Court Opinion

ID: 9891963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 22:03:24.037043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:40.527466
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/19/23; Certified for Publication 10/19/23 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION FIVE

 CECILIA ARCE,                                       B317161

      Plaintiff and Appellant,                      (Los Angeles County Super.
                                                    Ct. No. 19STCV41501)
      v.

 THE ENSIGN GROUP, INC. et
 al.,

      Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William F. Highberger, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
      Mahoney Law Group, Kevin Mahoney and George Singer
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Call & Jensen, Julie R. Trotter, Melinda Evans, Morgan E.
Podruski and Ellen Connelly Cohen for Defendants and
Respondents.

                        ___________________________
                        INTRODUCTION
       Plaintiff and appellant Cecilia Arce claims the nursing
facility where she worked as an aide for nine years was so
chronically understaffed—and she was so persistently
overworked—that she never took a rest break and frequently had
to work through her meal breaks. After her termination, Arce
brought a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General
Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) against
defendants and respondents Southland Management LLC
(Southland) and The Ensign Group Inc. (Ensign Group).1
       Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Arce lacked standing to bring a representative PAGA action
because she did not suffer a Labor Code violation within the
limitations period. But the trial court granted summary
judgment on a different, and perhaps broader, issue, holding that
Arce had not offered any “competent proof that one or more
cognizable Labor Code violation[s] occurred during her
employment in connection with her right to meal and rest
periods.” The court entered a judgment of dismissal, and Arce
appeals.
       On appeal, Arce contends respondents did not meet their
initial burden of establishing her lack of standing, and as such,
the court erred by granting summary judgment. We agree. We,
therefore, reverse and remand with directions.

1       All undesignated statutory references are to the Labor
Code.

                                  2
                         BACKGROUND
1.     Arce’s Work as a Certified Nursing Assistant
       Southland operates Southland Care Center, a skilled
nursing facility in Los Angeles. In 2009, Southland hired Arce to
work as a certified nursing assistant (CNA).2 As a CNA, Arce
provided her assigned patients with routine daily nursing care
and services, such as assisting them with bathing and brushing
their teeth, keeping them comfortable, and attending to their
basic hygiene needs.
       Arce primarily worked the overnight shift, from 11:00 p.m.
to 7:00 a.m. It appears Southland Care Center had three floors of
patients, with 40 patients on each floor. Six CNAs and three
licensed vocational nurses (LVNs) were assigned to the overnight
shift—two CNAs and one LVN per floor.
       Even with a typical load of 20 patients per CNA, Arce did
not have sufficient time to accomplish her assigned tasks. But if
one of the CNAs called in sick, the LVN would divide the absent
CNA’s patients among the remaining CNAs on other floors,
increasing each person’s workload. The system increased stress
on patients, who were left unattended when CNAs had to respond

2     There is a dispute about whether Arce was employed by
Southland only, by Ensign Group, a holding company that owns
the portfolio company that owns Southland, or by both Southland
and Ensign Group. Arce sued both companies, and both are
respondents in this appeal. As the trial court did not grant
summary judgment based even in part on the identity of Arce’s
employer, and the issue is immaterial to this appeal, we express
no opinion on that subject. We use employer when discussing
factual matters and respondents when discussing procedural
matters.

                               3
to different floors. And, with only one CNA available rather than
the usual two, taking a break also meant leaving the patients
unattended.
       Likewise, if an LVN needed help, she would call Arce or
another CNA to assist her, regardless of whether that person was
taking a break. When the LVN asked for assistance at these
times, Arce initially tried telling her she was off the clock. But
the LVN’s response “was that there was an emergency, if—that
there was a patient, either a patient was forward, or she needed
help, so [Arce] went to help her. [Arce] thought it was [her] duty
to do it.” Although no one ever told Arce she was expected to
interrupt her meal periods to help the LVN in these
circumstances, Arce believed the LVN “was above” her, so she
“understood, to [her] knowledge, that [she] was supposed to do
what [the LVN] asked” of her.3
       Arce worked her last shift on November 8, 2018. She
received payment for her accrued vacation time on November 19,
2018, and received her final wage statement on November 21,
2018, which was payment for the hours she had worked during
her last pay period. These dates are relevant to our analysis.
Neither wage statement contained premium wages for missed
meal and rest breaks.
       On November 23, 2018, Arce’s employment was terminated.

