Court Opinion

ID: 9583513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:39:25.262958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:03.385292
License: Public Domain

CARL B. JONES, Presiding Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent.
The Court’s opinion states that Don Garri-gan could deduce no change in the property in the spring of 1987 other than the gas company’s recent work to install a new gas line to the house then listed for sale through *1207Flair Agency, Inc. The Court also acknowledges the uncontroverted evidence that Gar-rigan had no way of knowing whether the water intrusion previously discovered in the house had been caused by a problem with the foundation unless there was some excavation of the soil around the foundation, or exploration of the sheetroek on the interior of the affected lower level of the house.
Yet, according to the evidence accepted by the jury, Garrigan proceeded to tell the Ec-kerts that the water found in the house in .1987 came to be there because the gas company had dug a trench to install the new gas line, and he even went so far as to offer an explanation of how the water came down the trench and then entered the lower floor of the house. He did not pass this explanation along from some other ostensibly authoritative source; he offered it as an original, affirmative statement of fact. Clearly, the statement was false; the statement was material; and Garrigan intended the Eckerts to rely upon it. They did in fact rely upon Garrigan’s statement (and his assurance that the French drain work had corrected this “one-time” problem), to their eventual detriment. This is the textbook definition of fraud. 76 O.S.1991 § 3(2); see Dawson v. Tindell, 733 P.2d 407, 408 (Okla.1987).
The Court seeks to justify reversal by saying that Garrigan’s statements were “not unreasonable,” apparently because he had no reason to suspect that he was not speaking the truth. In my view, under the circumstances of this case, the Court has turned the law of fraud on its head. Garrigan’s explanation and assurance communicated to the Ec-kerts were fraudulent precisely because he had no reason to know whether what he was saying was true or false, but nonetheless tried to explain (and so dismiss) the previous water problem.
In an action at law tried to a jury, the appellate court on review must accept the jury’s determination of disputed fact issues. The jury’s verdict is conclusive as to all disputed facts and all conflicting statements, including the credibility of witnesses and the effect and weight to be given to conflicting or inconsistent expert testimony. McCoy v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 841 P.2d 568, 570 and n. 5 (Okla.1992). These are not matters to be retried by appellate courts when there is evidence in the record to support the verdict. Holley v. Shepard, 744 P.2d 945, 947 (Okla.1987) (holding that Court of Appeals, by redetermining credibility of witnesses and assuming facts not supported by the evidence had so far departed from the proper standard of review as to call for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervisory power on certiorari).
I would affirm the judgment below on liability of Garrigan and the vicarious liability of Flair Agency, Inc., and on actual damages.1

. Beyond challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Appellants argue that the evidence of damages was unduly speculative and the trial court improperly allowed recovery of damages for emotional distress, and complain about the conduct of opposing counsel during examination of witnesses and closing argument. I would reject each of these grounds for reversal. I would, however, agree with Appellants that the matter of punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury, because, though his acts were fraudulent, there is no evidence that Garri-gan's acts were either actuated or accompanied by an evil intent, or were the result of such gross negligence or disregard of Appellees’ rights as may be deemed the equivalent to such intent. See Hamilton v. Amwar Petroleum Co., 769 P.2d 146, 149 (Okla.1989). I would therefore reverse only so much of the judgment as related to the award of punitive damages.