Court Opinion

ID: 9960723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 21:00:48.893644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:48.394316
License: Public Domain

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                                                  PUBLISHED

                                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                  No. 23-1150

        TBL LICENSING, LLC,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                        v.

        KATHERINE K. VIDAL, in her official capacity as Director of the United States
        Patent & Trademark Office; UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK
        OFFICE,

                                Defendants - Appellees.

        -----------------------------------

        INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION,

                                Amicus Supporting Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:21-cv-00681-CMH-IDD)

        Argued: January 24, 2024                                          Decided: April 15, 2024

        Before GREGORY, QUATTLEBAUM, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Gregory and Judge Benjamin joined.
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        ARGUED: Elizabeth D. Ferrill, FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT
        & DUNNER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Christina J. Hieber, UNITED
        STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
        ON BRIEF: Douglas A. Rettew, Naresh Kilaru, Troy V. Viger, FINNEGAN,
        HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
        Appellant. Thomas W. Krause, Solicitor, Benjamin T. Hickman, Associate Solicitor,
        Office of the Solicitor, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
        Alexandria, Virginia; Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Yuri
        S. Fuchs, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. Jonathan E. Moskin, FOLEY &
        LARDNER LLP, New York, New York; A. Justin Ourso III, OURSO COUNSELS,
        L.L.C., Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Jack A. Wheat, MCBRAYER PLLC, Louisville,
        Kentucky, for Amicus Curiae.

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        QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:

               TBL Licensing, LLC, more commonly known as Timberland, tried to register

        certain features from the design of its popular boot under the Lanham Act as trade dress.

        But the law prohibits the registration of product designs that have not acquired a distinctive

        meaning identifying the product with its maker in the minds of the consuming public. See

        TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28–29 (2001). It also bars the

        registration of product designs that are functional since protection of functionality is

        reserved for patent law. Id. at 29. Concluding the boot design is not distinctive, the United

        States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) refused to register it. TBL turned to federal

        district court, which agreed with the USPTO that the boot design is not distinctive and

        added that it is impermissibly functional. On either independent ground, the district court

        granted the USPTO’s motion for summary judgment. On distinctiveness, the issue we face

        is not whether the public recognizes the entire product as Timberland’s perhaps iconic boot;

        rather, we must decide whether the district court reversibly erred in concluding that the

        subset of design features that TBL selectively sought to register lacks distinctiveness in the

        public’s view. We hold that the district court did not reversibly err. So, without deciding

        functionality, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the USPTO.

                                                      I.

                                                     A.

               Generally, trademark law protects marks that distinguish the products of one maker

        from those of another. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 142

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        (2015). The first to use the distinctive mark acquires rights to that mark, including the right

        to prevent others from using it. Id. Though being the first to use a mark is enough to

        generate trademark protection, federal law provides various mechanisms that augment that

        protection. Id. Relevant here, the Lanham Act confers various legal rights to trademark

        owners who register their marks. Id. 1

               Trademark law is commonly known to protect words, for example, “Nike,” and

        symbols, like Nike’s “swoosh.” See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205,

        209 (2000). But it also can cover product designs. In fact, the Lanham Act defines

        “trademark” broadly to include “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination

        thereof” that is used or intended to be used “to identify and distinguish” the sources of

        different goods. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. “Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or

        ‘device’ almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning,” a product’s design can

        be registered and protected under federal law as trade dress, a type of trademark. Wal-Mart

        Stores, 529 U.S. at 209–10 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159,

        162 (1995)); see also TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 28 (“It is well established that trade dress can be

        protected under federal law.”); 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and

        Unfair Competition § 8:7 (5th ed. 2022) (“Today, it is clear that ‘trade dress’ can quality

               1
                 For instance, registration provides “constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of
        ownership” of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1072. Registration also serves as “prima facie
        evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the
        owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered
        mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the
        certificate.” Id. § 1057(b). Also, once a mark has been registered for five years, it can
        become “incontestable.” Id. §§ 1065, 1115(b).
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        [sic] as a type of ‘trademark’ and be registered and protected as a ‘trademark.’”). Examples

        of product designs treated as trade dress include Coca-Cola’s hourglass-shaped bottle, see

        Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162, the dripping red wax seal on a bottle of Maker’s Mark, see

        Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012), and the

        fish-shape of Goldfish crackers, see Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188

        (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

               But not all product designs can receive trade dress protection. See TrafFix, 532 U.S.

        at 29 (“Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many instances

        there is no prohibition against copying goods and products.”). Trademark law does not

        protect product designs that are functional as whole. Id. 2 Nor does it protect product designs

        that lack distinctive meaning as a source identifier. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 210. The

        same principles apply for purposes of registration under trademark law. See id.; 15 U.S.C.

        § 1052(e)(5).

               Whether a word, logo or design, to register a mark and obtain the benefits that

        follow, the mark’s owner must file an application with the USPTO. 15 U.S.C. § 1051. That

        application must include, among other things, “a drawing of the mark.” Id. § 1051(a)(2);

        see also 37 C.F.R. § 2.51. Per USPTO regulations, an application to register a product

               2
                  That is not to say that intellectual property rights never inhere in functional
        designs. But protecting functional designs is the province of patents, not trademarks. Patent
        law “encourage[s] invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs
        or functions for a limited time,” while trademark law “seeks to promote competition by
        protecting a firm’s reputation.” Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65; see also CTB, Inc. v. Hog
        Slat, Inc., 954 F.3d 647, 656–57 (4th Cir. 2020). What function gives in the realm of
        patents, it takes away in the domain of trade dress.

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        design must also include a written description of the design. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.37. Both the

        drawing and description define the mark that the applicant intends to register. See id. (“A

        description of the mark must be included if the mark is not in standard characters.”);

        id. § 2.52 (“A drawing depicts the mark sought to be registered.”); see also USPTO, U.S.

        Dep’t of Commerce, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1202.02(c) (Jan.

        2015), available at https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/Jan2015 [https://perma.cc/

        XKN2-VRAU] (“To ensure proper examination, the drawing and description of such a

        mark must accurately depict the mark the applicant intends to register.”); 3 1 McCarthy

        § 8:7 (“To be registerable as a trademark or service mark, the elements of the trade dress

        must be listed and defined so that the public will know the exact parameters of the claimed

        exclusive right covered by the registration.”).

               After an application has been filed, the USPTO review process begins with an

        examining attorney. If the applicant is dissatisfied with the examining attorney’s decision,

        it can appeal to the USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”). And if still

        dissatisfied, the Lanham Act permits an applicant to challenge a TTAB decision in district

        court. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b). Considered a new proceeding, an action under § 1071(b)

        allows for “additional development of the record and de novo review.” Snyder’s-Lance,

        Inc. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 991 F.3d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 2021); see also B & B Hardware,

               3
                 We refer to the version of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure in effect
        at the time TBL applied for registration, May 2015. That said, even if we were to refer
        instead to the manual’s most recent version, the key language would remain the same. See
        USPTO, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure
        § 1202.02(c) (Nov. 2023), available at https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current
        [https://perma.cc/49JF-673J].
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        575 U.S. at 144 (“In district court, the parties can conduct additional discovery and the

        judge resolves registration de novo.”).

                                                    B.

               For decades, TBL has sold the following boot in several colors:

        J.A. 28–29.

               In May 2015, TBL applied to register aspects of the boot’s design as protected trade

        dress with the USPTO. As required by law, see 37 C.F.R. § 2.37, TBL included a written

        description “specify[ing] which elements . . . constitute the mark and are claimed as part

        of the mark and which are not.” Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure

        § 1202.02(c)(ii).

               The mark consists of a three-dimensional configuration of a lace-up boot
               having an overall shape and silhouette as depicted in the drawings, with a
               visibly bulbous toe box and the following individual features:

               (1) the external appearance of a tube-shaped ankle collar on the outside
               surface of the product running from one eyelet panel to the other eyelet panel
               around the sides and rear of the boot and protruding over the upper side and
               rear panels of the boot (material on the inside of the ankle collar not being
               claimed);

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               (2) outsoles having two color tones divided horizontally and extending
               around the circumference of the boot, and visibly showing inverted tooth
               shaped cuts on each side of the heel of the outsole and around the sides and
               front of the forward portion of the outsole;

               (3) an hourglass-shaped rear heel panel, defined by four vertical stitching
               lines from the top of the outsole to the rear collar;

               (4) quad-stitching forming an inverted “U” shape around the vamp line in
               front of the boot at the bottom of the tongue and curving around to the left
               and right sides and ending at the cinched portion of the hourglass stitching
               of the rear heel panel; and

               (5) eyelets shaped hexagonally on the exterior-facing outside surface.

               The double row stitching around the rear and side ankle collar, the single
               stitching around the upper two eyelets on each side, the single stitching along
               the upper perimeter of the shaft in front of the eyelets and the boot tongue,
               the appearance of the eyelets on the boot interior, the top of the ankle collar,
               the bottom, outer most surface of the outsole, and the uppermost surface of
               the outsole connecting to the boot around the perimeter, all of which are
               depicted in broken or dotted lines, are not being claimed as part of the mark
               and serve only to show the position or placement of the mark.

        J.A. 253–54 (paragraph breaks added).

               Also as required by law, see 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 2.51, TBL

        included this drawing of the design features it sought to register:

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        J.A. 246. For clarity, we have added the numbers on the drawing, which correspond to the

        design features described in the application.

               Importantly, TBL did not try to register every aspect of the boot. In its registration

        application, TBL asserted—or, to use the legal term, “claimed”—intellectual property

        rights in some, but not all, of the features of its boot design. For instance, as a part of the

        design it sought to register, TBL claimed “the external appearance of a tube-shaped ankle

        collar on the outside surface of the product” but not “material on the inside of the ankle

        collar.” J.A. 253. Likewise, it claimed two-colored outsoles “visibly showing inverted

        tooth shaped cuts” along the soles’ sides, but not “the bottom, outer most surface of the

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        outsole.” J.A. 253–54. Also, the application claimed no particular color as a part of the

        boot’s design, such as the popular wheat-yellow color depicted above. Nor did it include

        TBL’s already-registered tree logo or TIMBERLAND word mark. 4

               The USPTO’s examining attorney refused to register the design, finding it overall

        functional and not distinctive. TBL appealed to TTAB, which affirmed the examining

        attorney’s refusal to register the design, finding the design lacks distinctiveness and

        declining to reach whether it is functional.

               As allowed by the Lanham Act, TBL challenged TTAB’s decision in federal district

        court, naming as defendants the USPTO and its then-acting director (collectively

        “USPTO”). After discovery, the parties agreed to allow the district court to “resolve any

        factual disputes without the need for a trial.” J.A. 32–40. Having so agreed, TBL and the

        USPTO then cross-moved for summary judgment. So, in effect, the district court conducted

        a bench trial. See, e.g., Satellite Television & Associated Res., Inc. v. Cont’l Cablevision of

        Va., Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 1983).

               The district court held that TBL could not register the design described in its

        application for two independent reasons. First, the district court found the design

        functional. Second, it found that the design, as described, has not acquired a distinctive

        meaning identifying the boots as Timberlands. On either ground, the district court granted

               4
                 TBL’s decision to limit the design features of the boot in its application was quite
        possibly strategic. Had it included, for instance, the inner ankle collar or the lug sole, the
        overall risk of a functionality finding likely would have increased. But having omitted these
        features in its application, TBL must prove that, without resorting to these unclaimed
        features, the public associates the features TBL did claim exclusively with Timberland.
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        the USPTO’s motion for summary judgment, denied TBL’s cross-motion and dismissed

        the case. TBL timely appealed that final decision, which falls within our appellate

        jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

                                                      II.

