Court Opinion

ID: 9939598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 18:15:10.162998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:28.035453
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00183-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

LUIS CABALLERO,                                                           Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                        Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 24th District Court
                         of Victoria County, Texas.

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

                 Before Justices Longoria, Silva and Peña
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

      Appellant Luis Caballero was found guilty by a jury for continuous sexual abuse of

a young child for which he was sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). By six issues, Caballero argues (1) he suffered from prosecutorial

vindictiveness when a subsequent indictment included a more severe, additional charge,
(2) his counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the subsequent indictment, (3) the

trial court abused its discretion in overruling his motion for directed verdict, (4) the trial

court abused its discretion when it violated his right to select counsel of his choice, (5) the

trial court abused its discretion in allowing a witness to remain in the courtroom during

testimony of other witnesses, and (6) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

certain evidence over objection. We affirm.

                           I.     MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD

       On July 8, 2022, Caballero filed his “First Amended Motion for Supplemental

Record” in this case. In his motion, Caballero noted that his appeal arises out of a

judgment in trial court cause number 22-03-33519-D and requested that the appellate

record be supplemented with court documents and transcripts from trial court cause

number 19-07-31619-D, a proceeding which ended in mistrial. According to Caballero,

supplementation was necessary to prosecute his appeal. This motion was carried with

the case as of July 21, 2022.

       According to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, if something relevant is omitted

from the clerk’s or reporter’s record, the trial court, the appellate court, or any party may

by letter direct the official court reporter or trial court clerk to prepare, certify, and file in

the appellate court a supplement containing the omitted items. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.5

(c)(1), 34.6(d). Any supplemental clerk’s or reporter’s record is part of the appellate

record. See id. In this case, the official court reporter filed one supplemental clerk’s record

on August 2, 2022, and the trial court clerk filed eight supplemental reporter’s records on

August 10, 2022. All the supplemental records contain court documents and transcripts

                                                2
from cause number 19-07-31619-D. Pursuant to Rules 34.5 and 34.6, all the

supplemental records, as of the date they were filed, are part of the appellate record. See

id. Accordingly, Caballero’s first amended motion for supplemental record is hereby

dismissed as moot.

                                         II.     BACKGROUND 1

       On July 18, 2019, a grand jury indicted Caballero under cause number 19-07-

31619-D for aggravated sexual assault of a child, Count 1, and indecency with a child,

Count 2. See id. §§ 21.11, 22.021. R.A., Caballero’s granddaughter, was the alleged

complainant. The State filed a motion to amend Count 1 of the indictment on February

15, 2022, which was granted by the trial court on the same day. The case proceeded to

jury selection on February 22, 2022. During jury selection, Caballero’s trial counsel

approached the bench and requested a mistrial after revealing that he had not informed

Caballero that Caballero was ineligible for probation as to both counts. The trial court then

permitted Caballero to discuss the matter with his trial counsel. After a brief pause in the

proceedings, the trial court was informed that Caballero wanted a mistrial and requested

the appointment of another attorney. The trial court granted Caballero’s motion for

mistrial, then addressed Caballero’s request for the appointment of another lawyer. When

the trial court asked Caballero whether there was any issue he had with his trial counsel,

other than what had happened regarding the mistrial, Caballero replied, “No, sir.” The trial

court then denied Caballero’s request for another lawyer. However, the trial court later

amended its initial ruling rejecting Caballero’s request for another attorney later that same

       1 We refer to the minor victim, her brother, and her mother by initials to protect their identities.

                                                      3
day and signed an order appointing co-counsel as second chair.

         On March 3, 2022, Caballero was reindicted under cause number 22-03-33519-A,

the instant case. The subsequent indictment contained the previously indicted counts of

aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child, but also included one

additional count of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. See id. §§ 21.02, 21.11,

22.021. On March 9, 2022, the State filed a motion to dismiss cause number 19-07-

31619-D, which was granted by the trial court on the same day.

         On March 17, 2022, Caballero filed a motion to quash claiming the indicted

offenses violated principles of double jeopardy. The trial court did not rule on the motion.

The case proceeded to jury trial on April 18, 2022. After the trial court read the indictment,

but before the parties conducted jury selection, the State abandoned the aggravated

sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child counts and proceeded solely on the

continuous sexual abuse of a young child count. The State and Caballero presented

several witnesses during trial. We summarize the evidence and testimony in relevant part

below.

         R.A.’s mother, M.A., testified that Caballero was her father and R.A.’s grandfather.

M.A. stated that in October 2017, after R.A.’s sixth birthday, Caballero had moved from

Rosenberg, Texas into her brother’s home in Victoria after being hospitalized due to a

brain tumor. Because Caballero was “short on cash” and did not have a job, M.A. and her

husband entered into an arrangement with Caballero by which he was paid $125 per

week to babysit R.A. and R.A.’s younger brother, D.A. Caballero babysat R.A. and D.A.

from 5 p.m. to about 9:30 p.m. while M.A. and her husband worked. M.A. further testified

                                              4
that Caballero babysat the children by himself at her home, and that he had once babysat

the children at her brother’s home overnight when M.A. and her husband went out of

town. According to M.A., Caballero saw R.A. almost daily or every other day and that R.A.

received special attention from Caballero as he bought her a dress and underwear. M.A.

also testified that Caballero bathed R.A. and not her brother, which M.A. found unusual.

M.A. stated that she did not want Caballero to bathe any of her children and that Caballero

explained that he bathed R.A. because “little girls need to smell good.”

