Court Opinion

ID: 9943060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:02:29.094732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:00.753831
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10752    Document: 41-1     Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10752
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       GENE E. OLUFEMI,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       EXCLUSIVE ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT,
       c/o Julie Stephens, Registered Agent,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-01391-SEG
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10752

                           ____________________

       Before WILSON, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Gene Olufemi filed a claim under the Fair Debt Collection
       Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, against the property
       management company Exclusive Association Management
       (“EAM”). Olufemi proceeded pro se below and is proceeding pro se
       on appeal. On appeal, Olufemi raises three issues related to the
       district court’s handling of various motions that he filed and chal-
       lenges the court’s ultimate dismissal of his claim on two grounds.
              First, he argues that the district court should have reversed
       its stay of proceedings upon his motion—which the court con-
       strued as a motion to reconsider—because the stay was based on
       the erroneous finding that it was unopposed. Second, he argues
       that the district court should have granted his motion for default
       judgment because he did not receive EAM’s answer until after the
       deadline had passed. Third, he argues that the district court should
       not have denied his motion for summary judgment as premature
       because discovery should not have been stayed.
              On the merits, he argues that the district court erred in
       granting EAM’s motion to dismiss his FDCPA claim. He argues
       that his claims were not precluded under the res judicata doctrine
       because his claim is for a continuing wrong and because the state
       court in a prior related proceeding did not allow him to present his
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       23-10752                Opinion of the Court                          3

       exhibits. Finally, he argues that EAM is a debt collector within the
       meaning of the FDCPA.
                                          I.
              We review a district court’s decision to stay discovery for an
       abuse of discretion. Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 960 F.3d 1296,
       1308 (11th Cir. 2020). “A district court abuses its discretion if it ap-
       plies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable
       or incorrect manner, or follows improper procedures in making its
       decision.” Id. The district court enjoys “broad discretion to stay
       proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket.”
       Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997).
               Dispositive motions that present purely legal questions—
       such as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim—should be
       resolved before discovery. Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123
       F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997). Discovery imposes high costs on
       the court and on litigants in time and resources, and thus, any claim
       that is not viable should be dismissed before discovery whenever
       possible. See id. at 1367-68. When there is a pending motion that
       presents a purely legal question and is likely to be dispositive, a dis-
       trict court may stay discovery pending the resolution of the mo-
       tion. See Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1308-09.
               Here, regardless of how the motion was construed, the dis-
       trict court did not abuse its discretion in denying Olufemi’s motion
       opposing the stay of discovery. Isaiah, 960 F.3d. at 1308. EAM’s
       motion to dismiss presented three questions that were potentially
       dispositive on Olufemi’s FDCPA claim: (1) whether the court had
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10752

       subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2)
       whether the doctrine of res judicata barred his claims; and (3)
       whether Olufemi failed to state a claim. Because the motion to
       dismiss presented a potential resolution to the case that required
       no further findings of fact, this Court’s precedent dictates that the
       district court should rule on the motion before discovery. Chuda-
       sama, 123 F.3d at 1367. A stay of discovery pending the resolution
       of the motion was an appropriate way for the district court to do
       so. Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1308-09.
              Even if Olufemi had timely responded to the motion, he of-
       fered no reason other than his opposition why the district court
       should not have granted the stay. Contrary to Olufemi’s assertion
       that the district court offered no explanation for the stay other than
       his lack of opposition, the court also stated it was staying proceed-
       ings “in the interest of efficiency.” Given the high costs of discov-
       ery and the preference for deciding dispositive, purely legal mo-
       tions before those costs are incurred, the district court was well
       within its discretion when it stayed proceedings and when it con-
       tinued the stay over Olufemi’s objection. Chudasama, 123 F.3d at
       1367-68.
                                        II.
             We review a denial of default judgment for abuse of discre-
       tion. Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985). Default
       judgment is discretionary and should only be used in “extreme sit-
       uations” because of the “strong preference” for deciding cases on
       the merits. Id.
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       23-10752               Opinion of the Court                         5

