Court Opinion

ID: 9635058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:34:20.653452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:16.680453
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice CARTER.
Kennedy offered evidence from Raschel-la Lampkins that the complaining witness told her and two other friends that they needed to have the same story, that they were going to have to say Kennedy touched A.C. so A.C. would not get in trouble, and that A.C. told them what their stories had to be concerning Kennedy touching her. The majority affirms the exclusion of this evidence, to which I dissent.
The majority opinion reaches its conclusion because “Kennedy limits his analysis to that portion of Rule 803(24) dealing with a statement against penal interest.” Therefore, the majority does not analyze whether this evidence was admissible based on other portions of Tex.R. Evid. 803(24).
I believe the evidence was admissible as provided by Rule 803(24) as a statement against the declarant’s social interest and as a statement invalidating a claim by the witness. This issue was clearly presented to the trial court — the evidence was offered by Kennedy, the State objected, based on hearsay, and Kennedy countered that the evidence was admissible as a statement against interest as set out in Tex.R. Evid. 803(24). I believe the issue has been sufficiently briefed in this Court. *319In the brief submitted to this Court, Kennedy presents an issue that the trial court erred by not admitting evidence under Rule 803(24). In the summary of the argument, Kennedy states the court erred in finding that the testimony did not fall under the exception to hearsay for a statement against interest under Rule 803(24). Kennedy argues on appeal that such denial was error and the evidence should have been allowed to be presented to the jury. In the argument section of the brief, Kennedy repeats the issue and quotes in its entirety Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24). Kennedy then cites a case as authority, Robinson v. Harkins & Co., 711 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.1986), which involves a statement embodying all three interests expressed in the rule (pecuniary, penal, and social). I believe that Kennedy has complied with the rule so that this issue is properly before the Court and should be addressed. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38(h) requires that the brief contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. Tex. R.App. P. 38(h). Here, the contention made is that the statement is an exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of the exceptions set out in Rule 803(24). The rule in its entirety is quoted as the authority, and a citation is given to a case and to the record. The briefing rules found in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure “are meant to acquaint the court with the issues in a case and to present argument that will enable the court to decide the case.” Tex. R.App. P. 38.9. The rules are to be construed liberally, and substantial compliance with the rules is sufficient unless the court determines the rules have been flagrantly violated (in which case the court may require further briefing), or that the case has not been properly presented, or that the law and authorities have not been properly cited (in which case the court may postpone submission, require additional briefing, or make any other necessary order for a satisfactory submission of the case). Tex.R.App. P. 38.9. Kennedy’s brief does not violate Rule 38.9 and substantially complies with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.8 Therefore, I will analyze the issues fairly raised in Kennedy’s brief.
I. EXCLUSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE
A. Testimony from Lampkins Concerning “Get[ting] Stories Straight”
Kennedy complains the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence from Lampkins that A.C. encouraged her friends to “get [their] stories straight.” Outside the presence of the jury, Lamp-kins testified A.C. told Lampkins and two other friends “that[J in case we all had to testify at eourt[,] that we all needed to have the same story.” Lampkins continued, testifying A.C. “told us our stories had to be that when he walked in, after he made that guy leave, that he started touching her. She never said that they had sexual intercourse. She just said that he touched her, that’s it. That’s what she told me.” Lampkins explained A.C. then “told us that we were going to have to say that he touched her so she wouldn’t get in troúble.” Lampkins repeated much of this testimony during the trial court’s in cam*320era investigation regarding related evidence. Testimony to this effect, Kennedy argues, is admissible as a statement against interest and, as such, an exception to the rule excluding hearsay. See Tex.R. Evid. 803(24).
B. Statement Against Interest Exception to Hearsay
The Texas Rules of Evidence provide that a statement against interest falls outside the rule excluding hearsay and defines a statement against interest as:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, or to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable person in declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. In criminal cases, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Tex.R. Evid. 803(24). The State limits its response to only one aspect of Rule 803(24) by pointing to the rule that any determination regarding the admissibility of a statement against penal interest in accordance with Rule 803(24) requires a two-step inquiry. See Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 113 (Tex.Crim.App.2004), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2295, 161 L.Ed.2d 1092 (2005). However, Rule 803(24) requires much more analysis than just whether a statement is one against the declarant’s penal interest.
Whether a statement is, in fact, a statement against interest under Rule 803(24) must be determined from the circumstances of each case. Drone v. State, 906 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, pet. ref'd). We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude a hearsay statement under Rule 803(24) for an abuse of discretion. See Bingham v. State, 987 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
1. Invalidating a Claim by Declarant
Initially, the language involving the invalidation of the declarant’s claim against another seems to address the statement excluded here. Although no Texas case-law has developed the application of the language “render invalid a claim by the declarant against another” in these circumstances, we note that the alleged statement, if believed by the jury, would tend to invalidate A.C.’s claim of abuse. So, while there is no authority delineating the boundaries of this aspect of Rule 803(24), I conclude that Lampkins’s testimony would be admissible in that A.C.’s statement would have rendered A.C.’s claim against Kennedy invalid.
2. Statement Against Social Interest
To be admitted on the basis it would subject the declarant to disgrace, the statement must be “in the context of the declarant’s social interests” and must be against such interests “at the time it was made.” Burks v. State, 40 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd) (citing Owens v. State, 916 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex.App.-Waco 1996, no pet.); Bell v. State, 877 S.W.2d 21, 24 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd)).
