Court Opinion

ID: 9838536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 18:03:32.082792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:38.059373
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

  SIMON ATEBA,
             Plaintiff,
              v.                                                      Civil Action No. 23-2321 (JDB)

  KARINE JEAN-PIERRE, in her official
  capacity as Press Secretary to the President
  of the United States, et al.,
             Defendants.

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

         The D.C. Circuit has long recognized that journalists’ access to the White House may

implicate First Amendment interests. See Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2020);

Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129–30 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Simon Ateba, a journalist covering the

White House for Today News Africa, an online publication focusing on American politics and the

relationship between the United States and African countries, challenges a recent change in White

House policy related to access for journalists. The new policy alters the requirements for obtaining

a “hard pass”—a special press credential that allows a journalist to enter the White House press

areas “on-demand.” Karem, 960 F.3d at 106. Ateba, who previously held a hard pass, lost his

credential under the new rule.

         On August 10, 2023, Ateba sued Karine Jean-Pierre, the White House Press Secretary;

Kimberly Cheatle, the Director of the Secret Service; and the Secret Service (collectively, the

“White House”), alleging that the new policy violates his First Amendment rights and runs afoul

of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 1 Before the Court is Ateba’s motion for a

         1
            Ateba alleges that all defendants violated his First Amendment rights, but only the Secret Service violated
his rights under the APA. The Court will differentiate among defendants when it reaches the merits of this dispute at
a later stage in the litigation.

                                                          1
preliminary injunction reinstating his hard pass and prohibiting the White House from enforcing

the new policy. The Court will deny the motion because Ateba has not shown he is likely to suffer

irreparable harm during the pendency of this litigation. The Court will, however, order expedited

summary judgment briefing so that the merits of Ateba’s challenge can be swiftly adjudicated.

                                           Background

       For decades, the White House has offered press credentials to journalists who cover the

President and his administration. See Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 126. These credentials allow journalists

to access the press areas of the White House complex, including the James S. Brady Press Briefing

Room, where they can attend press conferences, interview White House officials, and report on

the day-to-day of the administration. See Pl.’s Verified Compl. [ECF No. 1] (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 22,

26–27. The White House press corps includes reporters from a wide range of outlets, who rely on

the “essential access point” of the briefing room to do their jobs. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.

       Given the “strict security requirements” necessary to protect the President, access to the

White House is “tightly controlled.” Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [ECF No. 17]

(“Opp’n”) at 2; see Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 130 (recognizing a “compelling, even . . . overwhelming

interest” in the President’s safety (internal quotation marks omitted)). Today, the White House

offers two principal forms of access: First, a reporter can obtain a “hard pass,” a credential that

allows him to come and go freely from the press areas of the White House. Decl. of Nathan

Fleischer [ECF No. 17-1] (“Fleischer Decl.”) ¶ 6. Second, a reporter may get a “day pass,” a daily

credential issued upon application to the Secret Service. Id. ¶ 7. As discussed further below, day

pass and hard pass holders can access the same parts of the White House at the same times. Id.

¶¶ 6–7. However, day pass holders must undergo additional initial security screening and be

escorted from the White House gate to the press areas. Id. ¶¶ 7–9.

                                                 2
       Ateba is the White House Correspondent for Today News Africa, an “online publication

that focuses on relations between the United States and African nations.” Compl. ¶ 18. A longtime

journalist, Ateba began covering the White House in 2018. Id. ¶¶ 38–39. For the first three years,

he entered the White House with a day pass. Id. ¶ 39. From February 2021 through July 2023, he

held a hard pass. Id. ¶¶ 40, 62. During his time as correspondent, Ateba has become increasingly

frustrated by the reception he has received from the White House Press Office. Ateba asserts that

he “has rarely received any response—or even acknowledgment—of his questions from the White

House” and has been denied access to press conferences held by President Biden (even before he

lost the hard pass). Id. ¶ 42; see id. ¶ 43. As a result, faced with this situation, Ateba claims he

“resorted to one of the only options available to him: speaking up during press briefings.” Id. ¶ 45.

Ateba is known to “shout[] his questions to the White House Press Secretary . . . during briefings

. . . [and] speak over his fellow journalists.” Id. ¶ 47; see id. ¶¶ 47–52. In one notable incident,

Ateba interrupted a press conference featuring the cast members of the comedy TV series “Ted

Lasso,” who were invited to speak on mental health, to ask why he was not allowed to ask

questions. Id. ¶ 49. Ateba’s outbursts have not ingratiated him with the White House Press Office

or his fellow correspondents. Id. ¶¶ 48–53. His conduct has been the subject of considerable news

coverage, and he received a letter from the White House warning him that his hard pass could be

suspended or revoked if he continued disrupting press briefings. Id. ¶¶ 52, 58.

       On May 5, 2023, the White House announced a new set of criteria for obtaining a hard

pass: (1) full-time employment with a news organization; (2) a D.C.-area address; (3) access of

the White House within the last six months for work; (4) an assignment to regularly cover the

White House; (5) accreditation by a press gallery of the Supreme Court, the U.S. Senate, or the

U.S. House of Representatives; and (6) willingness to submit to a Secret Service background

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check. Compl. ¶ 55; see Ex. A [ECF No. 1-1]. Ateba asserts that these new criteria were “targeted”

at keeping him out of the White House. Compl. ¶ 57; see id. ¶ 54. Specifically, Ateba claims that

“excluding [him] was the goal of the specific revisions” requiring press gallery accreditation, since

“the White House knew he would not qualify for a hard pass under the new criteria.” Id. ¶ 60; see

id. ¶ 61. He asserts that Supreme Court press passes are difficult to come by, and he argues that

the criteria for obtaining a congressional press credential are subjective and prone to abuse,

particularly as to journalists who, like him, have spoken out of turn. Id. ¶¶ 67–74. Ateba fears he

will not be able to obtain a credential from the committees of journalists responsible for

congressional press credentialing because, he contends, they are “insular and hostile to

‘outsiders,’” id. ¶ 74, and use an amorphous criterion of being a “bona fide correspondent[] of

repute in the[] profession” to determine eligibility, id. ¶ 72; see also Mem. of Law in Supp. of

Prelim. Inj. [ECF No. 2] (“Mot.”) at 19–20. The White House, for its part, notes that this same

requirement of a congressional press gallery credential has been employed by many

administrations, including those of Presidents Obama and Trump. See Opp’n at 3; Sherrill, 569

F.2d at 126 & n.3, 129.

       Since the White House announced the new policy, Ateba has been unable to secure either

accreditation. He was denied the requisite credentials by the Supreme Court and continues to await

an answer regarding congressional press credentialing. Compl. ¶¶ 76–77.

       Ateba’s hard pass expired when the new policy became effective on July 31, 2023. Compl.

¶¶ 54, 62. On August 4, 2023, he requested an extension of his prior hard pass, which was denied.

Email from Allyson N. Bayless to Today News Africa (Aug. 6, 2023) [ECF No. 17-2]. He has not

applied for a new hard pass, he says, because it would be futile without the required congressional

or Supreme Court credential. Decl. of Simon Ateba [ECF No. 18-1] (“Ateba Decl.”) ¶ 6. Since

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the expiration of his hard pass, Ateba has sought a day pass on only one occasion. See id. ¶¶ 12,

15–16; Defs.’ Surreply in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [ECF No. 20] (“Surreply”) at 1–2.

His request was granted but he did not enter the White House. Surreply at 2. Ateba claims he was

confused about whether the request was granted. See Ateba Decl. ¶ 17.

        On August 10, 2023, Ateba simultaneously filed a complaint and a motion for a preliminary

injunction, asking the Court to enjoin enforcement of the new hard pass policy and reinstate his

hard pass for the duration of the litigation. He claims the White House Press Office engaged in

viewpoint discrimination by adopting a hard pass policy intended to exclude him and

impermissibly vested “unbridled discretion” in the congressional press gallery committees.

Compl. ¶¶ 83–95. He further asserts that the Secret Service’s failure to provide a reasoned

explanation for terminating his hard pass by allowing it to expire violates the APA. Id. ¶¶ 96–103.

The preliminary injunction motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution.

                                            Legal Standard

        “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.’” Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Winter v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). The moving party bears the burden of persuasion

to establish that (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tip in its favor; and (4) an injunction

is in the public interest. Id. A failure to show irreparable harm is “grounds for refusing to issue a

preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.”

Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

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                                               Analysis

       Because preliminary injunctive relief is never warranted in the absence of irreparable harm,

the Court may begin there. See, e.g., Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297; Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v.

United States (“NTEU”), 927 F.2d 1253, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.). For purposes of this

analysis, the Court will “assume[], without deciding, that [Ateba] has demonstrated a likelihood

that the [White House’s] conduct violates the law.” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 303. To satisfy this

prong, Ateba must demonstrate harm that is “certain and great,” “actual and not theoretical,”

“imminent” and “beyond remediation.” League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 838

F.3d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297). In this Circuit, “a prospective

violation of a constitutional right constitutes irreparable injury,” Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638,

653 (D.C. Cir. 2013), but only if the violation is “ongoing or ‘imminent.’” Singh v. Berger, 56

F.4th 88, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297) (cleaned up).

