Court Opinion

ID: 9576154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:21:18.039898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:21.960951
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from Division 2 of the majority opinion in this case. This court has consistently held that an automobile accident involving a rear-end collision is not automatically the fault of the driver of the following car. Hay v. Carter, 94 Ga. App. 382 (94 SE2d 755) (1956); Glaze v. Bailey, 130 Ga. App. 189 (2), 190 (202 SE2d 708) (1973). Further, in Brown v. Nutter, 125 Ga. App. 449, 450 (4) (188 SE2d 133) (1972) we held that where there was evidence that a car in which plaintiff was riding came to a sudden stop and testimony that one who attempts to stop within two car lengths at a speed of 15 miles per hour will skid was evidence from which a jury could conclude that the defendant was not negligent. Hence, I disagree with the majority opinion that such circumstances demand a finding of liability.
The cases relied on by the majority did not involve emergencies or “sudden stopping”; further, the case of McCann v. Lindsey, 109 Ga. App. 104 (135 SE2d 519) (1964) involved speeding, a wet highway and alleged brake failure — totally different circumstances than the instant case. The case of Forehand v. Pace, 146 Ga. App. 682 (247 SE2d 192) (1978), relied on by the majority, sets forth three rules which the majority ignores. First, and most important, Forehand holds at p. 683 that “ ‘[a] leading vehicle has no absolute legal position superior to that of the one following. Each driver must exercise ordinary care in the situation in which he finds himself... ’ ” (Emphasis supplied.); second, Forehand holds that in an action for negligence, “ ‘[t]he burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff to establish the negligence of the defendant and its causal relation to the claimed injury and damage. Code § 38-103; (Cits.)’ ”;and third, Forehand holds that “ ‘ [t]he law raises no presumption whatever as to who was to blame. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that defendant was negligent,’ [Cit.].” Applying these rules to the instant case, there was sufficient evidence, particularly on the questions of emergency and accident (both principles being in issue and charged) to authorize and justify the findings of the jury that the defendant was not negligent. Therefore, it is my opinion that the trial judge’s denial of plaintiffs motion for judgment n.o.v. was correct, and should not be reversed. “After a jury verdict has been returned the evidence is construed in its light most favorable to the prevailing party, for every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict. *188[Cit.] ” Brown v. Nutter, supra, at 450 (1).
I concur with Divisions 1 and 3 of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Judge Birdsong and Judge Carley join in this dissent.