Court Opinion

ID: 9942278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 18:12:35.437775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:53.490722
License: Public Domain

J-S27043-22

                                   2024 PA Super 29

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  HOZAY ANGELO ROYAL                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2429 EDA 2021

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 19, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004389-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.:                              FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2024

       Hozay Angelo Royal (“Royal”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

following his jury convictions for retail theft.1 We affirm in part, vacate the

order of restitution, and remand for a limited resentencing.

       The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this

case, including Royal’s jury trial, as follows:

       the Commonwealth first presented the testimony of Bernard
       Bulos, a Central Investigator for Macy’s Department Store [(“the
       store”)] who investigates theft for [the store] across the entire
       country. He stated [] one of his investigative tools is a system
       called TrueVue that is used mainly for inventory control purposes
       so the store can keep track of what items leave the store that
       aren’t paid for. It also is a system . . . used for Asset Protection,
       i.e., to identify individuals that leave the store with merchandise
       that isn’t properly paid for both from an employee standpoint as
       well as a customer standpoint. Mr. Bulos explained . . . that every
       time the system reads a tag that walks out of the store, it matches
       it to the sales database to see if it was sold or not. A report is
       received the following morning. He further explained . . . the
       merchandise has a tag, a UPC tag, and within that UPC tag there
____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3929(a).
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     is also a unique identifier, an EPC tag,2 which is embedded in RFID,
     a radio frequency identification.

          _____________________
          2An EPC is an identification that is specific to just that

          particular item. There is a different EPC for every UPC
          tag.    [See Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/21, at 5
          (transcript citations omitted).]

           The report that is generated by TrueVue is available the
     following day. The report provides the date, the time, and the
     EPC for each item. It also provides the door in the store the item
     went out of. It further provides a picture, a link, to the actual
     time-stamped video of who is walking out with the item.

                                  *****

            Mr. Bulos testified that he has been using TrueVue since
     2016, and . . . has used it in thousands of investigations for
     identification purposes. He never encountered any problems with
     the system. He explained that to assess its accuracy he always
     double checks it. He stated, “[s]o when we get that information,
     we can then take the UPC and go to our in-house records and run
     it again ourselves to make sure that it was not sold against our
     own sales records. So[,] we’ll always do that.” He has never
     found any inconsistencies in doing this. Further, the witness
     explained that he compares what is in the video to the information
     provided for by TrueVue. Because TrueVue provides the product
     image, that image will look identical to what’s in the video if it’s
     visible in someone’s hand.

           The Commonwealth then presented Mr. Bulos with Exhibit
     “C-1,” which he testified to as a picture taken on February 19,
     2019, by TrueVue, of [Royal] walking out of the store with a
     comforter in his hand in plain view. The picture also contained
     the manufacturer of the product, PB [C]omforters, and the specific
     brand, Charter Club. It also contained the UPC and the EPC
     numbers and the date and time the merchandise left the store,
     and the value of that item. The Commonwealth presented Mr.
     Bulos with additional exhibits “C-2,” “C-3,” “C-4,” “C-5,” which
     depicted in pictures [Royal] leaving the store with various bedding
     and cookware merchandise on the dates February 22, 2019,

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       February 26, 2019, February 28, 2019, and March 2, 2019,
       respectively.

              In response to these TrueVue reports, Mr. Bulos coordinated
       a “blitz” of the [store] on March 5, 2019. In this “blitz,” the
       witness called his peers in the neighboring area to meet up at [the
       store] to watch the mall doors and specifically, the southeast
       parking doors, and wait and see if [Royal] would come in that day.
       [Royal] did in fact come in that day. Mr. Bulos observed [Royal]
       exit the store with a Le Creuset pot in his arms. Having already
       confirmed [Royal] had not paid for that item, when [Royal] went
       out of the second set of doors Mr. Bulos stopped him and identified
       himself and told [Royal] he was being stopped for shoplifting.
       [Royal] tried to explain that he was just taking the item out of the
       store to show to his wife in the parking lot. No one identified as
       his wife ever appeared. At this point police were called.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/21, at 5-8 (transcript citations omitted, punctuation

corrected).

       The jury convicted Royal of six counts of retail theft. After trial but prior

to sentencing, Royal stated he wished to waive the right to counsel and

proceed pro se. The court conducted a Grazier2 hearing and permitted Royal

to proceed pro se with stand-by counsel. See N.T., 10/20/20, at 7.

