Court Opinion

ID: 9915560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 19:00:38.909468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:38.449713
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20276        Document: 00517022998             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/05/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                     January 5, 2024
                                      No. 23-20276
                                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Paulo Jorge Da Costa Casqueiro Murta,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:17-CR-514-8
                     ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Circuit Judge:*
         The original opinion in this case was issued by this panel on November
   28, 2023. We now GRANT the motion to recall the mandate and DENY
   the petition for panel rehearing. We therefore WITHDRAW our previous
   opinion and SUBSTITUTE the following:
         Plaintiff-Appellant the United States of America (the “Govern-
   ment”) appeals the district court’s order granting the motion of Defendant-

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-20276      Document: 00517022998          Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/05/2024

                                    No. 23-20276

   Appellee Paulo Jorge Da Costa Casquiero Murta to dismiss his indictment.
   Because the district court did not err in dismissing the indictment pursuant
   to the Speedy Trial Act, but failed to properly determine whether the dismis-
   sal should be with or without prejudice, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
   remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Murta, a foreign national, was charged with conspiracy to commit
   money laundering, conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
   and money laundering. His indictment details a criminal conspiracy between
   two United States residents, Roberto Enrique Rincon Fernandez (“Rincon”)
   and Abraham Jose Shiera Bastidas (“Shiera”), their U.S. businesses, and
   various then-current and former officials of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.
   (“PDVSA”), Venezuela’s state-owned oil and energy company. The
   criminal enterprise was essentially a bribery and money laundering scheme:
   Rincon, Shiera, and their businesses would send money and gifts to PDVSA
   officials in exchange for contract awards and priority payment status during
   Venezuela’s liquidity crisis. Murta, then a citizen of Portugal and
   Switzerland, worked in Portugal for a wealth management firm and allegedly
   assisted the bribery and money laundering scheme by facilitating or
   fabricating various financial transactions. On March 20, 2018, Murta
   participated in an interview in Lisbon, Portugal with four officials from the
   United States Department of Homeland Security and one inspector with the
   Portuguese judicial police. He was interviewed about his relationships with
   members of the alleged international conspiracy and the business entities
   associated with it. More than a year later, on April 24, 2019, Murta was
   named in a superseding indictment filed in the Southern District of Texas,
   for his alleged involvement in the bribery and laundering scheme. Murta
   fought extradition for almost two years. After being transported to Houston,
   Murta made his initial court appearance on July 12, 2021.

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           Murta’s trial date was first set for August 30, 2021, but several
   district-wide special ends-of-justice continuance orders delayed his trial until
   October 13 at the earliest because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently,
   on August 30, 2021, the district court reset the trial date to December 13,
   2021. Pretrial proceedings continued for the next month and a half, without
   either party seeking a continuance or filing additional motions. Then, on
   November 8, 2021, the court entered a sua sponte ends-of-justice
   continuance order resetting the trial date to March 21, 2022. Neither the
   Government nor Murta objected to the court’s sua sponte continuance at the
   time it was entered.
           Murta filed several dispositive motions between February 21 and
   February 24, 2022. On February 27, 2022, the Government filed a motion
   for a status conference concerning the Classified Information Procedures Act
   (“CIPA”), 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16,1 asserting that the trial team had been
   alerted to the existence of potentially discoverable information that was
   protected by the statute. At the status conference, the Government
   represented that an intelligence agency had an interest in the protected
   information at issue, and that it would take several months to resolve the
   procedural issues involved with permitting the court to review the classified
   documents, necessitating a delay of trial. As a result, the district court
   entered another ends-of-justice continuance, which reset the trial date to July
   25, 2022.
           On July 11, 2022, however, the district court granted several of
   Murta’s dispositive motions, including his motion to dismiss on statute of
   limitation grounds and his motion to suppress the statements he had made

           _____________________
           1
             CIPA governs the disclosure, admissibility, and use of classified information in
   federal criminal cases. See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 519-525 (5th Cir. 2011).

