Court Opinion

ID: 9915573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 19:02:35.281077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:37.757316
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/5/24 P. v. Martinez CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                          G062276

           v.                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 05CF1582)

 PAUL JAVIER MARTINEZ,                                                   OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Steven D. Bromberg, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Melissa Hill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              We appointed counsel to represent Paul Javier Martinez on appeal from the
trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing benefits based on Penal Code section
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1172.6. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue
against her client but advised the court she found no issues to argue on his behalf.
              The procedures set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and
Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, do not apply to appeals from the denial of
section 1172.6 petitions. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 226, 231.)
Therefore, when appointed appellate counsel finds no viable issues, counsel should file a
brief informing the court that counsel found no arguable issues and including a concise
narration of facts. (Id. at p. 231.) The reviewing court should send the brief to the
defendant with notice the defendant may file a supplemental brief or letter within 30
days, and if the defendant does not, the court may dismiss the appeal. (Id. at pp. 231-
232.) While no independent review of the record is compelled, the court retains
discretion to independently review the record in any appeal based on section 1172.6. (Id.
at p. 232.)
              We gave Martinez 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf.
Martinez did not file a supplemental brief or letter. We exercise our discretion to
independently review the record and find no arguable issue on appeal. We affirm the
postjudgment order.
                                          FACTS
              The context for the limited issue of this appeal is taken from the prior
nonpublished opinion, People v. Martinez (Sept. 14, 2012, G045646) (Martinez). As
relevant to this appeal, Martinez was tried without any codefendant and a jury convicted

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               Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered Penal Code former
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive
changes to the statute. For clarity, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6. All further
statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Martinez of aggravated assault and willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder. The jury also found true Martinez personally used a deadly weapon and inflicted
great bodily injury. (Ibid.) The convictions were based on allegations that in 2004, he
used a knife to attack an individual who danced with the female companion of a person
who had been at the crime scene with Martinez. (Ibid.) The jury also found Martinez
had been sentenced to a prior prison term. (Ibid.)
              Based upon the jury’s verdicts and findings, the trial court sentenced
Martinez “to prison for life with the possibility of parole . . . and a consecutive five-year
term” based on “accompanying enhancements and [a] prior prison term allegation. The
court stayed or struck the remaining sentences.” (Martinez, supra, G045646.) We
affirmed the judgment. (Ibid.)
              In 2022, Martinez filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel and both sides submitted briefing. At a
hearing, the court denied Martinez’s petition. The court reasoned Martinez was ineligible
for resentencing because “[t]he sole theory presented to the jury was that [Martinez] was
the actual perpetrator” of the underlying attempted murder and the jury found Martinez
personally used a deadly weapon and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the
victim. The court also noted the jury was not instructed on natural and probable
consequences, felony murder, conspiracy, or aiding and abetting liability. In its written
decision, the court concluded that, “[b]ased on the record of conviction, the
uncontroverted facts show the petitioner does not meet the statutory requirements
necessary for relief.” Martinez timely appealed.
                                       DISCUSSION
              Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019, to eliminate natural
and probable consequences liability for murder and to limit the scope of the felony-
murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis).) The statutes

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were amended “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who [was] not
the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, [and] was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) SB 1437 also added section
1172.6, which, as originally enacted, set forth a procedure whereby a “person convicted
of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory” could
petition for resentencing relief. (Former § 1172.6, subd. (a); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
              Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 775), effective January 1,
2022, amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a), to explicitly expand the category of
individuals entitled to petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).)
Subdivision (a) of that section now expressly permits individuals convicted of attempted
murder or manslaughter under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a
petition for resentencing relief. A section 1172.6 petition must make “‘a prima facie
showing’ for relief. [Citation.]” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) In Lewis, our
Supreme Court held, “The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s
prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions
with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.)
              Here, the trial court correctly concluded Martinez is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. The record established conclusively (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708) that he was not convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences theory or the felony-murder rule, and Martinez does
not contend otherwise. Although we note one of the given jury instructions dealt with the
topic of “other perpetrator[s]” (capitalization omitted), it clearly instructed the jury to
disregard the possible involvement of another perpetrator in the underlying chain of
events and to instead focus on “whether the defendant on trial here[, i.e., Martinez,]
committed the crimes charged.” All of the jury’s instructions were premised on a theory

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that Martinez was the actual perpetrator of the charged crimes. We have independently
reviewed the record and found no arguable issues on appeal.
                                    DISPOSITION
             The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                               O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

GOODING, J.

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