Court Opinion

ID: 9788416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:51:20.825088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:10.907834
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(concurring):
I 32 I concur in the thoughtful analysis, as well as the result, of the majority opinion. However, I write separately to suggest that in light of the persuasive authorities cited by the majority in explaining the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony, the time has come to revisit the boundaries of trial court discretion in excluding expert testimony on the subject. Such a decision is not for this court to make, but I would urge the Utah Supreme Court to consider mandating the admission of such testimony in appropriate cases.
' 33 As explained in detail in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), eyewitness testimony is subject to the inexact vagaries of human perception and memory and inevitably leads to mistaken identifications in a substantial number of cases. See id. at 488-91. Not only are jurors largely unaware of the problems with eyewitness testimony, they may actually give it greater weight than other forms of evidence. I see little to lose and much to gain if criminal defendants are allowed to present expert testimony explaining how and why the eyewitness testimony in any particular case may be unreliable. This conclusion is only bolstered by the post-Long cases and articles cited by the majority. See, e.g., Richard A. Wise et al., A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 807, 823-42 (2007) (arguing for admission of expert testimony when the primary or sole evidence against the defendant is eyewitness testimony).
4 34 While a Long instruction is certainly better than nothing in terms of ameliorating the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony, it may not be as helpful to a jury as a live witness who can address the particular circumstances of any individual case. In appropriate cases, le., cases where the State's case rests substantially on eyewitness testimony, *1012an expert's individualized critique of the circumstances may be both relevant and helpful to the jury. See Utah R. Evid. 401 (" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); id. R. 702(a) (stating that an expert may testify to specialized knowledge that "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence"). Further, because the expert can specifically address the impact of the particular facts of the case on the reliability of the eyewitness testimony, expert testimony should not be considered merely cumulative to a Long instruction. Cf. id. R. 403 (allowing exclusion of cumulative evidence); State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 17, 48 P.3d 953 ("[It is left to the trial court's sound discretion to decide whether the proffered expert testimony would constitute a lecture, the substance of which can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in a jury instruction, as opposed to through expert testimony." {emphasis added)). Accordingly, it seems appropriate that such evidence should be admitted absent some good reason for the trial court to exercise its discretion and exclude it.
€385 For the very reasons enunciated in the majority opinion, I urge the supreme court to revisit the issue of expert testimony in eyewitness cases. Nevertheless, the majority opinion faithfully implements the law as it currently stands, and under the current state of the law I concur in that opinion in all respects.