Court Opinion

ID: 2964784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:04.309248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:01.589925
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 96-1377
                                   UNITED STATES,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                   SAMUEL JORDAN,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                    [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                               Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                ____________________
            Diana L. Maldonado on brief for appellant.
            Donald  
                   K.  
                       Stern, United States Attorney, and   Ben  
                                                                 T.  
                                                                    Clements,
       Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
                                ____________________
                                    July 31, 1997
                                ____________________

                 Per  
                     Curiam. Appellant, Samuel Jordan, appeals his
            conviction after a jury trial of being a felon in possession of
            a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S922(g)(1). He argues
            that the district court committed prejudicial error in
            admitting certain evidence of prior bad acts, in violation of
            Fed. R. Evid. 403 and 404(b).
                 "Determining the admissibility of evidence of other
            (uncharged) bad acts requires a bifurcated inquiry. First, the
            district court must be satisfied that the proffered material
            has 'special' probative value, that is, that the evidence is
            relevant not to show a defendant's propensity toward evil, but
            to prove some controverted issue in the case. . . . Once shown
            to be relevant in the requisite sense, the evidence must pass
            still another sentry, embodied in Fed. R. Evid. 403. If the
            evidence brings unwanted baggage, say, unfair prejudice or a
            cognizable risk of confusing the jury, and if the baggage's
            weight substantially overbalances any probative value, then the
            evidence must be excluded."     United  
                                                   States v.   Rodriguez-
            Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 155 (1st Cir. 1989).
                 This court has "consistently recognized . . . that the
            district courts have broad discretion as to discerning the
            relevancy 
                     vel 
                         non of evidence, and as to gauging the probative
            value versus prejudicial impact calculus."  United 
                                                               States v.
            Tierney, 760 F.2d 382, 387 (1st Cir. 1985). "Only rarely --
            and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances -- will [this
                                         -2-

            court], from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a
            district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the . . .
            weighing of probative value and unfair effect."   Freeman v.
            Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988).
                 1. 
                   Testimony About Jordan's Gun Possession in March 1994.
                 The first error alleged by Jordan is the district court's
            admission of FBI Agent Barry O'Neill's testimony that in the
            context of a conversation with Jordan in February 1995,
            concerning a bank robbery that took place in March 1994, Jordan
            stated that "Guns is my trade" and that in March 1994, he "had
            a whole bag full of guns," most of which were semi-automatics.
            Based upon our review of the record, including the trial
            transcript, we agree with the district court that Jordan's
            possession of other semi-automatic guns in March 1994, is of
            special relevance to a material issue raised by this case:
            whether he possessed the semiautomatic gun seized from the
            scene of the crime on March 5, 1994.    See United 
                                                               States v.
            Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1413 (1st Cir.), 
                                                cert. denied
                                                             __ S.Ct. __,
            1997 WL 251219, 65 USLW 3798 (1997) (reasoning that "[i]tems
            linking Rose to pistols tended to corroborate [government
            witness'] testimony that Rose was a participant in the
            conspiracy and had possessed the [pistol in question]").
                 Although the evidence is undeniably prejudicial, the
            district court did not abuse its discretion in gauging that the
            prejudicial impact of the evidence, which was reduced by the
                                         -3-

            court's limiting instructions, did not outweigh its probative
            value. "[I]t must be remembered that the trial judge is
            Johnny-on-the-spot; he has savored the full taste of the fray,
            and his considerable discretion must be respected so long as he
            does not stray entirely beyond the pale." 
                                                     Tierney, 760 F.2d at
            388.
                 2. Testimony  
                               that  
                                    Jordan  
                                            Made  
                                                 Statements  
                                                             While  
                                                                    Being
            Questioned  
                       About  
                              His  
                                   Involvement  
                                                in  
                                                   a  
                                                      Bank  
                                                            Robbery  
                                                                     that
            Occurred in March 1994.
                 The district court's determination that this evidence was
            relevant because it provided a context for Jordan's statements
            regarding his possession of semi-automatic guns in March 1994,
            was not an abuse of discretion.  See United 
                                                        States v.  Davis,
            792 F.2d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding admission of
            evidence that investigation of defendant initiated with a
            search for a machine gun as "particularly relevant as placing
            in context" and making more believable defendant's statements
            that other guns that he was charged with possessing belonged to
            him).
                 Nor did the district court err in calculating that the
            prejudicial impact of the "context" evidence did not outweigh
            its probative value. While testimony linking Jordan to a bank
            robbery has significant potential for prejudicial impact, that
            potential was defused in several ways. First, the government's
            line of questioning was narrowly tailored to minimize the risk
                                         -4-

            of improper inferences. Second, the court's limiting
            instructions, given directly after the testimony, further
            minimized the risk of unfair prejudice.
                 3. Testimony 
                              About 
                                    Jordan's 
                                              Statement 
                                                        that 
                                                             the 
                                                                 Gun 
                                                                      was
            Stolen.
                 The district court admitted this evidence on the ground
            that it was relevant to proof of the knowledge element of the
            charged offense. Jordan argues that knowledge was not a
            controverted issue in this case. We need not resolve that
            question. Even if we assume (without deciding) that this
            evidence should not have been admitted under Fed. R. Evid.
            403(b), any error was harmless. Based upon our careful review
            of the record, "it is highly probable that the error [,if any,]
            did not contribute to the verdict."  Rose, 104 F.3d at 1414.
                 Appellant's conviction is affirmed.  See Loc. R. 27.1.
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