Court Opinion

ID: 9767286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:15:31.781656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:30.097726
License: Public Domain

SHARPE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the lower court and here render judgment that custody of the minor, Malinda Dohrmann, be awarded to and vested in appellant, Fred M. Dohrmann, in accordance with the decree of the district court of North Dakota dated September 18, 1967 and its order of October 28, 1967, overruling appellee’s post-judgment motions for rehearing and modification of the prior order.
I cannot agree that the facts set out in the majority opinion or any other facts in the record are legally sufficient to show that a material change of conditions has occurred in the period of time between the North Dakota judgment (whether the date be considered as September 18, 1967 or October 28, 1967) and the trial in Texas beginning on December 4, 1967, which would authorize in the best interest and welfare of the minor child a change of her custody from her father, appellant, as ordered by the North Dakota court, to appellee, the mother.
In my view, the trial court should have sustained appellant’s motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence, and in any event should have sustained appellant’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto and to disregard the jury finding *238on special issue No. 1 (that a material change of conditions had occurred since the North Dakota judgment), after the verdict was returned, and should have rendered judgment awarding appellant the custody of his minor daughter. I would sustain appellant’s basic contention that there is no evidence of a material change of conditions since the North Dakota decree and that a change of custody from appellant to appellee is not authorized on the record before us.
I believe that an additional statement of the material facts, either conclusively established or testified to by appellee or Billy D. Chandler, her present husband, will be helpful.
Appellant and appellee were married December 26, 1963 at Elko, Nevada. One child, Malinda, was born to said marriage on December 12, 1964. Appellant filed suit for divorce against appellee in a district court of North Dakota in October 1966. Appellee also filed a counterclaim for divorce. The case was tried before the court from March 27, 1967 until April 4, 1967. Judgment was entered on September 18, 1967 granting a divorce to appellant and dismissing appellee’s counterclaim. Custody of Malinda was awarded to appellant, her father. During the pendency of the suit, temporary custody of Malinda had been awarded to appellee. Appellee testified on the trial herein that she also had custody of two boys, Michael Rieboff and Matthew Laske; that Matthew was adopted by appellee during a prior marriage and that she had custody of Michael, who had not been adopted. Neither of the boys is related to appellant; nor are they related to Malinda Dohrmann, except to the extent that Matthew has been adopted by appellee. The sole ground for divorce alleged by appellant against appellee in the North Dakota suit was that of adultery with Billy D. Chandler. Shortly after the trial in North Dakota appellee moved to or near Blessing, Texas. Chandler had preceded her to that locality, where his parents lived. He assisted in moving horses, bought and leased land for pasture and built a house. Chandler testified that appellee and the three children moved in said house with him between about September 1 and September IS, 1967.
Appellee was personally served with notice of the North Dakota judgment, dated September 18, 1967, on September 26, 1967. Appellee’s attorneys in North Dakota on September 27, 1967 filed a motion denominated as follows:
“MOTION TO AMEND THE COURT’S FINDINGS OR TO MAKE ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO TAKE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY ON THE QUESTION OF CUSTODY OF THE CHILD, MALINDA DOHRMANN, AND TO STAY THE JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF THE CUSTODY OF MALINDA DOHRMANN ONLY UPON SUCH CONDITIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ADVERSE PARTY AS THE COURT DEEMS PROPER”
and gave notice of hearing of same for October 27, 1967, or as soon thereafter as it could be heard. On October 2, 1967 the North Dakota district judge, pursuant to appellee’s motion, entered an order staying the prior judgment “solely with respect to the question of the custody of the minor child, Malinda Dohrmann, until the hearing on said motion.” On October 28, 1967 the district court in North Dakota entered an order reciting in part that appellee’s motions came on for hearing on October 27, 1967, at which time she appeared through her counsel and appellant appeared in person and through counsel; and that appellee “made an additional motion for an Order Staying the Judgment insofar as the same relates to the custody of the minor child of the parties hereto; * * * ” The court denied all of appellee’s motions, dissolved the temporary stay of execution and ordered “That the Defendant (appellee *239here) shall forthwith transfer and give custody of the minor daughter of the parties hereto, Malinda Lee Dohrmann, and her personal possessions to the Plaintiff (appellant here), as provided in the Judgment entered herein.” Notice of the October 28, 1967 order was personally served on appellee at Blessing, Texas, on November 2, 1967. Later, on the same date, appel-lee married Billy D. Chandler. Shortly thereafter appellant came to Texas to obtain custody of Malinda, which appellee refused to surrender to him. On November 15, 1967 appellant filed his application for writ of habeas corpus in the district court of Mata-gorda County, Texas. The court granted the writ and on November 17, 1967, entered an order setting the case for jury trial on December 4, 1967, and further provided that temporary custody of Malinda would be placed with Mr. and Mrs. W. B. Chandler (parents of Billy D. Chandler) until the trial date. Additional pleadings were filed by all parties including a plea in abatement by appellant. Issue was thereby joined on the question of custody of the minor child. One of appellee’s contentions was that the North Dakota judgment awarding custody of the minor child to appellant was not entitled to full faith and credit. That contention is not well taken; and in effect the case was tried and has been appealed primarily on the issues raised by appellee’s cross-petition for change of custody, under which she had the burden of proof to establish that a material change of conditions had occurred since the rendition of the North Dakota court decree and that the welfare of the minor child required a change of custody from the father (appellant) to the mother (appellee).
On the trial of the case appellant moved for directed verdict at the close of all the testimony and after the verdict filed motion for judgment non obstante veredicto and to disregard the jury’s answer to special issue No. 1, all of which were overruled. Appellant’s timely filed motion for new trial was also overruled.
The majority opinion concedes that remarriage of appellee and establishment of a home do not amount to such a material change of conditions that would warrant the trial court to exercise jurisdiction to make a change of custody, but then holds that such matters along with other factors in this case affecting the child’s welfare can amount to such material change. I do not agree with the latter conclusion.
In my view there was no evidence in this case of anything which could be considered in law to be a material change of conditions. Appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Texas district court on November 15, 1967, some 18 days after the final order of the North Dakota court entered on October 28, 1967, and approximately 8 weeks after the original order of September 18, 1967, which was stayed by the North Dakota court as to custody of Malinda until hearing upon appellee’s post-judgment motions for rehearing and modification. It is thus apparent that we are dealing with a very limited period of time during which appellee was required to establish a material change of conditions affecting the welfare of the minor child.
I cannot reconcile the majority holding that a material change in conditions has been established in this case with decisions such as Bukovich v. Bukovich, 399 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Sup.Ct.1966); Short v. Short, 163 Tex. 287, 354 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.Sup.Ct.1962); Smith v. Clements, 424 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1968, wr. ref. n. r. e.); Heiskell v. Heiskell, 412 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1967, n. w. h.); Buhrman v. Buhrman, 407 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1966, n. w. h.); Autry v. Autry, 359 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso, 1962, n. w. h.); Fontaine v. Fontaine, 325 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1959, n. w. h.).
In Bukovich, where a decree of an Indiana court awarding custody to the father was involved, our Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts which had ordered a change of custody from the *240father to the mother, and in part held as follows :
“ * * * Notwithstanding the views of the courts below that it would be better for the child to remain with his mother rather than be placed in the home of his paternal grandparents in the custody of his father, and even if such were our view, the Indiana court has decreed otherwise in what we must assume was competent litigation. The facts here shown do not make the exceptional case which is prerequisite to an exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of Texas to the extent of a new and independent determination of child custody rights.”
In Short, where a decree of a New Mexico court awarding custody to the father was involved, our Supreme Court also reversed judgments of the lower courts which had ordered change of custody from the father to the mother and held in part as follows:
“A showing of only slight change of conditions is not sufficient grounds to change custody of children. Frequent custody hearings are discouraged and not encouraged. It is our opinion that the trial court abused its discretion in taking custody of the children from their father and awarding it to their mother. Leonard v. Leonard, 218 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.Civ.App., no writ hist.)”
In my view, the holdings in Bukovich and Short are applicable here, and prevent affirmance of the judgment.
Consideration of the evidence which ap-pellee relies upon to support the jury’s answer to special issue No. 1 reflects that there is not a single fact that did not exist prior to the North Dakota decree of September 18, 1967, or the order overruling appellee’s motions to modify that decree on October 28, 1967, or which does not fall within the three categories condemned by our Courts as being insufficient to support a change of custody, as follows: (1) The non-custodian parent’s remarriage and acquisition of a home are alone not sufficient to support a change of custody. See Smith v. Clements, 424 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1968, wr. ref. n. r. e.); Heiskell v. Heiskell, 412 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1967, n. w. h.) ; Fontaine v. Fontaine, 325 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1959, n. w. h.). (2) Changes showing adaptation of the child to its present environment or that the custodian has been separated from the child are insufficient to support a change of custody. See Buhrman v. Buhrman, 407 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1966, n. w. h.); Autry v. Autry, 359 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso, 1962, n. w. h.). (3) Changes relating only to the prospective improvement of the non-custodian parent are insufficient to support a change of custody. See Bukovich v. Bukovich, supra; Buhrman v. Buhrman, supra; Fontaine v. Fontaine, supra.
The majority opinion relies in part on the premise that there was a showing of a family relationship which did not exist at the time of the North Dakota decree. The evidence establishes that appellee had temporary custody of Malinda during the pend-ency of the North Dakota suit along with custody of the two boys; that shortly after the trial in North Dakota, appellee and the three children came to Texas where they lived together, ultimately moving into the same house with Billy D. Chandler before the North Dakota decree of September 18, 1967 was entered and before appellee was married to Chandler on November 2, 1967. There is no showing of a change in the family relationship between appellee, Malinda and the two boys. Appellee relied at the trial upon the fact that Billy D. Chandler was added to such family relationship, under the circumstances above-mentioned, after she came to Texas. Chandler is not related to either Malinda or the two boys who are in the custody of appellee, and does not have any legal obligation to them. Chandler does not have any legal right to exercise parental authority over Malinda or to treat her as his child. The record shows that Chandler was dismissed as a party to *241this suit by the trial court on December 4, 1967. The evidence reflects that appellee and Chandler for some period of time were business associates in North Dakota in connection with the ownership and training of horses. The change involved in such respect is only one of locality.
Ultimately, it appears that the evidence relied on by appellee concerning change of conditions is her marriage to Chandler and that she now has a home for Malinda, which she had prior to the North Dakota decree. Other evidence involving background information, financial and other circumstances of the parties and their families is not sufficient to establish the required material changes which affect the welfare of the minor child since rendition of the North Dakota decree.
Some of the expressions in Autry v. Autry, 359 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso, 1962, n. w. h.,) appear to be particularly applicable in this case. There the court held in part as follows:
“Mere change of circumstances normally incident to the passage of time occasioned, as it has been here, by undue delay not caused by any fault of relator, but due solely to the tedious and sometimes cumbersome processes of our own state justice is not, in our opinion, sufficient change of circumstances to warrant a denial by the trial court of the right of the last lawful custodian to immediate possession of the child or children; nor do we believe such normal change of circumstances as are apt to occur by reason of the adaptation of the child or children to -a particular environment, personal attachments, et cetera, would be sufficient to warrant the trial court in ordering a trial de novo on the issue of custody.
“At this writing, more than two years have elapsed since Judge Dawson entered his order of February 13, 1960 dismissing the application of the father for custody of the children, thereby declining to take jurisdiction of the custody matter and affirming, not only the right of the Maryland court to determine the question, but also the right of the mother of such children (relator) to have the Maryland court pass upon such question. It is inevitable that some changes must have taken place in the lives of the children during these two long years. They have undoubtedly become accustomed to their present surroundings and environment; no doubt they have made many new friends at play and at school and, in all probability, they are healthy, happy and contented with their present circumstances. By the same token there is no reason to believe the children would now be any less happy, healthy and contented if the situation had been reversed, with the children in the care and custody of their mother for the past two years instead of with their father.” 359 S.W.2d 272 at 277.
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“All too often, particularly in child custody cases, policies and attitudes adopted by our courts have resulted in decisions holding, in effect, that the only proper place to rear a child is within the boundaries of the particular state in which that court has jurisdiction. Even though the court finds that there is a prior, valid, subsisting judgment of another state awarding such custody, it may, in such cases, limit its consideration of the merits to conditions which have changed since that foreign judgment was rendered; but again, all too often, courts tend to find ‘changed conditions’ (regardless of how inconsequential they may be) to exist in favor of a local citizen. Such practices result in neither equity nor justice, and not only encourage unlawful acts on the part of parents, but tend to create strife and foster ill-will between courts of different states, and totally ignore principles of comity, which, we believe, have their best application in cases such as this.” 359 S.W.2d 272 at 278.
In my view the record herein does not establish the exceptional case required by *242Texas law for a new and independent determination of child custody rights, and does not authorize the change of custody from appellant to, appellee as ordered by the trial court. The North Dakota decree awarding custody of the minor child to appellant was and is entitled to full faith and credit by Texas courts.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of the lower court and here render judgment that appellant have custody of his daughter, Malinda Dohrmann, in accordance with the North Dakota decree of September 18, 1967 as made final by the order of October 28, 1967.