Court Opinion

ID: 9884035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:32:17.126906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:34.542701
License: Public Domain

SCHUMACHER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the stipulated terms of the original divorce decree. The decree dissolving the Prange marriage was based on two stipulations. Both parties were represented by counsel and each term was negotiated. Because stipulations represent “the parties’ voluntary acquiescence in an equitable settlement,” courts should be reluctant to alter the terms of a stipulation governing maintenance. Claybaugh v. Claybaugh, 312 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Minn.1981).
This court will find an abuse of discretion by a trial court only where there is an erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on the record before it. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn.1984). I believe this is such a case. The trial court modified the stipulated terms of the decree because it found a “change of circumstances.” It expressly recognized in its memorandum accompanying the order, however, that
respondent’s reduced income may be partially attributable to her failure to obtain employment subsequent to the dissolution. * * * The obvious implication is that respondent chose not to work. Further, it does not appear that respondent sought education or training during the past two years which would have enhanced her ability to find a good paying job. Had she done so, her income today might very well have exceeded that which she was receiving from the family business.
For the trial court to conclude that Patricia’s voluntary reduction in annual employment income from $13,000 to $9,000 was a sufficient change in circumstances to render the original stipulated settlement unreasonable and unfair appears to me to be against logic and the facts on the record.