Court Opinion

ID: 9838735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 18:04:31.836982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:35.054130
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/7/23 Rama Fund v. Comstock CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 THE RAMA FUND, LLC,                                        B314371

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No. 21SMCV00282)
          v.

 ADRIAN COMSTOCK,

          Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Harry J. Ford III, Judge. Affirmed.
     Shaw Koepke & Satter, Complex Appellate Litigation
Group, Jens B. Koepke and Anne M. Huarte for Defendant and
Appellant.
     Klapach & Klapach and Joseph S. Klapach for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                  ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
      Defendant and appellant Adrian Comstock defaulted on an
over $3.5 million loan that was secured by a deed of trust.
Comstock subsequently lost the property in a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale. Plaintiff and respondent, the Rama Fund, LLC
(Rama), the loan beneficiary, purchased the property. Rama filed
an unlawful detainer action to evict Comstock when he refused to
vacate the property. Rama then moved for summary judgment.
Comstock opposed the motion, arguing that the foreclosure
proceedings were invalid because they were based on an
inadequate notice of default under Civil Code section 2924.1 On
appeal, Comstock asserts a new theory that the foreclosure
proceedings were invalid pursuant to section 2953. We affirm the
judgment.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Loan
      In July 2018, Comstock took out a $3,587,500 loan from
Athas Capital Group, Inc. (Athas Capital Group) to purchase a
property in Beverly Hills. The loan was secured by a deed of
trust. Athas Capital Group assigned the beneficiary interest
under the deed of trust to Rama. Rama subsequently recorded a
substitution of trustee appointing California TD Specialists as
the substituted trustee under the deed of trust.
Comstock’s Default
      Comstock was required to repay the entire loan by
August 1, 2019. He failed to do so. In November 2019, California
TD Specialists recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell
Under Deed of Trust. The notice stated the default under
Comstock’s loan was “[t]he balance of the principal and interest

1     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Civil Code.

                                2
which became due on 8/1/2019, along with late charges,
foreclosure fees and costs and legal fees plus interest and/or
advances that have become due.” The total amount due was
$4,161,952.98.
       In February 2020, California TD Specialists recorded a
notice of trustee’s sale, with a foreclosure sale date in March
2020. Comstock and Rama agreed to postpone the sale several
times, ultimately to November 2020.
The Loan Extension Agreement
       In November 2020, Comstock, Rama, and Athas Capital
Group entered into a “Loan Extension Agreement.”
       The loan extension agreement provided that “[s]ubject to
RAMA’s timely receipt of the payment identified in section 2.a.i.
below, the Loan Documents are hereby amended and modified to
extend the Maturity Date of the Loan to December 1, 2021.”
Section 2.a.i of the agreement required that “[b]y 5:00 p.m. on
November 20, 2020, Comstock shall make a payment to RAMA in
the amount of $138,333.34 (‘Initial Installment’).” This was the
first of three required “Principal Reduction” payments
(hereinafter installment payments).
       After Comstock timely paid the initial installment, Rama
would postpone the foreclosure sale to a date on or after January
4, 2021.
       Comstock was to make a second installment payment of
$138,333.33 to Rama by 5:00 p.m. on January 1, 2021. The
agreement additionally required him to make “monthly interest-
only installment payments under the Note beginning December
1, 2020 . . . .” The agreement provided that “[i]f the Second
Installment payment and the monthly interest[-]only payment(s)
[are] made timely, Rama shall postpone the Sale to a date on or

                                3
after February 4, 2021.” The third installment payment was due
by February 1, 2021.
      Pursuant to the agreement, if Comstock timely paid a third
installment payment and all the monthly interest-only payments,
“within two (2) days of its receipt of the Principal Reduction
Payment in full, RAMA shall cause to be recorded in the County
Recorder’s Office for the County of Los Angeles a Notice of
Rescission pursuant to which RAMA shall rescind the [Notice of
Default] and [Notice of Trustee’s Sale].”
      In a section titled “Release by RAMA,” the loan extension
agreement stated: “For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this
Release by RAMA prohibits RAMA from proceeding with the
Sale, or exercising any other rights provided for in the Loan
Documents, in the event Comstock does not make all of [the]
payments required by section 2.a., 2.b., and 2.c.” The payments
required by sections 2.a, 2.b. and 2.c. are the three installment
payments.
      It is undisputed that Comstock made the first installment
payment on time, but he failed to pay the second installment
payment and monthly interest-only payment by the January 1,
2021 deadline.
Foreclosure Sale and Unlawful Detainer Action
      After Comstock failed to make the second installment
payment and monthly interest payment by January 1, 2021,
California TD Specialists conducted a foreclosure sale on January
6, 2021. Rama obtained title to the property.
      When Comstock refused to vacate the property, Rama filed
an unlawful detainer action to evict him under Code of Civil

                                4
Procedure section 1161a.2 Rama moved for summary judgment,
arguing it properly obtained title to the property at the
nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The trial court agreed, finding that
Rama had established, by undisputed facts, all three conditions
required to prevail on an unlawful detainer action under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3). The court found
that Rama established (1) a proper trustee’s sale in accordance
with section 2924, (2) duly perfected title, and (3) service on
Comstock of a three-day notice to quit.
       Comstock opposed the motion. He asserted that because
the 2019 notice of default was the only basis for the foreclosure
sale, and the 2019 default was cured by the loan extension
agreement, the sale violated section 2924, which requires a notice
of default that “set[s] forth the nature of each breach.” (§ 2924,
subd. (a)(1)(C).) After examining the terms of the loan extension
agreement, the trial court found no support for Comstock’s claim
that the agreement cured the default referenced in the 2019
notice of default or that the agreement otherwise rendered the
notice of default ineffective or void.
       The trial court also rejected Comstock’s argument that his
eviction would violate the public policy against forfeitures
because he was not a renter, he did not file a verified petition for
relief, he had made a material misrepresentation in his loan
application, and he failed to submit evidence showing he was

2    Although Comstock agreed he would not live at the
property while the loan was pending, he had, in fact, occupied the
home.

                                 5
ready and able to make “ ‘full compensation’ ” to Rama as
reflected in the 2019 notice of default.3
        Comstock timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
        Comstock asserts three arguments on appeal. As in the
trial court, Comstock contends the foreclosure sale was void
because the notice of default referred to Comstock’s failure to pay
the entire original debt by the maturity date of August 1, 2019,
and not his subsequent failure to pay the second installment
payment under the loan extension agreement. However, for the
first time on appeal, Comstock also argues the loan extension
agreement was in connection with the “making of or renewing of”
a loan secured by a deed of trust under section 2953, thus any
waiver of his rights to a new notice of default based on a breach
of the loan extension agreement was void. Finally, Comstock
claims the trial court abused its discretion by excluding his
declaration stating he was willing and able to tender all debts
due under the loan extension agreement. We find no error and
affirm.
I.      Standard of Review
        Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no triable
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c);
Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4
Cal.5th 607, 618.) When a plaintiff moves for summary
judgment, the “plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion that ‘each
element of’ the ‘cause of action’ in question has been ‘proved,’ and

3      The trial court rejected other arguments by Comstock, not
at issue in this appeal, as outside the scope of an unlawful
detainer proceeding.

