Court Opinion

ID: 9547190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:43:12.386382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:26.223156
License: Public Domain

MoCOMB, J.,
Dissenting.—I dissent. In the majority opinion it is stated: “When he (plaintiff) was 50 feet south of the south curb line of Melrose Avenue he signaled for a left turn and proceeded about 30 feet when he saw defend*608ants’ street car about two-thirds of a block away. . . . Mr. Bate continued to extend his arm to give the turning signal and, proceeding at approximately the same speed, turned to the left near the center of the intersection. The front wheels of his automobile were over the west rail of the south bound tracks when the automobile was struck near the middle by the street car.”
From this statement one of two conclusions is inevitable: Either the plaintiff’s testimony was not correct when he stated that he saw the street car two-thirds of a block away when he was approximately 30 feet from the intersection; or he failed to look, or looking failed to sec that which was apparent.
If the first conclusion is correct, plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to look and ascertain the position of the street ear before turning across .the tracks. If the second conclusion is correct, then he is equally guilty of contributory negligence for having failed to see that which was clearly evident, or seeing it, for having turned immediately in front of the street car.
It needs no argument to demonstrate the physical impossibility of a collision between an automobile, traveling at the rate of 15 to 20 miles per hour 20 feet from a given point, and a street car which, at the time the automobile is 20 feet from the given point, is two-thirds of a block from the same point. Obviously from the fact that there was a collision, under the above stated facts it is clear that plaintiff turned immediately in front of the street car and was thus contributorily negligent.
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on February 23, 1939, and an application by respondent to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on March 30, 1939. Shenk, J., voted for a hearing.