Court Opinion

ID: 9666516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:18:07.957239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:29.705036
License: Public Domain

*287On Petition to Rehear
AVERY, P. J.
(W. S.) In this ease the Opinion was filed on August 23, 1956 and announced on that date as provided by law. Counsel for the parties prepared an Order or Judgment upon said Opinion, filed August 31, 1956, styled and designated: “Order on Opinion of Honorable Court of Appeals ’ ’ and presented it to the Clerk, approved by counsel for both parties, the last paragraph of which is as follows:
“Plaintiffs in error are granted fifteen (15) days from the date of the entering of this order to take any legal steps that they deem necessary, usually required to be taken within ten (10) days, such as petition to rehear, etc. ’ ’
On September 15, 1956, plaintiffs-in-error filed a petition styled and designated: “Petition to Rehear and to Vacate Judgment or to Certify for En Banc Hearing for Plain tiffs-in-Error ’ ’.
Plaintifi's-In-Error now insist that by virtue of the above quoted provision in the Order or Judgment filed with the Clerk and oked by counsel for each of the parties, that Petition to Rehear is filed within the proper and allowed time.
Rule 22 of this Court permits the filing of petitions to rehear “within ten days after the opinion of the court is filed, except that, in cases decided within the last ten days of the term”, etc. There is no provision in the law nor in the Rules of this Court authorizing an extension of such time. It may have the inherent right to extend the time for filing petition to rehear within a reasonable time beyond the ten days. However, counsel *288for plaintiff s-in-error have assumed the position that because counsel for defendants-in-error agreed to and oked the Order or Judgment containing the above quoted provision, they were automatically granted such an extension without presenting it to the Court; but under Rule 19 of this Court it is provided that:
“Counsel may present decrees at any time when the court is not engaged in hearing a cause; but decrees about which counsel do not differ may be entered without being presented to the court. ’ ’
That Rule then provides how such action may come about, but in no wise intimates that the rules of this Court may be set aside merely because counsel have agreed to it, and of course the true meaning of that Rule 19 hereinabove quoted, is that when a decree, based upon an Opinion of this Court, is agreed to and conforms thereto, it may be entered without being presented to the Court. Rule 19 has no such meaning as that the rules of this Court may be suspended in any way or extended in any way without permission of the Court.
It is true in this case that on the 30th day of August, 1956, a letter was addressed to the Presiding Judge of this Court, written by the firm of Aspero & Aspero, in which it is said among other things that Mr. W. C. Rodgers has been associated with the firm of Aspero & Aspero, and that “Mr. Allen Cox, Jr. has agreed, for the defendants-in-error, that we may be granted an extension of fifteen days from the entry of the Order affirming judgments within which to file a Petition to Rehear”. In another paragraph of the letter, it is said that: “No doubt you have received this Order and we are confident that you will protect the rights of plaintiffs-in-error”.
*289When that letter was written the Order or Judgment had not even reached the Office of the Clerk and did not do so until August 31st, as above stated, and was never mailed to or presented to any member of this Court. However, in view of the fact that such letter was written, we have given consideration to the argument advanced supporting the Petition to Rehear and each of the Judges of this Court has again examined the original Opinion, the briefs filed in connection with the Assignments of Error, the original Petition to Rehear, and the reply thereto filed herein on September 22,1956, copy of which was furnished each member of this Court.
We have referred to Rule 22 and its provision with respect to the time allowed for filing petitions to rehear and to Rule 19 with respect to entering decrees where counsel for both parties have oked the same, and the effectiveness of such action to extend the time provided by the Rule for filing petitions to rehear, and this has been done so that the Bar may understand that a simple agreement by counsel for respective parties cannot suspend the rules of this Court in any regard.
The Petition to Rehear advances no theory or argument that was not advanced in the original Assignments of Error, Brief and Argument of plaintiffs-in-error, and if the petition as now filed could be considered a petition to rehear, it would be only upon the theory that the Opinion conflicts with the prior Opinion of'this Court, unpublished, in the case of Charles W. Campbell v. C. S. Hughes, filed January 7,1953, prepared by Judge Carney and approved by Judges Swepston and Avery, copy of which was attached to the Reply Brief of defendant-in-error filed in the instant case,
*290There is no necessity to refer to the facts in the case of Campbell v. Hnghes, supra, and make any comparison with the facts in the instant case. There was considerable difference in the facts as set out in the respective opinions. However, insofar as the Opinion in the instant case affirms the judgment of the Lower Court, such conclusions are similar.
