Court Opinion

ID: 9965786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 15:01:04.685914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:39.560529
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

DAVID S. JONES,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                   DA-0752-22-0236-I-1

             v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                    DATE: May 2, 2024
              Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      David S. Jones , El Paso, Texas, pro se.

      Bobbi K. Mihal , Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                 REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed his removal and denied his affirmative defense of reprisal for equal
employment opportunity (EEO) activity.        For the reasons discussed below, we
GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and
REMAND the case to the Denver Field Office for further adjudication in
accordance with this Remand Order.
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                  2

                                 BACKGROUND
      The appellant was employed as a Mail Handler Tech at the agency’s
Processing and Distribution Center in El Paso, Texas. Initial Appeal File (IAF),
Tab 6 at 26.    The agency removed him, effective March 28, 2022, based on
charges of failure to maintain regular attendance (one specification), failure to
follow leave requesting procedures (two specifications), and absence without
leave (AWOL) (two specifications). Id. at 13-17. The agency alleged that the
appellant was both AWOL and failed to maintain regular attendance when he did
not report to work or left early on 10 occasions between December 1 and
December 24, 2021. Id. at 13-14. The total resulting AWOL was 31.76 hours.
Id. at 14. The agency further alleged that the appellant failed to request leave,
have his absence approved in advance, and complete a Postal Service Form 3971,
Request for Notification of Absence (PS Form 3971), for “one or more” of these
dates. Id. at 13-14, 57-58, 61-62, 65, 68-69, 71, 73, 75.
      The appellant appealed his removal, raising an affirmative defense of
reprisal for prior EEO activity. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. The administrative judge issued
an affirmative defense order, notifying the appellant of his burden of proof to
establish an affirmative defense of discrimination under Title VII; however, the
order did not notify him of his burden to establish disability discrimination. IAF,
Tab 8. The appellant did not respond.
      Because the appellant did not request a hearing, the administrative judge
issued an initial decision based on the written record affirming the removal. IAF,
Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 13. He sustained all the charges, finding the
agency proved all the specifications. ID at 6-14. The administrative judge also
found the appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense of reprisal based on
EEO activity. ID at 3-5. He determined the agency established nexus between
the appellant’s misconduct and the efficiency of the service. ID at 5. Lastly, he
determined that the deciding official properly considered the relevant mitigating
                                                                                       3

and aggravating factors and that the penalty of removal was within the tolerable
limits of reasonableness. 2 ID at 9-12.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition
for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. In his petition for review, the appellant appears to
allege that his removal was improper because he requested leave under the Family
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) and because the agency improperly denied
his requests for reasonable accommodation.            Id. at 4-5.     The agency has
responded to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

                 DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
We remand the appeal to afford the appellant an opportunity to address his
affirmative defense of disability discrimination.
      On review, the appellant alleges that his attendance issues that served as
the basis for his removal were caused by his “serious condition/disabilities,”
which the agency improperly failed to accommodate, and that the agency failed to
engage in the interactive process. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. The administrative
judge did not address this claim in his initial decision. The agency argues that the
appellant did not raise this affirmative defense below, and thus essentially waived
it. PFR File, Tab 3 at 6. Based on the circumstances in this case, we disagree
that the appellant failed to raise or abandoned this defense and remand the appeal
to afford the appellant an opportunity to address his affirmative defense of
disability discrimination.

2
  The administrative judge observed that the charges of failure to follow leave
requesting procedures and AWOL merged, but found the merger did not alter his
penalty analysis. ID at 10-11. The parties do not challenge this reasoning on review,
and we discern no basis to disturb it. See Shiflett v. Department of Justice, 98 M.S.P.R.
289, ¶ 12 (2005) (explaining that merging charges does not mean that the duplicative
charge is not sustained or that the appellant’s misconduct somehow becomes less
serious by virtue of the merger); Jones v. Department of Justice, 98 M.S.P.R. 86, ¶ 16
(2004) (finding that an AWOL charge merged with a charge of failure to follow
instructions to provide evidence of medical incapacity when they were based on the
same period and the appellant’s failure to provide the required evidence caused him to
be AWOL).
                                                                                 4

