Court Opinion

ID: 9762649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:28:02.59425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:36.225499
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
The majority finds that an order denying the appellant’s petition for leave to file an amended pleading, asserting plaintiffs’ contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, is a final and appealable order. Under our current rules and case law, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are affirmative defenses which are waived if not raised in new matter. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030, 1082, Grota v. La Boccetta, 425 Pa. 620, 230 A.2d 206 (1967).
Furthermore, an immediate appeal must be sought. “[X]f review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost.” Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 73, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978). The majority’s conclusion is correct and I join. I write to address the need for reforming the rules of procedure relating to final orders and appealability.
In several recent cases the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that piecemeal appeals must be curtailed. In Bruno v. Elitzky, 515 Pa. 47, 526 A.2d 781 (1987), the Supreme Court held that an appeal of a sanction order for *624failure to respond to interrogatories is interlocutory despite the fact that the sanction order in Bruno precluded presentation of an affirmative defense. The court concluded that appeal of the sanction order must await the final disposition of litigation.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Hutchinson opined that the court was acting inconsistently. He noted that an order denying the plaintiff an opportunity to raise an affirmative defense was immediately appealable while a sanction order which had the same result for the plaintiff was not. He stated that unless the court overruled La Bocetta and its progeny, consistency required that the discovery sanction be viewed as a final order and appealable. Id., 515 Pa. at 52, 526 A.2d at 784.
Mr. Justice Papadakos, writing for the majority, responded to the dissent and expressed the need to stem the tide of premature appeals:
Mr. Justice Hutchinson has entered a dissent groping with the viability of Grota v. La Boccetta, 425 Pa. 620, 230 A.2d 206 (1967), which dealt with the substantive merits of an affirmative defense. By contrast, disposition of the case under review is based on the issue of a sanction order for failure to respond to interrogatories. This qualitative difference clearly distinguishes the two cases. But even more compelling is the yawning spectre of an avalanche of appeals which easily could overburden the judicial system. By insisting that sanctions are final orders, the dissent, in effect, would open the floodgates to perpetual judicial impermanence and impotence at the trial level and an unmanageable quantum of cases choking the appellate system.
Id. 515 Pa. at 50, n. 1, 526 A.2d at 782-83, n. 1.
Although the Supreme Court expressly limited its holding in Bruno to cases where a pre-trial sanction order precludes presentation of a defense, Bruno also presents a rationale which may herald a renewed review of what constitutes a final and appealable order. Mr. Justice Papadakos' rationale deserves broader application.
*625More recently, the Supreme Court embraced a stricter definition of what constitutes a final appealable order. In Wall v. Wall, 517 Pa. 29, 534 A.2d 465, 466-67 (1987), Mr. Chief Justice Nix, writing for the majority, adopted the principle that the proper time for appeal is when all matters have been resolved by the trial court. In the context of a divorce case, he concluded that an order that found a valid marriage between the parties was interlocutory because the trial court had not yet resolved other issues in the case relating to equitable distribution and alimony. In concluding that the decision as to the status of the parties alone was not final, the court stated:
The [trial] court's determination as to the validity of the marriage was merely its decision as to a particular legal issue without being a 'final' resolution of the overlying claim or cause of action____ The question of whether the declaration as to the validity of the marriage is a final order must thus be resolved in accordance with the standards and policies addressing interlocutory appeals.
Mr. Chief Justice Nix noted that the Supreme Court disfavored piecemeal appeals, because:
[A] policy which allows piecemeal appeals from a single case serves only to increase the cost of litigation, and favors the party with the greater resources, who can strategically delay the action at the expense of the indigent party.
Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 97, 501 A.2d 211, 215 (1985), quoted in Wall, 534 A.2d at 467.
Another recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case also restricts appealability. In Sweener v. First Baptist Church of Emporium, 516 Pa. 534, 533 A.2d 998 (1987). Justice Flaherty held that,
[a] pivotal consideration in determining whether an order is final and appealable is whether the plaintiff aggrieved by it has, for purposes of the particular action, been put “out of court” on all theories of recovery asserted against a given defendant for a given loss.
*626Id., 516 Pa. at 539, 533 A.2d at 1000. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
A strict definition of finality for purposes of appeal would limit the volume of the Pennsylvania appellate courts’ work load, would discourage delay, and would encourage the orderly and efficient administration of appellate review. See Pines, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice: Procedural Requirements and the Vagaries of Jurisdiction, 91 Dick.L.Rev. No. 1, 55, 58-59, n. 6. (1986).
As was recently stated in National Recovery Systems v. Perlman, 367 Pa.Super. 546, 533 A.2d 152, 154 (1987):
[B]oth the bench and bar would be better served by a return to the strict definition of a final order given in Pugar v. Greco: “one which usually ends the litigation, or alternatively, disposes of the entire case,” 483 Pa. 68, 73, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978), at least as to one party to the suit.
It is important to note that a stricter definition of final order does not deny review. In most cases it postpones review until the matter has been finally adjudicated at the trial level. Nor does it completely close the door to review of interlocutory orders. If one of the parties determines that immediate review of a non-final order is essential, he or she can seek such review under Pa.R.App.P. 312, or under Pa.R.App.P. 1501.
We note that in the federal courts F.R.Civ.P. 54(b) addresses final orders in cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the *627claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
With some flexibility, the rule requires that all matters be resolved at the trial level as a condition of appeal. In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980), Chief Justice Burger instructed that requests under Rule 54(b) should not be granted routinely and that the trial court should consider not only the equities involved in the case but also the efficient administration of justice.
I do not suggest the Rule 54(b) is the ideal solution for the efficient judicial administration in Pennsylvania. What I do point out is the need for reform. Confusion currently reigns in this area of the law. As Judge Del Sole cogently stated in his dissenting opinion in Zarnecki v. Shepegi, 367 Pa.Super. 230, 245, 246, 532 A.2d 873, 881 (1987) (Del Sole, J., dissenting):
The present state of the law in this area is confusing to say the least. Our appellate courts have held that the failure to immediately appeal one of these misnomered ‘final and appealable orders’ results in a loss of the right to have the trial court action later reviewed____ This in and of itself invites cautious counsel, when faced with the difficult question of determining whether or not an order is appealable, to take an immediate appeal, delay the litigation at the trial level and further burden the appellate courts of Pennsylvania____ The law in this area ... is unclear and dangerous to litigants and lawyers. A total re-examination and re-evaluation must be forthcoming so that these interlocutory appeals which are taken from misnamed “final orders” would not be permitted.
CAVANAUGH, J., joins this concurring opinion as well as the majority.