Court Opinion

ID: 9492269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:36:44.680446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:13.063352
License: Public Domain

PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is undisputed that the Oxyphan® filamentous membrane is designed for and used solely with a membrane oxygenator and is not a separate and distinct commercial entity. Moreover, a membrane oxygenator can not function without Oxyphan®. Therefore the Oxyphan® membrane is properly classified as a “part” of an oxygenator. See Bauerhin Techs. Ltd. Partnership v. United States, 110 F.3d 774, 779 (1997) (“an imported item dedicated solely for use with another article is a ‘part’ of that article within the meaning of HTSUS”) (citing United States v. Pompeo, 43 C.C.P.A. 9 (1955)); Bauerhin at 779 (an “ ‘integral, constituent, or component part, without which the article to which it is to be joined, could not function as such article’ is surely a part for classification purposes”) (quoting United States v. Willoughby Camera Stores, Inc., 21 C.C.P.A. 322, 324 (1933)).
The panel majority states that the Oxy-phan® filamentous membrane is not a “part” because it is imported on a roll, and a roll of Oxyphan® “nowhere marks or otherwise identifies the individual parts” of oxygenators. However, as the panel ma*1340jority recognizes, it is undisputed that each roll of Oxyphan® contains the material for the manufacture of approximately four ox-ygenators. Applying the panel majority’s rationale, Oxyphan® would be a “part” if it were simply repackaged so that each roll held one-fourth its capacity. Thei*e is no support in the case law for such a tenuous distinction, and no reliable law can flow from its promulgation.
The Harding Co. v. United States, 23 C.C.P.A. 250 (1936) does not require otherwise. The court in The Harding, discussing whether the imported item in that case (brake lining material) was a part of an automobile, stated that “[t]o be a part of an automobile, that is a brake lining, [the imported item] must be more than mere material for making a brake lining.” 23 C.C.P.A. at 252. In the case at bar, Oxyphan® is not “mere material” for making a part of an oxygenator — it is itself the part of the oxygenator that accomplishes the oxygenating function. It is a part “without which the article to which it is to be joined, could not function as such article.” Bauerhin, 110 F.3d at 779; Willoughby Camera, 21 C.C.P.A. at 324; see also Snow’s United States Sample Express Co. v. United States,'8 Ct. Oust. 17, 21 (1917) (discussing whether merchandise “was committed to a specific use and was so far advanced that it had an individuality which identified it in its unfinished state as the thing it would be when finished”).
The panel majority recognizes that “it is . undisputed that Oxyphan® has no commercial use other than making membrane oxygenators and therefore is ‘dedicated’ to such use.” Maj. Op. at 1339. It is also undisputed that membrane oxygenators can not oxygenate blood without Oxy-phan®. It is time to provide consistent and clear guidance. The standards set forth in Pompeo, Willoughby Camera, and Bauerhin, are straightforward, logical, and in accordance with the principles of the HTSUS. Applying these principles and precedent, the Oxyphan® membrane is properly classified a “part” of an oxygenator. Thus I must dissent from the court’s contrary ruling.