Court Opinion

ID: 9650821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:52:49.683404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:26.354979
License: Public Domain

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the conclusions reached by the majority. Section 203(a) of the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(a), defines three classes of carriers: common, contract, and private carriers. Into which of the three classifications appellant falls must be determined from the Act itself. A common carrier is defined as one who holds himself out to the general public to engage in the transportation by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce of passengers or property or any class or classes thereof for hire. In plain words, a common carrier agrees and is bound to haul any person or the goods or property of any person over his route, who pays the transportation price or charge. A contract carrier is defined as one who by private contract transports a person or his goods for hire. The common factor of the two classes is that neither owns or has a proprietary interest in the property which he transports. A private carrier in general is defined as one who transports goods of which he is the owner, lessee or bailee, when such transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bailment, or in furtherance of any commercial enterprise. The common or contract carrier has no interest or ownership in the property itself. His interest is entirely in its transportation under an agreement with the owner. His compensation or gain comes about only by a contract with the owner. The private carrier, on the other hand, has no contract with anyone for the transportation of goods, because the property he is hauling is his own. These definitions in the Act are clear and without doubt as to what they mean.
At the time of argument, the government assumed the position that the adoption of the construction of the Act contended for by appellant would to a large extent nullify the beneficial purposes of the Act and would result in serious injury to common and contract carriers. This is no concern of the administrative agency nor of this court. If Congress failed to accomplish what it sought to do, it has power to rectify its failure to accomplish a lawful function.
I subscribe to the declaration of the majority that the Act should be construed in the light of the declared Congressional policy, but that does not justify us in expanding a definition beyond its clear import because we feel that otherwise the Congressional policy will fail. It is clear to me that, as defined in the Act, one who transports goods which he owns or in which he has a proprietary interest is a private carrier and not subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act. If such a construction results in unfair competition with common or contract carriers, the remedy lies with Congress.
Of course, a private carrier must be such in good faith. He may not become the nominal or ostensible owner of goods for the purpose of evading the Act. So if one takes the title to goods which are in fact the property of another, solely for the purpose of transportation, he is not a private carrier. If appellant camouflaged its transaction and in fact is hauling goods that belong to others, under a contract or agreement for hire, then it is a contract carrier, even though it may have taken the nominal title and ownership of the goods in itself for the purpose of evading the Act.
But what are the facts ? Stickle was formerly in the wholesale and retail lumber business. Jackson was engaged in the retail lumber business, and also worked as a lumber salesman. They incorporated the appellant company. Its charter authorized it to buy and sell lumber at wholesale or retail or on a commission basis. It further authorized it to buy and sell at wholesale or retail other allied products, such as brick, paint, timber, and other products. Appellant solicits orders for lumber. It purchases its lumber from mills on the open market, buying wherever it gets the best prices, and paying its own money therefor. Most of the lumber is purchased to *162fill orders previously secured. The percentage of lumber so purchased varies from forty to eight-five per cent of the total lumber bought, depending on the condition of the market. Appellant also maintains a lumber yard in Oklahoma City where some lumber is stored and from which place deliveries are made, although at times there is po lumber stored in this yard. Appellant quoted its customers two prices, an f. o. b. price and a delivery price. The f. o. b. price included the cost of lumber to appellant, plus an added commission. The delivery price consisted of the f. o. b. price, plus the transportation charges. At first, all deliveries were made by common carrier. After appellant had been doing business for about a year, it purchased trucks, and thereafter made deliveries of lumber mostly in its own trucks, although from ten to thirty per cent is .still delivered by common carrier. It bought, paid for, and owned all the lumber it handled, whether sold f. o. b. or delivered. It did not haul for hire or transport property other than its own.
I attach no significance to the fact that appellant quoted an £ o. b. price which included the cost of the lumber to it, plus its commission, and a separate transportation charge in the event it delivered the lumber, rather than quoting a single price. The price of any article for sale consists of the cost, a reasonable profit, and transportation charges. Whether these items are stated separately or as a unit is immaterial. They are present and inherent in the price of any commodity offered for sale.
Neither is it of any significance that most or all of the profit results from savings in freight or reduced cost in transportation. If a wholesaler is so located that because of freight rates he finds himself unable to compete with a competitor more, favorably situated, and therefore buys a fleet of trucks and delivers the merchandise he sells, and as a result thereof he can reduce his transportation costs enough so that he can not only make a profit but even undersell his competitor who delivers by common carrier, is he any the less a merchant ? Is he not still a merchant even if his entire profit comes from savings in transportation costs? Does the fact that a merchant makes all his profit from reduced transportation costs result in a transmigration by which the soul of the merchant leaves his body and enters that of a transportation company? There is here no subterfuge or camouflage 'for the purpose of evading the act. Appellant is engaged in carrying out the purposes for which it was chartered. In furtherance of that purpose, and in order to increase its profits, it provides its own means of delivery rather than utilizing those of a common carrier. But as a result thereof, under the decision of the majority, it has in effect forfeited its charter and ceased to be a merchant and has become a transportation company. I do not believe that we are justified in construing and giving such an effect to words and definitions which, considered alone, are clear and unambiguous, under the guise of interpreting and effectuating Congressional intent and policy. If the explicit and clear language of Congress leads to a result other than what it intended, it has the power to correct it. We should not do so by judicial interpretation.
For these reasons, I am forced respectfully to dissent.