Court Opinion

ID: 9895378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 21:05:45.586778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:27.868587
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211380-U
                                       No. 1-21-1380

                                                                               FIRST DIVISION
                                                                               November 6, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
____________________________________________________________________________

                                   IN THE
                       APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                          FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________

JULIE LYNCH,                                          )     Appeal from the Circuit Court of
                                                      )     Cook County, Domestic Relations
       Petitioner-Appellee,                           )     Division
                                                      )
v.                                                    )     No. 2019 D 447
                                                      )
JOHN ZUMMO,                                           )     The Honorable
                                                      )     Diana Rosario,
       Respondent-Appellant.                          )     Judge Presiding.

       JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

                                           ORDER

¶1    Held: We affirm the circuit court’s entry of a Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage in the
      parties’ underlying divorce matter. The parties entered into a settlement agreement that was
      incorporated into a final divorce judgment by the court, despite Appellant’s objections that
      the language of the judgment differed from the settlement agreement and that the
      provisions of the settlement regarding his spousal maintenance and child support
      obligations were not enforceable. Appellant failed to sufficiently develop his present
      arguments before the circuit court, despite having had ample notice of the contents of
      Appellee’s draft marital settlement agreement, which was adopted by the court in rendering
      its judgment. We therefore find that he has forfeited a number of his contentions, and that
      the remainder fails to establish manifest error on the part of the circuit court.
1-21-1380

¶2      In the underlying dissolution of marriage matter, the circuit court denied Respondent-

Appellant John Zummo’s motion to dismiss Petitioner-Appellee Julie Lynch’s motion for

declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the parties’ Statement of Settlement Agreement

(“Agreement”) was valid and enforceable on the parties and a judgment of a dissolution of

marriage consistent with the terms of the Agreement. The court granted Lynch’s motion for

declaratory judgment and entered a Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage. Zummo appeals from

the order denying his motion to dismiss.

¶3                                             BACKGROUND

¶4      Lynch filed for divorce from Zummo on January 14, 2019. On March 31, 2021, the circuit

court set the matter for trial commencing on June 28, 2021. On May 9, 2021, without the

involvement of counsel, 1 the parties jointly executed a Statement of Settlement Agreement. The

Agreement sets out that the parties have agreed to settle “certain issues involved in their divorce

proceedings,” and includes a total of 14 listed items that the parties agreed upon, including

provisions for the division of marital assets and marital debts, Zummo’s support payments to

Lynch and their two sons, and the parties’ intent to execute a Parenting Allocation Judgment

Agreement (“Parenting Agreement.”) The Agreement concludes with a provision stating:

        This agreement is intended to resolve all of the issues regarding the division of marital
        assets, marital debts and the Parenting Agreement. The parties agree that these terms will
        be incorporated into a Martial Settlement Agreement (MSA) to be drafted and agreed upon
        by the parties’ respective counsel. Upon execution of the MSA by both parties, it shall be
        incorporated into an agreed Court order.

The provision in the Agreement that discusses support for the parties’ children states that, until

the later of the children turning 18 or graduating high school, Zummo would pay support in

1
 The parties note that Zummo’s counsel was in the process of withdrawing from his representation around this time;
his counsel was granted leave to withdraw on May 12, 2021, and Zummo, who is an attorney, filed his pro se
appearance on May 10, 2021. The parties also note that while counsel for the respective parties was not involved in
drafting the Agreement, Lynch’s father, who is also an attorney, assisted in the process.

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amounts established “through the use of the Illinois statutory calculations as agreed to by counsel

for John Zummo and counsel for Julie Lynch.” If counsel could not agree, the provision states

that the matter would be submitted to the court for resolution. The provision regarding Zummo’s

spousal support obligations to Lynch includes the same language regarding the use of statutory

calculations, and that any disagreements would be brought before the court as well.

¶5     The parties also negotiated an Agreed Allocation Judgment and Parenting Plan (“Parenting

Plan”) that resolved the issue of parental responsibility over their two children. The Parenting Plan

was signed by the parties on May 9, 2021 and entered on June 3, 2021.

¶6     The parties state that further negotiations were stalled by the parties’ disagreement over

Zummo’s maintenance obligations. The Agreement states that the statutory formula would be

applied to both Zummo’s base income and to any year-end bonuses that he received. After the

parties signed the Agreement, Zummo requested that a cap be applied to the amount of support

that would come from any bonus income he received. Lynch disagreed, arguing that they were

both bound to the terms of the Agreement, which did not mention an income cap, and that Zummo

had personally acknowledged that the Agreement was a complete and final agreement when he

stated as much before the court during a hearing on May 11, 2021.

¶7     Lynch filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment on June 23, 2021, seeking a declaration

from the court that the May 9, 2021 Agreement was valid, enforceable, and binding upon the

parties, as well as the entry of a Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage consistent with the terms of

the Agreement.

¶8     Zummo moved to strike and dismiss Lynch’s motion, arguing that a declaratory judgment

could not be used to have the court add or modify terms of the Agreement or convert it to a

Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage. He alleged that Lynch was asking the court to define bonus

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income in the manner that she preferred, when the language of the Agreement did not provide for

any definition of this term. He further claimed that the court could not enter the requested

declaratory judgment because it would not terminate the dissolution proceedings, due to the fact

that the parties would still have to submit disputes over child support and spousal maintenance to

the court.

¶9       At the hearing on both parties’ motions, Zummo, through counsel, admitted that the

Agreement was “valid and binding;” however, he characterized it as “nothing more than an

agreement to reach an agreement,” and argued that it was not a binding settlement agreement

pursuant to Section 502(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (“Act”)

because it did not resolve all issues of the divorce, and therefore could be converted into a divorce

judgment. Therefore, he claimed that a motion for declaratory judgment, which asks the court to

declare whether an agreement is valid, could not be used to ask the court to also enter the

Agreement into a Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage consistent with the terms of the

Agreement. Specifically, he again noted the undefined amounts of child support and spousal

maintenance, alleging that there was no “meeting of the minds” on those issues. Zummo further

claimed that the draft Marriage Settlement Agreement that Lynch attached to her motion

“expanded and materially modified” the terms of the Agreement in several ways, including in the

language used to describe Zummo’s future bonus income, as additional support for his argument

that she was asking the court to enter a final judgment with terms to which the parties did not

agree.

¶ 10     The circuit court denied Zummo’s motion to strike or dismiss and granted Lynch’s motion

for declaratory judgment. Reviewing the Agreement, the court found that the parties voluntarily

entered into the Agreement with the intent to eventually incorporate its terms into a Marital

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Settlement Agreement. The court further found that the terms of the Agreement were detailed,

clear, and unambiguous, including the child support and spousal maintenance provisions that were

particularly at issue in the parties’ disagreement. The court noted that Zummo’s counsel had

admitted that the Agreement was valid and enforceable, and determined that Zummo was

attempting to make changes to the support provisions of the Agreement. On July 15, 2021, the

court ruled that the Agreement was a valid and enforceable settlement agreement pursuant to

Section 502(a) of the Act, and ordered the parties to incorporate the Agreement into a marital

settlement agreement to present to the court at a prove-up date of August 6, 2021.

¶ 11   At the prove-up hearing, Lynch presented a First Draft Judgment before the court and asked

that it be entered. She was questioned about various provisions in the draft that were not found in

the Agreement, and agreed to strike some of those provisions if Zummo, who did not appear at the

hearing and who had not submitted any formal objection to these provisions, did not agree to them.

Zummo’s counsel stated that he objected to the entry of any judgment that deviated from the

Agreement. The circuit court found that the draft judgment was “reasonable and not

unconscionable” and that it conformed to the Agreement. On September 28, 2021, the circuit court

entered a Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage (“Judgment”) that omitted the provisions in

Lynch’s First Draft Judgment that she agreed to strike during the prove-up hearing but otherwise

conformed to her proposed draft.

