Court Opinion

ID: 9854627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:10:21.069831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:11.170327
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
dissenting:
Once again an effort is being made to compress the compass of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P. (2d) 614. I had thought that decision to be eminently correct when it was released; I retain that conviction; and being so convinced, I must resist any attempt at shrinking its scope and effect.
By statute gambling is forbidden and a penalty provided for its violation. C.R.S. ’53, 40-10-10. By another statute, cities and towns are vested with the authority to “suppress gaming and gambling houses, lotteries and fraudulent devices and practices, for the purpose of gaining or obtaining money or property * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.) C.R.S. ’53, 139-32-1 (52).
Then, too, cities or towns are empowered “to pass all ordinances, rules, and make all regulations proper or necessary to carry into effect the powers granted to [them], with such fines and penalties as the council or board of trustees shall deem proper; provided, no fine or penalty shall exceed three hundred dollars, and no imprisonment shall exceed ninety days for one offense.”
Whether acting pursuant to C.R.S. ’53, 139-32-1 (52), or in the belief it had such power under the 20th Amend*268ment to the constitution of this state, Denver did enact an ordinance which made it “unlawful for any person to * * * play for -money or any valuable thing at any game with cards, dice, or with any article, device, or thing whatever, which may be used for the purpose of playing or betting upon, or winning or losing money or other property; or to bet on any game others may be playing.”
It is of moment that we note the difference in punishment which may be inflicted for gambling. Under the statute (C.R.S. ’53, 40-10-10) the person convicted “shall be fined in any sum not less than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred and fifty dollars.” No specific penalty being provided in the ordinance relating to gambling, the general penalty provision of the Revised Municipal Code of the City and County of Denver applies, and it permits the imposition of a fine “in a sum not more than three hundred dollars ($300.00)” or that the person convicted be “imprisoned not to exceed ninety (90) days, or both so fined and imprisoned.” Section 011.10.
This difference in penalty takes on importance if gambling is a matter of state-wide cognizance because, should C.R.S. ’53, 139-32-1 (52), represent a proper delegation of authority to cities and towns, then the exercise thereof and the imposition of punishment in connection therewith would have to be in harmony with C.R.S. ’53, 139-33-1, which ordains:
“Municipal corporations shall have power to make and publish, from time to time, ordinances not inconsistent with the laws of the state, for carrying into effect or discharging the powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, order, comfort and convenience of such corporation and the inhabitants thereof, and to enforce obedience to such ordinances by fine not exceeding three hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding ninety days.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, if the problem of gambling is essentially *269local and municipal, Denver did not derive its power to enact its gambling ordinance from C.R.S. ’53, 139-32-1 (52), since Denver is a home rule city authorized to adopt carte blanche ordinances relating to local and municipal affairs by virtue of Article XX, Section 6, of the constitution, and it is no concern of the legislature as to what local and municipal problem prompts the enactment of the ordinance. Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P. (2d) 895; Pueblo v. Kurtz, 66 Colo. 447, 182 Pac. 884.
Is there an area of interest in gambling which can be said at once to be state-wide and local and municipal, in which the first to act legislatively preempts the field, or in which either may enact laws enforceable by the en-actor, and if so, does the first to proceed against the violator take jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other? Is gambling a matter of state-wide concern, reposing in the General Assembly the sole power to enact legislation in connection therewith, or does it pose a local and municipal problem, making effective the application of the 20th Amendment?
Article III of the Constitution of Colorado provides:
“The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments — the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution of Colorado, in reserving to the people the initiative and referendum, commences: “The legislative power of the state shall be vested in the general assembly consisting of a senate and house of representatives * * * ” Article IV, Section 11 of the Constitution of Colorado vests in the governor of this state the power to approve or disapprove every bill *270passed by the general assembly and provides for further legislative action in the event of his disapproval.
Thus, the Constitution vests the legislative power of the state in the General Assembly, the veto power in the Governor, and these powers are not delegable except where “in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.” Delegation of this power to legislate cannot be bestowed by implication, and no implied power to so delegate can be evolved by interpretation; the Constitution explicitly forbids it. Whatever the legislature passes in the proper exercise of its constitutional authority, a municipality cannot in effect veto, either in whole or in part, by adopting ordinances contrary to, inconsistent with, or at variance with parts of, such enactments; the Constitution explicitly forbids the exercise of veto by anybody but the Governor.
