Court Opinion

ID: 9785570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:13:20.185929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:57.541081
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J.
Having found no error requiring reversal, I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment. I write separately, however, to suggest the time has come to modify our position concerning whether a jury in a capital case should be completely informed of the meaning of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
The trial court in this case delivered CALJIC No. 8.84, the standard jury instruction concerning the penalties applicable in a capital case. That instruction states in pertinent part: “It is the law of this state that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder of the first degree shall be death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without possibility of parole in any case in which the special circumstance[s] alleged in this case [has] [have] been specially found to be true.” (Italics added.) We have, in prior cases, *139rejected the contention that the term “life without possibility of parole,” as used in this instruction, “confuses jurors or has a technical meaning that requires a sua sponte definitional instruction.” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1009 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171]; see, e.g., People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 270-271 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123]; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 457 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442]; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 561-562 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420].) Our position on this issue has been clear and consistent.
Jurors, however, faced with making the enormous decision whether or not to impose society’s ultimate criminal penalty, apparently are not so confident about the plain meaning of CALJIC No. 8.84. For example, in People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749], the jury, after retiring to deliberate, sent out a note asking the trial judge: “ ‘If we give life imprisonment without possibility of parole, can we be assured he will never be[] released from prison[?]’ ” (Id. at p. 123.) Similarly, in People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683], the jury, prior to closing argument, sent the trial court a note asking: “ ‘Does life in prison without the possibility of parole mean he will never get out under any circumstances?’ ” (Id. at p. 654.) In People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757 [257 Cal.Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844], the jury, after retiring to deliberate, sent out a note asking: “ ‘Is there any way at all that a parole could be granted[?] Please list the ways.’ ” (Id. at p. 797.) In People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604 [247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070], the jury asked this question: “ ‘[D]oes life in prison without possibility of parole mean just that, or is parole possible at some future date? If so, under what circumstances?’ ” (Id. at p. 640.) The instant case is no different; here, the jury sent out a note during deliberations that asked: “Does ‘without the possibility of parole’ mean no chance of parole—ever![?]”
Defense attorneys, aware of this potential confusion, often propose a special instruction in an attempt to clarify the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. For example, in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572], the defendant proposed an instruction that would have informed the jury that “life without the possibility of parole means ‘defendant will be imprisoned for the rest of his life.’ ” (Id. at p. 1159.) In People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86 [246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37], the defendant proposed this instruction: “ ‘[I]f you determine that life without the possibility of parole is the proper sentence, you are instructed that the defendant will never be released from prison.’ ” (Id. at p. 129.) In the instant case, defendant proposed this penalty phase instruction: “You are instructed that life without possibility of parole means exactly what it says: The defendant will be *140imprisoned for the rest of her life. [$]... [£] For you to conclude otherwise would be to rely on conjecture and speculation and would be a violation of your oath as trial jurors.”
We generally affirm a trial court’s rejection of such proposed instructions on the ground the instruction is technically incorrect (see People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1271 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475]) because a defendant, sentenced by a jury to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, could still gain his freedom if a state or federal appellate court grants relief on appeal, or if the Governor exercises his commutation or clemency power (People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 130). Although rare, these possibilities nevertheless exist.
Because the jury in this case specifically asked the trial court for guidance on the question of the possibility of parole, we know it was concerned about this issue. Given that the jury had already been instructed and had retired to deliberate, its question came at a critical point in the trial. Under the circumstances, the trial court should have answered the question. Penal Code section 1138 provides: “After the jury have retired for deliberation, . . . if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the case, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon being brought into court, the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called.” (Italics added.)
Some jurors may have been concerned that the primary actor in a conspiracy that resulted in two murders could eventually go free were they to vote for life imprisonment instead of death. By simply rereading CALJIC No. 8.84—the same instruction already provided to the jury—the trial court failed to clarify the legal issue that concerned the jury and thus ran the risk that some jurors, erroneously believing release on parole was a possibility, voted to impose the death penalty as a way of ensuring defendant would never be released to kill again. A death penalty verdict reached under such circumstances may implicate a defendant’s right to due process of law. (See Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, 162 [129 L.Ed.2d 133, 114 S.Ct. 2187] (plur. opn.) [due process violated when state imposes death sentence based in part on the defendant’s future dangerousness when jury not informed the alternative penalty of life imprisonment was without parole].)
Providing the jury with a more complete picture of the legal effect of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, admittedly, may encourage it to speculate on matters irrelevant to its penalty decision. We faced a similar situation in People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430], concerning whether a trial judge in a capital trial should inform the jury of the Governor’s commutation power. We concluded: “When the jury raises the commutation issue itself—either during voir dire or in a question *141posed to the court during deliberations—the matter obviously cannot be avoided and is probably best handled by a short statement indicating that the Governor’s commutation power applies to both sentences but emphasizing that it would be a violation of the juror’s duty to consider the possibility of such commutation in determining the appropriate sentence.” (Id. at p. 159, fn. 12.)
We should apply the same approach to a jury’s question concerning the meaning of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Thus, although CALJIC No. 8.84 seems clear on its face, some jurors may nevertheless believe a Ufe prisoner will still be able to obtain release on parole sometime in the future. If the jury submits a question on this topic, I believe the trial court should respond with a short statement explaining that, in unusual cases, future action by the judiciary or the Governor may permit the defendant to obtain parole, that such possibilities apply whether the jury imposes a sentence of death or of life without the possibility of parole, that the jury should assume such future actors will follow the law, and that the jury should not speculate on such possibilities and should assume the sentence it reaches will be carried out.1 (See People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 131; see generally People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 547 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [quoting extensive instructions concerning the import of a sentence of death or of life without the possibility of parole and the factors the jury cannot properly consider].) In that way, the jury is fully informed as to its sentencing choices but is instructed not to consider matters irrelevant to its decision. A contrary conclusion, in which we tolerate a jury reaching a penalty decision while uncertain of the true meaning of the applicable penalty choices, seems unwise.
In the present case, the trial court indicated that if the jury were again to question the meaning of “life without possibility of parole” it would provide “a further answer.” No further question was asked. Because nothing in the record suggests the trial court’s failure to clarify the law in response to the jury’s question convinced a juror to vote for death instead of life imprisonment, I cannot now conclude the trial court’s failure to clarify CALJIC No. 8.84 was prejudicial. Accordingly, I concur.
Kennard, J., concurred.

Of course, care should be taken not to suggest that the jury’s responsibility for its verdict is in any way diluted by the possibility of an appeal or future commutation or grant of executive clemency. (See People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 878-879 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305]; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 245 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302]; see generally Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633].) When a jury asks for greater elucidation on this subject, however, some mention of the possibility of appellate review or commutation may be unavoidable.