                                 6
hence that ‘there is no defense’ thereto. [Citation.]” (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Beebe v.
Wonderful Pistachios & Almonds LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 351,
369.) Once the plaintiff has met its burden, “the burden shifts to
the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of
one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a
defense thereto. The defendant or cross-defendant shall not rely
upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a
triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth
the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact
exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)
       “ ‘ “ ‘ “We review the trial court’s decision de novo,
considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing
papers except that to which objections were made and
sustained.” ’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” ’
[Citation.]” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th
340, 347.)
       Our standard of review for interpreting a contract is also de
novo. (Welch v. Welch (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 283, 296.)
II.    Comstock Did Not Raise a Triable Issue of Fact as to
       the Notice of Default
       A.       Nonjudicial foreclosure
       In California, a deed of trust is the primary real estate
security device. (Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (2011) 199
Cal.App.4th 118, 125.) “Under a deed of trust, ‘the borrower, or
“trustor,” conveys nominal title to property to an intermediary,
the “trustee,” who holds that title as security for repayment of the

                                 7
loan to the lender, or “beneficiary.” ’ [Citation.]” (Orcilla v. Big
Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 995 (Orcilla).) “If the
debtor defaults on the loan, the beneficiary may demand that the
trustee conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.” (Biancalana v.
T.D. Service Co. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 807, 813.)
       “Civil Code sections 2924 through 2924k provide a
comprehensive framework for the regulation of a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale contained in a deed of
trust.” (Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830.) The
“ ‘ “purposes of [the Civil Code’s] comprehensive scheme
[governing nonjudicial foreclosures] are threefold: (1) to provide
the creditor/beneficiary with a quick, inexpensive and efficient
remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor; (2) to protect the
debtor/trustor from wrongful loss of the property; and (3) to
ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties
and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Orcilla, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 995.)
       The foreclosure process begins with the “trustee,
mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents”
recording a notice of default and an election to sell. (§ 2924,
subd. (a)(1).) The notice of default must include a “statement
that a breach of the obligation for which the mortgage or transfer
in trust is security has occurred” and a “statement setting forth
the nature of each breach actually known to the beneficiary and
of [his or her] election to sell or cause to be sold the property to
satisfy [the] obligation . . . that is in default.” (§ 2924,
subd. (a)(1)(B)–(C).) Three months after recording the notice of
default, a notice of sale may be published, posted, mailed, and
recorded 20 days before the sale date. (§§ 2924, subd. (a)(3),
2924f.)

                                 8
         Before the sale, “ ‘section 2924c allows the borrower to cure
the default, reinstate the loan, and avoid foreclosure by paying
the amount in default, plus specified fees and expenses.’
[Citation.]” (Shetty v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 796, 801.) To cure the default, the borrower must
pay “the entire amount due” other than the portion of the
principal that would not have been due if no default had
occurred. (§ 2924c, subd. (a)(1); Taniguchi v. Restoration Homes
LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 478, 483 (Taniguchi).) The borrower
may make back payments to cure the default and prevent
foreclosure until five business days prior to the date of sale.
(§ 2924c, subds. (a)(1), (e).) If the borrower “does cure the default,
the beneficiary . . . shall, within 21 days following the
reinstatement, execute and deliver to the trustee a notice of
rescission that rescinds the declaration of default and demand for
sale and advises the trustee of the date of reinstatement.”
(§ 2924c, subd. (a)(2).)
         When a property is sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale,
“ ‘[i]f the trustee’s deed recites that all statutory notice
requirements and procedures required by law for the conduct of
the foreclosure have been satisfied, a rebuttable presumption
arises that the sale has been conducted regularly and
properly . . . .’ ” (Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76,
87.)
         B.    Unlawful detainer proceedings
         Unlawful detainer proceedings under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1161a require the party who purchased
property at a trustee’s sale and is seeking to evict the property’s
occupant to establish that the party “ ‘acquired the property at a
regularly conducted sale and thereafter “duly perfected” his

                                  9
title.’ ” (Orcilla, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011, citing Vella v.
Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255; Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a,
subd. (b)(3).)
        C.    Comstock did not cure his August 2019 default,
              thus no new notice of default was required
        Comstock argues the foreclosure sale was ineffective
because he cured the 2019 default by making the first
installment payment under the loan extension agreement, and
the 2019 notice of default did not mention his failure to pay the
second installment payment. He asserts that prior to the
trustee’s sale, Rama was required to issue a new notice of default
in order to foreclose based on Comstock’s breach of the loan
extension agreement. We disagree. Paying the first installment
payment did not cure the 2019 default, thus Rama was not
required to record a new notice of default before the foreclosure
sale.
        As the court observed in Orcilla, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at
page 1001, section 2924c does not specifically define “ ‘cure[,]’
[but] Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘cure of default’ ” as “ ‘[a]
debtor’s act to correct its failure to perform, or to refrain from
performing, according to the terms of an agreement.’ [Citation.]”
Section 2924c instructs that a “cure” requires the payment of “the
entire amount due, at the time payment is tendered, with respect
to (A) all amounts of principal, interest, taxes, assessments,
insurance premiums, or advances actually known by the
beneficiary to be, and that are, in default and shown in the notice
of default . . . , (B) all amounts in default on recurring obligations
not shown in the notice of default, and (C) all reasonable costs
and expenses . . . that are actually incurred in enforcing the
terms of the obligation . . . and trustee’s or attorney’s fees . . .

                                 10
other than the portion of principal as would not then be due had
no default occurred . . . .” (§ 2924c, subd. (a)(1).)
       Entering into a loan modification agreement, or the
extension of a loan, does not automatically or necessarily cure a
borrower’s preexisting default. (Orcilla, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1001–1002; Taniguchi, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 488.)
Instead, courts look to the parties’ agreement to determine the
steps, if any, the borrower must take beyond executing the
subsequent agreement.
       Orcilla is instructive. In Orcilla, after the borrowers
defaulted on a home loan, the parties entered into an agreement
that modified the loan’s principal balance and monthly payment.
(Orcilla, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 991.) The court rejected
the borrowers’ argument that by entering into the agreement
they cured their prior default under section 2924c, such that the
lender was required to rescind the original notice of default and
issue a new one prior to the trustee’s sale. (Id. at pp. 1001–1002.)
The court reasoned that while language stating “ ‘[t]his
agreement will bring your loan current,’ ” could, in isolation, be
viewed as indicating that merely entering into the agreement
cured the past default, “more specific language” in the agreement
“foreclose[d] that interpretation by making clear that ongoing
foreclosure proceedings would continue without additional notice
if the terms and conditions of the letter were not satisfied. One of
those terms required [the borrower] to make monthly payments
of $4,627.47 beginning September 1, 2008.” (Id. at p. 1001.)
Because the Orcillas did not allege they made the monthly
payments, the court concluded they had not “adequately allege[d]
violations of section 2924c, subdivision (a)(2) and section 2924,
subdivision (a)(1).” (Ibid.)

                                11
       With this in mind, we turn to the loan extension agreement
to determine whether the parties intended that Comstock’s
payment of the first installment payment under the loan
extension agreement would “cure” the default identified in the
November 2019 notice of default. “Contract interpretation is a
question of law.” (Canyon Vineyard Estates I, LLC v. DeJoria
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 995, 1003 (Canyon Vineyard Estates I,
LLC).) When interpreting a contract, “the intention of the parties
is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible.” (§ 1639.)
If a contract’s language is clear and unambiguous, intent is
determined solely by the language within the four corners of the
contract. (Brown v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 418, 432.)
“The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give
effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping
to interpret the other.” (§ 1641.) “Particular clauses of a contract
are subordinate to its general intent.” (§ 1650.)
       Nothing in the text of the loan extension agreement
indicates Comstock would cure his August 2019 default merely by
entering into the agreement and paying his first installment
payment. Instead, the agreement required Rama to file a notice
of rescission of the notice of default and the notice of trustee’s
sale only “[i]f the Third Installment payment and the monthly
interest[-]only payments are made timely.” It is undisputed
Comstock did not make these payments. The agreement also
states that if Comstock timely paid the “[i]nitial [i]nstallment”
then “RAMA shall postpone the Sale to a date on or after January
4, 2021.” Together, these sections of the loan extension
agreement establish that the first installment payment did not
cure the default but rather temporarily postponed the sale, and
the default would be cured only after Comstock made the third

