Court Opinion

ID: 9838471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 15:06:29.158312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:31.963354
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                              State of Florida

                      Opinion filed September 6, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D21-2261
                      Lower Tribunal No. 19-866-SP
                          ________________

                          AT&T Mobility, LLC,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                             Patrick Rigney,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Gordon
Murray, Judge.

      Dentons US, LLP, Angel A. Cortiñas and Jonathan H. Kaskel, for
appellant.

     Beighley, Myrick, Udell & Lynne, P.A., and Maury L. Udell, for appellee.

Before DAMOORGIAN, GERBER, and ARTAU, Associate Judges.

     GERBER, Associate Judge.

     The defendant below appeals from the county court’s final orders

denying the defendant’s “[Section] 57.105 Sanctions Motion for Raising a
Baseless ‘Data Throttling’ Claim,” and “[Section] 57.105 Sanctions Motion

for Raising a Legally Deficient ‘Administrative Fee’ Claim.” The defendant

argues it proved the plaintiff and his trial counsel knowingly asserted and

maintained patently false claims, and therefore the county court erred in

denying the two motions. According to the defendant, “Section 57.105 …

was created precisely to address this type of frivolous litigation.”

      We agree with the defendant’s argument as to its “[Section] 57.105

Sanctions Motion for Raising a Baseless ‘Data Throttling’ Claim,” and

therefore reverse the county court’s two duplicative orders denying that

motion.   We affirm, without further discussion, the county court’s order

denying the defendant’s “[Section] 57.105 Sanctions Motion for Raising a

Legally Deficient ‘Administrative Fee’ Claim.”

      We present this opinion in six sections:

      1. The plaintiff’s data throttling claim;
      2. The defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings;
      3. The defendant’s section 57.105(1)(a) motion as to data throttling;
      4. The county court’s hearings and orders;
      5. The parties’ arguments on appeal; and
      6. Our review.

                                       2
                  1. The Plaintiff’s Data Throttling Claim

      In August 2019, the plaintiff, through his attorney, filed a statement of

claim against the defendant in county court. After the parties stipulated to

invoke the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff ultimately filed a

“Corrected Amended Complaint,” the first three counts of which are relevant

to this appeal.

      The plaintiff’s “Count I – Fraud” pertinently alleged:

         30. … [I]n [its] advertising, sale, and renewal of mobile
             data plans, [Defendant] represented, directly or
             indirectly, expressly or by implication, to the Plaintiff,
             an unlimited mobile data plan customer, that the
             amount of data that the Plaintiff could access in any
             billing period would not be limited. Plaintiff is not in
             possession of the mobile data contract as it is under
             the exclusive control of [Defendant].

         31. [Defendant] specifically omitted the fact that it intended
             to throttle Plaintiff’s data, without Plaintiff’s knowledge
             or consent.        Had [Defendant] not omitted this
             information, Plaintiff would have not purchased [an] …
             unlimited plan.

         32. Plaintiff relied on [Defendant’s] representations
             regarding providing unlimited data, and, as a result,
             incurred damages and was injured as a result of the
             fraud by omission.

(emphases added).

      The plaintiff’s “Count II – Breach of Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing” pertinently alleged:

                                       3
        38. Plaintiff had a wireless agreement with [Defendant]
            wherein Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of
            performance of the agreement with no throttling of
            Plaintiff’s data speed so as to provide Plaintiff with
            unlimited data.

        39. [Defendant] was required to act in a commercially
            reasonable manner and limiting its ability to act
            capriciously  to     contravene    the   reasonable
            expectations of the Plaintiff in the [Defendant’s]
            performance [of the] wireless agreement.

        …

        43. As a result of [Defendant’s] breach of [the] implied
            covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff has
            been damaged.

(emphases added).

     The plaintiff’s “Count III – Damages Under the Florida Deceptive and

Unfair Trade Practices Act” pertinently alleged:

        47. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff was a consumer
            who had an “unlimited” data plan as advertised by
            [Defendant]. In the advertising, sale, and renewal of
            the unlimited mobile data plan, [Defendant] entered
            into a mobile data contract with Plaintiff that was
            advertised as providing access to unlimited mobile
            data and did not provide that [Defendant] could modify,
            diminish, or impair the services of customers who use
            more than a specified amount of data for permissible
            activities.

        48. [Defendant] imposed significant data speed
            restrictions on Plaintiff by virtue of its use of its network
            which flows throughout the United States and in
            particular, Florida. This practice was, and is, an unfair
            act or a deceptive trade practice ….

                                       4
         49. In the advertising, sale, and renewal of mobile data
             plans, [Defendant] has represented, directly or
             indirectly, expressly or by implication, to unlimited
             mobile data plan customers that the amount of data
             that the customer could access in any billing period
             would not be limited. Such a representation is unfair
             or deceptive as defined under the FDUTPA. Plaintiff
             is not in possession of the actual mobile data contract
             as it [is] under the exclusive control of [Defendant].

(emphases added).

       2. The Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

      The defendant, after filing its answer and affirmative defenses, filed a

motion for judgment on the pleadings. The defendant’s motion pertinently

alleged the plaintiff’s data throttling claims were “defeated by the plain

language of the applicable contracts between [Defendant] and Plaintiff that

form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims.”

      The defendant attached to its motion the governing “Wireless

Customer Agreement” upon which it was relying. The defendant argued that

even though the plaintiff had failed to attach the agreement to his corrected

amended complaint, the county court could consider the agreement’s

contents in ruling on the defendant’s motion. In support, the defendant cited,

among other cases, Glen Garron, LLC v. Buchwald, 210 So. 3d 229, 233

(Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“When a party refers to a document in the complaint,

                                         5
the trial court may use that document to assess the nature of the claims

alleged in the complaint.”).

      The defendant’s motion then quoted various sections of the agreement

which, according to the defendant, defeated the plaintiff’s claims, including

the following section:

            [Defendant] may reduce your data … speeds at any
         time or place if your data usage exceeds an applicable,
         identified usage threshold during any billing cycle.

(emphases added).

      Based on such plain language, the defendant argued it was entitled to

judgment on the pleadings:

            [C]ontrary to Plaintiff’s assertion that the Wireless
         Customer Agreements do not … allow [Defendant] to
         “modify, diminish, or impair the service of unlimited mobile
         data plan customers,” these Agreements explicitly provide
         [Defendant] with the ability to do exactly that. Plaintiff’s
         data throttling claims cannot rely on alleged
         misrepresentations that contradict the plain language of
         the parties’ contract, thus entitling [Defendant] to a
         judgment on these claims as a matter of law.

(internal citation omitted).

 3. The Defendant’s Section 57.105(1)(a) Motion as to Data Throttling

      One month after the defendant filed its motion for judgment on the

pleadings, the defendant served the plaintiff with its “[Section] 57.105

                                      6
Sanctions Motion for Raising a Baseless ‘Data Throttling’ Claim.”        The

defendant summarized its argument under section 57.105(1)(a) as follows:

            [Defendant] has never “throttled” Plaintiff’s wireless
         account as alleged because Plaintiff has never had an
         unlimited data plan, or any other plan, that was ever
         subject to the “throttling” program [which] Plaintiff
         describes.     Thus, Plaintiff’s “throttling” claim is not
         supported by the law or material facts necessary to
         establish the claim. Pursuant to Florida Statute [section]
         57.105, this Court should enter an order requiring Plaintiff
         and/or Plaintiff’s counsel … to pay [Defendant’s]
         reasonable attorney’s fees based on the filing and/or
         maintenance of claims against [Defendant] that are devoid
         of any legal or factual basis.

(emphases added).

      In support, the defendant attached the sworn declaration of a manager

within the defendant’s “Office of the President.”     The manager’s sworn

declaration attested to her personal knowledge to testify regarding the status

of a particular customer account and her ability to establish the foundation

for the business records exception to the hearsay rule regarding such

records. The manager’s sworn declaration then pertinently attested:

            [O]n [December 18, 2010], Plaintiff obtained the Nation
         450 Rollover with 2GB Data Plan; on September 20, 2013,
         Plaintiff enrolled in the Family Talk Nation 700 Rollover
         with 2GB Data Plan; on December 13, 2015, Plaintiff
         enrolled in the Mobile Share Value 2GB Data Plan; and, on
         March 27, 2019, Plaintiff obtained the Mobile Share Value
         4GB Data Plan and has remained on that plan until the
         present date.

                                      7
            None of these plans are an unlimited data plan. As the
         plan names indicate, the plan price includes a specific
         allotment of data per month.

(emphasis added; paragraph numbers omitted). Attached to the manager’s

sworn declaration were copies of the plaintiff’s referenced data plans.

      Based on the manager’s sworn declaration, the defendant’s section

57.105(1)(a) motion pertinently argued:

            Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel knew or should have
         known that Plaintiff’s claims based on “throttling” of an
         unlimited data plan lack a basis in law and fact. … Plaintiff
         cannot state a viable cause of action for fraud, breach of
         [the implied duty] of good faith and fair dealing, or violation
         of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act …
         based on “throttling” of an unlimited data plan because
         Plaintiff has never had an unlimited data plan. There is no
         amount of discovery that can possibly call into question the
         indisputable fact that Plaintiff has never had an unlimited
         data plan subject to “throttling.” Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s
         Counsel’s refusal to acknowledge this fact requires that
         this Court impose sanctions against Plaintiff and/or
         Plaintiff’s Counsel in accordance with [Florida Statute
         section] 57.105.

(emphases added).

