Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:08.794996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:44.008734
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          October 31, 1995  United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

          No. 94-2286

                            COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                         BLACKSTONE VALLEY ELECTRIC COMPANY,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The opinion of the Court issued October 6, 1995, is amended
          as follows:

          On page 28, line 23   Substitute "action" for "rulemaking".

          October 11, 1995
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2286
                            COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                         BLACKSTONE VALLEY ELECTRIC COMPANY,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The opinion of  this Court issued on  October 6, 1995 is corrected
        as follows:

            On the  cover sheet,  line 10:  substitute "Joseph  L. Tauro"  for
        "Joseph P. Tauro"; and

            On page 14, line 8: substitute "plain meaning" for "law".

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2286
                            COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                         BLACKSTONE VALLEY ELECTRIC COMPANY,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Joseph P. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                        Cyr, Boudin, and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                                ______________

                                _____________________

            John Voorhees,  with whom David  F. Goossen, Isaacson,  Rosenbaum,
            _____________             _________________  _____________________
        Woods &  Levy, P.C.,  David A.  Fazzone, P.C.,  and McDermott, Will  &
        ___________________   _______________________       __________________
        Emery were on brief, for appellant.
        _____
            Karen McGuire, Assistant  Attorney General of Massachusetts,  with
            _____________
        whom  Scott  Harshbarger, Attorney  General  of  Massachusetts was  on
              __________________
        brief, for appellee.
            Catherine Adams  Fiske,  Attorney,  United  States  Department  of
            ______________________
        Justice,  with whom Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Anne
                            ________________                              ____
        S.  Almy and Albert M. Ferlo, Jr., Attorneys, United States Department
        ________     ____________________
        of  Justice, and  Thomas H.  Beisswenger, United  States Environmental
                          ______________________
        Protection  Agency  were on  brief, for  the  United States  as amicus
        curiae.

                                 ____________________

                                   October 6, 1995
                                 ____________________

                    LYNCH, Circuit Judge.  The       Commonwealth      of
                    LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

            Massachusetts  seeks to recover  response costs  under CERCLA

            and Mass. Gen. L. ch. 21E from Blackstone Valley Electric Co.

            ("BVE") for the removal of ferric ferrocyanide ("FFC") from a

            waste   site  in   North  Attleboro,   Massachusetts.     The

            Commonwealth's ability to recover its response costs, said to

            be $5.8 million, turns largely on the question of whether FFC

            is a "hazardous substance" within the meaning of CERCLA.  The

            broader concern raised by this case is identifying who should

            decide  that  question and  by what  process.   We  hold that

            neither CERCLA  nor  the  existing  EPA  regulations  clearly

            establish whether FFC is a  hazardous substance, and that the

            district court erred in trying to resolve the question on the

            Commonwealth's motion  for summary  judgment, in the  face of

            warring expert  affidavits, where  there is no  textual plain

            meaning  to  resolve the  issue.   Invoking  the  doctrine of

            primary  jurisdiction,  we  hold  that  the  EPA  should,  as

            Congress  intended,  address   the  question  in   the  first

            instance.    Accordingly,  we  vacate the  grant  of  partial

            summary judgment  and  order  referral  to  the  EPA  for  an

            administrative  determination.   In  so doing  we reject  the

            EPA's argument as  amicus curiae  in this court  that it  has

            effectively answered the question of  whether FFC is a CERCLA

            "hazardous substance" by  adopting standard testing protocols

                                         -4-

            for  effluent discharge  regulations  promulgated  under  the

            Clean Water Act.

                                I.  Factual Background
                                    __________________

                    Like  many other  environmental cases,  the  story of

            this  case   starts  in  the   last  century.     Before  the

            construction  of the  natural  gas pipeline  system, gas  for

            consumer  use in  heating,  lighting, and  cooking was  often

            manufactured from coal at localized facilities.  According to

            one  1985 study commissioned by the EPA, there were some 1500

            such manufactured  gas plants  in  operation throughout  this

            country  between 1889  and 1950.   The  cleanup of  the waste

            byproducts  of the  manufacturing process,  which often  were

            buried on site or  deposited in landfills, has been  a source

            of modern environmental litigation.  See, e.g., John Boyd Co.
                                                 _________  _____________

            v.  Boston Gas  Co., 1992  WL 212231,  *1 (D. Mass.  Aug. 18,
                _______________

            1992),  aff'd,   992  F.2d  401,  403-04   (1st  Cir.  1993);
                    _____

            Interstate  Power Co. v. Kansas  City Power &  Light Co., 992
            _____________________    _______________________________

            F.2d 804, 805-06 (8th Cir. 1993).

                    An important  step in  the gas  manufacturing process

            was  the purification of the gas obtained from the coal.  One

            typical  purification method  involved pumping  the untreated

            gas through  "purifier  boxes" containing  wood chips  coated

            with iron oxide.   As  the untreated gas  passed through  the

            boxes,  it reacted  chemically  with the  coated wood  chips,

                                         -5-

            causing  unwanted  substances  to   be  filtered  out.    The

            byproducts of the purifying chemical reactions would build up

            on the wood  chips.  One such byproduct was  a blue substance

            called  ferric ferrocyanide  (more commonly,  Prussian Blue).

            Eventually,  the  spent  wood   chips     still  bearing  the

            byproducts  of  the  chemical purification  process     would

            typically be incinerated or buried.

                    In the early 1980's, blue-colored wood chips and soil

            were discovered  in a  landfill near  a  residential area  in

            North Attleboro,  Massachusetts.   Between July 1984  and May

            1986,   the   Massachusetts   Department   of   Environmental

            Protection ("DEP") excavated the site to remove the blue soil

            and  wood chips.   The blue  substance on the  wood chips was

            identified as  ferric ferrocyanide,  and the wood  chips were

            identified as "purifier box waste" from the coal gasification

            process.  The DEP determined that the FFC-coated chips at the

            site  had been transported there from a gas facility that had

            been operated by BVE's  direct corporate predecessor in Rhode

            Island from  1920-1961.   The Commonwealth subsequently  sued

            BVE as a generator of  the FFC to recover its cleanup  costs,

            pursuant  to  the  relevant  provisions  of  CERCLA  and  the

            analogous Massachusetts state statutes.1

                             II.  The Statutory Framework
                                  _______________________

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The only issue presented here is the CERCLA one.

