Court Opinion

ID: 9716281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:33:09.855483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.389380
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
The majority states:
"The rule reads as Wiseman claims. However, the obvious intent of Crim.R. 4(D) is to permit the State to obtain a ninety day extension of time within which a defendant who has exercised his Crim.R. 4 right to a speedy trial must be tried." At 18376.
Kindred v. State (1988) Ind., 524 N.E.2d 279, and Smith v. State (1987) Ind., 502 N.E.2d 485, cited by the majority, are consistent with this interpretation of the Rule. Nevertheless, such interpretation does violence to the clear language of the Rule itself.
To modify or abrogate trial or appellate rules by case decision is not the preferred course. - Such amendments should be brought about by a change of the language of the Rule, and then only by our Supreme Court. Cua v. Morrison (1992) Ind.App., 600 N.E.2d 951 (Sullivan, J. concurring, joined by Sharpnack, C.J.).