Court Opinion

ID: 9767551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:21:18.383239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.735474
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
On original submission this cause was reversed because of the admission into evidence of an extraneous offense by virtue of State’s Exhibit #3, a check, without the proper predicate being laid to demonstrate its relevancy or appellant’s connection therewith.
Appellant was charged with passing a forged instrument. In the State’s case in chief the State showed not only the charged offense on March 23, 1972, which involved State’s Exhibit #1, but over objection offered the extraneous offense of attempting to pass a forged instrument on March 24, 1972. At this time the appellant had offered no testimony and appellant had been positively identified as the party who passed State’s Exhibit #1, the check specified in the indictment. The introduction of the extraneous offense involving State’s Exhibit #2 was, under these circumstances, error. However, when the appellant later took the witness stand and denied passing State’s Exhibit # 1 as alleged in the indictment, he raised the issue of identity. The evidence relating to State’s Exhibit #2 would then have been admissible and rendered the earlier error harmless. This is not the point, however, in controversy.
The question on which reversal turned was the admission of State’s Exhibit #3 *120during the cross-examination of the appellant. Unlike the predicate laid for the introduction of State’s Exhibit #2 where the State called Frank Collins, who testified that appellant had attempted to pass State’s Exhibit #2, the prosecutor, after exhibiting State’s Exhibit #3 to the appellant after he denied having been the person who passed State’s Exhibit # 1, asserted in the presence of the jury:
“I guess the clerk that turned in State’s Exhibit 3 is also mistaken ?”
The exhibit was then offered and admitted over the vigorous objection that a proper predicate had not been laid, etc. As noted in the opinion on original submission, “The State offered no testimony or proof whatever as to where the check came from, in whose possession it had been, whether or not it had ever been passed or attempted to be passed by anyone, who had put the information on it, or whether it had ever been paid. It was simply admitted into evidence and exhibited to the jury without any explanation whatever as to its relevancy or as to any connection whatever with the appellant.” It should also be noted that State’s Exhibit #3 was not identified by the witness Morachnick as being one of the checks stolen.
It is clear from the prosecutor’s unsworn remark he was clearly inferring that the appellant had passed or attempted to pass State’s Exhibit #3.
The general rule is that an accused in a criminal case can be convicted, if at all, only by evidence that shows he is guilty of the offense charged. If the admission of an extraneous offense becomes proper, it is an exception itself to the general rule. See 23 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 194, p. 294.
“It must be remembered, however, that even though evidence of another crime may be relevant to the instant proceeding, such evidence should not he admitted unless the commission, of the other crime is clearly proved and the accused is shown to have been its perpetrator.” 23 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 195, p. 302 (Emphasis Supplied)
1 Branch’s Ann.P.C., 2d ed., Sec. 188, p. 204, makes much the same point. “It is error to admit evidence of another offense when defendant is not shown to be the party guilty of the offense.” (Numerous cases cited) (Emphasis Supplied)
Shepherd v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 387, 158 S.W.2d 1010 (1942), made clear that even though proof of extraneous offenses comes within an exception to the general rule of exclusion, the evidence of such extraneous offense or offenses “shall not be received unless the accused is satisfactorily shown to be a party to the commission of such offense”. See also Perez v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 639, 310 S.W.2d 334 (1958).
And in Tomlinson v. State, 422 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), this court, speaking through Judge Morrison, said that “no extraneous offense should be offered unless the State is prepared to prove that the accused committed the same.”
The authorities supporting this proposition of law are numerous indeed. Only in the controversial case of Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (indecent exposure case from Bexar County) does there seem to have been any serious departure.
It is clear from what has been said that the proper predicate was not laid for the admission of State’s Exhibit #3.
The dissents on original submission and on rehearing contend that Vandall v. State, 438 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), is controlling and a sufficient predicate was thus laid. The dissent also contends the majority opinion on original submission improperly distinguished Vandall when it said, “ . . . but that case (Vandall) is distinguished from this case in that it appears that the checks there had been identified by a witness as having been passed and *121presented for payment at about the time the check specified in the indictment had been passed.” (Emphasis Supplied)
In Vandall this court wrote :
“Appellant contends that other checks were erroneously introduced into evidence, because it was not proved that he passed them. Dorothy Hill testified that during the week following appellant’s departure, she was notified by the bank that some of the checks in the amount of $1200 or $1300 had been presented for payment. Three other company checks, numbered 10464, 10468 and 10469 were introduced. All were dated April IS, 1966; all four checks were otherwise identical, except for their typewritten amounts. Each check had the same endorsement, ‘Joe Vandall, 910 Ave. “R” ’. Check No. 10464 had below the endorsement the number 5599392.1
“1 The same as appellant’s ‘driver’s license’ number written below liis endorsement on the check No. 10465 which was passed to Hicks.
“Appellant had possession of and passed one of the checks taken from the company, and it may be inferred that he took all twenty-one checks.2 The se-
quence of the numbers on the checks, the number of appellant’s ‘driver’s license’ appearing on two of the checks, the same endorsement and address appearing on all of the checks, plus the fact that appellant did not report for work after April IS are sufficient facts to connect appellant with the three checks. The court properly admitted the checks into evidence. Cage v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 355, 320 S.W.2d 364.
“2. In Mason v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 516, 321 S.W.2d 591, this court stated that the rule is well-settled that [from] possession of an accused of a part of the stolen property theft of the whole may be inferred.”
The dissent contends that in Vandall the witness Dorothy Hill, the bookkeeper and office manager of the company where the checks were stolen, testified someone at a bank told her some of the checks had been presented and his testimony did not prove Vandall presented the checks. The record in Vandall reflects that this hearsay testimony was admitted on direct examination without objection. The dissent contends that the second paragraph of the Vandall opinion quoted above sums up to the sufficiency of the evidence to connect Vandall with the extraneous checks and the testimony of Dorothy Hill did not and should not have entered in such assessment of the sufficiency. We agree. Although it is clear in the Vandall opinion that such testimony was not taken into consideration, the basis of distinction between Vandall and the instant case used in the majority opinion on original submission was a misreading of the Vandall opinion.
With this distinction removed, is there any distinction between Vandall and the instant case? With the exception of the factual situation used in the assessment of sufficiency of the evidence in Vandall that he (Vandall) was employed at the place where the checks were stolen and failed to report to work once the checks commenced to be passed, the cases are similar. There was no proof in either case who presented the checks, who had the checks or how they came into the possession of the State. A reexamination of Vandall in light of authorities heretofore cited convinces us that the predicate in either case was not sufficient, and Vandall and cases relying upon Vandall should be overruled to the extent of any conflict therewith.
The dissent would appear to argue that since the proof showed the appellant passed one of the stolen checks and attempted to pass another check, the third check was admissible without more in the way of a predicate than was offered.
It would appear that the dissent relies upon the rule in theft cases that from proof of the recent unexplained possession by the accused of part of stolen property theft of the whole may be-inferred if it be shown that the whole of the property was *122taken at one and the same time and would extend without more that inference to check cases to cover possession by the accused of checks which had been altered or forged and further to show his guilty knowledge of the alteration or forgery. While it is not altogether clear, it appears that the dissent would allow it to be inferred (from possession of a part of the stolen checks) that appellant passed or attempted to pass other checks stolen at the same time which were obviously forged after the theft and which somehow found their way into the hands of the prosecution by the time of the trial without more of a predicate.
The State itself apparently will not go that far. In its brief on the motion for rehearing, the State argues that since the appellant admitted possession of State’s Exhibit #2, which he was attempting to pass when he was arrested, it can be inferred (since all the checks were taken at the same time) he also possessed State’s Exhibit #3 (the extraneous offense in question), citing Mason v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 516, 321 S.W.2d 591 (1959). The State further argues that since appellant admitted his endorsement on State’s Exhibit #2 the jury would have been authorized to compare his known signature on State’s Exhibit #2 with State’s Exhibits #1 and #3, citing Article 38.27, Vernon’s Ann.C. C.P. The State admits that this, standing alone, would not be sufficient to identify appellant as the passer of State’s Exhibit #3, but urges the comparison coupled with “other factors” would be sufficient.
In Cain v. State, 468 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), Judge Roberts, for the court, held that where handwriting samples are introduced without expert testimony to prove prior convictions and the jury alone must make comparison and there is no other evidence to connect the defendant with the prior convictions, identity of the defendant as the person previously convicted has not been sufficiently established, and that Article 38.27, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., authorizing comparison evidence to prove handwriting cannot be construed as meaning that mere introduction of a sample of a defendant’s signature, coupled with the introduction of a signature on records showing a prior conviction, will suffice as independent testimony to prove identity of the defendant as the person who was previously convicted.
Remaining convinced that this cause was properly disposed of on original submission, the State’s motion for rehearing is denied.