Court Opinion

ID: 9914800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 15:00:51.504434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:30.823857
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10211    Document: 77-1     Date Filed: 01/03/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                           Nos. 22-10211, 22-13144
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       RAVI KADIYALA, individually, and as the assignee of
       Credit Union Mortgage Utility Banc, Inc.,
                                            Plaintiﬀ-Counter Defendant-
                                               Appellee-Cross Appellant,
       CREDIT UNION MORTGAGE UTILITY BANC, INC.,
       an Illinois corp.,
                                            Plaintiﬀ-Counter Defendant-
                                                              Appellee,
       versus
       MARK JOHN PUPKE,
       MARIE MOLLY PUPKE,
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10211

                                          Defendants-Counter Claimants-
                                              Appellants-Cross Appellees,

       THE FLAGER GROUP AND ASSOCIATES,
       a Florida sole proprietorship,
       JOHN P. MILLER,
       individually, CPA, PA, a Florida Corporation,
       d.b.a. JOHN P. MILLER,
       NICOLE ELLERSTEIN,
       a.k.a. NICOLE AUGUSTE JACK,

                                                               Defendants.

                            ____________________

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 9:17-cv-80732-KAM
                           ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             This is an action alleging fraud in connection with the pur-
       chase of a substantial interest in Euro International Mortgage, Inc.
       (“Euro”), a mortgage company. The purchaser, Ravi Kadiyala,
       claims that, after the sale, he learned that the company’s key asset,
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       22-10211               Opinion of the Court                         3

       an “Eagle” lending designation from the Department of Housing
       and Urban Development (“HUD”), had been obtained by fraud,
       and he sued the sellers, Mark and Marie Pupke, for damages.
              After a seven-day trial, a federal jury found in favor of Kadi-
       yala on his claims against Mark for fraud and on his claims against
       Marie for conspiracy to commit fraud and aiding and abetting. In
       accordance with the verdict form, the jury assessed damages indi-
       vidually with respect to each of the three claims. The form did not
       ask the jury to provide an overall damages ﬁgure. For the fraud
       claim against Mark, the jury awarded $500,000 in compensatory
       damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. For the conspiracy
       claim against Marie, the jury awarded $250,000 in compensatory
       damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. And for the aiding-
       and-abetting claim, the jury awarded $250,000 in compensatory
       damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. Combined, these ﬁg-
       ures resulted in a total award of $1 million in compensatory dam-
       ages and $1.5 million in punitive damages.
              Post-trial, the district court granted the Pupkes’ motion un-
       der Rule 50, Fed. R. Civ. P., to reduce the damages award as dupli-
       cative. The court reasoned that the compensatory damages as-
       sessed against Mark and Marie were duplicative because the claims
       were all based on the same fraud and the same injury. So the court
       permitted recovery for $500,000 in compensatory damages against
       Mark, with joint and several liability against Marie for up to
       $250,000. The court also reduced the punitive damages award
       against Marie from a total of $500,000 to $250,000, reasoning that
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10211

       the two awards were based on the same conduct, so they were also
       duplicative.
              Both the Pupkes and Kadiyala have appealed. The Pupkes
       argue, for the ﬁrst time on appeal, that the jury’s damages award
       cannot stand because Kadiyala failed to prove actual damages and
       relied solely on “speculation and conjecture” about future proﬁts.
       For his part, Kadiyala maintains that the district court erred in re-
       ducing his damages as duplicative.
                                              I.
             As to the Pupkes’ appeal, we cannot grant any relief because
       the Pupkes never properly raised a challenge to the suﬃciency of
       the damages evidence before the district court. 1
               To preserve an evidentiary suﬃciency challenge in a civil
       case, the party must comply with Rule 50, including ﬁling a post-
       verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) or
       a new trial under Rule 59. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich,
       Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 400–01 (2006) (quotation marks omitted). If a
       party fails to make an appropriate post-verdict motion, we have “no

       1 Even assuming we had the power to consider this newly raised argument,

       we would review it only under the plain-error standard, which “rarely applies
       in civil cases.” Ledford v. Peeples, 657 F.3d 1222, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011). And
       generally, we will grant relief in a civil case under this standard only when
       necessary to prevent “a miscarriage of justice.” Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc., 861
       F.3d 1338, 1352 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). This is not a rare
       case where invoking the plain-error doctrine is necessary to prevent a miscar-
       riage of justice.
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       22-10211               Opinion of the Court                         5

       authority” to consider its challenge to the suﬃciency of the evi-
       dence. Hi Ltd. P’ship v. Winghouse of Fla., Inc., 451 F.3d 1300, 1302
       (11th Cir. 2006); see Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 404 (“[R]espondent’s fail-
       ure to comply with Rule 50(b) forecloses its challenge to the suﬃ-
       ciency of the evidence.”).
               Because the Pupkes “never sought a new trial” or a directed
       verdict based on insuﬃciency of the damages evidence, they “for-
       feited [their] right to do so on appeal.” Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 404.
                                        II.
              As to Kadiyala’s cross-appeal, “we review a district court’s
       determination regarding duplicative damages for clear error.” St.
       Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186, 1200
       n.17 (11th Cir. 2009).
              Ordinarily, “[t]he jury enjoys substantial discretion in award-
       ing damages within the range shown by the evidence, and . . . its
       verdict does not fail . . . so long as a rational basis exists for the
       calculation.” United States v. Sullivan, 1 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir.
       1993). Federal courts have “no general authority to reduce the
       amount of a jury’s verdict.” Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170
       F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999).
               But courts do have the power and duty to prevent “double
       recovery.” St Luke’s, 573 F.3d at 1203. A plaintiﬀ generally cannot
       be compensated for the same injury under diﬀerent legal theories.
       Id.; see Minotty v. Baudo, 42 So. 3d 824, 833 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“A
       double recovery based on the same elements of damages is prohib-
       ited.” (quotation marks omitted)).            Courts are therefore
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10211

       empowered to reduce an award to ensure that a plaintiﬀ does not
       receive more than his actual loss. See St Luke’s, 573 F.3d at 1203.
               Nonetheless, “a jury is not prohibited from allocating a sin-
       gle damages award between two distinct theories of liability.” Me-
       dina v. Dist. of Columbia, 643 F.3d 323, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In Co-
       quina Investments v. TD Bank, N.A., for example, the jury awarded
       the plaintiﬀ $16 million in compensatory damages and $17.5 mil-
       lion in punitive damages each on two claims (aiding and abetting
       and fraudulent misrepresentation) based on the same Ponzi
       scheme. 760 F.3d 1300, 1306–07 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2014). We sum-
       marily aﬃrmed the court’s refusal to reduce the award as duplica-
       tive, reasoning that it was clear from the record that “the jury in-
       tended a total of $32 million in compensatory damages and $35
       million in punitive damages,” which trial evidence of the plaintiﬀ’s
       total loss supported. Id. at 1307 n.4, 1319. Thus, a jury’s award is
       not duplicative merely because “it allocated the damages under two
       diﬀerent causes of action,” Gentile v. Cnty. of Suﬀolk, 926 F.2d 142,
       154 (2d Cir. 1991), so long as the jury intended that result and it is
       supported by the evidence at trial, see Coquina, 760 F.3d at 1319.
              Here, the district court did not oﬀer adequate grounds to
       justify reducing the total amount of damages that the jury
       awarded. The court reasoned that the compensatory-damages
       awards against Mark and Marie were duplicative of one another
       because they were based on the same fraud and the same injury.
       That alone is not enough, though, because the jury was not pro-
       hibited from allocating its total damages award between Mark and
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       22-10211                Opinion of the Court                          7

       Marie through the diﬀerent causes of action. See Coquina, 760 F.3d
       at 1319; Medina, 643 F.3d at 326; Gentile, 926 F.2d at 154. Nothing
       in the verdict form or the court’s instructions indicates that the jury
       did not intend to award Kadiyala a total of $1 million in compensa-
       tory damages. Nor did the court indicate that the total award ex-
       ceeded Kadiyala’s actual damages, which he claimed more than $10
       million. See Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Air Cap. Grp., LLC,
       614 F. App’x 460, 474 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[A] plaintiﬀ may recover
       damages on two claims stemming from the same conduct if the
       total does not exceed actual damages.”). So while we cannot rule
       out double recovery, we must conclude that the district court ex-
       ceeded its limited authority in this context by reducing the total
       amount of compensatory damages reﬂected in the jury’s verdict.
       See St Luke’s, 573 F.3d at 1203; Sullivan, 1 F.3d at 1196; Johansen, 170
       F.3d at 1329.
              The issue of punitive damages is no diﬀerent. The district
       court reasoned that the awards of $250,000 in punitive damages
       each for the conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting claims were dupli-
       cative because they were intended to sanction the same conduct.
       But nothing in the record suggests that the jury did not intend to
       award a total of $500,000 in punitive damages against Marie for her
       conduct. So just like with the issue of compensatory damages, the
       court lacked adequate grounds to reduce the award of punitive
       damages.
             For these reasons, we vacate the district court’s order reduc-
       ing the damages awarded to Kadiyala as duplicative, and we
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       8                    Opinion of the Court              22-10211

       remand with instructions to enter judgment consistent with the
       verdict and this opinion.
                                    III.
             In sum, we AFFIRM with respect to the Pupkes’ appeal (No.
       22-10211). We VACATE and REMAND, with instructions, with
       respect to Kadiyala’s cross-appeal (No. 22-13144).