Court Opinion

ID: 9925247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 06:06:14.491026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:48.341113
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    January 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 356493
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
ROBERT STEWART ALDERTON,                                            LC No. 19-004601-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of first-degree felony murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“felony-firearm”). Defendant was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first-degree felony murder
conviction and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Finding no errors
warranting reversal, we affirm.

                      I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       This case arises out of the homicide of defendant’s father, Rory Alderton, on January 11,
2019, at Rory’s home in Detroit, Michigan. Testimony from Rory’s girlfriend, Karen Schutter,
and two of Rory’s adult children, Kevin Alderton and Jessica Alderton, was admitted at trial and
demonstrated that Rory was afraid of defendant and felt threatened by him. Rory previously
obtained a personal protection order (“PPO”) against defendant in November 2018, but defendant
nevertheless continued to break into Rory’s home and engage in violent and threatening behavior.

        Rory died from multiple gunshot wounds, and DNA evidence collected from the murder
scene showed that defendant’s blood was located on Rory’s front door and underneath Rory’s
fingernails. When he was arrested three days after the murder, defendant had scratches on his
hands, and Rory’s cellular telephone, an “iPhone,” was in defendant’s pocket. Rory’s neighbors
saw defendant outside of Rory’s house during the 24-hour period surrounding the murder, and
surveillance video footage from a nearby gas station showed defendant in the vicinity of the murder
scene during that time period. Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, MCL

                                                -1-
750.316(1)(b), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b, and sentenced as previously noted. This
appeal followed.1

                                I. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

       On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it removed his appointed
counsel, Clifford Woodards as defendant’s trial counsel and replaced Woodards with new
appointed counsel, James Schlaff. We disagree.

                                  A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        In order to preserve an argument that a defendant’s right to counsel was violated because
the trial court replaced the defendant’s appointed counsel, the defendant must object to the
substitution of defense counsel in the trial court. People v Bailey, 330 Mich App 41, 52-53; 944
NW2d 370 (2019). Defendant did not contemporaneously object to the trial court’s replacement
of Woodards.2 Therefore, the issue is unpreserved, and we review the issue for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. Bailey, 330 Mich App at 53. Under plain-error review, a defendant
must demonstrate that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was clear or obvious, and (3) the error

1
  After defendant commenced this appeal, he filed in the trial court a motion for new trial, which
the trial court denied. Defendant then filed in this Court a motion to remand the case to the trial
court for a hearing under People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), which this
Court granted in part and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on defendant’s
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. People v Alderton, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered January 4, 2022 (Docket No. 356493). On remand, defendant filed a second
motion for new trial, a Ginther hearing was held, and the trial court rejected defendant’s
ineffective-assistance claims and denied his second motion for new trial.
         Defendant then filed in this Court a second motion to remand the case to the trial court,
this time seeking an evidentiary hearing concerning the failure of the police to inform defendant
of a video surveillance system of one of Rory’s neighbors, and the failure of the police to preserve
the surveillance system after examining it. We granted defendant’s motion and remanded the case
to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. People v Alderton, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered August 24, 2022 (Docket No. 356493). On remand, defendant filed a third
motion for new trial, another evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court denied defendant’s
renewed motion, concluding the government did not violate any constitutional requirements with
respect to the neighbor’s video surveillance system.
2
  Defendant notes in his appellate brief that he raised this issue in his first motion for new trial, but
doing so did not constitute a contemporaneous objection that preserved the issue. See generally,
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (“[R]equiring a
contemporaneous objection provides the trial court an opportunity to correct the error, which could
thereby obviate the necessity of further legal proceedings and would be by far the best time to
address a defendant’s constitutional and nonconstitutional rights”) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 274; 662 NW2d 836 (2003) (an issue concerning
the trial was unpreserved because it was raised only in a posttrial motion rather than at trial).

                                                  -2-
was prejudicial, i.e., it affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Bailey, 330 Mich App
at 53-54. Reversal is warranted only if the plain error resulted in the conviction of an innocent
defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.
Bailey, 330 Mich App at 54.

