Court Opinion

ID: 9892401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 18:10:41.24655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:16.606267
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hernandez, 2023-Ohio-3836.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     FULTON COUNTY

State of Ohio                                       Court of Appeals No. F-22-008

        Appellee                                    Trial Court No. 21CR104

v.

Juan D. Hernandez                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                   Decided: October 13, 2023

                                                *****

        T. Luke Jones, Fulton County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Stacey S. Stiriz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Adam H. Houser, for appellant.

                                                *****

        OSOWIK, J.

        {¶ 1} This is an appeal from an April 6, 2022 judgment of the Fulton County

Court of Common Pleas, denying appellant’s motion to suppress in the underlying 2021

DUI case. The motion sought to exclude evidence of two of appellant’s three prior DUI

convictions, a 2013 DUI conviction from the Bryan Municipal Court, and a 2017 DUI

conviction in the Fulton County Western District Court.
         {¶ 2} For clarity on the scope of this appeal, we note that the appeal is confined to

challenging the admission of evidence related to the 2013 DUI conviction in the Bryan

Municipal Court. It does not encompass the 2017 DUI conviction in the Fulton County

Western District Court. In addition, the motion to suppress did not challenge evidence

related to appellant’s 2014 DUI conviction in the Defiance Municipal Court. For the

reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.

         {¶ 3} Appellant, Juan D. Hernandez, sets forth the following sole assignment of

error:

         {¶ 4} “1. It was a violation of appellant’s due process rights when the Bryan

Municipal Court destroyed [or misplaced] the [audio recording] transcript of appellant’s

plea and sentencing in the 2013 case.”

         {¶ 5} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On August 15,

2021, appellant crashed his motor vehicle into a tree in rural Fulton County. Emergency

responders who arrived at the scene observed that appellant smelled strongly of alcohol,

had bloodshot eyes, and conceded that he had consumed multiple beers prior to the

accident. In addition, a bag of marijuana was recovered from the vehicle’s center

console. Appellant was taken by ambulance to a Toledo-area hospital for emergency

medical treatment.

         {¶ 6} In response to the above-described incident, appellant was indicted in

September of 2021 for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and

2.
drugs, in violation of R.C. 4511.19, a felony of the fourth degree, as enhanced based

upon an accompanying specification setting forth appellant’s three prior DUI convictions,

occurring in 2013, 2014, and 2017, respectively.

       {¶ 7} On February 1, 2022, appellant filed a motion to suppress, challenging the

admission of evidence of the 2013 and 2017 DUI convictions. It did not challenge

evidence of the 2014 DUI conviction. On March 4, 2022, the motion to suppress hearing

was conducted.

       {¶ 8} As pertains to the 2013 DUI conviction from the Bryan Municipal Court,

which underpins this appeal, counsel for appellant alleges that the failure of the Bryan

Municipal Court to retain the audio recording of appellant’s 2013 DUI change of plea

hearing should be construed as a breach of Sup.R. 26.05(G)(2) regarding the retention of

DUI case files by municipal courts, and in conjunction, the alleged records retention rule

breach should then be construed as a breach appellant’s due process rights based upon

speculation that the missing recording may have shown a due process breach not

otherwise reflected in the record of evidence.

       {¶ 9} Although appellant maintains that the 2013 audio recording was destroyed,

the record is devoid of evidence showing whether the unavailability of the recording

resulted from misplacement or destruction. Regardless, all trial court case documents

memorializing the proceedings in the 2013 DUI case, and comprising the trial court case

file, were retained, available, and admitted into evidence.

3.
       {¶ 10} We note that appellant makes no specific allegation setting forth a claimed

constitutional defect occurring in the course of the 2013 DUI case. Consistently, the

record of evidence is devoid of any such evidence. In addition, appellant denies any

recollection of the relevant portions of the proceedings. Rather, counsel for appellant

asserts that the 2013 recording “would have been helpful” in potentially unveiling a

speculative constitutional due process breach against appellant.

       {¶ 11} Contrary to appellant’s conjecture-based position upon appeal, appellee

submitted into evidence all of the trial court case file documents memorializing

appellant’s 2013 DUI change of plea and sentencing hearing. Appellee submitted into

evidence appellant’s initialed and executed acknowledgment and statement of rights,

waiver of rights, entry of guilty plea, and the corresponding final judgment entry of

conviction and sentence.

