Court Opinion

ID: 9911087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 16:00:26.710141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:50.926376
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     EVELINE J. EMMENEGGER,                          DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-0432-21-0258-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                 DATE: December 18, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Peter T. Jenkins and Kevin Bell , Silver Spring, Maryland, for the appellant.

           Jeff Ruch and Paula Dinerstein, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Emily Bright Hays , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

           Kevin Mack , Sacramento, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross
     petition for review of the initial decision, which found that the appellant proved
     her affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation, that the agency failed to
     prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel
     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     actions even in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosures, and that it
     effectively restored her to status quo ante. Generally, we grant petitions such as
     these only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party
     has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross
     petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross
     petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to address the alternative to
     the knowledge/timing test set forth in Dorney and to address the analysis of the
     Carr factors, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant is a GS-12 Research Microbiologist in the Western Fisheries
     Research Center of the agency’s U.S. Geological Survey in Seattle, Washington.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 7, 10.      As a Research Microbiologist, the
     appellant was responsible for developing research projects to improve the
     detection and diagnosis of fish pathogens, understand the biology of fish
     pathogens; develop concepts and methodologies that control pathogens to reduce
     losses in fish populations due to disease, and determining the critical factors
     involved with fish immune system as it relates to host-pathogen interactions.
     IAF, Tab 35 at 5. According to the agency, the appellant’s position is considered
     a Research Grade Evaluation (RGE) Scientist position.             Id. at 103, 123.
                                                                                                  3

     On October 16, 2019, the agency placed the appellant on a Notice of
     Unacceptable      Performance     and   Opportunity          to    Demonstrate     Acceptable
     Performance (NODAP), which served as a performance improvement plan (PIP),
     based     on   unsatisfactory   performance         in    critical    element    (4)   Science
     Communicated. Id. at 147, 178-82. The NODAP was in place from October 16
     until November 20, 2019. Id. On January 29, 2020, her first-level supervisor
     notified the appellant that she had failed to demonstrate acceptable performance
     during the NODAP period and proposed her removal. IAF, Tab 36 at 350-56.
     After    the   appellant   responded,    id.   at        363-91,     394-402,   the    deciding
     official removed the appellant from her position effective March 5, 2021, IAF,
     Tab 41 at 92-104.
¶3           On March 22, 2021, the appellant filed the instant Board appeal challenging
     her removal and requesting a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. The appellant alleged that her
     removal was the result of whistleblower retaliation. Id. at 7, 15. Subsequently,
     by letter dated April 9, 2021, the agency rescinded her removal and reinstated her
     to the Research Microbiologist or RGE Scientist position effective May 9, 2021. 2
     IAF, Tab 6 at 10. Thereafter, the administrative judge determined that a hearing
     was necessary to address whether the agency returned the appellant to status quo
     ante and her whistleblower retaliation affirmative defense. 3 IAF, Tab 22 at 1.
     Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision finding
     that the appellant proved her affirmative defense. IAF, Tab 112, Initial Decision
     (ID) at 2, 68, 72. He found that she proved disclosures (3), (10), (12), and (15)
     were protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and disclosure (9) was
     protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). ID at 17, 29, 38, 42, 50. He also
     2
       The agency rescinded the appellant’s removal after receiving an initial decision that
     found the Office of Personnel Management had not approved its performance appraisal
     system. IAF, Tab 112, Initial Decision (ID) at 58-59; See Laminack v. Department of
     the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-0432-20-0177-I-1, Initial Decision at 1, 12-15
     (Mar. 10, 2021).
     3
       The administrative judge identified, and the parties did not dispute, that the appellant
     asserted that she made 17 disclosures. ID at 9 n.5; IAF, Tab 73.
                                                                                              4

     found that she proved contributing factor and the agency failed to prove by clear
     and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action absent the
     protected disclosure or activity. ID at 61-68. However, the administrative judge
     concluded that the agency provided her with status quo ante relief. ID at 69-72.
     Therefore, he did not award the appellant interim relief or back pay. ID at 72.
¶4         The agency has filed a petition for review, largely arguing that the
     administrative judge erred in finding that it failed to prove by clear and
     convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel action absent the
     protected disclosure or activity. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 11-23.
     The appellant has filed a cross petition for review, arguing in part that the
     administrative judge erred in finding that some of her disclosures were not
     protected. PFR File, Tab 3 at 20-28. The appellant has also responded to the
     agency’s petition for review. Id. at 7-20. The agency has filed a response to the
     appellant’s cross petition for review and a reply to the appellant’s response to its
     petition for review. PFR File, Tabs 5-6. 4