The question immediately comes to mind: Wherein can it be said that the 20th Amendment “expressly” grants to a home rule city the power to enact ordinances on any governmental business other than those of purely local and municipal concern? A more than cursory perusal of Article XX, Section 6, bends one’s will to respond: The explicit wording of the amendment does not admit of a vagrant, elastic interpretation. Only local and municipal matters are “expressly” made the concern of a home rule city; indeed, not only does the language “expressly” make manifest that the authority of a home rule city begins and ends with local and municipal activities, but where the language leaves any room for resort to implication, the implication is against action beyond local and municipal affairs. Nota bene!
Article XX, Section 6 enables a city or town to adopt, amend or replace a charter “which shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.” It further provides that “[s]uch charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such [local and municipal] matters shall supersede * * * any law of the state in conflict therewith.” “Expressly,” supersedure *271of state law extends only to charter or ordinances dealing with local and municipal matters; impliedly, supersedure does not extend beyond that which is local and municipal in character. Moreover, there is no “express” delegation of power to the city or town to legislate on matters having an amalgam of significance to both state and municipality.
Continuing our consideration of Section 6 of the 20th Amendment, mark that the certification to and filing with the Secretary of State of the charter vests in the city or town “the powers set out in sections 1, 4 and 5 of this article, and all other powers necessary, requisite or proper for the government and administration of its local and municipal matters, including power to legislate upon, provide, regulate, conduct and control: [enumerating authority to act in several local and municipal areas].” The key to home rule action again is the local and municipal character of the function involved. And among the local and municipal matters are included several enumerated local and municipal activities. See specially concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Moore in Canon City v. Merris, supra.
Quoting further: “It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters, and the enumeration herein of certain powers shall not be construed to deny such cities and towns, and to the people thereof, any right or power essential or proper to the full exercise of such right (Emphasis supplied.) The recurring theme is the power to act in local and municipal matters: home rule cities or towns shall have “the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters” and any right or power essential or proper to the full exercise of such right.
It is then provided that “[t]he statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities and towns, except in so far as superseded by *272the charters of such cities and towns or hy ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.” (Emphasis supplied.) Placing the exception in proper perspective, we must advert to another segment of the amendment, already quoted, to-wit: “Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such [local and municipal] matters shall supersede * * * any law of the state in conflict therewith.” Thus, the several portions brought in right relation to each other expressly ordain that the applicable statutes have force and effect in home rule cities or towns except where superseded by charter or ordinances on local and municipal matters.
Always keeping in mind that ordinances on local and municipal matters may be adopted pursuant to the authority of the charter, we now consider subsection h, Article XX, Section 6, which provides for “the imposition, enforcement and collection of fines and penalties for the violation of any of the provisions of the charter, or of any ordinance adopted in pursuance of the charter.” Also, that part of the section reading as follows, “Any act in violation of the provisions of such charter or of any ordinance thereunder shall be criminal and punishable as such when so provided by any statute now or hereafter in force.” Nothing could be plainer than the limitation of power with which home rule cities and towns are invested. An eligible city or town may have a charter which shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters. Ordinances may be enacted pursuant to such charter in such local and municipal matters. Such charter and such ordinances supersede state law in conflict therewith, and such charter and such ordinances are subject to the penalizing power of the home rule city. No greater power is expressly granted to a home rule city; whatever implications can be deduced from the language, all work contrary to there being any power greater than that to be exerted upon local and municipal matters.
