Court Opinion

ID: 9393432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 13:05:35.839792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.231330
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hill, 2023-Ohio-1556.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                              HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                            :       APPEAL NO. C-220330
                                                   TRIAL NO. 22CRB-5036
          Plaintiff-Appellee,              :

    vs.                                    :
                                                       O P I N I O N.
 MIESHA HILL ,                             :

          Defendant-Appellant.             :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 10, 2023

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Connor E. Wood, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Lora Peters, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

WINKLER, Judge.

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Miesha Hill appeals her misdemeanor assault

conviction. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                       Background

       {¶2}   The state charged Hill with misdemeanor assault after an altercation

between Hill and her former neighbor, Tiniesh Wales. According to Wales’s testimony

at trial, on the day of the incident, Wales’s acquaintance, Brigette Green, asked Wales

to come to her home to help her with paperwork for her apartment. When Wales

arrived at Green’s home, she saw Hill. Hill and Wales had a history of problems, and

Wales believed that she had been set up. Wales and Hill started arguing, and Wales

proceeded to leave Green’s home. According to Wales, Hill grabbed Wales by the hair.

The two began tussling, and Hill kept swinging at Wales. Hill then grabbed an object

and hit Wales above the eye. Because Wales had her head down and covered, she did

not see the object. Wales started bleeding, and once Hill saw blood, she quit hitting

her. Wales then left Green’s home and called the police.

       {¶3}   An officer responded to Wales’s call. The officer testified that Wales had

a bleeding laceration above her left eye. Wales did not explain to the officer exactly

where the incident had happened, so he did not go to Green’s residence, but he did

drive down the street, and no one was waiting outside.

       {¶4}   In Hill’s defense, she called Green to testify. Green answered counsel’s

questions regarding her name, address, and her relationship with Hill, but then Green

invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate herself when counsel asked

whether she knew Wales, and whether she was at home on the day of the incident.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶5}   The defense then called Hill’s friend, Marquetta Hunter, to testify.

Hunter claimed that, on the day in question, she and Hill drove up to Green’s residence

to get a cigarette, and so that Hill could retrieve her mail. Hunter went to Green’s

home and stood outside while Hill went to check her mailbox. Hunter saw Wales

following Hill, and she saw a shiny object in Wales’s hand that she later learned was a

knife. Hunter saw Wales approach Hill and swing at her. The two fought, but then

Wales left.

       {¶6}   Hill’s boyfriend, Robert Coker, also testified on behalf of Hill. Coker

testified that he drove with Hill to Green’s home on the day in question. Coker was

standing outside Green’s home, and Hill went to check her mailbox. Coker then saw

Wales following Hill. When the pair got closer to Green’s home, Coker saw Wales

holding a black-handled knife. Wales tried to hit Hill with the knife, but Hill punched

Wales instead. The two fought, and Wales left.

       {¶7}   Finally, Hill testified in her own defense. Hill testified that she and

Wales had been friends, but their relationship deteriorated. On the day in question,

Hill went to her mailbox, and Wales approached her. Wales tried to start a fight with

her, but Hill walked away towards Green’s home. Hill heard yelling, and she turned

around and saw Wales coming at her with a knife. Hill was able to get Wales to drop

the knife, but Wales started swinging at her. After the fight, Wales left, and Hill stayed

at Green’s home waiting for the police to arrive.

       {¶8}   The trial court found Hill guilty of assault and sentenced her to one year

of community control. Hill appeals.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                    Green Invokes the Fifth Amendment Privilege

       {¶9}    In her first assignment of error, Hill argues that the trial court erred in

allowing Green to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

       {¶10} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution declare that no person shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself.

       {¶11} A witness asserting the Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination must assert “that he or she is faced with some authentic, objectively

reasonable danger of incrimination.” State v. Arnold, 147 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-

1595, 62 N.E.3d 153, ¶ 44, citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-487, 71

S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). A reasonable danger of incrimination exists where a

witness’s answers “may reasonably have a tendency either to incriminate the witness

or to furnish proof of an element or link in the chain of evidence necessary to convict

the witness of a crime.” Id. at ¶ 45. The Fifth Amendment “can be asserted in any

proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory;

and it protects against any disclosures which the witness reasonably believes could be

used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.”

