Court Opinion

ID: 9716740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:49:48.80614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:48.505263
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge.
Steven Kollar was convicted by a St. Joseph Superior Court jury of five counts of theft, a class D felony,1 and one count of corrupt business influence, a class C felony.2 Kollar raises three issues on appeal:
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions?
2. Whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel?
8. Whether the trial court erred in imposing his sentence?
We affirm.
Kollar owned and operated a coin shop in LaPorte, Indiana. In 1982, Kollar established what he termed a "one percent plan," whereby customers would purchase silver which was maintained at the coin shop. In return for the use of the silver, Kollar would pay one percent (1%) interest per month to the participants of the plan. Under the terms of the plan, the silver was available for price liquidation at any marketable hour. Too, the silver could be returned to the customer at any time with proper written notice.
*938In September of 1986, four gold boxes of coins worth approximately $212,000 were stolen from Kollar's store. Despite this reversal, business continued until June of 1987, when Kollar received several bad checks at a coin show. Kollar's coin shop closed shortly thereafter. The following is a synopsis of the transactions Kollar engaged in during the lifetime of his coin business which directly led to his convictions of theft and corrupt business influence.
On February 6, 1984, Dennis Gerrard purchased 100 ounces of silver under the "one percent plan." He later purchased another 300 ounces of silver. Gerrard received his monthly interest payments until Kollar's coin shop went out of business in June of 1987. The next month, Gerrard attempted to reclaim his four hundred ounces of silver. At that time, Kollar asked Gerrard to give him several weeks to obtain the silver. Kollar later tendered excuses as to why the silver had not been obtained. Gerrard never received his silver. He later obtained a judgment in small claims court against Kollar for $3,000.00.
Jim Eggleston entered the "one percent plan" in 1985 with a purchase of 1,470 ounces of silver. Eggleston paid $9,996.00 for the silver. In early 1986, Eggleston advised Kollar that he wanted out of the "one percent plan." After numerous delays and excuses offered by Kollar, Eggle-ston received only 200 ounces of silver. His loss was approximately $11,162.00.
On April 22, 1987, Frank Horvath paid Kollar for 12 ounces of gold and 800 oune-es of silver. Horvath received the majority of the metals, but he did not receive two ounces of gold worth approximately $930.00. Horvath later received a judgment against Kollar in small claims court.
Also in April of 1987, Dean Bixler agreed to purchase 719 ounces of silver from Kol lar. Bixler paid Kollar a total of $5,024.00 for the silver, but received only four hundred and ninety-seven (497) ounces of his silver. When Bixler requested the remaining silver, Kollar gave numerous excuses for its unavailability. Bixler later obtained a small claims judgment against Kollar for $1,864.80.
Marla and William Spies agreed to buy 738 ounces of silver from Kollar in May of 1987. The Spies' paid $5,998.40 at that time, and were told by Kollar that they could have their silver in two weeks. After two weeks had passed, Kollar informed the Spies that he was experiencing difficulty with the buyer and requested more time. The Spies later received 200 ounces of silver, but never received the remainder of their purchase. Their loss was approximately $4,000.00.
Several witnesses were presented at trial who had also participated in the "one percent plan" but had never received their principal investment. One of these witnesses had received neither his principal investment nor his interest payments. Additionally, David Henrickson, an expert in the field of coin and precious metals dealing, testified that it was neither economically feasible nor commonly accepted practice for a coin and precious metal dealer to retain precious metal and pay the customer one percent interest per month. In the expert witness' opinion, the "one percent plan" was similar to a pyramid scheme and Kollar should have "seen the writing on the wall" at least one year in advance. (Record at 258, 254.)
L.
Sufficiency
Kollar first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of five counts of theft and one count of corrupt business influence. To facilitate an orderly review of the question of whether Kollar's theft convictions are supported by sufficient evidence, we must first clarify a misconception regarding the elements of theft upon which the bulk of Kollar's arguments are premised.
"Theft" is defined as:
... knowingly or intentionally exert[ing] unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use ...
