Court Opinion

ID: 9619159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:23:03.012022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:37.963294
License: Public Domain

Smith, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.
*181Decided July 14, 2000.
Ann C. Stahl, for appellant.
T. Joseph Campbell, District Attorney, Mickey R. Thacker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Regardless of any favorable effect of the rest of the statement, I cannot dismiss counsel’s stipulation as simply “strategy.” Trial counsel testified that he was “unsure” at the time he stipulated the statement’s admission whether Kimberly Adkinson was going to take the stand. He also testified that he knew he could have requested that the statement be redacted to eliminate the reference to Adkinson’s drug dealing, but he did not. And he testified that he was aware that OCGA § 24-3-52 provides that the statement of a joint offender made after the enterprise has ended is admissible only against the declarant.
Yet, even when it became known to trial counsel that Kimberly was not going to testify, leaving the statement as the sole evidence presented implicating Adkinson in drug dealing, he did not request a limiting instruction based upon OCGA § 24-3-52. In fact, he testified he was not sure he even thought about the fact that admitting the statement violated Adkinson’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Right.
A strong presumption exists that trial counsel’s performance was within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Davis v. State, 238 Ga. App. 84, 89 (7) (517 SE2d 808) (1999). But I am persuaded that Adkinson met his burden of showing ineffective assistance. Trial counsel may have had strong reasons for agreeing to the stipulation initially. But in my view, when it became apparent that Kimberly would not testify and that her statement could not be used to incriminate Adkinson, counsel at least should have asked for a limiting instruction based upon OCGA § 24-3-52.
Because the statement was the only evidence supporting the State’s charge that Adkinson was in possession of amphetamines with intent to distribute, I agree with Adkinson that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s deficiency. I would grant him a new trial.