Court Opinion

ID: 9365717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 19:02:46.982295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:47.147820
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/24/23 Aaronoff v. Olson CA2/2
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                             SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                            DIVISION TWO

 VIDALA AARONOFF,                                            B295388
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                             (Los Angeles County
           v.                                                Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                             17SMRO00308
 CURTIS OLSON,
                                                             17SMRO00368)
           Defendant and Appellant.
 [And five other cases.*]

      APPEALS from a judgment and orders of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Hank M. Goldberg, Michael J. Convey, Emily T.
Spear, Gregory J. Weingart, and Wendy L. Wilcox, Judges. Affirmed
(B295388, B298224, B298532), reversed (B305935), vacated (B314319),
and dismissed (B309136).
      Vidala Aaronoff, in pro. per.; Law Office of William T. Heywood,
William T. Heywood; Law Office of Paul Kujawsky, Paul Kujawsky;
The Appellate Law Firm, Gregg Aaron Myers; Keiter Appellate Law
and Mitchell Keiter for Plaintiff and Appellant Vidala Aaronoff.
      John Walkowiak, in pro. per.; Law Office of William T. Heywood,
William T. Heywood; Law Office of Paul Kujawsky, Paul Kujawsky;

         * Aaronoff
                v. Olson (No. B298224); Olson v. Aaronoff
(No. B298532); Aaronoff v. Olson (No. B305935); Aaronoff v. Olson
(No. B309136); Aaronoff v. Olson (No. B314319).
Law Office of G. Scott Sobel and G. Scott Sobel for Appellant John
Walkowiak.
     Buchalter, Eric Michael Kennedy and Robert Collings Little for
Defendant and Appellant Curtis Olson.

              ________________________________________

      A long-running feud between Vidala Aaronoff (Aaronoff) and
Curtis Olson (Olson) has generated multiple lawsuits between them,
some of which have yet to be resolved. The appeals now before us
began with the parties’ dueling petitions for a civil harassment
restraining order. The trial court denied and dismissed the petitions of
both parties. Aaronoff appealed from the judgment of dismissal.
Shortly thereafter, the parties then moved for attorney fees, which the
court granted. Both parties appealed. While this appeal was pending,
Olson repeatedly attempted to enforce the fees award against Aaronoff.
She strenuously resisted. As a result, at Olson’s request, the trial court
twice amended the order awarding Olson attorney fees, initially to add
and later to delete certain judgment debtors.
      More litigation followed from the judgment of dismissal and the
amended attorney fees orders, all of which gave rise to the rest of these
appeals. Although we briefly describe the litigation underlying all the
appeals, we conclude only the challenges to the judgment of dismissal
and the original attorney fees orders are cognizable on appeal.
      We affirm the judgment denying and dismissing Aaronoff’s
restraining order petition against Olson and affirm the original orders
awarding attorney fees. However, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to amend the order awarding attorney fees to Olson once
Aaronoff’s appeal from the order had been filed. Because they therefore
are void, we reverse the initial order amending Olson’s attorney fee
award and vacate the second order. But as no practical purpose would
be served by remanding the matter to the trial court, the remaining
challenge to the void order amending Olson’s award of attorney fees is
dismissed as moot.

                                    2
          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Aaronoff and Olson met in 2002 and worked together to acquire
and preserve Chateau Colline, a historic apartment building. Olson
became the building owner, converted the apartments into eight
condominiums and resided part-time in one of the condominiums.
Olson served as president of the Chateau Colline Homeowners
Association from 2013 to 2016. Aaronoff resided in one of the
condominiums.
                            Appeal B295388
       At some point, the relationship between Aaronoff and Olson
soured. In 2015, Aaronoff petitioned for a civil harassment restraining
order against Olson, which was resolved through mediation. In
December 2016, Aaronoff in propria persona filed at least one civil
lawsuit. The defendants included Olson, other Chateau Colline
residents, the homeowners association, and the property management
company (2016 civil suit). Months earlier, Aaronoff had filed an
administrative complaint with the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The complaint named Olson
and the Chateau Colline Homeowners Association as respondents and
alleged discrimination based on sex and gender. HUD referred the
complaint to the California Department of Fair Employment and
Housing (DFEH) for investigation.
       In September 2017, Aaronoff again petitioned for a civil
harassment restraining order against Olson. He soon petitioned for a
civil harassment restraining order against her. On November 19, 2018,
the consolidated petitions were denied and dismissed by the trial court.
Aaronoff moved for reconsideration of the judgment and for a new trial.
Both motions were denied. Aaronoff’s appeal followed.
                    Appeals B298224 and B298532
       Olson and Aaronoff each requested attorney fees for having
successfully defended against the other’s restraining order petition.
Aaronoff also moved to strike or tax costs. On April 17, 2019, the trial
court awarded attorney fees to both parties and partially granted

