Court Opinion

ID: 9895619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 23:08:07.076165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:40.229429
License: Public Domain

11/07/2023

                                         DA 22-0280
                                                                                  Case Number: DA 22-0280

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                        2023 MT 213N

STATE OF MONTANA,

              Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

MIKEL STETSON LETHERMAN,

              Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:          District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
                      In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC-21-562
                      Honorable Donald L. Harris, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

               For Appellant:

                      Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Alexander H. Pyle, Assistant
                      Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

               For Appellee:

                      Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Cori Losing, Assistant
                      Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                      Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Victoria Calender,
                      Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana

                                                Submitted on Briefs: September 13, 2023
                                                          Decided: November 7, 2023

Filed:
                                    ir,-6‘A•-if
                      __________________________________________
                                       Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1    Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2    Mikel Stetson Letherman (Letherman) appeals his conviction following a jury trial

in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, for bail-jumping.

¶3    Letherman was convicted in a bench trial for driving under the influence. The

District Court released Letherman on his own recognizance. During the initial sentencing

hearing on March 5, 2021, Letherman requested new counsel and the District Court

continued the sentencing hearing. Following a hearing on March 10, 2021, Letherman was

allowed to proceed pro se with stand-by counsel and the District Court informed all parties

that a sentencing hearing would be scheduled in the near future. The District Court’s

Judicial Assistant, Kim Anderson (Anderson), emailed the parties the next day, proposing

several dates. After resolving scheduling conflicts, Letherman and the State agreed to

April 21, 2021, for the sentencing hearing. However, Letherman subsequently emailed

Anderson and informed her that he intended to file a motion to continue the hearing.

Letherman filed his motion on April 20, 2021, but the District Court took no action.

¶4    The District Court called the hearing at 2:13 p.m. Letherman failed to appear.

Letherman’s stand-by counsel indicated that she knew Letherman had filed a motion to

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continue but that she did not know his whereabouts. The State represented that it had not

been contacted by Letherman prior his filing the motion. The District Court informed the

parties that Letherman had contacted his assistant but that he had indicated he would be

present. Thereafter, the District Court issued a bench warrant.

¶5     Letherman was subsequently charged by information with bail-jumping, in violation

of § 45-7-308, MCA. During his jury trial, the State called Anderson as a witness.

Anderson testified that on April 20, 2021, Letherman telephoned her and inquired about

the status of the hearing scheduled for that day. Anderson informed him that the hearing

was still scheduled for 2:00 p.m. Letherman testified that he responded, “be right there.”

Anderson testified that, other than the one call just prior to the hearing, she received no

other calls from Letherman that day. In contrast, Letherman testified that he had called

Anderson back approximately 10 to 15 minutes later explaining he was dealing with

childcare issues, but that he was on his way. Letherman testified he also called Anderson

while in the courthouse parking lot to let her know he was trying to find a place to park.

Letherman claimed that Anderson informed him that court had already been adjourned. He

asked if there was any point in coming into the courtroom and Letherman testified

Anderson said, “[n]o, you’ll have to get rescheduled.” Letherman did not go back into the

courthouse. During the trial, Letherman explained to the jury the various reasons he was

having difficulty getting to court and that he had filed a request for continuance.

¶6     Both parties asked the jury to focus on the “without lawful excuse” element of the

bail-jumping statute. Section 45-7-308(1), MCA, states that “[a] person commits the

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offense of bail-jumping if, having been set at liberty by court order, with or without

security, upon condition that the person will subsequently appear at a specified time and

place, the person purposely fails without lawful excuse to appear at that time and place.”

The District Court instructed the jury pursuant to the bail-jumping statute, but neither party

requested the court provide a jury instruction clarifying what “without lawful excuse”

meant.

¶7       As part of the State’s closing, the State argued:

         A lawful excuse, ladies and gentlemen, is kind of, I think, what it says. Kind
         of per the law. Not my law, not because I think that I have an excuse, not
         because I didn’t feel like going to work today. It’s a lawful excuse; and in
         the legal world, as you heard from witnesses, that means an order from a
         court. It means a judge says. It doesn’t mean I say, it doesn’t mean that
         anybody in the County Attorney’s Office says, it doesn’t mean that the
         defense says; it means what a court says.

Letherman did not object to any part of the State’s argument. He now contends for the first

time on appeal that the prosecutor’s statements during argument that he needed a “court

order” to constitute a lawful excuse amounted to prosecutorial misconduct necessitating

plain error review.

