Court Opinion

ID: 9569370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:13:12.54505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:51:15.974858
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The majority relies on the concept of “piercing the corporate veil” in determining whether an action for tortious interference of contract can be sustained against Jordan. This theory does not belong in this case.
“The concept of piercing the corporate veil is applied in Georgia to remedy injustices which arise where a party ‘has overextended his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to defeat justice, perpetrate fraud or to evade contractual or tort responsibility.’ Kelley v. Austell Bldg. Supply, 164 Ga. App. 322, 326 (3) (297 SE2d 292). See also Bone Constr. Co. v. Lewis, 148 Ga. App. 61, 63 (4) (250 SE2d 851); Fla. Shade Tobacco Growers v. Duncan, 150 Ga. App. 34, 35 (256 SE2d 644).” Hogan v. Mayor &c. of Savannah, 171 Ga. App. 671, 673 (3) (320 SE2d 555). In the case sub judice, we are not concerned as to whether Jordan overextended his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to defeat personal liability for breach of contract. Instead, the pivotal issue is whether Jordan stepped outside his role as a corporate officer, breaching his duty to act in the best interests of the corporation (see Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physicians, 254 Ga. 216 (2) (326 SE2d 460)), and acted as a third party to vent his own personal feelings of animosity against one of Georgia Metal Systems & Engineering, Inc.’s employees.
“One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.” Restatement of Torts 2d, § 766. “In determining whether an actor’s conduct in intentionally interfering with a contract ... of another is improper or not, consideration is given to . . . the actor’s motive [and] the interests sought to be advanced by the actor ...” Restatement of Torts 2d, § 767 (b) (d). The interest of gratifying feelings of ill will toward another will generally not justify interference of contract by a corporate officer. See Restatement of Torts 2d, § 767, comment on clause (d). See also Restatement of Torts 2d, § 769 comments on clauses (d) and (e).
“A directed verdict is proper only where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced together with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom demands a particular verdict. OCGA § 9-11-50 (a); Tri-Eastern Petro. *480Corp. v. Glenn’s Super Gas, 178 Ga. App. 144, 145 (1) (342 SE2d 346) (1986).” Beard v. Fender, 179 Ga. App. 465 (346 SE2d 901).
Decided March 18, 1988.
Dana B. Miles, R. Timothy Hamil, for appellant.
Robert L. Littlefield, Jr., for appellee.
In the case sub judice, after examining the entire trial transcript and record, I find there was ample evidence to support a conclusion that Jordan’s actions were personally motivated, were in breach of his duty as a corporate officer and were in interference with the Georgia Metal Systems & Engineering, Inc. (“GMS”)/Energy Contractors, Inc. (“EC”) contractual relationship. Consequently, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Jordan on the issue of tortious interference of contract. See American Game &c. Svc. v. Knighton, 178 Ga. App. 745 (1) (344 SE2d 717), and cits. Compare Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613 (2) (250 SE2d 442).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.