Court Opinion

ID: 9471832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:42:05.019615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:35.876308
License: Public Domain

JOHN W. PECK, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur with Judge Edwards that the suppression order be vacated and this cause be remanded to the district court for reopening the suppression hearing to take further testimony. In reaching that conclusion, however, I follow a line of reasoning diverging from that followed by Judge Edwards.
*399The warrants at issue in this ease are federal in nature and must comply with the provisions of Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 as well as with constitutional requirements. United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1355 (10th Cir.1982). See United States v. Shorter, 600 F.2d 585 (6th Cir.1979). The defendants argue that there is no justification for reopening the suppression hearing because under Rule 41(c)(1),1 the magistrate was permitted to consider only those matters contained in the affidavit in determining whether there was probable cause for issuance of the warrants. The issue, accordingly, is whether in light of Rule 41(c)(1), there existed a compelling reason for reopening the suppression hearing to take testimony concerning the extent of the magistrate’s knowledge of the identity of the preparer of the affidavit. I believe there was a compelling reason to reopen the hearing.
The rule is firmly established that a warrant must stand or fall solely on the contents of an affidavit if that is the only matter presented to the issuing magistrate. United States v. Hatcher, 473 F.2d 321, 323-24 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Sherwin, 572 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 909, 98 S.Ct. 3101, 57 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1978). This rule, however, does not limit a district court’s consideration of evidence during a suppression hearing to the four corners of the affidavit. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the Supreme Court held that upon a substantial preliminary showing by a defendant that a false statement, necessary to a finding of probable cause, was included by the affiant in a written affidavit in support of an application for a warrant, either knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, the defendant was entitled to receive an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676-77. In addition to protecting the rights of the defendant, the hearing serves to prevent the perpetration of a fraud upon, and the making a mockery of, the judicial process. United States v. Barone, 584 F.2d 118, 126-27 (6th Cir.1978) (Keith, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115, 99 S.Ct. 1019, 59 L.Ed.2d 73 (1979). The hearing also permits the district court to determine whether in the circumstances of the ease “a procedural error in [the] preparation of the warrant .. . [may] be harmless within the meaning of Fed.R. Crim.P. 52(a).” Shorter, supra, 600 F.2d at 587. These purposes can be effected only if the district court is presented with a fully developed record that is not limited necessarily to the bounds of the affidavit.
In this case, evidence of the issuing magistrate’s knowledge of the identity of the preparer of the affidavit would further the purposes of the suppression hearing. In addition to assisting in the determination of whether the affiant either knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for *400the truth, drew a false affidavit, the evidence would enable the district court to determine whether the FBI agents had perpetrated a fraud upon the judicial process. Finally, the testimony proffered by the government would better enable the district court to determine whether the fact that the affidavit was signed by FBI agent Hamilton even though it contained the averments of FBI agent Owens was harmless error. See United States v. Mendoza, 491 F.2d 534, 538-39 (5th Cir.1974) (affidavit containing averments of one agent but signed by another was not invalid, even though technically in error, because not result of intentional misrepresentation).
In concluding that a remand is proper in this case, I do not mean to suggest that the findings of the district court were clearly erroneous. As Judge Edwards states, the question of whether the factual determinations that the district court may make on remand will be erroneous will properly be considered “when all the facts are on the record.” Nevertheless, to the extent that the district court made its factual determinations solely on the basis of the affidavit,2 it in my view erred in limiting the scope of its review.

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(1) provides:
(c) Issuance and Contents.
(1) Warrant Upon Affidavit. — A warrant other than a warrant upon oral testimony under paragraph (2) of this subdivision shall issue only on an affidavit or affidavits sworn to before the federal magistrate or state judge and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the federal magistrate or state judge is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the property or person to be seized and naming or describing the person or place to be searched. The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part. Before ruling on a request for a warrant the federal magistrate or state judge may require the affiant to appear personally and may examine under oath the affiant and any witnesses he may produce, provided that such proceeding shall be taken down by a court reporter or recording equipment and made part of the affidavit. The warrant shall be directed to a civil officer of the United States authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law thereof or to a person so authorized by the President of the United States. It shall command the officer to search, within a specified period of time not to exceed 10 days, the person or place named for the property or person specified. The warrant shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime. It shall designate a federal magistrate to whom it shall be returned.

. The district court stated in its opinion:
A copy of the affidavit in question is attached to this opinion. The affidavit on its face was misleading and defective. It contained the statement of Agent Owens in narrative fashion as though Owens had been present at the scene of the crime. A reading of the affidavit and record shows that there is no way that the magistrate could have known that these facts were related by Owens to Hamilton. The magistrate would have had to infer unless specifically advised that Hamilton had been made aware of these facts by the allged [sic] victims, Wright and Talley. Although the magistrate may have had something brought to his attention in addition to the affidavit the Court is not aware of any record taken of additional information. Therefore the Court is limited to review of the affidavit in determining the validity of the search warrant, that being the only information upon which the magistrate must have issued the warrant.
(Emphasis added). Although the magistrate could consider only the affidavit in determining whether probable cause existed for the issuance of a warrant, the district court is not so limited in determining other issues such as the affiant’s mental state in including the false statement in the affidavit.