Court Opinion

ID: 9662425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:08:36.561865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:28.857613
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10267     Document: 00516869485         Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/23/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                  FILED
                                                                        August 23, 2023
                                  No. 22-10267                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                  Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                      versus

   Adam Rey Bopp,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:21-CR-40-1
                  ______________________________

   Before Smith, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
          Adam Rey Bopp was indicted for knowingly possessing “material”—
   a cell phone—that contained child pornography. Even though the phone had
   thousands of such images, the indictment specifically described only four.
   Bopp pleaded guilty under a plea agreement. After sentencing, the district
   court ordered Bopp to pay restitution to several individual victims whose
   likenesses appeared in some images from Bopp’s phone. But these images
   were among those that the indictment did not specifically describe. Bopp
   argues that restitution is available only to victims who appeared in the four
   images specified in the indictment. We disagree and AFFIRM.
Case: 22-10267      Document: 00516869485          Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/23/2023

                                    No. 22-10267

                                          I
          In July 2020, the FBI began tracking a file-sharing network that
   hosted child pornography. Agents soon identified a device that had accessed
   the network over 60 times and had downloaded tens of thousands of images
   and videos of child pornography. They tracked the device to a group home
   where several registered sex offenders lived in Fort Worth, Texas. One of the
   residents was Adam Rey Bopp. Officers found an Android smartphone on
   Bopp’s person when they searched the home. Bopp volunteered the phone’s
   passcode to the FBI. He also admitted to previously serving time for having
   child pornography on his computer. Still, Bopp insisted that he had not
   looked at child pornography for “decades.” He also said that the phone
   contained no such images. The phone said otherwise. A forensic examination
   revealed 28,166 images and 6 videos of child pornography.
          Bopp was indicted on two related counts. Count One charged Bopp
   with knowingly possessing “material” containing an image of child
   pornography involving a prepubescent minor in violation of 18 U.S.C.
   § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). The indictment specifically charged possession
   of “one Motorola Moto G Stylus android cellular phone that contained the
   following described image files visually depicting [pornographic images of a
   prepubescent minor].” And the count listed and described four specific
   images found on Bopp’s phone. Count Two correspondingly charged Bopp
   with receiving child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1).
          Bopp pleaded guilty to Count One under a plea agreement. His plea
   waived most of his appellate rights:
          The Defendant waives his rights, conferred by 28 U.S.C.
          § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, to appeal the conviction,
          sentence, fine, order of restitution, and any order of forfeiture.
          The Defendant further waives his right to contest the
          conviction, sentence, fine, order of restitution, and order of

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                                   No. 22-10267

         forfeiture in any collateral proceeding, including proceedings
         under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
         The Defendant, however, reserves the rights to bring (a) a
         direct appeal of (i) a sentence exceeding the statutory
         maximum punishment, or (ii) an arithmetic error at
         sentencing; (b) to challenge the voluntariness of this plea of
         guilty or this waiver; and (c) to bring a claim of ineffective
         assistance of counsel.
   In exchange, the Government agreed to drop Count Two and to not bring
   “additional charges . . . based upon the conduct underlying and related to”
   Count One.
         The parties produced a factual resume to accompany the plea
   agreement. The resume’s language tracked the indictment’s language. But
   the resume also included the elements of the Count One offense:
         First: That the defendant knowingly possessed an item that
         contains an image of child pornography, as alleged in the
         indictment;
         Second: That the material was produced using materials that
         had been mailed, shipped or transported in or affecting
         interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
         computer;
         Third: That when the defendant possessed the material, the
         defendant knew the material contained child pornography; and
         Fourth: One of the child pornography images the defendant
         possessed depicted a prepubescent minor engaged in sexually
         explicit conduct.
   Additionally Paragraphs 2 and 3 included the following factual admissions:
         2. On or about January 28, 2021, FBI agents served a search
         warrant at his home in Fort Worth, Texas. Bopp was in
         possession of a Motorola Moto G Stylus android cellular phone