3     The court sustained respondents’ objections to most of
Arce’s testimony that she understood the LVN to be her
supervisor and believed she needed to follow the LVN’s
directions. We express no opinion on the court’s evidentiary
rulings because the excluded evidence is immaterial to our
resolution of this appeal. In any event, respondents did not
object to any testimony on which we rely.

                                4
2.    PAGA Notice
      On November 15, 2019, Arce submitted a prefiling PAGA
notice to the California Labor and Workforce Development
Agency (LWDA). As relevant here, the notice stated:
       “Ms. Arce will further allege in her complaint that she and
her coworkers were regularly interrupted during and/or forced to
forego lawful and timely meal and rest periods due to inadequate
staffing and other issues. Employer routinely required Ms. Arce
and aggrieved employees to work through meal and/or rest
periods and/or interrupted Ms. Arce, preventing her from taking
off-duty meal periods or on duty rest periods. Employer failed to
provide compliant meal and rest periods and/or payments for said
missed meal/rest periods.”
3.     Current Lawsuit
       Arce filed a class action complaint on November 19, 2019.
In the complaint, she stated that she had given written notice of
her PAGA claims to the LWDA and intended to amend her
complaint upon either receiving notice of the LWDA’s intent not
to investigate or the expiration of the LWDA’s time to provide
notice. She also stated that her amended complaint would assert
a representative action under PAGA seeking penalties for the
State of California.
       Arce filed the operative first amended complaint on
March 6, 2020. The complaint did not allege any individual or
class claims. Instead, Arce asserted six causes of action for
PAGA violations: failure to pay all wages (first cause of action),
failure to provide meal periods (second cause of action), failure to
provide rest periods (third cause of action), failure to timely pay
wages due upon separation of employment (fourth cause of

                                 5
action), failure to maintain accurate payroll records (fifth cause of
action), and unlawful deduction of wages (sixth cause of action).
       Respondents moved for summary judgment. They argued
that Arce did not suffer any Labor Code violations during the
limitations period, and thus lacked standing to pursue PAGA
claims. They also sought, in the alternative, summary
adjudication of four issues: (1) Arce did not satisfy PAGA’s
prefiling notice requirement with respect to her assertion that
she was not compensated for all her working time; (2) Arce did
not satisfy PAGA’s prefiling notice requirement because she did
not include facts or theories as to how Ensign Group could be
considered her joint employer; (3) Ensign Group was not Arce’s
employer; and (4) the sixth cause of action did not raise a triable
issue of material fact because the challenged deduction was
lawful.
       The court granted summary judgment in respondents’
favor. The court rejected respondents’ arguments that Arce’s
prefiling notice was insufficient. It held, however, that in
opposing the motion, Arce had not presented sufficient competent
evidence that she had suffered a Labor Code violation at any
point during her employment, and, therefore, had not established
a triable issue of material fact that she had standing to pursue a
PAGA claim. The court also concluded that Arce had not raised a
triable issue of material fact as to the sixth cause of action, which
concerned the legality of a payroll offset to account for a class-
action settlement. The court did not decide the issue of which
party was Arce’s actual employer.
       The court entered a judgment of dismissal, and Arce timely
appealed.

                                 6
                           DISCUSSION
       Arce contends the trial court erroneously granted summary
judgment because respondents did not present evidence sufficient
to negate the standing element of her PAGA claims. We agree.
1.     Standard of Review
       The standard of review of an order granting summary
judgment is well established. “The purpose of the law of
summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut
through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether,
despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their
dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
843.) The moving party “bears the burden of persuasion that
there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 850; see also Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The pleadings determine the issues to be
addressed by a summary judgment motion. (Nieto v. Blue Shield
of California Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60,
74.)
       On appeal from a summary judgment, we review the record
de novo and independently determine whether triable issues of
material fact exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001)
25 Cal.4th 763, 767; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) We resolve any evidentiary doubts or
ambiguities in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.
(Saelzler, at p. 768.) In performing this independent review, “we
follow the traditional three-step analysis. ‘We first identify the
issues framed by the pleadings, since it is these allegations to
which the motion must respond. Secondly, we determine
whether the moving party has established facts which negate the
opponents’ claim and justify a judgment in the movant’s favor.

