Court Opinion

ID: 9832794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:12:30.837694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:52.795386
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In our original opinion upholding the validity of the two elections herein we impliedly overruled the contention of the appellees in their original brief in regard to the unconstitutionality of the law under which the consolidation of the two schools was effected. In a motion for rehearing the appellees vigorously attack the constitutionality of that portion of section Sb of article 2742b relative to the consolidation of a common county line school district with a contiguous independent school district, asserting that such provision involves a subject not expressed in the title to the 1927 Act of the 40th Legislature and is therefore within the prohibition of section 35 of article 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon’s Ann. St.
The title of the 1927 Act (Acts 1927, 40th Leg., 1st C.S., p. 228, ch. 84) is in part as follows: “An Act to provide for increasing or diminishing the area of an Independent School District upon petition of qualified resident property taxpaying voters; * * * providing for increasing or diminishing the area of Common School Districts or abolishing Common School Districts by the County Board upon a vote of a majority of the qualified voters in the district affected; * * * providing for the establishment or consolidation of County Line School Districts”.
The appellees assert that the above title would not warrant the enactment of the provision relative to the consolidation of a common county line district with a contiguous independent district but would only warrant a provision consolidating one county line district with another county line district.
We are not in accord with the appellees’ contention in this respect. Under the liberal construction placed upon the above constitutional provision by our courts we are of the opinion the title of this Act was sufficient to support the enactment in the body of the bill relative to the consolidation of a county line district with a contiguous independent district. In speaking of the purposes of this constitutional provision the Commission of Appeals in Consolidated Underwriters v. Kirby Lumber Co., 267 S.W. 703, 705, said:
*664“It is well recognized that the' purposes of this provision ar-e to advise the Legislature and the people of the nature of each particular bill, so as to prevent the insertion of obnoxious clauses which otherwise might be ingrafted on it and become the law, and to obviate legislation through the combination, upon a composite bill, of the votes of the proponents of different measures included in it, some of which would not pass upon their merits if separately considered. Stone v. Brown, 54 Tex. [330] 342.”
In this connection it was held in the foregoing Kirby Lumber Company case that the title is sufficient if the general and ultimate subject of the particular act as a whole is found in the wording of the title, and the subject so expressed will support provisions in the body of the act that are component parts of the general subject, reasonably implied or auxiliary to it, relevant, germane, complementary, necessary or reasonably incidental.
In Doeppenschmidt v. International & G. N. R. Co., 100 Tex. 532, 101 S.W. 1080, 1081, the Supreme Court of Texas, speaking through Chief Justice Gaines, said: “It would be burdensome if not intolerable to require that the title should be as full as the act itself. The word ‘title’ implies that no such requirement exists. The purpose of the constitutional provision is merely to reasonably apprise the legislators of the contents of the bill, to the end that surprise and fraud in legislation may be prevented.”
It has also been held that it “is legitimate in the construction of a law ,to refer to the caption for explanation * * *, and it is equally permissible in the construction of the caption to refer to the body of the act * * *.” City of Austin et al. v. McCall, 95 Tex. 565, 68 S.W. 791, 793.
We therefore conclude that the title to this Act was sufficient to give “fair indication and reasonable notice” to the legislators that the body of the bill included the provision under attack and thus prevented “the mischiefs against which the Constitution seeks to guard”. 30 Tex.Jur. 92, § 43; Austin Independent School Dist. et al. v. Marrs, Superintendent, et al., 121 Tex. 72, 41 S.W.2d 9; City of Aransas Pass et al. v. Keeling, Atty. Gen., 112 Tex. 339, 247 S.W. 818; Breen v. Texas & P. R. Co., 44 Tex. 302; Pyote Independent School Dist. v. Dyer, Tax Collector, Tex.Com.App., 24 S.W.2d 37; Id., Tex.Com.App., 34 S.W.2d 578; Lowery, Tax Collector, v. Red Cab Co., Tex.Civ.App., 262 S.W. 147, writ of error refused; Pleasant Valley Common School Dist. No. 7 et al. v. Story, County Judge, et al., Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 258, writ of error refused.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.