Court Opinion

ID: 9566193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:34:53.810792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:28:29.273312
License: Public Domain

Judge GREENE
dissenting.
I disagree with the conclusions of the majority that it was not plain error “to require the defense to file notice of intent to rely upon self-defense . . . [and] for the trial judge to inform the jury prior to voir dire of the counsel’s intent to rely upon self-defense.”
Traditionally, the criminal law, unlike the practice in civil law, “has not required the defendant to specifically plead his defense. A plea of not guilty ordinarily brings into issue all possible defenses to the substantive charge.” 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.4, at 511 (1984); see State v. Todd, 264 N.C. 524, 530, 142 S.E.2d 154, 159 (1965) (plea of not guilty entitles defendant to rely on more than one defense, including self-defense). By statute, North Carolina has created an exception to this general rule by requiring a defendant who intends to raise the defense of insanity to “file a notice of his intention to rely on the defense of insanity.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-959(a) (1988). Any further restriction on the defendant’s right to assert any defense is a matter which should be reserved for the General Assembly as it is not within the province of this court to carve out such exceptions. Surely the question of whether to require a defendant to give pre-trial notice of his intention to rely on self-defense should not, as the majority suggest, be left to the discretion of the trial judge.
The State does not argue that either the state or federal constitution requires that such notice be given, but instead suggests that “disclosure of an affirmative defense prior to trial is entirely proper.” The determination of whether pre-trial notice of self-defense is proper presents not only complex questions of federal and state constitutional law, see Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973) (notice of alibi statute invalidated as violating federal due process clause); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (notice of alibi procedure found consistent with constitutional provisions prohibiting self-incrimination); Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1970) (notice of alibi order violated state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination notwithstanding that U.S. *217Supreme Court had determined that it did not violate federal constitution), but also presents basic questions of the desirability of creating a notice of self-defense procedure. The desirability of such a procedure is clearly within the, province of the General Assembly. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-959, Official Commentary (General Assembly specifically rejected requirement that defendant give pre-trial notice of alibi defense).
Furthermore, I believe the error of requiring the defendant to give a pre-trial notice of his intention to use self-defense became more egregious when the trial court revealed this information to the jury. Because this error, in my opinion, was fundamental and seriously affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial, I conclude the error to have been plain error, State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983), which in this case requires a new trial.