Court Opinion

ID: 9838923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 19:04:06.847594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:54.162923
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/8/23 P. v. Mendoza CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B316642

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. VA147093
           v.

 JOHN GILBERT MENDOZA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Debra A. Cole, Judge. Affirmed with
instructions.
      Law Offices of Allen G. Weinberg and Allen G. Weinberg,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scot A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________

      A jury convicted John Gilbert Mendoza of first-degree
murder, willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder,
and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Mendoza appeals
the murder and attempted murder convictions based on alleged
instructional error. We affirm but order corrections to the
minute order and abstract of judgment. Statutory citations are to
the Penal Code.
                                   I
      Mendoza had children with Gabriel Lopez, the aunt of
Valerie Ibarria. In March 2015, Ibarria was with Lopez at
Maggie’s Bar. Mendoza was also there with his girlfriend,
Monique Palacios. Ibarria believed Mendoza was disrespecting
her aunt. According to Ibarria, she and her aunt encountered
Mendoza in the parking lot, and Ibarria told Mendoza to leave
her aunt alone. Mendoza then hit her in the eye. Ibarria tried to
hit him back but could not. Mendoza left, and Ibarria called Juan
Mila, the father of her child, to come pick her up because she
could not drive. Mila did so and did not bring a gun.
      Palacios told a different story of that night. She said
Ibarria came to their table three or four times and yelled and
cursed at Mendoza. Palacios and Mendoza went to the parking
lot. While Mendoza was next to his motorcycle, Ibarria ran up
and attacked him, hitting him. Mendoza put up his arm to stop
her, and Ibarria ran into his arm and fell down. Ibarria then said
she was going to call her baby’s father to come shoot
Mendoza. After Mendoza left, a man drove up and asked Ibarria,
“where’s he at, so I could shoot him.” Palacios met Mendoza later
at her house and told him about the man and what he had

                                2
said. Palacios conceded on cross-examination she had never
mentioned this to the police or to Mendoza’s attorney until the
day before the trial began. Mendoza confirmed Palacios’ version
of events, though he said he had not heard exactly what Ibarria
said before he left.
       In February 2018, Ibarria went to a bar with a man she
was dating, Adrian Quesada, to celebrate her graduation from a
dental assistant program. Ibarria’s uncle, her uncle’s girlfriend,
and Ibarria’s cousin were already at the bar. Ibarria had done a
few lines of cocaine before arriving. While in the bar, Ibarria saw
Mendoza wearing a t-shirt that said security. She did not know
before seeing him that he worked at the bar. After having a
drink, Ibarria and Quesada went outside to Quesada’s car to
smoke and make out. While they were outside, Mendoza
approached his fellow security guard, Isaiah Savage, who was
working the door, and, without giving a reason, told him not to
let Ibarria and Quesada back in the bar.
       When Ibarria and Quesada returned to the bar’s entrance,
Savage told them he had been instructed not to let them re-
enter. Ibarria calmly asked whether she could tell her family she
could not come back in and say goodbye. Savage agreed that she
could do so, but said Quesada had to remain outside. As Ibarria
tried to re-enter the bar, Mendoza stopped her. At this point,
accounts of what happened begin to differ.
       Ibarria said Mendoza pushed her back out of the bar. As he
did so, he said, “Fuck that. You called child services on
me.” Quesada asked Mendoza, “Why are you pushing her; she’s a
female.” Mendoza again said Ibarria had called child services on
him. Quesada told Mendoza that Ibarria was just trying to say
goodbye to her family. Mendoza responded, “Fuck that. You

                                3
don’t know who the fuck I am.” Quesada responded, “You don’t
know who I am,” and “don’t be fucking talking to me like
that.” Ibarria testified that she heard someone say, “He’s gonna
go get his gun.” Quesada said, “Let’s go. Let’s leave,” and Ibarria
and Quesada hurried toward Quesada’s car.
       According to Savage, after Mendoza stopped Ibarria from
entering the bar, they argued, and Savage heard something about
social services. Quesada told Mendoza, “Don’t bring your
personal life into this.” Savage then pulled Quesada aside to
calm him down. Quesada listened to Savage, and said, “You’re
right. Imma go.” Ibarria and Quesada returned to their car, not
saying anything further to Mendoza.
       Mendoza claimed he “ushered” Ibarria out of the bar, but
did not touch her. As he did so, Mendoza told Ibarria she was not
coming back in because she kept calling social services on
him. Mendoza said Quesada said something about not touching
Ibarria. Savage then spoke to Quesada while Ibarria and
Mendoza “exchanged words” that Mendoza could not
remember. At further questioning from his attorney about his
exchange with Quesada, Mendoza said, “Um, well, I guess you
could say we verbally assaulted each other. Um, called each
other out of our names, cussed at each other. Things of that
nature.” In an earlier interview with police, Mendoza said,
Ibarria said, “Really? This is why you’re gonna fucken do
this?” Ibarria and Quesada started “talking shit.” Quesada said,
“who the fuck are you,” “don’t bring your personal problems to
work,” “[f]uck you, motherfucker,” and “[y]ou ain’t
shit.” Mendoza said Quesada “kind of pushed up” on him by
taking a few steps toward him so he was about seven feet away.

                                4
       All the witnesses agreed that after the encounter at the
door, Ibarria and Quesada headed toward Quesada’s car. Savage
testified that as he watched them go toward the car, he heard a
gun cock and saw in his peripheral vision Mendoza holding a gun
out in front of him. Mendoza began moving toward Quesada’s
car. When Savage heard gunshots, he began trying to get
everyone inside the bar.
       Mendoza claimed he followed Quesada and Ibarria toward
the car to tell them to leave because Ibarria was standing outside
the car and not getting in. Mendoza testified he was not saying
anything to them. On cross examination, he testified he said,
“Let’s get down. Let’s do this shit.” He testified he was afraid
but went toward them because it was his job to get them out of
the parking lot, and he did not want them to stay any
longer. Mendoza said when he was 20 to 25 feet away, he heard
gunshots. A bullet hit the right lower side of his stomach. He
reached for his gun, and another bullet hit his hand and a third
hit under his arm. He began shooting at Quesada’s car with his
other hand. He said Savage’s testimony that he had a gun in his
hand as he walked toward the car was untrue.
       Ibarria testified Quesada got into the driver’s side and
started the car. He yelled at Ibarria, to “Get in, get in!” Ibarria
opened the passenger side door and saw Mendoza walking toward
her with a gun. She saw Mendoza fire the gun and felt bullets hit
her legs. Ibarria fell to the ground. She heard additional bullets
hitting the car. Quesada again told Ibarria to “get in,” but she
could not. Quesada drove out of the parking lot.
       Quesada managed to leave the parking lot and begin
driving on Imperial Highway, but crashed into a wall less than a
mile away. Police found his body in the crashed car along with a

                                5
gun, expended cartridge casings, and fired bullets and bullet
fragments. Quesada died as a result of multiple gunshot
wounds. Police determined the gun found in the car fired the
casings found in the car, but it did not fire the bullets and bullet
fragments. The car bore 13 strike marks and bullet holes. Police
collected 14 expended casings in the parking lot of the bar and
determined they were all fired by the same .9 millimeter gun.
       Paramedics took Ibarria to a hospital. She sustained three
gunshot wounds to her legs and was in the hospital for about
three and a half weeks. At the time of the trial, she was still
suffering from the injuries, including trouble walking, lack of
feeling in her foot, and an inability to stand for long periods of
time. Police spoke to Ibarria while she was in the hospital. She
initially claimed not to know Quesada. The next day, she called
one of the officers and asked to speak again. During the
interview the following day, she admitted she had come to the bar
with Quesada and explained she had initially denied it because
she had a boyfriend in jail who she did not want to know about
Quesada.
       After the shooting, Mendoza returned to the bar and a
patron he knew as Sags drove Mendoza to the hospital in
Mendoza’s truck. Mendoza told police he instructed Sags to leave
the truck in the handicap parking and later told his brother to
move the truck. Police recovered the truck from an impound lot
several days later. Police never found the gun Mendoza claimed
he had left in the center console of the truck.
       Police spoke to Mendoza while he was at the hospital. He
repeatedly denied having a gun or having shot a gun that
night. (By trial, Mendoza changed his story on this point.) At
the hospital, he told the officers he followed Ibarria and Quesada

