Court Opinion

ID: 9381972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 14:07:02.7824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.143955
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Garry v. Borger, 2023-Ohio-905.]
                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                        HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 PATRICIA GARRY,                                     :   APPEAL NO. C-220069
                                                         TRIAL NOS. A-1800062
         Plaintiff-Appellant,                        :              A-1806668

   vs.                                               :   O P I N I O N.

 JOSEPH BORGER,                                      :

     Defendant-Appellee,                             :

  and                                                :

 JILL SIMS, et al.                                   :

         Defendants.                                 :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 22, 2023

Jennifer K. Nordstrom and Christopher T. Brann, for Defendant-Appellee,

Paul Croushore, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Z AYAS , Presiding Judge.

          {¶1}   Plaintiff-appellant Patricia Garry (“Garry”) appeals the trial court’s

denial of her motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

                           I.     Factual and Procedural History

          {¶2}   An automobile accident on Hunley Road in Anderson Township gave rise

to the present legal action. Shortly before midnight on December 16, 2016, defendant-

appellee Joseph William Borger was driving home from a friend’s house in wintry

conditions. At the same time, Dylan Schube and Josh Sims were stopped in their vehicle

in a lane of traffic on Hunley Road, unable to climb a hill due to the ice and rain. Schube’s

passenger Sims stepped out of the vehicle and began pushing the car from behind. When

Borger came around a blind curve in the road, he saw Schube’s vehicle stopped ahead and

crossed the center line into oncoming traffic. At the same time, Patricia Garry was a

passenger in a vehicle traveling the opposite direction on Hunley Road. As Borger crossed

the center line, his car and the car Garry was in collided head on, resulting in Garry

suffering from a broken arm and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).

          {¶3}   Plaintiff-appellant Patricia Garry filed a complaint against defendant-

appellees Joseph William Borger and Joseph M. Borger (“father”) asserting claims of

negligence and gross negligence against Borger and negligent entrustment against his

father.

          {¶4}   During the jury selection process, there was dispute as to two of the

prospective jurors’ ability to effectively serve on the jury. Juror No. 984949 (“Juror A”)

answered her questionnaire indicating that she "did not like cops" and believed that the

“judicial system” is “corrupt and racist.” Juror No. 950171 (“Juror B”) taught a class in

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the evenings on Tuesday and Thursday of each week and therefore would need to leave by

3:00 p.m. on those days.

        {¶5}    Garry argued that the court should have excused both of these jurors for

cause as Juror A could not be fair and impartial, and Juror B was unable to serve during

the time allotted for trial. Specifically, Garry argued that this new time restraint imposed

by including Juror B would materially interfere with her coordination of witnesses and

presentation of her case-in-chief. Therefore, Garry asked for the two jurors to be removed

for cause.

        {¶6}    Regarding Juror A, the trial court determined that she could be an effective

juror and that any biases that she may have had were not relevant in this civil case.

Furthermore, regarding Juror B, the trial court found that the trial’s schedule would not

be greatly affected by this potential juror’s scheduling restraint. As a result of the trial

court’s decision not to excuse these jurors for cause, Garry chose to use two of her three

preemptory challenges to remove them, noting on the record that she would have

preferred to use these challenges on other jurors if the court had removed them for cause.

        {¶7}    Importantly, the trial was only to determine Garry’s noneconomic

damages, as she chose not to claim her medical expenses and dismissed her claims for

economic damages. Prior to trial, Borger stipulated that his negligence “was the sole

proximate cause of the December 16, 2016, car accident involving Patricia Garry” and that

“no evidence or argument will be presented at trial that anyone other than Joseph W.

Borger is responsible for the December 16, 2016, car accident.” In exchange, Garry agreed

to withdraw her claim for punitive damages. Therefore, this trial focused solely on the

noneconomic damages to be awarded. The jury instructions specifically noted the

stipulation of liability as follows:

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       Defendant Joseph Borger's negligence was the sole cause of the crash on

       December 16, 2016, and that Defendant Joseph Borger’s admitted

       negligence was the proximate cause of some injury to Plaintiff Patricia

       Garry.

