Court Opinion

ID: 9547743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:51:21.17663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:02.610655
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — The majority commits a fundamental error by reviewing the trial court's denial of Volvo's motion to vacate the default judgment in terms of whether or not such denial was an abuse of discretion. The majority is quite right in asserting that generally motions under CR 60(b) are left to the trial court's sound discretion. Haller v. Wallis, 89 Wn.2d 539, 573 P.2d 1302 (1978); Altman v. Connally, 456 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1972). As to most of the *550many different grounds for vacating judgment, the trial court's decision should not be overturned without a showing of abuse of discretion. A motion that the judgment is void under CR 60(b)(5) is an exception to this rule of discretion, however. As the preeminent commentators on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have said about Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (the identical counterpart to our CR 60(b)(5)):
Necessarily a motion under this part of the rule differs markedly from motions under the other clauses of Rule 60(b). There is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b) (4). Nor is there any requirement, as there usually is when default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b), that the moving party show that he has a meritorious defense. Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well present a difficult question, but when that question is resolved, the court must act accordingly.
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice § 2862, at 197 (1973). See Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991, 44 L. Ed. 2d 481, 95 S. Ct. 1996 (1975); Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1955); Shannon v. Norman Block, Inc., 106 R.I. 124, 256 A.2d 214 (1969).
In a situation identical to the one presented here, the Ninth Circuit vacated a default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction, stating it had a "nondiscretionary duty" to grant relief from the judgment. Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1256 (9th Cir. 1980). While our own cases have not explicitly recognized such a nondiscretionary duty, Washington cases involving motions to vacate because the judgment is void under CR 60(b)(5) implicitly recognize such a duty by failing to review the trial court's decision in terms of abuse of discretion. King Cy. v. Rea, 21 Wn.2d 593, 152 P.2d 310 (1944) (vacating lower court decree without reference to abuse of discretion); Metropolitan Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Greenacres Mem. Ass'n, 7 Wn. App. 695, 502 P.2d 476 (1972) (recognizing the distinction between void *551and voidable judgments). The question before us is not whether the trial court abused its discretion, but whether the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction over Volvo.
Turning to the merits of Volvo's motion, I would hold the Court of Appeals correctly found personal service upon Volvo was inadequate since Mr. Machupa, upon whom service had been rendered, was not shown to be an "agent" of the corporation. See Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 Wn.2d 50, 558 P.2d 764 (1977); State ex rel. Western Can. Greyhound Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 26 Wn.2d 740, 175 P.2d 640 (1946); Faucher v. Burlington N., Inc., 24 Wn. App. 711, 603 P.2d 844 (1979). The majority itself betrays allegiance to the Court of Appeals holding in its conjecture that it "might have reached a different conclusion" than the trial court had it addressed the merits of Volvo's claim. Majority opinion, at 548. We need not pose the question in the hypothetical; it is our responsibility to reach the question. Reviewing the law and the facts, I would hold the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction to issue its decree.
That Volvo seeks vacation of a default judgment further compels us to vacate the judgment against Volvo. The court in Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1974) identified three policy concerns governing disposition of a motion to vacate a default judgment:
First, Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature and therefore must be liberally applied (e. g., Butner v. Neustadter (9th Cir. 1963) 324 F.2d 783, 786; 7 J. Moore, Fed. Prac., ¶ 60.10 [7], [9]; ¶ 60.18 [8]. Second, default judgments are generally disfavored; whenever it is reasonably possible, cases should be decided on their merits (e. g., Patapoff v. Vollstedt's Inc. (9th Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 863, 865; 6 J. Moore, Fed. Prac., ¶ 55.10[1]). Third, and as a consequence of the first two considerations, "[wjhere timely relief is sought from a default judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their merits" (7 J. *552Moore, Fed. Prac., ¶ 60.19, at 232-33; Butner v. Neustadter, supra, 324 F.2d at 786).
508 F.2d at 355. At this stage in the proceedings, Volvo does not even know if it made the engine for the boat which is the subject matter of Kennedy's contract claim. This case should be tried on the merits. I would affirm the unanimous Court of Appeals.
Brachtenbach, C.J., and Stafford and Pearson, JJ., concur with Utter, J.