Court Opinion

ID: 9945628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 07:11:47.962895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:35.045298
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed February 26, 2024

                                       In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-01063-CV

                HENRY MISHKOFF, Appellant
                            V.
 T. CHASE GARRETT, SCHEEF & STONE, LLP, AND SONIA BRYANT,
                         Appellees

               On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 199-03472-2022

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel
                           Opinion by Justice Molberg
      Appellant Henry Mishkoff appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his libel

suit under the TCPA. He contends the trial court erred in (1) granting appellees’

motion to dismiss because he established a prima facie case for his claim,

(2) awarding appellees attorney’s fees because no evidence showed the fees were

incurred and appellees failed to segregate fees relating to the TCPA, (3) failing to

address appellees’ claims of privilege and immunity, (4) failing to disqualify counsel

for appellees for violations of the disciplinary rules, and (5) denying Mishkoff a fair
trial by deciding the TCPA motion on an artificially shortened timeline at appellees’

urging. We affirm in this memorandum opinion.

                                  I. Background

      Mishkoff and his neighbor, appellee Sonia Bryant, were involved in a property

dispute. Mishkoff sued Bryant seeking a declaration he had an implied easement on

Bryant’s property, and Bryant filed a trespass counterclaim against Mishkoff. Bryant

alleged Mishkoff entered her property numerous times without her consent for the

purpose of harassing her. Bryant alleged,

      Mishkoff veers far out of the express easement granted across her
      property. In each of these instances of claimed trespass, Mr. Mishkoff
      can make no claim, much less a credible claim, that he was exercising
      his rights to an “implied easement” as the photographic and
      videographic evidence shows him underneath Bryant’s carport or on
      other areas of the Bryant Property where he makes no claim to an
      implied easement.

      Then, in a statement particularly at issue here, Bryant alleged, “He simply

seems to enjoy exposing himself to her security cameras[.]”             Immediately

afterwards, Bryant included a security camera screenshot depicting Mishkoff, who

was clothed, standing under what appears to be a carport and smiling at the camera.

Bryant alleged, “in one instance, Mr. Mishkoff brought third parties that appeared to

be surveyors onto her property without her prior consent and the police were called.”

Below this allegation is another security camera screenshot depicting Mishkoff and

another person walking away from the camera in the same carport area as above.

Finally, Bryant alleged on other occasions Mishkoff entered upon her property

                                        –2–
without her permission to take pictures and conduct surveillance for purposes of the

lawsuit.

      On July 11, 2022, Mishkoff initiated a new proceeding and filed an original

petition, alleging Bryant, her lawyer, T. Chase Garrett, and his law firm, Scheef &

Stone, LLP—the three appellees before us—libeled Mishkoff in filing Bryant’s

trespass counterclaim.    Mishkoff alleged the counterclaim’s statement that he

enjoyed exposing himself to Bryant’s security cameras “clearly states that Plaintiff

enjoys showing his sexual organs to Defendant Bryant’s security cameras.”

Mishkoff based his contention upon Merriam-Webster’s definition of “expose

oneself,” which defines the idiomatic phrase as “to show one’s sexual organs in

public.” He argued there was “no reasonable non-defamatory interpretation of the

defamatory statement” and stated the accompanying image was “somewhat dark and

lacks contrast, so some viewers of the photo might not reach the conclusion that

Plaintiff is fully clothed, especially with the contradictory language in the

defamatory statement.”

      Appellees generally denied Mishkoff’s allegations, asserted several

affirmative defenses, including the judicial proceedings privilege, and filed a motion

to dismiss under the TCPA. In their motion to dismiss, appellees contended the

allegation in the counterclaim was that Mishkoff “not only trespassed on Ms.

Bryant’s real property, but seemed to do so while evincing conspicuousness.”

Appellees pointed out there were “no genitals on display in the photograph nor were

                                         –3–
any alleged to be anywhere in the text of the counterclaim.” They further stated,

“The only allegation in the counterclaim was that Mr. Mishkoff trespassed onto Ms.

