Court Opinion

ID: 9666398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:13:51.634395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:33.885398
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
dissenting opinion.
Does the law mandate that a police officer who knows nothing about mechanics be promoted over a civilian master mechanic to be head of the automobile fleet maintenance department of the City of Houston Police Department (HPD)? Did the legislature mandate that only a police officer can supervise other police officers, even if the task at hand requires no special law enforcement skills, or that only a police officer can be in charge of the police computer department, police garage, or Police Training Academy? These absurd consequences flow as a result of the majority opinion and are not supported by logic, prior case law, the statute, or the history of the statute.
I agree with the court of appeals that the Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Act1 (the Act) applies only to positions requiring performance of traditional law enforcement duties such as making arrests, enforcing the law and conducting investigations. Moreover, I do not believe that there has been a showing that any “classified position” has been lost. No one lost their job as a result of the ordinances, and the number of positions within a classification was the same before and after the passage of the ordinances. For these reasons, I dissent.
The Act provides for the classification of all policemen within the department, and for the promotion of policemen according to their position on eligibility lists compiled from the results of competitive examinations. The Act provides that, except for a few narrow exceptions, “an existing position or classification or a position or classification created in the future either by name or by increase in salary may be filled only from an eligibility list that results from an examination held in accordance with this chapter.” Code Section 143.-021(c).2 In addition to “classified” policemen under the Act, HPD also employs approximately 2,000 employees who do work that does not require the specialized training of police officers, such as clerks, secretaries, computer operators, mechanics, janitors and the like. These employees are protected by another civil service ordinance that covers municipal employees.
In recent years, the trend in the HPD has been to “civilianize” the police department: that is, to hire additional civilians throughout the department for managerial and technical roles in order to free up trained police officers for the police work that only classified law enforcement personnel can do. The city ordinances have ranked Houston police officers below the non-classified chief of police in the following classifications, from highest to lowest rank: assistant chief, deputy chief, captain, lieutenant, sergeant, police officer, and probationary police officer. In my opinion, these are the career ladder positions that the Act endeavors to protect.
*297The city ordinances that the petitioners assert are in conflict with the Act were passed between 1982-1985.3 These ordinances created nine “civilian” departments or job assignments encompassing some of the duties formerly performed by classified police officers. The ordinances created four police administrator divisions: Planning and Research, Crime Information Center, Police Garage, and the Police Training Academy. The duties assumed by police administrators were formerly assigned to captains. The ordinances also created the following job assignments: two assistant police administrators; urban policy planner IV, an administrative assistant IV, and an education coordinator in the police academy, each of which is roughly equal in salary and assignment to positions held by a lieutenant.
In 1986, the city council passed City Ordinance 86-1278, which implemented a plan for reorganization by creating four new bureaus in HPD: Management Information, Fleet Maintenance, Career Development, and the Office of Planning and Research. The duties and functions of these bureaus were taken from other departments which were assumed into these new bureaus and four civilian administrators were promoted to head these bureaus. Before this reorganization, bureaus were traditionally headed by deputy chiefs.
The petitioners in this case are HPD police officers of various ranks who are at or near the top of the promotion eligibility list for their respective rank. They allege that the hiring of civilians to fill the new positions violates the Act and assert that had the Act been followed, each would have been promoted either into one of the newly created job assignments or into one of the positions vacated by officers who were themselves promoted.
The petitioners argued in their application for writ of error that the mandatory promotion procedures of the Act govern all positions in the HPD,4 not merely those which entail traditional law enforcement duties. The Act provides:
The commission shall provide for the classification of all fire fighters and police officers. [Code section 143.-021(a).]5
[A]n existing position or classification or a position or classification created in the future either by name or by increase in salary may be filled only from an eligibility list that results from an examination held in accordance with this chapter.” [Code section 143.021.]6
An eligibility list for a beginning position in the fire or police department may be created only as a result of a competitive examination held in the presence of each applicant for the position.... A person may not be appointed to the fire or police department except as a result of the examination. [Code section 143.-025(b).]7
Each person employed by the police department who is a member of the technical or communications class is eligible *298for a promotion within that class. [Code section 143.109(b).]8
Each provision of this chapter relating to eligibility lists, examinations, appointments, and promotions applies to the appointment or promotion of members of the technical, communications, and uniformed and detective classes within the member’s respective class. [Code section 143.109(e).]9
The petitioners assert that the court of appeals’ construction of “classified positions” as only those positions which require the performance of police work, cannot be harmonized with the broad language of these sections. I disagree. The Act provides that each “police officer is classified as prescribed by this subchapter and has civil service protection.” Code section 143.-021(b).10 In my view, the Act’s definition of “police officer” controls the scope of the chapter and precludes application of the Act to the disputed job assignments. In my opinion, the Act applies to HPD members who were appointed to their position “in substantial compliance with this chapter [chapter 143, which is the entire Act] or who is entitled to civil service status under Section 143.005, 143.084, or 143.103.” Code section 143.003(5).11
