Court Opinion

ID: 9859443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:43:01.366184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:00:48.882324
License: Public Domain

REILFUSS, C. J.
The plaintiff-appellant, Jeanne Priebe Johnson, and the defendant-respondent, Dr. Kenneth 0. Johnson, were married on September 10, 1955. At the time of trial both parties were forty-two years *140old. They had been married twenty years. They had three daughters who were fifteen, thirteen and twelve years of age at the time the divorce was granted. The second oldest daughter was born without her lower left arm.
The parties met when they were freshmen at DePauw University. They saw each other frequently throughout college and were married after Dr. Johnson completed his first year of medical school. The appellant received a degree in home economics and during the first four years of marriage she worked full time and provided a substantial portion of their support. Money was given to the parties by both of their parents and Dr. Johnson’s parents paid his tuition. Dr. Johnson supplemented their income by working during vacations.
In 1962 to 1963 the defendant started his medical practice, with a specialty in pediatrics, and earned approximately '$20,000. His earnings steadily increased until 1966 when they reached between $28,000 to $29,000. In 1967 he affiliated with the Milwaukee Medical Clinic, a corporation, and for the next three years suffered a lesser income. However by 1972 his gross earnings were $33,194; in 1973, $39,846; and in 1974, $39,679. The corporation provides health, life and disability insurance for the clinic members and their families.
The defendant is also one of several partners of the Good Hope Properties. This partnership owns the real estate in which the Milwaukee Medical Clinic is located.
The court found that the parties’ estate had been accumulated during the marriage. It found the value of the estate was as follows:
(1) Equity in the homestead and adjoining lot $40,270
(2) Securities Presently held in plaintiff’s name 14,646
Presently held in defendant’s name 7,745
*141(3) Cash savings and checking accounts Nominal
(4) Business Interest Good Hope Properties 48,720
Shares in Milwaukee Medical Clinic, S. C. 2,830
Total $109,211
As a member of the clinic the defendant received a salary of $36,000 per year. This amount was set at the beginning of the year to provide the doctor with a drawing account. His final annual earnings were dependent upon a formula determined by the clinic members and depended, to a substantial degree, upon the bills to the patients by each member. There were five or six pediatricians in the clinic membership and the defendant’s billings were about mid-point among the pediatricians.
The trial court did not include the value of defendant’s share of the clinic’s accounts receivable in the value of the estate. It noted that there was a dispute as to the disposition of these accounts between him and the clinic. The dispute centered around their value if Dr. Johnson severed his relationship with the clinic. If there was no severance Dr. Johnson would take the receivables as part of his compensation. The court found that if he did sever his relationship with the clinic the value of the receivables would be a substitute for income as he established a new practice. The value of the receivables was $44,700.90 less the cost of collection.
There was also a dispute over the value of the household furnishings. The plaintiff valued the furnishings at $3,000, while Dr. Johnson argued they were worth $15,-.000. The court made no finding as to the exact value of the furnishings. It found the plaintiff “grossly undervalued” the furnishings and that the defendant included items that were not furnishings.
In the estate division the court awarded the plaintiff the homestead and adjoining lot, those securities in her *142name, and all furniture, furnishings, appliances and equipment except the defendant’s books and papers and other items of personal property of personal interest to him. The value of these items was not established but it appears it was not substantial.
The plaintiff was divested of any interest in all other property owned by the defendant.
The court concluded that the award of alimony and the division of the estate were interrelated. The plaintiff was awarded $650 per month alimony until all the children reached majority or were otherwise emancipated. 'The alimony was to be terminated if the plaintiff remarried or if the defendant died.
Support money for the three teenage daughters was set at $450 per month. Additionally, the defendant was ordered to pay for all medical and dental expenses including prescription drugs. The responsibility of medical care was Dr. Johnson’s and the plaintiff’s authority was limited to “emergency and minor medical matters.” He was also required to maintain at least $60,000 of life insurance to secure the support order.
The first contention of the plaintiff-appellant is that the trial court improperly calculated the value of the estate. The trial court did not include the Good Hope Properties’ partnership earnings or the value of the accounts receivable in the clinic in valuing the estate. The partnership earnings of $1,958 were not included in the estate because it did not appear that they would be paid to Dr. Johnson. Partnership earnings had not been paid in the nine previous years. Although he did not receive these earnings they were reported as income. The defendant did receive $3,936 in 1974. This sum was his share of the amount two doctors paid to become partners in the Good Hope Properties. Both of these amounts .were appropriately excluded from the estate. There was no indication that Dr. Johnson would receive the partnership earnings. The partnership earnings were one indication of the value of Dr. Johnson’s interest in the *143partnership. The value of the partnership interest was also an indicator of Dr. Johnson’s future income; it assisted the court in determining proper alimony and support awards.
