Court Opinion

ID: 9496308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:23:01.571873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:27.989181
License: Public Domain

COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Anthony’s Title VII and ADEA claims relating to the positions filled by Wilham and Ledbetter are time-barred and, therefore, no longer actionable. Likewise, Anthony’s Tennessee Human Rights Act claims relating to the positions obtained by Wilham, Ledbetter, and Abston are time-barred, as they were not filed within the one-year statute of limitations period. Finally, under our established precedent, Anthony’s § 1981 claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations period. See Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 464 (6th Cir.2001) explaining that “[b]e-cause § 1981 does not specify a statute of limitations, [courts must] apply the one-year limitations period from Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104.” (citing Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575, 578 (6th Cir.1992)). Today, the majority supplants the well-established rule that the statute of limitations for § 1981 claims must be borrowed from an analogous state statute insofar as that rule applies to claims “aris[ing] under the portion of [§ 1981] enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.” I write separately because I believe there are no claims that arise under the portion of § 1981 enacted under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and because I believe 28 U.S.C. § 1658 was not intended to apply to § 1981 as amended or otherwise.
Although, § 1981(b) allows new causes of action in that it allows plaintiffs to bring previously unavailable claims — claims arising out of discriminatory conduct that occurs after the private employment relationship is formed — § 1981(b) alone cannot give rise to these causes of action. Instead, § 1981(b) defines the phrase “make and enforce contracts” as that phrase is used in § 1981(a). Specifically, as the majority notes, in reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), § 1981(b) was added to define that phrase more broadly than it had previously been defined. However, § 1981(a), entitled “Statement of equal rights,” is still the source of substantive rights in the statute. Because § 1981(b) is merely definitional, it functions only to broaden the scope of causes of action that arise under § 1981(a). Section 1981(b) does not, in and of itself, provide the basis for any causes of action. Therefore, the “new causes of action” that are now permitted as a result of the inclusion of § 1981(b) are actually § 1981(a) claims. Thus, I would find that § 1981 post-formation claims simply arise under § 1981(a), which is a statute enacted prior to the effective date of 28 U.S.C. § 1658, December 1, 1990. This finding renders the § 1658 limitations period inapplicable to § 1981 post-formation claims.
Alternatively, even assuming that a post-formation claim arises under both § 1981(a) and (b),1 § 1658 is at least am*518biguous as to whether Congress intended its “catchall” four-year statute of limitations to apply to these claims. The language of § 1658 simply does not address the eventuality when a cause of action “aris[es] under” two different “Acts of Congress,” one enacted before and one enacted after December 1, 1990. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co., 305 F.3d 717, 724 (7th Cir.2002). Thus, I would look beyond the plain language of § 1658 to determine whether it was intended to apply to post-formation § 1981 claims.
The legislative histories of § 1658 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 suggest that Congress did not intend § 1658’s four-year limitation period to apply to § 1981 post-formation claims. As the Seventh Circuit explained, § 1658 was enacted to “alleviate the uncertainty inherent in the practice of borrowing analogous state statutes of limitations for federal causes of action that do not contain their own limitations periods.” Id. at 725 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 101-734, at 24). Moreover, § 1658 “was also concerned with disrupting litigants’ settled expectations.” Id. (explaining that, to address this concern, Congress made § 1658 prospective). I agree with the Seventh Circuit that the conclusion that § 1658’s four-year limitation period does not apply to § 1981 post-formation claims is consistent with Congress’s two purposes in enacting § 1658. Id. at 726-27. Likewise, I believe that the legislative history of § 1981 supports this conclusion. Id. at 727 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1), at 63 (1991), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1991 at 549, 601).
Thus, I would find that Anthony’s § 1981 claims relating to the positions filled by Wilham, Ledbetter, and Abston, but not Kreyling, are time-barred. With respect to the claims that are not time barred, Anthony’s Title VII, ADEA, and § 1981 claims relating to the position Med by Kreyling and Anthony’s Title VII and ADEA claims relating to the position filled by Abston, I would deny these claims on the merits for the reasons stated by the majority.

. For the reasons described above, I believe that no claim will ever arise solely under *518§ 1981(b). However, for purposes of argument, I will concede that a § 1981 post-formation claim could be viewed as arising under both subsections (a) and (b) of § 1981.