Court Opinion

ID: 9791868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:19:40.84772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:54.521935
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fatzer, J.:
This was an action to recover a workmen’s compensation lump-sum judgment pursuant to K. S. A. 44-512a. The appeal is from the district court’s order sustaining the respondent-employer and its insurance carrier’s motion to dismiss the action. The employer and its insurance carrier are referred to as the respondents.
The facts are not in dispute. On August 16, 1969, the examiner entered a workmen’s compensation award in favor of the claimant. Thereafter, the respondents made timely written request to the director of workmen’s compensation for review of the award pursuant to K. S. A. 1969 Supp. 44-551.
On November 13, 1969, the director entered his order approving the examiner’s award and filed the same in his office. In addition *160to the payment of medical expense, the award directed payment of temporary total disability at the rate of $49 per week for 415 weeks in the amount of $20,335. The director found that as of August 16, 1969, the claimant was entitled to 65 weeks of compensation at the rate of $49 per week in the amount of $3,185 of which $1,568 had been paid leaving a balance of $1,617 due and owing, which was ordered paid in one lump sum. The remaining compensation in the amount of $17,150 was ordered paid at the rate of $49 per week for 350 weeks, or until the further order of the director.
Six days later, and on November 19, 1969, the respondents perfected an appeal to the district court of Douglas County from the directors award of compensation in favor of the claimant.
On the following day, November 20, 1969, the claimant served a statutory demand upon the respondents pursuant to 44-512a for payment of all due and unpaid weekly compensation benefits and for all unpaid medical expenses then due and unpaid.
The respondents last paid compensation to the claimant on October 5, 1969, and they failed to comply with the claimant’s statutory demand to pay the portion of compensation due under the award for the ten-week period preceding the director’s award.
On December 10, 1969, the claimant commenced this action to recover the entire amount of compensation and medical expenses awarded, less any payment previously made to him.
Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the action. On March 3, 1970, the district court entered its order sustaining the motion,
“. . . [¡Inasmuch as no payments were due at the time Claimant’s demand was served, such demand was as has been held: ‘premature and ineffectual to authorize an action for a lump sum judgment.’ (See: Hunter v. General Motors Corporation, 202 K. 166, at 170.)”
The sole question presented is whether a statutory demand for payment of compensation served upon the respondents after they perfected an appeal to the district court pursuant to K.S. A. 1969 Supp. 44-556, and within twenty days after the director made and filed his award, is premature and ineffectual to authorize an action under the provisions of 44-512a. In other words, was compensation awarded the claimant due and payable under 44-556 when he served his statutory demand upon the respondents on November 20, 1969? *161For reasons hereafter stated, we conclude no compensation was due or payable under the director s award when the claimant served his statutory demand.
Section 44-512a has been construed and applied by this court in many cases. In Casebeer v. Alliance Mutual Casualty Co., 203 Kan. 425, 454 P. 2d 511, the statute’s purpose and effect were stated. In the opinion it was said:
“. . . Without deviation, it has been held that if any compensation awarded shall not be paid when due, then, following service of the written demand provided for, continued nonpayment for twenty days thereafter accelerates the entire amount of compensation awarded, which immediately becomes due and payable, and the person entitled thereto may maintain an action to recover the specific amount in like manner as for the collection of a debt . . .” (1. c. 431.)
A statutory demand under 44-512a can only be effective for compensation awarded the claimant then due and unpaid. (Damon v. Smith County, 191 Kan. 564, 382 P. 2d 311.) When payment of compensation is not delinquent, either under the provisions of 44-556, or by reason of payment or tender of payment on the part of the employer or his insurance carrier, there can be no valid statutory demand upon which to predicate a 44-512a action.