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   during the 2018 interview in Lisbon. The Government appealed those
   decisions, and, following oral argument, another panel of this court reversed
   and remanded the case for further proceedings. United States v. Rafoi, 60
   F.4th 982, 1007 (5th Cir. 2023) (“Murta I”). Following that remand, Murta
   filed renewed motions to dismiss on speedy trial grounds and to suppress on
   the theory that his statements during the same interview were involuntary.
   On May 16, 2023, the district court granted Murta’s motion to suppress, and,
   on the following day, granted his motion to dismiss. The Government
   appeals, contending that the district court erred in (1) its dismissal of the
   indictment for violation of both the Speedy Trial Act and the Speedy Trial
   Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and (2) its grant of Murta’s motion to
   suppress the statements he made during the 2018 pre-indictment interview
   in Lisbon.
    II. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT A
               SPEEDY TRIAL ACT VIOLATION OCCURRED
          Following remand, Murta renewed his motion to dismiss the
   indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, arguing that more than
   seventy days of non-excludable delay had elapsed before the commencement
   of trial. The district court agreed, specifically finding that 141 days of non-
   excludable delay had elapsed from Murta’s initial appearance to the original
   dismissal of the indictment. Central to that finding was the district court’s
   conclusion that (1) twenty-nine days of non-excludable delay accrued
   between October 13, 2021, and November 10, 2021; and (2) the November
   8, 2021 sua sponte ends-of-justice continuance order failed to toll the speedy
   trial clock “[b]ecause the requirements for excludable delay did not exist” at
   the time the order was entered, meaning that an additional fifty-nine days of
   non-excludable delay occurred between December 25, 2021, and February

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   21, 2022.2 Consequently, the district court dismissed the indictment with
   prejudice.
           On appeal, the Government contends that the district court made
   several errors in its calculation of non-excludable time. The Government first
   asserts—and Murta does not meaningfully dispute—that the district court
   failed to properly calculate the period of non-excludable delay between
   October 13, 2021, and November 10, 2021, because the parties’ filing of
   pretrial motions during that time paused the speedy trial clock, pursuant to
   18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). As the Government correctly observes, only
   twelve days of non-excludable delay elapsed during that period because the
   record reflects that pretrial motions were pending before the district court
   and paused the seventy-day clock until October 30.3 The Government next
   argues that the district court erroneously failed to exclude the fifty-eight days
   between December 25, 2021, and February 21, 2022, because the November
   8 continuance order tolled the speedy trial clock. Murta disagrees,
   contending that the November 8 continuance was invalid. Both parties agree,
   however, that the determination of whether a Speedy Trial Act violation
   occurred turns on the validity of the district court’s November 8, 2021 sua
   sponte continuance order. If that continuance order failed to toll the speedy
   trial clock, then—as the Government concedes—a violation occurred and
   dismissal was proper. This is because, as both parties correctly note, fifty-
   eight additional days of non-excludable time accrued between December 25,

           _____________________
           2
             The district court erroneously concluded that the period constituted fifty-nine
   days of excludable delay. But, as the Government ultimately argued before the district
   court, and now asserts on appeal, the correct calculation is fifty-eight days.
           3
            Thus, the district court erred in failing to exclude the days from October 13, 2021,
   to October 29, 2021, but was correct in finding that the twelve days from October 30, 2021,
   to November 10, 2021, were non-excludable.

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                                     No. 23-20276

   2021, and February 20, 2022, meaning that, as of February 20, 2022, seventy
   days of non-excludable time had elapsed before the commencement of trial.
          “We review the district court’s factual findings supporting its Speedy
   Trial Act ruling for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United
   States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 351 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v.
   Stephens, 489 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2007)). “Factual findings are ‘clearly
   erroneous only if, based on the entire evidence, we are left with the definite
   and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” United States v.
   Barry, 978 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Akins, 746
   F.3d 590, 609 (5th Cir. 2014)). “There is no clear error if the district court’s
   finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id. (quoting United
   States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008)).
          “The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 . . . requires that a criminal defendant’s
   trial commence within 70 days after he is charged or makes an initial
   appearance, whichever is later, see [18 U.S.C.] § 3161(c)(1), and entitles him
   to dismissal of the charges if that deadline is not met, § 3162(a)(2).” Bloate v.
   United States, 559 U.S. 196, 198-99 (2010). The Speedy Trial Act exempts
   from the seventy-day clock:
          Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by
          any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant
          or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the
          Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the
          basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking
          such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
          defendant in a speedy trial.
   18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Such “ends of justice” continuances only toll the
   Speedy Trial Act when “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either
   orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by
   the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and

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                                     No. 23-20276

   the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. In making its balancing determination,
   the court “shall” consider a non-exhaustive list of factors, including:

          (i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
          proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
          proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
          (ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the
          number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the
          existence of novel question of fact or law, that it is unreasonable
          to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for
          the trial itself within the time limits established by this section.
          ....
          (iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case
          which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to
          fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable
          time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant
          or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny
          counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government
          the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking
          into account the exercise of due diligence.
   Id. § 3161(h)(7)(B).

          The Supreme Court has recognized that, “[a]lthough the Act is clear
   that the findings must be made, if only in the judge’s mind, before granting
   the continuance . . . the Act is ambiguous on precisely when those findings
   must be ‘se[t] forth, in the record of the case.’” Zedner v. United States, 547
   U.S. 489, 506-07 (2006) (quoting § 3161(h)(7)(A)). In declining to resolve
   the ambiguity with a bright-line rule, the Court observed that “at the very
   least the Act implies that those findings must be put on the record by the time
   a district court rules on a defendant’s motion to dismiss under § 3162(a)(2),”
   and noted that “[t]he best practice, of course, is for a district court to put its
   findings on the record at or near the time when it grants the continuance.”

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   Id. at 507 & n.7. “Much of the Act’s flexibility is furnished by” the ends-of-
   justice provision, which “gives the district court discretion—within limits
   and subject to specific procedures—to accommodate limited delays for case-
   specific needs.” Id. at 498-99. Nevertheless, ends-of-justice continuances are
   “not automatic” and require “specific findings” before they can toll the
   Speedy Trial clock. Bloate, 559 U.S. at 213. The “failure to make any express
   finding on the record cannot be harmless error.” United States v. Dignam, 716
   F.3d 915, 921 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Zedner, 547 U.S. at 506-07). Although
   decided before Zedner, in United States v. Bieganowski we held that “[t]he
   only requirements for [an ends of justice continuance] are that the order
   memorializing the continuance indicate when the motion was granted, and
   that the reasons stated be and can be fairly understood as being those that actually
   motivated the court at the time it granted the continuance.” 313 F.3d 264, 283
   (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
          Our review of the November 8, 2021 continuance order reveals that,
   on its face, it failed to provide reasons that “can be fairly understood as being
   those that actually motivated the court at the time it granted the
   continuance.” Id. The order refers to and relies on “representations”
   contained in a non-existent motion to continue, purportedly filed by one of
   the parties. Additionally, the order states that “[t]he motion for continuance
   is therefore GRANTED.” But the parties (as well as the court) concede that
   no such motion ever existed. The district court explained that this
   incongruity was the product of its own mistake when it ruled on Murta’s
   renewed motion to dismiss:
          The Court misjudged the terms and tenue [sic] of the [covid
          continuance] Orders and did not make Scheduling Order
          adjustments. Moreover, while the Court included form
          exclusion language, suggesting that the basis for excludable
          delay existed, in fact, no basis was presented to the Court then
          or since. Because the requirements for excludable delay did not

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          exist at the time, the Court’s Scheduling Order was
          unconstitutionally presumptuous. Hence, the Court’s
          November 8, 2021, Order was ineffective in tolling the STA
          because of these failures.
   The district court also conceded that neither party had made
   “representations” at the time of the continuance that would have justified
   the use of such language in the order. Given the plain language of the order,
   and the district court’s express admission of error, we cannot and do not
   conclude that the justifications provided in the November continuance order
   “can be fairly understood as those that actually motivated the court at the
   time it granted the continuance.” Bieganowski, 313 F.3d at 283; see also United
   States v. Dent, No. 21-60569, 2022 WL 3133864, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2022)
   (per curiam) (reversing defendant’s conviction when Speedy Trial Act
   violation occurred in part because one of the district court’s continuance
   orders “appear[ed] to have been entered in error” and thus failed to toll the
   seventy-day period).

          Moreover, the record confirms that the district court did not clearly
   err in its factual conclusion that “the requirements for excludable delay did
   not exist at the time” the November continuance order was entered. At that
   time, trial was set for December 13, 2021, and the only pending motion was
   Murta’s September 15, 2021 motion for review of the magistrate judge’s
   detention order. Previously, on August 11, 2021, Murta had filed a motion to
   dismiss the indictment grounded on the statute of limitations and another for
   discovery and inspection. On August 30, 2021, the district court entered an
   order deferring consideration of the motion to dismiss until the close of
   discovery and also entered a separate order denying without prejudice
   Murta’s motion for discovery and inspection. When the district court
   entered the November continuance order approximately a month before trial,
   neither party had filed additional discovery or dispositive motions.

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   Additionally, as of November 2021, neither party had moved for a
   continuance, and trial of the matter had been continued twice already because
   of the pandemic.4 And, for his part, Murta had expressed his trial readiness
   as early as the August 23, 2021 pretrial conference. Notwithstanding the
   Government’s arguments to the contrary, we are not “left with the definite
   and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” by the district
   court’s conclusion that the November continuance was unwarranted. Barry,
   978 F.3d at 217.
          The Government raises several challenges to the district court’s
   refusal to exclude the period of delay resulting from its November 8, 2021
   continuance. Each challenge is unavailing. The Government first contends
   that the November continuance order was facially valid because of its
   reference to the “miscarriage of justice” factor from 18 U.S.C. §
   3161(h)(7)(B)(i), citing several cases where we have held that a disputed
   ends-of-justice continuance was valid. But the Government’s argument is
   unpersuasive, as the cited cases involved continuance orders that (1)
   invariably complied with the procedural safeguards of § 3161(h)(7), and (2)
   were not entered by operation of the court’s admitted mistake. See, e.g.,
   United States v. Ayika, 837 F.3d 460, 465 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2016) (involving
   multiple continuances requested by the defendant where the district court
   “expressly stated . . . [its] reasons for finding that the interests of justice
   outweighed the defendant’s and the public’s interests in a speedy trial”);
   United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d 858, 862-63 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2010)
   (affirming district court’s exclusion of time resulting from a continuance
   requested by the defendant who represented that his attorney would be

          _____________________
          4
            See COVID-19 Special Orders – Houston/Galveston Division, U.S. Dist. &
   Bankr. Ct. of S.D. Tex., https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/page/covid-19-special-
   orders-houstongalveston-division (last visited Nov. 20, 2023).

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   absent due to National Guard training and thus required additional time to
   prepare for trial); United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 357 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (excluding time where district court made on-the-record finding that the case
   was “manifestly complex” and that it would be necessary for defendant’s
   new attorneys to be given more time to prepare for trial); United States v.
   Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s
   exclusion of time resulting from a continuance where case-specific finding
   was made that additional time was necessary for defendants to procure
   transcripts in preparation for trial); United States v. Madrid, 610 F. App’x
   359, 372 n.15 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (excluding time resulting from
   continuance where case-specific finding was made that the case was complex
   and involved voluminous discovery). We therefore reject the Government’s
   contention that the November continuance order’s mere recitation of the
   “miscarriage of justice” language from 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) sufficed
   to toll the speedy trial clock when the order on its face appears to have been
   entered mistakenly, and the district court itself conceded that it was entered
   in error. See, e.g., Bieganowski, 313 F.3d at 283 (holding that a valid
   continuance order must provide reasons that “can be fairly understood as
   being those that actually motivated the court at the time it granted the
   continuance”); Dent, 2022 WL 3133864, at *2 (holding that the continuance
   order failed to toll the speedy trial clock when it “appear[ed] to have been
   entered in error”).
          The Government next asserts that, notwithstanding the miscarriage
   of justice factor, the district court separately found that “a continuance is
   necessary to allow reasonable time for trial preparation.” That is an apparent
   reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv), which permits an ends-of-justice
   continuance on the district court’s determination that “the failure to grant a
   continuance . . . would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the
   Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking

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   into account the exercise of due diligence.” We have held that
   § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) requires, as part of the ends-of-justice analysis, a
   consideration of whether counsel for the parties have exercised due diligence.
   United States v. Blackwell, 12 F.3d 44, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1994). Nowhere in the
   November continuance order does the district court even recite such
   statutory language, let alone state its consideration of the parties’ exercise of
   due diligence. To the contrary, the district court later admitted that it simply
   included “form exclusion language” when it erroneously entered the
   November continuance order. The Government’s argument thus fails on this
   point. See id. at 47 (holding that ends-of-justice continuance did not toll the
   speedy trial clock when “[t]he record in this case does not reflect that
   Defense Counsel’s exercise of due diligence was considered by the trial
   court”).
          The Government also attempts to justify the continuance with post
   hoc rationalizations. This contention similarly misses the mark. The
   Government asserts that the district court’s “assessment” that additional
   time was needed to prepare for trial “was eminently reasonable” because,
   “by December 2021, the government had produced 7.6 million pages of
   discovery to Murta.” It further contends that “[t]he district court’s
   assessment . . . proved accurate” because Murta ultimately filed multiple
   dispositive motions in February 2022. However, the district court’s findings
   must be based exclusively on information available to it at the time the
   continuance was granted. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 506 (observing that “the
   Act is clear that the findings must be made, if only in the judge’s mind, before
   granting the continuance” (emphasis added)); Bieganowski, 313 F.3d at 283
   (holding that “the reasons stated” must be those “that actually motivated
   the court at the time it granted the continuance”). The fact that a large
   amount of discovery was disclosed, or multiple dispositive motions were

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   filed, after the November continuance is irrelevant to determining whether
   the continuance tolled the speedy trial clock.5
           Finally, the Government characterizes the district court’s refusal to
   exclude the time resulting from the continuance as an “extraordinary and
   unprecedented decision” that, “in effect, retroactively vacated the
   November Continuance Order.” The Government says that a district
   court’s ability to rescind ends-of-justice continuance orders would jeopardize
   the Government’s interest in relying on the permanence of court orders. The
   Government’s contention on this point is unpersuasive for at least two
   reasons: (1) courts routinely review ends-of-justice continuances to
   determine whether such orders effectively tolled the speedy trial clock, and
   (2) the Government’s argument presupposes that the November
   continuance was valid when entered.
           First, both district and appellate courts necessarily determine whether
   ends-of-justice continuances were valid at the time they were entered. See,
   e.g., Dent, 2022 WL 3133864, at *2 (reversing defendant’s conviction when
   Speedy Trial Act violation occurred in part because one of the court’s
   continuance orders “appear[ed] to have been entered in error” and thus
   failed to toll the 70-day period); United States v. Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 280 (5th
   Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s dismissal of the original indictment after
   the district court concluded that one of its continuance orders failed to toll
           _____________________
           5
              Relatedly, the Government implies that Murta’s failure to object to the
   November 8 continuance until February 2022 further justifies its tolling efficacy—a kind
   of waiver argument. But the Supreme Court has rejected such an interpretation, concluding
   that a defendant cannot waive the protections of the Speedy Trial Act since it would
   infringe on the public’s coexistent interest in a speedy trial. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 500-01
   (“The purposes of the Act . . . cut against exclusion on the grounds of mere consent or
   waiver . . . . [T]he Act was designed with the public interest firmly in mind. That public
   interest cannot be served, the Act recognizes, if defendants may opt out of the Act
   entirely.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)).

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   the speedy trial clock); United States v. Jones, 56 F.3d 581, 585 (5th Cir. 1995)
   (“In short, there is nothing in the record to justify a continuance . . . . [T]he
   indictment should have been dismissed on that basis.” (emphasis added)). The
   Government’s position here would effectively eliminate the district court’s
   ability to retroactively review whether an ends-of-justice continuance order
   tolled the speedy trial clock. This would have the paradoxical and inefficient
   effect of forcing the district court to proceed to trial in a matter that might
   otherwise have been dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, only to have
   the proceeding reversed on appeal. Notably, the Government offers no
   persuasive reason why we should deprive the district court of the first
   opportunity to consider the validity of its continuance order.
           Second, the Government’s framing of the issue presupposes the
   validity of the November continuance. For the reasons detailed above, we
   reject the Government’s contention that the November continuance order
   was valid, so the Government’s attempt to characterize the district court’s
   decision as an unprecedented intrusion into litigants’ interests in the
   permanence of valid court orders is unavailing.
           We therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its
   determination that the November continuance order failed to toll the speedy
   trial clock. Given the (1) twelve non-excludable days that accrued from
   October 30, 2021, to November 10, 2021; and (2) the fifty-eight non-
   excludable days that accrued from December 25, 2021, to February 20, 2022,
   a total of seventy non-excludable days had elapsed by February 20, 2022.6 A
   Speedy Trial Act violation thus occurred, and the district court was bound to
   dismiss the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (providing that the
           _____________________
           6
             We do not consider the parties’ arguments about the tolling effect of the March
   2022 ends-of-justice continuance order, because we agree that resolution of the Speedy
   Trial Act issue turns on the validity of the November 2021 continuance.

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                                      No. 23-20276

   indictment “shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant” should trial not
   commence within seventy days from the filing of the indictment or the
   defendant’s initial appearance).
       III. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
                     INDICTMENT WITH PREJUDICE
          Having determined that, although the district court erred in its total
   calculation of non-excludable days, that court was correct in its ultimate
   conclusion that a Speedy Trial Act violation occurred, we must next
   determine whether the court erred in dismissing the indictment with
   prejudice. “The decision whether to dismiss a complaint under the Speedy
   Trial Act with or without prejudice is entrusted to the sound discretion of the
   district judge and . . . no preference is accorded to either kind of dismissal.”
   United States v. Blevins, 755 F.3d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 2014) (alteration omitted)
   (quoting United States v. Blank, 701 F.3d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 2012)). “When
   the statutory factors are properly considered, and supporting factual findings
   are not clearly in error, the district court’s judgment of how opposing
   considerations balance should not lightly be disturbed.” United States v.
   Mancia-Perez, 331 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 2003) (alteration omitted) (quoting
   United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 327 (1988)). The statutory factors that
   the district court must consider in deciding whether to dismiss the
   indictment with or without prejudice are: (1) “the seriousness of the
   offense”; (2) “the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the
   dismissal”; and (3) “the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of
   this chapter and on the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
   Our review will focus on the district court’s evaluation of the first and third
   of those factors.
          As for the first factor, the district court correctly observed that the
   offense was relatively serious, given the penalties imposed for violation of 18
   U.S.C. § 1956—particularly, that a conviction could carry up to twenty years

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   of imprisonment. However, the court opined that “this factor is of little
   consequence since criminal charges are pending against Murta in Portugal.”
   The court cited to no authority to support the conclusion that charges
   pending in another country militate the severity of the crime under U.S. law
   and, even if it did, the Government correctly points out that although
   “Portuguese authorities have a pending investigation . . . no charges have
   been filed against Murta in Portugal.”7 We therefore conclude that the
   district court failed to properly consider this statutory factor, and we decline
   to afford any deference to its conclusion on this point.
          The third factor concerns the “impact of a reprosecution on the
   administration of [the Speedy Trial Act] and on the administration of
   justice.” Id. § 3162(a)(2). This factor “encompasses three concerns: (1) the
   defendant’s right to a timely trial; (2) the potential deterrent effect of a
   prejudicial dismissal on repeated violations of the Speedy Trial Act; and (3)
   the public’s interest in bringing the defendant to trial.” Blank, 701 F.3d at
   1090. “Also implicated by this factor is the presence or absence of prejudice
   to the defendant.” Mancia-Perez, 331 F.3d at 469.
          In a similar manner to its faulty analysis of the first factor, the district
   court weighed this third factor in favor of dismissal with prejudice, in part
   because “the people of Portugal have [as great a] stake in determining
   whether Murta’s conduct was of a criminal nature [as] the United States.”
   Again—just as with its evaluation of the first factor—the district court cited
   to no authority to support its conclusion that the interests of foreign citizens
   in prosecuting Murta supplant the interests of the American public in seeing
   him brought to trial in the United States. And, although that court did

          _____________________
          7
           At oral argument, counsel for the defendant conceded that nothing in the record
   demonstrates that Murta faced pending charges in Portugal.

