Court Opinion

ID: 9369177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 23:01:53.382258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.437299
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/23 Haghnazarzadeh v. Suntree Townhomes Owners’ Assn. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

DAVID HAGHNAZARZADEH,                                                  B313046

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. LC105752)
         v.

SUNTREE TOWNHOMES
OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Huey P. Cotton, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

    McGarrigle, Kenney & Zampiello and Patrick C.
McGarrigle for Defendant and Appellant.

     RJZ Law Group, Ryan E. Jackman, Jacob Haghnazadeh;
Benedon & Serlin and Melinda W. Ebelhar for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
               ______________________________
      Plaintiff and respondent David Haghnazarzadeh filed an
action against defendant and appellant Suntree Townhomes
Owners’ Association, Inc. (Suntree) for claims related to an
easement. After the litigation was underway, the parties
engaged in voluntary mediation, the result of which was a
settlement confirming the existence of an easement across
Suntree’s property that benefitted plaintiff’s property. Following
settlement, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit.
      Eighteen months after mediation, Suntree moved to vacate
the dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (d),1 arguing that the order was void because
Suntree’s director, Ciro Barilla (Barilla),2 who had attended the
mediation and signed the settlement agreement on behalf of
Suntree, was not permitted to do so. Suntree also argued that
each of the more than 100 individual homeowners within the
association was an indispensable party to the litigation and that
without their consent, the settlement was ineffective.
      The trial court denied Suntree’s motion, and Suntree
appeals.
      We affirm.

1
     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

2
      Barilla’s name is spelled differently throughout the
appellate record, sometimes as “Barilla” and other times as
“Barillas,” even in his own declarations.

                                2
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint
       According to the complaint,3 Suntree is an incorporated
homeowners’ association. It holds title to the common areas of
the subject condominium subdivision. Plaintiff, the owner of real
property adjacent to Suntree’s property, alleges that he is the
owner of an easement for ingress and easement that runs along
the border of the common areas of the condominium subdivision.
According to the complaint, Suntree “erected a demising wall”
along the border of the condominium subdivision’s common areas,
and “[s]aid demising wall prevents and interferes with Plaintiff’s
use of the Easement.”
Suntree’s cross-complaint
       In response, Suntree filed a cross-complaint. In the
operative verified second amended cross-complaint (SACC), it
alleges that it is the “authorized representative of its members”
pursuant to section 382, Civil Code section 5980, and the
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
It also alleges that it is the owner of the real property that is the
subject of the complaint. And, it alleges that it is “specifically
authorized and obligated to maintain and to repair damage” to
the common areas of the condominium development.
       None of the individual homeowners is named in any of the
cross-complaints.

3
       At the time plaintiff filed his complaint, he also recorded a
lis pendens. The lis pendens indicates that the lawsuit affects “a
condominium subdivision with 96 separate parcels.” It then
identifies each condominium unit.

                                 3
Proposed Doe amendments to the complaint
        Two years after the commencement of this litigation,
plaintiff filed Doe amendments to the complaint, naming each of
the individual owners of condominiums in the development. The
Doe amendments were not served.
Mediation and settlement
        In July 2019, the parties agreed to voluntary mediation. To
ensure that Suntree would send a representative with authority
to negotiate and consummate a settlement, on July 1, 2019,
plaintiff’s counsel notified Suntree’s counsel, Mr. Eurus Cady,
that an authorized member of Suntree must be present at the
mediation. Specifically, plaintiff’s counsel wrote: “[W]hile my
client is willing to participate in mediation, he does not believe
that it will be possible to have a meaningful mediation unless a
representative of . . . Suntree . . . is present, and vested with the
authority to approve a compromise at the time of
mediation. . . . Accordingly, please confirm that a principal of
. . . Suntree . . . will attend the mediation and will be vested with
full authority to enter into a settlement.”
        On July 9, 2019, plaintiff’s counsel and Mr. Cady had a
telephone conversation regarding an agreement to mediate.
“During that conversation, Mr. Cady stated that [plaintiff’s]
condition that an authorized member of Suntree be present at the
mediation was agreed upon by Suntree, and that Suntree’s then
‘personal counsel’ (Mr. Cady was insurance defense counsel),
Jeffrey Domine, would be sending an email with written
confirmation.” “Later that evening, [plaintiff’s counsel] sent
Mr. Cady an email outlining a proposal [for other terms of
mediation], including that the doe defendants would not be
served prior to mediation.” Mr. Cady confirmed his agreement.

                                 4
      On July 10, 2019, Mr. Domine sent plaintiff’s counsel an e-
mail stating that Suntree would “have at least one Board
member at the Mediation with full authority to resolve this
matter.”
      Mediation occurred on September 27, 2019. On behalf of
Suntree, Barilla attended the mediation. The parties reached a
settlement, which was reduced to a written stipulation for
settlement and signed by Barilla and Mr. Cady on behalf of
Suntree. The stipulation provides that the parties “intend to
prepare a more formal agreement of settlement,” and the
addendum to the settlement agreement adds that “[i]n the event
of any dispute with regard to the long form settlement agreement
such dispute will be resolved by binding arbitration.” It also
provides that the settlement agreement is “fully and formally
binding and enforceable” and that it “has been executed without
reliance on any promise, representation or warranty not
contained herein.” There is no provision requiring the individual
homeowners’ separate approval.
Dismissal
      On January 13, 2020, plaintiff filed and served a notice of
settlement of the entire case and request for court to retain
jurisdiction. Attached to the notice is a copy of the parties’
stipulation for settlement and mutual release of claims.
      On January 17, 2020, in accordance with the settlement’s
terms, the trial court dismissed the action.4

4
      On January 17, 2020, the trial court only dismissed the
complaint. On June 8, 2020, the trial court dismissed both the
complaint and second amended cross-complaint. On June 9,
2020, the trial court issued an order nunc pro tunc, correcting its
January 17, 2020, minute order to include dismissal of the second

                                 5
Suntree’s attempt to renegotiate the settlement
       In the months following mediation, Suntree and plaintiff
attempted to complete the long-form settlement agreement.
However, during this process, Suntree retained new counsel who
wanted to negotiate a new deal with plaintiff. The parties
participated in a second mediation in September 2020, but
reached no further agreements.
Motion to vacate the dismissal
       On March 11, 2021, Suntree filed a motion to vacate the
dismissal pursuant to section 473, subdivision (d). Suntree
argued that the dismissal was void because the settlement itself
was unauthorized. Specifically, it claimed that the 129
individual homeowners in the homeowners’ association were
“‘[i]ndispensable [p]arties,’” without whom the settlement was not
effective. In so contending, Suntree noted that plaintiff had filed
“Doe” amendments to name each homeowner as an individual
homeowner.
       Suntree further argued that Barilla was not authorized to
bind either the association or its individual homeowners. Rather,
only Suntree’s “full Board and the Indispensable Parties had the
authority” to settle the matter.
       Finally, Suntree asserted that its president, Robert B.
Sarvian (Sarvian), had advised plaintiff that any agreement
reached at mediation was subject to the approval of Suntree’s
board and the homeowners themselves.

amended cross-complaint so that the entire action is deemed
dismissed as of January 17, 2020.

                                6
Plaintiff’s opposition
       Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the motion was
untimely. In addition, he asserted that Barilla had the authority,
either actual or ostensible, to bind Suntree. Moreover, Suntree
had ratified the settlement: “Not once in the 18 months between
the execution of the Stipulation for Settlement and the filing of
this motion, did Suntree claim that Mr. Barilla lacked authority
to execute the document. Not despite being represented by
multiple attorneys at once; not despite the Stipulation for
Settlement being filed with the Court along with a notice of
settlement; not despite the Court’s dismissal pursuant to that
Stipulation for Settlement; not despite [plaintiff’s] multiple
subsequent letters demanding performance under the terms of
the Stipulation for Settlement; not despite the tens of emails and
telephone conversations between [plaintiff’s] counsel and
Suntree’s various attorneys.”
Trial court order
       After entertaining oral argument, the trial court denied
Suntree’s motion. In so doing, it found that Suntree had pled in
its verified SACC, consistent with California law and the
CC&R’s, that it was the authorized representative of the
individual members of the homeowners’ association. In fact, the
settlement agreement itself contains an express representation
by Suntree that it was acting on behalf of itself and its individual
homeowners.
       The trial court further found that Barilla had at least
ostensible authority to represent and bind Suntree to the
settlement.

                                 7
       Finally, the trial court found that Suntree had ratified
Barilla’s and Suntree’s attorneys’ authority by its postsettlement
conduct.
Appeal
       This timely appeal ensued.
                            DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review and relevant law
       “Section 473, subdivision (d), provides a trial court ‘may, on
motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside
any void judgment or order.’ ‘[I]nclusion of the word “may” in the
language of section 473, subdivision (d) makes it clear that a trial
court retains discretion to grant or deny a motion to set aside a
void judgment [or order].’ [Citation.] However, the trial court
‘has no statutory power under section 473, subdivision (d) to set
aside a judgment [or order] that is not void . . . .’ [Citation.]
Thus, the reviewing court ‘generally faces two separate
determinations when considering an appeal based on section 473,
subdivision (d): whether the order or judgment is void and, if so,
whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in setting
it aside.’ [Citation.] The trial court’s determination whether an
order is void is reviewed de novo; its decision whether to set aside
a void order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citations.]”
(Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
1009, 1020.)
       “In determining whether an order is void for purposes of
section 473, subdivision (d), courts distinguish between orders
that are void on the face of the record and orders that appear
valid on the face of the record but are shown to be invalid
through consideration of extrinsic evidence. ‘This distinction may
be important in a particular case because it impacts the

                                 8
procedural mechanism available to attack the judgment [or
order], when the judgment [or order] may be attacked, and how
the party challenging the judgment [or order] proves that the
judgment [or order] is void.’ [Citation.]” (Pittman v. Beck Park
Apartments Ltd., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1020–1021.)
       “An order [or judgment] is considered void on its face only
when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the
judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic
evidence. [Citations.] . . . If the invalidity can be shown only
through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations
or testimony, the order is not void on its face. Such an order
must be challenged within the six-month time limit prescribed by
section 473, subdivision (b), or by an independent action in
equity. [Citation.]” (Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd.,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021.)
II. Trial court properly denied Suntree’s motion to vacate the
dismissal
       We conclude that the trial court properly denied Suntree’s
motion to vacate the dismissal.
       A. Suntree’s motion was untimely
       First, we agree with plaintiff that Suntree’s motion was
untimely. The challenged judgment of dismissal is not void, as
the alleged invalidity can only be shown by extrinsic evidence,
namely the declarations offered by Suntree. As such, Suntree
was required to bring its motion by no later than July 2020.
Because it did not file its motion to vacate until March 2021, the
motion was untimely and therefore properly denied.

                                9
      B. The parties reached a valid settlement agreement
      Setting that aside, we conclude that the parties reached a
valid and enforceable settlement agreement.5 And the dismissal
was entered in accordance with the terms of that settlement.
             1. Barilla was authorized to act on behalf of Suntree
      Suntree contends that the settlement agreement is
unenforceable because Barilla, the board member who attended
the mediation and signed the settlement agreement, did not have
actual authority to act on behalf of Suntree. Even assuming that
Barilla did not have actual authority to bind Suntree, the trial
court did not err in finding that plaintiff demonstrated that he
had the ostensible authority to do so.
      “Ostensible authority is authority that the principal, either
intentionally or by lack of ordinary care, causes or allows a third
party to believe the agent possesses. [Citation.] Ostensible
authority is based on the principle of estoppel, and requires the
essential elements of estoppel, i.e., representation, justifiable
reliance, and changed position as a result of the reliance.
[Citation.] Ostensible authority must be based on the acts or
declarations of the principal and not solely upon the agent’s

5
       Suntree asserts that plaintiff knew he needed “full Board
approval and full [individual homeownership] approval” in order
for a binding settlement to be valid. As set forth herein, the
evidence demonstrates otherwise. The trial court acted well
within its discretion in rejecting Sarvian’s declaration that he
orally relayed this “ground rule[]” to plaintiff, particularly in
light of the contrary written evidence submitted in opposition to
the motion. (People v. Canada (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 637, 642
[“The rule that a trial judge is not required to accept as true the
sworn testimony of a witness applies to affidavits. [Citations.]”)

                                 10
conduct. [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Roseville Toyota, Inc. (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 994, 1005.)
       Here, there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s
finding of ostensible authority. After all, plaintiff’s attorney
notified Suntree that plaintiff would only participate in
mediation if “a representative of the Suntree HOA [was] present,
and vested with the authority to approve a compromise at the time
of mediation.” Suntree’s attorney responded in writing: “The
HOA will have at least one Board member at the Mediation with
full authority to resolve this matter.” Suntree then sent Barilla
to the mediation,6 where the parties reached a settlement. Under
these circumstances, the trial court did not err in finding that
Barilla had ostensible authority to negotiate a settlement on
behalf of Suntree.
             2. Suntree ratified Barilla’s authority and the
settlement agreement
       Furthermore, Suntree’s behavior after the settlement
ratified the authority of Barilla. “‘Ratification is the voluntary
election by a person to adopt in some manner as his own an act
which was purportedly done on his behalf by another person, the
effect of which, as to some or all persons, is to treat the act as if
originally authorized by him.’” (Estate of Stephens (2002) 28

6
      In his March 2021 declaration filed in support of Suntree’s
motion to vacate, Barilla asserts that he did not have the
authority to settle the claims arising in this lawsuit. The trial
court acted well within its discretion in implicitly disbelieving
Barilla. (Mosesian v. Bagdasarian (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 361,
368 [“It is axiomatic that a reviewing court will not reweigh the
evidence nor pass upon the credibility of witnesses. [Citations.]”)

                                 11
Cal.4th 665, 673.) “‘A purported agent’s act may be adopted
expressly or it may be adopted by implication based on conduct of
the purported principal from which an intention to consent to or
adopt the act may be fairly inferred, including conduct which is
“inconsistent with any reasonable intention on his part, other
than that he intended approving and adopting it.”’” (Behniwal v.
Mix (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1040.)
        Here, plaintiff filed and served a notice of settlement,
seeking dismissal of the action. Suntree did not object.
Thereafter, the trial court sent the parties a notice of settlement
and vacated all subsequent hearing dates. Again, Suntree did
not object. In fact, Suntree did nothing to challenge the
purportedly invalid settlement until more than a year later, when
it filed its motion to vacate the dismissal. Instead, it participated
in ongoing negotiations to resolve the outstanding items for the
long form agreement. Suntree’s conduct, fairly interpreted,
demonstrates its intent to approve and adopt the terms of the
stipulation for settlement that Barilla executed on its behalf.
              3. The individual homeowners were not
indispensable parties
        Urging us to reverse, Suntree argues that the individual
homeowners were indispensable parties to the litigation, entitled
to notice and an opportunity to participate in the mediation and
object to the proposed settlement. We are not convinced.
        Suntree brought its cross-action against plaintiff as the
authorized representative of the individual homeowners
pursuant to section 382, Civil Code section 5980, and the
CC&R’s. And, Suntree alleged in its verified pleading that it was
“specifically authorized and obligated to maintain and to repair
damage to the Common Areas.” It follows that the individual

