Court Opinion

ID: 9567186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:50:14.437645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:22.338191
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
concurring.
Although I am in agreement with the court’s conclusion that a probationer’s conditional liberty may be revoked for criminal conduct without the necessity of formal charges and conviction, I think a facet of the superior court’s ruling in the case at bar is deserving of discussion.
The state has significant interests in pursuing probation revocation proceedings either separately or in addition to separate criminal proceedings.1 Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the state makes the decision to hold a revocation hearing prior *16to initiation of criminal proceedings, the possibility of a future criminal trial has an important impact upon the probationer’s decision whether or not to testify and whether or not to present a defense at the revocation proceeding. Consideration of such factors led the American Bar Association to recommend that:
A revocation proceeding based solely upon commission of another crime ordinarily should not be initiated prior to the disposition of that charge. However, upon a showing of probable cause that another crime has been committed by the probationer, the probation court should have discretionary authority to detain the probationer without bail pending a determination of the new criminal charge.2
This position has been adopted by the American Law Institute3 and, at least arguably, by several state legislatures.4
When the probation revocation proceeding is based upon alleged criminal conduct as to which the probationer’s innocence or guilt remains to be adjudicated in a criminal proceeding, there is the possibility of dilution of the probationer’s privilege against self-incrimination, since at the criminal trial the prosecutor may be able to use evidence which the probationer presented in the probation revocation proceeding. Thus, in many situations “. . • . the defendant is confronted with the choice of either producing evidence at the revocation hearing and thus providing the state with incriminating evidence, or not producing evidence and thus foregoing a valuable defense.”5 In my view this is a problem of some significance which calls for solution.
Admittedly, here we are not required to address this question since the criminal charges against DeVoe were dismissed and the state determined it would go forward only with the probation revocation proceedings.6 Nevertheless, I think the question discussed here is deserving of study by Alaska’s legislature and Bar so that a solution can be reached to the self-incrimination *17question for future probation or parole revocation proceedings which are based on allegedly criminal conduct which has not as yet been the subject of adjudication in a criminal proceeding.7

. As one commentator has noted:
Revocation hearings are not required to be procedurally equivalent to criminal trials for two reasons. First, the deprivation of conditional liberty that results from revocation is not as severe as the deprivation of absolute liberty that results from conviction of a crime. Second, both the state and the individual have an interest in ensuring that revocation hearings do not become overly adversarial and formal: As the Court emphasized in Gagnon, ‘[I]n the greater self-consciousness of its quasi-judicial role in an adversary proceeding the hearing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation.’ Moreover, a relatively informal revocation proceeding might be held earlier and more expeditiously than a criminal trial. The defendant who has not committed a violation can thus return quickly to the more normal life situation that the conditional liberty system assumes aids in rehabilitation. Furthermore, the state’s financial costs are substantially reduced by not requiring formal adversarial hearings. Finally, enabling a state to revoke conditional liberty with relative ease may encourage it to grant conditional liberty in more cases, since it will be able quickly to terminate the experiment if an individual proves unable to handle this limited freedom.
In addition to its interest in an informal revocation proceeding, the state also has an interest in holding a separate criminal trial: Because the punishment obtainable in a revo*16cation hearing must be within the range of permissible punishments for the first offense committed, the state, in order to discharge its duty of societal protection, may need a criminal trial to obtain a punishment commensurate with the severity of the second offense, (footnotes omitted)
Note, Revocation of Conditional Liberty for the Commission of a Crime: Double Jeopardy and Self-Incrimination Limitations, 74 Mich.L.Rev. 525, 528 (1976).

.ABA Standards Relating to Probation § 5.3 (Approved Draft 1970). The Commentary, at page 63, states:
The relative informality of a probation revocation proceeding, as compared to the trial of an original criminal charge, underlines the danger. Relaxation of rules of admissibility of evidence, the absence of a jury, a lesser burden of proof — factors such as these can lead to an abuse of the proceeding by basing revocation upon a new criminal offense when the offense could not be proved in an ordinary criminal trial. Additional complexity is introduced by the position in which the probationer is put as regards his privilege against self-incrimination: a revocation proceeding before trial of the charge on which it is based well could compromise the assertion of this fundamental constitutional right. Cf. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 [88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889] (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 [87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562] (1967); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 [87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574] (1967).
These problems can be minimized if the probation revocation proceeding is postponed until after the disposition of the new criminal charge. The record will then be clear and the possibilities of unfairness to the probationer will have been sharply reduced, particularly as they involve the privilege against self-incrimination. This standard accordingly suggests such postponement as an operating policy. Compare Model Penal Code § 301.3, comment at 150-51 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).

. Model Penal Code § 301.3.

. Revocation of Conditional Liberty, supra note 1, at 527-28, n. 13.

. Id. at 536-37.

. Compare McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1232-35 (Alaska 1975), where in the context of prison disciplinary hearings in which the prisoner is charged with a major infraction involving conduct which constitutes a felony, we discussed the applicable Division of Corrections’ regulations and the inmates’ privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel.

. In addition to the American Bar Association Standard, another proposed solution is to statutorily grant use immunity to the probationer or parolee at the revocation hearing. See Revocation of Conditional Liberty, supra note 1, at 553-54.