Court Opinion

ID: 9930374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 19:00:37.540435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:12:25.401948
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                            ___________                          FILED
                                                             February 5, 2024
                             No. 22-30686                     Lyle W. Cayce
                            ___________                            Clerk

Damon Landor,

                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                 versus

Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public
Safety; James M. LeBlanc, in his official capacity as Secretary thereof,
and individually; Raymond Laborde Correctional Center;
Marcus Myers, in his official capacity as Warden thereof, and
individually; John Does 1-10; ABC Entities 1-10,

                                       Defendants—Appellees.
              ______________________________

              Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the Middle District of Louisiana
                        USDC No. 3:21-CV-733
              ______________________________

          ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before Clement, Graves, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
      Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel
rehearing (5th Cir. R. 35 I.O.P.), the petition for panel rehearing is
DENIED. The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED because, at the
                               No. 22-30686

request of one of its members, the court was polled, and a majority did not
vote in favor of rehearing (Fed. R. App. P. 35 and 5th Cir. R. 35).
      In the en banc poll, six judges voted in favor of rehearing (Smith,
Elrod, Willett, Ho, Duncan, and Oldham), and eleven voted
against rehearing (Richman, Jones, Stewart, Southwick,
Haynes,      Graves,       Higginson,         Engelhardt,       Wilson,
Douglas, and Ramirez).

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Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge, joined by Jones, Stewart,
Graves, Higginson, Engelhardt, Wilson, Douglas, and
Ramirez, Circuit Judges, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc.
        Officials at the Raymond Laborde Correctional Center knowingly
violated Damon Landor’s rights in a stark and egregious manner, literally
throwing in the trash our opinion holding that Louisiana’s policy of cutting
Rastafarians’ hair violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act before pinning Landor down and shaving his head. Landor
clearly suffered a grave legal wrong. The question is whether a damages
remedy is available to him under RLUIPA. That is a question only the
Supreme Court can answer.
                                           ***
        In determining whether RLUIPA permits Landor to recover money
damages against state government officials in their individual capacities, the
panel was bound to follow Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, which
answered that question in the negative. 560 F.3d 316, 328–29 (5th Cir. 2009)
(Sossamon I). The en banc court, of course, would have been free to overrule
that opinion.1 But overruling Sossamon I was only a necessary, not sufficient,
condition for affording Landor a cause of action.

        1
          Although doing so would have required us to determine that the Spending Clause
permits Congress to impose liability on the non-recipients of federal funds, not just the
recipients (i.e., the states) themselves when the Supreme Court—which often analyzes
Spending Clause legislation using a contract law analogy—has never stretched the analogy
that far. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002) (holding that a direct recipient of
federal funds may be held liable for intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of a
Spending Clause statute); Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212, 219
(2022) (“[W]e employ the contract analogy only as a potential limitation on liability
compared to that which would exist under nonspending statutes.” (internal quotation
marks, citation, and emphasis omitted)).

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       Had we overruled Sossamon I en banc, we would have then needed to
address the question that Sossamon I declined to answer—is RLUIPA’s
“appropriate relief” language sufficiently clear to put the state and/or its
employees on notice that the employees can personally be held liable for
monetary damages? There, we would have run into the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sossamon II, which held that, at least in the context of state
employees sued in their official capacities, RLUIPA did not clearly allow for
monetary damages. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285–86 (2011). To be
sure, the Supreme Court has now made clear that, at least in the RFRA
context, “appropriate relief” includes monetary damages against federal
officials in their individual capacities. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 45
(2020). But threading the needle between Sossamon II and Tanzin is a task
best reserved for the court that wrote those opinions. Cf. Lefebure v.
D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 660 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he only court that can
overturn a Supreme Court precedent is the Supreme Court itself.”).