      The plaintiff did not withdraw his corrected amended complaint’s three

counts pertaining to his data throttling claim within twenty-one days of service

of the defendant’s section 57.105(1)(a) motion, as permitted by section

57.105(4), to avoid the possibility of monetary sanctions. Shortly thereafter,

the defendant filed its section 57.105(1)(a) motion with the county court.

                                       8
              4. The County Court’s Hearings and Orders

     The county court first held a hearing on the defendant’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings. At the end of the hearing, the county court orally

ruled it was granting the motion with prejudice. The county court requested

the defendant’s counsel to submit a written order reflecting the oral ruling.

However, the following day, before the county court could execute a written

order memorializing its oral ruling granting the defendant’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings with prejudice, the plaintiff filed a notice of

voluntary dismissal of his entire action against the defendant without

prejudice.

     The county court later held a hearing on the defendant’s section

57.105(1)(a) motion. At the hearing, defense counsel pertinently argued:

          Plaintiff’s data throttling claim [was] premised on the
        assertion that [Defendant] throttled his unlimited data plan.
        …

            … [T]he problem with [that] assertion [was,] as
        established by the declaration attached to the motion for
        sanctions, Plaintiff has never had an unlimited data plan
        with [Defendant]. … He’s always had tiered plans. So …
        it’s not the fact that these claims failed to state a claim[.]
        [It’s] the fact that [these claims were] based on a falsity.
        That’s what justif[ies] sanctions under Florida [S]tatute
        [section] 57.105[(1)(a)].

(emphases added).

     The plaintiff’s counsel pertinently responded:

                                      9
   … [Plaintiff] alleged and advised me that he had an
unlimited data plan. … [The declaration attached to
Defendant’s section 57.105(1)(a) motion is] basically
saying [Defendant] didn’t have unlimited data. …

   … That’s … not enough to claim that the data throttling
claim is frivolous …. [Under section 57.105(1), t]he Court
must find that the claim, when it was filed, “[(a)] was not
supported by the material facts [necessary to establish] the
claim or defense or [(b)] would not be supported by the
application of then existing law to those material facts.[”]
…

   …

   And … [section] 57.105[(3)] says, “Notwithstanding
[subsections (1)] or [(2)], monetary sanctions may not be
awarded [(a)] under paragraph 1[(b)], if the court
determines the claim or defense was initially presented to
the court as a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law as [it applied] to the material
facts, [with] a reasonable expectation of success.” …

    … There’s been no actions against [Defendant] for
throttling people with tiered data …. I still could have
amended the claim to seek a tiered data throttling claim.
That may not have been successful, but it has to be
frivolous. And it’s not frivolous.

   …

   … I had a reasonable expectation of succeeding on the
claims [in this case]. The fact that this Court disagreed with
me, is not in and of itself fatal to my theory that data
throttling in and of itself is improper, immoral, unethical. …

   And if [Defendant] actually throttled [Plaintiff], I would’ve
amended the complaint to say it’s improper to throttle
[Plaintiff] under [his tiered data] contract. There is no

                              10
        existing law on data throttling, Judge. … And therefore,
        to hold that this [case] is a sanctionable event is improper
        under Florida law.

           …

           I would submit to the court that a data throttling claim,
        whether it’s [an] unlimited [data plan] or … a tiered plan is
        not frivolous.

           In this instance, we didn’t get to the next level because
        the Court basically found … the unlimited [data] claim didn’t
        apply. The Court didn’t even address whether or not it was
        a tiered plan. I didn’t even get to that point, Your Honor,
        because I decided to dismiss the cases.

           …

           … And I’ve … [also] met the [losing party’s] burden
        under … [section 57.105(3)(b), which provides that a court
        may not award monetary sanctions] “against [the] losing
        party’s attorney, [if he or she has] acted in good faith,
        based on the representations of his or her client, as to the
        existence of those material facts.” … [So] I’d ask the Court
        to deny [Defendant’s] motion for sanctions as to data
        throttling.

     At one point, the county court interrupted the plaintiff’s counsel’s

argument to ask whether the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of his action

without prejudice, after the county court had orally granted the defendant’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings with prejudice, should affect the court’s

evaluation of the defendant’s section 57.105(1)(a) motion. The plaintiff’s

counsel responded:

                                     11
            [The voluntary dismissal] doesn’t affect [the section
        57.105(1)(a) motion] at all …. [T]here’s been no finding on
        the issue because [Plaintiff voluntarily] dismissed the
        case]. If there was an actual finding under Florida law, then
        I think [Defendant] could have a theoretical argument that
        [Plaintiff’s data throttling claim] was sanctionable. …

(emphases added).

     In rebuttal, defense counsel argued that Plaintiff’s counsel, by basing

the corrected amended complaint on the false allegation that Plaintiff had an

unlimited data plan, deserved section 57.105(1)(a) sanctions:

        This is the exact type of conduct that [section] 57.105[(1)(a)]
     was intended to prevent[,] and it’s not like [Defendant] was [the]
     only one holding this information, even ignoring the fact we
     produced [that information] in discovery, and we served it on
     [Plaintiff’s counsel] with the Safe Harbor Letter. You know what
     type of plan you have. …

        …

        So, Your Honor, that’s the issue here. You, as a matter of
     law, have the jurisdiction to determine whether or not filing a
     claim that’s premised on saying you have an unlimited data plan
     … and especially saying, [“]I don’t have a tiered data plan[,”]
     which is a lie, is frivolous. … It’s a false assertion of fact. And
     that’s exactly the type of frivolous baseless allegation that
     [section] 57.105[(1)(a)] is meant to deter.

        …

         … [I]f [Plaintiff’s counsel] would have amended … [the
     complaint] to a tiered data plan throttling claim … [that] makes
     zero sense because … you can’t throttle a tiered plan … you use
     up your data and it’s done. … So [Plaintiff’s counsel] let the false
     allegation [of having an unlimited data plan] remain in the record

                                     12
     and that’s what you can’t do, especially after being warned [by
     service of a section 57.105(1)(a) motion]. …

        …

        … [Plaintiff’s counsel] tries to say that this was a novel issue.
     [That] [h]e is trying to change the law. I don’t see that, Judge. I
     just see a false allegation. I’m not sure what [Plaintiff’s
     counsel] would want the law to say here, but I don’t see any
     reasonable basis to conclude this with some extension of the law
     …

        Here[,] there’s no argument regarding law. It’s just a false
     assertion of fact that [Plaintiff’s counsel] filed with the
     Court. So issues of law and issues of fact are separate
     issues under [section] 57.105. And there’s competent,
     substantial evidence before this Court that Plaintiff’s [c]ounsel
     and Plaintiff filed a complaint [which] he … explicitly premised on
     having an unlimited data plan. And then when served with the
     [section] 57.105[(1)(a) motion,] didn’t dismiss it. You can’t lie [in]
     your pleadings. You just can’t. It’s against the rules.

        … And [Defendant] produced the documents and … served
     [Plaintiff] with the declaration [attesting that Plaintiff had a tiered
     data plan, not an unlimited data plan]. Declarations are
     competent, substantial evidence. A declaration is the same as
     an affidavit under Florida law. …

        So Judge, in conclusion … [Plaintiff’s complaint is] premised
     on having an unlimited data plan, and he didn’t have one. So for
     that reason, Judge, these claims were frivolous. [These claims]
     were frivolous when … made, [and] … were certainly frivolous
     when [Plaintiff’s counsel] was served with the [section]
     57.105[(1)(a)] motion.

(emphases added).

                                       13
      After the parties completed their arguments, the county court orally

announced it was denying the defendant’s section 57.105(1)(a) motion as to

data throttling. The county court pertinently stated:

            [A]t the time [I granted the Defendant’s motion for
         judgment on the pleadings, the Plaintiff’s data throttling
         claim] was a fairly debatable argument. … I made the
         decision [which] I thought was consistent with the law ….
         And still could have been fairly debatable on appeal … but
         the Plaintiff[] … decided to do a voluntary dismissal. …

            …

             But as such I cannot find that these arguments were not
         fairly debatable, that they were not filed in good faith, that
         the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff … either had a
         tier[ed] or unlimited or other type of account still could not
         be a victim of data throttling or slowing down. … [W]hat I
         would say is the case was dismissed … so we may never
         or know whether or not [I] was correct in [my] analysis. …

            But I say that again, I don’t find that the actions of the
         Plaintiff was frivolous or in bad faith. So … I respectfully
         deny the [Defendant’s] motion for [section] 57.105[(1)(a)]
         fee[s] ….

      After the hearing, the county court entered two duplicative written

orders confirming its oral denial of the defendant’s section 57.105(1)(a)

motion. The first order stated that the defendant’s motion was denied “for

the reasons stated on the record.” The second order, after stating the

defendant’s motion was denied, added:

         The Court finds that Defendant has not met its burden with
      respect to [section] 57.105 … Data throttling is a hotly contested

                                      14
issue with virtual[ly] no substantive applicable law applying to the
facts of this case[,] and while this Court did not agree with
Plaintiff’s theory … merely losing a case does not amount to a
frivolous claim. Moreover, in light of the fact that there is no
applicable law on the issue of data throttling, pursuant to [section]
57.105(3)[,] the Court determines that the claim was initially
presented to the Court as a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law[,] or the
establishment of new law, as it applied to the material facts, with
a reasonable expectation of success in light of the fact that
[Defendant] had previously settled numerous cases with
Plaintiff’s counsel which Defendant did not dispute.

