Court Opinion

ID: 9905770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 15:05:11.910702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.796165
License: Public Domain

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SJC-12166

                       COMMONWEALTH   vs.   AMADI SOSA.

            Hampden.       May 5, 2023. - November 30, 2023.

  Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ.

Homicide. Armed Assault with Intent to Rob. Firearms. Due
     Process of Law, Accomplice testimony. Constitutional Law,
     Confrontation of witnesses. Evidence, Videotape, Joint
     venturer, Intent. Joint Enterprise. Intent. Practice,
     Criminal, Severance, Trial of defendants together, Cross-
     examination by prosecutor, Confrontation of witnesses,
     Instructions to jury, Capital case, New trial, Assistance
     of counsel, Motion to suppress. Search and Seizure,
     Expectation of privacy.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on February 11, 2014.

     The cases were tried before Daniel A. Ford, J.; a motion
for a new trial, filed on August 23, 2019, was heard by Douglas
H. Wilkins, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered
by him.

     John M. Thompson (Linda J. Thompson also present) for the
defendant.
     David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for
the Commonwealth.
                                                                     2

    GEORGES, J.     This is a companion case to Commonwealth v.

Leiva, 484 Mass. 766 (2020).    There, we affirmed the convictions

of Julio Brian Leiva, who was tried together with the defendant

for the shooting death of William Serrano during an attempted

robbery.   Id. at 767, 769, 770 n.2.    A Hampden County jury

convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on

theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, as well

as armed assault with the intent to rob and unlawful possession

of ammunition.     Before us are the defendant's consolidated

appeals from his convictions and from the denial of his motion

for a new trial.

    The defendant has asserted numerous errors.      He contends

that the trial judge erred by (1) denying the defendant's motion

for relief from prejudicial joinder, or otherwise failing to

sever his trial from that of his codefendant, Leiva; (2)

allowing the prosecutor to use an unauthenticated video

recording during the course of trial; (3) denying the

defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty on the

charge of murder in the first degree; (4) failing to instruct

the jury on an essential element of the charge of unlawful

possession of ammunition; and (5) failing to instruct the jury

on involuntary manslaughter.    The defendant further contends,

with respect to his motion for a new trial, that the motion

judge erred both in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and
                                                                      3

in denying the defendant's motion.      Finally, the defendant

requests relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

    We discern no reversible error with respect to the

defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree and armed

assault with the intent to rob.      Additionally, after a thorough

review of the record, we decline to exercise our authority under

G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's

convictions of murder in the first degree and armed assault with

the intent to rob.    We also affirm the denial of the defendant's

motion for a new trial.     However, because of an error in the

jury instructions, the defendant's conviction of unlawful

possession of ammunition must be vacated.

    1.   Background.   a.   Facts.    We summarize the facts the

jury could have found, reserving further discussion of the facts

for our analysis infra.

    On November 10, 2013, the day of the shooting, the victim

joined his girlfriend for dinner at her sister's residence in

Springfield.   About twenty minutes after the couple arrived,

Leiva joined them, uninvited.    Leiva and the victim's girlfriend

had previously dated, ending their relationship about six months

prior to the shooting; they remained friendly after their

relationship ended.

    Leiva stayed in the kitchen for about thirty minutes,

eating and sending text messages on his cell phone before
                                                                     4

abruptly leaving and returning about fifteen minutes later.

After another ten to fifteen minutes had passed, Leiva departed

again.    He left through the back door of the house onto a small

porch where he passed by the victim, who was seated in a chair

with the girlfriend on his lap.     Leiva, the victim, and the

girlfriend were the only people on the porch.

     The girlfriend observed the defendant walk down the porch

stairs, then around to the right, where he disappeared behind

the porch.    A few minutes later, Leiva reemerged from behind the

porch, followed closely by two men in dark sweatshirts with

raised hoods.    The girlfriend recognized one of the men as the

defendant, a friend of Leiva, whom she had known for over six

months and with whom she frequently socialized.     As the three

men approached the porch steps, the girlfriend could see that

Leiva was carrying what appeared to be a shotgun or rifle with a

sawed-off barrel.1    She had previously seen this same gun at the

defendant's residence.

     Coming onto the porch, Leiva first pointed the barrel of

the gun at the girlfriend, who was attempting to block the top

of the stairway.     The three men pushed past her and surrounded

the victim, with Leiva now aiming the gun at the victim's chest.

Leiva then instructed the other two men to "run his pockets," at

     1   Police never recovered the gun used by Leiva.
                                                                      5

which point the two men bent over to reach into the victim's

pockets.   Although the girlfriend did not see what, if anything,

they retrieved, the victim was in possession of two cell phones

earlier that evening, and only one was discovered among the

victim's belongings.

    When the victim, who was still seated in the chair, pleaded

to be left alone, Leiva shot the victim seven times.       The

defendant and the other man stood on either side of Leiva,

looking on while facing the victim as the shots rang out.

Hearing the gunshots, the girlfriend's sister called 911.

Several minutes later, a responding officer entered the sister's

living room and found the victim, who, while screaming and

bleeding, had managed to crawl inside.    The victim was

transported to the hospital, where he later died in surgery.

After leaving the area, Leiva explained to a friend that he

"went to go rob somebody" while he was with two associates but

that things went wrong.

    b.     Procedural history.   In February 2014, a Hampden County

grand jury indicted the defendant for murder in the first

degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; armed assault with intent to murder,

G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17; armed

assault with intent to rob, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); and unlawful

possession of ammunition, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h).
                                                                        6

    The defendant's joint trial with his codefendant, Leiva,

commenced in January 2016.    Before trial, defendant's counsel

filed a motion for relief from prejudicial joinder, seeking to

sever the two cases on the grounds that the defenses would be

antagonistic.     The trial judge denied this motion.   At the close

of the Commonwealth's case, the trial judge allowed the

defendant's motion for required findings of not guilty as to the

charge of armed assault with intent to murder but otherwise

denied the motion with respect to the remaining charges.

    The jury acquitted the defendant of armed robbery but found

him guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of

deliberate premeditation and felony-murder with attempted

commission of armed robbery as the predicate felony, guilty of

armed assault with the intent to rob, and guilty of unlawful

possession of ammunition.

    The defendant timely appealed.     While his direct appeal was

pending, the defendant filed a motion in this court for a new

trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435

Mass. 1501 (2001).     We remanded the defendant's motion to the

Superior Court.     After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge,

who was not the trial judge, denied the defendant's motion.       The

defendant's motion to reconsider was likewise denied.

Thereafter, the defendant appealed from the denial of his motion

for a new trial, which we consolidated with his direct appeal.
                                                                          7

       c.    The trial.   At trial, the Commonwealth proceeded

against the defendant as a joint venturer with Leiva in the

armed robbery and murder of the victim.       In support of its

theory, the Commonwealth primarily relied upon the girlfriend's

testimony concerning the events that evening, including

identifying the defendant as one of the other two men involved

in the shooting.       See Leiva, 484 Mass. at 769-770.    The

girlfriend's timeline of events was corroborated by surveillance

footage that was recorded at an apartment building where Leiva

would frequently stay while visiting Springfield, which depicted

Leiva at various points on the evening of the shooting.2         Id. at

768, 770.

       Additionally, the Commonwealth's ballistics expert opined

that seven shell casings recovered from the crime scene had been

fired from the same weapon, as were five bullets recovered from

the scene of the shooting and the victim's body.          Id. at 770-

771.       The police seized from the defendant's residence live

rounds of ammunition of the same caliber and bearing the same

manufacturer's markings as the shells recovered from the crime

scene.      Id.

       The defendant's primary defense was that he had been

misidentified.       In support of this theory, counsel for the

       The apartment building was approximately a two-minute walk
       2

from the sister's residence.
                                                                    8

defendant pointed to numerous factors in his closing, including

the girlfriend's mistaken identification of the defendant due to

her focus on the gun, the darkness of the setting, and the

presence of hoods on Leiva's associates, as well as the

girlfriend's mistaken identification of another of Leiva's

associates.

    The defendant himself did not testify; Leiva, however,

did -- in narrative form -- which the judge permitted him to do

pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e), as appearing at 471 Mass.

1416 (2015) (rule 3.3 [e]).     See Leiva, 484 Mass. at 771–773.

The judge also prohibited counsel from referencing the

invocation of rule 3.3 (e) and strongly cautioned them against

examining Leiva on this topic.     Leiva testified that, while he

had visited the sister's residence on the day of the shooting,

he left to purchase some marijuana, did not see the defendant,

and did not shoot the victim.      Id. at 771.

    2.   Discussion.     a.   Standard of review.   "Where we

consider, as we do here, a defendant's direct appeal from a

conviction of murder in the first degree together with an appeal

from the denial of a motion for a new trial, we review the whole

case under G. L. c. 278, § 33E."      Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480

Mass. 763, 768 (2018).    "Where the claims are preserved, we

review for prejudicial error" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Gamboa, 490 Mass. 294, 299 n.8 (2022).      For
                                                                    9

claims that are unpreserved, and for "other errors we discover

after a comprehensive review of the entire record, [we review]

for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."

Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 160 (2020).

     b.    Severance of the codefendants' trials.   The defendant

first argues that severing his trial from the trial of his

codefendant, Leiva, was constitutionally required to protect his

due process rights and his right to confrontation,3 and that the

trial judge's denial of his motion for relief from prejudicial

joinder was otherwise an abuse of discretion.   These arguments

center on Leiva's testimony pursuant to rule 3.3 (e).

     We have previously concluded that "[t]he procedures used to

implement rule 3.3 (e) at the . . . trial were proper" and that

the trial judge's "rulings relative to the form of [Leiva]'s

testimony . . . did not constitute error."    Leiva, 484 Mass. at

784–785.   Nonetheless, we reexamine the propriety of this

procedure and testimony in the context of the nontestifying

defendant's severance arguments.4

     3 Because, as we conclude infra, there was no error, we need
not reach the defendant's argument that the alleged errors were
structural. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 Mass. 320, 337 n.15
(2014).

     4 We decline to hold, as the defendant insists, that
rule 3.3 (e) is "designed solely for use in single-defendant
trials." Because the defendant cites no legal authority in
support of this proposition and presents it in cursory fashion,
                                                                     10

    i.    Due process.   The defendant asserts that severance was

constitutionally required because the Commonwealth knowingly

used Leiva's false testimony to secure the defendant's

conviction, or allowed for Leiva's false testimony to go

uncorrected, thereby violating the defendant's due process

rights.   As the defendant did not raise this issue at trial,5 we

review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

See Commonwealth v. Ware, 482 Mass. 717, 721–722 (2019).     We

conclude that there was no error.

    It is true that "[t]he Commonwealth may not present

testimony at trial which [it] knows or should know is false"

(quotation omitted).     Ware, 482 Mass. at 721, quoting

Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 490 (2014).    "Nor may the

Commonwealth, 'although not soliciting false evidence, allow[]

it to go uncorrected when it appears.'"     Ware, supra, quoting

Commonwealth v. Hurst, 364 Mass. 604, 608 (1974).     A conviction

obtained in either scenario "must fall under the Fourteenth

Amendment" to the United States Constitution.     Napue v.

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).     Here, it is clear that the

"we are not obligated to consider it here."     Halstrom v. Dube,
481 Mass. 480, 483 n.8 (2019).

    5  Although the defendant's motion for relief from
prejudicial joinder does not appear in the record, there is no
indication that defense counsel ever argued, in writing or
orally, that the motion should be granted because of Leiva's
false testimony.
                                                                    11

Commonwealth did not affirmatively present false testimony,

given that Leiva was not the Commonwealth's witness, so the

question is whether the Commonwealth allowed Leiva's testimony

to go uncorrected when it knew or should have known that his

testimony was false.

    In order to correct testimony that is known to be false, a

prosecutor must "take such remedial measures before the jury

retire[] as are necessary to ensure that [they are] not

deceived."    Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, 336 Conn. 168,

189 (2020).   Although the precise remedial measures employed may

vary depending on the circumstances of a case, one such means of

correcting false testimony is, of course, cross-examination.

See Leiva, 484 Mass. at 784 n.19 ("Our system[] . . . hedges

against the risk that judgment will be rendered on false

premises by providing for rigorous cross-examination . . .").

See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) ("The

established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave

the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and

the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly

instructed jury").

    Here, the prosecutor challenged the veracity of much of

Leiva's narrative testimony by conducting a vigorous and

thorough cross-examination.    For example, the prosecutor showed

surveillance footage, depicting an individual running shortly
                                                                    12

after the murder.   Although Leiva disputed that he was this

individual, he conceded -- in response to the prosecutor's

questions -- that he is depicted in the footage at times before

and after the running individual can be seen.    The implication

was clear:    the prosecutor sought for the jury to infer,

contrary to Leiva's testimony, that the running individual was

in fact Leiva.    Indeed, the prosecutor explicitly stated during

closing arguments that the jury "would have every right to draw

the inference" that this individual was Leiva.

    With the prosecutor having rigorously cross-examined Leiva,

it was for the jury to determine whether he was telling the

truth.    See Forte, 469 Mass. at 490.   Indeed, there can be no

doubt that the jury were not deceived by Leiva; in order to

convict him, the jury needed to reject Leiva's version of

events.

    Nonetheless, the defendant points out that the prosecutor

asked Leiva on cross-examination whether he was trying "to help

[his] friend Amadi out," and further asked Leiva why he decided

to testify.    By doing so, the defendant argues, the prosecutor

was insinuating that Leiva was "Sosa's witness."     As improper as

these questions may have been, the defendant's theory has a

fatal flaw:    Leiva never answered, as the trial judge sustained

objections to these questions before Leiva could do so.      The

jury had been previously instructed that, if an objection was
                                                                   13

sustained, they were to disregard the question and not speculate

as to what the answer might have been.     See Commonwealth v.

Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 535 (2021) ("Jurors are presumed to

follow the instructions given").      Accordingly, because the

prosecutor did not knowingly use, or knowingly fail to correct,

false testimony from Leiva, the defendant's due process rights

were not violated.6

     ii.    Right to confrontation.   The defendant next claims

that severance was required because he was deprived of a

constitutional right to cross-examine Leiva on a "critical issue

of bias":    that Leiva was testifying falsely pursuant to rule

3.3 (e).    We review for abuse of discretion and conclude that

the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by restricting

cross-examination of Leiva's invocation of rule 3.3 (e).     See

Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 71-72 (1995).

     "Both the Sixth Amendment [to the United States

Constitution] and art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights] guarantee a criminal defendant's right to confront the

     6 We also reject the defendant's claim that the trial judge
misled the jury by placing Leiva under oath, as if to suggest
that Leiva's testimony was true. Swearing or affirming one's
duty to testify truthfully is a prerequisite to testifying. See
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 531 (2009). If placing
a witness under oath could somehow be construed as an
endorsement of the veracity of his or her testimony, it would be
impossible for the jury to ever engage in their role of
determining witness credibility. See Commonwealth v. Casey (No.
1), 442 Mass. 1, 8 (2004).
                                                                    14

witnesses against him through cross-examination."      Miles, 420

Mass. at 71.   "In determining whether a defendant's

constitutional right to cross-examine and thus to confront a

witness against him has been denied because of an unreasonable

limitation of cross-examination, we weigh the materiality of the

witness's direct testimony and the degree of the restriction on

cross-examination."    Id. at 72, citing Commonwealth v. Kirouac,

405 Mass. 557, 561 (1989).

    While criminal defendants have a right to cross-examine

prosecution witnesses concerning their bias, a judge may

properly foreclose such examination where the theory of bias is

"too tenuous" or "too speculative."    Commonwealth v. Bui, 419

Mass. 392, 401-402, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 861 (1995).      Here,

the connection between the invocation of rule 3.3 (e) and any

conceivable bias on Leiva's part is simply too tenuous.     The

defendant does not adequately explain how the invocation of rule

3.3 (e) would motivate Leiva to testify falsely.    At best, he

seems to vaguely suggest that preventing cross-examination on

this topic would somehow incentivize Leiva to perjure himself

because the falsity of his testimony would be shielded from

disclosure.    But the judge did not prevent counsel from

attacking the actual substance of Leiva's testimony; indeed, as

we explained supra, the prosecutor did so to great effect.
                                                                     15

    Moreover, we do not accept the notion that Leiva would have

been encouraged to perjure himself through the invocation of

rule 3.3 (e), particularly where the record demonstrates that

Leiva's attorney confirmed at sidebar that he had advised Leiva

in accordance with the rule.    The advice required of counsel

under rule 3.3 (e) is designed to dissuade false testimony, not

encourage it.    See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e) ("In a criminal

case, defense counsel . . . has a duty strongly to discourage

the client from testifying falsely, advising that such a course

is unlawful, will have substantial adverse consequences, and

should not be followed").    Given the attenuation between rule

3.3 (e) and Leiva's motive for testifying, the judge did not

abuse his discretion.

    iii.   Prejudicial joinder.     The defendant's final argument

concerning severance is that the judge abused his discretion in

denying the defendant's motion for relief from prejudicial

joinder.   "Absent a constitutional requirement for severance,

joinder and severance are matters committed to the sound

discretion of the trial judge."     Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430

Mass. 483, 485 (1999).    Accordingly, we review the judge's

denial of the motion for relief from prejudicial joinder for

abuse of discretion.     See Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245,

256 (2013).     We conclude there was no error.
                                                                 16

    "A judge should sever trials if a defendant meets the

burden of proving that (1) the defenses are 'antagonistic to the

point of being mutually exclusive,' or (2) 'the prejudice

resulting from a joint trial is so compelling that it prevents a

defendant from obtaining a fair trial'" (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 542 (2011).

Regarding the first basis, "defenses are mutually antagonistic

and irreconcilable where the 'sole defense of each [is] the

guilt of the other.'"    Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450

Mass. 25, 31 (2007).     It is not enough to require severance

simply because the defendants "assert inconsistent trial

strategies," Siny Van Tran, supra, or because "a defendant would

stand a better chance of acquittal if tried alone."

Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 629 (2017).

    Here, the defenses of Leiva and the defendant were not

mutually antagonistic.    Indeed, we previously noted that the

defendant and Leiva "advanced entirely consistent trial

defenses."   Leiva, 484 Mass. at 793 n.35.    The defendant

asserted he was misidentified as one of the participants, and

Leiva similarly denied that he shot the victim.     Under the facts

of this case, the jury were free to conclude both that the

defendant was misidentified and that Leiva did not shoot the

victim.   See Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 168–169

(2021) (defenses not so mutually antagonistic requiring
                                                                     17

severance where codefendants argued misidentification and lack

of involvement).   Thus, "as the jury could have accepted either

codefendant's argument while at the same time acquitting the

other," the defenses presented were not mutually antagonistic.

Commonwealth v. Fan, 490 Mass. 433, 440 (2022).

    Likewise, Leiva's testimony, which in no way implicated the

defendant, did not prevent the defendant from receiving a fair

trial.   Rather than pointing the finger at the defendant, Leiva

testified that he had not seen the defendant on the day of the

murder, and he denied having referred to the defendant in

connection with the shooting.     Among his scant testimony that

even related to the defendant, Leiva acknowledged that he had

initially asked a friend to pick him up at the defendant's

address on the night of the shooting, before changing his

request to a different address.    But this same information had

already been introduced in evidence independently through the

friend's testimony, as well as through a printout of text

messages exchanged between Leiva and the friend.     Thus, Leiva's

testimony on this point "was at best cumulative" of other

evidence in the record.   Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827,

837 (2012).   Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion

in denying the defendant's motion.

    c.   Use of compilation video recording.     A Springfield

police officer testified at trial that, shortly after the night
                                                                  18

of the shooting, he extracted surveillance footage from a

digital video recorder that was provided by the property

management office at the apartment building where Leiva went on

the night of the shooting.   The complete video footage contained

several camera angles of the property, spanning multiple hours

around the time of the shooting.   From this longer, multiple-

hour video footage, a condensed video recording (compilation

video) was created, culled to what was relevant to the shooting.

The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the

prosecutor to use this compilation video because it was never

authenticated, marked for identification, or admitted in

evidence.7   In response, the Commonwealth emphasizes that the

complete footage, from which the compilation was derived, was

admitted in evidence.

     As defendant's counsel objected to the use of the

compilation video, "we review to determine whether the judge

abused [his] discretion and, if so, whether the error resulted

in prejudice to the defendant" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 465 (2021), S.C., 491

Mass. 1011 (2023).   "An error is not prejudicial if it did not

influence the jury, or had but very slight effect" (quotation

     7 The prosecutor used the compilation video at several
points during his cross-examination of Leiva. The prosecutor
also showed various clips from the compilation video to the jury
during closing arguments.
                                                                    19

and citation omitted).   Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600,

618, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012).    We conclude that,

assuming error, the defendant was not prejudiced by the

prosecutor's use of the compilation video.

    The defendant does not argue that the complete footage

itself was erroneously admitted, where testimony was offered to

authenticate that footage.   In particular, an officer described

at trial how the complete surveillance footage was transported

and copied.   Additionally, an employee from the property

management office testified as to how this footage was provided

to the police, and offered various details concerning the

cameras that recorded this footage.

    Further, it is undisputed that the compilation video was a

subset of this longer surveillance footage that had already been

admitted in evidence.    There is no indication that, for example,

the visuals contained within the compilation video were somehow

digitally altered to depict events    that were different from

those depicted in the complete footage.    We have reviewed the

compilation video and compared it to the corresponding times

from the original surveillance footage.    Based upon our review,

we conclude that the sequencing of certain events from the

longer video footage into the compilation video "added little to

the Commonwealth's case and detracted little from the
                                                                  20

defendant's theory at trial."   Commonwealth v. Wood, 90 Mass.

App. Ct. 271, 282 (2016).

    Therefore, under these circumstances, we are convinced that

the defendant suffered no prejudice.   See Commonwealth v.

Kozubal, 488 Mass. 575, 588 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.

2723 (2022) (even if admission of isolated text messages between

defendant and victim was error, defendant was not prejudiced,

"given the cumulative nature of the evidence, including the

admission of the many text messages between the defendant and

the victim that the defendant does not contest").

    Finally, we note that while the defendant suffered no

prejudice here, the better practice is to authenticate excerpts

that have been copied from an exhibit, even when the complete

exhibit itself has already been authenticated and admitted in

evidence, to ensure that those excerpts are accurate copies.

See Commonwealth v. Leneski, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 294 (2006)

("properly authenticated" copy of videotape is admissible if

otherwise relevant).   Additionally, although the Commonwealth

did not do so here, parties should explore the viability of

admitting excerpts of voluminous video recordings pursuant to

Mass. G. Evid. § 1006 (2023), particularly where a jury may find

it "difficult to master the technology necessary to find and

view the relevant parts of the [complete] videos in the jury

room."   Commonwealth v. Suarez, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 562, 571-572
                                                                   21

(2019) (no abuse of discretion in admitting compilation of

surveillance videos pursuant to Mass. G. Evid. § 1006).

    d.     Deliberate premeditation.   The defendant also contends

that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a required

finding of not guilty on the charge of murder in the first

degree based upon the theory of deliberate premeditation.    He

claims the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that

he intended to kill the victim, reasoning that because Leiva's

intent to kill is not attributable to the defendant, the

evidence at best supported an inference that the defendant

intended to rob or intimidate the victim.    Additionally, the

defendant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to

establish deliberate premeditation, reasoning that, since "the

abrupt shooting" was a "surprise" to him, the defendant's intent

was not "the product of cool reflection."    See Commonwealth v.

Colas, 486 Mass. 831, 836 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v.

Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 435 (2015).    Although we acknowledge

that the issue is close, we conclude that the trial judge did

not err.

    In reviewing the denial of such a motion, we ask whether

"the Commonwealth's evidence, together with reasonable

inferences therefrom, when viewed in its light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, is sufficient to persuade a rational jury of

the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" (quotation and
                                                                     22

citation omitted).    Commonwealth v. Gibson, 488 Mass. 854, 857

(2022).   "The relevant question is whether the evidence would

permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires

such a finding."     Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747

(1988).

    For the defendant to be convicted on a theory of deliberate

premeditation, the Commonwealth had to prove that he "had or

shared an intent to kill or cause death" (quotation and citation

omitted).   Tavares, 471 Mass. at 435.    Additionally, the

Commonwealth had to prove that the decision to kill "was the

product of cool reflection" (citation omitted).     Colas, 486

Mass. at 836.     "Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient

to prove deliberate premeditation."     Commonwealth v. Salazar,

481 Mass. 105, 111 (2018).    "No particular period of reflection

is required for deliberate premeditation to be found."

Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 Mass. 262, 269 (1994).     "Thus, if

there was evidence presented from which the jury could infer

that the defendant intended to kill [the victim], and the

decision was the result of some period of reflection, however

short, then the defendant's motion . . . was properly denied."

Tavares, supra.

    Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury

could infer that the defendant shared Leiva's intent to kill the
                                                                   23

victim, and that this shared intent was the product of a period

of reflection.     Although Leiva's intent is not imputed to the

defendant, "[t]he jury may infer the requisite mental state [for

a joint venturer] from [his] knowledge of the circumstances and

subsequent participation in the offense" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 782–783 (2004), S.C.,

451 Mass. 1006 (2008).    Thus, the defendant's intent can be

"inferred from evidence that [the] defendant (a) observed

[Leiva] demonstrate or express lethal intent (e.g., by producing

a gun) and (b) thereafter took some step to help carry out that

intent."   Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 416–417

(2016).

    As defense counsel conceded at oral argument before this

court, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant knew

that Leiva possessed a gun.   Indeed, the defendant had ample

opportunity to observe the gun, given that the defendant was

standing next to Leiva, the encounter took several minutes, and

Leiva pointed the gun at the girlfriend before aiming it at the

victim.    See Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass. 131, 140 (2012).

Although the Commonwealth was not obligated to prove that the

defendant knew Leiva was armed, the defendant's knowledge is

probative as to his intent.    See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 Mass.

231, 245 (2014) (proof of defendant's knowledge that coventurer

is armed is not required).
                                                                  24

     Additionally, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to

conclude that the defendant supplied both the gun and the

ammunition, including (1) the girlfriend's testimony that she

had previously seen the murder weapon at the defendant's

residence and that the defendant was friends with Leiva; (2) the

girlfriend's testimony that she witnessed Leiva disappear behind

the porch and re-emerge with the defendant while holding a gun;

and (3) expert testimony that the caliber and manufacturer

markings of the ammunition found in the defendant's basement

matched the caliber of the bullets recovered from the victim's

body and the markings on the casings found at the crime scene.

See Commonwealth v. Beliard, 443 Mass. 79, 81-82, 86 (2004).

See also Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 416 ("knowledge and intent [may

be] inferred . . . when a defendant brings a gun to the scene of

the killing, but does not [himself] fire the fatal shot").

     We also look to the defendant's conduct at the time of the

shooting to infer intent.   See Freeman, 442 Mass. at 782–783.

First, the defendant complied with Leiva's instruction to "run"

the victim's pockets.8   Second, as Leiva shot the victim seven

     8 To be sure, an intent to rob cannot be conflated with an
intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. Mandile, 403 Mass. 93, 100
n.11 (1988). However, conduct that could support an inference
that a defendant intended to rob a victim may, under the right
circumstances, also support an inference that a defendant
intended to kill a victim. See, e.g., Freeman, 442 Mass. at
783. Here, even if this conduct is more probative as to the
defendant's intent to rob the victim, it nonetheless has some
                                                                   25

times, the defendant stood by Leiva's side facing the victim.

While mere presence at a crime scene is not sufficient to

establish intent, when viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury did not have to infer

that the defendant's intent was merely to rob or intimidate the

victim as he suggests.     See Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 414.    To the

contrary, the evidence at trial demonstrated that the three men

were positioned in such a way as to effectively block the victim

from the kitchen door and the porch stairs -- his only two means

of escape.   In other words, the victim was "[t]rapped in his

chair" on the small porch, while the three men stood over him.

Leiva, 484 Mass. at 767.    Thus, the jury could have reasonably

inferred that the defendant flanked Leiva, towering over the

victim with the intent of making the crime succeed.     See

Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 279 (2022) (defendant

standing next to shooter, who continued to aim gun at victim

after shooting, was probative as to defendant's shared intent to

kill victim); Watson, 487 Mass. at 163 (reasonable for jury to

infer defendant's role was to block street so others could not

interfere while coventurer shot victim).    That is, a rational

jury could reasonably infer that the defendant helped block the

weight as to the defendant's intent to kill the victim,
particularly given that the defendant knew that Leiva was armed.
                                                                    26

victim from escaping to ensure that Leiva could accomplish his

goal:   shooting and killing the victim.

    While the inference that the defendant intended to block

the victim from escaping is not itself inescapable, "reasonable

inferences . . . need not be necessary or inescapable, only

reasonable and possible" (quotations and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Schoener, 491 Mass. 706, 714 (2023).   Moreover,

"[t]he line that separates mere knowledge of unlawful conduct

and participation in it, is 'often vague and uncertain.     It is

within the province of the jury to determine from the evidence

whether a particular defendant [has] crossed that line.'"

Norris, 462 Mass. at 140, quoting Commonwealth v. Longo, 402

Mass. 482, 487 (1988).   Therefore, there was sufficient evidence

for a rational jury to conclude that the defendant intended to

kill the victim.

    There was likewise sufficient evidence for a rational jury

to conclude that the defendant's intent was a product of

deliberate premeditation.   Given the abrupt comings and goings

of Leiva over the course of the evening, and the defendant's

sudden appearance from behind the porch alongside Leiva, who was

at that point wielding a firearm, a jury could reasonably infer

that the defendant was "lying in wait" with the murder weapon

until the right time to provide the weapon to Leiva and join him

in a confrontation with the victim.   Tavares, 471 Mass. at 435–
                                                                    27

436.    See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 746 (2019)

("Deliberate premeditation can be inferred from the bringing of

a firearm to the scene of the killing . . .").

       Further, there is no evidence that the defendant was

"surprise[d]," as he claims; rather, the evidence was that he

freely stood by Leiva's side as the victim was shot seven times.

Accordingly, "[t]his case . . . does not suggest plain

spontaneity or tainted premeditation."      Commonwealth v. Rivera,

482 Mass. 259, 272 (2019).     In short, while any one fact in this

case would have been insufficient on its own, "the entirety of

the facts presented 'form[ed] a fabric of proof that was

sufficient to warrant the jury's finding beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant' was guilty of murder in the first

degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation as a joint

venturer."    Commonwealth v. Javier, 481 Mass. 268, 285 (2019),

quoting Commonwealth v. Rojas, 388 Mass. 626, 630 (1983).

       e.   Felony-murder.   The defendant also argues that there

was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of felony-

murder in the first degree with the attempted commission of

armed robbery as the predicate felony.      Although not clearly

articulated in the defendant's briefing, the defendant's

argument appears to suggest that the trial judge was required to

instruct the jury that they had to find, as an essential

"factual" element of felony-murder, that the maximum sentence
                                                                    28

for the predicate felony -- armed robbery -- is "punishable by a

maximum sentence of life imprisonment."    Because the jury were

not so instructed and no "evidence" of this "fact" was

presented, the defendant contends, his conviction of felony-

murder "is invalid."

     We disagree.   The penalty for armed robbery, as with other

criminal offenses, is set by statute; thus, the maximum sentence

allowable for armed robbery is a matter of statutory

interpretation -- "a pure question of law."    Commonwealth v.

Cintolo, 415 Mass. 358, 359 (1993).    Accordingly, this question

is "for the judge, not the jury."     Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487

Mass. 708, 735 (2021).   Here, as the defendant concedes, the

trial judge correctly instructed the jury that armed robbery is,

as a matter of law, a felony with a maximum sentence of life

imprisonment.   See G. L. c. 265, § 17.   Accordingly, the

defendant's argument fails.

     f.   Unlawful possession of ammunition.   In his brief, the

defendant argues, with respect to his conviction of unlawful

possession of ammunition under G.     L. c. 269, § 10 (h), that

there was insufficient evidence that he knew that Leiva's

firearm was loaded.9   Subsequently, in light of the United States

     9 The Commonwealth proceeded on a theory that the defendant
constructively possessed the ammunition found at the crime
scene; he was not charged in connection with the ammunition
seized from his residence.
                                                                    29

Supreme Court's holding in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n

v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2122 (2022), that the Second

Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an

individual's right to carry a firearm outside the home, this

court concluded that "licensure is . . . an essential element of

the crime of unlawful possession of ammunition under G. L.

c. 269, § 10 (h)."    Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 692

(2023) (Guardado I), vacated in part, 493 Mass. 1, 12 (2023)

(Guardado II).   The defendant thereafter filed a supplemental

brief in which he argues that our holding in Guardado I

necessitates that his unlawful possession conviction be vacated

and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

       We agree that the defendant's conviction must be vacated.

It is a violation of a defendant's Second Amendment and due

process rights "when he [i]s convicted of unlawfully possessing

ammunition although the jury were not instructed that licensure

is an essential element of the crime."    Guardado I, 491 Mass. at

693.   "[T]he Commonwealth carries the burden of proving each

element of a charged crime."    Id. at 682.   Here, the jury were

not instructed that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving

the defendant's lack of licensure as an element of the crime.

Thus, the defendant's unlawful possession conviction must be

vacated.
                                                                    30

    However, we disagree with the defendant's proposal to

remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.    The proper remedy

under these circumstances is to remand for a new trial.     See

Guardado II, 493 Mass. at 6-7, 12.    Accordingly, the

Commonwealth shall have an opportunity to prove that the

defendant unlawfully possessed ammunition.     Id. at 2-3, 12.

    g.    Manslaughter instruction.   The defendant next argues

that the judge erred in denying his request for an involuntary

manslaughter instruction.   The defendant reasons that the jury

could have found that the defendant acted "wanton[ly]" or

"reckless[ly]" in accompanying Leiva to merely frighten or

intimidate the victim, rather than to kill or rob him.     As the

defendant requested an involuntary manslaughter instruction at

trial, we review for prejudicial error.   See Commonwealth v.

Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 422 (2019).   We conclude that, even

assuming that the judge erred, there was no prejudice.

    Ordinarily, in the case of felony-murder, "the defendant is

not entitled to an instruction on manslaughter" (citation

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 523 (2016).

Nonetheless, "[a]n instruction on involuntary manslaughter is

appropriate in a felony-murder case . . . if there is evidence

that the defendant was merely engaged in wanton [or] reckless

conduct . . . ."   Commonwealth v. Donovan, 422 Mass. 349, 353

(1996).   Here, while the jury were not instructed on involuntary
                                                                    31

manslaughter, the trial judge did instruct the jury on murder in

the second degree, based on theories of both malice and felony-

murder.    Because the jury found the defendant guilty of murder

in the first degree based on both theories, the judge's

instruction on murder in the second degree precludes any

conclusion of prejudice.     See Commonwealth v. Chase, 433 Mass.

293, 300 (2001) ("This is not a case where the failure to

instruct on a lesser included offense left the jury with no

alternative between a murder conviction and an acquittal").     See

also Donovan, supra at 354 ("If the jury believed that the

defendant shared some lesser intent than that required for [the

underlying felony for felony-murder in the first degree], they

had the option of returning a verdict of murder in the second

degree.    They did not").

    h.     Motion for a new trial.   i.   Ineffective assistance of

counsel.   In his motion for a new trial, the defendant asserted

that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to

timely file a motion to suppress the ballistics evidence seized

from the basement of the apartment building where the defendant

resided.    The defendant maintained that the search warrant

affidavit of Springfield police Detective Timothy Kenney failed

to establish probable cause to search the basement for firearms,

ammunition, and related evidence.     In denying the defendant's
                                                                    32

motion for a new trial, the motion judge concluded that there

was probable cause to search the basement common area.

    On appeal, the defendant reiterates his argument that there

was no probable cause to search the basement for ammunition or

firearms, and therefore, the motion judge erred in concluding

otherwise.   The Commonwealth counters that the defendant lacked

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement, and

therefore no search occurred in the constitutional sense.     The

defendant asserts that the Commonwealth's argument must be

disregarded because the record is incomplete as to whether the

basement is a common area.    The defendant's argument misses the

mark.

