Court Opinion

ID: 9819063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:11.951448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:41:47.377759
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court: During a jury trial conducted in the circuit court of Champaign County, defendant, Harry Gosier, pled guilty to charges of two murders and two separate aggravated criminal sexual assaults. After accepting the guilty pleas, the circuit court found that defendant was eligible for the death penalty. Subsequently, the jury that had originally been empaneled to determine defendant’s guilt found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. The circuit court then sentenced defendant to death for the murders and to two consecutive 60-year sentences for the aggravated criminal sexual assaults. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. People v. Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127 (1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987, 119 L. Ed. 2d 590, 112 S. Ct. 2970 (1992). Thereafter, defendant filed a post-conviction petition (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 1992)). The circuit court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed the judgement of the circuit court. People v. Gosier, 165 Ill. 2d 16 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 872, 133 L. Ed. 2d 130, 116 S. Ct. 194 (1995). Defendant next filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States district court. The district court granted defendant a hearing on the issue of his competency to stand trial, but ultimately denied habeas relief. United States ex rel. Gosier v. Welborn, No. 96—C—2176 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1998). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Gosier v. Welborn, 175 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006, 145 L. Ed. 2d 387, 120 S. Ct. 502 (1999). On December 7, 1999, defendant filed a petition seeking relief pursuant to (i) the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 1998)), (ii) the state habeas corpus provisions (735 ILCS 5/10 — 101 et seq. (West 1998)), and (iii) section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401 (West 1998)). The circuit court dismissed the petition in its entirety, upon motion of the State, and this appeal followed. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651. We now affirm the judgment of the circuit court. BACKGROUND Our previous opinion on direct appeal, contains a detailed factual recitation of the events leading to defendant’s convictions and sentence. See Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127. We need not repeat those facts here given the procedural bases upon which we resolve this appeal. Defendant’s present petition raised some 15 claims of error which purportedly occurred during the trial proceedings. Due to the fact that, in this court, defendant has identified only five claims as necessitating reversal, we will limit our discussion to those claims. As he did below, defendant initially contends that a bona fide doubt existed as to his competency at the time of trial, which in turns calls into question whether his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily given. Defendant further argues that he was denied a fair and reliable sentencing hearing because (i) the State improperly excused several venirepersons on the basis that they had reservations about the application of the death penalty, (ii) one of the jurors did not understand that his lone vote against a sentence of death would preclude its imposition, and (iii) one of the jurors was allowed to serve on the panel despite stating that he would automatically impose the death penalty upon a conviction for first degree murder. Defendant’s final contention is that he was denied a fair and reliable sentencing hearing because of the “multiple and cumulative effects of numerous errors.” As noted previously, the State moved to dismiss the petition. In so doing, the State raised several distinct procedural challenges to the petition in the circuit court. The State argued that defendant’s petition was time-barred under section 122 — 1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and that defendant had failed to avail himself of the statutory exception to the time limitation. Moreover, the State contended that defendant’s petition was an improper successive petition and that defendant had failed to establish that fundamental fairness necessitated the relaxation of the bar on such filings. In ruling upon the State’s motion, the circuit court found that defendant’s petition was filed beyond the period of time mandated by the legislature in section 122 — 1. The circuit court further found that defendant did not meet the statutory exception to the timeliness requirement because his petition failed to include any allegations regarding the lack of culpable negligence. In the alternative, the circuit court also ruled that each of defendant’s claims was barred by principles of waiver and res judicata, noting in particular that several of the claims had been thoroughly litigated in the federal habeas corpus proceedings and found to be without merit. The circuit court further found that defendant’s claims for relief under the Illinois habeas corpus act and section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure were without merit. The court entered a written order to that effect, and this appeal followed. ANALYSIS Relief Under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 1994)) provides a statutory remedy by which prisoners may collaterally attack a prior conviction and sentence. People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 242 (1995). To be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant must establish that a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights occurred in the proceedings that resulted in the conviction or sentence being challenged. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). The Act contains several procedural hurdles a defendant must clear in order to claim relief. For example, section 122 — 1(c) of the Act expressly provides that no proceedings may be commenced after the passage of certain enumerated time periods “unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(c) (West 1998). In addition to the timeliness question, the Act contemplates the filing of only one petition, and “a ruling on a post-conviction petition has res judicata effect with respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the initial petition.” People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 375-76 (1988); accord People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273-74 (1992). Indeed, section 122 — 3 of the Act expressly states, “Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.” 725 ILCS 5/122 — 3 (West 1998). Nevertheless, exceptions have been made to this requirement in a limited range of circumstances. This court has allowed successive petitions when the proceedings on the original petitions were said to be deficient in some fundamental way. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 273-74. In order to establish this deficiency, we have held that a defendant must demonstrate both cause and prejudice for the failure to assert the matter previously. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d 194, 198-99 (2000); People v. Holman, 191 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (2000). After reviewing defendant’s allegations, we agree with the circuit court that defendant filed the instant petition well outside the time limitations set forth in section 122 — 1 of the Act. At the time defendant filed his petition, section 122 — 1(c) provided that, at most, defendant had three years from the date of his conviction to commence proceedings under the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(c) (West 1998). Defendant’s trial took place in October 1988. Defendant filed his petition in this matter on December 7, 1999, some 11 years after the completion of his trial. Accordingly, defendant’s filing of the petition falls beyond the time parameters established by the General Assembly and must be deemed untimely. As noted previously, section 122 — 1(c) provides that no proceedings may be commenced after the passage of the enumerated time periods “unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(c) (West 1998). Defendant’s petition does not contain any allegations, whatsoever, regarding defendant’s lack of culpable negligence. On appeal, defendant has failed to point to any facts contained in the petition which would place him within the ambit of this statutory exception. Indeed, defendant has not made any effort in this proceeding to acknowledge the requirements of section 122 — 1, the tardiness of his petition, and the lack of any allegations regarding culpable negligence. Under these circumstances, the circuit court properly concluded that the petition was untimely and that defendant provided neither the facts nor the theory to demonstrate that the tardiness was due to his lack of culpable negligence. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Our ruling that defendant’s petition is time-barred is dispositive of this appeal with respect to the claims of relief made pursuant to the Act. Nevertheless, we would point out — in a purely academic manner — that even had defendant alleged facts that would establish that the late filing was not due to his culpable negligence, his petition would still be barred as an improper successive filing. Defendant has not satisfied the cause and prejudice test for his failure to raise these issues at an earlier point in the history of this case. Even if we were to assume defendant had cause for failing to raise these matters previously, he cannot establish prejudice. We believe that, as to the issue regarding defendant’s competency, the opinions from the federal habeas corpus proceedings demonstrate a lack of prejudice. As to defendant’s other claims, we cannot say that the errors identified by defendant so infected the trial and sentencing proceedings that defendant’s convictions and sentence must be considered violations of due process. Relief Under the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act We next discuss whether defendant’s allegations warrant relief pursuant to the state habeas corpus provisions. Under Illinois law, a prisoner may seek habeas corpus relief in our courts. See 735 ILCS 5/10 — 101 et seq. (West 1998). However, the habeas corpus act provides relief only on the grounds specifically enumerated in section 10 — 124 of the act. See 735 ILCS 5/10 — 124 (West 1998). This court has consistently held that a writ under this act is available only to obtain the release of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the person of the petitioner, or where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner’s conviction that entitles him to release. See Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430 (1998) (and cases cited therein). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus may not be used to review proceedings that do not exhibit one of these defects, even though the alleged error involves a denial of constitutional rights. Barney, 184 Ill. 2d at 430, citing Newsome v. Hughes, 131 Ill. App. 3d 872, 874 (1985). The petition at issue in this case does not allege any error which is subject to review in habeas corpus proceedings. Defendant raises no question regarding jurisdiction, nor has he alleged a post-conviction event which would entitle him to release. Given these circumstances, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment with respect to defendant’s prayer for habeas corpus relief. Relief Under Section 2—1401 In light of the fact that defendant also couched his petition in terms of relief pursuant to section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we next address whether the circuit court properly dismissed the claims within that context. Initially, we note that although a section 2 — 1401 petition is usually characterized as a civil matter, relief under section 2 — 1401 extends to criminal cases. People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 460-61 (2000). We further note that a petition for relief from judgment made pursuant to section 2 — 1401 must be filed within two years after the entry of the judgment being challenged. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401(c) (West 1998). Petitions filed beyond the two-year period will not generally be considered. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 210 (1997) (and cases cited therein). As we stated in Caballero, “[T]he two year limitation mandated by section 2 — 1401 and its predecessor, section 72 [citation], must be adhered to in the absence of a clear showing that the person seeking relief is under legal disability or duress or the grounds for relief are fraudulently concealed. Crowell v. Bilandic, 81 Ill. 2d 422, 427 (1980); People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 317 (1978). Moreover, the fact that a post-judgment motion or an appeal may be pending does not serve to toll the period of limitation. See Sidwell v. Sidwell, 127 Ill. App. 3d 169, 174 (1984).” Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 211. A person may also seek relief beyond the two-year limitation of section 2 — 1401 where the judgment being challenged is void (People v. Harvey, 196 Ill. 2d 444, 447 (2001)) or where the opposing party has waived the limitation period (People v. Ross, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1053 (1989)). Defendant’s request for section 2 — 1401 relief was filed 11 years after the judgment of conviction was entered and sentence imposed in 1988. Defendant does not contend that any of the grounds for tolling the limitations period exist. Nor does he claim that the judgment being challenged is void. Moreover, waiver does not apply because the State raised the issue in its motion to dismiss. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court in this respect. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Tuesday, January 22, 2002, as the date on which the sentence of death, entered by the circuit court of Champaign County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119 — 5 (West 1996). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of this mandate to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where defendant is now confined. Circuit court judgment affirmed.