Court Opinion

ID: 9939541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:26.780765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:24.403677
License: Public Domain

J-S35032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.G.-M., A               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: O.G., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 830 MDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered May 1, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Orphans’ Court at
                              No(s): 2023-01

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2024

       O.G. (“Father”) appeals from the May 1, 2023 order of the orphans’

court terminating his parental rights to A.G.-M., born in December 2018

(“Child” or “Minor Child”). After careful review, we affirm.

       Child first came into custody of Lebanon County Children and Youth

Services (the “Agency”) on September 8, 2020 when A.M. (“Mother”) was

suspected of being under the influence of controlled substances while caring

for Child. At that time, Father was incarcerated in New York state. Mother

was arrested and charged, inter alia, with endangering the welfare of a child

as a result of the September 8, 2020 incident.            Child was adjudicated

dependent on October 5, 2020, and has remained in the same, pre-adoptive

foster home for the duration of this case.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S35032-23

       The Agency filed the petition to involuntarily terminate Father and

Mother’s parental rights on January 25, 2023, raising grounds for termination

under Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act.1         23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b). Hearings were held on the petition

on February 6, April 3, April 17, and May 1, 2023.          At the hearings, the

following witnesses testified: the Agency caseworker; a psychologist who

conducted a parenting capacity assessment of Mother; a special education

teacher who conducts weekly sessions with Child; Child’s pre-kindergarten

instructor; a parent educator who worked with Mother; Child’s foster mother;

Father; Father’s cousin; and Mother.

       The orphans’ court summarized the evidence presented at the

termination hearings that is relevant to this appeal:

       Minor Child is a four-year- old child who . . . has special needs due
       to autism. [Exhibit 3; ]N.T., 2/6/23[], at 24, 29, 37, 71; []N.T.,
       4/3/23[], at 32. Father is the natural father of Minor Child and is
       a forty-eight-year-old man []. Exhibit 3. []Mother[] is the natural
       mother of Minor Child and is a thirty-two-year-old woman [].
       Exhibit 3; []N.T., 5/1/23[], at 5. . . .

       . . . [At the review hearings held on March 10, August 5, and
       December 20, 2021 and July 25, 2022, it was reported that]
       Father had moderate compliance with his goals. N.T., 2/6/23, at
       60[, 62]. Father [was] incarcerated [at the time of the first
       termination hearing]. N.T., 2/6/23, at 62. [In the period between
____________________________________________

1 Child was represented by legal interests counsel, as well as a separate
guardian ad litem (“GAL”), in the termination proceedings. See In re
Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020) (holding that appellate
courts should engage in sua sponte review to determine if orphans’ court
appointed legal interest counsel to represent children in contested termination
proceedings).

                                           -2-
J-S35032-23

     the first and second hearing, Father was deported to El Salvador.
     N.T., 4/3/23, at 107; N.T., 4/17/23, at 28, 48.]

     . . . Father had the following twelve goals [established by the
     Agency to achieve reunification with Child]:

        1. Will cooperate      with   the   Agency   and   follow   all
        recommendations.

        2. Will sign all necessary documentation required by the
        Agency, including releases.

        3. Will inform the Agency of any address, phone number, or
        household member change within twenty-four hours of the
        change.

        4. Will pay child support as directed by the Domestic
        Relations Office.

        5. Will obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow all
        recommendations.

        6. Will participate in a mental health evaluation and follow
        all recommendations.

        7 Will cooperate with mental health service providers and
        participate in all sessions of recommended services until
        successfully discharged.

        8. Will participate in an Agency approved parenting program
        until successful completion and follow all recommendations.

        9. Will maintain a life free from crime.

        10. Will visit regularly with Minor Child.

        11. Participate in Minor Child’s services (occupational
        therapy, speech therapy, individual therapy, IBHS) through
        all providers (PA Counseling, IU13, etc.).

        12. Participate in parenting course/education for parents of
        children with autism.

     Exhibit 3; Exhibit 13[; N.T., 2/6/23, at 72; N.T., 4/3/23, at 115].

     . . . Father did make progress on completing his goals . . . N.T.,
     2/6/23, at 60, 62[]. Father’s ability to complete his goals was
     hindered by his incarceration and subsequent deportation. Exhibit
     6, 11; N.T., 2/6/23, at 73. Father is trying to return to the United

                                      -3-
J-S35032-23

     States [via a “U Visa,” which is offered when an individual is a
     victim of a crime in the United States]. N.T., 4/17/23, at 28-29.
     [The alleged crime that would support the visa application
     occurred while Father was incarcerated in the federal detention
     facility. N.T., 4/17/23, at 29. According to Father, the visa
     application is currently under investigation, and he could return to
     the United States within one year of the date of his testimony. Id.
     at 28-29, 47-48.]

     Father was moderate in following recommendations by the
     Agency. However, the Agency notably did have issues with
     getting Father to even agree to have Minor Child receive a haircut,
     and a court order became necessary. N.T., 2/6/23, at 61[; N.T.
     4/17/23, at 55-61]. Father [has provided the] Agency [with
     requested information] sometimes but not other times. N.T.,
     4/3/23, at 107-08, 116, 124-25; N.T., 2/6/23, at 73. Father
     offered some kinship options which the Agency explored. N.T.,
     2/6/23, at 58-59. Unfortunately, the kinship options were not
     sufficient or appropriate. []N.T., 4/3/23, at 108-10; N.T., 2/6/23,
     at 82-84.

     While incarcerated, Father did not complete and was not able to
     undergo drug and alcohol evaluation because he was out of state
     and did not have any drugs in his system when he was arrested.
     N.T., 2/6/23, at 73-74, 79-80. Father has a history of drug-
     related offenses. N.T., 2/6/23, at 79. Additionally, Father was
     unable to complete a parenting class because, even though he put
     in a request, there was no parenting program at the facility. N.T.
     4/17/23, at 34; N.T., 2/6/23, at 74. Father has not been able to
     participate in any sort of services for Minor Child’s autism due to
     his incarceration. N.T., 4/17/23, at 36[-37]; N.T., 2/6/23, at 75.
     Father has not been able to participate in any sort of parenting
     classes due to his incarceration. N.T., 2/6/23, at 75. Father was
     incarcerated since Minor Child was about two months old. N.T.,
     2/6/23, at 74.

     Conversely, Father completed a mental health evaluation and
     followed the recommendations provided. N.T., 2/6/23, at 74.
     Father also completed anger management at the correctional
     facility in 2019. N.T., 2/6/23, at 74. Father participated in
     vocational training while incarcerated. N.T., 4/17/23, at 34.
     Father seemed interested in Minor Child’s autism and about
     services for it. N.T., 2/6/23, at 76. Father contacted the Agency
     about Minor Child’s medical issues regarding his autism; Father
     was concerned perhaps he was not in the right services. N.T.,

                                    -4-
J-S35032-23

     2/6/23, at 78-79. Father was concerned about Minor Child
     receiving proper care and services because he wants what is best
     for his son. N.T., 4/17/23, at 12-13. Father was interested in
     ensuring Minor Child’s special needs were being addressed. N.T.,
     4/3/23, at 126.

     The Agency communicated with Father about his goals over the
     phone.     N.T., 2/6/23, at 76.       Father received the Child
     Permanency Plan from the Agency. N.T., 4/17/23, at 50. While
     the Agency provided Mother with services, there was not really
     much the Agency could put into place to help Father due to his
     incarceration out of state. []N.T., 2/6/23, at 76. In the last six
     months prior to the filing of the petition, from July of 2022 to
     January of 2023, all Father could really do was make phone calls
     with Minor Child. N.T., 2/6/23, at [77-]78.

     Lastly, Father’s visitation was through phone calls[ or video calls
     facilitated by the Agency, once or twice per] week. N.T., 4/3/23,
     at 75[, 114]; N.T., 2/6/23, at 68, 74[; N.T., 4/17/23, at 29].
     Father asked for more calls. N.T., 4/17/23, at 29. There were
     some phone calls that went well. N.T., 4/3/23, at 92. Father
     seemed to speak appropriately to Minor Child about Minor Child’s
     interests. N.T., 4/3/23, at 92. Father seemed to be interested in
     Minor Child’s well-being. N.T., 4/3/23, at 92. Father would ask
     Minor Child how he was, what he ate, about school, about friends
     and favorite toys, and about family during calls. N.T., 4/17/23,
     at 37[-38]. However, sometimes Minor Child did not engage much
     with Father throughout unless significantly prompted; Minor Child
     preferred to play with his toys and to see his foster mom. N.T.,
     4/3/23, at 115.