                                12
installment payment and the monthly interest-only payments.
Moreover, the agreement provides that nothing “prohibits RAMA
from proceeding with the Sale . . . in the event Comstock does not
make all of the payments required by section 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c.”
The second installment payment that Comstock failed to make on
time is in section 2.a. Read as a whole, the loan extension
agreement did not permit Comstock to cure his 2019 default by
paying the first installment payment.
       Comstock relies on the portion of the agreement stating
that the maturity date of the loan would be postponed until
December 1, 2021, if he timely paid the first installment
payment, to argue that he cured the default with that first
installment payment.4 Yet, when viewed in the context of the
more specific language in the agreement regarding rescission of
the notice of default only after the third installment payment,
this language alone cannot mean that Comstock “cured” his prior
default by making the first installment payment. If this were
true, the agreement would provide for rescission of the notice of
default after the first installment payment instead of after the
third. (Canyon Vineyard Estates I, LLC, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1003 [we must avoid an interpretation that would result in an
absurdity]; see also section 2924c, subd. (a)(2) [if the borrower
“does cure the default, the beneficiary . . . shall, within 21
days . . . execute and deliver to the trustee a notice of rescission

4     This is date by which Comstock was required to make a
“lump sum payment equal to the outstanding Principal balance of
the Loan plus all accrued interest, and any fees and other
charges that may then be due and payable pursuant to the Note,
Deed of Trust[,] and related Loan Documents.” The loan
extension agreement defines these documents corresponding to
the original July 3, 2018 loan.

                                13
that rescinds the declaration of default and demand for sale . . . .
The trustee shall cause the notice of rescission to be recorded
within 30 days . . .”].)
       This case is thus similar to Orcilla. Comstock defaulted on
his loan, entered into the loan extension agreement, then failed
to make a payment as required under the agreement. The
trustee sold the property without issuing a new notice of default.
As in Orcilla, a new notice of default was not required because
under the terms of the loan extension agreement, Comstock had
not cured his prior default. Indeed, in this case, the parties’
intent as to cure was clear because the agreement explicitly
provided for the rescission of the notice of default, but only after
Comstock made certain payments. Further, similar to the
modification agreement in Orcilla, the loan extension agreement
provided that Rama was entitled to continue with foreclosure
proceedings if Comstock failed to make “all of [the] payments
required by section 2.a.”
       Comstock attempts to distinguish Orcilla by arguing that
he made a payment under the loan extension agreement whereas
the borrowers in Orcilla failed to make any payments under their
agreement. This difference is immaterial. The Orcilla court held
that because the agreement stated “ongoing foreclosure
proceedings would continue” if the borrowers failed to satisfy “the
terms and conditions” of the agreement, and the borrowers
indeed failed to satisfy the terms and conditions of the
agreement, there was no need for a new notice of default.
(Orcilla, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.) The same is true
here. Under the loan extension agreement, the parties agreed
Rama could go forward with the sale if Comstock failed to make

                                14
one of the three installment payments. The default was never
cured, so there was no need for a new notice of default.
        This case is unlike Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan
Assn. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, on which Comstock relies to
argue that the notice of default was invalid. Anderson did not
involve a notice of default followed by a loan modification
agreement. Instead, the Anderson court held a very different
notice of default was invalid. There, the notice of default “listed
failure to pay taxes and advances for insurance premiums as
grounds of default . . . but appended the qualifying phrase ‘if any’
to the assertions.” (Id. at p. 205.) The court concluded the
phrase “if any” made the notice of default insufficiently specific,
thus creating a triable issue of fact as to whether the amount the
borrower tendered in advance of the sale to cure the default was
the correct amount. (Id. at pp. 215–217.) Comstock does not
argue that the notice of default here was in any way ambiguous,
or did not accurately refer to the amount of his August 2019
default.
        This case is also materially different from Taniguchi,
supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 478. In Taniguchi, the court concluded the
borrowers cured a default when they entered into a loan
modification agreement because the agreement stated that the
“ ‘[l]ender will bring the loan due for the October 01, 2009
payment.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 488.) In finding this language
sufficient to show that the parties intended the agreement to cure
the prior default, the court cited Orcilla, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th
982, for the proposition that “in appropriate circumstances, a
statement that an agreement ‘ “will bring your loan current” ’ can
reasonably be interpreted to mean that the agreement cures a
past default.” (Taniguchi, at p. 488.) Here, there is no such

                                15
language. Comstock argues that the statement that the first
installment payment would “extend the [m]aturity [d]ate of the
[l]oan” is similar enough to show his past default was cured. We
disagree. The more specific language in the loan extension
agreement regarding rescission of the notice of default makes
clear that Comstock did not cure his default simply by making
the first installment payment under the loan extension
agreement. No such specific language was present in the
agreement at issue in Taniguchi.
       Accordingly, Comstock did not cure the default identified in
the November 2019 notice of default when he paid the first
installment payment under the loan extension agreement. When
Comstock failed to make the second installment payment on
time, Rama had no duty under the loan extension agreement to
rescind the 2019 notice of default and issue a new one. That duty
did not arise until Comstock made a timely third payment and
paid all monthly interest payments. Rama was entitled to
proceed with the pending foreclosure sale without issuing a new
notice of default.
III. Comstock Has Forfeited His Argument Under
       Section 2953
       As noted above, Comstock’s arguments regarding cure of
the 2019 default and the resulting need for a new notice of
default were raised below, litigated, and rejected by the trial
court. However, on appeal, Comstock’s primary argument is one
he did not raise below. Comstock contends that to the extent the
loan extension agreement included a waiver of his right to a new
notice of default under section 2924, that portion of the
agreement was invalid and void under section 2953.

                                16
        Comstock concedes he has asserted this argument for the
first time on appeal; however, he contends he generally preserved
the issue by arguing the notice of default was defective. In the
alternative, he argues his claim under section 2953 is a legal
question based solely on undisputed facts present in the record,
thus we should exercise our discretion to consider the argument.
We disagree on both accounts.
        “ ‘ “As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court
cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties
must adhere to the theory (or theories) on which their cases were
tried. This rule is based on fairness—it would be unfair, both to
the trial court and the opposing litigants, to permit a change of
theory on appeal.” ’ [Citation.]” (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle
Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548.)
        Comstock’s claim under section 2953 is materially different
from his argument below that the notice of default was ineffective
because the default it described was cured by his first payment
under the loan extension agreement. Under section 2953, “[a]ny
express agreement made or entered into by a borrower at the
time of or in connection with the making of or renewing of any
loan secured by a deed of trust, mortgage or other instrument
creating a lien on real property, whereby the borrower agrees to
waive the rights, or privileges conferred upon the borrower by
[s]ections 2924, 2924b, or 2924c of the Civil Code . . . shall be void
and of no effect.”
        Comstock argues the loan extension agreement is one made
“at the time of or in connection with the making of or renewing of
any loan” under section 2953, so he could not waive his right to a
new notice of default that includes a “statement setting forth the
nature of each breach” under section 2924, subdivision (a)(1)(C).

                                 17
While Comstock’s argument, like his claim below, is premised on
the assertion that the notice of default was invalid, the similarity
between the arguments ends there. Comstock’s limited
contention that the notice of default was ineffective under
section 2924 because it failed to reference the loan extension
agreement did not preserve or encompass an argument that
section 2953 rendered part of the agreement void. Neither the
parties nor the trial court had the opportunity to consider the
applicability, if any, of section 2953. (Findleton v. Coyote Valley
Band of Pomo Indians (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 565, 569 [appellate
court loath to reverse judgment on grounds neither opposing
party nor court had opportunity to consider].)
       Comstock alternatively argues this court should exercise its
discretion to consider his argument under section 2953 because
the relevant facts are undisputed and the question is one of law.
While a party generally may not raise new theories on appeal,
“an appellate court may allow an appellant to assert a new theory
of the case on appeal where the facts were clearly put at issue at
trial and are undisputed on appeal.” (Richmond v. Dart
Industries, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 869, 879.) Here, however,
the facts relevant to the resolution of Comstock’s argument under
section 2953 were not “clearly put at issue.” (Ibid.) This is
apparent when considering Taniguchi, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th
478, the case Comstock relies on to support his section 2953
argument.5

5      Comstock suggests Taniguchi, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 478,
is “recent” authority. We note, however, that Taniguchi was
decided in December 2019, before the parties entered into the
loan extension agreement, and well before Rama instituted the
unlawful detainer proceedings in February 2021.

                                18
       In Taniguchi, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th 478, the borrowers
entered into a “loan modification agreement” after experiencing
difficulty making the required loan payments under their original
home loan. (Id. at p. 481.) The loan modification agreement
provided that the borrowers’ failure to make payments required
under the modified agreement would constitute a default and, in
the event of a default, the lender would have the option of
deeming the loan modification agreement null and void and
would have the right to enforce the original loan according to the
original terms. (Id. at p. 482.) Those original terms included
acceleration clauses authorizing the lender to require a
defaulting borrower to immediately pay the full amount of the
loan’s unpaid principal and all interest owed on that amount.
(Ibid.) The borrowers defaulted on the modified loan and were
informed that to cure the default they would be required to pay
not only the monthly payments missed under the modified loan
agreement, late charges, and foreclosure fees and costs, but also
all the principal, interest, and other charges that had been
deferred under the loan modification agreement. (Ibid.)
       Taniguchi concerned section 2924c, which provides a
statutory right of reinstatement, allowing a borrower to
“reinstate the loan by paying all amounts due, ‘other than the
portion of [the] principal as would not then be due had no default
occurred.’ ” (Taniguchi, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 483.) The
Taniguchi court concluded section 2953 voided the provisions of
the loan modification agreement that would have prevented the
borrowers from taking advantage of section 2924c’s provisions.
To reach that result, the Taniguchi court concluded the loan
modification was both made or entered into “ ‘in connection with
the making of . . . [a] loan secured by a deed of trust’ ” and was

                               19
also the “ ‘renewing of [a] loan secured by a deed of trust’ ” under
section 2953. (Id. at p. 487, citing section 2953.)
        The court reasoned the loan modification agreement was
“ ‘in connection with the making of . . . [a] loan secured by a deed
of trust’ (§ 2953), because amounts were added to the existing
loan, specifically the accrued and unpaid interest.” (Taniguchi,
supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 487.) The court also determined the
agreement could be understood as “the ‘renewing of [a] loan
secured by a deed of trust’ ” because it “amended and
supplemented the Taniguchis’ original obligation, changing the
time by which payments were due. And upon signing the
Modification, the Taniguchis were no longer in default.” (Id. at
pp. 487–488.) The court recognized that while a loan extension
may not bring an agreement under the ambit of section 2953
(Morello v. Metzenbaum (1944) 25 Cal.2d 494, 499–500), the loan
modification agreement was “not a mere extension because it
does not simply make the original loan effective for an additional
period.” (Taniguchi, at p. 488.) Although the original note
“continue[d] to exist, its terms [were] amended considerably by
the Modification.” (Ibid.) Specifically, the modification
agreement “adjusted the principal amount, eliminated an
adjustable interest rate rider, reduced the interest rate and
monthly payments, and deferred until the maturity [date] of the
loan approximately $116,000 of indebtedness, including accrued
and unpaid interest and principal, fees, and foreclosure
expenses.” (Id. at p. 481.) It also changed the loan from a 30-
year to a 10-year term. (Ibid.)
        In this case, the applicability of section 2953 is a legal
question that depends on facts not fully developed in the record
because the issue was never raised below. Whether the loan

