Court Opinion

ID: 9599934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:22:24.031954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:46.921798
License: Public Domain

Justice Mitchell
concurring in result.
Article I, section 26 of the Constitution of North Carolina commands that: “No person shall be excluded from jury service on account of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin.” In my view, it is clear beyond any doubt that this section of our Constitution was intended as an absolute guarantee that all citizens of this State would participate fully in the honor and obligation of jury service in all its forms; as petit jurors, grand jurors, and as foremen of the grand jury. This section of our Constitution was not enacted by the people of this State in a theoretical or abstract sense, such as by representatives in a constitutional convention. It was enacted by a direct vote of the entire people of North Carolina — the body politic — who were to be governed by its terms.
I do not believe that the people of North Carolina enacted this section of our Constitution for the benefit of criminal defendants who could show that they had been harmed by violations of its terms. Nor do I believe that the people intended that, in order to raise questions concerning alleged violations of this section, a person must be a member of any cognizable racial or ethnic group. Instead, the intent of the people of North Carolina was to guarantee absolutely unto themselves that in all cases their system of justice would be free of both the reality and the appearance of racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination in these twilight years of the Twentieth Century.
*311I completely agree with the argument that the duties of the grand jury foreman in North Carolina are only clerical in nature and do not affect the grand jury’s decision as to whether to return a true bill of indictment in any case. However, this fact is totally irrelevant to the issue before us. The people of North Carolina having guaranteed unto themselves a judicial system free of both the appearance and reality of racism, this Court may not frustrate their will by affirming any conviction obtained upon a bill of indictment rendered by a grand jury whose foreman was selected on the basis of race. The people of this State, as is their inalienable right, have adopted aq absolute prohibition in this regard, and we must apply it as such.
The defendant in the present case has made a prima facie showing — although only a prima facie showing — of discrimination against blacks in the selection of the foreman of the grand jury which indicted him. If he is able to establish upon the remand of this case that such discrimination in fact occurred, the indictment against him must be quashed without regard to whether discrimination had any actual effect on the grand jury’s decision to return a true bill. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
The Court should decide the issue before it on the basis of article I, section 26 of the Constitution of North Carolina and go no further. This Court’s construction of the Constitution of North Carolina is final and is binding, even upon the Supreme Court of the United States. Lea Co. v. N.C. Board of Transportation, 308 N.C. 603, 304 S.E. 2d 164 (1983). See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 74 L.Ed. 2d 535 (1983). Having decided this case on an adequate and independent State ground, the Court is most unwise from any standpoint — practicality, judicial restraint or disciplined legal scholarship — to address questions concerning the Constitution of the United States. See generally, Reed v. Madison County, 213 N.C. 145, 195 S.E. 620 (1938) and cases cited therein. To do so amounts to rendering an entirely unnecessary advisory opinion on questions which need not and should not be reached or decided. Id. Accordingly, I express no opinion here on matters involving the Constitution of the United States — matters as to which this Court cannot speak with finality. Further, I express no opinion with regard to any provision of the Constitution of North Carolina, other than article I, section 26.
*312Justice WHICHARD joins in this concurring opinion.