Court Opinion

ID: 9569093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:10:33.66753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:15:53.107249
License: Public Domain

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge,
concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
The defendant police officers Timothy Merkel and Roderic Weber had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for a violation of the Minnesota disorderly conduct statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1. Nonetheless, the majority reverses the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to these officers on the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, holding that the officers acted contrary to a “narrowing construction” of the disorderly conduct statute — a construction that has never been adopted by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and that has been expressly rejected by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The majority’s decision, therefore, is contrary to established principles of qualified immunity, which ensure that public officials are not subjected to suit unless they are on notice, through clearly established law, that their conduct is unlawful. I would affirm the judgment of the district court in its entirety.
*486I.
This case involves arrests for the misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct. Minnesota’s disorderly conduct statute provides:
Whoever does any of the following in a public or private place, ... knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know that it will, or will tend to, alarm, anger or disturb others ..., is guilty of disorderly conduct, which is a misdemeanor:
(3) engages in offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct or in offensive, obscene, or abusive language tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.
Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1 (emphasis added). Merkel and Weber contend there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs had engaged in “boisterous or noisy conduct” with reasonable grounds to know that it would tend to alarm or anger others.
The majority, however, declines to analyze the existence of probable cause under the plain language of the disorderly conduct statute. Instead, the majority concludes that the police officers acted in violation of a “narrowing construction” of the statute. The court reasons that where a person is engaged in “expressive conduct,” the prohibition on “boisterous or noisy conduct” in the disorderly conduct statute may be applied only to conduct that amounts to “fighting words,” or to words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Ante, at 478. And the majority further opines that this “narrowing construction” was clearly established law as of July 2006 when Merkel and Weber arrested the plaintiffs.
The majority’s conclusion is incorrect. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has not announced that the disorderly conduct statute is narrowed in the manner suggested by the majority, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals has rejected contentions that the prohibition on “boisterous or noisy conduct” is limited to “fighting words.” As of July 2006, therefore, Minnesota law did not clearly establish that police officers must conform their actions to a narrowing construction of the disorderly conduct statute, rather than to the statute as written.
The plaintiffs and the majority rely on the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.1978). There, the court held that a different clause of the disorderly conduct statute should be narrowly construed. The court concluded that absent a narrowing construction, the statute’s prohibition on “offensive, obscene, or abusive language ” tending reasonably to “arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others” violated the First Amendment. Id. at 418-19 (emphasis added). To preserve the constitutionality of the statute, the court construed that prohibition to extend only to “fighting words” — words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id. at 419 (internal quotation omitted).
In a later decision, however, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the portion of the statute at issue in this case, and held that the narrowing construction of S.L.J. did not apply. In In re Welfare of T.L.S., 713 N.W.2d 877 (Minn.Ct.App. 2006), filed just ten weeks before the arrests in this case, the court of appeals considered the statute’s prohibition on “offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct.” Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (emphasis added). The question in that case was whether police officers had probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct a student who shouted profanities *487at police officers inside a school. The court acknowledged that the profanities did not constitute “fighting words,” 713 N.W.2d at 881, but explained that the S.L.J. decision “addressed only that portion of the statute that criminalized ‘offensive, obscene, or abusive language.’ ” Id. at 880 (quoting Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3)) (emphasis added). The court concluded that “[although the disorderly conduct statute prohibits only ‘fighting words’ as applied to speech content, the disorderly shouting of otherwise protected speech or engaging in other ‘boisterous or noisy conduct ’ may still trigger punishment under the statute without offending the First Amendment.” Id. at 881. The court thus applied the statute’s prohibition on “conduct” without a narrowing construction, and held that the officers had probable cause to arrest the student. Id. The court reiterated this conclusion in Craig v. State, No. A07-1949, 2008 WL 5136170 (Minn.Ct. App. Dec.9, 2008), where it assumed for purposes of analysis that the defendant’s conduct merited First Amendment protection, and then rejected a contention that the “fighting words” limitation of S.L.J. should be extended to “conduct” governed by the disorderly conduct statute. Id. at *3-4.
The majority mischaracterizes T.L.S. as establishing only that the disorderly conduct statute may be applied to “boisterous and noisy non-expressive conduct.” Ante, at 478. The decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals was not so limited. Rather, the court explained that even where a person is engaged in expressive conduct or speech, it is constitutional to prohibit the objectionable manner in which that expression is communicated: “[T]he disorderly shouting of otherwise protected speech or engaging in other ‘boisterous or noisy conduct’ may still trigger punishment under the statute without offending the First Amendment.” T.L.S., 713 N.W.2d at 881 (first emphasis added). No narrowing construction was necessary, the court concluded, because “it is not the speech itself that triggers punishment; the statute may be applied to punish the manner of delivery of speech when the disorderly nature of the speech does not depend on its content.” Id. (emphasis added). Accord Craig, 2008 WL 5136170, at *3-4.2
Because T.L.S. represents the best evidence of the meaning of Minnesota law, see West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940), the district court properly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the portion of the disorderly conduct statute concerning boisterous or noisy conduct has been narrowly construed. Under Minnesota law, blaring music on a public sidewalk, in close proximity to pedestrians, in a noisy and bois*488terous manner may constitute disorderly conduct, whether the sound is an anti-consumerism message, fighting words, or the Iowa fight song. At a minimum, at the time of these arrests, the law was not clearly established that the police officers were required to disregard the interpretation of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in T.L.S., and instead to comply with a narrowing construction that has never been adopted by the Minnesota courts.
The majority seeks to bolster its conclusion by reference to a decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota that declared invalid as contrary to the First Amendment an entirely different statute concerning “harassment.” State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn.1998). The harassment statute was not limited to “boisterous or noisy conduct,” so Machholz is inapposite. Surely an objectively reasonable police officer, enforcing the disorderly conduct statute in July 2006, was entitled to rely on a decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals from May 2006 interpreting the disorderly conduct statute rather than a decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota from 1998 interpreting a felony harassment statute.
II.
Under the disorderly conduct statute as written and interpreted by the Minnesota courts, Merkel and Weber had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs. As the majority explains, “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). Five courts of appeals, moreover, have held that an officer’s authority to arrest for misdemeanors is not limited by any constitutional requirement that the offense be committed in the presence of the officer, or that the arrest occur promptly after the commission of the offense. Woods v. City of Chi, 234 F.3d 979, 995 (7th Cir.2000); Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.1995); Fields v. City of S. Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir.1991); Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir.1990); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.1974); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that “the requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the officer’s presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment”); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 5.1(e), at 30 (4th ed.2004) (concluding that “the presence test is not mandated by the Fourth Amendment”); cf. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 340 n. 11, 121 S.Ct. 1536 (“We need not, and thus do not, speculate whether the Fourth Amendment entails an ‘in the presence’ requirement for purposes of misdemeanor arrests.”). For purposes of qualified immunity, therefore, an officer making an arrest for a misdemeanor offense cannot be liable for violating clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer had probable cause (indeed, even “arguable” probable cause, Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 832 (8th Cir.2008)), that the arrestee committed an offense.
The disorderly conduct statute applies to persons who engage in “boisterous, or noisy conduct ... tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others,” Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3).3 *489Minnesota courts have interpreted this language to require only that the conduct be “likely” to have the proscribed effect. State v. Soukup, 656 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn.Ct.App.2003). No actual commotion need occur. Id.
Here, Merkel and Weber knew that someone had called 911 to report the plaintiffs’ conduct. The caller described the plaintiffs as “playing loud music from a boombox,” giving the officers reason to believe that the plaintiffs’ conduct was boisterous and noisy. The caller also stated that the plaintiffs were “calling themselves zombies and almost touching people,” suggesting further that their conduct was offensive. That the caller felt moved to dial 911 indicated that the plaintiffs’ conduct already had aroused alarm, anger, or resentment in at least one person (namely, the caller herself), and was likely to arouse such feelings in others, given the crowds downtown for the Aquatennial festival.
Police officers themselves observed conduct similar to what the 911 caller described. When Officers James Archer and Chad Martin arrived near the intersection of South Seventh Street and Nicollet Mall, they saw and heard the plaintiffs playing music over the speakers of their sound system, and witnessed them “coming up close to people.” They saw the plaintiffs dancing to the music while pretending to be zombies, their faces covered with makeup and fake blood. With the caller’s account of people “playing loud music from a boombox,” “calling themselves zombies,” and “almost touching people” largely substantiated, the officers advised the plaintiffs to turn down the volume and stay away from bystanders.
Merkel and Weber were entitled to rely on the information contained in the 911 call and the observations made by Archer and Martin. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) (holding that hearsay may be considered in determining the existence of probable cause, even if it would not be admissible in a criminal trial); White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250, 254 (8th Cir. 1971) (“[I]n determining whether probable cause existed we must evaluate the collective information of all the officers.”) (internal quotation omitted). The officers knew collectively that the plaintiffs played music loudly over their speakers on downtown streets while an outdoor festival was ongoing, that they were “coming up close to people,” and that someone called 911 to complain that they were loud and almost touching people. These facts were sufficient to warrant a reasonable person of caution in the belief that the plaintiffs engaged in boisterous or noisy conduct that was likely — and that the plaintiffs had reasonable grounds to know was likely — to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.
