Court Opinion

ID: 9840149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 14:05:21.363353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:08:56.968897
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                          ROBERT D. GARNER,

                                 Appellant,

                                     v.

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                 Appellee.

                               No. 2D22-866

                           September 15, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Kimberly Campbell,
Judge.

Andrea M. Norgard of Norgard, Norgard & Chastang, Bartow, for
Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lydon W. Schultz,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

SMITH, Judge.
     Robert Garner challenges the trial court's order resentencing him to
two consecutive life sentences, each with the possibility of parole after
twenty-five years, after a jury found him guilty of committing two
murders in 1994. Mr. Garner argues that his consecutive life sentences
are unconstitutional where he committed the offenses in one criminal
episode when he was a juvenile. Because Mr. Garner is entitled to the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years for each of the two homicide
offenses, he has been granted a "meaningful opportunity" to be
considered for release during his natural life, and thus his sentences do
not violate the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.1
                                        I
      On March 3, 1994, a jury found Mr. Garner guilty of two counts of
first-degree murder. The charges arose from a single criminal episode in
which Mr. Garner and two others, one aged nineteen and one a juvenile,
participated in the brutal killing of two elderly victims who were
neighbors of Mr. Garner and personally known to him.
      After his conviction, the trial court sentenced Mr. Garner to two
consecutive life sentences, each with a possibility of parole after twenty-
five years. Mr. Garner, who was nineteen years old at the time of
sentencing, would have been eligible for parole at age forty-four. Mr.
Garner appealed those sentences, which this court affirmed on October
9, 1996, in Garner v. State, 683 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Mr.
Garner's subsequent postconviction motions were unsuccessful and were
denied by the postconviction court.
      On June 24, 2016, Mr. Garner filed a Motion for Postconviction
Relief 3.850(a), (1), (b) (2) [sic] Alternatively, Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence 3.800(a), arguing that his two consecutive life sentences with
the possibility of review after twenty-five years constituted a de facto life
sentence and were thus impermissible for a juvenile under Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla.
2016), abrogated by State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. 2018).

      1 We also find no merit in the remaining arguments briefed by Mr.

Garner.

                                        2
       The State conceded that under Miller and its progeny, Mr. Garner
was entitled to resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2, Florida
Statutes (2016). The court granted Mr. Garner's motion for
postconviction relief. But on August 24, 2018, the State filed a Motion to
Reconsider Defendant's Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, arguing that
because the Florida Supreme Court in Michel, 257 So. 3d at 6-7, had
recently overturned Atwell and held that parole-eligible juvenile
defendants are not entitled to resentencing because their sentences are
constitutional, Mr. Garner's sentences were permissible. On December
20, 2018, the postconviction court issued an order granting the State's
motion to reconsider, vacating its previous order, and denying Mr.
Garner's postconviction motion. The court agreed with the State that
after Michel overturned Atwell, Mr. Garner's parole-eligible life sentences
were indeed constitutional.
       Mr. Garner appealed the December 20, 2018, order to this court.
Garner v. State, 310 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). We reversed the
order and remanded for resentencing, holding that the postconviction
court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its previous order based on the State's
untimely rehearing motion; we noted, however, that upon remand, the
decisional law at the time of resentencing would apply and that "Mr.
Garner may still receive the same sentence upon resentencing." Id. at
485.
       At resentencing, Mr. Garner presented testimony from a number of
witnesses including family members and friends, as well as a
psychologist who discussed the effects of trauma on a juvenile brain. On
March 4, 2022, the court resentenced Mr. Garner to consecutive life
sentences, each with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.
This timely appeal followed.

                                     3
                                     II
     In this appeal, Mr. Garner argues that his consecutive life
sentences for the two homicides, even with the possibility of parole after
twenty-five years, are unconstitutional under our decision in Mack v.
State, 313 So. 3d 694, 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (holding that the sexual
battery consecutive life sentence, which ran concurrent with the life
sentences for first-degree murder and burglary, violated the Eighth
Amendment). We review de novo the constitutionality of a sentence.
Williams v. State, 313 So. 3d 788, 790-91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (reviewing
juvenile life sentence with the possibility of parole and determining that
sentence "is not illegal under the law as it now stands").
     However, before we address Mack, a brief discussion of the evolving
case law is required.
     The United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 568 (2005), held that a juvenile receiving a death penalty sentence
for any crime violates the Eighth Amendment. In Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 75 (2010), the Supreme Court would later address Eighth
Amendment implications in the context of juvenile nonhomicide
offenders receiving life sentences without parole. Graham was sentenced
to life in prison without the possibility of parole for an armed burglary
committed when he was sixteen. Id. at 53-54. The Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids a sentence of life
without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender. Id. at 82. And while
states are "not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile
offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime," they must "give defendants
like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" before the end of the sentence
and during the offender's natural life. Id. at 75. In considering a

                                     4
sentence of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders,
Graham held that "[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological
justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense." Id. at 71.
      Importantly, Graham drew a marked distinction between
nonhomicide offenses and homicide offenses:
      There is a line "between homicide and other serious violent
      offenses against the individual." Kennedy [v. Louisiana, 554
      U.S. 407, 438 (2008)]. Serious nonhomicide crimes "may be
      devastating in their harm . . . but 'in terms of moral depravity
      and of the injury to the person and to the public,' . . . they
      cannot be compared to murder in their 'severity and
      irrevocability.' " Id. (quoting Coker [v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
      598 (1977)] (plurality opinion)). This is because "[l]ife is over
      for the victim of the murderer," but for the victim of even a
      very serious nonhomicide crime, "life . . . is not over and
      normally is not beyond repair." [Id.] (plurality opinion).
      Although an offense like robbery or rape is "a serious crime
      deserving serious punishment," Enmund [v. Florida, 458 U.S.
      782, 797 (1982)], those crimes differ from homicide crimes in
      a moral sense.
Id. at 69.
      Two years later, the Supreme Court would decide Miller, 567 U.S.
at 479, focusing in on homicide offenses committed by juveniles. Miller
filed a habeas petition arguing a violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights after he was convicted of murder and received a mandatory life
sentence without the possibility of parole for the murder of a store clerk
during a robbery. Id. at 466-67. Building upon its reasoning in Graham,
the Supreme Court held that a sentencing scheme that mandates a
juvenile sentence of life without the possibility of parole for all juveniles
convicted of homicide violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 479. Miller
reasoned that "a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider
mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty
for juveniles," such as age, age-related characteristics, and the nature of

                                       5
the crimes, because to do otherwise "violate[s] th[e] principle of
proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment." Id. at 489. Again recognizing the differences
between homicide and nonhomicide offenses, it declined to categorically
bar such a penalty, as it had done in Graham. Id. at 479. Instead, it
held that a mandatory sentencing scheme where juvenile homicide
offenders receive "lifetime incarceration without the possibility of parole,
regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of
their crimes," violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 489; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577
US. 190, 212 (2016) ("A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by
resentencing them.").
     In response to Graham and Miller, the Florida Legislature adopted
chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida, codified in sections 775.082,
921.1401, and 921.1402, Florida Statutes. Mack, 313 So. 3d at 695.
     The Florida Supreme Court in Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 676
(Fla. 2015), discussed the implications of Graham and Miller where a
juvenile was convicted of multiple nonhomicide offenses and received an
aggregate sentence of ninety years in prison. Henry held that "the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under
Graham is implicated when a juvenile nonhomicide offender's sentence
does not afford any 'meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.' " Id. at 679 (emphasis added)
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). Because Henry would be imprisoned
until he was at least ninety-five years old, the Florida Supreme Court
held that his aggregate sentence for his nonhomicide offenses afforded
him no meaningful opportunity for release and was therefore

