Court Opinion

ID: 9929346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:07:39.995756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:13.825429
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1365-MR

RICKY CAIN                                                            APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
v.           HONORABLE RODNEY DARREL BURRESS, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CI-00011

OUVITA HODGE                                                            APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Appellant, Ricky Cain, and Appellee, Ouvita Hodge, lived

together for a short period of time before separating. Hodge sued Cain, seeking to

obtain various items of personal property and damages. Cain failed to respond to

the suit and the Bullitt Circuit Court granted a default judgment. Cain filed a

motion to set aside the default judgment, which was denied. He appeals to this

Court as a matter of right. For the following reasons, we affirm.
                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                “Although default judgments are not favored, trial courts possess

broad discretion in considering motions to set them aside and we will not disturb

the exercise of that discretion absent abuse.” Howard v. Fountain, 749 S.W.2d

690, 692 (Ky. App. 1988) (citation omitted). A trial court does not abuse its

discretion unless its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by

sound legal principles.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Ky. 2004)

(citation omitted). CR1 55.02 provides: “For good cause shown the court may set

aside a judgment by default in accordance with Rule 60.02.” (Emphasis added.)

See VerraLab Ja LLC v. Cemerlic, 584 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Ky. 2019) (“Good cause

is not mere inattention on the part of the defendant . . . .”) (citation omitted).

                CR 60.02 provides in relevant part: “On motion a court may, upon

such terms as are just, relieve a party or his legal representative from its final

judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: (a) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect . . . or (f) any other reason of an

extraordinary nature justifying relief.” “We review the denial of a CR

60.02 motion under an abuse of discretion standard.” Foley v. Commonwealth,

425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citation omitted). With these standards in mind,

we now return to the present case.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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                                    ANALYSIS

             Cain’s primary argument on appeal is that he was not properly served

under CR 4.04(2):

             Service shall be made upon an individual within this
             Commonwealth . . . by delivering a copy of the summons
             and of the complaint (or other initiating document) to
             him personally or, if acceptance is refused by offering
             personal delivery to such person, or by delivering a copy
             of the summons and of the complaint (or other initiating
             document) to an agent authorized by appointment or by
             law to receive service of process for such individual.

The circuit court addressed this issue in its order denying Cain’s motion to set

aside the default judgment as follows:

             [T]estimony from Special Bailiff J.C. Wantland indicates
             that Mr. Wantland appeared at Defendant’s residence,
             that Defendant opened the door to his home, that Mr.
             Wantland displayed to him both the Summons and the
             Complaint through the glass storm door based on
             pandemic recommendations of social distancing at the
             time. Mr. Wantland informed Defendant of this action
             and left said copies of Summons and Complaint between
             the storm and front doors.

Cain appears to argue that the bailiff was required to place the Summons and

Complaint in his hands in order to complete service of process. We disagree. And

without citation or explanation, Cain also argues that the court “completely failed

to address the balance of the default judgment test.” There is no indication that

Cain properly preserved or adequately developed this issue before the circuit court.

“It is an unvarying rule that a question not raised or adjudicated in the court below

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cannot be considered when raised for the first time in this court.” Combs v Knott

Cnty. Fiscal Court, 141 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Ky. 1940). In any event, the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion here.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Bullitt Circuit Court’s

order granting a default judgment, and its order denying Cain’s motion to set aside

the default judgment.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Timothy Dennison                            James Winchell
Louisville, Kentucky                        Shepherdsville, Kentucky

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