Court Opinion

ID: 4724138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-08-12 02:50:02.081628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:45.609489
License: Public Domain

Anders, C. J.
(dissenting). —I am unable to concur in the conclusion reached by the majority of my brothers in this case. The plaintiff in the court below, being the owner of certain personal property, which she had previously mortgaged, sought to recover the possession, or the value thereof, from the defendant, who was sheriff of King county, and who -had taken said property into custody by virtue of a statutory foreclosure proceeding instituted by the assignee *28of the mortgagee. The note secured by the mortgage was overdue, and both it and the mortgage were in the possession of Andrew Merchant, to whom they had been transferred by the original mortgagee for value. No steps were taken in the pending proceedings, in accordance with the provisions of the statute or otherwise, to contest the right to foreclosure or the amount due; but instead of this, action was brought to recover the property then in the custody of the sheriff and of the law by reason of the default of the plaintiff herself. It is true the testimony of the defendant shows that, before the sale of the goods under the foreclosure proceedings, he was told by the plaintiff’s attorney that, as matter of fact, the note had been paid, and that the attempt to foreclose was a fraud between Robert and Andrew Merchant. But, under the circumstances, he was not bound to relinquish the property on a mere statement of that character, nor, indeed, would he have been justified, as an officer charged with the performance of an official duty, in so doing. It is disclosed by the record that the foreclosure and sale were substantially in conformity to the statute, and the sheriff should not be held responsible in the action for the goods sold by him, unless it be shown that his acts were wrongful and unauthorized by law. The action was tried and judgment rendered against the defendant in the lower court, on the theory that the note and mortgage of Mrs. Franklin had been paid, and that, therefore, the defendant had become a trespasser by seizing and disposing of the goods in question. But I am strongly of the opinion that all the testimony upon that point, taken together, fails to show more than that Robert Merchant promised Mrs. Franklin to pay her note before maturity, and that he failed to do so; and it requires no argument to demonstrate the proposition that a promise to pay is not payment, either in fact or in law. It also seems to me that all the testimony concerning the alleged fraudulent transactions between the *29Merchants and the agreement made by Robert Merchant with Mrs. Franklin to pay the note was wholly irrelevant, and should have been excluded by the court. Nor do I think the defendant waived any of his legal rights by going to trial, without objection, upon the pleadings, as made up by the parties to the action. The question of conspiracy between the Merchants and Btewart to defraud plaintiff was set up in her reply to defendant’s answer. It tendered an immaterial and collateral issue, and I- am unable to perceive how the denial of such allegations could, in any way, justify the introduction of testimony touching the same which was objected to by the defendant. In an equitable action against Robert and Andrew Merchant to compel a surrender and cancellation of the note and mortgage, such testimony would have been relevant and proper j and it may be that the facts and circumstances would have warranted the court, in that event, in granting the relief demanded. But in this action the sole question to be determined was whether or not the taking and selling of plaintiff’s chattels by the defendant was wrongful, and not whether some other person or persons were guilty, of perpetrating a fraud upon the plaintiff j and, in my judgment, the plaintiff should have been confined to the trial of the former question. For the foregoing and other reasons that might be given, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be reversed, and a new trial granted.
Hoyt, J., concurs.