Court Opinion

ID: 9627250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:40:50.639259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:44.016244
License: Public Domain

PHIL HARDBERGER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
This interlocutory appeal arises from two attorneys’ efforts to compel arbitration of a legal malpractice claim against them. The trial court denied the attorneys’ motion to compel arbitration. The majority reverses the trial court’s order and remands the cause to the trial court with instructions to enter an .order compelling arbitration.
Among other issues addressed by the majority is the client’s argument that the arbitration provision violates public policy. The majority dismisses this argument in a single sentence, asserting: “Gonzalez’s public policy contentions are unfounded because well established caselaw favors mandatory arbitration and holds that arbitration does not deny parties a right to a jury trial, as a matter of law.” The majority then cites three cases in support of its assertion, none of which involve an arbitration provision in an agreement between an attorney and a client. Because special public policy considerations are implicated when an attorney imposes an arbitration provision on his or her client, I respectfully dissent.
The legal and ethical implications of arbitration provisions in contracts between attorneys and their clients have been the subject of a number of articles. See, e. g., Clark, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Pre-Dispute Agreements Between Attorneys and Clients to Arbitrate Fee Disputes, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 827 (1999) (additional authorities cited in footnotes 5-8; cited herein as Clark); Powers, Ethical Implications of Attorneys Requiring Clients to Submit Malpractice Claims to ADR, 38 S. Tex. L.Rev. 625 (1997) (cited herein as Powers); Jane Massey Draper, B.C.L., Annotation, Validity and Construction of Agreement Between Attorney and Client to Arbitrate Disputes Arising Between Them, 26 A.L.R. 5th 107 (1995). The essence of these articles is that whatever public policy may be served by enforcing arbitration agreements is more than offset *693by the public policy of not allowing attorneys to take advantage of their clients. Trust is the essential ingredient in an attorney-client relationship. The great majority of clients are not even close to being in an equal bargaining position with their attorneys. They go to an attorney so the attorney can tell them what to do, not vice-versa.
In a serious personal injury case, such as this, clients are typically deeply in grief and overwhelmed by the circumstances that have come upon them. Pain and disability have entered their lives, and the breadwinner is no longer able to bring home wages for the family. As bills pour in, with no offsetting income, a true state of desperation exists. Are we then to allow attorneys, who represent such clients, to take away them rights to a jury should legal malpractice occur? I agree with the commentators in the cited articles and with the laws established in other jurisdictions that conclude that such a practice is against public policy. Certainly it should be against public policy in the absence of some additional protections for the client, which do not exist in the case.
The traditional advantages of arbitration may not be so advantageous in the context of a legal malpractice claim. For example, the savings of cost and time would likely be more of a disadvantage to the attorney alleged to have committed malpractice than to the client because the client’s new attorney will typically be handling the claim on a contingency basis. See Powers, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. at 637; see also Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.1992) (noting efficiency and lower costs are frequently cited as the main benefits of arbitration). In addition, the ability to pursue the claim in court may provide the client with a bargaining advantage in negotiating with an attorney who seeks to avoid litigation and its potential negative publicity. Id.
More importantly, the fundamental fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship dictates against an attorney’s ability to impose an arbitration condition on a client. Clients are often in vulnerable positions, requiring them to bestow a large amount of trust in their attorneys. “The client’s vulnerability vis-a-vis the attorney is often exacerbated by the Ghent’s current legal situation.... He is neither expecting, nor emotionally prepared, to ‘do battle’ with his chosen attorney to protect his own rights.” Power, 38 S. Tex L. Rev. at 648. Applying general contractual principles to an arbitration provision in the attorney-client context ignores the practical reality that in most instances the attorney and his or her client are not engaged in an arm’s length transaction during their initial negotiations. See Clark, 84 Iowa L. Rev. at 852.
Attorneys generally have a greater advantage over their clients in an arbitration setting. Attorneys are trained to conduct arbitration to the best advantage of their clients, in this case themselves. See Powers, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. at 631. Since one of the “selling points” of arbitration is the ability to proceed without an attorney, the client with the malpractice claim may not seek additional counsel, leaving the trained attorney with a distinct advantage. See id.
In a profession that is called upon to police itself, how can we justify allowing attorneys to take advantage of those who call upon their services? We cannot. Although the traditional contractual defenses, like unconscionability, may be available to clients who are taken advantage of, such a situation should never be allowed to arise. Clients who are in a weaker bargaining position may not be able to meet the burden of proving unconscionability. See Powers, 38 S. Tex L. Rev. at 639-42. This does not mean that the attorney would not have taken advantage of his or her client. It simply means that the legal definition of unconscionability, created by attorneys, is an uncertain road for an already burdened client.
Recognizing these public policy concerns, other states have prohibited or limited the inclusion of arbitration provisions in attorneys’ engagement letters. For example, Pennsylvania has adopted a rule *694that permits an arbitration provision in an engagement letter only if: (1) the advantages and disadvantages are fully disclosed by the attorney; (2) the client is advised of his right to consult independent counsel and is given the opportunity to do so; and (3) the Ghent’s consent is in writing. See Clark, 84 Iowa L. Rev. at 857-58. Both the District of Columbia and Michigan have taken a more restrictive approach and prohibit arbitration clauses in engagement letters unless the client has the advice of independent counsel. See id. at 858-863. Finally, Ohio has taken the most restrictive approach and simply prohibits pre-dispute arbitration agreements between attorneys and their clients. See id. at 862-64. Ohio reasons that requiring a client to hire a lawyer in order to hire a lawyer sends the wrong message. See id. at 863.
Public policy mandates that some restrictions must be placed on an attorney’s ability to include an arbitration provision in an engagement letter. Because no such restrictions were imposed in this case, I would conclude that the arbitration clause violates public policy and affirm the trial court’s ruling. I respectfully dissent.