Court Opinion

ID: 9762962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:34:29.787378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:38.794193
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Judge,
dissenting.
This is not a difficult case. Reduced to basics, the issue presented is simply whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors at appellant’s trial interpreted the jury charge in a manner that allowed conviction on an unlawful basis. If so, then the charge contains error “calculated to injure the rights of [the] defendant,” and appellant is entitled to a new trial under Article 36.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Relevant Facts

On the late evening of July 27,1990, appellant and Michael Williams got into an argument in Dallas regarding Williams’ wife. The argument escalated into a street fight, during which appellant stabbed Williams with a knife. Williams later died at a Dallas hospital. The Dallas County grand jury indicted appellant for murder under Texas Penal Code § 19.02(a)(1), which provides that “[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual.” At trial appellant testified that when he stabbed Williams, he did not mean to kill him.
In its charge to the jury, the trial court submitted, inter alia> the following definitions taken verbatim from Texas Penal Code § 6.03:
(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
Appellant objected to these definitions, arguing that murder was a “result offense” and *495that, consequently, the definitions of the culpable mental states should have been “limit[ed] ... to the result of the offense only.”1 Apparently, appellant feared that the jury would misunderstand the charge to authorize conviction even if the jury believed only that he intentionally engaged in the conduct (i.e., the stabbing) that caused Williams’ death. The trial court overruled appellant’s objection.
. The jury charge also contained the follow application paragraphs:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of July, 1990 in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, LAWRENCE EARL COOK, did intentionally or knowingly cause the death of MICHAEL WILLIAMS, an individual, by stabbing MICHAEL WILLIAMS with a knife, a deadly weapon, as alleged in the indictment, and that the defendant, in so acting, was not acting under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, then you will find the defendant guilty of murder.
Unless you so find beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of murder.
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 27th day of July, 1990 in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, LAWRENCE EARL COOK, did intentionally or knowingly cause the death of MICHAEL WILLIAMS, an individual, by stabbing MICHAEL WILLIAMS with a knife, a deadly weapon, as alleged in the indictment, but you further find from all the facts and circumstances in evidence in the case that the defendant, in killing MICHAEL WILLIAMS, if he did, acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, or if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether he so acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, then you will find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Unless you so find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter under the instructions given you, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of voluntary manslaughter.
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either murder or voluntary manslaughter, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which offense he is guilty, then you must resolve that doubt in the defendant’s favor and find him guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.
You are further instructed that before a person can be guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter under the indictment, he must have intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the deceased. Unless you so find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder or voluntary manslaughter, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will find the defendant not guilty and so state by your verdict.
(Emphasis added.)
The jury found appellant guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. See Tex.Penal Code § 19.04. On appeal appellant argued again that the jury charge definitions of the culpable mental states should have been limited to the result of the offense. The Fifth Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s argument, however, and affirmed his conviction. Cook v. State, 827 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1992). Relying upon Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 430-431 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), and Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84, 87-89 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), the court of appeals held that, in view of the application paragraphs submitted to the jury, “the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to limit the abstract definitions of the culpable mental states.” Cook v. State, 827 S.W.2d, at 430.

*496
The Applicable Law

Article 36.14 provides that “the [trial] judge shall, before the [final] argument begins, deliver to the jury ... a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case.” Article 36.19 provides, in turn, that
[w]henever it appears by the record in any criminal action upon appeal that any requirement of Article[ ] 36.14 ... has been disregarded, the judgment shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of [the] defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial.
“To determine whether [any] errors in the charge were calculated to injure appellant, the whole charge ... must be considered.” Bowlin v. State, 93 Tex.Crim. 462, 248 S.W. 396, 401 (App.1922). Indeed, “[n]o better rule exists than that the whole charge must be looked to, and the fact that some part of same is wrong will not call for a reversal unless there be danger that the jury were misled, or the cause of the accused injured by the erroneous charge.” McCann v. State, 129 Tex.Crim. 105, 83 S.W.2d 967, 972 (App. 1936).
In other words, if the charge, when read as a whole, states the law applicable to the case in a manner not reasonably likely to mislead jurors to the defendant’s detriment, then the charge is sufficient, although some portion of it, standing alone, might be subject to criticism or objection. We have stated and utilized this fundamental principle on countless occasions. See, e.g., Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 690-691 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Turner v. State, 806 S.W.2d 423, 43(M31; Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84, 87-89; Holley v. State, 766 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Selvage v. State, 680 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Inman v. State, 650 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Jackson v. State, 591 S.W.2d 820, 825 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). This principle is also the law throughout the United States. See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40, 111 S.Ct. 328, 329, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990); S. Childress & M. Davis, 2 Federal Standards of Review § 11.26 (1992); C. Wright, 2 Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 485 (2d ed. 1992); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1305 and 1352 (1989); 75B Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1487 (1992).

Conclusion

The charge given to the jury at appellant’s trial, when read as a whole, stated the applicable law in a manner that was not reasonably likely to mislead the jury into convicting on an unlawful basis. That is, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted appellant just because they thought he engaged in the conduct (i.e., the stabbing) that ultimately caused Williams’ demise. Although the abstract, definitional portion of the jury charge contained unnecessary “engage in conduct” language, it is very unlikely that language misled the jury given the explicit limiting instructions contained in the application paragraphs. The application paragraphs instructed the jurors quite clearly that they could not find appellant guilty of murder or manslaughter unless they first found beyond a reasonable doubt that he “intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the deceased.”
The majority opinion is not aided by our decisions in Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Kelly v. State, 748 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); and Haggins v. State, 785 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). In all those cases, unlike the instant case, the jury charge was such that it could have been interpreted by reasonable jurors as authorizing conviction if the jurors believed only that the defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in the conduct that caused the victim’s injury.
The majority opinion is disturbing because it is based upon a serious misunderstanding of our precedents regarding charge error. The majority’s determination to overrule Kinnamon, supra, is particularly disturbing, since our decision in that case was sound and so very recent.2 In my view, the very *497weighty considerations underlying the doctrine of stare decisis preclude the overruling of such a case. See Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 858, 862-863 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (Campbell, J., dissenting). Therefore, I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
McCORMICK, P.J., and WHITE and MEYERS, JJ., join.

. Murder is, of course, a "result of conduct” offense. Martinez v. State, 763 S.W.2d 413, 419 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

. In Kinnamon, a capital murder case, the defendant objected to the jury charge because its definition of "intentional” tracked Texas Penal Code § 6.03(a), i.e., it included superfluous “engage in *497conduct” language. The trial court overruled the defendant’s objection, however. On appeal we held, after a lengthy discussion, that the jury charge did not contain reversible error because, when read as a whole, it properly instructed the jurors that they could find the defendant guilty only if they believed he intentionally caused the death of the victim. We stated that, "[wjhen read in conjunction with the application paragraph, the phrase 'engage in conduct’ in the abstract definition of ’intentional’ did not provide for any additional degree of culpability.” Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d, at 89.