Court Opinion

ID: 9941696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 19:01:49.294401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:56.454497
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30218    Document: 00517066858         Page: 1   Date Filed: 02/16/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                 No. 22-30218
                                                                         FILED
                                                                  February 16, 2024
                                                                    Lyle W. Cayce
   Manuel Adams, Jr.,                                                    Clerk

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                     versus

   City of Harahan,

                                                      Defendant—Appellant.

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                          USDC No. 2:20-CV-2794

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
         This appeal arises from Manuel Adams’s suit against the City of
   Harahan (“the City”) for its alleged deprivation of his Fourteenth
   Amendment right to procedural due process. Because the City never violated
   Adams’s liberty interest in pursuing a career in law enforcement, we
   REVERSE the district court’s denial of the City’s Rule 12(c) motion.
Case: 22-30218         Document: 00517066858               Page: 2       Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                           No. 22-30218

                                   I.       Background
           A.       Chief Walker’s Disciplinary Charges Against Adams
           Adams ascended the ranks to Captain over an eighteen-year career in
   law enforcement with the Harahan Police Department (“HPD”). He had an
   unblemished disciplinary record during his tenure with HPD. But that
   changed in October 2019, when HPD Chief of Police Robert Walker (“Chief
   Walker”) determined that Adams was guilty of numerous offenses,
   including: (1) Conduct Unbecoming an Officer; (2) Unsatisfactory
   Performance; and (3) False Statement. As a classified civil service employee,
   Adams was entitled to a fifteen-day appeal window of Chief Walker’s
   disciplinary determinations. See La. R. S. § 33:2561.
           Adams exercised his right to appeal a week after Chief Walker’s
   charges. However, Chief Walker emailed the Jefferson Parish District
   Attorney’s office (“JPDA”) to inform it of his disciplinary action against
   Adams before he exercised his right. After communicating with Chief
   Walker, JPDA placed Adams’s name on its witness notification list (the
   “Giglio list”). 1 Adams alleges that an officer’s inclusion on the Giglio list is
   effectively a “death knell to a career in law enforcement.” Because the Giglio
   list is at JPDA’s discretion, a successful appeal by Adams would not force
   JPDA to remove his name from the list. With no guaranteed way to get his
   name off of the Giglio list, Adams sued the City.

           1
            JPDA maintains a witness notification list in accordance with Brady v. Maryland,
   373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Those cases require
   JPDA to turn over any evidence favorable to the defendant. This includes evidence that the
   accused can use to impeach police officers that the prosecution relies on in building its case.
   Adams avers that his inclusion on the Giglio list labels him as a liar or bad cop, which
   operates as a bar to his continued career in law enforcement.

                                                 2
Case: 22-30218       Document: 00517066858             Page: 3      Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                        No. 22-30218

           B.     District Court Proceedings
           Adams brought a civil rights suit against the City for violation of his
   procedural due process rights, stigma-plus-infringement, and defamation
   under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also included Louisiana state law claims for
   defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence. The City moved to dismiss
   his § 1983 claims under Rule 12(c). 2
          The district court first examined his procedural due process claim. It
   rejected Adams’s assertions that the City unconstitutionally violated his
   property interest because he was afforded due process when he exercised his
   right to appeal Chief Walker’s determinations. It then evaluated whether the
   City violated his liberty interests. Notably, it recognized Adams’s “liberty
   interest in his occupation as a law enforcement officer.” It reasoned that the
   Supreme Court supported its conclusion that Adams has a right “to engage
   in any of the common occupations of life.” Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 94
   (2015). It then held that the City violated his right by failing to provide him
   the “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
   manner” before reporting his disciplinary charges to JPDA. Matthews v.
   Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
          The district court opined that the process that the City provided
   Adams was unsatisfactory for at least two reasons: (1) he sufficiently alleged
   that Chief Walker oversaw his disciplinary proceedings and likely had bias
   against him; and (2) he remained deprived of his liberty interest even if his
   appeal was successful. Having established that Adams pleaded facts to
   support that Chief Walker violated his procedural due process rights based

           2
              The City did not challenge Adams’s defamation, invasion-of-privacy, or
   negligence claims in its Rule 12(c) motion. Therefore, those claims are not addressed in
   this opinion.

