Court Opinion

ID: 9365056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 22:03:51.508387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:42.966685
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 200286-U

                                 Order filed January 20, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                       )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                        )      of the 21st Judicial Circuit,
                                                       )      Iroquois County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                       )      Appeal No. 3-20-0286
             v.                                        )      Circuit No. 19-CF-44
                                                       )
      JARED P. SUTHERLAND,                             )      Honorable
                                                       )      James B. Kinzer,
             Defendant-Appellant.                      )      Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Hettel and Peterson concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: Evidence at trial was sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt of criminal sexual
                  assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse beyond a reasonable doubt; the
                  mittimus correctly reflects the court’s findings.

¶2          The defendant, Jared P. Sutherland, appeals his convictions for criminal sexual assault

     and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, arguing the State failed to prove the age element of the

     charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant also argues that the court mistakenly
     entered an order finding him guilty of the incorrect count and requests, in the alternative, that the

     mittimus be amended to show the correct count.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4          The State charged the defendant by 10-count indictment with predatory criminal sexual

     assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)), criminal sexual assault (id. § 11-

     1.20(a)(3)), and eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (id. § 11-1.60(b), (c)(1), (d)).

     The charges were all related to the sexual abuse of four of the defendant’s family members.

¶1          At issue in this appeal are counts II, III, and IV. Count II of the indictment charged the

     defendant with criminal sexual assault in that, between 2002 and 2008, the defendant

     “committed an act of sexual penetration with K.T., who was a family member under 18 years of

     age, in that the defendant placed his penis in the anus of K.T.” Count III charged the defendant

     with aggravated criminal sexual abuse in that, between 2002 and 2008, the defendant

     “committed an act of sexual conduct with K.T., who was a family member under 18 years of age,

     in that the defendant placed his hands and mouth on the penis of K.T.” Count IV charged the

     defendant with aggravated criminal sexual abuse in that, between 2002 and 2005, the defendant,

     “who was 17 years of age or older, knowingly committed the act of sexual conduct with K.T.,

     who was under 13 years of age, in that said defendant placed his hands and mouth on the penis of

     K.T. for the purpose of sexual arousal of the defendant.”

¶2          The defendant waived a jury and proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, K.T. testified that

     the defendant was his maternal uncle and served as a caretaker for K.T. and his younger brother

     when they were children. K.T. was born in August 1992. K.T. described sexual encounters with

     the defendant at five different residences while the defendant cared for him. K.T. testified that

     the incidents began when he was 7 or 8 years old and continued until he was 15 or 16.

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¶3          K.T. testified that the defendant lived in a trailer in Donovan (Donovan house) between

     2007 and 2009, when K.T. would have been 15 or 16 years old. The defendant’s three children

     would have been under five years old. K.T. testified regarding incidents at the Donovan house

     where the defendant would stroke K.T.’s penis and force K.T. to stroke the defendant’s penis.

     There were also incidents where the defendant forced K.T. to perform oral sex. K.T. also

     described occasions where the defendant would place his penis in K.T.’s anus and K.T. placed

     his penis in the defendant’s anus.

¶4          At the close of the State’s case, it dismissed counts VI and VII.

¶5          During the defendant’s case-in-chief, the court took judicial notice of petitions to

     establish custody from a family law case involving the defendant’s children. These documents

     showed that the defendant’s children were born in March 2006, July 2008, and September 2009.

¶6          The defendant denied abusing K.T. and stated that K.T. made up the accusations because

     K.T. blamed the defendant for his younger brother becoming a ward of the State. The defendant

     also testified that he moved into the Donovan house in late 2010. K.T. lived with the defendant

     there for a brief period in 2011, after he turned 18 years old. The defendant supported his

     testimony by producing the property deed, showing the purchase date in September 2010.

¶7          The court found

                    “[T]he State proved by a beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof the rectal

                    intercourse allegation in Count 2 with respect to [K.T.], the digital fondling in

                    Count 3 and the digital fondling in Count 5. And I find that the ages there were

                    consistent with [K.T.]’s testimony. I know [the defendant] was careful to make

                    sure that his allegation with respect to the Donovan house was that [K.T.] would

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                      have been over 18 at that point, but [K.T.] testified that he was under I think he

                      said 15 or 16 when this rectal intercourse event occurred.

                              *** I find [the defendant] guilty of Count 2, guilty of Count 4, guilty of

                      Count 5 and guilty of Count 9 and not guilty of Count 8 and not guilty of Count

                      3.”

       The parties asked for confirmation that the court found the defendant guilty on count IV and not

       count III, which the court confirmed.

¶8             At sentencing, the court stated that the defendant had been found guilty of counts II, III,

       V, and IX. The court sentenced the defendant to seven years’ imprisonment for count II, to be

       served consecutively with three concurrent terms of three years’ imprisonment for counts III, V,

       and IX. The written order lists the sentencing decisions for counts II, III, V, and IX. The

       defendant appeals.

¶9                                                II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10                                     A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 11           The defendant raises two sufficiency of the evidence issues. In a challenge to the

       sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

       essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL

       111056, ¶ 31; People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). In making this determination, we

       review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056,

       ¶ 31.

¶ 12           It is not the purpose of a reviewing court to retry a defendant. People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d

       150, 178 (2004). Instead, great deference is given to the trier of fact. See, e.g., People v. Saxon,

       374 Ill. App. 3d 409, 416-17 (2007). All reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the

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       prosecution will be allowed. People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 326 (2005). “ ‘Where evidence is

       presented and such evidence is capable of producing conflicting inferences, it is best left to the

       trier of fact for proper resolution.’ ” Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 416 (quoting People v. McDonald,

       168 Ill. 2d 420, 447 (1995)). The trier of fact is not required to accept or otherwise seek out any

       explanations of the evidence that are consistent with a defendant’s innocence; nor is the trier of

       fact required to disregard any inferences that flow from the evidence. People v. Sutherland, 223

       Ill. 2d 187, 233 (2006); see also Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 416-17. “[T]he testimony of a single

       witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to convict, even though it is contradicted by the

       defendant.” People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009). “A conviction will be reversed

       only where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a

       reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67.

¶ 13                                               1. Count II

¶ 14          The defendant contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

       doubt of criminal sexual assault because the evidence was insufficient to prove that K.T. was

       under 18 years old at the time of the incident.

¶ 15          As charged in count II, “[a] person commits criminal sexual assault if that person

       commits an act of sexual penetration and: *** is a family member of the victim, and the victim is

       under 18 years of age.” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3) (West 2018).

¶ 16          Here, K.T.’s testimony established that the defendant committed criminal sexual assault

       when, according to K.T., he was under 18 years old. Although the defendant’s testimony

       indicated that K.T. was over 18 years old when they lived together, this presented a credibility

       determination for the fact finder. From our review, the court reasonably resolved this factual

       question by finding that K.T.’s allegations and testimony were credible. Accordingly, we defer to

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       this credibility finding and conclude the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt of

       criminal sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 17                                              2. Count III

¶ 18          The defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for count

       III, aggravated criminal sexual abuse because, like his argument on the first issue, the State failed

       to prove K.T. was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense. Count III requires a showing

       that the defendant “commit[ed] an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is under 18 years of

       age and the person is a family member.” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(b) (West 2018). As found above,

       K.T.’s testimony sufficiently established that he was under 18 years old at the time of the

       charged offenses. Supra ¶ 16. In doing so, we reaffirm that questions of witness credibility are

       best left to the trier of fact who determined that these witnesses were credible. See Siguenza-

       Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228. Consistent with our holding for count II, we find the evidence proved

       beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations in count III.

¶ 19                                              B. Mittimus

¶ 20          The defendant asks this court to correct the mittimus to show a conviction for count IV

       instead of count III because the court erroneously entered a conviction on count IV after finding

       the defendant guilty of count III.

¶ 21          It is well-settled that “[i]t is the oral pronouncement of the judge which is the judgment of

       the court. The written order of commitment is merely evidence of the judgment of the court.

       [Citation.] When the oral pronouncement of the court and the written order are in conflict, the

       oral pronouncement of the court controls.” People v. Smith, 242 Ill. App. 3d 399, 402 (1993).

¶ 22          While the record shows there was confusion regarding which count the court intended to

       enter conviction on, it is clear that the court intended to enter judgment on count III. While the

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       court stated once that it found the defendant guilty of count IV, it subsequently stated, while

       explaining its verdict and at several court hearings afterwards, that the defendant was guilty of

       count III and not count IV. Thus, the court’s oral pronouncement ultimately established that it

       intended to find the defendant guilty of count III. Further, the court’s written sentencing order

       and the docket entry confirm that the court found the defendant guilty of count III.

¶ 23                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24          The judgment of the circuit court of Iroquois County is affirmed.

¶ 25          Affirmed.

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