Court Opinion

ID: 9551074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:47:22.428636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:01.114647
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
I begin with the observation of a jurist who, with sardonic wit, once declared: I disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion for the reasons stated in the majority opinion.
The majority impliedly concede—as all authority compels—that the Legislature may not defeat or materially impair the exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction of a court, including the superior court. “ ‘The jurisdiction of the system of state courts ... is defined by section 5 of article VI of the constitution [the predecessor to art. VI, §§ 10 and 11], and ... the constitutional jurisdiction and powers of the superior court as thus defined can in nowise be trenched upon, lessened, or limited by the legislature.’” (Sacramento etc. D. Dist. v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 414, 432 [238 P. 687]; see Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 192 [137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148].) The majority then go on to reach a conclusion in startling contradiction to this unassailable principle.
Dissatisfied with a decision of the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission), petitioner has reluctantly complied with the statutory requirement that it may seek review only in this court. It argues that this legislative restriction flies in the face of the constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the superior court where it would prefer to repair. Since petitioner has on its side an unbroken line of decisions supporting its interpretation of the constitutional language at issue and since those decisions are indistinguishable from the facts at hand I would deny *372the petition for a writ of review and allow petitioner to seek the writ where the Constitution allows; in the superior court.1
Three decisions directly on point—two of this court, one of the Court of Appeal—have upheld statutes limiting the superior court’s constitutional jurisdiction. Each decision, however, is premised explicitly on provisions in the Constitution empowering the Legislature to enact the statute in question.
Without question the touchstone in this area is Pacific Telephone etc. Co. v. Eshleman (1913) 166 Cal. 640 [137 P. 1119], which concerned the constitutionality of a statute indistinguishable from the one at hand (see p. 649) conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to review the proceedings of the Railroad Commission. This court termed as a fact “which cannot be blinked [at] and must be faced” that “the legislature has with deliberation restricted and curtailed the jurisdiction vested in the superior courts of this state by the constitution. And upon this but one thing can be said. If there be not in the constitution itself warrant and power to the legislature to do this thing, its effort must be declared illegal. ” (Id. at p. 652, italics added.)
The cases subsequent to Eshleman have followed its rationale without quiver. Each has likewise turned on the finding of an express provision in the Constitution granting the Legislature the right to curtail the jurisdiction of the superior court to review agency decisions.
A unanimous decision written by Justice Tray nor, Loustalot v. Superior Court (1947) 30 Cal.2d 905, 913 [186 P.2d 673], upheld a statute permitting only appellate courts to review the rulings of the Industrial Accident Commission under former article XX, section 21 (now art. XIV, § 4). Justice Tray nor explained; “In restricting any interference with the commission’s decisions or orders to proceedings in the appellate courts, the Legislature has carried out the declared policy of the constitutional provision that the commission be unencumbered by any but proceedings in the appellate courts. ” (Id. at pp. 912-913, italics added.) The court in Loustalot empha*373sized that the workers’ compensation act it reviewed followed “almost word for word” the Public Utilities Act upheld in Eshleman, and stressed that the plenary power provisions of the Constitution under which the challenged legislation was upheld were explicitly unlimited by any other provision in the Constitution. (Ibid.)
Similarly, in Dept, of Alcoholic Bev. Control v. Superior Court (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 67 [73 Cal.Rptr. 780], a unanimous court upheld a statute that limited review of decisions of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to the appellate courts. Finding that the legislation was “obviously patterned” and “obviously modeled” on statutes upheld in Loustalot, Justice Tamura concluded that the limitation was authorized by the “comprehensive” powers conferred on the Legislature in article XX, section 22, which included the express power to enact laws to implement that section. {Id. at pp. 73-75.)
In summary, each decision upholding elimination by statute of the superior court’s original jurisdiction to review agency decisions is bottomed on language in the Constitution granting the Legislature plenary and constitutionally permissible power to determine the method and scope of review of decisions of the particular commission in question.
Is there any provision in the Constitution that meets the absolute requirements of the Eshleman test, i.e., one that by its terms gives the Legislature broad power unlimited by any other constitutional provision to control the review of Energy Commission decisions?
The majority claim to find such a provision in article XII, section 5. They are plainly wrong. Article XII, section 5, which deals with the Public Utilities Commission and the Public Utilities Commission alone, declares in relevant part as follows: “The Legislature has plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this constitution but consistent with this article, . . . to establish the manner and scope of review of commission action in a court of record . . . .” (Italics added.) Although in express terms the provision gives the Legislature power to control the review' of PUC decisions, neither explicitly nor implicitly does it give it such power with regard to decisions of the Energy Commission, a separate and distinct statutory agency. Thus, no matter how repeatedly the majority assert that article XII, section 5, stands as constitutional authorization for the Legislature to change the jurisdiction of the courts, it simply does not contain any reference to the Energy Commission.
*374Until today a jurisdictional statute such as Public Resources Code section 25531 has been struck down without hesitation if it lacked the required constitutional authorization. Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) 170 Cal. 180 [149 P. 35], applied the Eshleman constitutional test to a provision of the Roseberry Act (Stats. 1911, ch. 399, § 18, p. 804) giving the superior court exclusive original jurisdiction to review awards of the Industrial Accident Commission, which at that time was a creature of statute only. The constitutional question was handled with brevity: “Under these circumstances, there appears to be no occasion for extended discussion of the constitutional point. Let us say, in a word, that, in the absence of some special constitutional authorization—and there was none such when the Roseberry Act passed—the constitutional jurisdiction of this court could not be taken away or impaired by legislative act. (Pacific T. & T. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 647, 690 [other citations omitted].) The Roseberry Act was not, therefore, effective to prevent application to this court to exercise its original jurisdiction by way of certiorari.” (Great Western Power, supra, at pp. 182-183, italics added.)2
The only difference between Great Western Power and the case at hand is the identity of the court whose constitutional grant of concurrent jurisdiction the Legislature sought to eliminate: here the superior court, there the Supreme Court.3 Great Western Power is thus dispositive of this case since section 25531, like the Roseberry Act, has no constitutional parentage.
The majority use an old ploy: when a controlling decision is contrary to preconceived notions, overlook it. They have done so with Eshleman, even though, as I have quoted above, its rule of law is crystal clear and has been followed for 72 years.
Today’s decision is supported, in reality, only by the majority’s belief that it would be practical to confine jurisdiction over review of section 25531 decisions to this court. First, they assert that there is a special relationship between decisions of the Energy Commission and those of the PUC, and impliedly conclude that as the latter are within our exclusive *375jurisdiction the former should be as well. They thus appear to hold that henceforth the question of jurisdiction will depend not on the constitutional mandate of article VI, section 10, but on the Legislature’s determination of what court can most efficiently adjudicate a given cause or proceeding.
Second, the majority justify their decision on the ground that it would be time-consuming to allow the superior court to review section 25531 determinations. While this may be an accurate assessment, the remedy lies in constitutional amendment.4 Making the trains run on time is neither a function of constitutional jurisprudence nor is it a guide to the meaning of our state’s basic document. “[T]he fact that a given law of procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. ” (INS v. Chadha (1983) 462 U.S. 919, 944 [77 L.Ed.2d 317, 340; 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2780-2781].)
It cannot be denied that in section 25531 the Legislature has with deliberation purported to restrict and curtail the jurisdiction vested in the superior courts of this state by the Constitution. But what the Legislature has thus attempted to do is beyond its power. “And upon this but one thing can be said. If there be not in the constitution itself warrant and power to the legislature to do this thing, its effort must be declared illegal.” (Pacific Telephone etc. Co. v. Eshleman, supra, 166 Cal. at p. 652.) There is no such power in the Constitution. (See Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, supra, 170 Cal. at pp. 182-183.)
*376For these reasons, I would deny the petition.5
Lucas, J., concurred.

