Court Opinion

ID: 9737551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:28:28.160897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.722625
License: Public Domain

Quinn, P. J.,
(dissenting). What is said here in no way condones the remarks of the trial judge at the call of the criminal calendar October 12, 1965, as quoted at the beginning of the majority opinion. The remarks were improper and injudicious, but on this record, they do not support the reasoning or the result of the majority opinion.
As noted in that opinion, the remarks were directed to all in the court room on October 12, 1965. Five weeks later and after an amended information *281charging a lesser offense was filed, defendant pleaded guilty to such lesser offense and recited on the record facts establishing the offense and his participation in it. At the same time, defendant stated he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily and that no threats or promises had been made to induce the plea.
I agree with the majority opinion that to lengthen a sentence because of a late plea of guilty is improper. If the record established this to be the fact here, I would vacate sentence and remand for re-sentencing. The record does not establish the fact, and the majority opinion only does so by assumption. I cannot make that assumption in view of the fact that all judicial proceedings in courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to be correct and regular, in the absence of proof to the contrary. 1 Wharton Criminal Evidence (12th .ed), § 126, p 233. In addition, as was said in In re Valle (1961), 364 Mich 471, 478:
“The oath of public officials as to the performance of their sworn duties is, it has been our experience, so consistently in accord with the fact of such performance that only in the most unusual circumstances would we be persuaded otherwise.”
The record does not support the claim of defendant that the remarks of the judge influenced defendant’s plea. In fact, defendant’s answers to judicial interrogation at the time of plea negate such a claim. In view of defendant’s positive assertion at time of plea that he pleaded freely and voluntarily without being influenced by threat or promise, I am unable to accept his present belated and self-serving argument that he was influenced by the implied threat in the remarks of the trial judge hereinbefore referred to as proof overcoming what is disclosed by the record at time of plea.
*282As stated in People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719, a convicted defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. On appeal from conviction, defendant has the burden of establishing reversible error, absent a showing of violation or denial' of constitutional rights, and reversible error is to be measured by the standards established by statute, CL 1948, § 769.26 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1096) and rule, OCR 1963, 529.1. (Winegar, supra). This defendant has failed to do.
I vote to affirm and such vote indicates my belief that the other points asserted by defendant on this appeal are without merit.