                                 6
because Quesada was still “talking shit” as he walked
away. Mendoza was angry and responded, “Well, what’s up
fool? . . . Let’s handle this. Let’s get down. Let’s do this
shit.” He told the officers he had a knife in his hand as he did
so. Mendoza claimed he then saw another man in flannel coming
from the side and flashes of gunfire from the car. Mendoza told
the officers he had never had a physical altercation with Ibarria
before. The officers took Mendoza’s phone and later searched the
data. The police found a picture of a .9 millimeter gun Mendoza
identified at trial as the gun he shot that night. The gun pictured
could have fired the expended cartridges found in the parking lot.
       Mendoza testified at trial. He stated that part of his job as
a security guard for the bar was to make sure patrons who
security asked to leave did not remain in the parking lot. He said
the bar’s policy was to give the patrons ten to 15 minutes to
leave, and if they did not, security would inform the bar’s
management. The bar’s management would then instruct
security what to do next. Mendoza claimed he did not follow this
policy here because he wanted Ibarria and Quesada to leave as
soon as possible. The bar’s policy was that security personnel
would be unarmed.
       Mendoza further testified that he felt nervous about Ibarria
and Quesada being there because he did not know if Quesada
was the man Palacios had seen come to pick Ibarria up with a
gun before. Mendoza conceded he was not in danger when
Ibarria and Quesada walked away toward Quesada’s car. He
stated he did not shoot because he was mad but because someone
was shooting at him.
       The parties stipulated that Mendoza had a previous felony
conviction.

                                 7
      Defense counsel informed the court she was not seeking an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of
passion. Defense counsel did ask the court to give CALCRIM No.
3475 “Right to Eject Trespasser from Real Property.” That
instruction reads:

            “The (owner/lawful occupant) of a
     (home/property) may request that a trespasser leave
     the (home/property). If the trespasser does not leave
     within a reasonable time and it would appear to a
     reasonable person that the trespasser poses a threat
     to (the (home/property)/ [or] the (owner/ [or]
     occupants), the (owner/lawful occupant) may use
     reasonable force to make the trespasser leave.

           “Reasonable force means the amount of force
     that a reasonable person in the same situation would
     believe is necessary to make the trespasser leave.

           “[If the trespasser resists, the (owner/lawful
     occupant) may increase the amount of force he or she
     uses in proportion to the force used by the trespasser
     and the threat the trespasser poses to the property.]

           “When deciding whether the defendant used
     reasonable force, consider all the circumstances as
     they were known to and appeared to the defendant
     and consider what a reasonable person in a similar
     situation with similar knowledge would have
     believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable,
     the danger does not need to have actually existed.

                                8
             “The People have the burden of proving beyond
      a reasonable doubt that the defendant used more
      force than was reasonable. If the People have not met
      this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
      <insert crime>.”

       The parties argued the issue both on and off the
record. The trial court stated it was not sure the evidence
showed Ibarria and Quesada were trespassers because they had
not been told to leave the parking lot. After reviewing Mendoza’s
testimony that Ibarria and Quesada were standing outside the
car, not getting in, the trial court said it would allow the parties
to argue the issue. However, after reviewing instructions
defining trespassing and re-reviewing the testimony, the trial
court reversed itself. The court concluded Ibarria and Quesada
were not trespassers because they had not been told to leave the
parking lot, and it would be confusing to the jury to introduce the
issue.
       During closing argument, defense counsel argued Mendoza
had acted in self-defense. She said Mendoza had a reasonable
fear because he had been told a man had come to Maggie’s Bar
with a gun at Ibarria’s summoning. She argued that the fact that
Quesada did have a gun and used it showed the reasonableness
of Mendoza’s fear. She urged the jury to believe Mendoza’s
statement that he walked up to the car with a knife hidden in his
hand and only got out his gun and shot after he had been shot
three times, acting in self-defense.
       The jury found Mendoza guilty of the first-degree murder of
Quesada, the willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder of Ibarria, and of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

