Court Opinion

ID: 9643729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:39:00.73973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:17.696561
License: Public Domain

FROST, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I dissent with respect to the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s summary judgment finding that Jacob Green-berg exercised the power of appointment in his will in favor of the trustee of the Jacob Greenberg Family Trust, as raised in the first and second appellate issues. I would reverse the summary judgment on the issue of appointment and remand that issue to the trial court. I concur with the majority’s decision on all other issues presented.

“Why shouldn’t we quarrel about a word? What is the good of words if they aren’t important enough to quarrel over? Why do we choose one word more than another if there isn’t any difference between them?”

— G.K. Chesterton

*678
Introduction

Perhaps the biggest challenge jurists face is determining what men and women, now silenced by death, meant by the words they used to deal with matters that are of great import to those who survive them. Today, the court’s task is to determine what the late Jacob Greenberg (“Jacob”) meant by what he said (and did not say) in his will. We must decide whether the words he chose were sufficient to constitute an exercise of the power of appointment his first wife, the late Lurine Karon Greenberg (“Lurine”) granted to him in her will to enable him to dispose of the property in the Jacob Greenberg Trust (“Jacob’s Trust”). Absent a valid exercise of the power of appointment, the property subject to the power passes to the Abby Greenberg Rosenfield Trust (“Karon’s Trust”) for the benefit of the only child of Jacob and Lurine, Karon Rosenfield Wright (“Karon”), formerly known as Abby Greenberg, and her descendants. The majority finds that the language in. Jacob’s will demonstrates a clear intent to exercise the power in favor of Jacob’s second wife, Joyce Z. Greenberg (“Joyce”), as trustee of the Jacob Greenberg Family Trust (the “Family Trust”), a trust Jacob and Joyce created during their marriage.
The standard for determining whether a donee/testator1 has exercised a power of appointment, as set forth in Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Fredericks, 155 Tex. 79, 283 S.W.2d 39, 47 (1955), is simple, straightforward, and not particularly difficult to satisfy; yet, the language in Jacob’s will does not pass the test, even when pieced together from unrelated sections of the document. The only mention of a power of appointment in Jacob’s will is not in the context of an exercise of that power, but in a general introductory section that lacks any appointive language and contains a troublesome incongruity. The mere inclusion of the generic words “power of appointment” in the introductory section should not be elevated to an exercise of a specific power, especially where the identity of the appointee is missing and must be supplied by reference to an entirely different part of the will (the residuary clause), which itself does not mention the power of appointment and which is not tied, directly or indirectly, to the section that does.
Although it may be possible to interpret Article 1 of Jacob’s will as foreshadowing an intention to exercise the power of appointment, Jacob failed to put any such notion into effect by following through with words of appointment or other language that would effect an exercise of the power and identify the appointee of the property. While another court has found the identity of an appointee by looking to the will’s residuary clause,2 that approach does not work in this case because, unlike the will in that case, the residuary clause in Jacob’s will contains no reference to the power of appointment and, unlike the circumstances in that case, there is nothing in the record to indicate any intent to make the appointive estate part of Jacob’s residuary estate. Furthermore, the residuary clause in Jacob’s will speaks only to Jacob’s estate; it does not purport to exercise the power of appointment or dispose of the property that is subject to the power. Absent any affirmative link between the general reference to “a power of appointment” in Article 1 and the residuary clause in Article 4, there is no basis for finding Joyce, as trustee of the Family Trust (the residuary beneficiary of Jacob’s will), the appointee of the property that is *679subject to the power Lurine granted to Jacob.
Despite painstaking analysis and unsparing scrutiny of the language in Jacob’s will, we will never truly know if Jacob meant to exercise the power of appointment he possessed; but, if he did, he did so in a way that makes it doubtful as to whether it was his intention to do so and that, alone, precludes a finding that the power was in fact exercised. See Republic, 283 S.W.2d at 47 (citing Hill v. Conrad, 43 S.W. 789, 791 (Tex.1897)).

