Court Opinion

ID: 9957456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 16:01:11.201221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:20.752822
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2114     Document: 010111026780       Date Filed: 04/04/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           April 4, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                         No. 23-2114
                                                (D.C. No. 1:17-CR-03338-JMC-SCY-4)
  GEORGE LOWE,                                                (D. N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.**
                  _________________________________

       Defendant-Appellant George Lowe appeals from the district court’s denial of

 his motion to dismiss an indictment as untimely and the denial of his request for an

 evidentiary hearing. Aplt. App. at 193, 222–32. Indicted on November 28, 2017,

 along with three codefendants, Mr. Lowe was charged with one count of conspiracy

 to defraud the government with respect to claims, 18 U.S.C. § 286; one count of

 conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349; and eighteen counts of

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
        **
           After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellate Case: 23-2114    Document: 010111026780        Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 2

 false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims, 18 U.S.C. § 287, and aiding and abetting the

 same, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). Aplt. App. 22, 50–56, 61–64. Mr. Lowe entered a

 conditional guilty plea as to the first count. Id. at 238–52. The district court

 sentenced Mr. Lowe to the lesser of one day’s imprisonment or time served and three

 years’ supervised release and ordered him to pay over $1.2 million in restitution. Id.

 at 270–71, 274. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

                                      Background

       The alleged fraudulent activity in this case concerned funding for the Big

 Crow Program Office (“BCPO”), a U.S. Army warfare assessment program based at

 Kirtland Air Force Base. Aplt. App. 22. The BCPO was originally funded by the

 Army, but after funding diminished, it received funds on a reimbursement basis and

 through supplemental Congressional appropriations. Id. at 22–23. The indictment

 alleged that beginning around 2004 and continuing through 2009, codefendant Milton

 Boutte, BCPO Director, conspired with Mr. Lowe and others to charge thousands of

 dollars for Mr. Lowe’s lobbying efforts on behalf of the BCPO, even though it had no

 funding or authorization for lobbying. Id. at 23.

       Mr. Lowe agreed to lobby government officials for BCPO funding, initially

 charging $15,000 per month and later demanding higher amounts. Id. at 31. To pay

 Mr. Lowe, other codefendants fraudulently obtained contracts under the Small

 Business Act Business Development Program on behalf of two business entities

 owned by codefendants (Miratek Corporation and Vartek, LLC). Id. at 23. Although

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 the funds were allocated to each business through the program to provide technical

 support to the BCPO, codefendants improperly diverted funds to pay for Mr. Lowe’s

 unauthorized lobbying, representing that Mr. Lowe was a “project manager” of each

 business entity. Id. at 30–33, 36–37, 48–49. Mr. Lowe submitted invoices for

 fraudulent hours of work to these entities as part of the conspiracy with codefendants.

 Id. at 33, 49, 241–42.

       After being indicted in November 2017, Mr. Lowe filed a motion to dismiss

 the indictment for pre-indictment delay. Id. at 68–85. Mr. Lowe argued that under

 the Due Process Clause he was prejudiced by the government’s eight-year delay in

 bringing charges because: (1) he could not subpoena members of Congress and their

 staffs to “substantiate his legitimate and lawful activity” as many members were

 either dead or no longer in office; (2) he could not access certain financial documents

 to show that he only received $1.2 million for lobbying, not the amount alleged by

 the government (over $3 million); and (3) critical witnesses were no longer available

 because of the passage of time. Id. at 68–72. He also requested an evidentiary

 hearing to show that the government’s delay in bringing charges was unnecessary and

 was instead “for the purpose of benefitting the government.” Id. at 83–85. Finally,

 Mr. Lowe made arguments regarding the statute of limitations, id. at 75–78, but he

 does not raise them here, conceding that his alleged criminal conduct falls within the

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 statute of limitations.1

        On August 21, 2018, the district court denied Mr. Lowe’s motion to dismiss

 the indictment. Id. at 232. First, while the district court assumed without deciding

 that Mr. Lowe could show actual prejudice, it found that his Due Process claim failed

 because he could not “establish that the government intentionally or recklessly

 delayed bringing the indictment[.]” Id. at 228. Second, the district court denied Mr.

 Lowe’s request for an evidentiary hearing because it was based on “bare-bones

 assertions” that the government had “no apparent reason” to wait so long to bring an

 indictment and failed to make specific or nonconjectural allegations about what facts

 an evidentiary hearing would uncover. Id. at 229–30. Finally, the district court

 rejected Mr. Lowe’s statute of limitations arguments. Id. at 222–26.

                                       Discussion

        We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for pre-indictment

 delay for abuse of discretion. United States v. Garcia, 74 F.4th 1073, 1094–95 (10th

 Cir. 2023) (omitting subsequent denials of certiorari). We also review the district

 court’s denial of a request for an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. United

        1
         In his “Statement of the Issues,” Mr. Lowe raises the question of whether 18
 U.S.C. § 3287 and the 2001 Congressional authorization of use of military force
 extend the statute of limitations for fraud “without limitation[.]” Aplt. Br. at 2–3.
 However, later in his brief, Mr. Lowe stated he “does not contest the district court’s
 reasoning that the statute of limitation for the crimes alleged against him were tolled
 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3287 and a November 28, 2017 indictment would be
 otherwise timely.” Aplt. Br. at 7. Therefore, we do not consider this issue.
                                            4
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 States v. Pearl, 324 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003).