                                   3
Aaronoff’s motion to strike or tax costs. Aaronoff and Olson each
appealed from the order to pay attorney fees.
                              Appeal B305935
       Olson repeatedly attempted to enforce his award of attorney fees.
Aaronoff refused to comply, claiming she was indigent and the
condominium in which she resided did not belong to her but to the
“ATW Trust.” Olson applied ex parte to amend his attorney fees order
to add the ATW Trust, as Aaronoff’s alter ego, and its current and
former trustees, including Aaronoff. His application was granted on
November 6, 2019; the court ordered the amendment as requested.
There was no appeal from this postjudgment order.
       At a later hearing, John Walkowiak, an ATW Trustee, advised
the trial court he was unable to comply with the court-ordered
production of trust documents. The court found there was no ATW
Trust, or if there were, it had been fraudulently created. Any property
transfers into the trust were thus fraudulently made to avoid debt
collection. Aaronoff and Walkowiak each appealed.
                              Appeal B309136
       The trial court denied Aaronoff’s motion, in which Walkowiak
joined, to strike or tax costs in response to Olson’s memorandum of
postjudgment costs. The court also denied Walkowiak’s motion to
vacate as “void” the amendment of Olson’s attorney fees order adding
the ATW Trust and its trustees as judgment debtors. Appeals followed.
                              Appeal B314319
       Olson moved again to amend his order of attorney fees. This
time, he sought to delete the previously added ATW Trust and its
trustees in order to lawfully enforce a writ of execution and foreclose on
Aaronoff’s condominium. Aaronoff filed opposition.
       The trial court granted Olson’s motion to amend the fees order as
requested and denied Aaronoff’s motion for reconsideration. Aaronoff
appealed.

                                    4
                              DISCUSSION
I.    Aaronoff’s July 23, 2021 Opening Brief Is Stricken as
      Deficient
      Representing herself, Aaronoff’s notice of appeal in B295388
challenged the trial court’s (1) judgment of dismissal following its
denial of her restraining order petition against Olson, (2) order denying
her motion for reconsideration, and (3) order denying her motion for a
new trial.1 Orders denying motions for reconsideration and a new trial
are not separately appealable, but may be reviewed as part of an
appeal from the underlying judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc.,2
§ 1008, subd. (g) [reconsideration]; § 906 [new trial].) In her notice of
appeal in B298224, Aaronoff challenged the trial court’s award of
attorney fees against her. Both appeals are the subject of Aaronoff’s
opening brief. However, our review of Aaronoff’s contested trial court
rulings is hampered by serious deficiencies in Aaronoff’s opening brief,
which she submitted in propria persona.3

      1 In the underlying proceedings, Aaronoff sometimes represented
herself or instead had retained counsel.
      2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
      3  At her request, Aaronoff’s July 23, 2021 opening brief replaced
her previously filed opening brief and covered appeals B295388,
B298224, and B305935. Aaronoff also filed in propria persona a
“corrected” opening brief for appeal B309136, which, like her July 23,
2021 brief, is deficient. Her appellate counsel filed an opening brief
and a reply brief for appeal B314319 (which was amended on
December 16, 2022), which we have reviewed. In light of our
disposition, we do not reach the issues raised in Aaronoff’s corrected
brief for appeal B309136 and in her appellate counsel’s briefs for appeal
B314319. We deny Aaronoff’s request for judicial notice filed with the
reply brief in appeal B314319. The material that is the subject of the
request is not necessary to our decision.
        Remarkably, 47 minutes before oral argument, Gregg Aaron
Myers, counsel for Aaronoff, filed an “emergency motion” seeking leave
to file an amended brief for appeal B295388 with a higher word count.
Myers claimed Aaronoff’s former attorney Paul Kujawsky and an

