Court Opinion

ID: 9856103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:38:12.117087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:02.500817
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
concurring in result. In my opinion, a new trial should be .awarded on ¡either or both of two grounds, viz.:
1. Defendant, in his testimony, denied that he intended to kill his wife and disavowed knowledge that he had done so. In short, there was no admission that defendant intentionally shot his- wife and thereby caused her death. Under these circumstances, the court erred in excluding from jury consideration whether defendant was guilty of manslaughter.
2. The -solicitor’s statement, to which Exception 1 relates, was of such nature that the court’s instruction could not and did not cure the prejudicial effect thereof. Had the defendant tendered, and had the solicitor or the court refused, a plea of guilty of murder in the first degree? If such plea had/ been tendered and accepted, with the court’s approval, the punishment would have been life imprisonment. G.S. 15-162.1. The statement that the “sole and only purpose of this trial” was to determine whether defendant should die in the gas chamber would be true only if such plea had been tendered and refused. Hence, the solicitor’s statement would seem to imply that defendant had tendered a plea of guilty of murder in the first degree. G.S. 15-162.1 provides: “Upon rejection of such plea, the trial shall be upon the defendant’s plea of not guilty, and such tender shall have no legal -significance whatever.”
It was permissible, in my opinion, for the solicitor to state to prospective jurors that the State sought a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree without a recommendation by the jury that the punishment be imprisonment for life and that, if such verdict were returned, the punishment under G.S. 14-17 would be death.
I do not..understand that any of the members of this Court entertain the opinion that the General Assembly, by the enactment of G.S. 14-17, intended -to abolish capital punishment. Nor -has it been stated or suggested that the State may not challenge a prospective juror foT cause if he declares on voiv dive that he has conscientious *7scruples against capital punishment, that is, that he could not in good conscience under any circumstances return a verdict on which the court would be legally required to pronounce a death sentence.
It would seem that a challenge for cause on the ground indicated would clearly imply that the State contended that the verdict should be a verdict requiring imposition of the death penalty.
After the jury has been selected and impaneled: If it finds the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, whether it will add to the verdict the recommendation that the punishment be imprisonment for life rests entirely within the discretion of the jury. The jury’s discretion is “absolute” and “unbridled” in the sense that there is no rule of law by which the jury is to be guided in making this decision.
While the jury’s power of decision is “absolute” or “unbridled,” it does not follow that the State’s counsel and the defense counsel may not submit their respective contentions for jury consideration.
While still of the opinion that a new trial was properly awarded in S. v. Oakes, 249 N.C. 282, 106 S.E. 2d 206, on the other grounds set forth in the opinion, I am convinced that we went too far in holding erroneous the trial court’s statement (without elaboration) that the State contended the jury should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree without a recommendation that the punishment be imprisonment for life.
As to S. v. Pugh, 250 N.C. 278, 108 S.E. 2d 649, I take a different view. There the presiding judge undertook to review the respective contentions of the State and of the defendant as to why the jury, if they found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, should not or should recommend life imprisonment. The function of the presiding judge is to declare and explain the law arising on the evidence given in the case. G.S. 1-180. In my opinion, it is no part of his function or duty to discuss or review the respective contentions as to a matter not governed by any rule of law but resting wholly within the discretion of the jury. In short, I think it permissible for the court to .state the ultimate contentions of the State and of the defendant, namely, the simple statement that the State contends the jury should not, and the defendant contends the jury should, recommend life imprisonment, but that it is not permissible for the court to discuss or review the various reasons or arguments submitted by the State’s counsel or by the defendant’s counsel in support of their respective ultimate contentions.
RodmaN, J., joins in this opinion.