Court Opinion

ID: 9790972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:02:14.771667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.933262
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
WAKATSUKI, J.,
WITH WHOM NAKAMURA, J., JOINS
I respectfully dissent.
In my view, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 803-42(b)(3) and article I, section 7 of our state constitution clearly preclude the admissibility of the recordings suppressed by the trial court.
*315I.
In enacting HRS § 803-42(b)(3), the House of Representatives’ clear intention is expressed in Standing Committee Report No. 605-78, reprinted in 1978 House Journal at 1661-1662:
[T]he bill incorporates added safeguards against unwarranted invasions of privacy. The most significant differences between the bill and the federal and most other state wire-tapping statutes are the complete prohibition of court-ordered, bugging.... In the interest of limiting invasions of privacy, the bill prohibits court-ordered bugging .... [B]ugging requires the consent of all parties entitled to privacy in the place to be bugged .... (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, the Senate’s clear intention is stated in Standing Committee Report 983-78, reprinted in 1978 Senate Journal at 1172:
[T]his bill incorporates added safeguards against unwarranted invasions of privacy, the most important of which is the prohibition of bugging, that is, the use of microphones to intercept conversations.
The court’s “primary duty [in interpreting and applying statutes] is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and to implement that intention to the fullest degree.” Black Construction Corp. v. Agsalud, 64 Haw. 274, 283, 639 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1982) (quoting Keller v. Thompson, 56 Haw. 183, 189, 532 P.2d 664, 669 (1975)).
Here, the majority did just the opposite by ignoring the intention of the legislature and deciding admissibility on a narrow construction of the word “installation.” The majority apparently reads “installation” to require affixing the recording device to some part of the physical premises. Since the recording device was attached to the police informant and not to the walls of the room or any part thereof, or its furnishings, the court reasons that there was no installation pursuant to HRS § 803-42(b)(3).
The definition of “install”, however, is not so narrow. Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines it as follows:
To set up or fix in position for use or service.
Id. at 717; see also The Random House College Dictionary 690 (rev. ed. 1980).
It is obvious that the recording device was installed onto the *316body of the informant for use or service to record the conversation that took place in Dr. Lee’s private office. Further, this obvious and more reasonable interpretation of the word “installation” in the statute is mandated by the legislature in Senate Committee Report No. 983-78, supra, at 1172:
Several members of your Committee have expressed concern that this bill lacks several important privacy safeguards specifically recommended by the Crime Commission. It may be that this concern can be minimized by calling for strict judicial construction of this law ....
Here, “strict judicial construction” certainly is not intended to explain the construction of the word “installation.” Rather, the context indicates a construction which limits the infringement of privacy rights. In other words, the legislature intended a judicial construction that would safeguard privacy rights on a stringent standard.
II.
The court reasons that narrowly construing “installation” is supportable because physically affixing a recording device within a room “necessitates a surreptitious entry into the premises [which] effects a greater invasion of privacy than does wiretapping.” (Emphasis added.)
Physical trespass is not the issue here. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), recognizes that the interception of oral communications concerns individuals’ rights to privacy, not property rights. In State v. Lo, 66 Haw. 653, 675 P.2d 754 (1983), this court did say that HRS § 803-42(b)(3) involved a “statutory right associated with places.” Id. at 661, 675 P.2d at 760. That language, however, cannot be read as suggesting that property interests control against unauthorized or unwarranted invasion into private places. The controlling interest is still an individual’s right to privacy. “[HRS § 803-42(b)(3)] protects ‘any private place’ and the privacy of anyone rightfully there,” Id. at 661, 675 P.2d at 760.
Trespass onto the property to install the devices was not relevant in Lo. In that case, the defendant was lured to a hotel room which was rigged with electronic surveillance and recording devices with the approval of the occupier of the room. The defendant’s *317privacy interests were at stake, not his property interests.
The majority concedes that Dr. Lee’s office is a private place pursuant to HRS § 803-42(b)(3). The fact that the entry into the doctor’s private office to affix a recording device was not surreptitious should not be material nor relevant. What is paramount is that under HRS § 803-42(b)(3) the privacy of Dr. Lee, who was in his private office when his conversation with the informant was surreptitiously recorded, should be fully protected.
The court speaks of the absurd result which would occur if a consenting participant may testify as to the contents of a conversation while unauthorized recordings of that conversation are inadmissible as evidence. That argument completely ignores the history of HRS § 803-42(b)(3). The legislature specifically determined, by enacting HRS § 803-42(b)(3), that conversations occurring in private places may not be recorded without the consent of all parties. In State v. Lo, supra, the consenting participant was free to testify as to the contents of the conversation. Nonetheless, this court held that the recordings were inadmissible.
The untenable result in this case is that the recording is admissible because the recording device was installed on the informant. Yet, a recording of the same conversation is not admissible if installed to the underside of a desk, or to the wall, or any other part of the doctor’s private office. Even if the device was installed to the outside of Dr. Lee’s office, or not installed at all but operated from outside the office to record the same conversation taken place in'his private office, the majority concedes that those recordings would be inadmissible. This absurdity loses sight of the legislature’s intent to protect individuals’ rights to privacy in private places irrespective of the methods used.
III.
The court found the recordings in this case unaffected by article I, § 7 of our state constitution, by relying on State v. Okubo, 67 Haw. 197, 682 P.2d 79 (1984), which in turn relies on State v. Lester, 64 Haw. 659, 649 P.2d 346 (1982). I disagree. I am of the opinion that Okubo and Lester should be overturned.
I do not concur with the majority that our state constitution *318provides no greater protection for individual privacy from government intrusion than does the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that Katz, supra, determines the outcome of this case. The language and history of our state’s constitutional provision on search and seizure convince me that Katz is not dispositive of constitutional issues involving surreptitious recordings by participant monitors. See Lester, supra, at 667 and 672.
A.
Prior to the 1968 Constitutional Convention, the language in the search and seizure provision of our state constitution mirrored the Fourth Amendment of our federal constitution.
During the convention, Katz v. United States, supra, had already been announced by the United States Supreme Court. Katz recognized that the Fourth Amendment protected privacy as well as property interests. Since states cannot diminish the protections accorded under the Fourth Amendment of our federal constitution, I do not question Katz’s applicability to our state in 1968.
The 1968 Constitutional Convention, however, amended our constitutional search and seizure provision by adding thereto the underscored language as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized or the communications sought to be intercepted.
In view of Katz at the time the Convention adopted the amendments, I do not believe that such amendments were made merely to re-emphasize the holdings of Katz. To the contrary, the recorded history of the amendments clearly indicates that the Convention intended to give broader protection to our citizens in regards to individuals’ private conduct and communications than would the holdings of Katz.
The Committee on Bill of Rights, Suffrage and Elections of the Convention stated:
Your Committee recognizes the need for certain protections of the individual’s right to privacy in the context of today’s society.
*319The tremendous growth of electronic communications technology along with a corresponding growth of electronic surveillance techniques make possible the ready encroachment upon a person’s private conduct and communication.
Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 55, reprinted in Proceedings of the 1968 Constitutional Convention, Vol. I, 233.
The Committee further stated:
Your Committee is of the opinion that inclusion of the term “invasions of privacy” will effectively protect the individual’s wishes for privacy as a legitimate social interest. The proposed amendment is intended to include protection against indiscriminate wiretapping as well as undue government inquiry into and regulation of those areas of a person’s life which are defined as necessary to insure man’s individuality and human dignity.
Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 55, supra, at 233-234.
When the majority reasons that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy under Dr. Lee’s circumstances, one must only look to Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 55, supra, adopted by the Convention to conclude that the majority’s reasoning is clearly contrary to the expressed intent of the Convention. In furtherance of implementing the Convention’s intent, the legislature enacted the Hawaii Wiretapping Law. HRS §§ 803-41 to -50. Obviously, the Convention and the legislature acknowledged that our society recognizes the reasonable expectation of privacy of a communication taking place in a private place.
B.
Where a recorded conversation gives clear evidence of guilty acts in a criminal proceeding, the facts and abhorence of such criminal acts may give sway to not impede the government’s ability to obtain criminal convictions.
In People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975), cert. den., 423 U.S. 878 (1975), the Michigan Supreme Court recognized the utility and importance of participant monitoring as an investigative tool of law enforcement. But “[ejqually significant is the security and confidence enjoyed by our citizenry in knowing that the risk of intrusion by this type of electronic surveillance is subject *320to the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. at 566, 227 N.W.2d at 515. That count further stated:
Our laws must ensure that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen may continue to engage in private discourse, free to speak with the uninhibited spontaneity that is characteristic of our democratic society.

