Court Opinion

ID: 9910346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:07:35.884723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:20.131054
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2935-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JONATHAN HAUGHEY-
MORALES, a/k/a
JONATHAN MORALES,
JONATHAN HAUGEY,
MARCO JIMENEZ, and
JONATHAN HAUGHEY,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

                   Argued October 31, 2023 – Decided December 15, 2023

                   Before Judges Whipple, Mayer and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 19-08-0882.

                   Kevin Scott Finckenauer, Assistant Deputy Public
                   Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
                   Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Kevin Scott
                   Finckenauer, of counsel and on the briefs).
            Kaili Elizabeth Matthews, Deputy Attorney General,
            argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
            Attorney General, attorney; Kaili Elizabeth Matthews,
            of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Jonathan Haughey-Morales appeals from a judgment of

conviction after a jury trial resulted in his conviction for the shooting death of

Carlos Garcia. We affirm.

      This case began on May 5, 2019, when Lilian Benavides was celebrating

her seventieth birthday.    At around 2:00 a.m., while partygoers were still

celebrating, defendant began to bang on the door, while carrying a rifle. Alexsys

Acosta opened the door, and defendant said he was looking for a man called

Landy who was at the party. Defendant waited outside for Landy.

      Once Landy came to the door, he and defendant began to argue. Acosta

told Landy and defendant to keep it down, meanwhile Acosta also held other

partygoers back as the situation was escalating. Landy took out his gun and

waved it at the sky during his argument with defendant, but soon, Landy and

defendant resolved their issue.

      The peace was short lived as once Landy reentered the house, the

defendant remained in the doorway even though Acosta told defendant to leave.

Defendant, still holding the rifle, refused to exit the house and fired into the

                                                                            A-2935-21
                                        2
entryway of the house. Defendant retreated, then returned and fired more shots

into the entryway. Thereafter, defendant once again retreated then returned to a

window and shot through the window. Four people were shot. However, only

Garcia—one of the partygoers who was shot—died as a result of his gunshot

wounds.

      The following day, defendant, who was injured, was picked up by police

in South Whitehall, Pennsylvania. He initially told police that he was attacked

by kids in a "game" and thus was taken to the hospital. Defendant was later

arrested and returned to New Jersey when police became aware defendant was

wanted in connection with the shooting.

      Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1),

(2); three counts of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1);

second-degree possession of a rifle for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4(a)(1); and third-degree possession of a rifle without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(c)(1).

      Defendant was tried in absentia due to his multiple interruptive outbursts

at trial. At various points defendant threatened the court, refused to get dressed

to appear before the court, and disrupted the court proceedings. There was also

ambiguity on the record of whether the issue of incapacity to stand trial was

                                                                            A-2935-21
                                        3
properly preserved for appeal. On March 2, 2022, the jury found the defendant

guilty on all six counts.

      During the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel asked for the court to

apply mitigating factors four and eleven 1 asserting defendant had a mental health

disorder demonstrated by defendant counsel's contact with defendant. The court

found nothing on the record to establish defendant had a mental disorder and

found no mitigating factors. The court found aggravating factors three, six and

nine and imposed consecutive sentences utilizing the Yarbough guidelines.

State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 644 (1985). Defendant was sentenced to an

aggregate term of seventy-one years. This appeal followed.

      Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:

             POINT I:  THE TRIAL COURT REVERSIBLY
             ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
             ON PASSION/PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER
             WHEN THE SHOOTING WAS CLEARLY
             PROMPTED     BY  THE    DRUNKEN    AND
             PHYSICALLY AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS       OF
             SEVERAL       PARTYGOERS       AGAINST
             [DEFENDANT].

1
  The two mitigating factors requested were: "(4) there were substantial grounds
tending to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct, though failing to establish
a defense . . . ; (11) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive
hardship to the defendant or the defendant's dependents." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(b)(4) and (11).
                                                                            A-2935-21
                                        4
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO ORDER A COMPETENCY HEARING IN LIGHT
OF THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUGGESTING
[DEFENDANT] WAS UNABLE TO ASSIST IN HIS
OWN DEFENSE OR PARTICIPATE IN THE
PROCEEDINGS DUE TO MENTAL ILLNESS. (Not
raised below).

    A.     [Defendant]'s Extremely Aberrant
    Behavior, the Discussions of His Mental
    Health Problems, and His Complete
    Refusal to Communicate With His
    Attorney or Participate in the Proceedings
    Should Have Caused the Trial Court to Sua
    Sponte Order a Competency Hearing Prior
    to Trial.

    B. [Defendant]'s Continued Refusal to
    Communicate with His Trial Counsel or
    Appear at the Trial Where He Was Facing
    Life in Prison, His Continued Aberrant
    Behavior, and His Telling the Trial Court
    that He Suffered from Mental Illness
    Further Should Have Caused the Trial
    Court to Sua Sponte Order a Competency
    Hearing.

