Court Opinion

ID: 9777393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:09:20.89539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:53.460965
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent, because while the prosecutor did not directly state defendant did not take the stand to deny the charges, this was the clear effect of his argument. I believe the statute prohibits comment on the fact the defendant did not take the stand, whether it is accomplished by direct, pointed language or by language which says so in effect. If we apply the statute so that it does not reach comment the clear effect of which is to point out that the defendant did not take the stand and dispute the charges, we are giving the statute a narrow application not justified by the broad language of its terms and are, as a matter of its practical application in the trial of a criminal case, emasculating it. The statute is phrased in the imperative and its mandate is that if defendant does not avail himself of his right to testify, “ * * * it shall not be construed to affect [his] innocence or guilt * * * nor shall the same raise any presumption of guilt, nor be referred to by any attorney in the case, nor be considered by the * * * jury * * *” To say as was done here, where the defendant saw fit not to testify and where there were only three parties present, one being defendant and the other two having testified, that “* * * For whatever reason Mr. Baker may have had at the time, whatever fancy may have caught him, whatever his problem is, it is undisputed from this witness stand that he did it * * *” is merely a covert way of saying to the jury, “You will observe that the defendant did not take the witness stand and deny the charges made by the two boys”, and is a clear violation of the intent of the statute. To borrow the analysis used in a similar problem in State v. Synder, 182 Mo. 462, 82 S.W. 12, 31, only the two boys and defendant were present when the alleged crime was committed, and as the two boys testified to it, there was no other person in existence save the defendant who could deny their statement as to what occurred, and no other conclusion can be drawn than that the prosecuting attorney did refer to defendant’s failure to go on the witness stand and deny the statement of the boys and that the attention of the jury was thus called to defendant’s failure to testify and to deny the statements. See also State v. Hayzlett (Mo. Sup.) 265 S.W.2d 321,323.
It seems to me that the argument here approved also violates the constitutional provisions against self-incrimination. Although our federal (Fifth Amendment) and state (Art. I, § 19, 1945 Constitution) constitutions give every one an absolute right not to be compelled to testify against himself, under the decision today the exercise of this right may be at the price of its being commented upon to the jury. No such penalty should attach to the assertion of a constitutional right. “* * * It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly * * *” and such comment by the prosecutor on the accused’s silence is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106.
I would reverse and remand.