Court Opinion

ID: 9767608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:22:42.911883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.052375
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
After our original opinion was issued on January 21, 1988, appellants, Star-Tel, Inc. (“Star-Tel”) and E.R. Stephenson (“Stephenson”), filed a motion for rehearing on February 4,1988, and then on February 10, 1988, filed a motion to withdraw judgment and opinion and to abate the appeal.
We will first address the motion to withdraw judgment and opinion and to abate the appeal. Appellants base this motion on the fact that on May 15, 1987, appellant, Star-Tel, Inc., filed its original petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The original suit was brought against appellants.
Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. sec. 362 (Supp. II 1978) automatically stays all judicial proceedings “against the debtor.” This article has been interpreted as staying all appeals of proceedings that were originally brought against the debtor, regardless of whether the debtor is the appellant or appellee. Freeman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 799 F.2d 1091, 1093-4 (5th Cir.1986); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1986); Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 449 (3d Cir.1982). Any court action in violation of the automatic stay is void, regardless of whether the court had notice of the bankruptcy, Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 60 S.Ct. 343, 84 L.Ed. 370 (1940); Wallen v. State, 667 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.App.—Austin 1984, no writ), and even in spite of the debtor’s failure to file a timely suggestion of bankruptcy, In re Roxse Homes, Inc., 74 B.R. 810, 814—15 (Bankr.D.C.Mass.1987); In re Clark, 69 B.R. 885, 889-90 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987).
However, stays pursuant to section 362 are limited to debtors and do not encompass non-bankrupt co-defendants. Teachers, 803 F.2d at 65; Wedgeworth v. Fiberboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.1983). Several bankruptcy courts have found that, under their general equity powers, they may extend the automatic stay to non-bankrupt general partners if it contributes to the debtors’ efforts to achieve rehabilitation. Id, (citing In re John-Mansville Corp., 33 B.R. 254 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1983) [and others]). However, we have no record before us of any such order by the bankruptcy court.
We therefore grant appellants’ motion to withdraw the opinion and stay the appeal in regard to Star-Tel, and deny the motion to withdraw our opinion and stay the appeal in regard to co-defendant Stephenson.
In regard to one of the points of error raised in appellants’ motion for rehearing, we wish to clarify our holding.
Appellants argue that our reliance on Guthrie v. National Homes Corp., 394 *151S.W.2d 494 (Tex.1965), is misplaced for holding that in the absence of a statement of facts, we must presume that the evidence supports the court’s judgment awarding damages against Stepehnson, individually. Appellants argue that, unlike in Guthrie, there was no special issue submitted on the matter in question in this case.
The general rule is that an independent ground of recovery is waived if no issue thereon is given or requested, Harmes v. Arklatex Corp., 615 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex.1981); Tex.R.Civ.P. 279; and no objection is required in order to preserve error, Malone v. Carl Kisabeth Co., 726 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). However, an exception to this general rule exists when the ground of recovery is conclusively established by the evidence. Harmes, 615 S.W.2d at 179. In the absence of the statement of facts, we must presume that the ground of recovery was conclusively established.
Appellants’ motion for rehearing is denied, and the judgment of the trial court against appellant Stephenson, individually, is affirmed. The appeal of the judgment against appellant Star-Tel is stayed pursuant to section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. Appellant Star-Tel is ordered to notify this Court upon conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings.