Court Opinion

ID: 9391541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 16:09:13.955446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.107318
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 GREGORY S. BURKE                         :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1320 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 22, 2022,
           in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0325182-1986.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                             FILED MAY 2, 2023

      Gregory S. Burke appeals pro se from the order denying his eighth

untimely-filed petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

      This Court previously summarized the pertinent facts and protracted

procedural history as follows:

      On August 13, 1980, Burke and two accomplices shot and killed
      the owner of a grocery store located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
      The homicide remained unsolved until October 1985, when the
      police were informed that Burke and his accomplices were the
      perpetrators of the incident. Burke subsequently entered into a
      negotiated guilty plea to second-degree murder, conspiracy,
      robbery, and possessing an instrument of crime. In 1987, the trial
      court sentenced him to life in prison. Burke filed a pro se PCRA
      Petition, after which his direct appeal rights were reinstated nunc
      pro tunc. Burke subsequently appealed, nunc pro tunc, and on
      September 3, 1992, this Court affirmed Burke’s judgment of
      sentence, but remanded to the trial court for resentencing. See
      Commonwealth v. Burke, 619 A.2d 786 (Pa. Super. 1992)
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      (unpublished memorandum).           On August 3, 1993, the
      Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Burke’s Petition for allowance
      of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Burke, 631 A.2d 1003 (Pa.
      1993). Thereafter, the trial court re-sentenced Burke to life in
      prison, and a concurrent term of five to ten years in prison for his
      conviction of conspiracy.

            Burke filed several unsuccessful PCRA Petitions over the
      next several decades.

Commonwealth v. Burke, 256 A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. 2021), non-precedential

decision at 1-2 (footnote omitted).

      On May 1, 2019, Burke filed his seventh pro se PCRA petition, as well

as four supplemental petitions. On July 2, 2020, the PCRA court issued a

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing

because it was untimely filed.     Burke filed a response.      By order entered

August 31, 2020, the PCRA court dismissed Burke’s seventh petition.

      Burke appealed. On May 7, 2021, we affirmed the order denying post-

conviction relief. Burke, supra. In doing so, we noted that although Burke

purported to invoke “the newly-discovered facts exception” he provided “no

argument or analysis as to how that exception applies, or how he established

that exception before the PCRA court.” Id. at 4.

      While his prior appeal was pending, Burke filed the pro se PCRA petition

at   issue,   his   eighth.   On    September     21,   2021,    Burke   filed   a

supplemental/amended petition.        Thereafter, the PCRA court issued a Rule

907 notice and Burke filed a response. By order entered April 22, 2022, the

PCRA court dismissed Burke’s eighth petition as untimely filed. This appeal

followed. The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925 compliance.

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      Burke challenges the denial of his most recent attempt to obtain post-

conviction relief. Using the applicable standard of review, we must determine

whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and is free of

legal error. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 749-50 (Pa. 2014)

(citations omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions. Id.

      Initially, we note that Burke’s pro se brief consists of a patchwork of

apparent prior filings—some pages are hand-printed while others are typed.

Within this sixty-page filing, Burke raises many claims of due process

violations and presents repetitive assertions regarding the timeliness of his

petition. Although Burke presents six substantive issues for review, we must

first determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that his eighth

petition was untimely filed, and that Burke failed to establish an exception to

the time bar.

      The   timeliness   of   a   post-conviction       petition   is   jurisdictional.

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment

becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an

exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

      The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

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right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time

on appeal.        Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of date the

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

      Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority    to    address   the   substantive   claims.”   Commonwealth      v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

      Before denying his seventh PCRA petition, this Court concluded that

“Burke’s judgment of sentence became final on November 1, 1993, when the

time to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme

Court expired.”      Burke, non-precedential decision at 3 (citations omitted).

