Court Opinion

ID: 9931112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 16:02:38.65732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:00.308186
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13423    Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 1 of 15

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13423
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JOHNNY ORDAZ,
        a.k.a. Jo,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cr-00070-VMC-AEP-1
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13423

                             ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                After a jury trial, Johnny Ordaz appeals his convictions for
        (1) possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of
        21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (“Count 1”); (2) possession of a
        firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of
        18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Count 2”); and (3) felon in possession
        of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (“Count
        3”).
               On appeal, Ordaz argues the district court erred: (1) by
        denying his motion to dismiss Count 3, in which he challenged the
        constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (2) by denying his motion
        to suppress; and (3) by denying his motions for a judgment of
        acquittal on Count 2. Ordaz also argues the district court at trial
        abused its discretion by limiting Ordaz’s cross-examination of an
        officer involved in the traffic stop. After review, we affirm Ordaz’s
        convictions.
                      I.     MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 3
               We generally review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
        denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment. United States v.
        Vineyard, 945 F.3d 1164, 1167 (11th Cir. 2019). But we review de
        novo the constitutionality of a statute. United States v. Wright,
        607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Ordaz contends that Congress
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        21-13423              Opinion of the Court                        3

        exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting
        § 922(g)(1).
               As Ordaz concedes, however, his facial and as-applied
        challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by
        our precedent. See United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235,
        1236 (11th Cir. 2008). Speciﬁcally, “[w]e have repeatedly held that
        Section 922(g)(1) is not a facially unconstitutional exercise of
        Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause[.]” United States v.
        Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011).
               Likewise, our Court has held that § 922(g)(1) is not
        unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a ﬁrearm
        only intrastate where the government demonstrates that the
        particular ﬁrearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Id.
               Here, at trial, the government demonstrated that Ordaz’s
        ﬁrearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Jeﬀrey Burt, an agent
        with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
        testiﬁed that the ﬁrearm found between the driver’s seat and center
        console of Ordaz’s car was manufactured outside of Florida, where
        Ordaz’s crimes occurred. See Wright, 607 F.3d at 715-16 (holding
        the government need show only a minimal nexus between the
        ﬁrearm and interstate commerce, such as evidence that the ﬁrearm
        was manufactured outside of the state where the defendant
        possessed it).
               Accordingly, we aﬃrm the district court’s denial of Ordaz’s
        motion to dismiss Count 3.
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        4                        Opinion of the Court               21-13423

                           II.     MOTION TO SUPPRESS
               Next, Ordaz argues that the district court erred in denying
        his motion to suppress because the police stopped and searched his
        car without probable cause. Ordaz argues evidence obtained as a
        result of the search should have been suppressed.
               At a hearing on Ordaz’s motion to suppress, the government
        presented the following testimony of Detectives Joe Petta, John
        Thames, Eric Davis, and Jonathan Kruse. At the time of the traﬃc
        stop, the detectives were familiar with Ordaz due to his suspected
        involvement in fentanyl distribution and a homicide. Prior to the
        traﬃc stop, they also knew that Ordaz was a convicted felon. On
        September 5, 2019, detectives saw Ordaz’s gray four-door Inﬁniti
        parked at his mother’s house, and detectives parked nearby to
        conduct surveillance. The tint on the Inﬁniti’s windows was so
        dark that detectives could not determine the race or sex of the
        driver or how many other people were in the car. As the Inﬁniti
        exited Ordaz’s mother’s neighborhood, Detective Petta, from his
        undercover police car, saw the Inﬁniti run a stop sign.
               The Inﬁniti continued to drive toward the next intersection,
        where Detectives Thames, Davis, and Scott Williamson were
        parked in another undercover police car. Detective Petta radioed
        those detectives to tell them that the Inﬁniti had run a stop sign.
        Those detectives radioed back that they saw the Inﬁniti run a
        second stop sign. The detectives did not initiate a traﬃc stop on
        the Inﬁniti at that time because their vehicles did not have lights or
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        21-13423              Opinion of the Court                        5

        sirens. Instead, they radioed Detective Kruse, whose car had lights
        and sirens, for assistance.
               The two undercover police cars followed the Inﬁniti for forty
        blocks until it parked at an apartment complex, at which point
        Detective Kruse arrived in a third police car. As the Inﬁniti
        attempted to pull out of the apartment complex, Detective Kruse
        activated his lights and blocked the Inﬁniti’s path. Detective Kruse
        exited his car and approached the Inﬁniti, but the Inﬁniti began to
        back up 30 to 40 yards until it reached the end of the parking lot.
               Detective Williamson then opened the Inﬁniti’s driver’s door
        and Ordaz exited the car. Detective Davis, who was standing in
        front of the open driver’s door, saw a ﬁrearm with an extended
        magazine between the driver’s seat and center console, and he
        yelled out that he saw a gun. Detective Davis also smelled
        marijuana and saw a marijuana cigarette in the driver’s side door.
               At the suppression hearing, Ordaz testiﬁed to the following.
        On September 5, 2019, Ordaz went from his mother’s house to an
        apartment complex to meet a friend. As Ordaz left his mother’s
        house, he stopped at the ﬁrst stop sign. Ordaz then proceeded to
        the next intersection and made a complete stop at the stop sign
        there too. Ordaz was careful to stop at those two intersections
        because they were in a busy area with a lot of accidents. Once he
        arrived at the apartment complex, Ordaz backed into a parking
        spot, called his friend, and then realized his friend was not home.
              As Ordaz exited the parking spot, a car pulled in front of
        him. Ordaz was scared because he was recently shot, and he began
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                21-13423

        reversing his car. Then Ordaz saw lights in the grill of the car in
        front of him and knew it was the police. Because he was in the
        middle of the parking lot, Ordaz continued to back up until he
        reached a parking spot. Ordaz assumed the window tint on his
        Inﬁniti was legal because he bought it from a dealership with the
        windows already tinted.
               After the hearing, the magistrate judge issued a report and
        recommendation (“R&R”) that Ordaz’s motion to suppress should
        be denied because the oﬃcers had probable cause to initiate the
        traﬃc stop and search Ordaz’s car. The magistrate judge credited
        the oﬃcers’ testimony that Ordaz ran two stop signs and that they
        believed his car had illegally dark window tint, which established
        probable cause to initiate the stop. The magistrate judge noted that
        the oﬃcers’ testimony was consistent about key events, and that
        the oﬃcers’ interest in Ordaz’s involvement in fentanyl distribution
        and a homicide was irrelevant to its probable cause analysis. The
        magistrate judge concluded that Ordaz was not credible because
        he had “substantial motivation to be less than candid in his
        testimony.” Further, the magistrate judge found that the oﬃcers
        had probable cause to search Ordaz’s car because the oﬃcers
        properly ordered Ordaz out of his car after the traﬃc stop,
        observed a ﬁrearm between the driver’s seat and center console,
        and knew he was a felon unable to possess ﬁrearms.
              Ordaz objected to the R&R, arguing that the magistrate
        judge erred in crediting the oﬃcers’ testimony over his own.
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        21-13423               Opinion of the Court                         7

        Speciﬁcally, Ordaz argued that the magistrate judge failed to
        consider the oﬃcers’ biases and motives in following Ordaz’s car.
               The district court overruled Ordaz’s objections and adopted
        the R&R. The district court found that the oﬃcers’ testimony was
        consistent as to the circumstances leading to the traﬃc stop, and
        that the magistrate judge noted the oﬃcers’ potential ulterior
        motives in following Ordaz but still found the oﬃcers to be
        credible. The district court thus deferred to the magistrate judge’s
        credibility determination and adopted its ﬁnding that the oﬃcers
        had probable cause to stop Ordaz’s car because he ran two stop
        signs and had illegal window tint on his car.
               In this appeal, when faced with a challenge to the denial of
        a motion to suppress, we review ﬁndings of fact for clear error and
        the application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Smith,
        459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006). We construe the district
        court’s fact ﬁndings in the light most favorable to the prevailing
        party. Id.
               First, the district court did not err by ﬁnding that the police
        had probable cause to initiate the traﬃc stop because three oﬃcers
        testiﬁed at a suppression hearing that they saw Ordaz run two stop
        signs, which is a traﬃc violation under Florida law. See Fla. Stat.
        § 316.123(2)(a); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As
        a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
        where the police have probable cause to believe that a traﬃc
        violation has occurred.”).
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  21-13423

                Although Ordaz testiﬁed that he did not commit these traﬃc
        violations, the magistrate judge and district court were allowed to
        believe the oﬃcers’ testimony to the contrary, and we defer to that
        credibility determination because nothing in their “understanding
        of the facts appears to be unbelievable.” See United States v.
        Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks
        omitted). And while Ordaz argues that the oﬃcers initiated the
        traﬃc stop because they suspected his involvement in unrelated
        criminal activity, not a traﬃc violation, the oﬃcers’ subjective
        motivations for initiating the stop “play no role in ordinary,
        probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” See Whren, 517 U.S.
        at 813.
                Second, the district court did not err by ﬁnding that police
        had probable cause to search Ordaz’s car. The automobile
        exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
        “allows the police to conduct a search of a vehicle if (1) the vehicle
        is readily mobile[,] and (2) the police have probable cause for the
        search.” United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).
        Ordaz does not dispute that his car, which he had been driving
        before the oﬃcers initiated the traﬃc stop, was operational. See
        United States v. Watts, 329 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating
        that a car is readily mobile where it is operational).
                The police obtained probable cause to search Ordaz’s car
        after they initiated the traﬃc stop and ordered him out of the car.
        See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (“[O]nce a
        motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traﬃc violation, the
        police oﬃcers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle
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        21-13423               Opinion of the Court                          9

        without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of
        unreasonable searches and seizures.”). Detectives testiﬁed at the
        suppression hearing that they were aware prior to the traﬃc stop
        that Ordaz was a felon, and as Ordaz exited his car, Detective Davis
        (1) saw a ﬁrearm between the driver’s seat and center console;
        (2) smelled marijuana; and (3) saw a marijuana cigarette in the
        driver’s door. Based on Ordaz’s status as a felon and the presence
        of a ﬁrearm, odor of marijuana, and a marijuana cigarette in the
        car, the police had probable cause to search the car. See United States
        v. Delva, 922 F.3d 1228, 1243 (11th Cir. 2019) (stating probable cause
        exists to perform a warrantless search of a car “when there is a fair
        probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
        the vehicle[.]” (quotation marks omitted)).
                Because the traﬃc stop and search of Ordaz’s car were
        proper under the Fourth Amendment, there was no error in the
        district court’s denial of Ordaz’s motion to suppress evidence
        obtained as a result of that stop and search.
                     III.   SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
              On appeal, Ordaz argues that the district court
        impermissibly restricted his cross-examination at trial of Detective
        Thames regarding the circumstances leading to the traﬃc stop.
        Ordaz contends his lines of questioning of Detective Thames
        would have shown that he did stop at the two stop signs and “would
        have shown that law enforcement really didn’t have [probable]
        cause” for the traﬃc stop that led to the search of his car and arrest.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  21-13423

               We review a defendant’s claim that the district court
        impermissibly limited the scope of cross-examination for a clear
        abuse of discretion. United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282,
        1295 (11th Cir. 2009).
                A district court’s discretion to limit cross-examination is
        restricted by a criminal defendant’s right under the Sixth
        Amendment’s Confrontation Clause to cross-examine the
        government’s witnesses. Id. Still, a defendant “is entitled only to
        an opportunity for eﬀective cross-examination, not
        cross-examination that is eﬀective in whatever way, and to whatever
        extent, the defendant might wish.” Id. at 1296 (quotation marks
        omitted). The information the defendant seeks to elicit must be
        relevant. Id.
                Here, the district court already determined after a
        suppression hearing that the police had probable cause to initiate
        the traﬃc stop. As explained above, the district court committed
        no error in that determination. The legal issue of probable cause
        for the traﬃc stop was not a question of fact at trial for Ordaz to
        re-litigate and for the jury to re-determine. See Bretti v. Wainwright,
        439 F.2d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting the “well-established rule
        that it is for the court, not the jury, to decide whether evidence has
        been illegally obtained”); Burris v. United States, 192 F.2d 253,
        254-55 (5th Cir. 1951) (“[T]he Court correctly ruled that the legality
        of the search warrant and the evidence obtained as a result of its
        execution was a matter of law for its determination. It was
        therefore entirely proper that the Court prohibit cross-examination
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        21-13423                Opinion of the Court                           11

        [at trial] of the witnesses upon this question when before the
        jury[.]”).1
               Further, Ordaz was able to ask questions of Detective
        Thames about the traﬃc stop itself, the search of his car, the
        collection of evidence, and Detective Thames’s police report about
        the stop and evidence seized.
               In contrast, Ordaz’s challenged lines of questioning at trial
        all concerned the underlying probable cause basis for the stop, such
        as how long the police followed Ordaz before initiating the traﬃc
        stop, whether they radioed other deputies for help, the number of
        patrol deputies in the county’s sheriﬀ’s oﬃce, whether there were
        opportunities to initiate the stop sooner, and the visibility of the
        emergency lights on Detective Kruse’s police car that initiated the
        stop. Accordingly, because the district court had already
        determined probable cause and the validity of the stop and search,
        we discern no error in the district court’s limitation of Ordaz’s
        cross-examination of Detective Thames.
               Finally, we recognize there is a presumption in favor of “free
        cross-examination on possible bias, motive, ability to perceive and
        remember, and general character for truthfulness.” Maxwell,
        579 F.3d at 1296 (quotation marks omitted). For the ﬁrst time in his
        reply brief, Ordaz argues that the disputed lines of questioning

