Court Opinion

ID: 9882444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:09:55.576705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:40.045014
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Pulley, 2023-Ohio-3277.]

                                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                     :
                                                   :
       Appellee                                    :   C.A. No. 29501
                                                   :
 v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 00303
                                                   :
 CHARLES F. PULLEY                                 :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                   :   Court)
       Appellant                                   :
                                                   :

                                              ...........

                                              OPINION

                                    Rendered on September 15, 2023

                                              ...........

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ELIZABETH A. ELLIS, Attorney for Appellee

CHARLES M. BLUE, Attorney for Appellant

                                             .............

WELBAUM, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Charles F. Pulley appeals from his convictions for

murder and endangering children after being found guilty by a jury of two counts of

murder, felonious assault, two counts of endangering children, and involuntary

manslaughter. The trial court merged some offenses and sentenced Pulley to a total of
                                                                                         -2-

18 years to life in prison.

       {¶ 2} On appeal, Pulley raises nine assignments of alleged trial court error,

including: denying funds for a false confession expert; overruling a motion to suppress;

finding that Pulley knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to assistance

of counsel; excluding relevant evidence; charging the jury with an incorrect statement of

law; and sentencing Pulley for allied offenses of similar import. Pulley also contends that

the verdicts were based on insufficient evidence, that the verdicts were against the

manifest weight of the evidence, and that cumulative errors occurred, requiring reversal.

       {¶ 3} After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in

rejecting funding for a false confession expert. No reasonable probability existed that an

expert would have aided Pulley’s defense, and Pulley did not receive an unfair trial

because he lacked assistance of such an expert. The trial court also did not err in

overruling Pulley’s motion to suppress, as Pulley knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

spoke with police and there was no evidence of coercion.            Furthermore, no error

occurred concerning Pulley’s waiver of assistance of counsel. The trial court thoroughly

explained the dangers associated with this decision and held many status hearings to

discuss Pulley’s situation. Moreover, Pulley waived or abandoned his request for self-

representation by asking standby counsel to assume representation after opening

statements ended.

       {¶ 4} We further find that the trial court did not commit error in refusing to admit

text messages between Pulley and the murdered child’s mother. Pulley invited any error

because he knew of these texts when they occurred but failed to mention them until the
                                                                                         -3-

State had nearly finished its case. Pulley’s complaint about jury instructions defining

“acting recklessly” lacks merit as well. While the court used an outdated instruction

reflecting the law before an amendment, the prior law actually imposed a higher burden

on the prosecution. Pulley, therefore, was not prejudiced.

       {¶ 5} The trial court also did not err in refusing to merge one charge of child

endangering with the other offenses as an allied offense of similar import. The offenses

were not allied, as they were committed during separate events and the harm caused

was separate and identifiable.      In addition, Pulley’s convictions were supported by

sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Two

prosecution experts testified as to the injuries and cause of the victim’s death, and Pulley

admitted that he had injured the victim. The State did not have to identify the precise

way in which Pulley injured the child; instead, it could rely on circumstantial evidence,

which was abundant.

       {¶ 6} Trial counsel also did not render ineffective assistance by failing to subpoena

the victim’s mother or to call others to authenticate the text messages. Again, Pulley

invited the situation by failing to disclose information to his attorney until the trial had

nearly ended. Further, the record lacks any evidence about the basis of the decisions

whether to recall the mother or to call other witnesses. Such decisions could have been

based on trial strategy, which appellate courts will not second-guess. Finally, because

no error occurred, there is no basis for finding cumulative error.        Accordingly, the

judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
                                                                                       -4-

                          I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

      {¶ 7} The charges against Pulley arose from the death of a six-week-old child,

A.G., who allegedly sustained injuries while Pulley babysat her on August 19 and 20,

2020. At the time, A.G.’s mother (“Mother”) was dating Pulley, who was not A.G.’s father.

      {¶ 8} Mother gave birth to A.G. on July 20, 2020, and the baby was healthy at birth.

At the time, Mother was nearly 18 years old, and A.G.’s biological father chose not to be

involved with the child. When A.G. was four or five weeks old, Mother needed to return

to work for financial reasons, and Pulley offered to care for A.G.          Transcript of

Proceedings (Jury Trial) (“Trial Tr.”), p. 373, 377, 379, 382, 392, 394-395, 396, and 397.

Pulley lived in West Carrollton, Ohio, with his mother, had been around A.G. frequently,

and had fed and cared for A.G. often at Mother’s house.         As a result, Mother felt

comfortable leaving A.G. with Pulley. Pulley’s house was only five or six miles away from

the Kroger where Mother worked, so Mother would be available if Pulley needed anything.

Id. at 374, 391-393, 397, and 399.

      {¶ 9} On August 19, 2020, Mother and A.G. rode the bus to McDonald’s and Pulley

picked them up there. They went to his apartment and then to GameStop so Pulley could

pick up a new video game. Pulley dropped Mother off at work around 2:00 p.m. He

was going to watch A.G. from 2:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. that day. Id. at 398-399.

      {¶ 10} When Mother left A.G. with Pulley, A.G. was perfectly fine. A.G. had no

injuries, bruises, lacerations, or contusions. If Mother had any concerns, she would have

told Pulley. Id. at 399-400. During the day, Mother texted with Pulley about how A.G.

was doing. Her impression from this was that nothing had occurred; she was not led to
                                                                                      -5-

believe A.G. needed help or that she needed to help Pulley with A.G.’s care. Id. at 403-

404. That evening, Pulley dropped A.G. off at Kroger because Mother’s step-father was

going to pick her up from work. Mother did not look in the car seat since A.G. was

sleeping. It was also dark outside. When Mother got home, took A.G. out of the seat,

and went to bathe her, she saw bruises on both sides of A.G.’s head. Id. at 405-406.

The bruises were long, across A.G.’s whole forehead to her temple. Mother called Pulley

and asked if he had dropped something on A.G.’s head or had dropped her. However,

Pulley said that nothing had happened; he stated that maybe A.G. had hit her head on

the car seat while Mother was on her way home. Mother was not aware that anything

like that had happened. Id. at 406.

      {¶ 11} When Mother got A.G. out of her bath, A.G. was a little bit fussy. Mother

just thought A.G. had a headache, and A.G. wasn’t showing any signs of being really hurt.

Mother gave A.G. some Children’s Tylenol and fed her. A.G. ate fine and slept well all

night. Trial Tr. at 407-408. The bruises worried Mother a little bit. Id. at 409. On the

morning of August 20, 2020, A.G. woke up well and ate fine. Mother was getting ready

for work and had to be there at 1:00 p.m. Pulley offered to watch A.G. again. Id. at 421.

Everything was normal with A.G. that morning, and she was not fussy. Mother still

observed the bruises on A.G.    At the time, Mother felt comfortable taking A.G. back to

Pulley, because she thought the car seat had to have caused the injury. Id. at 422.

      {¶ 12} That day, Mother had her car, so she drove A.G. to Pulley’s house. She

left A.G. there, ran to get diapers and food from McDonald’s, and came back. Mother

was supposed to work that day from 1:00 to 9:00 p.m. When Mother left for work, A.G.
                                                                                        -6-

was eating and sleeping fine. Id. at 423-425. Pulley was the only one Mother saw at

the apartment either day; Pulley’s mother was not home. Id. at 424.     After Mother had

been at work for only four or five hours, Pulley texted her and said A.G. was “out of it.”

Id. at 425. Pulley then sent Mother a picture, and she rushed over to pick up A.G. and

take her to the hospital. Before that, Mother and Pulley had texted; they communicated

less than the day before, but the conversation was normal. Id.

       {¶ 13} When Mother arrived, Pulley was holding A.G., and A.G.’s arms were

straight out and would not stay down. Id. at 427. Mother had never seen A.G. like that

before. Id. at 429. No one else was there other than Pulley and A.G., and A.G. was not

really responsive. Id. at 430. Mother then rushed A.G. to the hospital, which took about

10 minutes. When Mother walked into the hospital, A.G. was actively seizing. Id. at

431.

       {¶ 14} Hospital personnel rushed A.G. away and intubated her.          When they

finished, they took Mother to another room to talk to a social worker. Mother did not see

A.G. from around 6:00 p.m. until around 3:00 a.m. Trial Tr. at 432-433. Pulley texted

her to see how A.G. was, and she asked him what had happened. Pulley did not tell her

anything; he said he did not know. Id. at 433.    Mother stayed at the hospital until A.G.

died on August 23, 2020. Id. at 434-435.

       {¶ 15} A day or two before A.G. died, Pulley told Mother that the bruises on A.G.’s

head on August 19, 2020, had been caused by him dropping his phone on her head; he

also said A.G. had rolled off the couch. Furthermore, Pulley told Mother that on August

20, 2020, he had been dancing with A.G. and had tripped and hit her head on the
                                                                                        -7-

doorframe. Mother reported that to the police. Id. at 435-436.       On Saturday, August

22, 2020, Pulley came to the hospital to apologize. All he said was that he was sorry

and that it was not supposed to happen. Id. at 437. After that, Mother blocked Pulley

from contacting her because she did not want to talk to him. Id. at 438.

      {¶ 16} On August 20, 2022, Dr. Jonathan Thackery, a child abuse pediatrician and

the chief medical officer of population health at Dayton Children’s Hospital (“DCH”) was

the on-call pediatrician. Id. at 299-300 and 308-309. When A.G. was brought to DCH,

there was a concern about child abuse, and Dr. Thackery was asked to evaluate A.G.

due to the severity of her injuries. Id. at 309. When A.G. arrived at DCH, she was

actively seizing and had a variety of symptoms and signs consistent with it. A.G. was

sedated and a breathing tube was inserted. A.G. was then transferred to intensive care

in extremely critical condition and would have died within a short time without medical

intervention. Id. at 314-315.

      {¶ 17} A CAT scan revealed swelling throughout the brain tissue, a subdural

hemorrhage, a complex fracture of the left parietal skull, with multiple fractures, and

bruising of a large majority of A.G.’s scalp. Trial Tr. at 316. According to Dr. Thackery,

the injuries indicated a severe amount of force, not the kind where a child rolls off a bed

or is dropped by a caregiver; children in motor vehicle accidents who are restrained do

not show that kind of injury. Id. at 317. With this degree of injury, something would have

been clearly wrong immediately, causing vomiting, unconsciousness, stopped breathing,

seizure, or any combination of these symptoms. Id. at 318. The injuries and the child’s

response would be immediately apparent to a caregiver. Id. at 319. The doctor noted
                                                                                          -8-

that there were multiple facial impacts as well as a complete skull fracture of the left side

of the skull, which could have been a single impact point accounting for a lot of injury.

The doctor believed there were multiple impacts over time. Id. at 320.

       {¶ 18} Treatment was focused on maintaining A.G.’s blood pressure and breathing

and trying to treat brain swelling that can lead to death. Id. at 320-321. A cell phone

falling three or four feet onto A.G.’s head would not have caused that level of injury, nor

would the injuries have been caused by a child falling from a standard sized couch onto

the floor or a person dancing, swinging with the baby and striking a door frame, or any

type of routine care or accidental injury. Id. at 322. The injuries were consistent with

child abuse. Id. at 338. Dr. Thackery stated he “would expect the same constellation

of injuries in a severe highly traumatic incident.” Id. at 338-339.

       {¶ 19} On August 20, 2020, West Carrollton patrol officer Michael Holtrup was

called to DCH about the incident involving A.G. Detective Lawson also came to the

hospital. After they spoke with Mother, she gave them permission to take photos of a

text chain between Mother and Pulley, which included photos of A.G. Id. at 479, 481,

and 483-484. Holtrup and Lawson then went to Pulley’s home. Id. at 484. Holtrup

waited outside and eventually transported Pulley to the police station, where the

investigation continued in an interview room. Id. at 485-486.

       {¶ 20} Det. Lawson read Pulley Miranda warnings before the interview, and Pulley

signed a form waiving his rights and agreeing to talk to the police. Trial Tr. at 500 and

504. During the interview, Pulley gave inconsistent stories about what had occurred

during the two days he babysat. First, he said that nothing had happened the first day
                                                                                           -9-

and that A.G. did not have any bruises when she left his care.               Id. at 512-513.

Regarding the second day, Pulley relayed a convoluted story about various times A.G.

was fed and slept, and then would not eat, was stiff, and kept looking to the right. Id. at

514-518. Pulley denied causing any injury to A.G. Id. at 519.

       {¶ 21} Later in the interview, Pulley stated that on the first day, he had placed a

game controller on the couch and went to make A.G. a bottle. At the time, A.G. was on

the floor. The controller fell off the couch and hit A.G., causing bruises on the front and

side of her head. Id. at 521 and 524. Pulley then told the police that on the second day,

he did not have A.G. properly placed while they slept on the couch. As a result, A.G. fell

off the couch feet first, hit the back of her head, and started screaming very loudly. Id.

at 526-528. When Det. Lawson stated that due to its extent, the injury could not have

happened that way, Pulley said that A.G. may have fallen on his speaker or some metal

boxes because he had a lot of things scattered across the floor. Id. at 530-531.

       {¶ 22} Pulley also wrote out a statement for the police. Id. at 545-546 and State’s

Ex. 49. In the written statement, Pulley said that on the first day, he went to take a picture

of A.G. and dropped his phone on her. A few hours later, A.G. fell out of his hands onto

the floor causing a bruise to the side of her face. Id. at 547. On the second day, when

he was playing with A.G., he did a spin with her in his hands and accidentally hit the left

back side of her head. Id.

       {¶ 23} At that point, the police returned to Pulley’s home so he could reenact what

had occurred. The police also took photos, including the door jamb that A.G.’s head

allegedly struck. Trial Tr. at 548-449 and 552, and State’s Exs. 41 and 43. The police
                                                                                        -10-

took videos of Pulley’s demonstrations of having the baby in his arms and dropping a cell

phone on the baby, falling asleep on the couch and the baby’s falling, and holding the

baby and spinning into the door jamb. Trial Tr. at 553. During these demonstrations,

Pulley did not show that he had dropped a controller on A.G.’s head. Id. at 556. Det.

Lawson counted nine or 10 different explanations of how A.G. was injured. Id. at 556-

557. After the demonstrations ended, Det. Lawson went back to DCH and found that

A.G. was still in critical condition. Pulley was not arrested that night. Id. at 559.

       {¶ 24} On August 21, 2020, Pulley went to work at Kroger (where he and Mother

both worked). Pulley texted S.W., who was a Kroger supervisor for both Mother and

Pulley, and asked if S.W. had heard about Mother and her baby. Id. at 341-344. S.W.

asked Pulley to step outside, and Pulley told her in detail what had happened. Id. at 345.

Pulley stated that he had been babysitting A.G. for Mother while she worked, and A.G.

had been extremely fussy. Pulley could not calm A.G. down, so he had danced with her,

trying to soothe her. A.G. had been wrapped in his arms. Pulley said he kind of got

dizzy, tripped over his feet, and hit the back of A.G.’s head on the refrigerator. Pulley

demonstrated it. Id. at 346. Later the same day, they discussed the incident again, and

Pulley mentioned it was a door frame instead of a refrigerator. Id. at 347.

       {¶ 25} The following evening, S.W. got Pulley’s address and went to his home to

talk to him. Something did not sit right, and she thought she might obtain more detail in

an environment that was not professional. Id. at 349. At that time, Pulley was very quiet

and upset and there was not much interaction. All Pulley said was that he had not told

S.W. everything, that he was not able to get everything out, and that he did not know how
                                                                                          -11-

to tell Mother what had happened. Id. at 350.

        {¶ 26} Det. Lawson was informed on August 23, 2020 that A.G. had died, but the

police did not receive the full autopsy report until the end of January or very early February

2021.    No one was arrested in the interim.       Trial Tr. at 560-561.    Dr. Castiglione-

Richmond (“Dr. Richmond”), a forensic pathologist with the Montgomery County

Coroner’s Office, and her supervisor, Dr. Castro, performed A.G.’s autopsy. Id. at 248-

249 and 253. During the autopsy, Dr. Richmond noted bruises on the right side of the

forehead and over the eye on the left side. These bruises were separate and distinct

and were not part of one large injury. Id. at 260-261.

        {¶ 27} Dr. Richmond also observed an abrasion or some sort of scrape mark on

the back of A.G.’s head and shaved the head to better visualize it. A little bit on the right,

almost in the middle of the back of the head, was a big bruise associated with the scrape

mark. The scrape mark was part of a larger injury, and the injury had been potentially

caused by blunt force trauma.       Id. at 262-265. A.G. also had the following interior

injuries: bruising of all of the anterior scalp; bruising of the temporalis muscles on each

side of the head; bruising of the posterior part of the scalp on the right side; and bruises

almost all one unit involving the entire scalp. Id. at 265-269. The bruises were layered

one upon another and there were multiple impact points. Id. at 268.

        {¶ 28} The bruising on the left scalp was quite extensive, and on the left side, the

doctor was beginning to see a skull fracture. The fracture was linear, with fractures

radiating outward from it. For a fracture of this nature to occur, an excessive amount of

force would have had to be applied. Id. at 269-270. Dr. Richmond equated the force
                                                                                           -12-

with events like a child falling from a multi-story building or a motor vehicle collision. This

fracture in particular would have caused significant internal brain injury, i.e., “extensive

and diffuse catastrophic injuries,” meaning the injuries were not compatible with life. Id.

at 271-272. With an injury of this magnitude, the baby would cry, and neurological

compromises would develop within minutes, including seizures, where the body would

shake or be nonresponse to external stimuli, and sometimes the eyes would be deviated.

Id. at 272-273.

       {¶ 29} According to the doctor, A.G., at six weeks, was too young to cause these

injuries to herself.   She had no injuries or broken bones below the neck and was

otherwise healthy. Trial Tr. at 277-278. The doctor stated that the cause of death was

blunt force trauma, and the manner of death was homicide. Id. at 288-289. In addition,

the doctor watched the videos the police had made of Pulley’s various explanations of

how A.G. was injured and found they did not explain the extent of her injuries.

       {¶ 30} On February 4, 2021, an indictment was filed charging Pulley with the

following crimes: murder (proximate result), an unclassified felony; felonious assault

(serious harm), a second-degree felony; murder (proximate cause), an unclassified

felony; endangering children (serious physical harm), a second-degree felony;

manslaughter, a first-degree felony; and endangering children (parent-serious harm), a

third-degree felony.

       {¶ 31} After Pulley pled not guilty, the court imposed a $1,000,000 surety bond.

The court initially appointed counsel, but Pulley then retained private counsel.           On

February 22, 2021, defense counsel acknowledged receipt of the State’s discovery
                                                                                           -13-

packet, which contained a flash drive of various items, including “Cell Phone

Examinations – 20-123 and 20-124,” and “Cell Phone – texts/pics.” On February 23,

2021, counsel filed a motion to suppress any statements Pulley had made, and the motion

was set for hearing on March 26, 2021. The court also set a trial date of September 13,

2021.

        {¶ 32} On August 10, 2021, Pulley filed a motion for an order authorizing a

confession expert to interview Pulley at the State’s expense. The State then provided

supplemental     discovery    (a   supplemental    post-mortem      exam    report   of   Drs.

Castro/Richmond) to Pulley on August 19, 2021, and Pulley then moved to continue the

trial based on the need to decide if an expert was needed for the new discovery. On

September 16, 2021, Pulley filed an addendum to his motion, seeking funds for the

confession expert and for an expert medical witness on A.G.’s injuries and cause of death.

        {¶ 33} At a September 17, 2021 hearing, the court orally overruled the motion for

a confession expert and said it would take the medical expert request under

consideration. The court set a new trial date for December 20, 2021.

        {¶ 34} On September 22, 2021, the court filed an order allowing Pulley $4,000 for

expert assistance by a forensic pathologist. The same day, the court formally overruled

the motion for a confession expert and the suppression motion. A few days before the

December 2021 trial date, Pulley filed a pro se “motion to dismiss/drop” the murder

charge. Attached to the motion were numerous IRS and Uniform Commercial Code

forms listing the trial court judge, common pleas court, prosecutors, and so forth as

fiduciaries and “assignors”; an “affidavit of truth of autochthonous private protected civilian
                                                                                         -14-

status” signed by Pulley; various documents from the Ohio Secretary of State concerning

a “Charles Francis Pulley Trust”; and a power of attorney allegedly signed by Pulley.

       {¶ 35} On December 17, 2021, Pulley’s attorney signed for further discovery from

the State regarding 38 pages of “CCH’s” for several State witnesses. Then, on the day

of trial, Pulley’s attorney filed a motion for continuance because Pulley wished to

represent himself. The court continued the matter to January 13, 2022. Prior to that

time, the court filed an order striking Pulley’s pro se motion and exhibits from the record.

However, Pulley filed additional pro se materials before the January 13 hearing.

       {¶ 36} The court held a waiver of right to counsel hearing on January 13, 2022,

during which the court advised Pulley of his rights and the consequences of representing

himself. See Transcript of Proceedings (Motion to Suppress, Waiver of Right to Counsel,

Status Hearing (“Pre-Trial Tr. 1”), 43-78.   During the hearing, Pulley signed a waiver of

his right to counsel, and the court also let Pulley’s counsel withdraw. Id. at 75-77. The

written waiver was filed the same day, and the court filed an entry on January 14, 2022,

allowing the withdraw of counsel. The court then appointed stand-by counsel for Pulley

and held a status hearing on February 15, 2022.

