Court Opinion

ID: 9824659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:06:58.005035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:57.249761
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The appellee has filed his application for a rehearing, strenuously insisting that the opinion of this court pronounced on the 2d day of February, 1926, is erroneous. This court did not say in its opinion “that an,attachment issued upon affidavit which does not set out grounds therefor is void.” This court did say that the affidavit appearing in the record in this ease did not set out a single ground of attachment. And this court further said that the writ of attachment that did issue in this case was not authorized by law, and was void. This court is not unmindful of the liberal construction to be placed upon attachments as provided under sections 6212 and 6213 of the Code of Alabama of 1923. And under the provisions of section 6213, Code 1923, supra, it is the duty of this court to liberally construe the attachment law. But, as was said in the case of Gunter v. Du Bose, 77 Ala. 326, 329:
“We cannot add, by construction, to the statutory requisites, nor require greater certainty than is required by the'statute. An affidavit is sufficient, which sets forth the general juris*471dictional facts, either hy express averments, or by necessary implications. If they are set forth with substantial accuracy, the affidavit need not negative conclusions, or inferences to the contrary. A substantial compliance with the terms of the statute is sufficient.”
The affidavit in the instant case does not substantially comply with the statute, and the justice of the peace was without authority, therefore, to issue the writ of attachment.
The foregoing observations are indulged in reply to the insistence of the appellee as to the validity or quasi validity of the writ of attachment presented in this record. We deem this question without substantial merit in this cause, for the all-sufficient reason that it does not appear that said writ of attachment was ever served, or that any notice of any levy made thereunder was ever given to the defendant. The record before us fails to show that the justice of the peace ever acquired jurisdiction of the person of the appellant, either by service of a summons or the attachment of his property. The record on appeal to the circuit court of Pike county affirmatively disclosed the jurisdictional infirmities above specified, so that the appellant did not elect to hazard the rendition of a valid judgment against him by the circuit court of Pike county, Ala., by taking an appeal on a record that did not disclose the jurisdictional infirmities which were apparent on the fact of the record from the justice court to the circuit court of Pike county. This will suffice to differentiate the case at. bar from Roach v. Privett, 90 Ala. 391, 7 So. 808, 24 Am. St. Rep. 819. It affirmatively appears from the record before us that the justice of the peace did not have jurisdiction of the person of the appellant in the’rendition of the judgment appealed from because this record shows the service of no summons, it shows the service of no writ of attachment. Under these circumstances we are brought face to face with the principles announced in Burgin v. Ivy Coal & Coke Co., 127 Ala. 657, 29 So. 67, and by this pronouncement we are bound. That case correctly states the law, and its principle is applicable with full force and vigor to the case at bar.
In the ease of Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 398, 5 L. Ed. 290, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, said:
“It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which these expressions are used. If they go beyond the ease, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, where the very point is presented for decision.”
This principle, as quoted, has been many times expressed and followed by our Supreme Court.
It is next insisted that the appeal should have been dismissed in this court if the judgment in the court below was void. The judgment of the circuit court of Pike county, Ala., set out at page 3, is in due form, and upon its face is such a judgment as will’ support an appeal under the statute. It is quite true that, where the record shows that the court below did not acquire jurisdiction in the premises, its judgment or order in the premises will not support an appeal. In such cases it appears that our Supreme Court holds it sufficient to declare that, upon the record, the court below did not acquire jurisdiction in the premises, and that its judgment is void, and that such judgment will not support an appeal, and in that court the appeal is accordingly dismissed. Bowen v. Holcombe, 204 Ala. 549, 87 So. 87. In this court the practice has heretofore obtained to reverse and remand the cause, although the judgment appealed from is declared to be void. Courson v. State, 18 Ala. App. 538, 93 So. 223, and eases cited. Our attention being now called to the question, we hold that the judgment pronounced by the justice of the peace was void; that the judgment pronounced by the circuit court of Pike county was void, for reasons hereinabove expressed and apparent on the record. We therefore hold that the appeal in this cause must be dismissed at the cost of appellee. Bell v. King, 210 Ala. 557, 98 So. 796, and cases cited.
The application for a rehearing is accordingly overruled.