Court Opinion

ID: 9560676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:53:31.258907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:05.894859
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
The indictment charged that Richard Alphonso Taylor “feloniously did break and enter the dwelling of [another] with the intent to commit larceny therein . . . [i]n violation of Code § 18-.2-91.” This appeal poses the issue whether one who enters a dwelling house in the nighttime, breaks into a dwelling house in the daytime, or conceals himself in a dwelling house with the intent to commit larceny or other specified felonies, has committed an act which tends to or threatens to breach the peace. I believe that it does. Consequently, I would hold that criminal trespass is a lesser *655included offense of a charge of violation of Code § 18.2-91 when it is alleged that the defendant broke into a dwelling.
Certainly, not every entry onto the real property of another tends or threatens to breach the peace. If the property invaded is a field or a yard, such a trespass would not always threaten a breach of the peace. See Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 833, 835, 37 S.E. 841, 842 (1901)(unauthorized entry onto the land of another does not in and of itself justify an assault and battery upon a trespasser). Our burglary statutes, however, contain provisions specifically directed to dwelling houses. See Code §§ 18.2-90, 18.2-91, and 18.2-92. Entering a dwelling house under the circumstances proscribed by Code § 18.2-91 at the least threatens a breach of the peace. It is an act against the security of a property owner that is different and more traumatic than walking across a field. It is an aggressive act which brings an unwanted intruder into the intimate living space of another. Such an entry meets the majority’s test because by its very nature “it is made in such a way that it would reasonably appear to the possessor of the property that to resist would invite assault.” That conduct tends to cause or threaten a breach of the peace.
The majority appropriately cites Henderson v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. (8 Gratt.) 708, 710 (1852), for the proposition that “the breaking and entering of ‘the close of another’ is not criminal trespass unless accompanied by a breach of the peace.” It should be noted however that “the close” is “[a] portion of land, as a field, inclosed as by a hedge, fence, or other visible inclosure, or by an invisible ideal boundary founded on limit of title.” Black’s Law Dictionary 231 (5th ed. 1979). Henderson involved an entry onto the porch of a dwelling, the “close of another,” but not into the dwelling itself. The Henderson court did observe, however, that the mere act of entering the dwelling could suffice to establish a breach of the peace.
[Tjhat the place where the entry is made is a dwelling house, as reason would suggest, and the peace of those abiding under the sanctity of their home and the security of their castle would strongly require, is a most important circumstance to be taken into consideration in the aggravation of trespass quare clausum fregit into a misdemeanor; as is also the circumstance that the entry was made with fire arms or *656other offensive or dangerous weapons.
49 Va. (8 Gratt.) at 710-11.
The majority correctly observes that “an act of violence” is not a necessary element of a burglary charge. This position, however, does not exclude the fact that entry into a dwelling in violation of Code § 18.2-91 also threatens a breach of the peace. Use of force or violence may be sufficient to establish breach of the peace for common law trespass; however, like burglary, it is not a necessary element. “A breach of peace frequently involves intimidation and putting in fear; but not necessarily so.” State v. Christie, 97 Vt. 461, 463, 123 A. 849, 850 (1924). A disturbance in the nighttime by shouting alone may constitute breach of the peace. Id.
The majority also relies upon cases of unlawful entry and detainer. Even in actions for unlawful detainer, however, where the purpose of the action is to “restore[] the status quo of the parties, and settles nothing as to the title or right of possession,” Town of Grundy v. Goff, 191 Va. 148, 159, 60 S.E.2d 273, 278 (1950), proof of actual “force” by the entrant is not a required element. “[I]f the actions of the entrant . . . make it reasonably appear necessary that there must be a breach of the peace by the possessor in order to maintain . . . possession, then the entry is forcible within the purview of the [unlawful entry and detainer] statute.” Southern Ry. v. Lima Wood & Coal Co., 156 Va. 829, 834, 159 S.E. 69, 71 (1931).
It is inconsequential that not every violation of Code § 18.2-91 involves an act likely to produce violence if the act otherwise tends to breach the peace.4 As the Court stated in Henderson, the inva*657sion into another’s dwelling is an aggravating circumstance that alone elevates a simple tort of trespass into a criminal offense. The uninvited entry into the dwelling of another is a circumstance that has the tendency to cause the property owner to feel the need to resist the invasion. Thus, it is an act that threatens or tends to breach the peace. Common law trespass, therefore, is a lesser included offense of burglary where the accused is expressly charged with breaking and entering the dwelling of another.
Furthermore, Code § 18.2-121, provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to enter the land, dwelling, outhouse or any other building of another for the purpose of damaging such property or any of the contents thereof or in any manner to interfere with the rights of the owner, user or the occupant thereof to use such property free from interference.
This statute is one of several legislative codifications of common law trespass. This trespass offense is indisputably lesser included in the offense of breaking and entering a dwelling and defeats the notion that there is no middle ground between a conviction for *658burglary and acquittal.5
Significantly, in another appeal which is pending for decision in this Court, Dowell v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1567-87-2, the Commonwealth urges this Court to affirm a conviction for a lesser included offense of trespass where the defendant was tried on a statutory burglary indictment. The Commonwealth there urges that, although the trial judge did not specify whether he was applying common law trespass or Code § 18.2-121, the conviction was appropriate under either theory.
For these reasons, I hold that Taylor was entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense, and I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

