Court Opinion

ID: 9916419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 22:08:39.669727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:22.172350
License: Public Domain

01/09/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                         Assigned on Briefs November 7, 2023

                   JAMES MOORE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                  Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
                   No. 19-05109, C1907079 James Jones, Jr., Judge
                       ___________________________________

                            No. W2022-01785-CCA-R3-PC
                        ___________________________________

The Petitioner, James Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first
degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for
which he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years’ imprisonment. He now
appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, arguing that trial counsel was
ineffective by failing to: (1) subpoena records that might have shown the victim’s
intoxication; and (2) adequately advise the Petitioner about testifying. Alternatively, he
argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies entitles him to relief. After
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE
AYERS and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.

W. Price Rudolph, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, James Moore.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Regan Murphy, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                         OPINION

       On May 2, 2019, the Petitioner approached the victim outside of a nightclub and
shot him six times. See State v. Moore, No. W2020-00641-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL
1832142, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 7, 2021), no perm. app. filed. The victim and the
Petitioner had been friends for nearly fifteen years, but had a “falling out” a few months
before the shooting over the Petitioner’s use of the victim’s car. Id. The victim testified
at trial that prior to the shooting, he saw the Petitioner inside of the nightclub. As the victim
was leaving, he heard someone call out to him twice. He turned and saw the Petitioner
standing a few feet away. The Petitioner shot him, but he survived. He told police the
Petitioner was the shooter and identified the Petitioner both in a pre-trial photo array and
at trial. The Petitioner was convicted of attempted first degree murder and employing a
firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.

       After this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions, he filed a petition for post-
conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-
conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on November 3, 2022. At the hearing, trial
counsel and the Petitioner testified. The proof relevant to the issues raised in this appeal is
outlined below.

         Trial counsel testified that he was admitted to practice law in 2015 and exclusively
practiced criminal defense. The Petitioner’s case, however, was his first jury trial. Prior
to trial, he met with the Petitioner at least eight times. His trial strategy included presenting
an alibi defense, in conjunction with a misidentification defense. The Petitioner maintained
that he was with Kionna Graham driving to Texas to see his uncle when the shooting
occurred. The Petitioner said a few other people were also in the car, but he could not
recall their names. He also could not recall his uncle’s name, or where his uncle lived. The
Petitioner told counsel he could not remember much about the trip because he rode in the
backseat and consumed alcohol.

         Trial counsel said he spoke with Graham three to five times. Graham said she went
to Texas with the Petitioner to see the Petitioner’s uncle. They stopped in San Antonio to
visit her cousin, but she could not provide her cousin’s name. Trial counsel asked both the
Petitioner and Graham for information to help corroborate the Petitioner’s alibi such as
stops they made along the drive, debit card purchases, and phone calls placed but neither
provided any information. On the Monday before trial, Graham “changed her attitude a
little bit about whether she wanted to testify.” She told counsel the other people in the car
were the Petitioner’s friends and she could not remember their names. She said the
Petitioner was the driver. She said she did not want to testify, but she was willing to if she
absolutely had to. Before the trial began, counsel told the Petitioner that he “was not very
optimistic about [Graham] testifying” based on “the inconsistent information.” He “got
the sense that [he] was going to be putting someone up there that was going to commit
perjury,” so he and the Petitioner agreed that she would not testify.

        Trial counsel said he and the Petitioner were initially hoping the Petitioner would
testify. Counsel thought the Petitioner “would come across [as] likeable to the jury,” and
he had no criminal record. They had discussed the benefits and risks of the Petitioner
testifying and the kinds of questions he would be asked. When the Petitioner still had not
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provided details about his alibi the week before trial, however, counsel began to change his
mind about his recommendation that the Petitioner testify. After they decided Graham
would not be testifying, counsel recommended that the Petitioner not testify. He told the
Petitioner it was the Petitioner’s choice whether to testify, but testifying about his alibi
without Graham and without any specific details about the trip to Texas would not “be very
impactful.” Counsel said the Petitioner “wasn’t going to be able to answer any questions
and it would look very, very bad to the jury.” The Petitioner did not testify, and the defense
presented no proof at trial.

       Trial counsel testified that without the alibi defense, he was left with only a
misidentification defense. Counsel intended to cast doubt on the victim’s identification of
the Petitioner based on the victim’s intoxication, but expressed doubts about the
persuasiveness of this strategy given that the victim “knew [the Petitioner] well.” Counsel
reviewed the preliminary hearing and learned that the victim admitted to consuming “a
double shot of Jack” the night he was shot. Counsel did not try to subpoena medical records
to determine the victim’s level of intoxication because the State said they would share the
records when they received them. The State provided approximately 1,300 pages of
records the Friday before trial. Page 713 referenced a toxicology report, but no such report
was in the records. Counsel asked the trial court for a continuance, which the court denied.
When asked why he did not try to get the records himself earlier, counsel responded,
“inexperience.” Counsel said he did not try to determine the victim’s intoxication level
through other means such as witness interviews, credit card records, or video footage from
the nightclub. Counsel’s efforts were largely focused on trying to obtain proof to
corroborate the Petitioner’s alibi.

