Court Opinion

ID: 9772165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:09:06.109098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.392077
License: Public Domain

SCALES, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority enacts new legislation in order to arrive at an “equitable” result. The entire cause should be remanded to the trial court because genuine issues of material fact exist as to Prewitt’s counterclaim.
The record reflects that the City moved for summary judgment only on its own cause of action; the City did not contest Prewitt’s counterclaim in any way. Nor did Prewitt raise its counterclaim in its response to the City’s summary judgment motion. The judgment, however, without explicitly mentioning the counterclaim, disposes of it by reciting, “All relief requested and not expressly granted is denied.”
“It is axiomatic that one may not be granted judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action not addressed in a summary judgment proceeding.” Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983). Prewitt did not waive its counterclaim by not raising it in its response. Id; Westland Film Industries v. State Board of Insurance, 697 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex.App. — Austin 1985, no writ) (on rehearing). Therefore, the trial court erred in ruling on Prewitt’s counterclaim. Young v. Hodde, 682 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.1984).1 Prewitt does not, however, complain specifically about the form of the judgment;2 thus, we must consider Prew-itt’s third point of error as attacking a properly rendered, adverse summary judgment.
Under its third point of error, Prewitt argues that disputed fact issues concerning Prewitt’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees remain unresolved by the trial court’s judgment. I agree. The City did not present summary-judgment proof showing that no issue of material fact exists as to at least one element of Prewitt’s counterclaim. Adams v. Tri-Continental Leasing Corp., 713 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, no writ). Therefore, the City is not entitled to summary judgment on the counterclaim, Chessher, 658 S.W.2d at 564, and the cause should be reversed and remanded.
Moreover, Prewitt, as the worker’s attorney, pressed the worker’s claim against the third-party tortfeasor, and those efforts resulted in a settlement in excess of the City’s claim for reimbursement. The amount and value of Prewitt’s efforts are *725fact issues which were not addressed in the trial court.
When the legislature enacted section 6a(a), it undoubtedly did not “envision” a scenario such as that before us. This fact does not, however, grant this Court legislative powers. We may not, under the guise of construction, amend a statute by adding words to it, no matter how desirable such additions might seem, A.M. Servicing Corp. of Dallas v. State, 380 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1964, no writ), and we may not usurp the power of the legislature by reading into a statute language that is not there. Goldman v. Torres, 161 Tex. 437, 341 S.W.2d 154, 158 (1960). Moreover, the case before us does not demand statutory interpretation; the conundrum which the majority creates for itself is resolved by remanding the cause to the trial court. The amount and reasonableness of attorney’s fees is a question of fact, involving the consideration of various intangibles incapable of review by an appellate court. Mack v. Moore, 669 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
I would reverse and remand the cause to the trial court.

. The trial court should have rendered only a partial summitry judgment. The erroneous rendition of a final summary judgment does not, however, deprive this court of jurisdiction where, as here, the judgment expressly disposes of all parties and claims by stating that "all relief not expressly granted is denied." Teer v. Duddleston, 664 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex.1984); Hodde v. Young, 672 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 682 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex.1984); Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 626 S.W.2d 74, 77-78 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1981), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 644 S.W.2d 453, 454-55 (Tex.1982) (on rehearing). Our Court has held that this rule does not apply where the "Mother Hubbard” provision may reasonably be construed to deny only the other relief sought by the moving party and neither party understands the order to be a final judgment. Sakser v. Fitze, 708 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, no writ). This exception does not apply here.

. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that an error in the form of the judgment is not “fundamental error.” Young v. Hodde, 682 S.W.2d at 237; Teer, 664 S.W.2d at 704; Schlipf, 644 S.W.2d at 455.