Court Opinion

ID: 9543619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:47:11.382436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:42.702183
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Justice,
dissenting.
Gary Wayne Seaton’s leg was injured in 1976. He was taken to a hospital, treated, released, and went back to work. As a result of the injury he had surgery to improve his circulation in 1977 and again in 1982, all of which was paid for by his employers’ insurance. Again he returned to work and resumed normal activity. Finally in 1986 the doctors decided the leg must come off, and it did. When Seaton then filed his Form 3 to recover compensation for amputation of his leg he was (and is) told by the courts that there will be none, that the statute of limitations has run on his claim.
My dissent in McDonald v. Time-DC, 773 P.2d 1252 (Okla.1989), need not be re*1369peated here, but it foretold of eases such as this one and other injustices that will certainly be endured by some other unfortunate Oklahoma workers unless and until the McDonald doctrine is replaced by one more legally sound. This case graphically demonstrates the unfairness visited on these claimants whose true injuries are not immediately apparent after an accident. All workers of this State should now be aware that after an accident a compensation claim must be filed to protect the worker’s right to compensation for an injury, the full extent of which is unknown— even when the employer pays the immediate expenses, as in today’s case, and even if the employee continues to perform as usual on the job.
Professor Larson writes that under the type of statute used in Oklahoma “there is now almost complete judicial agreement that the claim period runs from the time the compensable injury becomes apparent.” 3 A. Larson. The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 78.42(a), 15-263 (1988).1 I would hold that the date of an “injury”, for the purpose of starting the limitations clock, is the date the claimant was, or should reasonably have been, aware of the compensable injury for which he seeks compensation.
Compensation for an injury in the form of a loss of a member of the body can first be prosecuted to a successful result when that member is in fact lost. The claimant’s leg was amputated on November 22, 1986, and it is that date, or the date on which Seaton first knew that an amputation was necessary, if earlier, that should have begun the limitations period for Seaton’s claim. The claim was filed in February 1987 and should not be barred by limitations.
The rule of law established by McDonald has ironic consequences. On the one hand it eliminates some claims of workers truly injured on the job such as Seaton. On the other hand it invites a great number of claims by workers who have suffered a bump or a bruise2 and must file a claim or risk losing compensation should the bump or bruise turn out later to be serious. If for no other reason than the keeping of a manageable docket of compensation claims, we would be well advised to reverse the majority’s holding in McDonald, and hereafter rule that the statute of limitations runs from the time the worker knows or should reasonably know that he has sustained a compensable injury.
I am authorized to state that Justice KAUGER joins in these views.

. For examples see: Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission, 43 Ariz. 50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934); Donaldson v. Calvert McBride Printing Co., 217 Ark. 625, 232 S.W.2d 651 (1950), Woodward v. ITT Higbie Mfg. Co., 271 Ark. 498, 609 S.W.2d 115 (App.1980); Bogdon v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 767 (Ind.App.1981); John Deere Dubuque Works v. Meyers, 410 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1987); Potter v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 248 Minn. 380, 80 N.W.2d 59 (1956); Rosa v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R.I. 215, 60 A.2d 150 (1948); Bearshield v. City of Gregory, 278 N.W.2d 164 (S.D.1979); Acme Body Works v. Industrial Commission, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756 (1931); Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187 (Wyo.1972).

. The majority in McDonald used the term “ill effect": "Some ill effect, however trivial, will be or should be recognizable immediately.” Id. at 1256.