Court Opinion

ID: 2963595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:12:35.106626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:43.742913
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          October 3, 1995   United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit

                                 ____________________

          No. 92-1923

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               JULIO LUCIANO-MOSQUERA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

          No. 92-1924

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   RAUL LUGO-MAYA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

          No. 92-1925

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 RAFAEL PAVA-BUELBA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

          No. 92-1973

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               CARLOS PAGAN-SAN-MIGUEL,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

          No. 92-1974

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               EDGAR GONZALEZ-VALENTIN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

          No. 94-1657

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               CARLOS PAGAN-SAN-MIGUEL,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The opinion of this court issued on August 28, 1995 is amended as
        follows:

            On page 35, lines 8-9, substitute "This argument is meritless." 
        for "This argument was not raised below, is reviewed for plain error,
        and is meritless."

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit

                                 ____________________

        No. 92-1923

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               JULIO LUCIANO-MOSQUERA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

        No. 92-1924

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   RAUL LUGO-MAYA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

        No. 92-1925

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 RAFAEL PAVA-BUELBA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

        No. 92-1973

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               CARLOS PAGAN-SAN-MIGUEL,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

        No. 92-1974

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               EDGAR GONZALEZ-VALENTIN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1657

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               CARLOS PAGAN-SAN-MIGUEL,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Boudin and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Lydia Lizarribar-Masini for appellant Luciano-Mosquera.
            _______________________
            Ramon Garcia for appellant Lugo-Maya.
            ____________
            Rafael Gonzalez Velez for appellant Pava-Buelba.
            _____________________
            Frank A. Ortiz for appellant Pagan-San-Miguel.
            ______________
            Wilfredo Rios Mendez for appellant Gonzalez-Valentin.
            ____________________
            Epifanio Morales Cruz, Assistant United States Attorney, with
            _____________________
        whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles Espinosa,
             _____________                          _______________________
        Senior Litigation Counsel, and Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant United
                                       _________________
        States Attorney, were on brief, for United States.

                                 ____________________

                                   August 28, 1995
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.  At  2:45  a.m. on  March 27,
                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            1991, in  the darkness of the night over a Puerto Rico beach,

            government flares  brightened the  sky as waiting  police and

            customs  officers surprised  and arrested six  men offloading

            eight bales of cocaine from two  yawls.  The men had  brought

            232.8  kilograms of  cocaine to  this country  from Colombia.

            Others  involved were  arrested on  land and  on sea.   Those

            arrests led ultimately to  these appeals by five of  the men,

            Carlos Pagan-San-Miguel, Edgar Gonzalez-Valentin,  Raul Lugo-

            Maya, Rafael Pava-Buelba and Julio Luciano-Mosquera.  

                      The  appeals  variously  raise  challenges  to  the

            sufficiency  of  the  evidence,   to  limitation  of   cross-

            examination,   to  the   admissibility  of   one  defendant's

            statement, to  remarks made during summation,  to the reading

            of the transcript  of trial  testimony to the  jury, to  jury

            instructions,   to  the  delay   in  transcribing  the  trial

            transcript, and  to  their sentences.    Of these,  only  one

            raises serious issues --  the question of the sufficiency  of

            the  evidence  to support  the  convictions  for carrying  or

            aiding and abetting the  carrying of a firearm during  and in

            relation to the drug offense as to certain defendants.

                      The convictions of defendants Pava-Buelba and Lugo-

            Maya are reversed on  the firearms count (Count 4)  and their

            sentences  on  that  count  are  vacated.    We affirm  their

            convictions and  sentences on  the drug counts  (Counts 1-3).

                                         -4-
                                          4

            The convictions and sentences of defendants Pagan-San-Miguel,

            Gonzalez-Valentin,  and Luciano-Mosquera are  affirmed on all

            counts.

                                      I.  FACTS

                      The  jury  heard  or   could  properly  infer   the

            following facts.   Oscar Fontalvo  arrived in Puerto  Rico in

            January 1991  to organize  a scheme  to smuggle cocaine  into

            Puerto  Rico.  The scheme involved the drugs being flown from

            Colombia, airdropped into the  sea at a prearranged location,

            picked up by a waiting boat and then sailed ashore.   In drug

            parlance,  this  operation  is  called a  "bombardeo."    The

            waiting boat  is called the "mothership."   Fontalvo enlisted

            Pagan-San-Miguel and Jose Perez-Perez, who were to be paid in

            kind  with   50  kilograms  of  cocaine.     Pagan-San-Miguel

            introduced Fontalvo to  Luis Soltero-Lopez,  who agreed  that

            his  boat, the F/V Marlyn,  would be used  as the mothership.

            Soltero-Lopez  recruited Jonas Castillo-Ramos  to be captain,

            and Castillo-Ramos  recruited two  crew members for  the drug

            run.

                      The operation  was planned at a  number of meetings

            in Puerto  Rico in  March 1991.   Fontalvo, Pagan-San-Miguel,

            Perez-Perez  and  Soltero-Lopez attended  the  meetings.   At

            least two of  these meetings  were at the  home of  Gonzalez-

            Valentin and, the jury could have inferred, Gonzalez-Valentin

            was there for at least one.

                                         -5-
                                          5

                      Perez-Perez brought a bag to one of the meetings at

            Gonzalez-Valentin's house.  Pagan-San-Miguel  and Perez-Perez

            opened  the bag  and  showed Fontalvo  and  the others  there

            (including  Gonzalez-Valentin) a  Colt M-16, Model  A-1, 5.56

            caliber fully automatic sub-machine  gun with an  obliterated

            serial number (the "M-16").  Later during the meeting, Perez-

            Perez  brought Fontalvo over to  his pick-up truck and pulled

            out from under the front seat an Intratec, Model TEC-9, semi-

            automatic .9mm pistol (the  "Intratec pistol").  Referring to

            the weapons, Pagan-San-Miguel said they had brought them.  

                      Communication  amongst  the  Colombian  and  Puerto

            Rican  participants,  the  plane,  and  the  F/V  Marlyn  was

            essential.   Pagan-San-Miguel and Fontalvo went  to Miami and

            purchased a  radio and antenna.   Pagan-San-Miguel and Perez-

            Perez installed them on the F/V Marlyn in Puerto Rico.   Code

            names  were  used for  radio  transmissions.   The  Colombian

            dispatcher  was "Khadafi"; Pagan-San-Miguel  was "Gigante" or

            "Padrino"  or  "Godfather."   Fontalvo  and  Pagan-San-Miguel

            handled  radio  communications  and set  up  a  radio in  the

            backyard of Gonzalez-Valentin's house, hiding it in a child's

            playhouse.

                      Soltero-Lopez,  the F/V  Marlyn's  owner,  flew  to

            Colombia to board the  plane so that during the  bombardeo he

            could identify his boat and  insure the drop was not  made to

            the wrong boat  (a not uncommon event).  The  F/V Marlyn went

                                         -6-
                                          6

            to  the Dominican Republic to  prepare for the  airdrop.  The

            Colombian drug owners, assigned a Colombian,  Pava-Buelba, as

            a "load watcher" to  observe the operation and report  to the

            Colombian suppliers about  the fate of  the delivery.   Pava-

            Buelba went to the  Dominican Republic to meet Castillo-Ramos

            and the mothership.

                      On March 25, 1991, the F/V Marlyn and its crew left

            the  Dominican  Republic  for   its  drug  rendezvous.    The

            Colombian load watcher, Pava-Buelba, joined the F/V Marlyn at

            sea after it  had cleared  Dominican Republic  customs.   The

            next morning, March  26, 1991,  the boat and  the plane  made

            radio contact.   The  plane dropped  eight bales  of cocaine,

            which were taken aboard the F/V Marlyn.

                      Waiting in Puerto Rico, Fontalvo, Pagan-San-Miguel,

            Luciano-Mosquera and Gonzalez-Valentin received word that the

            airdrop  had been successful.   A call came  in to Pagan-San-

            Miguel on a cellular phone in Luciano-Mosquera's car, warning

            that the  operation had been  discovered and that  the police

            were watching.  Pagan-San-Miguel reassured everyone, claiming

            he had  "informants in  the authorities" who  would give  him

            information  and that he had a police scanner.  Fontalvo went

            back to his cabin, leaving the others to proceed.  

                      The  F/V  Marlyn  anchored  in  Dominican  Republic

            waters until approximately 5:30 p.m. and then began  the trip

            to Buoy #8, the  designated meeting place for the  F/V Marlyn

                                         -7-
                                          7

            and  the two smaller boats  ("yawls").  Around  12:30 a.m. or

            1:30 a.m.  on March  27, the  F/V Marlyn and  the yawls,  all

            operating without running lights in the darkness, met several

            miles  off the western coast of Puerto  Rico at Buoy #8.  The

            cocaine was  roped down into  the yawls.   Pava-Buelba, Lugo-

            Maya, Perez-Perez  and Gonzalez-Valentin sailed the  yawls to

            Guanajibo Beach, near Mayaguez, Puerto Rico.

                      The landing site on  Guanajibo Beach that night was

            immediately  behind the  home  of Pagan-San-Miguel's  father.

            Two men, one fitting the description of Pagan-San-Miguel, the

            other  of Luciano-Mosquera, approached the landing yawls from

            the beach and helped to offload the bales of cocaine.  

                      Law  enforcement officials had indeed been silently

            monitoring  the  operation.  The airdrop had been observed by

            U.S.   Customs  Service   airplanes,  which   videotaped  the

            mothership.   Coast Guard vessels  had tracked the F/V Marlyn

            and  the yawls.  Camouflaged agents, hidden on the beach, had

            watched the offloading.   Flares went up; arrest signals were

            given.  The conspirators  scattered, leaving bales in  a line

            from  the yawls  to  the home  of Pagan-San-Miguel's  father,

            along the roughly five-meter wide beach.

                      Pagan-San-Miguel sprinted and  sought refuge  under

            an  abandoned Volkswagen at a house  next to the beach.  When

            found, he was  wet and had his jeans rolled  up to his knees.

            Gonzalez-Valentin, dressed in  camouflage pants and  black T-

                                         -8-
                                          8

            shirt,  completely wet and covered with sand, ran to the gate

            of  Pagan-San-Miguel's  father's house.    He  called out  to

            Pagan-San-Miguel's  father to  open  up, as  the police  were

            there.  He was arrested at the gate.

                      Luciano-Mosquera and Pava-Buelba were  found, about

            forty minutes after the  flares went up, under a  jeep parked

            in  a carport  by the  building where  bales of  cocaine were

            left.   Pava-Buelba  was  under the  driver's side,  Luciano-

            Mosquera  under  the  passenger's.    Pava-Buelba   was  wet,

            Luciano-Mosquera was dry.

                      Lugo-Maya headed to sea in one of the yawls and was

            intercepted  by   Coast  Guard  vessels.1    Perez-Perez  was

            arrested  near  the beach.    A later  search  of Lugo-Maya's

            escape  yawl  found  a  well-hidden   box  of  50  rounds  of

            ammunition.   That ammunition fit the  Intratec pistol, which

            was found in the beached other yawl.  

                      The   M-16   was   later   found   hidden   in  the

            undercarriage  of the  jeep where Luciano-Mosquera  and Pava-

            Buelba  had hidden  in  vain.    The  M-16  was  on  Luciano-

            Mosquera's side "at the place where the chass[is] and the [ ]

            springs of  the front of  the jeep are  located."  Two  small

            beepers were found above  the chassis on the same  side where

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The F/V Marlyn was not forgotten.  The U.S.S. Shark, a
            Coast Guard vessel, intercepted it, and a boarding party led
            by Lt. Wendy Abrisz arrested Castillo-Ramos and the two crew
            members.  Fontalvo was later arrested in Miami.

                                         -9-
                                          9

            the M-16 was found.   Two M-16 magazines with  twenty bullets

            in each  of them  were found  on the side  of the  Pagan-San-

            Miguel house.   The machine gun and the pistol  were the same

            ones Pagan-San-Miguel and  Perez-Perez had shown  to Fontalvo

            earlier.

                      No weapons were seen  during the observation of the

            offloading  operation and no weapons were found on any of the

            defendants.  There  had been  no weapons on  the F/V  Marlyn.

            Neither  Luciano-Mosquera nor Pava-Buelba  had arrived at the

            beach by the jeep.  There was no evidence as to who owned the

            jeep or how the jeep got there.  

                      After being given  his Miranda warnings, Pagan-San-
                                             _______

            Miguel later bemoaned his arrest to a police officer,  saying

            he would have  been given $300,000 for his role  in the deal.

            Instead, he was given a sentence of 60 years in prison by the

            court.    Fontalvo  and  Castillo-Ramos  were key  government

            witnesses at trial.

                      The  five appellants,  Luciano-Mosquera, Lugo-Maya,

            Pava-Buelba,  Pagan-San-Miguel  and  Gonzalez-Valentin,  were

            found guilty of conspiracy to import cocaine, in violation of

            21 U.S.C.    960 and 963 (Count 1); importing 232.8 kilograms

            of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.   952 and 18 U.S.C.   2

            (aiding and abetting) (Count  2); possessing the cocaine with

            intent  to distribute, in violation of  21 U.S.C.   841(a)(1)

            and 18  U.S.C.   2  (Count 3);  and of knowingly  carrying or

                                         -10-
                                          10

            aiding and abetting the  carrying of firearms in  relation to

            the  drug  trafficking crime  of  importing  the cocaine,  in

            violation of 18 U.S.C.   924(c)(1)  and 18 U.S.C.   2 (Counts

            4 and 5).  

                      The  district  court  sentenced  the  appellants on

            Counts 1, 2, and 3 to terms  of imprisonment ranging from 188

            to  360 months  and to  terms of  supervised release  of five

            years.   It  also sentenced  the appellants  on Count  4, the

            firearms  count as to the  M-16, to the  mandatory minimum of

            360 months  imprisonment, to  be served consecutively  to the

            terms of  imprisonment imposed  on Counts  1, 2  and 3.   The

            court dismissed  Count  5, the Intratec pistol count,  out of

                                         -11-
                                          11

            double  jeopardy  concerns.2    It  also  ordered  a  special

                                
            ____________________

            2.  At oral argument a question arose as to whether the
            district court had in fact dismissed Count 5 or had simply
            not sentenced on that count.  We asked the government to 
            inform us as to the disposition of the convictions for Count
            5.  In its response, the government represented that Count 5
            had not been dismissed and that the district court had simply
            not sentenced on that count.  Our own review of the docket
            sheet, however, reveals plainly an order dismissing Count 5,
            which the government acknowledged when the court called the
            order to counsels' attention.  We take a dim view of the
            government's conduct in this matter, even if it is viewed as
            nothing more than negligence.
                      The government now claims that, in any event, the
            order dismissing Count 5 is a nullity because the order was
            entered on the docket a few days after each appellant had
            filed his notice of appeal.  Pointing out that as a general
            rule the entry of a notice of appeal divests the district
            court of jurisdiction to adjudicate any matters related to
            the appeal, see United States v. Distasio, 820 F.2d 20, 23
                        ___ _________________________
            (1st Cir. 1987), the government argues that the entry of the
            notices of appeal divested the district court of jurisdiction
            over the case and that, absent jurisdiction, the order on
            Count 5 can have no effect.  
                      But the government forgets that a criminal judgment
            involving multiple counts is not final and appealable unless
            the record discloses the precise disposition (e.g., the
            sentence) for each count.  See United States v. Wilson, 440
                                       ___ _______________________
            F.2d 1103 (5th Cir.) (no final judgment where the court
            imposed sentence on three counts of a six count indictment
            and withheld sentence on three counts)(cited with approval in
            15B Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and
                                   ______  ____________________
            Procedure,   3918.7 & n.10 (2d ed. 1992)), cert. denied, 404
            _________                                  ____________
            U.S. 882 (1971).  The district court here had not specified
            the disposition of Count 5 by the time the notices of appeal
            were docketed.  Absent a disposition on Count 5, there was no
            final judgment from which the defendants could appeal. 
            Because there was no appealable order at the time the notices
            were filed, the notices of appeal could not have divested the
            district court of its jurisdiction over the case. 
            Accordingly, the district court had jurisdiction and its
            order dismissing Count 5 was not a nullity.
                      That the notices were premature does not affect
            this court's jurisdiction of these appeals.  The notices
            simply relate forward to the entry of judgment.  See  Fed. R.
                                                             ___
            App. P. 4(b);  cf. Yockey v. Horn, 880 F.2d 945, 948 n.4 (7th
                           ___ ______________
            Cir. 1989) (where district court inadvertently failed to
            dismiss one count of a multi-count complaint, notice of

                                         -12-
                                          12

            assessment of $50 for each  of Counts 1-4. 

                                II.  CONVICTION ISSUES

                      A.  Sufficiency of the Evidence
                          ___________________________

                      1.  Count 4, the M-16 Firearm Count.
                          _______________________________

                      Appellants'  principal focus  is on  the  denial of

            their Rule 29 motions at trial for  acquittal on Count 4, the

            M-16 firearm  count.   Each appellant  claims that there  was

            insufficient evidence to support his conviction under Count 4

            for  carrying, or aiding and abetting the carrying of, the M-

            16 during and in relation to the drug trafficking offense, in

            violation  of 18  U.S.C.    924(c)(1) and  18 U.S.C.    2(a).

            Section 924(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

                      Whoever, during and in  relation to any . .  . drug
                      trafficking crime  . . . uses or carries a firearm,
                      shall, in  addition to the punishment  provided for
                      such . . . drug trafficking  crime, be sentenced to
                      imprisonment  for five  years,  . .  .  and if  the
                      firearm  is a machine gun . . . to imprisonment for
                      thirty years. . . . . 

            18 U.S.C.     924(c)(1).   Section 2(a)  provides:   "Whoever

            commits an  offense against the United States or aids, abets,

            counsels, commands,  induces or  procures its commission,  is

            punishable as a principal."  18 U.S.C.   2(a).

                                
            ____________________

            appeal that was technically premature related forward after
            district court entered an order officially dismissing the
            remaining count).  The notices of appeal are treated as if
            they were filed on the date the order dismissing Count 5 was
            entered on the docket.  
                      Count 5 is no longer at issue in this case.  The
            government did not cross-appeal from the dismissal, nor has
            it requested reversal of the dismissal of Count 5.

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      The  standard  of  review  for sufficiency  of  the

            evidence is familiar.  "Our  task is to review the  record to

            determine  whether  the  evidence and  reasonable  inferences

            therefrom, taken as a  whole and in the light  most favorable

            to the prosecution, would allow  a rational jury to determine

            beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were  guilty as

            charged."  United  States v. Mena-Robles,  4 F.3d 1026,  1031
                       _____________________________

            (1st Cir.  1993),  cert. denied  sub  nom. Rivera  v.  United
                               ____________  _________ __________________

            States, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994).
            ______

                      The  facts of this case do not require us to define

            the  precise contours  of the  meaning Congress  intended the

            phrase "carries" to have, and we note the variety of views on

            both that issue and  the meaning of its companion  term "use"

            in 18 U.S.C.    924(c)(1).   See generally  United States  v.
                                         ___ _________  _________________

            Joseph,  892  F.2d  118,  126  (D.C.  Cir.  1989)  (to  prove
            ______

            carrying, the government must show that the defendant had the

            ability to exercise dominion and control over the firearm and

            that  the firearm  was  within  easy  reach  to  protect  the

            defendant during the drug trafficking offense); United States
                                                            _____________

            v.  Evans,  888 F.2d  891,  895  (D.C.  Cir. 1989)  (carrying
            _________

            comprehends more than actually  physically wearing or bearing

            a gun  on one's  person), cert.  denied sub  nom.   Curren v.
                                      _____________ _________   _________

            United States, 494  U.S. 1019 (1990); see  also United States
            _____________                         _________ _____________

            v. Bailey, 36 F.3d  106, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1994)  (Williams, J.,
            _________

            dissenting)  (stating that  carrying included  situations (1)

                                         -14-
                                          14

            where  a weapon was within  easy reach of  the defendant, (2)

            where  a defendant had  sufficient control  over confederates

            carrying weapons to establish constructive possession, or (3)

            where a  defendant had transported a weapon  by motor vehicle

            and  had ready  access to  the weapon  as if  it were  in his

            pocket), cert.  granted, 115 S.  Ct. 1689 (1995);  Bailey, 36
                     ______________                            ______

            F.3d 106 at 114-15 & n.1 (stating that what constitutes "use"

            depends  upon  the  nature  of   the  underlying  substantive

            offense);  United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.
                       ________________________

            1994) (focussing on whether the firearm was available for use

            in connection with the  narcotics trade).  Suffice it  to say

            that actual  physical carrying  of the  gun comes  within the

            scope of the statute.  See Joseph, 892 F.2d at 126. 
                                   ___ ______

                      The  conclusion is  reasonable  that  at least  one

            Puerto  Rico  based   participant  in  the  drug   conspiracy

            physically carried the  M-16 to the beach.  The M-16 had been

            at  Gonzalez-Valentin's house  a  few days  before the  beach

            landing.  It was then found in the undercarriage of the  jeep

            in  a carport  near the  beach, next  to a  building entryway

            where  bales of cocaine had been brought.  Someone brought it

            from Gonzalez-Valentin's  house to the  jeep.  The  fact that

            the  jeep  was  not  otherwise connected  to  the  defendants

            suggests  that  sometime  before  the  arrest,  the  gun  was

            somewhere  on the beach and  was then brought  from the beach

            and  placed  under the  jeep to  avoid  detection.   That the

                                         -15-
                                          15

            bullets  for the  machine  gun were  found behind  Pagan-San-

            Miguel's house near the bales of cocaine further supports the

            inference  that the  gun was  either carried  onto the  beach

            during the offloading or was nearby as part of the operation.

            Still, the  gun was not found  in the hands of  anyone at the

            beach and there is  no direct evidence as to who  carried the

            gun.  None of  the agents watching the offloading  saw anyone

            with a weapon of any kind.

                      Our initial focus then is on the sufficiency of the

            evidence  on  the aiding  and  abetting charge.    Aiding and

            abetting  requires  that  "the  defendant  [have]  associated

            himself with the venture, participated  in it as in something

            he wished to bring about,  and sought by his actions  to make

            it succeed."  United States v.  Alvarez, 987 F.2d 77, 83 (1st
                          _________________________

            Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 147 (1993).  Mere association
                   ____________

            with the principal, or mere presence at the scene of a crime,

            even  when  combined  with  knowledge that  a  crime  will be

            committed, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting

            liability.   Id.;  see  also United  States  v. De  la  Cruz-
                         ___   _________ ________________________________

            Paulino, No. 94-1985  (1st Cir. Aug. 3, 1995).  The defendant
            _______

            must  have taken  some  affirmative  action that  facilitated

            violation of   924(c)(1).3   Of course, knowledge that  a gun

                                
            ____________________

            3.  A Pinkerton instruction was never given to the jury, nor
                  _________
            did the government argue at trial or on appeal that Pinkerton
                                                                _________
            liability should apply.  See Pinkerton v. United States, 328
                                     ___ __________________________
            U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946).  We therefore could not support the
            convictions on a Pinkerton theory.  See United States v.
                             _________          ___ ________________

                                         -16-
                                          16

            would  be carried  is also  required.   See United  States v.
                                                    ___ _________________

            Torres-Maldonado, 14  F.3d 95, 103 (1st  Cir.), cert. denied,
            ________________                                ____________

            115 S. Ct. 193 (1994); see  also  United States v. DeMasi, 40
                                   _________  _______________________

            F.3d  1306,   1316  (1st  Cir.  1994)   (knowledge  that  co-

            conspirators  would  be using  a  gun  may be  inferred  from

            defendant's  activity in  planning  and attempting  to rob  a

            Brink's  armored truck  guarded by  two armed  guards), cert.
                                                                    _____

            denied  sub nom.  Bonasia v.  United States,  115 S.  Ct. 947
            ______  ________  _________________________

            (1995).

                      The question  here, then, is  whether the  evidence

            was  sufficient  to show  that  each  appellant  knew that  a

            firearm would be involved in the drug trafficking offense and

            took some action in relation to the M-16 that was intended to

            cause the firearm to be carried during and in relation to the

            drug  trafficking offense.  We believe  that the evidence was

            sufficient to convict Pagan-San-Miguel,  Luciano-Mosquera and

            Gonzalez-Valentin under this standard, but was not sufficient

            to convict Pava-Buelba and Lugo-Maya as to the M-16.

