Court Opinion

ID: 9704395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:34:08.673071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:01.887164
License: Public Domain

Danhof, J.
(dissenting). I vote to reverse.
After reading the instructions as a whole in the present case, it appears the only instructions given by the trial court relating to intoxication are set forth in toto by the majority. Those instructions read in relevant part:
"If the defendant’s mental faculties were so far overcome by intoxication or drugs that he was not conscious of what he was doing or did not know what he was doing, then he cannot entertain that specific intent and there being no such intent, the crimes * * * could not have been committed.”
People v Crittle, 390 Mich 367, 374; 212 NW2d 196 (1973), gives some specific examples of the capacity standard. Among them is "he was not conscious of what he was doing” and "did not know what he was doing”.
It is apparent the instructions in the present case only refer to the capacity standard and, as such, violate Crittle.
The majority opinion states, "In the case at bar, however, defendant testified that he could not even *681remember firing his weapon”. From this, the majority seems to infer that the defendant testified that he lacked the capacity at the time of the offense to form the requisite intent. This is not a permissible inference. The statement literally means that the defendant’s state of mind at the trial, i.e. his memory, was faulty. The statement has nothing to do with the defendant’s intent at the time of the offense. Moreover, it is not at all clear from the record that the defendant did not remember firing the gun.
The Crittle case may not be distinguished from the instant one on its facts. The defendant in Crittle argued that he intended an April Fool’s joke, not the specific intent for armed robbery. In the present case, the defendant’s main argument was that his intent was to defend himself from an aggressor, not to murder. This is almost the entire thrust of his testimony. There is also testimony that he had been drinking, but not that he lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent. Therefore, as in Crittle, the defendant was arguing that he had an intent different from that required for the offense.
Accordingly, I would conclude that the present case must be reversed because of the clear violation of Crittle, supra, in the trial court’s instructions.