Court Opinion

ID: 9881631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 15:28:36.224286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:13:55.445898
License: Public Domain

J-S30002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.I.F., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 1072 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 3, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0000552-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.I.F., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: S.F., MOTHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 1073 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered April 3, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000027-2023

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                       FILED OCTOBER 3, 2023

      S.F. (“Mother”) appeals from the April 3, 2023 decree granting the

petition filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to

involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her daughter, M.I.F., born in May
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2021 (“Child”).1 Mother further appeals from the April 3, 2023 order changing

Child’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to Section 6351 of the Juvenile

Act (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375). We affirm the termination decree and dismiss

the appeal from the goal change order as moot.

       We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows. The family

came to the attention of DHS in May 2021, at the time of Child’s birth, as a

result of mental health and substance abuse concerns related to Mother. See

N.T., 4/3/23, at 9. Specifically, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”),

Turning Points for Children, case manager, Michole Allen, testified:
       There was a [General Protective Services (“GPS”) report] made
       regarding Mother. It was mostly regarding her mental health. The
       GPS stated that Mother was making odd statements, such as she’s
       an angel. And if the child was a boy, she was going to have sex
       with the child. There was also an allegation of Mother using
       marijuana and PCP throughout her entire pregnancy. The report
       also stated that she was not receiving any type of prenatal care
       during her pregnancy.

Id. As a result, DHS obtained protective custody of Child on May 26, 2021.

See Order of Protective Custody, 5/26/21.2       Upon her discharge from the

hospital, Child was placed in foster care, where she has remained. See N.T.,

4/3/23, at 9, 36, 66.

____________________________________________

1 By separate decree of the same date, the trial court terminated the parental

rights of Child’s father, J.T. (“Father”). Father did not file an appeal or
participate in the instant appeals. We refer to Mother and Father collectively
herein as “Parents.”

2 For purposes of this matter, we cite to the dependency record, when
necessary, as it is part of the certified record in this case.

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       The court adjudicated Child dependent on August 31, 2021, and ordered

supervised visitation for Mother. See Order of Adjudication and Disposition,

8/31/21.     The court established a permanency goal of reunification.       See

Permanency Review Order, 11/30/21, at 1; see also Permanency Review

Orders, 3/1/22, 5/31/22, 8/29/22, & 1/6/23.3 In furtherance of reunification,

DHS created a single case plan requiring, inter alia, Mother to: maintain her

mental health, employment, and housing; participate in visitation with Child;

comply with CUA directives; and sign all necessary consents.           See N.T.,

4/3/23, at 12.

       Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted

permanency review hearings at regular intervals.          From November 2021

through August 2022, the court characterized Mother’s compliance with the

permanency plan as “full” or “substantial” and her progress toward alleviating

the causes of Child’s placement as “substantial.” Permanency Review Orders,

11/30/21, 3/1/22, 5/31/22, & 8/29/22, at 1.           In fact, Mother’s visitation

progressed to unsupervised in March 2022, and overnight in May 2022. See

Permanency Review Order, 3/1/22, at 2; Permanency Review Order, 5/31/22,

at 2; see also N.T., 4/3/23, at 13, 40.          The court additionally noted the

potential for reunification.     See Permanency Review Order, 5/31/22, at 2;

Permanency Review Order, 8/29/22, at 2.

____________________________________________

3 The court established a concurrent goal of adoption on January 6, 2023.    See
Permanency Review Order, 1/6/23, at 1.

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       However, by January 2023, the court described Mother’s compliance as

“minimal” and progress as “minimal.” Permanency Review Order, 1/6/23, at

1. Significantly, after suffering a miscarriage, Mother failed to attend visitation

from September 2022 until February 2023, and expressed a desire to execute

documentation to voluntarily terminate her parental rights. See N.T., 4/3/23,

at 13-16. In December 2022, she additionally forwarded Child’s social security

card and birth certificate, as well as milestone letters for Child, to Foster

Mother. Id. at 21, 71-72, 113. Despite Mother then indicating that she had

an “epiphany” and “wanted reunification,” requesting visitation in February

2023, Ms. Allen expressed concerns with Mother’s mental health and her

relationship with Father.        Id. at 16-17, 24-25, 63-65.   As such, Ms. Allen

stated that Child could not be safely reunified with Mother. Id. at 26, 35, 63-

64.

