Court Opinion

ID: 9796403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:56:47.040153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:12.057845
License: Public Domain

Justice BENDER,
dissenting.
The majority holds that Colorado’s criminal impersonation statute prohibits “the assumption of a false or fictitious identity or capacity” that “involv[es]” one of five enumerated “circumstance[s], purposefs], or result[s],” including the catch-all category in 18 — 5—113(l)(e), under which Alvarado was convicted. See Maj. Op. at 1208. Hence, the majority concludes that subsection 18-5-113(l)(e) does not require the prosecution to prove two acts, both the act of impersonation and the act from which a defendant intends to receive a benefit. Instead, the majority holds that this subsection “criminalizes any act involving [a] defendant’s knowing utilization of a false or fictitious identity or capacity with the intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for one’s self or another, or to injure or defraud another.” Maj. Op. at 1208. Because the plain language of subsection 18-5-113(l)(e) states that a person commits criminal .impersonation when he knowingly assumes a false or fictitious identity, and, in such identity he commits an additional act with the intent to unlawfully gain a benefit, I respectfully dissent.
Colorado’s criminal impersonation statute states that a person commits criminal impersonation if he knowingly assumes a false identity and in such identity does one of five additional acts, some of which contain their own culpable mental state:
A person commits criminal impersonation if he knowingly assumes a false or fictitious identity or capacity, and in such identity or capacity he:
(a) Marries, or pretends to marry, or to sustain the marriage relation toward another without the connivance of the latter; or
(b) Becomes bail or surety for a party in an action or proceeding, civil or criminal, before a court or officer authorized to take the bail or surety; or
(c) Confesses a judgment, or subscribes, verifies, publishes, acknowledges, or proves a written instrument which by law may be recorded, with the intent that the same may be delivered as true; or
(d) Does an act which if done by the person falsely impersonated, might subject such person to an action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or to liability, charge, forfeiture, or penalty; or
(e) Does any other act with intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for himself or another or to injure or defraud another.
§ 18-5-113(1), C.R.S. (2005) (emphasis added). Hence, a person who knowingly assumes a false identity is not liable under the statute. Instead, a person must knowingly assume a false identity and do an additional act: marry, post bail, confess a judgment, or do an act as described in (l)(d) or (l)(e).
To reach its conclusion that subsection (l)(e) of this statute requires the commission of only one act with two separate mental states, the majority misconstrues the nature of the five enumerated acts in subsections (l)(a) through (l)(e), and ignores the word “and”1 separating the introduction of the statute from the enumerated acts. I will address these issues in turn, beginning with the meaning of the word “and” in the statute.
*1211The term “assumes” in this statute does mean, as the majority states, “ ‘to arrogate, seize, [or] usurp’ the identity of another.” Maj. Op. at 1207. However, the statute connects the act of assuming to subsections (l)(a) through (l)(e) with the term “and.” The word “and” means “also; in addition; moreover; as well as.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary 51 (3rd ed.1996). Therefore, to convict a person of criminal impersonation, the prosecution must prove that he committed the act of knowingly assuming a false identity and, in addition to this, that he also did one of the acts enumerated in subsections (l)(a) through (l)(e). Hence, to be convicted, a person must knowingly assume a false identity, and in that identity he must also: marry, post bail, confess a judgment, or do an act described in (l)(d) or (l)(e). Because the majority misinterprets the term “and” to mean “in combination with” rather than “in addition to,” it concludes that “two acts are not required; the prohibited conduct can be seamless.” Maj. Op. at 1207. In my view, this conclusion conflicts with the plain meaning of the term “and” in the statute.
The majority does not view subsections (l)(a) through (l)(e) as enumerating additional acts that a person must do in addition to assuming a false identity. Instead, the majority characterizes certain of these additional acts as “ways that the offense of criminal impersonation may be committed” and others as merely adding an “additional culpable mental intent.” Maj. Op. at 1208. I find these characterizations unpersuasive in light of the plain meaning of the statutory language.
First, as discussed earlier, a person must do the conduct enumerated in (l)(a) through (l)(e) in addition to knowingly assuming a false identity. Second, these subsections do not describe mere ways in which a person assumes a false identity — they enumerate discrete acts. For instance, marrying is not merely “a particularized way[] in which” something is done. Maj. Op. at 1208. Rather, marrying is an act — it is something someone does — not a manner in which someone does something. See Webster’s New World College Dictionary 13 (3rd ed.1996) (defining “act” to mean “a thing done; deed”). Likewise, confessing to a judgment and posting bail are acts that a person could engage in to be liable under the statute.
Any doubt that subsections (l)(a) through (l)(e) enumerate additional acts rather than manners in which assuming a false identity may occur is laid to rest by the plain language,of subsections (l)(d) ,and (l)(e). When read with the introductory language, subsection (l)(d) states that a person commits criminal impersonation if he knowingly assumes a false identity “and in such identity ... does an act which if done by the person falsely impersonated” might subject that person to liability. § 18-5-113(l)(d), C.R.S. (2005) (emphasis added). Subsection (l)(e) states that a person commits criminal impersonation if he knowingly assumes a false identity “and in such identity ... does any other act with intent to unlawfully gain a benefit.” § 18-5-113(l)(e), C.R.S. (2005) (emphasis added).2 The word “act” demonstrates that the General Assembly intended these subsections to enumerate additional acts, not manners of assuming a false identity or additional mental states that apply to the act of assuming a false identity.
The majority reads the word “act” out of subsection (l)(e) and interprets the statute as if it read “A person commits criminal impersonation if he knowingly assumes a false identity with the intent to unlawfully gain a benefit.” In doing so, the majority interprets the intent element of subsection (l)(e) to refer not to the “act” enumerated in that subsection but rather to the act of assuming a false identity. Hence, the majority concludes that the intent element in (l)(e) requires “the prosecution prove an additional culpable mental intent beyond the knowingly *1212culpable mental state of the statute’s introductory language.” Maj. Op. at 1208. This interpretation conflicts with the language of (l)(e) which requires that a person does an act with the intent to gain a benefit. § 18-5-113(l)(e), C.R.S. (2005). Intent to gain an unlawful benefit is the culpable mental state for the additional act enumerated in the catch-all provision (l)(e), not an additional culpable mental state for the act of assuming a false identity.
Finally, while superfluous to a plain-language analysis, I note that the criminal impersonation statute’s location in Article 5 of the Colorado Criminal Code supports the conclusion that the General Assembly did not intend this statute to apply to a person who gives a false name to police. Article 5, part 1 contains offenses involving fraud, such as forgery, trademark counterfeiting, and obtaining a person’s signature by deception. These fraud crimes generally involve a person getting money, benefits, or recognition that is not due to him. See, e.g., § 18-5-102, C.R.S. (2005) (concerning forgery of a written instrument); § 18-5-110.5, C.R.S. (2005) (prohibiting trademark counterfeiting); § 18-5-112, C.R.S. (2005) (prohibiting the obtaining of a signature by deception). None of the crimes in part 1 or in Article 5 involve interactions with police or avoiding arrest, and it appears illogical to conclude that the legislature intended the catch-all provision of the criminal impersonation statute to extend outside the contours of criminal fraud to reach conduct involving avoiding arrest during a routine stop of a motor vehicle.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority reasons that "by using the words 'if and 'and' in tire introductory phrase” of tire criminal impersonation statute, the General Assembly "plainly tied the assumption of a false or fictitious identity or capacity to [a] defendant's use of it under enumerated circumstances, purposes, or results.” Maj. Op. at 1208. I find this interpretation unconvincing. The statute merely states that "[a] person commits criminal impersonation if” he does the following specified conduct. § 18-5-113(1), C.R.S. (2005). This statutory formula, "a person commits Crime X, if he does Y and Z" does not imply that the list that follows the word "and” includes mere "circumstances, purposes, or results” rather than a list of additional acts, any one of which a person must do to be liable under the statute.

. Alvarado wisely concedes that the word "other” in subsection (l)(e) likely refers to an act other than an act described in (l)(d) rather than to an act other than the act of assuming a false identity. Nonetheless, this subsection refers to an "act,” and read together with the introduction, and leaving out the word "other,” this subsection states that it is unlawful to assume a false identity and in that identity to do any act with the intent to unlawfully gain a benefit. See § 18-5 — 113(l)(d)—(e), C.R.S. (2005).