Court Opinion

ID: 9368752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 21:06:13.501493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.649079
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Banks, 2023-Ohio-292.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        SCIOTO COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                  :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                     : CASE NO. 22CA3980 &
                                                  CASE NO. 22CA3981
        v.                                      :

KACEY D. BANKS,                                 :
and Allegheny Casualty Company
and Lee Bail Bonds, LLC,                        : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendants-Appellants.                  :

_________________________________________________________________

                                           APPEARANCES:

George L. Davis, IV, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellants.

Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay S.
Willis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Portsmouth, Ohio, for
appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:1-26-23
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is an appeal from Scioto County Common Pleas Court

judgments that found Lee Bail Bonds, LLC and Allegheny Casualty

Company, appellants herein, did not show cause why judgment should

not be ordered in bond forfeiture proceedings.

        {¶2}     Kacey D. Banks, defendant below, was convicted of various

drug-related offenses in two cases.                 After Banks failed to appear

at sentencing, the trial court ordered his bond forfeited and,
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SCIOTO,     22CA3980 & 22CA3981

after a show-cause hearing, entered a judgment against appellants

in each case.

     {¶3}   Appellants assign one error for review:

            “THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED BY
            ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE SURETIES.”

     {¶4}   In May 2020, a Scioto County Grand Jury returned an

indictment that charged Banks with multiple drug-related offenses

(Trial Court Case No. 20CR109A (Appellate Case No. 22CA3981)).      In

August 2020, a Scioto County Grand Jury returned an indictment that

charged Banks with multiple drug-related offenses (Trial Court Case

No. 20CR470A (Appellate Case No. 22CA3980)).

     {¶5}   In Case No. 20CR109A, the trial court released Banks on a

$50,000 surety bond posted by Smith Bonds and Surety.   After the

indictment in Case No. 20CA470A, the court granted the state’s

motion to revoke the bond and released Smith Bonds and Surety.      On

July 22, 2020, the trial court decided to order a $250,000 cash or

surety bond and, on September 28, 2020, Lee Bail Bonds and

Allegheny Company, appellants herein, posted the $250,000 surety

bond in both Case No. 20CR109A and Case No. 20CR470A.

     {¶6}   On June 28, 2021, Banks entered a no contest plea to

trafficking in a Fentanyl-related compound with a major drug

offender specification, a first-degree felony.    The trial court
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SCIOTO,    22CA3980 & 22CA3981

scheduled sentencing for July 30, 2021.    When Banks failed to

appear for sentencing, the court, pursuant to R.C. 2937.35, ordered

forfeiture of bail in both cases, issued a bench warrant for Banks’

arrest, notified appellants, and ordered appellants to show cause

why judgment should not be entered for the bond amount set forth in

each case.

    {¶7}   On January 27, 2022, the trial court held a show cause

hearing.     Andrew Callif testified that Lee Bail Bonds acted as his

sub-agent and acknowledged they had not yet apprehended Banks.

    We * * * had his family sign the bond. We had him on ankle
    monitor. He would call us every week, which he would do.
    We * * * follow the monitor, as the company could too. He
    would always check in with us.     He would * * * come in
    after his court date * * * to let us know what’s going on.
    And like he made every single court date, and * * * I guess
    he made a * * * plea deal * * * and he had a Codefendant,
    Promise Hollings.

    * * *

    And when they were driving down here to * * * come to the
    sentencing, she came down * * * and he ripped off his angle
    monitor on I-75. I think it was near Detroit. And put it
    in a nice bag, and we located it. But we got him to every
    single court date * * * just after he pled guilty to it,
    you know, his lawyer * * * [t]old me he was going to do
    decades in prison.    And you know * * * I’m guessing he
    wasn’t willing to do decades in prison.

The trial court asked Callif if they had tracked Banks after he

failed to appear and Callif stated that they spotted Banks once in

Detroit, but did not have sufficient staff to apprehend him.
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SCIOTO,     22CA3980 & 22CA3981

Callif explained:

     [W]e’ve had a sighting. I have people in Detroit working
     on it. * * * [W]e’ve been to Detroit.        We’ve been to
     Chicago.   You know, we’ve probable [sic.] put in about
     $10,000.00 so far to locating him.      We’re * * * doing
     everything we can possibly do * * * I’ve been in business
     for 20 years, my dad’s been in it for 50 years, and you
     know * * * obviously we’re doing everything we can possibly
     do * * *. [Y]ou know he pled guilty so he knows that when
     he gets caught, you know, he’s going to be doing some major
     time, so it makes it, you know, harder, I guess.

     {¶8}   Callif proposed payment to the trial court of a non-

refundable $10,000 monthly payment until they apprehended Banks,

but the court declined and entered judgment in 20CR109A and

20CR470A against Lee Bail Bonds, Phillip Lee, and Allegheny

Casualty Company for $250,000 per case, for a total of $500,000.

