Court Opinion

ID: 9503276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 19:39:53.221327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:21.660040
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s decision to award costs to petitioners. However, for the reasons expressed below, I dissent from the majority’s decision to deny petitioners’ request for an award of attorney fees.
It is important to acknowledge at the outset the areas of agreement between the majority and this dissent. The majority correctly explains that petitioners are the prevailing parties in this action, because
“petitioners had succeeded in obtaining a direct statement that Article VIII, section 8, imposed a duty on the legislature to fund primary and secondary public education at a certain level, a result that the circuit court and the Court of Appeals had refused to give them.”
347 Or at 33. To that I would add that petitioners’ litigation also clarified that the legislature is subject to a constitutional obligation, not a mere aspirational guideline, under Article VIII, section 8, to appropriate sufficient funds to meet education quality goals established by law or accept responsibility for deficient funding by reporting the reasons for any deficiency in writing.1
I also agree that petitioners’ claim for declaratory relief under Article VIII, section 8, is the kind of claim that qualifies for an award of attorney fees under the court’s inherent power. The majority recites that a qualifying claim *37must be one “in equity,” citing Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 287, 959 P2d 49 (1998), and that petitioners’ claim satisfies that criterion. 347 Or at 33-34. However, this court in Swett v. Bradbury, 335 Or 378, 389, 67 P3d 391 (2003), concluded that the requirement in Armatta that the proceeding be one “in equity” was “of limited utility in determining whether to award an attorney fee.” Instead, the Swett court concluded that a plaintiffs successful invocation of the court’s authority to render a declaratory judgment concerning the disputed legal right would qualify for an award of attorney fees under the court’s inherent power. As noted, petitioners’ claim meets that criterion.
Finally, the majority correctly focuses on the state’s objection that “petitioners did not meet the third Deras requirement, i.e., they did not vindicate an important constitutional right applying to all citizens without any gain peculiar to themselves.” The state makes two arguments in support of that objection. First, the state asserts that petitioners succeeded only in obtaining reaffirmation of an undisputed proposition of law — that the legislature must follow the law — but that that principle was never in issue here. Second, the state claims that petitioners’ victory does not apply to all of Oregon’s citizens and, instead, benefits only students currently attending a public primary or secondary school and, arguably, their parents.
The majority does not address those objections. Instead, the majority focuses on the fact that petitioners sought, among other things, a mandatory injunction requiring the legislature to appropriate additional funds for public education and the court did not approve that requested relief. The majority labels that requested remedy “pivotal” to petitioners’ choice to enter into this litigation, but it cites nothing in the record to support that claim. 347 Or at 35. Finally, the majority asserts that petitioners’ failure to obtain an injunction regarding additional public school funding shows that they won only a Pyrrhic victory, implying that, in reality, they lost the war.
The majoritys response to the state’s objections is seriously flawed. The state’s argument at least concedes that *38the proper focus is on the success that petitioners’ action achieved, not on a form of requested relief that the court did not grant. That premise stems from petitioners’ status as prevailing parties who, but for the error below, should have received a favorable judgment on their claim.
The central value of the remedy of declaratory judgment, codified in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act at ORS 28.010 to 28.160, is the elimination of uncertainty and insecurity that result from the ambiguous description of legal rights and responsibilities in laws, contracts, and other writings. ORS 28.120 provides:
“This chapter is declared to be remedial. The purpose of this chapter is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and administered.”
Before petitioners filed this action, the terms of Article VIII, section 8, were nothing if not ambiguous. That provision seemed to impose a mandatory duty on the legislature to appropriate funds sufficient to ensure compliance with quality goals established by law. However, the text of the provision also linked that funding obligation, by the conjunction “and,” with a reporting obligation concerning both sufficient and insufficient appropriations. No court previously had addressed and resolved the multiple ambiguities in that provision. At least from petitioners’ standpoint, if Article VIII, section 8, imposed a dual obligation on the legislature to both appropriate sufficient funds and to publish a report concerning the quality of public education in Oregon, then it was clear from the available evidence that the legislature was violating its legal duty under that constitutional provision.
Petitioners’ complaint, as noted, sought a declaratory judgment concerning the legislature’s duties under Article VTII, section 8, and, in addition, sought an injunction requiring the state to provide sufficient funding for the then-current biennium. The majority ascribes great significance to petitioners’ unsuccessful request for a mandatory injunction *39requiring greater appropriations for public education. However, as this court pointed out in Swett, a request for injunc-tive relief in addition to declaratory relief is “pointless,” 335 Or at 389, because the courts assume that “the responsible state officials would honor the court’s declaration without the necessity of an accompanying injunction.” Id. Thus, properly analyzed, petitioners’ claim sought a declaratory judgment regarding the legislature’s duties under Article VIII, section 8, to remove the uncertainty and insecurity resulting from that provision’s ambiguity.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals determined that petitioners’ complaint should be dismissed. As this court noted in its opinion, the Court of Appeals had determined that the word “shall” in Article VIII, section 8, was intended to be “permissive” and, in reality, meant “may.” Pendleton School Dist., 345 Or at 607. This court rejected that position and concluded that petitioners were entitled to a declaratory judgment “that the legislature failed to fully fund the public school system, if that is the case.” Id. at 610. On the basis of the state’s admissions, this court also declared that “the legislature failed to act in accordance with the constitutional mandate.” Id. This court also concluded that it could not grant petitioners’ further request for a declaratory judgment requiring the legislature to fund the public school system at the levels required by Article VIII, section 8, because that relief would conflict with the reporting provisions in the measure.
This court’s opinion establishes that, in addressing its responsibilities under Article VIII, section 8, the legislature is carrying out a legal duty imposed by the constitution, not an aspirational guideline, as the Court of Appeals viewed the matter. The majority is wrong to discount the value of that declaratory judgment simply because it lacks a judicial enforcement mechanism. Just as this court in Swett assumed that public officials will comply with their duties as declared by the courts, we also assume that public officials will comply with legal duties imposed by the constitution, and will do so without the need for a court order. We cannot make that assumption regarding aspirational statements, even when they appear in the constitution. In that respect, petitioners’ *40successful appeal has clarified what the legislature is obligated, not merely permitted, to do, even if no further judicial scrutiny ever occurs in the future. That is a legally significant result for petitioners and the public.
I would take into consideration, however, the fact that petitioners did not succeed in obtaining a significant part of the relief that they sought. In similar proceedings concerning the recovery of attorney fees pursuant to a statute, the pertinent rule, ORAP 13.10(5)(b), directs the court to consider relevant statutory factors, including those set out in ORS 20.075(1) and (2), in determining the amount of any fee award. One such factor is “the results obtained.” ORS 20.075(2)(d). In considering an equitable award of prevailing party fees in this nonstatutory context, I would consider reducing the amount of an award because the result that petitioners obtained is less than they desired. I would not, however, completely deny a prevailing party attorney fee award in this case.
Finally, I reject the state’s contention that petitioners’ victory does not force the legislature to behave differently. Petitioners’ action sought to clarify the constitutional responsibility of the state legislature in appropriating public funds for public education throughout the state. All citizens benefit from the elimination of uncertainty and insecurity regarding the legislature’s compliance with its constitutional responsibilities in that regard. It is clear that petitioners’ action protected the public interest in compliance by the legislature with duties imposed by the constitution for the protection and education of all public school students. See Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47, 66, 535 P2d 541 (1975) (applying similar standard in awarding attorney fees; plaintiffs action protected the “interest of the public in preservation of the individual liberties guaranteed against governmental infringement of the constitution”). An exercise of the court’s inherent authority to award an attorney fee to the prevailing party is appropriate in that context.
In conclusion, I would allow an award of prevailing party attorney fees in this case. I would also consider reducing the award to take into consideration the result obtained by petitioners. I dissent from the majority’s decision to refuse *41to award an attorney fee in any amount to the prevailing parties.
For the reasons expressed above, I concur in part and dissent in part from the majority’s decision.
De Muniz, C. J., and Walters, J., join in this opinion.

 The Court of Appeals had agreed with the state’s contention that the seemingly mandatory terms of Article VIII, section 8 (“The Legislative Assembly shall appropriate in each biennium a sum of money sufficient to ensure * * *”), in fact embodied only “an aspirational goal of full funding for public education,” because the constitutional provision also offered the legislature the option of using an explanatory report to justify any funding deficiency. Pendleton School Dist. v. State of Oregon, 220 Or App 56, 76, 185 P3d 471 (2008), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 345 Or 596, 200 P3d 133 (2009). Relying on that reasoning, the Court of Appeals had affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioners’ complaint for declaratory judgment.