Court Opinion

ID: 9794992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:15:38.038194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:22:48.627022
License: Public Domain

SHENK, J.
I dissent. The prevailing opinion holds that the requirement that a claim be presented within six months “after the occurrence from which the damages arose” is met when the claim is presented within six months after the last of a series of occurrences which caused the damage, and, presumably, that recovery may be had for the entire damage including the damage arising from acts occurring more than six months prior to the presentation of the claim. I agree that a claim may properly be presented within six months from the last occurrence giving rise to damage, but I do not agree with the holding that recovery may be had for damage arising from occurrences which happened prior to the beginning of the six months’ period.
The purpose of the requirement for filing claims is not only to provide the municipality with information so that it may settle claims without litigation. Another very important purpose, in a case of continuing damage, such as the present one, is to give the city an opportunity to provide protection against damage by the continued acts complained of, should it deem itself liable. Therefore the rule stated in Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., 19 Cal.2d 123, 129 [119 P. 2d 717], that “where the time and extent of injury are uncertain, a statutory period of limitations begins to run when the fact that damage is occurring becomes apparent and discoverable, even though the extent of the damage may still be unknown,” has a sound basis in reason and justice. If, as was apparent in the present ease, a continuation of the acts would result in a loss to the plaintiff, either total or partial, both reason and justice required that the municipality be apprised of the first occurrence causing damage at least within the time required by law, rather than that the plaintiff be permitted to remain silent until the damage mounted to a total loss. To hold the plaintiff thus to the requirement is not at all to effect a disregard of the language of the charter provision. On the contrary, it is a compliance with the plain terms thereof. It does not follow that to require compliance would be to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right to compensation for damaging private property for public use. It is settled that although the constitutional provision is self-*206executing, the legislature may properly set up a procedure for the recovery of the damages, and that the filing of a claim within a specified period of limitations is a proper step in such procedure. “Although the Constitution grants the right to compensation, it does not specify the procedure by which the right may be enforced. Such procedure may be set up by statutory or charter provisions, and when so established, a failure to comply with it is deemed to be a waiver of the right to compel the payment of damages.” (Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., supra, 19 Cal.2d 123, 126 [119 P.2d 717]; Davis v. East Contra Costa Irrigation Dist., 19 Cal.2d 140 [119 P.2d 727]; Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 725 [123 P.2d 505]; Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 430 [278 P. 1028]; Los Angeles Athletic Club v. Long Beach, 128 Cal.App. 427 [17 P.2d 1061].)
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied December 2, 1943. Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.