Court Opinion

ID: 9537845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:25:43.326699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:04.874016
License: Public Domain

TUCKETT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. As mentioned in the main opinion, Mrs. Varley was admitted to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to the provisions of Section 64-7-29, U.C.A. 1953, which provides as follows:
The superintendent of the Utah State Hospital may admit for observation, diagnosis, care, and treatment any individual who is mentally ill or has symptoms of mental illness and who, being sixteen years of age or over, applies therefor, and any individual under sixteen years of age who is mentally ill or has symptoms of mental illness, if his parent or legal guardian applies therefor in his behalf.
The plaintiffs here claim that they have the right to maintain this action under the provisions of Section 63-30-10, U.C.A. 1953, which section is a part of the Governmental Immunity Act. The provisions of that section are as follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee-committed within the scope of his employment except if the injury:
******
(10) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail or other place of legal confinement, * * *.
The defendants contend that Mrs. Varley’s status came within the exception and that sovereign immunity is a complete defense to the plaintiffs’ cause of action. The court below was of the opinion that the Utah State Hospital is an institution of legal confinement within the meaning of the statute above referred to and there was no waiver of the defense of sovereign immunity.
In determining the intent of the legislature we must consider and give meaning to the entire provision of subsection (10) including the word “incarceration.” The word “incarceration” is synonymous with *5the word imprisonment1 and it would seem that a reasonable interpretation of the meaning of that word as used by the legislature was not intended to include a voluntary patient at a state hospital. I am of the opinion that the provision of the statute here referred to was given an unduly ■restrictive meaning by the majority.
I would reverse.

. State ex rel. Kahn v. Woodward, 123 Ind. 30, 23 N.E. 968; Longway v. State of Maine, et al., 611 Me. 430, 213 A.2d 519; Black’s Law Dictionary (3d Ed.), p. 941.