Court Opinion

ID: 9694158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:26:28.942285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:56.938010
License: Public Domain

White, C. J.,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds:
(1) That the Veterans’ Administration and Medicare are not entitled to reimbursement for the reasonable value of medical services provided to plaintiff:
(2) That plaintiff is not entitled to an award for a portion of the cost of adding a room to his home to *525enable him to be cared for at home;
(3) That the determination of the Workmen’s Compensation Court that the plaintiff’s cerebral vascular accident, hemiplegia, and respiratory infections were not a result of his brain injury, is not clearly wrong; and
(4) That plaintiff is not entitled to the statutory penalty and attorney’s fees as provided in section 48-125, R. R. S. 1943.
For the following reasons, however, I respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion.
“The findings of fact made by the Workmen’s Compensation Court after rehearing shall have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case.” § 48-185, R. S. Supp., 1976. The findings of fact made by the Workmen’s Compensation Court after rehearing will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly wrong. Boults v. Church, 200 Neb. 319, 263 N. W. 2d 478 (1978); Hyatt v. Kay Windsor, Inc., 198 Neb. 580, 254 N. W. 2d 92 (1977). The compensation court unanimously and specifically determined that plaintiff’s urinary tract infections and bowel difficulties were not the result of his brain injury, but were due to independent and unrelated causes.
Dr. Harold Ladwig examined plaintiff’s medical records and gave his opinion that plaintiff’s subsequent urinary tract infections were not a result of his brain injury. While plaintiff possibly had a minor urinary tract infection shortly after the accident, the serious reoccurring urinary tract infections he has since suffered from did not commence until August 1972. At that time he underwent surgery on his bladder and prostate. In connection with this a catheter was inserted. Several witnesses acknowledged that an indwelling catheter is a potential source of infection. Dr. Baldwin, who treated plaintiff from October 1971, until March 3, 1972, testified that when he last saw plaintiff he was not suffering from or afflicted with a urinary tract infection. *526There is sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the compensation court, and it cannot be said to be clearly wrong.
It is clear and undisputed from the record that plaintiff reached maximum recovery from his brain injury as of March 3, 1972, and that no further medical treatment, medicine, or surgical procedure would improve, remove, or lessen his injury. The primary question in this case is whether plaintiff is entitled, under the workmen’s compensation statutes, as existed on the date of his injury, to an award for non curative custodial care.
With a single stroke of the pen, the majority opinion concludes that a long series of precedents, by this court, are not “controlling or applicable here.” Citing these same decisions, one eminent author in the field of workmen’s compensation law concludes that Nebraska is among those jurisdictions which hold that workmen’s compensation medical benefits do not extend to “palliative measures useful only to prevent pain and discomfort after all hope of cure is gone.” 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 61.14, p. 10-474.
In Paulsen v. Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 1012, 26 N. W. 2d 11 (1947), the plaintiff suffered an injury to his right foot, and sought an award for an operation to decrease the disability to that foot. The record there failed to show there would be a definite improvement to plaintiff’s foot if the operation were performed. Denying plaintiff’s claim, we held: “Where the evidence discloses that further medical, hospital and surgical services would not definitely improve the condition of an injured employee, and where such improvement would be conjectural, the employer’s liability, under section 48-120, R. R. S. 1943, to furnish reasonable medical and hospital services and medicines, as and when needed, ceases.”
In Peek v. Ayres Auto Supply, 155 Neb. 233, 51 N. *527W. 2d 387 (1952), plaintiff, a salesman, suffered various injuries as the result of an automobile accident. Among the injuries suffered was a “brain injury with resulting traumatic encephalitis and post-traumatic neurosis.” Plaintiff sought an award for further medical services in connection with his injury. In denying his claim, we stated: “At the hearing on December 19, 1950, the plaintiff was admittedly improved and no necessity for further surgical or psychiatric treatment was shown. (Paulsen v. Martin-Nebraska Co., 147 Neb. 1012, 26 N. W. 2d 11 (1947) cited). * * * Therefore, in the light of the evidence and such, rules, we conclude that defendant should not be required to furnish plaintiff any future medical and hospital services.” See, also, Wilson v. Brown-McDonald Co., 134 Neb. 211, 278 N. W. 254 (1938); Halbert v. United States F. & G. Co., 185 Neb. 775, 178 N. W. 2d 781 (1970). These cases are directly applicable and should be controlling in this case.
Clearly, plaintiff will need custodial care for the rest of his life. In Newberry v. Youngs, 163 Neb. 397, 80 N. W. 2d 165 (1956), plaintiff broke his eyeglasses in the course of an accident. He developed headaches from not wearing them, purchased a new pair, and claimed payment for the eyeglasses. In denying his claim, we stated: “Need for eyeglasses is not the test. The burden placed upon the employer by section 48-120, R. R. S. 1943, is designed to relieve or cure the physical injuries suffered by the employee.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously, plaintiff is in pitiful condition. We cannot, however, permit our sympathy for plaintiff to force us into strained interpretations of our statutes and case law. As was cautioned in Runyan v. Lockwood Graders, Inc., 176 Neb. 676, 127 N. W. 2d 186 (1964): “The result of the instant case appears to be a harsh one. But this court is bound by the statute as enacted. It has no authority to alleviate *528the apparent harshness of the result by the application of equitable principles. The plain language of the workmen’s compensation law must be followed by this court. The right to and amount of recovery are purely statutory.”
