Court Opinion

ID: 9404891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 18:01:35.683351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:17.535087
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                              ____________                                    FILED
                                                                          June 23, 2023
                                No. 22-10412                             Lyle W. Cayce
                              ____________                                    Clerk

United States of America,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                    versus

Sherman Moore,

                                        Defendant—Appellant.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the Northern District of Texas
                        USDC No. 4:21-CR-309-1
               ______________________________

Before Smith, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:
       This case presents a pure question of statutory interpretation: What
does the phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation of children” in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(e) mean? The statute in question, titled “Sexual exploitation of chil-
dren,” criminalizes offenses relating to child pornography. It then provides
a mandatory sentencing enhancement for those who have two or more prior
state convictions “relating to the sexual exploitation of children.”
       Sherman Moore has two state convictions for indecency with a child.
The government contends that those convictions “clearly” relate “to the
                                 No. 22-10412

sexual exploitation of children,” so Moore should be subject to the enhance-
ment. Moore counters that “sexual exploitation of children,” in this context,
applies only to offenses relating to child pornography, so his sentence is not
subject to the enhancement.
       We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e)’s use of the phrase “relating to the
sexual exploitation of children” refers to any criminal sexual conduct involv-
ing children. Moore’s convictions for indecency with a child neatly fall
within that broad category, so we affirm the judgment of sentence.

                                       I.
       Sherman Moore pleaded guilty of indecency with a child under Texas
Penal Code § 21.11(a)(2) in 1992 and was placed on deferred adjudication
probation. He was convicted under the same statute in 1995 for a separate
offense and sentenced to eight years in prison. After serving six years, he was
placed on parole.
       In 2021, Moore pleaded guilty of sexual exploitation of children under
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The presentence report (“PSR”) did not include the
sentencing enhancement, but the government requested it in an objection to
the PSR. The government contended that Moore’s two state convictions for
indecency with a child made him subject to the enhancement. Over Moore’s
opposition, the district court agreed and sentenced Moore to 35 years’
imprisonment.
       Moore appeals, contending that his prior convictions are not convic-
tions “relating to the sexual exploitation of children.”

                                      II.
       Moore properly preserved the issue in the district court. Our review
is thus de novo. United States v. Hubbard, 480 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“We review the district court’s interpretation of a federal statute, as well as

                                       2
                                       No. 22-10412

its determinations regarding a prior conviction, de novo.” (footnotes
omitted)).

                                            III.
        To determine whether a defendant’s convictions under an indivisible
state law qualify as “predicate offenses” under a federal statute, we “‘look
only to the statutory definitions’—i.e., the elements—of a defendant’s prior
offenses, and not ‘to the particular facts underlying those convictions.’”1
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (quoting Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)). We then “line[] up that crime’s elements
alongside those of the generic offense and see[] if they match.” United States
v. Mendez-Henriquez, 847 F.3d 214, 218 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mathis v.
United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016)).
        So to determine whether Moore is subject to § 2251(e)’s sentencing
enhancement provision, we must first determine the conduct enumerated in
the generic offense (convictions “relating to the sexual exploitation of chil-
dren”) and then decide whether the elements of the Texas indecency-with-
a-child statute match.

                                            A.
        We begin by untangling the meaning of “relating to the sexual exploi-
tation of children.” We chart our course by laying out the proverbial direc-
tions of the statutory-interpretation rubric.
        Plain meaning is always the start. When interpreting statutory lan-
guage, words are given their ordinary, plain meanings, and language must be

        _____________________
        1
           The parties do not dispute that § 21.11(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code is
indivisible—it contains “a single . . . set of elements to define a single crime.” Mathis v.
United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2016).

                                             3
                                       No. 22-10412

enforced unless ambiguous. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560
U.S. 242, 251 (2010). This court is “authorized to deviate from the literal
language of a statute only if the plain language would lead to absurd results,
or if such an interpretation would defeat the intent of Congress.” Kornman
& Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir. 2008).
        But “[t]ext should never be divorced from context.” United States v.
Koutsostamatis, 956 F.3d 301, 306 (5th Cir. 2020). Depending on the phrase,
context can mean both the immediate clause and “the broader context of the
statute as a whole.” Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622
(5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
Statutory history, “the record of enacted changes Congress made to the rele-
vant statutory text over time,” can also provide helpful context. BNSF Ry.
Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893, 906 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis
removed); see also Thomas v. Reeves, 961 F.3d 800, 817 n.45 (5th Cir. 2020)
(en banc) (Willett, J., concurring).
        If applicable, canons of construction can be used to resolve remaining
ambiguity. See generally Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015). In very
rare cases, we may look to legislative history, but “[o]nly after application of
the principles of statutory construction, including the canons of construc-
tion.” Kornman, 527 F.3d at 451 (quoting Carrieri v. Jobs.com, Inc., 393 F.3d
508, 518–19 (5th Cir. 2004)). Regardless, its use is generally discouraged in
this circuit.2
        If these tools can’t get us out of stalemate, ties go to the runner—the

        _____________________
        2
         Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 428 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“[L]egislative history is relegated to a secondary source behind the language of the statute
in determining congressional intent; even in its secondary role legislative history must be
used cautiously.” (quoting Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1988))); see
also Thomas, 961 F.3d at 817 n.45 (Willett, J., concurring).

                                             4
                                 No. 22-10412

rule of lenity functions to resolve intractable ambiguity in a criminal defen-
dant’s favor. United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994).
       That sorted, we turn to the text.

                                      B.
       The title of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 is “Sexual exploitation of children.”
Subsections (a)–(d) prohibit various activities relating to child pornography.
       Subsection (e) then provides two potential sentencing enhancements.
First, a person is given a minimum of 25 years “if such person has one prior
conviction under this chapter, section 1591, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or
chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice), or under the laws of any State relating to aggravated
sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward,
or sex trafficking of children, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing,
sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.”
       Second, a person is given a minimum of 35 years “if such person has
2 or more prior convictions under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or
chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice), or under the laws of any State relating to the sexual
exploitation of children.”
       This case turns on the meaning of “relating to the sexual exploitation
of children” as used in the last clause of the two-conviction enhancement
provision.
Plain Meaning
       The phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation of children” is not
defined in § 2251. See also id. § 2256 (applicable-definitions section). We
thus begin by looking to the term’s “plain meaning at the time of enact-
ment.” Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 491 (2020).

                                       5
                                    No. 22-10412

       We fail to see a plain meaning of the term in isolation.
       The government provides us with dictionary definitions from a smat-
tering of time periods: In 2019, Black’s Law Dictionary defined “sexual
exploitation” as “[t]he use of a person, esp. a child, in prostitution, pornog-
raphy, or other sexually manipulative activity,”3 in 2007, one of Merriam-
Webster’s definitions of “exploit” was “to make use of meanly or unfairly
for one’s own advantage,”4 and in 2010, one of the New Oxford American
Dictionary’s definitions of “exploit” was to “use (a situation or person) in
an unfair or selfish way.”5 These definitions are too vague to define the term
clearly for our purposes. And although dictionaries can help decide plain
meaning, they can’t resolve ambiguity on their own. Yates, 574 U.S. at 537.
We need to look outside the phrase to decide what it means in context.
Statutory Structure & Context
       Section 2251 has some unusual structural elements, but none that sig-
nifies a clear meaning of “relating to the sexual exploitation of children.”
       The government contends that because the other federal statutes
referenced in the sentence-enhancement provisions (“chapter 71, chapter
109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice)”) include offenses other than child por-
nography, “[i]t is implausible that Congress intended to include so many
prior federal offenses, but chose to restrict qualifying state offenses to child
pornography production.” See United States v. Sanchez, 440 F. App’x 436,
440 (6th Cir. 2011). Perhaps.

       _____________________
       3
           Sexual exploitation, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
       4
           Exploit, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary (11th ed. 2007).
       5
           Exploit, The New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010).

                                         6
                                    No. 22-10412

       On the other hand, Moore points out that the one-conviction pro-
vision includes a federal predicate that the two-conviction provision does not:
18 U.S.C. § 1591, which criminalizes the “[s]ex trafficking of children or by
force, fraud, or coercion.” Moore claims that this discrepancy destroys any
presumption of parallelism between the two provisions, and therefore, the
government cannot be correct that the phrase “relating to the sexual exploi-
tation of children” in the two-conviction provision means more than just
child pornography.
       But even if Moore is correct that this lack of parallelism was inten-
tional, his conclusion does not follow. The claim that the state convictions
included in the one-conviction provision (listing “aggravated sexual abuse,
sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward, or sex traf-
ficking of children, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale,
distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography”) is not to be
interpreted identically to the two-conviction provision (“relating to the sex-
ual exploitation of children”) might be true, but that does not necessarily
mean that “relating to the sexual exploitation of children” includes only
child pornography-related offenses. So the lack of parallelism also leads to a
dead end.
       The broader statutory context, however, proves more helpful.
       Titles, when written by Congress,6 can be a helpful tool for statutory
interpretation. See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S.
33, 47 (2008) (“[S]tatutory titles and section headings are ‘tools available for
the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.’” (quoting Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002))). And here, the section that criminalizes

       _____________________
       6
          This title was written by Congress. See Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225, sec. 2(a), 92 Stat. 7.

