Court Opinion

ID: 9779366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:48:32.257917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:25.793323
License: Public Domain

GUILLOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority’s disposition of Anderson’s point of error, I do not agree with the disposition of Gilliland’s cross-point. The value of enhancement attributable to improvements made during the marriage to the separate property was determined to be $54,000.00. The trial court correctly decided that the value of enhancement, as opposed to cost of the improvements, should be the measure for reimbursement to the community. However, the trial court found that only $34,560.00 should be reimbursed to the estate (sixty-four percent of the $54,000.00 since thirty-six percent of the improvements or $7,237.89, the down payment, was found by the court to be separate property). The majority correctly decided that the $7,237.89 used for the down payment was community property. Thus, the entire cost of the improvements to the property ($20,237.89) was paid by the community, since the $13,000.00 loan secured by the mortgage was undisputedly community property. Gilliland argues that the cost of improvements should be reimbursed to the community since that amount is less than the amount of enhancement. I would hold that $54,000.00, the value of enhancement due to community improvements, should be reimbursed to the community estate.
The right to reimbursement is an equitable one. Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.1982); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935). The value of reimbursement has been defined in various ways. The concept of recompense was first recognized in Louisiana with the amount of compensation being the value added to the separate estate by community-erected improvements. Depas v. Riez, 2 La.Ann. 30 (La.1847). The court in Depas said that, if the value added to the separate estate failed to exceed the community-funded cost, the community would have, in effect, to bear the loss. The court also said that “whatever be the present value of the improvements, the recompense due the *110community for them cannot exceed their cost.” Depas, 2 La.Ann. at 44. See generally Smith, Principles of Reimbursement Among the Marital Estates, in ADVANCED FAMILY LAW COURSE (1982) (citing Baker, Reimbursement, in MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION IN TEXAS (1978)). Thus, the court in Depas took a cost or enhancement, whichever is less, approach.
Early Texas cases recognized the right to reimbursement, upon dissolution of the marriage, when the community estate had benefited the separate estate of one of the spouses. The courts measured the value in terms of cost of the particular improvements. Furrh v. Winston, 66 Tex. 521, 1 S.W. 527 (1886); Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58, 66-67 (1858).
The concept of enhancement as a measure of reimbursement appeared in cotenan-cy cases involving partition. The opinions clearly held that enhancement was the only measure of reimbursement to the estate that had benefitted the land. Lynch v. Lynch, 130 S.W. 461 (Tex.Civ.App.—1910, writ ref’d). The enhancement measure also arose in trespass to try title situations in which the parties who lost the land were still entitled to receive the value of improvements they had placed thereon. Enhancement was the measure applied. Bemrod v. Wright, 273 S.W. 938 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1925, no writ).
In the landmark case of Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935), the Supreme Court said that, in order to adjust the equities between respective parties in the settlement of estates, “the community estate must be reimbursed for the cost of the buildings erected by joint labors or funds upon the separate property of one of the spouses_” Dakan, 83 S.W.2d at 628. The Supreme Court cited Furrh, 1 S.W. at 529. In the next paragraph, the Supreme Court went on to say that the amount of recovery to the community is limited to the amount of enhancement of the property by virtue of the improvement. Dakan, 83 S.W.2d at 628. The language in Dakan has been interpreted to mean that the measure of reimbursement is whichever is less — enhancement or cost. Hale v. Hale, 557 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.Civ.App.— Texarkana 1977, no writ); Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
The trend since Dakan, however, has been to measure reimbursement in terms of enhancement rather than cost. Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.1964); Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (Tex.1952); Cook v. Cook, 665 S.W.2d 161, 165-66 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1983, no writ); Snider v. Snider, 613 S.W.2d 8 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1981, no writ) (implicit in the holding); Harris v. Royal, 446 S.W.2d 351 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1969, writ ref d n.r.e.).
I think, however, that the best rule for the trial court to apply would be the one that favors the most equitable result. The trial court sits in equity when it divides the marital estate, either upon divorce or death of a spouse. It has the power to adjust the equities and has all of the evidence before it. In the instant case, the trial court found that enhancement was the appropriate measure of reimbursement — an equitable remedy — and we should not disturb that ruling in absence of an abuse of discretion. Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex.1982). Accordingly, I would overrule Gilliland’s cross-point.
Like the majority, I would hold that the $7,237.89 spent on the down payment was community property, making the entire improvements ($20,237.89) community property. However, I would hold that the amount of reimbursement to the community estate should be $54,000.00, the amount of enhancement to the property due to community improvements. Accordingly, I would hold that one-half of $54,000.00, or $27,000.00, should be the amount of reimbursement to the decedent’s estate. Since Anderson concedes that one-half of the mortgage balance due ($5,077.00) should be charged against the amount to be reimbursed for community improvements, I would reverse and render judgment that the trial court enter $21,923.00 in the inventory of decedent’s estate as reimbursement *111for community improvements to Gilliland’s separate real estate.