Court Opinion

ID: 9372830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:58.501169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.887018
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                            MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     REBECCA HUEY,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         SF-0752-16-0627-I-1

                     v.

     DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,                            DATE: February 15, 2023
                 Agency.

                     THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Rebecca Huey, Concord, California, pro se.

           Amy R. Walker, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

                                            BEFORE

                                  Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her appeal of her allegedly involuntary reduction in grade for lack of
     jurisdiction.        For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
     petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

     Office of Regional Operations for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant requested and received a reassignment from her GS-12
     position to a GS-7 position in December 2014. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1
     at 3, 5, Tab 5 at 2. She later filed a Board appeal alleging that her reduction in
     grade was involuntary and was compelled by her managers’ harassing conduct.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 3, 5, Tab 5 at 4-5. She requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2.
¶3         The administrative judge issued an order instructing the appellant how to
     establish jurisdiction over her constructive adverse action appeal. IAF, Tab 11.
     The appellant submitted a response alleging that, between fiscal years 2011 and
     2013, her overall performance rating was lowered from Exemplary to Highly
     Effective to Effective, in retaliation for complaints that the appellant either
     brought herself or for which she served as a witness. IAF, Tab 12 at 4 -5. She
     alleged that her managers ignored her complaints of a hostile work environment,
     berated her in front of colleagues, set her up to fail, subjected her to an
     inequitable and unrealistic workload that compelled her to work 26 days in a row,
     reduced her telework agreement from 2 days to 1 day weekly and later revoked it
     entirely, denied her ad hoc telework requests, micromanaged her, made false
     accusations against her, and called her parents at their home to ascertain the
     appellant’s whereabouts.      IAF, Tab 12 at 4-11.      The appellant’s therapist
     purportedly prescribed her antidepressants and recommended the appellant take
     medical leave from October through December 2014 due to workplace stress. Id.
     at 10-11. The appellant also filed medical notes that she submitted to the agency
     on or around September 2 and October 24, 2014, in which her therapist
     recommended that the appellant be granted 2 telework days per week. IAF, Tab 5
     at 24-26, 30-31. One week later, on October 31, 2014, the agency suspended the
     appellant’s telework eligibility entirely. Id. at 47.
                                                                                         3

¶4         The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for
     lack of jurisdiction without holding a hearing. IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID).
     The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a response.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5         The Board lacks jurisdiction over appeals of employees’ voluntary actions.
     O’Clery v. U.S. Postal Service, 67 M.S.P.R. 300, 302 (1995), aff’d, 95 F.3d 1166
     (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table); 5 C.F.R. § 752.401(b)(9).       However, the Board has
     recognized that employee-initiated actions that appear voluntary on their face are
     not always so. Spiegel v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 140, 141 (1980).
     The Board may have jurisdiction over such actions under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 as
     “constructive” adverse actions.        To establish Board jurisdiction over a
     constructive reduction-in-grade claim, the appellant must show (1) that she lacked
     a meaningful choice in the matter, and (2) it was the agency’s wrongful actions
     that deprived her of that choice. See Bean v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R.
     397, ¶ 8 (2013).      When an employee alleges that the intolerable working
     conditions effectively deprived her of choice, she may need to show that she
     informed the agency of the existence of the objec tionable conditions and
     requested assistance or remediation from the agency. See Peoples v. Department
     of the Navy, 83 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 8 (1999), overruled on other grounds by Abbott v.
     U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 294 (2014).           If the appellant makes a
     nonfrivolous allegation of fact establishing Board jurisdiction, she is entitled to a
     hearing at which she must prove jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. Garcia v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 437 F.3d 1322, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en
     banc); Thomas v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶ 11 (2016).
¶6         In dismissing this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the administrative judge
     found that the appellant failed to make nonfrivolous allegations as to eac h
     element noted above. ID at 3-8. For the reasons set forth below, we find the
                                                                                          4

     appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction over the appeal ,
     and we remand this appeal for further proceedings.
¶7         In finding the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she lacked a
     meaningful choice in accepting a reduction in grade and that it was the agency’s
     wrongful conduct that deprived her of that choice, the administrative judge cited
     Miller v. Department of Defense, 85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 32 (2000), for the
     proposition that dissatisfaction with work assignments, a feeling of being unfairly
     criticized, or difficult or unpleasant working conditions are generally not so
     intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign. ID at 7-8. In its response
     to the appellant’s petition for review, the agency cites Miller and Brown v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 15, aff’d, 469 F. App’x 852 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
     and asserts that the appellant alleged little more than a difficult relationship with
     her supervisors. PFR File, Tab 3 at 11.
¶8         We disagree. The appellant alleged a continuing and increasing pattern of
     hostility by her managers, culminating in her need to take approximately
     3 months of medical leave due to workplace stress, which was later diagnosed as
     post-traumatic stress disorder. IAF, Tab 5 at 4-9, Tab 12 at 4-11. The appellant
     stated that, at the time she requested a reduction in grade, she was “under extreme
     emotional stress at the prospect of having to return to [work] after [her] medical
     leave was to end on December 31, 2014.” IAF, Tab 5 at 4. Th e appellant also
     submitted medical documents to the agency that appear to have requested a
     reasonable accommodation of 2 telework days per week; however, the agency
     cancelled the appellant’s telework eligibility entirely approximately 1 week after
     receiving the letter. 2 IAF, Tab 5 at 24-26, 30-31, 47. The Board has held that
     working outside of medical restrictions is not a viable option for Federal

