Court Opinion

ID: 9755495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:39:33.341372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:07.993531
License: Public Domain

D IONALD L. CORBIN, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority that the evidence in this case was obtained illegally because the officers began their warrantless search before they even attempted to obtain consent. I write separately to emphasize my concern about “knock and talk” searches in general. Before this type of consent search became so fashionable, the police were forced to investigate anonymous or unreliable tips before they could attempt to seize evidence. For example, in this case, the police would have had to attempt a controlled drug buy from Appellant, using the services of a confidential informant or an undercover police officer. With the advent of “knock and talk” procedures, however, the police are free to dispense with actual police work and “cut to the chase” of seizing evidence. In my opinion, “knock and talk” procedures should be used only as an investigative tool, not as a complete substitute for investigation. Furthermore, I agree with the majority that this type of warrantless intrusion into a person’s home should only be permitted between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m., as provided in Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.2(c). If searches conducted pursuant to a warrant, based on a judge’s finding of probable cause, cannot be served after 8:00 p.m. unless the judge makes one of three specific findings, then “knock and talk” searches, based on even less than reasonable suspicion, likewise should be limited. Otherwise, officers will attempt to use the darkness of the night to their advantage, as they did here. It troubles me that the officers in this case intentionally snuck up on Appellant after dark, parking their cars far enough away so that the occupants of the house would not see them. Even more troubling is that the lead officer in this case, Officer Johnson, admitted that he made a conscious decision not to inform Appellant of his right to refuse consent. Pie explained that he was better off not offering any information because, on some occasions in the past, he has informed suspects of their right to refuse and they denied consent to search. In other words, Officer Johnson intentionally refrained from informing Appellant of his right to refuse because he was afraid that Appellant might actually invoke his right. On this issue, I agree with Justice BROWN that we should interpret the Arkansas Constitution as requiring that the right to refuse consent be explained before “knock and talk” searches will be upheld. BROWN and Hannah, JJ., join in this concurrence.