                                      6
unconstitutional under Graham. Id. at 679-80; cf. Michel, 257 So. 3d at
4 (holding that a juvenile sentenced to concurrent life sentences with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years for first-degree premeditated
murder and armed robbery was not entitled to resentencing because
such sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Franklin v. State,
258 So. 3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 2018) (holding that "Florida's statutory
parole process fulfills Graham's requirement that juveniles be given a
'meaningful opportunity' to be considered for release during their natural
life" and receding from its decision in Atwell, wherein the court had
earlier held that a juvenile homicide offender's sentence of life with parole
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment where the release date was well
beyond the juvenile's life expectancy).
                                     III
     We now turn to our decision in Mack. Mr. Mack, a juvenile, was
convicted of homicide and nonhomicide crimes and sentenced to
concurrent life sentences for murder and burglary, which entitled him to
a sentencing review after twenty-five years under sections 921.1402(2)(a)
and 775.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2018), and to a consecutive life
sentence for sexual battery, which entitled Mr. Mack to a sentencing
review after twenty years under sections 775.082(3)(c) and
921.1405(2)(d). Mack, 313 So. 2d at 695. The issue before us in Mack
was the "absence of any penological purpose to be served by [Mr.] Mack's
consecutive life sentence for sexual battery and that sentence's
nullification of [Mr.] Mack's meaningful opportunity to obtain release
from incarceration under his murder and burglary sentences" under
Graham and Miller. Id. at 698. In reversing the consecutive life
sentences as unconstitutional, we held that the opportunity for release
for the first life sentence after twenty-five years was not "meaningful" as

                                      7
required by Miller because Mr. Mack would still be required to serve an
additional twenty years for the consecutive life sentence for the sexual
battery before the next review. Id. at 696. In so holding, we reasoned
that the consecutive life sentence for sexual battery, arising from the
same criminal episode, served no "penological purpose" and that "[a]s a
practical matter, its only effect [was] to eliminate any meaningful
opportunity for him to gain release from incarceration under the murder
and burglary sentences." Id. (emphasis added).
     The State argues an obvious distinction between Mack and the
instant case—here Mr. Garner was convicted of multiple homicide
offenses with each consecutive sentence carrying a life sentence with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years. Conversely, the issue in
Mack focused on the penological purpose of a consecutive life sentence
for the nonhomicide offense.
                                     IV
     The issue before us is one of first impression for our court.2
However, our sister court in the Fourth District addressed similar facts
and upheld as constitutional consecutive life sentences with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years where the juvenile committed
multiple homicides in a single episode. Hegwood v. State, 308 So. 3d
647, 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). In Hegwood, the juvenile was sentenced
to life in prison with a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum for three

     2 The United States Supreme Court "has not squarely addressed

the issue" before us now—whether the rules announced in Graham and
Miller "should be extended to cases in which a juvenile homicide offender
receives consecutive sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of
release" for each of the multiple homicide offenses. State v. Ali, 895 N.W.
2d 237, 244 (Minn. 2017). Nor has the Florida Supreme Court squarely
addressed the issue presented here.

                                     8
murders and life in prison with a three-year mandatory minimum for
robbery with a firearm. Id. The three murder sentences were ordered to
run consecutively to the robbery count running consecutively with the
first murder count. Id. The trial court ordered that the juvenile was not
entitled to review until he had served seventy-five years. Id. The
Hegwood court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it
ordered that the juvenile was not entitled to judicial review until after
serving seventy-five years but affirmed the three consecutive life
sentences for the three murders, holding that the consecutive life
sentences were constitutional under Miller and Michel, where Mr.
Hegwood would be provided judicial review after each life sentence. Id. at
648-49. As in Hegwood, Mr. Garner was sentenced to consecutive life
sentences for multiple murders and he will have a meaningful
opportunity for release because each of his life sentences provides for the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years.
                                      V
      Trial courts have broad discretion when sentencing a defendant
within the statutory limits. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481
(2000); see also Hoskins v. State, 965 So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 2007) ("Trial
courts are in the best position to observe the unique circumstances of a
case and have broad discretion in assigning weight to mitigators."). And
within those statutory limits, homicide offenses may carry harsher
sentences than nonhomicide cases. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438 (citing
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797) (noting that harsher sentences for homicide
offenses were justified due to "the fundamental, moral distinction
between" homicide and other offenses). A juvenile life sentence with the
possibility of parole "is not illegal under the law as it now stands."
Williams, 313 So. 3d at 790-91. The United States Supreme Court and

                                      9
the Florida Supreme Court have historically treated nonhomicide cases
differently than homicide cases. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 69; Miller, 567
U.S. at 473; Henry, 175 So. 3d at 678. Here, Mr. Garner has not
provided any legal authority supporting a departure from this long line of
authority. Therefore, until such time that the United States Supreme
Court or the Florida Supreme Court holds, or the Legislature enacts law,
that precludes the imposition of consecutive life sentences—even with
the possibility of parole or judicial review after twenty-five years for each
sentence—for juvenile homicide offenders who commit multiple murders,
we are bound to follow Graham, Miller, Michel, and Franklin.
      Accordingly, because the consecutive life sentence, here, with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years, was for the second homicide,
that sentence served a "penological purpose" and did not violate the
Eighth Amendment.3
      Affirmed.

