Court Opinion

ID: 9793793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:53:06.621248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:54.002334
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I dissent.
The majority persuasively establish that under Labor Code sections 5800 and 5806, and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, the superior court possesses jurisdiction to award interest on awards from the *488Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. The superior court is clearly vested with such jurisdiction by the statutes. However, Labor Code section 5806 also makes clear that jurisdiction is created only by filing a certified copy of the award. No provision exists for invoking superior court jurisdiction by filing a complaint.
Because the Legislature severely limits superior court jurisdiction in compensation matters and clearly allows invocation of that jurisdiction only by filing the award, this court may not dispense with the award filing requirement. But the majority refuses even to discuss this jurisdictional requirement (ante, pp. 486-487)—the central issue in the case.1
Labor Code section 5806 states in full: “Any party affected thereby may file a certified copy of the findings and order, decision, or award of the appeals board with the clerk of the superior court of any county. Judgment shall be entered immediately by the clerk in conformity therewith.” Obviously, the statutory prerequisite to the exercise of judicial authority is the filing of a certified copy of the board’s decision. Without such a filing, the superior court lacks any authority to act. (See, Bozaich v. State of California (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 688, 696-697 [108 Cal.Rptr. 392].)
The jurisdictional nature of section 5806 is demonstrated by the position it occupies in the statutory system of workers’ compensation. By constitutional command, the Legislature’s authority to establish and define the workers’ compensation system is plenary. (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 21, now art. XIV, § 4.) Pursuant to this constitutional directive, the Legislature has provided that board decisions may be judicially reviewed only by the appellate courts through a writ of review. (Lab. Code, § 5950.) In all other circumstances, “No court of this state . . . has jurisdiction to . .. interfere with the appeals board in the performance of its duties but a writ of mandate shall lie from the Supreme Court or a court of appeal in all proper cases.” (Lab. Code, § 5955.) Except for expressly specified duties like those provided by Labor Code section 5806, the Legislature has excluded the superior court from jurisdiction over compensation matters.
*489When a statute conferring jurisdiction specifies the procedure to be followed, the procedural requirements are themselves jurisdictional. In Safer v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 230, 242 [124 Cal.Rptr. 174, 540 P.2d 14], this court reiterated its holding in the landmark case of Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 290 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] “ 1 “[I]t seems well settled (and there appears to be no case holding to the contrary) that when a statute authorizes prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction,...” ’ ”
Moreover, even if failure to comply with the statutory requirement does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction in the fundamental sense, the failure would require the court to dismiss the action upon proper motion and if it failed to dismiss, extraordinary relief would be available to prevent the court from proceeding in violation of the statute. “ ‘Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provision, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, in so far as that term is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibition or annulled on certiorari.’’ ” (Safer v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 242, quoting from Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 291.)
Assuming arguendo entry of judgment under section 5806 is judicial (cf., Greitz v. Sivachenko (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 849, 850 [313 P.2d 922]; Vickich v. Superior Court (1930) 105 Cal.App. 587, 592 [288 P. 127]), the only judicial act permitted is the issuance of a judgment in conformity with the board’s certified award. The superior court cannot alter or modify—in any manner—the board’s decision. (Lab. Code, § 5955; Loustalot v. Superior Court (1947) 30 Cal.2d 905, 912 [186 P.2d 673]; Patterson v. Sharp (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 990, 998-999 [89 Cal.Rptr. 396]; Pizarro v. Superior Court (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 416, 417 et seq. [61 Cal.Rptr. 923].) Without a certified copy there is nothing for the judgment to be entered in conformity with, and the superior court completely lacks power to hear or determine the cause. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 17 Cal.2d 280, 288.)
Moreover, a superior court’s entry of judgment in absence of a certified copy of the board’s order would severely encroach upon the appeals board in the performance of its duties. One of the two means available to the appeals board to stay execution of its own ruling is to *490withhold certification of its order, decision, or award. (Lab. Code, § 5808.) If the superior court attempts to enter judgment in the absence of a certified copy of the award it obviously interferes with board authority. Again, the superior court lacks jurisdiction to act unless and until a certified copy is filed.
Refusing to address the central issue presented, the majority incorrectly reverse a correct superior court decision. Any other decision by the superior court is subject to later restraint by prohibition. Today’s opinion is wasteful to the parties and to the judiciary.
Richardson, J., and Wright, J.,* concurred.

Refusing to address this issue, the majority claim the superior court did not address it, although they are compelled to admit “it is not entirely clear.” (A nte, p. 486.) However, the issue was raised and argued before the superior court and the judge’s general statements (id., fn. 6) in ruling the court lacked jurisdiction encompassed the issue, specifically referring to Labor Code section 5806.

 Retired Chief Justice of California sitting under assignment by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council.