Court Opinion

ID: 9829299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:10:12.106547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:59.614744
License: Public Domain

Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
 Upon a further consideration of the question involved in this case, we have con-*688eluded that we erred in our disposition of the -cause upon original hearing. We have concluded that plaintiffs below and appellants here did allege facts showing the creation of a cotenancy between them and defendants created by the same act of law. When Lucinda P. Wiggins died, leaving the property in controversy, by the same act of law the plaintiffs acquired the legal title in the remainder therein, and their father, B. P. Wiggins, acquired a life estate therein; thus they become cotenants. When W. B. Richardson purchased the life interest in the land involved, he in turn became a cotenant with plaintiffs. He did not acquire by such purchase any title to the fee in the land, but merely the rights of occupancy during thg life of B. P. Wiggins. Therefore, under Roberts v. Thorn, supra, Richardson, father of defendants below, and plaintiffs be carné by the same act o£ law cotenants. If so, Richardson was under obligation to do no act either of commission or omission which would destroy the remainderman’s title. If he caused the forfeiture by the state for the nonpayment of interest, or fraudulently permitted said forfeiture to occur for the purpose of buying it again from the state, the plaintiffs, as cotenants, would have the right, upon payment of the amounts paid out on their behalf by Richardson to the state, to have their title to the property established. The possession of a life tenant, or of his as-signee, cannot be adverse to the holder of the legal title in remainder. 17 R. C. L. p. 643, § 33. A life tenant is under obligation to preserve the estate and to pay off the interest on existing incumbrances. 17 R. C. L. p. 639, § 29. It is a general rule that, if hfe-is compelled to pay the principal sum of the debt, he is entitled to reimbursement or contribution from the reversioner or remainder-man. One tenant in common will not be permitted to inequitably acquire title to the common property, solely for his own benefit or to the exclusion of his cotenantsthe general rule being that the purchase or ex-tinguishment of an outstanding title to an ifi-cumbrance upon, or a claim against, the common property, by one tenant in common inures to the benefit of all the co-owners (Rippetoe v. Dwyer, 49 Tex. 498; Anderson v. Clanch [Tex. Sup.] 6 S. W. 760; 38 Cyc. 41), who may, within a reasonable time, elect to avail themselves of the benefit of the purchase of the outstanding interest or conflicting claim, or the removal of the incumbrance from the common property (38 Cyc. 41, 42; Niday v. Cochran, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 292, 93 S. W. 1027; McFarlin v. Leaman [Tex. Civ. App.] 29 S. W. 44). Similarly, if by any fraudulent means the title to the common property is taken by one of the cotenants, he, upon timely complaint, by one or more of the injured persons, will be declared to hold the title thereto as trustee for their benefit (38 Cyc. 42; Clevenger v. Mayfield [Tex. Civ. App.] 86 S. W. 1062).
Upon the whole, we now think the original petition of plaintiffs was not subject to a general demurrer, and that the trial court erred in so holding. The motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment below will be reversed, and the cause remanded, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.