Court Opinion

ID: 9710462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:10:17.140205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.061149
License: Public Domain

NIGRO, Justice,
concurring.
Since I believe that the expert’s testimony regarding the negative rape kit test results is relevant under the Spiewak standard for relevancy,1 I join Madame Justice Newman’s majority opinion but write separately to address some of the concerns raised by Mr. Justice Cappy in his dissenting opinion.
Here, the expert testified in camera that the absence of semen or foreign pubic hairs from the rape kit test could indicate several possibilities: that there was no penetration, that there was penetration but with no ejaculation or external ejaculation, or that there was penetration and ejaculation but samples were lost due to victim activity subsequent to penetration or that a condom had been used. Given these various possibilities explaining negative test results, Justice Cappy dissents finding the expert’s testimony too speculative to aid the jury in determining whether penetration occurred. However, I find the expert’s testimony regarding the negative rape kit test results relevant. At the very least, the testimony supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact — whether or not penetration occurred. Thus, I would find the expert testimony admissible. *81While I understand Justice Cappy’s concerns, I believe they can effectively be curtailed in the course of normal trial practice. Counsel is entitled to question the victim regarding whether or not a condom was used, if or where any ejaculation occurred, and whether any activity, subsequent to penetration, may have caused a loss of samples. These questions can narrow the possibilities advanced by the expert in explaining the negative test results. The jury can then attribute what weight it deems appropriate to the expert’s testimony.

. Under Commonwealth v. Spiewak, evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact. Spiewak, 533 Pa. 1, 617 A.2d 696 (1992).