Whether the writ of review sought here is characterized as an exercise of superior court jurisdiction over “all causes” or as a petition for extraordinary relief the result is the same for analytical purposes because in both situations the superior court is granted jurisdiction by article VI, section 10. If this is a proceeding for extraordinary relief petitioner is allowed by article VI to invoke the jurisdiction of any one of three separate courts that are given concurrent original jurisdiction (the superior court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court); if it is otherwise viewed the only court having original jurisdiction is the superior court.

The court was unanimous in Great Western Power on the jurisdictional issue, although one justice dissented on other grounds.

The constitutional provisions governing judicial power over writ proceedings are little changed since the Roseberry Act was passed in 1911. Then article VI, section 4, granted the Supreme Court jurisdiction over petitions for writs of certiorari and article VI, section 5, granted superior courts that same power. These grants of jurisdiction were consolidated in article VI, section 10, which now provides that all three levels of courts share original jurisdiction over writ proceedings.

Of course, the Legislature has inherent power to create any agency it wishes unless the power is denied it by the Constitution. (Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 691 [97 Cal.Rptr. 1, 488 P.2d 161].) If the Legislature does create such an agency that entity is subject to the Constitution. So, for example, the Constitutional Revision Commission commented on a suggestion that all mention of the PUC be deleted from the Constitution so that the PUC would become merely a creature of the Legislature. It was recognized that the decisions of a purely statutory PUC would be subject to (inter alia) the original jurisdiction of the superior court. (Cal. Const. Revision Com., Background Study Cal. Const. Art. XII, Corporations and Public Utilities (1966) pp. 110-117, by John K. McNulty [hereafter McNulty].) Professor McNulty put it plainly: “If those portions of Article XII that relate to the Public Utilities Commission were simply struck out, the following constitutional powers or provisions would assert themselves to diminish the statutory powers of the Commission: (i) Article I, sec. 14 (just compensation and jury trial in eminent domain proceedings); (ii) Article II, sec. 1 (separation of powers); (iii) Article VI, secs. 4 and 5 (constitutional jurisdiction of Supreme Court and superior courts); (iv) possibly Article XI, sec. 6 (‘municipal affairs’ powers of freeholder charter cities); and (v) Article XI, sec. 19 and Article XIV, sec. 1 (obsolete provisions regarding municipal rate-fixing powers).” (McNulty, supra, at p. 117, fn. 16, italics added.) The Energy Commission, a purely statutory creation, is subject to the same restraints imposed by the Constitution.

Much of the material in this dissent was originally prepared by Justice Poché of the Court of Appeal while sitting under assignment in this court.