Court Opinion

ID: 9556162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 14:09:13.992686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:39.660934
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: August 16, 2023

           S23Y0585. IN THE MATTER OF ANDREW MATTESON.

        PER CURIAM.

        This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the renewed

petition for voluntary discipline filed by Andrew Matteson (State

Bar No. 477140) pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b) before the issuance

of a formal complaint. In Matteson’s first petition for voluntary

discipline, he sought a suspension of his license to practice law for a

period of time ranging from three months to six months as a sanction

for his violations related to two disciplinary matters. Matteson

previously asserted several mitigating factors, including that he had

mental health conditions that contributed to his misconduct and

that he made restitution to his clients who were impacted by his

misconduct. The Court rejected Matteson’s first petition because he

failed to provide proof of his mental health conditions and proof that
he made his clients whole, and because he failed to assure the Court

that he had taken steps to ensure that he would not commit the

same type of violations upon his readmission to the practice of law.

See In the Matter of Matteson, 314 Ga. 576, 580-581 (878 SE2d 196)

(2022) (“Matteson I”).   In this renewed petition, Matteson adds

nothing to the recitation of the facts, the admitted violations, or the

aggravating and mitigating factors supporting his requested

discipline.   Instead, he addresses the concerns this Court

highlighted in Matteson I by submitting proof related to his mental

health conditions and the treatment thereof, submitting proof that

his clients have been made whole, and by proposing conditions on

his reinstatement. He also agrees to a six-month suspension but

requests that it be imposed nunc pro tunc. Because Matteson has

sufficiently addressed the deficiencies set forth in Matteson I, and

because we agree that a six-month nunc pro tunc suspension is

appropriate, we accept Matteson’s amended petition for voluntary

discipline.

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     The underlying facts of the two disciplinary matters are recited

at length in Matteson I. In summary, as to the first disciplinary

matter, Matteson admits that he had represented a client in various

legal matters over several years, and that at some point he stopped

apprising his client of his work and of the important developments

in the legal matters; that the client eventually sued Matteson, who

chose not to dispute the client’s claims; that a consent judgment was

eventually entered against Matteson in the amount of $86,520; and

that he quickly took steps to satisfy the judgment. Matteson I, 314

Ga. at 576-577. As to the second disciplinary matter, Matteson

admits that he agreed to represent a client and his company in a

lawsuit against them for damages related to a business dispute;

that, although he filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, he failed to

take any additional material action in the case, even after a motion

for default judgment was filed and granted and a significant

judgment was entered against his clients; that these clients pursued

a legal malpractice claim against Matteson and his former law firm;

and that the claim was arbitrated, resulting in the issuance of an

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award of over $640,000 in the clients’ favor.                 Id. at 577-578.

Although, in his initial petition, Matteson failed to support his

assertion that his clients’ claims had been resolved in full, he has

now provided proof that he satisfied the judgments his clients

obtained against him.

      The facts set out in Matteson I support Matteson’s admissions

in this renewed petition that

      in connection with his representation of the client in [the
      first matter] he violated Rules 1.2 (a),[1] 1.4 (a),[2] 1.15 (I)
      (c),[3] and 1.16 (a) (2)[4] of the [Georgia Rules of
      Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), found at Bar Rule 4-102
      (d)]. And, with regard to his representation of the clients

      1 “Rule 1.2 (a) requires a lawyer to consult with and abide by a client’s

decisions concerning the scope and objectives of the representation.” Matteson
I, 314 Ga. at 578 n.1.
       2 “Rule 1.4 (a) provides that a lawyer shall “promptly inform the client of

any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed
consent . . . is required; shall consult with the client about the means by which
the client’s objectives are to be accomplished; shall keep the client reasonably
informed about the status of the matter; shall promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information; and shall explain matters to the extent
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.” Id. at 578 n.2.
       3 “Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides that, upon receiving funds in which a client

has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client and deliver that
portion of the funds which the client is entitled to receive.” Id. at 578 n.3.
       4 “Rule 1.16 (a) (2) provides that a lawyer shall withdraw from

representation of a client if the lawyer’s physical or mental condition
materially impairs his ability to represent the client.” Id. at 578 n.4.

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      in [the second matter], Matteson admits that he violated
      Rules 1.1,[5] 1.2 (a), 1.3,[6] 1.4, and 1.16 (a) (2) of the GRPC.
      The maximum sanction for a violation of Rules 1.4 and
      1.16 (a) is a public reprimand, while the maximum
      sanction for a violation of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.15 (I)
      is disbarment.

Matteson I, 314 Ga. at 578-579.

      Similar to his first petition, Matteson admits no aggravating

factors, but offers in mitigation “that he has no disciplinary record;

that he lacked a dishonest or selfish motive; . . . that he made a

timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the

consequences of his misconduct; that he displayed a cooperative

attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings; and that he is

remorseful for his actions and inactions.” Matteson I, 314 Ga. at 579

(citing ABA Standard 9.32 (a), (b), (d), (e), and (l)). In addition,

Matteson continues to offer as a mitigating factor that, at the time

of these violations, he was suffering from a mental disability or

emotional problems for which he was being treated by a doctor. See

      5 “Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to provide competent representation to his

client.” Id. at 578 n.5.
       6 “Rule 1.3 provides that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and

promptness in representing a client.” Id. at 578 n.6.
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ABA Standard 9.32 (c) and (i). However, unlike in his first petition

for voluntary discipline, Matteson has now provided, under seal,

letters from several mental health professionals who have treated

or are continuing to treat Matteson.         These letters support

Matteson’s claims that he began experiencing symptoms of

depression during the above-described representations; that he has

been treated for depression and anxiety since 2015; that he has been

relatively compliant with treatment and medication since that time;

and that his mental health does not present an impediment to his

practice of law. Additionally, Matteson has provided an affidavit

supporting his claim that his experience with depression ultimately

led him to close his law practice in 2019 and to step away from the

practice of law.