The trial court set forth why it did not include the accounts receivable of the clinic as part of the gross estate. Dr. Johnson would only receive these accounts, less collection costs, if his association with the clinic terminated. If he remained with the clinic he would receive them as salary; if he left, this payment would be in lieu of salary.
This court has held that it is error not to include among the assets for division a pension fund vested in the husband. Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis.2d 176, 178, 226 N.W.2d 518 (1975). It has also held that it is error to include a profit-sharing trust as an asset in making division of the estate and to include it as income in awarding alimony. Kronforst v. Kronforst, 21 Wis.2d 54, 63-64, 123 N.W.2d 528 (1963). The trial court considered the accounts receivable as the equivalent to salary. In considering the amount of alimony and support to be awarded, it looked to Dr. Johnson’s salary and his ability to pay. It was not error to view the receivables as salary. If Dr. Johnson remained with the clinic the receivables would be paid as salary. If he left, they would take the place of salary while he established his new practice. Because the receivables were viewed as salary, it would have been error to include them in the assets available for distribution.
Next, the appellant makes a series of arguments that challenge the alimony award, the division of the estate, the support award and the custody award. Each one of these determinations is within the sound discretion of the trial court.1 In the absence of some mistake or error *144respecting the facts upon which the award rests, the trial court’s award must be upheld unless an abuse of discretion can be shown or, under all the circumstances, the amount of an award is clearly excessive or inadequate.2
The alimony award was $650 per month until all the children of the parties reached their majority. The plaintiff-appellant does not contest the amount of the award but argues that the court abused its discretion by making an award limited in time, thereby terminating its ability to change the award if circumstances changed. Sec. 247.26, Stats.,3 explicitly states that the trial court may grant alimony for a limited period of time. Sec. 247.324 *145states that alimony for a limited period of time shall not thereafter he revised or altered. A review of the findings of fact demonstrates that the court considered these and other factors. The division of the estate and the alimony award were closely interrelated. The court noted that the appellant’s health and education appeared to enable her to obtain gainful employment but believed she should not be required to be solely dependent on her earnings immediately or while the children were minors.
The trial court in its memorandum decision made the following statement concerning the alimony award:
“The plaintiff’s health and education appear to enable her to obtain gainful employment. However the defendant’s abilities are such that she should not be required to be dependent solely upon her own earnings. Her stocks will produce some dividends. An important consideration is that she should be free to give primary attention to her responsibilities as a mother. The children are old enough that perhaps part-time employment is indicated. Further she has made a substantial investment in this marriage. Her husband now possesses skills which are productive of substantial earnings. Her skills have not been used, she now enters the job market at a disadvantage. She has no tenure.
“It seems reasonable that the Court should award the plaintiff alimony until the children all reach majority or are otherwise emancipated. The amount of course is *146subject to termination upon the defendant's death or plaintiff’s remarriage. Because the Court has granted the plaintiff a lesser share of the estate which it would have awarded if there had been a division in lieu of alimony, her alimony should not necessarily be terminated if she obtains full-time employment. Plaintiff is encouraged to obtain employment if possible so as not to further depreciate her opportunities. The Court sets alimony in the amount of $650 per month payable semimonthly.”
In granting alimony for a limited period of time, the court made a judicial choice which it was empowered to make by the legislature.
The statutes were amended in 1971 to provide for limited alimony.5 The legislature made a policy decision that a trial court was entitled to grant alimony for a limited period of time and would not be able to alter that award thereafter. We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in providing for limited alimony; nor can it be said that the award is clearly inadequate. Alimony for a limited period is a two-edged sword as to both parties. Both parties know the amount of alimony to be paid and the duration of the payments. The certainty of this award allows the parties to make plans without fears that the award will change. But if either party’s circumstances change so that payment is unnecessary or impossible, the award will not change. The plaintiff-appellant benefited from the certainty of the award and by knowing that within approximately six years she would have to be self-supporting.