¶ 12   Zummo now appeals from: (1) the July 15, 2021 order denying his Section 615 motion to

strike or dismiss Lynch’s motion for declaratory judgment and granting Lynch’s aforementioned

motion; and (2) the September 28, 2021 Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. He argues on appeal

that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and granting Lynch’s motion for

declaratory judgment because Lynch failed to allege sufficient facts showing she was entitled to

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her requested relief, and because the court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage that (1)

materially deviated from the Agreement; (2) violated the Act regarding maintenance and child

support; and (3) contained several ambiguous terms. He asks us to vacate the July 15, 2021 order

both as to the denial of his motion to dismiss and the granting of Lynch’s motion for declaratory

judgment. He further asks us to vacate the September 28, 2021 Judgment except as to the parties’

divorce and remand for resolution of the Agreement’s allegedly ambiguous terms and entry of a

marital settlement agreement consistent with the Agreement, or, in the alternative, to resolve the

alleged ambiguities in Zummo’s favor or remand those issues to the circuit court for clarification.

¶ 13    Lynch argues that we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the July 15, 2021 order because

Zummo improperly appeals from the denial of a motion to dismiss, an unappealable interlocutory

order. She further argues that, if jurisdiction is properly established, the circuit court’s order should

be affirmed because the parties had voluntarily entered into a complete, final, valid, and

enforceable settlement agreement and were now bound by its terms. She states in support of her

argument that even though there were certain allegedly non-material terms and mechanisms of

executing the Agreement, there was nonetheless the requisite “meeting of the minds” between the

parties, and a contract need not provide for every possible collateral matter or contingency in order

to be enforceable.

¶ 14                                         ANALYSIS

¶ 15                                    Jurisdiction on Appeal

¶ 16    As an initial matter, Zummo appeals from an order denying his motion to dismiss, as well

as a final order disposing of the underlying divorce proceedings. In such situations, we generally

will not review the denial of a motion to dismiss because any error made in such order merges into

the final judgment, and the appeal is taken from that final judgment. See Ovnik v. Podolsky, 2017

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IL App (1st) 162987, ¶¶ 19-21. Zummo admits in his brief that denials of motions to dismiss are

not ordinarily appealable, and he does not present a sufficient argument for deviating from this

rule in the present matter. Therefore, we will discuss the circuit court’s findings regarding the

Agreement to the extent that they relate to the court’s September 28, 2021 entry of the Judgment.

¶ 17   Zummo specifically points to three alleged ways in which the circuit court erred by entering

the Judgment. He claims that the Judgment (1) materially deviates from the Agreement without

making findings of unconscionability pursuant to Section 502 of the Act and without affording

Zummo a hearing on those issues; (2) orders Zummo to pay child support and spousal maintenance

in amounts that violated the statutory guidelines in Sections 504 and 505 of the Act and created

the potential for a windfall to Lynch; and (3) contains ambiguous terms.

¶ 18                                    Standard of Review

¶ 19   A marital settlement agreement is a contract, reviewed according to the principles of

contract law, and its terms are enforceable as contract terms pursuant to the Act. See In re Marriage

of Lyman, 2015 IL App (1st) 132832, ¶ 71; 750 ILCS 5/502(e) (West 2022). It requires an offer

and acceptance, a meeting of the minds on the terms of the agreement, and material terms that are

definite and certain, meaning that the court is able to ascertain what the parties have agreed to do.

Bruzas v. Richardson, 408 Ill.App.3d 98, 105 (1st Dist. 2011). A contract that leaves essential

terms of the agreement to future negotiation is not binding. In re Marriage of Haller, 2012 IL App

(5th) 110478, ¶ 28. However, a contract need not provide for “every collateral matter or every

possible future contingency which might arise” in order to be enforceable. Id. (quoting Morey v.

Hoffman, 12 Ill.2d 125, 130–31 (1957)). The primary aim in interpreting a contract is to “give

effect to the parties’ intent by interpreting the contract as a whole and applying the plain and

ordinary meaning to unambiguous terms.” Lyman, 2015 IL App (1st) 132832 at ¶ 71 (quoting

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Joyce v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary LLP, 382 Ill.App.3d 632, 636–37 (2008)). A trial court’s

determination of whether a valid and enforceable marital settlement agreement occurred will not

be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Baecker,

2012 IL App (3d) 110660, ¶ 25; In re Marriage of Stoker, 2021 IL App (5th) 200301, ¶ 48.

¶ 20   Our courts have found settlement agreements to be enforceable in situations comparable to

those that Zummo claims exist here. In Haller, the settlement agreement stated that spousal

maintenance would terminate upon the occurrence of any of the statutory circumstances; the court

rejected the appellant’s argument that by failing to specifically list those statutory factors, the

agreement was incomplete and unenforceable. Haller, 2012 IL App (5th) 110478 at ¶¶ 25-28. In

In re Marriage of Wig, the court found a marriage settlement agreement to be enforceable where

it clearly and unambiguously provided for the method of calculating initial spousal without

consideration for a specific statutory method for setting maintenance. In re Marriage of Wig, 2020

IL App (2d) 190929, ¶¶ 23-25. In reviewing the marital settlement agreement in Wig, the court

explained that, “What remained undetermined [when the parties executed their agreement] was the

dollar amount of monthly maintenance that petitioner would receive based on the parties' income.

That calculation was not a contingency that had to occur before respondent became entitled to

maintenance.” Id. at ¶ 26. And in Baecker, the court upheld a settlement agreement that left blank

certain terms regarding the sale of a car, where it was clear that the parties had discussed and

agreed to the distribution of proceeds and to set a sale price later. Baecker, 2012 IL App (3d)

110660 at ¶¶ 37-38.

¶ 21                          Whether the Agreement Was Enforceable

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¶ 22    Zummo admitted to the circuit court that the parties both entered into the Agreement and

that it was valid and binding,2 although he characterized it as merely an “agreement to reach an

agreement.” He further states that he does not dispute that the unambiguous terms of the

Agreement are binding on the parties. He makes no claims that there was no meeting of the minds

regarding the terms of the agreement, and specifically does not claim that the parties ever agreed

to setting a cap on his bonus income for calculating his support obligations. However, he contends

that Lynch asked the circuit court to alter the terms of the Agreement when it entered the Judgment,

and that the circuit court did so. He bases this part of his argument on the law of contract

construction and on Section 502 of the Act.

¶ 23    We need not delve into Zummo’s discussion of how a court must construe a contract

containing ambiguous terms, because we agree with the circuit court that the terms of the

Agreement are clear and unambiguous from the face of the contract, including the provisions

regarding spousal maintenance and child support. We similarly do not find merit in Zummo’s

contention that these provisions do not establish the amounts the parties agreed that Zummo would

pay going forward. He does not provide any authority stating that a settlement agreement pursuant

to Section 502 must list specific amounts of support obligations in order for that settlement to be

incorporated into a final judgment, or that a lack of definite amounts constitutes an ambiguity in

the agreement. We agree with the circuit court that by providing for the statutory method of

calculating support obligations, the Agreement is clear, and does not leave any terms up to any

contingency or future action.

2
  It is unclear what distinction Zummo attempts to draw in admitting that the Agreement is valid and binding, but not
enforceable as to the terms he alleges are ambiguous or insufficiently defined. However, we accept his position that
the Agreement is valid, as there is no dispute on this issue on appeal.

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¶ 24    The fact that the amounts Zummo will have to pay each year were not calculated prior to

the parties’ executing the Agreement does not constitute an agreement to reach a later agreement.

No future agreement is necessary—the parties already bound themselves to using the statutory

calculation method, as stated in the Agreement. As Zummo’s future annual income for each year

that he will be making these payments could not be known at the time that the parties entered into

the Agreement, it would be unreasonable to require a specific sum be listed for each year.

Furthermore, the fact that the parties did not know how Zummo’s income might change in the

coming years does not mean the Agreement was contingent on future events. We do not find that

the Agreement was unenforceable because it required the application of the statutory formula to

Zummo’s future income.