                                    5
       California Rules of Court,4 rule 8.204(a)(2)(A) requires the
appellant’s opening brief to identify the relief sought in the trial court
and the judgment or order appealed from. Rule 8.204(a)(2)(B) requires
the appellant’s opening brief to explain why the order appealed from is
appealable. Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires references to the record when
discussing facts. This applies to all matters referred to in any portion
of the brief, not just the statement of facts. (Conservatorship of
Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253.) Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)
requires the appellant’s opening brief to provide a summary of the
significant facts limited to matters in the record. Aaronoff’s opening
brief fails to comply with these rules. It contains few and incomplete
citations to the record, most of which appear to reflect Aaronoff’s own
filings. The problem is compounded by the massive size of the record
designated on appeal. Further, the 40-page statement of facts in the
opening brief recites events that preceded and/or are extraneous to the
litigation in this matter. It is also evident Aaronoff fails to comprehend
that the trial court was required to make its ruling based solely on
information relating to this case, not on issues in other cases in which
the parties may be currently or previously involved.
       We also note the statement of facts primarily consists of
argument, rather than a summary of the facts, and embellishes in
Aaronoff’s favor evidence produced during the proceedings. The
statement includes commentary on perceived reactions of the court,
counsel, and witnesses to hearing testimony. The statement also
contains information supposedly pertinent here that is outside the
record.

unnamed clerk of this court purportedly misinformed Aaronoff as to the
correct number of words permitted in an appellant’s opening brief
under California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c). It appears the
information provided by both Attorney Kujawsky and the clerk of the
court was correct. The motion is denied.
      4   Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                      6
       Most troubling is the inclusion of a “corrected” excerpt of Olson’s
testimony, labeled, “Accurate True Testimony, November 16, 2018.”
There is no explanation as to the source of this excerpt, which is not
part of the record, nor why it should supplant the excerpt of the official
reporter’s transcript, which is characterized in the statement of facts as
the “Altered Counterfeit Transcript, November 16, 2018.”
       To be sure, a self-represented party’s understanding of the rules
on appeal is generally more limited than an experienced appellate
attorney’s. Whenever possible, we will not rigidly apply technical rules
of procedure in a manner that deprives a party of a hearing.
Nonetheless, we are obligated to apply the Rules of Court and
substantive rules of appellate review to a self-represented party’s
claims on appeal, just as we would to those parties who are represented
by trained legal counsel. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975,
984–985; Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
522, 524.) We are compelled by these deficiencies to strike Aaronoff’s
July 23, 2021 opening brief.
       Even if we were to overlook the rule violations and accept the
statement of facts as presented in Aaronoff’s opening brief, there are
other insurmountable problems: For the first time on appeal, Aaronoff
argues she was a victim of “a fraud on the court,” presumably extrinsic
fraud. (See Kimball Avenue v. Franco (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1224,
1229.) Aaronoff maintains a bench officer, a court reporter, Olson’s
trial counsel, and Olson either provided or were influenced to provide
fraudulent documents or to commit fraudulent acts. Aaronoff did not
ask the trial court to grant a new trial because of extrinsic fraud.
Rather, her grounds at the time were newly discovered evidence, abuse
of discretion and misapplication of law by the trial court, and reliance
on the wrong standard of proof by her trial counsel, all of which the
court rejected. Aaronoff has thus forfeited her fraud-on-the-court
argument. “[O]nly those issues tendered in the trial court may be
raised on appeal.” (County of Sacramento v. Llanes (2008) 168
Cal.App.4th 1165, 1173.) That is because “ ‘[a] party is not permitted to
change his position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. To

                                    7
permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but
manifestly unjust to the opposing litigant.’ ” (Cable Connection, Inc. v.
DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1350, fn. 12.)
       Another problem is that Aaronoff is claiming certain documents
or statements Olson submitted in seeking attorney fees were false or
fraudulent. Resolving questions of credibility is not within our
purview. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)
       Finally, Aaronoff maintains her then trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at the restraining order hearing. While Aaronoff
strongly complained about the attorney’s performance in seeking a new
trial, she cannot prevail on any claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not available in
an ordinary civil proceeding because there is no constitutional right to
counsel. (See Chevalier v. Dubin (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 975, 978–979
[“It should be noted that the right to counsel constitutional provisions
refer specifically to criminal prosecutions, and hence do not apply to
civil proceedings”].)
       Although we are striking Aaronoff’s opening brief, as discussed
below, we have considered the claims made in her reply brief. When
the reply brief was filed, Aaronoff was not self-represented and her
appellate counsel drafted a reply brief that complied with the rules.
II.    Hearing On Restraining Order Petitions
       A.    Summary of the hearing evidence
       At the conclusion of the four-day hearing on their restraining
order petitions, the trial court determined that Aaronoff had failed to
demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of harassment within the
meaning of section 527.6 and entered a judgment of dismissal.5

