Court Opinion

ID: 9907475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:06:46.323136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:47.900471
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                 No. 23-0226
                           Filed December 6, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOHN HOUSTON FRALEY,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Taylor County, Elisabeth

Reynoldson, Judge.

      John Fraley challenges a restitution order. WRIT ANNULLED.

      Erin M. Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., Badding, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                            2

DANILSON, Senior Judge.

       John Fraley started a fire in a burn barrel near a utility pole and left the fire

unattended. Eventually, the utility pole, owned by Lenox Municipal Utilities, caught

fire. In light of these facts, Fraley pled guilty to reckless use of fire, in violation of

Iowa Code section 712.5 (2021).         The district court entered a judgment and

sentencing order accepting the plea. Following a subsequent restitution hearing,

the district court issued a post-sentencing restitution order requiring Fraley to pay

Lenox $1901.45 in victim restitution for replacement of the utility pole. Fraley

appeals, challenging whether Lenox is entitled to restitution.

       Because the district court entered the restitution order after sentencing,

Fraley can only challenge the order under Iowa Code section 901.7, see Iowa

Code § 901.3(10), and cannot appeal as a matter of right. State v. Patterson, 984

N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 2023). Instead, he can only seek appellate review by

petition for writ of certiorari. Iowa Code § 901.7(5). Although Fraley filed a notice

of appeal, we may treat that improper filing as a petition for writ of certiorari. Iowa

R. App. P. 6.108; State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2017). We proceed as

though Fraley filed a petition for writ of certiorari, grant the petition, and proceed to

the merits.

       “In a certiorari case, we review the district court’s ruling for correction of

errors at law.” Weissenburger v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 740 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 2007).

“A writ of certiorari lies where a lower . . . court has exceeded its jurisdiction or

otherwise acted illegally.” Id. (citation omitted). Illegality “occurs ‘when the court’s

findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly

applied the law.’” Patterson, 984 N.W.2d at 456 (citation omitted).
                                           3

       Iowa Code section 910.2(1) requires a defendant to pay any pecuniary

damages to the victim of their offense as part of restitution. A “victim” is “a person

who has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the offender’s criminal

activities.” Iowa Code § 901.1(11). “Pecuniary damages” are “all damages to the

extent not paid by an insurer on an insurance claim by the victim, which a victim

could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of the same facts or

event, except punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish,

and loss of consortium.” Id. § 901.1(6). However, “[t]he State bears the burden of

proof to recover damages due [to] the victim.” State v. Roache, 920 N.W.2d 93,

100 (Iowa 2018).

               In calculating a restitution order, the district court must find a
       causal connection between the established criminal act and the
       injuries to the victim. The damage must have been caused by the
       offender’s criminal act to justify the restitution order. Once the causal
       connection is established by a preponderance of the evidence, “the
       statute allows recovery of ‘all damages’ . . . which the state can show
       by a preponderance of the evidence.”

State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 168 (Iowa 2001) (omission in original)

(internal citations omitted).

       Fraley argues the district court erred by ordering him to pay restitution to

Lenox for replacement of the utility pole, contending the evidence presented at the

restitution hearing failed to establish that replacement of the utility pole was

necessary due to his criminal activity. He reasons the utility pole “eventually would

have been replaced regardless of the fire, so there is no causal connection

between the replacement of the pole and the fire.” Essentially, Fraley challenges

causation.    Causation is bifurcated into factual cause and scope of liability.

Roache, 920 N.W.2d at 101. We evaluate factual causation using a “but-for” test:
                                            4

       [T]he defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of the [victim]’s harm if,
       but-for the defendant’s conduct, that harm would not have occurred.
       The but-for test also implies a negative. If the [victim] would have
       suffered the same harm had the defendant not acted negligently, the
       defendant’s conduct is not a cause in fact of the harm.

Id. (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). And we apply Restatement (Third)

of Torts’ risk standard for scope of liability in criminal restitution determinations. Id.

at 102. To determine whether

       the [victim]’s harm is beyond the scope of liability as a matter of law,
       courts must initially consider all of the range of harms risked by the
       defendant’s conduct that the jury could find as the basis for
       determining [the defendant’s] conduct tortious. Then, the court can
       compare the [victim]’s harm with the range of harms risked by the
       defendant to determine whether a reasonable jury might find the
       former among the latter.

Id. at 101 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).

       Taking these concepts into account, we consider whether Lenox is entitled

to restitution for replacement of the utility pole. The utility pole would not have

caught fire and been damaged but for Fraley starting a fire in close proximity to it.

Yet Fraley argues he should not have to pay for its replacement because Lenox

would have to replace the pole after it naturally deteriorated over time anyway,

suggesting the fire he started was not the reason why the utility pole required

replacement. But Lenox’s general manager testified that the fire damaged a

preservative used to treat the pole, dried and weakened the pole, and shortened

the lifespan of the utility pole such that replacement was necessary after it caught

on fire. The manager explained prior to the fire there were no plans to replace the

utility pole nor were there any concerns about its condition other than it had a slight

lean. From this, we conclude the State established factual causation. It is also

reasonable to expect a defendant to pay for the replacement of an object that
                                             5

caught fire after the defendant started a fire in close proximity to it and left the fire

unattended. Thus, we also conclude replacement of the utility pole is within the

scope of liability. Because the State established factual causation and scope of

liability, it has established causation, and Lenox is entitled to pecuniary damages

for the cost to replace the utility pole.1

       As the State established causation between Fraley’s reckless use of fire

and the necessary replacement of the utility pole, Fraley cannot establish that the

district court acted illegally by ordering restitution in the form of pecuniary damages

for the cost of the pole’s replacement. We annul the writ.

       WRIT ANNULLED.

1 Fraley does not challenge the amount of pecuniary damages on appeal but rather

only claimed the victim was not entitled to restitution.