Court Opinion

ID: 9855227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:21:17.736245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:13.804780
License: Public Domain

*704Fontron, J.,
dissenting: In my opinion, this case is clearly distinguishable from Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P. 2d 933, on which the majority opinion is predicated.
First of all, the rationale of Sink is not applicable to the factual situation presented here. A refusal to permit this plaintiff to have redress for the wrong perpetrated upon her cannot be justified on the ground this action would tend to disrupt the marital relation. Domestic harmony had already been fractured in this case and divorce proceedings were pending between these parties when the alleged assault was committed upon the wife. I see no public policy to be served in denying a right of action to this plaintiff when the attack upon her occurred after institution of the legal proceedings which later culminated in divorce.
In Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P. 2d 941, an analogous situation was considered, and the court there said:
“Where at the time of the tort the marital relationship of the parties has completely lost its original character and the parties have taken concrete legal steps to dissolve the marital relationship altogether, we can perceive of no convincing reason for depriving an injured spouse of his or her cause of action.” (p. 235.)
This reasoning appeals to me as sound.
In the second place, the tort alleged in the instant case is alleged to have been an intentional and deliberate assault. It thus differs materially from the act which was involved in Sink, for there the plaintiff’s claim against her spouse was based on negligence. In my judgment, there is a vast difference between a negligent act, on one hand, and a willful, planned act, on the other, and this distinction has been recognized by other courts. (Ennis v. Truhitte, (Mo.) 306 S. W. 2d 549; Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 287 P. 2d 585.)
Under what I believe to be modern concepts of justice, it is a harsh rule indeed which refuses to extend the law’s protection to a wife who has been the victim of a willful assault by her estranged mate.
I would reverse this case and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Wertz, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.