Court Opinion

ID: 9773111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:37:46.810404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:50.215328
License: Public Domain

*627OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
CLINTON, Judge.
On original submission on a panel opinion 1 reversed this judgment of conviction for the offense of possession of more than four ounces of marihuana because the trial court deleted the words “and no other person” from a timely requested charge on circumstantial evidence. The panel opinion pointed out that, under the State’s theory of the case, the only way it could discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of appellant was by showing that he, and no other person,2 had possession of the marihuana. In its brief the State did not particularize any theory of party responsibility under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, §§ 7.01 and 7.02 and only obliquely suggested the charge was properly worded under “the evidence admitted,” without pointing out under its counterpoint just what or where it is. Consequently, reasoned the panel opinion, the omission of the words “and no other person” from the charge significantly affected appellant’s rights and constituted reversible error.
We granted the State leave to file a motion for rehearing in view of its reconstituted contention that the record evidences the fact that appellant’s father may have been involved with the possession of the contraband at issue and that the words “and no other person” were deliberately omitted from the charge for that reason.3 The State again would cite us to the tandem of Odell v. State, 95 Tex.Cr.R. 360, 254 S.W. 977 (1923) and Grego v. State, 456 S.W.2d 123 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) for the proposition that the words “and no other person” may be omitted from the charge if the evidence shows that there were other participants in the crime.
Let it be clearly understood at the outset that all agree that this is a circumstantial evidence case. There is no direct evidence whatsoever that appellant possessed the kilos of marihuana found in a burlap sack in a “tractor shed” on rural property owned by another who had rented it to appellant’s father. Thus the sole question with respect to the circumstantial evidence charge that was given is whether, under the facts of this case, it should have included the phrase “and no other person” and, therefore, the trial court erred in deleting it in charging the jury. To answer the question it is fitting that some rudimentary propositions as to circumstantial evidence be revisited.
Because of its very nature, circumstantial evidence, like direct evidence, must not only be probative and weighty enough to prove the essential elements of the offense charged but also it must exclude very reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 23 C.J.S. 560-561, Criminal Law § 907b. In a jury trial the mechanism for determining quality and quantity of the evidence is to submit a charge to the jury that instructs on the law of circumstantial evidence and applies it to the facts of the case, and thereby authorize the jury to respond according to its lights. Manifestly, to achieve a reliable determination the instructions must be faithful both to the law and to the particular facts of the case.
In Texas, as well as many other jurisdictions,4 the basic principle is substantially as stated early on in Jones v. State, 34 Tex. Cr.R. 490, 30 S.W. 1059 (1895):
*628“ . . . Error is urged because this charge5 fails to instruct that such evidence must be of so conclusive a nature as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. The essential element of an instruction on the law of circumstantial evidence is that the facts and circumstances necessary to the conviction must be such as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt. The evidence must not only be consistent with the prisoner’s guilt, but it must be inconsistent with every other rational conclusion.”
Accord: Smith v. State, 35 Tex.Cr.R. 618, 33 S.W. 339 (1895) motion for rehearing overruled, 35 Tex.Cr.R. 618, 34 S.W. 960 (Tex.Cr. App.1896).6
As shown in the margin, however, the Court soon permitted variation on the same theme when it determined that the right of the accused was effectively protected by the charge that was given. See Reeseman v. State, 59 Tex.Cr.R. 430, 128 S.W. 1126, 1129 (Tex.Cr.App.1910) and Powers v. State, 69 Tex.Cr.R. 214, 152 S.W.2d 909 (Tex.Cr.App.1913). Then, almost brusquely it seems,7 the Court confirmed as a correct instruction on circumstantial evidence, where a single accused was charged with acting alone, one which combined all the functional equivalents in one expansive statement, Manley v. State, 69 Tex.Cr.R. 169, 153 S.W. 1138, 1141 (Tex.Cr.App.1913); McGee v. State, 69 Tex.Cr.R. 580, 155 S.W. 246 (Tex.Cr.App.1913); Brown v. State, 74 Tex.Cr.R. 356, 169 S.W. 437, 449 8 (Tex.Cr. App.1913) and provided the genesis for what is regarded today as, in the phrase of the panel opinion, “standard boiler plate language,” as it appears in generally accepted form books such as 8 Texas Practice 168 ff., Willson’s Texas Criminal Forms, Morrison & Blackwell, § 82.02; Texas Criminal Pattern Jury Charges (1975) 3, CPJC 0.01; McClung, Jury Charges for Texas Criminal Practice (Jan. 1979) 221; 1 Branch’s Annotated Penal Code (2nd Ed.) 395, § 373.1.
Of course an accused may be charged with an offense on the theory that, although he did not, himself, alone commit it, he is criminally responsible for the conduct of the one or more other persons who did. His responsibility is as a party (nee principal)9 to the commission of the offense, and the jury is ordinarily instructed accordingly. Illustrative is the delineation made in Lawrence v. State, 477 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) with respect to Sherrad v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 119, 318 S.W. 900 (1958). Sherrad agreed to sell a specified *629amount of marihuana and accepted partial payment; when the buyer returned the next day, however, Sherrad was not present, but one Robson approached and completed the transaction. In Lawrence the accused negotiated the purchase and told the officer that “my man” would deliver in ten minutes; in that time one Lott did and received the money. Sherrad was reversed for failure to charge on the law of principals and circumstantial evidence; Lawrence was affirmed for he was clearly acting together with Lott.
Lately explicated is that the concept of criminal responsibility as a party is to benefit the State rather than to protect an accused, e. g., Romo v. State, 568 S.W.2d 298, 30210 (Tex.Cr.App.1978 opinion on rehearing) and Ellis v. State, 551 S.W.2d 407, 41111 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
Equally as rudimentary and as longstanding is that an accused charged with acting with another as a party in commission of an offense is not entitled to the protection of the standard circumstantial evidence charge. Boersh v. State, 62 S.W. 1060 (Tex.Cr.App.1901). In this situation the instruction substitutes for “no other person” a phrase such as in Boersh, “acting with some other person,” and, even though the other person or others be named in the indictment, the charge is sufficient in using an appropriate substitute rather than specifying a name or names, for the jury will “look to the proof as to the others,” Reid v. State, 57 S.W. 662, 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1900); Serrato v. State, 74 Tex.Cr.R. 413, 171 S.W. 1133, 1141 (Tex.Cr.App.1914).
Then there is the third situation that is actually a combination of the other two: When the state of the evidence is such that an accused alone committed the offense or was acting together with another or others in doing so, the law of parties becomes applicable. Odell v. State, 95 Tex.Cr.R. 360, 254 S.W. 977 (Tex.Cr.App.1923) is that type of case and is relied on by the State to support what was done here to the standard circumstantial evidence instruction. See also Traylor v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 323, 36 S.W.2d 506, 508 12 (1931).
The facts of Odell v. State, supra, are set out in full in its opinion. Based on them the Court was firm in the finding that participation of other persons with the accused was raised. In that posture, the Court held, that “it is the duty of the trial court to give to the jury appropriate instructions on the law of principals,” as was done there over objections of the accused. Consistently, then, with the evidence and the theory of the State, when the trial court came to the circumstantial evidence instruction it modified the standard charge by substituting for “and no other person” the phrase “either alone or acting in concert with another person.” This modification was correct because, the Court wrote:
“. . . When there is evidence supporting a theory that the accused and others committed the offense, it would be an error against the state for the court to instruct the jury that they must believe to a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused ‘and no other person’ committed the offense.”
Assuming in the case before us “there is evidence supporting a theory” that appellant and his father together committed the offense, had the court below followed Odell v. State, supra, and modified the standard charge as did the trial court in Odell, a problem would not exist.
*630But here there is neither theory that the appellant and his father were acting together 13 nor evidence of joint possession of the kilos of marihuana.14 Thus, Odell and its lone offspring, Grego, are not in point.
We have reviewed again the entire record15 before the Court and are satisfied that, notwithstanding defensive efforts to suggest alternatives, the case was tried on the single theory that appellant and no other person possessed the bag of kilos of marihuana found in the tractor shed. To refuse to include the phrase “and no other person” in the otherwise judicially approved standard circumstantial evidence instruction 16 is to withhold that protection to *631which an accused is entitled in such a case. Without it here, we are constrained to hold that appellant was not afforded the full benefit of a complete charge that required the jury to find that the evidence against him excluded every other reasonable hypothesis except his guilt.
The State’s motion for rehearing is, accordingly, overruled.
DALLY, J. dissents.

