Court Opinion

ID: 9533383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:31:15.25057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:02.302280
License: Public Domain

RAKER, J., concurring, joined by HARRELL, J.:
I join in the opinion of the Court and write separately to explain my reasons.
Maryland is one of the few states in the country that does not permit voir dire to inform the exercise of peremptory challenges. It has long been the rule in Maryland that voir dire is limited to the detection of bias sufficient to challenge a prospective juror for cause and not to assist in the exercise of peremptory challenges. See maj. op. at 11 (stating that “the single, primary, and overriding principle or purpose of voir dire is to ascertain ‘the existence of cause for disqualification’ ”) (citations omitted); Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 759 A.2d 819 (2000) (and cases cited therein); Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 633 A.2d 867 (1993).
I discern a trend in Maryland, on a case-by-case basis, to expand voir dire. The majority notes that “[i]f;. . requiring the proposed inquiry could be construed to be an expansion of the voir dire process, it certainly can not be construed to be an unreasonable one.” Maj. op. at 14 n. 8. This expanded right is addressed in the context of the exercise of challenges for *218cause, but, in my view, the expansion is, in reality, in the area of peremptory challenges. The discretion of trial judges in controlling voir dire is, little by little and case by case, being diminished. For example, this Court has identified ever-increasing areas of mandatory inquiry. See Dingle, 361 Md. at 10 n. 8, 759 A.2d at 824 n. 8. We require inquiry, when requested, into racial, ethnic, and cultural bias, see Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204, 232, 742 A.2d 952, 967 (1999); Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 285, 661 A.2d 1164, 1169 (1995); Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 15, 595 A.2d 448, 455 (1991); religious bias, see Casey v. Roman Catholic Arch., 217 Md. 595, 606-07, 143 A.2d 627, 632 (1958); predisposition as to the use of circumstantial evidence in capital cases, see Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343-44 (1946); and placement of undue weight on police officer credibility, see Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 349, 378 A.2d 1338, 1344 (1977).
In my view, Dingle represented the highwater mark in the sea change. See Dingle, 361 Md. at 22, 759 A.2d at 831 (Raker, J., dissenting) (noting that “the true issue in this case is different in kind from the many this Court has been called upon to address”). Rather than continue this case-by-case expansion of the scope of voir dire examination for cause, and in its wake continue to reverse judgments based on voir dire error, let us, once and for all, join the rest of the country and expand the purpose of voir dire in Maryland to include the informed exercise of peremptory challenges. Since we have not moved to abolish peremptory challenges,1 let us at least afford counsel the information necessary to exercise an informed challenge. To that end, I would endorse a voir dire process that would enable a lawyer to elicit sufficient informa*219tion to develop a rational basis for excluding a potential juror, whether for cause or by peremptory challenges.
I point out that, in expanding the voir dire process, I in no way endorse unduly prolonging the jury selection process or permitting abuses known to the trial lawyer. Voir dire should not be used to make a point to the jury or to indoctrinate potential jurors, but rather to gain information to aid in the exercise of challenges. The regulation of voir dire is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the trial judge should reasonably supervise and control the voir dire process to ensure against abuses.
Judge HARRELL has authorized me to state that he joins in this concurring opinion.

. Following Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), there has been, from time to time, a call to abolish peremptory challenges. See, e.g., id. at 102, 106 S.Ct. at 1726, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (Marshall, J., concurring); Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md.App. 55, 78, 627 A.2d 44, 55 (1993) (Wilner, J., concurring); People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 582 N.Y.S.2d 950, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1145-46 (1992); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L.Rev. 809 (1997). I have been unable to find any state that has followed the call.