Court Opinion

ID: 9779786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:45:30.646748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:40.736723
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the decision to deny the application for certificate of importance. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision answering the certified question in the negative. Here, the certified question requires us to examine the impact of the decree of adoption on Todd’s right to inherit from decedent. Todd, however, argues that he “is not attacking the decree of adoption,” contending instead that he is merely asserting his right to inherit from his natural father, decedent, under section 2 — 4(d)(1) of the Probate Act. Todd reasons as follows. He is the natural child of decedent. William subsequently adopted Todd. William is the brother of decedent. Decedent and William shared the same grandparents. Decedent’s and William’s grandparents were Todd’s great-grandparents. Thus, Todd concludes that he is decedent’s child under the exception in section 2 — 4(d)(1). I acknowledge Todd’s alleged family history; however, his argument that he “is not attacking the decree of adoption” is quite simply wrong. I agree with the majority that Todd is not attempting to be “un-adopted” or to challenge the fact that William is his adopted, and, therefore, legal father. Indeed that fact is integral to his claim of heir-ship. He is, however, challenging the express factual finding made by the circuit court in the adoption decree that Gary York is his natural father. Todd has a right under section 2 — 4(d)(1) only if he can establish that decedent is his natural father. Failure to establish this fact results in his inability to claim he falls within the exception articulated in section 2 — 4(d)(1). Unfortunately for Todd, the decree of adoption bars him from attempting to establish that decedent is his natural father. Again, this is because in the decree of adoption the court expressly found that Gary York is Todd’s natural father. Todd did not challenge this finding until the current action, which was filed approximately 19 years after Todd reached the age of majority. Thus, the decree of adoption must control. 750 ILCS 45/8(a)(1) (West 2006). Section 8(a)(1) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) provides, in pertinent part: “An action brought by or on behalf of a child *** shall be barred if brought later than 2 years after the child reaches the age of majority ***.” 750 ILCS 45/8(a)(l) (West 2006). The Act further provides: “In any civil action not brought under this Act, the provisions of this Act shall apply if parentage is at issue.” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/9(a) (West 2006). While the majority disagrees, I believe parentage is at issue in the case; it is the only basis for Todd’s claim of heirship. The fact that Todd filed a counterpetition to establish paternity confirms this point. Specifically, Todd is seeking to establish that decedent was his natural father, not Gary York. The provisions of the Parentage Act therefore apply (750 ILCS 45/9(a) (West 2006)) and the two-year limitation on actions brought under the Parentage Act has expired (750 ILCS 45/ 8(a)(1) (West 2006)). Thus, I would find that Todd is barred from attempting to establish that decedent is his natural father. While the majority relies upon section 8(c) of the Parentage Act1 in concluding that section 2 — 4(d)(1) of the Probate Act is still applicable, it ignores the fact that Todd only has a right under section 2 — 4(d)(1) if he can establish that decedent is his natural father. For reasons I have already discussed, Todd is barred from even attempting to establish this fact. Thus, Todd simply has no right to even assert under section 2 — 4(d)(1). In coming to this conclusion, I reject Todd’s reliance on section 3(c) of the Probate Act, which provides that the issue of heirship may be litigated “by any party interested therein in any place or court where the question may arise.” 755 ILCS 5/5 — 3(c) (West 2006). An “interested person” includes “one who has *** a financial interest[ ] [or] property right *** which may be affected by the action ***, including^] without limitation[,] an heir.” 755 ILCS 5/1 — 2.11 (West 2006). Because Todd has no interest cognizable under section 2 — 4(d)(1) of the Probate Act, he has no financial interest in decedent’s estate and therefore is not an “interested person” under the Probate Act. Finally, I believe the majority mistakenly finds support for its position in Tersavieh v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford, 143 Ill. 2d 74, 571 N.E.2d 733 (1991). I believe it is mistaken because of two factual differences that appear to me to be dispositive. First, I note that the facts of Tersavieh do not involve a challenge to findings in an adoption decree. And, second, the unrebutted affidavits in Tersavich established that prior to his death the decedent had acknowledged that he was the plaintiff’s father. Simply put, there was no “other” natural father of record in Tersavieh. Thus, given the facts of that case, the Tersavieh court expressly held that parentage was not at issue. Tersavich, 143 Ill. 2d at 81, 571 N.E.2d at 736. That is not our case. Here, we have an adoption decree that expressly finds that Gary York, not decedent, is Todd’s natural father. No alleged natural father other than Gary York has acknowledged (or can acknowledge) paternity. Indeed the decedent had no opportunity to acknowledge or deny paternity because the issue did not arise until after his death. Under these circumstances, it simply defies logic to conclude that parentage is not at issue in this case. The Tersavieh court would have found the limitations period of the Parentage Act applicable if parentage had been at issue. Tersavieh, 143 Ill. 2d at 81, 571 N.E.2d at 736. Since parentage is clearly at issue in the instant case, it is my position, not the majority’s, that is actually supported by the Tersavieh court’s reasoning. For the foregoing reasons, I would answer the'certified question in the affirmative and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.  Section 8(c) of the Parentage Act states: “This Act does not affect the time within which any rights under the Probate Act *** may be asserted beyond the time provided by law relating to distribution and closing of decedent’s estates or to the determination of heirship, or otherwise.” (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/8(c) (West 2006).