Court Opinion

ID: 9548947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:10:59.492649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:39.736579
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I commend the majority for its effort in this case. I concur with virtually every aspect of its carefully researched and well-reasoned opinion. However, I take issue with the majority’s conclusion that evidence of defendants’ fraudulent representations concerning the moisture specifications were not admissible under the fraud exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. I do not believe that even Pennslyvania law would allow defendants, given their behavior in this case, to hide behind the shield of the rule. Accordingly, I dissent.
This record is full of testimony that defendants and the Korean buyers had agreed to the higher moisture specifications on which plaintiff insisted, notwithstanding the express terms of the Korean contracts. Plaintiff claims that the higher specifications were a prerequisite to its participation in the transaction and that defendants’ representations that higher moisture percentages were tolerable induced it to enter into the contract. Nevertheless, the majority concludes: *332In reaching that conclusion, it relies on two Pennsylvania cases, Abel v. Miller, 293 Pa Super 6, 437 A2d 963 (1981), and LeDonne v. Kessler, 256 Pa Super 280, 389 A2d 1123 (1978), which hold that the Parol Evidence Rule bars the admission of evidence showing fraud in the inducement when the party seeking to introduce the evidence signed a contract that directly contradicts the oral representations. The reason for the rule is obvious: Parties should protect themselves by conforming the written contract to the actual agreement.
*331“* * * If Deerfield had intended to rely on oral representations that 7 meant 12 and 12 meant 15, it should have incorporated that agreement in its contract, notwithstanding the express provisions of the Korean contracts to the contrary. It was not necessary to amend the Korean contracts in order for Deerfield and Nerco to agree on when, as between those parties, the moisture penalties would be applicable. Because Deerfield signed the contract directly conflicting with the alleged oral agreement and providing that there were no agreements or representations, it cannot rely on the ‘fraud or material misrepresentation’ exception to the parol evidence rule, at least under Pennsylvania law. * * *” 72 Or App at 328.
*332I believe that the facts of this case take it outside the scope of the rule. Plaintiff was told by defendants that the Korean contracts (the ones containing the moisture specifications) could not be changed to reflect the true agreement, because the moisture specifications were set by the government and could never be varied in print, although variations could be agreed to orally. Thus, plaintiff attempted to protect itself but was induced by defendants, fraudulently or otherwise, to refrain from insisting that the contracts be changed.
The majority contends that, even if the Korean contracts could not be changed, plaintiff could have inserted a clause in its contract with defendant detailing the separate oral agreement. Undoubtedly, that would have been the best course of action. However, this court should not hold that plaintiffs failure to follow that course deprives it of relief from defendants’ fraud. On the contrary, plaintiff exercised due care when it tried to change the Korean contracts. Defendants’ explanation of why that was not possible, combined with numerous assurances that the oral agreement was inviolate, made plaintiffs actions wholly reasonable. I would affirm the trial court’s admission of the evidence.