       On January 19, 2023, DHS filed a petition for the termination of parental

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), as well as

a petition for a change of Child’s permanency goal from reunification to

adoption. The trial court held a hearing on the petitions on April 3, 2023.

Mother was present and represented by counsel. The Child, then almost two

years old, was represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”).4 DHS presented

____________________________________________

4 Insomuch as Child’s legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to

her young age, we find Section 2313(a) satisfied by the representation of
Attorney Newton. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018)
(holding, “if the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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the testimony of Ms. Allen, and Child’s foster mother, J.L.E. (“Foster Mother”).

Additionally, Mother testified on her own behalf.5

       By decree dated and entered April 3, 2023, the trial court involuntarily

terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Further, by order also dated and entered

April 3, 2023, the court changed Child’s permanency goal from reunification

to adoption.     Thereafter, on April 30, 2023, Mother timely filed notices of

appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).6         This Court consolidated

Mother’s appeals sua sponte on May 17, 2023.

       On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
       1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
       of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1)?

       2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
       of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2)?

____________________________________________

because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict
between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests; as such, the
mandate of Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act [(23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938)]”
is satisfied).

     We note that Child’s GAL argued in favor of termination. See N.T.,
3/20/23, at 82. He, however, did not submit a brief to this Court.

5 DHS also offered DHS Exhibits 1 through 4, which the court admitted without

objection. See N.T., 4/3/23, at 7-8. Mother proffered Mother’s Exhibits 1
through 3, which the court admitted. Id. at 59, 62.

6 On May 19, 2023, the trial court filed a Notice of Compliance with Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(a), dated May 18, 2023, in which it references its
reasoning placed on the record.

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      3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
      of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(5)?

      4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
      of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(8)?

      5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights
      of [Mother] under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b)?

      6. Whether the trial court erred by determining it to be in …
      [C]hild’s best interest to change the goal from reunification to
      adoption?

Mother’s Brief at 5-6 (cleaned up).

      We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,

which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of

whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent

evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When

applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings

of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021).          “Where the trial

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may

not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or

abuse of discretion.”    In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa.

2021). An abuse of discretion in this context exists “only upon demonstration

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.                See

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.      The trial court must initially determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven

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enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a).              Only if the court

determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under

Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section

2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M.,

71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the

petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing

evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing

as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of

the truth of the precise facts in issue.”        C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (citation

omitted).

       In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have long

held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only

agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well

as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(en banc). Instantly, we will analyze the court’s termination decrees pursuant

to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b),7 which provides as follows:
       (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
       be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
       grounds:

          (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
          six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
          either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
____________________________________________

7 This corresponds with Mother’s first and fifth issues.
                                                      Given our disposition
herein, we need not address Mother’s second, third, and fourth issues. See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

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        parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
        parental duties.
                                     ...

     (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
     which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
     filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

     In order to establish grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1), “[a] petitioner … must demonstrate by competent, clear and

convincing evidence, ‘[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has

refused or failed to perform parental duties.’” C.M., 255 A.3d at 363-64

(citation and footnote omitted). While undefined,
     our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the
     needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support.
     Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that
     develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of
     such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and
     association. The performance of parental duties requires that a
     parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance
     in the child’s life.

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, “[f]ortitude is required, as a parent must act with ‘reasonable

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firmness’ to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a parent-

child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform

parental responsibilities.” Id. (citation omitted).

      In assessing Section 2511(a)(1), trial courts should consider the entire

history of the case and avoid applying the statutory six-month requirement

mechanically.   C.M., 255 A.3d at 364.      However, the General Assembly’s

emphasis on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the

termination petition indicates this timeframe is the “most critical period for

evaluation” of a parent’s conduct. L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592.