                                                      A.

               Since the parties jointly authorized the district court to resolve factual disputes

        before cross-moving for summary judgment—effectively asking the district court to

        conduct a bench trial—we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Int’l

        Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d

        359, 362–63 (4th Cir. 2003). Functionality is a question of fact. CTB, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc.,

        954 F.3d 647, 658 (4th Cir. 2020). So is distinctiveness. U.S. Search, LLC v. U.S.

        Search.com Inc., 300 F.3d 517, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2002). Such factual findings are clearly

        erroneous only if there is no evidence in the record to support them or if, upon our own

        review of the record, we are “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

        been made.” Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1526 (4th Cir. 1984). Despite

        the deference it accords district courts as factfinders, clear error review does not insulate

        findings resulting from a misapplication of the law. Id. Rather, the district court’s legal

        determinations are reviewed de novo. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 362.

               Here, we must affirm the district court unless it reversibly erred in finding both that

        the design TBL claimed is functional and that the same design is not distinctive. In

        assessing both issues, we focus on the design drawn and described in TBL’s application.

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        See 37 C.F.R. § 2.37 (“A description of the mark must be included if the mark is not in

        standard characters.”); id. § 2.52 (“A drawing depicts the mark sought to be registered.”);

        see, e.g., Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte Int’l Am. Corp., 986 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir.

        2021) (“To decide whether a trade dress is functional, we look at the usefulness of the exact

        feature or set of features claimed by the trade dress.”); see also Trademark Manual of

        Examining Procedure § 1202.02(c) (“To ensure proper examination, the drawing and

        description of such a mark must accurately depict the mark the applicant intends to

        register.”); 1 McCarthy § 8:7 (“To be registerable as a trademark or service mark, the

        elements of the trade dress must be listed and defined so that the public will know the exact

        parameters of the claimed exclusive right covered by the registration.”). Crucial to this

        appeal, that means we consider only the outer ankle collar, the two-tone color and etching

        on the side of the boot’s sole, the hourglass rear heel panel, the quad stitching along the

        boot’s side and tongue area, the hexagonal eyelets for the boot’s laces and the boot’s

        bulbous toe box. Other design features of the boot—such as the popular wheat-yellow

        color, the tree logo, the lug soles and the inner ankle collar—cannot be used to prove

        distinctiveness, as they are not design features that TBL claimed in its application.

                                                        B.

               Beginning with functionality, a product design cannot be registered as a trade dress

        if it “comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5). As the

        party seeking to register its design, TBL bore the burden of proving that the design it sought

        to register is not functional. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32. A feature is functional “if it is essential

        to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.” Id.

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        (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.

        844, 850 n.10 (1982))). 5 More simply, a feature is functional if “it is the reason the device

        works.” Id. at 34. In TrafFix, the Supreme Court found functional a “dual-spring design”

        for preventing outdoor signs from toppling in windy conditions. Id. at 25, 33. In other cases,

        courts of appeals have found various product designs functional. See, e.g., CTB, 954 F.3d

        647 (chicken feeder’s color and shape); Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha, 986 F.3d 250

        (chocolate-covered cookie stick); Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., v. Cooper Indus., Inc.,

        199 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 1999) (multi-function pocket tool); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.

        Co., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (smartphone’s shape), rev’d in part on other grounds,

        580 U.S. 53 (2016).

               Our circuit looks to four factors to assess functionality: “(1) the existence of utility

        patents disclosing the utilitarian advantages of a design; (2) advertising focusing on the

        utilitarian advantages of a design; (3) the availability of functionally equivalent alternative

        designs which competitors may use; and (4) facts indicating that a design results in a

        comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing the product.” CTB, 954 F.3d at

        657–58.

               The district court split the applied-for design into eight elements: “collar, two-tone

        sole, lug soles, hourglass heel counter, quad stitching, shape of the vamp stitching,

               5
                 Alternatively, even if a feature is not functional under that traditional definition, it
        can still be functional if excluding others from using it “would put competitors at a
        significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (quoting
        Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165). “This test applies to the question of whether granting protection
        to an aesthetic design feature ‘would significantly hinder competition.’” CTB, 954 F.3d at
        657 n.5 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170). Neither party has invoked this alternative test.
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        hexagonal eyelets, and bulbous toe box.” TBL Licensing, LLC v. Vidal, 644 F. Supp. 3d

        190, 194 (E.D. Va. 2022). Focusing on only the first two of the four functionality factors,

        the district court pointed to utility patents and advertisements that it determined described

        the functional benefits of each element in turn. Then combining the elements, the district

        court wrote:

               The features of the applied-for boot design as a whole do what these features
               are supposed to do in any good boot: they make it comfortable, they make it
               durable, they make it waterproof, and they make it suitable for its intended
               uses, including hiking through a variety of environments and pursuing some
               work projects for which toe protection is needed.

        Id. at 199 (emphasis added). With that, the district court concluded that the boot design is

        functional.

               TBL takes issue with that finding on two grounds. First, TBL argues that, despite

        the district court’s concluding comments about the “applied-for boot design as a whole,”

        id., the court failed to meaningfully consider the design “as a whole,” as required by law.

        15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5); see CTB, 954 F.3d at 665. Second, even if the district ultimately

        analyzed the design as a whole, TBL contends that it erred in skipping the third and fourth

        functionality factors. However, a sufficiently strong showing on the first two factors—

        utility patents and advertising—compels a finding of functionality, without requiring a

        court to delve into the remaining factors. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33–34 (finding “no need”

        to assess alternative designs where it was clear from the utility patents that the design at

        issue was functional); CTB, 954 F.3d at 659–60, 662–64 (deciding that a design was

        functional based solely on the first two factors). Acknowledging this legal framework, TBL

        argues that the district court misconstrued the features TBL sought to register in its

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        application such that the court relied on inapposite patents and advertisements that did not

        provide evidence of functionality sufficiently strong to decide the case.

