Court Opinion

ID: 9733952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:21:19.99096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.677954
License: Public Domain

KIRSCH, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the prior bad act evidence, and, accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Probably no rule of evidence presents a greater challenge for trial counsel and trial and appellate courts than that posed by Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b). Indeed, in Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992), our supreme court noted that the federal counterpart of the rule "has generated more reported decisions than any other rule." Id. at 1840. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cireuit has observed: "If the evidentiary rules were ranked in accordance with the controversy they engender, Rule 404(b) would stand near the top." United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1301 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958, 108 S.Ct. 356, 98 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987), quoted in Mir. Ler, 12 Practices § 404.201, n. 7.
Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of prior bad acts to prove the character of the defendant to show that the defendant acted on the occasion at issue in conformity with that character; that is, that the defendant, as shown by the prior bad acts had the propensity to act in ways consistent with such acts. Such evidence is allowed for other purposes, such as motive, intent, and absence of mistake. Lannan, 600 N.E.2d at 1339. On the one hand, we allow such evidence under appropriate cireumstances to show intent, motive, absence of mistake, et cet-era. On the other hand, we disallow bad act evidence to show propensity; we say that if such evidence is offered only to prove that the defendant's charged conduct conforms with the defendant's prior bad acts-"the forbidden inference"-it is inadmissible. See Hardin v. State, 611 N.E.2d 123, 129 (Ind.1993).
It should be noted that the reason that the inference is forbidden is not because the inference is not reasonable, but because it is.15 The reason the inference is forbidden is because of a value judgment that the prejudice of the prior bad acts substantially outweighs the probative value of such evidence where the evidence is used to prove the commission of the act in question.16 Where it is used for another purpose, as for example where the defendant makes a claim of contrary intent, the balance is struck differently, and such evidence is admitted even though the probative value of such evidence is inferential.
Prior bad act evidence is probative of intent on the occasion at issue only through inference. The inference is that because the defendant had the requisite malevolent intent in the past it is more likely that he had the same intent on the occasion of the charged conduct. Similarly, in the case of motive, absence of mistake, common plan and so forth, the proba*241tive value of the prior bad act evidence is inferential. When used for these purposes, however, the inference is permitted. Only when used to prove character and action in conformity therewith is the inference forbidden; it is not forbidden when used "for other purposes."
Here, the probative value of the prior bad act arises from the inference that because Craun committed similar acts of child molestation in the past, his claim of mistake in the present instance is less likely than it otherwise would be. Thus, the prior bad act evidence is not being used to prove that Craun committed the acts of molestation ("the forbidden inference") but to disprove that his claims that all he had done was tickle the child victim and that she was mistaken when she claimed to have been molested-the permitted inference. Indeed, this case is very similar to People v. Thomas, 20 Cal.3d 457, 143 Cal.Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting) cited by our supreme court in Lannan. In Thomas, the defendant accused of molesting his daughter claimed that he was merely rubbing vaporizing cream on her chest for treatment of a cold. The dissenting opinion of Justice Clark argued that testimony of the defendant's other daughters that they, too, had been molested by their father was admissible to prove the defendant's true intent and absence of mistake. Our supreme court agreed, stating: "Evidence of prior sex. offenses-charged or uncharged-may also be admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove absence of mistake." Lannan at 1840.
So, too, here, I believe Craun's claim that H.D. mistook his tickling for something more sinister was inferentially less likely when viewed in the light of the prior bad act evidence that Craun touched other young girls inappropriately. The evidence was not used to prove the commission of the act, but to disprove Craun's claim of mistake. As such, the inference to be drawn was not forbidden, but permitted. I believe the admission of the prior bad act evidence was proper and would affirm the conviction.

. Indeed, Judge Warren D. Wolfson of the Illinois Appellate Court has written: "The [prior bad act] evidence is not barred because it is irrelevant. On the contrary, it is barred because it is too relevant. It invites potential misuse." Wolfson, "Evidence Advocacy: The Judge's Perspective," 28 Litigation 3 (Fall 2001).

. It is interesting that the Federal Rules of Evidence upon which Ind. Rule Evid. 404(b) is based now make a different value judgment and allow conformity evidence of similar offenses in sexual assault and child molestation cases for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. See FRE Rules 413, 414, and 415.