Court Opinion

ID: 9865629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:11:17.762229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:55.303124
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION'FOR REHEARING.
Movant contends in his motion for rehearing that so much of the verdict in this case as covers the period from the time of the. paying of the judgment rendered against it in the first suit, to wit, May 7, 1938, up to the time of trial of this action in the court below, to wit, Nov. 7, 1938, is improperly approved by this court. This present action was filed in the trial court on July 11, 1938, and while the defendant persisted solely in the defense of failure of the plaintiff to comply with the preliminary provisions as to monthly reports, yet in its answer to that action it continued to deny liability on the policy or that the plaintiff had been injured in an accident covered by the provisions of said policjf, and also denied that plaintiff had complied with the provisions as to the giving of notice every thirty days by a certificate from a doctor. This was a continuing absolute denial of liability on its part, and made it unnecessary for the plaintiff to continue to furnish the thirty-day notices of continuing total and permanent disability as provided for under the policy. We think that where the company has denied liability on the policy and has said that the policy does not cover the injury claimed, that before it can again demand a compliance with the preliminaries as mentioned in Code, § 56r-831, *363it must give plain and unequivocal notice that it withdraws its denial of liability on the policy and its unconditional refusal to pay and now relies on the policy and will insist on a compliance in the future with these conditions named in the policy. The insurer may not deny the contract, or that the contract covers the disability claimed, and refuse payment on that ground and still insist on a compliance with the provisions or conditions subsequent in the contract. Conditions with respect to the proof of loss and the continuance thereof are conditions subsequent to the happening of the hazard insured against. Where there is a denial that any loss is insured against, or that any loss has occurred, there is no need for the performance of these conditions subsequent.
The letters introduced in evidence in this case, written by the defendant, have never stated that it now admits, or then admitted, that the plaintiff had an injury which was protected by the terms of the policy it had issued to him, but merely stated that it would refuse to pay for the period of time accruing during the pendency' of the former action because the plaintiff had not continued to give it the notice required under the policy. When sued thereon it again denied any liability on the policy, and denied the happening of the original injury as being one covered by the policy. So long as the defendant continues to deny liability under the policy the need for the service or furnishing of the. thirty-day notices is suspended. It must admit the injury and its liability therefor, having heretofore continued to deny it, before it can again insist that the plaintiff comply with these terms of the policy. If any further liability occurs or the total disability continues, the insurer may for the future, by admitting that the policy is in effect and that it relies on the same, demand that the insured comply with its terms by furnishing the doctor’s certificates as required therein. It can not continue its unconditional refusal to pay and at the same time insist upon the insured giving to it the notices provided for in the policy.
There is always available to the insurer the defense that the disability has ceased.

Motion for rehearing is denied.

Broyles, O. J., and MacIntyre, ■J., concur.