               But even if we assume, without deciding, that the district court failed to analyze the

        design as a whole or improperly strayed from the design TBL drew and described in its

        application, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the limited design TBL

        sought to register, as defined in its application, has not acquired a distinctive meaning

        leading consumers to associate the design with TBL. On that ground alone, the applied-for

        design could not be registered as trade dress. We now turn to that dispositive ground.

                                                     C.

               To be registerable, a mark must cause the public to identify the product bearing it

        as coming from a specific source. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 210. That is, the mark must

        be distinctive. Id. A mark generally acquires distinctiveness “if it has developed secondary

        meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a

        [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.’” Id. at 211

        (quoting Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 851 n.11); see also U.S. Search, 300 F.3d at 525

        (defining secondary meaning as “the consuming public’s understanding that the mark,

        when used in context, refers not to what the descriptive word ordinarily describes, but to

        the particular business that the mark is meant to identify” (quoting Perini Corp. v. Perini

        Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1990)). 6 While the public “need not be able to

               6
                 A mark could also be inherently distinctive when its “intrinsic nature serves to
        identify a particular source.” Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 210 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v.
        Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). But, in product design cases, the Supreme

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        identify the name of the manufacturer that produces the product,” it must perceive “that the

        product emanates from a single source.” Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame

        Straightening Equip. Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 660 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting M. Kramer Mfg. v.

        Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 1986)); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,

        Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 766 n.4 (1992) (“Secondary meaning is used generally to indicate that

        a mark or dress has come through use to be uniquely associated with a specific source.”

        (internal quotation omitted)). That public perception must rely on the features claimed, as

        drawn and described in TBL’s application.

               This point is critical. Some consumers might recognize the whole boot, unclaimed

        features and all, as a Timberland. But TBL did not undertake to register the entire boot.

        Instead, TBL sought to register only the select attributes described in its application—for

        instance, two-colored outsoles “visibly showing inverted tooth shaped cuts” along the

        soles’ sides, but not “the bottom, outer most surface of the outsole.” J.A. 253–54. Just as

        TBL effectively narrowed the functionality inquiry by tailoring its application to select

        elements of its boot design, so too must we limit our secondary meaning analysis to those

        applied-for features. Thus, the question is whether the design features claimed in TBL’s

        application have acquired secondary meaning. And those features have not if consumers

        associate them with sources other than just Timberland. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766

        n.4; Tools USA, 87 F.3d at 660; Perini, 915 F.2d at 125.

        Court has all but closed the door on inherent distinctiveness because consumers typically
        consider product designs as “render[ing] the product itself more useful or more appealing”
        rather than “identify[ing] the source.” See id. at 212–16; see also 1 McCarthy § 7:94.
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               A party seeking to establish secondary meaning in a product design bears a

        “formidable burden of proof.” 1 McCarthy § 8:8.50; see also U.S. Search, 300 F.3d at 525–

        26. Reflecting that “rigorous evidentiary standard,” our circuit assesses secondary meaning

        through many factors: (1) advertising expenditures; (2) consumer studies linking the mark

        to a source; (3) record of sales success; (4) unsolicited media coverage of the product; (5)

        attempts to plagiarize the mark; and (6) the length and exclusivity of the mark’s use. U.S.

        Search, 300 F.3d at 525 (citing Perini, 915 F.2d at 125). “[N]o single factor is

        determinative.” Id.

               Applying these factors, the district court found that TBL failed to carry its

        formidable burden of proving that the design features of the boot that it sought to register

        have acquired secondary meaning. And, as described below, the district court did not

        clearly err in reaching that finding.

                                                1. Consumer Studies

               We start with consumer studies, or surveys, due to their importance in the secondary

        meaning analysis. “Survey evidence is generally thought to be the most direct and

        persuasive way of establishing secondary meaning.” Id. at 526 n.13. Indeed, TBL hired a

        survey expert in its effort to show that consumers associate the claimed features of its

        boot’s design with Timberland. But the district court pointed out several flaws with the

        survey.

               First, the survey, according to the district court, improperly suggested an outcome.

        The uncolored and unshaded drawing in TBL’s application “depicts the mark sought to be

        registered.” 37 C.F.R. § 2.52. But, instead of using that drawing, the survey used grayscale

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        photographs of the boots. While those photographs depicted boots that were light in color,

        the grayscale photographs of the non-Timberland boots used as control images appeared

        darker.

               The district court concluded that the grayscale photographs of the light-colored

        boots suggested to the survey respondents that the boot presented to them was a Timberland

        boot depicted in its best-selling wheat-yellow color. While the boot is now offered in

        multiple colors, the boot has been sold in a wheat-yellow color from the beginning. In fact,

        TBL previously applied to register that color but was ultimately unsuccessful. In its present

        application, the one on which our present analysis must focus, TBL has not claimed the

        wheat-yellow color or any other. So, the district court found that the survey used features

        of the boot’s design that were not part of the application to improperly suggest the boot

        was a Timberland.

               Second, the district court determined that the survey used a problematic progression.

        The survey began by asking, “Do you associate this boot design with any company or

        companies?” J.A. 328–29. Then, it asked, “What company?” J.A. 328–29. The district

        court worried that this progression may have nudged respondents to name only a single

        company, even if the respondents associated the boot with several. Such a nudge would

        matter because if the public associated the claimed design features with more than just

        Timberland, the design did not acquire a distinctive secondary meaning. See Two Pesos,

        505 U.S. at 766 n.4; Tools USA, 87 F.3d at 660; Perini, 915 F.2d at 125.

               TBL has not challenged the district court’s critique. In fact, it affirmatively waived

        any challenge to the district court’s findings regarding the weight, or lack thereof, of the

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        survey TBL proffered. Without “this most direct and persuasive” evidence of secondary

        meaning from consumers, TBL must resort to circumstantial evidence. U.S. Search, 300

        F.3d at 526 n.13.

