Court Opinion

ID: 9661704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:46:59.893877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:32.756898
License: Public Domain

ON THE MERITS
We affirm the judgment.
The TESCO suit was brought under T.R. C.P. 185, “Suit on Sworn Account” and was for material or services supplied in the form of electric current. A systematic record of charges, compiled and kept by TESCO, was incorporated into the petition, supported by affidavit. TESCO’s petition complied completely with the provisions of the Rule. In response, however, RIMCO filed only a general denial. As a “special defense” it pled in addition to the denial, as follows:
“Defendant would show that Texas Electric Service Company has made unilateral charges which are characterized as “late charges,” which are in excess of the maximum lawful rate to be charged a corporation, being 1.5% per month. Thus, said charges are in violation of Article 5069-1.06, Texas Revised Civil Statutes. Defendant seeks to recover all penalties of usury, cancellation of the principal of the obligation, double the amount of interest, and a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
After TESCO closed its opening testimony with proof of its reasonable attorney’s fees, RIMCO proceeded with its evidence. During the course thereof it was discovered that RIMCO had not complied with Rule 185 by denying the account under oath. The court permitted RIMCO to add to its previously filed answer the following sworn allegations:
“SPECIFIC DENIAL
“Defendant would show that the account sworn to in the plaintiff’s petition is not just, due or owing, specifically:
“A. Defendant did not occupy the premises at all times, and was not the owner or tenant thereof, and the electrical services were not provided to this defendant.
“B. Defendant did not agree to pay the charges on Exhibit A.
“C. The late charges are illegal and not due.”
By reference to Rule 185 it is obvious that even with this additional matter added to the RIMCO pleadings they were insufficient allegations to entitle it to deny the TESCO account. By the authorities such failure of compliance amounts to an admission that the account on which TES-CO had declared was correct. Airborne Freight Corp. v. CRB Marketing, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.1978). Therefore, no issue of fact as to the validity of the claim is presented. Brown v. Clark, 557 S.W.2d 558, 559-60 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1977, no writ). The sworn account itself was prima facie evidence that the debt was true and there was not the necessity that it be formally admitted into evidence for TESCO’s entitlement to have it so treated. Airborne Freight Corp., supra, (at p. 575).
*366Considering the law, we find that there was evidence in support of the demand by the suit on the sworn account. It was not only sufficient but is to be deemed uncontested. RIMCO’s first point of error, contending that there was no evidence, or insufficient evidence to support the judgment, is therefore overruled.
RIMCO’s second point of error asserts error in the denial of its counterclaim for usury in that there was a charge of interest in excess of the lawful rate, thus entitling it to the penalties under V.A.T.S. Title 79, “Interest”, Art. 5069-1.06, “Penalties”. RIMCO refers to a $17.30 “late charge” for nonpayment of $576.67 for electricity furnished from 3-28-76 to 4-28-76 and another “late charge” of $11.76 for nonpayment of $392.00 for electricity furnished from 4-28-76 to 6-15-76 (reflected by the account of TESCO in Exhibit A to its petition in sworn account).
In 64 Tex.Jur.2d, “Words & Phrases” (1965), we notice that interest is the compensation allowed by law fixed by the parties to a contract for the use, forbearance, or detention of money and that usury is defined as interest in excess of the amount allowed by law. There must be “interest” or there can be no usurious interest. We think it obvious that the “late charges” do not arise from the use, forbearance, or detention of money. It follows that there could be no usury in the demand of TESCO. The point is overruled.
From the foregoing it is obvious that TESCO was entitled to collect that upon which it declared by its sworn account. TESCO was not awarded this by the trial court. What it got was a lesser sum, for the trial court, acting as the finder of fact, did not see fit to grant the whole of the demand. The relief granted by its judgment was for approximately three-fourths (/4ths) of the account total, plus pre-judgment interest, and plus $300.00 in attorney’s fees. TESCO was not satisfied with the judgment, but did not take any action to appeal therefrom. It did not file an appeal bond.
RIMCO did appeal, whereupon TESCO concluded that it would be justified in attempting to get a judgment in the appellate court for the total of its entitlement. This it sought to obtain by a cross-point on appeal. Were we free to act, as was the trial court, our judgment would be one of reformation, by which TESCO’s judgment would be increased.
However, we have concluded that even though a proper judgment would have been that represented by TESCO it is without the power of this court to grant more than was awarded by the trial court because of TESCO’s failure to perfect a cross-appeal.
A somewhat similar case was Benton v. Taylor, 208 S.W. 704 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1919, writ ref’d). There Taylor had sued Benton, and Benton had filed cross-action in suit against Taylor. Trial was to a jury, following which a judgment was rendered that neither party recover anything from the other. From the denial defendant Benton perfected an appeal. Plaintiff Taylor did not perfect an appeal (bond held to have been filed to late). Nevertheless Taylor sought to present his cross-appeal, and Benton moved to dismiss the same. The court ordered the Taylor cross-appeal dismissed.
In Shirey v. Harris, 288 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1956, no writ), this court held that an appellee, who by cross-point on the appeal of another sought in addition to that received by the decision of the trial court an increase or additional amount of $500.00, could not be heard on that request. The reason stated by the appellate court was because the appellees had not executed the bond required by T.R. C.P. 324, “Prerequisites of Appeal”. To similar effect was the decision on Schell v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 439 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.), though in that case there had also been failure of the appeal of the plaintiff/appellant to perfect an appeal because of failure to timely file his appeal bond.
Where an appellee wants greater relief on appeal than received by the judg*367ment from which his adversary has appealed and become appellant, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to make the grant unless the appellee has perfected his own cross-appeal. In other words the relief desired may not be obtained by mere cross-point on the appeal. Cases bearing thereupon are annotated at 3 Tex. Digest, “Appeal and Error”, <3=395, “Effect of failure to give or defects in security” (1953).
In Scull v. Davis, 434 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1968, writ ref’d n. r. e.), Judge Preslar considers the authorities, including Jackson v. Ewton, 411 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.1967), on “points” and “cross points”, and their definition and function. His conclusion was that of the cross points in the case some probably qualified to be considered by rules of law and procedure and some did not. However, the court considered all in an abundance of precaution. It overruled them all.
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pollard Friendly Ford Co., 512 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1974, no writ), where the trial had been to the court without a jury, the appellee sought by cross-points of error to obtain on appeal more than the amount the trial court had awarded. Though there had been no cross-appeal the Amarillo court held existent the right to have the claim considered because of the cross-points. However, the court ultimately held appellee’s claim to be without merit. (In the case before us, had we followed the Amarillo court we would have held that our jurisdiction of TESCO’s cross-points obtained, and on the appeal would have awarded more to TESCO than was granted by the trial court.)
In our opinion our holding is in conflict with that of the Amarillo court in Travelers Indemnity. By our construction of the applicable law and Rules of Civil Procedure a cross-point of an appellee, where there is no cross-appeal, does not support and provide the ability of an appellee to seek in the appellate court different and/or greater relief than that granted to it by the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.