Court Opinion

ID: 9409018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 17:01:13.079061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.301953
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OSURE BROWN,                            No. 22-35244
                Plaintiff-Appellant,
  v.                                   D.C. No. 2:20-cv-
                                         00669-DGE
TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.;
PATENAUDE & FELIX APC; US
BANK, N.A.; NATIONAL                      OPINION
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2004-1; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2004-2; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2005-1; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2005-2; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2005-3; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2006-1; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2006-2; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2007-1; NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE STUDENT LOAN
TRUST 2007-2,
            Defendants-Appellees.
2              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Western District of Washington
         David G. Estudillo, District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted February 17, 2023
                   Seattle, Washington

                       Filed July 14, 2023

      Before: William A. Fletcher, Richard A. Paez, and
             Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

                  Opinion by Judge Paez;
               Concurrence by Judge VanDyke

                          SUMMARY *

    Fair Debt Collection Practices Act / Bankruptcy Law

    The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court’s dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of an
action brought by Osure Brown, a student loan borrower
who had received a bankruptcy discharge, alleging that
defendants’ attempts to collect debts that were discharged in
bankruptcy violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
and the Bankruptcy Code.
   Affirming the dismissal of Brown’s claims that were
based on a violation of his bankruptcy discharge order, the

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.               3

panel reiterated that Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, 276 F.3d
502 (9th Cir. 2002), precludes FDCPA claims and other
claims based on violations of Bankruptcy Code § 524.
     The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, as
barred by the one-year statute of limitations, of Brown’s
remaining FDCPA claim based on the theory that defendants
knowingly brought a meritless post-discharge debt
collection lawsuit because they knew they could not prove
ownership of Brown’s debts. Agreeing with other circuits,
the panel held that certain litigation acts, including service
and filing, can constitute distinct violations of the FDCPA
that each trigger the statute of limitations. In determining
which acts constitute independent violations, the court
considers (1) the debt collector’s last opportunity to comply
with the statute and (2) whether the date of the violation is
easily ascertainable. The panel concluded that Brown
sufficiently alleged one post-filing FDCPA violation in the
filing of an affidavit that presented a new basis, not
contained in the complaint, to show that defendants owned
the debts. Disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit, the panel
further held that when service occurs before the filing of a
suit, filing constitutes an independent violation of the
FDCPA.
     Concurring in the judgment, Judge VanDyke agreed
with the outcome and much of the reasoning of the majority
opinion, but he wrote that the rule announced in Part III.B of
the majority opinion—that when service occurs before the
filing of a suit, filing constitutes an independent violation of
the FDCPA—was an unnecessary conclusion and failed to
anticipate the intricacies that future cases are bound to raise.
4             BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

                         COUNSEL

Scott C. Borison (argued), Borison Firm LLC, Casper,
Wyoming; Phillip Robinson, Consumer Law Center LLC,
Silver Spring, Maryland; Christina L. Henry, Henry &
DeGraaff PS, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Albert J. Rota (argued), Jones Day, Dallas, Texas; Justin H.
Homes (argued), Bryan C. Shartle, and Bradley J. St.
Angelo, Sessions Israel & Shartle LLC, Metaire, Louisiana;
Emily J. Harris and Benjamin C. Byers, Coor Cronin LLP,
Seattle, Washington; Marc Rosenberg, Lee Smart PS Inc.,
Seattle, Washington; Thomas N. Abbott, Perkins Coie LLP,
Portland, Oregon; Kristine E. Kruger, Seattle, Washington;
for Defendant-Appellees.

                          OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

     In this case, we clarify what actions trigger the statute of
limitations for a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”) claim when the alleged violation of that statute
occurs within the context of a debt collection lawsuit. We
first reiterate that Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, 276 F.3d 502
(9th Cir. 2002), precludes FDCPA and other claims based on
violations of Bankruptcy Code § 524 (11 U.S.C. § 524). We
then conclude that certain litigation acts—including service
and filing—can constitute distinct violations of the FDCPA
that each trigger the FDCPA’s one-year statute of
limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Accordingly, we
affirm in part and reverse in part.
              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.                5

                               I.
    From 2003 to 2007, Plaintiff Osure Brown (“Brown”)
took out ten student loans to attend college in Washington
state. Defendants National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts
(collectively, “the Trusts”) ultimately purchased Brown’s
loans. The Trusts appointed Defendant U.S. Bank as their
special servicer.     The Trusts also hired Defendant
Transworld Systems, Inc. (“Transworld”), to collect the
defaulted loans, and hired Defendant Patenaude & Felix
(“Patenaude”), a law firm specializing in debt collection, to
represent them in debt collection actions. 1
    Several years after taking out the loans, Brown filed for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief. During his bankruptcy
proceeding, the Trusts filed ten proof of claim forms for the
outstanding student loan balance. As part of his Chapter 13
repayment plan, Brown made payments to his creditors for
thirty-six months, after which any remaining funds were
distributed to certain “non-dischargeable student loan
creditors,” including the Trusts. The bankruptcy court then
issued an order of discharge for all dischargeable debts under
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). The parties dispute whether the loans
owned by the Trusts were dischargeable, although that fact
is not relevant to our analysis of the district court’s dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
    After the bankruptcy discharge, Patenaude, on behalf of
Transworld and the Trusts, sent Brown ten letters seeking to
collect the remaining loan balance on each of Brown’s ten
loans. When attempts to settle the debts were not successful,
the Trusts turned to Washington state court to collect the

1
  We refer to the Trusts, U.S. Bank, Transworld, and Patenaude
collectively as “Defendants”.
6               BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

debts. They served Brown with ten summonses and
complaints on February 16, 2019. The Trusts then filed the
complaints on April 5, 2019, which were later consolidated
into one lawsuit. 2
   Along with the complaints, the Trusts filed an affidavit
by Jennifer Audet (“the Audet Affidavit”), a Transworld
employee, purporting to show that the Trusts owned the
underlying student loan debt. After Brown questioned
whether the Audet Affidavit demonstrated that the debts
were properly assigned to the Trusts in his summary
judgment motion, the Trusts filed an affidavit by Bradley
Luke (“the Luke Affidavit”), another Transworld employee,
on October 7, 2019, which also purported to show that the
Trusts owned the debts. The state court ruled that the Luke
Affidavit was inadmissible hearsay and excluded it.
Because the Trusts could not prove that the debts had been
properly assigned to them, the state court granted summary
judgment to Brown, dismissing the debt collection suit. The
Trusts did not appeal the judgment.
    On April 6, 2020, Brown filed this putative class action
in Washington state court, alleging violations of the FDCPA
and the bankruptcy court’s discharge order on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated. He alleges two distinct
classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c), a
“FDCPA Class” and a “Bankruptcy Class.” In Count I,
Brown alleges that Transworld and Patenaude violated the
FDCPA under two alternative theories: (1) by violating his
bankruptcy discharge order and (2) by filing a knowingly
meritless debt collection lawsuit. Count II requests

2
  We thus refer to the state court “action” or “lawsuit” in singular form.
No party argues that the date of consolidation is relevant to the FDCPA
statute of limitations defense.
                BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.                       7

declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of Count I for
the FDCPA Class against all Defendants. In Count III,
Brown alleges that the Trusts violated Bankruptcy Code
§ 524(a) (11 U.S.C. § 524(a)) by seeking to collect debts that
were discharged in bankruptcy.           Count IV requests
declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of Count III for
the Bankruptcy Class against the Trusts. Defendants
removed the case to federal court and Brown promptly filed
an amended complaint.
    Defendants filed a combined five motions to dismiss.
The district court considered all the motions together and
granted them in February 2022. The district court concluded
that most of Brown’s claims were precluded by Walls, which
held that discharged debtors do not have a private right of
action under Bankruptcy Code § 524 and thus cannot bring
FDCPA claims based on a violation of § 524. See 276 F.3d
at 509–11; 11 U.S.C. § 524. 3 The district court then
considered Brown’s remaining FDCPA claim, which was
based on the theory that Defendants knowingly brought a
meritless debt collection lawsuit. The court concluded that
dismissal was warranted under the FDCPA’s one-year
statute of limitations because more than a year had elapsed
between when Defendants served Brown with their debt
collection suit and when Brown filed his FDCPA claim. See
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Brown timely appealed.

3
 Section 524 provides that a discharge order “operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment
of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is
waived.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
8             BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

                              II.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A
judgment dismissing a case on the pleadings is reviewed on
appeal de novo.” Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). On review, we “must accept
all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe
them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Id. (quoting NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898
(9th Cir. 1986)) (cleaned up). We will affirm dismissal only
if “no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could
be proved consistent with the allegations.” Id. (citations
omitted). We also review de novo the question of whether a
claim is barred by the statute of limitations. See Bliss v.
CoreCivic, Inc., 978 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020)
(citations omitted).
                              III.
    We first address Brown’s claims based on a violation of
his bankruptcy discharge order. These claims are precluded
by Walls. We then address Brown’s remaining FDCPA
claim—that Defendants knowingly brought a meritless debt
collection lawsuit—and decide whether Brown has alleged
any violations of the FDCPA that are not barred by the
statute of limitations. We hold that he has.
                              A.
    In Counts I and III, Brown alleges that Defendants
attempted to collect debts that were prohibited from
collection by his bankruptcy discharge order. In Count I,
Brown contends that Transworld and Patenaude violated the
FDCPA by attempting to collect such debts. In Count III,
Brown alleges that the Trusts violated 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) by
attempting to collect debts discharged in bankruptcy. As the
              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.             9

district court correctly concluded, both claims are squarely
foreclosed by Walls. See 276 F.3d at 509–11. Our decision
in Manikan v. Peters & Freedman, LLP, 981 F.3d 712 (9th
Cir. 2020), does not alter this conclusion.
    In Walls, we held that a debtor who alleges a violation of
a bankruptcy court’s discharge order has no private right of
action under 11 U.S.C. § 524. The appropriate remedy is
contempt of court against the offending creditor pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 105(a). See Walls, 276 F.3d at 506–09. Because
§ 105 allows “an aggrieved debtor to obtain compensatory
damages, attorneys fees, and the offending creditor’s
compliance with the discharge injunction,” “no further
remedy is necessary.” Id. at 507. In so holding, we
explained that

        [i]mplying a private remedy . . . could put
        enforcement of the discharge injunction in
        the hands of a court that did not issue it
        (perhaps even in the hands of a jury), which
        is inconsistent with the present scheme that
        leaves enforcement to the bankruptcy judge
        whose discharge order gave rise to the
        injunction.

Id. at 509.
    We also held that a debtor may not pursue an FDCPA
claim based on a violation of the discharge order. Walls, 276
F.3d at 510–11. The plaintiff in Walls had sought relief
under the FDCPA, claiming that Wells Fargo violated her
discharge order by attempting to collect her debt after it had
been discharged. Id. at 504. We concluded, however, that
“[t]here is no escaping that Walls’s FDCPA claim is based
on an alleged violation of § 524.” Id. at 510. To allow her
10              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

to bring such a claim would allow a private right of action
“through the back door.” Id. at 510. Her claim would
“necessarily entail[] bankruptcy-laden determinations,”
which are best left to the bankruptcy court. See id.
    Brown’s Count III claim, entirely based on an alleged
violation of Bankruptcy Code § 524, is squarely precluded
by the first holding in Walls. 4 See 276 F.3d at 507–09. The
Count IV claim, which seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief on the basis of Count III, also fails because these
remedies are not stand-alone claims, and they do not survive
the dismissal of Count III when Brown has pled no facts
suggesting that any of the Defendants are likely to sue him
again. See City of Reno v. Netflix, Inc., 52 F.4th 874, 878–
79 (9th Cir. 2022); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil
Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). Moreover, any declaration
that certain debts have been discharged would need to be
made by the bankruptcy court. 5 See Stout v. Prussel, 691
F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1982) (“It has long been the rule in

4
  The Trusts also argue that Brown was required to assert his claims that
they did not have the right to enforce his loans and that those loans were
discharged as a compulsory counterclaim in the state court litigation.
Because Brown’s claims are precluded by Walls, we do not reach this
issue.
5
  Despite Brown’s argument, the Supreme Court’s decision in Taggart
v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019), does not grant the district court
authority to issue declaratory and injunctive relief relating to bankruptcy
discharges. Taggart concerned the legal standard for holding a creditor
in civil contempt when the creditor attempts to collect a debt in violation
of a discharge order. Id. at 1801. It did not concern a district court’s
jurisdiction to enforce a discharge order. The Court had no reason to
address that question because a bankruptcy court issued the civil
contempt order in Taggart. Id. at 1800.
              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.              11

this circuit that the right to a discharge in bankruptcy is left
to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court.”).
     To the extent Brown’s FDCPA claim in Count I is based
on the theory that Transworld and Patenaude improperly
sought to collect debts discharged in bankruptcy, the claim
fails under the second holding in Walls. See 276 F.3d at 510.
Brown disputes this conclusion, arguing that our decision in
Manikan narrowed Walls to allow his claim. This argument
is incorrect.
    In Manikan, we clarified that Walls does not preclude
claims under the FDCPA when those claims are not based
on a violation of a bankruptcy discharge order. 981 F.3d at
714. There, Manikan fully paid a debt to his homeowner’s
association through his Chapter 13 bankruptcy repayment
plan two years before the bankruptcy court entered a
discharge order. Id. at 714, 717. Nevertheless, after the
entry of the discharge order, a debt collector attempted to
serve Manikan with a Notice of Default. Id. at 714–15.
Manikan sued under the FDCPA because the debt collector
attempted to collect a debt that Manikan no longer owed. Id.
at 714–15. We held that Walls did not preclude his claim
because “whether an unfair debt collection practice occurred
does not depend on issuance or enforcement of the discharge
order.” Id. at 716. Rather, “even if Manikan had never
received a discharge in his bankruptcy case, he could still
assert [that the defendant] acted unlawfully by attempting to
collect a debt that he fully satisfied.” Id. at 717. His FDCPA
claims were “therefore premised on a wholly independent
theory of relief.” Id. Unlike in Walls, the FDCPA claims in
Manikan were not “inextricably intertwined with bankruptcy
issues.” Id.
12              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

    Brown cannot make the same argument. His theory is
identical to the one presented in Walls: that the Defendants
violated the discharge order by attempting to collect debts
that were discharged. See Walls, 276 F.3d at 504. Such a
claim necessarily requires a determination of whether the
debt was discharged, which is “within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.” Banks v. Gill Dist.
Ctrs., Inc., 263 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2001). As in Walls,
Brown’s claim is “premised on a violation of a bankruptcy
discharge order.” Manikan, 981 F.3d at 716. Indeed,
Brown’s definition for his proposed FDCPA class requires
that each class member received a bankruptcy discharge.
Allowing Brown’s FDCPA claims to proceed would
“circumvent the remedial scheme of the [Bankruptcy] Code
under which Congress struck a balance between the interests
of debtors and creditors by permitting (and limiting) debtors’
remedies for violating the discharge injunction to contempt.”
Walls, 276 F.3d at 510. Brown’s Count I claim thus fails on
this theory.
                                   B.
   Brown’s Count I claim also alleges an alternative
FDCPA theory, arguing that because Transworld and
Patenaude knew that they could not prove ownership of
Brown’s debts, they violated the FDCPA by bringing a
knowingly meritless debt collection lawsuit. 6 Because this