       M.A. testified that R.A. made an outcry of sexual abuse in March 2018 when she

was six years old, and around five months after Caballero had moved to Victoria. M.A.

noticed that R.A. began wetting her bed in December 2017, which had last occurred more

than two years prior. M.A. stated, “Whenever [R.A.] was taking a bath, she did say it was

burning; and I saw a rash. So I figured it was a rash.” According to MA., R.A. said her

“tee-tee was burning” and that “tee-tee” was the term R.A. used to refer to her vagina.

M.A. also noticed a personality change in R.A. a month or two prior to her outcry as she

became quiet and closed off when she was usually open and talkative. R.A. outcried four

days after she had last been around Caballero. On the morning of R.A.’s outcry, M.A.

asked R.A. about why she was wetting her bed, and R.A. stated she did not want to get

in trouble. After M.A. assured R.A. she was not in trouble, R.A. informed M.A. that

Caballero had touched her “tee-tee.” M.A. then called 9-1-1. A recording of the call was

admitted into evidence. M.A. further testified that she took R.A. to a forensic interview at

the Child Advocacy Center (CAC) and for an examination by a sexual assault nurse

examiner (SANE) a few days after her outcry.

                                             5
          R.A. was ten years old at the time of her testimony. R.A. testified that when

Caballero would babysit her, he touched her vagina with his hands more than twenty

times and did so in her home in the bathroom shower and at his house. R.A. explained

that her younger brother was usually asleep in his room at the time and that Caballero

would touch her around “7:00 to 8:00” at night. R.A. also explained that when Caballero

would touch her vagina, she would sometimes have her pants on, and Caballero would

pull them down.

          R.A. stated that Caballero slowly rubbed his penis on her butt, that his penis was

hard and got close to going inside her vagina or butt, and that she felt a burning sensation

or irritation after he would do so. According to R.A., “gooey white stuff” came out of

Caballero’s penis, and he would make her wipe it off with toilet paper and throw it into the

toilet.

          R.A. further testified that Caballero rubbed his penis on her vagina and butt at his

house and that he had rubbed his penis on her more than ten times. R.A. also stated that

Caballero made her touch his penis and testicles more than once. She explained that his

testicles were hairy, that his penis was tan-colored, hard, and stood “straight up.”

Caballero also made R.A. “kiss” his penis more than once, and that Caballero had “kissed”

her breasts and butt more than once. R.A. testified that these things occurred every time

he babysat her. R.A. also noticed blood on her bed sheet but told no one about it. R.A.

stated that by the time she told her mother what was happening, Caballero had been

babysitting her for months, and that she told her mother only a little of what happened.

R.A. also testified that Caballero had told her not to tell anyone what was going on, and

                                               6
that he would go to jail if she did so. R.A. stated that Caballero would give her baths after

touching her, not every time, but more than once, and that before, only her parents had

given her a bath. Caballero never bathed her younger brother. R.A. stated that her mother

never told her what to say about what Caballero did to her, that she did not make it up,

and that no other adults had done these things to her.

       Detective Wilmer McLeroy of the Victoria Police Department (VPD) testified that

he was the initial responding officer to M.A.’s 9-1-1 call on March 22, 2018, at 7:30 a.m.

Detective McLeroy stated that M.A. provided a statement to Detective Matthew Dailey.

According to Detective McLeroy, Caballero’s date of birth is May 23, 1970, and he was

arrested on March 28, 2018. A search warrant was obtained for Caballero’s residence

and executed on the same day. Various devices were seized and searched, including

Caballero’s laptop computer. Detective McLeroy also testified that Caballero had

voluntarily submitted a DNA sample to VPD on April 15, 2020.

       Leslie Kallus, a SANE, testified that she conducted a medical examination of R.A.

on March 23, 2018. As part of her examination, R.A. provided Kallus a statement

describing the sexual abuse she had experienced. This statement was included in

Kallus’s written report, which was admitted into evidence. According to Kallus, R.A. had

stated:

       It happened Monday night. My grandpa babysits us every day. He does this
       when my brother goes to bed. He pulled my panties down while I was
       watching TV, and he rubbed my tee-tee with his hand. Then he pulled his
       pants down, and he slapped my hand down to touch his wee-wee. It felt
       squishy. It looks like a straight line and round.

               Then he made me touch his balls. It was wet. Like when he’s inside
       a girl, he put his wee-wee in between my tee-tee and rubbed my butt with

                                             7
       his straight thing, his weaner.

       ....

              It hurt. I told him it hurt, but he wouldn’t stop. He said if I don’t finish,
       he would shoot me in the head. I know he has a gun. He then lifted my shirt
       and kissed my boobs. On Sunday night when he did it, he rubbed it, his
       wee-wee, on my butt really fast and stuff came out. He—he didn’t rub the
       stuff on me. It’s the stuff that comes out before we stop.

               I’m scared. When it comes out, he told me it happens after you put it
       in a girl. He makes me watch a lot of nasty movies. He makes me watch
       them in the morning. We watch it on YouTube on the Xbox. Mom said there
       were pictures of me naked. He probably sneaked in the bathroom when I
       was taking a shower. It started happening when I got used to him being
       around, when I stayed with him in the summer.

               When he started to babysit us, he babysits us all the time. He did this
       like a thousand times. He watches me when I take a bath. He even comes
       in the restroom to pee when I take a shower. He says guys like it when girls
       are clean. There’s blood on my bed. It happened[] Sunday but we washed
       them.

       ....

              When we went to take them out of the dryer, they were gone; but
       then they were back on my bed. But there’s still some blood on my sheets.
       My bunny still has blood on it. He had blood on his wee-wee. This happened
       Sunday when everyone was asleep[.]

