Court Opinion

ID: 9946565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 21:02:31.218545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:30.143948
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/29/24 Marriage of Campbell CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re Marriage of RICHARD                                   B319721
 JAMES and ARIANNE
 CHRISTINE CAMPBELL.                                         (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. LD070558)

 RICHARD JAMES
 CAMPBELL et al.,

           Respondents,

           v.

 ARIANNE CHRISTINE
 CAMPBELL,

           Appellant.

      APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Michael Amerian, Judge. Affirmed.

    Law Offices of Melissa B. Buchman and Melissa B.
Buchman for Appellant.
     Brott Gross Fishbein, Mark Gross; Law Office of Gary
Kurtz and Gary Kurtz for Respondent Richard James Campbell.

     No appearance by Respondent Marlene W. Valter, Psy.D.

                              ******
       This appeal arises out of a child custody dispute in which
the wife’s “misuse of the discovery process” and “unreasonable[]”
positions prompted the trial court to award the husband
$20,009.50 in discovery sanctions against her, as well as to
reduce a discovery sanction award in the wife’s favor against a
neutral custody evaluator by $16,905 because that excess amount
was driven by the wife’s “overly aggressive” and “antagonis[tic]”
litigation strategy. Finding no prejudicial error with these
sanctions rulings, we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Family and Litigation, Generally
       A.    Family
       Richard James Campbell (husband) and Arianne Christine
Campbell (wife) married in May 2007, and separated in January
2015. Their son Colin was born in November 2011; Colin has
cerebral palsy and “global developmental delays” that render him
nonverbal, and he also suffers from seizures.
       B.    Litigation
       Husband filed for dissolution in February 2015. In October
2016, the couple stipulated to a judgment of dissolution that
reserved the issue of custody over Colin. In September 2017, the
couple stipulated to a judgment agreeing to share legal and
physical custody of Colin equally.

                                2
       In early 2018, wife and husband filed cross-motions to
modify the custody and visitation order regarding Colin. Because
the cross-motions would require extensive proof, the matter was
initially set for an evidentiary hearing before a “hearing court
judge” instead of before the “home court judge,” to start on
August 13, 2020. The hearing eventually went forward before
the hearing court judge over eight days between January 12,
2021 and February 2, 2021.
       On March 30, 2021, the hearing court judge issued a 34-
page written ruling. The court awarded husband sole legal
custody over Colin, but the parents would continue to share joint
physical custody.1 In awarding sole legal custody to husband, the
court found that wife and husband had an “abysmal track record”
at coparenting due to their tendencies to “dismiss” and
“demonize” one another but found that, as between the two
parents, it was in Colin’s best interest to have husband as the
decisionmaker because he was the parent who “more often sought
to de-escalate conflict,” because he “favored more conventional
and tested treatments” for Colin, and because wife’s “judgment”
was clouded by “her anxiety and antipathy” toward husband.
       As described next, the 38 months between the filing of the
cross-motions and their resolution vividly illustrated wife’s
antipathy toward husband: Wife repeatedly filed ex parte
applications hundreds of pages in length, forum shopped by filing

1     Wife had supplemented her request for sole custody of
Colin as part of a potential residential move from the San
Fernando Valley, where husband also resided, to eastern San
Gabriel Valley. The court ruled that, if wife moved, she would
have physical custody of Colin for three weekends each month.
Shortly after the court issued this custody ruling, wife abandoned
her intention to move.

