Court Opinion

ID: 9596544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:51:07.844972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:35.377403
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Justice.
On July 8, 1995, two people were killed and a third injured when their vehicle was struck head-on by another vehicle being operated in the wrong lane of travel by Appellant, Garroll Seldon Fugate. Appellant’s blood alcohol level was later determined to be 0.26g/100ml. Following a trial by jury in the Montgomery Circuit Court, Appellant was convicted of two counts of manslaughter in the second degree and one count of assault in the second degree. He was sentenced to ten years on each count to run consecutively for a total imprisonment of thirty years. He appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b), and asserts six claims of error, four with respect to his competency to stand trial and two with respect to eviden-tiary rulings at trial.
I. COMPETENCY ISSUES.

A. Trial judge’s findings and conclusion.

Appellant was severely injured in the accident, sustaining ankle, hip and fa*18cial fractures, a compression fracture of the T-9 vertebra, and a transection of his spinal cord at the T-10 level, resulting in permanent paraplegia. Appellant suffers from a rare condition known as “painful paraplegia,” which causes him to suffer from chronic pain rather than no feeling at all below the level of the spinal cord injury. Appellant’s primary care physician, Dr. Richard Hall, declined to express an opinion as to Appellant’s competence to stand trial but did state that Appellant took prescription pain medication that occasionally caused him to be disoriented. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Hall admitted that Appellant understood the nature of his medical condition and that he was competent to make his own decisions with respect to future medical treatment.
Two psychologists testified at the competency hearing. Dr. Walter Powers, who had been appointed by the court to evaluate Appellant, opined that Appellant was competent to stand trial and that he was partially malingering and exaggerating his alleged mental deficiencies. Dr. Powers based his conclusions not only on his own examination, but also on interviews with nursing home attendants who observed Appellant on a daily basis and a neuropsy-chological evaluation performed by another psychologist at Dr. Powers’ request. Several of the nursing home employees testified that Appellant read books, watched television, conversed normally with other patients, participated in group activities, used a laptop computer, and frequented the smoking lounge where he often played checkers. One nursing home employee testified that Appellant would engage in normal conversations with her when they were alone, but if outsiders were present, he would commence to stutter and claim to be disoriented. Another testified that Appellant always addressed her by name except on one occasion when she came to his room while he was being interviewed by an unidentified man. On that occasion, Appellant claimed not to know her. Dr. Suzanne Johnson, who was retained by Appellant to evaluate his competency to stand trial, opined that Appellant was incompetent to stand trial and that he was neither malingering nor exaggerating. Her testimony was supported by that of Appellant’s sister.
In concluding that Appellant was competent to stand trial, the trial judge made extensive findings of fact with respect to the evidence and found the testimonies of Dr. Powers and the nursing home employees to be more persuasive. Since the trial judge’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, it was not clearly erroneous. Plumb v. Commonwealth, Ky., 490 S.W.2d 729, 731 (1973).

