Court Opinion

ID: 9900409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:30.24586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.219209
License: Public Domain

No. 343                July 6, 2023                     753

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
            RAY LOREN ROCKAFELLOR II,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
            Hood River County Circuit Court
               19CR18975, 19CR18981;
              A176458 (Control), A176459

  John A. Olson, Judge.
  Submitted December 7, 2022.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Sara F. Werboff, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  SHORR, P. J.
  Affirmed.
754   State v. Rockafellor
Cite as 326 Or App 753 (2023)                             755

        SHORR, P. J.
         In this consolidated criminal appeal, defendant
appeals from two judgments that together convicted him of
one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants, ORS
813.010(4), and one count of resisting arrest, ORS 162.315.
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discre-
tion and violated defendant’s rights under Article I, section
11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
when it ordered defendant, as well as all other individuals
in the courtroom who did not provide proof of their vacci-
nation against COVID-19, to wear a protective face mask
during trial except while testifying. We conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate defendant’s
constitutional rights and therefore affirm.
         The relevant facts are purely procedural. Defendant
was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants
and resisting arrest in two separate cases stemming from
the same incident. As defendant proceeded to a consolidated
jury trial in June 2021, defendant filed a “motion for con-
stitutional trial procedures,” in which he requested that
the “court state trial court procedures on the record or in
writing in advance of trial,” requested that “all witnesses
be barred from wearing facial coverings that bar full view
of facial expressions,” and requested supplemental intro-
ductory jury instructions. The trial court responded with
a letter informing defendant of the “trial protocol the court
will be employing to ensure a fair trial that is also safe for
all the participants” in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pan-
demic. That letter specified certain social distancing and
masking requirements that would be followed, including
that “[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)]
guidelines” would be followed “regarding masks,” that
“[a]nyone providing proof of completed vaccination will be
permitted but not required to remove their mask,” and that
“[w]itnesses will testify behind a clear divider from the wit-
ness chair but will not wear a mask while testifying.” Those
measures were consistent with Chief Justice Order (CJO)
No. 21-016 (May 25, 2021), which was in effect at the time of
trial and which required the use of protective face masks in
756                                           State v. Rockafellor

Oregon courts with only certain delineated exceptions, one
of which being that a judge was permitted to allow “fully
vaccinated participants to remove their protective face cov-
erings during the proceeding, provided that the judge both
requests and reviews proof of fully vaccinated status of any
such participant.” CJO No. 21-016, ¶ 4(a)(1).1
         On the morning of trial, defendant moved in limine
“asking although [defendant is] not vaccinated if he’d be
allowed to not wear a mask during his trial.” Defendant
cited State v. Schroeder, 62 Or App 331, 661 P2d 111, rev den,
295 Or 161 (1983), analogized the court’s mask require-
ment to shackling, and contended that the issue presented
“a due process question.” Defendant also argued that the
court’s mask requirement “poses some Confrontation Clause
issues” under both the state and federal constitutions, posit-
ing that the masking requirement would prevent him from
meeting his accusers “face to face.” Defense counsel added
that defendant had “passed a COVID test * * * yesterday.”
The state responded that defendant’s right to confront wit-
nesses would not be impeded by the masking requirement
and contended that masking was not analogous to shack-
ling. Nevertheless, the state conceded that it was not “famil-
iar with the actual Oregon or even federal guidelines right
now, or rules in place in terms of being masked,” and that
“without knowing the full rules either I—I can’t object, but
I’m not going to take a position at this point.”
         The trial court denied defendant’s request for an
exception from the masking requirement for unvaccinated
individuals, stating that “[m]y understanding of the current
CDC guidelines is that it’s recommended that persons who
are unvaccinated continue to wear masks, persons that are
vaccinated are not required to wear masks. We’re going to
follow the guidelines.” As to defendant’s shackling argu-
ments, the court concluded that there was nothing “about
wearing a mask that is the least bit stigmatizing in the cur-
rent society,” that masking was “completely innocuous under
current culture,” and that it bore “no relation to” shackling.
The court noted that the attorneys, jurors, and court would

   1
     The CJO is available at https://www.courts.oregon.gov/Documents/
CJO_2021-016.pdf (accessed June 27, 2023).
Cite as 326 Or App 753 (2023)                              757

all be wearing masks unless they both presented proof of
vaccination and chose to remove their mask. Finally, as to
defendant’s confrontation arguments, the court concluded
that masking did not “prevent a person from seeing the wit-
nesses against them and hearing their testimony and being
present with them.” The court reiterated that, should defen-
dant choose to testify, he would not “be required to wear a
mask during his testimony.”
         A jury was subsequently empaneled and heard the
evidence presented. After the state rested its case, the trial
court noted for the record that both lawyers and two jurors
had worn masks for the duration of the one-day trial thus
far, which the court believed supported its “supposition that
[masking is] not stigmatizing.” The jury returned guilty ver-
dicts on both counts, the court entered judgments of convic-
tion, and this timely appeal followed.
         As explained above, defendant assigns error to the
trial court’s order requiring defendant to wear a protective
face mask during trial except when testifying, contend-
ing that the masking requirement “infringed upon defen-
dant’s constitutional rights and was not justified based on
the record in this case.” Whether a defendant was denied
his constitutional rights to confrontation and a fair trial
are legal questions that we review for errors of law. State v.
Martin, 370 Or 653, 657-58, 522 P3d 841 (2022) (reviewing
alleged violation of confrontation rights for errors of law);
State v. Presock, 281 Or App 277, 280, 380 P3d 1192 (2016),
rev den, 360 Or 852 (2017) (reviewing alleged violation of
due process rights for errors of law). However, when such
rights are not implicated, we review a trial court’s exercise
of control over courtroom proceedings for abuse of discre-
tion. See State v. Pierce, 307 Or App 429, 432, 477 P3d 437
(2020) (reviewing trial court’s control over the presentation
of evidence and examination of witnesses for abuse of dis-
cretion); see also State v. Washington, 355 Or 612, 629, 330
P3d 596, cert den, 574 US 1016 (2014) (reviewing trial court’s
order requiring that a defendant be physically restrained
for purposes of courtroom security for abuse of discretion).
Under those standards, we first review the court’s ruling
without deference to determine whether the law was applied
correctly. If application of the correct legal principles leads
758                                         State v. Rockafellor

to more than one correct outcome, we then consider whether
the trial court’s decision was within the range of legally
correct discretionary choices and produced a legally correct
outcome. State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 312, 4 P3d 1261 (2000).
If so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id.
          Defendant raises two distinct arguments—first,
that the court’s masking requirement violated his right to
face-to-face confrontation under Article I, section 11, and the
Sixth Amendment, and second, that the masking require-
ment violated his right to appear without visible restraints
under Article I, section 11, and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The parties contend that defendant’s state
and federal rights are indistinguishable, and thus do not
offer differentiated arguments as to those separate authori-
ties. We agree and proceed in the same fashion.
         We first consider defendant’s confrontation rights—
under Article I, section 11, the right “to meet the witnesses
face to face,” and under the Sixth Amendment, the right “to
be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The central
purpose of confrontation is “to ensure the reliability of the
evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to
rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding
before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 US 836, 845,
110 S Ct 3157, 111 L Ed 2d 666 (1990). As the United States
Supreme Court noted in its earliest case considering the
Confrontation Clause, the primary object of the provision
was
   “to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
   sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against
   the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-
   examination of the witness in which the accused has an
   opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sift-
   ing the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him
   to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
   look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and
   the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is
   worthy of belief.”
Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237, 242-43, 15 S Ct 337,
39 L Ed 409 (1895). Confrontation combines four separate
elements—physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and
Cite as 326 Or App 753 (2023)                              759

observation of demeanor by the trier of fact—which together
ensure that evidence admitted against a criminal defendant
is “reliable and subject to * * * rigorous adversarial testing.”
Craig, 497 US at 846; see also Kirby v. United States, 174 US
47, 55, 19 S Ct 574, 43 L Ed 890 (1899) (similarly describing
confrontation as ensuring evidence is established by “wit-
nesses who confront [the defendant] at the trial, upon whom
he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-
examine, and whose testimony he may impeach”). Those ele-
ments also ensure a fair trial and the integrity of the fact-
finding process. Coy v. Iowa, 487 US 1012, 1019-20, 108 S Ct
2798, 101 L Ed 2d 857 (1988).
         However, face-to-face confrontation is still not the
“sine qua non of the confrontation right.” Craig, 497 US at
847. In certain “narrow circumstances,” competing inter-
ests may warrant “dispensing with confrontation at trial.”
Id. at 848. In other words, “precedents establish that the
Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial, a preference that must occasionally
give way to considerations of public policy and the necessi-
ties of the case.” Id. at 849 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted, emphasis in original). Specifically, a defen-
dant’s right to confront accusatory witnesses may be sat-
isfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial
“where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further
an important public policy” and “where the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured.” Id. at 850. Indeed, a declar-
ant’s otherwise reliable hearsay statements have survived
Confrontation Clause challenges despite the fact that the
declarant is not testifying in court. Id. at 847-48.
         We conclude that the circumstances here, in which
all courtroom participants including defendant were required
to wear a protective face mask if they did not provide the
court with proof of vaccination against COVID-19, with the
exception that all witnesses were ordered to remove their
masks while testifying, did not impede defendant’s rights to
confront the witnesses against him under Article I, section
11, or the Sixth Amendment. As explained above, confronta-
tion is primarily concerned with ensuring the reliability of
evidence offered by witnesses, and ensuring that a defendant
760                                       State v. Rockafellor

and jury have adequate access to witnesses. Craig, 497 US
at 845; Mattox, 156 US at 242-43. Here, the witnesses who
testified against defendant did so in his presence and in the
presence of the jury, where they were under oath and subject
to cross-examination. No element of the right to confronta-
tion promises the defendant that his entire face will be lit-
erally seen or requires the witness or others to observe the
same. In short, the defendant’s right to confrontation does
not require that defendant be unmasked in the courtroom.
See also United States v. Tagliaferro, 531 F Supp 3d 844,
849-50 (SDNY 2021) (similarly concluding that requiring a
criminal defendant to wear a protective face mask did not
violate his right to physical confrontation).
         Thus, we move to defendant’s argument that the
trial court’s order requiring him to wear a protective face
mask during trial except when testifying was akin to a
physical restraint visible to the jury that violated his rights
under Article I, section 11, and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In defendant’s view, the court’s order requir-
ing him to wear a mask conveyed to the jury that defendant
was a “potential vector of sickness,” thus prejudicing him.
         Both the state and federal constitutions prohibit
prejudicial security measures such as visibly shackling
or otherwise physically restraining a criminal defendant
during a jury trial unless doing so is justified by an essential
state interest. Deck v. Missouri, 544 US 622, 629, 125 S Ct
2007, 161 L Ed 2d 953 (2005); State v. Guzek, 358 Or 251,
263, 363 P3d 480 (2015), cert den, 580 US 1121 (2017). That
requirement rests on the understanding that “inherently
prejudicial” measures like visible shackling “undermine[ ]
the presumption of innocence and the related fairness
of the fact-finding process.” Deck, 544 US at 630; see also
Washington, 355 Or at 628 (“the use of physical restraints
can impinge on the presumption of innocence to which a
defendant is entitled and may also impair a defendant’s abil-
ity to participate in his or her defense, such as by consulting
with counsel or by taking the stand as a witness”). In other
words, the right is intended to ensure that the defendant is
afforded the presumption of innocence and a fair trial, and
may be implicated by practices that “single out the accused
Cite as 326 Or App 753 (2023)                              761

