Court Opinion

ID: 9541790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:28:40.277579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:48.762734
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the Superior Court order affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Penn Center House, Inc., Appellee. Contrary to the majority’s finding of genuine issues of fact that should be heard and resolved in a trial, my review of the entire record establishes no such issues as to any material fact relevant to the disposition of this case. A very simple issue is involved here — whether the trial court properly granted the Plaintiff/Appellee’s motion for summary judgment based on the pleadings, deposition testimony, affidavits and submissions of the parties. Both the trial court and the Superior court found no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and I agree.
Pa.Rule of Civil Procedure 1035, which governs a motion for summary judgment, provides in relevant part that summary judgment:
... shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine *180issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b). The rule further provides that:
... [w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Pa.R.C.P. 1035(d).
The summary judgment was entered in this equity action based on a claim by Appellee, Penn Center House, that shareholder-tenant, Sylvia Goldberg Hoffman, was keeping a dog on the premises in violation of House Rule 17 which forbad occupants from keeping animals without the express written permission of the corporation. The record establishes that House Rule 17 was enacted by the Penn Center House Board of Directors on February 17,1961 (affidavit of Samuel Cohan, manager of Penn Center House, R. 40a). Ms. Hoffman did not take up residence there until 1980.
The record establishes by Appellant’s deposition testimony that she admitted under oath that she is currently keeping a dog in her apartment, that this is the second dog that she has kept in that apartment, that she received a letter dated March 1, 1983 informing her that the keeping of her first dog violated the house rules, that she acquired her current dog in 1984, one day after the first dog died and after she received the notification that keeping a dog violated the house rules, that she received a second notice dated January 24, 1985 informing her that the keeping of the second dog violated the house rules and that she ignored this notice.
These facts establish that Appellant is keeping a dog in violation of the house rules by her own admission. In my mind, this is a sufficient basis upon which to grant summa*181ry judgment. As the Superior Court pointed out in its opinion:
A prima facie showing by the parties seeking summary judgment, i.e., the production of enough evidence to demonstrate such parties’ entitlement to a judgment if the evidence were uncontroverted at trial, shifts the burden of producing evidence to the party opposing the motion. In such circumstances summary judgment should be granted to the moving party unless the opposing party offers competent evidence admissible at trial showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Community Medical Services, Inc. v. Local 2665, 292 Pa.Super. 238, 437 A.2d 23 (1981). A non-moving party who does not properly oppose a motion for summary judgment with affidavits, depositions or the like, may not rely on the allegations of his pleadings to controvert facts presented by the moving party. Richland Mall Corp. v. Kasco Construction Co, [337] Pa.Super. [204], 486 A.2d 978 (1984); Pa.R.C.P. 1035(d).
(Memorandum opinion, J. 17020/87 at p. 3).
Appellant has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact in support of her allegation that the Penn Center Houses’s no-pet rule is enforced in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. She has failed to set forth any specific facts to support the allegation. Ms. Hoffman’s affidavit states that she is aware of a number of residents who keep pets without interference from management and that it is her belief that management is aware that residents keep various pets. This is hardly specific or factual support as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1035(d), and fails to create an issue of material fact.
Since Appellant did not present specific facts sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment was properly granted to Appellee and I would affirm the decision of the Superior Court.
McDERMOTT and ZAPPALA, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.