      “[T]he question of whether a parent has failed or refused to perform

parental duties must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of

the case.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977). Thus, “even where

the evidence clearly establishes a parent has failed to perform affirmative

parental duties for a period in excess of six months…, the court ‘must examine

the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the parent to

determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances, clearly

warrants permitting the involuntary termination [of parental rights].’” L.A.K.,

265 A.3d at 593 (citation omitted). The totality of the circumstances includes

consideration of the following: “(1) the parent’s explanation for his or her

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, if

any, including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact with the

child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental rights would have on the

child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Id. As explained by our Supreme Court,

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“the purpose of this analysis is to give effect to our mandate that courts avoid

a mechanical application of the law regarding the termination of parental

rights. The law must be applied with the purpose of serving needs and welfare

of each individual child in his or her particular circumstances.” Id.

      Instantly, with respect to the determination that DHS satisfied the

statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1), the trial court found that Mother evidenced a settled purpose to

relinquish her parental claim and failed to perform parental duties for the six

months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition.        N.T.,

4/3/23, at 128-29. The court stated, “Mother in essence relinquished any

parental claim [and] expressed on more than one occasion that she was not

in any position, nor does she desire to reunify.”      Id. at 128.      The court

continued, “There was nothing in the six months preceding the filing of the

petitions in this case for either parent to establish that they in any way were

trying to establish a parental claim to the child. [T]o the contrary, they failed

to perform parental duties.” Id. at 129.

      Mother acknowledges that, while grieving her loss from a miscarriage,

she expressed a desire to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights.        See

Mother’s Brief at 14.    She asserts, however, that in February 2023, she

requested to resume visitation and had two visits with Child prior to the

subject hearing. Id. Mother further argues that she was continuing to engage

in therapy, as confirmed by a letter from her therapist, and had maintained

housing and employment. Id. at 15.

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      Upon review, we are constrained to agree with the trial court.       The

record supports the determination that Mother evidenced a settled purpose of

relinquishing her parental claim to Child and failed to perform parental duties

in the six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition

in January 2023.    As revealed, Mother ceased visitation with Child from

September 2022 to February 2023, after suffering a miscarriage. See N.T.,

4/3/23, at 13-14. During this time, she also did not independently reach out

to see Child or inquire as to how Child was doing.      Id. at 20, 27, 70-72.

Mother explained that she was grieving and “at that time [she] believed that

was the best decision that a mother could make.” Id. at 111.      She “needed

for [C]hild to be in an environment where she got the love and attention that

she needed,” and that was “safe.” Id. at 111-12. Ms. Allen confirmed that,

until February 2023, Mother exhibited an intent to not reunify with Child. Id.

at 22, 62-63. Although Foster Mother wanted Mother to remain involved in

Child’s life, Ms. Allen stated that Mother “wanted to be known as a surrogate.”

Id. at 19.

      Indeed, Ms. Allen testified that Mother indicated a desire to sign

paperwork voluntarily terminating her parental rights (“VOLs”). Subsequent

to advising Mother to consider this decision further, Mother contacted Ms.

Allen at the end of October 2022, and reiterated her desire to voluntarily

terminate her parental rights, as follows:
      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Between September of 2022 and February
      of 2023, did you speak with Mother?

      MS. ALLEN: Yes.

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      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And what was the nature of your
      conversations with her?

      MS. ALLEN: Mother contacted me. And she expressed that she
      wanted to sign VOLs.

      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: As a result, did you have VOLs drafted?

      MS. ALLEN: Not until November.

      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Why did you wait to have them drafted until
      November?

      MS. ALLEN: I informed Mother that I thought she was making an
      impulsive decision. I told her that after suffering the miscarriage,
      I really believe that she needed to take time to just grieve her
      los[s] and consult with her therapist.

      And then I told her, you know, after you consult with your
      therapist, after you take some time, contact me. And we’ll talk
      again. Mother contacted me at the end of October of 2022.

      And she stated, “Remember you told me that I should take time
      to think about signing VOLs?” I stated, “Yes.” She stated, “Well
      I still want to sign the paperwork.”

Id. at 15-16.

      Moreover, in December 2022, after contacting Foster Mother for her

address, Mother sent Child’s social security card and birth certificate, as well

as milestone letters for Child, to Foster Mother. Id. at 21, 71-72, 113. Foster

Mother corroborated that Mother did not want reunification at that time. She

testified, “[Mother] told me to take care of [Child], not to worry about her.

She told me, during the conversation when she asked for my address, that

that would be the last time that she would call.” Id. at 72-73. As such, and

of significance, Ms. Allen recognized that Mother “had not taken steps to take

and maintain a place of importance in [Child]’s life” from September 2022 to

February 2023. Id. at 26.

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       Once Mother requested visitation in February 2023, she was offered and

participated in two supervised visits prior to the subject hearing, one in

February and one in March 2023. Id. at 17-18.8 As recounted by Ms. Allen,

Mother did not request for such visitation to be expanded. Id.

       While Mother never executed documentation to voluntarily terminate

her parental rights and subsequently expressed a desire for reunification and

re-engaged in visitation, given Mother’s clear desire to relinquish her parental

role and failure to perform parental duties in the six months immediately

preceding the filing of the termination petition, we discern no abuse of

discretion in the court’s finding grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1). Hence, we do not disturb it.

       Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1), we next must determine whether termination was proper under

Section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d

at 267.     “[T]he determination of the child’s ‘needs and welfare’ requires

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.          The

‘utmost attention’ should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of

permanently severing the parental bond.” Id. (internal citations omitted). As

our Supreme Court recently explained in Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085,

____________________________________________

8 When asked about the visitation schedule, Ms. Allen explained, “Because
there was no visitation order in the last [c]ourt order from January; she had
one visit in February and one visit in March.” N.T., 4/3/23, at 17.

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1113 (Pa. 2023), “a court conducting a Section 2511(b) analysis must

consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from

severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the parental bond

is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis, which includes a

determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child,

i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical,

and emotional needs and welfare.” K.T., supra (emphasis added).

      In addition, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must

also include consideration of other important factors.” Id. While not inventing

an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained that the inquiry must

consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present in the record,

including, but not limited to, “the child’s need for permanency and the length

of time in foster care…; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and

bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of

love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.”   Id. (footnote omitted); see

also id. at 1113 n.28.

      In concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves

Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to

Section 2511(b), the trial court stated:
      With regards to [Section] 2511(b), this court finds that Child does
      not have a parental bond with either Mother or Father in this case.
      Even if Child recently recognized Mom at one of the two visits that
      she had this year, there is no indication of a parent/child bond.

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      The last visit -- I believe the testimony was that the visit in March
      ended early after [C]hild -- Mom said Child was exhausted. The
      testimony from the CUA worker is that Child didn’t want to even
      interact with Mom and put a toy in-between [her and] Mother.
      There is no indication of a parent/child bond, which would be
      impossible for Parents to have given their lack of contact with
      Child during Child’s life.

      Due to the lack of visitation, it would have been impossible for
      Parents, given that they did not avail themselves for more visits,
      to establish a parental bond. I find that Child would suffer no
      irreparable harm if the rights of Parents were terminated, as Child
      has been having all of [her] needs met by [Foster Mother], who
      has been there for this [C]hild.

      I am heartened by the fact that [Foster Mother], and I hope that
      Parents will avail themselves of this, [does] not want to eliminate
      Parents from Child’s life. I would encourage Parents to avail
      themselves of [Foster Mother’s] willingness to have them
      participate in Child’s life.

      This is not something that happens every day when we’re in this
      situation in court. And I would encourage Parents to avail
      themselves so they can continue to be present in Child’s life. But
      I do find at this time it’s in Child’s best interest to change the goal
      to adoption, as Child has been in the same home since Child was
      four days of age. Child’s needs are being met by [Foster Mother].

      Child has not -- [Parents do not] meet any of Child’s needs. And
      I find that Child, at this young age, it’s very important for Child to
      have permanency. This is a child, it should be noted, that has
      special needs and is receiving various types of therapies that
      Parents are not familiar with.

