Court Opinion

ID: 9352077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 20:06:52.054261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:52.222832
License: Public Domain

J-S27029-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
               v.                           :
                                            :
                                            :
    MARVIN E. HILL                          :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 1535 EDA 2021

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 24, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0005356-2011

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                           FILED JANUARY 4, 2023

        Appellant Marvin E. Hill appeals from the order1 denying his timely first

Post Conviction Relief Act2 (PCRA) petition.        Appellant alleges that the

Commonwealth improperly failed to disclose evidence and that his trial

1 In his July 19, 2021 notice of appeal, Appellant stated that he was appealing
from an order entered on June 24, 2020. On August 19, 2021, this Court
issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as being
from an order that was not entered on the docket. Appellant filed a response
on August 30, 2021, and he explained that the order was in fact entered June
24, 2021, rather than June 24, 2020, and that a typographical error had
occurred. As the docket reflects that the order Appellant challenged was
entered June 24, 2021, and because Appellant filed a timely appeal on July
19, 2021, we are satisfied that the date on the notice of appeal was merely a
typographical error, and we decline to quash the appeal.            See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Fretts, 271 A.3d 383, 387 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal
denied, 281 A.3d 304 (Pa. 2022). We have corrected the caption accordingly.

2   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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counsel was ineffective.     We reverse the PCRA court’s order, vacate

Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and remand for a new trial.

     The PCRA court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

     On January 7, 2010, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to a radio
     call, Officer James Bryan arrived at the 1300 block of Cumberland
     Street and found Stacey Linwood Sharpe, Jr. [(the victim)], lying
     in the street shot. Officer Bryan transported Sharpe to Temple
     University Hospital, where at 10:24 p.m., he died. Sharpe
     suffered two gunshot wounds, one to the back that hit his lung
     and exited through the chest, and the other to the back of the
     right thigh.

     On January 7, 2010, at about 6:30 p.m., Katerina Love was sitting
     at her window in her home on the 1200 block of West Cumberland
     Street when she heard gunshots. She looked out the window and
     saw [Appellant] shoot Sharpe about three or four times and then
     run southbound on 13th Street. Ms. Love described the shooter
     as “dark skin, almost six feet, about 130 pounds, clean shaven,
     maybe 20 or 21-years-old, black pants, a black jacket with a red
     polo horse on it and a black hat with the red polo horse.” Ms.
     Love recognized [Appellant] as a man she had seen nearly every
     day outside of the store on 12th and Cumberland Street.

     On May 11, 2010, Ms. Love identified [Appellant] from a photo
     array. At trial, Ms. Love did not identify [Appellant], testifying
     that she did not remember the incident.

     From the 1200 block of Cumberland Street, officers recovered six,
     nine-millimeter fired cartridge cases [(“FCC”)], one bullet
     specimen and two bullet jackets. According to Police Officer
     Edward Eric Nelson, the six recovered [FCCs] were fired from the
     same firearm and both bullet jackets were fired from the same
     firearm.

     On January 8, 2010, Detective Thorsten Lucke recovered
     surveillance video from a [corner] store located on the 2500 block
     of Sartain Street, a little over a block from the shooting. The video
     recorded the interior of the store, focusing at the door. The video
     showed [Appellant], who was wearing a knit hat with a Polo
     emblem, repeatedly entering and exiting the store for about an
     hour prior to the time of the [shooting]. At 6:31 p.m., Tyree
     Alston, who was visible in the video standing outside of the store,

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     pointed down the street and then walked out of view with a second
     unidentifiable person.

     On April 28, 2010, [then-]Detective Nordo of the Homicide Unit
     was directed by an assigned detective to locate [Appellant],
     [Appellant’s brother,] Michael Hill, and Alston, who had been
     identified from a surveillance video as potential witnesses to the
     homicide. Detective Nordo located [Appellant] and his brother on
     the 2500 block of Sartain Street in Philadelphia. Detective Nordo
     transported [Appellant] to the Police Administration Building
     (“PAB”) in an unmarked minivan, while Michael Hill was
     transported in a separate vehicle.

     At approximately 5:30 p.m., they arrived at the PAB and, pursuant
     to the assigned detective’s instructions, entered the building
     through the rear entrance, the Police Detention Unit (PDU).
     [Appellant] was patted down and taken to the Homicide Unit.
     [Appellant] was seated on a bench in the Homicide Unit and told
     to wait.

     At around 8:30 p.m., Detective Nordo interviewed Michael Hill.
     Michael Hill indicated that on January 7, 2010, at about 6:30 p.m.,
     he was at the store at the corner of Sartain and Cumberland
     Streets, when Sharpe walked by and Alston started following him.
     Michael Hill then saw Alston pull out a gun and shoot Sharpe.
     Subsequently, on May 28, 2010, Michael Hill gave a second
     statement in which he indicated that both [Appellant] and Alston
     followed Sharpe and then he heard gunshots. The next day,
     [Appellant] told Michael Hill that he and Alston had shot Sharpe.
     On April 28, 2010, upon conclusion of Michael Hill’s interview,
     which ended well past Detective Nordo’s shift, Detective Nordo left
     the PAB.

     On April 29, 2010, at 12:10 p.m., for reasons unknown to the
     [c]ourt, [Appellant] was placed in a cell in the PDU. He remained
     in the cell for approximately fifteen minutes. At 12:25 p.m.,
     [Appellant] was checked out of the PDU cell and taken back to the
     Homicide Unit.

     Detective   Nordo arrived back at the Homicide Unit in the early
     afternoon   and found [Appellant] sitting at a desk. At 1:55 p.m.,
     Detective   Nordo began taking [Appellant’s] statement. Because
     Detective    Nordo believed that at all times [Appellant] was

                                    -3-
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        considered and being treated as a witness, he did not give
        [Appellant] Miranda[3] warnings.

        Detective Nordo credibly testified that [Appellant] was never
        placed in handcuffs, neither when transported in the police vehicle
        nor while at the PAB.        [Appellant] at all times appeared
        cooperative and forthcoming with information during his
        interview. After [Appellant] gave his statement he was free to
        leave and did so.

        [Appellant] testified that during the motion hearing that in
        January of 2010 he had been brought into the PAB as a witness in
        the same homicide investigation and he stayed at the PAB for
        three days while he was interviewed before he was released. This
        [c]ourt credited this testimony and [Appellant]’s testimony that
        on April 29, 2010, after he was informed of his brother’s
        statement, he decided to give a similar statement himself.

        On May 27, 2010, Tyree Alston gave a statement to police. Alston
        explained that on January 7, 2010, [Appellant], Michael Hill,
        himself and others were hanging around the store on Sartain and
        Cumberland Streets. [Appellant] saw Sharpe and told Alston that
        Sharpe owed [Appellant] money. [Appellant] then ran after
        Sharpe and shot him. [Appellant] and Alston then went back to
        [Appellant’s] home, where [Appellant] explained that he shot
        Sharpe because, “[i]f [he] let him get away with keeping [his]
        package, then anyone else would do it.” On July 21, 2011, Alston
        sent [Appellant] a letter apologizing for giving the statement to
        police and indicated that his statement was a lie. At trial, Alston
        testified that it was two unidentified males who actually shot
        Sharpe, not [Appellant].

        On May 31, 2010, Detective Sean Mellon of the Fugitive Squad
        began attempting to locate [Appellant]. On February 15, 2011,
        [Appellant] was arrested at his aunt’s house at 1913 East Orleans
        Street.

        At trial, Vincent Carter testified on behalf of [Appellant]. On
        January 7, 2010, at 6:30 p.m., Carter was driving on 13th Street
        and turned onto Cumberland Street. When Carter turned onto
        Cumberland, he saw one person shooting another person. Carter
        described the shooter as wearing a hoodie, skull cap, jeans and
        boots.

3   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

                                       -4-
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PCRA Ct. Op. & Order, 6/24/21, at 3-5 (citations omitted).

        The matter proceeded to a three-day bench trial on January 22, 2013.

At trial, Appellant was represented by Gerald Stein, Esq. (Attorney Stein or

trial counsel). Ultimately, the trial court convicted Appellant of third-degree

murder, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on a public

street in Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime.4 On April 5,

2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of sixteen and

one-half to forty-three years of imprisonment.5,6 Appellant did not file any

post-sentence motions. Appellant filed a timely direct appeal, and on March

13, 2014, this Court dismissed the appeal because Appellant failed to preserve

any issues for appellate review. Commonwealth v. Hill, No. 1375 EDA 2013,

2014 WL 10979724 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 13, 2014) (unpublished judgment

order) (Hill I).

        Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on July 16, 2014. The PCRA

court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition raising direct appeal

counsel’s ineffectiveness.   The PCRA court ultimately dismissed Appellant’s

4   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 6106(a)(1), 6108, and 907(a), respectively.

5  Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to fifteen to forty years of
imprisonment for third-degree murder, and a consecutive term of one and
one-half to three years of imprisonment for carrying a firearm without a
license. The trial court did not impose any further penalty for carrying a
firearm on a public street in Philadelphia and possession of an instrument of
crime.

6 The charge of intentionally failing to relinquish a firearm to a sheriff as
required by order was nolle prossed.

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petition on December 22, 2015.      On appeal, this Court affirmed the PCRA

court’s order. However, on April 11, 2017, our Supreme Court reversed this

Court’s ruling and remanded the case with instructions. Commonwealth v.

Hill, 149 A.3d 362 (Pa. Super. 2016) (Hill II), appeal granted, order rev’d,

168 A.3d 1248 (Pa. 2017) (Hill III) (per curiam order).          Following the

Supreme Court’s directive in Hill III, this Court remanded the matter for the

trial court to reinstate Appellant’s post-sentence and direct appeal rights nunc

pro tunc. Commonwealth v. Hill, No. 60 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 3017086 (Pa.

Super. filed July 17, 2017) (unpublished mem.) (Hill IV).

      On remand, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc,

arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Specifically,

Appellant claimed that there was no physical evidence that connected

Appellant to the offenses and that the three eyewitnesses to the incident were

not credible. See Post-Sentence Mot., 7/21/17, at 1. The trial court denied

Appellant’s motion on July 24, 2017.         On appeal, this Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Hill, No. 2579 EDA

2017, 2018 WL 6259235 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 30, 2018) (unpublished mem.)

(Hill V). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme

Court, which he discontinued on March 28, 2019.

      On March 29, 2019, Appellant filed a counseled, timely first7 PCRA

petition. On October 8, 2020, following a joint motion filed by Appellant and

7 Because our Supreme Court restored Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc
pro tunc, the instant PCRA petition is considered a “first” PCRA petition. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013).

                                     -6-
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the Commonwealth, the PCRA court visited the crime scene, accompanied by

counsel for both parties.    Appellant subsequently filed an amended PCRA

petition.   Therein, Appellant raised a Brady8 claim based on previously

undisclosed exculpatory evidence that he discovered while reviewing the

Commonwealth’s file. Am. PCRA Pet., 10/20/20, at 27-31.

        The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on January 29, 2021, during

which Appellant presented the following previously undisclosed evidence: a

full-length Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) report, which was more detailed

than the version used at trial; 911 calls from the time of the shooting; and

the victim’s cell phone records. N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 1/29/21, at 35-47. The PCRA

court reconvened the evidentiary hearing on March 23, 2021, during which

the parties presented evidence regarding radio communications between

officers on the date of the murder, video surveillance footage of Appellant,

and Appellant’s interactions with former Detective Nordo. N.T. PCRA Hr’g,

3/23/21. During the third day of the evidentiary hearing on April 1, 2021, it

was confirmed that Appellant’s trial counsel never received the 911 calls or

the victim’s cell phone records from the Commonwealth.        N.T. PCRA Hr’g,

4/1/21, at 17.

        The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on June 24, 2021. PCRA Ct.

Op. & Order at 31. On July 19, 2021, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on August 24, 2021. The PCRA court

did not file a separate Rule 1925(a) opinion.

8   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

                                     -7-
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      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review, which we

restate as follows:

      1. Did the PCRA court err and/or abuse its discretion when it
         denied Appellant’s PCRA petition alleging ineffective assistance
         of trial counsel?

      2. Did the PCRA court err and/or abuse its discretion when it
         denied Appellant’s PCRA petition alleging that the
         Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence prior to
         trial?

      3. Did the PCRA court err and/or abuse its discretion when it
         denied Appellant’s PCRA petition alleging that the
         Commonwealth presented misleading and false evidence at
         trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.9

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in rejecting

his claim that Attorney Stein was ineffective.        Appellant’s Brief at 54.

