Court Opinion

ID: 9575224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:29.384326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:05.691860
License: Public Domain

NEELY, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
Because this opinion is another fruit of the “poisonous tree” of Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990), I dissent. This opinion continues the redistribution of property begun with Whiting ’s eschewing the equitable distributive statute in favor of marital property. See Whiting, Id. (Neely, C.J., dissenting, for my criticism of the majority’s rationale and statutory interpretation).
In this case the majority, noting the uneven distribution of a 115-acre farm (two-thirds to the husband and one-third to the wife), remands this case because the circuit court did not consider all the factors specified in W.Va.Code, 48-2-32 [1984]. The majority specifically notes that the commissioner and the circuit court did not consider the presumption in favor of marital property, the effect of the marriage on the parties’ income-earning ability and the conduct of the parties that affected the value of the marital property.1 (See 183 W.Va. page 495, 396 S.E.2d page 457)
Although the Whiting procedure was not followed, the record in this case justifies the uneven distribution of the 115-acre farm and shows that the commissioner and the circuit court did consider all statutory factors. Regarding the 115-acre farm, the commissioner found:
In November 1950, the parties purchased a 115 acre farm in New Interest District, Randolph County, West Virginia, for approximately $25,000.00. The purchase included not only the real estate at a price of about $16,000.00, but also the livestock and other personal property located on the farm. The purchase was financed by use of borrowed funds of $5,000.00 and funds of the Defendant which had accumulated from oil and gas royalties and rentals from real estate inherited by the Defendant. Approximately $20,000.00 of Defendant’s separate funds were used for the purchase; the balance being financed through a $5,000.00 loan from Defendant’s relatives which apparently was repaid from joint funds of the parties.
Shortly after the purchase of the farm property and continuing until 1963 both parties worked essentially full time in and about the management and operation of the farm property and the Plaintiff performed homemaking services.
The commissioner noted that both parties gave full time care to the farm for about twelve years and that Mr. Tallman continues to devote full time to the farm. The commissioner also noted that Ms. Tallman had been employed by Davis & Elkins College to teach physical education from 1963 *501until the time of the divorce. The majority failed to acknowledge that these findings address the effect of the marriage on the parties’ income-earning ability and the conduct of the parties that affected the value of the marital property.
Although the commissioner did not specifically identify the 115-acre farm as “marital property” based on the Whiting presumption, the 115-acre farm was treated as marital property. Because of the unequal initial monetary contribution of the parties, the commissioner recommended the following allocation:
Two-thirds (%) of the value of the farm real estate purchased in 1950 to the Defendant. One-third (Vs) of the value of the farm real estate purchased in 1950 to the Plaintiff. One-half of the farm real estate purchased subsequent to 1950 to each the Defendant and the Plaintiff. One-half (Vs) of the value of the livestock and farm equipment to each of the parties.
In remanding this case, the majority is continuing to misuse the equitable distribution statute to redistribute separate property that the legislature has intended to remain separate. Although the farm became marital property (See Koontz v. Koontz, 183 W.Va. 477, 396 S.E.2d 439 (1990) (Neely, C.J., dissenting, for a discussion of the factors that should be considered to determine if property has become a joint enterprise and should be considered as marital property), Mr. Tallman’s initial contribution of approximately $20,000 of his separate funds to purchase the 115-acre farm justifies the unequal division of the property.2 The other factors specified in W.Va.Code, 48-2-32 [1984], were considered and addressed by the commissioner who, according to the majority, “took extensive evidence on the parties’ property, on the parties’ various inheritances, and on the parties’ respective contributions to the marriage.” 183 W.Va. page 494, 396 S.E.2d page 456.
Because the record indicates that fact finders considered the statutory factors in reaching a just and equitable distribution of the 115-acre farm, the majority’s focus on the circuit court’s failure to follow the Whiting form suggests that unequal distributions of marital property based on contributions of separate property aré disfavored and will be subject to intensive procedural review. Today’s decision continues to fertilize the Whiting marital property tree that subsumes all separate property after a marriage.

. By order dated 9 April 1987, the circuit court, over the exception of the parties, affirmed and adopted the commissioner’s report in its entirety-

. See Tollman, supra n. 1 noting that Mrs. Tail-man contributed $100.00 and $111.25 in 1952 and 1956, respectively, to the marriage.