Court Opinion

ID: 9644649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:01:28.060798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:16.360373
License: Public Domain

PRESLAR, Chief Justice
(concurring and dissenting).
I concur in the affirmance of the trial Court’s judgment, but must respectfully dissent on the holding that the proceeds of sale go to the Defendants. The majority opinion applies the rule that where you ask for two things and the Court only gives you one, its silence as to the other means that it is denied. In this case, they say that the Court was silent on the matter of the proceeds of sale of the house. Granted, the judgment did not use the words “proceeds of sale,” but the Court disposed of that issue when it rendered judgment. This, because that was the subject of the lawsuit.
That was what the Court decided when it construed the instrument by which the sons assigned “all of our right, title and interest in the estate of CATHALENE CRAVEY PARKER, of any property of whatsoever kind or wheresoever situate that would be bequeathed or devised to us by her will * * *.” Under the record in this case, it is a strained construction of the Court’s judgment to make an affirmative award to the sons who were Defendants.
The mother left the sons her share of the proceeds if the house was ever sold. They made an assignment to their stepfather. The problem arose as to whether that assignment included the proceeds. The parties went to Court to determine that question. When the Court ruled, it answered that question — regardless of the language used — because that was the only problem between these people. It was the problem that they brought to Court. It could be nothing more because that is all the sons got under the will — the proceeds of sale. That is all that cap logically be involved, it is the only problem these people had, and it is the problem they went to Court asking for a declaratory judgment on. They attached the will and the instrument of assignment and asked the Court for a construction.
A problem is created because the pleadings of the Plaintiff went further than the declaratory relief sought and pled matters of title to the house with counts of a trespass to try title nature. These were sur-plusage to the suit because no title was involved. These excessive matters pleaded are but trees which obscure the forest — the problem between these people — the subject of their lawsuit. The criterion is the substance rather than the form of action which *815entitles a party to any relief for which he shows a lawful reason. Ellison v. McGlaun, 482 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The substance of this controversy is who gets the proceeds— were they assigned? If we do not put form over substance, we must conclude that issue was the one before the Court and decided by it of necessity when it rendered judgment.
The rule of law as to two causes of action relied on in the majority opinion is not applicable here because if two causes of action could be said to exist, there was but one basis for determination in the judgment; that was a construction of the two instruments involved. As quoted in the majority opinion, the judgment recited that the instrument of assignment, the “deed”, conveyed title “fee simple absolute.” But, it is important to note that that finding was not based on the matters pleaded in the nature of trespass to try title. Rather, the judgment specifically reads that it is construing the instrument of assignment which the Court said was a “deed” vesting title in the Plaintiff. Thus, the Court construed the instrument of assignment in favor of the Plaintiff. In that, it answered the question of the effect of the assignment on the proceeds of sale. Incident to that finding was a recitation of title, which by poor draftsmanship is made to appear as an issue decided, or in fact the principal issue decided. But, as we have seen, that was not the subject matter of the suit.
Following the paragraph in the judgment which speaks of title, there is a second separate paragraph by which the Court says “It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants have divested themselves of any interest in said property, and costs of Court should be charged against Defendants.” In the writer’s opinion, that second paragraph is enough to relieve the judgment of the claim that it is silent on the proceeds of sale question. If the language alone does not suffice, the implication is that the Defendants signed everything away.
The writer’s construction of the judgment is bolstered by the fact that after its entry, the Defendants filed a written motion asking the Court to amend the judgment to provide that it was without prejudice to their making a claim for a share of the proceeds in the event of a sale. The Court by written order refused to make the amendment. To me, this is the Court’s explanation of its judgment to mean that it is contrary to the requested relief. Otherwise, it would have granted the motion to amend. Ordinarily, we would not be able to go outside of an unambiguous judgment for its construction, but the Defendants as Appellants have assigned error in the Court’s overruling their motion.
I would overrule that point of error, thereby holding that the judgment disposes of the question of the proceeds of sale in favor of the Plaintiff.
There is yet another reason why the judgment should not be construed as awarding any proceeds of sale to the Defendants; it recites that “fee simple absolute” title is vested in the Plaintiff by the Defendants’ Deed. This is the most comprehensive estate recognized by law. “The quantum of interest of which the owner of a fee simple is vested is expressed by the term ‘perfect’ ownership.” 22 Tex.Jur.2d, Estates, Sec. 3. It is clear of any qualification or condition. 4 Texas Practice, Land Titles, Lange, Sec. 348, Fee Simple Title (1961). Such a title would appear to exclude any claim by another for a portion of the proceeds of sale.
I would construe the judgment as awarding the proceeds of sale to the Plaintiff.