The court’s judgment states that “the Surety failed to produce the

defendant or show cause why judgment should not be ordered herein.”

This appeal followed1.

                                  I.

     {¶9}   In their sole assignment of error, appellants assert that

the trial court erred by entering judgment against the sureties.

In particular, appellants argue that the sureties showed good cause

why judgment should not have been entered against them.

     1
       On July 14, 2022, this Court consolidated Case No. 22CA3981
and 22CA3980.
                                                                         5
SCIOTO,    22CA3980 & 22CA3981

     {¶10} “A trial court’s bond-forfeiture decision is reviewed

using an abuse of discretion standard.”      State v. Slider, 184 Ohio

App.3d 68, 2009-Ohio-4179, 919 N.E.2d 775, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.), citing

State v. Green, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 02CA0014/02CA0019, 2002-Ohio-

5769, ¶ 11.    “‘[A]buse of discretion’ [means] an ‘unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or * * * a view or

action that no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.’ ”

State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d

818, ¶ 67, quoting State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-

4493, 894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23.      “An abuse of discretion includes a

situation in which a trial court did not engage in a ‘ “sound

reasoning process.” ’ ”      State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343,

2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34, quoting State v. Morris, 132

Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, quoting AAAA

Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50

Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).      The abuse of

discretion standard is deferential and does not permit an appellate

court to simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial

court.    Darmond at ¶ 34.

     {¶11} “Bail is security for the appearance of an accused to

appear and answer to a specific criminal * * * charge in any court

or before any magistrate at a specific time.”      State v. McKinney,
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SCIOTO,   22CA3980 & 22CA3981

2021-Ohio-3108, 177 N.E.3d 1022, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.), citing R.C.

2937.22(A).   Bail can be “cash or a bond.”   State v. Dye, 2018-

Ohio-4551, 122 N.E.3d 678, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.), citing Black’s Law

Dictionary 7th Ed.    Further, “[a] surety’s recognizance bond is a

contract between the surety and the state whereby the state agrees

to release the defendant into the surety’s custody and the surety

agrees to ensure the defendant is present in court on the

appearance date.”    City of Youngstown v. Edmonds, 2018-Ohio-3976,

119 N.E.3d 946, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Lott, 2014-Ohio-

3404, 17 N.E.3d 1167, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.); State v. Sherer, 108 Ohio

App.3d 586, 591, 671 N.E.2d 545 (2d Dist.1995); McKinney at ¶ 10.

     {¶12} R.C. 2937.36(C) sets forth bond forfeiture proceedings.

The court notifies the accused and each surety and requires each of

them to

     show cause * * * why judgment should not be entered against
     each of them for the penalty stated in the recognizance.
     If good cause by production of the body of the accused or
     otherwise is not shown, the court * * * shall thereupon
     enter judgment against the sureties or either of them, so
     notified, in such amount, not exceeding the penalty of the
     bond * * *. (Emphasis added.)

R.C. 2937.36(C).

     {¶13} Recently, this court examined the forfeiture statute in

McKinney, supra.    We noted that, in certain circumstances, “a

promisor may be excused from an obligation to the promisee when the
                                                                       7
SCIOTO,     22CA3980 & 22CA3981

performance promised is rendered impossible by operation of law, if

that impossibility was not foreseeable to the promisor.”    Id. at ¶

11, citing Scherer, 108 Ohio App.3d at 591.   In McKinney, the

surety alleged that, although McKinney had been arrested and jailed

in Michigan, the local sheriff declined to extradite McKinney.

Thus, the surety argued that McKinney’s incarceration made it

impossible by operation of law to apprehend and return McKinney,

and it should not be foreseeable that the sheriff would not

extradite McKinney or inform the surety about his incarceration in

Michigan.

     {¶14} After review, this court noted the lack of evidence

regarding the sheriff’s actions and disagreed with the surety.

Consequently, McKinney’s out-of-state incarceration neither

constituted “good cause” nor was unforeseeable.   Id. at ¶ 15.   If

the bond indicates that a defendant “shall not depart the

jurisdiction without leave,” but departs Ohio on his or her

volition without leave of the court, the flight of the accused “is

a business risk that the surety assumes,” and a trial court does

not err in forfeiting a bond under that circumstance.   McKinney at

¶ 14, citing State v. Sexton, 132 Ohio App.3d 791, 794, 726 N.E.2d

554 (4th Dist.1999), citing Scherer, 108 Ohio App.3d at 593-594,

671 N.E.2d 545 (2d Dist.1995).
                                                                        8
SCIOTO,   22CA3980 & 22CA3981

    {¶15} In Sexton, supra, this court held that a defendant's

incarceration in another state did not render impossible a surety's

performance in Ohio.    In Sexton, the defendant had been released on

bond in Lawrence County after arraignment, but failed to appear for

a preliminary hearing due to his incarceration in West Virginia.