                                              3
Case: 22-30218       Document: 00517066858             Page: 4      Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                        No. 22-30218

   on a deprivation of his liberty interest, it next evaluated whether he could
   sustain this claim against the City.
          The district court allowed Adams’s claim against the City to survive
   the pleading stage. It first reasoned that the municipal liability analysis was
   straightforward because he alleged that Chief Walker acted pursuant to a
   policy, practice, and custom of the City. Accordingly, the City was liable
   because Chief Walker acted as the final policymaker on its behalf. Second, it
   stated that the City was liable even though JPDA put Adams’s name on the
   list because Chief Walker “set in motion a series of events that would
   foreseeably cause the deprivation of [Adams’s] constitutional rights.” Morris
   v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 672 (5th Cir. 1999). Ultimately, it viewed the case
   as one where Chief Walker contrived an investigation against Adams,
   determined his guilt, and contacted JPDA intending to place his name on the
   Giglio list and end his career in law enforcement. Under that characterization,
   it determined that Adams successfully alleged a Fourteenth Amendment
   violation under § 1983.
          Finally, the district court addressed Adams’s stigma-plus-defamation
   claim. It held that he failed to allege facts demonstrating the “infliction of a
   stigma on the person’s reputation by a state official” plus “an infringement
   of some other interest.” Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935–36
   (5th Cir. 1995). The district court dismissed this claim but granted him leave
   to amend. 3 The City appealed.
          On appeal, the City argues that the district court erred in determining
   that Adams anchored his due process claim to a cognizable liberty interest. It
   asks us to reverse this determination and dismiss his claims. If we determine

           3
            The City does not contest the district court’s decision to allow Adams to amend
   his stigma-plus-defamation claim, so we do not address that claim herein.

                                              4
Case: 22-30218       Document: 00517066858             Page: 5      Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                        No. 22-30218

   that Adams has successfully alleged a violation of his liberty interest, it insists
   that we should still dismiss his claim because it provided him adequate due
   process.
                          II.     Standard of Review
           We review “de novo a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion
   for judgment on the pleadings.” Q Clothier New Orleans, LLC v. Twin City
   Fire Ins. Co., 29 F.4th 252, 256 (5th Cir. 2022). “The standard for deciding a
   Rule 12(c) motion is the same standard used for deciding motions to dismiss
   pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
   must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
   relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2007).
                                  III. Discussion
          A.      Standing
           Adams’s suit against the City raises unavoidable questions about his
   legal standing. Despite neither party nor the district court raising these
   concerns, we are required to address standing before analyzing the merits of
   his claim. See Lewis v. Hunt, 492 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining
   that federal appellate courts must evaluate potential jurisdictional defects,
   even when the parties and the district court fail to raise the issue). Standing
   requires a plaintiff to satisfy three basic elements: injury in fact, causation,
   and redressability. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
   This case turns on the causation and redressability elements. 4

          4
            Adams’s complaint alleges numerous injuries sufficient for standing, including:
   lost wages, opportunity for additional employment, and irreparable damage to his
   reputation.

                                              5
Case: 22-30218       Document: 00517066858             Page: 6      Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                        No. 22-30218

          On causation, Adams contends that without Chief Walker’s sham
   investigation, JPDA would never have considered placing him on the Giglio
   list. Because Chief Walker did not directly place him on the list, there are
   concerns about whether a sufficient causal link exists between his placement
   on the list and Chief Walker’s communications with JPDA. See California v.
   Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2117 (2021) (explaining that if “a causal relation
   between injury and challenged action depends upon the decision of an
   independent third party . . . standing is . . . ordinarily substantially more
   difficult to establish”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). But those
   concerns are not a barrier to his claim. The Supreme Court has explained that
   causation is satisfied when a plaintiff’s injury results from “the predictable
   effect of Government action on the decisions of third parties.” Dep’t of Com.
   v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019). Adams alleges that Chief Walker
   knew that contacting JPDA about his disciplinary charges would lead to his
   placement on the Giglio list. In fact, he asserts that was the primary reason
   for his alleged sham investigation. Thus, his injury stems from the
   “predictable effect” of Chief Walker’s actions and the causal link is
   sufficiently preserved for the purposes of standing. Id.
          That leaves redressability, which is best explained by highlighting
   what this lawsuit is not about. Adams did not only sue to get his name off the
   Giglio list—nor could he because such relief is unobtainable without
   including JPDA as a defendant. Instead, he primarily sought compensatory
   and punitive damages. 5 A suit for damages is conceivable against the City
   because Adams suffered a quantifiable injury from Chief Walker’s conduct.

