Court Opinion

ID: 9534285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:38:19.432906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:10.297871
License: Public Domain

McINERNEY, Justice
(dissenting).
In my opinion, a review of the competent evidence establishes that the trial court’s judgment, in this matter of equitable cognizance, is amply supported by the evidence. The testimony of the plaintiff is self-contradictory, and is supported, in substance, by only one witness, who is a friend and business associate.
The plaintiff testified that his “advancements” were reported as salary to the Social Security Administration; that he took a written assignment to Thornton four or five weeks before Thornton’s death without obtaining his signature or obtaining any other written agreement specifying plaintiff’s interests; that he knew Thornton, the only person capable of disputing his claim, was going to die and then waited until three weeks after Thornton’s death to first assert the interest claimed here. Plaintiff did not dispute the testimony that he remained silent about his asserted interest during the negotiations between Lauder and Thornton, in his presence, for the purchase by Lauder of Laffoon Oil' Company (wholly owned by Thornton) because “A1 (Thornton) didn’t want me to, it would keep him from selling his company”.
The evidence reveals that plaintiff’s cause of action is founded on verbal agreements with Thornton. Plaintiff knew that Thornton, after an illness of several months, was *611going to die, but did nothing to preserve his asserted interest. The time to resolve any difference with Laffoon Oil Company was during the lifetime of the man with whom he dealt, in this case, Thornton. The defendant would be able to defend the claim during Thornton’s lifetime, but was left in a position later of being unable to dispute what plaintiff said Thornton said. The mere outline of the problem presented by the plaintiff’s inaction best describes the difficulty and prejudice resulting from McLaughlin waiting until Thornton died to sue on an oral agreement between McLaughlin and Thornton.
I believe that the conduct on the part of the plaintiff in delaying his asserted claim, with knowledge of Thornton’s imminent death and the opportunity to institute his suit prior thereto, without affording notice to Lauder, the subsequent purchaser, of his asserted right, causing prejudice to defendant by its inability to defend against the belated claim constitutes laches and renders the demand stale. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, § 162. In my judgment, the evidence submitted by McLaughlin, viewed in the light of the record in its totality, fails to meet the requisite standard of persuasion applicable to proceedings of this nature, and fails to establish that an oral agreement to convey an interest in real property did, in fact, exist. In short, I would follow the trial judge’s findings and, hence, would affirm his judgment.
There was testimony presented by both parties, some inconsistent and contradictory, the weight and effect of which is to be determined by the trier of the facts. I am of the opinion that the general finding for the defendant is not against the clear weight of the evidence, Shaw v. Shaw, Okl., 282 P.2d 748; Lanford v. Cornett, Okl., 415 P.2d 984, 987; 12 O.S.1961, § 611, cases collected under note 5. I am also of the opinion that the trial court’s observation that the defendant was guilty of laches is well taken. A failure to assert a right at the most opportune time leaves open to question whether the right ever did, in fact, exist. This question was resolved in favor of the defendant. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, § 170, p. 716.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the reasons stated.