Court Opinion

ID: 9645835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:36:34.286589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:32.126614
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
Once again the majority indulges its crabbed views of the rights of an accused who is subjected to police interrogation. In my view, the majority today commits the same constitutional error as it did in Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970). Because I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Franklin, 438 Pa. at 419, 265 A.2d at 365, I must dissent.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court stated:
“If . . . [the defendant] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.”
384 U.S. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
In this case, appellant clearly indicated that he wished to consult his attorney before speaking with the police. At that point, all interrogation should have ceased. But it did not. Detective Brown’s inquiry, “do you want to tell us what took place?”, constituted an attempt to elicit a statement from appellant, and was thus impermissible interrogation.
*252“There is no difference for constitutional purposes between questioning an accused outright and more subtly suggesting that he incriminate himself without being asked specific questions. ... In our view, any question likely to or expected to elicit a confession constitutes ‘interrogation’ under Miranda.”
Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 227, 252 A.2d 575, 579 (1969).
The majority’s assertion that appellant’s statement was merely an exercise of his “right to change his mind” demonstrates a naive misunderstanding of the subtle pressures involved in custodial interrogation. The better rule has been articulated for the Court by Mr. Justice O’Brien: “For a waiver to be effective, the reversal of the defendant’s position must have been initiated by him.” Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 216, 302 A.2d 337, 340 (1973). This case is “not a situation where a person in custody, after asserting his rights, indicated a desire to waive them without any further activity on the part of the police.” Id. Rather, it was the prodding of Detective Brown that induced appellant to forego consultation with his attorney and make a formal statement, prodding that occurred after appellant had “indicate [d] '. . . that he wishe[d] to consult with an attorney before speaking . . . .” Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
This impermissible conduct of the police, in my view, tainted the statement that resulted from it. That statement, elicited in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights, should not have been admitted into evidence. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and grant appellant a new trial.