Court Opinion

ID: 9894946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 17:12:50.650391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:03.509840
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Schaaf, 2023-Ohio-4009.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio                                         Court of Appeals No. WD-22-045

        Appellee                                      Trial Court No. 2020CR0479

v.

Michael R. Schaaf                                     DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                     Decided: November 3, 2023

                                              *****

        Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        David T. Harold, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant.

                                              *****
        ZMUDA, J.

                                             I. Introduction

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Michael Schaaf, appeals the June 14, 2022 judgment of the Wood

County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of attempted murder and breaking and

entering. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                               A. Procedural Background

       {¶ 2} On October 22, 2020, appellant was indicted on one count of attempted

murder in violation of R.C. 2923.02(B) and (D), a first-degree felony; two counts of

aggravated arson in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(1) and (B)(2), each a first-degree

felony; one count of aggravated arson in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(2) and (B)(3), a

second-degree felony; and one count of breaking and entering in violation of R.C.

2911.13(B) and (C), a fifth-degree felony. The charges arose from the investigation of a

fire that occurred on July 8, 2020. Appellant appeared for his arraignment on November

2, 2020, and entered a not guilty plea to all of the charges.1 Following a competency

hearing in which appellant was deemed competent to stand trial and extended plea

negotiations, the matter proceeded to a four-day jury trial beginning on April 26, 2022.

During trial, the parties elicited the following testimony and evidence relevant to this

appeal:2

1
  Appellant was charged with an additional count of felonious assault through a separate
indictment that was joined with the present case, pursuant to Crim.R. 8 and 13, through
the trial court’s December 10, 2020 order. That additional count was dismissed during
appellant’s trial and is not part of this appeal.
2
 Both at trial and in this appeal, appellant only argued that the state had not shown that
he was the perpetrator of the arson. He does not challenge whether the fire was the result
of arson. Therefore, testimony unrelated to appellant’s identity as the perpetrator has
been omitted.

2.
                                    Testimony of K. C.

       {¶ 3} K.C. was appellant’s wife from 2002 until 2020. She and appellant divorced

in February, 2020. The following month, K.C. applied for, and was granted, a protection

order prohibiting appellant from contacting her and her children. Immediately following

their divorce, K.C. and her children remained in the marital residence. While there, she

observed appellant driving past the residence in his truck “on a regular basis.” She and

her children ultimately left the marital residence and they began staying with K.C.’s

parents in Wood County, Ohio in May, 2020, before finally moving into a nearby

residence.

       {¶ 4} On July 8, 2020, K.C. received a phone call from her father, F.C., “sometime

between 2:00 and 3:00” a.m., informing her that his house was on fire. He asked K.C. to

come and assist with getting her mother, J.C., to safety. During her testimony, the state

presented K.C. with a photograph of a lighter identified as State’s Exhibit 2C. She

testified that she had never seen or used the lighter before.

       {¶ 5} Additionally, she testified that while the couple was living in Alabama in

2018, appellant was involved in a motorcycle accident. As a result of that accident,

appellant suffered a traumatic brain injury and a back injury. Due to appellant’s ongoing

back pain resulting from the accident, he began to shift side-to-side when walking, a gait

she described as a “swagger.”

       {¶ 6} On cross-examination, K.C. testified that at the time of the fire, appellant

owned a yellow motorcycle. She was not, however, aware of the precise location of the

3.
motorcycle at the time of the fire and its aftermath. Lastly, K.C. stated that she believed

appellant only had one cell phone at the time the fire occurred.

                                     Testimony of F.C.

       {¶ 7} F.C. is K.C.’s father and appellant’s former father-in-law. He and J.C. lived

at a residence on Newton Road, Bowling Green, Wood County, Ohio from the mid-1970s

up to and including the date of trial. He testified that the fire that occurred on July 8,

2020 originated at the rear of the residence. He awoke that night to fire alarms some time

between 2:00 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. He immediately woke J.C., told her to get dressed, and

then went to determine the location of the fire. He proceeded through the residence

toward the garage. He initially believed that the fire began in the garage due to the

amount of smoke in that location.

       {¶ 8} Upon confirming that there was a fire, he called 911 to request assistance.

Then, seeing that the fire was only burning on one side of the garage, he pulled his

vehicle out to a safe distance and had J.C. sit in it while he returned to attempt to

extinguish the flames. Upon returning to the residence, he discovered that the main

portion of the fire was actually on the exterior of the sunroom at the rear of the residence.

He used his experience as a retired firefighter to instruct a neighbor that came to assist to

begin removing the siding and soffits from the property so that they could reach the

source of the fire underneath. The fire department arrived shortly thereafter and were

able to extinguish the fire before it spread to any other part of the house.

4.
       {¶ 9} After describing the incident, the state showed F.C. a photograph of a

lighter, identified as Exhibit 2C, that was discovered at the scene shortly after the fire was

extinguished. F.C. testified that it was not his lighter, that he had never seen the lighter

before, and that he did not own any lighters that looked similar.

       {¶ 10} On cross-examination, F.C. provided additional details regarding the

sequence of events following his discovery of the fire. He also noted that the neighbor

that assisted him had driven from approximately one mile away. He confirmed that while

he initially believed that the garage was the primary location of the fire that the flames

actually originated from the sunroom at the rear of the residence.

       {¶ 11} F.C. also testified that prior to the fire he had been involved in several

disputes with a neighbor. These disputes included an incident in which F.C.’s mailbox

was knocked over and an ongoing dispute over his neighbor’s continued mowing of grass

over F.C.’s property line. The mailbox incident occurred two days prior to the fire. F.C.

testified that the Wood County Sheriff’s Department investigated the mailbox incident

and concluded that the neighbor had not been involved. F.C. said that he did not recall

informing the deputy that responded to the fire on July 8, 2020, that he suspected his

neighbor likely started the fire. F.C. again denied owning a lighter similar to the state’s

Exhibit 2C and denied that he ever burned any refuse in a barrel behind his house. He

concluded his testimony by denying that he had started the fire on July 8, 2020.

5.
                          Testimony of Deputy Kert Appelhans

       {¶ 12} At the time of trial, Kert Appelhans had been employed as a deputy with

the Wood County Sheriff’s Department for 23 years. His primary assignment was “road

patrol.” He testified that on July 8, 2020, he responded in this capacity to a report of

smoke in a garage at F.C.’s residence.

       {¶ 13} Upon his arrival, he observed smoke both in the garage and the residence.

He could also hear smoke alarms ringing. He saw F.C. inside the residence with his wife

and went to speak with him. F.C. initially informed Deputy Appelhans that he did not

know the precise location of the fire but discovered it at the rear of the house while they

talked. After discovering the source of the fire, Deputy Appelhans then went to his

vehicle to retrieve a fire extinguisher.

       {¶ 14} Deputy Appelhans also testified that he and F.C. had some discussions

about the cause of the fire after it had been extinguished. F.C. informed him that there

was a gas heater in the sun room but that the pilot light had been turned off for the

summer. F.C. also stated that there were no electrical utilities in the wall where the fire

was located. F.C. informed Deputy Appelhans that he believed “the fire was suspicious.”

       {¶ 15} After the fire department arrived and began putting out “hot spots,” Deputy

Appelhans “chitchatted” with another responding deputy—Deputy Logan Spangenberg.

During their conversation, Deputy Spangenberg discovered a lighter in the grass

approximately 15 feet from where the fire occurred. After its discovery, Deputy

Appelhans remained by the lighter while Deputy Spangenberg went to get a camera and

6.
collect the evidence. Deputy Appelhans confirmed that state’s Exhibit 2 was an accurate

picture of the lighter that Deputy Spangenberg discovered.

        {¶ 16} On cross-examination, Deputy Appelhans described seeing flames on the

sun porch and spreading up through the eaves and soffits of the residence when he

arrived. He described it as “a significant fire.” Deputy Appelhans also stated that F.C.

indicated his belief that his neighbor’s children may have started the fire in response to

their ongoing dispute over the mailbox and property line. F.C. showed Deputy

Appelhans a set of stakes that he had placed at the property line to discourage his

neighbor from mowing on his property. Deputy Appelhans and Deputy Spangenberg

later searched appellant’s property but did not find any additional evidence related to the

fire.

        {¶ 17} Deputy Appelhans testified that K.C. eventually arrived at the scene and

told him that she believed appellant was responsible for the fire. She based her belief on

the fact that she had a protection order against appellant and because appellant had

allegedly threatened her with a firearm. Appelhans testified that F.C., after speaking with

K.C., also expressed his opinion that appellant could have started the fire.

                       Testimony of Deputy Logan Spangenberg

        {¶ 18} Deputy Logan Spangenberg had been employed as a deputy for the Wood

County Sheriff’s Department for approximately three years at the time of trial. He was

generally assigned to road patrol where his primary duties consisted of responding to

7.
calls for service. He was working in that capacity when he responded to a report of “fire

or smoke” at F.C.’s residence on July 8, 2020.

       {¶ 19} When he arrived, he observed smoke coming from the residence and

Deputy Appelhans running to his vehicle to obtain a fire extinguisher. He inquired

whether another fire extinguisher was necessary but Deputy Appelhans declined that

offer, stating that the responding fire department was close to arriving. Deputy

Spangenberg then entered the residence and escorted J.C. outside. He described the

smoke in the portion of the residence he entered as “a fair amount.”

       {¶ 20} After the fire department arrived, Deputy Spangenberg stood to the side

and began discussing the emergency call with Deputy Appelhans. During that

conversation, he saw a lighter on the ground a few feet in front of them. The lighter was

“15 to 20 feet” from the residence. He then contacted Detective Lieutenant Rod Smith of

the Wood County Sheriff’s Department who advised Deputy Spangenberg to photograph

the lighter and place it in an evidence bag. Deputy Spangenberg confirmed that he took

the photographs introduced as state’s Exhibits 2A, 2B, and 2C and that they were true

and accurate depictions of the lighter on July 8. 2020. After securing the lighter in an

evidence bag, Deputy Spangenberg locked the bag in his vehicle. He testified that no one

else had access to the vehicle at any time. After the incident concluded, he returned to

the Wood County Sheriff’s Office and placed the bag in an evidence locker.

8.
       {¶ 21} On cross-examination, Deputy Spangenberg denied ever touching or

kicking the lighter before it was collected. He did not recall ever testing the lighter to see

if it worked when it was in his possession.

                          Testimony of Deputy Jeremy Holland

       {¶ 22} Deputy Jeremy Holland was in his 17th year of employment with the Wood

County Sheriff’s Department at the time he testified at appellant’s trial. His general

duties during that time included, as relevant to this appeal, supervision of the

department’s evidence room.

       {¶ 23} He described the process of logging in evidence as beginning when an

officer brings evidence from the scene of a crime, places it in an evidence locker, and

then deposits the key to that locker in a drop box. When he arrives the next morning—if

the evidence is collected overnight as it was in the present case—he will obtain the key

from the drop box and open the evidence locker from inside the evidence room. The

evidence is then assigned a bin number and logged as being received in the evidence

room at that time. This is the same procedure that he performed to log the evidence bag

collected from the scene of the fire on July 8, 2020.

       {¶ 24} After describing this process, the state presented Deputy Holland with its

Exhibit 19. He identified the exhibit as an “evidence envelope” that is used to identify

the evidence contained therein and the circumstances under which it was collected.

Deputy Holland also described an additional blue label placed on the envelope. He

described this as a “BCI submission” label showing that the evidence was submitted to

9.
the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation. He then stated that State Exhibit 19 was an

evidence envelope containing a blue lighter. He also identified the contents of another

evidence envelope—State Exhibit 22—as appellant’s cell phone that was collected at the

Wood County Justice Center on October 29, 2020.

       {¶ 25} The state next presented Deputy Holland with its Exhibits 9A, 9B, and 9C.

He identified the cumulative exhibit as a “BCI submission sheet” that he used to submit

the lighter, appellant’s phone, and DNA samples from appellant3 and F.C. to the BCI for

testing. He testified that F.C.’s DNA was submitted “for elimination.” The submission

sheet reflected that the evidence was with the BCI from July 9, 2020, until August 12,

2020. He testified that the evidence had been in the evidence room from that date until

he retrieved it for purposes of trial in this case.

       {¶ 26} Appellant did not cross-examine Deputy Holland.

                                Testimony of Lindsay Deetz

       {¶ 27} Lindsay Deetz is a forensic scientist at the BCI crime laboratory in

Richfield, Ohio. She described herself as a specialist in the DNA section of the lab and

that she had analyzed DNA “thousands of times.” She was qualified as an expert witness

in DNA analysis without objection from appellant.

3
  The inclusion of appellant’s DNA sample was described through the subsequent witness
testimony of Lindsay Deetz. Because appellant’s appeal does not challenge the
submission of his DNA to the BCI, we include its submission to the BCI here for
purposes of clarity only.

10.
       {¶ 28} After providing a basic overview of how DNA identification works and

how she performs her analysis, Deetz provided specific details regarding her testing of

the evidence in the present case. She identified State Exhibit 19 as the blue lighter she

was asked to test in relation to the BCI case number associated with the July 8, 2020

incident. She testified that her analysis resulted in the collection of two DNA samples

from the lighter. Of these two samples, only one—identified as the “major

contributor”—was in an amount sufficient for her to compare to a known sample for

purposes of identification. Her analysis concluded that F.C. was not the major

contributor of the DNA discovered on the lighter. Her analysis also found that appellant

was the major contributor of the DNA discovered on the lighter. She also testified that

with each analysis they establish the statistical rarity of the DNA profile being tested.

She testified that the DNA profile matching appellant was rarer than one in one trillion

individuals. From this, she concluded to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that

appellant’s DNA “was included in the DNA that was found on the lighter.”

