Court Opinion

ID: 9721122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:48:52.108637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.431925
License: Public Domain

MATHIAS, Judge,
dissenting
Without question, a promise should- and usually does-stand for something. However, our legal system has wisely placed limitations on the formal enforceability of gratuitous promises. Because I think those limitations should apply here, I must respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that NIPSCO's gratuitous promise may be actionable as a matter of tort law. Specifically, the majority relies on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, which was adopted by this court in Harper v. Guarantee Auto Stores, 533 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 That section provides: (Ind.Ct.App.1989).
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
The "caveat" immediately following this section declines to express an opinion as to whether making "a gratuitous promise, without in any way entering upon performance, is a sufficient undertaking to result in liability under the rule stated in this Section." Nevertheless, and in the absence of any evidence that NIPSCO actually inspected the work at issue, the majority adopts such a rule: "a promise is sufficient when coupled with reliance by the injured promisee." 747 N.E.2d at 75.
As a preliminary matter, I believe that NIPSCO's conduct in question falls under Restatements (Second) of Torts § 323, rather than § 324A. NIPSCO's alleged promise to inspect was made directly to Mr. Light, not to a third party. However, as the comment to § 324A points out, the same logic and policy considerations are shared by the two sections. It is with this logic and policy that I take issue.
Our lives are filled with many relationships that never do and never should take *77on legal significance. A friend is no less a friend because the law does not define what friendship is.
Similarly, we often undertake tasks on behalf of others with the explicit or implicit understanding that the beneficiary can make no claim beyond disappointment when things do not turn out as originally promised or represented. When a relative or friend volunteers to "look at" a malfune-tioning motor vehicle or a home one is planning to purchase, I do not believe the common law should impose liability when such inspection either never takes place or turns out to be deficient. The majority's position and the position of §§ 823 and 324A is that liability might well attach. The important limiting concept is one of whether reliance was reasonable, a concept not fully developed by the majority or by the Restatement discussions.
As a matter of contract law, it is well settled that "[nljot every promise creates a legal obligation which the law will enforce. A promise must be predicated upon adequate consideration before it can command performance." Spickelmier Industries, Inc. v. Passander, 172 Ind.App. 49, 359 N.E.2d 563, 564 (1977). Under the facts and cireumstances before us, I believe that the payments NIPSCO would eventually receive from the Lights for the natural gas to fuel the appliances installed by the third-party contractor could serve as adequate consideration to enforce NIPSCO's promise to inspect under traditional contract theory.
Instead, the majority has embarked down a tort path that will likely have far-reaching and undesirable consequences. For this reason, I must respectfully dissent.