Court Opinion

ID: 9391171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 14:07:08.751034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.914347
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Clouser, 2023-Ohio-1425.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                         C.A. No.       22CA0051-M

        Appellee

        v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                      ENTERED IN THE
DAVID A. CLOUSER                                      COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                      COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
        Appellant                                     CASE No.   21CR0599

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: May 1, 2023

        STEVENSON, Judge.

        {¶1}     Appellant, David Clouser, appeals from his sentence in the Medina County

Common Pleas Court. We affirm.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}     Mr. Clouser was indicted by the Medina County Grand Jury in July 2021, on one

count of telecommunications harassment in violation of R.C. 2917.21(A)(1)(C)(2), a felony of the

fifth degree; one count of intimidation of an attorney, victim, or witness to a criminal offense, in

violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(2)(D), a felony of the third degree; and one count of violating a

protection order, in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1)(B)(3)(a), a felony of the fifth degree. Mr.

Clouser was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.

        {¶3}     In March 2022, the Medina County Grand Jury filed a supplemental indictment

charging Mr. Clouser with one count of violating a protection order, a violation of R.C.

2919.27(A)(1)(B)(2), a misdemeanor of the first degree. Count three was later amended to
                                                 2

attempted     violation    of    a    civil    protection    order,    a    violation     of    R.C.

2923.02(A)/2919.27(A)(1)(B)(3)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree.

       {¶4}    In May 2022, the trial court held a change of plea hearing. Mr. Clouser withdrew

his previous plea of not guilty and entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he pleaded

guilty to counts one, two, and three, and no contest to count four. The trial court found Mr. Clouser

guilty on count four. Mr. Clouser also agreed to a sentence of 18 months in prison with a 30-day

bond beginning May 23, 2022. Mr. Clouser requested the bond so that he could spend time with

his seven-year-old daughter who was scheduled for surgery. The agreed sentence was contingent

on Mr. Clouser’s compliance with the conditions of the bond. If he failed to comply, he would

receive the maximum sentence of 36 months.

       {¶5}    The conditions of the bond were that Mr. Clouser do the following: remain on

electronic monitoring and house arrest, stay away from specified addresses, reside at 147

Seiberling St., Akron, OH, have no contact with R.M., J.M., and A.B., and appear for sentencing

on June 21, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. The court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report.

       {¶6}    On June 15, 2022, the State moved to revoke Mr. Clouser’s bond, stating in support

that on June 14, 2022, Mr. Clouser contacted the Adult Probation Department and said his

electronic monitor would not charge. Mr. Clouser was instructed to report directly to Ohio Alcohol

Monitoring Systems so he could get a new charger. Mr. Clouser did not do so and his monitor

ceased operating, leaving no ability to track him. The trial court revoked his bond and issued a

capias the same day.

       {¶7}    The matter came before the court for sentencing on July 15, 2022. The State

informed the court that in addition to Mr. Clouser’s electronic monitor being turned off, he had

also violated other bond conditions. During the time his electronic monitor was off, Mr. Clouser
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contacted one of the victims, R.M’s boyfriend, and made a threatening statement to pass along to

R.M. that he still had her keys and knew where she was. The State also noted that the PSI contained

five pages of Mr. Clouser’s prior convictions.

       {¶8}     The trial court found that Mr. Clouser broke his bond conditions and sentenced

him to a prison term of 12 months on count one, a prison term of 36 months on count two, a jail

sentence of 180 days on count three, and a jail sentence of 180 days on count four, to be served

concurrently with each other. Mr. Clouser was given credit for 107 days served. He was advised

of his post-release control.

       {¶9}    Mr. Clouser timely appeals his sentence and raises one assignment of error for our

review. Because the record on appeal is incomplete, we must presume regularity and overrule his

assignment of error.

                                                 II.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT TO
       MAXIMUM JAIL AND PRISON TERMS WHEN CLEARLY AND
       CONVINCINGLY THE RECORD FAI[L]ED TO SUPPORT ITS FINDINGS
       AND FURTHER ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN THE APPELLANT
       AND STATE HAD REACHED AN AGREEMENT FOR AN EIGHTEEN
       MONTH SENTENCE.

