Court Opinion

ID: 9882461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:09.080015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:38.859053
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Townhouses of Catalpa v. Griffith, 2023-Ohio-2971.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 THE TOWNEHOUSES OF CATALPA                             :
 PHASE I CONDOMINIUM OWNERS'                            :
 ASSOCIATION                                            :      C.A. No. 29683
                                                        :
       Appellees                                        :      Trial Court Case No. 2021 CV 03160
                                                        :
 v.                                                     :      (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                        :      Court)
 GERRY GRIFFITH AKA GERRY E.                            :
 GRIFFITH, ET AL.                                       :

       Appellant

                                                ...........

                                                OPINION

                                     Rendered on August 25, 2023

                                                ...........

GERRY E. GRIFFITH, Pro Se Appellant

MICHELLE L. POLLY-MURPHY, MAGDALENA E. MYERS, & DARCY MEHLING GOOD,
Attorneys for Appellees

                                              .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Gerry Griffith appeals from a judgment of the
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Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas that granted a motion for summary

judgment and entered a decree of foreclosure relating to his condominium unit. While

this appeal was pending, Griffith paid the underlying judgment. This action has rendered

Griffith’s appeal moot. The appeal, accordingly, will be dismissed.

   I.      Facts and Course of Proceedings

        {¶ 2} On August 4, 2021, Plaintiff-Appellee The Townehouses of Catalpa Phase I

Condominium Owners’ Association (“the Association”) commenced a foreclosure action

against Griffith, the Montgomery County Treasurer, and Universal 1 Credit Union.

According to the complaint for foreclosure, Griffith owned a condominium unit and owed

maintenance fees, common expenses, and assessments. As a result, the Association

filed certificates of liens on the property.   The Association sought $12,188.26 plus

interest pursuant to R.C. 1343.03, as provided in the Declaration of Condominium

Ownership, as well as maintenance fees and assessments incurred after the filing of the

action, attorney fees, and court costs. The Association requested that all liens on the

property be marshaled and the premises be ordered appraised, advertised, and sold

according to law.

        {¶ 3} Griffith filed an answer in which he admitted that he owned the condominium

unit at issue but denied the remainder of the allegations within the complaint.        The

Association filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied on May 5,

2022. According to the trial court, the Association had failed in its motion to point to any

evidence showing it had a lien on interest, collection costs, attorney fees, enforcement
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assessments, or paralegal fees. Further, the trial court found that genuine issues of

material fact remained as to the amount Griffith owed the Association.

       {¶ 4} On August 19, 2022, the Association filed a renewed motion for summary

judgment, which the trial court granted. On November 30, 2022, the trial court entered

judgment for the Association in the amount of $19,921.03 plus 3% interest from August

14, 2022, “subject to automatic subsequent adjustments reflecting any additional unpaid

interest, administrative late fees, enforcement assessments, collection costs, attorney’s

fees, paralegal fees, and court costs[.]” The trial court also found that the Association

was entitled to foreclose on the property.

       {¶ 5} On December 30, 2022, Griffith filed a timely notice of appeal. While the

appeal was pending, a sheriff’s sale was scheduled for February 24, 2023. On February

15, 2023, Griffith filed a motion to stay the sale. On February 20, 2023, the Association

filed a motion to withdraw the sheriff’s sale and a motion to vacate the judgment entry

and dismiss the case. On February 24, 2023, the trial court issued an order vacating the

judgment entry and dismissing the case.

       {¶ 6} After receiving several extensions of time, Griffith filed his appellate brief on

May 15, 2023.     The Association then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal due to

mootness and a motion for an extension of time in which to file its appellate brief, pending

resolution of its motion to dismiss. According to the Association’s motion to dismiss, the

issues raised by Griffith in his appeal were moot, because he had failed to stay the trial

court’s judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 62 and had voluntarily paid the entire judgment

amount during the pendency of this appeal.
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         {¶ 7} On June 14, 2023, we issued an order overruling the Association’s motion to

dismiss Griffith’s appeal. We stated, in part:

                In the instant appeal, the trial court’s order vacating the judgment on

         appeal interferes with this court’s ability to adjudicate the appellate issues

         between the parties. The Association did not request a remand so that this

         court might relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court. Thus, the trial court’s

         order vacating the judgment on appeal is a nullity. It provides no basis for

         dismissal.