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                                 No. 22-30686

James C. Ho, Circuit Judge, joined by Elrod, Circuit Judge, dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc:
       Like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 authorizes courts to grant
“appropriate relief against a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(a). See
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(c) (same).
       Does “appropriate relief” mean that a person can sue under RLUIPA
for money damages against government officials? Before we can answer this
question, there are two Supreme Court precedents we must consider.
       In Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011), the Supreme Court held
that “appropriate relief” does not include actions for money damages under
RLUIPA—at least when it comes to suits against a State.
       But the Court’s analysis made clear that that’s only because States
enjoy sovereign immunity.
       As Sossamon explained, “RLUIPA’s authorization of ‘appropriate
relief against a government’ is not the unequivocal expression of state
consent that our precedents require. ‘Appropriate relief’ does not so clearly
and unambiguously waive sovereign immunity to private suits for damages
that we can be certain that the State in fact consents to such a suit.” Id. at
285–86 (cleaned up). “The requirement of a clear statement in the text of
the statute ensures that Congress has specifically considered state sovereign
immunity and has intentionally legislated on the matter. Without such a clear
statement from Congress and notice to the States, federal courts may not step
in and abrogate state sovereign immunity.” Id. at 290–91 (citation omitted).
       Individuals, by contrast, do not enjoy sovereign immunity.          So
Sossamon should have no bearing on suits against individual officers in their
individual capacities.

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       Indeed, that’s precisely what the Court held in Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592
U.S. 43 (2020). In Tanzin, the Court concluded that “appropriate relief
against a government” includes actions for money damages under RFRA
against government officials in their individual capacities. See id. at 45 (“The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) . . . gives a person whose
religious exercise has been unlawfully burdened the right to seek ‘appropriate
relief.’ The question here is whether ‘appropriate relief’ includes claims for
money damages against Government officials in their individual capacities.
We hold that it does.”); see also id. at 52 (“RFRA’s express remedies
provision permits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages
against federal officials in their individual capacities.”).
       In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly distinguished
Sossamon. It held that Sossamon does not apply to suits against individuals,
because unlike States, individuals “do not enjoy sovereign immunity.” Id. at
52. As Tanzin explained, “Sossamon held that a State’s acceptance of federal
funding did not waive sovereign immunity to suits for damages under
[RLUIPA] which also permits ‘appropriate relief.’ The obvious difference is
that this case features a suit against individuals, who do not enjoy sovereign
immunity.” Id. at 51–52 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
       Accordingly, I agree with Judge Oldham’s typically thoughtful dissent
that we should’ve reheard this case en banc.

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                                       No. 22-30686

Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, joined by Smith, Elrod,
Willett, Ho*, and Duncan, Circuit Judges, dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc:
       This case concerns remedies against state prison officials who
intentionally ignore federal protections for the free exercise of religion. In
Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, 866 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2017), we
held the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(“RLUIPA”) prevented Louisiana from forcing Rastafarians to cut their
dreadlocks. Damon Landor, a faithful Rastafarian, handed a copy of our Ware
decision to Louisiana state prison officials—who threw the opinion in the
trash and forcibly shaved Landor’s head. An injunction obviously would not
help the then-bald Landor. So he sued his abusers for money damages under
RLUIPA. Inexplicably, he lost. And doubly inexplicably, our en banc court
cannot be moved to rehear the case.
       The panel held RLUIPA does not allow prisoners to sue state prison
officials in their individual capacities for money damages. With all due
respect to my esteemed and learned colleagues, that result cannot be squared
with Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020). Tanzin held that individuals can
sue for money damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(“RFRA”). The operative provisions of RFRA and RLUIPA are in haec
verba, and both the Supreme Court and ours routinely interpret the statutes
in parallel. Today, unfortunately for Landor, our court pits the statutes
against one another. I respectfully dissent.
                                            I.
       Damon Landor is a faithful Rastafarian. In adherence to his religious
beliefs, he abides by the Nazarite Vow (the biblical oath also taken by Samson

       *
           Judge Ho concurs only in Parts I and II of this opinion.

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                                 No. 22-30686

