Court Opinion

ID: 9619053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:21:28.412898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:35.998640
License: Public Domain

Smith, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because I conclude that no manifest necessity existed for a mistrial in this case. The trial court granted the mistrial sua sponte, in chambers, off the record, over Putnam’s objection, and without first determining whether the jury had been tainted. Absent such manifest necessity, Putnam’s plea in bar should have been granted.
One may not be prosecuted for offenses for which that person was tried in a former prosecution if the former prosecution was “[terminated improperly after the jury was impaneled and sworn.” OCGA § 16-1-8 (a) (2). “A trial is improperly terminated if there was no manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial. Manifest necessity exists only under urgent circumstances.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jefferson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 8, 9 (479 SE2d 406) (1996).
[T]he existence of manifest necessity is to be determined by weighing the defendant’s right to have his trial completed before the particular tribunal against the interest of the public in having fair trials designed to end in just judgments; and the decision must take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stevens v. State, 215 Ga. App. 718, 719 (1) (452 SE2d 176) (1994). Although a trial court has a broad discretion in granting a mistrial, this power is subject to “stringent limitations.” Dotson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 7, 8 (1) (443 SE2d 650) (1994). Because declaring a mistrial over a defendant’s objection has severe consequences, a trial court must “give careful, deliberate, and *99studious consideration to whether the circumstances demand a mistrial, with a keen eye toward other, less drastic, alternatives, calling for a recess if necessary and feasible to guard against hasty mistakes.” (Citation omitted.) Smith v. State, 263 Ga. 782, 783 (1) (439 SE2d 483) (1994).
“Manifest necessity” may exist even when there are less drastic alternatives, “so long as the record discloses that the trial court considered alternatives before declaring mistrial.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Dotson, supra.
Here, the record does not disclose this careful consideration. No record was made of the discussion in chambers, and we cannot assume harm. The record made by the prosecutor after the return of counsel and the trial judge to the courtroom shows only that the judge indicated to counsel in chambers that he was assuming that the “information having been published in this morning’s paper would have come to the knowledge of one or more jurors.” The trial court did not poll the jurors or ask the group whether any of them had read the article or even seen the newspaper. Particularly given that defense counsel and the trial court suggest that the jurors were instructed to disregard any media coverage of the trial,3 we cannot assume that any of the jurors even saw the item.
Even if one or more jurors did see the article, in my view, we cannot assume that it would have precluded a fair trial. The newspaper story, which was placed into evidence, began with a statement that “[a] former Augusta resident unfairly convicted of child molestation two years ago, according to an appeals court, is standing trial again on the charges.” The trial court’s order characterizes this statement, among others, as “highly prejudicial.” But the article states clearly and accurately that this court ruled that “certain testimony and evidence shouldn’t have been given to the jury in his first trial and was unfairly prejudicial.” Moreover, although the article recites that the evidence at the first trial was “not overwhelming,” that statement was clearly attributed to this court, and it was balanced by also reporting our ruling that the victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to support the conviction. Even the trial court acknowledged that the article did not give one side an unfair advantage, reciting that it was “highly prejudicial to both parties.”
The trial court certainly could have determined whether any jurors had seen the newspaper item. If so, the trial court then could have determined whether any jurors had formed an opinion with regard to guilt or innocence based upon the article and finally could have determined whether instructing the jurors to disregard the arti*100cle would have allowed them to consider fairly the evidence introduced in the present trial. See generally Stevens, supra at 719-720 (1) (no manifest necessity for declaring mistrial because “curative instructions might have been sufficient to undo any possible harm”). The trial court in its order, relying on Abdi v. Georgia, 744 F2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1984), recites that “[d]efense counsel not only failed to express an alternative to a mistrial, but indicated that it was naive to believe that jurors were not exposed, at least indirectly, to the offensive newspaper report.” I do not find Abdi either applicable or persuasive.
Decided July 13, 2000
Peter D. Johnson, for appellant.
Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
In Abdi the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court’s speed in reaching a decision that a mistrial was necessary did “not indicate an abrupt or precipitous decision that failed to consider the alternatives seriously enough.” Id. at 1504. But unlike this case, in Abdi the necessity for a mistrial was caused by the egregious conduct of defense counsel in questioning the victim of a rape about her prior sexual conduct, in violation of Georgia’s Rape Shield Law, OCGA § 24-2-3. The record here reveals no misconduct on the part of counsel. In my view, it does not reveal the manifest necessity required for declaring a mistrial over the defendant’s objection. I am persuaded that having failed to explore alternative remedies before declaring a mistrial, the trial court should have granted Putnam’s plea in bar.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ruffin joins in this dissent.

 Notwithstanding this suggestion, no such instruction appears in the record.