Court Opinion

ID: 9738832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:03:53.806731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.706683
License: Public Domain

*244Black, J.
This case was regularly assigned to former Justice Adams. Prior to his leaving the bench the following opinion, which I adopt, was prepared by him and submitted to other members of the Court.
Plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile, suffered serious injuries when the car in which she was riding collided with one owned by defendant Henry Peuler, Sr., and operated by defendant Henry J. Peuler, his minor son.
The declaration alleged specific acts of negligence and violations of the motor vehicle code on the part of defendant Henry J. Peuler. Liability on the part of Henry Peuler, Sr., was claimed solely on the basis of imputation of the driver’s negligence under the ownership liability statute.
The pretrial statement indicated that the pleadings were complete and the case was at issue.
Subsequently the plaintiff procured the driving record of the minor son and thereupon moved to amend her declaration to incorporate a specific charge of actionable negligence on the part of Peuler, Sr., defendant-owner, in entrusting his vehicle to a driver known by him to be incompetent by reason of his past bad record. The court denied the motion, stating:
“I am usually of the opinion that a motion such as this, to amend the pleadings should be granted, providing it does not prejudice the rights of defendant, even though the case is at issue, and pretrial has been held. It appears that any amendment at this stage of the proceedings would usually permit opposing counsel to adequately prepare to meet the amended pleading. However, in this case, the purpose of the proposed amendment appears to be solely that of introducing a driving record which would influence the jurors’ decision in connection with the alleged negligence of defendant driver. *245■CLS 1956, § 257.731 (Stat Ann 1960 Eev § 9.2431), specifically provides that no evidence of the conviction of a driver for a violation under that chapter or of a local ordinance shall be admissible in any court in a civil action.
“The proposed amendment goes only to the liability of defendant-owner who will be liable as owner if defendant-driver was negligent in the operation of his automobile. It appears, therefore, that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is only to bring in the driving record of defendant-driver and thereby influence the jury. Since defendant has admitted that the car was being driven with the knowledge and consent of defendant-owner, the defendant-owner will be liable if defendant-driver is negligent.”
In Elliott v. A. J. Smith Contracting Co., Inc., 358 Mich 398, it was held in an action against a contracting company that the company might have been ■guilty of negligence in entrusting a motor vehicle to an employee unfit to be at the wheel. In that ■case the plaintiff was allowed to go to the jury on this theory, the action being solely against the employer and not against the employee truck driver. We do not conceive the rule there laid down to be ■confined solely to the employer-employee relationship. The negligence therein alleged might also occur between a parent and child if the child was unfit to be at the wheel. If the present action had been directed solely against the parent, and the child had not also been joined as a defendant, there would be no distinction between Elliott and this case.
The problem arises when we consider the provisions of CLS 1956, § 257.731 (Stat Ann 1960 Eev § 9.2431), which reads as follows:
“No evidence of the conviction of any person for .any violation of this chapter or of a local ordinance *246pertaining to the use of motor vehicles shall be admissible in any court in any civil action.”
Is the language of the statute so broad as to bar all evidence with regard to a driver’s past actions? We think not. The statute directs itself to “evidence of the conviction” and nothing further. Conviction implies, and, in fact, is a judgment with regard to an occurrence that has taken place. This is undoubtedly the reason for the statutory prohibition. However, the facts of past occurrences are not barred by the statute. Neither would the results flowing therefrom such as revocation of a driver’s license, Elliott v. A. J. Smith Contracting Co., Inc., supra, but only “evidence of the conviction.”
Conceivably, a whole series of past accidents or other events might be shown if they were of such a nature as to lead to the conclusion that the son was unfit to be at the wheel and the father allowed him to drive, having knowledge that this was so. Liability under such a situation is no more unusual than the liability that might result from entrusting a car to a drunken man or a loaded pistol to an infant.
"We think it clear that the prohibition of the statute is not as broad as it was construed to be by the trial judge. This is not a case where the motion to amend is denied simply because, in the opinion of the trial judge, the case has progressed so far that, as a matter of fairness, the motion should be denied. In such a situation we ordinarily would not interfere with the trial judge’s discretion. Here, however, it was conceded at the time the motion to amend was made that the case was in such a posture that the motion would ordinarily be granted. The motion was denied due tó a mistaken construction of the substantive law which led to the conclusion that the rights of one of the defendants would be prejudiced. We have seen that this is not the case. Moreover,. *247-the rights of the plaintiff were prejudiced in that the plaintiff was prevented from presenting to the jury all of his theories of the case consonant with the facts that could he developed upon trial. The trial court was in error. Its decision denying the motion to amend is vacated. The motion is granted. The matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Costs to appellant.
Kavanagh, Souris, and Otis M. Smith, JJ., concurred with Black, J.