Court Opinion

ID: 9581087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:11:35.944481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:41.748804
License: Public Domain

Justice EDMUNDS
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the errors here were not structural. Nevertheless, I believe that the instructions on felony murder were prejudicially erroneous and accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
These errors pervaded the instructions given to the jury. After counsel completed their closing arguments, the trial court began its instructions relating to first-degree murder with a brief introductory description of the offense:
*850Now as to the charge of first degree murder under the law in the evidence in this case, it is your duty to return one of the following verdicts: guilty of first degree murder or guilty of second degree murder or not guilty.
You may find the Defendant, Mr. Bunch, guilty of first degree murder or [sic] either or both of two theories. Either or both of two theories. That is on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation, or under the first degree felony murder rule.
First degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation is the intentional and unlawful killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation. First degree murder under the felony murder rule is the killing of a human being in the perpetration in this case of first degree burglary and/or robbery with a dangerous weapon.
Following these and other preliminary remarks, the trial court provided a detailed instruction explaining the elements of first-degree murder based upon premeditation and deliberation. However, when the trial court undertook to provide a similarly detailed explanation of the elements of felony murder, it began by instructing the jury: “Now I further charge that for you to find the Defendant guilty of first degree murder under the first degree felony murder rule, the State must prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt.” Having alerted the jurors to be on the lookout for three elements, the court defined only the first, that the killing was in the perpetration of an underlying felony. The court repeated this error in its mandate as to first-degree murder when it again defined only the element of felony murder relating to the commission of an underlying felony, omitting the rest. In addition, during another part of the instructions, the trial court apparently referred to the felony-murder rule as the “first degree murder rule.”
Finally, in its concluding instructions as to murder, the trial court advised the jury:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the Defendant or someone with whom he was acting in concert intentionally and with malice wounded the victim with a deadly weapon and that this proximately caused the victim’s death, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of second degree murder.
*851If you do not so find or have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty. And I believe I said that — and I will go back and repeat it. As to the felony murder — first degree murder on the basis of a felony murder rule if you don’t find that they committed those — either one of those two crimes one or the other or both neither — neither one and/or — and/or first-degree burglary or robbery with a dangerous weapon and if you don’t find that, then he would not be guilty of first degree murder based on the felony murder rule.
The mistakes and omissions in these instructions, and the inevitable resulting perplexity, would seem to be self-evident. The majority purports to consider the entire jury charge and the strength of the evidence to find the error harmless. However, as the preceding analysis indicates, the instructions in their entirety are, at best, confusing. This Court has found no error when an isolated piece of a jury instruction was incorrect or improper but the instruction taken as a whole was an accurate statement of the law. State v. McWilliams, 277 N.C. 680, 684-85, 178 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1971). In contrast, here, one isolated sentence in the introductory instructions was an accurate statement of the law but the instructions as a whole were incomplete and muddled.
We have held that the trial court must instruct on all the elements of a criminal offense. State v. Ramos, 363 N.C. 352, 355-56, 678 S.E.2d 224, 226-27 (2009) (prejudicial error when trial court failed to instruct on element of willfulness when the defendant’s evidence conflicted with the State’s evidence on that issue). The purposes of jury instructions are to provide guidance for the jury and to “ ‘give a clear instruction which applies the law to the evidence in such manner as to assist the jury in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict.’ ” State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 346, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2006) (quoting State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971)). Thus, the trial court has “the obligation ‘to instruct the jury on every substantive feature of the case.’ ” Id. at 347, 626 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 48 N.C. App. 680, 682, 270 S.E.2d 117, 118 (1980)). The guidance that our trial judges must provide juries of laypersons, unversed in the law but required to apply the law to the case at hand, was absent here. As a result, the jury had an insufficient basis for reaching a rational decision.
*852The strength of the evidence is the other leg on which the majority opinion stands. While the evidence here is indeed compelling, when erroneous and incomplete instructions have left an unguided, unchecked, and aroused jury to its own devices, mere strength of evidence provides an inadequate basis for a reliable verdict. If it did, we could dispense with the formality of trials. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Chief Justice PARKER and Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.