Court Opinion

ID: 9537444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:18:25.557425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:41.542822
License: Public Domain

Pearson, J.
(dissenting)—After Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), a determination of whether an intrusion on private property constitutes an unreasonable search depends upon the owner's actual "subjective expectation of privacy and whether that expectation is objectively reasonable." United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 1976).
Defendants testified as to their expectation of privacy of the greenhouse. This expectation was objectively evidenced by its construction and location on the premises. Furthermore, they testified that it was physically impossible to see the contents from the point where the observations were allegedly made. In my opinion the officer clearly intruded upon an area of the premises where a right of privacy was both subjectively expected and objectively reasonable. See Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968).
Moreover, the officer entered defendants' premises without express permission. Any implied permission should, in my view, be no broader than is necessary to accomplish the business at hand. Here the officer was purportedly investigating an abandoned vehicle located almost 1 mile from defendants' home. There was evidence the car had been at its location for some time. Defendants' connection with the vehicle was remote at best, and the officer's purpose in finding information about its owner was neither urgent nor compelling.
When the officer received no response to the knock on the door nearest his point of entry, he should have departed. At the very least, given his prior knowledge, he should have taken the most direct route to the other entry without departing from that route, as the court's findings suggest that he did. Any further intrusion was wholly unwarranted.
*68In addition,, it is obvious from what was discovered when the search warrant was executed, the officer could not have observed the contraband without entering the greenhouse. His statements of what he observed and the point from which he made the observation are implausible and suspect. At the very least, I consider his conduct so questionable that the court should not countenance it.
I would hold that the contraband was not observed from a place where the officer had a right to be and that his intrusion on defendants' privacy was unconstitutional. Wattenburg v. United States, supra.
Therefore, I dissent.
Reconsideration denied June 2, 1980.
Review granted by Supreme Court October 24, 1980.