Court Opinion

ID: 9957288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 00:00:42.933703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.613480
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50123       Document: 61-1      Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/03/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit
                             ____________
                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                               No. 23-50123
                             ____________                               FILED
                                                                     April 3, 2024
Sheet Pile, L.L.C.,                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                        Clerk
                                                        Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                   versus

Plymouth Tube Company, USA,

                                         Defendant—Appellee.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Western District of Texas
                          USDC No. 1:21-CV-18
               ______________________________

Before Willett, Wilson, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
      This business dispute concerns an exclusivity agreement between
PilePro LLC, now Sheet Pile LLC, and Plymouth Tube Company. In 2011,
PilePro and Plymouth contractually agreed that Plymouth would
manufacture certain products exclusively for PilePro. About a decade later,
PilePro’s successor-in-interest and assignee, Sheet Pile, accused Plymouth
of selling those products to other companies and sued for fraud and breach of
contract. Plymouth successfully moved for summary judgment, and we
AFFIRM.
 Case: 23-50123         Document: 61-1          Page: 2      Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                      No. 23-50123

                                            I
        Plymouth and PilePro (now Sheet Pile) are players in the market for
sheet pile connectors, which are steel sheets used to create walls that shore
up dirt or water on construction projects. Plymouth manufactures and sells
these connectors, and companies like PilePro and Sheet Pile buy and
distribute them.
        In 2011, Plymouth and “PilePro LLC (together with its subsidiary and
affiliates, including but not limited to PilePro Steel, L.P. ‘PilePro’)”
contractually agreed, in part, that Plymouth would not “manufacture any
type of extruded steel profile or connector . . . (‘Exclusivity Products’) for
any person or entity other than PilePro” until December 12, 2021
(“Exclusivity Agreement”). 1 We follow the Exclusivity Agreement’s lead in
using “PilePro” to refer collectively to PilePro LLC and PilePro Steel, L.P.,
unless otherwise specified.
        The years following Plymouth and PilePro’s 2011 Exclusivity
Agreement were far from frictionless. We begin by recounting, in roughly
chronological order, the underlying dispute between PilePro and Plymouth.
                                           A
        Between 2014 and 2015, Plymouth sent PilePro four different emails
and letters that are related to the Exclusivity Agreement and relevant here.
        First, on August 11, 2014, Plymouth sent PilePro a letter stating that it
would “no longer manufacture the Exclusivity Products.” It said that it
“shall continue to honor” other remaining obligations in the Exclusivity

        _____________________
        1
         The parties initially contracted in 2004 and modified this contract with the 2011
Exclusivity Agreement. Only the 2011 Exclusivity Agreement is at issue here.

                                            2
 Case: 23-50123          Document: 61-1          Page: 3       Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                       No. 23-50123

Agreement, impliedly including its obligation not to manufacture and sell
Exclusivity Products to anyone but PilePro.
        Second, on April 20, 2015, Plymouth emailed PilePro after PilePro
began defaulting on payments for previously purchased Exclusivity Products.
Plymouth wrote in relevant part:
        [A]s a result of what can only be deemed bad faith by [PilePro]
        in refusing payment for goods purchased and for failing to
        honor the [separate] Indemnity Agreement[ 2] we must now
        consider if such actions are a breach of the [Exclusivity]
        Agreement between us which would free us, if we so desired,
        to get back into the business and sell [to] anyone we so chose.
        Now we are not inclined to do this for we do not want to get
        back into the business, but if you[r] client will not protect us
        under the agreement, why should we protect your client.

        Third, on July 13, 2015, Plymouth sent PilePro a letter stating that it
intended to terminate the Exclusivity Agreement because of (1) PilePro’s
alleged failure to indemnify Plymouth in a separate suit and (2) PilePro’s
failure to pay for Exclusivity Products it had already purchased.
        Fourth, Plymouth sent PilePro a follow-up letter that it was exercising
its alleged right to terminate the Exclusivity Agreement, effective November
12, 2015. 3

        _____________________
        2
           Plymouth alleged that PilePro was contractually obligated to indemnify Plymouth
in a separate suit brought by Skyline Steel LLC, discussed below. This indemnity provision
is not relevant to this appeal and is referenced here only for completeness.
        3
           Sheet Pile argues on appeal that Plymouth did not terminate the agreement
because Plymouth’s bases for termination were not among the permissible bases outlined
in the Exclusivity Agreement. Plymouth does not argue the point, and neither party fully
briefs this issue. Because we can resolve this appeal on other grounds argued by the parties,
we need not address whether Plymouth successfully terminated the agreement.

