Court Opinion

ID: 9406942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 14:06:04.99132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.237935
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-624

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                             ROBERT S. LOGAN, JR.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a bench trial in the District Court, the

 defendant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while

 under the influence of liquor.1         On appeal, the defendant

 contends that the Commonwealth presented insufficient

 identification evidence.        We affirm.

       Background.     We set forth the facts in the light most

 favorable to the Commonwealth.         See Commonwealth v. Colas, 486

 Mass. 831, 833 (2021), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378

 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).       On February 19, 2020, at approximately

 5:15 P.M., off-duty Shirley police detective William McGuinness

 1 At the close of trial, the defendant admitted to sufficient
 facts on a charge of negligent operation, which the judge
 continued without a finding for a one-year period. The judge
 also found the defendant not responsible for four civil
 infractions relating to the same incident.
was in his car with his wife at the intersection of Columbia

Street and Main Street in Ayer when he noticed a small black

sedan speeding over a hill on Main Street.   The sedan lost

control as it crested the hill and crossed the double yellow

line multiple times before rolling onto its side and crashing

into a light pole.    McGuinness asked his wife to call 911 and

went to assist the driver.   The driver was able to kick the door

open to exit the sedan, and McGuinness instructed him to sit in

the grass at the intersection.   McGuinness observed an empty

bottle of rum and a bottle of Coca-Cola with liquid in it in the

sedan.

    Ayer police officer Casey Scott responded to the scene and

spoke with the operator of the vehicle, who was identified as

the defendant, Robert S. Logan, Jr.    The defendant told Scott

that he had been speeding on his way to get alcohol.    Scott

observed that the defendant's speech was slurred, his behavior

was erratic, and Scott smelled an odor of alcohol on the

defendant's breath.   The defendant complained of shoulder pain,

and Scott requested an ambulance to transport the defendant to

the hospital.   Scott testified that he spent between twenty and

thirty minutes with the defendant at the scene.    Over the

defendant's objection, the judge admitted the defendant's

medical records from the date of the accident.    At the close of

the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required

                                 2
finding of not guilty, arguing that no one "identified this

person sitting here as Robert Logan."    The judge denied the

motion and ruled that "as the fact finder . . . [there was]

sufficient evidence to believe that [the defendant] was the

person who . . . the police engaged with."

     Discussion.   "In determining whether the Commonwealth met

its burden to establish each element of the offense charged, we

apply the familiar Latimore standard.    '[The] question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the [Commonwealth], any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.'"   Colas, 486 Mass. at 836, quoting Latimore, 378 Mass.

at 677.    On appeal, the defendant solely challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence of his identity.2

     It is a basic principle of law that the Commonwealth must

establish as an essential element of any crime that the

defendant is the same person referred to in the evidence.     See

Commonwealth v. Davila, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 511, 512 (1984).

"[B]ald identity of name without confirmatory facts or

circumstances is insufficient to prove identity of person"

2 The Commonwealth was required to "prove that the defendant (1)
physically operated a vehicle; (2) 'on a public way or place to
which the public has a right of access; and (3) . . . was
impaired by the influence of intoxicating liquor.'"
Commonwealth v. Faherty, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 133-134 (2018),
quoting Commonwealth v. AdonSoto, 475 Mass. 497, 509 (2016).

                                  3
(citation omitted).     Commonwealth v. Coates, 89 Mass. App. Ct.

728, 731 (2016).   The Commonwealth may prove identity in several

ways, see Davila, supra, and "[t]he Commonwealth is entitled to

the reasonable inferences that a [fact finder] may draw from its

evidence on identification and the inferences drawn by the [fact

finder] need only be reasonable and possible, not necessary or

inescapable" (quotations and citations omitted).     Commonwealth

v. Blackmer, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 483 (2010).

     There is no dispute that the driver of the sedan that

crashed was Robert Logan, as evidenced by Scott's testimony and

the defendant's medical records, which identified the person

brought to the hospital from the crash as "Logan, Robert S."

Rather, the defendant argues that the Commonwealth did not

present sufficient evidence that he is the same Robert Logan who

was identified by police at the scene.     But the trial transcript

belies this argument.    After Scott testified that he spoke with

Robert Logan, the operator of the sedan that crashed, the

prosecutor said, "Your honor, at this time I'd ask that the

record reflect that the witness has identified the defendant --"

The judge interrupted the prosecutor and said, "It will."     The

prosecutor responded, but the transcript reflects that the

response was "inaudible."3    To the extent the transcript was

3 We note that the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine pursuant
to Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 243 (2014), to allow

                                  4
insufficient, it was the defendant's burden to resolve that

issue.    See Commonwealth v. Montanez, 388 Mass. 603, 604-605

(1983), citing Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as amended, 378 Mass. 940

(1979).    See also Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481

Mass. 1637 (2019).    While a more fulsome transcript may have

resolved the question, taking the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, along with the

longstanding principle that a judge as fact finder is presumed

to instruct herself properly on the law, see Commonwealth v.

Milo M., 433 Mass. 149, 152 (2001), we conclude that the

evidence sufficed.

     Our conclusion also finds support in the reasonable

inferences drawn from Scott's testimony.     This includes that the

driver identified himself as Robert Logan at the scene of the

accident, and Scott's responses to questioning at trial about

"the defendant" with answers detailing his response to the

accident involving Robert Logan.4     See, e.g., Coates, 89 Mass.

the in-court identification of the defendant by Scott. While it
is not clear that the judge ruled on the motion, defense counsel
did not object when the judge asked if there was an objection to
"the Clayton [sic] motion, which is the identification issue."
4 Scott referred to Robert Logan as the "operator" of the sedan

at the scene of the crash. Thereafter, Scott answered questions
about Robert Logan as "the defendant." From this, the fact
finder reasonably could have inferred that the person in court
was the same person at the scene of the accident. Robert Logan
could only properly be referred to as "the defendant" once he
had been charged and arraigned in court.

                                  5
App. Ct. at 731-732.    Moreover, "[i]t is not necessary that any

one witness should distinctly swear that the defendant was the

man, if the result of all the testimony . . . should identify

him as the offender" (citation omitted).      Davila, 17 Mass. App.

Ct. at 512.

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Blake, Walsh &
                                        Hershfang, JJ.5),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    July 5, 2023.

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  6