Court Opinion

ID: 9897327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:12.398776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.552523
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Jul 31 2023, 8:46 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
MICHAEL O. CAIN AND LINDA A.                                WILLIAM J. HUFF II
RAYMOND                                                     REVOCABLE TRUST
Todd G. Relue                                               DECLARATION DATED
Ryan T. Leagre                                              JUNE 28, 2011, AND
Plews Shadley Racher & Braun LLP                            NICOLE E. HUFF
Indianapolis, IN                                            REVOCABLE TRUST
                                                            DECLARATION, DATED
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT TAMMY                                JUNE 28, 2011
JO SEXTON-TROY                                              Tammy L. Ortman
                                                            Lewis & Kappes, P.C.
Darla S. Brown
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana
Sturgeon & Brown, PC
Bloomington, Indiana

                                             IN THE
     COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael O. Cain and                                         July 31, 2023
Linda A. Raymond et al.,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Plaintiffs and                                   22A-PL-1258
Counterclaim Defendants,                                    Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
                                                            Court
        v.                                                  The Honorable Holly M. Harvey,
                                                            Judge
William J. Huff II Revocable                                Trial Court Cause No.
Trust Declaration Dated June                                53C06-1804-PL-755
28, 2011, and Nicole E. Huff
Revocable Trust Declaration,
Dated June 28, 2011,
Appellees-Defendants and
Third-party Plaintiffs

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023                               Page 1 of 13
                                    Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                              Judge Crone and Senior Judge Robb concur.

      Kenworthy, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Trusts for William and Nicole Huff (collectively, “Huffs”) own a parcel of land

      abutting a neighborhood called The Shores. This parcel—which we call the

      THR Parcel—comes with certain appurtenant easement rights to cross The

      Shores. After the Huffs obtained the THR Parcel, they obtained an adjacent

      tract, which we call the Chumley Parcel. Eventually, litigation arose

      concerning the scope of the Huffs’ easement rights with respect to both parcels.

[2]   Below, the Huffs sought partial summary judgment, requesting a declaration

      “the Huffs are entitled to use the [e]asement[s] to access the Huffs’ [p]roperty,

      including both the THR Property and the Chumley Parcel, as long as [the]

      Huffs do not intensify the [e]asement[s].” Cain App. Vol. 2 at 154. The trial

      court granted the Huffs’ motion. In doing so, the court included language

      suggesting there is no longer delineation between the THR Parcel and the

      Chumley Parcel, which renders the declaratory judgment broader than

      requested. Determining the Huffs are entitled only to the declaratory judgment

      they sought, we affirm partial summary judgment for the Huffs while clarifying

      the scope of the judgment. We remand the case for further proceedings.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023         Page 2 of 13
      Facts and Procedural History 1
[3]   Kenton L. Robinson owned a tract of land near Lake Monroe, which he

      planned to develop into a subdivision called The Shores. Adjacent to the tract

      was the THR Property, at that point owned by Terre Haute Realty Corporation

      (“THR”). In 1990, Robinson executed a Grant of Easement (“Grant”), which

      specifically describes the THR Property as the dominant estate. See Cain App.

      Vol. 3 at 41–48 & 217. In the Grant, Robinson established three easements

      across common areas in The Shores. Id. at 41–48. A representative from THR

      signed the Grant, assenting to the “terms, conditions[,] and covenants” of the

      Grant. Id. at 44. One provision states:

              Grantee covenants to limit use of the easements . . . for the
              construction, development[,] and use by Grantee and
              its . . . assigns of six (6) single[-]family residential structures, each
              of which may include guest and caretaker quarters and other
              buildings attendant thereto, to be located on Grantee’s real estate
              described in Exhibit A and as more particularly described above.

      Id. at 43 (emphasis added). Exhibit A describes only the THR Property. See id.

      at 41–48 & 217. No portion of the Grant describes other property as part of the

      dominant estate. See id. at 41–48. And there is no language allowing THR or

      its successor in interest to unilaterally add land to the dominant estate. See id.

      1
        We held oral argument in this case at the Indiana Court of Appeals Courtroom on May 4, 2023. We thank
      the advocates for their skilled presentations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023                           Page 3 of 13
[4]   In 2017, the Huffs obtained the THR Property. See id. at 19–40. They later

      acquired the Chumley Parcel from Chumley, LLC. See id. at 13–18. The

      Chumley Parcel forms a peninsula on Lake Monroe. See id. at 78–79.

