Court Opinion

ID: 9566282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:36:06.621742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:33.316033
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Vice Chief Justice,
with whom KAUGER, Justice, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The court reverses the judgment on jury verdict for the plaintiffs in a tort action for damages from a mobile home’s structural design defect which had caused excessive moisture condensation above the ceiling. *655The trial court had instructed the jury on the theory of strict (or manufacturers’ products) liability alone. According to the court’s opinion, which remands the plaintiffs’ case for a new trial, the claim should have been “pursued as a warranty action.” In essence, the court holds that when a defective product causes “purely economic losses” but no personal injury, the manufacturer must be afforded the opportunity to assert the “warranty defenses” provided by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
I cannot accede to today’s pronouncement. In my view, the court need not now decide whether manufacturers’ products liability may be imposed in the absence of bodily injury. Whatever error the trial court might have committed by instructing the jury on a single theory of liability is harmless because record proof of fraud or gross negligence overwhelmingly supports the verdict. Plaintiffs’ judgment against the manufacturer should hence be affirmed.
I concur in that portion of the court’s opinion which reverses the judgment on jury verdict rendered for the mobile home dealer on its cross-claim against the manufacturer for “malicious interference with business relations.” There is no evidence of manufacturer’s malice vis-a-vis the dealer, and the verdict cannot be sustained on any other theory of recovery.
The plaintiffs’ case, submitted to the triers on strict liability theory, resulted in judgment on jury verdict against the manufacturer (appellant) for actual as well as for punitive damages. Because the harm for which suit was brought affected only the res — the article itself — and no relief was sought for injury to a person, the manufacturer argues that strict liability theory (also known in Oklahoma as manufacturers’ products liability) is inapplicable to this case. The court agrees and holds the UCC provides adequate relief.1
Assuming that in law a mobile home does, as the court holds today, come under the rubric of goods, there is nothing in the UCC’s warranty provisions which abrogates common-law remedies for damages from a product’s design defect.2 Legislative creation of a statutory remedy, without the express repeal of the pre-existing common law, cannot give rise to an exclusive remedy.3
Proof admitted at trial establishes not only manufacturer’s negligence in designing the product, but also its fraud and gross negligence. There is here ample evidence of the manufacturer’s obstructive behavior and reckless indifference to the safety of the habitational structure in contest as well as to the plaintiffs’ legitimate demands for corrective action.4 An appel*656late court must consider as harmless error the submission of a common-law action on an erroneous theory if there is substantial evidence to support the jury verdict on some other viable form of liability.5 Jury instructions that do not result in a “miscarriage of justice” or manifest a “substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right” may not be held reversibly prejudicial.6 Here, no showing has been made that the objectionable charge reversibly misdirected or misled the jury.7
In sum, the verdict for actual as well as punitive damages is supported by substantial evidence in the record. The plaintiffs should not have to stand another trial to satisfy niceties of the law.
I would affirm the plaintiffs’ judgment and reverse the judgment favoring the dealer on the cross-claim against the manufacturer.

. The court's opinion notes that manufacturers' products liability, as a theory of recovery, is founded upon the public’s interest in human safety. In my view, the recovery plaintiffs seek in this case is as affected by considerations of human safety as it would be if they were suing for bodily injury. Here, we are dealing with the quality of habitation. When the producer knows or should have known that its mobile home is unfit for use as a place of human habitation, this state’s public policy should equally condemn the product's manufacture and its placement into the stream of commerce as it would if bodily injury had occurred.

. Legislative intent to change the common law must never be presumed from an ambiguous, doubtful or inconclusive text. 12 O.S.1981 § 2, infra; Reaves v. Reaves, 15 Okl. 240, 82 P. 490, 495 (1905). See also State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Amer. v. Hampton, infra note 3 at 1035-1036 (Opala, J., concurring).
The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.1981 § 2 provide:
"The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions 808 P.2d — 17
and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma.... ”

. See, e.g., State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Amer. v. Hampton, Okl., 696 P.2d 1027, 1031 (1985); Hood v. Hagler, Okl., 606 P.2d 548, 552-553 (1980). In Hampton, the court held that Oklahoma’s “slayer statute,” 84 O.S.1981 § 231, "bars a beneficiary who has actually been convicted of the insured’s murder or first-degree manslaughter from recovering under the insurance policy," but does not preclude application of the common-law rule which allows, in a civil action following an acquittal, the beneficiary’s disqualification upon proof of the crime by a preponderance of the evidence. Hood holds that the "dog bite statute,” 4 O.S.1981 § 42.1, does not prevent a judgment’s reversal for trial court's failure to instruct on common-law negligence.

. See 23 O.S.1981 § 9, infra; Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., Okl., 688 P.2d 42, 45-46 (1984) (punitive damages may be recovered when the *656evidence shows reckless disregard for another’s rights, from which malice could be inferred). See also Wootan v. Shaw, 205 Okl. 283, 237 P.2d 442, 444 (1951).
The terms of 23 O.S.1981 § 9 are:
"In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant." (Emphasis added.) This statute has since been amended. See 23 O.S. Supp.1986 § 9.

.12 O.S.1981 § 78, infra; 20 O.S.1981 § 3001.1, infra; McDaniel v. McCauley, Okl., 371 P.2d 486, 489 (1962); Duncan v. Golden, Okl., 316 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1957); Russell v. Flanagan, Okl., 544 P.2d 510, 511 (1975); Home Ins. Co. v. Voto-Jacobus Motor Co., 189 Okl. 426, 117 P.2d 779, 781 (1941). See also Winslow v. Watts, Okl., 446 P.2d 598, 599 (1968) (the court’s syllabus ¶ 2) (if legally sustainable, a judgment must stand regardless of the reasons, theories or conclusions on which it is based; it will not be reversed for error unless it is made to appear that the claimed flaws affected the result reached in nisi prius court).
The terms of 12 O.S.1981 § 78 are:
"The court, in every stage of action, must disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect." (Emphasis added.)
The terms of 20 O.S.1981 § 3001.1 are:
“No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted by any appellate court of this state in any case, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury or for error in any matter of pleading or procedure, unless it is the opinion of the reviewing court that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.” (Emphasis added.)

. Messier v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., Okl., 687 P.2d 121, 129 (1984).

. Reversal is never automatic when proof varies from the plead theory. A variance alone is not ground for reversal unless it is prejudicial and works as a surprise. See Treadway v. Uniroyal Tire Co., Okl., 766 P.2d 938, 948 n. 16 (1988) (Opala, J., dissenting). The harmless error statute (20 O.S.1981 § 3001.1, supra note 5) mandates that these plaintiffs' judgment be held fit for affirmance since there is overwhelming evidence to support the verdict based upon another theory that is viable. Reversible jury misdirection occurs (a) when the instruction is on an unplead theory and the verdict is barren of evidentiary support for any viable theory of liability or (b) when the aggrieved party was prevented by surprise from defending on an unplead theory to which timely objection was interposed. See Messier v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., supra note 6 at 129; Braden v. Hendricks, Okl., 695 P.2d 1343, 1350 (1985); Sunray DX Oil Company v. Brown, Okl., 477 P.2d 67, 70 (1970); Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. Harper, Okl., 468 P.2d 1014, 1020 (1970); Great Western Motor Lines, Inc. v. Cazara, Okl., 417 P.2d 575, 576 (1966) (the court’s syllabus ¶ 4); Tyree v. Dunn, Okl., 315 P.2d 782, 784 (1957); Martin v. Arnold, 207 Okl. 69, 247 P.2d 517, 519 (1952).