Court Opinion

ID: 9580187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:02:58.190399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:07.231797
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
In People v. Cahill, post, at page 478 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037], a majority of this court abrogated the well- and long-settled California rule that, in a criminal trial, the admission into evidence of what has variously been called a “coerced” or “involuntary” confession by the defendant requires automatic reversal of any ensuing judgment of conviction. In my dissenting opinion, I demonstrated that there was no reason to abandon or even reconsider that rule.
Similarly, in this matter the majority abrogate the derivative and broader rule to the effect that the “introduction of a confession obtained from a *472defendant in violation of [federal] constitutional guarantees is prejudicial per se and requires reversal regardless of other evidence of guilt.” (People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714, 720 [68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625].) They hold that the admission of such a confession is subject to harmless-error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065] (hereafter sometimes Chapman). Their only support is Cahill. But Cahill is simply too slender a reed.
I turn to the case at bar. On December 25 and 26, 1985, defendant confessed to the police that he had murdered John Harrigan. The confessions were subsequently admitted at trial. Erroneously so. Each was inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974] (hereafter sometimes Miranda), and its progeny.
Recall that in Miranda the United States Supreme Court laid down the following rule to implement the privilege against self-incrimination contained expressly in the Fifth Amendment and impliedly in the Fourteenth:
“[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 706-707].)
The phrase “custodial interrogation” is crucial. The adjective encompasses any situation in which a “person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 706-707].) The noun “refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 1682], fn. omitted.)
In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880] (hereafter sometimes Edwards), the United States Supreme Court formulated a rule to further the purposes of Miranda: “[A]n accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is *473not subject to further interrogation by the authorities . . . , unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” (Id. at pp. 484-485 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 385-387].) An accused “initiates” such dialogue when he says or does anything that can be “fairly said to represent a desire” on his part “to open up a more generalized discussion relating ... to the investigation.” (Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 [77 L.Ed.2d 405, 412, 103 S.Ct. 2830] (plur. opn. by Rehnquist, J.).) Edwards is a “bright-line, prophylactic . . . rule” “providing ‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines . . . .” (Arizona v. Roberson (1988) 486 U.S. 675, 682 [100 L.Ed.2d 704, 713-714, 108 S.Ct. 2093].) As such, it applies “without qualifications or exceptions . . . .” (1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1991 pocket supp.) § 6.9, p. 135.)
In my view, defendant’s December 25 confession to the Harrigan murder was inadmissible under Miranda. Officer Jonathan Perkins advised defendant of his rights pursuant to that decision. Defendant declined to waive their protection, effectively requesting the assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, he was subjected to custodial interrogation in contravention of Miranda. He was, of course, actually in custody. He was also interrogated. Officer Perkins must surely have recognized that his comment on the investigation into the murder and the suspected involvement of defendant and his companion Ruby Padgett would induce an incriminating response. It did: “I had to kill that boy,” defendant replied; “I had to kill that boy,” he repeated; “He was going to identify me,” he explained.
Defendant’s December 26 confession to the Harrigan murder was also inadmissible under Miranda.
In conformity with the Edwards rule, defendant, “having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [was] not subject to further interrogation by the authorities . . . .” (Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 484 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 385-386].)
Defendant simply did not “initiate[] further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police” within the meaning of Edwards. (Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 485 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 386-387].) To be sure, he initiated the meeting on December 26. But he did so—as the transcript of the ensuing interrogation demonstrates—in order to get some cigarettes and to arrange to see Padgett. Certainly, he did not do or say anything that could be “fairly said to represent a desire” on his part “to open up a more generalized discussion relating ... to the investigation.” (Oregon v. Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 1045 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 412] (plur. opn. by Rehnquist, J.), italics added.)
*474Hence, at the December 26 meeting, defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation in contravention of Miranda. He was, still, actually in custody. He was also interrogated. The previous day, he had confessed he was Harrigan’s murderer. Now, he recanted: “I’m not a murderer ....’’ Officer Perkins must surely have recognized that his question probing defendant’s denial of complicity, “What does that mean?,” would induce an incriminating response. It did, immediately. “That means,” replied defendant, “that I just got drunk, and I didn’t know what the fuck I was, I know I was doing it, but I shouldn’t of done it.”
Under Miranda and its progeny, the majority’s “fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree” discussion, which derives from the Fourth Amendment analysis in Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471 [9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407], amounts to nothing more or less than an effort to avoid the fact that the Edwards rule applies “without qualifications or exceptions . . . .” (1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, supra, § 6.9, p. 135.) Manifestly, it is unsuccessful.
What, then, is the consequence of the admission of defendant’s Mirandaviolative confessions? Reversal.
This result is determined by application of the rule that the introduction of any confession offensive to the United States Constitution is reversible per se.
The same result, however, is compelled even if—as the majority hold— harmless-error analysis under Chapman is attempted.