       {¶ 12} The transcript of the suppression hearing reflects that appellant does not

deny that the trial court adhered to his constitutional rights during the course of the 2013

proceedings. The trial court inquired of appellant, “Don’t they [the Bryan Municipal

Court] play recording of the rights?” Appellant initially replied, “Yea.” Appellant then

modified his testimony, stating, “I can’t remember.” The trial court followed up by

asking, “So you had been in court when the rights were read, correct?” Appellant replied,

“Yes. I think.”

4.
       {¶ 13} Similarly, the trial court then inquired, “When you went in the first time to

court and they arraigned you, they informed you of the charges and the potential

penalties, am I correct?” Appellant replied, “I can’t remember.” However, the trial court

then noted, “This form says that you listened to a recording that advised you of all these

rights and you signed it * * * Is that correct?” Appellant replied, “I can’t remember.”

       {¶ 14} Upon cross-examination, appellee inquired, “So you did put your initials on

the one that says waive the right to counsel of your own choice, correct? And you

waived your right to counsel * * * and you initialed those things.” Appellant ultimately

conceded, “Yes.”

       {¶ 15} At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, appellant alleged that

constitutional impropriety was demonstrated by the unavailability of the 2013 DUI

change of plea audio recording, regardless of the admission of the case file documents of

the proceedings, all of which were demonstrative of constitutional compliance. In

response, appellee asserted that appellant failed to allege or demonstrate any specific

constitutional impropriety, and that the uncontroverted 2013 DUI trial court case file

reflected none. As such, appellee asserted that the motion to suppress should be denied.

       {¶ 16} On April 5, 2022, the trial court’s motion to suppress decision was issued.

The trial court explained, “At issue in this case is the propriety of the state being allowed

to introduce two prior [DUI] convictions * * * the State introduced five exhibits * * *

5.
from the Bryan Municipal Court * * *the tapes had either been destroyed or were

[otherwise] unavailable.”

       {¶ 17} In denying appellant’s motion to suppress, the trial court held, “The only

credible evidence before the court is the defendant’s signature on the waiver of rights * *

* at no time during defendant’s testimony did the defendant indicate he did not

understand * * * the defendant had significant issues with recalling all of the events

surrounding his plea and is, therefore, not credible * * * the 2013 conviction from the

Bryan Municipal Court is admissible to show a prior conviction.” This appeal ensued.

       {¶ 18} In the sole assignment of error, appellant alleges that the motion to

suppress denial was improper based upon the unavailability of his 2013 DUI change of

plea recording from the Bryan Municipal Court. We do not concur.

       {¶ 19} As held by this court in State v. Patton, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-22-001, 2022-

Ohio-3856, ¶ 37-38,

              It is well-established that appellate court review of a disputed motion

       to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. As held by the Ohio

       Supreme Court in State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 10 N.E.3d 691,

       2014-Ohio-1574, ¶ 7, ‘When considering a motion to suppress, the trial

       court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to

       resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. State v.

       Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). Consequently, an

6.
       appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are

       supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d

       19, 437 N.E. 583 (1982). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court

       must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of

       the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State

       v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 708, 707 N.E.2d 539 (1997).

       {¶ 20} In principal support of this appeal, appellant maintains that the trial court’s

unavailability of the 2013 change of plea audio recording constituted a breach of Rule of

Superintendence (“Sup.R.”) 26.05(G)(2), and that the alleged administrative breach should

be construed as a violation of appellant’s constitutional due process rights based upon

corollary speculation that a constitutional breach could have been reflected by the audio

recording. We do not concur.

       {¶ 21} We have consistently held that the Rules of Superintendence are not the

equivalent of rules of procedure and have no force equivalent to a statute. In re T.C., 6th

Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1106, 2015 Ohio 3665, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Gettys, 49 Ohio

App.2d 241, 243, 360 N.E.2d 735 (3d Dist.1976). They are internal housekeeping rules

which are of concern to the judges of the several courts but create no rights in

individuals. Id. See also In re M.N., 6th Dist. Ottawa Nos. OT-12-002, OT-12-003, OT-

12-004, OT-12-016, 2013-Ohio-836, at ¶ 23 and State v. Kennedy, 6th Dist. Wood No.

