Court Opinion

ID: 9562492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:30:18.181082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:22.766469
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I disagree with the decision. The depriving of the trial court of discretion, and making it mandatory to furnish the full contents of a presentence report to the defendant, works an unjustified, unnecessary and impractical change in our law. I think we should remain committed to the long-established rule which has worked quite well, of permitting the trial court to exercise his judgment as to whether, and to what extent, such a report is furnished to a person after he has been convicted of a crime.1 *1250With the precautions noted in the case of State v. Harris,2 I think the just-stated rule is fair, practical, in conformity with our law, and adequately protects both the defendant and the public.
The difficulty with the proposition espoused in the court’s opinion is that it appears to be based on the assumption that the convicted defendant has some vested right to probation, and that the trial judge has some obligation to show some justification for not granting it. Whereas, the fact is that after a person is convicted, his presumption of innocence, and other safeguards against convicting the innocent are gone.3 Then, the extent of the defendant’s entitlement is to have the sentence provided by law imposed upon him. However, the court, in accordance with Section 77-35-17, U.C.A.1953, is empowered to place the defendant on probation. This he will do if he thinks that will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the public interest. The statute places no restriction upon him as to how he will carry out that purpose. Therefore, he should be able to proceed in any reasonable and fair manner that will be helpful to him in discharging that responsibility.
The arguments listed in the main opinion against full mandatory disclosure impress me as being valid and persuasive. In addition to drying up the sources of information, the risk of provoking animosities, and possible dangers to persons willing to provide information, additional procedural burdens are created. It should be realized that all of these combined may well diminish rather than increase the possibilities of probation by dissuading judges from requesting presentence investigations and thus inviting the difficulties this new rule places upon them.
Notwithstanding what else may be said about this controversial proposition, I reiterate the caution expressed in State v. Harris4 that even after one has been convicted of a crime, he should still be treated with fairness; and that consistent with that objective, the trial court should exercise care to see that no false or misleading information is permitted to influence his judgment. This may well include the precaution that the court should indicate to the defendant and his counsel the general nature of any information adverse to him in the presen-tence report; and if the court thinks that any of the information and/or its source ought to be kept confidential, he should state, in a general way, why he thinks so.
It seems to be consistent with the pattern of justice under law, as administered through our courts, that sufficient confidence should be reposed in our trial judges to assume that they will discharge their duties in a responsible manner. But this change in our rule, which deprives the trial court of discretion in such matters, can only be justified under a contrary assumption, arising from distrust of those judges. We should indulge the presumption that they are men of integrity, and of fairness and sincerity of purpose; and conversely, we should not treat them as though they were without those qualities and so likely to engage in unfairness that they ought to be held under rigid rules and strict scrutiny by the convicted defendant and his counsel.
The change in the rule demeans the courts, puts further burdens upon them, and upon those who would enforce the law; meanwhile, it puts additional tools for encumbering and obstructing the processes of justice in the hands of those who violate thé law. It should also be kept clearly in mind that to whatever extent the courts impede justice, or help the guilty to evade justice, they are responsible for increasing dangers to the law-abiding citizenry. It is my firm conviction that the Court’s decision is an ill-advised and unjustified move in that direction, which adds fuel to the fire of the already too prevalent notion of the public: *1251that the courts lean more to the protection of criminals than to the protection of the rights of their victims and law-abiding.society.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent; and also concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Hall. I would adhere to the long-established and, in my judgment, better considered and more practical rule of allowing the trial judge discretion in such matters. Moreover, if there is to be any such abrupt change in the law, it should be by the legislature.

. State v. Harris, Utah, 585 P.2d 450 (1978); Reddish v. Smith, Utah, 576 P.2d 859 (1978); State v. Doremus, 29 Utah 2d 373, 510 P.2d 529 (1973); State v. Cunico, 23 Utah 2d 325, 462 P.2d 720 (1969).

. Supra, note I.

. Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 443 P.2d 1020 (1968) and authorities therein cited.

. Supra, note 1.