Court Opinion

ID: 9764692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:36:19.525161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:00.657763
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority sets out a proper test for determining when an informant may entrap a defendant, admits that the evidence raises an issue as to whether the informant in this case entrapped appellant, and then approves a charge which does not adequately inform the jury of the law as it applies to the facts of this case.
*700The charge given by the trial judge did in part track the language of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 8.06(b). However, the phrase “who was a person acting in accordance with instructions from a law enforcement agent” was ambiguous in that it failed to clarify how specific those “instructions” must be. Appellant’s complaint is that the charge may be interpreted in two ways: (1) that the informant, Rodriguez, was acting under specific instructions from the undercover agent, Moreno, to entrap appellant, or (2) that Rodriguez was acting under general instructions to perform as an informant gathering information for drug offense arrests. The majority correctly states that under proper circumstances a jury could find entrapment in either of the above situations. However, the charge does not convey that fact to the jury, and it creates a substantial risk of misleading the jury into believing that only specific instructions to entrap will suffice.
The extent of the confusion caused by the charge given in this case is vividly demonstrated by the jury argument of the prosecution:
“MR. WILCOX: And you will find under this entrapment flim flam thing that it says that you have to find that Johnny Rodriguez got instructions from Richard Moreno to go over there and say, ‘Go get me some heroin.’
MR. ZIMMERMAN: Your Honor, I’m going to object to that.
THE COURT: It will be overruled.
MR. ZIMMERMAN: Please note our exception. He’s misstating the charge.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. WILCOX: —that Richard Moreno has to have told Johnny Rodriguez, ‘You go over there and get this man to sell to you, and you pretend that you’re sick.’
MR. ZIMMERMAN: Your Honor, I’ll object to that, the charge in no way tells them that, ‘You have to go over there and get — ''
THE COURT: Overruled.”
It is apparent from the above colloquy that both the State and trial judge believed that the charge instructed the jury to find entrapment only upon a conclusion that the agent specifically instructed the informant to go to the bar and entrap appellant. This conclusion is further supported by a portion of appellant’s jury argument objected to by the State:
“MR. ZIMMERMAN: Entrapment doesn’t have to be by a uniformed law officer or by an undercover officer. And you’re instructed right here that if he was induced by Johnny Rodriguez- — •
MR. WILCOX: We’ll object to that as being a misstatement of the law. The law states very simply on Page 3 that he has to be induced by Johnny Rodriguez, acting on instructions from a law enforcement agent.
THE COURT: Sustained. The law is contained in the charge that you will take with you. And you will be guided by the charge of the Court.”
If both the prosecutor and the trial court were so persuaded as to what the charge meant, there is no reason to believe that the jury understood otherwise. It is therefore unfathomable whether the jury rejected appellant’s testimony that Rodriguez initiated the criminal activity or instead decided that Moreno did not specifically instruct Rodriguez to do so, thereby making an entrapment defense legally impossible. If the jury concluded the latter, the conviction would be based on an incorrect theory of law as demonstrated by the majority opinion.
The charge submitted by appellant attempted to rectify the problem by simply designating Johnny Rodriguez as a “law enforcement agent” and not including the “acting under instructions” language at all. His suggested charge was taken from Will-son’s Texas Criminal Forms, Sec. C-8.06 (Supp.1974). Such a charge would have been adequate to let the jury know that Rodriguez could have entrapped appellant through his own actions and would have avoided possible confusion about instructions given by the undercover officer.
Perhaps the best charge would be that suggested by Texas Criminal Pattern Jury Charges, Sec. 8.06 (1975), published by the State Bar of Texas. That charge would read as follows:
*701“Therefore, even if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense as alleged, but you further believe, or you have a reasonable doubt thereof, that he was induced to do so by_, who was a law enforcement agent, to wit: _, who used persuasion or other means likely to cause persons to commit the offense, to wit: -, and that the conduct of said - did not merely afford the defendant an opportunity to commit the offense, if any, you will find the defendant not guilty.”
The first blank space would contain the informant’s name. The second blank space would contain a brief explanation of the informant’s relation to the police. For example, the charge might state, “to wit: a person acting under specific instructions from police agents to entrap (the defendant).” Or it might state, “to wit: a person assisting police agents on a continuing basis in obtaining information for drug offense arrests.” Whatever the appropriate facts for the particular case, the charge would allow the judge to explain that the informant could have entrapped the defendant under a variety of agency theories and not only under specific instructions from an agent to entrap.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent.