Court Opinion

ID: 9899016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 19:00:34.91891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:19.254101
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30159        Document: 00516968644             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/15/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                      FILED
                                                                               November 15, 2023
                                       No. 23-30159                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Nakenia Johnson,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Iberia Medical Center Foundation,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 6:21-CV-3769
                     ______________________________

   Before Southwick, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Nakenia Johnson, a black woman, worked at Iberia Medical Center
   Foundation (“IMC”) from 2007 until her termination in 2021. Before being
   terminated, Johnson applied for but did not obtain a promotion to Medical-
   Surgical Manager in February 2021. Johnson claims that she did not receive
   this promotion because IMC’s promotion interview panel was comprised
   solely of white women. Johnson complained about the panel to IMC staff

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 23-30159

   both verbally and through email. IMC fired Johnson three months after she
   complained, citing numerous written and verbal complaints about her work
   performance and negative personal interactions with other IMC employees
   stretching back to August 2019.
          Johnson sued IMC for retaliation, racial discrimination, and failure-
   to-promote. The District Court dismissed all claims at summary judgment,
   finding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that IMC’s reasons
   for declining to promote and ultimately firing Johnson were legitimate, non-
   discriminatory, and non-pretextual. Johnson appealed.
          Johnson failed to adequately brief her proffered points of error save
   those concerning her retaliation claim, so those other claims are abandoned.
   As to Johnson’s retaliation claim, our review of the record confirms that there
   is no genuine dispute of material fact that IMC’s reasons for terminating her
   were legitimate, non-retaliatory, and non-pretextual. We AFFIRM.
                                I. Background
          Johnson joined IMC in October 2007, and worked as a charge nurse
   there until her termination in June 2021. While there, Johnson received
   positive feedback regarding her work performance, but also many complaints
   concerning work performance and especially negative interpersonal
   interactions with other IMC employees. This case stems from an incident
   where Johnson applied for, but did not obtain, a position as an IMC Medical-
   Surgical Manager in February 2021. As part of this process, Johnson and the
   other candidate, Marie Delcambre (a white woman), submitted applications
   to and conducted interviews with a selection panel. Only white women
   served as panelists on this panel. The same panel met with each candidate
   separately, asked them the same set of questions, and then each panelist

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   individually scored the candidate’s response to those questions. The
   panelists unanimously recommended, and IMC chose, Delcambre. 1
          Johnson verbally complained to chief nursing officer Sandy Morein
   that the panel was not diverse soon after learning that she did not obtain the
   position. She then emailed Morein on March 1, 2021, to voice the same
   complaint, insinuating that IMC’s decision to hire Delcambre over her was
   motivated by race.
          IMC terminated Johnson three months later on June 1, 2021, citing
   “repeated incidents of inappropriate and rude communications and behavior
   with regard to her fellow workers resulting in numerous complaints” as the
   reason for termination, then marked her as ineligible for rehire. Indeed,
   Johnson had over twenty written and verbal complaints filed against her for
   work performance issues and negative interpersonal interactions with other
   IMC employees stretching back to August 2019 at the time IMC terminated
   her. Johnson filed an EEOC complaint one week later. She then sued IMC
   after receiving her right to sue letter.
          Johnson filed suit against IMC for denial-of-promotion, racial
   discrimination, and retaliation. IMC filed a motion for summary judgment
   after the completion of discovery, which the District Court granted in full.
   Johnson appealed after the District Court denied her subsequent motion to
   alter or amend judgment.

          _____________________
          1
             The record reveals that IMC chose Delcambre because, in its judgment, (1)
   Delcambre’s managerial experience was superior; (2) Delcambre possessed better
   managerial temperament; (3) Delcambre performed better than Johnson during the peer
   interview process; and (4) the peer review panel unanimously recommended Delcambre
   for the Medical-Surgical Manager position and unanimously did not recommend Johnson.

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                                      II. Discussion
       A. Johnson Abandoned All Arguments Save Those
              Concerning Her Retaliation Claim.
           We first evaluate IMC’s argument that Johnson abandoned and
   waived her arguments concerning (1) the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
   (2) race discrimination, (3) failure to promote, and (4) evidentiary concerns
   regarding hearsay and authentication. IMC argues that Johnson’s opening
   brief only raises the issue of retaliation under Title VII, so all other claims or
   arguments should be deemed abandoned and waived. “An appellant
   abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal . . . [and
   a] party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the
   claim.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
   original) (collecting authority); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (“The
   appellant’s brief must contain . . . [the] appellant’s contentions and the
   reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
   which the appellant relies.”) (emphasis added); Roe v. Johnson Cnty., No. 21-
   10890, 2023 WL 117826, at *3 n.5 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2023) (“Roe’s remaining
   arguments are inadequately briefed and thus abandoned.”) (citing Cinel, 15
   F.3d at 1345). We address IMC’s points in turn.
           First, IMC is correct that Johnson does not meaningfully address 42
   U.S.C. § 1981’s application to her claims in her opening brief; indeed, she
   only mentions the statute in passing on a single page. She thus abandons
   arguments relating to it because of inadequate briefing. Cinel, 15 F.3d at 1345
   (5th Cir. 1994). 2

           _____________________
           2
             Further, the District Court was right to dismiss claims relating to this statute
   because IMC is a Louisiana political subdivision, La. R. S. § 46:1064, so Johnson’s § 1981
   claims against it fail regardless. See, e.g., Oden v. Oktibbeha Cty., Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 462–
   63 (5th Cir. 2001).