                                 12
homeowners were not indispensable parties to this matter. (See
Sierra Palms Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold Line Foothill
Extension Construction Authority (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1127,
1134 [individual homeowners not required to be named in an
action concerning common areas].)
       Ranch at the Falls LLC v. O’Neal (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 155
(Ranch at the Falls) is readily distinguishable. In that case, the
trial court granted judgment to a plaintiff who sought to quiet
title to two claimed easements with residential gated
communities. (Id. at p. 159.) Individual homeowners within the
gated communities, who owned the private streets abutting their
lots, brought a motion to vacate the judgment. (Id. at pp. 159,
171.) The trial court denied the motion, finding that the
individual homeowners were not indispensable parties to the
plaintiff’s lawsuit. (Id. at p. 160.) The Court of Appeal reversed,
reasoning, inter alia, that the individual “homeowners should
have been joined as parties, as required under the quiet title
statutes.” (Id. at p. 172.) After all, they owned the private
streets that abutted their properties. (Ibid.) Thus, the judgment
could not be binding against them unless they “were parties, or
unless, as a matter of law, the [homeowners’ association] had the
authority to bind its members to the grant of an easement over
the streets owned by the members.” (Id. at p. 173.)
       In contrast, plaintiff here does not allege a quiet title
claim.7 While Suntree does allege a claim for quiet title in the

7
       Suntree offers no legal authority in support of its assertion
that the recordation of plaintiff’s lis pendens at the onset of this
litigation made the individual homeowners indispensable parties
to this litigation. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)

                                 13
SACC, it did not join the individual homeowners as parties. In
fact, the SACC alleges that it was bringing its action “as the
authorized representative of its members” pursuant to section
382, Civil Code section 5980, and the CC&R’s.
       Furthermore, in Ranch at the Falls, at issue was a
judgment entered after a trial; the parties attempting to vacate
the judgment were individual homeowners who had not been
joined as defendants in the quiet title causes of action. (Ranch at
the Falls, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 167, 171.) But here, there
is a settlement agreement that expressly provides that the
homeowners association was acting on behalf of itself and the
individual homeowners.
       Relying heavily upon Gauss v. GAF Corp. (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 1110 (Gauss), Suntree contends that the signatures
of all of the individual homeowners were required in order for the
settlement to be enforced via section 664.6. In other words,
according to Suntree, Gauss forecloses the use of the section
664.6 procedure to “enforce a settlement agreement signed only
by a party’s agent.” (Gauss, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121.)
       In Gauss, the court considered “the enforceability of mass
tort settlements” under section 664.6. (Gauss, 103 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1112.) “Specifically, can section 664.6 be used to enforce a
settlement that was signed by a party’s agent, rather than the
party itself, when the agent had sole and exclusive authority to
settle claims on the party’s behalf?” (Gauss, at p. 1113, italics
added.) The court concluded that it could not: “The summary,
expedited enforcement procedure afforded by section 664.6 is only
available when a settlement satisfies the statutory requirements
designed to ensure the parties have actually consented to the
terms of the settlement.” (Gauss, at p. 1113, italics added.)

                                14
       Gauss is inapplicable to the instant case for at least two
reasons. First, Gauss was interpreting the requirements of
section 664.6. But the motion at issue here was one under
section 473 to vacate as void the settlement-prompted dismissal.
These two statutes have different purposes and different
procedural requirements. (See Basinger v. Rogers & Wells (1990)
220 Cal.App.3d 16, 23 [distinguishing 473 motion from 664.6
motion]; Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 799
[distinguishing 473 motion from 663 motion].) To the extent
Suntree is asking us to incorporate section 664.6’s requirements
into this section 473 motion, we decline to do so. Second, even if
we were to apply section 664.6’s requirement that there be a
writing “signed by the parties” to the lawsuit (§ 664.6, subd. (a)),
the individual homeowners were not parties to the instant
lawsuit (see Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 584
[“in providing for an enforcement mechanism for settlements by
‘parties,’ the Legislature intended the term to literally mean the
litigants personally”]), and, as set forth above, they were not
required to be. Thus, even if Gauss and section 664.6 applied,
their signatures were not required.
       Finally, we reject Suntree’s reliance upon the filed, but not
served Doe amendments, as evidence that the individual
homeowners were indispensable parties to this litigation. As
aptly pointed out by the trial court, the parties agreed that
plaintiff would only serve the Doe defendants (the individual
homeowners) after the mediation, or not at all if the mediation
resulted in a settlement. In light of this agreement, the
individual homeowners could not have been indispensable
parties.

                                 15
                        DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to costs on
appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                       _____________________, J.
                                       ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

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