Court Opinion

ID: 9353221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 15:00:30.802557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:12.783534
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11275    Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 01/11/2023    Page: 1 of 13

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                   In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                No. 22-11275
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        DANA HAMPTON,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        AMEDISYS GEORGIA, LLC,
        d.b.a. Central Home Health Care.
        an Amedisys Company,

                                                              Defendant,

        LAURA DICKERSON,
        AMEDISYS HOLDING, LLC.,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11275

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01874-WMR
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Appellant Dana Hampton, an African-American woman, ap-
        peals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment
        to Amedisys Georgia, LLC (“Amedisys”), her former employer and
        Laura Dickerson, her former supervisor (collectively “the defend-
        ants”), in her case alleging race discrimination under 42
        U.S.C. § 1981, retaliation under § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil
        Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 3, and state
        law intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent reten-
        tion claims. In her complaint, Hampton alleged that Dickerson ter-
        minated her unlawfully because of her race, that Dickerson knew
        of her racial discrimination claim and retaliated against her by ter-
        minating her, that Dickerson had racist tendencies and treated the
        Caucasian employees more favorably, and that Dickerson acted
        outrageously when she terminated Hampton.
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        22-11275               Opinion of the Court                          3

               Hampton argues on appeal, with respect to her race discrim-
        ination claim, that the district court erred in concluding that she
        did not identify a comparator and that she failed to show that her
        termination was pretextual. In other words, Hampton failed to
        show that Amedisys terminated her employment because she falsi-
        fied documents when she entered an incorrect payroll code, “A-
        code,” after Dickerson told her that she misused the code. She also
        argues, with respect to her retaliation claim, that the district court
        erred in determining that Dickerson, who terminated her, was un-
        aware that Hampton engaged in any protected activity prior to fir-
        ing her, and that she did not show pretext. Additionally, Hampton
        argues that the district court erred in finding that she did not pre-
        sent a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence to support
        her discrimination and retaliation claims. Further, she argues that
        the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Amedisys
        and Dickerson with respect to her state law claims. Having read
        the parties’ briefs and reviewed the record, we affirm the district
        court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
                                             I.
               We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo, “viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable infer-
        ences, in favor of the non-moving party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep.
        Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005). “We will affirm the
        grant of summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to
        any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
        a matter of law.” Id. For a factual issue to be genuine, it “must
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-11275

        have a real basis in the record.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321,
        1326 (11th Cir. 2005). “[M]ere conclusions and unsupported factual
        allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment
        motion.” Id.
                                        II.
               Section 1981 prohibits intentional race discrimination in the
        making and enforcement of public and private contracts, including
        employment contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Johnson v. Ry. Express
        Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720 (1975). Discrim-
        ination claims arising under § 1981 “have the same requirements of
        proof and use the same analytical framework” as Title VII claims.
        Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1256-57
        (11th Cir. 2012). Section 1981 discrimination claims that rely on
        circumstantial evidence are evaluated under the burden-shifting
        framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
        93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Id. at 1255.
               Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial bur-
        den to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Lewis v. City
        of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc)
        (“Lewis I”). To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show
        that (1) she belonged to a protected class, (2) she was subjected to
        an adverse action, (3) she was qualified to perform her job, and (4)
        her employer treated “similarly situated” employees outside her
        class more favorably. Id. at 1220-21.
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        22-11275               Opinion of the Court                         5

                To prove that an employer treated a similarly situated indi-
        vidual outside of an employee’s protected class more favorably, the
        employee must show that she and a comparator were “similarly
        situated in all material respects.” Lewis I, 918 F.3d at 1229. Gener-
        ally, a “similarly situated” comparator will have “engaged in the
        same basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff,” “been subject
        to the same employment policy,” and “will share the plaintiff’s em-
        ployment or disciplinary history.” Id. at 1227-28. If the plaintiff
        succeeds in making out a prima facie case of discrimination, “the
        burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondis-
        criminatory reason for its actions.” Id. at 1221.
                If the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must
        “demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was merely a
        pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. To show pretext, a plain-
        tiff must show both that the proffered reason was false, and that
        discrimination was the true reason. Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club,
        Inc., 4 F.4th 1149, 1163 (11th Cir. 2021). “The inquiry into pretext
        centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs and .
        . . not on reality as it exists outside of the decision-maker’s head.”
        Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th
        Cir. 2010).
               The record supports the district court’s finding that Hamp-
        ton did not identify a similarly situated comparator whom the de-
        fendants treated more favorably than her. Hampton repeatedly
        makes blanket allegations that non-African American employees
        often misused the A-Code and were not terminated from their
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        6                      Opinion of the Court               22-11275