                                         2. Advertising Expenditures

               TBL did, however, challenge the district court’s ruling on advertising expenditures,

        arguing it clearly erred in not giving such expenditures more weight. No doubt, TBL has

        spent vast sums on advertising. According to the declaration of a senior Timberland

        manager, TBL has spent over $81 million marketing the boot in the U.S. across various

        media over the past six years. But the district court declined to infer secondary meaning

        from advertisements merely picturing Timberland boots. It emphasized TBL’s failure to

        point to advertisements encouraging consumers to identify the boots as Timberlands by

        looking for the specific design features TBL sought to register.

               Expenditures themselves do not, from a legal standpoint, establish secondary

        meaning without a showing that they translated into what counts—consumers associating

        the claimed design features with a single source. See, e.g., B & J Enters., Ltd. v. Giordano,

        329 F. App’x 411, 419 (4th Cir. 2009) (argued but unpublished) (“Absent a showing that

        such expenditures ‘were effective in causing the relevant group of consumers to associate

        the mark with itself,’ secondary meaning cannot be established.” (quoting FM 103.1, Inc.

        v. Universal Broad. of N.Y., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 187, 196 (D.N.J. 1996))); Dick’s Sporting

        Goods, Inc. v. Dick’s Clothing & Sporting Goods, Inc., 188 F.3d 501, *7 (4th Cir. 1999)

        (unpublished table decision) (discounting advertising expenditures since the company

        alleging trade name infringement “failed to show that its expenditures were effective in

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        causing consumers in the . . . geographic area to associate the trade name . . . with [its]

        business”); see also 2 McCarthy § 15:51 (“[T]he mere expenditure of money is not, in

        itself, determinative of the actual result in buyers’ minds.”).

               Accordingly, not all advertisements are equally probative of secondary meaning.

        Advertisements that direct consumers to “look for” features claimed as trade dress to

        identify the advertiser’s product provide particularly powerful evidence that those features

        have acquired secondary meaning. See 1 McCarthy § 8:8.50 (stating that sometimes look-

        for advertising is “the only practical way to develop secondary meaning in trade dress”);

        id. § 15:52 (“The use of ‘look for’ advertising of a nonverbal designation like a package

        design can be persuasive evidence that this design drew consumers’ attention so that they

        used it to identify the source of the goods.”); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit

        Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Advertising that touts a product feature for its

        desirable qualities and not primarily as a way to distinguish the producer’s brand is not

        only not evidence that the feature has acquired secondary meaning, it directly undermines

        such a finding.”). The Maker’s Mark red wax seal illustrates this principle. In Maker’s

        Mark, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that “Maker’s Mark usually

        focus[ed] directly on the red dripping wax seal.” Maker’s Mark, 679 F.3d at 421. It

        explained that “the district court had before it, and considered, an abundance of Maker’s

        Mark advertisements that specifically feature the red dripping wax seal.” Id.

               On the other hand, advertising proves less if it does not somehow spotlight the

        claimed design features over other unclaimed attributes. See Forney Indus., Inc. v. Daco of

        Mo., Inc., 835 F.3d 1238, 1254 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[A]dvertising alone is typically unhelpful

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        to prove secondary meaning when it is not directed at highlighting the trade dress.”);

        Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 871 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The advertisements

        submitted with the application cannot establish secondary meaning because they do not

        separate the claimed dress of the products from the other marks that serve to identify the

        products as those of Aromatique.”); Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Entm’t Inc., 581 F.3d

        1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To demonstrate secondary meaning based on advertising, the

        advertising must be of a ‘nature and extent to create an association’ [of the trade dress]

        with the advertiser’s goods.” (quoting Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo,

        448 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006))).

               This makes sense. If advertising calls no special attention to the features of the

        product’s design claimed to have secondary meaning, such evidence generally carries less

        weight. Even so, less talk may be required to showcase to consumers a product’s more

        prominent features, which to an extent speak for themselves. See, e.g., Nabisco,

        50 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (“The Goldfish shape, the most salient feature of the product design,

        dominates these advertisements.”); id. at 204 (“The print advertisements call attention to

        the product configuration, prominently displaying the Goldfish form.”).

               The district court followed these principles. Looking beyond the mere expenditures,

        it explained that the advertisements TBL introduced depicted the entire boot. Those

        pictures, for example, included the wheat-yellow color and Timberland’s tree logo, even

        though those features are not claimed in its current trade dress application. Compared to

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        those unclaimed, but perhaps more conspicuous, features of the boot, 7 the advertisements

        did not call attention to the design features in the application—like the hexagonal shape of

        the eyelets or the fourth row of stitching, to name two examples. As a result, the district

        court did not clearly err in its analysis of this factor.

                                                 3. Sales Success

               TBL similarly argues that the district court’s analysis of the boot’s sales success was

        clearly erroneous. Without a doubt, the Timberland boot has enjoyed commercial success.

