Court Opinion

ID: 9852894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:38:24.547085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:36.565696
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
concurring specially.
While I concur in the majority’s resolution of this appeal and agree that Boswell is entitled to attorney fees under the special circumstances of this case, I must disagree with the route taken in Division 3 of the majority opinion to reach the conclusion that Boswell is entitled to an award of attorney fees. The special circumstances here are that the county agreed to pay Boswell’s attorney fees if she prevailed. Although she did not prevail in the trial court, she has prevailed on appeal, triggering the county’s promise to pay her attorney fees. But the majority opinion ignores those circumstances and the law.
The majority relied on the holdings in Griffies v. Coweta County, 272 Ga. 506 (2) (530 SE2d 718) (2000), and Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504 (2) (458 SE2d 791) (1995), for the proposition that it is proper for this Court to order an award of attorney fees to county officers who hire their own counsel rather than seeking representation by the county attorney. In this case and in the two cited cases, a majority of this Court has ignored the fact that the General Assembly has provided by statute for the representation of county officers whose representation by the county attorney would constitute a conflict of interest. OCGA § 45-9-21 (e) (2) establishes a process by which the chief judge of the superior court of the circuit in *54which the county is located, upon application, determines that an ethical conflict exists, clearing the way for the county officer to hire counsel at the county’s expense. This Court erred in the cited cases and errs again in the present case by establishing a rule that directly conflicts with the expressed will of our legislature.
Decided July 2, 2001.
Brenda H. Trammell, for appellant.
Mills & Moss, David C. Moss, for appellees.
Were it not for the county’s agreement to pay Boswell’s attorney fees, the result would necessarily be different had this Court given proper deference to the statutory scheme. The last sentence of OCGA § 45-9-21 (e) (2) sets a condition precedent to submission of the issue to the chief judge and to a determination that hiring outside counsel is appropriate: “This subsection shall not apply unless the governing authority of the county has first denied a written request by a county officer for counsel.” Id.
Because there is nothing in the record of this case to indicate that Boswell made a written request for counsel or that the issue was submitted to the chief judge for decision, she would not have been entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the statute. Since she was entitled to those fees only because the county agreed to pay them, the majority’s direction that attorney fees be assessed in Boswell’s favor just because she was the prevailing party on this appeal is unauthorized. Although I cannot agree with the reasoning behind the majority’s grant of attorney fees to Boswell, I concur in that grant because of the county’s agreement to pay them.