       {¶8}     Borger also consistently maintained throughout the trial in accordance

with the stipulation that the accident was his fault, both during direct and cross-

examination. However, Borger did testify, consistent with his deposition, that there was

a pedestrian in the roadway which led to his decision to cross the center line into

oncoming traffic. Borger stated the following about how the accident occurred during

direct examination:

       Q. Tell the jury how the accident happened.

       A. Sure. So I was on Hunley, and I reached a blind turn. And as I was going

       up around that blind turn -- or blind curve, I noticed there was a pedestrian

       in the road along with a stopped Jeep, and I applied my brakes. And when

       I realized I was sliding, not going to be able to stop in time, I went left of

       center to avoid hitting the pedestrian. And as I went left of center, that's

       when the Kia Soul was oncoming and we collided head-on.

                                           ***

       Q. What caused you to decide to steer left of center when you weren’t

       stopping?

       A. Because there was a pedestrian in the road and I did not want to hit

       them.

       {¶9}     After the defense rested, Garry sought to adduce the testimony of Deputy

Hicks of the Hamilton County Sherriff’s Office, who was one of the officers that

investigated the accident in question. Deputy Hicks had previously stated in an affidavit

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

that “Joseph Borger described the crash to me, but he did not tell me that he had slowed

or swerved to avoid a pedestrian in the roadway.” Therefore, Garry sought to call Deputy

Hicks both as a rebuttal witness and for the purpose of impeaching Borger, because at the

time of the accident, Borger had not told police that he had seen a pedestrian. Notably,

the issue of whether a pedestrian was actually in the road was not disputed, as both sides

acknowledged that Sims had been in the road attempting to push Schube’s vehicle. The

disagreement centered on whether Borger had seen the pedestrian as well as the vehicle

before crossing the center line.

       {¶10} The court held that there was no prior inconsistent statement to dispute

because Borger was never questioned about what he told Deputy Hicks. Therefore,

because there was no inconsistent statement, there was no rebuttal evidence allowed

under Evid.R. 613(B). The trial court noted that if Borger had denied making a statement,

then Deputy Hicks’s testimony would have been appropriate for rebuttal.

       {¶11} Ultimately, following a five-day jury trial, the jury delivered a verdict in

favor of Garry for damages related to her broken arm and PTSD. The total verdict was for

$45,000, which included $30,000 for pain and suffering, $10,000 for loss of enjoyment

of life and the inability to perform usual activities, and $5,000 for disfigurement from the

broken arm and necessary surgical repair. Garry subsequently moved for a new trial

under Civ.R. 59 “because there were errors of law and irregularities in the proceedings

that allowed evidence to go uncontroverted that, in fact, did inflame juror passions leading

to an inadequate verdict.” Borger filed a memorandum in opposition. The trial court

denied Garry’s motion for a new trial and entered the judgment, which is the subject of

Garry’s appeal to this court.

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                   II.       Assignments of Error

          {¶12} Garry brings three assignments of error in her appeal. In her first

assignment of error, Garry argues that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion in denying

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike two jurors: one was unable to be impartial and the other had a

departure deadline which would have interfered with his ability to serve, resulting in

prejudice.” In her second assignment of error, Garry asserts that “[t]he trial court [erred]

in disallowing impeachment of defendant when [Mr. Borger] offered evidence

contradicting his explicit stipulation which excused his negligence and aroused juror

sympathy.” Finally, for her third assignment of error, Garry stated that “[t]he cumulative

effect of the trial court’s errors mandates a new trial.”

                                      III.    Law and Analysis

   A. First Assignment of Error

          {¶13} In her first assignment of error, Garry argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying her motions to strike the two jurors, which resulted in Garry

exercising two peremptory challenges that otherwise would have been used on other

jurors.

          {¶14} An appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision as to a juror’s ability to

be impartial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 31, 553 N.E.2d

576 (1990), citing State v. Wilson, 29 Ohio St.2d 203, 211, 280 N.E.2d 915 (1972); see

State v. White, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150250, 2016-Ohio-3329, ¶ 35. A trial court has

broad discretion in determining whether to remove a prospective juror for cause. Gurley

v. Nemer, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21965, 2004-Ohio-5169, ¶ 5. A trial court’s ruling on a

challenge for cause will therefore not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

Id. at ¶ 6. The term “abuse of discretion” implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable. Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169, 559 N.E.2d 1301

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

(1990). When applying this standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court. Id. “The decision not to remove a potential juror for cause is a

matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Person, 174 Ohio App.3d

287, 2007-Ohio-6869, 881 N.E.2d 924, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.).

