Court Opinion

ID: 9397777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 14:05:33.334117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.414365
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                              Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2021-CA-1358-MR

SHAUN E. HILES                                                      APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, SPECIAL JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 14-CR-00213

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                            VACATING AND REMANDING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: JONES, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Shaun Hiles appeals from the Grant Circuit Court’s order

denying his RCr1 11.42 motion. Because Hiles’s motion raises issues which

cannot be resolved by an examination of the record, we vacate the trial court’s

order of denial and remand for further proceedings, including an evidentiary

hearing.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
                                       I. BACKGROUND

                On June 28, 2014, after several weeks of marital discord, Hiles shot

and killed his wife, Nicole Hiles and her friend, Larry Whiteker. Following his

trial, the jury found Hiles guilty of two counts of capital murder2 and two counts of

first-degree wanton endangerment.3 Consistent with the jury’s recommendation,

the trial court sentenced Hiles to two life terms without the possibility of parole

and to a term of five years for each wanton endangerment charge. The Kentucky

Supreme Court affirmed Hiles’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal in an

unpublished memorandum opinion. Hiles v. Commonwealth, No. 2016-SC-

000127-MR, 2017 WL 2600132 (Ky. Jun. 15, 2017). Hiles subsequently filed a

pro se motion to vacate his sentence under RCr 11.42. The trial court denied relief

in a written order entered on November 10, 2021, without conducting an

evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

                                         II. ANALYSIS

                A successful petition for relief under RCr 11.42 based on ineffective

assistance of counsel must survive the twin prongs of “performance” and

“prejudice” provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052,

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 507.020.
3
    KRS 508.060, a Class D felony.

                                               -2-
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky.

1985). The “performance” prong of Strickland requires as follows:

             Appellant must show that counsel’s performance was
             deficient. This is done by showing that counsel made
             errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
             “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
             Amendment, or that counsel’s representation fell below
             an objective standard of reasonableness.

Parrish v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Ky. 2008) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The “prejudice” prong requires a showing that

“counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable.” Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 736

(Ky. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064).

             Both Strickland prongs must be met before relief pursuant to RCr

11.42 may be granted. “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said

that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that

renders the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

This is a very difficult standard to meet. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is

never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473,

1485, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). We review counsel’s performance under

Strickland de novo. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d at 736.

             Hiles made several different claims in his pro se RCr 11.42 motion to

the trial court, but his counseled brief on appeal abandons several of those

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arguments. We consider the unbriefed claims to be waived here. “An appellant’s

failure to discuss particular errors in his brief is the same as if no brief at all had

been filed on those issues.” Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Ky. App.

1979); see also Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 815 (Ky. 2004).

             For his briefed issues, Hiles contends his trial counsel was ineffective

when he: (1) failed to adequately investigate and present a defense based on

extreme emotional disturbance (EED); and (2) failed to discover, through expert

testing, that Hiles suffers from “intermittent explosive disorder,” a psychiatric

condition which may have assisted in his EED defense. Hiles asserts that, had his

trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation, this information would have

sufficed to convince at least one juror to recommend a less severe sentence than

life without the possibility of parole.

             We must note at the outset that Hiles’s trial counsel did not give an

opening statement or present any witnesses during the guilt phase of the trial.

Instead, trial counsel briefly cross-examined each of the Commonwealth’s

witnesses in order to inquire as to whether the witness could testify as to Hiles’s

state of mind when he shot Nicole and Larry. Because there were no psychiatric

experts testifying for the Commonwealth, the answers were generally negative.

Then, in the penalty phase, trial counsel called one witness, Hiles’s teenage

daughter, in order to ask her (1) whether she loves and misses her mother, (2)

                                           -4-
whether she loves and misses her father, and (3) if she would like the jury to show

compassion and give her father the minimum sentence.

             It may be, as Hiles asserts, that his trial counsel utterly failed to

diligently investigate his case or present witnesses, including psychiatric experts,

who could have buttressed Hiles’s EED defense. If true, this could constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary.” McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Ky. 1986)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). However, it is also

possible, as the Commonwealth contends, that Hiles’s counsel declined to pursue

expert psychiatric testimony due to the witness testimony presented previously,

during Hiles’s pretrial competency hearing. Dr. Amy Trivette at Kentucky

Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) testified that Hiles was competent and

capable of participating in his defense, stating, “he does not suffer from a mental

illness or intellectual disability that would be expected to impair his ability to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the

requirements of the law.” Furthermore, she testified that there was evidence that

Hiles had malingered during his psychiatric testing. Finally, a deputy jailer, Jason

Hankins, testified that he had overheard Hiles assert he would escape punishment

by manipulating the staff into believing he was mentally ill.

                                          -5-
             It is also possible that trial counsel employed a strategy based on pure

cross-examination in order to avoid disclosing its defense to the Commonwealth.

See Vincent v. Commonwealth, 584 S.W.3d 762, 770-71 (Ky. App. 2019) (holding

that trial counsel’s decision to not hire an expert was valid strategy when RCr

7.24(3)(a) would have required disclosure to the Commonwealth of the test reports

and a summary of the expert’s testimony). As in this case, trial counsel in Vincent

was also confronted with a situation in which there was evidence of the defendant

malingering during psychiatric testing. If, like Vincent, trial counsel in this case

decided to avoid using expert testimony to prevent disclosure to the

Commonwealth, or to avoid the presentation of testimony to the jury regarding

Hiles’s malingering, then this would be a proper exercise of trial strategy and not

ineffective assistance of counsel. “It is not the function of this Court to usurp or

second guess counsel’s trial strategy.” Vincent, 584 S.W.3d at 771 (citations

omitted).

             The trial court’s order asserts that Hiles’s RCr 11.42 claims are

refuted by the record, in that trial counsel did offer an EED defense to the jury.

However, with respect to the trial court, the question is not whether trial counsel

presented an EED defense, but whether trial counsel was ineffective in the

presentation of this defense in such a way that proved ultimately prejudicial to the

defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Unfortunately, because

                                          -6-
the trial court declined to order an evidentiary hearing on Hiles’s RCr 11.42

motion, the record presents no evidence as to trial counsel’s motives for an

allegedly lackluster performance or an analysis as to whether this performance was

ultimately prejudicial.

             This, of itself, requires us to vacate the trial court’s dismissal of

Hiles’s RCr 11.42 motion. “A hearing is required if there is a material issue of fact

that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an

examination of the record. The trial judge may not simply disbelieve factual

allegations in the absence of evidence in the record refuting them.” Fraser v.

Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452-53 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted). “An

evidentiary hearing must be held in this case to determine whether the failure to

introduce mitigating evidence was trial strategy, or ‘an abdication of advocacy.’”

Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338, 345 (Ky. 2001) (quoting Austin v. Bell,

126 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 1997)).

                                    III. CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Grant Circuit Court’s order

denying relief pursuant to RCr 11.42. We remand this matter for an evidentiary

hearing with counsel appointed for Hiles, as required by Fraser, and for further

proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                          -7-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:   BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

David L. Stewart       Daniel Cameron
La Grange, Kentucky    Attorney General of Kentucky

                       Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
                       Assistant Attorney General
                       Frankfort, Kentucky

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