                      As  to  Pagan-San-Miguel,   there  was   sufficient

            evidence  that  he knowingly  assisted  the  carrying of  the

            weapon.  He  was the ringleader of  the importation operation

            in  Puerto Rico.  He was a  key participant in the meeting at

                                
            ____________________

            Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d 95, 101 (1st Cir.) ("On appeal, we
            ________________
            will not infer either that the jury found guilt based on a
            theory upon which it was not instructed, or that the jury
            would have found guilt had it been given a Pinkerton
                                                       _________
            instruction."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 193 (1994).
                            ____________

                                         -17-
                                          17

            Gonzalez-Valentin's  house  during which  he  and Perez-Perez

            showed Fontalvo the M-16.   He showed Fontalvo the  weapon at

            the meeting  and said they  had brought  it.  The  jury could

            certainly infer  that he, or Perez-Perez at  his direction or

            with his assistance, procured the  M-16 for purposes of using

            it to protect the operation.

                      The  evidence  is  also  sufficient  to  show  that

            Gonzalez-Valentin  knowingly  assisted  the  carrying  of the

            weapon.   Gonzalez-Valentin is  chargeable with  knowledge of

            the M-16, since the M-16 was displayed in his presence during

            one of  the meetings at  his house  and the jury  could infer

            that  he was present.   Moreover, by providing  his house for

            the meeting  at which the guns were  displayed and discussed,

            Gonzalez-Valentin   assisted   the  substantive     924(c)(1)

            offense.

                      As  for Luciano-Mosquera, when  viewed in the light

            most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient

            for the  jury to  infer that he  either carried  or aided  in

            carrying the weapon  to or  from the beach  and hid the  M-16

            under the  jeep at the  time he  hid or had  placed it  there

            sometime before the  arrests.  The weapon  was directly above

            him  in the undercarriage, no  more than an  arm's span away.

            It  was  also placed  up  in  the undercarriage  between  the

            chassis and the springs, so clearly someone took  some effort

            to  place the weapon there.  He  was at the beach with Pagan-

                                         -18-
                                          18

            San-Miguel  to meet the yawls;  he arrived at  the beach with

            Pagan-San-Miguel, who supplied the weapon; magazines from the

            M-16 were nearby; beepers were found near the gun (suggesting

            a connection between the  gun and the drug offense);  and the

            call  tipping  the  conspirators  off that  the  police  were

            watching came into  a car phone  in his  car.  This  evidence

            supports the  reasonable inference that his  proximity to the

            weapon was more than  a mere fortuity.  A jury could conclude

            from these circumstances  that Luciano-Mosquera either placed

            the weapon in the  jeep before the arrest signals  were given

            or  that he  carried the  weapon from  the beach  and hid  it

            underneath  the jeep as he was  hiding from the police.  From

            these circumstances,  a jury  could reasonably  conclude that

            Luciano-Mosquera had  carried the weapon sometime  during and

            in relation to  the offense or at least that  he aided in the

            carrying of the  weapon during  and in relation  to the  drug

            offense.   See United States v. Olbres, No. 94-2123, slip op.
                       ___ _______________________

            at 17 (1st  Cir. July 26, 1995) (evidence must  be taken as a

            whole, in cumulation). 

                      All of the appellants  have argued that, regardless

            of whether  the evidence  was sufficient  to show  aiding and

            abetting  "carrying," it  was insufficient  to show  that any

            carrying  was  done "during  and  in  relation to"  the  drug

            importation  offense.     They  argue   that,  because  their

            importation efforts ended  the moment the flares went up, the

                                         -19-
                                          19

            subsequently found  M-16 machine gun could  not have "related

            to"  the drug trafficking.   That argument  is inventive, but

            wrong.  The jury could easily infer from the discovery of the

            weapon in  close proximity to the  offloading operation after

            the arrest signals were given that  it had been carried at  a

            time when the offense was in progress, particularly  in light

            of the evidence that it was brought by the conspirators to  a

            planning meeting and shown off,  ammunition for it was  found

            nearby,  and  it was  found close  to  the bales  of cocaine.

            Further, the legislative history  of the 1984 amendment  to  

            924(c)  is explicit that where the defendant had a gun during

            the  underlying  offense  (even  if  the  gun  had  not  been

            displayed),   the   section   is  violated   "if   from   the

            circumstances  or  otherwise  it  could  be  found  that  the

            defendant intended to use  the gun if a contingency  arose or

            to  make his escape."  S. Rep.  No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.

            1, 314 n.10 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3492
                                ____________

            n.10; see also  United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250,
                  ___ ____  ______________________________

            254 (2d Cir. 1988).

                      In  sum, the  evidence  was  sufficient to  convict

            Pagan-San-Miguel,  Gonzalez-Valentin and  Luciano-Mosquera of

            carrying  the M-16 on an  aiding and abetting  theory.  Their

            convictions on Count 4 are, therefore, affirmed.

                      The  evidence  as  to  Lugo-Maya  and  Pava-Buelba,

            however, was insufficient to sustain a conviction on Count 4.

                                         -20-
                                          20

            The only evidence the government  presented linking Lugo-Maya

            to  the  M-16  was  the  evidence  that  50  rounds  of  .9mm

            ammunition for the  Intratec pistol were found  in the yawls.

            Evidence of  his involvement  with the Intratec  pistol might

            have  been  enough  to show  knowledge  of  the  M-16 on  the

            inference that the two firearms were together when the Puerto

            Rico-based participants met  to launch the  yawls to the  F/V

            Marlyn, and that knowledge of  one supports the inference  of

            knowledge of  the other.   There  was  no evidence,  however,

            showing that he took  any step to assist the  carrying of the

            M-16 in relation  to the drug offense.  Lugo-Maya  was not at

            the  meeting  where  the  M-16 was  shown.    The  government

            presented  no  evidence  that  Lugo-Maya took  any  steps  to

            procure or  otherwise supply the  weapons or ammunition.   He

            was also  nowhere near the weapon at  the time of his arrest.

            There  was  simply insufficient  evidence  to  show beyond  a

            reasonable doubt that he either carried or  aided and abetted

            the carrying of the M-16.

                      The  government's  only  evidence connecting  Pava-

            Buelba to the M-16 was  the fact that he was found  under the

            jeep  in which  the M-16  had been  hidden.   Unlike Luciano-

            Mosquera, however,  Pava-Buelba was  on the opposite  side of

            the  jeep from where the M-16  was found.  Given the darkness

            and the  fact that the gun  was stuck up  between the chassis

            and  the springs  it is  not reasonable  to infer  that Pava-

                                         -21-
                                          21

            Buelba  saw the weapon when he was  under the jeep.  And also

            unlike Luciano-Mosquera, there was no evidence linking him to

            the activities in Puerto Rico, specifically the activities on

            the beach on the evening of the arrest from which it would be

            reasonable  to infer  the requisite  knowledge of  the weapon

            before  he hid under the jeep.   Indeed, Fontalvo's testimony

            never associated Pava-Buelba with any weapons.    Pava-Buelba

            was simply a  load watcher  whose job it  was to observe  and

            report  back  to the  Colombian  supplier  about whether  the

            cocaine was  successfully delivered.  His  interests were not

            the same as the interests of the Puerto Rico-based importers.

            The first time he set foot in Puerto Rico  in connection with

            this case was when he  arrived at the offloading site  in one

            of  the yawls.   There  was no  evidence linking  him to  the

            Puerto Rico end of the operation where he would have  been in

            a position to know about the specific weapon.  Therefore, the

            inference that he knew  about the weapon is much  weaker than

            the  inference with  respect to Luciano-Mosquera.   Moreover,

            even if there were  evidence sufficient to infer that  he saw

            the hidden weapon in  the darkness once he crawled  under the

            jeep, given  his disconnection with  the Puerto Rico  side of

            the  operation,  such  knowledge   would  have  been  a  mere

            fortuity.   Unlike Luciano-Mosquera,  who was  found directly

            beneath the  weapon and had substantial  dealings with Pagan-

            San-Miguel  during  the hours  before  the  arrest, there  is

                                         -22-
                                          22

            insufficient evidence to  conclude beyond a reasonable  doubt

            that Pava-Buelba  hid under the jeep  to be next  to the M-16

            with  the  idea that  he  would  carry  it.   In  short,  the

            government did  not present  evidence  that Pava-Buelba  knew

            about the weapon sufficient to support a   924(c) conviction,

            even on an aiding and abetting theory.

                      Furthermore, there was no evidence that Pava-Buelba

            ever had  actual  possession of  the weapon.   With  Luciano-

            Mosquera  lying underneath the gun, it is far from clear that

            Pava-Buelba  was  in  a  position to  exercise  dominion  and

            control over the  weapon.  Even if his proximity  to the M-16

            under the  jeep gave  him sufficient  possession, at  most, a

            theory of constructive possession might have been argued.  In

            this  case,   however,   the  district   court   specifically

            instructed  the  jury  that  a conviction  for  "carrying"  a

            firearm could not  be based on constructive possession of the

            firearm.   Such  an  instruction sets  the benchmark  against

            which  the  sufficiency of  the  evidence  must be  measured.

            United  States v. Gomes, 969 F.2d 1290, 1294 (1st Cir. 1992);
            _______________________

            United  States  v.  Angiulo,  897  F.2d  1169,  1196-97  (1st
            ___________________________

            Cir.)(appellate   determination   of   sufficiency  must   be

            constrained by  trial court's instructions; "otherwise  . . .

            we would be  sustaining a  conviction on appeal  on a  theory

            upon which the jury was not instructed below"), cert. denied,
                                                            ____________

            498  U.S.  845   (1990).    While  the  correctness  of  that

                                         -23-
                                          23

            instruction  might  otherwise   be  open  to  question,   the

            government did  not object  to the instruction  at trial  nor

            does it  argue on appeal  that the  instruction was error.   

            See  Saylor v. Cornelius, 845 F.2d 1401, 1408 (6th Cir. 1988)
            ___  ___________________

            (although reversal  due to  a trial  error normally  does not

            raise double jeopardy concerns,  double jeopardy bar would be

            triggered  where  government  had  failed to  object  to  the

            error).

                      Issues   of  the   sufficiency   of  the   evidence

            necessarily  involve the  tension  between deference  to  the

            jury's  role under  the Seventh  Amendment  as the  finder of

            fact,  see Olbres,  No.  94-2123, slip  op.  at 18,  and  the
                   ___ ______

            appellate  court's role  in  providing  meaningful review  of

            whether  the government has indeed met its burden of proof of

            guilt  beyond   a  reasonable  doubt.       That   burden  is

            constitutionally  mandated.   In  re  Winship,  397 U.S.  358
                                          __  __  _______

            (1970).    The  Supreme  Court  has  said that  the  relevant

            question is  whether "after viewing the evidence in the light

            most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

            could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

            reasonable doubt."   Jackson v.  Virginia, 443 U.S.  307, 319
                                 ____________________

            (1979) (emphasis removed).    The    difficulty    of   these

            questions of  sufficiency of the evidence  to draw reasonable

            inferences is  illustrated  in  the  case law.    See,  e.g.,
                                                              ___   ____

            Stewart  v. Coalter,  48 F.3d  610 (1st  Cir.) (each  of four
            ___________________

                                         -24-
                                          24

            courts reviewing a conviction reach  different conclusions as

            to sufficiency, culminating in a split decision by a panel of

            this  court upholding  the  conviction), petition  for  cert.
                                                     ____________________

            filed, No. 94-9742 (U.S. June 19, 1995).
            _____

                      In sum, we believe there was insufficient evidence,

            in  light of  the  government's burden  of proof,  to convict

            either  Lugo-Maya or  Pava-Buelba of  carrying or  aiding and

            abetting  the  carrying  of  the M-16  and  so  reverse their

            convictions  on Count 4.   There is no  direct evidence as to

            either and an insufficient basis to  draw inferences of guilt

            beyond a reasonable doubt.

                      2.  Drug Counts.   
                          ___________

                      Gonzalez-Valentin  and Luciano-Mosquera  also raise

            sufficiency  challenges on  the drug  counts.   As the  facts

            above amply demonstrate,  there was overwhelming evidence  of

            each  appellant's  complicity in  the  scheme  to import  the

            cocaine  and   of  their  guilt on  the drug  counts.   Their

            convictions on the drug counts are affirmed. 

                      B.  Other Issues Going To The Verdict
                          _________________________________

                      The appellants4 -- principally  Pagan-San-Miguel --

            have raised six other claims of error concerning the district

            court's conduct of the  trial:  (1) the limitation  of Pagan-

                                
            ____________________

            4.  Appellants Gonzalez-Valentin and Pava-Buelba have
            incorporated all arguments made by the other appellants not
            inconsistent with those otherwise made in their briefs.  Our
            review of the issues applies therefore to their appeals as
            well.

                                         -25-
                                          25

            San-Miguel's cross-examination of  two government  witnesses,

            (2)  the  admission of  an  incriminating  statement made  by

            Pagan-San-Miguel, (3)  the refusal to grant  a mistrial after

            allegedly   improper   remarks  were   made   during  closing

            statements, (4) the jury instruction  on   924(c)(1), (5) the

            jury  instruction on  the defendants'  flight from  the crime

            scene, and (6) the allowance of a read-back of testimony by a

            government witness to the jury during its deliberation.  None

            of these claims of error provides a ground for reversal.

                                         -26-
                                          26

                      1.  Cross-Examination.
                          _________________

                      Pagan-San-Miguel complains that the  district court

            erred in cutting off his cross-examination into the penalties

            Castillo-Ramos would have faced on firearms counts which were

            dropped against him.  Pagan-San-Miguel attempted to establish

            bias  by showing that the government had been able to procure

            Castillo-Ramos'  cooperation  by   deciding  not  to   charge

            Castillo-Ramos  under  the  firearms  counts  in  the  second

            superseding indictment.    After questioning  on this  topic,

            Pagan-San-Miguel  asked  Castillo-Ramos whether  his attorney

            had informed  him that if  he had  been "found guilty  of the

            possession of  the firearm  during the  commission of  a drug

            offense  [he  would be]  sentenced  to  thirty-five years  in

            addition to the drug offense."   The district court sustained

            an objection  to this question  on the  ground that,  because

            defendants  faced  the  same  firearms  charges,  it  was  an

            impermissible   attempt  to   inform   the  jury   about  the

            defendants' possible punishment on the firearms counts.  

                      Pagan-San-Miguel claims that this truncating of his

            cross-examination impermissibly interfered with his  right to

            confrontation  under  the  Sixth  Amendment.    We  disagree.

            Pagan-San-Miguel  had  a  sufficient  opportunity  to  expose

            potential  biases,  including  any  bias  resulting from  any

            benefit   Castillo-Ramos  received   as   a  result   of  his

            cooperation.  Pagan-San-Miguel was able to ask Castillo-Ramos

                                         -27-
                                          27

            repeatedly  whether  he  had   received  a  benefit  for  his

            testimony.   Any  probative  value of  information about  the

            precise number  of years Castillo-Ramos would  have faced had

            he been charged  for the  firearms offense was  slight.   The

            district  court  properly  decided  that  the  value  of  the

            information was outweighed by  the potential for prejudice by

            having  the jury  learn  what penalties  the defendants  were

            facing.  

                      Although   cross-examination    is   an   important

            component of  a defendant's Sixth Amendment  rights under the

            confrontation  clause, a  defendant's right  to cross-examine

            witnesses is  not unlimited.   Delaware  v. Van  Arsdall, 475
                                           _________________________

            U.S. 673,  679 (1986).  A  district court is  entitled to cut

            off cross-examination that may  create prejudice or confusion

            of the issues, or may be harassing or unduly repetitive.  Id.
                                                                      ___

            Assuming  that the minimal  constitutional threshold level of

            inquiry was allowed, as here, a trial court has discretion in

            limiting cross-examination.  A trial court does not abuse its

            discretion if  there is  sufficient evidence before  the jury

            (absent  the excluded  evidence)  from which  the jury  could

            "make a  discriminating appraisal of the  possible biases and

            motivations  of the witnesses."  Brown v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1,
                                             _______________

            5 (1st Cir. 1992),  cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct.  1035 (1993).
                                _______________

            That was the case here.