Id.

Justice Marshall, in dissent, stated in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 121 (1980),
Because we are called on to decide whether evidence should be excluded only when a search has been “successful”, it is easy to forget that the standards we announce determine what government conduct is reasonable in searches and seizures directed at persons who turn out to be innocent as well as those who are guilty.
Unlike the majority, I cannot agree that our society today accepts as reasonable the possibility that anyone with whom we speak carries on him a recording device and that such recorded conversations may be used as evidence against us. Such a proposition, in my opinion, will only breed suspicion, mistrust and consequently, the result will be the destruction of our “family” society which this court should zealously protect and maintain.
The spector of electronic eavesdropping could easily have a profound effect on the discourse of those people formerly willing to assume the risk that their listeners might betray their confidential communication. If individuals can no longer determine when they are speaking “off the record”, they may lose their sense of personal security, a fragile composite of many irrational psychological factors. If this informality is destroyed, an important release mechanism for relieving social tension will cease to function.
Comment, B.U.L.Rev. 831, 842 (1972).
In State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 877-878 (1978), on rehearing 596 P.2d 10 (1979), the Alaska Supreme Court stated:
[M]any of the casual, the caustic, the irreverent remarks would be inhibited, as would criticism of individuals and policies. The employee could not with impunity point to shortcomings in his superiors or in the functions of his office. Families could not freely discuss the foibles of others. Clever *321prodding may elicit thoughtless comments about sex, religion, politics, acquaintances, personal finances and even one’s innermost thoughts. One takes the risk that his friend may repeat what has been said. One shouldn’t be required to take the additional risk of an entirely different character — that his conversation is being surreptitiously transcribed or broadcast.
A confidence repeated by a false friend is received by third parties with the attendant circumstances of the “friend’s” credibility and memory. One’s ill-considered remarks are not thereby preserved for posterity on the reels of magnetic tape nor insulated from the faded memories inherent in the passage of time. Faced with the choice of silence or the risk that comments will be “etched in stone,” a speaker may choose the former alternative, to the manifest diminution of the spontaneity which marks our daily discourse.
Our state constitution does not nullify any use of surreptitious recordings. Our constitution only requires, except in a few exceptional circumstances, that a warrant be obtained prior to conducting such searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.
This court, in holding that participant recordings of conversations are not searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy, removes the warrant requirement. The removal of the warrant requirement effectively removes such police activities from judicial control and from the command of reasonableness. See, Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 393 (1974). This result was never intended by the framers of our constitution, nor by our legislature.
I would affirm the suppression of the recordings.