Court Opinion

ID: 9852844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:37:48.871501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:35.698663
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the plain and unambiguous terms of OCGA § 5-3-7 are applicable to this case, I must respectfully dissent.
*563“If the words of a statute . . . are plain and capable of having but one meaning, and do not produce any absurd, impractical, or contradictory results, then this Court is bound to follow the meaning of those words.” Busch v. State, 271 Ga. 591, 592 (523 SE2d 21) (1999).
Where a statute is susceptible of one and only one construction, this court can not adopt a different construction merely to relieve [the] parties of some real or imagined hardship; but if the law is valid, we can only apply it in the form into which it was finally adopted as a statute by the lawmaking body.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State Revenue Comm. v. Nat. Biscuit Co., 179 Ga. 90, 100 (175 SE 368) (1934).
This case involves an appeal to a superior court. Without limitation, OCGA § 5-3-7 addresses exactly what must happen if such an appeal is dismissed. It mandates that “[a]n appeal shall suspend but not vacate a judgment and, if dismissed or withdrawn, the rights of all the parties shall be the Same as if no appeal had been entered.” As a result, when Larue Long initially appealed her case to the Superior Court of DeKalb County, it suspended the judgment already received in magistrate court. When Long later dismissed her appeal to the superior court, however, the judgment of the magistrate court was reinstated, “as if no appeal had been entered.” That is the law as drafted, and that is the law we must apply.
The holding of the majority would throw any decision by a magistrate court into uncertainty. A party who wished to avoid an adverse ruling of the magistrate court could simply appeal that ruling, dismiss the appeal, and effectively vacate the magistrate’s decision. The majority appears distracted by the fact that the appeal to the superior court is de novo; however, the fact of a de novo appeal has no impact on this question. When a losing party appeals from an adverse ruling, that party is seeking to have a higher court change the outcome of the lower court ruling. There are a number of standards of review that the reviewing court might apply. Where the standard of review is de novo, the reviewing court engages in a fiction and conducts the review as if no lower proceedings have previously occurred. But the fact remains that the only way for the losing party to obtain a different result is for the reviewing court to actually reach a different holding. In this case, the majority announces a new method. The losing party can wipe the slate clean simply by appealing and dismissing the appeal. The prevailing party is reduced to a mere observer as its favorable ruling degenerates into a meaningless judicial exercise. This cannot be the outcome that the Legislature intended.
*564Decided June 15, 2009.
William R. Carlisle, for appellant.
Allen Kopet & Associates, Adam H. Long, Veronica H. Cope, for appellee.
Fagan v. McTier, 81 Ga. 73 (6 SE 177) (1888), and Scott v. Aaron, 221 Ga. App. 254 (471 SE2d 55) (1996), have no bearing on this case. Fagan, decided in 1888, was based on the Code as it existed in 1882. All provisions of that Code have been specifically repealed. See OCGA § 1-1-10 (a) (3) (repealing all codes prior to the Code of Georgia of 1933). In turn, Scott is wholly distinguishable from the present matter. The Scott opinion holds:
An appeal from the magistrate court to the state court is a de novo appeal. OCGA § 15-10-41 (b) (1). Upon a de novo appeal, the state court is to try the issue anew and pass original judgments on the questions involved as if there had been no previous trial. Once a de novo appeal from a magistrate court in proper form is taken to a state or superior court, there is no statutory provision for the remand of the case or for reinstatement of the judgment of the magistrate court. Thus, the appeal itself may not be dismissed simply because of the absence of one of the parties to the cause.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. This case does not involve a remand or dismissal initiated by the superior court due to the absence of a party. This case involves the dismissal by a party. Therefore, Scott is simply not applicable to the case at hand.
Staying true to the plain language of the statutes in this case avoids the problems created by the majority. By its clear terms, OCGA § 5-3-7 controls the case at hand. In addition, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals below, Long’s reliance on the renewal statute, OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) (1), does not change this result. “For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. [Cit.]” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 (499 SE2d 630) (1998). OCGA § 5-3-7 specifically applies to appeals to superior courts, and OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) (1) applies to actions in the most general sense. Therefore, as the specific statute, OCGA § 5-3-7 controls the outcome of this case.
For all of these reasons, I believe the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join in this dissent.
*565Susan B. Ellis, amicus curiae.