The Search For Clear Intent

As movant in the summary judgment proceeding, it was Joyce’s burden to demonstrate that the language Jacob used in his will is “so clear” that it forecloses the possibility that some other reasonable intent could be imputed to him. Republic, 283 S.W.2d at 47. “If from the circumstances or the instrument executed, it be doubtful as to whether it was the intention to execute the power possessed by the grantor, then it will not be held that by such act or conveyance that power was in fact executed.” Id. (quoting Hill v. Conrad, 91 Tex. 341, 43 S.W. 789, 791 (1897)) (emphasis added). The test is not whether the one seeking to prove the exercise of the power (Joyce) has proffered the most reasonable or most likely explanation of the donee’s intent, as gleaned from the will. Instead, the test is whether it is possible to impute some other reasonable intent to the donee (Jacob) based on the language of the instrument or the surrounding circumstances. Id. Unless an intent to exercise the power is the only reasonable alternative, the Republic test is not met and the court cannot find an exercise of the power. Thus, the question before this court is:

Is it so clear from Jacob’s will that he intended to exercise the power of appointment that no other reasonable intent can be imputed to him?

Unless this question can be answered affirmatively, the court has no choice but to find that Jacob did not exercise the power of appointment. See Republic, 283 S.W.2d at 47.
In addition to satisfying the “clear intent” requirement, in order to constitute a valid exercise of a power of appointment, the language in the will must meet at least one of the following criteria:
(1) It must refer to the power of appointment; or
(2) It must refer to the property subject to the power of appointment; or
(3) The donee of the power (Jacob) “must have owned no other property to which the will could have attached and thus the will have been a vain and useless thing except it be held to be an exercise of the power.”
Id. (citations omitted).
It is undisputed that Jacob’s will does not satisfy criteria (2) or (3). The only place in Jacob’s will that the words “power of appointment” appear is in Article 1, which reads in pertinent part:
By this Will, I intend to dispose of all my property (that owned by me and that over which I have any power of disposition), real, personal and mixed, of whatever kind and wherever situated, including any property over which I may have a power of appointment. Such property will consist of my one-half interest in the community estate acquired by me and ... [Joyce], and also any separate property which I may own at the time of my death.
It is important to note that Article 1 does not specifically refer to the power of appointment Lurine granted to Jacob, nor does it identify any appointee/beneficiary of the exercise of that power. The majority looks to the residuary clause contained in Article 4, which itself does not mention or refer to any power of appointment, to supply that information. By employing this approach, the majority not only finds an exercise of a specific, unidentified power of appointment, but essentially creates an appointee of the prop*680erty that is subject to it. Whether read alone or in conjunction with the residuary clause in Article 4, the language in Article 1 is insufficient to constitute an exercise of the power of appointment because (1) there is no appointive language, (2) any language the majority is construing as appointive language is ambiguous and incongruous, and (3) there is no language identifying an appointee or connecting the power of appointment to the residuary estate.