                                3
motions seeking identical relief from both the home court judge
and the hearing court judge, played “hardball” in a “petty” way by
filing some applications the day before holidays when she knew
opposing counsel would be unavailable, and sought “excessive”
remedies more consistent with a “vendetta” than uncovering
evidence pertinent to adjudication. We proceed to recount only
those portions of this litigation pertinent to the issues on appeal.
II.    Wife’s Litigation “Vendetta” Against the Custody
Evaluator
       A.    The parties stipulate to a custody evaluator
       On April 5, 2018, husband and wife stipulated to have the
home court judge appoint Marlene W. Valter, Psy.D., (Dr. Valter)
as a child custody evaluator. Under this stipulation—which was
signed into a court order—Dr. Valter was to make
recommendations regarding legal and physical custody, a
parenting plan, and other custody and visitation issues; her
report was due in July 2018.
       B.    Dr. Valter delays providing report
       Dr. Valter did not submit her report until August 26, 2019,
some 13 months after its original due date. In taking so long, Dr.
Valter ignored repeated requests from the parties, and faced two
court orders setting April 10, 2019 and August 25, 2019
deadlines. At one point during this long wait, the home court
judge indicated he was “flabbergasted” and “speechless” at how a
“professional” like Dr. Valter failed to fulfill her “promise[]” to
finish the report in a timely fashion.

                                 4
       C.    Wife seeks to strike Dr. Valter’s report, to obtain
further documentary and testimonial information to
undermine it, and to punish Dr. Valter by having the court
imprison her or make her “pick[] up trash on the highway”
             1.     Motion to strike Dr. Valter’s report
       In September 2019, wife moved to strike Dr. Valter’s report
as being stale and due to Dr. Valter’s “bias” against wife. The
home court judge denied the motion without prejudice. Then, in
June 2020, wife again moved to exclude the report, and the
hearing court judge denied the motion because wife’s allegations
against Dr. Valter were “based on speculation.” Ultimately, the
court elected not to rely on Dr. Valter’s report at all in its March
2021 custody ruling.
             2.     Subpoena for production of Dr. Valter’s
business records
       On July 7, 2020, wife served Dr. Valter with a subpoena for
production of business records, including (1) all documents Dr.
Valter relied on in making the recommendations in her report, (2)
all documents related to who Dr. Valter interviewed, and (3) a
copy of Dr. Valter’s entire case file.
       When Dr. Valter failed to respond to the subpoena, wife
filed a motion on August 6, 2020, requesting that the trial court
(1) compel Dr. Valter to produce all documents responsive to the
subpoena; (2) order Dr. Valter to pay $10,632.50 in monetary
sanctions; and (3) hold Dr. Valter in criminal contempt. The
court set a hearing date for September 30, 2020.
       Prior to the hearing, Dr. Valter made two productions of
documents.
       Despite Dr. Valter’s productions, wife did not alter her
request. Instead, she appeared at the September 2020 hearing

                                 5
continuing to press for criminal contempt and, specifically, to
advocate for Dr. Valter’s imprisonment. Fearing incarceration,
Dr. Valter—who had appeared without counsel—invoked her
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and sought
a continuance to hire a lawyer. The court continued the hearing
until November 19, 2020.
       At the November 2020 hearing, wife still encouraged the
court to hold Dr. Valter in criminal contempt, but urged that she
be sentenced to “pick[] up trash on the highway.” The court
ordered Dr. Valter to disclose further documents and continued
the matter to January 5, 2021.
       Prior to the January 2021 hearing, Dr. Valter produced
further documents as ordered by the court.
       At the January 2021 hearing, and despite the further
productions, wife still insisted upon a finding of criminal
contempt and a sentence of community service against Dr.
Valter. The court denied wife’s request to hold Dr. Valter in
contempt, but took her request for monetary sanctions under
submission.
             3.     Subpoena for appearance at deposition
       Decrying Dr. Valter’s production of documents as
“unintelligible,” wife served Dr. Valter with a subpoena to appear
for a deposition on December 22, 2020, regarding the method of
her document production. When Dr. Valter objected that the
deposition was set to occur after the discovery cutoff date (of 30
days prior to the January 12, 2021 start date for the evidentiary
hearing), wife filed an ex parte application asking the trial court
to (1) compel Dr. Valter to attend the deposition; and (2) impose
$5,000 in monetary sanctions. After further briefing from Dr.
Valter and husband, the trial court denied wife’s application,

                                 6
reasoning that it was “an implicit request to reopen discovery”
and that such a request was without merit because the
information sought from Dr. Valter’s deposition was not “so
necessary as to justify reopening discovery.” The court did not
explicitly rule on wife’s request for monetary sanctions.
      D.     Trial court imposes sanctions against Dr. Valter
at an amount less than wife requests
      After the hearing court judge issued the custody ruling in
March 2021, and after further briefing and an October 2021
hearing on the issue of whether and how much to sanction Dr.
Valter for her initial noncompliance with the subpoena, the home
court judge issued a ruling on January 26, 2022. Wife’s initial
request for monetary sanctions had ballooned to $22,655. The
court ruled that Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.22 imbued
the court with discretion to award sanctions, but elected to
impose $5,750 in sanctions against Dr. Valter. The court
declined to award the full amount wife sought because, in its
view, wife’s “insistence on punishing Dr. Valter with criminal
contempt [wa]s beyond the pale” and “reflective of a personal
vendetta” by wife or her counsel fueled by “animosity and
antagonism.” Because the fees wife sought to recover as
sanctions were a direct product of her own “overly aggressive
strategy,” the court reduced the sanction award to what it viewed
as the more appropriate amount.

2    All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

                                7
III. Wife’s Attempts to Block Husband’s Deposition of
Her Expert
       A.    Wife “fully commit[s]” to calling a competing
child custody expert as a witness
       On December 16, 2020—three days after the discovery
cutoff date before the January 12, 2021 evidentiary hearing—wife
at a prehearing status conference before the hearing court judge
announced that she intended to call an expert witness to impeach
Dr. Valter’s opinion. When husband informed the court that this
was the first time wife had “fully committed” to calling this
expert, the hearing court judge indicated that he would order the
deposition of wife’s expert as necessary, and instructed that any
motions be filed with him (rather than with the home court
judge).3
       B.    Wife resists husband’s efforts to depose her
expert witness
       After wife ignored husband’s attempt to meet and confer
regarding a deposition date for wife’s expert, husband on
December 18, 2020 issued a subpoena to depose the expert on
January 4, 2021.
       On Christmas Eve 2020 (despite notice that husband’s
attorney was unavailable), wife filed with the home court judge
(despite the hearing court judge’s request to the contrary) an ex
parte application to quash the deposition subpoena on the ground

3      This hearing was not reported. Because husband and wife
provide predictably divergent versions of what transpired at the
hearing, we apply the appropriate standard of review by
recounting what transpired at the hearing in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s discovery sanctions rulings at issue
in this appeal.

                                 8
that the discovery cutoff date had passed (despite her position in
seeking to depose Dr. Valter after that cutoff date) and seeking
sanctions. Husband opposed wife’s application, and also sought
sanctions. The home court judge denied wife’s application,
ordering wife’s expert to comply with the subpoena. In issuing
the order, the court recognized that its order “effectively grant[ed
husband] leave to conduct expert discovery after the discovery
cutoff date,” but found that husband’s reasons “for not completing
the discovery earlier are reasonable” (namely, wife’s failure to
commit to calling her expert sooner) and that deposing the expert
was “necess[ary]” because husband “is entitled to be aware of
precisely how [the expert] will attack Dr. Valter’s report before
the hearing begins.” The court denied wife’s request for
sanctions, and set husband’s request for sanctions for hearing on
January 5, 2021.
       After husband agreed to accommodate wife’s expert’s
schedule by moving the deposition to January 7, 2021, and after
wife then informed husband that she would not produce her
expert on the new date, husband on January 5, 2021 filed with
the home court judge an ex parte application to compel the
deposition of the expert. Wife filed an opposition, which also
included a motion to vacate the earlier order denying her motion
to quash.
       At the January 5, 2021 hearing, the court denied wife’s
motion to vacate and granted husband’s application to compel the
deposition of wife’s expert. The court also took under submission
husband’s still-pending request for sanctions in opposing wife’s
Christmas Eve filing.

                                 9
       C.    Trial court imposes sanctions against wife
       When the home court judge took up the still-pending
monetary sanctions issue, and in response to husband’s
additional motion for sanctions for successfully compelling the
deposition of wife’s expert, further briefing, and an October 2021
hearing, the court issued a January 2022 order awarding
husband $6,740 in sanctions against wife (to be deducted from a
future attorney fee award for wife). The court reasoned that (1)
section 2024.050, subdivision (c), makes sanctions mandatory for
anyone who “unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion . . . to
reopen discovery”; and (2) wife’s attempts to block husband’s
deposition of her expert were “not substantially justified” because
she “wait[ed] until the eleventh hour to confirm” that the expert
would indeed testify but then “play[ed] hardball” based on an
incorrect interpretation of the discovery statutes.
IV. Wife’s Discovery Motions Against Husband
       A.    Wife propounds requests for production to
husband
       In December 2019 and January 2020, wife propounded two
sets of requests for production on husband. In total, wife sought
122 categories of documents, including husband’s financial
documents like tax returns, credit card statements, and
investment documents; husband’s business documents like
accounts receivables, bank account statements, and payroll; all
communications between husband and his new fiancée regarding
Colin or wife; and all documents supporting the statements
husband made in support of his January 2018 custody motion.
These document requests were in addition to the 186 requests for
admissions and 131 special interrogatories wife also propounded
on husband around the same time.

                                10
       B.    The trial court extends husband’s deadline
       After wife declined husband’s request for an extension to
respond, husband filed an ex parte application on March 5, 2020
requesting an eight-week extension to respond to the
“voluminous” discovery requests. Wife opposed. After a hearing,
the trial court granted husband an extension to May 8, 2020.
       C.    The parties meet and confer
       On May 8, 2020, husband served written responses and
some documents in response to one set of requests for production,
but served a blanket objection and produced no documents in
response to the other.
       Wife sent a meet-and-confer letter for each set of responses
on May 22, 2020. On June 4, 2020, husband responded to one of
the letters. Wife sent two additional letters, on June 4 and June
5, 2020, but received no further response from husband.
       D.    Wife files parallel motions before two judges
             1.    Wife files motion to compel before home court
judge
       On June 19, 2020, wife filed with the home court judge a
motion to compel further responses and production from
husband. She also sought issue sanctions against husband as to
several facts, as well as monetary sanctions. The hearing was set
for August 19, 2020, which was after the evidentiary hearing on
custody was originally set to begin (and, obviously, after the
discovery cutoff as well).
             2.    Wife files parallel motion in limine before the
hearing court judge
       On June 23, 2020 (just four days after filing the motion to
compel), wife filed with the hearing court judge two motions in
limine seeking, among other things, issue sanctions against

                                11
husband for his failure to comply with the requests for
production; one was more than 200 pages, the other more than
100. She specifically cited various discovery statutes and argued,
with the “fastly approaching custody hearing,” “the only remedy
at this juncture” to address husband’s “gamesmanship” was to
grant the motions in limine and impose issue sanctions.
Husband opposed the motions, and wife filed further replies.
             3.     The hearing court judge denies wife’s motions in
limine
       After a July 2, 2020 hearing, the hearing court judge
denied wife’s motions in limine. The court noted it was “highly
unorthodox to file simultaneously discovery motions before two
bench officers on the same topic” as wife did. It then rejected
wife’s requests for issue sanctions as an “unjustified” and
“extreme overreach” because husband had not first been
compelled by a court order to produce discovery, as required by
section 2031.320, subdivision (c). In light of wife’s unsuccessful
motions, the court concluded that sanctions against wife were
mandatory, but deferred that issue pending resolution of the
custody dispute. The hearing court judge then reminded the
parties that, as is the standard in trials, any document a party
seeks to introduce at the custody hearing that was not produced
in discovery would be subject to exclusion.
             4.     Wife continues to litigate the motion to compel
before the home court judge
       Just days after the hearing court judge denied her motions
in limine, wife on July 7, 2020 filed an ex parte application back
before the home court judge to advance the hearing on her motion
to compel so it could be decided prior to the evidentiary hearing.
The home court judge granted that relief, and conducted an

                                12
informal discovery conference on July 9, 2020; as a result of that
conference, the parties whittled down the dispute to only one
particular request for production, and filed further briefing in
mid-July. After the evidentiary hearing was moved to January
2021, the home court judge in late August 2020 (1) granted wife’s
motion to compel in part by ordering husband to produce a
tailored subcategory of documents in response to that one
request, (2) denied her request for issue sanctions, and (3)
deferred the issue of monetary sanctions.
       E.    Trial court imposes sanctions against wife
       When the home court judge took up the still-pending
sanctions issue after resolution of the custody dispute, and in
response to husband’s additional motion for sanctions for
opposing wife’s motions in limine, the court entertained further
briefing, held an October 2021 hearing, and issued a January
2022 ruling awarding husband $13,269.50 in sanctions against
wife (to be deducted from a future attorney fee award for wife).
The court reasoned that the motions constituted a “misuse of
[the] discovery” process because they were “procedurally
doomed,” as issue sanctions were unwarranted absent a prior
motion to compel responses.
V.     Wife’s Appeal
       Wife filed this timely appeal, challenging the home court’s
January 2022 discovery sanctions rulings.
                           DISCUSSION
       Wife challenges the trial court’s three discovery sanctions
rulings. We review a trial court’s imposition of such sanctions for
an abuse of discretion (Manlin v. Milner (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
1004, 1023; Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 57, 73 [reversal of discretionary sanctions order

                                13
appropriate only if trial court was “‘arbitrary, capricious, or
whimsical in the exercise of that discretion’”]; Cornerstone Realty
Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 771, 789 (Cornerstone)), while reviewing any
subsidiary legal questions de novo (People v. Doss (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 46, 54; Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106) and any subsidiary factual
questions for substantial evidence (Manlin, at p. 1023;
Cornerstone, at p. 789). Contrary to what wife argues, our task is
to review the trial court’s ruling and not its rationale, so we may
affirm on any ground supported by the record. (Kwan, at p. 73.)
I.     Reduction in Wife’s Sanctions Award Against Dr.
Valter4
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife
less than the total amount of monetary sanctions she sought
against Dr. Valter.5
       The trial court’s sanctions order has two potential statutory
bases. First, section 1987.1 empowers a party to move the trial
court for an order “directing” a third party to “compl[y]” with a
subpoena for document production, and section 1987.2 grants the

4     Dr. Valter did not file a respondent’s brief on appeal.

5     Although an appeal may be taken from an order directing
payment of monetary sanctions in excess of $5,000 (§ 904.1,
subds. (a)(11) & (a)(12)), the denial of sanctions generally is not
appealable (see Wells Properties v. Popkin (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th
1053, 1055). We nevertheless review wife’s challenge to this
portion of the discovery rulings because it is a postdissolution
order that is a final determination of the sanctions issue between
wife and Dr. Valter. (See Shelton v. Rancho Mortgage &
Investment Corp. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1345.)

                                14
court the discretion to “award the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred in making . . . the motion” unless the motion
was “made . . . in bad faith or without substantial justification.”
(§§ 1987.1, subd. (a), 1987.2, subd. (a).) Second, section 2025.480
empowers a party to move the court “for an order compelling” a
third party to “produce” documents under a subpoena for
document production, and also requires the court to “impose a
monetary sanction,” defined as the movant’s “reasonable
expenses” such as “attorney’s fees,” against the third party if it
“unsuccessfully . . . opposes [such] a motion to compel,” unless the
third party “acted with substantial justification.” (§§ 2025.480,
subds. (a), (i) & (j), 2023.030, subd. (a); see Unzipped Apparel,
LLC v. Bader (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 123, 130-134 [holding that
section 2025.480’s time limits govern “business records
subpoenas” issued against nonparties].) Here, because
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implicit findings
that wife had substantial justification for moving to compel Dr.
Valter’s further production in response to the subpoena and that
Dr. Valter lacked substantial justification for her initial
noncompliance with the subpoena, the court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding sanctions against Dr. Valter.
      The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in awarding
only $5,750 in sanctions rather than the $22,655 wife requested
because both statutory bases provide for the award of only
“reasonable expenses.” Contrary to what wife suggests, a trial
court is “not required to award sanctions in the full amount
requested” because “the principles of reasonableness and
causation” impose a duty on the court to, in its discretion, “reduce
the amount of fees and costs requested” to “fix a reasonable
amount” actually “incurred as a result of discovery abuse.”

                                15
(Cornerstone, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 791.) Here, the trial
court acted within its discretion in concluding that wife’s “overly
aggressive” litigation strategy in insisting upon holding Dr.
Valter in criminal contempt was unnecessary to secure Dr.
Valter’s compliance, and instead improperly motivated by desire
to punish Dr. Valter, which had the effect of driving up the very
expenses wife sought. (Accord, Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United
States, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 285, 294 [affirming trial
court’s ruling cutting the amount of mandatory sanctions by two-
thirds]; see also Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215,
1223 [discovery sanctions not intended “to punish the offending
party”]; Victor Valley Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1139 [contempt sanctions reserved
for “extreme cases”].)
       Wife attacks the trial court’s ruling on what boils down to
two grounds.
       First, she argues that the trial court was required to issue
sanctions under section 2025.480 (rather than section 1987.2),
and that a remand is therefore necessary for the court to exercise
its discretion under what wife believes is the sole controlling
statute. This argument lacks merit. Although, as wife points
out, the imposition of sanctions is mandatory under section
2025.480 but discretionary under section 1987.2, the trial court
did impose sanctions, so this particular distinction between the
two statutes is utterly irrelevant to wife’s appeal attacking the
amount of sanctions. Because the two statutes employ the same
standard as to the amount (that is, limiting it to reasonable
expenses), a remand for the trial court to conduct the same exact
inquiry into reasonableness would be a pointless waste of time.
(See People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [remand

                                16
unnecessary when record “‘clearly indicate[s]’” trial court “would
have reached the same conclusion”]; People v. McDaniels (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425; People v. McVey (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
405, 419.)
       Second, wife argues that the trial court’s reduction in the
award of sanctions “punished” her, “penalized” her, and
“impede[d]” her access to court in violation of due process.
Specifically, wife urges that because a third party’s disobedience
of a subpoena “may be” punishable by contempt (§§ 1991,
2025.480, subd. (j), 2023.030, subd. (e)), any expenses she incurs
in pursuing this “weapon[]” in her “arsenal” are automatically
reasonable, and any denial of those expenses is automatically a
denial of due process. This argument is absurd. A party who is
entitled to sanctions in the amount of reasonable expenses
incurred for swatting a fly may be entitled to the cost of a fly
swatter but is not constitutionally entitled to the cost of procuring
Hercules’s club when a fly swatter would do. By constitutionally
mandating sanctions in an amount that would reimburse the
deployment of any and all “weapons,” adopting wife’s argument
would effectively encourage the type of scorched-earth litigation
conduct that occurred here—a result we find to be inimical to the
ascertainment of truth that lies at the heart of the Civil
Discovery Act (§ 2016.010 et seq.). (Boston v. Penny Lane
Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950 [purpose of
discovery statutes is “‘to assist the parties and the trier of fact in
ascertaining the truth’”]; Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc.
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 389 [purpose of discovery statutes is
to “‘enhance the truth-seeking function of the litigation process’”],
disapproved on another ground in Brown v. USA Taekwondo
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 222, fn. 9.)

