Court Opinion

ID: 9409202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 08:08:29.135521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.211711
License: Public Domain

In the
          Court of Appeals
  Second Appellate District of Texas
           at Fort Worth
        ___________________________

             No. 02-22-00172-CR
        ___________________________

      DANIEL YOUNGBLOOD, Appellant

                       V.

            THE STATE OF TEXAS

     On Appeal from the 355th District Court
             Hood County, Texas
           Trial Court No. CR15272

       Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ.
     Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Daniel Youngblood appeals his felony conviction for failure to stop

and render aid following an accident involving death or serious bodily injury. See Tex.

Transp. Code Ann. § 550.021. In two issues, Youngblood argues that the State

violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and that the trial court erred by

refusing his request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of

misdemeanor failure to stop and render aid following an accident involving damage to

a vehicle. See id. § 550.022. Because we conclude that Youngblood was denied his right

to a speedy trial, we reverse Youngblood’s conviction and render a judgment of

acquittal.

                                    I. Background

       On January 26, 2021, Seth Reagan was stopped at a red light when his vehicle

was rear-ended by someone driving a BMW. Reagan’s vehicle received minor damage.

Reagan testified that he was “a little” dazed immediately after the collision and that he

got a “cut” on his nose from a Red Bull can he had been drinking from at the time of

the collision, which “bled a little bit” and required minor medical treatment. He did

not go to the emergency room and otherwise refused medical attention. Following the

collision, Reagan saw the driver of the BMW get out of the vehicle and then get back

into the vehicle before driving away. The driver of the BMW did not approach

Reagan’s vehicle or speak to him but instead drove away within fifteen seconds of the

collision.

                                           2
      State Trooper Marcus French responded to the scene of the collision and saw

Reagan’s vehicle and a trail of automobile fluid headed away from the scene of the

collision. He followed the trail of fluid to an empty BMW with severe front-end

damage parked approximately 300 feet up the road from Reagan’s vehicle. Inside the

vehicle, French found a Texas identification card and a debit card that apparently

belonged to Youngblood. French subpoenaed bank records for the debit card and

obtained security footage from the bank, which showed that Youngblood had driven

a BMW to the bank and used the debit card to make a withdrawal at the bank’s ATM

at 6:45 p.m. on January 26, 2021.

      In his investigative report dated February 10, 2021, French requested that arrest

warrants be issued for Youngblood for both misdemeanor driving while license

invalid with a previous conviction and felony failure to stop and render aid following

an accident involving death or serious bodily injury. On April 29, 2021, Youngblood

was arrested pursuant to the misdemeanor warrant. From the record it appears that

no information was ever filed. Youngblood remained in jail, though, where he was

served with the felony-arrest warrant on August 28, 2021.

      Youngblood’s jury trial began on July 11, 2022, and he was convicted on the

felony charge. Youngblood and the State agreed on a five-year sentence of

confinement and agreed to preserve all appellate issues raised during the guilt–

innocence phase. Youngblood timely appealed.

                                          3
                   II. Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial

      In his first issue, Youngblood contends that the delay from his initial arrest on

April 29, 2021, until his trial on July 11, 2022, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a

speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. He argues that under the four-factor balancing

test set out in Barker v. Wingo, he is entitled to a dismissal of the charges against him.

407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972); see also Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d

801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). To assist in evaluating Youngblood’s speedy-trial

claim, we will set out a detailed timeline below.

A. Speedy-Trial Facts

   • January 26, 2021, the collision with Reagan’s vehicle occurs.

   • February 10, 2021, Trooper French requests arrest warrants for both the
     misdemeanor and the felony offenses.

   • April 29, 2021, Youngblood is arrested for the misdemeanor.

   • August 28, 2021, Youngblood is arrested for the felony.

   • October 6, 2021, Youngblood is indicted.

   • October 19, 2021, Youngblood files a motion to proceed pro se.

