Court Opinion

ID: 9534662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:41:49.600418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:58.923410
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ROVIRA
dissenting:
The majority holds that “section 14-10-113(l)(c) requires a trial court to consider the economic circumstances of the respective spouses at the time any hearing relating to the division of marital property is held, including a hearing following a remand for the purpose of dividing the property between the parties.” Maj. op. at 696 (emphasis added). Because I believe such a holding is contrary to both the plain meaning of section 14-10-113(l)(c), 6B C.R.S. (1987), and the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act as a whole, I respectfully dissent.
I
The parties’ childless, twenty-four-year marriage was terminated by a decree of dissolution of marriage on February 13, 1987. The permanent order dividing the marital property was entered on July 7, 1987, and awarded Mrs. Wells the entirety of her contribution to her PERA pension fund. The trial court valued the fund at $35,060.50 — valuing only her contribution to the plan. Mr. Wells appealed the property division, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to consider the contribution that was made by the employer during the course of the marriage. See In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 P.2d 661 (Colo.1987). The court of appeals reversed and remanded directing the trial court to
consider the PERA benefits as being marital property subject to division pursuant to the supreme court’s holding in [In re Marriage of] Grubb, [745 P.2d 661 (Colo.1987),] as well as in In re Marriage of Nelson, 746 P.2d 1346 (Colo.1987) and In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47 (Colo.1983). However, the trial court is not required to divide the pension benefits involved here with mathematical precision. An equitable division, when considering the situation of the parties, should be the objective.
In re Marriage of Wells, No. 87CA1268, slip op. at 1 (Colo.App. Dec. 8, 1988) (not selected for official publication).
On remand, the trial court conducted a supplemental hearing on May 29, 1990, to consider evidence of the full value of the PERA. During this hearing, it considered evidence relating to changes in the economic circumstances of the parties which had occurred subsequent to July 1987. This evidence included testimony concerning Mrs. Wells’ congenital hearing loss, requiring binaural hearing aids, and degenerative *700hip, which had required a total hip replacement in 1988. Additionally, an expert testified that the present value of the PERA pension benefits as of February 1987 (the date of the decree of dissolution) was between $160,315 (if Mrs. Wells worked until age 63), and $202,985 (if Mrs. Wells worked until age 59).1
Based upon this “new evidence,” the trial court awarded 100% of the PERA benefits to Mrs. Wells and canceled a $7,500 note owed to Mrs. Wells from Mr. Wells. As pertinent to the issue at hand, the trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
A literal interpretation of [section 14-10-113, 6B C.R.S. (1987)] requires the Court to consider the economic circumstances and changes which have taken place since the date of the dissolution and which were in existence and probable at the time of the hearing on remand. Both parties have encountered significant changes in their economic circumstances since the dissolution.
The Respondent has still not filed any tax returns but is still working in his business, which appears to be modestly improving since the date of the dissolution. Additionally, Respondent has been able to have $30,000 of the $63,000 worth of debt awarded to him forgiven. Additionally, assets which were previously awarded to the Respondent have increased in value from $21,000 to $82,532. Respondent remains in good health and testified that a person with his education and experience would earn over $40,000 a year.
On the other hand, Petitioner has had a salary increase of $500 a month, and an annuity account which was worth $11,-000 in 1987 is now worth $28,000. Petitioner has problems, however, related to significant changes in her health since 1987. She has encountered a congenital loss of hearing in both ears which will require an annual expenditure in the neighborhood of $2,000 for treatments, repairs, and batteries, and she’s had to have a hip replacement which has severely limited her lifting ability to 15 pounds or less. Petitioner is not in danger of being fired, but it is clear from the comments of her employment supervisor that her hearing deficits and her lifting ability had definitely affected the probability of her continued employment.
Considering all of these factors and taking the statute literally, the Court finds that the best resolution of this problem is to award to the Petitioner her entire PERA benefit and cancel the note which was previously ordered to be made by Respondent payable to her.... [T]he Court considers this order to be an equitable division of the property of the parties, considering their economic circumstances at the time the order becomes effective.
II
Under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act), a trial court must make three determinations with respect to marital property. First, the court must characterize the property of both spouses as either marital property or separate property. To aid the trial court in this determination, the Act contains a presumption that all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is marital property. See § 14-10-113(3), 6B C.R.S. (1987). Next, the court must value the marital property as of the date of the decree or as of the date of the hearing on disposition of property if such hearing precedes the date of the decree of dissolution. Id. § 14-10-113(5). See In re Marriage of Price, 727 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Colo.1986); In re Marriage of Thompson, 706 P.2d 428, 430 (Colo.App.1985). Finally, the court must divide the marital property in accordance with section 14-10-113(1), which provides:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or in a proceeding for legal separation or in a proceeding for disposi*701tion of property following the previous dissolution of marriage by a court which at the time of the prior dissolution of the marriage lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall set apart to each spouse his property and shall divide the marital property ... in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including:
