Court Opinion

ID: 9580656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:07:17.54355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:25.778188
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The Civil Practice Act is not a “one size fits all” garment. It was not designed to fit every special statutory scheme. Because, in my view, the CPA cannot be tailored to fit the provisions governing claims filed under OCGA § 16-13-49 (n), I respectfully dissent.
*450In Rojas v. State of Ga., 269 Ga. 121 (498 SE2d 735) (1998), we held that the relation back provisions of the Civil Practice Act apply to answers filed in forfeiture proceedings under OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) and (p). But it does not necessarily follow that those same provisions apply to claims under OCGA § 16-13-49 (n). The answer to this question turns on whether the relation back provisions of the Civil Practice Act are in conflict with the expressly prescribed procedure set forth in subsection (n). OCGA § 9-11-81. If they are, the relation back provisions do not apply.
OCGA § 16-13-49 (n) sets up a two-tier process for the forfeiture of personal property with an estimated value of $25,000 or less. The first tier is “administrative” in nature: the district attorney notifies owners and interest holders that the property has been seized and is subject to forfeiture. If no claim is filed in a timely fashion, the property is forfeited to the State, and the matter is at an end. OCGA • § 16-13-49 (n) (6). If, on the other hand, a timely claim is filed, the case proceeds to a second tier. OCGA § 16-13-49 (n) (5). At that level, complaints, answers, and judicial proceedings come into play. And so do the amendment provisions of the Civil Practice Act. OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) and (p); Rojas v. State of Ga., supra. That is because the provisions of the Civil Practice Act do not conflict with the specific pleading provisions set forth in subsections (o) and (p) of the forfeiture statute. Id.; OCGA § 9-11-81. To put it simply, once a complaint is filed and the case proceeds in court, the Civil Practice Act supplements, and acts in concert with, the forfeiture statute. Thus, an answer to a forfeiture complaint can be amended, and the amended answer will relate back to the initial answer. Rojas v. State of Ga., supra.
However, the relation back provisions of the Civil Practice Act are in direct conflict with the express directives of OCGA § 16-13-49 (n). That subsection of the forfeiture statute expressly provides that in the absence of a timely filed claim the property in question is forfeited to the State. OCGA § 16-13-49 (n) (6). As noted above, the process is administrative in nature. And it is automatic. Thus, once the time to file a claim expires under OCGA § 16-13-49 (n), forfeiture is in order, and amendments are of no use. See Roberts v. State of Ga., 226 Ga.App. 824 (487 SE2d 667) (1997), in which the Court of Appeals correctly held (albeit for the wrong reason) that a claim filed pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49 (n) cannot be amended.
It follows that, although Rojas applies to owner or interest holder answers under OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) and (p), it does not apply to claims under OCGA § 16-13-49 (n). The majority errs in ruling otherwise.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this dissent.
*451Decided September 27, 2004.
Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Andrew T. Jones, GaryD. Bergman, for appellant.
Arleen Evans, for appellees.