Court Opinion

ID: 9536655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:04:22.173404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:55.277964
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J.
— I concur.
The majority opinion reverses as to counts 1, 3, and 4 upon the authority of People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], and People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459 [282 P.2d 509]. I dissented in those cases and my views remain unchanged concerning the undesirability there of departing from the previously established nonexelusionary rule. Nevertheless, the majority there decided that the earlier cases should be overruled, and that the exclusionary rule should be adopted. Since the decision of the cited cases, the exclusionary rule has become the rule in this state governing the admissibility of evidence; and the trial courts have been required to accept and apply it. I have reluctantly determined that I should now yield to the views of the majority and accept the exclusionary rule as the established rule.
The reasons for my determination may be briefly stated. The exclusionary rule, as established by the Cahan and Berger decisions, is admittedly merely “a rule of evidence.” (People v. Cahan, supra, p. 450.) Concerning the desirability of adopting the exclusionary rule, there has been sharp disagreement throughout the years among the best legal minds. It being merely a rule of evidence, I believe that the paramount consideration now, in the interest of the orderly administration of justice in this state, is that there be a firmly established rule which will not be subject to change from time to time with the possible change in the views of a single member of this court. My views respecting the desirability of adhering to an established rule constituted one of the reasons for my dissent in the Cahan and Berger cases. In the situation now confronting me, that same reason would seem to indicate that I should accept the rule established by the majority opinions in those cases.
Furthermore, it is clear from the opinion in the Cahan case, that this court still has before it the difficult task of adopting “workable rules” to supplement the general exclusionary rule. (People v. Cahan, supra, p. 451.) Numerous cases are now pending here involving the determination of such workable rules. Other pending cases, like the present one, call for a determination of the question of whether the admission of evidence, which should have been excluded *602under the exclusionary rule, has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Const., art. VI, §4%.) It appears desirable that all members of this court should participate in the determination of the numerous questions presented by the pending eases, and it further appears that full participation by any member of this court in the determination of many of these important questions will be possible only if such member is willing to accept the exclusionary rule as the established rule. If perchance, either the exclusionary rule itself, or any other rule that this court may adopt to supplement it, should prove unsatisfactory, it is within the province of the Legislature to deal with this important evidentiary problem in such manner as it may deem appropriate.
Edmonds, J., concurred.