     2
       The agency asserts that the appellant failed to engage in the interactive process for
     requesting reasonable accommodations. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10. The record is not
     developed on this issue and, at the jurisdictional stage, the Board will not weigh
     evidence to resolve conflicting assertions.      See Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service,
     60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994).
                                                                                          5

      employees and may constitute a nonfrivolous allegation that the employee lacked
      a choice in the action at issue. Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 13-15.
¶9            We further find that the appellant’s allegations are distinguishable from the
      facts alleged in Miller and Brown. The appellant in Miller did not allege that the
      agency violated his medical restrictions. E.g., Miller, 85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶¶ 12, 14,
      16-20, 27. Though the appellant in Brown alleged that the agency denied her
      request for an accommodation, the Board noted that she continued working for
      almost 2 1/2 years after the agency denied her request. Brown, 115 M.S.P.R. 609,
      ¶ 17.    The appellant here requested a transfer 1 1/2 months after the agency
      revoked her telework and before she was to return from medical leave. While we
      note that the appellant alleged she had two pending equal employment
      opportunity (EEO) complaints at the time she requested a reduction in grade, we
      find that she nonetheless nonfrivolously alleged that return to the alleged hostile
      work environment pending resolution of her EEO complaints would have been
      detrimental to her health.     E.g., IAF, Tab 5 at 4; cf. Axsom v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 17 (2009) (finding the appellant in a
      constructive removal appeal failed to nonfrivolously allege a reasonable person in
      his position would have resigned while the agency was pr ocessing his EEO
      complaints and had granted his accommodation request of additional leave
      beyond the requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act). Accordingly, we
      find that the appellant has alleged sufficient facts that, if proven, could establish
      that she lacked a choice in accepting a reduction in grade and that it was the
      agency’s wrongful conduct that deprived her of that choice.
¶10           We also disagree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant
      failed to nonfrivolously allege that she notified the agency that she believed her
      request for reassignment was compelled by intolerable working condit ions. ID
      at 3-7. The administrative judge cited Peoples, 83 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶¶ 8-9, for the
      proposition that the appellant must demonstrate the agency’s knowledge of the
      intolerable working conditions to establish a culpable connection between the
                                                                                         6

      objectionable conditions and the agency’s duty, if any, to alleviate the conditions.
      ID at 3.   However, Peoples concerned appellants who alleged that they were
      forced to absent themselves because a coworker created intolerable working
      conditions. Peoples, 83 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶¶ 2, 11. However, in a case such as this,
      in which the appellant claims that her supervisors harassed her, we find that she
      has sufficiently alleged that the agency was aware of her purported working
      conditions.   IAF, Tab 12 at 4-11; see O’Brien v. Department of Agriculture,
      91 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶¶ 7-9 (2002) (finding that an appellant’s claim of harassment
      by a supervisor constituted a nonfrivolous allegation that his re tirement was
      involuntary so as to warrant a hearing).
¶11         The agency asserts that the appellant’s medical documentation was
      insufficient to put it on notice that the appellant believed her working conditions
      were intolerable. PFR File, Tab 3 at 9-10. However, the appellant sent numerous
      emails to her supervisors alerting them of a purported hostile work environment
      in the months preceding her request for a reduction in grade . E.g., IAF, Tab 5
      at 16 (“This false accusation is causing me undue stress a nd creates a hostile
      work environment.”), Tab 12 at 31-32 (“I wanted to alert you to this incident
      because it was the worst in what I perceive to be a pattern of behavior . . . that is
      creating a hostile work environment for me and the rest of the R&P Team .”),
      49-50 (“This complete lack of response creates a hostile work environment for me
      because my customers become angry with me.”), 52 (“I feel that the emails you
      have been sending me regarding the review and this particular inquiry sheet are
      hostile in nature.”), 70-71 (“This decision to modify my telework agreement has
      caused and is continuing to cause me a great deal of emotional stress .”). The
      appellant’s November 2014 application for benefits from the Office of Workers’
      Compensation Programs (OWCP), which was provided to her supervisor, stated
      that the appellant’s “work-related stress and anxiety disorder are directly
                                                                                        7

      attributable to trauma caused by work demands/environment.” IAF, Tab 5 at 42. 3
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the agency
      was on notice that she believed her working conditions were intolerable.

                                           ORDER
¶12        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Office of
      Regional Operations for further development of the record and a jurisdictional
      hearing in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      3
        The agency notes that OWCP issued a May 6, 2015 determination finding that the
      appellant was not entitled to benefits. PFR File, Tab 3 at 9. However, OWCP’s
      May 2015 determination is irrelevant to whether the agency was on notice in December
      2014 as to the appellant’s belief that her working conditions were intolerable.