Court Opinion

ID: 9901770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 16:01:27.565898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:38.950564
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-5093     Document: 010110957210       Date Filed: 11/22/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        November 22, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 23-5093
                                                    (D.C. No. 4:21-CR-00228-JFH-1)
  CHRISTOPHER DEAN DANA,                                      (N.D. Okla.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, McHUGH, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Christopher Dean Dana pleaded guilty to coercion and enticement of a minor

 in Indian country, and the district court sentenced him to 360 months in prison. He

 appeals. In response, the government moves to enforce the appeal waiver in

 Mr. Dana’s plea agreement. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1328

 (10th Cir. 2004). We grant the government’s motion and dismiss this appeal.

                                      Background

       The parties entered into the plea agreement the morning of trial. The

 agreement required Mr. Dana to plead guilty to coercion and enticement of a minor in

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-5093     Document: 010110957210       Date Filed: 11/22/2023    Page: 2

 Indian country, an offense requiring a prison sentence between ten years and life.

 See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The agreement also required him to waive “the right to

 directly appeal the conviction and sentence” unless his sentence exceeded the

 statutory maximum. R. vol. 1 at 65. After the district court performed what even

 Mr. Dana describes as “a comprehensive colloquy,” Resp. at 10, Mr. Dana pleaded

 guilty.

           Before sentencing, Mr. Dana’s counsel moved to withdraw. The presentence

 investigation report had concluded that the federal sentencing guidelines called for a

 life sentence, a conclusion that apparently surprised plea counsel. Counsel had

 miscalculated the guidelines range, and his miscalculation led him to advise

 Mr. Dana that his sentence would likely fall in the range of ten to fifteen years. In

 addition, counsel said, Mr. Dana pleaded “guilty under the belief that by doing so he

 was removing the possibility of a life sentence.” R. vol. 2 at 16.1 The court granted

 plea counsel’s motion to withdraw and appointed a new lawyer to represent Mr. Dana

 going forward.

           Mr. Dana appeared with his new lawyer at sentencing. Mr. Dana urged the

 district court to impose 120 months, the government 360 months. The district court

 imposed 360 months.

           1
          Plea counsel’s motion to withdraw and the transcript of the hearing on that
 motion were filed (and will remain) under seal. To provide a coherent and thorough
 decision, however, we must discuss or quote some information in the sealed record.
 We have discussed or quoted only those parts of the sealed record that are necessary
 to fully explain our decision.
                                            2
Appellate Case: 23-5093    Document: 010110957210       Date Filed: 11/22/2023    Page: 3

                                       Discussion

       We will enforce an appeal waiver if (1) the appeal falls within the waiver’s

 scope, (2) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal, and

 (3) enforcing the waiver would not “result in a miscarriage of justice.” Hahn,

 359 F.3d at 1325. Mr. Dana does not dispute that his appeal falls within the scope of

 his waiver, so we need not address that issue. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d

 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005). He does, however, contend that his waiver was not

 knowing and voluntary, and that enforcing it would result in a miscarriage of justice.

 We are not persuaded.

 1. Mr. Dana fails to show that his waiver was unknowing or involuntary.

       Mr. Dana bears the burden to show that his waiver was unknowing or

 involuntary. See United States v. Tanner, 721 F.3d 1231, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013).

       To assess whether a waiver was knowing and voluntary, we typically focus on

 two factors: “whether the language of the plea agreement states that the defendant

 entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily” and whether the district court

 conducted “an adequate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.” Hahn,

 359 F.3d at 1325. These factors weigh heavily against Mr. Dana. He expressly

 asserted in his plea agreement that he understood his appellate rights and that he

 knowingly and voluntarily waived them. He further asserted that he understood the

 agreement and voluntarily agreed to it. At the plea hearing, Mr. Dana confirmed that

 he understood the appeal waiver. And after conducting a thorough plea colloquy, the

 district court found that he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.

                                            3
Appellate Case: 23-5093     Document: 010110957210         Date Filed: 11/22/2023     Page: 4

        Yet Mr. Dana suggests that the record does not show that he understood his

 appeal waiver. He underscores two facts. First, his petition to enter a guilty plea did

 not mention the appeal waiver in the section outlining Mr. Dana’s waiver of

 constitutional rights. But that omission is not surprising, for “it is well settled that

 there is no constitutional right to an appeal.” Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,

 656 (1977). Second, when he wrote out his understanding of the plea agreement, he

 did not mention the appeal waiver. But he did not mention his waiver of any other

 rights either, so we do not infer from his written statement that he did not know about

 the appeal waiver. Besides, any doubt about whether Mr. Dana understood his appeal

 waiver disappears once we look at the plea agreement and the transcript of the plea

 hearing.

