Court Opinion

ID: 9793984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:56:19.440483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:35.199894
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICES DALY and HASWELL
(dissenting) :
We dissent.
The majority grant a new trial to defendant because of failure of plaintiffs to list the names and addresses of two witnesses in response to defendant’s pretrial interrogatories. It is clear that this failure constituted a violation of pretrial discovery rules. It is equally clear that the names of these witnesses were communicated by plaintiff’s counsel to defendant’s counsel several days before trial; that the witnesses’ exact address was not given but only that they lived somewhere in the valley; and that plaintiffs’ counsel furnished defendant’s counsel with a tape of the witnesses’ statements and defendant’s counsel interviewed them and had a transcript of the statements of such witnesses prior to their examination at the trial.
During the course of trial when plaintiffs called the first of such witnesses to testify, defendant moved to exclude the testimony on the grounds of surprise occasioned by plaintiffs’ violation of pretrial discovery rules and requested the court to impose sanctions for such violation by excluding the testimony of such witnesses. The district court denied defendant’s motion in the following manner:
“THE COURT: Well, I am not going to invoke or impose this sanction, because I feel that this is pretty important testimony from their viewpoint. The sanction will not be imposed, and the motion will be denied.
*92“MR. ROTH: [defendant’s counsel] If your honor please, may we have the benefit of the use of a recorded statement that we have of this witness, which has not been transcribed as yet, and we would like the opportunity to review that testimony before her testimony is given, and we must cross examine.
“MR. McKEON: [plaintiffs’ counsel] We will have no objection to that.
“THE COURT: All right, that may be done, and this witness may be called at another time. If that is all, then we can return to the courtroom.
“THE COURT: All right, the record may show that the court is again in session, and in the presence of the jury. You may proceed.
“MR. McKEON: Your honor, as the court knows, counsel for the defendant have advised that they have a statement which they took this morning of Mrs. Ethel Davis, and which has not as yet been prepared and transcribed, and they would like to have the advantage of this statement when conducting cross examination of Mrs. Davis, and so we would be very happy to wait and call Mrs. Davis tomorrow morning, so that they will have the advantage of that particular statement at that time.
“MR. ROTH: Yes, that is our position in this matter, if the court please.
“THE COURT: Very well, that may be done, and the witness may be called tomorrow morning.
“MR. ROTH: Thank you, your honor, and thank you, again, Mr. McKeon.”
Following this colloquy, no farther continuance was requested. Defendant’s counsel received his request for a day’s delay in the examination of these witnesses. These witnesses were exhaustively examined and cross-examined the following day. The case was submitted to the jury in this posture with*93out further objection by defendant. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs.
Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. The district court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. The majority of this Court has reversed this ruling of the trial judge.
Section 93-5603, B.C.M.1947, sets forth the grounds on which a new trial may be granted. Subsection (3) provides for a new trial where the moving party was surprised by the testimony offered at the trial. In Hill v. McKay, 36 Mont. 440, 446, 93 P.345, 347, this Court set down the following criteria for granting a new trial on this ground:
“* * # it is the general rule that a new trial will be granted on the ground of surprise, only when it is clearly shown that the movant was actually surprised, that the facts from which the surprise resulted had a material bearing on the case, that the verdict or decision resulted mainly from these facts, that the alleged condition is not the result of movant’s own inattention or negligence, that he has acted promptly and claimed relief at the earliest opportunity, that he has used every means reasonably available at the time of the surprise to remedy the disaster, and that the result of a new trial will probably be different.”
These criteria were cited with approval recently in Morris v. Corcoran Pulpwood Co., 154 Mont. 468, 465 P.2d 827.
In our view a party may not secure a one day continuance in the witnesses’ testimony to prepare for cross-examination, fail to request a further continuance, permit the case to be submitted to the jury without further objection, and after an adverse verdict secure a new trial on the grounds of surprise. Under such circumstances the party seeking a new trial has not used every means reasonably available at the time of surprise to remedy the situation, one of the required criteria for securing a new trial on this ground. This is particularly *94true where, as here, the trial judge has denied movant a new trial under these circumstances.
Additionally, the refusal of the trial judge to impose the sanction of exclusion is not an abuse of discretion here nor is it an independent ground for granting a new trial.