Court Opinion

ID: 9890703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-14 00:00:33.269944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:50:02.591989
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60074         Document: 00516931047             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/13/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 23-60074
                                     Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                     ____________                               October 13, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Francisco Aguilera-Duque,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 1:22-CR-103-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Elrod, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Francisco Aguilera-Duque pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
   agreement, to illegal reentry after removal. The district court varied upward
   from the advisory guidelines range and imposed the statutory maximum
   sentence of two years of imprisonment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). On appeal,
   Aguilera-Duque contends that the district court erred by relying on his

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-60074      Document: 00516931047          Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/13/2023

                                    No. 23-60074

   pending, unsubstantiated federal drug charges in determining his sentence,
   by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence, and by ordering his
   sentence to run consecutively to any sentence imposed in his pending federal
   cases. He also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
   properly object to the district court’s reliance on his pending federal charges
   and to the consecutive sentences order.
          The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by the
   appeal waiver in Aguilera-Duque’s plea agreement. Aguilera-Duque argues
   that the appeal waiver is unenforceable as it was not knowing and voluntary.
   This is so, according to Aguilera-Duque, because the district court
   (1) provided him with an uncertified interpreter at his change of plea hearing,
   (2) failed to properly admonish him about his appeal waiver under Federal
   Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N), and (3) made errors at sentencing
   that he could not have anticipated at the time he entered the plea agreement.
   Aguilera-Duque’s contentions are without merit.
          First, contrary to Aguilera-Duque’s argument, the district court was
   not required to follow the procedures of 28 U.S.C. § 1827(f) because it did
   not determine that Aguilera-Duque waived his right to an interpreter. Cf.
   United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1980). Instead, as the
   Court Interpreters Act allows, the district used an “otherwise qualified
   interpreter” because it found that no certified interpreter was reasonably
   available. See § 1827(b)(2), (d)(1). In light of defense counsel’s statement of
   no objection, Aguilera-Duque “did not give the district court the
   opportunity” to provide reasons why a certified interpreter was unavailable;
   thus, the district court did not abuse its “wide discretion” in appointing an
   otherwise qualified interpreter. United States v. Paz, 981 F.2d 199, 200-01
   (5th Cir. 1992) (quotes at 200). In addition, Aguilera-Duque fails to point to
   any record evidence indicating that he had difficulty comprehending the
   proceedings or that the appointed interpreter’s translations were inaccurate,

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                                     No. 23-60074

   and his failure to object during the proceedings “weighs heavily against [his]
   claim of inadequate comprehension.” Id. at 201 n.2.
            Second, during his change of plea hearing, Aguilera-Duque did not
   argue that the district court failed to comply with Rule 11. Thus, review of
   his argument on appeal is for plain error. See United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d
   397, 411-12 (5th Cir. 2011). The change of plea transcript demonstrates that
   the district court sufficiently ensured that Aguilera-Duque personally
   understood the terms of his plea agreement and that he was waiving his right
   to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. See id. at 412;
   United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1994). Moreover, the
   district court did not commit a clear or obvious error by failing to orally
   inform Aguilera-Duque that he retained the right to raise an ineffective
   assistance of counsel claim; nor can Aguilera-Duque show there is a
   reasonable probability that he would not have entered his plea but for the
   alleged error. See Oliver, 630 F.3d at 411-12; Portillo, 18 F.3d at 292-93.
            Third, we have explained that the “uncertainty of [a defendant’s]
   sentence does not render [an appeal] waiver uninformed,” United States v.
   Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1992), and that a defendant may
   waive his right to appeal his sentence as part of a valid plea agreement, e.g.,
   Portillo, 18 F.3d at 292-93. Thus, Aguilera-Duque’s argument that he could
   not anticipate the alleged errors at sentencing does not allow him to avoid
   enforcement of the appeal waiver.
            Because the appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary and applies to
   the circumstances at hand, it bars Aguilera-Duque’s challenges to the district
   court’s sentence. See United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir.
   2005).     The appeal waiver does not bar Aguilera-Duque’s ineffective
   assistance of counsel claims, which were expressly reserved. However, he
   did not raise these claims in the district court.          Thus, the record is

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                                    No. 23-60074

   insufficiently developed to determine the adequacy of Aguilera-Duque’s
   representation, and we decline to address his ineffective assistance of counsel
   claims on direct appeal. See United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir.
   2014); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505-07 (2003)
   (explaining that a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion is the preferred method for
   bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
          For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s motion to dismiss is
   GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED in part as barred by the
   appeal waiver as to the sentencing claims and DISMISSED in part without
   prejudice to collateral review as to the claims of ineffective assistance of
   counsel. The Government’s alternative motion for summary affirmance is
   DENIED.

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