Court Opinion

ID: 9889918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 19:04:27.388419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:49.606363
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 P. v. Young CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096971

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 20FE009629)

           v.

 EDDIE YOUNG,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         After a jury found several firearm and great bodily injury enhancements true as
part of its verdict, defendant Eddie Young successfully argued at his sentencing that one
of those enhancements should be dismissed pursuant to Penal Code section 1385.
(Statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.) On appeal, both parties seek remand but for different reasons.
         Defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to argue for
dismissal of a second enhancement under section 1385. The People disagree but seek

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remand so the trial court may delineate the basis for certain penalty assessments that were
included in the abstract of judgment but not orally pronounced.
       We conclude that defendant has established ineffective assistance of counsel as to
his sentencing. Accordingly, we will vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

                      FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
       In June 2020, Robert C. was walking down an alleyway when he was approached
by defendant and two others in a car. Defendant got out of the car and patted Robert
down like he was looking for something. Defendant then turned around, as though he
was going to walk away, but then stopped and shot Robert in the chest.
       A jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)),
attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)),
and unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 29820). The jury further found that: (1) the
attempted murder was committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation (§ 664,
subd. (a)); (2) as to attempted murder and attempted robbery, defendant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), as
well as finding true lesser firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds.
(b)-(c)); and (3) as to assault with a semiautomatic firearm, defendant personally used a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and inflicted great bodily injury causing paralysis
(§ 12022.7, subd. (b)).
       In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found the following six aggravating
circumstances true: (1) the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness (California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)) (rule citations that follow are to
the California Rules of Court); (2) defendant engaged in violent conduct that indicates a
serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); (3) defendant’s sustained petitions in juvenile
delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); (4)

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defendant was on probation when the offense was committed (rule 4.421(b)(4)); (5)
defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime
(rule 4.421(a)(2)); and (6) defendant’s prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory
(rule 4.421(b)(5)).
       Defendant argued prior to sentencing that, pursuant to section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(B), one of the enhancements for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm
causing great bodily injury should be dismissed. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court
agreed, explaining that, “in order to not dismiss it, as the statute indicates that I must, I
would need to find that it’s necessary in order to avoid physical injury or serious danger
to others, and I don’t think I could make that finding because Mr. Young is getting a life
sentence—an indeterminate life sentence, and it’s not clear that he would be released
from that sentence at any point, and if he ever is released, it would only be after a very
long period of time and if the parole board found that he was suitable for release. [¶] So
under the new [section] 1385[, subdivision] (c), I am going to strike that second
enhancement of [section] 12022.53 . . . .”
       The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to: (1) seven years to life for
attempted murder; (2) 25 years to life for the remaining firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d); (3) the upper term of three years for the attempted
robbery; and (4) eight months (one-third the midterm) for the unlawful possession of a
firearm. The court stayed punishment pursuant to section 654 for the assault with a
semiautomatic weapon. In total, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 32
years to life and a determinate term of three years eight months. The court also orally
imposed a $3,000 restitution fine, a suspended $3,000 parole revocation fine, and $500 in
direct victim restitution. Beyond those fines and fees, the minute orders and abstract of
judgment indicate additional assessments of $120 under section 1465.8 and $90 under
Government Code section 70373, though the court did not orally pronounce such
assessments.

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                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I

                             Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, defendant argues his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to argue that, under a different provision of section 1385, the
trial court should have also dismissed the remaining section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement. Second, defendant argues that the two assessments included in the abstract
of judgment that were not orally pronounced are improper and should be deleted.
       “To establish constitutionally inadequate representation, a defendant must
demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s
representation subjected the defendant to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to the
defendant.” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845; see Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be
reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked
for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) That said, “deference to
counsel’s performance is not the same as abdication” and “ ‘must never be used to
insulate counsel’s performance from meaningful scrutiny and thereby automatically
validate challenged acts or omissions.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 675.)
       “In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) . . . ,
which amended section 1385 to specify factors that the trial court must consider when
deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of
justice. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.)

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Subdivision (c)(1) of section 1385 as amended provides: “Notwithstanding any other
law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so,
except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.”
Subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 provides in relevant part: “In exercising its discretion
under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
       The two pertinent mitigating circumstances here are when “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)) and when “[t]he
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years” (id., subd.
(c)(2)(C)). Trial counsel below successfully argued under the former provision that one
of defendant’s section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancements should be struck because
there were multiple enhancements. Defendant now submits that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to also argue that the remaining section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement—which carries a sentence of 25 years to life—should have been dismissed
under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) because that enhancement “could result in a
sentence of over 20 years.”
       Defendant maintains there is simply no satisfactory explanation why trial counsel
did not seek to have the remaining enhancement dismissed. We agree. Having already
argued to the court that all but a single enhancement should be dismissed under section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), we can conceive of no reasonable tactical purpose for not
also moving for dismissal of the remaining enhancement under the same standard. (Cf.
People v. Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 675-676 [concluding on direct appeal that
there was no conceivable tactical reason for counsel’s failure to object to misstatement of
burden of proof].)

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       We further conclude there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s
deficient performance, defendant would have achieved a more favorable result. The trial
court reasoned when dismissing defendant’s first section 12022.53, subdivision (d)
enhancement that doing so would not endanger public safety because defendant “is
getting a life sentence—an indeterminate life sentence, and it’s not clear that he would be
released from that sentence at any point, and if he ever is released, it would only be after
a very long period of time and if the parole board found that he was suitable for release.”
This reasoning arguably applies with equal force to dismissing defendant’s second
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement because, even if that enhancement was
dismissed, defendant would still be serving an indeterminate life sentence for attempted
murder. We believe there is a sufficient probability the trial court would have also
dismissed defendant’s remaining section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. As
such, we will remand the matter for resentencing.

                                              II

                                   Abstract of Judgment

       The parties effectively agree that the trial court erred by including assessments in
the abstract of judgment without orally pronouncing those assessments. The People seek
remand so the trial court may delineate the appropriate assessments. As we have already
concluded that resentencing is warranted, the parties may raise this issue in the trial court
on remand.

                                       DISPOSITION
       The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for
resentencing.
       Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.7, subdivision (a)(2), the
clerk of this court is ordered to forward a copy of this opinion to the State Bar upon
finality of this appeal. Further, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section

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6086.7, subdivision (b), the clerk of this court shall notify defendant’s trial counsel that
the matter has been referred to the State Bar.1

                                                   HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MAURO, J.

KEITHLEY, J.

1 Business and Professions Code section 6086.7, subdivision (a)(2) requires the court to
notify the State Bar “[w]henever a modification or reversal of a judgment in a judicial
proceeding is based in whole or in part on the misconduct, incompetent representation, or
willful misrepresentation of an attorney.”
 Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution

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