Court Opinion

ID: 9711855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:40:35.85861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.961097
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting: I am unable to agree with the majority on the application of the Illinois statute granting a person in custody the right to be tried within 120 days from his arrest unless he occasions a delay. III. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, § 103 — 5. I cannot understand how a petition for substitution of a judge made in this case on the day of the arraignment and assignment to the judge and accomplished the same day within a matter of minutes or at most a few hours by reassignment to a different judge can possibly have occasioned delay preventing a trial within 120 days. In determining whether delay was “occasioned by the defendant,” the court is called upon to decide whether the defendant’s acts in fact caused or contributed to the delay which carried the commencement of the trial beyond the 120-day period. (People v. Nunnery (1973), 54 Ill.2d 372, 297 N.E.2d 129; People v. Fosdick (1967), 36 Ill.2d 524, 224 N.E.2d 242.) Because of the prompt presentation of the defendant’s motion for substitution of judges in this case, it did not interfere with the opportunity of the State to bring him to trial within 120 days. The decisions relied on by the majority should not be regarded as controlling in this case because none of them involve a motion for substitution presented on the same day as the arraignment and original assignment to a trial judge together with reassignment on that very day. In People v. Spicuzza (1974), 57 Ill.2d 152, 311 N.E.2d 112, the motion for change of venue was presented on the day set for trial, which was the 115th day of the 120-day period. Similarly, the reassignment in People v. Rankins (1960), 18 Ill.2d 260, 163 N.E.2d 814, was made 119 days after the last continuance granted to the defendant. In People v. Zuniga (1973), 53 Ill.2d 550, 293 N.E.2d 595, the motion for substitution was made 10 days after the original assignment, at a time when the case had already achieved some priority on the trial calendar of the judge to whom it was first assigned. People v. Iasello (1951), 410 Ill. 252, 102 N.E.2d 138, involved a reassignment because of a motion for a separate trial from codefendants as well as a motion for substitution of judges presented when, as the Supreme Court put it, “the cause was on call for trial.” (410 Ill. 252, 255.) In People v. Nowak (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 158, 258 N.E.2d 313, the 120-day period was interrupted nqt only by a request for substitution of judges, but by requests for competency hearings as well. Thus, although the second judge assigned in Nowak set the trial for the same date set by the original judge, the competency hearing, which under the 120-day statute started the running of a new term, prevented trial within the initial 120-day period. Spicuzza and Zuniga do not establish an inflexible rule that the exercise by a defendant of his right to request a substitution of judges pursuant to section 114 — 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, § 114 — 5) automatically disrupts the running of the 120-day period without regard to whether his motion results in actual delay. In Spicuzza, the court emphasized that the effect of delaying the motion to disqualify the only two judges who had entered orders in the case until the day of trial was that “a delay resulted which was attributable to the defendant.” (57 Ill.2d 152, 155.) In this case the motion for substitution was presented at the earliest possible moment and before the case could have obtained any position of priority on the trial calendar of the first judge. Since the reassignment was made on the same day, the defendant’s objection to the judge could not have delayed his trial. If the circumstances are viewed so technically that the court concludes there was some delay, it could not have been for more than a few minutes or at most a few hours. Under any reasonable interpretation of the 120-day statute, this must be regarded as de minimus. The facts in People v. Walker (1968), 100 Ill.App.2d 282, 241 N.E.2d 594 are more like those in this case than any of the other authorities cited by the majority. In Walker the- motion for substitution was not made until the day foHowing the original assignment, although no trial date had been designated. Thus, the motion for substitution was not as prompt as in this case. The court in Walker reasoned that the motion for substitution of judges of necessity caused certain disruption and some delay and that it had an adverse effect upon the orderly administrative process. The court failed, however, to specify the nature of the disruption or the way in which its effect was adverse, and the concepts refied upon in Walker to rationalize that there was delay are entirely too nebulous to convince me that the 120-day term did not expire in this case. Although the majority opinion and some of the cases on which it relies caution us not to ignore the practical administrative problems in the criminal courts and that a substitution of judges necessarily causes administrative delay, I am unable to put my finger on what those administrative problems are or what delay could possibly have been caused in this case. Thére may have been some paperwork involved in reassigning ■■ this case to á new judge, and the motion for substitution involved an • appearance before the first judge followed by a second appearance before the presiding judge for the purpose of reassignment. However, the procedures the defendant set in motion by his petition had such trifling consequences there is no justification for holding that judicial administration is not elastic enough to accommodate his right to be tried before an impartial judge as well as his right to trial within 120 days." The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial which the 120-day rule is designed to' implement is meaningless if the rule is emasculated by narrow and' technical interpretations. 1 take note. of- the majority’s stated attempt to balance the right to a speedy trial with society’s interest in the fan- administration óf justice.However, the 120-day rule is a device which serves society’s interest by ; relieving overcrowded' county jails and speeding up the administration of justice as well as by providing a statutory implementation of the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial. In the era of increasing crime in which we unfortunately live, it is incumbent upon courts to apply the 120-day rule to mean what it says. Otherwise, notwithstanding a récerit ■ amendment to the statute1 providing for temporary suspension of the running of the period when delay is occasioned by the defendant in-contrast with- the present procedure of starting a new 120-day period," society will have no way of providing enough detention centers to house the numbers of prisoners awaiting trial. I, therefore, believe that the conviction should "be reversed.   P.A. No. 79-842 (September 8, 1975) amending section 103 — 5 of the Code.of Criminal Procedure’ (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 103 — 5).