Court Opinion

ID: 9852996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:40:57.429465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:39.399672
License: Public Domain

RAMIL, Justice,
concurring in opinion in which MOON, Chief Justice, joins.
I.
I agree with the majority’s explication of the federal Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), as well as the majority’s application of the PCA to the facts of the case before us. I also agree that the evidence obtained in violation of the PCA should be suppressed on adequate and independent state grounds via the exclusionary rule as applied in the State of Hawaii. However, because I believe the majority’s justification for applying the exclusionary rule in this case is potentially over-broad, I write separately to illustrate my own concept of how the State of Hawaii’s counterpart to the federal exclusionary rule should be applied. In so doing, I hope to explain why this appeal represents an exception to our general rule that before a defendant may benefit from the protections of the exclusionary rule, he or she must demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right. See majority at 466, 896 P.2d at 922 (citing State v. Scanlan, 65 Haw. 159, 160-161, 649 P.2d 737, 738 (1982)).
In my view, the exclusionary rule should generally apply only in situations where the evidence in question was obtained in violation of an individual’s constitutional rights. Thus, when governmental agents obtain evidence of a crime without violating any constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule should only be applied in very limited situations. In the instant case, the majority seems to justify its invocation of the exclusionary rule solely on the basis that governmental agents violated a federal law in the course of obtaining the evidence in question. In my opinion, the violation of any law by a governmental *471agent simply does not provide a sufficiently narrow category for invoking an exception to the exclusionary rule. Rather, we must approach these situations on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the rationales underlying our exclusionary rule are served, and whether the law violated warrants its application. I therefore feel compelled to delineate the reasons why the exclusionary rule applies in cases such as the one before us, where the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence obtained in accordance with the requirements of our state and federal constitutions, but in violation of the PCA. For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth below, I respectfully concur.
II.
The policy that military involvement in civilian law enforcement should be carefully restricted has deep roots in our nation’s history. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 375 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983, 94 S.Ct. 2385, 40 L.Ed.2d 760, rehearing denied, 417 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 3187, 41 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1974). Indeed, strong opposition to military encroachment into civil affairs existed prior to the Revolutionary War and has periodically resurfaced in this country ever since. See Clarence I. Meeks, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 69 Mil.L.Rev. 83, 86 (1975). One of the major concerns facing the delegates at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 was how to handle their fear of a standing army. Id. at 87; see also Walden, 490 F.2d at 375. The issue of the proper role of a national military was also raised in the states during the ratification process and is reflected in the Bill of Rights.1 Meeks, supra, at 87-88. During the Civil War, the aversion toward using the military to aid civil law enforcement slowly began to erode. Id. at 89-90. However, gross abuses during the Reconstruction Era precipitated the enactment of the Posse Comitatus Act.2 Id. at 89.
Since then, our country’s antipathy toward the use of the military in civilian law enforcement has remained strong. Chief Justice Burger expressed this sentiment in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972), a case involving a challenge to surveillance by the United States Army of civilian political activities during peacetime.3
The concerns of the Executive and Legislative Branches in response to disclosure of the Army surveillance activities—and indeed the claims alleged in the complaint4 —reflect a traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our history and found early expression, for example, in the Third Amendment’s explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers in private homes without consent and in the constitutional provisions for civilian control of the military. Those prohibitions are not directly presented by this case, but their philosophical underpinnings explain our traditional insistence on limitations on military operations in peacetime. Indeed, when presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully em*472powered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation’s history or in this Court’s decided cases, including our holding, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied.
Tatum, 408 U.S. at 15-16, 92 S.Ct. at 2326-27.
Trepidation toward the notion of military involvement in civilian law enforcement is particularly prominent in the State of Hawaii. Indeed, many of our citizens still remember the period during World War II when Hawaii existed under martial law.5 The impact was felt by every citizen from the moment martial law was declared upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, to the moment blackout and curfew were finally lifted on July 11,1945. See J. Garner Anthony, Hawaii Under Army Rule ix-x (1955) (providing a chronological list of principal events relating to military control of civil affairs in Hawaii during World War II). See also Jon M. Van Dyke, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 66 S.Ct. 606, 90 L.Ed. 688 (1946), in Government Under Martial Law, A Humanities Exhibit, 17 (1991) (describing some of the conditions that people living in the Territory of Hawaii were forced to endure during the time Hawaii existed under martial law). During this time period, almost every aspect of civilian life was monitored and controlled by the new military regime. See J. Garner Anthony, Martial Law, Military Government and the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Hawaii, 31 Cal.L.Rev. 477, 479-82 (1943).
As described by United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black:
[t]he Military authorities took over the government of Hawaii. They could and did, by simply promulgating orders, govern the day to day activities of civilians who lived, worked, or were merely passing through there. The military tribunals interpreted the very orders promulgated by the military authorities and proceeded to punish violators. The sentences imposed were not subject to direct appellate court review, since it had long been established that military tribunals are not part of our judicial system.... Military tribunals could punish violators of these orders by fine, imprisonment or death.
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 309, 66 S.Ct. 606, 608, 90 L.Ed. 688 (1946).
In Duncan, the petitioners, two civilians who were tried, convicted and sentenced to prison by military tribunals,6 challenged the authority of the military on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Id. at 307-11, 66 S.Ct. at 607-09. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the armed forces acted in violation of statutory authority and clearly exceeded the boundaries between military and civilian power. Id. at 324, 66 S.Ct. at 615-16. In reaching this holding Justice Black explained: “The established principle of every free people is, that the law shall alone govern; and to it the military must always yield... ,”7 Id. at 323, 66 S.Ct. at 615 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
*473While the Supreme Court’s decision in Duncan represents a strong reminder of the principles of freedom upon which the United States was founded, it also serves as a valuable reminder that these freedoms were largely forgotten during the period of World War II when Hawai'i existed under martial law. See Van Dyke, supra, at 19. There is no question that the history in this state exemplifies the potential dangers that exist when civilian life is under military rule. Nor is there any question that our history also demonstrates the importance of being vigilant with respect to the dangers sought to be averted by the enactment of the PCA in 1878. This is particularly true in peacetime when there is no ostensible justification for the intrusion. It is also true when we are dealing with incidents, such as the one before us, where the impact is not felt on a large scale. Indeed, “when a government wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom, and reduce them to slavery, it generally makes use of a standing army. That danger ... exists not only in bold acts of usurpation of power, but also in gradual encroachments.” Tatum, 408 U.S. at 18, 92 S.Ct. at 2328 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added & internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, because of the importance of the PCA stemming from the traditional American antipathy towards military involvement in civilian affairs, and the historical significance of military governance in the Territory of Hawai'i during World War II, we simply cannot wait for “widespread and repeated” violations of the PCA before invoking our counterpart to the federal exclusionary rule as a deterrent to potential future violations.8 And, while the PCA, as many courts have noted, contains its own independent mechanism for enforcement, i.e., “serious criminal sanctions,” see majority at 466, 896 P.2d at 922, I find it significant, as the Supreme Court did in Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 88 S.Ct. 2096, 20 L.Ed.2d 1166 (1968) with respect to the FCA, that no one has been charged or prosecuted under the PCA since its enactment in 1866. Clearly, the only existing “deterrent” is not much of deterrent at all.9
III.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in the majority’s holding that the evidence obtained in violation of the PCA in the instant case must be suppressed on adequate and independent state grounds via the Hawai'i exclusionary rule. As discussed supra, I write separately only to emphasize why I believe that the PCA warrants applying an exception to the general rule that in order to derive the benefits of our state counterpart to the federal exclusionary rule, a defendant must demonstrate a violation of his or her constitutional rights.

. For example, our country's resistance to any military intrusion into civilian affairs “found early expression ... in the Third Amendment's explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers in private homes without consent and in the constitutional provisions for civilian control of the military.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15-16, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 2326-27, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972).

. Until the passage of the PCA in 1878, the improper use of troops in Southern states included, inter alia, aiding in the execution of local laws, controlling striking workers, and collecting taxes. Meeks, supra, at 89-92.

. In a 5-4 decision, a majority of the Court held that a justiciable controversy did not exist because the plaintiffs lacked standing.

.The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Army maintained files on membership, ideology, programs, and practices of virtually every activist political group in the country, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 24-25, 92 S.Ct. at 2330-31. It also alleged that the Army used undercover agents to infiltrate these civilian groups and to reach into confidential files of students and other groups. Id. at 25, 92 S.Ct. at 2331. The Army allegedly then distributed the information it collected from the agents, as well as data collected from using various forms of electronic surveillance, to state federal and local governmental officials. Id.

. Martial law "[e]xists when military authorities carry on government or exercise various degrees of control over civilians or civilian authorities in domestic territory." Black’s Law Dictionary 974 (6th ed. 1990).

. One of the petitioners, Harry E. White, was charged with embezzling stock more than eight months after the Pearl Harbor attack. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 309, 66 S.Ct. at 608-09. The other, Lloyd C. Duncan, was charged with assault more than two years after the Pearl Harbor attack. Id. at 310, 66 S.Ct. at 609.

. Justice Murphy concurred in the Court’s decision. In his concurring opinion he forcefully stated:
Abhorrence of military rule is ingrained in our form of government. Those who founded this nation ... shed their blood to win independence from a ruler who they alleged was attempting to render the 'Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.’ ... In the earliest state constitutions they inserted definite provisions placing the military under ‘strict subordination' to the civil power at all times and in all cases. And in framing the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution they were careful to make sure that the power to punish would rest primarily with civil authorities at all times.... This supremacy of the civil over the military is one of our great heritages. It has made possible the attainment of a high degree of liberty regulated by law rather than caprice. Our duty is to give effect to that heritage at all times, that it may be handed down untarnished to future generations.
*473Duncan, 327 U.S. at 324, 66 S.Ct. at 616 (Murphy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

. I find it ironic that several courts, including the majority, that have found violations of the PCA or similar provisions, have concluded that there has not been "widespread or repeated” violations. However, because I see no need to wait for widespread and repeated violations, the point is irrelevant.

. Moreover, as the majority recognizes, another rationale behind our exclusionary rule, i.e., the imperative of judicial integrity, is also served in this case. Indeed, " '[njothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, disregard the charter of its own existence." State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 264, 492 P.2d 657, 663 (1971) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). And, as the Supreme Court stated in Lee v. Florida, supra, "no court, state or federal, may serve as an accomplice in the willful transgression of 'the Laws of the United States,’ Laws by which ‘the Judges in every State [are] bound....” Id. 392 U.S. at 386, 88 S.Ct. at 2101 (citing Art. VI, U.S. Const.). While, in my view, this principle must be exercised with caution, the instant case represents an appropriate circumstance for its invocation.