Specifically, Appellant asserts that Attorney Stein failed to introduce evidence

concerning the correct time that the shooting occurred. In support, Appellant

argues that his claim has arguable merit because trial counsel’s error

undermined Appellant’s defense, which was that Appellant was in surveillance

9 Appellant presents a single question in his statement of the questions
involved, which we have separated into three distinct issues. We also note
that Appellant has divided his argument into five sections. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a) (stating that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as
there are questions to be argued”). We do not condone Appellant’s failure to
comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, but because the noncompliance
does not impede our review, we decline to find waiver on this basis. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Levy, 83 A.3d 457, 461 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(declining to find waiver on the basis of the appellant’s failure to comply with
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, where the errors did not impede this Court’s
review).

                                      -8-
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footage from the Cumberland Deli and Grocery at the same time that the

shooting occurred approximately one block away.          Id.   Appellant further

argues that given the importance of establishing an accurate time of the

shooting, trial counsel had no strategic reason to direct the trial court to the

incorrect time of the shooting. Id. Appellant also claims that had trial counsel

correctly established the time of the shooting, there is a reasonable probability

that the outcome of his bench trial may have been different. Id.

      Appellant additionally argues that the PCRA court made multiple errors

in denying his PCRA petition. Id. at 55-61. Specifically, Appellant claims that

several of the PCRA court’s factual findings lack support in the record,

including that (1) the time stamp on the surveillance video was up to one hour

and one minute different than the actual time; and (2) there was an alleyway

behind the convenience store, which Appellant could have used to return to

the store after the shooting, at which point he appeared on the surveillance

footage.10   Id. at 55-56 (citing PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 16, 18, 23, 28).

Finally, Appellant contends that the PCRA court applied the incorrect legal

standard in evaluating Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id.

at 60-61.    Specifically, Appellant argues that the PCRA court improperly

required Appellant to provide evidence of his own innocence, establish that

10 We note that Appellant raises additional claims regarding misconduct by
Detective Phillip Nordo and the credibility of Love, who identified Appellant at
trial. The Commonwealth concedes that Appellant would be entitled to relief
on both issues. However, because we conclude that Appellant is entitled to
relief on other grounds, we need not address these additional issues.

                                      -9-
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evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him, and that the

Commonwealth had improperly suppressed the undisclosed evidence. Id. at

60 (citing PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 15-16, 29-31).          Therefore, Appellant

concludes that the PCRA court erred in denying his PCRA petition and that he

is entitled to a new trial. Id. at 62.

      The Commonwealth concedes that the “[s]urveillance video shows that

[Appellant] was likely in front of the corner store when the shooting occurred.”

Commonwealth’s Am. Brief at 12.            The Commonwealth also agrees with

Appellant that the PCRA court’s factual findings are not supported by the

record.   Id. at 27-32.   Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that the

record does not support the PCRA court’s finding that that there is an alleyway

behind the corner store which Appellant used to return to the store after the

shooting. Id. at 27-28 (citing PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 18, 28, 30-31); see

also id. at 38-39. The Commonwealth further argues that the PCRA court

misconstrued Detective Lucke’s expert testimony at trial to conclude that the

time stamp on the surveillance video could be up to one hour and one minute

off from the actual time in support of the PCRA court’s timeline of the shooting.

Id. at 28-29 (citing PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 16). Finally, the Commonwealth

asserts that the PCRA court held Appellant to a standard that was overly

burdensome, legally flawed, and “based on unsupported and incorrect findings

of fact.” Id. at 36-38. Therefore, the Commonwealth agrees that Appellant

is entitled to relief.

                                         - 10 -
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      Our review of the denial of PCRA relief is limited to “whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s

decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).         “The PCRA court’s credibility

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court;

however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014)

(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595

(Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “[t]his Court grants great deference to the

findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those

findings” (citation omitted)).

      When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we are

governed by the following standard:

      [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
      defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
      ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
      the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process
      that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
      place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the
      following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit;
      (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her
      action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of
      counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
      proceedings would have been different.

      We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the
      factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.
      Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal
      determination.

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      The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for
      his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have
      chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen,
      offered a significantly greater potential chance of success.
      Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they
      effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight
      analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he
      may have taken.

      Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that,
      but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
      been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
      to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

      It is well settled that a criminal defense attorney has a professional duty

to conduct reasonable investigations. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744

A.2d 717, 735 (Pa. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

691 (1984)).

