Court Opinion

ID: 9445402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:28:13.719786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:15.356045
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
As Judge HAND’S opinion points out, this child from birth was accepted by the father as his own and a part of his family; and while the parents were eligible to marry, they just did not bother to do so. No bar to either inheritance or receipt of social security benefits could have arisen had father and son remained in Puerto Rico; but removal to New York now results in denying these benefits to the recognized child. This very harsh result comes, in my opinion, from forcing Anglo-Saxon moral patterns on a family having its origin in the more tolerant atmosphere of Puerto Rico and the civil law it follows.1 And this, in *566turn, comes about from an emphasis on names or labels, rather than on substance, in translating civil law concepts into New York equivalents.
Whereas New York classes all children born out of wedlock as “illegitimates,” legal systems influenced by the Code Napoleon distinguish “natural children” from others — a natural child being one whose parents were not legally barred from marrying each other at the time of the child’s birth or conception.2 By informal voluntary acts a parent can raise a natural child to the status of “recognized (or acknowledged) natural child,” thus giving it rights of inheritance and certain social benefits. Or, by formal acts prescribed in the local civil code, the parent can “legitimate” the child, elevating it above recognized natural children to the level of those born in wedlock. In these civil law countries there are three categories of children— “legitimates,” “acknowledged natural children,” and others, i. e., bastards; and there are two different processes for changing status — “legitimation” and “acknowledgment.”3
I cannot agree that the New York law prevents an acknowledged natural child from taking personal property if his father dies intestate while domiciled in New York. It is clear that the status of the child would be determined by the law of the place where he was born. Miller v. Miller, 91 N.Y. 315. In that case a child bom out of wedlock in Würt-temberg attempted to take real property in New York by intestacy upon the death of his father. His parents had subsequently married each other, and the law of Württemberg entitled him to inherit real property there. Under the then law of New York, however, subsequent marriage did not “legitimate” children born out of wedlock and they could not inherit. The Court of Appeals applied the Würt-temberg law of inheritance and found for the child.4
In the most recent New York case discussed by my brethren a child born out of wedlock in Louisiana whose parents never married was considered eligible to inherit in New York. In re Slater’s Estate, 195 Misc. 713, 90 N.Y.S.2d 546. Louisiana’s Civil Code derived from the Code Napoleon and had the concept of acknowledged natural child. Under the Louisiana cases, which were cited in the New York opinion, the father’s informal acts of attending his daughter’s christening and later referring to her as his own were sufficient to confer this status on the child, despite the literal wording of Art. 203 of the LSA-Civil Code. Lange v. Richoux, 6 La. 560; Succession of Vance, 110 La. 760, 34 So. 767; Succession of Serres, 136 La. 531, 67 So. 356; Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635; Succession of Hebert, 33 La.Ann. 1099. Under other Louisiana cases, which were also cited in the New York opinion, such informal acts of the father were insufficient to “legitimate” the child and elevate it to full legal equality with children born in wedlock. Hart v. Hoss, 26 *567La.Ann. 90; Perkins v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., 147 La. 337, 84 So. 894; Duvigneaud v. Loquet, 131 La. 568, 59 So. 992; Stewart v. Parish of Jefferson Davis, 17 La.App. 626, 136 So. 659.
These cases held that both acknowledged and legitimated children had rights of intestate succession, and the distinction between the two groups was significant only if the child’s claim was contested by an heir with rights superior to an acknowledged child, but not superior to a legitimated one. The New York Surrogate in In re Slater’s Estate, supra, 195 Misc. 713, 90 N.Y.S.2d 546, properly did not distinguish between acknowledged and legitimated children, but rather classed both types together and contrasted them with children born out of wedlock and never elevated — a group which has no rights of inheritance or social position. Where he spoke of acknowledged children as “legitimate” or “legitimated,” he used these words in their New York, and not their Louisiana, sense.5
From the cases he cited it is clear the Surrogate understood that Louisiana courts would have called the Slater child “acknowledged,” and not “legitimated.” All commentators who have discussed the Louisiana cases have noticed that such informal acts create the first status, rather than the second.6 My brethren say these cases are irrelevant, and they prefer to interpret the Surrogate’s opinion in the light of four Louisiana statutes. But the cases which the Surrogate selected to support his decision seem a far better indication of his meaning than the naked text of these statutes — two of which he did not cite, and all of which are discussed in these cases.
Thus the result reached by the Surrogate appears to be good sense, as well as good law. Since civil law jurisdictions have three categories of children and New York has only two, the “acknowledged natural child” must be likened to either New York “legitimates” or New York “bastards.” The chief similarity to the New York bastard, for purposes of intestate succession, is a mere semantic identity — neither is labeled “legitimate.” On the other hand, the acknowledged child is one whom the father claimed as his own with knowledge that the act would confer on it rights of inheritance and greater social status.
My brethren rely on an earlier opinion of another Surrogate which takes their position; but it is unpersuasive authority, since it marches from a premise previously rejected by the New York Court of Appeals. In re Vincent’s Estate, 189 Misc. 489, 71 N.Y.S.2d 165. There a Surrogate refused to consult the foreign law of inheritance in determining whether acknowledged children were to be analogized to New York “legitimates” ; instead he looked to the foreign law of legitimacy. 189 Misc. 489, 71 N.Y.S.2d 165, 169. In this initial step he became involved in semantics which led necessarily to the conclusion that persons whom foreigners call “legitimate” are the only ones New Yorkers can treat as “legitimate” for purposes of inheritance. As pointed out above, the Court of Appeals proceeded more logically in the Miller case, 91 N.Y. 315, and looked to the foreign law of inheritance in such circumstances. Whether the author of the Slater opinion, 195 Misc. 713, 90 N.Y.S.2d 546, was convincing or not in his effort to distinguish the Vincent case, 189 Misc. 489, 71 N.Y.S.2d 165, he certainly had it before him and rejected its result.7
*568Faced as we are with. a conflict of New York cases we should follow the most recent state decision, especially since the contrary authority contradicts a lengthy, well-reasoned, unanimous opinion of the highest state court. The growing tendency of the New York courts to look with more sympathy on the claims of illegitimates leads to the same result. See In re Anonymous’ Estate, 204 Misc. 1045, 126 N.Y.S.2d 749. Considerations of policy and humanity point the same way. In such circumstances we should not be more harsh than the courts of the state whose law we are charged to apply. See Bloch v. Ewing, D.C.S.D.Cal., 105 F.Supp. 25.
Since, as I believe, acknowledged natural children may take by inheritance in New York, the plaintiff should prevail. The Puerto Rican Civil Code, which derives from the Louisiana and Spanish Civil Codes,8 has the same three categories of legitimates, recognized natural children, and others.9 Like the Louisiana law cited in the Slater case, 195 Misc. 713, 90 N.Y.S.2d 546, Puerto Rican law distinguishes between natural children who have been “recognized” and those who have been “legitimated.” The former have limited rights of inheritance and social status; the latter are raised to full equality with children born in wedlock.10 It is true that the Puerto Rican procedures for raising natural children to full legitimacy are somewhat different from the procedures in Louisiana ;11 but the difference cannot distinguish the Slater case from this one, since in both cases the child was only “acknowledged” under local law, and in neither case did the parents utilize the local procedure for eleyating their child to full equality with children born in wedlock.
I think we should reverse and direct judgment for the plaintiff.

