Court Opinion

ID: 9399553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 16:12:48.247128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:32.970917
License: Public Domain

J-A09018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 LAWRENCE FAWAZ ABOUSEIF                  :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 222 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 4, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-06-SA-0000323-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                  FILED: JUNE 5, 2023

      Appellant, Lawrence Fawaz Abouseif, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on January 4, 2022. We affirm.

      The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows.

       On October 31, 2021, at approximately 9:30 p.m.[,] Officer
       Christian DeAngelo [of the Northern Berks Regional Police
       Department] was positioned on Route 222 southbound assisting
       a broken down tractor trailer with his vehicle shadowing the
       tractor trailer so as to cast light upon it from his marked police
       cruiser. Appellant’s vehicle passed the marked police cruiser
       traveling southbound toward Route 73 and traveled through a
       steady red light at the intersection. Officer DeAngelo activated
       his emergency overhead lights and sirens and conducted a
       traffic stop of the vehicle. Officer DeAngelo ran [] Appellant’s
       license and registration and identified [Appellant] on the day of
       trial as the person whom he stopped that evening. … [Officer
       DeAngelo] then issued Appellant a citation for 75 Pa.C.S.A.
       § 3111[(a)]), Obedience to Traffic Control Device.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/22, at 2 (internal citations omitted).
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      On October 20, 2021, Appellant was found guilty of violating Section

3111(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”) following a non-jury summary trial

held before the magisterial district court. On November 1, 2021, Appellant

appealed his summary conviction to the Berks County Court of Common Pleas.

A summary appeal hearing was held on January 4, 2022, after which the trial

court also found Appellant guilty of violating Section 3111(a) of the MVC and

ordered him to pay a $150.00 fine. This timely appeal followed.

      Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

       Whether [Appellant] may rightfully avail himself of
       Pennsylvania’s “sudden emergency doctrine,” or a judicially
       expanded version thereof, or otherwise be vindicated, or
       “excused,” from culpability for the [MVC] violation for which he
       was cited, where a combination of supervening circumstances
       conspired [] to create a situation so urgent, unexpected, and
       overwhelming to him that they materially contributed to his
       commission of the violation?

       Whether due weight was accorded by the trial court to
       Appellant’s sworn testimony whereby he sought to establish
       and assert such a defense?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      Herein, Appellant’s “primary thesis” is that the “sudden emergency

doctrine,” applicable in civil cases, should operate to absolve him of criminal

liability for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3111(a), Obedience to Traffic Control

Device.   Appellant’s Brief at 7.   This issue, therefore, “presents [a] pure

question[] of law, over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope

of review is plenary.” In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 241 (Pa. 2017).

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      This Court previously addressed the application of the sudden

emergency doctrine in criminal matters in Commonwealth v. Matroni, 923

A.2d 444 (Pa. Super. 2007). In particular, the Matroni Court explained:

       The trial court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden
       emergency doctrine because that doctrine, a civil concept, is
       not a recognized defense [for] which Matroni was entitled to a
       jury instruction. As Matroni himself acknowledges, “the trial
       court is under a duty to instruct the jury on the correct legal
       principles applicable to the facts presented at trial.”
       Commonwealth v. Cox, 686 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Pa. 1996)
       (emphasis added). Here, the sudden emergency doctrine is not
       a legal principle applicable to the Vehicle Code charges in
       question.

                                      ***

       Extensive research has revealed no cases wherein a defendant
       has been permitted to successfully employ the sudden
       emergency doctrine as a defense to criminal charges, and we
       decline to allow Matroni to do so in this case.

Id. at 452 (parallel citation omitted).     In the aftermath of our decision in

Matroni, this Court has consistently rejected a criminal defendant’s attempt

to invoke the sudden emergency doctrine to              evade liability.    See

Commonwealth v. Coen, 2015 WL 6828068, at *3 (Pa. Super. July 24,

2015) (unpublished memorandum) (“Here, we likewise reject [the appellant’s]

invocation of the civil affirmative defense of the sudden emergency doctrine

in reviewing [the appellant’s] criminal conviction for driving at an unsafe speed

for road conditions.”); Commonwealth v. Epps, 2013 WL 11251604, at *5

(Pa. Super. Oct. 24, 2013) (unpublished memorandum) (“This court has

previously ruled that the sudden emergency doctrine is a civil law concept

                                      -3-
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inapplicable to the realm of criminal culpability.”).     Because the sudden

emergency doctrine is inapplicable in the criminal context, Appellant’s claims

of error fail.

      Moreover, even if the sudden emergency doctrine were applicable in this

matter, Appellant would not be entitled to relief.        Indeed, “the sudden

emergency doctrine . . . does not apply to vehicles moving in the same

direction, nor does it apply when the defendant is responsible for creating the

emergency.” Matroni, 923 A.2d at 452-453; see Cunningham v. Byers,

732 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. Super. 1999) (explaining that “the sudden emergency

doctrine applies only to moving instrumentalities thrust into a driver’s path of

travel”); see also Lockhart v. List, 665 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1995) (“It is

important to recognize, however, that a person cannot avail himself of the

protection of this doctrine if that person was himself driving carelessly or

recklessly.”).

      Here, at trial, Appellant admitted that he traveled through a steady red

light because he was driving too closely to the truck in front of him.

Specifically, Appellant testified as follows:

        [Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Lehman]: You say
        this is how close you were to the truck. Now this is not the
        night in question, correct?

        [Appellant]: This is not the night in question. This is not. This
        is a picture that I took in the daylight the next day.

        [ADA Lehman]: So[,] this is what you [are] saying is helpful
        with the tractor trailer in front of you?

        [Appellant]: That is correct.

                                       -4-
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       [ADA Lehman]: And you [are] saying that because you were
       this close to the vehicle in front of you, that you could not see
       the red light.

       [Appellant]: That is correct.

       [ADA Lehman]: But you acknowledge that when you passed
       the red light[,] it was red?

       [Appellant]: You see can I explain, Your Honor?

       [ADA Lehman]: No. My question is when you went over the
       red light, the light, it was red, correct?

       [Appellant]: When I went underneath it after I cross[ed]?

       [ADA Lehman]: Yes. So[,] you acknowledge later you learned
       that the light was red?

       [Appellant]: After I crossed.

       [ADA Lehman]: Okay. And you acknowledge that this picture
       would be a violation of the [MVC] because you are following too
       closely?

       [Appellant]: I had reason to follow to[o] closely.

N.T. Trial, 1/4/22, at 38-39. Hence, Appellant did not testify that something

“suddenly or unexpectedly” caused him to accelerate through the intersection

when the traffic light was red. Matroni, 923 A.2d at 453. To the contrary,

Appellant’s testimony revealed that he traveled through a steady red light

because, at the relevant time, he was driving too close to the truck in front of

him and, as such, Appellant was unable to see that the light was red. Because

Appellant’s own testimony reveals that his own error, i.e., driving too closely

to the truck in front of him, caused him to travel through the steady red light,

Appellant cannot avail himself of the protection of the sudden emergency

doctrine.

                                     -5-
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     Accordingly, having found no error on appeal, we will affirm Appellant’s

judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 06/05/2023

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