       The appellant raised a disability discrimination claim, entitling him
       to notice of his burden to prove this claim.
       When an appellant raises an affirmative defense, the administrative judge
must address the affirmative defense in a close of record order or prehearing
conference summary. Thurman v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 21, ¶¶ 10, 17
n.7.   The appellant must be provided with notice of his burden to prove his
claims. Alarid v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 17 (2015).
       Although in the appellant’s initial appeal he only raised an affirmative
defense of reprisal for EEO activity, he subsequently submitted two documents in
which he alleged that his management chain was discriminating against him based
on his medical condition.    IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 5 at 1-3.      Specifically, the
appellant submitted a copy of a November 9, 2018 statement that he indicated he
submitted to the “union and EEO,” seeking protection under the “Americans with
Disabilities Act” in connection with his supervisor’s behavior. IAF, Tab 5 at 1.
He also submitted a copy of a March 22, 2018 statement that he identified as a
union complaint in which he alleged he was treated unfairly because he is a
“disabled veteran,” in violation of the “Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” Id. at 2-3.
He later filed a pleading titled “EEO Submissions” that included copies of these
documents. IAF, Tab 18 at 3-4, 12.
       The appellant did not provide any additional information about his medical
condition or offer any explanation of how the agency’s later removal decision was
due to the agency’s failure to accommodate his medical condition. However, in
response to the affirmative defense order, the agency submitted information
demonstrating that the appellant contacted an EEO counselor in December 2021
claiming that his supervisor was discriminating against him based on his mental
and physical disabilities and retaliating against him for filing prior EEO
complaints when he denied the appellant’s requests for leave without pay and
charged him AWOL. IAF, Tab 10 at 32-34. We find that the above information
is sufficient to show that the appellant raised and attempted to pursue an
                                                                                        5

affirmative defense of disability discrimination.       See Turner v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 94 M.S.P.R. 381, ¶¶ 3, 7 (2003) (agreeing with an
administrative judge’s determination that a pro se appellant raised an affirmative
defense of disability discrimination when he challenged his removal and alleged
that he had medical conditions, was seeking treatment, and that the agency did
not offer to help him);         Melnick v. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 42 M.S.P.R. 93, 97 (1989) (recognizing that pro se pleadings are to
be liberally construed), aff’d, 899 F.2d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Table).
        Here, at no point during the proceeding below or in his initial decision did
the administrative judge notify the appellant of his burden of proof to establish an
affirmative defense of disability discrimination, including a failure to provide a
reasonable accommodation. IAF, Tabs 2, 8, 11, 17, 21. Moreover, the agency
did not provide these notices to the appellant in its response to the affirmative
defense order. 3 IAF, Tab 10 at 45; see Parker v. Department of Housing and
Urban     Development,    106 M.S.P.R.     329,   ¶¶   7-8   (2007) (stating    that   an
administrative judge’s failure to provide an appellant with specific notice of his
jurisdictional burden can be cured if the agency’s pleadings or the initial decision
contain the required notice).

        The appellant did not waive or abandon his disability discrimination
        claim.
        The agency argues that the appellant waived an affirmative defense of
disability discrimination because at no point during his oral reply to his proposed
removal or during the proceedings below did the appellant allege that his
December 2021 absences and attendance deficiencies were due to his medical
condition or the agency’s failure to accommodate such a condition. PFR File,
3
  The agency file contains the final agency decision (FAD) concerning the appellant’s
prior July 2021 EEO complaint. IAF, Tab 10 at 36-67. The FAD informed the
appellant of how to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, but it did
not advise the appellant of his burden of proof to establish a disability discrimination
affirmative defense based on the agency’s failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation. Id. at 55-56.
                                                                                   6

