Court Opinion

ID: 9589108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:41:25.304354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:00.968709
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment only, for the reason that the trial court erred in concluding it had no jurisdiction to consider the grandmother’s petition. That is the only question before us. The trial court did not reach the merits. Furthermore, it relied only on undisputed facts in reaching its jurisdictional conclusion. Thus, I cannot join the majority in its recitation of “evidence” and “facts” with regard to the father’s history, as that is beyond our ken and beyond the question. Besides, we are confined to the facts to the extent they were found by the trial court and are found in its order. Gibson v. Pierce, 176 Ga. App. 287, 288 (335 SE2d 658) (1985); Alonso v. Hospital Auth. of Henry County, 175 Ga. App. 198, 199 (2) (332 SE2d 884) (1985).
The trial court was correct to choose the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to apply to determine its jurisdiction over the case. It erred, however, in concluding that the children’s “home state” would have become that of their father in Florida upon the death of their mother in Georgia in September 1984 because he became their legal custodian prima facie by operations of law. OCGA § 19-9-2; Porter v. Johnson, 242 Ga. 188, 189 (1) (249 SE2d 608) (1978). It is the “home state” of the child that controls here as the pivot for jurisdiction. It does not turn on parental rights to legal custody, OCGA § 19-9-43. That is the ultimate substantive issue to be decided.
OCGA § 19-9-42 (5) defines “home state” as “the state in which the child, immediately preceding the time involved, lived with ... a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months ...” I take “the time involved” to mean, in this case, the time of removal in late May 1985. The grandmother is the “person” who was then acting as parent, and it is without dispute that the children were living with *159her for even more than six consecutive months before the removal. Thus Georgia was the children’s home state when they were removed to Florida. That satisfies the first criterion for this state’s jurisdiction under OCGA § 19-9-43 (a) (1) (B).
Decided September 2, 1986.
Thomas J. Browning, for appellant.
H. Burton Crews, Jr., for appellee.
The second is that the children’s absence from Georgia is explained by their removal by “a person claiming [the children’s] custody.” Not disputed is that the father claims custody and that he removed the children from Georgia.
Third is that this state’s interest in the children’s custody continues even though they are gone, because the person who was acting as parent continues to live here, and that is true of the petitioner Mrs. Harper.
Jurisdiction being certain under this alternative, it is unnecessary to consider whether jurisdiction would obtain under any of the other provisions describing circumstances which would authorize Georgia jurisdiction over the question of child custody.
Whether the children should be declared “deprived,” whether their custody should be given to DFCS and physically to petitioner, and whether the father’s parental rights should be terminated, all should now be subject to a trial below at which each interested party will have an opportunity to present the relevant evidence.