Court Opinion

ID: 9895425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 13:06:43.473259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:34.841008
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. CO22-768

                              Filed 7 November 2023

Carteret County, No. 18 CRS 53515

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

LEWIS VICTOR BRANCHE, III

      Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 5 April 2022 by Judge Joshua W.

Willey, Jr., in Carteret County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24

August 2023.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Robert
      C. Montgomery, for the State.

      Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Heidi
      Reiner, for Defendant.

      WOOD, Judge.

      Lewis Victor Branche, III (“Defendant”) admitted at trial, through counsel, to

having killed Kristen Bennett (“Bennett”), the mother of his son. A jury convicted

Defendant of first-degree murder based on theories of premeditation and deliberation

as well as lying in wait. Defendant challenges his conviction based on sufficiency of

the evidence.     We hold substantial evidence supports his conviction based on

premeditation and deliberation.    We further hold the trial court did not err by

admitting numerous gruesome photographs of the body, and the alleged errors
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                                 Opinion of the Court

contained in the Prosecutor’s closing argument did not prejudice Defendant.

Therefore, we uphold Defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder.

                       I. Factual and Procedural History

      At his trial, Defendant admitted, through counsel, he shot and killed Bennett

on 14 August 2018. At the time of her death, Bennett was twenty-four years old and

lived with Defendant and their five-year old son on Hibbs Road. Bennett worked as

a waitress at a strip club, and Defendant worked at a car dealership. Defendant

routinely carried a nine-millimeter handgun but was not known to carry a .22 pistol.

Bennett’s father, Chuck Bennett (“Chuck”) heard Defendant and Bennett argue about

the fact that Bennett worked at a strip club. Defendant voiced his displeasure about

Bennett’s employment, and Chuck described Defendant as “jealous” about it.

      On the day of the murder, Ray Gray, Jr. (“Gray”) had shopped at Food Lion in

Newport and was driving home when he noticed two people fighting in a yard on

Hibbs Road. Gray described the altercation as, “they were scrapping, having a fight.”

Gray decided he should intervene in the altercation, so he turned his car around and

parked in a neighbor’s driveway. Gray got out of his car, “walked towards the two

that were fighting,” and told them to stop. Gray was concerned about whether

Bennett was being assaulted and about two children who were playing in a nearby

sand pile. Gray stated Defendant and Bennett were flailing their arms in the air.

Bennett was advancing on Defendant, and Defendant was backing up and trying to

push Bennett back. Bennett told Gray to “get the F out of here,” and Gray was only

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                                 Opinion of the Court

on the scene for approximately two minutes. All of this occurred sometime between

1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m.

      A different witness, Robert Taylor (“Robert”), had picked up a sandwich during

his lunch break and was returning to work when he noticed a young lady, who was

later identified as Bennett, walking along the side of the road. She appeared to

Robert to be wiping her face. Another witness, Danny Taylor (“Danny”), was driving

down Hibbs Road between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on the day of the murder when he

saw a blue car pulled over on the side of the road as well as a woman resembling

Bennett. Bennett owned a blue Chevrolet. One of the car doors was open and it

looked to Danny like Bennett was getting ready to get into the car.

      A camera installed at a church across the street from Defendant’s and

Bennett’s residence captured their residence within its view. The camera captured

the altercation between Defendant and Bennett at 1:40 p.m. as well as Gray pulling

over and attempting to intervene at 1:43-1:44 p.m. Bennett’s car pulled out of the

driveway between 2:35 p.m. and 2:37 p.m. with Defendant and the two children inside

but not Bennett. Bennett’s car returned to the driveway between 2:57 p.m. and 2:58

p.m., and Defendant got out of the car. Finally, at 4:07 p.m., the camera captured

Defendant pulling out of the driveway in his truck. According to Defendant, he was

leaving to return to work.

      A few minutes after 4:00 p.m. on the day of the murder, Defendant called

Bennett’s mother, Christy Bennett (“Christy”), who lived with Defendant and

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Bennett at their residence on Hibbs Road, to tell her that he and Bennett had been

in an argument and that Bennett threw a bottle of red juice at him which hit Christy’s

mattress and sprayed everywhere. Defendant told her he took the sheets off the

mattress to launder them. Christy found this conversation odd. Two days later,

Christy called 9-1-1 on 16 August 2018 to report Bennett’s disappearance.

      After Bennett’s death, Defendant acted as though Bennett were simply missing

by putting up missing persons fliers and telling people she left him. Defendant told

law enforcement he returned home at approximately 2:30 p.m. on the day of the

murder to find Bennett, some of her clothes, and her stripper bag missing. At 5:59

p.m., Defendant texted Bennett, “Hey girl.” Later, he texted Bennett’s father “to see

if [Bennett] had said anything to him.”

      On 23 August 2018, behind Defendant’s property, law enforcement found a

very large pile of dead tree limbs piled up as well as fresh dirt and pine straw.

Investigators removed the branches and found an indentation in the ground.

