Court Opinion

ID: 9931177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 17:00:58.894663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:20.108938
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2143     Document: 010110996960        Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           February 8, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 22-2143
                                                      (D.C. No. 1:21-CR-00297-JB-1)
  DEAN GROSS,                                                    (D.N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before ROSSMAN, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
                   _________________________________

       Defendant-Appellant Dean Gross pled guilty to escaping from federal custody, 18

 U.S.C. § 751(a), and was sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment and three years’

 supervised release. 1 R. 24–33, 126–27. In the plea agreement, Mr. Gross agreed to

 waive appellate review of his conviction and sentence, with a narrow exception allowing

 him to argue on appeal that this court incorrectly decided United States v. Sack, 379 F.3d

 1177 (10th Cir. 2004). 1 R. 29–30. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
        **
           After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellate Case: 22-2143     Document: 010110996960         Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 2

 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We affirm on the preserved issue and dismiss the balance of the

 appeal.

                                        Background

        After being placed in pretrial custody at La Pasada Halfway House, Mr. Gross left

 without obtaining permission from pretrial services officers or employees. 1 R. 26–27.

 A warrant was issued for his arrest, and Mr. Gross was later apprehended by law

 enforcement and transferred to federal custody. 2 R. 6. In exchange for his guilty plea

 on the escape charge, the government agreed to drop a false statement count, 18 U.S.C.

 § 1001(a)(2). 1 R. 30. As relevant here, the plea agreement contained the following

 waiver:

        [T]he Defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal the Defendant’s
        conviction(s) and any sentence, including any fine, within the statutory
        maximum authorized by law, as well as any order of restitution entered by
        the Court. The Defendant also waives the right to appeal any sentence
        imposed below or within the Guideline range upon a revocation of supervised
        release in this cause number.

 Id. at 29–30. Notwithstanding the waiver, the agreement allowed Mr. Gross to appeal

 “[t]he denial or rejection of any motion or any argument, oral or written, claiming that the

 United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in [Sack], was incorrectly

 decided.” Id. at 30. In his opening brief to this court, Mr. Gross made several arguments

 that the government contends are barred by his waiver. The government moved to

 enforce the waiver, but this court denied the motion without prejudice as untimely under

 10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(3)(b). This court subsequently denied reconsideration, explaining
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Appellate Case: 22-2143      Document: 010110996960         Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 3

 that our practice is either to grant a motion to enforce an appeal waiver and dismiss an

 appeal in its entirety, or deny the motion and send the entire appeal to a merits panel.

                                         Discussion

           On appeal, Mr. Gross makes several arguments in addition to arguing that Sack

 was wrongly decided. First, he argues he was afforded inadequate notice regarding what

 conduct would subject him to a criminal conviction because the language of his release

 conditions was ambiguous. Aplt. Br. at 15–21. Second, he argues his plea was invalid

 because it was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. at 21–30. Finally, he argues

 the superseding indictment was factually inadequate and failed to protect him from a

 double jeopardy violation. Id. at 30–34. The government seeks enforcement of the

 waiver.

 A.        Appeal Waiver Enforcement

           We review de novo whether a defendant’s appeal waiver is enforceable. United

 States v. Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008). “A particular waiver’s

 enforceability hinges on: ‘(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the

 waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived

 [his] appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage

 of justice.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004)).

 We address each factor in turn.

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            1. Scope of Appellate Waiver

            First, Mr. Gross’s arguments that he was afforded inadequate notice by his

 ambiguous release conditions 1 and that the superseding indictment was factually

 inadequate certainly fall within the scope of the waiver. Both arguments challenge his

 conviction, which the waiver expressly prohibits. We do not consider them

 independently. To the extent that Mr. Gross argues his plea was not knowing, voluntary,

 and intelligent, we consider that in the next step of our analysis as part of our inquiry

 under Ibarra-Coronel and Hahn.

            2. Knowing and Voluntary

            Normally, when a defendant challenges only the appeal waiver provision of a

 plea agreement, we are not obligated to consider the validity of the plea itself. United

 States v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183, 1190 n.5 (10th Cir. 2014). But when the defendant

 asserts that the plea itself was not knowing and voluntary — as Mr. Gross does here —

 we may examine the entire plea, including the appeal waiver and the plea provisions. Id.

 at 1189–1190. The parties agree that Mr. Gross failed to raise this argument below, so

 we review for plain error. Aplt. Br. at 21; Aplee. Br. at 14.

