Court Opinion

ID: 9447560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:37:45.153123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:05.694399
License: Public Domain

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in that part of the opinion and judgment that reverses, with direction to acquit, William F. Powers on Count Six.
With every deference to the views of my colleagues, I must dissent from that part of the opinion and judgment of the Court that reverses, with direction to acquit, Harry S. Getchell and Hollis Rinehart, and also from that part of the opinion and judgment which reverses for further disposition the conviction of Francis E. Getchell.
First, as to the conviction of William F. Powers, I agree that the only evidence showing any use of the mails in connection with Count Six, the only one on which Powers was convicted, was admitted by the Court as against Francis E. Getchell alone. Thus, as the opinion of the majority points out, there was no evidence to connect Powers with this offense.
Second, as to the conviction of Rinehart and Harry S. Getchell under Count Eight, it seems to me that the majority has misapprehended the meaning of the statute. The indictment charged that the defendants, “having devised the said scheme [the scheme being the scheme to defraud, fully alleged in the mail fraud Count One of the indictment] and artifice to defraud, would and did in the sale *692of securities, by the use of the mails, wilfully' employ said scheme and artifice to defraud, said use of the mails being in the manner following, towit:” (emphasis added), then is alleged the mailing of the letter to Fox, set out in the majority opinion.
Treating of this Count, the Court says: “[This] letter contained no offers, promises, or representations. It employed neither directly nor indirectly any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” I think it is perfectly clear that the letter need meet none of these tests to support the indictment. It was proof of one thing, and one thing only: that the defendants were engaged “in the sale of any securities * * * by the use of the mails.” (Emphasis added.) Proof that in such sale, i. e., sale by use of the mails, the defendants employed “any device, scheme or artifice to defraud” was to be found by showing the defendants’ participation in the basic scheme to defraud, which the majority says was proved as to Francis E. Getchell, and which it did not reach as to Rinehart and Harry S. Getchell.
To repeat, the letter was proof, and it was essential proof, that there was a sale of the securities mentioned in the letter by mail. There was no proof, and it need not be any proof of the existence of the fraudulent scheme, nor need the letter be in furtherance of the scheme as would be the case under a mail fraud prosecution. This statute is turned the other way about from the mail fraud statute. It is not the use of the mails here that is made the gist of the offense. The use of the mails merely gives the Federal Government jurisdiction. It is the employment of a scheme to defraud that is the gist of the offense, the employment of such a scheme being made a crime where the sale of securities is made by mail.
Certainly the letter asking for a confirmation of a subscription to the stock and asking how the stock was to be issued, is evidence of a “sale by use of the mails.” It thus becomes necessary to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Rinehart and Harry S. Getchell participated in the fraudulent scheme. The majority of the Court did not attempt to pass on this question. The case against these defendants, and particularly against the attorney Rinehart, is weaker than against Francis E. Getchell. I cannot find that it was insufficient to support the finding by the Jury that Harry S. Getchell knowingly participated in the scheme to defraud, particularly in light of all of the evidence which the jury could believe about Harry’s efforts to conceal the secret magic formula in his “little bottle.” As to Rinehart, I would not dissent from a judgment granting him a new trial along with Francis E. Getchell. I do dissent from an order directing his acquittal.
Finally, as to the case against Francis E. Getchell, with all deference I think the Court follows an entirely unprecedented course in setting aside the verdict of the jury. This is so because, while conceding, although with evident reluctance, that there was sufficient evidence to convict Getchell, the Court succeeds in making it appear that this man, who, without any possible dispute, made numerous factually false statements in obtaining money for his unsuccessful venture, was more sinned against than sinning. And this the Court does without pointing to a single error sufficient in itself to work a reversal of the jury’s verdict, and, what is not made apparent by the majority opinion, on grounds that are so insubstantial or so vague that they are not mentioned or even hinted at by counsel for Getchell in the three briefs filed in this Court on his behalf.
I can fully sympathize with an accused who, without any previous criminal record, finds himself convicted of the crime of mail fraud late in life. It is very apparent, from the opinion of the Court, that my colleagues feel that the jury should not have convicted Getchell, but it is equally apparent, it seems to me, that they are unable to find any basis of error *693to warrant setting aside the conviction. Truly, it seems to me, this is an extreme illustration of the truth of the saying, “hard cases make bad law.”
As stated in the majority opinion, no one of the grounds of error for which this Court reverses the verdict of the jury was called to the attention of the trial court in this ten-week trial, no one of them was complained of by counsel for Getchell either in stating the grounds of his appeal or in argument in this Court. This is not a case in which counsel appears in this Court urging that we take notice of plain error under Rule 52(b), F.R.Cr.P. Thus, of course, the matter was not presented to the Court for consideration. Aside from such a judgment being attended with all the evils of any decision based on a point not argued by the parties, it appears to me that the standards for review of a jury verdict in criminal cases will be seriously impaired for the future if, in such circumstances, we can reject the verdict of a jury on such general grounds, some of which are not even completely stated in the opinion of the Court.1
A reading of this record clearly indicates that this defendant is no sensitive, enginuous dreamer or optimist. Several of his letters, notably that to one woman who complained he had defrauded her and to whom he made restitution under threat of prosecution, indicate that he was sufficiently worldly-wise and aggressive in his attitude to warrant the jury’s finding that he was guilty of a wilful fraud. The record certainly does not depict a defendant in need of the extraordinary protection extended by the unusually broadened power of review here asserted on his behalf by the majority of the Court.
I would affirm the judgment of conviction as to both the Getchells.

. The Court criticizes the length of the indictment, but without specifying wherein the long indictment was prejudicial. The majority weighs the character evidence in favor of one defendant in light of the public offices held by his character witnesses, a matter that I think is entirely beyond the power or function of this Court to consider. The majority opinion says it was not error for the trial court to permit the jury to road the indictment, but then says it tended to prejudice the defendants. The Court then makes what to me is the surprising statement, “The very length of the trial itself * * * was likely to impress the jury with the importance which the Government attached to the prosecution and with the presumed gravity of the alleged scheme to defraud.” Thus grounds of reversal are hinted at without being clearly defined.