Court Opinion

ID: 9757337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:34:13.414246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:38.287613
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
I concur in the majority’s disposition because I believe that the appellant has shown a sufficient degree of possible prejudice as to warrant a new trial. However, while I agree that the practice of trial judges in communicating with a jury ex parte should be discouraged, I am unable to agree with the majority’s course of action, the adoption of a prophylactic rule.
In the instant case the jury’s task was to determine whether the appellee had breached his contract, not to allocate blame. The jury’s note to the trial judge stating that they “feel both parties are at fault and each should share the loss” indicates their complete confusion as to the legal issues involved. Under such circumstances, the failure to give additional in*571stractions, or at least to inform counsel of the confusion, constituted prejudicial error. Cf. Worthington v. Oberhuber, 419 Pa. 561, 215 A. 2d 621 (1966).
We have frequently stated that “ ¿a proper administration of justice requires that new trials be not granted on errors which counsel had ample opportunity to correct. . . .’” Segriff v. Johnston, 402 Pa. 109, 113, 166 A. 2d 496, 499 (1960); see Lobalzo v. Varoli, 422 Pa. 5, 220 A. 2d 634 (1966); Hill v. Gerheim, 419 Pa. 349, 214 A. 2d 240 (1965). Since, in the situation encompassed by this case, counsel was not afforded an opportunity to correct the error, the holdings of the above cases are not controlling. However, their reasoning, in part founded on the belief that a party should not be permitted to impose extensive litigation on his adversary and our already overburdened trial courts without a showing of fundamental error or incurable prejudice, should lead this Court away from the strict stance taken by the majority.
I have previously stated that I heartily approve of the grant of a new trial in any case where justice requires it. See Lobalzo v. Varoli, 422 Pa. 5, 8, 220 A. 2d 634, 636 (1966) (concurring opinion). Thus, when error is committed during the course of a trial, which counsel could not have corrected, there is a presumption that the error is prejudicial. But this presumption need not be irrebuttable; opposing counsel should be permitted an opportunity to show that the error was harmless.
This does not mean that there are not occasions when per se rules are warranted. A prime example of the necessity for such rules is in the area of criminal procedure, where the accusatorial system, the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial, and the presumption of innocence, combine to admonish an appellate court not to substitute its belief of guilt, however justified it may seem to us on the record, for the independent *572ascertainment by a jury. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S. Ct. 1628 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S. Ct. 1417 (1963). Or a prophylactic rule may be in order where the goal is to deter undesirable and potentially dangerous conduct. Of. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 383 U.S. 903, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
However, I see nothing to be gained from adopting a prophylactic rule in the instant situation. The reason for prohibiting a trial judge from communicating with a jury ex parte is to prevent the court from unduly influencing the jury and to afford counsel an opportunity to become aware and to seek to correct any error which might occur. Where there is no showing either that the court’s action may have influenced the jury or that its directions were erroneous, then the reason for the rule dissolves.
Trial judges are rarely afforded the luxury of time given to the appellate bench to carefully consider and reconsider each decision they make during the course of a trial. Thus, I do not think it is necessary to reprimand a trial judge for making a perfectly understandable mistake provided that no one is prejudiced thereby. By imposing a per se rule, the loss falls upon the successful party below, who in all probability will prevail on retrial, although he will have been forced to expend additional time and money, and on other litigants whose cases will be delayed because of the addition to trial court backlog.
Thus, I see no justification and much mischief from the majority’s rule and I am unable to lend my approval.