Court Opinion

ID: 9391535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 16:09:11.411383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.775631
License: Public Domain

J-A07028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 ZHI LIN                                 :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 JACK M. BERNARD                         :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :    No. 831 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered March 21, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 2108000779

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                           FILED MAY 2, 2023

      Jack M. Bernard appeals from the trial court order denying his petition

to open the default judgment entered against him and in favor of Zhi Lin. We

affirm.

      Lin initiated a negligence and breach of contract action against Bernard

in August 2021 and subsequently filed an affidavit of service confirming that

personal service occurred in September and October 2021. On December 4,

2021, Bernard’s counsel entered an appearance. In December 2021, Lin filed

a praecipe for entry of default judgment. Lin attached to it a copy of the

certificate of service of the notice of praecipe to enter the default judgment,

stating the notice had been served by mail on November 24, 2021. The court

entered the default judgment on December 8, 2021.

      On December 20, 2021, Bernard filed a petition to open the judgment

by default, arguing the affidavit of service was fraudulent and claiming he had
J-A07028-23

not been served with the complaint and had not received notice of intent to

enter default. He also attached preliminary objections raising improper service

of process, lack of personal jurisdiction for failure to serve the complaint, and

failure to conform to law or rule of court for failing to plead whether the

contract was written or oral and, if written, to attach the contract.

      In January 2022, the trial court issued a rule to show cause why the

petition should not be granted. At the hearing, Bernard claimed he had

received a package from Lin in August 2021 that included a letter referencing

the enclosed complaint and some papers, but not the complaint. N.T., Mar.

16, 2022, at 7-9. However, Bernard then abandoned his argument regarding

service, and proceeded only on the claim that he raised a meritorious

preliminary objection because Lin did not properly plead whether the contract

was written or oral and, if written, failed to attach the contract, as required

by Pa.R.C.P. 1019(h) and (i). Id. at 35-36. Bernard argued the court had to

open the judgment under Pa.R.C.P. 237.3. Id. at 10-12.

      The court denied the petition to open the default judgment, finding

Bernard had not asserted a meritorious defense. Bernard filed a timely appeal.

      Bernard raises the following issues:

         1. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it denied
         [Bernard’s] Petition to Open the Default Judgment entered
         on December 8, 2021?

         2. Did the trial court commit an error of law in its application
         of Pa.R.C.P. No. 237.3(b)(2) to [Bernard’s] timely Petition
         to Open the Default Judgment with his proposed Preliminary
         Objections (“Petition”) attached thereto?

                                      -2-
J-A07028-23

            3. Did the trial court commit an error of law in determining
            that [Bernard] was required to plead a meritorious defense
            instead of one or more preliminary objections with merit?

Bernard’s Br. at 7. Bernard’s claims are related, and we will address them

together.

       Bernard argues that under Rule 237.3, if a petition to open is filed within

ten days of the entry of the default judgment, the court must grant it where

the petitioner attaches one or more meritorious preliminary objections. He

points out he filed the motion to open within ten days of the entry of default

judgment. He then argues he attached his preliminary objections, which

included improper service of process, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure

to conform to rule of court or law because Lin did not attach a copy of the

contract.

       Bernard argues that because Lin did not plead whether the contract was

written or oral or attach a copy of any written agreement, his third preliminary

objection had merit and therefore the court had to grant the petition to open.

Bernard relies on Estate of Bradley v. A.B.E. Group, No. 2461 EDA 2021,

2022    WL     4282829    (Pa.Super.   filed   Sept.   16,   2022)   (unpublished

memorandum), as persuasive authority that he claims supports his argument

that the court must grant the petition to open if the objection has merit and

would normally be granted at the preliminary objection stage. He further

argues on appeal that he was not properly served in Massachusetts, as the

mail delivery was not signed for by Bernard or an authorized agent.

                                       -3-
J-A07028-23

      “[A] petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the equitable

powers of the court, and absent an error of law or a clear, manifest abuse of

discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal.” Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 986 A.2d 171, 175 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting US Bank N.A. v.

Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 994 (Pa.Super. 2009)). “An abuse of discretion occurs

when a trial court, in reaching its conclusions, overrides or misapplies the law,

or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. (quoting Mallory, 982 A.2d at 994).

