Court Opinion

ID: 9955502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:12:25.131408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:59.313662
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. St. Valle, 2024-Ohio-1167.]

                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                               EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                        :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :
                                                               No. 113191
                 v.                                   :

VEGIL ST. VALLE,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                 :

                                 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 28, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-23-678108-A

                                                Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Daniel T. Van and Lindsay Patton, Assistant
                 Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

                 Robey & Robey and Gregory Scott Robey, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

                 Defendant-appellant, Otis Edward Williams, indicted in this matter

under an alias, Vegil St. Valle, appeals the ten-year prison sentence and a $10,000

fine imposed by the trial court after he pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and

possession of criminal tools. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.   Factual Background and Procedural History

              Williams reported that he is a citizen of Jamaica who is present in the

United States without legal immigration status.

              On March 1, 2023, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted

Williams — under his St. Valle alias1 — on charges of drug trafficking, drug

possession and possession of criminal tools. The drug charges carried major drug

offender specifications and all the charges carried forfeiture specifications targeting

cell phones and $414 in cash.

              On August 23, 2023, the state amended the indictment pursuant to a

plea agreement and Williams pleaded guilty to trafficking in violation of

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) (a first-degree felony) and possessing criminal tools in violation

of R.C. 2923.24(A) (a fifth-degree felony).           Both counts carried forfeiture

specifications. The state dismissed the remaining count and the major drug offender

specifications through a nolle prosequi.          The state and Williams agreed to

      1 At the change-of-plea hearing, the parties stipulated to an amendment to the

indictment changing the defendant’s name to “Vegil St. Valle, a.k.a. Otis Edward
Williams.” The defense sentencing memorandum also spells the defendant’s name as
“Otis Edward Williams.” Therefore, we refer to the defendant by that name throughout
this opinion.
        We note, however, that the presentence-investigation report alternatively
identifies his true name as “Otis Edward Williams” and “Otis Williams Edwards.” When
Williams was arrested, he was carrying a Georgia driver’s license under the name “Vegil
St. Valle”; this is also the name under which he is incarcerated. We further note that many
of the letters in mitigation identify the defendant as “Otis Edwards.” And the
presentence-investigation report identifies that Williams has used other
aliases — including Mario Brown, Ian Obryant, Eric Smith and William Johnson as well
as many alias social security numbers and birth dates.
recommend a sentencing range of five to eleven years in prison. The trial court

engaged in the following colloquy with respect to that portion of the agreement:

      THE COURT: The government has further indicated to this Court that
      you entered into an agreement whereby you agree to be sentenced
      between five and eleven years in prison. Did you enter into that
      agreement?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

      THE COURT: Do you understand it?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

      THE COURT: Do you have any questions with reference to it?

      THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

             The trial court accepted Williams’ guilty pleas, ordered a presentence

investigation and set the matter for sentencing.

             On August 23, 2023, Williams filed a motion to waive fines and costs,

attaching a document styled as an affidavit of indigence.

             On September 12, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. In

advance of sentencing, Williams filed a sentencing memorandum and numerous

letters in mitigation. He advocated for an aggregate sentence of five years in prison,

noting, among other things, that he was genuinely remorseful for his conduct, had

led a law-abiding life for ten years prior to these offenses and was simultaneously

facing federal prosecution for illegal reentry into the United States and probable

deportation. The defense described his conduct as follows:

      [T]he Defendant was given the opportunity to make $400, if he would
      pick up and deliver a parcel. Defendant went to the home and paid the
      homeowner $200, for receiving the package. Defendant then loaded
       the package in his car and was stopped by police as he was driving to
       deliver the package [which contained around a kilogram of a substance
       containing cocaine].

              Williams addressed the court at the sentencing hearing, as did defense

counsel. The court noted that Williams had prior drug convictions in 1998 and 1999

and also had a federal conviction for illegal reentry into the United States. Defense

counsel noted that Williams had been living in Cleveland Heights, had a “stable

home” and “stable relationship” and had “grown children, all who [sic] are solid

citizens.”

              After confirming with defense counsel that “[y]ou entered into an

agreement with the State of Ohio for a sentence between five and 11 years,” the trial

court announced its sentence. It sentenced Williams to ten years in prison and a

$10,000 fine on the trafficking count. It sentenced him to 11 months in prison and

a $250 fine on the possessing-criminal-tools count.2 The court ran the prison

sentences concurrently and awarded 231 days of jail-time credit.

                The court thereafter reduced its sentence to a journal entry, which

read as follows, in relevant part:

       The court considered all required factors of the law. The court finds
       that prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.

       The court imposes a prison sentence at the Lorain Correctional
       Institution of 10 year(s).

       2 The trial court referred to these fines as “costs” in announcing its sentence at the

hearing but in context it was clear that the court meant the money penalties as fines. The
court identified these money penalties as fines in its sentencing entry and no party raises
an error in this appeal from the court’s misstatement at the hearing.
      Count 1: F1, 10 year(s) * * *

      Count 3: F5, 11 month(s) * * *

      ***

      The defendant is ordered to pay a fine in the sum of $10,250.00. (Count
      1 — $10,000.00 fine; Count 3 — $250.00 fine)

      The court hereby enters judgment against the Defendant in an amount
      equal to the costs of this prosecution.

             Williams appealed, raising the following assignments of error for

review:

      First Assignment of Error: The trial court erred when it imposed a 10-
      year prison term that is not supported by the record.

      Second Assignment of Error: The trial court abused its discretion when
      it imposed a $10,000 fine, despite Appellant filing a timely motion to
      waive fines and costs, with a supporting affidavit of indigency.

II. Law and Analysis

      A. First Assignment of Error

              Williams asks us to vacate his sentences. Presumably, he would have

us remand the matter for resentencing. He first contends that the sentences are

contrary to law because the trial court erroneously believed he had five previous

felony drug convictions when, in fact, he only had two. This argument is meritless.

Williams’ counsel corrected the trial court’s misunderstanding at the sentencing

hearing and the court acknowledged the correction before announcing its sentence.

              Williams’ remaining arguments concern the trial court’s weighing of

the statutory sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12(B), (C), (D) and (E). He contends

that the court failed to properly consider the mitigating factors enumerated at
R.C. 2929.12(C)(3), (C)(4), (E)(1), (E)(4) and (E)(5) and, further, failed to consider

that Williams is facing federal illegal reentry charges and deportation. And, he says,

the court put too much emphasis on certain aggravating factors. Finally, he argues

that the trial court gave undue weight to his lack of immigration status and failed to

fairly consider a character letter written on his behalf.

               At the heart of all these arguments is a contention that the

circumstances of his case do not support a ten-year prison sentence.

               Williams asks us to review his felony sentences under the standard set

forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Under that statute, an appellate court may increase,

reduce or otherwise modify a sentence or vacate a sentence and remand for

resentencing if it “clearly and convincingly” finds that (1) the record does not

support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),

2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) or 2929.20(I) or (2) the sentence is “otherwise contrary

to law.” See State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231,

¶ 21.

               This case, however, involves a jointly recommended sentence. Our

review of Williams’ sentence is therefore limited by R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). Under that

statute, a sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to appellate review “if

the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant

and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.”

R.C. 2953.08(D)(1); see also State v. Noling, 136 Ohio St.3d 163, 2013-Ohio-1764,

992 N.E.2d 1095, ¶ 22 (R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) is “a statutory limit on a court of appeals’
jurisdiction to hear an appeal.”). This limitation on a defendant’s ability to challenge

a jointly recommended sentence on appeal applies to sentences imposed as a result

of plea agreements involving an agreed specific term, plea agreements involving a

jointly recommended sentencing range and plea agreements involving pleas to

multiple offenses with a jointly recommended aggregate sentencing range. State v.

Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108724, 2020-Ohio-3802, ¶ 8–10; State v.

Patterson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106655, 2018-Ohio-4114, ¶ 10; State v. Grant,

2018-Ohio-1759, 111 N.E.3d 791, ¶ 11–20, 23 (8th Dist.). “That appellant agreed to

a sentencing range or sentencing cap, as opposed to a specific sentence, is

immaterial.” Grant at ¶ 23.3

               As this court explained in Grant:

       Range agreements are no different than specific term agreements; they
       are both negotiated agreements based on a quid pro quo arrangement
       where each side gives up something in exchange for being bound by the
       terms of the agreement. Under either scenario, the defendant can “cap”
       or limit his exposure. When an agreed range is involved, the state is
       ensured the sentence will fall within the agreed range and the
       defendant is ensured the sentence will not exceed it. We cannot permit
       a defendant to agree to a term of imprisonment, whether expressed
       specifically or within a range, in exchange for lesser charges or having
       some charges dismissed, only to turn around and challenge that very
       agreement on appeal. Such practice would only serve to undermine the
       state’s incentive to enter plea agreements in the first place.

       3 We are aware of at least one case in which a majority of a panel of this court

considered a defendant’s appellate arguments regarding the trial court’s weighing of
statutory sentencing factors, even after an agreed sentence. See State v. Townsend, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107458, 2019-Ohio-1442, ¶ 4, 7, fn.1, 10–25. However, the majority
noted that its decision to consider the argument was based in part on the state’s failure to
argue that it could not. Id. Here, the state specifically argued that the agreed sentence
limits our ability to consider Williams’ appellate arguments.
      ***

      Where a defendant agrees to a sentencing range, he implicitly agrees to
      all definite sentencing possibilities within that range * * *. “If [the
      defendant] believed a sentence at the top end of that range was
      improper, [he] should not have accepted a plea deal that authorized it.”
      [State v.] Connors, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26721, 2016-Ohio-3195,
      at ¶ 4.

Grant at ¶ 18, 31; cf. State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5, 2005-Ohio-3095, 829

N.E.2d 690, ¶ 25 (“The General Assembly intended a jointly agreed-upon sentence

to be protected from review precisely because the parties agreed that the sentence is

appropriate. Once a defendant stipulates that a particular sentence is justified, the

sentencing judge no longer needs to independently justify the sentence.”).

              A sentence is “authorized by law” within the meaning of

R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) “‘if it comports with all mandatory sentencing provisions.’”

(Emphasis deleted.) State v. Sergent, 148 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-2696, 69

N.E.3d 627, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1,

922 N.E.2d 923, paragraph two of the syllabus; see also State v. Adkins, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 109184 and 109185, 2021-Ohio-1294, ¶ 11.

              In this case, Williams and the state jointly recommended a sentencing

range of an aggregate five to eleven years in prison. Williams thus agreed that any

sentence within that range would be appropriate. The ten-year prison sentence the

trial court imposed was within that jointly recommended range. While Williams

disagrees with the trial court’s weighing of certain statutory sentencing factors, he

makes no argument that his sentence fell outside of the statutory range for these

offenses or failed to comport with any mandatory sentencing provision. Compare,
e.g., State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 26–

27 (considering a trial court’s failure to merge allied offenses of similar import, a

mandatory duty, in the context of an agreed sentence). Further, Williams does not

challenge his sentence on constitutional grounds. See State v. Bennett, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 112182, 2023-Ohio-4412, ¶ 27–30 (Sean C. Gallagher, J., concurring)

(stating the opinion that “[w]hen an appeal of a sentence is presented as a

constitutional claim, * * * that appeal of the sentence does not arise under R.C.

2953.08(A), and therefore, the appellate court has authority to review the sentence

despite the preclusionary language under [R.C. 2953.08(D)(1)],” an issue that is not

before us in this appeal.). Finally, we note that Williams is not challenging the

validity of his plea agreement and has not sought to withdraw his plea.           He

challenges only the resulting sentences imposed after he pleaded guilty.

               Because the sentences imposed by the trial court were within the

jointly recommended sentencing range and were authorized by law, Williams’

sentences are not reviewable by operation of R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).

              We, therefore, overrule Williams’ first assignment of error.

      B. Second Assignment of Error

               Williams contends that the trial court erred by imposing a $10,000

fine on the trafficking count when he had filed a motion to waive fines and costs and

an affidavit of indigency prior to the sentencing hearing.
                 Because Williams did not object to the imposition of the fine at the

sentencing hearing, we review this argument only for plain error. See, e.g., State v.

Brantley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94508, 2010-Ohio-5760, ¶ 12.

                 Crim.R. 52(B) provides that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting

substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of

the court.” An appellate court notices plain error “‘with the utmost caution, under

exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’”

State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002), quoting State v.

Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

Plain error “must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings” and we will not find

plain error unless, but for the error, the outcome would have been different. Barnes

at 27; Long at paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St.3d 420,

2008-Ohio-2787, 889 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 78. “The burden of demonstrating plain error

is on the party asserting it.” State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642,

873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 17.

                 William pleaded guilty to drug trafficking in violation of

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a first-degree felony. R.C. 2925.03(D)(1) states, in relevant

part:

        If the violation of division (A) of this section is a felony of the first * * *
        degree, the court shall impose upon the offender the mandatory fine
        specified for the offense under [R.C. 2929.18(B)(1)] unless, as specified
        in that division, the court determines that the offender is indigent.
               R.C. 2929.18(B)(1), in turn, requires a trial court to impose a fine of

at least $10,000, and up to $20,000, for a first-degree drug trafficking offense.

