Court Opinion

ID: 9962592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 20:13:52.621937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:07.646445
License: Public Domain

J-A24003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 CRAIG S. HARTMAN                          :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :    No. 550 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 17, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-09-CR-0001392-2021

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                             FILED APRIL 23, 2024

      Craig S. Hartman, Appellant, appeals the judgment of sentence entered

by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court). Following a jury

trial, Appellant was found guilty of sex offenses against two minor children.

He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 23 to 46 years, and

designated as a Sexually Violent Predator. In this appeal, Appellant contends

that the trial court erred in admitting photos downloaded from his cellular

phone because the warrant for the phone’s search was constitutionally

overbroad, and the evidence prejudiced him at trial. He also argues that the

trial court abused its discretion by imposing a de facto life sentence, and by

not properly considering individualized sentencing factors.        Finding that

Appellant is entitled to no relief on either claim, we affirm.
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       The two minor victims in this case were L.H. (age 9) and K.R. (age 10).

Appellant met L.H. first through the child’s grandmother, Marge Heckman,

who was the child’s guardian. Heckman worked at a diner where Appellant

was a long-time customer, and L.H. would be brought to the diner on

occasions when a babysitter could not be found. Appellant often spent time

with L.H. during Heckman’s shifts. Appellant later met K.R. through L.H., as

the two children had become good friends at school.

       In the summer of 2020, Appellant took both L.H. and K.R. on a variety

of outings, including trips to the mall, the park, and fast-food restaurants. He

also bought them clothes, took them to get pedicures, and brought them to

the home of his sister, Dawn Borusky, so that the girls could use the swimming

pool at the residence.

       On July 23, 2020, after K.R. had returned home from Borusky’s house,

she told her mother that Appellant had put his fingers in her vagina and anus,

causing her to bleed later that day. This incident had occurred in Borusky’s

swimming pool while Appellant played a game with the two girls in which they

would hide his wristwatch; Appellant would attempt to find the watch by

fondling them under their bathing suits and penetrating the girls digitally.

       K.R.’s mother reported what she was told to the police, and K.R. was

taken to a nearby hospital to be physically examined.1 About two weeks later,

____________________________________________

1 The physical examination of K.R. and the testing of the clothing she wore

that day yielded no evidence of sexual abuse.

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the child spoke with a forensic interviewer, Allison Rose, to further recount

her experiences with Appellant. K.R. told Rose that, in addition to the incident

at the pool, Appellant had taken her and L.H. to his apartment and raped

them. The children were instructed by Appellant not to tell anyone about what

he had done.

      Rose conducted a forensic interview with L.H. a few days later, and the

child denied that Appellant had abused her in any way.        But at a second

interview with Rose about four months after that, L.H. echoed K.R.’s account.

L.H. claimed that Appellant had on numerous occasions penetrated her with

his fingers.

       Detective Stephen Reeves was assigned to the case soon after the

children came forward, and on October 22, 2020, he contacted Appellant to

ask if he would appear at the police station to answer questions. Appellant

agreed, and on that same day he spoke to Detective Reeves for about two

hours, gave a statement, and took a polygraph test.

      In his recorded interview with Reeves, Appellant denied having had any

sexual contact with either L.H. or K.R. He admitted to playing games with the

children in his sister’s pool, but insisted that it was not sexual in nature.

Moreover, Appellant admitted that he would occasionally rub L.H.’s shoulders,

arms, feet, and knees. He would also send text messages to L.H. every day,

and he stated that he loved her.

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       Just prior to the polygraph test, Detective Reeves asked Appellant for

his cellular phone, and Appellant initially agreed, giving both verbal and

written consent. Detective Reeves had possession of the phone for about an

hour, during which time he found a file in the phone called “L.H.,” containing

196 photos of the child. None of the photos were pornographic or sexually

explicit in nature, but a few of them were taken from behind the child, at

angles where her buttocks was prominently displayed. In many of the photos,

L.H. was wearing a swimsuit.

