Court Opinion

ID: 9850488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:58:06.763943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:38.031329
License: Public Domain

BIVINS, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I concur in the opinion as to all issues, except as to restitution. The majority, in affirming the trial court’s authority to order defendant to pay the amount she charged for the drugs, relies on State v. Taylor, 104 N.M. 88, 717 P.2d 64 (Ct. App.1986). Because I disagree with Taylor, I disagree with the holding in this case. Because authority to order restitution must be found under NMSA 1978, Section 31-17-1 (Repl.Pamp.1981) entitled “Victim restitution,” and because that statute does not apply to the circumstances of this case, I would remand for resentencing, deleting the requirement that defendant make restitution to the state. I first discuss why, in my opinion, Taylor was incorrectly decided as to the restitution issue, and then address the question whether the victim restitution statute applies to the facts of this case. In Taylor, this court found it unnecessary to decide whether restitution was appropriate under Section 31-17-1(A), the specific victim restitution statute, because we held that restitution was proper under NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-6(F) (Cum. Supp.1985), the catch-all provision which gives the trial court power to impose conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation when the trial court defers or suspends a sentence. This the court could not do. When the legislature has made a specific provision regarding a matter, that specific provision controls over another general provision. State v. Ayala, 95 N.M. 464, 623 P.2d 584 (Ct.App.1981). Here the victim restitution statute is specific; therefore, if restitution to the state is to be upheld, it must be found in that statute. According to Section 31-17-1(A), a person is not a victim unless he has suffered actual damages. State v. Griffin, 100 N.M. 75, 665 P.2d 1166 (Ct.App.1983). “Actual damages” are “all damages which a victim could recover against the defendant in a civil action * * Section 31-17-1(A)(2). The state is not a “victim” here; nor was the state a victim in Taylor. This statute was designed to compensate persons who experience a loss which directly stems from the crime, such as, those persons whose cars are stolen or whose homes are vandalized. United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921 (4th Cir.1980). The statute does not extend to awards of restitution to the state for costs it incurs in the investigation of crimes. Id.; see United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Jimenez, 600 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir.1979). We can hardly characterize investigatory expenses as “actual damages” when those expenses are provided for in law enforcement budgets. While not relying on the victim restitution statute, Taylor cited to State v. Pettit, 73 Or.App. 510, 698 P.2d 1049 (1985). The facts, in Pettit, were similar to the facts here and in Taylor. Police officers bought cocaine from the defendant. The trial court later ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the department. The statute, in Pettit, is also similar to ours. A person was not a victim unless he had suffered pecuniary damages. In order to determine whether pecuniary damages could be awarded, the court had to determine, -first, whether there was a civil remedy available whereby the police department could recover damages, and, second, whether that recovery would constitute special damages. The Pettit court said that an appropriate civil recovery could be found in rescission and restitution. The parties had entered into an illegal contract. Because the parties, however, were not in pari delicto, the police department could repudiate the contract and recover any value, namely the money, which it had conferred on the defendant. Even though the goal of restitution is to return the parties to the status, quo ante, the court reasoned that the department was not required to return the cocaine to the defendant because the defendant had no legal right to possess contraband. As to whether the award constituted special damages, the court, in Pettit, looked to the language of the statute which provided that special damages “ ‘shall include, but not be limited to, the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken or otherwise harmed * * Because the money “taken” by the defendant was the “property” of the department, and only the equivalent, not the exact money, could be returned, the court concluded that the special damages requirement had been met. While the analysis, in Pettit, is creative and has a certain appeal, I believe the court strained the statute beyond its intended purpose. Even if we were to acknowledge merit in this analysis when the only parties to the criminal transaction are the state and the defendant, the flaw in the court's reasoning is borne out when there are three actors in the crime — the defendant, the state, and the person who is actually victimized by the crime. In such a case, the actual damages would be measured by the loss the citizen victim had suffered. The governmental costs involved in investigating the crime would be too distinct and remote from the offense to be recovered also as “victim restitution.” See United States v. Vaughn. Absent a more specific legislative authorization, Section 31-20-6(F) should not be read to accomplish what Section 31-17-1(A) does not permit. United States v. Vaughn. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which awards to the state restitution from defendant.