Court Opinion

ID: 9964960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 14:12:55.768038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:50.353239
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                  In The Supreme Court

     United States of America, Plaintiff,

     v.

     Patrick Fitzgerald Clemons, Defendant.

     Appellate Case No. 2022-001378

ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
         APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                      Opinion No. 28202
           Heard October 25, 2023 – Filed May 1, 2024

           CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED

     United States Attorney Adair Ford Boroughs, Assistant
     United States Attorney Kathleen Michelle Stoughton, and
     Assistant United States Attorney Justin William
     Holloway, all of Columbia, for Plaintiff.

     Elizabeth Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Defendant.

     Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
     Attorney General W. Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney
     General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Deputy
     Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, all of
     Columbia, for Amicus Curiae State of South Carolina.
JUSTICE HILL: Patrick Clemons pled guilty in federal district court to being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). At the time of
his conviction, Clemons had two prior South Carolina convictions for Criminal
Domestic Violence of a High and Aggravated Nature (CDVHAN), S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-25-65, and one prior South Carolina conviction for Assault and Battery Second
Degree (AB2d), S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(D). As a result of these prior
convictions, Clemons was designated an armed career criminal under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and subject to an enhanced,
mandatory-minimum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment. After he was
sentenced, Clemons appealed the imposition of his enhanced sentence under the
ACCA to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing one may
be convicted of both CDVHAN and AB2d in South Carolina by committing reckless
or negligent conduct, and therefore, neither qualifies as a predicate offense for
enhanced sentencing under the ACCA's "elements clause." See 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(2)(B)(i) (defining a "violent felony" as "any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another");
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1821–22 (2021) (plurality) (holding a
crime that requires only a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a "violent
felony" as defined by the ACCA's elements clause).
Pursuant to Rule 244, SCACR, the Fourth Circuit has certified the following
questions to this Court:
   1. What mental state is required to commit South Carolina Assault and Battery
      Second Degree, in violation of S.C. Code § 16-3-600; and

   2. What mental state is required to commit South Carolina Criminal Domestic
      Violence of a High and Aggravated Nature, in violation of S.C. Code § 16-25-
      65?

Before answering these questions, we note that, in both S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-65
and S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600, the South Carolina Legislature has chosen to
proscribe multiple types of criminal conduct. In other words, instead of defining one
way of committing the crime, these statutes provide several, disjunctive ways the
elements of the offense may be met. As such, there is not a one-size-fits-all mens
rea required for a conviction under either S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-65 or S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-3-600(D). Rather, the mens rea required for culpability under either S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-25-65 or S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(D) depends upon the actus rea
of the crime being prosecuted as CDVHAN or AB2d. See United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980) (explaining "[c]riminal liability is normally based upon
the concurrence of two factors, 'an evil-meaning mind [and] an evil-doing hand'"
(quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952))).

Further, as the Borden plurality explained, federal courts use the "categorical
approach" to determine whether an offense satisfies the elements clause of the
ACCA. Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822; Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137,
144 (2010). Under the categorical approach, the facts underlying a conviction are
immaterial to whether a conviction will be deemed a "violent felony" under the
ACCA. Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822. Instead, "[i]f any—even the least culpable—of
the acts criminalized" by the offense's statute do not meet the requirements of the
elements clause of the ACCA, then that conviction cannot serve as an ACCA
predicate. Id.

The Borden plurality explained that, under federal law, there are "four states of mind
. . . that may give rise to criminal liability[; t]hose mental states are, in descending
order of culpability: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence." Id. at 1823.
After a thorough analysis into the legislative intent of the ACCA, specifically the
elements clause, the Borden plurality held the term "against the person of another"
within the elements clause requires "the perpetrator direct his action at, or target,
another individual." Id. at 1825. The Borden plurality reasoned the elements clause
of the ACCA excludes reckless conduct, which is not "aimed in that prescribed
manner" and to hold otherwise would contravene the purpose of the ACCA, stating:
"The treatment of reckless offenses as 'violent felonies' would impose large
sentencing enhancements on individuals (for example, reckless drivers) far afield
from the 'armed career criminals' ACCA addresses—the kind of offenders who,
when armed, could well 'use [the] gun deliberately to harm a victim.'" Id. (quoting
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S., 137 145 (2008)). The Borden plurality defined the
mens rea of recklessness by stating: "[a] person acts recklessly, in the most common
formulation, when he 'consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk'
attached to his conduct, in 'gross deviation' from accepted standards." Id. at 1824
(quoting Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c)).

South Carolina has not wholescale adopted the federal hierarchy of mental states,
nor does South Carolina verbatim employ the definitions of purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, or negligence found in Borden. Nevertheless, for the purposes of
answering the Fourth Circuit's inquiry, we rephrase the two certified questions as
follows:

   1. May a defendant be convicted of the offense of South Carolina Assault and
      Battery Second Degree, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600, with a
      mens rea of recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code?

   2. May a defendant be convicted of the offense of South Carolina Criminal
      Domestic Violence of a High and Aggravated Nature, in violation of S.C.
      Code Ann. § 16-25-65, with a mens rea of recklessness as defined by the
      Model Penal Code?

We hold the answer to both of these questions is "yes."

                  I.   Assault and Battery in the Second Degree

South Carolina's general assault and battery crimes are codified by degrees in S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-3-600 (2015 & Supp. 2023). AB2d is found in § 16-3-600(D),
which states, in relevant part:

       (D)(1) A person commits the offense of assault and battery in the
       second degree if the person unlawfully injures another person, or offers
       or attempts to injure another person with the present ability to do so,
       and:

            (a) moderate bodily injury to another person results or moderate
            bodily injury to another person could have resulted; or

            (b) the act involves the nonconsensual touching of the private
            parts of a person, either under or above clothing.

