Court Opinion

ID: 9579680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:57:27.18366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:40.346585
License: Public Domain

EHRLICH, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe that the dispositive question on appeal is whether ADOT waived its claim that Medina was required to request a rehearing of its decision when it said in superi- or court that a motion for rehearing was not a prerequisite to judicial review of its order suspending Medina’s driver’s license pursuant to AR.S. section 28-694. In other words, the issue is whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies implicates a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent because I conclude that Medina’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies deprived the court of jurisdiction. In this regard, an analysis of the statutory requirements relating to a review of ADOT’s license-suspension decisions is indispensable to a determination whether a licensee’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is jurisdictional.
When the legislature added AR.S. section 28-694, the statute was silent as to the ne-eessity of a rehearing, 1987 Ariz.Sess.Laws Ch. 262, § 4, and it remains that way despite amendments. In light of this silence and because the case concerns the actions of a state agency, the general provisions of the Arizona Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), AR.S. § 41-1001 et seq., are implicated. Didlo v. Talley, 21 Ariz.App. 446, 448, 520 P.2d 540, 542 (1974). The APA instructs regarding reconsideration of an agency’s decision that, “[ejxcept when good cause exists otherwise, an agency shall provide an opportunity for a rehearing or review of the decision of an agency before such decision becomes final.” A.R.S. § 41-1062(B) (emphasis added). The obvious reason for this is to allow the agency with the expected expertise to correct its mistakes before the judicial process is invoked.
The Motor Vehicle Division of ADOT, the entity responsible for Medina’s license suspension, has specified the rehearing process in the following administrative regulation:
Any party in a contested case before the executive hearing office who is aggrieved by a decision rendered in such case may file with the executive hearing office, not later than 15 days after service of the original decision, unless otherwise prescribed by law, a written motion for rehearing of the original decision, specifying the particular reasons for rehearing.
AAC. R17-A-912(A). The use of the permissive word “may” does not relieve Medina from requesting a rehearing as a prerequisite to judicial review. The word “indicates an option only in the sense that a party may decide not to pursue any further review” as this court recently wrote regarding a similarly-worded regulation outlining the rehearing procedure for action taken against a physician’s professional license. Rosen v. Ariz. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 185 Ariz. 139, 143, 912 P.2d 1368, 1372 (App.1995) (citing Ariz. Law Enforcement Merit Sys. Council v. Bonn, 133 Ariz. 429, 432-33, 652 P.2d 168, 171-72 (App.1982)).4
*420“There is no question that if a hearing and review process is provided to parties before an administrative agency, failure to utilize that process precludes judicial review.” Sanchez-O’Brien Minerals Corp. v. State, 149 Ariz. 258, 261-62, 717 P.2d 937, 940-41 (App.1986) (citing Herzberg v. David, 27 Ariz. App. 418, 555 P.2d 677 (1976); Campbell v. Chatwin, 102 Ariz. 251, 428 P.2d 108 (1967)). It makes no difference if the remedies are set forth in the act creating the agency in question or described in the general statutes relating to administrative procedure. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Hoffman, 23 Ariz.App. 116, 120, 531 P.2d 161, 165 (1975). The Arizona Administrative Review Act, a compilation of statutes which “applies to and governs every action to review judicially a final decision of an administrative agency,” A.R.S. § 12-902(A) (emphasis added), demonstrates that an agency decision is not “final” and therefore not subject to judicial review until rehearing is sought.
In all cases in which a statute or a rule of the administrative agency requires or permits an application for a rehearing or other method of administrative review, and an application for a rehearing or review is made, no administrative decision of such agency is final as to the party applying therefor until the rehearing or review is denied, or the decision on rehearing or review is rendered.
A.R.S. § 12-901(2) (emphasis added). The above principle was affirmed in Rosen when this court concluded that a physician’s failure to timely request a rehearing of the board’s licensure decision as allowed by the board’s administrative regulation prevented the superior court from reviewing the board’s decision; the physician was barred from further review. 185 Ariz. at 143, 912 P.2d at 1372.
Medina’s failure to follow the rehearing procedure provided by law and exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review deprived the superior court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction cannot be waived by a party and may be asserted at any time. E.g., Swichtenberg v. Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 82, 828 P.2d 1218, 1223 (App.1991).5 Accordingly, I would reverse and reinstate the administrative determination.

. For comparison, there is A.R.S. section 28-691, a companion of section 28-694, which includes the license suspension procedure for a driver who refuses to submit to a blood/breath test. The 1987 amendment to section 28-691 added the language that "[a] motion for rehearing is not required." This was the same legislation that resulted in section 28-694. I interpret this difference as an affirmative legislative act to modify the usual review procedure; had the legislature *420intended to include a similar provision in section 28-694, it certainly could and would have done so.

. I recognize that there is uncertainty surrounding the question of when exhaustion is required. In fact, an administrative-law commentator has noted that, "[w]hen a court deems exhaustion desirable, it may say that it lacks jurisdiction to interfere, but when the question is a close one, a court may acknowledge that the result depends more on judicial discretion than on law.” Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 26:1 at 414 (2d ed. 1983). See also Johnson v. Mofford, 181 Ariz. 301, 303, 890 P.2d 76, 78 (App.1995); Original Apartment Movers, Inc. v. Waddell, 179 Ariz. 419, 420, 880 P.2d 639, 640 (App.1993). I believe it appropriate to give the agency an opportunity to reconsider its actions before judicial review is involved.