Court Opinion

ID: 9533734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:34:12.364192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:09.272435
License: Public Domain

Justice CASTILLE
concurring and dissenting.
Like Mr. Justice Eakin, I am in accord with the Majority’s approach and decision with the exception of what the majority characterizes as appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth exercised its peremptory challenges, at this 1981 trial, in a racially discriminatory fashion which violated the later, non-retroactive decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The Majority notes that the PCRA1 court dismissed this Batson claim without addressing it in its opinion. The Majority vacates the dismissal and remands for the PCRA court to consider the Batson issue in the first instance, including consideration of appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing. I respectfully dissent from the vacatur and, in addition, I write because I have some concerns respecting the Majority’s inaccurate portrayal of the claim for PCRA review purposes.
As a general matter, I believe it is essential for trial judges to address in their opinions all properly preserved claims, so as to facilitate meaningful appellate review. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 868 A.2d 379 (Pa.2005); Commonwealth v. Fulton, 583 Pa. 65, 876 A.2d 342, 2002 WL 1160755 (May 30, 2002); Commonwealth v. (Roy) Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167 (1999). In order to further this salutary requirement, the Court need only to remand for the trial court to file a supplemental opinion addressing the collateral claim arising from jury selection. Because it is premature to vacate the denial of relief on the claim, however, I dissent from the vacatur.
I think it is particularly unwise to vacate the order in light of the Majority’s mischaracterization of the actual nature of the claim. The Majority poses this claim as if it were a Batson *145claim pure and simple. If this were so, the ordered remand is futile, for appellant unquestionably waived any Batson claim when he failed to raise it at trial and on direct appeal. As Justice Eakin correctly notes, for purposes of this collateral attack, the only cognizable and non-waived claim arising out of jury selection is a layered claim sounding in the ineffective assistance of prior counsel.
This case was tried long before Batson was decided. Counsel did not foresee that decision and did not preserve a Batson-type claim. As a matter of Sixth Amendment law, it is beyond cavil that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to anticipate a change in the law such as Batson. Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 473 (Pa.2004) (“It is settled that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict changes and/or developments in the law.”); Commonwealth v. Todaro, 549 Pa. 545, 701 A.2d 1343, 1346 (1997) (same). Given these immutable facts, as well as the other obvious deficiencies in appellants proffer, there is much to be said for Justice Eakin’s view that appellant’s claim of counsel ineffectiveness respecting Batson should be rejected now rather than later, so that his new penalty hearing may proceed apace. Indeed, upon remand for supplemental opinion, the PCRA court need say little more than what I have noted, given that the claim turns upon an attempt to secure, via the guise of ineffectiveness, the retroactive benefit of a non-retroactive decision.
The Majority vacates, rather than merely remanding for a supplemental opinion. The Majority also fails to make clear that the claim upon which it vacates sounds in ineffective assistance of counsel, and not in Batson qua Batson. I therefore dissent from the Court’s mandate.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq.