Court Opinion

ID: 9948766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:10:28.988998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:49.946319
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hall, 2024-Ohio-835.]

                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                  :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,            :
                                                            No. 112865
                 v.                             :

ENOCH HALL,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.           :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-21-664990-A

                                          Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Carla B. Neuhauser, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Appellant Enoch Hall (“appellant”) appeals his convictions in this

case. Upon review, we affirm.

                   On December 15, 2021, appellant was indicted on charges for

trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), drug possession in violation of
R.C. 2925.11(A), and possession of criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A),

each a felony of the fifth degree and each with forfeiture specifications. Appellant

filed a motion to suppress that was denied by the trial court following a hearing that

was held prior to the start of trial.

               The charges arose from an incident that occurred on October 15,

2021, when Cleveland Metroparks police officers found appellant sleeping in the

driver’s seat of a vehicle parked in Edgewater Park at 12:30 a.m., which is after

closing hours when people are not permitted in the park. Upon approaching the

vehicle, Officers Kara Ditch and Kevin Huff both smelled the odor of raw marijuana

coming from the vehicle and also observed a suspected marijuana blunt in plain view

on the center console. When a police sergeant arrived at the scene, appellant

stepped out of the vehicle and was handcuffed for officer safety, searched, and

placed in the back of a police cruiser. The officers searched appellant’s vehicle and

found the suspected marijuana blunt, a plastic bag of suspected raw marijuana, a

grocery bag containing a white powder that tested positive for cocaine, two scales,

$3,018, three cell phones, a box of sandwich bags, and baking powder. The

suspected marijuana was never tested.         Other testimony and evidence were

presented.

               During trial, the trial court denied appellant’s motions for acquittal.

The jury found appellant guilty on all counts and specifications. On May 17, 2023,

the trial court sentenced appellant to a jail term of 14 days on each count.
               Appellant timely filed this appeal. He raises three assignments of

error for review.

               Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court

erred by denying his motion to suppress. Appellant argues the officers lacked

probable cause to search him or his vehicle.

               “Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a

mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Toran, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3564,

¶ 14, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71,

¶ 8. “An appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are

supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio

St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). “But the appellate court must decide the legal

questions independently, without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Id., citing

Burnside at ¶ 8.

               For a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment, it must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a

warrant, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Moore,

90 Ohio St.3d 47, 49, 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349,

350, 588 N.E.2d 113 (1992). As the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized, “the

smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient

to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 48. “There need be no other tangible

evidence to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle.” Id.

               In this case, both officers testified to being employed as police officers

by the Cleveland Metroparks Police Department and to having received training

relative to their employment. Officer Ditch testified to her training for identifying

marijuana, including being trained in how it looks and how it smells. She testified

that when she approached the vehicle and as appellant rolled down the window, she

smelled the distinct odor of raw marijuana.          She also observed a suspected

marijuana blunt in plain view in the vehicle’s center console. Officer Huff testified

that he also smelled the distinct odor of raw marijuana as he approached the vehicle

and observed a suspected marijuana cigarette in plain view. He testified he went to

the police academy and has been trained to recognize controlled substances,

including how to identify the smell of raw marijuana. He testified that he has

smelled and observed both raw and burnt marijuana hundreds of times.

               We are not persuaded by appellant’s arguments regarding the lack of

testimony that the police officers were licensed, the lack of any contraband found on

his person, the lack of testing of the suspected marijuana, or other challenges

presented. The circumstances established that the Cleveland Metroparks officers

were qualified to recognize the odor of marijuana. No additional factors were

necessary to corroborate the suspicion of the presence of marijuana. See id. at 50.

The officers had probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle for contraband.

Further, it was reasonable for them to examine bags or containers found in
appellant’s vehicle. See State v. Vega, 154 Ohio St.3d 569, 2018-Ohio-4002, 116

N.E.3d 1262, ¶ 13-16, citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157,

72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302, 119 S.Ct. 1297,

143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999).

              Upon our review, we find the trial court did not err in denying

appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

              Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims that his

convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court erred by

denying his motions for acquittal.

              “‘A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is governed by the same

standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient

evidence.’” State v. Spaulding, 151 Ohio St.3d 378, 2016-Ohio-8126, 89 N.E.3d 554,

¶ 164, quoting State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d

386, ¶ 37. “‘The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id., quoting

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the

syllabus.   When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court

considers “whether the evidence, ‘if believed, would convince the average mind of

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Pountney, 152 Ohio St.3d

474, 2018-Ohio-22, 97 N.E.3d 478, ¶ 19, quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the

syllabus.
              Appellant challenges the lack of investigation in this case to connect

him to any of the contraband found in the car, to the phones found in the car, or to

the car itself. The record demonstrates that appellant was found sleeping in the

driver’s seat of the vehicle at 12:30 a.m., which was after the park was closed. He

rented the vehicle, he had the keys to the vehicle, and he was the sole occupant in

the vehicle. The police found in the center console of the vehicle the suspected

marijuana blunt, a plastic bag of suspected raw marijuana, a scale, and baking soda.

In the driver’s door was a grocery bag containing cocaine and cocaine base and a

scale with cocaine residue on it. The total amount of cocaine was established to be

less than five grams. In the glove box was a large amount of cash. In the back seat

was a box of baggies. Three cell phones were also found in the vehicle.

              Upon a thorough review of the record, we find that the direct and

circumstantial evidence in this case and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn

therefrom were more than sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the

essential elements of the crimes of trafficking under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), drug

possession under R.C. 2925.11(A), and possession of criminal tools under R.C.

2923.24(A), as well as the forfeiture specifications, proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. We are not persuaded by appellant’s arguments otherwise. The second

assignment of error is overruled.

              Under his third assignment of error, appellant claims his convictions

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. He incorporates the same

challenges raised under his sufficiency argument.
               When evaluating a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, “we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new

trial.” State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114 N.E.3d 1092, ¶ 168,

citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

Reversing a conviction based upon the weight of the evidence should occur “‘only in

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”

Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d

717 (1st Dist.1983).

               After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we do not

find the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of

justice that the adjudication must be reversed. Although appellant challenges the

testimony and evidence that was provided, this is not the exceptional case in which

the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. The third assignment of error is

overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR