Court Opinion

ID: 8860197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 17:45:21.241716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:05:47.696227
License: Public Domain

MORRIS, District Judge
(dissenting). I am unable to join in the order reversing the decree of the circuit court, which it is proposed to pass in this case, and will very briefly state my reasons:
Behlmer, in his petition to the commission, complained that he was charged as freight on two car loads of hay from Memphis to Summerville at the rate of 28 cents per 100, while the rate over the same roads to Charleston, 22 miles further, was only 19 cents. This, he alleged, was a violation of the fourth section of the interstate commerce act. He further complained that the 9 cents, additional per 100 charged to Summerville was based on the local rate for 22 miles from Charleston back to Summerville over the South Carolina Railroad, which itself, he alleged, was excessive and unreasonable; and he further alleged that the combined rate of 28 cents from Memphis to Charleston was excessive and unreasonable, and in violation of the first section of the act. The defendants answered, alleging that there were eight all-rail routes which were competitors for the business from Memphis to Charleston; that there was, besides, existing water competition from ports on the Atlantic Coast to Charleston; and that the rate from Memphis to Charleston of 19 cents per 100 was forced upon the defendant lines by this rail and water competition which they had to meet at Charleston, but which the South Carolina Railroad did not have to meet at Summerville; and that rates which were just and reasonable to Summerville would result in the loss of the business, if charged to Charleston. The commission considered only the allegation that the defendants violated the long and short haul clause, and, in view of their decision on that point, deemed it unnecessary to consider whether any other provision of the law had been violated. In the decision of the commission appears the following:
“There is no showing in this proceeding of competition by lines not subject to the act to regulate commerce for the carriage of hay from Memphis td Charleston, and the fact that there may be competition for such traffic by lines which are subject to the act, or that hay may be carried to Charleston by various rail and water, or part-rail and part-water, routes, from points other than Memphis, does not justify the defendant carriers in departing from the general rule of the fourth section upon their own motion. Such considerations may constitute reasons for applying to the commission for relief under the proviso clause of that section, but, for the reasons stated in our decisions of the cases above cited, they do not justify carriers in departing from the rule of the fourth section without such relieving order. Water competition, to justify lower long-haul rates, must exist between the point of shipment and the longer-distance destination. One transportation line cannot be said to meet the competition of another transportation line for the carrying trade of any .particular locality unless the latter line could and would perform the service alone if the' former did 'not undertake it. The competition of markets or the competition of carrying lines subject to regulation under the act to regulate commerce does not justify carriers in making greater short-haul or lower long-haul charges over the same line without an order issued by the commission on application therefor after investigation.”
*909The decision then quotes the rule of practice of the commission with reference to applications under the proviso o£ the fourth section, and then proceeds:
“Because Charleston is an important seaport and railroad center, and liay may be and is carried tliere from various points, is not a sufficient reason for a departure from tliis rule. The just interests of the carrier are fully protected by the proviso clause of the fourth section. The defendants are under no obligation to compete at low rates for the carriage of hay from Memphis to Charleston. They ought not to engage in such competition if.the rates obtainable are not remunerative. If they are remunerative, the defendants cannot, in the face of the prohibition of the fourth section, and the provision in that section for the issuance of relieving orders, assume to say that such rates, though profitable on Charleston traffic, are insufficient for the transportation of car-load quantities to a shorter point on the same line, and in the same direction.”
There was no finding of fact by the commission other than is contained in the foregoing extract from its decision, and it is obvious that the commission did not jiass upon the question of the dissimilarity of the circumstances and conditions, nor upon the question whether (he rate for the shorter haul was of itself reasonable and just. They took the law to be that, by charging a greater rate for the shorter haul over the same line, the carriers were prima facie without justification, and that they could only be permitted lawfully to make the charge after they had been authorized upon application to the commission under the proviso of the fourth section. One of the cases cited by the commission in support of this proposition of law is the decision of the circuit court of appeals in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 9 C. C. A. 689, now known as the “Social Circle Case.” Tlie supreme court, in reviewing that case (162 U. S. 184-194, 16 Sup. Ct. 700), did not approve such a hard and fast rule, but held in that case that as the commission had found as a fact that the circumstances and conditions were not so dissimilar as to justify the rates charged, and as the circuit court of appeals had approved that finding, the supreme court would not disturb it." But in the case known as the “Import Case,” 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666, the supreme court held, in deciding a similar question, that it was error for the commission not to consider an existing competition which affected rates, and tlie fact that rates had to be reduced in order to secure freight, which otherwise would go by other routes, was one of the circumstances and conditions which must be considered before substantial similarity could be determined. It may be fairly said, therefore, that tlie commission failed to consider one of the circumstances without which it could not arrive at a just finding. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197-238, 16 Sup. Ct. 666; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 21 C. C. A. 51, 74 Fed. 715; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 73 Fed. 409. It was error, I think, for the commission to hold that the carriers could not justify themselves because they had not first made application for relief under the proviso of the fourth section. It has been held (hat, if the carrier can show that the circumstances and conditions of the two hauls are dissimilar, the statute *910lias not been violated. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 50 Fed. 295. And this seems a reasonable construction of the law. The case, therefore, it appears to me, came into the circuit court without any finding of fact upon which an order against the carriers could be predicated. The circuit judge examined the testimony, and considered the evidence tending to prove that the through rate had been forced down by the natural advantages of Charleston as a trade center, having numerous routes by rail, by rail and water, and by water over which merchandise of the kind in question was brought to that citv, and to compete with which the defendant' carriers were obliged to reduce their railroad rates on through freight to Charleston. Summerville had no similar natural or artificial advantages, and its only carrier, the South Carolina & Georgia Eailroad, ivas not subject to having its local rates forced down by competition below what was reasonable and just. Upon consideration of all the proven facts, the circuit judge found that the circumstances and conditions were not substantially similar, and that the defendant carriers had not violated the act. With this conclusion I agree. There is abundant proof to support it, and also to show the destructive loss which would result to the South Carolina & Georgia Eailroad (the successor of the South Carolina Eailroad) if it was required to conform its local rates to its share of the through rates.