Court Opinion

ID: 9927543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-28 22:30:42.674084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:19.119192
License: Public Domain

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                            Reporter of Decisions
Decision:    2023 ME 78
Docket:      Was-23-169
Submitted
  On Briefs: November 29, 2023
Decided:     December 28, 2023

Panel:          STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.

                                  CAROL WILLIAMSON

                                              v.

                                      DAVID FINLAY

STANFILL, C.J.

         [¶1]   Carol Williamson appeals from the District Court’s (Machias,

Harrigan, J.) order dismissing her complaint for protection from harassment

and awarding attorney fees to David Finlay, and from the denial of her motion

for relief from judgment pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

Because Williamson’s notice of appeal is untimely to the extent that it is from

the underlying judgment, the only issue before us is whether the trial court

erred in denying her Rule 60(b) motion. We affirm.

         [¶2] In an order docketed on March 22, 2023, the court dismissed with

prejudice Williamson’s complaint for protection from harassment and awarded

attorney fees to Finlay after Williamson and her attorney failed to appear for

the final hearing on her claim. Williamson moved for relief from judgment
2

pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) the next day. Finlay opposed

that motion. In a revised order on May 5, the court denied Williamson’s motion

for relief, finding “[n]o error or injustice exists which would require the Court

to vacate its Order.”

      [¶3] Williamson filed a notice of appeal as to both orders on May 9.

      [¶4] A civil appeal may be taken within “21 days after entry into the

docket of the judgment or order appealed from.” M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). The

time for appeal is extended if a party timely files a motion

      (A) for judgment as a matter of law under M.R. Civ. P. 50(b); or

      (B) to make or amend findings of fact or conclusions of law under
      M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) or (b); or

      (C) for a new trial under M.R. Civ. P. 59; or

      (D) to alter or amend the judgment, including a motion for
      reconsideration of the judgment under M.R. Civ. P. 59; or

      (E) for reopening or reconsideration before the Public Utilities
      Commission pursuant to its rules of practice.

M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(2). A motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) is

not among the motions listed in the rule and does not extend the time for filing

an appeal. See id. Moreover, Rule 60(b) itself provides that “[a] motion under

this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its

operation.” M.R. Civ. P. 60(b).
                                                                                                     3

       [¶5] Williamson filed her notice of appeal on May 12, within twenty-one

days after denial of the 60(b) motion, but more than twenty-one days after the

judgment of March 22. Her appeal from the dismissal and award of attorney

fees is therefore untimely, and only the appeal from the denial of the motion

under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) is timely and reviewable.

       [¶6]     Williamson’s arguments before this court are directed to the

March 22 judgment. Although her appeal of the denial of her 60(b) motion is

timely, Williamson has developed no arguments in connection with that appeal

and we therefore consider her challenge to that order to be waived.1 See

Melhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290 (“[I]ssues adverted to in a

perfunctory       manner,       unaccompanied           by     some      effort    at    developed

argumentation, are deemed waived.”) (quotation marks omitted).

       The entry is:

                       Judgment affirmed.

   1  Even if we were to consider Williamson’s argument on the merits, we would affirm the order.
“We review the denial of a M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion and will set aside the
decision only if the failure to grant the relief works a plain and unmistakable injustice against the
[moving party].” Woolridge v. Woolridge, 2008 ME 11, ¶ 7, 940 A.2d 1082 (quotation marks omitted).
“Rule 60(b) ‘presupposes that a party has performed [her] duty to take legal steps to protect [her]
own interests in the original litigation.’” McKeen & Assocs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 1997 ME 73, ¶ 4, 692
A.2d.924 (quoting Reville v. Reville, 370 A.2d 249, 254 (Me. 1977)). “The appellant has the burden of
showing that the trial court exceeded the bounds of the reasonable choices available to it, considering
the facts and circumstances of the particular case and the governing law.” In re David H., 2009 ME
131, ¶ 41, 985 A.2d 490 (quotation marks omitted). The court reasonably found that Williamson’s
failure to appear for the final hearing was not the result of excusable neglect, and thus its denial of
her 60(b) motion was within its discretion.
4

F. David Walker, IV, Esq., Rudman Winchell, Bangor, for appellant Carol
Williamson

Jeffrey W. Davidson, Esq., Davidson Law Office, LLC, Machias, for appellee David
Finlay

Machias District Court docket number PA-2022-76
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY