Court Opinion

ID: 9895724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 16:06:44.027566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:26.036631
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 230285
                                           No. 1-23-0285
                                   Opinion filed November 8, 2023
                                                                                     Third Division
 ______________________________________________________________________________

                                              IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                         FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COMMUNITY                           )   Appeal from the
 COLLEGE DISTRICT NO. 508, d/b/a City Colleges of             )   Circuit Court of
 Chicago,                                                     )   Cook County.
                                                              )
           Plaintiff-Appellant,                               )
                                                              )
     v.                                                       )   No. 21 CH 736
                                                              )
 DAVID MIGAJ; ANDREE MCKISSICK, Hearing                       )
 Officer; and COOK COUNTY COLLEGE TEACHERS                    )
 UNION LOCAL 1600,                                            )
                                                              )
           Defendants                                         )
                                                              )   Honorable
 (David Migaj and Cook County College Teachers Union          )   Michael T. Mullen,
 Local 1600, Defendants-Appellees).                           )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
           Justices D.B. Walker and R. Van Tine concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                            OPINION

¶1        Plaintiff, Board of Trustees of Community College District 508, doing business as City

Colleges of Chicago (Board), appeals from the circuit court order on administrative review that
No. 1-23-0285

affirmed a hearing officer’s reversal of the Board’s decision to dismiss defendant David Migaj, a

tenured professor, based on his failure to report to work during a four-day, unexcused absence.

¶2      On appeal, the Board argues that the hearing officer’s decision was arbitrary and

unreasonable because she exceeded her authority under the relevant statute, Illinois Supreme Court

precedent, and the Board’s rules when she erroneously required the Board to prove that Migaj

intended to abandon his job.

¶3      For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, which affirmed the

final administrative decision of the hearing officer. 1

¶4                                        I. BACKGROUND

¶5      Defendant David Migaj was a tenured Spanish professor at Wilbur Wright Community

College (Wright College) from October 1999 until the plaintiff Board terminated him on March

12, 2020, after he failed to report to work during a four-day, unexcused absence in January 2020.

Migaj was part of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Cook County College Teachers

Union, Local 1600 (Local 1600). The Board is the governing body of the City Colleges of Chicago

(City Colleges), a system of seven community colleges created pursuant to the Public Community

College Act (Act) (110 ILCS 805/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)). Wright College is part of the City

Colleges’ system.

¶6      Wright College schedules professors every January to work during registration week, when

faculty members advise students and prepare to teach for the upcoming semester. Faculty members

do not teach during registration week but they are required to participate pursuant to their collective

        1
         In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018),
this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.

                                                  -2-
No. 1-23-0285

bargaining agreement. Migaj signed up to participate in registration week from January 6 to

January 9, 2020. He failed, however, to attend registration week during those dates and did not

inform anyone at Wright College about his planned absence. Instead, he traveled to Hawaii with

airline tickets that were purchased nearly a month earlier in December 2019. Wright College Dean

of Instruction Pamela Monaco became concerned after Migaj had not appeared for work that week

and contacted him on January 9, 2020. He told her for the first time during that telephone call that

he was in Hawaii and was planning to return to campus the next day. He did not mention at that

time that he was in Hawaii to attend a funeral. After that phone call ended, Migaj sent Dean

Monaco an e-mail explaining that he would use personal days for the missed time.

¶7     When Migaj arrived on campus the next day, he met with Dean Monaco regarding his

absence. That same day, Migaj submitted for the first time a request to take time off for the trip.

Human resources business partner Allison Guengerich told him that he did not have enough

personal time to cover four days and could not make a request after the fact. Furthermore, a Wright

College staff member informed Migaj about the requirements for bereavement leave. Ultimately,

Migaj did not pursue obtaining bereavement leave. Guengerich told Migaj that he would be subject

to a predisciplinary hearing on January 16, 2020, for job abandonment, as defined by the City

Colleges’ work rules and the Board’s rules and policies.