                                 9
       Mendoza appeals his convictions of first-degree murder and
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder.
                                   II
       Mendoza argues his convictions of first-degree murder and
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder must be
overturned because the trial court erred in failing to give
instructions on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion
and the right of a lawful occupant to use reasonable force in
ejecting trespassers. Neither argument has merit. As a separate
matter, we order sentencing corrections.
                                   A
       The trial court did not err in refusing to give a voluntary
manslaughter based on heat of passion instruction.
       Trial courts have a sua sponte duty to give instructions on
lesser offenses when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could find the defendant committed the lesser but not the greater
offense. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 148-149,
162.) The instruction on a lesser included offense is unnecessary
when substantial evidence does not support that offense. (People
v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 554-555 (Moye).)
       A murder may be reduced to voluntary manslaughter
where the defendant acted under the heat of passion. (§ 192,
subd. (a).) The defense has two components: a subjective one and
an objective one. (People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995,
1000.) To meet the subjective criterion, the defendant’s passions
must have actually been aroused by the victim at the time of the
killing. (Ibid.) Most significantly here, to meet the objective
criterion, the provocation offered by the victim must have been
sufficient that a reasonable person would react from passion

                               10
rather than judgment. (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935,
938-939.)
       Case law provides concrete examples of provocation that is
insufficient as a matter of law. Taunting words, a technical
battery, a slight touching, or simple assault is not
enough. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826-827
(Gutierrez).) A verbal argument with expletives together with a
tussle involving chest scratching and kicking similarly does not
warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. (Ibid.)
Where the victim called the defendant a motherfucker and
repeatedly challenged the defendant to use a weapon if he had
one, the provocation was plainly insufficient. (Ibid.)
       The evidence here at most shows Ibarria “talked shit,”
though the only specifics Mendoza provided was that Ibarria
said, “Really? This is why you’re gonna fucken do this?” As to
Quesada, Mendoza testified they “verbally assaulted each
other.” According to Mendoza, Quesada told him not to push
Ibarria and said, “who the fuck are you,” “don’t bring your
personal problems to work,” “[f]uck you, motherfucker,” and
“[y]ou ain’t shit.” Mendoza said Quesada “kind of pushed up” on
him by taking a few steps toward him. However, even at that
point, Quesada was still seven feet away from Mendoza.
       These exchanges were insufficient to cause a reasonable
person to act from passion rather than judgment. (Gutierrez,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 826-827.) The victims spoke expletives
and taunting words. Neither Ibarria nor Quesada touched
Mendoza. The only evidence of physical force was Ibarria’s
statement that Mendoza pushed her out of the doorway of the
bar. Because there was not substantial evidence of sufficient
objective provocation, the trial court’s decision not to give a

                               11
voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion instruction was
proper.
                                   B
       The trial court did not err in failing to give CALCRIM 3475
because substantial evidence did not support it. (Moye, supra, 47
Cal.4th at p. 555.)
       CALCRIM 3475 identifies several elements that must be
present for it to come into play. One element is that a trespasser
has failed to leave within a reasonable time after being asked to
do so. The surveillance video and Savage’s testimony establish
gunshots began within about a minute of Ibarria and Quesada
departing from the bar’s entrance after being told to leave. About
one minute does not exceed a reasonable time.
                                   C
       At the August 30, 2021 sentencing hearing, the trial court
sentenced Mendoza to “life with the possibility of parole, with a
minimum parole date of seven years” for the attempted murder
conviction. The minute order and abstract of judgment state the
sentence on this conviction is seven years to life. We order the
trial court to correct the minute order and abstract of judgment to
reflect that the sentence on the attempted murder conviction is a
life term with the possibility of parole after seven years,
consistent with the court’s oral pronouncement at the
hearing. (People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977 fn. 4
[common shorthand of “7 years to life” is inaccurate because it
suggests a minimum term exists rather than a minimum parole
eligibility].)

                                12
                           DISPOSITION
      We order the trial court to correct the minute order and
abstract of judgment to reflect that the sentence for Mendoza’s
conviction for willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder is a life term with the possibility of parole after seven
years. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

                                          WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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