in the book of Judges). A man who takes the Nazarite Vow must abstain from
wine and other alcohol. See Numbers 6:2–4. He must also not cut his hair. See
Numbers 6:5. Landor did not cut his hair for almost two decades. At its
longest, Landor’s locks fell nearly to his knees.
       Beginning in August 2020, Landor was incarcerated for five months
in three different Louisiana state prisons. State officials at the first two
prisons accommodated Landor’s religious beliefs, allowing him to wear a
rastacap over his long hair.
       But on December 28, 2020, three weeks before his ultimate release
from prison, Landor was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional
Center (“RLCC”). Landor informed the intake guard that he was a
practicing Rastafarian and presented the guard with various legal materials
regarding his religious accommodations. Of note, Landor included in his
materials a copy of our RLUIPA decision in Ware.
       The intake guard threw Landor’s materials, including the Ware
decision, in the trash. The guard then summoned the RLCC warden, who
asked Landor if he had documentation about his religious beliefs from his
sentencing judge. Landor lacked that specific documentation but offered to
contact his lawyer to obtain those materials. In response, the warden glibly
quipped that it was “[t]oo late for that.” The warden instructed prison
guards to escort Landor to another room, where Landor was forcibly
handcuffed to a chair. As two guards held Landor down, another individual
shaved his head to the scalp.
       Upon release from prison, Landor sued several defendants, including
the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, the
Department’s Secretary, RLCC, and the RLCC warden. As relevant to this
appeal, Landor brought claims under RLUIPA for money damages against
several Louisiana state officials in their individual capacities. The district

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                                  No. 22-30686

court rejected his RLUIPA claims for money damages at the motion to
dismiss stage, Landor v. La. Dep’t of Corrs. & Pub. Safety, 2022 WL 4593085,
at *2 (M.D. La. Sept. 29, 2022), and a panel of this court affirmed that
decision, Landor v. La. Dep’t of Corrs. & Pub. Safety, 82 F.4th 337 (5th Cir.
2023).
                                       II.
         No one can reasonably debate that the prison officials violated
Landor’s rights under RLUIPA. We so held in Ware, and no one has
suggested we should revisit that decision. The only divide is over the scope
of remedies. In my view, (A) RLUIPA provides a cause of action for money
damages against state officials in their individual capacities. And (B) the
panel’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive.
                                       A.
         RLUIPA authorizes a person to “assert a violation of this chapter as
a claim . . . in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). A “violation of this chapter” refers
to RLUIPA’s prohibition against the government’s imposition of a
substantial burden on “the religious exercise of a person residing in or
confined to an institution,” unless the government demonstrates that the
burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.
See ibid.; see also id. § 1997(1) (defining institution to include jails, prisons,
pretrial detention facilities, and government nursing homes). RLUIPA itself
defines the term “government” to include state officials. See id. § 2000cc-
5(4)(A)(ii).
         As for obtaining “appropriate relief against a government,” the
Supreme Court recently clarified the meaning of that phrase. In Tanzin, the
Court interpreted the exact same phrase as it appears in RFRA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1(c). The Tanzin Court held 8–0 that “appropriate relief against a

                                        9
                                  No. 22-30686

government” includes damages actions against government officials in their
individual capacities. 592 U.S. at 52.
       The Supreme Court’s interpretation of RFRA in Tanzin should be
dispositive of our interpretation of RLUIPA in this case. Over and over
again, the Court has called RLUIPA and RFRA “sister” or “twin”
statutes. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 730 (2014)
(“sister”); Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015) (“sister”); Ramirez v.
Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 424 (2022) (“sister”); see also Little Sisters of the Poor
Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2396 n.13 (2020)
(Alito, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“twin”). And the Court has
repeatedly interpreted one statute by looking to its precedent interpreting the
other. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 718, 730 (looking to RLUIPA to interpret
RFRA); Holt, 574 U.S. at 362–63, 364 (looking to RFRA precedents to
interpret RLUIPA); Ramirez, 595 U.S. at 425, 427 (looking to RFRA
precedents to interpret RLUIPA); see also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006) (looking to
RLUIPA’s application to predict RFRA’s); Sossamon v. Texas (“Sossamon
I I ”), 563 U.S. 277, 286 n.5, 289 n.6 (2011) (weighing the lower courts’
interpretation of a parallel RFRA phrase to assess notice of monetary liability
in an RLUIPA case).
       In short, not only is the relevant text in RLUIPA identical to that in
RFRA, but Supreme Court precedent also commands us to interpret the two
statutes in tandem. Given Tanzin, RLUIPA (like RFRA) authorizes
damages suits against state officials.
                                         B.
       Against this straightforward application of Supreme Court precedent,
the panel offered three counterarguments: (1) RLUIPA and RFRA are
different    statutes    with     different      constitutional   justifications;