      5 Section 527.6 allows “[a] person who has suffered harassment”
to seek “an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.” (§ 527.6,
subd. (a)(1).) “ ‘Harassment’ ” includes “unlawful violence, a credible
threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed
at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the
person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct
must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer

                                    8
       The reply brief submitted on Aaronoff’s behalf does not attack the
sufficiency of the evidence in support of the trial court’s judgment.
Therefore, we only briefly summarize the facts, construing them in the
light most favorable to the judgment of dismissal. (People v. Curl
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 342, fn. 3 [failure “to attack the judgment as
unsupported by substantial evidence amounts to a concession that it is
supported by such evidence”].)
       Aaronoff petitioned for a civil harassment restraining order in
September 2017 because she feared Olson. According to Aaronoff and
other witnesses, Olson was suspected of embarking on a campaign,
both directly and through third parties, to force her out of Chateau
Colline. As proof, witnesses for Aaronoff testified: Olson confronted
Aaronoff angrily and inquired about “a renter”; Aaronoff said Olson
looked at and photographed her through her condominium windows;
Aaronoff’s condominium was being photographed and surveilled by
strangers when she was away; a bathroom window lock and a backdoor
lock and screen on Aaronoff’s condominium were damaged; Aaronoff
was upset by the removal of her lockbox containing her keys; and
several strangers, escorted by Chateau Colline’s general contractor,
were behaving “suspicious[ly]” outside Aaronoff’s condominium.
       On cross-examination, witnesses acknowledged they never saw
Olson engage in the alleged harassing conduct, and they denied
harassing Aaronoff at Olson’s behest. Olson testified and denied
committing, or having others commit, any acts of harassment against

substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) “ ‘Course of
conduct’ ” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) “At the hearing, . . . [i]f the judge
finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment
exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6,
subd. (i).) The determination that a restraining order should be
granted rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. (Biosense
Webster, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 827, 834.)

                                     9
Aaronoff. There was also testimony some of the recounted incidents
were either tied in with the 2016 civil suit or served a legitimate
purpose.
      Aaronoff testified some documents pertaining to the 2016 civil
suit were stolen from her condominium and Olson had security
cameras installed at Chateau Colline. Olson told Aaronoff the camera
facing her backdoor enabled him to “watch what [she] was doing.”
Aaronoff also testified unknown men wearing black clothing had
surveilled and stalked her outside Chateau Colline. On cross-
examination, Aaronoff testified the actions of these men were “the
basis” of her civil harassment petition, although she knew of no
connection between them and Olson.
      In declining to grant Aaronoff’s petition against Olson, the trial
court concluded “there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence”
that the alleged incidents were either not directed at Aaronoff and/or
served a legitimate purpose related to the safety and security of
Chateau Colline or could not be connected to Olson at all.6 The court
also noted that some incidents were currently being litigated in the
2016 civil suit.
      B.     Contentions Concerning Attorney Lamdien T. Le
             1.     Background facts
      Attorney Lamdien T. Le7 had been retained to represent Olson
and other named defendants in Aaronoff’s 2016 civil suit. At the time,
Aaronoff was self-represented. Le spoke with her multiple times,
including in March 2017, as part of settlement negotiations.
      In February 2018, Aaronoff subpoenaed Le to appear as a witness
at the restraining order hearing. Aaronoff wanted to examine Le
concerning their March 8, 2017 phone conversation, which she had
purportedly memorialized in a follow-up e-mail to Le. During that

      6Neither party requested a statement of decision. However, in
denying Aaronoff’s petition, the trial court issued a detailed, well-
reasoned oral decision.
      7   The record shows Attorney Le also gave his name as Dien Le.

