Court Opinion

ID: 9386214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 17:08:49.305013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.155650
License: Public Domain

J-A07037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    COREY BURNS                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1410 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0002222-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                             FILED APRIL 11, 2023

        Corey Burns (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas following his non-jury

conviction of aggravated assault1 and related charges for the stabbing of Jabril

Lassiter (Victim). On appeal, Appellant challenges both the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence supporting his convictions, in particular, the court’s

determination that the evidence disproved his claim of self-defense. For the

reasons below, we affirm.

        On February 24, 2020, Appellant stabbed Victim during a fight. He was

arrested and charged with aggravated assault, simple assault, possession of

an instrument of crime (PIC), terroristic threats, recklessly endangering

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).
J-A07037-23

another person, and attempted murder.2 The case proceeded to a non-jury

trial conducted on January 24, 2022.             The trial court summarized the

testimony presented as follows:

             [Victim] testified at trial that he resides at his grandmother’s
       home on the 2100 block of North Newkirk Street, in the city and
       county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Appellant lives across the
       street, and [Victim] has known him over ten years. Throughout
       the day of February 24, 2020, Appellant had an ongoing dispute
       with [Victim], his siblings, and cousins. Around 8:00 p.m., while
       [Victim] was “at a friend’s house” around the corner from his
       grandmother’s residence, his sister called to advise him of a “big
       altercation” then occurring at the home. [Victim] returned to the
       area and saw a lot of people outside — including his sisters and
       cousins — “yelling” and “arguing” with Appellant and his wife who
       were inside their own home. After [Victim] arrived, Appellant
       yelled from his home window: “Get your family.” When [Victim]
       replied “No,” Appellant said: “Okay, I'll be right back.” Appellant
       then exited his home and entered his vehicle that was parked on
       North Newkirk Street, which is a one-way street.

             [Victim] testified that the verbal confrontation with
       Appellant made him uncomfortable at his grandmother’s home
       because “[t]here was too much going on” and he “just wanted to
       leave.” One of [Victim’s] sisters therefore agreed to drive him
       elsewhere for the night. After Appellant had already entered his
       vehicle, [Victim] proceeded to walk toward his sister’s vehicle that
       was parked nearby. However, as [Victim] passed Appellant’s car,
       Appellant opened his driver’s side door, striking [Victim’s] arm.
       [Victim] responded by punching Appellant, who remained inside
       his vehicle. [Victim] testified that the two men then exchanged
       more punches before Appellant ultimately stabbed him:

             So once I threw a punch, he threw a punch, and now it’s
          to the point where we exchanging blows. And I’m not
          thinking nothing of it. All of a sudden, I hear my cousin yell,
          ‘He go[t] a knife, he got a knife,’ which made me instantly
          just jump back and made me want to check myself. I
____________________________________________

2 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a), 907(a), 2706(a)(1), 2705, 901, and 2502,
respectively.

                                           -2-
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          started checking myself. I had a big gash in my hoodie. I
          took my hoodie off, my shirt, my undershirt, and that’s
          when all the blood started coming out. I started to panic. I
          started getting weaker and weaker by the second.
          ...

              I was feeling weak. I was feeling like I was about to faint.
          It was more of like a panic than anything because I seen,
          like, how much blood I was losing. And my - as the situation
          happened, cops are coming down the street already. So my
          cousin yelled to them, ‘My cousin is stabbed, my cousin is
          stabbed. He need[s] attention.’ So they basically - like, I
          was losing too much blood so they put me in the car and
          they drove me to the hospital themselves.

              [Victim’s] cousin, Tequoia Baxter (“Ms. Baxter”), witnessed
       the altercation and testified that before the stabbing Appellant had
       quarreled with her and her relatives throughout the day.
       According to Ms. Baxter, Appellant repeatedly threatened to kill
       her, [Victim], and other family members:

          . . . He was saying, `I’m going to fuck y’all up. I’ll kill y’all.
          I’m going to beat you the fuck up. [Victim], I’m going to
          fuck you up. Quoia, you don't want it with my girl,’ which
          is me. I’m Quoia. `Y’all scared. Y’all don't want it over
          there. I’ll fuck everybody up in that house. I’m going to kill
          y’all.’ That’s mostly it.

             Ms. Baxter further testified that Appellant emerged from his
       home around 8:00 p.m., and that while entering his vehicle, he
       again threatened to kill [Victim] when he “catch[es]” him.[3] When
       [Victim] subsequently walked past Appellant’s vehicle, whose
       driver’s side door was partially open, the two men immediately
       commenced fighting. The fight lasted “about a minute or two,”
       and when Ms. Baxter attempted to pull [Victim] away from the
       vehicle, she saw Appellant reach for a shiny object. [Victim] then
       “started checking [himself]” and discovered he was bleeding
       profusely. Police officers soon arrived and transported [Victim]
       and Ms. Baxter to the hospital.

____________________________________________

3Specifically, Ms. Baxter testified that as Appellant was getting into his car,
he said “Brill, [referring to Victim,] when I catch you, I’m going to fuck you
up. I’m going to kill you when I catch you[.]” N.T., 1/24/22, at 33.

                                           -3-
J-A07037-23

             [During Ms. Baxter’s cross-examination, Appellant played
      body cam footage from an officer at the scene that included a
      statement by Ms. Baxter’s sister, Tecairra. The only questions
      Appellant asked Ms. Baxter regarding this recording was in
      relation to where Teciarra was located at the time of the incident.]

            The parties stipulated that [Victim] was admitted to Temple
      University Hospital with a stab wound to the left chest. He was
      provided two units of blood and “underwent needle decompression
      of the left chest followed by placement of a tube in the left chest.”
      [Victim] subsequently underwent thoracic surgery on March 3,
      2020, and he was discharged on March 6, 2020.

            Philadelphia Police Officer Cody McGovern testified that he
      responded to the altercation scene and observed “multiple people
      screaming and yelling” that Appellant “has a knife.” Officer
      McGovern approached Appellant’s vehicle and saw the knife in his
      hand. “After being asked multiple times,” Appellant “eventually
      dropped the knife” and Officer McGovern recovered the weapon,
      which was a pocket-knife with a 4-inch handle and a 3-and-a-half-
      inch blade.

             In his defense, Appellant presented the testimony of
      Philadelphia Police Officer Andres Ortega, who testified that he
      arrived at the scene after Appellant had already been arrested.
      Officer Ortega searched for witnesses and spoke to a male parked
      in a white van on the 2100 block of North Newkirk Street. This
      individual identified himself as Craig Thompson and Officer Ortega
      recorded their conversation on body cam[, which was played at
      trial]. Mr. Thompson advised Officer Ortega that he witnessed
      [Victim] open the car door and start punching Appellant, who
      defended himself and stabbed [Victim].

Trial Ct. Op., 7/14/22, at 2-4 (record citations & footnotes omitted). Appellant

did not testify at trial.

      In closing arguments, Appellant’s counsel maintained that Appellant

acted in self-defense. The trial court held the matter under advisement and

directed the parties to file post-trial briefs concerning the issue of self-defense.

Both Appellant and the Commonwealth filed briefs on February 11, 2022.

                                       -4-
J-A07037-23

       Thereafter, on February 15, 2022, the trial court entered a verdict of

guilty on all charges, except attempted murder. On April 13, 2022, Appellant

filed a pre-sentence motion for a new trial, contending the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence. See Appellant’s Pre-Sentence Motion for a New

Trial Because the Verdict was Against the Weight of the Evidence, 4/13/22, at

1-9 (unpaginated).       The court convened a hearing on April 27, 2022, but

ultimately denied Appellant’s motion on May 18, 2022. That same day, the

trial court sentenced Appellant to two concurrent terms of two to four years’

imprisonment for PIC and terroristic threats, to be served concurrently with a

term of six years’ probation for aggravated assault.         This timely appeal

follows.4

       Appellant presents the following two claims for our review:

       1. Was not the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to convict
          Appellant of aggravated assault, simple assault, [REAP], and
          [PIC], where [Victim] repeatedly punched Appellant, who was
          sitting inside his car, and the Commonwealth failed to disprove
          self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt?

       2. Did not the trial court err and abuse [its] discretion by denying
          Appellant’s pre-sentence motion for a new trial because the
          verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, where the
          trial court considered evidence of little weight regarding
          provocation?

____________________________________________

4Appellant complied with the trial court’s directive to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

                                           -5-
J-A07037-23

Appellant’s Brief at 3.5

       In his first issue, Appellant insists the evidence presented by the

Commonwealth was insufficient to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he acted in self-defense when he stabbed Victim.

       Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-

settled:

       In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support
       a [verdict], we are “obliged to determine whether the evidence
       presented at trial and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom,
       viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
       verdict winner, are sufficient to satisfy all elements of the offense
       beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1133 (Pa. 2011) (citation

omitted). While Appellant does not contest the fact that the evidence was

sufficient to establish the offense of aggravated assault,6 he nevertheless

insists that the evidence also proved he acted in self-defense.

       In considering a self-defense claim, we must bear in mind:

       When a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the
       Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a defense

____________________________________________

5 In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant presented a third issue, challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of terroristic threats.
See Appellant’s Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 6/13/22, at 2
(unpaginated). However, he has abandoned that issue on appeal.

6 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) (“A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he
. . . attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]”).

                                           -6-
J-A07037-23

      beyond a reasonable doubt. While there is no burden on a
      defendant to prove the claim, before the defense is properly at
      issue at trial, there must be some evidence, from whatever
      source, to justify a finding of self-defense. If there is any evidence
      that will support the claim, then the issue is properly before the
      fact finder.

Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. 2001) (citations

omitted). Here, we agree with Appellant that the issue of self-defense was

properly before the trial court, as fact-finder, based on Victim’s testimony that

he punched Appellant, who, at the time, was sitting in his own car. See N.T.,

1/24/22, at 13. Nevertheless, the question that remains is whether the trial

court properly determined the Commonwealth disproved Appellant’s claim of

self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

      Section 505(a) of the Crimes Code provides that “[t]he use of force upon

or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force

is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use

of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 505(a). Section 505(b)(2), however, restricts the use of “deadly force:”

      (2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section
      unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect
      himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual
      intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:

            (i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or serious
      bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in the
      same encounter; or

            (ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using
      such force with complete safety by retreating, except the actor is
      not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless
      he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by
      another person whose place of work the actor knows it to be.

                                      -7-
J-A07037-23

18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2)(i)-(ii).

      Therefore, the Commonwealth sustains its burden of disproving self-

defense if it establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least one of the

following:

      1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger
      of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or
      continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to
      retreat and the retreat was possible with complete safety.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted & emphases added). Moreover:

      The Commonwealth must establish only one of these three
      elements beyond a reasonable doubt to insulate its case from a
      self-defense challenge to the evidence. The Commonwealth can
      negate a self-defense claim if it proves the defendant did not
      reasonably believe he was in imminent danger of death or
      great bodily injury and it was necessary to use deadly force to
      save himself from that danger.

         The requirement of reasonable belief encompasses two
         aspects, one subjective and one objective.         First, the
         defendant must have acted out of an honest, bona fide belief
         that he was in imminent danger, which involves
         consideration of the defendant’s subjective state of mind.
         Second, the defendant’s belief that he needed to defend
         himself with deadly force, if it existed, must be reasonable
         in light of the facts as they appeared to the defendant, a
         consideration that involves an objective analysis.

      [T]he use of deadly force itself “cannot be viewed in isolation with
      [the victim] as the sole physical aggressor and [the defendant]
      acting in responsive self-defense. [T]his would be an incomplete
      and inaccurate view of the circumstances for self-defense
      purposes.” To claim self-defense, the defendant must be free
      from fault in provoking or escalating the altercation that led
      to the offense, before the defendant can be excused from using
      deadly force. Likewise, the Commonwealth can negate a self-
      defense claim by proving the defendant “used more force than

                                     -8-
J-A07037-23

      reasonably necessary to protect against death or serious bodily
      injury.”

Id. at 787-88 (citations omitted) (some emphasis in original & some emphasis

added).

      We note, too, that Section 505(b)(2.1) codifies the “castle doctrine,”

which creates a presumption that a victim’s forceful entry into a defendant’s

home or vehicle provides the defendant with the requisite reasonable belief

that a response with deadly force is necessary:

      (2.1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2.2), an actor is
      presumed to have a reasonable belief that deadly force is
      immediately necessary to protect himself against death, serious
      bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force
      or threat if both of the following conditions exist:

            (i) The person against whom the force is used is in the
      process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or has unlawfully and
      forcefully entered and is present within, a dwelling, residence or
      occupied vehicle; or the person against whom the force is used is
      or is attempting to unlawfully and forcefully remove another
      against that other’s will from the dwelling, residence or occupied
      vehicle.

           (ii) The actor knows or has reason to believe that the
      unlawful and forceful entry or act is occurring or has occurred.

18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.1)(i)-(ii).     However, as our Supreme Court has

explained, “Section 505(b)(2.1) does not . . . broaden the rights of the

accused when asserting a castle doctrine defense[, but i]nstead, provides an

evidentiary mechanism to aid in the factfinder’s evaluation of the merits of a

castle doctrine defense.” Commonwealth v. Childs, 142 A.3d 823, 831-32

(Pa. 2016). With this background in mind, we consider Appellant’s arguments

on appeal.

                                     -9-
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       Appellant first maintains that he possessed a reasonable “objective and

subjective belief that he needed to use deadly force to stop [Victim] from

punching him after [Victim] attacked him inside his own car[.]” Appellant’s

Brief at 20.       Appellant emphasizes that Victim admitted “to opening

[Appellant’s] car door and beginning the attack.”           Id. at 21.7     Further, he

insists he was entitled to a presumption that his use of deadly force was

necessary pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.1) because Victim “had

unlawfully    entered     and    was    present    within   [Appellant’s]    vehicle[.]”

Appellant’s Brief at 24.     He argues:

       His only choices were to let himself get punched repeatedly, try
       to drive the car (which would also risk serious bodily injury, not
       only to himself and [Victim], but to the crowd on the street), or to
       use the knife to defend himself.

Id. at 21.

       Next, Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to prove that he

provoked or prolonged the encounter that led to the stabbing. See Appellant’s

Brief at 25. He emphasizes that he need not be completely “free from blame”

to claim self-defense. See id. at 26. Rather, Section 505(b)(2)(i) provides

that provocation defeats self-defense only when “the provoking acts are made

with ‘the intent of causing death or serious bodily injury.’”          Id., citing 18

Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2)(i) (emphasis in original). Here, he insists that his act of

____________________________________________

7  We note that while Victim did testify he “opened” Appellant’s car door and
“threw a punch,” he stated he did so only after Appellant “opened” the door
first, and “hit [him] with it.” N.T., 1/24/22, at 13.

                                          - 10 -
J-A07037-23

opening his car door and bumping Victim’s arm was not sufficient provocation

to defeat his claim of self-defense under the statute. See Appellant’s Brief at

26-27. Nor, he asserts, did his purported “threatening statements to [Victim]

and his family . . . made prior to the encounter in the car . . . provoke the

attack.” Id. at 27.

      Third, Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to prove he had an

“avenue to retreat . . . with complete safety.” Appellant’s Brief at 32. He

emphasizes that he was “sitting in the driver’s seat of his car, with [Victim]

blocking his means of escape[,]” and that Victim “was fighting so aggressively

that even being stabbed was not enough to get him to cease his attack.” Id.

Furthermore, he maintains that even if he had been able to get out of his car,

he was “still amid a hostile, possibly violent crowd.”       Id.   Thus, it was

reasonable of him to believe he could not retreat in safety.

      Here, the trial court concluded that Appellant’s self-defense claims failed

“for several reasons.” Trial Ct. Op. at 8. The court opined:

      The testimony establishes that Appellant provoked or at least
      continued “the difficulty” that led to the stabbing. From inside his
      home, Appellant argued throughout the day with [Victim] and his
      family. [Victim’s] cousin, Ms. Baxter, testified that Appellant
      repeatedly threatened to “beat” and “kill” [Victim] and his
      relatives. [Victim] testified that during the argument Appellant
      yelled at him to “[g]et your family.” When [Victim] replied “no,”
      Appellant said he would “be right back.”

      . . . Appellant [then] exited his home and walked towards his
      vehicle, where he possessed a knife. Before entering his vehicle,
      Appellant again threatened to kill [Victim] when he “catch[es]”
      him. [Victim] testified that he thereafter walked past Appellant’s
      vehicle, and that Appellant opened his driver's side door and
      struck [Victim] with the door. In response, [Victim] punched

                                     - 11 -
J-A07037-23

     Appellant and a fight ensued, during which Appellant stabbed the
     unarmed [Victim].

            By verbally provoking and/or continuing the altercation —
     i.e., threatening to kill [Victim] and his family, and striking
     [Victim] with his vehicle’s door — Appellant forfeited his claim of
     self-defense.

           The evidence similarly failed to establish that Appellant
     “entertained a reasonable belief that he was in danger of death or
     serious bodily injury and thus it was necessary to use deadly
     force” when he stabbed [Victim].         “The requirement of a
     reasonable belief encompasses two aspects, one subjective and
     one objective.” “First, the defendant must have acted out of an
     honest, bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger, which
     involves consideration of the defendant's subjective state of
     mind.”

           As Appellant noted in his post-verdict motion, under 18
     Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2.1), a defendant is “presumed to have a
     reasonable belief that deadly force is immediately necessary to
     protect himself against death [or] serious bodily injury” when ( 1)
     “[t]he person against whom force is used is in the process of
     unlawfully and forcefully entering . . . [an] occupied vehicle . . . ,”
     and (2) “[t]he actor knows or has reason to believe that the
     unlawful and forceful entry or act is occurring or has occurred.”

                                  *     *      *

            Here, the Commonwealth’s testimony regarding Appellant’s
     conduct overcomes his “presumed” reasonable belief that deadly
     force was immediately necessary to protect himself against death
     or serious bodily injury. The testimony established that Appellant
     was at least partially or equally responsible for provoking the fight
     with the unarmed [Victim]. Ms. Baxter testified that Appellant
     repeatedly threatened to “beat” and “kill” [Victim] and his
     relatives, and [Victim] testified that during the argument
     Appellant had yelled at him to “[g]et your family.” When [Victim]
     replied “no,” Appellant said he would “be right back.” Appellant
     then exited his home, walked towards his vehicle, and again
     threatened to kill [Victim] when he “catch[es]” him. [Victim]
     testified that when he thereafter walked past Appellant’s vehicle
     to enter his sister’s vehicle, Appellant opened his driver’s side door
     and struck [Victim] with the door. A fight ensued with both men
     exchanging punches, but there is no testimony regarding who, if
     anyone, obtained an advantage in the struggle. Nevertheless,

                                      - 12 -
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      Appellant at some point stabbed his unarmed opponent with a
      knife.

             Aside from the evidentiary presumption that is belied by
      Appellant’s own conduct, there is simply no other evidence
      supporting that Appellant believed that he was in “danger of death
      or serious bodily injury” from the unarmed person whom he just
      threatened to beat up and kill. While the evidence supports an
      assumption that Appellant anticipated and desired a physical
      altercation with [Victim], the testimony does not support that
      Appellant feared death or serious bodily injury from the
      anticipated confrontation.     Moreover, Appellant could have
      avoided the physical altercation altogether, which he clearly must
      have anticipated under the circumstances, by staying inside his
      home and calling the police.

             Lastly, “when the actor is confronted by non-deadly force,”
      his “retaliation must not be excessive.” The testimony here
      establishes that Appellant sought an altercation with [Victim], and
      that when the altercation occurred with only punches being
      exchanged, Appellant grabbed a knife and stabbed his unarmed
      foe. There was no evidence that [Victim], who fought with his
      fists, posed a deadly threat during the altercation.

             Because Appellant did not establish that “his use of a knife
      was necessary to protect himself against serious bodily injury, and
      because even if [Appellant] retained the privilege of self-defense
      after the altercation began,” his “use of force was excessive” and
      defeats his self-defense claim.

Id. at 8-12 (citations & footnotes omitted).

      Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant

statutory and case law, we agree with the trial court’s analysis.           While

Appellant focuses on the fact that he was “attacked . . . inside of his own

car[,]” he neglects to appreciate the circumstances surrounding, and leading

up to, the purported “attack.”    See Appellant’s Brief at 20.   As the court

recounts, Appellant argued with Victim and his family throughout the day and

repeatedly threatened to beat up or kill Victim and his family. See Trial Ct.

                                    - 13 -
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Op. at 8-9; N.T., 1/24/22, at 32-34. Moreover, immediately before Appellant

left his home to go to his car, he yelled to Victim, “Get your family[,]” to which

Victim replied, “No.” N.T., 1/24/22, at 12. Appellant then stated, “Okay. I’ll

be right back.” Id. Appellant left his home and went directly to his car. See

id. As Victim walked by Appellant’s car, Appellant hit Victim with the car door,

and Victim responded by punching Appellant. See id. at 12-13. Appellant

then returned the blows. As the trial court points out, “there is no testimony

regarding who, if anyone, obtained an advantage in the struggle.” Trial Ct.

Op. at 11.

      However, Ms. Baxter testified that during the ensuing fist fight, she

witnessed Appellant “reaching toward the passenger side of his car” before he

had a knife in his hand. See N.T., 1/24/22, at 35. Therefore, considering

Appellant’s prior threats, the trial court could have concluded that Appellant

left his home specifically to retrieve the knife which he knew he had in his car.

In any event, the circumstances precipitating Victim’s first blow support the

trial court’s determination that Appellant “continu[ed] the altercation” ─ thus,

“forfeit[ing] his claim of self-defense” ─ and that he did not possess an

objectively reasonable belief that he was required to use deadly force to

protect himself. See Trial Ct. Op. at 9, 11.

      Appellant cites several cases in support of his assertion that “the use of

deadly force against an unarmed complainant can be justified.”               See

Appellant’s Brief at 22-23 (emphasis added).          However, none of those

decisions compel a different result here.

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      Both Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949 (Pa. 1981), and

Commonwealth v. Helm, 402 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1979), are domestic abuse

cases. In Watson, there was evidence the victim (the defendant’s husband)

“often hit” the defendant, and, on the night in question, knocked her to the

ground, threatened to kill her, and was on top of her strangling her when she

shot him. Watson, 431 A.2d at 951-52. The Supreme Court reversed the

defendant’s conviction of voluntary manslaughter, concluding:

            In view of [the defendant’s] history of abuse at the hands
      of her husband, along with his increased determination and use of
      force against her immediately prior to the shooting, and in view
      of the testimony of the Commonwealth’s own witness, . . . that
      [the defendant] shot her husband only after he had placed his
      hands around her neck, we conclude that [the defendant’s] belief
      that she was in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death
      when she shot her husband was reasonable, and that the
      Commonwealth failed to introduce sufficient evidence to negate
      [her] claim of self-defense on this ground.

Id.

      Similarly, in Helm, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s

conviction of voluntary manslaughter, concluding that the Commonwealth

failed to disprove that the defendant reasonably believed she was in danger

of death or serious bodily injury when she stabbed the victim, her boyfriend,

in her own home. See Helm, 402 A.2d at 504. The Court explained:

      The [u]ncontradicted evidence revealed that the stabbing
      occurred during an argument in which the victim pursued [the
      defendant] throughout the apartment, beat her, knocked her
      down several times, choked her, and repeatedly hit her head
      against the floor all of this at a time when [the defendant] was six
      months pregnant.

