Court Opinion

ID: 9687256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:20:30.894162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:25.187213
License: Public Domain

Todd, Justice
(dissenting).
I disagree with the result reached by the majority under the facts of this case. I am in accord with the general principles of law stated in this opinion. However, I would hold that the statute, Minn. St. 602.04, is invalid since the legislature has no constitutional power to prescribe rules of evidence for the judicial branch of government.
Our decision in TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N. W. 2d 468 (1952), clearly enunciates the rule to be followed in applying the presumption of due care; namely, the presumption is valid and remains in the case until rebutted by any evidence offered by the defendant. When the defendant does come forth with any evidence of decedent’s negligence, the presumption should completely disappear from the case; and since I would hold the statute invalid, the jury should receive no instruction regarding this rule of law.
Consequently, the adoption of comparative negligence in Minnesota has no effect on the application of the rule. If the defendant offers no evidence to rebut the presumption of due care, the rule is valid and plaintiff should be entitled to a directed verdict as to decedent’s lack of negligence. Such a result does not elevate the presumption of due care to an evidentiary status but merely permits the operation of a procedural rule regulating the burden of proof. There is no evidence for the jury to compare since the defendant has offered none. If the defendant does offer any evidence as to decedent’s negligence, the rule disappears from the *398case, it is tried as an ordinary negligence matter, and, as I have indicated above, § 602.04 should be ignored and the jury given no instructions whatsoever regarding the presumption of due care.
It is obvious that the presumption-of-due-care rule operates in a very narrow spectrum. If the evidence of defendant’s negligence is clear and convincing, there is no need for the application of the rule. If defendant can carry the very light burden of coming forth with any evidence of decedent’s negligence, the rule disappears from the case. Since the burden on the defendant is so extremely light, we should exercise a great deal of caution in denying to plaintiff the application of the rule. Particularly, if we must indulge in speculation regarding the evidence in order to deny to plaintiff the application of the rule, we defeat the general purpose of the rule — to act, in the trial court’s words, as a shield to protect those who cannot answer.
The facts in this case would require that the jury engage in speculation in order to find any evidence of decedent’s negligence. The physical position of the vehicles after the collision is not in dispute nor is the fact that marks leading back to the intersection establish the point of impact in the southwest quadrant and that the right front of decedent’s vehicle and the left front of defendant’s car were damaged. However, the testimony of Richard Olson regarding alleged markings in the road prior to the point of impact was completely discredited on cross-examination when he indicated that he could not identify these markings as having been made by the vehicles in question. Therefore, we can only speculate that decedent was proceeding south on County Road No. 52 at the time of the collision. We could also speculate that he was proceeding east on County Road No. 6 and made a proper right turn and was struck by defendant’s vehicle. Even if we assume that defendant had the statutory right-of-way, we must speculate that he had maintained proper speed so as not to have forfeited his statutory right-of-way.
Again, if we assume that defendant had the statutory right-of-way, it appears from the majority opinion that this prima *399facie rule of law is being elevated to evidentiary status in order to find any evidence of decedent’s negligence. It seems strange that in properly determining the nonevidentiary status of the presumption-of-due-care rule, the majority has inferentially elevated a highway traffic regulation to evidentiary status.
The facts of this case should require the application of the presumption-of-due-care rule. I would sustain the trial court’s order directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of decedent’s negligence, and there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s determination of defendant’s negligence.