                                         -6-

            A.  The "Hazardous Substance" List
                ______________________________

                    CERCLA  provides  state   and  federal   governmental

            authorities with  broad power  to clean  up waste  sites, and

            then  to seek  recovery  of response  costs from  responsible

            parties.   42  U.S.C.      9604, 9607;  see generally  Dedham
                                                    _____________  ______

            Water Co. v. Cumberland Farm Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150
            _________    ___________________________

            (1st Cir. 1989).   One of the predicates to  CERCLA liability

            is  the  release  or   threatened  release  of  a  "hazardous

            substance" at the site.

                    A  "hazardous substance"  is  defined in  CERCLA,  42

            U.S.C.   9601(14),  by  incorporation  of  certain  lists  of

            substances, wastes, and pollutants  identified in a number of

            other environmental  statutes, including the Clean  Water Act

            ("CWA"),  33 U.S.C.    1251  et seq.2    CERCLA requires  the
                                         ______

            Administrator of the EPA to promulgate and revise regulations

            designating   as   additional   "hazardous  substances"   any

            substances  which, "when  released  into the  environment may

            present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or

            the environment . . . ."   42 U.S.C.   9602(a).  The  EPA has

            codified   a  consolidated   list  of   hazardous  substances

                                
            ____________________

            2.  CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substance" also
            incorporates the pollutants listed in the Solid Waste
            Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation and
            Control Act, 42 U.S.C.   6921 et seq., the Clean Air Act, 42
                                          _______
            U.S.C.   7401 et seq., and the Toxic Substances Control Act,
                          _______
            15 U.S.C.   2601 et seq.  The parties agree that only the CWA
                             _______
            list is pertinent here.

                                         -7-

            subsuming all of the  statutory lists incorporated by CERCLA,

            at 40 C.F.R.   302.4, Table 302.4 ("Table 302.4").3

                    The substance FFC is not specifically named in any of

            the statutory lists of  substances incorporated by CERCLA and

            hence  does not  appear in  Table 302.4.   The EPA  has never

            taken  official action  pursuant  to its  authority under  42

            U.S.C.    9602(a)  specifically  to  add FFC  to  the  CERCLA

            hazardous substance list.  Table 302.4 does  list, however, a

            broad category  of compounds    "cyanides"   which,  in turn,

            the Commonwealth claims, does encompass FFC.
                                     ____

            B.  "Cyanides"
                 ________

                    The  category  "cyanides"  in  Table  302.4  has  its

            origins  in the  CWA.   The EPA  was required  to promulgate,

            within a short period  following the CWA's enactment,  a list

            of "any toxic pollutant or combination of such pollutants" to

            be subject to regulation under the statute.  See CWA, Pub. L.
                                                         ___

            No. 92-500,   307(a)(1), 86 Stat. 816, 856, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.

            951, 1000.   Pursuant to this  directive, an ad  hoc EPA work
                                                         __  ___

            group  developed  a proposed  list  of  65 toxic  pollutants.

            After  public notice and comment,  this list (the "CWA list")

            was adopted  by Congress, see 33  U.S.C.   1317(a), published
                                      ___

                                
            ____________________

            3.  The Massachusetts analogue to CERCLA defines "hazardous
            material" to include all "hazardous substances" under CERCLA. 
            See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 21E,   2.
            ___

                                         -8-

            by the  EPA, see 43  Fed. Reg. 4108-09  (Jan. 31,  1978), and
                         ___

            codified, see 40 C.F.R.   401.15.
                      ___

                    In addition to identifying various specific, discrete

            chemical  compounds (e.g.,  "benzene," "2,4-dichlorophenol"),
                                 ____

            the  CWA list  also  identifies several  groups of  compounds

            associated  with  particular  elements  (e.g.,  "arsenic  and
                                                     ____

            compounds,"  "zinc  and  compounds"),  and  classes  of  more

            generally   denominated   compounds  (e.g.,   "nitrosamines,"
                                                  ____

            "chlorinated ethanes").   One of  the latter such  classes of

            compounds on the  list is  "cyanides."  The  dispute in  this

            case has centered on  whether the term "cyanides" in  the CWA

            list  (and  incorporated  into  Table  302.4)  includes  FFC,

            thereby bringing FFC within  the scope of CERCLA's definition

            of "hazardous substance."

                       III.  Proceedings in the District Court
                             _________________________________

                    After discovery,  the Commonwealth moved  for partial

            summary judgment as to  liability against BVE, claiming that,

            as a matter of law, FFC is a "hazardous substance" within the

            meaning of CERCLA.  The Commonwealth argued FFC  falls within

            the "plain meaning" of the term "cyanides" in Table 302.4.4

                                
            ____________________

            4.  To avoid confusion, we observe that neither party
            attaches controlling significance to the fact that the common
            name of the substance at issue   ferric ferrocyanide  
            ____
            contains the word "cyanide."  In fact, according to modern
            chemical nomenclature conventions, the proper name for FFC is
            "iron(III) hexacyanoferrate(II)."  The appearance of the word
            "cyanide" within the name "ferric ferrocyanide" does not
            factor into the interpretation.

                                         -9-

                    After  a  hearing on  the Commonwealth's  motion, the

            district court  directed the  parties to "focus  only on  the

            meaning of the term  ['cyanides'] as it is understood  in the

            general scientific community."  Commonwealth of Mass. v. BVE,
                                            ____________________________

            Civ.  No. 87-1799-T, Memorandum at 5 (D. Mass. May 23, 1990).

            Accordingly, BVE  filed expert affidavits attesting  that the

            plain meaning  of "cyanides"  does not include  the substance
                                               ___

            FFC, and the  Commonwealth filed expert affidavits  attesting

            that it does.

                    Additionally, the Commonwealth  attempted to  solicit

            the EPA's involvement in the case.  Before filing its motion,

            the Commonwealth had asked the EPA to participate in the case

            as amicus curiae, but the EPA had refused.  After the summary

            judgment hearing,  the Commonwealth asked the  EPA to provide

            an  affidavit  stating  that  the  EPA's  own  definition  of

            "cyanides"  encompasses  FFC.   The  EPA  again declined  the

            Commonwealth's invitation.   Instead, the EPA  wrote a letter

            to the  Massachusetts Attorney  General's  office, signed  by

            Stephen D.  Luftig, the Director of  EPA's Emergency Response

            Division  (the "Luftig  Letter").   The  letter purported  to

            describe the EPA's  administrative view of the  status of FFC

            vis- -vis  the  CERCLA/CWA  category  of   "cyanides."    The

            Commonwealth provided  this letter  to the district  court as

            additional support for its motion.

                                         -10-

                    The  district court granted the Commonwealth's motion

            for  partial summary judgment.  Commonwealth of Massachusetts
                                            _____________________________

            v.  Blackstone Valley  Electric Co.,  777 F.  Supp. 1036  (D.
                _______________________________

            Mass.  1991).   The  district court  made  no mention  of the

            Luftig  Letter in its decision.   It relied  instead upon two

            sentences of text concerning  chemical testing procedures for

            cyanides   contained  in   a  reference   publication  called

            "Standard Methods."  See American Public Health Ass'n et al.,
             ________________    ___

            Standard Methods for the  Examination of Water and Wastewater
            _____________________________________________________________

            (18th  ed.  1992).   One  of the  Commonwealth's  experts had

            averred that  Standard Methods  is  a "'universally  accepted
                          ________________

            environmental  chemistry lab  testing manual  in  the general

            scientific community.'"   777 F. Supp.  at 1038 n.3  (quoting

            expert   affidavit).     Based   on  its   reading  of   that

            publication,5  the  district  court  concluded that  FFC  was

            properly classified as a "complex cyanide," that "[t]he plain

            meaning  of  cyanides  includes  complexes  such  as   ferric

            ferrocyanide,"   and  that  FFC  was  therefore  a  hazardous

            substance within the meaning  of CERCLA.  Id.  at 1039.   The
                                                      ___

                                
            ____________________

            5.  The district court focused on the following paragraph:

                    Cyanide refers to all of the CN groups in cyanide
                    compounds that can be determined as the cyanide ion,
                    CN-, by the methods used.  The cyanide compounds in
                    which cyanide can be obtained as CN- are classed as
                    simple and complex cyanides.

            777 F. Supp. at 1038 (quoting Standard Methods, supra, at 4-
                                          ________________  _____
            18).

                                         -11-

            district court rejected BVE's arguments and expert affidavits

            supporting   a  contrary  result   and  added:  "Blackstone's

            argument, essentially, is that FFC should not be on the list.

            This is a  contention that Blackstone  should present to  the

            EPA, not to this court."  Id.6
                                      ___

                    We  disagree with  the  district court's  conclusions

            about   the  "plain   meaning"  of   "cyanides."     We  have

            considerable sympathy, however, for its  sentiment that BVE's

            arguments  about the  status  of  FFC  are  best  suited  for

            presentation to the EPA.

                                   IV.  Discussion
                                        __________

                    We review the district court's summary judgment order

            de novo.  See Vasapolli v.  Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir.
            _______   ___ _________     _______

            1994).  Our review of the  district court's interpretation of

            the  relevant statutory framework also is plenary.  See Estey
                                                                ___ _____

            v. Commissioner, Maine Dep't of Human Services, 21 F.3d 1198,
               ___________________________________________

            1201 (1st Cir. 1994).  In assessing whether the  Commonwealth

            is entitled  to judgment as a  matter of law,  we must regard

            the record and draw  all inferences in a manner  favorable to

            BVE.  Only if, viewed in that light, the record  discloses no

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Later, based in part on its grant of partial summary
            judgment against BVE on the FFC issue, the court entered
            summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth on the issue of
            BVE's liability as a generator under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
              9607(a)(3).  See Commonwealth of Mass. v. Blackstone Valley
                           ___ __________________________________________
            Electric Co., 808 F. Supp. 912, 914-16 (D. Mass. 1992).  BVE
            ____________
            has not appealed from the latter order.

                                         -12-

            genuine  issue of material fact  will we uphold  the grant of

            summary judgment.   FDIC v. Bay Street Dev. Co., 32 F.3d 636,
                                ____    ___________________

            639 (1st Cir. 1994).

            A.  Absence of Plain Meaning
                ________________________

                    The Commonwealth and BVE  both argued to the district

            court that  the term  "cyanides" has a  "plain meaning,"  but

            were sharply at  odds as to whether  that meaning encompasses

            FFC.  The district court endorsed the plain meaning approach,

            see  777 F. Supp. at  1038, and agreed  with the Commonwealth
            ___

            that  the plain meaning of  "cyanides" includes FFC.   Id. at
                                                                   ___

            1039.   We  find that  the district  court's reliance  on the

            plain meaning approach was misplaced on the facts here.

                    Of course when the words of a statutory provision are

            clear,  the  provision's   plain  meaning  must   govern  its

            application, unless  a  palpably unreasonable  outcome  would

            result.  See, e.g., Hogan v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co.,
                     _________  _____    _______________________________

            61 F.3d 1034, 1037 (1st Cir. 1995); Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d
                                                ________    ____

            53, 67-68 (1st Cir.  1994).  Yet, as the  qualifications that

            are a part of the plain  meaning rule suggest, that rule does

            not  provide  a  panacea   for  every  problem  of  statutory

            construction.   Words can be ambiguous,  often materially so.

            See Greenwood  Trust Co. v.  Commonwealth of Mass.,  971 F.2d
            ___ ____________________     _____________________

            818, 825  (1st Cir.  1992) ("[T]he plain-meaning  doctrine is

            not a pedagogical  absolute."), cert. denied, 113 S.  Ct. 974
                                            ____________

            (1993).   When  ambiguity is  identified, a  dispute about  a

                                         -13-

            statute's  or  regulation's  proper  construction  cannot  be

            resolved  simply by placing  the gloss of  "plain meaning" on

            one competing interpretation.    See, e.g., In re  Jarvis, 53
                                             _________  _____________

            F.3d 416, 419 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding plain meaning  inquiry

            inapposite where relevant language was indeterminate); United
                                                                   ______

            States  v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 294-96 (1st Cir. 1993) (same,
            ______     ______

            where term "revoke" was ambiguous in relevant context); Isaac
                                                                    _____

            v.  Harvard Univ., 769 F.2d  817, 820 (1st  Cir. 1985) (same,
                _____________

            where terms "proceedings" and "terminated" were  ambiguous as

            used);  cf. Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 700 (1st Cir.
                    ___ _____    ___________

            1992)  (finding term "reduction-in-force" to be ambiguous and

            therefore "unplain" in context of an ERISA plan).

                    Here, both  BVE and  the Commonwealth argue  that the

            plain meaning of "cyanides"  can be ascertained by consulting

            "the scientific  community."  To  this end, they  have filled

            the record  with  competing expert  affidavits setting  forth

            contradictory views  (each  ostensibly authoritative)  as  to

            whether FFC is a member of the category "cyanides."

                    But no "plain" meaning of the  term "cyanides" can be

            identified  from among  these conflicting  expert affidavits.

            It  is true that, as  a general rule  of construction, when a

            statute contains  "technical words or terms of  art, 'it [is]

            proper to explain them by reference to the art  or science to

            which  they  [are] appropriate.'"    Corning  Glass Works  v.
                                                 ____________________

            Brennan, 417  U.S. 188, 201 (1974)  (bracketed alterations in
            _______

                                         -14-

            original) (quoting  Greenleaf v. Goodrich, 101  U.S. 278, 284
                                _________    ________

            (1880)).

                    Assuming  that  the  "scientific  community"  is  the

            appropriate  body  by  reference  to  which  the  meaning  of

            "cyanides"  should  be  determined,  the  basic indeterminacy

            nonetheless  remains.   The "scientific  community" is  not a

            monolithic  entity   that  has   spoken  here  in   a  single

            authoritative voice.  As one of BVE's experts stated, members

            of  different disciplines within  the scientific community at

            large are apt to  take sharply contrasting approaches  and to

            give  conflicting answers  to  the question  whether FFC  can

            properly be classified as  one of the "cyanides."   Thus, the

            Commonwealth's  key expert,  an  analytical  chemist,  states

            confidently  that  "[t]here  can  be no  dispute  . . .  that

            cyanides and all other  chemical substances are defined based
                                                            _______

            on   chemical  reactivity   [emphasis   added],"   and   thus

            understands   "cyanides"  to  include   "all  those  chemical

            compounds containing the negatively charged cyanide ion, CN-"

            and  that  "can yield  the  free cyanide  ion"  in laboratory
                                                               __________

            conditions.  Then, stating  that "there is no doubt  that the

            CN moiety in iron cyanide complexes is uni-negative" and that

            FFC  does  release  the  free  cyanide  ion  when  boiled  in

            concentrated sulfuric acid, he concludes that FFC is properly

            categorized as one  of the  "cyanides."  On  the other  hand,

            BVE's expert (who  was one of the consultants to  the EPA who

                                         -15-

            helped devise the CWA list) asserts  just as confidently that

            most scientists other than analytical chemists  "would define

            'cyanides' as substances that are toxic due to the CN group."

            Stating  that   FFC  is  not  toxic  and   does  not  release

            "toxicologically  significant doses  of [free]  cyanide under

            environmental  conditions  [emphasis  added],"  BVE's  expert
            _____________

            concludes that FFC is  not properly classified as one  of the

            "cyanides" within the meaning of CERCLA.

                    The term  "cyanides" as it appears in Table 302.4 is,

            we  believe, ambiguous in the context of this case.  The term

            suffers from  an  ambiguity that  might  be classified  as  a

            "categorical indeterminacy."  See Clark D. Cunningham et al.,
                                          ___

            Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 Yale L.J. 1561, 1585 (1994)
            ____________________________

            (reviewing Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges (1993)).
                                          ______________________

            At least  on the record  before us,  the category  "cyanides"

            does not admit of  crisply defined boundaries, and resolution

            of  the disagreement  about  whether FFC  falls within  those

            fuzzy boundaries  requires a  value-laden  choice from  among

            competing interpretive assumptions, a  choice that cannot  be

            made through mere inspection of the term's normal or ordinary

            usage.

                    Mindful  that we  must view the  record in  the light

            most favorable to BVE,  this indeterminacy cannot be resolved

            by designating the Commonwealth's rendition of the meaning of

            "cyanides" as "plain."  From the viewpoint of a federal court

                                         -16-

            presented  with  facially  credible  expert  affidavits  that

            directly  contradict each  other on  the issue,  the question

            whether  "cyanides"  in  Table  302.4  encompasses  FFC   for

            purposes of  CERCLA liability cannot be answered  as a matter

            of law.7

            B.  Legislative and Regulatory History
                __________________________________

                    Having  found  considerable  ambiguity  in  the  word

            "cyanides,"  we  turn  to  whether  the  history  of  the CWA

            provides a clearer understanding.  The legislative history of

            the statute contains no  express congressional guidance as to

            the scope of  the term.   The regulatory  history of the  CWA

            toxic  pollutant  list,  however,  does  provide  substantial

            reason for skepticism about  the Commonwealth's and the EPA's

            claim that "cyanides" encompasses FFC.

                    The  list  of  substances and  classes  of substances

            currently codified  at 40  C.F.R.   401.15  (and incorporated

            into  Table 302.4)  was  developed  by  the EPA  pursuant  to

            Congress' directive to produce a  list of toxic pollutants to

            be subject to regulation under the  CWA. See CWA, Pub. L. No.
                                                     ___

            92-500,    307(a)(1), 86  Stat.  816, 1972  U.S.C.C.A.N. 951,

            1000.     Congress   defined  "toxic  pollutants"   as  those

            "pollutants, or combination of pollutants" that were believed

                                
            ____________________

            7.  We also note that the EPA has not argued in its amicus
            brief that the plain meaning of cyanides in Table 302.4
            includes FFC.

                                         -17-

            to "cause death,  disease, behavioral abnormalities,  cancer,

            genetic  mutations,   physiological  malfunctions  (including

            malfunctions  in reproduction)  or physical  deformations" in

            organisms  or  their   offspring.    33   U.S.C.    1362(13).

            Congress expressly instructed the EPA in devising the list to

            "take  into  account  the  toxicity  of  the  pollutant,  its

            persistence, degradability, the  usual or potential  presence

            of  the affected organisms  in any waters,  the importance of

            the  affected organisms  and  the nature  and  extent of  the

            effect  of  the toxic  pollutant  on such  organisms."   CWA,

            supra,    307(a)(1), 86  Stat. at  856, 1972  U.S.C.C.A.N. at
            _____

            1000.

                    After public notice and  an initial period for public

            comment,  the   EPA  published  a  proposed   list  of  toxic

            pollutants  for regulation under the CWA.  38 Fed. Reg. 24342

            (Sep.  7, 1973).  This original proposed list did not include

            the category "cyanides."  Instead, it listed "cyanide and all

            cyanide  compounds."   38  Fed.  Reg.  at  24344.    The  EPA

            commentary   accompanying  the   proposed  list   noted  that

            "[c]yanide  is on  the  list because  of  its high  order  of

            toxicity to aquatic life."   Id.  The text  then acknowledged
                                         ___

            that  some commentators  had "objected  to inclusion  of 'all

            cyanide compounds'" and had "argued that only compounds which

            dissociate in  water to form toxic  concentrations of cyanide

            ion  or hydrogen  cyanide should  be included."   Id.   Thus,
                                                              ___

                                         -18-

            there  was  some  public concern  that  the  listing of  "all

            cyanide compounds" was overinclusive,  and that only a subset

            of "cyanide  compounds"   compounds  which, in  environmental

            conditions would  produce toxic results    should be included

            on  the CWA  list.   The  EPA's  commentary stated  that  the

            "proposed effluent  standards will  take these  comments into
                                          _______________________________

            account . . . ."   Id. (emphasis  added).  On  the final  CWA
            _______            ___

            list  of  toxic  pollutants  (as adopted  by  Congress),  the

            category "cyanide  and  all cyanide  compounds" was  replaced

            with the category "cyanides."  See 40 C.F.R.   401.15.
                                           ___

                    Viewed  in  the  light  most favorable  to  BVE,  the

            evidence indicates  that FFC  is highly stable,  insoluble in

            water, and  completely non-toxic  to human and  aquatic life.

            Against  the  backdrop  of   (1)  the  definition  of  "toxic

            pollutant"  contained  in  the  CWA;  (2)  the  congressional

            directive that  required the  EPA to  "take into account  the

            toxicity"  of pollutants in  producing the CWA  list; (3) the

            EPA's own comment that "cyanide is on the list because of its

            high order of toxicity";  and (4) the objections  that appear

            to have precipitated the change from "cyanide and all cyanide

            compounds" to "cyanides", there would seem substantial reason

            to doubt that FFC, claimed to be a non-toxic substance, could

            properly be  deemed to  fall within the  category "cyanides."

            The history of the CWA list tends to support BVE's claim that

                                         -19-

            the category "cyanides"  was never contemplated to  encompass

            substances such as FFC for purposes of the CWA or CERCLA.

                    This  leaves  the question  of  whether  the EPA  has

            adopted  elsewhere an  official  agency  interpretation  that

            clearly  includes  or  excludes  FFC as  a  CERCLA  hazardous

            substance.   We find that  no such agency  interpretation has

            been established.

            C.  Absence of A Regulatory Definition
                __________________________________

                    In its  amicus brief,  the EPA distances  itself from

            the parties' and district court's "law" approach.   It argues

            that  the  initial  decision  whether  FFC  is  a  "hazardous

            substance" is one that must be left to the EPA.  We agree.

                    It   further  argues,   however,  that   although  no

            definition  of "cyanides"  can  be found  in the  regulations

            identifying CERCLA  hazardous substances,  it is spelled  out

            elsewhere in the applicable regulatory framework, and that it

            encompasses FFC.  On this score, we are not  persuaded, for a

            number  of reasons.    The regulatory  text  itself does  not

            support the argument; the argument leads to results which are

            overbroad and  defy common  sense; the  EPA has itself  taken

            inconsistent  positions; the  position is  articulated solely

            and  for the first time  in a litigation  posture; and policy

            reasons dictate against the approach proposed by the EPA.

                    1.  Absence of Rules Specifically Concerning FFC
                        ____________________________________________

                                         -20-

                    The  EPA  has  clearly  not  acted  pursuant  to  its

            authority under  CERCLA, 42  U.S.C.   9602(a), nor  under the

            CWA,   33  U.S.C.     1317(a)(1),   to  promulgate   a   rule

            specifically  listing FFC as a "hazardous substance" (CERCLA)

            or a "toxic  pollutant" (CWA).  Neither  the Commonwealth nor

            amicus contends otherwise.   The EPA has also never  issued a

            rule specifically for  the purpose of  defining the scope  of

            the term "cyanides."  The EPA has in the past resorted to its

            rulemaking authority to provide  clear guidance to the public

            as to the scope  of at least six other  substances or classes
                                             _____

            of substances listed  as CWA toxic pollutants, see  40 C.F.R.
                                                           ___

              129.4, but  it never has  done so with respect  to the term

            "cyanides."    Indeed, the  Luftig  Letter  submitted by  the

            Commonwealth to  the district court acknowledges  that "[t]he

            term 'cyanides' is not specifically defined in the CWA or, as

            far as we can determine, in the legislative history . . . ."

                    2.  The "Total Cyanide" Test
                        ________________________

                    The  EPA's central  focus in  its amicus brief  is on

            certain regulations establishing a  testing protocol for  the

            analysis  of cyanide  in effluent  discharges under  the CWA.

            The EPA contends that this  test procedure provides the legal

            definition  of "cyanides,"  and  that FFC  falls within  this

            definition.    We  conclude   that  this  contention  is  not

            supported by the relevant  regulatory framework, and that the

                                         -21-

            testing protocol referred  to cannot properly be  interpreted

            to provide the definition of "cyanides" under CERCLA.

                    Independent of  its authority to  designate hazardous

            substances and toxic pollutants under CERCLA and the CWA, the

            EPA also  has authority and  responsibility under the  CWA to

            "promulgate guidelines  establishing test procedures  for the

            analysis of  pollutants that shall include  the factors which

            must  be provided  in  any [CWA  compliance certification  or

            permit application]."  33 U.S.C.   1314(h).  Pursuant to this

            delegation, the EPA has issued regulations incorporating test

            procedures for measuring the level of certain "parameters" in

            a water or  waste sample.  See 40 C.F.R.   136.3.  One of the
                                       ___

            listed  parameters  is  "cyanide-total,  mg/L."    Id.    The
                                                               ___

            regulation  indicates  that  the  procedures to  be  used  in

            measuring  "cyanide-total" in  effluent discharges  are those

            described  in the  Standard  Methods  reference  publication.
                               _________________

            Amicus  places  overriding  significance  upon  one  of these
                                                            ___

            procedures, called  the "total  cyanide" test.   See Standard
                                                             ___ ________

            Methods,  supra,  at 4-20,  4-23.    This procedure  involves
            _______   _____

            boiling  the sample  to  be tested  in concentrated  sulfuric

            acid.   Compounds that contain the CN group in their chemical

            composition, it  is said, will release  detectable amounts of

            free cyanide when subjected to the procedure.

                    Amicus claims that, under the EPA's regulations,  any

            substance that releases cyanide upon being boiled in sulfuric

                                         -22-

            acid under the "total  cyanide" test qualifies as one  of the

            "cyanides"  for purposes  of  CERCLA liability.   It  further

            claims that because FFC  releases some cyanide when subjected

            to the "total  cyanide" test,  it is necessarily  one of  the

            "cyanides" within the  meaning of  CERCLA.  We  do not  think

            that this conclusion follows.

                    The  EPA's  own  regulations  do  not  use  the  test

            procedures  identified  at 40  C.F.R.   136.3  (including the

            Standard  Methods protocol)  to define  the scope of  CWA- or
            _________________               ______

            CERCLA-designated categories of toxic pollutants or hazardous

            substances.   The regulations never state  that any substance

            that  releases  cyanide  under   the  "total  cyanide"   test

            qualifies as one  of the "cyanides"  for purposes of  CERCLA.

            Rather,  the  regulations  themselves  say   something  quite

            different.    The regulation  that  specifically  governs the

            applicability  of the identified  test procedures states that

            the  procedures are  intended  to "perform  the measurements"
                                                            ____________

            required  in  connection  with  (a) Clean  Water  Act  permit

            applications,   (b)  discharge   reports,  and   (c)  certain

            compliance  certifications  issued  by  states.    40  C.F.R.

              136.1  (emphasis added).    None of  these three  expressly

            designated uses  for the test procedures  is applicable here,

            and  none has anything to  do with providing  a definition of
                                                            __________

            any  class of pollutants.  The  regulations intend the "total

            cyanide" procedure to serve only the purpose of measuring the

                                         -23-

            total  CN8 by weight in  the chemical composition  of a given

            waste sample,  not to define which  chemical substances count

            as a  member of the category  "cyanides."  Thus, even  if FFC

            can  be measured  for "total  cyanide" composition  under the
                    ________

            Standard Methods procedure,9  it surely does not  follow as a
            ________________

            matter of law or logic that  FFC is one of the "cyanides" for

            purposes of CERCLA liability.

                    A further difficulty  with amicus' attempt to  define

            "cyanides"  by reference  to the  total cyanide test  is that

            such  a definition may lead  to nonsensical results.   One of

            BVE's   experts  observes   that  there  are   many  everyday

            substances  that  contain  the  CN group  in  their  chemical

            composition (e.g.,  vitamin B-12, the synthetic  fiber Orlon,
                         ____

            and a number of  common medicines such as Lomotil),  and some

            or  all of  these  substances, like  FFC, would  also release

            cyanide when subjected to the conditions of the total cyanide

            test.10   Yet  no one,  including the  EPA, would  categorize

                                
            ____________________

            8.  "CN" is the chemical formula of the cyanide molecule.

            9.  BVE's expert asserts that because of the properties of
            FFC, the total cyanide test cannot actually give an accurate
                                                                ________
            quantification of the total CN composition by weight in a
            given sample of FFC.  The Commonwealth's expert appears to
            agree on this point, but states that because FFC does
            nevertheless yield some cyanide when subjected to the
                               ____
            procedure, FFC is one of the "cyanides."

            10.  The Commonwealth's expert appears to deny that vitamin
            B-12 would release cyanide in a total cyanide test.  For
            purposes of deciding the Commonwealth's summary judgment
            motion, we credit BVE's position on this factual issue, as we
            must.  The EPA in its amicus brief does not attempt to

                                         -24-

            vitamin B-12, for  example, as one  of the "cyanides"  within

            the meaning of the CWA or CERCLA.  BVE's experts have averred

            that FFC's  chemical structure and composition  are much more

            similar  to  substances  like  vitamin  B-12  than  to  toxic

            substances like potassium cyanide.   Assuming BVE is correct,

            as  we must here, a  rule that defined  "cyanides" to include

            all substances that release any cyanide when subjected to the
            ___                         ___

            total   cyanide   test   would   appear   to   be   untenably

            overinclusive.11

                    The unsettled  nature of the status  of FFC vis- -vis

            the category  "cyanides" is further demonstrated  by at least

            one documented  situation in  which the  EPA has  appeared to

            take official action at odds with the position articulated in

            its amicus brief.   This situation, discussed  in some detail

            in  the  Luftig  Letter  submitted  to  the  district  court,

            involved the  EPA's handling  in 1985 of  ferrocyanide wastes

            generated at  a facility  operated by the  Mearl corporation.

            Mearl  had filed  a petition  before the  EPA to  exclude its

            wastewater treatment sludge from  regulation under RCRA.  See
                                                                      ___

                                
            ____________________

            dispute BVE's factual assertion.

            11.  Indeed, the problem of overbreadth is what appears to
            have prompted commentators to object to the EPA's original
            inclusion of "cyanide and all cyanide compounds" on the
            proposed CWA list, and what prompted the change to
            "cyanides."  See 38 Fed. Reg. at 24344.  Yet, using the
                         ___
            "total cyanide" test to define "cyanides" as amicus proposes
            would, in effect, make the category "cyanides" equivalent to
            the rejected formulation, "all cyanide compounds."

                                         -25-

            50 Fed. Reg. 7882, 7888-90 (Feb. 26, 1985).   Although a test

            for total cyanide indicated positive results, Mearl argued to

            the EPA that all cyanide in  the waste was "in the insoluble,

            non-toxic form  of ferric  ferrocyanide."   50  Fed. Reg.  at

            7889.   After  public hearing  and comment,  the EPA  granted

            Mearl's petition  to exclude the waste  from RCRA regulation,

            stating  that  "the   waste  does  not  exhibit  any  of  the

            characteristics  of hazardous  waste."   50 Fed.  Reg. 48886,

            48890  (Nov. 27,  1985).   The EPA  further stated  that "the

            cyanide  present [in the sludge, in the form of FFC] will not

            convert to  free cyanide  [in  environmental conditions]  and

            therefore  is  not  of  regulatory concern  with  respect  to
            __________________________________________

            ground-water or  atmospheric exposure routes."   50 Fed. Reg.

            at 48890 (emphasis added).

                    While  technically, the  decision to  exclude Mearl's

            wastewater sludge from RCRA regulation was limited to Mearl's

            own facility, and did  not directly affect the status  of FFC

            under the CWA or CERCLA, it is difficult to ignore the  EPA's

            statement  that the  FFC  in the  Mearl  sludge was  "not  of

            regulatory  concern" because  it  would not  convert to  free

            cyanide  under  environmental  conditions.   Here,  too,  the

            record supports  the conclusion  that  the FFC  found at  the

            Attleboro site may  pose no threat of  releasing free cyanide

                                         -26-

            under normal  environmental conditions.12  At  a minimum, the

            EPA's action with respect to the Mearl petition provides some

            support for BVE's position in this litigation.

                    We conclude that the  EPA rules promulgated under the

            CWA  that identify  test  procedures for  the measurement  of

            wastewater parameters,  including the total cyanide  test, do

            not set forth an agency definition of "cyanides" for purposes

            of the CWA's  list of  toxic pollutants or  CERCLA's list  of

            hazardous substances.  Thus,  even assuming that FFC releases

            cyanide  when  subjected to  the  Standard  Methods test  for
                                              _________________

            measuring  "total cyanide," it does not follow as a matter of

            law that FFC is one of the "cyanides" for  purposes of CERCLA

            liability.

                    3.  Agency Deference
                        ________________

                    The  varying  positions stated  in  the  EPA's amicus

            brief and in the Luftig Letter concerning the EPA's purported

                                
            ____________________

            12.  The Commonwealth's experts (and its counsel at oral
            argument) have suggested that FFC could degrade and release
            cyanide gas when exposed to sunlight.  BVE's expert has
            attested to a directly contrary conclusion.  Additionally,
            the Commonwealth's counsel asserted at oral argument that
            some free cyanide was found at the Attleboro site, suggesting
                              ___
            that the cyanide had dissociated from the FFC under
            environmental conditions.  However, as far as the record
            discloses, only trace amounts of free cyanide were found at
            the site, i.e., measuring less than 1 part per million.  By
                      ____
            comparison, the generally recognized safety threshold for
            free cyanide in workroom air is 10 parts per million.  For
            purposes of evaluating the Commonwealth's summary judgment
            motion, we must assume that FFC does not degrade when exposed
            to sunlight, and that no more than background levels of free
            cyanide were detectable at the Attleboro waste site.

                                         -27-

            definition of "cyanides" are  not entitled to deference under

            the principles  of Chevron U.S.A., Inc.  v. Natural Resources
                               ____________________     _________________

            Defense Council, Inc., 467  U.S. 837 (1984).  It  is apparent
            _____________________

            that the argument for defining "cyanides" by reference to the

            total  cyanide  test has  been  tailored  to and  articulated

            specifically  for purposes  of this  particular litigation.13

            As  such, that position need not be given any special weight.

            See   Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 499
            ___   ______    ________________________________________

            U.S. 144, 156-57 (1991) (agency's litigating position, in the

            nature of  "post hoc rationalization" rather  than the result

            of  the official exercise of action authority, is entitled to

            no Chevron deference); see  also Director, Office of Workers'
               _______             _________ ____________________________

            Compensation  Programs,  U.S.  Dep't   of  Labor  v.  General
            ________________________________________________      _______

            Dynamics  Corp., 980 F.2d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 1992); Brewster v.
            _______________                                   ________

            Sullivan, 972 F.2d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1992).
            ________

                    4.  Policy Considerations
                        _____________________

                                
            ____________________

            13.  The Luftig Letter, while written by an EPA official,
            does not set forth an entrenched EPA view.  The letter does
            not articulate a definition as such of the term "cyanides"
            and is tellingly circumspect in its discussion of the EPA's
            purported position on whether FFC falls within that category. 
            Instead of stating outright that the EPA adheres to an
            established definition of "cyanides" that encompasses FFC, it
            makes only the far weaker statement that "the manner in which
            EPA addresses cyanides under the Clean Water Act indicates
            that the term does include ferric ferrocyanide." 
            Furthermore, while the letter says that the EPA uses the
            total cyanide test described in Standard Methods, it never
                                            ________________
            states that the EPA has defined "cyanides" by reference to
                                    _______
            that test, offering the more limited assertion that
            "[t]he[se] testing procedures provide confirmation that
                                                  ____________
            ferric ferrocyanide is a 'cyanide' [emphasis added]."

                                         -28-

                    We  are also troubled by the EPA's approach here as a

            matter  of  policy.   A  complicated  regulatory regime  like

            CERCLA or the CWA cannot function effectively unless citizens

            are  given  fair  notice  of  their  obligations.    Congress

            delegated to  the EPA the  continuing task of  defining which

            substances  are   "hazardous  substances"  to   which  CERCLA

            liability can attach.   The EPA does not  argue here that the

            term "cyanides"  has  a plain  meaning  that would  enable  a

            person  to answer  the question  of whether FFC  falls within

            that category.   Instead, it suggests  that the patchwork  of

            regulations  relating   to   the  measurement   of   effluent

            discharges can be  adapted to the task at hand.   We can thus

            determine the  status of  FFC for CERCLA  liability purposes,

            says the  EPA, by  boiling the  FFC in  concentrated sulfuric

            acid.  Yet the EPA points  to no regulation or other source  

            except its amicus submission  to this court   that  tells the

            public that boiling a substance in concentrated sulfuric acid

            is the way to  determine whether it legally qualifies  as one

            of the "cyanides."  That is not fair notice to the public and

            is not  what Congress  contemplated when it  granted the  EPA

            power  to promulgate  regulations  to  define and  supplement

            CERCLA's list of hazardous substances.

            D.  Primary Jurisdiction
                ____________________

                    Because  there exists  no basis  for concluding  as a

            matter  of law that  FFC falls within  the scope  of the term

                                         -29-

            "cyanides,"  the  district  court's  order  granting  partial

            summary  judgment  in  favor  of  the  Commonwealth  must  be

            vacated.  We  are left,  then, to decide  whether the  proper

            disposition  of  this appeal  is to  remand  the case  to the

            district court for  trial, or to prescribe  some other avenue

            for appropriate  factfinding with  respect to  "cyanides" and

            FFC.  We conclude that the proper course is a referral to the

            EPA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

                    Having  found that the  term "cyanides" is ambiguous,

            that EPA's  regulatory framework does  not adequately  define

            the  term, that the legislative and regulatory history of the

            term  "cyanides"   does  not  establish   the  Commonwealth's

            position, and that  the position advocated  by amicus is  not

            entitled  to  deference,  we   are  left  with  virtually  no

            legislative  or  administrative   guidance  for   determining

            whether,  on  the  record  before  us,  FFC  is  one  of  the

            "cyanides."    Congress  delegated  to the  EPA,  not  to the

            courts, the  authority to administer the  CWA toxic pollutant

            list  and the CERCLA list of hazardous substances.  This case

            seems  clearly  to call  for referral  to  the EPA  under the

            "primary   jurisdiction"   doctrine,   for   an   appropriate

            administrative determination of whether FFC  falls within the

            category  "cyanides."  Cf. Chastain v. AT&T Co., 351 F. Supp.
                                   ___ ________    ________

            1320,  1323  (D.D.C.  1972)  (invoking  primary  jurisdiction

            doctrine and referring case to the relevant agency, where the

                                         -30-

            court  was  "unwilling  and  unable  to  assume  the  initial

            responsibility  of evaluating the  highly technical questions

            raised by the parties").