Kallus found no indication of injury to R.A.’s genitals or anus. However, Kallus testified

that sexual abuse could occur without visible damage to the genitals or anus because the

body can heal very quickly, explaining that “[w]ithin two or three days you may not see

any type of injury to the genitalia, even if there had been any type of bleeding or any type

of blunt force trauma just because it does heal that quickly.” Kallus determined that R.A.

had no sexually transmitted diseases and completed a rape kit of R.A., which included

two vaginal swabs, two thigh swabs, two breast swabs, two anal swabs, a saliva swab,

                                                8
and a swab from R.A.’s underwear.

       Caitlyn Crebo, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety

(DPS) testified that no semen was detected on the vaginal, anal, thigh, or panty swabs.

However, blood was detected on R.A.’s underwear. Credo indicated that further analysis

was conducted by a third-party laboratory. Sapana Prajapati, a DNA analyst with

Signature Science, a private forensic laboratory, testified that she received cuttings from

vaginal, thigh, breast, and panty swabs, and two known DNA reference samples from

R.A. and Caballero. Prajapati stated that she attempted to perform DNA testing of the

cuttings and compare them with the reference samples. Though the presence of male

DNA was detected from each cutting, Prajapati testified that she ultimately could not draw

any conclusions because the quantity or quality of the male DNA present in the cuttings

was not sufficient to perform a comparison.

       After the State presented its case in chief, Caballero moved for directed verdict,

which was denied by the trial court. Caballero presented four witnesses, including himself.

Caballero testified, among other things, that he did not sexually abuse R.A. The jury was

thereafter read the jury charge and presented closing arguments by the parties. The jury

found Caballero guilty of committing continuous sexual abuse of a young child and

sentenced him to forty years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                         III.    PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS

       In his first issue, Caballero argues that he was “impermissibly re[]indicted after a

mistrial was declared to include the offense of [continuous sexual abuse of a young child].”

According to Caballero, nothing in the record rebuts a presumption that “seeking the more

                                              9
severe charge with the more severe punishment after this mistrial was anything but

vindictiveness.” We construe Caballero’s issue as a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness.

        Generally, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complaining party must

make a timely request, objection, or motion that states the grounds for the ruling sought

with sufficient particularity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, and the trial

court must rule on the request, objection, or motion. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).

        An appellant generally waives claims of judicial and prosecutorial vindictiveness

by failing to object at trial. See Neal v. State, 150 S.W.3d 169, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)

(“Because appellant never presented his prosecutorial vindictiveness claim in the trial

court, he failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.”); see also Harris v. State, 364

S.W.3d 328, 336–37 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (concluding the

defendant failed to preserve judicial vindictiveness claim because he did not object to

sentence or otherwise raise claim of judicial vindictiveness in trial court); Fleck v. State,

No. 01–09–00983–CR, 2011 WL 1632168, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28,

2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Neal and finding

prosecutorial vindictiveness claim not preserved when counsel did not present complaint

to trial court); Roberts v. State, No. 01–03–00311–CR, 2004 WL 2612413, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 18, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (concluding complaint of judicial vindictiveness not preserved when not

raised in trial court). 2 While Caballero filed a motion to quash arguing that the second

        2 Caballero cites to Kerr v. State for the proposition that his issue requires no objection or

preservation. 624 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). In Kerr, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused
the State’s petition for discretionary review from an unpublished memorandum opinion, and thus issued no
opinion holding such a proposition. See Sheffield v. State, 650 S.W.2d 813, 814 (holding that “the summary
                                                   10
indictment violated principles of double jeopardy, he did not raise the issue of

prosecutorial vindictiveness in the motion nor at any other point to the trial court.

Accordingly, we conclude that Caballero has not preserved his claim of prosecutorial

vindictiveness for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A), (a)(2); Neal, 150

S.W.3d at 180; We overrule Caballero’s first issue.

                                   IV.      INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

        In his second issue, as an alternative to his first, Caballero claims that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to “timely object or seek to quash the inclusion of the

[continuous sexual abuse of a young child] count in the indictment as a product of

[prosecutorial] vindictiveness.”3

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

        The right to counsel does not mean the right to errorless counsel. Robertson v.

State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In order to prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test set

forth in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, (1984); see also Ex parte

Imoudu, 284 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The first prong requires a showing

that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This requirement can be difficult to meet since there is “a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

refusal of a petition for discretionary review by this Court is of no precedential value”). In addition, Judge
Keller issued a dissenting opinion in Kerr, which Caballero does not cite to.
        3 Though Caballero uses the term “judicial vindictiveness” in his brief, his argument regards actions

by the State and not the trial court. Accordingly, we construe Caballero’s claim that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial vindictiveness.
                                                     11
professional assistance.” Id. at 689.

       When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on

direct appeal, the record “is in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct

fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.” Andrews v. State, 159

S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Moreover, where the reviewing court “can

conceive potential reasonable trial strategies that counsel could have been pursuing,” the

court “simply cannot conclude that counsel has performed deficiently.” Id. at 103. When

a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time on direct

appeal, he must show that “under prevailing professional norms,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

688, no competent attorney would do what trial counsel did or no competent attorney

would fail to do what trial counsel failed to do. See Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 102.

       The second Strickland prong, sometimes referred to as “the prejudice prong,”

requires a showing that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, there is a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability” is defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. Thus, in order to establish prejudice, Caballero must show

“that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result

was reliable.” Id. at 687. It is not sufficient for him to show “that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Rather, Caballero must

show that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact[ ]finder would

have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Id. at 695.

       The appellant has the burden to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by a

                                              12
preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999). Allegations of ineffectiveness “must ‘be firmly founded in the record.’” Bone v.

State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813).

The Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (cleaned up). A failure to make a showing

under either prong defeats a claim for ineffective assistance. See Rylander v. State, 101

S.W.3d 107, 110–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). To demonstrate that trial counsel’s failure

to object amounted to ineffective assistance, appellant must first show that the trial judge

would have erred in overruling such an objection. Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891,

901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

       Generally, prosecutors have broad discretion to decide what charges to file against

a criminal defendant. Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 173. Yet, that discretion is not without limits. A

prosecutor may not increase the charges brought against a defendant simply as a

punishment for invoking a right. United States v. Saltzman, 537 F.3d 353, 359 (5th Cir.

2008). “To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is

a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,

372 (1982) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).

       A defendant establishes a claim for vindictive prosecution by offering either:

       1) proof of circumstances that pose a “realistic likelihood” of such
       misconduct sufficient to raise a “presumption of prosecutorial
       vindictiveness,” which the State must rebut or face dismissal of the
       charges;[] or 2) proof of “actual vindictiveness”—that is, direct evidence that
       the prosecutor’s charging decision is an unjustifiable penalty resulting solely
       from the defendant’s exercise of a protected legal right.

                                             13
Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 173 (first citing United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 139, 140–41 (2d

Cir.1999); and then citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373). Under the first prong, the Supreme

Court has held that there is a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness if the State

pursues increased charges or sentence after a defendant has been convicted, exercises

his legal right to appeal, and obtains a new trial. See id. (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381).

When the presumption from the first prong does not apply, courts look at the second

prong, which grants a defendant relief if he can show actual vindictiveness. See id. A

defendant establishes such a claim by proving with objective evidence that the

prosecutor’s charging decision was a “direct and unjustifiable penalty” that resulted “solely

from the defendant’s exercise of a protected legal right.” Id. (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at

384 & n.19). The defendant bears the burden of both production and persuasion without

the aid of any legal presumption. See id. (first citing United States v. Sarracino, 340 F.3d

1148, 1177–79 (10th Cir. 2003); and then citing United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568,

572 (5th Cir.1998)).

B.     Discussion

       In his brief, Caballero argues that “[t]here can be no possible legal strategy reason

to fail to file a motion to quash when a more severe crime with a more severe sentence

is being sought by the State for reasons of [prosecutorial] vindictiveness,” and concludes

that, “[b]ut for defense counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would necessarily

have been very different.”

       In order to determine whether counsel’s failure to object to the second indictment

based on prosecutorial vindictiveness constituted ineffective assistance, we must first

                                             14
determine if Caballero has shown that the trial judge would have erred in overruling such

an objection. See Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d at 901. Regarding his underlying claims

of prosecutorial vindictiveness, we first note that a presumption of prosecutorial

vindictiveness appears inapplicable in this case because Caballero was not convicted at

the first proceeding, nor did he obtain a new trial after exercising his right to appeal. See

Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381; Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 173. Furthermore, Caballero has not cited

authority expanding the applicability of the presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness to

facts similar to this case, and we have found none. Even if the presumption applied in this

case, Caballero did not raise this issue to the trial court and the State had no opportunity

to rebut such a claim. See Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 173. Thus, under these circumstances, a

determination whether the trial judge would have erred in overruling such an objection

would be purely speculative. See Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d at 901; see also Bone,

77 S.W.3d at 835 (“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not built on retrospective

speculation; they must ‘be firmly founded in the record.’ That record must itself

affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.”)

       In addition, nothing in the record establishes proof of actual vindictiveness. See

Neal, 150 S.W.3d at 173. Caballero points to no direct evidence—and we have found

none—establishing that the prosecutor’s decision to reindict Caballero with an additional

count of continuous sexual abuse of a young child was an unjustifiable penalty resulting

solely from Caballero’s exercise of a protected legal right. See id. Thus, Caballero has

not demonstrated that the trial judge would have erred in overruling his underlying claims

of prosecutorial vindictiveness. See Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d at 901. Accordingly,

                                             15
Caballero has not shown that his counsel was ineffective. See id.; see also Bone, 77

S.W.3d at 835. We overrule Caballero’s second issue.

                                   V.     SUFFICIENCY

       In his third issue, Caballero argues the trial court abused its discretion when it

overruled his motion for directed verdict. Caballero also contends that the evidence was

legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Because a motion for a

directed verdict is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we address these

issues together. See Garza v. State, 398 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2010, pet. ref’d.).

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that only one standard should be

used to evaluate whether the evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction

beyond a reasonable doubt: legal sufficiency. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 905–07

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Accordingly, we will apply the legal-sufficiency

standard   when    addressing    Caballero’s     legal-sufficiency   and   factual-sufficiency

arguments. Id.

       “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider

the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the verdict’ to determine whether any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Delagarza v. State, 635 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2021, pet. ref’d) (quoting Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App.

2020)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We consider both direct

                                            16
and circumstantial evidence as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from

the evidence and are not mere speculation. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “We

resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the verdict, keeping in mind that the

factfinder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight

to give their testimony.” Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at 723 (first citing Walker v. State, 594

S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); and then citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.04).

       We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the

offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d

321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily

restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for

which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d

at 240). A person is guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if:

       (i) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits
           two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of
           sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims; and

       (ii) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the
            actor is 17 years of age or older and the victim is a child younger than
            14 years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the
            victim at the time of the offense.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). The State may seek one conviction under § 21.02 for

multiple acts of sexual abuse over an extended period of time. See Price v. State, 434

                                              17
S.W.3d 601, 605–06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). An “act of sexual abuse” under this statute

includes, among other things, aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(c). With respect to indecency of a child, the touching of a child’s

breast, including touching through clothing, does not qualify as an “act of sexual abuse”

under § 21.01. See id. § 21.02(c)(2). The location of the sexual acts is not an element of

the offense. See id. § 21.02(b). Nor does the statute require all elements of the offense

to be committed in one county. See id.; Meraz v. State, 415 S.W.3d 502, 505 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d).

