Court Opinion

ID: 9583776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:41:57.881263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:45.038429
License: Public Domain

*834Beasley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. The trial court was not precluded from reaching the merits of plaintiff’s claim because it did have jurisdiction of it.
Mitchell, the former ward, filed an “action to set aside dismissal of [the guardian of plaintiff’s property]” in the superior court. She amended it once to detail certain alleged irregularities with respect to fulfillment of the guardian’s duties and to seek a final accounting and settlement in the superior court. In her original complaint, she had asked the superior court to permit her to file with the probate court a petition for final accounting and settlement.
As authority for bringing this action in superior court, plaintiff cited OCGA § 9-11-60 (d), which governs motions to set aside judgments and specifies the permissible grounds for such relief. This method for obtaining relief from the probate court judgment constitutes a direct proceeding, as stated in subsection (b). Sanders v. S. D. Leasing, 189 Ga. App. 409, 410 (376 SE2d 420) (1988), disapproved on other grounds Okekpe v. Commerce Funding Corp., 218 Ga. App. 705, 706 (463 SE2d 23) (1995). It is limited to the court which issued the judgment complained of, because subsection (b) provides that “[j]udgments may be attacked by motion only in the court of rendition.”
Plaintiff could attack the probate court judgment in the superior court only in accordance with subsection (a), which governs collateral attacks. As provided therein, only “[a] judgment void on its face may be attacked in any court by any person.” The question then is whether plaintiff’s action in reality attacks the probate court judgment as being “void on its face” despite plaintiff’s designation of subsection (d) as her procedural means.
The Supreme Court has defined the term “void on its face,” as used in this portion of the 1966 Civil Practice Act, to mean “those judgments which lack either personal or subject matter jurisdiction.” Murphy v. Murphy, 263 Ga. 280, 282 (430 SE2d 749) (1993). Clearly, the probate court had jurisdiction of the guardian’s application for letters of dismission. OCGA § 29-2-84. Plaintiff’s action, as amended, did not challenge that.
She did challenge the procedure which was followed in the probate court, which she alleged short-circuited the statutory requirements for dismissal of the guardian, allowing the guardian to defraud her. She also claimed that a nonamendable defect appeared on the face of the record in that she, as the minor whose property was the subject of the guardianship, was “not given notice of the dismissal hearing as required by OCGA § 29-2-77.” It provides for notice by citation. In this regard Mitchell’s case differs from Lawing v. Erwin, 251 Ga. 134 (303 SE2d 444) (1983), in which the complainant did not “assert lack of notice or failure of service” when attacking a judgment *835collaterally and thus was not permitted to proceed under OCGA § 9-11-60 (a). Id. at 135. The Supreme Court recognized that such an assertion would allow a subsection (a) collateral attack. That was not changed by Murphy, which limited “void on its face” to judgments which lack either personal or subject matter jurisdiction.
As to deficiencies in the probate court procedure with respect to lack of accounting and settlement, this would not come within the definition attributed to “void on its face” by the Supreme Court so as to allow her collateral attack on this basis in the superior court.
As to lack of notice, which addresses lack of personal jurisdiction in the probate court to issue letters of dismission, the statutory procedure for obtaining such letters does not expressly require notice to her or the appointment of, or notice to, a guardian ad litem as plaintiff asserted. OCGA § 29-2-84 requires only notice by publication, which was accomplished. But the purpose of such publication is to notify creditors and other unknown interested parties that the guardian is about to be dismissed and to provide an opportunity to object. It is additional to notice to the person whose property is the subject matter of the guardianship and thus who owns the main interests at stake. Notice by the least effective means, publication, is obviously not intended for the ward, who not only is known but also has allegedly just become able to manage his or her property independent of the guardian. Such a person is rarely, if ever, likely to learn of the application for dismission by reading the county’s official organ. Due process requires notice to the ward. As stated eloquently by Judge Floyd E. Propst in his Handbook for Probate Judges of Georgia (Council of Probate Court Judges of Georgia, 1992) at 358: “The law is very jealous of the rights and interests of wards, and seeks rigidly to guard them.” The significance of dismission is awesome, because “[djismissal under [OCGA § 29-2-84] . . . amounts to an adjudication that [the guardian] has fully and completely performed all the duties of his trust.” Gay v. Gay, 121 Ga. App. 287, 290 (173 SE2d 712) (1970). The estates of minors, as here, and incompetent persons are at stake.
