Court Opinion

ID: 9857130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:33:49.64231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:03.080246
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Majority and Concurring Opinions filed
September 21, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-23-00031-CV

RDF AGENT, LLC, RELATED FUND MANAGMENT, LLC, AND BRIAN
                    SEDRISH, Appellants
                                       V.

ELECTRIC RED VENTURES, LLC, MANFRED CO. L.C., AND MONZER
                   HOURANI, Appellees

                   On Appeal from the 129th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 2022-20609

   MEMORANDUM CONCURRING OPINION

      In this special appearance appeal, the court holds that RDF Agent, LLC,
Related Fund Management, LLC, and Brian Sedrish engaged in sufficient
minimum contacts with Texas to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
them concerning appellees’ claims. I agree that the trial court did not err in
denying the special appearances, but only because appellees presented evidence
that appellants committed a tort in Texas. I am unable to join the majority opinion
in full, but respectfully concur in the judgment, because the court suggests that a
personal jurisdictional anchor exists in facts beyond the commission of the alleged
tort.

         As the majority opinion correctly observes, “doing business” in Texas
includes contracting with a Texas resident when either party is to perform the
contract in whole or in part in Texas and “committing a tort” in Texas. Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.042. The majority concludes that specific jurisdiction
exists under the “committing a tort” prong because appellees alleged and presented
evidence that Sedrish made a misrepresentation in Texas during a meeting to
discuss an ultimately unsuccessful financing arrangement for an Arizona project. I
agree that the trial court did not err in denying the special appearances on this
basis.

         However, the majority opinion also relies on a preliminary term sheet and
related negotiations as support for the permissible exercise of specific jurisdiction.1
The majority cites several facts unconnected to the alleged commission of the tort
but heavily tethered to the term sheet. The opinion could lead a reader to believe
that the court is holding that appellants purposefully availed themselves of the
privilege of doing business in Texas based on the term sheet and the surrounding
negotiations. I believe this is error.

         One of the principal considerations in the purposeful availment analysis is
whether the defendant sought some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself
of the jurisdiction. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575

         1
         The majority assumes the term sheet’s validity, though it disclaims any expression of
opinion on the matter. Based on the term sheet’s plain language, however, only limited
provisions were intended to be binding.

                                              2
(Tex. 2007). In my view, the term sheet and surrounding discussions fail this part
of the analysis because, by attempting to negotiate and arrive at a financing
arrangement for a real estate investment in Arizona, the parties were not seeking to
benefit or profit in Texas. See id.; Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten,
168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005); KC Smash 01, LLC v. Gerdes, Hendrichson,
Ltd., L.L.P., 384 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).

      Additionally, of the entire term sheet, only a single clause reasonably could
be said to have been inserted for the purpose of profiting in Texas: the right of first
refusal provision relating to the Houston hotel. But the insertion of that clause into
the term sheet by any of the appellants cannot support specific jurisdiction because
that fact fails the “substantial connection” test—there exists no substantial
connection between that clause or contact and the operative facts of the litigation.
See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585. None of appellees’ allegations have any
substantial connection to the right of first refusal provision.

      For similar reasons, I also disagree with the majority’s discussion on pages
14-15 of the majority opinion, where the court concludes that RDF Agent’s
contacts with Texas “extend well beyond the Term Sheet’s right of first refusal.”
Again, the point of the term sheet and its surrounding discussions was to profit the
parties by investing in a project in Arizona, not Texas. And the facts cited by the
majority do not demonstrate the existence of any jurisdictional contacts by RDF
Agent that supposedly “extend beyond the Term Sheet.”

                                           3
      With these thoughts, I concur in the judgment.

                                             _____/s/ Kevin Jewell____________
                                             Kevin Jewell
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Hassan, and Wilson (Hassan, J., majority).

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