                                    10
conversation, Le suggested Aaronoff dismiss the 2016 civil case without
prejudice and refile it, if necessary, following the DFEH investigation.
According to her e-mail, Aaronoff declined, saying if she dismissed the
suit, she feared Olson might hurt her or have someone run her over
while she was walking her dog. Le told her it was more likely that
Olson would harm her if she failed to dismiss the suit. Aaronoff wrote
in her e-mail to Le that she had been traumatized by his threat.
       Le moved to quash the subpoena on grounds of litigation
privilege and attorney-client privilege. Aaronoff opposed the motion,
relying primarily on her e-mail. The trial court concluded the subpoena
sought irrelevant testimony and granted the motion to quash.
       Later, at the hearing on the restraining order petitions, Aaronoff
testified at length. Just before the end of her redirect examination,
Aaronoff volunteered that Le had said that if she did not dismiss the
2016 civil suit, Olson would hurt her and run her over with a car while
she was walking her dog. On reopened cross-examination, Aaronoff
changed her testimony to coincide with her e-mailed version to Le. On
reopened redirect, Aaronoff testified she believed Olson hired Le to
harass her.
       With no defense objection, the trial court allowed Olson to call
Attorney Le as a rebuttal witness. Le testified and denied having
threatened Aaronoff’s life or saying that Olson would hurt or kill
Aaronoff if she did not dismiss the 2016 civil suit. Aaronoff’s trial
counsel did not cross-examine Le.
       In denying Aaronoff’s petition, the trial court referred to her
testimony about Le’s alleged statement. The court stated it viewed
Aaronoff’s testimony with “distrust” and “skepticism.” Although the
statement Aaronoff attributed to Le was the “most succinct, clear
evidence of a threat” to her safety, Aaronoff failed to mention it in her
petition or while testifying until late in the hearing.
              2.   Trial court did not commit reversible error
                   in allowing Attorney Le to testify
       In her reply brief, Aaronoff contends that allowing Le to testify as
a rebuttal witness was reversible error because her counsel was

                                    11
unprepared to cross-examine “a surprise” witness, who had been
permitted to remain in the courtroom unlike the other testifying
witnesses.
       This claim is not properly before us. At the hearing, Aaronoff’s
counsel made no objection to Attorney Le testifying as a rebuttal
witness for the reason she now raises on appeal—that Le should have
been prohibited from testifying because the trial court had granted
Olson’s motion to quash Aaronoff’s subpoena. (See Evid. Code, § 353,
subd (a).) Even if we were to consider this claim on the merits, it fails
for two reasons: First, Le was not a “surprise witness.” In this civil
proceeding, there was no obligation for the parties to disclose rebuttal
witnesses. (See rule 3.1548(b)(2).) Second, even if Le should have been
prohibited from testifying, the “improper admission of evidence is not
reversible error absent a demonstration of actual prejudice amounting
to a miscarriage of justice.” (Douglas v. Ostermeier (1991) 1
Cal.App.4th 729, 739.) Aaronoff cannot show prejudice. Had his
motion to quash not been granted, Le would have been called as a
witness by Aaronoff. Le would then surely have denied, as he did at
the hearing, that either he or Olson had threatened Aaronoff with
harm. Accordingly, any error was harmless. (See People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; Easterby v. Clark (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
772, 783 [Watson standard applies to evidentiary errors].)
III. Hearing on Motions for Attorney Fees
       At the hearing on the motions for attorney fees, the trial court
found Aaronoff and Olson were each the prevailing party in defending
against the other’s restraining order petition and awarded them
attorney fees.
       On appeal, the parties attack the attorney fees they were each
ordered to pay. “We review the trial court’s award of attorney fees for
abuse of discretion, which we find only if no reasonable basis for the
court’s action is shown.” (Hoffman v. Superior Ready Mix Concrete,
L.P. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 474, 489.)

                                   12
      A.     Aaronoff’s Challenge to Olson’s Attorney Fees
             Award
       Aaronoff contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to consider her ability to pay in determining Olson’s award of attorney
fees. We disagree.
       Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in awarding attorney fees.
Exercise of that discretion is guided by statute. Aaronoff is correct
there can be a statutory obligation for the trial court to assess a party’s
ability to pay in awarding attorney fees. (See, e.g., Fam. Code, § 271,
subd. (a).) But Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (s),
upon which the trial court in this case expressly relied, contains no
such requirement. The statute provides: “The prevailing party in an
action brought pursuant to this section may be awarded court costs and
attorney’s fees, if any.” Nonetheless, at the hearing the court advised it
was taking into account each party’s ability to pay “to do substantial
justice,” and Aaronoff, appearing in propria persona, argued to the
court at length that she lacked the ability to pay any attorney fees.
       B.    Olson’s Challenge to Aaronoff’s Attorney Fees
             Award
             1.     Factual background
       Prior to awarding attorney fees, the trial court explained how it
had calculated them: The court had conducted a line-by-line
examination of each party’s billing statements and deducted those
charges that were duplicative, unreasonable, or unnecessary to the
objectives of the litigation. Using this approach, the court found
Aaronoff had incurred $40,295 in attorney fees after deducting $6,790
from Aaronoff’s total bill of $47,085. As for Olson, the court determined
his attorney fees were $118,897.03 after deducting $31,877. Aaronoff
thus owed Olson $78,602.03 in attorney fees.
       The record shows the parties had an agreement concerning their
requests for attorney fees. The parties realized the total fees charged
by their trial counsel included overlapping or mixed fees for the defense
and prosecution of the respective petitions. To ensure the trial court
considered only the defense fees, the parties agreed to request half of

                                    13
the total fees charged in moving for attorney fees. Aaronoff requested
attorney fees in the amount of $24,750, or roughly half of the $47,085 of
total fees charged. In awarding Aaronoff $40,295 instead of $24,750,
the court explained it viewed cutting her total fees in half as a basis for
determining her award was “an arbitrary decision.” The court stated,
“[I]t is more fair and equitable that the court consider all of [Aaronoff’s]
attorney’s fees and costs expended in this matter.”
              2.    Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
                    awarding Aaronoff increased attorney fees
        Olson argues the trial court abused its discretion by “unilaterally
and substantially” increasing Aaronoff’s fees beyond the maximum she
requested pursuant to the parties’ agreement. Olson’s argument is
without merit.
        The trial court exercised its statutory authority to award
Aaronoff attorney fees. Ample evidence supported the amount of the
award as calculated by the court. Olson has provided no authority for
the proposition the court was constrained by the parties’ agreement
from exercising its authority under section 527.6 to impose attorney
fees.
IV. Amendment to Olson’s Attorney Fees Award
        Aaronoff timely appealed from the April 17, 2019 order that she
pay Olson attorney fees. Thereafter, Olson applied ex parte to amend
the order to add the ATW Trust and its trustees as judgment debtors.
He argued the alter ego theory and/or the equitable principles theory
supported his application.
        On November 6, 2019, the trial court granted Olson’s
application.8 As pertinent here, the court ruled the order awarding
attorney fees to Olson be amended “to include Vidala Aaronoff, Trustee
of the ATW Trust, With An Effective Date of January 1, 2012, Milder
Arroliga, Trustee of the ATW Trust, With An Effective Date of
January 1, 2012, any and all current trustees of the ATW Trust, With

      8 The proceedings were not reported; the trial court issued the
orders in chambers.

                                    14
an Effective Date of January 1, 2012, and The ATW Trust, as
additional judgment debtors.” Aaronoff did not appeal from the
amended attorney fees order.
       In her reply brief, Aaronoff contends the amended attorney fees
order constituted reversible error because it violated the automatic stay
provision triggered by an operative appeal. We agree.
       Pursuant to section 916, “the perfecting of an appeal stays
proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed
from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby,
including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may
proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected
by the judgment or order.” (§ 916, subd. (a).) “The purpose of the
automatic stay . . . ‘is to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction by
preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided’ ” and to
“ ‘prevent[ ] the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering
the appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that
may affect it.’ ” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35
Cal.4th 180, 189; LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 862,
872 [§ 916 precludes the trial court from enforcing, vacating, or
modifying an appealed judgment].) “[S]ection 916, as a matter of logic
and policy, divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject matter
on appeal—i.e. jurisdiction in its fundamental sense.” (Varian Medical
Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, supra, at p. 198.) Accordingly, “any
subsequent trial court proceedings on matters ‘embraced’ in or ‘affected’
by the appeal [are] void—and not merely voidable.” (Ibid.; id. at p. 196
[“any judgment or order rendered by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction is ‘void on its face’ ”].)
       Except for a brief reference in a footnote, Olson does not address
the automatic stay provision of section 916. Instead, he argues we have
no jurisdiction to review the amended attorney fees order of
November 6, 2019, because Aaronoff failed to appeal from it.9 Olson is

      9In the footnote, Olson cites Hearn Pacific Corp. v. Second
Generation Roofing, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 117 to suggest because
Aaronoff failed to perfect her appeal from the amended attorney fees

                                    15
correct that Aaronoff failed to appeal from this postjudgment order. He
is also correct that the time for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional
and once the deadline has expired, we have no power to entertain the
appeal. (Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide
Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56; see rule 8.104(a)(1).)
But where, as here, an order or judgment lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, it can be attacked at any time, even for the first time on
appeal.10 (People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 225; accord, Alliance
for California Business v. State Air Resources Bd. (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 1050, 1060.)
       Next, Olson contends, assuming Aaronoff has invoked appellate
jurisdiction, the trial court properly amended the attorney fees order
for the same two reasons Olson provided in his application: First, the
trial court’s authority to amend a judgment “ ‘ “ ‘to add additional
judgment debtors on the ground that a person or entity is the alter ego
of the original judgment debtor . . . “ ‘is an equitable procedure based on
the theory that the court is . . . inserting the correct name of the real
defendant.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Favila v. Pasquarella (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 934,
942; accord, Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 508.)

order, no automatic stay was possible. But in that case, the party filed
an untimely appeal from the original attorney fees order, which meant
the trial court still had jurisdiction to amend the attorney fees order as
it did. (Id. at pp. 146–147.)
      10   We also note Walkowiak moved to vacate the amended fee
order as “void” for violating section 916, and he timely filed appeal
B309136 from the trial court’s denial of his motion. Courts have long
recognized a void judgment may be attacked “ ‘ “directly or collaterally
. . . either by parties or strangers.” ’ ” (OC Interior Services, LLC v.
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1330, italics
added.) Strangers to the action can attack the void judgment or order
so long as they show their interests have been affected by it. (Plaza
Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 1, 15–16.)

                                     16
Olson argues because, under section 187,11 the ATW Trust was
Aaronoff’s alter ego, the order awarding Olson attorney fees could be
amended to include the trust as the true judgment debtor to carry out
the order. Second, “an unnamed party may be included as a judgment
debtor if ‘the equities overwhelmingly favor’ the amendment and it is
necessary to prevent an injustice.” (Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. L.M.
Ross Law Group, LLP (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188–1189.) Olson
argues the evidence he presented that Aaronoff was using the ATW
Trust to fraudulently shield assets from debt collection clearly justified
the amendment.
        Olson’s arguments miss the point. There is no dispute a trial
court generally has authority to amend a judgment to add a judgment
debtor under the alter ego theory and equitable principles theory—but
not after the party has perfected an appeal. Aaronoff’s earlier and
timely appeal from the original attorney fees order divested the trial
court of jurisdiction to add the ATW Trust and its trustees as judgment
debtors. The court acted contrary to section 916, which precluded it
from amending the attorney fees order while the order was under
review in this court. The amended attorney fees order is therefore void.
        Because section 916 divested the trial court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the attorney fee order, “any ‘proceedings taken
after the notice of appeal was filed are a nullity’ ” and “void—and not
merely voidable.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, supra, 35
Cal.4th at pp. 197–198.) When “ ‘there is an appeal from a void
judgment’ ”—or in this case, a void amended order—our jurisdiction
“ ‘is limited to reversing the trial court’s void acts.’ ” (Id. at p. 200.)
That is what we are obligated to do here.

      11 Section 187 provides: “When jurisdiction is, by the
Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court
or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also
given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding
be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of this Code.”

                                     17
                              DISPOSITION
      The judgment of dismissal following the denial of Aaronoff’s
restraining order petition (appeal B295388) and the orders awarding
attorney fees to both parties (appeals B298224 and B298532) are
affirmed. The order of November 6, 2019, amending the order
awarding Olson attorney fees (appeal B305935) is reversed as void, and
the order of April 16, 2021, further amending that order (appeal
B314319) is vacated. Appeal B309136 is dismissed as moot. The
parties are to bear all their own costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                         LUI, P. J.
We concur:

     CHAVEZ, J.

     HOFFSTADT, J.

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