Court Opinion

ID: 9556023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 21:00:42.212204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:47:12.564147
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2835
BARBARA TULLY, et al.,
                                                Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                 v.

PAUL OKESON, et al.,
                                               Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
         Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
            No. 1:20-cv-01271 — James P. Hanlon, Judge.
                     ____________________

     ARGUED MAY 17, 2023 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2023
                ____________________

   Before RIPPLE, SCUDDER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Indiana law allows “elderly” vot-
ers—those sixty-five or older—to vote by mail. Indiana voters
who are younger than sixty-five must fall within one of
twelve other categories in order to vote by mail. Because of
the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indiana Election Commission
extended absentee-voting privileges to all registered Indiana
voters for the June 2020 primary but did not renew that order
for the November 2020 general election.
2                                                            No. 22-2835

    The plaintiffs are Indiana voters who were allowed to vote
absentee in the primary, but who do not otherwise qualify for
absentee voting. They initially sought a preliminary injunc-
tion requiring Indiana to permit unlimited absentee voting,
claiming that the State’s failure to extend absentee voting to
all eligible voters abridged the rights of younger voters in vi-
olation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and also infringed
their fundamental right to vote in violation of the Equal Pro-
                                                         1
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district
court denied their request for a preliminary injunction.
    We heard the plaintiffs’ appeal less than six weeks before
the 2020 general election, and after absentee voting already
had begun. Mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition “to
exercise caution and restraint before upending state election
regulations on the eve of an election,” we affirmed the denial
of a preliminary injunction. Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 611–
12 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Tully I”) (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S.
1, 4 (2006)). Relevant to the present appeal, we concluded that
the plaintiffs had not made a strong showing of likelihood of
success on the merits in light of McDonald v. Board of Election
Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), which held that
“‘the right to vote’ does not include Plaintiffs’ ‘claimed right
to receive absentee ballots.’” Tully I, 977 F.3d at 613 (quoting
McDonald, 394 U.S. at 807).
    Back in the district court, the plaintiffs abandoned their
Fourteenth Amendment claim, and both parties moved for
summary judgment. The district court concluded that Tully I
established the law of the case, and that even if the law of the

1 The plaintiffs named the individual members of the Indiana Election
Commission, as well as the Indiana Secretary of State, as defendants.
No. 22-2835                                                   3

case doctrine did not apply, our decision constituted control-
ling authority. The plaintiffs again sought review.
    We now affirm the district court’s judgment, but on differ-
ent grounds. Given the circumstances under which we issued
Tully I, that decision does not constitute the law of the case;
nor do we consider ourselves bound by its reasoning. Consid-
ering the merits anew, however, we hold that Indiana’s grant-
ing the opportunity to vote by mail to elderly voters does not
abridge the right to vote of those under sixty-five. The provi-
sion does not violate the Twenty- Sixth Amendment.
                               I.
                      BACKGROUND
    Indiana law allows thirteen categories of voters to vote by
mail. Ind. Code § 3-11-10-24. These categories include voters
working the polls; voters confined in a hospital or other health
care facility; voters with disabilities; voters who are caregiv-
ers; voters who do not have transportation to the polls; and
voters who are “elderly,” among others. See id. For purposes
of Indiana’s voting regulations, “‘[e]lderly’ means a voter
who is at least sixty-five (65) years of age.” Id. § 3-5-2-16.5.
    Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indiana Election
Commission extended absentee-voting privileges to all regis-
tered Indiana voters for the June 2020 primary. For the No-
vember general election, however, the Commission did not
renew its order. Instead, it sought to alleviate the effects of
COVID-19 by implementing extensive safety protocols, issu-
ing protective equipment for election day, and allowing vot-
ers in all counties to vote during a twenty-eight-day period
before the election.
4                                                    No. 22-2835

