Court Opinion

ID: 9473085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:18:58.969494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:18.708256
License: Public Domain

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion because I think the majority has misinterpreted the district court’s order and frustrated the purpose of the consent decree. Although it is not clear whether the majority views the district court’s opinion as an interpretation or a modification of the consent decree, see supra at 653-54, the opinion impliedly treats the decision as a modification of the decree. This treatment is unwarranted.
First, Monsanto did not present the district court with a motion to modify the consent decree. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60. Rather, Monsanto presented the district court with a motion to restrain the Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) from consideration of applications, and to enforce the terms of the decree as Monsanto understood them. Consequently, the order entered by the district court did not modify the decree, it enforced the decree. Thus, I believe that the majority erred in misapprehending the import of the district court’s order.
Second, I believe the district court interpreted and enforced the decree properly. Between the parties, a consent decree is conclusive as to its contents. Star Bedding Co. v. Englander Co., 239 F.2d 537, 541 (8th Cir.1957). For purposes of enforcement, consent decrees are to be construed as contracts. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238, 95 S.Ct. 926, 935, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 562 (6th Cir.1981). Further, the scope of a consent decree is to be discerned from what appears within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to the decree. Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, — U.S.—,—, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 2586, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984). ITT Continental, 420 U.S. at 233, 95 S.Ct. at 932, quoting, United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971); United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 493 F.2d 1259, 1264 (8th Cir.1974).
Because a consent decree is to be construed as a contract, reliance upon certain aids to construction is proper.
Such aids include the circumstances surrounding the formation of the consent order, any technical meaning words used may have had to the parties, and any other documents expressly incorporated in the decree. Such reliance does not in any way depart from the “four corners” rule____
*657ITT Continental, 420 U.S. at 238, 95 S.Ct. at 935; see also Brown, 644 F.2d at 562. Even if a district court fails to retain jurisdiction explicitly, as it did here, the court has the inherent power to enforce agreements entered into in settlement of litigation pending before it. Sarabia v. Toledo Police Patrolman’s Ass’n, 601 F.2d 914, 917-18 (6th Cir.1979), quoting, Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862, 97 S.Ct. 165, 50 L.Ed.2d 140 (1976). “It is also clear that the enforcing court has the power to interpret a decree when its language results in confusion.” EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 798 (10th Cir.1979). Finally, as the majority notes, the consent decree in this case was intended to be a remedy. See supra at 651-52.
The most significant part of the consent decree, for purposes of this ease, is the provision which allows Monsanto to “make presentations to the Panel and answer any inquiries put by the Panel____” Record at 107. This litigation centers around what the parties meant by “make presentations.” I think the district court’s due process discussion referred to what the parties intended by providing Monsanto with an opportunity to make a presentation before the SAP. It was not, as it is construed by the majority, a separate basis for the district court’s order. The due process discussion was directly related to Monsanto’s right under the consent decree not just to a presentation, but to an effective presentation. This is not to say that Monsanto was entitled to an adversarial hearing. However, Monsanto has never argued for an adversarial hearing, nor does the district court’s order demand that one be held. The district court simply ordered that Monsanto be given the information it needed to make the type of presentation the parties had contemplated when they entered into the consent decree.
It is true that by entering into the consent decree Monsanto waived whatever due process right it may have had to sue the EPA for its negligent, administrative mistake. However, Monsanto did not waive the privilege of actively participating in the process intended to mitigate the damage caused by the EPA’s negligence, for the consent decree specifically states that Monsanto has the right to make presentations. The issue is what the parties intended these presentations to entail. Certainly it is not unreasonable to assume that Monsanto was to be given the opportunity to make meaningful presentations.
It is helpful to remember that, by negligently disclosing trade secrets belonging to Monsanto, the EPA set the stage for a situation which might result in a severe financial loss for Monsanto. To mitigate this loss, and presumably to mitigate or avoid EPA liability for the loss, the parties entered into a consent decree. The consent decree requires the EPA to identify for SAP review any application which contains: one of two active ingredients; one of six derivatives from each of those active ingredients; or any combination of those six derivatives when the data is submitted in any of three subject areas. Monsanto contends that it needs to know the active ingredient relied on in the product application and the name of the applicant in order to make a presentation.1 The EPA contends *658that Monsanto is not entitled to any information regarding an application.
If the EPA's contention is to be accepted, as it is by the majority, then in order to have a meaningful presentation before the SAP Monsanto must explore the entire universe of each of the protected active ingredients, each derivative of those ingredients, and/or every combination of those derivatives, as they might apply to any one of three distinct subject areas. At best, a presentation of this nature would be quite lengthy and would contain a great deal of irrelevant information as far as any one application is concerned. This type of presentation, the logical result of the majority’s decision, is absurd and it may not be possible to make such a presentation. Further, if the consent decree intended to provide for this type of presentation, there would be no need for more than one presentation by Monsanto. Yet the language of the consent decree clearly provides for an individualized presentation on each subject application.