¶8     The Board charged Migaj with violating section 4.19 of the Board’s policies and

procedures, which provided that an employee will be considered to have abandoned his

employment and shall be subject to termination if he is absent for three consecutive workdays

without prior written approval and without speaking directly with his supervisor. Further, the

Board’s employee manual set forth work rules, and the Board alleged that Migaj violated three

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No. 1-23-0285

rules regarding being absent without leave, failing to call in advance when tardy or not showing

up for work, and conduct unbecoming a public employee.

¶9     City Colleges’ employee Emily Chu presided over the predisciplinary hearing. Migaj and

representatives of Local 1600 attended and presented his case. Chu found that Migaj abandoned

his employment and recommended termination as the appropriate remedy for his violation of the

three work rules. On March 12, 2020, the Board terminated Migaj’s employment, and he appealed

pursuant to section 3B-4 of the Act (id. § 3B-4). The parties selected the hearing officer, and the

hearing was held in August 2020.

¶ 10   Dean Monaco testified that she and the dean of student services had spent a significant

amount of time in the 2019 fall semester, ensuring that faculty and union representatives were

involved in the planning process for the 2020 spring semester registration week so that faculty felt

they had a voice and a role in carrying out their responsibilities under their collective bargaining

agreement. This included ensuring that faculty members had the right to choose their own hours

for registration week and acquiescing with their request to ensure that their attendance was

recorded. Accordingly, the college used sign-in sheets to track the attendance of the faculty

members. Monaco testified that the use of the sign-in sheets was “new” and she did not know if

the college had used sign-in sheets during prior registration weeks. When Monaco realized that

Migaj was not attending as scheduled and had not asked to take leave, she left him a message on

his home answering machine and sent him an e-mail.

¶ 11   Monaco testified that when Migaj contacted her by telephone on January 9, 2020, he said

that he was visiting Hawaii because his wife wanted to go there, that his absence from registration

week was not a big deal, and that he would see Monaco at work on January 10, 2020, to discuss

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No. 1-23-0285

this. When Migaj and Monaco met on January 10, 2020, Migaj said that he had to go to Hawaii,

his absence without prior approval was not a big deal because classes had not started, and he did

not know why Monaco was making this into something. Monaco reminded him that he had agreed

to work the registration week hours and had a responsibility to the students and his colleagues to

attend or let people know if he was not going to show up for work. Migaj responded that he hoped

Monaco treated white Americans the way she was treating him. Dean Monaco acknowledged that

in March 2019 she had allowed Migaj to use a half personal day when he failed to show up for

work without notice.

¶ 12   Guengerich testified that she had reviewed Migaj’s employment file and the college’s

attendance records. A June 21, 2005, letter in Migaj’s file showed that he was absent at the end of

the semester without giving the college prior notice and the college president gave him a verbal

warning after a predisciplinary hearing. The warning stated that his absence was an unacceptable

violation of the rules. At that time, Migaj said he had to go to Spain for a family emergency because

his grandfather died. Furthermore, the attendance records from August 2015 to January 2020

showed that Migaj had used three or more consecutive personal days on at least three occasions in

August 2015, August 2016, and August 2018, during either registration week or faculty

development week. His attendance records did not show whether he took any steps to obtain prior

approval for his use of that personal time. Moreover, his record did not show that he had received

any disciplinary action for that conduct. Guengerich had created a spreadsheet of Migaj’s absences

from his attendance records, which was admitted into evidence. Guengerich testified that

employees who had no more personal days could still take time off but they had to record that time

as a zero day and would not be paid for it. Ultimately, Migaj was not allowed to use personal days

                                                -5-
No. 1-23-0285

or zero days to cover the four days he was absent in January 2020. Guengerich and Wright College

President David Potash testified that, to their knowledge, Migaj was the first tenured faculty

member at Wright College to be discharged for job abandonment.

¶ 13   Migaj testified that he had to attend a funeral in Hawaii for his wife’s grandmother, who

died on December 11, 2019. The funeral was originally scheduled to take place during the first

week of January but was delayed one week to accommodate out-of-town attendees. He admitted

that he knew with certainty by the end of December 2019 that he would miss four days of

registration week, but never disclosed his intentions to any Wright College employee or asked for

permission to take leave. While in Hawaii, Migaj answered e-mails, made phone calls, and

exchanged text messages with students.

