Court Opinion

ID: 9569253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:11:57.088569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:51:37.111567
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
Although I concur with Divisions 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the majority opinion, I cannot concur with the holdings in Division 2, so I must dissent to that division and to the judgment.
The essence of the majority’s position is that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes by the State and that, even if he had, the State *604made a sufficient explanation of its use of peremptory strikes to remove black jurors from the jury. I must disagree with both holdings.
Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75 (4) (365 SE2d 111) (1988), cited by the majority, established the burden a defendant in future Batson cases must bear. The obvious import of the establishment of that standard is that the defendant’s burden had not been clearly established until the day Aldridge was decided. That being so, this Court cannot properly hold that appellant has failed to meet his burden because he did not make the showing required by Aldridge. It is clear from the record that the trial court and the prosecuting attorney had no clearer idea of the standards to be applied in Batson claims than appellant did. The record makes it clear, notwithstanding the trial court’s recitation of the factors considered, that the holding that appellant did not make a prima facie case was based on nothing more than a count of the jury and the trial court’s memory that there was a federal case holding that the presence of any blacks on the jury defeats a Batson claim. This case, therefore, is one in which the trial court, contrary to the Supreme Court’s requirement in Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500 (4) (360 SE2d 578) (1987), that more factors be considered than just the number of blacks on the jury, considered only that factor. Although the presence of blacks on the jury as chosen undercuts any inference of impermissible discrimination arising from the use of peremptory strikes to remove blacks from the jury, that presence does not, by itself, destroy the inference. My review of the record leads me to the conclusion that the trial judge in this case made his determination that no prima facie case had been established on the basis of insufficient information, and that the hearing on the issue was insufficiently full and complete to permit an adequate showing. It is for that reason that I would return this case to the trial court for a new hearing on the issue of appellant’s Batson claim.
Second, I cannot agree that the prosecuting attorney in this case provided race-neutral explanations of his use of peremptory strikes that would permit an appellate review of the issue. The prosecuting attorney made the general statement that the blacks who were struck from the jury were those who knew appellant or his family or knew of appellant or his family. I do not believe such a broad-brush approach is adequate. Compare Hillman v. State, 184 Ga. App. 712 (1) (362 SE2d 417) (1987). See also Powell v. State, 182 Ga. App. 123 (3) (355 SE2d 72) (1987).
My position in this case must not be misunderstood as criticism of the trial court’s handling of the Batson claim. This case was tried in February 1987, and guidance for the trial courts on these issues was sparse. It is clear to me from the transcript that the trial court attempted to comply with the U. S. Supreme Court’s mandate, but had not been provided sufficient guidelines for doing so. In the inter*605vening months, the relative burdens and responsibilities have been clarified significantly. It is with confidence, then, that I would remand this case to the trial court for a complete hearing on appellant’s Bat-son claim.
Decided March 18, 1988
Rehearing denied March 30, 1988
Alfred D. Fears, William P. Bartles, Alfred D. Fears, Jr., for appellant.
E. Byron Smith, District Attorney, Tommy K. Floyd, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
For the reasons stated, I must dissent to the holdings in Division 2 of the majority opinion and to the judgment.