Court Opinion

ID: 9590746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:58:04.691077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:37.924411
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The evidence at the hearing showed that a rule nisi and a bench warrant were issued on May 16, 1978. Appellant could not be found in Bibb County, and the only address that the probation office had on file was his mother’s Fort Valley, Georgia, address. The clerk of court sent notices to that address by certified mail, return receipt, that he had exhausted his appeals and that he was to comply with the court order. Although the incident report which initiated the abandonment action showed him to be living at a Clairmont Road address in Decatur, there was no evidence as to whether the probation officer knew of this address or had attempted to locate him there. The rules governing his suspended sentence, however, required him to report to the probation office as directed by his probation officer, to report immediately any change in his home address (which they had listéd as being his mother’s home in Fort Valley), to report any change in his place of employment, and to remain in Bibb County unless he was granted permission to leave by the court.
As Moody’s suspended sentence could not be revoked without a hearing, OCGA § 42-8-34 (d) (2), and he was notified that the remittitur had been returned and he was required to comply with the terms of his suspended sentence, he cannot now complain that he should not be required to serve his suspended sentence simply because the child he abandoned has reached the age of majority. Criminal statutes of limitation are tolled if an offender is arrested and then conceals himself before indictment or if he escapes before indictment in order to avoid arrest. See OCGA §§ 17-3-1; 17-3-2; Dennard v. State, 154 *94Ga. App. 283, 284 (267 SE2d 886) (1980). An analogous situation is presented in the instant case where the defendant had exhausted his appeals and was ordered to present himself to the court to show cause why his suspended sentence should not be revoked, and a warrant for his arrest was issued.
Decided January 30, 1989.
Ford & Ford, Michael C. Ford, for appellant.
Clarence H. Clay, Jr., Solicitor, J. Robert Sikes, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
An even stronger analogy may be made to a case in which a prisoner who is serving a sentence escapes from confinement. The time elapsing between the escape and the recapture of the prisoner contributes nothing towards service of the sentence. Theriault v. Peek, 406 F2d 117 (1968); Phillips v. Dutton, 378 F2d 898 (1967). In the instant case, Moody had been convicted of child abandonment and his sentence suspended provided he comply with the conditions imposed by the court. He did not comply, and his suspended sentence was revoked. We do not interpret OCGA § 42-8-34 (d) (2) to mean that a person so convicted may conceal himself during the child’s minority and reappear after the child reaches the age of majority and claim that he cannot be required to serve his time for violating the sentence. Such a flagrant violation of the law mandates that the period during which he conceals himself must result in a tolling of the time when he is required to serve his suspended sentence.
I must respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this dissent.