Court Opinion

ID: 9561580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:12:23.130231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:58.163212
License: Public Domain

On Motion fob Rehearing.
Frankum, Justice.
The appellee in a vigorous and well-reasoned motion for rehearing contends that this court has, in rendering the foregoing opinion, recognized a collateral attack upon the temporary restraining order which is not permitted and has erroneously classified the temporary restraining order as “void” when it was at most defective. Though we did not expressly so hold, counsel for the appellee correctly recognizes that the basis *191of the ruling which we have made is that the requirements of the portion of the 1967 Act quoted in the opinion from Code Ann. § 81A-165 (b) are jurisdictional and that unless the movant or applicant complies with the conditions precedent for the granting of a restraining order without notice to the opposite party, as set forth therein, the judge to whom the application is made acquires no jurisdiction to issue such order. Appellee contends, however, that the order was not void, but was at most erroneous because the trial judge who issued the order had general jurisdiction to issue injunctions and restraining orders and also had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.
Jurisdiction in the context of the question presented by the appeal in this case should not be so narrowly defined, however. Jurisdiction means nothing more or less than the power and authority of the judge to act in the particular matter before him. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. p. 991. 21 CJS 28 et seq., Courts, § 15. It includes the authority to do the particular think done in a particular way. Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 405 (106 P2d 411). It is the authority or power to act in a case in a particular way. Hill v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 527 (106 P2d 876). While the provisions of section 65 of the Civil Practice Act of 1966 as amended (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 665; Ga. L. 1967, pp. 226, 240; Code Ann. § 81A-165) quoted in the opinion do not specifically use the word “jurisdiction” we do not think that the language is subject to any interpretation other than that it denies authority to the judges of the superior court to issue ex parte restraining orders “unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.” It is true that the judges of the superior courts have general jurisdiction to issue injunctions and restraining orders and that in this broad sense the judge in this case had the general power and authority to act. But, the statute says that “no temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice” unless the required showing is made. It is difficult to see how a plainer restriction upon the power and authority of the judge to act in such matters could have been *192expressed. Similar restrictions on the authority of the judges of the superior courts to issue ex parte restraining orders have been recognized and upheld by courts of other jurisdictions, as well as by this court. See Williams v. Koelsch, 67 Ida. 341 (180 P2d 237), and State v. Harris, 229 Mo. App. 721 (81 SW2d 632). And see Strickland v. Griffin, 70 Ga. 541, 550.

Rehearing denied.

All the Justices concur.