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

     The agency’s petition for review presents no basis for disturbing the
     administrative judge’s finding of reprisal for whistleblowing.
¶5         The agency has shown no error in the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1.
     When whistleblower retaliation claims are made in the context of an otherwise
     appealable action, as here, the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence
     that she made a protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity and that the
     4
       The appellant has also filed a motion for leave to file a reply to the agency’s response
     to her cross petition for review. PFR File, Tab 8. The Office of the Clerk of the Board
     acknowledged the appellant’s motion but explained that the Board’s regulations do not
     provide for pleadings other than a petition for review, a cross petition for review, a
     response to the petition for review or cross petition for review, and a reply to a response
     to a petition for review. PFR File, Tab 9 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5)). It
     informed the appellant that the Board would decide to grant or deny her request. Id.
     at 1. We have reviewed the appellant’s motion for leave to file a reply to the agency’s
     response but are not persuaded by her argument regarding the need for the additional
     submission. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5). Accordingly, the appellant’s motion is denied.
                                                                                         5

     disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action at issue.
     Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 49.                If the
     appellant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the agency to prove by clear
     and convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel action absent the
     protected disclosure or activity.    Id. If the agency fails to meet its clear and
     convincing evidentiary burden, the Board shall grant the appellant corrective
     action. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2).
¶6        The administrative judge found that the appellant presented a prima facie
     case of whistleblower reprisal. ID at 61-62. In particular, he first found that the
     appellant made protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and engaged in
     activity protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). Id. The administrative judge
     next found that the appellant satisfied the contributing factor criterion through the
     knowledge/timing test because the proposing official knew of protected
     disclosures (3) and (10), and both the NODAP and proposed removal occurred
     within 2 years of those protected disclosures.     Id.; Mastrullo v. Department of
     Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶¶ 18, 21 (2015) (stating that the contributing factor
     element can be shown if the personnel action occurred within 1 to 2 years after
     the protected disclosure). On review, the parties do not dispute that the appellant
     made protected disclosures (3) and (10) under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or that such
     disclosures were a contributing factor in her removal, and we discern no basis to
     disturb these findings. PFR File, Tab 1.
¶7        Although not raised by the parties on review, the administrative judge
     concluded that the appellant failed to meet the knowledge/timing test with respect
     to protected disclosure (12) and protected activity (9). ID at 61-62. He reasoned
     that there was no indication that the officials taking the action were aware of the
     protected disclosure and activity, therefore the appellant failed to establish that
     they were a contributing factor in her removal.               Id.     However, the
     knowledge/timing test is not the only way an appellant can establish contributing
     factor. Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012). The
                                                                                        6

     Board has held that, if an administrative judge determines that an appellant has
     failed to satisfy the knowledge/timing test, he shall consider other evidence, such
     as evidence pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for
     taking the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was personally directed
     at the proposing or deciding officials, and whether they had a desire or motive to
     retaliate against the appellant. Id., ¶ 15. Any weight given to a whistleblowing
     disclosure, either alone or in combination with other factors, can satisfy the
     contributing factor standard.     Id.   Because the administrative judge did not
     address whether the appellant proved contributing factor using the types of
     evidence set forth in Dorney, we modify the initial decision to do so.
¶8        Regarding the strength of the agency’s reasons for removing the appellant,
     as further explained below, we find its reasons to be weak. Regarding whether
     the protected disclosures and activity was directed at the officials involved in the
     removal action, the proposing official was named in the appellant’s Scientific
     Integrity Complaint which is the subject of protected activity (9). ID at 27-28.
     Regarding whether those responsible for the removal had a desire or motive to
     retaliate against the appellant, the findings in the Scientific Integrity Complaint
     identified issues that implicate the proposing official’s managerial and
     supervisory capabilities.     IAF, Tab 42 at 22-26.      As such, the appellant’s
     protected activity is sufficient to establish substantial retaliatory motive.   See
     Chavez v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 33 (2013).
     However, protected disclosure (12) does not appear to be directed at any
     individual and the record lacks evidence of a motive to retaliate based on this
     disclosure.    ID at 40-42.     Thus, we find the appellant established that her
     protected activity was a contributing factor in her removal.
¶9        To the extent that the administrative judge did not address the Dorney
     factors, he erred. However, because he properly found the appellant otherwise
     established contributing factor in the agency’s action, any such error was
     harmless.     See Panter v. Department of the Air Force , 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282
                                                                                         7

      (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s
      substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).

      The agency failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      removed the appellant absent her protected disclosures.
¶10        Because the administrative judge found that the appellant established a
      prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal, the burden shifted to the agency to
      establish by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same
      action in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosures.              Pridgen,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 49. Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of
      proof that produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the
      allegations sought to be established; it is a higher standard than the
      “preponderance of the evidence” standard.         Sutton v. Department of Justice,
      94 M.S.P.R. 4, ¶ 18 (2003), aff’d, 97 F. App’x 322 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 5 C.F.R.
      § 1209.4(e).
¶11        In determining whether an agency has shown by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the
      protected activity, the Board will consider all of the relevant factors, including
      the following factors (“Carr factors”): (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence
      in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate
      on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any
      evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who did not
      engage in such protected activity, but who are otherwise similarly situated. Soto
      v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11; see also Carr v. Social
      Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board does
      not view the Carr factors as discrete elements, each of which the agency must
      prove by clear and convincing evidence, but rather weighs these factors together
      to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole.           Soto,
      2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 13.        The Board must consider all the evidence, including
      evidence that detracts from the conclusion that the agency met its burden.
                                                                                               8

      Id., ¶ 11; see also Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed.
      Cir. 2012).
¶12         The administrative judge analyzed these factors and concluded that the
      agency did not have strong evidence that it found “the appellant’s performance so
      deficient that it warranted removal.”         ID at 62-68.      On review, the agency
      challenges this finding and argues that the administrative judge made erroneous
      findings of material fact and improperly weighed the evidence in his
      decision, particularly as it pertains to his analysis of the first Carr factor.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-23. We are not persuaded.
¶13         In the initial decision, the administrative judge placed the most weight on
      the first Carr factor which he found weighed in the appellant’s favor. 5 ID at 65.
      He concluded that the agency did not prove all of the elements of its
      performance-based removal under chapter 43. ID at 62-64; Lee v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 15. Specifically, he found that the agency did
      not prove that the appellant’s performance remained unacceptable after
      an adequate improvement period. ID at 64-65; Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 15. In so
      finding, he reasoned that under the higher clear and convincing standard, there is
      evidence that the appellant’s manuscript submitted during the NODAP was
      acceptable and published with revisions consistent with the usual journal
      publication process following her return to work. ID at 64-65.
¶14         The Board has held that an agency need not establish the strength of its
      reasons under Carr factor 1 by any particular quantum of evidence, nor must it
      prove the elements of its charges by clear and convincing evidence.                  Soto,
      2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 13 & n.4. Therefore, the administrative judge erred to the extent
      he required the agency to prove the elements of its chapter 43 removal by clear
      and convincing evidence. ID at 64-65. For the reasons set forth below, however,
      we find that any such error was not prejudicial.

      5
        Although the agency rescinded the removal, the administrative judge considered the
      strength of its reasons for taking the action in his evaluation of Carr factor 1. ID at 62.
                                                                                           9