    Where, as here, a defendant's motion for a new trial based

on ineffective assistance of counsel has been denied and we are

reviewing it alongside his direct appeal pursuant to G. L.

c. 278, § 33E, our task is to determine whether counsel erred

and, if he did, whether that error "was likely to have

influenced the jury's conclusion" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 754 (2008).     More

specifically, "the defendant must show that the motion to

suppress would have been successful, and that failing to bring

such a motion . . . created a substantial likelihood of a

miscarriage of justice."     Commonwealth v. Banville, 457 Mass.

530, 534 (2010).
                                                                   33

     Here, the evidence presented in connection with the

defendant's motion for a new trial implicates, at minimum, a

likelihood that the basement is a common area.10   The basement

was part of a three-family residence.   In general, occupants of

a multiunit residence lack a reasonable expectation of privacy

in its common areas.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410

Mass. 290, 302 (1991).   That said, the question whether such an

occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a

purportedly common area "cannot be answered categorically."

Commonwealth v. Dora, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 144–145 (2003).      If

that question were to be answered in the negative, then "the

police [were] free to search [the basement] without a warrant

and without probable cause."   Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456

Mass. 254, 259 (2010).

     However, we need not answer that question.    It is true that

some details regarding the basement are unclear.11   But this is

     10For example, at an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's
motion for a new trial, Detective Kenney testified that the
basement could be accessed through a staircase that connects to
each apartment. Additionally, there were no clearly marked
areas in the basement that could be used to attribute ownership
to particular individuals. However, Detective Kenney could not
recall whether the basement had a door or whether he forced
entry to gain access to the basement.

     11For example, it is unclear whether, assuming that the
basement had a door, it was locked at the time of the search.
It is likewise unclear who actually used the basement and
whether any residents were excluded from using the basement. We
express no opinion as to the precise facts that would have been
                                                                     34

precisely why a motion to suppress would have failed -- because

it is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that he had a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement and its

contents at the time of the search, rather than the

Commonwealth's burden to show that he had no reasonable

expectation of privacy.   See Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass.

686, 697 (2003).   Therefore, "if the record is unclear," the

defendant has failed to meet his burden.    Id.   In this context,

the defendant's burden on his motion for a new trial is the same

as the burden he would have had if his trial counsel had filed a

motion to suppress; that is, in order to meet his burden of

demonstrating that a motion to suppress would have been

successful for purposes of his motion for a new trial, the

defendant was obligated to present sufficient evidence that

demonstrated he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

basement.   See Commonwealth v. Druce, 453 Mass. 686, 703 (2009)

("A defendant who seeks a new trial based on ineffective

assistance of counsel bears the burden of proving the

ineffectiveness").

    Here, nothing that the defendant submitted in support of

his motion for a new trial resolves whether he had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the basement.    Without even, for

required for the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable
expectation of privacy in this case.
                                                                   35

example, a signed affidavit from the defendant providing

additional details concerning the basement, the defendant did

not satisfy his threshold burden of demonstrating that a search

in the constitutional sense had occurred at all.   See

Commonwealth v. D'Onofrio, 396 Mass. 711, 714 (1986).

    While the motion judge did not address whether the

defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, "[a]n

appellate court is free to affirm a ruling on grounds different

from those relied on by the motion judge if the correct or

preferred basis for affirmance is supported by the record and

the findings."   Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102

(1997).   The record clearly supports the conclusion that the

defendant did not meet his threshold burden of demonstrating

that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement.

Accordingly, the motion judge did not err in denying the

defendant's motion for a new trial.

    ii.   Evidentiary hearing.   The defendant also argues, with

respect to his motion for a new trial, that the motion judge

erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.   However, the

motion judge did hold an evidentiary hearing.   After this

evidentiary hearing, the defendant did not request another

hearing in his motion for reconsideration.   Thus, the motion

judge concluded that another hearing was unnecessary and adopted

the defendant's version of the facts.
                                                                  36

     Where the trial court had already conducted an evidentiary

hearing, and where the defendant made no request for another, it

would have been "fair to conclude that the defendant was

proceeding on the facts from the existing . . . record."

Commonwealth v. Pimental, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 333 (2002).      In

any event, the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in

determining that another hearing was unwarranted, as he could

have reasonably concluded that the briefing and documents before

him "were sufficient to allow him to reach an informed

decision."   Commonwealth v. Barry, 481 Mass. 388, 401 (2019).

     i.   Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   Finally, we have

reviewed the entire record and discern no basis upon which to

exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.12

     3.   Conclusion.   For the reasons stated, the defendant's

convictions of murder in the first degree and armed assault with

intent to rob are affirmed.   The trial court's orders denying

the defendant's motion for a new trial and the defendant's

motion for reconsideration of the same are likewise affirmed.

     12To the extent we do not discuss other arguments made by
the defendant (including arguments on duplicative convictions,
an alleged error in the jury instruction on felony-murder in the
second degree, alleged ambiguities between the attempted
commission of armed robbery and the commission of armed assault
with intent to rob, the alleged irrelevance of certain
photographic evidence, and omissions from Detective Kenney's
search warrant affidavit), they "have not been overlooked. We
find nothing in them that requires discussion." See
Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
                                                                 37

We vacate and set aside the conviction of unlawful possession of

ammunition and remand to the Superior Court for a new trial on

the unlawful possession indictment.

                                   So ordered.