Court Opinion

ID: 9720067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:14:46.893217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:12.815050
License: Public Domain

POCHÉ, J.
I dissent.
The schism that exists within this panel with respect to the use of similar prior convictions for impeachnient needs no reenactment. Students of such cleavage should be more than satisfied with People v. Harris (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 204 [164 Cal.Rptr. 296].
*734What is novel about the majority opinion here is its dismissal of People v. Burdine (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 442, 449 [160 Cal.Rptr. 375], as “not being supported by any reasoning or authority.” Suffice it to note that the reasoning and authority in Burdine belong to the Supreme Court of California. All the Burdine decision purported to do was to follow the command of the California Supreme Court that similar and identical priors be treated identically. (People v. Fries (1979) 24 Cal.3d 222, 230 [155 Cal.Rptr. 194, 594 P.2d 19]; People v. Spearman (1979) 25 Cal.3d 107, 114 [157 Cal.Rptr. 883, 599 P.2d 74], For further guidance see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].)
Here the charged crime of grand theft and the priors of burglary and receiving stolen property are “similar” in the important sense that they sound like what they are to any juror: members of the theft family. Nothing in the majority opinion challenges that characterization. Trained legal minds may be able to distinguish between and among them but jurors are not required to carry such legal equipment. For this and other reasons these similar prior convictions required “extreme caution” in handling. They didn’t get it.
It is clear that the trial court erred in admitting these priors because each of them was similar to the offense for which appellant was on trial. This court admits “it cannot know what appellant’s testimony would have been.” Absent any basis for concluding that such testimony would not have affected the result, it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to appellant would have been reached in the absence of this error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 [299 P.2d 243]; People v. Fries, supra, 24 Cal.3d 222, 234.)
I would reverse the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 12, 1980. Poché, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 1, 1980. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.