Court Opinion

ID: 9473102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:19:11.423172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:19.022841
License: Public Domain

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part, and concurring in part:1
In this case, the Georgia system of imposing the death penalty is shown to be unconstitutional. Although the Georgia death penalty statutory scheme was held constitutional “on its face” in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), application of the scheme produces death sentences explainable only on the basis of the race of the defendant and the race of the victim.
I write to state clearly and simply, without the jargon of the statisticians, the results produced by the application of the Georgia statutory death penalty scheme, as shown by the Baldus Study.
The Baldus Study is valid. The study was designed to answer the questions when, if ever, and how much, if at all, race is a factor in the decision to impose the death penalty in Georgia. The study gives the answers: In Georgia, when the defendant is black and the victim of murder is white, a 6 percent greater chance exists that the defendant will receive the death penalty solely because the victim is white. This 6 percent disparity is present throughout the total range of death-sentenced black defendants in Georgia. While the 6 percent is troublesome, it is the disparity in the mid-range on which I focus. When *919cases are considered which fall in the mid-range, between less serious and very serious aggravating circumstances, where the victim is white, the black defendant has a 20 percent greater chance of receiving the death penalty because the victim is white, rather than black. This is intolerable; it is in this middle range of cases that the decision on the proper sentence is most difficult and imposition of the death penalty most questionable.
The disparity shown by the study arises from a variety of statistical analyses made by Dr. Baldus and his colleagues. First, Baldus tried to determine the effect of race of the victim in 594 cases (PRS study) comprising all persons convicted of murder during a particular period. To obtain better results, consistent with techniques approved by the National Academy of Sciences, Baldus identified 2,500 cases in which persons were indicted for murder during a particular period and studied closely 1,066 of those cases. He identified 500 factors, bits of information, about the defendant, the crime, and other circumstances surrounding each case which he thought had some impact on a death sentence determination. Additionally, he focused on 230 of these factors which he thought most reflected the relevant considerations in a death penalty decision. Through this 230-factor model, the study proved that black defendants indicted and convicted for murder of a white victim begin the penalty stage of trial with a significantly greater probability of receiving the death penalty, solely because the victim is white.
Baldus also observed thirty-nine factors, including information on aggravating circumstances, which match the circumstances in this case. This focused study of the aggravating circumstances in the mid-range of severity indicated that “white victim crimes were shown to be 20 percent more likely to result in a death penalty sentence than equally aggravated black victim crimes.” Majority at 896.
We must not lose sight of the fact that the 39-factor model considers information relevant to the impact of the decisions being made by law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries in the decision to impose the death penalty. The majority suggests that if such a disparity resulted from an identifiable actor or agency in the prosecution and sentencing process, the present 20 percent racial disparity could be great enough to declare the Georgia system unconstitutional under the eighth amendment. Because this disparity is not considered great enough to satisfy the majority, or because no identification of an actor or agency can be made with precision, the majority holds that the statutory scheme is approved by the Constitution. Identified or unidentified, the result of the unconstitutional ingredient of race, at a significant level in the system, is the same on the black defendant. The inability to identify the actor or agency has little to do with the constitutionality of the system.
The 20 percent greater chance in the mid-range cases (because the defendant is black and the victim is white), produces a disparity that is too high. The study demonstrates that the 20 percent disparity, in the real world, means that one-third of the black defendants (with white victims) in the mid-range cases will be affected by the race factor in receiving the death penalty. Race should not be allowed to take a significant role in the decision to impose the death penalty.
The Supreme Court has reminded us on more than one occasion that “if a state wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.” Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). A statute that intentionally or unintentionally allows for such racial effects is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment. Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent.2

. Although I concur with the majority opinion on the ineffective assistance of counsel and death-oriented jury issues, I write separately to express my thoughts on the Baldus Study.
I also join Chief Judge Godbold's dissent, as to the Giglio issue, and Judge Johnson’s dissent.

. Nothing in the majority opinion regarding the validity, impact, or constitutional significance of studies on discrimination in application of the Florida death penalty scheme should be *920construed to imply that the United States Supreme Court has squarely passed on the Florida studies. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has passed on the Florida studies, on a fully developed record (as in this case), under fourteenth and eighth amendment challenges.