Court Opinion

ID: 9673459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:12:09.573725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.403520
License: Public Domain

Mallett, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I agree with parts i, n, and hi(b) of the lead opinion, I respectfully dissent from part m(A). I believe that the “open and obvious” doctrine does not bar the plaintiff’s cause of action for defective lighting.
In Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 94; 485 NW2d 676 (1992), this Court recognized the “open and obvious” doctrine, as stated in 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 343A(1), p 218:
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the fact that a hazard is open and obvious does not absolutely absolve the possessor of land of liability. A possessor of land may still be liable to invitees if he should anticipate that the hazard will cause injury. This Court restated this rule in Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 611; 537 NW2d 185 (1995):
[T]he Rule generated is that if the particular activity or condition creates a risk of harm only because the invitee does not discover the condition or realize its danger, then the open and obvious doctrine will cut off liability if the invitee should have discovered the condition and realized *147its danger. On the other hand, if the risk of harm remains unreasonable, despite its obviousness or despite knowledge of it by the invitee, then the circumstances may be such that the invitor is required to undertake reasonable precautions. The issue then becomes the standard of care and is for the jury to decide. [Emphasis in original.]
In this case, the state of the lighting in the Westland Sports Arena would have been obvious to any person in the arena with normal vision. The obviousness of the defect, however, does not end the inquiry. The question then becomes whether the possessors of the Westland Sports Arena should have anticipated that the defective lighting could cause an injury, even though the state of the lighting was obvious.
The Westland Sports Arena is held open to the public, and hockey players who rent the rink should be able to expect that the rink operator will take reasonable steps to make the rink safe. In addition, the possessor of a public ice rink should anticipate that inadequate lighting will cause an injury. Hockey is a fast-paced game that requires quick reflexes. Inadequate lighting will certainly interfere with a player’s ability to react to the puck.
Most importantly, the operators of Westland Sports Arena not only should have anticipated that the defective lighting would cause injury, they did anticipate that the lighting would cause injury. In two separate memos, Tamara McKinstry, the arena manager, requested that the lights be fixed for safety reasons. Also, in her deposition testimony, she acknowledges that adequate lighting is necessary to the protection of persons playing hockey.
Plaintiff may be comparatively negligent for going on the ice despite knowledge of the inadequate light*148ing and for positioning himself near the goal. Under Michigan’s system of “true” comparative negligence, however, a plaintiff’s negligence alone will not support a defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 660; 275 NW2d 511 (1979). Consequently, the plaintiff’s negligence, if any, does not relieve the possessor of the Westland Sports Arena from the general duty of maintaining a safe premises for its invitees.
Brickley and Cavanagh, JJ., concurred with Mallett, C.J.
Kelly, J., took no part in the decision of this case.