Court Opinion

ID: 9844629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:45.999984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:39.260329
License: Public Domain

MONTOYA, Justice (concurring specially) : I concur in the result of the opinion prepared by the Chief Justice, but only on the grounds that the affidavits of disqualification in both cases were not timely filed and, therefore, did not effectively serve to disqualify the respondents in both of the cases which are the subject of prohibition proceedings before this court. It is my belief that the opinion need not go any further since, the holding of untimely filing of the affidavits is enough to completely resolve the issues presented. I disagree with the majority in what I consider to be obiter dicta in their holding that the provisions of § 21-5-8, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp. (Repl. Vol. 4, 1970), are applicable only as to the judge before whom the case is to be tried on the merits. I further disagree with the majority’s action in overruling State v. Armijo, 39 N.M. 502, 50 P.2d 852 (1935), and all other cases which follow that decision. The majority, I feel, have misinterpreted the statute by disregarding the words “before whom the action * * * is to be tried and heard” and the meaning of the word “trial” by deciding that the statute applies only to the judge before whom the case is to be tried on the merits. (Emphasis added.) The meaning and significance of the above-quoted language was well defined and properly interpreted in State v. Armijo, supra, which the majority in this opinion have summarily overruled. We have consistently followed that opinion. See State ex rel. Weltmer v. Taylor, 42 N.M. 405, 79 P.2d 937 (1938); State ex rel. Lebeck v. Chavez, 45 N.M. 161, 113 P.2d 179 (1941); State v. Hester, 70 N.M. 301, 373 P.2d 541 (1962) ; State ex rel. Howell v. Montoya, 74 N.M. 743, 398 P.2d 263 (1965). In Armijo, supra, in considering the timeliness of the filing of an affidavit, although some action had already been taken by the trial judge by the consent of all parties, in discussing the meaning of the statute of disqualification and the time in which it is to be exercised, we said (39 N.M. at 506, 50 P.2d at 854-855) : “We have, therefore, by the terms of section 2 of our statute, a time limit for filing of affidavits in cases to be tried at a term of court, whether such cases be civil or criminal. We can also see by the wording of section 2 of this statute that the Legislature contemplated such being at issue before the affidavit of disqualification was filed. This does not necessarily contemplate, as contended for by relator, that an appearance, all pleadings, motions, etc., which are necessary to bring a case to issue shall have been submitted before the filing of the affidavit. On the contrary, we believe that under chapter 184, a litigant cannot experiment with the judge presiding over the case, and, upon encountering an adverse ruling, conclude to file his affidavit of prejudice. The affidavit must be directed at the judge ‘before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard.’ Section 1. A hearing is contemplated. Whether such hearing be on a motion, demurrer, plea, or answer is immaterial. It is a hearing on an ‘issue.’ In a broad sense, a hearing includes every step therein where the judge is called upon to rule for or against any party to the cause. It is the judicial examination of the ‘issue’ in the broad sense that is contemplated by chapter 184. “We hold that an affidavit of prejudice is timely made if filed and called to the attention of the court before it has made any ruling on any litigated or contested matter whatsoever in the case, either on a motion, demurrer, or plea of the party making the affidavit, or on the motion, demurrer, or plea of any other party to the action, of the hearing of which the party making the affidavit has been given notice, otherwise it is not timely made. We cannot permit a litigant to test the mind of the trial judge like a boy testing the temperature of the water in the pool with his toe, and if found to his liking, decides to take a plunge. The plunge into the pool of litigation with an affidavit disqualifying the trial judge must be made on a belief of prejudice theretofore entertained, and not on any subsequent discovery of such belief of prejudice resulting from an adverse ruling.” The same reasoning and holding should apply to the instant case. We have held that the right to disqualify judges is a substantive right. Beall v. Reidy, 80 N.M. 444, 457 P.2d 376 (1969). The majority, in their opinion, have approved the disqualification rule adopted by the Second Judicial District Court applicable to criminal cases, even though the rule is not before us in the cases decided by their opinion. The rule is not a part of the record and its applicability, or even its compliance with the disqualification statute, was not in issue in the instant case. It does not appear to this writer tO' be judicious on our part to approve any procedure which effectively prevents or even dilutes the exercise of a substantive right. The disqualification statute does not say “any one of so many judges” that might try the case, but says “* * * the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried and heard, * * * If the present system of disposing of cases in the Second Judicial District inhibits or in any way interferes with the substantive right of a litigant to disqualify a judge, as set forth in the statute, then the latter right must prevail. Otherwise, the statutory right is more illusory than real. In any event, the remedy is to be sought from the legislature and should not be attained by judicial fiat or rule. In view of the foregoing, I concur in the result but only on the basis of the untimely filing of the affidavits of disqualification. SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION McMANUS, Chief Justice.  This court on February 1, 1974, issued its combined opinion in Gray v. Sanchez, No. 9833, and Robertson v. Sanchez, No. 9853. One issue raised in the Gray case, supra, was not covered in the opinion filed, and this supplemental opinion concerns only that issue. This issue urged by Gray was that the order entered in his case pursuant to Rule 28, New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure [§ 41-23-28, N.M. S.A.1953 (Supp.1973)] was beyond the jurisdiction of the court because of its failure to copy into the order subsection (c) of that rule. This subsection contains exceptions. Further Gray alleges that Rule 28 is an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. These arguments are without merit.' It is so ordered. OMAN, STEPHENSON, MONTOYA and MARTINEZ, JJ, concur.