Court Opinion

ID: 4045780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-28 23:57:04.956306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:56.878269
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                     01-14-00366-CR
                                                           FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                   HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                               1/28/2015 10:02:56 PM
                                                                 CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                              CLERK

        No. 01-14-00366-CR

                                                  FILED IN
    In ltre Court of AFpeaIs               1st COURT OF APPEALS
                                               HOUSTON, TEXAS
          For The First                    1/28/2015 10:02:56 PM
   JudiciaL District of Texas              CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
          Houston,   Te:Id.   Mr.

Washington's family disclosed the incident where Mr. Washington suffered head injuries

when he was hit by a taxicab as a child, and his intellectual slowness throughout his life,

at that   tine. Id.    They adrnitted thal they had not advised Trial Counsel previously

because they were embarrassed, and didn't want           Mr. Washington to be viewed      as

"cra:2y".   Id.   Trial Counsel became concerned that Mr. Washington was suffelir.rg from

an intellectual disability and further, may not be competent to stand trial.

   Trial started on April 7,2010. On that day, Trial Counsel filed Appellant's Motion

lor an Intellectual Disability and Cornpetency Evaluation and an accotnpanying Motiori

for Continuance in order to have the evaluation perfotmed. CR-130. The Trial Court

conducted two hearings regarding this motion. The first hearing was in front of Judge

Wilkinson, a visiting judge in the    1781h   District Courl. RR2. During this hearing, Mr.

Washington's family testified to his issues delineated in the background section above     -
notably, Mr. Washington's accident when he was 4-5 years old, and his consistent

intellectual slowness since that time. See RR4. Judge Wilkinson denied the Appellant's

Motion for an Intellectual Disability and Competency Evaluation at that 1ime. RR4-80.

    A   second hearing was held the    following day on April 8, 2010 in front of a second

visitingjudge, Judge Mallia, regarding the Appellant's motion for an evaluation and short

continuance. RR4. Judge Mallia also presided over'the tlial lor Capital Murder. In the

second hearing, one mernber of Mr. Washington's family came forward to expound on

Mr. Washington's low intelligence that had been discussed the day before.          See RR4.

Trial Counsel also advised the Court that Mr. Washington was unable 1o assist in Voir

                                                6
Dire on April 7,2010, and detailed the usefulness of this evaluation for challenging the

motion to suppress and the foreseeable element of party     liability. RR2-5-11. Trial

Counsel discussed with the Trial Courl that he would need only a few days to conduct the

evaluation, and provided    a   neuropsychologist who was available     to   conduct the

examination immediately.   RR4-7. Visiting Judge Mallia denied the Motion for         arr

Intellectual Disability and Compelency Evaluation, and wanted the trial to go forward as

planned. RR4-80.

   On April 9, 2010, plior to the prosecution publishing Mr. Washington's confession,

Trial Counsel moved again for an inlellectual disability evaluation and a continuance to

allow the evaluation to occur. RR6-46-50. Trial Counsel again notified the Trial Court

that they had a neuropsychologist, Shawanda Anderson, available to do the evaluation

In support, Trial Counsel noted that he is re-urging now as the evaluation could be

valuable to the admissibility of the statenent, and to Mr. Washington's decision to

testify. RR6-46-50. Trial Counsel admitted the affidavit of his co-counsel at this time

revealing some     of the issues he had noticed while attempting to wol'k with       Mr.

Washington in preparation for   trial. RR6-46-5, CR-142-143. Further, Trial Counsel filed

Appellant's Motion for a Coutested Competency Trial under 458.003 and 468.051 of the

Texas Code of Crirninal Procedure at this tirne.   RR6-46-50. All motions were denied

by the Trial Court once again. RR6-50.

                                             7
                         SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

         Appellant   filed a Motion for an Intellectual Disability and              Competency

Evaluation in this case prior to      trial. After two hearings,    the Trial Coufl denied the

Appellant's access to an exped that could assist the Appellant in building a defense to the

Capital Murder charges. The Trial Court again denied this tequest when Appellant

moved for the evaluation prior to the admission of his confession that was made to

investigators   in this case. This denial of         access   to expert   assistance violated the

Appellant's Due Prooess rights to the basic tools necessary to build a deferrse. These

rulings by the Trial Court called into question the fundamental fairness of the ttial, and

thus, the case should be remanded for a new trial on the rnerits.

         Appellant also filed a Motion for a Contested Competency Trial pursuant to 468

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Prior to the Trial Court's ruling, Appellant

placed a valiety of evidence before the Trial Courl lhat pointed to Appellant's inability to

assist in building his defense   -   notably that Appellant did not have the sufficient present

ability to consult with Trial Counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.

The Trial Courl abused its discretion when it found that the evidence put forward was uot

more than a scintilla, and thus, denied Appellant's Motion for a Contested Competency

Trial.

                                                 8
                                    POINT OF'ERROR ONE

 WHETHER THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE
  COURT REFUSED TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO OBTAIN THE
         ASSISTANCE OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERT

                            ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

      a.   Rule of Law

      Due Process under the United Stales Constitution requires that a defendant have

access 10 tlre basic raw materials integral to      building an effective defense. Ake     t,.

Oklahoma,47O U.S. 68, 105 (1985). These basic raw materials include the help                     ofa

defense expert. 1d. The irnporlant questior.r when deciding           if   an expert is needed, is how

important the scientific issue is in the case and how much help the def'ense expert will be

to the defendant's case. .Rey v. State,897 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

           A   defendant   is   entitled   to expert assistance if the defendant establishes              a

substantial need and that the fundamental fairness ofa trial is called into question without

that assistance. Rey, 897 S.W.2d 333, 338. There are three factors the coufls look at

wlren considering whether a Defendant is entitled to the assistance of an expefi. Ake                    v.

Oklahoma,470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). The first factor is the private interest that is at stake.

Id.   The private interest of the defendanl lies in the accuracy ofthe outcome of a criminal

lrial. Id. at 78. This private intetest of the defeudant is "obvious              and weighs heavily"

due to the potential for loss of     liberly. Id.   aL   105. The second factor is the interest of the

Slate.     Id.   The State's only interest is judicial economy.        1d     The Coud has found that

this interest is "not substantial" in light of the Defendar.rt's and the S1a1e's interest it'l the

accuracy of criminal proceedings. Id.          a|79.     The third factor looks at how impo(ant the

expert testimony      will be to the Delendant irr building an effective defense as well               as to

                                                     9
the factfindel in resolving issues in the case. 1d
                                                   'l'he Coutts use tlle thl'ee lactor lcst to

delermine when an expell         is irnportant enough to truilding a   clefense   thal   zrcoess is

lequired, Iley, 897 S.W.2d 333, 337. The Court notes that a Defendant nray be devastated

by the absence of psychiatric testimony; while with that testimony they would have                a

reasonable chance ofsuccess. Ake, a|83.

    b.   Three Part Test in Ake

         Though the facls in Ake lelated to the aid of a psychiatric expert for the insanity

defense, Texas Coufis have expanded the      lfte decision to all expert   assistance. Rey, at

338. The Due Process test melely leans on the question of fundamental fairness

calculated by weighing three factors: 1) the private iuterest at stake, 2) the interest of the

state, and 3) the imporlance of testimony in building a defense and aiding the factfinder.

Id. a|337-38.

         1.   Private Interest

         The Defendant in this case was charged with Capital Murder, and was facing a

life sentence without the possibility of parole ifconvicted. The Courts have consistently

held that a Defendant facing any charge has a substantial interest in the accuracy ofthe

proceedings. Tl.re inlerest is obvious when the Liberty at stake is as substantial as the

punishment that follows a Capital Murder conviction. The Private interest in this case

weighs heavily.

         2.   Interest of the State

         The Courts have looked at two areas when reviewing the state's interest in an lfte

analysis, judicial economy and burden to provide the expefi. Rey, at        339, In Rey, lhe

                                                t0
Appellant asked for a pathologist to aid in building a defense to a Capital Murder charge

out ofRandall County, Texas. Rey, at335-36. The defendant filed the motion for expeft

assistance prior to   trial, and the trial court ruled on the nlotioll aftel healing the testinony

ofthe state's pathologist.    Id     In review, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that

because there was a pathologist available in a "one-day" drive to Dallas, Texas, and that

his fee was expected to be $2,200, that the state's interest in judicial economy was not

substantial in light ofthe their overlapping interest in the accuracy of the proceeding.

Rey, a1339.

        In this oase, the Appellant had acquired an expert to assist in building a defense

on a Capital Murder charge. RR6-47. This experl was able 1o evaluate the defendant

within 3-4 days. RR6-47. There was no fur.rding asked of the Court at the lime the

motion was filed or ruled upon. Appellant's Motion for an httellectual Disability

Evaluation and Continuance was filed and ruled on twice prior to the first witness taking

the stand, and again at the introduction of1he Appellant's confession. RR2-52, RR4-12,

RR6-46-50, In order to provide the defendant due process, the Trial Court in             Rey   would

have had to continue     trial for   a   brief period to allow the expert to review the case. This is

true, because the Trial Court ruled on the Motion lbr Pathologist during trial. Id. a|335-

336. The Appellant's Motion for Continuance does not separate this case from the

decision in Rey. Considering the state's conculrent interest wilh the defendant in the

accuracy ofthe proceedings, the state's interest in judicial economy is not-substantial in

light ofthe Appellant's interest. The Appellant's interest weighs more heavily than the

interest ofthe slale as in Ake and Rey.

                                                      i1
          3. Importance         of Expert Testimony      - Threshold Showing

          In the third pron g of the Ake test, the Defendant must make a threshold showing

that the issue for which the expefl is to testify or evaluate is "likely to be a significant

factor" attrial. Ake v. Oklahomq, 470 \J.5.68, 82-83, 86. In Rey, the Court found the

issue 1o   "likely be significant"   as it went 10 the core   ofthe Appellant's defensive theoty.

Rey, at 340-42. In cases where the threshold showing was not met under the Ake test, the

Defendant typically failed to articulate a defensive theory and why the defensive expert

would aid in establishing that theory. Id. at341; Moore v. Kemp,809 F.2d702,717-1'8

(1   lth Cir'. 1987)   (defendant's request not sulficient where he did not advise cout't     oftype

of expcrt sougl.tl or role expert would play, hc did not offbr namc of oxpoll that miglrt be

available or    s1a1e   what the expert coulcl have conlribulecl to Id.   Texas Penal Code $ 7.02(b) is the only

viable tlieory for the prosecution if specific intent is not at issue outside the underlying

robbery. AIl other theories of parly liability require      a specific intent on part   of the

Appellant in order to be guilty of the actions of co-conspirators. The State solidified their

dependence on this theory by stating that from opening statement to uow, the language            in

$ 7.02(b) has been the issue in this case. RR7-137.

        Defense Counsel built his defensive strategy arourd the fact that the defendant

should not have anticipated that one ofthe co-conspirators would take the life ofthe

robbery victim. The Appellant depended on distancing himself from the actions of his

co-conspirator    -   defending against the "should have anticipated" language of $ 7.02(b).

This was evident when Defense Counsel stated in closing argument: "But here's the other

truth: Christopher didn't kill hinr. He didn't agree to kill him. And no one could have

foreseen that David Rodriguez was going to die that night, except maybe the mad man

that did it."

                  d.    Conclusion

        The defendant meets the threshold showing requirement of Ake's third prong

The tlrird prong of Ake tequires the defendant to show that information from the expert

will likely   be significant at   trial. Appellate Courts   have looked at two different areas

when deciding whelher this threshold requilement ofsignificance has been met with the

Trial Court Judge: Whether the Defendant laid out 1) a defensive theory and how the

                                                   19
expert would aid in that theory, and 2) how impo(ant the issue that the expert was going

to discuss was to the underlying case.

       Here the defendant laid out to thejudge that he wanted an evaluation for

intellectual disability to support a defensive tl.reory related to the conspiracy allegation by

the State. More specifically, to go towards whether the defendant should have

anticipated that a co-conspirator would commit capital murder during the robbery.

Appellant articulated not only the reasons for his concerns about the defendant's mental

ability, but also outlined the subjectivity oftbe    $ 7.02(b) standard that was the crux    of tlre

State's case and how an evaluation could procure valuable evidence to fighting the

"should have anticipated" element. Trial Counsel atticulaled the defensive theory he

wished to expound upon, and how the expert could assist in that theory.

        Further, it cannot be overstated how central and crucial the "should have

anticipaled" language was during the prosecution of the Appellant. It was the crux of the

prosecution's case from pre-trial motions through closing argument. During the olal

motion for an evaluation prior to trial, the state conceded that $ 7.02(b) would be the

basis for their charge to   thejury, and in fact,   $ 7.02(b) was the only theory that the

proseoution laid out to the jury as a viable avenue for conviction in closing argument.

This was the central issue to the case, and the imporlance ofhaving expefi testimony to

combat that attack is apparent fi'om the record.

        The Defendant met his th eshold requirenent under Ake based upon his

articulation of 1) his defensive theory under $7.02,2) the way the expert would be used

to assist in building that theory, and 3) articulating the impofiance ofthe "should have

anticipated language" prior to 1he Trial Court ruling on the Motion.

                                                20
      E. Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement Under Miranda

         a    Rule of Law

         In Mirttttdu v. Arizlna. the Supfeme Court or.rtlined 1he fiamework lot slatemenls

lhal arc made to the state duling custodial inte::rogatiou. 'l'he Coul't recognized that

r:ustotlizrl iutelrogations. by their ver1, natture, genelate "compelling pressurcs wliich          wotli

to underrninc thc iridividual's will to tesist ancl to contpcl hint to speak whole hc would

no1   othelwise do so lieely." Mirundu t,. lrizona,381 tJ.S.436,467 (1966). Inoldelto

cornbat the inlrcrenl conrpnlsior.r associatcd with custodial ititot't'ogatiot.t, fu[irandtt

ir.nposecl procedules     lhat police must Jbllow when denling with an aooused. A'lortut t'.

IJurbine,475 1J.S.412,420 (1986). Notab)y, Lhrtuda mandated that priolto the

initiation o1'queslior.ring. the   zrccused rnust be   fully inlbrmed oftheir rights to teurain

silerrt and 1o havc counsel ptcsct'rr. A4irutdtt,    a|468. Once the accnsed        hzrs   becn rcad his

lighls r:ndel Mirtmda,ll.re accused nrusl make a kuowiug, inlelligent, alld volutltary

waiver o1'those lights fol queslioning to contillue. Id.ar444.475. I'hc Mirutcla *:'aiver

has two distinct hurdlcs that rnust be orclssecl lbr'1he waiver 1o be         eflcctive. Brewer      v.

l!/illiunts,430 U.S. 387,404 (1977). ltirst. thc accused's waiver ofhis liglrts must bc

volunlaly     -   a producL o1'liee and deliberate choice   ralhet than intinidalion or coetoion.