                                 17
II.    Imposition of Sanctions Against Wife
       A.    Sanctions for ex parte applications to block
deposition of expert
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
husband monetary sanctions against wife for her unsuccessful
attempts to block husband from deposing her expert.
       The court was statutorily empowered to impose those
sanctions. Section 2024.050 vests the court with discretion to
grant a party leave to “reopen discovery” after the cutoff after
balancing several competing considerations. (§ 2024.050, subds.
(a) & (b).) That statute also makes sanctions mandatory against
any party “who unsuccessfully . . . opposes a motion . . . to reopen
discovery.” (Id., subd. (c).) Because husband’s subpoena would
result in a deposition of wife’s expert after the discovery cutoff
date, his subpoena necessarily functioned as a request to reopen
discovery and all of wife’s attempts to block the subpoena—
namely, (1) her ex parte application to quash the deposition
subpoena, (2) her motion to vacate the court’s denial of her
application to quash, and (3) her opposition to husband’s ex parte
application to compel the deposition—necessarily functioned as
oppositions to that request. Indeed, the substantive import of
husband’s subpoena was obvious to everyone below: The trial
court treated husband’s subpoena as a motion to reopen and
proceeded to evaluate the statutory considerations pertinent to
reopening discovery, and wife’s multifarious filings opposing the
subpoena all complained that the discovery cutoff date had
passed. Because the trial court understood and conducted the
proper analysis, wife’s citation to Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc.
v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568,
1571, 1588 (Pelton-Shepherd), which found error where a court

                                18
failed to do conduct the proper analysis, is irrelevant. And
because wife explicitly recognized that husband’s subpoena, if
permitted, would reopen discovery, her suggestion that she was
somehow blindsided by the sanctions award is disingenuous.
Because wife was “unsuccessful[]” in blocking husband from
deposing her expert after the discovery cutoff, monetary
sanctions against wife were required. (§ 2024.050, subd. (c).)
       Wife makes two further arguments.
       First, she argues that the trial court somehow lacked the
authority to impose sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure
section 2024.050 because husband did not formally move to
reopen discovery, and because no one cited to that specific statute
in their filings regarding deposing wife’s expert. We reject this
argument. Like the law in general, discovery motions turn on
their substance, not on the label the parties choose to attach to
those motions or the statutory provisions they elect to cite or not
to cite. (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 187, 193 [“‘The nature of a motion is determined by
the nature of the relief sought, not by the label attached to it.
The law is not a mere game of words’”]; O&C Creditors Group,
LLC v. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 546,
560 [“Like the trial court, we do not find labels to be dispositive
and instead look at the substance of the motion”]; Hudson v.
Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 999, 1011 [“a trial court may
disregard the caption of a motion and instead treat it in
accordance with the relief it requests”]; Civ. Code, § 3528 [“The
law respects form less than substance”].) This is why a motion
that is not labeled a motion to reopen can still function as one if
the court and parties treat it as such. (Cf. Pelton-Shepherd,

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supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1588.) That is precisely what
happened here, and thus the sanctions award was appropriate.
       Second, wife argues that husband’s requests for sanctions
were untimely. Wife waived this argument by failing to raise it
in the trial court or in her opening brief on appeal. (Raceway
Ford Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 161, 178 [arguments raised for first
time in reply brief are waived]; People ex rel. Feuer v. Superior
Court (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1384 [“raising arguments for
the first time in a reply brief is unfair to the other part[y]”].)
Wife is wrong in any event. She contends that husband’s request
for sanctions was untimely because he did not first seek to reopen
discovery, but his subpoena necessarily sought to reopen
discovery and a trial court is not required to reopen discovery in
one order prior to issuing a second order compelling discovery; a
court may do both simultaneously in the same order. (See Pelton-
Shepherd, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1587-1588.)
       B.     Sanctions for veiled motions to compel
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
husband monetary sanctions against wife for her unsuccessful
motions to compel discovery.
       Although wife labeled her motions filed with the hearing
court judge as motions in limine, the substance of her two
motions was for relief in a discovery dispute—namely, for issue
sanctions against husband for his failure to comply with her
requests for production. Indeed, her motions repeatedly cited to
the Civil Discovery Act. Thus, wife’s motions were motions to
compel. As such, the court was obligated to impose monetary
sanctions against her if they were “unsuccessful[].” (§§ 2031.300,
subd. (c), 2031.310, subd. (h), 2031.320, subd. (b).) Here, they
were. That is because issue and evidentiary sanctions may be