1. Lack of Appointive Language

There is no language in Jacob’s will that purports to constitute an exercise of the power of appointment. The phrase on which the majority relies makes a general comment about Jacob’s “intention” in making his will, without ever actually exercising the power of appointment. Nowhere in his will does Jacob use words of appointment, clearly or unclearly.
In determining whether language is sufficient to satisfy the Republic criteria, other courts have relied on the presence of express language in the document purporting to exercise the power of appointment. For example, in Foster, the Dallas Court of Appeals, finding a valid exercise of a power of appointment, observed that the document purporting to exercise it “referenced the power of appointment granted under the [donor’s] will and stated that the [donee] was expressly exercising that power.” 884 S.W.2d at 499. The operative document contained the following appoim tive language:
I, BILLY A. FOSTER, the donee of a power of appointment given me under the Last Will and Testament of [donor] ... hereby expressly exercise the aforesaid power by appointing one half of the assets subject to it to my brother, William Foster ...
Id. Nowhere in his will does Jacob state that he is exercising the power of appointment or that he is appointing the trustee of the Family Trust (Joyce) to receive the property that is subject to the power. There is no mention of the property that is subject to the power of appointment. There is no reference to Lurine’s will or to the specific power granted to him by Lu-rine’s will — only a generic reference in the introductory article to “any property over which I may have a power of appointment.” 3 Taking into consideration the context in which the words “power of appointment” are mentioned in Article 1, and the lack of any corresponding disposition in the entire balance of the instrument, it strains any reasonable construction to conclude that by this language Jacob exercised the power of appointment in favor of Joyce, as trustee of the Family Trust. This language simply does not manifest a present intention to exercise a specific power of appointment and, at the very least, leaves Jacob’s intent open to question.
The word “intend,” as used in Article 1, indicates an expectation or contemplation rather than a specific undertaking. This interpretation is supported by the fact that Jacob makes his initial statement of his “intentions” in Article 1 and then proceeds, article by article, to carry them out' — with the “power of appointment” being the one exception. After making a precatory statement in Article 1, Jacob makes his declarations (Article 2), devises and bequeaths his property (Articles 3 — 4), appoints an executrix of his estate (Article 5), issues directives as to payment of taxes and expenses upon his death (Article 6), and gives specific instructions as to the burial and disposition of his body after his death (Article 7), each time using language of present tense command to carry his stated intentions into effect. Jacob, however, never again mentions the power of appointment, directly or indirectly, nor does he issue any directives to carry into effect any notion he might have had to exercise the power.
*681Jacob’s will is replete with expressions of directions and commands, which by legal and common understanding operate to execute all of his other stated objectives. See e.g., Article 2 (“I declare ... ”); Article 3 (“I give and devise ... ”); Article 4 (“I give, devise and bequeath ... ”); Article 5 (“I nominate and appoint ... ”); Article 6 (“ I direct ... ”); Article 7 (“I direct ... ”); and Article 8 (“I further direct ...”). Noticeably absent is any provision in which Jacob purports to exercise the power of appointment Lurine gave to him in her will.4 Given the consistent and uniform style and overall scheme Jacob adopted in his will, one would expect to see an article in which he undertook to act upon any intention he had to exercise the power, but there is no “I appoint ...” or “I exercise ...” language anywhere in his will. That Jacob knew how to use clear and express language of present tense command to execute his objectives and give directions to effect his intentions is not only demonstrated in multiple places in his will, but is also apparent from the trust instrument he signed to create the Family Trust. See e.g., Amended and Restated Trust Agreement for the Jacob Greenberg Family Trust, Article VII (“Settlor nominates and appoints ... ”). The fact that Jacob did not use such appointive language in the one place in his will that contains any reference to a power of appointment is some indication that he did not intend to exercise the power. Moreover, the uncertainty and ambiguity resulting from the omission of appointive language leaves the door open for other reasonable intentions that could be imputed to him. For example, it is possible that Jacob initially contemplated exercising the power and had an article dedicated to the execution of it, but thereafter changed his mind and removed that article from the body of the document, without removing the precatory language in Article 1.
To reach its conclusion that Jacob exercised the power, the majority must, by implication, supply words of appointment that one intending to exercise the power should have used but which are not clearly implied in the instrument. The court’s task, however, is not to fill the gaps in Jacob’s will by supplying the words that Jacob might have intended to write; rather, the court must look at the words he actually used. See Shriner’s Hosp. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex.1980); White v. Taylor, 155 Tex. 392, 286 S.W.2d 925, 928 (1956); Gregg v. Jones, 699 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (expressly declining to “resort to the substitution of words for the words of the testatrix”). The mere mention of a power of appointment, without appointive language, is insufficient to constitute an exercise of the power.

