Court Opinion

ID: 9542527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:35:24.487913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:13.686407
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring: I concur in the court’s decision affirming the defendant’s convictions and sentence of death. I do not believe that it is necessary in this case, however, to consider the constitutionality of the aggravating circumstance provided by section 9 — l(bX7) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — l(bX7)), and therefore I do not join that part of the majority’s opinion. The sentencing hearing in this case was conducted by the trial judge alone, the defendant having waived his right to a jury for that purpose. In the first stage of the proceeding, the trial judge found the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances rendering the defendant eligible for the death penalty: that the defendant had been convicted of murdering two or more persons (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)(3)), and that the defendant’s strangulation murder of his 11-year-old brother Scott was exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)(7)). The parties then proceeded to submit evidence in aggravation and mitigation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty and accordingly sentenced the defendant to death. Although the defendant raises a number of arguments against his death sentence, he has made no challenge, in either the circuit court or this court, to the trial judge’s findings regarding the existence of the two statutory aggravating circumstances. Nonetheless, the majority considers on its own motion the constitutionality of section 9 — 1(b)(7), which provided the second statutory aggravating circumstance found by the trial judge in this case. The majority states that its inquiry is prompted by the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Maynard v. Cartwright (1988), 486 U.S. 356, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372, 108 S. Ct. 1853. In Maynard the Court considered a provision in Oklahoma’s capital sentencing law permitting the imposition of the death penalty in cases in which the murder was “exceptionally heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” {Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 378, 108 S. Ct. at 1856.) The Court noted, as a requirement of a constitutionally valid system of capital sentencing, that the sentencer’s discretion be channeled and limited so that “the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action” can be reduced. {Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 380, 108 S. Ct. at 1858.) Relying on Godfrey v. Georgia (1980), 446 U.S. 420, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398, 100 S. Ct. 1759, which ruled that a similar statutory aggravating circumstance had been applied in an unconstitutional manner by a jury, the Maynard Court held that the language of the Oklahoma statute was vague and failed to provide sufficient guidance to the sentencing authority. The aggravating circumstance at issue here permits the imposition of the death penalty if “the murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.” (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — l(bX7).) The majority notes the similarity between the language used in section 9 — 1(b)(7) and the language used in the Oklahoma statute. The majority believes, however, that the Illinois provision is “much more specific in describing the conduct which qualifies an accused for the death penalty than the Oklahoma statute which was considered in Maynard, and not susceptible to arbitrary application when the requirements of the statute are strictly followed.” (128 111. 2d at 140.) Relying on the autoptic evidence presented at trial, the majority concludes that the circuit judge did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in applying section 9 — 1(b)(7) to the defendant’s murder of the 11-year-old victim. Unlike the majority, I see no reason to determine in this appeal the appropriate construction to be given to the “exceptionally brutal or heinous” aggravating circumstance provided by section 9 — 1(b)(7). Even if we were to assume that the “exceptionally brutal or heinous” aggravating circumstance was applied unconstitutionaUy in this case — and I express no opinion on that question — the defendant would not be entitled to a new sentencing hearing. (See Barclay v. Florida (1983), 463 U.S. 939. 956-58. 77 L. Ed. 2d 1134. 1148-49. 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3428-29 (plurality opinion); Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862, 880-90, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 252-58, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2744-50.) Here, the trial judge expressly found the existence of an additional statutory aggravating circumstance, the multiple-murder provision of section 9 — l(bX3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — l(bX3)), which independently rendered the defendant eligible for the death penalty. Moreover, the trial judge’s finding of the existence of the separate aggravating circumstance under section 9— 1(b)(7) did not introduce any otherwise inadmissible evidence into the sentencing process. Having found in the first stage of the capital sentencing proceeding the existence of an independent and uncontested circumstance that rendered the defendant eligible for the death penalty, the trial judge was free to consider, at the second stage of the proceeding, the circumstances of the defendant’s offenses. The Illinois death penalty statute does not accord any added significance to the existence of multiple statutory aggravating circumstances. Therefore, in light of the admissibility of the evidence on which the sentence was based, it cannot be said that the trial judge’s finding of the existence of a second statutory aggravating circumstance, under section 9 — l(bX7), could have prejudiced the rights of the defendant. People v. Brownell (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 508, is not to the contrary. The defendant in that case was convicted of murder, aggravated kidnapping, and rape. In a bench proceeding, the trial judge found the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances rendering the defendant eligible for the death penalty: that the victim was killed in the course of the commission of a felony, and that the victim was an eyewitness against the defendant (see 111. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 9— l(bX6), (bX7)). Following a consideration of the aggravating and mitigating evidence, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death for the murder conviction; sentences of imprisonment were imposed for the convictions for aggravated kidnapping and rape. On appeal, the Brownell court held that the first aggravating circumstance was applicable to the facts in that case but that the second circumstance was not. Referring to the trial judge’s use of the “murdered eyewitness” aggravating circumstance, this court stated: “The court appears to have made the finding that the victim was an eyewitness upon the evidence adduced at trial — that the victim, as the subject of the aggravated kidnapping and rape, could have later testified against the defendant. We do not think this particular factual situation was intended by the General Assembly to be included within this aggravating factor. Rather, we think the General Assembly intended to include situations where, during an investigation or prosecution of a separate offense which has previously taken place, a witness is killed in an attempt to stymie the investigation or prosecution.” Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d at 525-26. This court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentences of imprisonment but vacated the defendant’s death sentence and remanded the cause for a new capital sentencing hearing. The court explained: “The partial resentencing hearing'is essential because of the profound importance we attach to the trial court’s role in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. In this instance, the trial court weighed an aggravating factor which we have concluded figured erroneously in the court’s sentencing decision. We have now removed that factor from the scale. Whether the scale will remain stable or will tip as a result of our conclusion is initially for the trial court to determine. For us either to affirm or reverse the trial court’s sentence, without providing the trial court an opportunity to resentence in light of our conclusion of law, would usurp the trial court’s function as the sentencing authority.” Brownell, 79 111. 2d at 535-36. In Brownell the sentencing judge construed the defendant’s conduct as giving rise to an aggravating circumstance that was not actually warranted by the evidence. Thus, the trial judge’s finding of the existence of the “murdered eyewitness” circumstance introduced into the case, and therefore into his sentencing determination, factual matters that should not have been considered. The present case is different, for even a declaration of the invalidity of the “exceptionally brutal or heinous” aggravating circumstance found in section 9— l(bX7) of the Criminal Code would not preclude the sentencing judge from considering the evidence of the manner in which the defendant committed the murder of his 11-year-old brother. JUSTICE STA.MOS joins in this special concurrence.