¶ 14   Migaj testified that he never took time off when he was teaching and used only his personal

days during faculty development week or registration week. He asserted that he was never told

that he could not use personal days during registration week. He claimed that he had never been

disciplined for missing consecutive days during registration week or faculty development week,

nor was he ever told that his missing three consecutive days of work without prior approval was

considered to be job abandonment. Migaj had previously used personal days to cover consecutive

days off and explained that he always did so after the fact by submitting a certificate of attendance.

(Faculty members were paid in arrears and submitted their certificates of attendance to payroll

after the pay period.) Migaj had never previously notified his supervisor ahead of time that he was

going to be using consecutive personal days. Specifically, Migaj testified that, in 2013, he missed

four consecutive days during registration week to go to Spain. He did not provide his supervisor

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No. 1-23-0285

with advance notice of those absences. Rather, he provided that notice upon his return when he

completed his certificate of attendance.

¶ 15   The parties submitted closing briefs to the hearing officer. Migaj’s brief argued, inter alia,

that the Board failed to meet its burden to prove that Migaj intended to abandon his job.

¶ 16   On January 29, 2021, the hearing officer issued an award, finding that although the Board

had just cause to discipline Migaj, it did not have just cause to terminate his employment. The

hearing officer found that Migaj’s actions in missing work on January 6, 7, 8, and 9, 2020, violated

Board policies, procedures, and work rules, but other factors mitigated in favor of discipline short

of discharge. Specifically, the hearing officer cited the Board’s lack of consistent enforcement of

its policies and work rules and its acquiescence to Migaj’s conduct as the primary factors in favor

of lesser discipline. To support these findings, the hearing officer relied on (1) Guengerich’s

testimony and spreadsheet, which indicated that the Board had previously allowed Migaj to use

multiple personal business days in 2015, 2016, and 2018, (2) Guengerich’s testimony that no other

tenured faculty member had been fired for abandoning employment at Wright College, and (3)

Dean Monaco’s prior conduct in allowing Migaj to use a half personal day in March 2019, when

he failed to show up for work without notice.

¶ 17   Regarding the just cause analysis, the hearing officer cited the book Just Cause: The Seven

Tests, by Adolph M. Koven and Susan L. Smith, and considered whether (1) there was a reasonable

rule or work order, (2) adequate notice was given, (3) a sufficient investigation was conducted

before taking disciplinary action, (4) the investigation was fair and objective, (5) the evidence

presented was substantial and there was an adequate basis for taking disciplinary action, (6) equal

treatment was applied to the grievant, and (7) the discipline applied was appropriate considering

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No. 1-23-0285

the grievant’s length of service, i.e., the discipline was reasonably related to the seriousness of the

problem. The hearing officer found that the first two factors weighed in the Board’s favor but the

remaining factors weighed in Migaj’s favor. The hearing officer found that the predisciplinary

hearing analysis failed to consider the Board’s lax enforcement of its policies towards Migaj, his

20 plus years of employment, and the collective bargaining agreement’s progressive discipline

policy.

¶ 18      The hearing officer stated that the record demonstrated that Migaj was the first tenured

professor to be charged with job abandonment but the Board treated another employee who

engaged in more severe misconduct than Migaj in a more favorable manner. Specifically, R.W., a

professor at another college, had failed to teach her online classes, failed to assign homework, and

made up grades for imaginary assignments. Nevertheless, R.W. had received a written reprimand

rather than a discharge. The hearing officer also found significant Migaj’s reliance upon case law

delineating the procedural protections afforded to tenured teachers and found inapplicable the

Board’s case law involving settings outside of teaching.

¶ 19      The hearing officer concluded that the most important factor in her decision was the

Board’s acquiescence on four occasions when it did not enforce its attendance policy. She stated

that the Board could not now invoke its attendance policy and utilize it against Migaj so as to

require his termination. The hearing officer ordered the Board to reinstate Migaj with full back

pay and issue him a written reprimand. The hearing officer did not address the issue of whether

the Board had to prove that Migaj intended to abandon his job.