                                             3
Case: 23-50123         Document: 61-1       Page: 4    Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                   No. 23-50123

                                        B
         On October 1, 2015, Plymouth sued PilePro Steel, L.P., in Illinois state
court after PilePro failed to pay for previously purchased Exclusivity
Products. PilePro Steel removed the suit to federal court. See Plymouth Tube
Co. v. Pilepro Steel, LP, No. 15 C 10353, 2017 WL 4707454 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19,
2017).
         In April 2016, PilePro Steel filed several counterclaims, including a
claim that Plymouth had breached the Exclusivity Agreement by
manufacturing Exclusivity Products for third parties. It amended its
counterclaims on July 6, 2016, but then abandoned them in October 2016.
The district court ultimately granted Plymouth’s motion for summary
judgment. PilePro did not appeal.
                                        C
         Meanwhile, in March 2016, Plymouth settled a separate suit brought
by another entity, Skyline Steel LLC. This suit is relevant only to the extent
that, as part of the settlement agreement, Plymouth agreed to manufacture
Exclusivity Products for Skyline and began doing so in June 2016.
                                        D
         A few years later, in 2019, PilePro LLC declared bankruptcy. Sheet
Pile then purchased PilePro LLC’s assets and was “assign[ed] . . . any and all
of [PilePro LLC’s] claims and defenses . . . against Plymouth . . . related to

                                        4
Case: 23-50123             Document: 61-1           Page: 5      Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                         No. 23-50123

any pre-petition activities of [PilePro LLC] other than related to the
Intellectual Property.”
                                               E
       Now for this case.
       As PilePro LLC’s assignee, Sheet Pile sued Plymouth in Texas state
court on November 24, 2020, for allegedly selling Exclusivity Products to
third parties in breach of the Exclusivity Agreement and for fraudulently
representing in 2014 and 2015 that it was not manufacturing Exclusivity
Products. Plymouth removed the case to federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction.
       Plymouth moved for summary judgment on both of Sheet Pile’s
claims. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation and granted Plymouth’s motion. It concluded that Sheet
Pile’s breach-of-contract claim was barred by Texas’s four-year statute of
limitations, and, alternatively, by res judicata based on its breach-of-contract
counterclaim in the Illinois action. It held that the fraud claim was also time-
barred, and, alternatively, that Sheet Pile did not show a genuine dispute of
material fact to survive summary judgment.
       Sheet Pile timely appealed.
                                               II
       The rules for reviewing summary judgment are familiar and well
settled. “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” 4 Summary judgment is
appropriate only when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
       _____________________
       4
           Pierce v. Dep’t of U.S. Air Force, 512 F.3d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2007).

                                               5
 Case: 23-50123           Document: 61-1        Page: 6      Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                      No. 23-50123

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” 5 “We may affirm a summary judgment on any ground supported by the
record, even if it is different from that relied on by the district court.” 6
                                            A
       We start with Sheet Pile’s breach-of-contract claim.
       Sheet Pile alleges that Plymouth breached the Exclusivity Agreement
by selling Exclusivity Products to third parties beginning in June 2016.
Plymouth responds that it is entitled to summary judgment because Sheet
Pile’s breach-of-contract claim is barred by (1) the statute of limitations and,
alternatively, (2) res judicata based on PilePro’s Illinois breach-of-contract
counterclaim. Plymouth’s limitations defense is dispositive.
        Under Texas law, a breach-of-contract claim is subject to a four-year
statute of limitations. 7 To succeed on its limitations defense, Plymouth
“must (1) conclusively prove when [Sheet Pile’s] cause of action accrued,
and (2) negate the discovery rule, if it applies and has been pleaded or
otherwise raised.” 8 A cause of action normally accrues “when a wrongful act
causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later,
and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred.” 9 Accordingly, “a

       _____________________
       5
           Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
       6
           Holtzclaw v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001).
       7
         Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.051; Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586,
592 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).
       8
         See KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746,
748 (Tex. 1999).
       9
         Archer v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d 281, 288 (Tex. 2018) (quoting S.V. v. R.V., 933
S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996)).

                                            6
 Case: 23-50123             Document: 61-1          Page: 7      Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                           No. 23-50123

cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the moment the contract is
breached.” 10
        But there’s a narrow exception 11: “[W]hen the nature of the plaintiff’s
injury is both inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable,”12
Texas’s discovery rule “defers accrual of [the] cause of action until the
plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the
facts giving rise to [the] cause of action.” 13 “An injury is inherently
undiscoverable if it is, by its nature, unlikely to be discovered within the
prescribed limitations period despite due diligence.” 14 Texas courts
“determine whether an injury is inherently undiscoverable on a categorical
basis because such an approach ‘brings predictability and consistency to the
jurisprudence.’” 15 “[T]o avoid defeating the purposes behind the limitations
statutes,” the Texas Supreme Court “ha[s] restricted the discovery rule to
exceptional cases.” 16
        Sheet Pile contends that Texas’s discovery rule applies and defers
accrual until PilePro discovered in 2017 or 2018 that Plymouth sold

        _____________________
        10
             Id. (citing Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex. 2015)).
        11
          Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (observing
that the Texas Supreme Court has “restricted the discovery rule to exceptional cases to
avoid defeating the purposes behind the limitations statutes”)
        12
         Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex. 2001) (citing
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455–56 (Tex. 1996)).
        13
         TIG Ins. Co. v. Aon Re, Inc., 521 F.3d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 2008) (alteration adopted)
(quoting HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998)).
        14
             Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 734–35 (citing S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 7).
        15
             Id. at 735 (quoting Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex. 2001)).
        16
             Via Net, 211 S.W.3d at 313.

                                                7
 Case: 23-50123             Document: 61-1            Page: 8    Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                          No. 23-50123

Exclusivity Products to third parties. 17 Whether the discovery rule applies is
a question of law 18 that we answer as would the Supreme Court of Texas. 19
        Without the discovery rule, Sheet Pile’s breach-of-contract claim
accrued in June 2016, when Plymouth began selling Exclusivity Products to
Skyline. That’s more than four years before Sheet Pile filed suit in November
2020. Sheet Pile’s breach-of-contract claim is thus time-barred under
Texas’s normal accrual rules. 20
        We decline Sheet Pile’s request to apply the discovery rule here.
Although the Texas Supreme Court has not held that the discovery rule is
categorically inapplicable to breach-of-contract injuries, Sheet Pile points to
no Texas case applying it, and we have found none. 21 Ruling as we think
Texas courts would, 22 we conclude that Sheet’s Pile’s breach-of-contract

        _____________________
        17
          Roberto Wendt, the owner and managing member of Sheet Pile LLC, stated in
his declaration that “[i]t was not until . . . 2017[] that PilePro learned of the sales.” But in
its opening brief, Sheet Pile alleges that it did not discover Plymouth’s third-party sales
until 2018.
        18
             Aon Re, Inc., 521 F.3d at 357.
        19
          See id. at 361 (“It is our duty, however, to rule on this Texas state law issue as
would the Texas courts.” (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))).
        20
             See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.051.
        21
           In an unpublished, per curiam opinion, a previous panel of this court cited Via
Net for the unequivocal rule that Texas’s “discovery rule does not apply to breach of
contract . . . claims.” Jeanbaptiste v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 14-10671, 2014 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21468, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 7, 2014) (per curiam). That panel went too far. Although
the Texas Supreme Court has yet to apply the discovery rule to a breach of contract, it has
not foreclosed that possibility. See Via Net, 211 S.W.3d at 314 (“We do not hold today that
the discovery rule can never apply to breach of contract claims.”); see also Beavers v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 436, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Via Net, 211 S.W.3d at 314).
        22
             See Aon Re, Inc., 521 F.3d at 361.

                                                  8
 Case: 23-50123            Document: 61-1          Page: 9      Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                         No. 23-50123

injury was not inherently undiscoverable and thus cannot surpass Texas’s
high bar for deferral under the discovery rule.
        Had it acted diligently, PilePro (now Sheet Pile23) would have
discovered Plymouth’s alleged breach within the limitations period. For
contracting parties such as PilePro, “due diligence requires that [it] protect
its own interests” by, for example, “asking [its] contract partner for
information needed to verify contractual performance.” 24 “[F]ailing to even
ask for such information is not due diligence.” 25 PilePro never asked
Plymouth to disclose its sales—despite knowing that Plymouth threatened in
2015 to sell to third parties, receiving Plymouth’s purported termination of
the Exclusivity Agreement in 2015, and filing and amending a breach-of-
contract counterclaim in 2016. If it had, PilePro would have learned of any
third-party sales, or, if Plymouth refused to disclose that information,
Plymouth’s fraudulent concealment would have deferred accrual.26 “While
        _____________________
        23
           As PilePro LLC’s assignee, Sheet Pile cannot get the benefits of the discovery
rule by arguing that it could not have been aware of Plymouth’s alleged 2016 breach because
it did not purchase PilePro’s assets until 2019. “Because an assignee [here, Sheet Pile]
stands in the shoes of the assignor [here, PilePro LLC], [Sheet Pile] was subject to the
statute of limitations as it applied to [PilePro’s] independent actions for breach . . . .” See
Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. of Chambers & Harris Counties. v. Jarrar’s Plumbing,
Inc., 74 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied), abrogated on other
grounds by Duffey v. Sleep Ctr. of Longview, 598 S.W.3d 711 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020,
no pet.).
        24
             See Via Net, 211 S.W.3d at 314.
        25
          Id.; see also Beavers, 566 F.3d at 440 (“The Texas cases establish that, at a
minimum, due diligence would require the appellants to request information to verify
MetLife’s performance of its contractual duties.”).
        26
            See Beavers, 566 F.3d at 441. Sheet Pile doesn’t expressly argue fraudulent
concealment to rebut Plymouth’s statute-of-limitations defense. But to the extent we can
construe Sheet Pile’s fraud claim as alleging that Plymouth fraudulently concealed its
contractual breach, it fails. As we explain below, Sheet Pile has not raised a genuine dispute
of material fact that Plymouth made a false representation in 2014 or 2015 to conceal its
sales to third parties. See Trousdale v. Henry, 261 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston

                                               9
Case: 23-50123             Document: 61-1            Page: 10   Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                         No. 23-50123

the facts of this specific case do not govern the categorical inquiry, they are
not atypical” 27; there will often be some number of red flags, like those here,
that would prompt a sophisticated party such as PilePro to inspect the other
party’s contractual performance. 28 Because Sheet Pile should have
discovered any breach “during the relatively long four-year limitations
period” had it acted diligently, this type of breach-of-contract injury is not
inherently undiscoverable. 29 We thus conclude that the Texas Supreme
Court would not apply the discovery rule here. 30
        Sheet Pile makes one last attempt to avoid Plymouth’s limitations
defense. It argues that the limitations period began anew each time Plymouth
sold Exclusivity Products to a third party, meaning that any alleged third-
party sales within four years of its November 2020 suit aren’t time-barred.
However, Sheet Piled forfeited this “serial breach” argument because it
failed to present it to the magistrate judge. 31

        _____________________
[14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (“To prove fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must
demonstrate the defendant had (1) actual knowledge that a wrong occurred; (2) a duty to
disclose the wrong; and (3) a fixed purpose to conceal the wrong.”); Shah v. Moss, 67
S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. 2001) (“To avoid summary judgment on limitations grounds, Moss
must have raised a fact issue to support his fraudulent-concealment assertion.”); Marcus &
Millichap Real Est. Inv. Servs. of Nev., Inc. v. Triex Tex. Holdings, LLC, 659 S.W.3d 456, 463
(Tex. 2023) (per curiam) (same).
        27
             See Via Net, 211 S.W.3d at 314.
        28
           See generally JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d
648 (Tex. 2018) (discussing red flags and sophistication in the context of justifiable
reliance); Nooner Holdings, Ltd. v. Abilene Vill., LLC, 668 S.W.3d 956 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2023, pet. denied) (same).
        29
             See Via Net, 211 S.W.3d at 315.
        30
             See Beavers, 566 F.3d at 440–41.
        31
         See Lewis v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 662 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(“This argument is waived because it was not presented to the magistrate judge . . . .”).

                                                10
Case: 23-50123            Document: 61-1             Page: 11   Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                        No. 23-50123

       Even if Sheet Pile hadn’t forfeited the argument, it would have failed
on the merits. Texas courts have recognized serial accrual of breaches in a
few discrete instances, none of which apply here: (1) when the breach is of an
installment contract 32; (2) when the “defendant’s wrongful conduct caused
temporary (as opposed to permanent) injuries to real property” 33; and (3) in
the “very limited circumstance[]” when the same wrongful conduct causes
“distinct legal injuries,” 34 as when exposure to asbestos gives rise to
“separate disease[s]” that “manifest years or even decades apart.” 35 The
Exclusivity Agreement is not an installment contract, which eliminates (1).
And the suit here doesn’t turn on the longevity of Sheet Pile’s injury, so (2)
is out too. As for (3), Sheet Pile didn’t suffer distinct legal injuries each time
Plymouth allegedly sold Exclusivity Products to third parties. Unlike the
“separate disease[s]” that may arise at different times following asbestos
exposure, any later-in-time third-party sales wouldn’t have inflicted a type of
injury that was separate and distinct from that caused by earlier sales. 36
Rather, because Plymouth’s alleged third-party sales would have violated the
same exclusivity provision in the Agreement, each would have inflicted the
same type of injury. So once Plymouth allegedly breached the Exclusivity
Agreement in June 2016, PilePro had an actionable claim, and any subsequent
third-party sales by Plymouth would have only added to PilePro’s existing

       _____________________
       32
         Garden Ridge, L.P. v. Clear Lake Ctr., L.P., 504 S.W.3d 428, 446 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
       33
         Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 817
(Tex. 2021).
       34
            Id. (citing Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tex. 2000)).
       35
            Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.3d at 652–53.
       36
            See id.