    The plaintiffs, voters in Indiana who were allowed to vote
absentee in the primary but did not otherwise qualify for ab-
sentee voting in the general election, brought this action. Ini-
tially, they sought a preliminary injunction requiring Indiana
to permit unlimited absentee voting in the general election.
They asserted that the State’s extension of absentee-voting
rights to voters over sixty-five years of age abridged the rights
of younger voters in violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment. Second, they contended that requiring some voters to
vote in person during the pandemic infringed their funda-
mental right to vote in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court de-
nied their request for a preliminary injunction, and we af-
firmed that decision. Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608 (7th Cir.
2020).
    In affirming the district court’s denial of a preliminary in-
junction, the panel majority concluded that the plaintiffs had
not made a strong showing of likelihood of success on the
merits because “‘the right to vote’ does not include Plaintiffs’
‘claimed right to receive absentee ballots.’” Id. at 613. The
panel’s decision relied on McDonald v. Board of Election Com-
missioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). In that case, pretrial
detainees in Illinois had argued that the State’s voting laws
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it granted the
right to vote absentee to voters who were “physically incapac-
itated,” but did not make the same provision for those who
were “judicially incapacitated.” Id. at 805. The Court rejected
that argument, explaining that at issue was “a claimed right
to receive absentee ballots,” not the right to vote. Id. at 807.
Given this conclusion, the panel majority in Tully I similarly
concluded that Indiana’s absentee-voting rules did not impact
No. 22-2835                                                                5

the plaintiffs’ right to vote and therefore did not implicate the
                                  2
Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
    In reaching this decision, the panel majority was
“guide[d]” by “[t]wo other principles.” Tully I, 977 F.3d at 611.
First, it noted that “the Constitution explicitly grants states
the authority to prescribe the manner of holding federal elec-
tions.” Id. “Second, the Supreme Court’s Purcell principle
counsels federal courts to exercise caution and restraint before
upending state election regulation on the eve of an election.”
Id. at 611–12. Because voting already was underway when the
case was heard, the panel was “wary of turning the State in a
new direction at this late stage.” Id. at 612.
    The concurring judge agreed that the plaintiffs had “made
a weak case” that their right to vote had been abridged on the
basis of age. Id. at 619 (Ripple, J., concurring). The definition
of the elderly as sixty-five years or older was “a common-
sense tool” that “relieve[d] the Commission of the insur-
mountable task of adjudicating … which of its older citizens
would be deterred in coming to the polls on a November day
because of the physical and social conditions that invariably
afflict senior citizens.” Id. The concurring judge specifically
noted that “[a] November day in Indiana, at least in the north-
ern regions of the State, can pose a significant obstacle to leav-
ing one’s home.” Id. The concurrence also expressed a wari-
ness of using McDonald’s definition of the right to vote in all
circumstances, explaining: “McDonald antedates the

2 The only issue in the current appeal is whether Indiana’s extension of
absentee voting to “elderly” voters violates the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment; therefore, the discussion of prior proceedings is limited to that issue
as well.
6                                                    No. 22-2835

ratification of this Amendment, however, and it may well be
that the day will come when the general rule articulated in
McDonald will have to yield to the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
when the values protected by that Amendment are clearly at
stake.” Id.
    Back in the district court, both parties moved for summary
judgment. The district court determined that the panel’s deci-
sion on the preliminary injunction established the law of the
case, and that, in any event, it was bound by the panel’s deci-
sion. It acknowledged that the opinion concerned only the
question of whether a preliminary injunction should issue,
and that decisions in the preliminary-injunction context did
not necessarily implicate the law of the case. Nevertheless, the
district court interpreted the majority decision as resting on a
purely legal determination. Because the applicable law had
not changed since the issuance of the panel’s opinion, it could
not deviate from Tully I. The district court therefore granted
summary judgment to the State defendants on the ground
that the absentee-ballot provision did not violate the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment. The plaintiffs timely appealed.
                               II.
                        DISCUSSION
A. Law of the Case
    The State first maintains that the law of the case precludes
us from revisiting our decision in Tully I. “The law of the case
doctrine ‘is a rule of practice, based on [the] sound policy …
that, when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should
be the end of the matter.’” Creek v. Vill. of Westhaven, 144 F.3d
441, 445 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680
F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1982)). “The consistency provided by
No. 22-2835                                                      7

