Court Opinion

ID: 9588596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:10.514481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:53.508117
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. It is well-established that when an appeal is taken from an award of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation granting compensation the evidence must be construed by this court in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and cannot be reweighed on appeal. Any finding of fact by either an administrative law judge or the full board, when supported by any evidence, is *165conclusive and binding upon the court to which such an appeal is taken. Home Indem. Co. v. Swindle, 146 Ga. App. 520 (246 SE2d 507) (1978). An appellate court must accept that evidence most favorable to sustain the award. Continental Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 69 Ga. App. 683 (26 SE2d 682) (1943). The issue on appeal is whether there is “any evidence” to authorize a finding in accordance with the contentions of the party who prevailed before the full board. Cobb Gen. Hosp. v. Burrell, 174 Ga. App. 631 (331 SE2d 23) (1985). OCGA § 34-9-105 (c) sets forth the grounds for setting aside a board decision, and any application of Division (3), “[t]he facts found by the members do not support the decision,” requires application of the “any evidence” rule to board decisions. A review of the record indicates that there is ample evidence to support the claim for compensation under the above-stated rule, and the decisions of the full board and the superior court should be affirmed.
Further, our decision in this case is consistent with this court’s general policy of construing the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act liberally in order to afford the injured , claimant a remedy. “The case, though it has many sprangles in the record, has a solid nucleus which controls it.” Kirkland v. Wade, 61 Ga. 478, 481 (1878).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Presiding Judge Banke, and Judge Pope join in this dissent.
On Motion for Rehearing.
“We are fully aware of the well-established rule in respect to the finality and binding effect of the findings and award of the State Board of [Workers’] Compensation, when supported by any competent evidence; but as was said in [Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Honea, 71 Ga. App. 569, 571-572 (31 SE2d 421) (1944)]: ‘While it has been ruled in numerous decisions of the Supreme Court and this court, that findings of fact by the State Board of [Workers’] Compensation, if supported by any competent evidence, are conclusive, in the absence of fraud, and can not be set aside by the courts; still, where there is no conflict in the evidence and but one legal conclusion can be reached therefrom . . ., then a finding by the board granting compensation can, and under the law, should be set aside by the court.’ ” Gay v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co., 72 Ga. App. 122, 125 (33 SE2d 109) (1945), overruled on other grounds Federal Ins. Co. v. Coram, 95 Ga. App. 622 (98 SE2d 214) (1957). There is no conflict in the evidence in this case. Compare Reliance Ins. Co. v. Ham, 130 Ga. App. 382 (203 SE2d 315) (1973). .Although appellee was to serve “at the pleasure” of the district attorney, the remaining undisputed evidence as to the district attorney’s lack of a right to control appellee in his capacity as special counsel cannot be eliminated from consideration. “[D]irect and posi*166tive testimony cannot arbitrarily be rejected by a jury or other trier of facts. . . .” Maddox v. Buice Transfer &c. Co., 81 Ga. App. 503, 506 (59 SE2d 329) (1950). Here, as in Coastal Timberlands v. Brown, 141 Ga. App. 800 (234 SE2d 373) (1977) and Employers Mut. &c. Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Johnson, 104 Ga. App. 617 (122 SE2d 308) (1961), the undisputed evidence of record demanded a finding that appellee was an independent contractor notwithstanding the Full Board’s finding that he was an employee of the district attorney. In holding that the Full Board’s finding is erroneous, we are adhering to, not deviating from, the “any evidence” rule. Considering all of the undisputed evidence, there is none which would authorize a finding that appellee was an employee.
Decided March 8, 1989
Rehearing denied March 30, 1989
Nixon, Yow, Waller & Capers, Paul H. Dunbar III, E. Freddie Sanders, for appellant.
Burnside, Wall & Daniel, Thomas R. Burnside, Jr., Harry D. Revell, for appellee.

Motion for rehearing denied.

Carley, C. J., Birdsong, Sognier and Benham, JJ., concur. Beasley, J., concurs in judgment only. Deen, P. J., Banke, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Pope, J., dissent.