                                         -28-
                                          28

                      2. Pagan-San-Miguel's Incriminating Statement.
                         __________________________________________

                      Pagan-San-Miguel  argues  that  the district  court

            erred by not conducting a hearing out of the jury's presence,

            pursuant to Jackson  v. Denno,  378 U.S. 368  (1964), and  18
                        _________________

            U.S.C.    3501(a),5  to  determine the  voluntariness of  his

            incriminating  statements.    Police  Officer  Samuel  Jusino

            testified that Pagan-San-Miguel,  while being held  following

            his  arrest, told Jusino  that he  "would make  three hundred

            thousand  dollars out  of [the  drug venture]" and,  once the

            arrest  signals  were given,  "that  he ran  and  hid himself

            underneath a metal plank, and if he had found a hole he would

            have gone through that place."  

                      Before the issue of a Jackson v. Denno hearing  may
                                            ________________

            be raised  on appeal,  the issue  of voluntariness  must have

            been  placed  before  the  district  court  in  a timely  and

            coherent manner.   See  United States  v. Santiago Soto,  871
                               ___  _______________________________

            F.2d  200,  201 (1st  Cir.) (failure  to  raise the  issue of

            voluntariness in  a way  that would  have  alerted the  trial

            judge that a  Jackson v. Denno  hearing was desirable  waives
                          ________________

            right to  hearing), cert.  denied, 493 U.S.  831 (1989);  see
                                _____________                         ___

            also  United States  v. Berry,  977 F.2d  915, 918  (5th Cir.
            ____  _______________________

            1992)  (a  generic  objection  to the  admissibility  of  the

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Section 3501(a) provides, in pertinent part, that
            "[b]efore such confession is received in evidence, the trial
            judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any
            issue as to voluntariness."  18 U.S.C.   3501(a).

                                         -29-
                                          29

            confession was insufficient to  put the court on  notice that

            defendant sought a Jackson v. Denno hearing and therefore the
                               ________________

            court's  ruling was  reviewed for  plain error).   Pagan-San-

            Miguel failed to  place the issue  properly before the  trial

            court here.

                      Pagan-San-Miguel did not specifically object to the

            admissibility of the statements on voluntariness grounds.  He

            never  specifically requested a  voluntariness hearing during

            trial.  He never  raised the voluntariness issue in  his pre-

            trial motion  to suppress statements made  to law enforcement

            personnel.  He never raised voluntariness in his objection to

            the  statement  at  trial.     His  objection  was  a  narrow

            foundational one not  going to voluntariness  -- that at  the

            time of Officer  Jusino's testimony no one  had yet testified

            that  Miranda  warnings had  been  given  to Pagan-San-Miguel
                  _______

            before  he  made the  incriminating  statements.   The  court

            specifically asked Pagan-San-Miguel whether his  objection as

            to  foundation was a suppression request and Pagan-San-Miguel

            informed  the court  that  it was  not.   Indeed  during  the

            colloquy with  the district court over  the testimony, Pagan-

            San-Miguel conceded that "there [was] evidence that [Miranda]
                                                                 _______

            warnings were properly made and there was a waiver."  Given

            his  disclaimer  that  he  was  seeking  suppression  of  the

            statement  and the  total  absence of  any evidence  that the

            statements  were made involuntarily, Pagan-San-Miguel did not

                                         -30-
                                          30

            sufficiently  apprise the  district court  that voluntariness

            was an issue.  Thus, Pagan-San-Miguel's claim to a Jackson v.
                                                               __________

            Denno hearing has been waived.
            _____

                      There  also is  no  colorable claim  here that  the

            district   court   was   nevertheless  obliged   to   hold  a

            voluntariness  hearing sua  sponte.   See Santiago  Soto, 871
                                   ___  ______    ___ ______________

            F.2d at 202  (recognizing, without adopting, a rule that such

            a hearing must be given sua sponte under circumstances, "such
                                    ___ ______

            as  a  defendant's  apparent  abnormal  mental   or  physical

            condition, obvious ignorance or lack of awareness," raising a

            serious  question over  voluntariness).  At  best, Pagan-San-

            Miguel's argument  is that he  was so "shell-shocked"  by the

            events  that transpired on the beach that the court must have

            been alerted  to the possibility  that he did  not understand

            the Miranda warnings  that were given  to him and that,  as a
                _______

            result, his  statements  made hours  later were  involuntary.

            Undoubtedly a defendant who suddenly becomes aware the police

            are  on  to him  suffers  a  jolt,  but that  jolt  does  not

            incapacity make.

                      3.  Remarks During Closing Arguments.
                          ________________________________

                      Pagan-San-Miguel argues that  certain remarks  made

            during  the closing  arguments were  unduly prejudicial.   He

            points  to four remarks, one  made by the  attorney for Pava-

            Buelba and three  made by  the government.   None provides  a

            basis for reversal.

                                         -31-
                                          31

                      Pava-Buelba's  attorney, in  an apparent  effort to

            distinguish  his  client  and  to  distinguish  the  firearms

            charges from the drug charges,  made the following remarks to

            the jury:

                           I ask you to please keep in mind that the fact
                      that there  are a number of  defendants here [does]
                      not mean that they  were all to be treated  as one.
                      And the fact that they were being charged with five
                      different counts does not mean that you had to find
                      them guilty or  innocent or all the  same, but that
                      you could  choose  and pick.   And  that you  could
                      discern among  the evidence and determine which, if
                      any, were guilty of any of the counts charged.
                           Some might  be guilty  of one  or more.   Some
                      might be guilty of  none.  And I ask  you to please
                      be careful  watching the evidence so  that you will
                      be able  to  distinguish  between  each  and  every
                      individual and each and every count.

            Pagan-San-Miguel  objected  to  these  remarks,  arguing they

            implied that  Pava-Buelba was guilty of the drug offenses and

            thus  implicated the  other defendants.   The  district court

            sustained the objection.  Pagan-San-Miguel's later motion for

            a mistrial was  denied, but  the court offered  to provide  a

            curative instruction, which all  defendants declined.  Pagan-

            San-Miguel argues that a curative instruction would have been

            pointless and  that the district court  abused its discretion

            in refusing to grant a new trial.

                      Fatal to Pagan-San-Miguel's claim, however, is that

            to "require a new trial, we must conclude . . . that, despite

            the instruction,  the misconduct was likely  to have affected

            the trial's outcome."  United States v. Capone, 683 F.2d 582,
                                   _______________________

            585-86 (1st Cir. 1982) (internal  citations omitted).  In the

                                         -32-
                                          32

            context of the full  record, these statements could  not have

            had any  impact on the outcome of the trial.  The evidence of

            Pagan-San-Miguel's   complicity  on   the  drug   counts  was

            overwhelming.   Moreover,  a curative instruction  would have

            solved any spillover problem created by the statements.

                      Pagan-San-Miguel  also challenges  the government's

            statement   that  "Carlos  Pagan-San-Miguel  can't  deny  his

            association  with [Fontalvo], that  terrible, terrible person

            that was described to you."  Pagan-San-Miguel argues this was

            an impermissible  comment from  a prosecutor on  an accused's

            failure to testify.  We think it was not.  The government did

            not say  that Pagan-San-Miguel "didn't deny his association,"

            only  that he  "can't deny his  association."   Even assuming

            that this  comment cut too  close to  the line, "there  is no

            reason  to  conclude that  the prosecutor  intentionally drew

            attention  to  the appellant's  silence  at  trial."   United
                                                                   ______

            States v.  Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 980 (1st Cir. 1995).  And the
            _________________

            evidence  was  otherwise so  overwhelming  that this  comment

            could have had no effect on the jury's judgment.  Id. at 977.
                                                              ___

                      Pagan-San-Miguel's  next two challenges  are to the

            government's statements that the firearm found under the jeep

            "would be used  to protect  the very cocaine  that was  being

            illegally smuggled into Puerto  Rico" and that "Carlos Pagan-

            San-Miguel bragged about having bought the firearms."  Pagan-

            San-Miguel argues that  the first was  misleading in that  it

                                         -33-
                                          33

            suggested  that  the jury  could  convict  the defendant  for

            planning on using the  firearm once it had arrived  in Puerto

            Rico, an offense  not charged in the  indictment.  Pagan-San-

            Miguel's reading  is strained, at best.   The first statement

            was consistent with the evidence and the government's theory.

