Court Opinion

ID: 9898996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 17:10:41.927697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:12.653655
License: Public Domain

J-A22005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 WILLIAM H. HENSLER JR.,               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 WHOLESALE MINE SUPPLY, L.P.,          :        PENNSYLVANIA
 WSAJT PROPERTIES, L.P.                :
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
 BECKER/WHOLESALE MINE SUPPLY,         :
 LLC, BECKER GLOBAL-AMERICA, INC.      :
 (AKA/FKA/SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST        :   No. 293 WDA 2023
 TO BECKER MINING AMERICA, INC.),      :
 BECKER MINING SYSTEMS, A.G.,          :
 GREGORY A. SANDERS, FRANZ             :
 BECKER, WOLFGANG WEGNER, AND          :
 MAX BRINCKMANN                        :
 _____________________                 :
                                       :
 BECKER/WHOLESALE MINE SUPPLY,         :
 LLC AND BECKER GLOBAL-AMERICA,        :
 INC.                                  :
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
 WILLIAM H. HENSLER JR., SUSAN J.      :
 HENSLER, WHOLESALE MINE SUPPLY,       :
 L.P., COMTROL CORP., ALAN J.          :
 QUINN, JOSEPH A. DIBRIDGE, AND        :
 HENSLER COMMUNICATIONS                :
 CONSULTANTS, L.P. D/B/A/ HC           :
 GLOBAL, AND COMTROL-WEST, LLC         :
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: ALAN J. QUINN,             :
 COMTROL CORPORATION, AND              :
 COMTROL-WEST. LLC                     :

            Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at
                             No(s): 5219

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                     FILED: November 15, 2023
J-A22005-23

      Alan J. Quinn, Comtrol Corporation (“Comtrol”), and Comtrol-West, LLC

(collectively, the “Quinn Parties”) appeal from the order granting the motion

to compel and for sanctions filed by Becker/Wholesale Mine Supply, LLC and

Becker Global America, Inc. (collectively, the “Becker Parties”). We reverse

and remand for further proceedings.

      By way of background, this matter involves complex cross-cases filed

by the Quinn Parties, the Becker Parties, and several other non-participants

on appeal. After a lengthy, consolidated non-jury trial, the trial court found

the Quinn Parties liable for damages as to several of the counts raised in the

complaints. While post-trial motions were pending, the Becker Parties filed a

motion for preliminary injunctive relief, seeking an order prohibiting the Quinn

Parties from dissipating their assets and requesting appointment of a receiver

to monitor Comtrol’s financial status.

      After negotiation, the parties resolved the motion by filing a consent

order to appoint a limited receiver for Comtrol (“Consent Injunction Order”).

Relevant to this appeal, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Consent Injunction Order

outlined the duties of Comtrol concerning the receiver. Paragraph 6 stated in

whole as follows:

      By the seventh day of each month, Comtrol shall send the receiver
      electronically financial and accounting data for the immediate
      prior month, including without limitation producing the
      QuickBooks backup file for Comtrol (i.e. the .qbb file) or any
      equivalent file for other accounting software utilized by Comtrol,
      to enable the receiver to (i) analyze Comtrol’s sales, expenses,
      overhead, net profit, gross profit, liabilities and equity and (ii)
      develop income statements, balance sheets and cash flow

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      statements. In addition, Comtrol will be required to produce to
      the receiver on a monthly basis any contract/agreement entered
      into by Comtrol during the prior month, and, on an annual basis,
      produce Comtrol’s federal and state tax returns. The receiver will
      be compensated by [the Becker Parties].

Consent Injunction Order, 12/30/22, at ¶ 6 (cleaned up). Paragraph 7 of the

Consent Injunction Order provided that, “To the extent the receiver has

questions regarding data he/she is reviewing, the receiver shall be permitted

to communicate with, and ask questions to, Alan Quinn, President of Comtrol,

and Mr. Quinn shall promptly respond to the questions truthfully and

accurately.” Id. at ¶ 7.

