Court Opinion

ID: 9858571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:28:33.830889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:51.652509
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence in this cause “fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that W.S. Barber, B.S. Barber, and Jean Brown participated in a combination with Bob Cunningham and Wade Navarre to commit or conspire to commit theft."1 It is apparent to me that neither the court of appeals in its opinion, nor the majority now, seems able to discern any difference between the “combination,” which the accused must act “with intent to establish, maintain, or participate in,” and the actual commission of or conspiracy to commit one of the offenses enumerated in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 71.02(a)(lH7). The plain fact of the matter is that the purpose of the “combination” need not be to facilitate the commission or conspiracy to commit the enumerated offense; rather, that offense must be committed or contemplated with a mind toward facilitating the already existing “combination” — those “five or more *238persons who collaborate in carrying on criminal activities” in general.2 Operating under this shared misapprehension of the import of the statute, the court of appeals and a majority of this Court nevertheless reach contrary conclusions as to whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to convict.
Along the way the majority concludes that it is unnecessary to convict all “five or more persons” charged collectively with organized criminal activity in order to convict any single one of them. See generally V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 71.03. I could not agree more with this proposition had I written it myself. For an accused to be convicted under Chapter 71 of the Penal Code, it must be shown that: 1) at the time of his guilty conduct there existed a criminal combination; and, either 2) he committed one of the offenses enumerated in § 71.02(a)(lH'i), supra, or 3) he agreed with one or more people to commit one of the enumerated offenses, and he and one or more of those with whom he agreed performed an overt act in pursuance of the agreement; and 4) that he specifically intended thereby “to establish, maintain, or participate in” the combination or in its profits. That all alleged members of the combination did not either commit or conspire to commit one of the enumerated offenses cannot insulate those members who did from prosecution and conviction.
However, in footnote 1 the majority develops a corollary it believes “logically follows” from this proposition that to my way of thinking is neither “logical” nor faithful to the clear statutory formula. Judge McCormick there concludes, without benefit of exegesis:
“that one person could serve as the organizer of four or more others and that ‘ringleader’ could alone be found guilty. It would not be necessary for the other co-conspirators to have committed an overt act, or even to have known of each others’ existence. The fact that the ring leader (1) intended to participate in a criminal combination, and (2) performed the overt act of soliciting and organizing others in furtherance of the combination, would be sufficient to support his conviction under Section 71.02(a).”
Maj.Op. at p. 225. Two misconceptions seem evident to me from this conclusion. First, at least when the theory of prosecution is that the accused “conspired to commit” one of the offenses listed in § 71.02, supra, he “and one or more” co-conspirators must be found to have performed an overt act — not the accused alone. But more fundamentally, as I have already noted, the majority fails to recognize that the statute differentiates between the general “criminal activities,” which are the raison d’etre of the combination, and the particular offense under § 71.02, supra, which the accused must be found to have committed or conspired to commit with the requisite intent to facilitate that combination. “[Sjoliciting and organizing others in furtherance of the combination” is simply not an “overt act” pursuant to the “agreement” contemplated by the statute.
This second misconception forms an integral basis of the majority’s belief that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction in this cause:
“Each of the three appellants had either the intent to establish, maintain or participate in a combination or in the profits of said combination; their agreement being demonstrated by their individual acts in setting up and maintaining and attempting to protect the scheme from discovery.”
Maj.Op. at p. 227. Here again the majority seems to confuse “agreement” with “com*239bination.” However, while “agreement goes to the culpable act of the accused, “combination” is part and parcel of the requisite accompanying mental state — the specific intent. Before it can be said that the accused “conspired to commit” — that is, that he, inter alia, “agreed” to commit —one of the enumerated offenses with the specific intent “to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination[,]” the combination must already have been in existence. Surely what is contemplated by V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 71.01(b) is not an “agreement” to form the combination in the first instance! See note 2, ante.
I cannot subscribe to resolution of the sufficiency issue in this cause under such a muddled construction of the applicable statutes.
The majority would also measure sufficiency of the evidence against a jury charge that is “correct for the theory of the case presented[.]” See Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708, 715 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982) (On State’s motion for rehearing). Whatever this language means, I had thought the Court had since abandoned that particular prerequisite to measuring sufficiency of the evidence according to the charge. See Fain v. State, 725 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Clinton, J., concurring and dissenting); Marras v. State, 741 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Clinton, J., concurring). At any rate, the majority then concludes “there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations that a combination was formed ...” Maj.Op. at p. 227. This Court measures sufficiency of the evidence by the charge that is given to the jury, not by “the allegations.” E.g., Boozer v. State, 717 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984).
To compounding confusion where we should be casting light, I dissent.
TEAGUE, MILLER and DUNCAN, JJ., join this opinion.

. All emphasis supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. Apparently unlike the majority, I do not understand "intent to establish" to be synonymous with intent to form a criminal combination. Although one definition of “establish” reads: "4 a: to bring into existence: FOUND ... b: to bring about: EFFECT[,]” more likely in the context of § 71.02(a), supra, the word denotes: "1: to make firm or stable ... 5 a: to set on a firm basis ... b: to put into a favorable position[.]" Websters New Collegiate Dictionary (1979). To hold otherwise would lead to the absurd result that one person acting alone could engage in organized criminal activity as long as when he actually committed one of the enumerated offenses he harbored some vague intention of putting together a combination at a later date, though he had not yet done so.