Investigators used a probe to prod the dirt, and they smelled an odor of decomposition

on it. They did not discover a body, but they did find a grave approximately five-foot-

three inches long, thirty-four inches wide, and seventeen inches deep. Soil from this

shallow grave was found to have trace amounts of blood in it.

      Defendant was arrested for Bennett’s murder on 4 September 2018. While

incarcerated, Defendant had conversations with an inmate named William Greene

(“Greene”), who agreed to provide information to law enforcement in exchange for a

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potential dismissal of his own charges. Greene stated that Defendant told him he

and Bennett had a big argument because he had seen texts on her phone to a number

he did not recognize and had deleted the number from her phone. Bennett then

walked away. Defendant took the kids elsewhere, drove back to pick up Bennett, and

then returned to the house where they continued fighting. Defendant stated that

Bennett threatened to show him videos of her performing fellatio on other people.

Defendant told Greene that after Bennett’s threat “something clicked off in his head

and he just grabbed the gun that was on the counter and shot her in the back of the

head.” Greene told law enforcement Defendant said he had “lost it,” and it was “out

of nowhere.” Defendant told Greene the gun he used to kill Bennett was “for shooting

animals in the yard. . . . any little animal he would go out back, bang bang[.]”

Defendant revealed to Greene he ultimately hid Bennett’s body in a burn pit next to

a doghouse located at Defendant’s grandfather’s house.

      On 16 July 2019, acting on the information provided by Greene, investigators

obtained permission from Defendant’s grandfather to dig under the burn pit on his

property.   Investigators used a backhoe to carefully remove layers of earth.

Investigators uncovered heavily decomposed remains wrapped in a tarp.           The

remains were identified as Bennett’s, and the cause of death was a gunshot wound to

the back of the head. The entrance wound was in the back of the skull. Bullet

fragments found in the skull were determined to be from a .22 caliber gun that could

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                                   Opinion of the Court

be either a rifle or handgun, but more likely a handgun. There was no other trauma

to the bones other than that caused by the bullet.

        Defendant’s trial was held 29 March to 5 April 2022. At the close of the

evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss the first-degree murder charge based

on premeditation. The trial court denied the motion, finding “the evidence is sufficient

to go to the jury on the issue of premeditation, deliberation.” The State then gave

notice it would seek to instruct on first-degree murder based on a theory of lying in

wait.

        At the charge conference, the State sought the lying in wait jury instruction.

Defendant objected, arguing the relevant caselaw required facts demonstrating the

perpetrator was stalking or following someone, which could not be the case here

because Bennett was killed in her own dwelling.            Defendant contended the

circumstances of this case were no “different than any other domestic shooting that

takes place.” The trial court overruled Defendant’s objections and instructed the jury

on first-degree murder based on theories of lying in wait and premeditation and

deliberation. The trial court also instructed the jury on second-degree murder.

        The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder on theories of both

lying in wait and premeditation and deliberation.          The trial court sentenced

Defendant to a term of life imprisonment without parole.          Defendant appealed

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b) and 15A-1444(a). All other relevant facts are

provided as necessary in our analysis.

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                                    II. Analysis

      The issues before this Court are: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence for

the jury to convict Defendant of first-degree murder based on theories of

premeditation and deliberation and lying in wait; (2) whether the trial court erred by

instructing the jury on lying in wait; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting

numerous gruesome photographs; and (4) whether certain statements by the

Prosecutor during his closing argument prejudiced Defendant’s trial. We address

each argument in turn.

                         A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

      On the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the charge of

first-degree murder to the jury based on theories of premeditation and deliberation

and lying in wait, we adhere to the following standard of review:

             This Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the
             evidence de novo. Upon a defendant’s motion for dismissal,
             the question for the Court is whether there is substantial
             evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense
             charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of
             the defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. We
             review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
             giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences.
             Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal
             of the case but are for the jury to resolve. Substantial
             evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
             might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
             Court may consider both direct and circumstantial
             evidence, even when the evidence does not rule out every
             hypothesis of innocence.

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                                    Opinion of the Court

State v. Elder, 278 N.C. App. 493, 499, 863 S.E.2d 256, 264 (2021) (citations, quotation

marks, and brackets omitted).

                          1. Premeditation and Deliberation

      Our Supreme Court has defined “premeditation” and “deliberation” as follows:

             “Premeditation” means that the defendant formed the
             specific intent to kill the victim some period of time,
             however short, before the actual killing. “Deliberation”
             means an intent to kill executed by the defendant in a cool
             state of blood, in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge
             or to accomplish an unlawful purpose and not under the
             influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by lawful
             or just cause or legal provocation. . . . “[C]ool state of blood”
             does not mean an absence of passion and emotion. One
             may deliberate, may premeditate, and may intend to kill
             after premeditation and deliberation, although prompted
             and, to a large extent, controlled by passion at the time.”

State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 77, 405 S.E.2d 145, 154 (1991) (citations omitted).

      If the victim sufficiently provokes the perpetrator, the killing may not be

premeditated. See State v. Taylor, 337 N.C. 597, 607, 447 S.E.2d 360, 367 (1994).

However,

             [t]he fact that defendant was angry or emotional will not
             negate the element of deliberation during a killing unless
             there was anger or emotion strong enough to disturb
             defendant’s ability to reason. Evidence that the defendant
             and the victim argued, without more, is insufficient to show
             that the defendant's anger was strong enough to disturb
             his ability to reason.

State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 94, 478 S.E.2d 146, 156 (1996) (brackets omitted).

Evidence regarding motive is probative of the “degree of the offense,” although motive

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                                   Opinion of the Court

itself is not an essential element of first-degree murder. State v. Wiseman, 178 N.C.

784, 791, 101 S.E. 629, 632 (1919).

      Moreover, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to

premeditation and deliberation, this Court considers “the conduct and statements of

the defendant before and after the killing.” State v. Rose, 335 N.C. 301, 318, 439

S.E.2d 518, 527 (1994). As for a defendant’s conduct after the killing, “any unseemly

conduct towards the corpse of the person slain, or any indignity offered it by the

slayer, as well as concealment of the body, are evidence of express malice, and of

premeditation and deliberation in the slaying.” Id. at 318, 439 S.E.2d at 527. For

example, the Rose court upheld the defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder in

part because there was “evidence of an elaborate process of removing the body, bloody

bedclothes and personal items from the scene of the killing.” Id. at 319, 439 S.E.2d

at 527. In Rose, the defendant cleaned the victim’s apartment, hid the victim’s body

in one car before moving it to another, and ultimately transported the body to a

remote location and buried it. Id. at 319. 439 S.E.2d at 527. The Rose court held

“Defendant’s handling of the body from the time of the killing until the body was

finally burned and buried is evidence from which a jury could infer premeditation and

deliberation.” Id. at 319, 439 S.E.2d at 527. Additionally, in State v. Patel, this Court

concluded, “the evidence of defendant’s conduct . . . in disposing of the body after the

murder was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that defendant killed [the

victim] with premeditation and deliberation.” 217 N.C. App. 50, 63, 719 S.E.2d 101,

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110 (2011). The Patel court reasoned, “the fact that [the victim’s] body was burned

after she was killed constitutes additional evidence of premeditation and

deliberation.” Id. at 62, 719 S.E.2d at 109. Finally, in State v. Weathers, our Supreme

Court concluded there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find murder with

premeditation and deliberation where:

             Defendant’s conduct after the killing provides further
             evidence of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant
             went to great lengths to conceal the murder, including
             disposing of the body and destroying or hiding evidence
             such as the pipe, the sheets, and the mattress. Defendant's
             uncaring attitude about the victim, evidenced by killing
             her and then dumping her nude body by the roadside, could
             be considered by the jury in finding premeditation and
             deliberation.

339 N.C. 441, 452, 451 S.E.2d 266, 272 (1994).

      Here, the evidence demonstrates Defendant was not “under the influence of a

violent passion” to the point of murder during either the fight in the front yard nor at

the moment he picked up Bennett while she was walking down the side of the road

and brought her home. Bonney, 329 N.C. at 77, 405 S.E.2d at 154. Although Bennett

advanced toward Defendant during their confrontation in front of the home and

Defendant attempted to push her back, they were not physically fighting or

attempting to hit one another. Greene testified the couple continued fighting even

after Defendant picked her up in the car, and, according to Defendant, Bennett made

threats arousing his jealousy after they returned home. However, neither instance

demonstrates Defendant was impassioned to the point of losing his ability to reason.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Geddie, 345 N.C. at 94, 478 S.E.2d at 156. Defendant never physically lashed out at

Bennett other than attempting to push her away from him as she advanced on him.

As for her efforts to make him jealous, the jury could have—and likely did in this

case—consider Bennett’s threats to arouse jealousy as evidence showing Defendant’s

motivation to kill her rather than arousing “lawful or just cause or legal provocation.”

Bonney, 329 N.C. at 77, 405 S.E.2d at 154.

      Even if Defendant did not form the specific intent to kill Bennett until some

point after they returned to the house, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to

conclude Defendant committed murder in the first-degree.           First, the evidence

Defendant argues supports second-degree murder, such as Bennett’s work at a strip

club and her verbal threats to Defendant to arouse his jealousy, could have

demonstrated to a reasonable jury motive rather than provocation. See Taylor, 337

N.C. at 607, 447 S.E.2d at 367; Wiseman, 178 N.C. at 791, 101 S.E. at 632.

      Second, the State argued the fact Defendant murdered Bennett with a .22

caliber handgun rather than with the nine-millimeter he customarily carried

demonstrates some planning on his part. Specifically, the State argues the choice of

the .22 caliber handgun to commit the crime was likely because such a gun is smaller

and easier to dispose of, quieter, and less likely to make an exit wound and therefore

less messy.   Defendant argues Greene’s testimony demonstrates the .22 caliber

handgun just happened to be on the kitchen counter, and so it was just the weapon

Defendant happened to grab in the heat of the moment. At trial, forensic scientist

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                                  Opinion of the Court

Hope Bruehl testified the bullet was a .22 and more likely from a handgun than a

rifle because it was all lead and not jacketed. Detective Joshua Phillips testified .22

handguns are normally smaller in size than other handguns and fire more quietly

than higher caliber handguns. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the State, the jury could have accepted the foregoing relevant evidence to support a

conclusion that Defendant purposely chose the .22 caliber handgun rather than his

nine-millimeter because the .22 is cleaner and quieter. Elder, 278 N.C. App. at 499,

863 S.E.2d at 264. Therefore, we conclude Defendant’s choice to use the .22 caliber

handgun constitutes evidence demonstrating premeditation and deliberation.

      Third, and most importantly, Defendant’s actions following the murder

demonstrate a planned strategy to pretend Defendant had nothing to do with the

murder and to avoid detection as the perpetrator.         Defendant’s actions, taken

together, constitute a long-term, well-thought out, and strategic plan to avoid being

discovered as the perpetrator. Defendant (1) called Bennett’s mother to tell her a

story he made up about Bennett throwing a bottle at him and red juice spraying on

the bed causing him to do laundry; (2) told people Bennett left him; (3) texted Bennett

at almost 6:00 p.m. although he knew she was dead; (4) played dumb in a text to

Bennett’s father about Bennett’s whereabouts; (5) pretended to look for Bennett by

posting fliers regarding her disappearance; (6) initially disposed of Bennett’s body

behind the house; and (7) relocated the body to a burn pit away from his home where

it was less likely to be discovered by law enforcement. Defendant’s conduct after the

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                                  Opinion of the Court

murder supports first-degree murder based upon premeditation and deliberation

because it shows Defendant “went to great lengths to conceal the murder,” including

initially burying the body behind his house and then reburying it on his grandfather’s

property. Weathers, 339 N.C. at 452, 451 S.E.2d at 272. Considered together, all of

Defendant’s carefully planned actions constituted substantial evidence for the jury to

find Defendant committed the murder with premeditation and deliberation.

Weathers, 339 N.C. at 452, 451 S.E.2d at 272.

       Finally, Defendant, through counsel, admitted he shot and killed Bennett,

constituting substantial evidence Defendant was the perpetrator of the offense.

Elder, 278 N.C. App. at 499, 863 S.E.2d at 264. Because substantial evidence existed

for the jury to determine (1) Defendant committed murder with premeditation and

deliberation, and (2) Defendant was the perpetrator of the offense, the trial court did

not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

       Defendant argues this Court should not consider acts subsequent to a killing

as evidence of premeditation and deliberation because of our Supreme Court’s words

in State v. Steele:

              Subsequent acts, including flight or hiding the body, or
              burning the bloody clothes and otherwise destroying traces
              of the crime, are competent on the question of guilt. The
              basis of this rule is that a guilty conscience influences
              conduct. From time immemorial it has been thus accepted:

              “The wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous
              are bold as a lion.” 28 Prov. 1.

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             “Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all.” Hamlet,
             Act III, scene I.

             “Guilty consciences always make people cowards.”         The
             Prince and his Minister, Pilpay, chap. III, Fable III.

             Flight is not evidence of premeditation and deliberation.

190 N.C. 506, 511, 130 S.E. 308, 312 (1925) (citations omitted).            Specifically,

Defendant argues the holding in Steele is controlling law which prevents this Court

from considering acts subsequent to a killing as evidence of premeditation and

deliberation and that later cases are misstatements of the law. We disagree. Steele

holds flight, and flight alone, is not evidence of premeditation and deliberation. The

Steele court states “subsequent acts” are relevant to guilt, but it does not hold that

subsequent acts cannot be considered evidence of premeditation and deliberation. We

conclude Steele means what it says and nothing more. Our courts have held that a

defendant’s subsequent acts other than flight are probative of premeditation and

deliberation. Patel, 217 N.C. App. at 63, 719 S.E.2d at 110; Rose, 335 N.C. at 318,

439 S.E.2d at 527; Weathers, 339 N.C. at 452, 451 S.E.2d at 272.

      Defendant further argues a seemingly exculpatory statement to Greene

mandates we vacate his murder conviction based on premeditation and deliberation.

Greene testified Defendant told him “something clicked off in his head and he just

grabbed the gun that was on the counter and shot her in the back of the head.”

Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen the State introduces in evidence

exculpatory statements of the defendant which are not contradicted or shown to be

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                                  Opinion of the Court

false by any other facts or circumstances in evidence, the State is bound by these

statements.”   State v. Carter, 254 N.C. 475, 479, 119 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1961). The

Carter court further held the defendant’s motion to dismiss should be granted “when

the State’s evidence and that of the defendant is to the same effect, and tend only to

exculpate the defendant.” 254 N.C. 475, 479, 119 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1961). “The

introduction by the State of exculpatory statements by the defendant, however, does

not prevent the State from introducing evidence which shows facts concerning the

crime to be different from the incident as described by the exculpatory statements.”

State v. Freeman, 326 N.C. 40, 42–43, 387 S.E.2d 158, 159 (1990) (other evidence

presented by the State supported defendant’s premeditation and deliberation

conviction even though defendant had told someone prior to the shooting that he was

thinking of shooting the victim in the shoulder to “keep him under control”) (quotation

marks omitted). Because the State presented other evidence supporting Defendant’s

first-degree murder conviction, the holding in Carter does not compel us to vacate

Defendant’s conviction of murder by premeditation and deliberation.

                                   2. Lying in Wait

      A first-degree murder verdict as to one theory will stand even if such a verdict

as to another theory fails. See State v. McLemore, 343 N.C. 240, 249, 470 S.E.2d 2, 7

(1996) (upholding the defendant’s conviction based on premeditation and deliberation

but finding error in his conviction based on felony murder). Moreover, provided the

record demonstrates which “theory or theories the jury relied [upon] in arriving at its

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verdict,” there is no need for a new trial. State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 219, 393 S.E.2d

811, 816 (1990). Here, the jury marked the verdict form indicating it found Defendant

guilty of first-degree murder based on both theories, premeditation and deliberation

and lying in wait. Because we uphold Defendant’s first-degree murder conviction

based on premeditation and deliberation, we need not address the sufficiency of the

evidence for the conviction based on lying in wait.

                    B. Instructing the Jury on Lying in Wait

      At trial, the State sought to instruct the jury on lying in wait over numerous

objections by Defendant. The trial court ultimately decided to give the instruction.

Defendant argues doing so constituted error based on insufficiency of the evidence

Defendant committed first-degree murder by lying in wait. Thus, Defendant frames

his argument regarding the giving of the instruction essentially in the same manner

he argues the evidence was insufficient to convict on lying in wait. Accordingly, based

on our discussion above, we need not separately address this argument.

                   C. Introduction of Numerous Photographs

      At trial, the State admitted approximately 150 photographs, including: (1) the

tarp containing the body recovered from where Defendant reburied it; (2) tattered,

dirty clothes and jewelry removed from the body; (3) the body in its decomposed state

and with maggots; (4) arrangements of bones after the body was “rendered”; and (5)

numerous photos of the skull, some showing the bullet hole. Defendant argues, based

on N.C. R. Evid. 403, many photos were irrelevant, redundant, and prejudicial as

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they were designed to prey on jurors’ sympathies, and there was a reasonable

probability the jury would have reached a different result had it not been subjected

to so many such photos. We disagree.

      Because Defendant did not object to the admission of photographic evidence at

trial, we review for plain error. N.C. R. App. 10(a)(4); see also State v. Miles, 223 N.C.

App. 160, 164, 733 S.E.2d 572, 575 (2012) (“[W]here there is no objection to the

admission of the evidence at trial, we are limited to a review for plain error”).

      “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” N.C. R. Evid. 403. “[P]hotographs showing the

condition of the body and its location when found are competent despite their

portrayal of a gruesome spectacle. This holds true even where the photographs depict

remains in an advanced state of decomposition, and where the cause of death is

uncontroverted.” State v. Harris, 323 N.C. 112, 127, 371 S.E.2d 689, 698 (1988)

(citations omitted). “Photographs of a homicide victim may be introduced even if they

are gory, gruesome, horrible or revolting, so long as they are used for illustrative

purposes and so long as their excessive or repetitious use is not aimed solely at

arousing the passions of the jury.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 284, 372 S.E.2d

523, 526 (1988).

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                                  Opinion of the Court

      Defendant argues we should reach the same conclusion as in Hennis, in which

the court held repetitive, “grotesque and macabre” photos “added nothing to the

[S]tate’s case” and were therefore “only for inflaming the jurors.” 323 N.C. at 286,

372 S.E.2d at 528. In Hennis, the court also found the manner in which the State

presented the photographs compounded their prejudicial effect. Specifically, the

Hennis court held the “erection of an unusually large screen on a wall directly over

defendant’s head such that the jury would continually have him in its vision as it

viewed the slides” and the “thirty-five duplicative photographs published to the jury

one at a time just before the state rested its case” were excessively redundant and

“enhanced” the prejudicial effect. Id. at 286, 372 S.E.2d at 528.

      Here, Defendant argues it was error for the trial court to allow the State to

admit a “staggering 150+” photographs. It is not the volume of photographs that pose

a potential issue in this case, but rather their content and whether they are overly

duplicative or irrelevant. We hold they are not. We note that the vast majority of

photos cannot be said to inflame the passion of jurors because they depict

unemotional subjects, such as: aerial photos of the burn pit, including one photo

which shows only trees and what looks like a field of grass; woods and dirt;

investigators digging into the ground; a brush pile and a dirt hole; and entirely

mundane photographs of the home, its yard, and surrounding fence.

      Some photographs could be considered distressing but not rising to the level of

potentially inflaming jurors, specifically depicting: the tarp in which Bennett’s body

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                                  Opinion of the Court

was wrapped; Bennett’s hair sticking out of the tarp; dirty clothes and jewelry; and

bones after the body was rendered.        Although showing jurors photographs of

Bennett’s dirty clothes, jewelry, and rendered bones, along with the jurors’ knowledge

that they were sitting for a murder case, had potential to cause emotion, we cannot

say such photographs were “grotesque and macabre,” as Defendant argues. The

photographs do not depict bloody, gory details of any injuries or any identifiable

human features that would arouse jurors’ sympathy for Bennett to the point of

prejudicing their decision to find Defendant guilty based merely on such photographs.

It is true that some photographs depicted Bennett’s skull, making visible the bullet

hole that killed Bennett. However, these photographs were highly relevant to the

State’s case in proving the cause of death and had some relevance to the charge of

first-degree murder by lying in wait. Our Supreme Court recently stated “[t]he

prosecution’s burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a

defendant’s tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense. Even

a stipulation as to the cause of death does not preclude the State from proving all

essential elements of its case.” State v. Richardson, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 171

(2023) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, then, the danger of unfair

prejudice did not substantially outweigh the photographs’ probative value.

      Certainly, the most distressing photographs depicted Bennett’s decomposed

body, and maggots were clearly visible in some. However, the photographs were used

appropriately as evidence to help the State develop and illustrate testimony

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                                  STATE V. BRANCHE

                                   Opinion of the Court

regarding the extensive search and efforts required to find Bennett’s body and to

discover Defendant’s actions to conceal it, as well as the breakthrough resulting from

the information Greene provided regarding re-burial of the body. Defendant’s actions

subsequent to the murder, specifically his carefully executed plan to conceal the body,

were relevant to the elements of premeditation and deliberation, making the

difference between first- and second-degree murder. The photographs presented at

trial depicted the culmination of the investigation to locate Bennett’s body and

provided evidence of premeditation and deliberation. Hennis, 323 N.C. at 284, 372

S.E.2d at 526. Therefore, this case is distinguishable from Hennis because we cannot

say such photographs “added nothing” to the State’s case. Also, there are no facts

suggesting the State presented the photos in such a prejudicial manner as in Hennis,

such as how the photographs in that case were displayed unusually large and directly

over the defendant’s head, keeping the defendant in the jury’s view the entire time.

Accordingly, Defendant’s argument fails, and we find no plain error in the trial court’s

admission of the photographs.

                        D. The State’s Closing Arguments

      Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to sustain objections to the

Prosecutor’s statements when he mentioned the punishment for second-degree

murder, mentioned Defendant did not have to testify, and discussed the law

regarding provocation. Defendant further argues the trial court erred by failing to

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                                  STATE V. BRANCHE

                                  Opinion of the Court

intervene ex mero motu when the Prosecutor commented on Defendant’s failure to

plead guilty.

      As for the three statements to which Defendant objected, the issue is

preserved, and we review the trial court’s rulings for abuse of discretion. State v.

Walters, 357 N.C. 68, 101, 588 S.E.2d 344, 364 (2003). Specifically, we determine

whether “the remarks were improper,” then whether “the remarks were of such a

magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced defendant, and thus should have been

excluded by the trial court.” Id. at 101, 588 S.E.2d at 364.

      Defendant did not object to the Prosecutor’s comment regarding his failure to

plead guilty. When a defendant fails to object to a Prosecutor’s closing argument at

trial, “this Court must determine if the argument was so grossly improper that the

trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu,” and specifically whether the

trial court should have intervened by “(1) preclud[ing] other similar remarks from the

offending attorney; and/or (2) instruct[ing] the jury to disregard the improper

comments already made.” Id., 357 N.C. at 101, 588 S.E.2d at 364 (quotation marks

omitted).

                1. Mentioning the Punishment for Second-Degree Murder

      Defendant contends the prosecutor appealed directly to the jurors’ emotions by

mentioning the punishment for second-degree murder as opposed to the punishment

for first-degree murder. We note the trial court sustained Defendant’s objection to

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                                   STATE V. BRANCHE

                                   Opinion of the Court

the Prosecutor’s mention of the punishment for second-degree murder.              During

closing argument, the Prosecutor stated:

             [Defendant’s counsel] talked about punishment. The
             punishment is life without parole, first degree murder.
             What he’s going to tell you, your decision is not to be based
             on what the punishment is or isn’t. Saying what the
             punishment is simply impresses upon you the seriousness
             of your duty, and there’s nobody that needs to impress that
             upon you. You already know that. You have already
             showed us that.

             You know, if I wanted to really upset you, I could tell you
             the punishment for second-degree murder, minimum
             punishment for second-degree murder for this defendant, 93
             months.

             [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection.

             THE COURT: Sustained.

(Emphasis added.) However, following the ruling, the trial court did not give a

curative instruction.

      A trial court’s instructions can cure erroneous statements by a prosecutor.

