Court Opinion

ID: 9536147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:55:39.149129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:28.028531
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe that the majority opinion errs in its conclusion of law. As the majority opinion notes, the record amply demonstrates that Parker made threats of physical injury to fellow workers. Parker was advised by supervisory personnel to stop making such threats. He did not comply with that direction, but continued making threats, including one to blow up the employer’s plant. For that conduct he was discharged. Hence, I see no question presented in the instant case requiring any discussion of the burden of proof of employee misconduct.
The only remaining question is whether the conduct of Parker constituted “misconduct” as a matter of law. I can conceive of no state of facts that would more clearly demonstrate misconduct as a matter of law. The majority opinion agrees with the finding of the Industrial Commission that the threats were made while Parker was upset or angry, that the threats were only conditional and that Parker “never had any actual intention of carrying out his threat to destroy the employer’s plant.”
I applaud the majority of the Court and the Industrial Commission for their asserted ability to examine the mental processes of Parker. However, I note that this Court most recently in Matthews v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 619 P.2d 1110 (1980) (rehearing granted June 9, 1980), said that in the test for misconduct in standard-of-behavior cases, “[t]he employee’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant.”
Here there is nothing in the record to indicate that Parker was speaking in jest when he made the threats. Under such circumstances, I see no reason why an employer should be expected or required to tolerate threats of violence either toward other employees or to the physical security of the plant. I would hold that such constitutes misconduct as a matter of law.
DONALDSON, C. J., concurs.