       {¶ 37} During this hearing (at which standby counsel, Mr. Baldwin, was present),

the court said it would hold status hearings around every three weeks because Pulley

was proceeding pro se. Id. at 79. At that time, the State said it had given full discovery

to Pulley’s prior counsel and had now also given full discovery to Baldwin, Pulley’s

conduit. Id. at 81-82. At that time, Baldwin agreed that he had received full discovery

from the State. Baldwin also said that some discovery was electronic and some was
                                                                                        -15-

paper, that he had met with Pulley, who did not want to keep a copy at the jail, and that

he had offered to meet with Pulley whenever Pulley wished to review discovery. Id. at

83. In addition, Pulley stated that he had told Baldwin he would contact him when he

needed the discovery. Id. at 83-84.

       {¶ 38} During this hearing, the court also addressed a motion Pulley had filed on

February 9, 2022, seeking full discovery. Id. at 84-85. Pulley stated at the hearing that

he was not able to say what was missing and would have to go through the discovery to

find out. Id. at 86. The court advised Pulley that he would have to be able to provide a

complete list of what was missing at the next status hearing. Id. During the hearing,

the court asked Baldwin if he had reviewed the discovery and would be prepared to

proceed with trial if Pulley decided not to represent himself. Baldwin said that was

correct. Id. at 90-91.

       {¶ 39} A further status hearing was held on March 3, 2022. In the interim, Pulley

had filed several motions. At the hearing, the court stated that any further motions would

have to be filed by March 31, 2022. Pre-Trial Tr. 1 at 101. Due to Pulley’s repeated

failure to respond to questions that were asked, the court said another hearing would be

held on Pulley’s waiver of the right to counsel. Id. at 105.

       {¶ 40} On April 4, 2022, the court held another status conference. At that time,

the court provided Pulley with an initial draft of the jury instructions and stated Baldwin

would also be given a copy. Transcript of Proceedings (Status Conference) (“Status

Tr.”), 3. During this hearing, Pulley reiterated that he wanted to continue to represent

himself. Id. at 8.
                                                                                          -16-

       {¶ 41} The final pretrial was held on May 9, 2022. At that time, the court again

discussed with Pulley if he wished to continue representing himself, and Pulley said he

did. Id. at 23-26. The court also confirmed that standby counsel was prepared to go

forward if Pulley requested. Id. at 24. Before trial, Pulley filed more motions, including

a motion requesting discovery (on May 16, 2022), and a motion to disqualify the trial judge

(on May 20, 2022). The court denied the latter motion the first day of trial and followed

that with a written decision. Trial Tr. at 112-113, and Order and Entry Overruling Motion

for Disqualification (May 24, 2022).

       {¶ 42} After Pulley failed to pose any questions to jurors during voir dire or to make

an opening statement, the court again asked Pulley if he wanted to continue to represent

himself. Trial Tr. at 236. Pulley then elected to have Baldwin represent him, and the

trial proceeded in that fashion.       During trial, Pulley filed a pro se affidavit of

disqualification, again attempting to have the trial judge recuse, and this matter was

denied as well. See Decision Order and Entry Overruling Affidavit of Charles F. Pulley

III for Disqualification and Recusal (May 26, 2022), and Trial Tr. at 596.

       {¶ 43} Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found Pulley guilty of all

offenses as charged. During sentencing, the court merged the first five offenses, and

the State elected to have Pulley sentenced for murder, which resulted in a mandatory

prison term of fifteen years to life.     The court found that the remaining offense,

endangering children (parent-serious harm), did not merge, and it sentenced Pulley to a

three-year term on that charge to be served consecutively to the murder sentence. This

timely appeal followed.
                                                                                        -17-

                          II. Denial of Motion for Expert Funds

       {¶ 44} Pulley’s first assignment of error states that:

              The Trial Court Violated Appellant’s Due Process in Violation of His

       Rights by Denying His Motion for Funds to Obtain a False Confessions

       Expert at State Expense.

       {¶ 45} Under this assignment of error, Pulley contends that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying his request for a confession expert because he had demonstrated

a reasonable probability that the expert would aid in his defense. In denying the request

for expert funds, the court found that Pulley had “failed to make a particularized showing

of a reasonability probability that the requested expert would aid in his defense, and that

denial of the requested expert assistance would result in an unfair trial.” Decision, Order

and Entry Overruling Motion for Expert Assistance of Confession Expert (Sept. 22, 2021),

p. 3. The court further found that due to the existence of audio and video recordings of

Pulley’s statements, assessing reliability was not beyond the jury’s knowledge or

expertise. Id. at p. 4.

       {¶ 46} We have previously distinguished between voluntariness of confessions,

which trial judges decide, and reliability of confessions, which is a jury issue. State v.

Stringham, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2002-CA-9, 2003-Ohio-1100, ¶ 28. In that case, the

defendant claimed the trial court had erred in excluding testimony from an expert on false

confessions. Id. We agreed with the trial court that the confession had been voluntary

and had not been the result of a Miranda violation. Id. at ¶ 26. However, on the issue
                                                                                         -18-

of the expert’s exclusion, we commented that:

              “The manner in which a statement was extracted is, of course,

      relevant to the purely legal question of its voluntariness, a question most,

      but not all, States assign to the trial judge alone to resolve. But the physical

      and psychological environment that yielded the confession can also be of

      substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of the defendant's guilt or

      innocence. Confessions, even those that have been found to be voluntary,

      are not conclusive of guilt. And, as with any other part of the prosecutor's

      case, a confession may be shown to be ‘insufficiently corroborated or

      otherwise ... unworthy of belief.’ Indeed, stripped of the power to describe

      to the jury the circumstances that prompted his confession, the defendant

      is effectively disabled from answering the one question every rational juror

      needs answered: If the defendant is innocent, why did he previously admit

      his guilt? Accordingly, regardless of whether the defendant marshaled the

      same evidence earlier in support of an unsuccessful motion to suppress,

      and entirely independent of any question of voluntariness, a defendant's

      case may stand or fall on his ability to convince the jury that the manner in

      which the confession was obtained casts doubt on its credibility.”

Id. at ¶ 29, quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688-689, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d

636 (1986).

      {¶ 47} We further noted Crane’s observation that “ ‘[w]hether rooted directly in the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or
                                                                                          -19-

Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” ’ ” Id. at ¶ 31,

quoting Crane at 690. Thus, “ ‘[t]hat opportunity would be an empty one if the State were

permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a

confession when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence.’ ” Id.

Because the trial court in Stringham had excluded the expert’s testimony solely on the

basis of voluntariness while reliability was central to the defense, we found the trial court

had erred. Id. at ¶ 42.

       {¶ 48} Notable differences exist here, however. First, unlike the case before us,

Stringham involved exclusion of expert testimony at trial, after the defense first questioned

the expert outside the jury’s presence to decide admissibility. The trial court initially

found much of the testimony admissible, then changed its mind on reconsideration. At

that point, the defense made a detailed proffer of the testimony. The testimony included

analysis of the particular defendant. Id. at ¶ 26-27. Here, in contrast, no expert affidavit

was submitted, nor did Pulley submit a proffer. As will be noted, only general statements

were made.

       {¶ 49} More importantly, the issue here differed, as it concerned whether the trial

court was required to pay for expert testimony. In this context, a defendant’s rights are

more limited. “Due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, requires

that an indigent criminal defendant be provided funds to obtain expert assistance at state

expense only where the trial court finds, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that the
                                                                                        -20-

defendant has made a particularized showing (1) of a reasonable probability that the

requested expert would aid in his defense, and (2) that denial of the requested expert

assistance would result in an unfair trial.” State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 144-145,

694 N.E.2d 932 (1998), syllabus, approving and following State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d

277, 533 N.E.2d 682 (1988).

       {¶ 50} “In making this determination, the court must consider ‘(1) the effect on the

defendant's private interest in the accuracy of the trial if the requested service is not

provided, (2) the burden on the government's interest if the service is provided, and (3)

the probable value of the additional service and the risk of error in the proceeding if the

assistance is not provided.’ ” State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 327, 738 N.E.2d

1178 (2000), quoting Mason at 149. “A defendant must show not just a mere possibility

but a reasonable probability that an expert would aid in his defense.” State v. Maxwell,

139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 223, citing Broom at 283.

       {¶ 51} Since the matter was within the trial court’s sound discretion, we review for

abuse of discretion. Mason at 150. An abuse of discretion “ ‘implies that the court's

attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Blakemore

v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).              However, “most

instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable,

rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River

Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597

(1990). Decisions are unreasonable if they are not supported by a sound reasoning

process. Id.
                                                                                          -21-

       {¶ 52} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held it “axiomatic” that “ ‘[n]o court - not a

trial court, not an appellate court, nor even a supreme court - has the authority, within its

discretion, to commit an error of law.’ ” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-

Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 38, quoting State v. Boles, 187 Ohio App.3d 345, 2010-

Ohio-278, 932 N.E.2d 345, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).           Accord State v. Kocevar, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 29483, 2023-Ohio-1513, ¶ 24.1

       {¶ 53} Having reviewed the record, we find no abuse of discretion on the trial

court’s part with respect to refusing to pay for an expert. First, the motion seeking an

expert in confessions did not state any specific reason why such an expert was needed,

other than counsel’s belief (without explanation) that she had “probable cause to suspect

that utilization of this particular expert will produce exculpatory evidence.” Motion for

Expert Assistance of Confessions Expert, p. 2. This is not a particularized showing; in

fact, there was no particularity. Furthermore, nothing substantive was presented in the

addendum that Pulley later filed, other than generalized statements such as “[w]ithout an

expert, the Defendant will be unable to have any testimony regarding the kinds of

situations that often result in false confessions,” and that without an expert in that field,

1 This is contrary to the State’s assertion that an abuse of discretion is “more than an

error of judgment, but instead demonstrates ‘perversity of will, passion, prejudice,
partiality, or moral delinquency.’ ” State’s Brief, p. 8, quoting Pons v. Ohio State Med.
Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993). To the extent the State is equating
an “error of judgment” with an “error of law” (while attempting to avoid using the
discredited term “more than an error of law”), the Supreme Court clearly stated in Johnson
that trial courts are not free to make errors of law. A “judgment” is synonymous with a
“ruling” or holding,” i.e., a legal decision. See https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/judgment (accessed August 8, 2023). Furthermore, a lack of sound reasoning
does not require perversity of will, prejudice, moral delinquency, and so forth. A trial
court decision can be based on unsound reasoning without demonstrating these
characteristics.
                                                                                       -22-

“Defendant’s trial will be unfair.”   Addendum to Motion for Expert Assistance, p. 2.

