Court Opinion

ID: 9692507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:56:02.571095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.950220
License: Public Domain

Coleman, J.
(reversing in part, affirming in part). Because this case was administratively held in abeyance pending the decision in People v Carter, 395 Mich 434; 236 NW2d 500 (1975), I concur in the result reached by Justice Levin in part I of his opinion. The defendant’s case should be remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction for second-degree murder and for resentencing.1
*8I cannot agree with Justice Levin that Sergeant Ewald’s cursory search of the bedroom during a potentially life-endangering situation while the occupants of the apartment were not yet under police control was unjustified or illegal. He acted reasonably to protect the lives of his fellow officers.
I
At approximately 9 p.m. on May 11, 1971, Detective Sergeants Edward Ewald and Lawrence Kelly of the Detroit police department received a radio message directing them to investigate a robbery and shooting at a Detroit bar. They arrived at the bar at approximately 9:15 p.m. There they were told that sometime between 8:30 p.m. and 8:50 p.m. two men armed with handguns had robbed the bar and killed the bartender. One of the handguns used in the crime had already been recovered. They were also told that one of the robbers had been wounded, captured and taken to Detroit General Hospital.
At approximately 11:30 p.m. Ewald and Kelly went to the hospital and spoke with the wounded robber. He told them that the other robber’s name was Claude Crawl and that Crawl was the one who had shot the bartender. He gave them a rough description of Crawl and the address of an apartment in Highland Park where Crawl could be found. He also said a third man was involved in the robbery, but he did not name or describe the man or say where the man could be found.
Ewald and Kelly left the hospital and radioed the Highland Park police department for assist*9anee. Soon a Highland Park scout car with three uniformed officers joined them and the group drove towards the Highland Park address where Crawl was said to be. They arrived at the address shortly after midnight.
The address was a two-story apartment building. The wounded robber had said Crawl would be in apartment 204. The Highland Park officers warned Ewald and Kelly that there had been trouble, including shootings, at this apartment building in the past. One Highland Park officer drove the scout car into an alley behind the building and remained with the car. Ewald, Kelly and the remaining Highland Park officers approached the building’s front entrance. They pinpointed the location of apartment 204. Ewald positioned himself in an alcove from which he could observe the apartment’s windows and the front of the building. Kelly and the two officers continued upstairs to the apartment.
When Kelly and the two officers reached the apartment, Kelly knocked on the door. One of the occupants of the apartment opened the door and admitted the three policemen into a small hallway. Straight ahead the hallway led to the living room and kitchen. Three steps from the door on the left side of the hallway was the entrance to a small bedroom. The occupants were scurrying all through the apartment. The three policemen ran through the apartment looking for Crawl and trying to bring the occupants under control.
Meanwhile, Ewald observed from his position downstairs a man climb out one of the apartment’s windows and jump to the ground. Ewald shouted for the man to halt and identified himself as a police officer. The man walked a few steps and then halted. Ewald determined that the man was *10Claude Crawl, placed him under arrest and ordered him back to the apartment.
Approximately two minutes after Kelly and the two officers were admitted to the apartment, Ewald and Crawl appeared at the door. The door was open and Ewald directed Crawl, who was now handcuffed, inside. Ewald turned Crawl over to the control of one of the officers. Another man and two women were in the living room. They were milling or running around. There was much confusion. Kelly and the other officer were trying to persuade the occupants to sit down and stay still. At this point, Ewald looked in the bedroom. No one was there. Ewald then looked under or on the bed and saw a small black barber’s case.2 He opened the unlocked case and found a chrome plated handgun, live and spent shells, barber’s tools and identification cards belonging to Crawl. Ewald did not look anywhere else in the bedroom. He seized the case and its contents, and took these items to police headquarters along with Crawl and the three occupants, who had been arrested on narcotics charges. Crawl was charged with first-degree murder after confessing to the crime.
Before trial, Crawl filed a motion to suppress the items seized at the apartment. After an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied. The items were admitted into evidence against Crawl at his trial. Several witnesses identified the gun as looking like one of the guns used in the robbery. A ballistics expert testified that tests run on the gun and bullets found at the scene of the robbery showed that the gun was used in the robbery. Crawl testified that he was a barber. The identification cards found with the gun were Crawl’s.
*11II
Justice Levin contends that at the point Sergeant Ewald entered the bedroom there was no justification for seizing and opening the barber’s case. He says that "there was no danger that anyone in the apartment could grab the bag and * * * make use of any weapon contained in the bag”. I respectfully disagree.
When Sergeant Ewald captured Crawl outside the apartment, he was not thereby prohibited from returning to the apartment to assist his fellow officers. When he entered the apartment, about two minutes after the raid began, the situation was not under police control. An unidentified man and two women were milling or running around the living room of this small apartment. There was a great deal of confusion. The man could have been the third robber. The other handgun used in the crime was not accounted for. The officers had every reason to believe they were in a life-endangering situation. There had been trouble, including shootings, at this apartment building in the past. It was dark and late at night. They were looking for a murderer and an accomplice who might well be prepared to kill again.
Under these circumstances, I cannot say that Sergeant Ewald’s cursory search was unreasonable or illegal. The lack of police control and the dangerousness of the situation justified his proceeding without first obtaining a search warrant. To have delayed would have needlessly endangered the lives of his fellow officers.
Justice Levin relies heavily upon Chimel v California, 395 US 752; 89 S Ct 2034; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969), and United States v Chadwick, 433 US 1; 97 S Ct 2476; 53 L Ed 2d 538 (1977), to support his *12conclusion that the search in this case was illegal. The limits on the scope of warrantless searches established by these cases do not come into play until arrests have been made and the police are in control of the situation.
In Chimel, three policemen were admitted to the defendant’s home by the defendant’s wife and waited for the defendant to return from work. When he arrived, the police arrested him for burglary of a coin shop. Then, accompanied by the defendant’s wife, the police conducted a detailed 45-minute search of every room in the house. In Chadwick, federal officers seized a double-locked footlocker they suspected to contain marijuana. The footlocker was transported to a Federal police building where it was locked in an evidence storage room. A few hours later, at their convenience, the officers opened and searched the footlocker.
Neither Chimel nor Chadwick involved uncontrolled and potentially life-endangering situations like the situation in the case at bar. Also, the searches in those cases were much more intrusive than the quick, protective search undertaken here. Thus, I do not find either of these cases to be controlling or convincing precedents.
The case at bar is much more like Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v Hayden, 387 US 294; 87 S Ct 1642; 18 L Ed 2d 782 (1967). There the police were told that an armed robber had just entered a certain address. The police went to the address, a two-story house, and knocked on the door. A woman answered the door and admitted the police. The police knew the robber was armed, but they did not know where in the house he was. They immediately fanned out through the house looking for the robber and for weapons. In the course of the next few minutes, one policeman found the *13robber in an upstairs bedroom and arrested him. Ammunition for a handgun and a cap worn by the robber during the robbery were found underneath the mattress of the robber’s bed and ammunition for a shotgun was found in a bureau drawer. A sawed-off shotgun and a handgun were found on the main floor inside a toilet flush tank and clothing worn by the robber during the robbery was found in the basement inside a washing machine. The United States Supreme Court upheld the search for and seizure of all these items, saying:
"They [the police] acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man * * * and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that [the robber] was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape.” Warden v Hayden, supra, 298-299. (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, although the police knew where Crawl was and had already arrested him, three other persons, one of whom could have been the third participant in the robbery and murder, were milling or running around the small apartment. The situation was not under control. The police had every reason to believe that their lives were in danger. Sergeant Ewald’s cursory search, limited to the discovery and opening of the barber’s case (a logical place to hide a small handgun), was a minor intrusion into the defendant’s privacy necessary to insure that the police had control of the other handgun used in the robbery *14so that it could not be used against them by one of the three persons not yet under police control or arrest.
Justice Levin suggests that the police had other alternative courses of action that could have insured their safety just as well. Upon leisurely reflection, that may or may not seem true. However, we must remember that a police officer acting in a crisis situation does not enjoy the luxury of calm contemplation and collegial discussions before he or she must make on-the-scene decisions that may mean the difference between life and death.
Obviously, a line must be drawn somewhere. The sanctity of the home is an important value that must be protected. In drawing a line, however, other values must be weighed in the balance. The value of protecting police officers’ lives and of bringing a dangerous felon to the bar of justice are two that come to mind. These values must be carefully weighed according to the circumstances of each case.
Here, the search was quite limited in scope and it occurred contemporaneously with an ongoing situation potentially dangerous to the officers’ lives. The officers did not know what they would be facing when they entered the apartment. Sergeant Ewald only looked in one very logical place, the barber’s case laying on the bed, to find the missing handgun. The handgun and shells used in the crime were, in fact, in the case. He well could have judged that the security of all depended on finding and seizing the gun. In his place, I believe that my reaction would have been the same.
Sergeant Ewald acted reasonably under exigent circumstances. I would not draw the line as finely or as narrowly as Justice Levin has done today. *15Neither legal precedent nor moral values nor the need for a lesson to the police in self-restraint require a complete reversal of the defendant’s conviction on the basis of this search and seizure.
None of the other issues raised by the defendant warrant a complete reversal and the granting of a new trial. However, because his case was held in abeyance for the decision in People v Carter, supra, on the procedural issue of whether instructions on second degree murder must be given in felony murder cases, and because he requested such instructions at trial, he should receive the benefit of the Carter decision. Therefore, I would remand to the trial court for resentencing on a conviction of second-degree murder, or, upon the motion of the prosecutor for a new trial on the original charge of first-degree murder.
Ryan, J., concurred with Coleman, J.

 Justice Levin’s opinion is dicta to the extent that it attempts to decide whether the holding in People v Carter is to be retroactively applied to cases preceding Carter that were not held in abeyance for the decision in that case. It should also be noted that none of the cases cited by Justice Levin in footnote 2 of his opinion discussed whether Carter should be retroactively applied to nonabeyance cases. All of the cited cases were decided by peremptory orders and there*8fore should not be interpreted as controlling precedents on the issue of Carter’s retroactivity. The question of the extent of Carter’s retro-activity is still open.

 Ewald originally said he saw the case "under” the bed, but thereafter consistently testified that he saw it lying on top of the bed when he looked in the bedroom.