. The panel opinion was written by the Honorable Quentin Keith, Commissioner of the Court of Criminal Appeals, for a panel consisting of Presiding Judge Onion and Judges Phillips and Tom Davis and himself.

. Emphasis in original. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. Assembling bits and pieces of testimony, the State now argues:
“ . . .No certain amount of evidence is necessary, in any criminal trial, to either convict, or to raise a reasonable doubt, and therefore in this cause, in the first instance, the evidence shows the involvement, real, apparent, or potential, of Lupe, Sr., and therefore, the view initially advanced by the State in Odell and Grego ... is correct.”

.See 23 C.J.S. 561, Criminal Law § 907c.

. The trial court had instructed in effect that in order to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence each fact necessary to the conclusion must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that the facts must be consistent with each other and the main fact and the circumstances taken together must be of a conclusive nature and “producing, in effect, a reasonable and moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.”

. In adhering to its pronouncement in Jones v. State, supra, the Court expressed satisfaction that it was consonant with an earlier opinion from another jurisdiction in which the jury was told that it “must not only find, to a moral certainty, that the accused committed the offense, but that no other person committed it; thus directly leading the mind of the jury to the question of exhausting every other reasonable hypothesis that might indicate that some other person than the accused committed the offense charged.” That notion was confirmed in Crow v. State, 37 Tex.Cr.R. 295, 39 S.W. 574 (Tex.Cr. App.1897); yet, presently when confronted with the underscored phrase, the Court appeared to retreat from it or find that what was instructed amounted to its functional equivalent, e. g., Moore v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 266, 45 S.W. 809, 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1898), Ramirez v. State, 43 Tex.Cr.R. 455, 66 S.W. 1101 (Tex.Cr. App.1902) and Moseley v. State, 59 Tex.Cr.R. 90, 127 S.W. 178 (Tex.Cr.App.1910).