B. Appellant’s absence from the competency hearing.

Appellant claims it was reversible error to conduct the competency hearing in his absence. The hearing was held on October 2, 1997, at the courthouse in Mt. Sterling, Montgomery County, Kentucky. On that date, Appellant was a medicated, mostly bedfast patient at a nursing home in Frenchburg, Menifee County, Kentucky. Defense counsel explicitly waived Appellant’s presence at the hearing, explaining:
In my opinion, it would endanger him to try to move him. It would certainly place him in a great deal of pain to try to move him over here for this hearing.
Appellant does not contest the accuracy of this statement and does not claim that his attorney was acting without his authorization. Nor does he suggest how he was actually prejudiced by his absence from the hearing. He does not assert that his counsel inadequately presented the evidence in his behalf or inadequately cross-examined the witnesses for the Commonwealth. He does not describe how he *19could have assisted counsel or what additional testimony he would have presented so as to avoid the judge’s ultimate determination that he was competent to stand trial. In fact, Appellant’s ability to provide such assistance might well have prejudiced his claim of incompetency, ie., that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to participate rationally in his defense. In other words, his ability to assist his counsel at the hearing may well have proved the Commonwealth’s contention that he was competent to stand trial. The sum and substance of Appellant’s claim with respect to this issue is that there should be a bright line rule that no one can waive a defendant’s right to be present at his own competency hearing except the defendant, him/herself.
“[T]he right to be present at every critical stage of the trial,” RCr 8.28(1), protects a defendant against purposeful or involuntary exclusion, e.g., Price v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 885, 892 (2000), but not voluntary exclusion. Even “[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver.” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114, 120 S.Ct. 659, 663, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000) (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 2669, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991)). Although it would be preferable that the waiver come directly from the defendant, himself, there is no constitutional requirement to that effect. Clark v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315, 324 (2nd Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1116, 121 S.Ct. 865, 148 L.Ed.2d 778 (2001); Polizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 1311, 1322 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, sub nom., Palazzolo v. United States, 495 U.S. 933, 110 S.Ct. 2175, 109 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990). Unlike RCr 9.26, which requires that waiver of the right to trial by jury be in writing, there is no rule or statute specifying the proper method for waiving the right to be present at every critical stage of the trial.
In Richmond v. Commonwealth, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 642 (1982), this Court unanimously held that an attorney could waive a defendant’s right to attend a pretrial deposition that would be used as testimony against him at trial (as opposed to here, where none of the testimony elicited at the competency hearing was used at trial). Although it is asserted that it was the defendant in Richmond, not his attorney, who waived his right to be present at the deposition, the opinion does not support that assertion.
Richmond himself was not present, but-it is abundantly clear that he could have been if his attorney had so chosen.
Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
Appellant primarily relies on the plurality opinion in Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 900 (1989). Dean does not mention Richmond, much less purport to overrule it. And suffice it to say that “[a] minority opinion has no binding precedential value ... [and] if a majority of the court agreed on a decision in the case, but less than a majority could agree on the reasoning for that decision, the decision has no stare decisis effect.” Ware v. Commonwealth, Ky., 47 S.W.3d 333, 335 (2001) (quoting 20 Am.Jur.2d, Courts, § 159 (1995)).
Nor do the other cases cited by Appellant support his proposition. Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir.1986), only held that the defendant had a right to be present at his competency hearing but did not address the issue of waiver of that right. Hill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 95 (1971), did not involve a competency hearing, but a post-trial evidentiary hearing at which twenty-eight witnesses testified with respect to the merits of the defendant’s post-trial motions. The defendant and her counsel were not notified of *20the hearing and did not attend. The trial judge denominated the hearing a “court of inquiry.” When an associate of the defendant’s attorney learned of the ex parte proceedings and requested an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, his request was denied on grounds that the hearing was an “investigation, not a trial.” Id. at 98. That is a far cry from a failure to appear at a hearing pursuant to an explicit waiver by counsel on grounds of a debilitating physical disability.
Appellant cites Conley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 569 S.W.2d 682 (1978), for the proposition that an “accused has the right to be present and to cross-examine witnesses,” but Conley was referring to “courts of inquiry” and “lunacy inquests.”
There was no court of inquiry or lunacy inquest involved in this action. Appellant was not about to lose his liberty by being involuntarily committed to a mental institution.
Id. at 685. The holding of the Court of Appeals on this issue was that Appellant was not entitled to a hearing on his competency to enter a guilty plea because “[t]he trial judge had no ‘reasonable doubt’ concerning appellant’s sanity to stand trial or to plead guilty.” Id. at 686. Conley did not involve an issue of voluntary waiver.
In Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C.Cir.1963), the defendant was present at the beginning of his trial, then voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom, but remained in custody in an adjacent United States Marshal’s office. Cross merely holds that the judge should have determined whether the defendant’s absence was voluntary. “The Government does not attempt to explain how, under Rule 43 [F.R.Cr.R. 43 is virtually identical to RCr 8.28], a person in continuing physical custody can ‘voluntarily absent’ himself.” Id. at 631.
None of these cases support the proposition that defense counsel cannot waive his client’s presence at a pretrial competency hearing. Thus, the crux of this issue is whether we should follow our unanimous opinion in Richmond or the plurality opinion in Dean. We conclude that Justice Leibsoris dissent on this issue in Dean makes far more sense than the inflexible rule urged by Appellant in this case:
Here, the waiver was explicit, and was made by counsel, presumably competent to judge whether his client was needed. I see no reason, constitutional or otherwise, to create a rule that counsel cannot waive his client’s presence at depositions [or, as here, at a pretrial competency hearing].
Dean v. Commonwealth, supra, at 910 (Leibson, J., concurring in part).

C. Failure to hold a second competency hearing.

Because Appellant was admitted to the University of Cincinnati Hospital on May 8, 1998, his trial was rescheduled from May 19 until June 1, 1998. On the morning of trial, Appellant moved for another continuance for the purpose of obtaining a new competency evaluation. The request was denied. The trial judge stated on the record that he had personally contacted Appellant’s attending physician at the hospital and had been assured that Appellant was physically able to attend trial, so long as oxygen was available to him. (Oxygen was available but was not used.) The hospital records introduced in support of the motion for continuance reflect an admission diagnosis of hypoxia. The only references in the records to Appellant’s mental status were “alert, oriented” and “little recollection of what happened earlier today.” It appears that Appellant was kept overnight and discharged the next day. Under these facts, the trial judge did not abuse his discre*21tion in overruling the motion for a continuance so that another competency evaluation could be obtained. Crawford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 847, 850-51 (1992); Mozee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 769 S.W.2d 757, 759 (1989); Pate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 769 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1989).

