Court Opinion

ID: 9625513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:43:12.046259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:10.015407
License: Public Domain

McCLINTOCK, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe that the majority has basically cited the pertinent authorities. I differ in the application of the principles there set forth to the facts of this case. In my opinion the identification of defendant as the robber of Woody’s Truck Stop was so impermissibly suggestive and of such importance to the prosecution’s case that the witness should not have been permitted to give this testimony. • To me, there has been a denial of due process which under established principles and the special facts of this case could have affected the outcome thereof. I would therefore reverse and remand the cause for new trial.
At a preliminary hearing held November 18 before Justice of the Peace Garfield, the defense had requested civilian clothing for Campbell but. was refused. He was brought into the hearing room by a member of the county sheriff’s force, in prison garb and handcuffed. He was the only person in the room thus attired and over objection of counsel that any in-court identification would be tainted and inherently unreliable, was identified by Hughes as the robber. The objection was renewed and Garfield then suspended the hearing, disqualifying himself from further involvement, and describing the procedure as a “farce,” and “mockery of justice,” by reason of the conduct toward the defendant.
The defendant frames the constitutional issue as a denial of due process of law in that his compelled presence at the preliminary hearing of November 18, 1976, while handcuffed and in prison clothing while the victim of the crime was attending, tainted the victim’s identification testimony so that the trial court was required to suppress and exclude such testimony. Failure to do so by that court after timely motion and further objection at the trial is alleged to be error of such constitutional magnitude as compels reversal.
Although this court has had occasion in the past to discuss the issue of identity as an essential element of proof of the offense charged, we have as yet not addressed this issue as presented. I feel this no hindrance, as the United States Supreme Court has spoken on this subject with force. That court has established sufficient standards to cover the issue in a line of cases beginning with United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). This trilogy of Wade-Gilbert-Stovall has spawned other cases which, considered as a continuum, provide a framework upon which to weave an answer.
It is true that Wade and Gilbert involved the right to counsel at post-indictment lineups, but together with Stovall, they provide a test to determine if a pretrial identification violates due process because it is unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive. I quote from Wade, 388 U.S. at 228, 87 S.Ct. at 1933:
“ * * * [T]he confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable- factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial. The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. * * * A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses *370for pretrial identification.” (Footnotes omitted)
The determination of a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the “totality of the circumstances surrounding it. . . ” Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 1972; whether the subsequent in-court identification should be excluded, as tainted by these pretrial confrontations, will depend on whether or not the latter testimony had an “independent origin.” Gilbert v. California, supra, 388 U.S. at 272, 87 S.Ct. 1951. The identification will be excluded or its admission determined error, if the “procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). I see the test as follows:
1. The court must determine whether the initial identification, here at the preliminary hearing of November 18, 1976, was so “unnecessarily” or “impermissibly suggestive,” that it would “give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irrevocable misidentification.”
I would hold that the mere presence of the defendant in prison clothes and handcuffed, at a preliminary hearing, where one of the purposes is the identification of the alleged robber by the victim, is inherently, unnecessarily and impermissibly suggestive. This effect has been noted in Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969), where the court, citing Stovall, supra, noted that “show ups,” the practice, in essence, of a one-person lineup, are suspect and widely condemned. I feel it logical that the next step is also true: that a one-person show up, where that person is handcuffed, accompanied by a policeman, and dressed in prison garb is, and must be, inherently suspect. Justice of the Peace Garfield noted as much at the preliminary hearing on November 18, 1976, when he remarked that the witness would naturally identify the person in such a situation. Garfield then continued the hearing and removed himself from further participation.
The Federal Supreme Court has allowed such procedures only in exigent circumstances, as in Stovall, supra, where the victim, and only witness, was hospitalized in serious condition. It was a situation where it was imperative that the defendant be shown to the victim immediately before the possibility of death precluded any identification.
Having made this determination, I move to what I feel is the next question:
2. Whether, considering the “totality of the circumstances,” and notwithstanding this initial taint, the in-court identification had sufficient “independent basis” or “origin” that the taint was attenuated, or dissipated, sufficiently to find it passes constitutional muster.
In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), when faced with an identity issue, the court noted that the question that needed to be answered was whether, notwithstanding this suggestiveness, the identification was reliable. In this regard, Biggers presented several factors that should be considered, and listed them as follows: the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the crime; the witness’ degree of attention; the accuracy of prior descriptions; the level of certainty of witnesses at the confrontation; and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375. I proceed to this analysis.
A. Opportunity to view.
There was no testimony as to the lighting condition in or around the truck stop, other than the statement made by Mr. Hughes that it was “dark” when the robbery occurred. This was around 2:00 a. m.
The victim initially claimed that he did not see the alleged robber come in — he heard him. When requested to “hand it over,” he stated he acted “real quick” and then upon request laid on the floor. He never saw the robber leave; he only heard him go. He testified the time lapse was one to one and one-half minutes from the initial entry until he laid down. This com tradicts, I feel, his statement that he acted *371quickly. Later he reduced the time to one minute. He never saw an automobile; he stated he was “afraid,” but calm enough to know the robber and what he wore. He testified he was looking out the window and saw the robber approach, less than one block away. He later backed off this testimony, and claimed he did not see him walk up, except for a very short distance, and could not tell if he arrived on foot or by car. In response to the question if he did see him approach on foot, he replied, “No, sir. Yes.” His opportunity to view the robber was only fair.
