Court Opinion

ID: 9898013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:48.599406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:09.083155
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
                      (not the court’s final written decision)

The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

           ANTHONY DEIEN, on behalf of himself
           and all others similarly situated,                DIVISION ONE

                                Respondent,                  No. 84056-8-I

                         v.                                  PUBLISHED OPINION

           SEATTLE CITY LIGHT,

                                Respondent,

           MATTHEW PAMPENA,

                          Appellant/Objector.

                 DWYER, J. — When the trial court determines that a class action

          settlement agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, we intervene in the

          judicially approved settlement only on a clear showing that the court abused its

          considerable discretion in so ruling. Moreover, we will not conclude that the trial

          court abused discretion that it had no opportunity to exercise due to an objector’s

          failure to raise a particular objection to the settlement before that court. Indeed,

          the general rule that an argument must be presented to the trial court in order to

          be preserved for appeal is particularly salient in the context of a class action

          settlement, where due process concerns mandate that putative class members

          are informed regarding proposed objections.

                 Here, Matthew Pampena issued the sole objection to a class action

          settlement agreement between Seattle City Light and Anthony Deien, a former
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/2

          customer of the public utility. At the final approval hearing, the trial court

          overruled Pampena’s objection and approved the settlement agreement.

          Pampena appealed. In resolving the issues presented, we first decline to review

          an objection to the settlement that Pampena failed to raise in the trial court. We

          next conclude that the sole objection that is preserved on appeal does not

          undermine the sufficiency of the trial court’s reasons for approving the

          settlement. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling

          that the settlement agreement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Accordingly, we

          affirm the trial court’s approval of the class settlement.

                                                     I

                 On August 21, 2019, Anthony Deien, a former Seattle City Light (SCL)

          customer, filed a class action complaint against the public utility in the King

          County Superior Court. The complaint alleged that SCL inaccurately

          estimated electricity meter readings following its attempt to transition to digital

          meter readers, resulting in estimated bills to customers that were “often wildly

          inaccurate” and subsequent “true up” bills “that [were] five, ten, or even thirty

          times the amounts of [customers’] prior bills.” As a result, the complaint alleged,

          SCL “often charge[d] customers for electricity they did not use and charge[d]

          higher rates than the rates authorized by the municipal code.” Premised on

          these allegations, the complaint asserted claims for breach of contract and the

          duty of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Washington Consumer

          Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW, and violation of chapter 80.04 RCW

          and WAC 480-100.

                                                     2
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/3

                   During discovery, Deien obtained nearly 70,000 pages of documents and

          millions of billing data records. Both Deien and SCL engaged experts to conduct

          analyses of the voluminous billing records. The parties thereafter engaged in

          mediation in November 2020 and February 2021. After more than six months of

          additional negotiations, Deien and SCL finalized and executed a settlement

          agreement resolving the asserted claims. Throughout the parties’ negotiations, a

          motion to dismiss the case, having been filed by SCL, was pending in the trial

          court.

                   On September 29, 2021, Deien filed a motion for preliminary approval of

          the settlement agreement. The trial court granted preliminary approval and set

          forth a deadline by which putative class members were required to file any

          objections to the settlement. On February 28, 2022, Matthew Pampena filed the

          sole objection to the settlement agreement. While the agreement included both

          significant monetary relief and multiple forms of injunctive relief, Pampena

          objected on the basis of a single injunctive relief provision in the agreement.

          Specifically, he asserted that the agreement’s application of an “estimated

          [electricity] usage table,” required to be used by SCL in performing billing

          recalculations, would not provide meaningful relief to putative class members.

                   On April 15, 2022, following a final approval hearing, the trial court

          overruled Pampena’s objection and granted final approval of the settlement

          agreement. The court conditionally certified the class for settlement purposes

          and determined that notice to the settlement class members was sufficient. With

          regard to Pampena’s objection, the court explained: “The Court can only approve

                                                      3
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/4

          or deny the Settlement agreed to by the parties, not modify it. The Court does

          not agree that the injunctive relief provisions as written will make it too difficult for

          consumers to have bills recalculated in appropriate cases.”

