Court Opinion

ID: 9705889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:25:27.024237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:10.963188
License: Public Domain

*549POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting:
Once upon a time, a man’s home was his castle, but now, through the advent of electric home confinement, prison authorities have the technology to transform a man’s home into his dungeon.1 While confinement within one’s home is most certainly preferable to incarceration in a jail, I am convinced that home confinement, enhanced by the imposition of stringent restraints on an offender’s liberty, satisfies the definition of “imprisonment” under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731 (Driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance).2 Moreover, assuming arguendo that electronic home confinement does not constitute imprisonment, I, nevertheless, would credit appellant with the 26 days he spent on electronic home confinement and remand for a new parole hearing. See Jacobs v. Robinson, 49 Pa. Cmwlth. 194, 410 A.2d 959 (1980).
When appellant applied for parole, the Commonwealth opposed the motion because appellant had served only ten days in prison with the remainder of his incarceration spent *550at his home on electronic confinement.3 On July 20,1987, a hearing was held before the sentencing court regarding appellant’s parole petition. The court, following its prior decision in Commonwealth v. Anthony, 36 Ches.Co.Rep. 72, 46 Pa.D. & C.3d 298 (1987), reasoned that electronic home confinement did not qualify as imprisonment within the meaning of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e). Therefore, the court denied parole and directed appellant serve the remaining twenty days of his mandatory thirty day sentence in the Chester County Prison. Appellant’s petition for reconsideration was denied, and he was released on bail pending the outcome of this appeal. The Majority, in affirming the decision of the court below, essentially adopted the lower court’s reasoning that electronic home confinement is not “imprisonment” since “imprisonment” requires confinement to be in a “correctional or similar institution.”
Pennsylvania’s DUI statute provides as a penalty for two-time offenders a “minimum term of imprisonment of ... not less than 30 days ...” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e)(l)(ii). Black’s Law Dictionary, 5 Ed., 1979, defines “imprisonment” as follows:
The act of putting or confining a man in prison. The restraint of a man’s personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his powers of locomotion. It is not a necessary part of the definition that the confinement should be in a place usually appropriated to that purpose; it may be in a locality used only for the specific occasion; or it may take place without the actual application of any physical agencies of restraint (such as locks or bars) as by verbal compulsion and the display of available force. Every confinement of the person is an “imprisonment” whether it be in a *551prison or in a private house, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets. Any unlawful exercise or show of force by which person is compelled to remain where he does not wish to be McKendree v. Christy, 29 Ill.App.2d 195, 172 N.E.2d 380, 381 (emphasis added).
Instantly, appellant was under “house arrest:” his whereabouts were continuously monitored electronically; he was subjected to rigorous drug testing; he submitted to unannounced visits from prison officials; and, if he ventured more than one hundred feet from his telephone, he faced the very real possibility that escape charges would be filed. Certainly, appellant’s situation qualifies as “imprisonment” pursuant to Black’s definition.4
Further, on prior occasions, we have found that confinement of a DUI offender in an alcohol rehabilitation center qualifies as “imprisonment” under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e). See Commonwealth v. Usher, 264 Pa.Super. 435, 399 A.2d 1129 (1979) (alcohol rehabilitation); Commonwealth v. Mallon, 267 Pa.Super. 163, 406 A.2d 569 (1979) (alcohol rehabilitation); Commonwealth v. Jones, 211 Pa.Super. 366, 236 A.2d 834 (1967) (mental institution).5 Our Supreme Court has refused to adopt a per se rule concerning credit for time served in a rehabilitation program while on parole. Instead, our high Court has ruled that interpreting “custody” must be done on a case by case basis, based on the extent of the *552restraints placed upon the individual’s liberty. Cox v. Com., Bd. of Probation and Parole, 507 Pa. 614, 493 A.2d 680, 684 n. 7 (1985); see also Commonwealth v. Cappiello, 284 Pa.Super. 476, 426 A.2d 146 (1981) (remanded for a hearing to determine the extent of residential custody). Presently, I am convinced that appellant’s liberty was restrained in an amount equal to or surpassing that of rehabilitation programs which are routinely afforded the status of “imprisonment.”
