Court Opinion

ID: 9665314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:44:42.849497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:14.709314
License: Public Domain

AKER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which reverses the appellant’s conviction for incest. The majority contends that conviction for both rape and incest violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. I respectfully disagree.
As the majority correctly points out, the standard for determining this issue was stated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306.
The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not....
Where the majority opinion goes astray is in its insistence that this rule is somehow something more than a rule of statutory construction. It is not. The majority opinion appears to suggest that conviction for both offenses is prohibited because both crimes were committed by the same act, and thus would involve substantially the same “proof” at trial.
This reasoning ignores the language of Blockburger, supra, upon which the majority purports to rely. The rule does not say conviction of two separate offenses for the same act is prohibited, but instead, the rule is designed to determine when conviction of two offenses for the same act is prohibited. Conviction of two offenses is not prohibited where “each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” The “facts” referred to are the elements of the statutory provisions.
In this case it is clear that “each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Rape, as defined in KRS 510.040 and as applied to this case, requires proof of (1) sexual intercourse, (2) with one who is less than twelve years old. Incest, as defined in KRS 530.020, requires proof of (1) sexual intercourse, (2) with certain members of one’s family (in this case the appellant’s daughter). While both rape and incest each require proof of sexual intercourse, each requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. The rape herein requires proof that the partner was under twelve; incest requires proof of a family relationship.
The majority’s reliance on Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054, is likewise unpersuasive. Under the felony murder statute involved in that ease, conviction of felony murder required proof of the underlying felony. Obviously then, the underlying felony was a “lesser-included offense” of felony murder in the sense that conviction for felony murder required proof of every element of the felony. Conviction for the felony did not require proof of a fact not required for conviction of felony murder.
I am of the opinion that conviction for both rape and incest under the facts of this case do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The policy behind each statute is distinct. The rape statute seeks to deter and punish those who would have intercourse with children incapable of consent. The incest statute seeks to deter and punish those who would have intercourse with close members of their family. That the appellant committed both *204crimes by the same act is of no constitutional significance.
I would affirm the judgment of the lower court in all respects.