*939IC 85-48-4-2(a). Control over the property of another is "unauthorized" if it is exerted:
* * % * * *
(4) by creating or confirming a false impression in the other person; [or]
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(6) by promising performance that the person knows will not be performed;
# * # * * #
IC 85-48-4-1(b).
Kollar was charged and convicted of theft under IC 85-48-4-1(b)(6), i.e., theft "by promising performance that the person knows will not be performed." However, Kollar argues that, according to Miller v. State (1989), Ind.App., 535 N.E.2d 170, reh. denied, the State must also prove that a defendant "created or confirmed a false impression in the other person" pursuant to IC 35-48-4-1(b)(4) in order to prove theft under IC 35-48-4-1(b)(6). As Kollar correctly points out, a conviction of theft by false pretenses under IC 85-48-4-1(b)(4) requires a showing that misrepresentations as to past or present facts were made in order to gain possession of another's property. Convictions under this subparagraph cannot be premised upon misrepresentations which were promissory in nature, such as promises to repay loans. Coburn v. State (1984), Ind.App., 461 N.E.2d 1154, 1156-1157. However, we conclude that Kollar's interpretation of Miller is erroneous; proof of an offense defined under IC 35-48-4-1(b)(6) does not also require proof of the offense defined in IC 85-48-4-1(b)(4).
In Miller, we held that any specification in the charge of theft under a particular subparagraph of IC 35-48-4-1(b) is sur-plusage and cannot result in a fatal variance between the charge and the proof. We added that the various enumerated incarnations of "unauthorized control" supported this conclusion because they do not purport to be mutually exclusive. The following improvident language was used to illustrate this point and was seized upon by Kollar in forming his arguments:
For example, promising performance under (6) certainly creates a false impression under (4) that vitiates any consent under (1) and represents an exertion of control in an unintended manner under (2).
Miller, supra at 171. "Promising performance that the person knows will not be performed" under subparagraph (6) does not create a "false impression" under sub-paragraph (4), since proof of the creation of a "false impression" definitionally excludes the promise of future performance. To an extent, subparagraph (6) can be considered to "pick up'" where subparagraph (4) ends. Thus, we disregard Kollar's contentions of insufficient evidence based upon failure to prove misrepresentation of past or existing fact.
The key to the offense of theft by promising performance that the person knows will not be performed is the intent of the person when he secures control of the property. Miller, supra at 172. In order to have met its burden under this subsection, the State must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Kollar knew at the time he procured the money from his victim that his promises would not be performed. Id. On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. In sufficiency cases, we look exclusively to the evidence most favorable to the State and all inferences logically drawn therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conviction, it will be affirmed. Jewell v. State (1989), Ind., 539 N.E.2d 959, 964.
Kollar argues that the evidence does not support a conclusion that he had the intent to deprive Gerrard and Eggle-ston of their money or silver at the times their separate purchases occurred. Kollar argues that the 1% plans purchased by Gerrard and Eggleston occurred prior to the theft of the $212,000 worth of gold coins from his business, and thus that he could not have been aware at the time of the purchases that he would be unable to honor their repayment requests. However, the record shows that the gold coins were stolen in September of 1986. Eggleston *940requested the return of his silver in February of 1986, at which time Kollar told Eg-gleston that he would comply with his request. In August of 1986, after repeated phone calls and attendant excuses, Kollar produced only 200 of the 1,470 ounces of silver owed. All of this preceded the alleged financially crippling theft of the gold coins. Too, Kollar's behavior in failing to produce Eggleston's principal investment and providing numerous excuses for that failure was distinctly similar to his behavior with investors who made their purchases throughout the lifetime of his business. From this, the jury was entitled to infer that Kollar never intended to return silver purchased and placed in his keep under the 1% plan. Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Anglin v. State (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 721, 723.
Kollar argues that the remaining purchases upon which his theft charges were based occurred prior to the receipt of the bad checks which forced the close of his business in June of 1987, and thus that intent to deprive was not shown because he could not have foreseen that circumstance. Kollar also argues that the financial reversals suffered by the gold theft in 1986, which preceded the remaining purchases, did not prove a knowing intent to deprive because he had suffered a larger reversal in the past and had recovered from it completely. We are unpersuaded.
Horvath, Bixler and Spies purchased silver and gold from Kollar in April and May of 1987. The purchasers were told they would receive their silver or gold within a matter of weeks; the purchasers' attempts to recover the full amount of their purchases were met with excuses for non-payment which both preceded and post-dated the receipt of the bad checks. In fact, Spies was eventually told that her money had been used to pay for "someone else's stuff." Record at 281. Hendrickson testified that common business practice would have placed the metal with the purchasers within one week of order. He also testified that Kollar would have realized that he could not meet his commitments up to one year prior to these purchases.
The record shows that Kollar repeatedly accepted money from purchasers, promised delivery of goods within short periods of time, then lulled purchasers with excuses why delivery was not had and made fractional delivery of purchases. This pattern began prior to Kollar's initial financial reversals and continued well after he should have been aware that his business was failing. This is sufficient to support the inference that Kollar never intended to deliver the precious metals Horvath, Bixler and Spies purchased from him. These convictions are affirmed.
Kollar also argues that his convietion of corrupt business influence is unsupported by the evidence. Kollar contends that, because the evidence underlying his theft convictions is insufficient, his corrupt business influence based upon those offenses cannot stand. As we concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support the underlying offenses, this argument is a nullity. However, Kollar also argues that there nonetheless is insufficient evidence regarding a "pattern of racketeering activity" to support his conviction. We disagree.
Kollar was charged with violating West's AIC 85-45-6-2(a)(8) which reads:
A person ... who is employed by or associated with an enterprise, and who knowingly or intentionally conducts or otherwise participates in the activities of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, ... commits corrupt business influence, a Class C felony.
A "pattern of racketeering activity" means:
engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intent, result, accomplice, vie tim, or method of commission, or that are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics that are not isolated incidents....
IC 85-45-6-1. In defining "pattern of racketeering" in the context of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), after which our RICO act is patterned, the United States Supreme Court concluded that proof of the same required a showing that the racketeering predicates are related and they amount to *941or pose a threat of continued eriminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. (1989), - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 LEd.2d 195; Dellenbach v. State (1987), Ind.App., 508 N.E.2d 1309.
Kollar contends that: 1) there is no showing that the two one percent plan transactions and the three other purchases were "related"; and 2) that there was no showing of a threat of continued criminal activity since his business was closed and no transactions occurred after that closing. We disagree. A relationship is established between predicates in this case by the common thread of Kollar accepting payment for metals, promising delivery of the metals within a short period of time or on demand, and failing to deliver all or parts of the purchases. The threat of continued activity is shown by the lengthy duration of the scheme prior to closing of the coin shop and Kollar's stated intention to continue in the coin business. The State proved multiple predicate acts and a pattern of racketeering activity. The evidence is therefore sufficient to convict Kollar of corrupt business influence.
II.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Kollar secondly contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel. In order to prove this claim, Kollar must overcome a strong presumption of competence on the part of counsel. Only strong and convincing evidence will overcome this presumption. Terry v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1089. The standard for counsel's performance is that of reasonably effective assistance as measured by prevail ing professional norms. Wickliffe v. State (1988), Ind., 523 N.E.2d 1385, 1387. Isolated poor strategy, mistakes, bad tactics or inexperience do not necessarily establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Terry, supra. A successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is established when a defendant shows that his attorney's performance was deficient and that his defense was prejudiced by counsel's poor performance. Lopez v. State (1988), Ind., 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1129.
Kollar contends that trial counsel's four requests for continuances and failure to depose or interview Hendrickson prior to trial evidence a lack of preparedness which operated to the detriment of his defense. However, Kollar does not direct this court to specific instances showing that trial counsel was unprepared to try the case when it went to trial or attempt to show that a pretrial interview would have enabled trial counsel to better cross-examine Hendrickson. Kollar fails to show deficient performance on the part of trial counsel or prejudice resulting therefrom, and therefore has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel.
During the course of trial, trial counsel for Kollar was granted leave to add Robert L. Rush as an expert witness for the defense to counterpoint what proved to be unfavorable expert testimony by State's witness Hendrickson. Rush was present to testify on the second day of trial, but he was not called before trial recessed. Rush was not subpoenaed to appear the following day and in fact did not appear. No other expert testimony was offered by the defense.
Kollar claims ineffective assistance of counsel in trial counsel's failure to subpoena Rush. Kollar argues that Rush would have contradicted Hendrickson's testimony concerning customary practices in the coin and precious metal business and thus provide support for Kollar's position that the losses suffered by his clients were due to poor business judgment rather than an intent to steal.
The substance of the proffer Kollar made at trial was that Rush would testify that contrary to Hendrickson's position, some dealers retain precious metal belonging to others and pay interest thereon. Kollar also stated that Rush would testify that Hendrickson himself had lent precious metal to other people and charged interest. However, Hendrickson himself admitted on cross-examination that, while the one percent plan was not commonly accepted business practice, it was economically feasible where consistently high volume business *942occurred. We cannot conclude that Rush's testimony would have added significantly to this revelation. In addition, practice of offering the one-percent plan itself was not on trial. Rather, it was the manner in which Kollar utilized the metals placed in his possession under this plan which resulted in several of his theft convictions. There is nothing to suggest that Rush would testify that it was common business practice to offer a "one percent" plan to customers and then fail to return their silver pursuant to the terms of the agreement. In order to ascertain whether trial counsel's performance was deficient, we must look to the totality of the evidence to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the outcome would have been different. Messer v. State (1987), Ind.App., 509 N.E.2d 249, 253, reh. denied, trans. denied. In light of the evidence previously summarized, we cannot conclude that Rush's testimony would have altered the jury's conclusion that at the time Kollar {entered into the questioned transactions, he did not intend to return the silver to its rightful owners.
TIL.
Sentencing
Finally, Kollar contends that the trial court erred in imposing sentence by: 1) failing to consider certain mitigating circumstances; 2) considering several improper aggravating cireumstances; 3) imposing an unreasonable and excessive term of imprisonment; and 4) ordering restitution without entering requisite findings. We affirm Kollar's sentence with regard to his first three allegations of error but remand for entry of findings regarding Kollar's ability to pay restitution and establishment of the manner of performance.
In addressing claims regarding the propriety of a sentence, we are bound by the standard of review set forth in Indiana Rules for Appellate Procedure, Rule 17(B) which states:
(1) The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized by statute except where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
(2) A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate to the particular offense and offender for which such sentence was imposed.
The trial judge identified the following aggravating and mitigating circumstances in pronouncing sentence:
The Court has considered matters in aggravation and mitigation and finds that the defendant is a young person, there was no physical violence. These are matters in mitigation. However, the Court finds that the defendant participated in a long enduring scheme to defraud portions of the public who were comprised of persons who were investing typically their savings toward their future or the future of their children and the Court finds the particular scheme involved which preyed on the saving investments of these persons is a matter in aggravation. Moreover, the Court finds that the defendant's pattern of lulling victims while encouraging other new vie-tims is a matter in aggravation. The Court finds further that the amounts of losses suffered particularly by Mr. Eg-gleston, Mr. Bixler and the Spees [sic] are significant amounts and together with the timing of the losses that was occasioned by the defendant, are matters in aggravation. The Court finds that the matters in aggravation outweigh the matters in mitigation.
Record at 112-118. In complex form, simplified for our purposes, the trial court then sentenced Kollar to: the presumptive term of five years enhanced by three years for aggravating cireumstances for corrupt business influence; the presumptive two years for his Count II theft conviction to be served concurrently with his corrupt business influence conviction; the presumptive two years for each of his theft convictions under Counts II through V, to be served consecutively to his corrupt business influence conviction and to each other; and the presumptive two years enhanced by two *943years for aggravating circumstances on his theft conviction under Count VI After suspending portions of this sentence, the trial court entered an executed sentence of sixteen years imprisonment.
