Court Opinion

ID: 9386310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 00:00:26.774488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:05.503080
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-51039   Document: 00516707857      Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/11/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                                                                          FILED
                                                                      April 11, 2023
                             No. 21-51039                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                          Clerk

   Carolyn Smith, as Trustee of the Smith Family Living
   Trust; Lirtex Properties, L.L.C.,

                                                      Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                versus

   The City of Bastrop; Connie Schroeder, in her official
   capacity as a member of the City Council of the City of
   Bastrop, Texas; Willie "Bill" Lewis Peterson, in his
   official capacity as a member of the City Council of
   the City of Bastrop, Texas; Drusilla Rogers, in her
   official capacity as a Director of Hunters Crossing
   Local Government Corporation; Lyle Nelson, in his
   official capacity as a member of the City Council of
   the City of Bastrop, Texas; Bill Ennis, in his official
   capacity as a member of the City Council of the City of
   Bastrop, Texas; Dock Jackson, in his official capacity
   as a member of the City Council of the City of Bastrop,
   Texas; Lynda Humble, in her official capacity as a
   Director of Hunters Crossing Local Government
   Corporation; Drusilla Rogers, in her official capacity
   as a member of the City Council of the City of Bastrop,
   Texas; Rick Womble, in his official capacity as a
   Director of Hunters Crossing Local Government
   Corporation; Michelle Dodson, in her official
   capacity as a Director of Hunters Crossing Local
   Government Corporation; Lyle Nelson, in his official
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                                         No. 21-51039

   capacity as a Director of Hunters Crossing Local
   Government Corporation; Tabitha Pucek, in her
   official capacity as a Director of Hunters Crossing
   Local Government Corporation; TF Hunters Crossing,
   L.P., as successor-in-interest to Forestar (USA) Real
   Estate Group, Inc.,

                                                                Defendants—Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 1:19-CV-1054

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Ho and Engelhardt, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Plaintiffs-Appellants Carolyn Smith, as Trustee of the Smith Family
   Living Trust, and Lirtex Properties, L.L.C. (collectively, “Plaintiffs-
   Appellants), challenge the district court’s dismissal of the claims that they
   have asserted under the United States and Texas Constitutions relative to
   City of Bastrop Ordinance No. 2019-40. For the reasons stated herein, the
   district court’s judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED IN PART and
   VACATED and REMANDED IN PART. Specifically, we affirm the
   dismissal of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ federal procedural and substantive due
   process claims but, because the basis for the district court’s dismissal of
   Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Texas law claims is not sufficiently clear to enable
   proper appellate review, we vacate and remand relative to those claims.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.

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                                         I.
          City of Bastrop Ordinance No. 2019-40 (the “2019 Ordinance”) was
   enacted on September 24, 2019, by the City Council of the City of Bastrop,
   Texas, pursuant to the Texas Public Improvement District Assessment Act
   (“PIDA Act”), Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 372.001, et seq. The Texas
   PIDA Act permits municipalities and counties to undertake and finance
   public improvement projects in definable parts of the municipality or county
   by levying special financial assessments upon the property within the
   definable area specially benefited by the improvement. The legislation thus
   makes public improvements possible that otherwise might not be if the
   entirety of the municipality’s taxpaying citizenry, rather than only the owners
   of property specially benefited by them, had to bear their costs. Various types
   of improvements are permitted, including constructing or improving streets
   and sidewalks, providing water, wastewater, and drainage facilities, and
   constructing or improving off-street parking, landscaping, lighting and signs.
   See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 372.003.
          The public improvement project that is the focus of the 2019
   Ordinance involved the creation and/or provision of public streets, water
   distribution lines and facilities, storm sewer lines and facilities, public area
   landscaping, a public park and hike/bike trail, and area signage, as well as
   public area property maintenance, on a previously unimproved 283.001-acre
   parcel of land on which various residences and commercial buildings were to
   be built. The project commenced with the filing of a petition, as required by
   § 372.003, on July 18, 2001. And, on September 11, 2001, City of Bastrop
   Resolution No. R-2001-19 established the “Hunters Crossing Public
   Improvement District” (hereinafter, the “Hunters Crossing PID”).
          After notices were published and a public hearing held, the City of
   Bastrop City Council passed and approved Resolution No. R-2003-34 on
   November 11, 2003, and Ordinance No. 2003-35 (hereinafter, the “2003