Nothing was added in the way of specifics during the motions hearing. See Transcript

of Proceedings (Motions Hearing, Final Pre-Trial Conference) (“Pre-Trial Tr. 2”), 5.

These are general comments about possibilities, not about reasonable probabilities. In

addition, there was no showing that Pulley would receive an unfair trial without such

assistance.

       {¶ 54} Having reviewed the record, we find no basis for concluding that exculpatory

evidence existed, that there was a reasonable probability that a confession expert would

have aided Pulley’s defense, or that Pulley received an unfair trial because he did not

have the assistance of such an expert. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is

overruled.

                                 III. Motion to Suppress

       {¶ 55} Pulley’s second assignment of error states that:

              The Trial Court Erred in Overruling the Appellant’s Motion to

       Suppress.

       {¶ 56} Under the second assignment of error, Pulley contends that the trial court

erred in denying his motion to suppress because it did not consider the totality of the

circumstances, like his lack of experience with law enforcement, his lack of a criminal

history, his age, and his mental state. According to Pulley, he had been barely over 18

years of age, had been emotionally distraught and inexperienced with law enforcement,

and the police had taken advantage of his emotional state.
                                                                                           -23-

       {¶ 57} In its decision, the trial court noted that it had viewed the videos of Pulley's

interviews with the police. The court found that Pulley had not been in custody when he

spoke with police, that Miranda warnings were administered anyway, and that, under the

totality of the circumstances, Pulley had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived

those rights. Decision, Order and Entry Overruling Motion to Suppress (Sept. 22, 2021)

("Suppression Dec."), p. 6. After considering the totality of the circumstances, the court

also found that Pulley's statements to police had been voluntarily made, that he had not

been unduly influenced to talk or in distress, and that he had willingly conversed with the

police. Id. at p. 7-8.

       {¶ 58} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier

of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the

credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting these

facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference

to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d

71, ¶ 8.

       {¶ 59} “[W]hether a confession is voluntary and whether a suspect has been

subjected to custodial interrogation so as to require Miranda warnings are analytically

separate issues.” Stringham, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2002-CA-9, 2003-Ohio-1100, at ¶ 10,

citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000),
                                                                                         -24-

and State v. Chase, 55 Ohio St.2d 237, 246, 378 N.E.2d 1064 (1978). “While voluntary

waiver and voluntary confession are separate issues, the same test is used to determine

both, i.e., whether the action was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.”

State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844 (1988). Accord State v. Graham,

136 Ohio St.3d 125, 2013-Ohio-2114, 991 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 24; State v. Smith, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 24264, 2011-Ohio-3288, ¶ 20. “To determine whether a valid waiver

occurred, we ‘consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and

prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of

interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of

threat or inducement.’ ” State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, 999

N.E.2d 557, ¶ 35, quoting State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976),

paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶ 60} “However, the use of an inherently coercive tactic by police is a prerequisite

to a finding of involuntariness.” State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179,

920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 71, citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93

L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).       As a result, courts “need not assess the totality of the

circumstances” unless they “first find that the detectives used a coercive tactic.” Id.,

citing State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 472, 739 N.E.2d 749 (2001). Coercive police

tactics include “physical abuse, threats, or deprivation of food, medical treatment, or

sleep.” Wesson at ¶ 35.

       {¶ 61} Here, Miranda warnings were not required because Pulley was not in

custody. Nonetheless, the police did provide Pulley with the warnings. “Even when
                                                                                         -25-

Miranda warnings are not required, a confession may be involuntary and subject to

exclusion if, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's will was overborne

by the circumstances surrounding the giving of his confession.” State v. Kelly, 2d Dist.

Greene No. 2004-CA-20, 2005-Ohio-305, ¶ 11, citing Dickerson at 434. “The State must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's confession is voluntary.”

State v. Knight, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2004-CA-35, 2008-Ohio-4926, ¶ 107, citing Lego v.

Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972).

       {¶ 62} As a preliminary point, the trial court did specifically say it had considered

the totality of the circumstances. Suppression Dec. at p. 6. While the court did not

specifically mention Pulley’s age (18), the court said there was no evidence in the record

that Pulley was naïve. Id. In evaluating the court’s decision, we have reviewed the

suppression transcript as well as all the interview videos.

       {¶ 63} The evidence elicited at the suppression hearing indicates that Detective

Lawson had been with the West Carrollton Police Department for 18 years. Pretrial Tr.

1 at 6-7. After being summoned to DCH on August 20, 2020, Lawson spent several

hours there investigating. He learned from Mother that Pulley had watched A.G. on the

19th and 20th of August. He and several officers then went to Pulley’s home to talk about

the incident. Id. at 8-10. When they arrived, Lawson told Pulley that he wanted to talk

with him, and they explained to Pulley’s mother why they were there. Pulley then agreed

to go to the police station. Pulley was not in custody, nor was he in handcuffs. Id. at

11.

       {¶ 64} The police transported Pulley to the station, as he did not have a ride.
                                                                                       -26-

When they arrived, Lawson took Pulley into an interview room.         The interview was

recorded and the process began around 1:30 a.m. Id. at 11-14. Pulley was not in

handcuffs, the door was not locked, and Pulley could have left at any time. Lawson then

read Pulley’s rights to him, asking if he understood them. Pulley initialed each right and

signed the rights form. At the time, Pulley had completed 12 years of school, including

four years of high school. Id. at 14-16. Lawson asked Pulley if he was under the

influence of anything and if he knew why he was there. Pulley said he understood why

he was there and was not under the influence of any substance. Id. at 15-16. After

Pulley completed the form, he agreed to speak with Lawson. Id. at 17.

      {¶ 65} The actual interview began around 1:40 a.m. Lawson did not see any

signs of intoxication or that Pulley was under the influence of anything. Pulley spoke and

understood the English language, was oriented to time and place, never indicated he was

confused or unable to proceed, did not invoke any rights, and did not ask for a lawyer.

Id. at 19-21. The interview lasted about an hour, and then Pulley spent 15-20 minutes

writing out a statement. Pulley was given an opportunity to use the restroom and was

given a bottle of water at the beginning of the interview. Id. at 21. The police did not

threaten Pulley nor did they make any promises. Id. at 24.

      {¶ 66} After the interview, the police went to Pulley’s home, where Pulley

voluntarily demonstrated how he injured A.G. Again, at no time did Pulley invoke any

Miranda rights or ask for an attorney, nor did the police make any promises or threaten

him. Id. at 25-26 and 28.

      {¶ 67} The interview videos also show no evidence of police coercion. During the
                                                                                          -27-

interviews, the police were cordial and Pulley did not appear to be confused or incapable

of understanding what was occurring at any time. At the very end of the interview, after

admitting that he had injured A.G. on two separate days and after writing a statement,

Pulley appeared to be slightly upset (although it was somewhat difficult to tell, as his head

was bowed). Given that A.G. was in critical condition and that Pulley had injured her,

distress would be normal. Pulley did not appear upset or in any emotional state when

he subsequently showed the police (at his home) how A.G.’s injuries were caused.

       {¶ 68} In any event, the trial court’s decision was supported by competent, credible

evidence, and the facts satisfied the pertinent legal standards. Accordingly, the second

assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.

                      IV. Waiver of Right to Assistance of Counsel

       {¶ 69} Pulley’s third assignment of error states as follows:

              The Trial Court Erred in Finding Appellant Made a Knowing,

       Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver of His Right to Assistance of Counsel.

       {¶ 70} Under this assignment of error, Pulley argues that the trial court erred in

accepting his waiver of counsel because he filed motions with the court that were

nonsensical and also demonstrated during various hearings that he did not understand

the legal process, made irrational statements like saying that he wanted a “ ‘plea in

abatement’ ” and “ ‘to revoke all keys and contracts,’ ” and essentially had no idea how to

represent himself. Appellant’s Brief at p. 22.     In response, the State contends that

Pulley’s former counsel had no concerns over his competence, that the trial court could
                                                                                         -28-

not have been more thorough in protecting Pulley’s rights, that Pulley stated off the record

that he was “playing a game of chess,” that Pulley could not show prejudice because he

elected to be represented by counsel once the trial began, and that counsel was

experienced with this kind of case and was prepared for trial. State’s Brief at p. 9-21.

Having reviewed the record, we agree with the State.

       {¶ 71} Under the Sixth Amendment, accused parties have the right to make a

personal defense, i.e., to represent themselves. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819,

95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).         The Ohio Constitution provides a similar

independent right. State v. Martin, 103 Ohio St.3d 385, 2004-Ohio-5471, 816 N.E.2d

227, ¶ 24. “Once the right to counsel is properly waived, trial courts are permitted to

appoint standby counsel to assist the otherwise pro se defendant.”            Id. at ¶ 28.

However, “there is no constitutional right to standby counsel.” State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio

St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 13.

       {¶ 72} If serious offenses are involved as defined by Crim.R. 2(C), “when a criminal

defendant elects to proceed pro se, the trial court must demonstrate substantial

compliance with Crim.R. 44(A) by making a sufficient inquiry to determine whether the

defendant fully understood and intelligently relinquished his or her right to counsel.”

Martin at ¶ 39, citing State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 345 N.E.2d 399 (2005),

paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶ 73} No precise script or formula has been proscribed for this. State v. Johnson,

112 Ohio St.3d 210, 2006-Ohio-6404, 858 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 101. “ ‘The information a

defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election * * * will depend on a
                                                                                        -29-

range of case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or sophistication, the

complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding.’ ” Id.,

quoting Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004).

However, “[a] criminal defendant must ‘unequivocally and explicitly invoke’ the right to

self-representation.”   State v. Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175, 2016-Ohio-1594, 63

N.E.3d 93, ¶ 29, quoting State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772

N.E.2d 81, ¶ 38. Pulley did this here, on every occasion it was discussed, until he

decided after opening statement that he wanted his stand-by counsel to take over

representation. Trial Tr. at 236.

        {¶ 74} “Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a

lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be

made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record

will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ”

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, quoting Adams v. U.S. ex rel.

McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). Accord Obermiller at

¶ 30.

        {¶ 75} As noted, Pulley initially had appointed counsel and then retained private

counsel. However, on the day of the December 20, 2021 trial, counsel asked for a

continuance because Pulley wanted to represent himself.          The trial court therefore

continued the trial and conducted a lengthy hearing on January 13, 2022, during which

the court clearly explained the perils of self-representation. Nonetheless, Pulley insisted

on the course he had chosen, after which the court allowed Pulley to represent himself
                                                                                           -30-

and a written waiver was filed. See Pre-Trial Tr. 1 at 43-78 (Jan. 13, 2022). The court

also appointed stand-by counsel for Pulley. Thereafter, the court conducted several

status hearings, during which it further advised Pulley about his rights, discussed Pulley’s

lack of understanding of legal procedures, and continually cautioned Pulley that his lack

of knowledge was handicapping him and he would be better served by having counsel.

