Court Opinion

ID: 9549480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:19:22.797623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:23.346342
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and this court’s decision in State v. Monroe, 103 Idaho 129, 645 P.2d 363 (1982), I must dissent.
Edwards held:
“When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.” 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d at 386.
*532This court adopted Edwards and the reasoning contained therein in State v. Monroe, supra. Today the court departs from that reasoning in its conclusion that Mr. Calegar is arguing for the non-admission of non-statements. One wonders why the prosecutor would argue to admit those statements if they were not effective. We cannot, at the appellate level, intelligently evaluate what effect the admission of those statements may have had on the jury in the drama of the actual courtroom setting. Although Mr. Calegar did not make a dramatic statement of guilt, the inferences to be drawn from that testimony may well have influenced the jury. The rules announced in Edwards and Monroe are clear. Once the defendant has invoked his right to counsel, any further interrogation must cease; and if further interrogation does take place at the police officers’ instigation, those statements must be suppressed. In failing to follow this clearcut rule, the majority is encouraging that behavior which the exclusionary rules seek to discourage. In circumstances such as this the police may very well gamble by continuing the questioning in anticipation that at least three members of this court will find it to be “harmless error.”
This court, in fulfilling its responsibilities to supervise the administration of justice, has a duty to encourage adherence to, not evasion of, the procedural safeguards which promote fair trials and due process.
Additionally, the question of consent goes to the admissibility of the suitcase and its contents. The trial court admitted the suitcase over defendant’s objection, finding that the consent was voluntarily and intelligently given. Based on Monroe and Edwards it is clear that this was not a valid waiver. The majority ignores the consent issue and bases its holding on another exception to the warrant requirement. A review of the record reflects that consent was the only issue raised below to support admitting the evidence. It is a rule of appellate review that issues not raised below will not be passed upon by this court on appeal.
The majority is correct that this area of criminal law is fraught with confusion. The majority is likewise correct in setting forth two justifications for allowing searches incident to an arrest, those being (1) to secure the safety of the police officers making the arrest, and (2) to prevent the destruction of evidence. However, neither of these justifications is present in this case. The suitcase was seized by the arresting officers, thereby precluding any possibility that the defendant might obtain a weapon from it or destroy the evidence it contained. The cases cited by the majority, including New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), all involved a search conducted at the scene of the arrest, i.e., “incident to the arrest”. In the instant case, the search of the suitcase was conducted several hours later, purportedly with the defendant’s consent. Belton concerned the ambiguity of what area is within the immediate control of the arrestee. The court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” 453 U.S. 460, 101 S.Ct. 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 775 (emphasis supplied). The court then reasoned that since the passenger compartment is within the reach of the arrestee, so also will the containers be within his reach. The holding of Belton is in keeping with the purpose behind this exception to the warrant requirement. In footnote 3, 101 S.Ct. 2864, the court stated:
“Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic content. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”
As stated above, the search in the instant case cannot be justified by either of those purposes. Additionally, for emphasis sake, the search here was not contemporaneous with the arrest; therefore it could not be “incident to the lawful arrest.” The majority seems to recognize this argument When *533it includes the language of United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974):
“It is also plain that searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention. If need be, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960), settled this question. There the defendant was arrested at his hotel, but the belongings taken with him to the place of detention were searched there. In sustaining the search, the Court noted that a valid search of the property could have been made at the place of arrest and perceived little difference
‘when the accused decides to take the property with him, for the search of it to occur instead at the first place of detention when the accused arrives there ....”’ 415 U.S. 803, 94 S.Ct. 1237, 39 L.Ed.2d 775.
Edwards involved a search of defendant’s clothing ten hours after his arrest. There was no substitute clothing available that late at night and as soon as substitute clothing was available it was provided. Additionally, the court noted that this was the standard practice in that city. The court stated, “[t]his was no more than taking from respondent the effects in his immediate possession that constituted evidence of crime.” It can logically be contended that because Edwards still had his clothing the evidence it contained could still be destroyed. In the instant case the suitcase . was within the control of the police, there was no possibility that the evidence it contained would be destroyed, and it would have been of little inconvenience for the authorities to procure the required search warrant. The reasoning of the dissent in Edwards is a more correct statement of the law.
“As the Court has repeatedly emphasized in the past, ‘the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” ’ Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576. Since it is conceded here that the seizure of Edwards’ clothing was not made pursuant to a warrant, the question becomes whether the Government has met its burden of showing that the circumstances of this seizure brought it within one of the ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The Court finds a warrant unnecessary in this case because of the custodial arrest of the respondent. It is, of course, well settled that the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search or seizure incident to a constitutionally valid custodial arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685. But the mere fact of an arrest does not allow the police to engage in warrantless searches of unlimited geographic or temporal scope. Rather, the search must be spatially limited to the person of the arrestee and the area within his reach, Chimel v. California, supra, and must, as to time, be ‘substantially contemporaneous with the arrest,’ Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, 84 S.Ct. 889, 891, 11 L.Ed.2d 856; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-368, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883-884, 11 L.Ed.2d 777.”
The dissent then concluded that there was no justification for dispensing with the warrant requirement, the police had ample time to seek a warrant, and exigent circumstances were not present to excuse their failure to do so.
The search involved here was removed in time from the arrest, the suitcase was secured, and the police had ample time to procure a search warrant. Their failure to do so made the search “unreasonable” under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
*534In footnotes, the majority states that its disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to discuss the automobile exception, and the probable cause exception to the warrant requirement. These exceptions, as well as the incident to a lawful arrest exception, were not argued or briefed either below or to this court. Any decision or discussion should be based on a full factual development, which is not present here. Consequently, no comment is made in this dissent.
Finally, in a footnote, the majority states that this search would have been justified under an inventory search. While this may be true, no such inventory search was conducted and it is not the role of this court to create facts to support a conclusion.
I would reverse the holding of the district court and remand in light of Edwards v. Arizona, supra and State v. Monroe, supra.
BISTLINE, J., concurs.