Court Opinion

ID: 9497107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:43:18.537271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:00.205879
License: Public Domain

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting, with whom PREGERSON and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges, join:
During a suspicionless search of his residence and an involuntary detention during that search, Raphyal Crawford agreed to go to the FBI office to talk. FBI Agent David Bowdich conducted the search because he hoped that he could induce Crawford to confess to a bank robbery that had taken place about two and a half years earlier.. Agent Bowdich testified that he and his fellow officers had no expectation they would find any evidence of the “old bank robbery” during the search. Rather, he testified that he planned the search and accompanying detention as a “tool” to get Crawford to confess. After about an hour and a half at the FBI office, Crawford confessed to participating in the bank robbery.
At the time of the search and detention, Crawford was a California state parolee subject to explicit conditions of parole. None of these conditions, however, authorized a suspicionless search whose sole purpose was to investigate a pre-parole crime. I conclude that, in the absence of an explicit condition of parole, a search of a parolee’s residence to investigate a pre-paróle crime must be justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that evidence of that crime will be found. Because the search of Crawford’s residence and accompanying detention were conducted without any such suspicion, they violated the Fourth Amendment.
When evidence is produced by “exploitation” of an underlying illegality, such as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, it must be excluded from the evidence the prosecution presents at trial. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). Because Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers purposely, and successfully, used the illegal suspicionless search and accompanying detention as a “tool” to produce Crawford’s confession, that confession should not have been admitted into evidence. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I. Background
On July 27, 2000, at about 8:20 in the morning, FBI Agent Bowdich arrived with four state law enforcement officers at Crawford’s residence, where he was living with his sister. As a “courtesy,” Agent Bowdich had notified Crawford’s parole officer of his intention to search Crawford’s residence, but the parole officer did not accompany Agent Bowdich. The officers knocked on the door, and Crawford’s sister let them in. Agent Bowdich, Detective Gutierrez, and at least one other officer went into the bedroom where Crawford was asleep with his eighteen month-old daughter. Detective Gutierrez and Crawford testified that the officers had their guns drawn. The officers woke Crawford, took him into the living room, and seated him on the couch. Agent Bow-dich testified that Crawford was “detained” on the couch and was not “free to leave” while the officers searched the residence.
*1083The search of Crawford’s residence and his accompanying detention lasted between thirty and fifty minutes. During this time, as officers searched the residence, Crawford’s sister tried to get her children ready for their day. Agent Bowdich used this time to “chit-chat” with Crawford. Late in the conversation, Agent Bowdich asked about what he described as an “old bank robbery.” Agent Bowdich then suggested that Crawford might be “more comfortable” talking at the FBI office. Under the circumstances created by Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers — several officers searching Crawford’s residence during the early morning, an accompanying detention of Crawford on the couch in the living room, Crawford’s eighteen month-old daughter still sleeping in the bedroom, and Crawford’s sister trying to get her children ready for the day — Crawford agreed that a conversation at the FBI office would be “more comfortable.”
Agent Bowdich and Detective Gutierrez escorted Crawford to Agent Bowdich’s car. During the twenty minute drive to the FBI office, Detective Gutierrez sat in the back seat next to Crawford. Once at the FBI office, Crawford was taken into an interview room, and the door was closed. Agent Bowdich began to read Crawford his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), but Crawford stopped him, asking if he was under arrest. Agent Bowdich said that he was not and discontinued reading the Miranda rights. After about an hour and a half in the interview room, Crawford confessed to the bank robbery.
Agent Bowdich testified in the district court that he did not expect to find evidence of the bank robbery in his search of Crawford’s residence. Rather, he sought an opportunity to talk to Crawford about the “old bank robbery” in a situation where Crawford would be at a psychological disadvantage. Further, he hoped that the suspicionless search of Crawford’s residence might turn up evidence of violations of state law that he could use for leverage to get Crawford to confess to the robbery. Agent Bowdich testified forthrightly: “We weren’t looking for evidence of a bank robbery, but we were looking at [the] potential of possibly flipping him, if we were able to find evidence of a state case, where we would take all that evidence and give it to one of our state officers who was there for us — with us.” Agent Bowdich repeatedly made clear in his testimony that the sole purpose of the suspicionless search of Crawford’s residence and accompanying detention was to investigate the bank robbery. That robbery was, of course, committed before Crawford was released on parole.
II. Fourth Amendment Violation
Crawford contends that the suspicion-less search of his residence, and the accompanying detention, violated the Fourth Amendment. I agree.
A. Conditions of Crawford’s Parole
At the time of the search and detention, Crawford was on parole from California state prison. When he was released from prison, he signed what is sometimes called a “Fourth Waiver” form, which imposed certain conditions during his parole. I am willing to assume for purposes of this case that these conditions of parole are valid. However, none of these conditions authorized a suspicionless search whose sole purpose was the investigation of a pre-parole crime.