                However, insofar as the Association argues that Griffith’s voluntary

         satisfaction of a valid judgment renders the instant appeal moot, arguments

         about mootness may be made in the Association’s brief and will be decided

         upon submission of the briefs to a merit panel. Griffith may respond to the

         Association’s mootness arguments in his reply brief.

         {¶ 8} The Association then filed its appellate brief in which it raised the mootness

argument again and responded to the merits of Griffith’s argument on appeal. Griffith

did not file a reply brief.

   II.      Griffith’s Voluntary Payment of the Underlying Judgment Rendered This

            Appeal Moot

         {¶ 9} Since the issue is dispositive, we will confine our analysis to the issue of

mootness. Civ.R. 62(B) states the following:

                When an appeal is taken the appellant may obtain a stay of execution
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       of a judgment or any proceedings to enforce a judgment by giving an

       adequate supersedeas bond. The bond may be given at or after the time of

       filing the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond

       is approved by the court.

Thus, an appellant is entitled to a stay of execution of a judgment pending appeal if the

appellant posts the supersedeas bond in the amount established by the trial court.

Taylor v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28242, 2019-Ohio-2132, ¶ 7.

       {¶ 10} Griffith did not post a supersedeas bond. Although he filed a February 15,

2023 motion to stay the foreclosure sale, he voluntarily paid the entire judgment before

the trial court ruled upon his motion. “It is a well-established principle of law that a

satisfaction of judgment renders an appeal from that judgment moot.”               Blodgett v.

Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 245, 551 N.E.2d 1249 (1990). “Where the court rendering

judgment has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and of the parties, and fraud

has not intervened, and the judgment is voluntarily paid and satisfied, such payment puts

an end to the controversy, and takes away from the defendant the right to appeal or

prosecute error or even to move for vacation of judgment.” Lynch v. Bd. of Edn. of City

School Dist. of City of Lakewood, 116 Ohio St. 361, 156 N.E. 188 (1927), paragraph three

of the syllabus. “The rationale behind this general rule is that a reversal of the trial court's

judgment, after full voluntary payment has been made, would not offer any relief to the

appellant[.]” Poppa Builders, Inc. v. Campbell, 118 Ohio App.3d 251, 253, 692 N.E.2d

647 (2d Dist.1997).

       {¶ 11} In its appellate brief, the Association notes that Griffith paid the judgment in
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full on February 20, 2023. Appellee’s Brief, p. 6, citing Appellant’s Brief, p. 7. Attached

as one of the exhibits to Griffith’s appellate brief is a copy of a February 17, 2023 check

made out for $28,059.27 to “THE TOWNHOUSES OF CATALPA PHASE I

CONDOMINIUM OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION RE: GERRY E GRIFFITH.” Below the copy

of the check is a stamp noting that the check was received on February 20, 2023. There

is a handwritten note by the stamp that states “Payment in full.”

       {¶ 12} While Griffith’s February 15, 2023 motion to stay the foreclosure sale and

the February 17, 2023 check were not part of the record transmitted to us on appeal, we

have taken judicial notice of the trial court’s docket in this case to have a full and complete

picture of the mootness issue. See Pewitt v. Lorain Corr. Inst., 64 Ohio St.3d 470, 472,

597 N.E.2d 92 (1992) (“[A]n event that causes a case to become moot may be proved by

extrinsic evidence outside the record.”). The copy of the check attached to Griffith’s

appellate brief, along with the Association’s representation that the judgment has been

paid in full, establish that the underlying judgment was satisfied in full while the appeal

was pending before us.

       {¶ 13} There is no evidence in the record that Griffith’s payment to the Association

was not voluntary.     While we recognize that Griffith likely felt pressure to pay the

judgment rather than risk losing his property, we have previously held that “[c]ollection

efforts, an appellant’s financial circumstances, or other economic considerations do not

make an appellant’s full satisfaction of a judgment involuntary.”         (Citations omitted.)

Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28242, 2019-Ohio-2132, at ¶ 10. Due to Griffith’s

voluntary payment of the underlying judgment, we must conclude that his appeal is moot.
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  III.      Conclusion

         {¶ 14} Having concluded that Griffith’s appeal is moot, we will dismiss the appeal.

                                       .............

TUCKER, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.