            5. The Parties’ Arguments on Appeal

On appeal, the defendant summarizes its argument as follows:

      Plaintiff and his trial counsel knowingly asserted and
   maintained patently false claims. Based on these false
   claims, Plaintiff, through counsel, aggressively prosecuted
   this frivolous case, forcing [Defendant] to expend
   substantial monies and attorney time defending [this case].
   Section 57.105[(1)(a)], Florida Statutes was created
   precisely to address this type of frivolous litigation.

        … Plaintiff’s factual claim that he had an unlimited data
   plan was demonstrably false. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s trial
   counsel should have known it was false prior to filing the
   [f]rivolous [c]omplaint, and certainly had actual knowledge
   it was false upon receiving [Defendant’s] answer, motion
   for judgment on the pleadings, and motion for [section
   57.105(1)(a)] sanctions and supporting [declaration].
   Plaintiff’s false allegations violated Section 57.105(1)(a)
   and required the trial court to impose sanctions. The
   [county] court reversibly erred by: (i) ignoring the
   uncontroverted evidence that Plaintiff did not even have an
   unlimited plan; and (ii) misapplying the good faith
   exception under Section 57.105(3)(a), which does not
   apply to unsupported factual allegations under Section

                                 15
       57.105(1)(a) or claims that could have been, but were not,
       asserted.

(emphases added).

     The plaintiff summarizes his response to the appeal as follows:

          The … claim[s] against [Defendant], asserting that
       [Plaintiff] was unjustly subject to data throttling … [were]
       not frivolous, as the trial court correctly ruled. The [county]
       court correctly noted that … [Plaintiff’s] data throttling claim
       was a good faith argument for extension, modification, or
       reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as
       it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable
       expectation of success. …

          …

          Based on the entirety of the record, the [county] court
       did not abuse its discretion in denying [Defendant’s]
       motions for sanctions and should be affirmed in all
       respects.

                              6. Our Review

     Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2019), pertinently provides:

       (1) Upon the court’s initiative or motion of any party, the
       court shall award a reasonable attorney’s fee, including
       prejudgment interest, to be paid to the prevailing party in
       equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party’s
       attorney on any claim or defense at any time during a civil
       proceeding or action in which the court finds that the losing
       party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have
       known that a claim or defense when initially presented to
       the court or at any time before trial:

       (a) Was not supported by the material facts necessary to
       establish the claim or defense; or

                                     16
        (b) Would not be supported by the application of then-
        existing law to those material facts.

        …

        (3) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), monetary
        sanctions may not be awarded:

        (a) Under paragraph (1)(b) if the court determines that the
        claim or defense was initially presented to the court as a
        good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
        reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as
        it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable
        expectation of success.

        (b) Under paragraph (1)(a) or paragraph (1)(b) against the
        losing party's attorney if he or she has acted in good faith,
        based on the representations of his or her client as to the
        existence of those material facts.

     Although normally a lower court's order denying a section 57.105(1)(a)

motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, an appellate court’s standard

of review is de novo when the lower court's denial of a section 57.105(1)(a)

motion is based on an issue of law. L. Offs. of Fred C. Cohen, P.A. v. H.E.C.

Cleaning, LLC, 290 So. 3d 76, 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020); Paul v. Avrahami,

216 So. 3d 647, 649 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

     Here, we agree with the defendant’s argument that the county court

committed two errors—the first error committed as a matter of law, and the

second error committed as an abuse of discretion—in the county court’s

application of section 57.105. We will address each error in turn.

                                     17
      A. The First Error

      The county court’s first error, committed as a matter of law, was in

disregarding the legal basis upon which the defendant was seeking

monetary sanctions—section 57.105(1)(a)—and instead focusing solely on

the plaintiff’s request to apply section 57.105(3)(a)’s prohibition of awarding

monetary sanctions “if the court determines that the claim or defense was

initially presented to the court as a good faith argument for the extension,

modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as

it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable expectation of success.” §

57.105(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019).

      Section 57.105(3)(a)’s plain language states that its prohibition applies

to a motion seeking monetary sanctions only “[u]nder paragraph(1)(b).” Id.

However, the defendant’s motion seeking monetary sanctions was not

brought under section 57.105(1)(b), for which the prevailing party’s burden

is to show “the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have

known that a claim … when initially presented to the court or at any time

before trial … [w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing

law to those material facts.” § 57.105(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphases

added).

                                      18
      Rather, the defendant’s motion seeking monetary sanctions was

brought under section 57.105(1)(a), for which the prevailing party’s burden

is to show “the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have

known that a claim … when initially presented to the court or at any time

before trial … [w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to

establish the claim or defense.” § 57.105(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphases

added).