       After Appellant completed the polygraph test, he asked for the return of

his phone. Detective Reeves instead kept the phone in his possession while

he applied for, and was granted, a warrant to search the device. The officer’s

affidavit of probable cause enumerated the items to be searched in such a

way as to avoid any potential limitations on the material that could be

recovered. The “searched for” items included “any and all” documents, files,

call   history,   email   activity,   photos,   videos,   images,   and   identifying

information.      A search warrant was granted, and it contained an identical

description of the items to be searched for. Police relied upon the warrant to

download the phone’s contents, including all the photos saved in the “L.H.”

folder.

       Charges were filed on May 6, 2021, and Appellant moved to exclude the

photos from the evidence at trial. He argued in his omnibus pre-trial motion

that the search warrant was invalid because it “did not identify specifically the

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information to be seized,” and “did not contain the requisite probable cause

to conduct the search within the four corners of the written affidavit attached

to the search warrant.” Appellate did not elaborate on the argument at the

hearing on the motion. See Suppression Hearing Transcript, 6/30/2022, at

p. 24.

         The trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion, finding that

Appellant consented to the search of the phone, and that regardless, the

search was supported by probable cause. See Trial Court’s Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, 7/6/2022, at 4-5; see also Trial Court 1925(a)

Opinion, 4/21/2023, at 9-11.2 Accordingly, the Commonwealth was permitted

to introduce the photos, and 121 of them were shown to the jury.             The

Commonwealth relied on the photos in closing to argue that Appellant’s

possession of them established that he had sexually objectified L.H., rebutting

his claim that the relationship was purely platonic. See N.T. Trial, 9/15/2022,

at 47-48.

____________________________________________

2 The trial court indicated in its 1925(a) opinion that Appellant’s contention is

without merit in part because the photos introduced at trial were retrieved by
Detective Reeves during the one-hour window in which Appellant had given
consent. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 4/21/2023, at 9. However,
Detective Reeves testified at the suppression hearing that no photos were
downloaded from the phone until after Appellant withdrew his consent, and a
warrant for the phone’s search had been granted. See Suppression Hearing
Transcript, 6/30/2022, at 40.        Consistent with that testimony, the
Commonwealth now asserts in its brief that the photos of L.H. admitted into
evidence were downloaded from Appellant’s phone pursuant to the search
warrant. See Appellee’s Brief, at 11.

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      At the conclusion of the trial, Appellant was found guilty of the following

offenses: one count of rape of a child (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c)); two counts

of aggravated indecent assault of a child less than 13 years of age          (18

Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b)); two counts of indecent assault of a child less than 13

years of age (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7)); two counts of indecent exposure

(18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a)); two counts of corruption of minors (18 Pa.C.S.A. §

6301(a)(1)(ii)); and two counts of unlawful contact with a minor (18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 6318(a)(1)).

      As to each of the two counts of aggravated indecent assault of a child

less than 13 years of age, Appellant received consecutive 10-year minimum

mandatory sentences, both with an upward range of 20 years. These terms

were imposed in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(a)(3), which mandates

that a person convicted of that offense receive a sentence of not less than 10

years. As to one of the two counts of unlawful contact with a minor, Appellant

received a term of three to six years, also to be served consecutively to the

other counts. The record reflects that Appellant was not sentenced on the

remaining counts, resulting in an aggregate prison term of 23 to 46 years. He

was also required to register as a Sexually Violent Predator.

      The trial court gave its rationale for the sentence first by discussing the

effect of Appellant’s crimes on the two minor victims, their families, and the

community at large. See Sentencing Hearing Transcript, 1/17/2023, at 26.

The trial court then recounted the evidence of Appellant’s manipulative

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behavior, including his friendship with L.H.’s guardian, and frequent activities

with both minor victims over an extended period of time. See id., at 26-29.

      The trial court also responded to the argument made by defense counsel

that the sentence sought by the Commonwealth would exceed Appellant’s

lifespan, as he would not be parole-eligible until the age of 92. While agreeing

that Appellant might not live long enough to qualify for parole, the trial court

balanced that consideration against the possibility of recidivism even for a

parolee of that advanced age. See id., at 29-30. As an example, the trial

court referred to a 93-year-old repeat sex offender in an unrelated case. See

id.

      Appellant filed a post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of his

sentence, and the motion was denied. He then timely filed a notice of appeal,

and in his brief, he raises the following two issues for our consideration:

      1. Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress
      photographs found on Appellant's phone where the warrant's
      description of the items to be searched for and seized was
      unconstitutionally overbroad, an error that was not harmless?

      2. Did the trial court err and manifestly abuse its sentencing
      discretion when it sentenced a 67 year old with no prior criminal
      history to a minimum term of 23 years imprisonment as it did not
      conduct an individualized sentence determination, utilized an
      unreliable sentencing factor, and imposed what is in effect a
      sentence of life imprisonment?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

      The Commonwealth responded in its brief that Appellant’s overbreadth

challenge is waived, that the warrant was not overbroad, and that any defect

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concerning the warrant’s scope was harmless error. As to Appellant’ second

issue, the Commonwealth asserted that it is not reviewable here because it

involves a discretionary aspect of sentencing which does not pose a

“substantial question.” The Commonwealth argued in the alternative that the

claim lacks substantive merit because the trial court considered all relevant

sentencing factors and properly exercised its discretion when imposing a term

within the maximum range permitted by the Sentencing Code.

      We first consider whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s

motion to suppress the photos of L.H. that were downloaded from his cell

phone. On review of an order denying a suppression motion, this Court “is

limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the

record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.”

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017). The trial

court’s factual findings are binding on this Court if they are supported by the

record, but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See id. The scope of our

review is limited to “only the suppression hearing record and excludes

evidence elicited at trial.” Id.

      At the outset, we find that Appellant’s overbreadth challenge is

preserved for appellate review. In his motion to suppress, Appellant argued

that the warrant for the search of his phone was not drafted with sufficient

particularity to pass constitutional muster because it encompassed items for

which there was no probable cause.

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      Recently, in Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 716 (Pa. Super.

2023), this Court explained that the particularity requirement for a warrant

subsumes two distinct types of challenge to a warrant’s validity. The first type

is a claim that a warrant is not “particular enough,” allowing police to rely on

an ambiguity of search terms to rummage through a defendant’s belongings

at will. See id. The second type of claim is an “overbreadth” challenge, in

which the asserted defect is that the described items to be seized are definite,

but so broad in scope that the search encompasses items for which there is

no probable cause. See id.

      Appellant’s particularity challenge could have been more precise in his

written motion, and he did not elaborate on the nature of his contention at

the suppression hearing. However, the argument he made about the defect

of the search warrant encompasses the specific issue now raised on appeal,

see Ali, 293 A.3d at 716, and the trial court considered the overbreadth

challenge in its 1925(a) opinion. We likewise find that Appellant’s claim is

preserved, enabling us to consider its merits.

      Under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, individuals are

guaranteed the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizes. See

Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1071-72 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citing Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 502 (Pa. Super.

2021)(en banc)).    Generally, police may not search for or seize evidence

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belonging to an individual without first obtaining a warrant supported by

probable cause. See Heidelberg, 267 A.3d at 502.

      Probable cause exists where, “given all the circumstances set forth in

the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime

will be found in a particular place.” Commonwealth v. Young, 287 A.3d

907, 919 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Green, 265 A.3d

541, 551 (Pa. 2021)). Search warrants must “describe with particularity the

items sought, to establish that ‘citizens generally enjoy protection . . . from

general, exploratory searches by government actors.’” Young, 287 A.3d at

919 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rega, 70 A.3d 777, 785 (Pa. 2013)). A

warrant is unconstitutionally overbroad where it authorizes a search and

seizure of specific material for which there is no probable cause. See id., at

920. The “standard for an overbreadth challenge applies equally to the search

of a digital space as it does for a physical search.” Green, 265 A.3d at 553-

54.

      “[I]n any assessment of the validity of a description contained in a

warrant, a court must initially determine for what items probable cause

existed.”   Commonwealth v. Rivera, 816 A.2d 282, 290-91 (Pa. Super.

2003). A warrant is valid if there is no “unreasonable discrepancy” between

the listed items and the items for which there was probable cause to search.

See id. “Because the particularity requirement in Article I, Section 8 is more

stringent than in the Fourth Amendment, if the warrant is satisfactory under

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the Pennsylvania Constitution it will also be satisfactory under the federal

Constitution.”     Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1003 (Pa. Super.

2014).

       Here, the search warrant for Appellant’s cellular phone is plainly

overbroad. The items to be searched for and seized were enumerated in the

warrant so that the entirety of the device’s contents were identified.     The

search was in no way limited to the recovery of evidence of a crime relating

to the minor victims. As a result, police were permitted to search and seize

material from the phone that had nothing to do with the allegations against

Appellant.    The search was therefore unconstitutional because it was not

limited to items for which police had probable cause of a crime. See e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 18 (Pa. Super. 2014) (warrant for

search of email account was overbroad because, despite that there was

probable cause that “evidence of criminal activity could be found in emails in

the account[,] it did not justify a search of every email therein”).3

       Although the warrant was overbroad, that does not end our inquiry. We

must next determine whether the admission of the photos downloaded from

Appellant’s cell phone caused him prejudice.       “An error involving state or

____________________________________________

3 It is possible for the defect in an overbroad warrant to be cured by limiting

language in supporting documents, such as an affidavit of probable cause.
See Young, 287 A.3d at 929-31. But here, the documents supporting the
warrant do not cure the warrant’s overbreadth because they contain identical,
and equally overbroad, lists of items to be seized from Appellant’s cell phone.

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federal constitutional law ‘can be harmless only if the appellate court is

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless.’” Melvin,

103 A.3d at 20 (quoting Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa.

1978)). Harmless error may be found where:

      (1) The error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was
      de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely
      cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially
      similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; (3) the properly
      admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
      overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
      insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
      contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 811 A.2d 556, 561 (Pa. 2002) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344, 350 (Pa. 1999)).

      In the present case, the admission of the photos was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt for several reasons. First, Detective Reeves had reviewed

the photos after receiving Appellant’s consent to search his phone, and he

would have been permitted to describe the images to the jury even had the

photos been ruled to be inadmissible at the trial. See e.g., Commonwealth

v. Rovinski, 704 A.2d 1068, 1074 (Pa. Super. 1997) (witnesses permitted to

describe photographs they had seen before those photos had been admitted

into evidence).   The photos’ content was therefore partially cumulative of

available evidence in the form of the detective’s testimony.

      Second, Appellant admitted to facts that proved he had an inappropriate

relationship with the victims, again making the photos cumulative of other

evidence. For example, Appellant did not dispute that he “loved” L.H., that

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he frequently sent text messages to the child, that he had taken her to his

house without her guardian’s permission, and that he had often touched

various parts of the child’s body. He also could not have disputed the fact

that he had numerous photos of L.H. in his phone because he had allowed

Detective Reeves to look at them. Thus, the suggestive nature of a fraction

of the photos merely corroborated the established fact that Appellant’s

feelings for the victims were not always platonic.

      Third, the photos themselves were not inflammatory, and Appellant’s

possession of them did not constitute a crime. The vast majority of the photos

showed D.H. engaged in normal everyday activities, such as a scaling a

climbing wall or entering a swimming pool. Only a few of them were arguably

suggestive of an improper motive on Appellant’s part – those taken from the

behind the child and apparently accentuating her buttocks. And even those

questionable photos were subject to interpretation, in that a reasonable

person could see them in a completely innocent light.           Thus, while the

warrant’s overbreadth made it defective, this defect had minimal impact under

the circumstances, such that the admission of the photos was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.

      Appellant’s second (and final) claim in this appeal is that the trial court

abused its discretion in sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of 23 to

46 years. He asserts that he received a de facto life sentence, as Appellant

will not be eligible for parole until he is 92 years old. The specific legal basis

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for the challenge is that trial court violated the Sentencing Code by failing to

consider individualized sentencing factors, such as his rehabilitative needs and

lack of a prior criminal record. Appellant takes particular issue with the trial

court’s reference to a 93-year-old repeat sex offender, arguing that the trial

court made an improper generalization about the likelihood of recidivism from

that single instance despite the low probability that an elderly sex offender

will recidivate. See Appellant’s Brief, at 36-37.

      “[A] challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 842

(Pa. Super. 2014).     The right to review of a discretionary aspect of a

sentencing is not absolute, and such a challenge “must be considered a

petition for permission to appeal[.]” Commonwealth v. Fiascki, 886 A.2d

261, 263 (Pa. Super. 2005). In order to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to

review such claims, an appellant must satisfy a four-part test:

      (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal . . . ; (2)
      whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a
      motion to reconsider and modify sentence . . . ; (3) whether
      appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4)
      whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed
      from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. 2015).

      A substantial question for review exists only where an appellant asserts

"a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to

the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process." Commonwealth

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v. Bynum-Hamilton, 135 A.3d 179, 184 (Pa. Super. 2016).                 Such a

determination "must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis." Id.

      Here, we find that Appellant has successfully invoked our jurisdiction to

review a discretionary aspect of his sentence.        He timely appealed his

judgment of sentence, preserved the sentencing issues now before us, and

filed a brief that comports with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).    Appellant also raised a

substantial question regarding whether the trial court properly took his

advanced age and rehabilitative needs into account. See Commonwealth v.

Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (septuagenarian consecutively

sentenced to what may be a life term arguing failure to consider rehabilitative

needs raised a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34

A.3d 135, 148 (Pa. Super. 2011) (explaining that a sentence may be excessive

where the lower range of a prison term is unlikely to terminate prior to the

end of a defendant’s life span). He argues that the trial court failed to comply

with the individualized sentencing requirements mandated by section 9721(b)

of the Sentencing Code. We will therefore consider the merit of his claim that

the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

      "Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion." Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super.

2006) (citation omitted). To establish an abuse of discretion, an appellant

must show, by reference to the record, "that the sentencing court ignored or

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misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice,

bias, or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision." Id.

      In fashioning a sentence, a judge must consider factors such as the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant, the need for the protection of the public,

and the gravity of the offense. See Commonwealth v. Peters, 516 A.2d

1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 1986). The sentencing judge is in the best position

to consider “the nature of the crime, the defendant's character, and the

defendant's displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference.” Commonwealth

v. Fries, 523 A.2d 1134, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1987). "[T]here is no requirement

that a sentencing court's imposition of sentence must be the minimum

possible confinement[.]" Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 965 (Pa.

2007). A trial court instead has discretion to run sentences concurrently or

consecutively to other sentences being imposed. Commonwealth v.

Mouzon, 828 A.2d 1126, 1130-1131 (Pa. Super. 2003).

      At the sentencing in the case at hand, the trial court considered all

mandatory sentencing factors when imposing a prison term that as well within

the statutory maximum. In fact, the lion’s share of the aggregate sentence –

two consecutive 10-year terms – results from minimum terms that were

statutorily mandated and not a matter of judicial discretion.

      Additionally, the trial court adhered to individualized sentencing

requirements by stating on the record the reasons for the length of the

sentence.   The trial court explicitly considered the nature of Appellant’s

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offenses, his personal history, the protection of the public, the impact on the

community, and Appellant's rehabilitative needs.

      Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider his age and

improperly referred to another instance of an elderly sex offender who

reoffended on parole. In context, however, the trial court’s reference was not

an abuse of discretion or otherwise a departure from the requirements of an

individualized sentencing.

      Defense counsel had argued at the sentencing hearing that the 23-year

minimum term was too long because Appellant would not survive to become

parole eligible at the age of 92.       The trial court gave credence to that

possibility, but noted briefly that a parolee of that age may still commit a

sexual offense and pose a risk to the public. The trial court was not applying

an unfounded generalization about elderly offenders to Appellant. Rather, the

trial court was accurately stating that it could not presume that Appellant

would pose no risk to the public if he lived long enough to be eligible for parole.

Thus, we conclude that Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of

his sentence has no merit and that the judgment of sentence must be upheld.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 4/23/2024

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