Court Opinion

ID: 9743225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:28:49.825426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:39.998765
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING JUSTICE LORENZ delivered the opinion of the court: In their petition for rehearing, defendants maintain that this court failed to consider the statutory requirement that the petitioner for intervention “will or may be bound by an order or judgment in the action.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2—408(a)(2).) Although we believe that our analysis adequately addressed the issue, we take this opportunity to address new arguments presented by defendants’ petition, in the interests of fullness and finality. We note, however, that the trial court’s denial of the petition for intervention was based on the adequacy of representation.  Defendants argue that because we held petitioner’s interest was not adequately represented, petitioner will not and cannot be bound by an order or judgment in this action. This reasoning proves too much: If inadequate representation negated binding judgment as these two ideas are used in the statute, then no petitioner could qualify for intervention as of right, and the statute would be a nullity. More important are the circumstances of this case. Petitioner owns a condominium unit in a building which the city alleges to be unhealthful; the city seeks fines, injunctive relief, and even an order of demolition. Whether relief is granted or the status quo preserved, this adjudication will directly and substantially affect the quality of the air in the building, the expense of belonging to the association, and the physical components (possibly the existence) of the building. It strains credulity to say that petitioner may not be bound by an order or judgment in this action. Yet defendants argue stridently that “will or may be bound” requires that the judgment be res judicata as to a petitioner for intervention, and that this court has erred in relaxing the standard to “an enforceable right or tangible detriment.” Defendants point to Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States (1961), 366 U.S. 683, 6 L. Ed. 2d 604, 81 S. Ct. 1309, which involved application of the predecessor Federal intervention rule in the context of a government antitrust suit. Defendants maintain that Sam Fox interpreted the rule upon which the Illinois intervention statute was founded, and that our reliance upon Federal cases interpreting the successor rule is misplaced. Professor Sherman Cohn, then chairman of the Federal Bar Association Committee on Federal Rules and Procedure, stated with respect to the amendment of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24: “The immediate motivation for the change in the rule was the Supreme Court’s decision in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States. *** [T]he Court pointed out in Sam Fox that the two elements required by 24(a)(2) could never coexist and thus the section was a nullity in class actions.” (Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Geo. L.J. 1204, 1230 (1966).) Noting that the Sam Fox dilemma rendered intervention impossible in all suits involving representation of absent interests (54 Geo. L.J. 1204, 1230 n.106), Professor Cohn concluded: “The new rule seems to have solved the res judicata problem under the old rule while retaining the requirement of inadequate representation. It appears to be more in line with the practice prior to the federal rules and with the original intent of the draftsmen and the court to codify and amplify that practice.” (Emphasis added.) (54 Geo. L.J. 1204, 1231.) In other words, after Federal interpretation of the predecessor rule led down a logical cul-de-sac, the successor Federal rule returned to the path of common sense. The Illinois supreme court never adopted the Sam Fox rationale, instead wisely and consistently treading the road to a practical civil procedure. Our supreme court interprets “will or may be bound” to require an interest greater than that of the general public, such that a party will stand to benefit or suffer by the legal operation of a judgment, but the court has rejected the requirement of a direct interest in the suit. (Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 102, 112, 417 N.E.2d 1343; Mensik v. Smith (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 572, 590, 166 N.E.2d 265; Dowsett v. City of East Moline (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 560, 567, 134 N.E.2d 793.) For reasons we will belabor no longer, petitioner for intervention has fulfilled this requirement.  Finally, returning to the adequacy of representation issue, defendants argue that our opinion will paralyze the city’s efforts to enforce the building code against condominium properties by requiring the city to join all unit owners. We observe that the city did not advance this argument on its own behalf. We do not believe that our opinion is subject to any such interpretation. We did not hold that a condominium association cannot represent its members, but merely stated that the association here did not represent the interest of this petitioner. Nor did we hold that unit owners were necessary parties, but only that a petitioner who undertakes the effort and expense to intervene should receive such consideration as the statute warrants. If another unit owner wishes to intervene, that person also must show that his or her interest is sufficient, and that such interest is inadequately represented by existing parties, including the present intervener. (See Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 747 (1968).) In our view, the letter and spirit of the statute can only be advanced by allowing intervention in this case. For the foregoing reasons defendants’ petition for rehearing is denied. SULLIVAN and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur.