Court Opinion

ID: 9710665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:14:58.104894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:58.794052
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority decision upholding the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for armed violence. Defendant was charged with armed violence, based upon a predicate offense of possession of a controlled substance (less than 15 grams of cocaine). Armed violence with a category I weapon such as a handgun is a Class X felony with a minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years. 720 ILCS 5/33A — 3(a) (West 1996). Defendant compares that punishment with the punishment for other offenses where the weapon is actually used. For example, a person who commits aggravated battery with a firearm, who causes injury by the discharge of a firearm, where the victim is an ordinary citizen, is guilty of a Class X felony with a minimum term of imprisonment of six years. 720 ILCS 5/12— 4.2(b) (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(a)(4) (West 1996). The question in this case is whether the proportionate penalties clause has been violated under the third test set out in Koppa, “where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more harshly.” Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at 164. Courts are especially deferential to the legislature when applying this test. Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at 171. In Koppa, the court concluded that armed violence is not a less serious offense than aggravated criminal sexual abuse or aggravated kidnapping, because of the high risk of harm associated with the presence of a weapon. Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at 172. The same cannot be said of this case. A person who carries a firearm while he possesses a controlled substance clearly is “a less serious threat to the public health and safety” than someone who actually uses that firearm to injure someone. In Espinoza, where the defendant allegedly struck an individual with a bottle while in a public bar, the court applied the second test referenced in Koppa, i.e., “where identical offenses result in different sentences” (Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d at 164) (citing Christy and Lewis). See Espinoza, 184 Ill. 2d at 257, 259. The court concluded that armed violence predicated on aggravated battery (public way) committed with a category III dangerous weapon was not “identical” to aggravated battery accompanied by one of several enumerated aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) of the aggravated battery statute (720 ILCS 5/12 — 4(b) (West 1994)). Espinoza, 184 Ill. 2d at 259. The case before us does not involve identical offenses, the second Koppa test, but similar offenses, the third Koppa test. Defendant asks that we vacate the armed violence conviction and remand for sentencing on the unlawful possession count. I would, however, vacate the 15-year sentence and remand for sentencing as a Class X felony with a minimum of 6 years.