There is nothing to seek between the lines of Article *273XX, Section 6, because nothing is there. The amendment is open as day, expository and single-purposed. This is exemplified by certain bellwether words which should keep us from going astray. These words are: “charter” and “ordinances made pursuant to” such charter in such local and municipal matters. The charter “shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.” “Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such [local and municipal] matters shall supersede * * * any law of the state in conflict therewith.” Ordinances made pursuant to a charter which “extends to all its local and municipal matters,” let me say by way of emphasis. A home rule city or town may impose, enforce and collect fines and penalties “for the violation of any provisions of the charter, or of any ordinance adopted in pursuance of the charter.” The statutes shall prevail “except as superseded by the charters * * * or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.” “Any act in violation of the provisions of such charter or of any ordinance thereunder shall be criminal,” and so forth. Always the charters extend to all local and municipal matters; always the ordinances must be enacted within the scope of the charters; here is the plain import of the 20th Amendment.
Hence, there can be no concurrent authority. Whatever is adequate to warrant the exercise of the “legislative power of the state” is a matter of statewide concern, and if the General Assembly legislates thereon, the statute is applicable throughout the length and breadth of the state. According to Article XX, Section 6, Denver or any other home rule city is amenable to the statute thus enacted.
To hold that municipality and state may each act in certain twilight spheres because of common concern regarding such matters necessarily recognizes a delegation of legislative power impliedly bestowed. Yet the whole 20th Amendment bespeaks the delegation of express powers, negatives the bestowal of implied powers, and, *274in fact, all implications therein indicate restriction of power to those expressly granted.
Cities and towns shall always have a vital interest in any problem of a statewide nature. To refer to a statewide matter is to refer to something that affects every part of the state. A matter could not be of statewide concern if it did not affect all parts of the state, including cities and towns, whether they be home rule municipalities or not. Degrees of concern should not be the measuring stick. Murders in Denver may give it an ascendancy of concern in regard to them over the towns of Red Cliff or Red Wing or other cities and towns of Colorado, but that is not, and should not be, the test. If there is present a generality of concern throughout the state in a problem, regardless of peaks and dips in the level of interest therein, the matter is of statewide cognizance.
Such dissection of the 20th Amendment led us to say in Canon City v. Merris, supra:
“ ‘Supersede’ is defined ‘as meaning to supplant * * *; to replace, displace, or set aside and put another in the place of; to take the place of by reason of superior worth, appropriateness, efficiency or right.’ 83 C.J.S., p. 889. In the company of words appearing in Article XX, Section 6, the term ‘supersede’ means that the law of the state is displaced on a local and municipal matter where there is an ordinance put in its place. Where, however, the matter is of statewide concern, supersession does not take place. Application of state law or municipal ordinance, whichever pertains, is mutually exclusive.”
With a more exacting scalpel Mr. Justice Moore did a more extensive dissection in his concurring opinion, and concluded:
“The meaning of this language is plain. There is no room for strained construction. The effect of it is that until such time as a home rule city enters a given field of legislative enactment by a proper exercise of the delegated legislative power, the applicable law of the state *275shall govern. If the state law is to be rendered ineffective within the city limits on a matter which is ‘local and municipal’ the city council can adopt an ordinance which thereupon ‘supersedes’ the state law within the city limits. By no stretch of the imagination can this constitutional provision be held to warrant the adoption of a city ordinance on a matter which is of general or statewide concern as distinguished from a ‘local or municipal matter.’ ”
Mr. Justice Moore and I had an abundance of precedent to vindicate our utterances. These precedents merely accepted the plain language of the 20th Amendment at face value, and sought not to embellish or deform its simple grant of power to home rule cities and towns, that they shall exercise self-government in local and municipal matters. I would have us adhere to our previous pronouncements. This does not deny that there may be a problem of application, for questions of statewide versus local and municipal concern will trouble courts in the future as they have in the past.
That supersession takes place only as to local and municipal matters has been time and again intimated in the decisions of this court. Without any attempt to cite all the cases so indicating, I would point out some which sustain the proposition.
In order to sanction a regulation of a home rule city, we must determine that the regulation of the subject “is purely a local matter.” Walker v. People, 55 Colo. 402, 135 Pac. 794. Such determination must result from the distinction between governmental powers and functions and “matters of purely local and municipal character.” People v. Denver, 90 Colo. 599, 10 P. (2d) 1106.
The effect of modifying words showing the extent to which a home rule city may exercise its delegated power is nowhere better exemplified than in the case of Mauff v. People, 52 Colo. 562, 123 Pac. 101. The following quoted portion of the decision is so much in point that the potent modifying words I have capitalized and other *276words expressing limitations of power of home rule cities have been italicized.