The majority declares that this definition is circular, arguing that the Act can be avoided by not requiring any standards of applicants. But the fact that the Act can be given one absurd construction does not justify the opposite extreme. From the legislative history and case law concerning who was covered by the Act formerly, along with an analysis of the requirements to become a “police officer” covered by the Act, we can determine the intended scope of the Act.
The earliest predecessor to this section, Article 1269m, section 2, broadly defined “policeman” as “any member of the police department who draws compensation for his services as a member of said department.” 12 Act of June 2, 1947, ch. 325, § 2, 1947 Tex.Gen.Laws 550, 551. This definition was construed by some courts to include: juvenile social workers, switch board operators, linemen, clerks, mechanics and other employees incidental to the operation of the police department. See City of San Antonio v. Handley, 308 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1958, writ ref’d); City of Wichita Falls v. Cox, 300 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of San Antonio v. Hahn, 274 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of San Antonio v. Wiley, 252 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1952, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
In reaction to these cases, the legislature narrowed the scope of coverage of the Act by changing the definition of “policeman.” In 1957, Section 2 of the Act was amended to define “policeman” as “any member of the Police Department appointed to such position in substantial compliance with the provisions of Sections 9, 10, and 11 of this Act....” Act of 1957, ch. 391, § 1, 1957 Tex.Gen.Laws 1171. Sections 9, 10, and 11 provided some of the qualifications for entry positions as a policeman. After the 1957 amendment, the Act mandates that we look to the qualifications for appointment to the beginning position of police officer to determine the Act’s coverage.13
*299The majority concludes that because the Act includes a requirement that applicants be tested on their knowledge of “police work and work in the police department,” we must expand the Act’s coverage beyond traditional law enforcement positions. This section suggests that a good officer has to know something of the department bureaucracy, but does not mean that department bureaucrats must be police officers. Otherwise, it can just as easily be argued that since the statute requires that all applicants must be able to speak English14, all English speakers are covered by the Act.
I would not restrict the inquiry to the fact that a written exam is required covering the subjects of police work and work in the police department. The Act does not suggest we may select one of the requirements for appointment to an entry position and ignore all others in determining legislative intent. A written examination is not the only requirement imposed on all applicants by these sections. The Act also requires that, generally, no beginning applicant may be over 36 years of age.15 It also requires that all applicants for the same position meet the same physical requirements.16
Finally the Act requires all beginning police officers to meet the “legal requirements necessary to become eligible for future licensure by the [Texas] Commission on Law Enforcement Officers Standards and Education.” Tex.Loc.Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.023(e) (Vernon 1988).17 To be eligible for licensing a party must exhibit weapons proficiency. Tex.Gov.Code § 415.052(a)(5) (Vernon 1990). The Texas Administrative Code defines proficiency in terms of being able to achieve a score of seventy percent shooting various weapons at certain distances. 37 Tex.Admin.Code § 211.104 (1990). Before the court gives too expansive an interpretation to the Act, it should keep in mind that those covered by the Act must meet these additional requirements. It is not true, as the court’s opinion would indicate, that all a civilian has to do to qualify for a position is sit down and study for a written examination. Under the court’s opinion, a civilian computer genius who is 37 or has a physical disability is forever barred from supervising the police computer department because some employees of the department are police officers. For the same reasons, a civilian master mechanic could not be in charge of the police garage or the best available civilian educator could not be in charge of the police academy. Thus, from the legislative intent to narrow coverage to “police officers,” and the nature of the requirements imposed on beginning “police officers,” it must be concluded that the Act applies only to the hiring and promotion of employees who were originally appointed to HPD as law enforcement officers, and does not affect HPD’s employment of civilians.
This common sense interpretation is consistent with the legislative and judicial history of the Act. Favoring a statutory construction without discriminatory implica*300tions, I am convinced that it is the nature of the job and not the qualifications of one’s subordinates that determines whether a supervisor must be a police officer. If an officer is performing a job that does not require traditional law enforcement skills, it makes no sense to require that his or her supervisor must be a law officer. I would hold that it is only those supervisory positions which require the supervision of traditional law enforcement functions that are “classified” supervisory positions.
I disagree that the mere fact that a supervisor supervises classified police officers mandates that the supervisor must also be a police officer as defined by statute. In my opinion, the legislative and judicial history clearly indicates that the 1957 amendment operated as a legislative overruling of the pre-1957 constructions of the Act, and narrowed the scope of the application of the Act to police department employees who perform law enforcement duties.
Petitioners argue that the specific inclusion of specialty positions shows that the Act must have broader application.18 The fact that the legislature must affirmatively act to extend the Act protection to a class of police department employees implies legislative intent that the Act does not automatically extend to all employees. Also, petitioners ignore the fact that the same statutes expressly preclude the exact “crossover promotions” which petitioners are now seeking:
A member of a particular class is not eligible for promotion to a position outside that class and lateral crossover by promotion by a member of one class to another class is prohibited. If a member of one class wants to change classes, the member must qualify and enter the new class at the lowest entry level of that class.
