Court Opinion

ID: 9929952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 20:02:40.012152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:57:40.644007
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/5/24 In re Omari H. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

In re OMARI H., et al., Persons                                   B323254
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.                                                              (Los Angeles County
________________________________                                  Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  22CCJP02056)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

KASEEM H.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Kristen Byrdsong, Juvenile Court Referee. Dismissed in
part and conditionally affirmed with directions in part.
      Laura D. Pedicini, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                    _____________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

       Kaseem H. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings and disposition orders declaring his children,
four-year-old Omari H. and two-year-old twins Kamiayah H. and
Kaseem H. Jr., dependent children of the court under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).1
Kaseem argues that substantial evidence did not support the
court’s finding Kaseem’s marijuana use put the children at
substantial risk of serious physical harm; that the court abused
its discretion by ordering him to undergo drug testing and, if he
tested positive or missed a test, to participate in a substance
abuse treatment program; and that substantial evidence did not
support the court’s removal order.
       We conclude that, because the children’s mother, Arkell P.,
did not appeal from jurisdiction findings based on her substance
abuse, and because Kaseem did not appeal from jurisdiction
findings based on his mental health issues and the domestic
violence between him and Arkell, his appeal from the jurisdiction
findings based on his substance abuse is not justiciable.
Therefore, we dismiss his appeal from the jurisdiction findings.
We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
ordering Kaseem to undergo drug testing and, if necessary,
treatment and that, although the court applied the wrong
standard of proof in making its findings supporting removal, the
error was harmless.
       Finally, Kaseem contends the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services and the juvenile
court failed to comply with the inquiry provisions of the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related
California law. The Department concedes, and we agree, Kaseem
is correct. Therefore, we conditionally affirm the juvenile court’s
orders and direct the court to ensure the Department complies
with the inquiry and, if necessary, notice provisions of ICWA and
related California law.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.    The Department Investigates a Referral Concerning
            the Children
      In April 2022 the Department received a report stating that
Kaseem hit Arkell in the face and that Omari, Kamiayah, and
Kaseem Jr. witnessed the incident. The Department had
received a similar report one month earlier, in March 2022, when
Kaseem hit Arkell in the face after an argument about the
behavior of Kaseem’s 10-year-old son, A’mir.2 After the
March 2022 incident, Arkell left the home with Omari,
Kamiayah, and Kaseem Jr., and Kaseem followed them. Kaseem
was arrested.

2     The Department had recently placed A’mir with Kaseem.
After the March 2022 incident, the Department removed A’mir
from Kaseem.

                                 3
       A Department social worker interviewed Arkell and
Kaseem about the April 2022 incident. Arkell said that she and
Kaseem argued about Kaseem’s refusal to help her care for the
children, that she hit Kaseem first, and that Kaseem hit her in
the face twice and slammed her face into the floor. Arkell said
the children were in the bedroom at the time. Arkell said that
she and Kaseem were under a lot of stress and that they
frequently argued about A’mir, who had severe behavioral and
mental health issues. Arkell said she had been diagnosed with
depression and anxiety, but was not taking any medication or
receiving any mental health services. She said she smoked
marijuana in the car every night while the children slept.
       Kaseem told the social worker that he and Arkell had
argued, but that, because of his mental illness, he did not
remember hitting Arkell. Kaseem stated that he was bipolar
schizophrenic and that he was not taking medication or receiving
mental health services. Kaseem said that he had been
hospitalized in a psychiatric facility when he was younger, that
he had been prescribed medication, and that he did not like the
side effects. Kaseem also said he smoked marijuana in his car
daily to help with his mental health.

      B.    The Department Files a Petition Under Section 300,
            and the Juvenile Court Detains the Children
      On May 26, 2022 the Department filed a petition on behalf
of Omari, Kamiayah, and Kaseem Jr. alleging counts under
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). The Department alleged
Kaseem and Arkell had “a history of engaging in violent
altercations in the presence of the children,” which placed the
children “at risk of serious physical harm.” The Department also

                                 4
alleged Kaseem and Arkell had “a history of substance abuse,”
were “current abuser[s] of marijuana,” and had mental and
emotional problems, which rendered them “incapable of providing
regular care for the children.” Finally, the Department alleged
the children’s half brother, Tyler, received permanent placement
services because of Arkell’s mental health problems, which placed
“the children at risk of serious physical harm.”3
      At the detention hearing the juvenile court found the
Department had made a prima facie showing Omari, Kamiayah,
and Kaseem Jr. were persons described by section 300 and
ordered their continued detention from Kaseem and Arkell. The
court ordered monitored visitation for Kaseem and Arkell and
required them to visit separately.

