Court Opinion

ID: 9726475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:52:14.215674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:27.745808
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICIE STENGEL, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In its order denying defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court found: “[T]hat on September 26,1978, at approximately 4:45 A.M. Officer Randy Ragon * ° * observed the [defendant driving a vehicle at a slow rate of speed in the vicinity of Wesley Road ® e e. Officer Ragon observed the- [defendant drive into a business/industrial area that was not open for business at that hour of the morning, and which was a high-crime area, several burglaries having been reported in that area. Officer Ragon further observed the [defendant drive into a railroad yard which was posted: ‘No Trespassing.’ Officer Ragon followed the [defendant's vehicle, thinking that either the [djefendant was lost and needed help or was about to engage in some criminal activity.” A trial court’s findings of fact in connection with a motion to suppress evidence should not be disturbed on appeal unless they are manifestly erroneous. (People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 525, 401 N.E.2d 513; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 304 N.E.2d 280.) Because I believe that the findings of fact in the instant case are not manifestly erroneous, but on the contrary the evidence sufficiently supports the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, I would affirm. In People v. McGowan (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 73, 370 N.E.2d 537, cert, denied (1978), 435 U.S. 975, 56 L. Ed. 2d 69, 98 S. Ct. 1624, police officers stopped and frisked two men walking down Washington Street in Peoria at 12:50 a.m. The two men were wearing black clothing. A .22-caliber automatic pistol was found concealed under the defendant’s belt, and he was charged with unlawful use of a weapon (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 24 — 1(a)(4)). At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence, including the pistol, one of the officers testified that, although he had received no reports of burglaries in the few hours before the stop, he knew from having patrolled the area that it was a commercial and industrial area which had suffered a number of burglaries. He said it was unusual to see people in that area at that time of night, but he admitted he was aware that a tavern, open until 1 a.m., was located about two blocks from where he stopped the defendant and Ms companion who were headed in the general direction of the tavern. The Illinois Supreme Court held the stop was legal, stating: “[Wjhile it is possible that the defendant and his companion were merely on their way to Penn’s Tavern to have a fast drink before closing time, we agree that it was much more likely that persons dressed in black, walking in the dead of night through an otherwise deserted commercial and industrial area which had been plagued by burglaries, had just committed or were about to commit a burglary. Under these circumstances, the suspects easily might have eluded the officers had the officers attempted to observe the two suspects further rather than stopping them immediately. Hence, we agree that Officer Fulton’s inference of an imminent or recent burglary was reasonable, and that stopping the defendant therefore was reasonable under the circumstances.” 69 Ill. 2d 73, 78-79, 370 N.E.2d 537, 540. In the instant case, defendant’s car was seen traveling slowly and turning into a parking lot in a business area with industries and warehouses, located in a neighborhood which had been the site of two recent burglaries, at 4:45 a.m. when all of the businesses were closed except the railroad which had a skeleton crew. The car was seen turning around about one-half block onto the railroad yard, which was private property and posted with “No Trespassing” signs. The car was then seen driving slowly away from the business area in the direction from which it had come. Since Officer Ragon testified he did not believe defendant had time to get out of his car while on the railroad yard, it appeared unlikely that defendant had any business with the railroad’s skeleton crew. As in McGowan, based on the facts perceived and known by the police, it was possible that defendant was engaged in perfectly legal activities. It was much more likely, however, that he drove into the railroad yard intending to commit the third recent burglary in the neighborhood. Under these circumstances the stop was legal. See People v. Hellemeyer (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 491, 328 N.E.2d 626. In holding the stop of defendant illegal, the majority relies principally on the case of People v. Lilly (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 379, 347 N.E.2d 842, which is readily distinguishable. In Lilly the police stopped a car about 10:30 p.m. after it slowed down on a one-lane gravel road and pulled over to the right. There is no indication that the area of the stop had been the site of recent crimes, or that the defendant drove his car onto private property. For the reasons stated above, I would affirm defendant’s conviction.