Court Opinion

ID: 9640269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:01:59.512565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:28.710031
License: Public Domain

*80Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen :
I dissent.
In my opinion, a preliminary objection which challenges the jurisdiction of a court of equity on the ground that plaintiff has an exclusive statutory remedy raises, in the majority’s own words, a “true question of jurisdiction.” While I do not take issue with the majority’s definition of a jurisdictional question— as one involving the “power to enter upon the inquiry” — or “the competency of the court to determine controversies of the general class” — I cannot agree that this is not such a question. Under the Act of March 21, 1806, P. L. 558, 4 Sm. L. 326, 46 P. S. §156, it has long been held in various contexts that where a remedy or method of procedure is provided by a legislative act, these procedures shall be followed exclusively without interference by courts of equity. Y.M.C.A. v. Reading, 402 Pa. 592, 167 A. 2d 469 (1961); Knup v. Philadelphia, 386 Pa. 350, 126 A. 2d 399 (1956). In my opinion, this Act and the cases decided under it hold that when the legislature provides a complete statutory scheme for the regulation of a particular subject matter the power of regulation is thereby confined to the organs designated in the statute and is not to be shared with equity, unless it is specifically provided otherwise.
Superimposed upon this rule is the exception set out in Philadelphia Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 571, 190 A. 2d 111 (1963), to the effect that equity does have jurisdiction in the rare circumstances where pursuit of the statutory directions would not be adequate or would cause irreparable harm to plaintiff. (While I agree with the principle of this exception I disagree with its application in Philadelphia Life).
The source of the majority’s error is the failure to distinguish between a preliminary objection based upon *81the historical ground of “adequate remedy at law” and a preliminary objection based upon “exclusive statutory procedure.” While it is true that there may be an “adequate remedy at law” where there is an “exclusive statutory procedure” these assertions are not one and the same thing. (That there is a distinction is supported by Rule 1509 of Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure which separately designates them). The former merely asserts that, in this particular case, equity should not grant relief, just as it should not grant relief when there is “laches” or “unclean hands”. It does not assert that equity had no power of inquiry into the type of question involved. The latter, however, asserts that the legislature has deprived equity of the power of inquiry.
The failure to so distinguish also gives rise to the majority’s second error, to wit, that a dismissal of preliminary objections based upon “exclusive statutory procedures” is not an appealable order under the Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23, §1, 12 P.S. §672. The majority supports this proposition with White v. Young, 402 Pa. 61, 166 A. 2d 663 (1960), which was based upon Korona v. Bensalem Township, 385 Pa. 283, 122 A. 2d 688 (1956). But these cases involved dismissal of objections based upon “adequate remedy at law” which (until 1937) were provided for by the Act of June 7, 1907, P. L. 440, 12 P.S. §1227, and were expressly excluded from the operation of the Act of 1925, supra, by §4 thereof. Objections based upon “exclusive statutory procedures,” on the other hand, are not excluded from the operation of the Act of 1925 and since the objection raises a “true question of jurisdiction” its disposition is appealable under the Act of 1925.
It remains to determine whether defendants’ preliminary objections based upon “exclusive statutory procedures” should be sustained in the case at bar. There is a complete statutory scheme for the regula*82tion of the subject matter. The statute, under which the taxing ordinance was passed, specifically provides, inter alia, for a method of appealing from the enactment of the ordinance to the courts of quarter sessions within thirty days of the adoption of the ordinance. Act of June 25, 1947, P. L. 1145, §3, as amended, 53 P.S. §6853. Moreover, the ordinance itself, in §9 thereof, charges the treasurer with the administration and enforcement of the ordinance and provides that any person aggrieved by any decision of the treasurer shall have the right of appeal to the court of common pleas as in other cases provided.
In my opinion, the disposition of the questions— whether constitutional or otherwise — arising under the amusement tax ordinance should be heard in the context of the procedures set forth in the statute and/or the ordinance and that equity has no power over the subject matter. Moreover, in this case, no exception is applicable, as in Philadelphia Life, because the procedures provided are adequate to the task and plaintiff would suffer no irreparable harm by pursuing them.
Therefore, I would sustain the preliminary objections to equity’s jurisdiction in this case.