Court Opinion

ID: 9476962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:10:05.762933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:36.638376
License: Public Domain

GUY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the substantive conclusions reached by the court but write additionally to address certain procedural problems which are capable of repetition.1 The Com*1447mittee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (Committee) advanced three theories under which it was entitled to receive and the court was entitled to release requested grand jury materials: (1) the constitutional impeachment power of the House, (2) the inherent supervisory power of the district court over grand juries, and (3) Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).2 We have elected to address the request only in terms of Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) (hereinafter (C)(i)). This is particularly appropriate since the parties do not argue that this section is inapplicable and it enables us to reach a decision without the exploration of more nebulous constitutional and “inherent power” grounds.
I would suggest that (C)(i) petitions require initially and on review a three-step analysis. First, is this an appropriate circumstance for a (C)(i) request? This is a legal conclusion and is reviewed de novo. Second, if there is a proper (C)(i) request from a procedural standpoint, has there been the requisite showing of particularized need? This would normally be a mixed question of law and fact and would be reviewable de novo. Third, in the grant or denial of the request, was discretion properly exercised? This latter decision is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. When this suggested analysis is applied here, it results in my reaching the following conclusions.
Although the Committee simply sent a letter asking for the grand jury materials, that letter is properly construed as a petition seeking (C)(i) disclosure. Under Rule 6(e)(3)(D), when such a petition is filed, the proceeding may only be ex parte if the government is the petitioner.3 Although the Committee is part of government in a broad sense, it is more logical to conclude that the “government” referred to in Rule 6(e)(3)(D) refers to the government as defined in Fed.R.Crim.P. 54(c).4 Thus, when the district court originally proceeded ex parte, it was in error as notice should have been given to the “attorney for the government” and “the parties to the judicial proceeding,” which in this case is Judge Hastings. I would conclude any error was harmless, however, for the following reasons: (1) the court did notify the government and Judge Hastings of the entry of its order before any materials were actually released; (2) the government does not object to disclosure; and (3) Judge Hastings, by filing a stay motion and appeal, has had an opportunity to be heard in the district court and on appeal. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that this was an appropriate circumstance to consider a (C)(i) request.
Judge Merritt has dealt fully with the particularized need issue and nothing further need be said.
The last inquiry in the suggested three-part analysis concerns whether the court properly exercised its discretion in the order of release it issued. Although in different cases the focus of this inquiry will vary, in this case the only question raised concerns the propriety of allowing the Senate to have access to the grand jury materials at this time. On this issue, I part company with the majority’s analysis, although it would appear that little differ*1448ence in result is likely. The majority indicates that the material may only be given to the Committee but acknowledges the Committee can then do with it as they see fit.
I have no quarrel with this conclusion, and were I exercising discretion as a trial judge, I would have done as the majority suggests. However, I cannot conclude that the district court under these circumstances abused its discretion by allowing the materials to be released in accordance with the Committee’s confidentiality rules. Given that this all occurs long after the grand jury has finished its work, the criminal trial has concluded, and the Committee has already made public a synopsis of the grand jury proceedings, I cannot say the district court abused its discretion in allowing initially what the majority concludes can happen anyway. It seems to me that the majority has merely substituted its discretion for that of the district court.
Finally, on the discretion issue, I would emphasize that it is still within the district court's discretion to deal with other (C)(i) disclosure requests. All the district court did here was to turn a copy of the grand jury materials over to the Committee. The district court is still the custodian of the official record of the grand jury, and thus it is to the district court that Judge Hastings initially should make his showing of particularized need if he seeks a copy of the grand jury record.

. The House Judiciary Committee has already requested additional grand jury materials over and above those that are the subject of this appeal.

. Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) reads as follows:
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made—
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding; ....

. Rule 6(e)(3)(D) reads as follows:
(D) A petition for disclosure pursuant to subdivision (e)(3)(C)(i) shall be filed in the district where the grand jury convened. Unless the hearing is ex parte, which it may be when the petitioner is the government, the petitioner shall serve written notice of the petition upon (i) the attorney for the government, (ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding if disclosure is sought in connection with such a proceeding, and (iii) such other persons as the court may direct. The court shall afford those persons a reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard.

.Fed.R.Crim.P. 54(c) reads in pertinent part as follows:
(c) Application of Terms. As used in these rules the following terms have the designated meanings.
"Attorney for the government” means the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United States Attorney, an authorized assistant of the United States Attorney,....