‘‘While the conception underlying workmen’s compensation is one of insurance, an employer is not an insurer of his employee or his safety, and the acts are not designed to afford life, health, old age, or unemployment insurance.” 99 C. J. S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 9, p. 54. ‘‘ * * * the existence and amount of the right to, and corresponding liability for, compensation depend on the provisions of the particular statute.” 99 C. J. S., Workmen’s Compensation, § 6, at p. 51.
The majority opinion concludes that under section 48-120, R. R. S. 1943, plaintiff is entitled to an award for noncurative custodial care. Section 48-120, R. R. S. 1943, holds the employer liable for ‘‘reasonable medical and hospital services and medicines as and when needed and in addition to devices necessary for treatment, the first prosthetic devices.” (Emphasis supplied.) Under no reasonable construction or interpretation of this statute can it be said that the employer is liable for purely custodial care of the injured employee, which will do nothing to improve his injured condition.
In 1965, the Workmen’s Compensation Law was amended by the Legislature to allow the injured employee to recover the cost of a first prosthetic device. Laws 1965, c. 278, § 1, p. 799. The introducer of that act in his Statement of Intent, and later in floor debate explained that: ‘‘This bill expands the definition of medical payments under the Workmen’s Compensation Statutes. Presently, the statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, has meaning that no prosthetic device is covered under medical payments. This means that if a workman is injured on the job in-the scope of employment and *529otherwise covered by Workmen’s Compensation his medical expenses would terminate at the point that he needed a prosthetic device. If he lost a leg or an arm and needed an artificial limb or a glass eye or other similar prosthetic device, the present law does not cover it.” Floor Debate, L. B. 278, p. 393 (1965).
The majority opinion holds that the same statutory language, which had to be amended by the Legislature to allow an injured workman to recover the cost of a prosthetic device, permits recovery for unlimited noncurative custodial care.
The majority opinion overrules Claus v. DeVere, 120 Neb. 812, 235 N. W. 450 (1931), and establishes a right to compensation for nursing care furnished by the wife at home. The rule denying such compensation under our statute has been settled law for 47 years (since 1931). So far as I can discover, it has never been challenged or disturbed by the Legislature. It is now abrupty overruled. It would seem clear that a rule of such established standing, interpreting the statute, should not be reversed except after a full hearing and examination in the legislative forum.
Plaintiff and the concurring opinion of Brodkey, J., cite numerous cases to us from other jurisdictions for the propositions that the long-range “reasonable medical and hospital services” include nursing home care, and that the nursing services of a wife are compensable. I have carefully examined these cases and find them inapplicable. These cases arise in different jurisdictions, under different statutory language, and are the products of different case law. I shall not attempt to distinguish each and every case in this dissent. Two examples, however, will suffice to illustrate the inappropriateness of these cases to the situation before us. In Daugherty v. City of Monett, 238 Mo. App. 924, 192 S. W. 2d 51 (1946), the Missouri workmen’s compensation statute specifically required the employer to furnish *530“medical, surgical and hospital treatment, including nursing.” (Emphasis supplied.) The statute did not require the nursing to be that of a trained professional. Thus, in allowing compensation for the nursing services of a wife, the Missouri court was merely following the directive of its Legislature. Again, in A. G. Crunkelton Electric Co., Inc. v. Barkdoll, 227 Md. 364, 177 A. 2d 252 (1962), that state’s statute specifically held the employer liable for “nurse and hospital services.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Time forbids further discussion.
Every wife now becomes a nurse — and a paid one. The claim here is already for 3,371 hours from August 2, 1975, to February 12, 1976. The plaintiff is elderly, but suppose he were 20 years younger? And the wedding vow “to care for him, in sickness and health” becomes, in .part, an employer’s financial burden.
Where does the majority opinion tell us where the marital obligation ceases and the paid nursing services begin? How does the fact-finder resolve the overlap between household duties and nursing care? For example, what portion of special diet preparation is paid for, et cetera? Is the time spent on a necessary exercise walk with the injured husband compensable? Where are the guidelines?
If there are professional criteria for the determination of such issues, it would seem particularly appropriate for their establishment in the legislative forum.
The question of the burden of proof is not met in the broad brush of the majority opinion. The evidence necessarily must come from and be developed under the protected cloak of the home and domestic privacy. It, perhaps, will be undisputed and invulnerable to attack. The recent experience of the federal government in administering the welfare programs points to caution in the context presented in this case.
*531There are a multitude of free welfare services and disability provisions now available in our society which did not exist at the time of the decision of this court in Claus v. DeVere, supra, or when the compensation statute was enacted. Whether any of this is relevant, I do not know. But I do know that this abrupt and far-reaching policy determination and reversal of settled law should not be made unless full opportunity for consideration and hearing of the competing considerations is had in the legislative forum.
Under the guise of judicial interpretation, the majority opinion has rewritten and liberalized recovery under the workmen’s compensation laws. If such a result is desirable, the responsibility for the nature and amount of benefits accorded to the injured employee rests with the Legislature.
Spencer and Clinton, JJ., join in this concurrence and dissent.