      C.     The Juvenile Court Sustains the Petition and
             Removes the Children
      At a jurisdiction hearing in July 2022 the juvenile court
found Omari, Kamiayah, and Kaseem Jr. were persons described
by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). The court sustained,
as amended, counts b-1 (failure to protect due to domestic
violence), b-2 (marijuana use by Arkell), b-3 (marijuana use by
Kaseem), b-5 (Kaseem’s mental and emotional problems), and j-1
(neglect of half sibling Tyler due to Arkell’s mental and emotional
problems). The court struck counts a-1 (nonaccidental serious
physical harm due to domestic violence) and b-4 (Arkell’s mental
and emotional problems). The court ordered visitation for
Kaseem and Arkell.

3     Arkell’s son Tyler was in a legal guardianship with Arkell’s
aunt and living with Arkell’s mother.

                                 5
       At a disposition hearing in August 2022 the juvenile court
declared Omari, Kamiayah, and Kaseem Jr. dependent children
of the court and removed them from Kaseem and Arkell. The
court ordered Kaseem to participate in domestic violence
counseling, individual counseling, and parenting classes. The
court also ordered Kaseem to undergo random and on-demand
drug testing, and, if he tested positive or missed a test, to
participate in a full drug treatment program. The court ordered
separate, monitored visitation for each parent. Kaseem timely
appealed from the court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition
orders.4

                           DISCUSSION

      A.     Kaseem’s Appeal from the Jurisdiction Findings Is
             Not Justiciable
       Kaseem argues substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings based on his marijuana use.
Because Kaseem did not challenge the court’s other jurisdiction
findings, however, his appeal is not justiciable.
       The “principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a
child, not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that ‘“[a]s long as

4     In addition to appealing from the order requiring drug
testing and treatment if necessary, Kaseem stated in his notice of
appeal he was appealing from the orders “for parents not to
arrive together” and to “take parenting for special needs.”
Because in his brief Kaseem addresses only the order requiring
drug testing and treatment, he has abandoned any challenge to
the other orders identified in his notice of appeal. (See In re M.B.
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 617, 620, fn. 1.)

                                  6
there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial
that another might be inappropriate”’ [citation]. Thus, where
jurisdictional findings have been made as to both parents but
only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may be rendered
moot. [Citation.] The same is true where there are multiple
findings against one parent; the validity of one finding may
render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.” (In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283-284; see In re D.M. (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 634, 638-639.)5
      The juvenile court made jurisdiction findings against both
parents, and Kaseem does not challenge the jurisdiction findings
against Arkell. Moreover, Kaseem challenges only the findings
against him based on his marijuana use, and not the findings
against him based on domestic violence or those based on his
mental and emotional problems. Therefore, his challenge to the
jurisdiction findings based on drug use is not justiciable. (See
In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283; see, e.g., In re Madison S.
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-329 [appeal from a jurisdiction
finding under section 300, subdivision (b), was nonjusticiable

5     Although the Supreme Court in In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at pages 283 to 284 stated that a challenge to less
than all jurisdiction findings may be “moot,” we use the broader
term “nonjusticiable.” (See In re C.F. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 454,
463 [an “‘“action that originally was based on a justiciable
controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions
have become moot by subsequent acts or events”’”].) In deciding
whether a dependency appeal is nonjusticiable, either because it
is moot or for other reasons, the critical factor is whether the
appellate court can provide any effective relief. (See In re N.S.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [mootness]; In re I.A. (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [nonjusticiability].)

                                 7
where the mother did not challenge a finding under section 300,
subdivision (j)]; In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979
[“Because jurisdiction was proper on other grounds, mother
cannot expect a more favorable result, and we need not consider
her appeal.”].)
       Kaseem argues his challenge to the jurisdiction findings
based on his marijuana use is justiciable because those findings
served as the basis for the court’s orders requiring him to
undergo drug testing and, if necessary, drug treatment. It is true
a challenge to some but not all of the jurisdiction findings may be
justiciable where the parent demonstrates “a specific legal or
practical consequence that would be avoided upon reversal of the
jurisdictional findings,” for example, where the challenged
finding “‘serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also
challenged on appeal.’” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283.)
       But that rule does not apply here. The jurisdiction finding
regarding Kaseem’s drug use was not the only basis for the drug
testing and treatment orders. The juvenile court had discretion
to make those disposition orders as part of Kaseem’s case plan
based on the other (unchallenged) jurisdiction findings. (See
In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006-1008
[juvenile court acted within its discretion in ordering random
drug and alcohol testing for a parent, even though the court did
not sustain a count based on the parent’s alcohol use]; see also
In re K.T. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25 [“The court’s broad
discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the
child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with
this discretion, permits the court to formulate disposition orders
to address parental deficiencies when necessary to protect and
promote the child’s welfare, even when that parental conduct did

                                 8
not give rise to the dependency proceedings.”]; In re D.L. (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1148 [once the juvenile court sustains a
petition, the court has “the authority to order a nonoffending
parent to participate in services”].) As we will discuss, the court
had discretion to order Kaseem to undergo drug testing and
participate in drug treatment to protect the children, even if the
court’s findings regarding Kaseem’s drug use did not support
dependency jurisdiction. Therefore, Kaseem’s challenge to the
jurisdiction findings regarding his drug use is not justiciable.6

      B.     The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
             Ordering Kaseem To Submit to Drug Testing and, if
             Necessary, Drug Treatment
      Kaseem argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering him to undergo random drug testing and, if he tested
positive or missed a test, to participate in a drug treatment
program. The court did not abuse its discretion.
      Section 362, subdivision (a), provides “the court may make
any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody,
conduct, maintenance, and support” of a child described by
section 300. Such orders may include “any reasonable orders to
the parents or guardians of the child who is the subject of any
proceedings under this chapter as the court deems necessary and
proper to carry out this section.” (§ 362, subd. (d); see In re
Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 673.) “At disposition, the

6     Kaseem has not asked us to exercise our discretion to
consider the merits of his nonjusticiable appeal. (See In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282 [“Even when a case is moot, courts
may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the
dispute.”].)

                                 9
juvenile court is not limited to the content of the sustained
petition when it considers what dispositional orders would be in
the best interests of the children.” (In re Briana V. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311.) “‘The juvenile court has broad
discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the
child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly.
On appeal, this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear
abuse of discretion.’” (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058,
1071; see In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 522 [“We review
the juvenile court’s disposition case plan for an abuse of
discretion.”].)
       Kaseem contends there was insufficient evidence that his
marijuana use presented a substantial risk of harm to the
children or that he was under the influence of marijuana when he
cared for the children. But there was. Kaseem admitted that he
had smoked marijuana since he was 15 or 16 years old and that
he smoked every day (or every other day) in his car “to help with
his mental health.” Kaseem stated he stopped using marijuana
when a Department social worker asked him to, but he resumed
smoking to deal with “stress and some life situations.”
       Kaseem argues that using marijuana was “beneficial to his
mental health” and recommended by his health care provider.
However, the issue before the juvenile court was not whether
Kaseem’s marijuana use was legal or beneficial to him, but what
would best serve and protect the children’s interests. (See In re
D.P., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1071-1072 [“the paramount
concern always must be the child’s best interests, and we cannot
reverse a disposition order reasonably fashioned to eliminate the
conditions that led to dependency jurisdiction, no matter how
burdensome its requirements may seem from the parent’s

                                10
perspective”].) At the disposition hearing, counsel for the
Department argued, and the juvenile court found, it was not safe
for someone under the influence of marijuana to supervise one-
year-old twins and a two-year-old child with special needs. Given
Kaseem’s dependence on marijuana, his nearly daily use, and the
demands of caring for not one but three very young children, the
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Kaseem to undergo
drug testing and to participate in a drug treatment program if he
tested positive or missed a test. (See In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th
520, 558 [“It is reasonable for courts to infer that very young
children require a substantial degree of close supervision.”].)

      C.     The Juvenile Court Applied an Incorrect Standard of
             Proof in Removing the Children from Kaseem
       “The burden of proof at the jurisdictional phase is
preponderance of the evidence; the burden of proof at disposition
is clear and convincing evidence.” (In re Ma.V. (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 11, 24.) Thus, before the juvenile court may
remove a child from a parent, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that the child would be at substantial risk of
physical or emotional harm if returned home and that there are
no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without
removal. (§ 361, subd. (c).) “‘This heightened burden of proof [at
disposition] is appropriate in light of the constitutionally
protected rights of parents to the care, custody and management
of the children.’” (Ma.V., at p. 24; see In re Henry V. (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 522, 530 [“Due process requires the findings
underlying the initial removal order to be based on clear and
convincing evidence.”].)

                                11
       Kaseem argues the juvenile court erred in applying a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof when it removed
the children. He is correct. At the disposition hearing the
juvenile court stated it was finding, “by a preponderance of the
evidence, the children remaining in the home of the parents
would pose a substantial danger to the children’s physical health,
safety, protection, physical and emotional wellbeing.” That is not
the right standard.
       The Department contends Kaseem forfeited his argument
the juvenile court applied the wrong standard of proof by not
objecting at the hearing. A “reviewing court ordinarily will not
consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been
but was not made in the trial court. . . . [¶] Dependency matters
are not exempt from this rule.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1287, 1293; see In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109,
1127.) However, “application of the forfeiture rule is not
automatic,” and a reviewing court may exercise its discretion to
reach an “important legal issue,” even if the issue is forfeited.
(S.B., at p. 1293.) Whether the juvenile court applied the wrong
standard before removing the children from Kareem is
sufficiently important that we will exercise our discretion to
consider the issue. (See In re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376,
385 [exercising discretion to consider a forfeited issue where “the
juvenile court applied a different standard and burden of proof,
thus altering the statutory framework that governs detention or
removal of a dependent child”]; In re Frank R. (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539 [“we are reluctant to enforce the
[forfeiture] rule when it conflicts with due process”].)

                                12
      D.     But the Juvenile Court’s Error Was Harmless
      The “erroneous application of the preponderance of the
evidence standard rather than the clear and convincing evidence
standard [is] not . . . structural error requiring automatic
reversal. Instead, the reported cases have analyzed the error
under the Watson standard and required a showing it was
reasonably probable the appellant would have achieved a more
favorable result under the proper standard of proof.”
(Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 514, 535.)
Because clear and convincing evidence supported removal, it is
not reasonably probable Kaseem would have received a more
favorable result had the juvenile court applied the correct
standard of proof.
      The juvenile court found there were no reasonable means to
prevent removal “given the unresolved domestic violence and
untreated mental health and substance abuse issues. It’s
concerning parents are still arriving to visits together, despite
their very lengthy domestic violence history.” That domestic
violence history included three reported incidents, in
October 2019, March 2022, and April 2022, the latter two of
which occurred in the presence of the children. The October 2019
incident occurred when Arkell was nine months pregnant with
Omari, and at that time Arkell told police she and Kaseem had
three previous physical altercations, making at least six known
incidents of domestic violence. In addition, Kaseem had five
interactions with law enforcement for domestic violence
predating his relationship with Arkell and had been ordered to
complete a 52-week domestic violence program.
      Despite this extensive history, Kaseem denied he had a
history of domestic violence and did not remember hitting Arkell.

                               13
Nor did Kaseem take responsibility for any of the past incidents
of domestic violence; instead, he blamed his 10-year-old son A’mir
for causing the problems that led to domestic violence between
Kaseem and Arkell and argued that, because A’mir no longer
lived with Kaseem, domestic violence was not likely to recur.
(See In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156 [denial of domestic
violence increases the risk it will recur]; see also In re Gabriel K.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“[o]ne cannot correct a problem
one fails to acknowledge”].) Kaseem’s failure to acknowledge or
address the domestic violence issue was particularly concerning
because Kaseem and Arkell continued to interact. Although
Kaseem moved out of the apartment, he did not have a
permanent home and stayed with relatives or slept in his car.
Kaseem continued to help Arkell with transportation and
purchasing food, and they arrived together for visits, even if only
one of them was visiting the children. Thus, the risk of violence
between Kaseem and Arkell (and the resulting risk of harm to
the children) remained.
      In addition to the history of domestic violence, Kaseem’s
mental health issues also supported removal. Kaseem was
diagnosed as bipolar schizophrenic, and the court ordered him to
take psychotropic medication. Kaseem stated that, although he
was in and out of psychiatric hospitals when he was younger, he
no longer had any mental health problems and did not need
medication. He also attributed his inability to remember hitting
Arkell to his mental illness. Although at the disposition hearing
Kaseem submitted a letter from a health clinic provider stating
he “does not need psychotropic medications at this time,”

                                 14
overwhelming evidence supported the juvenile court’s concern
about Kaseem’s untreated mental health issues.7
      Given Kaseem’s history of mental illness, his daily use of
marijuana, and his failure to take responsibility for his long
history of domestic violence, Kaseem has not shown that, had the
juvenile court applied the standard of proof of clear and
convincing evidence, it is reasonably probably he would have
achieved a more favorable result. Therefore, the court’s error in
applying the wrong standard was harmless.

      E.     Remand Is Required for the Department and the
             Juvenile Court To Comply with ICWA
       “ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.101 et seq.) set minimal procedural protections for state
courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing
them in foster care or adoptive homes” (In re Rylei S. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316), including “‘ask[ing] each participant “at
the commencement” of a child custody proceeding “whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child”’” (In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500,
review granted July 26, 2023, S279743; see 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a);
In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 77). California law “‘more
broadly imposes on social services agencies and juvenile courts
(but not parents) an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire”

7      The Department contends the letter did not specify the
provider’s professional capacity, but the letter in the record
contains the handwritten designation “PMHNP-BC,” an
initialism for board-certified psychiatric mental health nurse
practitioner. (See Osborne v. Colvin (D.Neb. 2015) 95 F.Supp.3d
1147, 1157.)

                                15
whether a child in the dependency proceeding “is or may be an
Indian child.”’” (J.C., at p. 77; see § 224.2, subd. (a); In re A.R.
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 237.)
        “[S]ection 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the child
protective agency to ask ‘the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and
where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’”
(In re J.C., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 77; see In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 437; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)
Although this duty is “commonly referred to as the ‘initial duty of
inquiry,’ it ‘begins with the initial contact’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and
continues throughout the dependency proceedings.” (J.C., at
p. 77; see Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) 599 U.S. 255, 266 [when a
state court adjudicates a foster care or adoption proceeding,
“ICWA governs from start to finish”]; In re Rylei S., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 319.) In addition, the “‘juvenile court “has a
responsibility to ascertain that [the child protective agency] has
conducted an adequate investigation”’ [citation], and must
determine whether ICWA applies to the child’s proceedings.”
(In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 31; see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2);
J.C., at p. 78; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3).) The court
may not “find that ICWA does not apply when the absence of
evidence that a child is an Indian child results from a [child
protective agency] inquiry that is not proper, adequate, or
demonstrative of due diligence.” (In re Josiah T. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 388, 408; see In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
1183, 1198.)

                                  16
       In the Indian Child Inquiry Attachment to the petition
(Judicial Council form ICWA-010(A)), the Department stated that
on May 4, 2022 a social worker questioned Arkell and that the
social worker had no reason to believe Omari, Kamiayah, or
Kaseem Jr. was or may be an Indian child. In its detention
report the Department stated: “The Indian Child Welfare Act
does not apply. On 05/04/22 [Arkell] verbally denied that the
children have any Indian Ancestry.” Arkell and Kaseem
completed parental notification of Indian status forms (Judicial
Council form ICWA-020), on which they indicated they had no
known Indian ancestry. At the May 31, 2022 detention hearing
the juvenile court found it had no reason to know Omari,
Kamiayah, or Kaseem Jr. was an Indian child under ICWA.
       Kaseem argues, the Department concedes, and we agree
the Department did not comply with its duty of inquiry because it
did not ask any known extended family members whether Omari,
Kamiayah, or Kaseem Jr. is or may be an Indian child. (See In re
Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 319 [“Regardless of a
parent’s response concerning his or her possible Indian ancestry
on the ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status
form, . . . section 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the agency to ask
the child, the parents, extended family members and others who
have an interest in the child whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child.” (Fn. omitted.)].) Those family members include
Arkell’s mother (whom the Department contacted about the
children’s placement); Kaseem’s sister, brother, and father; and
Arkell’s brother and father. The juvenile court also erred in
finding ICWA did not apply and in failing to ensure the
Department conducted an adequate inquiry. (See Rylei S., at
p. 320.) Therefore, we direct the juvenile court to ensure the

                                 17
Department conducts a proper inquiry. (See id. at p. 326; In re
J.K. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 498, 507.)

                         DISPOSITION

      Kaseem’s appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings is dismissed as nonjusticiable. The court’s disposition
orders removing Omari, Kamiayah, and Kaseem Jr. from Kaseem
and requiring Kaseem to submit to drug testing and, if he tests
positive or misses a test, to participate in a substance abuse
treatment program, are conditionally affirmed. The juvenile
court is directed to ensure the Department fully complies with
the inquiry and, if necessary, notice provisions of ICWA and
related California law, including inquiring about possible Indian
ancestry from extended family members.

                                    SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             FEUER, J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

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