  I.   Alleged Deprivation of White House Access

       Ateba argues that he faces irreparable harm because, without a hard pass, “he has extremely

limited access to the White House press facilities . . . which substantially limits his ability to cover

the White House for [Today News Africa].” Mot. at 23. While the parties are at odds over the

equivalence of a day pass, certain facts are not in dispute. On a weekly basis, journalists can

request links to a form that would allow them to register for visitor passes to enter the White House

each day. Ateba Decl. ¶ 8; Fleischer Decl. ¶ 8. After a journalist submits this form, which includes

biographical data, the Secret Service conducts a background check and authorizes access to the

White House press areas. Fleischer Decl. ¶ 8; Mot. at 2. When a journalist visits the White House

on a day pass, he must undergo additional security screening and then be escorted to the press

areas. Compl. ¶ 39; Fleischer Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9. But once inside, the day pass allows a journalist to

enter the White House grounds during the same times as a hard pass holder and attend the same

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press events. Fleischer Decl. ¶ 7; see Compl. ¶ 26. Ateba is eligible to apply for a day pass. See

Suppl. Decl. of Nathan Fleischer [ECF No. 20-1] (“Fleischer Suppl. Decl.”) ¶ 3; Ateba Decl. ¶ 15.

For three years before he obtained a hard pass, Ateba used day passes to enter the White House.

Compl. ¶ 39; Surreply at 2.

       Ateba disputes the convenience and reliability of this day pass system. He contends that it

limits his ability to cover breaking news because he needs to request day pass links the Thursday

prior and submit a form by 5:00 p.m. the day before he intends to access the White House. Ateba

Decl. ¶¶ 8–9. He claims that it can be confusing whether a request for a day pass was in fact

granted. Id. ¶¶ 14–17. And he asserts that journalists arriving on a day pass must wait “as much

as a half hour” for an escort, which “mak[es] the process quite cumbersome.” Id. ¶ 11. Without

a hard pass, Ateba says he is “unable to provide the quality of coverage of the White House that . . .

[his] readers deserve.” Id. ¶ 5; see Compl. ¶ 27 (noting that the White House Correspondents’

Association has said a hard pass is necessary for a correspondent to “effectively perform his or her

duties, which include providing the public with on-the-spot news coverage of unforeseen and

unscheduled events, along with cataloguing the daily activities of the head of the executive branch”

(quoting Br. of Amicus Curiae The White House Correspondents’ Association in Supp. of

Appellee Seeking Affirmance at 3, Karem, 960 F.3d 656 (No. 19-5255)).

       The White House, by contrast, characterizes the security clearance process as simple,

requiring only a short form with the journalist’s biographical data. Fleischer Decl. ¶ 8. Security

screening takes “[o]n average . . . one minute longer” for the journalist to clear security, although

they “might need to wait for [an] escort . . . to the Press Area.” Id. ¶ 9. The White House submitted

further evidence suggesting that a journalist can apply for a day pass shortly before arrival,

irrespective of the policy Ateba describes requiring submission by 5:00 p.m. the day before. See

                                                  7
Ateba Decl. ¶ 8. For example, on the one occasion Ateba sought a day pass since losing his hard

pass, he requested the day pass application links at 9:40 p.m. on Sunday, August 27, 2023, and

received them the next day at 9:07 a.m. Ex. 4 to Surreply [ECF No. 20-2]. He filled out the form

by 11:00 a.m., and his same-day request to attend a press briefing was granted. Fleischer Suppl.

Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.

        Ateba contends that he is irreparably harmed by the loss of his hard pass, which requires

him to use the day pass system when he plans to enter the White House. He claims that the D.C.

Circuit’s holding in Karem, 960 F.3d 656, that a reporter suffered irreparable harm when his hard

pass was merely suspended, supports his position. Mot. at 23. But in Karem, it was the fact of the

suspension, without requisite Fifth Amendment due process, that squarely supported a finding of

irreparable harm. 960 F.3d at 667–68 (citing Sherrill, 568 F.2d at 131). And, moreover, it appears

that Karem (the reporter) was actually unable to access the White House. See id. at 665

(characterizing Karem’s punishment as a “month’s exile”). Ateba does not allege that he was

denied due process, 2 and he can still access the White House with a day pass.