1. Validity of the Parole Conditions
Judge Trott contends in his separate opinion that the parties in this case have misunderstood the legal status of a “Fourth Waiver” form. As I understand his argument, Judge Trott contends that *1084at all relevant times California had the authority under state law to enter into an agreement with a would-be probationer, but did not have such authority with a would-be parolee. According to Judge Trott, the State unilaterally imposes conditions of parole, in contrast to conditions of probation, which are established by agreement between the State and the would-be probationer.
Judge Trott relies on the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Reyes, 19 Cal.4th 743, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445 (1998). In explaining why consent by a would-be parolee cannot be used to validate an otherwise illegal search, the court wrote, in language quoted by Judge Trott:
The consent exception to the warrant requirement may not be invoked to validate the search of an adult parolee because, under the Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, parole is not a matter of choice. The Board of Prison Terms must provide a period of parole; the prisoner must accept it. (Pen.Code § 3000 et seq.) Without choice, there can be no voluntary consent to inclusion of the search condition.
Id. at 448 (citation omitted) (italics indicate sentence not quoted in Judge Trott’s opinion). Under this reasoning, the State has no authority to bargain with the would-be parolee, and therefore lacks the authority to threaten to withhold parole unless the parolee agrees to waive some or all of his Fourth Amendment rights. Judge Trott thus argues that what the parties in this case call a “Fourth Waiver” form is not an agreement under which the parolee agrees to waive his Fourth Amendment rights in order to gain parole. Rather, the “Fourth Waiver” form is a notification to the parolee of conditions unilaterally imposed upon him by the State.
Judge Trott understands California law somewhat differently from the Deputy Attorney General representing the State as amicus, and from the Assistant United States Attorney. During oral argument to our en banc court, both attorneys represented that the conditions of parole at issue in this case were at all relevant times a matter of agreement between the State and the parolee. Both attorneys told us that if California state prisoners choose not to waive their Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of being granted parole, those prisoners do not get parole and stay in prison. The Deputy Attorney General, in particular, represented that California law has changed since the California Supreme Court’s decision in Reyes. The State’s brief maintains that between March 1, 2001 and October 1, 2003, sixty-seven inmates refused to sign new conditions of parole and were returned to prison.
In some circumstances, it might matter whether conditions of parole are unilaterally imposed by the State, as contended by Judge Trott, or are imposed pursuant to an agreement between the State and the parolee, as contended by the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant United States Attorney. In this case, however, it does not matter. For the purposes of this case, I assume that the conditions contained in the “Fourth Waiver” form signed by Crawford are valid. They may be valid because, as Judge Trott contends, the State had the power unilaterally to impose them. Or they may be valid because Crawford agreed to them as a condition of gaining parole. Or, indeed, they may be invalid. But it makes no difference in this case, for in no event do the conditions of parole in the “Fourth Waiver” form authorize a suspicionless search of Crawford’s residence to investigate a pre-parole crime.
2. Meaning of the Parole Conditions
Crawford signed the “Fourth Waiver” form in 2000, just before he was released *1085from prison. There are several possible readings of the parole conditions contained in the form, but under none of these readings did these conditions authorize the suspicionless search conducted by Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers. To understand the conditions, it is helpful first to sketch out the legal background against which they were written.
a. Legal Background
For many years, the California Supreme Court has upheld conditions allowing sus-picionless probation and parole searches. See, e.g., People v. Woods, 21 Cal.4th 668, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019, 1028 (1999) (probation); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 448 (parole); People v. Bravo, 43 Cal.3d 600, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336, 342-43 (1987) (probation). The court has indicated that these conditions have two purposes: first, to ensure compliance with the law while on probation or parole; and, second, to ensure compliance with the terms of probation or parole. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1027. Probation and parole searches must be reasonably related to these two purposes. See People v. Robles, 23 Cal.4th 789, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311, 316 (2000) (“As our decisions indicate, searches that are undertaken pursuant to a probationer’s advance consent must be reasonably related to the purposes of probation.”).
The California Supreme Court has described the purpose of ensuring compliance with the law only in terms of a probationer’s or parolee’s current compliance, not pre-probation or pre-parole compliance. For example, in Woods, the California Supreme Court stated, “[T]he dual purpose of a search condition [is] to deter further offenses by the probationer and to ascertain compliance with the terms of the probation.” 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1024 (emphasis added); see also Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 450 (“ [T]he purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked search of a defendant is to ascertain whether [the parolee] is complying with the terms of [parole]; to determine not only whether he disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law.’ ”) (quoting People v. Mason, 5 Cal.3d 759, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630, 632 (1971)) (emphasis added); Bravo, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d at 342 (also quoting Mason, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d at 632). The California Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld suspi-cionless parole searches for evidence of current crimes. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1028 (suspicionless search for evidence of current crime); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 447 (suspicionless search for evidence of current drug use); Bravo, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d at 343(search for evidence of current drug sales). But I am unaware of any case in which the California Supreme Court has upheld either a suspicionless search for evidence of a pre-parole crime, or a suspicionless search whose sole purpose is to investigate a pre-parole crime.
In 2000, when Crawford signed his conditions of parole, the case law of our circuit was even stricter than that of the California Supreme Court. In a long line of cases, we had repeatedly held that probation and parole searches could dispense with the ordinary requirements of a warrant and probable cause only when the search was not a subterfuge for investigation into past or current crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Ooley, 116 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir.1997) (“[W]e have long recognized that the legality of a warrantless search depends on a showing that the search was a true probation search and not an investigation search.”); United States v. Vought, 69 F.3d 1498, 1501 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 794 (9th Cir.1995), rev’d on other grounds, 519 U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997); United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 897 *1086(9th Cir.1991); United, States v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir.1985); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc); Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160,162-63 (9th Cir.1969). Probable cause and a warrant were required for ordinary law enforcement investigations of probationers and parolees — of both past and present crimes — where the Fourth Amendment would otherwise so require.
A year after Crawford signed his “Fourth Waiver” form, the Supreme Court partially overruled this line of cases in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). Relying on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Woods, 21 Cal.4th 668, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019, the Court upheld an investigatory probation search, based on a California probation condition, where officers had reasonable suspicion that evidence of a current crime would be found. The Court repeated the dual justifications given by the California Supreme Court for probation searches: “It was reasonable to conclude that the [California probation] search condition would further the two primary goals of probation — rehabilitation and protecting society from future criminal violations.” 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587 (emphasis added); see also id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587 (‘When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, ... an intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy is reasonable.”) (emphasis added).
The Court in Knights addressed only the level of suspicion, or cause, required for probation searches for evidence of current crimes. It did not address the level of suspicion required to justify searches for evidence of past crimes. But for purposes of understanding Crawford’s “Fourth Waiver” form, the question is not what Knights means or might mean. The question, rather, is what California officials understood to be the law when they presented the “Fourth Waiver” form to Crawford a year before Knights was decided, and what Crawford might reasonably have understood to be the meaning of that form when he signed it.
b. The Parole Conditions
The “Fourth Waiver” form signed by Crawford contained two clauses:
You [Crawford] and your residence and any property under your control may be searched without a warrant by an agent of the Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer.
Parolee’s Initials
You agree to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.
Parolee’s Initials
Clause 1 specifies that “you and your residence and any property under your control” may be searched; authorizes searches by law enforcement officers and agents of the Department of Corrections; and authorizes searches “without a warrant.” By contrast, Clause 2 specifies only that “you” (Crawford) agree to be searched; authorizes searches by parole officers and other peace officers; and authorizes searches and seizures both “with or without a search warrant,” and “with or without cause.”
Three different readings of the two clauses are possible. The first two readings understand the clauses as part of an integrated whole in which each clause has *1087a distinct meaning. The third reading understands the clauses as having synonymous meanings. Under none of these readings does the “Fourth Waiver” form authorize a suspicionless search of Crawford’s residence to investigate a pre-parole crime.
The first reading focuses on the fact that Clause 1 is narrow and relatively protective. Clause 1 specifies that it applies to searches of Crawford, his residence, and property under his control; and it dispenses only with a requirement for a warrant. By contrast, Clause 2 is general and relatively non-protective. It does not specify any particular kind of search, and it dispenses with both a warrant and a cause requirement. The reference in Clause 1 to a search of a “residence” suggests that a residential search is authorized under Clause 1, but not under Clause 2. Further, the absence of a statement in Clause 1 that a search may be conducted “with or without cause” suggests that a search under Clause 1 requires cause, unlike Clause 2. Under this reading, Agent Bowdich’s search was not authorized under either clause because Clause 1 does not authorize suspicionless searches at all, and Clause 2 does not authorize suspicionless searches of residences.
The second reading focuses on the nature of a parole search under California law. Clause 2 clearly authorizes a conventional suspicionless parole search as described and authorized under California case law. See, e.g., Bravo, 738 P.2d 336. It allows searches at any time “with or without a search warrant” and “with or without cause,” and it specifically refers to searches by a “parole officer.” If Clause 1 is to have some independent meaning, it must refer to other kinds of searches. Searches to investigate pre-parole crimes, not specifically authorized by California case law, would be among these other searches. Under this reading, Agent Bow-dich’s search was not authorized under either clause because Clause 1 does not allow suspicionless searches at all, and because Clause 2 does not authorize suspi-cionless searches to investigate pre-parole crimes.