¶ 25    Zummo also seemingly attempts to use the fact that the Agreement—and therefore the

Judgment—includes provisions that the parties will submit disputes to the circuit court to argue

that the underlying divorce proceeding is never actually terminated, because the parties could go

back before the court at any time in the future to argue over the support calculations. He does not

present any basis for such a contention, and we decline to find that the Agreement could not be

incorporated into a final judgment based on these provisions. Indeed, the fact that the parties agreed

to calculate Zummo’s future support obligations on an annual basis rather than list out specific

amounts that he will have to pay in both child support and spousal maintenance decreases the

possibility that the post-divorce litigation will continue, if Zummo’s income were to change

significantly in the future.

¶ 26    Zummo relatedly argues that because the Agreement does not resolve all issues that needed

to be addressed in the divorce proceedings, it could not be incorporated into a final judgment. His

basis for claiming that the Agreement does not resolve all material matters is that it states that it

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resolves “certain issues” in the divorce proceedings, and that it provides that the parties will submit

disputes regarding the amounts of Zummo’s child support and spousal maintenance obligations to

the court for resolution. He claims that, pursuant to the laws of contract, the Agreement was not

complete and enforceable because essential terms were missing, and that the parties indicated their

intent to only resolve certain—and not all—issues via the Agreement. See Haller, 2012 IL App

(5th) 110478 at ¶ 26. We have already addressed the fact that the Agreement does include clear,

detailed, and binding provisions for determining Zummo’s child support and spousal maintenance

obligations. Despite Zummo’s references to other sections of the Agreement, we find no clearer

indication of the parties’ intent regarding child support and spousal maintenance than those

paragraphs that specifically lay out the terms to which the parties agreed regarding those matters.

See Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill.2d 208, 233 (2007) (To determine the parties’ intent, the court

begins with the text of the contract, as it is the best indication of that intent.)

¶ 27    Finally, we note that Zummo initiated the argument over the Agreement before the circuit

court because he wished to, in essence, add a term to the Agreement that it did not contain—the

cap on his bonus income. Zummo does not claim that he believed at any point up to signing the

Agreement that his bonus income would be capped for the purposes of calculating his support

obligations. As Zummo repeatedly states, a court cannot modify a contract by inserting new terms

to which the parties did not agree.

¶ 28                    Whether the Circuit Court Modified the Agreement’s Terms

¶ 29    Having determined that the Agreement contained valid and enforceable terms regarding

child support and spousal maintenance, we next address Zummo’s claim that the circuit court, in

entering the final Judgment, impermissibly modified the terms of the Agreement. See Frederick v.

Professional Truck Driver Training School, Inc., 328 Ill.App.3d 472, 480 (1st Dist. 2002) (Court

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cannot not add terms to the agreement when the agreement is silent as to those terms, especially

where the added language would clearly change the plain meaning of the agreement.) Zummo

devotes approximately five pages of his brief to listing what he claims to be material differences

between the Agreement and the Judgment.

¶ 30   The record shows that Zummo’s counsel objected to the entry of “any proposed judgment

that does not comport with the [Agreement]” at the prove-up hearing, and Lynch was questioned

on various provisions in her draft that Zummo now claims were material changes from the

Agreement, that were impermissibly approved by the circuit court. Lynch agreed to strike certain

provisions that she admitted were not in the Agreement, and the circuit court’s Judgment excluded

those portions as well. Zummo now points to this section of the hearing’s transcript as proof that

the circuit court added terms to the Agreement by incorporating these provisions into its Judgment.

¶ 31   At the hearing, Zummo’s counsel conducted a lengthy comparison of the Agreement and

Lynch’s proposed draft, identifying several instances where the two differed. As we have noted,

Lynch agreed to strike many of these provisions from her draft during the hearing, and the circuit

court did not incorporate those into its final Judgment. As to the remaining provisions, Zummo

does not provide an argument for why they ought not to have been included in the Judgment,

beyond stating that this language is not found in the Agreement. However, we will review the

respective portions of the Agreement and the Judgment that are the most relevant to the issues on

appeal—the sections discussing spousal maintenance. The Agreement states:

       8) John Zummo agrees to pay Julie Lynch spousal support from February 1, 2021 for a
       period of 11 years. Said payment amounts shall be established through the use of the Illinois
       statutory calculations as agreed to by counsel for John Zummo and counsel for Julie Lynch.
       Using the same formula, counsel shall also calculate a percentage of any year-end bonus
       awarded to John pursuant to his employment contract. If counsel are unable to reach
       agreement on either the amounts or bonus percentage, the issue will be submitted in writing
       to the Court for resolution.

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Article VI of the Judgment states:

       6.2. Maintenance to Wife:

       ***

       c) Monthly Maintenance to Julie: John shall pay modifiable, non-taxable guideline
       maintenance to Julie.

                 i. Maintenance Based on Income from current base income: John’s current gross
                 annual base salary from his employment at Gutnicki, LLP is $225,000 annually.
                 John shall pay to Julie guideline maintenance, in part, based on his base salary from
                 employment and Julie’s income from employment. The Court finds that given
                 John’s current base salary from employment and Julie’s gross annual income of
                 approximately $74,000, guideline monthly maintenance payment on current base
                 income due and owing to Julie is $2,081 per month (net) starting July 15, 2021 and
                 shall continue for a term of eleven years ending after the last payment being made
                 by John to Julie on February 1, 2032.

                 ii) Maintenance for February, March, April, May, and June: Also starting July 15,
                 2021 and continuing thereafter for twelve months, John shall pay to Julie $867 a
                 month that represents retroactive maintenance payments for the months of
                 February, March, April, May, and June of 2021.

                 iii) Additional Maintenance: Pursuant to his employment agreement John may be
                 eligible for an annual bonus/partner distribution/revenue split on collections each
                 year which will be payable in January for the prior year. Within seven days of John
                 receiving any bonus partner distribution/revenue split on collections or other
                 income in addition to his base salary, the parties shall perform a true-up calculation
                 to determine the amount of additional maintenance over and above the base
                 monthly amount to be paid by John to Julie for the prior calendar year in accordance
                 with the terms and conditions set forth below.

¶ 32   We agree with Zummo that the two documents, both here and elsewhere, are not identical.

We draw specific attention to the application of Zummo’s bonus payments in calculating his

maintenance obligation—the Agreement refers only to “year-end bonuses” while the Judgment,

adopting Lynch’s draft, uses the potentially more expansive “annual bonus/partner

distribution/revenue split on collections.” However, neither document mentions a cap on any of

these amounts.

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¶ 33   More troublingly, the record indicates that Zummo had an opportunity to develop and

present before the court an argument that Lynch’s proposed draft marital settlement agreement

materially differed from what the parties agreed to, and/or to submit a competing draft agreement

that he believed better comported with the Agreement. Zummo’s counsel was aware that the circuit

court had found the Agreement to be valid and enforceable in its July 15, 2021 ruling on Lynch’s

motion for declaratory judgment; the court set an August 6, 2021 prove-up hearing date on the

marital settlement agreement in that same order. Zummo’s counsel was also aware that on August

6, 2021, the court continued the prove-up hearing, specifically to give the parties additional time

to resolve any outstanding issues regarding the marital settlement agreement. Zummo’s counsel

appeared on the new prove-up hearing date of September 28, 2021, at which Lynch both presented

her proposed draft and appeared in person to testify. Zummo did neither. Instead, his counsel relied

on identifying to the court the differences between Lynch’s draft and the Agreement, and stood on

his objection to the entry of any final judgment that differed from the Agreement.

¶ 34   As previously mentioned, Lynch agreed to strike several portions of her draft, but the court

allowed other portions referenced by Zummo’s counsel to remain in what the court ultimately

adopted into the Judgment. Zummo was not present to testify as to which portions were materially

different and why, or provide any countervailing argument for why the court shouldn’t enter

Lynch’s draft, as modified during the prove-up hearing.