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Id. The facts in Watson and Helm do not bear any resemblance to those

presented herein.

        Appellant also relies on Commonwealth v. Eberle, 379 A.2d 90 (Pa.

1977), which, while not a domestic abuse case, involved a drunken male

attacking a female friend in her own home.         Prior to the stabbing, the

“exceedingly drunk” victim “tore” down bookshelves and screamed at

defendant before “lung[ing]” at her, at which time she grabbed a knife and

fatally stabbed him. See id. at 92. Unlike here, the defendant was alone in

her one-room apartment when the victim became violent. See id. at 94. The

Supreme Court concluded, inter alia, that the Commonwealth failed to

disprove that the defendant reasonably believed she was in danger of death

or serious bodily injury. Id. Here, prior to the stabbing, Appellant and Victim

were involved in a mutual fist fight, following a day-long rift between the two

families.

        Lastly, Appellant relies upon Commonwealth v. Schaller, 426 A.2d

1090 (Pa. 1981).       See Appellant’s Brief at 22-23.   However, the issue in

Schaller was whether, inter alia, the trial court should have charged the

jury on self-defense, when the defendant presented “some evidence of self-

defense”8 ─ not whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was

sufficient to disprove self-defense. See Schaller, 426 A.2d at 1096. Thus,

contrary to Appellant’s characterization, the Supreme Court did not determine
____________________________________________

8   See Schaller, 426 A.2d at 1095-96.

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that the defendant acted in self-defense when he shot an unarmed larger man

moving towards him “reaching out with his hands raised.” See Appellant’s

Brief at 22-23.

      Notably, Appellant does not address the case cited by the trial court ─

Commonwealth v. Jones, 332 A.2d 464 (Pa. Super. 1974) ─ for the

proposition that “when the actor is confronted by non-deadly force, his

retaliation must not be excessive.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 12 (some quotation

marks omitted), citing Jones, 332 A.2d at 466. In Jones, earlier on the day

of the incident, the defendant had fought with his common law wife’s son and

nephew when he went to her home to pick up some belongings. See Jones,

332 A.2d at 465. Later that evening, the defendant’s common law wife called

him to warn him that her son, his cousin and two others were heading to his

residence. See id. The defendant told her to call the police, which she did.

Id.

      Meanwhile, the defendant “armed himself with a kitchen knife, and left

the premises to await the arrival of the carload of hostile youths.” Jones, 332

A.2d at 465. After the youths threw some items at the house, the defendant

left his porch to confront them. Id. One of the youths kicked the defendant.

Id. The defendant struck the victim, who then pushed the defendant to the

ground. Id. After the defendant “jumped” up, he used the knife to “slash[ ]”

at the victim. Id. The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and

appealed arguing his “intent was vitiated by [his] showing of self-defense.”

Id.

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      A panel of this Court rejected Appellant’s claim for several reasons:

      [The defendant] knew that the police had been notified, so that
      any possible danger to his house would be abated immediately.
      Nonetheless, he left the security of his home to confront the
      youths. The force exerted against the youths by the [defendant],
      therefore, was not ‘immediately necessary’ to protect himself. Nor
      was his belief that force was necessary reasonable because he
      knew that the police were coming. There was already animosity
      between the [defendant] and the youths. Therefore, by coming
      onto the porch when the action was not reasonably necessary,
      [defendant] was ‘continuing the difficulty’ that resulted in the
      assault of [the victim]. Further, the force exercised on the
      [defendant] did not justify the use of deadly force. (Wielding a
      knife certainly amounts to the use of deadly force.)          [The
      defendant] chose to engage in fisticuffs, but then drew his knife
      after he had been knocked down. . . .

Jones, 332 A.2d at 466.

      The facts in Jones are similar to those presented herein. Appellant and

Victim’s family had been engaged in an argument for most of the day.

Appellant was safely inside his own home, but chose to leave to go to his car

after threatening Victim, and then struck Victim with his car door as Victim

passed by ─ actions, which the trial court found, at the very least, “continu[ed]

the altercation[.]” See Trial Ct. Op. at 9.

      Appellant, however, insists that while he “may have engaged in bravado

within the context of a neighborhood beef,” he was forced to resort to the use

of deadly force “when he was attacked inside his own vehicle and surrounded

by a hostile crowd.”      Appellant’s Brief at 25.     The court rejected this

characterization, finding there was no evidence supporting Appellant’s

purported belief “that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury from

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the unarmed person whom he just threatened to beat up and kill.” Id. at 11

(quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the court also determined “[t]here was

no evidence that [Victim], who fought with his fists, posed a deadly threat

during the [ensuing] altercation.” Id. at 12. Because we agree the evidence

presented by the Commonwealth sufficiently disproved Appellant’s claim that

he “reasonably believed” he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury at

the time of the attack, and Appellant responded with more force than

necessary to defend himself, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge warrants no

relief. See Smith, 97 A.3d at 787 (“The Commonwealth must establish only

one of these three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to insulate its case

from a self-defense challenge to the evidence.”).

       In his second issue, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence

supporting his conviction. Our review of a weight claim is well-established:9

       When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we
       review the trial court’s exercise of discretion. A trial court may
       sustain a weight challenge only if the verdict is so contrary to the
       evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. The weight of
       the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to
       believe all, none or some of the evidence and to determine the
       credibility of the witnesses. We defer to the trial court’s decision
       regarding a weight of the evidence claim because it had the
       opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented.

____________________________________________

9We note that Appellant properly preserved this claim in a timely post-verdict
motion filed prior to sentencing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Appellant’s Pre-
Sentence Motion for a New Trial Because the Verdict was Against the Weight
of the Evidence, 4/13/22.

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Commonwealth v. Clemens, 242 A.3d 659, 667 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations

& quotation marks omitted).

      Here, Appellant argues “[i]t shocks the conscience to base the verdict

on [Victim’s] dubious description of getting bumped by Appellant’s car door

[as] provocation justifying [Victim’s] attack.” Appellant’s Brief at 34-35. He

emphasizes that the only witness who testified that Appellant opened his car

door and bumped Victim was Victim himself. See id. at 35. Rather, Appellant

maintains the “more accurate” and sensible sequence of events was supplied

by Ms. Baxter’s sister, Tecairra, who was recorded on body cam video

providing the following sequence of events: Appellant called Victim “a bitch,”

at which time Victim walked up to the car and said, “What [did] you say?,”

before he opened the car door and “started swinging” at Appellant. Id. at 36.

Appellant also insists his threats to Victim did not constitute sufficient

provocation for the attack, considering that Victim’s “family advanced the

verbal back and forth as much as Appellant.”           Id.      Indeed, Appellant

emphasizes Officer McGovern’s testimony that the scene was “chaotic” with

“maybe 20 people outside screaming and yelling[.]”           Id. at 37 (quotation

marks omitted), citing N.T., 1/24/22, at 47.

      In addressing Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim, the trial court

emphasized that it “considered the overall circumstances in which the

altercation   occurred[,]”   which   was   “the   culmination    of   an   ongoing

confrontation[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 13 (citation & quotation marks omitted).

The court further explained that: during the preceding argument Appellant

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threatened to beat up and kill Victim and his family; he told Victim he would

“be right back,” after instructing Victim to “get his family” and Victim replied

“no[;]” and Appellant walked straight to his vehicle while threatening Victim

again. See id. at 13. While the court acknowledged there was “conflicting

testimony” as to whether Appellant struck Victim with his car door, it

concluded “the weight of the testimony (1) did not establish that Appellant’s

‘use of a knife was necessary to protect himself against serious bodily

injury[;]’ (2) but did establish that Appellant at least shared culpability in

provoking the altercation, and this his use of force in stabbing his unarmed

foe was excessive.” Id. at 13-14. Appellant has failed to demonstrate the

court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion, and, therefore, his challenge

to the weight of the evidence fails. See Clemens, 242 A.3d at 667.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/11/2023

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