Court Opinion

ID: 9672634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:58:18.085656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.602913
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Judge,
concurring.
Applicant was convicted in 1976 of capital murder. In this writ of habeas corpus he challenges the conviction on the basis that he was deprived not only of his Fifth Amendment right as elucidated in the majority opinion, but also of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. While I concur with the judgment of the Court reversing applicant’s conviction, I am also of the opinion that his Sixth Amendment rights were clearly violated.
The evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing was uncontradicted that applicant had both appointed and retained counsel at the time that Dr. Grigson was appointed to evaluate applicant. The record is also undisputed that Dr. Grigson evaluated the applicant on the very same day that the trial judge ordered him appointed and that applicant’s lawyers were not given advance notice that Dr. Grigson would evaluate their client; nor were counsel given the opportunity to consult and advise applicant regarding Dr. Grigson’s appointment and evaluation. Finally, applicant carried his burden in showing that counsel was unaware that Dr. Grigson’s appointment and evaluation would encompass the issue of petitioner’s “future dangerousness”.
The United States Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) unanimously held that a person under indictment for capital murder, who has counsel representing him, is entitled under the Sixth Amendment to consult with his attorneys prior to any psychiatric evaluation. Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith, counsel representing a capital defendant is entitled to be made aware of a pending psychiatric evaluation and to advise and prepare his client prior to any evaluation occurring. Estelle v. Smith, supra, at 476, 101 S.Ct. at 1879. (concurrence, Rehnquist, J.). The facts in this case are indistinguishable from Smith insofar as petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim is concerned.
This Court in capital murder cases has uniformly followed the teachings of Smith. Ex Parte Demouchette, 633 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Fields v. State 627 S.W.2d 714 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Mays v. State, 653 S.W.2d 30 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). There is no question but that Smith is to be applied retroactively. Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.1981); Cf. Fields. supra, (McCormick, J. dissenting.)
The issue that requires further development in the majority opinion is whether the applicant has in fact waived any constitutional error by failing to timely and properly object at trial to the admission of the evidence in question. This Court has, in the past, not applied a contemporaneous objection rule to this type of error. See Demouchette, supra, Fields, supra, and Mays, supra. Recently, however, this Court has applied a contemporaneous objection rule in a non-capital direct appeal. Parker v. State, 649 S.W.2d 46 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
In Parker, supra, Presiding Judge Onion applied what he perceived to be a “waiver of constitutional error” rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Engle v. Isaacs, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982), and held that the fact that an objection may have been futile at the time of Parker’s trial, such futility did not necessarily constitute cause for Parker’s failure to object.
In Engle v. Isaacs, supra, the Supreme Court held that before a federal court exercises it’s habeas corpus jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 2254, interests of comity *486demand that a petitioner demonstrate “cause and prejudice” if he has failed to follow State procedural rules, such as failing to timely object. If a federal court finds that there has been a “state procedural default” then a petitioner must demonstrate ‘cause and prejudice” for the default. In Engle the petitioner argued that any objection on his part would have been futile; the Supreme Court rejected the futility of an objection as “cause”. However the Court specifically left open the question of whether the novelty of a constitutional claim would ever establish “cause”. Engle, supra, at 130, 102 S.Ct. at 1573.
The question left open in Engle was answered just last term in Reed v. Ross, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984). In Reed, supra, the United States Supreme Court established that, as far as exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction by a federal court reviewing a state criminal conviction, “cause" is established when the novelty of a constitutional right could not reasonably have been known by competent counsel at the time of trial. (emphasis added). That Court specifically held “that where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures.” Id., 104 S.Ct. at 2910.
I submit that under the Supreme Court’s analysis, applicant in the case sub judice would have a forum in federal court. The constitutional violation here challenged could not reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial since it was not a known right until six years after the trial.
Of equal significance to this writer is this State’s own procedural default rule. While the teachings of Engle and Reed may be instructive, they are in no way binding on this Court. The rules enunciated in Engle v. Isaacs and Reed v. Ross concern the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction once a State procedural default has been shown. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). I do not interpret these cases as attempting to impose a federal procedural waiver standard to be used by State courts.
This Court has for at least twelve years held that a defendant has not waived his right to assert a constitutional violation by failing to object at trial if at the time of his trial the right had not been recognized. Ex Parte Taylor, 484 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Ex Parte Sanders, 588 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ex Parte Casarez, 508 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Cuevas v. State, 641 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). In view of these cases decided by this Court and in view of the extension by the Supreme Court of the doctrine in Engle v. Isaacs to its current posture in Reed v. Ross, I would reaffirm the holding in Cuevas, supra, that “where a defect of constitutional magnitude has not been established at the time of trial, the failure of counsel to object does not constitute waiver”, and I would overrule Parker, supra, to the extent that it is in conflict.
With the foregoing in mind, I concur with the judgment of the Court.
W.C. DAVIS, CLINTON, McCORMICK, TEAGUE and MILLER, JJ., join this opinion as well as the majority opinion.