(c) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective....
Id. § 14-10-113(1) (emphasis added). At issue in this case is the date (or, under the majority rationale, dates) upon which a property division becomes effective.
In concluding that a trial court is required to consider the economic circumstances of the spouses at the time any hearing relating to the division of marital property is held, the majority reasons:
Had the General Assembly intended courts to consider only the economic circumstances of the parties as of the date of the decree, instead of the date on which a subsequent hearing is conducted to finalize the property division, it could have so stated. Therefore, while the character and value of the property are established as of the date of the decree of separation or dissolution and cannot be changed or modified because of an increase in value or change in character after that date, see § 14-10-113(3) and (5), 6B C.R.S. (1987), the specific language of section 14 — 10—113(l)(c) requires the trial court to consider the “economic circumstances of the parties at the time the division of property is to become effective.” This phrase is not synonymous, either in intent or effect with the phrase “as of the date of the decree.”
Maj. op. at 697 n. 6. I disagree. It is clear that the General Assembly did not use the phrase “as of the date of the decree” in section 14-10-113(l)(c) because the General Assembly clearly contemplated circumstances under which the property division was not to “become effective” until after the date of the decree of dissolution. Three such circumstances are expressly set forth by statute. They are proceedings for disposition of property following a previous dissolution of marriage by a court which (1) lacked jurisdiction over the spouse or (2) lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property prior to the dissolution of the marriage, § 14-10-113(1), 6B C.R.S. (1987), and (3) the entry of a decree with respect to property disposition may be deferred by the court until after the decree of dissolution where such deferral is in the best interests of the parties. Id. § 14 — 10—106(l)(b). Thus, had the General Assembly used the phrase “the date of the decree,” it would also have had to create three exceptions.
Instead, the General Assembly used one phrase, “at the time the division of property is to become effective,” applicable to all circumstances. These circumstances necessarily include the case at hand, where the date of the decree of property distribution is the same as the “effective” date of that distribution — July 1987. Thus, I find no support in the language of the statute for the majority’s conclusion. Moreover, using the majority’s reasoning, had the General Assembly intended the economic circumstances to be considered at the time of any hearing concerning property disposition, it would have so stated.
The majority recognizes that “[fjinal orders and judgments of trial courts are fully effective when they are entered,” maj. op. at 697, and that the provisions of a decree respecting “property disposition may not be revoked or modified unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment.” C.R.C.P. 60(b). However, the majority holding completely fails to give effect to the finality that the General Assembly intended with respect to property divisions — the majority finds at least two effective dates for the disposition of the marital property in this ease — the original property disposition order of July 7, 1987, and the supplemental property disposition order of June 19, 1990. Such a conclusion renders, in effect, each spouse an insurer of the other spouse’s *702physical and financial condition until the conclusion of the last appeal concerning property division.2 I would not place such a burden on parties who have chosen to terminate their marital relationship. The plain language of section 14-10-122(l)(a) demonstrates that the General Assembly never intended a property disposition decree to be so ethereal.
Ill
In contrast to the majority’s conclusion, I am of the opinion that a more common sense interpretation of section -113(l)(c) requires that the economic circumstances of the parties be considered on only one date — the effective date of the original property division order, July 7, 1987. Accordingly, while the trial court properly considered the increased value of the PERA pension brought about by its consideration of the employer’s contribution as fixed in 1987, it erred in considering the economic circumstances of the parties as of May 1990.
The consideration of economic circumstances after the date of the original property division order is nothing more than an invitation for the trial court to effectively revalue the marital property as of the date of remand for redistribution. Indeed, that is precisely what occurred here. As noted above, the trial court relied upon the following facts in redistributing the marital property: (1) The reduction in the value of Mr. Wells’ assigned marital debt from $63,-000 to $33,000; (2) the increase in value of the assets awarded to Mr. Wells from $21,-000 to $82,532; and (3) the increase in value of Mrs. Wells’ annuity account from $11,000 to $28,000. Reliance on these facts amounts to a de facto revaluation of the marital assets under the guise of considering the economic circumstances of the parties during the redistribution of the marital estate — a clear violation of the valuation requirements of section -113(5).
Accordingly, I would affirm the opinion of the court of appeals.

. At all times relevant to this appeal Mrs. Wells has been employed by the Jefferson County School District.

. In this case the parties bore the obligation of the other’s financial well-being for over three years from the date of the decree of dissolution.