Court Opinion

ID: 9774248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:12:45.786294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:04.404762
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
YOLLERS, Judge.
On original submission appellant’s sole contention was that the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning an extraneous offense. At the trial the appellant stated his objection as follows:
“[Defense counsel]: We feel that this testimony is not admissible for the reason that it shows an extraneous offense. However, in all candor I feel since the question of identity has come up — that would be the basis of our objection, if it does show an extraneous offense other than for which he’s being tried, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. The objection will be overruled, . . . ”
On original submission it was held that the contention on appeal varied with the trial objection. It was also held that even if the objection was sufficient to preserve the complaint on appeal, the extraneous offense was admissible as an exception to the general rule for the purpose of establishing identity. Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
After reexamination of the record we conclude that the objection which was *525made by the appellant in the trial court was adequate to preserve this question on appeal. The record in the trial court reflects that a hearing was conducted by the court outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of the testimony concerning the extraneous offense. This hearing occurred prior to appellant’s objection because the prosecutor, apparently in anticipation of appellant’s objection, requested permission to approach the bench and explain his intention to present the testimony of a witness concerning an extraneous offense. After the witness was examined outside the presence of the jury the court was preparing to call the jury in when defense counsel made the objection which is in issue. It appears that the objection was timely and that from an examination of the record it was apparent that the trial judge and the prosecutor were both well aware of the grounds upon which the objection was voiced. As this Court pointed out in Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1977):
“The generally acknowledged policies of requiring specific objections are twofold. First, a specific objection is required to inform the trial judge of the basis of the objection and afford him the opportunity to rule on it. Second, a specific objection is required to afford opposing counsel an opportunity to remove the objection or supply other testimony.”
It is apparent from this record that both of these qualifications were met and the objection was sufficient to preserve the matter for review on appeal.
In support of this ground of error the appellant also contends that there is a lack of sufficient distinguishing characteristics between the primary offense and the extraneous offense here offered to authorize the admission of this extraneous transaction.
This Court noted in Ransom, supra, at 812 that “evidence of an extraneous offense is admissible to prove identity, when identity is an issue, only if there is some distinguishing characteristic common to both the extraneous offense and the offense for which the accused is on trial.”
It was also noted in Ransom that the common distinguishing characteristics may be the proximity in time and place or the common mode of the commission of the offenses. See Ford v. State, 484 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
In the ease at bar the record reflects that a person identified as the appellant along with a companion entered a Denny’s Restaurant located on Gulf Freeway in Harris County at approximately 11:40 p. m. on December 31, 1974. Appellant took a revolver from the left side of his belt or pants waistband and he and his companion, who had a sawed-off shotgun, took money from the cashier and all of the patrons. The patrons were directed to lie on the floor or in their booths. Appellant was described as having been dressed in brown and wearing a cap. One witness described appellant as having facial hair.
In the extraneous transaction a person positively identified as the appellant did on December 20, 1974, enter a restaurant of a Howard Johnson Motor Lodge on the Gulf Freeway in Harris County at approximately 9:30 p. m. The appellant used a pistol to rob the cashier and the pistol was placed, as he was leaving, by his right hand in the left side of his pants. He was also described as wearing a cap and having facial hair. The witness noticed that when appellant left the restaurant area and ran to the motor lodge the witness could see that there was a holdup there because everybody was lying on the floor.
Although it was not observed that appellant had a companion in the course of the robbery involved in the extraneous transaction the evidence presented a ready inference that a companion was keeping the employees lying on the floor of the motor lodge as appellant committed the robbery in the restaurant. Therefore in addition to the existence of notable distinguishing characteristics in the method employed in each offense it appears that both offenses were committed in restaurants, located on the Gulf Freeway in Harris County, at night, but during business hours. The of*526fenses were committed only 11 days apart. The appellant was positively identified as one of the co-actors in each and was described as having facial hair, wearing a cap and brandishing a pistol in his right hand which he kept in the left side of his belt or pants waistband. The proximity in time and place as well as the common mode of commission of the offenses here are even more compelling than those addressed in Ransom, supra. The trial court satisfied itself that these attributes of similarity were sufficient to admit the testimony of the extraneous transaction. We agree that sufficient similarity was shown to meet the exception to the rule that extraneous transactions are inadmissible unless shown to be relevant on the issue of appellant’s identity in the trial of the primary offense. Even appellant’s objection shows that the issue of identity was raised in the trial of the primary offense.
No error was committed by the trial court in allowing the State to prove the extraneous transaction even though it showed an extraneous offense. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
ODOM, J., concurs in the result.
ROBERTS, and PHILLIPS, JJ., dissent for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion on original submission.