        According to the same declaration setting forth TBL’s advertising expenditures, the boot

        has brought in over a billion dollars in sales from 2013 through 2021, averaging well over

        $100 million per year. However, the district court did not lend these sales much weight

        without any evidence showing why customers bought the boots. The district court reasoned

        that sales would suggest secondary meaning only if customers bought the boots because

        they associated the claimed design features with Timberland. But, the district court

        emphasized, TBL had not produced evidence that customers bought its boots because they

        attributed to Timberland the features TBL sought to register—the outer ankle collar, the

        two-tone color and etching on the side of the boot’s sole, the hourglass rear heel panel, the

        quad stitching on the boot’s side and tongue area, the hexagonal eyelets for the boot’s laces

        and the bulbous toe box. As the district court observed, customers could just as well have

        bought the boots because they liked how those features look or work. Liking those features

               7
                 To be fair, recall that, in a previous application, TBL tried and failed to register
        the wheat-yellow color. But we must focus on the separate application before us, which
        did not claim the color.
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        is, of course, good for sales, but it does not establish that the design features in the

        application acquired secondary meaning, which focuses on source identification. 8

               Are sales numbers themselves ever indicative of secondary meaning in product

        design cases? Other circuits have deduced that they typically are not “since the product’s

        market success may well be attributable to the desirability of the product configuration

        rather than the source-designating capacity of the supposedly distinguishing features or

        combination of features.” Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431,

        1452 (3d Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th

        Cir. 2016) (“Standing alone, sales volume may not be indicative of secondary meaning

        because it could be related to factors other than source identification.” (quoting Sally

        Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 978 (10th Cir. 2002))); In re Bongrain Int’l

        (Am.) Corp., 894 F.2d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (determining that “[g]rowth in sales”

        did not prove acquired distinctiveness where it “may indicate the popularity of the product

        itself rather than recognition of the mark”); see also 1 McCarthy § 8:8.50 (“[T]o use the

        volume of sales to serve as evidence to prove secondary meaning in a trade dress, there

        must be some proof that the sales were generated by the alleged trade dress rather than by

        factors other than source identification.”). Although our court has long listed sales success

        as one of the relevant factors for assessing secondary meaning of trademarks in general,

               8
                 In addition, customers may have bought the boots because they liked other features
        that were not part of TBL’s application, such as the wheat-yellow color, the tree logo or
        the lug sole. Or customers may have attributed those unclaimed features to Timberland.
        Regardless, customer perceptions of the unclaimed aspects of the boot cannot demonstrate
        that the claimed portions of the boot have acquired secondary meaning.
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        U.S. Search, 300 F.3d at 525 (citing Perini, 915 F.2d at 125), when it comes to product

        designs, we agree with our sister circuits that a product’s sales success, considered in a

        vacuum, typically is less helpful to showing whether the product’s design has acquired

        secondary meaning. That is not to say that sales success should be ignored in product design

        cases, only that the sales numbers by themselves—without evidence linking them to a

        product’s source designation as opposed to its design—will rarely, if ever, signal the

        presence or absence of secondary meaning.

                Therefore, while the Timberland boot boasts impressive sales, we see no clear error

        in the district court’s determination that the numbers themselves did little to indicate that

        the claimed features of the boot’s design have acquired secondary meaning.

                                       4. Unsolicited Media Coverage

                TBL’s challenge to the district court’s analysis concerning media coverage follows

        the same pattern. The Timberland boot has appeared in various media. As one senior

        Timberland manager has catalogued, the boots have appeared in television, movies, music

        and publications. The record also contains reams of Instagram posts of individuals, mostly

        celebrities, wearing boots that user comments identify as “Timberlands,” “Tims” or the

        like.

                Even so, the district court found that these references did little to show that the

        design features TBL specifically sought to register had acquired secondary meaning.

        Rather, the district court stressed that these images from media coverage, like the

        advertisements, included features of the Timberland boot that were not part of its trade

        dress application. Some images include TBL’s registered tree logo burned onto the boot’s

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        side. Also, as the district court observed, most of the images present the boot in its best-

        selling wheat-yellow color, a feature TBL does not claim in its current application. The

        district court considered these unclaimed design features to be more distinctive than the

        design that TBL now wishes to register as trade dress.

               True, as TBL argues, the presence of other identifiers is not always fatal to showing

        a product design’s distinctiveness. But their presence can suggest that a producer relies on

        that other branding rather than just the claimed design to identify itself as the product’s

        maker. See Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 872 (concluding that articles were insufficient to

        support a showing of secondary meaning since they “do not distinguish between the trade

        dress and Aromatique’s other marks”); see also Gen. Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F.2d 95, 99

        (4th Cir. 1940) (“It is of course possible that marks may be so completely associated with

        one another in the minds of the public as not to indicate separately the origin of the

        goods.”). So, the district court did not legally err by considering the role of the unclaimed

        design features.

               In finding the unclaimed design features played a predominant role in identifying

        the boot, the district court did not need to look far since TBL had already admitted that

        they do. When previously TBL sought to register the wheat-yellow color as trade dress,

        TBL officers stated under oath that it was only the boots’ color that allowed for their

        identification as Timberlands. TBL objects that the statements it made in that prior trade

        dress application “do not give rise to estoppel in subsequent proceedings.” Reply Br. at 29

        (quoting Institutional Wholesalers, Inc. v. Saxons Sandwich Shoppes, Inc., 170 USPQ 107,

        1971 WL 16746, at *2 (TTAB Mar. 29, 1971)). But the district court did not conclude that

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        these prior declarations estopped TBL from asserting in this case that the design it now

        claims has enjoyed unsolicited media coverage; rather, the district court determined only

        that the prior sworn statements “undercut” TBL’s current position that its boot is

        identifiable based on features other than its color. TBL Licensing, 644 F. Supp. 3d at 201–

        02. TBL’s prior inconsistent declarations to the USPTO are certainly relevant evidence.

        See Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015);

        Freedom Card, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 432 F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. 2005).

               As with TBL’s advertising, the media coverage of the Timberland boot does not

        highlight the aspects of the boot design claimed in TBL’s current application. To the

        contrary, many of the design features TBL described in its application are imperceptible in

        many of the images contained in the record.

               In weighing the media portrayals of the boot, the district court did not legally or

        clearly err.

                                           5. Attempts to Plagiarize

               TBL also argues that attempts by others to plagiarize its boot show secondary

        meaning. And true, attempts to plagiarize a design can evince its distinctiveness. U.S.

