Court Opinion

ID: 9897243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:09.665836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:25.938627
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              Oct 30 2023, 9:20 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                               Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                    and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joel M. Schumm                                             Andrew B. Howk
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      John D. French
                                                           Hall, Render, Killian, Heath &
                                                           Lyman
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Civil                                 October 30, 2023
Commitment of:                                             Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-MH-752
J.F.,
                                                           Appeal from the Marion Superior
Appellant-Respondent,                                      Court, Probate Division
        v.                                                 The Honorable David Certo, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
St. Vincent Hospital and Health                            49D08-2303-MH-9936
Care Center, Inc. d/b/a St.
Vincent Stress Center,
Appellee-Petitioner.

                                Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                              Judges Bailey and Tavitas concur.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023                           Page 1 of 9
      Case Summary
[1]   J.F. appeals her temporary involuntary commitment, arguing it was not

      supported by sufficient evidence. Because J.F.’s appeal is moot and does not

      fall within an exception to the mootness doctrine, we dismiss.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   At the time of her most recent commitment hearing, J.F. was thirty-nine years

      old. She struggled with substance abuse and was diagnosed with “psychotic

      disorder unspecified.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 33. Early in January 2023, J.F.’s parents

      began to recognize a “significant” change in J.F.’s behavior—most notably an

      increase in severe paranoia and delusions. Id. at 13. At that time, J.F.’s

      paranoia focused on her employment. She believed her co-workers were part of

      a “crime family” who “targeted” and “harassed” her. Id. at 14. J.F. conveyed

      her fellow employees tried to run her over and were “triggering . . . [her] PTSD

      on purpose with loud noises and shouting and freaking [her] out.” Id. at 47.

      J.F. would not elaborate to her parents because she believed her phone was

      hacked, arrests were being made, and the “FBI was involved.” Id. at 14.

      Eventually, J.F. lost her job.

[3]   On January 24, 2023, J.F.’s father returned to his home and found J.F. in his

      closet. When confronted, J.F. pleaded to him: “Please don’t kill me. Please

      don’t kill me.” Id. at 15. The next day, J.F. “barricaded at the top of the stairs”

      at her parents’ house. Id. at 15–16. When her parents went upstairs to

      investigate, they found J.F. and her two young children locked in the bathroom.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023          Page 2 of 9
      J.F.’s children were screaming and “crying uncontrollably.” Id. at 16. Not

      recognizing her parents, J.F. inquired “Who are you?” and begged “don’t kill

      us.” Id. When recounting this incident, J.F. expressed she believed someone

      was threatening her kids because she “was getting weird messages . . . through

      Facebook” that would appear and then be deleted as if “someone was on that

      phone with [her].” Id. at 50. J.F. explained, “I was typing a note to myself,

      and I was typing something about the kids and someone else typed, ‘They’re

      going to die.’ Like . . . someone was on there typing with me . . . like a ghost

      writer was typing with me.” Id. After this event, J.F. was hospitalized.

[4]   Following her release, J.F. lived in her car and a motel. Within a short time,

      J.F. was admitted at St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc. d/b/a

      St. Vincent Stress Center (“Stress Center”). In February 2023, the Stress Center

      unsuccessfully sought to involuntarily commit J.F. After this commitment

      hearing, J.F.’s parents lost contact with her for a couple of weeks.

[5]   Early in March 2023, J.F. arrived at her parents’ house just as her parents were

      leaving. Because her parents did not permit her to go into the house, J.F.

      waited outside. Once her father returned home, J.F. “threw her keys, her ID,

      and her phone . . . onto the ground and just took off . . . into the woods.” Id. at

      12. Concerned J.F. might commit suicide, J.F.’s parents called the police. The

      police located J.F. about 150 yards from the house sitting on a tarp in the

      woods. Although J.F. claimed she was just camping, it was about twenty-nine

      degrees outside and J.F. did not have proper clothes or camping supplies. J.F.’s

      parents “had enough,” and asked for a no trespass order against J.F. Id. at 13.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023        Page 3 of 9
      After the incident, J.F. was transported to the Stress Center—her third

      hospitalization in three months.

[6]   On March 10, 2023, the Stress Center filed a Report Following Emergency

      Detention and Physician Statement seeking the involuntary commitment of

      J.F. 1 Dr. Erika Cornett—the Stress Center’s attending psychiatrist—treated J.F.

      during her February and March inpatient admissions. At J.F.’s March

      commitment hearing, Dr. Cornett recounted J.F.’s delusions and paranoid

      behavior. For example, J.F. had asked Dr. Cornett whether Dr. Cornett was

      going to mess with the clocks by making them jump forward and backward so

      J.F. did not know what time it was. And J.F. claimed Stress Center staff hid

      cameras in her room and were slipping her medications. Additionally, Dr.

      Cornett conveyed J.F. resisted taking her medication and lacks insight

      regarding the severity of her condition.

[7]   According to Dr. Cornett, J.F.’s “decision making is impaired” due to her

      paranoia. Id. at 34. Dr. Cornett further explained all J.F.’s decisions are based

      on her paranoia; thus, J.F. is “unable to make decisions that are safe to her.”

      1
        J.F. contends the trial court and the Stress Center cannot rely on an incident that occurred about a month
      and a half prior to the commitment hearing. See Appellant’s Br. at 19 n.5. We disagree. Indiana Code
      Section 12-26-7-5 permits a trial court to involuntarily commit an individual after “completion of the
      hearing” and “consideration of the record.” Therefore, the trial court could have properly considered any
      information contained in the record—including testimony regarding J.F.’s recent behavior, prior
      hospitalizations, and previous petitions for commitment. See Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ind. Ct.
      App. 2004), (noting the trial court could properly consider the respondent’s five-year history of mental illness
      requiring hospitalizations and causing paranoia, delusional thoughts, and threatening and destructive
      behavior), trans. denied.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023                                  Page 4 of 9
      Id. In Dr. Cornett’s opinion, J.F. is gravely disabled. At the conclusion of the

      hearing, the trial court determined J.F. suffered from a mental illness and was

      gravely disabled. The trial court did not find J.F. was dangerous. J.F. now

      appeals.

      J.F.’s Appeal Is Moot and No Exception to the Mootness
      Doctrine Applies

[8]   J.F. contends we should reach the merits of her claim although her term of

      commitment has expired. 2 A case is moot when “the controversy at issue has

      been ended, settled, or otherwise disposed of so that the court can give the

      parties no effective relief.” Civ. Commitment of E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health

      Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam). However, Indiana

      recognizes a “public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, which may be

      invoked when the issue involves a question of great public importance which is

      likely to recur.” Id. (quoting Matter of Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 54 (Ind. 1991)).

      For over twenty years, this Court has “routinely considered the merits of

      [appeals of expired temporary civil commitment orders] despite finding them

      moot.” Id. at 467. We do so because a civil commitment, regardless of

      purpose, has a “‘very significant impact on the individual’ and ‘constitutes a

      significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.’” Id.

      (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979)).

      2
       Regarding mootness, the Stress Center “leaves to this court’s discretion whether or not J.F. has satisfied the
      necessary exception for review and takes no position with regard to the same.” Appellee’s Br. at 11 n.1.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023                                 Page 5 of 9
[9]    Although this Court has “broad discretion” to decide whether the public

       interest exception to mootness applies, we must exercise this discretion

       “thoughtfully and thoroughly” and on a “case-by-case basis.” Id. at 465–67.

       Cases addressing novel issues, developing case law on a complicated topic, or

       presenting a close call are especially appropriate for consideration on the merits.

       Id. at 467. Because a hallmark of a moot case is a court’s inability to provide

       effective relief, see Civ. Commitment of T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr.,

       Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019), appellate courts are not required to

       issue an opinion in every moot case, E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 467. Judicial opinions

       invoking the public-interest exception “are, for all practical purposes, advisory

       opinions.” Id. (quoting I.J. v. State, 178 N.E.3d 798, 799 (Ind. 2022) (per

       curiam)). And courts should avoid issuing advisory opinions. See Snyder v.

       King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 786 (Ind. 2011).