          5
              Adams’s complaint does not foreclose the district court’s decision to provide
   equitable relief in the form of his removal from JPDA’s Giglio list. But he does not
   specifically pray for an equitable remedy, leaving it entirely to the district court’s
   discretion.

                                              6
Case: 22-30218         Document: 00517066858               Page: 7      Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                          No. 22-30218

   Indeed, Adams satisfies the redressability element even if his injuries result
   in just nominal damages. See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 801–
   02 (2021) (“[A] request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability
   element of standing[.]”). Because Adams sued the proper party and sought
   relief within the district court’s power to grant, he had standing. See Lujan,
   504 U.S. at 560–61. We therefore proceed to the merits of his due process
   claim.
            B.      Whether Adams’s Occupational Liberty Interest Exists
            The City urges reversal on two grounds, arguing that: (1) the district
   court erroneously determined that Adams had a liberty interest in his “future
   employment as a law enforcement officer”; and (2) even if Adams
   sufficiently pleaded a cognizable liberty interest, the City legally deprived
   him of that interest by providing him adequate process.
            We first analyze whether Adams’s alleged liberty interest in his
   desired career has any basis in this court. After surveying the applicable
   caselaw, we conclude that it does. 6 But after careful examination of his
   complaint and the record, we still hold in the City’s favor because it never
   deprived Adams of his occupational liberty. And without the deprivation of a
   liberty interest, the City could not have violated Adams’s right to procedural
   due process.
            “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects against
   deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its

            6
            This court’s rule of orderliness requires us to recognize liberty interests that we
   have acknowledged in previous cases. See In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th 787,
   792 (5th Cir. 2021) (“It is a well-settled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness that one panel of
   our court may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the
   law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our en banc court.”
   (quoting Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intel. Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)).

                                                 7
Case: 22-30218      Document: 00517066858          Page: 8    Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                    No. 22-30218

   procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”
   Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Accordingly, to state a claim
   for a due process violation, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the deprivation of a
   protected property or liberty interest, and (2) that the deprivation occurred
   without due process of law.” Holden v. Perkins, 398 F. Supp. 3d 16, 23 (E.D.
   La. 2019) (citing Grimes v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 930 F.2d
   441, 444 (5th Cir. 1991)).
          Liberty interests come from two sources: (1) “the Constitution itself,
   by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty’”; and (2) “an
   expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Id. (citations
   omitted). Despite only providing two sources for discerning liberty interests,
   the Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n a Constitution for a free people,
   there can be no doubt that the meaning of ‘liberty’ must be broad indeed.”
   Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (“Bd. of
   Regents”).
          We begin our examination of Adams’s liberty interest in pursuing his
   chosen career with our decision in Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 392 F.2d
   697 (5th Cir. 1968). In that case, three high school students sued a school
   district in response to a new regulation banning certain types of hairstyles and
   imposing hair-length requirements. Id. at 698–99. Appellants, being aspiring
   rockstars, claimed that imposing the hair regulations violated their
   constitutional rights to expression and due process. Id. The district court held
   in the school district’s favor, dissolving the students’ temporary restraining
   order, and denying their motion for an injunction. Id. at 697.
          In affirming the district court, we expressly recognized the students’
   desire to pursue a commercial venture as musicians. See id. at 703 (“We
   recognize that appellants are professional musicians performing as a musical
   combo.”). We explained that their “right to follow this chosen business or