. Diaz v. State, 62 Tex.Cr.R. 317, 137 S.W. 377, 378 (Tex.Cr.App.1911), may be viewed as a harbinger.

. After quoting the instruction verbatim, the Court rejected unstated criticisms of it, noting “the charge as given has been so frequently approved by this court it almost seems unnecessary to cite authorities . . ”

. See Pitts v. State, 569 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) and note also therefrom that a charge on the law of parties may be given when supported by the evidence though that manner of criminal responsibility is not pled in the indictment; see also LeDuc v. State, 593 S.W.2d 678 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).

. “In a case where a charge on the law of parties is applicable, it is usually the State that insists on and is entitled to have such a charge, including an application of the law to the facts, submitted to the jury.”

. Such charge is “a State’s charge and does not protect a defendant’s rights,” but does not eliminate the necessity for a charge on circumstantial evidence when that character of evidence is relied upon to establish guilt, id., at 411.

.While the charge as given is not set out in the opinion, apparently it provided enough “exclusivity” for the even then outdated Moore v. State, supra, said was sufficient for the Court to decide the issue on that theory. The notion of “joint possession” alluded to, though clearly supported by the evidence in view of the testimony of wife of appellant, was patently a “backup” expression.

.Without any doubt the State tried this case on a theory that did not implicate the father of appellant. He was not alleged to be a party to possession of the marihuana. Indeed, he was called as a witness by the State to testify in such a way as to exculpate himself. The following testimony adduced by the State on direct examination is illustrative:
“Q: You don’t know what was picked up? A: They said it was marijuana [sic] — it’s what they say.
Q: Did you know anything about that bag of marijuana [sic]?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know anybody that did?
A: No, sir.
‡ * * * ‡ ‡
Q: State whether or not you had anything to do with that tractor shed, where that bag of marijuana [sic] was found.
A: No, sir.”
Moreover, as he was being cross examined by counsel for appellant the State assumed the same protective stance a lawyer ordinarily takes for “his” witness. Thus, after a series of questions using the terms “your house” and “your place,” the State objected:
“Your Honor, at this time, we move this constant repetition of ‘your place’ — when the record shows he doesn’t own the place, in the first place — be stricken. He is a mere tenant. We ask that counsel be instructed not to use that term ‘your place,’ as if he is the owner in fee simple of it.”
Pursuing the point on redirect examination, the State was emphasizing that Galvan Senior had rented just the residence and fenced garden when the following occurred:
“Q: And you paid nothing for the outbuildings?
A: No. But I am entitled to use it.
Q: Wait a minute. I didn’t ask you that, did I?
⅝ sjs sfc * * *
MR. GINZEL (The prosecutor): And I ask the Court to instruct the jury to disregard the last part of the witness’ answer, as not responsive to the question . . ”
That the trial court proceeded to do.
Further, in his final argument responding to the suggestion of appellant’s counsel that many other people he named could have possessed the marihuana, the prosecutor asserted:
. [H]e is talking about all of these possibilities, you know, the State should exclude, That is not what the Court tells you. . It has got to be a reasonable hypothesis under the evidence. . . . This stuff, this accomplice, this sneak, or whoever — whoever—and I say that this way, put it this way: There was nobody other than Lupe Galvan.”

. On cross examination appellant’s counsel drew from Galvan Senior affirmative answers to questions designed to show that he had permission to use and easy access to the tractor shed in which the marihuana was found, as did others from neighboring places who from time to time took water from a well nearby. To this scenario the State added on redirect examination:
“Q: And you had nothing to do with that tractor shed yourself, did you?
A: No.
Q: Didn’t pay any rent for it, did you? A: No.
Q: Didn’t intend to use it, and you didn’t need it, did you?
A: I didn’t need it; no, sir.
Q: As far as you know, that was just there, wasn’t it? You didn’t have anything in it, did you?
A: No. No, sir.”

. To demonstrate the location of the tractor shed in relation to the residence and other outbuildings and landmarks appellant introduced four photographs; each page in the record where index indicates each exhibit will be found bears a notation: “Original Exhibit Remains in Custody of Court Reporter.” The same is true with respect to photographs and other exhibits offered by the State. How then is this Court expected to understand what was thought important enough to develop before and present to the jury as a part of the case? When evidentiary issues are raised on appeal the record must contain all the evidence for our review in order intelligently to decide the question. Those concerned with preparing, examining and approving the record should see that every exhibit admitted in evidence finds its way into the record.

. A litany of challenges to the same charge was rejected in, e. g., Thomas v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 54, 344 S.W.2d 453 (1961) and it was found to be “correct” in Phea v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 77, 199 S.W.2d 160 (1947).