[5]   In 2018, Michael O. Cain and Linda A. Raymond—owners of one of the

      affected lots in The Shores (collectively, “Cain”)—sued the Huffs, alleging the

      Huffs were exceeding their easement rights. Cain App. Vol. 2 at 58. At first, the

      lawsuit concerned only the THR Property, focusing on whether the Huffs could

      truck logs from the THR Property across The Shores. See id. at 58–63. The

      litigation led to two appeals involving the propriety of injunctive relief. See Cain

      v. William J. Huff, II Revocable Trust Declaration, Dated June 28, 2011, 149 N.E.3d

      645 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied; William J. Huff, II Revocable Trust

      Declaration, Dated June 28, 2011 v. Cain, 120 N.E.3d 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019),

      trans. denied. Eventually, the litigation involved the Chumley Parcel. See Cain

      App. Vol. 2 at 126–28, 140.

[6]   The Huffs filed a counterclaim against Cain and a third-party complaint against

      Tammy Jo Sexton-Troy and eleven other affected estate-holders in The Shores 2

      (collectively at times, “Sexton-Troy”). See id. at 141–64. The Huffs later moved

      for summary judgment on Count 3 of the counterclaim/third-party complaint.

      Cain App. Vol. 2 at 164–65. In doing so, the Huffs sought a specific declaratory

      judgment “the Huffs are entitled to use the [e]asement[s] to access the Huffs’

      2
          Apart from Cain and Sexton-Troy, no other affected estate-holder participates in this appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023                                   Page 4 of 13
      [p]roperty, including both the THR Property and the Chumley Parcel, as long

      as [the] Huffs do not intensify the [e]asement[s].” Id. at 154. In seeking this

      declaration, the Huffs asked the trial court to “apply the law of the case” and

      rely on language in portions of the prior appellate opinions. Id. at 165. 3

[7]   The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the Huffs. In doing so, the

      court determined it was bound by the law-of-the-case doctrine. Id. at 54–55.

      The written order contains the following statement: “[T]he Huffs may use the

      Grant . . . to access the entirety of their real estate, without regard for the

      delineation between the THR [Property] and [the] Chumley Parcel[.]” Id. at 55

      (emphasis added). The order also contains language rendering the order final

      and appealable. See id. at 57. Several non-prevailing parties moved to correct

      error, see Sexton-Troy App. Vol. 2 at 203–15, and the court denied those motions.

[8]   Cain and Sexton-Troy4 now appeal.

      Discussion and Decision
[9]   At the outset, we note the parties at times focus on the law-of-the-case doctrine.

      But we need not address this doctrine in depth. As our Supreme Court has

      explained, this doctrine “is not a uniform rule of law, but rather ‘only a

      3
          Cain unsuccessfully cross-moved for summary judgment; Cain does not appeal the denial of this motion.
      4
        Contrary to the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, Sexton-Troy did not acknowledge our order setting
      oral argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 52(C) (“Counsel of record and unrepresented parties shall file with
      the Clerk an acknowledgment of the order setting oral argument no later than fifteen (15) days after service of
      the order.”). Further, without explanation, Sexton-Troy did not appear at the oral argument.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023                                 Page 5 of 13
       discretionary rule of practice.’” State v. Lewis, 543 N.E.2d 1116, 1118 (Ind.

       1989) (quoting United States v. U.S. Smelting Refin. & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186,

       199 (1950)). As such, the doctrine does not limit the power of an appellate

       court. 5 See id.; accord 18B Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §

       4478 (3d. ed. 2023) (noting any perceived constraint “is a matter of discretion”

       and, “[s]o long as the case remains alive, there is power to alter or revoke earlier

       rulings”). And to the extent either prior appeal in this case (involving mere

       injunctive relief) implicated the law-of-the-case doctrine, we decline to apply the

       doctrine. Cf. State v. Huffman, 643 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ind. 1994) (electing to

       address the merits out of fairness); Wedel v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 839

       N.E.2d 1236, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Huffman and declining to apply

       the discretionary doctrine where the prior appeal involved property rights).

       Standard of Review

[10]   Cain and Sexton-Troy (“Neighbors”) appeal from the denial of their motions to

       correct error, which challenged the order granting summary judgment to the

       Huffs. In general, we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error

       for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the ruling is “clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court

       5
         “Principles of authority, however, do inhere in the ‘mandate rule’ that binds a lower court on remand to the
       law of the case established on appeal. The very structure of a hierarchical court system demands as much.”
       18B Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 (3d. ed. 2023); see, e.g., In re C.F., 911 N.E.2d
       657, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (differentiating horizontal stare decisis (which Indiana does not recognize) from
       vertical stare decisis, which is “an obligation to follow the decisions of superior tribunals”—an obligation
       Indiana does recognize).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023                                 Page 6 of 13
       has misinterpreted the law.” Bruder v. Seneca Mortg. Servs., LLC, 188 N.E.3d