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   Ordinance”) on December 9, 2003. 1 Exhibit B to the 2003 Ordinance is the
   Hunters Crossing PID “Service and Assessment Plan” (hereinafter, the
   “2003 SAP”), which was prepared on November 19, 2003. In 2004, another
   ordinance (the “2004 Ordinance”) involving the Hunters Crossing PID was
   passed and approved. The 2004 Ordinance included a “Revised Capital
   Assessment Roll” correcting minor mathematical and scrivener errors in the
   “2003 Assessment Roll” that is part of the 2003 SAP.
           In 2005, the original developer of the Hunters Crossing PID broke
   ground on the improvement project. By mid-July 2011, a majority of the
   capital improvements projects in the Hunters Crossing PID had been
   completed.
           In 2017 and 2018, the Bastrop City Council conducted annual reviews
   of the 2003 SAP, and passed and approved additional ordinances involving
   the Hunters Crossing PID. Although both the 2017 and 2018 Ordinances
   included an “Assessment Roll” for the next fiscal year, the City Council did
   not amend the 2003 SAP in either year.
           In September 2019, however, the City Council passed and approved
   the 2019 Ordinance, along with the 2019 “Amended and Restated Service
   and Assessment Plan” (hereinafter, “the 2019 SAP”), 2 which includes the
   “2019 Assessment Roll.” Notably, unlike the 2003 and 2004 Assessment
   Rolls, the 2019 Assessment Roll lists all of the commercial, multifamily, and
   single-family lots in the Hunters Crossing PID—each identified by property
   identification number—that the developer had subdivided and sold since the

           1
           Certain documents in the record also refer to the 2003 Ordinance as the “Original
   Assessment Ordinance.”
           2
               The 2019 SAP, which is Exhibit A to the 2019 Ordinance, replaces the 2003 SAP.

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   2003 Ordinance and 2003 SAP were approved. 3 The 2019 Ordinance
   documents reveal that 510 single-family lots were created, whereas the 2003
   Ordinance and SAP had contemplated 464 single-family lots. The number of
   planned versus actually-developed commercial and multifamily lots likewise
   differ.
             The 2003 Ordinance and SAP and the 2019 Ordinance and SAP also
   set forth different time periods over which the Hunters Crossing PID capital
   assessments are amortized and payable in annual installments. The 2003
   documents contemplate payments over 25 years; the 2019 documents extend
   that time until January 2034 for commercial assessments, until January 2041
   for multi-family and undeveloped lot assessments, and until January 2030 for
   single-family residential assessments. Finally, although the total capital
   assessment is $11,961,260 in the 2003 Ordinance and SAP, as well as in the
   2019 Ordinance and SAP, the 2019 documentation reveals that the entirety
   of that amount is capital costs (exclusive of interest) incurred in constructing
   the planned public improvements, 4 whereas the 2003 documents indicate
   that sum includes $7,475,787 of estimated capital costs (exclusive of interest)
   and $4,485,473 of estimated capitalized interest.
             Following the September 24, 2019 adoption of the 2019 Ordinance
   and 2019 SAP, two Hunters Crossing PID property owners—Plaintiffs-

             3
             The 2003 and 2004 Assessment Rolls did not provide that information because,
   as of those dates, the property was not yet subdivided into, and sold as, individual lots.
   Thus, the 2003 and 2004 documents identify larger tracts of land described as including
   varying numbers of individual lots to be sold by the developer during the course of the
   project. And the Fiscal Year 2018 and Fiscal Year 2019 Assessment Rolls reflect ten tracts
   of land (encompassing varying amounts of single-family home lots), rather than the eight
   tracts identified for single-family lots in the 2003 and 2004 documentation.
             4
             Unless otherwise indicated, “capital costs” refers to construction costs,
   (including land costs and various professional fees) for the Hunters Crossing PID public
   improvements.

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   Appellants Smith and Lirtex—filed this suit, on October 28, 2019, against
   the City of Bastrop and various city officials (collectively, the “City
   Defendants), as well as the Hunters Crossing PID property developer,
   Forestar (USA) Real Estate Group, Inc. (“Forestar”), and its successor-in-
   interest, TF Hunters Crossing, LP (“TF”). Plaintiffs-Appellants seek (i) a
   declaration that the 2019 Ordinance violates the substantive and procedural
   due process protections provided by the United States Constitution and thus
   is invalid; (ii) a declaration that the 2019 Ordinance violates the Texas
   Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive lawmaking; (iii) a declaration
   that the City Defendants have acted ultra vires in seeking to enforce the 2019
   Ordinance; (iv) a permanent injunction against enforcement of the 2019
   Ordinance; and (v) an award of reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees
   under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
          Challenging various aspects of the 2019 Ordinance, Plaintiffs-
   Appellants aver that, by 2019, the City of Bastrop was legally prohibited from
   assessing any capital costs that the developer had incurred in excess of the
   $7,475,787 estimated in the 2003 Ordinance and SAP because (i) the 2003
   Ordinance only permitted the City to legally levy $7,475,787 for capital costs,
   and (ii) the City Council had not timely reviewed and updated the 2003 SAP
   to account for any “cost overruns”— i.e., capital costs (exclusive of interest)
   that the developer had incurred in excess of the $7,475,787 estimated in the
   2003 Ordinance and SAP.
          The district court denied a motion to dismiss filed by the City
   Defendants, denied a motion for partial summary judgment filed by
   Plaintiffs-Appellants, and granted in part and denied in part a motion for
   summary judgment filed by the City Defendants. In granting the City
   Defendants’ motion in part, the district judge rejected Plaintiffs-Appellants’
   assertions that (1) the PIDA Act prevented the City of Bastrop from including
   a particular type of interest in the original 2003 Ordinance; and (2) the 2019

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   Ordinance deprived property owners of the right to immediately pay off the
   entirety of their individual assessments. More specifically, the district court
   reasoned that the PIDA Act “contains no provision prohibiting municipal
   governments from including interest in an assessment” and, even if
   immediate payoff was not available prior to 2019, there is no evidence
   demonstrating that the 2019 Ordinance—the ordinance in question—
   precluded immediate payoff. 5 In denying the City Defendants’ summary
   judgment motion in part, the district court decided that (1) Plaintiffs-
   Appellants have constitutionally-protected property interests “aris[ing]
   from the PIDA Act” and (2) disputed fact issues prevented granting the
   motion in its entirety. 6
           On May 17–18, 2021, a bench trial was held on the remaining issues;
   thereafter, the parties submitted post-trial briefs. On September 29, 2021, the
   district court entered an order setting forth written findings of fact and
   conclusions of law. Though acknowledging the City of Bastrop’s various
   administrative shortcomings in the interim years between passing and
   approving the 2003 Ordinance and passing and approving the 2019
   Ordinance, the district court rejected the federal due process challenges to
   the 2019 Ordinance and rendered judgment in the defendants’ favor.
   Concluding that Plaintiffs-Appellants had failed to carry their evidentiary
   burden of proof, the district court explained, in pertinent part:
                 As an initial matter, until 2019, Defendants did not ex-
          ercise due diligence in properly and transparently administer-
          ing the Hunters Crossing PID. Plaintiffs Smith and Liriano

          5
            The district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding this
   determination.
          6
             The district judge also adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations
   regarding these issues.

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         [Lirtex’s representative] testified that they did not have access
         to accurate information about the PID before purchasing their
         properties or in the years after. The City of Bastrop repeatedly
         provided inaccurate information to property owners. This is
         bolstered by testimony from representatives of the City of
         Bastrop and Hunters Crossing that the PID was poorly admin-
         istered and that they were unaware of how the PID was being
         administered or the legal parameters of the PID before 2019.
         This should have been corrected sooner. However, as to this
         action, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proving that the
         2019 Ordinance was unlawful.
                 The outcome of this case turns on whether Defendants
         increased the total amount due on the PID in the 2019 Ordi-
         nance. The Court concludes that the 2003 Ordinance and SAP
         levied a total of [approximately] $11.962 million collectively on
         the properties, without specifically apportioning this among in-
         dividual properties or limiting a portion of this total to interest.
         The 2003 Ordinance did not finally apportion the Capital As-
         sessment levied in lump sum on the approximately 283 acres of
         property in the Hunters Crossing PID because the property
         had not been developed. Not until the 2019 Ordinance was
         there an apportionment of the Capital Assessment levied in
         lump sum by the 2003 Ordinance. The 2019 Ordinance con-
         firmed actual costs of PID Capital Improvements, credited past
         payments made towards the Capital Assessment on a parcel-
         by-parcel basis, provided for the owner’s option to either pay
         in lump sum or pay in annual installments the Capital Assess-
         ments on a parcel-by-parcel basis, and made findings of special
         benefits received by properties on a parcel-by-parcel basis
         based on the actual costs of the PID Capital Improvements and
         the classified land-use as measured by a square-foot or per-lot
         basis. As such, the 2019 Ordinance did not increase the amount
         of the Capital Assessment levied in lump sum on the 283 acres
         in the PID in the amount of approximately $11.962 million. The
         2019 Ordinance accurately credited property owners for the
         payments that they had previously made towards the PID.

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                Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show that the ex-
          tended time period for property owners to make payments, be-
          yond 2028, increased the amount of the PID’s capital assess-
          ment due by each of the Plaintiffs.
                 Further, the 2019 Ordinance did not include interest in
          the $11.962 million total that was apportioned. Because interest
          was not included, the Court concludes that interest was not im-
          properly calculated in the 2019 Ordinance.

                                        ***
                  [The] PIDA [Act] grants governing bodies discretion in
          adjusting assessments, but places significant restrictions on
          that discretion by mandating the process required for adjust-
          ment, thus creating a property interest for individuals within
          the PID. Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 372.013, 372.014,
          372.015, 372.017, 372.018.
                  [The] PIDA [Act] states that the service plan must be
          reviewed and updated annually “for the purpose of determin-
          ing the annual budget for improvements.” Tex. Local
          Gov’t Code § 372.013(b). [The City defendants] did not
          conduct these annual reviews until 2019. However, because
          the Court finds that the total amount levied under the 2003 Or-
          dinance was $11.9 million, the Court concludes that there was
          no increase under the 2019 Ordinance and therefore there are
          no actionable substantive due or procedural due process viola-
          tions. Additionally, for the same reasons, the Court concludes
          that none of the Defendants have acted ultra vires or engaged
          in a civil conspiracy, and Hunters Crossing is not liable for neg-
          ligent misrepresentation.
   Although the district court did not expressly address Plaintiffs-Appellants’
   claims asserted under the Texas Constitution in its findings and conclusions,
   it “order[ed] that judgment be entered in favor of Defendants.” A “Final
   Judgment” awarding judgment “in favor of the Defendants,” and ordering

