Court Opinion

ID: 9791159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:06:50.942994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.507783
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting):
I concur in the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Crockett and in support thereof, comment further as follows.
In reversing the trial court, the main opinion quotes from People v. Superior Court.1 That case is an intermediate appellate court decision, which, of course, we need not espouse, particularly since it is factually inapposite. The court there held that counsel had a conflict of interest when the two defendants he was representing were offered inconsistent plea bargains, although both defendants declined the offers. *701Such is not at all comparable to the facts of this case. Schumacher had nothing to do with Smith’s defense after the guilty plea was entered by Hall. Carter, who did try the case, was not a party to the plea bargaining session, and the only reasonable inference to be drawn from Schumacher’s nonparticipation at trial is that any question of conflict of interest was thereby eliminated. Such an inference is adequately supported by the defendant himself since at trial he did not once complain of the assistance rendered by either Schumacher or Carter, nor of their competency, good faith, ethics or presence of any conflict of interest. He now so challenges his legal representatives for the first time on appeal, a practice which we have traditionally refused to condone.
The main opinion makes passing reference to Glasser v. U. S.2 and Holloway v. Arkansas3 and apparently accepts the facts and decisions therein as decisive of the issue presented here. However, Glasser is a complete factual stranger to the case at hand. In that case, co-defendants were actually tried over the objection of one co-defendant as to joint representation by the same counsel. In the instant case, defendant Smith at no time objected to his representation by Carter, and, significantly, only Smith stood trial, represented solely by Carter.
As was stated in Holloway:
One principle applicable here, emerges from Glasser without ambiguity. Requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent co-defendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se viola-tive of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.
It thus seems clear, in the absence of a showing otherwise, that where one counsel represents only one co-defendant, no violation of a constitutional right occurs.
The generalization in the main opinion that “members of the same association may not represent defendants with conflicting interests,” while true in most instances, is not to be taken as an absolute prohibition. State v. Thompson4 points out that a conflict of interest arises only when such conflict becomes manifest as by a timely made “strong objection,” as was the case in Glas-ser and Holloway.
Our own recent case of State v. Tippetts 5 also bears upon this matter. In that case, co-defendants were represented by separate counsel. On the day of trial, the attorney for Tippetts’ co-defendant, Lopez, was ill and the latter accepted representation by the former’s attorney, without objection. We held that, absent an affirmative showing of a “conflict of interest,” no constitutional issue was raised and that Glasser was not in point. The same rationale was employed in State v. Andrews:6
In order for assistance by counsel for an accused to be impaired by representation of the same attorney, actual conflict must in fact have existed or be inherent in the facts of the case from which a possibility of prejudice flows. [Citations omitted.]
In the absence of any evidence whatsoever of any conflict of interest, I decline to engage in unwarranted speculation as to its existence. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. 94 Cal.App.3d 626, 156 Cal.Rptr. 487 (1979).

. 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).

. 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).

.108 Ariz. 500, 502 P.2d 1319 (1972).

. Utah, 584 P.2d 892 (1978).

. 106 Ariz. 372, 476 P.2d 673 (1970).