       {¶ 29} During appellant’s cross-examination, Deetz stated that she swabbed the

entire “handle” portion of the lighter to collect the DNA sample. She testified that

although she identified appellant’s DNA, she could not explain how his DNA was placed

on the lighter. She testified that if an item is stored under certain conditions that the

DNA can remain on the item “indefinitely.” She also described the laboratory

precautions she takes to ensure that DNA samples are not contaminated with other DNA

samples during her testing. Deetz also acknowledged that while she could not identify

11.
F.C. as the major contributor of DNA found on the evidence that she could not conclude

that his DNA was not part of the unidentifiable DNA found on the lighter.

                               Testimony of Susan Hubbell

       {¶ 30} Susan Hubbell is a neighbor of F.C. She testified that on July 11, 2020, she

heard a loud motorcycle outside her residence as she was getting ready for bed. She

looked out her window and saw a motorcyclist park his motorcycle in from of F.C.’s

house. The individual then began walking up F.C.’s driveway. Hubbell observed the

individual walk around the back of F.C.’s residence and then turn around and walk back

to the motorcycle. She could not see the individual’s face but observed that he walked

“like [he] was drunk or something.” She described his gait as “left-right, left-right” and

that it “wasn’t just a normal gait of a person.”

       {¶ 31} On cross-examination, she stated that she observed the individual from

approximately 100 to 150 feet away. She could not provide any specific details regarding

the individual beyond his gait and that the motorcycle he drove was louder than others

she had previously heard.

                     Testimony of Detective Lieutenant Rod Smith

       {¶ 32} At the time of trial, Rod Smith had served as Detective Lieutenant with the

Wood County Sheriff’s Department for three years. As part of his work, he received

training specific to interviewing witnesses, victims, and those suspected of committing

crimes. In that training, he was taught to look for discrepancies, movement, and

12.
deflection—changing the subject from the question asked—as indicative of the person

being interviewed’s reliability.

       {¶ 33} On the night of July 8, 2020, Detective Smith was serving as the on-call

detective to assist with investigations that occurred “after hours.” He was contacted by a

deputy at the scene of the fire at approximately 3:00 a.m. He instructed the deputy “that

there were things to look for” at the scene and was informed that the deputy had already

discovered the lighter—an item the deputy believed was suspicious. Detective Smith

requested that the deputy take photographs of the lighter and then collect the lighter and

place it in an evidence bag.

       {¶ 34} Detective Smith did not report to the scene until the following morning,

when he met with Frank Reitmeier, an investigator from the State Fire Marshall’s office.

Mr. Reitmeier informed Detective Smith that F.C. suspected that appellant started the

fire. In light of this suggestion, Detective Smith prepared and sent a preservation letter to

Verizon to ask them to preserve all of appellant’s phone records in their possession. He

then sought, and received, a search warrant for the phone records, which he also

delivered to Verizon. He also obtained a search warrant permitting him to seize

appellant’s phone. That warrant was ultimately served following appellant’s arrest.

       {¶ 35} Contemporaneous with his investigation of appellant, Detective Smith also

investigated F.C.’s neighbor. F.C. informed Detective Smith of the incident with his

mailbox and that he had observed his neighbor fixing his vehicle the following day.

After speaking with the neighbor, Detective Smith concluded that there was no damage to

13.
the vehicle consistent with running over the mailbox and since that was F.C.’s only bases

to suspect the neighbor may have started the fire, he did not consider the neighbor as a

suspect. He also testified that he eliminated F.C.’s family members as suspects but was

not asked to explain the basis for that decision.

       {¶ 36} Detective Smith and Mr. Reitmeier interviewed appellant on September 17,

2020. During that interview, Detective Smith learned that appellant had not been a guest

at F.C.’s residence at any time in 2020. Appellant denied that he had driven by F.C.’s

residence at any time in 2020. When asked about whether he owned a grill and how he

lit it, appellant “distanced himself” from using the word “lighter” before ultimately

conceding that he owned a “grill lighter.” Appellant then told Detective Smith that the

lighter with his DNA on it could only have been placed there by his soon-to-be ex-wife,

K.C.

       {¶ 37} After appellant was arrested, his cell phone was collected pursuant to the

search warrant and a deputy in the Wood County Sheriff’s Department was tasked with

copying the data from the phone. The cell phone data showed, based on the location of

cell phone towers picking up its signal, that appellant’s phone was traveling north on

Interstate 75 between 11:00 p.m. on July 7, 2020, and 1:00 a.m. on July 8, 2020 towards

Toledo, Ohio. The signal indicated that the phone traveled north of Toledo to the border

between Ohio and Michigan. The phone’s signal was next received by a cell phone tower

at 2:00 a.m. just north of Findlay, Ohio. At 10:45 a.m., text messages were sent from

appellant’s phone to appellant’s sister and brother-in-law, respectively, asking if it was ok

14.
for him to come to their residence in Indiana. Detective Smith testified that appellant’s

use of the phrase that he needed to “leave Ohio” in suggesting a visit was suspicious

based on his training.

        {¶ 38} Detective Smith next discussed the search history recovered from

appellant’s cell phone. He noted that appellant’s search history included “approximately

a dozen internet searches on arson, on evidence during arson, on DNA, and evidence for

arson cases.” He also found an additional search seeking information on where “firemen

start fires.”

        {¶ 39} Referencing Ms. Hubbell’s report of a motorcycle parked in front of F.C.’s

residence on July 11, 2020, Detective Smith testified that he asked appellant about that

incident during the interview. Appellant denied having driven his motorcycle to F.C.’s

house. He continued his denial after Detective Smith informed him that a neighbor

reported “someone matching [appellant’s] description” at the residence that evening.

        {¶ 40} On cross-examination, Detective Smith noted that the internet searches on

appellant’s phone took place on September 17, 2020, after the interview in which

Detective Smith described the course of his investigation. He also acknowledged that

none of the searches were conducted prior to the July 8, 2020 fire. As to Ms. Hubbell’s

report, Detective Smith testified that appellant described owning two motorcycles at the

time of the fire. In addition to denying that he drove his motorcycle to F.C.’s residence,

appellant also told Detective Smith that he was “unable to drive a motorcycle that far.”

15.
       {¶ 41} Appellant’s counsel then asked Detective Smith about the scope of his

investigation. Detective Smith testified that when he spoke with a neighbor the day after

the fire, that the neighbor advised him that F.C. had trail cameras installed prior to the

fire. He did not follow-up with F.C. to obtain any video captured by those cameras and,

on redirect examination, Detective Smith explained that he believed the trail cameras

were actually installed later on July 8, 2020, at his suggestion, because K.C. expressed

concern about leaving the property unoccupied while her parents awaited repairs from the

fire. As a result, he concluded that they were not in place at the time of the fire and

would not have recorded the incident.

       {¶ 42} Detective Smith next reviewed the affidavit he executed in support of the

search warrants. He conceded that the affidavit did not identify arson investigation as

part of his experience. He also stated that his last training in arson investigation was

approximately 10 years before appellant’s trial. He also affirmed that his affidavit stated

that F.C. identified appellant as the only suspect despite F.C. having also mentioned his

dispute with one of his neighbors. Detective Smith also recalled that he received an

email from appellant following their September 17, 2020, claiming that appellant was at

his sister’s house in Indiana on July 8, 2020. Detective Smith later testified that

appellant’s sister denied that appellant was with her on the date of the fire. Lastly,

Detective Smith testified that he had received a copy of a cell phone tower mapping

16.
report from appellant’s expert witness—Anthony Milone—and that he agreed with the

conclusions in the report.4

                              Testimony of Frank Reitmeier

       {¶ 43} Frank Reitmeier testified that he had served as an investigator with the

Ohio Fire Marshall’s Office for 16 years prior to appellant’s trial. He was called to the

location of the fire on July 9, 2020, to assist in the arson investigation. During that

investigation, Mr. Reitmeier smelled gasoline in an area behind F.C.’s residence.

Following laboratory testing of debris collected from the area that confirmed the presence

of gasoline,5 Reitmeier concluded that the fire was set intentionally with gasoline used as

an accelerant. He further testified, however, that it was impossible to determine whether

the fire was started by the lighter that was discovered at the scene.

       {¶ 44} Reitmeier also described his assistance with the investigation that

determined appellant had started the fire. He testified that he initially considered multiple

individuals as suspects including F.C., K.C., F.C.’s neighbor, and appellant. All suspects

other than appellant were eliminated by the Wood County Sheriff’s Department through

the course of its investigation. Reitmeier agreed with those conclusions. He also testified

that it was common in the course of his investigations to learn that the perpetrator of the

4
 Appellant’s counsel did not introduce Milone’s report or specify any of his conclusion
during Detective Smith’s testimony.
5
 The state had previously elicited testimony from Christa Rajendram, a laboratory
support chemist with the State Fire Marshall’s Forensic Lab, confirming the presence of
gasoline in debris collected from the area in which the fire originated.

17.
arson would return to the scene of the fire. He stated that this was included in his training

and that the offenders would return for various reasons including to see the damage done

or to discern why the fire did not cause the damage that they anticipated.

       {¶ 45} Reitmeier was present at Detective Smith’s interview with appellant on

September 17, 2020. He described appellant as cooperative but also that appellant often

“deflected” his responses when asked about the fire to discuss he and K.C.’s domestic

relations issues. He confirmed that appellant did not object to having a DNA sample

taken at the time of the interview. Reitmeier testified that he asked appellant directly if

he had started the fire and appellant responded that “he did not.” Appellant also denied

hiring anyone to start the fire.

           The State Rests and Appellant’s Crim.R. 29 Motion for Acquittal

       {¶ 46} At the conclusion of Reitmeier’s testimony, the state rested its case-in-

chief. The state them moved for each of its exhibits to be admitted into evidence. The

trial court admitted the state’s exhibits into evidence over appellant’s objections.

       {¶ 47} Appellant then made his motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29.

Appellant argued that there was no evidence that he was in the area of the fire on July 8,

2020, and no evidence that the lighter discovered in the course of the investigation was

used to start the fire. In response, the state argued that the presence of the lighter

containing appellant’s DNA, in conjunction with “all the evidence that was presented to

the court” regarding the arson itself, was sufficient to support charged offenses when

viewed in a light most favorable to the state. The trial court denied appellant’s motion.

18.
       {¶ 48} Appellant then proceeded with his case-in-chief in which the following

testimony was elicited:

                               Testimony of Gail Ambrose

       {¶ 49} Gail Ambrose testified that she is appellant’s sister. At the time of trial,

she lived in Kokomo, Indiana, and had done so for the previous 30 years. She testified

that injuries from a 2018 motorcycle accident affected appellant’s sleep patterns and his

ability to express his thoughts articulately. He also had difficulty staying on topic during

conversations.

       {¶ 50} Ambrose recalled receiving a text from appellant on July 8, 2020. In his

text, appellant asked if he could come to her home in Indiana to work on documents for

his pending domestic relations dispute with K.C. She testified that appellant had already

asked two days prior about coming to her home and she understood this text as a

clarification of when he would make the trip. She told him that he was welcome that day

and he arrived between 3:00 and 4:00 that afternoon. She testified that he spent time

preparing for an upcoming hearing in his domestic relations proceeding with K.C. and

that he left to return to Ohio the following day.

       {¶ 51} On cross-examination, Ambrose confirmed that appellant was not at her

house at 2:30 in the morning on July 8, 2020. She acknowledged that appellant had

previously stated that he was at her residence at that time but she attributed that mistake

to memory issues and confusion arising from his motorcycle accident. The state next

asked Ambrose why the text messages appellant sent about coming to her residence two

19.
days prior to the fire were not recovered from his phone. She stated that the data

recovered conflicts with her recollection and that appellant did indeed contact her about

coming to Indiana prior to the fire. She did not recall appellant’s text message on July 8,

2020, saying the he needed to “leave Ohio” but stated that she would not dispute that he

used that terminology if it was reflected in the data recovered from his phone.

                             Testimony of Anthony Milone

       {¶ 52} Anthony Milone is a cell phone tower data analyst with Speckin Forensics

in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He described his duties as taking cell phone data recovered

from a cell phone and preparing a map of the phone’s location based on “interactions the

phone is making with cell towers[.]”

       {¶ 53} Milone testified that he had the opportunity to review appellant’s cell

phone data after it was recovered by the Wood County Sheriff’s Department. He focused

his review of the data on appellant’s cell phone interactions with cell towers between

8:00 p.m. on July 7, 2020, and 11:30 a.m. on July 8, 2020. His review of the data

revealed appellant’s sent and received text messages, phone calls, and internet activity in

that timeframe. He was also able to identify the location of the towers that interacted

with appellant’s phone during that time period.

       {¶ 54} Milone testified that appellant’s phone was stationary from 8:00 p.m. until

10:00 p.m. on July 7, 2020. The phone then interacted with towers moving northward

from Findlay, Ohio, until it interacted with a tower in Toledo, Ohio, at 1:00 a.m. on July

20.
8, 2020. The phone then began moving southward until it interacted with a tower in

Findlay, Ohio at 2:06 a.m. It remained in Findlay until 11:30 a.m.

       {¶ 55} Milone prepared a report reflecting his findings as to the location of

appellant’s cell phone during the relevant time period. He concluded that because the

phone was interacting with a cell tower in Findlay, Ohio, from 2:06 a.m. until 11:30 a.m.,

that the phone was located in Findlay, Ohio, during that time. He ultimately concluded

that appellant’s phone was not in the “Bowling Green area around 2:00, 2:30, [or] 2:42

a.m.” on the morning of July 8, 2020.

       {¶ 56} On cross-examination, Milone agreed that there were different types of

signals emanating from a cell phone interacting with a tower based on whether the phone

was transmitting phone calls, text messages, or using internet services. The signal he

used to connect appellant’s cell phone to the cell tower in Findlay, Ohio was an internet

service signal that can run in the background while the phone is inactive, that is, not

transmitting text messages or phone calls. He testified that the portion of his report

finding that the cell phone was interacting with cell towers in Findlay, Ohio was based

only on the phone’s internet signal and that he was unaware of any text messages or

phone calls being transmitted between 2:06 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. on July 8, 2020. He

conceded that he could not conclude that appellant was not in the area of the fire at the

time it occurred, only that his phone was not in the area.