                                          8
Case: 22-30218      Document: 00517066858           Page: 9    Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                     No. 22-30218

   occupation free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within
   the liberty and property concepts of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. (citing
   Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)). We concluded, however, that the
   “action taken by the school authorities [did] not . . . interfere with [the
   students’] right to continue in their chosen occupation of professional rock
   and roll musicians” because their business activity was not eliminated “as a
   practical matter because of the school’s rules and regulations.” Id. at 704.
          We also contemplated occupational liberty interests in Shaw v. Hosp.
   Auth., 507 F.2d 625, 628 (5th Cir. 1975). There, a plaintiff claimed that his
   right to procedural due process was infringed by the Hospital Authority’s
   denial of his application for staff membership at a local hospital. Id. at 626.
   Under the applicable bylaws and regulations, staff membership at public
   hospitals was reserved for “full-practice physicians and duly licensed
   dentists.” Id. (citing Ga. Code Ann. § 84-601). Podiatrists, like the
   plaintiff, did not fall into either category, so membership was never extended
   to those professionals. Id. The crux of the plaintiff’s due-process claim was
   that in denying his staff membership to the hospital, the Hospital Authority
   interfered with his constitutional right to pursue his chosen vocation, offering
   him inadequate process before depriving him of his substantive right. Id. at
   628.
          A panel of this court agreed with the plaintiff, holding that “in seeking
   staff privileges at [the hospital],” he sought to “engage in his occupation as
   a podiatrist and this [was] a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
   Amendment.” Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)). In
   recognition of his liberty interest in working as a podiatrist, we explained that
   the plaintiff was “entitled to a hearing conforming to minimal requirements
   of procedural due process of notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. We
   ultimately vacated and remanded in his favor, concluding that he never
   received due process.

                                          9
Case: 22-30218     Document: 00517066858            Page: 10    Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                     No. 22-30218

          We again considered an individual’s liberty interest in their business
   in San Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 1991). In San
   Jacinto, a local arcade owner asserted third-party claims under § 1983 against
   the city of Waxahachie, Texas and one of its police officers (collectively
   “Waxahachie”). Id. at 699. The arcade owner alleged that Waxahachie
   deprived her of her right to run her business by using its authority to
   intimidate customers from frequenting her arcade. Id. In her complaint, she
   asserted that Waxahachie targeted her business because it mostly catered to
   entertaining large groups of minors. Id. The district court held in
   Waxahachie’s favor, granting summary judgment because the plaintiff failed
   to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her liberty or property
   interests were violated, and that Waxahachie was directly responsible for her
   arcade’s downfall. Id. at 699–704.
          On appeal, a panel of this court reversed in the plaintiff’s favor. We
   first concluded that she clearly asserted a cognizable Fifth and Fourteenth
   Amendment right to “operate a legitimate business, free from arbitrary
   deprivation by local police acting under the color of state law.” Id. at 702
   (citing Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217, 1222 (5th Cir. 1983) (“It requires
   no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common
   occupations of the community is of the very essence of the freedom and
   opportunity that it was the purpose of the [fourteenth] Amendment to
   secure.”) (alteration in original), clarified on rehearing, 724 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.
   1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984)). After acknowledging her liberty
   interest, we remanded to the district court to evaluate whether Waxahachie
   sought to deprive her of this interest without due process of law. Id. (“Kacal
   can succeed in a section 1983 claim by showing that the officers, acting under
   color of state law, sought to remove or significantly alter her liberty and
   property interests in [her arcade] without due process of law.”).

                                          10
Case: 22-30218     Document: 00517066858            Page: 11    Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                     No. 22-30218