      Following entry of the Consent Injunction Order, the court appointed

Thomas Pratt of Schneider Downs & Co., Inc. as the limited receiver. Mr. Pratt

then requested certain historical documents from Comtrol, including annual

financial statements, tax returns, key employee compensation, and sales

information, from years 2019 through 2022.       Mr. Pratt indicated that he

needed this information to provide context for his evaluation and analysis of

the accounting data received by Comtrol. The Quinn Parties refused to provide

the bulk of the documents sought, asserting that they were beyond the scope

of the Consent Injunction Order since they related to matters preceding the

receiver’s appointment.

      The Becker Parties consequently filed a motion to compel and for

sanctions. The Quinn Parties filed an opposition, and the court entertained

oral argument. On February 17, 2023, the trial court granted the motion in

whole, directing the Quinn Parties to provide the documentation requested by

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the limited receiver and imposing sanctions on the Quinn Parties and their

counsel, finding that they “lacked a good faith basis to oppose the motion.”

Order of Court, 2/17/23, at ¶ 2.

         The Quinn Parties filed a timely appeal. Both the Quinn Parties and the

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The Quinn Parties raise the following

two issues on appeal:

    I.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
           error of law by improperly modifying and expanding the scope
           of the Quinn Parties’ and Becker Parties’ Consent Injunction
           Order contrary to its plain language and the parties’ intent?

   II.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
           error of law by imposing sanctions against the Quinn Parties
           and their counsel based upon its erroneous conclusion that they
           “lacked a good faith basis” in opposing the Becker Parties’
           motion to compel and for sanctions and where the mandatory
           procedures of Pa.R.C.P. 1023.2 were not followed?

Quinn Parties’ brief at 4 (cleaned up).

         Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we first consider the

appealability of the order in question, as it impacts this Court’s jurisdiction.

See Calabretta v. Guidi Homes, Inc., 241 A.3d 436, 441 n.6 (Pa.Super.

2020) (stating that “[b]ecause we lack jurisdiction over an unappealable

order, it is incumbent on us to determine, sua sponte when necessary,

whether the appeal is taken from an appealable order.” (cleaned up)). On

June 30, 2023, this Court issued a rule for the Quinn Parties to show cause

why the order appealed from either satisfied the three-prong test of a

collateral order set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 313(b), or was appealable as an order

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modifying an injunction pursuant to Rule 311(a)(4). The Quinn Parties filed a

timely response, asserting that the order was appealable under both sections

in question. The rule was discharged, and the parties were advised that this

issue may be revisited by this panel.

      Rule 311 provides in pertinent part as follows:

      (a) General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right and
      without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from the following types of
      orders:

                  ....

      (4) Injunctions. An order that grants or denies, modifies or
      refuses to modify, continues or refuses to continue, or dissolves
      or refuses to dissolve an injunction unless the order was entered:

            (i) Pursuant to [certain provisions of the Divorce Code]; or

            (ii) After a trial but before entry of the final order. Such
      order is immediately appealable, however, if the order enjoins
      conduct previously permitted or mandated or permits or
      mandates conduct not previously mandated or permitted,
      and is effective before entry of the final order.

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a) (emphasis added).

      This Court has stated that pursuant to subsection (ii) above, “an appeal

may be taken from an order that (because a final judgment has not yet been

entered) is not otherwise appealable . . . if (1) the order enjoins conduct

previously allowed or allows conduct previously prohibited, and (2) the

injunction takes effect before entry of a final judgment.”       Thomas A.

Robinson Family Ltd. P’ship v. Bioni, 178 A.3d 839, 847 (Pa.Super. 2017).

The clear purpose of this subsection to the rule “is to permit an immediate

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appeal if an immediately-effective permanent injunction makes such a change

to the status quo that the aggrieved party needs quick appellate recourse

without incurring delays from post-trial proceedings in the trial court.” Id.

      In their response to the rule to show cause, the Quinn Parties asserted

that the order in question satisfies Rule 311 above and is appealable because

it (1) modified the scope of the Consent Injunction Order, (2) mandated new

conduct by compelling the Quinn Parties to produce documents to a limited

receiver, and (3) was entered and made effective before entry of the final

order.   See Quinn Parties’ response to rule to show cause at 7-12. Upon

review, we agree that the order is appealable pursuant to 311(a)(4)(ii). It

clearly “mandates conduct not previously mandated” from the Quinn Parties,

and there is no dispute that the order was effective before entry of a final

order, since it was entered while post-trial motions were still pending before

the court. Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4)(ii); see also Thomas A. Robinson Family

Ltd. P’ship, supra at 846.       Moreover, we determine that the order is

appealable insofar as it imposes sanctions on the Quinn Parties and their

attorneys. See Stewart v. Foxworth, 65 A.3d 468, 471 (Pa.Super. 2013)

(stating that “[a]n order imposing sanctions, including one that imposes

sanctions on an attorney, is considered a final order and is therefore

appealable.”).

      Having determined that this appeal is properly before us, we now turn

to the merits. The Quinn Parties’ first contention is that the trial court erred

by expanding the obligations of the parties pursuant to the Consent Injunction

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Order. See Quinn Parties’ brief at 15-22. A consent order “is a contract which

has been given judicial sanction, and, as such, it must be interpreted in

accordance with the general principles governing the interpretation of all

contracts.”   Com. ex rel. Kane v. UPMC, 129 A.3d 441, 463 (Pa. 2015)

(citation omitted).

      This Court has stated thusly concerning contract disputes:

      [W]hen interpreting the language of a contract, the intention of
      the parties is a paramount consideration. In determining the
      intent of the parties to a written agreement, the court looks to
      what they have clearly expressed, for the law does not assume
      that the language of the contract was chosen carelessly.

      When interpreting agreements containing clear and unambiguous
      terms, we need only examine the writing itself to give effect to
      the parties’ intent. The language of a contract is unambiguous if
      we can determine its meaning without any guide other than a
      knowledge of the simple facts on which, from the nature of the
      language in general, its meaning depends. When terms in a
      contract are not defined, we must construe the words in
      accordance with their natural, plain, and ordinary meaning. As
      the parties have the right to make their own contract, we will not
      modify the plain meaning of the words under the guise of
      interpretation or give the language a construction in conflict with
      the accepted meaning of the language used.

      On the contrary, the terms of a contract are ambiguous if the
      terms are reasonably or fairly susceptible of different
      constructions and are capable of being understood in more than
      one sense. Additionally, we will determine that the language is
      ambiguous if the language is obscure in meaning through
      indefiniteness of expression or has a double meaning. Where the
      language of the contract is ambiguous, the provision is to be
      construed against the drafter.

Riverview Carpet & Flooring, Inc. v. Presbyterian SeniorCare, 299 A.3d

937, 983-84 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citation omitted).

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      The Quinn Parties argue that the trial court ignored the plain language

of the Consent Injunction Order and expanded the scope of the limited

receivership.   See Quinn Parties’ brief at 18-20.   They focus primarily on

paragraph 6 of the order, which they assert clearly delineates an obligation to

produce only particular accounting and financial documents to the receiver

relating to the preceding month. Id. at 18-19. The Quinn Parties aver that

this language imposes solely “forward looking” duties on Comtrol, which do

not include producing historical documents. Id. at 18. As such, they contend

that the court was in error by compelling them to produce the financial

statements, tax returns, and other documents from 2019 through 2022

identified in the court’s order.

      In rejecting this claim, the trial court looked to the purpose of the

agreement, determining that the goal was “to allow Comtrol to continue

operating its business while preventing the dissipation of assets to preserve

the value of the company at the time of the judgments in which it was

implicated.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/3/23, at 3. Based on this, the court stated

that “the receiver must have some baseline information to assess any

changes” to Comtrol’s business value. Id. Therefore, it rejected the Quinn

Parties’ position that the Consent Injunction Order was “forward looking,”

concluding that the objective of the agreement would be rendered moot

because “there would be no cognizable way to assess whether assets have

been dissipated or not.” Id.

                                     -8-
J-A22005-23

      For their part, the Becker Parties likewise assert that the trial court did

not err in compelling production of the documents sought by the limited

receiver.   See Becker Parties’ brief at 24-32.       Particularly, they cite to

paragraph 7 of the Consent Injunction Order, which allows the receiver to ask

questions to Comtrol’s president, Mr. Quinn, about any documents distributed,

and mandates that Mr. Quinn provide prompt and truthful answers. Id. at 26.

The Becker Parties interpret this language as setting no limitation on the

questions that the limited receiver may ask or the form of information he may

request. Id. Additionally, they argue that when this language is construed

within the context of the order as a whole, it is plainly necessary for the

receiver to obtain this information so that he can monitor Comtrol’s obligations

to continue operating “in the ordinary course of business” pursuant to the

Consent Injunction Order. Id. at 26-27. Similar to the trial court, the Becker

Parties contend that the only reasonable way to interpret the Consent

Injunction Order is to permit the limited receiver to acquire the historical

documents in question. Id. at 29-32.

      After careful review of the certified record and the applicable law, we

conclude the court erred in compelling the Quinn Parties to produce the

documents requested by the limited receiver. Initially, we determine that the

terms of the Consent Injunction Order are clear and unambiguous on their

face, and therefore we need not look beyond the writing itself to determine

the intent of the parties. See Riverview, supra at 983. As the Quinn Parties

highlight, paragraph 6 of the Consent Injunction Order provides that by the

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seventh day of a given month, Comtrol “shall send the receiver electronically

financial and accounting data for the immediate prior month[.]” Consent

Injunction Order, 12/30/22, at ¶ 6 (emphasis added). Nowhere does it require

that Comtrol produce any documents prior to the month of the limited

receiver’s appointment, let alone ones dating back to 2019. The language

employed by the parties clearly expressed an intent to give a narrower scope

of powers to the limited receiver.

      Moreover, we are not persuaded by the Becker Parties’ reliance on

paragraph 7 of the Consent Injunction Order to support its position that

Comtrol was required to produce historic documents from 2019 through 2022.

That provision permitted the limited receiver to ask questions of Mr. Quinn

“regarding data he/she is reviewing” and mandated that he respond truthfully,

but it did not impose any duty to produce documents other than those

identified in the agreement. Id. at ¶ 7. This process is wholly consistent with

the parties’ negotiated agreement for appointment of a limited receiver, and

this interpretation does not render the purpose of the Consent Injunction

Order moot, as the trial court concluded.

      In short, by compelling production of documents not encompassed by

the plain language of the Consent Injunction Order, the trial court expanded

the scope of the agreement under the guise of interpretation.      We cannot

countenance this result when the law necessitates a presumption that the

written words used by these sophisticated parties were chosen with care. See

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Riverview, supra at 983. Based on the above, the order granting the motion

to compel must be reversed.

      The Quinn Parties next contend that, among other reasons, the court

erred in granting sanctions against them and their counsel when it determined

that they lacked a good faith basis in opposing the Becker Parties’ motion to

compel.   See Quinn Parties’ brief at 38-42.       Concerning sanctions, our

standard of review “is one of abuse of discretion by the trial court.”     ACE

American Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyds and Companies, 939 A.2d

935, 945 (Pa.Super. 2007). We note that “[a]n abuse of discretion is not

merely an error of judgment.           It requires a showing of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly

erroneous.” SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 217 A.3d 1248,

1251 (Pa.Super. 2019).

      Here, the trial court ascertained that sanctions were appropriate

because it had “ample basis to find that the Quinn [P]arties had no good faith

basis for opposing the motion to compel.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/3/23, at 5.

As such, it concluded that the sanctions were allowable pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.

1023.1(c) and (d), where parties “knowingly raise, in bad faith, frivolous

claims which have no reasonable possibility of success, for the purpose of

harassing, obstructing or delaying the opposing party.”        Id. (discussing

Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1).

      As discussed in detail above, the Quinn Parties not only had a good faith

basis in which to oppose the motion to compel, but their claim in opposition

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warranted denial of that motion.          Accordingly, we conclude that the court

abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against the Quinn Parties and their

counsel when its decision rested upon an incorrect finding. Therefore, the

court’s order granting sanctions against the Quinn Parties cannot stand.1

       Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 11/15/2023

____________________________________________

1 Since we grant relief to the Quinn Parties for the reasons stated supra, we

do not address their alternative argument concerning the Becker Parties’
alleged failure to properly request sanctions in accordance with Pa.R.C.P.
1023.2. See Quinn Parties’ brief at 31-38.

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