                 The trial court further found:

                         11.    The Settlement is the result of arms’ length
                 negotiations conducted in good faith by experienced attorneys
                 familiar with the legal and factual issues of this case.
                         12.    The Settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in
                 the best interests of the Settlement Class in light of the complexity,
                 expense, and duration of litigation, as well as the risk involved in
                 establishing liability and damages and in obtaining and maintaining
                 the class action through trial and appeal.
                         13.    The consideration provided by the Settlement
                 constitutes fair value given in exchange for the release of the
                 Settlement Class Members’ Released Claims against the Released
                 Parties. The Court finds that the consideration provided to the
                 Settlement Class Members is reasonable, considering the facts and
                 circumstances of the claims and defenses asserted in the action,
                 and the potential risks and likelihood of success of pursuing class
                 certification and trial on the merits.

                 Thus, the court granted final approval of the settlement agreement “as fair,

          reasonable, adequate, just, and in compliance with all applicable requirements of

          the applicable laws, and in the best interest of the Settlement Class.”

                 Pampena appeals.

                                                      II

                 On appeal, Pampena asserts for the first time that the settlement

          agreement is structured to avoid meaningful oversight of SCL’s compliance with

          its provisions and, thus, that the trial court erred in granting final approval of the

          settlement. We adhere to the longstanding rule that a litigant may not raise an

          argument on appeal that he refrained from raising in the trial court, particularly

                                                      4
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/5

          when, as here, the rationale for applying that rule is especially salient.

          Accordingly, we decline to address this assertion of error.

                 Generally, we will not entertain claims of error on appeal that were not first

          presented to the trial court. RAP 2.5(a). This rule “reflects a policy of

          encouraging the efficient use of judicial resources.” State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d

          682, 685, 757 P.2d 492 (1988). It does so by discouraging litigants from

          “remain[ing] silent as to claimed error during trial and later, for the first time,

          urg[ing] objections thereto on appeal.” Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Lee, 70

          Wn.2d 947, 950, 425 P.2d 902 (1967). While we retain the discretion to consider

          an issue not raised in the trial court, we rarely exercise such discretion. Karlberg

          v. Otten, 167 Wn. App. 522, 531, 280 P.3d 1123 (2012).

                 In the trial court, Pampena raised only one objection to the approval of the

          settlement agreement—that a sole injunctive relief provision setting forth the

          method for performing billing recalculations does not provide sufficient relief to

          unnamed putative class members. On appeal, however, Pampena additionally

          requests that we reverse the trial court’s approval of the settlement agreement on

          another basis. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court erred by approving the

          settlement agreement because, according to Pampena, the agreement fails to

          provide for meaningful oversight of SCL’s compliance with its provisions. In his

          briefing and at oral argument, Pampena contended that these claims of error are

          indistinguishable. They are not. Indeed, nowhere in his objection in the trial

          court did Pampena even reference any such “oversight.” Thus, we find

                                                      5
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/6

          unpersuasive his suggestion that this claim of error was, indeed, presented to the

          trial court.

                  Accordingly, we must determine whether to entertain the merits of this

          claim of error on appeal. We decline to do so. Pertinent to our decision is the

          particular significance in this context of the application of the rule that issues not

          raised in the trial court are unpreserved on appeal. When an objector asserts a

          purported defect with a proposed class settlement that was not presented to the

          trial court, both the court and the parties are prevented from timely addressing

          any defects with the settlement that are meritorious. Moreover, reviewing

          unpreserved objections for the first time on appeal deprives class members of

          their right to be apprised of the nature of any objection to the class settlement.1

                  The trial court’s limited role in reviewing class settlements further dictates

          that objections thereto be first presented to that court. In reviewing a class

          settlement, the court is not

                  empowered to rewrite the settlement agreed upon by the parties.
                  [It] may not delete, modify, or substitute certain provisions of the
                  consent decree. [While the court] may suggest modifications, . . .
                  ultimately, it must consider the proposal as a whole and as
                  submitted. Approval must then be given or
                  withheld. . . . In short, the settlement must stand or fall as a whole.

                    1 In some cases, federal courts have relaxed the standard for waiver in class actions.

          They have done so when circumstances prevented an objection from being raised in the trial
          court or when permitting waiver was otherwise in the best interest of class members. See, e.g.,
          Saucillo v. Peck, 25 F.4th 1118, 1130 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that “an objector need not be an
          oracle and predict issues that will arise for the first time in the district court’s final order”); In re
          Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 430 (3d Cir. 2016)
          (recognizing that “in many instances class members are far removed from the litigation and lack
          the information and incentive to object”); In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 714 (7th
          Cir. 2015) (rejecting the waiver argument when the objecting class members were unaware of the
          conflict of interest in the trial court). Here, Pampena was not precluded from raising this objection
          in the trial court, and the interests of the putative class members as a whole weigh in favor of
          waiver.

                                                             6
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/7

          Officers for Just. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 630 (9th Cir. 1982).

          However, the court may deny without prejudice the approval of a settlement

          agreement, explaining the deficiencies that foreclosed such approval and

          allowing the parties an opportunity to address the settlement’s shortcomings.

          See, e.g., Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1050 (9th Cir. 2019)

          (identifying “several aspects of the settlement that . . . cast serious doubt on

          whether the settlement meets the applicable fairness standard”); Haralson v.

          U.S. Aviation Servs. Corp., 383 F.Supp.3d 959, 967 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

          (deferring a ruling on class certification “until the parties have corrected the

          deficiencies in the Settlement”). Thus, it is in the interests of the class members

          that any objections to the settlement are timely raised in the trial court, allowing

          the parties to address any meritorious complaints without risk of delaying

          settlement due to challenges that are without merit.

                 In class action cases, the courts have “an independent obligation to

          protect the interests of the class.” In re Nat’l Football League Players

          Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 430 (3d Cir. 2016); see also In re Gen.

          Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d

          Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “the court plays the important role of protector of the

          absentees’ interests, in a sort of fiduciary capacity”). Here, we fulfill that

          obligation by declining to review for the first time on appeal Pampena’s objection

          to the settlement agreement on the purported basis that it fails to provide for

          meaningful oversight of SCL’s obligations thereunder.

                                                     7
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/8

                                                    III

                 Pampena additionally contends, as he did in the trial court, that the

          injunctive relief provision setting forth the method for performing billing

          recalculations does not provide meaningful relief to the unnamed putative class

          members. Thus, he asserts, the trial court erred by approving the settlement

          agreement. We disagree. The trial court properly considered the appropriate

          factors in exercising its discretion to approve the settlement agreement, and the

          record is devoid of any indication that the court abused its discretion in so ruling.

          Indeed, Pampena’s objection, which, in any event, is unsupported by the terms of

          the agreement, does not specifically attack the sufficiency of the trial court’s

          reasoning. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s final approval of the settlement

          agreement.

                                                    A

                 “‘The class action device, while capable of the fair and efficient

          adjudication of a large number of claims, is also susceptible to abuse and carries

          with it certain inherent structural risks.’” Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours,

          Inc., 145 Wn.2d 178, 187, 35 P.3d 351 (2001) (quoting Officers for Just., 688

          F.2d at 623). Civil Rule 23 is designed to guard against such risks, including by

          requiring that “[a] class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the

          approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall

          be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.” CR

          23(e). “Although CR 23 is silent in guiding trial courts in their review of class

          settlements, it is universally stated that a proposed class settlement may be

                                                    8
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/9

          approved by the trial court if it is determined to be ‘fair, adequate, and

          reasonable.’” Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 188 (quoting Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power

          Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993)).

                 The trial court’s determination involves a balancing of several factors,

          including

                 the likelihood of success by plaintiffs; the amount of discovery or
                 evidence; the settlement terms and conditions; recommendation
                 and experience of counsel; future expense and likely duration of
                 litigation; recommendation of neutral parties, if any; number of
                 objectors and nature of objections; and the presence of good faith
                 and the absence of collusion.

          Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 188-89. This list of factors “is not exhaustive, nor will each

          factor be relevant in every case.” Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 189. However, the

          court’s “role in evaluating a proposed settlement must be tailored to fulfill [these]

          objectives.” Officers for Just., 688 F.2d at 625.

                 Due to the consensual nature of settlements, the trial court’s inquiry is

          “delicate” and “largely unintrusive.” Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 189.

                 “[T]he court’s intrusion upon what is otherwise a private consensual
                 agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must be
                 limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that
                 the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or
                 collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement,
                 taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all
                 concerned.”

          Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 189 (alteration in original) (quoting Officers for Just., 688

          F.2d at 625). “It is not the trial court’s duty, nor place, to make sure that every

          party is content with the settlement.” Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 189. Nor is the

          proposed settlement “to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure

                                                     9
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/10

          of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.” Officers for Just., 688

          F.2d at 625.

                 Our task on appeal is even more limited than that of the trial court. In our

          review of an order granting approval of a class settlement, we accord great

          weight to the trial judge’s views. Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 189-90. This is so

          because

                 “[the trial judge] is exposed to the litigants, and their strategies,
                 positions and proofs. He is aware of the expense and possible
                 legal bars to success. Simply stated, he is on the firing line and
                 can evaluate the action accordingly.”