     Many calls did not go well, and Minor Child would wait about one
     or two minutes and then run to the other end of the room to do
     something else. N.T., 4/17/23, at 52; N.T., 2/6/23, at 75. The
     Agency would put the phone on speaker and try to encourage
     Minor Child to speak with Father. N.T., 2/6/23, at 75. If Father
     asked anything, Minor Child would yell “stop[.”] N.T., 2/6/23, at
     75. Minor Child did not seem to have a clue who was on the
     phone. N.T., 2/6/23, at 75. Father refers to himself as “Papa[,”]
     but Minor Child refers to Father [by his first name] if he uses a
     name at all. N.T., 2/6/23, at 75. Minor Child would also
     sometimes press a red hang-up button because he did not want
     to talk. N.T., 4/17/23, at 52; N.T., 4/3/23, at 75. He also would
     sometimes throw the cellphone into another room and state he
     did not want to talk. N.T., 4/3/23, at 75. Minor Child has hidden

                                    -5-
J-S35032-23

     under the kitchen table yelling stop. N.T., 4/3/23, at 75. He also
     put the cellphone underneath a couch cushion while Father was
     talking to him. N.T., 4/3/23, at 75. Additionally, sometimes Minor
     Child would simply sit there and just not talk. N.T., 4/17/23, at
     52; N.T., 4/3/23, at 75.

     This Court notes that Minor Child is “potty-trained.” N.T., 4/3/23,
     at 37, 76. However, Minor Child [would] “go to the bathroom”
     upon himself before, during, and after visitation but not at other
     times, and Minor Child will not nap after visits. N.T., 5/1/23, at
     39-41[]; N.T., 4/17/23, at 51-52; N.T., 4/3/23, at 37-38, 78[].
     Additionally, Minor Child acted poorly and somewhat violently at
     pre-kindergarten after having visitation. Exhibit 8; Exhibit 14;
     N.T., 4/3/23, at 34-36. Minor Child also had poor behavior prior
     to visits if he knew about them. N.T., 4/3/23, at 52. Minor Child’s
     poor behavior related to visits has gotten worse with time. N.T.,
     4/3/23, at 41. While Minor Child has exhibited some poor
     behavior on days without visitation as well, the “potty” issues were
     more closely related than the poor behavior to visits. N.T.,
     4/3/23, at 49-51. Notably, when Minor Child attends other
     appointments and returns to pre-kindergarten, he does not exhibit
     the poor behavior like he does after visits. N.T., 4/3/23, at 53.
     Lastly, Minor Child has had trouble sleeping and clings to foster
     mom for comfort to fall asleep. Exhibit 9; N.T., 4/3/23, at 79-80.
     It seems that Father and Mother talking about taking Minor Child
     to California during visitation appears to have triggered his
     behavior. N.T., 4/3/23, at 88. This Court also notes that Father
     has a negative relationship, if any, with foster mom. N.T., 4/3/23,
     at 84. Phone calls with Father went from being in the foster home
     to the courthouse because Father was being very disrespectful.
     N.T., 4/3/23, at 74-75, 85-86.

     Father feels like he has a bond with Minor Child. N.T., 4/17/23,
     at 40. Father desires to be with his son. N.T., 4/17/23, at 44.
     Father sent some gifts while he was incarcerated. N.T., 4/17/23,
     at 36. Father gave Minor Child a “Transformer” toy for a
     Christmas gift. N.T., 4/3/23, at 125; N.T., 2/6/23, at 78. Father
     sent a picture that he drew for Minor Child. N.T., 2/6/23, at 59.
     Minor Child knows when the gifts are from Father. N.T., 4/3/23,
     at 96. Minor Child sometimes wears gifts from Father and seems
     to appreciate the multiple gifts Father provided. N.T., 4/3/23, at
     95-96. Minor Child has also provided some return gifts to Father.
     N.T., 4/3/23, at 96. . . . [Notwithstanding Father’s efforts], the
     Agency caseworker testified that Minor Child does not have bond
     with Father. N.T., 2/6/23, at 79. [] The Agency caseworker also

                                    -6-
J-S35032-23

     testified that it would be in the best interest of Minor Child to
     terminate Father’s parental rights. N.T., 2/6/23, at 84.

     Conversely, Minor Child has a very strong and positive bond with
     the foster family. N.T., 4/3/23, at 54-55. [Child has been in the
     same foster home for his entire time in placement. N.T., 2/6/23,
     at 57.] Minor Child calls the foster mother “Mom[,”] the foster
     father “Dad[,”] Father [by his first name], and Mother “Mommy
     A[____,” using her first name]. N.T., 4/3/23, at 84; N.T., 2/6/23,
     at 84. Minor Child needs permanency and has been with the foster
     family his whole time in placement and longer than his biological
     family. []N.T., 2/6/23, at [] 57. Minor Child shares a room with
     another foster child at his foster home. N.T., 2/6/23, at 84. He
     is very comfortable there. N.T., 2/6/23, at 84. The foster family
     provides stability and permanency for him. N.T., 2/6/23, at 84.

     The foster mother participated in Minor Child’s special education
     with him and his teacher[]. N.T., 4/3/23, at 5, 13. The foster
     family followed a recommendation to use the same reward system
     at home that the daycare uses to help address Minor Child’s
     needs. N.T., 4/3/23, at 8, 73-74. Minor Child is also typically
     very happy with the pre-kindergarten, and he loves to play with
     his friends and to interact. N.T., 4/3/23, at 31. He loves to help,
     is very energetic, and tries new things. N.T., 4/3/23, at 31-32.

     The foster family is an adoptive resource for Minor Child. N.T.,
     4/3/23, at 83. The foster family would like to keep Mother
     involved in Minor Child’s life. N.T., 5/1/23, at 52. Additionally,
     the foster mother stated that, if they adopt[] Minor Child, then
     they would continue to have contact with Father and Mother,
     especially Mother[,] as long as it was in Minor Child’s best interest.
     N.T., 4/3/23, at 84-85.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/21/23, at 3-10.

     On May 1, 2023, the orphans’ court entered an order involuntarily

terminating both Father and Mother’s parental rights. Father filed a timely

notice of appeal and concurrently filed a concise statement of errors

                                     -7-
J-S35032-23

complained of on appeal, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).2 On July 21,

2023, the orphans’ court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), in

which the court stated that the Agency had established grounds for

termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) and (2) and

under subsection (b).

       Father presents the following issues for our review: “Did the Court err

in involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Appellant, Father?” Father’s

Brief at 2. While Father only raises one appellate issue, he challenges the

orphans’ court’s determination that termination of his parental rights was

appropriate under subsections (a) and (b) of Section 2511.

       We conduct our review in light of the following:

       The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
       requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
       credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
       by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
       courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
       or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
       of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
       unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
       court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
       the record would support a different result. We have previously
       emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
       observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In the Interest of J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)).

____________________________________________

2 Mother did not appeal from the May 1, 2023 termination order.         Orphans’
Court Opinion, 7/21/23, at 3-4.

                                           -8-
J-S35032-23

       The burden is on the petitioner in the lower court to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of

parental rights are valid. In the Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 522 (Pa.

Super. 2021).    The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as

“testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

       Under Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, the orphans’ court must first

determine whether the particular conduct of a parent warrants involuntary

termination of their parental rights under any one of the eleven grounds

enumerated in subsection (a). 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11); T.S.M., 71 A.3d

at 267; In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021).            If the

orphans’ court determines that the petitioner established grounds for

termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court

then must proceed to assess the petition under subsection (b), which focuses

on the child’s needs and welfare. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); T.S.M., 71 A.3d at

267.

       Here, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to

Sections 2511(a)(1) and (2), and subsection (b). However, this Court may

affirm the court’s decision to terminate if we agree with its determination

concerning any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b).

See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We focus

our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

                                      -9-
J-S35032-23

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         *        *             *

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

         *        *             *

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. . . .

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the moving party must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that there is (1) repeated and continued incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence;

and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 600 (Pa.

2021).

      [S]ubsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a parent’s refusal or
      failure to perform parental duties, but instead emphasizes the
      child’s present and future need for essential parental care,
      control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
      being. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be
      read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home
      and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy of restraint

                                     - 10 -
J-S35032-23

      in state intervention is intended to protect. This is particularly so
      where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is
      no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and emphasis

omitted).

      The grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) are not limited

to affirmative misconduct but also include parental incapacity that cannot be

remedied. In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021).

“Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt

assumption of full parental duties.” Id. “[W]hen a parent has demonstrated

a continued inability to conduct his . . . life in a fashion that would provide a

safe environment for a child, whether that child is living with the parent or

not, and the behavior of the parent is irremediable as supported by clear and

competent evidence, the termination of parental rights is justified.” Z.P., 994

A.2d at 1118 (citation omitted).

      In its opinion, the orphans’ court stated that, despite Child having been

in placement for approximately 32 months as of the date of the last

termination hearing and the Agency having devoted substantial resources to

assist Father, he had only made moderate progress towards completing the

case goals put forth by the Agency. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/21/23, at 16,

18. The court noted that “a lot of important goals remained incomplete,” and

that Father “refused to put in the effort necessary to comply with the goals

and recommendations.” Id. at 16, 18-19. The court expressed its “biggest

concern” with Father’s inability to effectively conduct visitation with Child,

                                     - 11 -
J-S35032-23

resulting in Child’s avoidance of Father during video or telephonic visits and

poor behavior before and after the visits, including an inability to nap, violent

behavior in pre-kindergarten, and bathroom accidents. Id. at 16-18, 21. The

courted noted that Child’s poor behavior during visits was in part triggered by

Father’s discussion of taking Child to California for vacation. Id. at 17. The

court additionally highlighted that Father refused to consent to Child’s receipt

of a haircut, which required hearings and a court order to ultimately procure

the haircut, and the fact that Father did not consistently keep the Agency

informed of his status and whereabouts. Id. at 17-18.

      The court observed that Father’s incapacity was based in large part upon

his incarceration, which “inhibited his ability to parent and to complete” the

goals set out by the Agency. Id. at 18. Nevertheless, the court noted that

“Father’s incarceration was his own fault,” and “Father was not able to have

appropriate visitation when given the chance” during his period of

imprisonment.     Id.   The court additionally stated that Father’s recent

deportation will mean that Father will continue to be unable to provide Child

with ongoing essential parental care, control, and subsistence. Id. at 18.

      In this Court, Father argues that the Agency did not raise Section

2511(a)(2) as grounds for termination in the termination petition and instead

the Agency only proceeded under Section 2511(a)(1), (5), and (8). Father’s

Brief at 3, 10-12. As the orphans’ court determined that the Agency did not

meet its burden under subsections (a)(5) and (8), Orphans’ Court Opinion,

7/21/23, at 15, Father contends that the court could only proceed under

                                     - 12 -
J-S35032-23

subsection (a)(1) and the purported grounding in the decision to terminate on

subsection (a)(2) was in error. Father’s Brief at 10-12. Father accordingly

solely addresses whether termination was appropriate under subsections

(a)(1) and (b). Id. at 10-11.

      We disagree with Father that the Agency did not raise subsection (a)(2)

as grounds for termination.     While the Agency in the termination petition

imprecisely located the discussion of subsection (a)(2) as a sub-paragraph

within the discussion more broadly applicable to subsections (a)(5) and (8),

Termination   Petition,   1/25/23,   ¶¶18,    18(h),   the   citation   to   Section

2511(a)(2), as well as the required proof under that subsection, are clearly

set forth in the petition. Id. ¶18(h). We further note that Father has not

raised any argument that he was deprived of the opportunity to present

evidence or to respond to the Agency’s evidence at the hearings based upon

his claim that subsection (a)(2) was not a valid basis for termination. Instead,

Father simply ignores the relevant language in the termination petition

concerning subsection (a)(2), as well as any discussion of the orphans’ court’s

analysis on this issue and focuses his entire Section 2511(a) argument on

subsection (a)(1).   After our close reading of the text of the termination

petition, we decline to do the same.

      Turning to the question of whether the Agency presented sufficient

evidence to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s parental

rights to Child should be involuntarily terminated under Section 2511(a)(2),

we conclude that the Agency has met its exacting burden in this case. The

                                     - 13 -
J-S35032-23

record supports the Agency’s conclusion that Father was not able to satisfy

many of the goals established by the Agency, such as a drug and alcohol

evaluation and parenting classes, based in large part upon Father’s

incarceration outside of Pennsylvania for the majority of the pendency of this

case. While Father readily participated in telephonic or video visitation that

the Agency arranged, these visits were generally not beneficial for Child. Child

often failed to communicate with Father during the calls, either ignoring him

entirely, running out of the room and hiding from the phone, or hanging up

on Father. Child also engaged in violent behavior directly before or after visits,

his sleep schedule was disturbed by the visits, and he often went to the

bathroom on himself despite being potty trained. Father’s behavior had other

negative effects on Child, such as when he refused to consent to have Child’s

long hair cut, despite the discomfort this caused Child as a result of his sensory

issues. N.T., 2/6/23, at 61; N.T. 4/17/23, at 55-61.

      The record additionally supports the orphans’ court’s finding that the

principal contributor to Father’s incapacity to provide Child with essential

parental care was based upon Father’s incarceration, notwithstanding Father’s

clear interest in Child’s well-being. Father was initially arrested in February

2019—two months after Child’s birth and seven months before Child was

removed from the home—and he remained in detention in New York state

correctional facilities and in an immigration facility until he was deported in

March 2023. N.T., 2/6/23, at 62, 73; N.T., 4/3/23, at 107; N.T., 4/17/23, at

30, 46.

                                     - 14 -
J-S35032-23

      While the fact of a parent’s incarceration by itself is insufficient to

support termination under Section 2511, this Court has explained that

“incarceration will certainly impact a parent’s capability of performing parental

duties[] and may render a parent incapable of performing parental duties

under subsection (a)(2).” In the Interest of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474

(Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also In re A.D., 93 A.3d

888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014).           Our Supreme Court has stated that

“incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court’s

conclusion that grounds for termination exist under [Section] 2511(a)(2)

where the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration

has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or

subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be

remedied.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012); see also

In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 677 (Pa. 2014). “Each case of an incarcerated

parent facing termination must be analyzed on its own facts, keeping in mind

. . . that the child’s need for consistent parental care and stability cannot be

put aside or put on hold.” K.M.W., 238 A.3d at 474 (citation omitted).

      Father’s incarceration during this case led to him being unable to

complete various Agency goals, including attending parenting classes and

complete a drug and alcohol evaluation, and also precluded Father from

visiting Child in person or attending his medical or educational appointments.

Effectively, Father’s only opportunity to provide Child with essential parental

care and stability was through the telephone and video visits, which, as

                                     - 15 -
J-S35032-23

described above, often had negative affects that outweighed any positives.

Therefore, we conclude that the orphans’ court properly considered Father’s

incarceration as a significant factor in Father’s incapacity to provide Child with

essential parental care under Section 2511 (a)(2). See S.P., 47 A.3d at 831

(holding that trial court appropriately found that a parent’s incarceration since

prior to the child’s birth and throughout the duration of the case caused the

child to be without essential care, control, or subsistence).

