Court Opinion

ID: 9449019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:52:55.966609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:39.208342
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge (dissenting).
After obtaining judgment for $7,000 against appellant Austin’s brother in a personal injury suit, Smith instituted garnishment proceedings against appellant Austin. Austin failed to respond and default judgment was entered against him. Thereafter, a second suit was instituted against appellant to satisfy the judgment by judicial sale of real property he allegedly owned in the District of Columbia. Appellant did not appear, and a second default judgment was entered in favor of appellees herein.
Over four years after the first default judgment, and three and a half years after the second, appellant moved to vacate the first judgment on the grounds that he was not properly served and that he was not indebted to his brother.1 The District Court found that service was proper and denied the motion. Austin appeals.
I think the record before us compels affirmance. The marshal’s return upon the service in question states: “I hereby certify and return that I served the annexed garnishment on the therein named Clarence Austin by handing to and leaving a true and correct copy thereof with him personally * * 2 And the marshal’s affidavit states:
“He [the marshal] saw a person, in the uniform of a guard, in the 800 block of St. Catherine Street, N. E., which person fitted the description of Clarence Austin.
“That he approached said person and served him with the writ of attachment and interrogatories and the person so approached and served admitted that he was Clarence Austin, but stated that he (Clarence Austin) had nothing to do with this matter and the papers did not pertain to him. This service occurred at 2:30 P.M.”
Upon these facts, I do not think the District Court erred in refusing to set aside the first default judgment.
I take this view reluctantly. Appellant’s allegation that he was never indebted to his brother is not contradicted. It may well be that if, as it appears, the marshal did hand appellant a summons, he ignored it, not out of disdain for the law but out of ignorance of it. Moreover, it appears that appellant is a man of limited means. And affirmance of the judgment would burden him with his brother’s $7,000 debt for personal injuries for which appellant was in no sense responsible. This, as appellees con*345cede with commendable candor, appears harsh indeed.
But Congress has ordained that “ * * * if the garnishee shall have failed to answer the interrogatories served on him, or to appear and show cause why a judgment of condemnation should not be entered, such judgment shall be entered against him for the whole amount of the plaintiff’s judgment and costs, and execution shall be had thereon.” [D.C.Code, § 15-312 (1961)]
Appellant has advanced no argument for a construction of the statute that would benefit him.3
I would therefore affirm.

. In the years between entry of the second default judgment and the filing of this motion, trustees appointed by the District Court to effect the sale under the second default judgment mailed appellant copies of their annual accounts.

. I think the “garnishment” referred to in the deputy marshal’s return of service includes the interrogatories. I find no evidence that it does not include them. The mere possibility of their not having been served does not justify the result readied by the majority in the absence of any authority for the imposition of a requirement that the return of service affirmatively show the interrogatories were served with the garnishment.

. Compare Payne v. Furtado, 22 Hawaii 723 (1915); Flanegan v. Earnest, 1 Chandler 149, 2 Pin. 196 (Wis.1849); Kingsley v. Missouri Fire Co., 14 Mo. 465 (1851). 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 254 (1943); 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶[ 37.-03 (1950).
Also compare 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 655, 61 S.Ct. 422, 89 L.Ed. 479 (1940); Shima v. Brown, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 115, 133 F.2d 48 (1943); Edmonston v. Sisk, 156 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1946), concerning possible conflict between the default provision of D.C.Code § 15-312 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.