                                         B. ANALYSIS

        This issue is moot as a result of Woodards’s death approximately one year after the trial
ended. In general, “a court will not decide moot issues.” People v Thue, 336 Mich App 35, 39;
969 NW2d 346 (2021). “An issue is moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the
reviewing court to fashion a remedy to the controversy.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Defendant argues that the trial court erred in replacing his appointed trial counsel,
Woodards, whom defendant now professes to have preferred as his counsel. Defendant’s appellate
brief seeks a new trial because of the trial court’s purported error in removing and replacing
Woodards. However, as defendant acknowledges in his appellate brief, Woodards is deceased,
and if this Court were to grant defendant his requested remedy of a new trial, he would again be
represented by an attorney other than Woodards, the attorney whom defendant now claims to have
preferred. It is, therefore, impossible for this Court to grant defendant a suitable remedy. The
issue is thus moot, and we need not decide it. See id.

       But even if the issue were not moot, defendant’s argument lacks merit. Woodards was
suspended from the practice of law for 30 days effective December 1, 2019, the suspension was
then extended for another 75 days, and his license ultimately was not reinstated until October 29,
2020. On January 9, 2020, the court removed Woodards and appointed Schlaff as defendant’s
counsel. The case was tried from February 25, 2020 through February 28, 2020. Accordingly, it
was proper for the trial court to remove and replace Woodards because he was unable to represent
defendant while suspended from the practice of law. See MCR 9.119(B), (E).

                                II. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

      Defendant next argues that the trial court committed evidentiary and constitutional errors
by admitting into evidence certain statements made by Rory. We disagree.

                                A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 251; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). An abuse of discretion
“occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes.”
People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 565; 852 NW2d 587 (2014) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “A decision on a close evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion.”
Thorpe, 504 Mich at 252.

       However, a preliminary issue of law regarding the admissibility of evidence is reviewed
de novo. People v Jambor (On Remand), 273 Mich App 477, 481; 729 NW2d 569 (2007).
Whether a defendant’s constitutional rights of confrontation have been violated presents a question
of constitutional law that is also reviewed de novo. People v Bruner, 501 Mich 220, 226; 912
NW2d 514 (2018).

                                               -3-
                                         B. ANALYSIS

        Defendant’s challenged statements of Rory were admitted through the testimony of
Schutter, Kevin, and Jessica, and through Rory’s verified statement in support of the petition for a
PPO against defendant. Defendant contends these statements were inadmissible and violated his
right to confrontation. We turn, first, to the statements in question.

        Schutter, Rory’s girlfriend, testified that Rory said that he felt threatened by defendant
because defendant broke into Rory’s house and was threatening. Rory stated that he had obtained
a PPO against defendant and had him arrested several times, and hoped that defendant would get
off drugs and obtain rehabilitation. Rory told Schutter that defendant would sometimes break into
Rory’s house and sleep in the basement. When defendant was there, Rory kept his bedroom door
barricaded because he felt threatened by defendant. Schutter related that Rory did not want
defendant to hurt or kill anyone.

       Kevin, Rory’s son, testified that Rory told him about Rory’s relationship with defendant,
and Kevin saw the way that Rory and defendant interacted. Rory expressed concerns about
defendant and was afraid that defendant was going to hurt Rory. According to Kevin, defendant
acted erratic and damaged Rory’s home when Rory was gone. Rory sent pictures to Kevin and
told him about what was happening. After the PPO was obtained in November 2018, defendant
would repeatedly come to Rory’s house, Rory would call the police, and the police would arrest
defendant. Kevin testified that defendant would then be released a day later and break into Rory’s
house again through a window. According to Kevin, Rory expressed concerns about defendant’s
behavior, arguments, and violent outbursts.

        Jessica, Rory’s daughter, testified that she had knowledge of Rory’s relationship with
defendant. Around the end of 2018, Rory stated several times that defendant was becoming
aggressive toward Rory and that Rory was scared of defendant. Jessica stated that defendant began
living with Rory in July 2018, and around October 2018 or November 2018, Rory was trying to
get defendant out of the house because defendant was becoming violent and aggressive. Rory sent
pictures to Jessica showing damage to Rory’s bedroom door that defendant had caused while trying
to get into Rory’s locked bedroom. Jessica testified that Rory also said that defendant had
destroyed a safe, and Rory sent Jessica pictures of holes defendant had put into a wall. According
to Jessica, Rory was terrified and frustrated that the PPO was not working; Rory had defendant
arrested several times, and Rory would then get out and come back into the house.

        A redacted and certified copy of the PPO that Rory obtained against defendant was also
admitted into evidence at trial. Two pages of the exhibit consisted of a verified statement made
by Rory in support of the petition for a PPO. The statement was signed by Rory and dated
November 6, 2018. In the statement, Rory asserted that at 2:00 a.m. on October 1, 2018, defendant
kicked in Rory’s door and told Rory to give defendant money or defendant would “f*** [Rory]
up.” Rory said that defendant was “stoned all the time” and that Rory was “afraid” defendant
would “beat [Rory] with [defendant’s] baseball bats he keeps in the house.” On October 8, 2018,
defendant “kicked” and screamed that Rory “better give [defendant] money and [Rory’s] car keys
or [defendant] would f*** [Rory] up.” On November 3, 2018, defendant told Rory “to go get a
hotel room or [Rory] would be sorry.” Rory stayed with a friend that night, and when Rory

                                                -4-
returned home the next day, defendant said he had warned Rory and started walking toward Rory
until Rory drew a firearm.

        “In general, hearsay—an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted—may not be admitted into evidence.” People v Green, 313 Mich App 526, 531; 884
NW2d 838 (2015). MRE 803(3)3 provides the following exception to the general prohibition on
hearsay:

       A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or
       physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
       bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
       remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification,
       or terms of declarant’s will.

        In People v Propp (On Remand), 340 Mich App 652, 667; 987 NW2d 888 (2022), held in
abeyance ___ Mich ___; 990 NW2d 336 (2023), we held that “all of the [murder] victim’s
statements regarding defendant’s pattern of stalking, threats, and domestic violence were
admissible as evidence concerning the victim’s state of mind—and her fear of defendant—under
MRE 803(3).” “Evidence of the [murder] victim’s state of mind, evidence of the victim’s plans,
which demonstrated motive (the ending of the marriage and the tension between the victim and
defendant), and evidence of statements that defendant made to cause the victim fear were
admissible under MRE 803(3).” Propp, 340 Mich App at 667 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). In addition, the victim’s “statements were also admissible for several valid nonhearsay
purposes, including the effect that they might have had in motivating defendant to kill the victim.”
Id. at 667; see also People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 310; 642 NW2d 417 (2002) (explaining
that the victim’s statements were “relevant to numerous issues in the case, including the issues of
motive, deliberation, and premeditation . . . .”).

       Rory’s statements were admissible under MRE 803(3). The central focus of Rory’s
statements consisted of expressions that he was afraid of defendant and felt threatened by him.
Rory’s statements included examples of what caused his fear and feeling of being threatened and
were relevant to facts at issue, including by demonstrating familial discord and tension that existed
between Rory and defendant, and revealing a possible motive for defendant to have broken into
Rory’s home and killed him. “Although motive is not an essential element of the crime, evidence
of motive in a prosecution for murder is always relevant.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210,
223; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Familial discord is similar to marital discord, which has been held
relevant to establish a motive to commit murder.

             Evidence of marital discord is relevant to motive just as evidence of marital
       harmony would be relevant to show lack of motive. Discord or lack of discord in
       an ongoing relationship obviously has some tendency to make the existence of a

3
  An amendment of MRE 803(3) took effect on January 1, 2024, but the amendment does not alter
the substantive meaning of the rule in any way that is relevant to the present issue on appeal. We
have quoted the provision as it existed before the January 1, 2024 amendment.

                                                -5-
       fact in controversy more or less probable—whether or not the accused ended the
       relationship as it is alleged he did. Whether the marital discord is of a type that
       would provide a motive for murder is an issue of weight, not admissibility. [People
       v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 453; 537 NW2d 577 (1995).]

The statements also indicated a possible ground to find that defendant premeditated the murder.
See Ortiz, 249 Mich App at 310. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
the statements under MRE 803(3).

        Defendant further suggests that Rory’s statements should have been excluded because they
were substantially more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. Under MRE 403, relevant
evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Evidence is not unfairly
prejudicial merely because it is damaging to a party’s case. People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494, 501;
537 NW2d 168 (1995). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has “an undue tendency to move the
tribunal to decide on an improper basis, commonly, though not always, an emotional one.” Id.

       Unfair prejudice exists when there is a tendency that evidence with little probative
       value will be given too much weight by the jury. This unfair prejudice refers to the
       tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party’s position
       by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, e.g., the jury’s
       bias, sympathy, anger, or shock. [People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 614; 709
       NW2d 595 (2005) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

        Rory’s statements were probative of the family discord that existed between himself and
defendant, which was relevant to motive and premeditation. Defendant’s behavior reflected in the
statements was far less serious than his conduct underlying the charged offenses. There was no
improper injection of considerations extraneous to the merits of the case. Even if there was unfair
prejudice, it did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. See Thorpe, 504
Mich at 252 (“A decision on a close evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an abuse of
discretion.”).

         Even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the statements, defendant would
still not be entitled to relief. “Under the harmless-error rule set forth in MCL 769.26, it is presumed
that preserved, nonconstitutional error—such as evidentiary error—is harmless, and to overcome
that presumption the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating, on the strength of the entire
record, ‘that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.’ ” Propp, 340
Mich App at 661-662. Defendant has failed to rebut the presumption of harmlessness as there was
overwhelming evidence of guilt: (1) DNA evidence indicated that defendant’s blood was on Rory’s
front door and underneath Rory’s fingernails; (2) testimony of Rory’s neighbors and video
surveillance from a nearby gas station indicated that defendant was near the crime scene on the
date at issue; and (3) when he was arrested three days after the murder, defendant had cuts on his
hands consistent with an attempt by Rory to defend himself, and defendant’s pocket contained
Rory’s cellular telephone. Thus, on the strength of the entire record, defendant has failed to
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the alleged evidentiary error was outcome-
determinative. See id.

                                                 -6-
        Defendant further argues that his state and federal constitutional rights of confrontation
were violated by the admission into evidence of Rory’s verified addendum in support of the
petition for PPO. We disagree.

         “Both the United States and Michigan constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to confront the witnesses against him or her.” People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 10; 777
NW2d 732 (2009), citing US Const, Am VI, and Const 1963, art 1, § 20. “To preserve this right,
testimonial hearsay is inadmissible against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable
at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” Garland, 286
Mich App at 10, citing Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 68; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177
(2004). “However, if the hearsay is nontestimonial, the Confrontation Clause does not restrict
state law from determining admissibility.” Garland, 286 Mich App at 10.

       Statements taken by police officers during interrogations are generally considered
testimonial. Crawford, 541 US at 52. The United States Supreme Court has further clarified:

       Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
       under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
       interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They
       are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
       ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish
       or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. [Davis v
       Washington, 547 US 813, 822; 126 S Ct 2266; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006).]

In addition, “there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement
is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”
Ohio v Clark, 576 US 237, 245; 135 S Ct 2173; 192 L Ed 2d 306 (2015) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “In the end, the question is whether, in light of all the circumstances, viewed
objectively, the primary purpose of the conversation was to create an out-of-court substitute for
trial testimony.” Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

        Rory’s verified addendum in support of the petition for a PPO was not testimonial. The
primary purpose of giving the statements in the verified addendum was not to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution. Rather, the purpose of the verified
addendum was to meet an ongoing emergency, i.e., convince a family court to issue a PPO to end
a threatening situation created by defendant. Moreover, there was no police interrogation or other
law enforcement involvement at this stage. In sum, no basis exists to conclude that the primary
purpose of the verified addendum was to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.
Hence, because the statements contained in the verified addendum were not testimonial, defendant
was not denied his constitutional rights of confrontation.