                                 20
extension agreement was made in “connection with the making of
or renewing of any loan” under section 2953 is a fact intensive
question that depends on factors such as whether the agreement
deferred the principal; added other amounts to the existing loan,
such as interest and foreclosure expenses; and whether it
otherwise considerably amended the terms of Comstock’s original
loan. Because Comstock did not assert a defense under
section 2953, the parties did not address these issues as either
disputed or undisputed facts in connection with Rama’s motion
for summary judgment. The record, as it stands, does not provide
dispositive answers to these factual questions.
       For example, it is unclear whether the loan extension
agreement increased the principal and created a new obligation.
The agreement states, “as of the Effective Date, the outstanding
Principal amount of the Loan is $4,000,000,” yet the original loan
was for $3,587,500. The record does not reflect whether or why
the principal amount changed from the initial loan to the loan
extension agreement, or whether any change was pursuant to the
original loan agreement or was the result of negotiations between
the parties following Comstock’s first default. The adjustment of
the loan’s principal amount was a critical factor in the Taniguchi
analysis. (Taniguchi, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 487.) Evidence
such as correspondence between the parties or communications
that would show their intent in entering into the loan extension
agreement may have been relevant in determining whether the
loan extension agreement was a loan renewal within the meaning
of section 2953. (City of Hope National Medical Center v.
Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 393 [“[a] party’s conduct
occurring between execution of the contract and a dispute about
the meaning of the contract’s terms may reveal what the parties

                               21
understood and intended those terms to mean”].) Indeed, Rama
asserts it would have proffered specific evidence to defeat the
section 2953 argument had Comstock raised it below.
        Comstock’s section 2953 argument does not pertain “only to
questions of law on undisputed facts, which could not be altered
by the presentation of additional evidence.” (Glassman v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1326.) The
opposite appears to be true; the presentation of additional
evidence may have altered the facts established through the
summary judgment procedure. We therefore decline to reach
Comstock’s section 2953 argument for the first time on appeal.
(In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th
481, 509–510 [declining to consider for first time on appeal
allegations that raise new “issues of fact that could be altered by
the presentation of additional evidence”]; Krechuniak v. Noorzoy
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 713, 726–727 [declining to consider for first
time on appeal argument regarding written agreement that
presents a new factual situation “ ‘the consequences of which are
open to controversy and were not put in issue or presented at the
trial’ ”], citing Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 341; cf.
Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [considering a theory
of recovery raised for first time on appeal where the question is
“ ‘presented on the facts appearing in the record’ ” and new
“theory does not contemplate any factual situation different from
that established by the evidence in the trial court”]; see
Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 739, 767
[even if new theory raised on appeal is pure question of law court
has discretion not to consider it].)

                                 22
IV.    Comstock’s Declaration Regarding Tender
       Comstock argues the trial court improperly excluded his
declaration stating he was willing and able to tender outstanding
debt based on Rama’s evidentiary objection that the declaration
lacked sufficient personal knowledge. Although the trial court’s
written ruling indicated it sustained Rama’s evidentiary
objection, the court appeared to still consider the content of the
declaration. The court found Comstock failed to submit any
evidence he was ready and able to tender the full amount of debt
listed in the notice of default. It explained that Comstock only
submitted evidence that he was willing and able to make the
payments that were “due and owing under the [loan extension
agreement].” Thus, even if the trial court erred in sustaining the
evidentiary objection, the error was not prejudicial as the court
considered the content of the declaration and addressed the issue
of tender on a substantive basis, relating it to the amount owing
under the 2019 notice of default. Comstock does not contend he
provided evidence demonstrating an ability to tender the
outstanding debt identified in the 2019 notice of default.

                                23
                         DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Rama is to recover
its costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                        ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                 EGERTON, J.

                              24