Court Opinion

ID: 9464464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:33:48.175085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:38.392312
License: Public Domain

MESKILL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In this action, Anthony Herbert alleges that he has been libeled by Barry Lando, Mike Wallace, C.B.S. and Atlantic Monthly. Under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), he may prevail if he proves that the defendants acted with “actual malice,” that is, knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. The major purpose of this lawsuit, therefore, is to expose the defendants’ subjective state of mind — their thoughts, beliefs, opinions, intentions, motives and conclusions — to the light of judicial review. Obviously, such a review has a “chilling” or deterrent effect. It is supposed to. The publication of lies should be discouraged. The discovery by a libel plaintiff of an editor’s state of mind will not chill First Amendment activity to any greater extent than it is already being *996chilled as a result of the very review permitted by New York Times v. Sullivan. The majority’s attempt to eliminate or reduce that chill is supportable in neither precedent nor logic.
The plaintiff in a libel action bears the heavy burden of proving actual malice by clear and convincing proof. The notion that a plaintiff carrying such a burden should be denied the right to ask what the defendant’s mental state was is remarkable on its face. In my view Judge Haight was quite right to apply the normal rules of discovery and to permit inquiry into the defendants’ mental state.
Chief Judge Kaufman finds a basis for creating a new editorial privilege in “the privilege established by Branzburg [v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)],” ante at 227, and in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974) (right of reply statute), and C.B.S., Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973) (editorial advertising), which deal generally with the protections afforded to “the exercise of editorial control and judgment.” 418 U.S. at 258, 94 S.Ct. at 2840. By combining the Branzburg privilege with the Tornillo and C.B.S. protections for editing, the Chief Judge creates an editorial privilege. Judge Oakes adopts a somewhat different approach. He too relies on Branzburg, Tornillo and C.B.S., but he goes further and, relying primarily on a speech given by Mr. Justice Stewart at the Yale Law School, extracts from the free press clause a doctrine which appears to convert the fourth estate into an institution not unlike an unofficial fourth branch of government. This fourth branch is' given a special privilege presumably for the same reasons that the three official branches are given executive, congressional and judicial privileges.
I find neither approach persuasive. Contrary to the suggestions of my colleagues, there is presently no constitutional privilege against disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources, either in the criminal context, Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, or in the civil context, Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.) (Stewart, J.) (libel action), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910, 79 S.Ct. 237, 3 L.Ed.2d 231 (1958). Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966, 93 S.Ct. 2147, 36 L.Ed.2d 686 (1973), which is cited by the majority as supporting such a privilege, merely held that a district judge in a civil case did not abuse his discretion in denying a motion to compel a non-party journalist to disclose the identity of a confidential news source where the identity of the source was of questionable materiality to the plaintiff’s cause of action and could be obtained by other means. The Court explained:
Although it is safe to conclude, particularly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg . . . that federal law does not recognize an absolute or conditional journalist’s testimonial “privilege”, neither does federal law require disclosure of confidential sources in each and every case, both civil and criminal, in which the issue is raised.
470 F.2d at 781. The decision stands for the proposition, with which I wholeheartedly agree, that the public interest reflected in the First Amendment and in State “newsman’s privilege” statutes is entitled to be considered when a district judge exercises discretion with regard to discovery matters. The decision recognized no privilege. In view of Branzburg and Garland it could not have. See also Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 418, 54 L.Ed.2d 291 (1977); Carey v. Hume, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 492 F.2d 631, cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 2654, 41 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). Thus, to the extent that the majority relies on “the privilege established by Branzburg” and its elaboration in Baker, today’s decision is without precedential foundation.
The Tornillo and C.B.S. decisions also provide little support for the privilege created by the majority. Those cases establish that when the government tries to control what is published or broadcast the courts may *997find an unconstitutional “intrusion into the function of editors.” 418 U.S. at 258, 94 S.Ct. at 2839. Neither decision supports the unqualified “proposition that the First Amendment will not tolerate intrusion into the decisionmaking function of editors.” Ante at 987 (Oakes, J., concurring). Some intrusions, such as those which occur when the press is required to publish or broadcast views with which it disagrees, are prohibited. Other intrusions, such as the intrusion inherent in all libel actions, are permitted. See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 681-85, 92 S.Ct. 2646. The intrusion against which the majority seeks to protect editors is the chilling effect that “judicial review of the editor’s thought processes,” ante at 980, will have on the “exercise of editorial judgment.” Id. at 980; 990-991 (Oakes, J., concurring). After New York Times v. Sullivan, however, judicial review of the editor’s thought process is what a libel action is all about. The mere existence of a libel cause of action chills the exercise of editorial judgment. That is the whole idea. It is exactly this kind of chill that New York Times v. Sullivan condones.
Judge Oakes’ argument based on the “structural or institutional aspect of the Free Press guarantee,” ante at 988, is troubling for two reasons. First, I doubt whether it can be considered to add anything to the Chief Judge’s arguments based on Branzburg, Tornillo and C.B.S. Second, before the Court can recognize any special, preferred position for the press as an institution, it must necessarily recognize a distinction between personal rights on the one hand and institutional rights on the other. “Freedom of the press is a ‘fundamental personal right’ ” which encompasses “the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph” as well as that of “the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.” Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 704, 92 S.Ct. at 2668, quoting, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 1242 (1938). If we distinguish between institutional and personal rights to liberty of the press and place the former in a preferred position, then we necessarily place the latter in a subordinate position. The First Amendment interest of the public in having access to the truth is not necessarily better served by an institution than an individual. I would recognize such a distinction only with the greatest reluctance, and I would certainly not do so on the basis of a single speech, even one given by Mr. Justice Stewart. Compare Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974), in which the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Stewart, held that journalists have no special access to information not available to the public generally.
It makes no sense at all for us to construct a privilege designed to eliminate or reduce a chill on expressive activity which is already generated by the libel action itself. I do recognize, however, that some of the discovery sought by Herbert, particularly the conversations sought in the fourth of the five categories of assertedly objectionable inquiries, ante at 983, has a potential for what Judge Oakes refers to as an “incremental” chilling effect, ante at 993-994, over and above that contemplated by New York Times v. Sullivan. The discovery of communications between editors and journalists, as distinguished from subjective mental states, may well have the effect of inhibiting “the free interchange of ideas within the news room.” Ante at 980, 990 (Oakes, J., concurring). If the press were forced to disclose all of the ideas and theories that are explored during the editorial process, then intellectual exploration itself would be discouraged — without necessarily, or even probably, deterring irresponsible journalism. By thus discouraging “the creative verbal testing, probing, and discussion of hypotheses and alternatives which are the sine qua non of responsible journalism,” ante at 980; see 993-994 (Oakes, J., concurring), discovery of the communications sought under category four could have an incremental chilling effect not built into the New York Times v. Sullivan libel action. The operation of this incremental chill is actually rather conven*998tional in nature. It is the same sort of chill that forms the basis for most privileges: a chill on the expression of ideas or the communication of information in the context of certain special, lawful, confidential relationships. However, a moment’s reflection will reveal that a privilege sufficient to eliminate this incremental chill would have to be exceedingly broad. All confidential communications, whether oral or written and whether made in the newsroom or elsewhere, would have to be covered. It seems to me that if such a privilege were really necessary to protect the editorial function, we would have heard about it long before now. Like the Supreme Court in Branzburg, I would be “unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination.” 408 U.S. at 703, 92 S.Ct. at 2668. The Supreme Court has shown no enthusiasm for the creation of new constitutional privileges, particularly where, as here, they are based on claims of chilling effect that depend on the imaginations of judges rather than proof supplied by the parties. Compare Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 693-95, 92 S.Ct. 2646, with N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) (in support of its claim of a privilege against disclosure of the identity of its rank-and-file membership, the NAACP made an “uncontroverted showing” that exposure had in the past led to harassment of its membership).
I would affirm Judge Haight’s order compelling discovery.