Court Opinion

ID: 9723563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:20:13.365744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:10.864776
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, EJ.
¶ 20. (dissenting). I agree with the majority that Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) requires that Wood-Land be primarily engaged in a logging operation in a forest setting in order to qualify for the statutory tax exemption. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the summary judgment *892record entitles the Village to summary judgment. Instead, I see competing reasonable inferences on the question of whether Wood-Land's primary business activity is logging as contemplated by the statute or the clearing of land with timbering as an ancillary activity. I would reverse and remand for a trial on that question. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 21. Wisconsin Stat. § 70.111(20) exempts the following property from general property taxes:
All equipment used to cut trees, to transport trees in logging areas or to clear land of trees for the commercial use of forest products.1
¶ 22. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Village did not dispute that Wood-Land harvests trees and then processes the trees into wood byproducts for commercial use. However, the Village contended that Wood-Land's primary business activity was to clear land for development and that Wood-Land's timbering operation was merely incidental to that primary activity. Wood-Land argued that the clearing of land is an obvious consequence of any timbering operation, and that its primary business activity was logging.
¶ 23. The Village's claim for summary judgment rested on two evidentiary themes: (1) certain advertis-*893ings promoting Wood-Land as a tree-clearing and grubbing operation, and (2) financial records showing that Wood-Land reaped more of its income from its logging and clearing operations than from its sale of timber by-products.
¶ 24. Against this evidence, Wood-Land offered the affidavit of Steven Barnekow, a Wood-Land officer and employee, who offered the following description of Wood-Land's business operation:
The business of Wood-Land Contactors Inc. is an integration of the cutting of trees at the lands of others, who contract for this service, the clearing of such lands of trees, and Wood-Land's commercial processing thereafter of the cut trees into forest products for sale to others at profit.
At its operations site Wood-Land Contractors Inc. also has dedicated areas for the seasoning and processing of cut trees into commercial forest products.
Barnekow's affidavit goes on to describe the machinery that Wood-Land uses to perform its timbering operations. These include a felling machine with a bar saw attachment which enables the operator to seize a tree with a girth up to thirty-three inches and a height of eighty feet or greater. For smaller trees, Wood-Land uses more conventional timbering machinery: skid-sters with front-end attachments that grasp trees by the trunk, holding them upright, with a shear at the base; brush hogs; and chain saws.
¶ 25. Wood-Land transports some of the felled trees to an on-site chipper machine within the logging area for processing into wood chips. Other trees are either loaded onto log racks and hoisted by hook truck or trailer, or are loaded directly onto log trucks or pup trailers and transported to Wood-Land's off-site opera*894tions facility for processing. Barnekow described this processing operation as follows:
Saw logs in the logging industry refer to sections of quality trees, (e.g. walnut, maple, white spruce), cut to 8 to 20 foot lengths, suitable for sale to lumber mills for their milling of the logs into boards, veneer or similar product for wholesale or retail sale.
Wood-Land regularly, and as part of its business operations, cuts sections of such felled trees into commercially suitable lengths, for the sale of them as saw logs to lumber mills. In the year 2000 Wood-Land sold saw logs at contract prices totaling $36,452. In the year 1999, the total was $52,050.
Trees of less than saw log quality are processed by Wood-Land into fireplace/wood burning stove firewood.
Other trees not suitable for conversion to saw logs or firewood are processed into whole tree wood chips. This material is then sold for commercial use and WoodLand advertises such products for sale.
¶ 26. Barnekow also explained what Wood-Land does not do:
Wood-Land does not engage in landscaping. In cutting trees and clearing trees from land, it undertakes no design or planning work, no grading, no terra-forming, no undertakings regarding subsequent plantings, land features, structures or uses of the land.... How the land looks or is used after Wood-Land's work is not part of its business.