 The majority cites Kauffmann v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 400, 409, 382 S.E.2d 279, 283 (1989), for the proposition that “[a] lesser included offense is one ‘composed entirely of elements that also are elements of the greater offense.’ ” Apparently, the majority interprets this language to mandate that the ‘greater/lesser included” offense analysis be determined solely by comparing the elements of the offenses as they appear in the statutes or are defined by the common law. However, as the Kauffmann case goes on to say: “[l]n order for one crime to be a lesser included offense of another crime, every commission of the greater offense must also be a commission of the lesser offense.” In my opinion, the “greater/lesser included” offense analysis, when involving offenses such as statutory burglary that may be committed in a variety of manners (i.e., breaking into a storehouse or breaking into a vehicle), must look not to the statute but to the specific allegations of the indictment. In Jones v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 757, 240 S.E.2d 658, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978), the Supreme Court recognized the significance of the wording of the *657indictment and stated: “Manifestly, a robbery indictment includes all elements of whatever larcency offense it charges, whether grand or petit, and the larcency offense charged is, therefore, lesser-included in robbery.” Id. at 759-60, 240 S.E.2d at 660. See also Blowe v. Peyton 208 Va. 68, 75, 155 S.E.2d 351 (1967). This holds true even though, as in Jones, an essential “element” of the larcency “offense” is the value of the property, which is not an essential “element” of the “offense” of robbery. Jones, 218 Va. at 760, 240 S.E.2d at 661. Thus, where, as here, the accused is specifically charged with breaking into a “dwelling,” “every commission” of that offense also, necessarily, constitutes the commission of common law trespass.
Moreover, in making that anlysis, the issue is not one of simply comparing the technical “elements” of the crime even as charged in the indictment. The issue is, instead, one of examining whether, in proving the crime specifically charged in the indictment, the goverment also, necessarily, will prove the “lesser” offense. Thus, the fact that conduct that threatens a breach of the peace is not a technical “element” of statutory burglary is inconsequential; what is determinative is that in proving an unlawful entry into a dwelling, as charged in the indictment, the Commonwealth also will necessarily prove an act that threatens a breach of the peace. This analysis answers the majority’s concern that the Commonwealth not be disadvantaged by charging one crime only to have the defendent ask for a lesser included offense instruction on another crime the Commonwealth had not sought to “prove.” If, in attempting to prove the crime charged, the Commonwealth, by definition, will be proving another, albeit one with fewer elements, the Commonwealth is not disadvantaged.

 Although the majority declines to decide whether Code § 18.2-121 is a lesser included offense because Taylor’s counsel offered an instruction only on common law trespass, I believe that Taylor was entitled to have the jury instructed as to the lesser included offense even if the tendered instruction was defective. The Supreme Court has spoken to this point:
We adhere to the rule that the trial court Is not required to amend or correct an erroneous instruction, but the rule Is subject to the limitation that when the principle of law is materially vital to a defendant in a criminal case, it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse a defective instruction instead of correcting it and giving it in the proper form. A jury should not be left in the dark on the subject.
Whaley v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 353, 355-56, 200 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1973).