WD-81-19, 1981 WL 5849, *2 (Dec. 4, 1981).

7.
         {¶ 22} Therefore, appellant’s assertion that his conviction should be vacated based

upon the Ohio Rules of Superintendence is meritless. S.C. v. T.H., 9 Dist., Summit No.

29594, 154 N.E.3d 345, 2020-Ohio-2698, ¶ 8.

         {¶ 23} Appellant further maintains that “evidence that Appellant waiver of his

right to counsel was unconstitutional was destroyed by the Bryan Municipal Court.”

         {¶ 24} Recently, where remarkably similar claims have been made, we have again

held that where questions arise concerning a prior conviction, a reviewing court must

presume all underlying proceedings were conducted in accordance with the rules of law

and a defendant must introduce evidence to the contrary in order to establish a prima-

facie showing of constitutional infirmity. State v. Gerken, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-22-007,

2023-Ohio-2244, ¶ 27-40, citing State v. Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199, 2007-Ohio-1533,

863 N.E.2d 1024, ¶ 8.

         {¶ 25} With respect to ‘uncounseled’ pleas, we presume that the trial court in the

prior convictions proceeded constitutionally until a defendant introduces evidence to the

contrary. State v. Thompson, 121 Ohio St.3d 250, 2009-Ohio-314, 903 N.E.2d 618, ¶ 6.

         {¶ 26} At the suppression hearing the following exchange took place with the trial

court:

                Q: Okay and how was the written waiver of rights presented to you?

                A: The bailiffs- yea the bailiffs just threw it in front of me on the

         table and said initial here, here, here, here.

8.
              Q: Okay and all of those things that were initialed, did thew Judge

       read those to you in open court?

              A: Not that I recall.

       {¶ 27} The trial court concluded that “defendant had significant issues with

recalling all of the events surrounding his plea and is therefore not credible.”

       {¶ 28} It is undisputed that appellant executed the waiver form presented to him in

the 2013 case in the Bryan Municipal Court. The trial court further noted that “at no time

during Defendant’s testimony did the defendant indicate that he did not understand that

he was waiving his right to counsel–along with other significant rights–at the time he

entered his plea.”

       {¶ 29} The record contains State’s Exhibit 1, captioned “STATEMENT OF

RIGHTS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT,” signed and dated by appellant, in which

appellant expressly acknowledges being fully advised of the pending charges and all of

the accompanying consequences, as well as all implicated constitutional rights.

       {¶ 30} The record also contains State’s Exhibit 2, which is a signed, dated, and

initialed waiver of all constitutional rights by appellant. The record further contains the

change of plea to guilty to DUI form, executed and dated by appellant, in which appellant

again expressly acknowledges his voluntary entry of the plea and his awareness and

waiver of all related constitutional rights. Lastly, the record contains the final judgment

entry, memorializing the change of plea and the sentence imposed by the trial court.

9.
       {¶ 31} Like appellant in Gerken, Hernandez had the burden to make a prima facie

showing of constitutional infirmity in this case. It was necessary that he present some

evidence that showed that he was not, in fact, afforded his right to counsel. Like Gerken,

Hernandez testified at the suppression hearing, but he could not recall any facts germane

to the issue of whether he was given an explanation or understood that he was waiving

his right to counsel in the 2013 conviction. Nevertheless, the evidence establishes that he

unmistakably signed his waiver of right to counsel. As such, Hernandez has not

presented the threshold evidence to establish his prima facie showing. Id. at ¶ 31.

       {¶ 32} When reviewing a motion to suppress, an appellate court must defer to the

trial court’s credibility determinations and other factual findings if they are supported by

competent, credible evidence. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372,

797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. We find that competent, credible evidence supports the trial court’s

credibility determination and “[a] bald allegation of constitutional infirmity is insufficient

to establish a prima facie showing with respect to an ‘uncounseled’ plea.” Thompson at ¶

7.

       {¶ 33} Wherefore, we find that the submitted 2013 trial court case file documents

constitute competent, credible evidence in support of the trial court’s motion to suppress

decision. Thus, we find appellant’s assignment of error to be not well-taken.

10.
       {¶ 34} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Fulton County Court of

Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal

pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                               ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                   JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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