Court Opinion

ID: 9673014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:04:24.840728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:19.703242
License: Public Domain

LARSON, Justice.
I respectfully dissent from Divisions IV and V of the majority opinion, and the result. As I see it, the obvious desire of the majority to grant defendant a new trial adds to, rather than dissolves, the confusion of trial courts and attorneys as to when an instruction must or. must not be given. This court should try to help and guide the trial courts in the performance of that duty. Certainly they can get no help or guidance from this opinion. On the other hand, until now considerable discretion has been vested in the trial court in passing upon the propriety of instructions necessary for jury guidance when considering the guilt or innocence of one charged with a crime, and we have been slow to find an *169abuse of that discretion in a ruling- on a motion for a new trial. Must the trial court, without adequate guidance, now guess as to whether this court will agree with its holding that an instruction is or is not adequate, should or should not be clarified, and is or is not proper? I feel the trial court was correct in its rulings on these issues, that it did not abuse its fair discretion, and that the cause should be affirmed.
In Division IV the majority finds the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to further instruct the jury as to the significance of a finding that defendant did not take part in the actual theft but did know of it afterwards and participated in the disposal of the stolen goods. It held the jury’s request called for a clarification of the law and required the court to distinguish between an accessory before the fact and an accessory after the ⅝⅛ I cannot agree.
As the State points out, defendant was charged as a principal or as an aider and abettor with the crime of larceny and larceny in the nighttime in violation of sections 709.1 and 709.4 of the Code. He was not charged as an accessory either before or after the fact. In Iowa these are designated as separate and distinct offenses under sections 688.1 and 688.2, and neither is dependent upon the trial or conviction of the principal.
Section 688.1 of the Code provides: “The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal is abrogated, and all persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet its commission, though not present, must hereafter be indicted, tried, and punished as principals.”
On the other hand, section 688.2 provides for indictment, trial and punishment of an accessory after the fact to the commission of a public offense.
The provisions of the Code thus provide that the charge of being an accessory after the fact is considered a separate and distinct offense. State v. Jones, 115 Iowa 113, 88 N.W. 196; State v. Philpott, 222 Iowa 1334, 271 N.W. 617; 21 Am.Jur.2d 200, Criminal Law, section 126; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 95, p. 273.
The State’s theory of the case as presented was that defendant was a principal or an aider and abettor, that he participated in the actual larceny in the nighttime and was apprehended in flight from the scene of the crime shortly thereafter.
The jury’s inquiry related to the consequences of a defendant participation in a public offense after the fact, which was not the offense charged.
Section 784.2, Code 1966, provides: “After the jury has retired for deliberation, * * * if it desires to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, * * * the information required must be given as provided by law, * * Thus, only when the instructions given do not cover an issue upon which the law requires an instruction is it necessary for the court to give the additional information. State v. Mullenix, 212 Iowa 1043, 1047-1050, 237 N.W. 483, 485-487.
The trial court felt its Instruction No. 12 clearly and adequately told the jury what constituted a principal and an aider and abettor sufficient to justify a finding of guilt of the offenses charged. The words “accessory before the fact” or “accessory after the fact” were not used, and the language of the court could scarcely be understood to refer to a crime involving after-the-fact actions. Instruction No. 12 told the jury: “You are instructed that under the laws of this state all persons knowingly involved in the commission of a crime or aiding and abetting its commission may be charged, tried, and punished as principals. In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal venture; and *170that he willfully participate in it as in something he wishes to bring about; and that he willfully seek by some action of his own to make it succeed.” (Emphasis supplied.) As the State contends, this instruction was adequate and fairly informed the jury as to the law applicable to the facts revealed herein. I agree.
There was no request for clarification of Instruction No. 12 at the time of trial and no objection as to its adequacy in the motion for a new trial. If defendant thought it inadequate, he was under a duty to call it to the court’s attention at that time. State v. Kaster, Iowa, 160 N.W.2d 856, 859.
In Division IV the majority admits defendant was charged with the crime of larceny in the nighttime and that the proof of aiding and abetting is sufficient for conviction as a principal. It also admits the instructions given on these matters were proper, and that an original instruction as to the distinction between an accessory before the fact (section 688.1) and after the fact (section 688.2) was not required. Indeed, had such an instruction been given, defendant would no doubt have claimed its giving was reversible error.
Nevertheless, pursuant to the jury’s note while in deliberation asking the judge, “If Kittelson did not take part in the actual theft but did help throw it out, or did know about it afterward — would he be guilty of larceny or of larceny in the nighttime?”, the majority would require the judge to give an additional instruction on an issue foreign to the crime for which he was being tried. In my opinion this goes too far.
The trial court considered the instructions given were sufficient to enlighten the jury on the law as applied to the offense charged and the theory under which the case was tried. What more is necessary? If the jury indicates it is venturing beyond the case before it, must the court do more than tell it to return to the issues presented and apply the law given by its instruction? If more is required, then what is the test?
Obviously, it was defendant’s theory that he did not participate in the larceny either before or after its commission, that he did not aid or abet its commission or know of the disposition of the stolen property.
Any instruction as to an accessory, in my opinion, was improper, and any inference that the jury was confused as to the effect of subsequent participation would not rise to the dignity of a request for amplification of a given instruction. The fact that juries may confuse themselves is not grounds for the court to join them as an adviser. I would hold the court fairly and properly analyzed the situation and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to advise the jury on a subject not included in its original instructions, which were not objected to during the trial.
Although the majority’s insistence on granting this defendant a new trial disturbs me, the failure to set out a rule on guideline by which a trial court can determine when it must grant such a jury request disturbs me even more. After citing several foreign cases which the majority asserts require the granting of such a request under similar statutes, it says: “We do not decide the statute (section 784.2) requires amplifying instructions in all cases. Questions may be asked which can not be answered by the court without exceeding its proper function. The trial court must make its decision in each case under the particular circumstances then existing.” What circumstances must be considered? I submit this direction is of no help to trial courts or to attorneys or the bar in general.
On the other hand, the trial court here did consider the circumstances, did refuse to give an instruction which it felt would exceed its proper function, and did direct the jury to further consider its instructions in the light of the issues and charges involved. Certainly the jury request was not ignored. Since it did not constitute a request for amplification of an instruction *171given, the new and improper request was denied. Nowhere in the instructions given is the word “accessory” used, and yet the majority would require the court to venture into that field of law because the jury seemed confused as to the effect of after-handling of the stolen property. I have carefully examined the cases cited by the majority and fail to find one of them that goes that far.
In Division V of its opinion the majority next finds fault with the trial court’s effort to instruct on an issue it felt was raised by the evidence presented by defendant. It concluded this evidence permitted and perhaps required the giving of an alibi instruction. The majority holds the giving of this instruction (18A) was reversible error because “the giving of such an instruction was not substantiated by the record”, that this instruction confused the minds of the jury, and that its giving was an abuse of the court’s discretion. I disagree.
Although it admits the failure of defendant to proffer an alibi defense alone would not prevent or deny the giving of such an instruction if the evidence offered by the defendant arose to the dignity of an alibi defense, it simply finds that evidence insufficient here. Again the majority fails to give the trial court or the attorneys any idea or rule by which courts can apply this court’s idea as to what evidence is sufficient to permit'or require the giving of an alibi instruction.
I do not agree that defendant’s evidence and Formaro’s testimony did not tend to establish the essential elements of alibi. It did tend to establish that defendant could not have been at the scene of the crime, that at the time of the larceny he was in or near Decorah, which is some 30 or 40 miles west of Monona where the break-in occurred. It did tend to prove more than a denial that he was at the scene of the crime or create an easily manufactured defense. True, if defendant’s evidence is not directed to showing impossibility of his being at Decorah and Monona at the time of the break-in, then it would not justify an alibi instruction, but I submit the evidence was all to the contrary.
The majority concedes defendant’s evidence was not disparaged, that it showed he was either in his mother’s home in Decorah or in a car that night up until his apprehension southwest of Calmar, many miles from Monona. It admits this evidence tended to prove he was in an automobile from about 2:30 A.M. to 3:45 A.M. that morning in the vicinity of De-corah and Calmar, Iowa, and that a trip from Decorah to Monona and back to Cal-mar would cover approximately 68 miles.
The trial court felt this evidence was sufficiently clear to justify the giving of such an alibi instruction and, if any discretion is given the trial court in such cases, these circumstances justify its decision and certainly do not reveal any abuse of that discretion. Considering the time elements and the distances involved, it is hard to see why this defendant evidence did not rise to the dignity of alibi. How much greater distance or less time would justify or require the court to instruct on alibi? How much, if any, discretion is vested in the trial court? If such courts are to intelligently apply such a rule, it seems some guidance should be given for proper application. Here again the majority fails to provide any guidance. I have examined the cases cited in the majority opinion and find in none of them support for the finding that the evidence here was insufficient to justify the court’s alibi instruction No. 18 A.
The majority cite and refer to State v. Wagner, 207 Iowa 224, 230, 231, 222 N.W. 407, 410, 61 A.L.R. 882, which apparently applies a general rule to the facts of that case. The court there stated: “Such extraneous affirmative facts, depending on precise date, time, place, occurrences, and conditions at such place and the relation of such occurrences and conditions to the *172time and place of the commission of the crime * * * are easily manufactured. If defendant’s evidence is not directed to showing such impossibility, then he is not setting up an alibi, and his evidence ought not to be disparaged as an easily manufactured defense.” I have no quarrel with that statement. Applied here, defendant’s evidence was directed toward showing it was impossible for him to be at Monona when he was between 30 and 40 miles away at the time the break-in must have occurred.