Tab 3 at 6.    Rather, according to the agency, in his oral reply the appellant
alleged that the reasons for his attendance issues were that he was not told ahead
of time that he needed to work, he left work early of his own accord without
being given permission when he saw employees from another shift arriving, and
he had childcare issues.    Id.   Although we agree that the appellant did not
expressly state that his attendance issues on the dates underlying the removal
were attributable to his medical conditions and the agency’s failure to
accommodate them, we do not find that the appellant waived an affirmative
defense of disability discrimination.
      In determining whether an appellant has waived or abandoned a previously
raised affirmative defense, the Board will consider the following nonexhaustive
factors:   (1) the thoroughness and clarity with which the appellant raised an
affirmative defense; (2) the degree to which the appellant continued to pursue the
affirmative defense in the proceedings below after initially raising it; (3) whether
the appellant objected to a summary of the issues to be decided that failed to
include the potential affirmative defense when specifically afforded an
opportunity to object and the consequences of the failure were made clear;
(4) whether the appellant raised the affirmative defense or the administrative
judge’s processing of the affirmative defense claim in the petition for review;
(5) whether the appellant was represented during the course of the appeal before
the administrative judge and on petition for review, and if not, the level of
knowledge of Board proceedings possessed by the appellant; and (6) the
likelihood that the presumptive abandonment of the affirmative defense was the
product of confusion, or misleading or incorrect information provided by the
agency or the Board. Thurman, 2022 MSPB 21, ¶ 18.
      As established above, we find that there is sufficient information in the
record to show that the appellant clearly raised and attempted to pursue an
affirmative defense of disability discrimination. Moreover, although it does not
appear that the appellant provided a written response to the affirmative defense
                                                                                          7

order or an objection to the close of record conference order, we find those
considerations outweighed by the fact that the administrative judge failed to
provide this pro se appellant notice of his burden to establish a disability
discrimination affirmative defense and failed to address the defense in the close
of record order. 4    Thus, we find that a remand is necessary to provide the
appellant notice of his burden and an opportunity to address his affirmative
defense of disability discrimination. 5 Id., ¶ 17 n.7 (2018).
4
  In the agency’s response to the affirmative defense order, it references the appellant’s
“response to the Affirmative Defense Order dated May 26, 2022.” IAF, Tab 10 at 7. At
the close of record conference, which the appellant did not attend, the administrative
judge sought clarification from the agency concerning this May 26th submission
because the appellant had failed to submit it to the Board. IAF, Tab 11 at 1-2. The
agency clarified that the appellant had submitted an undated 6-page pleading, which the
agency received on May 26, 2022. Id. In the order summarizing the conference, the
administrative judge clearly notified the appellant that the Board had not received this
pleading, yet the appellant did not respond or file it with the Board. Id. at 2. We
discern no abuse of discretion by the administrative judge in his handling of this matter.
See Dieter v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 32 ¶ 23 (recognizing an
administrative judge’s wide discretion to control the proceedings).
5
  The appellant may have been trying to raise a claim of discrimination under the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 ( USERRA)
when he twice submitted documentation below alleging that he was treated unfairly
because he is a “disabled veteran,” in violation of the “Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the
Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974.” IAF, Tab 5 at 2-3,
Tab 18 at 3-4. The appellant does not re-allege those claims on review, nor does he
otherwise allege that he was discriminated against based on his status as a veteran. On
remand, the administrative judge should clarify the appellant’s claim. To the extent the
appellant is claiming his removal is based on his military service and veteran status, and
not just based on his service-related disability, the administrative judge also shall notify
the appellant of his burden to establish an affirmative defense of discrimination under
USERRA. See Durr v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 844 F. App’x 329, 332 (Fed.
Cir. 2021) (finding Board jurisdiction when the appellant alleged he was denied medical
leave “for reason of [his] status of being a 10-point, military service-connected disabled
veteran,” and that “if another employee had made a request for leave for medical
reasons, that such would have been granted”); Covington v. Department of the Interior,
2023 MSPB 5, ¶ 19 n.5 (stating that the Board may rely on nonprecedential decisions of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit when it finds their reasoning
persuasive); Slentz v. U.S. Postal Service, 92 M.S.P.R. 144, ¶ 9 (2002) (determining
that the Board had USERRA jurisdiction over an appellant’s claim of discrimination
based on his status as a disabled veteran); McBride v. U.S. Postal Service, 78 M.S.P.R.
411, 414-15 (1998) (explaining that USERRA does not prohibit discrimination based
solely on a disability incurred during military service).
                                                                                  8

On remand the agency must establish that it complied with FMLA as part of its
overall burden of proving the AWOL charge.
      On review, the appellant states that he was “informed to get an [FMLA].”
PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. In the record below, the appellant submitted an incomplete
copy of FMLA Designation Notice form (Case No. 109001409735), showing that
on October 25, 2021, just prior to the December 2021 AWOL underlying his
removal, he had been approved to take FMLA-protected leave for his own serious
health condition. IAF, Tab 18 at 5. When FMLA is implicated relative to a
leave-related charge, the agency must prove that it complied with FMLA as part
of its overall burden of proving the charge.          Ellshoff v. Department of the
Interior, 76 M.S.P.R. 54, 73-74 (1997). However, the administrative judge did
not identify the agency’s burden at any point throughout the appeal, nor did he
make a finding as to whether the agency complied with FMLA in sustaining the
AWOL charge.
      The record contains very limited information concerning the FMLA issue.
Despite the agency’s October 25, 2021 approval of the appellant’s FMLA case,
the agency asserted without explanation that the appellant’s December 2021
absences underlying his removal were not covered by FMLA. IAF, Tab 6 at 5. In
support of this assertion, it submitted copies of the appellant’s PS Forms 3971 for
the absences underlying the removal, which show that the appellant’s absences
were unscheduled and not covered by FMLA. Id. at 57-58, 61-62, 65, 68-69, 71,
73, 75. However, these forms were completed by the agency, and the appellant
refused to sign them. Id. The agency also submitted a record of the appellant’s
leave summary showing that despite having been approved for FMLA leave in
October 25, 2021, none of the appellant’s absences through the remainder of 2021
were designated as FMLA-protected. Id. at 51. The records also show that as of
December 24, 2021, the appellant had a leave balance of 354.69 hours of annual
leave and 84.71 hours of sick leave. Id. at 72, 76.
                                                                                9

      During a December 30, 2021 pre-disciplinary interview, the agency
acknowledged that the appellant had an approved FMLA Case No. 109001409735
for “scheduled appointments,” as well as another FMLA Case No. 109001449006
that was “pending for approval.” IAF, Tab 7 at 9. The agency’s questions during
that interview appear to suggest that on certain dates that were not part of the
removal action, e.g., December 11 and 12, 2021, the appellant attempted to
invoke FMLA. Id. As a U.S. Postal Service employee, the appellant is entitled to
FMLA-protected leave under the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 2601 and 29 C.F.R.
part 825. Young v. U.S. Postal Service, 79 M.S.P.R. 25, 35 n.4 (1998). However,
here it is unclear whether the appellant attempted to use FMLA leave for his
AWOL absences underlying the removal, whether his FMLA Case No.
109001449006 was ever approved to cover those absences, or whether the agency
was otherwise required to designate those absences as FMLA-protected in light of
his approved FMLA Case No. 109001409735. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(a) (“In
any circumstance where the employer does not have sufficient information about
the reason for an employee’s use of leave, the employer should inquire further of
the employee . . . to ascertain whether leave is potentially FMLA-qualifying.”);
see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(d) (stating that an employer “may retroactively
designate leave” as FMLA protected). Because there is insufficient information
in the record to determine whether the agency complied with FMLA as part of its
overall burden to prove all the charges, we find that remand is also necessary to
further develop the record on this issue.

                                      ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Denver Field
Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
      On remand, the administrative judge shall provide the appellant with notice
and information on how he can prove a claim of status-based disability
discrimination and a claim of denial of a reasonable accommodation. He shall
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also provide the agency with notice and information regarding its burden to prove
that it complied with FMLA as part of its overall burden of proving all the
leave-related charges.   Additionally, the administrative judge shall allow the
parties to submit additional argument and evidence on these issues.
      After fully adjudicating the appellant’s claim of disability discrimination
and developing the record on whether the agency complied with FMLA, the
administrative judge shall then issue a remand initial decision making findings on
these claims.   In that remand initial decision, the administrative judge may
incorporate his findings regarding the merits of the appellant’s other affirmative
defense of reprisal for EEO activity, which the parties do not dispute on review
and with which we discern no error.        See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980).

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.