            We find no error, plain or otherwise, with Mr. Gross’s plea. While Mr. Gross

 understands that he left the halfway house without permission, he continues to argue that

        1
          On its own, this argument expressly challenges Mr. Gross’s conviction,
 which is prohibited by the waiver. However, Mr. Gross maintains that the inadequate
 release conditions are the reason why his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and
 intelligent. Aplt. Br. at 24–30. Thus, while we do not consider the argument
 independently, we do address it in analyzing whether the plea was knowing and
 voluntary.
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 “the conflicting detention provisions of his pretrial release conditions would have

 prevented him from understanding what they required.” Aplt. Br. at 26. For instance,

 Mr. Gross argues that his detention provisions required that he reside at the halfway

 house while restricting him to “home detention[.]” Id. at 12. According to Mr. Gross, he

 “could not both have resided at the halfway house and at his home.” Id.

         The record does not support this contention. When Mr. Gross was initially placed

 in pretrial custody at La Pasada, the court stated, “I’m not willing to allow or to authorize

 Mr. Gross’ release back home.” 1 Aplee. Supp. App. 55. As an alternative, the court

 agreed to “authorize Mr. Gross’ release to La Pasada Halfway House” and instructed Mr.

 Gross that he would be subject to “GPS monitoring on home detention at La Pasada.” Id.

 at 55–56. The court informed Mr. Gross that he could leave for specified appointments

 but reiterated that “otherwise, you have to be at La Pasada.” Id. at 55.

         Mr. Gross also claims his release conditions, plea hearing, sentencing hearing,

 and plea agreement failed to inform him of his obligation to obtain permission to leave

 the halfway house and that the court never asked whether he understood this requirement.

 Aplt. Br. at 25. But the plea agreement and plea colloquy are to the contrary. Mr. Gross

 confirmed that he was not impaired or coerced, 2 Aplee. Supp. App. 7–8, 24–26; that he

 understood the proceeding, id. at 26; that he understood the charges, including the

 elements of the offense and the possible penalties, id. at 11–13; and that he read and

 understood “each and every term of” the plea agreement and reviewed the agreement

 with counsel. Id. at 13–14, 19. When asked by the magistrate judge to describe why he

 was guilty of the offense, Mr. Gross responded, “I left the halfway house without

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 permission.” Id. at 22. Mr. Gross acknowledged that he knew he lacked permission to

 leave. Id. at 23. Finally, the court carefully reviewed Mr. Gross’s appeal waiver and

 confirmed his understanding. Id. at 19–21. Nothing in the record suggests that Mr.

 Gross’s plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

         3. Miscarriage of Justice

        An appellate waiver results in a miscarriage of justice in four situations: “[1]

 where the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, [2] where

 ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders

 the waiver invalid, [3] where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4] where

 the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (alterations in original)

 (citation omitted). Mr. Gross has not argued, nor does the record suggest, that the district

 court relied on impermissible factors or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel;

 he expressed satisfaction with counsel. 2 Aplee. Supp. App. 19. Mr. Gross was

 sentenced far below the statutory maximum of five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). Thus,

 only factor four is disputed. As discussed above, the plea and accompanying waiver were

 knowing and voluntary — no miscarriage of justice occurred. We enforce the appeal

 waiver, and we will dismiss the appeal except for the issue regarding Sack.

 B.     United States v. Sack

        Mr. Gross argues that this court wrongly decided that an individual who resides at

 a halfway house pursuant to pretrial release conditions is “in custody” for purposes of 18

 U.S.C. § 751(a). Aplt. Br. at 14 (citing Sack, 379 F.3d 1177). Of course, Mr. Gross

 recognizes that “[o]ne panel of this court cannot overrule the judgment of another panel

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 absent en banc consideration.” Arostegui-Maldonado v. Garland, 75 F.4th 1132, 1142

 (10th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); Aplt. Br. at 15. He raises the

 issue to seek certiorari from the Supreme Court. Thus, regarding that challenge, the

 judgment is AFFIRMED, and the balance of the appeal is DISMISSED.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                                Circuit Judge

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