¶15        The agency asserts that it had strong evidence in support of its conclusion
      that the appellant’s performance was unacceptable because the appellant’s
      NODAP manuscript was published only after it went through significant edits and
      added a co-author. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-23. While the appellant admittedly
      made revisions to her manuscript before its publication, Hearing Transcript (HT),
      Day 4 at 29-30, 228, 248, 252, the agency appears to mischaracterize the record
      evidence to support its argument that her manuscript was deficient, PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 13. For example, the agency asserts that when the appellant returned to
      work, she edited the NODAP manuscript before submitting it to her new
      supervisor who still considered it to be in draft format. Id. at 13. The agency
      characterizes his testimony as though he stated her manuscript was not ready to
      be sent for publication. However, her supervisor testified that while he thought
      “there was probably a more elegant way to look at the data,” he thought it was
      fine to send to a journal. HT, Day 3 at 104-05.
¶16        The agency also points to the appellant’s testimony and asserts that “[she]
      explained that the journal sent her ‘moderate to major revisions,’” after which
      she enlisted a co-author who, according to the agency, “contributed to the
      necessary statistical revisions that she was unable or unwilling to complete.”
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-14. It also asserts that “[the manuscript] still contained
      significant statistical deficiencies and no co-author when [the] [a]ppellant first
      submitted it to the [j]ournal.” 6 Id. at 14. Nonetheless, during her testimony, the
      appellant explained that she made minor edits before submitting it to the journal
      and in turn the journal sent her moderate revisions in the first round. HT, Day 4
      at 27-30, 225-32, 248, 252.      She also explained she solicited a co-author to
      complete a supplemental analysis using a different methodology to confirm her
      statistical analysis was correct. 7 Id. at 228-33. The record lacks evidence to
      6
        The record lacks evidence that the journal considered the appellant’s statistical
      analysis to be “significantly deficient” as the agency suggests. IAF, Tab 83 at 57-59.
      7
        The agency appears to assert that the appellant admitted that her former supervisor
      advised her to enlist a co-author to conduct such an analysis. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14;
                                                                                             10

      support that the co-author made any statistical revisions as the agency appears to
      claim. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-14.
¶17         The agency further argued that the administrative judge erred in “plac[ing]
      enormous weight on [an] out-of-court, unsworn statement.” 8            PFR File, Tab 1
      at 15-16. To support its removal action, the agency heavily relied on deficiencies
      identified in the appellant’s NODAP manuscript by the proposing official and an
      external reviewer. 9 IAF, Tab 35 at 311-14, Tab 36 at 60-74, Tab 41 at 92-103.
      However, as the administrative judge acknowledged, there is evidence in the
      record that the appellant’s manuscript was acceptable.             ID at 64-65.      This
      evidence is not limited to the internal review that the administrative judge
      explicitly identified in the initial decision. ID at 65. Particularly of note is the
      external reviewer’s feedback, wherein he states, amongst other things, that “[the]
      paper clearly represents a great deal of careful work and analysis,” and “[w]ith
      some simplification to the figures and discussion the paper is publishable.” IAF,
      Tab 35 at 313-14. This is consistent with the assessment of the internal reviewer
      finding the manuscript “in great shape.” IAF, Tab 35 at 316. Thus, in examining
      the strength of the evidence in support of the agency’s removal action, we find
      the agency’s evidence that the appellant’s performance remained deficient after
      the NODAP period to be weak. Accordingly, we agree with the administrative
      judge that this factor favors the appellant.
¶18         We next consider the second Carr factor, the strength of any motive to
      retaliate on the part of any agency officials who were involved in the decision in
      question. We have found that “[t]hose responsible for the agency’s performance

      HT, Day 4 at 251. However, the appellant explains that she wanted to compare the
      newer analysis to the older analysis that her former supervisor told her to perform. HT,
      Day 4 at 251.
      8
         The agency characterizes the internal review finding the appellant’s NODAP
      manuscript “in great shape” as the “out-of-court, unsworn statement.” PFR File, Tab 1
      at 15; IAF, Tab 35 at 316-17.
      9
        The deciding official testified that the external review had a substantial impact on his
      removal decision. HT, Day 2 at 184.
                                                                                           11

      overall may well be motivated to retaliate even if they are not directly implicated
      by the disclosures . . . as the criticism reflects on them in their capacities as
      managers and employees.”          Wilson v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      2022 MSPB 7, ¶ 65 (quoting Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1370); Smith v. Department
      of the Army, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶¶ 28-29 (same).                  The administrative judge
      determined that this factor weighed in favor of the agency, reasoning, amongst
      other things, that its action to respond to the appellant’s protected disclosures did
      not indicate a motive to retaliate and that the investigation into one of the
      appellant’s complaints did not find specific misconduct by the officials involved
      in her removal. ID at 65-67.
¶19        Though not disputed by the parties on review, we find the administrative
      judge took an overly restrictive view of the second Carr factor. In particular,
      he did not address whether the appellant’s disclosure reflected on the responsible
      officials in their capacities as managers and employees, which is sufficient to
      establish a substantial retaliatory motive even when the disclosure does not
      directly implicate or harm them. See Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 33. However,
      because we agree with the administrative judge’s ultimate disposition of this
      appeal, we further find that, to the extent he erred in addressing the institutional
      motive to retaliate, any such error did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive
      rights. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).
¶20        Turning to the third Carr factor—whether the agency takes similar actions
      against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly
      situated—the administrative judge found that the agency presented evidence that
      it placed similarly situated non-whistleblowers on a NODAP. ID at 67-68. Thus,
      he concluded this factor weighed in favor of the agency.           Id.   However, the
      agency   presented   no   evidence    that   it   removed    any   similarly    situated
      non-whistleblowers from Federal service.
¶21        The absence of evidence on Carr factor 3 can either be neutral or “cut[]
      slightly against the Government,” depending on the circumstances .             Miller v.
                                                                                       12

      Department of Justice, 842 F.3d 1252, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Whitmore v.
      Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The agency “is
      required to come forward with all reasonably pertinent evidence” regarding this
      factor because it has greater access to such information.      Whitmore, 680 F.3d
      at 1374-75. The agency does not have an affirmative burden to produce evidence
      concerning each and every Carr factor, including Carr factor 3, but the absence
      of any evidence relating to Carr factor 3 can effectively remove that factor from
      the analysis, and may well cause the agency to fail to prove its case overall. Id.
      Thus, given the lack of evidence that similarly situated non -whistleblowers were
      removed, we modify this initial decision to find that Carr factor 3 does not weigh
      in favor of the agency. Nonetheless, considering all of the Carr factors, we agree
      with the administrative judge that the agency failed to meet its burden of proving
      by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel
      action absent the appellant’s protected disclosures. ID at 68; Soto, 2022 MSPB 6,
      ¶ 11; see also Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1368.          We therefore agree with the
      administrative judge that the appellant proved her affirmative defense of
      whistleblower retaliation. ID at 68.

      The agency’s remaining argument provides no basis to disturb the initial decision.
¶22        On review, the agency also argues that the administrative judge
      inadequately analyzed and improperly weighed relevant evidence and testimony.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-20. Specifically, it argues that the administrative judge
      “completely failed to even acknowledge, let alone consider” the deciding
      official’s removal analysis or his testimony. Id. The agency also challenges the
      administrative judge’s credibility findings as it relates to its witnesses and the
      appellant. Id. at 20-23. In particular, the agency claims that the administrative
      judge found its witnesses credible, while finding against the credibility of the
      appellant, but “gave unfettered credence” to the appellant in concluding that Carr
      factor 1 weighed in her favor. Id. at 22-23. However, the record is devoid of
      evidence that the administrative judge found that the appellant lacked credibility.
                                                                                      13

¶23        Having considered the agency’s arguments on review, which largely
      constitute mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s findings, we discern
      no reason to reweigh the evidence or substitute our assessment of the record
      evidence for that of the administrative judge. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service,
      74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative
      judge's findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate
      inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility); Broughton v.
      Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987); see
      also Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
      (holding that the Board may overturn credibility determinations only when it has
      “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so). The administrative judge’s failure to
      discuss in depth all aspects of the deciding official’s analysis and hearing
      testimony does not mean that he did not consider them and is not a basis to
      overturn his well-reasoned findings. See Marques v. Department of Health and
      Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir.
      1985) (Table).

      The appellant’s cross petition for review is denied.
¶24        In her cross petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative
      judge erred in finding that the agency restored her to status quo ante. PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 20-22. Returning an appellant to the status quo ante means placing her
      as nearly as possible in the same situation that she would have been in if the
      action rescinded had never occurred. Fairley v. U.S. Postal Service, 63 M.S.P.R.
      10, 12 (1994). Status quo ante relief includes cancelling the action; reinstating
      the appellant to her former position or other substantially equivalent position, as
      appropriate; back pay; interest on back pay; and other employment benefits that
      she would have received had the action not occurred. Samble v. Department of
      Defense, 98 M.S.P.R. 502, ¶ 15 (2005). The administrative judge found, and the
      appellant does not dispute that the agency rescinded her removal, paid her back
      pay with interest, processed a within-grade-increase, processed Thrift Saving Plan
                                                                                      14

