Court Opinion

ID: 9759628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:22:33.275234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:03.547547
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Gunther, J.:
I find it necessary to dissent from the majority opinion for reasons I consider fundamental in the administration of our criminal laws. In the long history of our Commonwealth, only twice have we considered surety of the peace cases, and this is the first time we have been called upon to rule on the venue question. The rule enunciated by the majority only tends to confuse and make uncertain what has been considered generally as the well defined guide posts on venue.
*447As aptly stated by Judge Watkins in Ms dissent, “When the defendant questioned the jurisdiction of the court, venue became a distinct issue of fact and the burden was on the Commonwealth of proving venue.” An examination of this record reveals that nowhere has the Commonwealth established venue in Westmoreland County. The majority of this Court overlooks this fundamental prerequisite. Nowhere in this record is it shown that the defendant committed an overt act in Westmoreland County! This vacuum is displaced by showing that the alleged victim received the threat in Westmoreland County.
For the refutation of this venue fallacy, it is only necessary to refer to the original legislative enactment on this subject, the Act of 1700, 1 Smith Laws 5:
“That whosoever shall threaten the person of another, to wound, kill or destroy him, or do him any harm in person or estate . . .; such person so threatening as aforesaid shall be bound over, with one sufficient surety, to appear at the next Session or County Court, to he holden for the county where such offense was committed, to he proceeded against according to law; ...” (emphasis supplied).
What is the offense? The legislature very plainly spelled it out as the making of a threat. The overt act (required in all criminal prosecutions) is the threat and not the receipt thereof. The overt act in this case was made in Allegheny County and not in Westmoreland County. From a historical point of view, it is very evident that venue was placed in the geographical location where the threat was made or committed. The invention of the telephone whereby a threat may be transmitted beyond the limited distance of ordinary hearing did not change venue. The means of communication — whether by voice, mail or modern mechanical devices — did not and could not change the overt *448act or the place where such took place. If the majority view be sound, logic concludes that the offense cannot be prosecuted in Allegheny County because it is not complete, but logic also precludes prosecution in Westmoreland County for the same reason and for the additional reason that the accused has committed no overt act in the latter county.
It is a general common-law rule that crimes are cognizable and punishable only within the jurisdiction where they have been committed. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 5 Binney 617; Commonwealth v. Kunzmann, 41 Pa. 429; Commonwealth ex rel. Riley v. Hudock, 37 Pa. Superior Ct. 176, 178; McCoy v. Kalbach, 51 Pa. Superior Ct. 364, 375. While there are legislative instances where this common-law rule has been modified, surety of the peace has never been used as an exception to the well established principle of venue. Both the historical concept and the legislative intent clearly substantiate the proposition that if any crime has been committed (this being plainly a misdemeanor), it was committed in Allegheny County. At best, surety of the peace is an attempt to commit some crime which is restrained by law before the threatened act is put into execution. As such, this Court has ruled that the attempt is prosecuted in the county where made. Commonwealth v. Neubauer, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 528, 16 A. 2d 450.
Yenue may not be likened to homogenized milk which can be stirred up sufficiently as to be unable to separate the cream from the milk. The overt act required in every criminal act in the determination of venue cannot be confused or commingled with a result, as here, which gives rise to a cause of action. I cannot accede to any legal homogenization process, regardless of the legal skills employed, which attempts to confuse or makes uncertain the question of venue. *449While it may be said that venue is a technical device, it is, nevertheless, a legal principle recognized, sanctioned and employed from the earliest common law to date by the accused in order to insure a trial or hearing in his own back yard. This is his right!
Neither can I accept, even by analogy, the contract theory advanced by the majority. The contractual principles of offer and acceptance shed no light in the determination of venue, in this case. Such analogy invites complications which are neither necessary nor controlling. The principles of criminal law seldom turn on the question of offer and acceptance of contractual obligations. Nor do I consider the case of United States v. Thayer, 209 U. S. 39, 28 S. Ct. 426, 52 L. Ed. 673, as controlling even by way of illustration. The conviction in that case turned on the question of whether defendant’s physical presence in a government building was necessary in order to be guilty of soliciting government employees for contributions rather than on the question of whether an overt act was there committed. The case turned on the question of solicitation “in any manner whatever” under federal law and the use of the mails therefor rather than on the question raised here.
Without even considering the question of whether a jury trial should have been granted when requested, and which is not free from doubt, I would reverse the order and the sentence of the court below. ->