Court Opinion

ID: 9843138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:28:16.522668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:37.845676
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree that Florida’s solicitation law encompasses conduct which cannot be classified as an attempt. Defendant’s plea of nolo contendere to solicitation to traffic in cocaine (Second Degree Felony) does not-permit a finding that defendant is guilty of an attempt to possess with intent to distribute or to distribute cocaine. I write separately, however, because in other applications, the crime of solicitation in Florida may overlap with attempt. For example, had defendant been convicted of solicitation where he was charged with hiring someone to distribute cocaine, the solicitation conviction would, in my opinion, properly be classified as an attempt. This is because for Sentencing Guidelines purposes “attempt” is meant in its “classic” sense, regardless of “definitional deviations in state law.” United States v. Liranzo, 944 F.2d 73, 78-79 (2d Cir.1991). I agree that we apply the categorical approach for inquiries under the Armed Career Criminal Act and we should apply the same rule under the Guidelines. However, this does not mean we apply Florida’s definition of “attempt” any more than we apply a state’s definition of “burglary.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (“burglary” under' 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) is used in its “generic” sense).
Indeed, the majority applies federal law to determine whether defendant’s conviction can be characterized as aiding and abetting and conspiracy; analyses in which I fully agree. The Court also relies on federal law in its initial discussion of attempt. It then turns to an analysis of how Florida treats solicitation, relying on Hutchinson v. State, 315 So.2d 546 (Fl. Dist. Ct.App.1975), and relies on Florida’s holding that solicitation is not attempt. Because it held solicitation did not require an intent to commit a specific crime or an overt act while attempt does, the Hutchinson court concluded “to call solicitation an attempt is to delete the element of overt act.” Id. at 548 (citing Gervin v. State, 212 Tenn. 653, 371 S.W.2d 449 (1963)).4 The hiring of someone to do a criminal act or a command from a person in a position of authority to do so would, in my- opinion, supply the overt act. Thus, because I conclude that solicitation and attempt can overlap and that some Florida convictions for solicitation to commit a controlled substance offense may be appropriately categorized, for federal sentencing purposes, as attempts, I concur separately.
*241According to W. LeFave & A. Soott, Criminal Law § 6, at 424 (1972), the modern doctrine of attempt was crystallized in the 1801 case of Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5 (1801). In that case, the defendant was charged with soliciting a servant to steal his master’s goods. The Justices acknowledged that there was no evidence that the goods were in fact stolen or that the servant agreed to steal them. It was a case of pure solicitation. All four Justices agreed that the attempt was an indictable offense. The act of solicitation was expressly noted by Justice Lawrence as an act towards carrying out defendant’s intent to commit the crime.
Some writers have indicated that in determining whether a defendant has gone beyond preparation to attempt, one can use the same analysis that one would use to determine if there is an act in furtherance of a conspiracy. Hiring someone to transport a controlled substance would ordinarily, I believe, be an overt act.
That mere solicitation can be an attempt under federal law is discussed at length by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114, 95 S.Ct. 792, 42 L.Ed.2d 812 (1975). Mandujano was convicted of attempted distribution of heroin. An undercover officer tried to purchase heroin from defendant who attempted to locate some through phone calls, but was unable to do so. He said he would continue trying but needed some money up-front, which the officer gave him. Defendant later returned the money and never did deliver any heroin. Manduja-no claimed,
that at most he was attempting to acquire a controlled substance, not to distribute it; that it is impossible for a person to attempt to distribute heroin which he does not possess or control; that his acts were only preparation, as distinguished from an attempt; and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Id. at 372.
The court found an attempt. The case contains an extensive discussion of attempt requirements. The holding seems to me to be based on the conclusion that solicitation may be sufficient definite progress toward committing the crime to satisfy conviction for attempt.
The court in United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1076, 106 S.Ct. 838, 88 L.Ed.2d 809 (1986), cited by the majority, relied upon Mandujano.
I would simply leave to another day whether a conviction for solicitation under Florida law, where the indictment was limited to some specific conduct, could constitute an attempt for Guidelines purposes.

. Hutchinson was overruled in part in Gentry v. Florida, 437 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1983). There, the court held that attempt, under Florida law, did not require intent to commit a specific crime if the underlying crime did not require specific intent.