Court Opinion

ID: 9728046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:56:46.274589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:45.430099
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the decision to affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in the case of Mary Eloise Cherry, but write separately to express the view that failure of *648counsel timely to object to the failure of the trial judge to afford an opportunity for argument before verdict should operate as a waiver of that right and a bar to the defendant’s right to raise that issue in any subsequent proceeding.
I dissent from the Court’s decision to reverse the conviction of Ronald Jackson.
I

The Cherry Case

The majority’s holding that the failure of Cherry’s attorney to interpose a timely objection results only in the loss of the right to raise the issue on direct appeal and is not a waiver of the right to argument, while consistent with the Court’s holding in Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 386 A.2d 336 (1978), does not go far enough.
I would hold that the failure of a defendant represented by counsel1 to interpose a timely objection constitutes a waiver of the right and a bar to raising the issue thereafter in direct or collateral attack upon the judgment, except upon a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The right to have counsel present argument before verdict, while an important right of constitutional origin, may be waived by inaction. Judge Eldridge put it well when, in speaking for the dissenting judges in Covington, supra, 282 Md. at 540, 386 A.2d 336, he said:
I do not agree with the defendant’s contention that the right to closing argument before the rendition of the verdict is of such a character that there can be a waiver only where the record affirmatively shows a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of the right. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). The Supreme Court in Herring v. New York, supra, likened the right to have counsel make closing argument to other aspects of the right to the assistance of counsel, such as the right to have counsel elicit the defendant’s *649sworn testimony and the right of counsel to decide when during the course of the defense to have the accused take the stand, 422 U.S. at 857-858 [95 S.Ct. at 2552-2553], These rights clearly fall within the category of tactical decisions by counsel. As the Supreme Court said in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512, 96 S.Ct. 1691 [1697], 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), regarding the constitutional right of a criminal defendant not to be tried in prison clothes:
“Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial rests with the accused and his attorney.”
Like the right not to be tried in prison garb, the right to make closing argument falls within the category of a strategic matter resting with the accused and his attorney. Normally, when there is no assertion of a right of this character, an appellate court should assume that a strategic decision was made to waive the exercise of the right.
This Court has upheld waiver of other constitutional rights by inaction. In State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 570, 375 A.2d 228 (1977), the Court said:
The poll of the jury, the very procedure by which unanimity is confirmed, is an “absolute right” of “constitutional dimension,” Ross v. State, 24 Md.App. 246, 253, 330 A.2d 507 (1975), rev’d on other grounds, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976), which can be waived by the simple failure to exercise it. Similarly, a mere failure to object to the admission of illegally seized evidence amounts to a waiver of that valuable right. Jenkins v. State, 232 Md. 529, 532-33, 194 A.2d 618 (1963); Porter v. State, 230 Md. 535, 536-37, 187 A.2d 870 (1963).
Attorneys in this State are well aware of the requirements of our civil and criminal rules for contemporaneous objection to perceived errors. See Maryland Rules 2-517 and 4-322. It would therefore impose no unusual or unexpected burden upon counsel to require the interposition of a *650reasonably prompt objection upon the failure of a trial judge to afford an opportunity for argument. In Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879 (1962), we have an example of the noting of a timely objection, and consequent preservation of the right.
There seems to be present in the reasoning in this Court’s previous cases the notion that it is too late to object after the verdict has been rendered, and that there is therefore no valid reason for requiring objection to be made within a reasonable time after the error. It is true, as the Court pointed out in Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 423, 463 A.2d 808 (1983), that the error cannot be cured by the unilateral action of the trial judge in striking the verdict and allowing argument before again making a finding. But it does not follow that there is no basis for the existence of a rule requiring a seasonable objection. In fact, such a rule has considerable utility. When the failure to afford an opportunity for argument has resulted from an oversight, and the error is promptly brought to the attention of the trial judge, several opportunities exist for prompt resolution of the problem. First, the trial judge may represent to the defendant his belief that he can effectively strike from his mind the verdict just entered and give full and fair consideration to the argument of counsel before reaching a new verdict, and the defendant may very well prefer to proceed on that basis. Of course, as the Court pointed out in Spence, the defendant has an absolute right to insist upon the granting of a mistrial, and he cannot be required to proceed. But where the record demonstrates the defendant understands his right to a mistrial, and voluntarily elects to proceed to judgment with that trial judge, he certainly should have the option to do so.2 In the absence of a timely objection, this opportunity for a prompt disposition of the case is lost.
Additionally, in those cases in which a mistrial must be declared because the defendant does not elect to proceed, it *651will often be possible to promptly begin the trial anew before another judge. Doing so would avoid the expense and delay of a post conviction hearing, and in many cases would avoid substantial inconvenience to the witnesses.
Finally, the utilization of the waiver rule would remove the option now afforded defense counsel to maintain silence until after the disposition hearing, and complain when dissatisfied with the sentence.
Any reasonably effective trial counsel knows of the absolute right to present argument before verdict, and will certainly be immediately aware of the deprivation of that right when it occurs. When a defendant’s attorney desires the opportunity to argue, but is deprived of it, he will have the opportunity to say so. Even though the objection is lodged after the error has occurred, it will be timely if it is promptly interposed. If the attorney is not aware of the right to present argument, that fact may be addressed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Because it is reasonable to require a defense attorney to promptly complain if denied the right of argument, and because the utilization of the waiver rule serves several legitimate interests and furthers the goal of prompt disposition of criminal cases, I would announce the rule through the vehicle of this case, limiting it to prospective application.
II