6
  In support of this theory, Brown cites several FDCPA sections,
including: § 1692e(2)(A) (prohibiting debt collectors from making a
“false representation of the . . . legal status of any debt”); § 1692e(5)
(prohibiting debt collectors from “threat[ening] to take any action that
cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken”); § 1692e(10)
(prohibiting debt collectors from using “any false representation or
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect a debt”); and § 1692f
               BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.                    13

theory is not “premised on a violation of a bankruptcy
discharge order,” Manikan, 981 F.3d at 716, it is not
foreclosed by Walls. The district court acknowledged this
distinction but concluded that Count I nevertheless failed
because—to the extent it was based on the meritless lawsuit
theory—the claim was time-barred by the FDCPA’s one-
year statute of limitations, as Brown was required to file the
FDCPA claim one year from the date the state court
complaints were served, rather than one year from the date
the complaints were filed. To so conclude, the district court
looked to Washington law, which provides that a plaintiff
commences a lawsuit when a complaint is served or filed,
whichever comes first. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.020;
Seattle Seahawks v. King County, 913 P.2d 375, 376 (Wash.
1996). Brown challenges this conclusion, arguing that he
has alleged several independent violations of the FDCPA,
including the filing of the complaints on April 5, 2019 and
the filing of the Luke Affidavit on October 7, 2019, each of
which commences a one-year statute of limitations under the
FDCPA and render timely the April 6, 2020 filing of this
lawsuit (April 5, 2020 was a Sunday). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a)(1)(c) (explaining that if the last day to file falls on a
Sunday, the plaintiff may file the next business day); see also
Hart v. United States, 817 F.2d 78, 80 (9th Cir. 1987)
(applying Rule 6(a) to a federal statute).
    We hold that Brown correctly asserts that some litigation
acts can constitute independent FDCPA violations and that
each such violation triggers its own one-year statute of
limitations under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)
(creating a one-year statute of limitations for each violation

(prohibiting debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means
to collect or attempt to collect any debt”).
14            BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

of the FDCPA).        After discussing relevant FDCPA
precedent, we address the alleged post-filing violations, and
then address the distinction between service and filing.
Because Brown has alleged discrete violations after the date
of service of the complaints, we reverse.
                              1.
     Congress enacted the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors” in order to “protect
consumers.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). “The FDCPA pursues
[this purpose] by imposing affirmative requirements on debt
collectors and prohibiting a range of debt-collection
practices.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 358 (2019)
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b–1692j). While Congress’s
“ultimate objective was to protect consumers from
harassment by debt collectors, Congress intended to achieve
this purpose by regulating the conduct of debt collectors.”
Mattson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc., 967 F.2d 259, 261 (8th
Cir. 1992) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)). “Because the statute
is broadly remedial, we liberally construe the FDCPA in
favor of consumers.” McAdory v. M.N.S. & Assocs., LLC,
952 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Hernandez v.
Williams, Zinman & Parham PC, 829 F.3d 1068, 1078–79
(9th Cir. 2016)).
    Although we perhaps have not yet said so explicitly,
every alleged FDCPA violation triggers its own one-year
statute of limitations as provided in §1692k(d). See Bouye
v. Bruce, 61 F.4th 485, 490, 491 n.5 (6th Cir. 2023)
(explaining that at least five circuits “adhere to the view that
every alleged violation of the FDCPA has its own [one-year]
statute of limitations”); Solomon v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 395
F. App’x 494, 497 (10th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases) (“For
statute-of-limitations purposes, discrete violations of the
              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.               15

FDCPA should be analyzed on an individual basis.”). This
rule is clear from the text of the statute. Under the FDCPA,
consumers can bring private actions “in any appropriate
United States district court without regard to the amount in
controversy . . . within one year from the date on which the
violation occurs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). The Supreme
Court recently clarified that there is no “discovery rule” for
FDCPA claims, so “absent the application of an equitable
doctrine, the statute of limitations in § 1692k(d) begins to
run on the date on which the alleged FDCPA violation
occurs, not the date on which the violation is discovered.”
Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 358. Thus, to determine when the
FDCPA’s statute of limitations begins to run, the key
question is what act constitutes the occurrence of an FDCPA
violation. The Supreme Court has said only that whether
something “occurred” under the FDCPA means whether it
“actually happened.” Id. at 360.
    Although the FDCPA clearly “appl[ies] to lawyers
engaged in litigation,” Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294
(1995), it is less clear which litigation acts can constitute
independent FDCPA violations when the underlying
FDCPA violation is a debt collection lawsuit. As the
Supreme Court has explained, “it would be odd if the
[FDCPA] empowered a debt-owing consumer to stop the
‘communications’ inherent in an ordinary lawsuit and
thereby cause an ordinary debt-collecting lawsuit to grind to
a halt.” Id. at 296. While making clear that Congress did
not intend to “create a [] broad[] exception[] for all litigating
attorneys” in the FDCPA, the Court explained that it is not
necessary to read “ordinary court-related document[s]” as
violating the FDCPA. See id. at 296–97. Nevertheless, the
FDCPA “applies to attorneys who ‘regularly’ engage in
consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that activity
16              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

consists of litigation.” Id. at 299. 7 In short, some litigation
acts may constitute independent FDCPA violations;
otherwise, debt collectors could commit unlimited FDCPA
violations after commencing an improper debt collection
action.
     We have considered FDCPA claims related to debt
collection lawsuits in two prior cases. In Naas v. Stolman,
130 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 1997), we noted that we had never
before “determined at which point the statute of limitations
begins to run when the alleged violation of the Act is the
filing of a lawsuit.” Id. at 893. We concluded that an
FDCPA violation occurred when a debt collector filed an
allegedly improper debt collection lawsuit, not when the
lawsuit was decided. Id. To so conclude, we considered that
“[f]iling a complaint is the debt collector’s last opportunity
to comply with the Act, and the filing date is easily
ascertainable.” Id.; see also id. (discussing the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Mattson, 967 F.2d at 261, which relied
on these considerations to determine that an FDCPA
violation occurred when abusive debt collection letters were
mailed, but not received). The statute of limitations for the
FDCPA claim thus ran from the date the debt collection
lawsuit was filed. We had no reason to consider whether the
date of service affected this analysis.
   In McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger,
LLC, 637 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011), we held that certain post-