See Pre-Trial Tr. 1 at 85 (Feb. 15, 2022), 96-101 and 105-106 (March 3, 2022); Status

Tr. at 4-5, 8, 19-27, and 31-34 (Apr. 4, 2022), and Pre-Trial Tr. 2 at 23-26 (May 9, 2022).

During all these hearings, Pulley was adamant that he wanted to represent himself.

       {¶ 76} The court also ascertained that stand-by counsel was prepared for trial and

could replace Pulley, if Pulley chose. Pre-Trial Tr. 1 at 90-91 and Pre-Trial Tr. 2 at 24.

In addition, both Pulley’s former retained counsel and his stand-by counsel indicated that

they did not have concerns about Pulley’s competence to stand trial. Pre-Trial Tr. 1 at

43-44, and Status Tr. at 26 and 30.     The record could not be clearer regarding the fact

that the court did everything it could to fully advise Pulley of his rights and to protect his

interests, while Pulley refused to listen or heed the court’s advice. This is consistent with

the instruction that “a trial judge ‘must investigate [a defendant's request for self-

representation] as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him

demand.’ ” Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d 175, 2016-Ohio-1594, 63 N.E.3d 93, at ¶ 42,

quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948).

       {¶ 77} According to the transcripts, the trial court also asked Pulley about a remark

he had allegedly made while leaving the courtroom to the effect that he was “playing a

game of chess” and “was going to win.” Pre-Trial Tr. 1 at 44-45 (Jan. 13, 2022). The
                                                                                         -31-

court stated that the remark had been made to a deputy and was also overheard by

another judge, both of whom had reported the remark to the court. The court then

stressed that the trial process is not a “game of chicken” or a “game of winning” and that

Pulley was the only person facing consequences, which were grave. Id. at 45. Pulley

denied making the remarks and insisted that he still wished to represent himself. Id.

       {¶ 78} “Finally, even if a defendant has made an unequivocal and explicit request

for self-representation, a defendant may later waive that request by acquiescing in

counsel's representation.” Obermiller at ¶ 31, citing Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-

Ohio-3751, 772 N.E.2d 81, at ¶ 42, citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182, 104

S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Pulley therefore waived or abandoned his request for

self-representation when he asked for stand-by counsel to represent him after opening

statements.

       {¶ 79} In light of the preceding discussion, Pulley’s third assignment of error is

overruled.

                                V. Exclusion of Evidence

       {¶ 80} Pulley’s fourth assignment of error states that:

              The Trial Court Denied Appellant’s Constitutional Right to Present

       Evidence by Excluding Relevant Evidence.

       {¶ 81} Under this assignment of error, Pulley contends that the trial court erred by

refusing to admit text messages between Mother to Pulley, during which Mother made

statements about wanting to “ ‘throw [A.G.] against the f***ing wall if she doesn’t shut the
                                                                                           -32-

f*** it [sic],’ ” and that Mother felt she was a “ ‘horrible mother’ ” * ** and [A.G.] deserves

someone better, * * * someone that wouldn’t hurt her bc they were angry.’ ” Appellant’s

Brief at p. 26, quoting from text messages allegedly written, respectively, on August 13,

2020, and August 15, 2020. According to Pulley, the texts were relevant for purposes of

establishing an alternate theory that Mother was the source of some injuries to A.G. and

to impeach Det. Lawson’s statement that there was no evidence that Mother was

responsible for any of A.G.’s injuries. Id. at p. 25 and 27. Pulley contends that the trial

court erred in finding that the text messages could not be authenticated by Lawson, who

was testifying at that point and was the State’s last witness. Trial Tr. at 533.

       {¶ 82} “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court * * *.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Haines, 112 Ohio St.3d

393, 2006-Ohio-6711, 860 N.E.2d 91, ¶ 50. This would again mean review for abuse of

discretion, which includes decisions that lack a sound reasoning process. AAAA Ents.,

Inc., 50 Ohio St.3d at 161, 553 N.E.2d 597.

       {¶ 83} To put this issue in the proper factual context, we note several items, most

of which were mentioned above in the Statement of Facts: (1) more than a year before

trial, Pulley’s retained counsel received the State’s discovery packet, which included a

flash drive of various items including cell phone examinations and cellphone “texts/pics”;

(2) during the February 15, 2022 hearing (which was more than three months before trial),

the State had given full discovery to Pulley’s appointed stand-by counsel as a conduit for

Pulley. At that time, Pulley did not want to keep a copy at the jail and said he would

contact the attorney when he needed the discovery; and (3) in a pro se pleading filed on
                                                                                          -33-

February 28, 2022, Pulley alleged that Mother had made “incriminating and misleading

statements” and that Mother “never wanted this baby, which is also addressed in her ‘cell

phone text messages.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Affidavit of Charles F. “Based on Truth and

Facts,” p. 8. At that time, Pulley also alleged that his counsel had not released, shared,

or discussed full discovery with him. Id.

       {¶ 84} Further relevant facts included that, during the March 3, 2022 status

hearing, the discovery issue arose again, and standby counsel Baldwin again assured

the court that he had spoken with Pulley and that, while complete discovery was available,

Pulley did not want discovery at the jail. Pre-Trial Tr. 1 at 104. Pulley again said he

would advise Baldwin if he wanted the discovery. Id. at 104-105. Additionally, during

the April 4, 2022 status hearing, the court stated that Pulley had previously been provided

“all of the discovery” and that it appeared it was sitting on Pulley’s table. Status Tr. at 5.

Pulley confirmed this was correct. Id.

       {¶ 85} Later, Pulley reiterated that he did not believe the State had failed to turn

over any discovery to him, other than a witness list (which was not yet due). Id. at 7-8.

At this time, the State noted that it had given Pulley’s retained counsel full discovery, had

done the same with Baldwin, with a few additions, and “in abundance of caution, * * *

[had] now provided a -- * * * third complete paper discovery packet to the Defendant that

is sitting on his table.” Id. at 8-9. Pulley acknowledged that he had received a “full and

complete copy of all paper discovery.” Id. at 9-10. See also id. at 27. During that

hearing, the trial court again discussed self-representation and the need to be prepared

for trial, and Pulley said he would be prepared for the May 23, 2022 jury trial. Id. at 32-
                                                                                         -34-

34.

       {¶ 86} Other facts include that during the May 9th, 2022 final pretrial, the State

reported that it had received a request that day from Pulley asking to view his cell phone,

which the police had taken at the time of arrest. The State further noted that it did not

intend to introduce the phone as an exhibit, but the State could work out something with

the stand-by attorney. Pre-Trial Tr. 2 at 15-16. At that time, Pulley stated that he

wanted to go through his phone, as it was “pretty important.” Id. at 19. This was about

two weeks before trial.

       {¶ 87} The final facts are that on May 16, 2022 (a week before trial), Pulley signed

a receipt for discovery relating to a download of all documents printed from a phone (four

pages). He also filed a motion to compel based on the State’s alleged failure to comply

with discovery and withholding of exculpatory evidence. This related to “extracted data

of text messages by TFO Robert Bell from [Mother] & her two cell phones” and Pulley’s

two cell phones. May 16, 2022 Motion to Compel, p. 1. According to Pulley, there were

“self-incriminating” text messages on Mother’s phone that the West Carrollton police

officers should have had in their possession. However, Pulley would have been aware

since the time of the crime (around 21 months before trial) that these allegedly

“incriminating text messages” could be found either on his own phone or Mother’s phone.

       {¶ 88} Rather than mentioning these “important” facts to his attorneys, Pulley

waited until the second day of trial, after Mother had testified, to tell his former stand-by

attorney and now counsel about this information. As indicated, during the testimony of

the last State’s witness, defense counsel informed the court that, over the lunch break,
                                                                                       -35-

Pulley’s father had handed him copies of messages between Pulley and Mother, which

showed messages that had been deleted from what the police took screenshots of at

DCH (i.e., Mother’s phone) and additional text messages that were relevant to whether

Mother could have been involved in the injuries to the child. Trial Tr. at 533. The

implication was that Mother had deleted the messages before the police took

screenshots, and Pulley’s phone had had the complete texts. Also, Pulley had taken the

copies given to him on May 16 and had provided those to his father. Id. at 533 and 536-

538.   The State noted that the documents in question had been in the possession of

Pulley’s retained attorney since the original discovery was released and that, while the

State normally does not print out downloads due to the volume of material on phones

(and has no obligation to do so), the State had printed out 5,000 pages and had given

them to Pulley on May 16, 2022. Id. at 536-537.

       {¶ 89} The court concluded that the State had done nothing wrong and that Pulley

had created the problem by failing to disclose this information to his attorney. The court

stressed that this appeared to be another tactical choice by Pulley and his father. Id. at

539-541. At that point, the State made a liminal motion to prevent Pulley from cross-

examining Det. Lawson about the texts. Id. at 541-542. The court granted the motion

based on authentication and hearsay grounds. Id. at 542-543. Before court resumed,

the defense asked for leave to subpoena Mother to testify about the records. Id. at 543.

However, the court said that would be discussed the following day, as court would be in

session then. Id.

       {¶ 90} Subsequently, during the cross-examination of Det. Lawson, the court
                                                                                           -36-

sustained the State’s objection to a question about the texts. The court offered to allow

the defense to proffer the evidence, but counsel elected to wait until after the end of

Lawson’s testimony. Id. at 571-575. Due to the illness of defense counsel, trial did not

occur on the next day but resumed the day thereafter. At that time, the defense proffered

the evidence as Defendant’s Ex. E. The court accepted the proffer but said the exhibit

would not go to the jury. Id. at 579-581. During this discussion, the court pointed out

that Pulley had had this discovery in his possession and had had the chance to point it

out to his counsel. Id. at 580-581. Nothing further was said about subpoenaing Mother,

and the record lacks any evidence showing that an attempt was made to do so. The

defense then rested without calling any witnesses. Id. at 599.

       {¶ 91} Based on the record, we find that Pulley is precluded from asserting error

on this ground because he invited any error. “The doctrine of invited error holds that a

litigant may not "take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced.” State

v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 324, 738 N.E.2d 1178 (2000), quoting Hal Artz Lincoln-

Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 502 N.E.2d 590 (1986), paragraph one

of the syllabus. Under this doctrine, “ ‘ “an appellant, in either a civil or a criminal case,

cannot attack a judgment for errors committed by himself or herself; for errors that the

appellant induced the court to commit; or for errors into which the appellant either

intentionally or unintentionally misled the court, and for which the appellant is actively

responsible.” ’ ” (Emphasis added.) State v. Davis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28796,

2021-Ohio-142, ¶ 27, quoting Daimler/Chrysler Truck Fin. v. Kimball, 2d Dist. Champaign

No. 2007-CA-07, 2007-Ohio-6678, ¶ 40. (Other citation omitted.)
                                                                                           -37-

       {¶ 92} For example, a defendant has been precluded from raising error arising

from the fact that he was convicted for felonious assault (a charge for which he was not

indicted), because his counsel asked for a jury instruction on that charge. State ex rel.

Beaver v. Konteh, 83 Ohio St.3d 519, 520, 700 N.E.2d 1256 (1998). See also State v.

Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539, 140 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 269-279 (defendant could

not object to the fact that a jury was allegedly “tainted” by removal of a juror because his

attorney asked that the juror be removed); State v. Woodruff, 10 Ohio App.3d 326, 327,

462 N.E.2d 457 (2d Dist.1983) (defendant cannot assign error to the trial court’s

admission of polygraph results when he introduced them through his own witness). In

Woodruff, we noted that “the rule of ‘invited error,’ a corollary of the principle of equitable

estoppel, prohibits a party who induces error in the trial court from taking advantage of

such error on appeal.” Id.

       {¶ 93} In State v. Anderson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 1983-CR-1344, 1984 WL

3846 (Sept. 5, 1984), two defense witnesses testified during a bench trial that the

defendant had acted in self-defense. However, the State produced rebuttal evidence

showing the witnesses fabricated their stories at the behest of the defendant’s brother;

the witnesses then recanted when the court recalled them. Id. at *1. On appeal, the

defendant alleged that the trial court had erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial after

the false testimony was revealed. Id. at *2. Due to evidence that the defendant was

aware of the witnesses’ intent to lie and was party to the perjury, we applied the invited

error doctrine and found the defendant was estopped from asserting the assignment of

error. Id.
                                                                                            -38-

       {¶ 94} We have reviewed the proffered exhibit, and the printed text messages

appear to have been obtained from Pulley’s phone, as Pulley was listed as the “Outgoing”

participant.   Because Pulley would have been aware of the content of his own text

messages (and Mother’s alleged replies) from the time they were apparently made during

July and August 2020, there was no conceivable reason for his failing to raise the issue

until nearly the end of trial in May 2022. Pulley had been represented by counsel for

many months and could have alerted counsel to a possible alternate basis for the child’s

injuries and supporting evidence. He chose not to do so. Whether one wants to call

this invited error, equitable estoppel, or waiver, Pulley’s failure to do so prevents this issue

from being considered on appeal.

       {¶ 95} Even if we were to consider this point, perhaps for plain error, the trial court

did not err. Evid.R. 901 governs authentication, and “Evid.R. 901(A) requires, as a

condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence, a showing that the matter in question

is what it purports to be.” State v. Simmons, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24009, 2011-

Ohio-2068, ¶ 12. “The authentication threshold is low, meaning that the party seeking to

introduce the disputed evidence need only demonstrate ‘a reasonable likelihood that the

evidence is authentic.’ ” State v. Shropshire, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28659, 2020-

Ohio-6853, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Yuschak, 2016-Ohio-8507, 78 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 16 (9th

Dist.). “Evid.R. 901(B) provides examples of numerous ways that the authentication

requirement may be satisfied. The most commonly used method is testimony that a

matter is what it is claimed to be under Evid.R. 901(B)(1).” State v. Renner, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 25514, 2013-Ohio-5463, ¶ 30, citing Royse v. Dayton, 195 Ohio App.3d
                                                                                         -39-

81, 2011-Ohio-3509, 958 N.E.2d 994, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 96} “ ‘[I]n most cases involving electronic print media, i.e., texts, instant

messaging, and e-mails, the photographs taken of the print media or the printouts of those

conversations are authenticated, introduced, and received into evidence through the

testimony of the recipient of the messages.’ ” State v. Irwin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

26224, 2015-Ohio-195, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Roseberry, 197 Ohio App.3d 256, 2011-

Ohio-5921, 967 N.E.2d 233, ¶ 75 (8th Dist.). The recipients of the messages here were

allegedly Mother and Pulley. Pulley could have testified (but obviously was not required

to do so), and he did not. Pulley also chose not to pursue the avenue of subpoenaing

Mother. Without the testimony of at least one of these people, the participants in the text

conversations would not be identified. In addition, while Det. Lawson reviewed a digital

(not physical) download of the phones, he was not the person who conducted the

download; that was Detective Bell. Trial Tr. at 541 and 571. Thus Bell would have been

the person who could have authenticated the download.                Again, Pulley never

subpoenaed Bell; in fact this issue was never discussed.

       {¶ 97} Finally, we disagree with Pulley that Mother’s “testimony was the primary

evidence establishing the time of injury for the State’s theory of the offense.” Appellant’s

Brief at p. 27.     To the contrary, Pulley’s statements during the police interview

established the times of injury. Pulley admitted that he had injured A.G. on both days

and demonstrated how the baby had been injured; he also indicated that no one had been

present at these times. Therefore, Pulley’s own statements were the primary source for

establishing the time of injury.
                                                                                          -40-

       {¶ 98} In light of the preceding discussion, the fourth assignment of error is

overruled.

                              VII. Incorrect Jury Instruction

       {¶ 99} Pulley’s fifth assignment of error states that:

              The Trial Court Erred by Charging the Jury with a Definition of

       Recklessly Which Was an Incorrect Statement of Law.

       {¶ 100} Under this assignment of error, Pulley maintains that the trial court erred

by using Ohio Jury Instruction (“OJI”) C.R. 417.17, which defines acting “recklessly” and

applies to crimes committed before March 23, 2015. According to Pulley, this instruction

imposes a lower standard than is required by law. Before addressing this issue, we note

the following standards that apply to error based on jury instructions.

       {¶ 101} Crim.R. 30(A) provides that:

              On appeal, a party may not assign as error the giving or the failure

       to give any instructions unless the party objects before the jury retires to

       consider its verdict, stating specifically the matter objected to and the

       grounds of the objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection

       out of the hearing of the jury.

       {¶ 102} Here, Pulley failed to object to the jury instructions in the trial court. See

Trial Tr. 604-607. A party who fails to object “has forfeited all but plain error.” State v.

McAlpin, 169 Ohio St.3d 279, 2022-Ohio-1567, 204 N.E.3d 459, ¶ 247, citing Crim.R.

52(B) and State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). Crim.R. 52(B)
                                                                                         -41-

states that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although

they were not brought to the attention of the court.”

       {¶ 103} To establish plain error, “appellant must show that an error occurred, that

the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights,” i.e., the error

“affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562,

114 N.E.3d 1092, ¶ 52, citing Barnes at 27. In the context of affecting a trial outcome,

the accused must “demonstrate a reasonable probability that the error resulted in

prejudice – the same deferential standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel

claims.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Thomas, 152 Ohio St.3d 15, 2017-Ohio-8011, 92

N.E.3d 821, ¶ 33, quoting State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38

N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22.

       {¶ 104} The plain error rule also “applies to errors that were never objected to at

trial, even if those errors can be classified as structural.” (Citation omitted.) McAlpin at

¶ 66. Furthermore, “even if an accused shows that the trial court committed plain error

affecting the outcome of the proceeding, an appellate court is not required to correct it;

[the Supreme Court of Ohio has] ‘ “admonish[ed] courts to notice plain error ‘with the

utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest

miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Rogers at ¶ 23, quoting Barnes at 27,

quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the

syllabus.

       {¶ 105} Turning now to the issue before us, Pulley was charged with six counts:

murder (proximate result of felonious assault with serious harm), felonious assault
                                                                                           -42-

(serious physical harm), murder (proximate cause of endangering children), endangering

children (serious physical harm), involuntary manslaughter, and endangering children

(parent – serious harm).

       {¶ 106} Count One of the indictment charged Pulley with murder, i.e., causing

A.G.’s death as a “proximate result of the offender’s committing an offense of violence, to

wit:   FELONIOUS      ASSAULT      (SERIOUS      PHYSICAL      HARM),     in   violation    of

2903.11(A)(1).” A violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) is felonious assault. When the trial

court instructed the jury on Count One and the predicate offense of felonious assault, it

stated: “Before you can find the Defendant guilty of felonious assault, serious physical

harm, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that * * * Pulley knowingly caused serious

physical harm to A.G.” Trial Tr. at 653.

       {¶ 107} Count Two charged Pulley with felonious assault, serious physical harm in

violation of the same statute, i.e., R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). The court also instructed the jury,

as before, that Pulley must have “knowingly caused serious harm to A.G.” Id. at 655.

       {¶ 108} Count Three was a murder charge with the predicate offense of

endangering children (serious physical harm), “in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1). This

statute prohibits persons from abusing children and is a second-degree felony when it

results in serious physical harm to the child. See R.C. 2919.22(E)(2)(d). With respect

to the child endangerment charge, the court instructed the jury that Pulley must have

recklessly abused a child. The court then defined “recklessly” as follows:

              A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the

       consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is
                                                                                         -43-

       likely to cause a certain result or be of a certain nature.      A person is

       heedless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to

       the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such

       circumstances are likely to exist. Risk means a significant possibility as

       contrasted with a remote possibility that a certain result may occur or that

       certain circumstances may exist.

Trial Tr. at 657-658.

       {¶ 109} Count Four of the indictment charged Pulley with child endangerment in

violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), and the culpable state, again, was acting recklessly. The

court did not repeat the definition of acting recklessly but reminded the jury that it had

already read the definitions contained in this charge. Id. at 659. Count Five charged

Pulley with causing A.G.’s death as a proximate result of committing or attempting to

commit the felony of endangering children (parent-serious harm), in violation of R.C.

2903.04(A). R.C. 2903.04(A) states that “No person shall cause the death of another or

the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's

committing or attempting to commit a felony.”        Violations of this statute constitute

involuntary manslaughter. Concerning the predicate crime, the court again used the

above definition of acting recklessly with a slight variation. Id. at 661-662. Specifically,

the last sentence of the definition added the following italicized words:

              Risk means a significant possibility as contrasted with a remote or

       even a significant possibility that a certain result may occur or that certain

       circumstances may exist.
                                                                                            -44-

Trial Tr. at 662.

       {¶ 110} Finally, Count Six of the indictment charged Pulley with endangering

children in that Pulley “did recklessly create a substantial risk to the health or safety of the

child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support, which resulted in serious physical

harm to the child,” in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A). Again, the court described the state

of mind as acting “recklessly” and stated that it had already read the definitions to the jury.

Id. at 663.

       {¶ 111} Thus, Counts One and Two required a culpable mental state of

“knowingly,” and the remaining four counts required a culpable mental state of

“recklessly.” Responding to Pulley’s arguments, the State contends that any error would

not have prejudiced Pulley, as the State was held to the higher culpable state of proving

that Pulley acted knowingly for purposes of the felonious assault conviction in Count Two

(and thus for the murder conviction in Count One). In addition, the State notes that it

conceded at sentencing that the convictions in Counts One through Five should be

merged. State’s Brief at p. 26. Pulley did not respond to this argument in his reply brief,

and we agree with the State. At sentencing, the State did agree that these offenses had

to merge. Trial Tr. at 696. Pulley’s counsel agreed as well, with the only disagreement

being whether Count Six should also be merged. Id. at 668-669.

       {¶ 112} If the jury concluded that Pulley acted knowingly with respect to the counts

that pertained to A.G.’s murder and the predicate offense, it is hard to see how the jury

did not also conclude that Pulley had acted recklessly, regardless of definition, since that

is a lesser culpable state that “knowingly.” Compare R.C. 2901.22(B) and (C). In fact,
                                                                                           -45-

R.C. 2901.22(E) specifically states that “[w]hen recklessness suffices to establish an

element of an offense, then knowledge or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such

element.” Consequently, not only was there no plain error, there was no error. The

court also merged the first five convictions, consistent with the parties’ discussion. Trial

Tr. at 699.

        {¶ 113} The trial court did find that Count Six did not merge with the other offenses

due to a separate animus for the injuries occurring on the first day, i.e., August 19, 2020.

Id. at 700-701. Again, this count required a mental state of having acted recklessly. As

currently constituted, R.C. 2901.22(C) provides that:

                A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the

        consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk

        that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be

        of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances

        when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person

        disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are

        likely to exist.

        {¶ 114} This statute was amended in 2014, with an effective date of March 23,

2015.    See Am. S.B. 361, 2014 Ohio Laws 194, which enacted R.C. 2901.20 and

amended R.C. 2901.21 and R.C. 2901.22. Before amendment, R.C. 2901.22(C) read

as follows:

                A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the

        consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is
                                                                                            -46-

       likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person

       is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference

       to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such

       circumstances are likely to exist.

       {¶ 115} The pre-amendment content is consistent with the trial court’s instructions,

which means that the instructions did not contain the current definition. This would only

be pertinent to Count Six, which the court did not merge.

       {¶ 116} According to the Bill Analysis of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission,

the bill “[m]odifies current law's mental state of ‘recklessly’ by providing that, with heedless

indifference to the consequences, a person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk

that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result instead of a known risk, as

under current law.” Legislative Service Commission -2- Am. S.B. 361 as Passed by the

Senate,           http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/lsc/analyses130/s0361-ps-130.pdf

(accessed on Aug. 12, 2023).

       {¶ 117} In response to this issue, the State contends that whether the former

definition imposed a lower standard of culpability appears to be a matter of first

impression. State’s Brief at p. 26. The State further argues that, nonetheless, nothing

indicates that the former definition of “recklessly” contains a lower standard or that the

State’s burden of proof was lessened as Pulley maintains. Id.

       {¶ 118} Contrary to the State’s position, this is not a case of first impression. We

did mention the amendment to R.C. 2901.22(C) in a case decided shortly after the

amendment.      See State v. Webber, 2015-Ohio-2183, 35 N.E.3d 961 (2d Dist.).               In
                                                                                          -47-

Webber, we considered whether a father had acted recklessly for purposes of child

endangerment by giving his 16-month-old child an adult sleep medication before putting

her to bed. In the morning, the child was found dead, tangled in her blanket, and the

father was convicted of involuntary manslaughter based on the predicate offense of child

endangerment. Id. at ¶ 3 and 4.

       {¶ 119} We applied the former definition of recklessly and rejected the father’s

claim that his actions were negligent rather than voluntary. Id. at ¶ 5-35. We noted that

the father “administered ZzzQuil to the child without consulting a doctor, when that

medication was labeled as contraindicated for young children, and then placed the child

to sleep in a crib that was very crowded with bedding and other soft objects. Moreover,

Webber's initial denials to the sheriff's deputies and coroner's investigator about

administration of the drug to the child, because he was ‘scared of getting into trouble,’

suggest that he had perceived that there was risk to the child associated with the use of

the medication. He also had not consulted with the child's pediatrician about the use of

diphenhydramine for any purpose, despite very recent visits to the doctor's office for

illnesses.” Id. at ¶ 34.

       {¶ 120} In a footnote, we discussed the amendment to R.C. 2901.22(C), noting

that “[t]he changes appear to be for clarity but, if anything, lower the standard by

substituting a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ in place of a ‘known risk.’ ” Id. at ¶ 10,

fn. 1. While this comment was dicta, we also have previously agreed with it in a case

applying the amended definition. See State v. Hypes, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-110,

2019-Ohio-4096, ¶ 21, fn. 2.      We continue to agree.       In fact, the amendment also
                                                                                           -48-

eliminated the word “perversely,” which suggests a high level of intent. Consequently,

by giving the outdated jury instruction, the trial court actually held the State to a higher

standard of proof, not a lower one. Pulley, therefore, was not prejudiced at all, and no

error or plain error occurred. Accordingly, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                                    VII. Allied Offenses

       {¶ 121} Pulley’s sixth assignment of error states that:

              The Trial Court Erred by Convicting Appellant of Allied Offenses of

       Similar Import.

       {¶ 122} Under this assignment of error, Pulley argues that the trial court erred by

failing to merge Count Six with Count One (the murder conviction for which the State

elected sentencing). Count Six alleged that between August 19 and 20, 2020, Pulley did

“recklessly create a substantial risk to the health or safety of [A.G.] by violating a duty of

care, protection, or support, which resulted in serious physical harm to the child” in

violation of R.C. 2919.22(A) (endangering children). According to Pulley, there was no

evidence of serious harm to A.G. on August 19, 2020, i.e., no behavior that suggested

“substantial suffering and intractable pain.” Appellant’s Brief at p. 31. Pulley further

contends that, because of this, the convictions on both counts must have been based on

the events of August 20, 2020, and therefore were committed by the same animus and

conduct and resulted in the same harm.

       {¶ 123} Before sentencing, the State filed a memorandum urging the court to find

a separate animus for Count Six because injuries to A.G. occurred on two separate days
                                                                                         -49-

and the culmination resulted in serious physical harm. In responding, Pulley argued that

the only evidence of injury on August 19, 2020, was bruising. During the sentencing

hearing, the trial court found a separate animus for Count Six, due to the bruising of A.G.,

Mother’s concern about the child on August,19, and the fact that a five-week baby cannot

communicate pain in a manner other than what a mother is able to observe. Trial Tr. at

700.

       {¶ 124} Under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and as

extended to Ohio citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment, “multiple punishments for the

same offense” are precluded. State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34

N.E.3d 892, ¶ 10. Ohio’s protection against multiple punishments is codified in R.C.

2941.25, which provides that:

              (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to

       constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or

       information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may

       be convicted of only one.

              (B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses

       of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of

       the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as

       to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such

       offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

       {¶ 125} “As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses are allied

offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must ask three
                                                                                            -50-

questions when the defendant's conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) Were the

offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and

(3) Were they committed with separate animus or motivation? An affirmative answer to

any of the above will permit separate convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the

import must all be considered.” Ruff at ¶ 31.

       {¶ 126} “Merger is a sentencing question, not an additional burden of proof

shouldered by the state at trial,” and the defendant has the burden to establish entitlement

to this protection.   State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999

N.E.2d 661, ¶ 18. De novo review applies to decisions on whether to merge certain

offenses as allied offenses under R.C. 2941.25. State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482,

2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 1.

       {¶ 127} Here, there is no question that Pulley injured A.G. on separate occasions.

Pulley admitted that to the police and to Mother. Although his account differed on how

the injuries on August 19 occurred, he dropped either a cell phone or game controller on

A.G.’s head (explaining one bruise on A.G.’s forehead) and A.G. also rolled off the couch

or fell out of his hands onto the floor. Trial Tr. at 435-436 and 547.

       {¶ 128} Consistent with Count Six of the indictment, R.C. 2919.22(A) provides that

“No person, who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or control, or

person in loco parentis of a child under eighteen years of age or a child with a mental or

physical disability under twenty-one years of age, shall create a substantial risk to the

health or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.” R.C.

2919.22)(E)(2)(c) further states that “[i]f the violation is a violation of division (A) of this
                                                                                            -51-

section and results in serious physical harm to the child involved,” it is a felony of the third

degree. This is the crime for which Pulley was convicted.

       {¶ 129} R.C. 2901.01(A)(5) defines “serious physical harm to persons.”                In

instructing the jury on serious physical harm, the trial court referred to several types of

harm reflected in R.C. 2901.05(A)(b)-(e). Trial Tr. at 659. These include:

               (b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death;

               (c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity,

       whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial

       incapacity;

               (d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement

       or that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement;

               (e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to

       result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged or

       intractable pain.

The trial court’s merger decision relied on the final definition, R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(e). See

Trial Tr. at 700.

       {¶ 130} According to the evidence, including Pulley’s statements (which we have

already mentioned), A.G. sustained separate and distinct injuries (bruises) on the right

side of her forehead and on the left side of her head extending down to her temple on

August 19, 2020. There was also a hint of bruising at the side of her nose when she was

admitted to DCH. Trial Tr. 260-261, 312, 313, and 325. The injury to the back of A.G.’s

head (a scrape mark and large bruise) was another separate injury caused by blunt force
                                                                                           -52-

trauma and occurred the following day. This particular injury, including the skull fracture,

would have had immediate impact and was catastrophic. Id. at 262-264 and 271-272.

         {¶ 131} While both sets of injuries involved the same victim, they occurred far apart

in time. They were not committed during the same transaction or during an ongoing

event.    For example, in Ruff, the defendant was convicted of rape and aggravated

burglary in connection with three different women.            The issue was whether the

aggravated burglary conviction for each victim should be merged into the rape conviction

for that particular victim. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, at

¶ 1-6. The trial court sentenced the defendant for both convictions pertaining to all three

victims. However, the court of appeals found that “because the conduct relied upon to

establish the rapes was the same conduct used to establish the physical-harm element

of the aggravated burglaries, the offenses were allied and subject to merger.” Id. at ¶ 8.

After outlining the correct analysis for evaluating allied offenses, the Supreme Court of

Ohio remanded the case “for the court of appeals to consider whether the import of the

aggravated burglary and the import of the rape were similar or dissimilar in each of the

three separate events.” Id. at ¶ 29.