B.Degree of attention.
It is difficult to chronicle this factor. The victim testified that he noticed the robber was a “nervous type person.” He was certain of the jacket (“green”) although he had earlier described it as dark. He noticed a dark spot on the coat, but this was never confirmed in the record at trial as fact. He described the hair as “long, stringy” and dark. Later, when shown a wig allegedly worn by the robber, he was certain that was the wig because he thought the robber could be wearing one, but he wasn’t sure at the time. It was the “same,” however. Later, in response to a direct question, he stated, “I didn’t see his hair at the scene, he had a hat on at the time.” He described that hat as dark; an officer testified it was a black and gray checkered hat. At the preliminary hearing the victim described it as a “skullcap” of dark color. No testimony in the record provides a clear answer.
He was “sure” of the pistol, describing it as a “lugar [sic] type pistol.” Later, he used the term “revolver,” although he said he knew a little about firearms, and understood the difference. At one point, he referred to the weapon as a “luger type revolver.” He was sure it was the same because it “was a dark color,” but he acknowledged that 95% of all weapons of this nature are that color. He described the robber as having a mustache and being about “5'7" — 5'8",” about 140-150 pounds. Never in the record are the height and weight of the defendant given.
He was, as we noted, “afraid,” “fearful,” but “calm” enough to know what the robber was dressed like. The Michigan Supreme Court noted in People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461, 470 (1973), citing Anastasi, Fields of Applied Psychology, 548 (1964), that “ ‘. . . [cjontrary to legal folklore, strong emotion at the time of observation or subsequent report tends to increase the probability of error.’ ” Hughes’ statements are contradictory, I feel, and this fact weakens the reliability of his testimony.
C. Accuracy of prior description.
The victim noted in court his previous identification of the defendant at the pretrial. He specifically remembered that he wore a “kind of green uniform,” was handcuffed and accompanied by a sheriff.
He claims he was shown at least “50” mug shots, but no one substantiated this. He was never confronted with the defendant after the crime until the November 18, 1976 preliminary hearing. At that hearing he described the robber as wearing a dark color “skullcap” having “long-black-stringy hair”; “a rain jacket on, had dark pants, he also had a mustache.” He was “sure” of his man.
As testified to by him, he gave a description to the police after the robbery, not mentioned in the testimony of the responding and investigating officers. He omitted mention of the mustache and of the hair length, because no one asked him, even though at trial he was “certain” they were the same.
D. Level of certainty of the witness at the confrontation.
The witness-victim was always “sure,” “certain” that the defendant was the right man — the man who robbed him on November 8, 1976 — even though he was confused about the hat, ranging in his description from a dark, small skullcap to a small, dark hat, even though the officer described it as black and gray checkered; he was confused about the weapon; about the jacket; about the hair; the time; and even his reactions *372to the event. He was “afraid,” “fearful,” but “calm.”
He hardly appears to me to be certain about anything. He claims this certainty after briefly viewing a man wearing a hat of some description, having long hair, a long coat of some color, and dark pants. The only mention of a mustache came at the preliminary hearing of November 18, 1976, and at the identification in court, at trial. At neither proceeding did the defendant wear clothing anything like the alleged robber. In addition, I feel that this factor is not to be considered as primary. If any distinctive level of strength should be assigned to it, I feel it should be discounted rather than appreciated. Once the effect of the suggestive circumstances has come into play, the witness or victim, by repeated statements, may simply be reinforcing his own error. As Justice Marshall points out in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 130-131, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), with citations, the degree of the witnesses’ certainty is “worthless as an indicator that he is correct.” Marshall quotes from Wade, supra, 388 U.S. at 229, 87 S.Ct. at 1933:
“ * * * ‘[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the [pretrial confrontation], he is not likely to go back on his word later on * * (Quoting from Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades, I Crim.L.Rev. 479, 482 (1963).
See also People v. Anderson, supra, especially the appendix discussion of cognitive dissonance, and Foster v. California, supra; “Certitude is not the test of certainty.” 0. W. Holmes, Jr., The Natural Law, 32 Harv. L.Rev. 40 (1918).
E. The length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
This is the most objective of the criteria, and the most difficult to assign value to. Here, the crime occurred on November 8, 1976. The victim first confronted the witness on November 18, 1976, then on December 2, 1976 (both at preliminary hearings) and, again, at trial on February 28, 1977. He claims he was shown about “50 mug shots” at some unspecified time in between; there is no other substantiation of this story, the officers who testified specifically denying any and all knowledge of this alleged fact.
3. The third factor to be considered is the “corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.” Manson v. Brathwaite, supra.
Manson, after discussing Neil v. Biggers, supra, Stovall v. Denno, supra, and the other authorities, and, after adopting their analysis, stated as follows, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 1912:
“We therefore conclude that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall confrontations. The factors to be considered are set out in Biggers.”