LABRIT, J., Concurs.
SILBERMAN, J., Concurs specially with an opinion in which LABRIT, J.,
concurs.

      3 More than twenty-five years have elapsed since Mr. Garner was

first sentenced, and he has not yet moved for judicial review, although
we understand from his briefing that he intends to file such motion. This
opinion is limited to the issues raised herein, and nothing in this opinion
should be construed as to reach the merits of such motion for review or
additional filings related thereto.

                                     10
SILBERMAN, Judge, Specially concurring.
      I concur with the majority decision, affirming Mr. Garner's
consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole after twenty-five
years as to each count of first-degree murder.4 The majority has
distinguished this court's decision in Mack v. State, 313 So. 3d 694, 695
(Fla. 2d DCA 2020), which involved a juvenile who committed multiple
crimes in a single criminal episode. There, Mr. Mack was sentenced to
concurrent life sentences for a homicide and a burglary and a
consecutive life sentence for a sexual battery, a nonhomicide offense. Id.
Here, Mr. Garner was sentenced to consecutive life terms for two
homicides committed in a single criminal episode.
      At issue in Mack and here is how to deal with a juvenile's
consecutive life sentences where each sentence provides for judicial
review or the possibility of parole after a specified period of incarceration
served on the initial life sentence. Mack concludes that consecutive
sentences would afford Mr. Mack no meaningful opportunity to be
released from incarceration. Id. at 696. This court explained that the
consecutive life sentence for the sexual battery would render Mr. Mack
ineligible to seek release from incarceration even if he were found to be
fully rehabilitated and entitled to release on the homicide and burglary
sentences. Id. Instead, he would be returned to prison to begin serving
his life sentence for the sexual battery with judicial review after another
twenty years' imprisonment. Id. The court concluded that there is no

      4 It is worth noting that while each of Mr. Garner's life sentences

includes the possibility of parole, in Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307,
1314 (2021), the Supreme Court reiterated that neither its earlier cases
nor the Eighth Amendment prohibits a discretionary sentence of life
without parole for a juvenile who commits a homicide. Jones does not
impact the analysis of Mr. Garner's claim.

                                     11
penological purpose for such an outcome and that the sentencing
scheme violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
set forth in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
at 696, 698.
      The majority concludes that there is a penological purpose to
support the consecutive sentences imposed here for two homicides. At
this point, I cannot disagree. But if Mr. Garner is eventually granted
release on parole on his first sentence, an issue that will need to be
resolved is whether there will still be a penological purpose justifying his
return to prison to begin serving his second sentence, for which he would
not be eligible for release on parole for twenty-five years.
      Current law does not clearly resolve this issue when the sentences
are for multiple homicides. The Florida Supreme Court has reiterated
that an offender's juvenile status implicates the Eighth Amendment and
warrants different considerations when the offender faces criminal
punishment as if the juvenile were an adult. Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d
675, 677 (Fla. 2015) (discussing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)).
The court held "that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment under Graham is implicated when a juvenile
nonhomicide offender's sentence does not afford any 'meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.' " Id. at 679 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75
(2010)).
      In Graham, the Supreme Court noted that "[a] State is not required
to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a
nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give defendants
like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on

                                     12
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." 560 U.S. at 75. The Court
added that
      while the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing
      a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide
      offender, it does not require the State to release that offender
      during his natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying
      crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and
      thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives.
Id.
      In a case dealing with the sentencing of a juvenile offender who
committed first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed carjacking,
the Florida Supreme Court reviewed Florida's statutory scheme to
address whether a trial court is required to review a juvenile's aggregate
sentence imposed during the same sentencing proceeding. State v.
Purdy, 252 So. 3d 723, 725–27 (Fla. 2018). The court held that Florida's
juvenile sentencing statutes do "not provide for aggregation of sentences
at judicial sentence review." Id. at 729. The court emphasized that it
was deciding the issue solely under Florida statutory law and was not
addressing any challenge to consecutive sentences on Eighth
Amendment grounds. Id. at 729 n.2. The court also noted that after
Graham, the United States Supreme Court discussed juvenile homicide
offenders and held "that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition
of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juvenile
homicide offenders." Id. at 725 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479).
      In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held "that the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison
without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." 567 U.S. at 479. But
the Court did not discuss the issue of consecutive life sentences for
juveniles who commit multiple homicides in a single criminal episode
and whose sentences provide for the possibility of parole after twenty-five

                                     13
years as to each sentence. The Court again emphasized that "children
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing" and
"have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform." Id. at
471 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569–70 (2005). The Court noted that the penological justifications
for imposing harsh sentences include retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Id. at 472–73. However, the Court
reiterated "that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile
offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes." Id. at 472.
     The cases discussed above do not directly answer the issue of
whether the sentences imposed here violate the Eighth Amendment. At a
minimum, these sentences would require that Mr. Garner serve at least
fifty years in prison. Even if he were to be released on parole as to his
first life sentence after twenty-five years, he would be returned to prison
to begin serving his second life sentence without further parole review
until he has served another twenty-five years in prison. Thus, for two
homicides committed during a single criminal episode, even if his first
parole review determines there is no penological purpose requiring that
he remain in prison as to the first life sentence, the same factors that
warranted his release as to that sentence would not allow him to leave
prison for another twenty-five years.
     It is possible that differences in the facts of each homicide
committed by Mr. Garner may justify his return to prison to serve
twenty-five years before he may be parole eligible as to the second
sentence. But it is also possible that the factors supporting his release
from the first life sentence may establish that there would be no
penological purpose in having Mr. Garner serve the second sentence.

                                    14
     As the majority opinion notes, the Fourth District upheld the
constitutionality of a juvenile defendant's three consecutive life
sentences, with judicial review after twenty-five years as to each
sentence, for three homicides committed during a single criminal
episode. See Hegwood v. State, 308 So. 3d 647, 648–49 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020). In doing so, the Fourth District rejected the trial court's
pronouncement that Mr. Hegwood was not entitled to judicial review of
his sentence until after seventy-five years, when all of his minimum
sentences have been served. Id. at 649. The Fourth District discussed
the holding in Miller that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders." Id. at 648 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 479). But the
court did not address the Supreme Court's observations regarding
juveniles' "diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform" or
"the distinctive attributes of youth [that] diminish the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders."
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72.
     Mr. Garner has not yet sought or obtained release to parole from
his first life sentence. As previously noted, should he be successful in
obtaining release to parole on that sentence, then it appears he will be
remanded to custody to begin serving his second sentence. But his
release from prison on the first sentence is a contingent future event that
may not occur. The Supreme Court has stated that "[a] claim is not ripe
for adjudication if it rests upon 'contingent future events that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.' " Texas v. United
States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)); see also Trump v. New York,
141 S. Ct. 530, 535 (2020) (relying on the ripeness discussion in Texas v.

                                     15
United States to conclude that an Article III claim was not ripe for review
due to "contingencies and speculation that impede judicial review");
Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 918 (Fla. 2013) (concluding that a claim
that a death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment because the defendant may be
incompetent at the time of execution is not ripe for review until a death
warrant has been issued).
     Until Mr. Garner obtains release from his first life sentence, he will
not begin serving his second life sentence. Should this occur, he will
have the opportunity to raise a claim that returning him to prison to
begin his second life sentence serves no penological purpose and violates
the Eighth Amendment. At that point, a court will be able to evaluate his
claim, which will then include the circumstances surrounding Mr.
Garner's release to parole on his first life sentence. See Cheffer v. Reno,
55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (declining to reach an Eighth
Amendment challenge and recognizing that such a challenge can be
raised in the future when the controversy is ripe).
     For these reasons, I concur in the majority decision affirming the
trial court's resentencing order.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

                                     16