Kollar contends the trial court failed to consider the additional mitigating circumstances that he was indigent, remorseful, had no prior criminal record, had built his business since the age of 15, and had an outstanding business reputation until his business began to fail. However, the trial court has broad discretion in sentencing and is not required to acknowledge or adopt all mitigating cireumstances argued by a defendant. Hammons v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1250, 1255, reh. denied, 496 N.E.2d 1284. In this case, the trial judge apparently considered the additional alleged mitigating circumstances to be insignificant. We are not persuaded that he abused his discretion in this regard.
Kollar also contends the trial court considered improper factors as aggravating cireumstances. Specifically, Kollar claims that it was improper to consider that he participated in a "long enduring scheme" that was a "pattern" because they are elements of his corrupt business influence conviction. See Linger v. State (1987), Ind.App., 508 N.E.2d 56. He also claims the finding that the "amount and timing of the losses was significant" was improper because it is a generality which does not specify why the particular offenses required an enhanced sentence. See St. John v. State (1988), Ind., 523 N.E.2d 1353.
We need not address these contentions on their merits because the trial court identified other aggravating circumstances sufficient to support Kollar's sentence. The trial court's findings that Kollar: defrauded "portions of the public who were comprised of persons who were investing typically their savings toward their future or the future of their children"; lulled certain victims while encouraging others to invest; and stole significant amounts of money from those victims constitute particularized findings regarding the nature and cireumstances of the crimes committed as contemplated by West's AIC 85-38-1-T(a)(2). This is sufficient to support the imposition of the enhanced and consecutive sentences. See Henderson v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 68, 72 ("[when the record indicates that the trial judge engaged in the evaluative processes but simply did not sufficiently articulate his reasons for enhancing sentence and the record indicates that the sentence imposed was not manifestly unreasonable, then the purposes underlying the specificity requirement have been satisfied").
Kollar contends his sentence was disproportionate to the severity of financial losses suffered in this case, citing Cunningham v. State (1984), Ind.App., 469 N.E.2d 1, reh. denied, trans. denied, in favor of this proposition. In Cunningham, the defendant was given an executed sentence of 16 years in prison for the crimes of illegally obtaining food stamps (theft) and perjury. The defendant's convictions rested upon his failure to disclose outside income sources. Noting that the crimes charged as felonies in that case were frequently prosecuted as misdemeanors in this state and in view of the overwhelming mitigating cireumstances, which included the fact that the defendant had five children dependent on him for support, we concluded that the sentence was manifestly unreasonable in light of the offense and the offender. We cannot conclude the same in the case before us.
The aggravating circumstances enumerated by the court, including the significant amounts of money lost by three investors, Kollar's pattern of lulling certain victims while encouraging more to invest, and theft of money saved for investing in the future, place these crimes apart from those in Cunningham. The theft of food stamps is what is considered a victimless crime. The crimes before us were directed toward a number of people who lost significant portions of their future security at Kollar's hands. We cannot consider the sentence manifestly unreasonable in light of this fact.
Finally, Kollar contends and the State concedes that the trial court erred in *944ordering him to pay restitution to the vice-tims without determining whether he was capable of making restitution or specifying manner of payment. IC 85-88-2-2(a)(5) requires that, when restitution or reparation is a condition of probation, as here, the court "shall fix the amount ... and ... manner of performance." The trial court must also determine the defendant's ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered. Maxwell v. State (1983), Ind.App., 455 N.E.2d 1171, 1176, trans. denied. In failing to enter such findings, the trial court abused its discretion.
The convictions are affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to ascertain the defendant's ability to make restitution and fix manner of payment.
GARRARD, J., concurs.
MILLER, J., dissents in part with separate opinion.

. West's AIC 35-43-4-2(a).

. West's AIC 35-45-6-2(a)(3).