Court Opinion

ID: 9722523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:38:01.733815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:02.169623
License: Public Domain

*244Opinion
CROSBY, J.
Steven Lawrence failed to present a claim for an injury suffered on a public sidewalk with the correct entity, the State of California. We find the error was excusable because he did—reasonably but erroneously—serve the County of Orange well within the statutory time and the county chose not to alert him to the truth concerning ownership of the property until the 100-day period in which to serve the proper agency had run. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying his petition to be relieved of the claims filing requirement.
I
Lawrence alleges he stepped on a sharp piece of metal protruding from the sidewalk along Pacific Coast Highway in Dana Point, an unincorporated area in the County of Orange, on March 8, 1982. Lawrence retained counsel within five weeks, and a secretary was assigned the task of determining which public agency to present with the claim (Gov. Code, § 911.2).
She telephoned the sheriff’s substation in south Orange County and was advised Dana Point was not an incorporated city and had no responsibility for sidewalk maintenance and that the area was under the control of the county. For reasons not explained in any declaration, the secretary also contacted several other cities in the vicinity and was advised “they were [all] part of the County.” She reported her findings to an attorney in the office who caused a claim to be filed with the County of Orange on April 30, 1982.
Lawrence’s attorneys received an acknowledgment of receipt of the claim on May 4, 1982, which stated it had been referred to the county’s risk management department for processing. When the 45-day period to act on it passed with no further response, counsel filed a complaint against the county. Not until August 6, 1982, more than three months after receiving the claim, did the county finally advise Lawrence’s counsel that the site of the accident was actually under the jurisdiction and control of the State of California.
By this time, of course, the 100-day period to present a claim to the state had lapsed. Lawrence’s application to file a late claim was denied, and he petitioned the superior court for relief from the claims presentation requirement (Gov. Code, § 946.6). The trial court found he did not make “a reasonable effort ... to determine who the proper entity was” and denied the petition. We disagree.
*245II
Because the “trend [is] ... in favor of granting relief unless absolutely forbidden by statute ...” (Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 33 [56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818]), an order denying relief from the claims presentation requirement is reviewed more closely than one granting relief. (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435 [197 Cal.Rptr. 601, 673 P.2d 271].) Nevertheless, to be relieved of the claims presentation requirement under Government Code section 946.6 the petitioner must demonstrate mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Id., at p. 435.)  Lawrence’s counsel concedes the error, but argues it was excusable, i.e., “ ‘that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476 [58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753].)
Factually, this case is somewhat similar to Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 529 [148 Cal.Rptr. 729], where the petitioner was injured when he struck a submerged pipe while swimming in a canal managed by Buena Vista Water District. He filed a claim with that entity, but did not learn the offending pipe was owned by another water district until more than 100 days after the accident. His petition to be relieved of the claims filing requirement was denied. The appellate court concluded the investigation by petitioner’s counsel, although negligent, was neither “cavalier” nor “devoid of diligence” and reversed. (Id., at p. 536.)
By way of contrast, in Shank v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 152 [188 Cal.Rptr. 644], a patient slipped and fell as she left her physician’s office. Her attorney wrote to the medical center within hours of the accident and asked that his letter be forwarded to the center’s insurance carrier. The center replied on stationery which bore the county seal, the words “Department of Health Services,” and the letterhead, “Los Angeles County-Olive View Medical Center.” More than 100 days after the accident, the center advised any claim would have to be made to the county board of supervisors. The appellate court affirmed denial of the petition for relief from the claims presentation requirement, noting, “a petitioner or his attorney must show more than that they did not discover a fact until too late; they must establish that in the use of reasonable diligehce they failed to discover it. [Citations.] There is a total absence of evidence that petitioner or her attorney exercised reasonable diligence (or any diligence) in an effort to ascertain the public status of Olive View. . . . The trial court properly could find that such conduct was not that of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances, and thus constituted inexcusable neglect.” (Id., at p. 157.)
*246Contrary to the semantic nitpicking of the dissent, the secretary to Lawrence’s counsel, unlike the attorney in Shank, did conduct an investigation, however modest; unfortunately it yielded incorrect information. Like the investigator in Kaslavage, she probably asked the wrong questions and might perhaps be criticized for failing to verify her information with another department of the county before filing the claim. But how painstaking and intense is such a simple inquiry expected to be? Given the apparent lack of complexity of the assignment, we think her efforts were sufficient. An arm of the county government, the sheriff’s office, specifically informed her the sidewalk was under county control; and a claim was filed with that entity well in advance of the 100-day limit.
We do not, as the dissent incorrectly suggests, approve sloppiness in the practice of law. But as judges we must not be so quick to forget the realities of the hectic and complex world of contemporary litigation. The crazy-quilt geography of our state’s political subdivisions and its stringently short claims statute create a deadly trap for even the most wary; but there is lamentably little time in busy law offices for redundant effort or double-checking of deceptively simple projects such as determining who owns a particular sidewalk. Mistakes will be made: That is why the Legislature has created various provisions to correct them and why courts should not hesitate to implement the cure where it is just to do so—as it surely is here.
Although we are unaware of its motives, the county behaved as though it deliberately desired to sabotage Lawrence’s lawsuit. After promptly acknowledging receipt of his claim, it waited a great while before notifying his counsel that the sidewalk was not within its jurisdiction. The county’s prompt written acknowledgment, coupled with the failure to disclaim responsibility during the running of the balance of the 100-day period would have lulled any attorney into a false sense of security; there was never the slightest indication to suggest the necessity of further inquiry.
Consequently, we find the neglect to have been of the excusable variety. Those responsible for the processing of tort claims in government agencies, such as Orange County’s risk management office, are acutely aware of the stringent time requirements of the Tort Claims Act. And they are—or should be—quite familiar with the parameters of the urban public property within their domain. In light of the county’s behavior, it is entirely understandable that Lawrence’s counsel did not catch the error. Under these circumstances it is more appropriate for the state, which has never hinted that it has been prejudiced by the relatively short delay, to yield to its injured citizen.
Accordingly, the order denying the petition for relief from the claims presentation requirement is reversed. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
*247Wallin, J., concurred.