                                                11
Case: 23-50123           Document: 61-1            Page: 12      Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                        No. 23-50123

damages. 37 Accordingly, one—and only one—limitations period began to run
in June 2016. 38
        Because Plymouth has established that Sheet Pile’s breach-of-
contract claim is time-barred, it is entitled to summary judgment. We
therefore need not reach Plymouth’s argument that Sheet Pile’s claim is
barred by res judicata.
                                              B
        We turn next to Sheet Pile’s fraud claim.
        Sheet Pile contends that Plymouth represented in its 2014 letter and
2015 email that it was not selling Exclusivity Products; that, in reliance on
those statements, it purchased those products from other suppliers at a
higher cost; and that Plymouth nonetheless began selling Exclusivity
Products to third parties in mid-2016, which it did not discover until 2017 or
2018. Plymouth, in turn, argues that it is entitled to summary judgment

        _____________________
        37
           Cf. Smith v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 102 S.W. 908, 909 (Tex. 1907) (“[T]he
original breach of the contract . . . would have given a right of action at once, including the
right to recover all such damages as proximately resulted, whether they had then accrued
or not, and that limitation would therefore have run from the time of that breach.”).
        38
          This makes sense as a matter of efficiency. Once Sheet Pile knew—or should
have known with reasonable diligence—that Plymouth was breaching the Exclusivity
Agreement, it should have sued for breach of contract to mitigate its damages. Cf. Cosgrove,
468 S.W.3d at 40 (“Allowing them to slumber on this knowledge . . . before seeking a
corrected deed is not a luxury we have recognized, and would render meaningless parties’
recognized duty to exercise diligence in examining their mineral rights.”).

                                              12
Case: 23-50123           Document: 61-1           Page: 13      Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                       No. 23-50123

because Sheet Pile’s fraud claim (1) is barred by the statute of limitations,
and, alternatively, (2) fails on the merits as a matter of law.
        Even if the fraud claim isn’t time-barred, 39 summary judgment is
proper because it fails on the merits. 40 Actionable fraud requires that
(1) Plymouth “made a material representation that was false”; (2) Plymouth
“knew the representation was false or made it recklessly as a positive
assertion without any knowledge of its truth”; (3) Plymouth “intended to
induce [PilePro] to act upon the representation”; and (4) PilePro “actually
and justifiably relied upon the representation and suffered injury as a
result.” 41 Sheet Pile has not created a genuine dispute of material fact that
Plymouth’s 2014 and 2015 representations—that Plymouth was not then
selling Exclusivity Products to third parties—were false when made or were
made in reckless disregard of their truth. 42 There is no evidence that
Plymouth sold Exclusivity Products to third parties in 2014 or 2015—Sheet
Pile even concedes as much. Nor is there evidence that Plymouth told PilePro

        _____________________
        39
           Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004(a)(4) (stating that the statute of
limitations for fraud claims is four years).
        40
         Because limitations is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional requirement,
we need not reach it. See In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Tex. 2010).
        41
          See JP Morgan Chase Bank, 546 S.W.3d at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001)).
        42
          See Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323,
339 (Tex. 2011) (“We conclude that as a matter of law, Powell’s representations were
actionable, and legally sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that they were known to be
false when made.” (emphasis added)); Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs &
Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (“A fraud cause of action requires a
material misrepresentation, which was false, and which was either known to be false when
made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth[] . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).

                                             13
Case: 23-50123         Document: 61-1           Page: 14     Date Filed: 04/03/2024

                                       No. 23-50123

it wouldn’t sell Exclusivity Products to third parties despite plans to do so. 43
Rather, in its 2015 email, Plymouth expressly warned PilePro that it might
begin selling to third parties if PilePro didn’t hold up its end of the bargain.
Sheet Pile cannot now act surprised that Plymouth later followed through
with that threat. Accordingly, Sheet Pile has failed to create a genuine dispute
of material fact on the first element of its fraud claim. Plymouth is thus
entitled to summary judgment.
                                   *        *         *
        Accordingly, we AFFIRM summary judgment for Plymouth.

        _____________________
        43
         See Formosa Plastics Corp., 960 S.W.2d at 46 (“[A] fraud claim can be based on a
promise made with no intention of performing . . . .”).

                                           14