               The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
       Olufemi’s motion for default judgment because the record indi-
       cates that EAM’s answer was timely filed and served. EAM was
       served with the complaint on May 16, 2022, so the deadline to serve
       its answer was June 6, 2022. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Accord-
       ing to the certificate of service, EAM filed and served its answer on
       June 3, 2022, three days before the deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P.
       5(b)(2)(C). Olufemi maintains that he never received the answer
       by mail. Even if this were enough to show that service was un-
       timely, Olufemi received the answer via email on June 21, 2022,
       before any meaningful action in the case, and thus was not preju-
       diced. Given the strong preference for deciding a case on the mer-
       its, the district court’s denial of default judgment was not an abuse
       of discretion.
                                        III.
              We review “the district court’s grant or denial of summary
       judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district
       court.” Thai Meditation Ass’n of Alabama, Inc. v. City of Mobile, Ala-
       bama, 83 F.4th 922, 926 (11th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is ap-
       propriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
       as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
       matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Each party must support its
       factual assertions by citing evidence in the record. Id. 56(c)(1).
       Thus, “[s]ummary judgment is premature when a party is not pro-
       vided a reasonable opportunity to discover information essential to
       his opposition.” Smith v. Florida Dept. of Corr., 713 F.3d 1059, 1064
       (11th Cir. 2013).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10752

             The district court did not err in denying Olufemi’s motion
       for summary judgment as premature because EAM did not have
       an opportunity to discover evidence to support its opposition.
                                        IV.
               We generally review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss
       for failure to state a claim and may affirm on any basis supported
       by the record, regardless of whether the district court relied on that
       basis. Baker v. City of Madison, Alabama, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th
       Cir. 2023). However, when a party fails to object to a magistrate
       judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and rec-
       ommendation (“R&R”), that party waives the right to challenge on
       appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to legal con-
       clusions, so long as the party was informed of the period for object-
       ing and the consequences of failing to object. 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In
       the absence of a proper objection, however, we may review on ap-
       peal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. Id.
              Res judicata prevents parties from relitigating issues already
       decided by a competent court. Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d
       1241, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011). “In considering whether to give pre-
       clusive effect to state-court judgments under res judicata . . . the
       federal court must apply the rendering state’s law of preclusion.”
       Id. Under Georgia law, a claim is precluded if the following ele-
       ments are met: “(1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of
       the parties or their privies, (3) previous adjudication on the merits
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       23-10752                 Opinion of the Court                            7

       by a court of competent jurisdiction,” and (4) final judgment. Id. at
       1265 n.21 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40).
              Olufemi waived his right to appeal the district court’s find-
       ing that his claims were precluded under the res judicata doctrine
       because he did not challenge the magistrate judge’s legal conclu-
       sion in the R&R and he was advised of the consequences of failing
       to object. He does not argue that the interest of justice demands
       that we review the issue, and the interest of justice does not so de-
       mand because, as discussed below, the motion to dismiss may be
       affirmed on other grounds.
               Even if Olufemi’s res judicata challenge were not waived, the
       district court did not err because Olufemi’s FDCPA claim was pre-
       cluded. Strong, 651 F.3d at 1263. His state court and federal claims
       involved the same subject matter, cause of action, and parties, and
       the state court had jurisdiction and reached a final judgment on the
       merits. Strong, 651 F.3d at 1263. Thus, the district court did not err
       in finding that Olufemi’s claim was precluded.
                                           V.
              To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a
       claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
       662, 678 (2009). In other words, the complaint must contain suffi-
       cient facts such that a court could draw a reasonable inference that
       the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. The pleading
       need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but must include
       “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
       accusation.” Id. In considering a motion to dismiss, courts “are not
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10752

       bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual al-
       legation.” Id.
              The FDCPA only applies to “debt collectors.” Harris v. Lib-
       erty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc., 702 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2012). “[N]ot
       all who collect debts are ‘debt collectors’” within the meaning of
       the statute. Id. A “debt collector” is a person who regularly collects
       or attempts to collect the debts owed to another, but it does not
       include employees of creditors or entities that collect debt inci-
       dental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
              Here, the district court did not err in granting EAM’s motion
       to dismiss because Olufemi’s complaint failed to state a claim. Iq-
       bal, 556 U.S. at 678. To bring a claim under the FDCPA a plaintiff
       must show that the defendant is a debt collector, which means
       more than an entity who collects debts. See Harris, 702 F.3d at 1302.
       Olufemi’s complaint merely stated that EAM contacted him about
       an alleged debt throughout 2021. He did not include any facts
       about what sort of entity EAM is, what the alleged debt was,
       whether EAM was attempting to collect the debt for itself or an-
       other entity, or any other information that would be necessary for
       a court to determine whether EAM was a debt collector within the
       meaning of the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Rather, Olufemi’s
       statement of the case was “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlaw-
       fully-harmed-me accusation.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 1 at 4; Iqbal, 556 U.S.
       at 678. Because Olufemi’s complaint did not contain sufficient facts
       such that a court could draw a reasonable inference that EAM was
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       23-10752               Opinion of the Court                         9

       a debt collector within the meaning of the statute, the district court
       did not err in granting EAM’s motion to dismiss.
             For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
       is
             AFFIRMED.