      The indictment alleged that the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young

child occurred in Victoria County. As the underlying “acts of sexual abuse,” the indictment

alleged that Caballero committed aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with

a child. A person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child when he intentionally, or

knowingly:

      ...

      (iii)   causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth,
              anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor;

      (iv)    causes the anus of a child to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual
              organ of another person, including the actor; or

      (v)     causes the mouth of a child to contact the anus or sexual organ of
              another person, including the actor; and

      ...

      the victim is younger than 14 years of age, regardless of whether the person
      knows the age of the victim at the time of the offense . . . .

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B). A person commits indecency with a

                                            18
child if, with a child younger than 17 years of age, whether the child is of the same or

opposite sex and regardless of whether the person knows the age of the child at the time

of the offense, the person engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to

engage in sexual contact. Id. § 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” includes any touching by a

person of the genitals of a child, including touching through clothing, if committed with the

intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of a person. Id. § 21.11(c)(1). The term also

includes any touching of any part of the body of a child, including touching through

clothing, of any part of the genitals of a person. Id. § 21.11(c)(2).

       In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, we are mindful that in the

prosecution of an offense under chapter 21 of the Texas Penal Code, the uncorroborated

testimony of a child sexual abuse victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for

either the offense of continuous sexual abuse or the underlying predicate offenses of

aggravated sexual assault or indecency with a child. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 38.07(a), (b)(1); Chasco v. State, 568 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019,

pet. ref’d); Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.).

Courts give wide latitude to the testimony of child sexual abuse victims. See Villalon v.

State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). A child victim’s description of what

happened and when it occurred need not be expressed with the same level of

sophistication and detail that an adult might use. Soto v. State, 267 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.). Furthermore, corroboration of the child

victim’s testimony by medical or physical evidence is not required. Id. The mens rea and

requisite specific intent of the accused can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct, his

                                             19
remarks, and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense. McKenzie v.

State, 617 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

B.       Discussion

         Considering the entire record, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to

support Caballero’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child based on

multiple incidents constituting aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a

child.

         The evidence demonstrated that Caballero began babysitting R.A. after he moved

to Victoria in October 2017, shortly after R.A.’s sixth birthday. R.A. made an outcry of

sexual abuse on March 22, 2018, and stated to M.A. that Caballero had touched her

vagina. R.A. testified that Caballero touched her vagina with his hands more than twenty

times. R.A. stated that Caballero would rub his penis on her butt, that he took her pants

off when doing this, and that his penis was hard, not soft. R.A. also testified that

Caballero’s penis got close to going inside her vagina or butt, and she felt a burning

sensation or irritation after he would do this, and that “gooey white stuff” came out of his

penis. R.A. also stated that Caballero rubbed his penis on her more than ten times. In

addition, R.A. testified that Caballero made her touch and “kiss” his penis more than once

and indicated that he made her touch his genitals and had kissed her butt more than

once. According to R.A., Caballero had told her not to tell anyone about what he was

doing to her and that he would go to jail if she told anyone. R.A. also testified that

Caballero sometimes bathed her after performing acts of sexual abuse.

         Kallus testified about the statement that R.A. provided, which was part of the SANE

                                             20
report admitted into evidence. R.A.’s statement indicated, among other things, that

Caballero had pulled down her underwear and rubbed her vagina with his hand, that he

pulled his pants down and slapped her hand down to touch his penis, and that he made

her touch his testicles. R.A. also stated that Caballero put his penis “in between” her

vagina and rubbed her butt with his penis “really fast and stuff came out.” In addition, R.A.

stated, “When he started to babysit us, he babysits us all the time. He did this like a

thousand times.”

       Caballero argues that “the DNA evidence came back inconclusive” and “there was

no video or photographic evidence to support a finding of guilty.” However, R.A.’s

testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a

young child, and corroboration of her testimony by medical or physical evidence is not

required. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1); Chasco, 568 S.W.3d at

258; Garner, 523 S.W.3d at 271; Soto, 267 S.W.3d at 332. Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we hold the evidence sufficient to establish the

essential elements of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child beyond a

reasonable doubt. Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at 723. We overrule Caballero’s third issue.

                                 VI.    COUNSEL OF CHOICE

       In his fourth issue, Caballero claims that the trial court denied his right to select the

counsel of his choice in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Article

I § 10 of the Texas Constitution, and Article 1.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       “We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to substitute counsel under an

                                              21
abuse of discretion standard.” Coleman v. State, 246 S.W.3d 76, 85 n. 36 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008) (cleaned up); see also Carroll v. State, 176 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). “The trial court abuses its discretion when it acts

arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Johnson

v. State, 352 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). If the

trial court’s ruling falls within the “zone of reasonable disagreement,” then it has not

abused its discretion, and we will uphold its ruling. Id. “Under this standard, we may only

consider the information presented to the trial court at the time of its decision.” Id. at 227–

28.

       “The right of the accused to counsel, both at trial and on appeal, is fundamental.”

In re Fletcher, 584 S.W.3d 584, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, orig.

proceeding) (quoting Buntion v. Harmon, 827 S.W.2d 945, 948–49 (Tex. Crim. App.

1992)). “Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, an indigent defendant is entitled

to the appointment of counsel.” Id. (first citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–

44 (1963); and then citing U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV). However, “an indigent defendant

does not have the right to the appointment of counsel of choice.” Id. (quoting Stearnes v.

Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).

