Court Opinion

ID: 9638618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:48:57.649628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:03.772174
License: Public Domain

MACK, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
The trial court has meticulously and correctly stated the law with respect to the burden that appellant had in establishing that the performance of his trial counsel was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Having done so, without granting a hearing as to matters dehors the record, the court has effectively foreclosed to appellant the opportunity to meet that burden. I suggest consideration of the following scenario: a prisoner, in a post-trial motion for collateral relief, alleges that in preparation for trial he gave his trial counsel the name and address of a key eyewitness to the incident forming the basis for his conviction, that he told trial counsel that the witness would corroborate his version of the facts and exonerate him of the charges, that he requested that trial counsel interview and subpoena the witness, and that trial counsel failed to do so because in counsel’s view, no one would believe the witness. Do these facts, without more, raise a question as to whether trial counsel was properly representing the client? On a record lacking any statement by counsel as to why the witness was not produced, and casting *1341no light whatsoever on the matter, can we say with certainty what might have happened if the witness had been produced? Can we say that there was no witness, that if there were, the witness would not have testified, or that even if the witness had testified, the jury would have rejected the testimony? Would we, or any court, be in a posture to say that the movant had not been prejudiced, or to dispose of the motion on the ground that the movant had shown no prejudice?
This recitation is more than a scenario; it is basically the instant ease bereft of the inferences that we are drawing from the character of a neighborhood and the people who may frequent it. Here, the trial judge denied a brief inquiry, in my opinion mandated by the language of § 23-110, see infra, that would have put to rest important yet unanswered questions. Yet, appellant’s critical allegation, that his counsel failed to contact a key witness, is neither vague, nor conclusory, nor wholly incredible and thus dictates a hearing. See Gibson v. United States, 388 A.2d 1214, 1216 (D.C.1978). Indeed, testimony from a police officer, as well as appellant, tells us that a female witness was at the scene of the crime. We know that the witness was not at trial. We do not know whether appellant’s allegation, that he requested counsel to contact the witness and that counsel refused to do so, is true or false. We do not know whether appellant’s further allegation — that the witness would have corroborated his testimony — is true or false, or whether, if true, would merit relief. Neither lawyers nor the courts can pinpoint with any degree of accuracy the proclivities of a particular individual to act or not to act in self-interest (or against self-interest) under varying circumstances. That is why the statute here in question requires a hearing, with the opportunity for testimony and cross-examination, with respect to questions not answered on the face of the record. Unless we resist the tendency to make general assumptions as a result of our experience with respect to the so-called “criminal milieu,” we run the risk of weakening our own statutory and constitutional protections.
In its brief the government argues that “it is highly implausible that Ms. Smith [the witness] would have corroborated appellant’s testimony, and that even if she did, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.” (Emphasis added.) In like vein, the trial court in holding that the facts did not warrant a new trial or a post-conviction hearing, reasoned that “in light of the evidence against appellant and the availability of a Fifth Amendment privilege to [Ms. Smith], the attorney, no doubt, decided it would not be useful or provident to call her.” (Emphasis added.) In this court, my colleagues add a new dimension to the speculation. In purported reliance on the case of McAdoo v. United States, 515 A.2d 412 (D.C.1986), the majority speaks of the “improbability of the notion that Ms. Smith would have admitted her own guilt to exonerate Sykes.” (Emphasis added.) The majority can gain no support from McAdoo for the basic reason that the movant in that case was granted a hearing.1
By contrast here, the trial court, in denying a hearing, merely presumed that a lawyer made a legitimate, tactical decision not to contact or call a witness at the request of his client. Now my colleagues add to the speculation by presuming that the witness would not have been cooperative, that the witness would have been required to incriminate herself,2 and that in any event lawyers are competent! (I dare not question this last proposition except to suggest *1342that this is why the law requires a hearing in this case. See Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142 (D.C.1990), cited by the majority.) The mandate of § 23-110 is clear: “[ujnless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the prosecuting authority, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.” D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989 Repl.).
The problem with the majority’s reasoning is that it has put the cart before the horse. In finding that the outcome of the case would have been no different under the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), it is carving out any exception to the mandate of § 23-110. It has stopped short of holding that the specifications of the motion are “patently frivolous” or “palpably incredible.” It could not so hold on the face of the record because, with respect to those specifications, there is no record. We have repeatedly emphasized that, when a post-trial motion alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, a hearing is required, “where the ineffectiveness concerns facts dehors the record.” See Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1283 (D.C.1987), citing Gibson, supra, 388 A.2d at 1216; see also Miller v. United States, 479 A.2d 862, 869-70 (D.C. 1984). Only recently we re-emphasized the importance of developing a pertinent factual record where an appellant has raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Simpson v. United States, 576 A.2d 1336, 1338-39 (D.C.1990); see Johnson v. United States, 585 A.2d 766 (D.C.1991).
I would remand the record for a hearing and appropriate findings.

. McAdoo’s counsel testified at that hearing where he declined the trial court's invitation to produce an alleged contract killer and conceded that trial counsel’s failure to do so was reasonable. McAdoo, supra, 515 A.2d at 412. My colleagues in the instant case say that McAdoo is controlling because "we assume, for purposes of this appeal that Sykes’ trial counsel would have testified as did the attorney in McAdoo and would have acknowledged that he did not interview Ms. Smith."

. If one is to believe the evidence produced at trial by the government, this assertion does not follow as a matter of course. Moreover, we are simply unaware of what, if anything, a contact with the witness would have produced.