Court Opinion

ID: 9832843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:14:32.264349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:53.754332
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant insists that we have misconstrued the holding in Erie, etc., v. Noble, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 245, 124 S. W. 172, as it relates to the sufficiency of the pleadings upon the question of interest. The exact point made is that the damages alleged in the petition are in specific amounts upon each item; and, while the amount awarded by the jury on each item plus interest thereon does not exceed the amount alleged, interest cannot be allowed, because there was no claim for interest as such, and there was no general ad damnum allegation or prayer for an amount in excess of the specific allegations.
It niay be that we have misconstrued the holding in the above and some of the other cases cited by appellant; but we are clearly of the view that upon principle the trial court was authorized by the pleadings to award interest in this case.
The petition álleged facts showing plaintiffs to be entitled to actual damages in the amount alleged upon each item, and that such damages accrued at specific dates. Under the holdings in the cases cited in our original opinion, such facts entitled plaintiffs to interest as a matter of law. The prayer concludes: “For such other and further relief, general and special, at law and in equity, to which the plaintiffs may show themselves entitled to receive.” The petition therefore alleged every fact essential to the recovery of interest, and the prayer for general relief certaiply ought to be sufficient to authorize the court to afford it.
As stated in the early case of Lee v. Boutwell, 44 Tex. 151, Chief Justice Roberts writing: “The cause of action under our system of pleading depends upon the facts stated in the petition that are appropriate for a recovery rather than upon the particular breach laid, or the specific relief prayed, where there is a general prayer for relief, which, of course, must be understood to have reference and applicability to the facts alleged, whether the specific relief as specially prayed be granted or not.” (Italics ours.)
The principle thus announced may now be regarded as fundamental and elementary in our Texas system of pleading. And under the prayer for general relief our courts have uniformly awarded the full'measure of recovery warranted by the facts stated in the *385pleadings, regardless of any deficiency in the prayer for specific relief. Trammell v. Watson, 25 Tex. Supp. 210; Silberberg v. Pearson, 75 Tex. 287, 12 S. W. 850; Garvin v. Hall, 83 Tex. 295, IS S. W. 731.
Tbe case presented in the record resolves itself into the following: Plaintiffs have pleaded a ease which entitles them upon the facts stated to interest upon the damages shown from the date of the accrual as a matter of law. The evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury findings as to the amount of such damages. The uncontradieted evidence fixes the date at wfiieh the damages accrued. The prayer asked for such general relief as plaintiffs might appear entitled to. Under the facts alleged and proven, plaintiffs would be entitled as a matter of law to interest. No injury whatever could result to defendant by the omission of a specific prayer for interest. It was deprived of no right and deterred from making no defense that was not applicable alike to the relief specifically prayed for. By every rule of justice and fair dealing plaintiffs are entitled to interest. By applying the ordinary test of common sense to the situation, plaintiffs are entitled to interest. It would therefore be an extremely technical rule of law that would deny it to them.
The motion is overruled.
Overruled.