        On cross-examination, trial counsel emphasized that his supervisor, who had done
at least one hundred trials, assisted him in preparing for trial and was present at the trial.
Counsel said that, because the alibi defense fell apart on the Monday before trial, he did
not have much time to consider any other strategies. He said that the medical records said
a toxicology report was completed, but they did not say whether it “had come back.”
According to the affidavit presented at trial, the records provided were complete. He did
cross-examine the victim at trial about his intoxication the night of the shooting, and the
victim admitted that he had been drinking, but denied being intoxicated.

       The Petitioner testified that he told trial counsel that he went to Texas the day of the
shooting, but he never said he was drinking. The Petitioner did not remember where he
went in Texas or anywhere he stopped. He knew the names of the other people in the car
with him, but he did not provide their names to counsel because they did not want to testify.
The only information he provided counsel that could assist in his defense was Graham’s
information. He expected Graham to testify at trial, and said counsel did not advise him
how not presenting Graham’s testimony might affect the outcome of his case. Counsel did
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not tell him that Graham decided not to testify, and he thought Graham was going to be at
trial.

        The Petitioner said trial counsel “sort of” talked to him about testifying. He thought
counsel told him not to testify before trial. Counsel told him that he had a right to testify,
but he did not tell him that the judge would instruct the jury that they could not hold his
failure to testify against him. After the State concluded its proof at trial, counsel did not
talk to him about his option to testify, advise him whether he should testify, or prepare him
for the Momon hearing.

       On cross-examination, the Petitioner said he did not tell trial counsel the names of
the people that went to Texas with him because the people were threatening him and his
family. He said he also knew his uncle’s name but did not tell trial counsel because his
uncle did not want to come to court. He initially refused to provide his uncle’s name at the
evidentiary hearing, but eventually said it was Pete Knox. He said that knowing what he
knows now, he would have testified at trial and told the jury he was on his way to Texas
when the shooting occurred.

       The post-conviction court filed a written order denying the petition for post-
conviction relief on December 15, 2022. The court found that trial counsel’s alleged
failures were neither deficient, nor prejudicial. In regards to the records, the court noted
that the nightclub records could not themselves prove the intoxication level of the victim.
The court then found that because the records that trial counsel failed to subpoena were not
provided at the hearing, the Petitioner could not demonstrate any prejudice. In regards to
the Petitioner’s trial testimony, the court noted that trial counsel testified that he did
adequately advise the Petitioner about testifying. The court found that “[b]ased [on] the
lack of alibi and the lack of memory, counsel discouraged the Petitioner from testifying,
but told the Petitioner that ultimately it was his decision[.]” The court found that counsel’s
assessment that the Petitioner’s testimony would have been more harmful than helpful was
a reasonable strategic decision and therefore not ineffective. Regardless, the Petitioner
could not establish prejudice because “[i]t appears from [the] [P]etitioner’s own testimony
that he would not have provided any information during trial that would have supported in
any way the supposed alibi defense or . . . any other form of defense[.]” The court also
denied relief based on cumulative error, stating that it “finds no merit to the arguments
presented by [the] Petitioner individually or collectively.” The Petitioner filed a timely
notice of appeal.

                                        ANALYSIS

        The Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when
trial counsel failed to: (1) subpoena the victim’s medical records; (2) subpoena business
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records from the nightclub where the shooting occurred; and (3) adequately advise the
Petitioner about testifying. Alternatively, he argues that he is entitled to relief under the
cumulative error doctrine. The State responds, and we agree, that the Petitioner has failed
to show that trial counsel was ineffective.

        A claim for post-conviction relief based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
presents mixed questions of law and fact. Mobley v. State, 397 S.W.3d 70, 80 (Tenn. 2013)
(citing Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tenn. 2011)). We review the post-
conviction court’s conclusions of law de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Id.
The post-conviction court’s findings of fact, however, are conclusive on appeal unless the
evidence preponderates against them. Calvert, 342 S.W.3d at 485 (citing Grindstaff v.
State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn. 2009); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999)).
“Accordingly, appellate courts are not free to re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence, nor are
they free to substitute their own inferences for those drawn by the post-conviction court.”
Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Honeycutt, 54
S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2001)).

        The right to effective assistance of counsel is protected by both the United States
Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I,
§ 9. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must
establish that: (1) his lawyer’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A petitioner successfully
demonstrates deficient performance when the petitioner establishes that his attorney’s
conduct fell “below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Baxter v. Rose, 523
S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). Prejudice arising therefrom is demonstrated once the
petitioner establishes “‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. at 370 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “Because a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test,
a failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on
the ineffective assistance claim.” Id.

