Court Opinion

ID: 9458885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:04:33.803428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:55.826475
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
Two days prior to the commencement of appellant’s trial, the defendant in another case, United States v. Artis, Crim. No. 625-70, was acquitted by a unanimous jury. The trial judge in that case berated the jurors for returning a verdict of which he would be “ashamed” and for showing too little concern for the “crime situation.” Two (or perhaps three — the record on this point is unclear) of the jurors who were subjected to this unfortunate attack participated in appellant’s trial, and voted to convict him of second-degree murder and carrying. a dangerous weapon.
All of us “strongly disapprove of the acrimonious remarks of the trial judge in the former case,” majority opinion at 548 because “[cjritical or laudatory words with reference to the verdict may unduly influence jurors during the remainder of their term.” Majority opinion at 550 (emphasis added. The point of disagreement is whether appellant’s conviction must be reversed.
A majority of the panel concludes that the conviction should not be reversed, apparently on the grounds that appellant was not prejudiced by the presence of the Artis jurors. But it is hard to see how appellant could have demonstrated any prejudice short of taking the disfavored step of introducing affidavits of the jurors who had been criticized by the trial judge in Artis. Even that course would reveal prejudice to the defense only if the jurors were (1) consciously influenced by the attack in Ar-tis, and (2) willing to admit it. A Procrustean demand for a showing of prejudice is ill-suited to a case where the very integrity of the judicial process is at stake and where the inability to demonstrate prejudice offers little assurance that prejudice did not exist. Cf. it. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 64-66 (1970).
If the trial judge had been aware of the Artis incident and of the manifest possibility of prejudice to the defendant in this case, he would surely have taken *552some action to eliminate that prejudice. But the trial court had no opportunity to take such action because the prosecutor, who subsequently admitted knowing that some of the jurors had been criticized for their verdict in an earlier case, failed to disclose that information to defense counsel or the trial court. Nevertheless, this Court refuses to reverse the conviction, pointing out that it “ae-cept[s] the prosecutor’s statement that he was concerned primarily with the hard reality of the Artis jurors’ earlier verdict, indicating an attitude unfavorable to the prosecution, rather than with the speculative effect of the comments of the .previous judge.” Majority opinion at 551. Perhaps the prosecutor reásoned correctly that the participation of these jurors represented a greater threat to the government than to the defense. The simple answer, however, is that the prosecutor is not the judge of what is unduly prejudicial to the government or the defense.- Nor does he have the power, irrespective of his good or bad intentions, to decide that the cause of justice is best served by having these jurors participate. His action deprived the trial judge of the ability to rule on a question that goes to the heart of the fairness of appellant’s trial.
The Court also suggests that the prior incident “would not have constituted an automatic disqualification of all Artis jurors, if they felt able to render a fair verdict in future cases.” Majority opinion at 551. That may well be true, but no one questioned these jurors about the prior incident to determine whether it would impair their ability to render a fair verdict. And even if these jurors would not be subject to automatic disqualification, they could have been peremptorily challenged by the defense. The sixth amendment guaranteed appellant a trial before an impartial jury, and the impartiality of the jury should have been established by the trial court and not by the opposing litigant. By concealing the information from defense counsel and from the trial court, the prosecutor — whether his motives were good or bad — thwarted the judicial process. If the information had been disclosed, the trial judge might have excused the Artis jurors sua sponte; he might have granted a prosecution or defense motion for the disqualification of these jurors; or he might have considered it sufficient to instruct the jurors that they were obliged to disregard the comments of the trial judge in Artis. For the present purpose we need not decide which of these, or any other, courses of action would have best served the fair administration of justice. Because the information was withheld from the trial judge, he was barred from taking any action at all. Reversal of appellant’s conviction is therefore required.