      They don’t know where Child is receiving the therapy at this point.
      There was no testimony that they would be able to care for Child.
      And I find that it would be in Child’s best interest to free Child for
      adoption.

N.T., 4/3/23, at 133-35 (cleaned up; internal punctuation and capitalization

also corrected).

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      Conversely, in arguing a lack of clear and convincing evidence that

termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves Child’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b),

Mother baldly asserts that she wants to visit with Child and reestablish a bond.

See Mother’s Brief at 19.

      Upon review, the record supports the finding that termination favors

Child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b).        Mother’s visitation with

Child progressed to unsupervised visitation in March 2022, and then to

overnight, weekend visitation in May 2022.       See N.T., 4/3/23, at 13, 40;

Permanency Review Orders, 3/1/22 & 5/31/22. Ms. Allen acknowledged that,

“to her knowledge,” such visitation was “appropriate.” N.T., 4/3/23, at 40.

However, Mother then ceased participation in visitation in September 2022,

after suffering a miscarriage. N.T., 4/3/23, at 13. While Mother resumed

supervised visitation in February 2023, Ms. Allen raised the following

concerns:
      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Since September of 2022, how many visits
      had [Mother] had with [Child]?

      MS. ALLEN: The two in 2023; the one in February and the one in
      March.

      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And at this time, would you have concerns
      recommending any sort of unsupervised contact with [Child]?

      MS. ALLEN: Yes.

      [COUNSEL FOR DHS]: And what are those concerns?

      MS. ALLEN: [Child] is no longer familiarized with her mother. At
      the last visit, [Child] wouldn’t even engage in the visit unless Ms.
      [C.], who is [Foster Mother]’s aunt, unless she was in the visitation

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      room. When Ms. [C.] tried to walk out the room, [Child] began
      crying, screaming. She wouldn’t let Mother touch her. So she
      was asked to stay inside. [Child] would not interact with her
      mother throughout the visit. She actually put a toy in-between
      the two of them to separate them.

Id. at 18.

      Significantly, Mother failed to engage in visitation with her young child

for a period of five months, from the time Child was 16 months old until almost

two years old. As such, despite any prior visitation and contact, Ms. Allen

opined that a parent-child bond did not exist between Mother and Child. Id.

at 35-36. She testified that Child “is just not comfortable” with Mother and

would not suffer any irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were

terminated. Id. at 26-27.

      Instead, Ms. Allen indicated that Child “is very much bonded with the

family, with [Foster Mother] and her aunt” and looks to Foster Mother for her

“daily parental needs.” Id. at 37-38. Notably, Child had been in her current

pre-adoptive foster home since she was four days old. Id. at 37, 66, 79-89.

Ms. Allen described, “[Child] is very playful with [Foster Mother]. She’s very

attached to her.” Id. at 37. Foster Mother further observed, “[Child] is a

very, very happy little girl.” Id. at 78-79.

      Moreover, Foster Mother testified that Child has gross motor delays and

did not believe that Mother would be able to care for her. She stated, “[Child]

has gross motor delays. She is not able to walk. … In addition to physical

therapy, she does receive occupational therapy and speech therapy. … And

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just the care that she requires, I’m not sure if [Parents] would be able to do

it.” Id. at 79.

       Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the record corroborates the

trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights best

serves Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

pursuant to Section 2511(b). As such, we do not disturb it. Since our review

confirms that there was a sufficient basis for the involuntary termination of

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), we affirm

the trial court’s decree.

       Given our disposition concerning termination, Mother’s appeal from the

goal change order is moot. See In the Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905,

917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super.

2002)) (“[E]ven if Father had not waived his goal change claim, it would be

moot in light of our decision to affirm the court’s termination decrees.”).9

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the termination decree and dismiss

the goal change order as moot.

       Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed as moot.

____________________________________________

9 Even if not moot, for the reasons we have already discussed throughout this

memorandum with respect to termination, the record confirms that changing
Child’s goal to adoption is in her best interest. See In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084,
1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011).

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Date: 10/3/2023

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