Court Opinion

ID: 9706250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:37:04.245142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:20.745882
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I am unable to accept as sound in principle or as necessary in practice the conclusion of the majority that, for the court below to obtain jurisdiction over appellant, two personal services of process were required.
To hold as the majority does, that enforcement of the subpoena “is an independent judicial proceeding requiring service of process,” creates, in my view, an unrealistic and arbitrary barrier between the initial procedural step of issuance of the subpoena and its enforcement for disobedience. Enforcement (when necessary) is merely another aspect (following issuance) of the subpoena to achieve the single objective — the appearance of the subpoenaed witness.
The Charter expressly confers jurisdiction on the courts of common pleas of Philadelphia County to enforce subpoenas issued by officers of the city empowered to hold hearings. It seems obvious that the courts acquired jurisdiction for enforcement purposes from the moment the procedural act of serving the subpoena was completed and that no further personal service of process was required. Thereafter, whether the court was called upon to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction depended upon the turn of events.
*15It seems equally clear that it was not intended by §8-409 of the Charter to require the service of process twice in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. The Charter directs that designated city officials “shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses” (emphasis supplied) by subpoena but reserves to the courts the determination whether the subpoena should be enforced.
Thus, the service of. a subpoena under the Charter is a procedural device which initiates the proceeding. If the witness disobeys the subpoena, he does so subject to the express grant of authority in the court to issue proper enforcement orders. In this respect, the process is not unlike the procedure which now obtains in our courts with respect to subpoenas. Any party may secure process from the appropriate prothonotary or clerk and may have it served by anyone upon the witness. Thereafter, even though the court has had no advance notice of the issuance of the process or of its service, the court may proceed to make appropriate orders when the subpoena is disobeyed.
Had the Legislature intended that the courts should exercise complete supervision over the issuance of a subpoena in order to obviate what the majority fears, that “the subpoena power is one which is fraught with possibilities of abuse,” it would have provided that city officers must first make application to the court for the issuance of its process. This would have given the court control over issuance as well as enforcement. This, however, the Legislature did not do. Instead it gave to city officers the power to issue process without involving the court unless controversy arises. Obviously, the Legislature did not wish to burden the court with such procedural matters when court action might not be required, and, therefore, merely provided that the court not be obliged to act unless enforcement problems arise.
*16While it is true that some discretion is vested in the officers with respect to whether a subpoena should be issued, this is precisely the discretion reposed in a litigant or counsel who desires to compel a witness to testify and issues a subpoena for the purpose. In the ordinary court situation, process is issued in the name of the court, but application to the court for leave to issue is not required; the process issues without the court’s permission or knowledge.
The real problem is whether, when the Legislature gives enforcement powers to a court, that tribunal must issue its own process and have it served, notwithstanding that the power to initially issue and serve is conferred upon an agency of government not connected with the court itself. There is no impediment to empowering such officer to issue and serve the process and thus bring the witness within the jurisdiction of the court for enforcement purposes, as long as the Legislature does not confer judicial enforcement powers upon the officer. In this instance, it is a procedural device only, establishing the circumstances under which, if ever, the witness must appear in court to answer for his disobedience. No logical or legal reason appears why the procedural step of issuance by the court could not be eliminated, thus saving the time and efforts of a busy court.
Certainly, in establishing adjective matters, the Legislature could logically simplify practice so long as substantive law is not offended. Much of the theory behind our rules of civil procedure is to refrain from burdening the court whenever possible, bringing discovery and other matters to the court’s attention only when enforcement or protective orders are involved. I see no difference between the procedure in these situations and that established under the Charter and followed here.
*17I would, therefore, affirm the order of the court below compelling appellant to appear in response to the subpoena properly issued and served.