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(2) constitutional avoidance; and (3) precedent from our sister circuits. All
three are unpersuasive.
                                            1.
       First, the panel distinguished Tanzin by pointing to the different
constitutional justifications for RLUIPA and RFRA. See Landor, 82 F.4th
at 342–43 (“[A]fter all, [Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas (“Sossamon I ”),
560 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009),] and Tanzin involve different laws.”). RFRA
applies to the federal government pursuant to Congress’s various
enumerated powers,1 whereas RLUIPA applies to the States under
Congress’s Spending and Commerce powers. The panel then focused on the
Spending Clause. “Spending Clause legislation ‘operates like a contract,’ so
‘only the grant recipient—the state—may be liable for its violation.’”
Landor, 82 F.4th at 341 (quoting Sossamon I, 560 F.3d at 328). Thus, the panel
held, RLUIPA cannot be used to hold non-grant-recipient state officials
personally liable for free-exercise violations.
       This is incorrect for two reasons. First, it is true that Spending Clause
legislation is in a sense contractual: Congress agrees to pay if the recipient
performs. But it is not true that the Spending Clause prohibits regulating

       1
          The Supreme Court has never been clear about the justification for RFRA as
applied to the federal government. But Michael Stokes Paulsen provides this explanation:
       Congress possesses the same power to pass RFRA, as RFRA concerns
       federal statutes, as it had to pass those other federal statutes in the first
       place. If Congress had power to pass a statute to begin with, Congress has
       power to modify it by enacting RFRA . . . . RFRA operates as a sweeping
       “super-statute,” cutting across all other federal statutes (now and future,
       unless specifically exempted) and modifying their reach. RFRA qualifies
       Congress’ regulations of commerce, of defense, of the post office, of
       immigration, of bankruptcy, of federal lands, and so on.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56
Mont. L. Rev. 249, 253 (1995) (internal citations omitted).

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anyone beyond the recipient. That is presumably why the panel recognized
that Congress can regulate “individuals who aren’t party to the contract.”
Landor, 82 F.4th at 344 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608
(2004)). Otherwise, how could Congress have required the States receiving
federal highway funds to pass criminal laws regulating the behavior of
underage individuals? See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). South
Dakotan 19-year-olds weren’t parties to the Spending Clause contract in
Dole. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 ed., Supp. III). If South Dakota can agree to
criminalize the behavior of its 19-year-old bourbon enthusiasts, it’s unclear
why Louisiana cannot agree to make its prison officials liable for forcibly
shaving Damon Landor’s head.2
        Second, as best outlined in Dole, Congress’s spending power is subject
to four general restrictions: Spending Clause legislation must (1) be in pursuit
of the general welfare, (2) impose unambiguous conditions on the grant of
federal money, which (3) are related to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs, and (4) do not violate other provisions of the
Constitution. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08. RLUIPA’s provision for
individual official liability complies with these restrictions.
        Courts generally defer to Congress on whether (1) a “particular
expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes.” Id. at 207 (citation
omitted). RLUIPA was broadly intended to protect prisoners’ religious
exercise rights. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716–17 (2005). And it
cannot be seriously disputed that making individual officials liable for

        2
            Nor would this provision of RLUIPA be unique in submitting such individuals
to liability. For example, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986
regulates activities in hospitals that accept federal funds. Doctors in those hospitals who
violate certain provisions related to patient treatment are subject to a civil penalty of not
more than $50,000, even though they did not agree to the Spending Clause “contract.”
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B).

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violating religious exercise rights serves the same general public purpose.
With respect to (2) unambiguous conditions, the States had “clear notice”
of this Spending Clause condition. Cf. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295–96 (2006). Note that this is not a case where
the “statutes at issue are silent to available remedies.” Cf. Cummings v.
Premier Rehab Keller, PLLC, 596 U.S. 212, 220 (2022). The remedies are
discussed in RLUIPA’s text, which (again) is materially identical to
RFRA’s. As applied to suits against individual officials and as understood by
an ordinary person at the time of RFRA’s enactment, the remedy of
“appropriate relief” plainly encompassed money damages, as the Supreme
Court unanimously held. See Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 50–52. The condition of
personal liability is (3) reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure.
Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 172 (1992). If RLUIPA aims to
protect free exercise in prison, then monetary liability for state officials
should deter government misconduct and protect religious exercise.3 Finally,
RLUIPA’s provision for state official liability does not (4) violate other
provisions of the Constitution. The provision is not unduly coercive, nor is it
the kind of “economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option
but to acquiesce.” See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 582 (2012). Thus, as a
condition on Spending Clause legislation, this provision of RLUIPA is
constitutional.

