Court Opinion

ID: 9484194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:43:21.157687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:04.750454
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I find that it is not clear from the record whether the district court knew it had the discretion to order that Mack Devaney’s federal sentences run concurrently with his state sentence, I would remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. As a result, I dissent.
The transcript from the sentencing hearing shows that the following took place. First, the court sentenced Devaney. When the court sentenced Devaney for both the firearm charge and for violation of probation, it mentioned that the federal sentences imposed will afford “adequate deterrence and provide just punishment.” J.A. at 35, 37.1 Second, the court stated that the federal sentences were to run consecutive with each other. After sentencing Devaney, the court stated:
The defendant is currently serving a state sentence. It is ordered that a detainer be lodged against him and upon his release form [sic] state custody that he be remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal Service.
Id. at 38-39. Soon thereafter, the court recessed. At some later point, the case was reconvened and the following dialogue took place:
MR. HOUSER [Defendant’s counsel]: In the Mack DeVaney case, we had maybe a point of clarification and/or a request.
THE COURT: All right.
*78MR. HOUSER: Your Honor, I guess a point of clarification — and if I am wrong on it we would request it, is the running of this time with the state charges.
I understand from the probation office that his state sentence that he is serving now would run through the summer of 1995.
MR. DEVANEY: That is right.
MR. HOUSER: That is correct according to Mr. DeVaney and Ms. Candela, and we are asking that the federal sentence run concurrent with that.

THE COURT: I don’t see how I can do that.

MR. HOUSER: So it would be consecutive then?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. HOUSER: Very well.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Id. at 39-40 (emphasis added). After this dialogue, the matter was adjourned.
Based on the hearing, it is plausible that the district court did not think that it could impose a federal sentence concurrent with a state sentence. However, it is just as plausible that it did know that it had that option.
The court’s earlier comments — “adequate deterrence” and “just punishment” — may indicate that the court recognized that the federal sentences could be imposed concurrently or consecutively with the state sentence. It could be that the court thought the federal sentences should run consecutive to any state sentence in order to adequately punish and deter Devaney for his current federal violations. Or the comments could have meant simply that, in light of the applicable guideline range, the sentences are reasonable.
The court’s later statement makes it more difficult to determine whether the court knew it had the discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. When the court was specifically asked about the possibility of having the sentences run concurrently, the court’s response — “I don’t see how I can do that” — may indicate that it did not know that it had that option. The government argues, however, that the statement does not reflect that the court was laboring under a mistaken impression of its sentencing discretion. The government argues that the court was merely informing Devaney that it was not going to give him what he was asking for. Again, both ways of viewing the statement seem plausible.
The Sixth Circuit has previously dealt with whether a district court recognized that it had the discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. In United States v. Stewart, 917 F.2d 970, 971 (6th Cir.1990), the district court had indicated on the record, more than once, that it ordered a consecutive sentence because it felt it had no discretion to order a concurrent sentence. Because the district court explicitly and repeatedly stated that it had no discretionary authority to impose concurrent sentences, this court remanded the case so that the district court could utilize its discretion. Id. at 973. In United States v. Smith, No. 92-5216, 1992 WL 317178, at *4, 1992 LEXIS 28888, at *10 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 1992), “the district court listened to the defendant’s arguments for a concurrent sentence and rejected them. Moreover, the district court not only rejected defendant’s arguments for a concurrent sentence, it made an explicit statement of its reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.” That panel held that the district court recognized its discretionary authority and used it appropriately. Id.
Those two clear-cut cases show the foggy character of the record in this case. Nowhere did the court explicitly say that it had no discretion (although it did come close by saying “I don’t see how I can do that”). However, nowhere did the court explicitly state that it realized that it had the discretion to impose concurrent sentences but refused to do so in this case. Because of the murky nature of this ease, I would remand the case to the district court so that it could explicitly state whether it knew that it had the discretion to impose concurrent sentences. I find the benefit to the defendant could be potentially great and the inconvenience to the government would be minimal.

. With regard to the firearms violation, the sentencing court stated, in pertinent part:
... defendant, Mack DeVaney, is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 44 months in CR 3-91-105. This term is at the middle of the guideline range. This sentence will afford adequate deterrence and provide just punishment.
J.A. at 35. With regard to the probation violation, the court stated, in pertinent part:
... defendant, Mack DeVaney, is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of imprisonment of four months. Again this term is in the middle range of the guideline range. The sentence will afford an adequate deterrence and provide just punishment. This sentence will be consecutive to the sentence in CR 3-91-105.
Id. at 37.