Court Opinion

ID: 9709400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:46:47.952143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:48.483596
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION

Justice EAKIN.
I join the majority’s opinion concluding the Tarbert-Blouse guidelines were met, and agree the Superior Court’s decision should be reversed.
I write separately because the majority opinion may be read to construe the guidelines as an exclusive five-factor test to determine if a DUI checkpoint is constitutional. See Majority Op., at 477-79, 957 A.2d at 724-25. However, each DUI checkpoint is distinct in time, place, law enforcement personnel involved, duration, safety needs, etc. Therefore, these guidelines should not be interpreted as five mandatory factors; they should properly be utilized as a non-exclusive list, identifying some important and specific factors that should be analyzed in every case.
Further, the majority apparently concludes “substantial compliance” with the guidelines occurs when all five factors are met. Id., at 477-88, 957 A.2d at 724-27. If all five factors must be met, this would be “complete compliance” with the guidelines, not merely “substantial compliance” as Blouse requires. Commonwealth v. Blouse, 531 Pa. 167, 611 A.2d 1177, 1180 (1992). As each checkpoint is necessarily unique, “substantial compliance” will vary with each case; in some cases, meeting four of the five factors could be “substantial compliance.” In other cases, substantially, but not completely, meeting all five factors could be deemed “substantial compliance.”
This interpretation of the guidelines better meets basic constitutional jurisprudence. The totality of the circum*486stances, not an exclusive laundry list of factors, is reviewed to determine if probable cause exists to conduct a search or seizure, Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 594 Pa. 319, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (2007) (citations omitted) (search); Commonwealth v. Clark, 558 Pa. 157, 735 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1999) (citations omitted) (seizure). “The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). Likewise, reasonable suspicion for a Terry1 stop is also evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Revere, 585 Pa. 262, 888 A.2d 694, 707 (2005). Therefore, I do not think evaluating the constitutionality of a stop via a DUI checkpoint, as opposed to a stop based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause, should be evaluated solely on five enumerated factors, but should be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).