There appears to be a rather narrow application of Rule 803(24)’s statement against the “social interest” exception. See Sills v. State, 846 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). Sills describes the types of facts which would give rise to the application of this facet of Rule 803(24):
To be admissible, a statement against interest that makes the declarant the object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace
*321must be in the context of the declarant’s social interests, such as a confession by a small-town minister of homosexual conduct, Purtell v. State, 761 S.W.2d 360, 369 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), ... or a statement by a husband that he was responsible for an automobile accident whereby his wife became a paraplegic. Robinson v. Harkins & Co., 711 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.1986).
Sills, 846 S.W.2d at 397 (some citations omitted); see also Franklin v. State, 992 S.W.2d 698, 706 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd).
A type of statement that qualifies as a statement against social interest is presented when an appellant convicted of sexual assault of a child complained of the trial court’s admission of hearsay statements in which the fourteen-year-old complainant confessed to her mother to having had sexual relations with the twenty-six-year-old appellant. See Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754, 766 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd). She made the statements reluctantly and only did so when confronted by the possibility that her mother already “knew everything,” subjecting the complainant to punishment if she were to be untruthful. Id. This Court reasoned that “a reasonable person in [the complain-antj’s position would have known that her statements would subject her to disgrace in the eyes of her mother.” Id. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the hearsay statements.
To illustrate what evidence does not qualify as a statement against social interest, the Waco court’s opinion in Burks should be considered. There, the complainant’s note to her friend boasting about a sexual encounter with a boy was not admissible in an indecency and sexual assault of a child case. Burks, 40 S.W.3d at 701. The note did not qualify as a statement against social interest because it was not of a nature that would have subjected the declarant/complainant to “hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable person in declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.” Id.
Here, on the other hand, evidence that A.C. attempted to influence her friends to testify Kennedy touched her, so she would not get in trouble, runs directly against A.C.’s social interests. Her family, friends, and community would likely treat her with varying degrees and types of hostility, distrust, and resentment if it were revealed that she had lied about the abuse. Common sense and social norms suggest A.C. would have been subject to “disgrace, ridicule, or hatred” for having falsely accused a family friend of sexual assault. So the statement more closely resembles those deemed admissible in Glover and Purtell than it does the inadmissible statement in Burks.
Outside the presence of the jury, A.C. denied ever having made this statement. Likewise, other friends of A.C. testified outside the presence of the jury that A.C. did not make such a statement regarding “get[ting] [their] stories straight.” So, there is a conflict in the evidence. Such conflicts and related issues concerning credibility of witnesses fall squarely within the traditional purview of the jury. See Lester v. State, 120 S.W.3d 897, 902 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). The initial determination of trustworthiness is an issue of law, while the ultimate weight to be given to the testimony will be decided by the jury.9 I believe the court erred in *322excluding the testimony of Lampkins on this subject.
II. Harm Analysis
Where, as here, erroneous exclusion of evidence is the result of misapplication of the Texas Rules of Evidence and its admission is not claimed to be required by the United States or Texas Constitutions, we analyze harm under Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a), which provides that error may not be predicated on a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless a “substantial right” of the party is affected. Tex.R. Evid. 108(a); Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 666 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). The standard is the same as that under Rule 44.2(b). Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b); Potter, 68 S.W.3d at 666. A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Lester, 120 S.W.3d at 903. A criminal conviction should not be overturned for nonconstitu-tional error if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has a fair assurance the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect. See Tex. R.App. P. 44.2(b); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (citing King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)).
The excluded evidence, if believed by the jury, would seriously call into question the testimony of the complaining witness. A.C. was the primary witness to testify as to the guilt of Kennedy and, unless her testimony was believed, there was no direct evidence of Kennedy’s guilt. The excluded testimony went to the heart of the case — the credibility and believability of the only witness who testified Kennedy committed sexual assault. The excluded testimony attacked the credibility of the witness on the most important issue in the case, not some collateral matter or some detail of little importance. I cannot say with fair assurance that the erroneous exclusion of these statements of the complaining witness did not affect Kennedy’s substantial rights.
Under these circumstances, I believe we must reverse the case for further proceedings. I respectfully dissent.

. The majority opinion suggests Kennedy's brief did not put the State or this Court on notice Kennedy was relying on all aspects of Rule 803(24). Of course, I believe that both the Court and the State were properly notified as the rules require. However, if the concern is that the State should have further opportunity to respond, we could authorize supplemental briefing by the State "whenever justice requires, on whatever reasonable terms the court may prescribe.” Tex.R.App. P. 38.7.

. The jury, as trier of fact, is the ultimate judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. See Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon *3221979). The jury is entitled to accept or reject all or any part of the testimony by the witnesses for the State or the accused. Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Reconciliation of evidentiary conflicts is solely a function of the trier of fact. Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Millerv. State, 909 S.W.2d 586, 593 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no pet.).