Court Opinion

ID: 9407585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 16:09:18.031064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.013107
License: Public Domain

J-S11018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                  :
                v.                                :
                                                  :
                                                  :
    SOLOMON JOHNSON                               :
                                                  :
                        Appellant                 :   No. 2123 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 30, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-15-CR-0004505-2004

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                                    FILED JULY 7, 2023

       Solomon Johnson appeals the denial of his request for relief under the

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The PCRA

court denied the petition as untimely. We affirm.

       In August 2006, a jury convicted Johnson of terroristic threats, false

imprisonment,        intimidation   of   a     witness,   involuntary   deviate   sexual

intercourse (“IDSI”), and simple assault.1 The court sentenced Johnson in

December 2006. In 2007, the court granted Johnson permission to file a nunc

pro tunc direct appeal, and, although Johnson filed a timely appeal, this Court

dismissed it on October 2, 2008, for his failure to file a brief. See Trial Court

Docket Entry No. 1. Johnson did not seek further appellate review at that time.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2706(a)(1), 2903(a), 4952(a)(1), 3123(a)(3), and
2701(a)(1), respectively.
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He did file a PCRA petition in August 2009. The PCRA court dismissed it, and

we affirmed the dismissal.

      On January 12, 2022, Johnson filed what he styled as a “habeas corpus”

petition, claiming prosecutorial misconduct. Noting that it was his second

PCRA petition, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss

the petition. See Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Petition Pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), filed May 10, 2022. The court determined that Johnson’s

petition was untimely and did not satisfy any time-bar exception. See id. at

2 n.1. It also determined that Johnson waived review of his issue because he

could have claimed prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal. See id. at 3

n.1 cont’d (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544). Johnson responded to the notice

stating that the court had erred in treating his habeas petition as a PCRA

petition and the time restrictions of the PCRA did not apply. See Response to

907 Notice, filed June 21, 2022. The court denied Johnson’s petition and

entered an order advising Johnson of his right to appeal the order within 30

days, on June 30. See Order, filed June 30, 2022. The docket does not reflect

that the court served Johnson with this order. See Trial Court Docket Entry

No. 9/1.

      On July 30, 2022, Johnson filed a notice of appeal in this Court. On

August 15, our Prothonotary sent notice to the trial court explaining that

Johnson had incorrectly submitted his notice of appeal to this Court rather

than the trial court. The same day, Johnson properly filed his notice of appeal

with the trial court.

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J-S11018-23

      Before turning to Johnson’s appellate issues, we address whether

Johnson’s appeal was timely, as his appeal was docketed in the trial court

more than 30 days after the entry of the order from which he appealed. See

Commonwealth v. Burks, 102 A.3d 497, 500 (Pa.Super. 2014) (stating this

Court may address issue of timeliness of appeal sua sponte). We nonetheless

will not quash. The appeal period does not begin to run until the trial court’s

clerk of courts notes the date of service on the docket. See Pa.R.Crim.P.

114(C)(2)(c) (docket entries “shall contain” the “date of service of the order”);

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4) (indicating that an order dismissing a petition without a

hearing “shall advise the defendant . . . of the time limits within which the

appeal must be filed”); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1) (the appeal period only begins

running on the date the Clerk “mails or delivers copies of the order to the

parties”), (d)(1). No such docket notation exists here. The time for taking an

appeal never     started to   run,   and    we   treat the   appeal as    timely.

Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa.Super. 2000).

      Johnson presents the following question, which we repeat verbatim:

            •   Issue: “Prosecution    Misconduct”    (Based   on   (3)
                Factors)

            1. Prosecuted a charge knowing is not supported by
               probable cause (i.e. IDSI) . . .

            2. For using perjured testimony . . .

            3. Prosecution allowed victims misstatements regarding
               IDSI to stand uncorrected . . .

Johnson’s Br. at 4.

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      “When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, we must determine

whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by the record and free of legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(citation omitted).

         A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one,
         must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s
         judgment of sentence became final, unless he pleads and
         proves one of the three exceptions outlined in 42
         Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final at the
         conclusion of direct review by this Court or the United States
         Supreme Court, or at the expiration of the time for seeking
         such review. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(3).

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (case citations and

footnote omitted). A court may not address the merits of an untimely PCRA

petition unless the petitioner pleads and proves a time bar exception. See

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010); 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

      We do not reach the merits of Johnson’s issue as the PCRA court

properly dismissed his petition as untimely. Johnson’s judgment of sentence

became final on November 3, 2008, when his time to appeal the dismissal to

our Supreme Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908;

Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa.Super. 2005) (concluding

petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final for PCRA purposes when the

time to appeal dismissal of direct appeal expired). The one-year time bar,

therefore, expired on November 3, 2009. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

Accordingly, the instant petition, filed on January 12, 2022, was facially

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untimely and the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review Johnson’s claim

unless he was able to successfully plead and prove one of the statutory

exceptions to the time bar. See id. at § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

      Here, Johnson did not attempt to assert any time-bar exception in his

PCRA petition. As it was his burden to establish timeliness, the PCRA court

properly denied his petition for untimeliness.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/7/2023

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