Court Opinion

ID: 9567561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:55:34.585354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:40.829140
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent.
The facts essential to be stated are these: Bell is an osteopathic physician with offices in Seattle. Two men, who were police officers, came to his office and asked for some amphetamine tablets by a trade name. Bell asked if they were patients, and they replied that they were. Without further inquiry, Bell then sold each of them 30 tablets of the dangerous drug which they had requested.
*677The pertinent portion of Laws of 1955, ch. 24, § 1, p. 164 (now RCW 69.50.308),1 the statute under which Bell was charged, is as follows:
It shall be unlawful for a person, firm, or corporation to sell, give away, [dangerous drugs] . . . except upon the written or oral order or prescription of a physician, surgeon, dentist, or veterinary surgeon licensed to practice in the state, and shall not be refilled without the written or oral order of the prescriber: Provided, That the above provisions shall not apply to the sale at wholesale by drug jobbers, drug wholesalers, and drug manufacturers to pharmacies or to physicians, dentists* or veterinary surgeons, nor to each other, nor to the sale at retail in pharmacies by pharmacists to each other or to physicians, surgeons, dentists or veterinary surgeons licensed to practice in this state; . . .
Bell’s position is that he is specifically excepted from the prohibition of the statute because he is a physician and that the italicized portion of the following instruction, which the court gave, does not appear in the statute and is erroneous:
Under the laws of the state of Washington, sale or dispensing of a dangerous drug is a crime, except upon the written or oral order or prescription of a physician, surgeon, dentist, or veterinary surgeon duly licensed to practice in the state of Washington.
However, a physician may sell or dispense dangerous drugs if in good faith and in the course of his professional practice for therapeutic purposes only.
(Italics ours.)
Basically, the question is: Did the legislature in enacting RCW 69.40, entitled “Poisons and Dangerous Drugs,” intend to except physicians from the prohibition of dispensing dangerous drugs absolutely, or did it except physicians from the prohibition only if the drugs were dispensed in good faith in the course of professional practice for therapeutic purposes?
*678The purpose of RCW 69.40 is plain enough; it is to regulate the sale of dangerous drugs. In so doing, the legislature gave certain powers to allow physicians and others to prescribe and dispense drugs in the course of professional treatment for legitimate medical purposes. This is true because in another section of the act (RCW 69.40.064) it is provided:
A prescription, in order to be effective in legalizing the possession of dangerous drugs, must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by one authorized to prescribe the use of such dangerous drugs. An order purporting to be a prescription issued to an addict or habitual user of dangerous drugs, not in .the course of professional treatment is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of this section; and the person who knows or should know that he is filling such an order, as well as the person issuing it, may be charged with violation of this chapter, A legitimate medical purpose shall include use in the course of a bona fide research program in conjunction with a hospital or university.
(Italics ours.)
Bell contends that the language of this section, or words of similar impact, may not be used in the instruction because he was only charged with violating the portion of Laws of 1955, ch. 24, § 1, p. 164, above quoted. I do not agree, because the rule as stated in State v. Houck, 32 Wn.2d 681, 684,203 P.2d 693 (1949) is:
Statutes in pari materia must be construed together. Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things; and in construing a statute, or statutes, all acts relating to the same subject matter or having the same purpose, should be read in connection therewith as together constituting one law. The object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the intent of the legislature, and it proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes having to do with related subject matters were governed by one spirit or policy, and were intended to be consistent and harmonious in their several parts and provisions.
Accord, State v. Rinkes, 49 Wn.2d 664, 306 P.2d 205 (1957); *679In re Cress, 13 Wn.2d 7, 123 P.2d 767 (1942); see also Beach v. Board of Adjustment, 73 Wn.2d 343, 438 P.2d 617 (1968).
The instruction that sale could be made “if in good faith and in the course of his professional practice for therapeutic purposes only” encompasses the same limitations and paraphrases the statutory language “for a legitimate medical purpose.” Even though deviation from the statutory language should not be encouraged, the test of an instruction is not a matter of semantics, but whether the jury was misled as to its functions and responsibilities under the law. State v. Hayes, 73 Wn.2d 568, 439 P.2d 978 (1968); State v. La Porte, 58 Wn.2d 816, 365 P.2d 24 (1961). Bell may not successfully urge upon the court that the statute gave him the authority to sell or dispense dangerous drugs in bad faith, outside the course of his professional practice for nontherapeutic purposes. This would be an absurd interpretation which we are not required to make. State v. Warbur-ton, 97 Wash. 242, 166 P. 615 (1917). The rule is well stated in State v. Rinkes, supra at 667, as follows:
Strict construction of a penal statute means merely that the punitive sanctions must be confined to such matters as are clearly and manifestly within the statutory terms and purposes. It does not mean that a forced, narrow, and over-strict construction should be applied to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.
I believe that Bell’s activities, as found by the jury, fall clearly and manifestly within the statutory terms and purposes of RCW 69.40 and that he was well aware of the provisions thereof. He cannot be considered to be a stranger to the act. Rather, in the practice of his profession, he would be required to know its provisions concerning the sale and dispensing of drugs. See Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502, 69 L. Ed. 402, 45 S. Ct. 141 (1924); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348, 62 L. Ed. 763,38 S.Ct. 323 (1918).
Bell also assigns error to the failure of the court to give the following proposed instruction:
There is no statutory requirement under the laws of *680the State of Washington that a physician examine a person before administering, prescribing, or selling drugs to said person.
You are further instructed that a prescription for drugs is not required. Drugs may be sold upon the written or oral order of a physician, surgeon, dentist or veterinary surgeon, duly licensed to practice in the State of Washington.
The proposed instruction would, in effect, have advised the jury that physicians are unconditionally exempt from the act. I have rejected this theory for the reasons set forth above.
Bell assigns error to the introduction of evidence that one of his assistants had previously (1) sold amphetamines without prescription in his office and (2) intentionally recorded less than the correct amount of amphetamines sold. The assistant testified that she informed Bell of the sale of amphetamines without prescription shortly after each sale, and that the false record was made on Bell’s instruction. All of this evidence was relevant for the purpose of showing the absence of accident or mistake and, also, a common scheme or plan to sell drugs in the office on a casual basis. State v. Goebel, 40 Wn.2d 18,240 P.2d 251 (1952).
Bell claims that there was error in the introduction of the testimony of a lay witness as to the medical use of the dangerous drug. The witness testified from her own knowledge that the drug was used for diet control. It was therefore not a medical opinion requiring the testimony of an expert, but rather the statement of a fact within the knowledge of the witness. Harris v. Saunders, 113 Wash. 482, 194 P.533, 198 P. 393 (1920).
Finally, Bell has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. A review of the record discloses that there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury.
The judgment entered upon the verdict should be affirmed.
Petition for rehearing denied May 17, 1973.
Appealed to Supreme Court May 25, 1973.

This statute was RCW 69.40.060 and was superseded by the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.