21.
              Appellant Rests, Renewed Crim.R. 29 Motion for Aquittal

       {¶ 57} Appellant rested his case-in-chief at the conclusion of Milone’s testimony.

After the admission of his exhibits, appellant renewed his Crim.R. 29 motion. He argued

that Milone’s report indicating that appellant’s phone was traveling southward at the time

the fire started, in addition to the alleged lack of identity evidence in the state’s case-in-

chief, warranted an acquittal based on the state’s failure to introduce sufficient evidence

to show that he committed the charged offenses. The state responded that appellant’s

phone not being at the scene of the fire did not indicate that appellant himself was not

present and requested the trial court deny the motion. The trial court denied appellant’s

motion and the parties proceeded with closing arguments.

                         Jury Deliberation, Verdict, and Sentencing

       {¶ 58} Following closing arguments, the trial court provided the jury with its

instructions and the jury retired to deliberate. The jury ultimately returned a guilty

verdict on all counts.

       {¶ 59} The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on June 10, 2022. The trial

court determined that counts 1—attempted murder—and counts 2, 3, and 4—aggravated

arson—all merged for purposes of sentencing. The parties agreed that count 5—breaking

an entering—did not merge with any other counts.

       {¶ 60} The state elected to have appellant sentenced on count 1 of the merged

offenses and the trial court imposed an indefinite prison term of a minimum of 7 years

and a maximum of 10.5 years pursuant to R.C. 2967.271. The trial court also imposed a

22.
sentence of 12 months in prison on count 5. The trial court’s judgment was memorialized

in a judgment entry dated June 14, 2022.

                                   B. Assignment of Error

         {¶ 61} Appellant timely appealed and asserts the following errors for our review:

      1. The trial court erred in denying appellant’s Crim.R. 29 Motion; and

      2. The jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at

         trial.

                                     II. Law and Analysis

         A. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion.

         {¶ 62} In his first assignment or error, appellant argues that the trial court erred

when it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. Both at trial and on appeal, appellant

does not dispute that someone intentionally started the fire on July 8, 2020, or that that

individual’s conduct would satisfy the elements of the charged offenses. Instead, he

argues that the state failed to introduce sufficient evidence that he was the individual that

started the fire. He notes that there was no eyewitness testimony placing him at the scene

of the fire on July 8, 2020. Further, he argues that the cell tower data recovered from his

phone did not place him at the scene of the fire. As a result, he claims that the state did

not introduce sufficient evidence that he was the individual that committed the offenses.

We disagree.

         {¶ 63} “The standard of review for a denial of a Crim.R. 29 motion is the same as

the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Johnson, 6th Dist. Wood

23.
Nos. WD-13-008, WD-13-009, 2014-Ohio-2435, ¶ 11. In reviewing a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Smith, 80

Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). In making that determination, we do not

weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Were, 118 Ohio

St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 132. Whether there is sufficient evidence

to support a conviction is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386,

678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

       {¶ 64} It is undisputed that “[e]very criminal prosecution requires proof that the

person accused of the crime is the person who committed the crime.” State v. Tate, 140

Ohio St.3d 442, 2014-Ohio-3667, 19 N.E.3d 888, ¶ 15. “This truism is reflected in the

state’s constitutional burden to prove the guilt of ‘the accused’ beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id., citing In re. Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970). “Like any fact,

the state can prove the identity of the accused by ‘circumstantial or direct’ evidence.” Id.,

citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272-273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). We find that

the state presented sufficient evidence at trial to show that appellant committed the

charged offenses.

       {¶ 65} The record shows that immediately after the fire was extinguished, a lighter

was discovered approximately 15 feet from the fire’s origin. That lighter was collected

and subjected to laboratory testing by the Ohio BCI. Lindsay Deetz, the forensic scientist

24.
that conducted that testing confirmed that appellant was the primary contributor of the

DNA found on the lighter. She testified that the likelihood of any other individual having

the same DNA profile as appellant was less than one in one trillion. Additionally, K.C.

and F.C. testified that the lighter did not belong to either of them. Finally, K.C. testified

that she and appellant were involved in contentious domestic relations proceedings and

that she believed he was angry with her.

       {¶ 66} Appellant argues that this testimony and evidence is insufficient because

there was no eyewitness testimony placing him at the scene of the fire. We reject

appellant’s argument that the state was obligated to present any corroborating testimony

to find that the evidence it did introduce was sufficient. When analyzing sufficiency of

the evidence, we address the evidence that the state presented. State v. Herrera, 2022-

Ohio-4769, 204 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 33 (6th Dist.). The absence of a specific type of evidence

does not negate the sufficiency of the evidence that the state did present. Id. Further,

whether the evidence the state did introduce could be corroborated or disputed by

additional evidence goes to the weight of that evidence, not the sufficiency. State v.

