Court Opinion

ID: 6759903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-21 00:30:24.897532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:02:34.177833
License: Public Domain

Locher, J.,
dissenting. Although I have no quarrel with the general principles of law expressed in the syllabus and majority opinion, I must dissent because it is clear that the California superior court erroneously applied the doctrine of cy pres in the case sub judice. Because the California judgment is contrary to California law, and because the California court had no jurisdiction over the trust assets in question, I would hold that the judgment of that court is not entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of Ohio.
To begin, a review of relevant California law reveals a statute which expressly provides for a result contrary to that reached by the California superior court and the majority opinion. California Civ. Code Section 1389.3 states:
“(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), when the donee of a discretionary power of appointment fails to appoint the property, releases the entire power, or makes an ineffective appointment, in whole or in part, the appointive property not effectively appointed passes to the person or persons named by the donor as takers in default or, if there are none, reverts to the donor.
“(b) When the donee of a general power of appointment makes an ineffective appointment, an implied alternative appointment to the donee’s estate may be found if the donee has manifested an intent that the appointive property be disposed of as property of the donee rather than as in default of appointment.” (Emphasis added.)
This statute is clearly on point. The donee, Marcia Rivas, made an ineffective appointment when Alcoholics Anonymous refused to accept more than $500 of the trust distribution. Marcia Rivas also had a discretionary power of appointment. See California Civ. Code Section 1381.4. Thus, under *146Section 1389.3(a), the trust assets not effectively appointed by the will of Marcia Rivas pass to the taker in default as provided by the trust document, namely the Roberta Pawlak trust. Also on point is Estate of Eddy (1982), 134 Cal. App. 3d 292, 184 Cal. Rptr. 521, in which it was held that under the statute, where a donee failed to effectively exercise a power of appointment in her will, the trust property passed to the donor’s son, who was named as the taker in default. In light of the statute and this case, it can only be concluded that the California superior court erred when it applied the doctrine of cy pres to the trust assets in question.
The California decision is also invalid because it ignored the express language of the trust to the effect that if the donee failed to make an effective appointment, the trust property was to be held for or distributed to one of the named takers in default. The cy-pres doctrine is designed to give effect to the intent of a donor, not to thwart it. For this reason, the cy-pres doctrine does not apply where, as here, the donor’s intent is to the contrary. See, e.g., Restatement of the Law 2d, Trusts (1959), Section 399, Comment c, at 299; Section 401, Comment d, at 311.
Generally, the final judgment of a sister state’s court must be given full faith and credit where that court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, even if the judgment is erroneous. See Milliken v. Meyer (1940), 311 U.S. 457, 462. However, a judgment of a sister state’s court is subject to collateral attack in Ohio if there was no subject matter or personal jurisdiction to render the judgment under the sister state’s internal law, and under that law the judgment is void.
The California superior court in this case had no jurisdiction over either Toledo Trust Company, the trustee, or the trust assets. The mere fact that notice of the hearing in the California superior court was mailed to Toledo Trust does not subject Toledo Trust to the jurisdiction of that court. Furthermore, since the trust assets belong to the Roberta Pawlak trust, the California superior court had no jurisdiction over them. See Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235. The majority unpersuasively attempts to distinguish Hanson by stating that the California decision “merely sought to ascertain and give effect to the testamentary intent of a California domiciliary,” rather than exercise jurisdiction over the trust assets. In my view, this is a meaningless distinction, for how could the California court purport to decide to whom to distribute the trust assets without exercising jurisdiction over those assets?
In summary, the majority opinion is ill-founded because it merely presumes that the California judgment is valid. A closer look, however, reveals that under California law the California superior court had no jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter in question, rendering the California judgment void. Consequently, I would hold that the California judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, and I would affirm the summary judgment of the trial court in favor of the Toledo Trust Company. Accordingly, I dissent.