7
  This rule does not mean that lawyers can be found liable for any
missteps in the litigation process. Lawyers acting as debt collectors
“may not be held liable if [they] ‘show[] by a preponderance of evidence
that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid any such error.’” Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295 (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(c)).
                 BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.                        17

filing litigation acts can constitute FDCPA violations. Id. at
951–52. In McCollough, the debt collector served requests
for admission that asked the debtor to admit facts that were
not true, even though the debt collector “had information in
its possession that demonstrated the untruthfulness of the
requested admissions.” Id. at 952. The debt collector also
did not explain to the debtor that “the requests would be
deemed admitted after thirty days.” Id. Because we
“consider the debt collector’s conduct from the standpoint of
the least sophisticated debtor,” we held that this conduct
violated the FDCPA as a matter of law. Id. By utilizing
abusive discovery procedures, the debt collector committed
an FDCPA violation through its litigation conduct. That
decision, however, did not directly address the statute of
limitations. 8
    To determine whether a litigation act constitutes an
independent violation of the FDCPA and thus has its own
statute of limitations, we now derive the following test from
Naas: When the alleged FDCPA violation is the bringing of
a debt collection lawsuit, we determine which actions
constitute independent FDCPA violations by considering (1)
the debt collector’s last opportunity to comply with the

8
  Our sister circuits have also held that mid-litigation acts can constitute
new FDCPA violations, but have done so without addressing statute of
limitations issues. See, e.g., Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d
226, 234 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that debtor properly alleged an FDCPA
violation based on the theory that “the summary judgment motion itself
contained false statements”); Bentrud v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia &
Vician, P.C., 794 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2015) (reviewing whether motion
for summary judgment violated the FDCPA); Miljkovic v. Shafritz &
Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[D]ocuments filed
in court in the course of judicial proceedings to collect on a debt, like [a]
sworn reply, are subject to the FDCPA.”).
18            BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

statute and (2) whether the date of the violation is easily
ascertainable. See 130 F.3d at 893.
     Under this test, if a debt collector decides to take a
certain action during litigation, courts must assess whether
that act was the debt collector’s “last opportunity to comply”
with the FDCPA. Examples of litigation-related acts that
could independently violate the FDCPA include a debt
collector serving a request for admission of facts it knows
are false or filing an affidavit containing new information it
knows to be false. See, e.g., McCollough, 637 F.3d at 652.
The debtor must, however, allege “specific actions” taken by
the debt-collector that show “more than another attempt to
argue that a violation arising from the filing of a debt-
collection suit continues as long as the suit remains
pending.” Gajewski v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 650 F. App’x
283, 287 (7th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied; see also
Bouye, 61 F.4th at 491 (quoting Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson &
Rothfuss, 587 F. App’x 249, 259 (6th Cir. 2014)) (“[T]he
violations that occur within the limitations window must be
discrete violations; they cannot be the later effects of an
earlier time-barred violation.”). Put simply, to plausibly
allege that a litigation act is a violation of the FDCPA, the
debtor must aver sufficient facts to show that the debt
collector’s act is a new violation of the FDCPA. Under our
newly formulated test, the focus appropriately remains on
the debt collector’s actions. There is a difference between
litigating a case and committing affirmative FDCPA
violations during that litigation.
     With this framework in mind, we turn to Brown’s claims.
                              2.
   We first consider Brown’s argument that several of
Defendants’ post-filing acts constituted independent
              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.               19

FDCPA violations. These include Patenaude mailing the
filed lawsuits and the affidavit to Brown on April 8, 2019;
Transworld submitting the Luke affidavit to replace the
Audet affidavit in the state court action on October 7, 2019;
and the state court hearing on October 24, 2019, including
statements made by Patenaude lawyers at that hearing.
    Two circuits have addressed mid-litigation acts and the
FDCPA’s statute of limitations. Both concluded that when
certain acts constitute independent violations of the FDCPA,
those acts will trigger their own one-year statutes of
limitations under § 1692k(d). In Demarais v. Gurstel
Chargo, P.A., 869 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2017), the Eighth
Circuit concluded that the debtor plausibly alleged an
FDCPA violation on the basis of a law firm’s request for a
continuance on the October 5, 2015 trial date. Id. at 695.
The law firm argued that the FDCPA claim was time-barred
because the request was simply a “permissible litigation
tactic” in the underlying debt collection lawsuit, which was
filed in June 2014, and the debtor filed the FDCPA claim
over a year later on February 5, 2016. Id. at 689–90. The
Eighth Circuit noted that not “every continuance request
violates the FDCPA.” Id. at 696. But the law firm had a
pattern of falsely threatening to proceed to trial, showing up
on the trial date with no witnesses or evidence, and—if the
debtor appeared with counsel—requesting a continuance.
See id. at 689–90. Litigation tactics are not insulated from
liability when they violate the FDCPA, id. at 696 (citing
Heintz, 514 U.S. at 296), and in Demarais, the debtor had
plausibly alleged that the law firm had threatened to take
action that it did not intend to take in violation of § 1692e(5),
id. at 695. In so holding, the Eighth Circuit explained that
the district court improperly looked to whether the alleged
violation “relate[d] back” to the complaint. Id. at 694.
20           BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