      The defendant met its burden under section 57.105(1)(a).            The

plaintiff’s corrected amended complaint repeatedly alleged—seven times, in

fact—that he was an unlimited data plan customer (the alleged material fact),

to establish his standing that as an unlimited data plan customer, he was

unjustly subjected to the defendant’s data throttling.

      However, as the defendant’s section 57.105(1)(a) motion argued, the

plaintiff never was an unlimited data plan customer.          Rather, as the

defendant’s manager’s sworn declaration—attached to the defendant’s

section 57.105(1)(a) motion—pertinently attested:

             [O]n [December 18, 2010], Plaintiff obtained the Nation
          450 Rollover with 2GB Data Plan; on September 20, 2013,
          Plaintiff enrolled in the Family Talk Nation 700 Rollover
          with 2GB Data Plan; on December 13, 2015, Plaintiff
          enrolled in the Mobile Share Value 2GB Data Plan; and, on
          March 27, 2019, Plaintiff obtained the Mobile Share Value
          4GB Data Plan and has remained on that plan until the
          present date.

                                      19
            None of these plans are an unlimited data plan. As the
         plan names indicate, the plan price includes a specific
         allotment of data per month.

(emphases added; paragraph numbers omitted).

      At no point in the proceedings below did the plaintiff or his counsel

attempt to challenge the defendant’s manager’s sworn declaration in any

manner—neither (1) factually on the basis that the defendant’s manager’s

sworn declaration’s attestations were not true; (2) legally on the basis that

the defendant’s manager was unqualified to have rendered such factual

attestations; or (3) legally on the basis that her factual attestations were not

competent, substantial evidence upon which the county court could grant the

defendant’s section 57.105(1)(a) motion.

      We acknowledge that, at the hearing below, the plaintiff had argued

the defendant allegedly had not made any corporate representative available

for deposition regarding the plaintiff’s claims before the defendant had filed

its motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, after the county court

orally pronounced its intent to grant the defendant’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings with prejudice, the plaintiff chose to voluntary dismiss his

action. The record does not indicate that before voluntarily dismissing the

action, the plaintiff had filed a motion for rehearing arguing that a judgment

on the pleadings would be premature due to the lack of a corporate

                                      20
representative’s deposition. Nor does the record indicate that upon the

defendant’s filing of its manager’s sworn declaration, the plaintiff sought to

depose the defendant’s manager regarding her factual attestations, or that

the plaintiff attempted to file his own sworn declaration contradicting the

defendant’s manager’s sworn declaration. Thus, we conclude the plaintiff

waived any alleged inability to challenge the defendant’s manager’s sworn

declaration.

      Our dissenting colleague argues: “[T]he facts set forth in the sworn

declaration attached to the motion for sanctions under section 57.105 were

never stipulated to nor was the declaration itself introduced into evidence at

the evidentiary hearing held on the sanctions motion. Instead of presenting

evidence at the hearing, [Defendant] chose to rely solely on its counsel’s

argument.” Those are arguments which the plaintiff never articulated to the

county court. Instead, as stated above, the plaintiff failed to challenge the

defendant’s manager’s sworn declaration factually or legally in any manner.

      B. The Second Error

      The county court’s second error, committed as an abuse of discretion,

was in not finding, pursuant to section 57.105(1)(a), that the plaintiff and his

attorney knew, or should have known, that the plaintiff’s claim, when

presented to the county court in his corrected amended complaint, was not

                                      21
supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim.               §

57.105(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019).         The defendant’s manager’s sworn

declaration was competent, substantial evidence that the plaintiff never was

an unlimited data plan customer, despite the plaintiff’s oft-repeated

allegations to the contrary in his corrected amended complaint. The plaintiff

never presented, and never attempted to present, any evidence

contradicting the defendant’s manager’s sworn declaration.

      The plaintiff’s corrected amended complaint, in what may have been a

thinly-veiled attempt to obscure the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of never

having been an unlimited data plan customer, alleged in Count I’s paragraph

30, “Plaintiff is not in possession of the mobile data contract as it is under the

exclusive control of [Defendant].” (emphases added).             The corrected

amended complaint repeats this allegation in Count III’s paragraphs 47 and

49: “Upon information and belief, Plaintiff was a consumer who had an

‘unlimited’ data plan as advertised by [Defendant]. … Plaintiff is not in

possession of the actual mobile data contract as it [is] under the exclusive

control of [Defendant].” (emphases added).

      We view these allegations as specious. As the defendant’s counsel

contended in his rebuttal argument during the section 57.105(1)(a) hearing,

“You know what type of plan you have.” And even if the plaintiff accurately

                                       22
alleged that he did not possess his mobile data contract, he and his counsel

should have known what type of data plan that the plaintiff had simply by

confirming, through his own billing statements, whether he was an unlimited

data plan customer, before alleging that in his corrected amended complaint.

