Court Opinion

ID: 9833862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:06:23.309707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:08.073590
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
On rehearing the warrantors advance the following propositions against our judgment, reforming the judgment entered against them on their warranty, and allowing interest from the 24th day of May, 1901, the date of their deed to appellants:
(1) “The court eri-ed in rendei-ing judgment against those defendants upon the warranty, because these defendants sold a lai-ge quantity of land in bulk without any pi-ovision that same was per acre, or that the same pi-ice should apply to all the acres, and if plaintiffs lose this land, thereby decreasing the acreage and not obtaining the amount called for in their deed, their remedy would not be upon the warranty as was held in the case of Nicholson v. Slaughter [Tex. Civ. App.] 217 S. W. 716, and in numerous other decisions of the coui-ts of Texas, and, the land having been sold in bulk, this court was without authority under the law to i-efoi-m the judgment, and render a judgment for the amount of the acreage lost at the average pi-ice per acre, wlieh large amounts of timber land of different values and containing various amounts of stumpage had been sold for a lump sum, there being no proof that the particular land had been sold at the average price, or that it was an avex-age of the total acreage, or that it was worth as much as the other lands, or that the sale had been on the acreage basis, or that this land had been sold at any particular amount.”
The following statement made by appellants, which is not controverted by warran-tors, disposes of this proposition:
“The evidence in this case showed that Y. A. Petty and G. A. Stemenberg conveyed this land to John H. Kirby on May 24, Í901, which title passed into the appellants; that G. A. Sternen-berg died in April, 1908, devising all of his property to his widow, Mrs. Emma B. Sternen-lxerg, defendant warrantor, who received all his property, which was in value worth more than $10,000. It was agreed that John H. Kirby paid $1.25 per acre for the land so conveyed to him.”
(2) “The court erred in reforming and rendering- judgment upon the warranty from the date of the original pui-ehase, because, in so finding and holding, this court holds contrary to and in effect ovei-rules the case of Huff v. Reilly, 64 S. W. 387.”
[13] As we understand the facts of this case, we are not in conflict with Huff v. Reilly, cited by warrantors. The facts show that warrantors’ grantees were never in possession of the land in controversy in this suit. When the grantee has not been in possession of the demised premises, “the measure of damages in a suit upon general warranty of title to land is the purchase money, with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment.” Fidelity Lumber Co. v. Ewing (Tex. Civ. App.) 201 S. W. 1175.
Appellants insist that we are in conflict with our holding in this case on the former appeal upon the issue of three years’ limitation. On the former appeal of this case (230 S. W. 871) we held:
“The insti-ucted verdict in favor of appellees cannot be sustained under the three-year statute. If E’roderick Lewis or his heirs sold this land to Samuel Rogers, or those holding under him, it follows that appellees did not hold title or color of title to support limitation .of three years.”
On this appeal we have said, on the issue of three years’ limitation:
“We adhere to our former rulings.”, ,
*981We were trying to say that appellees, under our holding, had a record title, and, consequently, did not need the benefit of the three-year statute of limitation; but, if we were wrong in this holding, and if appellees did not hold the record title, that then they could not recover on the three-year statute of limitation. So appellants are in error when they construe our opinion as holding “that appellees have neither title nor color of title.”
Again, appellant sáys:
“As the facts on this appeal and the former appeal are the same, this court must overrule its former opinion, or on this appeal hold that the appellees are trespassers.”
In all its details the facts on this appeal are not the same as on the former appeal. The former appeal was from an instructed verdict, and we were discussing the case from that standpoint. This appeal is from a jury verdict, thus presenting entirely different issues.
Appellant has very ably reviewed the many authorities in Texas on the issue of prior possession, to wit: House v. Reavis, 89 Tex. 626, 35 S. W. 1063; Watkins v. Smith, 91 Tex. 589, 45 S. W. 560; Teagarden v. Patten, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 571, 107 S. W. 909; Boyd v. Miller, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 165, 54 S. W. 411; Duren v. Strong, 53 Tex. 379; Caplen v. Drew, 54 Tex. 493; Parker v. Railway, 71 Tex. 132, 8 S. W. 541; Texas Co. v. Dunn, 81 Tex. 1, 16 S. W. 647, 26 Am. St. Rep. 776; Lockett v. Glenn (Tex. Sup.) 65 S. W. 482; Buie v. Penn (Tex. Civ. App.) 172 S. W. 547; Keys v. Mason, 44 Tex. 140; Linard v. Crossland, 10 Tex. 462, 60 Am. Dec. 213; Randell v. Robinson (Tex. Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 717; Christy v. Scott, 14 How. 282, 14 L. Ed. 422; Randell v. Robinson (Tex. Civ. App.) 211 S. W. 625; Mortimer v. Jackson (Tex. Com. App.) 206 S. W. 510; Frazer v. Seureau, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 416, 128 S. W. 649; Allen v. Vineyard (Tex. Civ. App.) 212 S. W. 266. We based our disposition of this cause on & ruling of this court in McCarthy v. Houston Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 221 S. W. 307, where we said:
“Plaintiff’s possession, if any, was under a void deed. This negatived any‘presumption of title from a showing made by plaintiffs of pri- or possession.”
As we understand the facts of that ease on prior possession, appellants had a stronger case than is presented on this appeal. Since filing our opinion herein on the 16th ultimo, the Commission of Appeals, while reversing the disposition made by us of the McCarthy Case, quoted with approval the above proposition.
The motions for rehearing filed herein are in all things overruled.