¶ 35   On appeal, Zummo does refer to his lack of opportunity to present any evidence at the

hearing, but only in the context of claiming that the court should have conducted an

unconscionability hearing if it were modifying the Agreement due to unconscionability. Zummo

does not claim that the Agreement was unconscionable for any reason; rather, he repeatedly

acknowledges that it is a valid agreement that he willingly and knowingly entered into. Regarding

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the contents of Lynch’s proposed draft, both Lynch and Zummo mention on appeal that both sides

were engaged in discussions over converting the Agreement into a draft marital settlement

agreement to submit to the circuit court, before negotiations broke down and Lynch filed her

motion for declaratory judgment. This means that Zummo and/or counsel had some knowledge of

what became Lynch’s proposed draft as far back as May or June 2021. Lynch’s motion for

declaratory judgment also mentions that her counsel sent the final draft marital settlement

agreement to Zummo on June 14, 2021. Furthermore, Zummo’s counsel appeared to be sufficiently

apprised of the contents of the draft to be able to question Lynch on all of the alleged discrepancies

at the prove-up hearing. Therefore, despite validly noting the existence of differences between the

Agreement and both the draft and final marital settlement agreements, Zummo does not provide

any explanation for his failure to adequately pursue his arguments before the circuit court.

¶ 36   Zummo also cites to the decision in Herhold to argue that the circuit court in the present

matter not only improperly entered a divorce judgment that altered the terms of the Agreement,

but that Zummo was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence that Lynch’s draft judgment

differed from the terms the parties agreed to in the Agreement. Herhold v. Herhold, 123 Ill.App.2d

293 (1st Dist. 1970). In Herhold, the circuit court entered a divorce decree drafted by the wife,

over the husband’s objection that the decree did not conform to one of the terms of the parties’

property settlement. Id. at 294-95. The court heard testimony from both parties, and the husband

tendered a competing draft decree. Id. The decree was vacated on appeal, with instructions to the

circuit court to substitute the husband’s proposed version of the contested provision. Id. at 298.

¶ 37   For the reasons mentioned above, we find that Zummo had every opportunity to present

the sort of countervailing evidence he references in his reliance on Herhold. We cannot make an

appellant’s argument for him where he has failed to support his claims. See U.S. Bank Trust Nat.

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Ass’n v. Junior, 2016 IL App (1st) 152109, ¶ 20 (“An appellant cannot expect this court to develop

arguments and research the issues on the appellant's behalf.”) We similarly do not expect the circuit

court to have developed his arguments for him. Therefore, we find that the circuit court did not

commit manifest error in entering the Judgment.

¶ 38                      Zummo’s Arguments Based on Violations of the Act

¶ 39    Zummo next raises various arguments alleging that the circuit court violated certain

sections of the Act, by: (1) failing to first hold a hearing on and make a finding of unconscionability

that would warrant its entry of a Judgment that deviated from the Agreement; (2) setting child

support awards that deviate from the Agreement and the Act’s guidelines, without making a

finding justifying a deviation from the guidelines; (3) ordering an alleged maintenance true-up that

improperly benefitted Lynch; and (4) failing to cap Zummo’s maintenance obligations. Zummo

raises these arguments for the first time on appeal, and they are therefore forfeited. See Smith v.

Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill.2d 209, 229 (1986) (Matters not presented before the trial court may not be

raised for the first time on appeal.)

¶ 40                    Whether the Judgment Contains Ambiguous Terms

¶ 41    Zummo concludes with an alternative plea stating that if we decline to vacate the Judgment,

its ambiguous provisions should either be construed against Lynch or remanded to the circuit court

for clarification. He lists various alleged ambiguities with which he takes issue. This argument is

forfeited for being raised for the first time on appeal, as we discussed above. Zummo had the

opportunity to develop all of his objections to the Agreement, Lynch’s proposed draft judgment,

and the circuit court’s Judgment. To the extent that he has preserved any of his contentions for

appeal, he merely listed several alleged inconsistencies, with no supporting argument or evidence.

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Zummo presented insufficient grounds for the

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circuit court’s entry of the Judgment to have been in error. We therefore find that the circuit court’s

entry of the Judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 42                                      CONCLUSION

¶ 43   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 44   Affirmed.

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