¶ 20      On February 16, 2021, the Board appealed the hearing officer’s final decision to the circuit

court. The Board argued that its decision to terminate Migaj was governed exclusively by section

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No. 1-23-0285

3B-4 of the Act and the hearing officer improperly imported into this matter disciplinary

requirements from the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and Local 1600. The

Board also argued that the final decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, clearly

erroneous, and arbitrary and capricious.

¶ 21   After briefing and oral argument, the court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs

answering whether (1) there was a distinction between the standard applied in arbitration

proceedings under the collective bargaining agreement and the standards applied in termination

proceedings brought pursuant to section 3B-4 of the Act, (2) the Board was required to establish

that Migaj intended to abandon his position to establish dismissal for cause under the Act, and

(3) there was a distinction between cause and just cause under section 3B-4 of the Act. The parties

timely filed supplemental briefs responding to these questions. On March 8, 2022, the court issued

an order remanding the case back to the hearing officer to answer whether, given the hearing

officer’s consideration of all appropriate factors, the Board demonstrated that there was cause to

discharge Migaj pursuant to section 3B-4 of the Act.

¶ 22   The parties submitted supplemental briefs to the hearing officer, who issued her

supplemental award on July 13, 2022. She addressed the question posed to her by the court, and

her view of the correct answers to the three questions the court had posed to the parties. The hearing

officer concluded that the Board still failed to demonstrate that there was cause to terminate Migaj

pursuant to section 3B-4 of the Act because his four-day absence during registration week did not

amount to a substantial shortcoming that was detrimental to the college or Migaj’s students since

his absence occurred during four noninstructional days. Moreover, Migaj was performing job

duties such as e-mailing and texting students during his absence. Furthermore, there was no

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No. 1-23-0285

“logical nexus” between Migaj’s absence and violation of the work rule and his longstanding

fitness as a tenured professor with over 20 years of functional service.

¶ 23   The hearing officer also found that the Board failed to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that Migaj intended to abandon his position because he was cooperative with the Board

at all times and demonstrated a definitive willingness to immediately return to the college and

continued to teach until he was wrongfully discharged. The hearing officer reaffirmed her prior

decision, finding that although the Board failed to demonstrate cause for discharge, it did

demonstrate that Migaj should receive the lesser form of discipline of a written reprimand.

¶ 24   On January 13, 2023, after briefing and oral argument, the circuit court entered an order

denying the Board’s complaint for administrative review and affirming the hearing officer’s July

2022 decision. The Board timely appealed.

¶ 25                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26   Our standard of review for a hearing officer’s decision in a proceeding under the Act is

governed by the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 to 3-113 (West 2018)). 110 ILCS

805/3B-6 (West 2018).

       “The proper standard of review in cases involving administrative review depends upon

       whether the question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of fact and

       law. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210

       (2008). An administrative agency’s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are

       considered prima facie true and correct. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2012). As such, an

       agency’s factual findings are not to be reweighed by a reviewing court and are to be

       reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Exelon Corp. v.

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       Department of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 272-73 (2009). Factual determinations are against

       the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Cinkus,

       228 Ill. 2d at 210. Questions of law are reviewed under a de novo standard, and mixed

       questions of law and fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Exelon Corp.,

       234 Ill. 2d at 272-73. A mixed question of fact and law examines the legal effect of a given

       set of facts. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill.

       2d 380, 391 (2001). Put another way, a mixed question asks whether the facts satisfy the

       statutory standard or whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not

       violated. Exelon Corp., 234 Ill. 2d at 273. An administrative decision is clearly erroneous

       ‘ “when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence

       is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” ’ AFM

       Messenger Service, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 393, 395 (quoting and adopting the definition of

       ‘clearly erroneous’ from United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

       (1948)).” Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District

       No. 186, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50.

¶ 27   The Board argues that it was empowered to discharge Migaj because there is no dispute

that he violated Rule 4.19, which clearly defined job abandonment and dictated that it result in

termination. According to the Board, the hearing officer’s determination that Migaj violated Rule

4.19 “should have ended the analysis” because that rule focuses on the employee’s objective

actions and not the employee’s subjective intent. The Board contends that once the hearing officer

found that Migaj violated its rules and policy, the hearing officer had no alternative but to uphold

the Board’s decision to terminate Migaj’s employment. Put another way, the Board argues that the

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No. 1-23-0285

hearing officer had no legal authority to find cause for discipline instead of cause for discharge.