The result becomes only more absurd when one looks at the information Monsanto would have been entitled to by law had the consent decree never been entered into. Under the regulations governing applications for the registration of a product, the EPA is required to publish upon receipt of the application the applicant’s name and the product’s active ingredient.2 After publication, Monsanto or any other party, would have had by law the right to comment on the application within thirty days. 40 C.F.R. § 162.6(b)(6) (1984). Presumably, if Monsanto could show that an applicant relied on trade secrets misappropriated from Monsanto, approval of the application would be postponed if not denied. Under the majority’s interpretation of the consent decree, Monsanto has less information than it would have been entitled to prior to the decree,3 and the “remedy” supposedly contained in the decree is illusory. This, from a decree which was necessary initially because of the EPA’s negligence.
More importantly, under the majority’s interpretation Monsanto is deprived of the information it needs to make an effective presentation. Thus, the consent decree may as well not contain the presentation provision because it is rendered meaningless. While the majority’s decision protects the EPA, it certainly does not do justice to the language of the consent decree agreed on by the parties, nor does it ameliorate the impact of EPA’s misconduct or negligence.
Third, the flaw in the majority opinion, which makes this interpretation of the consent decree possible, is the majority’s acceptance of the EPA’s arguments which, at bottom, are disingenuous. In one breath the government argues that it has not “formally accepted” any application referred to the SAP. Thus, any such application has not been received and the publication requirements of FIFRA are inapplicable. In the next breath, as justification for not giving Monsanto the information it has requested, the EPA invokes the confidentiality provisions of FIFRA.
I would agree with the majority and the EPA in one respect: the SAP was set up as a screening device and, as a result, the publication provisions of FIFRA should not apply. However, I would go one step fur*659ther and hold that the confidentiality provisions of FIFRA should not apply either. The EPA wants to relieve itself of liability for the negligent disclosure of Monsanto trade secrets and, because the EPA is afraid that Monsanto will misappropriate the information it obtains in the SAP review process, it wants to insulate itself from further liability by not divulging any information to Monsanto. See (Final Confidentiality Determination by the EPA). Record at 143, 149-51. I agree that the EPA is in an uncomfortable position. Nevertheless, it is in a situation of its own making. Perhaps the consent decree does not offer adequate protection to the EPA and applications referred to the SAP. However, the EPA should not now be allowed to adopt a strained interpretation of the consent decree, which deprives Monsanto of its remedy, simply because it failed to guarantee that adequate safeguards against disclosure by Monsanto existed in the decree. Courts of law should be in the business of enforcing consent decrees to effectuate their intent, not in the business of rendering consent decrees meaningless when one party to a decree fails to protect its interest adequately.
Finally, the majority’s analysis of the problem presented in this case is flawed because the majority assumes the integrity of all applicants whose applications are referred to the SAP. While most applicants can be assumed to have integrity, there will most likely be one applicant who has none; hence the need for the consent decree. The party who obtained Monsanto’s trade secrets from the EPA clearly knows that this information was misappropriated. Both parties to this proceeding obviously believed that whoever obtained the protected information would try to use it, or the screening procedure never would have been established. Further, all applicants are put on notice that they must submit data which demonstrates that their products are the result of independent research and not the result of misappropriated information. Under these circumstances, it is not farfetched to believe that whoever obtained this information will utilize all devices and skills available to get an application past this screening device.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the presentations before the SAP were not intended to be adversarial in nature. However, I think the majority errs in concluding further that if they are non-adversarial then the decree didn’t intend the SAP to rely on the presentations to help sharpen the issues before the SAP, and help ferret out the wrongdoer. The very existence of a provision for presentations allows for a contrary conclusion. Without the aid of these presentations, the SAP may not be able to fulfill its function. There is no evidence anywhere in the record to indicate that, absent a meaningful presentation by Monsanto, the SAP has sufficient information or expertise to see through a bogus application. Yet, under the majority’s interpretation of the decree, Monsanto does not have even an opportunity to make a presentation regarding the relevant active ingredient and what research or data must support a particular active ingredient. Nor does Monsanto have the opportunity to inform the SAP that the disclosed information would have been of no value to a particular applicant, a determination Monsanto should be able to make readily given the proper information. See Record at 129-31. (Letter from Monsanto’s counsel to EPA counsel).
In sum, the point is that the EPA and Monsanto entered into a consent decree before a court which was intimately familiar with the complex litigation before it. Given this familiarity, the evidence of record, the circumstances surrounding the decree, and the very language of the decree, the district court’s interpretation of the decree was eminently reasonable. The majority simply disagrees with this interpretation, but in so doing I do not believe that the majority gives the district court’s decision the deference it deserves. “Few persons are in a better position to understand the meaning of a consent decree than the judge who oversaw and approved it.” Brown, 644 F.2d at 558 n. 12. Further, even if the majority’s disregard of the dis*660trict court’s decision could be justified, the majority’s opinion defeats the purpose of the consent decree, which was to afford Monsanto a remedy. Monsanto is deprived of being an active participant in mitigating the harm wrought by the EPA’s negligence because the presentations are meaningless. Because the presentations are, in effect, meaningless, there is no guarantee that SAP will be able to screen out the applicant who relies on trade secrets misappropriated from Monsanto. It is inconceivable to think that Monsanto could have petitioned the court for, and entered into an agreement which intended this result. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