       At Royal’s sentencing for these offenses and another crime,3 he

challenged the weight of the evidence in this case and asserted he could not

be sentenced for the retail thefts as felonies because the criminal information

graded his crimes as misdemeanors. See N.T., 7/19/21, at 26-32. The trial

____________________________________________

2 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

3 See CP-46-CR-5423-18, which was before this Court at J-S27042-22 (filed

12/12/23).

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court denied Royal’s assertions and imposed an aggregate sentence for this

docket of three to fourteen years of imprisonment.4

       Royal filed a timely post-sentence motion, a later supplement, and an

untimely notice of appeal, which the trial court later denied.5 Both Royal and

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Royal presents the following issues for our review:

       [1]    Request to remand to the lower court for an evidentiary
              hearing based on after-discovered evidence pursuant to
              Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(C).

       [2]     Did the trial court err in not addressing [Royal’s] claims of
              ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his post-sentence
              motion when the trial court granted [Royal] to proceed [sic]
              pro se after the convictions where the trial court was
              required to determine if an evidentiary hearing was required
              or if the claims could be resolved on the existing record?

       [3]    Did the sentencing court err as a matter of law when it
              imposed illegal sentences when the Commonwealth failed to
              aver any prior retail theft convictions in the Bill of
              Information, contrary to precedent of this Court and the
              Supreme Court of Pennsylvania?

       [4]    Was the sentencing court without jurisdiction to impose a
              restitution order when it did not determine an amount of
              restitution at the time of sentencing?

Royal’s Brief at 4 (issues reordered; capitalization standardized).6

____________________________________________

4 The sentence in the instant matter is to be served consecutively to that in

CP-46-CR-5423-18.

5 We will regard this appeal as having been timely filed after the entry of an

order denying post-trial motions. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5).

6 For ease of disposition, we have reordered the issues in Royal’s Brief.

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     Royal’s first issue requests a remand for an evidentiary hearing based

on a claim of after-discovered evidence. A claim of after-discovered evidence

must satisfy a four-prong test; it must show:

     (1) the evidence could not have been obtained before the
     conclusion of the trial by reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is
     not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence will not
     be used solely for purposes of impeachment; and (4) the evidence
     is of such a nature and character that a different outcome is likely.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 650 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted).     The   evidence    must    be    “producible   and    admissible.”

Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818, 825 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

Further, “[t]he test is conjunctive; the appellant must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that each of these factors has been met in

order for a new trial to be warranted.” Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55

A.3d 532, 537 (Pa. Super. 2012) (brackets omitted).

     The alleged after-discovered evidence in this case is a variety of

technical information concerning the operation of the TrueVue software. See

Royal’s Brief at 12-20. Royal contends this information showed the software

and/or related hardware was not operating correctly or was defective and,

therefore, the Commonwealth did not prove the items in question were stolen.

See id. Royal argues he should receive a new trial based on this information

which he claims he obtained by researching the manufacturer’s website and

having conversations with some of the manufacturer’s employees. See id. at

17-20. The Commonwealth counters that

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      [t]he alleged after-discovered evidence could have been
      discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to trial.
      [Royal] uncovered the alleged after-discovered evidence by
      talking to the company who makes TrueVue systems. Meaning,
      when he decided to look for information related to the system, he
      easily found it, and it could have been discovered by the exercise
      of reasonable diligence prior to trial.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8. We agree.

      In the context of after-discovered evidence claims, this Court has

defined the “reasonable diligence” duty of a defendant in the following

manner:

      To obtain a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, the
      petitioner must explain why he could not have produced the
      evidence in question at or before trial by the exercise of
      reasonable diligence. A defendant may unearth information that
      the party with the burden of proof is not required to uncover, so
      long as such diligence in investigation does not exceed what is
      reasonably expected. Thus, a defendant has a duty to bring forth
      any relevant evidence in his behalf. A defendant cannot claim he
      has discovered new evidence simply because he had not been
      expressly told of that evidence. Likewise, a defendant who fails
      to question or investigate an obvious, available source of
      information, cannot later claim evidence from that source
      constitutes newly discovered evidence.

Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 363–64 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(internal citations omitted).

      Here, the purported evidence was not unavailable at the time of trial.

Royal knew the Commonwealth would be presenting testimony regarding the

TrueVue system. There was nothing preventing the defense from doing what

Royal did after trial, researching the product on the company’s public website

and contacting the company for information.

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      Royal attempts to evade the after-discovered evidence standard by

claiming the Commonwealth withheld this technical information in violation of

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See Royal’s Brief at 13-14.

      However, to prove a Brady violation, an appellant must show the

evidence was suppressed or withheld by the Commonwealth.                   See

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 276 (Pa. 2011). Further, there is

no Brady violation “when the appellant knew or, with reasonable diligence,

could have uncovered the evidence in question, or when the evidence was

available to the defense from non-governmental sources.”          Id. (citations

omitted). As noted above, the evidence in question was available via a public

website and from contacting the manufacturer. Royal could have obtained it

at any time. Because Royal could have readily obtained this evidence from

non-governmental sources, there is no Brady violation. See id. Moreover,

because Royal has not shown he exercised due diligence in attempting to

discover this information, he has not met the requirements for a new trial

based on after-discovered evidence.          See Padillas, 997 A.2d at 363–64.

Royal’s first issue does not merit relief.

      Royal next contends trial counsel was ineffective. See Royal’s Brief at

32-45. This claim is premature.

      Our Supreme Court recently reiterated the well-established principle

that claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are to be raised in collateral

proceedings and may not be raised on direct appeal. See Commonwealth

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v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 391 (Pa. 2021) (stating, “claims of trial counsel's

ineffectiveness ... are to be presented in a [petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546]”); see also

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013) (stating, “claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to PCRA review”); 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (setting forth ineffective assistance of counsel as

grounds for collateral relief if pleaded and proven by a preponderance of the

evidence). Therefore, Royal’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

are premature, and we dismiss them without prejudice to his right to raise

them in a collateral proceeding.7

       In his third claim, Royal argues the trial court erred in sentencing him

for retail theft as a third-degree felony because the criminal information did

not detail his prior convictions for retail theft. See Royal’s Brief at 21; see

also Information, 10/1/18, at 1-2 (unnumbered).           Royal maintains the

____________________________________________

7 Royal’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Hudson, 820 A.2d 720 (Pa. Super.

2003), to support the resolution of an ineffective assistance claim on direct
appeal is misplaced. See Royal’s Brief at 32-34. In Hudson, the appellant
had raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a post-sentence motion
and the trial court disposed of them on the merits after holding an
evidentiary hearing. See Hudson, 820 A.2d at 725-26. Because of this
procedure, we found an exception to the general rule and addressed the
merits of the appellant’s ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal. See
id. Here, the trial court properly declined to address the merits of Royal’s
premature claims. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/21, at 19. Thus, Hudson
does not support Royal’s contention his ineffective assistance of counsel claims
should be addressed on direct appeal.

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Commonwealth did not provide him with adequate notice of the sentence he

faced. See id. at 21-25.

      18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3929 provides as follows, in pertinent part, with respect

to the grading of retail theft offenses:

      (1) Retail theft constitutes a:

                                           ***

          (iv) Felony of the third degree when the offense is a third or
          subsequent offense, regardless of the value of the
          merchandise.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3929(b)(1)(iv).

      This Court has previously held the information does not need to specify

the prior retail thefts for a retail theft to be graded as a third-degree felony.

In Commonwealth v. Orrs, 640 A.2d 911 (Pa. Super. 1994), this Court

stated:

      [t]he failure to specify in the information the crimes previously
      committed, establishing the basis for charging a felony three, does
      not affect the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case and convict
      as a felony, third degree. Prior offenses need not be proven at
      the preliminary hearing or at trial [to] establish the appropriate
      grading of such offense for which the accused may be tried. The
      accused need only be placed on notice that the Commonwealth
      will seek a third[-]degree felony sentence in the event of
      conviction.

Orrs, 640 A.2d at 912-13 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, this

Court held where the criminal complaint and the information cited the correct

statute and grading, including the notation “F3” it was sufficient to put the

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defendant on notice the Commonwealth was charging him with a felony. See

id. We concluded:

       [h]ence, the requisite notice and averment of a third[-]degree
       felony having been contained in the information and complaint,
       jurisdiction to hear the matter . . . clearly was present. The prior
       offenses in grading retail theft do not constitute substantive
       elements of the offense (felony third degree, Retail Theft); as
       such, evidence only may be produced at sentencing for purposes
       of grading the crime under subsection (b), Grading.

Id. at 913 (emphasis eliminated).

       In the instant matter, the criminal complaint, and the bill of information

both informed Royal the charged offense was an F3. See Criminal Complaint,

3/25/18, at 3; Information, 10/1/18, at 1-2 (unnumbered). Further, Royal

acknowledged in a pretrial motion the Commonwealth graded the offense as

a felony. See, e.g., Motion to Modify Pretrial Bail, 1/6/20, at 1. Thus, Royal

received the required notice. See Orrs, 640 A.2d at 912-13. Royal’s third

issue fails.8

       In his final issue, Royal challenges the legality of the imposition of

restitution because the trial court failed to comply with the dictates of 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 1106. See Royal’s Brief at 46-48. Royal also claims the amount

of restitution imposed by the trial court is incorrect. See id. at 48.

____________________________________________

8 We are not persuaded by Royal’s attempt to distinguish Orrs.         See Royal’s
Brief at 17-25. The cases he cites either predate Orrs, do not concern the
retail theft statute, are legally and factually distinguishable, or are not binding
precedent. See id. Orrs is binding precedent in this matter. See Orrs, 640
A.2d at 912-13.

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      A challenge to the authority of the trial court to impose an order of

restitution is a challenge to the legality of sentence; and a challenge that the

amount of restitution is speculative or incorrect is a challenge to the

discretionary aspects of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54

A.3d 86, 92 (Pa. Super. 2012). Royal raises his challenges to the award of

restitution for the first time on appeal, and, therefore, the trial court did not

address the issue in its opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/21, at 16-20.

      As noted, a challenge to the amount of a restitution award based on the

trial court’s consideration of the Commonwealth’s evidence regarding loss is a

challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence, not the legality of

sentence. See Commonwealth v . Weir, 239 A.3d 25, 38 (Pa. 2020). Royal

waived this claim because he raised it for the first time on appeal.           See

Commonwealth v. Sulpizio, 281 A.3d 352, 359 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding

challenge to the amount of restitution pertains to the discretionary aspects of

sentence and is waived when not raised in the trial court).

      Royal also raises his challenge to the trial court’s alleged failure to

comply with 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106 for the first time on appeal. This is a non-

waivable challenge to the legality of Royal’s sentence over which our scope of

review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo.                      See

Commonwealth        v.   Laur,   295    A.3d    241,   243   (Pa.   Super.   2023).

Pennsylvania law provides for mandatory restitution where “property of a

victim has been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its

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value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1106(a). The statute continues:

      [a]t the time of sentencing the court shall specify the amount and
      method of restitution. In determining the amount and method of
      restitution, the court:

         (i) Shall consider the extent of injury suffered by the victim,
         the victim’s request for restitution as presented to the
         district attorney in accordance with paragraph (4) and such
         other matters as it deems appropriate.

         (ii) May order restitution in a lump sum, by monthly
         installments or according to such other schedule as it deems
         just.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(2)(i-ii).

      Our Supreme Court has explained, “restitution must properly be

included in a sentence. . . . [T]he Superior Court held these requirements

provide the defendant with certainty as to his sentence, and at the same time

allow for subsequent modification . . . if necessary.”     Commonwealth v.

Dietrich, 970 A.2d 1131, 1133-34 (Pa. 2009) (citations and brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted). Failure to comply with Section 1106(c)(2)

results in an illegal sentence. See Commonwealth v. Mariani, 869 A.2d

484, 485–86 (Pa. Super. 2005) (invalidating as illegal trial court’s order at the

sentencing hearing which failed to specify both the amount and method of

restitution and postponed determining same until after sentencing hearing).

      Here, at sentencing, the Commonwealth informed the court Royal owed

restitution in the amount of $4,568.95. N.T., 7/19/21, at 41. Royal offered

no objection and the Court immediately imposed restitution in that amount.

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See id. at 45. Thus, Royal’s claim the trial court did not specify the amount

at sentencing as required by Section 1106(c)(2) is belied by the record.

However, the trial court did not specify the method of restitution at the

sentencing hearing, instead including it in the sentencing order. See N.T.,

7/19/21, at 41-45; Sentencing Order, 7/19/21 at 1 (unnumbered). While we

cannot find any published opinion addressing this method of specification, in

an unpublished memorandum,9 this Court stated it was not sufficient to

include the method of payment in a sentencing order, rather it must be stated

at the time of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Galvin, 446 WDA 2019

(Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum at 8-9 n.5) (remanding for

resentencing because including the method of payment of restitution in the

sentencing order rather than stating it at the time of sentencing did not comply

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(2)). While Galvin is not binding precedent, it is of

persuasive value.      Accordingly, we are constrained to find the trial court’s

failure to specify the method of payment at the sentencing hearing rendered

that portion of Royal’s sentence illegal. Therefore, we vacate the portion of

Royal’s judgment of sentence that ordered restitution. See Commonwealth

v. Muhammed, 219 A.3d 1207, 1212-13 (Pa. Super. 2019).

____________________________________________

9 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential memoranda decision of

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).

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      For the reasons discussed above, we affirm in part but vacate the portion

of Royal’s judgment of sentence that imposed restitution.      We remand for

resentencing limited to the reimposition of $4,568.95 in restitution and an on-

the-record specification of the method of payment.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case

remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 2/20/2024

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