Court Opinion

ID: 9376721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 17:07:41.668201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.649475
License: Public Domain

J-A26038-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    RICARDO DUPLESSIS                          :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :      No. 2601 EDA 2021

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007098-2021

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM:                                    FILED MARCH 3, 2023

        Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the

motion to quash filed by Appellee, Ricardo Duplessis, and dismissed the

charges brought in the criminal information. We reverse and remand.

        The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as follows:

           On December 30, 2020, Alphonzo Anderson (“Decedent”),
           was shot and killed at 1109 Rosalie Street. [Appellee] was
           arrested and charged with Murder and associated charges
           on January 4, 2021. A preliminary hearing was held on
           August 9, 2021, where the Commonwealth called Marquita
           Grasty as the only testifying witness.         Ms. Grasty’s
           identification of [Appellee] was stipulated between counsel
           as Ms. Grasty and [Appellee] share a child. Ms. Grasty
           testified that she and [Appellee] have known each other
           since 2011, dating on and [off] for approximately six years.
           Ms. Grasty gave birth to their child in 2017, and officially
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A26038-22

       ended the relationship with [Appellee] in 2019. Over the
       course of her relationship with [Appellee], Ms. Grasty began
       dating the Decedent on and off in 2016. [Appellee] was
       aware of this relationship.

       On the night of December 29, 2020, Ms. Grasty was at home
       where she called the Decedent a Lyft at approximately
       10:00 p.m. While Ms. Grasty intended to send a screenshot
       of the Lyft ride to the Decedent, she accidently sent the
       screenshot to [Appellee], and her mother.      [Appellee]
       responded to the text message asking if Ms. Grasty would
       speak on the phone. [Appellee] further stated that Ms.
       Grasty would not speak to him since the Decedent would be
       at her home. Ms. Grasty replied to [Appellee’s] message,
       stating “Mr. Anderson was coming to get something out of
       her car and then going home.”

       The Decedent arrived at Ms. Grasty’s home at
       approximately 11:00 p.m. [Appellee] texted Ms. Grasty
       stating, “he was going for a walk.” Ms. Grasty did not
       respond. The Decedent was inside Ms. Grasty’s home for a
       few hours before leaving to sleep in Ms. Grasty’s Honda
       Accord, parked in the rear of her home. To Ms. Grasty’s
       knowledge, people did not usually travel in the back area of
       her home, but [Appellee] had previously been in that area.
       When the Decedent left to sleep in the car, Ms. Grasty went
       to her bedroom to go to sleep. Overnight, Ms. Grasty woke
       up to the sound of four gunshots. Ms. Grasty sent a text
       message, checking on the Decedent. Without receiving a
       response, Ms. Grasty went back to sleep under the
       assumption the Decedent was still asleep. At approximately
       7:00 a.m. Ms. Grasty walked outside to find the Decedent
       sitting in the car, covered in blood.        Counsel further
       stipulated that if Officers McDonna and McCabe were to
       testify, they would attest to arriving at 1109 Rosalie Street
       on December 30, 2020 at approximately 7:39 a.m. where
       they found the Decedent sitting in a gray Honda Accord with
       gunshot wounds to the face.

       A video compilation created during the investigation was
       presented at the preliminary [hearing]. Ms. Grasty was
       previously shown the video during an initial interview with
       the homicide unit. While on the stand, Ms. Grasty viewed
       the same video with the inclusion of additional angles.