. The district court’s order required the EPA to disclose to Monsanto the applicant’s submission regarding the independent development of the product, “having deleted all confidential formula information and research and test data submitted to defendant which is normally required by defendant of an application for a pesticide registration____” The parties appear to agree that, when distilled, the district court's order requires the EPA to give Monsanto the name of the active ingredient and applicant in any relevant application. Thus, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s order required the EPA to "disclose the registration application and supporting submission in a substantially unedited form." Supra at 653. The regulations governing applications require much more information than an applicant’s name and the name of the active ingredient in a product. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 162.6— 162.10 (1984). Yet disclosure requirements only apply to an applicant’s name and the active ingredient in a product. 40 C.F.R. § 162.6(b)(6) (1984). The submission referred to in the district court's order is a statement submitted by the applicant which is to address whether the applicant obtained its product through indepen*658dent research or obtained the product by misappropriating Monsanto trade secrets. See Record at 128 (memo from Director of Pesticide Programs to the SAP, detailing SAP’s responsibilities). Thus, it is safe to assume that the submission will contain more data than the product’s active ingredient and the applicant’s name. Contrary to the majority's inference, Monsanto was not to receive a great deal of information under the district court’s order; it simply was to receive significant information.

. The regulations do not require disclosure of an applicant’s formula or data information, but neither does the consent decree nor the district court’s order. Apparently, the name of the active ingredient is not considered to be part of the protected information, i.e., the formula and data information.

. It is true, however, that under the district court's interpretation of the consent decree Monsanto would be the only party privy to the applicant’s name and the product’s active ingredient, while under the regulations Monsanto would have to share this information with the public at large.