Instead, the district court should have looked at the lawyer’s
actions at The October 5 trial and “determined whether [the
plaintiff] plausibly alleged that [the law firm] violated the
FDCPA on that date.” Id.
     The Sixth Circuit also recently decided that a mid-
litigation misrepresentation carried its own statute of
limitations, such that a debtor’s FDCPA claim based on that
act was not time-barred. The facts of that case are similar to
those presented here concerning the filing of the Luke
Affidavit. In Bouye v. Bruce, attorney James Bruce
represented Mariner Finance, LLC, an entity that had bought
debtor Zahra Bouye’s debt from Winner Furniture. 61 F.4th
at 487. After Bouye defaulted on her retail installment
contract (“RIC”), Bruce filed suit in state court on behalf of
Mariner on March 4, 2019. The RIC attached to the
complaint, however, did not establish that Winner had ever
properly transferred the debt to Mariner such that Mariner
had a right to sue on the debt. Id. at 487. On July 2, 2019,
Bruce supplemented the record with a second, updated RIC
that showed a Winner employee had authorized the transfer
of the debt to Mariner. Id. at 487–88. On March 19, 2020,
Bouye sued Bruce in federal court, alleging a violation of the
FDCPA based on the theory that “Bruce, on Mariner’s
behalf, doctored the RIC mid-litigation to make it look like
the debt assignment from Winner to Mariner was proper.”
Id. at 488. Bruce argued that Bouye’s claim was time-
barred, as she brought suit more than a year after the state
court lawsuit was filed.
    The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that
the alleged filing of a false RIC constituted a new FDCPA
violation. Id. at 491. By filing an updated RIC and moving
for summary judgment on that basis, Bruce made an
“affirmative[] misrepresent[ation] to the [c]ourt.” Id. The
             BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.              21

claim for that misrepresentation “would have started
accruing either [] when Mariner filed the second RIC, or . . .
when Mariner moved for summary judgment based on that
filing.” Id. (finding it unnecessary to decide which date
triggered the statute of limitations). The court explained that
FDCPA violations must be discrete instances, and the
replacement of the RIC was discrete from the initiation of
the lawsuit:

       Bouye’s single claim is independent of
       Mariner’s initial filing of the lawsuit—not a
       continuing effect of it—because it is a
       standalone FDCPA violation. This is not a
       case where Bruce simply “reaffirmed” the
       legitimacy of the state suit throughout the
       litigation. Rather, the allegation is that Bruce
       introduced an RIC with a false assignment of
       debt that occurred after the lawsuit was filed.
       If we were to only consider the date Mariner
       filed suit . . . without regard to subsequent
       FDCPA violations within that lawsuit, we
       would create a rule that disregards the fact
       that § 1692k(d) creates an independent
       statute of limitations for each violation of the
       FDCPA.

Id. at 493 (citing Slorp, 587 F. App’x at 259).
    We agree that when a debt collector commits an FDCPA
violation that does more than “simply reaffirm[] the
legitimacy of the state suit,” id. (internal quotation marks
omitted), that new violation can constitute a “last
opportunity to comply” with the FDCPA, see Naas, 130 F.3d
at 893. Assuming the date of that action is easily
22           BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

ascertainable, id., it may form the basis of a new FDCPA
violation. Whether a lawyer appropriately litigates a case or
engages in conduct that violates the FDCPA is a fact-
intensive inquiry that requires a case-by-case approach. See
Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A., 674 F.3d 814, 819
(8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he diverse situations in which potential
FDCPA claims may arise during the course of litigation, and
the Supreme Court’s caution in Heintz . . . counsel against
anything other than a case-by-case approach.”).
     In this case, we conclude that Brown has alleged one
post-filing FDCPA violation: the filing of the Luke
Affidavit. By filing a new affidavit that attempted to show
that the Trusts owned the debts, Defendants did more than
“reaffirm” the original complaint. Rather, they presented a
new basis—not contained in the complaint—to show that the
Trusts owned the debts. When Defendants ceased to rely on
the Audet Affidavit and moved forward with the Luke
Affidavit, this discrete event created a “last opportunity to
comply” with the FDCPA. See Naas, 130 F.3d at 893. The
filing date is also easily ascertainable. See id. While Brown
has thus alleged a violation, we do not address the merits of
his claim.
    Brown’s remaining alleged violations, which include the
mailing of the lawsuits and arguments made at the state court
summary judgment hearing, are standard litigation events
that reasonably follow the commencement of a lawsuit.
They do not constitute final opportunities to comply with the
FDCPA and therefore are not independent FDCPA
violations.
                             3.
    Our analysis, however, does not end there. As other
circuits have explained, there is no “continuing violation
                BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.                       23

doctrine” in the FDCPA context, which would allow
plaintiffs to “sweep in a series of component acts that
comprise a claim, if one of those acts was within the
limitations period.” Bouye, 61 F.4th at 493. Rather, “the
only kinds of claims a plaintiff can bring are discrete
violations of the FDCPA.” Id. Thus, finding that the Luke
Affidavit is an independent violation does not allow Brown
to include actions before October 7, 2019, the date on which
the Luke Affidavit was filed, in his FDCPA claim. But
Brown also argues that Defendants committed an
independent FDCPA violation on April 5, 2019, when they
filed the complaints, even though they had previously served
him with the complaints. This argument requires us to
consider the distinction between service and filing.
     Only the Tenth Circuit appears to have considered this
issue head on. In Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107 (10th
Cir. 2002), the court held that when service occurs after the
filing of a debt collection lawsuit (the reverse of our situation
here), the statute of limitations to bring an FDCPA claim
runs from service, not from filing. 9 Id. at 1113. The Tenth
Circuit held that “the plaintiff does not have a ‘complete and

