Court Opinion

ID: 9567990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:59:33.129859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:09.787127
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
In dismissing this appeal, the majority ignores the fact that there does not exist any real party in interest who could be substituted as plaintiff. In these circumstances, the defense of “real party in interest” cannot constitute a matter in abatement. Thus, a motion for summary judgment was appropriate, and the grant of that motion was directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).
The trial court purported to grant the defendant congregation’s motion for summary judgment based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, we must consider the substance of that motion and order. “ ‘[I]t is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls.’ [Cit.]” State v. Smith, 276 Ga. 14-15 (1) (573 SE2d 64) (2002). When we disregard the nomenclature, it becomes clear that subject matter jurisdiction was not the basis for the motion or the trial court’s order. The trial court found that the plaintiffs, who were not members of the defendant congregation, could not bring suit on behalf of the umbrella organization and its members, because the undisputed evidence shows that the defendant congregation constitutes the majority of the membership of that organization. There was no challenge to the proposition that, if the plaintiffs had standing and were the real parties in interest, the trial court could lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. See Burry v. DeKalb County, 165 Ga. App. 246, 248 (1) (299 SE2d 602) (1983).
Ordinarily, a “real party in interest” objection “does not go to the merits of an action, but rather is a matter in abatement for which summary judgment is inappropriate. [Cits.]” Tri-County Investment Group v. Southern States, 231 Ga. App. 632, 636 (2) (500 SE2d 22) (1998). Thus, when a motion is made based on the prosecution of a suit by one who is not the proper party plaintiff,
such a motion is to be treated as a matter in abatement, in that the erring party, rather than having judgment entered against him, is now simply precluded from proceeding with the suit until the error has been corrected by the substitution of the proper party plaintiff.
*889Decided January 8, 2008.
Clark & Clark, Fred S. Clark, for appellants.
Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleet Multi Fuel Corp., 178 Ga. App. 859, 861 (344 SE2d 742) (1986). However, the fact that the “real party in interest did not exist to be substituted into this action at the time the judgment[ ] below [was] rendered distinguishes this case from Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleet Multi Fuel Corp., [supra].” Walden v. John D. Archbold Mem. Hosp., 197 Ga. App. 275, 278 (4) (398 SE2d 271) (1990). The majority can disregard the non-existence of a real party in interest at the time of judgment only by expressly disapproving Walden, which is a whole-court decision of the Court of Appeals. See OCGA § 15-3-1; Court of Appeals Rule 33 (a). I respectfully submit that Walden is well reasoned and should be approved and followed rather than discarded.
When the judgment was entered in this case, only the defendant congregation, because it constituted the majority of the umbrella organization, was arguably authorized to bring suit on behalf of that organization. However, “[a] person cannot sue himself; the same person cannot be both plaintiff and defendant in the same action, even in different capacities. [Cits.]” Connell v. Murray, 205 Ga. App. 702, 703 (423 SE2d 304) (1992). Therefore, the defendant congregation could not bring suit, as the representative of the umbrella organization, against itself. Moreover, even if such an action was theoretically possible, the defendant congregation has resisted suit and clearly would not consent to be substituted as plaintiff. Furthermore, the evidence shows that there has not been any meeting of a maj ority of the members of the umbrella organization authorizing the filing of a complaint on its behalf, and the plaintiffs have not produced any countervailing evidence. Thus, there does not exist any real party in interest who could be substituted as plaintiff.
Accordingly, the trial court’s decision that the plaintiffs could not represent the umbrella organization because only the defendant congregation constituted a majority did “not abate [the] action until a proper party plaintiff can be substituted[,]” but rather “resulted in a final disposition of [the] action and thus constituted [the grant of] a plea in bar. The motion to dismiss ... therefore when supported by evidence outside the pleadings became a summary judgment. [Cit.]” Burry v. DeKalb County, supra. Thus, contrary to the majority, a direct appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is available pursuant to OCGA§ 9-11-56 (h), and the plaintiffs were not required to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). I therefore dissent to the dismissal of this appeal.
*890Weiner, Shearhouse, Weitz, Greenberg & Shawe, David E. Laesser II, William G. Glass, Malcolm McKenzie III, for appellee.