from everyone else in the courtroom.” Holbrook v. Flynn, 475
US 560, 567, 106 S Ct 1340, 89 L Ed 2d 525 (1986).
         When an inherently prejudicial security measure
is at issue, a trial court must make a determination that
such restraints are justified by a state interest specific to
that particular trial. Deck, 544 US at 629; Washington,
355 Or at 628 (requiring court to hold a hearing for that
purpose where it must receive evidence from both parties
before making “a record of its factual findings and reason-
ing in support of its order”). If such findings are not made, or
where the order lacks adequate justification, “the defendant
need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due
process violation”—instead, “the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the shackling error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Deck, 544 US
at 635 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see
also Washington, 355 Or at 629 (reviewing similar security
measure orders for abuse of discretion).
         Both state and federal case law have been clear,
however, that only some security measures are “inherently
prejudicial” such that they create an unacceptable risk that
the jury will consider “impermissible factors” in making its
ultimate determination. Flynn, 475 US at 570. For instance,
in Flynn, the deployment of security personnel in the court-
room—specifically, four officers quietly sitting in the first
row of the courtroom’s spectator section—was not inher-
ently prejudicial, in part because “the presence of guards at
a defendant’s trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he
is particularly dangerous or culpable.” Id. at 569. Where the
protective measure is not inherently prejudicial, the defen-
dant must show actual prejudice as a result of the measure.
Id. at 572. Under those circumstances, the “defendant bears
the burden of establishing that the trial court abused its
discretion in adopting the security measures that it did.”
Washington, 355 Or at 650.
         Here, we do not see a basis to conclude that the
court’s order regarding protective face masks, which applied
not only to defendant but to all courtroom participants
equally, singled out defendant in a way that undermined the
presumption of innocence or defendant’s right to a fair trial.
762                                       State v. Rockafellor

The order required all courtroom participants to wear a pro-
tective face mask throughout the trial unless they provided
the court with proof of their vaccination against COVID-19.
The only exception to the court’s order was the requirement
that witnesses remove any mask while testifying behind a
clear divider. Those protective measures were fully consis-
tent with the requirements of CJO No. 2021-016 and were
not inherently prejudicial to defendant. As the trial court
noted for the record, other courtroom participants also wore
masks, including both attorneys and two of the six jurors.
Within that context, the fact that defendant wore a face
mask except when testifying did not necessarily commu-
nicate to the jury that defendant specifically was a danger
to the community—instead, the jury could have made any
number of inferences about defendant’s mask-wearing, or
none at all. And, because the court’s order permitted those
who were vaccinated to continue to wear a protective face
mask if they chose to do so, we do not agree with defen-
dant’s argument that the court’s order necessarily com-
municated to the jury that he was unvaccinated or that he
was particularly dangerous. Thus, because the court’s face
mask order was not inherently prejudicial towards defen-
dant, defendant bears the burden to establish that he was
actually prejudiced by the order. But defendant does not
point us to any evidence of actual prejudice as a result of
the face mask order, and we see no evidence of such preju-
dice on this record. The jury received the usual instructions
regarding the presumption of innocence, the proof-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt requirement, and their duty to decide the
case based on the evidence, rather than bias or prejudice.
Absent some evidence of actual prejudice, we must presume
that the jurors followed those instructions. See State v.
Smith, 310 Or 1, 26, 791 P2d 836 (1990) (“jurors are assumed
to have followed their instructions, absent an overwhelming
probability that they would be unable to do so”).
         In conclusion, the trial court did not violate defen-
dant’s right to confront the witnesses against him or his
right to a fair trial free of visible restraints when it ordered
defendant and other courtroom occupants to wear a protec-
tive face mask throughout trial unless they presented the
court with proof of their vaccination against COVID-19 or
Cite as 326 Or App 753 (2023)                              763

were testifying behind a clear divider. Further, the order
applied to all courtroom occupants equally, meaning that
defendant was not subject to an inherently prejudicial physi-
cal restraint. Defendant presents no argument that his right
to a fair trial was actually prejudiced by the court’s order.
As a result, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion
in issuing and enforcing the order.
        Affirmed.