      Here, the record reflects that the Commonwealth provided a CAD report

to the defense prior to trial. The report indicated that authorities received the

first 911 call reporting the shooting at 6:29:47 p.m., as reflected by the time

notation and the abbreviation “REC.” Am. PCRA Pet., 10/20/20, at Ex. F. At

trial, Attorney Stein based his argument on the fact that the shooting occurred

“no later than” 6:30:29 p.m., which was the time that police received the

report from the initial 911 call. See N.T. Trial, 1/28/13, at 225.

      In addressing trial counsel’s alleged error, the PCRA court explained:

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     At trial, defense counsel’s theory of the case centered around his
     argument that [Appellant] was captured on camera standing in
     front of the Cumberland Deli Grocery more than three hundred
     fifty feet from the location of the shooting at the time it took place.
     To support this contention, trial counsel presented, along with
     other evidence, the trial CAD report to demonstrate that the first
     dispatch to the of this shooting was recorded at 6:30:29 p.m. In
     his closing, trial counsel argued that, the timing of the dispatch
     necessarily indicated that the shooting took place at some time
     prior to the first report associated with the shooting, asking the
     [c]ourt to conclude that the shooting took place while he was
     being recorded on camera.

     The evidence contained in the newly-discovered full CAD report
     has been presented to this [c]ourt by both the Commonwealth
     and [Appellant] in an attempt to demonstrate that the instant
     shooting in fact took place at 6:29:17 p.m., approximately thirty
     seconds prior to the first 911 call that was reported at 6:29:47
     p.m. This evidence was presented in conjunction with the video
     surveillance footage, which was presented to this [c]ourt at trial,
     demonstrating that [Appellant] approached the Cumberland Deli
     Grocery at 6:29:15 p.m. before the shooting took place, and
     remained at that location until 6:31:37 p.m., after the shooting
     took place.

     The record demonstrates that trial counsel did not make a faulty
     factual averment concerning the exact time that the instant
     shooting occurred. In his closing, trial counsel was careful to
     assert that the decedent was shot at some time prior to 6:30:29
     p.m. Given the evidence presented in this case, and now after
     review of the evidence presented in this collateral proceeding, a
     more specific pronouncement concerning that time would have
     been impossible. The evidence presented in the trial CAD report
     aligns with that currently brought forward by the Commonwealth
     and [Appellant]. While it is useful in demonstrating the elapse of
     time after the first witness reported the shooting in this matter, it
     is insufficient to preclude this [c]ourt’s finding that [Appellant]
     returned to the Cumberland Deli Grocery shortly after the
     shooting.

PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 14-15.

     As the PCRA court further explained,

     In his closing arguments, trial counsel went as far as to argue that
     the shooting must have taken place at some point prior to 6:30:29

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     p.m., an argument that this [c]ourt credited. None of these
     factual circumstances were in dispute at trial, nor are they in
     dispute after the evidentiary hearing. However, the presented
     911 calls and full CAD report do little to bring the Commonwealth’s
     and [Appellant’s] proposed time of shooting beyond the realm of
     mere speculation.

     In October of 2020, months before the evidentiary hearing in this
     matter, the Commonwealth, [Appellant], and this [c]ourt visited
     the scene of the instant shooting. During that visit, this [c]ourt
     noted the distance between where the shooting was said to have
     taken place, the corner store where [Appellant] was captured on
     camera, and the length of the alleyway behind the corner store.
     By this [c]ourt’s estimate, even if the [c]ourt accepted the
     Commonwealth’s and [Appellant’s] contention that only thirty
     seconds had elapsed between the time of the shooting and the
     time of the first 911 call at 6:29:47 p.m., [Appellant] had ample
     time to navigate the back alleyway and appear on the surveillance
     camera, approaching from an easterly direction.

     Ultimately, the presentation of the full CAD report does not change
     this [c]ourt’s factual analysis of the circumstances surrounding the
     instant shooting. While serving as the factfinder during the
     January 2013 bench trial, this [c]ourt served as the sole arbiter of
     credibility and the weight of the evidence, was free to believe all,
     part, or none of the evidence presented at trial. In a bench trial,
     the trial court is presumed to know the law, ignore prejudicial
     statements, and disregard inadmissible evidence.

     Because this [c]ourt had the opportunity to hear and see the
     evidence presented at the time of trial, including the signed
     witness statements provided to investigators, new evidence must
     be considered in light of this [c]ourt’s factual determinations as
     previously rendered at trial. At trial, this [c]ourt considered
     evidence and argument demonstrating that the instant shooting
     took place sometime prior to 6:30:29 p.m. The information
     provided in the full CAD report does not fundamentally alter the
     evidence presented to this [c]ourt at trial, instead it merely
     supplements the evidence previously known to this [c]ourt when
     it was making its determination. For that reason, [Appellant]
     cannot demonstrate prejudice . . . with respect to his claim.