        employment; however, she fails to specifically identify any em-
        ployee, other than Shante Collins, a clinical manager (“Collins”)
        and Hampton herself, who misused the A-Code, let alone an em-
        ployee who was “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis,
        918 F.3d at 1218.
                As the district court found, Collins is not an appropriate
        comparator because Collins is not outside of Hampton’s protected
        class; Collins is also an African American female. Moreover, Col-
        lins is not an appropriate comparator because Collins did not en-
        gage in the same misconduct as Hampton. Dickerson testified that
        Collins was not terminated for improperly using the A-Code be-
        cause Dickerson counseled her about it, and she ceased using the
        A-Code. On the contrary, after Dickerson counseled Hampton on
        her improper use of the A-Code, Hampton proceeded to use the
        code two more times.
                Hampton repeatedly claimed that Dickerson treated her dif-
        ferently than non-African American and Caucasian colleagues, but
        she did not provide evidence of who Dickerson allegedly treated
        differently, and how that different treatment was related to Hamp-
        ton’s race. Hampton testified that she felt Dickerson singled her
        out for harassment, but this mere allegation does not indicate that
        Dickerson treated her differently because of her race. As the dis-
        trict court correctly concluded, without identifying an appropriate
        comparator, Hampton fails to satisfy the fourth element of a prima
        facie case of discrimination.
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        22-11275                Opinion of the Court                          7

                Further, even if Hampton established a prima facie case, she
        cannot show that the defendants’ proffered reason for terminating
        her, inappropriate A-code use, was pretextual. Dickerson termi-
        nated Hampton’s employment after Hampton misused the A-
        Code, Dickerson counseled Hampton on the appropriate use of the
        A-Code, and Hampton proceeded to use the A-Code two addi-
        tional times. Dickerson thus terminated Hampton’s employment
        for falsifying payroll records, which is a critical offense violation
        under the company’s policy. Because we conclude that Amedisys
        and Dickerson have adequately explained their rationale for termi-
        nating Hampton, and Hampton has not presented evidence that
        their reasons are merely pretexts for discrimination, we affirm the
        district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on
        Hampton’s claim of racial discrimination.
                                          III.
               Under Title VII, an employer may not retaliate against an
        employee because she has opposed any practice made unlawful un-
        der that law, or because she has made a charge or participated in a
        proceeding thereunder. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Employment-re-
        lated retaliation claims are also cognizable under § 1981. CBOCS
        West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 452, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1958
        (2008).
               A retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence is also
        analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting frame-
        work. Ring, 4 F.4th at 1163. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff
        must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. To establish
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-11275

        a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff may show that: (1) she
        engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an ad-
        verse action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the
        protected expression. Id.; see also Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
        Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (“[A]
        plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found
        the challenged action materially adverse.”).
               For prima facie purposes, the causation requirement has
        been construed broadly such that “a plaintiff merely has to prove
        that the protected activity and the negative employment action are
        not completely unrelated.” Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261
        F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). How-
        ever, at a minimum, an employee must show that “the deci-
        sionmaker actually knew about the employee’s protected expres-
        sion.” Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1053
        (11th Cir. 2020). An employer’s awareness “can be established
        through circumstantial evidence—but not by unsupported infer-
        ence.” Id. Particularly, evidence that an individual “could have
        told” a decision maker about an employee’s protected activity con-
        stitutes “pure speculation,” and does not defeat summary judg-
        ment when the decision maker denies knowledge of the em-
        ployee’s activity. Id. at 1054.
               The record demonstrates that the district court did not err
        in granting summary judgment to Amedisys and Dickerson on
        Hampton’s claim of retaliation. Hampton did not establish a prima
        facie case of retaliation because she did not show that Dickerson
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        22-11275               Opinion of the Court                       9

        knew of any complaint of racial discrimination before Dickerson
        terminated Hampton’s employment. Hampton’s testimony does
        not indicate she complained to the Human Resources Representa-
        tive, Beau Bergeron, about racially motivated conduct by Dicker-
        son; Hampton does not mention race at all in her recollection of
        her phone call with Bergeron. Hampton further attested that on
        July 10, 2019, she had a phone conversation with Jessica Fernald,
        another Human Resources Representative, during which she com-
        plained about Dickerson’s racial discrimination and harassment.
        After the conversation, Hampton stated that she sent Fernald an
        email providing examples of the racial discrimination and harass-
        ment from Dickerson that she relayed during the phone conversa-
        tion. However, the record indicates that Hampton’s email does
        not mention racially motivated conduct by Dickerson. Rather, the
        email included numerous incidents and grievances she had with
        Dickerson, yet it failed to mention even once how Hampton’s race
        influenced the issues she had with Dickerson.
               Further, as discussed above, Hampton did not show that the
        defendants’ proffered reason for terminating her was pretextual.
        Hampton offers no evidence that Dickerson knew of Hampton’s
        complaints on June 26, 2019, or July 10, 2019, prior to her termina-
        tion. Hampton seems to assume that Dickerson knew about the
        complaints based on the temporal proximity between Hampton’s
        July 10 complaint, and Dickerson’s contact with Fernald on July 11
        seeking to terminate Hampton’s employment. However, in her
        declaration, Dickerson attested that she was not aware that
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-11275

