Court Opinion

ID: 9585171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:57:10.114066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:24.242869
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in the last paragraph of the majority opinion here and in the judgment of affirmance since the contractor was sued and judgment obtained in accordance with law. An in rem proceeding was then commenced against the property more than two years after the judgment was obtained against the contractor. Under the earlier interpretations by the Supreme Court of Code Ann. § 67-2002 prior to the 1968 amendment (Ga. L. 1968, p. 317), this procedure was proper. See such cases as Southern R. Co. v. Crawford & Slaten Co., 178 Ga. 450 (173 SE 378), and others citing this case.
However, I am not perfectly satisfied with the majority interpretation of Code Ann. § 67-2002 as *360amended by Ga. L. 1968, p. 317 et seq. Hence, I specially concur.
I agree fully with the statement in the opinion that we have been cast into a legal thicket in regards to the meaning of the amendment in Ga. L. 1968. That Act clearly stated in the amending clause that it was amended "so as to provide that any lien enforced directly against the property so improved shall be brought within twelve (12) months from the time such material, services, labor or supplies were furnished.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thereafter, it would appear from the body of the Act that the same 12 months required for suit to be filed against the contractor or subcontractor would satisfy the requirements of the law. But in the event the contractor or subcontractor should abscond or die or remove from the state within 12 months from the date the services, labor, supplies or material were furnished so that personal jurisdiction could not be obtained in a suit for said services, labor, material, supplies, or if the contractor or subcontractor had been adjudicated a bankrupt, or, if after filing suit, no final judgment could be obtained against him by reason of his death or adjudication in bankruptcy, then no judgment was necessary against him, and the lien could be enforced directly against the property so improved "in an action against the owner thereof, if filed within 12 months from the time same shall become due.” (Emphasis supplied.) The last language italicized is that which the legislature caused the appellate courts to be put into the legal thicket. However, I note here that in 1977 the General Assembly has since re-written in its entirety Code Ann. § 67-2002 as heretofore amended. See in this connection Ga. L. 1977, pp. 675-679.
This case (sub judice) differs on its facts from those in Whitley Const. Co. v. Carlyle Real Estate Limited-72 Partnership, 137 Ga. App. 113 (222 SE2d 895), and Associated Dist. v. De La Torre, 138 Ga. App. 71 (225 SE2d 462). I see no need to disapprove and overrule same regardless of whether or not they are incorrect. The Whitley case involved a suit first against the materialman after lien had been properly filed against the property and suit timely filed against the contractor. The contractor *361voluntarily bankrupted and the plaintiff materialman was enjoined in his suit against the contractor. A new suit was then filed more than 12 months from the time the same shall become due (the delivery of the goods becoming a part of the realty). This suit was dismissed in the trial court and Associate Justice Marshall, while a judge on this court, concurred in by Chief Judge Bell and Judge Webb, affirmed the judgment. This case differs from the case in question, and even though it may be wrong in its interpretation there is no need to overrule it. The case of Associated Dist. v. De La Torre, supra, is another case written by Justice Marshall, concurred in by Presiding Judge Pannell and Judge Evans, in which the trial court was affirmed in the direction of a verdict for the defendant owner because of lack of privity of contract between the owner and the contractor ordering the supplies. That division of this court in the opinion also referred to the fact that the plaintiff was attempting to enforce the lien against the property owner by commencing same some 17 months after filing of the lien. However, judgment had previously been obtained in which we assume from the opinion that same was filed within the 12-month period. Again this division of the court may be incorrect in its interpretation of the law, but I do not feel that it is necessarily controlling in this instance since the court had already concluded that there was no privitv of contract between the alleged contractor and the owner.
I therefore concur in the judgment only.