The Board concedes that the hearing officer makes the ultimate determination of whether the Board

had cause to discharge an employee. The Board, however, argues that the hearing officer does not

make that decision in a vacuum and cannot ignore the Board’s lawfully enacted rules and apply a

different standard. The Board asserts that cause is linked to and defined by the Board’s rules, so

the hearing officer’s fact-finding to determine whether cause exists must be done within the

confines of the rules established by the Board.

¶ 28   The construction of the Board’s rules raises an issue of law that we review de novo. See

People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 231 Ill. 2d 370, 380 (2008). “In construing

regulations promulgated by an administrative agency, the same rules used to interpret statutes

apply.” LaBelle v. State Employees Retirement System of Illinois, 265 Ill. App. 3d 733, 736 (1994).

“One of the primary rules of statutory construction is that the court should first consider the

language of the provision at issue, and, where that language is clear, it should be given effect

without resorting to other aids for construction.” Id. However, an agency’s interpretation of an

ambiguous provision in its enabling statute or its regulations is entitled to “substantial weight and

deference” as an informed source based upon its “experience and expertise” to ascertain legislative

and regulatory intent. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d

76, 98 (1992).

¶ 29   Section 3-32 of the Act gives the Board the power to establish tenure policies for the

employment of teachers and the cause for removal. 110 ILCS 805/3-32 (West 2018). Furthermore,

section 3-42 of the Act gives the Board the right to employ personnel and establish policies

governing their employment and dismissal. Id. § 3-42. Based upon its authority under the Act, the

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Board enacted Rule 4.19, which provides that “an employee will be considered to have abandoned

his/her employment and shall be subject to termination of his/her employment if *** [t]he

employee is absent for three (3) consecutive workdays without prior written approval and without

speaking directly with his/her supervisor.” Further, the Board’s employee manual sets forth the

following work rules relevant here.

                “Work Rule #1: Absence without leave. Employees will be subject to termination

       for violations of the Abandonment of Employment Policy. See Article [4.19] of the Board

       Rules.

                ***

                Work Rule #3: Failing to call in advance when tardy or not showing up for work.

                                               ***

                Work Rule #50: Conduct unbecoming a public employee.”

¶ 30   Rule 4.19 is not ambiguous. The plain language of this rule imposes an objective standard

by specifying that an employee will be presumed to have constructively abandoned his job and

shall be subject to termination if he is absent for three consecutive workdays without prior written

approval and without speaking directly with his supervisor. See Black’s Law Dictionary 309 (7th

ed. 1999) (defining “constructive” as “[l]egally imputed; having an effect in law though not

necessarily in fact”). Nevertheless, such an absence by the employee does not automatically result

in his termination where the plain language of the rule states that he “shall be subject to

termination,” which indicates the use of discretion, rather than “shall be terminated,” which would

indicate that discharge would be mandatory. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1172

(10th ed. 1998) (defining “subject” as “to bring under control or dominion[,] *** to make (as

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oneself) amenable to the discipline and control of a superior”). Moreover, section 3B-4 of the Act

provides that the tenured employee at the hearing for dismissal before the hearing officer “may

offer evidence and witnesses and present defenses to the charges” (110 ILCS 805/3B-4 (West

2018)), which indicates that the employee has the opportunity to rebut the presumption of job

abandonment or offer evidence in mitigation of that charge.

¶ 31   We disagree with the Board’s assertion that the hearing officer’s finding that Migaj violated

Rule 4.19 “should have ended the analysis.” An administrative agency possesses no inherent or

common law powers, and any authority that the agency claims must find its source within the

provisions of the statute by which the agency was created. County of Cook v. Illinois Local Labor

Relations Board, 302 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686-87 (1998). Accordingly, the authority of an

administrative agency to adopt rules and regulations is defined by the statute creating that

authority, and such rules and regulations must be in accord with the standards and policies set forth

in the statute. Gunia v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 211 Ill. App. 3d 761, 769 (1991);

Popejoy v. Zagel, 115 Ill. App. 3d 9, 11 (1983).