R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(a), (B)(1). The statute goes on to state the following:

      If an offender alleges in an affidavit filed with the court prior to
      sentencing that the offender is indigent and unable to pay the
      mandatory fine and if the court determines the offender is an indigent
      person and is unable to pay the mandatory fine described in this
      division, the court shall not impose the mandatory fine upon the
      offender.

               The state contends that Williams failed to comply with this statute

because the document attached to his motion to waive the fine was not a properly

executed affidavit. The state notes that the document does not appear to bear a

notary seal or stamp. Therefore, the state says, “[I]t is unclear who has notarized

this document and whether the person carries a valid commission.”

               An affidavit is “a written declaration under oath, made without notice

to the adverse party.” R.C. 2319.02. The document attached to Williams’ motion

indicates that the statements therein were declared under oath. That said, it is true

that the person serving as notary to this document — their signature appears

visually similar to the signature of Williams’ counsel on the motion itself — failed to

provide a completed notarial certificate as required by R.C. 147.542. Williams’

affidavit does not include, for example, “[t]he notary’s printed name, displayed

below the notary’s signature or inked stamp” or “[t]he notary’s notarial seal and

commission expiration date.” R.C. 147.542(F). We also note that the document was

executed by the defendant using an alias, Vegil St. Valle, and not under his apparent
true name.    On the other hand, the state did not object to the trial court’s

consideration of the affidavit and the trial court did not strike the document.

               We need not dwell on these facts or consider whether this document

is defective for purposes of R.C. 2929.18(B)(1), because we would affirm the trial

court’s judgment even if the document were a properly executed affidavit of

indigency.

               “[A]n offender who files an affidavit alleging that he or she is indigent

and is unable to pay a mandatory fine is not automatically entitled to a waiver of that

fine.” (Emphasis deleted.) State v. Gipson, 80 Ohio St.3d 626, 634, 687 N.E.2d 750

(1998). The sentencing court must find that the offender is an indigent person and

is unable to pay the mandatory fine in order to waive the fine. State v. Cotto, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107159, 2019-Ohio-985, ¶ 11.

              Before imposing a fine under R.C. 2929.18, a trial court is required to

“consider the offender’s present and future ability to pay the amount of the sanction

or fine,” R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), but “‘there are no express factors that must be taken

into consideration or findings regarding the offender’s ability to pay that must be

made on the record.’” Cotto at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Hampton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 103992, 2016-Ohio-5419, ¶ 7. Generally, a trial court satisfies this requirement

when it considers a presentence-investigation report that contains information

about the defendant’s financial situation and his ability to pay the fine. See, e.g.,

State v. Clemons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101230, 2015-Ohio-520, ¶ 10; State v.

Simpson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101088, 2014-Ohio-4580, ¶ 21. Ultimately, to
avoid the imposition of a mandatory fine, the burden is on the defendant “to

affirmatively demonstrate that he or she is indigent and is unable to pay the

mandatory fine.” (Emphasis deleted.) Gipson at 635; Cotto at ¶ 13.

               Here, the trial court considered a presentence-investigation report

that contained information about Williams’ financial situation and his ability to pay

the fine. Among other things, it indicated that Williams had been employed doing

“drywall and flooring.” Defense counsel also noted, at the sentencing hearing, that

Williams had stable housing, a stable romantic relationship and adult children.

Furthermore, we note that Williams retained counsel throughout the trial court

proceedings and before this court. See State v. Reese, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

107564, 2019-Ohio-1779, ¶ 7. Finally, when he was arrested he was in possession of

multiple cell phones and over $400 in cash.

               While we acknowledge that Williams is not a U.S. citizen and will be

facing potential deportation after his release from prison, we cannot say, based on

the record before us, that the trial court failed to consider Williams’ present and

future ability to pay the fine or that it was unreasonable for the trial court to conclude

that Williams would be able to pay the fine. Accordingly, we do not find plain error

in the trial court’s imposition of the fine.

               We, therefore, overrule Williams’ second assignment of error.

III. Conclusion

               Having overruled Williams’ assignments of error for the reasons

stated above, we affirm.
         The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

         It is ordered that the appellee recover from the appellant the costs herein

taxed.

         It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is

terminated.

         A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR