Court Opinion

ID: 9541710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:27:57.940601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:30.282099
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Appellant contends that Ms pre-sentencing request to withdraw his guilty plea to armed robbery was erroneously denied.
At the time his guilty plea was tendered, the appellant was a 29-year old Czechoslovakian citizen, who had entered the United States in 1969 with his family. While he had been educated in his home country for *556the profession of an electronics engineer, the appellant was not gainfully employed due in part to his unsatisfactory command of the English language. At the time of his arrest, the appellant allegedly confessed to two prior robberies and had in his possession in excess of $7,000 taken from a third bank robbery. Appellant was indicted on the three robberies and attendant larcenies. Two days after his arrest in Dauphin County for the state offenses, federal detainers were lodged and indictments were subsequently returned in the United States District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, charging the appellant with the same offenses under the federal criminal statutes. In October of 1971, the appellant pleaded guilty to the federal offenses, and was scheduled for deportation hearings to be held within the next few months.
On December 8, 1971, in the presence of counsel and ■with the assistance of an interpreter,1 the appellant pleaded guilty to the state offenses after an extensive colloquy. When the appellant returned to the Dauphin County Court for sentencing on April 24, 1972, he requested leave to withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. On May 2, 1972, oral motions were heard, and subsequently denied. At this hearing, the district attorney informed the Court that the appellant was scheduled for sentencing on federal charges on the next *557day. Appellant was thereafter sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 7% nor more than 15 years.
At the hearing to consider appellant’s request, the appellant offered the following as cause for withdrawal of his guilty plea: Appellant stated that his attorney at time of trial had threatened him that if he pressed for trial, he would withdraw his appearance and support; furthermore, he said that he had been in a state of fear as this was Ms first arrest in the United States and that a prior confrontation with the communist form of justice for “political crimes” had left him in confusion, so that he believed that cooperation with his attorney and with the court system was essential to his well-being; he asserted that he did not understand the implication or the meaning of the colloquy, both because of his fear and because the interpreter was inadequate; and, finally, he stated that he had pleaded guilty to the federal offenses because it was his understanding that a deportation, and not imprisonment, would result therefrom.
It was certainly within the trial court’s discretion to test the credibility of the appellant and believe tidal counsel who denied any threats over the allegations of the appellant. It is, however, my opinion, that the cumulative nature of appellant’s situation at the time he tendered his guilty plea,2 and because his request *558was made prior to sentencing, tbe trial court should have permitted a withdrawal of the guilty pleas. Since the Commonwealth has failed to cite any prejudice that would result in availing the appellant his right to a trial by jury, this Court should “liberally allow” a request for withdrawal of a guilty plea, where, as in the instant case, the request is made prior to sentencing and the cause appears just.3
The judgment of sentence should be reversed, appellant be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas, and a new trial ordered.
Spaeth, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 The interpreter provided by the Court was not professionally employed as such, and while she had familiarity with the Slovak language, appellant submits that her proficiency and clarity of explanation was deficient precluding a thorough understanding of the trial court’s colloquy. It further appears on the state of the record that appellant, who was suffering under a language problem, did not have the benefit of counsel due to alleged waivers thereof, at either his arraignment or his preliminary hearing. In order to smoothly conduct the colloquy which resulted in appellant’s relinquishment of his constitutional right to a trial by jury, an “interpreter” was provided at this stage for the first time.

 The fact that the trial court considered the guilty pleas in the federal proceedings as relevant to his ruling on appellant’s motion to withdraw on the state charges may in itself be error. This point was not, however, raised. What is an important factor is that the trial court construed appellant’s request one day before sentencing on federal charges as a motive and as an “induce[ment] of his motion,” so as to come under Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 164, 286 A.2d 638 (1971), prohibiting the Commonwealth from prosecuting or imposing punishment for the same offense as a prior conviction in the federal courts, “unless it appears . . . that the *558interests of the Commonwealth . . . are substantially different.” A majority of this Court agreed that the timeliness of appellant’s request so as to possibly benefit by the Mills decision in escaping punishment in this Commonwealth might be “strongly suggestive of the conclusion reached by the lower court” In the federal courts, the appellant may have received a suspended sentence or may have been deported because of his alien status, his unemployment and its effect on his family’s welfare, and his criminal activity. To deny appellant’s request because of the trial court’s interest in imposing punishment for the sake of punishment, and construing Mills as a devious obviation of the criminal process, was an improper exercise of judicial discretion.

 See, Commonwealth v. Santos, 450 Pa. 492, 495-6, 301 A.2d 829 (1973); Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 190, 299 A.2d 268 (1973); A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, §2.1 (b).