Court Opinion

ID: 9628092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:07:14.264574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:44.799741
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, J.,
dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether damages for mental distress are recoverable in an action for interference with contractual relations. The majority hold that such damages may be recoverable. I agree that mental distress damages may, in some cases, be recoverable incident to a tort claim for interference with contractual relations, but I disagree with both the analysis contained in the majority opinion and with its holding.
*722As I read the majority opinion, mental distress damages are allowable once the tort of interference with contractual relations is proved, but limited as follows:
1. “The mental distress, injured reputation or other harm not only must have * * * resulted from defendant’s interference, it also must have been an injury of a kind that would have been expected as a common and predictable accompaniment of disrupting the type of relationship with which the defendant interfered” (majority opinion at 718).
2. Mental distress damages are limited to “* * * serious anxiety and frustration [which] are typical and predictable effects of disruptive interference in a business setting * * *. Recovery extends only to the mental or emotional distress involved in dealing with the disruption itself * * *. [Distress at personal consequences such as a sacrificed vacation, financial stringency, or family stresses would not [give rise to damages]” (majority opinion at 719-720).
The majority opinion specifically rejects any rule which turns on the degree of defendant’s culpability (majority opinion at 720), saying that there should be no consideration of “* * * the factor of defendant’s culpability” (majority opinion at 716). According to the majority opinion, once the tort of interference with contractual relations is made out— that is, a showing of intentional and improper interference with the performance of the contract between another and a third person — mental distress damages follow if they meet the criteria set forth above.
I disagree. I believe that before any recovery for damages for mental distress can be made incident to the tort of interference of contractual relations, the conduct of the tortfeasor must be either “malicious” or of the “outrageous” type which would support recovery of damages on the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In 1923 Francis Bowes Sayre wrote an article in the Harvard Law Review entitled “Inducing Breach of Contract,” 36 Harv L Rev 663 (1922-23). In that article he carefully traced the historical background of this tort. It appears that the tort had its genesis in claims for interference with the property of others. He pointed out that in *723early Roman law, the head of a Roman household was entitled to bring an action of his own “* * * for insult offered to him through injury to his wife, his children, or his slaves.” Id. at 663. In those days, wives as well as slaves were viewed as property of the head of the household.
In the thirteenth century, such a cause of action was recognized in England and in 1349 an additional remedy was created by statute, giving rise to liability for enticing another’s servants. This statute, the Ordinance of Labourers, was enacted in response to the agricultural crisis created by the Great Plague. Id. at 665-666.
In 1853, Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, extended the remedy, recognizing an action for damages for interference with contractual relations. Recovery was permitted on a claim by an empresario that the defendant had maliciously enticed and procured a singer, Miss Wagner, to refuse to perform for the plaintiff. On page 672 of the article, Mr. Sayre concluded that although Lumley v. Gye involved a claim of malicious interference, by the twentieth century the remedy was available for any intentional interference with a contract. He pointed out, at page 676, that malice, in the sense of an aim to harm the plaintiff, is no longer required and that the tort can be made out upon the intentional interference with the contract of another, with competition no longer a justification for appropriation of another’s property right in an existing contract. According to the Restatement (4 Restatement of Torts (Second) § 766), the tort is made out by showing that the defendant “intentionally and improperly [interfered] with the performance of a contract * * * between another and a third person.”
In some torts, “* * * if mental suffering is the direct and natural result of the [tort], the jury may properly consider mental distress as an element of damages.” Fredeen v. Stride, 269 Or 369, 372-373, 525 P2d 166 (1974) (action for damages for conversion of a dog). The concurring opinion of Tongue, J., reflects this point of view. He would allow damages for mental distress incident to a claim of intentional interference with contractual relations “* * * if they are reasonably expected to result from the interference.” The majority take an intermediate view, allowing mental distress damages if the elements set forth on page 722 above are proved.
*724Even though it can be claimed that such approaches echo traditional formulations of recoverable tort damage rules, I disagree. I would require the showing of an additional factor (such as malice or outrageous conduct) before allowing damages for mental distress for intentional interference with contractual relations, and I take this position for reasons enumerated or implicit in the majority opinion; i.e., that while the cause of action cannot reasonably be construed as protective of economic interests alone, the remedy should not be so broadly applied as to allow recovery in every instance where interference with a contractual relationship produces emotional distress.
Dean Prosser states that there are three lines of cases which have considered this issue. One line of cases limits the recoverable damages to the contract measure of damages. Another line applies the tort measure of damages, but limits the damages to those which are “sufficiently proximate,” by analogy to the rules as to negligent torts. A third line of cases treats the tort as an intentional one, and allows recovery for unforeseen expenses, as well as for mental suffering, damage to reputation, and punitive damages. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 948-949 (4th ed 1971).1
In the tort under consideration, there is a marked difference from other intentional torts which allow recovery of mental distress damages. For example, in the case of an assault, no one could deny the social and individual interests in the security of a person. Such interests certainly outweigh any possible conflicting interest in the freedom to do violence. But the tort that is here involved, in a real sense, is in direct conflict with freedom of otherwise lawful commercial action. As stated by Professer Sayre,
“* * * the law can undertake to restrain everyone from committing acts of violence without seriously impairing the general freedom of action; it cannot thus undertake to restrain everyone from committing otherwise lawful acts which may result in causing people to break their contracts, without sacrificing that very freedom of individual action which the common law exists largely to secure.” Sayre, supra at 687.