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-445, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972).

       {¶12} “Generally, a witness must assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against

self-incrimination on a question-by-question basis.” State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-7740,

97 N.E.3d 1068, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), citing Vega v. Tivurcio, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

14AP-327, 2014-Ohio-4588, ¶ 12. The trial court has a duty to inquire into the

witness’s justification for asserting the privilege. Arnold at ¶ 46.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶13} Hill argues that the trial court erred in failing to inquire as to the basis

of Green’s asserted Fifth Amendment privilege. Because Hill did not object to the trial

court’s inquiry below, this court reviews for plain error. See Crim.R. 52(B).

       {¶14} Wales testified that Hill’s assault occurred at Green’s home. During

Wales’s cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Wales about Green’s

nickname as “the candy lady,” and whether she sells cigarettes and other items out of

her home. Wales testified in the affirmative. Defense counsel also repeatedly referred

to the “candy lady” during the cross-examination of the investigating police officer.

       {¶15} Following the state’s case-in-chief, defense counsel called Green to

testify. The trial court questioned whether Green wanted an attorney to advise her

given Wales’s testimony insinuating that Green deals drugs out of her home. Green

responded that she wanted an attorney. The trial proceeded as to the other defense

witnesses while the trial court called an independent attorney to advise Green. Green

consulted with counsel and then returned to the witness stand. Green answered two

questions regarding her relationship with Hill, but then she invoked her Fifth

Amendment right not to testify regarding whether she knew the victim, or whether she

was at home on the day of the incident. Defense counsel chose not to ask any more

questions and did not object. The trial then proceeded with Hill’s testimony.

       {¶16} Even if the trial court erred in allowing Green to assert her right not to

testify, Hill has not demonstrated plain error on the part of the trial court on this

record. Defense attorney’s reference to Green as the “candy lady” raised the Fifth

Amendment concerns in the first place. When Green invoked her Fifth Amendment

privilege in refusing to answer defense counsel’s questions, Hill did not object to

Green’s refusal to answer the questions. Moreover, Green was a defense witness, and

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Hill’s attorney did not proffer any further questions. Therefore, this court has no way

to determine the relevance of the questions and whether any answers to them would

have been subject to the Fifth Amendment.

          {¶17} We overrule Hill’s first assignment of error.

               Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

          {¶18} In her second assignment of error, Hill argues that her assault

conviction is contrary to law.

          {¶19} When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an

appellate court determines whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, a rationale trier of fact could have found that the state

proved all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.                When

considering a challenge to the weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review

the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the

credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of

justice. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

          {¶20} The trial court found Hill guilty of misdemeanor assault in violation of

R.C. 2903.13(A), which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt

to cause physical harm to another * * *.” According to Hill, the trial court erred

because Hill acted in self-defense to protect herself from Wales as Wales swung a knife

at her.

          {¶21} The trial court specifically rejected Hill’s version of the facts in finding

her guilty. The trial court found that the stories of Hunter, Coker, and Hill were

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

inconsistent, particularly in that all of them claimed to be driving the same car. The

trial court also found portions of Hill’s testimony incredible, for example, the trial

court did not find it plausible that Hill would have turned her back to Wales and

started walking away if Wales had been speaking to her in a threatening manner. The

trial court also found Hunter’s and Coker’s testimony not credible in that the two

testified that they saw Wales approach Hill with a knife, but neither intervened in any

way. The trial court was in the best position to determine the credibility of the

witnesses. See State v. Landrum, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150718, 2016-Ohio-5666.

       {¶22} The evidence brought forward by the state showed that Hill attacked

Wales and hit her with an object, causing her eye to bleed. Wales called the police, and

the responding officer testified that the cut on Wales’s eye was “bleeding pretty good.”

None of the defense witnesses waited for the police or called police, despite their story

that Wales had attempted to attack Hill with a knife. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the state, the trial court could have found that Hill committed

assault, and the trial court did not lose its way and create a manifest miscarriage of

justice in finding Hill guilty. See Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273, 574 N.E.2d 492;

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541.

       {¶23} We overrule Hill’s second assignment of error.

                                     Conclusion

       {¶24} Having overruled Hill’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.
                                                                    Judgment affirmed.

BERGERON, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Please note:

       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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