Court Opinion

ID: 9577007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:30:50.014356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:50.350592
License: Public Domain

BIRDSONG, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully with all that is said in the majority opinion, but I write separately to respond to Judge Eldridge’s special concurrence. Even though I concurred in Judge Eldridge’s opinion in Gardner v. State, 225 Ga. App. 427 (483 SE2d 912) (physical precedent), and did not respond to his special concurrence in McGlohon v. State, 228 Ga. App. 726 (492 SE2d 715) (physical precedent), upon further reflection I cannot agree with his view that Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) is not applicable to the trial court’s analysis in a Batson/McCollum challenge.
More significantly, however, I believe this theory expressed in the concurring opinion in this case as well as in the majority opinion *624in Gardner v. State, supra and in the concurring opinion in McGlohon v. State, supra are contrary to Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 898 (2) (463 SE2d 699), in which our Supreme Court held that Purkett requires trial courts to apply the three-part test to Batson challenges. Additionally, I believe that this theory is contrary to the considerable body of law that has developed in this area. See, e.g., Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149 (476 SE2d 252); Chandler v. State, 266 Ga. 509 (467 SE2d 562); McKenzie v. State, 227 Ga. App. 778 (490 SE2d 522); O’Neal v. State, 226 Ga. App. 224 (482 SE2d 478) (physical precedent). Thus, as we are bound to follow Jackson, we cannot adopt Judge Eldridge’s views on this issue even though they are helpful in analyzing the appellate considerations applicable in a Batson/McCollum challenge. Therefore, if I could now do so, I would withdraw my full concurrence in Gardner.