Court Opinion

ID: 9724862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:17:59.486687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:48.749996
License: Public Domain

RACANELLI, P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
While the record, arguably, demonstrates a valid basis for a temporary detention consistent with constitutional mínimums (see Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 51 [61 L.Ed.2d 357, 362, 99 S.Ct. 2689]; In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957]; and cf. People v. Michael (1955) 45 Cal.2d 751 [290 P.2d 852]) whether the challenged jurisdictional finding rested upon a “sound legal.. .[or] correct factual basis” (majority opn., ante, p. 780) is unascertainable. As the majority grudgingly recognizes, it is seriously doubtful whether a mere refusal to answer questions in a detention setting— without more—can ever furnish an adequate basis for an arrest. (See Terry v. Ohio (1967) 392 U.S. 1, 34 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 913-914, 88 S.Ct. 1868] (conc. opn. of White, J.); Michigan v. DeFillippo (1979) 443 U.S. 31 [61 L.Ed.2d 343, 99 S.Ct. 2627]; Brown v. Texas, supra; cf. Norwell v. City of Cincinatti (1973) 414 U.S. 14 [38 L.Ed.2d 170, 94 S.Ct. 187] [1st Amend, analysis].) Here, it would appear that the pivotal finding was based to an appreciable degree upon the minor’s resolute insistence to remain silent and to be let alone.* Although lawful grounds might have existed to support a misdemeanor violation as the majority concludes, I am aware of no rule of law which requires that doubt must be automatically resolved in favor of the state at the risk of impermissibly compromising fundamental constitutional rights. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand with instructions that the trial *782court expressly indicate whether the implied finding that the minor resisted or obstructed the officer in the discharge of his official duty is based upon factual circumstances other than the invocation of the constitutional right to remain silent.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 29, 1980. Racanelli, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 5, 1981. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 In sustaining the wardship petition, the trial court articulated its reasons in the following manner: “... it just seems to me under these circumstances, where the Officer was advised that a potential misdemeanor, malicious mischief, had taken place. He went to the deck, he observed the piece of mud on the deck. He then went to interrogate the youngsters next-door because there was a suspicion in his mind they were the ones who were responsible. [§] The youngster then refused to cooperate. He would not wait. He would not talk. He insisted on exercising the right to remain silent and his own constitutional rights. I don’t think that was reasonable. I find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Petition has been established.” (Italics added.) The court later added that if “the suspect refuses to identify himself, the officer may take that person into custody.”