Court Opinion

ID: 9948987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 16:01:03.80977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:26.567952
License: Public Domain

21-6594
     Lin v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Douchy, IJ
                                                                           A212 929 499

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of March, two thousand
 4   twenty-four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                    REENA RAGGI,
 8                    RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
 9                    BETH ROBINSON,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   CHAOLIANG LIN,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                    v.                                         21-6594
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York, NY.
 2

 3   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Principal Acting Assistant
 4                                       Attorney General; John S. Hogan, Assistant
 5                                       Director; Todd J. Cochran, Trial Attorney,
 6                                       Office of Immigration Litigation, United
 7                                       States Department of Justice, Washington,
 8                                       DC.

 9         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

10   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

11   AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

12         Petitioner Chaoliang Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of

13   China, seeks review of an October 25, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming a

14   December 6, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application

15   for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against

16   Torture (“CAT”). In re Chaoliang Lin, No. A212 929 499 (B.I.A. Oct. 25, 2021), aff’g

17   No. A212 929 499 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 6, 2018). We assume the parties’

18   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan

20   Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s adverse

21   credibility determination “under the substantial evidence standard.” Hong Fei

22   Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of

                                              2
 1   fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

 2   conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 3         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 4   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or

 5   responsiveness of the applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the

 6   applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency

 7   of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of

 8   record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard

 9   to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the

10   applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We

11   defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

12   circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

13   adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.

14   2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. We conclude that substantial evidence

15   supports the adverse credibility determination.

16         The agency reasonably relied on Lin’s inconsistencies and demeanor. See

17   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).    In the written statement accompanying his

18   application for asylum, Lin emphasized the beating and detention his parents

19   endured as a result of his preaching Christianity by telephone to friends and

                                              3
 1   relatives in China. But in his testimony before the IJ, when asked by his lawyer

 2   why he feared returning to China, Lin testified that Chinese police beat up and

 3   threatened a friend to whom he had been preaching. When asked if he knew

 4   anyone else who had a problem because of his preaching, Lin said no. He did not

 5   mention that his parents had also been beaten and detained on account of his

 6   preaching until prodded with questions about what his parents had told him. It

 7   was only during this series of questions that Lin disclosed that police had visited

 8   his parents and searched their home for evidence of his preaching—an assertion

 9   that was central to his alleged fear of future persecution. These omissions and

10   inconsistencies support the agency’s credibility determination.

11         Moreover, the agency’s credibility determination was further reinforced by

12   the IJ’s assessment of Lin’s demeanor. See Tu Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 400 (2d

13   Cir. 2006) (“Demeanor is virtually always evaluated subjectively and intuitively,

14   and an IJ therefore is accorded great deference on this score—no less deference

15   than that accorded other fact-finders.”).    In this case, the IJ found that Lin’s

16   testimony appeared rehearsed and that his demeanor was “not persuasive.”

17   CAR at 36–37.

18         Lin’s credibility was further undermined by the lack of reliable

19   corroboration. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An

                                              4
 1   applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,

 2   because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to

 3   rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”). His uncle’s

 4   testimony contradicted his own on a foundational issue – whether he had

 5   preached Christianity from the United States by telephone or whether he had done

 6   so while physically in China. And the letters from his mother and friend were

 7   from interested parties who were not subject to cross examination. See Likai Gao

 8   v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that an IJ “act[s] within her

 9   discretion in according . . . little weight” to letters from declarants who are

10   “interested parties” and not available for cross examination); see also Y.C. v. Holder,

11   741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We defer to the agency’s determination of the

12   weight afforded to an alien’s documentary evidence.”).

13         The multiple inconsistencies and lack of corroboration provide substantial

14   evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145

15   n.8 (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an

16   IJ was compelled to find him credible.          Multiple inconsistencies would so

17   preclude even more forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.          The adverse

18   credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and

19   CAT relief because all three claims are based on the same factual predicate. See

                                               5
 1   Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).              Because the adverse

 2   credibility determination is dispositive, we need not reach Lin’s argument that he

 3   established a pattern or practice of persecution of Catholics in Fujian Province. 1

 4   See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies

 5   are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary

 6   to the results they reach.”).

 7          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

8    motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

 9                                             FOR THE COURT:
10                                             Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
11                                             Clerk of Court
12

     1 Nor is Lin’s pattern or practice argument properly before us as he did not exhaust it
     before the BIA, and he relies on evidence that was not presented to the agency. See
     8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (“[T]he court of appeals shall decide the petition only on the
     administrative record on which the order of removal is based.”); Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t
     Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (requiring petitioner to exhaust issues before the
     BIA), abrogated in part on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1111–
     14 (2023) (holding that exhaustion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional).

                                                  6