. “The common law of England, which is also the American common law, is more unfavorable to the illegitimate child than the civil law of Rome, on which the continental legal systems are based, mainly in two respects: It does not recognize a legal relationship even between the mother and the child and it does not allow *566legitimation by subsequent marriage.” Freund, Illegitimacy Laws of the United States and Certain Foreign Countries 9 (1919).

. Robbins & Deák, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: A Comparative Study, 30 Col.L.Rev. 308, 321-325 (1930); Note, 15 La.L.Rev. 221 (1954).

. “Tbe relation less than legitimation, that of recognized natural child, may arise by • the law of several European states, between a parent and a natural child.” 2 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws § 140.2 (1935).
For a translation of the civil codes of France and Switzerland dealing with this subject see Freund, op. cit. supra note 1, at 245-248, 254 — 256. For a translation of the modern Spanish law on the subject see Fisher, The Civil Code of Spain 56-70 (5th Ed. 1947). See also Laws of Puerto Rico Ann. tit. 31, §§ 442-507 (1954), and the Translation of the Civil Code in Force in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, published by the Government Printing Office in 1899, at 22-27.

. The quotation from the Württemberg statute in the Court of Appeals opinion clearly indicates that the statute governs the inheritance of real property in Wurttemberg. 91 N.Y. 315, 317.

. See note 10 infra, where a commentator similarly used the word “legitimated” in its Anglo-Saxon sense to cover children “acknowledged” through Louisiana procedures.

. E. g., Professor Leonard Oppenheim’s comprehensive article, Acknowledgment and Legitimation in Louisiana — Louisiana Act 50 of 1944, 19 Tulune L.Rev. 325 (1945), and the works cited by him; Freund, op. cit. supra note 1, at 24; Stevenson, Analysis and Tabular Summary of State Laws Relating to Illegitimacy in the United States 16-19 (1929); U. S. Dept, of Labor, Children’s Bureau, Chart No. 16, “Paternity Laws,” 2 (1938); Note, 15 La.L.Rev. 221 (1954).

. The other case cited by my brethren, In re Tomacelli-Filomarino, 189 Misc. *568410, 73 N.Y.S.2d 297, does not contain a sufficient statement of the Mexican law to indicate whether or not the child involved was in the same position as the plaintiff; in any event the decision relies wholly on the Vincent case, 189 Misc. 489, 71 N.Y.S.2d 165, and adds nothing to it.

. See the historical notes to Laws of Puerto Rico Ann. tit. 31, §§ 442-5.07, especially § 442 (1954).

. Sec. 442 is the same as §§ 178-180 of the La. Civil Code of 1870, and defines legitimate and illegitimate children. Secs. 461-466 further define legitimate children and state their rights. Secs. 481-486 govern the process of “legitimation.” Secs. 501-506 define natural children, prescribe the modes for recognizing them, and state the rights of recognized natural children. Secs. 507-514 govern the right of other children to support.

. See U. S. Dept, of Labor, op. eit. supra note 6, at 2: “The law of Louisiana differs from that of other States in being based on the Napoleonic Code. Only the child of persons who might legally have married at the time of the child’s conception, may be legitimated on marriage of his parents. Such children, called natural children, are the only children born out of wedlock whose interests are protected by the Louisiana law. In addition to legitimation on formal acknowledgment of paternity and marriage of the parents, such a child may be ‘legitimated’ for purposes of inheritance by either the natural mother or father on declaration of intentions before a notary public or two witnesses. The law of Puerto Rico is similar in origin and similarly defines a natural child.”

. In Puerto Rico at the time when the plaintiff was born, full legal equality for children born out of wedlock was possible only if the parents subsequently married. Laws of Puerto Rico Ann. tit. 31, § 482 (1954). In Louisiana at the time of the Slater child’s birth such equality was conferred only if there were formal acts, either before a notary or in the marriage contract. E. g., Perkins v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co., 147 La. 337, 84 So. 894; Duvigneaud v. Loquet, 131 La. 568, 59 So. 992; Succession of Serres, 136 La. 531, 67 So. 356. In both jurisdictions later legislation has made it much easier for children born out of wedlock to attain full equality. See Oppenheim, Acknowledgment and Legitimation in Louisiana — Louisiana Act 50 of 1944, 19 Tulane L.Rev. 325 (1945); Laws of Puerto Rico Ann. tit. 31, § 441 (1954), passed in 1952.