Court Opinion

ID: 9796665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:02:05.98794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:53.859509
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
I concur in the judgment. I write separately to explain why I do not join in the entirety of the majority’s reasoning.
For the second time in less than a year, this court has been asked to evaluate the constitutional validity of a law enforcement response to an anonymous phoned-in report of potential criminality (see People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8, 136 P.3d 810] (Wells)) and to apply the rule about such reports laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. J. L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266 [146 L.Ed.2d 254, 120 S.Ct. 1375] (J. L.). In J. L., police received an anonymous tip that a young African-American male wearing a plaid shirt was standing at a particular bus stop and was carrying a concealed weapon. Police located a person at the bus stop who matched the tipster’s description but failed to observe any criminal behavior. They nevertheless detained and searched the man, discovering a concealed *477weapon. The high court unanimously invalidated the search, reasoning that confirmation of the innocent details of an anonymous tip was insufficient to supply reasonable cause to detain. “An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” (Id. at p. 272, italics added.)
Wells posed a similar situation, but a majority of this court came to a different conclusion. In Wells, an anonymous caller reported the existence of a blue van traveling in a certain direction on the highway “ ‘weaving all over the roadway.’ ” (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) Police located a van matching the description but did not confirm any criminality, i.e., the van was not weaving or speeding, and the van’s driver was apparently obeying all relevant traffic laws. Based solely on the information provided in the anonymous tip, however, police stopped the vehicle and arrested the driver on finding she appeared intoxicated. A majority of this court upheld that search and seizure, citing a plethora of purported justifications: the Wells majority distinguished J. L. because the possibility of a drunk driver weaving on the highway posed “a far more grave and immediate risk to the public than a report of mere passive gun possession [as in J. L.]” (Wells, at p. 1087); the state has a strong interest in preventing drunk driving (ibid.); the tipster had personal knowledge of the crime because he or she “presumably” viewed the van weaving (ibid.); the level of personal intrusion accompanying a traffic stop is “considerably less” than the patsearch in J. L. (ibid.); in light of the “ ‘pervasive regulation’ ” of vehicles on public roadways, people have a reduced expectation of privacy when in their cars (ibid.); and the tip’s description of the van was sufficiently detailed to permit an inference it was reliable (id. at p. 1088).
I dissented in Wells because the majority’s multiple stated rationales, alone or in combination, were unpersuasive in light of J. L., supra, 529 U.S. 266. The instant case, by contrast, presents a closer question than in Wells, for the anonymous caller in this case reported defendant had threatened him personally with a gun, thereby establishing (to the extent such can be established by an anonymous tip) that the caller had personal knowledge of the crime. This circumstance is critically important. The J. L. court emphasized that an anonymous tip, though corroborated as to its innocent aspects, was insufficient to supply reasonable cause to detain, in part because the “unaccountable informant. . . neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about [the defendant].” (J. L., at p. 271, italics added; see also id. at p. 270, quoting Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 329 [110 L.Ed.2d 301, 110 S.Ct. 2412] [“ ‘an anonymous tip *478alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity’ ”].) The majority in Wells argued the tipster in that case must personally have seen the blue van weaving all over the roadway, but, as I explained in my dissent, the argument failed because the conclusion was without factual support; the majority merely presumed the tipster was an eyewitness to the illegal activity. (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1092 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) “That the tip [in Wells] was from another driver or any other eyewitness is no more than conjecture; nothing is known of the identity of the tipster or the basis of the tipster’s knowledge.” (Ibid., italics added.)
By contrast, the tipster in this case was not completely anonymous; he revealed his name was “Drew.” More importantly, he was an eyewitness to the illegal activity. He reported to police that someone matching defendant’s description had “just pulled a gun” on him and threatened to shoot him. A few minutes after his initial call, “Drew” called back to report that he had driven by the crime scene again and his initial description of the car was incorrect, further indicating he was actually at the scene and had personal knowledge of the crime.
These facts distinguish the instant case from Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1078, where the record was devoid of evidence the tipster had personal knowledge of any crime. J. L., supra, 529 U.S. 266, is distinguishable on this ground as well, for the caller in that case provided no information suggesting he or she had personal knowledge of any criminality. On balance, then, I agree with the majority here that Officer Dominguez, responding to “Drew’s” report that someone matching defendant’s description had just threatened him with a firearm, did not violate defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the officer detained and searched him.