       {¶10} In his single assignment of error, Mr. Clouser argues that the trial court’s sentence

of the maximum 36 months instead of the agreed 18 months was unsupported by the record and

not warranted. Mr. Clouser requests that this Court vacate his sentence.

       {¶11} As an initial matter, we note that Mr. Clouser incorrectly states that the standard of

appellate review is abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court has held that “an appellate court may

vacate or modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing

evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that
                                                  4

the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,

¶ 1; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which

will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought

to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954).

        {¶12} Trial courts may impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are not

“required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing * * * more than minimum sentences.”

State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, paragraph seven of the syllabus. “Nevertheless,

‘the court must carefully consider the statutes that apply to every felony case[,]’ including ‘R.C.

2929.11, which specifies the purposes of sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which provides guidance

in considering factors relating to the seriousness of the offense and recidivism of the offender.’”

State v. Lucas, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29077, 2019-Ohio-2607, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Mathis, 109

Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38. “[W]here the trial court does not put on the record its

consideration of [Sections] 2929.11 and 2929.12 [of the Ohio Revised Code], it is presumed that

the trial court gave proper consideration to those statutes.” State v. Steidl, 9th Dist. Medina No.

10CA0025-M, 2011-Ohio-2320, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d, 2008-Ohio-4912,

¶ 18, fn. 4.

        {¶13} “Unless the record shows that [a] court failed to consider the factors, or that the

sentence is ‘strikingly inconsistent’ with the factors, the court is presumed to have considered the

statutory factors if the sentence is within the statutory range.” State v. Fernandez, 9th Dist. Medina

No. 13CA0054-M, 2014-Ohio-3651, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Boysel, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013-CA-78,

2014-Ohio-1272, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Rutherford, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 08-CA-11, 2009-

Ohio-2071, ¶ 34.
                                                  5

       {¶14} Of the four counts included in Mr. Clouser’s sentence, intimidation in violation of

R.C. 2921.04(B)(2)(D), a third-degree felony, was the highest degree of offense charged and

carried the 36-month prison sentence. There is a presumption that a prison term would be imposed

for a felony of the third degree. R.C. 2907.05(C)(2). Mr. Clouser’s sentence falls within the range

of options under R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) (definite prison terms of nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-

four, or thirty-six months). Therefore, Mr. Clouser’s sentence is not contrary to law as it was

squarely within the specified sentencing range.

       {¶15} The trial court ordered a PSI. “When a PSI is requested in a case, ‘there is a

presumption that the trial court utilized it in imposing a sentence.’” State v. Burden, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 28367, 2017-Ohio-4420, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Cox, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19773, 2000

WL 372317, at *2 (Apr. 12, 2000). However, the PSI was not included in the record for our

review. “It is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the record on appeal contains all matters

necessary to allow this Court to resolve the issues on appeal.” State v. Farnsworth, 9th Dist.

Medina No. 15CA0038-M, 2016-Ohio-7919, ¶ 16. See also App.R. 9. This includes the PSI where

appropriate. State v. McLeod, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20757, 2002 WL 388909, at *2 (Mar. 13,

2002). “This Court has consistently held that, where the appellant has failed to provide a complete

record to facilitate appellate review, we are compelled to presume regularity in the proceedings

below and affirm the trial court’s judgment.” Farnsworth at ¶ 16.

       {¶16}     Assuming without deciding whether Mr. Clouser’s argument is properly before us

on appeal from his agreed upon sentence, see R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), this Court is unable to review

the merits of his argument because the record before us does not contain the PSI necessary for

appellate review. See State v. Vasquez, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29422, 2019-Ohio-5406, ¶ 8.

“Without the context the PSI might provide, we cannot conclude that there is clear and convincing
                                                 6

evidence in the record the sentence is contrary to law.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Elek,

9th Dist. Summit No. 20CA011611, 2023-Ohio-41, ¶ 37, citing State v. Davis, 9th Dist. Summit

No. 29824, 2021-Ohio-1796, ¶ 10. We must presume regularity in the proceedings below and

affirm. Accordingly, Mr. Clouser’s assignment of error is overruled.

                                                III.

       {¶17} Mr. Clouser’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                       SCOT STEVENSON
                                                       FOR THE COURT
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SUTTON, P. J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

ERIC D. HALL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.