          We later reaffirmed the notion of an occupational liberty interest in
   Stidham v. Tex. Comm’n on Private Sec., 418 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2005). In that
   case, a plaintiff filed a § 1983 suit against Texas Commission on Private
   Security (“TCPS”) officials after they sent threatening letters to patrons of
   his funeral home business in retaliation for his refusal to apply for a TCPS
   license. Id. at 487. The district court granted TCPS qualified immunity from
   the suit at the summary judgment stage. A panel of this court reversed that
   decision, determining that TCPS violated the plaintiff’s clearly established
   constitutional rights by “depriving him of his liberty interest without due
   process of law.” Id. at 491.
          As we do now, the Stidham panel marshaled out numerous Supreme
   Court and Fifth Circuit decisions in acknowledging the plaintiff’s liberty
   interest in operating a funeral home business. See id. (quoting Truax v. Raich,
   239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) and citing Ferrell, 392 F.2d at 703; Shaw, 507 F.2d at
   628; and San Jacinto, 928 F.2d at 704). The panel ultimately concluded that
   the plaintiff “identified a protectible liberty interest in pursuing an
   occupation of his choice.” Id. at 491–92.
          Finally, and most recently, we discussed the right to “freely practice”
   in one’s “chosen profession” in Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456, 467 (5th
   Cir. 2021). There, Ghedi brought due process claims against the Attorney
   General, Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security
   Administration (“TSA”), and Customs and Border Protection after he was
   placed on TSA’s selectee list. Id. at 456. He alleged that these entities placed
   him on the selectee list, which subjected him to enhanced screenings at
   airports, in retaliation to his refusal to be an informant for the Federal Bureau
   of Investigation. Id. He claimed that his placement on the list made it “nearly
   impossible” for him to continue his “business and humanitarian” work. Id.
   at 467. A federal district court dismissed his claims.

                                          11
Case: 22-30218     Document: 00517066858           Page: 12    Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                    No. 22-30218

          We affirmed the district court’s decision on appeal, first stating that
   Ghedi’s right to participate in a profession of his choosing had a basis in this
   court. Id. at 467. But we nonetheless held against him because he failed to
   meet the high burden of proving that the Government deprived him of the
   right. Id. Specifically, we explained that deprivation of occupational liberty
   only occurs when the government has “effectively foreclosed” the ability for
   someone to work in his desired field. Id. (“Ghedi must plead facts showing
   that Defendants ‘effectively foreclosed’ him from practicing his chosen
   profession to show a deprivation.”). Because Ghedi merely pleaded that his
   placement on the screening list made it “nearly impossible to do” his job, he
   was not deprived of his right to work in his chosen field. Id. (quotation
   omitted).
          In sum, Adams’s right to pursue a career in law enforcement is deep-
   rooted in the Fifth Circuit’s jurisprudence. The mere existence of that right,
   however, is insufficient for Adams to bring his suit against the City. He must
   also sufficiently allege facts demonstrating that the City violated his
   occupational liberty interest. As we will demonstrate, he has not met his
   burden.
          C.     Whether the City Infringed Adams’s Liberty Interest
          As he did at the district court, Adams maintains that the City deprived
   him of his right to a career in law enforcement and the armed forces by
   prompting JPDA to place him on the Giglio list. We disagree.
          A plaintiff claiming that his right to work in a common occupation
   must “plead facts showing that [the defendants] effectively foreclosed him
   from practicing his chosen profession to show a deprivation.” Ghedi, 16 F.4th
   at 467. Our precedent makes clear that a plaintiff’s liberty interest remains
   intact when the Government simply makes his efforts to remain in a given
   vocation more difficult or even “nearly impossible[.]” Id.

                                         12
Case: 22-30218     Document: 00517066858            Page: 13   Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                     No. 22-30218

          For example, in Ferrell, we explained that the school district did not
   interfere with the students’ rights to seek a musical career by imposing hair-
   length requirements. 392 F.2d at 703. And in San Jacinto, the violation of
   Kacal’s liberty interest stemmed from the police’s intentional efforts to
   discontinue her business entirely. 928 F.2d at 703. Even in Shaw, the
   podiatrist was blocked entirely from conducting his business in a public
   hospital by the Hospital Authority’s refusal to grant him licensure. 507 F.2d
   at 628. The general principle from these cases is clear: a plaintiff’s liberty
   interest in pursuing a specific profession is only violated if he has been
   completely prevented from working in that field.
          Here, Adams has not sufficiently pleaded that the actions Chief
   Walker took to get him placed on JPDA’s Giglio list prevent him from
   working in his desired careers. On its face, his complaint certainly alleges that
   his inclusion on the Giglio list prohibits him from engaging in two of his
   chosen professions: (1) a law enforcement officer; and (2) a member of the
   United States Army Reserve (the “Reserve”). But he repeatedly contradicts
   those assertions, rendering them nothing more than conclusory statements.
   And we cannot accept his “threadbare allegations . . . [failing to] give rise to
   a reasonable inference that the Government has effectively foreclosed” him
   from serving as a member in those honorable professions. Ghedi, 16 F.4th at
   467.
          First, Adams’s complaint states that an officer’s inclusion on the
   Giglio list is “a death knell to a career in law enforcement.” He also
   emphasizes that Chief Walker “knew he was destroying careers when he
   began to . . . send out Giglio violation notices to [] JPDA before procedural
   due process had run through appeals.” At no point, however, does he plead
   that he lost his current or a future job due to Chief Walker’s communications
   with JPDA or his placement on the Giglio list. Put differently, the City,
   through Chief Walker’s alleged conduct, may have made Adams’s career