   • October 25, 2021, Youngblood files a pro se “application” for writ of
     mandamus with this court requesting that the trial court be ordered to give him
     a speedy trial, grant his motion to proceed pro se, and give him an examining
     trial. 1

      1
        The documents filed by Youngblood did not comply with the requisites for a
petition for writ of mandamus. We sent noncompliance letters to Youngblood on
October 26, 2021, and January 27, 2022, along with his unfiled documents. We
received no further correspondence from Youngblood.

                                            4
   • November 9, 2021, Youngblood’s appointed trial counsel withdraws as counsel
     and the trial court appoints new trial counsel. On the same day, Youngblood’s
     newly appointed counsel files a motion to suppress.

   • November 22, 2021, Youngblood’s trial counsel files a motion for a speedy
     trial.

   • December 13, 2021, Youngblood’s trial counsel files an amended motion to
     suppress.

   • January 18, 2022, the trial court hears and grants Youngblood’s motion to
     proceed pro se.

   • February 2, 2022, Youngblood files a motion to quash, which the trial court
     sets for hearing on March 14, 2022.

   • February 7, 2022, Youngblood files another motion for a speedy trial, which
     the trial court sets for hearing on March 14, 2022.

   • February 15, 2022, the trial court hears and denies Youngblood’s amended
     motion to suppress.

   • March 8, 2022, Youngblood files an amended motion for reconsideration to
     suppress evidence.

   • March 14, 2022, Youngblood files an amended motion to quash and a petition
     for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court requesting a court date, findings of
     fact, and a dismissal based on due process violations, unreasonable search and
     seizure, and unlawful arrest.2

   • March 17, 2022, Youngblood files a motion in limine and a motion to disclose
     confidential informants.

   • March 21, 2022, the State files responses to Youngblood’s motion to quash and
     to his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

      2
        The petition also asserts that Youngblood’s Sixth Amendment rights had been
violated, but it does not identify which rights or how they were violated.

                                           5
   • March 22, 2022, the State files a response to Youngblood’s motion to disclose
     identity of confidential informants, and on the same day, the trial court hears
     Youngblood’s motion to quash, petition for writ of habeas corpus, motion for
     reconsideration to suppress evidence, motion for a speedy trial, and motion to
     disclose identity of confidential informants.

   • March 22, 2022, the State announces “ready” and the trial court sets
     Youngblood’s case for trial on May 9, 2022.

   • March 24, 2022, Youngblood files an amended petition for writ of habeas
     corpus in the trial court requesting only an examining trial.

   • May 5, 2022, the trial court holds a status hearing to inform Youngblood that
     his May 9, 2022 trial setting is postponed until July 11, 2022. Youngblood
     asserts his right to a speedy trial and requests a special setting, which the trial
     court denies.

   • May 17, 2022, Youngblood files a motion to dismiss on the grounds that his
     Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated.

   • June 28, 2022, the trial court hears and denies Youngblood’s motion to dismiss.

   • July 11, 2022, Youngblood’s trial begins.

B. The Barker Factors

      The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the

accused in all criminal prosecutions the right to a speedy trial, which is extended to

the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Barker, 407 U.S.

at 515, 92 S. Ct. at 2184; see U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV. To determine when a Sixth

Amendment speedy-trial violation occurs, appellate courts apply a balancing test using

the Barker factors. See 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808

(reciting Barker factors). Appellate courts weigh (1) the length of the delay, (2) the

                                           6
reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his speedy-trial right, and

(4) prejudice to the defendant because of the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct.

at 2192; see State v. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The conduct

of the State and the defendant are weighed under each factor, though no single factor

alone is necessary or sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation. Barker, 407 U.S. at

533, 92 S. Ct. at 2193; Black v. State, No. 02-21-00057-CR, 2022 WL 3464563, at *3

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 18, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Cochnauer v. State, No. 02-19-00165-CR, 2021 WL 3931914, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Sept. 2, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

       The length of the delay is, to an extent, a triggering mechanism for the

remaining factors in the balancing test. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 113; Black, 2022 WL

3464563, at *3; Cochnauer, 2021 WL 3931914, at *3.

       Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no
       necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.
       Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial,
       the length of the delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily
       dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; see Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 113; Dragoo v.

State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 313–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Notably, the Supreme Court has

explained that “the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is

considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407 U.S. at

531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192.

                                            7
      If a presumptively prejudicial delay has occurred, the State bears the initial

burden of justifying the delay. Black, 2022 WL 3464563, at *3; Harper v. State, 567

S.W.3d 450, 459 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, no pet.). The defendant, in turn, has

the burden to prove both his diligent assertion of his right to a speedy trial and to

show prejudice. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Black,

2022 WL 3464563, at *3. The defendant’s burden on the third and fourth factors

“varies inversely with the State’s culpability for the delay; the greater the bad faith or

official negligence on the part of the State, the less a defendant must show assertion

of the right or prejudice.” Black, 2022 WL 3464563, at *3 (first citing Cantu, 253

S.W.3d at 280–81; and then citing Bender v. State, No. 02-17-00342-CR, 2018 WL

4401745, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication)).

C. Standard of Review

      In our review, we apply an abuse of discretion standard for the factual

components, giving “almost total deference to historical findings of fact of the trial

court that the record supports and draw[ing] reasonable inferences from those facts

necessary to support the trial court’s findings.” Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808–09; see

Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 113–14. We review de novo “whether there was sufficient

presumptive prejudice to proceed to a Barker analysis and the weighing of the Barker

factors, which are legal questions.” Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 809. However, “while an

evaluation of the Barker factors includes fact determinations and legal conclusions,

                                            8
‘the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo.’” Lopez,

631 S.W.3d at 114 (quoting Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767–68 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016)).

D. Analysis

      1. Length of the Delay

      At the outset, Youngblood was required to make a threshold showing that the

length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial. See Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808;

Black, 2022 WL 3464563, at *4. Presumptive prejudice “simply marks the point at

which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger [the Barker] enquiry.”

Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114 (quoting State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821–22 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1999)). “When the length of delay stretches well beyond the bare minimum

needed to trigger a full Barker analysis, the length of [the] delay weighs against the

State, and the longer the delay, the more the defendant’s prejudice is compounded.”

Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 809 (footnote omitted).

      To calculate the delay length, we measure from the time that the accused is

arrested or formally accused. Id. An “accusation” occurs when the defendant is either

arrested or formally charged with a crime. Id.; Black, 2022 WL 3464563, at *4. The

speedy-trial clock thus starts when a formal indictment, information, or actual arrest

occurs. Cochnauer, 2021 WL 3931914, at *3; see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,

320, 92 S. Ct. 455, 463 (1971).

                                            9
       Youngblood and the State disagree on when the speedy-trial clock started.

Youngblood contends that the speedy-trial clock started when he was first arrested for

criminal conduct pursuant to the misdemeanor warrant on April 29, 2021. Beginning

the clock on April 29, 2021, would amount to a 438-day delay, or approximately

fourteen-and-a-half months. The State, on the other hand, argues that the speedy-trial

clock did not start until Youngblood was arrested for the felony charge3 on August

28, 2021, which would amount to a 317-day delay, or approximately ten-and-a-half

months. Regardless of whether the speedy-trial clock started on April 29, 2021, or

August 28, 2021, we conclude that, based on the peculiar circumstances of this case,

either would sufficiently trigger the Barker analysis.

       Although there is no set amount of time necessary to trigger the Barker analysis,

it appears that the facts of this case are not typical with respect to when the speedy-

trial clock begins to run. “Previous Texas authorities hit around the question, but do

so in different contexts.” Stone v. State, No. 08-16-00343-CR, 2018 WL 1737076, at *4

(Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 11, 2018, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).

       In Lopez, the defendant was arrested on April 18, 2017, pursuant to a felony

charge. 631 S.W.3d at 110. On July 12, 2017, the State dismissed the felony charge and

reduced it to a misdemeanor charge based on the same criminal conduct. Id. The trial

court set the case for trial on August 8, 2017, and ultimately granted the defendant’s

       3
        During oral arguments, counsel for the State argued that the speedy-trial clock
started the date of the felony arrest. In its brief, however, the State appears to argue
that the speedy-trial clock started when Youngblood was indicted on October 6, 2021.

                                            10
motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds. Id. at 111, 112. In its review of an asserted

speedy-trial violation, the Court of Criminal Appeals measured the delay “from the

time of [the defendant’s April 18, 2017] arrest to the August 8[] trial date,” or 112 days

in jail, despite the subsequent misdemeanor charge filed on July 12, 2017. Id. at 114–

15. The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the speedy-trial clock started

on the date of the defendant’s initial arrest for the felony, not the date of the

misdemeanor charge for which he would have been tried. See id. at 114.4

      Conversely, in Stone, the defendant was arrested for misdemeanor driving while

intoxicated (DWI) on March 27, 2015. 2018 WL 1737076, at *1. Over the next

eighteen months, the defendant was formally charged with the misdemeanor, the case

was set and reset for trial multiple times, the State subpoenaed several witnesses, and

the defendant filed motions for a speedy trial. Id. at *1–2. In July 2016, the State

informed the trial court that the case was being presented to a grand jury, and on

September 6, 2016, a grand jury returned an indictment for the felony offense of

intoxication assault. Id. at *2. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss for want

of speedy trial on September 26, 2016. Id. The El Paso Court of Appeals, however,

declined to measure the length of the delay from the date of the defendant’s initial

arrest on March 27, 2015, and instead concluded that the speedy-trial clock began on

September 6, 2016, the date of the felony indictment. Id. at *6. The court reasoned

      4
        Although the court ultimately held that the 112-day delay was not
presumptively prejudicial and insufficient to trigger an analysis of the remaining Barker
factors, we cite this case for guidance only in calculating the delay.

                                           11
that “[o]nly after making a more careful consideration of whether it could prove

beyond a reasonable doubt a novel medical causation question did the State elevate

the charge to a felony.” Id.

       We find persuasive a federal case from the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, in which the court concluded that “[g]iving each charge its own

relevant time period for assessing delay could subject a criminal defendant to nearly

ceaseless pre-trial detention due to superseding indictments, each time justified by a

new charge with a new element.” United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir.

2019). Quoting the United States Supreme Court, the Second Circuit reasoned that

“the speedy[-]trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy

incarceration prior to trial . . . [and] shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and

the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” Id. (quoting United States v. MacDonald,

456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 1502 (1982)).

       Here, unlike in Stone, the issue is not whether the speedy-trial clock begins at

Youngblood’s arrest for the misdemeanor or at his indictment. Rather, the issue is

simply which arrest starts the clock. This case is further distinguishable because, after

a brief investigation—approximately two weeks—Trooper French requested arrest

warrants for both the misdemeanor offense and the felony offense on the same day.

Indeed, the officer’s investigative report—dated February 10, 2021—charges

Youngblood with both offenses for the same criminal conduct. At trial, the officer

testified that he sought the misdemeanor arrest warrant from the justice court but that

                                            12
the felony arrest warrant had to be requested from the Hood County District

Attorney’s Office, “[s]o they’re not going to come - - the warrants are not going to be

out at the same time.” There was no novel question that the State had to consider

before pursuing the felony charge. The mere fact that the district attorney’s office

took longer to prepare the felony warrant than the justice court took to sign the

misdemeanor warrant should have no bearing on when Youngblood became an

“accused.” Giving each of Youngblood’s charges its own relevant time period for

assessing the delay would subject him to nearly ceaseless pre-trial delay. Accordingly,

we conclude that Youngblood became an “accused” on the date of his initial arrest—

April 29, 2021.

      But even if we did not reach this conclusion, “[g]enerally, a delay of eight

months to a year, or longer, is presumptively prejudicial and triggers a speedy[-]trial

analysis.” Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114 (first citing Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 889

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003); and then citing Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1992)); see also Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314 (“In general, courts deem delay

approaching one year to be ‘unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.’”

(quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2691 n.1

(1992))). Therefore, even if we do not measure the time between April 29, 2021—

Youngblood’s initial arrest—and August 28, 2021—Youngblood’s felony arrest—the

almost year-long delay between Youngblood’s felony arrest and the start of his trial

                                          13
would still be presumptively prejudicial and trigger an analysis of the remaining Barker

factors. This factor weighs against the State.

       2. Reasons for the Delay

       The State has the burden of justifying the length of the delay. Cantu, 253

S.W.3d at 280; Wade v. State, No. 02-21-00125-CR, 2023 WL 2534468, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). When assessing this factor—reasons for delay—different weight is given

to different reasons. Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 809; Cochnauer, 2021 WL 3931914, at *3.

For instance, deliberate conduct by the State will weigh more heavily against the State

than more neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded dockets. Gonzales, 435

S.W.3d at 809; Cochnauer, 2021 WL 3931914, at *3. But “a valid reason, such as a

missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92

S. Ct. at 2192. If the State fails to give a reason for delay, the factor will be considered

neutral and weigh slightly against the State. Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314. And as with the

triggering point for a full-Barker analysis, a justifiable reason for delay in a complex

case may not be a justifiable reason in a simple case. Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 810;

Wade, 2023 WL 2534468, at *5.

       At the March 22, 2022 hearing on Youngblood’s second motion for a speedy

trial, the State provided no justification for the delay. When the trial court held a

status hearing on May 5, 2022, to inform Youngblood that his May 9, 2022 trial

setting was further delayed, it was the trial court that provided a justification for the

                                            14
delay: a CPS trial that began on May 2, 2022, was “taking a long time and w[ould] not

finish” before May 9, 2022. At the hearing on Youngblood’s motion to dismiss, the

trial court provided the same justification when it denied Youngblood’s motion.

       On appeal, the State appears to blame the delay on Youngblood’s colliding with

Reagan’s car ten months into the COVID-19 pandemic when “[e]very court in the

state was experiencing significant backlogs.” But our analysis concerns only the trial

court in this case, and the State offers no evidence to support its broad, two-sentence

COVID-19 justification. There is no evidence—and the State does not assert—that

the trial court ceased criminal matters during the pandemic, and if it did, the State

does not explain the extent or duration of the cessation. It is also unclear whether the

trial court or the district attorney’s office used virtual methods, such as Zoom, to

allow criminal matters to move forward, as several other courts in the state had done.

“Not having that information matters because ‘even in a pandemic, the Constitution

cannot be put away and forgotten.’” Wade, 2023 WL 2534468, at *7 (quoting Duc Minh

Huynh v. State, No. 05-21-00991-CR, 2022 WL 17261155, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Nov. 29, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)); see Roman Cath.

Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020) (per curiam).

       The State also argues that Youngblood’s May 9, 2022 trial setting was

“preempted by a Child Protective Services case that could not be postponed” and that

his case was specially set at the next available setting after a continuous sexual abuse

case that had been specially set in June. The State offers no evidence in support of its

                                            15
argument. Nor does the State cite any authority supporting its contention that CPS

matters must be prioritized over criminal matters. Indeed, “a crowded court docket is

not a valid reason for delay.” Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890.

       The majority of the State’s argument attempting to justify the delay is that

Youngblood’s litigation strategy was directly responsible for the delay.5 Referring to

Youngblood’s pre-trial motions, the State contends that the delay was simply a

“necessary consequence of [Youngblood’s] extensive pre-trial litigation.” The record

does not show that Youngblood’s pre-trial litigation was “extensive”—it consists of

only seventy-seven pages of hearing transcript on his pre-trial motions—and the State

cites to no authority that a defendant’s pre-trial evidentiary motions or motions for a

speedy trial constitute a waiver of the speedy-trial claim. Cf. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S.