                                  7
Finally, if the summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a
judgment, we determine whether the opposition demonstrates
the existence of a triable, material factual issue.’ ” (Shamsian v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 975.) “We
need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons
in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial
court, not its rationale.” (Oakland Raiders v. National Football
League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.)
2.     Applicable Labor Code Principles
       “California’s Labor Code contains a number of provisions
designed to protect the health, safety, and compensation of
workers.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 73, 80 (Kim).) As relevant here, every employee is
entitled to a 10-minute paid rest break per four hours of work
and a 30-minute unpaid meal break per five hours of work.
(§§ 226.7, 512.1.) During those periods, the employer must
relieve the employee of all work, relinquish control over her
activities, and permit her a reasonable opportunity to take an
uninterrupted break. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior
Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1040 (Brinker).) “[A]n employer
may not undermine a formal policy of providing meal breaks by
pressuring employees to perform their duties in ways that omit
breaks.” (Ibid.) “[I]f the employer knows that meal breaks are
missed, shortened, or unduly delayed because the employer has
instructed the employee to work, or has otherwise impeded the
taking of breaks, that duty is contravened, absent a suitable
waiver or agreement by the employee.” (Safeway, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1155.) If the employer fails
to provide a required meal period or rest break, it must
compensate the employee with a “premium”—an additional hour

                                8
of pay for each workday during which a violation occurred.
(§§ 226.7, subd. (c), 512.1, subd. (c); Naranjo v. Spectrum Security
Services, Inc. (2022) 13 Cal.5th 93, 104–105 (Naranjo).)
       When an employment relationship ends, employers must
promptly pay all unpaid wages to the departing employee.
(Naranjo, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 105.) Employers who willfully
delay end-of-employment wages are subject to “waiting time
penalties.” (§ 203; Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82.) “[J]ust like
other forms of wages, any unpaid premium pay must be paid
promptly once an employee leaves the job. And when an
employer willfully fails to comply with this obligation,” waiting
time penalties are available. (Naranjo, at p. 110.)
       “Employers who violate these statutes may be sued by
employees for damages or statutory penalties. [Citations.]
Statutory penalties, including double or treble damages, provide
recovery to the plaintiff beyond actual losses incurred. [Citation.]
Several Labor Code statutes provide for additional civil penalties,
generally paid to the state . . . . [Citation.] Before PAGA’s
enactment, only the state could sue for civil penalties.” (Kim,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 80.) But “[g]overnment enforcement proved
problematic. . . . The Labor Commissioner and other agencies
were . . . hampered in their enforcement of civil penalties by
inadequate funding and staffing constraints. [Citation.] To
facilitate broader enforcement, the Legislature enacted PAGA,
authorizing ‘aggrieved employees’ to pursue civil penalties on the
state’s behalf.” (Id. at p. 81.)
       Any “aggrieved employee” has standing to bring a PAGA
action. (§ 2699, subd. (a).) An aggrieved employee is “any person
who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one
or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (§ 2699,

                                 9
subd. (c); Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82.) Thus, a plaintiff has
standing to bring a PAGA action if (1) she was employed by the
alleged violator, and (2) she suffered at least one Labor Code
violation on which the PAGA claim is based. (Kim, at pp. 83–84.)
       “A PAGA action is subject to a one-year statute of
limitations.” (Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 42,
59.) But because a would-be PAGA plaintiff can only bring her
claim to court 65 days after submitting a prefiling notice to the
LWDA, the statute of limitations is tolled for 65 days from the
time the notice is submitted. (§ 2669.3, subds. (a)(2)(A), (d).)
3.     Issues Framed by the Complaint
       As we have observed, we first consider the allegations of
the complaint to determine the scope of the issues. (Serri v.
Santa Clara University (2020) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 858 (Serri).)
Here, Arce alleged she had standing to bring her PAGA action as
an aggrieved employee who was subject to at least one of the
Labor Code violations identified in her notice to the LWDA.
       As to meal periods, Arce’s complaint alleged respondents
“had a pattern, practice, and policy of not providing proper meal
periods due to their scheduling and understaffing issues, high
patient to nurse ratio, and heavy workload.” Arce was instructed
to clock out for meal periods and continue working or was
interrupted when patients required assistance. Respondents also
failed to pay an additional hour of wages for each workday in
which a meal-period violation occurred.
       Arce’s complaint made similar allegations about rest
breaks. She alleged her “breaks [were] interrupted whenever . . .
patients needed assistance,” and she was required to work
through rest breaks. Respondents’ “high patient to nurse ratio,
understaffing, and heavy workload . . . systematically denied