Bryant’s real property and made sure he was in full display of her security cameras

when doing so.” Appellees argued Mishkoff’s legal action fell within the TCPA’s

scope because it was brought in response to appellees’ exercise of their right to

petition. They argued Mishkoff could not carry his burden to present clear and

specific evidence of a prima facie case for his defamation claim because the

statement in question was an opinion, and it further had no defamatory meaning

given the context of the counterclaim. Finally, they argued the statement was

absolutely privileged because it was made in a judicial proceeding, and furthermore,

the doctrine of attorney immunity shielded the attorney appellees from liability for

actions taken in connection with representing Bryant. Appellees also sought

damages under civil practice and remedies code § 27.009(a)(2) (court may award to

moving party under the TCPA sanctions against the party who brought the legal

action as the court determines sufficient to deter the party who brought the legal

action from bringing similar actions described in TCPA).

      In response, Mishkoff argued, among other things, the statement itself was

prima facie evidence because appellees “have accused [him] of committing a sexual

offense” and thus defamed him. Mishkoff also argued the judicial proceedings

privilege did not apply because the statement in question bore no relation to the

proceedings. Appellees replied, arguing, among other things, that Mishkoff was

                                        –4–
failing to read the statement in context as the law requires; in context, they said,

“[t]he general tenor of the pleading is that [Mishkoff] trespasses onto Ms. Bryant’s

property and appears to enjoy positioning himself within the view of her security

camera (i.e., ‘exposing himself’) while doing so.” Given the context of the rest of

the pleading, appellees argued, Mishkoff had not and could not prove the statement

had any defamatory meaning and the suit should be dismissed at step two of the

TCPA. As to the judicial proceedings privilege, appellees argued that, even if the

court interpreted the statement in question as Mishkoff did, it was “a statement about

what Plaintiff did while on [Bryant’s] property during the act of a trespass” and thus

bore “some relationship” to the judicial proceeding.

       The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss on August 25,

2022, where the parties reiterated the arguments they had presented in their filings.

       On September 23, 2022, the trial court1 granted appellees’ motion to dismiss,

ordered that Mishkoff take nothing, awarded $17,875 in attorney’s fees to appellees,

awarded appellees conditional appellate fees, and awarded a further $10,000 under

§ 27.009(a)(2) as a sanction to deter Mishkoff from bringing such actions in the

future.

                                         II. Discussion

   A. TCPA

   1
     Following two voluntary recusals and subsequent transfers by the presiding judge, this cause was
ultimately decided by Judge Angela Tucker.
                                                –5–
        In his first three issues, Mishkoff argues the trial court erred in granting

appellees’ TCPA motion to dismiss, awarding fees and sanctions under the TCPA,

and failing to address appellees’ privilege and immunity arguments, which he argues

were inapplicable.

1. Applicable law

        The TCPA protects citizens who petition or speak on matters of public concern

from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence them. In re Lipsky, 460

S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001–.011).2

Its purpose “is to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to

petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to

the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a

person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 27.002.

        Under the TCPA, a party may file a motion to dismiss a legal action “based

on” or “in response to a party’s exercise of the right to free speech, right to petition,

or right of association . . . .” Id. § 27.003(a). A three-step decisional process follows.

First, the trial court must dismiss the legal action “if the moving party demonstrates

that the legal action is based on or is in response to: (1) the party’s exercise of:

    2
      The 2019 amendments to the TCPA took effect on September 1, 2019, and apply “only to an action
filed on or after” that date, while “[a]n action filed before [that] date is governed by the law in effect
immediately before that date.” See Act of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, §§ 11–12, 2019 Tex.
Gen. Laws 684, 687. Because Mishkoff filed his legal action on July 11, 2022, the 2019 amendments apply
here.
                                                  –6–
(A) the right of free speech; (B) the right to petition; or (C) the right of association;

or (2) the act of a party described by Section 27.010(b).” Id. § 27.005(c).

