Court Opinion

ID: 9704804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:47:01.892788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:05.599120
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
South Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions (SDPJI) (Criminal)1 Vol. II, 1-16-72 provides:
Accomplice — Testimony Viewed With Caution
You are instructed that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with great care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case, (emphasis added)
The comment to this instruction provides that if requested, this instruction must be given in addition to SDPJI (Criminal) 1-16-6, (now SDPJI (Criminal) 1-14-7). The authority cited for instruction 1-16-7 is State v. Douglas, 70 S.D. 203, 16 N.W.2d 489 (1944) and State v. Beene, 257 N.W.2d 589 (S.D.1977). This instruction has been followed throughout the state since January 1, 1978, as required by the Beene decision.
There are sound reasons for the giving of a cautionary instruction. As stated in Beene, supra:
“[Ejxperience has shown that the evidence of an accomplice should be viewed with care, caution and suspicion because it comes from a tainted source and is often given in the hope or expectation of leniency or immunity.” [citations omitted.] In addition to being derived from a suspect source accomplice testimony is frequently cloaked with a plausibility which may interfere with the jury’s ability to evaluate its credibility. “[A]n accomplice is not merely a witness with a possible motive to tell lies about an innocent accused but is such a witness peculiarly equipped, by reason of his inside knowledge of the crime, to convince the unwary that his lies are the truth.’ ”
257 N.W.2d at 590, quoting People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal.3d 953, 967, 127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 145-146, 544 P.2d 1335, 1345-1346 (1976).
In Beene, we reversed a conviction in light of the trial court’s failure to give a requested cautionary instruction dealing with accomplice testimony. 257 N.W.2d at 591. This court gave a detailed explanation as to why an accomplice’s testimony should be viewed with distrust. Id. at 592. Characterizing an accomplice as a “corrupt source of testimony,” we wrote:
‘The jurors must be warned that, in effect, the accomplice may tailor the truth to his or her own self-serving mold, and that they are to weigh the testimony with that caveat in mind.’
*661Id., quoting People v. Gordon, 10 Cal.3d 460, 471, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 913, 516 P.2d 298, 305 (1973).
There is no doubt that all the reasons for this inherent distrust were present in the case at bar. Absent Buck’s testimony, there was nothing linking the defendant to the burglary. Buck had much to gain by tailoring his testimony — a plea to a misdemeanor instead of a class IV felony.
The trial court indicated that the modification of defendant’s proposed instruction # 2 more accurately stated the law as it exists in the. State of South Dakota. I disagree. The majority opinion provides that on at least three occasions we have approved the use of the word “caution” rather than the word “distrust” in such instructions. Citing: State v. Spoonemore, 287 N.W.2d 109 (S.D.1980); Beene and Douglas, supra. A fair reading of these cases challenges the accuracy of this statement.
In Spoonemore, the defendant’s proposed accomplice instruction stated in part, “You will receive such testimony with caution, closely scrutinize it in the light of all of the other evidence in the case, and give to it such weight as you may think it is entitled to have.” 287 N.W.2d at 110. The defendant’s proposed instruction in Beene, supra, provided in part: “The testimony of an [accomplice] ... must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness[.]” 257 N.W.2d at 590 n. 2. In Douglas, the refused instruction stated in part, “... you should examine [the accomplice’s] testimony with great care and caution, before you accept it as true.” 70 S.D. at 223, 16 N.W.2d at 499. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 330 (1981) defines “distrust” as “to have no trust or confidence in; the lack or absence of trust: suspicion, wariness.” It defines “caution” as “warning, admonishment, precaution, prudent forethought to minimize risk; one that arouses astonishment or commands attention.” A review of the proposed instructions in these cases, indicates to me that something more than the solitary word “caution” was necessary to convey to the jury that a skeptical approach must be taken toward accomplice testimony in order to achieve the ends of justice. A fair reading of South Dakota cases supports this viewpoint.
Although I concede that many of the opinions refer to cautionary instructions and sometimes interchange the words “caution” and “distrust,” it is undisputed that the pattern jury instructions uses the word distrust, and not caution, in the portion of the instruction at issue. In light of the above definitions, I presume that there was a precise reason for doing so. If we continue to approve the substitution of critical words such as these, this court will habitually run into problems of interpretation. More importantly, however, we will run the risk of compromising the due process rights of the accused.
Furthermore, a review of the facts in this case clearly supports the need to view the testimony of accomplice Buck with distrust, and not just with caution. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence which tended to connect Laib with the commission of the offense, except for the accomplice’s testimony concerning the two flashlights. As indicated, one flashlight was in the accomplice’s locker, the other one was found on a dresser in a room that Laib shared with four other individuals at the Glory House. As further indicated, the rooms at the Glory House were not locked and other residents, including Buck, had access to them. In view of this extremely weak “corroborating testimony”, the failure to instruct the jury that Buck’s testimony should be viewed with distrust was clearly enough to unfairly tip the scales against the defendant. The “tale” as told by accomplice Buck simply could not be properly weighed by the jury" when they were not properly instructed thereon.
I further dispute the State’s claim that either prong of the two-prong test for determining the sufficiency of corroboration of accomplice testimony was substantially met in this case. As noted by the majority, the rule is satisfied if such evidence in some substantial degree (1) tends to affirm *662the truth of the testimony of the accomplice, and (2) tends to establish the guilt of the defendant. The State’s claim that the physical evidence of the two tool boxes tended to affirm Buck’s testimony is highly questionable. The State argued that this evidence showed that the crime was committed, and secondly, that two people committed this crime. In my view, it did not tend to affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony nor did it tend to establish the defendant’s guilt. Indeed, considering all the facts of this case, the two tool boxes no more tended to establish Laib’s guilt than they would tend to establish the guilt of any other person.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand to the trial court for a fair trial.

. The South Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions— Criminal are drafted by a committee of judges and attorneys. The instructions are updated on a continual basis for the benefit of the bench and bar.

. Currently denominated: SDPJI (Criminal) 1-14-8, Accomplice — Testimony How Viewed.