Court Opinion

ID: 9696075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:35:02.404245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:18.198036
License: Public Domain

Clinton, J.,
dissenting.
I have grave doubt that the Legislature intended to adopt a definition of the term “to transport” which is so broad and all-inclusive as to justify a finding under the evidence here that the subject automobile was be-» ing used “to transport” the controlled substance. The statute in question was adopted from 21 U. S. C. A'.-, section 881, subdivision (a) (4). This section of the federal statute describes one class of property subject to seizure and forfeiture and reads as follows: “(4) All conveyances, including, aircraft, vehicles, or vessels; which are used, or • are intended for. use, to transport; or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale; *469receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1) or (2), except that— . . There is a significant difference between the quoted section and that same section as it was incorporated in the Nebraska-statute. The following words are omitted from the Nebraska version: “or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,' sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of.” The omission of the quoted words in section 28-4, 135, R. S. Supp., 1972, can only mean that the Legislature did not intend to equate possession in an automobile with the phrase used “to transport.” It would appear that the legislative intent was to permit the forfeiture of motor vehicles, airplanes, etc., when they are an instrumentality of the crime. If, for example, the Legislature intended to include only those cases where the purpose of the substance being in the • car was to move the substance from one point to another then a limited definition of transport is required. A homely illustration might make the point: If one takes several bags of groceries from the supermarket to one’s home it can be readily stated that he is using the automobile “to transport” the groceries. On the other hand, if one keeps a box óf kleenex in the glove compartment for use when needed, can it really be argued that the automobile is being used “to transport” the kleenex.
In short, I would accept the defendant’s argument that the forfeiture provisions of the statute were aimed at trafficking in controlled substances. In this case the quantity of marijuana found in the car was very small. Certain other evidence, residue of smoked marijuana, and the packaging method indicate the substance was in the car for use. There was no evidencé that the owner was dealing in drugs.
In this case the amount of marijuana was an ounce or two. Under the statute the penalty for possession of. quantities less than a pound is a, $500 fine and/or a *4707-day sentence in the county jail. § 28-4,125(4), R. S. Supp., 1972. The owner paid a $350 fine and served the maximum sentence in jail on a charge of possession. The practical effect of this proceeding is the forfeiture by the defendant of a car worth several thousand dollars and that is an additional penalty which I do not believe the Legislature contemplated in this situation. See McConnell v. McKillip, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N. W. 505.