Court Opinion

ID: 9563891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:49:22.818955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:07.025015
License: Public Domain

PERRY, J.,
dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the majority’s views of the law of eminent domain. It should be noted that to reach a reversal of the judgment of the trial court, the majority rely upon the law of nuisance. The majority seem to admit that this has never been the law of this state, but argue that it should be. So far as I have been able to ascertain, no jurisdiction whose constitution reads as does ours has ever sustained such a proposition.
In substance, plaintiffs’ assignments of error are, (1) the trial court refused to submit to the jury as evidence of a taking, evidence that airplanes did travel directly over the property owned by plaintiffs at a height of more than 500 feet, and (2) the trial court refused to submit to the jury evidence of airplane flights which do not travel over the plaintiffs’ property but over property adjacent thereto. It is these adjacent flights which, if considered, must rest solely upon the law of nuisance.
Considering first the issue of flights above the 500-foot level, I am of the opinion that such flights may be considered in determining whether there has been a “taking” in the constitutional sense.
In the case of United States v. Causby, 328 US 256, 66 S Ct 1062, 90 L Ed 1206, the rule of law was established that ownership in land could not be considered in this space age as extending upward “to *202the periphery of the universe” and that therefore Congress had the authority to declare that all navigable airspace above our land was a part of the public domain.
Congress had defined navigable airspace as that airspace above the minimum safe altitude of flight as prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. As applied to the matter before us, the minimum airspace established for safety is 500 feet. At first blush it would appear that all airspace above the 500-foot level of the plaintiffs’ property, being within the public domain, plaintiffs would have no proprietary interest therein which could be taken, but I do not believe this conclusion can be sustained.
Subsequent to the determination of United States v. Causby, supra, the Civil Aeronautics Authority included in its determination of airspace the glide path and the take-off path to and from the 500-foot level to the airport. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 US 84, 82 S Ct 531. The Supreme Court of the United States, in considering the effect of this additional regulation within the scope of the national airport plan, provided in 49 USCA, Section 1101, et seq., stated that private ownership in land “presupposes” the use of some of the airspace above. The court therefore held there was a constitutional taking of an air easement over the plaintiff’s property line directly in the glide and ascent path of the planes.
From this latter case it appears that the power of Congress to establish a navigable airspace as public domain may not authorize a trespass above the owner’s property, if, as a consequence thereof, there is injury to the owner’s reasonable use and enjoyment of his land.
*203It seems to me this is a proper rule to balance public and private interests arising from the abolishment of the common-law rule that ownership in land extended upward to the periphery of the universe, therefore, where the flight directly over the land, by reason of noise and vibration, can be said in fact to cause serious interference in the owner’s use and enjoyment of the property, it is a trespass, which is a constitutional taking, and requires full compensation.
In the matter before us, however, after searching the record, I am unable to find any evidence that would support a judgment of a taking, based on interference with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the land by airplane flights above the 500-foot level. Therefore, in my opinion, the trial court did not err in refusing to submit this issue to the jury.
Turning now to the issue presented as to whether the flights over the lands of adjacent owners, which create a noise nuisance, can constitute a taking of the plaintiffs’ property in a constitutional sense.
So far as material, our constitution, which provides for just compensation for property taken, reads as follows:
“Private property shall not be taken for public use, * * * without just compensation; * * Art I, § 18.
In the recent case of Cereghimo v. State, 230 Or 439, 370 P2d 694, a ease of inverse condemnation, this court pointed out that the taking of property in the constitutional sense was the taking of all or a part of an individual’s possessory right in the property, not just interference with its use and enjoyment. The court stated:
“The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of *204the United States and Article I, Section 18, of the Oregon Constitution are identical in language and meaning. The word ‘property’ in these provisions is not ‘used in its vulgar and untechnieal sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law,’ but ‘to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.’ United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-378, 65 S.Ct. 357, 359, 89 L.Ed. 311, 156 A.L.R. 390. When the sovereign exercises the power of eminent domain ‘it deals with Avhat laAvyers term the indiAddual’s “interest” in the thing in question. That interest may comprise the group of rights for which the shorthand term is “a fee simple” or it may be an interest known as an “estate or tenancy for years”, as in the present instance.’ Ibid. See 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.) §§ 63, 64. Or it may be such a right as is involved in this case.”
That this same rule as to a constitutional taking in an inverse condemnation suit is adhered to by the United States is found in United States v. Gausby, supra. In that ease government planes (heavy bombers) were flown at an elevation of approximately 87 feet directly over the Causby property as they took off and returned to the airfield. The court stated:
“* * * If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it.
“We agree that in those circumstances there would be a taking. Though it would be only an easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would *205"be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The owner’s right to possess and exploit the land— that is to say, his beneficial ownership of it— would be destroyed. It would not be a case of incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance such as was involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546. In that case property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for damages resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke and the like incidental to the operations of the trains. In the supposed case, the line of flight is over the land. And the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were used for the runways themselves.” (Emphasis mine.)
Again, that there may be no question of the rule of law, the court remanded the case for an accurate description of the easement taken. To the same effect is the recent case of Griggs v. Allegheny County, supra.
That the definition of a constitutional taking has consistently been grounded in the appropriation of an interest in the realty itself has been a rule of law of long standing under the Constitution of the United States is shown by the case of Portsmouth Harbor L. & H. Co. v. United States, 260 US 372, 43 S Ct 135. In this case damages were sought in inverse condemnation because of the establishment of a fort in which there were gun emplacements and shells were fired over and across the plaintiff’s land. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said: “This is a claim in respect of land which, or an interest in *206which, is alleged to have been taken by the United States government. * # *” (Italics mine.)
This court has always recognized and maintained this distinction between the loss of a proprietary right and damage in inverse condemnation proceedings. This is borne out by the cases cited by the majority.
In Iron Works v. O.R. & N. Co., 26 Or 224, 37 P 1016, this court carefully pointed out that the owner of property adjacent to a street has a proprietary interest in the street. And thus having a proprietary interest, this interest cannot be taken without just compensation.
This same thought is carried out in the case of McQuaid v. Portland & V. R’y. Co., 18 Or 237, 22 P 899, and to show that the court had in mind the distinction between a constitutional taking for which compensation must be paid and the creation of a nuisance which does not require compensation, I quote:
it# # * The latter will, doubtless, be obliged to submit to the ordinary inconveniences and consequences which the construction of a railroad track, and the moving of a locomotive and cars thereon, occasion — be compelled to endure the smoke, noise, and screeching which naturally result from the use of that character of vehicles; but they cannot be deprived of the right of ingress and egress to and from their premises without compensation. * * *”
In Brand v. Multnomah County, 38 Or 79, 60 P 390, 62 P 209, 50 LRA 389, also cited, the court simply held that a change of grade in a street did not create an additional servitude upon an abutting owner’s interest in the street. This case has no application to the matter at hand.
*207In Kurtz v. Southern Pacific Co., 80 Or 213, 155 P 367, 156 P 794, also cited, the basis of relief in the original opinion of the court is somewhat obscure, but no doubt is left in the opinion on rehearing. The relief of injunction was granted upon the fact that there had been no prior purchase or condemnation of the owner’s proprietary interest in the land, “an easement of ingress and egress,” the court stating:
“The evidence discloses that the spur track of which complaint is made is a special injury affecting no other property owner than plaintiff, that it will materially and premanently [sic] affect his ingress and egress to and from his lots, and consequently his property rights are invaded in a manner which can only be lawfully done by compromise or condemnation.”
Not a single Oregon case will support the theory that a mere nuisance can be considered a taking, as provided in our constitution, nor does any other jurisdiction where the language of the constitution is similar to ours hold that a mere nuisance can be considered a taking, nor does the majority cite any case so holding. The reason for this is fundamental. The law of trespass and nuisance is based upon different concepts of social justice.
A nuisance, although a tort, does not contemplate a physical invasion of the property of another, but the use of a person’s own property in such a way as to interfere with another’s free enjoyment of his property.
“A nuisance, in the ordinary sense in which the word is used, is any thing that produces an annoyance — any thing that disturbs one or is offensive; but in legal phraseology it is applied to that class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use by a person of his *208own property, real or personal, or from Ms own improper, indecent or unlawful personal conduct, working an obstruction of, or injury to, a right of another or of the public, and producing such material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or hurt, that the law will presume a consequent damage. * * 1 Wood on Nuisances, 3d Ed, § 1, page 1.
While a nuisance may cause as much damage to a person’s enjoyment of the use of his property as a trespass, this does not mean that because an individual has suffered a damage, this damage requires compensation by the public.
“It goes without saying that the courts have never construed the ‘just compensation’ clause of a federal or state constitution as requiring payment for all injuries imposed upon persons or property by acts of government. Any such requirement would make government itself impossible. No legislature can enact an important statute which does not directly or indirectly impose a material loss on some property owners. The imposition of a tax, the establishment of a new banking system or currency reform, the enactment of a new protective tariff, will often inflict losses on many private citizens far in excess of the total loss imposed by the most drastic act of condemnation in the history of the world. Yet no compensation for these losses is required.” 1 Orgal on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, 2d Ed, § 1, page 5.
Governmental acts may be detrimental to the personal interests of adjoining land owners, but this does not constitute a taking.
“Sanitary Dist. v. Johnson, 343 Ill, 11, 174 N.E. 862 (1931) (sewage reduction plant); Winchester v. Ring, 312 Ill. 544, 144 N.E. 333, 36 A.L.R. 520 (1924) (cemetery); Schuler v. Wilson 322 Ill, 503, 153 N.E. 737, 48 A.L.R. 1027 (1926) (school); *209Frazer v. Chicago, 186 Ill. 480, 57 N.E. 1055, 51 L.R.A. 306 (1900) (smallpox hospital); Mayfield v. Board of Education, 118 Kan. 138, 233 Pac. 1024 (1925) (school); Barry v. Smith, 191 Mass. 78, 77 N.E. 1099, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1028 (1906) (contagious disease hospital). In Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 Pac. 377, 18 A.L.R. 393 (1921) the court said: ‘Private property may be damaged, and its value lessened because it is located close to some public building, such as a jail, or hospital, or public hall, yet such damage is purely incidental and not recoverable. The noise consequent on the operation of railroad trains upon a private right of way may depreciate the value of adjoining private property, and be_ an annoyance to those living in the immediate neighborhood, but such damage is purely consequential and is not recoverable.’ ” 1 Orgal on Valuation Under Eminent Domain, 2d ed, § 1, page 6.
Practically all human activities engaged in carrying out a commercial enterprise may interfere with someone’s enjoyment of his property. It is the right of an owner of land to use his land in any lawful manner, and it is only when the manner of use creates a grave interference with another’s enjoyment of his property that the law will seek to redress this type of wrong. This is a natural requirement of organized society. There must be some give and take to promote the well-being of all. The underlying basis in nuisance law is the common-sense thought that in organized society there must be an adjustment between reasonable use and personal discomfort. No such consideration is involved in the law of trespass.
Trespass of property which, as has been pointed out, effects a taking in a constitutional sense, comprehends a physical invasion of the property either by the person or by causing a physical object to enter *210upon or over the property of another. Martin et ux. v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Or 86, 342 P2d 790.
“One who intentionally and without a consensual or other privilege
(a) enters land in possession of another or any part thereof or causes a thing or third person so to do, or
(b) remains thereon, or
(c) permits to remain thereon a thing which the actor or his predecessor in legal interest brought thereon in the manner stated in §§ 160 and 161.
is liable as a trespasser to the other irrespective of whether harm is thereby caused to any of his legally protected interests.” Restatement of the Law, Torts, Vol 1, § 158.
Therefore, it is the taking of an owner’s possessory interest in land as compared with interfering with an owner’s use and enjoyment of his land that distinguishes a trespass which is a “taking” from a nuisance, which is not. *211Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 NC 185, 77 SE2d 682.
*210“There is a distinction between a nuisance and a trespass, although many things are sometimes called nuisances which are mere trespasses, and it has been said that an action for a nuisance which violates a property right incident to the ownership of land is in the nature of one for trespass to realty. The difference is that a nuisance consists of a use of one’s own property in such a manner as to cause injury to the property or other right or interest of another and generally results from the commission of an act beyond the limits of the property affected, while a trespass is a direct infringement of another’s right of property. Thus, where there is no actual physical invasion of the plaintiff’s property, the cause of action is for nuisance rather than trespass. * * *” 39 Am Jur 282, Nuisances, § 3.
*211Since a nuisance interferes with the enjoyment of the right to possess land, different rules of law apply to the balancing of the interests of owners. An owner’s use of his own land will not create liability unless his use causes substantial interference with another’s enjoyment of his property. 4 Restatement of Torts, Interference with the Use of Land, Ch 40, § 822, p 226. Also, the utility of the use that creates the nuisance must be weighed against the “gravity of the harm.” Id, Ch 40, § 826, p 241, and Ch 40, § 828, p 250.
Such considerations are foreign to the law of trespass. A trespass imports damage and permits recovery, though no actual damage is caused. This rule of law is so well established citation of authority is unnecessary. There can be no balancing of interests.
Where a permanent trespass is committed by govvernment, the constitution will not permit a balancing of the value of the taking for the benefit of the public against the interests of an owner. The owner must be fully compensated for his loss.
As pointed out, different policy considerations are involved in the laws of trespass which can ripen into a taking, and the laws of nuisance. The people have established these policy differences through the constitution and the enactment of laws which provide for entirely different procedures and considerations. See ORS 281.210, et seq., and ORS 105.505, et seq. This court ought not to exceed its powers to establish a different policy.
The distinction between what the law is, and a belief of what the law ought to be, is pointed out in *212the case of Batten v. United States, 306 F2d 580 (10th Cir 1962). This case is directly in point with the issue before us, and the majority opinion therein sustains the position which I have taken here.
The majority here, as does Mr. Chief Judge Murrah in his dissent in Batten v. United States, supra, seeks to place consequential damage in the same category as a taking, without attempting to draw the distinction which has always existed in the law; that is, the taking of a possessory interest as opposed to damage.
A nuisance takes none of the title in the property. The full legal title rests in the owner. If the nuisance is abated in any manner, the damage suffered has ended and the land is again restored to its full value to the owner. On the other hand, if there is a taking, the property right of ownership or some interest therein has been transferred from the owner to the sovereign, and does not again revert to the original owner even though the use to which the property has been put by the sovereign ceases.
It may well be, as suggested by Chief Judge Murrah, that “fairness and justice, as between the State and the citizen, requires the burden imposed to be borne by the public and not by the individual alone.” But the question of who should bear the burdens imposed by the creation and continuance of a great society created and maintained for the benefit of all, is, as pointed out herein, a political question to be resolved by a majority of the people through their elected representatives and not by judicial fiat.
As pointed out by the majority in Batten v. United States, supra, this course has been taken in many states by its citizens, and this is the course *213which should be taken in this state, if the entire burden is to be borne by the public.
In setting forth the principles of law which should prevent this court as a matter of law, as well as policy, from commingling the remedies afforded under the law of eminent domain and nuisance, I do not wish to convey the thought that the plaintiffs are without a remedy. The discussion that the plaintiffs may have a remedy requires consideration of the majority’s statement to the effect that an easement of nuisance may be created as between private individuals. The rule has no application to public nuisances.
This court has established the rule that a damage action lies against a municipality, which has the same immunity from suit as does the state, for the creation of a nuisance for the benefit of the public. Wilson v. City of Portland, 153 Or 679, 58 P2d 257.
We have also stated that the “convenience of the public” will not authorize the public to acquire an easement of nuisance by prescription. Ulmen v. Town of Mt. Angel, 57 Or 547, 112 P 529.
A careful reading of the case of Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 US 546, 34 S Ct 657, 58 L Ed 1088, cited by the majority, will show that this decision, which permitted a recovery of damages for a nuisance, was based upon the same principles announced by this court in Wilson v. City of Portland, supra.
It is true that the damage created by a nuisance may equal a taking of the whole, but this does not justify this court in stating that a nuisance may constitute a taking of a possessory interest in land, as contemplated by our constitution.
*214Since, as the plaintiffs state, this action was tried on the theory of inverse condemnation, the trial court committed no error in its rulings and the judgment should be affirmed. If the plaintiffs have suffered damage for a non-trespassory nuisance, they may seek redress in an action or suit, as provided by law.
For the reasons above set forth, I dissent.
Chief Justice McAllister and Justice Eossman concur in this dissent.