Court Opinion

ID: 9716643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:46:43.994799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.514259
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in result
Notwithstanding my concurrence in Atkins v. State (1983) Ind.App., 451 N.E.2d 55, I am somewhat troubled by the extension of the public intoxication definition of “public place” to the public indecency statute. It appears that our past decisions in the public intoxication context have been driven by policy considerations. However, as noted by the majority, a public place must be accessible to the public, and I find it difficult to accept the *69premise that the inside of a closed vehicle traveling upon the highway is accessible to members of the public. Be that as it may, while I may at this point in time question whether an intoxicated person inside a closed vehicle is in a “public place” because the vehicle is upon a public road accessible to members of the public, that is not the question before us. The issue before us involves the public indecency statute.
As stated in Thompson v. State (1985) Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 1372, 1375, (quoting Lasko v. State (1980) Ind.App., 409 N.E.2d 1124, 1128-29):
“[The purpose of the statute is] to protect the non-consenting viewer who might find such a spectacle repugnant.”2
Common sense and human experience tells us that the usual highway vehicle traveler, whether'walking, in an automobile, pick-up truck, or motorcycle would not have his moral sensibilities offended by the driver of a tractor-trailer rig who could not be viewed by the unsuspecting traveler. Only the occupant of a bigger big-truck or a low flying helicopter would be likely to observe defendant’s bizarre lack of attire. In this context, therefore, as did our Supreme Court in Chubb v. State (1994) Ind., 640 N.E.2d 44, 47 reh’g denied, I would hold that while he was traveling upon the public highway in his vehicle, Whatley was not “visible to the casual public eye” and was therefore not in a public place.3
The situation was relevantly altered, however, when Whatley knowingly drove his vehicle into the weigh station. Because operators of tractor-trailer rigs are required to stop at such stations, there can be little doubt that Whatley knew of the likelihood that a motor carrier inspector would approach his vehicle in that place accessible to all similar drivers and that he might be requested to exit the vehicle.
It is this circumstance which permits me to agree with the conclusion that Whatley knowingly and intentionally appeared in a public place in a state of nudity and which permits me to concur in affirmance of the judgment.

. In State v. Sevier (1889) 117 Ind. 338, 340, 20 N.E. 245, the court, without supporting authority, espoused an arguably analogous rationale for the public intoxication statute: "The purpose of the law is to protect the public from the annoyance and deleterious effects which may and do occur because of the presence of persons who are in an intoxicated condition.” However, an earlier case concluded that the statute was a valid in that it "fairly tends to repress and restrain the excessive and dangerous use of intoxi-eating liquors...." Evans v. State (1877) 59 Ind. 563, 564.

. The defendant in Chubb was in a restroom stall which had partitions separating it from other similar stalls but could be and was seen by the undercover officer standing outside Chubb’s stall. Notwithstanding this degree of visibility, the court held that Chubb’s conduct was not visible "to the casual public eye.” Id.