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   evaluate the prejudice to Murta resulting from the Speedy Trial Act violation
   as it relates to his mental and physical health, it failed to consider “the most
   serious type of prejudice, i.e., the possibility that [the] defense was impaired
   by the substantial delay experienced in this case.” Blank, 701 F.3d at 1090.
   Because the statutory factors were thus not properly considered, reversal is
   warranted and remand is appropriate for proper application of the test
   outlined in § 3162(a)(2).
       IV. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
    INDICTMENT PURSUANT TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND RULE 48(B)
             OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

          In its order that was made the subject of this appeal, the district court
   concluded that, in addition to the Speedy Trial Act violation, the Speedy
   Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment and Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of
   Criminal Procedure were “independent bas[es] for dismissing th[e] case
   against [Murta] with prejudice.” We briefly address why the district court
   erred in so concluding.
          The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
   “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. CONST.
   amend. VI. “While ‘the ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution are
   designed to move at a deliberate pace,’ the ‘right of a speedy trial is
   necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
   circumstances.’” United States v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366, 373 (5th Cir.
   2020) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)). The
   determination whether a Speedy Trial Clause violation occurred is made
   through application of the Barker factors.8 See Goodrum v. Quarterman, 547
   F.3d 249, 257 (5th Cir. 2008). Likewise, “[t]he appropriate analysis under

          _____________________
          8
              Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

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   [Rule 48(b)] requires the application of the Barker factors.” United States v.
   Harrison, 918 F.2d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 1990). The Barker factors are: “(1)
   length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s diligence in asserting
   the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d at 373.
   The district court’s application of the Barker factors is reviewed de novo and
   its factual determinations concerning the speedy trial right are reviewed for
   clear error. Id.
          The first factor “functions as a triggering mechanism,” and is
   satisfied “if the trial has been delayed for at least one year.” See id. at 374.
   The parties do not dispute that it was so delayed. The second factor, the
   reason for the delay, examines “whether the government or the criminal
   defendant is more to blame.” Id. (quoting Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 91
   (2009)). The district court weighed this factor against the Government. The
   Government concedes that “the length of delay here was about four years,”
   but insists that the bulk of the delay resulted from (1) Murta’s own efforts to
   resist extradition and (2) the time that elapsed during the Government’s
   successful first appeal.
          We agree. Nearly half of the time constituting the four-year delay
   resulted from Murta’s extradition fight, which should not be held against the
   Government. See United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1995)
   (“[The defendant] cannot avoid a speedy trial by forcing the government to
   run the gauntlet of obtaining formal extradition and then complain about the
   delay that he has caused by refusing to return voluntarily to the United
   States.”). Additionally, seven months of that delay are attributable to the
   Government’s successful first appeal, which likewise should not be held
   against the Government. See United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir.
   2007) (“Because it was an important issue on which the government
   prevailed, we do not find that the government’s interlocutory appeal was
   unreasonable, and, therefore, we do not weigh the period of the interlocutory

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   appeal against the government.”). Only four months of that delay resulted
   from the Government’s request for a trial continuance—the March 2022
   continuance—which is comparatively slight.9 The district court thus erred
   when it weighed this factor heavily in favor of Murta.
           The third factor is the defendant’s diligence in asserting his or her
   speedy trial right. The “assertion of that right is a demand for a speedy trial,
   which will generally be an objection to a continuance or a motion asking to go
   to trial. At the very least, a defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial rights
   should manifest ‘his desire to be tried promptly.’” Id. at 211-12 (quoting
   United States v. Litton Sys., Inc., 722 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1984)). Here, the
   district court weighed this factor in favor of Murta after concluding that
   Murta repeatedly asserted his speedy trial right during pretrial proceedings.
   Critically, however, the district court failed to consider Murta’s two-year
   extradition fight in its evaluation of this factor—conduct that we have held
   weighs against the defendant. See United States v. Ansari, 48 F.4th 393, 400
   (5th Cir. 2022). We therefore conclude that the district court erred in
   weighing this factor as well. When balancing Murta’s protracted efforts to