      While Father is no longer incarcerated, he now faces an additional

obstacle to his ability to parent Child based upon his deportation to El Salvador

in March 2023. N.T., 4/3/23, at 107; N.T., 4/17/23, at 28. We are aware of

no published case law addressing a parent’s deportation from the United

States as a cause of parental incapacity under subsection (a)(2). However,

where a term of incarceration extends beyond the date of the termination

hearing, our Supreme Court has held that “the length of the remaining

confinement can be considered as highly relevant to whether ‘the conditions

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be

remedied by the parent,’ sufficient to provide grounds for termination

pursuant to [Section] 2511(a)(2).” S.P., 47 A.3d at 830 (quoting 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(2)); see also D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 677.             In S.P., the Court

determined that the trial court properly found that the uncertainty of the

parent’s parole date and the fact that he would be required to reside in a half-

way house and subsequently complete various required agency services

demonstrated that the causes of the parental incapacity could not be remedied

                                     - 16 -
J-S35032-23

under subsection (a)(2). 47 A.3d at 831. In D.C.D., the Court concluded that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that an incarcerated

parent was incapable of curing his incapacity as a parent when his minimum

release date was not until five years beyond the date of the termination

hearing. 105 A.3d at 677. Similarly, this Court held that a parent subject to

an out-of-state no-contact order banning contact with the subject child based

upon probable prior abuse is analogous to long-term imprisonment for the

purpose of determining parental incapacity under Section 2511(a)(2) and that

the “causes of [the parent’s] parenting incapacity cannot be remedied as long

as the no-contact order remains in place.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 896-97

(Pa. Super. 2014).

      We conclude that Father’s deportation to El Salvador is also analogous

to an indefinite term of imprisonment as he is prevented from having any in-

person contact with Child in the United States and therefore Father cannot

provide the essential parental care, control, and subsistence that Child

requires. As in D.C.D., S.P. and A.D., Father’s indefinite ban from returning

to the United States as a result of his deportation results in him being unable

to remedy his incapacity as a parent. D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 677; S.P., 47 A.3d

at 431; A.D., 93 A.3d at 896-97. While Father testified that he has applied

for a “U-Visa” to return to the United States based upon his status as a victim

of a crime in this country and that the visa could be granted within as little

as one year, N.T., 4/17/23, at 28-29, 47-48, Father’s hope to reenter the

United States on the U-Visa and be an available resource for Child is

                                     - 17 -
J-S35032-23

“speculative at best,” and he is no better a situation than a prisoner facing a

lengthy sentence with no definitive prospect for an imminent release. S.P.,

47 A.3d at 430-31 (citation omitted). We may not “subordinate indefinitely

[C]hild’s need for permanence and stability” based upon Father’s “hope for

the future” of a potential reentry to the United States and reunification with

Child. In the Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 983 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted); see also K.M.W., 238 A.3d at 474 (“Parental rights are not

preserved by waiting for a more suitable [] time to perform one’s parental

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and

emotional needs.”) (citation omitted).

      Accordingly, we find that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion

in concluding that Father had a continuing incapacity to provide Child with

essential care, control, and subsistence and that this incapacity could not be

remedied. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 600. As the Agency

demonstrated an adequate ground for termination under Section 2511(a)(2),

we must proceed to address whether the lower court properly found that

termination was warranted under Section 2511(b), which requires the court

to “give primary consideration to the development, physical and emotional

needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).       As under Section

2511(a), the party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that termination best serves the child’s needs and welfare pursuant

to subsection (b). In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105, 1114 (Pa.

2023).

                                    - 18 -
J-S35032-23

      “The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly

interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and

stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and quotation marks omitted);

see also K.T., 296 A.3d at 1106. “Notably, courts should consider the matter

from the child's perspective, placing her developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” K.T., 296 A.3d

at 1105.

      Beginning with In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), our Supreme Court

has consistently mandated that any Section 2511(b) analysis “requires

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.” T.S.M.,

71 A.3d at 267. Specifically, “[c]ourts must determine whether the trauma

caused by breaking [the parent-child] bond is outweighed by the benefit of

moving the child toward a permanent home.” Id. at 253 (cleaned up). The

recognized threshold for this required bond inquiry is whether termination will

sever a “necessary and beneficial relationship,” causing the child to suffer

“‘extreme emotional consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” K.T.,

296 A.3d at 1109-10 (quoting E.M., 620 A.2d at 484). “However, in cases

where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is

reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d

439, 445 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). “Accordingly, the extent of the

bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the

particular case.” Id. (citation omitted).