Chapman, it need not be emphasized, is intolerant and unforgiving of error.
As the Chapman court itself declared: “The California constitutional [harmless-error] rule emphasizes ‘a miscarriage of justice,’ but the California courts”—and the majority are in accord (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 447)—“have neutralized this to some extent by emphasis, and perhaps overemphasis, upon the court’s view of ‘overwhelming evidence.’ We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229] [(1963)]. There we said: ‘The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ . . . [T]his statement in Fahy . . . emphasizes an intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional errors that ‘affect substantial rights’ of a party. An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly *475influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived of as harmless. Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence . . . , casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. . . . There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. Connecticut about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 23-24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711], fns. omitted.)
In Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. _ [114 L.Ed.2d 432, 111 S.Ct. 1884], and Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993)_U.S._[124 L.Ed.2d 182, 113 S.Ct. 2078], the United States Supreme Court provided the following explanation:
“The Chapman test is whether it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” (Yates v. Evatt, supra, 500 U.S. at p._[114 L.Ed.2d at p. 448, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1892]; accord, Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra,_U.S. at pp__-_[124 L.Ed.2d 182 at p. 189].) “To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question . . . .” (Yates v. Evatt, supra, 500 U.S. at p__ [114 L.Ed.2d at pp. 448-449, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1893]; accord, Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra,_U.S. at p._[124 L.Ed.2d 182 at p. 189].)
The focus under Chapman is what the jury actually decided and whether the error may have tainted its decision. “[T]he issue ... is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence [and instructions] . . . , independently of the” error. (Yates v. Evatt, supra, 500 U.S. at p__[114 L.Ed.2d at p. 449, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1893].) Stated differently, the “question” is “what effect [the error] had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.” (Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra,_U.S. at p__[124 L.Ed.2d 182 at p. 189].) Or, in still other words, the “inquiry” is “whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in [the] trial was surely unattributable to the error.” {Ibid.)
As a consequence, the focus under Chapman is not what a reviewing court might itself decide on a cold record. “[W]hen it does that, ‘the wrong entity judges the defendant guilty.’ ” (Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra,_U.S. at p__ [124 L.Ed.2d 182 at p. 190], quoting Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, *476578 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470-471, 106 S.Ct. 3101].) By its very terms, Chapman precludes a court from finding harmlessness based simply “upon [its own] view of ‘overwhelming evidence.’ ” (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].)
Neither is the focus under Chapman what a reviewing court might conjecture the jury would have decided in the absence of the error. The “hypothetical inquiry” whether, if the jury had not been exposed to the error, it would have made the decision it did, “is inconsistent with the harmless-error standard announced in Chapman .... While such a hypothetical inquiry ensures that the State has, in fact, proved [its case] beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not ensure that it has proved [it] beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of a jury.” (Yates v. Evatt, supra, 500 U.S. at p._ [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 455, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1898], italics in original (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.); accord, Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra, _ U.S. at p. _ [124 L.Ed.2d 182 at p. 189].) “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered. . . .” (Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra,_U.S. at p__[124L.Ed.2d 182 at p. 189].)
Lastly, the focus under Chapman is not what a reviewing court might speculate concerning “what effect the . . . error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury . . . .” (Sullivan v. Louisiana, supra,_U.S. at p._[124 L.Ed.2d 182 at p. 189].) “[M]ore [is required] than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury’s action . . . ."(Ibid.)
In this case, the error simply cannot be held harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman. In his Miranda-violative confessions, defendant personally declared his guilt. To be sure, other evidence was introduced to prove what he acknowledged. But that evidence did not, and could not, render his confessions “unimportant.” Any assertion to the contrary blinks reality. A “confession operates as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense.” (People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 731 [44 Cal.Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665].) It has an “indelible impact” “on the trier of fact .... If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on that evidence alone, without careful consideration of the other evidence in the case. Apart, perhaps, from a videotape of the crime, one would have difficulty finding evidence more damaging to a criminal defendant’s plea of innocence.” (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 313 [113 L.Ed.2d 302, 333, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1266-1267] (cone. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) At trial, the prosecution itself treated defendant’s confessions as crucial. I can find no reason to disagree.
In concluding to the contrary, the majority rely on what they deem “overwhelming” evidence of guilt apart from defendant’s confessions. (Maj. *477opn., ante, at p. 448.) But, as explained, Chapman effectively prohibits an appellate court from indulging in its own views as to the weight of the properly admitted evidence. Rather, it requires the court to concentrate on the improperly admitted evidence from the perspective of the jury. This the majority do not even attempt. Had they done so, they would have come to the conclusion that the error here, which resulted “in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to” defendant “cannot... be conceived of as harmless.” (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 23-24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711].)
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment in its entirety.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 15, 1993. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.