*725It seems to me that we are faced with a policy question. The award of damages for mental distress in such cases may tend to limit (to quote Mr. Sayre) “* * * freedom of individual action which the common law exists largely to secure.” To the extent that the policies are in conflict, I would resolve that question in favor of freedom of individual action, subject to the limitation that where the conduct of the defendant is “outrageous” (as defined in Restatement of Torts (Second) § 46, and recognized in Pakos v. Clark, 253 Or 113, 453 P2d 682 (1969)), or where the defendant’s goal is more than the securing of a commercial advantage, and involves as well, a desire or intent to injure the plaintiff, then damages for mental distress would be recoverable.
Permitting the recovery of the same type of damages for breach of contract as the plaintiff could obtain from the person with whom the original contract was made would make the plaintiff whole in an economic sense, at least as far as any claim for breach of contract against such person is concerned. The majority, however, would permit the additional recovery of mental distress damages, irrespective of the defendant’s culpability, upon a showing that such damages are “of a kind that should have been expected as a common and predictable accompaniment of disrupting the type of relationship with which the defendant interfered.”
Most jurisdictions, including Oregon, deny recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as a discrete cause of action, absent some showing of aggravated circumstances such as outrageous conduct or malicious intent. To do otherwise, in a real sense, abolishes all forms and theories of action and makes directly actionable any intentional infliction of such damages. See Fieger v. Glen Oaks Village, 309 NY 527, 132 NE2d 492 (1956). See also Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or 210, 214-215, 536 P2d 512 (1975) (concept that every intentional infliction of harm is prima facie a tort unless justified was rejected). Compare Top Service Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or 201, 209-210, 582 P2d 1365 (1978).
The cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not fully defined in Oregon. This court *726has not yet considered whether, in the absence of the breach of an obligation incident to a defendant’s special relationship to a plaintiff, recovery for emotional distress alone can be based on conduct not deliberately aimed at causing plaintiffs emotional distress. Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435, 454-458, 600 P2d 398 (1979). However, we only allow damages in an action for the infliction of emotional distress if the actor “* * * by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress.” Pakos v. Clark, supra; Restatement of Torts (Second) § 46. Even in the cases in which this court has allowed redress for mental disturbance caused by otherwise tortious conduct, but without accompanying physical injury, the facts of those cases involved “outrageous conduct, invasion of the right of privacy, or some special circumstances of considerable magnitude.” Melton v. Allen, 282 Or 731, 736, 580 P2d 1019 (1978). Limiting the recovery of damages for mental distress in an action for interference with contractual relations to situations involving malicious or outrageous conduct would insure a measure of uniformity in our tort law.
Granted, there are statements in Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or 65, 73, 439 P2d 601 (1968) (dicta) and Macca v. Gen. Telephone Co. of N.W., 262 Or 414, 420, 495 P2d 1193 (1972), to the effect that “* * * where an independent basis of liability exists, irrespective of whether there existed physical injuries, recovery has been uniformly allowed for mental suffering and anguish.” Macca, supra at 420. Concededly, such statements are at variance with my conclusion.
Macea involved an erroneous listing by the telephone company of plaintiffs telephone number as the “after-hours” number of a commercial concern, resulting in plaintiffs being disturbed by numerous late-night telephone calls. The telephone company, when informed of its error, refused to correct the situation by placing the number on “intercept.” We characterized plaintiffs cause of action as being “* * * governed by the law relating to private nuisance, and [we stated that] plaintiff is entitled to recover for mental distress resulting from defendant’s negligent act.” 262 Or at 418.
*727I confess to being less than completely confident in my position, because my suggested “rule” would depart from the normal damages rule in tort cases and impose a required showing of a second tier of culpability in order to obtain the type of damages — mental distress damages — which normally are recoverable upon proof of the elements of a tort. Perhaps my disagreement with the majority is not that substantial, for they, too, limit damages for mental distress, requiring that the elements set forth on page 722, above, be made out.2
A certain amount of emotional distress and anxiety is an unavoidable part of living in our complex society. As stated above, we have heretofore strictly limited recovery of damages for such emotional distress and anxiety. Our society is one which has depended, since its inception, upon a high degree of “freedom” in conducting economic transactions. To again quote Mr. Sayre, this tort differs from many other torts in that the interest in the promised business advantage is “peculiarly apt to be in direct conflict with the interests of third persons in * * * the general freedom of ‘motion and locomotion’; often the former interest can be protected from interference by third parties only by a sacrifice of the latter * * 35 flarv L Rev at 687.
I see a real difference between (1) interference with contract, simply to get the benefits of a deal (as, for example, if a defendant induced a third person to break a commodity contract with the plaintiff, and the defendant did not know with whom the third person had contracted, but the defendant simply needed the commodity for legitimate business purposes) and (2) interference with an existing contract in order to vex, annoy, injure or otherwise harm a plaintiff. In both cases the act is intentional. But in both cases the goal is not identical; there is a substantial difference between the two situations — a difference which should be recognized and applied.
Turning then to the facts of this case, the evidence shows that the defendant’s motive in purchasing these *728cattle from the third person was not to vex, annoy, or injure the plaintiff. The evidence shows that the defendants, and an agent for the defendant Johnson Cattle Co., Inc., had been dealing with the third person for the purchase of these very cattle for approximately two months, but had been unable to reach an agreement with her. In the absence of any evidence of aggravated misconduct or malicious intent on the part of the defendant, I would deny recovery of damages in this case.
Tanzer, J., joins in this dissent.

 Other authorities which list further citations to the three lines of authority include: 30 Colum L Rev 232, 236 (1930); 38 B U L Rev 285-295 (1958); 7 Santa Clara Lawyer 140, 141-147 (1966).

 At all events, it should be remembered that one of the elements of this tort is intentional interference with a contract “for an improper objective or by wrongful means.” See majority opinion at page 717. The factors to be considered in determining whether interference is “improper” are set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767.