Court Opinion

ID: 9551554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:55:15.89766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:09.829527
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice.
By this special action, petitioner seeks to prohibit the Superior Court of Maricopa County from entering an order canceling a lis pendens. It was brought under Rule 2, Special Actions, Rules of Procedure, 17A A.R.S. Rule 2 provides in part:
“Any person who previously could institute an application for a writ of mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari may institute proceedings for a special action.”
Prohibition lies where an inferior court is acting in excess of or without jurisdiction and injustice is apt to occur if the appellate court does not intervene. Charboneau v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 101 Ariz. 586, 422 P.2d 702 (1967); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966). In order to determine whether a lower court has acted without jurisdiction, the Supreme Court will examine the external validity of the proceedings to determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, the persons, and to render the particular judgment given. Caruso v. Superior Court of Pima County, 100 Ariz. 167, 412 P.2d 463 (1966).
In petitioner’s first amended complaint, he alleges that a joint venture was formed with the individual defendants, the individual respondents here, to acquire, develop and sell a 70-acre parcel of real property. Petitioner does not assert that he has a contract with the corporate defendants, the actual owners of the property. He alleges that he expended his time and effort for two years pursuant to the contract but has not yet been compensated. He asks the court for an accounting and dissolution of the joint venture, together with disposition of the partnership assets in which he claims a 25% interest, and he also asks that a constructive trust be impressed on the 70 acres sufficient to reflect his alleged one-quarter interest in the asserted partnership assets. Petitioner also filed, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1191, a lis pendens describing the 70-acre parcel of real property. The court below thereafter granted a motion to quash the lis pendens, and this special action was brought to set aside the court’s order.
Petitioner’s prayer in his complaint to impose a constructive trust is for relief equitable in nature. Both at common law and in equity, the pendency of a suit affecting the title to real property was constructive notice thereof to all the world. Lis pendens statutes are designed to provide a better form of notice to one who may be interested in a particular piece of real property and who may be affected by the outcome of litigation in which the property is the subject matter of a suit.
“ * * * long before the enactment of any statutory regulations on the subject, the mere pendency of a suit in equity affecting the title to real property was *384held, both at common law and in equity, to constitute constructive notice thereof to all the world, and the registry statutes, so far from creating the doctrine, actually limited its application by making it effective only if the action were indexed in accordance with the statutory requirements. In short, being a creature not of statute but of common law and equity jurisprudence, the doctrine of Us pendens is wholly subject to equitable principles.” Dice v. Bender, 383 Pa. 94, 97, 117 A.2d 725, 727 (1955). (Emphasis supplied)
Since A.R.S. § 12-1191(A) was adopted to provide an effective means of giving notice to parties interested in land and is not a restriction on the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, the Superior Court had the power to grant the relief sought in the motion to quash the lis pendens.
“The jurisdiction of a court of equity does not depend upon whether the court has or has not granted relief under similar circumstances,- but upon the necessitities of mankind and the correct princi- ■ pies of natural justice which are applicable alike to all conditions of society, all ages, and all people, and the courts should adapt their practice and course of proceeding to the existing state of society, and not, by too strict an adherence to forms, rules, and precedents, decline to administer justice.” Grand I. B. of Locomotive Engrs. v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 398, 31 P.2d 971, 978 (1934).
And since the Superior Court had the jurisdiction to determine respondents’ motion, this special action' to prohibit the Superior Court must be ordered quashed.
While the foregoing is sufficient to dispose of this case, two further matters are worthy of comment.
The instant case is the near-perfect example of why this Court has in the past refused to override the discretion of a lower court. It was aptly- stated in Beefy King International, Inc. v. Veigle, 5 Cir., 464 F.2d 1102, 1104 (1972):
“The effect of a lis pendens on the owner of property, however, is constraining. For all practical purposes, it would be virtually impossible to sell or mortgage the property because the interest of a purchaser or mortgagee would be subject to the eventual outcome of the lawsuit.”
Irreparable financial loss can be sustained by the corporate owners of the property and, of course, by their stockholders by the' filing of the lis pendens. The 70 acres in question are in the process of development from raw land to dwelling and commercial property. The initial cost of the land was approximately $523,000.00. This was provided by respondents. Nor, so far as the record is concerned, has petitioner agreed to pay or paid any of the development cost's. But by reason of the lis pendens, the ability to financially continue the development of the property is manifestly greatly impaired. The potential future loss to respondents while the case is slowly wending its way through the court system is disproportionately high when compared to the petitioner’s claimed rights.
By contrast, petitioner has little to lose by filing a lis pendens. The filing of a notice of lis pendens is a part of a judicial proceeding and, as such, is privileged and will not sustain an action for slander of title. Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz.App. 149, 481 P.2d 519 (1971). The financial losses incurred by reason of an unsuccessful venture will have to be absorbed by respondents. The trial judge obviously believed that it is inequitable not to annul the lis pendens.
This case is not analogous to Andrew Brown Company v. Painters Warehouse, Inc., 11 Ariz.App. 571, 466 P.2d 790 (1970). In that case, the lower court granted a motion to quash certain writs of garnishment in a proceeding which was not within the contemplation of the garnishment statutes. While the opinion held that the lower court' was without jurisdiction to quash the writs of garnishment, the dis*385tinction controlling the disposition of the case was adequately recognized there:
“[1] We note at the outset that garnishment was unknown to the common law; it has come into being as a statutory remedy, [citations] Since garnishment is a creature of statute, garnishment proceedings are necessarily governed by the terms of those statutes, [citations] Thus, courts may not allow garnishment proceedings to follow any course other than that charted by the legislature, [citations].” 11 Ariz.App. at 572, 466 P.2d at 791.
As stated, lis pendens is simply a statutory substitute for notice of a legal proceeding which affects the title to realty. It is fundamentally procedural because it provides a different, more adequate method of notice without conferring any additional substantive right. We do not consider that the two statutes are analogous.
The petition for special action is ordered quashed.
CAMERON, C. J., and LOCKWOOD, J., concur.