This is a factor also recognized in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999; 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970). In Coleman, the court, although upholding the admissibility of the pre-trial identification, specifically noted the absence of suggestive influences and misconduct by the state. In this case, the preliminary hearing affords a clear example of such an abuse. We would be hard pressed to find a more flagrant example.
This court has generally adhered to the principle that to reverse “there must be prejudicial error, and the party appealing has the burden of showing such error.” Belondon v. City of Casper, Wyo., 456 P.2d 238, 242 (1969), cert. den. 398 U.S. 927, 90 S.Ct. 1815, 26 L.Ed.2d 89. This principle is to some extent at least incorporated into Rule 49(a), W.R.Cr.P. which states that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” However, we do not find Wyoming precedent discussing the question of harmless error in the context of constitutionally impermissible conduct. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 15 L.Ed.2d 705, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967) is pertinent in that respect. After pointing out that all 50 states have harmless-error statutes or rules the court concluded that *373there may be some constitutional errors “which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant” that they may be deemed harmless, “not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction,” 386 U.S. at 22, 87 S.Ct. at 827, but continued at pp. 23-24, 87 S.Ct. at p. 828:
“ * * * We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171. There we said: ‘The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ Id., at 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230. * * * An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived of as harmless. Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment. There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. Connecticut about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. While appellate courts do not ordinarily have the original task of applying such a test, it is a familiar standard to all courts, and we believe its adoption will provide a more workable standard, although achieving the same result as that aimed at in our Fahy case.” (All emphasis added)
Insofar as the defendant has claimed violation of his rights under the Federal Constitution, the rule announced in Chapman is binding upon us. I consider that it is equally pertinent to rights asserted under our state constitution and that that test must be applied to the facts of this case.
I would also apply the principle that “ ‘[prejudicial error is such error as in all probability must have produced some effect upon the final result of the trial,’ ” State v. Reddington, 80 S.D. 390, 125 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1973), quoting from State v. Pirkey, 24 S.D. 533, 124 N.W. 713, which in turn cited State v. Britton, 27 Wash.2d 336, 178 P.2d 341, reh. denied (1947). The Supreme Court of Washington later makes this pertinent observation in State v. Martin, 73 Wash.2d 616, 440 P.2d 429, 437, reh. denied, cert. denied 393 U.S. 1081, 89 S.Ct. 855, 21 L.Ed.2d 773:
“ * * * When the appellate court is unable to say from the record before it whether the defendant would or would not have been convicted but for the error committed in the trial court, then the error may not be deemed harmless, and the defendant’s right to a fair trial requires that the verdict be set aside and that he be granted a new trial.”
The question is not whether the jury has made a sustainable choice but whether the process of making that choice has or could have been affected by improper evidence or some other irregularity in the proceedings. See State v. Pirkey, supra; Commonwealth v. Cavell, 244 F.Supp. 560, 567 (D.C.M.D.Pa.1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 1004, 86 S.Ct. 1921, 16 L.Ed.2d 1018, cert. denied 384 U.S. 1009, 86 S.Ct. 1986, 16 L.Ed.2d 1021.
The evidence at trial shows that police officers responded quickly to the report of the robbery. One officer located and in his patrol car followed a car which had pulled out from a street curb and went into an alley. He observed a man standing outside the car on the passenger’s side who then ran out of sight. He continued his search, again losing contact, and then saw him *374again when his companion officer had stopped the man and placed him in custody. On the ground and near the car, alongside of which this man had been seen, the officers found a wig, placed in evidence and concerning which Hughes testified as previously recounted. In the car and on the ground around the car there was found a considerable amount of currency, and a .22 caliber pistol was also found on the front seat of the car. This pistol was linked to the robbery by testimony of the state expert on firearms who said that an ejected cartridge found in the room where Hughes had been forced to lie down and a bullet had been shot into the counter, had been ejected from this pistol. We may therefore conclude that there was evidence, excluding the in-court identification by Hughes of the defendant, from which the jury could have found defendant to have been the robber.
However, the question is not what the jury might have done in the absence of the tainted testimony.
In conclusion, testimony of Hughes was of the greatest importance in tying the man first discovered beside that car which had tangible evidence relating to the crime to the man who had committed the robbery. We may not properly surmise that the jury ignored Hughes’ testimony, unsatisfactory as it was, and I am unable to say that his identification was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. The pretrial identification was unnecessarily and impermissibly suggestive. Measuring the evidence in this case in accordance with the factors suggested in Neil v. Biggers, supra, and other authorities, I am unable to say that the subsequent in-court identification had an independent basis, and hence submit it was error to admit the same. The suggestive influences permeate this testimony too deeply for us to save it. While I agree that the law generally places questions of identity in the province of the jury, Johnson v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1294 (1977), when this question of identity becomes tangled with conduct such as occurred here, it is the duty of this court closely to inspect lest constitutional rights become meaningless.
People v. Anderson, supra, contains an excellent discussion of the law and psychology of identification testimony and suggests that the dissipation of the taint necessary for proof on an independent basis must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. We perhaps go further when we adopt the rule stated in Chapman (as I think the majority does), but I am unable to declare a belief that the identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.