The third reading abandons the attempt to read the “Fourth Waiver” form as an integrated whole in which Clauses 1 and 2 have independent meanings. As seen above, Clause 2 authorizes a standard sus-picionless parole search under California case law. Clause 1 may be read, redundantly, to authorize exactly the same type of search. In several cases, the California Supreme Court has interpreted a parole condition worded precisely as Clause 1 is worded to authorize a suspicionless parole search. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 31 Cal.4th 318, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496, 499 (2003); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 446. In these cases, the court has interpreted the phrase “without a warrant” to mean not only without a warrant but also “without cause.” However, the court in these cases did not discuss any other parole conditions that might also have been present. I therefore do not know whether the court would interpret the phrase “without a warrant” to dispense with a requirement for cause if there had been an additional parole condition, comparable to Clause 2, dispensing with both warrant and cause.
But even if I read Clause 1 to dispense with a requirement for cause, I should not read the clause more broadly than the California Supreme Court has read it. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the purposes of parole and probation searches are to ensure current compliance with law and with probation and parole terms. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1027. Given this case law, I would require a very clear statement in the Fourth Waiver form that *1088it authorizes a suspicionless search to investigate pre-parole crimes. There is no such clarity in the form Crawford signed. Thus, under any reading consistent with California law, Agent Bowdich’s search was not authorized under either Clause 1 or Clause 2, because neither clause authorizes suspicionless searches to investigate pre-parole crimes.
During oral argument, the Deputy Attorney General told us that the “Fourth Waiver” form signed by Crawford is no longer used for California parolees. That fact may lessen the long-term importance of this case, but it does not change the parole conditions of which Crawford was given notice. Under any of the possible readings of the “Fourth Waiver” form, the form does not authorize a suspicionless search of Crawford’s residence to investigate a pre-parole crime. The question posed in this case is thus whether the suspicionless search of Crawford’s residence was valid in the absence of an explicit parole condition authorizing such a search.
B. A Parolee’s Expectation of Privacy in the Absence of a Controlling Condition of Parole
We know that a parolee has a reduced expectation of privacy, and that a State may “condition” parole on compliance with “often strict terms and conditions of ... release.” Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998). This expectation of privacy may be reduced but not entirely eliminated. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-21, 122 S.Ct. 587(balancing privacy interest of probationer). Pursuant to the “special needs” doctrine, a State may require, as an explicitly stated condition of probation, that a probationer’s residence may be searched without a warrant. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). However, the Supreme Court has never held that a parolee can be subjected to a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-parole crime.
1. United States v. Knights
The opinion closest on point is the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). That opinion strongly suggests — indeed, almost compels — the conclusion that at least in the absence of an explicitly stated condition of parole providing otherwise, any search of a parolee’s residence to investigate a pre-parole crime must be based on at least reasonable suspicion. A California court sentenced Knights to probation subject to the condition “that Knights would ‘[sjubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.’ ” Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 587. Pursuant to this condition, State authorities conducted a warrantless search of Knights’s apartment and found evidence of a current crime.
The search of Knights’s apartment was not based on probable cause, but merely on reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. The Court construed the terms of the explicit probation condition to permit a “suspicionless search,” but, because the search in the case was supported by reasonable suspicion, it did not reach the question whether such a suspicionless search condition was valid. Id. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587. Nor did the Court reach the question whether Knights’s purported consent to a search contained in the explicit conditions of probation was, in and of itself, a valid waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 112, 122 S.Ct. 587.
The Court did consider the condition of probation a “salient circumstance” under a “totality of the circumstances” test because it provided notice to Knights of the *1089searches to which he might be subject. Id. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587. Weighing the probationer’s interest in privacy against the government’s interest in the intrusion, the Court held that “the balance of ... considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s house.” Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587(emphasis added). Using an “ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis,” id. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 587, the Court concluded:
Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term “probable cause,” a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable. Those interests warrant a lesser than probable-cause standard here. When an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.
Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In Knights, the probationer was subject to an explicitly stated condition of probation allowing suspicionless searches of his residence for evidence of current crimes, which the court treated as a “salient circumstance.” Id. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587. In this case, by contrast, Crawford was subject to no explicit condition of parole that allowed suspicionless searches to investigate pre-parole crimes. The argument in favor of the suspicionless search in this case is thus much weaker than in Knights. Not only was Knights subject to an explicit condition of probation; he was also searched for evidence of a current crime. Both of these circumstances indicate that the balance of interests under the “totality of the circumstances” would require greater justification for a valid search in Crawford’s case than in Knights’s.
2. Special Needs Doctrine
Judge Trott contends that the “special needs” doctrine allows a suspicionless search in this case. I disagree for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has authorized suspicionless searches only in a narrowly defined class of cases, where “special needs” of the state “beyond the normal need for law enforcement” justify the program of searches. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). The purpose of the search here — investigation of a bank robbery that took place over two years earlier — clearly served the “normal need for law enforcement” to solve past crimes.
