Court Opinion

ID: 9623684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:40:11.963116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:33.538248
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
An order revoking probation and reinstating a previously suspended term of imprisonment constitutes the imposition of a criminal sentence. Gilligan v. State, 560 P.2d 17, 19 (Alaska 1977). Consequently, in revoking probation in this case, the superior court was under an obligation to accord Hernandez the same procedural safeguards to which Hernandez was entitled at his original sentencing hearing. Under Criminal Rule 32(d), preparation of a pre-sentence report was required for use by the sentencing court. Dodd v. State, 686 P.2d 737 (Alaska App.1984). Additionally, in determining the amount of suspended time to reinstate, the court was required to consider and apply the Chaney sentencing criteria.1 Gilligan v. State, 560 P.2d at 19. And Hernandez was entitled to a full explanation of his sentence. See Houston v. State, 648 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Alaska App.1982).
I am unable to conclude that the superior court’s failure to order preparation of an updated presentence report constitutes harmless error in this case.2 Without knowing what relevant information an updated presentence report might have revealed, it is difficult for me to conclude that preparation of a report would not have affected the superior court’s consideration and application of the Chaney criteria.3
I am further unable to conclude that the sentencing court appropriately considered the Chaney sentencing criteria prior to imposing Hernandez’ felony sentence or that the court adequately explained Hernandez’ sentence in light of those criteria. After independently reviewing the sentencing record, I am simply not convinced that the sentencing court believed the Chaney criteria even to be applicable to Hernandez’ probation revocation proceedings.
Under the circumstances, I believe the appropriate course for this court would be to remand Hernandez’ case for preparation of a presentence report and for resentenc-ing on the felony count. In all other respects, I concur in the court’s decision of this case.

. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970).

. The majority decision emphasizes that preparation of a presentence report was not requested by Hernandez. However, unlike the adversary setting of a trial, where guilt is at issue, a sentencing hearing is a proceeding in which paramount importance must be placed on the court’s need to obtain all relevant and reliable information concerning the defendant. See Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1202 (Alaska 1983). Accordingly, in my view, preparation of a pre-sentence report is not the type of procedural right that a defendant can waive for tactical purposes. Thus, I do not consider the absence of a request in this case to be determinative, even assuming the decision to forego preparation of a report was a tactical one. Moreover, my review of the record discloses no reason to believe that the absence of a request in this case was tactical and not simply an oversight.

.A substantial period of time had elapsed since Hernandez was originally sentenced, and he had apparently undergone significant changes in his life since that time. In any event, it appears from the record that the sentencing court did not have an opportunity to review the original presentence report fully prior to ordering Hernandez reincarcerated. Significantly, the court elected to reject the verbal recommendations of Hernandez’ probation officer, who recommended a sentence of six months’ imprisonment for the probation revocation.