The appellant contends that dividing the estate by awarding her the house penalized her for seeking the divorce by “saddl [ing her] with the expense and trauma of a forced sale of the homestead.” This argument can*147not be accepted. The award of the homestead property did not, nor was it an attempt to, penalize the appellant. It was a logical division of the estate. The two substantial interests in the estate were the homestead and the business interest in Good Hope Properties. The interest in Good Hope Properties is Dr. Johnson’s share of the ownership of the property which the Milwaukee Medical Clinic occupies. It would not have been advisable to grant the plaintiff-appellant an interest in this property. The only alternative was to award to her the homestead. It is true that substantial monthly payments on the mortgage remained and would be difficult to meet, but there was an available alternative. The homestead and the adjoining lot were appraised at approximately $89,000. The trial court found the equity to be $40,270. This means, of course, the mortgage was about $49,000. A letter from the Marshall & Ilsley Bank, an exhibit in the case, reveals the monthly payments on the mortgage on the house and additional lot are $326.74, and that if the principal were reduced by $20,000 the monthly payments would drop to $219.29 per month. The adjoining lot to the homestead, valued at $19,000, could have been or can be sold. The money obtained from such a sale can be applied to the mortgage, thus reducing the monthly mortgage payments. Whatever the solution, the award of the homestead was a reasonable effort to equitably divide the estate.
The plaintiff-appellant cites the court to Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wis.2d 744, 229 N.W.2d 629 (1975), and argues that the support award was inadequate. The facts of Parsons are somewhat similar to this case. The alimony award in Parsons was $800 per month and the support award was $350 per month for one child. Here the support award was $450 per month for three children, one of whom was an exceptional child. It should be noted that Dr. Parsons’ annual income was substantially greater than Dr. Johnson’s. In the years 1970-72, Dr. *148Parsons’ average gross income was $55,287, whereas Dr. Johnson’s average income for the years 1973 and 1974 was $89,765. The appellant received a substantially greater share of the estate than did Mrs. Parsons, and medical expenses of the Johnson daughters were to be incurred by Dr. Johnson.
While division of an estate, an alimony award and a support award are all separate and distinct awards, they cannot be made in a vacuum. The amount of support money will affect the ability of a spouse to make alimony payments and the division of property will effect the need and the amount of the other awards. The support award of $450 per month may have been somewhat low but it was not an abuse of discretion. This is particularly true when it is noted that in addition to support payments Dr. Johnson is responsible for medical expenses. Further, the award of support money is subject to modification if future circumstances warrant a revision.
In awarding custody of the children to the appellant the trial court stated “[b]y statute the person awarded custody is given the power and duty to authorize necessary medical, surgical, hospital, dental and institutional care. Because the defendant is a pediatrician and is concerned with the welfare of his children, the Court shall direct that the medical care shall be the full responsibility of the defendant with the plaintiff’s authority being limited to emergency and minor medical matters.” The appellant argues that such a custody award will produce absurd results. In determining custody the trial court is vested with wide discretion; the polestar is the best interests of the children.6 The court did not abuse its discretion; the provision for major medical responsibility *149which rests with the defendant doctor can well be in the best interests of the children.
During the pendency of this action a new prosthesis for the parties’ daughter, Virginia, was purchased by the appellant without consulting Dr. Johnson. The prosthesis was not a hook, but rather “like a hand.” Dr. Johnson believed a hook, which was functional, was preferable to a cosmetic hand. Dr. Johnson had taken a course on juvenile amputees and believed most amputees preferred a hook. He stated that experts advised the use of a hook. While the trial court could well have required the defendant to pay for this prosthesis, under the facts of this case we do not believe it was an abuse of discretion to require the plaintiff to do so.
The appellant’s final argument is that the court erred in allowing the defendant to assert his fifth amendment privilege regarding the allegation of adultery and the relation of his finances to the allegation. It is argued that the assertion of the privilege prevented the court from accurately determining his ability to pay as required by sec. 247.26, Stats.
There is no question that the right against self-incrimination exists in civil cases; however, the exercise of the right permits the trial court to draw an inference against the interest of the witness asserting the privilege.7 In this case the trial court drew the inference and concluded that the defendant committed adultery. Additionally, the court noted that some of Dr. Johnson’s “business expenses . . . may be questionable.”
We do not decide whether the trial court permitted the privilege to be asserted on matters unrelated or irrelevant to evidence which could be used against Dr. Johnson in a subsequent criminal proceeding. This is so because even if the use of the privilege was applied improperly — in a too broad fashion — it did not prevent *150the trial court from determining ability to pay. The court was fully informed of the status, nature and source of the defendant’s assets and income. From this information it was able to fairly divide the estate, award alimony and award support.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.

 Greco v. Greco, 73 Wis.2d 220, 229, 243 N.W.2d 465 (1976); Farwell v. Farwell, 33 Wis.2d 324, 330, 147 N.W.2d 289 (1967).

 Anderson v. Anderson, 72 Wis.2d 631, 638, 242 N.W.2d 165 (1976).

 “246.26 Alimony, “property division. Upon every judgment of divorce or legal separation, the court may, subject to s. 247.20, further adjudge for a limited period of time to either party such alimony out of the property or income of the other party for support and maintenance, except no alimony shall be granted to a party guilty of adultery not condoned, and the court may further grant such allowance to be paid by either or both parties for the support, maintenance and education of the minor children committed to the other party’s care and custody as it deems just and reasonable. The court may also finally divide and distribute the estate, both real and personal, of either party between the parties and divest and transfer the title of any thereof accordingly, after having given due regard to the legal and equitable rights of each party, the length of the marriage, the age and health of the parties, the liability of either party for debts or support of children, their respective abilities and estates, whether the property award is in lieu of or in addition to alimony, the character and situation of the parties and all the circumstances of the case; but no such final division shall impair the power of the court in respect to revision of allowances for minor children under s. 247.25. . . .”

 “247.32 Revision of judgment. After a judgment providing for alimony or other allowance for a spouse and children, or either of them, or for the appointment of trustees as aforesaid *145the court may, from time to time, on the petition of either of the parties and upon notice to the family court commissioner, revise and alter such judgment respecting the amount of such alimony or allowance and the payment thereof, and also respecting the appropriation and payment of the principal and income of the property so held in trust, and may make any judgment respecting any of the said matters which such court might have made in the original action, except that a judgment which either fails to provide alimony for either party or provides alimony for either party for a limited period only under s. 247.26 shall not thereafter be revised or altered in either respect nor shall the provisions of a judgment with respect to final division of property be subject to revision or modification.”

 Laws of 1971, eh. 220.

 Kuesel v. Kuesel, 74 Wis.2d 636, 639, 247 N.W.2d 72 (1976); Graichen v. Graichen, 20 Wis.2d 200, 121 N.W.2d 737 (1963).

 Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis.2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292 (1970).