“The purpose of article XX was to give to the people of the city and county of Denver exclusive control in matters of local concern ONLY. The people of the city and county of Denver have no power whatever to legislate by their charter upon matters of state and county governmental import and character. The fact that the authority given by article XX to the people of the city and county of Denver to legislate was confined and limited SOLELY to local matters was the precise thing that made it possible for the courts to uphold and enforce it. If by article XX it had been undertaken to free the people of the city and county of Denver from the state constitution, from statute law, and from the authority of the general assembly, respecting matters other than those PURELY of local concern, that article could not have been upheld.”
Whatever is local and municipal is subject to the jurisdiction of the home rule city. All other matters are subject to the control of the state. This is the unequivocal meaning of People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P. (2d) 256. Note:
“The only question with which we are here concerned is whether the derelictions charged in the information are violations of regulations of motor vehicle traffic of a local and municipal nature, over which a home-rule city has exclusive jurisdiction. If not, the general laws of the state apply.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Decisions have drawn the line of demarcation between matters subject to the jurisdiction of state or municipality on whether the subject of action has aspects beyond that which is local and municipal in character. Thus, it has been said that the home rule municipality is “as much amenable to state control in all matters of a public, as distinguished from matters of a local, character as are other municipalities.” (Emphasis supplied.) Keefe v. People, 37 Colo. 317, 87 Pac. 791, 8 L.R.A.N.S. *277131; Mauff v. People, supra; People ex rel. v. McNichols, 91 Colo. 141, 13 P. (2d) 266.
It appears to me that the point of cleavage in making the above distinction is this: local and municipal matters are subject to municipal action, but, if there is something additional in the way of an interest in which the public has a concern, then the state has jurisdiction. Perhaps this is made more definite by an additional quotation from People ex rel. v. McNichols, supra. A state law concerning vital statistics was involved and the court held that vital statistics “are not of local concern only; they are of general public importance.” The purport of the quoted section is that vital statistics are of local concern, but that such concern does not end there; that the general public has an interest in vital statistics. Hence, the home rule city is controlled by the statute.
The last cited case suggests a guide for determining when a matter is subject to the jurisdiction of the state or of a home rule city. Other guides appear from decisions rendered by this court. For instance, the fact that a home rule city may attach a more immediate and greater importance to a subject than may be found in the general public does not make that subject a local and municipal matter only. If the state at large has an interest, the law of the state takes precedence.
Such is the purport of People ex rel. v. McNichols, supra. And such is the purport of two other decisions of this court. It was said in Keefe v. People, supra, that:
“The work of building a sanitary sewer by a city, in a sense, is local, in that it affects, primarily, its own citizens; but it is directly connected with the public health, and is a matter of concern and great importance to the people of the entire state.”
Hence, a state statute regulating hours of labor on public works was held applicable to Denver.
To like effect was the decision in Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329, 266 Pac. 214. We quote:
“That the building and maintenance of a court house *278is of general public interest is manifest from the necessities of justice. That a court house and its usual incidents be maintained in Denver county is of nearly as great importance to the state at large as to Denver, and so of the court house of every other county. The legislation of the state which requires every county to maintain such a place is a recognition of this proposition.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The lesson to be drawn from these last three decisions is this: even though the subject of state legislation has a greater impact upon the municipality than upon the public at large, still the fact that the general public has an interest in the matter makes the matter properly one for state action.
Another test resorted to in a number of cases may be put this way: whatever the legislature might have granted to a city before the adoption of the 20th Amendment constitutes a local and municipal matter upon which the city may legislate. City of Pueblo v. Kurtz, 66 Colo. 447, 182 Pac. 884, makes this clear in these words:
“* * * the city has the right under the XXth amendment and the Home Rule amendment to adopt any provision for its charter on subjects local and municipal or ‘of local concern,’ and such provision supersedes the statute. Subjects local and municipal or of local concern are held * * * to include any power which the Legislature might have granted before the amendment.”