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   that “all relief not specifically granted is denied,” was entered the same day.
   This appeal followed.
                                         II.
          An appellate court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
   judgment de novo, “applying the same standard as the district court.” Moon
   v. City of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is
   appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
   the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
   56(a). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is such that a
   reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Kitchen v.
   BASF, 952 F.3d 247, 252 (5th Cir. 2020). A party asserting that there is a
   genuine dispute as to any material fact must support its assertion by citing to
   particular parts of materials in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
          Following a bench trial, appellate courts “review the district court’s
   findings of fact for clear error, and conclusions of law and mixed questions of
   law and fact de novo.” French v. Allstate Indem. Co., 637 F.3d 571, 577 (5th
   Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is
   without substantial evidence to support it, the court misinterpreted the effect
   of the evidence, or th[e] court is convinced that the findings are against the
   preponderance of credible testimony.” Bd. of Trs. New Orleans Emp. Int’l
   Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Gabriel, Roder, Smith & Co., 529 F.3d 506, 509 (5th
   Cir. 2008). A district court’s interpretation of a statute or ordinance is
   reviewed de novo. Rothe Dev. v. United States DOD, 666 F.3d 336, 338 (5th
   Cir. 2011).
          We may affirm on any basis supported by the record even if it differs
   from that on which the district court relied. Although cited most often in the
   summary judgment context, this rule applies regardless of whether judgment
   has been rendered on summary judgment motions or follows a bench trial. In

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   re Deepwater Horizon, 48 F.4th 378, 385 (5th Cir. 2022) (summary
   judgment); Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 784 F.3d 270,
   273 (5th Cir. 2015) (summary judgment); Meche v. Doucet, 777 F.3d 237, 244
   (5th Cir. 2015) (bench trial); see also West African Ventures Ltd. v. SunTx Cap.
   Partners II GP, L.P., 841 F. App’x 705, 706 (5th Cir. 2021) (unpub.) (per
   curiam) (bench trial); Hearn v. McCraw, 856 F. App’x 493, 495 (5th Cir.
   2021) (unpub.) (per curiam) (bench trial), cert. denied sub nom. Hearn v.
   McCraw, 142 S. Ct. 754 (2022). Notably, the matter is one within our
   discretion as a court of review; thus, we are not required to “sift through the
   record for potential reasons to affirm that were not addressed by the district
   court.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Estrada, No. 22-50039, 2022 WL 2826447, at
   *3 (5th Cir. July 19, 2022) (summary calendar) (unpub.) (per curiam) (citing
   Rutila v. Dep’t of Transp., 12 F.4th 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2021)).
                                               III.
               On appeal, Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that the district court erred
    in rejecting their assertions that the 2019 Ordinance violates the due process
    protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution.
                                                A.
               The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
    without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. 7 The
    Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause provides both procedural and
    substantive protections. Although federal procedural due process

           7
             Appellants’ federal due process claims are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
   Section 1983 itself is not an origin of substantive rights, but instead acts as a vehicle for
   enforcing federal rights secured by the United States Constitution and other federal law.
   Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

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    protections do not preclude governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or
    property, they do require that such deprivations include certain procedural
    safeguards. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). Substantive
    due process protections, in contrast, “bar[] certain government actions
    regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”
    Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Franklin v. United States, 49
    F.4th 429, 435 (5th Cir. 2022).
           Plaintiffs-Appellants maintain that the 2019 Ordinance deprives
    them of property interests in violation of their federal procedural and
    substantive due process protections. The property interests protected by
    federal due process “are not created by the [United States] Constitution.”
    Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. “Rather they are created and their dimensions are
    defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
    source such as state law[.]” Id.; see also Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813
    F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Once a state confers a property right, it
    cannot constitutionally deprive such an interest without procedural
    safeguards.”). Whether a state-created property interest “rises to the level”
    of a constitutionally-protected interest, however, is determined by federal
    constitutional law. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005);
    Wigginton v. Jones, 964 F.3d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom.
    Wigginton v. Univ. of Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1268 (2021). Even so,
    “[r]esolution of the federal issue [] begins with a determination of what it is
    that state law provides.” Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 757. And, though
    protected property interests “extend well beyond actual ownership of real
    estate, chattels, or money,” a legitimate claim of entitlement is required.
    Roth, 408 U.S. at 571–72.
          Federal law also determines what procedural protections the Four-
   teenth Amendment requires. This is true even where state law is the source
   of the protected property right at issue. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.