The Majority determined “imprisonment” requires that the restraint of liberty must occur in an “institution,” and, since appellant’s home is not an “institution” per se, appellant was not imprisoned. For this analysis, the Majority relies on the provisions of the sentencing code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9755, which require confinement in a “correctional or other appropriate institution.” To be sure, appellant was not committed to an “institution” in the traditional sense. However, the simple fact that the appellant was not incarcerated in an institution with high walls, iron bars and armed guards (or white-coated orderlies, nurses and physicians) should not prevent appellant from receiving credit for time served pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760. I believe that the electronic home monitoring system has in fact converted appellant’s home into an “appropriate institution.”
In support of its holding that appellant must serve his mandatory minimum sentence in prison, the Majority cites Commonwealth v. Sojourner, 513 Pa. 36, 518 A.2d 1145 (1986), for the proposition that a “second-time offender, as in this case, must necessarily serve the minimum sentence in prison." (emphasis added). However, Sojourner does not address the issue of whether a minimum sentence must be served in what is traditionally considered a “prison.” Rather, Sojourner holds that it is an abuse of discretion not to impose the minimum mandatory sentence; the opinion simply does not address the issue of where that sentence must be served. Instantly, there is no dispute that the sentence imposed was correct; the only question is whether the location where the sentence was served satisfies the *553requirements of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731. Likewise, Commonwealth v. Kearns, 365 Pa.Super. 13, 528 A.2d 992 (1987), addressed the question of whether the correct minimum sentence was imposed, not the question of whether the sentence was served in the proper location.6
Upon review, I am convinced that the stringent restraints placed upon appellant’s liberty are sufficient to qualify his situation as “imprisonment,” thus meriting credit for time served in electronic home confinement. In fact, I believe that the electronic home confinement program, in combination with the threat of escape charges, alters the very nature of the “home” to that of an “other appropriate institution” under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9755.7
Moreover, regardless of whether appellant was imprisoned during his home confinement, I still am convinced that he is legally entitled to credit for the time he served on electronic home confinement pursuant to Jacobs v. Robinson, 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 194, 410 A.2d 959 (1980).8
The Majority attempts to distinguish Jacobs, supra, on the ground that placement of appellant on electronic home confinement was “accomplished by the warden who had no authority to change the sentence imposed by the court,” rather than by clerical error as occurred in Jacobs, supra. This is most certainly a distinction without a difference. In both cases, it was error on the part of prison officials which *554allowed the release of the prisoners.9
In Jacobs v. Robinson, supra, the Commonwealth Court ruled:
[Petitioner cannot be classified as an escapee upon his inadvertent release by prison authorities. Furthermore, a prisoner cannot be compelled to serve a sentence in installments and has a right to serve his sentence continuously. Robinson v. Department of Justice, 32 Pa. Cmwlth. 77, 377 A.2d 1277 (1977). Since the charge of escape upon which the warrant of arrest was issued was dismissed, we must credit the petitioner with the time he was under the supervision of the Probation Department of Philadelphia County.4 See Adams v. Board of Probation and Parole, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 524, 395 A.2d 1035 (1979).
Therefore, we will grant summary judgment in petitioner’s favor and order the Bureau of Corrections to recompute his sentence, crediting the time from September 14, 1977 to December 16, 1978 to the sentence imposed April 19, 1977 and made effective March 24, 1977.
Jacobs v. Robinson, 410 A.2d at 960.
Following the Commonwealth Court’s lead in Jacobs v. Robinson, supra, I would direct the Chester County Court of Common Pleas to credit appellant with the time he served while on electronic home confinement. Clearly, appellant’s case is more compelling than that of Wayne Jacobs. Rather than benefit from a fortuitous clerical error, appellant voluntarily applied for the home confinement program upon the reasonable belief (created by assurances of prison officials) that the time spent in the program would be credited toward his sentence. While in the electronic home *555confinement program, appellant was subjected to far greater supervision than Wayne Jacobs who was merely on parole. Since appellant has the same right as Wayne Jacobs to serve his sentence continuously, I conclude that it was error not to credit the appellant with the time he served on electronic home confinement under the supervision of the Chester County Prison system.10
Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the lower court and remand for a new parole hearing, directing the lower court to credit appellant with the time he served in the electronic home confinement program.11
CIRILLO, President Judge, joins dissenting opinion by POPOVICH, J.