    A. Preindictment Delay

        To prove a Due Process violation based on preindictment delay, the defendant

 must show (1) actual prejudice resulting from the delay and (2) that the government

 purposefully designed the delay to gain a tactical advantage or harass the defendant.

 Garcia, 74 F.4th at 1096. The first factor, actual prejudice, “is generally a necessary

 but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and [] the due process inquiry must

 consider the reasons for the delay as well[.]” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.

 783, 790 (1977); United States v. Koch, 444 F. App’x 293, 297 (10th Cir. 2011).

 Upon the defendant’s prima facie showing of fact that a violation occurred, the

 burden shifts to the government to present evidence that the delay was properly

 motivated and justified. Garcia, 74 F.4th at 1096. The defendant bears the ultimate

 burden of showing the Due Process violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

        After assuming without deciding that Mr. Lowe could show actual prejudice,

 the district court denied Mr. Lowe’s Due Process claim because he failed to

 demonstrate that, under the second factor, the government purposefully or recklessly

 delayed in bringing the indictment. Aplt. App. 228.2 We agree that Mr. Lowe failed

        2
          The district court’s order stated that the second factor could be satisfied if the
 prosecutorial delay was either intentional or “incurred in reckless disregard of
 circumstances, known to the prosecution, suggesting that there existed an appreciable
 risk that delay would impair the ability to mount an effective defense.” Aplt. App.
 227 (quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795 n.17). The Supreme Court has seemingly
 approved the reckless standard, but this circuit has declined to explicitly adopt it.
 See Garcia, 74 F.4th at 1097. It is of no moment in this case because the district
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 to make a prima facie showing of purposeful delay, consequently, we do not consider

 whether Mr. Lowe has shown actual prejudice.

        Mr. Lowe cannot demonstrate that the government acted intentionally in

 bringing about the delay. In fact, Mr. Lowe’s brief makes little argument regarding

 the second factor. Aplt. Br. at 9–11. Mr. Lowe’s brief states that “investigative

 agents knew that the delay with an indictment would significantly increase the risk to

 Mr. Lowe in his ability to mount an effective defense” and that “the government . . .

 recklessly paid no attention to the clock[.]” Id. at 11. But he does not support these

 contentions with any facts from the record or with legal authority. See Fed. R. App.

 P. 28(a)(8)(A) (appellant’s brief must contain “contentions and the reasons for them,

 with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant

 relies”).3

        Although Mr. Lowe bears the initial burden of demonstrating intentional delay,

 the government offered specific reasons for its delay before the district court —

 primarily, that the allegations in the indictment were complex, involving a fraudulent

 scheme with multiple defendants and business entities, and that the acquisition of

 court concluded that the defendant failed to show preindictment delay under any
 standard — as do we.
        3
          Given the lack of factual or legal development, we have discretion to
 consider Mr. Lowe’s argument regarding the second factor waived because it
 “consist[s] of little more than generalized and conclusory statements” and “makes no
 attempt to engage with the district court’s reasoning[.]” United States v. Walker, 918
 F.3d 1134, 1152–53 (10th Cir. 2019); see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Although the
 district court denied Mr. Lowe’s Due Process claim solely on the second factor, Mr.
 Lowe’s brief does not engage with the district court’s reasoning.
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 documents from multiple government and grand jury subpoenas took time. See Aplt.

 App. 230–31. Mr. Lowe offers no evidence or argument to rebut the government’s

 reasonable explanation, beyond suggesting that government agents (not specifically

 named) knew that the passage of time would affect Mr. Lowe’s defense. This does

 not suffice to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in evaluating

 this issue.

    B. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

         “[S]peculation . . . is an insufficient basis for requiring an evidentiary

 hearing.” United States v. Sutton, 767 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1985); see also

 United States v. Coleman, 149 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Evidentiary hearings

 are warranted only when the allegations . . . are sufficiently definite, specific and

 non-conjectural and detailed enough to enable the court to conclude that a substantial

 claim is presented and that there are disputed issues of material fact which will affect

 the outcome of the motion.”). At various points throughout his briefing, Mr. Lowe

 contends that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to flesh out evidence showing how

 he was prejudiced and that the government’s delay was intentional. Aplt. Br. at 8,

 10–11; Aplt. Reply Br. at 6. But he fails to point out what specific evidence would

 tend to support either actual prejudice or intentional/reckless delay. Mr. Lowe’s

 argument is wholly speculative, and we find no abuse of discretion in the district

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Appellate Case: 23-2114   Document: 010111026780         Date Filed: 04/04/2024   Page: 8

 court’s decision to deny an evidentiary hearing.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Paul J. Kelly, Jr
                                            Circuit Judge

                                           8