¶ 32   Although the Act gives the Board the power to establish tenure policies for the employment

of teachers and administrative personnel, causes for removal, and policies governing employment

and dismissal, that power is not unrestricted and must be exercised in a manner that is consistent

with other sections of the Act. 110 ILCS 805/3-30 (West 2018). The General Assembly limited

the Board’s ability to discharge a tenured faculty member by requiring that the discharge be for

cause and by providing due process procedures and review mechanisms under section 3B-4 of the

Act. See id. § 3B-4. While the statute allows a community college board to decide in the first

instance the existence of cause for removal, if the tenured faculty member challenges that finding

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by filing an adequate notice, the faculty member has the right to a review of the case by a

disinterested hearing officer who can uphold his discharge or issue him a lesser penalty. Id.; see

Board of Trustees of Community College District 508 v. McKinley, 160 Ill. App. 3d 916, 923, 925

(1987).

¶ 33      This court’s decision in McKinley further solidified the understanding that a hearing officer

can issue a penalty less than discharge pursuant to the authority granted him under section 3B-4

of the Act. In McKinley, the Board argued that the hearing officer had no authority to overturn a

discharge decision and institute a lesser penalty if he found that the employer had cause for

discipline. McKinley, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 923. The McKinley court disagreed and stated that while

the Board was correct in insisting that cause for discipline existed, its decision was not dispositive

on the issue of discharge. Id. The court explained that “because of the statutory procedure

prescribed by section 3B-4, the board’s decision is not subject to administrative review; rather, it

is present only as a procedural predecessor to the hearing officer’s decision, which is the only

decision that [is] before the court on administrative review.” Id. The court went on to hold that:

                 “Section 3B-4 of the Act directs the hearing officer particularly to ‘make a decision

          as to whether or not the tenured faculty member shall be dismissed.’ [Citation.] The hearing

          officer is thereby empowered not only to evaluate the facts in a given case, but he or she

          may also evaluate the propriety of dismissal. Toward that end, the hearing officer is

          authorized to conduct a full evidentiary hearing.” Id.

McKinley makes clear that the hearing officer, not the Board, makes the ultimate decision when it

comes to the discharge of a tenured employee under the Act. The powers afforded to hearing

officers by section 3B-4 do not deprive the Board of its power to decide, in the first instance, the

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circumstances in which removal for cause may be warranted. Rather, the hearing officer’s final

decision must comport with her authority under section 3B-4 and follow the due process

protections afforded to tenured faculty members that the General Assembly incorporated into the

Act.

¶ 34   The Board also asserts that the hearing officer, in rendering her final decision, improperly

rejected the applicability of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Education of

Rockford School District No. 205 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill. 2d 80

(1995), which prohibited an arbitrator from imposing procedures from a collective bargaining

agreement because the governing statute already provided for such procedures. Rockford,

however, is factually distinguishable from this case and does not conflict with or overturn

McKinley. The issue the court dealt with in Rockford was whether a notice to remedy issued to a

tenured teacher pursuant to section 24-12 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, ¶ 24-

12) could be challenged under a just cause arbitration procedure. Rockford, 165 Ill. 2d at 91. The

Illinois Supreme Court held that the collective bargaining agreement’s just cause provision was

preempted by section 24-12 of the School Code because the process for dismissal was laid out in

the School Code, not the collective bargaining agreement. Id.

¶ 35   The Board’s citation of Rockford, which does not involve the same legal challenge raised

in the present case, is unavailing. Rockford actually reinforces the McKinley decision by holding

that a review of a tenured professor’s discharge is governed by the governing statute and its

incumbent procedures, which is found here in section 3B-4 of the Act.

¶ 36   The Board also argues that the hearing officer’s decision is arbitrary and unreasonable

because she exceeded her authority under the Act when she applied her own standards to Migaj’s

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conduct—contrary to the Board’s rules. Specifically, the Board argues that Rule 4.19 regarding

job abandonment is based on the employee’s objective conduct but the hearing officer erred by

imposing on the Board the burden to prove that Migaj subjectively intended to abandon his job.