                                 *     *      *

     At trial, the Commonwealth argued that [Appellant] shot the
     decedent after appearing on video surveillance in front of the

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     [corner store]. This argument was thoroughly challenged by the
     defense at trial, who employed the trial CAD report to establish
     that the shooting took place no later than 6:30:29. This evidence,
     like the other information contained in the reports the
     Commonwealth and [Appellant] presented during this litigation, is
     sufficient to support the timeline of events after witnesses had
     already discovered the decedent’s wounds and called 911. This
     case instead hinges on the timeline and sequence of events after
     the first shot rang out. The timing of the phone calls does not
     preclude the factual determination that [Appellant] traversed the
     alleyway behind the [corner store] immediately after the shooting
     and reappeared on camera, approaching from the east side of the
     store. For that reason, this [c]ourt gives this evidence little
     credence, and does not find it sufficient to overturn the verdict.

                                 *     *      *

     To grant [Appellant’s] motion for a new trial based on the
     sequence of events presented in this proceeding, this [c]ourt
     would be required to adopt an implausible sequence of events that
     had multiple eyewitnesses call 911 mere seconds after the instant
     shooting, with the assailant running towards the decedent’s body
     moments after he shot him. This [c]ourt cannot credit a factual
     scenario that includes the shooter firing six shots at the decedent
     from a fixed location before sprinting towards his body and past a
     potential eyewitness before escaping down the busiest
     thoroughfare in the area.             This [c]ourt rejects the
     Commonwealth’s and [Appellant’s] contention that the decedent
     was shot and killed a mere thirty seconds before the first 911 call
     was recorded. [Appellant] failed to present evidence, such as live
     witness testimony, demonstrating that [Appellant] was absent
     from the area of the shooting, and was otherwise incapable of
     committing the instant murder. Based on the layout of the area,
     [Appellant] had ample time to return to the [corner store] in the
     immediate aftermath of the shooting. This [c]ourt . . . cannot
     conclude that [Appellant] has met his burden. Accordingly, his
     claims fail and the petition must be dismissed.

Id. at 18-19, 23, 30-31 (citations omitted).

     Following our review of the record, we conclude that the PCRA court

erred in denying Appellant’s petition. See Lawson, 90 A.3d at 4.

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      As noted previously, the record reflects that the time of the shooting

was a central question in this case. Indeed, Attorney Stein confirmed at the

PCRA hearing that the time that the shooting occurred was of “paramount

importance” to the defense. N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 1/29/21, at 15. At trial, the trial

court heard evidence that the shooting occurred after Appellant was seen in

surveillance footage from Cumberland Deli and Grocery at 6:29:31 p.m.11

See N.T. Trial, 1/28/13, at 22 (indicating that the police first received report

of the shooting at 6:30:29 p.m.). In his closing argument, Attorney Stein

emphasized the fact that although Appellant was in the store at 6:29:31 p.m.,

the shooting was reported to police at 6:30:29 p.m. See id. at 225; see also

Am. PCRA Petition, 10/20/20, at Ex. F. During the PCRA hearing, Attorney

Stein confirmed that his focus was on “[06]:30:29, reporting of the shooting,

and how that related back to the timestamp on the store video.” N.T. PCRA

Hr’g, 1/29/21, at 38.    Attorney Stein also explained that he gleaned this

information from the CAD report that the Commonwealth disclosed to him

prior to trial. See id. at 37. However, the record reflects that in addition to

the timestamp indicating when the report was made to police, the CAD report

also states that authorities received the first 911 call about the shooting at

11 During trial, Detective Lucke testified that he compared the timestamp on
the surveillance video with the series of clocks at the U.S. Naval Observatory
in Washington, D.C. N.T. Trial, 1/25/13, at 8. He noted that due to Daylight
Savings Time, the timestamp on the surveillance video was off by, “an hour
and some seconds. It was not an hour and a minute, an hour and ten minutes.
This was approximately one hour and some seconds. I did not document the
seconds. It was less than an hour and a minute.” Id. at 9.

