        3

             Hollowell later filed a document that the District Court con-
       strued as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. There, he
       summarily argued that the court lacked jurisdiction. The District
       Court denied the motion, finding that there was jurisdiction based
       on the indictment.
              During jury selection, Hollowell moved for a mistrial be-
       cause the jury did not consist of his peers, as none of the jurors
       were Indigenous. The Government argued that there was no legal
       basis for a mistrial, and the District Court denied the motion.
               At trial, the Government called Benjamin Southall. Southall
       testified that he worked for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tabaco, and
       Firearms (“ATF”), investigating violations of federal firearms laws.
       Southall added that he witnessed Hollowell buy firearms from Ar-
       rowhead Pawn in Clayton County, Georgia.
              The Government also admitted a receipt for firearms Hol-
       lowell bought from Arrowhead Pawn. Additionally, the Govern-
       ment admitted an ATF Form 4473 “Firearms Transaction Record”
       that Hollowell completed with each firearm that he purchased—
       which federal firearms licensees are required to obtain before trans-
       ferring a firearm to a purchaser. On the form, Hollowell stated that
       he was a U.S. Citizen, lived in Dunwoody, Georgia, and answered
       “yes” in the fields asking whether he was the actual transferee or
       buyer of the firearm. The Government also admitted text mes-
       sages that showed Hollowell had coordinated with potential cus-
       tomers about meeting to buy the firearms he had purchased from
       Arrowhead Pawn.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12905

              Collectively, the evidence demonstrated that Hollowell
       made false statements when he purchased sixteen firearms over a
       two-month period with intent to resell the firearms for profit. The
       jury found Hollowell guilty on all counts.
               After the trial, Hollowell filed multiple documents arguing
       that the court lacked jurisdiction due to his Indigenous nationality
       of the Cherokee Nation. At his sentencing hearing, Hollowell
       again objected that the court lacked jurisdiction over him as a citi-
       zen of the Cherokee Nation. Further, he contended that the jury
       did not consist of his peers. The District Court overruled Hollow-
       ell’s objections and it imposed a total sentence of forty-six months’
       imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Hol-
       lowell timely appealed.
                                         II.
              We review questions of statutory subject matter jurisdiction
       de novo. United States v. Grimon, 923 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2019).
                                        III.
               Although he makes multiple conclusory arguments, all of
       Hollowell’s arguments rely on the same premise: the District
       Court did not have jurisdiction because he is a citizen of the “Tsa-
       lagi Cherokee Nation” and did not commit any offense under the
       Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Hollowell also asserts that he
       was not tried by a jury of his peers because the jury did not consist
       of fellow tribal members. We disagree.
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       22-12905                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

               District courts have jurisdiction to hear cases involving “all
       offenses against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
       “[A]n indictment charging that a defendant violated a law of the
       United States gives the district court jurisdiction over the case . . . .”
       McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1252 (11th Cir. 2001). And
       “[a] federal district court has personal jurisdiction to try any defend-
       ant brought before it on a federal indictment charging a violation
       of federal law” in its district. United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320,
       1326 (11th Cir. 2003).
              As to Hollowell’s main contention, the District Court had
       both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The indictment
       charged Hollowell with violating federal laws—dealing in firearms
       without a license and making false statements to a federally li-
       censed firearms dealer—based on his firearm purchases from Ar-
       rowhead Pawn in suburban Atlanta. As we have previously noted,
       “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution
       comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3231. . . . That’s the beginning and the end
       of the jurisdictional inquiry.” McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1252 n.11 (omis-
       sion in original) (quoting Hugi v. United States, 164 F.2d 378, 380
       (7th Cir. 1999)). Thus, Hollowell’s status as a Native American is
       irrelevant. 2

       2 Although Hollowell does not explicitly refer to himself as a “sovereign citi-

       zen,” he asserts that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because he is a “nat-
       ural man.” We have summarily rejected “so called ‘sovereign citizen[]’” the-
       ories as frivolous. Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1223 n.2 (11th Cir.
       2020) (quoting United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013)).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12905

              Likewise, Hollowell’s invocation of the Major Crimes Act is
       immaterial. The Major Crimes Act applies to crimes committed
       “within . . . Indian country.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Indian country
       includes “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
       the jurisdiction of the United States Government.” Id. § 1151. Sub-
       urban Atlanta does not meet that definition. See McGirt v. Okla-
       homa, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459, 207 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2020) (noting that
       the “key question” under the Major Crimes Act is whether an of-
       fense was committed in Indian country).
                Finally, Hollowell has abandoned any argument that he was
       not tried by a jury of his peers. Although we construe pro se filings
       liberally, “this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de
       facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient plead-
       ing in order to sustain an action.” United States v. Padgett,
       917 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v.
       County of Escambia,132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)). Hollow-
       ell’s filing fails to point to any law or supporting authority for this
       argument. At best, Hollowell’s assertion is based on his sovereign
       citizen argument, which this Court has summarily rejected as friv-
       olous. See United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir.
       2013). And “simply stating that an issue exists, without further ar-
       gument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue and
       precludes our considering the issue on appeal.” Singh v. U.S. Att’y
       Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see also Tim-
       son v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]ssues not
       briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.”).
       Hollowell, thus, has abandoned this issue.
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       22-12905              Opinion of the Court                      7

            Accordingly, we hold that the District Court had jurisdiction
       and we affirm Hollowell’s conviction.
             AFFIRMED.