Court Opinion

ID: 9607699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:01:22.125402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:59.785048
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that there were exigent circumstances that excused the police from obtaining a search warrant.
The evidence shows that Phillips was on temporary leave from the state penitentiary, where he had been serving sentences for forgery in the first degree and failure to appear in the first degree, both felonies.* 1 He had failed to report to his parole officer, and had failed to respond to the parole officer’s repeated demands that he report. An arrest warrant had been issued for him on a charge of escape in the first degree, a class B felony.2
The police had probable cause to believe that Phillips was in defendant’s trailer. They were aware of the nature and gravity of Phillips’ current offense and his prior conviction for failure to appear. Phillips was aware that a warrant had been *605issued for his arrest and that the police were attempting to serve that warrant. The sparsely populated, rural area would have facilitated his escape. By concealing himself inside defendant’s trailer, he effectively tried to escape the service of the arrest warrant. Although the police did not see Phillips running away from the trailer, it is unreasonable to suggest that they could not have reasonably inferred that he would try. Under the totality of the circumstances, it was perfectly reasonable for the police to infer that Phillips would attempt to escape.
The record does not support the majority’s assertion that police backup units were only 15 minutes away. 81 Or App at 603. Corson testified that it would take backup units 15 minutes to arrive “if there had been any officers available.” I find no evidence in the record on the question whether police backup was, in fact, available at the time.
The majority opinion is woolgathering when it asserts: “It is plain from the record that Rutledge could have secured the east side [of the trailer] by walking from the northwest corner to the northeast corner of the trailer, while Corson was in the vehicle parked at the southwest corner” and that “there was a telephone in Schoenecker’s trailer which could have been used to obtain either assistance or a telephonic warrant.” 81 Or App at 604. The only testimony in the record on those points is Corson’s, and it is directly to the contrary. Further, even assuming that Corson could have used the Schoeneckers’ telephone, a fact not in evidence, there is no evidence that Corson could have observed the area while inside the Schoeneckers’ trailer. His testimony that that would leave Rutledge “in a dangerous situation” was unchallenged. State’s exhibit 4, a diagram of the area, makes the majority’s comments about what the police could have done little more than Monday morning quarterbacking.
Corson’s entry was made peaceably. He walked through an open door. When he met defendant, he immediately identified himself. He showed his badge and identification, told defendant who he was and his purpose and authority. Accepting the trial court’s findings of fact,31 conclude that *606the state has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that exigent circumstances justified searching defendant’s trailer without a search warrant. I would hold that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress.

 Corson testified that he knew why Phillips had been sentenced to the state penitentiary.

 The maximum term of imprisonment for a Class B felony is 10 years. ORS 161.605(2).

The trial court’s findings that escape in the first degree is not a “grave offense” and that there was no strong likelihood that Phillips would try to escape appear to me to be conclusions rather than findings of fact. If they are conclusions, they are not binding on this court. State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 585 P2d 681 (1978).