Court Opinion

ID: 9839574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 15:07:06.742141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:47.565300
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 21-1182
                             Filed September 13, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

PAUL LEE CRUZ,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

        Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton

(good-cause hearing) and Cheryl Traum (bench trial), District Associate Judges.

        Paul Lee Cruz appeals his conviction and sentence following a bench trial

for domestic abuse assault causing injury or mental illness. AFFIRMED.

        Audra F. Saunders, Des Moines, and Benjamin Bragg (until withdrawal),

Clive, for appellant.

        Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller (until withdrawal) and

Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

        Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ. Buller, J., takes no

part.
                                             2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

         Paul Lee Cruz appeals his conviction for domestic abuse assault causing

injury    or   mental   illness,   first   offense,   in   violation   of   Iowa   Code

section 708.2A(2)(b) (2021). Cruz asserts the district court erred in finding good

cause to delay the trial past the speedy-trial limitation period. He also claims there

is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. Finding no abuse of discretion

and substantial evidence to support the conviction, we affirm.

         Speedy trial. Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b), “If a

defendant . . . has not waived the defendant’s right to a speedy trial the defendant

must be brought to trial within [ninety] days after indictment is found or the court

must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be

shown.” Our caselaw makes clear, “Whether the delay is great or small, dismissal

under our rule is required unless the state carries its burden to show that the

defendant waived speedy trial, that the delay was attributable to the defendant, or

other ‘good cause’ exists for the delay.” State v. Taylor, 881 N.W.2d 72, 78

(Iowa 2016).

         “We review a district court’s application of the procedural rules governing

speedy trial for correction of errors at law.” State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703

(Iowa 2017). “The district court’s good-cause finding is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion, although . . . ‘that discretion is a narrow one, as it relates to

circumstances that provide good cause for delay of the trial.’” Id. at 704 (citation

omitted).

         Yet because any “delay cannot be evaluated entirely in a vacuum,”
         we also consider surrounding circumstances such as the length of
         the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial,
                                         3

       and whether prejudice resulted from the delay. Hence, as we have
       explained, these surrounding circumstances essentially operate on
       a sliding scale:
                      The shortness of the period, the failure of the
               defendant to demand a speedy trial, and the absence
               of prejudice are legitimate considerations only insofar
               as they affect the strength of the reason for delay. This
               means that, to whatever extent the delay has been a
               short one, or the defendant has not demanded a
               speedy trial, or is not prejudiced, a weaker reason will
               constitute good cause. On the other hand, if the delay
               has been a long one, or if the defendant has demanded
               a speedy trial, or is prejudiced, a stronger reason is
               necessary to constitute good cause.
       We have noted that “most, if not all, cases justifying reversal based
       on speedy-trial violations involve delays numbering weeks or
       months, not days.”

Id. (internal citations omitted).

       Here, the ninety-day period was to expire on May 27, 2021.1 A jury trial was

scheduled to begin on May 10. A pretrial conference was held on May 6, at which

time both the State and defense indicated they were ready to proceed to trial. But

the defense requested the matter be tried to the bench,2 and the State did not

oppose the request.3 The court filed its order following the pretrial conference on

May 6, indicating a non-jury trial was scheduled for June 15.

       On May 20, the district court set a videoconference hearing for the next day:

             This case has a speedy deadline of May 25 [sic], 2021.
       Defendant has requested a bench trial. That is set for June 15, 2021.
             A hearing needs to be held on the speedy trial issue and
       whether or not there is good cause to go beyond that deadline.

1  Both the “Record of Pretrial Conference” and “Order Following Pretrial
Conference” note a speedy trial expiration date of May 27, 2021.
2 Cruz’s written waiver of jury trial was signed on May 6 and e-filed on May 10.
3 The belated request was beyond the deadline for pretrial motions.
                                           4

       After the hearing, the district court made findings that the waiver of jury trial

was a strategic decision by the defense, the June 15 trial date was selected by the

defense, and after the trial date was rescheduled, the State communicated with

defense counsel and asked if Cruz was waiving his speedy trial demand.

