Court Opinion

ID: 9949395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 16:05:18.795504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.122781
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Mar 11 2024, 8:47 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                        Jermaine Garnes,
                                        Appellant-Defendant

                                                    v.

                                         State of Indiana,
                                          Appellee-Plaintiff

                                           March 11, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CR-606
                          Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court
                           The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                        79D01-2108-MR-8

                             Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                    Chief Judge Altice and Judge Kenworthy concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024                   Page 1 of 12
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   Criminal defendants have the constitutional right to present a complete defense.

      But this right is not absolute. Jermaine Garnes contends that he was denied a

      complete defense at his trial for the murder of 3-year-old Z.C. when a mistrial

      was declared after he informed the jury that the child’s mother had already been

      convicted of murder. Garnes was subsequently retried and convicted of murder

      at his second trial.

[2]   Garnes makes two arguments on appeal. The first is that his conviction for

      murder should be vacated on double jeopardy grounds because the trial court

      erred in granting the mistrial. His second argument claims that his maximum

      sentence is inappropriate. Finding no merit to either, we affirm.

      Facts
[3]   In the summer of 2021, Garnes lived with his girlfriend, Crystal Cox, and her

      three-year-old son, Z.C. One evening, Garnes called 911 and reported that Z.C.

      was not breathing. Although the operator instructed Garnes and Cox on

      administering CPR, the paramedics arrived to find no one doing so, and that

      Z.C. was dead. Z.C.’s body was “cold” and “mottling” with bruises covering

      nearly all of his body. Tr. Vol. III, p. 86. An autopsy revealed extensive internal

      injuries, consistent with a “very, very high force to the front or to the side of the

      body.” Id. at 114-15.

[4]   The State charged Garnes with murder, as well as two Level 1 felonies—neglect

      of a dependent resulting in death and aggravated battery—and battery resulting
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024           Page 2 of 12
      in death to a person less than 14 years old, a Level 2 felony.1 A few days before

      Garnes’s trial, a newspaper reported that a jury had found Cox guilty of

      murder. In response, the trial court, with the parties’ agreement, questioned

      potential jurors about their knowledge of the article and Cox’s conviction. Four

      prospective jurors had read the article online and were excused for cause.

      Although two more potential jurors revealed they were generally aware of

      Cox’s case, they had not read the article. The trial court denied Garnes’s

      motion to excuse the two jurors for cause.

[5]   A full jury was seated, and Garnes’s trial began. During opening arguments,

      Garnes’s counsel highlighted Z.C.’s alleged frailties and Cox’s involvement.

      Then said:

                 there is no dispute that [Z.C.] has numerous bruises on his body
                 and ultimately died from internal injuries, there is no dispute that
                 he died while in the care of his mother, Crystal Cox, and the
                 Defendant Jermaine Garnes. Most significantly it is not in
                 dispute that Crystal Cox was convicted of murdering [Z.C.].

      Tr. Vol. II, pp. 158-59.

[6]   The State immediately objected and requested a sidebar outside the jury’s

      presence, which the trial court granted. The State expressed disbelief that

      Garnes’s counsel had mentioned Cox’s conviction in his opening argument,

      given the efforts to screen anyone from the jury with this information. The State

      1
          Cox was charged with similar crimes.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024             Page 3 of 12
      also emphasized that the information was likely inadmissible. Garnes’s counsel

      rebutted that no motion in limine prevented the information from coming in at

      trial and that the evidence would be admissible. The trial court tabled the issue

      until both sides had time to research it and the State could decide whether to

      move for a mistrial.

[7]   The trial continued the rest of the morning. But following an extended

      afternoon break, the State moved for a mistrial. The trial court granted the

      motion. It reasoned that Garnes’s opening statement was “intended as a trial

      tactic” to inform the jury of the prior conviction even though the parties and the

      trial court had tried to prevent the jury from learning about the prior conviction.

      Id. at 219-20.

[8]   After the trial court declared a mistrial, Garnes moved to dismiss his case. He

      claimed that double jeopardy protections attached when the jury was sworn in

      and that further prosecution was prohibited. The trial court rejected this motion

      because it found the mistrial proper. It reiterated its findings that Garnes’s

      “impermissible statements were a deliberate trial tactic, a mischaracterization,

      and improper,” and were “not inadvertent, but a calculated statement made

      presumably as a trial tactic to shift the blame to the mother of the child.” App.

      Vol. II, p. 139. The trial court also concluded that no admonishment or

      alternative option would have fixed the “prejudicial effect the statements likely

      had on the jury.” Id. at 138-39.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024          Page 4 of 12
[9]    After a second trial on the same four charges, the jury found Garnes guilty on

       all counts. The trial court sentenced Garnes to 65 years imprisonment, with one

       year suspended.

       Discussion and Decision
[10]   We address Garnes’s arguments in multiple steps. The first and central issue

       here is whether the trial court properly granted the mistrial. Deciding this

       question raises two derivative issues: (1) whether evidence of Cox’s conviction

       was admissible; and (2) whether a “manifest necessity” justified the mistrial.

