Court Opinion

ID: 9897307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:57.398197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:48.405231
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Aug 23 2023, 9:47 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT B.T.                                ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Riley L. Parr                                              Theodore E. Rokita
Lebanon, Indiana                                           Attorney General of Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT N.T.                                Abigail R. Recker
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
Michael C. Price                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
Zionsville, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of: A.T., Child in                           August 23, 2023
Need of Services:                                          Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-JC-3051
B.T. (Mother) and N.T. (Father),                           Appeal from the Boone Circuit
Appellants-Respondents,                                    Court
                                                           The Honorable Lori N. Schein,
        v.                                                 Judge
                                                           The Honorable Sally E. Berish,
The Indiana Department of                                  Magistrate
Child Services,                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           06C01-2110-JC-316
Appellee-Petitioner.

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                            Judges Riley and Weissmann concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023                           Page 1 of 33
      Case Summary
[1]   B.T. (“Mother”) and N.T. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the adoptive

      parents of A.T. Since being adopted by Parents in 2015, A.T. has engaged in

      problematic and sometimes violent behaviors. Parents have worked with

      various service providers over the years to provide A.T. with effective treatment

      and care. At some point, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)

      became involved with the family, providing them with wrap-around services as

      needed. On October 4, 2021, Parents and A.T. appeared at DCS, with Parents

      claiming that A.T.’s condition had worsened and that she required residential

      placement for treatment. A.T. also indicated that she did not feel safe in

      Parents’ home at that time. Two days later, on October 6, 2021, DCS filed a

      petition alleging that A.T. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). The

      juvenile court subsequently found A.T. to be a CHINS. Parents appeal part of

      the juvenile court’s CHINS determination. Concluding that the juvenile court

      correctly adjudicated A.T. to be a CHINS but that the portion of the juvenile

      court’s order relating to Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and -2 is not supported

      by the evidence, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Parents are the adoptive parents of A.T., who was born on June 5, 2006. Prior

      to her adoption by Parents, A.T. “had been a victim of physical abuse and

      neglect by her biological parent, including witnessing sexually abusive

      behaviors by her” biological mother. Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 8.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 2 of 33
      Parents met A.T. when she was placed at Coyote Hill Christian Children’s

      Home as a ward of the State of Missouri. While placed at Coyote Hill, A.T.

      had “struggled with behavioral issues including sexually acting out on others,

      excessive self-masturbation, property destruction, bullying children at school,

      extreme attention-seeking, and excessive lying including false allegations of

      prior sexual abuse by biological father with brother’s knowledge of it

      happening.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 8. She had been diagnosed with

      post-traumatic stress disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, attention deficit

      hyperactivity disorder, anxiety disorder, and reactive attachment disorder and

      had been prescribed various medications.

[3]   Despite being aware of A.T.’s mental-health and behavioral issues, Parents

      adopted A.T. and her brother in 2015. A.T. has, at times, demonstrated

      problematic and violent behavior since her adoption by Parents and has, at

      times, received both inpatient and out-patient treatment for her mental-health

      diagnoses. In 2016, after consultation with A.T.’s then-support team, Parents

      took A.T. off of her prescribed medications, and A.T. experienced a period of

      stability. However, by 2019, A.T.’s condition had deteriorated such that her

      then-support team had recommended that she again be medicated.

      Additionally, at some point, A.T. “began to report seeing an entity named

      Samuel with her at times,” producing “letters she claimed were from Samuel,

      drafted in her own handwriting.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 11.

[4]   A.T. “was admitted to two acute emergency psychiatric stays during” August of

      2020. Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 12. Beginning in September of 2020,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 3 of 33
      A.T. received residential treatment from Resource for “nine and a half (9½)

      months.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 12. While at Resource, A.T.

      displayed “dangerous self-harming behaviors, aggression toward peers, [and

      would] inappropriately manipulate situations and cross boundaries to get her

      way. She sexually acted out with peers, displayed suicidal ideation, threatened

      to kill her therapist and attempted to physically harm [her] therapist.”

      Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 12. A.T. was discharged from Resource on

      July 19, 2021, without successfully completing her programming “due to

      Medicaid terminating funding for the private placement.” Appellant B.T.’s

      App. Vol. II p. 13. Following A.T.’s discharge from Resource, the family was

      referred to DCS for community wrap-around services. In the months that

      followed, A.T. continued to engage in problematic, sometimes violent behavior.

[5]   On October 4, 2021, following another incident involving A.T., Parents brought

      her to their local DCS office. Parents reported that A.T. had threatened to kill

      her adult sibling and had threatened to harm them. Parents indicated that they

      wanted A.T. “to go to a facility” and A.T. indicated that she did “not feel safe

      in [Parents’] home.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 57. As of October 4,

      2021, A.T. had been diagnosed with “Reactive Attachment Disorder,

      Dysregulated Mood Disorder, ODD, ADHD, and Anxiety. [A.T. was] on

      medications and participating in wrap around services through DCS.”

      Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 57.

[6]   While at the DCS office, Parents met with DCS representatives who were a part

      of A.T.’s family-care team, with whom they eventually agreed to a safety plan

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023        Page 4 of 33
      that would have A.T. transported to a hospital for a risk assessment, with

      Parents following behind in a separate vehicle. However, after the members of

      A.T.’s family-care team left the DCS offices, a DCS supervisor, who was not a

      part of A.T.’s family-care team, “overrode the agreed on safety plan and instead

      had the [family-case managers] advise Parents they had to agree to take Child

      home with them or DCS would charge them with abandonment.” Appellant

      B.T.’s App. Vol. II pp. 16–17 (emphasis in original, internal quotation omitted).

[7]   DCS removed A.T. from Parents’ home and, two days later, on October 6,

      2021, filed a petition alleging that A.T. is a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code

      section 31-34-1-1. A.T. was initially placed in two different foster homes,

      before being placed in “residential placement at Oaklawn Psychiatric Center.”

      Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 17. A.T.’s placement in each of the foster

      homes failed due to A.T.’s “verbal and physical aggression and violent physical

      behavior” as, in both homes, A.T. “threatened physical harm or to kill foster

      placement’s family members and laid hands on foster placement or foster

      placement’s family members in anger.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 17.

      A.T. also engaged in

              multiple incidents of self-harming behavior, including attempted
              cutting, punching objects causing serious injury to her hand,
              refusing to take medication, attempting to drink chemicals,
              placing pop-tops and other objects in her mouth, taking an entire
              bottle of medication at one time (then spitting it out – but
              without the ability for placement to do a proper pill count to
              know if [A.T.] did in fact swallow any pills).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023     Page 5 of 33
      Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 17. A.T.’s concerning behaviors, including

      physical aggression toward others, self-harm, and suicidal ideation have

      continued since her placement at Oaklawn. Since A.T.’s placement at

      Oaklawn, A.T. has engaged in family counseling, as have Parents, with the

      therapeutic recommendation since A.T.’s admission being that there be no in-

      person visitation between Parents and A.T. but with cards passed through the

      therapist.

[8]   As the case proceeded, Parents separately requested permission to offer

      evidence establishing that A.T. was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section

      31-34-1-6. The matter eventually proceeded to a five-day evidentiary hearing,

      beginning on March 3, 2022, and continuing on June 1 and 2, 2022; July 27,

      2022; and August 17, 2022. On July 26, 2022, after the first three days of the

      evidentiary hearing had been completed and after DCS had completed its case-

      in-chief, DCS requested permission to amend its initial CHINS petition to

      include an allegation that A.T. was also a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code

      section 31-34-1-2. Parents objected to DCS’s request to amend the CHINS

      petition, arguing that the amended petition was untimely and that “permitting

      an amendment at this stage undermines all concept of notice and due process

      rights.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 143. The juvenile court granted

      DCS’s request over Parents’ objection and the proceedings continued.

[9]   On October 31, 2022, the juvenile court issued an order in which it found A.T.

      to be a CHINS, concluding that the evidence demonstrated that A.T. is a

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 6 of 33
CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1, -2, and -6. With regard to

Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, the juvenile court concluded as follows:

        DCS has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [A.T.]
        is a [CHINS] as defined by [Indiana Code section] 31-34-1-1 in
        that her physical and mental condition is seriously impaired and
        seriously endangered as a result of the inability and refusal of the
        Parents to supply her with the necessary shelter, supervision, and
        medical care.

        Parents appeared at DCS on October 4, 2021[,] with no other
        intention than leaving without Child in their care and custody.
        They claimed to be afraid of her violence; but routinely disregard
        her behaviors as attention seeking only. They refused to [agree to
        as part of a] reasonabl[e] safety plan for her return home. They
        refused to provide alternative placement options for her, claiming
        she had burned all her bridges. Parents were intent on Child
        being placed only in residential treatment that day and Mother
        unequivocally stated on the last day of trial that Parents stance
        on Child’s continued placement only in long term residential
        treatment and not in their home has not changed.

        Further, Parents have established a pattern of ignoring
        professional medical Orders for Child’s care by removing Child
        from prescribed medications and ignoring counseling treatment
        plans. Parents made repeated decisions against medical advice
        for Child. Parents have refused to acknowledge Child’s
        increasingly dangerous behaviors and instead believe her
        behaviors are attention seeking and nothing more.

        The coercive intervention of the Court is necessary because on
        October 4, 2021[,] Parents refused to provide Child with the
        necessary shelter and supervision which seriously impaired and
        endangered her well-being and their stance on taking her back
        into their home has not changed. In addition, they have
        established a pattern of refusing to provide her with the necessary

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023        Page 7 of 33
        medical care and treatment prescribed by multiple physicians and
        mental health professionals, which has seriously impaired and
        endangered her well-being.

Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II pp. 19–20 (underlining in original). With regard

to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2, the juvenile court concluded as follows:

        DCS has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [A.T.]
        is a [CHINS] as defined by [Indiana Code section] 31-34-1-2 in
        that during 2016–2018[,] Parents willfully chose to ignore or
        disregard multiple medical Orders of Child’s physicians and
        mental health professionals regarding her medications and
        mental health treatment plans.

        In addition, during those years and years after, Parents chose to
        disregard the recommendations of educational specialists
        regarding Child’s Educational Disability in her best interest,
        which recommended home schooling or online school. Parents
        unilaterality acted in their own best interest and enrolled her in
        public school.

        During this period, Child reported seeing a hallucination or
        celestial being, Samuel. Child reports Samuel guides her actions
        and affects her moods. Parents disregarded this as simply further
        attention seeking behavior, thus seriously endangering Child’s
        mental health.

        Also, during this period, Child’s behaviors in the home and at
        school increased in intensity, violence and frequency and grew to
        include suicidal ideation. Parents again disregarded these
        behaviors as attention seeking and seriously endangered Child’s
        mental health.

        The coercive intervention of the Court is necessary because
        Parents[’] acts or omissions in withholding Child’s medication
        and therapy more likely than not lead to the increase in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023          Page 8 of 33
        frequency and intensity of Child’s negative and dangerous
        behaviors. Parents established a pattern of acting in their own
        best interest in making these decisions, not in Child’s best
        interest. Mother in fact testified to the very same. Without the
        coercive intervention of the Court on behalf of Child, Parents are
        certain to revert to the same decision[-]making process.

Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 21. With regard to Indiana Code section 31-

34-1-6, the juvenile court concluded as follows:

        [Parents have1] proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
        [A.T.] is a [CHINS] as defined by [Indiana Code section] 31-34-
        1-6 in that Child has exhibited self-harming behavior both in the
        home and at school and those behaviors have steadily increased
        in intensity and danger.

        Child has substantially endangered her own health (taking an
        entire bottle of pills) or the health of another (threatening to take
        weapons to school, threatening to kill a teacher or children in
        their sleep, threatening to kill Mother and brother). These
        behaviors have happened in the home, in and out of multiple
        relative foster and residential placements and continue to do so
        while in the current DCS residential placement. She sees a
        hallucinated being. She is violent toward others. She threatens
        to harm and kill others. She has physically harmed others.

        The coercive intervention of the Court is necessary because
        Parents have failed to take Child’s behaviors seriously and failed
        to protect the Child, themselves and others from Child. The
        coercive intervention of the Court is necessary because Child is

1
  The juvenile court’s original order indicated that DCS had proven that A.T. was a CHINS pursuant to
Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6, but the court subsequently issued a nunc pro tunc order, correcting its
conclusion to state that Parents had proven that A.T. was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-
1-6.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023                           Page 9 of 33
               unable to protect herself.

               DCS has misinterpreted the statute in their argument against a
               Finding under IC 31-34-1-6. The statute does not require Child
               to present a danger only to Parents, and the argument that she is
               not a danger because of her current placement is not well
               founded. First, the statute requires endangerment of “another
               individual”, not endangerment to the parent. Child is clearly
               continuing to present a danger to other individuals while she [is]
               in residential placement. Secondly, perhaps that danger is indeed
               mitigated because of her placement and intensive level of
               supervision; however, that does not mean she is not a substantial
               danger. It simply means due to Court intervention an
               appropriate placement has been found to address her needs.

       Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II pp. 22–23 (emphases in original). Given these

       conclusions, the juvenile court ordered that A.T. “shall remain in her current

       home or placement, with supervision by DCS” and that the family should

       continue to engage in family therapy. Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 26.

       Discussion and Decision
[10]   At the outset, we note that in adjudicating A.T. to be a CHINS, the juvenile

       court concluded that A.T. was a CHINS under multiple sections of the Indiana

       Code, including Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-

       6 provides that in order to adjudicate a child to be a CHINS under that section,

       it must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence that

               A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes
               eighteen (18) years of age:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023          Page 10 of 33
                        (1) the child substantially endangers the child’s own
                        health or the health of another individual; and
                        (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation
                        that:
                               (A) the child is not receiving; and
                               (B) is unlikely to be provided or
                               accepted without the coercive
                               intervention of the court.

       Parents do not challenge the juvenile court’s conclusion that A.T. is a CHINS

       pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6 on appeal. As such, regardless of

       the success of Parents’ arguments on appeal, the portion of the juvenile court’s

       order adjudicating A.T. to be a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6

       will remain intact.

[11]   However, Parents’ challenges to the juvenile court’s order are not moot given

       the harmful collateral consequences that may be suffered by a parent following

       a CHINS determination. For instance, a CHINS determination, especially one

       indicating that a parent had neglected or abandoned a child, could result in

       adverse job consequences or preclude a parent from serving as a foster parent in

       the future. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014) (providing that a

       CHINS determination could result in adverse job consequences or preclude a

       parent from serving as a foster parent). As such we will address Parents’

       appellate challenges to the juvenile court’s order.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 11 of 33
       I.      Parents’ Challenges to the Juvenile Court’s Order
[12]   Parents contend that the juvenile court erred in allowing DCS to amend the

       CHINS petition to include Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2 after three days of

       the evidentiary hearing had been completed. They also contend that the

       evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s determination that A.T. is

       a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and -2.

       A. Amendment to CHINS Petition
[13]   Indiana Trial Rule 15(B), which we have previously noted applies to CHINS

       proceedings, see Maybaum v. Putnam Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 723 N.E.2d 951,

       954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), provides as follows:

               When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
               implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
               as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
               the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
               the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion
               of any party at any time, even after judgment, but failure so to
               amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
               evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
               within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
               pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the
               presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
               and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
               admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
               his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a
               continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.

       Ind. R. Trial P. 15. In Maybaum, we noted that while a CHINS petition “is an

       integral part of ensuring that the parents have notice of the allegations and an

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023        Page 12 of 33
       opportunity to contradict [DCS’s] evidence,” the purpose of Trial Rule 15(B)

       “is to promote relief for a party based upon the evidence actually introduced at

       trial, notwithstanding the allegations set forth in the pleadings.” 723 N.E.2d at

       954. Furthermore, “[n]otice may be express if raised prior to or during trial, or

       implied, if the evidence presented at trial places a reasonably competent

       attorney on notice that the issue was before the court.” Id. We generally

       review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an amendment to pleadings for

       an abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Patel, 174 N.E.3d 1061, 1064 (Ind. 2021).

[14]   In this case, following the third day of the evidentiary hearing and after DCS

       had rested its case-in-chief, DCS requested permission to amend the CHINS

       petition to include Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2, which states that a child

       may be found to be a CHINS if the “child’s physical or mental health is

       seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the child’s parent.”

       DCS argues that the evidence that had been presented during its case-in-chief

       supported a CHINS determination under this statutory section and that the

       requested amendment would simply allow the pleadings to conform to the

       evidence. The juvenile court granted DCS’s request to amend the CHINS

       petition over Parents’ objections.

[15]   On appeal, DCS argues that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in

       allowing it to amend the CHINS petition, pointing specifically to the fact that

       the juvenile court offered to grant Parents a continuance so to present them

       with an opportunity to refute the allegation during their cases-in-chief. We

       have previously concluded that “[i]f the trial court allows introduction of an

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023     Page 13 of 33
       issue not raised before trial, an objecting party may seek a reasonable

       continuance in order to prepare to litigate the new issue.” In re V.C., 867

       N.E.2d 167, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[16]   In this case, DCS’s motion was filed ten minutes before the close of business on

       the day before the fourth day of the evidentiary hearing. The juvenile court

       indicated that it would grant Parents a continuance to prepare a defense to the

       amendment if Parents so wished but counsel for Parents declined, with each

       indicating that they would proceed with the fourth day of the hearing as

       scheduled and with Father’s counsel indicating that they would “take

       advantage of the Court’s opportunity here to come back on another day for

       those types of issues.” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 37–38. Notably, the fifth day of the

       evidentiary hearing did not occur until three weeks later, which gave Parents

       and their counsel the opportunity to craft a defense and attempt to refute the

       previously-admitted evidence relating to a CHINS finding under Indiana Code

       section 31-34-1-2. We cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in

       allowing DCS to amend the CHINS petition, especially given the fact that

       Parents and their counsel had the opportunity during the three weeks between

       hearing dates to craft responses to DCS’s added allegation.

       B.      Sufficiency of the Evidence
[17]   The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that when deciding whether a child is a

       CHINS,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 14 of 33
               [j]uvenile court judges are often faced with the challenge of
               balancing multiple factors and multiple voices…. Judges must
               uphold the due process rights of parents, apply the proper law,
               and take into account recommendations and input from the court
               appointed special advocate (CASA), DCS, parents, step-parents,
               guardians, grandparents, the child, and often several attorneys.
               By their very nature, these cases do not fit neatly defined
               guidelines.

       In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2012). “A CHINS finding should

       consider the family’s condition not just when the case was filed, but also when

       it is heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290. Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme

       Court has held that when the court’s coercive intervention is not necessary, “the

       State may not intrude into a family’s life.” Id.

[18]           When reviewing a trial court’s CHINS determination, we do not
               reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Instead, we
               consider only the evidence that supports the trial court’s decision
               and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. When a trial
               court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and
               conclusions law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We
               consider, first, whether the evidence supports the findings and,
               second, whether the findings support the judgment. We will
               reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous.
               A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support
               the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly
               found facts.

       In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned

       up).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 15 of 33
[19]   Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s

       conclusion that A.T. was a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and

       -2. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that in order to adjudicate a child

       to be a CHINS under that section, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the

       evidence that

               (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
               or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
               neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the
               child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
               education, or supervision:
                      (A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is
                      financially able to do so; or
                      (B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the
                      parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or
                      other reasonable means to do so; and
               (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
                      (A) the child is not receiving; and
                      (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
                      coercive intervention of the court.

       (Emphasis added). Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2(a) provides that in order to

       adjudicate a child to be a CHINS under that section, DCS must prove by a

       preponderance of the evidence that

               A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes
               eighteen (18) years of age:
                     (1) the child’s physical or mental health is seriously
                     endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the
                     child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and
                     (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation
                     that:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023          Page 16 of 33
                                 (A) the child is not receiving; and
                                 (B) is unlikely to be provided or
                                 accepted without the coercive
                                 intervention of the court.

       (Emphasis added).

[20]   In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s

       order, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that A.T. was a

       CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and -2 because there was no

       evidence demonstrating a connection between Parents’ actions and A.T.’s

       diagnoses and behaviors. For his part, Father argues that the evidence is

       insufficient to support a CHINS determination under any theory other than

       Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6 because abandonment never occurred and the

       challenged reasons for the CHINS adjudication are based on forbidden

       speculation. We will address Parents’ arguments separately.

       1.      Mother’s Arguments

[21]   Mother argues that numerous factual findings made by the juvenile court are

       not supported by the evidence. Specifically, she challenges the sufficiency of

       the evidence to support Finding Numbers (“Finding No.”) twenty-one, thirty-

       three, thirty-five, thirty-seven, fifty-one, fifty-two, fifty-eight, fifty-nine, seventy-

       two, seventy-seven, and seventy-eight.

       a.      Finding No. Twenty-One

[22]   Finding No. twenty-one reads: “In February 2016, Mother and Father took

       Child off all medications because Child, who was nine (9) years old, didn’t
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023           Page 17 of 33
       want to take them.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 9. On cross-examination,

       Mother was asked “[w]hose decision was it to stop [A.T.’s] medications in

       February of Twenty-Sixteen?” Tr. Vol. V p. 40. Mother’s response reads as

       follows:

               It was a team decision. [A.T.] had voiced she didn’t want to be
               on meds because she felt it stigmatized her and so we met with
               her worker, the state worker, I don’t remember her name, but it
               was a[n] adoptive worker from the State of Miss, Missouri as
               well as her psychiatrist I mean we had team meetings every
               week, so teams were involved in all of our decisions throughout
               this time.

       Tr. Vol. V pp. 40–41. Mother further stated that A.T. was nine years old at the

       time her team decided to stop her medication.

[23]   While Finding No. twenty-one is accurate in as far as A.T. had voiced to

       Parents that she had not wanted take medication because she felt “it

       stigmatized” her, the finding is inaccurate in so far as it suggests that Parents

       unilaterally stopped A.T.’s medication because of A.T.’s wishes. Tr. Vol. V. p.

       40. The distinction is important given that the juvenile court appears to have

       relied on Finding No. twenty-one in concluding that “Parents established a

       pattern of ignoring professional medical [o]rders for [A.T.’s] care by removing

       [A.T.] from prescribed medications,” Parents “have established a established a

       pattern of refusing to provide her with the necessary medical care and treatment

       prescribed by multiple physicians and mental health professionals,” “Parents

       willfully chose to ignore or disregard multiple medical [o]rders of [A.T.’s]

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 18 of 33
       physicians and mental health professionals regarding her medications,” and

       “coercive intervention of the Court is necessary because Parents[’] acts or

       omissions in withholding [A.T.’s] medication and therapy more likely than not

       lead to the increase in frequency and intensity of [A.T.’s] negative and

       dangerous behaviors.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II pp. 20, 21.

[24]   DCS has pointed to no evidence to counter Mother’s testimony that the

       decision to stop A.T.’s medication in 2016 was not a unilateral decision by

       Parents, but rather was a decision made in consultation with an agreement by

       A.T.’s then-care team. Thus, to the extent that the juvenile court relies on

       Finding No. twenty-one to support its conclusion that Parents unilaterally

       stopped A.T.’s medication in 2016, against the recommendation of A.T.’s

       doctors and caregivers, the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s

       finding but rather supports the opposite finding, i.e., that Parents had stopped

       A.T.’s medication in consultation and agreement with her psychiatrist and case

       worker.2

       2
         Although not specifically challenged by Mother, we note that Finding No. twenty-four is also not
       supported by the evidence in so far as it indicates that the decision to stop A.T.’s medication in 2016 “was a
       unilateral decision by Parents, against all professional and medical recommendations at the time[.]”
       Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 10. Again, Mother’s testimony, which was not countered by DCS, indicates
       that the decision to stop A.T.’s medication was a team decision, not a unilateral decision made by Parents,
       and that the decision was not made “against all professional and medical recommendations.” Appellant
       B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 10.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023                              Page 19 of 33
       b.      Finding Nos. Thirty-Three, Thirty-Five, Fifty-One, Fifty-Two, and
               Seventy-Seven

[25]   Finding No. thirty-three reads: “Parents believe [A.T.’s] suicidal ideations at

       school were a result of being redirected by the teacher and nothing more.”

       Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 11. Finding No. thirty-five reads: “Parents

       believe [A.T.’s] suicidal ideations were done for shock value and nothing

       more.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 11. Finding No. fifty-one reads:

       “Parents believed [A.T.’s] self-harming behaviors were only for attention and

       not intended for actual harm, as were her suicidal ideations.” Appellant B.T.’s

       App. Vol. II p. 13. Finding No. fifty-two reads: “Parents declined to safety

       plan regarding knives and sharp objects in the home. Parents refused to remove

       any barber shop supplies from their home (scissors and knives brother used for

       his business). They believed it was unnecessary as [A.T.] would only harm

       herself for attention and nothing more.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 13.

       Finding No. seventy-seven reads: “Parents declined to safety plan regarding

       weapons in the home, stating instead [A.T.] should know not to use them.”

       Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 16.

[26]   On cross-examination of Mother, DCS inquired into A.T.’s attention-seeking

       behaviors, with the following exchange occurring:

               [DCS]:        Is it true that [A.T.] has attention seeking behaviors?
               [Mother]: Yes.
               [DCS]:        Is it true that one of those attention seeking
               behaviors is to express suicidal ideation?
               [Mother]: It can manifest that way.
               [DCS]:        Has [A.T.] ever actually attempted suicide?

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023        Page 20 of 33
               [Mother]: [A.T.] has hurt herself many times I don’t know if it
               was an attempt to suicide. She has reported both yes and no on
               the same incidents so I-I can’t speak to that.

       Tr. Vol. V p. 64. Mother also testified about A.T.’s more than thirty threats to

       commit suicide in late 2019 and early 2020, with Mother stating that the threats

       occurred primarily at school, “mostly when she was being told to do something

       that’s kind of what the teachers gave off is that [the threats occurred] mostly

       when she was being told like in a redirect.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 203. Mother further

       testified that they sought treatment for A.T. in response to her threats,

       describing her two short inpatient stays before she eventually was placed at

       Resource for nine and one-half months.

[27]   Further, while one of A.T.’s teachers testified that Father had stated that A.T.’s

       behavior was “attention seeking,” he further testified that Father had indicated

       that he “just wanted to take her to the emergency room or the stress center.”

       Tr. Vol. II p. 72. A DCS representative who worked with the family indicated

       that Mother had indicated that she did not believe that a safety plan was

       warranted regarding weapons or sharp objects in the home “because they know

       that [A.T.] would only harm herself for attention.” Tr. Vol. II p. 108. The

       record does not support the finding that Parents were asked, much less that they

       refused, to remove the items from the home but rather the evidence centered on

       discussions about whether such items should be locked up or put away.

[28]   The evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that Parents believed that

       A.T.’s behavior was, at least in part, attention-seeking. To the extent that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023         Page 21 of 33
       Parents assert otherwise, their assertion amounts to a request for this court to

       reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–

       78. However, to the extent that the juvenile court used these findings to support

       the conclusions that Parents did not treat A.T.’s threats seriously or did nothing

       to attempt to provide her with any necessary care or treatment, the juvenile

       court’s conclusions are not supported by these findings as the evidence clearly

       established that Parents had taken A.T.’s threats seriously enough to seek

       various forms of treatment for A.T.

       c.      Finding No. Thirty-Seven

[29]   Finding No. thirty-seven reads: “Parents believe Child’s report of seeing

       Samuel was an attempt at attention[-]seeking and nothing more.” Appellant

       B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 11. Mother’s testimony regarding A.T.’s report of seeing

       “Samuel” provided as follows:

               So there was this period of time where she began saying when
               she came back home that she was seeing this entity and that she
               could summon him and that he was standing behind us and that
               he was mocking us, or he didn’t agree with us, and so she would
               leave letters from Samuel to herself in her handwriting but she
               said they were from him if that makes sense. So we would find
               these letters and she would come and be like no he’s real stop
               telling me he’s not real and as I tried to be sensitive to this
               situation and say I believe that he is real to you but nobody else
               can see this and there is such a thing as a distortion of reality. So
               I tried to be very open with her that like, if she was using if for
               behavioral tendencies that needed to stop and we needed to
               figure out better ways. Like if she was trying to get something
               out of it whether that was attention seeking which we-we used a
               lot she, I said if this is an attention seeking procedure then we

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023        Page 22 of 33
               need to stop. If you are actually seeing this we need psychiatric
               help, so we obviously had Aspire so we started talking with her
               therapist and her psychiatric, she had a med specialist actually it
               was … that actually started suggesting we put her back on meds
               and we said trialing this and so by the time we got back to
               Zionsville they said they really saw a need for medication and so
               we did go ahead and reintroduce a physiatrist and a medication
               specialist to be on her team when she came to Zionsville.

       Tr. Vol. IV pp. 199–200. Mother’s testimony does not indicate that Parents

       believed that A.T.’s reports of seeing “Samuel” were nothing more than

       attention-seeking. DCS does not point to any additional evidence, but merely

       argues that the juvenile court could reasonably infer from the evidence that

       Parents believed that A.T.’s report were “attention[-]seeking and nothing

       more.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 11. We disagree. The evidence does

       not support the juvenile court’s finding that Parents discounted A.T.’s report as

       attention seeking and nothing more. As such, to the extent that the juvenile

       court relied on this finding to support its conclusion that Parents failed to treat

       A.T.’s mental-health issues seriously, such conclusion cannot be supported by

       this unsupported finding.

       d.      Finding Nos. Fifty-Eight and Fifty-Nine

[30]   Finding No. fifty-eight reads: “Ms. Green[3] observed [A.T.] to be a thoughtful

       kind person and had no inappropriate interactions with her. [A.T.] worked

       3
         Katherine Green is a self-employed habilitation provider who met with A.T. when she “interviewed to
       become the Habilitation Provider and possibly to provide service[s]” for the family. Tr. Vol. II p. 202.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023                            Page 23 of 33
       toward her goals of impulse control, respecting relationships with others and

       appropriate interactions.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 14. Finding No.

       fifty-nine reads: “Ms. Green observed the interactions between Parents and

       [A.T.] to be stressful, negative and frustrating. Parents told [A.T.] ‘If you don’t

       start to act better, we are going to give you up.’” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II

       p. 14. Citing to Pitcavage v. Pitcavage, 11 N.E.3d 547, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),

       Mother argues that these findings are “inappropriate” because they merely

       recite a witness’s testimony. Appellant B.T.’s Br. p. 29. For its part, DCS

       asserts that the findings indicate that the juvenile court’s findings represent the

       court’s summary of Green’s testimony, which it claims the juvenile court found

       to be credible. We agree with DCS on this point. The juvenile court’s findings

       regarding Green’s testimony are an accurate summation of Green’s overall

       testimony.

       e.      Finding Nos. Seventy-Two and Seventy-Eight

[31]   Finding No. seventy-two reads:

               October 3, 2021[,] [Family Case Manager (“FCM”)] Shelia
               Crossley held a safety planning meeting with Parents and [A.T.].
               Parents were adamant [A.T.] could not return to the home as
               they were fearful of her. The safety plan was written for [A.T.] to
               remain with the family friend pending a Child and Family Team
               Meeting (CFTM) to be held at the Boone County DCS Office on
               October 4, 2021.

       Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 15. Finding No. seventy-eight reads: “Parents

       did not believe [A.T.] was a harm to herself or others, as they believe her

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 24 of 33
       actions and behaviors are all attention seeking.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II

       p. 16. In challenging these findings, Mother asserts

               Findings #72 and #78 are unsupported by the evidence, and in
               any event are internally inconsistent. Parents self-evidently
               believed that A.T. was a danger, at least to others, as Mother’s
               testimony recounted countless examples of A.T.’s explosive
               behaviors. Moreover, it is counterintuitive that parents would be
               afraid of A.T. and yet also believe that all of her behaviors were
               to garner attention. These findings are also inconsistent with
               Parents’ repeated request—that went unheeded by DCS until
               A.T. physically assaulted a foster parent—that A.T. be admitted
               to a residential facility because of her behaviors.

       Appellant B.T.’s Br. p. 29. DCS does not respond to Mother’s arguments

       regarding these findings. We agree with Mother that the findings are

       inconsistent, and that Finding No. seventy-eight is unsupported by the record as

       the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that Parents feared A.T. and

       believed that she was a threat to both herself and others. As for Finding No.

       seventy-two, the record reveals that following an episode in the family home,

       FCM Crossley had discussed a temporary safety plan with the family that

       included A.T. spending the night at a family friend’s home until a CFTM

       meeting could be held the next day. As such, Finding No. seventy-two is

       supported by the evidence.

       f.      Mother’s Additional Arguments

[32]   Mother argues that “[s]tripping away the findings that lack any factual basis in

       the record, the [juvenile] court’s decision finding a CHINS-1 and -2 is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 25 of 33
       inappropriate because none of the findings nor conclusions explain how the

       parents’ purported actions or omissions caused A.T.’s diagnoses” and the

       juvenile court’s decision “stretches the CHINS statute too far and delves into

       connecting dots that do not exist.” Appellant B.T.’s Br. p. 29 (emphasis in

       original). Mother further argues that DCS did not present any evidence to

       suggest that “had parents followed all treatment recommendations to a “T” that

       A.T. would not be in the same position today.” Appellant B.T.’s Br. pp. 29–30

       (emphasis in original). “Said another way, no evidence was presented that

       Parents caused, whether by act or omission, A.T.’s present status.” Appellant

       B.T.’s Br. p. 30 (emphasis in original). Mother correctly asserts that the

       juvenile court’s own findings indicated that A.T.’s behavior did not significantly

       change during periods when she was medicated versus unmedicated or

       receiving versus not receiving mental-health treatment.

[33]   Mother also argues that the juvenile court’s determination that Parents

       abandoned A.T. is not supported by the evidence. We have previously

       concluded that “abandonment exists when there is such conduct on the part of

       a parent which evidences a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and

       relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re Adoption of M.L.L., 810 N.E.2d

       1088, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Mother asserts

       that Parents did not abandon A.T. but rather that “DCS foisted a Hobson’s

       choice upon Parents: Take A.T. back with them to a likely unsafe environment

       … or accept a substantiation.” Appellant B.T.’s Br. pp. 32–33. Mother further

       asserts that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023     Page 26 of 33
               [i]f Parents intended on October 4, 2021[,] to abandon A.T., it
               was exceptionally poorly executed. The uncontroverted
               testimony was that Parents participated in wrap-around services
               after removal even after DCS sought to discontinue wrap-around,
               Tr. Vol. III, pp. 195–99, and then participated in family therapy
               through Oaklawn. Id. at 241–42.

       Appellant B.T.’s Br. p. 33. We agree with Mother that the record does not

       support the juvenile court’s conclusion that Parents abandoned A.T.

       2.      Father’s Arguments

       a.      Abandonment

[34]   Father challenges the juvenile court’s determination that Parents abandoned

       A.T., arguing that A.T. “was never abandoned by [Parents], period. Parents

       were thrust into in an extreme set of circumstances regarding how and under

       what conditions it would be literally, physically safe to keep [A.T.] in their

       home, in the first week of October of 2021,” after A.T. had threatened Mother

       and her brother. Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 23. Father further argues that

               It is at this critical point that DCS itself destroyed its own
               abandonment allegation. Rather than follow through with the
               plan, DCS waited for [Parents’] Wrap Around supports to leave,
               then dismissed the attending police officer, and demanded,
               threatened, and coerced [Parents] to take Child immediately, or
               face “charges” of neglect and abandonment. [Parents] never had
               the opportunity to follow through on the hospital plan, to confer
               with hospital staff, to continue discussions with the Wrap
               Around supports that had worked with them since July of 2021
               to try to maintain [A.T.] in the face of DCS’[s] own efforts to
               prevent the residential placement parents were requesting help in
               obtaining, which itself had already been successful in

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023      Page 27 of 33
               maintaining parent-approved shelter for Child for the two
               previous nights (October 2 and 3). Due to DCS’[s] unilateral
               disruption of [Parents’] crisis management plan, no one knows if
               any of a multitude of other events might have taken place…. By
               asserting [Parents] abandoned [A.T.], DCS whistles past the fact
               that [Parents] never actually refused to take [A.T.] home had the
               plan not been interrupted by DCS, and is merely speculating that
               [Parents] would have not taken her home, as well as speculating
               that the hospital would have released her in the first place.

       Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 24. Father asserts that “[a]bandonment never

       happened, abandonment was not proven or supported by sufficient evidence[.]”

       Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 25. As we concluded above, we must agree. The

       record clearly demonstrates, and even the juvenile court’s factual findings

       recognize, that Parents went to DCS on October 4, 2021, seeking help in

       acquiring what they believed, and what DCS ultimately determined, was

       appropriate care for A.T. Parents have demonstrated a pattern of providing for

       A.T.’s needs, including seeking outside assistance when necessary. Since A.T.

       has been removed from their care, Parents have actively participated in therapy

       in a manner consistent with the recommendations of A.T.’s therapist. Thus, to

       the extent that the juvenile court’s CHINS determination relating to Indiana

       Code section 31-34-1-1 is based on a determination that Parents had abandoned

       A.T., such a determination is not supported by the record.

       b.      Evidentiary Challenges

[35]   Father also argues that the “[e]vidence is insufficient to sustain CHINS theory

       other than CHINS-6,” claiming that many of the juvenile court’s factual

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023    Page 28 of 33
findings regarding the need for A.T. to be placed in residential treatment are

inconsistent or “trap” parents. Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 29. Father points out

that some of the juvenile court’s findings, including Findings Nos. nineteen,

twenty-four, twenty-seven, and fifty, and conclusory paragraphs two and four

are inconsistent as they both paint a picture that Parents did not do enough for

A.T. but also somehow indicated that their act of advocating for the need for

residential placement amounted to neglect and abandonment. For instance,

Finding No. nineteen states that following A.T.’s second emergent stay, service

providers recommended that Parents “pursue residential treatment for” A.T.

but Finding No. fifty criticizes Parents for being “adamant” that residential

treatment was the “only service that was appropriate for” A.T. Appellant

B.T.’s App. Vol. II pp. 9, 13. Finding No. twenty-seven indicates that in 2018,

a service provider suggested that residential treatment was “an appropriate

option for” A.T., but that Parents opted to try a different treatment plan rather

than seeking residential placement at that time. Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II

p. 10. Father asserts that

        Again, it must be asked, are Parents to be blamed for trying to
        put [A.T.] in residential placement, or for keeping [A.T.] out of
        residential placement? In the [juvenile] court’s findings, they are
        blamed for both, most egregiously at the precise moment when
        DCS decided to open a case specifically because they knew
        residential placement was critical, which has obviously played
        out in real time since the case opened, as exactly correct.

Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 31.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023       Page 29 of 33
[36]   Finding No. twenty-four indicated that the decision to remove A.T. from

       medication was a “unilateral decision by Parents, against all professional and

       medical recommendations at the time, which they feel is justified because it is

       what Child wanted as well and Child thought talking to Mother was as good as

       a counselor.” Appellant B.T.’s App. Vol. II p. 10. As we mentioned above in

       Footnote 2, the juvenile court’s determination that the decision to stop A.T.’s

       medication was a unilateral decision made by Parents is not supported by the

       record. Father asserts that “[t]here is copious evidence that participation with

       [A.T.] in medication, therapy, and counseling, has no cause and effect

       relationship to [A.T.’s] behaviors escalating or de-escalating.”4 Appellant

       N.T.’s Br. p. 30. In support, Father points to the juvenile court’s other factual

       findings which outlined the various treatment options and placements sought

       and agreed to by Parents over the course of A.T.’s life.

[37]   Father also challenges the juvenile court’s findings relating to A.T.’s education,

       stating that

                Findings in paragraphs 28, 29, 30, and 32 suggest [Parents] are at
                fault for not following recommendations for [A.T.] to be home-
                schooled or in online schooling. Findings in paragraphs 63 and
                64, then suggest [Parents’] requested controls on [A.T.]’s

       4
         Father claims that DCS’s allegation that Parents had neglected A.T. by stopping her medication or
       changing A.T.’s therapy treatment options in 2016 is countered by evidence indicating that since A.T.’s
       removal from Parents’ home, DCS has not always been consistent with A.T.’s counseling or medication
       management as it did not initially require A.T. to participate in therapy, counseling, or medication
       management. As we concluded above, the juvenile court’s findings regarding Parents’ decision to stop A.T.’s
       medication in 2016 are insufficient to support the juvenile court’s conclusions that Parents neglected A.T. or
       refused to provide her with necessary medical care.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023                             Page 30 of 33
               behaviors at Zionsville Middle School were unnecessary,
               baseless, and that there were “no behaviors of [A.T.’s] to be out
               of the ordinary for a child in [teacher’s] classroom or any typical
               intensive intervention student.”

       Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 31 (last set of brackets in original). Finding Nos.

       twenty-eight, twenty-nine, thirty, and thirty-two can be read together as

       criticism for Parents enrolling A.T. in in-person schooling while Finding Nos.

       sixty-three and sixty-four can be read together as apparent criticism for Parents

       being too involved with A.T.’s schooling as the supporting testimony indicated

       that A.T. was, for a time, responding well to the in-person setting and was

       behaving as other children in her class. Father further argues that

               In either case, [P]arents are again blamed regardless of which
               direction they pivot. If [A.T.] is not put in a school facility, they
               are not following professional recommendations. When they put
               [A.T.] in a school facility, their parental decisions are found as
               neglectful or detrimental, even as they are proven to be prescient.

       Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 32.

[38]   Father asserts that Parents’ “choice of schooling, medical care, and attempts to

       alleviate and modify [A.T.’s] consistently anti-social and self-harming behaviors

       through any means, and with professional advice, is a parental choice, one not

       to be lightly preplaced by DCS’[s] or the [juvenile] court’s own hindsight[-

       ]based criticism.” Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 32. Father also takes issue with the

       juvenile court’s conclusion that Parents “chose themselves over” A.T., pointing

       to the years of prior and continuing efforts that they have undertaken on A.T.’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023        Page 31 of 33
       behalf. Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 32. Father concludes his appellate arguments

       by asserting that

               This is the kind of case that calls for Appellate relief, and an
               establishment of a reasonable outcome that recognizes that
               parents facing an unwinnable situation do not need the State to
               pile on at the moment of crisis, instead of providing grace and
               help. Nineteen months after filing a CHINS petition, five full
               days of heated trial, and intensive preparation of an appeal on an
               888 page transcript later, finds us all exactly where [Parents]
               suggested was needed for [A.T.] on the day of removal, and what
               was predicted by the last residential therapist just three months
               before the CHINS case opened – with [A.T.] in a residential
               placement because of her unremedied behaviors.

       Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 33.

       3.      The Juvenile Court’s Conclusions are Not Supported by the Record

[39]   The juvenile court appears to have relied heavily on its findings that Parents

       believed A.T.’s problematic behaviors were nothing more than attention-

       seeking and the fact that Parents “unilaterally” took A.T. off of her medication

       for a period between 2016 and 2018 as its main reasons for adjudicating A.T. to

       be a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and -2. As is discussed

       above, the juvenile court’s reliance on these findings is erroneous as the findings

       are not supported by the evidence. Further, despite the juvenile court’s

       determination that Parents had displayed a pattern of disregarding the

       recommendations of service providers, the record indicates that Parents had not

       unilaterally made decisions regarding A.T.’s care, but rather made decisions

       after consultation with various service providers in both Missouri and Indiana.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023      Page 32 of 33
       The fact that some service providers might not have agreed with all of the

       decisions made regarding A.T.’s care over a number of years does not, in and of

       itself, support a determination that Parents neglected A.T.’s needs.

[40]   Father argues that “[t]he evidence is at best equivocal in that no pattern of

       behavior corresponds to Child either being in or out of medication management

       or counseling.” Appellant N.T.’s Br. p. 30. The juvenile court’s factual

       findings indicate that Father is correct in this regard. The juvenile court’s

       conclusion that A.T. is a CHINS under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and -2

       are not supported by the record. Thus, while the juvenile court’s determination

       that A.T. is a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6 remains

       intact, we reverse the juvenile court’s determination that A.T. is a CHINS

       under Indiana Code sections 31-34-1-1 and -2.

[41]   The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

       Riley, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JC-3051 | August 23, 2023      Page 33 of 33