Court Opinion

ID: 9564422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:00:22.745004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:24.177375
License: Public Domain

Adams, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Divisions 1 and 3, and concur in that portion of Division 2 that finds that the initial questioning of Smith was within the limited scope of an initial on-scene investigation and that the officer’s actions violated Miranda. I must respectfully dissent, however, as to the remainder of Division 2 because I do not believe the error was harmless under the circumstances. I further dissent to Division 4 because I do not believe that the state proved that Smith’s consent was voluntary.
Although the majority correctly notes that Smith was entitled to a Miranda warning at the time the officers extended their interrogation into a visit to apartment 809, the issue does not turn on a simple Miranda violation. At that point, the majority concedes the interrogation had gone beyond mere investigation into a detention that equated with a formal arrest, entitling Smith to Miranda protection. *625I believe Smith’s detention at that point was illegal because it went beyond the scope of a second-tier stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). “[A] second-tier stop is subject to strict boundaries regarding duration, intent, and scope. Such investigative stop should be brief, limited in time to that minimally necessary to investigate the allegation invoking suspicion.” (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) State v. Harris, 261 Ga. App. 119, 122 (581 SE2d 736) (2003).
Here, the interrogation progressed into a third-tier stop, or arrest, which requires probable cause. State v. Kaylor, 234 Ga. App. 495, 496 (507 SE2d 233) (1998). And I do not believe the police had sufficient probable cause at that time to arrest Smith. She was driving a car which had been identified as being involved in a crime one hour previously, which gave the officers articulable suspicion to stop the car and conduct a brief investigative inquiry. But both eyewitnesses identified the perpetrators as two males, and no computer equipment was found in the car. Without more, I do not believe that the police had probable cause to arrest Smith at that point and her continued detention was illegal.
The circumstances of Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 376-378 (1) (290 SE2d 442) (1982), and the later cases cited by the majority, are distinguishable because in those cases, the defendant was legally in police custody at the time of the Miranda violation. See Cotton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 18, 20 (513 SE2d 763) (1999); Casey v. State, 246 Ga. App. 786, 791 (4) (542 SE2d 531) (2000). And while a Miranda violation standing alone may not be enough to suppress the evidence, the violation in this case occurred while Smith was being illegally detained. The illegal detention was a violation of Smith’s constitutional rights, which was sufficient to support the suppression of the information obtained at apartment 809. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 484-485 (83 SC 407, 9 LE2d 441) (1963) (exclusionary rule bars from trial verbal statements and physical evidence obtained following illegal home invasion and arrest); Brown v. State, 191 Ga. App. 779 (383 SE2d 170) (1989) (evidence obtained as a result of illegal detention and unlawful seizure of property should have been suppressed); Robinson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 741 (305 SE2d 381) (1983) (confession obtained as a result of illegal arrest not admissible). Thus, I believe that it was clear error for the trial court to deny Smith’s motion to suppress the information gleaned as a result of the visit to apartment 809.
And the information derived from the officers’ visit to apartment 809 led them to apartment 702, where I agree that Officer J. P. Wilbanks illegally entered the apartment by leaning inside the door*626way.2 The majority holds that the evidence found in apartment 702 was nevertheless admissible as a result of Smith’s later consent, which the majority contends ratified the prior warrantless search of the apartment. See Atkins v. State, 173 Ga. App. 9, 12 (3) (325 SE2d 388) (1984).
“When seeking to justify a warrantless search, the State carries the burden of showing that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Fulghum, 261 Ga. App. 594, 595 (2) (583 SE2d 278) (2003). Wilbanks testified that when he obtained Smith’s consent to search the apartment, he told her that he had two options, either to seek a search warrant or to obtain her consent. And that if she did not consent, he could obtain a warrant based upon the information he had at that point. On cross-examination, Wilbanks was asked:
And I want to be clear on one thing you said earlier. You told her — you Mirandized her and you told her that she could consent to search and you told her, I believe, your testimony earlier was, that she could consent and if she didn’t that was fine, you could just go ahead and get a warrant because you knew — I believe your statement was you were beyond probable cause at that point for a warrant?
And Wilbanks replied, “That’s substantially what I stated, yes.” Smith’s testimony is in agreement with Wilbanks. She said he told her, “You might as well, you either sign a consent form or we can go get a search warrant and get it searched.”3