                                    - 19 -
J-S35032-23

        “[A] court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and welfare analysis

must consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from

severance of the parental bond.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. Our Supreme Court

has explained that the court should consider, as appropriate, the child’s need

for permanency and length of time in foster care, the child’s placement in a

pre-adoptive home and whether there is a bond with the foster parents, and

whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs. Id. Nonetheless, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors

that must be considered by an orphans’ court in this context. Id. at 1113

n.28.

        Father argues that the orphans’ court erred in its analysis under Section

2511(b), contending that he has a strong bond with Child as demonstrated by

Father’s testimony that Child makes drawings of him and Father together

during visits and that Child says that his natural parents are his best friends.

N.T. 4/17/23, at 41, 53. Father additionally argues the Agency should have

undertaken greater efforts to place Child with the various kinship resources

he suggested within his extended family. Finally, Father contends that the

court did not give due consideration to the fact that the Agency failed to

provide him with training on how to parent an autistic child.

        We find no cause to disturb the orphans’ court’s determination pursuant

to Section 2511(b) that termination of Father’s parental rights would best

serve the needs and welfare of Child. In its opinion, the orphans’ court found

that Father did not maintain sufficient visitation with Child in order to maintain

                                      - 20 -
J-S35032-23

the parent-child bond. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/21/23, at 19. Further, the

court determined that the visits, on the whole, were detrimental to Child’s

physical and mental well-being, as most plainly evidenced by Child’s bathroom

accidents. Id. The orphans’ court concluded that Father does not appear to

have a bond with Child, and, even if one exists, the bond is not necessary or

beneficial to Child. Id.

      The orphans’ court further determined that Child’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs were “being addressed better by the foster

parents” who are an adoptive resource for Child. Id. at 20-21. The court

explained that Child calls his foster parents “Mom” and “Dad” as opposed to

his natural parents who he called by their first names. Id. at 19-20. The

court noted that foster parents provide stability and permanency for Child

because he has been with that family during his entire time in placement—

approximately 32 months as of the date of the court’s decision—and longer

than his biological family. Id. at 20. The court stated that Child shares a

room with another foster child in his foster home and he is very comfortable

in that home.     Id.      Further, the court recognized that foster mother

participated in Child’s special education program with his teacher, Child is

happy in the school environment, and that the foster family has incorporated

the reward system used at school into Child’s home routine. Id.

      The orphans’ court’s findings with respect to Section 2511(b) are

supported by competent evidence.        Moreover, the lower court properly

addressed under our caselaw not only whether there exists a bond between

                                     - 21 -
J-S35032-23

Father and Child and the effect of severing such a bond but also Child’s

relationship with his foster parents, the duration of his placement in foster

care, and whether the foster home meets his developmental, physical, and

emotional needs.       K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113.     Father argues that he has a

positive bond with Child as shown by their interactions during the visits, yet

there is ample countervailing evidence to show that, while Father and Child

have some form of a relationship, the bond between them was minimal, if

any,3 and that Child’s behavior surrounding the visits demonstrated that the

parent-child bond was not beneficial and its severance would not harm Child.

       Father’s remaining arguments with respect to Section 2511(b) focus on

the Agency’s actions rather than the Child’s needs and welfare. K.M.W., 238

A.3d at 473 (focus under Section 2511(b) is on the interests of the child).

Nevertheless, we note that, while Father contends that the Agency should

have made greater efforts to provide him with training to parent an autistic

child, the fact remains that Father was confined in New York detention facilities

or residing in El Salvador for the duration of this case and therefore the Agency

was limited in the services it could offer. Finally, the record shows that the

Agency explored the various kinship resources that Father offered, but they

were determined to be not suitable or appropriate. N.T., 2/6/23, at 58-59,

82-84; N.T., 4/3/23, at 108-10.

____________________________________________

3 We note, in particular, that the Agency caseworker testified that Father and

Child do not share a bond. N.T., 2/6/23, at 79.

                                          - 22 -
J-S35032-23

     Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in the orphans’

court’s determination under Section 2511(b). We therefore affirm the court’s

order involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to

Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/09/2024

                                    - 23 -