    C.       The Detailed Discussion of
    [Defendant]'s Mental Health Issues at
    Sentencing, and Trial Counsel's Statement
    That They Contributed to His Lack of
    Ability to Participate In His Own Defense,
    Further Should Have Compelled the Trial
    Court to Hold a Competency Hearing.

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
REFUSED TO FIND MITIGATING FACTORS THAT
WERE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND

                                                 A-2935-21
                        5
             FAILED TO EXPLAIN THE OVERALL FAIRNESS
             IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES, AS
             REQUIRED, RESULTING IN AN EXCESSIVE LIFE
             SENTENCE.

      We first address our standard of review. Generally, if there is no objection

to a jury instruction at the time it is given, then "there is a presumption that the

charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case." State

v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012). If the defendant fails to obje ct, then the

appellate court reviews for plain error. State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021); R.

2:10-2. An error will be disregarded, unless doing so will produce an unjust

result and the error raises "a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the

jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v Funderburg, 225

N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347,

361 (2004)). Otherwise, we apply the rational basis test in the case the trial

court fails "to provide a jury instruction when defendant requested it." State v.

Carrero, 229 N.J. 118, 128 (2017).

      The trial court also makes the ultimate determination as to a defendant's

competency, and our review of such determinations is "highly deferential."

State v. Moya, 329 N.J. Super. 499, 506 (App. Div. 2000). If a trial court decides

to not hold a competency hearing, we will not disturb that decision unless it is

clear and convincing that "defendant was incapable of standing trial." State v.

                                                                              A-2935-21
                                         6
Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 73-74 (1959). There would need to be a "bona fide doubt"

that defendant "failed to meet the competency standards." State v. Harris, 181

N.J. 391, 459 (2004).

      The standard of review for a criminal sentence is an abuse of discretion.

State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979). This standard also applies to

decisions to impose consecutive sentences. See State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229,

244-45 (2004).

                                        I.

      Defendant argues the trial court should have supplied a provocation

charge because when viewed in light most favorable to defendant, he was

provoked and had no adequate cooling off period. Defendant further argues it

was reasonable for him to have been provoked in his situation given the

circumstances he was facing. He compares the facts of his case to State v.

Mauricio, where an inebriated defendant was shoved out of a club by a bouncer.

117 N.J. 402, 404 (1990). He posits that, like Mauricio, he was provoked given

the hostility he faced from the partygoers by being "forcibly ejected by a heavily

inebriated group."

      Based on our review, the evidence in this record is not sufficient to support

a provocation charge. "[A] court 'shall not charge the jury with respect to an

                                                                             A-2935-21
                                        7
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the

defendant of the included offense.'" State v. Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 113 (1994)

(quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e)). Under this test, there must be a rational basis in

the evidence for a jury to convict of a lesser offense. Id. at 113-14. We view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. Carrero, 229 N.J. at

128.

       Four   elements   are   needed   to   warrant   the   passion/provocation

manslaughter charge: (1) provocation must be adequate; (2) the defendant must

not have had time to cool off between the provocation and the slaying; (3) the

provocation must have impassioned the defendant; and (4) the defendant must

not have actually cooled off before the slaying. Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 411. The

first two elements are objective, the last two are not and thus should be left to

the jury. Id. at 413. For provocation to be adequate, a reasonable person would

need to have been provoked beyond their control. State v. Canfield, 470 N.J.

Super. 234, 275 (App. Div. 2022). A battery, except for a "light blow," can be

considered sufficiently provocative.    State v. Robinson, 136 N.J. 476, 492

(1994). The adequacy of the provocation depends on the proportionality of the

response and a disproportionate response will preclude finding that provocation

was adequate. State v. Darrian, 255 N.J. Super. 435, 449 (App. Div. 1992).

                                                                           A-2935-21
                                        8
      Utilizing this standard, the defendant's argument is unavailing. 2 For there

to be adequate provocation a reasonable person would need to have been

provoked "beyond the power of his . . . control." Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. at

292. Here, the uninvited defendant approached the house with a rifle at two in

the morning while the family was celebrating a birthday.          He argues the

partygoers were hostile, with multiple combative partygoers forcibly ejecting

him. However, defendant was the one with a rifle, and instead, the partygoers

were visibly trying to push defendant away from the door as he continued to try

to get into the house. Evidence in the record demonstrates Acosta was trying to

deescalate the situation by coaxing the partygoers back into the house.

      Even if we were to accept the dubious assertion that defendant was

pushed, instead of being lightly moved away from the door as Acosta

continuously asked defendant to "get the f[***] out of [the] house," defendant

accosted Acosta with the rifle in his hand. The encounters do not demonstrate

defendant was being provoked in such a way that a reasonable person would

2
  Defendant asks us to follow State v. Coyle, asserting the State can secure a
conviction for murder only if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing
was not a product of provocation. 119 N.J. 194, 221 (1990). However, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-4(b)(2) is meant to provide a lesser-included offense in the case that the
homicide is committed in the heat of reasonable provocation. See State v.
Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 378-79 (2012).

