Court Opinion

ID: 9736994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:12:17.562723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:55.798963
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CHAPMAN specially concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I am troubled by its careful avoidance of any discussion of the basis for its ruling; it cites not a single case and it refers to no statute. Most importantly, it repeatedly asserts that the holding is not based on any provision of the United States Constitution. To this last assertion I would reply that the repetition of a statement does not make it any more true, contrary to the cries of the butcher in The Hunting of the Snark: “ ‘As the Bellman would tell you,’ he added with pride, T have uttered that sentiment once.’ ‘Tis the note of the Jubjub! Keep count, I entreat, You will find I have told it you twice. ‘Tis the song of the Jubjub! The proof is complete, If only I’ve stated it thrice.’ ” L. Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark, in Logical Nonsense, The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll, at 279 (1942). The majority apparently finds itself in a quandary; if it states that its holding is based upon the due process clause of the United States Constitution, then it would not be able to reach its decision because Kentucky v. Whorton (1979), 441 U.S. 786, 60 L. Ed. 2d 640, 99 S. Ct. 2088, holds that failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence does not in and of itself violate the Constitution, but that such a failure must be evaluated in the light of the totality of the circumstances in the case. It seems to me, however, that by going to the other extreme and deciding to make its decision a part of the court-made law of this district, the majority must suffer the criticism of Justice Black, dissenting in Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, 85 S. Ct. 1731, when he stated: “The inference I gather from these repeated statements is that the rule is not a right or privilege accorded to defendants charged with crime but is a sort of punishment against officers in order to keep them from depriving people of their constitutional rights. In passing I would say that if that is the sole purpose, reason, object and effect of the rule, the Court’s action in adopting it sounds more like law-making than construing the Constitution.” (Emphasis added.) Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 649, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 620, 85 S. Ct. at 1748 (Black, J., dissenting). Finally, I would refer the majority to its comment that the “ ‘little print takes away the big print.’ ” (191 Ill. App. 3d at 594.) I would then ask it to examine its big-printed holding that there is no constitutional basis for its decision with its small-print statement that “[w]e can guarantee protection of defendants’ rights by this directive.” (191 Ill. App. 3d at 595.) If there is truly no constitutional basis for its decision, then what is the basis of the defendants’ rights that the majority is so desirous of protecting? The constitutional basis in any decision in this case cannot be denied. Both the United States Supreme Court and our own State supreme court have held that the reasonable doubt standard is of constitutional dimension. In In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, the Supreme Court stated: “Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In People v. Pembrock (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28, our supreme court, in discussing the appropriate standard for commitment under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, stated that “[t]he requirements of due process, under both the United States and Illinois constitutions, mandate that the drastic impairment of the liberty and reputation of an individual which results from civil commitment under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act be justified by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pembrock, 62 Ill. 2d at 321, 342 N.E.2d at 29. In my judgment there are other and more appropriate ways to reach the proper result which the majority has reached. First, with regard to this case, under the totality of circumstances approach set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Kentucky v. Whorton, when the jury is told in the written instructions that “the law applicable to this case is contained in these instructions,” and when those instructions do not inform the jury of the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence, I would hold that the defendant was deprived of due process under either the United States or the Illinois Constitution. Alternatively, and with regard to future cases, I would hold that the due process clause, article I, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution requires that the reasonable doubt-presumption of innocence instruction be given by the court in writing at the close of every criminal case. If the due process clause mandates that no one is to be deprived of liberty unless the presumption of innocence is overcome by proof beyond a reasonable doubt then the jury must be properly advised of the standard under which it may convict. The failure to advise is reversible error in any case and I would so hold. For the above reasons I concur in the result reached by the majority.