Court Opinion

ID: 9516730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:50:33.863897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:04.024963
License: Public Domain

LAVORATO, Justice
(dissenting).
I am not convinced this record affirmatively overcomes the presumption of prejudice triggered by the inadmissible evidence of past drug use. See Vine St. Corp. v. City of Council Bluffs, 220 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1974) (“Prejudice is presumed when error appears unless the contrary is affirmatively established.”). I think the jury’s answers to the issues in the special verdict form can reasonably be interpreted as a finding that Kimberly suffered no damages. Such a finding is so overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence that I can reach but one conclusion: this unfairly prejudicial and devastating evidence affected not only the jury’s determination of damages but also its determination of liability. Consequently, I think the error did affect a substantial right of the plaintiffs. See Iowa R.Evid. 103(a).
There comes a time when error in a trial is so patently prejudicial and unfair that we should not attempt to rationalize it away once it is properly brought to our attention. This is such a case.
One such rationalization implied by the majority is particularly disturbing because it suggests a dangerous precedent. I agree that a litigant is entitled to only one fair trial. Until that happens, however, the amount of time and expense expended should not justify putting the case to rest.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
CARTER, SNELL and ANDREASEN, JJ., join this dissent.