2. Ambiguous and Incongruous Language

In ascertaining Jacob’s intentions vis a vis the power of appointment granted to him in Lurine’s will, and in determining the proper construction to be placed on the language he used in his own will, the court must be mindful of the legal nature of a power of appointment. Under well settled Texas law, a power of appointment is not property but “a mere right or power.” Krausse, 430 S.W.2d at 47. The authority that Lurine, as the donor, gave to Jacob, as the donee, by the power of appointment did not vest in Jacob any estate, interest, or title in the property that is subject to the power. See Nowlin v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 908 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex.App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 1995, no writ). It is critical to note that Jacob did not own the property subject to the power,5 nor did *682that property belong to his estate. Because of this legal principle, Jacob’s reference to “my property’’ in Article 1 and to “my estate” in Article 4 cannot be overlooked or ignored in determining his intent.6 Jacob’s choice of the word “my” as a limiting modifier in each of the provisions on which the majority relies to find an exercise of the power must be considered in light of the well established legal principle that a power of appointment is merely a power to direct the disposition of property7 and is not itself property nor is it recognized as such within the law.
In determining whether Jacob, as donee, exercised the power of appointment, it is the duty of the court to look to the language Jacob actually used8 and to give effect to every part of his will, if it is legally possible or practicable. See Henderson, 150 S.W.2d at 154. The statement in Article 4 (residuary clause) in which Jacob bequeaths to Joyce, as trustee of the Family Trust “the rest, residue and remainder of my estate”9 cannot be construed to include any property subject to the power of appointment because that property did not belong to Jacob or his estate.10 For this simple reason, it is not legally possible or practicable to give effect to a construction that includes the property of Jacob’s Trust in the disposition of Jacob’s residuary estate.
The same rationale applies to the phrase in Article 1 which states “I intend to dispose of my property.”11 It is not possible to take these words at face value and, at the same time, interpret them to include “any property over which [Jacob] may have a power of appointment” because, as a matter of law, the former does not include the latter. The presence of this incongruity in the first sentence of Article 1 is only compounded in the sentence that immediately follows in which Jacob explains that “[s\uch property will consist of ...”12 his separate property and his interest in community property. Notably, the law does not view a power of appointment as either separate or community property. Moreover, the property that is subject to the power of appointment is not Jacob’s property' — separate or community — but is the property of Jacob’s Trust. While it is always preferable to give effect to every word and phrase in a will, it is not always possible to do so. The incongruities in Article 1 cannot be harmonized. Thus, the one place in Jacob’s will that makes any reference to a power of appointment contains a non sequitur.
*683To conclude that Jacob exercised the power of appointment, the court must twice ignore Jacob’s choice of the word “my” to describe the property he intended to dispose of in his will. Joyce argues that to do otherwise would impose too technical a reading on Jacob’s will. Attributing Jacob’s choice of words to inaccuracy of expression would be a viable option if his intent were otherwise clear from the instrument. The balance of the document, however, fails to demonstrate any intent to exercise the power of appointment. If anything, its silence on this weighty matter suggests that there was no intent to appoint the property. Under these circumstances and given the record in this case, there is no basis for twice departing from a strict reading of the words Jacob actually used in his will.13 Moreover, the fact that it is necessary to do so in order to find an exercise of the power suggests that Jacob’s intent to exercise it is less than clear.

3. Lack of Language Identifying Appointee or Connecting Power of Appointment to Residuary Estate

The “power of appointment” reference in Article 1 is not specifically tied to any appointee/beneficiary of the property that is subject to the power of appointment Lurine granted to Jacob. The residuary clause in Article 4 disposes of Jacob’s property not otherwise bequeathed in his will. It does not mention the power of appointment or the property that is subject to the power, nor does it purport to identify any appointee of such property. Although the Krausse court found that the testatrix/donee of a power of appointment intended that the appointive estate become part of her residual estate, in doing so, the court relied on extraneous circumstances not present in this case.14 More importantly, the residuary clause in Krausse specifically disposed of property over which the testatrix “may own or ... over which [she] then shall have power of testamentary disposition.” Krausse, 430 S.W.2d at 48-49. In contrast, the residuary clause in Jacob’s will merely names the beneficiary of the “rest, residue and remainder of my estate” (which, as noted, cannot include any power of appointment or property subject to the power), but does not make any reference whatsoever to the power of appointment or the property that is subject to it, nor does the residuary clause purport to include or dispose of any property over which Jacob may have a power of appointment.
The residuary clause in Article 4 does nothing that could arguably constitute an exercise of the power of appointment, and there is nothing in Article 4 that evinces any intention to do so. Unlike the will in Krausse, there is nothing in Jacob’s will to provide a nexus between the power of-appointment and the residuary estate. There is no clear statement of intent in Jacob’s will or anything in the record to suggest that Jacob intended to include an appointive estate, consisting of the property that is subject to the power of appoint*684ment Lurine granted to Jacob, -within the meaning of “my estate.” It simply requires too big a leap to bridge the precato-ry Article 1 (which contains a crippling incongruity with respect to the power of appointment) and Article 4 (which makes no mention of the power of appointment at all) together in order to find an exercise of the power in favor of Joyce, as the trustee of the Family Trust.
The residuary estate clause is not a catchall for the unexecuted powers of a testator who happens to be the donee of a specific power of appointment. The basic purpose of a residuary clause is to prevent partial intestacy. See Morris v. Finkelstein, 442 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref. n.r.e.). It is not intended to operate as a default provision where a donee of a power of appointment fails to exercise the power. Just as a power of appointment is not property capable of being bequeathed,15 the exercise of a power of appointment is not a bequest. A power of appointment may not be exercised merely by naming a residual beneficiary in the donee’s will, particularly where there is no appointive language anywhere in the instrument and nothing to tie the appointment to the appointee/beneficiary in the residuary clause. Deeming the residual beneficiary the appointee of property that is subject to a power of appointment without specific words of appointment in the residuary clause or some other nexus between the exercise of the power of appointment and the residual beneficiary violates the spirit as well as the letter of Republic.