Second, in addition to Knights (discussed above), Judge Trott relies on Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998), and Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). Scott and Griffin both involved enforcement of explicit conditions of parole or probation. Neither Scott nor Griffin supports the application of a “special needs” analysis to uphold a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-paróle crime.
In Scott, an explicit condition of parole prohibited Scott from owning or possessing firearms or other weapons. When firearms, a compound bow, and three arrows were found in his bedroom, his parole was revoked. The Court did not need to reach the question of the constitutionality of the search of Scott’s bedroom because its narrow holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply in parole revocation *1090hearings was “sufficient to decide the case.” Id. at 362 n. 3, 118 S.Ct. 2014. Without mentioning the phrase “special needs,” the Court wrote, “[t]he State ... has an ‘overwhelming interest’ in ensuring that a parolee complies with [conditions of parole] and is returned to prison if he fails to do so.” 524 U.S. at 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014.
In Griffin, an explicit condition of probation permitted a warrantless search of probationer Griffin’s residence so long as there were “reasonable grounds” to believe Griffin possessed contraband. 483 U.S. at 870-71, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The Court held that supervision of probationer Griffin was a “ ‘special need’ of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.” Id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. “Reasonable grounds,” as interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, required less suspicion than probable cause, but more than no suspicion. In Griffin’s case, the “reasonable grounds” requirement was satisfied by the presence of a detective’s tip that contraband might be present. The Court upheld a search of Griffin’s residence:
We think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin’s probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by “reasonable grounds,” as defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Id. at 875-76,107 S.Ct. 3164.
In this case, by contrast to Scott and Griffin, the State cannot rely on an explicit condition of parole. Without such a condition in the “Fourth Waiver” form, we have no formal expression of need — “special” or otherwise — by the State. Moreover, the explicit search condition whose constitutionality was sustained in Griffin — based on the State’s formal expression of its “special need” — did not permit a suspicion-less search. It permitted only a search based on “reasonable grounds.” Finally, and perhaps most important, the searches in both Scott and Griffin were for evidence of current crimes. By contrast, Crawford’s residence was searched because Agent Bowdich was investigating a pre-paróle crime. In sum, neither Scott nor Griffin supports allowing a suspicionless search here.
3. Expectation of Privacy
Crawford had a sufficient subjective expectation of privacy, on the facts of this case, that he should be able to enforce the right to privacy to which he is objectively entitled. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (describing a two part inquiry: “has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy” and is “society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (citing Ciraolo).
Crawford’s subjective understanding is somewhat unclear. On the one hand, Crawford testified that as a general matter, “I just, you know, just took for granted that, you know, I’m on parole, that I don’t have no rights at all[.]” On the other hand, he also twice testified, specifically as to the early morning search actually conducted by Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers, that he was “in shock” as a result of the search. Taking these statements together, I conclude that Crawford did not expect the search and detention to which he was subjected.
It is not unrealistic to expect the State to draft language in a parole condition form with the care customarily used by a competent lawyer; nor is it unrealistic to read language drafted by the State according to the rules of construction ordinarily applied to documents having legal consequence. But it is unrealistic to use legal *1091analysis to interpret a parolee’s general oral statement that he “has no rights at all,” explaining his decision to acquiesce to apparent police authority, to deprive him of his otherwise applicable Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 660 (9th Cir.2000) (observing that our court has “rejected the argument that a person lacks a subjective expectation of privacy simply because he ... could have expected the police to intrude on his privacy”).
4. Comparable Treatment of Probationers and Parolees
Judge Kleinfeld contends in his separate opinion that probationers and parolees should be treated differently for purposes of probation and parole searches. I disagree. The Court in Knights did not address the question of whether, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a probationer and a parolee should be treated comparably. However, other cases by the Court suggest that they should be. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (“[I]t is always true of probationers (as we have said to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special[probation] restrictions.’ ”) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)) (alteration in original). The California Supreme Court invokes the same justifications for conditions of probation and parole, without differentiating between probation and parole. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1027(probation); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 450 (parole). I agree with Judge Kleinfeld that for some purposes probationers and parolees can be treated differently, but I do not believe that they are different for present purposes. Indeed, we have explicitly stated that probationers and parolees are indistinguishable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Harper, 928 F.2d at 896 n.l (“Nor do we see a constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth amendment.”).
5. Fourth Amendment Violation
The Supreme Court in Knights has told us that the key to a Fourth Amendment analysis is a balancing of interests. “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 534 U.S. at 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587 (citation omitted). Under ordinary circumstances, of course, a residential search must be justified by a warrant based on probable cause. Here, however, Crawford was a parolee, and the State therefore had a greater interest than usual in conducting searches to ensure that Crawford was obeying the law. On the other hand, the “Fourth Waiver” form drawn up by the State and signed by Crawford did not assert the right to conduct suspicionless searches of Crawford’s residence to investigate pre-parole violations of the law. That is, not only did the State not assert that it needed to conduct such searches in order to “promot[e] legitimate governmental interests”; Crawford was also never given notice that he would be subjected to such searches.