                                          7
                                       No. 22-10412

activities related to child pornography is titled “Sexual exploitation of chil-
dren.” That is a strong point in Moore’s favor.
       But the rest of the context goes the other way. The chapter in which
the section appears is titled “Sexual exploitation and other abuse of chil-
dren” and includes prohibitions against such things as failure to report child
abuse. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2258. Section 2251 is followed by § 2251A, titled
“Selling or buying of children”; § 2252, titled “Certain activities relating to
material involving the sexual exploitation of minors”; and § 2252A, titled
“Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child por-
nography.” This hodgepodge of usage seems to evidence that Congress did
not have a clear definition in mind for the term “sexual exploitation.”
       Further, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006
(“CPSA”),7 which amended § 2251(e), uses the phrase “child exploitation”
in a broader sense than just child pornography. Section 701 of the act defines
“child exploitation enterprise” (for the purposes of § 2252A) to include sex-
ual abuse of a minor victim, and section 704, which relates to “additional
prosecutors for offenses relating to the sexual exploitation of children,”
describes “offenses relating to the sexual exploitation of children” as includ-
ing types of sexual abuse against a minor victim.
       That context strongly suggests that the term refers to a broader swath
of conduct than just child pornography. The section’s enactment history
confirms that interpretation.
       The first version of the current § 2251 was enacted in 1978, and
although it was titled “Sexual exploitation of children,” the phrase “relating
to the sexual exploitation of children” was not used in the original enhance-

       _____________________
       7
           Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587.

                                             8
                                         No. 22-10412

ment provision. Instead, an offender would be subject to an enhancement if
he had “a prior conviction under this section.”8 The phrase in question was
first used in 1996, when an amendment split the enhancement into two
parts—one amount of enhancement for one prior conviction and a greater
amount of enhancement for two prior convictions.9 The wording for both
enhancements was identical—if the relevant conviction was “under this
chapter or chapter 109A, or under the laws of any State relating to the sexual
exploitation of children,” the offender was subject to the enhancement. Id.
        After 1996, the sentencing-enhancement provisions were minorly
amended several times to add more predicate enhancements, generally
expanding the scope of what predicate convictions made an offender eligible
for each enhancement. In 1998, chapter 117 was added,10 and in 2003, chap-
ter 71 and section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice) were added.11
        Then, as part of the CPSA, Congress amended the one-conviction
enhancement by replacing the term “sexual exploitation of children” with
“aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact involving a
minor or ward, or sex trafficking of children, or the production, possession,
receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child por-
nography.”12 The two-conviction enhancement was left the same—the

        _____________________
        8
         Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-225, sec. 2(a), 92 Stat. 7.
        9
          Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 121, 110
Stat. 3009.
        10
           Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314,
sec. 201, 112 Stat. 2974.
        11
             PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, sec. 507, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
        12
             Pub. L. No. 109-248, sec. 206(b)(1), 120 Stat. 587.

                                               9
                                        No. 22-10412

offender’s sentence would be enhanced if he had “2 or more prior con-
victions under this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or
under section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice), or under the laws of any State relating to the sexual exploitation of
children.”
        There isn’t a clear reason why Congress would have amended the
predicate convictions for the one-conviction enhancement but not for the
two-conviction enhancement; but the judicial understanding of the phrase at
the time of the amendment confirms our understanding of the phrase as
incorporating more than just convictions for offenses relating to child
pornography.
        Before the 2006 amendment, at least two circuits interpreted
§ 2251(e)’s use of the phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation of children”
as including conduct beyond activities relating to child pornography. See
United States v. Randolph, 364 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Smith, 367 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Yet when Congress
amended § 2251(e) in 2006, it did not change its use of the phrase in the two-
conviction provision. Though the 2006 amendment was not a full re-
enactment, Congress’s choice to amend part of 2251(e) but not all of it may
be a sign of Congressional acquiescence in the existing judicial interpretation
of the phrase.13
        Considering the broader statutory context, the government is correct:
The phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation of children,” in this context,

        _____________________
        13
           See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be
aware of a[] . . . judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it
re-enacts a statute without change.” (collecting cases)); see also Caleb Nelson, Stat-
utory Interpretation 478–85 (2011) (discussing the presumption of “ratification-
by-reenactment” while noting its weaknesses).

                                              10
                                      No. 22-10412

easily encompasses a broader swath of conduct than just conduct relating to
child pornography.14

                                           IV.
        Having determined that the phrase “relating to the sexual exploitation
of children” stretches beyond child pornography, we must define what con-
duct does fit within its scope. Moore does not provide a recommendation.
The government stresses that we should adopt the term’s “common, ordin-
ary meaning,” which is undoubtably true but not sufficiently helpful. For
example, the government asks us to define the term as “taking advantage of
children for selfish and sexual purposes.” Later, it states that the term should
mean “taking advantage of or using children for sexual purposes.” Neither
of these definitions is precise enough to be workable.
        The circuits that have interpreted the phrase broadly have adopted a
variety of definitions.15 The Fourth Circuit defines it as “to take advantage
of children for selfish and sexual purposes.” United States v. Mills, 850 F.3d
693, 697 (4th Cir. 2017). The Sixth Circuit broadly states that it “evinces a
Congressional intent to define [the phrase] to extend to child-sexual-abuse
offenses as well as child-pornography-related offenses,” United States v.
Sykes, 65 F.4th 867, 889 (6th Cir. 2023), and the Third Circuit does not
appear to have a working definition, United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651,
675 (3d Cir. 2012); Randolph, 364 F.3d at 122. The Eighth Circuit says that
it refers to “any criminal sexual conduct with a child” because, “[b]y its very

        _____________________
        14
            Because the phrase is unambiguous in context, we have no reason to reach
legislative history or the rule of lenity.
        15
           The only court of appeals to have adopted Moore’s proposed definition is the
Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Schopp, 938 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding
that the phrase “sexual exploitation of children” as used in § 2251(e) “means the produc-
tion of child pornography”). For the reasons given, we reject that narrow construction.

                                            11
                                  No. 22-10412

nature, any criminal sexual conduct with a child takes advantage of, or
exploits, a child sexually.” Smith, 367 F.3d at 751. The First Circuit agrees,
stating that it “unambiguously refers to any criminal sexual conduct involv-
ing children.” United States v. Winczuk, 67 F.4th 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2023).
       For several reasons, that last reading is the best fit.
       First, it is a broad definition of the term, which seems proper because
of the use of “relating to.” The ordinary meaning of “relating to” is
“broad” and means “to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern;
to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.’” Hub-
bard, 480 F.3d at 347–48 (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S.
374, 383 (1992)); see also Relate, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.
1979). It thus makes sense to interpret the phrase “relating to the sexual
exploitation of children” in a broad sense, such as any criminal sexual con-
duct involving children.
       Second, it tracks persuasive authority.        In United States v. Ary,
892 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2018), this court described a broad list of crimes
as “qualifying prior convictions for the sexual exploitation of children.” The
section at issue in Ary, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, is titled “Certain activities relating
to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors,” and § 2252(b)(1),
similarly to § 2251(e)(1), increases the mandatory minimum sentence when
“such person has a prior conviction under this chapter, section 1591, chapter
71, chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10 (article 120
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), or under the laws of any State
relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct
involving a minor or ward, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing,
sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography, or sex
trafficking of children.” In Ary, we repeatedly summarized that list as “con-
viction[s] for sexual exploitation.” 892 F.3d at 788, 789. Ary’s summary of

                                       12
                                  No. 22-10412

§ 2252(b)(1)’s predicate convictions does not bind our interpretation of
§ 2251(e), and its description of the relevant convictions as types of “sexual
exploitation” is likely dictum, but the opinion does provide persuasive
authority for adopting a definition of the phrase as broad as any criminal sex-
ual conduct involving children.
       Third, the definition we adopt is workable and contains limiting prin-
ciples. Though broad enough to encompass a wide range of predicate con-
victions, “sexual” and “children” are bright-line terms that can provide easy
guidance to lower courts and litigants alike.

                                       V.
       Armed with the proper definition of “relating to the sexual exploita-
tion of children,” we return to Moore. His convictions are both under Texas
Penal Code § 21.11(a)(2), which prohibits indecency with a child. The parties
agree that the elements of the offense (at the time of Moore’s convictions)
were
       (1) that the child was within the protected age group [younger
       than seventeen] and not married to the accused,
       (2) that a child was present,
       (3) that the accused had the intent to arouse or gratify some-
       one’s sexual desire,
       (4) that the accused knew that a child was present, and
       (5) that the accused exposed his anus or genitals.
Yanes v. State, 149 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref’d)
(alteration in original) (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(2)
(West 2003)); see also Uribe v. State, 7 S.W.3d 294, 296–97 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1999, pet. ref’d).
       Such conduct is unequivocally criminal sexual conduct involving chil-

                                       13
                                 No. 22-10412

dren. Cf. United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2000).
Moore was convicted under the statute twice. The district court thus did not
err in applying the 35-year sentencing enhancement.
       AFFIRMED.

                                      14