        Mr. Dana also challenges the validity of his plea itself. He argues that his lack

 of experience with the criminal-justice system and his plea counsel’s failure to

 understand the sentencing guidelines prevented him from entering a valid plea. If he

 did not enter the plea agreement knowingly, then “the appellate waiver subsumed in

 the agreement also cannot stand.” United States v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183, 1189

 (10th Cir. 2014).

        Counsel’s advice that Mr. Dana’s sentence would likely fall in the range of ten

 to fifteen years does not undermine the validity of his plea. That remains true even if

 the advice resulted from counsel’s ignorance about the sentencing guidelines. The

 plea agreement advised Mr. Dana that “any estimate of the likely sentence received

 from any source is a prediction, not a promise.” R. vol. 1 at 75. At the plea hearing,

                                              4
Appellate Case: 23-5093    Document: 010110957210        Date Filed: 11/22/2023      Page: 5

 moreover, he claimed to understand that the “sentence imposed may be different from

 any estimate” from his counsel. Id. at 91. In any event, an “erroneous sentence

 estimate” by itself will “not render a plea involuntary.” United States v. Silva,

 430 F.3d 1096, 1099 (10th Cir. 2005).

       More troubling is plea counsel’s allegation that Mr. Dana pleaded “guilty

 under the belief that by doing so he was removing the possibility of a life sentence.”

 R. vol. 2 at 16. Such a belief would have been plainly incorrect. The record,

 however, contains ample evidence that Mr. Dana knew he faced a possible life

 sentence when he pleaded guilty. In his petition to enter a guilty plea, he asserted

 that his attorney informed him that he could receive the maximum possible

 punishment—life in prison. He also acknowledged that the possible “range of

 punishment” under the plea agreement was ten years to life. R. vol. 1 at 59. The plea

 agreement itself explicitly said that “the maximum statutory sentence is life

 imprisonment.” Id. at 74. And when answering the judge’s questions under oath at

 the plea hearing, Mr. Dana claimed to understand that his sentence “may include a

 term of imprisonment between ten years up to life.” Id. at 88. “Solemn declarations

 in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.

 63, 74 (1977). And in the end, plea counsel’s statement that Mr. Dana believed his

 plea removed the possibility of a life sentence does not overcome the numerous

 statements in the record showing that Mr. Dana knew a life sentence was possible.

       On this record, Mr. Dana has failed to show that his waiver was unknowing or

 involuntary.

                                            5
Appellate Case: 23-5093    Document: 010110957210        Date Filed: 11/22/2023     Page: 6

 2. Enforcing the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice.

       Enforcing an appeal waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice if (1) the

 district court relied on an impermissible sentencing factor; (2) ineffective assistance

 of counsel in negotiating the waiver makes it invalid; (3) the sentence exceeds the

 statutory maximum; or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful, seriously affecting the

 fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See Hahn, 359 F.3d

 at 1327. Mr. Dana has the burden to show that enforcing his appeal waiver will

 result in a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 959

 (10th Cir. 2004).

       Mr. Dana contends that enforcing his waiver will result in a miscarriage of

 justice for two reasons. First, he says that “his plea resulted from improper,

 inadequate, and insufficient advice.” Resp. at 14. We understand him to argue that

 he received ineffective assistance. But “a defendant must generally raise claims of

 ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral proceeding, not on direct review.

 This rule applies even where a defendant seeks to invalidate an appellate waiver

 based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Porter, 405 F.3d at 1144 (citation

 omitted). We see no reason here to depart from our general practice of requiring

 defendants to raise ineffective-assistance claims in collateral proceedings. Second,

 Mr. Dana argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We take this

 argument to allege that his waiver is otherwise unlawful. But the argument alleges

 merely a sentencing error. And to decide if the waiver is unlawful, we ask “not

 whether the sentence is unlawful, but whether the waiver itself is unlawful because of

                                            6
Appellate Case: 23-5093     Document: 010110957210       Date Filed: 11/22/2023   Page: 7

 some procedural error or because no waiver is possible.” United States v. Sandoval,

 477 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007).

        For these reasons, Mr. Dana has not shown that enforcing his appeal waiver

 will result in a miscarriage of justice.

                                        Disposition

        We grant the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver. We dismiss

 this appeal.

                                             Entered for the Court
                                             Per Curiam

                                            7