Given the balance of interests — informed by the “Fourth Waiver” form that Crawford signed, the inapplicability of the “special needs” analysis, Crawford’s subjective and objective expectation of privacy, and the comparable treatment of probationers and parolees under the Fourth Amend*1092ment — I conclude that Agent Bowdieh and his fellow officers needed, at a minimum, “reasonable suspicion” to justify their search of Crawford’s residence and Crawford’s accompanying detention. The sole purpose of the search and detention was to investigate a pre-parole crime, and to justify that search Agent Bowdieh needed at least a reasonable suspicion that he would find evidence of that crime. Because Agent Bowdieh had no such suspicion, I conclude that the search of Crawford’s residence, and the accompanying detention of Crawford during that search, violated the Fourth Amendment.
III. Attenuation of the Fourth Amendment Violation
Under established law, evidence obtained through the “exploitation” of illegal behavior by the police cannot be admitted into evidence. Brown, 422 U.S. at 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254. The question under Brown was whether there had been sufficient “attenuation” of the illegality that the evidence obtained could be admitted. The Supreme Court stated that once an illegality has been shown, we must decide whether “the evidence has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407).”[T]he purpose of this attenuated connection test is to mark the point of diminishing returns of the deterrence principle inherent in the exclusionary rule.” United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir.1999).
When the evidence at issue is a confession, the attenuation analysis determines whether the confession is the result of an exploitation of the illegality, or whether it is the result of the defendant’s “free will.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 226, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). As we explained in United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir.1979):
The “free will” of an inculpating defendant is to be considered in light of the twin policies — deterrence and judicial integrity — of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule. It is not enough for Fourth Amendment attenuation that the statement be uneoerced; the defendant’s “free will” must also be sufficient to render inapplicable the deterrence and judicial integrity purposes that justify excluding his statement.
A determination that a confession was a product of a defendant’s “free will” under an attenuation analysis is different from a determination that a confession was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216-17, 99 S.Ct. 2248. A confession can be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment and yet, at the same time, inadmissible into evidence because it is the result of an exploitation of an illegality under a Brown attenuation analysis. Id.
The Supreme Court has instructed us to look to three factors in performing an attenuation analysis: (l)”the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession,” (2)”the presence of intervening circumstances,” and, (3) “particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254; see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982) (quoting Brown factors); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (same).
An analysis of the attenuation factors in this case leads to the conclusion that Crawford’s confession should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court found that the first factor, “temporal proximity,” favored Crawford. I agree. The “temporal proximity” between the search and Crawford’s detention at the residence, on the one hand, and Crawford’s *1093confession, on the other, was close. The drive to the FBI office took about 20 minutes, and Crawford confessed after about an hour and a half at the office.
The second factor, “intervening circumstances,” also favors Crawford. Intervening circumstances, in the case law, means intervening events. We look at “intervening events of significance” that “render inapplicable the deterrence and judicial integrity purposes that justify excluding [a tainted] statement.” Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d at 1289 & n. 3; see also United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 343(9th Cir.1990). Examples of such events include release from custody, an appearance before a magistrate, or consultation with an attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir.1981) (“The crucial factor in this case is that Wellins was permitted to consult with his attorney.”). In this ease, there were no intervening events. In a continuous, uninterrupted sequence, Agent Bowdich and the other officers conducted the illegal search; detained Crawford during the search; took Crawford to the FBI office; and talked to him in a closed room in the office until he confessed. Nothing else happened. This factor thus clearly cuts in favor of Crawford.
Finally, the third factor, “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct” also favors Crawford. Agent Bowdich candidly admitted that the “purpose” of his suspicionless search and detention was to get Crawford to confess to the pre-parole bank robbery. Agent Bowdich testified that he conducted the unconstitutional sus-picionless search as a “tool” to obtain that confession. As we explained in Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d at 1289, “[w]hen police purposely effect an illegal arrest or detention in the hope that custodial interrogation will yield incriminating statements, the deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule is especially compelling.” See also Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254(finding taint of illegal arrest not attenuated when “[t]he arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up.”). Because the search was conducted with the purpose of pressuring Crawford to confess, this factor weighs heavily in favor of excluding the confession.
Further, the official misconduct was “flagrant.” At the time of the search, the case law in this circuit required probable cause to justify investigatory searches, whether the crimes being investigated were current or past. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a. California Supreme Court case law did not (and still does not) authorize suspicionless parole searches to investigate past crimes. Anyone charged with a knowledge of this case law — as Agent Bowdich, an FBI agent, must be— should have known at the time that a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-paróle crime was not authorized under either our case law or that of the California Supreme Court. Anyone with a knowledge of the case law also should have known that the “Fourth Waiver” form signed by Crawford did not authorize a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-paróle crime.