¶ 27. The trial court's findings essentially track Barnekow's summary judgment affidavit. The trial court described Wood-Land's business activity as follows:
Wood-Land clears trees from the lands of others under contract. It then processes the trees into logs, firewood, *895and wood chips which it advertises for sale and sells. This processing includes machining of the wood at the removal site and back at Wood-Land's yard. Wood-Land often clears land that is to be developed or used by others for purposes other than further tree cultivation. But Wood-Land does not grade, prepare, plan, or involve itself in any activity other than the removal of trees from the land and subsequent processing trees into logs, firewood, and chips.
It is beyond dispute that much of Wood-Land's equipment is used to "cut trees," to "transport trees in logging areas," or to "clear land of trees." It is also clear that the logs, firewood, and wood chips produced from the trees and sold by Wood-Land are forest products which are commercial in use.
¶ 28. Despite these findings, the trial court agreed with the Village's argument that Wood-Land did not qualify for the exemption because Wood-Land's primary business purpose was to clear land for development, not to convert the harvested timber into commercial products. On this basis, the trial court awarded summary judgment to the Village.2 The majority upholds that ruling. I disagree.
*896¶ 29. For purposes of this dissent, I will allow that the evidence cited by the Village demonstrates a prima facie case for summary judgment. See Jones v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 80 Wis. 2d 321, 326-27, 259 N.W.2d 70 (1977). Therefore, I turn to the next step in summary judgment methodology — whether the evidence offered by Wood-Land created a material issue of fact. See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Hunzinger Constr. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 281, 291, 507 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1993).
¶ 30. The majority places great weight on the fact that Wood-Land's timbering operation serves to clear the land on which the operation is conducted. However, Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) does not negate the exemption if the effect of the logging operation is to clear land. As a matter of fact, the statute expressly envisions the clearing of land: "to clear land of trees for the commercial use of forest products." Id. Indeed, I have difficulty envisioning a situation where a logging operation will not result in the clearing of land.
¶ 31. The majority also says, "[Wood-Land's] business is to clear land for the purpose of giving developers what they want: land free from obstructions. That is what it gets paid for." Majority at ¶ 13. This reasoning fails on two fronts. First, as I have already noted, the *897statute contemplates that the clearing of land will he a consequence of a logging operation. In short, WoodLand does exactly what the statute envisions: "clear land of trees for the commercial use of forest products." Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20). Second, I fail to see how the motives of the land owners factor into the statutory analysis. The statute requires an examination of WoodLand's primary reason for the use of its logging equipment, not an examination of the land owners' motives for wanting the timber removed and their lands cleared.
¶ 32. The majority also concludes that because some of Wood-Land's customers want their land cleared of timber and because Wood-Land satisfies that need, Wood-Land is not engaged in the iogging business for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20). But in making that conclusion the majority fails to address Barnekow's affidavit which contends that while land clearing is an obvious consequence of timbering, it is not the primary business function of Wood-Land. I conclude that the summary judgment record supports the competing inferences drawn by both parties in this case and that those inferences are reasonable. As such, this case should go to trial.
¶ 33. Moreover, I fear that the majority has looked at the evidence only from the standpoint of the Village. For instance, the majority says, "We are convinced that had Wood-Land in fact claimed that it was in the logging business, it would have made that claim in the trial court and asked for a trial to prove it." Majority at ¶ 9 n.2. However, Barnekow's affidavit establishes that Wood-Land is engaged in a classic logging operation. Wood-Land owns and operates sophisticated machinery uniquely designed for logging. Using this machinery, Wood-Land harvests timber, *898which results in the clearing of lands. Wood-Land then transports the timber to either its on-site or off-site machinery for processing into saw logs, firewood and wood chips, which are sold commercially. Barnekow's description of Wood-Land's operations reflects the very scenario envisioned by Wxs. Stat. § 70.111(20), which exempts equipment used "to cut trees, to transport trees in logging areas or to clear land of trees for the commercial use of forest products."
¶ 34. The majority also holds that Wood-Land is not "involved in the systematic cutting and transporting of logs for eventual commercial use." Majority op. at ¶ 8. Therefore, according to the majority, Wood-Land falls into the category of those "who incidentally cut trees as part of some other business." Id. However, as indicated above, Barnekow's affidavit demonstrates that Wood-Land's business model is a logging operation.
