Court Opinion

ID: 9406957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 14:11:21.696375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.295127
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges AtLee, Friedman and Senior Judge Clements
UNPUBLISHED

              CONNIE MARIE MAXEY, A/K/A
               CONNIE MARIE DEMERS
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1865-22-4                                         PER CURIAM
                                                                                  JULY 5, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY
                                              Victoria A.B. Willis, Judge

                              (John M. Spencer; Spencer, Meyer & Koch, PLC, on brief), for
                              appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Collin C. Crookenden,
                              Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Connie Demers appeals the trial court’s judgment finding her in violation of her probation

              and revoking the balance of her previously suspended sentence. Demers argues that the trial court

              acted “inappropriately” when it imposed a sentence that was “unnecessary.” In addition, Demers

              contends the trial court failed to consider her mitigating circumstances. After examining the

              briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary

              because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). The trial

              court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     In February 2015, the trial court convicted Demers for driving under the influence of alcohol

              or drugs, fourth or subsequent offense. By final order entered May 15, 2015, the trial court

              sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment with three years and six months suspended, conditioned

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
upon ten years good behavior and indefinite supervised probation. Demers’s previously suspended

sentence was revoked and resuspended, in part, in 2018. Demers finished her term of active

incarceration and returned to supervised probation in March 2019.

       In June 2022, Demers’s probation officer reported that Demers had incurred new

convictions, including a conviction for driving while intoxicated, third or subsequent offense. In

addition, Demers repeatedly failed to attend her drug screens and tested positive for opiates. The

trial court issued a capias on June 28, 2022, which was served on Demers the following day.

       On July 7, 2022, the trial court granted Demers’s motion for bond and placed her on pre-trial

services. In addition, the trial court ordered that Demers refrain from using alcohol or illegal drugs

not prescribed by her physician and successfully complete the Medically Assisted Treatment

Program (MAT). On August 22, 2022, pre-trial services reported that Demers had admitted that she

had used methamphetamine and provided a false urine screen. The trial court issued a new capias,

which was served on Demers on October 23, 2022.

       At the revocation hearing, Demers conceded that she had violated the terms and conditions

of her suspended sentence. The trial court found Demers had violated her probation and proceeded

to sentencing. Demers, by counsel, stated that there was “not much” to say in Demers’s defense

other than she “messed up.” Demers argued that she was unlikely to reoffend because of her age.

In addition, while on bond, Demers was in a motor vehicle accident and broke her C-2 vertebrae;

she underwent surgery to fuse her vertebrae, and she was incarcerated during recovery. Demers

acknowledged that she used drugs while she was on bond. Demers had a good family, lived locally,

and wanted to “change.” Demers asked the trial court to impose a sentence at the low end of the

sentencing guidelines.

       The Commonwealth argued that Demers had incurred a total of five driving under the

influence convictions. Finding Demers’s repeated offenses “inexplicable,” the Commonwealth

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asserted that she posed a danger to herself and others every time she consumed alcohol and drove a

vehicle. The Commonwealth noted that the trial court had provided Demers opportunities to

address her addiction but that she simply “doesn’t care.” The Commonwealth asked the trial court

to revoke the balance of Demers’s sentence to protect the community, noting that “every day

[Demers] is behind bars is a day she is not getting behind the wheel of a car.”

       In allocution, Demers apologized for her actions, acknowledging that she had “put

everybody in jeopardy.” Demers contended that she had not consumed alcohol or driven a motor

vehicle since her accident and she depended on others for transportation. Demers was raised by her

alcoholic father and suffered physical and mental abuse. She was trying to improve herself and had

enrolled in the MAT program, found a sponsor, and attended the Christian Sisters Transition

Program. Demers acknowledged that she was scared for herself but she asked the trial court for

“flexibility” so she could continue the programs and “stay on track” with her sobriety.

       The trial court acknowledged Demers’s addiction but noted that it had given her several

opportunities to rehabilitate. The trial court found that Demers was “playing a deadly game” each

time she drove after using drugs or alcohol. Finding “no other option,” the trial court revoked

Demers’s previously suspended sentence “to insure the safety and the protection of the community.”

Demers appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a three-year active

sentence because it failed to give proper weight to her mitigating evidence.

                                            ANALYSIS

       Subject to the provisions of Code § 19.2-306.2, after suspending a sentence, a trial court

“may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at

any time within the probation period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code

§ 19.2-306(A). Moreover, “[i]f the court finds the basis of a violation of the terms and conditions

of a suspended sentence or probation is that the defendant was convicted of a criminal offense

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that was committed after the date of the suspension . . . , then the court may revoke the

suspension and impose or resuspend any or all of that period previously suspended.” Code

§ 19.2-306.1(B). The question of an appropriate sentence “is a matter that lies within the trial

court’s discretion.” Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 645, 650 (2005) (citing Slayton v.

Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 365 (1946)); Code § 19.2-306.1(B).

       The record reflects that Demers suffered new convictions during the suspension period.

Thus, the trial court was authorized to “revoke the suspension and impose or resuspend any or all

of that period previously suspended.” Code § 19.2-306.1(B). Furthermore, this was Demers’s

second violation.

       The record does not support Demers’s claim that the trial court failed to weigh her

mitigating evidence properly. At the hearing, the trial court carefully explained that there were

multiple aspects of sentencing. It noted the importance of rehabilitation, but also its obligation to

punish “behavior [that] merits . . . punishment.” The trial court lamented the outcome but,

considering all the circumstances, determined that imposing the balance of Demers’s sentence

was the “only option” left.

       “The statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the

trial court valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of

all or part of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740

(2007). Considering Demers’s new conviction for the same offense during the suspension

period, the trial court reasonably concluded that active incarceration was appropriate because she

was not amenable to rehabilitation. “When coupled with a suspended sentence, probation

represents ‘an act of grace on the part of the Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and

sentenced to a term of confinement.’” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 582, 587 (2010)

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(quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443, 448 (2008)). Demers failed to make productive

use of the grace that had been extended to her.

       In fashioning Demers’s sentence, it was within the trial court’s purview to weigh any

mitigating factors she presented, including her acceptance of responsibility, her participation in

programs, her medical condition, and her willingness to obtain treatment for her addictions. See

Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000). The record demonstrates that the trial court

considered the mitigating evidence Demers presented. Balanced against those circumstances,

however, was Demers’s disregard for the trial court’s orders and the rules of probation. Indeed,

Demers had incurred a total of five DUI convictions—the last one while on probation. In addition,

she had admitted to using drugs and altering a drug screen while on bond. The trial court carefully

balanced the evidence and circumstances in this case and determined that an active sentence of three

years’ incarceration was appropriate.

       “For probation to have a deterrent effect on recidivism, real consequences must follow a

probationer’s willful violation of the conditions of probation.” Price, 51 Va. App. at 449. Upon

review of the record in this case, we conclude that the sentence the trial court imposed represents

such real consequences and was a proper exercise of judicial discretion. See Alsberry v.

Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 314, 321-22 (2002) (finding the court did not abuse its discretion

by imposing the defendant’s previously suspended sentence in its entirety “in light of the

grievous nature of [the defendant’s] offenses and his continuing criminal activity”).

                                           CONCLUSION

       Finding no abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion, its judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                             Affirmed.

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