Court Opinion

ID: 9730066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:00:02.730023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:03.781136
License: Public Domain

GUSTAFSON, J.
I dissent.
The majority opinion quite correctly notes that the jury was not compelled to believe defendant when he said that he did not see plaintiff’s vehicle until he was only 100 to 130 feet away from it. But if the jury disbelieved defendant, this gives rise to no evidence as to when defendant actually saw plaintiff’s vehicle.
The majority opinion points out that plaintiff’s vehicle could have been seen by defendant 400 feet away and cites Brandelius v. City & County of San Francisco (1957) 47 Cal.2d 729 [306 P.2d 432] for the proposition that “Evidence that the defendant could plainly have seen the peril if he had looked is sufficient to support the necessary inference of knowledge.” (Italics added.) I do not read the cited case as standing for that proposition. On the contrary, it emphasizes time and time again that the defendant must have actual knowledge of plaintiff’s position of danger. It is in fact one of the anomalies of the last clear chance doctrine that the “driver who looks carefully and discovers the danger, and is then slow in applying his brakes, may be liable, while the one who does not look at all . . . may not.” (Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 443.)
*351I concede that in Brandelius the Supreme Court said that because there was evidence that “[defendant] had an unobstructed view of the situation for at least 135 feet,” the jury could have inferred that he had actual knowledge of the victim’s position of danger long before the point in time defendant claimed that he first saw the victim. Other cases cited in the majority opinion likewise emphasize the “unobstructed view” situation.
Were I free to do so, I would reject that principle. It is common human experience that of two persons with equally acute senses, one will feel something that the other does not, one will taste something that the other does not, one will smell something that the other does not, one will hear something that the other does not and one will see something that the other does not. That the other could have felt, tasted, smelled, heard or seen what the first did should not permit an inference that the other actually did. It is not too uncommon, for example, for a driver to run into the middle of a long train even though the day is clear, the warning bell is sounding and lights are flashing. The reason usually is that the driver is negligently inattentive. He may, for example, be looking at the floor of his vehicle for a dropped cigarette lighter and his radio may be playing loudly so that he neither sees nor hears what he could have seen and heard had he been acting prudently. But to equate what one could have done with what one actually did is, in my opinion, not logically justified.
I do not contend that the jury is bound by the testimony of the defendant. Evidence that a passenger shouted a warning to defendant about plaintiff’s position of danger or that defendant took action calculated to avoid the accident would permit an inference by the jury that defendant had actual knowledge of plaintiff’s position of danger even though defendant testifies to the contrary.
But accepting, as I must, the principle that mere opportunity to know permits an inference of actual knowledge, I do not believe that on the facts of this case there is substantial evidence of actual knowledge. Had the jury been instructed on the doctrine of last clear chance and had the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, we would have been required to determine whether there was “substantial evidence” supporting the verdict. That term “clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. Obviously the word [substantial] cannot be deemed synonymous with ‘any’ evidence. It must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.” (Estate of Teed (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638 [247 P.2d 54] quoted with approval in People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122 [70 Cal.Rptr. 193, 443 P.2d 777].)
Defendant was faced with one of the nightmares of freeway driving. To *352leave “number 2 lane” of the freeway and get on the Valley Vista off-ramp he was required to cross “number 3” and “number 4” lanes which were feeding traffic onto "‘number 2 lane” of the freeway. This dangerous maneuver requires great skill. Quite naturally defendant looked to his right to ascertain that he was not on a collision course with vehicles traveling in “number 3” and “number 4” lanes. The majority opinion, noting that defendant was still in the “number 2 lane” when he actually saw plaintiff’s car, questions why defendant’s car left the “number 2 lane” and began to cross the triangle where it collided with plaintiff’s car. I think there is no room for any question. Defendant had obviously started to turn toward the off-ramp (although his car was still within “number 2 lane”) and this action would have taken him across the triangle and across “number 3” and “number 4” lanes had plaintiff’s vehicle not been stalled in the triangle.
The majority opinion points out that if defendant had seen plaintiff’s vehicle when defendant was 400 feet from it, defendant “need only have continued to travel as he had been travelling in ‘number 2 lane’ in which case he would have avoided [plaintiff’s] car.” I think this is the very reason why there is no substantial evidence that defendant saw plaintiff’s car at that point in time. Not only would no reasonable man have turned after seeing plaintiff’s car, but no sane man would have done so. Unlike Brandelius (cable car versus pedestrian) and other cases, a collision here posed as much of a threat of personal injury or death to defendant as it did to plaintiff. To me an inference that defendant saw plaintiff 400 feet away is not “reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.”
Moreover, 'in each of the cases cited in the majority opinion holding that the jury was entitled to conclude that defendant “must have seen” the plaintiff earlier than defendant claimed, there was no evidence that defendant was looking, or had any reason to look, elsewhere than at plaintiff. Here, however, defendant had every reason to do what he said he did, that is, to look to his right to ascertain the traffic in the two lanes which he was about to cross. In this state of the evidence, it would be unreasonable for a jury to conclude that defendant “must have seen” plaintiff.
The majority opinion holds that even if defendant did not see plaintiff’s vehicle until defendant, as he testified, was from 100 to 130 feet from it, the jury could have found that defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. With this I also disagree. At the speed at which defendant was traveling, if he slammed on his brakes within three-fourths of a second, he would have traveled 60 feet. That he reacted immediately is demonstrated by the fact that he left 48 feet of skid marks. I believe that the majority opinion erroneously assumes that defendant, simply because his vehicle was in “number 2 lane” when he saw plaintiff’s vehicle, had not started to turn to cross the triangle. Thus the majority opinion states that “no action was *353required on [defendant’s] part to avoid the accident. [Defendant’s] last clear chance to avoid the collision consisted of his maintaining his course.” The turn necessary to leave “number 2 lane” obviously had to be started while the vehicle was still in that lane. It is incredible to me that any trier of fact could find that defendant knew plaintiff’s position of danger, “turned his automobile so that it pointed at [plaintiff’s] stalled car” and simultaneously applied his brakes.
There is no point in analyzing each reported last clear chance case because the cases are irreconcilable. One case which deserves mention is Kaake v. Lott (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 895 [60 Cal.Rptr. 843], There the defendant motorist hit the plaintiff bicyclist after defendant became aware of plaintiff’s position of danger. While it was physically possible for defendant to have passed plaintiff on the left without hitting him, “defendant was given but seconds within which to make an election either to swerve left or turn right and apply her brakes in so doing.” Defendant chose the latter course and hit plaintiff. The trial judge instructed the jury on last clear chance and a verdict was returned for plaintiff. Then the trial judge ordered a judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict. The judgment was affirmed on appeal on the basis that defendant’s wrong choice of action was immaterial because “the doctrine of last clear chance never meant a splitting of seconds when emergencies arise.” The reason that case deserves mention is that this division of this court held that the trial judge erred in instructing on last clear chance and now the majority opinion tells the same trial judge that he erred in not instructing on that doctrine. When the majority opinion states that the jury could have found that defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident even though he had “only a second and one-half” within which to act, it is in direct conflict with cases such as Bell v. Huson (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 820 [4 Cal.Rptr. 716] holding as a matter of law that the doctrine is inapplicable when the defendant has only two seconds to act.
Finally, I am not of the opinion from “an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” that any error in failing to instruct on the doctrine of last clear chance “resulted in a miscarriage of justice” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13) because it is not reasonably probable that a verdict for the plaintiff would have been reached had the instruction been given. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [299 P.2d 243].)