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           Second, IMC is correct that Johnson abandoned her race
   discrimination claims. Johnson makes this clear in her opening brief. 3 That,
   and a review of her brief, confirms that these lines of argument were
   abandoned. Id. Third, IMC is correct that Johnson fails to adequately brief
   her failure to promote claim on appeal. While Johnson states that this claim
   is one of two bases for her appeal, she devotes no argument to it. Instead, the
   brief only discusses the promotion process as it relates to her alleged
   protected activity of complaining about not being promoted. Arguments
   concerning her failure to promote claim are thus abandoned due to
   inadequate briefing. Id.; see also L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs.,
   Inc., 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th Cir. 1994) (argument lacking citation to authority
   deemed abandoned).
           Fourth, IMC is correct that Johnson fails to adequately brief her issues
   regarding the District Court’s consideration of summary judgment evidence.
   All Johnson offers is a single paragraph of “argument” where she makes
   conclusory statements regarding alleged hearsay and personal knowledge
   issues contained within certain affidavits. She offers no analysis or caselaw at
   all, and in doing so abandons these issues. Cinel, 15 F.3d at 1345 (5th Cir.
   1994); see also Bradley v. Sheriff’s Dep’t St. Landry Par., 958 F.3d 387, 395
   (5th Cir. 2020) (“Bradley has inadequately briefed the issue. Bradley devotes
   a single paragraph to his prosecution claims. . . . [He only offers] conclusory
   assertions devoid of any specifics [and fails to] cite any case law.”).

           _____________________
           3
              “In responding to [IMC]’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [Johnson] withdrew
   her claims of . . . race discrimination as to the 2020 denial of promotion to the Medical
   Surgical Manager position, her race discrimination claim regarding acts of Dr. O’Brien,
   [and] her claim of racial harassment . . . . [Johnson] recites only the parts of her argument
   in opposition to IMC’s Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to her showing of
   pretext on her Title VII failure to promote claim and her retaliatory discharge claim as these
   two (2) claims are the basis of this appeal.” (emphasis added).

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           We now consider Johnson’s remaining argument concerning her
   retaliation claim.
                      B. Johnson’s Retaliation Claim.
           Our de novo review 4 confirms that the District Court properly
   dismissed Johnson’s retaliation claim for her failure to demonstrate that
   IMC’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating her was
   pretextual. We review Title VII claims lacking direct evidence of
   discrimination 5 under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Cardiel v. Apache
   Corp., 559 F. App’x 284, 288 (5th Cir. 2014). That framework applies as
   follows, starting with a requirement that the employee establish a prima facie
   case of retaliation:
           To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under . . . Title VII,
           a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in an activity
           protected by statute; (2) her employer took an adverse

           _____________________
           4
              We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Johnson’s
   retaliation claim de novo. Mills v. Davis Oil Co., 11 F.3d 1298, 1301 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary
   judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the
   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Davidson v. Fairchild Controls Corporation,
   882 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2018). When considering a motion for summary judgment, a
   court “must view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
   party.” Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2013). If the
   record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
   party, then there is no genuine issue for trial. Harvill v. Westward Communications, L.L.C.,
   433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Steadman v. Texas Rangers, 179 F.3d 360, 366 (5th
   Cir. 1999)). Any unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported
   speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence and are insufficient in
   defeating a motion for summary judgment. Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 540 (5th
   Cir. 2003).
           5
            “Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of intentional
   discrimination without inference or presumption.” Brown v. E. Mississippi Elec. Power
   Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993).

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          employment action against her;[ 6] and (3) a causal connection
          exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. If
          the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
          the employer to state a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its
          decision. After the employer states its reason, the burden shifts
          back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer’s
          reason is actually a pretext for retaliation which the employee
          accomplishes by showing that the adverse action would not
          have occurred “but for” the employer’s retaliatory motive. In
          order to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must show “a
          conflict in substantial evidence” on the question of whether the
          employer would not have taken the action “but for” the
          protected activity.
   Feist v. Louisiana, Dept. of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454
   (5th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). We address each contested element in turn.
                            1. Protected Activity.
          IMC briefly mentions this issue, but tellingly does not devote more
   than a single, conclusory footnote to it and instead submits a brief that
   operates under the assumption that protected activity occurred. We assume
   arguendo that Johnson satisfies this element because, as discussed below, she
   nevertheless fails to present a genuine dispute of material fact that IMC
   presented legitimate, non-retaliatory, and non-pretextual reasons for
   terminating her.
                          2. Prima Facie Causality.
          The parties dispute whether the three-month gap between Johnson’s
   complaint concerning the hiring panel and her termination constitute prima
   facie causality for her Title VII claim. After a plaintiff establishes that she

          _____________________
          6
          The parties do not dispute whether Johnson’s termination constitutes an adverse
   employment action for the purposes of a Title VII claim.

