Court Opinion

ID: 9494105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:29:28.657482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:09.007290
License: Public Domain

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part, and dissenting in the judgment:
I concur in parts II A-C of Judge Wilkins’s opinion. I do not concur in part II D or part III, however, and I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the court because that judgment affirms Marion Promise’s sentence for a crime for which he has never been charged or indicted, and, therefore, never tried or convicted. This plain error not only clearly affects Promise’s substantial rights, it also goes to the very heart of the judicial process. If not remedied, this error will “seriously affect” the “fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” and so, as the Supreme Court has directed, we “should correct” the error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). I regret, and dissent from, the court’s refusal to do so.
I.
Speaking for a majority of the court, Judge Wilkins clearly and persuasively explains why a specific threshold drug quantity constitutes an element of the aggravated drug trafficking offenses prohibited by 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999), which must be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
In this case, the grand jury indicted and the petit jury convicted Promise of a single offense — conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute “a quantity of cocaine and cocaine base.” No specific drug quantity charge was submitted to, or returned by, the grand jury. Consequently, the petit jury that tried Promise never considered the question of drug quantity, let alone found beyond a reasonable doubt that Promise conspired to distribute more than 50 kilograms of cocaine or 50 grams of cocaine base.
The statute at issue provides that the maximum sentence for conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute an unquantified amount of cocaine is no more than 20 years imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C). Therefore, under the new rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Apprendi, the maximum prison term that the district court could have legally imposed on Promise for this single count of conspiracy involving an unspecified “quantity of cocaine and cocaine base” is 20 years. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2359 n. 10, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (“The judge’s role *187in sentencing is constrained at its outer limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury”)- Yet the district court, not having the benefit of the decision in Apprendi sentenced' Promise to 30 years imprisonment pursuant to 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i) for the more serious crime of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a specific threshold quantity of Schedule I or II controlled substance, e.g., at least 50 grams of cocaine base.
Judge Wilkins properly concludes that the district court plainly erred in sentencing Promise to a prison term of 30 years. Judge Wilkins also correctly finds that this plain error affected Promise’s substantial rights and rightly recognizes -one of the reasons why this is so — it resulted in Promise receiving a sentence of ten more years in prison than the statute he was charged with violating permits.
The court’s refusal, notwithstanding these conclusions, to recognize this plain error is stunning. This serious misjudgment reflects a failure to appreciate fully both the nature of the error at issue here and the impossibility of overlooking such an error without jeopardizing the fairness, integrity, and reputation of judicial proceedings.
II.
The error at issue in this case is a sentencing error only in the sense that it can be remedied by vacating Promise’s sentence and remanding for resentencing. But, unlike the usual sentencing error, the root of this error is not a simple failure to calculate the correct sentence for the crime for which the defendant has been charged and convicted.1 Rather, the error here rests on the district court’s decision to sentence Promise for a crime for which he was never charged or convicted.
The imposition of such a sentence is antithetical to our system of justice. It deprives Promise of the most fundamental of rights — the right to be tried and convicted only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury. That Promise.was properly indicted and convicted of a different (lesser) crime does not change the fact that he was never indicted or convicted of the crime for which he was sentenced. As the Supreme Court reminded us in Apprendi itself, “ ‘the indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted.’ ” Apprendi 120 S.Ct. at 2362 n. 15 (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 232-33, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875) (Clifford, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). The indictment here simply did not do that. Using this indictment as the basis for imposing on Promise a 30 year sentence for an aggravated drug offense is precisely the same as using a defendant’s indictment and conviction on a manslaughter offense, carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years, as *188the basis for imposing a life sentence for murder.
The United States Constitution expressly prohibits such a result. The Constitution guarantees all of us the right to have each element of a crime presented to, and found by, a grand jury prior to being tried, convicted, or sentenced for that crime. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment promises that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S. Const, amend V. And the Sixth Amendment ensures that this indictment shall inform the accused “of the nature and cause of the accusation” against him. U.S. Const, amend. VI.
More than a hundred years ago, in its seminal opinion construing these provisions, the Supreme Court noted the importance of a court placing itself “as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed” the Constitution. Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887). Recognizing that the grand jury’s critical role in “protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation” is of “very ancient origin,” long predating the founding of this Country, the Court surmised that the Framers were “imbued in the common-law estimate of the value of the grand jury.” Id. at 10-12, 7 S.Ct. 781. The Court concluded that the Framers “therefore, must be understood to have used the language which they did in declaring that no person should be called to answer for any capital or otherwise infamous crime except upon an indictment or presentment of a grand jury, in the full sense of its necessity and of its value.” Id. at 12, 7 S.Ct. 781 (emphasis added). For this reason, the Supreme Court held that “an indictment found by a grand jury was indispensable to the power of the court to try the petitioner.” Id. at 12-13, 7 S.Ct. 781 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has never retreated from its dictate that the Constitution makes a grand jury’s indictment “indispensable” to the power to try a defendant for a serious crime. Rather, the Court has consistently and repeatedly reiterated the fundamental nature of the constitutional right to be tried only on charges presented to a grand jury.
Particularly relevant here, the Court has expressly held that “after an indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened through amendment except by the grand jury itself.” Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (emphasis added). In the case at hand, although the government presented the grand jury with an indictment containing only the elements necessary to charge Promise with a violation of § 841(b)(1)(C), the district court sentenced him to the more serious crime defined in § 841(b)(1)(A); the court did not formally amend the indictment, but its sentence had the same effect. The Supreme Court in Stirone addressed a similar situation and concluded that “[a]l-though the trial court did not permit a formal amendment of the indictment, the effect of what it did was the same.” Id. at 217, 80 S.Ct. 270. The district court here, as in Stirone, “destroyed the defendant’s substantial right to be tried only on the charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury.” Id. This “basic right is far too serious” to be “taken away with or without court amendment.” Id. at 217-19, 80 S.Ct. 270. To do so, the Supreme Court has instructed, is “fatal error.” Id. at 219, 80 S.Ct. 270.
By formalizing the grand jury requirement in our Constitution, the Framers indicated their understanding of the importance of convening “a body of laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one because of preju*189dice and to free no one because of special favor.” Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956). These characteristics of the grand jury provide several “safeguards essential to liberty in a government dedicated to justice under law.” Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 202, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948).
Because of the grand jury requirement, before the United States can prosecute anyone for a serious crime, an independent body of the citizenry must “declare, upon careful deliberation, under the solemnity of an oath, that there is good reason for his accusation and trial.” Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 11. This evidentiary function protects all of us “from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial before probable cause is established.” Id. at 12, 7 S.Ct. 781 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, because the Sixth Amendment demands that an accused “be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against him, the “indictment must set forth ... every ingredient of which the offence is composed.” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875) (internal quotation marks omitted). This notification allows the accused to prepare a defense as to every element of the indicted crime, or, after considering the charged elements and the maximum penalty permitted under the indictment, allows him to forego a trial and plead guilty. See Cole, 333 U.S. at 201, 68 S.Ct. 514. Without notification through indictment, one accused of criminal activity cannot knowingly decide whether to plead guilty or face trial, or adequately defend himself at trial against every element necessary to convict and punish him for a particular crime.
But the “most valuable function of the grand jury” may be “to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will.” Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906). See also Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12, 7 S.Ct. 781 (“[The grand jury] is justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive public prosecutions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The requirement of indictment by grand jury constrains the power of both the prosecutor and the court by limiting what can be submitted for trial, conviction, and sentence. And, indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he very purpose of the requirement that a man be indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.” Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218, 80 S.Ct. 270.
Thus, the true measure of the right denied Marion Promise is this: the district court sentenced Promise as if he had been indicted and convicted of a far more serious offense, imposing on Promise ten more years of imprisonment than the offense for which he was actually indicted and convicted permits. In doing so, the district court denied Promise rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which have long been regarded as “essential to liberty in a government dedicated to justice under law.” Cole, 333 U.S. at 202, 68 S.Ct. 514.
III.
Nevertheless, this court refuses to recognize this error because it believes, with clear hindsight, that Promise was not innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced — that the government presented “overwhelming” evidence at trial establish*190ing his guilt. Ante at 190. But correcting plain error does not depend on a defendant’s innocence. Rather, the Supreme Court has instructed that an appellate court “should” exercise its discretion to correct any plain error prejudicing a defendant’s substantial rights, which “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 713 n. 18 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[T]he term ‘miscarriage of justice’ is not the equivalent of ‘miscarriage of result.’ ”); United States v. Han-no, 21 F.3d 42, 49 (4th Cir.1994) (finding error “impacts on the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings” without discussing the evidence of guilt).
Certainly, sentencing a man for a crime for which he has been neither charged nor convicted seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Perhaps this is most easily seen by analogy. Returning to the defendant indicted and convicted of manslaughter, but illegally sentenced to life imprisonment for murder — I hope and trust no member of this court would “decline to notice” this “sentencing” error, even where the evidence adduced at trial indicated that the defendant’s actions likely fit the statutory definition of murder. No such result could be regarded as fair, nor could “judicial proceedings” that would permit such a sentence to stand instill “public confidence.” See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. For an appellate court to “decline to notice” such an error would constitute a serious abuse of discretion, producing a true “miscarriage of justice.” Id. Declining to notice the error in this case gives rise to the same fundamental unfairness, engenders the same lack of confidence in judicial proceedings, results in the same miscarriage of justice, and constitutes the same grave abuse of discretion.
Because the grand jury is “not bound to indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained,” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), our judicial system does not permit this or any other court to usurp the grand jury’s role as gatekeeper. The court today attempts to do this sub silentio, stating “[tjhere simply can be no doubt that had the indictment included the specific threshold quantity of 50 grams of cocaine base, the jury would have found Promise guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ante at 163 (emphasis added). But the fact is that the indictment returned against Promise did not include any aggravated drug offense charge and we do not know what evidence the grand jurors considered. Because of this, we cannot know whether they would have indicted Promise of an aggravated drug offense if such a charge had been submitted to them.
A court cannot rely on its own view of what indictment a grand jury could or would have issued if the grand jury was never, presented with a charge, or what verdict a petit jury could or would have reached if the petit jury was never presented with an indictment. “[I]t is utterly meaningless to posit that any rational grand jury could or would have indicted [the defendant] ..., because it is plain that this grand jury did not, and absent waiver, a constitutional verdict cannot be had on an unindicted offense.” Floresca, 38 F.3d at 712 (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, whether the grand jury would have indicted Promise on the available evidence is irrelevant because:
The very purpose of the requirement that a man be indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses charged *191by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge. Thus the basic protection the grand jury was designed to afford is defeated by a device or method which subjects the defendants to prosecution for [an element] which the grand jury did not charge.
Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218, 80 S.Ct. 270 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
For this reason, contrary to Judge Wilkins’s suggestion, the case at hand critically differs from Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), and United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302 (4th Cir.2000). Simply put, the district courts in Johnson and Bowens, unlike the district court here, did not sentence the defendants to crimes not charged in the indictment returned against them. Because the Johnson and Bowens errors occurred not in failing to present a charge to the grand jury, but in the “trial process,” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), an appellate court could examine that process and discern that “overwhelming” and “essentially uncontroverted” evidence presented at trial supported the charges the grand jury had returned against the defendants. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544; Bowens, 224 F.3d at 315. Upon making this assessment of the evidence at trial, the Supreme Court in Johnson and our court in Bowens could conclude with confidence that declining to notice the courts’ sentencing errors would not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial process.” Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770).
Such a determination is impossible in a case like that at hand in which the defendant has never been charged with, or in-dieted of, the crime for which he has been sentenced. It is impossible because grand jury proceedings are secret. Thus, a court simply “cannot knoiu whether the grand jury would have included in its indictment” a charge not before it. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 219, 80 S.Ct. 270. Assessment of the evidence presented at trial provides no reliable assurance as to what facts were presented to, or found by, the grand jury.
To attempt to judge the fairness of a sentence based on charges never made to a grand jury is to have this court “make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jur[ors].” Russell v., United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). The Supreme Court has out-lawed such post hoc judicial guesswork, precisely because it would allow a defendant to “be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, ' the grand jury which indicted him.” Id.
This is why, quite unlike most trial errors, “an indictment found by a grand jury [i]s indispensable to the power of the court to try [the defendant] for the crime with which he was charged.” Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12-13, 7 S.Ct. 781 (emphasis added). Indeed, “the lack of grand jury indictment ... gives rise to a right not to be tried.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 802, 109 S.Ct. 1494, 103 L.Ed.2d 879 (1989) (emphasis added). Thus, while it is appropriate for a reviewing court to assess the available evidence in determining when to notice instructional errors or other errors occurring at trial, a court simply does not have the “power” to review the evidence presented at trial before a grand jury’s indictment allows it to do so. See Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215, 80 S.Ct. 270 (“[T]he Fifth Amendment requires that prosecution be begun by indictment.”).2
*192IV.
In response to what I have written above, my colleagues contend that I improperly “eschewt ] a flexible approach in favor of a per se rule requiring appellate courts to notice plain error whenever a defendant suffers a conviction or sentence not authorized by the indictment.” Ante at 163-64 n. 9. I offer this brief reply.
First, I confess that I do believe that sentencing a defendant for a crime for which he was neither indicted by a grand jury nor convicted by a petit jury is an error that always seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of our judicial process. Furthermore, I believe that the Constitution requires this conclusion and that the Supreme Court has never held to the contrary. Today, in holding otherwise, this court takes a step toward disregarding altogether the right to grand jury indictment and to trial by petit jury in favor of judicial imposition of a sentence for whatever crime an appellate court believes that a defendant has committed. This, I hope, the Constitution will never permit.
However, invocation of a “per se” rule is unnecessary to the proper resolution of this case. Rather, balancing all even arguably pertinent considerations requires precisely the same result — noticing the plain error and ordering re-sentencing. On the other hand, the court’s “flexible approach,” assertedly “based on a balancing of numerous considerations,” id., actually is grounded entirely on just two factors, both of which are irrelevant in the case at hand, gives short shrift to the fundamental nature of the grand jury error before us, and completely ignores the most relevant additional considerations.3
First, the court exaggerates the significance of two matters that are of minimal importance in the grand jury context — the strength of the government’s evidence4 and post-indictment notice. These “considerations” are of little import in this case because, as I explained in part III, grand jury proceedings are secret, and thus no matter what evidence was produced at trial, and no matter what notice the government provided post-indictment, a court simply “cannot know whether the grand jury would have included in its indictment” a charge never presented to it. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 219, 80 S.Ct. 270.
This view entirely accords with Supreme Court precedent. One need look no further than Olano. There, the Court listed *193numerous cases in which it had reiterated the appropriate plain error standard as set forth in United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936); in only one, , Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 82 S.Ct. 1287, 8 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (per curiam), did the Court hold that the plain error should be noticed and corrected. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (collecting cases). The error noticed in Silber, like the error at issue here, involved a deféc-tive indictment. (Silber had moved to dismiss the indictment in the trial court; when that motion was erroneously denied, Silber failed to raise the indictment error in the court of appeals or the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court nonetheless noticed the plain error. Silber, 370 U.S. at 717, 82 S.Ct. 1287.) Although the evidence adduced at Silber’s trial unquestionably established both his guilt and that he had notice of the unindicted information, see Silber v. United States, 296 F.2d 588, 590 (D.C.Cir.1961), the Supreme Court, without any consideration of that evidence or the notice, corrected the plain indictment error and reversed the judgment. Silber, 370 U.S. at 718, 82 S.Ct. 1287. Just as the evidence at trial was irrelevant to the Supreme Court’s decision to notice the plain indictment error in Silber, it should be irrelevant to our decision to notice the plain error here.5
In addition, in its emphasis on the post-indictment “notice” given Promise, the court fails to recognize t hat the grand jury not only serves to inform a defendant of the charge against him, but that possibly the “most valuable function of the grand jury” is “to stand between the prosecutor and the accused” to protect a defendant against charges “dictated by malice or personal ill will.” Hale, 201 U.S. at 59, 26 S.Ct. 370. Declining to notice this error allows the prosecution and the court to circumvent the grand jury and punish a man on the basis of evidence that they, not the grand jury, deem sufficient. Accordingly, post-indictment notice does nothing to preserve the integrity of the grand jury process or protect our grand jury rights, which are so “essential to liberty in a government dedicated to justice under law.” Cole, 333 U.S. at 202, 68 S.Ct. 514.
At the same time that the court, inflates two irrelevant considerations, it downplays a critical one — the fundamental nature of the grand jury error. We have previously recognized, even when considering simple instructional error, that the “fundamental nature of [an] error” is a factor that an appellate court on plain error review should consider in “appropriately exer-cis[ing]” its discretion “so as to preserve the fairness, integrity and reputation of the judicial process.” United States v. David, 83 F.3d 638, 648 (4th Cir.1996). Here, that factor, which the court today barely mentions, weighs heavily in favor of noticing and rectifying the error. For this error — sentencing a defendant for a crime for which he has never been charged, let *194alone indicted or convicted — denies a right too vital to be ignored. When “a plain error [i]s committed in a matter[this] absolutely vital to defendants,” an appellate court properly notices it. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658, 16 S.Ct. 1127, 41 L.Ed. 289 (1896) (emphasis added). Indeed, even my colleagues who dissented in Floresca, although refusing to find as the majority did that the indictment was defective, recognized that when, as is concededly the case here, an indictment is truly defective “it may be that the burden [a defendant must meet to warrant correction of plain error] will be met most of the time.” Floresca, 38 F.3d at 726 n. 17 (Russell, J., dissenting, joined by Wilkinson, Wilkins, Niemeyer, and Williams, JJ.) (emphasis added).
In addition to refusing to recognize the importance of the vital right denied here, the court today completely ignores the most relevant factors that the Supreme Court has found significant in assessing whether to notice errors that are far less fundamental than the one in this case. Thus, the court pays no mind to a “consideration” that helped tip the scales in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), on which the court so heavily relies. Noticing the error in Johnson would have required reversing the defendant’s conviction and possibly resulted in a costly new trial. See Id. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (noting that “reversal of [the] conviction” would seriously affect the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings). The consequences of noticing the defect in this case are not nearly as onerous. We can rectify the instant error simply by re-sentencing Promise to the maximum term allowed by the statute for the offense of which he was indicted and convicted. Promise would not be set free, nor would the government have to undertake a new trial. The minimal costs of noticing this “fatal error,” Stirone, 361 U.S. at 219, 80 S.Ct. 270, certainly pale in comparison to the damage done to the integrity of our judicial process in failing to correct it.
Perhaps even more surprisingly, the court also ignores the fact that noticing the error in this case does not encourage a defendant to “sandbag” the government, he., forego timely objection in the trial court for strategic advantage. Yet, the Supreme Court has time and again emphasized that preventing sandbagging is critically important in determining whether to notice plain error. See, e.g., Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466, 117 S.Ct. 1544; United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 16 n. 13,105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 238-39, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940).
Hence, in cases in which the Supreme Court has refused to notice plain error, a timely objection in the trial court could have eliminated, or substantially ameliorated, any error by means well short of the drastic relief — ordering a new trial — necessary to remedy the error on appeal. For example, in [Joyce B.] Johnson, 520 U.S. at 464, 117 S.Ct. 1544, if the defendant had timely objected to the trial court’s determination of materiality, that court could have submitted the question to the jury; in Olano, 507 U.S. at 727-29, 113 S.Ct. 1770, if the defendant had timely objected to the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations, the trial court could have refused to permit the alternates to be present; in Young, 470 U.S. at 13, 105 S.Ct. 1038 and Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. at 239-42, 60 S.Ct. 811, if the defendant had timely objected to the prosecutor’s arguments, the trial court could have halted the arguments; and in [Enoch L.] Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 199-200, 63 S.Ct. 549, *19587 L.Ed. 704 (1943), if the defendant had timely objected to the prosecutor’s comments on the defendant’s failure to testify on .certain matters, the trial court could have prohibited the comments or instructed the jury to disregard them. Possible sandbagging by the defendant was, indeed, a problem in all of these cases; correcting the error was necessary to prevent future use of the tactic which created the error.
In contrast, had Promise timely objected to imposition of the 30-year sentence as contrary to Apprendi, the trial court could only have avoided error by giving Promise precisely the relief that we should now order — vacating the sentence and remanding for imposition of the proper 20-year sentence. As the court recognizes, “Unquestionably, had the district court been aware of Apprendi at the time of trial, it would have imposed a sentence of 20 years imprisonment, instead of the term of 30 years it actually imposed.” Ante at 161 n. 8. Accordingly, noticing the plain error here would not permit Promise (unlike Olano and the others) to obtain any strategic benefit from his failure to timely object to the error in a timely manner.
The vital rights and critical error involved here, alone or in conjunction with the most relevant factors the Supreme Court has examined in determining whether to notice less fundamental errors, unquestionably demonstrate that the court abuses its discretion in refusing to notice and correct the error.
V.
Today, this court, on the basis of what it believes the grand jury would have done if the government had sought an indictment for a more serious crime, affirms the sentence Marion Promise received for that more serious crime — even though Promise was never, charged, never indicted, never tried, and never convicted of that crime. Long ago, the Supreme Court warned against allowing a court to “change the charging part of an indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to have been, or what the grand jury would probably have made if their attention had been called to suggested changes.” Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 10, 7 S.Ct. 781. If this is permitted, the Court cautioned, “the great importance which the common law attaches to an indictment by a grand jury ... may be frittered away until its value is almost destroyed.” Id. Unfortunately, that has happened today.
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate Promise’s sentence and remand to the district court for re-sentencing, with instructions to impose a sentence not exceeding 20 years, the statutory maximum for the sole offense for which Promise was indicted and convicted, as the decision of the en banc court in United States v. Angle, No. 96-4662(L) (4th Cir. June 29, 2001) (en banc), requires. Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s refusal to do so.
Judge Widener has authorized me to indicate that he joins parts I, II, III, and V of this opinion. Judges Michael and King have authorized me to indicate that they join in the entire opinion.

. Long ago, the Supreme Court expressly held that a court has no "authority” to impose a *192sentence other than that which the law provides for the offense on which a defendant "was indicted and convicted." In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 254, 258, 14 S.Ct. 323, 38 L.Ed. 149 (1894) (Even "[i]f the court is authorized to impose imprisonment” for the crime on which the defendant has been indicted and convicted, if the term of imprisonment "exceeds the time prescribed by law, the judgment is void for the excess.”).

. The court’s approach also creates a rule so vague as to be almost impossible to discern or follow; for the court never tells us which of its "considerations” is dispositive or how its "considerations” are to be weighed. Presumably, even overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence of a defendant’s guilt, without post-indictment notice, is insufficient to persuade the court not to notice an error like that at issue here. See ante at 163. But if this sort of evidence were accompanied by a notice, but not one which was "manifestly] adequate,” should a court notice this sort of error? What if the government provided an adequate notice, and presented strong, but not undisputed, evidence?

. The court suggests that assessment of the government’s evidence and Promise’s failure to dispute that evidence are two separate "considerations,” see ante at 163 n. 9; in-fact they are just different parts of a single "consideration” — the strength ("overwhelming” and/or "undisputed” or not) of the prosecution’s evidence — which, for all we know, the grand jury never considered.

. The court attempts to distinguish Silber on the basis that the Supreme Court "did not discuss the strength of the Government’s proof, [or] whether the defendant had actual notice.” Ante at 164-65 n. 9. But that is precisely the point. The Supreme Court in Silber corrected the plain error caused by the defective indictment without regard to the trial evidence or the notice given. In fact, the Court thought the defect serious enough to warrant sua sponte correction, despite the defendant’s failure to bring the error to the Court's attention. See Silber, 370 U.S. at 718, 82 S.Ct. 1287.
Furthermore, despite the court’s assertion to the contrary, see ante at 164-65 n. 9, for the reasons discussed in part III, the Supreme Court’s consideration of the evidence in declining to correct the jury instruction error at issue in Johnson does not alter the fact that the Court looked past the evidence to correct the indictment error in Silber.