Court Opinion

ID: 9907015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 18:02:50.555166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:32.215319
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/5/23 P. v. Foreman CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                           B323856
                                                                       (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    Super. Ct. No. BA414792)

           v.

 REECE MATUI FOREMAN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
James R. Dabney, Judge. Affirmed.
         Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah
P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                              INTRODUCTION
         In 2015, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Reece Matui
Foreman (Foreman) of voluntary manslaughter. In 2022, Foreman filed a
petition for recall and resentencing under former Penal Code section
1170.95.1 The trial court denied the petition, concluding Foreman was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The court found section 1172.6 was
inapplicable to Foreman because he was not convicted under any imputed-
malice theory.
      On appeal, Foreman argues the trial court erred in concluding he was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. He asserts that, based on the
instructions given at his original trial, the jury could have convicted him
under an imputed-malice theory of liability. We disagree with Foreman’s
argument and affirm the trial court’s order.

                               BACKGROUND
      A jury found Foreman guilty of one count of voluntary manslaughter
(Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a))2 and found he personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
      At trial, the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the felony murder rule, or on any other imputed-
malice theory of liability.
      The trial court sentenced Foreman to 32 years and four months in state
prison. In 2016, a different panel of this court affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Forman3 (Dec. 20, 2016, B266113) [nonpub. opn.].)

1     Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive
changes to the statute.
2     All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3     We note Foreman’s last name was sometimes spelled “Forman” in the
record.
                                   2
      In 2022, Foreman filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.
The trial court appointed counsel on his behalf. Foreman’s counsel filed a
brief arguing the jury could have convicted Foreman of manslaughter under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or another imputed-malice
theory. The basis for counsel’s argument was that the implied malice
instruction given at Foreman’s original trial contained the words “natural
and probable consequences.” The prosecution opposed the petition and
argued Foreman was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the
record demonstrated he was the actual killer. In support of its argument, the
prosecution noted the jury found Foreman personally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense.
      The trial court denied Foreman relief as a matter of law. At the
hearing on the petition, the court found that although the instruction at issue
contained the words “natural and probable consequences” when defining
implied malice, Foreman was not convicted under any “vicarious liability”
theory. The trial court also found Foreman was not entitled to relief because
he was the “actual killer.”
      Foreman timely appealed.

                               DISCUSSION
      A. Governing Law
      Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) limited accomplice liability
under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and eliminated convictions for
murder based on a theory under which malice is imputed to a person based

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solely on that person’s participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959
(Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) Senate
Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437) added section 189, subdivision (e) (limiting
application of the felony-murder rule) and section 188, subdivision (a)(3)
(stating that “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime”). As amended by Senate Bill No.
775, effective January 1, 2022, these ameliorative changes to the law now
expressly apply to attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
      SB 1437 also created a procedure, now codified at section 1172.6, for a
person convicted of murder, attempted murder, or voluntary manslaughter
under the former law to be resentenced if the person could no longer be
convicted of those crimes under the current law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant commences that
procedure by filing a petition containing a declaration that, among other
things, the defendant could not presently be convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or voluntary manslaughter under the current law. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) If a petition establishes a prima facie case for
relief, the trial court must appoint counsel if requested, issue an order to
show cause, and hold an evidentiary hearing. (Strong, at pp. 708–709;
§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1).)

      B. Analysis
      On appeal, Foreman renews his trial court argument that the “natural
and probable consequences” language in the implied malice jury instruction
left open the possibility that he was convicted under a now-invalid imputed-

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malice theory. However, People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043 (Soto)
rejected this argument. The Soto court explained that “[a]lthough the
instructions related to implied malice and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine of aiding and abetting include similar language
regarding a ‘natural [and probable] consequence,’ they are distinctly different
concepts.” (Id. at p. 1056.) The natural and probable consequences doctrine,
unlike the use of the language in the implied malice definition, is “a theory of
liability by which an aider and abettor who intends to aid a less serious crime
can be convicted of a greater crime.” (Id. at p. 1058.) The court further
explained, “[SB 1437] changed the circumstances under which a person could
be convicted of murder without a showing of malice, but it did not exclude
from liability persons convicted of murder for acting with implied malice.”
(Id. at p. 1057; see also People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997, 1005
[recognizing SB 1437 “did nothing to remove implied malice as a basis for a
second degree murder conviction”]; People v. Lee (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254,
261, 263 [the natural and probable consequences doctrine is not an implied
malice theory].)
      We agree with Soto. At Foreman’s trial, the jury was not instructed on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the felony murder rule, or
any imputed-malice theory of liability. Nor did the prosecution argue any of
those theories to the jury. It follows that Foreman was not convicted under
an imputed-malice theory. The trial court was therefore correct in concluding
Foreman is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.4

4     In light of our conclusion, we do not address the merits of the trial
court’s alternative finding that Foreman was the “actual killer.”
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                        DISPOSITION
The order denying Foreman’s petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                             ZUKIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.

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