       Second, the court “may not dismiss a legal action under this section if the

party bringing the legal action establishes by clear and specific evidence a prima

facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” Id. § 27.005(c). This

prima facie standard requires the nonmovant to bring forth “only the minimum

quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of

fact is true.” In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Prima facie evidence is evidence that will suffice

as proof of a fact in issue; “[i]n other words, a prima facie case is one that will entitle

a party to recover if no evidence to the contrary is offered by the opposite party.”

Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 358 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.).

       Finally, the court must dismiss the legal action if the movant “establishes an

affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d).

       “Legal action” under the TCPA “means a lawsuit, cause of action, petition,

complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that

requests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief.” Id. § 27.001(6). “Exercise of the

right to petition” means, among other things, a communication in or pertaining to a

judicial proceeding. Id. § 27.001(4). “‘Communication’ includes the making or

submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium, including oral, visual,

                                           –7–
written, audiovisual, or electronic.” Id. § 27.001(1). Judicial proceeding means an

actual, pending judicial proceeding. Levatino v. Apple Tree Cafe Touring, Inc., 486

S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied).              A communication

“pertaining to” a judicial proceeding does not include anticipated or potential future

judicial proceedings. Id. “To trigger the TCPA’s protection, the ‘legal action’ must

be factually predicated on the alleged conduct that falls within the scope of the

TCPA’s definition of the exercise of the right to petition.” Sorkin v. P.T. Atlas Mfg.,

L.L.C., No. 05-21-00657-CV, 2022 WL 780444, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 15,

2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      When the text of the TCPA dictates the outcome of a case, we review the trial

court’s ruling de novo. Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591

S.W.3d 127, 132 (Tex. 2019). In our review, we consider “the pleadings, evidence

a court could consider under Rule 166a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and

supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense

is based.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a); Dyer v. Medoc Health

Services, LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied).

      In construing the TCPA, we must determine and give effect to the

Legislature’s intent. See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25

(Tex. 2003). The best guide to what lawmakers intended is the enacted language of

a statute, “which necessarily includes any enacted statements of policy or purpose.”

Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018). Moreover, we determine

                                         –8–
legislative intent from considering an act as a whole rather than its parts in isolation.

City of San Antonio, 111 S.W.3d at 25. We construe the statute’s words “according

to their plain and common meaning, unless a contrary intention is apparent from the

context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results.” City of Rockwall v.

Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625–26 (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted). We “may not

judicially amend a statute by adding words that are not contained in the language of

the statute.” Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 508 (Tex. 2015).

2. Analysis

      On appeal, Mishkoff does not challenge the TCPA’s applicability, so we

presume without deciding that appellees met their burden under step one to prove

Mishkoff’s libel claim is based on or in response to their exercise of the right to

petition. See Buzbee v. Clear Channel Outdoor, LLC, 616 S.W.3d 14, 27 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.).

      Furthermore, because we conclude below that appellees have established an

affirmative defense to Mishkoff’s libel claim as a matter of law, we need not

determine whether he established a prima facie case for each element of his claim.

See Youngkin, 546 S.W.3d at 681 (assuming without deciding nonmovant met his

step-two burden in concluding movant was entitled to dismissal because he

established an affirmative defense); Rockman v. Ob Hospitalist Grp., Inc., No. 01-

21-00383-CV, 2023 WL 3311548, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 9,

2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Sinkin & Barretto, P.L.L.C. v. Cohesion Props.,

                                          –9–
Ltd., No. 04-20-00106-CV, 2021 WL 1649525, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr.

28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Watson v. Hardman, 497 S.W.3d 601, 608–09

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.) (concluding TCPA movant established

affirmative defense to defamation without first considering whether nonmovant met

his step-two burden); see also Temple v. Cortez Law Firm, PLLC, 657 S.W.3d 337,

344–48 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.) (concluding legal action was exempt from

TCPA without first deciding whether movant met step-one burden to show TCPA

applied).

        As noted above, appellees raised the judicial proceedings privilege as an

affirmative defense in their answer and in their TCPA motion to dismiss. Under this

privilege, communications in the due course of a judicial proceeding will not serve

as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander, regardless of the negligence or malice

with which they are made. Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d

40, 46 (Tex. 2021). The judicial proceedings privilege is an absolute privilege that

covers any statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses, and

attaches to all aspects of the proceedings, including statements made in open court,

pre-trial hearings, depositions, affidavits and any of the pleadings or other papers in

the case.3 Id. (citing James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916–17 (Tex. 1982) (per

    3
      Given the facts of this case, we need not here discuss “other ‘well-settled rules of law’” defining the
privilege “which may extend in certain cases to communications that are preliminary to—and not simply
made in—a judicial proceeding.” Marble Ridge Cap. LP v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 611 S.W.3d 113,
128–138 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. dism’d) (discussing such rules and cases applying the privilege).
                                                   –10–
curiam)). The privilege applies not only to libel and slander claims but can extend

to other torts when the claims are based on an allegedly defamatory communication

in a judicial proceeding. See Rose v. Wash, No. 05-22-00289-CV, 2022 WL

17750750, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 19, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Whether an allegedly defamatory communication is related to a judicial

proceeding is a question of law, and we resolve all doubt in favor of the privilege.

Id. (citing Rossa v. Mahaffey, 594 S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, no

pet.)). We consider the entire communication in its context and extend the privilege

to statements bearing some relation to the judicial proceeding. Id.

      We conclude appellees have established the judicial proceedings privilege

applies here and bars Mishkoff’s libel claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 27.005(d). With his claim, Mishkoff seeks to recover for an allegedly defamatory

statement made in Bryant’s counterclaim for trespass against Mishkoff. Because

this statement was made in a judicial proceeding—a pleading—it is absolutely

privileged and cannot serve as the basis for Mishkoff’s libel claim against appellees.

See Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 46 (privilege extends to counsel and parties); Rose,

2022 WL 17750750, at *5 (concluding defamation claim against party based on

communications party made in affidavit in custody modification proceeding was

barred by judicial proceedings privilege); Watson, 497 S.W.3d at 608–09

(concluding defamation claim based on statements made in rule 202 petition was

barred by judicial proceedings privilege).

                                        –11–
        Despite the above, Mishkoff argues the judicial proceedings privilege does

not apply because the statement in question was unrelated to the subject of the

proceeding. He relies on Jenevein v. Friedman, 114 S.W.3d 743, 748 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2003, no pet.), where we concluded that an allegedly defamatory statement

must bear “some relation” to the proceeding for the privilege to apply. We also

clarified in that case that this “some relation” test “does not require that the

defamatory statement meet technical relevance, materiality, or admissibility

standards.”      Id. at 748–49.         Here, the statement in question was made in a

counterclaim for trespass and described Mishkoff’s alleged conduct in trespassing

on Bryant’s property. There is no question the statement bore some relation to the

trespass proceeding. We overrule Mishkoff’s first issue.4

        In his second issue, Mishkoff argues the trial court erred in awarding

attorney’s fees to appellees because they offered no evidence their fees “were

actually incurred” within the meaning of § 27.009(a) and they failed to segregate

time spent on issues unrelated to the TCPA. We review attorney’s fees awards under

the TCPA for abuse of discretion. See Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299

(Tex. 2016). If the trial court orders dismissal of a legal action under the TCPA, the

court shall award to the moving party court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees

    4
      We also overrule Mishkoff’s third issue, where he seems to complain that the trial court erroneously
failed to address appellees’ privilege and immunity arguments. However, as explained above, appellees
raised these affirmative defenses under step three of the TCPA, and the trial court disposed of the TCPA
motion by granting it. Because of our conclusion on the judicial proceedings privilege, we need not reach
the separate doctrine of attorney immunity. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
                                                 –12–
incurred in defending against the legal action. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 27.009(a)(1). Attorney’s fees are incurred by a party if the party is “liable for

payment” of the fees. Cruz v. Van Sickle, 452 S.W.3d 503, 522 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2014, pet. struck).

      Appellees presented evidence of attorney’s fees through the affidavit of J.

Mitchell Little, who stated, among other things, that he and Scheef & Stone “were

engaged in this matter on an hourly basis” and appellees “agreed to cover the cost of

this litigation.” Little described the hourly rates and hours spent on the case and

attached to his affidavit the firm’s billing record for the case, which described the

various tasks performed, time expended, and rates charged.

      Mishkoff relies on Cruz, 452 S.W.3d at 522, in arguing appellees did not incur

any attorney’s fees here. In that case, we concluded that defendants who were

represented pro bono “did not incur attorney’s fees under section 27.009(a)(1)

because they did not at any time become liable for the attorney’s fees set forth in the

invoices.” Id. Here, by contrast, nothing in the record suggests counsel for appellees

provided pro bono representation; instead, Little stated he and the firm were engaged

on an hourly basis and appellees agreed to cover the cost of litigation. Although

there is some authority suggesting an attorney representing himself does not “incur”

fees, and here, Garrett and Scheef & Stone represented themselves, see Jackson v.

State Off. of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 290, 299–300 (Tex. 2011) (concluding

pro se attorney-litigant could not recover fees under government code statute

                                        –13–
allowing recovery of attorney’s fees “incurred” because attorney “did not incur

attorney’s fees as that term is used in its ordinary meaning because he did not at any

time become liable for attorney’s fees” in course of representing himself),

nevertheless, they and Little also represented Bryant, who according to Little’s

affidavit agreed with the other appellees to pay attorney’s fees and was thus liable

for attorney’s fees, see McRay v. Dow Golub Remels & Gilbreath PLLC, No. 01-21-

00032-CV, 2022 WL 17981671, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29,

2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding whether party paid invoices directly or

insurer paid them does not alter fact that party incurred fees); Mohamed v. Ctr. for

Sec. Pol’y, 554 S.W.3d 767, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied) (rejecting

appellant’s contention that law firm represented appellees pro bono when affidavit

evidence showed defendants retained counsel at fixed hourly rates).

      We also must reject Mishkoff’s contention that appellees failed to segregate

time spent on issues unrelated to the TCPA. A TCPA movant may recover fees

incurred in defending against the legal action, not just fees incurred in prosecuting a

TCPA motion. See Cardio Grp., LLC v. Kring, No. 05-22-00101-CV, 2022 WL

17817971, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Finally, Mishkoff argues the award of sanctions was inappropriate “because

the rationale of that award was not explained by the trial court, as required by the

TCPA.” However, § 27.007(a), which Mishkoff relies on, provides: “If the court

awards sanctions under Section 27.009(b), the court shall issue findings regarding

                                        –14–
whether the legal action was brought to deter or prevent the moving party from

exercising constitutional rights and is brought for an improper purpose, including to

harass or to cause unnecessary delay or to increase the cost of litigation.” TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.007(a). Because the trial court did not award sanctions

under § 27.009(b)—it awarded sanctions under § 27.009(a)(2)—findings were not

required by the Act; we reject Mishkoff’s argument. Given all of the above, we

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellees attorney’s

fees or sanctions. Mishkoff’s second issue is overruled.

   B. Attorney disqualification

      In Mishkoff’s fourth issue, he argues the trial court abused its discretion by

failing to disqualify appellees’ counsel for violations of the disciplinary rules. He

specifically relies on Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08, which

“prohibits the lawyer from acting as both an advocate and a witness in an

adjudicatory proceeding.” See Chintam v. Chintam, No. 05-22-00022-CV, 2023 WL

5345829, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 21, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In

re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)).

      As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record

must show the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection,

or motion and the trial court ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either

expressly or implicitly or refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and

the complaining party objected to the refusal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). These

                                        –15–
preservation requirements apply to complaints about a trial court’s failure to

disqualify a lawyer. See Drum v. Calhoun, 299 S.W.3d 360, 371 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2009, pet. denied) (when appellant did not bring complaint about conflict of interest

to trial court’s attention until after trial court signed order dismissing claims with

prejudice, he failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review); Fox v. Wardy,

224 S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied) (concluding appellant

failed to preserve disqualification issue for appellate review when he did not obtain

a ruling on his motion to disqualify).

      Nothing in the record indicates Mishkoff presented this complaint to the trial

court. On the contrary, at the hearing on appellees’ motion to dismiss, Mishkoff

inquired about whether he would be able to call opposing counsel as witnesses and

then explicitly disclaimed a disqualification complaint:

      MR. MISHKOFF: I’m planning to call Mr. Garrett as a witness in the
      case and then possibly the other S&S lawyers as well. I don’t know
      who. They haven’t gone into discovery yet. Is it acceptable in your court
      for any of the S&S lawyers to be both witnesses and attorneys
      representing other clients in the same case?

      THE COURT: That question is not before me. No one has filed any
      motion articulating any reason why they should be disqualified.

      MR. MISHKOFF: Well, I’m not asking them to be -- I’m not very clear
      on this. I’m sorry. I am not asking for them to be disqualified. I am
      perfectly happy with them doing that, unless I go to call them as a
      witness and have you say, no, they can’t be a witness because they’re
      also attorneys in the case. If you are saying that won’t happen, then I
      have no problem with them being attorneys.

                                         –16–
      THE COURT: So I think what you are talking about is the sword and
      shield issue with assertions of privilege, and we will deal with those
      according to the law if and when they arise.

      MR. MISHKOFF: Thank you.

Given this, we conclude Mishkoff has waived this complaint. See TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a); Drum, 299 S.W.3d at 371. Mishkoff’s fourth issue is overruled.

   C. Recusals

      Finally, Mishkoff argues he was deprived of a fair trial because two judges

voluntarily recused themselves belatedly, leaving Judge Tucker a short period of

time in which to decide appellees’ motion to dismiss. We must reject Mishkoff’s

argument. Mishkoff never filed a motion to recuse any of the judges assigned this

case. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a requires a party to file a recusal motion ten

days before the trial date or other hearing stating the grounds why the judge should

not sit in the case. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a. A party that fails to follow rule 18a’s

procedures waives the right to complain of a judge’s failure to recuse himself or

herself. In re Marriage of Samford, 173 S.W.3d 887, 890 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2005, pet. denied). We conclude Mishkoff has waived any complaint about the

timing of the voluntary recusals here.

      Additionally, the trial court ruled on appellees’ motion to dismiss within the

time provided by statute. The trial court must rule on a TCPA motion not later than

the thirtieth day following the date the hearing on the motion concludes. TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(a). A hearing on the motion was held on August 25,

                                         –17–
2022—within the ordinary timeframe of sixty days following service of the motion

provided by statute. See id. § 27.004(a). The trial court therefore ruled on the motion

within thirty days of the hearing when it granted the motion on September 23, 2022.

We decline to address Mishkoff’s speculations that the trial court did not have

sufficient time to consider the parties’ filings and arguments.

      Finally, to the extent Mishkoff raises a constitutional complaint about the

denial of a fair trial, we conclude he has inadequately briefed this complaint and thus

waived it by failing to cite any pertinent authorities to support his argument. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (brief must contain clear and concise argument for contentions

made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record); Sutton v.

Octapharma Plasma Inc., No. 05-20-00018-CV, 2022 WL 17883794, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (party waives issue on appeal

by failing to adequately brief complaint). Mishkoff’s final issue is overruled.

                                   III. Conclusion

      We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                            /Ken Molberg/
221063f.p05                                 KEN MOLBERG
                                            JUSTICE

                                        –18–
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

 HENRY MISHKOFF, Appellant                      On Appeal from the 199th Judicial
                                                District Court, Collin County, Texas
 No. 05-22-01063-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. 199-03472-
                                                2022.
 T. CHASE GARRETT, SCHEEF &                     Opinion delivered by Justice
 STONE, LLP, AND SONIA                          Molberg. Justices Pedersen, III and
 BRYANT, Appellees                              Miskel participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the order of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellees T. CHASE GARRETT, SCHEEF &
STONE, LLP, and SONIA BRYANT recover their costs of this appeal from
appellant HENRY MISHKOFF.

Judgment entered this 26th day of February, 2024.

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