Court Opinion

ID: 9546441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:29:25.608076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:26.691582
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
dissenting: With considerable reluctance I am obliged to disagree with the majority opinion. The essence of the *945petitioner’s 60-1507 motion is, as accurately diagnosed by the court, that he was coerced by his own counsel into entering his plea of guilty, and he desired to call his counsel, Mr. Dekker, as a witness to prove the point. Under this state of facts it is my opinion that the trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing constituted error.
Rule No. 121 (/) of the Supreme Court (201 Kan. xxxni) reads as follows:
“Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, the court shall notify the county attorney and grant a prompt hearing. ‘Prompt’ means as soon as reasonably possible considering other urgent business of the court. All proceedings on the motion shall be recorded by the official court reporter.”
Subsection (h) of the same rule provides:
“The prisoner should be produced at the hearing on a motion attacking a sentence where there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which he participated. The sentencing court has discretion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting a full evidentiary hearing and requiring the prisoner to be present.”
I cannot reconcile the court’s present opinion with the foregoing sections of our rule or with our former pronouncements interperting the rule. The basis of the petitioner’s claim, i. <?., that his plea was coerced, and thus rendered involuntary by virtue of his attorney’s advice and hostility, is clearly not insubstantial. Nor can the worth of this contention be determined, implausible though it may seem, solely by reference to the files and records of the case itself. The record made at an arraignment may constitute a prima facie showing of voluntariness on the part of an accused, but it is subject to challenge, as in this case.
In Rodgers v. State, 197 Kan. 622, 419 P. 2d 828, this court reversed the judgment of the lower court which summarily overruled a motion under K. S. A. 60-1507 where allegations of fact were set forth, and witnesses were named in support thereof. In remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Fromme, said:
“. . . Even though the charges leveled by the petitioner may seem improbable the matter raised could not be determined alone by the files and records of the court. . . .” (p. 624.)
True, Rule No. 121 (g) provides that the uncorroborated statements of the movant, or petitioner, are insufficient to sustain his burden of proof, and we have held that where a petitioner lists no *946witness on whom he intends to rely in support of his motion, it may be assumed supporting witnesses are not available, and an evidentiary hearing is not required. (Baier v. State, 197 Kan. 602, 419 P. 2d 865; King v. State, 200 Kan. 461, 436 P. 2d 855.) However, since the present motion sets forth the name of a witness whom petitioner intends to produce to support his claim, Rule No. 121 (g) has no bearing in this case.
The crime to which the petitioner pleaded guilty, and the circumstances shown surrounding it, are revolting at best. Nonetheless, so far as this particular action is concerned, I must respectfully differ with my learned colleagues. In my judgment the case should be remanded with directions that an evidentiary hearing be held.
Fatzer, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.