¶ 37   As discussed above, the Board’s burden under Rule 4.19 did not require the Board to prove

that Migaj intended to abandon his job; the Board proved that Migaj violated Rule 4.19 by showing

that he was absent for at least three consecutive days without prior written approval. The hearing

officer clearly ruled that the Board proved that Migaj’s four-day absence violated Rule 4.19. That

rule violation, however, established Migaj’s constructive, rather than actual, job abandonment, and

he had the opportunity to rebut that presumption of job abandonment by presenting evidence in

defense or mitigation as part of the hearing officer’s just cause analysis. Thus, the hearing officer’s

statement that the Board failed to meet its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

Migaj intended to abandon his job is actually more accurately stated as, although the Board

established that Migaj constructively abandoned his job by missing at least three consecutive days

of work without prior written authorization, the facts showed that Migaj rebutted the presumption

of job abandonment or presented sufficient mitigation evidence. As previously stated, a tenured

faculty member can be discharged only based on a showing of just cause by the community college

board. 110 ILCS 805/3B-2 (West 2018).

¶ 38   The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that

       “[t]here are many instances in which three days’ absence, without notice, might occur

       without the slightest indication of resignation or of improper conduct. An employee may

       be at a distant place, and by reason of weather, or other act of God, unable to communicate

       with, or to reach, his place of employment; or he may be temporarily ill, or there may be

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       other legitimate reasons why a failure to give notice of absence would necessarily be

       excusable ***.” People ex rel. Polen v. Hoehler, 405 Ill. 322, 328 (1950).

Whereas a resignation “requires an intent to terminate employment,” abandonment “usually

involves a clear manifestation of unwillingness to teach.” Brown v. Board of Education, Galatia

Community Unit School District No. 1, 38 Ill. App. 3d 403, 409 (1976). This court, however, has

not always clearly expressed this distinction between the concepts of resignation and

abandonment. See Piecuch v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 312 Ill. App. 3d 78, 86 (2000)

(“for there to be effective resignation or abandonment of employment, the employee must have an

intention to relinquish the employment accompanied by an unequivocal act of relinquishment”);

Fruhling v. County of Champaign, 95 Ill. App. 3d 409, 418 (1981) (“though the two concepts are

not identical, effective resignation or abandonment requires an intention to relinquish the

employment accompanied by an unequivocal act of relinquishment”). We conclude that the issue

of whether the tenured faculty member rebutted the presumption that he violated Rule 4.19 by

showing a clear manifestation of his willingness to teach is properly considered as mitigation

evidence under the hearing officer’s analysis of whether just cause to dismiss the faculty member

exists. Any error by the hearing officer by stating that the Board had the burden to prove Migaj

violated Rule 4.19 by showing that he intended to abandon his job is harmless because, in context,

the hearing officer clearly determined that the Board proved by a preponderance of the evidence

that Migaj violated Rule 4.19. Rather, the hearing officer, as discussed below, found that the Board

failed to show just cause to dismiss Migaj for this rule violation because Migaj showed, inter alia,

that he did not intend to abandon his job.

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No. 1-23-0285

¶ 39   Finally, we review whether the hearing officer’s decision finding cause for discipline, and

not discharge, is supported by the record and, thus, is not arbitrary and unreasonable. This presents

a mixed question of law and fact and is subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard.

Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 63. An agency’s decision is clearly erroneous where the court is left

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed when applying the

established facts to the applicable legal principles. Id.

¶ 40   The Board dismissed Migaj on a “for cause” basis. In Illinois, a tenured full-time employee

of a community college district has a vested contract right in continued employment, subject to

termination only upon the occurrence of just cause for dismissal, a reduction in the number of

faculty members employed by the board, or a discontinuance of some particular type of teaching

service or program. 105 ILCS 805/3B-2 (West 2018). “It [is] the function of the hearing officer to

determine whether the tenured employee’s violations constituted cause for discharge ***.”