TexXoc.Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.103(b) (Vernon 1988); see also section 143.109(c). The Act further provides:
Each provision of this chapter relating to eligibility lists, examinations, appointments, and promotions applies to the appointment or promotion of members of the technical, communications, and uniformed and detective classes within the members’ respective class.
Id. section 143.109.
Furthermore, as a matter of law there was not a failure to fill a vacancy within a classification in violation of the Act. The Act requires the city council to establish by ordinance the classification of police officers, and the number of positions in each classification. Id. section 143.021(a).19 The council created the classifications of Assistant Chief, Deputy Chief, Captain, etc. The council does not set forth the job assignment or title that is at issue here. The four positions in question are the heads of (1) the Management Information Bureau (performing the functions of the former Technical Services Bureau, and the Computer Services Division); (2) the Fleet Maintenance Bureau; (3) the Career Development Bureau; and (4) the Office of Planning and Research were created by the Chief of Police, rather than created by ordinance. The number of classified positions were not reduced as a result of the department’s reorganization, although some classified officers were transferred to different job assignment. The police civil service system protects classifications, and positions within the classification, but does not create a vested interest in any particular job assignment. Since no classified position was lost, as a matter of law the plaintiffs have no cause of action.20
*301I am as troubled by the questions left open by the so-called “standard” adopted in today’s opinion. The court writes:
In the absence of a clear definition of “police officers,” courts should determine the scope of the Act by viewing the statute as a whole. The Act applies to any position requiring a competitive examination.21 (Citations omitted.) Such an examination tests an applicant’s “knowledge of and qualifications for ... police work and work in the police department,” as well as the applicant’s “general education and mental ability.” (Citations omitted.) We conclude, then, that the Act applies to any position requiring proficiency in all of those areas. If a particular position requires substantial knowledge of “police work and work in the police department,” then it must be classified.
At 294.
Who determines that a particular position requires knowledge of “police work and work in the police department?” The Mayor? City Council? Police Chief? Police Unions? Civil Service Commission? The Courts?
By its very nature, all supervisory positions require that the supervisor know something about the work he or she is supervising whether in the police department or elsewhere. Does today’s opinion stand for the proposition that all supervisory positions within the police department will always be covered by the Act?
I am also concerned that the majority overestimates the effectiveness of its new standard. I disagree that “the standard we discern today should, in most cases, produce an unequivocal answer as to whether a particular position must be classified.” At 295. The majority’s conclusion that “the duties of an ordinary clerk-typist in the police department do not require knowledge of police work and work in the police department” is not so obvious under this standard. It seems that all employees of the police department must have some knowledge of police work and work in the police department so a court could conclude that the clerk-typist position was classified under this standard. Furthermore, the argument that the conjunction “and,” at 294 n. 7, solves the problem misses the point— the proposed standard is still confusing and subject to broad interpretation.
The court of appeals’ common sense reading of the statute was much more likely to result in unequivocal answers as to whether a position was classified. The court of appeals’ standard established that only positions requiring performance of law enforcement duties or supervision of police officers performing law enforcement duties were classified. 762 S.W.2d at 187. Under this standard, there is no way a court could find that a clerk-typist position was classified. Thus, I agree with the court of appeals opinion and would affirm the court of appeals judgment.
Finally, I am concerned with the procedural disposition of this case. The court “hold[s] that the challenged placements contravened the Act’s requirement that all covered positions be filled in accordance with the statutory terms,” and “reversefs] the judgment of the court of appeals and remand[s] the cause to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.” At 296. This disposition is confusing. What does this mean? What is the trial court to do? The only guidance given to the trial court to determine if the positions are classified is the majority’s so-called new standard: Whether the positions requires proficiency in “ ‘knowledge of and qualifications for police work and *302work in the police department,’ as well as ‘general education and mental ability.’ ” At 294. However, the majority correctly states that whether a position comes within the ambit of the Act is a question of law. At 294. Questions of law are within our jurisdiction to render final judgment. Why then does the majority duck rendering judgment in this case? Is this a signal that the court expects for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing before it issues another ruling in this case.
There is no purpose in our remanding this cause to the trial court for it to “enter” (render) a judgment that we can render. Alternatively, if the trial court is to hear more evidence regarding whether the positions in question are classified in light of the court’s new nebulous standard, then the whole case should be remanded, in the interest of justice, for new trial. Also, the court of appeals never reached the city’s factual insufficiency points and today’s opinion denies the city their right to a meaningful appellate review.
In conclusion, the majority’s convoluted opinion muddles the law and is micro management at its worst. Absent corrective legislation, the court’s failure to give clear guidance to the bench and bar will not only serve to keep this case and others like it in the courts for some time to come but will also thwart the Act’s purpose of facilitating efficient police and fire departments.
For all of these reasons, I dissent.
CORNYN, J., joins in this dissent.
OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

