Court Opinion

ID: 9962304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 15:03:08.681308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:19.353408
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                SHAWN CHARLES GOFF, Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                         v.

              STATE OF ARIZONA, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

                              No. 1 CA-CV 23-0220
                               FILED 4-23-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                             CV2021-016191
                  The Honorable Jay R. Adleman, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Shawn Charles Goff, Buckeye
Plaintiff/Appellant

Wieneke Law Group, PLC, Phoenix
By Kathleen L. Wieneke, Laura Van Buren, Brendan F. Porter
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees State of Arizona, et al.

Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, P.C., Phoenix
By Sarah L. Barnes, Kelley M. Jancaitis
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Centurion of Arizona, LLC
                            GOFF v. STATE, et al.
                            Decision of the Court

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1             Shawn Charles Goff appeals from the superior court’s order
denying leave to amend his first amended complaint (the “FAC”) against
the State of Arizona (the “State”), Centurion of Arizona, LLC (“Centurion”),
and Correctional Officer II Rochin (collectively, “Defendants”). For the
following reasons, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2          Goff is a prisoner confined at a facility operated by the State’s
Department of Corrections (“DOC”).

¶3             The allegations of the FAC, taken as true and viewed in the
light most favorable to Goff as the plaintiff, see Johnson v. McDonald, 197
Ariz. 155, 157, ¶ 2 (App. 1999), establish that on September 17, 2020,
correctional officers came to Goff’s cell and directed him to “cuff up” so
they could conduct a cell search. Due to COVID-19 concerns, Goff asked the
officers to put on masks before entering his cell. They refused to do so and
demanded his cooperation with the cell search, warning, “We can do [this]
the easy way or the hard way.” Out of concern for his “safety due to
COVID-19,” Goff refused. The officers then “threaten[ed]” him with pepper
spray. To protect himself against exposure to pepper spray, Goff placed a
plastic bag over his head. A prison nurse arrived and told Goff that she
would place him on suicide watch if he did not take the plastic bag off his
head. Goff explained that the plastic bag had “holes punched in it” and so
was “impossible to suffocate in.” When the nurse again told him to take the
plastic bag off his head, Goff again refused, and the officers pepper-sprayed
him. After “empt[ying] 3 riot cannisters of pepper spray into [Goff’s] cell,”
the officers briefly left the pod “to let the pepper spray dissipate.” They then
returned in “full riot gear” and “gas masks” and forcibly removed Goff
from the cell.

¶4          The officers took Goff to the suicide watch pod, where he was
“forced to strip naked” and subjected to what he described as a

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                           GOFF v. STATE, et al.
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“demean[ing]” and “humiliat[ing]” body cavity search “without justifiable
suspicion or cause.” Although he “exhibited no suicidal behavior or
psychosis,” he was left in the suicide watch pod “for 7 days,” during which
he was naked, unshowered, and without access to his personal property.
Further, he was denied the opportunity to “go outside” to “recit[e] specific
incantations & prayers” in observance of his “Wiccan faith’s Fall Equinox
Holiday Ritual” that was celebrated between September 19 and September
22. When he was finally released from suicide watch, he was taken to a new
cell, where he found some of his items of personal property missing
(including religious texts and legal materials relating to pending litigation)
and his remaining belongings “covered in pepper spray.” Since then, Goff
asserts, prison officials have subjected him to “cruel & unusual
punishment” by keeping the lights in his cell (and the entire unit)
“constant[ly] illuminat[ed],” which “prevents [him] from sleep[ing]” and
“negatively affects [his] mental health.”

¶5            Goff served a notice of claim (“NOC”) on the State, but none
of the other Defendants, in February 2021. In his NOC, Goff described the
events that occurred on September 17 and his subsequent placement on
suicide watch. The NOC made no reference, however, to the body cavity
search to which he was allegedly subjected, nor did it mention the alleged
deprivation of his right to practice his faith by participating in outdoor
rituals to observe the autumnal equinox. Likewise, although the NOC
mentions the lights were kept on “24 hrs. a day” during the seven days he
spent on suicide watch, the NOC made no reference to prison officials
purportedly subjecting him to “punishment” in the form of “constant
illumination” after he was released from suicide watch and returned to a
cell.

