Court Opinion

ID: 9904378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:34:35.073182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:34.016102
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                           FIFTH DISTRICT

                                          NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                          FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                          DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

PAPA JOHN'S USA, INC., A FOREIGN PROFIT
CORPORATION, and LORENA GONZALEZ,
                   Petitioners,
                                             Case No. 5D22-716
 v.                                          LT Case No: 2018-CA-002908-O

PAULA MOORE,

                   Respondent.

________________________________/

Opinion filed July 15, 2022

Petition for Certiorari Review of Order
From the Circuit Court for Orange County,
Kevin B. Weiss, Judge.

Todd R. Ehrenreich, David L. Luck and
Michael J. Ellis of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith, LLP, Coral Gables, for Petitioners.

Brian J. Lee, of Morgan & Morgan,
Jacksonville, for Respondent.

COHEN, J.

      Papa John’s USA, Inc. and Lorena Gonzalez, defendants below

(collectively, “Petitioners”), seek certiorari relief from the trial court’s order
granting Paula Moore’s (“Respondent”) motion for sanctions, to compel, and

to invoke the rule of sequestration. For the reasons discussed below, we

grant the petition and quash the order.

     In 2015, Gonzalez, while working as a delivery driver for Papa John’s,

was involved in an automobile accident with Respondent, who was a

passenger in the other vehicle. Thereafter, Respondent filed suit against

Petitioners for negligence. In June 2021, Respondent took the deposition of

Papa John’s corporate representative, Robert Duncan. Duncan testified that,

in preparation for his deposition, he had not personally interviewed Gonzalez

but instead reviewed her deposition testimony and other relevant materials.

On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to elicit from Duncan another

reason why he had not personally communicated with Gonzalez prior to his

deposition. Duncan explained that he had asked Tai Phetsanghane,

defense’s co-counsel, to contact Gonzalez on his behalf to gather some

additional facts; and after speaking with Phetsanghane, he had no additional

questions for Gonzalez.

     Plaintiff’s counsel then sought to inquire into “everything” that Duncan

had discussed with Phetsanghane, to which defense counsel objected based

on attorney-client privilege. The deposition was eventually terminated after

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the parties could not agree on the scope of any follow-up questioning

regarding communications between Duncan and Phetsanghane.

      Respondent then filed her motion for sanctions, to compel, and to

invoke the rule of sequestration, arguing that defense counsel’s questioning

of Duncan regarding his communication with Phetsanghane waived the

attorney-client privilege and that Duncan’s deposition should continue

without any objection on that basis. She also sought sanctions for defense

counsel’s improper instructions not to answer questions on that matter and

for unilaterally terminating the deposition. Finally, Respondent sought to

sequester attorney Phetsanghane to prevent his communication with

Duncan and to depose Phetsanghane at a later date. In response,

Petitioners argued that attorney-client privilege was not waived and that

Respondent’s attempt to delve into the substance of the communications, as

opposed to merely the facts learned by Duncan, was prohibited. Petitioners

also moved for a protective order against sequestering Phetsanghane,

asserting that doing so would be unduly burdensome and deposing him

would further intrude on attorney-client privilege.

      The trial court granted Respondent’s motion, finding that attorney-

client privilege had been waived by defense counsel’s line of questioning. It

ordered Duncan’s deposition to continue and permitted Respondent to ask

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questions    regarding    what    was    discussed     between     Duncan     and

Phetsanghane, along with any related questions that may follow. The trial

court also granted Respondent’s request for sequestration, thereby

preventing Phetsanghane from attending the continued deposition or from

communicating with Duncan in the interim. Finally, the trial court awarded

sanctions by ordering Petitioners to pay Respondent’s attorney’s fees in

connection with the motion.

      Petitioners timely filed this petition for writ of certiorari, contending the

trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by finding that the

attorney-client privilege was waived and by permitting Respondent to inquire

into the substance of the specific communications between Duncan and

Phetsanghane. Petitioners maintain that the proper remedy is to allow

Respondent to question Duncan about the underlying factual information that

was gathered from that conversation. We agree.