       “The defendant must accept counsel assigned by the court unless he or she

effectively waives the right to counsel for self-representation or can show adequate cause

for appointment of a different attorney.” Reddic v. State, 976 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg, 1998 pet. ref’d) (citing Thomas v. State, 550 S.W.2d 64,

68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(j)(2)

                                              22
(requiring that an appointed attorney represent a defendant until “permitted or ordered by

the court to withdraw as counsel for the defendant after a finding of good cause”). A trial

court is under no duty to search for an attorney until it finds one agreeable to the

defendant. See Reddic, 976 S.W.2d at 283 (citing Malcom v. State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 791

(Tex. Crim. App. 1982)). When a trial court appoints an attorney to represent an indigent

defendant, the defendant has received the protections provided under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments. See id. (citing Malcolm, 628 S.W.2d at 791). “[T]he defendant

may not manipulate his right to counsel so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the

court or interfere with the fair administration of justice and must, in some circumstances,

yield to the general interest of prompt and efficient justice.” Carroll, 176 S.W.3d at 256

(first citing King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); and then citing

Garner v. State, 864 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d)).

B.     Discussion

       Though Caballero’s request for another attorney was initially denied by the trial

court during jury selection of his first trial, the record indicates that the trial court signed

an order appointing his requested counsel as second chair later that same day.

Nonetheless, Caballero claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing his

original court-appointed attorney to remain as his trial counsel throughout trial.

       Caballero argues that “the disagreement on the record” between him and his

original counsel “rose far beyond the level of personality conflict.” We note that

“personality conflicts and disagreements concerning trial strategy are typically not valid

grounds for withdrawal[ of counsel].” Barnett v. State, 344 S.W.3d 6, 24 (Tex. App.—

                                              23
Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (quoting King, 29 S.W.3d at 566). Caballero points to no

evidence in the record of what he terms a “fundamental conflict” between him and his

original counsel. Rather, Caballero points out that his original counsel “did not understand

the range of punishment for the offense . . . [for] which [Caballero] was charged.” The

record of the first trial indicates that Caballero’s original counsel requested a mistrial after

discovering that he had not informed Caballero that Caballero would be ineligible for

probation, which was granted by the trial court. When addressing Caballero’s request for

another attorney, the trial court asked Caballero whether there was any issue he had with

his original counsel, other than what had happened regarding the mistrial, and Caballero

replied, “No, sir.”

       Caballero argues that “the trial court’s concern regarding existing representation

existed to the extent that a second chair[ . . . ]was appointed by the court sua sponte to

prevent future mistrials related to [original] counsel’s performance.” However, the record

is devoid of the trial court’s reasoning for its appointment of co-counsel, Caballero points

to none, and we decline to speculate what those reasons may have been. In any event,

we do not view the mistrial in Caballero’s first case as evidence of adequate or good

cause for the withdrawal of Caballero’s original counsel. See Reddic, 976 S.W.2d at 283;

see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(j)(2). “A mistrial halts trial proceedings

when error is so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be

wasteful and futile.” Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). By

successfully requesting a mistrial before trial commenced, Caballero was spared of any

ill effects he may have suffered from his original counsel’s failure to inform him that he

                                              24
was not eligible for probation.

       The record indicates that Caballero’s original counsel never sought to withdraw

from representing Caballero and remained his attorney throughout the case, including the

second trial which resulted in his convictions. Thus, Caballero received the protections

provided under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Reddic, 976 S.W.2d at 283.

Because Caballero failed to establish adequate or good cause for the withdrawal of his

original counsel at the time he made his request, we hold that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in permitting Caballero’s original counsel to remain as his trial counsel. See

Johnson, 352 S.W.3d at 227–28; Reddic, 976 S.W.2d at 283; see also TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(j)(2). We overrule Caballero’s fourth issue.

                            VII.   SEQUESTRATION OF WITNESS

       In his fifth issue, Caballero argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

permitting M.A. to remain in the courtroom during R.A.’s testimony.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       “The procedure of excluding witnesses from the courtroom is commonly called

putting the witnesses ‘under the [R]ule.’” Russell v. State, 155 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); TEX. R. EVID. 614. The purpose of “the Rule” is “to prevent the testimony

of one witness from influencing the testimony of another, . . . by one witness either

overhearing the testimony of another witness or talking to that witness regarding his

testimony.” Webb v. State, 766 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted); see Russell, 155 S.W.3d at 179. However, there are

exceptions to “the Rule.”

                                             25
      “Article 36.03 was enacted as a part of 2001 legislation strengthening the ability of

crime victims and particular witnesses to participate in certain criminal justice

proceedings.” Garcia v. State, 553 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet.

ref’d.) (citing Act of May 14, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1034, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws

2290, 2290). The current version of Article 36.03 states:

      (a) Notwithstanding Rule 614, Texas Rules of Evidence, a court at the
      request of a party may order the exclusion of a witness who for the purposes
      of the prosecution is a victim, close relative of a deceased victim, or
      guardian of a victim only if the witness is to testify and the court determines
      that the testimony of the witness would be materially affected if the witness
      hears other testimony at the trial.

      (b) On the objection of the opposing party, the court may require the party
      requesting exclusion of a witness under Subsection (a) to make an offer of
      proof to justify the exclusion.

      (c) Subsection (a) does not limit the authority of the court on its own motion
      to exclude a witness or other person to maintain decorum in the courtroom.

      (d) In this article:

              (1) “Close relative of a deceased victim” and “guardian of a victim”
              have the meanings assigned by Article 56A.001.

              (2) “Victim” means a victim of any criminal offense.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.03. Under Article 56A.001, “guardian of a victim”

means “a person who is the legal guardian of the victim, regardless of whether the legal

relationship between the guardian and victim exists because of the age of the victim or

the physical or mental incompetency of the victim.” See id. § 56A.001(5).

      “A trial court is ‘without authority to exclude [a qualifying witness] unless the court

determine[s] her testimony would be materially affected if she heard the other testimony

at trial.’” Garcia, 553 S.W.3d at 647 (quoting Wilson v. State, 179 S.W.3d 240, 248 (Tex.

                                            26
App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.)). “In the absence of such a showing, a trial court does

not err in allowing the witness to remain in the courtroom.” Id. “Additionally, unlike Rule

614, Article 36.03 places the burden on the party seeking exclusion of a witness to make

an offer of proof to justify the exclusion.” Id. “Thus, ‘legal guardians of crime victims should

generally be permitted to stay in the courtroom.’” Id. (citing Parks v. State, 463 S.W.3d

166, 174 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 36.03(a))).

B.     Discussion

       At trial, M.A. was the first witness to testify during the State’s case-in-chief. Prior

to cross-examination and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court stated that the

“rule” had been invoked and ruled that M.A. could not remain in the courtroom during

R.A.’s testimony pursuant to Rule 614. However, after M.A. concluded her testimony, the

trial court requested the parties to approach the bench for a conference. The following

exchange occurred:

       [The Court]:                 The Rule has been invoked. However,
                                    according to Article 36.03, a victim’s mother or
                                    a close relative is able to remain in the
                                    courtroom while the victim is testifying unless
                                    the defendant has an offer of proof they would
                                    like to make as to why the witness—victim’s
                                    testimony would be materially affected. Do you
                                    have that at this time?

       ...

       [The Court]:                 Article 36.03 trumps Rule 614.

       [Counsel for Caballero]:     I do believe it states something about if there’s
                                    an alternative support person. Considering that
                                    dad would be an individual that could be

                                              27
                                   available to the child during the child’s
                                   testimony, I believe that would suffice as to an
                                   alternative support person to assist us in making
                                   sure all the testimony in this case isn’t
                                   compromised.

       [The Court]:                Anything else?

       ...

       [Counsel for Caballero]:    . . . . Judge, I would just think the child is still a
                                   very young, impressionable age. I think that
                                   would lend itself to some kind of—not
                                   necessarily manipulation or coercion, but
                                   certainly some kind of influence by the mother.

       [The State]:                State has a case, Garcia v. State—

       [The Court]:                Your request to exclude [M.A.’s] presence from
                                   the courtroom while other witnesses are
                                   testifying, your request is denied.

After cross-examination and re-direct, M.A. did not testify again for the remainder of the

trial. On appeal, Caballero does not argue that M.A. is not a “guardian of a victim” as

defined in Articles 36.03 and 56A.001. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.03(a),

(d)(1); 56A.001(5). Instead, Caballero simply re-urges the arguments he lodged at trial.

Caballero argues that he offered evidence that “(1) [R.A.’s] father, who was not a witness,

was available to be in the courtroom to provide support” and “(2) [R.A.] was still at a very

young, impressionable age that lent her impermissible influence by the mother.”

       Though the trial court and the parties discussed whether M.A. should be excluded

from the courtroom, the exchange appeared to focus on whether R.A.’s testimony would

be materially affected by the presence of M.A. The exclusion of R.A. from the courtroom

was not at issue. Proper application of Article 36.03 required the trial court to determine

                                             28
whether M.A.’s testimony would be materially affected if M.A. heard other testimony in

the trial. See id. § 36.03(a) (“Notwithstanding Rule 614, Texas Rules of Evidence, a court

at the request of a party may order the exclusion of a witness who for the purposes of the

prosecution is a . . . guardian of a victim only if the witness is to testify and the court

determines that the testimony of the witness would be materially affected if the witness

hears other testimony at the trial.”); Garcia, 553 S.W.3d at 647 (“A trial court is ‘without

authority to exclude [a qualifying witness] unless the court determine[s] her testimony

would be materially affected if she heard the other testimony at trial.’”). Whether R.A.’s

testimony would be materially affected by the presence of M.A. is simply not relevant to

M.A.’s exclusion under Article 36.03. Caballero’s arguments at trial and on appeal revolve

around whether R.A.’s testimony would be materially affected by M.A.’s presence in the

courtroom and are therefore not relevant to the proper inquiry. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. -36.03(a). Consequently, the record shows that Caballero failed to make

an offer of proof justifying M.A.’s exclusion. See Garcia, 553 S.W.3d at 647. As a result,

we find no error in the trial court’s decision to allow M.A. to remain in the courtroom. We

overrule Caballero’s fifth issue.

                                VIII.   EVIDENTIARY RULING

       In his sixth issue, Caballero argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

allowing evidence that he accessed legal pornography.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion. Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Under that

                                            29
standard, the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence will be upheld as long as

it was within the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. If the trial court’s evidentiary

ruling is correct on any applicable theory of law, we will not disturb it. De La Paz v. State,

279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

       “Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable

than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining

the action.” TEX. R. EVID. 401. While relevant evidence is generally admissible,

“[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Id. R. 402. Further, relevant evidence may be

excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of

the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Id. R. 403.

       Rule 404(b)(1) precludes the admission of evidence of a crime, wrong, or act solely

to prove a person’s character to show that he acted in conformity with that character on

a particular occasion. Id. R. 404(b)(1). Rule 404(b)(2) allows for such evidence to be

admitted for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. R. 404(b)(2). The

purposes listed in Rule 404(b)(2) “are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively

exhaustive.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343. Indeed, extraneous evidence may also be

introduced to rebut a defensive theory. Robbins v. State, 88 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002); Richardson v. State, 328 S.W.3d 61, 71 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet.

ref’d) (per curiam). Thus, while Rule 404(b) limits character evidence, it is nevertheless a

rule of inclusion. De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343.