      A court may open a default judgment “if the moving party has (1)

promptly filed a petition to open the default judgment, (2) provided a

reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading, and

(3) pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations contained in the

complaint.” Id. at 176. “[A] meritorious defense is . . . a defense . . . that if

proved at trial would justify relief.” Smith v. Morrell Beer Distr., Inc., 29

A.3d 23, 26 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Penn-Delco Sch. Dist. v. Bell Atl.-

Pa. Inc., 745 A.2d 14, 19 (Pa.Super. 1999)).

      Under Rule 237.3(b)(2), the first and second prongs of the test are

presumed to be met, and the trial court must open the judgment if the

petitioner filed the petition to open within 10 days of the entry of the default

judgment and one or more proposed preliminary objections has merit:

         (2) If the petition is filed within ten days after the entry of
         a default judgment on the docket, the court shall open the
         judgment if one or more of the proposed preliminary
         objections has merit or the proposed answer states a
         meritorious defense.

                                      -4-
J-A07028-23

Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(b)(2). Rule 237.3(b)(2) “does not change the law of opening

judgments.” Rule 237.3, Note. “Rather, the rule supplies two of the three

requisites for opening such judgments by presupposing that a petition filed as

provided by the rule is timely and with reasonable explanation or legitimate

excuse for the inactivity or delay resulting in the entry of the judgment.” Id.

       In Estate of Bradley, 2022 WL 4282829, at *1, this Court reversed the

denial of a petition to open where it was filed within ten days of the entry of

the default judgment, and it raised a demurrer to a request for attorney fees.1

We pointed out that Rule 237.3 did not alter the law of opening judgment,

“but merely ease[d] the burden of a party against whom judgment has been

entered and who move[d] promptly for relief from that judgment.” Id. at *2.

We reasoned that when the petition to open is filed within 10 days, the “only

relevant point of inquiry for the trial court” is whether the petitioner alleged

“a meritorious defense in [the] preliminary objections.” Id. at *3. We

reiterated that the requirement of a meritorious defense is that a “defense

must be pleaded that if proved at trial would justify relief.” Id. at *4 (citation

omitted). We concluded that the petitioner in the Estate of Bradley had

raised a meritorious defense because if the petitioner proved that no statute

or agreement provided for the recovery of counsel fees, and no other

exception applied, the petitioner would be entitled to relief. Id. at *5.

____________________________________________

1This Court may cite its unpublished non-precedential memoranda filed after
May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

                                           -5-
J-A07028-23

       Here, the trial court found that Bernard did not include a meritorious

preliminary objection. The court found that Bernard’s third objection—failure

to conform to Pa.R.C.P. 1019(h) and (i) by not stating whether the agreement

was oral or written or attaching a written contract—lacked merit. It reasoned

that the objection would not justify relief at trial, as it did “not address the

crux of the complaint, negligence and malpractice,” and would not justify relief

on the claims.2 Trial Court Opinion, June 8, 2022, at 4. It further found that a

judgment should not be opened on a mere technical ground, and the failure

to attach a contract or allege whether it was oral or written, was a technical

defense. Id.

       The court did not abuse its discretion in finding Bernard’s third

preliminary objection did not raise a meritorious defense for purposes of the

petition to open. The failure to allege whether the contract was written or oral

or to attach a written complaint was a curable error in pleading and would not

justify relief at trial. Moreover, in addition to the contract claim, the complaint

asserted a claim for negligence.

       On appeal, Bernard argues that the service was improper because it was

not signed for by him or an authorized agent. He did not raise this argument

before the trial court. He therefore waived this claim and we will not consider

____________________________________________

2 The complaint alleged that Bernard was Lin’s attorney and failed to file
responses or appear at scheduled conferences.

                                           -6-
J-A07028-23

it on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the

trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).3, 4

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/2/2023

____________________________________________

3 In the preliminary objections, Bernard claimed he had not been served. At
the hearing, he clarified he received the package, but claimed it did not include
the complaint. He then only sought relief based on his claim that the complaint
failed to conform to Pa.R.C.P. 1019(h) and (i). See N.T., Mar. 16, 2022, at
35-36; Trial Ct. Op. at 3.

4 If Bernard had raised on appeal the same claim he raised in the trial court,
that is, he did not receive the complaint, we would conclude the court did not
abuse its discretion in finding he abandoned this claim and that it lacked merit.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 3.

                                           -7-