Court Opinion

ID: 9827161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:14:25.106544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:25.159018
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant’s counsel, in the presentation of an able motion for rehearing, have shaken
*686the opinion of this court on the question of collateral attack, citing the following authorities: Heath v. Layne, 62 Tex. 687; Fortson v. Alford, 62 Tex. 578; Edwards y. Halbert, 64 Tex. 667; Alford v. Halbert, 74 Tex. 846, 12 S. W. 75; Ruenbuhl v. Heffron, 38 S. W. 1030; Bender v. Damon, 72 Tex. 92, 9 S. W. 747; Cruger v. McCracken, 87 Tex. 586, 30 S. W. 537.
[5] On the question of the approval by the probate court of Fuqua’s claims during the permanent administration it is contended that this record does not show that the probate court rendered judgment or an order approving said claim, and that the same was entered of record as prescribed by article 1853 of the Revised Statutes of 1895. The statute provides:
“All such decisions, orders, decrees and judgments shall be entered on the records of the court, * * * and any such decision, order, decree or judgment shall be a nullity unless entered of record.”
Appellant says:
“This entry on the record must be found on the minutes of the probate court or upon the claim docket. The question is: Has appellee proven by an entry on said record, that is, on either the minutes of the court or the claim docket, an order, judgment, or decree of the court approving or adjudicating said claim?”
The claim docket presented in this record bearing upon this question presents during the temporary administration all the different claims of appellee involved in this suit, showing the amount, the date of claim, when due, and the date when the interest begins, the rate of interest, and the allowance of same. The first claim presented on said page is the one for $45,832.66 that is exhibited as a part of the records of the temporary administration. Opposite this item is the following, evidently exhibiting an action upon the claim docket during the permanent administration :

On page 43 of the statement of facts we find the following:
“Plaintiff introduced all these reports and orders from the probate minutes as showing the dealings of respondent, Mrs. Reeves, as ad-ministratrix, and the probate court of Hale county, with the different claims, the use of the property for the payment of claims, and the claims, that were recognized and approved by her, as follows:
“ ‘No. 99. In re Estate of Oscar T. Reeves, Deceased. In the County Court - of Hale County, Texas, July Term, 1909.
“ ‘Now comes Mrs. Miinnie Reeves, adminis-tratrix of said estate, and shows to the court that she has on hands about $20,000, most of which is available for paying off the claims against said estate, and that the money is lying idle in bank; that one claim for a large amount, about $90,000, has been proved up and allowed against the estate in favor of W. H. Fuqua; that there are a few, if any, other claims to be presented against said estate, and they will not be for large amounts. She therefore prays that she may be authorized to pay on said Fuqua claim such sums from time to time as she may deem proper.
“ ‘Madden, Trulove & Kimbrough and E. Graham, Attorneys for Mrs. Minnie Reeves, Admx.
“ ‘No. 99. In re Estate of Oscar T. Reeves, Deceased. In the County Court of Hale County, Texas, July 23, 1909.
“ ‘On this day came on the application of the administratrix for authority to make payments on the claims of W. H. Fuqua, and it appearing to the court that said Fuqua has proved up his claim for a large amount, that there are probably few other claims to be presented against said estate, that the administratrix has in her hands idle in bank about $20,000 and the court being in all things satisfied it is ordered that the administratrix of this estate be authorized to make such payments on said Fuqua claim from time to time as she may deem proper.’ ”
If the order of the court approving the claim is sufficiently shown upon the record, as we now view the controversy, it is immaterial whether the resistance to the enforcement of the deed of trust is a direct or collateral attack. The notation upon the claim docket of the approval July 16, 1909, of an amount approved, to wit, $92,190.97, we are prone to consider, especially if permitted to take it in connection with what is shown upon the docket during the temporary administration as an order of approval of a claim to that amount. The pleading says that to base it upon the memoranda during the temporary administration makes it void, because the temporary administration is a nullity. This argument is specious, in this: If you once assume that the memorandum last quoted was made on the claim docket during the permanent administration, the court evidently intended to approve a claim or claims amounting to $92,190.97. If the claims on the same page of the docket are of that amount, or approximately so as to make a discrepancy immaterial, it is evident that the probate judge intended to approve those claims during the permanent administration, and the question is not what he based the same upon, but whether there was an actual order of allowance. We think this, taken in connection with the last order quoted, is sufficient to show an order of allowance by the probate court entered of record within the purview of the statute as that the judgment is valid, and not void; it is only the order characterized a nullity, if not of record. Other matters in connection therewith are sufficiently proven.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.