¶6             Goff filed his original complaint in October 2021, naming as
defendants the State, Centurion, Rochin, and other individuals not relevant
to this appeal because Goff never effected service of process on them.1 See
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1. Goff asserted claims arising under both the Arizona and
United States Constitutions based on Defendants’ conduct on September
17, his subsequent confinement on suicide watch, and the purported
deprivation of his right to participate in rituals relating to the autumnal
equinox.

1 Goff also sued DOC, its employees David Shinn, Jason Bremer, Lieutenant

Curtis, and Correctional Officer II Young, and several Centurion
employees.

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                            GOFF v. STATE, et al.
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¶7             The Defendants removed the case to the United States District
Court of the District of Arizona, asserting federal question jurisdiction over
Goff’s federal constitutional claims. Goff moved to remand the case to the
superior court, explaining that the removal “prejudices [his] claims”
because federal law requires a showing of “deliberate indifference” while
state law “requires [him] to prove only negligence.” He agreed to “dismiss
his First, Fourth, Seventh, [Eighth], & Fourteenth Amendment claims . . . in
order to obtain automatic remand back to the Superior Court of Arizona.”
Goff filed the FAC, in which he alleged no federal constitutional claims.
Instead, he alleged Arizona constitutional and statutory claims, including a
claim for violation of his religious rights under the “liberty of conscience”
provision of Article 2, Section 12, of the Arizona Constitution and Article
20, Section 1, of the Arizona Constitution, which secures “[p]erfect
toleration of religious sentiment” to “every inhabitant of this state.” The
FAC also asserts a variety of other constitutional and statutory claims,
including for cruel and unusual punishment; violation of Article 2, Section
13, of the Arizona Constitution, the equal privileges and immunities clause;
and retaliation in violation of A.R.S. § 41-1492.10. The district court granted
Goff’s motion to remand because the FAC “does not assert any federal
constitutional claims.”

¶8              Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the FAC, arguing
that Goff’s claims fail for a variety of reasons. First, Defendants argued, Goff
served his NOC only on the State, and so his claims against all other
Defendants must be dismissed for noncompliance with A.R.S.
§ 12-821.01(A). Similarly, they urged that many of Goff’s claims against the
State—including claims arising out of the body cavity search, the “constant
illumination” of his cell, and the alleged denial of his right to participate in
the fall equinox observance—are barred because he never raised them in
his NOC. Moreover, Defendants asserted, Goff’s constitutional claims
against the State fail because the Arizona Constitution “establishes [no]
private right of action,” while his statutory claims are based on inapplicable
statutes. Finally, Defendants argued that Goff’s claims are barred by A.R.S.
§ 31-201.01(L) because the FAC asserts no federal claims and does not allege
that Goff suffered “serious physical injury.”2

2 Under Section 31-201.01(L), a prison inmate “may not bring a cause of

action seeking damages or equitable relief from the state or its political
subdivisions, agencies, officers or employees for injuries suffered while in
custody . . . unless the complaint alleges specific facts from which the court
may conclude that the plaintiff suffered serious physical injury or the claim
is authorized by federal statute.”

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                           GOFF v. STATE, et al.
                           Decision of the Court

¶9            In response, Goff cited various statutes that purportedly
establish a basis for relief. He asserted, for example, that A.R.S.
§§ 41-1493.01 et seq. “provide a private right of action for [the] unlawful (&
unconstitutional) deprivation of [his] established religious rights” and that
the officers’ use of pepper spray and the loss of his personal property
violates various criminal statutes. Goff did not, however, respond to
Defendants’ arguments that many of his claims are barred for
noncompliance with A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A), that the Arizona Constitution
provides no private right of action, and that all of his claims are barred by
A.R.S. § 31-201.01(L). Citing case law for the proposition that “a plaintiff
with an ‘arguable’ claim should be permitted to amend the complaint
before a pending motion to dismiss is ruled on,” Goff concluded his
response by asking the court to “allow [him] to amend his Complaint, to
include supplemental and concurrent jurisdiction.”

¶10            The court did not receive Goff’s response, and so granted
Defendants’ motion to dismiss as “uncontested.” Goff then filed a motion
he entitled “Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order,” asserting
that he “did, in fact, file” a response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. He
asked that the court treat his response “as both timely & properly filed” and
to grant his request to amend the FAC.

¶11           Several weeks later, Goff filed a second amended complaint
(the “SAC”) without being granted leave to amend. In the SAC, Goff re-
urged all of the claims in the FAC and cited additional constitutional and
statutory provisions in purported support of those claims.