       469, 471 (Ind. 2022). Moreover, “[w]e review summary judgment decisions de

       novo, applying the same standard as the trial court.” U.S. Automatic Sprinkler

       Corp. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 204 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. 2023). As to summary

       judgment, the party seeking summary judgment must designate the evidence

       “on which it relies for purposes of the motion.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). At that

       point, any opposing party shall designate evidence in opposition. Id. In the

       end, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the “designated

       evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

       and that the moving party is entitled to . . . judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

       Indiana Easement Law

[11]   As our Supreme Court recently stated: “An easement is the right to use

       another’s land for a specified purpose. An easement appurtenant benefits

       adjoining land; an easement in gross benefits a specific individual. The land

       benefited by an easement is the dominant estate; the land burdened by an

       easement is the servient estate.” Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d 987,

       990 (Ind. 2018). And where—as here—an easement was “voluntarily created

       by a written instrument to serve a specified purpose,” the easement is known as

       an express easement. Easement, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

       Furthermore, in seeking summary judgment, the Huffs do not claim any implied

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023         Page 7 of 13
       easement rights. 6 Rather, this case involves only express easements

       appurtenant, i.e., “a permitted use of land granted by the servient estate-holder

       for the benefit of the dominant estate-holder [that] runs with the dominant

       estate.” DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d at 991.

[12]   When examining the scope of easement rights in Indiana, we “hold[] the parties

       to the agreement they—or their predecessors in interest—made when they

       negotiated their easement or acquired their property concerning the easement.”

       Id. at 995; cf. Successor in Interest, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (noting

       a successor in interest “retains the same rights as the original owner, with no

       change in substance”). In this way, Indiana common law “promotes

       certainty,” ensuring “property interests and corresponding property values

       remain stable and predictable.” DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d at 995.

[13]   As to our common law, appurtenant easement rights benefit only the dominant

       estate; those rights do not automatically benefit all estates held by the dominant

       estate-holder—else, an easement appurtenant would essentially convert to an

       easement in gross, contrary to the original agreement. See, e.g., id. at 990 (“An

       easement appurtenant benefits adjoining land; an easement in gross benefits a

       specific individual.”). In sum, when rights stem from the land, they run with

       the land. See, e.g., id. And unless (1) the instrument establishing the easement

       6
        See, e.g., Appellee’s Br. (Responding to Cain) at 13 (“The Grant . . . creates express, appurtenant easements.”) &
       21 (“Huff[] [is] the titleholder[] of the dominant estate benefitted by the [e]asements appurtenant created in
       1990[.]”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023                                     Page 8 of 13
       provides otherwise or (2) the affected estate-holders modify their agreement

       concerning the easement, appurtenant easement rights do not grow or shrink

       based on the property holdings of the current landowner. See, e.g., id. at 995.

[14]   As to the scope of easement rights, “[t]he nature, extent[,] and duration of an

       easement created by an express agreement or grant must be determined by the

       provisions of the instrument creating the easement.” Erie-Haven, Inc. v. First

       Church of Christ, 292 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973). That is, a court

       “must ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties[.]” Blind Hunting

       Club, LLC v. Martini, 169 N.E.3d 1121, 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Ascertaining

       the parties’ intent requires “proper construction of the instrument,” id., and

       “general rules of construction apply,” Brown v. Heidersbach, 360 N.E.2d 614, 618

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). As for those rules of construction, to the extent an

       agreement is unambiguous, we give words their “plain and ordinary meaning in

       light of the whole agreement, ‘without substitution or addition.’” Hartman v.

       BigInch Fabricators & Constr. Holding Co., Inc., 161 N.E.3d 1218, 1223 (Ind. 2021)

       (quoting Care Group Heart Hosp., LLC v. Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d 745, 752 (Ind. 2018)).

       And the construction of an agreement is generally appropriate for summary

       judgment, presenting a pure question of law subject to de novo review. See, e.g.,

       Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d at 753 (involving construction of a contract); Martini, 169

       N.E.3d at 1125 (involving construction of an instrument granting an easement).

       Interpreting the Grant

[15]   Here, the designated evidence indicates the Grant was a private agreement

       between Robinson and THR, recorded in Monroe County in early 1990—long
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023        Page 9 of 13
       before Huff acquired the THR Property in 2017. See Cain App. Vol. 3 at 41–50.

       As to the Grant, the preamble is directed toward THR and “its members,

       successors, assigns, invitees[,] and licensees,” id. at 41, and the designated

       evidence indicates Huff is THR’s successor in interest, see id. at 19–40. The

       Grant identifies only the THR Property as the dominant estate. See Cain App.

       Vol. 3 at 41–48 & 217. And the Grant does not provide for unilateral expansion

       of the dominant estate. See id. at 41–48.

[16]   Applying the unambiguous language of the Grant within the broader context of

       Indiana common law, we conclude there is a legal distinction between rights

       associated with the THR Property and rights associated with the Chumley

       Parcel. Put differently, neither the Grant nor our common law extinguishes

       delineation between the THR Property, which is identified as the dominant

       estate, and the Chumley Parcel, which is not identified in the Grant. For

       example, under the Grant, the Huffs may use the easements to facilitate

       development of the THR Property. That is because the Grant states as much:

               Grantee covenants to limit use of the easements . . . for the
               construction, development[,] and use by Grantee and
               its . . . assigns of six (6) single[-]family residential structures, each
               of which may include guest and caretaker quarters and other
               buildings attendant thereto, to be located on Grantee’s real estate
               described in Exhibit A and as more particularly described above.

       Cain App. Vol. 3 at 43 (emphasis added). But because the Grant does not refer

       to the Chumley Parcel or otherwise permit unilaterally adding land to the

       dominant estate—and because the affected estate-holders have not modified

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023              Page 10 of 13
       their agreement concerning the easements—Indiana law does not allow Huff to

       use the easements to facilitate logging or other development of the Chumley

       Parcel. 7 See DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d at 995 (directing courts to apply the terms of

       the easement instrument unless subsequently modified by the parties); accord

       Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4.11 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 2023)

       (discussing the presumption that, when the agreement does not specifically state

       otherwise, an appurtenant easement does not benefit a later-acquired tract).

       Scope of Declaratory Judgment

[17]   In the count at issue, the Huffs sought a specific declaration concerning the

       scope of their easement rights. That is, the Huffs sought a declaration “the

       Huffs are entitled to use the [e]asement[s] to access the Huffs’ [p]roperty,

       including both the THR Property and the Chumley Parcel, as long as [the]

       Huffs do not intensify the [e]asement[s].” Id. at 154. As to the requested

       declaration, we discern no restraint (contractual or otherwise) prohibiting the

       THR Homeowners from, at the very least, moving between the THR Property

       and the Chumley Parcel as an independent means of ingress or egress via Lake

       Monroe. 8 Thus, in this way, the Huffs are entitled to the very declaration

       sought: “[T]hat the Huffs are entitled to use the [e]asement[s] to access the

       Huffs’ [p]roperty, including both the THR Property and the Chumley Parcel, as

       7
           To the extent aspects of the injunction-phase appeals suggest a lack of delineation, we respectfully disagree.
       8
        We provide one example of a use that does not impermissibly burden the easement. Other uses, if
       contested, will need to be judged prospectively on a case-by-case basis.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023                                    Page 11 of 13
       long as [the] Huffs do not intensify the [e]asement[s].” Id. Such a declaration

       would not extinguish delineation between the parcels. Yet the current

       declaratory judgment goes further than the judgment requested: “[T]he Huffs

       may use the Grant . . . to access the entirety of their real estate, without regard for

       the delineation between the THR [Property] and [the] Chumley Parcel[.]” Id. at

       55 (emphasis added).

[18]   Our Supreme Court counsels us to exercise judicial restraint. See generally, e.g.,

       Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476, 792 (Ind. 2005). And “[u]nder the cardinal

       principle of judicial restraint, if it is not necessary to decide more, then it is

       necessary not to decide more.” 21 C.J.S. Courts § 179 (2023); see also 20 Am.

       Jur. 2d Courts § 43 (“Unnecessary decisions by a court are to be avoided.”).

[19]   Adhering to principles of judicial restraint, we ultimately affirm the partial grant

       of summary judgment in favor of the Huffs while narrowing the scope of the

       declaratory judgment. That is, we hereby clarify the Huffs are entitled only to

       the specific declaration sought in Paragraph 38 of their counterclaim/third-

       party complaint, which reads as follows: “The Huffs request the Court to enter

       a Declaratory Judgment that the Huffs are entitled to use the Easement to

       access the Huffs’ Property, including both the THR Property and the Chumley

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023            Page 12 of 13
       Parcel, as long as Huffs do not intensify the Easement.” Cain App. Vol. 2 at

       154. 9

       Conclusion
[20]   We affirm partial summary judgment for the Huffs while clarifying the Huffs

       are entitled only to the specific declaratory judgment sought in their pleading.

       Having clarified the scope of the judgment, we remand for further proceedings.

[21]   Affirmed and remanded.

       Crone, J., and Robb, Sr. J., concur.

       9
        Thus, in light of principles of judicial restraint, we decline to address the parties’ arguments concerning the
       merits of the broader declaratory judgment the Huffs did not specifically request in their pleading.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1258 | July 31, 2023                                  Page 13 of 13