Court Opinion

ID: 9686869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:10:07.825266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:27.765151
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  LESLIE A. HUMPHREY                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant                 :
                                                 :
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
  JOHN DUSTIN ROSS                               :   No. 174 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered December 30, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s):
                            2022-FC-000732-03

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                 FILED: AUGUST 24, 2023

       Leslie A. Humphrey (“Mother”) appeals from the December 30, 2022

custody order that awarded her primary physical custody of P.A.R., the

daughter born to her and John Dustin Ross (“Father”) in June 2020.               We

affirm.

       Mother and Father never married but lived together until Father left the

family residence in February 2022.             Father currently lives fewer than ten

minutes from Mother’s home in York County, Pennsylvania. The relationship

remained tumultuous after the separation and on April 29, 2022, Father

agreed to the entry of a final PFA order, as to Mother only, without admission

of guilt. Pursuant to the PFA, the parties’ communications were restricted to

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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custody-related messages on Our Family Wizard, an electronic co-parenting

tool. The PFA order expired on April 29, 2023.

      On May 22, 2022, Mother filed a custody complaint that focused on

Father’s   alleged   problems    with   anger   management    and   marijuana

consumption.    The trial court entered an interim custody order awarding

Mother primary physical custody and granting Father partial physical custody

on Tuesday and Thursday evenings and overnights on alternating weekends.

See Order, 6/14/22 at 5. The parties shared legal custody. Id. at 4.

      The trial court scheduled evidentiary hearings during two non-

consecutive days in November and December 2022. Mother and Father both

testified, presented supporting witnesses, and admitted exhibits.       Kasey

Shienvold, Psy.D., testified about the Psychological Risk Assessment that he

performed on Father and submitted his report for the court’s review. As to

Father’s substance abuse, Dr. Shienvold noted that Father acknowledged

smoking marijuana nightly by prescription for chronic pain and explained that

he also took Adderall by prescription for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity

Disorder. N.T., 12/22/23, at 20, Mother’s Exhibit 17 at 2. Ultimately, as to

Father’s mental health, Dr. Shienvold opined within a reasonable degree of

psychological certainty that, “There is no significant evidence to suggest that

[Father] is struggling with major mood, anxiety, or thought disorder . . . [and

Father] is determined to be a mild to moderate risk of harm to [his daughter].”

Id., Mother’s Exhibit 17 at 4.

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      After the hearing, the trial court issued an order and an opinion stating

its findings with respect to the factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a),

discussed infra. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/22, at 5-19. In addition to

fashioning a comprehensive custody schedule, the trial court prohibited Father

from ingesting medical marijuana “during the [six] hours immediately

preceding his operation of a motor vehicle with the child in it.” Final Custody

Order, 12/29/22, at 13.      Mother filed a notice of appeal, along with a

concurrent concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court entered a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)

opinion addressing those arguments.

      Mother presents three issues, which we reorder for ease of review.

      I. Whether the lower court committed an abuse of discretion
      and/or an error of law when it determined that the history of past
      drug abuse was a neutral factor when that determination is not
      supported by the record?

      II. Whether the lower court committed an error of law and/or
      abuse of discretion when it ordered that Father may consume
      marijuana and transport the child after a six-hour wait period
      when that conclusion is: unsupported by facts in evidence, is
      against the weight of the evidence, is contrary to the best interests
      of the child, and is impliedly consenting to criminal conduct?

      III. Whether the lower court committed an abuse of discretion
      and/or an error of law when it failed to apply the "best interest of
      the child standard" in implementing a custody schedule which:
      Dramatically changes the existing schedule[;] affords almost 1/7th
      of the child’s waking hours to a non-custodial party[;] results in
      less time with the child’s sibling[;] does not serve the stated
      interest of the court[;] is not supported by the record[;] and is
      not consistent with statutory provisions?