¶ 35.- The majority also says that Wood-Land's operations are not conducted in a forest setting. But here again, the evidence allows for competing reasonable inferences. The fact that Wood-Land has advertised as a tree clearing operation might support the argument that its principal business operation is the clearing of land. However, other of Wood-Land's advertising promotes the commercial wood products resulting from its timbering operation. Moreover, the use of a felling machine sufficient to harvest 80 foot trees, skidsters with grapling attachments, brush hogs, and a saw milling operation capable of producing eight- to twenty-foot saw logs for further sale to the industry hardly suggests an operation that harvests, in the words of the majority, "tree[s] standing in front of a residential lawn." Majority at ¶ 12.
¶ 36. The resolution of this case rests, in part, on Wood-Land's primary business intent. Does Wood-Land *899exist to provide land-clearing services or does it exist to perform logging operations within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20)? Intent is a question that does not lend itself to summary judgment methodology. Lecus v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 81 Wis. 2d 183, 190, 260 N.W.2d 241 (1977) (the issue of intent is not one that properly can be decided on a motion for summary judgment). Moreover, on summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish the absence of a genuine disputed issue as to any material fact. Kraemer Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 565, 278 N.W.2d 857 (1979). As such, it was the Village's obligation to demonstrate a right to summary judgment "with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy." Id. at 566. Finally, the court must view the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. at 567.
¶ 37. Bearing these black letter law principles of summary judgment in mind, I would hold that the summary judgment record reveals competing reasonable inferences in favor of both parties as to WoodLand's primary business purpose and intent.
¶ 38. Alternatively, the majority says that even if its analysis of the summary judgment record is wrong, the Village nonetheless prevails in this case because tax exemption statutes are to be construed against the party claiming the exemption. Majority at ¶ 18.1 fully accept this rule, and I further agree that it has a role to play in this case. But I contend that the majority has the cart before the horse in applying the rule at this pretrial stage of the proceedings. When applying a rule of statutory construction to a set of facts, the court must first know what the facts are. Instead of applying the rule at summary judgment where the evidence allows for competing reasonable inferences as to whether *900Wood-Land is entitled to the statutory exemption, I would submit that question to a jury together with the jury instruction regarding the presumption.
¶ 39. I would reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Village and remand for a trial on the question. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

 The wording of Wis. Stat. § 70.111(20) presents a number of grammatical problems. First, it is not clear whether the prepositional phrase "in logging areas" modifies only the immediate preceding phrase "to transport trees" or also the earlier phrase "to cut trees." In addition, it is not clear whether the concluding prepositional phrase "for the commercial use of forest products" modifies only the immediate preceding phrase "to clear land of trees" or all of the preceding phrases. These uncertainties did not surface in the trial court because the discussion in that forum was whether Wood-Land's "primary" business activity was logging.

 In making its ruling, the trial court relied on Village of Menomonee Falls v. Falls Rental World, 135 Wis. 2d 393, 400 N.W.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1986). There, a rental company occasionally sold some of its products that were no longer useable as rental property or when a rental customer would ask to purchase a product. Id. at 395. Based on these isolated and occasional events, the rental company contended that its rental inventory was stock-in-trade, entitling it to the exemption conferred by Wis. Stat. § 70.111(17). Falls Rental World, 135 Wis. 2d at 395. We held that the rental company was not entitled to the exemption because the business activity of the company was to provide a service through the rental of its *896products. See id. at 398. That essential business purpose was not changed by the fact that the company occasionally ridded itself of outmoded products or occasionally sold a product to a rental customer. See id.
As this dissent will reveal, I see competing reasonable inferences from the summary judgment evidence as to whether Wood-Land's business model constitutes two discrete operations or a single unitary operation. If the former, the trial court will have to decide which operation is primary, akin to the analysis in Falls Rental World. If the latter, the court need not perform that exercise and Falls Rental World would not apply.