           _____________________
           9
              The district court found that the March 2022 continuance, in which the
   Government alerted the court to a discovery issue involving CIPA, was the product of
   “intentional bad-faith delay.” Thus, the district court held that the second Barker factor
   “weigh[ed] heavily in Murta’s favor.” But neither the district court nor Murta point to any
   deliberate conduct that convinces us to make an inference of bad faith on the part of the
   Government. See Cowart v. Hargett, 16 F.3d 642, 647 (5th Cir. 1994) (“There has been no
   showing that the state intentionally delayed the proceedings in this case.”). The record,
   including the Government’s explanation of the events leading up to the March 2022
   continuance, indicates that, at most, the Government was negligent in its raising of the
   CIPA issue. Delays as a result of the Government’s negligence, however, weigh only
   slightly in favor of dismissal. See id. (“Unexplained or negligent delay is weighed against
   the state, but not heavily.”). The district court’s evaluation of this factor was therefore
   flawed, and, at most, it should have balanced the factor only slightly in favor of dismissal.

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   resist extradition against his repeated pre-trial assertions of the speedy trial
   right, this factor should at least be weighed neutrally.
           Finally, we consider the prejudice to the defendant. “The burden is
   ordinarily on the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice.” Duran-Gomez,
   984 F.3d at 379. “‘Actual prejudice’ is assessed in light of the three following
   interests of the defendant: (1) ‘to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;’
   (2) ‘to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;’ and (3) ‘to limit the
   possibility that the defense will be impaired.’” United States v. Harris, 566
   F.3d 422, 433 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). The
   impairment of the defense is considered the “most serious of the three types
   of prejudice.” Frye, 489 F.3d at 212 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Here,
   the district court focused on the length of Murta’s pretrial incarceration,
   Murta’s health concerns, and the fact that he was confined outside of his
   home country. Notably, the district court made no determination whether
   Murta’s defense was impaired by those circumstances. When considering
   that the second and third Barker factors weigh, respectively, slightly in favor
   of dismissal and neutrally, the district court’s findings of prejudice here do
   not convince us that, on balance, a Sixth Amendment violation occurred.
   And, because the same Barker factors govern the district court’s dismissal of
   the indictment based on Rule 48(b), the same conclusion applies. See
   Harrison, 918 F.2d at 474. Therefore, the district court’s judgment as to the
   Speedy Trial Clause and Rule 48(b) must be reversed.10

           _____________________
           10
              Given the history of this case and some findings by the district judge not
   discussed herein, we exercise our discretion by ordering reassignment of this case to a
   different district judge on remand. See Miller v. Sam Hous. State Univ., 986 F.3d 880, 893
   (5th Cir. 2021); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 763-64 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
   Further, because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the indictment pursuant to the
   Speedy Trial Act but remand and order that this case be reassigned to another district judge
   to evaluate whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice, we express no
   opinion as to whether the district court erred in granting Murta’s motion to suppress. This

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                                         No. 23-20276

                                      V. CONCLUSION
           We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the indictment
   pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, REVERSE the district court’s dismissal
   of the indictment with prejudice pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act,
   REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of the indictment pursuant to the
   Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment and Rule 48(b) of the Federal
   Rules of Criminal Procedure, VACATE the district court’s granting of the
   motion to suppress, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with
   this opinion. We further direct the Chief Judge of the Southern District of
   Texas to REASSIGN this case to another district judge for further
   proceedings on remand.

           _____________________
   is so that, on remand, the district court may decide whether dismissal of the indictment
   with prejudice is proper, thus terminating the case and mooting Murta’s suppression
   motion. On the other hand, the district court could decide on remand that dismissal without
   prejudice is proper, paving the way for the Government to refile charges against Murta. But
   the issues raised in Murta’s suppression motion will only become live again if the
   Government has both the ability and the desire to refile charges. Given the multiple
   outstanding contingencies on remand, resolution of Murta’s suppression motion would not
   involve a concrete legal issue and would be merely advisory. See Am. Stewards of Liberty v.
   Dep’t of Interior, 960 F.3d 223, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2020). We nevertheless vacate the district
   court’s order granting Murta’s motion to suppress so that, if necessary on remand, Murta
   could again file another suppression motion for the district court to determine in the first
   instance.

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