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       Testifying to the video compilation, Ms. Grasty identified
       [Appellee] as the individual seen walking on Summerdale
       Avenue. Despite defense counsel objections, Ms. Grasty’s
       identification of [Appellee] was admitted. Ms. Grasty further
       testified that she was able to accurately identify [Appellee]
       based on familiarity with his general demeanor due to their
       long-term relationship.      Although [Appellee] knew Ms.
       Grasty to park her car behind her home, Ms. Grasty testified
       that [Appellee] would not have known the Decedent was
       sleeping in her car. Ms. Grasty initially said that she did not
       know [Appellee] to own a gun but attested to his history of
       violence. In 2019, [Appellee] choked Ms. Grasty during a
       domestic altercation. Ms. Grasty originally testified that
       [Appellee] did not make any comment regarding her
       relationship to the Decedent during the incident, however,
       upon refreshing her recollection with a police statement, it
       was established that [Appellee] wrote in a letter to Ms.
       Grasty “while I was choking you, all I saw was your
       boyfriend [Decedent].” Further testimony based on the
       prior statement revealed that Ms. Grasty was aware
       [Appellee] owned a firearm that he stored in his basement
       ceiling.

       On cross examination, Ms. Grasty testified that multiple
       residents regularly parked their vehicles in the alley located
       behind her home. Ms. Grasty was aware that the Decedent
       was charged with dealing drugs and carrying an illegal
       firearm but was unaware of his involvement at the time of
       his death. Ms. Grasty admitted that there was nothing
       specifically unique about [Appellee’s] walk to make it
       identifiable, nor had [Appellee] suffered an injury that would
       make his walk distinctive. The only time [Appellee] went to
       Ms. Grasty’s home at night was upon his release from jail in
       2020 to pick up their son.

       Lastly, counsel stipulated to the video compilation which is
       summarized as follows: The video, time stamped at
       approximately 5:45 a.m., shows an individual walking down
       Summerdale Ave. toward the back alley where Ms. Grasty’s
       parked vehicle is located. An individual is seen dressed in
       plain, dark, clothing and black shoes. Video surveillance
       from a private residential home located on Rosalie Street,
       showed the individual entering the alleyway and walking in
       the direction of the gray Honda Accord. The individual

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           proceeds to investigate the vehicle and remove a firearm
           from his jacket pocket. Surveillance shows the individual
           walking around the car with the firearm in hand. The
           individual then walks to the other side of the alleyway, out
           of view of the camera. Approximately [two] minutes lapse,
           and the individual walks past the car again without the
           firearm present.     The next camera angle shows the
           individual standing at the Summerdale Ave. entrance to the
           alleyway for several minutes. After, the individual returns
           to the alley he is seen walking towards the car, with the
           firearm in hand. The individual approaches the car, looks
           inside, and proceeds to fire [three] gunshots into the car.
           The individual then runs out [of] the alley toward Frontenac
           Street. The video surveillance concludes on Frontenac
           Street showing the same individual dressed in dark clothing
           exiting the alley way and running up the street.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/17/22, at 2-5) (internal footnotes and record

citations omitted).

        At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, Appellee was held for court

on charges of murder, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm

on public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing instruments of crime (“PIC”).1

On September 22, 2021, Appellee filed a motion to quash the charges. In it,

Appellee argued that the Commonwealth “failed to establish a prima facie

case” as to any of the charges. (Motion, filed 9/22/21, at ¶3). The court

conducted another hearing on November 17, 2021. That same day, the court

granted Appellee’s motion and dismissed all charges. Specifically, the court

determined “that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of

identity.” (N.T. Pretrial Hearing, 11/17/21, at 5).

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 6106, 6108, and 907, respectively.

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      The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 2021.

On January 4, 2022, the court ordered the Commonwealth to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.                The

Commonwealth timely filed its Rule 1925(b) statement on January 18, 2022.

      The Commonwealth now raises one issue for our review:

         Did the [trial] court err in ruling that the evidence was
         insufficient to establish a prima facie case that [Appellee]
         committed the crimes charged, where [Appellee’s] ex-
         girlfriend—who had known him for more than eight years—
         identified him from a surveillance video as the person who
         repeatedly shot the victim as he lay sleeping in a car parked
         in an alleyway behind her house?

(Commonwealth’s Brief at 4).