      “We will grant certiorari only if Petitioners establish: (1) a departure

from the essential requirements of the law; (2) resulting in material injury for

the remainder of the trial; (3) that cannot be corrected on post-judgment

appeal.” Cowan v. Gray, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D274, D274 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan.

21, 2022) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Knapp, 234 So. 3d 843, 848

(Fla. 5th DCA 2018)). The order on appeal satisfies the second and third

                                        4
elements, providing us with jurisdiction. Id. (“We first examine the second

and third elements to determine our jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)); see also

Montanez v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 135 So. 3d 510, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA

2014) (“An order that erroneously compels a party to produce privileged

information is a classic example of a discovery order subject to certiorari

review because the harm caused by the disclosure of privileged information

is irreparable.” (citation omitted)).

      The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by

finding that attorney-client privilege had been waived and by granting

Respondent      broad     permission    to   question   Duncan     about    his

communications with Phetsanghane. “A client has a privilege to refuse to

disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing, the contents of

confidential communications when such other person learned of the

communications because they were made in rendition of legal services to

the client.” § 90.502(2), Fla. Stat. (2021). However, “A person who has a

privilege against disclosure of a confidential matter or communication waives

the privilege if the person . . . voluntarily discloses or makes the

communication when he or she does not have a reasonable expectation of

privacy, or consents to disclosure of, any significant part of the matter or

communication.” § 90.507, Fla. Stat. (2021). Still,

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            The client does not waive the privilege by testifying
            generally in the case or testifying as to facts that were
            the subject of the consultation with his or her
            attorney, but if the client or attorney testifies as to
            privileged communications in part, this serves as a
            waiver as to the remainder of the privileged
            consultation or consultations about the same subject.

Coates v. Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., 940 So. 2d 504, 511 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2006) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).

      A review of the relevant deposition testimony demonstrates that

defense counsel did not ask questions of Duncan regarding the substance

of the privileged communication, nor did Duncan’s answers reveal the same.

As such, the attorney-client privilege was not waived. Moreover, the trial

court’s order permits Respondent to inquire into far more than just the factual

information Duncan learned during his communication with Phetsanghane.

See Carnival Corp. v. Romero, 710 So. 2d 690, 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)

(“Although the communications between an attorney and client are

privileged, the underlying facts are discoverable.”). We agree with Petitioners

that Respondent may inquire into only the factual information Duncan

gathered during the communication.

      Finally, the trial court’s reliance on our decision in Marrero v. Rea, 312

So. 3d 1041 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021), was misplaced. That case involved a

scenario in which plaintiff’s counsel voluntarily became a witness by filing an

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affidavit concerning his authority to settle the case, which served as a waiver

of attorney-client privilege as to that issue. Id. at 1050–51 (“[T]he trial court

failed to apply the concept of waiver of that privilege to the extent

Respondent and his attorney had already testified in affidavits to Attorney

Panagakis’ lack of settlement authority.” (citing Lender Processing Servs.,

Inc. v. Arch Ins. Co., 183 So. 3d 1052, 1062–64 (Fla. 1st DCA

2015) (explaining attorney-client privilege waived when one party challenges

settlement by asserting that counsel had no authority to settle))). Those

circumstances are clearly not present in the instant case.

      Accordingly, we quash the order on appeal because the trial court

departed from the essential requirements of law in granting Respondent’s

motion. 1

      PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED.

EVANDER, J., concurs.
NARDELLA, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.

      1
       We also quash the remaining portions of the trial court’s order on
sequestration and sanctions, as those rulings stemmed from its erroneous
decision on the attorney-client privilege issue.

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                                           5D22-716
                                           LT Case No: 2018-CA-002908-O

NARDELLA, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part.

      I join the majority in quashing the trial court’s order granting

Respondent’s motion to compel testimony protected by the attorney-client

privilege. Restrained by the limits of certiorari jurisdiction, I would not reach

the remaining portions of the trial court’s order on sequestration and

sanctions.

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