“When an officer represents to an accused that a warrant to search will be obtained if consent is refused, and does not have probable cause to secure the warrant, then the accused’s consent is invalid.” (Citation omitted.) Darby v. State, 216 Ga. App. 781, 783 (2) (455 SE2d 850) (1995). If the illegally obtained evidence is excluded, the record shows that Wilbanks did not have sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant. Prior to leaning into the apartment, Wilbanks had no evidence of any stolen merchandise in the apartment and there was nothing to connect either the car or Smith directly to apartment *627702 because Smith had not yet admitted that she lived there. And there is no evidence as to the information he actually obtained at apartment 809, other than a direction to apartment 702, or as to whether the information came from a competent or reliable source for that information. “Where the State seeks to establish probable cause through information provided by an unidentified informant, the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge are ‘major considerations in the probable cause analysis.’ ” (Footnote omitted.) Lyons v. State, 258 Ga. App. 9, 11 (1) (572 SE2d 632) (2002). All the state provided was a name, Cory, for someone in apartment 809, who may or may not have lived there, and that he directed police to apartment 702. At best, this information shows that Cory knew where Smith and Caldwell lived, but it does not show that he had knowledge to connect them to any criminal activity. Therefore, that information was insufficient to establish probable cause. Id. And although the car was parked directly in front of apartment 702, that information alone would not justify a search warrant. The 700 building contained a number of apartments. When considered as a whole, the information on the record does not provide sufficient probable cause for a search warrant. See, e.g., id. at 9. And without such probable cause, the information was also insufficient to justify the arrest of Smith and Caldwell.
If consent is given following an illegal detention, the state must prove that the consent was not a product of that illegality. Pledger v. State, 257 Ga. App. 794, 797 (572 SE2d 348) (2002). It must be determined, therefore, whether the consent is the product of “free will” or was obtained “by exploitation of [the prior] illegality” and that determination depends upon the facts of each case. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.
To determine the voluntariness of a consent to search, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances,
including such factors as the age of the accused, the length of detention, whether the accused was advised of his constitutional rights, and the psychological impact of all these factors on the accused. In determining voluntariness, no single factor is controlling. A consent to search must be the product of an essentially free and unrestrained choice by its maker.
State v. Gerace, 210 Ga. App. 874, 875 (2) (437 SE2d 862) (1993).
Under the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, I would conclude that Smith’s consent was not voluntary. I note that the state presented no testimony as to Smith’s age or education. But at the point she gave her consent, she had been detained by four police officers for one and one-half hours, without access to the *628outside world. Her cell phone, her car, and her four-month-old baby had been effectively seized by police. She had been escorted by officers through the complex to two separate apartments. There is evidence that at the first apartment, she observed officers handcuff the occupants. At the second apartment, she had been used as a decoy to lure Caldwell into opening the door. At that point, the officer illegally entered the apartment by leaning inside and then immediately seized both Caldwell and her by the wrists and walked them to a police car where they were handcuffed and placed in the back seat.
The officer’s illegally obtained knowledge of the stolen equipment and the tip to investigate apartment 702 cannot be separated from Smith’s later consent. That knowledge led Wilbanks to physically grab Smith and Caldwell and to place them under arrest. And it provided the primary legal basis for Wilbanks’s representation that he could obtain a warrant.
Accordingly, I would find that Smith’s consent to search resulted from the officers’ exploitation of illegally obtained information and an illegal entry into the apartment, and that the evidence obtained following the consent should have been suppressed. See Bolton v. State, 258 Ga. App. 217, 218-219 (573 SE2d 479) (2002); Pledger v. State, 257 Ga. App. at 797, 800.
The facts of this case are readily distinguishable from Brown v. State, 261 Ga. App. 351 (582 SE2d 516) (2003), upon which the majority relies. There, police were conducting a “knock-and-talk” investigation and asked someone outside the defendant’s mobile home where the defendant was. The individual indicated that the defendant was inside. The officer then knocked on the door, where someone else said the defendant was in the bathroom. The officer called out, then went into the home and knocked on the bathroom door asking the defendant to come outside. The officer then left the mobile home. He returned when he was called back inside. The defendant later consented to a search of his premises and escorted officers to locations in the woods where he had stored drugs.
Although the officer in Brown first entered the home illegally, he obtained no evidence as a result of that illegal entry, and the consent was obtained shortly after the initial contact with police. Any evidence was obtained only after the defendant consented to a search of his property. But most importantly, that case has none of the earmarks of the totally police-dominated situation present in this case, where Smith was completely in police control for one and one-half hours and bodily led from location to location to assist the police in obtaining evidence to use against her.
I am authorized to state that Judge Barnes joins in this opinion.
*629Decided July 16, 2003
Reconsideration denied July 31, 2003
Angela D. Duncan, for appellant (case no. A03A0669).
Tyrone M. Hodnett II, for appellant (case no. A03A0673).
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Julie L. Johnson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

 I also believe that the method of Wilbanks’ approach to apartment 702 must be considered in analyzing the issues in this case. Wilbanks insisted that Smith accompany him there and then went to the effort to hide his presence, in effect, using Smith as a decoy to get Caldwell to open the door.

 I take issue with the majority’s characterization of Smith’s testimony as “straining credulity.” She testified that she was apprehensive because she believed the police had superior knowledge of the situation. In any event, there is no issue of credibility as to what Wilbanks told her in order to obtain her consent. Both witnesses agree that he told her that either she could consent to a search or he would get a warrant.