Court Opinion

ID: 9384267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-02 23:15:08.360762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.170904
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                         OF TEXAS
                                      NO. WR-92,475-01

                  EX PARTE MATHEW DAVID LOZOYA, Applicant

            ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN
             CAUSE NO. F46837-A IN THE 18TH DISTRICT COURT
                           JOHNSON COUNTY

     HERVEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which RICHARDSON,
NEWELL, WALKER, and MCCLURE, JJ., joined. KELLER, P.J., KEEL, and
SLAUGHTER, JJ., concurred. YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

                                          OPINION

       Applicant pled guilty to two counts of third-degree felony obtaining a controlled

substance by fraud. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 481.129(a)(5)(B), (d)(2). Pursuant

to a plea bargain, Applicant pled guilty to two counts, and the State 1 abandoned the other

       1
          When we refer to the State, we mean the local district attorney’s office. In contrast, we
also refer to the State Prosecuting Attorney (SPA), which filed an amicus curiae brief in this
case. The SPA’s Office is a state-wide agency that represents the people of Texas in all
proceedings before this Court. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 42.001; compare id. § 42.005(b) (“A district
or county attorney may assist the state prosecuting attorney in representing the state before the
                                                                                         Lozoya–2

two. The State agreed to recommend a four-year sentence of confinement in one count

and to place Applicant on community supervision for 10 years in the other. The trial court

followed the agreement and ordered Applicant’s sentences to run concurrently. However,

the maximum initial period of supervision for this offense, without a lawful extension,

which is absent here, is five years. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12 § 3(b)(2)(B) (2017)

(maximum initial period for a felony is 10 years except that it is five years for other

certain third-degree felonies, including obtaining a controlled substance by fraud). In year

six, the prosecutor filed a motion to revoke. The trial court revoked Applicant’s

community supervision and sentenced him to five years’ incarceration. We filed and set

this case to determine (1) whether Applicant should be estopped from challenging the

trial court’s revocation of his community supervision because he accepted benefits under

his plea agreement, (2) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke Applicant’s

supervision after the five-year period expired if estoppel does not apply, and (3) the

proper remedy if Applicant is entitled to relief. We conclude that Applicant is not

estopped from challenging the trial court’s order revoking his community supervision,

that the trial court had no jurisdiction to revoke Applicant’s community supervision, and

that the proper remedy is to vacate the trial court’s order revoking Applicant’s

community supervision.

court of criminal appeals.”), with 42.005(a) (“The state prosecuting attorney may assist a district
or a county attorney in representing the state before a court of appeals if requested to do so by
the district or county attorney.”).
                                                                                           Lozoya–3

                                   PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2

       About six months after the five-year period of supervision expired, a motion to

revoke was filed. 3 The capias issued seven days later, and the trial court subsequently

revoked Applicant’s community supervision. Applicant agreed to plead true to the

allegations in return for the State recommending a five-year sentence of imprisonment.

       The State later notified Applicant that it believed that the trial court did not have

jurisdiction to revoke his community supervision when it did because no motion to

revoke had been filed nor did a capias issue before expiration of the five-year period.

Applicant filed the instant writ application making the jurisdiction argument. After

       2
         We do not recite the facts supporting the charges because this case deals with legal
issues that do not turn on those facts.
       3
           The district attorney’s office alleged that Applicant,

             •   Failed to totally abstain from the illegal use of controlled substances
                 because he admitted to consuming methamphetamine on or about March
                 28, 2019,

             •   Failed to report to his supervision officer on April 22, 2019,

             •   Failed to pay his $60 supervision fee for the months of April through
                 December 2016; January through December 2017; January through
                 December 2018; and January through April 2019,

             •   Failed to pay his $361 court cost as scheduled,

             •   Failed to timely pay his $1,000 fine, his $10 crimestopper fee, his $80
                 bond fees, and $80 UA fees, and

             •   Failed to participate in his mandatory drug or alcohol continuum of care
                 treatment plan after completing the SAFEP Relapse Program successfully
                 complete Phase I of his continuum of care due to him leaving the
                 Salvation Army and not returning.
                                                                                     Lozoya–4

receiving the application, we remanded it for further record development. The trial court

entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, and it recommended that we grant relief.

                FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

       The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that mostly dealt

with Applicant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his counsels’ lack

of knowledge about applicable community-supervision law. 4 Relevant to this case, the

habeas court concluded that an order placing a defendant on community supervision was

void to the extent it purports to subject a defendant to an unlawful period of supervision.

It further concluded that, because Applicant’s community supervision ended after the

lawful five-year period expired without a motion to revoke having been filed within that

time, the court did not have the jurisdiction to revoke Applicant’s community

supervision, and the judgment purporting to do so was void for lack of jurisdiction. The

habeas court relied on Prior v. State, 795 S.W. d 179, 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990),

Pedraza v. State, 562 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), and Coffey v.

State, 500 S.W.2d 515, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

       A habeas court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are reviewed under a

bifurcated standard. See Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d 558, 567 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014). We defer to a habeas court’s findings of fact that are supported by the record,

especially when the findings are based on credibility and demeanor. Rios v. State, No.

       4
       Applicant had different counsel for his motion to revoke. That counsel also did not
know about the five-year limitation.
                                                                                     Lozoya–5

PD-0441-21, 2022 WL 17481021, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2022). We also defer to

a habeas court’s rulings on mixed questions of law and fact when resolution of the legal

issue turns on the credibility of evidence or demeanor of witnesses. Guzman v. State, 955

S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review de novo legal questions and mixed

questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility or demeanor. Id. The habeas court

is the original factfinder, but this Court is the ultimate factfinder and can exercise that

authority “to make contrary or alternative findings and conclusions.” Ex parte Reed, 271

S.W.3d 698, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

                                        ESTOPPEL

       This Court has recognized two theories of estoppel: estoppel by contract and

estoppel by judgment. Rhodes v. State, 240 S.W.3d 882, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We

have said that estoppel by contract means that “a party who accepts benefits under a

contract is estopped from questioning the contract’s existence, validity, or effect” and that

estoppel by judgment means that “[o]ne who accepts the benefits of a judgment, decree,

or judicial order is estopped to deny the validity or propriety thereof, or of any part

thereof, on any grounds; nor can he reject its burdensome consequences.” Id. (quoting 31

C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 124 (contract by estoppel), 130 (estoppel by judgment)

(1996)).

                           a. Clarifying Estoppel by Contract

       We begin by addressing estoppel by contract. We have not been as precise as we

could have been in the past when discussing this doctrine. We now take the opportunity

to clarify its application in criminal law. Estoppel by contract prevents a party from
                                                                                   Lozoya–6

“deny[ing] the truth of facts agreed on and settled by force of entering into a

contract . . . ” 31 C.J.S. Waiver and Estoppel § 55 (2019). It means “that a party is bound

by the terms of his own contract until set aside or annulled for fraud, accident, or

mistake.” United Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. Fowler, 38 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Dallas 1931, writ dism’d w.o.j.). For estoppel by contract to apply, no acceptance of

benefits is necessary. The doctrine turns on whether a party took a position inconsistent

with essential facts recited in the contract to the prejudice of another. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel

and Waiver § 70 (2019). Estoppel by contract does not apply here because Applicant is

not challenging the terms of the plea agreement. For example, Applicant does not argue

that the State orally agreed to recommend a five-year probated sentence even though the

plea paperwork shows that the State would recommend a 10-year probated sentence.

       When we have referred to estoppel by contract in Rhodes and subsequent cases,

we meant estoppel by acceptance of benefits under a contract, which is a closely related

but distinct type of estoppel. Rhodes, 240 S.W.3d at 891 (referencing a version of

estoppel that turns on the acceptance of benefits but mislabeling the doctrine as estoppel

by contract which does not turn on the acceptance of benefits). Our conclusion is

supported not only by the definition we adopted, but also by our citations in Rhodes. In

Rhodes, we cited Section 124 of Volume 31 of the Corpus Juris Secundum. Id. (citing 31

C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 124 (2009)). But that section deals with acceptance-of-

benefits estoppel, and the doctrine’s application to contracts is addressed in the following

section, Section 125. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 125 (2009). On the other hand,

estoppel by contract is discussed in Section 55, which we never cited. Id. § 55. Going
                                                                                          Lozoya–7

forward, we will not refer to estoppel by contract when determining whether an applicant

should be estopped from bringing a claim because he accepted a benefit from a plea

bargain. 5

                                          b. Discussion

             i. Can a Court Sua Sponte Raise Estoppel on Behalf of the State?