       Because we affirm the trial court’s judgment in declaring a mistrial during the

       first trial, Garnes’s conviction from the second trial stands. We then conclude

       that his sentence is not inappropriate.

       I. The Trial Court Properly Granted a Mistrial
[11]   Garnes argues that the trial court improperly declared a mistrial and that his

       second trial therefore violated his Fifth Amendment right “not to be placed

       twice in jeopardy.”2 Brock v. State, 955 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ind. 2011). A mistrial is

       a serious remedy, particularly so after the jury has been seated and double

       jeopardy protections have attached. Id. “Once jeopardy has attached, the trial

       court may not grant a mistrial over a defendant’s objection unless ‘manifest

       necessity’ for the mistrial is found.” Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1015 (Ind.

       2
        The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable here through the Fourteenth
       Amendment, provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
       of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024                                 Page 5 of 12
       1998). A trial court’s decision to grant a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of

       discretion. Brock, 955 N.E.2d 195, 207 (Ind. 2011).

[12]   Garnes asserts that because evidence of Cox’s murder conviction was

       admissible, his trial counsel’s reference to it during opening arguments in

       Garnes’s first trial was not grounds for a mistrial. Thus, we begin with the

       evidentiary issue and then proceed to whether the trial court abused its

       discretion in declaring a mistrial.

       A. Evidence of Cox’s Conviction Was Inadmissible

[13]   Garnes contends the evidence of Cox’s conviction was admissible because he

       intended to offer the evidence “to show that someone else” murdered Z.C.

       Appellant’s Br., p. 16. In that vein, Garnes asserts that a criminal defendant

       “has the absolute right to present evidence” that someone else committed the

       charged crime.” Id. While the right to present a defense is an important right, it

       is not without limitation.

[14]   Criminal defendants cannot present any evidence or make any arguments they

       please while presenting their defense. See generally Holmes v. South Carolina, 547

       U.S. 319, 326-27 (2006) (noting that “well-established rules of evidence permit

       trial judges to exclude evidence”); see also Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 926

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“Regardless of [the defense’s theory], evidence to support

       the theory must comply with applicable evidentiary rules.”). And the argument

       Garnes sought to make—that another person committed the crime—is, at

       bottom, no different than any other argument a defendant might make. Holmes,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024          Page 6 of 12
       547 U.S. at 327 (finding that application of evidentiary rules “regulating the

       admission of evidence proffered by criminal defendants to show that someone

       else committed the crime with which they are charged” has been “widely

       accepted”).

[15]   Evidence of Cox’s conviction was inadmissible here. As both parties agree, the

       reverse of this situation—where the prosecution attempts to introduce evidence

       of an accomplice or co-defendant’s conviction—is typically found improper if

       the evidence speaks only to “the fact that others indicted for the same offense

       had been found guilty.” Moore v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1099, 1102 (Ind. 1987)

       (quoting Lincoln v. State, 133 N.E. 351 (Ind. 1921)).

[16]   Indeed, this Court has already found that “the same rationale applies to make

       improper any attempt by a defendant to disclose the previous conviction or

       guilty plea of a co-defendant in hopes of establishing his innocence of the crime

       charged.” Jefferson v. State, 399 N.E.2d 816, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Of course,

       the propriety of any such action still “depends on the facts and circumstances

       surrounding the case.” Moore, 515 N.E.2d at 1103 (citing Zarnick v. State, 361

       N.E.2d 202, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977)). The facts and circumstances of this case

       support the trial court’s decision to find evidence of Cox’s conviction

       inadmissible.

[17]   First, Cox’s conviction was not relevant evidence at Garnes’s trial. Evidence is

       relevant if it has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable” and is “of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024         Page 7 of 12
       consequence” in resolving the issue.3 Ind. Evidence Rule 401. If evidence is not

       relevant, it is inadmissible. Evid. R. 402.

[18]   Our Supreme Court has already spoken on the related issue of introducing

       evidence of a co-defendant’s guilty plea and indicated that “in many cases”

       such evidence “has been considered irrelevant and inadmissible.” Moore, 515

       N.E.2d at 1102 (collecting cases). That is the case here. Cox’s conviction, like

       the guilty plea in Moore, had no bearing on Garnes’s guilt or innocence at his

       trial. In other words, it was “not substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt or

       innocence.” Phelps v. State, 453 N.E.2d 350, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Jefferson,

       399 N.E.2d at 825.

[19]   This is so because Cox’s conviction does not show that she alone murdered

       Z.C. Cf. Allen v. State, 813 N.E.2d 349, 361-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding

       that a defendant could present evidence that others committed the crime with

       him). In fact, Cox was convicted of murder on the theory that she was Garnes’s

       accomplice; in effect, that she and Garnes murdered Z.C. together. See Cox v.

       State, 210 N.E.3d 305, *2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (mem.) (noting that in

       prosecuting Cox, the State proceeded “under a theory that Garnes inflicted the

       3
         We note that many of the cases cited within this opinion predate the adoption of Indiana’s Rules of
       Evidence in 1994. In general, caution is warranted when citing to such cases. See Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d
       386, 389 n.2 (Ind. 1997) (observing that “long-standing rules of evidence have been subsumed or eliminated
       by the adoption of our new rules of evidence”). But here, the governing standard is, for our purposes,
       relatively unchanged. Compare Ind. Evidence Rule 401 with Moore, 515 N.E.2d at 1103 (“Evidence is relevant
       if it tends to prove or disprove an issue material to the case.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024                                Page 8 of 12
       fatal blows and that Cox acted as an accessory to Garnes in committing the

       murder”). Cox’s conviction therefore is unrelated to Garnes’s guilt.

[20]   Having established that it was improper for Garnes’s counsel to inform the jury

       of Cox’s conviction, we turn to the next step: whether a mistrial was required.

       B. A Manifest Necessity Requiring a Mistrial Existed

[21]   When a defendant objects to a motion for mistrial, as Garnes did here, there

       must exist a “manifest necessity” to support the mistrial. A “manifest necessity”

       exists when, “the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated” by

       continuing the trial, through either jury bias or prejudice. Jackson v. State, 925

       N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. 2010) (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580

       (1824)). This standard does not require that the mistrial be “necessary” in a

       “strict literal sense,” given “the difficulty in measuring jury bias.” Id. (quoting

       Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 505, 511 (1978)).

[22]   Garnes argues that a manifest necessity did not exist because the trial court

       could have cured any prejudice with a simple admonishment instructing the

       jury to ignore the reference to Cox’s conviction. Garnes relies on the fact that

       admonishments are generally the preferred way to cure an error that may bias

       the jury. See Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006) (“When an

       improper argument is alleged to have been made, the correct procedure is to

       request the trial court to admonish the jury.”). But in all events, “the reviewing

       court must ‘accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge’s evaluation of

       the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024           Page 9 of 12
       affected by the improper comment.’” Jackson, 925 N.E.2d at 373 (quoting

       Washington, 434 U.S. at 511).

[23]   Speaking to a similar situation, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that

       “[a]n improper opening statement unquestionably tends to frustrate the public

       interest in having a just judgment reached by an impartial tribunal.”

       Washington, 434 U.S. at 512. Although the trial court “may instruct the jury to

       disregard the improper comment,” the court “must have the power to declare a

       mistrial in appropriate cases.” Id. at 513. Otherwise, “unscrupulous defense

       counsel [will] be allowed an unfair advantage.” Id.

[24]   The trial court acted within its discretion in declaring a mistrial. With the

       agreement of both parties, extensive efforts were undertaken during voir dire to

       ensure the jury was not tainted by the public news of Cox’s conviction. But

       these efforts were undone in an instant when Garnes’s counsel referenced that

       conviction during opening arguments. We see nothing in the record to disprove

       the trial court’s finding that this was a deliberate strategy by Garnes’s counsel

       “to shift the blame to [Cox]” and that only a mistrial could remedy the fear of a

       tainted jury. App. Vol. II, p. 139.

[25]   Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in declaring a mistrial and

       find no double jeopardy issue with Garnes’s second trial and consequent

       conviction.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024        Page 10 of 12
       II. Garnes’s Sentence Is Not Inappropriate
[26]   Lastly, Garnes challenges his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

       Under this rule, we may revise a sentence if “after due consideration of the trial

       court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the

       nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule

       7(B). Our aim in reviewing sentence appropriateness is to “attempt to leaven

       the outliers” and “not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence.” Knapp v. State,

       9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014). We therefore defer substantially to the trial

       court’s sentencing decision, which prevails unless “overcome by compelling

       evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense . . . and the

       defendant’s character.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[27]   The nature of Garnes’s offense supports his 65-year sentence. This was a

       heinous crime. Garnes’ sole claim is that because Cox was also convicted of

       Z.C.’s murder, some of the blame must be cast her way. But the underlying

       facts show Garnes was the person primarily responsible for 3-year-old Z.C.’s

       injuries. Garnes’s acts included “punching” and “grabbing” the child with the

       “extreme amount of force” necessary to cause his fatal injuries. Tr. Vol. III, pp.

       101-04, 145. Thus, we find nothing about the nature of Garnes’s sentence

       inappropriate.

[28]   Similarly, Garnes’s character does not compel sentencing relief. This analysis

       requires consideration of a wide range of facts, such as Garnes’s “criminal

       history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Pritcher v. State,

       208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Garnes has a history of similar
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024         Page 11 of 12
       violent conduct including convictions for domestic violence and assault and

       battery. As the State notes, it is particularly troubling that, as remediation for

       his 2008 conviction for domestic violence, Garnes was ordered to complete a

       program aimed at limiting violent behavior. In sum, Garnes’s character does

       not warrant finding his sentence inappropriate.

       Conclusion
[29]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial in Garnes’s

       first trial. Thus, his second trial did not violate double jeopardy protections and

       Garnes’s murder conviction is affirmed. We also affirm his 65-year sentence,

       finding it is not inappropriate in light of Garnes’s character and the nature of his

       offense.

       Altice, C.J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Bruce W. Graham
       Graham Law Firm P.C.
       Lafayette, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana
       Samuel J. Dayton
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-606 | March 11, 2024          Page 12 of 12