      In any event, upon the defendant’s service of its section 57.105 motion

and its manager’s sworn declaration attesting that none of the plaintiff’s four

data plans had been unlimited data plans, the plaintiff and his counsel had

one final opportunity to confirm whether the plaintiff, at any point, had

contracted for an unlimited data plan. If the plaintiff never had an unlimited

data plan, then he and his counsel could have voluntarily dismissed the

action within the twenty-one day safe harbor period without becoming

subject to monetary sanctions. The plaintiff and his counsel did not do so.

See HFC Collection Ctr., Inc. v. Alexander, 190 So. 3d 1114, 1119 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2016) (“The primary purpose of the safe harbor [notice] is to provide

the party in receipt of the [notice] with the opportunity to withdraw or abandon

a frivolous claim before sanctions are sought.”).

      We also conclude that the plaintiff’s counsel should not be excused

from the imposition of section 57.105(1)(a) monetary sanctions under section

57.105(3)(b), providing: “Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), monetary

sanctions may not be awarded … [u]nder paragraph (1)(a) … against the

                                      23
losing party's attorney if he or she has acted in good faith, based on the

representations of his or her client as to the existence of those material

facts.” (emphases added). As stated above, the plaintiff’s counsel should

have and could have confirmed whether the plaintiff had an unlimited data

plan before alleging that in the corrected amended complaint. Similarly,

upon the defendant’s service of its section 57.105 motion and its manager’s

sworn declaration attesting that none of the plaintiff’s four data plans had

been unlimited data plans, the plaintiff’s counsel should have confirmed

whether the plaintiff had contracted for an unlimited data plan, or else

voluntarily dismissed the action within the twenty-one day safe harbor period.

Lastly, the plaintiff’s counsel cannot fall back on his argument that he could

have amended the complaint to allege the defendant had committed data

throttling under the plaintiff’s tiered data plans. The plaintiff’s counsel never

sought leave to amend the operative complaint to make this necessary

correction, and thus never subjected that argument to the defendant’s

opposition or the county court’s scrutiny.

      For these reasons, the plaintiff’s counsel is equally subject to section

57.105(1)(a) monetary sanctions. See Yang Enters., Inc. v. Georgalis, 988

So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“To avoid liability, counsel must

                                       24
make an objectively reasonable investigation of the purported facts

supporting a claim.”).

                                 Conclusion

      Based on the foregoing, we reverse the county court’s two duplicative

orders denying the defendant’s “[Section] 57.105 Sanctions Motion for

Raising a Baseless ‘Data Throttling’ Claim.” We remand for the county court

to enter a single order granting that motion, and to set an evidentiary hearing

to determine the amount of reasonable attorney's fees, including

prejudgment interest, to be paid to the defendant in equal amounts by the

plaintiff and the plaintiff’s counsel, incurred in the defense of the plaintiff’s

data throttling claim from the date of service of the statement of claim upon

the defendant through the filing date of the defendant’s notice of appeal.

      As stated above, we affirm, without further discussion, the county

court’s order denying the defendant’s “[Section] 57.105 Sanctions Motion for

Raising a Legally Deficient ‘Administrative Fee’ Claim.”

      Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

DAMOORGIAN, Associate Judge, concurs.
ARTAU, Associate Judge, concurs in part and dissents in part with an
opinion.

                                       25
ARTAU, Associate Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

      Zero. That is the amount of evidence introduced at the evidentiary

hearing held on AT&T’s motion for sanctions pursuant to section

57.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2019). Thus, I dissent from the majority’s

reversal of the trial court’s denial of AT&T’s motion for sanctions.

      The Third District and its sister courts have consistently reversed

awards of section 57.105 sanctions when neither the sworn declarations or

affidavits, nor other proof, were introduced into evidence at the evidentiary

hearing conducted on the sanctions motion. See, e.g., Glob. Xtreme, Inc. v.

Advanced Aircraft Ctr., Inc., 122 So. 3d 487, 491 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)

(“[U]nsworn representations by counsel about factual matters do not have

any evidentiary weight in the absence of a stipulation.” (quoting Daughtrey

v. Daughtrey, 944 So. 2d 1145, 1148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)); see also, e.g.,

Pansky v. Pansky, 259 So. 3d 872, 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (reversing

section 57.105 fee award on grounds that it was not supported by competent

evidence because it was “based exclusively on argument of counsel” and

records previously provided by counsel in support of the requested fee award

were not “admitted into evidence” at the hearing on the motion); Morton v.

Heathcock, 913 So. 2d 662, 669-70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (reversing section

                                      26
57.105 fee award because attorney “affidavits” were not “authenticated or

introduced into evidence” at the hearing on the motion for sanctions).

      A trial court’s “finding that a party is entitled to recover attorney’s fees

under section 57.105 must be based upon substantial, competent evidence

presented at the hearing” on the motion for sanctions. Swan Landing Dev.,

LLC v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n., 97 So. 3d 326, 328 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

(quoting Mason v. Highlands Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 817 So. 2d 922,

923 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)); see also, e.g., Morton, 913 So. 2d at 669-70.