¶8       This Court “generally do[es] not address ‘prosecutorial misconduct pertaining to a

prosecutor’s statements not objected to at trial.’” State v. Mercier, 2021 MT 12, ¶ 13, 403

Mont. 34, 479 P.3d 967. We may however, “review such issues under the plain error

doctrine.” Mercier, ¶ 13. The plain error doctrine is to be “employed sparingly, on a

case-by-case basis . . . .” State v. Akers, 2017 MT 311, ¶ 13, 389 Mont. 531, 408 P.3d 142.

This Court may elect to review a claim under the plain error doctrine “where failing to

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review the claimed error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave

unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may

compromise the integrity of the judicial process.” Akers, ¶ 13. However, “[a] fundamental

aspect of ‘plain error,’ is that the alleged error indeed must be ‘plain.’” State v. Godfrey,

2004 MT 197, ¶ 38, 322 Mont. 254, 95 P.3d 166. Additionally, “[t]he party requesting

reversal because of plain error bears the burden of firmly convincing this Court that the

claimed error implicates a fundamental right and that such review is necessary to prevent

a manifest miscarriage of justice . . . .” State v. George, 2020 MT 56, ¶ 5, 399 Mont. 173,

459 P.3d 854.

¶9     On appeal, Letherman argues that the prosecutor’s statements during closing

argument about what constituted a lawful excuse compromised the fairness and integrity

of the trial and undermined confidence in the verdict. This Court considers “improper

statements by the State during closing arguments ‘in the context of the entire argument.”’

Mercier, ¶ 37. Here, viewing the prosecutor’s closing argument in its entirety, it is evident

the explanation of what constituted a lawful excuse was confined to a small portion of the

overall argument. The prosecutor clarified that it was the jury’s duty to consider the facts

and remain “uninfluenced by passion or prejudice.” She urged the jury to closely examine

the facts and evidence for inconsistencies in witness testimony and it was the jury’s

ultimate determination as to the credibility and weight of any testimony or evidence

provided. The prosecutor then showed the jury the District Court order setting the date and

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time for the sentencing hearing and highlighted that Letherman had been copied on the

correspondence to support that he was aware of the time.

¶10    Having presented the State’s evidence that Letherman had been set at liberty and

was aware of the date and time set for sentencing––as required by § 45-7-308(1)––the

prosecutor then discussed the lawful excuse element of the statute. She emphasized that

Letherman was not only aware of the date and time for the hearing but had chosen that

date. Next, she conceded that Letherman had unsuccessfully attempted to file a motion to

continue.   Finally, the prosecutor ended by reminding the jury that––contrary to

Letherman’s testimony––Anderson testified that he did not call her again, he simply did

not show up. She stated, “he didn’t show up, he didn’t call, he didn’t call the next day.

She testified under oath he never called again.”

¶11    In a similar case, we considered whether statements made by a prosecutor during

closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal under the plain

error doctrine. Mercier, ¶¶ 34-36. In Mercier, the prosecutor responded to prior statements

made by defense counsel during the State’s closing which Mercier argued were taken out

of context and amounted to a “‘wholly improper ad hominem attack on defense counsel’

and ‘create[d] a prejudicial link between defense counsel’s alleged immorality and

[Mercier’s] guilt.’” Mercier, ¶ 36. This Court determined the statements did not constitute

prosecutorial misconduct because prosecutors may “comment on ‘the gravity of the crime

charged, the volume of evidence, credibility of witnesses, inferences to be drawn from

various phases of evidence, and legal principles involved[.]’” Mercier, ¶¶ 37-38. We

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concluded that although the prosecutor’s statements bordered on the edge of inappropriate,

when viewing the record as a whole they were not enough to require plain error review.

Mercier, ¶ 38.

¶12    Here, when viewing the record as a whole the prosecutor’s statements during closing

argument do not meet the requirements for exercising plain error review. The jury heard

Letherman’s testimony about the reasons he was unable to appear and that he had filed a

motion to continue. The jury heard that he was “trying to act within the law” which,

Letherman argued, qualified as a lawful excuse.

¶13    Ultimately, the jury found Letherman guilty after considering all the evidence

presented by both parties. On this record, we cannot conclude that failing to exercise plain

error review would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the question

of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the

judicial process. We cannot conclude that Letherman’s fundamental right to a fair trial was

implicated. The jury was apprised of all the facts and evidence, including Letherman’s

reasons for not appearing, and reached a conclusion that he was guilty of bail-jumping. We

decline to exercise plain error review of Letherman’s alleged claim of prosecutorial

misconduct during the State’s closing argument.

¶14    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents

no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent

or modify existing precedent.

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¶15   Affirmed.

                           /S/ LAURIE McKINNON

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

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