                                                                            A-2935-21
                                        9
lose control. In addition to the lack of provocation, defendant did not flee after

he was pushed out of the house. Instead, his response was not proportional since

he raised his rifle and fired multiple times into the house. See Darrian, 255 N.J.

Super. at 449.     This disproportional response precludes the finding of

provocation. Therefore, the passion/provocation charge was not warranted.

      Moreover, even if we were to accept there was sufficient provocation,

there was time for the defendant to cool off before he began shooting. A "trial

court may withhold instructions if there was undeniably a reasonable cooling-

off period." Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 413. Once defendant was told to leave the

house, Landy was no longer waving his own gun at defendant, and defendant

began to retreat. Instead of leaving, defendant returned to shoot at the house

multiple times when no one else was posing a threat or approaching him.

                                       II.

      We also reject the argument the court should have sua sponte requested a

competency hearing for defendant. Defendant argues that his behavior, along

with his refusal to cooperate with his counsel, refusal to attend court, flooding

his holding cell, and his discussions with counsel regarding mental health

problems, demonstrated he suffered from a mental illness and necessitated the

court conduct a competency hearing to ensure defendant's ability to stand trial.

                                                                            A-2935-21
                                       10
Defendant argues, citing State v. Gorthy, his inability to "assist in his own

defense" should have shown that his mental condition precluded a meaningful

interaction with his attorney, and required the court to conduct a hearing to

ensure defendant's competency. 226 N.J. 516, 530 (2016).

      N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(a) states that "[n]o person who lacks capacity to

understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be

tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such

incapacity endures."   Under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b), in general, a defendant is

competent if proofs establish that defendant has: (1) the mental capacity to

understand his presence in relation to time, place and things, and (2) he

comprehends that he is in court, with a judge, he is being charged, that a lawyer

will assist him in his defense and that he can participate in an adequate

presentation of his defense.

      A competency hearing shall be held if there is "bona fide doubt" regarding

a defendant's competency to stand trial. State v. Lambert, 275 N.J. Super. 125,

128 (App. Div. 1994) (citations omitted). Where defendant challenges a court's

decisions to not sua sponte order a competency hearing, the standard of review

"is a strict one." Harris, 181 N.J. at 458 (citing Spivey, 65 N.J. at 37). Our

review of the trial court's failure to sua sponte order a competency hearing is

                                                                           A-2935-21
                                      11
highly deferential.   Moya, 329 N.J. Super. at 506.        The test to determine

competence is not "fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need

for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed." Lambert, 275 N.J. Super.

at 129. Furthermore, a defendant's counsel finding "no reason to question [a

defendant's] competency must be given substantial weight." Harris, 181 N.J. at

458.

       The defendant's assistance of his own defense does not require him to

understand legal questions but to assist in the account of the facts, witnesses,

and other trial related information. See Gorthy, 226 N.J. at 532. Refusing to

attend court or speak with his attorney is not sufficient to call into question the

defendant's mental health, as it does not demonstrate he cannot appreciate the

proceedings. Defendant understood he was in court and the nature of the

proceedings. Defendant also responded accordingly when asked questions about

the trial during jury instructions and stated he understood that disruptive

behavior would lead to his removal from the courtroom. Thus, if defendant

could understand basic elements of the proceeding, then defendant can be

considered competent.

       Defense counsel stated during the sentencing that defendant understood

what was going on around him and defense counsel never believed defendant's

                                                                             A-2935-21
                                       12
competency was an issue to be raised at trial. Since defense counsel is in the

best position to assess defendant's competency, counsel's failure to raise the

competency issue supports the absence of any evidence that defendant was

incompetent. See Harris, 181 N.J. at 458. Nor does defendant's disruptive

behavior warrant the court to order a competency hearing. See Harris, 181 N.J.

at 453. We discern insufficient evidence in the record to raise a bona fide doubt

that defendant failed to meet the competency standards in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(a).

                                        III.

      Defendant argues that the trial court's refusal to find mitigating factors

was erroneous.    Our review of sentencing is under an abuse of discretion

standard. State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 603 (2014). Defendant's argument

is unavailing, as the trial court is not required to find mitigating factors but has

discretion weighing the factors. See State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 68-69 (2014).

The trial court sufficiently explained why it did not find for the mitigating

factors requested, as these factors were not supported by the record. During

sentencing, the trial court also discussed each mitigating factor not limited to

the factors requested by defendant.

      Defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences

and did not thoroughly explain its decision when reviewing the Yarbough factors

                                                                              A-2935-21
                                        13
and failed to consider the overall fairness of an aggregate sentence in rendering

its decision. See State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 268 (2021).

      Defendant's Yarbough arguments are not persuasive. However, defendant

and the State are correct that a remand is required for the sole purpose of

conducting a fairness finding under Torres.

      Affirmed in part and remanded for the limited purpose of rendering a

fairness determination under Torres, 246 N.J. at 268.          We do not retain

jurisdiction.

                                                                           A-2935-21
                                      14