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   Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (“the answer to the question of what
   process is due ‘is not to be found in a [state] statute’”). Thus, although state
   action may constitute a breach of contract or a violation of state law, federal
   due process is not violated “every time a . . . government entity violates its
   own [procedural] rules.” Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224,
   1230 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Rather, “unless the conduct tres-
   passes on federal constitutional safeguards, there is no [federal] constitu-
   tional deprivation.” Id. In other words, where the procedures utilized satisfy
   the constitutional minimum, “entitlement to something more by virtue of
   [state rules] [is] a matter of state law, not [federal] constitutional law.” Id. at
   1231 (emphasis added). See also Jackson v. Pierre, 810 Fed. App’x 276, 279
   (5th Cir. 2020) (summary calendar) (per curiam) (requirements of proce-
   dural due process not violated simply by virtue of officials’ failure to comply
   with university’s internal rules or policies); Dearman v. Stone Cnty. Sch. Dist.,
   832 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 2016) (whereas denial of official nonrenewal hear-
   ing may have violated state law, federal due process was satisfied by receipt
   of notice and an opportunity to respond); Brown v. Texas A&M Univ., 804
   F.2d 327, 335 (5th Cir. 1986) (state university’s failure to comport with inter-
   nal procedures does not by itself amount to violation of federal due process
   requirements).
          Federal procedural due process requirements are “flexible and call[]
   for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”
   Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). The core requirement of fed-
   eral procedural due process is the “‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
   time and in a meaningful manner.’”Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,
   380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
          Conversely, a violation of substantive due process occurs, regardless
   of procedural protections, when (i) a governmental entity deprives a plaintiff
   of a constitutionally protected property interest; and (ii) the government’s

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   deprivation lacks a rational basis. See Simi Inv. Co., Inc. v. Harris Cnty., 236
   F.3d 240, 249–50 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (procedural
   fairness is not determinative of substantive protections); Franklin, 49 F.4th
   at 435 (same). No substantive due process violation exists where it is “at
   least debatable” that a rational relationship with a conceivable legitimate gov-
   ernment interest exists. Simi Inv. Co., 236 F.3d at 251 (quoting 50 FM Prop-
   erties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 174–75 (5th Cir. 1996)).
                                          B.
          Plaintiffs-Appellants maintain that the 2019 Ordinance deprived them
   of federal procedural due process protections by increasing their Hunters
   Crossing PID capital assessments without having timely satisfied the Texas
   PIDA Act’s annual procedural requirements. Specifically, Plaintiffs-
   Appellants emphasize the absence of any record evidence that the Bastrop
   City Council—as purportedly required by Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code
   §§ 372.013–372.017—annually reviewed and approved the developer’s
   actual capital expenditures in excess of the capital costs estimated in the 2003
   Ordinance and SAP and, during the same year that the additional costs were
   incurred, updated the SAP to reflect the adjusted amount of capital costs. In
   other words, Plaintiffs-Appellants maintain that 2019 Ordinance is unlawful
   because its $11,961,260 capital assessment includes capital cost “overruns”
   despite the City Council’s failure to annually review and adjust the SAP to
   reflect the additional capital costs in the same years that they were incurred.
          Plaintiffs-Appellants’ substantive due process claims also allege an
   “increased assessment,” but add the assertion that the 2019 Ordinance fails
   rational basis review. Specifically, because the City itself would bear no
   financial liability if the 2019 Ordinance were invalidated, Plaintiffs-
   Appellants maintain that the allegedly illegitimate purpose of the 2019
   Ordinance is to benefit a private developer at the expense of Hunters
   Crossing PID property owners.

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                                           C.
           Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions, the record in
   this matter, and applicable law, we find no reversible error in the district
   court’s federal due process rulings and thus affirm the district court’s
   judgment, relative to those claims, for the reasons stated herein. In reaching
   this decision, we note, at the outset, that the Texas PIDA Act is hardly a
   model of clarity. 8 Indeed, even at this stage of these proceedings, counsel for
   the parties seemingly cannot agree on the order in which various key events
   contemplated by the Texas PIDA Act occur and, in some instances, what
   those events entail.
           Further complicating matters, the 2003 Ordinance and SAP reveal
   that City officials and the Hunters Crossing PID project developer originally
   contemplated a 25-year amortization period for the project’s capital
   assessments. But, the planned public improvements also (1) involved a large,
   undivided and undeveloped tract of land that the developer/original owner
   was to subdivide, over time, into an undetermined number of privately-
   owned lots; and (2) was to be financed by means of a special property
   assessment (secured by a lien on the property) for which annual payments
   were not due and collected for each lot until such (undetermined) time that
   the developer transferred ownership of the lot. By virtue of this arrangement,
   the beginning and ending dates of the amortization payment periods for the
   individual lots within the Hunters Crossing PID are determined by the date
   on which the property developer transferred ownership of the lot and thus
   vary.

           8
             Although the Texas Legislature has amended certain PIDA Act provisions in
   recent years, those amendments—given the relevant timeframe—do not apply here.

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            At the same time, section 372.018 of the Texas PIDA Act provides
   that an “assessment or reassessment . . . is a first and prior lien against the
   property assessed . . . [and] a personal liability of and charge against the
   owners of the property . . . that is effective from the date of the ordinance or
   order levying the assessment until the assessment is paid.” See Tex. Loc.
   Gov’t Code § 372.018 (emphasis added). And, at least for the years
   between 2001 and 2009, section 372.017 provided that an assessment made
   payable in periodic installments “must continue for a period of time
   necessary to retire the indebtedness on the improvements.” See Tex. Loc.
   Gov’t Code § 372.017 (effective June 16, 2001–June 18, 2009) (as
   amended by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 1341, § 15, eff. June 16, 2001). 9
           Considering all of this information together, the staggered nature of
   the property owners’ payment schedules, combined with apparently later-
   than-anticipated conveyances of at least some of the lots in the Hunters
   Crossing PID, has made the originally contemplated 25-year amortization
   schedule problematic. The same reasons seemingly necessitate the extended
   payment periods established by the 2019 Ordinance.
           In any event, for purposes of this aspect of the instant appeal,
   Plaintiffs-Appellants challenge the federal constitutionality of the 2019
   Ordinance, not the PIDA Act itself or the 2003 Ordinance and SAP. 10 And

           9
             In 2009, section 372.017 was amended, relative to the payment of assessments in
   periodic installments, to state, in pertinent part: “The installments . . . must continue for:
   (1) the period necessary to retire the indebtedness on the improvements; or (2) the period
   approved by the governing body for the payment of the installments.” See Tex. Loc.
   Gov't Code Ann. § 372.017 (as amended by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 320, § 1, eff. June
   19, 2009).
           10
              Given that the applicable limitations period for claims asserted under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1983 is borrowed from state law, and Texas has a two-year limitations period for personal
   injury claims, Plaintiff-Appellants’ focus on the 2019 Ordinance, rather than the 2003
   Ordinance, or even the City Council’s inaction during the interim years in which the bulk

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   the PIDA Act’s various statutory complexities and uncertainties do not
   materially hinder our assessment of the specific federal due process claims at
   issue here.
           As the district court concluded, the 2019 Ordinance and SAP, like the
   2003 Ordinance and SAP, provide for a total capital assessment of
   $11,961,260. Additionally, although the $11,961,260 amount stated in the
   2003 Ordinance and SAP includes an estimated $4,485,473 of capitalized
   interest in its total, the Texas PIDA Act, contrary to Plaintiffs-Appellants’
   assertions, does not clearly prohibit the inclusion of interest in an assessment.
   Nor have Plaintiffs-Appellants shown that the district court clearly erred in
   finding that the 2019 Ordinance and SAP properly confirmed the actual costs
   of the Hunters Crossing PID’s capital improvements, credited past payments
   made on a parcel-by-parcel basis, and determined the special benefits
   received by properties on a parcel-by-parcel basis.
           We recognize, of course, that the 2019 Ordinance’s assessment is for
   $11,961,260 in capital costs, rather than the $7,475,787 of capital costs
   (exclusive of interest) plus $4,485,473 of capitalized interest that are
   estimated in the 2003 Ordinance and SAP documents. Importantly, however,
   Plaintiffs-Appellants’ complaints regarding the capital costs incurred in
   excess of the 2003 estimate are not directed to alleged waste, fraud, or
   extravagance—or any other inappropriate labor/material expenditures—
   that presumably would have been discovered and disallowed if the Bastrop
   City Council had annually reviewed and adjusted the SAP for the Hunters
   Crossing PID during the same years that the additional capital costs were

   of the construction work apparently was completed, is understandable. See Redburn v. City
   of Victoria, 898 F.3d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 2018) (courts considering the timeliness of § 1983
   claims must borrow the relevant state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions);
   Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a).

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   incurred. Instead, Plaintiffs-Appellants simply tout the City Council’s failure
   to perform annual ministerial duties without showing any actual prejudice
   resulting from those omissions.
          Specifically, Plaintiffs-Appellants maintain that, under the PIDA Act,
   the property developer “waived” its right to recover capital costs in excess
   of the amount estimated in the 2003 Ordinance and SAP by failing to ensure
   that the Bastrop City Council satisfied the PIDA Act’s “annual review and
   adjustment requirements” during the same years in which the cost overruns
   were incurred. Contrary to Plaintiffs-Appellants’ assertions, the Texas PIDA
   Act, despite requiring annual reviews and updates of the SAP, and permitting
   corresponding adjustments of the capital assessment for each property
   owner, does not explicitly mandate the “waiver” consequence urged by
   Plaintiffs-Appellants. Nor are we aware of any Texas jurisprudence
   concluding that one is implied. Certainly, none of the PIDA Act sections
   cited by the Plaintiffs-Appellants, in support of this “all or nothing”
   approach, expressly state that a governing body’s failure to perform these
   ministerial duties automatically invalidates the property assessment and
   relieves the owners of property benefiting from the public improvements of
   the obligation to pay for them. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 372.013–
   372.017. In fact, the Texas PIDA Act does not specify a statutory
   consequence for a violation of any of its requirements.
          Given the numerous and evolving duties imposed upon and
   undertaken by municipal governing bodies like the Bastrop City Council,
   combined with the relative recency and complexity of the Texas PIDA Act,
   occasional administrative shortcomings are not surprising. Had the Texas
   Legislature intended for “any and all” such shortcomings—even in the
   absence of actual resulting prejudice—to automatically trigger the “waiver”
   consequence urged by Plaintiffs-Appellants, it could have easily said so. But,
   it did not. And, given the varied nature, size, and complexity of the myriad

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   of improvement projects authorized by the PIDA Act—some involving
   substantial financial expenditures and commitments, and extensive, if not
   irreversible, modifications of immovable property—that omission is
   significant, if not telling. 11 In any case, we decline to infer that Texas law
   mandates such an extreme consequence in the absence of an unequivocal
   directive from the Texas Legislature or the Texas Supreme Court. 12
           Furthermore, the pertinent question presently before this court is
   whether Plaintiffs-Appellants were deprived of federal due process
   protections. Apparently failing to appreciate this point, Plaintiffs-Appellants
   maintain that “no process in 2019 would have been sufficient to satisfy the
   Constitution’s minimum demands.” Specifically, they reason that “the
   PIDA Act itself provides the procedures that the City was required to follow
   if it had wanted to adjust the assessment to incorporate the developer’s
   overrun capital costs,” and “[g]iven [that] the annual reviews had not taken
   place[], the 2019 Ordinance violates procedural due process.” 13

           11
             Given the absence of a specified statutory consequence for any violation of the
   PIDA Act’s requirements, it is conceivable that Texas legislators may have logically
   expected that property owners concerned about government inaction vis-à-vis third-party
   developers, contractors, suppliers, etc., would promptly seek to bring about compliance,
   including, if necessary, by applying for a writ of mandamus in state court.
           12
              Given the obvious difficulty that local government officials, property developers,
   and experienced lawyers have had in understanding and applying the Texas PIDA Act,
   additional legislative efforts to clarify the legislation’s requirements likely would prove
   beneficial to all.
           13
               This argument also improperly lumps together two different deprivations: one
   is procedural (annual review and adjustment in the same year that a cost overrun occurs)
   and one is substantive (the 2019 capital assessment). In the context of the Fourteenth
   Amendment’s due process clause, “life, liberty, and property” are “substantive rights
   [that] cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.” Levitt
   759 F.2d at 1232. “The categories of substance and procedure are distinct.” Id. And,
   “‘[p]roperty’ cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more
   than life or liberty.” Id.

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          This argument, like Plaintiff-Appellants’ “waiver” argument, again
   fails to recognize that federal law, not state law, dictates the procedural pro-
   tections required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. And,
   the core requirement of federal procedural due process is the “‘opportunity
   to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews, 424
   U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552). On the record before us,
   there is no indication that the Bastrop City Council, prior to passing and ap-
   proving the 2019 Ordinance and SAP, on September 24, 2019, failed to pro-
   vide sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard, at a meaningful time and
   manner, to Plaintiffs-Appellants and the other Hunters Crossing PID prop-
   erty owners.
          To the contrary, the parties’ submissions reflect that: (1) the City
   hosted a Hunters Crossing PID “Town Hall Meeting” at the Bastrop Con-
   vention Center, on August 19, 2019, to review the proposed 2019 SAP; (2) at
   the August 19, 2019 “Town Hall Meeting,” City officials disseminated a
   four-page pamphlet (the “Town Hall Pamphlet”) explaining the background
   and rationale for the proposed 2019 SAP, as well as its contents, and provid-
   ing instructions for the submission of questions and comments for the City
   Council to consider prior to its September 10, 2019 meeting; (3) on August
   31, 2019, the City published a notice in the Bastrop Advertiser of a public hear-
   ing to be held, on September 10, 2019, to consider the 2019 SAP; (4) the
   minutes of the September 10, 2019 City Council meeting reflect that a public
   hearing was held on that date regarding the 2019 Ordinance, the 2019 SAP,
   and the Fiscal Year 2020 Assessment Roll, during which the City Council
   heard from a number of speakers, including counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants,
   before approving the first reading of the 2019 Ordinance; (5) on September
   12, 2019, the City published notice in the Bastrop Advertiser of a public hear-
   ing to be held on September 24, 2019 to consider the 2019 SAP; and (6) on
   September 24, 2019, the City Council met in a public meeting during which

