Court Opinion

ID: 9712682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:58:27.183008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:13.748126
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Price, J.:
I agree with Judge Spaeth that the issue of whether this divorce, based on the record before us, was properly granted is waived. This is so for although appellant raises the question in her brief on this appeal there were no exceptions filed in the lower court, and the issue was *655not presented to the lower court. Based on our traditional standards of review in such cases and were the issue before us properly, I feel it necessary to note that the record is grossly inadequate to establish that the conduct of appellant which was alleged to have constituted indignities was independent of any mental disease. This is particularly so since appellee has the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the mental illness occurred after the course of conduct relied upon. Otherwise, mental illness should be a complete defense to a suit for divorce for conduct occurring during the existence of the mental disorder, and a divorce should be denied where, as in this record, it is far from clear whether or not the course of conduct was related to appellant’s mental condition. There can be no argument that appellant is mentally ill and has been for some time. Her conduct for an indeterminate time amply demonstrates this conclusion, including, but not limited to) the episodes I will designate by their locale as the Harrisburg, New Jersey and Florida episodes. The Master dismisses this whole matter in a single sentence:
“The Master does not feel that the defendant’s words and actions were the result of her mental illness, but rather that the illness happened after most of the events as related by the plaintiff.”
I can only assume that the Guardian ad litem and the appellant’s attorney, relying upon their satisfaction with the stipulation and agreement for a permanent allowance, accepted the situation as being in the best interest of the appellant. I am not satisfied that this is so. The doctrine of waiver as recently developed, however, admits to no exception applicable to this appeal, although I reach this conclusion reluctantly.
Since I too agree that the court should have approved the agreement, as discussed by Judge Spaeth, I join his opinion and would remand with instructions to enter an appropriate order in accordance with the agreement of the parties.