        3
          As multiple amici discuss, money damages are often necessary to vindicate rights
under RLUIPA. Money damages “raise the price of unlawful conduct and make it less
attractive to potential wrongdoers,” see Brief of Amici Curiae 19 Religious Organizations
in Support of Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 6, and are particularly
important where prisons can moot claims for injunctive or declaratory relief through release
or transfer. See Brief of Amici Curiae Bruderhof, Clear, the Jewish Coalition for Religious
Liberty, and the Sikh Coalition in Support of Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc
at 4–6.

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       The import of Tanzin in this case is undeniable. And RLUIPA’s
authorization under the Spending Clause does nothing to change that.
                                      2.
       But what about constitutional avoidance? In Sossamon I, the panel
chose a narrow reading of RLUIPA’s remedial provision to “avoid the
constitutional concerns that an alternative reading would entail.” 560 F.3d at
329.
       Whatever its merits back in 2009, that choice is now foreclosed.
Tanzin unanimously held that “appropriate relief against a government”
includes money damages against individual officials. See 592 U.S. at 50–52.
This interpretation of RFRA was supported by the text, see id. at 48–49, the
historical context, see id. at 49–50, and policy reasons, see id. at 51. Tanzin
thus compels us to reject the argument that the relevant portion of RLUIPA
(a “sister” or “twin” statute to RFRA) is ambiguous. And while
constitutional avoidance is a powerful substantive canon, see, e.g., Bond v.
United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014), it cannot be invoked where there is no
ambiguity. This is especially true where, as shown above, there are no
constitutional concerns with the correct reading of RLUIPA.
                                      3.
       But what about the reasoning of our sister circuits? The panel noted
that the approach in Sossamon I was consistent with other circuits’ decisions.
See Landor, 82 F.4th at 343 n.5 (listing authorities). But again, I am not sure
that works after Tanzin.
       Few of these decisions applied the Dole four-part framework, relying
instead on constitutional avoidance (off the table after Tanzin), see, e.g.,
Washington v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 2013); Nelson v. Miller, 570
F.3d 868, 889 (7th Cir. 2009), or holding (incorrectly) that Congress cannot

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use the Spending Power to regulate individuals who were not party to the
imagined contract, see, e.g., Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 903–04 (9th Cir.
2014); Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1335 (10th Cir. 2012). The circuits
that actually analyzed this RLUIPA provision under Dole held that there was
insufficiently clear notice of the condition. See Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d
554, 568–70 (6th Cir. 2014); Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 188–89 (4th
Cir. 2009). But those decisions came before Tanzin, which obviates any
argument about clear notice and the phrase “appropriate relief against a
government.” All of this is to say that no circuit has squarely considered the
impact of Tanzin within a comprehensive analysis of the Spending Clause
and Dole.
                               *        *         *
       Last term, the Supreme Court decided a case about § 1983 and
Spending Clause legislation. See Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v.
Talevski, 599 U.S. 166 (2023). The petitioners urged the Court to adopt a
kind of Spending Clause exceptionalism and to carve out statutes passed
under that Clause for disfavored treatment under § 1983. See id. at 177–78.
The Court rejected that argument, see id. at 178–80, choosing instead to
follow the traditional principles announced in Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273
(2002). See Talevski, 599 U.S. at 180–92.
       Here too, the panel and the state officers advocate a kind of Spending
Clause exceptionalism. No matter that Tanzin interpreted the exact same
phrase in RFRA, the reasoning goes, because RLUIPA is a Spending Clause
statute, and Spending Clause statutes are somehow second-class laws.
Moreover, the thinking appears to be, we need not do the work required by
Dole because our sister circuits haven’t. And because if we’re wrong, the
Supreme Court can tell us.

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      It is certainly true that the Supreme Court could fix the mistake we
made today. But the Court could also fix every mistake we attempt to fix
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35. We have the en banc process
to fix errors like the one we made in Sossamon I. I regret we chose not to do
so.

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