Court Opinion

ID: 9792401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:28:57.968705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.621913
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, P. J.,
dissenting.
Unless we are prepared to require that trial courts accept a police officer’s unlikely version of the historical facts, there was sufficient evidence here to support the trial court’s conclusion that the conduct of the deputy sheriff amounted to a stop of defendant rather than a mere street encounter. Because the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, support the trial court’s conclusion that defendant was unlawfully stopped, we are bound by it. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 443 P2d 621 *760(1968); State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 585 P2d 681 (1978). Accordingly, I dissent.
To understand what occurred, more facts are necessary. The deputy had been parked at a gas station next to a tavern for approximately eight minutes before defendant came out of the tavern and drove off. Although the deputy testified that he did not see defendant come out of the tavern, he immediately started down the road behind defendant. He followed him for approximately one-half mile at a speed of 45 to 50 miles per hour on an icy and snowy road, remaining only four car lengths behind him. The deputy’s patrol car, a Bronco, was equipped with flashers on the roof.
Defendant pulled to the side of the road near an intersection. Instead of going by defendant, the deputy pulled up along side defendant’s car; he testified that he did so because he lacked sufficient opportunity to stop behind defendant on the shoulder. He stated that he leaned over and asked defendant what he was doing, but he did not roll down his window. He then got out of his car and approached defendant’s vehicle with a flashlight to see if there were any weapons in the vehicle.
Although defendant did not give a turn signal when he pulled off the road, the officer stated he did not stop defendant for that reason. He further testified that he had no reason to believe that defendant had committed a crime that would authorize a stop under ORS 131.615(1). In fact, he testified he had no intention of stopping defendant.
The trial court’s specific findings were:
“1. The patrol car followed Spenst as close as possible for 1/2 mile.
“2. The patrol car was recognizable as a police car.
“3. The patrol parked alongside and even with Spenst’s car on a snowy, icy, slippery road where maneuverability was limited.
“4. The deputy got out of the car and initiated contact with Spenst in a manner identical with a ‘stop’ contact in furtherance of his intent to ‘see what he was doing.’ ”
Those facts are supported by the record and, together with the reasonable inferences that the trial court was entitled *761to draw from the evidence, support the trial court’s conclusion that the officer’s conduct was reasonably calculated to cause defendant to pull off the road, as he did, and to give the officer an opportunity to question him to “see what he was doing.” The court was also entitled to conclude, as it did, that the officer restrained defendant’s liberty or required him to alter his course of conduct. The trial court treated the deputy’s conduct as constituting a stop. The evidence supports the court’s findings, and the findings, together with the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, support its conclusion that the deputy’s conduct constituted a stop in violation of the statute, ORS 131.615. We are bound by that conclusion of a statutory violation.
Although it may be true that the ultimate face-to-face encounter between the deputy and defendant was nothing more than mere conversation (i.ea Warner encounter of the third kind), the manner in which that ultimate encounter was achieved was not an ordinary conversation on the street, as the majority would have us believe. In my opinion, the majority is being unrealistic in so holding.
Because I think we are bound by the findings and conclusions of the trial court, I would affirm. Accordingly, I dissent.