Court Opinion

ID: 9665778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:56:54.90283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.841895
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Judge
(concurring in result).
There were three arrests made here: first for lewd and indecent conduct; second, for violation of controlled substance law, and third, for carrying a concealed weapon. The arrest for possession of marijuana and the arrest for carrying a concealed weapon were not made until after the envelope and the satchel, respectively, had been opened, so neither the search of the envelope nor the search of the satchel can be justified as incident to the latter two arrests. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); State v. Koen, Mo., 487 S.W.2d 562 (1972). The searches must stand or fall on the arrest made for lewd and indecent conduct. There is nothing in this case involving an arrest for a minor traffic violation and the case does not present any problem or question as to what can be done about a search of an automobile when the police make a stop by reason of a traffic violation, as was the case in State v. Meeks, 467 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. banc 1971). The offense here had nothing to do with traffic or the opera-' tion of a motor vehicle.
Likewise, the case does not involve search of the person of the arrestee, as in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) or Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973). The defendant was *497personally searched, true, but the challenged search and seizure here is of the weapon, which was found in a satchel on the front seat of the automobile. It was not found on the defendant’s person.
As stated in the principal opinion, the arrest of defendant for lewd and indecent conduct was made when defendant got out of his car, when defendant was standing right beside the car. The open satchel, which proved to contain the loaded gun, was in plain view on the front seat “right next to the position where the driver was sitting”. Under these circumstances, the seizing and opening of the satchel was well within the law as declared by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
In State v. Meeks, Mo., 467 S.W.2d 65, 66, supra, it was pointed out there is no Missouri case where the search of an automobile, following a warrantless arrest and removal of the person from the car, has been upheld upon the showing of nothing more than the mere isolated fact of arrest for a minor violation. In the case before us, not only was there an arrest of the driver as he got out of the car, there was on the seat next to where he had been sitting an open satchel, contents unknown, within his easy reach and access. In the Meeks case, the marijuana was in a closed “console” and in a closed glove compartment, and the search was beyond question an exploratory search, nothing more, and was held so by a majority of the court, see 467 S.W.2d l. c. 66 where the search is described in the principal opinion as a “purely exploratory venture — a fishing expedition” and 467 S.W.2d 1. c. 69 where Judge Finch, in his concurring opinion, says he would reverse and remand because it was “an unauthorized, warrantless, exploratory search.” The Meeks case and the present case are not at all factually similar — one was an exploratory search, one was not. The dissenting judges in Meeks were willing to permit such exploratory search; the majority was not.
Neither United States v. Robinson, supra, nor its companion case of Gustafson v. Florida, supra, approves such exploratory search of an automobile. Neither case is in point. In both cases, there was no question of the search of an automobile before the court. The searches in both cases were of the persons of those arrested and the evidence sought to be suppressed was the evidence which was found on the person. In Robinson, it was heroin capsules found in a cigarette package in the breast pocket of the suspect’s overcoat; in Gustaf-son, it was marijuana cigarettes found in a cigarette box in a pocket of the suspect’s suit coat.
In the Robinson opinion, the court points out that the decision of the court of appeals was on the issue of how far the police officials could go in searching the person of the prisoner. What the Robinson case held was that the officer was entitled to search the person of the arrestee and inspect what was found on the person. The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals which had held that the heroin found in the search of the person was inadmissible, as constituting a search viola-tive of the Fourth Amendment.
The dissent in Robinson was on the basis that the search of the person was too broad for an arrest for a routine traffic violation, arguing there was no justification for opening the cigarette package and looking inside. There was no consideration in either the majority opinion or the dissent as to what could be done about searching an automobile.
In the Gustafson case again the majority opinion dealt with what kind of search could be made of the person of the ar-restee. The court’s holding was “that upon arresting petitioner for the offense of driving his automobile without a valid operator’s license, and taking him into custody, Smith [the policeman] was entitled to make a full search of petitioner’s person incident to that lawful arrest.”
*498In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, it is made clear he is doubtful as to whether the kind of arrest and search made in Gustafson may not have violated petitioner’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but no such claim was presented to the court and, on the contrary, petitioner conceded the constitutional validity of the arrest. So Mr. Justice Stewart concludes that the incidental search of his person was constitutionally valid. Nothing is said about searching an automobile following a traffic arrest.
In his concurring opinion in Gustafson, Mr. Justice Powell dealt with the matter of search of the person, concluding that “a valid arrest justifies a full search of the person.” Again, nothing is said about searching an automobile.
The dissent in Gustafson is directed to the search of the person, taking the position there was no justification for opening the cigarette box found in the coat pocket and looking inside the box.
As applied to the factual situation presented by the case before us, the Robinson and Gustafson cases are no authority for declaring a rule “that an officer making a warrantless custodial arrest of the driver for a minor offense may, as an incident thereto, search such part of the interior of the automobile from which the driver might obtain a weapon.” This rule purports to authorize exploratory searches. Although it refers to that part of the interior from which the driver might obtain a weapon, it does this merely as a means of marking out the boundaries which can be searched. It makes no requirement that there be some likelihood or danger that there is a weapon or that the officer is apprehensive on this score or that the search has any connection with the offense for which the arrest was made. So long as the part of the interior searched is a part where a weapon might be placed subject to access, it can be searched. This means virtually the complete interior of the car can be searched any time there is a valid arrest of the driver on any charge whatsoever, no matter how petty.
The principal opinion uses a phrase new to Missouri law — “custodial arrest.” Presumably this means an arrest where the officer takes the suspect into custody, not where he is going to release the suspect with a summons, although paradoxically it would seem the officer would be in more danger in the latter instance than he would be in the former, where he has the suspect in custody, outside the car, much more subject to control than were he inside the car.
The rule announced by the principal opinion means that anytime a police officer decides to make a “custodial arrest”, no matter how petty or minor the violation involved may be, he has carte blanche to search the interior of the car for anything he can turn up, so long as it is found in a part of the interior from which the driver conceivably could obtain a weapon if one were there. It makes no difference that the officer is not apprehensive for his safety or that, as here, there is nothing which could be found in the car relating to the offense for which the arrest was made.
No one knows how many such searches will be made. We will hear only of the ones where something is found and the suspect is tenacious enough to preserve the question in a court of law and carry it through to appeal. We will not hear of the countless instances where a citizen is required to submit to an intensive search of the interior of his automobile and nothing illegal or incriminating is found. It does not matter how personal, confidential, or intimate may be the papers, articles, or objects in the automobile, whether in a sealed envelope, sack, carton, box, brief case, closed or open — all these may be opened, exposed, read, and considered by the officer under today’s decision. It fosters the very kind of abuse of government power the Fourth Amendment was designed to 'prevent. There is no need for it and we should emphatically reject it.
*499If the courts do not enforce the constitutional rights of the citizen no one will. By adopting the rule espoused by the principal opinion, we are withdrawing from the field and leaving the citizen to the whim of the police. For these reasons, while I agree that under Chimel v. California, supra, the trial court was correct in overruling the motion to suppress, I am unable to subscribe to the exploratory search rule announced by this case.