                               10
[Arce] . . . from taking proper rest breaks.” Respondents also
failed to provide an additional hour of wages for each workday in
which a rest-break violation occurred.
       The complaint alleged that respondents’ failure to pay meal
and rest premiums at the time of the violations meant those
premiums were due upon separation of employment. But,
according to the complaint, respondents did not timely pay those
wages or accurately calculate them.
       These allegations sufficiently state causes of action for
Labor Code violations under PAGA.
4.     Respondents Sought Summary Judgment on Statute of
       Limitations Grounds
       As the moving parties, respondents had the initial burden
to show Arce’s claims had no merit—that is, that one or more
elements of each cause of action could not be established, or that
there was a complete defense to each cause of action. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (o); see Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 935, 945.) “If a defendant’s moving papers make
a prima facie showing that justifies a judgment in its favor, the
burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie
showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.”
(Jones, at p. 945; Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 965.) In assessing whether
respondents have made the required showing, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to Arce and resolve all
evidentiary doubts or conflicts in her favor. (Serri, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 859.)
       In their motion for summary judgment, respondents
correctly noted that a plaintiff asserting a representative claim
under PAGA must be aggrieved. Thus, Arce must be “someone

                               11
‘who was employed by the alleged violator’ and ‘against whom
one or more of the alleged violations was committed.’ ” (Kim,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 83–84.) It is undisputed that Arce worked
for Southland Care Center. Respondents argued, however, that
Arce was not an aggrieved employee because any Labor Code
violations occurred outside the limitations period, with the
statute of limitations measured by one year from the last
violation.4 Specifically, they argued Arce’s claims were time-
barred because her last day of work was November 8, 2018, and,
therefore, she could not have missed a meal or rest break after
November 15, 2018—one year before she submitted her pre-filing
notice to the LWDA.
       This was not sufficient to negate standing.
       Arce’s last shift was on November 8, 2018, and her last
wage statement was issued on November 21, 2018. She
submitted a prefiling notice of her PAGA claim to the LWDA on
November 15, 2019. As discussed, Arce, like other employees in
California, was entitled to entitled to a 10-minute rest break per
four hours of work and a 30-minute meal break per five hours of
work. (§§ 226.7, 512.1.) For any day Arce’s employer failed to
provide a break, it was required to compensate her with a one-
hour pay premium. (Naranjo, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 104–105.)
All unpaid premiums were “wages” due upon termination. (Id. at
p. 110.) Thus, any overdue premiums were required to have

4     The motion stated: “This Motion is made on the grounds
that there is no triable issue of material fact as to any claim
asserted by [Arce] because . . . . [Arce] lacks standing to pursue
PAGA claims given she did not suffer any violations alleged
during the applicable limitations period for those claims.”

                                12
been paid in the November 21, 2018 wage statement—and every
outstanding premium Arce’s employer failed to pay as part of this
wage statement constituted its own Labor Code violation, each of
which fell within the limitations period. It is undisputed that the
final wage statement did not contain any premium payments.
       Thus, it was not enough to for respondents to show that
Arce had not been denied a meal or rest break during the year
before she submitted her PAGA notice. They also needed to
establish that Arce had been paid all outstanding meal and rest
premiums—either before or after her termination. That is,
respondents needed to provide evidence that either (1) Arce had
never suffered a Labor Code violation, and thus, no premiums
were due upon her termination, or (2) they paid all premiums at
the time of the violations, so no additional monies were due Arce
upon her termination. Arce would lack standing in the former
case because she had not suffered a Labor Code violation; in the
latter, because the violations were outside the limitations period.
       Respondents emphasized that Arce knew her employer’s
policies required her to take meal and rest breaks, and she was
never explicitly told not to follow those policies. Certainly,
“[p]roof an employer had knowledge of employees working
through meal periods will not alone subject the employer to
liability for premium pay,” but “an employer may not undermine
a formal policy of providing meal breaks by pressuring employees
to perform their duties in ways that omit breaks.” (Brinker,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) Here, Arce alleged her employer’s
understaffing and workload policies made it effectively
impossible for her to take the required breaks. Respondents’
moving papers did not present any evidence to negate this claim.