The probate judge in this case knew that due process notice was required by law and it was part of the procedure practiced, but not in this case. He stated in his affidavit: “It is the procedure of this court, in a proceeding for the dismissal of a guardian, that I appoint a guardian ad litem where the ward is still a minor, that notice of the proceeding be given by the petitioner to the ward and that a hearing is conducted on all issues with regard to dismissal of the guardian including a fully accounting of the ward’s estate.”
The notice to the ward had to be accomplished pursuant to *836OCGA § 9-11-4 or § 29-2-77, in order to constitute due process.3 OCGA § 15-9-122 provides that the general laws and rules of practice are applicable to civil cases in the probate courts unless OCGA § 9-11-81 provides to the contrary. OCGA § 9-11-81 states that the Civil Practice Act applies “to all special statutory proceedings except to the extent that specific rules of practice and procedure in conflict [with the CPA] are expressly prescribed by law.” OCGA § 29-2-84, which sets out the procedure for obtaining letters of dismission, does not spell out how the ward is to be notified. Thus, OCGA § 9-11-4 does not conflict with it.
Statutes are to be construed as a whole. Weldon v. Bd. of Commrs. of Monroe County, 212 Ga. App. 885, 887 (2) (443 SE2d 513) (1994), and cits. And the service provisions of the Civil Practice Act harmonize well with the probate code provisions for letters of dismission. The legislature clearly intends CPA process to apply to probate court procedure where appropriate. OCGA § 9-11-4 (j). The latter merely requires publication to notify non-parties who may have an interest, which is not covered by the CPA. The CPA covers notice to the adverse party, in this instance the ward. OCGA § 9-11-4. Plus the probate code allows an optional means of notifying the ward other than by CPA service, i.e., by citation. OCGA § 29-2-77. Plaintiff cites OCGA § 29-2-77 as the governing statute with respect to notice to her; it must be construed to mean that, instead of one of the other statutory provisions for service, the guardian may use this method, i.e., citation to appear and be present. “May” does not mean the guardian can notify or not, but rather that the guardian “may” do it in this fashion, or under OCGA § 9-11-4.4 The finality of the grant of letters of dismission in Hoke v. Walraven, 57 Ga. App. 106 (194 SE 610) (1937), pivoted largely on the fact that it was done “after due citation” to the ward, who therefore “had knowledge that the application would be made . . . [and] filed no objection to the guardian’s discharge.” Id. at 106. The court stated that the ward “was legally cited by the ordinary to show cause against the discharge.” Id. at 115. See Propst, supra at 368.
A guardian “may” wish to cite the ward or new guardian to be present at settlement of the guardianship account so as to preclude the final account from being challenged within five years, as would otherwise be permitted by OCGA § 29-2-74, or within four years, as provided by OCGA § 29-2-83. A particular form of due process being provided for in the probate code for mere settlement of accounts, and *837no special notice process being required in the probate code for dis-mission of the guardian altogether, the general civil practice requirements apply. This analysis does not involve a consideration of the constitutionality of OCGA § 29-2-84 at all. It merely involves an ascertainment of the procedure required by the laws of Georgia for the grant of letters of dismission to a guardian. Such a determination requires more than a consideration of OCGA § 29-2-84 in isolation; one small square of fabric does not a cloak make.
In her brief on appeal, plaintiff Mitchell relies on OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) (3). She was a minor at the time and had become emancipated due to marriage; that is what prompted the guardian’s application for dismission. Just because she became emancipated did not mean the guardian did not have to give notice, as appellants argue. Whether emancipated or not, the guardian was legally responsible for her property, the disposition of which was under the supervision of the court, until dismission.
It is on this ground alone that the superior court had jurisdiction of the action as a collateral attack, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (a). Since the superior court did not reach this issue, it would normally be necessary to remand the case for the court to rule on it. However, it is undisputed that service was not made on the emancipated minor ward, by citation or otherwise. The probate court judge by affidavit swore that at the time of dismissal of the guardian “no notice of the dismissal petition was given the ward by the Court nor is there a record of service on the ward.” There was not even a final receipt from the ward, showing a final settlement between the guardian and the ward. See OCGA §§ 29-2-82, 29-2-81; Propst, supra at 316-317. The superior court had jurisdiction of this issue and should have set aside the judgment of the probate court on this basis.
A judgment right for any reason is to be affirmed. Darugar v. Hodges, 221 Ga. App. 227, 229 (471 SE2d 33) (1996). Thus, I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as the vacating and setting aside of the probate court order is concerned.
2. But the superior court went further and ordered that defendant Kirby and her surety present her accounts and vouchers for examination and for a final accounting, and in addition ordered that the case be tried by a jury on the issues of a final accounting and plaintiff’s allegations. As authority for doing so, the superior court cited OCGA § 23-2-70 and two cases from the Supreme Court.
OCGA § 23-2-70 establishes the scope of equity jurisdiction over matters of account. Mitchell’s action is not one for an equitable accounting but rather to set aside another court’s order in part because of an improper and inadequate accounting. It is only in certain prescribed circumstances, such as when an accounting at law is inadequate, that equity jurisdiction can be exercised. Herring v. *838Standard Guaranty Ins. Co., 238 Ga. 261 (232 SE2d 544) (1977); Peeples v. Peeples, 193 Ga. 358 (18 SE2d 629) (1942). The accounting which plaintiff seeks, and her challenges to the “full discharge of the duties of [the guardian’s] trust,” are within the competence of the probate court as set forth in OCGA §§ 29-2-84, 29-2-76. Compare OCGA § 29-2-45. They are matters within the jurisdiction of the probate court in connection with the application for letters of dismission and must be resolved within that statutory procedure.
The two cases cited by the superior court do not support its assuming jurisdiction over the guardian’s fulfillment of her duties with respect to plaintiff’s property. In Evans v. Little, 246 Ga. 219, 220 (271 SE2d 138) (1980), the Supreme Court held that “[t]he existence or non-existence of administration of [an] estate does not preclude the bringing of a partition action by a tenant in common” and also that the liability of one co-tenant to the others for amounts he collected is based on his status as a co-tenant, not on his status as an administrator. Thus, the proper jurisdiction for the co-tenants’ action was in the superior court. The other case cited by the superior court is Atlanta Trust Co. v. Nat. Bondholders Corp., 188 Ga. 761 (4 SE2d 644) (1939), which involves an equitable petition for accounting, which plaintiff’s action in the superior court is not.
Thus, I concur in the reversal of the superior court’s judgment but only to this extent.
One other matter: plaintiff brought her action against both the guardian and the guardian’s surety, Utica, but the probate court judgment she seeks to set aside did not relieve the surety. It just relieved the guardian from paying further bond. Plaintiff recognizes in her brief on appeal that Utica has not been discharged and relieved of liability. She apparently has not sued Utica on the bond. Utica is an appellant because it does not want the dismissal of its principal, the guardian, to be set aside. In this it should fail.
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this opinion.

 OCGA § 15-9-17 also provides methods of service “notwithstanding . . . other provision[s] of law to the contrary,” but this section was not in effect until July 1, 1994. Ga. L. 1994, p. 725, § 1. The probate court issued its final order in 1991.

 Or, after July 1, 1994, under OCGA § 15-9-17.