81, 93–94, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1292 (2009) (finding no speedy-trial violation when

defendant was appointed at least six attorneys and “aggressively” sought to dismiss his

attorney on the eve of trial); Wade v. State, 83 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2002, no pet.) (finding no speedy-trial violation when reason for delay was defendant’s

ignoring his duties under his community supervision).

       The State had the burden to justify the reasons for the delay. Youngblood’s

criminal case was not complex, and the reasons provided by the State do not justify

the length of the delay. Even if it had, the State’s initial failure to provide a reason for

       5
        Notably, the State raises this argument for the first time on appeal; it provided
no such justification at either the hearing on Youngblood’s motion for a speedy trial
or the hearing on his motion to dismiss.

                                            16
the delay and the trial court’s overcrowded docket would still weigh against the State,

though less heavily than deliberate conduct. This factor weighs against the State.

      3. Assertion of the Right

      The third factor—assertion of the speedy-trial right—concerns whether and

how the defendant asserts the right. Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 810; Cochnauer, 2021 WL

3931914, at *4. The defendant bears the burden to show that he timely asserted his

right. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280, 282–83. Any delay in asserting a speedy-trial right

weighs against a defendant, as does requesting dismissal rather than trial. See Dragoo,

96 S.W.3d at 314–15; see also Cochnauer, 2021 WL 3931914, at *4 (filing for dismissal

after trial court granted defendant’s request for speedy trial undermined defendant’s

claim of speedy-trial violation because it showed a desire for no trial instead of a

speedy trial). But “[r]epeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of the

defendant.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283.

      Here, the record shows that Youngblood first asserted—or at least attempted

to assert—the right on October 25, 2021, when he sought a writ of mandamus with

this court requesting, among other things, a speedy trial. Youngblood filed his first

motion for a speedy trial on November 22, 2021. After the trial court granted

Youngblood’s request to represent himself, he filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial

on February 7, 2022, which the trial court finally heard on March 22, 2022. Neither of

Youngblood’s speedy-trial motions sought dismissal, nor did his application for writ

of mandamus. On May 17, 2022, after his May 9, 2022 trial setting had been extended

                                          17
to July 11, 2022, and thirteen months after his initial arrest, Youngblood filed a

motion to dismiss asserting that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.

Throughout his case, Youngblood also made several requests on the record that his

case be set for trial at three separate hearings before filing his motion to dismiss.

       Youngblood diligently sought a speedy trial. He first asserted his right in the

trial court in a motion for a speedy trial—not a dismissal—within seven months of his

initial arrest and less than two months after he was formally charged. Cf. id. at 283–84

(acknowledging that “one cannot file a motion for a speedy trial until formal charges

are made” and that an accused may “wait until he is charged, then file a motion for a

speedy trial, . . . then file a motion to dismiss because he has diligently sought what he

is entitled to”). Youngblood then asserted his speedy-trial right several times. His

motions unequivocally requested a speedy trial and were considered by the trial court,

and in response, the trial court set a trial date. Only after he had requested a speedy

trial several times did he seek a dismissal. Moreover, the State concedes that

Youngblood “certainly asserted his right to a speedy trial.” We conclude that

Youngblood asserted his right and that his repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh

heavily in Youngblood’s favor.

       4. Prejudice

       The final Barker factor—prejudice—is assessed in light of what the speedy-trial

right is designed to prevent: oppressive pretrial incarceration, a defendant’s anxiety

and concern, or impairment of a defense. Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 315. Impairment of a

                                            18
defense is the most serious, as an inability to adequately prepare for trial skews the

fairness of the justice system. Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193).

Actual prejudice is not required, but the defendant must show some prejudice caused

by the delay. McCarty v. State, 498 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (citing

Harris v. State, 489 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)). If the defendant makes a

prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the

defendant “suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary

and inevitable delay.” Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 826 (quoting Ex parte McKenzie, 491

S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)).