        In assessing an attorney’s performance, we “must be highly deferential and should
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689). In addition, we must avoid the “distorting effects of hindsight” and must “judge
the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “No particular
set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
                                             -5-
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how
best to represent a criminal defendant.” Id. at 688-89. However, “‘deference to matters of
strategy and tactical choices applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon
adequate preparation.’” House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Goad,
938 S.W.2d at 369).

       I. Failure to Subpoena Records.1 The Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s failure
to subpoena the victim’s medical records and the nightclub’s business records was
deficient. He contends that the victim’s toxicology report and the nightclub’s credit card
records could have shown that the victim was heavily intoxicated when he was shot and
therefore cast doubt on the credibility of his identification of the Petitioner. The State
responds that counsel’s failure to subpoena the records was reasonable because: (1) the
State already subpoenaed the victim’s medical records and agreed to provide them to
counsel; and (2) the nightclub’s records would show how much alcohol the victim
purchased, not consumed. The State also contends that the Petitioner cannot demonstrate
prejudice because the Petitioner failed to present either record at the evidentiary hearing.

       The Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel’s failure to subpoena records was
deficient. First, counsel’s decision not to independently subpoena the victim’s medical
records was not deficient because the State agreed to provide counsel the records when
they received them. We note that trial counsel did attempt to obtain the records. The State
provided 1,300 pages of records the Friday before trial, and trial counsel asked for a
continuance which was denied. There is no proof that counsel could have received the
records earlier if he had subpoenaed them himself. Second, counsel’s failure to subpoena
the nightclub’s records was not deficient because, though the records may have shown that
the victim purchased alcohol, counsel’s strategy was to demonstrate the victim’s
intoxication by other, more direct means—the victim’s own admission that he consumed
alcohol the night he was shot, and his medical records. Therefore, his failure to subpoena
records did not fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.” See Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369.

       The Petitioner also failed to establish that trial counsel’s failure to subpoena records
was prejudicial. A petitioner generally cannot establish that the failure to subpoena and
present documents was prejudicial unless the petitioner presents the documents at the post-
conviction hearing. Pilate v. State, No. W2017-02060-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 3868484,
at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 14, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 6, 2018). Without
the toxicology report or nightclub records, we cannot speculate whether such records exist,
or whether they would have shown that the victim was highly intoxicated when he was
shot. Even if the records did show the victim’s intoxication, the Petitioner cannot establish

       1
           We have combined the Petitioner’s first and second issues.
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a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Because the victim had been friends with the Petitioner for fifteen years, we are not
persuaded that the victim’s intoxication could have cast sufficient doubt on the victim’s
identification. Accordingly, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

       II. Failure to Adequately Advise. The Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s failure
to “adequately explain to [him] the pros and cons of testifying at trial” and failure to
“strongly [encourage] [him] to testify” was ineffective. He contends that had he been
advised adequately, he would have testified that he was not in Memphis when the shooting
occurred and there is a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted him. The State
responds that counsel’s advice was reasonable, and there is no reasonable probability that
the Petitioner’s testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial.

        The Petitioner has not established that trial counsel was ineffective. The evidence
supports the post-conviction court’s finding that counsel discouraged the Petitioner from
testifying based on the Petitioner’s lack of memory of his trip to Texas, but told the
Petitioner it was ultimately his decision. Trial counsel testified that he explained the
benefits and risks of testifying to the Petitioner and discussed questions he may be asked.
He advised the Petitioner not to testify because he was unable to answer any questions
about his trip to Texas. Counsel’s actions, therefore, were not deficient. Additionally, the
Petitioner suffered no prejudice. The record supports the court’s finding that had the
Petitioner testified, “he would not have provided any information during trial that would
have supported in any way the supposed alibi defense or . . . any other form of defense[.]”
There was no proof that the Petitioner went to Texas besides his own testimony. Though
counsel believed the Petitioner “would come across [as] likeable to the jury,” the Petitioner
could not provide any details about his trip to Texas and would not have been able to
answer questions on cross-examination. The Petitioner did not remember where he went
in Texas or anywhere he stopped along the way, and refused to provide the names of the
people that went with him. There is no reasonable probability that this vague alibi assertion
would have changed the result of the trial given that the victim, who had been friends with
the Petitioner for fifteen years, identified the Petitioner as the perpetrator. Accordingly,
the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

       III. Cumulative Error. Alternatively, the Appellant argues that the cumulative
effect of trial counsel’s deficiencies entitles him to relief. The State responds that the
Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he has not shown that trial counsel was deficient.
The cumulative error doctrine applies when “multiple errors [were] committed in trial
proceedings, each of which in isolation constitutes mere harmless error, but when
aggregated, have a cumulative effect on the proceedings so great as to require reversal in
order to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 76

                                             -7-
(Tenn. 2010). Because none of trial counsel’s alleged errors constituted deficient
performance, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

                                  CONCLUSION

      Based on the above reasoning and authority, we affirm the judgment of the post-
conviction court.

                                  ___________________________________________
                                    CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE

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