Court Opinion

ID: 9564578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:03:32.664811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:32.036444
License: Public Domain

Finley, C. J.
(dissenting) — Assuming, arguendo, that the earnest-money agreement in the instant case is defective (inadequate legal description of the land), I nevertheless cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority. We must still determine whether a vendee, under a contract for the sale of land, which does not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds, may repudiate the agreement and recover his down payment from a vendor who is ready, willing and able to perform the contract and convey the land.
The majority opinion, relying on Dubke v. Kassa (1947), 29 Wn. (2d) 486, 187 P. (2d) 611, answers this question in the negative. This holding is based upon an assumption that a contract of this type is merely unenforcible, not void. The weight of authority clearly supports this conclusion. But it seems to me that the force of numbers and the persistent habit of closely following precedent should not immunize the rule of Dubke from the possibility of reevaluation and revision.
Frankly, I question the validity of the Dubke ratio decidendi and the assumption underlying the majority opinion. If the purported contract in the instant case is absolutely void — rather than being voidable or simply creative of a right as to which no remedy is available for enforcement — then there is simply and absolutely no consideration to support the payment made by the vendee, and he ought to recover it. Reedy v. Ebsen (1932), 60 S. D. 1, 242 N. W. 592. Actually, it seems to me incongruous and *717a bit on the ridiculous side to say the writing is void or even unenforcible (which is the equivalent of: saying that it created no legal relations between the parties), and then to say that for some unarticulated, vague or mysterious reason, the legal or other relationships of the parties were altered sufficiently to be judicially cognizable and to give the vendor a legal right to keep the vendees’ down payment.
Our statute of frauds, RCW 64.04.010, provides:
“Every conveyance of real estate, or any interest therein, and every contract creating or evidencing any encumbrance upon real estate, shall be by deed: . . . ”
By way of comparison, noté:
(1) RCW 19.36.010: “In the following cases, specified in this section, any agreement, contract and promise shall be void, unless such agreement, contract or promise, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized, that is to say: . . . [Specified situations omitted.]” (Italics mine.)
(2) English Statute of Frauds (29 Car. ch. 3, § 4 (405) (1677)):“. . . no action shall be brought . . . upon any contract or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them . '. . ” unless in writing.
RCW 19.36.010 is clearly illustrative of the type of statute under which an attempt to contract, failing''to meet the statutory requisites, is absolutely void. The English statute, on the other hand, lends itself readily to the construction that an oral contract for the sale of land is valid, but there is simply no remedy available for its enforcement. RCW 64.04.010, governing contracts for the sale of land in Washington (see 34 Wash. L. Rev. 124, 134-135) does not fall neatly into either category. As is noted in the majority opinion, we have from time to time spoken of contracts not meeting the requirements of this statute, rather loosely, as being both void and unenforcible. In most- cases it makes little difference. In the instant case, however, it makes a great deal of difference. The words void and unenforcible are terms of art and are mutually exclusive. Before this case can be decided, we must determine which of these *718terms is made appropriate by RCW 64.04.010. As a matter of legal logic, it cannot be both.
In Reedy v. Ebsen, supra, the South Dakota court set forth the following quotation from Brandies v. Neustadtl (1860), 13 Wis. 158, explaining the difference as follows:
“ !. . . The parol contract, being void, furnishes no consideration for the payment. A consideration, to be sufficient, must be either a benefit to one party or a damage to the. other. The purchaser can derive no benefit from the supposed Contract. Nothing passes to him by virtue of it; he obtains no interest in the land, and no promise or agreement on the part of the seller to convey him any; and he can never derive any advantage from what has transpired, except it. be. as a matter of favor on the seller’s part. . . . The. reason given for not allowing the purchaser under the.English statute, and those like it, to repudiate the agreement and recover back what he has paid, so long as the seller is in no default, is very obvious. But it cannot be given here. It is that the agreement is not void but voidable, or, to speak more correctly, not actionable. . . . The repeal of the statute in such case would at once enable the purchaser to maintain his action upon the agreement. With us it is otherwise. Its repeal would leave him in no better situation than formerly. There is in that case a valid living contract between the parties, and though the remedy be suspended, it binds the conscience, and, until it has been broken, constitutes a sufficient consideration for the payment of the money. There being thus a good consideration, if the purchaser chooses to rely upon the honor of the seller for the performance of his contract, instead of putting it in such form that the courts can enforce it, it is no injustice to say to him that he shall not ignore it, at least until that honor has been violated. . . . Under our statute there is no contract; nothing which can be the foundation of any legal or equitable obligation; and how can the court create one? ... It finds one party in the unexplained possession of the money of another, which he knowingly received without any legal equivalent, and not as a gift, and which he has no legal or equitable right to retain; and why should he not refund? . . . ’” (Italics mine.)
Assuming, arguendo, that a contract of the type with which we are here concerned does not meet the statutory requirements as to form or formality, I believe that because *719of the absence of a clear manifestation of legislative intent a good deal more consideration should be given to the problem by this court than appears to have been given in the Dubke case, upon which the majority rely. In fact, assuming again that the legal description is defective, it seems to me that the language of RCW 64.04.010 most strongly supports a conclusion that the earnest-money agreement in the instant case is not merely unenforcible, but is void. Thus, I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority.
However, except for the purpose of argument, I am unwilling to make the assumption that the legal description is fatally defective and is either void or voidable. On this point I agree with the reasoning of Judge Hill’s opinion and the disposition of this appeal as suggested therein.