Court Opinion

ID: 9723920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:38:05.974117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.371395
License: Public Domain

COLOGNE, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
I concur with the majority in affirming the Board’s finding of the employer’s wrongful denial of access and the order permitting access. I also concur in the conclusion of the majority there is no evidence of “surveillance” as that term is normally understood. As to the balance of the opinion, I would apply the applicable law to the charges of illegal interrogation and discrimination on an individual basis, carrying out the view that “we are to view the statements in their entirety and consider their total effect on the receiver” (N.L.R.B. v. Four Winds Industries, Inc. (9th Cir. 1976) 530 F.2d 75, 78; italics added). The majority, instead, defers to the particular sensitivity of the Board which sits with no more before it than we have—a transcript of testimony before the ALO.
The standard of review is whether the Board’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole (Lab. Code, § 1160.8; Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Bd. (1951) 340 U.S. 474 [95 L.Ed. 456, 71 S.Ct. 456]; Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335 [156 Cal.Rptr. 1, 595 P.2d 579]). This review, however, is subject to the cautionary instruction given us by the Supreme Court in Universal Camera, supra, at page 490 [95 L.Ed. at pp. 468-469]: “[C]ourts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions than some courts have shown in the past. Reviewing courts must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate the conventional judicial function. Congress has imposed on them responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds. That responsibility is not less real because it is limited to enforcing the requirement that evidence appear substantial when viewed, on the re*346cord as a whole, by courts invested with the authority and enjoying the prestige of the Courts of Appeals. The Board’s findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board’s decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence or both.” (Italics added.) The freedom with which the Board may act is always subject to constraints imposed by the Constitution as well as the statutes. “[The Supreme Court] has recognized that ‘in the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.... Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.’ [Citations.] The right thus to discuss, and inform people concerning, the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only as part of free speech, but as part of free assembly. [Citation.]” (Thomas v. Collins (1945) 323 U.S. 516, 532 [89 L.Ed. 430, 441, 65 S.Ct. 315, 323-324].)
It has been made clear that both the union and the employer have the right in a labor dispute to express opinions, and that right extends to more than abstract discussion, unrelated to action. Free trade in ideas was envisioned by the framers of the Bill of Rights, as well as free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts. Accordingly, the employer’s attempts to persuade persons not to join the union must be as unfettered as the union’s attempt to persuade to action with respect to joining. These discussions are within the First Amendment guaranty (Labor Bd. v. Virginia Power Co. (1941) 314 U.S. 469 [86 L.Ed. 348, 62 S.Ct. 344]; Southwire Company v. N.L.R.B. (5th Cir. 1967) 383 F.2d 235, 240-241).
The constitutional right is not without limitations. The law envisions free and open discussions in labor relations, including opinions as to the advantages and disadvantages of unions. It is the employee who must make the ultimate choice and he must be free of coercion by threats of reprisal or force or promise of benefit (Lab. Code, §§ 1153, 1154). It is not intended the Board or this court should act as censor of the reasonableness of the statements or consider the merit of competing propaganda (Luxuray of N.Y., Div. of Beaunit Corp. v. National Lab. Rel. *347Bd. (2d Cir. 1971) 447 F.2d 112, 117). This constitutional right of expressing one’s views, opinions and arguments, together with its limitations, is specially provided for in the Agricultural Labor Relations Act. Labor Code section 1155 reads: “The expressing of any views, arguments, or opinions, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute evidence of an unfair labor practice under the provisions of this part, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force, or promise of benefit.”
There is a fine line between what is a “threat” and what is a “prediction.” The former is not privileged, the latter is (Southwire Company v. N.L.R.B., supra, 383 F.2d 235, 241). Unless the speech contains a “threat of reprisal or force of promise of benefit,” it is privileged. A mere prediction of what effect unionization would have on the company is not an unfair labor practice (NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 [23 L.Ed.2d 547, 580, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1942]). An employer is free to tell the employees “‘what he reasonably believes will be the likely economic consequences of unionization that are outside his control’” and not “‘threats of economic reprisal to be taken solely on his own volition.’ [Citations.]” (NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. at p. 619 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 581, 89 S.Ct. at p. 1942]).1
In analyzing the statements of the employer, we must look not for certain words, but rather, view the statements in their entirety and consider their total effect on the receiver (Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 619 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 581]; N.L.R.B. v. Tommy’s Spanish Foods, Inc. (9th Cir. 1972) 463 F.2d 116). The test was restated by the Supreme Court and cited by the majority. Whether the statements are to be viewed one way or the other is a matter left to the Board, giving appropriate weight *348to the ALO’s determinations,2 but protection of First Amendment rights is within the particular province of the courts to protect and defend and we should not abdicate our responsibility in that regard on the simplistic rationale that substantial evidence supports a conclusion of coercion by the Board.
In reviewing these cases, I do not attempt to repeat the facts since the majority has accurately stated them in considerable detail. I believe it is essential to review those cases where I see error in the Board’s conclusion.

Illegal Interrogations and Threats.

A. Supervisor Jose Rios and Employee Herlinda Avitua

The record reveals a conversation between Rios and Avitua where Rios asked her if she had signed the authorization card and said she should not have done that. This conversation cannot be excised from the setting of a friendly and close relationship. Avitua specifically testified the conversations were friendly (she was a close friend of Rios and his daughter) and she was not intimidated by the questioning. How can a Board reject the credibility of the claimant on such a vital issue as this, the subjective effect of statements? That effect could not better be stated than by the employee herself. The Board found it irrelevant Avitua *349was not actually intimidated because in its view such questioning per se tends to interfere with free expression.
The Board held that while interrogation is not a per se violation of the act, it does constitute a violation when it tends to coerce, restrain or interfere with the employee’s free exercise of rights under the act. It held it was irrelevant whether Avitua was in fact intimidated. The test whether the questioning tends to be coercive, though not wholly dependent on the employee’s being in fact coerced, must include a number of factors. “(1) The history of the employer’s conduct and attitude towards its employees; (2) the nature of the information sought—for example, did the interrogator appear to be seeking information on which to base action against individual employees; (3) the position or office of the interrogator in the company’s hierarchy; (4) the place and method of interrogation—was the employee summoned to the boss’ office, or was there an atmosphere of ‘unnatural formality?’; and (5) truthfulness of the reply.” (N.L.R.B. v. Huntsville Manufacturing Co. (5th Cir. 1975) 514 F.2d 723, 724.) While there is evidence of the employer’s antiunion animus, there was at that time no evidence to support a showing the interrogation was related to any of these factors. Rios was not hostile, the information was solicited to properly advise Avitua, not to be used against her; Rios was low in the company hierarchy; the setting was informal and the answers were a truthful admission of having signed the organizational card. Under these circumstances, especially in light of the ALO’s finding, I believe the Board’s action was not a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence available to it.
There is nothing wrong with openly opposing the union or conducting an antiunion campaign so long as it does not impinge upon the rights of the employees (N.L.R.B. v. Monroe Tube Co., Inc. (2d Cir. 1976) 545 F.2d 1320, 1327-1328; N.L.R.B. v. M & W Marine Ways, Inc. (5th Cir. 1969) 411 F.2d 1070, 1073). Viewing the evidence most favorable to support the Board’s finding, I can only see an inquiry of a friend to determine if counseling is appropriate and a statement of cautionary advice, not a command. This was given to a friend apart from an anti-union setting. This setting and the absence of intimidating effect were confirmed by other witnesses. If such a dispassionate, nonintimidating conversation between friends is illegal, there is no right of free speech ever to be conceded in union matters.
I would reverse the Board’s order as it applies to Avitua, for it is contrary to the law requiring us to consider the “total effect on the *350receiver” of the statement (N.L.R.B. v. Four Winds Industries, Inc., supra, 530 F.2d 75, 78).

B. Shovel Crew Foreman Ramon Gonzales

The very spotty and ambiguous nature of the evidence, its credibility cloaked with the doubts of the ALO evidenced by his rejection of this claim, demands special attention. The alleged unfair labor practice applicable to Rodriguez occurred when Gonzales asked him if he had a UFW button. While the employee has a protected right to wear a union badge, and interfering with that right is an unfair labor practice, asking “whether” the employee had to wear the badge is not an unfair labor practice (Lee Cylinder Div. of Golay & Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1966), nor is the inquiry “why he is wearing the badge” (Dixisteel Bldg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 393 (1970)). Nowhere is there evidence the questions of Gonzales to Bermea about Berumen, were coercive or intimidating so as to inhibit organizational activities. There was no effort to obtain the organizing list nor serious threat to sue anyone. The statement cannot be construed as anything more than idle conversation. We are directed to no specific evidence upon which the Board relied for its conclusions there was in fact coercion or questions made in a threatening manner, for there is none.
I would reverse the Board’s order as it applies to the charges concerning Rodriguez and his supposed conversations relating to Bermea and Berumen.

C. Irrigator Foreman Charlie Figueroa/Employee Abelino Ortega

The language was not coercive or threatening. The Board preferred to rely on Ortega’s testimony that he understood “you let the one you are holding go to get the ones that are flying, and at the end you are going to end up with nothing,” to mean he was going to “end up without a job at Abatti.” That is an unwarranted conclusion, especially in light of the requirement that findings contrary to the ALO findings must be carefully scrutinized. Statements of opinion and reasons why one should not join the union are properly protected by the United States constitutional right of free speech.
I would reverse the Board’s order as it applies to Ortega.

*351
D. Other Interrogations

In each instance, the conversations were friendly; as the majority points out, statements were made by way of “prediction.” The Board agreed the employees were not intimidated by the statements but somehow envisioned enough facts to support their finding of threats of loss of jobs. An honest discussion of the issues and consequences, without intimidation, is what the law expects. I believe everything said here should be protected under the free speech doctrine.

Discriminatory Discharges ¡Refusals to Rehire.

Acknowledging the law to be as stated in the majority opinion, I would review the facts on each of the cases. The evidence is extremely meager concerning these January layoffs and failure to rehire and, in light of the ALO’s dismissal of these claims, I have reservations about the Board’s action but reluctantly accept in each instance even the most tenuous thread of evidence to support its ruling. On that basis alone, I can conclude there is substantial evidence to support all but the three cases discussed below.

A. Shovel Crew

The majority acknowledges the discharge was apparently based on Gonzales’ memory of the employee’s seniority, which it considered to be wrong, though without apparent antiunion reference, since the layoff of this crew included both union and nonunion employees. It is the refusal to rehire which must be addressed in any event.

B. Berumen

There was no evidence the company knew of Berumen’s union activity. Gonzales denied knowledge and Berumen said he did not know if the company was aware of it. The fact Berumen engaged in such activity is not enough to raise an inference Gonzales knew of it, especially where it was done secretly so Gonzales would not know. Knowledge of union activity is essential to show it motivated the discharge (N.L.R.B. v. Garner Tool and Die Manufacturing, Inc. (8th Cir. 1974) 493 F.2d 263).
There is no evidence here to support a charge of unfair labor practice.

*352
C. Chavarria

There was evidence he was often absent and, when on the job, often drunk. The essential element missing here to establish entitlement to be rehired was that Chavarria never applied for work. Another worker with poor attendance was hired when he applied. While the Board decision states the rule properly, i.e., the employee is not required to do a futile act, and cites Teamsters v. United States (1977) 431 U.S. 324 at page 366 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 434, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1870], the rule does not exempt everyone from the requirement of applying for employment. The Supreme Court in that same case said at 431 U.S. pages 366 and 367 to 368 [52 L.Ed.2d pp. 434, 435, 97 S.Ct. at pp. 1870, 1871]: "... When a person’s desire for a job is not translated into a formal application solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who goes through the motions of submitting an application.
“To conclude that a person’s failure to submit an application for a job does not inevitably and forever foreclose his entitlement to seniority relief under Title VII is a far cry, however, from holding that nonapplicants are always entitled to such relief. A nonapplicant must show that he was a potential victim of unlawful discrimination. Because he is necessarily claiming that he was deterred from applying for the job by the employer’s discriminatory practices, his is the not always easy burden of proving that he would have applied for the job had it not been for those practices. .. That case involved a situation where the employer announced his policy of discrimination by posting a sign reading “Whites Only.” The court pointed out that the same message could be communicated more subtly but just as clearly by his practices—consistent discriminatory treatment of actual applicants, by the manner he advertises vacancies, responses to inquiries, etc. None of that is in evidence here. There is antiunion animus here to be sure, but no evidence of any discriminatory hiring practices within Chavarria’s knowledge which would lead him to believe application for work was futile. The employer’s discriminating practices were not apparent at that time.

D. Sprinkler Crew

The layoff here was due to work slowdown, not discrimination. The question remains, was the refusal to rehire discriminatory. I would af*353firm the action of the Board except as it applies to Miguel Lopez Chavez, who testified he never applied for work.
As to other employees, while the evidence is conflicting and tenuous, it is sufficient to support the Board’s conclusion Abatti’s refusal to rehire was a violation of law.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 10, 1980. Cologne, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 28, 1980. Bird, C. J., did not participate therein.

In NLRB v. Gissel, supra, the employer told his workers the company was in a precarious financial condition and the strike-hungry union would make unreasonable demands causing the plant to shut down and they would all be out of work. The court there held the statements were without support since no demand had been made by the union, there was no basis for assuming the union would have to strike to be heard and no evidence showed other plant closings were due to unionism. They were coercive threats. It said:
“[A]n employer, who has control over that relationship and therefore knows it best, cannot be heard to complain that he is without an adequate guide for his behavior. He can easily make his views known without engaging in ‘“brinkmanship”’ when it becomes all too easy to ‘overstep and tumble [over] the brink,’ Wausau Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 369, 372 (C.A. 7th Cir. 1967). At the least he can avoid coercive speech simply by avoiding conscious overstatements he has reason to believe will mislead his employees.” (NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, at p. 620 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 582, 89 S.Ct. at p. 1943].)

After hearing the evidence, the administrative law officer dismissed 14 of the claims. The Board' reinstated all but one of these claims. This disparity concerns me. As stated in Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (9th Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 1074, 1078-1079, the court said:
“Weight is given the administrative law judge’s determinations of credibility for the obvious reason that he or she ‘sees the witnesses and hears them testify, while the Board and the reviewing court look only at cold records.’ [Citations.] All aspects of the witness’s demeanor—including the expression of his countenance, how he sits or stands, whether he is inordinately nervous, his coloration during critical examination, the modulation or pace of his speech and other non-verbal communication—may convince the observing trial judge that the witness is testifying truthfully or falsely. These same very important factors, however, are entirely unavailable to a reader of the transcript, such as the Board or the Court of Appeals.... ”
When the Board chooses to disregard the factual findings of its hearing officer, I believe our burden on review is to that extent increased and we are bound to scrutinize the Board’s findings more carefully in light of the absence of underlying factual findings by the ALO (see N.L.R.B. v. Four Winds Industries, supra, 530 F.2d 75, 80; Garza v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 318-319 [90 Cal.Rptr. 355, 475 P.2d 451]). Even so, that rule remains; the Board is entitled to reject the hearing officer’s findings on credibility if substantial evidence supports contrary findings.