Unless there is an express constitutional provision permitting it, the general assembly may not transfer its legislative power to any other governmental agency. Such is the substance of Article III of the Constitution. Such has been the sense of decisions of this court. In re Senate Bill No. 72, 139 Colo. 371, 339 P. (2d) 501; Casey v. People, 139 Colo. 89, 336 P. (2d) 308; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 71 Colo. 495, 208 Pac. 465; Colorado, etc. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 54 Colo. 64, 129 Pac. 506; Burcher v. People, 41 Colo. 495, 93 Pac. 14, 124 Am.S.R. 134.
*279In re Senate Bill No. 72, supra, contains answers to interrogatories of the Governor on the very question here considered. A fair statement appears in the syllabus of the Pacific Reporter:
“Senate Bill providing that where subject matter of municipal ordinance may be of both local and state-wide concern, existence of state legislation on subject matter, or subsequent adoption of state legislation thereon, shall not deprive municipal corporation of right or power to make ordinances thereon not inconsistent with laws of the state, unless statute declares that only state shall have power to adopt legislation thereon, and that where statute and ordinance cover same subject matter so that same act can be prosecuted as criminal matter both for violation of statute and ordinance, prosecution for ordinance violation shall bar prosecution under statute and prosecution under statute shall bar prosecution under ordinance, is an invalid delegation of legislative power in violation of the Constitution. Const. art. 5, § 1; C.R.S. ’53, 139-33-1(3).” (Emphasis supplied.)
In November, 1912, the people of this state adopted the present Section 6 of Article XX of the Constitution of this state. A part of said section provides that:
“Any act in violation of the provisions of such charter or of any ordinance thereunder shall be criminal and punishable as such when so provided by any statute now or hereafter in force.”
Concerning this quoted portion of Section 6, we said in Canon City v. Merris, supra, that “[e]ven though an ordinance effectually covers a local and municipal matter, and it is a counterpart of a law of the state, its violation is triable and punishable as a crime where so designated by the statute.”
Prior to the adoption of Section 6 of Article XX, it had been declared that “[t]he state has never relinquished to the new city and county of Denver, and never can surrender to it, the power to enact laws to punish crimes and misdemeanors, and the operation of such laws *280embraces all of the people of the state, whether living in municipalities or counties created directly by the constitution, or organized under general laws. Such legislation would not be valid if it expressly exempted the city and county of Denver from its operation.” (Emphasis supplied.) Keefe v. People, supra.
Later, the circumscription expressed in the Keefe case was considerably softened and intimation made that the people could permit a delegation of authority by the general assembly to define and punish crime. For this court stated, “The people have confided to the general assembly the power of declaring what acts or omissions shall constitute a crime, but they have not confided to the general assembly the authority to transfer this power to any other person or body.” People v. Lange, 48 Colo. 428, 110 Pac. 68.
In a very recent case, Casey v. People, supra, not involving a home rule city, we perhaps too broadly stated, “Only the legislature may declare an act to be a crime. People v. Lange, supra. That precious power cannot be delegated to others not elected by or responsible to the people.”
Although too sweeping in denying the power of the people to delegate legislative authority, because Article 111 of the Constitution decrees that it will be recognized where “expressly” granted in the Constitution, the language of this opinion is clearly correct in that legislation on crime of state-wide import has not been committed to “others not elected by or responsible to the people.”
Denver has been delegated authority by the people to make a charter and to enact ordinances extending to local and municipal matters, the violation of which shall be criminal and punishable as such when such charter and ordinances have counterpart statutory provisions the violation of which is criminal. Does municipal action regarding gambling fall within that which may be considered purely local and municipal?
It should be observed that C.R.S. ’53, 139-32-1(52), *281empowers cities and towns to “suppress gaming and gambling houses,” and gambling devices and practices. The investiture of cities and towns with this authority follows traditional legal decorum. “One of the most unusual powers enjoyed by municipal corporations is that of abating or suppressing nuisances.” 62 C.J.S. §281, p. 629.
