Court Opinion

ID: 9965338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 14:02:19.223994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:54.165392
License: Public Domain

21-3085-cr
United States v. Koshkin

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                    SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 2nd day of May, two thousand twenty-four.

        PRESENT:           John M. Walker, Jr.,
                           Steven J. Menashi,
                                  Circuit Judges,
                           Orelia E. Merchant,
                                  District Judge. *
____________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                 Appellee,

           v.                                                  No. 21-3085

OLEG KOSHKIN,

                 Defendant-Appellant. †
____________________________________________

*Judge Orelia E. Merchant of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
†   The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
For Appellee:                          EDWARD CHANG (Sandra S. Glover, on the
                                       brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for
                                       Vanessa Roberts Avery, United States
                                       Attorney for the District of Connecticut,
                                       New Haven, CT.

For Defendant-Appellant:               JOHN S. WALLENSTEIN, Law Office of John S.
                                       Wallenstein, Garden City, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut (Shea, J.).

      Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

      Defendant-Appellant Oleg Koshkin appeals from a judgment of conviction
entered on December 13, 2021, by the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut. After a jury trial, Koshkin was found guilty of one count of
conspiracy to cause intentional damage to a protected computer in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A), 1030(b), and 1030(c)(4)(B); and one
count of aiding and abetting the causing of intentional damage to a protected
computer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A), 1030(b), and 1030(c)(4)(B) and
18 U.S.C. § 2. The jury found that Koshkin, through his company Crypt4u,
provided crypting services to Peter Levashov, who operated an illegal botnet
known as the “Kelihos botnet.”

      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

                                         I

      First, Koshkin argues that the government did not present sufficient
evidence as to either count. He contends that there was insufficient evidence that
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he knowingly participated in the conspiracy, that he knowingly aided and abetted
Levashov in committing a crime, or that the Kelihos botnet damaged at least ten
computers.

         We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, “viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences
in the government’s favor and deferring to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’
credibility.” United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th 536, 559 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A defendant “cannot prevail on a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 560 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

         The government presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that Koshkin knew that Levashov was operating an illegal
botnet and intentionally assisted Levashov in doing so. The evidence showed that
Crypt4u developed a high-volume automated crypting system specifically for
Levashov’s Kelihos botnet. Furthermore, the government presented transcripts of
online     chat   conversations   between       Levashov    and    the   user   handle
“admin@crypt4u” regarding crypting services. In one such chat, Levashov wrote
that he was operating a “Clickbot,” which Levashov testified is a “type of bot
which generate[s] fake traffic.” Gov’t App’x 153, 155. And there was evidence that
Koshkin was the user behind the admin@crypt4u handle.

         The government also presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that the botnet infected thousands of computers, let alone ten
or more.

                                           II

         Second, Koshkin argues that the government did not present sufficient
evidence that venue was proper in the District of Connecticut, and he contends
that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to venue.

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      “Venue is proper in any district in which [the] defendant committed the
crime, and the government must prove venue by a preponderance of the
evidence.” United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2000). Venue is proper
under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) when the government establishes that the
defendant “damaged a protected computer located in the [district].” United States
v. Calonge, 74 F.4th 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2023).

      However, “even though [venue] is afforded significant Constitutional
protection, a defendant’s right to proper venue is a personal defense subject to
waiver.” United States v. Novak, 443 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2006). And we have held
that a defendant’s “objections to venue are waived” when the defendant “fail[s] to
object to venue at any point during the district court proceedings.” United States v.
Matera, 489 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Grammatikos, 633
F.2d 1013, 1022 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that when a defendant did not request a
jury instruction as to venue and did not object “to the court’s failure to include
such charges … we have long and consistently held such issues to have been
waived” and citing cases); Bala, 236 F.3d at 95 (“[A] defendant’s objections to
venue are waived unless specifically articulated in defense counsel’s motion for
acquittal.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

      Here, Koshkin did not object to venue in the district court or request a jury
instruction as to venue. He has therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. In
any event, the district court’s failure to instruct the jury as to venue was not plainly
erroneous. See Grammatikos, 633 F.2d at 1022 (holding that the defendant had
waived venue by failing to request a jury instruction as to venue and further
concluding that the district court’s failure to instruct the jury was not plainly
erroneous). There was evidence that the botnet infected tens of thousands of
computers, and Levashov testified that he “[p]robably” had “at least one bot from
every state.” Gov’t App’x 204. A jury could find by a preponderance of the
evidence that at least one of the infected computers was located in Connecticut.

                                              4
                                   *     *      *

         We have considered Koshkin’s remaining arguments, which we conclude
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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