Court Opinion

ID: 9740582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:37:55.748411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.022791
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
DeBruler, J.
At trial the accused took the witness stand and, upon questioning by his counsel, sought to testify to facts and events which the trial court construed to be evidence of alibi. The prosecutor objected to this testimony on the ground that no notice of alibi had been filed in accordance with the alibi statute. Defense counsel argued that the objection should be overruled because the evidence that was being offered was not evidence of alibi. Upon consideration of the argument, the trial court sustained the objection, and the accused was not permitted to give this disputed testimony. The correctness of this ruling is not challenged in this appeal. However, in my judgment, the legal position taken by defense counsel at the time of this argument provides an adequate basis for our determination that he was not ineffective in his representation. In the judgment of defense counsel, no notice of alibi was necessary because the testimony would not directly put the accused in a place other than the place of the offense at the critical time. The record provides support for his judgment. The excluded testimony was that, at the time of the offense, the accused was accompanied by one Bonnie Bentkowski. Bonnie Bentkowski was not mentioned by the victims of the alleged offense at trial. Whether this was evidence of alibi at all is arguable, and therefore, like the majority, I conclude that there was no denial here of the effective assistance of counsel.
The majority opinion is underpinned in part by the holding in Lake v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 264, 274 N.E.2d 249. In *568that case, this Court held that, if no statutory notice of alibi is given, the accused’s own testimony constitutionally may be excluded at trial if such testimony would establish an alibi. I dissented in that case on other grounds and would now register my dissent on this additional ground. The personal right of the accused in a criminal case to testify and to be represented by counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 13, of the Indiana Constitution. These personal rights are held ransom by a statute, the purpose of which is to protect the State from facing surprise defenses. Such need of the State surely exists, but it is amply satisfied by limiting the exclusionary rule of the statute to alibi witnesses other than the accused. If, as in the case at bar, the accused should choose to offer his own alibi evidence as the lone evidence of alibi in the case, the State should be permitted a continuance to meet the situation. Surprise testimony of this sort by the accused is seldom overwhelming. Since a continuance is a suitable remedy, the exclusionary sanction is an unjustified and overbroad intrusion upon the constitutional right of the accused to testify and be represented by counsel. In Shelton v. Tucker, (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.E.2d 231, the principle applicable here was stated:
“In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” 364 U.S. at 448 (Footnotes omitted.) See also: State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, (1947) 225 Ind. 360, 74 N.E.2d 914.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 334 N.E.2d 691.