McKinley, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 925. “Cause” connotes some substantial shortcoming rendering

continuance in employment in some way detrimental to discipline and efficiency of service; cause

is something that the law and sound public policy recognize as a good reason for the employee to

no longer hold that position. Id.

¶ 41   This court has a highly circumscribed role when reviewing an administrative appeal of a

circuit court order affirming the hearing officer. Our role as an appellate court is to review the

administrative decision, not the circuit court decision. Denton v. Civil Service Comm’n, 277 Ill.

App. 3d 770, 773 (1996). On review, we are prohibited from reweighing the evidence or making

an independent determination of the facts. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88. We are not justified in

reversing findings made by the hearing officer, even if an opposite conclusion is reasonable or

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No. 1-23-0285

given that we might have ruled differently. See id. We may not substitute our judgment for that of

the hearing officer. See id. In making our determination, we may not reevaluate the credibility of

the witnesses who testified before the hearing officer. See Trayling v. Board of Fire & Police

Commissioners of Bensenville, 273 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9 (1995). Finally, if the record contains evidence

supporting the hearing officer’s decision, it should be affirmed. See Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at

88-89.

¶ 42     The hearing officer found the existence of mitigating factors to support a lesser penalty

than discharge for Migaj. Specifically, she cited the college’s lack of consistent enforcement of its

policies and work rules and its acquiescence to Migaj’s prior misconduct as the primary factors in

favor of lesser discipline. The hearing officer supported these findings with the testimony of human

resources business partner Guengerich and Dean Monaco. Based on Guengerich’s testimony and

her spreadsheet, the hearing officer found that Migaj had been allowed in the past to improperly

use multiple consecutive personal days without obtaining prior permission without receiving any

discipline. The hearing officer also relied on Guengerich’s testimony that no other tenured faculty

member had been fired by Wright College for abandoning employment and further relied upon

Dean Monaco’s prior conduct in allowing Migaj to use a half personal day on another occasion

when he failed to show up for work without notice. The hearing officer also found that Migaj had

every intention of returning to Chicago to resume teaching his course load for the spring 2020

semester. Additionally, even while he was absent from Wright College, he was answering student

questions via e-mail and telephone and, thus, was meeting his advising responsibilities. The

hearing officer was right to conclude that, in the case of a tenured faculty member, the Board had

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No. 1-23-0285

to show more than a mere violation of a written job abandonment rule in order to meet its burden

of showing just cause for dismissal.

¶ 43   Applying the appropriate legal standard for cause to the facts of the case, the hearing officer

concluded that Migaj’s four-day absence during faculty development week did not amount to a

“substantial shortcoming.” The hearing officer found significant that the missed days occurred

during four noninstructional days and, thus, was not detrimental to the college, the Board, or

Migaj’s students. The hearing officer also found that there was no “logical nexus” between Migaj’s

absence/violation of a work rule and his longstanding fitness as a tenured professor with over 20

years of functional service. The hearing officer noted that the facts of McKinley were “strikingly

akin” to Migaj’s case and she applied the exact same analysis and rationale that was applied in

McKinley in reaching her own decision. As in McKinley, the hearing officer again identified the

Board’s lax enforcement of its policies and disparate treatment between Migaj and another tenured

faculty member as reasons for why she believed the Board improperly terminated his employment.

The hearing officer’s legal analysis was reasonable, sound, and supported by the facts presented

during Migaj’s discharge hearing.

¶ 44   There is no basis for this court to find that the hearing officer acted in an arbitrary and

unreasonable manner when she determined that the Board had cause to discipline Migaj but not

discharge him.

¶ 45                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 46   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, which affirmed the

final administrative decision of the hearing officer that reversed the Board’s termination of Migaj’s

employment and ordered that he be reinstated with back pay and be assessed a written warning.

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No. 1-23-0285

¶ 47   Affirmed.

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No. 1-23-0285

             Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Migaj,
                                 2023 IL App (1st) 230285

Decision Under Review:        Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 21-CH-736;
                              the Hon. Michael T. Mullen, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                     James D. Thomas and Elliot R. Slowiczek, of Jackson Lewis
for                           P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                     Kurtis Hale, of Poltrock & Poltrock, of Chicago, for appellees.
for
Appellee:

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