Court Opinion

ID: 9848870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:28:56.125821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:50.655243
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
On June 12, 1985, this court handed down an opinion affirming the trial court. On July 30, 1985, this court vacated the former and substituted a new opinion reversing the trial court. In the second “motion for rehearing appellant’s able attorney ardently argues his abhorrence to our adherence” to the rendering of the latter opinion. Eschen v. Roney, 127 Ga. App. 719, 723 (194 SE2d 589) (1972). “The instant appeal is confirmation that rehearing motions are considered closely and in detail because judges recognize they are subject to the affliction called ‘judicial astigmatism,’ which may be both visual and mental.” Ramsey v. Thomas, 133 Ga. App. 869 (212 SE2d 444) (1975).
1. It is my opinion that the trial court did not err when, over objection, the jury was instructed: “Testimony of a party who offers himself or herself as a witness in his or her own behalf is to be construed most strongly against such party when it is self-contradictory, vague, or equivocal, and that party is not entitled to a finding in his or her favor if that version of testimony that is most unfavorable to that party shows that the verdict should be against that party.” It is argued that the charge was not authorized by the evidence and, thus, provides a basis for reversal. To this I cannot agree. A review of the transcript reveals that, to some extent, the charge was applicable to testimony of both parties. No witnesses other than Mrs. Weathers and Cowan testified as eyewitnesses to the collision.
The collision occurred late on Saturday, November 24, 1980, on the four-lane southbound side of Interstate 285 in DeKalb County be*26tween the entrance ramp from Bouldercrest Road and the next exit ramp, which is Moreland Avenue. Appellant entered southbound I-285 from Bouldercrest, then moved into the second lane from the outside. She was driving her Chevrolet Citation automobile between 50 and 55 miles per hour when she collided with the tractor-trailer truck driven by Cowan. The latter was in the lane to her immediate left. The point of impact was the right front wheel of Cowan’s tractor. His speed was approximately 50 miles per hour. After the collision, appellant’s car crossed the two lanes to her left; she struck the inside concrete median, and then drove her car to a nearby service station. She testified that she was within her lane, that she never saw Cowan’s truck, and that she never saw anything to the left or right of her. She stated: “I was just driving in my lane out 285, and then all of a sudden, I was hit. I didn’t know by what or who[m].” She contends that Cowan left his lane and moved across to hit her, but that she never saw him. Appellee Cowan testified that he was in the third lane from the outside preparing to move to the right lane to exit at Moreland Avenue, and that he had his right-turn signals turned on, as well as running lights. Cowan checked in his mirrors to see if anything was behind or beside his truck and saw nothing. At the time he felt the impact, he had not moved from his lane and did not see Mrs. Weathers’ vehicle before the collision. His testimony was arguably self-contradictory on the question of whether he had been passed by or had passed any vehicles during the period of time shortly before the impact. Cowan admitted that he entered a guilty plea to a charge of improper lane change. Weathers’ testimony was self-contradictory on thé issue of her alleged disability. While refusal to give this charge would probably not have constituted error in this case (compare Fuels, Inc. v. Rutland, 123 Ga. App. 23 (4) (179 SE2d 290) (1970)), no reversible error appears from its inclusion. From examination of the entire thirty-eight transcript pages of the trial court’s charge to the jury I find it to be fair, complete, and accurate when considered as a whole. “A charge, torn to pieces and scattered in disjointed fragments, may seem objectionable, although when put together and considered as a whole, it may be perfectly sound.” Brown v. Matthews, 79 Ga. 1 (1) (4 SE 13) (1887).
2. Another enumeration of error complains of the denial of a motion for new trial. “Where a jury returns a verdict and it has the approval of the trial judge, on appeal that verdict must be affirmed if there is any evidence to support it. After a verdict, the evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, for every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict. The trial court did not err in denying [appellants’] motion for a new trial.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Warren v. Cox, 168 Ga. App. 818, 819 (310 SE2d 569) (1983). I would therefore affirm the action of the trial *27court. It has long been established: “We suppose we must give him the benefit of every presumption on both branches of the case; and, so doing, we cannot pronounce with due legal certainty that he erred. We can suspect him of error, but cannot convict him. We held up the case from the last term, when it was argued, until the close of the present term, and used all reasonable diligence to discover the alleged errors. But the farthest advance we could make was into doubt. We entered that dim, misty atmosphere, and could neither go forward nor return. There we rest.” Gray v. Willingham, 59 Ga. 858, 859 (1877).
Decided July 30, 1985 —
Rehearing denied September 13, 1985 — Cert, applied for.
Thomas W. Thrash, for appellants.
Arnold Wright, Jr., Alan L. Newman, for appellees.
I must respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth.