Court Opinion

ID: 9846041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:33:14.668587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:31.589143
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Even without a showing of prejudice, the majority opinion will require the reversal of any bench trial in which the trial judge denied a party’s request to present closing argument. Although the rule is clear in Georgia that parties have an absolute right to closing argument in a jury trial,1 there is no justifiable reason to extend that rule to bench trials. Because there is no evidence that the trial judge’s decision not to hear closing arguments in this case harmed either of the parties, there is no need to reverse the entire case. Accordingly, I dissent.
The majority cites no Georgia case in which a bench trial was reversed for the trial court’s refusal to allow the parties to present a *807closing argument. The best that is offered is 125-year-old dicta. In Early & Lane v. Oliver & Norton, this Court wrote eloquently about the importance of argument to the “mental satisfaction” of the parties.2 But the Court in that case ruled that the refusal to allow equal time for closing arguments did not require reversal because the Court was not convinced that the outcome would have been different had the trial court listened to the proposed closing argument.3
The underlying flaw in the majority opinion is the conspicuous absence of any similar “harm” analysis. The Court in Early & Lane read the proposed argument and stated that “though it was both able and extended, we cannot think that it would or should have been followed by a different judgment if the [trial judge] had heard every word of it.”4 Since there was no showing here of the proposed closing argument or how the plaintiff was harmed by the court’s refusal to hear it, there is no basis for reversal.5
Neither can the majority draw any legitimate support from Madison v. Montgomery.6 In that case, this Court again refused to reverse a judgment due to the trial court’s refusal to hear oral arguments in a bench trial, ruling instead that the parties had waived the issue.7 The Court did not conclude that an error had occurred, but ruled that even “if one had in fact been committed,” it did not require reversal of the case.8
The only Georgia case cited by the majority to directly decide whether a trial court’s refusal to hear closing argument during a bench trial warranted reversal of the case is Jolly v. Catoosa County Bd. of Ed.9 In that case, this Court clearly stated that “the case being for decision by the judge without a jury, [the trial judge’s] refusal to hear argument is not such an abuse of discretion as will require a reversal.” This is far sounder reasoning than that offered by the majority in this case, and should carry the day, at least absent a showing of prejudice.10
The trial judge, having heard the evidence presented by the par*808ties, is in the best position to know whether closing argument is necessary to reach a decision in the case. Absent a showing that a party suffered some prejudice as a result of the denial of its request for closing argument, it is simply a waste of judicial resources to require a trial judge to listen to closing arguments in every case under threat of reversal on appeal. The courts of many other states follow this sensible rule.11
Decided April 27, 2004.
Jan V. Hinson, Alice A. Blanco, Robert L. Jones, for appellant.
David A. Webster, for appellee.
Because the trial judge is in the best position to determine the necessity of closing argument in a non-jury civil trial, there is no sound reason for this Court to compel him to do so, absent a showing that he abused his discretion and thereby unfairly prejudiced one of the parties.

 See VanDyke v. Martin, 55 Ga. 466 (1875).

 63 Ga. 11, 18, 19 (1879).

 Id. at 19-21.

 Id. at 20.

 See also Motor Service Express v. Cowan, 120 Cal. App. 284, 286 (7 P2d 763) (1932) (court’s refusal to hear closing arguments no basis for reversal where “[n]o showing is made that appellant suffered any prejudice from such refusal, nor is it shown that counsel had any authorities or argument to submit which had not previously come to the court’s attention.”).

 206 Ga. 199 (56 SE2d 292) (1949).

 Id. at 205-206.

 Id. at 206.

 171 Ga. 193 (2) (154 SE 788) (1930).

 In both Early & Lane and Jolly, the trial court’s decision with respect to closing argument was addressed under the abuse of discretion standard. The majority opinion makes no mention of that deferential standard in the present case.

 See, e.g., Oil Workers Intl. Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 581 (230 P2d 71) (1951) (“Oral argument in a civil proceeding tried before the court without a jury, is a privilege, not a right, which is accorded the parties by the court in its discretion.”); Warner v. Close, 96 SW 491, 492 (Mo. App. 1906) (“where a court decides a civil suit submitted to him on the law and evidence, where he acts without hearing the arguments of counsel, the presumption will arise that no such argument was necessary to aid the court to come to a just conclusion.”); Barnes v. Benham, 75 P. 1130 (Okla. 1904) (“where a case is tried to a court, and after the evidence is all in it is fully satisfied as to the weight of the evidence and the law of the case, it is not compelled to listen to arguments.”); Pozitzer v. W.R. Martin Co., 374 SW2d 194, 195 (Ky. 1964) (“if in [the trial judge’s] sound discretion [oral] argument is unnecessary we see no valid reason why he should be compelled to hear it.”).