Court Opinion

ID: 9389596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 20:11:45.657624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:28.680184
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                       April 25, 2023
                               STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                     SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                             SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                     OF WEST VIRGINIA

In re J.H.

No. 22-611 (Logan County 21-JA-75)

                                MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner Mother L.H.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Logan County’s May 17, 2022, order
terminating her parental rights to J.H.2 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is
unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        In June of 2021, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that petitioner was
unable to care for then one-month-old L.H. The DHHR had received a referral that petitioner had
a history of methamphetamine abuse and was currently trading Suboxone for illegal drugs.
According to the reporter, petitioner was “hearing voices” and behaving erratically, including
being “out walking on the white line in traffic with the baby.” The reporter also voiced concerns
that the baby was underfed and underweight, in addition to alleging that petitioner “jerked [the
child’s] neck to the point that [the child] started screaming in pain.” The reporter expressed concern
that petitioner would kill the child rather than permit Child Protective Services (“CPS”) to remove
her.

        When CPS investigated, petitioner’s aunt informed them that petitioner has a history of
substance abuse and mental health issues, including schizophrenia. The aunt, with whom petitioner
and the child lived, described petitioner as acting like a “zombie,” in that she was “not . . . able to
respond or comprehend conversations.” When a CPS worker spoke with petitioner, petitioner
“stared at the worker and would not answer questions.” The worker “would often have to snap her
fingers in an effort to get . . . [petitioner’s] attention.” Prior to the petition’s filing, petitioner was
transported to a facility that addresses mental health and substance abuse treatment, but petitioner
refused to cooperate or submit to an evaluation. When CPS explained that they would seek
emergency custody of the child, petitioner “became very aggressive and came within inches of
[the] CPS[] [worker’s] face yelling, cursing, and pointing her fingers.”

        1
         Petitioner appears by counsel Rebecca E. Mick. The West Virginia Department of Health
and Human Resources (“DHHR”) appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and
Assistant Attorney General Brittany Ryers-Hindbaugh. Dianna Carter Wiedel appears as the
child’s guardian ad litem.
        2
       We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
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        Petitioner indicates that she was absent from the preliminary hearing due to her
incarceration in Virginia, but she does not include the preliminary hearing order or the transcript
from that hearing. Further, petitioner has not included the adjudicatory order in the appendix record
on appeal, although the transcript from an October 2021 hearing shows that the court adjudicated
her of neglecting the child by virtue of her untreated mental health issues and incarceration.

        By the time of the final dispositional hearing in April of 2022, petitioner remained
incarcerated, though she was represented by counsel. During the hearing, the DHHR presented
testimony concerning petitioner’s lack of participation and failure to correct the conditions of
abuse and neglect at issue. The court ultimately found that there was “no evidence to demonstrate”
that petitioner “has meaningfully addressed the issues which led to the filing of the petition . . . or
that she has any intention of even attempting to do so.” The court further found that petitioner
failed to take advantage of the services the DHHR offered and the opportunities the court
presented. Accordingly, the court found that there was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner
could substantially correct the conditions of neglect in the near future and that the child required
permanency. As such, the court terminated petitioner’s parental rights.3 It is from the dispositional
order that petitioner appeals.

         On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Before this Court, petitioner argues that
termination of her parental rights was in error because the court should have imposed a less
restrictive dispositional alternative. According to petitioner, termination was unnecessary because
the child was placed with a relative who provided the child with consistent, close interaction and
the child was doing well in the home. However, petitioner ignores the fact that the court found that
the child required permanency, which necessitated termination of petitioner’s parental rights. This
is especially true in light of the fact that petitioner made no effort to remedy the conditions of
neglect at issue. Indeed, the record shows that even when taken to a facility where she could receive
treatment for her mental health issues and substance abuse, petitioner refused treatment. Petitioner
makes much of how guardianship would have achieved permanency for the child, but she ignores
the fact that “an adoptive home is the preferred permanent out-of-home placement of the child”
following termination of parental rights. Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Michael M., 202 W. Va. 350,
504 S.E.2d 177 (1998).

        Petitioner also alleges that she was not unfit due to “misconduct, neglect, immorality,
abandonment, or other dereliction of duty,” but instead because of mental health issues. This
argument is without merit, however, as the record shows that petitioner was adjudicated as unfit
because of her neglect of the child. Petitioner argues that the neglect at issue was “out of her
control,” which evidences a failure to accept responsibility for her lack of treatment for these
issues. We simply cannot accept petitioner’s position, which essentially seeks to absolve her of
any neglect that flows from her mental illness. Importantly, this Court has previously held that
untreated mental illness that results in abuse or neglect of a child is a sufficient basis upon which

       3
        The proceedings concerning the unknown father are ongoing. Respondents indicate that
the permanency plan for the child is adoption in the current placement.

                                                  2
to terminate a parent’s parental rights. See Matter of Abuse and Neglect of R.O., 180 W. Va. 190,
375 S.E.2d 823 (1988) (“We have also expressly recognized that the inability or unwillingness of
a parent to obtain medical treatment to correct a mental deficiency that endangers the welfare of
his or her children will support a termination of parental rights.”). Therefore, petitioner is entitled
to no relief.

       Additionally, it is important to recognize that

               “[c]ourts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of
       parental improvement . . . where it appears that the welfare of the child will be
       seriously threatened, and this is particularly applicable to children under the age of
       three years who are more susceptible to illness, need consistent close interaction
       with fully committed adults, and are likely to have their emotional and physical
       development retarded by numerous placements.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re R.J.M.,
       164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).

Cecil T., 228 W. Va. at 91, 717 S.E.2d at 875, Syl. Pt. 4. The child here was roughly one year old
at the time of disposition, supporting the circuit court’s finding that termination of petitioner’s
parental rights was necessary in order to achieve permanency for the child. Further, the evidence
demonstrated that there was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could substantially correct the
conditions of neglect. While petitioner argues that in January of 2022 she became cooperative and
agreed “to do whatever it would take” to be reunified with the child, the record supports the court’s
finding that she had no intention of correcting the issues. As set forth above, petitioner’s statements
to the lengths she would go for the child are undermined by the fact that she refused treatment
when it was readily available. As such, the court had a sufficient basis upon which to make the
findings necessary to terminate petitioner’s parental rights. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)
(permitting circuit court to terminate parental rights upon finding that there is no reasonable
likelihood that conditions of neglect can be substantially corrected in near future and when
necessary for child’s welfare); see also Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55
(2011) (permitting termination of parental rights “without the use of intervening less restrictive
alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect .
. . can be substantially corrected”).

       For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its May
17, 2022, order is hereby affirmed.
                                                                                           Affirmed.

ISSUED: April 25, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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