The Jackson Case

At the conclusion of the State’s case defense counsel made a motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts, and *652argued that the State’s case was factually and legally insufficient. Judge Caplan denied the motion, and the defense rested without producing any evidence. Thereupon, the following occurred:
The Court: The test is now beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty as to all four charges.
Any argument?
[Defense Counsel]: Yes.
[Prosecutor]: Your honor, I believe the State has met its burden as to the kidnapping and the assault. He has identified first of all the individual who pointed the shotgun and bailed out of the rear seat of the cab. The officer described the man with the brown coat who fired the blast and was in the back seat from where the blast came. The officers testified that they were placed in fear. Certainly it was danger, fired directly at the officers. Your honor, whether or not the blast did actual damage to the officers is immaterial. Certainly there was an assault here, and they were placed in fear, backed off for their own protection, from any further attacks. And certainly there was an intent to kill.
As to the kidnapping, you heard that Mr. Gibson was placed in the trunk and carried away. Fortunately the officers were able to come to his aid and release him.
I believe, your honor, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the robberies, the kidnapping and assault with intent to murder as to both officers.
The Court: The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that there was a robbery of the victim in this case, Mr. Gibson, that robbery was at gun point, and there was an exchange of United States currency from the victim, Mr. Gibson, to the assailants in this case, more particularly to the defendant. So the Court finds that robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon has been sustained.'
As to kidnapping, 105, the Court believes that the State has met its burden as to kidnapping in this case.
*653As to assault with intent, there was a shotgun blast from the cab in the direction of the police car. Both officers testified that they were in fear at that time. There was a shotgun found in the cab and the Court finds that the defendant was the one who pointed that weapon at the officers.
Although there was no direct testimony that the weapon was fired by the defendant, there is evidence that the gun was in the possession of the defendant, and the Court believes that the defendant was the person who fired that weapon, and the Court believes it was with the intent to do bodily harm, and to strike a vital organ of the police officers.
So I deny the motion as to five, six and seven, and find that the State has made out its burden.
Is the defendant ready for sentencing?
[Defense Counsel]: Your honor, we need a pre-sentence investigation, especially in light of this situation, that has not relieved itself.
The Court: Wasn’t there a report done?
[Defense Counsel]: Only after I stomped my feet and pleaded with Judge Davis, and there is no background at all in it.
The Court: We will order a presentence report and schedule this for disposition the last week in August.
[There follows a discussion concerning the availability of each attorney, and the scheduling of the case for a disposition hearing.]
We have no way of knowing from the printed transcript how much time elapsed between the conclusion of argument by the prosecutor and commencement of the trial judge’s findings. We cannot know whether by non-verbal communication of any kind defense counsel indicated to the judge that having heard the prosecutor’s argument, he had nothing to add to the argument he had just advanced in support of a judgment of acquittal. We can determine, however, that there was ample opportunity for defense counsel to *654have interposed an objection, and that he did not do so. I find it difficult to believe that competent counsel, intent upon arguing the case as soon as the prosecutor concluded, would not have interposed an objection as soon as the judge began to state his findings. In any event, defense counsel had every opportunity to object on any of the several occasions he addressed the court immediately thereafter. He did not do so, nor did he make any mention of the alleged error at the sentencing hearing that occurred two months later.
An earlier expression of an intent to present argument is no substitute for promptly bringing to the attention of the court a claimed failure to permit argument. I would affirm the conviction.

. Because the defendants in each of these cases were represented by counsel, I address only that situation.

. I do not find it at all improbable that a defendant and his attorney would be sufficiently convinced of the integrity and objectivity of a *651trial judge to elect to proceed following an opportunity for argument. Nor do I believe that the trial judges of this State would experience any significant difficulty in fulfilling such expectations. The holding of Spence, while fulfilling important requirements relating to the perception of fairness, does not suggest that a defendant could not voluntarily elect to proceed with the trial. Additionally, a defendant and his counsel may have a strong desire to have the case remain with the particular judge for purposes of disposition, and this may contribute to a decision by the defendant to proceed.