        Search, 300 F.3d at 525. But, under the law of secondary meaning, it matters why one

        imitates. Imitation of design features only to profit from the design’s functionality does not

        establish secondary meaning. Imitation suggests secondary meaning only if it is intended

        to deceive consumers about the product’s source. See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater

        Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 45 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he relevant intent is not just the intent to

        copy, but to ‘pass off’ one’s goods as those of another.”); Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1453

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        (“[A]ttempts to copy a product configuration [may] not be probative [because] the copier

        may very well be exploiting a particularly desirable feature, rather than seeking to confuse

        consumers as to the source.”); Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc.,

        730 F.3d 494, 514 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he appropriate ‘intent’ to focus on is not the intent

        to copy but rather the intent to deceive or confuse.”); Thomas & Betts, 65 F.3d at 663

        (“Copying is only evidence of secondary meaning if the defendant’s intent in copying is to

        confuse consumers and pass off his product as the plaintiff’s.”); Aromatique, 28 F.3d at

        871 (holding that it was clearly erroneous to infer secondary meaning from the copying of

        a product when the copier conspicuously used its own trademarks to distinguish its

        products); Craft Smith, LLC v. EC Design, LLC, 969 F.3d 1092, 1106 (10th Cir. 2020)

        (“[W]hen a competitor copies a product’s design, its purpose is not necessarily to confuse

        consumers, but to copy the aspects of that product that make it more functional.”); see also

        2 McCarthy § 15:38 (“[E]vidence of copying must be accompanied by evidence that the

        copier’s intent was to confuse customers as to source or sponsorship and was not merely

        copying to replicate a useful product feature or to join in a market trend.”). But see P & P

        Imps. LLC v. Johnson Enters., LLC, 46 F.4th 953, 962 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Though some

        circuits have adopted . . . an intent to confuse requirement, we have not done so.” (internal

        citation omitted)). 9

               9
                In our circuit, a plaintiff in an infringement case triggers a rebuttable presumption
        of secondary meaning by proving that “the defendant directly and intentionally copied its
        mark.” Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 371; see also M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.3d at 448
        (“[E]vidence of intentional, direct copying establishes a prima facie case of secondary
        meaning sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant on that issue.”). But

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               Here, the district court declined to infer distinctiveness from the existence of boots

        resembling Timberlands. It concluded that TBL has not provided any evidence showing

        that its competitors sell similar looking boots intending to trick consumers into thinking

        their boots are Timberlands. In support of that conclusion, the court noted that TBL has not

        identified any ruling that competitors have infringed its alleged trade dress.

               TBL responds that it persuaded two of its competitors to stop selling similar looking

        boots. But it never provided written documentation of those supposed enforcement efforts,

        even after the USPTO requested it. Though TBL asserts that it resolved those matters over

        the phone without documentation, TBL has not demonstrated that any of its competitors

        crossed the fine line that distinguishes emulating desirable product features from

        plagiarizing protected designs to confuse consumers about their source. Since TBL failed

        to produce evidence of intentional plagiarism, the district court did not clearly err in

        declining to infer distinctiveness from the mere existence of similar looking boots.

        even this infringement framework focuses on the copier’s intent to confuse consumers
        about a product’s source. See Osem Food Indus. Ltd. v. Sherwood Foods, Inc., 917 F.2d
        161, 165 (4th Cir. 1990) (“When a newcomer to the market copies a competitor’s trade
        dress, its intent must be to benefit from the goodwill of the competitor’s customers by
        getting them to believe that the new product is either the same, or originates from the same
        source as the product whose trade dress was copied.”); see also Dick’s Sporting Goods,
        188 F.3d 501, *9 (finding no evidence of deliberate copying since “the record reveals no
        evidence that [defendant] intended to palm off the reputation or goodwill of [plaintiff] by
        employing the trade name”); Devan Designs, Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 998 F.2d
        1008 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (affirming district court’s
        finding that the presumption was rebutted by showing, among other things, that advertising
        focused “on the attractiveness of the product rather than its source”).
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                                      6. Continuous and Exclusive Use

               Instead, the district court found that the presence of similar looking boots from other

        manufacturers actually undermined TBL’s argument that its claimed design features are

        distinctive. The last factor suggests secondary meaning only if the continuous use of the

        design in commerce is also substantially exclusive. See U.S. Search, 300 F.3d at 526 n.12

        (“Even assuming [plaintiff] has used ‘U.S. Search’ continuously since 1982 . . . , length of

        time alone is insufficient to establish secondary meaning.”); B & J Enters., 329 F. App’x

        at 419 (“[E]vidence of length of use, absent a showing of exclusivity, is inadequate to

        satisfy the sixth Perini factor.”). “The saturation of the market with look-alike boots,” to

        the district court, undercut TBL’s assertion of secondary meaning. TBL Licensing,

        644 F. Supp. 3d at 200. TBL argues that the district court lent too much weight to those

        lookalikes.

               TBL contends that the district court erred by considering competing designs without

        scrutinizing on a more granular level each design and its relative share of the U.S. boot

        market. It is true that courts sometimes have considered competitors’ minimal market

        shares to find that their competing marks did not weaken the commercial strength of a

        senior mark. See, e.g., Combe Inc. v. Dr. August Wolff GmBH & Co. KG Arzneimittel,

        382 F. Supp. 3d 429, 452–53 (E.D. Va. 2019) (considering the limited sales and marketing

        of third-party marks in determining that they did not materially weaken the commercial

        strength of the plaintiff’s mark), aff’d, 851 F. App’x 357 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam);

        Select Auto Imps. Inc. v. Yates Select Auto Sales, LLC, 195 F. Supp. 3d 818, 833 (E.D. Va.

        2016) (“Without evidence as to the extent of actual day-to-day use of [third-party] marks,

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        the probative value of such evidence is minimal.”). But we have never required a deep dive

        into those details. See, e.g., CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 269–

        71 (4th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that third-party use of similar marks undermined commercial

        strength, without analyzing market share); Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

        888 F.3d 651, 663–64 (4th Cir. 2018) (same). Nor have other circuit courts when there is

        evidence of significant third-party use. 10 Even when the record “does not establish the exact

               10
                   Compare Echo Travel, Inc. v. Travel Assocs., Inc., 870 F.2d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir.
        1989) (determining the distribution of lookalike pamphlets cut against exclusive use
        despite the record not establishing “the exact extent of the third party use”); Forney,
        835 F.3d at 1254 (holding that CEO’s testimony that Forney was the exclusive user of the
        trade dress was an insufficient showing of exclusive use to survive summary judgment,
        especially in light of “several pictures offered by [the defendant] showing product packages
        in the retail-metalworking sector that bear a close resemblance to Forney’s product
        packaging”); Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339 (determining that TTAB failed to
        adequately account for evidence of “a fair number of third-party uses” of similar marks by
        discounting the evidence for lack of “specifics regarding the extent of sales or promotional
        efforts surrounding the third-party marks”); and Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen
        GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir.
        2015) (“[E]xtensive evidence of third-party use and registrations is ‘powerful on its face,’
        even where the specific extent and impact of the usage has not been established.”), with
        Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imps. Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that
        evidence of third-party registrations was insufficient to weaken a trademark where
        “[d]efendant introduced no evidence that these trademarks were actually used by third
        parties, that they were well promoted or that they were recognized by consumers”); Curtis-
        Stephens-Embry Co. v. Pro-Tek-Toe Skate Stop Co., 199 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir.
        1952) (finding evidence of third-party trademark registrations insufficient to support a
        finding of invalidity where the registrations “did not show, and there was no effort made
        to prove, where they had been used (other than at the place of business), whether they were
        in use after the dates of the registrations or had been discontinued, or how exclusive their
        use had been”); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[T]hird
        party use of one or more suggestive or arbitrary elements of a plaintiff’s trade dress renders
        that trade dress indistinct only if the third party use is so extensive and so similar to the
        plaintiff’s that it impairs the ability of consumers to use the trade dress of the products to
        identify their source.”); and L.D. Kichler Co. v. Davoil, Inc., 192 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed.
        Cir. 1999) (determining that the district court improperly suggested that “any use by others,

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        extent,” widespread third-party use of substantially similar designs suggests the at-issue

        design lacks secondary meaning. Echo Travel, Inc. v. Travel Assocs., Inc., 870 F.2d 1264,

        1269 (7th Cir. 1989).

               So, while TBL had every right to argue that the lookalike boots were not

        substantially similar and that their minimal sales did not preclude exclusivity, the district

        court was entitled to consider the countervailing evidence. And based on our review, the

        record is replete with pictures of boots marketed and sold in the United States that appear

        “substantially similar” to the design TBL sought to register, which suffices to prevent TBL

        from proving it exclusively used that design. See Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit

        Forming, Inc., 743 F.2d 1039, 1045 (4th Cir. 1984) (approving of the admission of

        evidence of “substantially identical” and “substantially similar” designs as “probative of

        the extent and nature of exclusivity of use”); Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,

        909 F.3d 1110, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (ruling that evidence of the use of “substantially

        similar” but not identical trade dress may inform a secondary meaning analysis).

               As the party seeking registration, TBL bore the “rigorous” burden of showing

        secondary meaning, including continuous and exclusive use. U.S. Search, 300 F.3d at 525.

        To find TBL failed to discharge its burden, the district court was not required to assess the

        market shares of the myriad of lookalike boots. Nor was the district court obligated to run

        through each boot one-by-one and discuss how it resembled the applied-for TBL design.

        including an infringing use derived from the originator of the mark, precludes an
        applicant’s ‘substantially exclusive’ use”).
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        As a result, the district court did not clearly err in finding that TBL came up short of

        showing its use of the design was substantially exclusive.

               To sum up our secondary meaning analysis, TBL had to show that the design

        features described in its application encourage consumers to buy the boot not because those

        features make the boot a solid product but because, to the public, those features make the

        boot a Timberland product. Since this distinctiveness concept is “intuitive” and “heavily

        fact-dependent,” “when a factfinder does make findings on this question . . . , an appellate

        court will naturally be exceedingly reluctant to rule such findings clearly erroneous.”

        Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. SanGiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363, 377 (4th Cir. 1999).

        Without a viable consumer survey, TBL lacks direct evidence of secondary meaning.

        Resorting to circumstantial evidence, TBL has not shown that its sales or advertising

        expenditures have translated into consumer recognition of the design elements it sought to

        register. Indeed, portrayals of TBL’s boot in marketing materials and the media tend to

        highlight features not claimed in TBL’s current application. The many similar looking

        products in the boot market do not show that competitors copied TBL’s design intending

        to confuse consumers. Rather, those lookalikes undermine TBL’s attempt to show that the

        design it sought to register has come to be “uniquely associated” with Timberland. Two

        Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766 n.4; see also Tools USA, 87 F.3d at 660; Perini, 915 F.2d at 125.

        Assessing these various factors, the district court found that TBL failed to show that the

        combination of features it specified in its registration application—the outer ankle collar,

        the two-tone color and etching on the side of the boot’s sole, the hourglass rear heel panel,

        the quad stitching along the boot’s side and tongue area, the hexagonal eyelets for the

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        boot’s laces and the boot’s bulbous toe box—leads consumers to associate the boot with

        Timberland alone. Since our review of the record does not leave us with “a definite and

        firm conviction that a mistake has been made,” we conclude that the district court did not

        clearly err in finding that the design TBL sought to register has not acquired secondary

        meaning. Pizzeria Uno Corp., 747 F.2d at 1526.

                                                      III.

               In conclusion, the district court did not clearly err in finding that TBL failed to carry

        its burden of proving that the boot design it sought to register has acquired a distinctive

        meaning. For that reason alone, TBL could not register the design described in its

        application, regardless of whether or not that design, as a whole, is functional. Accordingly,

        without deciding the functionality issue, the district court’s judgment is

                                                                                          AFFIRMED.

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