Conclusion

This is not a case in which the donee’s manifest intention is obscured by an inaccurate mode of expression. Here, there is nothing to demonstrate “so clear” an intent by Jacob to exercise the power of appointment in favor of the trustee of the Family Trust so as to exclude all other reasonable intents. The majority finds that two provisions in Jacob’s will, when read together, are sufficient to find an exercise of the power of appointment in favor of Joyce, as trustee of the Family Trust. In the precatory Article 1, Jacob used the word “my” to describe the property he sought to dispose of in his will. In the residuary clause of Article 4, he used the same possessive pronoun to describe the estate he bequeathed to Joyce, as trustee of the Family Trust. Any reference by Jacob to “my property” or “my estate” is wholly inconsistent with the notion of disposing of property subject to the power of appointment Lurine granted to Jacob because that property belonged to Jacob’s Trust, not to Jacob. In finding an exercise of the power of appointment, the majority must not only ignore Jacob’s use of the word “my” in both places, but must also insert, by implication, words of appointment not found or implied in the four corners of the instrument.
Jacob was no stranger to sophisticated estate planning. After the death of his first wife (Lurine), he served as trustee for both Jacob’s Trust and Karon’s Trust. He later created the Family Trust with his second wife (Joyce). Long before Jacob signed his will in April 1991, Texas law made it clear that a power of appointment is not a property interest and that the property that is subject to the power is not vested in the donee (Jacob). See Krausse, 430 S.W.2d at 47. It is reasonable to presume that Jacob appreciated the legal character of the power and was cognizant of the fact that absent his exercise of it, the property that was subject to that power would pass to Karon’s Trust for the benefit of his only child and her descendants. By the same token, it is unreasonable to presume that Jacob intended to exercise a very important power granted to him in Lurine’s will by using cryptic and ambiguous references that must be pieced together from two unrelated articles in his own will and that deviate in style and *685format from all other directions and commands in the instrument.
The Texas Supreme Court, after observing that the language of the will being construed in Republic “showed that it was most probably drawn by an attorney,”16 reasoned that it was “most improbable ... that either [the testator] or an attorney knowing of the power of appointment, and ... seeking to draw a will exercising such power, would omit in the will drawn any reference whatever to such power.” 283 S.W.2d at 48 (emphasis added). Employing this same rationale, it seems highly improbable that, in the face of Republic, Jacob or his attorney would undertake to exercise the power of appointment granted to Jacob in Lurine’s will without (1) utilizing appointive language, or (2) referring to either the specific power being exercised or the property being appointed, or (3) expressly directing where or to whom the appointed property was to go. It is also unlikely that Jacob would have used terms such as “my property” and “my estate” to refer to property which, as a matter of law, did not belong to him and which was not part of his estate. Had Jacob intended to exercise the power, surely he would have done so in a direct, clear and positive way, or at least in a way that did not make it doubtful and uncertain as to whether it was his intention to do so. Had Jacob intended for the property subject to the power to pass to Joyce, as trustee of the Family Trust, surely he would not have left it to the courts to find, by stretching and straining, that which he could have so easily stated expressly.
The majority reaches beyond the boundaries of Republic and its progeny to find the exercise of a power of appointment where none exists. Moreover, it does so in the face of evidence that makes it doubtful as to whether it was Jacob’s intention to execute the power. The presence of this doubt in and of itself is sufficient under Republic to preclude any finding of an exercise of the power of appointment. Whatever Jacob’s true intent may have been, at the end of the day, it cannot be said that his intent to exercise the power was “so clear that no other reasonable intent can be imputed under [his] will.” Republic, 283 S.W.2d at 47. Therefore, under Republic there can be no finding that Jacob intended to execute the power of appointment.
I would reverse the trial court’s rendition of summary judgment, which found as a matter of law that Jacob exercised the power of appointment granted to him in Lurine’s will in favor of Joyce, as trustee of the Family Trust, and remand that issue for further proceedings.

. The person granting the power of appointment, such as a testator through a will, is the "donor." The person receiving the power is the "donee.” The one who receives property from the donee is the "appointee.” See Foster v. Foster, 884 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) (citations omitted).

. See Krausse v. Barton, 430 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether Jacob held powers of appointment other than the power granted to him in Lu-rine's will.

. In refusing to find an exercise of the power of appointment in Republic, the Texas Supreme Court noted the absence of "any language stating the will is exercising such power of appointment.” 283 S.W.2d at 47.

. See Republic, 283 S.W.2d at 46. ("A power of appointment is a power of disposition given to a person over property not his own ...,”) (quoting Thompson on Wills 596, § 400 (3d ed.)) (emphasis added).

. "The presumption should be indulged that the testator did not intend to use any meaningless or superfluous words, but that he intended for every provision, clause or word in his will to have a meaning in the disposition to be made of his property.” Henderson v. Stanley, 150 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1941), rev’d on other grounds, 139 Tex. 160, 162 S.W.2d 95 (1942).

. Because anyone who takes through Jacob’s power of appointment necessarily takes "under the authority of the power, as if the power and the instrument executing the power had been incorporated in one instrument,” any appointee, in effect, takes from Lurine (the donor), not Jacob. See Krausse, 430 S.W.2d at 47. As the donee, Jacob is treated merely as the agent of the donor. See id.

. See Kettler v. Atkinson, 383 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex.1964) (noting that "[i]n ascertaining the intention of the testatrix, we must give effect to the words selected by her”).

. Emphasis added.

. "Estate” has a technical meaning, defined as "the real and personal property of a decedent....” Tex. Prob.Code § 3(1) (Vernon Supp.1999); see Hudson v. Hopkins, 799 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1990, no writ). In connection with estate and succession taxes, a power of appointment operates to transfer the property from the donor, not the donee, to the appointee or takers in default. See G.A.C. Halff Found. v. Calvert, 281 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.). "[P]roperty covered by the power is not a part of the 'estate' of the donee or 'property which passes by will’ of the donee, whether or not the power is general and whether or not the donee exercised it.” Id. at 184.

. Emphasis added.

. Emphasis added.

. See Weathers v. Robertson, 331 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Words in general, whether technical or popular are to be taken in their plain and usual sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be collected and that sense ascertained besides. All other things being equal the natural and literal import of words and phrases is presumed to have been intended.’’) (quoting Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (Tex.1949)).

. The Krausse court found that the testatrix intended to "merge” the property over which she had the power of appointment with her personal estate based on (1) language in the residuary clause in her will which made reference to the power of appointment; (2) in the absence of a "merger," there would have been insufficient funds available, making the special bequests "nugatory, a result which the [testatrix] in all probability did not intend;” (3) certain provisions in the will would have been unnecessary unless there was a blending of the estates; and (4) the estate other than the appointive estate consisted only of a relatively small amount of cash and the appointive estate was quite large. 436 S.W.2d at 48-49.

. See G.A.C. Halff Found., 281 S.W.2d at 184.

. Texas courts have recognized that lawyers use terms in wills in a technical sense. See Bergin v. Bergin, 159 Tex. 83, 315 S.W.2d 943, 946 (1958) (holding that a layman “cannot be deemed to have used words in the same technical sense that the words might have if they were used by an attorney”).