       (2) A person who violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor,
       and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than two thousand five
       hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than three years, or both.

AB2d was enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform
Act of 2010, which abolished or repealed all common law assault and battery
offenses and all prior statutory assault and battery offenses and, in place of these
offenses, codified attempted murder in S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-29 (2015), and four
degrees of assault and battery, stratified by level of injury and other aggravating
factors, in § 16-3-600. State v. Middleton, 407 S.C. 312, 315, 755 S.E.2d 432, 434
(2014).

In South Carolina, what mens rea is required for conviction of a statutory offense is
a question of legislative intent. State v. Ferguson, 302 S.C. 269, 272, 395 S.E.2d
182, 183 (1990). When a criminal statute is silent as to the intent necessary for a
conviction, we consider the common law and the development of the statute to
decide whether the Legislature intended the crime to require criminal intent and, if
so, what level of intent. State v. Jefferies, 316 S.C. 13, 19, 446 S.E.2d 427, 430–31
(1994). In criminal statutes where the Legislature has not precisely set forth the level
of intent required for conviction, we have been reluctant to fix the level at a high
setting, unless there is evidence that such a level accords with legislative intent. To
do otherwise would upset the separation of powers, as it would carry the risk that we
have narrowed the prosecutorial reach of a statute the Legislature designed to widely
sweep. See State v. Morris, 376 S.C. 189, 201–02, 656 S.E.2d 359, 366 (2008)
(holding Court would not "weaken" securities fraud statute by requiring proof of
scienter rather than recklessness where there was no evidence legislature intended
higher level of intent of scienter for conviction).

The Model Penal Code defines the mental state of recklessness in the following
way:

             A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element
             of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial
             and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or
             will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
             nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose
             of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him,
             its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard
             of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
             actor's situation.

Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c).

We find some of the criminal acts proscribed by § 16-3-600(D) may be committed
with general criminal intent, including the mental state of recklessness as defined by
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c). See Ferguson, 302 S.C. at 272, 395 S.E.2d at 183
("In offenses at common law, and under statutes which do not disclose a contrary
legislative purpose, to constitute a crime, the act must be accompanied by a criminal
intent, or by such . . . indifference to duty or to consequences as is regarded by the
law as equivalent to a criminal intent." (quoting State v. Am. Agric. Chem. Co., 118
S.C. 333, 337, 110 S.E. 800 (1922)); 6A C.J.S. Assault § 86 (2023) ("Wanton and
reckless conduct may substitute for the intentional conduct element necessary for a
battery."). To be sure, the subsections of § 16-3-600(D) dealing with attempt may
require specific intent. See, e.g., State v. Sutton, 340 S.C. 393, 397, 532 S.E.2d 283,
285 (2000) ("In the context of an 'attempt' crime, specific intent means that the
defendant consciously intended the completion of acts comprising the choate
offense. In other words, the completion of such acts is the defendant's purpose.");
see also State v. King, 422 S.C. 47, 55–56, 810 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2017) (reaffirming
Sutton's definition of "specific intent" for an attempted crime).

Today, we hold only that, under some circumstances, a person may be convicted of
AB2d with a mens rea of recklessness.

      II.   Criminal Domestic Violence of a High and Aggravated Nature

CDVHAN is codified in S.C. Code Ann § 16-25-65 (2015 & Supp. 2023), and states,

in relevant part:

             (A) A person who violates Section 16-25-20(A) is guilty
                 of the offense of domestic violence of a high and
                 aggravated nature when one of the following occurs.
                 The person:

                    (1) commits the offense under circumstances
                        manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
                        human life and great bodily injury to the victim
                        results;

                    (2) commits the offense, with or without an
                        accompanying battery and under circumstances
                        manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
                        human life, and would reasonably cause a person
                     to fear imminent great bodily injury or death; or

                 (3) violates a protection order and, in the process of
                     violating the order, commits domestic violence in
                     the first degree.
South Carolina's current version of CDVHAN, along with its general criminal
domestic violence statute, S.C. Code Ann § 16-25-20 (2015 & Supp. 2023), was
enacted in 2015 as part of the Domestic Violence Reform Act. To be guilty of any
degree of domestic violence under either S.C. Code Ann § 16-25-65 or S.C. Code
Ann § 16-25-20, the perpetrator must satisfy the elements of S.C. Code Ann § 16-
25-20(A). Section 16-25-20(A) of the South Carolina Code states:

             It is unlawful to:

                 (1) cause physical harm or injury to a person's own
                     household member; or

                 (2) offer or attempt to cause physical harm or injury to
                     a person's own household member with apparent
                     present ability under circumstances reasonably
                     creating fear of imminent peril.

As in AB2d, in S.C. Code Ann § 16-25-20(A), the Legislature has chosen to
criminalize battery and attempted battery. Likewise, we therefore hold some of the
criminal acts proscribed in CDVHAN may be committed with general criminal
intent, including a mental state of recklessness as defined by Model Penal Code
§ 2.02(2)(c). It is also possible the sections dealing with attempt may require
specific intent.

Today, we hold only that, under some circumstances, a person may be convicted of
CDVHAN with a mens rea of recklessness.

                                  III.   Conclusion

In South Carolina, it is possible for a defendant to be found guilty of both AB2d and
CDVHAN with a mens rea of recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code.
The Fourth Circuit's certified questions are
ANSWERED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.