Court Opinion

ID: 9396280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-20 06:11:35.558783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.794516
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed May 18, 2023

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                              No. 11-21-00295-CV
                                  __________

      APACHE CORPORATION AND APA CORPORATION,
                     Appellants
                                          V.
  APOLLO EXPLORATION, LLC; COGENT EXPLORATION,
       LTD., CO.; AND SELLMOCO, LLC, Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 385th District Court
                           Midland County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. CV57872

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION
      This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss brought
under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (West 2020). In this case, we consider whether a
fraudulent transfer claim is “based on, or in response to” Appellants’ exercise of free
speech, when the facts supporting the claim were disclosed in a press release that
was issued by Appellants. See id. §§ 27.003(a), .005(b). We hold that the claim is
based on and in response to the conduct of Appellants in transferring assets, rather
than any exercise of free speech in the press release. On that basis, we affirm the
trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to dismiss under the TCPA.
                                 Background Facts
      This appeal is the latest development in litigation that spans nearly a decade.
In 2014, Apollo Exploration, LLC; Cogent Exploration, Ltd., Co.; and SellmoCo,
LLC (collectively, Appellees) sued Apache Corporation for breach of a purchase
and sale agreement that involved 109 oil and gas leases. As trial approached, the
trial court struck all of Appellees’ expert witnesses on damages and rendered a take-
nothing judgment in favor of Apache. The trial court also awarded $4,800,000 in
attorneys’ fees to Apache. An appeal to this court followed. See Apollo Expl.,
LLC v. Apache Corp., 631 S.W.3d 502, 514 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021), rev’d in
part, No. 21-0587, 2023 WL 3134243 (Tex. Apr. 28, 2023). We will refer to our
prior opinion and the appeal from which it arose as “Apollo I.” As reflected in our
case citation to Apollo I, the Texas Supreme Court recently reversed in part our
opinion in Apollo I and remanded the case back to us for further proceedings. 2023
WL 3134243, at *18.
      The press release at the center of the TCPA claim was issued on January 4,
2021, while the appeal of Apollo I was pending in this court. In the press release,
Apache announced a reorganization. The reorganization included a transfer of
Apache’s assets in Suriname and the Dominican Republic to Appellant APA
Corporation. The press release also included a statement from John J. Christmann
IV, Apache’s chief executive officer and president. Christmann indicated that the
reorganization would “modernize our operating and legal structure” and that the use

                                         2
of a holding company “offers advantages in risk management.” Apache later issued
a second press release on March 1, 2021, announcing that the reorganization had
been completed.
      We issued our opinion in Apollo I in June 2021, reversing in part and
remanding to the trial court for the determination of several causes of action. 631
S.W.3d at 545. Soon thereafter, on August 17, 2021, Appellees filed the lawsuit
against Apache and APA that is the subject of this appeal. The lawsuit, which
repeatedly references the January 4 press release in its statement of facts, asserts a
cause of action under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA), alleging
that the reorganization made it impossible, or at least more difficult, to reach the
Suriname and Dominican Republic assets in order to satisfy a judgment against
Apache. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001–.013 (West 2023).
      Apache and APA answered and filed a motion to dismiss. Although most of
the motion to dismiss was focused on a request for dismissal under Rule 91a of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion also, in a single paragraph, generally
sought relief under the TCPA, indicating that “in attempting to impose liability on
Apache for its communications with its shareholders, Plaintiffs are infringing upon
Apache’s right to speak freely with its shareholders and the investing public.” See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.
      The trial court heard the motion to dismiss on December 3, 2021. The parties
directed the bulk of their attention at the hearing on Appellants’ request for relief
under Rule 91a. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and this appeal from
the TCPA denial followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(12)
(West Supp. 2022).

                                          3
                                       Analysis
      In their sole issue, Appellants assert that the trial court erred in denying their
motion to dismiss under the TCPA. One purpose of the TCPA is to protect citizens
from retaliatory lawsuits meant to intimidate or silence them on matters of public
concern. Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. 2019); In
re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). The Legislature
enacted the TCPA “to safeguard ‘the constitutional rights of persons to petition,
speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the
maximum extent permitted by law’” while, at the same time, protecting a person’s
right “to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.”         Kinder Morgan
SACROC, LP v. Scurry Cnty., 622 S.W.3d 835, 847 (Tex. 2021) (quoting CIV. PRAC.
& REM. § 27.002).
      To effectuate this dual purpose, the TCPA employs a three-step process to
determine whether a lawsuit or claim is subject to dismissal. Montelongo v. Abrea,
622 S.W.3d 290, 296 (Tex. 2021). First, the movant must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that a legal action is based on, or in response to, the
movant’s exercise of one of three protected rights: the right of free speech, the right
to petition, or the right of association. CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 27.003(a), .005(b); see
also Montelongo, 622 S.W.3d at 296. If the movant makes this showing, the burden
shifts to the nonmovant to establish by “clear and specific evidence” a prima facie
case for each essential element of the claim in question. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.005(c); Montelongo, 622 S.W.3d at 296. Finally, even if the nonmovant meets
that burden, the trial court is required to dismiss the legal action if the movant
establishes “an affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(d).

                                           4
        We review de novo the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss. Rossa v.
Mahaffey, 594 S.W.3d 618, 624 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.). Whether the
TCPA applies to a particular claim is a question of statutory construction and is also
reviewed de novo. Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018).
        Did Appellants Preserve the Issue?
        Appellees contend that Appellants failed to preserve their TCPA issue for
appeal because they never mentioned “the issue of whether the fraudulent transfer
action was based on or in response to an exercise of the right to free speech” in the
trial court.1 A party may not claim that the TCPA applies to a protected right on
appeal if they did not also rely upon the same protected right in the trial court.
Caliber Oil & Gas, LLC v. Midland Visions 2000, 591 S.W.3d 226, 238 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.); Rossa, 594 S.W.3d at 626.
        In this case, Appellants devoted only a single paragraph of their motion to
dismiss to the TCPA. However, that paragraph alleges, among other things, that
Appellees “are infringing upon Apache’s right to speak freely with its shareholders
and the investing public.” While this allegation does not track the statutory language
word-for-word, it is sufficient to raise the issue of whether Appellants’ protected
right to free speech has been affected by the fraudulent transfer claim. See Adams v.
Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. 2018) (“Rules of error
preservation should not be applied so strictly as to unduly restrain appellate courts
from reaching the merits of a case.”). We will therefore address the TCPA issue on
the merits.

        1
          Appellees further assert that Appellants failed to preserve error on the issue of whether the subject
of the press release was “a matter of public concern,” an element that supports the existence of the protected
right of free speech. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 27.003(a), 27.001(3) and (7). Because we do not reach the
question of whether the press release constitutes free speech under the TCPA, we do not address this
argument.
                                                       5
      Did Appellants Establish a Nexus?
      As their initial burden under the TCPA, Appellants are required to establish a
nexus between the rights protected by the statute and Appellees’ claims. Grant v.
Pivot Tech. Sols., Ltd., 556 S.W.3d 865, 879 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied);
see also Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 428–29 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2019, pet. denied). To do so, they must show that their claim is “factually
predicated on the alleged conduct that falls within the scope of [the] TCPA’s
definition of ‘exercise of the right of free speech,’ petition or association.” See
Grant, 556 S.W.3d at 879; Sloat v. Rathbun, 513 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2015, pet. dism’d) (concluding that any activities by the movant “that are not
a factual predicate for [the nonmovant’s] claims are simply not pertinent to the
inquiry” of whether the TCPA applies to the claims); see also Enter. Crude GP
LLC v. Sealy Partners, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 283, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2020, no pet.); Porter-Garcia v. Travis Law Firm, P.C., 564 S.W.3d 75, 85 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Cavin v. Abbott, 545 S.W.3d 47, 65
(Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.).
      After the TCPA was enacted, the Texas judicial system experienced a
groundswell of claims making use of the TCPA in novel ways. See ML Dev, LP v.
Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2022, pet. denied). The TCPA was then amended in 2019 in an effort to tighten its
language “so that it could no longer be used improperly as a litigation tactic to thwart
its purpose.” Laura Lee Prather & Robert T. Sherwin, The Changing Landscape of
the Texas Citizens Participation Act, 52 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163, 165 (2020); see Act
of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 684.
      One of the more significant changes was a narrowing of the categories of
connections that must be demonstrated in order to meet the nexus requirement. See

                                           6
ML Dev, 649 S.W.3d at 626. Prior to the amendment, a movant was required to
establish that a claim against it was “based on, relate[d] to, or . . . in response to” the
movant’s exercise of a protected right. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(b) (old version);
ML Dev, 649 S.W.3d at 626. The amendment removed language which allowed a
movant to show that the action in question “relates to” the movant’s exercise of a
protected right, which was the most expansive of the three categories of connections.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(b) (current version); ML Dev, 649 S.W.3d at 626;
Robert B. James, DDS, Inc. v. Elkins, 553 S.W.3d 596, 604 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2018, pet. denied) (characterizing “relates to” as a “broader qualifying
phrase”). The statute now requires a movant to demonstrate that the action is either
“based on” or is “in response to” an exercise of a protected right. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§§ 27.003(a), .005(b). Thus, the amendment now requires TCPA movants “to
establish a closer nexus between the claims against them and the communications
they point to as their exercise of protected rights.” ML Dev, 649 S.W.3d at 629.
      In determining whether Appellants have satisfied the burden of proving that
their claims fall within the scope of the TCPA, we consider the pleadings and
affidavits that state the facts on which liability is based to determine the true nature
of the dispute. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a); David H. Arrington Oil & Gas
Operating, LLC v. Wilshusen, 630 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, pet.
denied); see also Clayton Mountain, LLC v. Ruff, No. 11-20-00034-CV, 2021 WL
3414754, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 5, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). The
plaintiff’s pleading is the “best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature of the
action.” Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Stockyards
Nat’l Bank v. Maples, 95 S.W.2d 1300, 1302 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1936));
Wilshusen, 630 S.W.3d at 190. Therefore, we determine the TCPA’s applicability
based on a holistic review of the pleadings. Adams, 547 S.W.3d at 897.

                                            7
        Appellants assert that the fraudulent transfer lawsuit is “based on or in
response to” its exercise of free speech because it is “factually predicated” on the
press release.       In response, Appellees contend that their claim for fraudulent
concealment is based on or in response to Appellants’ conduct in transferring assets,
rather than the press release. The press release, they contend, is merely evidence of
such conduct. We conclude that Appellees’ claims are neither “based on” or “in
response to” the press release/communication.2
        “Based On…”
        Other courts of appeals have frequently made a distinction between claims
that are “based on” a communication and claims that are “based on” conduct.
“[W]hen a claim does not allege a communication, and is instead based on a
defendant’s conduct, the TCPA is not implicated.” Pacheco v. Rodriguez, 600
S.W.3d 401, 410 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.). This distinction is best
illustrated by two recent cases.
        In Smith v. Crestview NuV, LLC, a pre-amendment case, an investor sued a
medical technology company that had allegedly misapplied its investment funds.
565 S.W.3d 793, 794–95 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied). Later, the
investor also sued a doctor associated with the company for “aider” liability under
the Texas Securities Act. Id. at 795–96; see former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
581-33.F(2). The doctor asserted that the aider-liability claims arose out of alleged
communications, between himself and the owner of the company, that were
protected under the TCPA. Id. at 798. The court concluded that, although the doctor
admitted he had a number of communications with the owner of the company, the

        2
          Appellees also argue that the contents in the press release do not constitute the “[e]xercise of the
right of free speech” under the Act. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(3), (7). Because we have concluded
that the lawsuit is not based on or in response to the press release, we do not reach this issue.
                                                       8
causes of action against him were not based on those communications but were
instead based on his “actions and inactions.” Id. at 798. Accordingly, the TCPA did
not apply to such claims. Id. at 797–98.
      In ML Dev, a post-amendment case, a retail chain sought rights to an easement
following the purchase of a tract of land where it planned to build a distribution
center. 649 S.W.3d at 625. The sellers alleged that the claims at issue were based
on their statements denying access to easements, and that such statements were
protected free speech under the TCPA. Id. at 628. The First Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion, holding that the buyer’s claims
were not based on or in response to the communications denying the easement, but
in response to the denial of easement access. Id. at 629. As such, the movants did
not meet the “higher burden” imposed under the amended TCPA. Id. at 628.
      In this case, Appellees’ pleadings reference the press release somewhat
extensively in their statement of facts. However, the claim could also be stated
without any reference to the press release whatsoever, and the press release is not
essential to those claims. Instead, Appellees’ claims are based on Appellants’
conduct in transferring certain assets from Apache to APA.
      Appellees also correctly argue that there is a difference between
communication that is part of the claim itself and communication which merely
serves as evidence in support of a claim. See Polo, 632 S.W.3d at 45 (“the
communications at most are ‘evidence’ that the parties will likely present at trial to
be used by the trier of fact in determining whether CPL had a retaliatory motive for
terminating him, but the lawsuit is not itself factually predicated on them”); In re
IntelliCentrics, Inc., No. 02-18-00280-CV, 2018 WL 5289379, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Oct. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing a distinction between
communications used as evidence to support a claim for breach of contract and a

                                           9
claim that is based on or in response to the communication); see also Allied Orion
Grp., LLC v. Pitre, No. 14-19-00681-CV, 2021 WL 2154065, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (adopting and applying the
reasoning in Polo). The references to the press release in Appellees’ pleadings
merely point to evidence in support of their fraudulent transfer claim. The press
release itself is not a part of the claim.
       “…Or In Response To”
       We likewise conclude that Appellees’ claims are not “in response to” the press
release. Appellants argue that the “in response to” language in the TCPA should be
interpreted expansively, relying in part on Baylor Scott & White v. Project Rose
MSO, LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied). In Baylor, the
Tyler Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff’s claims are “‘in response to’ a protected
activity when they react to or are asserted subsequently to the communication.” 633
S.W.3d at 276 (citing Grant, 556 S.W.3d at 880). Appellants appear to argue from
this language that any lawsuit that follows a related communication is “in response
to” the communication for purposes of the TCPA, regardless of whether the
relationship between the communication and the lawsuit is otherwise tenuous and
unimportant.      The facts of Baylor and Grant do not support such a broad
interpretation.
       In Baylor, a group of companies owned by two former National Football
League Players brought suit against Baylor Scott & White. The former players
alleged that, after Baylor purchased a controlling interest in a sports medicine facility
that was owned by Texas Sport and Spine, the owners cancelled their contracts with
the players without paying for their services. Id. at 273. As a result, the former
players alleged that the owners gained the benefit of the former players’ marketing
and consulting services, including the publicity that came with those services,

                                             10
without having to pay for them. Id. The causes of action asserted by the former
players included fraud, promissory estoppel, and civil conspiracy. Id. at 273–74.
The Tyler Court of Appeals found that the claims made by the former players were
“based on or in response to” the alleged communications between the owners of the
facility and held that the TCPA applied. Id. at 280.
      Grant involved an asset purchase agreement between two technology
companies. 556 S.W.3d at 871. During the course of the acquisition, the relationship
between the parties deteriorated, and the buyer eventually sued the seller and its
owners. Id. at 871. Among other things, the buyer alleged that the sellers conspired
to defraud the buyer in connection with the purchase agreement and that the sellers
solicited and accepted business from the buyer’s customers and employees. Id. at
880–81. The Austin Court of Appeals held that such conduct satisfied the pre-
amendment requirement for a nexus between the communication and the lawsuit.
Id. at 881.
      In both Baylor and Grant, the pleadings made it clear that the parties’ claims
were in reaction or response to the communications themselves. The claims against
Baylor were asserted “in response to” (or, to borrow the Austin and Tyler courts’
terminology, “in reaction to”) a conspiracy between the owners of the sports
medicine facility. Likewise, the claims in Grant were asserted in response and/or
reaction to allegedly fraudulent statements and the recruitment of customers and
employees. The same thing cannot be said in this case. Appellees’ claims are in
response to (or reaction to) the alleged fraudulent transfer of assets, not to the press
release which announced those transfers.
      Interpreting the TCPA in the manner suggested by Appellants would lead to
a near limitless application of the nexus requirement. Almost every lawsuit, at its
core, involves some communication that is made by or between the parties, and as

                                          11
the press release illustrates, the present case is no exception. See Polo, 632 S.W.3d
at 45. We do not agree that the mere sequence of a communication, followed by a
lawsuit that relates in some way to the communication, is sufficient to demonstrate
that a claim is “in response to” the communication. We likewise do not read Baylor
or Grant to suggest such an interpretation, and to the extent they do so, we disagree.
      Prima Facie Burden
      While we have concluded that the TCPA is inapplicable to this claim, we are
also satisfied that Appellees met their burden of producing “clear and specific”
evidence of their fraudulent transfer action. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(c).
      The TCPA’s requirement of “clear and specific evidence” means that the
nonmovant “‘must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its claim’ and
must provide enough evidence ‘to support a rational inference that the allegation of
fact is true.’” Hall, 579 S.W.3d at 377 (quoting Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590–91); see
also CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(c); Stallion Oilfield Servs. Ltd. v. Gravity Oilfield
Servs., LLC, 592 S.W.3d 205, 214 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied). In
determining whether a legal action should be dismissed, the TCPA requires us to
consider the evidence presented by the parties, as well as the pleadings themselves.
See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a).        In so doing, we are mindful that a TCPA
motion to dismiss is not a trial on the merits and is not intended to replace either a
trial or the summary judgment proceeding established by the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. Stallion, 592 S.W.3d at 215.
      Under TUFTA, “[a] transfer . . . is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the
creditor’s claim arose before or within a reasonable time after the transfer . . . if the
debtor made the transfer . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor.” BUS. & COM. § 24.005(a)(1). This language gives rise to four elements:
(1) whether Appellees are creditors, (2) whether Appellants are debtors, (3) whether

                                           12
assets were transferred after, or a short time before, the claim arose, and (4) whether
the transfers were made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Appellees. See
Nwokedi v. Unlimited Restoration Specialists, Inc., 428 S.W.3d 191, 204–05 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). We conclude that Appellees have
provided “clear and specific” evidence 3 for each of these elements. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. § 27.005(c).
        Elements (1) and (2) require Appellees to establish that they are in a
debtor/creditor relationship with Appellants. Under TUFTA, a creditor is a “person
. . . who has a claim,” and a debtor is a “person who is liable on a claim.” BUS. &
COM. § 24.002(4), (6). A “claim” is a “right to payment . . . , whether or not the
right is reduced to judgment.” Id. § 24.002(3). Appellees pleaded that they are a
creditor of Apache, and—in support of this claim—attached to their petition copies
of their pleadings, as well as our opinion and judgment in Apollo I. Such evidence
is sufficient to support a rational inference that Appellees had asserted a claim
against Apache at the time of the transfer, even though such claim was not yet
“reduced to judgment.” See BUS. & COM. § 24.002(3). Element (3) is likewise
satisfied inasmuch as the press release contains Appellants’ own description of the
transfers at issue.
        Element (4) requires proof of Apache’s intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud.”
BUS. & COM. § 24.005(a)(1). TUFTA provides a list of so-called “badges” of fraud,
eleven “nonexclusive indicia of fraudulent intent,” in Section 24.005(b). Janvey v.
GMAG, L.L.C., 592 S.W.3d 125, 129 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Janvey v. Golf Channel,
Inc., 487 S.W.3d 560, 566 (Tex. 2016)). This list includes consideration of whether

        3
         Appellants assert that Appellees rely solely on their petition, and that they have offered no other
evidence in support of their TUFTA claims. This is incorrect. Appellees attached copies of the January 4
and March 1 press releases, as well as our opinion and judgment in Apollo I, to their pleadings and later
relied on those documents in their response to the motion to dismiss.
                                                    13
“the transfer or obligation was to an insider” (subpart 1) and whether “before the
transfer was made . . . , the debtor had been sued.” (subpart 4). 4 BUS. & COM.
§ 24.005(b)(1), (4). “Evidence of a single ‘badge of fraud’ does not conclusively
demonstrate intent, but a confluence of several presents a strong case of fraud.”
Janvey, 487 S.W.3d at 566–67.
       The petition and attached exhibits provide support for the two badges
described above, as well as additional evidence of intent. An “insider,” for purposes
of subpart 1, includes an “affiliate” of a corporation, which can include a person who
“directly . . . owns” the debtor. BUS. & COM. § 24.002(7)(D), (1). At the hearing on
the motion to dismiss, Appellants agreed that APA Corporation meets this definition.
It is also evident from the petition and attached exhibits that Appellees’ lawsuit
preceded the transfer, in satisfaction of the element found in subpart 4 of the list of
badges.      As additional evidence of fraudulent intent, Appellees point to
Christmann’s statement in the January 4 press release that the use of a holding
company offered “advantages in risk management.”
       Appellees’ evidence does not conclusively resolve the issue. However, its
satisfaction of two of the badges of intent, combined with the contents of the
January 4 press release, provide an explanation of the factual basis for the element
of intent, as well as evidence to support a rational inference in support of that
element, in satisfaction of the TCPA’s requirement for prima facie evidence. Hall,
579 S.W.3d at 377. In so holding, we do not comment on whether such evidence
would be sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment or to support a jury
finding on the issue of intent. See Stallion, 592 S.W.3d at 215.

       4
          Appellees also allege that “transfer of substantially all [Apache Corp.’s] assets” under
Section 24.005(b)(5). However, the factual allegations in Appellees’ pleadings merely state that the
transfers involved Apache’s “most valuable assets,” and Appellees offer no other evidence in support of
this claim.
                                                  14
                                         This Court’s Ruling
        We hold that Appellants have failed to establish the required nexus between
the press release and the claims that have been asserted by Appellees, and that, in
any event, Appellees have satisfied their burden under the TCPA of bringing forth a
prima facie case. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                           JOHN M. BAILEY
                                                           CHIEF JUSTICE

May 18, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Wright, S.C.J. 5

Williams, J., not participating.

        5
          Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland,
sitting by assignment.
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