       According to Texas civil law, which we have approvingly cited in this area, a

defendant must plead and prove estoppel because it is an affirmative defense. TEX. R.

CIV. P. 94 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth

affirmatively . . . estoppel . . . and any other matter constituting an avoidance or

affirmative defense.”). While that rule does not neatly translate to criminal law, we have

never had the occasion to decide whether the State has a duty, as the aggrieved party, to

raise estoppel or whether courts will sua sponte raise the issue for the State. See Ex parte

Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (courts can sua sponte consider

whether laches should bar relief).

       Estoppel was not mentioned in this litigation until this Court ordered the State to

address the topic when we filed and set the writ application for submission, and now, the

State argues that estoppel does not apply. 6 Even the SPA argues that, “[b]ecause estoppel

is an equitable doctrine, the Court is not required to apply it when the directly aggrieved

       5
         Estoppel by contract could become an issue in another plea-bargain case if a defendant
takes a position inconsistent with the terms of the plea bargain to the prejudice of the State.
       6
         We recently said that the State can raise estoppel on direct appeal for the first time as
the prevailing party at trial, but we also suggested that the non-prevailing party forfeits the
argument if not preserved. See Martell v. State, PD-1234-20, 2022 WL 1548020 (Tex. Crim.
App. May 11, 2022).
                                                                                      Lozoya–8

party (the local District Attorney) is not demanding it” and that “[t]he local interest may

be at its apex here when relief would be a remand of the cause to the trial court for further

proceedings.” SPA’s Amicus Curiae Brief at 4 (citing Neal v. State, 150 S.W.3d 169, 173

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Both Texas and federal courts recognize that prosecutors have

broad discretion in deciding which cases to prosecute.”)). We need not, however, resolve

this unbriefed, open question about whether courts can sua sponte raise estoppel because

we conclude that estoppel does not apply.

 ii.   Limitations on Application of the “Estoppel by Acceptance of Benefits” Doctrine

       Under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine, “[t]he acceptance of any benefit from a

transaction or contract, with knowledge or notice of the facts and rights, will create an

estoppel.” 31 C.J.S. Waiver & Estoppel § 154 (2019) (estoppel by acceptance of benefits,

generally). But the doctrine is not without its limits. “[I]t is essential that the person

against whom the estoppel is claimed must have acted with knowledge of the facts and of

his or her rights . . . .” Id. § 155 (elements, extent, and limits of rule governing estoppel

by acceptance of benefits); see Frazier v. Wynn, 472 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1971)

(“‘[T]here can be no ratification or estoppel from acceptance of the benefits by a person

who did not have knowledge of all material facts’ at the time of acceptance.”); 28 AM.

JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 61 (2021) (“Before one’s acceptance of a benefit can

amount to an ‘estoppel,’ it must be shown that the benefit was accepted with knowledge

of all the material facts.”). There is no voluntary acceptance of a benefit if the person

“lacks knowledge of some material fact at the time of acceptance . . . ,” and if a person

involuntarily accepts a benefit, acceptance of the benefit will not create an estoppel if the
                                                                                    Lozoya–9

person takes steps to “tender back the benefits . . . .” Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 56,

65 n.43 (quoting Turcotte v. Trevino, 499 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi

1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

                             iii.   No Estoppel is Created Here

       The record shows the following: (1) trial counsel, the State, and the judge all

erroneously believed that Applicant could have been placed on community supervision

for 10 years, (2) Appellant’s motion-to-revoke counsel had the same mistaken belief, (3)

the State notified Applicant on October 9, 2020, after it discovered the issue, 7 (4) the

court appointed an attorney for Applicant on January 28, 2021, and (5) Applicant filed

this application on March 18, 2021, less than two months later. Even if, as the SPA

argues, placing a defendant on community supervision is a per se benefit, there is no

evidence that anyone knew the material facts that the maximum lawful initial period of

supervision was only five years or that Applicant was bargaining away his right not to be

placed on community supervision for longer than legally allowed. This also is not a case

in which Applicant slept on his rights.

       We need not decide the exact contours of the acceptance-by-benefits doctrine

today. It is sufficient for us to conclude that, based on this unusual case in which no one

knew about the material facts that the maximum lawful initial period of supervision was

only five years or that Applicant was bargaining for an unlawful period of supervision,

Applicant’s acceptance of the 10-year period of community supervision, assuming it was

       7
          The State issued a notice pursuant to the Michael Morton Act. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 39.14. It did not say in its notice when it discovered the issue.
                                                                                    Lozoya–10

a benefit, was not voluntary. We further conclude that Applicant did not acquiesce to the

statutorily unlawful period of supervision or ratify it because, once he learned the

material facts, he diligently pursued his claim. It would be inequitable on this record to

hold that an acceptance-of-benefits estoppel was created under the plea agreement or the

judgment.

                   TRIAL COURT’S JURISDICTION TO REVOKE

       The issue in this case is a narrow one: Applicant argues that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to revoke his community supervision after the five-year period expired. This

case is not about whether the trial court had jurisdiction to place Applicant on community

supervision for more time than was lawfully allowed, it is about whether the trial court

had jurisdiction to revoke Applicant. It is also not about whether the trial court had the

authority to place Applicant on community supervision for more time than was lawfully

allowed, or whether Applicant’s sentence was illegal. 8 Applicant also does not challenge

the length of the supervisory period.

       The SPA argues in its amicus brief that the trial court retained jurisdiction because

the original judgment placing Applicant on community supervision was still “valid at the

time Applicant’s community supervision was revoked . . . .” It goes on to argue that the

       8
         The applicant in Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) was placed
on community supervision for 10 years even though he was not probation eligible because of an
affirmative deadly weapon finding. Id. at 657. He argued on writ that he was entitled to relief
because his sentence was illegal. Id. Williams is distinguishable from the instant case because
Applicant does not argue that his sentence is illegal, and Applicant is challenging the order
revoking his community supervision, not the order placing him on community supervision.
                                                                                  Lozoya–11

fact that “the excessive term of community supervision was later discovered to be

unauthorized does not change that.” Because our precedent is relevant to the disposition

of this issue, we review it now.

       In Coffey, the appellant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life

imprisonment based on an enhancement. Coffey, 500 S.W.2d at 515. He appealed,

arguing that the enhancement conviction was void. Id. at 515-16. The appellant had been

placed on community supervision for a two-year period, and after the period ended, the

State filed a motion to revoke, which the trial court granted. Id. at 516. We held that a

trial court has jurisdiction to revoke community supervision after the supervision period

ends only if a motion to revoke was filed and a capias issued before expiration of the

period. Id. Applying that law to the facts, we concluded that the trial court in the

enhancement case did not have jurisdiction to revoke the appellant’s community

supervision because no motion to revoke had been filed before the supervisory period

lapsed. Id. at 517; see Stover v. State, 365 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963)

(“Only the [trial] court’s action authorizing the arrest of the probationer, followed by

diligent effort to apprehend and hear and determine the claimed violation, can authorize

revocation after the probation term has ended.”).

       In Pedraza, the appellant was convicted of misdemeanor assault and placed on

community supervision for two years. Predraza, 562 S.W.2d at 259. In year one, his

community supervision was revoked. Id. He appealed and argued that the trial court’s

order placing him on community supervision was void ab initio because the maximum

period of supervision for that offense was only one year. Id. at 260. We held that the
                                                                                  Lozoya–12

order placing the appellant on community supervision was void only “to the extent it

purported to subject [the] appellant to probationary supervision beyond the time

authorized by law” and denied relief because the State filed its motion to revoke and the

offense (DWI) was committed before the expiration of the maximum one-year period of

supervision. Id. In discussing the issue, we said that a period of supervision runs

continuously until it expires and that, “[h]ad the maximum period of [community

supervision] to which [the] appellant could lawfully be subjected (one year) expired prior

to the violation and revocation of his [community supervision], a different situation

would be presented.” Id.

       In Prior, the appellant pled guilty to third-degree felony delivery of more than

one-quarter ounce of marijuana. Prior, 795 S.W.2d at 179. The trial court deferred a

finding of guilt and placed the appellant on deferred-adjudication community supervision

for five years. Id. The appellant absconded and was later arrested in New Hampshire. Id.

at 180. After the five-year period expired, the trial court adjudicated the appellant guilty

and sentenced him to five years’ confinement. Id. at 179-80. The appellant appealed and

argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate him guilty because the

period of deferred-adjudication supervision had expired, and the State did not use due

diligence in apprehending him. Id. at 180. We held that a trial court has jurisdiction to

revoke a defendant’s deferred-adjudication community supervision after the term expires

so long as the motion to revoke is filed and the capias issued before the expiration of the

supervisory period, and the State used “due diligence to apprehend the probationer and to

hear and determine the allegations in the motion.” We denied relief because the motion to
                                                                                  Lozoya–13

revoke was filed and the capias issued before the period of supervision ended. We did not

address the appellant’s due diligence claim because he failed to preserve it.