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Mother’s brief at 4 (cleaned up) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).1

       We review a custody order for an abuse of discretion. R.L. v. M.A., 209

A.3d 391, 395 (Pa.Super. 2019).            We will not find an abuse of discretion

merely because we would have reached a different conclusion than the trial

court. Id. Rather, we will find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court

overrode or misapplied the law in reaching its conclusion, or the record shows

the trial court’s judgment was manifestly unreasonable or the product of

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. Id.

       Our scope of review is broad.           Id.   Since this Court does not make

independent factual determinations, we must accept findings of the trial court

that are supported by competent evidence of record. S.C.B. v. J.S.B., 218

A.3d 905, 913 (Pa.Super. 2019). Importantly, we defer to the trial court on

matters of credibility and weight of the evidence, as the trial court viewed and

assessed witnesses firsthand. Id. However, we are not bound by the trial

court’s deductions or inferences. Id.

       In a child custody case, “the best interest of the child is paramount.”

S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa.Super. 2014).                Once a custody

arrangement is established by order, a court may modify it at any time upon

a party’s petition if the modification serves the best interests of the child. See

23 Pa.C.S. § 5338.        To that end, the Child Custody Act sets forth sixteen

____________________________________________

1 Father did not file a brief.

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factors that a court must consider before making any custody determination,

including a modification of a custody order. See E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451,

460 (Pa.Super. 2019). Therefore, “[i]t is within the trial court’s purview as

the finder of fact to determine which factors are most salient and critical in

each particular case.” Id. (citation omitted). The statutorily required factors

are as follows:

      (a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
      determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
      factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
      affect the safety of the child, including the following:

            (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
            frequent and continuing contact between the child and
            another party.

            (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
            member of the party’s household, whether there is a
            continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
            which party can better provide adequate physical
            safeguards and supervision of the child.

            (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating
            to consideration of child abuse and involvement with
            protective services).

            (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
            of the child.

            (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
            education, family life and community life.

            (5) The availability of extended family.

            (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

            (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
            child’s maturity and judgment.

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            (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
            other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
            reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
            child from harm.

            (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
            consistent and nurturing relationship with the child
            adequate for the child’s emotional needs.

            (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
            physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
            needs of the child.

            (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

            (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability
            to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

            (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
            willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
            another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
            another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
            cooperate with that party.

            (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
            member of a party’s household.

            (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
            member of a party’s household.

            (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).

      Instantly, the trial court carefully considered the foregoing custody

factors and explained its rationale for granting Mother primary physical

custody.   The court determined that factors two, four, six, eight, and ten

favored Mother, no factors militated in favor of Father, and the remaining

factors were either neutral or inapplicable. Significantly, as to factors thirteen

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and fourteen, relating to the level of conflict between the parties, and the

parties’ history of drug or alcohol abuse, respectively, the court concluded that

the factors were neutral because of the parties’ improved co-parenting efforts,

Father’s progress in counseling, and Father “legitimate prescriptions for

medical marijuana and Adderall.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/22, at 18.

      The court summarized its best interest analysis as follows:

             Of the 16 factors considered by the court, eleven of them
      were neutral or did not really apply. That tends to suggest a
      relatively even matching of the parties, but admittedly, the
      remaining five factors were not even. On the other hand, the five
      factors which favored [Mother] were not overwhelmingly
      favorable to her and provide less advantage to her than she
      apparently thinks.

             Of the five factors which favored [Mother], one factor
      favored her only slightly (stability/continuity) and two others
      favored [Mother] but were given little or no weight (abuse and
      efforts to turn child against the other parent). Those limited
      weightings and the slight favoring on stability/continuity mitigated
      the impacts of three factors [weighing in Mother’s favor], meaning
      that 14 were neutral or close enough to it that they didn’t greatly
      move the needle overall. . . .

             In addition, the court applied moderate weight to a neutral
      factor (parental duties) because it was a significant factor. While
      it favored neither [parent], it was important to the case and was
      not to be disregarded simply on account of being neutral. The
      moderate weighting assigned was intended to communicate that
      the factor suggested a neutral custody award was more
      appropriate rather than being a factor that was neutral because it
      was irrelevant. Giving this particular neutral factor a moderate
      weight was this court’s way of stating that the factor more strongly
      suggested a shared custody outcome as opposed to one awarding
      one parent with a greater amount of time than the other. This
      should have been a signal to [Mother] that her apparent victory
      was less overwhelming than she seemingly believed it to be.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 2/28/23, at 6-7.

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      Mother’s first argument challenges the weight that the trial court applied

to certain best-interest factors, namely factor fourteen relating to the parties’

respective past substance abuse.       Scoring the trial court’s best-interest

analysis as a five-nil contest in her favor, Mother asserts that the court erred

in finding that factor fourteen was neutral.      She reasons, “a [sixth] and

possibly pivotal factor should have been decided in [her] favor.” Mother’s

brief at 16.   Essentially, Mother asserts that the court erred in equating

Father’s habitual consumption of marijuana and Adderall, which he currently

acquires pursuant to a recently issued medical authorization and prescription,

respectively, outweighs her present reliance on Adderall and evidence of her

past marijuana consumption. Id. at 17. Assailing the trial court’s role as the

ultimate arbiter of fact, she contends “it is unsupported by the record for the

lower court to find that [Father’s] history of drug and alcohol abuse is not far

more substantial than that of [Mother].” Id. at 18.

      In rejecting Mother’s assertion that the trial court discounted Father’s

history of substance abuse in finding this factor neutral, the trial court

highlighted that Father engaged in substantial rehabilitation efforts “and

manifested significant behavioral changes for the better.” Rule 1925 Opinion,

2/28/23, at 4-5. Hence, notwithstanding Father’s past substance abuse, his

current reliance on prescribed medication is not a detriment to his daughter’s

best interests. As the trial court accurately observed, while Mother discounts

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Father’s efforts, the trial court “saw it differently” and this difference of opinion

is not an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 5. We agree.

      Mother’s arguments simply ask that we reweigh the evidence adduced

during the hearing to reach conclusions in her favor. It is axiomatic that a

party cannot dictate the weight that the trial court attributed to the evidence

or its consideration of any single factor. Indeed, as we explained in M.J.M. v.

M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa.Super. 2013), “it is within the trial court’s

purview as the finder of fact to determine which factors are most salient and

critical in each particular case.” We simply will not revisit the trial court’s

factual findings that are based on the certified record to reassess the weight

of the evidence. J.R.M. v J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[W]ith

regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to

the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-

hand[.]”). Thus, inasmuch as the certified record sustains the trial court’s

findings of fact regarding the extent and significance of Father’s rehabilitation,

we do not disturb them. See S.C.B. supra, at 913. Having reviewed the

certified record, we discern neither an abuse of discretion nor legal error in

the trial court’s best-interest analysis pursuant to § 5328(a).

      Mother’s second argument is an extension of her assessment of Father’s

marijuana use.      She challenges the court’s reliance upon the proviso

prohibiting Father from operating an automobile with P.A.R. in it within six

hours of ingesting marijuana as it is insufficient to render him unimpaired

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pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i), the DUI statute criminalizing the

operation of a motor vehicle with any amount of marijuana in his blood, and

therefore, she argues that it does not serve her daughter’s best interest.

Mother’s brief at 18-19.    Mother suggests that the trial court should have

specifically precluded Father from driving in violation of the DUI statute, which

she highlights would eliminate any possibility that he would drive his daughter

while impaired. Id. at 19. Ultimately, she posits that the provision “expressly

allows Father to drive a motor vehicle with the child inside, for purposes of

the custody order, if he waits six hours after consuming medical marijuana to

drive.” Id. at 20.

      We reject Mother’s glib contention that the relevant provision authorized

Father to drive while impaired. In actuality, the trial court order specifically

directed that “[n]o person transporting the child shall consume alcoholic

beverages or take an illegal substance prior to transporting the child or be

under the influence of . . . any other substance that impairs the ability to drive

while transporting the child.” Pa.R.A.P. Opinion at 2/28/23, at 9-10. Thus,

notwithstanding Mother’s protestations to the contrary, the court specifically

prohibited anyone, including Father, from operating a motor vehicle while

impaired.

      Mother’s apprehension with the court’s six-hour restriction is founded

on the misconception that the court sanctioned otherwise improper conduct.

It did not. The trial court opinion that accompanied the custody order

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cautioned Father that “the mere presence of the psychoactive component of

marijuana (THC)2 or even only the inactive metabolites which do not cause

impairment can be the basis for a DUI charge in Pennsylvania even if he is not

impaired at all.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/22, at 17-18. Thus, as the trial

court colorfully concludes, the provision “is not the ‘get out of a THC DUI free

card’ that [Mother] makes it out to be.” Pa.R.A.P. Opinion at 2/28/23, at 12.

In fact, the trial court fashioned the six-hour restriction in addition to the

general prohibition of impaired driving to assuage Mother’s concerns about

Father’s behavior. The court explained,

       The intention was to provide a workable rule in the custody order
       to give [Mother] a realistic means of recourse for civil contempt if
       she suspected [Father] of DUI[-]type conduct under Pennsylvania
       law as it relates to THC. She has no duty with this bright line rule
       to produce toxicological evidence or prove actual impairment and
       she has access to contempt remedies.

               The DUI statute contained in the [Pennsylvania Motor]
       Vehicle Code and all related chemical testing statutes provide no
       relief to a litigant in custody court like [Mother] who does not have
       the backing of state authority to compel blood testing or secure a
       warrant to compel chemical testing. In the event [Mother]
       becomes concerned [Father] is using THC, say from a social media
       post, and then he shows up at a custody exchange driving himself
       in a vehicle, she likely could do very little absent this language,
       other than to call 911 and hope for the best. With this language
       in place, she can choose to litigate the issue even if the police
       decline to investigate or prosecute because of concerns about lack
       of probable cause to require a blood draw or an inability to secure
       a conviction [.] . . . [Mother] fails to appreciate that this rule was
       written by the court to give her an enforcement tool to prevent a

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2 THC, or Tetrahydrocannabinol, or is the primary psychoactive component in

marijuana.

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      possible harm she complained of at trial, which was [Father]
      driving with THC in his system.

Id. at 12.

      Phrased differently, the restriction provides that, if Father operates a

vehicle within six hours of ingesting medical marijuana, he is in violation of

the custody order and is subject to sanction regardless of actual impairment.

This tool that the court provided for Mother’s use is hardly the imprimatur for

criminal conduct that she suggests.     Accordingly, we discern no abuse of

discretion in the trial court supplementing the DUI statute by fashioning a

clear and objective prohibition on Father’s operation of a motor vehicle with

his daughter within six hours of ingesting medical marijuana.

      Finally, we address Mother’s challenge to the schedule of physical

custody because it increased Father’s periods of overnight custody from the

two overnights that he exercised in the interim custody order. This issue has

two components: (1) the increased periods of partial physical custody will not

benefit P.A.R. because of Father’s work schedule; and (2) Father’s paramour,

Amanda Bryant, whom Mother equates to someone with third-party standing,

will “exercise” periods of physical custody “1/7th of the child’s waking time.”

Mother’s brief at 11-12. Mother characterizes the parallel cruxes of these two

contentions as follows: “The lower court’s final order then can best be

characterized as a focus on increasing the amount of [Father’s] overnights at

the expense of meaningful time the child spends with the child’s parents[; and

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t]he child’s interests cannot be served by prioritizing time with a third-party

over that of one of the parents.” Id. at 12-13. Again, no relief is due.

