Court Opinion

ID: 9850948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:04:54.259213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.023689
License: Public Domain

JOSEPH, C. J.,
dissenting.
It is impossible for me to believe that the majority understands what it is saying. The trial court said that the stop of defendant and his companion in an automobile was illegal.1 The trial court also held that the police had no objective, articulable basis for a reasonable suspicion that defendant or his companion had committed a crime. Thus, under ORS 131.615, there was no basis for a stop.
The majority does not seem to have noticed (or just cannot bring itself to acknowledge) one critical fact: No crime *407for which defendant and his companion could have been suspects had been reported in that neighborhood on that day at any relevant time. That their conduct was consistent with crimes that might have been committed on a different day cannot be an adequate basis for a suspicion that defendant and his companion had committed a specific crime or crimes with which they might have been charged as a direct result of the police stopping and investigating them.2 The conclusion of the majority “that Truedson had a reasonable suspicion that defendant and his companion had committed a crime,” 93 Or App at 405-06, lacks any foundation whatsoever in this record. That is, there was no objective, articulable basis for forming a belief that could be reasonable.
That is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s suppression order. However, the majority insists on compounding its error by holding that it was all right for the officer to detain defendant and his companion for approximately 27 minutes and question them about their activities in the neighborhood, check their identity and fill out some sort of a report.3 Again, the majority seems wholly unaware of the fact that there was no crime being investigated.
Moreover, the majority adds a new aspect to the ever more complicated case law under ORS 131.615. That is, because defendant’s companion had no identification, it was all right to detain defendant, who did have a driver’s license and who did furnish Truedson his date of birth, both of which Truedson was able readily and quickly to confirm. Given that Truedson started the whole process with a pretext stop (not based on any claim of reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed and that defendant and his companion had committed it), it is mind-boggling that the majority would uphold what happened here.
If that is not enough, the majority’s citation of State v. Tucker, 286 Or 485, 595 P2d 1364 (1979), ought certainly to alert the reader (and the Supreme Court on review). In the *408first place, Tucker appears to be based on the Fourth Amendment. It is certainly not based very much, if at all, on ORS 131.615. In the second place, the main foundation of Tucker is that the original contact between the defendant and the police was a legal stop. In the third place (and related to the second place), the Supreme Court was at pains in Tucker to explain some of its language in State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d 1006 (1977), and to point out that, once it is accepted that the initial contact between the police and a citizen was based on a pretext, the game is up. 286 Or at 493.
It is also hardly legitimate to cite State v. Tucker, supra, and to ignore either our opinion in State v. Carter/Dawson, 34 Or App 21, 578 P2d 790 (1978), or the Supreme Court’s opinion in the same case on review. 287 Or 479, 600 P2d 873. Although our decision in that case is probably only an historical curiosity at best, see Younger v. City of Portland, 305 Or 346, 350 n 5, 752 P2d 262 (1988), the Supreme Court accepted (or, at least, did not reject) the standard which we applied:
“Traffic stops should be the minimum possible intrusion on Oregon motorists, and not an excuse to begin questioning, searching or investigating that is unrelated to the traffic reason for the stop.” 34 Or App at 32.
Even if our opinion in Carter/Dawson is of doubtful authority, the principle remains valid: In the absence of an articulable basis for reasonable suspicion that the driver of an automobile has committed a crime, and if there is no other basis for stopping his movement, such as a violation of the traffic laws, the police cannot make use of information garnered during a stop. It is astonishing that the majority thinks the law is otherwise. See Pooler v. MVD, 306 Or 47, 755 P2d 701 (1988).

 I understand the majority to concede that the personal characteristics of defendant and his companion and the appearance of their car do not contribute to reasonable suspicion.

 It seems strange that, in 27 minutes, the police could not have arranged to check the Dakota Drive house to determine whether it had been burglarized.