.A4oran, at   421. Second,    1he accused nrust have     futl awareltcss of   Lroth the trature   of the

righls he is waiving and the consequences o1'the deoision to waive those righls. /d.

Considering the "totality ofthe cilolunstances", both oflheso staudards nrust be tnel

belbre a coLn't rnay oonolude theit ar ar,:ousecl's,l4irundu righls hacl been waivecl. Falc                t,.

A4ichael O., 442 \1.5.701 .125 (11)'79).

                                                    21
         Whcn looking at rvhethcl an accnsed has full arvarer.ress ofthc natute ofhis tights

ancl the oonsequences ol'1he decision 1o waive those rights, a courL n.rus1            look at the

particular thcts and cilcumstanccs, including the background, cxpetietlce, conduct, atld

ecluoation ol'the accused. ,Iohnson v. Zerbst,304 IJ.S.458,464 (1938).                 All   laots ur.rique

to the accuscd lhat havc bcaring ou his cotrptehcnsion of his rights ate relevant il.l

delernrining whethel the waivel is linowing alrd intelligent. L.eza v,Stttle,351 S.W.3d 344

'l'his u,ould ir.rclude lowcred intellect. dlug usc, ol othcr menlal clisorclers. Oursltourn r,

Srare,259 S.W.3d 159, 172 (Tex. Clim. App. 2008).

         The stale of Texas has codified Miranda iu Texas Code o[Climinal Pt'oceclule

38.22. tJnder'l'exas Code of Climinal Procedurc 38.22(2)(a),            an.   accused mltsl     Lre   tead

five lisred righls belil'e any questioning by oll'icers. Tex. Ctin. Proc. Ann, Lfl.38'22

Sec.   2(a). If tlrc statcmcnt ofthe   irccnsecl is vidco rccorded thcn these rigbts must bc

lead to 1he accrrsed on rer.:older prior'1o questioning, aucl the accusc.cl lntlst Illake a

l565 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

                                                       30
              a.   A4ol   io n wos   T   nel.r l:'/lad antl Presenl.ed with Suorn Alfidavit

          On ApLil 10,2014. thc july lorurd the defendant guilty o1'Capital Murder'. and the

Tlial Court sentenced the del'endant 1o ti1'e in plison without the possibility ol parole. CR-

148. A notice of appeal was timcly filcd on Aplil 10,2014.                Cllt-l52      On May 9,2014,

tlie Appellant timely liled a Motion lbl New 'l-r'ial with the 178(l' Dislrict Cotrrt o1'Harris

County, l'cxas. Clt-157. 'l'lre Motion was prcscuted to thc cooldi:iatol of the 'flial Court

in conrpliance nith 'l'cxas Rule of Appellate Ptooeclut'e 2l.6. ,\ee C1t-i71. Attached to

tlre Motion fol New 'l'r'ial was an aflidavit from 'l'r'ial Counscl. 'l'he Motion for Ncrv l'r'ial

and supporting     alldavit delailed the       lac1s underlying the groutrds 1'or 1hc Appellant's

Motion for Ncw'l'r'iaJ      -   notably, the Trjal Corut's 1) dcriial of Appellanl's requcst to

obtain an expelt     1br- assistanoe     in building a deJ'ense under   -,1/rc,   2) denial o1'tlie

Appcllant's molion to continue so thc deltndant could be evaluated by tliat expert, and 3)

denial o{'the Appellant's request lbl a compelency trial. CR-157-166. The Appellant

rcqucstcd ar oral healing in ordcr to expand the record with live testimony lelating to thc

Appollant's intellectual disability thal'I'r'ial C'ounsel hacl not been allowetl to pursue

during 1hc tlial. 'l'his request 1br a hcaling rvas made 1o insure a correct decisiorr was

nrade in the Motion Ior New 1\'ial and meaningl'ul review could be olrtaiued on tlireot

appeal.

          'I'he Motion fol New'frial was timely Iiled, pr:opelly pleseuted to 1he'frial Cjourl.

and was supportcd by an          affidavit lrorn 'l'rial Couusel clelailing glouuds fol relief. 'l-his

lirst prong   o1 the antrlysis is met,

                                                      3l
              b.     Apnelku'rt's Motion fo r New Trial an.d suooortins affidut,it nolified
                     t lrc Triu l ('o t rrt,tf rcu.soua ls l t' g rounJs frtr rclicfthut \'(r( ttol

                     detenninable fi"om tlte record

                         i.    Rule of Lalv
         'l.'exas   Ilule of Appellatc Proccclurc 21.3 lays out a list o1'spccific grouucls that

woulcJ entitle      aDelendantto leliel'in     a   Motion 1'orNew'Tlial. lJnder'21 3(b),          a dcfendarlt

is entitlcd to a ncrv    tlial if the 'll ial Court has conimiltcd     a mzrterial    clrot likcly   1o   injure

tlie Delbnclant"s rights. Further, the Trial Courl is not limited to            1he   eight aleas Iocated in

'l'exas Rule o1'Appellate Proccdntc 21.1i, and l.ras discretion to glant              relicl'iri the

Del'endant's motiolL fol nerv trial lbr other reasous. "For I30 years, out trial oourls have

had the discretion to grant a new trial in the intcrest           ofiusticc. I{ule 21.3 does not

provicle an exhauslive         list." T'atlor v. Slate, 163 S,W.3d     277, 282 (Tex.      App.-Ausliu

200s).

           The Motion lbr New Trinl and suppo ing affidavit clelailed llvo distincl grounds,

that oould enlitle thc l)c{tndant to leliel'anci wero not clctclrlinabls fi'om thc rccord.

Since the denial of the Appellant's Motiori            lbl   a Clonipelency   'll ial under 468 could be

asosrtaincd frorn tho rccold,        it is no1 argued in this scction.

                         ii.   Ground for lLelief und er Ake           v,   Uniled Stales

                                   n,   Ann t'!luttt tttttilicd tlrc Trittl Ctttrrt ol rcusonublc
                                         rounds lhat cou.ld entitle l m lo relie
         'l'he first ground for lelief in the Appellant's Motion lbr Ncw'l't'ial rvas a

ohallerrge wder        t\rc. Priol'to   trial. Trial Counsel moved lbt au evaluatiou of the

Appcllant by a nouropsycJrologist in lwo hcaliugs on his Motion for lntellcclnal

Disabilily and Compelency Evzrlr,ration. "frial Counsel re-ltrgecl this rnotion il'hile

                                                        32
obiecting 10 l)re pr.osccution's offcr of tlic AppeJlant's conf'cssion in Slate L,)xhibit 3A. In

llie suppolting alhdai,il, Tlial Counsel detailed thal days bel'crre trial the del'endant had

been unablc to assist him in buildiug a de1-ense for his case. CIR-165. Atound that same

tirne, inlbrmation hatl beeu obtained fior.n 1he lamily thaL the Appellanl lterd been stluck

b5r a oar a1 a      yonllg age, and had not becn "r.ight" thcr.cafier. clR-165. 'l-rial counscl also

details how expert lestinony rvould have been usecl to aid in the del'ense o1'the Appellant

at   lrial thlough dcfcnding against whclhcr             1hc dcfendant oould reasol.rabll' .[oresee thc

actions ol'the co-oonspiir.ttors, and rvhether'1he del'enclant's waivel o{'l.ris Mirtutt}a rigl't|s

rvercknowing,intelligent,andvoluntaly,ClR-165.'lhcattackunder',4ftedctailcdaclaim

that the due lrrocess r.ights o1'the def'endant hac{ been violaled by the Trial             coutt rvlten

they failed 1o providc cxpefi assistance 1br use at trial.

              'Ihis issue lalls under relieflhat cau be sought uncler Texzrs Rule of Appellate

Proocclulc        21.3(b)      a matolial elror that is   liltely to iniuro tlie dcfonclant's tights. Ar the

very least, a violation oI the Appellanl's Clonstitulional Righls as sla|ed in Akc shoulcl lall

uncler 1he Court's discrolion as otltcr grotutds            lot lelicf   made in the inlerest ofjustioe

'lhis issue was plopelly taised to the l'r'ial Courl, and detailed leasonable glor"rnds thal

coulcl lravc cntitled the Appellant kr          lclicl

                                     b.   Th e Ake lsstte    i,s   t'tol Delerminable /rom lhe Record

               In detcrrtining a [)ue Proccss claitl uuclct ;{/rc, thc maiu issttc is hor.v i1'llpol'tant

llie scientilio issue is in the       case, aud how much help a defeuse expert could hzrve given

llclt   1t.   f1141u,   897 S.W.2d 333. 338 ('l'ex. Clim. App. 1995).

                                                           1.)
         Givcn thc standard 01'the Clonstitulional claitn unclet Ake,lliis issuc rvas not

determinable li'onr the trial lecord. The Trial Coult liad uo1 allowed         lbl   re Appellant tcr

be evaluatcd   fol an intellcctual disability prior to liis couviction. 'l'o determit.rc whcther

the Del'endant's DLre Process rights rvete violated the Trial and AppellaLe Clottt'ts musl

lool< at how importanl the scientific issue is in the case and how much help the defense

expert could havc bcen (emphasis added) to the Appellant's case at trial. Though the

Appellant was able to make a thleshold showing about the imporlance of the issue, he

was unable 1o give the concrete evidence that is needed to bolster the          lfre claim. In the

Appellant's Motion for New Trial, Trial Counsel included affidavits alleging the facts

within his knowledge that gave rise to the possibility ofan intellectual disability, but

these statements pale in comparison to the power thal live testimony on the issue could

have garnered. The Trial Court in the Motion for New         Tlial   and the Appellate Coutls

would have been greatly aided in hearing more concrete information on the subject of

Appellant's perceived intellectual disability.

         'l'he I\4otion fbr Nerv'l'rial requesled an olal hcariug so that thc tccord could be

expanded u,ith r.nole tangible inlblmation on the Appellant's jntellectual           state. Willioul

this adclitional ovidcnce, the'l'rial Court in thc Molion {bl Now'l'r'ial ancl 1hc Appollatc

Court on appeal cannot clelelmine the valiclity of the Duc Ptocess isstte raised ul.rder.,lka.

An cvaluation and firlther ovidence on any inlellectual disability was nceded in ordet ttr

mle on the ,,lfre issue and to expand the record fol Ayrpellate Cout1s to niake a decisiou on

a possiblc   violation of'1hc clcltndant's constitutionerl rights. Ciiven tltc two goals ofthe

Motion lbr New Tr:ial, to decide i1'Ihe case neetls to be lelried     at.rd   to expaud the r-ecorcl

lbl   meaningfr-rl nppeal,lhc l'r'ial Court should havc glantod the Appe llant's reqttesl {bl           a

                                                 34
I.rearing on the   Motion fol Nerv'l'r'ial. As it   stancls" the   Appcllatc Courts al'e stLlck to

pondel   ila   tlue intellectual 906 S.W.2d 500, 517 (Tex. Crirn App. 1995). A trial coult

ll'ill en'in not gr'anling   a molion   fbt oontinttanoe if thc oasc Ibt'a coutittuatlce was so

convir.rcing that no leasonable j uclge r.vould have urade that ruling in light ofoourL

scheduling and thc iuterest of the stale- Gonzales v. Slate,304 S.W.3d 838, 842 ("['cx.

Clim. App, 2010). 'lhe appellate court will lind hann in the denial of                a   uotion lo

contirue "'only if thc lccord shorvs rvith consiclolzrblo spcci{ici1y horv the clcltudalrt was

harrned by lhe absence        oltnole preparation title than he actually liad "'1d

         In the Motion lbr New Trizrl aucl the sr4rporting allidavit the facls lelating to the

Appcl)ant's Molion for Continuauce wcre outlined tblthc'i'rial Courl. CIR-157-165

                                                     35
'lrial Counsel askecl for a conlinnancc       at various stages of thc proccedings          in ordet to

obtain expert assistance to evaluate the Appellant l'crr au iutellectual disability, S'ze                Itll4-

80, Itl{2-52, Itlt6-50. 'll'ial Clounscl articulated 1he exaol clel'cnsivc theorics thal the

expert's testimony would nid in eslablishing. Trial Counsel notified the l'r'ial Cotrrt that

the contiunance would only lake a ferv days and thal a ncnropsychologist had already

been selected who was availnble 10 oonduct         1l.re   evaluation.

        Ilthc'l'rial Cburt did abuse thcil disclction in dcnying thc             Appe llarrl's   Motion lor

Cor inuance. lhis would be a tnalerial en'or thal was likely to inj ule the liglrts              o1   llie

clclcndant, cntitling the Appellantto lelief undcr'21.3(b). In adclition. any en:or iu the

denial o.fthe Appellanl's Motion 1br Continuance could hzrve enlitled the Appellant to

relief in the intcrest oljustice outsidc of the gror.rnds lislod in 'l'exas I{ulo of Appe)late

Procedure   21.3. l'he Appellant liolifir'd      the Tliarl Court ofleasonable grouncls that could

cnlitlc thc Appcllant   1o   rclicl

                               b.     The Mol iort fbr Cortl.inuance Lssue vtas nttt
                                      Determinable ft'ont tlrc llecord

    A'l'rial   Cour-t's "Denial of a Motion     lbr Continuance rvill        be found an abusc        of

disr:r'etion on appeal only il'the r-ecorcl shows with considelable specifioity liow the

clel-endant rvas halmecl Lry the abscnce      olmote preparation titne than lie actually had. 'l his

showing can orciinarily be matle only at a healing on            er   motion lbr uerv trial, beoause

almost ah,vays only at that tine will thc defendanl be ablc to ploduco evidencc as to what

adclitional inlblmalion, evidenoe or witnesses the           c1e1'ense   rvould hzrve had available if. the

motion fol delay had treen glanted." (ionzrtlev v. Statc,304 srv3d                83 8.   842-843 ('l'ex.

Clrirn. App.2010).

                                                    36
    ln Cionztles, the def'endant askcd fbr an expert          10 assist   in blrilding his defcnsc in   a

child sextral assault case. Id. ttt840. Specifically, 1he del'endant algued iat an expel1 was

needed to rcrricw the mcdical lecorcls         ofthe child victim in that case. /d at 841 'l'hc

del'endant's requesl lbt'a ueclioal expelt was ntade the day o{'1rial, and the trial oourt

dsnicd a rrotior.l for contiuuauce to allowthe expert 10 prcpare fot'trial.            Id   Aftct

conviotion, the delendant filed a rnotion fbl new tlial reqr:estiug an ol'al hearing to

dcvclop thc harrn related to the defetrdaut's allcgation that the'l'rial Cotrt abused theil'

discletion iri deni,ing the molion to continue. Id. al84l-842. The Trial Court cleniecl the

rnotion fol new tljal wilhout a hearing.

    The Ciourt       olCrirlinal Appeals     helcl tliat the Trial Courl did not zrbuse its discletion

by lnling on thc Motion lor Ncw '[ rial without a ltearing. 'l'he C]our1 in (iontrzttlcs, slalcd

tharl 1he   Trial   Clor"ut had to make a cleternrination on i1'there r.i,as   elror itt 1he denial o1'the

Defbndant's Molion lor Contiuuaucc bcfbre the harnt analysis was.justificd. Id. at 843-

843. If the Juclge tburd no enor iu the denial             o1'the coutinuance thcn the de1'endant

would not neccl to develop harm in the second patt ofthe analysis.                /d   Put dilI'crently' thc

Trial Clourt woulcl never       ge1   to the harm analysis, ancl therefore. thc issue coulcl be

dclclrnir-rable Ii'orn thc locold r'r'ithout livc tcstimony.      /d      In so linding, thc Corrrt of'

Clrirninal Appeals ernl:hasizecl Lhal continutlnccs based          ot.r   the abseuce o1'a witness

recpriro the clelenclant to dctail the due diligence that was lurdcflakeu in proclrrirrg tlro

rvilness, and why they were unable 10 requesL the rvitness unlil the da),oltrial.               1d ln
(ionzules, cotinsel for thc defendanl had beon on the casc for 8 months atid gavc uo

explanation for waiting unlil Lhe clay         oflrial belbrc requesting      arssislance frotn au expert

ancl a c422 S.W.3d 676, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);

'l'cx. Crirn, Ploc. r\nn. Art. 4613.003(a), 'l hc Dcf'endanl musl n'Icet bolh prongs of thc tcst

10 be   conpelenl    1cl   stand   lrial   as the del'endanl's   abilily to lationally assist in his deletrse

is indispensablc to his cor.npetcucy. See'lurner, a|689.

                                                          41
   To protect the due process rights ofthe Defendant, the trial courl is obligated to

inquire into the accused's competency once the issue is sufficiently raised.     Id' A nere
suggestion of incompetency is sufficient to raise the issue. Turner, at 692. Orroe the

issue of the defendant's currpetetlcy to sland trial ltas beer1 suggested. 1he courl sl.rall

determine by "informal inquily" whetltet lhete is sotne evidence fi'om atiy soluce that

would support a findiug that the defendant rnay be incompetent to sland trial. Tex. Code

Crirn. Proc. Ann. afi.46B.004(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006). lf there is in fact son.re evidence

fronr any source to suggesl thal the de1'endant may (cntphasi's atlded) be incompetent          1o

stand tr:ial then the Trial Courl shall order a competeucy heariug. Turner, a| 692.       'fo

make the determinalion if some eviclence exists, the Tlial Court must put aside all

competillg evidence that suggests colnpetence. and decide if more than a scintilla of

evidenoe exisls that may rationally lead to a conolusion of incon-rpetency.      1d If this

standard is rllet then the Trial Courl rnust ordet'a competency     lrial. 1d. If a cour-t holds     a

trial to determine whether the defendant is illcompetent to stand 1rial, on the request of

either palty or the motion ofthe court, ajury shall make the determination. Tex. Code.

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 468.051(a).

    Trial Counsel in this case filed   a   Motion for an Intellectual Disability and

Competency Evaluation and a Motion for a Contested Competency Tlial under Texas

Rule of Criminal Procedure 46B. CR-130, CR-136. Appellant also made nunterous

suggestions to the Trial Court relating to his concerns about the competency         ofthe

Appellant thloughout the ploceedings as detailed in the pr-ocedure facts portion of this

brief.   These motions and oral assefiions rnade to the Trial Couft were sufficient to raise

the issue of competency triggeling an informal inquiry by the Trial Court. The Trial

                                                  42
Court tnade this informal inquiry in two liearings where the Appellant's family testified

legatding the Appellant's intelligence issues, and affidavits ofthe Trial Counsel and his

co-counsel's observations were presetrted to the Trial Court and put in the Clerk's Record

on Appeal. RR2, RR4, CR-142. The only issue being contested is whether there was

more than a scintilla ofevidence that the Appellant did not have sufficient present ability

to consult with Trial Counsel with a reasonable degree ofrational understanding, such

that the Trial Court abused its disctetion in not granting a competency trial.

            a   The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Not Granting the
                Appellant's Request for a Competency Trial under Texas Code
                of Criminal Procedure 468
    During the two hearings on the Appellant's Motion for lntellectual Disability and

Competency Evaluation, the Appellant put forward facts lelating to his intelligence

issues. This evidence came by way of testimony from the Appellant's family and

affidavits from Trial Counsel. The evidence is as follows:

    1.   Appellant never'finished lJigh School. Itl{2-9.

    2.   Appellant had issues rvith his mernot'y. RR2-18.

    3.   At four or Iive yeats old, Appellarrt rlas struck   Lry a taxicab r'vhile   riding liis

         bicycle. 'l'his inciclont causcd thc Appellant to bc hospitalizod fot two         days    fbr

         hcad irrj urics. RR2-34.
   .
    4.   Farnily mcmbers rnlrst repeal simple ir.rslr'uctions to the Appcllant over and ot'cr

         belbrc he undelstands. I{l{2-23,

    5.   Appollant is easily inlluenccd by olhers and I'ails   1o   think lbr himsclL l{11.2-26.

                                               43
6.    Appellant is unable to livc orr his own at the age of40. as he is unable to do the

     sinrple tasks it would tal422 S.W.3d 676.689 ('l'cx.0im. App.2013);'l'ex. Ctiur. Proc. Ann. Art.

468.003(a). Evidence relevant       10 these issues   includes whethel'a del'endant can (1)

understand the chargcs against him and the potential consequctices ofthe pending

clirainal proceedings; (2) disolose    1o oouusel   peltilielll laots, ovents. arcl   states   olnrind;

(3) cngagc in a reasonecl choice o1'lcgal stt'ategics and options; (4) understand the

advelszrizrl natule   olcliminal proceedingsl (5) exlribit    apploprierle courtroolr behavior;

and (6) testily. Morris v. Sratc, 301 S.W.3d 281, 286-87 ('I'ex.        Clini. App 2009).

      'Ihe facts laid out before the'llial Corut prior 10 the mling on the Appellant's Motion

lbr   a Cornpelency   Trial sltow much more than a scintilla of evidetroe that the Appellant

did not lravc thc plcsent abilitl to consull rvith '[-rial (]ounscl rvith a reasonablc degrcc         of

tnder.standing. The Appellanl was unable to t{isclose to Trial Counsel relevalrt litcts zind

cvcnts in a nranner lhat tttadc scuse. W)rcn protnpted to l'ecall timcs for a time line ol'

events as lhey happeued, Appellant coulcl not felay this        inlbrnation iu a coherettt lnauller.

Appcllant u,as also not ablc    10 cngagc   in teasoned choicc in regalds 1o prcsentcd lcgal

sllategies. He 1'ailod to undersland or l'ollow the def'enses as lhey wete laid out irr liont oll

hirn. and did not r,u.rdelstand why his palcuts rvould no1 bo tcstilying in ccrtaiu

proceecliugs. CR-143. The entile pt'ocess seemed 1o overwhelm Appellant's ability tcl

lunotion.    l;ur1Jrer. Appel)altt was not cngaged     duringiury selcction evcn u'hcu prornpted

                                                 45
for assistancc b)'hjs l'rial Counscl. I1e sinrply sat and lepeated nonlrertiueut tlucslious

to Trial Counsel. Most inrpoltzinlly, Appellant rvas not in a conditiotr to lestify on his

own lre]ralf. lle would agree wilh anything thal was slated to him. and was lrot cohclellt

enough to telJ the stoly o1'whal happencd on the night in questiou, He was t-tot able to do

thc one thing that coulcl have beucliltcd hinr thc nrost in bis tl.ial - tcll his siclc oftbe

s1ory.

              b.   Conclusion

          Aliel hearing all   o1'the above evicience, the   Tlial Court   had 10 make a decisior.r on

whetlicr therc was "moLc than a scirrtilla ofevidence that rnay rationally lead to a

conclusion ol inconpelency." Turner, at 692. Under'Iexas Code of Crimitial Procedure

468, the l'rial Court must give a colnpetency trial to the defendant if tlris standald is met.

If   he does not, then the   Trial Courl has al:used its discretion. Turner, a|692. The

evidenco bofore the'Irial Courl was much mole than a scirtilla and went to show that

Appellanl was not able       1o   aid in building a defense. This inzrbility to consnll with Ttial

Counsel rvith a rational undcrstanding is at thc core ofcompetency.            'llris is evcn urot'c

importarlt rvhen a defendanl is rurable to assisl in a lrial lor Capital Mur:der'. The Trial

Court abused its discletion by denying Appellant's Motion lbr a Competency 'l.rial in this

case as lhele was much more than a          scinlilla of evidence that would rationally lead to a

conclusion of compelency.

                                                    46
                            PRAYER FOR RELIEF

        For the reasons herein alleged, Appellant respectfully requesls this court

reverse the.judgn-rent of the Trial Courl and remand the case for   a       new trial on the

merits, or renand the case to the Trial Courl for a hearing on the Motion for New

Trial

                                             ND     A.                  ,   JR.
                                          TexasBar# 15208500
                                          440 Louisiana, Suite 200
                                          Houston, TX77002
                                          (7 t3) 223-ss7 s
                                          (713)224-28rs (FA]{)

                                          Attorney for Appellant
                                          CI{RISTOPHER WASHINGTON

                          CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

        As required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.3 and 9.5(b), (d), (e), I
certify that I have served this document on all other parties, which are listed below
on January 28,2015, as follows:

               Devon Anderson
               I{arris County District Attorney
               Appellate Division
               1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600
               I{ouston, Texas 77 002
               Attorney for the State of Texas
               By:     ElectronicTransmission

                                                         WE         ]FLL

                                          47