        Hampton had lodged a complaint of racial discrimination and har-
        assment against her.
               Hampton’s assumption that Dickerson knew about her June
        26, 2019, and July 10, 2019, complaints is not supported by the rec-
        ord. The evidence demonstrates that Dickerson warned Hampton
        on two occasions not to use the A-Code for patient visits made dur-
        ing regular business hours. However, Hampton continued to use
        the A-Code two additional times despite Dickerson’s warnings to
        her that she was misusing the payroll code. Dickerson then con-
        tacted Human Resources about Hampton’s termination. Hamp-
        ton offers no evidence that “the reason proffered was not the real
        basis for the decision, but a pretext for discrimination.” Richardson
        v. Leeds Police Dep’t, 71 F.3d 801, 806 (11th Cir. 1995). Thus, we
        affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the de-
        fendants on Hampton’s retaliation claim.
                                        IV.
               We have held that the McDonnell Douglas framework is not
        the only way to defeat a summary judgment motion in the Title
        VII discrimination context. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,
        644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff can also survive
        summary judgment if she presents “a convincing mosaic of circum-
        stantial evidence” that raises a reasonable inference that her em-
        ployer intentionally discriminated against her. Id. A plaintiff may
        show a “convincing mosaic” by presenting evidence that demon-
        strates (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, and “other
        bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent
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        22-11275               Opinion of the Court                      11

        might be drawn,” (2) “systematically better treatment of similarly
        situated employees,” and (3) “that the employer’s justification is
        pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 934 F.3d 1169, 1185
        (11th Cir. 2019) (“Lewis II”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
               We have not held, in a published opinion, that the “convinc-
        ing mosaic” theory is applicable in Title VII retaliation cases. In
        Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir.
        2021), we assumed without deciding that a “convincing mosaic”
        theory could be used to establish a retaliation claim, but concluded
        that the plaintiff had not shown a “convincing mosaic” for the same
        reasons that his retaliation claim failed under the McDonnell Doug-
        las framework. Id. at 1273 n.2.
                Likewise, even assuming that the “convincing mosaic” the-
        ory is applicable in the retaliation context, we conclude that the
        district court properly found that Hampton did not present a con-
        vincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence to support her retalia-
        tion claim. As stated earlier, the record belies Hampton’s claim
        that Dickerson retaliated against her because there is no evidence
        that Dickerson knew Hampton had complained about Dickerson’s
        alleged discriminatory animus. Thus, Hampton cannot demon-
        strate a convincing mosaic to support her retaliation claim under
        either theory. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment to the defendants with respect to Hampton’s
        convincing mosaic arguments.
                                        V.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-11275

                “[A]n appellant abandons a claim when [s]he either makes
        only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner
        without supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate
        Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). To adequately
        brief a claim, an appellant must “plainly and prominently” raise it,
        “for instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument to
        those claims.” Id. Additionally, “[w]hen an appellant fails to chal-
        lenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district
        court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any
        challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to
        be affirmed.” Id. at 680.
               To support an intentional infliction of emotional distress
        claim under Georgia law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the conduct
        was intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct was extreme and out-
        rageous, (3) there was a causal connection between the wrongful
        conduct and the emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress
        was severe. Plantation at Bay Creek Homeowners Ass’n v. Glasier,
        825 S.E.2d 542, 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
               We conclude that Hampton has abandoned on appeal her
        intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because she does
        not assert that there was a causal connection between wrongful
        conduct and severe emotional distress. The record provides no ev-
        idence to show that the defendants’ conduct was intentional or
        reckless, or extreme and outrageous. Thus, we affirm the district
        court’s judgment as to this claim.
                                        VI.
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        22-11275               Opinion of the Court                        13

               Under Georgia law, to support a claim of negligent reten-
        tion, “a claimant must show that the employer knew or should
        have known of the employee’s propensity to engage in the conduct
        which caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Herrin Bus. Prods., Inc v. Er-
        gle, 563 S.E.2d 442, 446 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). A negligent retention
        claim is “necessarily derivative and can only survive summary
        judgment to the extent that the underlying substantive claims sur-
        vive the same.” Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Mosley, 634
        S.E.2d 466, 489 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
               We conclude that the district court properly granted sum-
        mary judgment to the defendants on each of Hampton’s underly-
        ing claims; thus, her derivative negligent retention claim also fails.
        See id. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting sum-
        mary judgment to the defendants as to this claim, and we affirm its
        judgment.
               Based on the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district
        court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Hamp-
        ton’s racial discrimination claim, retaliation claim, and state law
        claims.
              AFFIRMED.