We have held that the keeping and use of gambling devices, being prohibited by statute, are common nuisances. Gambling Devices v. People, 110 Colo. 82, 130 P. (2d) 920. Gaming and gambling houses are nuisances. People ex rel. v. District Court, 26 Colo. 385, 58 Pac. 604, 46 L.R.A. 850. See 66 C.J.S. §48, p. 800. To the extent that Denver suppresses gambling houses or devices, or gambling, it had the power without resort to the statute.
But may Denver define gambling, make it an offense and provide for the punishment by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the event of a violation of the ordinance? It may if gambling is a purely local and municipal matter. Is it such? Salt Lake City v. Doran, 42 Utah 401, 131 Pac. 636, holds that the large and populous municipalities present greater opportunities for successful gambling operations, thereby making it a local and municipal problem. There are cogent reasons why I cannot agree.
The fact that crime can be more fruitful and accomplished with greater ease in more densely populated areas is not a reason for making it a local and municipal matter. If this were true, then burglary and robbery, for instance, might be said to be local and municipal. In order for an ordinance to supersede a statute defining a crime, the city adopting such ordinance, must have some peculiar circumstances which present a local and municipal problem. The peculiar circumstances may be such that, as a matter of law, it may be said that the subject of the ordinance is of concern to the municipality. On the other hand, whether the problem is truly a local and municipal concern may be a question of fact.
Gambling per se is a problem of general importance *282to the state, so much so that several statutes have been enacted prohibiting various phases of gambling. C.R.S. ’53, 40-10-8, et seq. Penalties are provided for the violation of these several sections. In enacting these statutes the legislature prima facie enacted public laws. The legislature believed that gambling was the proper subject of a public law.
There is no more quoted section of our statutes than C.R.S. ’53, 40-1-1, which defines crime:
“A crime or misdemeanor consists in a violation of a public law * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is an offense against the sovereign, and a criminal action is one prosecuted by the state against a person charged with a public offense committed in violation of a public law. Hoffman v. People, 72 Colo. 552, 212 Pac. 848. That the legislature permitted cities and towns to “suppress” gaming and gambling houses and gaming devices and practices indicates that it retained power to define offenses involving gambling and to provide for their punishment.
Gambling has been considered so completely a matter of state-wide concern that its legitimation has been believed to be a matter for the voters of the state to act upon. Consider the ordinance in question. If it is a matter of local and municipal concern, it is then something that the state can never affect by legislation. If it is a matter of local and municipal concern, the state would be foreclosed from passing any law on the subject which could be effective in Denver. If it is a matter of local and municipal concern, Denver could adopt by amendment such an innocuous ordinance that in effect gambling would be sanctioned within the confines of the city. For these reasons I believe that gambling must be considered not only as being of local concern, but equally of state-wide interest, and ergo, subject to state control.
The state could have delegated to Denver the power in form of ordinances to enact rules and regulations by which Denver as an agency of the state would aid the *283state in controlling gambling. This is well brought out in the case of Board of County Commissioners v. Smith, 22 Colo. 534, 45 Pac. 357, 33 L.R.A. 465:
“Judge Dixon was of opinion that the power conferred upon the boards of county commissioners could be sustained upon either of two principles of constitutional law: First, the law being complete, its operation might be made contingent; second, because such delegation is in the furtherance of the power of local self-government.
“It will be conceded that the powers conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other body or authority, except as the principle may be modified by the second maxim. It is, however, not essential that the law should take effect immediately upon its leaving the hands of the legislature. Its operation may, under certain limitations, be made to depend upon a contingency.
“Mr. Justice Agnew, speaking for the court in Locke’s Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, says: ‘What is more common than to appoint commissioners under a law to determine things, upon the decision of which the act is to operate in one way or another? * * Then the true distinction, I conceive, is this: —the legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must therefore be the subject of inquiry and determination outside the halls of legislation.’ ”
In recent decisions Mr. Justice Moore has affirmed this proposition. Hazlet v. Gaunt, 126 Colo. 385, 250 P. (2d) 188; Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P. (2d) 755.
I have stated what I believe to be an irrefutable position on spheres of operation for state and home rule *284cities. These views are in diametric opposition to those expressed by Mr. Justice Doyle.
Mr. Chief Justice Hall joins in this dissenting opinion.