Court Opinion

ID: 9721083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:48:11.054462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.338004
License: Public Domain

ELKINGTON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
I would accept the superior court’s ruling as to the racial composition of the jury. There was no claim of bad faith, or improper “juggling” of jury lists or summons, or otherwise, on the part of the county. Blacks comprise 7.3 percent of the county’s total adult population. The jury commissioner’s “pretty good estimate” of “maybe nine [blacks] out of 209” actually serving on juries, as I compute it, is 4.3 percent, a not extraordinary disparity under the circumstances. Richmond, where most blacks reside, is at the opposite end of the county from the courthouse, 25 miles away. Many persons from that area simply do not respond to jury summons; others seek to be excused for “undue hardship” (see Code Civ. Proc., § 200), i.e., “no transportation,” “no person to care for small children,” “loss of wages,” “medical problems,” etc. Nearly allways the jury commissioner has no knowledge of the summoned person’s race.
It is significant that at oral argument Buford’s attorney’s only suggestion for improvement of the county’s jury selection process was that blacks be bussed from Richmond to the courthouse for jury service, a solution raising as many constitutional problems as the problem itself.
Nor do my brother justices of the majority offer any solution. They expressly “do not hold existing jury procedures in Contra Costa County to be invalid.” ‘“The burden is on the appellant in every case affirmatively to show error and to show further that the error is prejudicial; . . .’” (People v. Corral (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 300, 307 [36 Cal.Rptr. 591].) Here, finding neither error, nor prejudice, for “practical considerations” our court has reversed the conviction of a proven burglar.
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 25, 1982, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 25, 1982. Mosk, J., Richardson, J., and Kaus, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.