the rule protects parties from the expense and vexation at-
tending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and
fosters reliance on judicial action.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). “This doctrine advises against revisiting ear-
lier rulings ‘absent a compelling reason, such as manifest er-
ror or a change in the law.’” Toliver v. Pollard, 688 F.3d 853, 861
(7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Minch v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 294,
301 (7th Cir. 2007)).
    Here, it would not be “sound policy” to invoke the law of
the case doctrine. Tully I concerned the issuance of a prelimi-
nary injunction. The Supreme Court has held that legal and
factual rulings made as part of a preliminary-injunction anal-
ysis are not binding upon panels when they later consider the
matter on the merits. See Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.
390, 395 (1981). The Court has explained that
       [t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is
       merely to preserve the relative positions of the
       parties until a trial on the merits can be held.
       Given this limited purpose, and given the haste
       that is often necessary if those positions are to
       be preserved, a preliminary injunction is
       customarily granted on the basis of procedures
       that are less formal and evidence that is less
       complete than in a trial on the merits. A party
       thus is not required to prove his case in full at a
       preliminary-injunction hearing[,] and the
       findings of fact and conclusions of law made by
       a court granting a preliminary injunction are not
       binding at trial on the merits.
       …
8                                                   No. 22-2835

       [W]here a federal district court has granted a
       preliminary injunction, the parties generally
       will have had the benefit neither of a full oppor-
       tunity to present their cases nor of a final judi-
       cial decision based on the actual merits of the
       controversy. Thus when the injunctive aspects
       of a case become moot on appeal of a prelimi-
       nary injunction, any issue preserved by an in-
       junction bond can generally not be resolved on
       appeal, but must be resolved in a trial on the
       merits.
Id. at 395–96 (citations omitted).
    Although Camenisch was not speaking directly to the con-
tours of the law of the case doctrine, the factors identified by
the Court—a less-than-developed record, a short timeline,
and a concomitant truncated legal analysis—usually counsel
against invoking the law of the case doctrine in a way that
would preclude a full merits determination. See 18B Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4478.5 (3d ed. 2019) (“Rulings—pre-
dictions—as to the likely outcome on the merits made for pre-
liminary injunction purposes do not ordinarily establish the
law of the case, whether the ruling is made by a trial court or
by an appellate court.”). Of course, this general rule does not
apply to “[a] fully considered appellate ruling on an issue of
law made on a preliminary injunction appeal.” Id.; see also Fish
v. Schwab, 957 F.3d 1105, 1141 (10th Cir. 2020) (using this guid-
ing principle to determine that a preliminary-injunction
No. 22-2835                                                               9

analysis was law of the case); Howe v. City of Akron, 801 F.3d
                                                               3
718, 740 (6th Cir. 2015) (same and collecting cases).
    Here, although Tully I rested on a point of law, it also was
made on the eve of the 2020 election. As we noted in Tully I,
voting already was underway when we heard oral arguments
on September 30, 2020. We were cognizant of the fact that any
changes in voting methods would place additional burdens
on State resources already taxed due to COVID-19. Even more
importantly, last-minute changes in voting rules could have
confused the electorate. Our ultimate decision was animated
by these weighty concerns—ones the Supreme Court has au-
thorized, and encouraged, us to consider. Purcell, 549 U.S. at
4–5. However, at this point, the election has passed, and our
decision will neither strain the electoral system nor jeopardize
the integrity of the electoral process. We therefore now exam-
ine more critically the issue for decision.
B. Abridgement of the Right to Vote
    The Twenty-Sixth Amendment provides that “[t]he right
of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of age.” U.S. Const. amend.
XXVI, § 1. Here, the plaintiffs do not allege that any citizens
of Indiana were denied their right to vote. Rather, their claim
is that the right to vote of those under sixty-five was abridged.
We focus therefore on when there is an “abridgement” of “the
right to vote” for purposes of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.

3 Moreover, on at least one occasion, this court has followed a
preliminary-injunction analysis as law of the case. See Pearson v. Thompson,
No. 89-3248, 1992 WL 25349, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 1992).
10                                                            No. 22-2835

                                     1.
    In answering this question, we are, as our colleagues in the
Fifth Circuit have observed, working, in essence, on a consti-
tutional blank slate. See Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978
F.3d 168, 183 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment “has yet to be interpreted in any significant
depth”). The Supreme Court has not addressed the definition
of the right to vote in the context of the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment.
   The plaintiffs start by inviting our attention to the lan-
guage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and note that it mir-
                                                          4
rors the language employed in the Fifteenth and Twenty-
                           5
Fourth Amendments. The cases interpreting those Amend-
ments, the plaintiffs submit, therefore should guide our inter-
pretation of the identical language of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment. According to the plaintiffs, the plain language

4 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment states: “The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude … .”
5 The Twenty-Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part: “The right of
citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for
President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or
for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax
or other tax.”
   The Nineteenth Amendment also employs the same language. See U.S.
Const. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.”). However, as with the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, there is a
dearth of case law interpreting the Nineteenth Amendment.
No. 22-2835                                                   11

of the Fifteenth Amendment, and by extension the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment, “has been understood to ‘secure[] freedom
from discrimination’ in all ‘matters affecting the franchise.’”
This broad understanding of the right to vote, the plaintiffs
insist, encompasses absentee voting.
   We agree with the plaintiffs that the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of the equivalent language in the Fifteenth and
Twenty-Fourth Amendments is a good starting place for our
analysis. However, to reach the plaintiffs’ endpoint—that the
Amendment must be read as requiring no distinction on the
basis of age in any matter related to voting—we must ignore
the understanding of the right to vote at the time of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s ratification.
    We begin with some foundational principles. Although an
immediate purpose for the enactment of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment was to lower the voting age in state and local
elections to eighteen, the language of the Amendment “trans-
cend[s] the particular controversy which was the immediate
impetus for its enactment.” Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512
(2000). As with the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth
Amendments, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment “provide[s] an
individual right to be free from the denial or abridgement of
the right to vote based on the classification described in the
Amendment.” Abbott, 978 F.3d at 184. Thus, “the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment confers an individual right to be free from
the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of
age.” Id.
   To determine the contours of that right, we look first at the
language of the Amendment and the way that language was
understood at the time the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was
adopted. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–95
12                                                 No. 22-2835

(2008) (reviewing how the terms of the Second Amendment
were understood at the time of ratification). At the time the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment was ratified, “[i]n-person voting
was the rule, absentee voting the exception.” Abbott, 978 F.3d
at 188. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald v.
Board of Election of Commissioners of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807
(1969), handed down only two years before the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment was ratified, clearly distinguishes the right to
vote from “a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.” As we
have explained, McDonald involved a class of pretrial detain-
ees at the Cook County jail who were unable to vote absentee
because they were not “physically incapacitated.” Id. at 805.
They brought an action claiming that the distinction between
those who were “physically incapacitated” and “judicially in-
capacitated” violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. The
Court initially considered the level of scrutiny that should be
applied and noted that,
       while the “States have long been held to have
       broad powers to determine the conditions un-
       der which the right of suffrage may be exer-
       cised,” we have held that once the States grant
       the franchise, they must not do so in a discrimi-
       natory manner. More importantly, however, we
       have held that because of the overriding im-
       portance of voting rights, classifications “which
       might invade or restrain them must be closely
       scrutinized and carefully confined” where those
       rights are asserted under the Equal Protection
       Clause. And a careful examination on our part
       is especially warranted where lines are drawn
       on the basis of wealth or race, two factors which
       would independently render a classification
No. 22-2835                                                    13

       highly suspect and thereby demand a more ex-
       acting judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 807 (citations omitted). However, the Court did not have
to apply “[s]uch an exacting approach” because the absentee
ballot provisions had not been drawn on the basis of a suspect
category, nor did they “ha[ve] an impact on appellants’ ability
to exercise the fundamental right to vote.” Id. The Court ex-
plained that it was “not the right to vote that [wa]s at stake”
but rather “a claimed right to receive absentee ballots.” Id. The
Court specifically noted that “the record [wa]s barren of any
indication that the State might not … possibly furnish the jails
with special polling booths or facilities on election day, or pro-
vide guarded transportation to the polls themselves for cer-
tain inmates.” Id. at 808 n.6.
    McDonald’s conception of “the right to vote” as the effective
exercise of the franchise is also consistent with the Court’s in-
terpretations of the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), is a case in point.
Lane involved concerted efforts by the Oklahoma legislature
to deny its black citizens the right to vote. Initially, the Okla-
homa legislature imposed a literacy test for voting “from
which white voters were in effect relieved through the opera-
tion of a ‘grandfather clause.’” Id. at 269. The Court struck this
provision in 1915. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1915). To try to minimize the effects of the Guinn decision,
the Oklahoma legislature passed a law that automatically reg-
istered individuals who had voted in the election of 1914
(while the discriminatory literacy law was in effect) but re-
quired any new voter to register within a twelve-day time
frame in 1916 or forever lose their right to vote. In 1934, a
black voter, who, by operation of the statute, had
14                                                     No. 22-2835

“permanently lost the right to register and hence the right to
vote,” challenged this statutory scheme. Lane, 307 U.S. at 271.
Noting that “[t]he Fifteenth Amendment secures freedom
from discrimination on account of race in matters affecting
the franchise,” id. at 274, the Court concluded that the legisla-
ture’s efforts to preclude black citizens from registering—and
therefore voting—violated the Amendment.
    Similarly, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966),
involved a facial challenge to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
In considering whether the Fifteenth Amendment provided
authority for Congressional action, the Court stated:
       Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment declares
       that “(t)he right of citizens of the United States
       to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
       United States or by any State on account of race,
       color, or previous condition of servitude.” This
       declaration has always been treated as self-
       executing and has repeatedly been construed,
       without further legislative specification, to
       invalidate state voting qualifications or procedures
       which are discriminatory on their face or in practice.
Id. at 325 (emphasis added). The Court then listed a number
of cases, which concerned registration, physical casting of bal-
lots, or disenfranchisement through district line drawing. See,
e.g., id. (citing, among other cases, Lane, 307 U.S. at 274; Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (addressing denial of right to
cast a ballot in a primary election); Gommillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960) (addressing the redrawing of municipal
boundaries to exclude minority voters)). After listing these ex-
amples of “state voting qualifications or procedures which are
discriminatory on their face or in practice,” the Court in
No. 22-2835                                                   15

Katzenbach reaffirmed that “States have broad powers to de-
termine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may
be exercised.” 383 U.S. at 325 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Thus, when referencing “state voting qualifications or
procedures which are discriminatory on their face or in prac-
tice,” the Court was focused on the right to register, the right
to cast a ballot, and the right to have that ballot counted. It
was not concerned with peripheral matters typically left to the
States.
   While the Court’s Fifteenth Amendment cases shed light
on the nature of “the right to vote,” the Court’s seminal
Twenty-Fourth Amendment case helps us understand the
term “abridge.” In Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965),
the Court considered the constitutionality of a Virginia law
that required qualified citizens to either pay a poll tax or file
an annual certificate of residence in order to vote. The Court
had little difficulty in concluding that this choice violated the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s absolute ban of the poll tax.
The Court explained that
       [i]t has long been established that a State may
       not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a
       right guaranteed by the Constitution. … Signif-
       icantly, the Twenty-fourth Amendment does
       not merely insure that the franchise shall not be
       “denied” by reason of failure to pay the poll tax;
       it expressly guarantees that the right to vote
       shall not be “denied or abridged” for that rea-
       son.
Id. at 540 (citation omitted). In explaining when the right is
“abridged,” the Court stated that, “like the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, the Twenty-fourth ‘nullifies sophisticated as well as
16                                                    No. 22-2835