        1 Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1,

        1981 are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
        1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                    21-13423

        were meant not merely for probable cause, but were to test
        Detective Thames’s credibility generally. A party normally forfeits
        issues not timely raised in his initial brief. See United States v. Smith,
        416 F.3d 1350, 1352 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2005). But even if Ordaz had
        raised this issue in his initial brief, he was not entitled to “unlimited
        inquiry.” See Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1295-96 (quotation marks
        omitted). The jury was able to adequately weigh Detective
        Thames’s credibility given his other testimony on
        cross-examination about the ultimate traﬃc stop, the number of
        oﬃcers participating in that stop, the search of Ordaz’s car and the
        collection of evidence, and the report he wrote about the stop and
        the evidence seized. Ordaz does not explain how a reasonable jury
        would have received a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent impression of
        Detective Thames’s credibility had Ordaz been able to pursue
        further the additional lines of questioning. See id.
               Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        limiting Ordaz’s cross-examination of Detective Thames.
             IV.    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE ON COUNT 2
              Ordaz also contends that the district court erred in denying
        his motions for a judgment of acquittal on Count 2, arguing that
        the government’s evidence was insuﬃcient to show that he
        possessed a ﬁrearm in furtherance of a drug-traﬃcking crime.
               We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of
        acquittal based on the suﬃciency of the evidence. United States v.
        Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the
        suﬃciency of the evidence, we consider whether a reasonable trier
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        21-13423                Opinion of the Court                         13

        of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        government, could ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
        doubt. Id.
               Federal law prohibits the possession of a ﬁrearm in
        furtherance of a drug-traﬃcking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
        The “in furtherance requirement demands that the government
        establish that the ﬁrearm helped, furthered, promoted, or
        advanced the drug traﬃcking.” United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d
        1322, 1340 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). To do so,
        the government must establish some nexus between the ﬁrearm
        and the drug selling operation, including by showing the kind of
        drug activity being conducted, the accessibility of the ﬁrearm, the
        status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the ﬁrearm
        is loaded, and the proximity of the ﬁrearm to the drugs or drug
        proﬁts. Id. at 1340-41.
               Intent to distribute can be shown by circumstantial evidence,
        such as the amount of drugs found and the presence of other items
        commonly used for distribution, including scales and money near
        the drugs. United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1392 (11th Cir. 1989);
        United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1076 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting
        that cash, plastic bags, and the lack of paraphernalia used to
        consume drugs can also show the intent to distribute).
               Here, after record review, we conclude ample evidence
        established Ordaz possessed a ﬁrearm in furtherance of a
        drug-traﬃcking crime. First, the government’s evidence showed
        that Ordaz possessed fentanyl with the intent to distribute it,
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                21-13423

        including (1) 2.5 grams of fentanyl found in the driver’s side door;
        (2) several sandwich- and dime-sized plastic bags, some of which
        contained fentanyl; (3) two digital scales; and (4) $588 in cash.
        See Poole, 878 F.2d at 1392; Mercer, 541 F.3d at 1076.
               Second, the government’s evidence tied the ﬁrearm to
        Ordaz’s drug traﬃcking, including (1) the ﬁrearm was accessible to
        Ordaz, as it was found between the driver’s seat and center console;
        (2) the ﬁrearm was in close proximity to the fentanyl, which was
        found in the driver’s side door; (3) Ordaz was a felon and his
        possession of the ﬁrearm was illegal; (4) the ﬁrearm was loaded;
        and (5) Detective Petta’s testimony that drug dealers often carry
        ﬁrearms to protect drugs, proceeds, and themselves. See Dixon,
        901 F.3d at 1341.
                While Ordaz testiﬁed that he never sold fentanyl, the
        fentanyl was for his personal use, and the ﬁrearm was only for
        self-protection, the jury was free to discredit his testimony and
        conclude that the opposite was true. See United States v. Brown,
        53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen a defendant chooses to
        testify, he runs the risk that if disbelieved the jury might conclude
        the opposite of his testimony is true.” (quotation marks omitted)).
        Further, given the corroborative evidence of his guilt outlined
        above, Ordaz’s testimony may alone establish the highly subjective
        element of his intent to possess a ﬁrearm to further a
        drug-traﬃcking crime. See id. at 314-15.
               Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        verdict, a reasonable jury could conclude that Ordaz intended to
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        21-13423                     Opinion of the Court                             15

        possess a ﬁrearm in furtherance of a drug-traﬃcking oﬀense.
        Accordingly, we aﬃrm the denial of Ordaz’s motions for a
        judgment of acquittal on Count 2. 2
                                      V.    CONCLUSION
               For the above reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s denial
        of Ordaz’s motion to dismiss Count 3, motion to suppress, and
        motions for a judgment of acquittal on Count 2, as well as its
        limitation of Ordaz’s cross-examination of Detective Thames.3
                AFFIRMED.

        2 On appeal, Ordaz does not raise any legal or factual challenges to his sentence

        on any of his convictions.
        3 We grant Ordaz’s motion to file a corrected reply brief.The brief attached
        to his motion simply restates the correct amount of fentanyl found in his pos-
        session.