                                          13
Case: 22-30218         Document: 00517066858                 Page: 14        Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                            No. 22-30218

   “nearly impossible to” advance in, but it never effected the prohibition—
   temporary, permanent, or otherwise—of his career as a police officer. Ghedi,
   16 F.4th at 467.
            In fact, as the record details, the only reason that Adams is not
   presently a member of HPD is because he agreed to retire from the force as a
   condition of his settlement with the City during his civil service appeal. 7
   Specifically, his agreement with the City provided that Adams would: (1)
   receive an “absolute nullity” declaration from the civil service tribunal; (2)
   be reinstated with a return to his rank as Captain; (3) receive backpay
   calculated to his original date of demotion to Sergeant; (4) have two other
   disciplinary actions reversed and dismissed; and (5) be permitted to “retire
   upon his reinstatement with full benefits.” So, based on his pleadings at the
   district court and the record on appeal, Adams has not alleged that the City
   ever prevented his career as a law enforcement officer with HPD or any other
   police force. Rather, he ended his career by his own hand and on his
   bargained-for terms.
           Second, Adams flatly concedes that the City did not bar or interfere
   with his continued employment in the armed forces. 8 His complaint makes
   troubling allegations that Chief Walker and his assistant, Officer Moody,
   used a pretextual basis to contact his commanding officers in the Reserve to

            7
             Notably, Adams’s settlement also included terms requiring the City to reach out
   to several parties that may have been privy to his inclusion on the Giglio list, so that they
   can learn that he was cleared of the disciplinary charges during his appeal process.
            8
               The standard in a procedural due process claim based on a government entity’s
   deprivation of someone’s liberty interest requires more than the Government’s alleged
   efforts to deprive someone of a specific interest. The Government must successfully deprive
   the plaintiff of a cognizable interest for a claim to accrue. See supra Part III.B; see also Bd. of
   Regents, 408 U.S. at 569 (“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the
   deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty
   and property.” (emphasis added)).

                                                   14
Case: 22-30218     Document: 00517066858           Page: 15    Date Filed: 02/16/2024

                                    No. 22-30218

   notify them of his pending, falsely brought disciplinary charges with HPD.
   But he goes on to admit that his employers heard his side of the story and
   allowed him to retain his employment with the Reserve.
          Furthermore, Adams states that the effects of the City’s
   communications with his commanding officers have yet to come to fruition,
   opting instead to plead numerous speculative problems that the dilemma may
   cause. Like the plaintiff in Ghedi, he may suffer some hardship as he attempts
   to progress through the ranks in the armed forces, but that potentiality alone
   is insufficient to hold that the City “effectively foreclosed” his military
   career altogether. 16 F.4th at 467.
          To conclude, the City incorrectly insists that the district court created
   a novel liberty interest in this case. The district court’s decision to
   acknowledge Adams’s right to a career in law enforcement is supported by
   decades of Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. See supra Part III.B.2. We nonetheless
   hold in the City’s favor because Adams has not pleaded that an actual
   deprivation of this recognized interest occurred by failing to state that the
   City foreclosed his career in law enforcement or the armed forces. And
   because the City never violated Adams’s liberty interest, we need not address
   his remaining arguments on the amount and degree of process he received.
                              IV.    Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE the district court’s
   judgment on the City’s Rule 12(c) motion.

                                         15