simple-minded modes’ of impairing the right guaranteed.” Id.
at 540–41. Specifically, “[i]t hits onerous procedural requirements
which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by those
claiming the constitutional immunity.” Id. at 541 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Thus, the Court continued, to demonstrate the law’s invalid-
ity, the plaintiffs only needed to “show[] that it imposes a ma-
terial requirement solely upon those who refuse to surrender
their constitutional right to vote in federal elections without
paying a poll tax.” Id. (emphasis added).
    The Court went on to describe how the certification re-
quirement “erect[ed] a real obstacle to voting in federal elec-
tions.” Id. Specifically, those who opted not to pay the tax had
to
       file in each election year, within a stated interval
       ending six months before the election, a nota-
       rized or witnessed certificate attesting that they
       have been continuous residents of the State
       since the date of registration (which might have
       been many years before under Virginia’s system
       of permanent registration) and that they do not
       presently intend to leave the city or county in
       which they reside prior to the forthcoming elec-
       tion.
Id. “In effect,” the certification “amount[ed] to annual re-
registration which Virginia officials have sharply contrasted
with the ‘simple’ poll tax system.” Id. at 542. Based on this
evidence, the Court was “constrained to hold that the
requirement imposed upon the voter who refuses to pay the
poll tax constitutes an abridgment of his right to vote by
reason of failure to pay the poll tax.” Id.
No. 22-2835                                                   17

    The Court did note that the alternative need not be as on-
erous as the certification requirement: “The requirement im-
posed upon those who reject the poll tax method of qualifying
would not be saved even if it could be said that it is no more
onerous, or even somewhat less onerous, than the poll tax.”
Id. The plaintiffs seize on this language as suggesting that any
imposition—however minor—is constitutionally prohibited.
But context is key. The sentences immediately following state:
“For federal elections, the poll tax is abolished absolutely as a
prerequisite to voting, and no equivalent or milder substitute
may be imposed. Any material requirement imposed upon the
federal voter solely because of his refusal to waive the consti-
tutional immunity subverts the effectiveness of the Twenty-
fourth Amendment and must fall under its ban.” Id. (empha-
sis added). In short, the Court is clear that an “abridgement”
must involve the imposition of a “material requirement.”
    The plaintiffs urge that this interpretation of abridgement
cannot be reconciled with the Court’s later pronouncements
in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320, 333–34
(2000). In Bossier Parish, the Court considered “the question
whether § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, … 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c, prohibits preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted
with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose.” 528
                 6
U.S. at 322–23. The Court first reiterated that the meaning of
“‘abridging the right to vote on account of race or color’ refers
only to retrogression in § 5.” Id. at 333. It stated:
        The term “abridge,” however—whose core
        meaning is “shorten,” see Webster’s New Inter-
        national Dictionary 7 (2d ed.1950); American

6 This provision has been moved to 52 U.S.C. § 10304.
18                                                   No. 22-2835

       Heritage Dictionary 6 (3d ed.1992)—necessarily
       entails a comparison. It makes no sense to sug-
       gest that a voting practice “abridges” the right
       to vote without some baseline with which to
       compare the practice. In § 5 preclearance pro-
       ceedings—which uniquely deal only and specif-
       ically with changes in voting procedures—the
       baseline is the status quo that is proposed to be
       changed: If the change “abridges the right to
       vote” relative to the status quo, preclearance is
       denied, and the status quo (however discrimi-
       natory it may be) remains in effect.
Id. at 333–34. However, this was not the case with proceedings
under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Fifteenth Amend-
ment:
       In § 2 or Fifteenth Amendment proceedings, by
       contrast, which involve not only changes but
       (much more commonly) the status quo itself,
       the comparison must be made with a hypothet-
       ical alternative: If the status quo “results in [an]
       abridgement of the right to vote” or “abridge[s]
       [the right to vote]” relative to what the right to
       vote ought to be, the status quo itself must be
       changed. Our reading of “abridging” as refer-
       ring only to retrogression in § 5, but to discrim-
       ination more generally in § 2 and the Fifteenth
       Amendment, is faithful to the differing contexts
       in which the term is used.
Id. at 334.
No. 22-2835                                                                19

   Based on this distinction, the plaintiffs maintain that, for
purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment (and by extension the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment), “abridge” must be something
                                                                  7
more than “retrogression” as that term is used in § 5. We cer-
tainly agree with the plaintiffs in principle. Whether section
3-11-10-24(a)(5) of the Indiana Code has a retrogressive effect,
i.e., whether it renders the Plaintiffs “worse off,” is not the
equivalent of asking whether their right to vote has been
abridged. Focusing just on retrogression for purposes of the
Fifteenth Amendment would preclude relief to individuals
who, even before the passing of the act in question, had not
enjoyed fully the right to vote. As the Court in Bossier Parish
explained, in order to determine whether the Fifteenth
Amendment has been violated, the question is whether the
right to vote—as it was intended to be exercised—has been
abridged. Bossier Parish therefore sets the starting point for de-
termining whether an “abridgement” has occurred as that