            There is no plausible argument that this statement was likely

            to have affected the outcome of the trial or was so egregious

            that a  new trial is needed  as a sanction.   See Capone, 683
                                                          ___ ______

            F.2d  at 587.   While  the second  statement appears  to have

            exaggerated the evidence, there was no  objection and it does

            not amount to plain error.  See Taylor, 54 F.3d at 977.  
                                        ___ ______

                      4.  Jury Instruction on 18 U.S.C.   924(c)(1).
                          _________________________________________

                      Pagan-San-Miguel argues that the  court erroneously

            instructed the jury  on an essential element  of the firearms

            offense,  18 U.S.C.   924(c)(1).   That section requires that

            the  defendant  have  carried  the  firearm  "during  and  in

            relation  to    .    .   .  [a] drug trafficking crime."  The

            district  court, however,  instructed  the jury  that it  was

            enough if the defendant knowingly carried the firearm "during

            the  commission of  the crime  of drug  trafficking."   In so

            doing, the district court appears  to have relied on obsolete

            statutory language.   Before 1984,    924(c)(1) provided that

            it  was a crime to carry  a firearm "during the commission of

            any [federal]  felony."   In 1984, however,  Congress amended

            the  language adding the phrase  "during and in relation to,"

                                         -34-
                                          34

            to  make clear  that  the  firearm  must  be  linked  to  the

            underlying  felony to come  within the scope  of the statute.

            S.  Rep.  No.  224,  supra,  at  312-13,  reprinted  in  1984
                                 _____                _____________

            U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3490-92.

                      Because  Pagan-San-Miguel  did  not  object  to the

            instruction,  the instruction  is reviewed  for plain  error.

            See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  Pagan-San-Miguel argues that the
            ___

            court's use  of  the phrase  "during the  commission of"  was

            plain error,  claiming it omitted an essential element of the

            offense and it broadened the scope of the conduct under which

            the jury could convict.  

                      The actual  charge given here  undercuts Pagan-San-

            Miguel's argument.6   The district court  emphasized that the

            carrying  of  the firearm  must  be  linked to  the  specific

            underlying  drug  offense  for  which   the  defendants  were

            convicted:  

                      First,  it  must  be  proven  that  a[] defendant[]
                      committed a crime of  drug trafficking for which he
                                ____________________________
                      may  be  prosecuted  in  the United  States.    And
                      second, that during the  commission of the crime of
                                                             ____________

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Faced with a similar challenge the Ninth Circuit has held
            that the change in statutory language was not substantive and
            that the requirement that the firearm be linked to the crime
            was already implicit in the statute.  "Though the legislative
            history does not say so expressly, it strongly implies that
            the 'in relation to' language did not alter the scope of the
            statute, explaining that the original section was directed at
            persons who chose to carry a firearm as an offensive weapon
            for a specific criminal act."  United States v. Stewart, 779
                                           ________________________
            F.2d 538, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation
            omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867 (1987).  
                      ____________

                                         -35-
                                          35

                      drug trafficking the defendant[]  knowingly carried
                      ________________
                      a firearm.

            In light of the  actual instruction given, Pagan-San-Miguel's

            attack on the instruction does not rise to the level of plain

            error.  

                      Pagan-San-Miguel also argues  that the  instruction

            allowed the  jury to convict  for a crime not  charged in the

            indictment because the firearms charge was limited to Count 2

            of  the  three drug  counts.   Pagan-San-Miguel  has  not and

            cannot  articulate how, in the  context of this  case, such a

            possibility created a "miscarriage  of justice" or "seriously

            affect[ed] the fairness,  integrity or  public reputation  of

            judicial  proceedings".  See  United States v.  Olano, 113 S.
                                     ___  _______________________

            Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993).    

                      5.  Jury Instruction on Flight.
                          __________________________

                      Pagan-San-Miguel  also  argues  that  the  district

            court erroneously  instructed the  jury about his  flight and

            concealment.  This argument  is meritless.  As long  as there

            is an  adequate factual predicate supporting  an inference of

            guilt  on the crime charged,  as there was  here, evidence of

            the  accused's  flight may  be  admitted  at  trial  to  show

            consciousness  of guilt.    See United  States v.  Hernandez-
                                        ___ _____________________________

            Bermudez, 857 F.2d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1988).    
            ________

                      6.  Read-Back To The Jury.
                          _____________________

                      Pagan-San-Miguel  and Luciano-Mosquera  assert that

            the district  court committed  error when  it failed  to take

                                         -36-
                                          36

            certain precautions in  allowing the  testimony of  Castillo-

            Ramos, the boat captain, to  be read back to the jury  at the

            jury's request, during deliberations.  Counsel did not object

            to  the procedures  followed; in fact,  what happened  was by

            agreement among  counsel.7  To prevail,  defendants must show

            plain error.

                      It  certainly would  have been  preferable for  the

            district  court to have  taken some precautions.   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            United States v. Hernandez,  27 F.3d 1403, 1408-09 (9th  Cir.
            __________________________

            1994) (reversing a conviction  where district court failed to

            take  precautions to  prevent undue  emphasis on  the witness

            testimony  that  jury  reviewed during  deliberation),  cert.
                                                                    _____

            denied, 115 S. Ct. 1147 (1995).  But  counsel did  not object
            ______

            and  the standard set by Olano  is not met.   In light of the
                                     _____

            overwhelming evidence  of guilt on  the drug counts  to which

            Castillo-Ramos' testimony went, the read-back did  not result

            in  a miscarriage  of justice,  nor did  the absence  of such

            precautions  seriously  affect  the  fairness,  integrity  or

                                
            ____________________

            7.  The court reporter entered the jury room unsupervised and
            read the testimony.  The court gave the jury no cautionary
            instructions (i.e., that the testimony was not to substitute
            for the jurors' memories, or that the jury should not focus
            on one particular aspect of the evidence to the exclusion of
            other evidence).  There was no observation of the court
            reporter's reading of the testimony to ensure that no
            editorializing or slanting was done during the reading.  No
            instructions were given to the court reporter to be careful
            not to converse with the jurors or otherwise taint their
            deliberations and to be careful not to read to the jury
            potentially prejudicial side-bar conferences she had recorded
            during the course of Castillo-Ramos' testimony. 

                                         -37-
                                          37

            public  reputation  of judicial  proceedings.    There is  no

            evidence that anything untoward happened in the jury room and

            no  reason to  think  the reporter  did  anything other  than

            properly read the pertinent portions of the record.

                      Pagan-San-Miguel  and  Luciano-Mosquera also  argue

            they were never consulted by either of their attorneys or the

            court about  whether  they  would waive  their  right  to  be

            present during the read-back.  Although the defendant's right

            to be present at every stage of the proceedings may be waived

            by the defendant,  it is less  clear whether the  defendant's

            attorney can waive it.  See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,
                                    ___ __________________

            418  &  n.24  (1988).    Nevertheless,  Pagan-San-Miguel  and

            Luciano-Mosquera  were present  at  the  time  Castillo-Ramos

            actually  gave his  testimony and  so could  "confront" their

            accuser.  There was no plain error.

                               III.  SENTENCING ISSUES

                      A.  Pagan-San-Miguel
                          ________________

                      Pagan-San-Miguel  challenges  his  sentence on  two

            grounds,  neither of which has  merit.  He  asserts he should

            not  have been given  a four  level increase  as a  leader or

            organizer of  the activity under  3B1.1(a)  of the Sentencing

            Guidelines.    See   United  States  Sentencing   Commission,
                           ___

            Guidelines Manual,  3B1.1(a) (Nov. 1991).   He also argues he
            _________________

            should have  been given a  downward adjustment of  two levels

            for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.  3E1.1(a).  

                                         -38-
                                          38

            Absent a  mistake of law, the  district court's determination

            of a  defendant's role may be set aside only for clear error.

            United States v.  Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d 105,  111 (1st Cir.
            ________________________________

            1995).  There was no error.

                      The  facts  outlined  earlier establish  Pagan-San-

            Miguel's  leadership  and   organizational  role.    Fontalvo

            testified  that  Pagan-San-Miguel  was "the  land  person  in

            charge  of all the merchandise."   Indeed, his  code names in

            the  operation were  "Gigante,"  "Padrino," and  "Godfather."

            Pagan-San-Miguel's argument  that the court  made no specific

            finding that at  least four others were under  his leadership

            and control  does not help  him.   It was  obvious that  nine

            others, at the least, were involved in addition to Pagan-San-

            Miguel.  And "retention of  control over other participants .

            .  . is  not  an essential  attribute  of organizer  status."

            Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d at 113.
            ______________

                      As   to   acceptance   of    responsibility,   "the

            determination of  the sentencing  judge is entitled  to great

            deference on review."  U.S.S.G.  3E1.1,  comment. (n.5).  The

            fact  that  Pagan-San-Miguel  in  pre-trial  plea  bargaining

            unsuccessfully offered to plead guilty  to the drug counts if

            certain  conditions were  met does  not provide  a sufficient

            basis  to  reverse  the  district court's  decision.    "This

            adjustment is not intended  to apply to a defendant  who puts

            the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the

                                         -39-
                                          39

            essential factual  elements of guilt, is  convicted, and only

            then admits  guilt and expresses remorse."   U.S.S.G.  3E1.1,

            comment.  (n.2).  His argument  is not enough  to reverse the

            district    court's   determination   that   he   failed   to

            "demonstrate[]  a recognition  and affirmative  acceptance of

            personal responsibility for his  criminal conduct."  U.S.S.G.

             3E1.1(a);  see also United States  v. Curran, 967  F.2d 5, 7
                        ________ ________________________

            (1st Cir. 1992).

                      B.  Gonzalez-Valentin
                          _________________

                      Gonzalez-Valentin argues he was a minor participant

            and thus  entitled to  a two level  reduction under  U.S.S.G.

             3B1.2(b).   The trial judge's determination  was not clearly

            erroneous.  See  United States v.  Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d  1124,
                        ___  ___________________________

            1131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 484 (1992).
                             ____________

                      Gonzalez-Valentin was at the beach to assist in the

            offloading; his  house was  used regularly  to plan the  drug

            smuggling; weapons were shown and  discussed at his house;  a

            communications  radio was  hidden and  used in  his backyard.

            There  was  ample  evidence he  was  more  culpable than  the

            average  participant.      See  U.S.S.G.    3B1.2,   comment.
                                       ___

            (backg'd.).

                      C.  Lugo-Maya
                          _________

                      In addition  to the mandatory sentence  of 30 years

            on  Count 4, Lugo-Maya was sentenced  under the Guidelines on

            the drug counts,  Counts 1-3.  Lugo-Maya challenges on appeal

                                         -40-
                                          40

            the district court's  calculation of his guidelines  sentence

            on the  drug counts.  He argues the court erred in not giving

            him two-level reductions each  for being a minor participant,

            pursuant   to  U.S.S.G.   3B1.2(b),  and  for  acceptance  of

            responsibility,  pursuant to  U.S.S.G.   3E1.1(a).    As  the

            district  court properly  found,  Lugo-Maya was  not a  minor

            participant -- he supplied  the yawls, sailed one out  to the

            mothership, helped to unload the drugs from  the boat, sailed

            the drugs to shore and helped unload them to the land.  As to

            acceptance of responsibility, Lugo-Maya's claim is factbound,

            and  the district  court's resolution  of  it is  not clearly

            erroneous.  See United States v. Royer, 895 F.2d  28, 29 (1st
                        ___ ______________________

            Cir. 1990).  His sentence on the drug counts is affirmed.

                            IV. SECTION 2255 MOTION ISSUES

                      While  these  consolidated  appeals  were  pending,

            Pagan-San-Miguel filed  in the district court  a motion under

            28 U.S.C.    2255 to vacate and  set aside his  conviction on

            the ground that the  court reporter's delay in providing  him

            with a transcript  denied him  his right to  a timely  appeal

            and, therefore, deprived  him of  due process of  law.8   The

                                
            ____________________

            8.  Pagan-San-Miguel filed his notice of appeal on August 3,
            1992.  Around that time, the court reporter agreed to furnish
            the necessary transcripts to Pagan-San-Miguel.  The court
            reporter, however, did not provide any transcripts to Pagan-
            San-Miguel until mid-1994.  Largely due to the court
            reporter's failure to prepare the transcripts, this court
            extended the period for briefing the case sixteen times.  On
            at least three occasions this court entered Orders to Show
            Cause threatening the court reporter with contempt if she did

                                         -41-
                                          41

            district  court denied  the motion.9   On  appeal, Pagan-San-

            Miguel argues that this was error.

                      Although  extreme delay  in  the processing  of  an

            appeal may  amount  to a  due process  violation, and  delays

            caused by court reporters  are attributable to the government

            for  purposes of  determining  whether a  defendant has  been

            deprived of  due process, see, e.g., United States v. Wilson,
                                      ___  ____  _______________________

            16 F.3d  1027, 1030 (9th  Cir. 1994), mere  delay, in and  of

            itself will not give rise  to a due process infraction.   The

            defendant must show prejudice.   See United States v. Tucker,
                                             ___ _______________________

            8 F.3d 673, 676-77  (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc),  cert. denied,
                                                            ____________

            114 S. Ct. 1230  (1994).  Whether an appellate  delay results

            in  prejudice sufficient  to warrant  reversing  a conviction

            rests, most  importantly, on a  showing that it  has impaired

            the appeal or  the defense in the event of  retrial.  See id.
                                                                  ___ ___

            at 676.

                                
            ____________________

            not produce the transcripts.

            9.  We have held that absent extraordinary circumstances a
            district court should not entertain a   2255 motion while a
            direct appeal from the same conviction is still pending. 
            United States v. Gordon, 634 F.2d 638 (1st Cir. 1980). 
            _______________________
            Nevertheless, instead of dismissing Pagan-San-Miguel's motion
            as being premature, the district court denied the motion.  In
            such a case, we may elect to reach the merits of the   2255
            motion.  See United States v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, 993 n.1,
                     ___ ________________________
            1000 n.6 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1015 (1989);
                                      ____________
            see also Rule 5, Rules Governing Proceedings in the United
            ________
            States District Courts Under Section 2255 of Title 28, United
            States Code, advisory committee note (1976).

                                         -42-
                                          42

                      There  was no  prejudice.   Although  there was  an

            appalling  delay in  preparing the  transcripts, there  is no

            argument  they are incomplete  or unreliable.  This  is not a

            situation  in  which  the  court  reporter  has  prepared  an

            unusable transcript.  Compare Wilson, 16 F.3d at 1031 (record
                                  _______ ______

            had portion missing or was unintelligible so  that record was

            totally  unreliable).   Indeed, Pagan-San-Miguel  only argues

            that the delay impaired his ability to present "the strongest

            possible evidence  in support  of the appellant's  version of

            the  facts"  surrounding  the  read-back  of  Castillo-Ramos'

            testimony   to  the  jury.    As  Pagan-San-Miguel  concedes,

            however,  no  objection  was  made to  the  district  court's

            handling of  the read-back.   And since  Pagan-San-Miguel has

            not  shown plain error in this regard, this argument does not

            make a difference to his appeal.10

                      The order  of the district court denying his   2255

            motion is affirmed.

                                      CONCLUSION

                      The  convictions   and  sentences   of   appellants

            Luciano-Mosquera, Pagan-San-Miguel, and Gonzalez-Valentin are

            affirmed on  all counts.   The  convictions of  Lugo-Maya and

            Pava-Buelba are reversed  on Count 4  and their sentences  on

                                
            ____________________

            10.   Alternatively, Pagan-San-Miguel requests that we set
            aside his conviction pursuant to our supervisory powers. 
            This is not an appropriate case for this court to exercise
            its supervisory powers.  See Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676.  
                                     ___ ______

                                         -43-
                                          43

            that  count  are  vacated.    Lugo-Maya's  and  Pava-Buelba's

            convictions and sentences on the drug counts, Counts 1-3, are

            affirmed.   The  district  court's order  denying  Pagan-San-

            Miguel's   2255 motion is affirmed.  It is so ordered.
                                                 ________________

                                         -44-
                                          44