Furthermore, “[i]t is well settled that affidavits are not admissible to prove

facts in issue at an evidentiary hearing because they are not subject to cross-

examination and because they impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the

other party.” Fortune v. Fortune, 61 So. 3d 441, 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

      Here, the facts set forth in the sworn declaration attached to the motion

for sanctions under section 57.105 were never stipulated to nor was the

declaration itself introduced into evidence at the evidentiary hearing held on

the sanctions motion. Instead of presenting evidence at the hearing, AT&T

chose to rely solely on its counsel’s argument. Indeed, the only evidence

AT&T submitted during the evidentiary hearing was the testimony of its

attorney to support its unrelated motion to tax costs based on its status as

the prevailing party.

                                       27
      In response to AT&T’s contention that the lawsuit was frivolous, the

plaintiff’s counsel argued: “It’s clearly not frivolous. And my point is they

have to prove that this claim was frivolous. They have not proven it, period.”

I agree.

      Not only did AT&T fail to introduce competent, substantial evidence at

the hearing on the motion in support of its claim that the plaintiff’s “data

throttling” claim was based on a materially false statement of fact entitling it

to section 57.105 fees as a sanction, it failed to introduce any evidence at

all. Nonetheless, the majority quotes extensively from the arguments the

parties’ counsel made at the hearing on the motion for sanctions in support

of its conclusion that AT&T met its burden of proving entitlement to 57.105

sanctions.

      “Argument of counsel, however, is not evidence.” Blanco v. State, 7

So. 2d 333, 337 (Fla. 1942); see also, e.g., Stading v. Equilease Corp., 471

So. 2d 1379, 1379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (“The hearing consisted solely of the

arguments of opposing counsel, which is, of course, not evidence.”). Thus,

AT&T did not satisfy its burden to prove it was entitled to sanctions. See

Glob. Xtreme, Inc., 122 So. 3d at 491 (“[I]n light of the absence of an

evidentiary hearing or the presentation of sworn testimony on the issue, we

                                      28
conclude that the trial court was without discretion to [award section 57.105

sanctions.]”).

      As the Fourth District explained long ago:

      [T]he practice we wish to see terminated is that of attorneys
      making unsworn statements of fact at hearings which trial courts
      may consider as establishing facts. It is essential that attorneys
      conduct themselves as officers of the court; but their unsworn
      statements do not establish facts in the absence of stipulation.
      Trial judges cannot rely upon these unsworn statements as the
      basis for making factual determinations; and this court cannot so
      consider them on review of the record. If the advocate wishes to
      establish a fact, he must provide sworn testimony through
      witnesses other than himself or a stipulation to which his
      opponent agrees.

Leon Shaffer Golnick Advert., Inc. v. Cedar, 423 So. 2d 1015, 1016-17 (Fla.

4th DCA 1982) (emphasis added).

      Contrary to our well-established precedent, the majority shifts the

burden of proof to the plaintiff by concluding that he somehow waived any

need for AT&T to meet its burden of proving by substantial, competent

evidence that it was entitled to sanctions. Cf. Mason, 817 So. 2d at 923

(reversing an award of sanctions under section 57.105 because “no

substantial, competent evidence in support of the motion for fees was

presented to the trial court” by the moving party at the hearing on the

sanctions motion).

                                     29
      Furthermore, the majority’s waiver position is contrary to the plain

language of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(e), which provides that

“[w]hen an action has been tried by the court without a jury, the sufficiency

of the evidence to support the judgment may be raised on appeal whether or

not the party raising the question has made any objection thereto in the trial

court or made a motion for rehearing, for new trial, or to alter or amend the

judgment.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(e) (emphasis added).

      Lastly, the majority’s waiver position is contrary to the “tipsy coachman”

rule because the trial court correctly denied AT&T’s motion for section 57.105

sanctions, albeit for the wrong reason, when AT&T failed to meet its burden

of proof at the evidentiary hearing on its motion. See, e.g., Dade Cnty. Sch.

Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) (“[I]f a trial court

reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be upheld if there

is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.”); Home Depot

U.S.A. Co. v. Taylor, 676 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (explaining

that when a trial judge makes “the right decision, albeit for the wrong reason”

it will be upheld pursuant to the “tipsy coachman” rule adopted by our

supreme court in Carraway v. Armour & Co., 156 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla.

1963)).

                                      30
      Therefore, while I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the trial

court’s order denying the defendant’s sanctions motion on the administrative

fee claim, I respectfully dissent because AT&T failed to carry its burden of

proof at the evidentiary hearing on the sanctions motion and cannot shift its

burden to the party it is seeking to sanction.

                              *        *         *

     Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                                      31