State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 238, 464 S.E.2d 414, 437 (1995). Nevertheless, “it is

not error for the trial court to fail to give a curative jury instruction after sustaining

an objection, when defendant does not request such an instruction.”              State v.

Williams, 350 N.C. 1, 24, 510 S.E.2d 626, 642 (1999). General instructions given at

the outset of a trial may be “sufficient to cure any prejudicial effect suffered by [a]

defendant regarding evidence to which an objection was raised and sustained.” State

v. Gordon, 248 N.C. App. 403, 412, 789 S.E.2d 659, 666 (2016).

                                          - 22 -
                                  STATE V. BRANCHE

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Here, the trial court sustained Defendant’s objection. Towards the beginning

of the trial, the trial court instructed the jury, “When the Court sustains an objection

to a question, you must disregard the question and the answer, if one is being given.”

The trial court additionally instructed the jury during the jury charge, “The jury

should not acquit or convict a defendant based on the severity or lack of severity of

punishment that will be imposed for the offense.” Given the trial court’s instructions,

and even presuming the Prosecutor’s statement was improper, we conclude the

statement did not ultimately prejudice the outcome of Defendant’s trial. Walters, 357

N.C. at 101, 588 S.E.2d at 364.

                  2. Mentioning Defendant Did Not Have to Testify

      Defendant argues he was prejudiced by the Prosecutor mentioning Defendant

did not have to testify because a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s right

not to testify. At trial, the Prosecutor stated in his closing argument:

             The Judge will tell you [Defendant] does not have to
             testify, and the fact that he does not testify cannot be
             used against him and I want you to make sure you don’t
             use it against him. But that doesn't mean he can’t call
             other witnesses -- any witness.

             [DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor.

             THE COURT: Sustained.

             [THE STATE]: Judge, I can argue where are the
             witnesses.

             THE COURT: Well, overruled. Overruled.

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                                 STATE V. BRANCHE

                                  Opinion of the Court

             [THE STATE]: Where are the witnesses? Where is any
             witness?

      A criminal defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination is enshrined in our

Constitution and law. N.C. Const. art. I, § 23; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-54. Our Supreme

Court has held “any direct reference to defendant’s failure to testify is error and

requires curative measures be taken by the trial court.” State v. Reid, 334 N.C. 551,

554, 434 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1993). Specifically, the State

             may comment on a defendant's failure to produce witnesses
             or exculpatory evidence to contradict or refute evidence
             presented by the State.           However, a prosecution's
             argument which clearly suggests that a defendant has
             failed to testify is error. . . .

             When the State directly comments on a defendant’s failure
             to testify, the improper comment is not cured by
             subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction
             on a defendant's right not to testify.

Id., at 555–56, 434 S.E.2d at 196–97.

      Whether a new trial is appropriate depends on the appellate court’s

determining whether “[c]omment on an accused’s failure to testify . . . is harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 557, 434 S.E.2d at 198. In applying Reid, this

Court has focused on whether there was doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. State

v. Riley, 128 N.C. App. 265, 270, 495 S.E.2d 181, 185 (1998). For example, in Riley,

this Court concluded the prosecutor’s statements during voir dire (“if you want that

evidence in, you’re going to put the defendant on the stand. . . . You have to let the

defendant testify to it”) constituted error meriting a new trial because there was

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                                  STATE V. BRANCHE

                                  Opinion of the Court

conflicting evidence at trial about who fired the gunshots. Id. at 269, 495 S.E.2d at

184.

       Here, the facts are distinguishable from Reid. In Reid, the prosecutor stated

in his closing argument, “Now defendant hasn’t taken the stand in this case-” to which

the defendant objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. Id. at 554, 434

S.E.2d at 196.     Here, the trial court sustained Defendant’s objection to the

Prosecutor’s mention of Defendant’s failure to testify but overruled it to allow the

Prosecutor to make an argument regarding Defendant's lack of witnesses. There is

no doubt the Prosecutor’s statement was improper. However, there also is no doubt

regarding the identity of the perpetrator because Defendant, through counsel,

admitted to having killed Bennett. In view of the trial court’s sustaining Defendant’s

objection, the evidence of Defendant’s motive for planning to kill Bennett, his

confession, his use of the .22 caliber handgun, and his acts subsequent to the killing,

we hold the Prosecutor’s remark pertaining to Defendant’s decision whether or not to

testify is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Reid, 334 N.C. at 554, 434 S.E.2d at

196.

                    3. Statement of Law Regarding Provocation

       At trial, the Prosecutor sought instructions regarding “mere words” not rising

to the level of legal provocation from a case called State v. Simonovich, 202 N.C. App.

49, 54, 688 S.E.2d 67, 71 (2010).      The trial court denied the State’s request.

Nevertheless, the Prosecutor proceeded to explain Simonovich in his closing

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                                  STATE V. BRANCHE

                                  Opinion of the Court

argument. Defendant objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. The

Prosecutor explained to the jury, “State versus Simonovich, Court of Appeals, 2010.

Provocation must be more than mere words as language, however abusive, neither

excuses, nor mitigates killing. I’m not talking about cursing, flailing. We’re talking

about absolutely goading somebody into doing it.”

