Court Opinion

ID: 9568879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:08:18.612268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:11:30.431341
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I write separately to clarify my position that Deputy Clemones’ actions fall on the very cusp of permissible police conduct.
As noted by the majority, the evidence shows that Clemones had reason to believe that Anderson was driving after having had his license suspended. Thus, Clemones was authorized to stop Anderson to ascertain whether he had obtained a valid driver’s license. After Clemones determined that Anderson did have a valid license, Clemones then asked for permission to search the car. In other words, *152the purpose for the traffic stop was at an end before Clemones sought permission to search the vehicle.
Decided January 12, 2004.
Hine & Niedrach, Christopher P. Twyman, for appellant.
Leigh E. Patterson, District Attorney, John F. McClellan, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Under the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizures — including traffic stops — must be reasonable.13 Moreover,
if [an] officer continues to detain [a motorist] after the conclusion of the traffic stop and interrogates him or seeks consent to search without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer has exceeded the scope of a permissible investigation of the initial traffic stop. This is so because a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.14
Given that the traffic stop was at an end, I am troubled by Clemones’ decision to ask for consent to search Anderson’s car. However, in addressing this issue, this Court has focused on whether the officer’s request results in any further detention of the motorist. Where, as here, an officer asks consent to search immediately following the conclusion of the traffic stop — with no delay — this Court has found such request does not violate Fourth Amendment principles.15 This is so because it is the detention that makes an officer’s continued questioning impermissible.16 Accordingly, as the evidence shows that Clemones requested permission to search immediately after concluding the traffic stop and that he did not ask other questions unrelated to the stop in order to prolong the detention, his request here did not offend the Fourth Amendment.17 It follows that the trial court did not err in denying Clemones’ motion to suppress.

 See State v. Williams, 264 Ga. App. 199 (590 SE2d 151) (2003).

 (Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Padron v. State, 254 Ga. App. 265, 268 (1) (562 SE2d 244) (2002).

 See Evans v. State, 262 Ga. App. 712, 715 (1) (a) (586 SE2d 400) (2003); Novicky v. State, 245 Ga. App. 284, 285 (2) (537 SE2d 740) (2000).

 See Henderson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 278, 280 (551 SE2d 400) (2001) (physical precedent only).

 See Navicky, supra.