     Matteson further states in his petition and affidavit that, in

early 2019, he began advising his clients in writing that he could no

longer act as their attorney and that, for a six-month period

beginning on April 1, 2019, he performed no legal work and had no

source of income. In support of these claims, Matteson provided a

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copy of a letter he sent to a client, in which Matteson informs the

client that he is no longer able to serve as the client’s legal

representative because he will no longer be practicing law due to

personal issues, updates the client on the status of the client’s case,

and offers to assist the client in retaining new counsel. Additionally,

Matteson provided with his sworn affidavit, in which he states that

from April 2019 through October 2019 he did not work at all, his

2019 income tax returns as evidence that he was not fully employed

in 2019.

     Based on these claims, Matteson now requests as discipline a

six-month suspension from the practice of law and that this

suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc, in consideration of the fact

that, beginning in April 2019, he voluntarily refrained from the

practice of law for at least six months and fulfilled his ethical

obligations to his clients. See In the Matter of Onipede, 288 Ga. 156,

157 (702 SE2d 136) (2010) (“[W]hen an attorney requests entry of a

suspension or voluntary surrender order nunc pro tunc, it is the

lawyer’s responsibility to demonstrate that they voluntarily stopped

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practicing law, the date on which their law practice ended, and that

they complied with all the ethical obligations implicated in such a

decision, such as assisting clients in securing new counsel and

facilitating the transfer of client files and critical information about

ongoing cases to new counsel.”). Further, Matteson proposes as part

of his discipline that every three months in the first year following

his reinstatement he be required to provide the Office of General

Counsel (“OGC”) with an opinion from a mental health professional

certifying that his mental health does not present an impediment to

his practice of law; that he participate in the State Bar of Georgia’s

Law Practice Management Program’s General Consultation service;

and that he implement any recommendations made by that service

during such consultation.7

     7 Matteson has attached to his affidavit a letter from a mental health

professional certifying that, as of January 2023, his mental health does not
present an impediment to his practice of law. Further, Matteson states in his
sworn affidavit that he has already participated in the State Bar of Georgia’s
Law Practice Management Program’s General Consultation service, which
occurred in February 2023, and the Bar does not dispute Matteson’s
participation in this program.

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      The State Bar has filed a response, noting that Matteson has

now submitted proof of the mental health conditions that

contributed to his misconduct, provided evidence that his clients’

claims have been resolved, and has taken steps to ensure that his

ethical failures will not reoccur.            The Bar does not dispute

Matteson’s asserted factors in mitigation and asserts that it does not

oppose the six-month suspension requested by Matteson and that

the discipline Matteson requests is sufficient to serve as “a penalty

to the offender, a deterrent to others, and [] an indication to laymen

that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession.”8 In the

Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981). Moreover,

the Bar asserts that this Court has imposed similar discipline in

other cases involving violations of the Rules implicated here. See,

e.g., In the Matter of Kirby, 312 Ga. 341 (862 SE2d 550) (2021)

(accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing a six-

      8 Notably, however, the Bar notes in aggravation, as it did before, that

Matteson’s behavior suggests a pattern of misconduct, that he committed
multiple offenses, and that he had substantial experience in the practice of law.
See ABA Standard 9.22 (c), (d), and (i).

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month suspension for attorney who admitted violating Rules 1.2,

1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 in four separate matters where attorney addressed

his mental health and practice management problems); In the

Matter of Johnson, 303 Ga. 795 (815 SE2d 55) (2018) (accepting

petition for voluntary discipline and imposing a six-month

suspension, with conditions, for attorney who violated Rules 1.3, 1.4,

1.5, 1.15 (I), 1.16 (d), and 5.5 (a) in six separate client matters where

attorney was suffering from personal and emotional problems at

time of misconduct and had taken intervening efforts to improve

himself and his law practice); In the Matter of Huggins, 291 Ga. 92

(727 SE2d 500) (2012) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline

and    imposing    six-month     suspension     with    conditions    for

reinstatement for violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II), 1.16,

and 9.3 in five client matters, where attorney had no prior

disciplinary history and was receiving treatment for his personal

issues). Further, the State Bar does not oppose Matteson’s request

that his suspension be imposed nunc pro tunc to April 1, 2019. The

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Bar, therefore, recommends that the Court accept Matteson’s

renewed petition for voluntary discipline.

     Having reviewed the record in this case, including the

documentation submitted under seal which includes Matteson’s

sworn affidavit, 2019 tax returns, and client letter, we agree that

the imposition of a six-month suspension is appropriate under these

circumstances and is consistent with the precedent cited above. We

also agree that Matteson has made the required showing under

Onipede to support the imposition of his six-month suspension nunc

pro tunc to April 1, 2019, and note that, because Matteson has

sufficiently shown that he voluntarily stopped practicing law from

April 1, 2019, through September 30, 2019, he has completed his

suspension. Accordingly, Matteson is hereby reinstated with the

conditions that, within 90 days of the date of this opinion, he provide

the OGC with an opinion from a mental health professional

certifying that his mental health does not present an impediment to

his practice of law and provide such an opinion every three months

for the first year of his reinstatement, and that he implement any

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recommendations made by the State Bar of Georgia’s Law Practice

Management Program’s General Consultation service.

     For these reasons, Andrew Matteson is hereby suspended from

the practice of law nunc pro tunc as of April 1, 2019, and he is hereby

reinstated with the conditions set forth above.

     Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Six-month
suspension nunc pro tunc. Reinstated with conditions. All the
Justices concur.

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