[10]   Just recently, this Court considered the merits of appeals from expired

       temporary commitment orders without invoking the public interest exception to

       the mootness doctrine. See Civ. Commitment of C.P. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health

       Care Ctr., Inc., ___ N.E.3d ___, 2023 WL 5965625, No. 22A-MH-2960 (Ind. Ct.

       App. Sept. 14, 2023); see also Civ. Commitment of M.T. v. Cmty. Health Network,

       ___ N.E.3d ___, 2023 WL 5965629, No. 23A-MH-341 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 14,

       2023). Instead, in C.P. and M.T., this Court addressed the merits of appeals

       based on the “harmful collateral consequences” that accompany commitment

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023          Page 6 of 9
       orders. 3 See C.P., ___ N.E.3d at ___, 2023 WL 5965625, at *6; see also M.T., ___

       N.E.3d at ___, 2023 WL 5965629, at *4. As explained in C.P., Indiana

       appellate courts have applied the “collateral consequences” doctrine to hold

       that appeals are not moot where review of appeals on their merits may still

       provide meaningful relief. C.P., ___ N.E.3d at ___, 2023 WL 5965625, at *5

       (surveying cases where appellate courts have invoked the collateral-

       consequences doctrine to review the merits of appeals where the order at issue,

       if invalid and left undisturbed, could contribute to a future adverse finding

       against the appellant); see also In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014)

       (holding an appeal was not moot based on the “long-lasting collateral

       consequences” that accompany CHINS adjudications). With both the public

       interest exception and the collateral consequences doctrine in mind, we turn to

       J.F.’s appeal.

[11]   Here, J.F.’s appeal does not address a novel issue, present a close call, or

       provide an opportunity to develop case law on a complicated topic. Cf., e.g.,

       T.W., 121 N.E.3d at 1042 (choosing to address a moot temporary commitment

       because the appeal involved the important public question of the probate

       3
         In T.W., the parties before the Court had not developed a record on possible “harmful collateral
       consequences” from the commitment orders aside from the terms of those commitments. 121 N.E.3d at
       1044, n.5. So, the Court left open the possibility respondents in civil commitment cases could seek relief
       from the collateral consequences caused by invalid commitment orders in the trial court. See id; see also E.F.,
       188 N.E.3d at 466. On properly presented records, C.P and M.T. reached the question left open by the
       Supreme Court and held the respondents’ appeals were not moot even though the terms of their
       commitments had expired because of the collateral consequences accompanying the respondents’ involuntary
       commitment orders. C.P., ___ N.E.3d at ___, 2023 WL 5965625, at *6; M.T., ___ N.E.3d at ___, 2023 WL
       5965629, at *4–5.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023                                Page 7 of 9
       commissioner’s authority to enter civil commitment orders). Accordingly, we

       do not believe it is appropriate to invoke the public interest exception to reach

       the merits of J.F.’s appeal. See E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 467 (noting cases addressing

       novel issues, developing case law on a complicated topic, or presenting a close

       call are especially appropriate for consideration on the merits).

[12]   Further, we decline to consider the merits of J.F.’s appeal based on the

       collateral consequences doctrine. In our view, we should apply this doctrine

       only when the appellant demonstrates a particularized collateral consequence

       flowing from the temporary commitment order. See e.g., C.P., ___ N.E.3d at

       ___, 2023 WL 5965625, at *5 (holding the collateral consequences doctrine

       applied when the appellant had “long exercised his right to possess a handgun”

       and his temporary commitment order, if invalid but left in place, would prohibit

       him from continuing to possess any firearms). Although J.F. raised a collateral

       consequence—an addition to her medical history which would make future

       involuntary commitment proceedings against her more likely to succeed—she

       has not sufficiently shown a particularized harmful consequence would befall

       her if this Court declined to reach the merits of her appeal. Thus, we will not

       apply the collateral consequences doctrine.

       Conclusion
[13]   Because J.F.’s civil commitment order is moot and no exception to the

       mootness doctrine applies, we dismiss.

[14]   Dismissed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023        Page 8 of 9
Bailey, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-752 | October 30, 2023   Page 9 of 9