                                  III. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

        Defendant next argues that he was denied due process because of the failure of the police
to preserve a neighbor’s video surveillance system or to disclose its existence to the defense. We
disagree.

                                                -7-
                                 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Whether defendant was denied due process presents a constitutional question, which is
reviewed de novo. People v Wilder, 485 Mich 35, 40; 780 NW2d 265 (2010).

                                         B. ANALYSIS

        “To warrant reversal on a claimed due-process violation involving the failure to preserve
evidence, a ‘defendant must prove that the missing evidence was exculpatory or that law
enforcement personnel acted in bad faith.’ ” People v Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1, 16; 909 NW2d
24 (2017), quoting People v Hanks, 276 Mich App 91, 95; 740 NW2d 530 (2007). “When the
evidence is only ‘potentially useful,’ a failure to preserve the evidence does not amount to a due-
process violation unless a defendant establishes bad faith.” Dickinson, 321 Mich App at 16,
quoting Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). The
defendant has “ ‘the burden of showing that the evidence was exculpatory or that the police acted
in bad faith.’ ” Dickinson, 321 Mich App at 16, quoting People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362,
365; 494 NW2d 873 (1992). Bad faith exists when the police act maliciously, People v Heft, 299
Mich App 69, 79; 829 NW2d 266 (2012), or engage in gamesmanship or a deliberate attempt to
conceal evidence. People v Greenfield, 271 Mich App 442, 454 n 9; 722 NW2d 254 (2006). Mere
negligence on the part of the police does not amount to bad faith. Youngblood, 488 US at 58.

         Moreover, “[a] prosecutor is not required to seek and find exculpatory evidence or assist
in building the defendant’s case . . . .” Dickinson, 321 Mich App at 16 (quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Heft, 299 Mich App at 79 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (stating
that the prosecutor “is not required to undertake discovery on behalf of a defendant.”). Similarly,
the prosecutor does not have “a constitutional duty routinely to deliver [the prosecutor’s] entire
file to defense counsel.” Youngblood, 488 US at 55 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Defendant contends that the prosecution acted in bad faith when it failed to disclose to the
defense the collection, examination, and return of the neighbor’s DVR box, and otherwise failed
to preserve the DVR box or its contents.4 However, there is no evidence of bad faith and no basis
exists to conclude that the police acted maliciously, engaged in gamesmanship, or made a
deliberate attempt to conceal evidence. Rather, law enforcement merely pursued an investigative
avenue that ultimately led to a dead end. The police collected the DVR box to determine if it
contained surveillance video footage from the time period of the murder. The DVR box was
provided to a police video expert, Detroit Police Sergeant Steve Ford, who determined that it
contained no recorded video footage from the time of the murder or for a substantial period of time
before it. The DVR box was then returned to its owner.

       Defendant contends that the police should have preserved the DVR box or its contents and
informed the defense about the extraction efforts through formal police reports. Again, however,

4
  Defendant does not argue that the DVR box or its contents were actually exculpatory, nor does
the record contain any support for such an argument. Rather, defendant contends that the DVR
box or its contents constituted potentially useful evidence and that the police acted in bad faith.
This is insufficient. See Dickinson, 321 Mich App at 16.

                                                -8-
Sergeant Ford, an expert in video extraction, determined that the device contained no video from
around the time of the murder. Although the police could have followed the practice defendant
suggests, it was not constitutionally mandated. The prosecutor is not constitutionally required to
“make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a
case.” Youngblood, 488 US at 55 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The video extraction
effort did not yield any evidence, exculpatory or otherwise, and there was, therefore, no
constitutional duty to tell the defense about it.

         Defendant also argues that, if the DVR box had been preserved, the defense could have
examined it to determine if it contained other recordings from earlier time periods to show that
defendant was living at Rory’s house with his consent and was entering and exiting the house
normally using a key to the doors. But there is no evidence that any such recordings existed or
that law enforcement acted in bad faith by failing to preserve any such recordings. In examining
the DVR device, the police understandably were focused on determining if the device contained
video from around the time of the murder. There is no indication that law enforcement knew that
earlier time periods would be relevant to a defense theory or that they acted in bad faith by failing
to preserve the DVR box. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief.

                       IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       Lastly, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney: (1) failed to move to suppress Rory’s iPhone; (2) did not adequately advise defendant
concerning testifying at trial; and (3) failed to obtain the neighbor’s video surveillance footage.
We disagree.

                                 A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        Whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law. Heft, 299 Mich App at 80. Findings of fact are reviewed
for clear error, and questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

                                          B. ANALYSIS

        “To prove that his defense counsel was not effective, the defendant must show that (1)
defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is
a reasonable probability that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” People v
Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 68; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed,
and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Head, 323 Mich App
526, 539; 917 NW2d 752 (2018) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “In examining
whether defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, a
defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance was born from a
sound trial strategy.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). To
establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” People v
Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9; 917 NW2d 249 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A

                                                -9-
“defendant has the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).

                                  1. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

       First, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to
suppress Rory’s iPhone, which was recovered from defendant’s person during his arrest.
Defendant contends that the iPhone constituted the fruit of the poisonous tree because the police
lacked probable cause for his warrantless arrest.

       “Both the United States and the Michigan Constitutions protect persons against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Nguyen, 305 Mich App 740, 751; 854 NW2d 223
(2014), citing US Const, Am IV, and Const 1963, art 1, § 11.

       A custodial arrest based on probable cause is not an unreasonable intrusion under
       the Fourth Amendment. An arresting officer, or collectively the officers involved
       in an investigation (“the police team” approach), must possess information
       demonstrating probable cause to believe that an offense has occurred and that the
       defendant has committed it. In reviewing a claim that the police lacked probable
       cause to arrest, this Court must determine whether facts available at the moment of
       arrest would justify a fair-minded person of average intelligence in believing that
       the suspected person had committed a felony. Probable cause requires only a
       probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of
       criminal activity. Circumstantial evidence, coupled with those inferences arising
       therefrom, is sufficient to establish probable cause. [Nguyen, 305 Mich App at 751-
       752 (quotation marks, ellipsis, and citations omitted).]

        Defendant was arrested on January 14, 2019, three days after the murder. By that time,
law enforcement knew that Rory had been murdered in his home by multiple gunshots. Schutter,
Kevin, and Jessica had informed the police about defendant’s violent and threatening behavior
toward Rory, and the police were aware that Rory obtained a PPO against defendant and that
defendant had repeatedly violated the PPO. The police also knew that Rory’s neighbors had seen
defendant outside Rory’s house multiple times during the 24 hours surrounding the murder. The
evidence known to the police was enough to establish “a probability or substantial chance” that
defendant had engaged in criminal activity; “an actual showing” that defendant engaged in
criminal activity was not required in order to establish probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 752.
Accordingly, the arrest was lawful, and a motion to suppress the iPhone recovered from
defendant’s person during the arrest would therefore have failed. Defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to file a futile motion. See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793
NW2d 120 (2010) (“Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

                    2. DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL

        Next, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare and
present defendant’s testimony at trial and for failing to present evidence corroborating defendant’s
testimony. We disagree.

                                               -10-
        Initially, it is noted that defendant’s current claim that he wanted to testify at trial differs
from what he stated under oath at trial. After the prosecution rested, defendant was placed under
oath outside the presence of the jury. Defendant testified that he and his trial counsel, Schlaff, had
talked about his defense and about whether he should testify. Defendant stated that he had decided
not to testify after speaking with Schlaff. Defendant agreed that Schlaff had advised defendant of
his absolute right to testify, that Schlaff did not make any promises or force defendant not to testify,
and that it was defendant’s own decision not to testify.

        To the extent defendant now claims that Schlaff was ineffective for advising defendant not
to testify, defendant’s argument fails. “[D]ecisions regarding what evidence to present and
whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy, which [this Court]
will not second-guess with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398;
688 NW2d 308 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]his Court will not substitute
its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy.” People v Davis, 250 Mich
App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).

        At the Ginther hearing, Schlaff testified that, during their pretrial meetings, he and
defendant discussed whether defendant should testify; defendant stated he “was not interested in
testifying.” According to Schlaff, defendant “seemed to be pretty adamant about” not wanting to
testify. Schlaff stated he did not tell defendant before trial whether he should testify because he
generally advises his clients to wait and see how the case goes before making a final decision about
testifying. Concerning Rory’s iPhone, defendant told Schlaff that he had accidentally picked up
the phone. Schlaff did not believe that any purported similarity between Rory’s phone and
defendant’s phone was of any significance because phones become very personal. Hence, as a
strategic matter, Schlaff determined that defendant’s assertion that he had accidentally grabbed
Rory’s phone was not likely to be a successful defense.

        Schlaff also testified that, about halfway through trial, he and defendant again discussed
whether defendant should testify. Schlaff thought there were too many issues that came out during
trial about which the prosecutor would have cross-examined defendant and that those issues might
have “complicated things” for the defense. Schlaff related that if defendant had testified, he could
have been impeached on cross-examination with some of his criminal history and prior bad acts
he had committed, including a 2018 retail fraud conviction. Schlaff stated he left the decision
whether to testify up to defendant, but advised that he did not think defendant “would get much
out of” testifying. Instead, Schlaff’s trial strategy was to raise reasonable doubt by calling into
question the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

         There is no basis to question Schlaff’s strategic assessment that defendant should not
testify, given the risks of cross-examination and the fact that defendant’s convoluted explanation
for how he came to be in possession of Rory’s iPhone would likely not be credible to the jury. Nor
is there any reason to second-guess Schlaff’s failure to present other evidence, such as phone
records, because Rory’s iPhone and defendant’s iPhone were not identical; defendant’s iPhone
was “a little bit bigger,” as defendant conceded in his Ginther hearing testimony.

        In addition, defendant testified at the Ginther hearing that he was not in the vicinity of
Rory’s house for three days encompassing the date of the murder. If defendant had testified to that
effect at trial, he would have likely faced cross-examination about how his testimony was

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inconsistent with DNA evidence, testimony of Rory’s neighbors who saw defendant outside
Rory’s house, and video surveillance footage from a nearby gas station. Overall, defendant has
failed to establish that Schlaff was ineffective in his advice regarding whether to testify.

                                  3. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

        Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to discover the
neighbor’s video surveillance system during an independent defense investigation or to ask for an
adverse-inference instruction if the system no longer existed. Defendant is not entitled to relief on
the basis of this argument.

        As already explained, Sergeant Ford testified that the DVR box did not contain any
recorded video footage from the time period of the murder. Defendant provides nothing but
speculation that the DVR box might have contained video footage favorable to the defense.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, he would not have been entitled to an adverse-inference
instruction on the basis of the failure of the police to preserve the DVR box or its contents. Unlike
in People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 450; 719 NW2d 579 (2006), which defendant cites, the police
here did not violate a statutory duty by failing to preserve the DVR box, which is what was
determined in Anstey to warrant an instruction to the jury. Overall, defendant is unable to
demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for the failure of defense counsel
to discover the video surveillance system or to ask for an adverse-inference instruction, and
defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

                                   V. CUMULATIVE ERROR

        Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial on the basis of the cumulative effect
of multiple errors. “Absent the establishment of errors, there can be no cumulative effect of errors
meriting reversal.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 106; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). In the present
case, defendant has not established the existence of any errors. Hence, there is no cumulative
effect of errors meriting reversal. See id.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                              /s/ Noah P. Hood

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