Court Opinion

ID: 9581341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:13:58.990188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:52.538705
License: Public Domain

Justice Meyer
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion except as to that part entitled “II. Sentencing Phase,” which holds that defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the kidnapping judgment has been arrested. I believe that portion of the majority opinion to be in error, and I would vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of Darryl Williams on both the theories of premeditation and deliberation and of the felony murder rule. The underlying felony submitted was armed robbery. The kidnapping was not submitted as an underlying felony in the guilt phase. In such cases, this Court has held that the underlying felonies may also be considered as an aggravating circumstance at sentencing. State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 230-31, 283 S.E. 2d 732, 750 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038, 72 L.Ed. 2d 155 (1982). During the sentencing phase of the trial, Judge Hobgood submitted to the jury as one of the aggravating circumstances, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5), that the murder of Darryl Williams was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of the armed robbery, or the kidnapping of Williams, or both. Judge Hobgood also instructed the jury that, on the issues and recommendation form, it should answer whether its finding of this aggravating circum*531stance was “on the basis of the defendant’s commission of robbery with a dangerous weapon of Darrel [sic] Wade Williams, or first-degree kidnapping of Darrel Wade Williams, or both.” Judge Hobgood gave the jury three choices:
Your answer will be one of the following choices: one, robbery with a firearm; or, two, first-degree kidnapping; or three, both robbery with a firearm and first-degree kidnapping.
When the jury returned its verdicts as to the first-degree murder of Darryl Wade Williams, the jury answered that it had found two aggravating circumstances: (1) that the defendant previously had been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(3); and (2) that the murder of Darryl Wade Williams was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery with a firearm of Darryl Wade Williams or first-degree kidnapping of Darryl Wade Williams, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5). The jury also answered that its finding of the second aggravating circumstance was based on the defendant’s commission of “[b]oth robbery with a dangerous weapon and first degree kidnapping.”
The majority holds that since the evidence was insufficient to support the first-degree kidnapping conviction, the trial court erred in submitting the kidnapping offense as an alternative theory for the aggravating circumstance under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5). I agree.
It should be noted that the defendant made no objection, when given the opportunity, to the State’s request for an instruction on kidnapping as an aggravating circumstance. The defendant also made no objection to Judge Hobgood’s framing of the issue as to whether the jury found the aggravating circumstance of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5) on the basis of the armed robbery or kidnapping or both. Here, under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5), there were alternative theories in a single enumerated aggravating factor:
(5) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape *532or a sex offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (1983) (emphasis added). The majority has correctly held that though the kidnapping as an alternative theory for the aggravating circumstance was erroneously submitted, the aggravating factor survived because it was also based on the armed robbery.
The majority distinguishes between the “strong” evidence of defendant’s guilt and the “hotly contested” evidence as to punishment. I must say that the significance of that distinction escapes me. In every death case, the evidence as to punishment is “hotly contested” — and even if it is not as a matter of fact, we treat it as such —because a life hangs in the balance. Without question, when a juror weighs a recommendation of punishment in a capital case, the strength of the evidence of guilt is still in his or her mind and is of significant -importance. Here, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, and the manner of the killing was brutal.
The majority says “we can only speculate as to what weight or consideration the jury gave the kidnapping.” Is that not true in every case in which an aggravating factor has erroneously been submitted? That is precisely why this Court is compelled to make the harmless error analysis. By making the analysis, we direct and focus our attention on the precise question of whether we are able to say that, absent the offending circumstance, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different result.
“In capital sentencing procedures, erroneous submission of an aggravating circumstance ... is not reversible per se; [such] error [is] subject to a harmless error analysis.” State v. Daniel, 319 N.C. 308, 315 n.2, 354 S.E. 2d 216, 220 n.2 (1987). Where the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming, as here, the Court has not hesitated to say that:
[W]e are here convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the result of the weighing process used by the jury would not have been different had the impermissible aggravating circumstance not been present. Our review of the voluminous evidence offered by the State *533convinces us that submission of the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed while committing the robbery was not prejudicial error.
In addition to considering the evidence supporting the proffered aggravating circumstances, the jury was of course aware of the evidence offered at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Thus, even though the submission of the underlying felony was error, overwhelming evidence supporting other statutory aggravating factors convinces us that the weighing process has not been compromised.
State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 286, 288, 283 S.E. 2d 761, 784, 785, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1398, reh’g denied, 463 U.S. 1249, 77 L.Ed. 2d 1456 (1983).
The jury specifically found that it based its finding of the aggravating circumstance of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5) on the alternative ground that the defendant committed the murder of Darryl Williams during the commission of the armed robbery of Williams. Therefore, even though the jury could not properly find that the murder of Williams was committed during the kidnapping, there still remains the unchallenged finding that the murder was committed during the armed robbery of Williams. Here, the aggravating circumstance survives even though there was error in submitting the kidnapping offense as an alternative basis for the aggravating circumstance. Therefore, a determination that it was error to submit the kidnapping as an alternative theory for the aggravating circumstances does not invalidate the jury’s finding of the aggravating circumstance under N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 (e)(5).
It is completely inconsistent for this Court to let a death sentence stand where an entire aggravating factor is erroneous (as in Taylor) and grant a new sentencing hearing when the aggravating factor survives but contains one erroneous theory.
Even the majority characterizes the evidence of defendant’s guilt as “strong.” The majority also concedes that the jury returned a recommendation of death for the murder of Anna Quick, where kidnapping was not submitted as a possible basis for an aggravating factor. The evidence of defendant’s guilt of two brutal *534murders is overwhelming. We also know the defendant killed a third person in the same manner as a part of the same course of conduct. See State v. Robbins, 309 N.C. 771, 309 S.E. 2d 188 (1983). The wounds in each killing were similar; all three murders were execution-style killings with, in each case, shots behind the ear and in the back.
I am convinced that the error in the submission of the kidnapping offense as a theory of the aggravating circumstance to the first-degree murder of Darryl Williams was harmless and does not entitle the defendant to a new sentencing hearing.