Court Opinion

ID: 9729194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:28:59.997405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.989582
License: Public Domain

EVANS, J.
I concur in the majority’s general discussion on the present state of the law pertaining to employee rights but dissent from the factual conclusions therein reached. In this instance I view the circumstances giving rise to the preparation of the refused counseling memorandum and the request that the employee counsel and confer with his employer as related to job performance, not to threatened or anticipated discipline.
*1005Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, no right to union representation is vested in the employee pursuant to Government Code sections 3527 and 3528 during normal inquiries or interviews relating to job performance, even though the employee may fear discipline may be imminent as a result of his job performance.
In Social Workers’ Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 382 [113 Cal.Rptr. 461, 521 P.2d 453], the Supreme Court, while acknowledging the employee’s right to union representation at an employer-employee investigatory inquiry, limited that right to circumstances, not involving “a normal interview with regard to employment matters.” (Id., at p. 392.)
Here, the interview requested by the building manager with Robinson and his supervisor related to normal employment matters regarding plaintiff’s job performance; the subject matter did not contemplate a discussion, interrogation, or investigation relating to any possible discipline of Robinson; only investigations into conduct for purposes of imposing discipline afford the employee the right to union representation during those interviews. (Ibid.)
In sum, the employer’s intention here was to interview and discuss normal employment matters, i.e., job performance and attitude; it was not intended as an investigation of the employee’s activities for purposes of imposing discipline. Such normal employment-related discussions or interviews, as contrasted to investigations of employee conduct, even though discipline although not contemplated by the employer may have been feared by the employee, do not vest the employee with a right to union representation at the employment-related interview. (Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.; Social Workers’ Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept., supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 386-392; Mobil Oil Corporation v. N.L.R.B. (7th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 842.)
I have arrived at my conclusion, having considered the discourse on the various rights of public employees contained in Civil Service Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 22 Cal.3d 552 [150 Cal.Rptr. 129, 586 P.2d 162], and concur with the court that in cases of public employment, the employee is entitled to due process in matters involving contemplated discipline. The question is what process is due? In Civil Service Assn., the court did not deem the prediscipline rights established in Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 [124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774], to be *1006applicable in matters relating to minor disciplinary action. That conclusion is also compelled, where, as here, discipline, either actual or threatened, was not contemplated. At the time when representation was claimed by the employee and not afforded, the employer was attempting only to get the recalcitrant employee into a counseling session for analysis of his conduct and direction as to future performance. At that time Skelly mandated due process (presence of counsel) was not required. However, it is acknowledged that the Legislature has extended the right to representation to include the presence of union representatives at investigational confrontations by the enactment of the MeyersMilias-Brown Act. (See Gov. Code, §§ 3502, 3504.) The purpose of such procedure was succinctly stated in NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc. (1975) 420 U.S. 251, 260-261 [43 L.Ed.2d 171, 180, 95 S.Ct. 959], to be that, “The union representative whose participation he seeks is, however, safeguarding not only the particular employee’s interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly. ” (Italics ours.) In Civil Service Assn., the California Supreme Court extended the right to union representation in minor disciplinary actions involving public employees, although due process representation as defined in Skelly is not required. An examination, of the factual background of this case discloses it to be sufficiently dissimilar to the disciplinary factual background related in Civil Service Assn, as to not warrant further extension of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act into an area obviously dealing with employee perforniance, a management function, as distinguished from a prediscipline investigation or a minor disciplinary conference.
Applied as broadly as.their sweeping language, these statutes might have supported Robinson’s demand had he been facing an interview in which discipline was To be'imposed. Such was not the case. This truculent employee’s supervisors were simply tiying to get him into a “counseling” session for an analysis of his conduct. I do not believe the Legislature was bent upon propelling union representatives into a noncrisis meeting of that sort. In' the words of retired Associate Justice Leonard Friedman, “It would be a terrible way to run a railroad.”
I would affirm the judgment.
The petition of defendant and respondent and real party in interest and respondent for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 13, 1979. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.