Court Opinion

ID: 9768757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:47:14.0856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:44.365487
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
STEINFELD, Judge.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion for two reasons. The opinion states that:
“The appellant owner, Marc Blackburn, telephoned appellee, Ellis Dewey Yates, Jr., a Blackburn Brick Company truck driver and another employee, Tommy Ea-den, who were temporarily out of work because of adverse weather conditions and inquired if they were available to do the work about which appellee Cherry had inquired. Both men agreed to do the work and the appellant owner, Blackburn, went with them to appellee Cherry’s premises and informed appellee Cherry he had located some men to help. Thereafter, the appellant owner, Blackburn, left the Cherry premises to go about his own business.”
Yates was not a loaned employee. Rice v. Conley, Ky., 414 S.W.2d 138 (1967).
Yates claimed that he was injured on February 26, 1965. KRS 342.185 requires that “ * * * a notice of the accident shall have been given to the employer as soon as practicable after the happening” of the injury. More than 63 days passed before notice waá given. The phrase “as soon as practicable” has been construed in Peabody Coal Company v. Harp, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 170 (1961), to mean that notice must be given “within a reasonable time under the circumstances of each particular case”. See cases cited therein. Reasonable *819promptness is required. The delay must have been occasioned by reasonable cause. No reason is offered by Yates that convinces us that the notice was given “as soon as practicable” after the happening of the injury.
MONTGOMERY and OSBORNE, JJ., join in this dissent.