Faulkner, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1108, 2023-Ohio-971, ¶ 27, citing State v. Halfhill,

4th Dist. Gallia No. 21CA4, 2022-Ohio-3242, ¶ 28, citing Cleveland v. Watson, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 108746, 2020-Ohio-3284, ¶ 37 (“[C]orroboration * * * goes to credibility,

which is a matter for manifest weight of the evidence, not sufficiency.”); State v. Greer,

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1153, 2022-Ohio-3082, ¶ 38 (holding that lack of corroboration

for co-defendant’s testimony attacked co-defendant’s credibility, not the sufficiency of

25.
the state’s evidence). Therefore, the lack of any corroborating eyewitness testimony

placing appellant at the scene of the fire on July 8, 2020, is irrelevant to our review of

appellant’s first assignment of error.

       {¶ 67} Instead, we review only whether the evidence the state did introduce was

sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that appellant was the individual that

committed the arson beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113,

684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). That evidence included the discovery of a lighter containing

appellant’s DNA found near the location where the fire was intentionally set despite the

fact that appellant had not been at the residence on any occasion prior to the fire in 2020,

a report of an individual matching appellant’s description parking a motorcycle walking

to the rear of the residence where the fire occurred a few days after the fire, appellant’s

attempts to deflect questions related to the arson during his September 17, 2020

interview, and appellant’s anger with K.C. over their pending domestic relations case.

Viewing that evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we find that the state

presented sufficient evidence to show that appellant committed the charged offenses and

the trial court did not err in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal.

       B. The jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence
          presented at trial.

       {¶ 68} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the jury’s verdict

was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial. Specifically, he argues

that “[b]ecause there was no direct identification of appellant by witnesses” that the

26.
state’s case was “entirely dependent on circumstantial evidence that forensically linked

appellant to the arson.” This, he argues, resulted in an erroneous verdict because the

Sheriff’s Department’s investigation was lacking and the jury based its verdict on its

sympathy toward F.C. and J.C.

       {¶ 69} “When examining whether a conviction was contrary to the manifest

weight of the evidence, the appellate court serves as a ‘thirteenth juror’ to conclude

whether the trial court lost its way so significantly as to result in a manifest miscarriage

of justice, necessitating that the conviction be overturned.” State v. Butler, 6th Dist.

Lucas No. L-08-1390, 2010-Ohio-178, ¶ 11. We note that questions regarding the

“weight and credibility of evidence are primarily for the trier of fact.” State v. Teal,

2017-Ohio-7202, 95 N.E.3d 1095, ¶ 58 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Pena, 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-12-1309, 2014-Ohio-423, ¶ 22. This court’s “discretionary power to grant a new

trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

       {¶ 70} Essentially, appellant argues that the lack of eyewitnesses to the arson, the

Sheriff’s Department allegedly insufficient investigation to rule out appellant’s neighbor

as a suspect, and the cell phone data purportedly showing that he was not in the area at

the time of the fire, shows that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Having reviewed the record, we find that the jury’s verdict was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

27.
        {¶ 71} The only disputed issue at trial was whether appellant committed the arson.

The record shows that a lighter containing appellant’s DNA was discovered near where

the fire started. The morning after the fire, appellant sent a text message to his sister in

Indiana stating that he needed to “leave Ohio.” Additionally, both Detective Smith and

Mr. Reitmeier found that while appellant was cooperative during his September 17, 2020

interview, he “deflected” when he was asked any questions about the arson. The lack of

eyewitness testimony does not negate the probative value of this evidence as appellant

argues. Further, while undisputed evidence suggests that appellant’s cell phone was not

in the vicinity of the fire at the time it was started, appellant’s own witness testified that

this evidence could not show whether appellant himself was or was not in the vicinity of

the fire.

        {¶ 72} In sum, while appellant has shown that evidence and testimony elicited at

trial may have complicated the question for the jury as to whether appellant committed

the arson, the record does not show that the jury “lost its way so significantly as to result

in a manifest miscarriage of justice” in resolving that question. See Butler, 6th Dist.

Lucas No. L-08-1390, 2010-Ohio-178, at ¶ 11 Put simply, this is not an exceptional case

that warrants reversal of appellant’s conviction. For these reasons, we find that the jury’s

verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and find appellant’s second

assignment of error not well-taken.

28.
                                       III. Conclusion

         {¶ 73} We find appellant’s first and second assignments of error not well-taken.

Therefore, we affirm the June 14, 2022 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common

Pleas.

         {¶ 74} Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                         Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Gene A. Zmuda, J.                                ____________________________
                                                           JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
                                                 ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                       JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                 ____________________________
                                                           JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

29.