Court Opinion

ID: 9364140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 16:03:25.678729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.246454
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed January 18, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D21-2013
                        Lower Tribunal No. 16-4224
                           ________________

                          Leila Williams, etc.,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                       Barbara Williams, et al.,
                                 Appellees.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Spencer Eig,
Judge.

     Leila Williams, in proper person.

     Glenn Ricardo Miller, LLC, and Glenn R. Miller; Arnaldo Vélez, P.A.,
and Arnaldo Vélez, for appellees.

Before LOGUE, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.

     BOKOR, J.
      We agree with the trial court that, under the circumstances present

here, no precedent exists to reopen an estate that was fully administered

and discharged over 60 years ago. See Hannan v. Doyle, 337 So. 3d 1258,

1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (citing Carraway v. Carraway, 883 So. 2d 834, 835

(Fla. 1st DCA 2004) for the proposition that “Florida case law appears to only

permit the reopening of an estate after the discharge of the personal

representative where there were procedural irregularities or facts

constituting fraud or bad faith”); but see, e.g., Egger v. Egger, 506 So. 2d

1168, 1168–69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (determining that the statute of limitations

in section 95.22, Florida Statutes (1985) doesn’t bar an action to quiet title

initiated by heirs of the decedent). The record contains no allegation of

procedural irregularities, fraud, or bad faith. Finding no error with the trial

court’s determination, we affirm the dismissal.

      However, applying the same logic, as no basis existed for the probate

court to assume jurisdiction and reopen an otherwise duly administered

estate, discharged in 1960, no basis exists for the probate court to make

further findings as to the lawful owner of the subject property. As the matter

was not properly before the probate court, the court possessed no

jurisdiction to make such findings. We therefore vacate the portion of the

order on appeal (designated as paragraph (A) in the “Further Ordered and

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Adjudged” portion of the order on appeal) that purports to determine

ownership of the subject property.

     Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

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