         {¶ 132} On remand, the court of appeals still held that the convictions should be

merged because “[t]he element of physical harm for each aggravated burglary was

established by Ruff's rape of the victim. The harm that resulted from the rape of each

victim was same harm that resulted when each burglary escalated to aggravated burglary.

Thus, the harms were not ‘separate and identifiable.’ ” State v. Ruff, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-120533, 2015-Ohio-3367, ¶ 19. Again, however, the crimes against A.G. were
                                                                                         -53-

committed separately; they were not part of the same transaction. To put it another way,

if the injuries A.G. sustained on the second day had never taken place, Pulley could still

have been charged with a crime based on having injured A.G. on August 19, 2020.

       {¶ 133} In remarking on A.G.’s pain on August 19, 2020, the trial court appears to

have focused on Ruff’s first question, which is whether the offenses were “dissimilar in

import or significance.”   With respect to this point, the court stated in Ruff that “a

defendant's conduct that constitutes two or more offenses against a single victim can

support multiple convictions if the harm that results from each offense is separate and

identifiable from the harm of the other offense.” Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-

995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 26. Clearly, harm was caused to A.G. as the result of the two

separate offenses, because she was bruised in two areas on August 19, 2020.

Nonetheless, satisfaction of this factor was not required, because “an affirmative answer

to any” of the three considerations in Ruff, i.e., conduct, animus, and import, “will permit

separate convictions.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 31. We also note that the extent of

A.G.’s pain or injury is not relevant in this context; it is more properly considered in

connection with a manifest weight issue.       However, Pulley did not make such an

argument.

       {¶ 134} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to merge Count Six with

the other offenses. The sixth assignment of error, therefore, is overruled.

                 VIII. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

       {¶ 135} Pulley’s seventh assignment of error states that:
                                                                                        -54-

              Appellant's Convictions Are Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence to

       Prove Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt and Are Against the Manifest

       Weight of the Evidence.

       {¶ 136} Under this assignment of error, Pulley contends that his convictions were

not supported by sufficient evidence because the experts disagreed on the number of

injuries sustained and could not identify the mechanism of the injury. For the same

reasons, Pulley contends that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

       {¶ 137} “A sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument challenges whether the state has

presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to

the jury or to sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Cherry, 171 Ohio App.3d

375, 2007-Ohio-2133, 870 N.E.2d 808, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In this situation, we apply the test from State v.

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), which states that:

              An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

       evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence

       admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would

       convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable

       doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

       most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

       the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
                                                                                          -55-

       {¶ 138} Furthermore, “[b]ecause the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and

hear the witnesses, * * * [t]he decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony

of particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen

and heard the witness.” State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL

476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997).

       {¶ 139} In contrast to a sufficiency analysis, “[w]hen a conviction is challenged on

appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the

entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider witness

credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact

‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Hill, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

25172, 2013-Ohio-717, ¶ 8, quoting Thompkins at 387. “A judgment should be reversed

as being against the manifest weight of the evidence ‘only in the exceptional case in which

the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20

Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

       {¶ 140} “Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts,

manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that

a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a

finding of sufficiency.” (Citation omitted.) State v. McCrary, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11. Accord State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

29349, 2023-Ohio-27, ¶ 72. As a result, “a determination that a conviction is supported

by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.”
                                                                                        -56-

(Citations omitted.) State v. Braxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-725, 2005-Ohio-2198,

¶ 15.

        {¶ 141} The two counts of murder were based on R.C. 2903.03(B), which provides

that “[n]o person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's

committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or

second degree * * *.” As previously noted, the predicate felony for the first murder count

was felonious assault (serious harm), in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), and the predicate

felony for the other murder count was R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) (endangering children).

        {¶ 142} Having reviewed the record, and based on our prior discussion, we find no

merit in Pulley’s arguments.     The evidence against Pulley was overwhelming.          As

indicated, Pulley admitted that he had injured A.G. on both August 19 and 20, 2020, and

that he had been alone with A.G. The State presented testimony from a coroner as well

as a doctor who attended A.G. while she was a patient at DCH. Both experts testified

that the injuries to A.G. were catastrophic, would not have been caused accidentally, were

due to blunt force trauma, and resulted in A.G.’s death. Trial Tr. at 272, 276-277, 279-

280, 281, 316-320, 322, and 338-339.

        {¶ 143} A.G. was five weeks old and had no health issues before being placed in

Pulley’s care. While Pulley’s varying stories attempted to minimize his actions and the

child’s injury, A.G. suffered catastrophic head injuries while in his care and died as a

result. A.G. could not possibly have injured herself. Furthermore, as the State notes, it

did not have to prove the precise way in which Pulley injured A.G.; it could rely on

circumstantial evidence, which was abundant. Compare State v. King, 179 Ohio App.3d
                                                                                         -57-

1, 2008-Ohio-5363, 900 N.E.2d 645, ¶ 44 (2d Dist.) (“despite the fact that there was no

eyewitness to the actual injury, the evidence supports a finding that the harm was not

caused by an accidental fall following a seizure, or by an injury earlier in the day. To the

contrary, the evidence supports a finding that the injury occurred during the time that

[defendant] had exclusive care and control of [the child].”).

       {¶ 144} “Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same

probative value and therefore should be subjected to the same standard of proof.”

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, at paragraph one of the syllabus. As noted,

the required state of mind for these charges was that Pulley acted either knowingly or

recklessly.   “Recklessness, like any other essential element of an offense, may be

proved through circumstantial evidence.” State v. Jones, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25986,

2012-Ohio-4256, ¶ 6, citing State v. Hatfield, 121 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2009-Ohio-353, 901

N.E.2d 813, ¶ 19-24. Likewise, a state of acting “knowingly” or with knowledge can be

established through circumstantial evidence. E.g., State v. Rodano, 2017-Ohio-1034,

86 N.E.3d 1032, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.); State v. Terry, 186 Ohio App.3d 670, 2010-Ohio-1604,

929 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.) (“[k]nowledge, like all kinds of intent, can be inferred

from circumstantial evidence”).

       {¶ 145} Accordingly, Pulley’s convictions were not based on insufficient evidence

and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.       The seventh assignment of

error is overruled.

                             IX. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
                                                                                           -58-

       {¶ 146} Pulley’s eighth assignment of error is that:

              Appellant Was Prejudiced by the Denial of His Right to Effective

       Assistance of Counsel, in Violation of His Rights Under the Sixth and

       Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

       {¶ 147} In connection with this assignment of error, Pulley raises four ways in

which trial counsel was allegedly ineffective: (1) failing to argue for individual examination

of the text messages; (2) failing to subpoena Mother to be recalled or to subpoena another

witness who could provide a foundation for the messages; (3) failing to be aware of the

specific content of the text messages; and (4) failing to object to the incorrect statement

of law about acting recklessly, which resulted in a lesser burden on the State.

Appellant’s Brief at p. 34.

       {¶ 148} To succeed on ineffective-assistance claims, a defendant must establish:

(1) trial counsel’s deficient performance; and (2) the deficient performance caused

prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

(1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraph two of the

syllabus. In order to prove deficient performance, a defendant must show that “counsel's

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation.” Strickland

at 688.   To show prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.”      Id. at 694.   “In making the determination whether the

specified errors resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent
                                                                                            -59-

challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury

acted according to law.” Id.

       {¶ 149} Courts reviewing ineffective-assistance claims “will not second-guess trial

strategy decisions” and “ ‘must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ ” State v. Mason, 82 Ohio

St.3d 144, 157-158, 694 N.E.2d 932 (1998), quoting Strickland at 689. “Trial counsel is

entitled to a strong presumption that his or her conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable assistance. Hindsight is not permitted to distort the assessment of what was

reasonable in light of counsel's perspective at the time.” State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d

516, 524-525, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992), citing Strickland at 687-689.

       {¶ 150} We have already rejected Pulley’s argument about the jury instruction on

recklessness and will not consider that matter further. Moreover, we have already said

that Pulley invited any error by failing to raise the text issue until the middle of trial when,

in fact, he would have been well-aware of any of Mother’s statements since he was a

party to these conversations in August 2020 – many, many months before trial.

Furthermore, Pulley placed his trial counsel in an impossible position by failing to mention

this evidence until the State was almost ready to conclude its case.              The alleged

evidence was also somewhere within around 5,000 pages of printed materials that were

made available a few weeks before trial. At that time, Pulley was representing himself

(by his own choice), and while standby counsel indicated he was prepared for trial, it

would be unreasonable to expect that counsel would wade through 5,000 pages of

information, when counsel was not even aware of what he would be expected to find.
                                                                                         -60-

       {¶ 151} The point is that Pulley knew about all of this information and could have

alerted his standby (later trial) counsel of these facts if they were indeed relevant.

However, he chose not to do so, following a course with which the trial court was familiar,

i.e., gamesmanship. This tactic was discussed during the discussions in the middle of

trial. Trial Tr. at 533-543. In this regard, the court noted, among other things that “Look,

it’s my understanding the Defendant has had these in his possession for over a year since

Mr. VanNoy was representing him, and specifically, the Defendant had the printouts when

the State’s other efforts to provide discovery were not sufficient. Defendant had these.

Chose to give them to his dad instead of his attorney or his standby counsel, and then,

now, in the middle of trial, suggests that the State has engaged in some nefarious

behavior.” Id. at 533. The court also remarked that this appeared to be another “tactical

effort” by Pulley and his father to create some issue, and that this effort had been

discussed all along before trial. Id. at 540.

       {¶ 152} In addition, the record does not contain any evidence about decisions

whether or not to recall Mother or to subpoena other witnesses. Such decisions could

have been based on trial strategy, which we will not second-guess. Consequently, there

is no merit to the eighth assignment of error, and it is overruled.

                                   X. Cumulative Error

       {¶ 153} Pulley’s final assignment of error is as follows:

              The Cumulative Effect of the Errors Set Forth Herein Deprived

       Appellant of His Constitutional Rights to a Fair Trial.
                                                                                       -61-

       {¶ 154} Under this assignment of error, Pulley argues that the cumulative effect of

errors, including failing to present relevant evidence at trial, warrants reversal of the

judgment. “State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 509 N.E.2d 1256 (1987), paragraph

two of the syllabus, recognized the doctrine of cumulative error. Under this doctrine, a

conviction will be reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a

defendant of a fair trial even though each of the numerous instances of trial-court error

does not individually constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233,

2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 223, citing DeMarco at 196-197.

       {¶ 155} Because we have found no error, no basis exists for applying the

cumulative error doctrine. Consequently, the ninth assignment of error is overruled.

                                     X. Conclusion

       {¶ 156} All of Pulley’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

                                     .............

TUCKER, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.