Court Opinion

ID: 9898209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:10.356061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:12.473940
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Personal Restraint                  No. 84058-4-I
 of:
                                                          DIVISION ONE
 ALFREDO MARTINEZ BARRAGAN,
                                                          UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                        Petitioner.

       PENNELL, J.* — Alfredo Barragan filed a personal restraint petition (PRP),

arguing his due process rights were violated, he received ineffective assistance of

counsel at trial, and, in the alternative, he should be granted leave to conduct

additional discovery. Mr. Barragan’s claims for the relief are based on evidence

that was disclosed by the State the day before the commencement of trial.

Mr. Barragan has not demonstrated the withheld evidence prejudiced the outcome

of his case or that there is good cause to believe additional discovery would be

fruitful. We therefore deny the petition and the discovery motion.

                                      BACKGROUND

       A jury convicted Alfredo Barragan of various felonies relating to sexual

assaults against his daughter. The facts underlying Mr. Barragan’s case are more

fully set forth in the opinion addressing his direct appeal: State v. Barragan,

No. 80365-4-I, slip op. at 2-11 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020) (unpublished),

        * The Honorable Rebecca Pennell is a Court of Appeals, Division Three, judge sitting in
Division One pursuant to CAR 21(a).
No. 84058-4-I

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/803654.pdf. We recount here only those

facts necessary to resolve Mr. Barragan’s PRP.

        Mr. Barragan and Georgina Rocha Herrera are the parents of G.1, who was

born in 1994. Mr. Barragan and Ms. Rocha lived together for most of G.’s

childhood, but separated in 2012, when G. was a high school senior. After the

separation, Mr. Barragan and Ms. Rocha continued regular contact and operated

a business together.

        In late 2015 or early 2016, Ms. Rocha discovered sexually explicit images

on Mr. Barragan’s Apple iPhone 6. The phone contained pictures and videos of a

woman alone in a bathroom. The images included close-ups of the woman’s

genitalia. Ms. Rocha recognized the woman as G. based on her tattoo, clothing,

and voice. Ms. Rocha recognized Mr. Barragan in one of the videos.

        Ms. Rocha did not alter or delete the bathroom videos, but moved them out

of the deleted folder to the main folder. At that time, Ms. Rocha did not talk

to Mr. Barragan or G. about the videos. Ms. Rocha kept the iPhone 6 and

Mr. Barragan never asked for it back.

        In the summer of 2018, Ms. Rocha was in Mr. Barragan’s apartment and

discovered a hole on the wall separating Mr. Barragan’s bedroom from the

bathroom. The hole was hidden by a mirror. Ms. Rocha deduced that the images

found on the iPhone 6 had been recorded through the hole from the vantage point

of Mr. Barragan’s bedroom. While she was in the apartment, Ms. Rocha found a

        1 To protect the privacy interests of the daughter, who was a minor during the majority of

time relevant to Mr. Barragan’s offense conduct, we refer to her only by a first name initial.

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No. 84058-4-I

Samsung Galaxy phone. Ms. Rocha picked up the phone and a video started

playing immediately. The video depicted G. having sexual intercourse with a man

that Ms. Rocha later learned was G.’s boyfriend. The video appeared to be a

recording of a video from another phone, which Ms. Rocha recognized as G.’s

because of a distinct crack on the phone’s screen.2

      On further investigation of the phone, Ms. Rocha discovered a link to an

iCloud account that contained sexually explicit videos of G. together with

Mr. Barragan. Ms. Rocha was able to recognize G. and Mr. Barragan by their

bodies, movement, clothing, and surroundings.3 The videos were stored in an

iCloud server. Ms. Rocha tried to save them, but did not have access to the iCloud

account and did not know the password. Ms. Rocha then took a video of the

images using her own phone.

      Ms. Rocha then confronted Mr. Barragan about the images and told him to

stay away from G. She then talked to G. and G. disclosed she had been sexually

abused by Mr. Barragan. The two women contacted law enforcement and

Ms. Rocha turned over the iPhone 6, the Samsung Galaxy, and Ms. Rocha’s

personal phone, an iPhone 7.

      As the police investigation unfolded, G. recounted the details of

Mr. Barragan’s abuse. G. explained Mr. Barragan began molesting her when she

was in the third grade. After her parents separated in 2012, G. moved into an

apartment with Mr. Barragan, where the abuse continued. G. recognized the

      2 G. confirmed this information.
      3 G. later confirmed the images were of herself and Mr. Barragan.

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No. 84058-4-I

images of the woman in the apartment bathroom as herself. However, she was not

aware at the time that anyone was taking photos or video of her. G. moved out of

Mr. Barragan’s apartment in 2015, intending to stop the abuse. Nevertheless, she

visited her father on Sundays to watch television. During these visits, G would fall

asleep on the couch after being served alcohol by Mr. Barragan. Upon waking up

on the couch, G. would notice that her pajama bottoms were undone. One time

she was awakened by the sensation of her father on top of her, but later hoped

that it was just a bad dream. G. subsequently recognized images taken from

the Samsung Galaxy phone as depicting sexual acts perpetrated on her

by Mr. Barragan while she was sleeping on his couch. G. did not remember

Mr. Barragan filming her while she was on the couch. She also did not consent to

any sexual activity.

       Mr. Barragan was arrested on July 19, 2018. The State charged him with

14 felony offenses, including rape, child molestation, incest, and voyeurism. At the

time of Mr. Barragan’s arrest, law enforcement seized an iPhone 7. During a later

search of Mr. Barragan’s apartment, officers also seized an iPhone 4.

       Law enforcement searched Mr. Barragan’s phones and his iCloud storage

account. During this process, officers uncovered intimate photos of G. that did not

involve Mr. Barragan. G. explained that Mr. Barragan had access to her phone

while she was living with him.

       Prior to trial, Mr. Barragan filed two motions relevant to this PRP. First,

Mr. Barragan sought to suppress some of the cell phone photographs and videos,

arguing the State could not authenticate the materials or establish a chain

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No. 84058-4-I

of custody. Mr. Barragan’s argument was that multiple individuals, including

Ms. Rocha and G., had access to the phones, the phone plan and the iCloud

storage account. Mr. Barragan pointed out that there were videos in the iCloud

account that likely did not come from Mr. Barragan’s phone. The motion was

denied.

      Mr. Barragan’s second motion was a motion to dismiss, filed the day before

trial. In the motion, Mr. Barragan argued the State had failed to disclose

exculpatory evidence—an e-mail chain between the State’s lead detective and a

representative of Apple Incorporated that was dated approximately seven months

earlier. The e-mail chain stated the detective had found videos on the iCloud

account that were dated after Mr. Barragan’s arrest.

      The court held a hearing on Mr. Barragan’s motion on the morning of trial.

During the hearing, the State disputed defense counsel’s claim that the withheld

e-mail chain constituted new information. The prosecuting attorney pointed out that

the defense had previously been given discovery disclosing that the detective had

communicated with Apple. And, as reflected in the suppression motion, the

defense knew that there were images in the iCloud account that did not come from

Mr. Barragan’s phone. The prosecuting attorney also read out a text message

conversation between the lead detective and G. that had been disclosed in

discovery. During the exchange, the detective and G. discussed the fact that

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No. 84058-4-I

photos from G.’s phone had “recently” been uploaded to Mr. Barragan’s iCloud

account. Report of Proceedings (May 28, 2019) at 12.4

        The trial court denied Mr. Barragan’s motion to dismiss. Trial proceeded as

scheduled and the jury convicted Mr. Barragan on all counts. The conviction was

affirmed on appeal and Mr. Barragan has now filed a timely PRP.

                                          ANALYSIS

        PRP relief is proper when a conviction has been obtained in violation of the

United States Constitution, Washington State Constitution, or laws of the State of

Washington. RAP 16.4(c)(2). To be entitled to PRP relief, a petitioner must

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there was a constitutional

error that resulted in actual and substantial prejudice, or (2) there was a

nonconstitutional error involving a fundamental defect that inherently resulted in a

complete miscarriage of justice. In re Pers. Restraint of Dove, 196 Wn. App. 148,

154, 381 P.3d 1280 (2016).

        Mr. Barragan’s claim for PRP relief is based entirely on the State’s late

disclosure of the e-mail chain with Apple. According to Mr. Barragan, the withheld

evidence contributed to two constitutional errors. First, he claims the late

disclosure violated his right to due process. Second, he argues he was deprived

of his right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney did not request a

continuance to investigate the significance of the e-mail chain.5

         4 G. commented in the text message exchange with the detective that she did not know the

account had been linked to her phone.
         5 To the extent the State argued defense counsel had prior knowledge of the substance of

the e-mail chain, Mr. Barragan argues his attorney was ineffective for not investigating the
significance of third-party access to the iCloud account. This alternative argument does not change
our analysis.

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No. 84058-4-I

       To establish a due process violation based on withheld evidence, the

defendant must show (1) the undisclosed evidence was favorable, (2) that it was

suppressed by the State (as opposed to a third party), and (3) and that prejudice

ensued. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144

L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999). Establishing prejudice involves demonstrating a reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different. In re Pers. Restraint of

Mulamba, 199 Wn.2d 488, 503, 507, 508 P.3d 645 (2022). Speculation is not

enough. The mere possibility that undisclosed evidence might have led to other

exculpatory information is insufficient to establish prejudice. State v. Mak,

105 Wn.2d 692, 704-05, 718 P.2d 407 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds

by State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 645, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).

       A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel also requires a showing of

prejudice, in addition to establishing deficient conduct. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The test for prejudice

is essentially the same as it is for withheld evidence. See id. at 694. To obtain relief

based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Id..

       Mr. Barragan’s due process and ineffective assistance claims fail because

he has not shown prejudice. Rather than showing how the withheld e-mail chain

impacted his convictions, Mr. Barragan hypothesizes that further investigation of

the e-mail chain could have led to exculpatory evidence. This type of speculation

is not sufficient to warrant relief.

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No. 84058-4-I

       The primary problem for Mr. Barragan’s argument is that the undisclosed

e-mail chain does nothing to undermine the contents of the State’s video and photo

evidence. The fact that others had access to the iCloud account is interesting. But

it does not detract from the fact that the images in the account depicted

Mr. Barragan sexually abusing his daughter.

       Mr. Barragan suggests that timely disclosure of the e-mail chain would have

allowed defense counsel an opportunity for an expert forensic analysis. But

Mr. Barragan has not provided any concrete reason to believe that an expert

review would have been fruitful. The mere possibility that an expert might have

been able to provide favorable evidence is insufficient to establish prejudice. See

In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 188 Wn.2d 356, 376, 395 P.3d 998 (2017) (Without

knowing “what the missing [expert] would have said” the evaluation of prejudice is

“highly speculative.”).

       Mr. Barragan suggests that because G. and Ms. Rocha had access to his

iCloud account, they could have manipulated the video and photo evidence in

order to plant fabricated images of sexual abuse. According to Mr. Barragan, the

iCloud access creates “significant questions concerning the tampering or alteration

of video evidence.” Reply to State’s Response to PRP at 17. Mr. Barragan’s

characterization is inapt. While an allegation of fabricated evidence is a significant

accusation, there is no significant evidence to suggest this is what happened.

There are other reasonable explanations of why images from G.’s iPhone were

found in stored in Mr. Barragan’s iCloud account. For example, it is possible that

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No. 84058-4-I

Mr. Barragan purposefully set G.’s iPhone to automatically upload images to his

account as part of his long-standing scheme of sexual abuse.

      Mr. Barragan also argues the undisclosed Apple e-mail chain would have

bolstered his motion to suppress images taken from his phones and iCloud

account based on lack of authentication and chain of custody problems. But G.

testified that the images in question were of her and Mr. Barragan and were taken

while G. was at Mr. Barragan’s apartment. This was sufficient to meet the minimal

burden of authentication. State v. Sapp, 182 Wn. App. 910, 914-16, 332 P.3d 1058

(2014). Furthermore, a properly authenticated photo or video is readily identifiable

and therefore does not require the State to show chain of custody. See State v.

Roche, 114 Wn. App. 424, 436, 59 P.3d 682 (2002) (“Evidence that is unique and

readily identifiable may be identified by a witness who can state that the item is

what it purports to be.”); Territory of Guam v. Ojeda, 758 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir.

1985) (A “witness identifying the item in a photograph need only establish that the

photograph is an accurate portrayal of the item in question.”).

      Finally, Mr. Barragan argues that if we reject his due process and ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, we should grant leave for additional discovery on the

iCloud storage and cell phone forensics issues. We are unpersuaded. The

availability of postconviction discovery is not automatic. To obtain discovery, the

moving party must show “a substantial likelihood the discovery will lead to

evidence that would compel relief.” In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 137 Wn.2d 378,

392, 972 P.2d 1250 (1999). This burden has not been met. As set forth above, the

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No. 84058-4-I

idea that investigation of the iCloud account would yield exculpatory information is

entirely speculative. The request for discovery is therefore denied.

                                  CONCLUSION

       The petition for relief and Mr. Barragan’s motion for discovery are denied.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in

the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

                                          ______________________________

WE CONCUR:

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