Court Opinion

ID: 9848812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:27:53.433182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:47.918623
License: Public Domain

NOBLE, Justice (dissenting). I am unable to agree with the majority that the language of Section 59-10-25, N.M.S.A.1953, requires a construction that a workman who has recovered damages in tort may not thereafter have a workmen’s compensation award for the same injury if credit can be given the employer and his insurance carrier for the tort recovery. It is axiomatic that an employee has the right to the compensation provided by statute unless it is denied by the workmen’s compensation law. If, therefore, right to compensation is denied because the employee first recovered in tort against a third-party tortfeasor, it must be found in the following language of § 59-10-25, N.M.S.A.1953: “ * * * but he * * * shall not be allowed to receive payment or recover damages therefor and also claim compensation from such employer hereunder, and in such case the receipt of compensation * * * shall operate as an assignment to the employer * * of any cause of action, to the extent of the liability of such employer to such workman occasioned by such injury which the workman * * * may have against any other party for such injuries * * Construing all of the parts of the statutory provision to obtain the legislative intent, Reed v. Styron, 69 N.M. 262, 365 P.2d 912, it is apparent that the intent was to subrogate the employer pro tanto to any recovery by the employee against a third-party tortfeasor immediately upon payment of any compensation. Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 37 N.M. 479, 24 P.2d 731. The employer’s right to share in any recovery by the employee against a third-party tortfeasor not only accrues immediately upon his payment of any compensation benefit to the employee, but, in addition, his right to share therein is immediate not only to the extent of the compensation then paid but to the extent of his full liability to the employee. Clearly, the statute is so worded that it gives to the injured employee an opportunity to obtain one full recovery, but prohibits him from receiving a double recovery for the same injury. Noblin v. Randolph Corp., 180 Va. 345, 23 S.E.2d 209. See also Johnson v. Miles, 188 Md. 455, 53 A.2d 30. In Chapman v. St. John Drilling Co., 73 N.M. 261, 387 P.2d 462, an injured workman was held entitled to the larger of the workmen’s compensation awards permitted by two or more states for his benefit so long as credit was given on the larger for a prior smaller award. It was said that the statute permits a single recovery for the employee’s own benefit of the highest of two or more remedies. Where compensation has been paid, as in this case, it seems clear to me that the employer does then have a right to have any tort recovery by the employee credited against his compensation liability. The tort action must be in the employee’s name but a judgment therein is pro tanto for the benefit of the employer to the extent of the employer’s liability to the employee. Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 99, 370 P.2d 816; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358. Since it is the payment of some compensation that gives the employer the right to reimbursement, Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., supra; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., supra, it follows that under the language of the statute, the workman who recovers in tort before any compensation payment is received by him is barred from thereafter recovering compensation because, under such circumstances, there would be no right to reimbursement out of the tort recovery. Robbins v. National Veneer & Lumber Co., 120 Ind.App. 213, 88 N.E.2d 773. It is the prejudice to the employer’s right of reimbursement by some act of the employee under such circumstances as would prevent recoupment by the employer that prevents an award in compensation after a recovery from a third-party tortfeasor. White v. New Mexico Highway Commission, 42 N.M. 626, 83 P.2d 457. The legislature has provided two remedies to an injured workman: (1) his common law tort remedy against a third-party tortfeasor; and (2) the statutory compensation right, with the provision that the employee may only keep for his own benefit the larger of the two recoveries, that is, that he is actually limited to a single recovery for his own benefit. That must be the meaning of the language that “the right to receive payment or damages * * shall not be affected by this act.” The language “shall not be allowed to receive payment or recover damages therefor and also claim compensation * * * ” is followed by the words “and in such case, the receipt of compensation * * * shall operate as an assignment * * * ” The words “in such case” can only refer to the previous language, i. e., if the workman has been paid some compensation and has recovered in tort from a third-party tortfeasor, then the employer is entitled to reimbursement from the tort recovery not only to the amount of compensation he has paid but to his total liability to the employee for compensation benefits. It is clear to me that the legislature contemplated the two remedies and only intended that the employee not receive two recoveries for his ozvn benefit. That this is so is made clear by the fact that he may recover in tort against the third-party after receipt of compensation so long as the employer receives credit for his liability for compensation benefits. To hold that there may be a tort recovery only after a compensation award has been made is to place an extremely narrow construction on the legislative intent and one contrary to our express rules for construction of the workmen’s compensation act. See Lucero v. C. R. Davis Contracting Co., 71 N.M. 11, 12, 375 P.2d 327, 328, where we said: “The Workmen’s Compensation Act is remedial in nature; is given a liberal interpretation by both the trial and reviewing courts; reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the employee; its beneficent purposes may not be thwarted by technical refinement or interpretation; * * The employer’s insurance carrier intervened in the tort action in this case, participated in the trial of the case, and was specifically subrogated in the judgment to the extent of the employer’s liability to the employee. No prejudice has been urged and under the express provision of the tort judgment, the employee has only a single recovery for his own benefit. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. I, therefore, dissent from the majority. COMPTON, C. J., concurs in the dissent.