Court Opinion

ID: 9707336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:09:05.655978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:09.314366
License: Public Domain

BRODY, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I concur with the Court’s opinion as to Counts I and III of the Perrins’ complaint, but I must respectfully dissent as to Count II. Because I am persuaded that the Per-rins produced sufficient evidence before the Board to carry their burden of proof on the variance issue, I would affirm the Superior Court’s judgment as to Count II as well.
The Court concludes that the Perrins failed to prove that beneficial uses did not exist for Lot 7B other than its use for construction of a residence. I disagree. When a variance applicant demonstrates that, absent the variance, the land in question is unsuitable for all uses permitted by the zoning ordinance, the burden of negating the possibility of a reasonable return is met. See Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 313 A.2d 741, 749 (Me.1974). As the record makes abundantly clear, all but one *865of the permitted uses in the Rural Residence Zone would be precluded by the wetland setback requirement. The other use permitted in the zone, public open space recreational use, is not at issue. “While an applicant for a variance must negative the economic viability [of] uses permitted by the ordinance, it is not necessary that he demonstrate that no reasonable return is possible from special permit uses or uses of a quasi public nature.” 3 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 20.18, at 421 (3d ed. 1986). The Perrins therefore met their burden of negating the possibility of a reasonable return from all other permitted uses for Lot 7B.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the Perrins failed to negate the possibility of a reasonable return from their use of Lot 7B “as an unimproved lot contiguous to Lot 7A on which [they] had constructed their residence.” The Court misinterprets our decision in Marchi v. Town of Scarborough, 511 A.2d 1071 (Me.1986), and inappropriately equates nonuse with beneficial use. In Marchi, we found the absence of any other beneficial use for a substandard lot to be fully established where the record revealed that the property in question was strictly confined to residential use, was un-buildable unless the variance was granted, and the applicant was “not an abutting owner.” Id. at 1073. In apparent reliance on this language, the Court seizes upon the distinction that the Perrins are the owners of the adjacent lot to support its holding.
This distinction is meaningless in the context of this case. The rationale behind the abutting-owner distinction is that “ ‘[administrative relief is not warranted where the owner of contiguous substandard lots can solve his own problem by combining them to meet the minimum requirements of the zoning regulations.’ ” Sibley v. Town of Wells, 462 A.2d 27, 31 (Me.1983) (quoting 3 R. Anderson, supra, § 18.54, at 291 (2d ed. 1977)) (emphasis added). That rationale does not apply here. Despite the Court’s repeated mischaraeteri-zation of Lot 7B as merely a portion of Lot 7, the fact remains that Lot 7B is a separate, approved, conforming lot that cannot be made buildable simply by recombination with Lot 7A, which has already been improved. •
Nor do any of the cases cited by the Court support its conclusion to the contrary. In Sibley, for example, we upheld the denial of a variance because the applicants owned two contiguous substandard lots that could be combined to allow construction without violating the sideline setback requirements of the ordinance. Similarly, in Barnard, we affirmed the denial of a variance because the applicant owned a single large lot that she sought to subdivide into two lots of substandard size in order to build a second house. In Marchi, on the other hand, we vacated the denial of a variance because there, as here, the applicant owned only one substandard lot that was unbuildable unless the variance was granted.
The record reveals that the Perrins can build no house at all on Lot 7B unless a variance is granted. The record also establishes the absence of any other beneficial use for Lot 7B. On this evidence, the Board was compelled to conclude that the Perrins satisfied the first prong of the hardship test by proving that strict application of the wetland setback requirement would deprive them of a reasonable return.
The Perrins also presented sufficient evidence before the Board to carry their burden of proof on the remaining three prongs of the hardship test. First, they established that their lots are the only one-acre parcels in a section of Bartlett Farms consisting of two-acre and larger parcels. Even if wetlands permeate the entire area, as the Town contends, the Perrins showed that their need for a variance is nonetheless due to the uniquely smaller size of Lot 7B that makes the setback requirement impossible to meet. Accordingly, the Board could not rationally have found on the basis of the evidence before it that the Perrins’ need for a variance was based solely on general conditions in the neighborhood.
Second, the record reveals, and the Board found, that the Perrins’ lot is a conforming lot in the Rural Residence Zone *866and that the proposed construction would be a two-story home measuring forty-six feet by twenty-four feet. The record also shows that the Perrins were seeking no more than an area variance, that is, a variance not involving a use prohibited by the zoning ordinance. It is inconceivable that the Board could have found that the addition of a single-family home in a subdivision of single-family homes would alter the essential character of the locality.
Finally, although section 4353(4)(D) states that hardship that is “the result of action taken by the applicant” is not undue hardship as required to be shown for a variance, the mere fact that the Perrins sought and obtained approval to subdivide Lot 7 is not determinative. To constitute self-created hardship within the meaning of the statute, the hardship must result from action taken by the applicant with notice of the zoning restriction that gives rise to the hardship. See, e.g., Sibley v. Town of Wells, 462 A.2d at 31 (a landowner may not be granted a variance on the grounds of undue hardship when he purchases the land with actual or constructive knowledge of the zoning restrictions). The record shows that when the Perrins applied for resubdivision approval in May of 1987, they had ho notice of the wetland setback requirements to be enacted five months later.
In fact, until the Tov/n amended its zoning ordinance relative to required minimum setbacks from wetlands in October of 1987, there was not even a wetland on Lot 7B that would require a setback. The amended ordinance defined the term “wetlands” for the first time and also classified wetlands as “coastal,” “inland,” and “transitional.” As a result of the new definitions, a seasonally wet drainage ditch crossing Lot 7B became for the first time either an inland or transitional wetland. Furthermore, the Perrins received resubdivision approval from the Town Planning Board before the wetlands ordinance was enacted. Clearly, the hardship to be suffered by the Perrins unless a variance is granted cannot be said to be the result of their own action, and the Board was compelled to conclude that the Perrins met their burden on this prong of the hardship test as well.
Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in reversing the decision of the Board on the ground that the Perrins produced sufficient evidence to meet all of the statutory prerequisites for obtaining a variance. I would therefore affirm the court’s judgment on Count II of the Perrins’ complaint.