K. S. A. 1969 Supp. 44-556 provides in part that an appeal to the district court may be taken by any party to the proceeding within twenty days after the director files his award, and in addition provides:
“. . . That no compensation shall be due or payable until the expiration of such twenty (20) day period and then the payment of past due compensation awarded by the director shall not be payable, if within such twenty (20) day period notice oí appeal to the district court has been filed and the right to appeal shall include the right to make no payments of such compensation until the appeal has been decided by the district court if the employer is insured for workmen’s compensation liability with an insurance company authorized to do business in this state or, if the employer is a self-insurer, and has filed a bond with the district court in accordance with K. S. A. 44-530: Provided, however, That the perfection of an appeal to the district court shall not stay the payment of compensation due for the ten-week period next preceding the director’s decision, and for the period of time after the director’s decision and prior to the decision of the district court in such appeal . . .”
While the statute appears to contain conflicting provisions with respect to the payment of compensation pending an appeal to the district court, its provisions have been construed in our recent cases of Hunter v. General Motors Corporation, 202 Kan. 166, 446 P. 2d *162838, and Kissick v. Salina Manufacturing Co., Inc., 204 Kan. 849, 466 P. 2d 344. In the Hunter case, referring to 44-556, it was said:
. . This statute substantially provides . . . that an appeal may be taken from an award of the director by filing a notice of appeal with the director within twenty days after the award has been made and filed, and that no compensation shall be due or payable until the expiration of such twenty-day appeal period.” (1. c. 169.)
In the Kissick case, it was said:
“. . . K. S. A. 1969 Supp. 44-556 provides in substance that any party may appeal from the director’s decisions, rulings and awards to district court within 20 days after the same have been made and filed, that no compensation shall be due or payable until expiration of such 20-day period, and that past due compensation shall not be payable if within such period notice of appeal has been filed; provided, however, that perfection of the appeal shall not stay payment of compensation due for the period of ten weeks next preceding the director’s decision and for the period between the director’s decision and the decision of the district court on appeal.” (1. c. 851.)
For discussion of the statute see, also, Scammahorn v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Assn., 195 Kan. 220, 223-225, 404 P. 2d 165.
In the instant case, the statutory demand was served upon the respondents within the twenty-day period after the director filed his award, and the fact it was served after the respondents perfected their appeal to the district court did not accelerate the entire amount of the compensation awarded the claimant. Under the express terms of the statute, no compensation was. due or payable for twenty days after the director filed his award, and no valid effectual demand may be made within that time upon which to predicate a 44-512a action. Clearly, the statutory demand was premature and ineffective since it was served within the twenty-day period. In the Hunter case, it was held:
“A demand made under K. S. A. 44-512a for payment of compensation awarded by tire workmen’s compensation director is premature and ineffectual where the same is made within the twenty-day period during which an appeal from the director’s award may be taken to district court under the provisions of IC. S. A. 1967 Supp. 44-556.” (Syl. ¶ 1.)
Under our cases construing the provisions of 44-556, it may be said that for a written demand to be effective under 44-512a it must be served upon the delinquent employer after the expiration of the twenty-day period following the filing of the director s award. (Hunter v. General Motors Corporation, supra; Kissick v. Salina Manufacturing Co., Inc., supra.) This is not to say, however, that *163pending an appeal to the district court the claimant is without remedy to compel payment of the compensation awarded. The point was covered in the Rissick case, and it was said:
“Our conclusion does not leave a claimant without remedy should his employer fail or refuse to pay compensation due pending the appeal. The statute, K. S. A. 1969 Supp. 44-556, clearly directs that an appeal from the director’s award shall not stay payment of compensation due for the ten-week period next preceding the director’s decision and during pendency of the appeal. If compensation is not paid when due, the workman has been provided with a handy and effective tool to force compliance, namely, the procedure outlined in K. S. A. 44-512a. Use of this statute, in our opinion, is the means by which the legislature intended all compensation due and payable should be enforced, including that which is due pending appeal. In Griffith v. State Highway Commission of Kansas, supra, this view finds expression in syllabus 2:
‘K. S. A. 44-512a is the declared public policy of the state that compensation awards shall be promptly paid, and is the means selected by the Legislature to insure their enforcement, and applies to all awards or judgments without the slightest qualifications.’ (1. c. 855, 856.)”
The district court did not err in dismissing the claimant’s action.
The judgment is affirmed.