Because Burke filed his eighth petition almost three decades later, it is

patently untimely unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving

that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

      After review, we concur with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Burke

failed to plead and prove a time-bar exception. In his eighth petition, Burke

asserted that he could establish the governmental interference exception

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based upon violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), as well as

the   newly-discovered    fact   exception,   based   on   the   fact   that   the

Commonwealth intentionally withheld the following: 1) his medical records

that would have supported his claim of diminished capacity, 2) the arrest

record and a deal the Commonwealth made with a “star witness” who testified

at his preliminary hearing; and 3) alleged plea deals that were made with his

accomplices.    In addition, Burke raises as a newly-discovered fact our

Supreme Court’s decision in        Small      which eliminated the previously

recognized public record presumption in post-conviction proceedings.

      In addressing these claims, the PCRA court concluded that Burke failed

to prove any exception to the PCRA’s time bar:

             Rather than presenting any evidence to satisfy the
         timeliness requirements, [Burke] proceeded to discuss his
         substantive claims. Therefore, he has failed to demonstrate
         that his claims were submitted within one year of the date
         he allegedly discovered the facts underlying these claims.
         See [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)]. This kind of presentation
         fell woefully short of [Burke’s] obligation to explain how one
         of the three statutory exceptions applied.                See,
         Commonwealth v Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 589 ([Pa.] 2000),
         overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v.
         Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020).

            As [Burke] failed to plead and prove one of the
         exceptions to the PCRA time-bar, this [c]ourt is without
         jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claims, or offer any
         form of relief.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/22/22, at 1-2.

      Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion. Initially,

Burke’s attempt to correct the deficiencies in his PCRA petition by presenting

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additional argument and information in his appellate brief fails.      Burton,

supra; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), supra.

      Nonetheless, we note that a review of the protracted post-conviction

proceedings in this case refute Burke’s attempt to establish either time-bar

exception. We briefly address each exception below.

      First, Burke contends that the Commonwealth committed a number of

Brady violations.     Although a Brady violation might fall within the

governmental interference exception to the PCRA’s time bar, the statute

nevertheless requires a petitioner to plead and prove: (1) the failure to

previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government

officials, and (2) the information on which he relies could not have been

obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.      Commonwealth v.

Williams, 105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. Super. 2014).

      A review of the claims Burke raised in his previous petitions reveals that

Burke raised the claim regarding his medical records in his third PCRA petition

filed in 2010 and raised his concerns regarding the testimony of the

Commonwealth’s star witness as early as his fourth PCRA petition in 2012.

Although the claims regarding alleged deals that his accomplices made with

the Commonwealth appear to be raised for the first time, we note that Burke’s

self-serving allegations are the only evidence that any such agreement or deal

existed. See Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1194 (Pa. 2014)

(explaining a purported Brady claim failed when there was no credible

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evidence to establish that the Commonwealth promised a witness parole in

exchange for his testimony).

      To the extent that Burke claims that these same allegations constitute

newly-discovered facts, we note that this assertion fails for the same reasons.

To satisfy this exception, a PCRA petitioner must allege and offer to prove that

the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not previously known to the

petitioner and could not have ascertained earlier with the exercise of due

diligence. Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017). Here,

Burke knew of the facts regarding his medical records and the star witness

arrest records years before filing his eighth PCRA petition.      Although his

allegation of deals the Commonwealth made with the accomplices is new to

his claim for post-conviction relief, it is not supported by any credible

evidence.

      Finally, we note that the Small decision cannot constitute a newly

discovered fact. See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 763 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (explaining that judicial decisions are not newly-discovered facts

for purposes of the PCRA’s time bar exception).      Moreover, in Small, our

Supreme Court made clear that there is no longer a “public record exception”

pursuant to which a court may find that information available to the public is

not a fact that was previously “unknown” to the PCRA petitioner.

Nevertheless, the high court clarified that “[t]he textual requirements of the

time-bar exception remain.” Small, 238 A.2d at 1286. Thus, despite the

elimination of the public record presumption, the PCRA petitioner must still

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establish due diligence. Here, Small is of no benefit to Burke, as he already

knew about his medical records and his concerns regarding the star witness’

testimony. His claim regarding deals the Commonwealth allegedly made with

his accomplices is no more than speculation.

      In sum, the PCRA court correctly determined that Burke’s eighth PCRA

petition was untimely filed, and he did not plead or prove an exception to the

PCRA’s time bar. As such, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of his six

substantive issues. Derrickson, supra. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s

order denying Burke post-conviction relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/2/2023

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