Apparently, Cruz informed defense counsel he did not want to waive speedy trial.

Cruz does not take issue with the court’s findings, but maintains the State did not

meet its burden to establish good cause, asserting the State should have insisted

on going to trial on May 10. His appellate brief argues, “The State cannot ask that

its own fault be remedied and determined ‘good cause’ because they called off

their witness on a day that they could have held the jury trial.”

       The court concluded:

               After hearing statements of counsel and Defendant it is clear
       that an unintentional mistake in scheduling was made. While
       Defendant clearly took his attorney’s advice and agreed to a bench
       trial, he did not fully understand the reason today. He and his
       attorney need to discuss this if it remains an issue. Regardless, the
       court makes the determination that there is good cause to go beyond
       the speedy trial deadline in this case as there is insufficient time to
       have a trial before the deadline . . . given the need for a judge and
       court reporter as well as notice to witnesses and gathering of
       evidence. Also defense selected the trial date of June 15, 2021 when
       jury was waived last minute.

       It is true “mere acquiescence in setting a trial date is not sufficient to lead to

a waiver of speedy trial rights.” Taylor, 881 N.W.2d at 77. But here, the defense

selected the date,4 as the original trial date was changed by counsel for strategic

4 At the hearing the prosecutor stated, “I think [June 15] was the first date that

[defense counsel] was able to get for a non-jury trial in a reasonable time.”
Defense counsel stated, “Well, I advised Mr. Cruz that it was probably in our best
interests to waive a jury, since there’s legalistic arguments we’re going to need to
make that a jury is not going to pick up on, that a court can. So when I got a bench
trial date, it was June 15th, and I figured that was okay.”
                                          5

reasons, and the trial court was entitled to consider that fact in its good-cause

determination. See McNeal, 897 N.W.2d at 707 n.2 (“In reviewing a district court

ruling for abuse of discretion, it makes sense to consider the facts and

circumstances as they existed when the district court ruled.”). Cruz does not claim

the delay of nineteen days resulted in prejudice. We find no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s finding that good cause existed for the delay. See id. at 707 (“Given

the record and the parties’ arguments at the time, the district court took a

reasonable course of action.”).

       Sufficiency of the evidence. Cruz claims the State presented insufficient

evidence to convict him of domestic abuse assault. We review his challenge for

legal error. See State v. Banes, 910 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018). Our

sufficiency review is the same for a bench trial as a jury trial. State v. Myers, 924

N.W.2d 823, 826 (Iowa 2019). The court’s findings of fact have the effect of a

special verdict—binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. State v.

Fordyce, 940 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Iowa 2020). We view the record in the light most

favorable to the court’s decision. Myers, 924 N.W.2d at 827.

       C.O. testified Cruz grabbed her by the hair and held her down while he

drove her to his house when he was supposed to be driving her home. Cruz

testified, “I grabbed the back of her jacket and some hair, I guess.” He asserted

he was trying to keep her from jumping from his moving vehicle.

       The trial court made these findings:

       [C.O.] and [Cruz] were in an intimate relationship at the time of the
       incident and are parents of two children. On or about January 30,
       2021, [Cruz] went to [C.O.]’s work to give her a ride. They had a
       couple drinks at [Cruz’s] work, then proceeded to another bar in the
       area. [C.O.] testified she wanted [Cruz] to take her to her residence,
                                           6

       but he wanted her to come to his home. The two have never lived
       together and [C.O.] lives with her father and her children. [C.O.]
       attempted to get out of [Cruz]’s vehicle when she felt pain on her
       head. [C.O.] believes [Cruz] pulled her hair. The vehicle came to an
       abrupt stop and she fell. She sustained road rash from the fall.
       [Cruz] told her to get back in the vehicle. He held her hair again and
       held her head down until they were close to his residence. Once
       [Cruz] released his hold on her, she got out of the vehicle and started
       screaming. An individual nearby let her use his phone. [C.O.] called
       her father to come get her and he called the police. Exhibits admitted
       in to evidence show a raised red wound and a spot where hair was
       missing from [C.O.]’s head.
               [Cruz] testified that he was only driving [two to three] miles per
       hour when [C.O.] jumped out of the vehicle the first time. They were
       traveling [thirty-five] miles per hour when she tried to jump out the
       second time. He testified that he did not mean to pull her hair. The
       court does not find [Cruz]’s testimony to be credible. The court was
       able to observe both [C.O.] and [Cruz] as they testified. [C.O.] was
       visibly upset when she testified about the events that evening. Her
       testimony about where the events took place was credible. [Cruz]
       was driving toward his residence and not [C.O.]’s. When [C.O.] was
       able to get away from [Cruz], they were near his residence. In
       addition, his testimony that he was driving [two to three] miles per
       hour during the first incident is not credible. The court assess[es]
       credibility to the State’s witness.

       Cruz acknowledges this case hinges on the credibility of the witnesses. He

takes issue with the court’s credibility assessment. As factfinder, it was for the trial

court to determine witness credibility.        We give those findings “considerable

deference.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004).

       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s verdict and

giving proper deference to the court’s assessment that [C.O.] was credible and

Cruz was not, there is substantial evidence to support the conviction for domestic

abuse assault causing injury. So, we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.

       Greer, J., concurs; Tabor, J., dissents.
                                          7

TABOR, Judge (dissenting).

       “I want it done now.” In no uncertain terms, Paul Cruz repeated his demand

for a speedy trial at the hearing scheduled by the district court to determine whether

good cause existed to set his bench trial beyond the ninety-day deadline in Iowa

Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b). Because the district court was wrong in

finding good cause for the delay, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and

remand for dismissal.

       A timeline helps set the stage.        The State filed its trial information on

February 26, 2021. The State had ninety days to bring Cruz to trial. See Iowa R.

Crim. P. 2.33(2)(b). Day ninety was May 27, 2021. In his written arraignment,

Cruz demanded his right to a speedy trial. After an April 15 pretrial conference,

the parties documented that a trial date was set for May 10, and the speedy-trial

deadline expired on May 27. At a pretrial conference on May 6, Cruz signed a

written waiver of his right to a jury trial. Both his attorney and the prosecutor also

signed the waiver document. After that pretrial conference, the court filed an

order—again noting Cruz’s demand for a speedy trial and the May 27 expiration

date—setting a bench trial for June 15, 2021.

       Two weeks later, the court realized the new date was outside the speedy-

trial period and scheduled a hearing for May 21 to consider “whether or not there

is good cause to go beyond that deadline.” At the hearing, the prosecutor told the

court he did not know why, even after the jury waiver, the trial did not go forward

on May 10, “other than, as you know, on that date we’ll adjust the trial schedule for

the next week, and if somebody wants to go to a non-jury trial, why we always

accommodate—almost always accommodate them because of speed.”                     The
                                           8

prosecutor also said he confirmed a “couple days” before the good-cause hearing

that Cruz did not want to waive his speedy-trial right despite the new trial date.

       Then the court asked defense counsel: “[D]id you have a trial already set

on the 10th? Was that the problem with the jury trial or was it a strategic decision

that you made about the 10th of May?” Counsel explained that the defense

strategy was “to waive a jury” because they had “legalistic arguments” better suited

to having a judge as the trier of fact. Counsel added: “So when I got a bench trial

date, it was June 15th, and I figured that was okay.”

       The majority seizes on that last statement, casting it as a strategic decision

by Cruz to select a trial date outside the ninety-day deadline. It then cites State v.

McNeal for the proposition that “it makes sense to consider the facts and

circumstances as they existed when the district court ruled.” 897 N.W.2d 697, 707

n.2 (Iowa 2017). Trouble is, when the district court ruled on Friday, May 21, 2021,

the speedy-trial period had yet to expire. In fact, the State knew that Cruz was still

demanding a speedy trial—at least as of May 19—eight days before time lapsed.

Yet the State made no effort to schedule a bench trial within that looming deadline.

And the court did not hold the State to its burden of bringing Cruz to trial. See

State v. Zaehringer, 306 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1981) (“[T]he [S]tate, not the

defendant, has the responsibility for bringing the defendant to trial within the

specified period.”).

       Instead, the court blamed “communication problems” for the trial date being

set too far out. The court reasoned:

              I don’t think anybody’s really at fault for setting this outside of
       the speedy trial, and speedy trials have been hard to calculate at best
       during COVID.
                                         9

              But it does appear that you guys both agree to what the
       calculation was and that we have gone beyond that. I now
       understand the strategic reason why he switched from a jury trial to
       a non-jury trial. They couldn’t do a non-jury trial on the 10th because
       they were doing other trials.

       It is unclear who the court meant by “they” or why “they” could not hold a

bench trial in place of the jury trial scheduled for May 10, or reschedule the bench

trial before the May 27 deadline. But it contradicts our caselaw to consider defense

counsel’s assent to the setting of a trial date beyond the ninety days as a waiver

of Cruz’s right to a speedy trial. See id.; State v. Phelps, 379 N.W.2d 384, 387

(Iowa Ct. App. 1985). Zaehringer requires “sufficient additional circumstances” to

compel a finding of waiver. 306 N.W.2d at 795. No such circumstances appear

on this record.

       Besides, the district court did not find waiver. 5 It found good cause for

leaving the trial set on a date nearly three weeks after expiration of the speedy-

trial period. Granted, we review that finding for an abuse of discretion. State v.

Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa 2006). But the district court’s discretion is

narrow “as it relates to circumstances that provide good cause for delay of the

trial.” Id. And “[w]e require diligence from those seeking to prove good cause.”

Taylor, 881 N.W.2d at 76.

       Under our speedy-trial rule, we do not engage in a multi-factor balancing

test to determine good cause. Rather, we rely on a single factor: the reason for

5 The court must dismiss a criminal charge if trial is not started within ninety days

after the charging instrument is filed unless the State shows (1) defendant waived
speedy trial, (2) the delay was attributable to the defendant, or (3) there was good
cause for the delay. State v. Taylor, 881 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2016).
                                          10

the delay. Id. at 77. If that reason is not good enough, other factors will not save

the charge from dismissal. Id.

       In its written order finding good cause, the district court identified the reason

for the delay as “an unintentional mistake in scheduling.” The court added: “[T]here

is insufficient time to have a trial before the deadline [of] May 25, 2021, given the

need for a Judge and court reporter as well as notice to witnesses and gathering

of evidence.” The court’s order is deficient for three reasons. First, it misstates

the deadline as May 25 rather than May 27. Second, the hearing record did not

support the court’s finding that more time was needed to gather evidence or notify

witnesses, much less to line up a judge and court reporter. Third, generalities

about court scheduling problems do not show good cause. Id. (explaining “good

cause to avoid speedy trial must be rooted in facts, not conclusions”).

       The State acknowledges that the record and the court’s order are “not

models of clarity.” But it insists the delay was attributable to Cruz. The State

focuses on Cruz’s “last-minute request for a bench trial”—signed four days before

the trial date. True, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1) mandates that a jury-

trial waiver occur at least ten days before trial. But that rule also allows belated

waivers if the prosecuting attorney consents. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.17(1). And that’s

what happened here. Having consented to the jury waiver, the State cannot use

that waiver as an excuse for not bringing Cruz to trial before the speedy-trial

deadline. As our supreme court has said:

       The decisive inquiry in these matters should be whether events that
       impeded the progress of the case and were attributable to the
       defendant or to some other good cause for delay served as a matter
       of practical necessity to move the trial date beyond the initial ninety-
       day period required by the rule.
                                         11

Campbell, 714 N.W.2d at 628.        The State cannot show that Cruz’s jury trial

waiver—as a matter of practical necessity—prevented it from bringing him to trial

before May 27, 2021.

       Because the State did not show good cause for the delay, I believe we must

enforce the speedy-trial rule and dismiss the trial information.