Court Opinion

ID: 9658054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:45:23.568058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:50.974363
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority in this case. I believe that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment. As noted by the majority:
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, that the ultimate inferences to be drawn from those facts are clear, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Baker’s Local No. 433 Welfare Fund, ante p. 215, 375 N.W.2d 922 (1985).
In my view the appellant was barred from recovering against the City of Tekamah by reason of having assumed the risk, knowing full well of the dangers present. The record conclusively establishes that Ms. Gilbert was thoroughly familiar with the intersection, having driven over the street each day for more than 10 years, and could have taken an alternate route if she wished. In Rodgers v. Chimney Rock P.P. Dist., 216 Neb. 666, 670, 345 N.W.2d 12, 15 (1984), we repeated the oft-cited rule regarding assumption of risk by saying: “ ‘ “One who knows of a dangerous condition, appreciates its dangerous nature, and deliberately exposes himself to the danger assumes the risk of injury from it.” ’ ”
In Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc., 174 Neb. 1, 115 N.W.2d 776 (1962), the plaintiff was held to have assumed the risk when injured by diving off the defendant’s raft without first checking the water depth. And in Schwartz v. Selvage, 203 Neb. 158, 277 N.W.2d 681 (1979), the plaintiff mailman, who slipped on an unknown object on defendant’s residence steps, was held to have assumed the risk because he saw the clutter on the steps and did not use the handrail.
One who, knowing and comprehending a danger, voluntarily *619exposes himself to it, although not negligent in so doing, is deemed to have assumed the risk and is precluded from recovery. See, Hess v. Holdsworth, 176 Neb. 774, 127 N.W.2d 487 (1964); Garcia v. Howard, 200 Neb. 57, 262 N.W.2d 190 (1978).
It therefore appears to me that regardless of how wide, in fact, the street may be or how steep the grade of the street may be, the lack of visibility for drivers crossing the crest of the hill, the curvature of the road from the south to the north on the east side of the hill, and the adequacy or inadequacy of traffic controls, when one accepts the fact that with knowledge of the intersection and the apparent dangers thereof, Ms. Gilbert, nevertheless, procéeded, one must also conclude that she is barred from recovery. A summary judgment, therefore, was appropriate. I would have affirmed the decision of the district court.