Court Opinion

ID: 9558473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:10:10.242704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:19.587002
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
specially concurring.
While I concur in the dismissal of this appeal, persuaded by the authorities and reasoning of the majority opinion, I am troubled by the implications thereof. I am hopeful that district courts will remain constantly concerned with the probable and practical mootness that goes with the con-demnor taking and imposing the improvement upon the property before the owners’ appellate rights have ripened. When the highway has been constructed, it is academic to still be litigating the taking — but this is the state of the law as I view it — inequitable as it may be.
As stated in the majority opinion, there is a “possibility that the condemnor may occupy and use the premises while its right to take remains in dispute.” In the present case, this theoretically means that a limited-access highway facility could be constructed over appellants’ land before they have an opportunity to have judicial review of the necessity or authority for the taking. By the time compensation is awarded, and thus an appealable order entered, it is conceivable that appellants’ challenge in this respect may have become meaningless. Once constructed a highway is difficult to move.
I do not doubt the authority of the district court to enter an order granting possession to a condemnor prior to determination of damages. The statutes and rules of this state contemplate such a procedure. See § 1-754, W.S.1957; § 1-793, W.S.1957; § l-792(b), W.S.1957, 1977 Interim.Supp.; and Rule 71.1(e), W.R.C.P. The decision to grant immediate possession in the condemn- or rests in the sound discretion of the district court. Given a possibly severe effect on property rights, however, such discretion must be exercised only after due circumspection. My concern with such an occurrence is somewhat lessened by the remedies which I see as available to aggrieved landowners — aside from the knowledge that compensation at some time will be awarded. First, in appropriate cases I believe resort may be had to the provisions of Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P. See 12 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 3042, at 96; and Burkhart v. United States, 9 Cir. 1954, 210 F.2d 602. Second, I believe that a stay of proceedings may be sought by a condemnee under appropriate circumstances. Such is not the case under the Federal Declaration of Taking Act, (40 U.S.C.A. §§ 258a through 258e) and under certain state laws. See 40 U.S.C.A. § 258b; and Wright v. State, 204 Okl. 380, 230 P.2d 462, *740466 (1951). In those jurisdictions there are specific statutory provisions which preclude an appeal from operating to delay the prosecution of work on the condemnee’s property. I could find no such statute or rule in Wyoming and would, therefore, assume that such a procedure is available in this state. See City of Portland v. Anderson, 248 Or. 201, 432 P.2d 1020 (1967). By this recitation, I do not foreclose the possibility that there may be other remedies available to a condemnee which will temper the potential harshness of our ruling in this and other cases.
With the preceding observations in mind, I concur in the dismissal of this appeal.