      Here, Youngblood claims prejudice in that the delay both cost him personally

and caused his defense to suffer. He asserts that he missed several important family

events, including weddings and funerals, and that witnesses’ memories of exculpatory

events following the collision had faded during the delay. At the hearing on his

motion to dismiss, Youngblood argued that he had been harmed by the delay because

he had to wait through multiple appointed attorneys, that he had missed his

daughter’s birthdays and Father’s Days, and that the additional extension on his trial

date caused him further harm. The State does not respond or otherwise address this

element, nor does it attempt to rebut the presumptive prejudice of the delay. See

Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 654–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (finding the

defendant entitled to relief where the State’s negligence caused the prejudicial delay

and it did not “rebut, explain, or minimize the presumption of prejudice”).

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      At trial, Youngblood’s defense was that he did stop to check on Reagan

following the collision. Youngblood testified at his own trial and disputed the State’s

claim that he did not check on Reagan immediately after the collision. According to

Youngblood, he got out of his vehicle and went to Reagan’s window to ask if he was

okay. Reagan responded, “Yes,” and Youngblood confirmed that Reagan’s only injury

was the cut on his nose and that he did not need an ambulance. Youngblood

contends that he drove away from the scene of the collision only after making sure

that Reagan was okay.

      On cross-examination, Youngblood questioned Reagan’s memory of the

incident. In response to Youngblood’s questioning, Reagan first testified that “nobody

approached [his] vehicle that night.” He then stated that the owner of a body shop

near the scene of the collision approached him to ask if he was okay, if he needed an

ambulance, or if he needed to go to the hospital. Youngblood then asked Reagan,

“Would it surprise you to know that that was me that came to your car door?” Reagan

responded, “I wouldn’t remember too well.”6

      Lieutenant Blake Martin from the volunteer fire department also testified. The

State questioned him about the fire department’s response to the scene of the

collision and about his observations. When asked if he observed Reagan at the scene,

      6
       On redirect, the State sought to clarify Reagan’s statement that he did not
remember who approached his vehicle to check on him by offering that it was the
owner of the body shop that checked on him, and Reagan simply agreed despite
previously questioning his memory.

                                          20
Martin responded, “Honestly, I do not remember.” When asked if Reagan had been

treated by someone else in the fire department, Martin referred to the fire

department’s report from the collision and vaguely responded, “I believe so.”

       Youngblood represented himself, pro se, and he was incarcerated from the

time of his initial arrest up until the date of his trial. “Passage of time, whether before

or after arrest, may impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant

of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend himself.” Marion, 404

U.S. at 322, 92 S. Ct. at 464; see also United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 889 (5th Cir.

1978) (“[I]n order to prejudice the defense to the extent necessary to constitute a

speedy[-]trial violation, the faded memory must substantially relate to a material fact in

issue.”). Because the failure to stop was material in Youngblood’s conviction, we

conclude that Youngblood was prejudiced by the delay. Accordingly, this factor

weighs against the State.

       5. Balancing the Barker Factors

       Taken together, the Barker factors demonstrate a speedy-trial violation. First,

the delay was presumptively prejudicial with or without the inclusion of Youngblood’s

initial arrest. Second, the State bore the burden of proof to justify the delay and

wholly failed to do so; in any event, the delay was the result of neutral factors such as

the trial court’s overcrowded docket, which would still weigh against the State. Third,

Youngblood diligently sought a speedy trial, and his repeated requests for a speedy

trial weigh heavily in Youngblood’s favor. Finally, the record indicates that

                                             21
Youngblood was prejudiced by the delay, which the State failed—indeed did not

attempt—to rebut. This simple prosecution may have been of little moment to the

State, but it mattered greatly to Youngblood. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 655 (citing

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S. Ct. at 2693). We conclude that Youngblood’s

constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. We sustain his first issue.

                                     III. Conclusion

       Having sustained Youngblood’s Sixth Amendment issue, we do not reach his

second issue. See Tex. R. App. 47.1. We reverse Youngblood’s conviction and render a

judgment of acquittal.

                                                         /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                         Wade Birdwell
                                                         Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: July 13, 2023

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