9
  Other circuits have interpreted Naas and Johnson as reaching opposite
conclusions. “Where FDCPA claims are premised upon allegations of
improper pursuit of debt collection litigation, courts are split as to when
the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations begins to run: some have
held that such claims accrue upon filing the underlying collection action,
[citing Naas], while others use the date on which the purported debtor
was served with the complaint [citing Johnson].” Schaffhauser v.
Citibank, 340 F. App’x 128, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding it
unnecessary to reach the issue); accord Ruth v. Unifund CCR Partners,
604 F.3d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 2010) (same). There is no conflict between
these two cases. We had no reason to consider the difference between
service and filing in Naas, as it made no difference to the overall
timeliness of the plaintiff’s suit.
24            BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

present cause of action,’ and thus no violation occurs within
the meaning of § 1692k(d),” until both filing and service
have occurred. Id. at 1113 (quoting Bay Area Laundry &
Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S.
192, 201 (1997)). The court explained that if a debt collector
files a suit but then “elects to call off the process server and
abandon the collection suit before the plaintiff has been
served,” id. at 113–14, the abandoned lawsuit does not
constitute an “attempt to collect” the debt under the FDCPA,
id. at 114. “[T]he fact that a party that has committed half
an actionable wrong is likely to commit the other half cannot
suffice to create a complete and present cause of action.” Id.
     At least as it applies to the facts here, we reject the
Johnson court’s two-halves-make-a-whole approach.
Accord Tyler v. DH Capital Mgmt., 736 F.3d 455, 463–64
(6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting Johnson’s approach and holding
that filing alone may constitute an FDCPA violation). When
service occurs first, Johnson’s reasoning does not make
sense. See 305 F.3d at 113–14. Service alone can be a
violation of the FDCPA, as it is the exact kind of threatening
action Congress intended to prohibit. Indeed, it is clearly
barred by § 1692e(5), which lists as a violation of the
FDCPA “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally
be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” If a debt
collector serves a debtor with no intention of filing the
complaint, the debt collector is clearly threatening legal
action in violation of the FDCPA. Because service does not
require the payment of filing fees, it is not hard to imagine a
debt collector engaging in abusive service practices to coerce
alleged debtors into payment. But filing may also constitute
an independent violation of the FDCPA, especially because
it can cause additional harm to the debtor. A pending legal
action “could be a red flag to the debtor’s other creditors and
              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.               25

anyone who runs a background or credit check, including
landlords and employers.” Tyler, 736 F.3d at 464. The
debtor may thus have additional FDCPA claims under §
1692e and § 1692f once the lawsuit is filed.
    Applying our newly derived test here, we hold that when
service occurs before filing, filing constitutes an independent
violation of the FDCPA. Under the first factor of the test,
service is not a debt collector’s “last opportunity to comply”
with many FDCPA prohibitions. See Naas, 130 F.3d at 893.
Because filing requires an additional act that can cause new
harm to the debtor, filing is the debt collector’s last
opportunity to comply. This test correctly places the onus
on debt collectors to analyze their actions to make sure they
comply with the FDCPA. See Mattson, 967 F.2d at 261
(explaining that Congress intended to protect consumers by
“regulating the conduct of debt collectors” (citing 15 U.S.C.
§1692(e)); Tyler, 736 F.3d at 464 (“[T]he focus should be on
the debt collector’s actions.”). Filing is not merely
“doubling down” on the initial act of service; it requires an
affirmative step forward. After serving a complaint, a debt
collector could learn new information about the validity of
the case or decide against filing for any number of reasons.
Thus, while service alone can constitute an FDCPA
violation, the final step of filing presents a “last opportunity”
to comply with the FDCPA when the alleged violation is the
bringing of a knowingly meritless lawsuit. See Naas, 130
F.3d at 893. And as to the second factor, the filing date is
easily ascertainable. See id.
    Because we conclude that service and filing are
independent FDCPA violations, each act has its own one-
year statute of limitations under § 1692k(d). Thus, Brown
had one year from the date of filing of the state court action
26              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

to bring his FDCPA claim, and his lawsuit is timely. 10 We
reverse the district court’s dismissal of Count I. Because
Count I survives, we also reverse and remand Brown’s
Count II claim for declaratory and injunctive relief for
consideration consistent with this opinion.
                                  C.
    Finally, Brown argues that because the state court found
that the Trusts lacked admissible evidence to demonstrate
ownership of the debt, we must give “full faith and credit”
to that decision by directing judgment for Brown on his
FDCPA claim. This argument fails. The state court found
that Defendants failed to present sufficient evidence to show
that they owned the debts, but did not address the issue in
this case: whether Defendants knowingly brought a meritless
lawsuit in violation of the FDCPA. The Supreme Court has
explicitly said that it does “not see how the fact that a [debt-
collection] lawsuit turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful
could, by itself, make the bringing of it an ‘action that cannot
legally be taken.’” Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295–96 (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1692e(5)). While the state court’s decision could
possibly be evidence in support of Brown’s FDCPA claim,
this lawsuit does not in any way “relitigate” the issues in the

10
   Transworld and Patenaude also argue that certain alleged violations,
such as filing, are not actionable because they were directed at Brown’s
counsel, not Brown. This position is plainly wrong. See, e.g., Sayyed,
485 F.3d at 232 (“A communication to debtor’s counsel, regarding a debt
collection lawsuit in which counsel is representing the debtor, plainly
qualifies as an indirect communication to the debtor.”); Demarais, 869
F.3d at 692 (recognizing that discovery requests could constitute FDCPA
violations even though they were sent “directly” to plaintiff’s counsel);
Miljkovic, 791 F.3d at 1300 (“[W]e find it impossible to conclude, under
the plain language of the FDCPA, that a debt collector’s communications
to an attorney representing a consumer are not covered by the Act.”).
              BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.               27

state court action. See Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d
1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998).
  AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and
REMANDED.
    The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
    I agree with the outcome and much of the reasoning of
the majority opinion, but I write separately because the rule
announced in Part III.B.3 of the majority’s opinion—
“hold[ing] that when service occurs before filing, filing
constitutes an independent violation of the FDCPA”—is an
unnecessary conclusion that carries our circuit into the
unknown without anticipating the intricacies future cases are
bound to raise.
     First, the rule is unnecessary. In this case, the limitation
periods began when the trusts filed the affidavits of Jennifer
Audet and Bradley Luke on April 5, 2019, and October 7,
2019, respectively. Those periods ended on April 6, 2020,
and October 7, 2020, respectively. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(c). Brown timely filed his complaint
on April 6, 2020, alleging that the trusts had knowingly filed
meritless debt collection suits. If those affidavits knowingly
misrepresented that the trusts owned Brown’s loan debt, the
filing of each affidavit constituted a discrete violation of the
FDCPA and marked the last opportunity to not violate the
FDCPA with respect to that affidavit. See Naas v. Stolman,
130 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997). Since I agree with the
majority that the filing of an allegedly false affidavit triggers
the limitations period for the FDCPA, see Bouye v. Bruce,
28           BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

61 F.4th 485, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2023), the concurrent filing
of Jennifer Audet’s affidavit with the trusts’ complaints
makes it unnecessary to decide (as the majority nonetheless
does) whether complaints filed after service independently
violate the FDCPA. Since Brown’s claim that the trusts filed
knowingly meritless collection suits was raised within one
year of the underlying affidavits, it is gilding the lily to
decide whether the trusts’ complaints also triggered the
FDCPA’s limitations period.
     Second, it’s a much harder question whether the filing of
a complaint after service constitutes an independently
wrongful act under the FDCPA for purposes of calculating a
new limitations period, and I therefore hesitate to set down
new precedent in that regard when it’s unnecessary. A
comparative illustration will underscore the difficulty: In
instances where service of process post-dates the filing of a
complaint, it is hard to discern when an actionable wrong has
occurred because a debtor typically feels threatened at the
moment of service, not the moment of filing. Debtors are
often unaware of a collection suit that has been filed until
service is rendered. In such situations, it is arguable that an
adverse action has not been consummated until the date of
service. Indeed, that’s what the Tenth Circuit decided in
Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 2002).
The Johnson court decided that service rendered after filing
was an indispensable “half” of an “actionable wrong,” and
only with service did the limitations period begin to run on
the whole action. Id. That has some intuitive appeal. After
all, a filed complaint might be abandoned before a debtor is
haled into court. When that happens, the harm arguably
never reaches fruition.
   But where, as here, service pre-dates the filing of a
complaint, a debtor receives the threat of legal action first.
             BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.             29

So it is hard to see how filing a complaint after service is
sufficiently distinguishable from other downstream
litigation activities that do not constitute separate adverse
actions. See, e.g., Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296
(1995) (noting it would be odd to interpret the FDCPA as
allowing an “ordinary court-related document” or
communication “inherent in an ordinary lawsuit” to cause
“an ordinary debt-collecting lawsuit to grind to a halt”). The
majority appears to recognize this difficulty and suggests
that “filing may also constitute an independent violation of
the FDCPA” because it “can cause additional harm to the
debtor” and “could be a red flag” for a debtor’s credit score.
(Emphasis added.) But such indeterminate consequences do
not merit the majority’s unconditional holding that, in all
instances “when service occurs before filing, filing
constitutes an independent violation of the FDCPA.” It is
far from certain that the post-service filing of a complaint
constitutes an independently actionable wrong, nor does
Brown assert that the trusts’ complaints harmed his credit.
By contrast, Brown does assert that the affidavits were
knowingly false.
     Third, to the extent the majority views the post-service
filing of a complaint as a debt collector’s “last opportunity
to comply with” the FDCPA, that is a strained reading of
Naas, 130 F.3d at 893. See Johnson, 305 F.3d at 1114 n.4
(“[T]he choice between accrual upon filing and accrual upon
service was not before the court in Naas.”). Pre-filing
service of a meritless complaint already constitutes a failure
to comply with the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). So
the term “last opportunity to comply” can’t really mean the
last opportunity to rectify a previous wrong or to reverse
prior non-compliance. Otherwise, every litigation action
would constitute another “last opportunity to comply,” since
30            BROWN V. TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS, INC.

every such action marks a missed opportunity to turn back
and cease from litigating an improper debt-collection action.
Instead, the phrase obviously meant something more like the
“last clear chance to avoid” the discrete commission of a
different FDCPA violation. Here, that discrete misstep was
clearly the service of process, not the subsequent filing of the
complaint.
    It may very well be that some meritless debt collection
complaints filed after service constitute actionable wrongs
under the FDCPA, but because that is a factually contingent
inquiry that should turn on the facts and allegations of each
case, I cannot endorse the majority’s broader rule and
needlessly prejudge such future cases. Here, it is enough that
the filing dates of the affidavits show that the district court
erred in holding that Brown’s claim that the trusts knowingly
filed meritless collection suits was time-barred, and I
therefore respectfully concur in the judgment.