All three attenuation factors clearly favor Crawford. I therefore conclude that his confession, obtained as a result of the illegal suspicionless search of his residence and his accompanying illegal detention, could not properly have been admitted into evidence.
IV. Majority’s Analysis
The majority opinion makes two mistakes. First, it repeatedly characterizes the search by Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers as a “parole search.” See, e.g., *1094maj. op. at 1050-51 and 1051. However, Agent Bowdich’s suspicionless search for evidence of a pre-parole crime was not a parole search under California law. This first mistake is not essential to the majority’s analysis, however, for the majority is willing to assume that the search and accompanying detention violated the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the majority relies on New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990), to conclude, incorrectly, that the modern cases in which the Court has performed an attenuation analysis— Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor — do not apply. Unlike the first mistake, this mistake is crucial.
The majority discusses the search and detention in Crawford’s home as if they can be neatly separated for analysis. See, e.g., maj. op. at 1054 (“The analysis that applies to illegal detentions differs from that applied to illegal searches.”); id. at 1057-58 (“Because the search failed to produce any physical evidence, however, and because Defendant made no incriminating statement during the search, we fail to see how the search, as distinct from the presumed illegal detention, caused Defendant’s statement in the FBI office.”). While analyses of illegal searches and seizures can sometimes be kept separate, there is no doubt that an illegal search and an illegal detention both violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308-09, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997) (illegal search); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 287, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 99 S.Ct. 2248. (illegal seizure). It is a standard police practice to restrict the motion of suspects during a residential search. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (Fourth Amendment allows temporary detention of homeowner while police search the house pursuant to a warrant, so long as detention is reasonable); Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir.1994) (describing “custom and practice” of Portland police to detain occupants of a residence during a search); Wellins, 654 F.2d at 552 (defendant detained while his house was searched). In this case, because the search and detention were carried out simultaneously and with the same goal, Crawford’s detention was inseparable from, and ancillary to, the illegal search, and the legality of the search and detention must be analyzed together.
The attenuation analysis in Brown, Dun-away, and Taylor applies equally to illegal searches and illegal seizures. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 597, 95 S.Ct. 2254(“In Wong Sun, the Court pronounced the principles to be applied where the issue is whether statements and other evidence obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded.”). Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor have strikingly similar facts. In all three cases, the defendants were detained without probable cause. In Brown and Taylor, the defendants were formally arrested; in Dunaway, the defendant was not formally arrested. After their illegal detentions, all three defendants confessed. In each case, the Court conducted an attenuation analysis to determine if the confession was the product of the illegal detention.
In Harris, by contrast, the defendant was arrested with probable cause. The police entered Harris’s house without an arrest warrant and arrested him in the house. Because the entry into the house had been accomplished without an arrest warrant, the arrest was illegal under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, the Court held that since the illegal act — the arrest — had been performed with probable cause and because the illegal arrest had not produced the confession, the confession was not required to be sup*1095pressed under Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor. See Harris, 495 U.S. at 21, 110 S.Ct. 1640.
It is uncontested in this case that at the time of the search Agent Bowdich had probable cause to arrest Crawford for the bank robbery. But he never arrested him. That is, he had probable cause to do what he did not do. But he had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the search and accompanying detention. That is, he had no probable cause to do what he did do. The majority opinion nonetheless concludes that because Agent Bowdich had probable cause to arrest Crawford, the suspicionless illegal search and detention are comparable to the illegal arrest in Harris. I disagree with that conclusion.
First, in Harris, the police had probable cause to justify their illegal act — the arrest of Harris. They lacked an arrest warrant, which made Harris’s arrest illegal under Payton; but they had probable cause to perform the arrest. In this case, by contrast, Agent Bowdich had no probable cause (or even reasonable suspicion) to justify his illegal acts — the search and accompanying detention. The Supreme Court in Harris stated clearly that the existence of probable cause for the illegal arrest differentiated that case from Broim, Dunaway, and Taylor, where there had been no probable cause for the illegal actions in those cases. It wrote:
In each of those cases, evidence obtained from a criminal defendant following arrest was suppressed because the police lacked probable cause. The three cases stand for the familiar proposition that the indirect fruits of an illegal search or arrest should be suppressed when they bear a sufficiently close relationship to the underlying illegality.
495 U.S. at 18-19,110 S.Ct. 1640.
Second, in Harris, there was no causal link between the illegal act (the arrest without a warrant) and Harris’s confession. The fact that Harris was illegally arrested in his home made it no more likely that he would confess than if he had been legally arrested with a warrant. The Court in Harris specifically noted the importance of the causal connection between the illegal conduct and the confessions in Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor. The Court wrote:
We have emphasized ... that attenuation analysis is only appropriate where, as a threshold matter, courts determine that “the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.” * * *. Harris’ statement taken at the police station was not the product of being in unlawful custody. Neither was it the fruit of having been arrested in the home rather than someplace else. * * * We ... hold that the station house statement in this case was admissible because Harris was in legal custody, ... and because the statement, while the product of an arrest and being in legal custody, was not the fruit of the fact that the arrest was made in the house rather than someplace else.'
Id. at 19-20, 110 S.Ct. 1640 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In this case, as in Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor, there is a clear causal link between the illegal actions and Crawford’s confession.
The majority opinion, however, concludes that there was no causal link. In part, the majority reaches this conclusion by a divide-and-conquer strategy. It treats the illegal search and detention as if they were two separate events, such that a causal relationship must be established between the illegal search and the confession, and, separately, between the illegal detention and the confession. But these illegal actions were inextricably intertwined. The question therefore must be whether these illegal actions considered together, as they *1096occurred in the real world, were causally connected to Crawford’s confession.
In part, the majority reaches its conclusion by a because-we-say-so strategy. It simply denies that there was a causal link. But Agent Bowdich’s forthright testimony contradicts that conclusion. Agent Bow-dich — who was in the best position to know — clearly believed that there was a causal link. As he testified, the illegal search and detention were “a tool” to get Crawford to confess. Given Agent Bow-dich’s clear statement of purpose, as well as the factual narrative of how he accomplished that purpose, it is impossible to conclude that there was no causal link. The degree of the causal connection may be in question; but the fact of that connection cannot be denied.
Hams is premised on there being no causal link at all. Once there is a some kind of a causal connection, Hams no longer governs. In the words quoted by the Court in Harris, the attenuation analysis applies when the challenged evidence is “in some sense the product of the illegal government activity.” Harris, 495 U.S. at 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Once there is a causal connection “in some sense,” the degree and consequence of that connection is evaluated under the attenuation test of Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor.
Third, and finally, the majority opinion relies on a sentence in Harris to conclude that an attenuation analysis is not required in this case. Maj. op. at 1056. I quote that sentence in context:
Because the officers had probable cause to arrest Harris for a crime, Harris was not unlawfully in custody when he was removed to the station house, given Miranda warnings, and allowed to talk. For Fourth Amendment purposes, the legal issue is the same as it would be had the police arrested Harris on his doorstep, illegally entered his home to search for evidence, and later interrogated Harris at the station house. Similarly, if the police had made a warrant-less entry into Harris’ home, not found him there, but arrested him on the street when he returned, a later statement made by him after proper warnings would no doubt be admissible.
495 U.S. at 18, 110 S.Ct. 1640(emphasis added to indicate sentence quoted by the majority). Here, the Court is comparing the actual illegal arrest of Harris inside his home to two hypothetical situations. With these hypotheticals, the Court is making the point that there was no causal link between the illegal acts and the subsequent confession. In Harris, the illegal arrest did not produce the confession. See id. at 19,110 S.Ct. 1640(“Harris’ statement taken at the police station was not the product of being in unlawful custody.”). In the two hypotheticals, the illegal search and illegal entry did not produce the confession. In other words, the Court was emphasizing the necessity of a causal connection between the illegal act and the confession, and thereby differentiating Harris from Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor, in which there was such a connection. Thus, far from supporting the majority’s analysis, the sentence it quotes from Harris serves only to underline the difference between this case and Harris.
In sum, Agent Bowdich gained a psychological advantage over Crawford through the illegal early morning search of his residence and the illegal detention incident to that search. This advantage would not have been available had Agent Bowdich simply waited until Crawford walked out onto the sidewalk before arresting him. Because Agent Bowdich had no probable cause (or even reasonable suspicion) to justify his illegal acts, and because those illegal acts had the purpose and effect of getting Crawford to confess, this case does not come under the rationale of Harris, *1097but rather under the rationale of Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor. Under those cases, the illegal actions of Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers were not sufficiently attenuated to allow Crawford’s confession to be admitted into evidence.
V. Conclusion
In the end, this is a fairly simple case. Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers conducted a suspicionless search of parolee Crawford’s residence, and accompanying detention, to investigate a pre-parole crime. This search and detention violated the Fourth Amendment. The illegal search and detention created circumstances under which Agent Bowdich invited Crawford to talk at the FBI office, where he would be “more comfortable.” After an hour and a half in a closed interview room at the FBI office, Crawford confessed to the bank robbery. This illegal search and detention, and subsequent course of conduct, were deliberately, and successfully, undertaken by Agent Bow-dich in order to obtain Crawford’s confession. That confession was therefore inadmissible.
I respectfully dissent.