D. Defense counsel’s request to videotape the trial.

The Montgomery Circuit Court courtroom was not video-equipped at the time of this trial. The proceedings were recorded and transcribed by the official court reporter. Appellant requested that his privately retained cameraman be permitted to videotape the entire trial so that his inability to assist his attorney at trial could be demonstrated and preserved for appellate review. The trial judge allowed the cameraman to videotape Appellant during recesses but not while the trial was in progress.
A judge has a right and obligation to maintain control over his own courtroom so as to minimize or prevent activities that might distract the jurors during the course of the trial. Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 872, 884-85 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1034, 113 S.Ct. 1857, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993); Preston v. Commonwealth, Ky., 406 S.W.2d 398, 404-05 (1966). Generally, whether to permit cameras in the courtroom is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, § 198 (1991). SCR 4.310 (Appendix) specifies restrictions with respect to the use of cameras in the courtroom during trial and specifically provides that any such unofficial recordings shall not be admissible upon any appeal of such proceedings. Id. § 7. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting Appellant’s privately retained cameraman to videotaping inside the courtroom only during trial recesses.
II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES.

A. Admission of evidence of blood alcohol presumption.

The Kentucky State Police trooper who investigated the accident testified over objection that the blood alcohol level for which a state trooper will customarily make an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol is “per se, point one” (meaning 0.10). Evidence as to the amount of blood alcohol content necessary to establish a presumption of intoxication is inadmissible in the trial of any criminal offense other than a violation of KRS 189A.010. Walden v. Commonwealth, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 102, 103 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805 (1996); Overstreet v. Commonwealth, Ky., 522 S.W.2d 178, 179 (1975); Cormney v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 943 S.W.2d 629, 634 (1996). In each of the cited cases, however, the error was deemed harmless because there was ample other evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the collision.
Although the testimony of the investigating officer in this case technically did not inform the jury of the minimum blood alcohol content necessary to trigger the presumption of intoxication, it was close enough. But, as in the cited cases, there was also sufficient additional evidence of Appellant’s intoxication to render this testimony harmless. RCr 9.24. The investigating officer testified that full and empty beer cans were found in Appellant’s truck and on the ground around it at the scene of the collision. Blood drawn from Appellant after he was taken to the hospital revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.26. A waitress at a local restaurant who served Appellant shortly before the accident testified that his speech was slurred and that he was unsteady on his feet. Another *22witness testified that he encountered Appellant on the highway and that Appellant was driving so erratically that the witness believed he was drunk. Another witness testified that he was forced off the road when he encountered Appellant’s vehicle being driven in the wrong lane of travel, and of course, Appellant’s vehicle was still in the wrong lane of travel when it struck the vehicle occupied by the three victims.

B. Exclusion of evidence of Appellant’s physical condition.

During the penalty phase of the trial, Appellant proffered evidence as to his physical condition and resultant reduced life expectancy as evidence in mitigation of the penalty in this case. On the date this case was tried, KRS 532.055(2)(b) provided:
The defendant may introduce evidence in mitigation. For purposes of this section, mitigating evidence means evidence that the accused has no significant history of criminal activity which may qualify him for leniency. This section shall not preclude the introduction of evidence which negates any evidence introduced by the Commonwealth.
Since the evidence of Appellant’s physical condition and life expectancy did not relate to his history of criminal activity and did not negate any penalty phase evidence offered by the Commonwealth, it was excluded by the trial judge.
Effective ' July 15, 1998, KRS 532.055(2)(b) was amended to read as follows:
The defendant may introduce evidence in mitigation or in support of leniency. 1998 Ky. Acts, ch. 606, § 111.
Appellant asserts that this statute should have been applied retroactively to permit the introduction of the excluded evidence in support of leniency. KRS 446.110 allows mitigating provisions of new laws to be applied retroactively if the affected party consents. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Phon, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 106 (2000), we affirmed the imposition of a sentence of life without parole in a case where the crime was committed prior to the effective date of the amendment of KRS 532.030(1), but the sentence was imposed after that date. Here, the sentencing hearing was held before the effective date of the amendment to KRS 532.055(2)(b); thus, there was no amendment in effect that could be retroactively applied.
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed by the Montgomery Circuit Court are affirmed.
LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
KELLER, J., dissents by separate opinion with STUMBO, J., joining that dissenting opinion.