. As prisons become increasingly overburdened, electronic home confinement programs will become increasingly popular alternatives to the expansion of existing penal facilities and the construction of new institutions. In fact, the need to employ alternate means of imprisonment has already affected the Commonwealth. Consider the following, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections estimates that by 1993, the state penal system will have an overpopulation of between 10,897 to 12,806 inmates or, in other words, 176 percent to 190 percent of capacity. See "Jail crowding to rise faster than expected”, Harrisburg Patriot, Volume 148, No. 278, Page 1, Col. 4, November 21, 1989. These figures do not account for the recent loss of prison beds due the much publicized prison riots in at the institution at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.

. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e) Penalty.-
(1) Any person violating any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree and the sentencing court shall order the person to pay a find of not less than $300 and serve a minimum term of imprisonment of:
(ii) not less than 30 days if the person has previously been convicted of an offense under this section of of an equivalent offense in this or other jurisdictions within the previous seven years.

. Under the electronic home confinement program, appellant wore a monitoring device. Another monitoring device was affixed to his telephone. If appellant ventured more than one hundred feet from his telephone, an alarm would sound at the headquarters of the private company which provides the service to the county. The company would then notify the authorities. In addition to the electronic monitoring, appellant was subject to random drug and alcohol testing and received unannounced visits from prison officials.

. The Majority correctly states that “[w]e must construe the language of the statute according to common and ordinary usage. Commonwealth v. Hill, 481 Pa. 37, 391 A.2d 1303 (1980)." What could be more representative of the common and ordinary legal usage of a word than the definition given in Black’s Law Dictionary ?

. The Majority misconstrues the holding in Commonwealth v. Conahan, 388 Pa.Super. 369, 565 A.2d 798 (1989). Conahan does not hold that time served in an inpatient alcohol treatment program does not constitute service of statutorily mandated minimum sentence of imprisonment. Rather, Conahan holds that the trial court abused its discretion when it credited a defendant with time served voluntarily in a inpatient alcohol treatment facility when that hospitalization occurred before an adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence. In fact, Judge Cirillo’s concurring opinion recognizes that credit can be granted for time spent in a rehabilitation program after conviction and sentencing, and advocates allowing credit for time served after arrest but before conviction and sentencing.

. As the author of the opinion in Kearns, I stated "[bjecause the second offense occurred within seven years of the prior conviction, the minimum term of imprisonment required under the statute is not less than thirty (30) days in prison.” However, recognizing the vast differences in issue presented in Kearns and the present case, the use of the term "prison” in Kearns is of little, if any, guidance.

. For additional information concerning electronic home confinement, see Hurwitz, House Arrest: A Critical Analysis of an Intermediate-Level Penal Sanction, 135 U.Pa.L.Rev. 771 (1987), and Ball and Lilly, “The Potential Use of Home Incarceration for Drunken Drivers”, Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 32, No. 2, 224-247 (1986).

. The grant or denial of parole is a matter of the sentencing court’s discretion which is subject to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. Romolini, 384 Pa.Super. 117, 557 A.2d 1073, 1077 (1989).

 Cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) (a prisoner, although released and placed on parole, was in the custody of members of the parole board.)

. Although, the Majority cites no authority for its determination that the warden was not empowered to place appellant on electronic home confinement, we will assume for the purposes of this issue only that the warden had no authority and, thus, committed error in placing appellant in the home confinement program.

. We also note that the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, in an Official Opinion, has similarly concluded that a defendant who was paroled by a judge who had no jurisdiction over him because the sentence imposed had a maximum of two years or more is entitled to credit for post-release time spent on parole since he was not an escapee. See Official Opinion No. 1, Pennsylvania Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 12 at 1104 (March 19, 1983). While Attorney General's opinions are not binding upon the court, they are entitled to great weight. E.g., McDowell v. Good Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 397 Pa. 237, 245, 154 A.2d 497, 501 (1959).

. Though not directly implicated presently, the 5th Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy would have precluded resentencing of appellant had his sentence been a flat 30 days, rather than 30 days to 23 months. However, as DUI offenders are routinely granted parole after they have served the minimum term, the practical, though not legal, effect of requiring appellant to serve twenty additional days in the county jail would be two punishments for the same offense in violation of the spirit, but not letter, of the 5th Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. See North Carolina v. Pearce, Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711, 718-719, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076-2077, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) quoting Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 173, 21 L.Ed. 872 ("If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offense. And * * * there has never been any doubt of [this rule’s] entire and complete protection of the party when a second punishment is proposed in the same court, on the same facts, for the same statutory offense.”).