Later, Sexton was released from the West Virginia jail, but was

arrested and incarcerated in South Carolina before his return to

Ohio.   Id. at 792.   The trial court conducted a bond forfeiture

hearing and entered judgment against the surety. Id.     On appeal,

the surety argued that Sexton's South Carolina incarceration should

be viewed as unforeseeable and that it was impossible to produce

Sexton's body.   This Court, however, rejected the surety's argument

and concluded that Sexton voluntarily fled the jurisdiction, that

his recognizance explicitly provided that he shall “not depart

without leave,” and that “[t]he flight of a defendant is a business

risk that a surety assumes.”     Id. at 794.

    {¶16} In the case sub judice, appellants argue that the trial

court’s finding of a lack of good cause is arbitrary and

constitutes an abuse of discretion.     Appellants contend that Banks

fully complied with the bond conditions up until his sentencing

hearing and then he absconded, and “[a]t that point, producing the

defendant was impossible.”     Further, appellants contend that “the
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SCIOTO,    22CA3980 & 22CA3981

fact that defendant was released pending sentencing after pleading

to charges that could send him to prison for decades was

unforeseeable.”   Appellants argue that in McKinney, the defendant

failed to appear for a pretrial hearing, while here Banks failed to

appear for a sentencing hearing after he entered a plea to serious

charges.    Appellants argue that “had the sureties been made aware

of the defendant’s plea and release pending sentencing, perhaps

they would not have wished to continue on their bond.”

     {¶17} However, appellee points out that appellants produced no

evidence to support a finding that their performance on the bond

had been rendered impossible by operation of law, or that such an

impossibility was foreseeable to the surety.    Moreover, appellee

also notes that appellants posted this surety bond with knowledge

that Banks’ bond previously had been revoked in Case No. 20CR109A

due to his arrest for the offenses involved in Case No. 20CR470A.

Obviously, this particular defendant exhibited characteristics that

would appear to elevate his risk of non-appearance.

     {¶18} It is not a trial court’s responsibility to notify a

surety of each decision in the case.    In State v. Stevens, the

Supreme Court of Ohio observed:

     The foregoing precedents make it abundantly clear that a
     surety is charged with the knowledge of when its defendant
     is to appear in court on the date set for trial. The surety,
     by posting bail bond, guarantees that it will produce the
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SCIOTO,     22CA3980 & 22CA3981

     defendant in court when called. State, ex rel. Howell, v.
     Schiele (1949), 85 Ohio App. 356, 40 O.O. 234, 88 N.E.2d
     215, affirmed (1950), 153 Ohio St. 235, 41 O.O. 249, 91
     N.E.2d 5. See Hughes, supra. With respect to the instant
     cause, the date the defendant pled guilty was the date set
     for his trial. Had the surety performed its duty of
     following the progress of defendant's case as well as his
     whereabouts, it would have had actual notice in open court
     that the defendant had pled guilty and that the bond was
     continued. Since the surety did not attend the proceeding
     where the court continued the bond, the surety had
     constructive notice of the continuation by way of the
     court's journal entry. In our view, the surety was afforded
     sufficient due process by the trial court in a manner
     provided by Crim.R. 46(J).

30 Ohio St.3d 25, 27, 505 N.E.2d 972 (1987).

     {¶19} Sureties are provided constructive notice of a

continuation of bond by way of the court's entry, and are obligated

to remain informed about the status of its principle's case.       State

v. AAA Sly Bail Bonds, 5th Dist. Richland No. 17-CA-56, 2018-Ohio-

2943, ¶ 65.     Thus, if a surety perceives that continuation of bond

may be too risky, it may choose to apply for a discharge of the

bond.     See Crim.R. 46 and R.C. 2937.40.   Id.   In the case at bar,

appellants had constructive notice of the status of the cases.

     {¶20} As noted above, the act of fleeing to another

jurisdiction without a court’s permission should be reasonably

foreseeable by the surety.     Sherer, 108 Ohio App.3d 586 at 594, 671

N.E.2d 545.     Here, the trial court complied with the bond

forfeiture statute, informed the surety about the defendant’s
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SCIOTO,   22CA3980 & 22CA3981

failure to appear and held a hearing to provide appellants the

opportunity to show cause as to why judgment should not be entered

against them.   Therefore, in our view the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it failed to find good cause why judgment

should not have been entered against appellants.

    {¶21} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellants’ sole assignment of error and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                         JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
SCIOTO,   22CA3980 & 22CA3981

                                                                    12

                           JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that appellee
recover of appellants the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.

          A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

    BY:_____________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                          NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.