      As to Mother’s protestations the court reasoned,

            [Mother] quibbles about the court changing visits for a few
      hours on some nights into overnights, but again, it is nothing that
      rises to the level of abuse of discretion. The elimination of the
      back-and-forth that comes with a several hour custody visit was
      an attempt by the court to limit transitions and to make the
      schedule simpler, which the court perceived to be in the best
      interest of the child. Again, disagreement is not abuse of
      discretion.

            [Mother] also complained that additional time awarded to
      [Father] would be in the presence of [Father’s] paramour, not
      [Father], and maintained that this was an error. The record
      contains testimony from [Father] that indicates his willingness to
      alter his schedule and his way of operating his business. In
      addition, his business is seasonal, so his unavailability due to work
      even with no changes would not apply in at least some months.
      The court found the testimony of [Father] on his availability to
      care for the child to be credible.

Rule 1925 Opinion, 2/28/23, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted)

      First, Mother’s reference to the interim order as a guidepost for her

daughter’s best interests is unavailing because the interim order was based

on the relevant facts pled when Mother initiated the case and without the

benefit of a two-day evidentiary hearing. Hence, as the trial court highlighted

in the Rule 1925 opinion, “[Mother] has no legal entitlement to the conditions

of the interim order as a locked in starting point or handicap for her benefit at

trial.” Id. at 8.

      Similarly, we also reject Mother’s characterization of Ms. Bryant,

Father’s paramour, as a non-parent, third-party whose custodial rights are

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subservient to Mother’s pursuant to § 5327(b) of the Child Custody Act. That

provision provides, in pertinent part, “In any action regarding the custody of

the child between a parent of the child and a nonparent, these shall be a

presumption that custody shall be awarded to the parent.”                23 Pa.C.S.

§ 5327(b).    Mother first reasons that since Ms. Bryant is Father’s primary

childcare provider when Father is at work, she will be exercising custody

during the majority of Father’s custodial periods. Next, she invokes R.P. v.

K.F., 2020 WL 974414, at *10 (Pa.Super. 2020), a citable non-precedential

decision pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), for the proposition that the trial court

erred by not fashioning a custody schedule that allowed Mother to provide her

daughter childcare when father was at work. Mother’s brief at 13.

      Mother’s reliance upon R.P. is questionable because the R.P. Court held

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mother a

right of first refusal, over the paternal grandmother, when Father needed to

use a baby siter. We explained that it served the child’s best interest for the

trial court to permit the father, in his discretion, to utilize third parties, to care

for his son while exercising his custodial time. Id. at *9. Indeed, finding “no

merit [in the m]other’s argument that the trial court awarded Grandmother

any form of custody,” this Court upheld the trial court’s endorsement of the

father’s freedom to choose a childcare option that is convenient for him. Id.

at *10.

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      Disregarding our deference for the best-interest determinations of trial

courts, rejection of the mothers’ argument equating the caregiver with a non-

parent third-party, and our support for the father’s autonomous child-care

decisions, Mother argues that because Ms. Bryant does not share a long-

standing bond with P.A.R., which was apparent in R.P., we should find that

the trial court abused its discretion in not requiring Father to utilize her

exclusively in this case. We disagree. In addition to the fact that Mother’s

argument contrasts with all but one aspect of this Court’s reasoning in R.P.,

the trial court highlighted Father’s flexibility and willingness to adapt his work

schedule, and more importantly, the fact that Father’s employment is seasonal

“so his unavailability due to work . . . would not apply in at least some

months.” Rule 1925 Opinion, 2/28/23, at 6. Considering the foregoing in

light of our deferential standard of review, we do not discern that the trial

court abused its discretion in declining to craft a custody schedule that

provides Mother custodial periods when father is working. See Ketterer v.

Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 539 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“Ultimately, the test is

“whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the

evidence of record.”).

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/24/2023

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