Court Opinion

ID: 9704646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:41:46.811186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.867783
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
This author does not subscribe to the views expressed in the majority opinion in Kolb v. Kolb, 324 N.W.2d 279, as cited in the majority opinion under Standard of Review. Rather, this author still hew to the rule enunciated in Sneesby v. Davis, 308 N.W.2d 565 (S.D.1981) and Masek v. Masek, 90 S.D. 1, 237 N.W.2d 432 (1976), that the applicant seeking custody modification must prove (1) a substantial and material change in circumstances since the decree of divorce was entered, and (2) the welfare and best interests of the child require the modification being sought.
In reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law, there can be little doubt that there was a substantial change of circumstances upon which a change of custody could be based. These were all facts after the divorce decree was entered. The mother had agreed to yield custody of these children as she could not take care of them. She signed an agreement to that effect.
However, there were further circumstances to reflect that she thereafter stabilized her employment and living situation and the father, who apparently had a good job as a semi-truck driver, had lost his job and at the time of the modification hearing had no job at all. It appears that a loving grandmother was the chief support and stabilizing influence in the lives of these two girls while the mother was trying to readjust her life and while the father was trying to stabilize his employment. So — to repeat — there was a fulfillment of the first requirement in Sneesby, namely, the facts supported, by a preponderance of evidence, that there had been a substantial and material change of circumstances.
As these facts all developed after the divorce decree was entered, the rationale of Kolb (to look behind the decree of divorce for facts) is inapposite. It is true that custody was not a contested issue in the divorce proceedings. But everything is factually decided in this case, post divorce proceedings. In this case, this Court is not going behind the divorce decree at all, so how the rationale of Kolb can come into play is enigmatic.
This takes us to the second requirement, namely, that there be a consideration for the welfare and the best interests of the children. Moreover, that same be established, for a modification, by a preponderance of the evidence. Under all of the circumstances and facts of this case, I am convinced that no such preponderance of the evidence showing has been established. First of all, the father was unemployed and without means to support the child at the time of the modification. Second, in the short time that he had a close relationship with these two girls, it was via a temporary custody agreement executed by his ex-wife and his mother. It was his mother who was caring for the children by furnishing the necessities of life.
It appears from the transcript that his ex-wife secured new employment at Topeka, Kansas, and did have a home for the children to shelter them. This mother did sign a temporary custody agreement but this was terminable at her will. She therefore had the right to terminate it and regain custody of the two girls.
As the majority opinion suggests, it was during this temporary custody arrangement that the father sought custody. The mother was confronted with a change of custody proceeding, now at issue here, in *646contravention of the temporary custody agreement and before she had an opportunity to regain the physical custody of the children after she stabilized her situation in Topeka, Kansas. I specially concur because I find disfavor with the Kolb precedent and its application to this factual scenario.
I also agree with the reversal in this case for the reason that there was an omission of finding of fact and conclusion of law which pertained to a parent versus a non-parent custody award. The trial court recognized the law, for it was expressed in the Memorandum Opinion; however, there were no findings of fact/conclusions of law which pertained to the gross misconduct or unfitness of the mother. See Matter of G.H., 390 N.W.2d 54 (S.D.1986). And with the father having neither home nor job, it was obviously an award of custody to the grandmother in spirit.
I am firmly convinced that the trial court erred in splitting the custody of these two girls. These girls should not be deprived of the daily association and love of one another. There are no compelling circumstances reflected in this record to split the association of these two sisters — it would be an emotional and traumatic blow to each child. After all, they have always been together. The Court has, in the past, consistently encouraged a stable home environment and the preservation of the family unit. Jasper v. Jasper, 351 N.W.2d 114 (S.D.1984); Andera v. Andera, 277 N.W.2d 725 (S.D.1979).
When father and mother are divorced, it is a tremendous psychological blow to the children; one parent is gone from the home. When, as in split custody of the siblings, the children are separated from one another, it is an additional blow so psychologically traumatic, that great instability of the children is fostered. Simply put, when children lose one of their parents at home, they rely upon one another, and need one another, ever the more. See Ebert v. Ebert, 38 N.Y.2d 700, 704, 382 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474, 346 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1976). Accord: McKay v. McKay, 253 Iowa 1047, 115 N.W.2d 151 (1962).
Severe hostility between siblings, inability of either parent to care for all of the children, and damaging competition between siblings (manifesting ill will and malignity) can rise to such a level that split custody is compelling. Joint Custody and Shared Parenting 6 (J. Polberg, ed. 1984). Split custody of siblings, as a judicial remedy and judgment, should be uncommon and rare in the law. Compelling-reasons must be advanced to separate brothers and sisters. Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1976). These sisters obviously have a strong bond between them. It would be wrong to sever this constant and loving bond which was developed over a period of many years. Cf. Matter of G.H., 390 N.W.2d 54 (where this Court affirmed the trial court’s finding of compelling reasons in a dependency and neglect case for separating siblings).
Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, I specially join the majority in reversing the trial court.