¶12             After reviewing and considering Goff’s filings, the court
noted that Goff’s response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss was timely
filed, and so proceeded to address the parties’ arguments on their merits.
The court held that the Arizona Constitution established no private right of
action for Goff’s claims and that the FAC failed to allege facts sufficient to
support a statutory cause of action. Further, the court found that Goff could
not assert a cause of action against any of the individual Defendants,
presumably because they were never served with the NOC. The court
therefore granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the FAC for failure
to state a claim. The court then struck the SAC, holding that “it was not filed
pursuant to the requirements plainly set forth by” Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 15.

¶13          After the court entered final judgment dismissing Goff’s
claims, Goff timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1).

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                           GOFF v. STATE, et al.
                           Decision of the Court

                               DISCUSSION

¶14           In his opening brief, Goff does not challenge the superior
court’s dismissal of the FAC.3 Instead, he challenges the court’s denial of
his request for leave to amend, asserting that the FAC “can, in fact, be saved
by amendment.”

¶15            A plaintiff may amend his complaint “once as a matter of
course,” and any subsequent amendment requires “leave of court or . . . the
written consent of all opposing parties.” See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)-(2).
Although “[l]eave to amend must be freely given when justice requires,”
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a “court may deny leave to amend if it finds undue
delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
previous amendments or undue prejudice to the opposing party,” Carranza
v. Madrigal, 237 Ariz. 512, 515, ¶ 13 (2015) (cleaned up). We review a court’s
denial of a request to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion.
Tumacacori Mission Land Dev., Ltd. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 231 Ariz. 517, 519,
¶ 4 (App. 2013).

¶16            Rule 15(a)(4) requires a party seeking to amend a pleading to
file a motion and to attach, as an exhibit thereto, “a copy of the proposed
amended pleading,” which “must show the respects in which the proposed
pleading differs from the existing pleading by bracketing or striking
through the text to be deleted and underlining the text to be added.” Here,
Goff never filed a motion to amend, instead making a cursory request to
amend at the end of his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Further,
Goff never submitted a copy of the proposed second amended complaint
to the court. Although Goff asserts that he should have been granted
leniency as a “pro se prisoner with zero [access] to [relevant legal]
information and absolutely no legal training,” self-represented litigants are
not entitled to “special leniency.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8
(App. 2022). Goff’s failure to comply with Rule 15(a)(4) is alone sufficient
basis to affirm the order striking the SAC and denying leave to amend. See
Carranza, 237 Ariz. at 515, ¶ 12 (holding that plaintiff’s failure to “attach
copies of the proposed amended pleadings” and “notify the court and
opposing counsel how the proposed substitution would amend the
pleadings” constituted a “sufficient basis for the trial court to deny” his
motion to amend).

3 Although Goff challenged the dismissal of the FAC in his reply brief, a

claim raised for the first time in a reply is waived. See Univ. Med. Ctr. of S.
Nev. v. Health Choice Ariz., 253 Ariz. 524, 529, ¶ 22 n.2 (App. 2022).

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                              GOFF v. STATE, et al.
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¶17            Moreover, leave to amend is properly denied if the
amendment would not cure the defects in the original pleading. See Wall v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 170 Ariz. 591, 597 (App. 1991) (affirming denial of
leave to amend because new claim would not survive summary judgment).
Here, as Defendants point out, Goff does “not identify how his [SAC]
differed from his [FAC] or why it corrected the deficiencies” in the FAC.

¶18             The SAC alleges the same claims arising under the Arizona
Constitution that the FAC asserted, and Goff has never offered any
authority for the proposition that the Arizona Constitution creates a private
right of action. Further, although the SAC adds new constitutional and
statutory citations in purported support of Goff’s claims, Goff offers no
explanation of the relevance of these provisions. The new Arizona
constitutional provisions cited in the SAC, for example, include Article 22,
Section 15, and Article 18, Section 5. The former authorizes the State to
establish and support correctional and penal institutions, while the latter
provides that the defenses “of contributory negligence” and “assumption
of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact . . . left to the jury.”
Ariz. Const. art. 22, § 15; Ariz. Const. art. 18, § 5. Neither provision purports
to create a private right of action in favor of a private litigant, and so neither
provides a basis for any affirmative claim for relief.