        Rather, Ateba asserts that the deprivation of a hard pass causes irreparable harm to his First

Amendment rights. The D.C. Circuit has recognized that “White House press facilities having

been made publicly available as a source of information for [newspersons], the protection afforded

newsgathering under the [F]irst [A]mendment guarantee of freedom of the press requires that this

access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons.” Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129

        2
            As argued in the White House’s opposition, Ateba likely cannot demonstrate similar harm here since

        the White House issued this policy months in advance and gave Mr. Ateba an opportunity to apply
        for renewal of his hard pass—something he has not done—while simultaneously setting forth the
        standards and procedures that would govern both issuance of a hard pass in the first instance and
        revocation of a hard pass once granted.

Opp’n at 24. Ateba’s passing allegation of a Fifth Amendment violation in his reply brief will not be considered. See
Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [ECF No. 18] (“Reply”) at 14.

                                                         8
(footnote and citations omitted). Sherrill may imply that a journalist suffers a First Amendment

harm when he or she is arbitrarily denied access to the White House press areas. But cf. Zemel v.

Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (noting there is no general First Amendment right to enter the White

House). Even accepting this premise, Ateba has not demonstrated that he has suffered harm since

he still has access to White House press areas with a day pass. See Opp’n at 24. The Court

recognizes that Ateba is inconvenienced by needing to fill out the form and wait on a press escort.

Further, it is possible he would miss an event occurring on short notice because he had not

requested credentials in advance. But this latter result may be avoided if Ateba applies for a week’s

worth of day passes in advance, even if he is unsure whether he will use them. Ultimately, he

remains able to enter the White House using the day pass system, which, on the evidence before

the Court, appears to be an acceptable alternative for the duration of the litigation.

       Ateba points to a recent Ninth Circuit order in support of his position that being required

to use a day pass instead of a hard pass constitutes irreparable harm. A panel of that court recently

concluded that a journalist was irreparably injured when he was excluded from Maricopa County

press briefings because “constitutional injury is not ‘rendered de minimis or otherwise mitigated

by requiring [him] to avail [himself] of a less desirable, even if somewhat effective alternative.’”

Reply at 19 (quoting TGP Commc’ns, LLC v. Sellers, No. 22-16826, 2022 WL 17484331, at *6

(9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2022)). But that journalist, unlike Ateba, was denied access to the briefings and

left to watch a livestream. See TGP Commc’ns, 2022 WL 17484331, at *6 (describing “the

County’s exclusion of [the journalist] from its limited forum”); cf. Consumer’s Union of U.S., Inc.

v. Periodical Correspondents’ Ass’n, 365 F. Supp. 18, 26 (D.D.C. 1973) (condemning arbitrary

“[e]xclusion from the [congressional] press galleries”), rev’d on other grounds, 515 F.2d 1341

(D.C. Cir. 1975). On the evidence before the Court, Ateba has not made a “clear showing,” Winter,

                                                  9
555 U.S. at 22, that denial of access to the White House is “likely to occur,” Henke v. Dep’t of

Interior, 842 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2012), such that he would be irreparably harmed during

the litigation.

 II.    Other Alleged Harms

        Ateba further argues that “adoption of an unconstitutional hard pass eligibility policy that

infringes on the freedom of the press is itself irreparable harm that justifies a preliminary

injunction.” Mot. at 23. It is often said that when a party seeks a preliminary injunction to prevent

the deprivation of a First Amendment right, the only question for the Court is whether “the

deprivation is shown to be likely.” Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,

897 F.3d 314, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Because a “prospective violation of a constitutional right

constitutes irreparable injury,” Gordon, 721 F.3d at 653, even if it lasts only “minimal periods of

time,” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976), a preliminary injunction should issue if the

violation is shown to be likely to occur and the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits,

Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 334.

        However, “[t]hat abstract principle must be applied to the relevant factual setting.” Getty

Images News Servs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123 (D.D.C. 2002). It is not

enough to “merely allege a violation of freedom of expression in order to satisfy the irreparable

injury prong.” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 301; see also Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894, 903

(D.C. Cir. 1972) (weighing “indirect and incidental chill” of government action that did not result

in “direct suppression of speech or press”). A plaintiff “must show that their ‘First Amendment

interests are either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief is sought.’” Chaplaincy,

454 F.3d at 301 (quoting NTEU, 927 F.3d at 1254–55). Where speech is not directly curtailed, a

                                                 10
plaintiff must “demonstrate that the allegedly impermissible government action would chill

allowable individual conduct.” Id. at 301.

        The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in NTEU is instructive. See Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 301.

NTEU involved a suit by government employees to enjoin an ethics law prohibiting them from

receiving compensation for delivering speeches or writing articles. 927 F.2d at 1253–54. The

D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction since the employees failed to show

they would “cease speaking or writing before the district court resolves their constitutional

challenges.” Id. at 1255. Since the employees could still get reimbursed for their expenses, it was

unconvincing that they were unable to afford to continue engaging in First Amendment activities.

Id. And any lack of financial incentive to “continue writing or speaking” was a “foreseeable long-

term effect[]” that “did not entitle the [plaintiffs] to preliminary, injunctive relief.” Id.

        Because the White House policy does not limit what Ateba can publish, his bare assertion

that the policy violates the freedom of the press does not suffice to establish a likelihood of

irreparable harm. And Ateba has not demonstrated the hard pass policy is likely to chill his

newsgathering activities to the detriment of his readers. Ateba has indicated that, despite the

difficulties he faces without a hard pass, he “will continue to cover the White House” and remains

“determined to continue providing quality coverage for his readers.” Compl. ¶ 81. The evidence

suggests he will be able to do so: “For his first three years covering the White House, Mr. Ateba

obtained a temporary daily press pass . . . .” Id. ¶ 39; see Opp’n at 25. And since his hard pass

expired, he has only tried to seek entry to the White House one time. Ateba asserts that on the

prior two occasions the White House held a press briefing in August, he was not aware in time to

request a day pass. Ateba Decl. ¶ 13. It is not clear to the Court whether this was a failure of

Ateba’s diligence or the White House Press Office’s advance planning. In any event, the fact that

                                                   11
the White House was willing to clear an 11:00 a.m. request for access, see Fleischer Suppl. Decl.

¶¶ 2–3, suggests Ateba could cover most if not all press briefings, allowing him to gather the news

and deliver it effectively to his readers. See Getty Images, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 123 (finding no

irreparable harm when it was unclear how the challenged regulation would affect journalists’ right

of access to Guantanamo Bay).

       Ateba also argues that his speech (and that of other journalists) will be chilled because his

“efforts to fight the White House’s de facto policy of never calling on him made [him] unpopular

with colleagues in the press corps,” and accordingly the new policy “requires” him and other

journalists to “self-censor so that they can ingratiate themselves with their colleagues” who decide

whether he can obtain the press gallery credential that is now a prerequisite to obtaining a White

House hard pass. Mot. at 20. This alleged harm is too speculative to support relief, particularly

in light of the evidence Ateba supplies of his own behavior—years of acting in ways that disgruntle

other correspondents, despite the contemporaneous cost to his relationship with the White House.

See Compl. ¶¶ 46–53. While self-censorship could possibly be a “long-term effect” of the hard

pass policy, the evidence at this stage does not support a finding that First Amendment interests

are “threatened or in fact being impaired.” NTEU, 927 F.2d at 1255 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

       Finally, in reply, Ateba argues that he suffers a competitive harm because he is at a

“disadvantage to the other White House journalists who are allowed to have hard-pass access.”

Reply at 20. The Court has found on the evidence before it that Ateba retains access to the White

House facilities on substantially similar terms. Indeed, he has the very access most reporters do

in terms of entry. To the extent “Mr. Ateba’s competition gets more—and more efficient—access

to the White House press areas and the President,” id. at 19, any resulting competitive harm is

                                                12
unlikely to “accrue ‘in the absence of preliminary relief’—that is, before the district court can

resolve the case on the merits.” Singh, 56 F.4th at 109 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).

       In sum, the Court concludes that Ateba has not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable

harm. Hence, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.

                                         *       *       *

       For the foregoing reasons, and upon consideration of the entire record herein, it is hereby

       ORDERED that [2] plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED; it is further

       ORDERED that the following schedule shall govern further proceedings:

           1. Defendants shall file any motion for summary judgment, including any

               Administrative Record, by not later than September 20, 2023. Briefing shall be

               limited to 25 pages.

           2. Plaintiff shall file any opposition to defendants’ motion combined with any cross-

               motion for summary judgment by not later than October 4, 2023. Briefing shall be

               limited to 25 pages.

           3. Defendants shall file any reply in support of their motion combined with any

               opposition to plaintiff’s cross-motion by not later than October 11, 2023. Briefing

               shall be limited to 15 pages.

           4. Plaintiff shall file any reply in support of his cross-motion by not later than October

               18, 2023. Briefing shall be limited to 15 pages.

       SO ORDERED.

                                                                                  /s/
                                                                           JOHN D. BATES
                                                                       United States District Judge
Dated: September 6, 2023

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