Court Opinion

ID: 9776115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:19:06.365296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:34.509980
License: Public Domain

*896PRICE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the judgment of the majority, and I join the first part of the majority opinion, which makes its determination on the basis of statutory analysis. However, I dissent as to the latter portion, which discusses legislative history. Under our approach to statutory interpretation, we look to the literal text of the statute for its meaning, and we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The only exceptions to this rule are where application of the statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, or if the plain language is ambiguous. Id. Because the plain language of the relevant statutes is not ambiguous, and because a literal interpretation of those statutes does not lead to an absurd result, we need not, and indeed should not, consider the legislative history. Id. at 785-786.