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   the 2019 Ordinance and SAP were approved and adopted after a second read-
   ing.
          Nor have we been given any reason to think that any valid objections
   to particular capital cost amounts could not have been adequately considered
   by the City Council, in 2019, prior to voting on the 2019 Ordinance and 2019
   SAP. For instance, Plaintiffs-Appellants have not shown that events occur-
   ring between the time that the capital cost overruns were incurred and the
   City Council’s consideration of the proposed 2019 Ordinance and SAP some-
   how deprived them of previously available pricing or other relevant infor-
   mation. Indeed, on the instant record, it is far from clear that the capital im-
   provement project’s final figures differ from those that would apply if the
   City had previously performed the annual SAP review and adjustments in the
   same years that capital cost amounts exceeding the 2003 estimate were in-
   curred. Thus, for all these reasons, we are not convinced that Plaintiffs-Ap-
   pellants were not accorded the procedural protections required by the Four-
   teenth Amendment’s due process clause.
          Now turning to the substantive due process challenges asserted by
   Plaintiffs-Appellants, we conclude those claims likewise lack merit. Although
   the capital assessments set forth in the 2019 Ordinance and SAP certainly
   constitute governmental deprivations of a protected property interest, such
   deprivations do not violate substantive due process protections unless they
   lack a rational basis. See, e.g., Simi Inv. Co., 236 F.3d at 251. Notably, a gov-
   ernment entity’s failure to follow the procedures established by state law
   does not automatically render that conduct arbitrary or unrelated to a legiti-
   mate state interest. See Stern v. Tarrant Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 778 F.2d 1052,
   1060 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the notion that “state law defines . . . which
   means to a chosen goal are rational, [because] then all intentional violations
   of state law by state agencies would violate the fourteenth amendment”); see
   also Levitt, 759 F.2d at 1233 (rejecting assertion that a “state’s failure to

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                                    No. 21-51039

   follow its own [procedural] rules is a per se deprivation of substantive due
   process”).
          Nor does the fact that the City would bear no financial responsibility
   to the project developer for capital costs in excess of the 2003 estimated
   amount—if the 2019 Ordinance were invalidated—necessarily divest the
   2019 Ordinance of a rational basis. To the contrary, ensuring that persons
   who have provided goods and/or services, as part of a PIDA Act project, are
   fairly compensated by the owners of property specially benefitting from the
   resulting improvements is entirely consistent with the purpose of the PIDA
   Act. Otherwise, public improvements made possible by the PIDA Act might
   cease to exist if third-party providers were to become unwilling to participate
   in such projects because of concerns that inconsequential government short-
   comings might ultimately deprive them of reasonable compensation.
          This is particularly true where, as here, it is not apparent that the
   Hunters Crossing PID’s total capital assessment actually increased as a result
   of the City Council’s admitted administrative shortcomings, and invalidating
   the 2019 Ordinance seemingly would provide a windfall to the property
   owners who have benefited from the public improvements. Accordingly, on
   the showing made, we are not convinced that the 2019 Ordinance lacks the
   rational basis required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due
   process protections.
          For the foregoing reasons, we, like the district court, are not
   persuaded that Plaintiffs-Appellants suffered actionable violations of the
   procedural and substantive protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth
   Amendment’s due process clause. Accordingly, we affirm the district

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   court’s judgment to the extent that it rejected the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ due
   process claims. 14
                                               IV.
            Plaintiffs-Appellants also contend that the district court erred in
    rejecting their assertions that the 2019 Ordinance violates the Texas
    Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws. Specifically, Article I,
    section 15 of the Texas Constitution states: “No bill of attainder, ex post
    facto law, retroactive law, or any other law impairing the obligations of
    contracts, shall be made.” See Tex. Const. art. I, sec. 16. A retroactive
    law “is one which gives pre-enactment conduct a different legal effect from
    that which it would have had without the passage of the statute.” Union
    Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39, 60 (Tex. 2014).
            Plaintiffs-Appellants argue the 2019 Ordinance is “a textbook
    instance of retroactive lawmaking” because it “adjusts the assessments by
    incorporating the developer’s overrun costs incurred many years earlier,
    despite the fact that the City never reviewed these costs in the years that
    they were incurred.” Thus, Plaintiffs-Appellants maintain, “the 2019
    Ordinance gives the City’s and developer’s pre-enactment conduct ‘a
    different legal effect than that which it would have had[.]’”

           14
                As stated above, the district court determined that the PIDA Act’s
   establishment of procedural requirements for the adjustment of property assessments
   “creat[ed] a [federally protected] property interest for individuals within the PID.”
   Considering all of the legal principles discussed herein, as well as the Texas Legislature’s
   failure to have expressly legislated a specific consequence for noncompliance with the
   PIDA Act’s annual review and adjustment requirements, when it easily could have done
   so, we disagree. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s
   judgment relative to the federal due process claims asserted by Plaintiffs-Appellants.

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                                     No. 21-51039

           Although the district court entered a “Final Judgment” awarding
    judgment in favor of the defendants, and further ordered that “all relief not
    specifically granted is denied,” the district court did not expressly address
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims asserted under the Texas Constitution in its
    post-trial findings of fact and conclusions of law. On this limited record, we
    are left to speculate regarding the scope and substance of the district court’s
    assessment of Plaintiffs-Appellants’ state-law claims and, thus, are unable
    to provide adequate appellate review. Accordingly, we vacate the district
    court’s judgment relative these claims and remand them to the district court
    for further consideration and/or a statement of reasons for judgment.
                                         V.
           As stated herein, the district court’s September 29, 2021 judgment
   in favor of Defendants-Appellees is AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED
   IN PART, and REMANDED IN PART.

                                         24