      Simonovich is inapposite here because it relates to provocation in the context

of voluntary manslaughter, which is not at issue in this case. Id. at 54, 688 S.E.2d at

71. The relevant law regarding provocation in the context of first- versus second-

degree murder is as follows:

             “The fact that defendant was angry or emotional will not
             negate the element of deliberation during a killing unless
             there was anger or emotion strong enough to disturb
             defendant's ability to reason. Evidence that the defendant
             and the victim argued, without more, is insufficient to show
             that the defendant’s anger was strong enough to disturb
             his ability to reason.”

Geddie, 345 N.C. at 94, 478 S.E.2d at 156 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets

omitted).

      A misstatement of law by a prosecutor may be “cured by proper instructions

given by the trial court when it charge[s] the jury.” State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316,

366, 572 S.E.2d 108, 140 (2002). Here, although citing law relevant to voluntary

manslaughter rather than first- or second-degree murder, the Prosecutor’s

explanation of the law is not very different from the correct law regarding provocation

(Simonovich’s “mere words” versus Geddie’s arguing, “without more” not being

                                         - 26 -
                                  STATE V. BRANCHE

                                  Opinion of the Court

enough to mitigate first-degree murder).          Moreover, the trial court properly

instructed the jury it could not find Defendant guilty of first-degree murder if

Defendant was under the influence of a violent passion. When instructing the jury

on the law relevant to what the State must prove regarding malice, the trial court

explained the State must prove:

             [D]efendant acted with deliberation, which means that the
             defendant acted while the defendant was in a cool state of
             mind. This does not mean that there had to be a total
             absence of passion or emotion. If the intent to kill was
             formed with a fixed purpose, not under the influence of
             some suddenly aroused violent passion, it is immaterial
             that the defendant was in a state of passion or excited when
             the intent was carried out.

This explanation is the proper statement of law regarding the required state of mind

for premeditation and deliberation, and we conclude it cured any misstatement of the

law by the Prosecutor. Barden, 356 N.C. at 366, 572 S.E.2d at 140.

                4. Mentioning the Defendant Failed to Plead Guilty

      Defendant argues he was prejudiced by the Prosecutor mentioning Defendant

admitted to killing Bennett through counsel but failed to plead guilty because a

prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s failure to plead guilty or his exercise

of the right to be tried by a jury. In his closing argument, the Prosecutor stated,

             The judge is going to tell you about first-degree murder.
             [Defendant’s counsel] was kind enough to admit what his
             client could not deny, deny what his client could not admit,
             to being guilty of this. Killing another human being
             intentionally with malice, malice equals hatred or ill will

                                         - 27 -
                                  STATE V. BRANCHE

                                  Opinion of the Court

             or infliction of a wound with a deadly weapon to cause a
             death.

             I believe [Defendant’s counsel] said that his client acted
             with malice and killed Kristen Bennett.

Defendant argues this statement constitutes an improper comment on Defendant’s

failure to plead guilty.

      “A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to plead not guilty and be tried

by a jury. Reference by the State to a defendant’s failure to plead guilty violates his

constitutional right to a jury trial.” State v. Degraffenried, 262 N.C. App. 308, 310,

821 S.E.2d 887, 889 (2018) (brackets omitted). This Court’s job is to determine

“whether the prosecutors’ comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make

the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id. at 311, 821 S.E.2d at 889.

      Here, the Prosecutor was building an argument regarding premeditation and

deliberation, noting Defendant admitted to killing Bennett but not to what was the

largest point of dispute at trial—the requisite intent for first-degree murder. For

example, the Prosecutor continued: “[D]efendant, of course, caused the victim’s death.

. . . Okay. Premeditation and deliberation, this is what [Defendant’s counsel] did not

stipulate to. Because this makes his client guilty of first-degree murder. So we’re

going to break this down into common sense.” We conclude the Prosecutor’s comment

was directed at what was and was not at issue for the jurors to decide rather than an

improper statement regarding Defendant’s failure to plead guilty. In any event, the

Prosecutor’s comment was not so grossly improper that the trial court failed to

                                         - 28 -
                                  STATE V. BRANCHE

                                  Opinion of the Court

intervene ex mero motu because it was much more clearly a reference to what the

jurors were already well aware of (Defendant’s admission, through counsel, regarding

the killing) than a targeted attack on Defendant’s failure to plead guilty.

                                  III. Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we hold substantial evidence supported Defendant’s

jury conviction for first-degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation, and

thus, we do not address the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the theory of

lying in wait. We further hold the admission of numerous and graphic photographs

did not constitute plain error in a case focused on Defendant’s acts subsequent to the

murder as they related to premeditation and deliberation. Finally, we hold the

alleged improper statements in the Prosecutor’s closing argument did not prejudice

Defendant.    Consequently, we hold Defendant received a fair trial, free from

prejudicial error.

      NO ERROR.

      Judges ZACHARY and FLOOD concur.

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