Court Opinion

ID: 9628634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:27:23.681791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:09.045273
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE CASTLES
dissenting in part.
I concur in that part of the majority opinion which holds that the issue of “accidental means” under the terms of the policy was a jury question.
I dissent from the holding that the double indemnity exclusion clause does not apply. To quote from the majority opinion:
“* * * it is not sufficient to relieve defendant of liability by the hare fact that Meyers intentionally inflicted injuries upon Terry.” Emphasis supplied.
The clause reads: “This benefit [double indemnity] does not cover death caused or contributed to directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, by: * * * injury intentionally inflicted by another person.”
“The hare fact that Myers intentionally inflicted mjuries upon Terry” is exactly what is excluded.
This court, under the guise of resolving doubts in favor of the insured, is doing violence to the plain unequivocal language of the policy and has the effect of torturing the meaning beyond its legitimate import. Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 15 Colo. 351, 25 P. 713, 11 L.R.A. 297. We should not rewrite a policy for persons, sui juris, in favor of the insured. Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 Mont. 254, 29 P.2d 1046.
The fact is conclusive that the insured died as a result of injuries inflicted by Meyers. Under the policy exclusion above, was it required for recovery that Meyers intended such a disastrous result? It is clear that Meyers did not so intend, but he did engage in fisticuffs; he did intentionally strike the blows; and the blows did produce the injuries which caused the death. The jury found by its special verdict that Meyers did not intend the result of the blows. But this is immaterial since the blows *345were intentionally struck and contributed to, indirectly at least, and wholly to the death of insured.
The court instructed, as stated in the majority opinion, as to the exception clause, along with the reasoning of the beneficiary expressed in her brief, as follows:
# * if in a given situation, [such as here] the result of an intentional act is, when contrasted by its dire, unforeseen and unexpected character, to be regarded as a result happening by ‘accident’ or by ‘accidental means’ then that same rationale must lead a court to hold, upon the same facts and in the same situation, though judged from the standpoint of the other participant, that fatal injuries inflicted by one, such as Meyers, upon another, such as Terry, are not injuries ‘intentionally inflicted’ unless the inflieter could have reasonably foreseen that injuries would ensue of the breadth and scope of those inflicted. ’ ’
The statement above leaves out somewhat significantly, the addition of the phrase, “caused or contributed to directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, by * * * injury intentionally inflicted by another person”. We think this phrase, if it means what it clearly says, eliminates any necessity to look to the intention of the inflieter as to the result of his act. And, thus, in the instant case, even though the death was by accidental means, it was excluded as caused or contributed to, directly or indirectly, wholly or partly by intentionally inflicted injuries.
In Newell v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 94 N.H. 26, 45 A.2d 579, 581, 166 A.L.R. 1111, it was held that under a somewhat similar exclusion as here, that “ * * * upon interpretation of the policy, it did not matter if the fatality was not contemplated or if the intentionally injurious act by Palmer was only indirectly or partially the cause of death. Coverage was excepted by the terms of the policy.” The Newell case was cited with approval in Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Partian, 205 Md. 60, 106 A.2d 79, a Maryland ease in which the exact exception clause as in the instant case was referred to, although not ruled upon.
*346Encyclopedia authorities differ somewhat on the rules stated. In 29A Am.Jur., Insurance, § 1198, pp. 339, 340, it is said :
“By the weight of authority an intention to cause death or inflict the specific injury which is suffered by the insured is not essential to the applicability of an exception in ease of injuries intentionally inflicted upon the insured or of injuries which are the result of an intentional act, at least if the act which causes the injury or death was intentionally directed against the insured. Thus, this conclusion has been reached where the insured was intentionally struck in the face by another person, who did not intend to kill him, and fell backward, striking his head on the pavement and fatally fracturing his skull, the injury to his face by the initial blow not being serious. [Citing Ryan v. Continental Casualty Co., 94 Neb. 35, 142 N.W. 288, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 524, Ann.Cas.1914C, 1234.] There is, however, authority to the contrary; [Citing Union Accident Co. v. Willis, 44 Okla. 578, 145 P. 812.] and there are some cases holding such a provision inapplicable where the act itself was not intentionally directed against the insured.”
This same statement with authorities appears in 56 A.L.R. 685, 690.
On the other hand, in 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 772, pp. 801, 802, it is said:
“Where a provision of the policy excludes intentional injury, it is the intention of the person inflicting the injury that is controlling; and to come within the exception, the act which causes the injury must be wholly intentional, not merely partly so. While there is some authority to the contrary, it is the general rule that the necessary intent must be to inflict the injury actually inflicted * * *. It has been held that where death ensues from the injury it is necessary that the person inflicting the injury should have had the intent to kill * *
Of all the cases cited for this proposition, I find none of them which has an exclusion clause like the one under discussion, and *347in many of them there were fact- disputes. Such is also true of the cases cited in the majority opinion.
The majority opinion is clearly wrong in law. In effect, it holds that it is against public policy to write such an exclusion clause in low cost premium insurance policies, and that this court will ignore words plainly written in construing them. If this should be desired and could be accomplished as a public policy, it should be a legislative matter and not for this court.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent to that portion of the majority opinion discussed.