Court Opinion

ID: 9793871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:54:40.005042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:15.595504
License: Public Domain

WEISBERG, Judge,
concurring.
The legislature has adopted two policies that come into conflict in this case. On the one hand, we have the enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act, with the goals of promoting the free flow of commerce and the use of general partnerships as a form of business. On the other hand, we have community property statutes that require joinder whenever real property or a guaranty is involved, with the goal of protecting the marital community and a non-consenting spouse.
Some legislatures in other community property states that normally require joinder of both spouses when dealing with real property have nevertheless decided that the acts of a general partner-spouse should bind the marital community and the non-consenting spouse. See Cal.Corp.Code § 15025(2)(e) (West 1991); McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 867-68 (Tex.1976) (interpreting Texas Uniform Partnership Act); Attaway v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 232 F.2d 790, 794 (10th Cir.1956) (New Mexico). Our legislature, however, has not indicated which policy should be controlling when there is a conflict.
Although our legislature has not indicated which policy should control, I agree with the rationale of the majority opinion that the Arizona Supreme Court has decided this question. See Cummings v. Weast, 72 Ariz. 93, 231 P.2d 439 (1951). In Cummings, the court held that “the community interest of a spouse in a partnership such as this [real property] and its assets is subordinate to the power of the partners under the agreement *576of the partnership____” Id. at 99, 231 P.2d at 443. Although our supreme court may wish to revisit this issue, we are bound by existing precedent. Bade v. Arizona Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Din, 150 Ariz. 203, 205, 722 P.2d 371, 373 (App.1986).
I recognize that anomalies can be created by subordinating community property rights to partnership rights. For example, a spouse could enter into a general partnership without his or her spouse’s knowledge, and then acquire real property, encumber it, and dispose of it, all the while binding the non-consenting spouse. While it still would be necessary to determine that the partnership was valid, and not merely a subterfuge to avoid community property restrictions, by such means a partner-spouse would be able to do what a non-partner-spouse could not.
I respectfully disagree with one non-essential point of the majority opinion. The opinion distinguishes the instant case from this court’s decision in Tatum, & Bell by focusing on Tatum & Bell’s reliance upon the reasoning in Grimm. I do not believe that the court in Tatum & Bell relied upon the reasoning in Grimm. Instead, the Tatum & Bell court simply concluded that community property rights prevailed over partnership rights and, therefore, a partner-spouse could not unilaterally bind the community to a guaranty even while acting as a general partner. Obviously, this policy decision would apply just as readily to the purchase of real property.
Notwithstanding the Tatum & Bell court’s policy decision, I believe that this court is bound by the precedent of Cummings until and unless our supreme court or legislature decides otherwise.