Court Opinion

ID: 9949484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 19:04:55.784657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:30.068841
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 240222-U

                                        No. 1-24-0222

                                 Order filed March 11, 2024.

                                                                                  First Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                           IN THE

                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

VICTORIA KNIGHT,                          )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
            Petitioner-Appellant,         )     Cook County.
                                          )
                                          )
      v.                                  )     No. 2024 COEL 000005
                                          )
STATE OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD,           )
CASSANDRA B. WATSON (Chair), LAURA K )
DONAHUE (Vice Chair), JENNIFER M.         )
BALLARD (Member), CRISTINA D. CRAY        )
(Member), TONYA L. GENOVESE (Member),     )
CATHERINE S. McCRORY (Member), RICK S. )
TERVEN, SR. (Member), & SAMANTHA JEAN )
GASCA, Candidate),                        )     The Honorable
                                          )     Araceli R. De La Cruz
            Respondents-Appellees.        )     Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

                                           ORDER
¶1     Held: The State Officers Electoral Board properly overruled an objection to the
statement of candidacy where the erroneous date included therein was a mere technical defect
and the candidate substantially complied with the Election Code.
No. 1-24-0222

¶2     Petitioner Victoria Knight challenges a decision of the State Officers Electoral Board (the

Board) which overruled her objection to respondent Samantha Jean Gasca’s candidacy for the

Illinois State Senate. Specifically, Knight maintains that Gasca’s name should not be included on

the ballot of the Republican Party at the general primary election because her statement of

candidacy contained the wrong date for the primary election. We affirm the Board’s decision.

¶3                                       I. Background

¶4     On December 4, 2023, Gasca filed a statement of candidacy for Illinois State Senator

Legislative District 19. According to her statement, “I am a candidate for Nomination/Election to

the office of Illinois State Senator in the 19th District, to be voted upon at the primary election to

be held on 11/05/2024.” Thus, Gasca’s statement erroneously cited the date of the general

election rather than the date of the primary election, which is to be held on March 19th. Gasca

also filed a State Senate Primary Petition setting forth the correct date of the primary election.

Every page of the 196-page petition correctly lists March 19th as the date of the primary

election.

¶5     Knight then filed a verified objector’s petition with the Board. She argued that the

erroneous date rendered Gasca’s statement of candidacy invalid under section 7-10 of the

Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2022)). Consequently, Knight asked that Gasca’s

nomination papers be stricken and that her name not be printed on the official ballot for the

Republican primary election. In response, Gasca moved to strike the objector’s petition, arguing

that such a de minimis error did not invalidate her nomination papers. She also argued that her

petition, the only document a voter would ever see, listed the correct date of the primary election.

¶6     The hearing officer for the Board concluded that the error was de minimis and insufficient

to deny Gasca ballot access, and that Gasca had substantially complied with the Election Code.

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No. 1-24-0222

The Board’s general counsel agreed, adding that section 8-8, rather than section 7-10, applied

because Gasca was seeking the office of senator.

¶7     Following a hearing on January 11, 2024, the Board granted Gasca’s motion to strike and

overruled Knight’s objection. The Board found that the statement of candidacy substantially

complied with section 8-8 of the Election Code and that the statement’s inclusion of an incorrect

primary election date was not a sufficient basis to deny Gasca ballot access.

¶8     Knight then filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court, raising the same

arguments that were raised before the Board. Gasca filed a brief in opposition. On January 30th,

the circuit court entered a written order affirming the Board’s decision. Like the Board, the court

found the erroneous primary election date was a de minimis error and that Gasca substantially

complied with section 8-8. Knight now appeals.

¶9                                        II. Analysis

¶ 10   On appeal, Knight asserts once more that Gasca’s name should not appear on the ballot

because her statement of candidacy erroneously included the date of the general election rather

than the primary election, in violation of section 7-10 of the Election Code.

¶ 11   We review the decision of the Board, rather than the circuit court. Cortez v. Municipal

Officers Electoral Board for City of Calumet City, 2013 IL App (1st) 130442, ¶ 14. The parties

agree that our standard of review is de novo, as the pertinent facts are undisputed. See Hossfeld v.

Illinois State Board of Elections, 238 Ill. 2d 418, 423 (2010) (applying a de novo standard of

review where the historical facts were not in dispute).

¶ 12   Knight continues to rely on section 7-10 whereas the Board and the circuit court found

that section 8-8 applied instead. Section 7-10 states that “[t]he name of no candidate for

nomination, or State central committeeperson, or township committeeperson, or precinct

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No. 1-24-0222

committeeperson, or ward committeeperson or candidate for delegate or alternate delegate to

national nominating conventions, shall be printed upon the primary ballot unless a petition for

nomination has been filed on his behalf as provided in this Article in substantially the following

form[.]” 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2022). That section requires that both the petition for nomination

and the statement of candidacy include the date of the election in question. Id.

¶ 13   Yet, Article 8 of the Election Code governs candidates for the General Assembly, the

office Gasca seeks here. 10 ILCS 5/8-1 (West 2022). Section 8-8 specifically governs the form

of petitions for nomination to the General Assembly. 10 ILCS 5/8-8 (West 2022); Whelan v.

County Officers’ Electoral Board of Du Page County, 256 Ill. App. 3d 555, 556 (1994). Under

that section, “no candidate for nomination shall be printed upon the primary ballot unless a

petition for nomination shall have been filed on his behalf as provided for in this Section. Each

such petition shall include *** a statement of candidacy by the candidate filing or on whose

behalf the petition is filed.” 10 ILCS 5/8-8 (West 2022). In addition, the statement of candidacy

“may be in substantially” the form set forth in that section. 10 ILCS 5/8-8 (West 2022). The form

therein requires the candidate to state, in pertinent part, that “I am a candidate for nomination to

the office of .... to be voted upon at the primary election to be held on (insert date)[.]” 10 ILCS

5/8-8 (West 2022).

¶ 14   Knight has not cited section 8-8 or developed any argument explaining why section 7-10,

rather than section 8-8, would control Gasca’s candidacy for the General Assembly. See Ill. S.

Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). In any event, both sections require the statement of

candidacy to set forth the date of the election and both require substantial compliance. 10 ILCS

5/7-10, 8-8 (West 2022). Given these similarities, we find case law addressing section 7-10 to be

instructive and that Knight’s deficient brief does not preclude meaningful review.

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No. 1-24-0222

¶ 15   The requirements for the nominating petition and statement of candidacy are mandatory.

Lawlor v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 28 Ill. App. 3d 823, 829 (1975). Yet, access to the

ballot is a substantial right that is not to be denied lightly. Sullivan v. County Officers Electoral

Board of Du Page County, 225 Ill. App. 3d 691, 693 (1992). Consequently, a minor error in a

nominating petition should not lead to a candidate’s removal from the ballot. Id. Similarly, where

nominating papers satisfy the apparent purpose of the statute, they will survive a minor defect, as

only substantial compliance is required. Cortez, 2013 IL App (1st) 130442, ¶ 40. This court has

also recognized that a minor error will not lead to the removal of the candidate’s name “where

there is no basis for confusion as to the office for which the petition was filed and there is no

conflict between the statement of candidacy and nominating petition[.]” Crossman v. Board of

Election Commissioners of City of Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st) 120291, ¶ 18. Even where a

conflict exists, an objection will not be sustained if the conflict may be readily resolved. See

Sullivan, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 694. Conversely, a candidate is not in substantial compliance where

she completely ignores a statutory element. Samuelson v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board,

2012 IL App (1st) 120581, ¶ 32. Substantial compliance is assessed on a case-by-case basis

(Corbin v. Schroeder, 2021 IL 127052, ¶ 38), and courts may read a nominating petition as one

complete document in order to find substantial compliance (Samuelson, 2012 IL App (1st)

120581, ¶ 32).

¶ 16   The general purpose of section 8-8, like section 7-10, is to set forth an orderly procedure

for qualified persons seeking public office to enter primary elections. See Lewis v. Dunne, 63 Ill.

2d 48, 53 (1976). The statement of candidacy’s more specific purpose is to obtain a sworn

statement from the candidate demonstrating that she is qualified to enter the primary election for

the office in question. Id. at 54. In assessing compliance with section 8-8, and section 7-10, the

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No. 1-24-0222

nomination papers, taken as a whole, must not create a basis for confusion, and the purpose of

the nomination papers containing an error must not be frustrated by the error. See Wiesner v.

Brennan, 2016 IL App (2d) 160115, ¶ 27; cf. Lawlor, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 828 (rejecting the

petitioner’s assertion “that the nominating petition and the statement of candidacy must be read

together and, therefore, his petition and his certificate of candidacy substantially comply with the

statute”); see also Lawrence v. Board of Election Commissioners of City of East St. Louis, 45 Ill.

App. 3d 776, 778 (1977) (finding Lawlor’s suggestion that a statement of candidacy must stand

or fall by itself, without consideration of the petition, does not accurately reflect the law).

¶ 17   We agree with the Board’s determination that Knight substantially complied with section

8-8, notwithstanding that her statement of candidacy set forth the wrong date for the primary

election. This mistake did not undermine that statement’s purpose of showing that Knight was

qualified to enter that election. In addition, the erroneous date was not likely to lead to confusion

given that the statement of candidacy clearly referenced the primary election, that voters do not

generally see that statement, and that Gasca’s nominating petitions included the correct date.

Furthermore, the conflict in dates is one that can easily be resolved.

¶ 18   We categorically reject the suggestion that including the wrong date in the statement was

the equivalent of ignoring the statute’s date requirement, or that nefarious intent led Gasca to

deliberately include the wrong date. See also Wiggins v. Rogers, 2019 IL App (1st) 190161,

¶¶ 16, 18, 20, 25 (rejecting the objectors’ assertion that the statement of candidacy and

nominating petitions, which cited the date for the consolidated election instead of the

consolidated primary election, in violation of the municipal code and section 10-4, reflected an

attempt to bypass the primary election where the nominating petitions specifically requested the

candidate’s name to be placed on the ballot for the primary). Moreover, Knight does not dispute

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No. 1-24-0222

that Gasca’s nominating papers were otherwise in good order. Cf. Lawlor, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 825

(finding the candidate’s name was properly omitted from the ballot where the statement of

candidacy failed to specify that the candidate (1) was qualified to vote in the Republican

primary, (2) was a candidate for nomination of the Republican Party to the office of

Representative for the 5th Congressional District, and (3) was a candidate for the special

Republican Primary to be held on April 15th, and where (4) the candidate failed to request that

his name be printed on the primary ballot for that election).

¶ 19   In short, Knight has not met her burden in this case. See Samuelson, 2012 IL App (1st)

120581, ¶ 39.

¶ 20                                  III. Conclusion

¶ 21   The Board properly determined that Gasca substantially complied with section 8-8 of the

Code and thus, her name will be included on the primary ballot.

¶ 22   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment upholding the Board’s

decision.

¶ 23   Circuit court judgment affirmed.

¶ 24   Board decision affirmed.

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