      The following principles apply to this Court’s review of an order granting

a pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus:

         We review a decision to grant a pre-trial petition for a writ
         of habeas corpus by examining the evidence and reasonable
         inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the
         Commonwealth. Whether the Commonwealth satisfied its
         burden of establishing a prima facie case for each charged
         crime is a question of law, to which this Court’s standard of
         review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

         A pre-trial habeas corpus motion is the proper means for
         testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence
         to establish a prima facie case. To demonstrate that a prima
         facie case exists, the Commonwealth must produce
         evidence of every material element of the charged
         offense(s) as well as the defendant’s complicity therein. To
         meet its burden, the Commonwealth may utilize the
         evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and also may
         submit additional proof.

Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 203 A.3d 1115, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal

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citations and quotation marks omitted).

       On appeal, the Commonwealth emphasizes Ms. Grasty’s preliminary

hearing testimony identifying Appellee as the individual depicted in the

surveillance video.    In support of this identification, the Commonwealth

reiterates that Ms. Grasty “was intimately familiar with [Appellee’s]

appearance, gait, and demeanor because she had known him for nine years,

dated him for six years, and had a child with him.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at

12).     To the extent that the trial court found Ms. Grasty’s testimony

unconvincing, the Commonwealth insists that the court made “an improper

pretrial credibility determination.” (Id. at 13). The Commonwealth concludes

that it presented a prima facie case as to each of the criminal charges, and

this Court must reverse the order granting Appellee’s pretrial motion.     We

agree.

       “The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether the

Commonwealth has made out a prima facie case for the offenses charged.”

Commonwealth v. Ouch, 199 A.3d 918, 923 (Pa.Super. 2018).

          The preliminary hearing is not a trial. The principal function
          of a preliminary hearing is to protect an individual’s right
          against an unlawful arrest and detention. At this hearing
          the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing at least
          a prima facie case that a crime has been committed and that
          the accused is probably the one who committed it.

                                   *    *    *

          In addition, the evidence should be such that if presented
          at trial, and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted
          in allowing the case to go to the jury. The standard clearly

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         does not require that the Commonwealth prove the
         accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at this stage.
         Most significant in this appeal, the weight and
         credibility of the evidence is not a factor at this stage.

Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 172 A.3d 5, 10 (Pa.Super. 2017) (emphasis

added; internal citations and quotation marks omitted).                   “Inferences

reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would support a verdict

of guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth’s case.” Ouch, supra at 923 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

      Additionally, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines first-degree murder

as follows:

         § 2502. Murder

            (a) Murder of the first degree.―A criminal homicide
         constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed
         by an intentional killing.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).

         To find a defendant guilty of first-degree murder a jury must
         find that the Commonwealth has proven that he or she
         unlawfully killed a human being and did so in an intentional,
         deliberate and premeditated manner.

              It is the element of a willful, premeditated and
              deliberate intent to kill that distinguishes first-degree
              murder from all other criminal homicide. …

         The mens rea required for first-degree murder, specific
         intent to kill, may be established solely from circumstantial
         evidence.

Commonwealth v. Schoff, 911 A.2d 147, 159-60 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal

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citations and quotation marks omitted).

     The Crimes Code also defines the offense of PIC as follows:

        § 907. Possessing instruments of crime

          (a) Criminal instruments generally.—A person
        commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses
        any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally.

                                *    *    *

            (d) Definitions.—As used in this section, the following
        words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them
        in this subsection:

                                *    *    *

           “Instrument of crime.” Any of the following:

                  (1) Anything specially made or specially adapted
           for criminal use.

                (2) Anything used for criminal purposes and
           possessed by the actor under circumstances not
           manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a), (d).

     The Uniform Firearms Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:

        § 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license

           (a)   Offense defined.—

                (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any
           person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person
           who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person,
           except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,
           without a valid and lawfully issued license under this
           chapter commits a felony of the third degree.

                                *    *    *

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           § 6108. Carrying firearms on public streets or public
                property in Philadelphia

              No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any
           time upon the public streets or upon any public property in
           a city of the first class unless:

              (1)   such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or

              (2) such person is exempt from licensing under section
           6106(b) of this title (relating to firearms not to be carried
           without a license).

18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1) and 6108.

      Instantly, the record shows that Ms. Grasty first met Appellee in 2011,

and she gave birth to his child in 2017. (See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 8/9/21,

at 8-9).      After providing some additional context for this years-long

relationship, Ms. Grasty unambiguously identified Appellee as the individual

depicted in the surveillance video:

           [PROSECUTOR]:       Does Homicide then show you some
           video from the area around your house?

           [WITNESS]:           Yes.

           [PROSECUTOR]:       After you watch the video, do you
           recognize anyone in the video?

           [WITNESS]:           Yes.

           [PROSECUTOR]:        Who do you recognize in the video?

           [WITNESS]:           [Appellee].

(Id. at 19-20).

      Thereafter, the Commonwealth played a “compilation video,” which

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included images captured by several different cameras on the morning of the

shooting. (Id. at 20). Again, Ms. Grasty identified Appellee as the individual

in the video:

         [PROSECUTOR]:        Ms. Grasty, can you see this individual
         walking?

         [WITNESS]:           Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR]:        Do you recognize that walk?

         [WITNESS]:           Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR]:        Whose walk is that?

         [WITNESS]:           [Appellee].

(Id. at 23).

      At that point, defense counsel objected and argued that Ms. Grasty’s

testimony was “not a reliable identification because of our inability to see” a

clear image of the individual on the video.            (Id. at 24).     The court

acknowledged that “[y]ou can’t necessarily see who that is” in the video, but

Ms. Grasty made a permissible identification “based on a walk.” (Id.) When

testimony resumed, the prosecutor confirmed that Ms. Grasty was familiar

with Appellee’s walk and his “general demeanor.” (Id. at 25). Ms. Grasty

also stated that she had seen Appellee wear clothing that was similar to the

wardrobe worn by the individual in the video. (See id.)

      Despite   this   evidence,     the   trial   court   determined   that   the

Commonwealth failed to establish that Appellee was the individual depicted in

the surveillance video. The court stated:

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         Here, evidence established that a premeditated, intentional
         killing amounting to first-degree murder occurred on
         December 30, 2020. However, the Commonwealth failed to
         [demonstrate] that Appellee was, more likely than not, the
         individual who was responsible for the killing. During the
         preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth presented a video
         compilation and stipulated to the summary. Although the
         video accurately depicts the events of the crime, lay witness
         identification of the individual shown was not sufficient given
         the lack of identifiable factors.

                                   *     *      *

         The video vaguely depicts an individual wearing dark
         clothing without identifying graphics or apparel logos.
         Additionally, the individual wore a hood, covering the head
         and a significant portion of the face. The face of the
         individual was not revealed in any of the varying camera
         angles presented.

                                   *     *      *

         Although circumstantial evidence may create a logical
         connection as to [Appellee’s] motive, the witness
         identification based solely on her relationship with
         [Appellee,] in the absence of further corroborating evidence,
         is insufficient to establish that Appellee is responsible for the
         killing.

(Trial Court Opinion at 7-9).

      On this record, we must disagree with the court’s conclusion that the

Commonwealth failed to provide an adequate identification of Appellee. Ms.

Grasty’s testimony definitively established: 1) she had known Appellee for

years; 2) she was familiar with his appearance and demeanor; and 3) she

believed Appellee was the individual depicted in the video. Under the totality

of these circumstances, one could reasonably infer that Appellee was

responsible for the shooting. See Wyatt, supra. The trial court’s decision to

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the contrary amounts to an impermissible evaluation of the weight of the

evidence at the preliminary hearing stage. See Hilliard, supra.

     Our review of the testimony produced at the preliminary hearing, viewed

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and accepted as true at this

juncture, leads us to conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient

evidence to establish a prima facie case as to murder, PIC, and the firearms

charges filed against Appellee.     See Ouch, supra; Hilliard, supra.

Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Appellee’s motion to quash and

remand this case for further proceedings.

     Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

     Judge Bowes joins this memorandum.

     Judge Pellegrini files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/3/2023

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