Court Opinion

ID: 9518024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:41:00.13354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:00.273475
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge FRIEDMAN.
Because I disagree that the grievance arbitration award reinstating Sherie Vra-ble (Grievant), without backpay and benefits and subject to multiple conditions, violates the public policy exception to the essence test, I respectfully dissent.
In this case, Grievant was employed at Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 (Intermediate Unit) as an elementary school classroom assistant, responsible for working with emotionally disturbed students. On March 18, 2002, she was discovered in the school’s restroom suffering the effects of a drug overdose caused by the Fentanyl patch she was wearing on her back.1 On March 27, 2002, the Intermediate Unit suspended Grievant without pay until further notice and, on September 24, 2002, terminated Grievant. The Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Association (Association) filed a grievance on Griev-ant’s behalf alleging that the Intermediate Unit did not have just cause to discharge Grievant.
The grievance ultimately was submitted to arbitration, and the Arbitrator was asked to determine whether the Intermediate Unit had just cause to discharge Grievant under Appendix C, section 9(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), based on the assertion that her March 18, 2002, possession and use of a controlled substance at work constituted “immorality’ under section 1122(a) of the Public School Code of 1949 (Code).2
The Arbitrator concluded that the Intermediate Unit lacked just cause to terminate Grievant because her conduct did not rise to the level of “immorality under Code section 1122(a), defined by case law as “a course of conduct that offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and elevate.” (Arbitrator’s op. at 6, R.R. at 43a, citations omitted). Although the Arbitrator did not condone Grievant’s “foolish and irresponsible behavior,” he found that it was “one and only one workplace incident” in a span of twenty-three years with the Intermediate Unit. (Arbitrator’s op. at 7, R.R. at 44a.) Therefore, the Arbitrator concluded *1213that, when viewed dispassionately, this single episode was not a course of conduct that would offend the morals of the community, and he sustained the grievance.
The majority takes pains to point out that Grievant had a history of drug abuse, implying that such past conduct should be considered in determining whether the Arbitrator’s award should be set aside. I recognize that the record contains evidence that Grievant had a past history of depression and addiction to pain killers; however, it is undisputed that Grievant’s discharge on grounds of “immorality” under section 1122(a) of the Code was based solely on the incident of March 18, 2002. Because information of past drug involvement was irrelevant to the issue before him, the Arbitrator properly made no findings in that regard.3 Instead, the Arbitrator specifically found that, while serious, the isolated incident for which Grievant was discharged i-epresented a single lapse of judgment in an otherwise long and unblemished employment history with the Intermediate Unit and, thus, did not warrant termination.
Moreover, the Arbitrator did not ignore the gravity of Grievant’s offense or the fact that she may have ongoing drug issues; consequently, the Arbitrator fashioned an award that, while imposing a lesser discipline, directly addressed the offending conduct and provided a last chance agreement expressly designed to prevent its recurrence. Specifically, the award reinstated Grievant effective the first work day of the 2003/04 school year,4 without back pay or benefits for the eighteen months she was away from work, conditioned on her written agreement to: (1) complete the terms and conditions of her one-year probation period pursuant to an October 18, 2002, court order; (2) participate in and complete a structured drug and alcohol counseling and treatment program, be bound by all its conditions and sign a release of information form so that the Intermediate Unit may be in contact with the treating organization; (3) abstain from all mood-altering drugs and chemical substances while on duty; (4) be subject to random drug/alcohol testing, with her immediate removal upon a positive result in any measure; (5) meet and maintain acceptable performance, conduct and leave usages, which are to be monitored by the Intermediate Unit; and (6) provide the Intermediate Unit with regular written reports of her treatment with sufficient specificity to allow Intermediate Unit to determine whether Grievant is abiding by the terms of the award. A breach of the award by Grievant in any way at any time during the 2003/04 school year would result in her immediate removal for violation of the last chance agreement. (Arbitrator’s award at 7-8, R.R. at 44a-45a.)
As recognized by the majority, this court must assume that the CBA, as interpreted by the Arbitrator, required the award handed down. Thus, the issue presented to this court on appeal is whether Griev-ant’s conditional reinstatement, without *1214back pay and benefits, contravenes the well-defined dominant public policy to protect children in school from the dangers of illicit drugs and drug use. The majority holds that it does and, as support for its decision, cites Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 956 A.2d 477 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008), petition for allowance of appeal granted by — Pa.-, 972 A.2d 482 (2009), wherein this court vacated an arbitrator’s award as violative of public policy. However, critical distinctions between Philadelphia Housing and the present case compel a contrary result in the matter now before us.
In Philadelphia Housing, Thomas Mitchell, an employee of the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA), was discharged for sexual harassment of a female co-worker after an investigation of the co-worker’s formal complaint revealed that she had been subjected to an ongoing course of sexual harassment by Mitchell and that Mitchell had a pattern of sexually harassing female employees. The arbitrator characterized Mitchell’s behavior as “lewd, lascivious and extraordinarily perverse” but, nevertheless, concluded that PHA did not establish just cause to terminate, as required by the parties’ CBA. The arbitrator sustained Mitchell’s grievance and awarded a “make whole” remedy, which provided for Mitchell’s unconditional reinstatement with back pay. PHA’s petition to vacate the award was denied by the trial court, but this court reversed on appeal.5
In doing so, we identified the explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace, including employer prevention of such harassment, investigation of complaints of harassment and application of appropriate sanctions against those who commit such conduct. We then noted that “[i]n cases where courts have upheld arbitrators’ awards reinstating employees who have committed sexual harassment, there still has been some significant sanction against the offending employee.”6 Philadelphia Housing, 956 A.2d at 485. Finally, we stated,
in considering the issue before us, we must assume that the CBA itself calls *1215for the remedy set forth in the Arbitrator’s award; the question to be asked is does a CBA requirement to reinstate Mitchell without conditions and make him whole run counter to the identified public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace. In light of the cases discussed above, we conclude that the Arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA so undermines the stated public policy that it cannot be enforced.
Philadelphia Housing, 956 A.2d at 486. (Emphasis added, citations omitted.)
We agreed that termination was not required in every case of sexual harassment, but we emphasized that there must be some correlation between an employee’s misconduct and an employer’s response. Observing that the arbitrator had interpreted the CBA as requiring unconditional reinstatement of an employee who committed numerous acts of sexual harassment, we concluded that an employer forced to honor that arbitration award would not comply with public policy requirements that an employer impose appropriate discipline for proven cases of sexual harassment in order to ensure a safe work environment free of such conduct. In other words, because the arbitrator in Philadelphia Housing specifically found that Mitchell was guilty of repeated, egregious acts of sexual harassment against a co-worker and yet imposed no discipline tuhatsoever on the offending employee, this court found that the award contravened public policy.7 Philadelphia Housing.
The situation in the present case stands in stark contrast to that in Philadelphia Housing. Here, the Arbitrator found that Grievant’s use of the Fentanyl patch on March 18, 2002, was a single, irresponsible act in a lengthy and otherwise flawless career and, therefore, did not qualify as just cause for her termination. However, the Arbitrator did not award a “make whole” remedy. Instead, the Arbitrator effectively upheld an eighteen-month suspension without pay, which the Arbitrator determined was discipline commensurate with Grievant’s isolated act of drug use at work. In addition, the Arbitrator imposed conditions on Grievant’s reinstatement that would serve to ensure that she would be drug-free in the future.
All this seems lost on the majority, which, in its conclusion, adopts the position of the Intermediate Unit that
to reinstate an employee who attended work while under the influence, while charged with the duty to oversee young children, with the hope that she will overcome her addiction, defies logic and violates public policy.... Simply put, an elementary classroom is no place for a recovering addict. It demonstrates a tolerance, rather than intolerance for illicit drug use, and is in direct contravention of public policy.
(Majority op. at 1211-12.)
The majority ignores that an addict is always recovering, never cured. Thus, with this decision, the majority precludes the possibility of a grievance arbitration award imposing any discipline short of termination for such an employee and also prevents that terminated employee (or any recovering addict) from securing future *1216employment in the educational field. As important as it is to eliminate drug use from schools, I cannot agree with the creation of such precedent.
A court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate “some explicit public policy” that is “well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.’ ” W.R. Grace and Company v. Local Union 759, International Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66, 65 S.Ct. 442, 89 L.Ed. 744 (1945)). The federal public policy exception does not go to the correctness of the underlying merits but only to the legality of the remedy. “[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987).
Grievant’s conduct on March 18, 2002, clearly violated the fundamental public policy against allowing a person in possession of, or under the influence of, drugs to supervise the care and custody of school children, and the majority obviously believes that such conduct disqualifies Griev-ant from holding a teaching position. However, as the majority correctly states, “the question is not whether Grievant’s use of the Fentanyl patch while on duty as a school assistant violated public policy. The question is, rather, whether the reinstatement of Grievant with conditions violated public policy.” (Majority op. at 1210.) Unlike the majority, I agree with the trial court that the Arbitrator’s award does not violate the stated policy. To the contrary, not only has the Arbitrator imposed significant discipline on Grievant for the offending conduct, but, through the numerous conditions of reinstatement, the Arbitrator has created safeguards that reinforce this important public policy. Accordingly, I would affirm.

. Criminal charges were filed against Griev-ant for possession of a controlled substance, and Grievant subsequently executed and submitted a Petition for Probation Without Verdict, in which she pled guilty to the charge. Probation Without Verdict is a probationary program for first offenders accused of nonviolent possessory offenses. No verdict is entered against the defendant at the time, and the case is deferred. If the defendant successfully fulfills the terms and conditions of probation, the court dismisses the charges against him or her. However, if the defendant violates any terms or conditions of probation, the court may proceed as in any criminal case or may continue the probation. By order dated October 18, 2002, Grievant was placed on one-year probation. (Arbitrator's decision at 4-5, R.R. at 41a-42a.)

. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 11-1122(a). Appendix C, section 9(b) of the CBA provides, in relevant part, that the employer shall not discharge an employee without just cause, which includes any causes included for professional employees in section 1122 of the Code. (R.R. at 33a.)

. Because it was inappropriate for the Arbitrator to consider Grievant’s past medical history, consideration of that same information certainly is beyond this court's appellate scope of review.

. I note that Grievant was relieved of her duties in March 2002, that the Arbitrator's award was issued on June 30, 2003, and that reinstatement was to begin "effective the first work day for the bargaining unit in the 2003/04 school year." (R.R. at 44a.) Generally, school begins early in September; thus, the award did not provide Grievant with "immediate reinstatement to the classroom.” (Majority op. at 1211-12.) In fact, at the time Grievant was scheduled for reinstatement, she nearly would have completed the one-year probation period (from October 18, 2002, through October 18, 2003) imposed by court order, one of the conditions of her reinstatement.

. We initially reversed based on a “core function” analysis; however, our supreme court vacated that order and remanded with instructions that we reconsider PHA’s petition in light of Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Association, PSEA/NEA, 595 Pa. 648, 939 A.2d 855 (2007). In that case, our supreme court articulated new principles governing the “essence test” standard of review of grievance arbitration awards under the Public Employe Relations Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 ' P.S. §§ 1101.101 — 1101.2301, by replacing the "core function” exception to the essence test with the public policy exception to the essence test applied in federal courts. On remand, we again reversed, holding that the arbitrator's award violated public policy.

. Among the various cases discussed, the following seems particularly relevant here.
In Communication Workers of America v. Southeastern Electric Cooperative of Durant, Oklahoma, 882 F.2d 467 (10th Cir.1989), the employer discharged an employee after a customer reported that he had sexually harassed her. In modifying the discipline imposed, the arbitrator recognized this as a one-time offense and noted the employee’s otherwise unblemished record and his penitent and apologetic attitude. The arbitrator concluded that the single offense, albeit serious, should not lead to discharge and that a one-month suspension without pay was commensurate with the improper conduct. The Tenth Circuit upheld the award, expressly noting that the arbitrator imposed corrective discipline and had fully incorporated the important public policy against sexual harassment into his reasoning.
Philadelphia Housing, 956 A.2d at 485-86. (Footnotes omitted.)

. Indeed, in Philadelphia Housing, we implied that if the arbitrator had imposed any reasonable discipline on Mitchell, we would have reached a different result. As we stated, "In cases where, as here, the arbitrator found that the discharged employee committed the sexual harassment for which he was terminated, any decision to reinstate the offending employee has always included imposition of some discipline designed to deter future offending conduct. However, in this case, the Arbitrator's award simply removed the discharge imposed by PHA without substituting a lesser penalty in its place.” Philadelphia Housing, 956 A.2d at 487 n. 19.