Court Opinion

ID: 9913732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 18:00:38.705354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:37.767990
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 28 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAURIKIT, LLC,                                  No.    22-16527

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 4:20-cv-08733-YGR

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
APPLE, INC.,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of California
                Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

                    Argued and Submitted December 14, 2023
                            San Francisco, California

Before: KOH, H.A. THOMAS, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Partial Dissent by Judge DESAI.

      SaurikIT, LLC (“SaurikIT”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of its

antitrust suit against Apple, Inc. (“Apple”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846

F.3d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      1. The district court dismissed SaurikIT’s claims premised on Apple’s

warranty agreements because SaurikIT’s complaint, filed in 2020, alleged injury

based on conduct that occurred in 2008, and SaurikIT’s pleadings did not allege

new conduct within the four-year statute of limitations. SaurikIT argues that Apple

engages in an overt act that resets the statute of limitations every time it sells a new

iOS device with a warranty agreement that requires iOS users to use only the App

Store. But, as the district court found, the warranty term in question existed in

2008, and SaurikIT does not allege that the term has changed since. SaurikIT has

thus failed to allege that the new warranty agreements constitute anything more

than “a reiteration or extension of” prior ones. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Panasonic

Corp., 747 F.3d 1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs had sufficiently

alleged a new overt act where defendants met and adopted an anticompetitive

contract which expanded the scope of the alleged anticompetitive conspiracy and

stating that “the typical antitrust continuing violation occurs . . . when conspirators

continue to meet to fine-tune their cartel agreement” (cleaned up)). And permitting

new unchanged warranty agreements to establish continuing violations would

vitiate the purpose of the statute of limitations.

      2. SaurikIT also maintains that Apple’s contracts with iOS app developers

constitute continuing antitrust violations within the statute of limitations period.

But its complaint offers only conclusory allegations that the developer contracts

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“have not stayed static over the years,” were “modified” to “shore up perceived

holes,” and that these “ever-more-restrictive changes” occurred within the

limitations period. These conclusory statements do not meet the pleading

requirements set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009) (noting that a complaint does not

“suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’ . . . Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”); Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–60 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the

allegations in the complaint are true.” (cleaned up)). The district court therefore did

not err in dismissing this claim. Nor did the court err in concluding that SaurikIT

had not pled adequate facts to allege that Apple steered customers away from

Cydia through enforcement of its developer agreements, as SaurikIT makes only a

conclusory allegation that it was harmed by such enforcement. See Pace Indus.,

Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 238 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A]n overt act

which will restart the statute of limitations . . . must inflict new and accumulating

injury on the plaintiff.”).

       AFFIRMED.

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                                                                   FILED
SaurikIT, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 22-16527                         DEC 28 2023
                                                                MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
DESAI, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

      I respectfully dissent from Section 2 of the memorandum disposition. The

majority’s holding imposes a pleading burden beyond what is required to survive a

statute of limitations defense. I would hold that SaurikIT’s allegations about Apple’s

app developer agreements state a “continuing” antitrust violation within the statute

of limitations period. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Panasonic Corp., 747 F.3d 1199, 1202

(9th Cir. 2014).

      This court may uphold a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds only if,

construing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the

timeliness of the claim.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207

(9th Cir. 1995); see also Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 507 (9th Cir. 2017). And

we must reverse a dismissal when the timeliness of the claim depends on “factual

questions not clearly resolved” on the face of the complaint. Supermail Cargo, 68

F.3d at 1207. We should do so here.

      SaurikIT alleges that Apple’s developer agreements “have not stayed static

over the years,” but have been updated with “ever-more-restrictive changes” to

“shore up perceived holes in, and add new restrictions on, developers’ ability to use

alternative app stores and[] payment processing services.” The majority rebuffs
these allegations as “conclusory,” but SaurikIT need not detail each specific change

to the developer agreements to satisfy Rule 8. See Shields v. Credit One Bank, N.A.,

32 F.4th 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Iqbal did not require [the plaintiff] to include

more granular details about the exact nature” of her allegations); cf. Benavidez v.

County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining that, even

under a heightened Rule 9(b) standard, “a complaint need not allege ‘a precise time

frame,’ ‘describe in detail a single specific transaction’ or identify the ‘precise

method’ used to carry out the fraud.” (quoting United States v. United Healthcare

Ins., 848 F.3d 1161, 1180 (9th Cir. 2016))).

      Beyond that, SaurikIT alleges that Cydia previously operated since 2008 as

the “second-most successful iOS app distribution channel” for iOS users “despite all

the roadblocks that Apple threw its way.” And “Apple only really succeeded in

excluding all competing iOS app distribution and payment processing services from

the App Store in 2019 and 2020.” That is, SaurikIT contends that Apple’s more

restrictive developer agreements, combined with recent technological updates, have

finally “result[ed] in complete exclusion” of App Store alternatives like Cydia.

These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to show that Apple engaged in

overt acts during the statute of limitations period, including by “fine-tun[ing]” its

developer agreements to stave off competition. Samsung, 747 F.3d at 1204 (quoting

Midwestern Mach. Co. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 392 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 2004)).

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      For these reasons, I would reverse the district court’s dismissal of SaurikIT’s

claims. I respectfully dissent.

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