Court Opinion

ID: 9583176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:35:42.649041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:52.160457
License: Public Domain

*687Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
While I cannot agree that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed without condition, I believe that if the judgment is properly construed it can be affirmed with direction. However, the majority’s determination regarding the finality of the trial court’s order leads inexorably to the conclusion that, even though the absence of certain hearing transcripts prevents reversal on evidentiary grounds, the injunction is overly broad on its face as a matter of law. Thus, if the majority opinion were accurate in characterizing the injunction as permanent and final with respect to the determination of all issues of fact and law, then the judgment would have to be reversed.
The trial court’s order is extreme in its breadth, enjoining any development and any ground disturbance activities on any portion of the defendants’ 100-acre tract. Depending on the evidence before the trial court, such an injunction may conceivably be appropriate if it is interlocutory and serves merely to preserve the status quo until a final decision on the merits. See Gray v. DeKalb County, 230 Ga. 95, 97 (3) (195 SE2d 914) (1973). However, “ja]n injunction should not ‘ “impose on defendant any greater restriction (burden) than is necessary to protect plaintiff from the injury of which he complains.” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Bruce v. Wallis, 274 Ga. 529, 531 (1) (556 SE2d 124) (2001). Even if the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the proposed development scheme would cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff’s land, the trial court should not have permanently enjoined any and all development or ground disturbance, because “the court could not have foreseen that any alteration of [the 100 acres] would have irreparably injured [Flournoy].” (Emphasis in original.) Fairfield Corp. No. 1 v. Thornton, 258 Ga. 805, 806 (374 SE2d 727) (1989).
The trial court’s judgment in this case provides that it is effective only “pending further order” and “until such time as the Defendants present to [the trial court] an engineered plan that satisfies the Court that appropriate safeguards will be in place to protect the property of Plaintiff.” I would construe these provisions to make the injunction interlocutory so. that the limiting language mitigates the sweeping nature of the injunction. However, the majority insists that the injunction is permanent, but still asserts that the trial court leaves the door open for development. To the contrary, if the injunction is not interlocutory, it slams the door shut to any development as a result of a future court order in the pending suit, and requires the defendants to initiate, as plaintiffs, a new civil action, with all the attendant trouble and delay, and to prove a change in circumstances. Stone Man v. Green, 265 Ga. 877, 878 (463 SE2d 1) (1995); Southern Ice and Coal Co. v. Atlantic Ice and Coal Corp., 143 Ga. 810, 814 (85 SE 1021) (1915); OCGA § 9-5-9. Thus, the majority’s construction of the injunction as permanent makes the limiting language in the *688order meaningless and demands the conclusion that the trial court failed to “craft an injunction ‘in a manner that is the least oppressive to the defendant while still protecting the valuable rights of the plaintiff.’ [Cit.]” Goode v. Mountain Lake Investments, 271 Ga. 722, 724 (2) (524 SE2d 229) (1999). This Court cannot rewrite the injunction for the trial court so as to include necessary limitations, especially in the absence of transcripts. Rhodes v. Bd. of Health of Towns County, 270 Ga. 565, 566 (512 SE2d 890) (1999). Accordingly, the majority’s interpretation of the trial court’s order as a permanent injunction renders it hopelessly overbroad. Fairfield Corp. No. 1 v. Thornton, supra.
Contrary to Division 2 of the majority opinion, it is not only appropriate, but absolutely necessary, to consider whether the injunction is actually interlocutory. The absence of evidentiary transcripts will not prevent this Court from considering a question on appeal which can be resolved by referring to the terms of the injunction itself. See Cason v. Upson County Bd. of Health, 227 Ga. 451 (1) (181 SE2d 487) (1971). Appellants raise just such a non-evidentiary issue when, citing Fairfield Corp. No. 1 v. Thornton, supra, they contend that, even if there was proof of irreparable injury and Flournoy was entitled to an injunction, the trial court’s order nevertheless is overly broad. The majority inexplicably ignores this contention, even though it relates to the only issue which can be resolved in the absence of the transcripts of all hearings. As discussed above, whether the injunction is impermissibly overbroad, as appellants contend, depends upon whether its extremely broad provisions are of a final or temporary nature. Although Division 3 of the majority opinion describes the trial court’s order as partly final and partly interlocutory, Georgia law does not provide for a hybrid injunction which is both permanent and interlocutory with respect to the substantial equities of the case. Johnson v. James, 246 Ga. 680, 682 (272 SE2d 692) (1980).
