Court Opinion

ID: 9630081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:59:25.248875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:30.556453
License: Public Domain

KERN, Associate Judge
(concurring):
In Small v. United States, D.C.App., 304 A.2d 641, 643 (1973), we said:
The requirement that a sentencing judge state explicitly on the record his determination whether a youth offender will derive rehabilitative benefit from Youth Act treatment is wholly consistent with our directive in past cases to trial judges with respect to other facets of a criminal proceeding “to enhance the record with clear evidence” so as to avoid the subsequent need on appeal “to reconstruct skimpy records or to fill the void in empty records on appeal.” . . . The minutes taken by the sentencing judge to state expressly for the record his determination whether or not the defendant before him will derive rehabilitative benefit from the Youth Act will save months of litigation after sentence as to what the sentencing judge had determined and whether he complied with the Act.
In Dorszynski v. United States, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d - (1974), the Supreme Court (at 3044) concluded:
[A]n express finding of no benefit must be made on the record, [but] the Act does not require that it be accompanied by supporting reasons.
The Court pointed out (at 3053) :
Appellate courts should not be subject to the burden of case-by-case examination of the record to make sure that the sentencing judge considered the treatment option made available by the Act.
In the instant case the trial court immediately after the verdict stated in open court (R. 279) :
He’s [appellant] young enough; he didn’t pull the trigger, so, maybe the Youth Center evaluation is the answer.
However, then the trial court, upon learning from appellant that he had already been at the Youth Center for a prior larceny conviction (R. 279), stated (R. 281):
I’m not going to play God; I’m not going to string him along; no, no Youth Center.
Subsequently, at sentencing, the following colloquy between appellant’s counsel and the court occurred (R. 3) :
MR. FAYAD: At this time I would request Your Honor to reconsider sending Mr. Taylor back to the Youth Center. The last time you indicated you didn’t wish to do that, as Mr. Taylor was sent down there once.
THE COURT: That is right.
Then, the trial court commented (R. 4, 5) :
In 1969, ... he [appellant] pled guilty . . . and . . . got three years probation under the Federal Youth Correction Act. In October of 1970 again he was the recipient of the benefits of the Youth Correction Act.
Mr. Taylor your opportunity to be rehabilitated will be in prison.
I conclude in this particular case, in which the sentence was imposed prior to Small and Dorszynski, that after a search of the record and a piecing together of words and phrases uttered to and by the sentencing judge he did comply with the Act. Henceforth, however, the trial court should be mindful of the Chief Justice’s admonition, “An explicit finding that petitioner would not have benefited from treatment under the Act would have removed all doubt concerning whether the enlarged discretion Congress provided to sentencing courts was indeed exercised,” Dorzynski at 3053, and should make such “no benefit” finding.