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   engaged in protected activity, she must then show that “a causal connection
   exists between the protected activity and the adverse [employment] action.”
   Aguillard v. Louisiana Coll., 824 F. App’x 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
   denied, 141 S. Ct. 1079 (2021). Close timing between an employee’s protected
   activity and an adverse employment action can be sufficient evidence of
   causality so long as the temporal proximity is “very close.” Id.
          Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Johnson, the three-
   month lapse of time between emailing Morein and her termination is
   sufficient to establish the causality element of her prima facie claim. See, e.g.,
   Feist, 730 F.3d at 454 (holding that “[w]hile a four-month gap may be
   sufficient evidence of causation, a five-month gap is too long absent other
   evidence”).
           3. Legitimate Non-Retaliatory Reasons for
                          Termination.
          The burden now shifts to IMC, which must now articulate a
   “legitimate, nonretaliatory reason” explaining its adverse employment
   action. Feist, 730 F.3d at 454. IMC’s burden is “only one of production, not
   persuasion, and involves no credibility assessment.” McCoy v. City of
   Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2007). To satisfy this burden, IMC
   “must articulate a nondiscriminatory reason with sufficient clarity to afford
   [Johnson] a realistic opportunity to show that the reason is pretextual.”
   Watkins v. Tregre, 997 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Burton v.
   Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 231 (5th Cir. 2015)). It does so.
          IMC carries its burden by submitting evidence that it terminated
   Johnson after receiving numerous internal complaints concerning both her
   work performance and negative interpersonal interactions with other IMC
   employees stretching back to August 2019—predating her application for a
   promotion. IMC thus carries its burden of production. See, e.g., Godfrey v.

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   Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2022 WL 495040, at *8 (W.D. La. Feb. 17, 2022)
   (“[P]oor performance is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
   termination.”) (citing Tregre, 997 F.3d at 282); Burton v. Freescale
   Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 231 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We have repeatedly
   held that a charge of ‘poor work performance’ is adequate when coupled with
   specific examples.”) (collecting authority).
    4. Johnson Presents no Genuine Dispute of Material
    Fact that IMC’s Proffered Reason for Termination
                      was Pretextual
          Since IMC proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
   terminating Johnson (a multi-year history of complaints regarding poor
   performance and negative interpersonal interactions in this case), Johnson
   must establish that her protected activity constituted a “but for cause of the
   adverse employment decision” by showing that IMC’s nondiscriminatory
   justification is merely pretextual. Saketkoo v. Administrators of Tulane Educ.
   Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 1001–02 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted).
   She must do this by showing that the adverse action would not have occurred
   but for the employer’s retaliatory motive. Feist, 730 F.3d at 452–54. Johnson
   must show “a conflict in substantial evidence” on the question of whether
   IMC would not have taken the adverse action “but for” the protected
   activity to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 454 (emphasis added) (quoting
   Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1996). “This inquiry
   requires a greater showing than mere causal connection. It requires that the
   plaintiff show that protected conduct was the reason for the adverse action.”
   Owens v. Circassia Pharms., Inc., 33 F.4th 814, 834–35 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (emphasis added). “In other words, even if a plaintiff’s protected conduct is
   a substantial element in a defendant’s decision to terminate an employee, no
   liability for unlawful retaliation arises if the employee would have been
   terminated even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Id.; Wantou v.

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   Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422, 437 (5th Cir. 2022) (same).
   Johnson fails to make this showing.
          Other than the three-month temporal proximity between Johnson’s
   email complaining about the panel composition and her termination, no facts
   support a retaliatory motive by IMC. See, e.g., Myers v. Crestone Int’l, LLC,
   121 F. App’x 25, 28 (5th Cir. 2005) (summary judgment warranted where
   “[t]he only evidence of a connection between [plaintiff’s] firing and her
   [protected] activity . . . is the timing[.]”). There is nothing to suggest that,
   but for Johnson’s complaints regarding the panel, she would not have been
   terminated. On the contrary, the record reflects many complaints had been
   filed against Johnson for her performance and negative interpersonal
   interactions with other IMC employees, dating back years before she
   complained about the panel. Such a record fails to create a genuine dispute
   of material fact that Johnson would not have been terminated but for her
   engaging in protected conduct. See Owens at 834–35. That Johnson received
   some past acknowledgement of positive performance does not indicate that
   her complaining about the panel was the “but for cause” for her termination.
   Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 1001–02. Johnson fails to demonstrate that IMC’s
   proffered reason for termination was merely pretextual, which dooms her
   retaliation claim.
                               III. Conclusion
          Johnson’s retaliation claim fails to present a genuine dispute of
   material fact that IMC’s proffered reason for termination was merely
   pretextual, and her other claims fail due to abandonment and waiver. We
   AFFIRM the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.

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