Where, as here, an injunction by its terms remains in effect until further order of the trial court, it is ordinarily viewed as interlocutory. Sherman v. Kirk, 141 Ga. 680 (3) (81 SE 1108) (1914); Elliott v. McDaniel, 236 Ga. App. 845, 846 (513 SE2d 249) (1999). See also Walter v. Slayton, 227 Ga. 676, 679 (1) (182 SE2d 464) (1971). The majority addresses and resolves this issue, even though it claims not to, by relying solely on the word “permanent.” However, this nomenclature is completely inconsistent with the language of the order that specifies the duration for which it will be effective. “The effect of a judicial act and not the trial court’s characterization of it determines whether it is a final judgment. [Cit.]” Levingston v. Crable, 203 Ga. App. 16, 18 (416 SE2d 131) (1992).
Furthermore, the record confirms that the injunction should be *689construed to be interlocutory in this case. The trial court’s only prior action was the entry of a temporary restraining order (TRO), which set a time limit for discovery and for evidentiary proffer of the requisite elements for interlocutory injunctive relief. When the TRO expired, the parties apparently continued to adhere to it. However, the trial court did not enter any further order until the one which is the subject of this appeal. In fact, the plaintiff’s complaint does not even pray for a permanent injunction. The record does not contain a notice of final hearing, an order consolidating the most recent hearing on the application for interlocutory injunction with the trial on the merits, or any acquiescence to such a consolidation in the transcript of that hearing. See OCGA § 9-11-65 (a) (2); Georgia Kraft Co. v. Rhodes, 257 Ga. 469, 471 (1) (360 SE2d 595) (1987). That transcript shows that the trial court did not intend to enter a final order permanently enjoining development by the defendants of their entire 100-acre tract. Instead, the trial court stated that the property should be developed and encouraged defendants to settle the case by agreeing not to develop two lots and by not insisting on payment for those lots. The trial court closed the most recent hearing with a reference to making “the temporary injunction permanent until [the trial court] is convinced that there is a plan in place that will protect [plaintiff’s] property.” (Emphasis supplied.) In its quotation from the ensuing order of the trial court, the majority opinion omits a reference to the TRO. The trial court actually “concluded that the temporary injunction and temporary restraining orders heretofore entered should be made permanent . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) There was not any previously existing temporary injunction and, in the context of the whole order and the record, it is clear that the trial court was entering, for the first time, an interlocutory injunction. Where, as here, “after an interlocutory hearing, the trial judge passes an order continuing in effect a previous restraining order until further order of the court, such order is in effect the granting of an interlocutory injunction .... [Cit.]” Moore v. Selman, 219 Ga. 865, 868 (1) (136 SE2d 329) (1964).
Moreover, since any other construction of the trial court’s judgment would cause it to be overly broad, any ambiguity arising from inconsistent nomenclature should be resolved so as to prevent such an impermissible interpretation. When an injunction “ ‘is susceptible of two meanings, one of which would render it illegal and the other proper, that construction will, if reasonably possible, be given it that would render it legal.’ [Cit.]” Clark v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 240 Ga. 289, 294 (5) (240 SE2d 250) (1977).
Because permanent injunctions are referred to as “perpetual” in OCGA § 9-5-10, trial judges in Georgia, like the trial court here, have on occasion referred to interlocutory injunctions as “permanent.” *690McMillan v. Savannah Guano Co., 133 Ga. 760 (2) (66 SE 943) (1910); Strickland v. Griffin, 70 Ga. 541, 550 (5) (1883). When a trial judge does so, “this will not require a reversal of his decision that the defendant should be enjoined; but direction will be given that the order be so modified as to relieve it of the inaccuracy of expression. [Cit.]” McMillan v. Savannah Guano Co., supra at 761 (2) (a). See also Cross v. Miller, 221 Ga. 579, 583 (3) (146 SE2d 279) (1965); Hardy v. Thomas, 208 Ga. 752, 753 (7) (69 SE2d 609) (1952); Strickland v. Griffin, supra at 552 (5). Therefore, the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment granting injunctive relief should be with direction that the trial court modify the injunction by striking the confusing and erroneous reference to it as permanent. Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that the judgment of the trial court should be unconditionally “affirmed.”
Decided March 22, 2004.
Alston & Bird, Scott E. Hitch, Denney, Pease, Allison & Kirk, Ray L. Allison, Jaimie B. DeLoach, Clifton C. Fay, for appellants.
Buchanan & Land, Jerry A. Buchanan, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Fletcher and Justice Hunstein join in this dissent.