Court Opinion

ID: 9782063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:55:34.053969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:29.905378
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, J.,
dissenting.
1 1 I dissent to the majority's resolution of Proposition I. A magistrate and trial judge found that the statutory provisions allowing for alternate jurors in multicounty grand juries cannot be harmonized with the Oklahoma Constitution. After reviewing the plain language of the constitution, I agree. I would find that portion of 38 0.$.Supp.2004, § 21, which authorizes three additional alternate grand jurors, unconstitutional and uphold the decision below.
'I 2 At the outset, I want to compliment my colleague, Judge Lewis, on his concurring opinion. I believe it is excellently researched and written. I absolutely agree with his explanation of why any grand jury in Oklahoma must be composed of twelve qualified jurors. My own analysis depends entirely on this argument. As I explain below, I cannot agree with his conclusion that the Oklahoma grand jury, as provided for by the constitution, does not effectively provide alternates. Because I believe that alternates are built into the constitutional language, I conclude that the statute providing separately for grand jury alternates is not constitutional.
(3 Article 2, § 18 of the Oklahoma Constitution states, "A grand jury shall be composed of twelve (12) persons, any nine (9) of whom concurring may find an indictment or true bill." 1 This plain language means that a grand jury must consist of twelve qualified people, but only nine are required to return an indictment or true bill. As a practical matter, this creates a system of alternate jurors within the constitutional language authorizing a grand jury. If only nine jurors are necessary to return a true bill, then the remaining three constitutionally-mandated jurors are, in effect, alternates. For this reason, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that § 18 does not address issues relating to alternate grand jurors. As I read the constitutional provision, it includes provision for up to three alternate grand jurors within the mandated twelve jurors.2
T4 As the majority states, the constitution's grand jury provisions found in § 18 are3 The constitution provides for some supplemental statutory framework to allow a grand jury to convene and function. However, the Legislature only has authority to pass enabling legislation where the constitution itself is silent on an issue. We have upheld legislation which puts in place a functional framework by addressing issues not included in the constitutional provision.4 This framework includes the role of the district attorney or Attorney General, the presence of a court reporter, the obtaining, use and disclosure of transcripts, and questions of who may be present in the grand jury *411room during grand jury sessions.5 We have also upheld legislation creating a framework for multicounty grand juries.6 However, we have held that these statutory provisions must be truly supplemental, and cannot either add to or subtract from the plain language of the constitution.7
15 The majority sets forth the correct tests for interpretation of constitutional and statutory measures. We must attempt to harmonize the statute with the constitution,8 construing the statutory provision liberally and upholding it unless it is inconsistent with the constitutional language.9 Applying the appropriate legal tests, I reach the opposite conclusion from the majority. I agree with the majority that the principle of allowing alternate jurors is sensible at both the grand jury and petit jury level. I believe the constitution itself recognizes this principle. I join the lower courts in this case in concluding that the plain language of § 18, which specifies the number of grand jurors and effectively authorizes alternate grand jurors, cannot be harmonized with the statutory language authorizing additional alternate grand jurors beyond the number twelve mandated by the constitution. The statutory language covers an issue already contained in the constitutional provision. It is contradictory, in that it allows for three grand jurors to be seated over the twelve provided for in the constitution; it is superfluous, because the constitutional language provides for alternate jurors. I believe the moving parties met their burden to show the statutory provision cannot be harmonized with the constitutional language, and I would uphold the lower courts' decision.
16 I believe the magistrate was right. Therefore, I must address the issue of her jurisdiction over the question raised in the State's second proposition of error. A magistrate's normal duties include presiding over and conducting preliminary examinations, and determining whether a crime has been committed and if there is probable cause to bind the defendant over for trial.10 This necessarily includes the authority to rule on motions which may provide a defense to the criminal charge.11 A magistrate may rule on a motion to suppress evidence before the preliminary hearing is held or the defendant is bound over.12 In fact, a party must raise an objection to illegally obtained evidence at the earliest possible time.13 This is exactly what the defendants here did.
1 7 The defendants filed a Motion to Quash Indictment and to Suppress Any Evidence Obtained by the Multi-County Grand Jury. The motion claimed the inclusion of alternates in the grand jury process rendered that process faulty and the Indictments from that proceeding invalid. The defendants complained that the evidence on which the indictments relied was illegally obtained through a faulty grand jury process. They asked that the State be barred from using this evidence in support of any indictments or criminal prosecution. This is an excellent example of a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence, and the magistrate was required to rule on it.14
*4121 8 I believe the magistrate correctly ruled on the issue of the evidence obtained by the grand jury. I also agree with Judge Black's subsequent ruling that the State may use any evidence obtained independently from and prior to the grand jury proceedings. If the State wishes to proceed against these defendants, it may proceed with the preliminary hearing as ordered by Judge Black. I would affirm the rulings below, and deny this appeal.

. Ok. Const. art. 2, § 18. "Any interpretation of Section 18 must begin with a reading of the provision as a whole, giving effect to each part through the natural significance of the words used and their grammatical arrangement." State v. Bezdicek, 2002 OK CR 28, 53 P.3d 917, 919.

. In interpreting the plain language of § 18, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that it mandated "the number, unanimity and impartiality" of grand jurors, and is self-executing in this respect. Movants to Quash Multicounty Grand Jury Subpoenas v. Powers, 1992 OK 142, 839 P.2d 655, 656. See also, In Re House Bill. No. 145, 205 Okla. 364, 1951 OK 288, 237 P.2d 624, 627. This Court has held that a true bill requires at least nine grand jurors to unanimously concur by vote or ballot on each separate indictment. Eubanks v. State, 5 Okla.Crim. 325, 114 P. 748, 752 (1911).

. Bezdicek, 53 P.3d at 918.

. See generally 22 0.$.2001, §§ 311-346.

. 22 0.9.2001, § 340.

. 22 0.$.2001, §§ 350-363 (Multicounty Grand Jury Act).

. Bezdicek, 53 P.3d at 920-21. See also State v. Hooker, 1908 OK 244, 22 Okla. 712, 98 P. 964, 967.

. State v. Pratt, 1991 OK CR 95, 816 P.2d 1149, 1151, overruled on other grounds, Pitts v. State, 2003 OK CR 21, 78 P.3d 551.

. State v. Howerton, 2002 OK CR 17, 46 P.3d 154, 157-58; Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, 12 P.3d 452, 456; 25 0.8.2001, § 29.

. Harris v. State, 1992 OK CR 74, 841 P.2d 597, 600; State v. Benson, 1983 OK CR 43, 661 P.2d 908, 909.

. Harris, 841 P.2d at 600 (claim of immunity would complete defense to the criminal charge); Nicodemus v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 1970 OK CR 83, 473 P.2d 312, 315 (magistrates may rule on sufficiency of the evidence, motions to suppress and demurrers).

. Day v. Freeman, 1990 OK CR 35, 792 P.2d 1193, 1194; Stone v. Hope, 1971 OK CR 302, 488 P.2d 616, 619.

. Hyde v. Hutchison, 1971 OK CR 162, 483 P.2d 766, 768; Gragg v. State, 72 Okl.Cr. 189, 114 P.2d 491, 492 (Okl.Cr.1941).

. Holt v. State, 1973 OK CR 38, 506 P.2d 561, 565 (magistrate must rule on any questions of law properly before her).