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                                    No. 22-10267

          that contained the child pornography images described in
          paragraph one [the same prepubescent images described in the
          indictment].
          3. Bopp admits that he knowingly possessed child
          pornography, and that he knew . . . that some of the images he
          possessed depicted a prepubescent minor engaged in sexually
          explicit conduct.
   The district court accepted Bopp’s plea. And Probation got to work
   preparing the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR).
          The PSR noted that Bopp’s phone had 28,166 images and 6 videos of
   child pornography. Each video counted as 75 images. For purposes of the
   Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR recommended holding Bopp accountable
   for 28,616 images of child pornography. Probation submitted the PSR to the
   court. Bopp did not file any written objections to the PSR.
          Meanwhile, Probation sent all the images from Bopp’s phone to the
   National Center for Missing and Exploited Children for victim identification.
   That Center identified four individuals, but only after Probation had already
   submitted the PSR. Probation then included an addendum to the PSR to
   identify these victims, and it recommend that Bopp pay $3,000 in restitution
   to each. Both the Government and Bopp objected to the addendum. The
   Government sought larger restitution amounts for some victims. Bopp
   objected to any restitution, arguing that it exceeded the statutory maximum
   penalty.
          The district court overruled both the Government’s and Bopp’s
   objections. First, the court declined to institute steeper restitution given the
   circumstances of the offense, the resources necessary to collect larger
   amounts, and Bopp’s ability to pay. The court then heard argument on
   Bopp’s objection. Bopp argued, “Because the victims [identified in the
   addendum] were not alleged in the count to which Mr. Bopp has pleaded

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                                           No. 22-10267

   guilty, any order of restitution would be inappropriate and would constitute
   a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum . . . .” The Government
   responded that the indictment’s images were examples of the images found
   on the phone and did not bear on the extent of the charged conduct—
   possession of the phone. The district court agreed with the Government. It
   sentenced Bopp to 151 months’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised
   release. It also ordered Bopp to pay $3,000 in restitution to each of the
   victims whom the Center had identified.
          Bopp timely appealed.
                                                 II
          Bopp challenges the district court’s restitution award. He argues that
   restitution was available only for those victims who appeared in the four
   images that Count One described. We “review the legality of the district
   court’s order of restitution de novo.” 1 If we conclude “that an award of
   restitution is permitted by the appropriate law,” we then review “the
   propriety of a particular award for an abuse of discretion.” 2
          The Government moved to dismiss Bopp’s appeal, citing the plea
   agreement’s appeal waiver. We express no view on that motion. Instead, we
   exercise our discretion to decide the case on the merits. 3 Accordingly, we
   DENY AS MOOT the Government’s motion to dismiss.
          Victims of certain crimes involving child pornography are entitled to
   an “order of restitution . . . direct[ing] the defendant to pay the victim . . . the

          _____________________
          1
              United States v. Norris, 217 F.3d 262, 271 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
          2
              Id. (citation omitted).
          3
              See United States v. Graves, 908 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 2018).

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                                            No. 22-10267

   full amount of the victim’s losses.” 4 That amount “includes any costs
   incurred . . . as a proximate result of all trafficking in child pornography
   offenses involving the same victim.” 5 A “victim” is an “individual harmed
   as a result of a commission of a crime under [18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2560a].” 6
   Finally, “the term ‘a crime’ refers to the offense of conviction.” 7
           Bopp pleaded to the “crime” of knowingly possessing a phone that
   contained child pornography, including that of prepubescent minors in
   violation       of    § 2252A(a)(5)(B)        and     (b)(2).      Section 2252A(a)(5)(B)
   criminalizes possessing “material” containing pornographic images—no
   matter how many images the material contains. That is why “each ‘material,’
   or medium, containing an image of child pornography” is a separate offense. 8
   Bopp admitted possessing material (a phone) that contained child
   pornography. Bopp’s “victims” are the individuals who appear in the images
   from his phone. Bopp’s crime (possessing the phone) plainly “involves”
   these victims (whose images appeared on the phone). 9 Under the statute,
   then, all of the victims are therefore entitled to restitution—whether or not
   the indictment included images depicting them.
           The indictment charged Bopp with a crime, but Bopp has identified
   no rule or statute that would require the indictment to also include

           _____________________
           4
               18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1).
           5
               Id. § 2259(c)(2).
           6
               Id. § 2259(c)(4).
           7
               Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 445 (2014).
           8
             See United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 2013); cf. United States
   v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 503–05 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Through different transactions, Planck
   possessed child pornography in three separate places—a laptop and desktop computer and
   diskettes—and, therefore, committed three separate crimes.”).
           9
               18 U.S.C. § 2259(c)(2).