The majority concedes the mere failure of the defendant to notify the State of an alibi defense as provided in section 777.18 of the Code does not prevent the giving of such an instruction if the evidence later justifies it. The question is not determined simply by what defendant contends is his defense. State v. Bosworth, 170 Iowa 329, 152 N.W. 581.
I also agree it is primarily the duty of the trial court to assess all of defendant’s evidence before deciding whether an alibi defense is raised and whether such an instruction is proper. Of course, this discretion is not absolute and is reviewable on appeal.
The problem here presented is whether under the defendant’s evidence the court could reasonably find that he was attempting to interpose the alibi defense.
A close examination of the cases is helpful to our determination of what evidence may be considered as an attempt to establish an alibi and call for this instruction.
In State v. Dunne, 234 Iowa 1185, 1191, 1192, 15 N.W.2d 296, 300, it is said:
“An instruction on alibi should not be given when testimony for a defendant seeks merely to controvert the state’s evidence. Under a plea of not guilty, a defendant has a right to show not only that he did not commit the act but that he was doing something else at the time. Where an alibi is claimed, a defendant is attempting to prove not only that he was not present, but that he was at another place so remote or under such circumstances that he could not have been present. Unless a defendant is attempting to show the practical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime, he is not setting up an alibi and his evidence should not be disparaged as an easily manufactured defense. In determining whether an alibi is claimed, the distance of defendant’s whereabouts from the scene of the crime, as shown by his evidence is not the only determining factor. The question is whether if defendant’s evidence is believed the practical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime is thereby established. State v. Wagner, 207 Iowa 224, 230, 231, 222 N.W. 407, 61 A.L.R. 882, and cases cited; State v. Bird, 207 Iowa 212, 215, 220 N.W. 110, 222 N.W. 411; State v. Debner, 205 Iowa 25, 28, 215 N.W. 721; 15 Am.Jur. 14, 15, §§ 314, 315; annotation 67 A.L.R. 138, 149.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In State v. Wagner, supra, at pages 230 and 231 of 207 Iowa, 222 N.W. at page 410, we had this to say as to when the instruction should not be given:
“Obviously, this instruction should not be given when the defendant is seeking to do no more than controvert merely by way of negation the evidence of the state— when he is not attempting by proof of facts, wholly extraneous to the state’s evidence that he was not only not present, but that it was impossible that he could have been present, — impossible not merely because he says he was not there, but affirmatively because he was so situated or circumstanced that he could not have been there. * * * The circumstances and conditions, the facts proved to constitute an alibi, must have been such that he could not at the time thereof have been at the place of the commission of the offense, and therefore could not have been the perpetrator.”
In State v. Stump, 254 Iowa 1181, 1194, 119 N.W.2d 210, 218, we find this discussion as to when a defendant’s evidence interposes a defense of alibi:
*173“Even in the absence of the alibi notice required by section 777.18, Code of Iowa, I.C.A., defendant may take the witness stand and testify to all material and relevant matters. He may testify that he was so far away and at such a specified place that he could not have been present at the scene of the crime. * * * If the defendant voluntarily elects to go further and call witnesses to testify in support of his alibi he must then give the notice required by statute. He assumes the offensive. He offers witnesses to testify that he could not possibly have committed the offense because he was too far away. This goes only to the testimony that he was at some specific place. If established it constitutes an absolute defense. To the extent that it may be an absolute defense it is affirmative in nature.”
A careful examination of the record before us discloses testimony of both the defendant and another that at the time of this larceny he could not have been present at the scene of the crime. Surely, if believed, it would constitute an absolute defense to the crime charged. Defendant testified he was at his mother’s home in Decorah from 5 P.M. until 2:30 A.M. the next morning, that between 2:30 or 3 A.M. and 3:45 A.M. he was in an automobile being driven from Decorah to Calmar over gravel roads, a distance of 10 or 11 miles. Formaro, called on his behalf, corroborated this story and testified that he and defendant were at the home of defendant’s mother in Decorah from 5 P.M. until 2:30 A.M. the next morning, and they made slow progress on the trip to Calmar over unfamiliar gravel roads and did not arrive in Calmar until 3 :45 A.M. when they were stopped by authorities. Decorah is 10 miles north of Calmar, and Monona, where this break-in occurred, is 29 or 30 miles east of Calmar. I believe defendant’s affirmative evidence as to his location at the time of this break-in was sufficient to justify, if not require, the giving of the alibi instruction No. 18A.
I am satisfied defendant here had a fair trial, that the trial court tried hard to provide such a trial, and that it did not in any way abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct further as to aiding and abetting and in giving an alibi instruction under the circumstances revealed by the evidence. I would affirm.
GARFIELD, C. J., and SNELL and MOORE, JJ., join in this dissent.