Court Opinion

ID: 9773728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:57:03.380381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:56.816689
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
Both appellants and appellee have filed motions for rehearing. While we overrule the motions for rehearing, we write to address the complaints raised therein.
Appellants complain, among other things, that this Court failed to address their ERISA1 elaims, and that the Bank never moved for summary judgment on their reliance claim. By their fourth and fifth points of error, appellants complain that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on their ERISA claims because appellee never moved for summary judgment on those *480claims and the evidence raised a fact issue thereon.
By Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Original Petition, appellants specifically pleaded breach of the employment agreement. After stating their breach of contract theory, the appellants pleaded the following:
IV.
Alternatively, as a consequence of the [Bank’s] representations, the [Garners] are entitled to the benefits described in the Executive Security Plan, and, in addition, are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, under applicable federal law. See Chapter 18 of Title 29 of the United States Code. [ERISA]
By its summary judgment motion, the Bank contended that it was entitled to prevail on all causes of action pleaded by the Garners. In particular, the Bank asserted that it did not breach the Executive Security Plan alleged by the Garners. Breach of that plan by failure to pay the required benefits was a necessary element of both the contract claim and the ERISA claim raised in state court. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) & (e)(1); Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 133 n. 1 (Tex.1994). Accordingly, the Bank was entitled to summary judgment on the ERISA claim, as well as the contract claim urged by the Gamers. The ERISA claim encompasses the state-law claim for benefits due, and accordingly is dependent upon a finding that the Bank breached its duty to provide such benefits. If our original opinion was not sufficiently clear, we herein overrule appellants’ fourth and fifth points of error.
By their sixth point of error, appellants also complain that the Bank never moved for summary judgment on their reliance claim. Their Third Amended Original Petition stated the following claim:
V.
Alternatively, as a consequence of the [Bank’s] representations upon which the [Gamers] reasonably relied, the [Gamers] have suffered damages in an amount that exceeds the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court.
However, Texas courts have recently denied the existence of a separate cause of action in tort for detrimental reliance. See University of Texas System v. Courtney, 946 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1997, n.w.h.). Neither have we found any authority to suggest that “reliance” by itself is an independent cause of action. Rather, it is an element of other causes of action in which the tortious or unlawful conduct of the defendant is “relied upon” to the detriment of the plaintiff.
Accordingly, in the present case, paragraph five of the Garner’s petition did not set out a “reliance” claim that had to be addressed in . the summary judgment motion as a separate cause of action, but merely pleaded reliance as a part of its other claims in contract and tort. We properly overruled appellants’ sixth point of error.
This brings us to the Bank’s complaint on rehearing that fraud and misrepresentation claims were never raised in the pleadings and should not have been remanded for trial.
A court should uphold the petition as to a cause of action that may be reasonably inferred from what is specifically stated, even if an element of the cause of action is not specifically alleged. SmithKline Beecham, 903 S.W.2d at 354r-55. We have already set out in our opinion the elements of fraud and negligent misrepresentation, both of which include the necessary elements of misrepresentation and reliance. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 688; Southwestern Clinic, 850 S.W.2d at 753. As these elements were specifically alleged in paragraph five of the petition, we conclude that the Gamer’s petition fairly plead a cause of action for fraud or misrepresentation.
We overrule both motions for rehearing.

. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. See 29 U.S.C. § IQOletseq.