Court Opinion

ID: 9439906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:53:07.751213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:41.821805
License: Public Domain

LYNCH, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately to stress my understanding that in Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983 arising out of a warrantless arrest the statute of limitations may typically, but does not necessarily, begin to run at the time of arrest.
There may be circumstances in which plaintiffs neither knew, nor had reason to know, at the time of their warrantless arrests that they had suffered a constitutional injury and so the statute would not begin to run upon arrest. Similarly, the arrest may lead to a chain of events leading to a different characterization of the entire constitutional injury, and so a different accrual date. See Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 654-55 (10th Cir.1990). That the common law of *5false arrest has often been interpreted to establish that the common law cause of action accrues upon the arrest1 does not answer the question of the accrual date for § 1983 actions. The Supreme Court in Albright v. Oliver, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and earlier cases, see, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), has instructed federal courts to look to the true nature of the constitutional claims being asserted, rejecting labels.
As Judge Cyr’s very thoughtful opinion states: “[t]he essential elements of actionable section 1983 claims derive first and foremost from the Constitution itself, not necessarily from the analogous common law tort.” Accordingly, the law does not, I believe, bind the accrual date for the constitutional tort in warrantless arrests inevitably and invariably to the date of arrest. The case of a warrant-less arrest is not before us, and no more now need be said.

. But see Justice Ginsburg’s views in her ring opinion in Albright v. Oliver, - U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 807, 814-817, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994).