       In Donaldson, the applicant pled guilty to indecency with a child and was placed

on community supervision for six years. Ex parte Donaldson, 86 S.W.3d 231, 232 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002) (per curiam). During that period of supervision, the State filed its first

motion to revoke, which the trial court later dismissed upon request of the State. Id. Two

days after the supervision period expired, the trial court issued an order purporting to

reinstate the State’s motion to revoke and later revoked the applicant’s community

supervision and sentenced him to six years’ confinement. Id. The applicant filed a

postconviction writ application and argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter

orders reinstating the State’s motion to revoke and revoking his community supervision

because the period of supervision elapsed. Id. We agreed and granted relief. Id. at 233.

We reasoned that any action to revoke a defendant’s community supervision that is taken

after the expiration of the applicant’s period of supervision is without jurisdiction unless

a motion to revoke was already pending, and because no motion to revoke was pending

when the applicant’s supervisory period ended, the trial court’s orders purporting to

reinstate the State’s second motion to revoke and revoking the applicant’s community

supervision were void. Id.

       This case presents the “different scenario” we envisioned in Pedraza: Does a trial

court have jurisdiction to revoke a defendant’s community supervision during an

unlawful period of supervision when the motion to revoke was filed and capias issued
                                                                                        Lozoya–14

after the lawful period of supervision expired? 9 We think that the weight of our precedent

shows that the answer to that question is no.

       The SPA argues that, so long as the trial court had jurisdiction to place a defendant

on community supervision, it has jurisdiction to revoke the defendant’s community

supervision—even after the lawful period of supervision ends—until the order is set aside

or the trial court grants relief under Article 11.072. We are not persuaded. A trial court

must have jurisdiction for each action it takes. Ex parte Armstrong, 8 S.W.2d 674, 676

(Tex. Crim. App. 1928) (“Unless the power or authority of a court to perform a

contemplated act can be found in the Constitution or laws enacted thereunder, it is

without jurisdiction and its acts without validity.”). Thus, even though the trial court had

jurisdiction to place Applicant on community supervision, whether the trial court had

jurisdiction to revoke his community supervision is a different question.

       Having settled that, resolution of the jurisdictional issue is clear. Applicant was

placed on community supervision for 10 years even though the maximum period was five

years. Applicant’s period of supervision expired after the five years elapsed because it

was never lawfully extended, and at the time the period of supervision ended, there was

no motion to revoke pending nor had a capias issued. Therefore, the trial court acted

without jurisdiction when it purported to enter an order revoking Applicant’s community

supervision and sentencing him to five years’ confinement.

       9
         As previously noted, Applicant’s community supervision could have been extended
from five to 10 years, and had it been, the trial court would have retained jurisdiction to revoke
Applicant’s community supervision.
                                                                                 Lozoya–15

                                        REMEDY

       The last question is the proper remedy. The State requests that we not unwind the

entire plea agreement because it wants to waive its right to enforce that aspect of the plea

bargain. See Cox, 482 S.W.3d at 118 (citing Ex parte McJunkins, 954 S.W.2d 39, 41

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“[I]n some circumstances, the [S]tate may waive an invalid

portion of the judgment and retain the remainder of the plea agreement.”)). It asks that

this Court only set aside the trial court’s judgment revoking Applicant’s community

supervision and sentencing him to five years’ confinement. Id. We will do so.

                                     CONCLUSION

       Having concluded that Applicant is not estopped from challenging the jurisdiction

of the trial court to revoke his community supervision, that the trial court did not have

jurisdiction to revoke Applicant’s community supervision under the circumstances of this

case, and that Applicant’s period of supervision ended after the five-year term, we grant

relief. The judgment in cause number F46837 in the 18th District Court in Johnson

County revoking Applicant’s community supervision and sentencing him to five years’

confinement is vacated.

Delivered: March 29, 2023

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