Court Opinion

ID: 9844858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:10:25.716314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.386830
License: Public Domain

GREENE, Judge,
dissenting.
I do not believe N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-22 and 28A-19-3 require a personal representative to be appointed before a plaintiff is entitled to a section 1-22 suspension of the statute of limitations in her claim against an estate. I, therefore, dissent.
An injured party’s right to proceed with a claim against a person she claims to have negligently caused her injuries is not abated by the death of the party alleged to have been negligent, as the action survives against the personal representative or collector of the decedent’s estate. N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-1 (2001). If the death occurs “before the expiration” of the applicable statute of limitations, the “action may be commenced against [the] personal representative or collector after the expiration” of that time period; this is so “providedf] the action is brought... within the time specified for the presentation of claims in G.S. 28A-19-3.” N.C.G.S. § 1-22 (2001). A claim is timely presented, within the meaning of section 28A-19-3(a),1 if an action is filed in the courts within a specified period of time after the personal representative or collector provides notice pursuant to section 28A-14-1. N.C.G.S. § 28A-19-1(b) (2001). If no representative or collector is appointed and thus no notice given for the presentation of claims against the estate, the time for the filing of the claim against the estate of the negligent decedent remains suspended. Prentzas v. Prentzas, 260 N.C. 101, 103, 131 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1963) (“death suspended the running of the statute [of limitations] until the qualification of an administratrix”); Lassiter v. Faison, 111 N.C. App. 206, 211, 432 S.E.2d 373, 375-76 (a plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the statute of limitations extension where no notice of claims was published by personal representative pursuant to section 28A-14-1), disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 176, 436 S.E.2d 381 (1993); see Ragan v. Hill, 337 N.C. 667, 673, 447 S.E.2d 371, 375 (1994) (section 28A-19-3 does not “operate where no personal representative or collector has been appointed”); see also Mabry v. Huneycutt, 149 N.C. App. 630, 634, 562 *87S.E.2d 292, 294 (2002) (an administrator’s “failure to establish in the record that she complied with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-3(a) regarding general notice to creditors precludes [a] defendant from relying upon the statute of limitations as a bar”)..2
In this case, the pleadings reveal plaintiffs negligence action accrued on 3 November 1997 and defendant died on 2 July 1998. At the time of defendant’s death, the applicable three-year statute of limitations had not expired. See N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) (2001). Plaintiff filed an action against defendant and has not filed an action against the Estate. The pleadings do not reveal whether a personal representative or collector has been appointed for the Estate or, if so, whether there have been section 28A-14-1 notifications to those having claims against the Estate.3 This record, therefore, cannot support the trial court’s order that any future action by plaintiff against the Estate arising out of the accident occurring on 3 November 1997 is necessarily barred by the statute of limitations.4

. North Carolina General Statutes § 28A-19-3(a) is the applicable section in this case because the negligent act supporting the claim at issue “arose before the death of the decedent.” See N.C.G.S. § 28A-19.3(a) (2001).

. I agree with the majority that “Prentzas or Lassiter [do not support] the proposition that the applicable statute of limitations is suspended by the death of the decedent indefinitely until an administrator is appointed.” The statute of limitations is not suspended indefinitely because it cannot extend beyond three years after the death of the decedent, N.C.G.S. § 28A-19-3(f) (2001), unless the claim falls within the scope of section 28A-19-3(i), in which event there is no limit on the length of the suspension, N.C.G.S. § 28A-19-3(i) (2001). If a personal representative or collector has not been appointed prior to the time bar in section 28A-19-3(f), a plaintiff can “apply to have entitled persons adjudged to have renounced [their right to administer the estate] and to then have letters of administration issued to some other person” under section 28A-4-1(b)(4) or section 28A-12-4. Ragan, 337 N.C. at 673, 447 S.E.2d at 375; N.C.G.S. § 28A-5-2(b)(1) (2001).

. Furthermore, the fact that Allstate has chosen to intervene in this case suggests that plaintiffs claim may fall within the scope of section 28A-19-3(i), which provides that a plaintiff’s claim against a decedent’s estate is not barred “to the extent that the decedent... is protected by insurance coverage with respect to such claim.” N.C.G.S. § 28A-19-3(i).

. I am aware that once a defendant pleads the statute of limitations, the burden is on the plaintiff to show her action was instituted within the prescribed period. Little v. Rose, 285 N.C. 724, 727, 208 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1974). In this case, however, the statute of limitations was pled by Allstate only in response to plaintiff’s complaint against defendant, and plaintiff does not contest the dismissal of that complaint. The statute of limitations as a basis for dismissing a future claim against the Estate by plaintiff was not pled by Allstate and indeed would have been premature. The trial court, nonetheless, addressed the issue and under these circumstances, I do not believe the burden was on plaintiff to show the statute of limitations had not expired.