Court Opinion

ID: 9472720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:08:18.690833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:05.574726
License: Public Domain

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,
with whom NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting.
Because the majority has erroneously concluded that the state qualified privilege of fair comment applies to the WZZM reports on Bichler’s personal financial affairs, I must respectfully dissent. Inasmuch as the salient facts have been accurately compiled in the majority opinion and in Judge Weick’s dissent, their duplication at this point would serve no useful purpose.
Michigan has long recognized the venerable doctrine of a qualified privilege of fair comment.1 See, e.g., Miner v. Detroit Post & Tribune Co., 49 Mich. 358, 13 N.W. 773 (1882). The “doctrine of qualified privilege may properly be regarded as including statements made in good faith by a citizen of the community having, or claiming to have, special knowledge or information bearing on such matters of public concern and communicated to others concerned or interested”. Timmis v. Bennett, 352 Mich. *1019355, 369, 89 N.W.2d 748, 755 (1958). In Timmis v. Bennett, the unanimous state supreme court identified six elements of the qualified privilege: (1) a good faith communication, (2) a cognizable interest to be upheld, (3) a communication which is limited in scope to the interest advanced, (4) a proper occasion for the publication, (5) a publication in the proper manner, and (6) a publication only to appropriate parties.
The Timmis v. Bennett court further held that the existence of the privilege was an issue of law. However, once the existence of the privilege was established, the plaintiff would bear the burden of demonstrating actual malice. The issue of actual malice becomes a jury question if the evidence merely raised a probability of malice.2 89 N.W.2d at 753 (citing Bacon v. Michigan Central R.R. Co., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N.W. 181 (1887)).
Primarily, Bichler challenges the existence of (a) the station’s cognizable interest in his personal financial affairs, and (b) a communication limited in scope to the interests advanced.
Bichler contends that, in order for WZZM-TV to have had a legitimate interest which would immunize its report, there must have been a “logical nexus” between the theater and his personal financial condition. The majority opinion conducts no real analysis of this issue. Instead, the majority merely concludes that because the broadcast “deal[t] with matters of public interest____ WZZM carried its burden of establishing a privileged occasion”. Maj.op. at 1012. Thereafter, the majority reluctantly concedes “[tjhere must be some connection” between the individual finances and the theater, id. at 1012, and in a conclusory summary states that “Bichler’s financial condition played an integral part in” the subject of the broadcast. Id. at 1012. Thus, the majority has conveniently assumed, without factual support, the relevance of Bichler’s financial condition, which was the precise issue presented to the en banc court.
It must be conceded that, absent the closing of the theater, Bichler’s personal financial predicament would not have been subject to the fair comment privilege. Accordingly, to invoke the privilege, WZZM was mandated the burden of proving a rational relationship between the closing of the theater and Bichler’s private affairs. Manifestly, no such proof appears on the appellate record.
The Thunder Bird was a corporation. Bichler was merely a shareholder. He was not the sole owner of the theater. Further, WZZM was acutely aware of the fact that Bichler was not either the de facto or de jure owner of the theater.3
Additionally, the record is significantly devoid of any inference that Rummel obtained or attempted to obtain any information whatsoever connecting Bichler’s personal affairs to the corporate affairs of the Thunder Bird. It is hornbook law that a corporation is a distinct legal entity apart from its shareholders and I can discern no rational relationship between the activities of a corporation and the financial affairs of its shareholders.
Rummel used the artifice of the theater’s closing to publicly humiliate Bichler with an unverified assumption that the individual’s asserted financial straits had resulted in the closing of the Thunder Bird, leaving innocents “in the lurch”. As a result, Bichler was visited with immediate, devastating and insurmountable economic repercussions from his personal creditors.
The “thesis” of the news report was not, as the majority erroneously and without support hypothecates, “that the theater was in financial trouble which caused it to close”. Maj.op. at 1012. Instead, Rum-*1020mel’s “story” was that Biehler’s personal turmoil had somehow impacted the viability of the Thunder Bird. As previously noted, no individual ever suggested this connection to Rummel and no attempt was made by Rummel to verify the severe implication of the newscast’s integration of Bichler’s personal finances in the report on the theater’s closing. Bichler’s personal integrity was called into question by the news report and he was cast in a negative and false light before his community. Without having provided even the most remote justification to include the plaintiff’s alleged personal misfortunes in a report about the corporation, WZZM failed to demonstrate the cognizable interest necessary to invoke the common law privilege. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s contrary determination.4
In reaching this result, I would not characterize news reporters as “toothless tigers”, since I am mindful of the important role that the media serves in today’s society. However, as must all societal institutions, it must employ its important privileges with an equally crucial regard for the responsibility inherent in its power. In this case this journalist acted not only unprofessionally, but with a willful disregard for the facts and circumstances of the case, and in such an irresponsible manner as to cause severe damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiff. Such willful disregard should not and is not condoned, whether in the common law, state or federal enactments, within the context of this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.5

. The fair comment privilege is of ancient origin and was treated as needful of little explication in Toogood v. Spyring, 149 Eng.Rep. 1044 (Ex. 1834); therein it was observed that a publication is privileged when it is, fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters where his interest is concerned.

. To the extent that Judge Weick’s dissent asserts a factual issue as to the existence of malice arising from the Bichler deposition testimony, I join with Judge Weick in urging that summary judgment was an inappropriate vehicle for disposing of this case. The majority’s bland assertion that the testimony was vague and insufficient is a mechanism of avoidance.

. As the majority noted, when Kowalczyk asked Rummel to delay the report, Kowalczyk did so as a result of his shareholder interest in the Thunder Bird. Maj. op at 1016.

. The majority insists that it would not have been possible to report the putatively legitimate story — the theater’s closing — without the egregious commentary upon Bichler’s personal affairs. Maj. op. at 1015. This is another example of the majority’s predeliction for assuming the conclusion. In fact the two items were not inseparable. The Thunder Bird’s relationship with Playmoore Productions — the impetus for the story — was obtained from Moore; the plight of Bichler personally was revealed by court records. Thus, the sources, as well as the substance, of the items were distinct. Justicious editing of the broadcast could have avoided this lawsuit. Instead, an over eager television reporter invented connections without justification and aired a damaging unverified news report. No privilege should prevent WZZM from being held accountable for the resulting losses.

. I also join fully Judge Jones' eloquent dissent.