The allegations in the petition now being considered for rehearing, or for the vacation of the judgment, or certifying this case for en banc hearing for plaintiffs-in-error, as related to the case of Campbell v. Hughes, do not justify this Court in granting the petition for either purpose.
Referring specifically to the application for en banc hearing by all nine members of this Court, which points out what petitioners aver is a conflict in the Opinion in the instant case, with that of Horne v. Palmer, 38 Tenn. App. 354-360, 274 8. W. (2d) 372, 374-376, it is not necessary to refer to the quotations from that Opinion other than the ones referred to in the petition now under consideration. In that case the Court said:
“Plaintiff Hanzy Horne testified that he was trav-elling at about 45 miles per hour when the Palmer truck pulled out in front of him too close for him to stop. Prom the foregoing we think there is permissible an inference that Home was guilty either of proximate or remote negligence. The finding of some amount, small though it is, in his favor negatives a finding of proximate negligence, leaving remote negligence as the only possible jury finding against the Hornes.
*291‘ ‘ To understand the insistence of the plaintiffs that the verdicts are inconsistent and are compromise verdicts, it is necessary to quote at some length the remarks of the Court and jury when the jury returned to report its verdict:
“ ‘The Court: How do you find?
‘ ‘ ‘ The Foreman: Let Mr. Palmer pay the doctor bill and the hospital hill.
“ ‘The Court: You find for Hanzy Horne? What about Hanzy Horne ?
“ ‘The Foreman: Well we just forgot about that.
“ ‘The Court: You can’t forget about that.
“ ‘The Foreman: Can’t we?
“ ‘The Court: You found for W. it. Horne, that is the father.
“ ‘The Foreman: No, just have the boy * * * let Mr. Palmer pay for the hospital bill and the doctor bill.
‘ ‘ ‘ The Court: Mr. W. E. Horne is the one who sues for the doctor and hospital bill.
“ ‘The Foreman: Well just change that.’
‘After the Court appropriately charged the jury to return separate verdicts in the cases, the jury retired and after further deliberations offered to return verdicts dismissing the suit of the son and the cross action of Palmer and awarding $136, representing hospital and doctor’s bills, in favor of W. R. Horne. *292The Court properly declined to accept the verdicts as inconsistent and after further instructions from the Court the jury retired and thereafter returned the final verdicts of $75 in favor of each of the Hornes and dismissing the cross action.
“It is obvious from the foregoing that the jury was confused and, despite the diligent efforts of the Court, we think they either remained confused or set out to compromise the cases. Though wishing to dismiss the suit of Hanzy Horne, the jury apparently decided to deduct $75 from the hospital and doctor’s bills and award that amount to Hanzy Horne so that the verdict in that case would not be inconsistent with a verdict in favor of the father.”
“In these cases, in addition to the smallness of the verdicts, the record shows affirmatively that the jury was confused and the questions and remarks of the jury suggest that the only purpose in rendering a verdict in favor of Hanzy Horne was to make the verdict in that case consistent with a verdict of $75 in favor of W. E. Horne and yet not substantially exceed in both cases the hospital and doctor’s bills. Yet, the trial court and this court cannot be sure what the jury intended. To review a verdict in such a situation presents a difficult problem and one which cannot be satisfactorily solved. We think justice can only be done by reversing and remanding both eases for a new trial.”
While the facts in the cases are different to a considerable extent, it seems proper to further state that in the *293instant case there is no statement by the jury showing that it was confused and certainly the Trial Court did not consider the jury to be confused and there is nothing in the entire record in the instant case which indicates that the jury undertook at any stage of the proceedings to change its verdict.
The application for a rehearing in this case, the application for vacation of the judgment and the granting to plaintiffs-in-error an en banc hearing before the entire Court of Appeals of Tennessee, is denied and the petition is dismissed.
Avery, P. J. (Western Section), and Carney and Be-,jach, JJ., concur.