Court Opinion

ID: 9514953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:52:40.239559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:23.173587
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 20.] It is true that Dahl is entitled to all favorable inferences and we should view his version of the facts as true, for summary judgment purposes. Barnaud v. Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist., 2000 SD 57, ¶ 11, 609 N.W.2d 779, 781 (citing SDCL 15-6-56(c)). This rule of law is tempered by the equally important rule that Dahl must make more than bare assertions in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. Dahl must purport more than the mere factual allegation that he was terminated. Sorrels v. Queen of Peace Hosp., 1999 SD 133, ¶ 18, 601 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Konenkamp, J., concurring). He must point to specific evidence to support his position before this “disputed” fact rises to the level of a genuine issue of material fact. The bare allegation of “termination” is not enough in fight of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Id. Even if there is a need for a “whistleblower” exception to the employment at-will doctrine, the underlying facts of this case do not cry out for its adoption here.
[¶ 21.] Dahl was demoted not terminated. He concedes that he received a letter of assignment following a meeting where *169he claims he was fired. Instead of responding by performing the assignment, Dahl willfully ignored it. The majority misstates the facts when it says “Combined impermissibly forced Dahl to choose between reporting the loss or losing his job.” This is simply not true. By deposition, Dahl was asked:
Q: When you got this letter did you not call somebody up and ask about it?
A: No. My lawyer at that time said just ignore it.
When questioned by deposition, he also admitted that Combined asked him “many times” to perform certain assignments as a sales representative. Dahl defiantly rejected any such assignments. The facts are clear: Dahl received this demotion, and he chose, albeit at his attorney’s direction, not to respond to his new assignment. Dahl cannot take a position more favorable to him than what his testimony would allow. As we have often stated, “a party cannot claim benefit of a version of the facts more favorable to his contentions than he gave in his own sworn testimony.” Chord v. Reynolds, 1999 SD 1, ¶ 19, 587 N.W.2d 729, 738. His claim that he was terminated is without support in the record and does not withstand summary judgment.
[¶ 22.] With Dahl having been demoted, it is doubtful that this Court wishes to extend this already tenuous cause of action to demotions. “A demotion necessarily implies a continuation of service in some different capacity and not a termination.” Adams v. Bd. of Fire and Police Comm’rs of Village of Skokie, 144 Ill.App.3d 905, 98 Ill.Dec. 606, 494 N.E.2d 728, 730 (1986). This is precisely what happened here. Dahl was asked to take on the duties of sales representative rather than district manager. After it became apparent that Dahl was not willing to perform these duties, he, in effect quit his job. There is a strong common law presumption that an employee may be demoted at-will. This is true because, as a logical extension, an employee may be discharged at-will, thus the “at-will presumption would surely apply to lesser quantums of discipline as well.” Scott v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 11 Cal.4th 454, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 427, 904 P.2d 834, 840 (1995).
[¶ 23.] There is no reason to give a legal remedy to those that are demoted, let alone discharged or terminated. Incompetent, disgruntled, or just plain lazy employees now have the ability to threaten suit against their employer because of a “whistleblower” cause of action that is not based on a clear public mandate. Recognizing a retaliation tort for action short of termination could subject employers to torrents of unwarranted and vexatious suits filed by disgruntled employees at every juncture in the employment process.
[¶ 24.] Despite such facts, the majority adopts a “I know it when I see it” approach to determining whether a former employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge. This is certainly not what the Legislature had envisioned when it codified the employment at-will doctrine. See SDCL 60-4-4. It is also important that before we embrace an exception to our well established employment at-will doctrine, that the conduct of the employer “contravenes a clear mandate of public policy.” Niesent v. Homestake Min. Co., 505 N.W.2d 781, 783 (S.D.1993). Dahl has failed to show that Combined in reassigning him for funds unaccountable on his watch somehow equates to the clear contravention of public policy. Not only should this Court proceed only if there is a clear public mandate to preserve, but it should also be paramount that this Court fashion its scope of intervention narrowly.
[¶ 25.] Furthermore, the majority’s position On public policy is unsound. It depends on the misprision statute as the overriding principal for the adoption of the “whistleblower” exception. The majority states that “there is no public policy that can be said to be more basic or necessary than the enforcement of the state’s criminal code or the protection of the life and property of its citizens.” While I agree *170with this basic premise, it is not relevant to the case at hand. The misprision statute ostensibly employed by Dahl to protect his actions is a farce. It was not until he received notice from Combined that he was about to lose approximately $1800 did he consider reporting the loss of premiums. Only when his pocketbook was about to be.affected did he cry wolf. It is also undisputed that his report to the Division was in May of 1994, yet Dahl continued to work for Combined until June of 1995. Thus, Dahl was not demoted or, arguendo, terminated, until more than a year after the events he claims cost him his job. In addition, the only case cited by the majority involving the reporting of a crime is the Palmateer case. In fact, in that case, the “whistleblower” reported the crime to the local law enforcement agency. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 876. It is fairly obvious that such a scenario here does not exist. To rely on a “whistleblower” exception based on a clear public mandate to enforce the criminal code, one must “blow the whistle” to an agency who could enforce that code. The Department of Insurance is not a law enforcement agency. The majority, even under the most strained view, cannot make such a claim. Dahl failed to report to the proper authorities as required by statute. Thus, the misprision statute should not apply.
[¶ 26.] The majority constructs a slippery slope by adopting this cause of action based on these facts. By establishing the precedent in this case, this Court, in effect, would be playing puppet master over the internal management of private business. The Court should not place itself in a position to oversee job transfers, alterations in job duties, and quite perhaps even internal discipline decisions. “The potential for expansion of this type of litigation is enormous.” Ludwig v. C & A Wallcoverings, Inc., 960 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir.1992). If we travel down this endless path towards judicial oversight of purely private matters, “[t]he courts then would be called upon to become increasingly involved in the resolution of workplace disputes which center on employer conduct that heretofore has not been actionable at common law or by statute.” Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill.2d 29, 206 Ill.Dec. 625, 645 N.E.2d 877, 882 (1994). The Court, by adopting this cause of action, under these facts, amounts to judicial micro-management of employer/employee relations.5
[¶ 27.] This Court “should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation” based particularly on the facts in this case, when the violation of a clearly mandated public policy has not been established. Burnham v. Karl and Gelb, P.C., et al., 50 Conn.App. 385, 717 A.2d 811, 815 (1998). The legal quagmire created by the adoption of this new unwarranted exception would place the judiciary inside boardrooms across South Dakota. This Court should exercise judicial restraint by allowing the Legislature to determine the appropriateness of this cause of action. It is not a judicial function to legislate job security.
[¶ 28.] What clearly mandated “public policy” is the foundation in this case? It certainly is not the statutory workers’ compensation exception in Niesent or the narrow exception involving refusal to commit an unlawful act in Johnson. I agree *171with the trial court that Dahl did not carry his burden of showing a violation of clearly mandated public policy in this case.
[¶ 29.] Therefore, I respectfully dis- , sent.

. It is also important to note that the record clearly indicates that the Department of Insurance's investigation concluded without clearly identifying the culprit of the missing funds. In fact, the Department concluded that mismanagement of funds and the lack of appropriate record keeping hindered its ability to investigate. Thus, the Department's threat to Combined if Combined decided to fire Dahl was wholly irresponsible and unwarranted. This matter is entirely among Dahl, Combined, and the local state's attorney, and not a matter for the Department of Insurance.