                                             30
B.     Discussion

       Caballero argues that the trial court erred in permitting Detective McLeroy to testify

regarding a website link of a pornographic video that was found on Caballero’s computer.

Caballero specifically argues that admission of the complained-of testimony was in

violation of Texas Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 404(b).

       In the guilt phase, during the State’s case-in-chief, Caballero elicited testimony

from M.A. on cross-examination which indicated that M.A.’s sister had been molested by

Caballero and that M.A. had been molested by someone else. Caballero further elicited

testimony from M.A. that a police report incorrectly advised that M.A. had stated she had

been molested by Caballero and that the police “got it wrong.”

       Later during its case-in-chief, the State informed the trial court outside the

presence of the jury that it sought to elicit testimony from Detective McLeroy regarding an

internet link to a pornography video that had been found on Caballero’s laptop as well as

the title of the video link. The State argued that Caballero had “opened the door” to such

testimony by attacking M.A.’s credibility during cross-examination by eliciting testimony

suggesting that she fabricated or lied to police that Caballero had molested her. The trial

court denied the State’s request.

       Later on in the trial, Caballero testified during his case-in-chief that he did not

commit any sexual abuse of R.A. In reference to Kallus’s testimony regarding R.A.’s

statements during the SANE examination, Caballero testified that he had not made R.A.

watch “nasty movies” and there was not any kind of “adult entertainment on the Xbox.”

After Caballero finished testifying, the trial court called the parties to a bench conference.

                                             31
The following exchange occurred:

       [The Court]:                The State had approached the bench yesterday
                                   about some extraneous acts dealing with
                                   pornography. The Court believes that that would
                                   be admissible at this time.

       ...

       [Counsel for Caballero]:    And we will re-call the officer.

       [The Court]:                Which one?

       [Counsel for Caballero]:    The officer that testified about the electronics.

       [The Court]:                Did you notify the officer to start coming over
                                   here?

       [Counsel for Caballero]:    No, but I will now.

       [The Court]:                After lunch?

       [Counsel for Caballero]:    Yes.

       [The Court]:                All right.

       [Counsel for Caballero]:    I want to put an objection on the Court’s ruling. I
                                   believe that that item was found on the tower. I
                                   asked if there was anything on the Xbox. I was
                                   specific with the Xbox because that’s what the
                                   child referenced. Child never referenced any
                                   kind of computer. So I—I object to the Court’s
                                   ruling.

       [The Court]:                The Court believes it goes to intent. Objection is
                                   overruled.

After the trial court’s ruling, Caballero was cross examined by the State.

       Later in his case-in-chief, Caballero called Detective McLeroy to testify. Detective

McLeroy testified that a website URL on Caballero’s computer was found but he could

not determine how the URL got on the computer, whether through Caballero’s intentional

                                                32
act or some other manner. During the State’s cross-examination, Detective McLeroy

revealed that the URL linked to a video on a pornography website and stated the title of

the video link. Caballero did not object to this testimony.

       In this case, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in allowing admission

of the complained-of testimony because Caballero failed to preserve his complaints on

appeal. In his brief, Caballero states that he made Rule 402, 403, and 404(b) objections

to the complained-of evidence in his motion in limine. To preserve a complaint for review,

a party must have presented a timely objection or motion to the trial court stating the

specific grounds for the ruling desired. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). A motion in limine

“is a preliminary matter and normally preserves nothing for appellate review.” Fuller v.

State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d

650, 655 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (stating that a motion in limine, whether

granted or not, does not preserve error and that a ruling on such a motion “does not

purport to be one on the merits but one regarding administration of the trial”). “For error

to be preserved with regard to the subject of a motion in limine, an objection must be

made at the time the subject is raised during trial.” Fuller, 253 S.W.3d at 232; see also

Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Although appellant filed

a motion in limine, he did not object to the prosecutor’s questions at the time they were

asked and answered. Motions in limine do not preserve error. Because appellant failed

to lodge a proper objection, he failed to preserve error”). Further, for a complained-of error

to be preserved for appellate review, the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal

must comport with the objection made at trial. See Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691

                                             33
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

        Caballero’s motion in limine did not preserve error regarding his complaints on

appeal. Fuller, 253 S.W.3d at 232. At the time the trial court pronounced that it was

permitting admission of the complained-of evidence, Caballero did not raise Rule 402,

403, or 404(b) objections, nor did Caballero obtain a running objection on any of these

bases. Rather, Caballero’s objection at trial appears to be, at most, an argument that

Caballero’s testimony had not “opened the door.” 4 Therefore, Caballero’s complaints on

appeal do not comport with the objection made at trial. See Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691. We

also note that Caballero himself elicited testimony from Detective McLeroy that a URL

link was found on his computer and did not object when the State elicited testimony from

Detective McLeroy regarding the pornographic nature of the link. See Coble v. State, 330

S.W.3d 253, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“Erroneously admitting evidence will not result

in reversal when other such evidence was received without objection.”); Marin v. State,

851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“All but the most fundamental rights are

thought to be forfeited if not insisted upon by the party to whom they belong.”); Armstrong

v. State, 718 S.W.2d 686, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that, without a timely and

specific objection to the admission of evidence during trial, any error in admitting the

evidence is waived). We overrule Caballero’s sixth issue.

        4 When defense counsel pursues a subject or line of questioning that would ordinarily be outside

of the realm of proper comment for the State, the defense “opens the door” and creates a right of reply for
the State. Tovar v. State, 221 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). “A party who
opens a door to an issue ‘cannot complain when the opposing party desires to go into the details of that
subject.’” Id. (quoting Sherman v. State, 20 S.W.3d 96, 101 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.)).

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                                   IX.     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                        NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                        Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
8th day of February, 2024.

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