Court Opinion

ID: 9600002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:22:49.507949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:48.396222
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Dissenting.
In a unanimous decision rendered in 1985, this court held that when a married couple buys a disability insurance policy with community funds, and the disabled spouse begins receiving benefits on the policy during the marriage, policy benefits paid after the couple has separated are the disabled spouse’s separate property if such benefits were intended to replace that spouse’s postdissolution earnings, but are community property if the couple purchased the policy with the intent to provide *1044retirement income. (In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848 [221 Cal.Rptr. 546, 710 P.2d 346] [hereafter Saslow].) In this case, noncancelable term disability insurance1 was purchased with community funds, but benefit payments did not commence until after the couple’s separation, during which time the insured spouse had used separate property to pay for renewal of the policy. Concluding that Saslow is inapplicable here, the majority holds that the disability benefits are entirely the property of the insured spouse.
I disagree. Although disability insurance is rarely purchased for the purpose of providing retirement income, when a couple has bought a disability insurance policy with this goal in mind we should recognize the community’s interest in the policy, just as we recognize the community’s interest in retirement pensions paid for with community funds. Here, in awarding all of the disability insurance benefits to the insured spouse, the majority disregards the substantial sums the community paid to purchase the policy. Not only is this an inequitable result, it is also an erosion of this court’s decision in Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848. Unlike the majority, I would apply the Saslow rule to this case and hold that to the extent the marital couple intended the disability policy to provide for retirement income, the policy proceeds are community property, in an amount proportional to the percentage of the policy premiums paid for with community funds.
I
John and Edie Elfmont (husband and wife) were married in 1975. In 1977, they bought disability insurance that would pay benefits of $3,500 per month if husband, a physician, became disabled.2 In either 1980 or 1981, husband injured his back, but did not believe the injury was serious. Between 1980 and 1984, the couple gradually increased the coverage under husband’s disability policy and purchased additional policies; the couple ultimately carried insurance that would pay $9,000 per month if husband became disabled.3 The policies were term insurance, renewable every three months. Each policy stated, in capital letters: “Non-Cancellable and Guaranteed CONTINUABLE TO AGE 65 AT GUARANTEED PREMIUMS.” The policies *1045explained that so long as the insured maintained full-time employment, he or she was entitled to continue to renew the policy, without increase in premium, until the age of 65. They provided for lifetime benefits if the insured became disabled by the age of 60.
In 1985 or 1986, a CAT scan showed that husband had a large herniated disc, apparently the result of the injury occurring in 1980 or 1981. The couple separated in 1987; thereafter, husband, using his separate funds, continued to renew each of the disability insurance policies. In 1989, husband suffered a further injury to his back. The next year, at the age of 50, he retired, and began to receive disability benefits totaling $9,000 per month on the three policies.
In the dissolution proceedings, wife offered evidence that husband had suffered intermittent back pain following his back injury in 1980 or 1981; that he hated the practice of medicine; that he had repeatedly told her and others he intended to retire, “come hell or high water,” when he reached 50; and that he had told her about another physician who had deliberately permitted a slipped disc to degenerate so he could claim disability benefits.
The trial court found that during their marriage the Elfmonts had bought 80 percent of their first disability insurance policy (providing $4,000 a month in benefits) as a replacement for husband’s income if he became disabled, and that these benefits were thus his separate property. With regard to the remaining 20 percent of that policy (providing benefits of $1,000 per month) and the couple’s other two disability insurance policies (each providing benefits of $2,000 per month)—all bought after husband had injured his back in 1980 or 1981—the court found that the parties purchased the disability insurance to provide retirement income, rather than to replace earnings, and that therefore the benefits were community property. Consequently, the court awarded the wife half of these benefits, amounting to $2,500 per month. The court ordered the community to reimburse husband for the separate funds he expended to renew the “community portion” of the policies. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that all of the disability benefits were husband’s separate property.
II
In In re Marriage of Stenquist (1978) 21 Cal.3d 779 (148 Cal.Rptr. 9, 582 P.2d 96] (hereafter Stenquist), we addressed the issue of whether the military *1046disability pension of a husband should be treated as community or as separate property. The husband married six years after joining the Army. Three years after the marriage, he suffered an injury that resulted in amputation of his left arm, but he chose to stay in the service and did not retire until seventeen years later. At that time, he elected to receive a disability pension at 75 percent of his basic pay, in lieu of a retirement pension at 65 percent of basic pay.
In a subsequent court proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, the husband contended that the disability pension was his separate property. In support, he cited this court’s decisions in In re Marriage of Jones (1975) 13 Cal.3d 457 [119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420] and In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838 [126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561]. Jones held that a military person’s right to disability benefits, acquired before earning a “vested” right to ordinary retirement benefits, was separate property. The next year, in Brown, we held that retirement benefits earned during the marriage, irrespective of whether they were “vested” or “nonvested” at the time of separation, were valuable community assets deserving of judicial protection.
We concluded in Stenquist that neither Jones nor Brown lent support to the husband’s claim in Stenquist that the disability pension was his separate property. We said: “Looking beneath the label of a ‘disability’ pension, . . . the trial court found that only the excess of the ‘disability’ pension rights over the alternative ‘retirement’ pension represented additional compensation attributable to husband’s disability; the balance of the pension rights acquired during the marriage, it ruled, served to replace ordinary ‘retirement’ pay and thus must be classed as a community asset. [¶] We agree with the reasoning of the trial court; to permit the husband, by unilateral election of a ‘disability’ pension, to ‘transmute community property into his own separate property’ (In re Marriage of Fithian [(1974)] 10 Cal.3d 592, 602 [111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449]), is to negate the protective philosophy of the community property law as set out in previous decisions of this court. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court apportioning husband’s pension rights between separate and community assets and dividing the community interest equally between the spouses.” (Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 782-783, fn. omitted.)
As we later explained in Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pages 858-859, our decision in Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d 779, articulated two rationales in affirming the trial court’s disposition: “First, [Stenquist] held that it could not ‘permit the serviceman’s election of a “disability” pension to defeat the community interest in his right to a pension based on longevity.’ (Stenquist, *1047supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 786.) Such a result would ‘violate the settled principle that one spouse cannot, by invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat the community interest of the other spouse.’ (Ibid.) It would unjustly deprive the wife of a valuable property right ‘ “simply because a misleading label has been affixed to [the] husband’s pension fund benefits.” ’ (Id., at pp. 786-787.) [¶] Second, the Stenquist court discussed the purposes of a military disability pension. Such tensions were said to function in part to compensate the veteran for lost earnings and personal suffering caused by the disability. To that extent they were held to constitute separate property. (Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 787-788.) [¶] However, the court recognized that a ‘disability’ pension received later in life might function principally as a retirement pension. (Ibid.) Indeed, the court found that the ‘primary objective’ of the disability pension in Stenquist was to provide retirement support. Therefore, it held that the portion of the disability pension that was equivalent to the regular retirement pension was community property. (Id., at pp. 788-789.)”
Applying to the facts of Saslow the rationale of Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d 779, we concluded that when disability insurance is purchased to replace a disabled spouse’s lost earnings, any postseparation disability benefits are the disabled spouse’s separate property. (Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 860-861.) Benefits under the disability insurance policy, if acquired with community funds, become community property only if the benefits were intended to provide the marital couple with retirement income. (Ibid.) Pointing out that under California law a retirement pension is community property to the extent that it was paid for with community funds, Saslow held that disability benefits intended to take the place of retirement benefits should be treated the same way.4 To do otherwise, we observed, would deprive the nondisabled spouse of a valuable property right simply because the benefits received were given the “misleading label” of disability rather than retirement benefits. (Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 860.)
We acknowledged in Saslow that the “purpose” analysis articulated in Stenquist, supra, 21 Cal.3d 779, would in some cases be difficult to apply,
*1048citing the factual scenario in Saslow itself as a prime example. But, expressing faith in the ability of experienced trial judges to make difficult factual determinations, we concluded in Saslow that Stenquist’s “purpose” or “primary objective” analysis would lead to “the most equitable distribution of disability insurance benefits.” (Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 860-861.)
The facts of this case are almost identical to those of Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848. The only difference is that in Saslow the disabled husband retired and began receiving benefits under the disability policy before he and his wife separated, while here the disabled husband started drawing disability benefits three years after he and his wife had separated. The majority regards this difference as significant. I do not.
As I have pointed out previously, the marital community retains a post-separation interest in a spouse’s retirement pension that has not vested at the time of separation. (In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838.) In my view, there is a similar community interest in a noncancelable term disability insurance policy which was purchased by the marital community for the primary purpose of providing retirement income, from which no benefits are being drawn at the time of separation. In either case, the marital community looks to the pension or the insurance as a source for retirement funds. In each situation, the community’s interest is contingent: at the time of dissolution there is no assurance that any insurance or pension benefits will ever be paid to either spouse. In each case, accrual of benefits depends on the actions of one spouse: unless the spouse carrying the disability insurance continues to pay the premiums on the policy, no benefits on the policy will be paid, and unless the spouse eligible for the pension continues employment at the job until the pension vests, no pension benefits will be paid (In re Marriage of Foster (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1068, 1072-1074 [227 Cal.Rptr. 446]).
Because, as just explained, disability insurance purchased as a substitute for retirement benefits shares the same purpose and essential characteristics of a pension, it should be treated the same as a pension under our community property system, regardless of when the benefits on the pension or the disability insurance policy are first paid. Thus, the rule this court enunciated in In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838—that postseparation retirement benefits are community property to the extent those benefits are attributable to the community—should apply with equal force to postseparation disability benefits that the parties intended as retirement income, even when no disability benefits are paid until after the spouses have separated. For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that this case is governed by this court’s decision in Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848.
*1049The majority seeks to distinguish Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, and holds that the disability payments in this case are husband’s separate property. The majority reasons that the community’s interest in the noncancelable term disability insurance policies ended upon expiration of the last term for which the premiums were paid with community funds. The majority points out that although husband thereafter continued to renew the policies, he did so with his separate funds, and although he may have done so for the purpose of providing himself with retirement income, he no longer desired to provide the community with such income. Accordingly, the majority concludes, the community had no interest in any benefits under the policy when the disability causing husband’s retirement from his medical practice occurred after the expiration of the last term of disability coverage that was purchased with community funds. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 1034-1035.)
The majority’s reasoning is based on a fallacious premise: By holding that the marital community’s interest in husband’s disability insurance policy expired when the last term paid for with community funds ended, the majority treats noncancelable term disability insurance as if it merely provides the insured party with coverage for a discrete period of time. In so doing, however, the majority ignores a critical aspect of such insurance. Noncancelable term disability insurance not only provides the insured with benefits if a disability arises during the term covered by the policy; equally important, it also gives the insured the right to continue to renew the policy, with no increase in premiums, even if the insured has since inception of the policy developed a medical condition that may render him or her uninsurable. Depending on the insured’s condition, the right of renewal can be as valuable, or even more valuable, than the disability coverage for the term covered by the policy, because it provides assurance of coverage, regardless of medical condition.
This case provides a good illustration of the value of the right of renewal. As mentioned earlier, in 1985 or 1986 a CAT scan showed that husband had a large herniated disc in his back. The existence of that condition, if revealed to the insurer, would most likely have made the insurer quite reluctant to cover husband for disability arising from problems with his back; it is a virtual certainty that any company willing to insure him under these circumstances would have charged substantially higher premiums than those paid on the disability insurance policies purchased by the community at a time when husband could truthfully state that he was unaware of having any serious back injury. In all likelihood, it was only the right of renewal, paid for with community funds, that enabled husband to insure himself for the period in which he suffered the additional back injury that led to his retirement, thus enabling him to receive the disability benefits at issue in this case.
*1050Although there is no California decision dealing with the precise issue presented here—whether the marital community retains a postseparation interest in noncancelable term disability insurance originally purchased with community funds—the question of whether the community retains an interest in term life insurance that is initially purchased with community funds but is thereafter renewed with separate funds has been addressed in a number of opinions. Most have held that the community retains a postseparation interest in the policy, so long as the right of renewal is valuable. (Bowman v. Bowman (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 148, 159-160 [217 Cal.Rptr. 174]; In re Marriage of Gonzalez (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1021 [214 Cal.Rptr. 634]; Biltoft v. Wootten (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 58 [157 Cal.Rptr. 581]; Modern Woodmen of America v. Gray (1931) 113 Cal.App. 729 [299 P. 754]; but see In re Marriage of Spengler (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 288 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 764] [renewal right a mere “expectancy”]; In re Marriage of Lorenz (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 464 [194 Cal.Rptr. 237] [term life insurance not a community asset because it lacks cash surrender value].) The same should be true of the disability insurance policy in this case.
According to the majority, term disability insurance and term life insurance have different purposes and therefore should be treated differently. Term life insurance, the majority asserts, is intended to offset the economic consequences of the insured’s death, while term disability insurance “is to replace lost earnings.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1034].) This asserted purpose of disability insurance is at odds with this court’s statement in Saslow, supra, 40 Cal.3d 848, that an insured may purchase disability insurance not to replace lost earnings but to provide retirement income. The majority does not explain how its approach can be reconciled with Saslow, perhaps because it is unable to do so.
For the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the trial court properly found that $5,000 per month in disability benefits that were intended to provide retirement income should not be treated as husband’s separate property. The trial court, however, erred when it concluded that all of those benefits were community property. Those benefits are in part attributable to husband’s postseparation renewal of the insurance with his separate funds, and the trial court’s order that the community pay husband the amount of the premiums paid with his separate property does not adequately compensate husband for his separate interest in the insurance benefits. A retirement pension paid for partly with community and partly with separate funds would be subject to apportionment. (In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 848; see also Biltoft v. Wootten, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 62 [apportioning term life insurance].) Similarly, in this case the trial court should have apportioned the benefits based on the contributions of the *1051community and of husband’s separate property from the time the community first purchased the policies. The majority of the premiums were paid with community funds; accordingly, a corresponding percentage of the benefits should be community property.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

 Term insurance provides coverage for a certain period, or term. The insurance expires at the end of the term if the insured does not renew the policy by paying another premium. So-called “noncancelable” term disability insurance may not be canceled by the insurer so long as the insured continues to pay premiums on the policy. (See Ins. Code, § 10273 [defining noncancelable insurance]; 2 Cal, Insurance Law & Practice (1995) §§ 25.04[2], 26.05[13] [discussing renewability of disability insurance].)

 The majority states that husband alone purchased the insurance. Although he may have filled out the application for the insurance, the policy premiums were paid for with community funds. It is therefore more accurate to state that the community purchased the policy.

 It is unclear from the record how many separate disability insurance policies the couple ultimately carried. Husband’s insurance broker testified that the couple had three policies, one *1045providing benefits of $5,000 per month and each of the other two providing benefits of $2,000 per month. Only two policies, however, were admitted into evidence, one providing benefits of $7,000 per month and the other providing benefits of $2,000 per month. The trial court and the parties proceeded under the assumption that there were three policies, as described by the broker; I shall do the same.

 A married couple may purchase disability insurance for the purpose of providing retirement benefits when, as in this case, the insured spouse suffers from a degenerative condition which, the couple believes, is likely to ultimately cause the insured spouse to retire. Although the concurring opinion by Justice Baxter asserts that it is “preposterous” to expect that an insurance company will provide insurance to a person with such a condition (conc, opn., ante, p. 1037]), an insurance company may be contractually obligated to do so under an agreement to offer disability insurance to ¿11 employees of a company for which an insured is employed. Alternatively, an insurance company may believe that the insured’s condition will not cause his or her retirement until the amount of the premiums exceeds the present value of the amount it will ultimately pay out in benefits. In any event, in this case the insurer did insure husband, and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision that husband and wife bought the insurance to provide them with retirement benefits.