Court Opinion

ID: 9409727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 13:06:20.385763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:52.952162
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                       CLERK OF SUPREME
                                                                       COURT JULY 7, 2023
                                                                    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 128

Cameron Mickelson and Danielle Mickelson,            Plaintiffs and Appellants
      v.
City of Rolla,                                        Defendant and Appellee

                                No. 20230009

Appeal from the District Court of Rolette County, Northeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Anthony S. Benson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.

Rachael S. Mickelson Hendrickson, Rolla, N.D., for plaintiffs and appellants.

Howard D. Swanson, Grand Forks, N.D., for defendant and appellee.
                         Mickelson v. City of Rolla
                               No. 20230009

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Cameron and Danielle Mickelson appeal from a district court order
granting summary judgment to the City of Rolla and the subsequently entered
judgment. Their attorney, Rachael Mickelson Hendrickson, requested records
from the City under the state’s open records statute, N.D.C.C. § 44-04-18. The
City argues that the district court properly granted summary judgment
because, among other things, the Mickelsons failed to give the City notice
under N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.2(3). We affirm.

                                       I

[¶2] The standard of review for summary judgment is well established:

             Summary judgment is a procedural device under
      N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c) for promptly resolving a controversy on the
      merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material
      fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed
      facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. The
      party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate there are no
      genuine issues of material fact and the case is appropriate for
      judgment as a matter of law. In deciding whether the district court
      appropriately granted summary judgment, we view the evidence
      in the light most favorable to the opposing party, giving that party
      the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be
      drawn from the record. A party opposing a motion for summary
      judgment cannot simply rely on the pleadings or on unsupported
      conclusory allegations. Rather, a party opposing a summary
      judgment motion must present competent admissible evidence by
      affidavit or other comparable means that raises an issue of
      material fact and must, if appropriate, draw the court’s attention
      to relevant evidence in the record raising an issue of material fact.
      When reasonable persons can reach only one conclusion from the
      evidence, a question of fact may become a matter of law for the
      court to decide. A district court’s decision on summary judgment is
      a question of law that we review de novo on the record.

                                       1
Solberg v. McKennett, 2021 ND 44, ¶ 6, 956 N.W.2d 767 (quoting Aftem Lake
Developments, Inc. v. Riverview Homeowners Ass’n, 2020 ND 26, ¶ 8, 938
N.W.2d 159).

[¶3] This Court has also explained its method for interpreting statutes:

            Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which is fully
      reviewable on appeal. The primary purpose of statutory
      interpretation is to determine the intention of the legislation.
      Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly
      understood meaning, unless defined by statute or unless a
      contrary intention plainly appears. If the language of a statute is
      clear and unambiguous, the letter of the statute is not to be
      disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. If the
      language of the statute is ambiguous, however, a court may resort
      to extrinsic aids to interpret the statute.

Johnson v. Menard, Inc., 2021 ND 19, ¶ 16, 955 N.W.2d 27 (citation omitted).
Whether an appellant satisfied a statutory notice requirement is a question of
statutory interpretation. Laufer v. Doe, 2020 ND 159, ¶¶ 15-20, 946 N.W.2d
707.

                                        II

[¶4] The district court found that the Mickelsons did not establish that they
complied with the notice requirement in N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.2(3). Hendrickson
requested the documents from the City under N.D.C.C. § 44-04-18(2). If an
entity violates section 44-04-18, “[a]n interested person or entity may not file
a civil action under this section seeking attorney’s fees or damages, or both,
until at least three working days after providing notice of the alleged violation
to the chief administrative officer for the public entity.” N.D.C.C. § 44-04-
21.2(3).

[¶5] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.2(3) has four requirements
before a party may sue: (1) the person must provide notice, (2) of an alleged
violation, (3) to the public entity’s chief administrative officer, and (4) at least
three working days must have passed since the first three elements were all
satisfied. Both parties agree that Rolla’s mayor is the chief administrative
officer for the City.
                                         2
[¶6] A document intended to provide notice under a statute or rule must
clearly state the fact or allegation of which the document is giving notice. The
only content required by N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.2(3) is that the notice provided
must contain “notice of the alleged violation.” Other similar statutory notice
provisions provide greater specificity as to the required content. See N.D.C.C.
§ 32-12.2-04 (describing requirements for a notice of a claim against the state
for an injury). Here we have only the ordinary meaning of this simple
provision. The ordinary meaning of “violation” is a breach of the law. Black’s
Law Dictionary 1881 (11th ed. 2019). A violation is “alleged” when it is
“[a]sserted to be true as described.” Black’s Law Dictionary 94 (11th ed. 2019).
The term “notice” carries several different meanings depending on the context.
Because this statute requires notice be provided to the public entity’s chief
administrative officer, we read the statute as referring to actual notice or
express notice. Black’s Law Dictionary 1277 (11th ed. 2019) (“actual notice.
(18c) 1. Notice given directly to, or received personally by, a party. — Also
termed express notice.”).

[¶7] Considering the plain meaning of this language in the context of the open
records statutes, we conclude that to “provide notice of the alleged violation,”
the notice must describe, paraphrase, or cite to the statutory requirement
alleged to have been violated and generally describe the facts alleged to
constitute the violation. A document does not comply with this notice statute
simply because a party could infer the fact or allegation of which notice must
be provided. Cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315
(1950) (stating where notice is required by the Due Process Clause, “[t]he
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it”).

[¶8] Here, the Mickelsons argue that they complied with the notice statute
on the basis of two exhibits in the record and because Hendrickson notified
Rolla’s mayor of the violation at a December 14, 2021 Public Works Committee
meeting and at a December 15, 2021 Regular Council meeting. The first exhibit
is an “Outline of Ordinances” that Hendrickson gave to the mayor of Rolla at
the two meetings, and the second is a letter dated December 16, 2021, written
by Hendrickson and sent to the Attorney General. The mayor received a copy
of the letter from the Attorney General.
                                       3
[¶9] Neither document gave the City notice of an alleged violation. The
outline of ordinances simply informs the City that certain records had been
requested but nothing had been received in response. The outline alleges some
delay in response, but it does not contain any statement alleging a “violation”
of any statute or rule and does not state it is to provide notice of anything. The
letter to the Attorney General states: “I am requesting an opinion under
N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.1 on behalf of my clients Cameron and Danielle Mickelson
as to whether the City of Rolla violated N.D.C.C. § 44-04-18 by failing to
respond to a record request within a reasonable time.” This sentence does not
allege that a violation occurred. Rather, it merely requests the Attorney
General’s office to determine whether the City violated the open records
statute; therefore, it is insufficient notice under N.D.C.C. § 44-04-21.2(3).
Because we conclude the letter was not sufficient to provide notice of an alleged
violation, we do not decide whether the Mickelsons established that they
provided the letter to Rolla’s mayor by sending it to the Attorney General’s
office, which forwarded it to the mayor on its own initiative.

[¶10] Finally, the Mickelsons failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that
they provided sufficient notice at either the Public Works Committee meeting
or the Regular Council meeting. The minutes of the council meeting do not
mention that the Mickelsons or Hendrickson alleged at the meeting that the
City had violated N.D.C.C. § 44-04-18(2). Nor have the Mickelsons cited to any
evidence in the record demonstrating sufficient notice was provided at either
meeting. They failed to “draw the court’s attention to relevant evidence in the
record raising an issue of material fact.” McKennett, 2021 ND 44, ¶ 6.

                                      III

[¶11] The district court properly granted summary judgment to the City. We
affirm.

[¶12] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

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