Court Opinion

ID: 9831433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:06:18.844893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:34.758634
License: Public Domain

On Motion of Defendant in Error for a Rehearing.
 In connection with the motion, we have again considered the evidence in the statement of facts sent to this court, and do not agree with defendant in error in his view that the appeal was disposed' of under a misapprehension of the facts “in Several very material particulars.” The “conditional sale contract” referred to in the opinion reversing the judgment was not between Calloway and the General Motors Acceptance Corporation, as is stated in the motion, but it purported to be between Calloway and the Michaels Motor Company. It was in fact, as shown by uneontradicted testimony, between Calloway and O’Connor; the latter acting in the matter as the agent of both defendant in error and the Michaels Motor Company. The contract was executed by Calloway, and it was not pretended that Mrs. Robertson, who acted at O’Connor’s instance (it seems from her testimony as a witness) in filling blanks in the printed form used, did not act within the implied authority conferred by Calloway when he executed the instrument with blanks unfilled therein. J. W. Jenkins Sons Music Co. v. Johnson, 175 Mo. App. 355, 162 S. W. 308; 13 C. J. 308 ; 2 C. J. 1242 et seq.; 1 R. C. L. 1008, 1012, 1018; 41 C. J. 420. Unquestionably, for anything to the contrary appearing in the record sent to this court, Calloway was-bound by the sales contract; and the only option he had, if any, under it was to exchange the coupé for the sedan, if he chose to do so within the time contemplated. The coupé became his property when it was delivered to him, and unquestionably, had he made the payments as agreed upon, he could have held it as against defendant in error. The fact that Calloway had a right under hi-S agreement with O’Connor, the agent in the transaction of both defendant in error and the Michaels Motor Company, to exchange the eoupé for the sedan, did not until such an exchange was effected make the coupé any less his property than it would have been had he had no such right. We did not and do not think it was of any importance to the rights of the parties whether the sales contract was executed by defendant in error or not; for his undertaking under it was performed when he, acting by O’Connor, delivered the coupé to Calloway.
The motion is overruled.