Court Opinion

ID: 9588794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:38:59.701479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:49:51.500466
License: Public Domain

WALLER, Justice
(Concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur with the majority insofar as it holds the expert testimony of Richards was properly excluded. I also concur with the finding that stating a juror is of the “redneck variety” is not a race neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. However, I disagree with the decision that the “dual motivation principle” should not apply to this area of Equal Protection challenges. For that reason, and because if such a principle were employed here I would find no Equal Protection violation, I respectfully dissent.
Under the dual motivation principle, if a court concludes a peremptory strike “has been exercised in part for a discriminatory purpose, the court must consider whether the party whose conduct is being challenged has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike would have nevertheless been exercised even if an improper factor had not *62motivated in part the decision to strike.” Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir.1995). As the majority notes, this principle has been adopted by the Supreme Court in other areas of Equal Protection analysis in determining purposeful racial discrimination,1 although that Court has not yet specifically addressed its applicability to a Batson challenge. However, a number of lower courts, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, have done so. Jones, 57 F.3d at 417. See also Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1149, 116 S.Ct. 1449, 134 L.Ed.2d 569 (1996); Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 616, 136 L.Ed.2d 540 (1996). See also Gottis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174 (Del.1997); People v. Pecor, 286 111. App.3d 71, 221 Ill.Dec. 234, 675 N.E.2d 141 (1996), cert. denied, 173 I11.2d 539, 226 Ill.Dec. 137, 684 N.E.2d 1340, and cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 429, 139 L.Ed.2d 329 (1997).
In Howard v. Senkowski, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals provided a comprehensive discussion of the application of dual motivation analysis as applied to discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. That case focused on the interrelation between the three-step inquiry enunciated in Batson and the dual motivation principle:
Dual motivation analysis, in effect, may supplement so-called “pretext” analysis, which applies to a claimant’s “burden of persuading the court that [he or] she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” When the issue is the all-or-nothing question of whether or not an impermissible consideration motivated the challenged action ... pretext analysis employs the familiar three-step approach____ Once the claimant has proven improper motivation, dual motivation analysis is available to the person accused of discrimination to avoid liability by showing that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the improper motivation that the claimant has proven.
*63The two forms of analysis are not incompatible. The claimant always has to prove discriminatory motivation. If he succeeds, the accused party has an opportunity to show that there were really two motives and that a permissible motive would have led to the challenged action. In effect, the accused party is permitted to show, if he can, that the improper motivation proved by the claimant was only part, and not the decisive part, of the motivation.
986 F.2d at 27 (internal citations omitted).
In finding it proper to apply dual motivation analysis to this aspect of Equal Protection jurisprudence, Howard noted the Supreme Court’s reliance on other types of Equal Protection cases (which utilized dual motivation) in reaching its seminal decision in Batson v. Kentucky.2 Id., 986 F.2d at 28 (“Since dual motivation analysis was explicitly invoked by the Supreme Court in the context of determining racial motivation for purposes of adjudicating a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, and since Batson equated jury discrimination claims with ‘any case alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,’ one might have thought there would be no question but that such analysis applies to an equal protection challenge based on racial motivation in any context, including the context of peremptory challenges”) (internal citations omitted).3
Batson clearly emphasized it sought to further the “general equal protection principle that the ‘invidious quality’ of governmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory ‘must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.’ ” 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 1721, 90 L.Ed.2d at 85 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597, 607-08 (1976)) (emphasis supplied). In my opinion, the majority’s holding today goes far beyond this principle *64and what Equal Protection requires.4
“In detailing the particulars of the Batson proof scheme, we are mindful that its sole purpose is to help courts and parties answer, ‘not necessarily evade[,] the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.’ ” Jones, 57 F.3d at 421. I would find dual motivation analysis appropriate in the context of Equal Protection challenges to peremptory strikes, and thus affirm the Court of Appeals.
MOORE, A.J., concurs.

. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977).

. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

. Interestingly, the Second Circuit felt not adopting dual motivation analysis would be unfair to Equal Protection claimants. See Howard., 986 F.2d at 29 ("It is unlikely that in this 'most compelling' context [i.e. Equal Protection challenges related to discrimination in the judicial system], the Court intended to invoke a standard more onerous for claimants than that applicable in other equal protection contexts”) (emphasis supplied). Howard was focusing on certain language from Batson where the Court held, "The Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race." Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d at 83 (emphasis supplied).

. Technically, since the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider these issues in the context of the dual motivation principle, were this the majority opinion, remand would most likely be appropriate. Because this is not the majority opinion, I would only add that were I applying dual motivation analysis to the facts of this case, I would find Respondent met his burden of showing he would have struck juror eighteen without the offensive reason. Respondent gave several reasons for striking this juror: (1) she is opinionated; (2) she is stubborn; (3) she is headstrong and unwilling to listen to others; (4) her family has had problems with the law and she might have prejudices against Respondent's attorney or law enforcement, and (5) she is "kind of what we refer to as a redneck variety.” Without doubt the first four reasons are race neutral. Respondent was concerned primarily that the juror would not be a "team player” with other jurors; he had some personal knowledge of her as being opinionated and unwilling to compromise. He was also concerned about certain prejudices she might have against him or law enforcement because of her family background.
Furthermore, Respondent’s stating he struck juror eighteen because she was of a "redneck variety” is not precisely the same as saying he struck her because she was white. "Redneck” does not only refer to a person's racial status. It also means a "person who advocates a provincial, conservative, often bigoted sociopolitical attitude considered characteristic of a redneck.” American Heritage Dictionary 1037 (2d college ed. 1982). The fact that this term can refer not only to race but also to beliefs and attitudes further supports the finding that under the circumstances of this case the ultimate reason Respondent struck the juror was not because of her race. I point out that while "redneck” can be used in a stereotypical sense, that is not what occurred in this case. Certainly, this is the ultimate evil to avoid when striking jurors: making the assumption that because a juror is a member of a certain race, he or she will have certain prejudices, sympathies or attitudes. With "redneck,” the assumption is not based merely on race but on social or economic status, i.e. "because this juror is a redneck, she must have a provincial, conservative or bigoted sociopolitical attitude.” In this case, however, Respondent was not assuming juror eighteen had certain undesirable attitudes because she was a lower-class white person; he based his conclusions on actual prior knowledge.