                 “In fact, so much respect is accorded the opinion of the trial court in
                 these matters that [we] will intervene in a judicially approved
                 settlement of a class action only when the objectors to that
                 settlement have made a clear showing that the [trial court] has
                 abused its discretion.”

          Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 189-90 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation

          marks omitted) (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 454-55

          (2d Cir. 1974)).

                                                    B

                 Here, in approving the class settlement as “fair, reasonable, adequate,

          [and] just,” the trial court evaluated the settlement pursuant to the factors set

          forth above. For instance, the court considered “the facts and circumstances of

          the claims and defenses asserted in the action, and the potential risks and

          likelihood of success of pursuing class certification and trial on the merits.” The

          court indicated that the likelihood of success on plaintiffs’ CPA claim “was a valid

          concern.” Indeed, SCL’s motion to dismiss the complaint was pending during the

                                                    10
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/11

          parties’ negotiations. Such uncertainties at the time of settlement “weigh[]

          heavily in favor of a finding that the settlement was fair, adequate, and

          reasonable.” Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 192.

                 The trial court additionally found that, given class counsel’s skill and

          experience, counsel’s support of the settlement was entitled to great weight.

          This finding is supported by the record, which demonstrates that class counsel

          has significant experience litigating class action lawsuits, and that counsel’s law

          firm has tried numerous such actions, obtaining significant relief for class

          plaintiffs. The trial court properly considered that, “[w]hen experienced and

          skilled class counsel support a settlement, their views are given great weight.”

          Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 200.

                 The trial court additionally considered the future expense and likely

          duration of litigation, as well as the putative class members’ reaction to the

          settlement, in evaluating whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and

          adequate. See Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 188-89. The court found that approval of

          the settlement was appropriate “in light of the complexity, expense, and duration

          of litigation, as well as the risk involved in establishing liability and damages and

          in obtaining and maintaining the class action through trial and appeal.” The court

          determined that the putative class members were provided “the best notice

          practicable” and noted that only one such class member, Pampena, had filed an

          objection to the settlement. Such factors further weigh in favor of settlement

          approval.

                                                   11
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/12

                  Finally, the trial court found that the settlement agreement “is the result of

          arms’ length negotiations conducted in good faith by experienced attorneys

          familiar with the legal and factual issues of this case.” This finding of good faith

          and the absence of collusion supports the court’s approval of the settlement.2

          See Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 188-89. Relatedly, the record demonstrates that the

          parties engaged in extensive discovery and obtained expert analysis of

          voluminous billing records prior to settlement negotiations. Such facts further

          support the trial court’s approval of the settlement. See Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at

          199.

                                                         C

                                                          1

                  Each of these considerations supports the trial court’s determination that

          the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Taken together, they weigh

          heavily against a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by approving

          the settlement. Nevertheless, Pampena asserts that the injunctive relief

          provision setting forth the method for performing billing recalculations does not

          provide meaningful relief to the unnamed putative class members. We disagree.

                  Pampena’s objection is unsupported by the terms of the agreement.

          Moreover, his claim of error does not attack the sufficiency of the trial court’s

          reasoning for approving the settlement. Indeed, Pampena nowhere addresses

          the propriety of the trial court’s assessment of the pertinent considerations.

                  2 Pampena contends on appeal, without any basis for so asserting, that class counsel

          breached a fiduciary duty to the putative class members. He points to no evidence of collusion or
          bad faith, and the record is wholly devoid of any such evidence.

                                                         12
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/13

          Accordingly, we conclude that his assertion—that the trial court abused its

          discretion by approving the settlement—is wholly without merit.

                 In addition to providing significant monetary relief, the settlement

          agreement provides for injunctive relief requiring SCL to improve its customer

          service and consumer billing procedures in six specific ways. Pampena objects

          to only one of these injunctive relief provisions. The challenged provision

          requires SCL to “develop and use an estimated usage table to calculate or

          recalculate a customer’s bill and to then adjust the bill” when an estimated or a

          subsequent “[t]rue-up” bill results from one of three conditions. Those conditions

          include (1) an uninstalled meter, (2) a problem or delay by SCL in loading the

          meter reads, (3) or a determination by SCL, following an investigation, that the

          bill “is not attributable to Customer Conduct.”

                 The “estimated usage table,” pursuant to which billing recalculations are

          made, includes “three billing levels to which a bill will be adjusted.” These billing

          levels are based on both premise size and the existence of high electricity usage

          features, “such as a lighted greenhouse or pool.” Pursuant to the agreement,

          “[t]he Normal billing level will apply to the majority of residential customers,”

          whose pertinent bills will be recalculated “at 70% of the average electricity

          consumption of [an SCL] customer.” It additionally provides for billing

          recalculation “set at 50% of the average electricity consumption” of an SCL

          customer and “130% of the average electricity consumption” for the “Below

          Average” and “Above Average” billing levels, respectively.

                                                    13
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/14

                 Pampena concedes that, because the “estimated usage table” is set at a

          level below the average electricity consumption for SCL customers as a whole,

          the billing recalculations made pursuant to the agreement are likely to provide a

          significant benefit to consumers. He nevertheless challenges the provision

          stating that such relief will be available when, following an investigation, SCL

          concludes that the estimated bill or subsequent “[t]rue-up” bill is “not attributable

          to Customer Conduct.” According to Pampena, the agreement should instead

          place the burden of establishing the source of billing errors on SCL itself, rather

          than providing relief when an inaccurate bill is “not attributable” to the actions of

          the customer.

                 However, in overruling Pampena’s objection, the trial court found that “the

          injunctive relief provisions as written” will not “make it too difficult for consumers

          to have bills recalculated in appropriate cases.” The record supports this finding.

          The agreement both defines “Customer Conduct” and, in an exhibit to the

          agreement, requires SCL to offer use of the “estimated usage table” to

          recalculate a customer’s bill when the increased billing “remains unexplained”

          following the investigation.3 Thus, Pampena’s suggestion that SCL will be

          permitted to simply attribute billing inaccuracies to customer conduct is contrary

          to the language of the agreement itself.

                 3 Pursuant to the agreement, “Customer Conduct”

                 means any action by the [SCL] customer or person acting on the customer’s
                 behalf that directly or indirectly affects the amount of electricity metered, such as
                 increased actual electricity usage, theft, current diversion, fraud, restricting
                 access to the meter or other equipment on the premises, or customer’s failure to
                 timely report a move-in date or start of service.

                                                          14
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/15

                                                           2

                  Pampena additionally misunderstands the role of the court in assessing

          the sufficiency of a class action settlement. The trial court is neither “presented

          with a choice between alternative remedies” nor “empowered to rewrite the

          settlement agreed upon by the parties.” Officers for Just., 688 F.2d at 630. The

          court “may not delete, modify, or substitute certain provisions of the consent

          decree.” Officers for Just., 688 F.2d at 630. Rather, “it must consider the

          proposal as a whole and as submitted.” Officers for Just., 688 F.2d at 630.

          Furthermore, ensuring that “every party is content with the settlement” would be

          an intrusion by the trial court on the private agreement that would “contravene

          the very nature of consensual settlements.” Pickett, 145 Wn.2d at 189.

                  This understanding of the trial court’s role in evaluating class action

          settlements, which has eluded Pampena here, must inform our review of the

          court’s settlement approval. Were the trial court to have denied Deien’s motion

          for final settlement approval, the significant monetary and injunctive relief

          provided in the settlement would have been put at risk.4 As the trial court

          recognized, the plaintiffs would have faced significant hurdles were the case to

          have proceeded to litigation. Moreover, even had the parties agreed to a revised

          settlement, the putative class members would have incurred significant delay in

          receiving the relief to which they are entitled pursuant to the agreement.

                   4 We note that much of the injunctive relief set forth in the agreement would likely not

          have been available to the plaintiffs were this litigation resolved on the merits. The CPA provides
          for prospective injunctive relief to enjoin further violations of the act. RCW 19.86.090. Such relief
          can be obtained only upon serving the attorney general with the pleading alleging a CPA
          violation. RCW 19.86.095.

                                                           15
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
          No. 84056-8-I/16

                 When evaluating a class action settlement, “[i]t is the complete package

          taken as a whole, rather than the individual component parts, that must be

          examined for overall fairness.” Officers for Just., 688 F.2d at 628. Here, the trial

          court did precisely that. The settlement agreed to by the parties sets forth

          extensive relief, both prospective and retrospective, for SCL customers.

          Pampena’s objection to a single injunctive relief provision, even if that objection

          had accurately reflected the agreement, is a far less significant consideration

          than he suggests. Additionally, Pampena wholly disregards the pertinent

          considerations of the trial court in evaluating the settlement.

                 For all of the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court

          properly exercised its discretion in granting final approval to the proposed

          settlement agreement.

                 Affirmed.

          WE CONCUR:

                                                   16