                    The Supreme Court has stated that "[n]o fixed formula

            exists for  applying the  doctrine of primary  jurisdiction."

            United  States v. Western Pacific Railroad  Co., 352 U.S. 59,
            ______________    _____________________________

            64  (1956).   Broadly  speaking,  the  doctrine, informed  by

            principles  of  deference  to  agency  decisionmaking,  gives

            effect  to  the  eminently  sensible notion  that  "in  cases

            raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience

            of judges  or cases requiring the  exercise of administrative

            discretion, agencies created by  Congress for regulating  the

            subject  matter should not be passed over."  Id. (quoting Far
                                                         ___          ___

            East  Conference  v.  United  States, 342  U.S.  570,  574-75
            ________________      ______________

            (1952));  see generally  II  Kenneth C.  Davis  & Richard  J.
                      _____________

            Pierce,  Jr., Administrative Law  Treatise   14.1,  at 271-80
                          ____________________________

            (3d ed. 1994).   The doctrine  is intended  to "serve[] as  a

            means of coordinating administrative and judicial machinery,"

            and to  "promote uniformity  and take advantage  of agencies'

            special  expertise."  Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592
                                  _____________    _________________

            F.2d 575, 580 (1st Cir. 1979).

                    This court has said that there are three factors that

            guide the  decision whether or  not to defer  a matter  to an

            agency under the primary jurisdiction doctrine:

                    (1) whether the  agency determination  l[ies]
                    at the heart of  the task assigned the agency

                                         -31-

                    by  Congress;  (2)  whether agency  expertise
                    [i]s required to unravel intricate, technical
                    facts;  and (3)  whether, though  perhaps not
                    determinative, the agency determination would
                    materially aid the court.

            Id. at 580-81 (citing Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor,
            ___                   ___________________________    _______

            414 U.S. 113, 114-15 (1973)).  All three of these factors are

            plainly  satisfied here.  The determination  whether FFC is a

            hazardous substance  is specifically within the  scope of the

            EPA's delegated authority; the EPA's expertise is required to

            sift  through and properly weigh all of the arguments for and

            against  including FFC  within  the category  "cyanides"; and

            official  rulemaking   by  the   EPA  on  this   issue  would

            indisputably assist  the court in determining BVE's liability

            to the Commonwealth under CERCLA.14

                    The judicial machinery is  ill-suited to fashioning a

            workable rule  for determining  whether the substance  FFC by

            virtue of  its  chemical, structural,  functional,  or  other

            qualities, falls within the properly conceived definition  of

            "cyanides."   That determination is  much better left  to the

            EPA.

                                
            ____________________

            14.  We acknowledge the general principle that a primary
            jurisdiction reference to an agency is usually inappropriate
            in an enforcement action brought by the agency.  See ICC v.
                                                             ___ ___
            B&T Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1182, 1187 (1st Cir. 1980) (stating
            _______________
            that the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply where
            the agency brings suit, because the agency's position on the
            matter to be litigated will be clear).  This action, however,
            was brought by the Commonwealth, not by the EPA.  As noted
            above, the EPA's position on the definition of "cyanides" is
            far from clear.

                                         -32-

                    Referral  to the  EPA under  the doctrine  of primary

            jurisdiction  will  also  serve  the  interest   of  national

            uniformity in regulation.   The question of whether FFC  is a

            CERCLA hazardous substance is of more than local concern.  As

            noted  earlier,  FFC  is  a   common  byproduct  of  the  gas

            manufacturing process that was  prevalent in prior decades at

            some 1500 different facilities across the country.  Moreover,

            a  determination as to whether  FFC is one  of the "cyanides"

            would undoubtedly have significant implications    beyond our

            purview    for similar  substances whose status  under CERCLA

            currently  remains unclear.  Rather than leave this matter to

            the risk of inconsistent outcomes before particular courts in

            different  parts of the country, we believe it better to have

            the EPA resolve the issue nationwide.15

                    Accordingly,  we  conclude that  this case  should be

            referred to  the EPA  for an administrative  determination of

            whether FFC is one of the "cyanides" within the meaning of 40

            C.F.R.   401.15  and Table 302.4.   We further  conclude that

            the district court proceedings  in this case shall  be stayed

            and that the  court shall retain jurisdiction over  this case

            pending an  appropriate determination of the  relevant issues

                                
            ____________________

            15.  The EPA's determination would, of course, be subject to
            judicial review and thus would not be immune from challenge
            if arbitrary, unreasonable, clearly contrary to the statute's
            intended effect, or otherwise unlawful.  See ABF Freight
                                                     ___ ___________
            Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 114 S. Ct. 835, 839 (1994); Brown v.
            __________    ____                              _____
            Secretary of HHS, 46 F.3d 102, 106 (1st Cir. 1995).
            ________________

                                         -33-

            by the  EPA.16  See Reiter  v. Cooper, 113 S.  Ct. 1213, 1220
                            ___ ______     ______

            (1993)  (explaining  that  court  has  discretion  to  retain

            jurisdiction  pending administrative  referral or  to dismiss

            the case without prejudice).

                    The  district court's order  granting the  motion for
                    _____________________________________________________

            partial summary judgment is vacated.  The case is remanded to
            ___________________________________   _______________________

            the district court for  primary jurisdiction reference to the
            _____________________________________________________________

            EPA.  The district court shall refer the matter to the EPA to
            ___   _______________________________________________________

            determine  whether FFC  qualifies  as one  of the  "cyanides"
            _____________________________________________________________

            within the  meaning  of  40  C.F.R.   401.15  and  40  C.F.R.
            _____________________________________________________________

              302.4, Table 302.4.  No costs are awarded.
            ____________________   ____________________

                                
            ____________________

            16.  In so doing, we note that BVE has placed the $5.8
            million at stake here in an interest bearing escrow account. 
            The Commonwealth's interests will be protected during the
            stay.  When we asked the Commonwealth at oral argument if any
            additional protections would be required should the EPA's
            primary jurisdiction be invoked, the Commonwealth sought
            nothing further.

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