Court Opinion

ID: 9720088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:15:12.930805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:31.508676
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
{dissenting). The appealed decree reads in full as follows:
“This cause having come on for a trial on the merits, and having been heard upon the pleadings filed and the proofs made therein, and having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, and the court having found that the statute, PA 1956, No 40, § 154, as amended by PA 1957, No 61 (CLS 1956, § 280.154, as amended [Stat Ann 1960 Rev §11.1154]), required defendant drain commissioner to give notice to property owners in the Sexton-Kilfoil drainage district, including plaintiff, of the day of meeting of the board of review for review of apportionment of benefits, by first class mail, by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the community involved, and by posting in at least 5 conspicuous places in such drainage district; .and having further found that the said provisions of the statute and the further provision thereof to the effect that the failure to send or tó recéiye such'notice by mail *174does not constitute a jurisdictional defect nor invalidate such, drain proceedings and/or tax, is a proper exercise of legislative power and is constitutional; and having found that the defendant did in fact comply with such statute in the course of the Sexton-Kilfoil drain proceedings; and the court further finding that although plaintiff did not actually receive such notice by mail, nonetheless it is deemed to have received proper notice within the purview of the statute in such case made and provided; and the court having found that the SextonKilfoil drain proceedings were jurisdietionally intact and the plaintiff being deemed to have had proper notice of such proceedings, it may not maintain an action in chancery seeking review thereof; and the court being otherwise fully advised and informed in the premises and having rendered its opinion on the matters involved herein, to which opinion reference may be made for more particularity and shall be considered a part of this decree,
“Now, therefore, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bill of complaint filed in this cause be, and the same is hereby dismissed, without costs to either party.”
Plaintiff has properly invoked the aid of equity to obtain the process which, in the course of these statutory proceedings, was due it by admonition of the Fourteenth Amendment. That admonition is as much a part of the drain code as if written therein for, as said in both reports of Blythe v. Hinckley (173 US 501, 508 [19 S Ct 497, 43 L ed 783]; 180 US 333, 338 [21 S Ct 390, 45 L ed 557]), “the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the laws of every State as its own local laws and constitution.” I construe and apply the code accordingly and, guided by the Mullane (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306 [70 S Ct 652, 94 L ed 865]) and Walker (Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 US 112 *175[77 S Ct 200, 1 L ed 2d 178]) Cases, hold that this plaintiff has been denied due process as charged in its bill and is therefore entitled to plenary relief from the consequences of notice withheld when adequate notice could and should have been given.
Now I have always supposed that when equity has accepted jurisdiction—of person and subject matter—for any good reason known to her exalted jurisprudence, the chancellor should and does retain jurisdiction to accomplish equity’s benign and final purpose; that of providing complete relief in one suit with due determination of the rights and duties of the parties growing out of or connected with the pleaded subject matter. Our latest expression in such regard appears in Jeffery v. Lathrup, 363 Mich 15, 22.* There is no disclosed reason why we should relegate plaintiff to another administrative hearing and litigation stemming inevitably therefrom.
I would reverse and remand with direction to proceed with hearing and determination of plaintiff’s allegation that the project provides no benefit for its property. Plaintiff should, of course, have costs.
*176There is no occasion, now, for determination of the question whether, under the statute, proven mailing of a notice constitutes due process. Suppose the notice is mailed but not received by the addressee, through no fault of his own. Is he then precluded from challenging validity of the special assessment of his property? I would carefully refrain from hinting an answer to such question until a specific case requiring an answer either way is before us.
Kavanagh and Souris, JJ., concurred with Black, J.

 Jeffery refers authoritatively to the collection of principles and citations appearing in Second Michigan Cooperative Housing Association v. First Michigan Cooperative Housing Association, 358 Mich 252, 256, 257. Having first quoted Pomeroy’s enduringly pertinent precepts, our unanimous Court therein reaffirmed allegiance to what was said in Whipple v. Farrar, 3 Mich 436, 446 (64 Am Dec 99):
“But it has often been held, and in New York and some of the other States, it is regarded as a settled rule, that where a court of chancery has gained jurisdiction of a cause for any purpose of relief, it will retain it, for the purpose of giving full relief. 1 Story Equity Jurisprudence, § 71, note 2, and eases there cited; Bradley v. Bosley, 1 Barb Ch (NY) 125, 151; see, also, 2 Harris Ch 286.
“This is a rule of such practical utility in promoting the ends of justice—preventing unnecessary suits, saving expense, and avoiding delay, as commends itself strongly to our approbation, and the ease under consideration is one where it may well be applied.”
This ease of International Salt Co. v. Wayne County Drain Commissioner is another case where it—the stated rule of retention of jurisdiction—“may well be applied.”