                                13
       To the contrary, respondents’ very own evidence supported
it. According to deposition excerpts that respondents attached to
their moving papers, Arce told her supervisors she was
overwhelmed by the number of patients who needed help from
limited staff; the workload prevented her from taking breaks. 5
The supervisor responded that Southland would get more
personnel to fix the problem, but they never did. Thus, Arce went
back to the supervisor to tell him that she did not have enough
time to attend to all the patients in her care. Again, Arce was
told they would get more staff. When none materialized, she
went to her supervisors a third time to repeat that she did not
have sufficient time to care for patients on other floors when that
floor’s staff called in sick. Arce explained that she could not take
her lunch break because it would mean leaving her assigned
patients alone. The supervisor “looked concerned and said that
that wouldn’t happen, but it kept on happening.” Arce spoke to
one supervisor four times and spoke to another supervisor three
times. Neither supervisor remedied the staffing shortages, and
no one ever told Arce how to take breaks in a way that would be
consistent with her duty to her patients. Respondents have
presented no evidence that these issues were immaterial or that
they were addressed.6

5    Although no supervisors were available to speak with Arce
during her shifts, she was able to speak to administrators after
her workday.
6     For example, although respondents emphasize that Arce
was expected to follow meal- and rest-break policies, it also
produced a 160-item list of CNA job duties, which included
“[c]ooperate with . . . facility personnel to ensure that nursing
services can be adequately maintained to meet the needs of the

                                14
       Likewise, respondents insisted that Arce knew she could
make corrections to her recorded time, and that such a request
had never been rejected. But company records respondents
submitted as exhibits state that Arce was not required to track
her rest periods, only her meal breaks. And, in any event,
respondents do not present any evidence that, after adjusting her
time, Arce was paid the required premiums.
       On this record, we conclude that respondents did not
produce sufficient evidence to meet their initial burden of
production on the standing issue, i.e., that Arce had not suffered
a Labor Code violation during her employment. Arce’s complaint
alleged that “scheduling and understaffing issues, high patient to
nurse ratio, and [a] heavy workload” made it functionally
impossible for her to take meal and rest breaks. Respondents’
moving papers did not address or negate those allegations. They
did not, for example, submit data about night-shift staffing levels
or information about how their patient-to-nurse ratio compared
to the industry standard. Because respondents did not furnish
evidence tending to negate Arce’s allegations that their practices
conflicted with their written break policies, they did not meet
their initial burden of production, and summary judgment should
have been denied.7

residents,” “[w]ork[ ] beyond normal working hours,” and “[m]eet
with your shift’s nursing personnel, on a regularly scheduled
basis, to assist in identifying and correcting problem areas,
and/or the improvement of services.” Respondents did not
produce evidence that anyone had explained to Arce how to
satisfy these competing imperatives.
7    At oral argument, respondents’ counsel relied heavily on
David v. Queen of Valley Medical Center (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th

                                15
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded with
directions to the trial court to vacate its order granting summary
judgment and enter a new order denying summary judgment.
Appellant Cecilia Arce shall recover her costs on appeal.

                                     RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                  MOOR, J.                       KIM, J.

653, a case that was neither cited in respondents’ brief nor
provided to Arce and the court before argument. (See Kinney v.
Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal.3d 348, 356 [“An appellate court is not
required to consider any point made for the first time at oral
argument, and it will be deemed waived”].) Regardless, David is
unpersuasive. In that case, the plaintiff argued her meal breaks
had been interrupted because charge nurses asked her questions
during the breaks and pointedly looked at the clock. (David, at
pp. 659, 662.) Here, by contrast, Arce testified that she could not
take her breaks because she was directed to assist with patients,
and the facility’s staffing practices made it effectively impossible
to take breaks without compromising patient care or endangering
patient health. Also significant is that, when the plaintiff in
David did suffer an interrupted break, she was compensated with
appropriate premium pay. (Id. at p. 662.) In the present case,
even when Arce requested time adjustments for missed meal
periods and the employer adjusted her regular pay, Arce did not
receive premium pay. Finally, unlike respondents here, the
hospital in David presented “extensive evidence that plaintiff’s
supervisors did not urge her to work during meal or rest periods
and that she did not report missing a meal or rest break to her
supervisors.” (Id. at p. 659.)

                                16
Filed 10/19/23

                   CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                            DIVISION FIVE

 CECILIA ARCE,                           B317161

     Plaintiff and Appellant,            (Los Angeles County Super.
                                         Ct. No. 19STCV41501)
     v.

 ENSIGN GROUP, INC.,

     Defendant and Respondent.

THE COURT:
                 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the opinion filed in
the above matter on September 19, 2023, is certified for
publication with no change in judgment.

___________________________________________________________
RUBIN, P. J.                     MOOR, J.             KIM, J.