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                                         No. 22-10267

   descriptions of all the images or all the victims. On the contrary, the
   indictment tracks the statute’s language: “Specifically, Bopp possessed one
   Motorola Moto G Stylus android cellular phone that contained the following
   described image files visually depicting a prepubescent minor engaged in
   sexually explicit conduct . . . .” The object of the possession in the
   indictment is clearly the “Motorola Moto G Stylus,” not any of the images.
   The indictment’s reference to the four images does not change the operative
   action for conviction—possession of the phone containing the images.
           The factual resume confirms this understanding. It lists the elements
   of the crime as focused on Bopp possessing an “item” or “material” that
   contained child pornography. There is no element of possession of specific
   images. Indeed, if there were, we would be talking about a different offense. 10
   To be sure, the enhancement in § 2252A(b)(2) requires there be at least one
   image of a prepubescent minor. But that does not change the elements of
   § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The only logical reading of the factual resume is that the
   specific images were included as examples for the enhancement. The resume
   states, “Bopp admits that he knowingly possessed child pornography, and
   that he knew the files depicted real minors engaged in sexually explicit
   conduct. Bopp also knew that some of the images he possessed depicted a
   prepubescent minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” (emphasis
   added). If the indictment targeted only the four images containing the
   prepubescent minors, then the factual resume would not refer to only
   “some” images having that characteristic.
           Bopp’s contrary contentions confuse the elements of the offense that
   he pleaded to. He argues that the indictment’s four images merely

           _____________________
           10
             See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (making it a crime to knowingly receive the
   child pornography itself).

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                                           No. 22-10267

   “particularized the real-world facts underlying one of the charged crime’s
   elements.” (emphasis added). He continues that the indictment’s reference
   to “the following described image files” as limiting the scope of the
   indictment to the four specified images because “the following”
   communicates exclusivity. These arguments misconstrue the elements
   of § 2252A(a)(5)(B). That statute criminalizes possession of material
   containing child pornography. The phone was that “material,” no matter
   whether it contained one image or twenty thousand. Bopp’s appears to
   suggest that Government thought the images were an element of the crime.
   We disagree. The indictment’s reference to the specific images does not
   create any new elements of the offense. And no element of § 2252A(a)(5)(B)
   focuses on possession of specific images. 11 Factual allegations cannot limit
   the scope of an offense if they do not go to an element of that offense.
           Bopp points to United States v. Reasor 12 as a case exemplifying and
   supporting his position. But again, he incorrectly assumes that possessing
   specific images is an element of the offense. In Reasor, the prosecution tried
   to substitute a different entity as the victim of the crime to satisfy a crime’s
   interstate commerce element. 13 Reasor is thus inapplicable here. The images
   are not an element of the crime; only the “material” is. Our cases on whether
   an indictment’s temporal language limits the scope of restitution for
   fraudulent schemes which Bopp cites are also irrelevant for the same reason.
   In those cases, as in Reasor, allegations about the length of that scheme go to
   an element of the offense (the fraudulent scheme). Not so here. The

           _____________________
           11
              See United States v. Terrell, 700 F.3d 755, 764 (5th Cir. 2012) (listing the elements
   as “(1) knowingly possessed material that contained an image of child pornography and (2)
   a jurisdictional nexus” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
           12
                418 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2005).
           13
                See id. at 474.

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                                    No. 22-10267

   allegations about the required elements begin and end with possession of the
   phone. Allegations about the images are not allegations that go to any element
   of the offense.
          Bopp does not otherwise challenge the restitution order. He does not
   deny that his phone had images of the victims identified in the restitution
   order. And he does not deny that the victims were harmed by his possessing
   a phone containing their images as stated in their victim statements. We also
   see no error with the district court’s finding and amount of restitution.
   Accordingly, the district court did not err.
          AFFIRMED.

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