      contributions, removed the removal from her personnel file, and returned the
      appellant to the performance standards that were in place prior to her removal.
      ID at 69. Thus, we discern no basis for disturbing this finding.
¶25        Instead, the appellant argues that she has not been restored to status quo
      ante because her duties differ from those that she held before her removal.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 20.    Specifically, she reasserts on review that the agency
      refused to restore her to the committees she previously served on, forbade
      her from resuming her old duties, and required her to raise her own funding.
      Id. at 21-22; IAF, Tab 109 at 16-18.      In finding that the agency effectively
      restored the appellant to her position as an RGE Scientist with the full range of
      duties, the administrative judge concluded that the agency restructured the
      committees the appellant served on before its proposed removal and the old duties
      to which she referred were collateral duties.    Id. at 71.   He also credited the
      testimony of her new supervisor that RGE Scientists are required to obtain
      funding. Id. The appellant’s assertions on review constitute mere disagreement
      with the administrative judge’s findings, which we find no reason to disturb.
      Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06; Broughton, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359.

      The appellant’s remaining arguments on review do not provide a basis for
      reversing the initial decision.
¶26        To the extent that the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s
      findings that disclosures (6), (11), (13), and (14) were not protected, her
      argument is unpersuasive. PFR File, Tab 3 at 23-24. Her primary concern in this
      regard is that she would be able to obtain additional damages if the administrative
      judge did not err in finding these disclosures to be not protected.      Id. at 24.
      However, for the reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree with the
      administrative judge that disclosures (6), (11), (13), and (14) were not protected.
      ID at 38, 43-44, 47-48.
¶27        We also find unpersuasive the appellant’s argument that the administrative
      judge erred in denying all her witnesses who were not also agency witnesses.
                                                                                       15

      PFR File, Tab 3 at 25-27. An administrative judge has wide discretion to control
      the proceedings, including the authority to exclude testimony he believes would
      be irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.          Parker v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 353, ¶ 21 (2015). The appellant has not shown
      the administrative judge abused her discretion in denying her request for certain
      witnesses or in otherwise controlling the hearing-related proceedings.
¶28        An administrative judge also has broad discretion in ruling on discovery
      matters, and absent an abuse of discretion, the Board will not find reversible error
      in such rulings. E.g., Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 16
      (2016). The appellant alleges that “[the administrative judge] denied [her] the
      opportunity to take any discovery in his procedural ruling of February 3, 2022.”
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 27-28. However, the administrative judge did not deny the
      appellant the opportunity to engage in discovery.            Instead, he denied her
      discovery request because she failed to initiate discovery within the specified
      time limit. IAF, Tab 31 at 3-7. Thus, she has not shown that the administrative
      judge abused his considerable discretion in this regard.
¶29        Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and cross petition for review
      and affirm the initial decision as modified by this Order.

                      NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                            YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                           ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
            You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of
      the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
      regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
      you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
      and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
      You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
      the initial decision on your appeal.
                                                                                 16

             NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
         YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST CONSEQUENTIAL AND/OR
                   COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your consequential
damages, including medical costs incurred, travel expenses, and any other
reasonable and foreseeable consequential damages. To be paid, you must meet
the requirements set out at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(g) or 1221(g). The regulations may
be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202 and 1201.204.
      In addition, the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012
authorized the award of compensatory damages including interest, reasonable
expert witness fees, and costs, 5 U.S.C. § 1214(g)(2), which you may be entitled
to receive.
      If you believe you are entitled to these damages, you must file a motion for
consequential damages and/or compensatory damages WITHIN 60 CALENDAR
DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You must file your motion with the
office that issued the initial decision on your appeal.

                           NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
      A copy of the decision will be referred to the Special Counsel “to
investigate and take appropriate action under [5 U.S.C.] section 1215,” based on
the determination that “there is reason to believe that a current employee may
have committed a prohibited personnel practice” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 5 U.S.C. § 1221(f)(3). Please note that
while any Special Counsel investigation related to this decision is pending, “no
disciplinary action shall be taken against any employee for any alleged prohibited
activity under investigation or for any related activity without the approval of the
Special Counsel.” 5 U.S.C. § 1214(f).
                                                                                       17

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 10
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Boards final decision in this matter.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

10
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   18

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                19

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     20

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 11   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

11
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       21

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Jennifer Everling
                                     Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.