¶19            Likewise, the new statutory authorities cited in the SAC
include, for example, A.R.S. § 12-542, which establishes a two-year
limitations period for various claims, A.R.S. § 31-238, which entitles the
State to an offset for incarceration costs against any monetary obligation
owed to a prison inmate, and A.R.S. § 32-1201, which defines terms relating
to the regulation of the practice of dentistry. None of these statutes establish
a cause of action for affirmative relief, and so none provide a legal basis for
Goff’s claims.

¶20            Goff has not explained why his claims against the individual
Defendants, as well as his claims against the State relating to the body cavity
search and the purported deprivation of his religious liberty, are not barred
for noncompliance with A.R.S. § 12-821.01. See Haab v. County of Maricopa,
219 Ariz. 9, 14, ¶ 26 (App. 2008) (affirming dismissal of claims against
county and holding that plaintiff’s notice of claim “did not satisfy the
requirements of A.R.S. § 12-821.01” because it failed to “provide notice to
the [c]ounty of the facts on which [plaintiff] based his claims”). Goff’s
failure to offer any argument to support the viability of those claims is fatal
to his position. See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 452, ¶ 101 n.9 (2004)
(“Failure to argue a claim usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of
that claim.”) (citation omitted).

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                             GOFF v. STATE, et al.
                             Decision of the Court

¶21              Finally, the SAC does not state a claim for relief because none
of the claims asserted could survive A.R.S. § 31-201.01. That statute bars a
prison inmate from bringing claims for damages or equitable relief against
the State unless “the complaint alleges specific facts from which the court
may conclude that the plaintiff suffered serious physical injury or the claim
is authorized by a federal statute.” A.R.S. § 31-201.01(L). A “serious
physical injury” is “an impairment of physical condition that creates a
substantial risk of death or that causes serious disfigurement, prolonged
impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily organ.” A.R.S. § 31-201.01(O)(3). Goff did not allege, in the SAC,
that he suffered such an injury. His only allegations relating to any physical
injury are that he was pepper sprayed and strip-searched on September 17
and that, since then, the lights to his cell have been kept on, interfering with
his sleep. He does not allege that he suffered “substantial risk of death,”
“disfigurement,” or “prolonged impairment” of any kind. See id. Further,
although Goff asserts, for the first time in his opening brief, that he
contracted COVID-19 as a result of the events of September 17 and that he
has a pre-existing traumatic brain injury resulting from an injury in 2011,
factual allegations raised for the first time on appeal provide no basis for
relief. See, e.g., Belen Loan Invs., LLC v. Bradley, 231 Ariz. 448, 455, ¶ 17 (App.
2012) (noting that, in reviewing dismissal for failure to state a claim, “we
look only to the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint”) (emphasis
added).

¶22             In an effort to avoid A.R.S. § 31-201.01, Goff asserts that his
claims are authorized by “federal constitutional and statutory laws of the
First, Fifth, [and] Eighth Amend[ments]” to the United States Constitution,
42 U.S.C. § 12101, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and other federal statutes. Because Goff
never cited these federal authorities in his SAC or his response to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC, they entitle him to no relief on
appeal. See Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300 (1994) (“Because a trial
court and opposing counsel should be afforded the opportunity to correct
any asserted defects before error may be raised on appeal, absent
extraordinary circumstances, errors not raised in the trial court cannot be
raised on appeal.”); Barkhurst v. Kingsmen of Route 66, Inc., 234 Ariz. 470, 476,
¶ 22 (App. 2014) (“We generally do not consider arguments and legal issues
on appeal that have not been specifically presented to the superior court.”).

¶23           In any event, because Goff already secured the remand of this
case from federal district court based on his representation that he would
withdraw all federal claims, he is judicially estopped from re-asserting
claims arising under federal law. See State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 182
(1996) (“This court has long recognized that as a general rule, a party who

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                          GOFF v. STATE, et al.
                          Decision of the Court

has assumed a particular position in a judicial proceeding is estopped to
assume an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding involving the
same parties and questions.”) (cleaned up). We therefore reject Goff’s
belated efforts to resurrect his federal law claims in the SAC.

¶24            Because Goff did not comply with procedural requirements
before filing his SAC, and because he has failed to establish that he would
be entitled to any relief on any of the claims asserted in the SAC, the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend and
striking the SAC.

                             CONCLUSION

¶25          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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