       {¶15} First, Garry asserted that Juror A could not be fair and impartial. R.C.

2313.17 governs challenges of jurors for cause. As applicable here, R.C. 2313.17(B)(9)

provides that a prospective juror may be excused for cause when that person “discloses by

the person’s answers that the person cannot be a fair and impartial juror or will not follow

the law as given to the person by the court.” In addition, R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) “requires the

court to make a subjective determination about a potential juror’s fairness and

impartiality and therefore requires the exercise of judicial discretion.” Hall v. Banc One

Mgmt. Corp., 114 Ohio St.3d 484, 2007-Ohio-4640, ¶ 1. “The determination of whether

a juror is impartial or biased involves a judgment of credibility, which may not be apparent

from the record on appeal. Therefore, a reviewing court will defer to the trial judge who

sees and hears the juror.” Hunt v. E. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105953, 2019-

Ohio-1115, ¶ 37.

       {¶16} In the present case, Juror A expressed in her questionnaire that she “did

not like cops” and believed that the “judicial system” is “corrupt and racist.” However, the

juror assured the court that she could listen to evidence from both sides with impartiality

and that she would follow instructions given by the court. See Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio

St.3d 161, 169, 559 N.E.2d 1301 (1990) (assurances from a juror that she could be

impartial and would follow the law were material). After interviewing this juror, the trial

court was convinced that she would make an effective juror and that any bias she may

have would not be relevant in the present civil case. The juror also expressed some

trepidation about making a judgment in the case, but the court noted that it believed this

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

represented an ability to appreciate the seriousness of the task at hand and would make

her an attentive juror.

       {¶17} Garry relies on Tisdale v. Toledo Surgical Specialists, Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-07-1300, 2008-Ohio-6539, to support her position. In Tisdale, a party moved to

strike a prospective juror due to an inability to be impartial and fair in deliberation. Id.

The question of impartiality in Tisdale stemmed from the fact that the juror had worked

at the defendant hospital for decades and had worked closely with various defendants and

key witnesses, including her immediate superior. Id. However, Tisdale is clearly

distinguishable in the severity of the potential bias present. In the present case, Juror A

expressed general negative feelings about police and the judicial system. While this may

have warranted further discussion with counsel and the court to ensure she could be

impartial, it is clearly distinguishable from the direct conflicts of interest addressed in

Tisdale.

       {¶18} The present case bears a closer resemblance to Long v. Harding, 12th Dist.

Butler No. CA2020-11-120, 2021-Ohio-4240, where the prospective juror indicated that

he believed some personal-injury litigants used the process “as a way to get money” and

sometimes used the system to their advantage. Id. at ¶ 18. The Long court denied the

challenge for cause because “[w]hile [the prospective juror] expressed skepticism

regarding potential fraudulent claims and resulting damage awards, she never stated she

could not be impartial.” Id. The Long court noted that her answers were an “implicit

recognition that a plaintiff bears the burden of proof and disclosed her intent to scrutinize

evidence rather than blindly accept it.” Id. at ¶ 23. Because the trial court was in the best

position to observe the juror’s demeanor and judge her ability to be impartial, the

appellate court did not find an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 24.

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶19} In State v. Person, this court found that a prospective juror who admitted

that he had already decided the defendant was guilty due to a newspaper article could be

rehabilitated through extensive questioning of counsel and the court as well as an

attestation that he would be “fair and impartial.” Person, 174 Ohio App.3d 287, 2007-

Ohio-6869, 881 N.E.2d 924, at ¶ 30. “While [the prospective juror] conceded that he had

formed an opinion about the case, he also said that the opinion was based on an

incomplete account, that he would listen to both sides, and that he would apply the

applicable law as it was given to him.” Id. at 31. These assurances were sufficient to

conclude that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to remove the

prospective juror for cause. Id.

       {¶20} Viewing the totality of the voir dire proceedings and considering the

deference to which the trial judge is entitled in seating a jury, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it refused to excuse Juror A for cause.

       {¶21} Regarding Juror B, Garry argued that a scheduling conflict that would

require him to leave by 3:00 p.m. on Tuesday and Thursday made him unfit to serve on

the jury. Garry asserted that this new time constraint “materially interfered with her

coordination of material witnesses and her ability to present her case in chief through

witnesses, given their schedules.”

       {¶22} In the trial court’s entry denying plaintiff’s Civ.R. 59 motion for a new trial,

it provided the following reasoning for not dismissing Juror B:

       [T]he Court did not limit the amount of days the trial could commence and

       the parties were permitted to present witnesses by Zoom. This Court

       allows witnesses to be taken out of turn. There are numerous time

       impediments that cannot even be anticipated in any given trial, particularly

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       in the midst of a global pandemic, but the Court was confident that the

       trial’s schedule would not be greatly affected by this potential juror.

       {¶23} The appellate court must defer to the trial court unless its actions are

deemed “unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Berk, 53 Ohio St.3d at 169, 559

N.E.2d 1301. A decision is made arbitrarily when “made without consideration of or

regard for facts [or] circumstances.” State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16,

97 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 12, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 96 (5th Ed.1979). Notably, even

though Juror B was dismissed via a peremptory challenge, the record reflects that the trial

adjourned before 3:00 p.m. on those two days that the potential juror would have needed

to leave early to teach his class. Given the trial court’s reasoning and the modest

imposition on scheduling, it cannot be said that the decision to not dismiss Juror B was

“unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Id. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it refused to excuse Juror B for cause.

       {¶24} Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

   B. Second Assignment of Error

       {¶25} In her second assignment of error, Garry argues that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying her attempt to call Deputy Hicks as a rebuttal witness and to

impeach the testimony of Borger. In order to reverse the decision of the trial court

concerning admission or exclusion of evidence, this court must find both an abuse of

discretion and proof of material prejudice. Ijakoli v. Alungbe, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

210366, 2022-Ohio-2423, ¶ 26. An abuse of discretion prejudices a party when it affects

a substantial right. See Evid.R. 103(A). “In other words, the exclusion must have ‘affected

the final determination of the proceeding.’ ” Ijakoli at ¶ 29, quoting Buckmaster v.

Buckmaster, 4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA13, 2014-Ohio-793, ¶ 23.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶26} Rebuttal evidence is that which is given to explain, refute, counteract, or

disprove facts given in evidence by the adverse party. State v. Bowman, 144 Ohio App.3d

179, 186, 759 N.E.2d 856 (12th Dist.2001), citing State v. McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 446,

700 N.E.2d 596 (1998). Rebuttal evidence becomes relevant only to challenge the

evidence offered by the adverse party, and such evidence is limited in scope to serve that

purpose. McNeill at 446. The admission or exclusion of rebuttal testimony is within the

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

       {¶27} Garry asserts that the statements made by Borger were “highly prejudicial”

and resulted in an “insufficient verdict” that was “not based on actual evidence” but

instead resulted from the “unchecked arousal of juror passions.” Further, Garry argues

that Borger engaged in “juror nullification,” which she defines as “where a party implies

or insinuates excuse from the law hoping that jurors will ignore the law or jury

instructions and act on their prejudices or passion.” Therefore, Garry argues the rebuttal

testimony of Deputy Hicks was necessary to combat this prejudicial effect on the jury.

Garry argues that “[w]hile Borger did not expressly say ‘it was the pedestrian’s fault,’ his

testimony clearly implied that he had no choice but to hit Ms. Garry.” Significantly,

Borger, in his testimony during direct examination, admitted that he was at fault,

including conceding that his speed and inability to stop was the reason that he crossed the

center line:

       Q: Joseph, do you know whose fault the accident was?

       A. It was mine.

       Q. And you understand now that you were driving too fast for the icy road?

       A. Yes.

Further, during cross-examination, Garry’s counsel asked the following:

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       Q: And you agree that the reason that you were going to hit the pedestrian,

       as you say, is because you were not leaving enough room in front of your

       vehicle to safely stop if you encountered a hazard in the roadway?

       A: Correct.

       {¶28} The assertion that Borger abdicated responsibility in his testimony does

not align with the record. Thus, the trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion

in excluding this evidence. See State v. Dubose, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070397, 2008-

Ohio-4983, ¶ 69.

       {¶29} Even still, it is possible that Deputy Hicks’s testimony should have been

admitted for impeachment. A statement made by Borger to police after the accident

would constitute a prior inconsistent statement and therefore be governed by Evid.R.

613(B) for the purposes of impeachment. See State v. Dearmond, 179 Ohio App.3d 63,

2008-Ohio-5519, 900 N.E.2d 692, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.); State v. Scheidel, 165 Ohio App.3d 131,

2006-Ohio-195, 844 N.E.2d 1248, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.); State v. Holmes, 30 Ohio St.3d 20,

23, 506 N.E.2d 204 (1987). Under Evid.R. 613(B), extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent

statements is admissible only if both of the following apply:

       (1) If the statement is offered solely for the purpose of impeaching the

       witness, the witness is afforded a prior opportunity to explain or deny the

       statement and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate

       the witness on the statement or the interests of justice otherwise require;

       (2) The subject matter of the statement is one of the following:

               (a) A fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

               other than the credibility of a witness;

               (b) A fact that may be shown by extrinsic evidence under Evid.R.

               608(A), 609, 616(A), or 616(B);

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                 (c) A fact that may be shown by extrinsic evidence under the

                 common law of impeachment if not in conflict with the Rules of

                 Evidence.

Evid.R. 613(B)

        {¶30} The first requirement for impeachment with a prior inconsistent

statement, as stated above in Evid.R. 613(B)(1), is that a witness must be afforded an

opportunity to explain or deny a prior inconsistent statement before extrinsic evidence of

that statement is admissible. State v. Weathersby, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-971055, 1998

Ohio App. LEXIS 5762 (Dec. 4, 1998). However, as the trial court noted, “[d]efendant was

never questioned about his non-statement to Hicks, thus he never denied making the

statement.” Borger was never asked whether he did or did not tell Deputy Hicks about a

pedestrian. Therefore, as identified by the trial court, the first requirement under Evid.R.

613 has not been satisfied and the extrinsic evidence for impeachment was correctly

excluded.

        {¶31} Therefore, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying Garry’s attempt to call Deputy Hicks as a rebuttal witness to impeach the

testimony of Borger.

    C. Third Assignment of Error

        {¶32} Finally, in her third assignment of error, Garry argues that the cumulative

effect of the trial court’s errors deprived her of a fair trial.

        {¶33} Under the doctrine of cumulative error, “a judgment may be reversed if the

cumulative effect of multiple errors deprives a defendant of his constitutional rights even

though, individually, the errors may not rise to the level of prejudicial error or cause for

reversal.” Stanley v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-999, 2013-

Ohio-5140, ¶ 124, citing State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995).

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

However, “the cumulative error doctrine is not typically employed in civil cases.” Id. In

addition, “the doctrine of cumulative error is inapplicable when the alleged errors are

found to be harmless or nonexistent.” State v. Adkins, 2020-Ohio-1618, 153 N.E.3d 970,

¶ 66 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Shine, 2018-Ohio-1972, 113 N.E.3d 160, ¶ 141 (8th Dist.).

          {¶34} The cumulative error doctrine is not typically employed in civil cases, and

even if it were applied, the present case lacks the numerous errors necessary to rise to the

level of cumulative error. See State v. Hinkle, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-20-02, 2020-Ohio-

5571, ¶ 70. The above analysis does not support a finding of error and thus cannot

constitute the “numerous instances of trial court error” necessary for cumulative error.

See State v. Leach, 150 Ohio App.3d 567, 2002-Ohio-6654, 782 N.E.2d 631, ¶ 57 (1st

Dist.).

                                        D. Conclusion

          {¶35} The trial court did not err when it denied plaintiff-appellant Garry’s

motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59. Therefore, Garry’s three assignments of error are

overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

B ERGERON and W INKLER , JJ., concur.

Please note:
          The court has recorded its own entry this date.

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