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sought if and only if the party to be sanctioned has violated a
court order compelling discovery (§§ 2023.010, subds. (d)-(g),
2023.030, 2031.300, subd. (c), 2031.310, subds. (a) & (h),
2031.320, subd. (a)), and no such order had been issued against
husband with respect to the requests for production. Thus,
sanctions were not only appropriate here; they were required.
       Wife asserts three arguments in response.
       First, she argues that (1) motions in limine are not motions
to compel (and provides a seven-page exegesis in support of her
theory), (2) she labeled her motions as motions in limine, such
that (3) she cannot be sanctioned for filing unsuccessful motions
to compel. This argument is flawed. To begin, a motion to
compel can be brought as a motion in limine (see, e.g., Reedy v.
Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1290 [terminating sanctions
sought in motion in limine]); they are not mutually exclusive
procedural vehicles. Further, and as noted above, what matters
is the substance of wife’s motions—not the label she attaches to
them. To hold otherwise is to invite litigants to engage in
duplicitous doublespeak, as this case vividly illustrates: Wife
specifically argued in her motions in limine that the discovery
statutes—and, specifically, section 2023.030—applied to husband
and authorized an award of issue sanctions in her favor, yet now
argues that those very same statutes do not apply to her or
authorize an award of monetary sanctions in his favor. Even
more perniciously, wife filed her motions in limine as a backdoor
tactic to have the discovery dispute pending before the home
court judge adjudicated first by the hearing court judge. Seeing
the motions in limine for what they were—discovery motions—
the court did not abuse its discretion in treating them as such.

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       Second, wife argues that sanctions were not warranted
because she “acted with substantial justification” in bringing her
motions. (§§ 2023.030, subd. (a), 2031.300, subd. (c), 2031.310,
subd. (h), 2031.320, subd. (b).) Specifically, she claims she was
“forced” to file the motions in limine with the hearing court judge
because husband’s delay in meeting and conferring over the
discovery dispute caused her to miss the deadline to have her
motion to compel before the home court judge heard before the
then-scheduled date for the evidentiary hearing. This does not
amount to substantial justification. Substantial justification
means that a motion is “‘“well grounded in both law and fact.”’”
(Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Corut (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 127, 139.) To begin, wife’s argument does not
address whether there was substantial justification regarding the
merits of her motions, which—as noted above—unquestionably
fail because she was seeking issue sanctions despite the absence
of a predicate court order compelling discovery. Wife’s argument
instead deals with her justification for using one procedural
vehicle over another for presenting her meritless arguments; we
do not see how her choice of vehicle can imbue her substantially
unjustified motions with substantial justification. But even
assuming they could, wife’s reasons for filing her motions in
limine are not persuasive because if—as wife now claims—she
filed her motions in limine solely because the hearing date for her
motion to compel before the home court judge was set too late,
wife had another viable remedy available: She could have sought
ex parte relief to advance the hearing date. Indeed, wife
pursued—and obtained—that very remedy after the hearing
court judge denied her motions in limine as a meritless and

                                22
procedurally improper end run around her pending motion to
compel before the home court judge.
      Third and lastly, wife argues that imposing sanctions for
her unsuccessful motions in limine before the hearing court judge
was improper because she ultimately prevailed on her parallel
(and almost simultaneously filed) motion to compel before the
home court judge. Wife is comparing apples to oranges. Just
because the home court judge ordered husband—after the
evidentiary hearing—to produce documents responsive to a single
request does not mean wife’s motions in limine seeking a far
broader spectrum of issue sanctions were proper, particularly
given the absence of any motion to compel production of the
documents at the time issue sanctions were sought in those
motions in limine.
                         DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. Husband is entitled to his costs on
appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

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