It is true that the officers did not arrest the plaintiffs until after they suspected that the plaintiffs were affiliated with a violent gang, and by that time, the plaintiffs were neither dancing nor playing music. Probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs engaged in disorderly conduct, however, did not dissipate in the time between their initial encounter with police and their arrests. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 449, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 *490L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Unlike probable cause to search, probable cause to arrest, once formed will continue to exist for the indefinite future, at least if no intervening exculpatory facts come to light.”) (citing cases); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 219 (1st Cir.1997). That the officers may have been motivated to make the arrests by matters unrelated to the plaintiffs’ conduct, such as concerns about possible gang affiliation, is also immaterial to the Fourth Amendment analysis. “[A]n arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004).
While the arrests in retrospect may seem unnecessary and ill-advised, that does not mean that they were in violation of clearly established constitutional rights. Nor should this legal conclusion arouse fears that the jails of Minneapolis will be filled with people who play loud music on sidewalks. The Supreme Court in Atwater observed that “the country is not confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests,” 532 U.S. at 353, 121 S.Ct. 1536, and there is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that Minneapolis is any different. It is reasonable to presume that judgment and discretion typically lead officers to resolve probable cause concerning disorderly conduct — like probable cause concerning the seat belt violation in Texas at issue in Atwater — with warnings or citations. In this case, it appears that Merkel and Weber were prepared to forgo arrests until they were apprised of intelligence reports concerning a gang known for wearing face paint, and the plaintiffs were then unable to provide identification that would dispel concerns about possible gang activity. For better or worse, these later developments informed the officers’ exercise of discretion about how to respond to the preexisting probable cause. An arguably poor exercise of discretion, however, must be distinguished from a violation of clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment. The district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim alleging an unconstitutional seizure.
The existence of probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs engaged in disorderly conduct was constitutionally sufficient to justify their detention between the arrests on Saturday night and their release on Monday. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the officers on the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim.
III.
I concur in the majority’s judgment rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that they were seized in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment right of free speech. To prevail on their claim of retaliation, the plaintiffs must show an absence of probable cause for their seizures. Cross v. Mokwa, 547 F.3d 890, 896-97 (8th Cir.2008); Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir.2000). Because there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs committed the offense of disorderly conduct under Minnesota law, summary judgment was appropriate on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim.
I also concur in the judgment affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim that the officers committed the state-law tort of false imprisonment. Under Minnesota law, “if an arrest is made without proper legal authority, it is a false arrest, and so false imprisonment.” Lundeen v. Renteria, 302 Minn. 142, 224 *491N.W.2d 132, 135 (1974). An arrest for a misdemeanor conforms to Minnesota law as long as police officers, in their presence, have observed conduct giving rise to probable cause to believe that the offense was committed. Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Minn.1990); Henry v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 357 N.W.2d 121, 122-23 (Minn.Ct.App.1984); see Minn.Stat. § 629.34, subd. 1(c)(1). The plaintiffs argue that their arrests were made without proper legal authority because probable cause did not exist to believe that they committed any offense.
The facts of the seizures outlined above, even without considering the 911 call that prompted the investigation, were sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the plaintiffs engaged in disorderly conduct in the presence of officers. As noted, the officers themselves observed conduct similar to what the 911 caller described, including that the plaintiffs were playing music over the speakers of their sound system, dancing to the music with their faces covered with makeup and fake blood, and “coming up close to people.” The district court thus did not err in granting summary judgment on the claim of false imprisonment.
Finally, I concur in Parts III and IV of the opinion of the court. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

. That a State may regulate the manner in which expression is delivered, without regard to content, is well established. The Supreme Court long ago held, for example, that enforcement of a New Jersey ordinance that prohibited sound trucks from broadcasting in a "loud and raucous manner” did not violate the First Amendment rights of an operator who used the sound apparatus to engage in expressive conduct by commenting on a labor dispute. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79, 88-89, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949) (plurality opinion); id. at 96-97, 69 S.Ct. 448 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 97-98, 69 S.Ct. 448 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790, 796, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (concluding that "it can no longer be doubted that government has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise,” even in "such traditional public forums as city streets and parks,” and even with respect to music, “one of the oldest forms of human expression”) (internal quotation and bracket omitted); Carew-Reid v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 903 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding regulation banning use of amplifiers by musicians on New York City subway platforms).

. Although the phrase “tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others” immediately follows the phrase "offensive, obscene, or abusive language," the Minnesota *489courts apparently read the "tending reasonably to arouse” clause also to modify the portion of the statute concerning "offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct.” B.g., Craig, 2008 WL 5136170, at *4. In any event, the opening clause of the subdivision makes clear that conduct violates the statute only if the person knows, or has reasonable grounds to know, that it will, or will tend to, alarm, anger or disturb others. Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1.