Court Opinion

ID: 9595034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:35:01.202676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:55.480008
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
“Statutes such as [Code § 18.2-248(C)], providing additional punishment for subsequent commission of the same offense, are criminal in nature.” Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 762, 250 S.E.2d 760, 762 (1979) (footnote omitted). “[T]he rule of construction applicable to [criminal statutes] is that if the language admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that resulting favorably to the accused should be applied.” Wesley v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 268, 276, 56 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1949). “Moreover, the general rule is that the prior conviction must precede the commission of the primary offense in order to activate the enhanced punishment provision under habitual criminal statutes.” Ansell, 219 Va. at 761, 250 S.E.2d at 761-62.
“While in common parlance a verdict of guilty is said to be a conviction, it must be given its strict legal meaning when a second offense is made a distinct crime, carrying with it heavier penalties. The authorities overwhelmingly establish, first, that in the legal sense a conviction is a judgment on a plea or verdict of guilty; second, a second offense, carrying with it a more severe *264sentence, cannot be committed in law until there has been a judgment on the first; third, the indictment, charging the accused of being a second offender, must set forth the fact of the prior conviction, as that is an element of the offense in the sense that it aggravates the offense described in the indictment, and authorizes the increased punishment.”
United States v. Abreu, 962 F.2d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (quoting Singer v. United States, 278 F. 415, 420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 620 (1922)). Indeed, this Court has held that a jury verdict of guilty is not a conviction until the trial judge enters judgment. Dowell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1145, 1147-49, 408 S.E.2d 263, 264-66 (1991), off’d en banc, 14 Va. App. 58, 414 S.E.2d 440 (1992).
Relying upon Morris v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 206, 321 S.E.2d 633 (1984), Flythe v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 832, 275 S.E.2d 582 (1981), and Ansell, the majority strictly construes Code § 18.2-248(C) against the interpretation favorable to the accused. In all of these cases, the Supreme Court addressed one specific statute, Code § 18.2-53.1, and found a legislative purpose that suggested deviation from the general rule. However, the purpose of Code § 18.2-53.1 is not the same as the purpose of Code § 18.2-248(C).
In Ansell, the Supreme Court determined that the purpose of the statute proscribing the use of a gun in the commission of felonious offenses was “to deter violent criminal conduct rather than to reform the most dangerous class of criminals.” 219 Va. at 763, 250 S.E.2d at 762. In reaching that determination, the Court relied upon the legislative purpose that it derived as follows from the statutory language.
The 1976 Amendment [to Code § 18.2-53.1] restricted the application of the statute to the serious felonies therein enumerated rather than having it apply to all felonies. However, the severity of the punishment was significantly increased. Inflexible penalties replaced the wide range of discretionary penalties originally authorized; trial courts were prohibited from suspending the sentence, in whole or in part, or placing the offender on probation; and the punishment was required to run consecutively rather than concurrently with the punishment imposed for commission of the primary felony.

Id.

*265The Supreme Court recognized, however, that all habitual criminal statutes do not serve the same purpose. They may be enacted either “to serve as a warning to felons and to give them an incentive to reform . . . [or] to deter criminal conduct.” Ansell, 219 Va. at 762, 250 S.E.2d at 762. In the case of Code § 18.2-248(C), nothing in the legislation suggests that the General Assembly did not intend the statute to act as a warning to felons and to provide for an incentive to reform. Such a warning in order to provide incentives is an appropriate purpose for statutes that address narcotic offenders. See Gonzalez v. United States, 224 F.2d 431, 435 (1st Cir. 1955).
Absent legislative expression to the contrary, we have no mandate to adopt the harshest, most punitive interpretation of the statute. Abreu, 962 F.2d at 1451 (second and subsequent offense statutes are harsh and must be strictly construed in favor of the accused to avoid and protect against unintended applications). I would hold that when Code § 18.2-248(C) is strictly construed against the Commonwealth, as we are bound to construe criminal statutes, Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 246, 248, 402 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1991); and when the statute is “ ‘limited in application to cases falling clearly within the language of the statute,’ ” id. (quoting Crews v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 531, 536, 352 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1987)), an accused must have been convicted of a violation of Code § 18.2-248 prior to the commission of a second offense before that person can be subjected to an increased punishment for “second or subsequent conviction of such a violation.” Code § 18.2-248(C). “Such a rule is not only easily administered by the trial courts but fully recognizes the highly penal nature of a statute providing for severer punishment on conviction of a second offense.” State v. Lopez, 120 Ariz. 607, 609, 587 P.2d 1184, 1186 (1978). See also Garrett v. State, 59 Md. App. 97, 112-18, 474 A.2d 931, 938-41, cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d 372 (1984).
I dissent.