. Tex.Loc.Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 143.001-.134 (Vernon 1988 & Supp.1991). References to the "Act" or the "code” are to the Texas Local Government Code unless otherwise noted.
The case was tried prior to recodification, under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1269m, repealed by Act of 1987, ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306. Corresponding references to the prior codification are noted in the footnotes.

. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Art. 1269m, § 8(b) (repealed).

. Houston, Tex., Ordinances 82-1165, 84-1290, and 85-568.

. In their application, petitioners assert that "the only construction which harmonizes all of the Act's provisions is the one which affords civil service protection to all members of police departments, regardless of whether their job requires police work.” This position, shared by the dissent in the court of appeals, 762 S.W.2d 189, was abandoned by petitioners during oral argument of this case:
J. Mauzy: Counselor, are you taking the position that the state civil service law applies to every employee of the police department? Attorney for Petitioners: No your honor, I am not.
J. Hecht: You do agree that there are some employees of the police department who are not covered by the statute, and now the squabble is which ones are which?
Attorney for Petitioners: I think that is a possible interpretation.
J. Hecht: In essence there are some employees of a police department who are not covered by the statute? That is your view?
Attorney for Petitioners: I think that probably is the correct interpretation.

. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Art. 1269m, § 8(a) (repealed).

. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Art. 1269m, § 8(b) (repealed).

. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Art. 1269m, § 9(a) (repealed).

. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Art. 1269m, § 14A(a) (repealed).

. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Art. 1269m, § 14A(d) (repealed).

. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1269m, § 8(c) (repealed).

. At the time of suit, the predecessor to this statute defined policemen as those appointed "in substantial compliance with the provisions of sections 9, 10, and 11 of this Act, or entitled to Civil Service Status under section 14B or 24 of the Act.” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1269m, § 2. Sections 9, 10, and 11 refer to the qualifications of beginning policemen, as described below.

. With the recodification of the act into the Local Government Code, the term "policeman” was replaced by "police officer." Tex.Local Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.003 (Vernon 1988).

. Now the code defines a police officer as one appointed in substantial compliance with chapter 143 of the code, i.e., the entire act. Tex.Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.003(5) (Vernon 1988).

. Tex.Loc.Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.023(f) (Vernon 1988).

. The Act provides:
A person who is 45 years of age or older may not be certified for a beginning position in a police department. A person who is 36 years of age or older and under 45 may not be certified as eligible for a beginning position in a police department unless the person has at least five years’ experience as a peace officer or at least five years’ of military experience.
Tex.Loc.Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.023(c) (Vernon 1988). I do not see how the local commission is authorized to make an exception as the majority suggests.

. The Act requires:
The commission shall set the age and physical requirements for applicants for beginning and promotional positions in accordance with this chapter. The requirements must be the same for all applicants.
Tex.Loc.Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.022(a) (Vernon 1988). See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1269m, § 9(d) (repealed). While it is possible that the commission could make a "soft track” and a "hard track,” I find the simpler explanation to be that the legislature intended to narrow the Act’s applicability to those whose job responsibilities reasonably require them to meet the requirements of the statute, those performing traditional law enforcement duties.

.See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1269m, § 9(e) (repealed).

.Tex.Loc.Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.103(a) (Vernon 1988) extends the act to special peace officers such as park police and airport police. Section 143.109 extends the act to a "communications class”, which "each person who performs the technical operation of police radio communications,” and "technical class” which includes “each person who performs criminal laboratory analysis and interpretations or the technical aspects of criminal identification and photography.” See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1269m, §§ 14A & 14B (repealed).

. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1269m, § 8(a) (repealed).

. The majority describes a "horizontal” and "vertical” classification system that does not exist either in the facts of this case or in the Act. There is no evidence that the legislature ever *301contemplated or intended the Act to be analyzed in this fashion. The Act does not discuss non-classified employees of the department, and certainly does not mandate that any supervisor whose duties include the supervision of classified officers must also be classified.
Moreover, there is no horizontal classification in the Act that is not satisfied by the Houston system of providing for the various ranks of the police officers. The Act does nothing more than require that classified police officers be permitted to advance in rank to the same extent after the reorganization of the department as before. The Houston ordinances satisfy this requirement.

. None of the nine civilian departments or job assignments in question require the taking of competitive examinations.