I write separately because I cannot subscribe to the remainder of the majority’s analysis. The J. L. court explained that anonymous tips were different from those made by callers known to police, both because the reputation of known callers can be assessed and known callers can be held responsible if their allegations turn out to be fabricated. (J. L, supra, 529 U.S. at p. 270.) The J. L. court held that when deciding whether an anonymous tip supplies reasonable cause to detain and search, the critical question is whether the tip bore “ ‘sufficient indicia of reliability.’ ” (Ibid.) The majority here reasons “Drew’s” tip supplied sufficient indicia of reliability because he called the 911 emergency number and the call was recorded. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 467.) The majority fails, however, to explain how either circumstance enhances the caller’s reliability, that is, how an anonymous caller’s use of the familiar 911 line or the recording of the call will assist courts in evaluating *479the caller’s reputation or veracity, or will permit police to hold the caller responsible for a false or fabricated tip.1
Contrary to the majority’s implication, someone who wishes to make a false accusation, perpetrate a hoax, or is merely mistaken, can do so just as easily by calling 911 as by calling police on a nonemergency line.2 Similarly flawed is the majority’s reliance on the fact the telephone call was recorded. The majority reasons an anonymous call that is recorded is more reliable because the caller risks being identified by his or her voice or having the call traced to its originating location. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 467.) Left unexplained is how the mere recording of a telephone call facilitates tracing it to its source. Nor is there any evidence callers are aware their call will be recorded or that officers in the field review such recordings to see if they recognize the tipster’s voice before responding to the call. That this court, as the majority assures us, has listened to the call and found “nothing in it that casts doubt on the tipster-victim’s veracity” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 467, fn. 2) seems patently irrelevant to the issue at hand, i.e., whether when made the call provided police with justification for intruding on defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.3 In short, an anonymous call, without more, provides little or no information about the reliability or trustworthiness of the caller, irrespective of whether the call was to 911 and was recorded.
That police must take 911 calls “ ‘seriously and respond with dispatch’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 467, quoting U.S. v. Terry-Crespo, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 1176) and should not “discount anonymous 911 calls reporting contemporaneous violent conduct” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 467) responds to an argument no one is making. Nothing in J. L. (or, for that matter, my dissenting opinion in Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1089) suggests police are powerless to respond to an anonymous 911 call or that police should ignore or discount such calls. Indeed, once police are on the scene, they may be able to corroborate some criminal aspect of an anonymous tip. J. L. merely teaches that an anonymous tip must bear some indicia of reliability, such as being *480corroborated as to its criminal aspects and not just its innocent details, before such a tip is sufficient to warrant the invasion of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Finally, the majority’s conclusion that the anonymous tip here was sufficiently reliable because the tipster provided “an accurate and complete description of the perpetrator and his location, the details of which were confirmed within minutes by the police when they arrived” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 468), fails to apprehend that it was exactly this type of confirmation of the innocent details of an anonymous tip that the high court in J. L held to be insufficient. “The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” (J. L, supra, 529 U.S. at p. 272, quoted with approval in the maj. opn., ante, at p. 471.)
The majority suggests this case falls outside J. L’s insistence that police determine whether an anonymous call bears sufficient indicia of reliability because the crime reported involved a “grave and immediate risk not only to the caller but also to anyone nearby.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 465.) To be sure, the J. L. court left open the possibility that an anonymous tip warning of some catastrophic harm, such as a person carrying a bomb, could “justify a search even without a showing of [the tip’s] reliability.” (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at pp. 273-274.) But the anonymous tip here, reporting defendant had threatened the caller with a firearm (but apparently was no longer doing so) did not pose a danger of similar magnitude to the offense the high court speculated about in J. L. As I explained in my dissenting opinion in Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 1091: “That the high court in J. L. left open the possibility that a catastrophic threat might justify a somewhat relaxed standard of reasonable cause to detain does not suggest we are now to rank all crimes along a sliding scale, permitting investigatory detentions on lesser showings when the detainees are suspected of more serious crimes. Certainly merely by mentioning the possibility of a threat ‘so great’ that some lesser degree of suspicion could justify a detention, the high court did not suggest such a regime.” The majority’s hypothetical of a freshly kidnapped child (maj. opn., ante, at p. 468, fn. 3) may be distinguished as just such a catastrophic threat. That some exceptions exist at the extreme outer edges of the law does not justify a wholesale jettisoning of the general rule that anonymous tips must be corroborated in some aspect of their criminality and not just as to their innocent details.
Also troubling is what the majority fails to include in its analysis, factors on which the Wells majority placed considerable importance. First, in concluding police in Wells had reasonable cause to stop the defendant’s vehicle based solely on an anonymous tip, the Wells majority explained that “the *481level of intrusion of personal privacy and inconvenience involved in a brief vehicle stop is considerably less than the ‘embarrassing police search’ on a public street condemned by J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at page 272.” (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1087.) I disagreed with that reasoning (id. at p. 1093 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.)), and the majority appears to have abandoned it for this case. Had the majority chosen to apply that reasoning here, it would be forced to conclude it weighed against the search and seizure, for defendant was extracted from his vehicle at gunpoint and made to lie facedown on the pavement with his hands at his sides, hardly a trivial inconvenience or innocuous invasion of his personal privacy.
Second, the Wells majority justified the detention there by explaining that “ ‘in light of the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways, individuals generally have a reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle on public thoroughfares.’ ” (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1087, quoting In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, 68 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, 38 P.3d 433].) I disagreed with that reasoning as well (Wells, at pp. 1092-1093 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.)) because the Fourth Amendment’s auto exception, based as it is on the mobility of cars and the state’s pervasive regulation of them, merely permits a more extensive search once a vehicle is lawfully stopped and the driver detained. With some exceptions not applicable here, the auto exception does not permit a detention and search on a lesser quantum of cause. Although defendant here was in his car parked on a public street when police encountered him, the majority, without explanation, has chosen not to invoke the auto exception to justify his detention and search.
By abandoning these twin rationales, central to the majority’s reasoning in Wells but apparently of no use today, the majority sows substantial doctrinal doubt where additional clarity would be more appropriate. After today’s decision, for example, one might wonder: Is the “level of intrusion of personal privacy and inconvenience” (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1087) accompanying a particular detention a factor courts should consider when evaluating whether an anonymous tip justified the detention or not? Do anonymous tips require less corroboration when vehicles are concerned (as Wells suggested) or not? This uncertainty, created by the asymmetry of the majority opinions in Wells and the instant case, ill serves the bench, the bar, and—most importantly—the law enforcement authorities who are charged with the daily implementation of these increasingly complex legal rules.
I would instead pare down the analysis to its essential core and hold—as J. L, supra, 529 U.S. 266, instructs—that an anonymous tip to police cannot justify a suspect’s detention or search unless it is corroborated as to some aspect of the criminal activity reported, or other facts exist demonstrating the *482reliability of the tip and/or the veracity of the tipster. Here, unlike in Wells, the tip itself provided some evidence the tipster was speaking from personal knowledge, having himself been the victim of the reported potentially violent crime that occurred only moments before. Under such circumstances, the tip, though essentially anonymous, bore sufficient indicia of reliability to provide police with reasonable cause to detain and search defendant. Accordingly, I concur in the result the majority reaches today, although, as explained above, I do not join in the whole of its reasoning.
Moreno, J., concurred.

 The majority relies on U.S. v. Terry-Crespo (9th Cir. 2004) 356 F.3d 1170, 1176, but that case did not involve an anonymous call.

 Moreover, the majority’s analysis distinguishing 911 calls from other calls to police potentially reduces the holding of J. L. almost to the vanishing point, for most calls to police are 911 calls.

 Unlike Justice Kennard, in her concurring opinion, I put no weight on the “tone” of the caller’s voice or the “urgency” he conveyed. (Conc. opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at p. 473.) First, the relative degree of urgency one might glean from the caller’s vocal inflection was not litigated below, rendering reliance on that factor suspect; second, nothing in the record suggests the dispatcher or the police officer effecting the detention actually relied on the caller’s vocal tone in assessing his reliability; and third, to recognize an agitated or urgent vocal tone as a factor demonstrating reliability of an anonymous tip would potentially swallow the rule, for one can imagine that virtually all callers to police emergency numbers betray some agitation and emotion in their voices.