7 In their brief, the plaintiffs rely heavily on cases interpreting § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. However, the Voting Rights Act does not employ the
same language as the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. See Allen v. Milligan, 143
S. Ct. 1487, 1499–1501 (2023) (tracking the history of the Voting Rights Act
from its origins when it “closely tracked the language of the [Fifteenth]
Amendment” to the adoption of the “effects” test in 1982). Moreover, the
Court has made it clear that “abridgement” for purposes of § 2 has no ap-
plication outside of the context of the Voting Rights Act. See Brnovich v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2337 (2021) (stating that “[w]e need
not decide” what “to deny or abridge the right … to vote on account of
race or color” “would mean if it stood alone because § 2(b) … explains
what must be shown to establish a § 2 violation”). Therefore, to the extent
§ 2 cases speak directly to the Fifteenth Amendment, as in Bossier Parish,
they provide guidance for our interpretation of the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment. They are not otherwise helpful in resolving the issue currently be-
fore us.
20                                                  No. 22-2835

term was used in Harman. That starting point is the right to
vote, which may or may not be secured by the status quo of
state law.
   With this understanding of “abridgement” and “right to
vote,” we turn to the facts of the present case.
                               2.
    Indiana provides myriad ways for registered voters to ex-
ercise their right to vote. They may cast ballots in person at
their precinct polling places on election day. Ind. Code § 3-11-
8-2. They also may cast their ballots in person at various loca-
tions for the twenty-eight days prior to election day. Id. §§ 3-
11-4-1, 3-11-10-26. Additionally, voters who cannot vote in
person on election day due to “illness or injury,” caring for
someone at a private residence, or disability, may vote via a
travelling voter board, which will bring a ballot to the voter’s
house and then return it for counting. Id. § 3-11-10-25. Finally,
Indiana allows mail-in voting for voters who fall into specific
categories. See id. § 3-11-10-24(a)–(b). These include: individ-
uals who have “a specific, reasonable expectation of being ab-
sent from the county on election day during the entire twelve
(12) hours that the polls are open”; individuals scheduled to
“work … during the entire twelve (12) hours that the polls are
open”; individuals “confined on election day … because of an
illness or injury during the entire twelve (12) hours that the
polls are open”; individuals who are disabled; and individu-
als who are “elderly,” among others. Id.
    Even a cursory reading of Indiana’s voting laws reveals
full protections of the right to vote for all registered voters.
Not only may all voters vote in person in their precinct on
election day, but for twenty-eight days prior to the election,
No. 22-2835                                                               21

they also may vote at various other locations. Provisions are
made for those who are physically unable to get to the polls,
and those who care for them. Absentee voting is available for
individuals who, because of vocation, occupation, or physical
condition, cannot get to the polls on election day. Indiana has
included “elderly” voters among this group—and with good
reason. It represents a sound legislative judgment that these
individuals encounter special barriers in exercising their right
to vote. Eliminating those barriers hardly creates a material
burden on the exercise of the franchise by other citizens.
    Indiana imposes no requirements, much less material re-
quirements, on the exercise of the franchise through this ac-
commodation of the elderly. The extension of absentee voting
to the elderly does not impose any unconstitutional burden
                                                                            8
on the right of those under sixty-five to exercise the franchise.
Consequently, there is no abridgement as that term is under-
stood in the Supreme Court’s case law.
                               Conclusion
    For the reasons set forth in this opinion, Indiana’s exten-
sion of absentee voting to “elderly” voters does not violate the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment. The judgment of the district court
is therefore affirmed.
                                                              AFFIRMED

8 In Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 192 (5th Cir. 2020), the
Fifth Circuit similarly concluded that “the Texas Legislature’s conferring
a privilege to those at least age 65 to vote absentee did not deny or abridge
younger voters’ rights”; however, it reached that conclusion by way of an
alternate analytical path.
22                                                    No. 22-2835

    LEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. I ﬁnd much to agree with in the majority opinion. First,
I concur with my respected colleagues that the law of the case
doctrine does not apply to Tully I in light of the particular cir-
cumstances of the case at that time. This is particularly true
given that my colleagues were on the panel that issued that
opinion.
    Second, I also agree with the majority opinion’s thorough
articulation of the legal principles underlying appellants’
Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim. In particular, I agree with
the majority’s observation that the constitutional “right to
vote,” as discussed in the Supreme Court’s decisions in
McDonald, Lane, and Katzenbach, encompasses the right to the
“eﬀective exercise of the franchise,” including “the right to reg-
ister, the right to cast a ballot, and the right to have that ballot
counted.” Maj. Op. at 13–15. I believe that this correctly con-
strues McDonald in the context of the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment (which postdates McDonald) and the other voting rights
amendments. See Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 619 (7th Cir.
2020) (Ripple, J., concurring) (observing that “it may well be
that the day will come when the general rule articulated in
McDonald will have to yield to the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
when the values protected by that Amendment are clearly at
stake”).
    Third, I also join the majority in rejecting appellants’ con-
tention that every age-based distinction in voting procedures
constitutes an “abridgment” of the right to vote within the
meaning of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. As the majority
opinion rightly notes, only those requirements that materially
restrict one’s right to vote may be constitutionally suspect. See
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 541 (1965) (noting that, like
No. 22-2835                                                      23

the Fifteenth Amendment, the Twenty-Fourth “hits onerous
procedural requirements which eﬀectively handicap exercise
of the franchise”) (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275
(1939)).
     Finally, I concur with the majority opinion’s rejection of
appellees’ argument that a voting law can only “abridge” the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment right to vote if it is “retrogressive,”
i.e., it renders some voters “worse oﬀ” in their ability to exer-
cise the franchise as compared to the status quo. Maj. Op. at
19. As the majority acknowledges, the “starting point” from
which to measure an abridgment is “the right to vote, which
may or may not be secured by the status quo of state law.” Id.
at 20; see Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 334 (2000)
(“If the status quo results in an abridgement of the right to vote
or abridges the right to vote relative to what the right to vote
ought to be, the status quo itself must be changed.”) (cleaned
up); cf. Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 190–91 (5th
Cir. 2020) (holding that an abridgment only exists if a law
makes voting “more diﬃcult” for a person than it was before
the law was enacted).
    In sum, the way I understand the majority opinion, we
hold today that a voting law abridges the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment right to vote if, on the basis of age, it imposes a
materially onerous requirement that eﬀectively handicaps an
individual’s right to exercise the franchise. Furthermore, a
law may abridge the right to vote even if it does not render
anyone “worse oﬀ” but only makes it easier for some groups
(in this case, the elderly) to vote. I agree with all of this.
    I part ways with the majority opinion in a small but signif-
icant way. Rather than decide now, as a matter of law, that the
statute in question does not impose a materially onerous
24                                                 No. 22-2835

requirement upon non-elderly voters under Harman, I would
remand this case to the district court so that the parties may
further develop the factual record based upon the standard
we articulate today.
    It is undisputed that some Indiana voters—including ap-
pellants—are prohibited from voting absentee and are re-
quired to cast their ballots in person, solely because of their
age. I am unprepared to declare that appellants cannot possi-
bly prove that this legislative distinction imposes an onerous
procedural requirement from which the elderly are exempt.
See Harman, 380 U.S. at 541–42; see also Abbott, 978 F.3d at 198
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (de-
scribing Texas voting laws similar to Indiana’s as imposing “a
material requirement to vote in person … on younger vot-
ers”). The practical diﬃculties of casting a ballot in person in
Indiana, including the challenges of locating and physically
going to a polling place during regular hours and any costs
related to doing so (such as lost wages or child care costs), to
the extent they are imposed on appellants because of their
age, may rise to such a level as to render that method of voting
unconstitutionally “cumbersome,” Harman, 380 U.S. at 541,
when compared to the absentee-voting procedure to which
the elderly are entitled. I would give appellants an oppor-
tunity to make this showing before the district court, guided
by our opinion here.
    For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent
in part.