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6:29:47 p.m., some 42 seconds earlier than the time that trial counsel relied

on during closing argument. See Am. PCRA Pet., 10/20/20, at Ex. F. Although

Attorney Stein confirmed that he understood that the 6:29:47 p.m. notation

indicated when the first 911 calls were made and received, see N.T. PCRA

Hr’g, 1/29/21, at 64, Attorney Stein did not use that information to

corroborate Appellant’s alibi as depicted in the surveillance footage.

Therefore, because Attorney Stein failed to reasonably investigate the veracity

of Appellant’s potential alibi defense, we conclude that Appellant’s claim has

arguable merit. See Basemore, 744 A.2d at 735.

        With respect to the reasonable basis prong, Attorney Stein stated during

the PCRA hearing that he “felt like it was sufficient to rely on the timing in the

CAD report instead of making an issue out of the time of the 9-1-1 calls[.]”

N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 1/29/21, at 80. However, Attorney Stein acknowledged that

in cases where there is an alibi defense that is potentially corroborated by

video evidence, minutes, even seconds, “could make all the difference in

terms of whether . . . the alibi defense is going to be accepted by the fact

finder[.]” Id. at 87. In light of Attorney Stein’s testimony, we conclude that

Appellant has met his burden of proving that Attorney Stein lacked a

reasonable basis for centering his trial argument around the “report” time of

the shooting as noted in the trial CAD report. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at

1043.

        Further, there is a reasonable probability that had Attorney Stein

centered his argument on the fact that the shooting occurred prior to 6:29:47

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p.m., there could have been a different result at trial. See id. at 1044. As

noted above, ascertaining the timing of the shooting was of paramount

importance. See N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 1/29/21, at 15. Attorney Stein further noted

that in such cases, seconds “could make all the difference in terms of whether

. . . [a] defense is going to be accepted by the fact finder[.]”       Id. at 87.

Moreover, the Commonwealth concedes that not only is Appellant entitled to

relief, but he is “likely innocent.”   Commonwealth’s Am. Brief at 5 (citing

Commonwealth’s Post Hr’g Brief at 1, 3-4 (stating that evidence of record

establishes Appellant’s “entitlement to relief and his likely innocence.”)).

Therefore, because Appellant’s conviction was heavily dependent on the

evidence establishing the amount of time between the surveillance video and

the time of the shooting, we agree with the parties that the PCRA court erred

in rejecting this claim. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 714

(Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (finding Strickland prejudice when defense

counsel failed to adequately investigate a potential alibi).

        Finally, we note that in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court rejected

Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim based on its own theory that Appellant could

have been in the alleyway behind the corner store immediately after the

shooting and then returned to the store, at which point Appellant would have

reappeared on the store’s video camera. PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 18, 23, 28,

31. However, the record contains no evidence to support this theory of the

case.    Compare id. with N.T. Trial, 1/28/13, at 238-39 (reflecting the

Commonwealth’s argument that Appellant committed the shooting after he

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left the store and did not return to the store); see also Ex. C-2 (map of the

crime scene and the surrounding area).

      Likewise, the record does not support the PCRA court’s hypothesis that

the time stamp in the corner store surveillance video was up to one hour and

one minute off from the actual time. Compare PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 16

(noting that there was an hour discrepancy between the time stamp on the

surveillance video and the real time “presumably due to the semi-annual

change in clocks of [D]aylight [S]avings [T]ime” and that “the time stamp

could be reflecting a time up to one minute off from the actual time

memorialized on video”) with N.T. Trial, 1/25/13, at 8-9 (reflecting Detective

Lucke’s testimony that because the time stamp on the video had not been

adjusted for the end of Daylight Savings Time, it was off by “an hour and

some seconds. It was not an hour and [a] minute”). For these reasons, we

conclude that the PCRA court’s findings are not entitled to deference. See

Lawson, 90 A.3d at 4 (explaining that “[t]he PCRA court’s findings will not be

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record”

(citations omitted)); see also Davis, 262 A.3d at 595.

      In   sum,   we   conclude   that   Attorney   Stein’s   ineffectiveness   so

undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of

guilt or innocence could have taken place. Accordingly, we are compelled to

reverse the PCRA court’s order and remand for a new trial.12

12 As noted previously, in light of our disposition, we do not address the merits
of Appellant’s remaining claims.

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      Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for a

new trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      Judge Stabile concurs in the result.

      Judge Sullivan concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/04/2023

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