Court Opinion

ID: 9397241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 19:07:32.943958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:22.459357
License: Public Domain

C.M. v. J.M., No. 852, September Term, 2022. Opinion by Wright, J.

FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER – SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF MENTAL
INJURY TO SUSTAIN FINDING OF ABUSE OF A CHILD
Trial court could find by a preponderance of the evidence that father engaged in mental
abuse of his 13-year-old child by creating a substantial risk of harm, and that Father’s
actions were intentional or with reckless disregard to the consequences of his actions,
where, among other things, child expressed during judicial interview with court that he
was frightened of father’s reaction to child identifying as gay; father’s numerous text
messages to mother, child’s older sibling, and child; and a child protective services report
that child did not feel safe with father and child was concerned that father might hit him
for identifying as gay.

FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER - JUDICIAL INTERVIEW OF CHILD
Trial court need not provide a detailed recitation of private, judicial child interview. Trial
court committed no error when it summarized for the parties the gist of its interview with
child.

FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER – RELIEF
Relief granted by trial court was reasonable and well-tailored to the facts presented given
father’s view of gay child where the relief ordered did not change quantity of contact but
stated that visitation can only occur if child “is comfortable doing so” and father may not
communicate with child via telephone or text messages about child’s sexual orientation.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-02-FM-22-808824

                                                                               REPORTED

                                                                      IN THE APPELLATE COURT

                                                                           OF MARYLAND*

                                                                                 No. 852

                                                                          September Term, 2022
                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                                  C.M.

                                                                                    v.

                                                                                 J.M.
                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                     Kehoe,
                                                                     Zic,
                                                                     Wright, Alexander, Jr.
                                                                        (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

                                                                                  JJ.
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials     ______________________________________
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this
document is authentic.
                                                                          Opinion by Wright, J.
                2023-05-24 14:59-04:00
                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                     Filed: May 24, 2023
Gregory Hilton, Clerk

* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
       The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County entered a final protective order against

C.M. (“Father”) on grounds that he was mentally abusive to his 12-year-old son (“N.”)

regarding his son’s sexual orientation. On appeal, Father raises three questions, which we

have rephrased for clarity:

       I.      Did the circuit court err in finding that Father had inflicted mental
               injury on N.?

       II.     Did the circuit court err when it interviewed N. outside the presence
               of the parties and their counsel?

       III.    Did the circuit court err because the relief granted was not reasonably
               tailored to address the mental injury inflicted?

For the following reasons, we shall affirm.

                                  BACKGROUND FACTS

       Father and J.M. (“Mother”) were married for about five years and had two children

before divorcing in 2012. As part of the divorce settlement, the parties agreed to joint legal

custody of their two children with Mother to have primary physical custody and Father to

have visitation every other weekend from Friday to Sunday.

       Roughly three years later, on June 15, 2022, Mother filed for a protective order for

herself and her children, then aged 15 and 12, alleging that Father had caused her and the

children mental injury based on abusive texts and emails he had sent to them. The District

Court granted the temporary petition; requested the Department of Human Services

investigate and issue a Child Protective Services Report (“CPS Report”), and transferred

the case to the circuit court for a final order.
       At the final protective order hearing on June 22, 2022, both parties testified, the

children were separately interviewed by the court, and several exhibits were entered into

evidence, including the CPS Report.

       Mother testified that she filed the protective order because she was concerned for

her and her children’s safety as a result of the numerous texts Father had sent, which over

the years had “progressively gotten worse.” The parties focused on events that occurred

during the four months that preceded the filing of the protective order.

       As to their older child, “S.”, Mother testified that about three years ago, S. told her

that he believed he was transgender.1 Mother denied steering S. toward identifying as

transgender but has actively supported S. by arranging for therapy and attending meetings

of Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (“PFLAG”). When S. told Father

that he identified as transgender, Father “opposed” his decision and refused to call him by

his preferred name. S. subsequently engaged in the self-harming behavior of “cutting.”

On March 4, 2022, Father sent the following text messages to S.:

       What is your email address? I’m sending you an email and I’m copying your
       mother and my lawyer. I’m t[ir]ed the BS manipulations. Your grandmother
       doesn’t call you S[.] and neither does either one of your aunts and uncle up
       here and for some reason my Christian beliefs are being attacked, so the
       intent is for a trial, so that everyone can understand what your mother that
       has manipulated a wedge after you and I had already came to an agreement
       [to call you a shortened version of your given name]. Thanks[.]

       1
         We shall refer to the parties’ oldest child as “S.” which is the first letter of the
name the child prefers to be called rather than his given name. We shall also refer to S.
with his preferred pronouns, he/him/his.
                                              2
Mother testified that S. is “scared” to be around Father because “he doesn’t feel support;

doesn’t feel that S[.] can be himself, . . . his true self[.]”

       As to their younger child, N., Mother testified that about five months ago N. told

her that he believed he was gay. On June 11, 2022, Father sent N. the following text:

       You can text me anytime. Just between us and call if you ever need to talk.
       I will tell you like I told you before – you are being heavily manipulated and
       influenced by your mother and sister. Son. Listen to your dad and our father
       who created us (God) in this matter. Please please do not allow these demons
       you are surrounded by influence you. Pray my son. For protection. I love
       you. Dad.

The next day, while N. was visiting Father at his house, Father asked N. to show him his

TikTok account. According to Father, N. started acting “very strangely[,]” eventually

walking outside the house and calling and then texting his Mother. Father testified he told

N. that he was not “happy with” him because he had every right to see N.’s social media

account. Father then told N. that because he was undercutting his authority by calling

Mother, he could “[j]ust go home.” N. called his Mother to pick him up and while she was

enroute, Father and N. had a conversation in which N. told him he was gay. Father testified

that he responded by telling N.: “I love [you] no matter what, and that whatever he is when

he’s an adult and down the road, that I will love him, but he needs to respect that his father

doesn’t actually hold the same beliefs due to my Biblical beliefs.” He explained to the

court that his “Christian beliefs, my Biblical beliefs, preclude me from agreeing with any

LGBTQ agenda.” Father testified that his Christian religion “means everything” to him.

       Mother was asked about her observations of N. when she drove him home from

Father’s house. She testified that N. “seemed a little down and out, and was a little shaken

                                                 3
up, and you know, I just asked if he was okay, and he said . . . ‘I am now.’” She testified

that N. told her that when he told his Father he was gay, his Father said, “No, you’re not,

but I love you anyway.”

       Later that evening, Father texted a picture to S. The picture is of two unhappy

looking teenage girls with zig zag stitching across their chests with the typed statement

above it: “It’s not ‘top surgery.’ It’s a radical elective double mastectomy performed on

healthy girls who have been sucked into a cult by groomer schools and online influencers.”

Father wrote underneath the picture: “Don’t ever do this stuff to yourself. If you ever want

to talk about the thousands of UK children who regretted this and other things later in life,

let me know. Also, I hope you read my google email to you.”

       Father sent a second text a few hours later to S. that showed a photograph of a bull

with horns with the message, “If you’re still confused about gender, try milking a bull and

you’ll learn real quick.” Father texted underneath the photograph: “I think this one is

hilariously accurate.”

       The next day Father texted Mother the following text messages over the course of

an hour, each paragraph represents a separate text:

       You really have no idea who you are talking to. . . . The wolves will enter in
       and not spare the flock says our father. . . . The ascension of Christ opened
       the book of Revelation, it has been 80 generations now, but we are the last.
       And time is almost up. I will not be staying. Many will. You will understand
       after all of this is over. I promise, you will live to see. . . . You have no idea
       who I am. And you should thank me because if I can have you and your
       parents repent and turn before this is over, that’s 3 souls I will get credit for
       saving.

                                             ***

                                               4
      I am a child of God. I am a watchm[a]n. They have been warned, but as
      instructed each has to work out our own salvation says our father. Your fake
      Christian parents have been warned, or at least your father, to Repent and
      turn.

                                          ***

      For example, our father tells us about tranny’s and gays right in the bible.
      He says any one who cuts off things or if man lay with man or women with
      women will be burned. But the Holy See and most other Churches say, no,
      it’s all good now.

                                          ***

      This is what Christ was talking about when he said, when I leave, I know the
      wolves will enter and not spare the flock. You have no idea how close we
      are to Michael standing up. But I promise, short of God taking you out
      prematurely, I do believe you will see.

                                          ***

      The spirit of Truth is upon you. You are being shown the truth that you must
      bend to or you and your parents will burn. It’s that simple.

                                          ***

      You have been warned and will have no excuse now once asked to give an
      account.

Half an hour later, Father texted Mother a picture of a horned, animal-like human sitting

on a throne and wrote that it is a picture of a deity called “Baphomet” that was “after

everyone’s children right now.” He continued:

      What you are going to see very shortly in this world is of Biblical
      proportions. . . . As I stated to you before, we are the last and you have no
      idea how close we are to Michael standing up. If you and your family do not
      repent and turn before that happens, you will be subjected to the plagues that
      follows after Michael stands. Again, and for the last time, you and yours
      have been warned.

                                            5
      A CPS report dated June 21, 2022, was admitted into evidence. The case worker, a

licensed social worker, wrote that five days after the incident between Father and N., she

interviewed the children in person at their respective schools, and Mother and Father over

the telephone. As to the interview with the children, she wrote:

      S[.] stated around 6th grade, his relationship with his father went downhill.
      S[.] stated he came out as transgender and his father blames his mother and
      says he is a part of a cult. S[.] stated he wanted to get into therapy and his
      father blamed his mother. S[.] stated his father threatens to sue his mother
      because he is transgender. S[.] stated he stopped seeing his father regularly
      in late 2019. S[.] stated he sometimes goes to his father’s around the holidays
      because he wants to continue to see his cousins. S[.] stated his father has
      sent him text messages and emails with information against the LGBTQ+
      community. S[.] denied feeling safe with his father. This worker asked why.
      S[.] stated he guesses it is more of an uncomfortable situation because he
      does not feel like he can be himself.

             This worker asked how his father treats N[.] S[.] stated this past
      weekend, their father kicked N[.] out of the house because he would not show
      him a TikTok because it stated he was gay. S[.] stated his father also
      threatened to break the phone. S[.] was not present for the incident. S[.]
      denied his father ever becoming physical with him or his mother. S[.] stated
      years ago, his father “slammed” N[.] because he was learning how to ride a
      bike and said something like “mom would have done it better”. S[.] denied
      witnessing what happened.

                                          ***

      N[.] stated he sees his father every other weekend. N[.] stated this past
      weekend was not good but normally they are fine. N[.] stated his father was
      mad because he would not show him his TikTok. N[.] stated he would not
      show him his TikTok because it showed his sexual orientation. N[.] stated
      he eventually told his father he was gay. N[.] denied his father becoming
      physical with him and stated it was only verbal. N[.] stated his father was
      insulting his mother and said “you can go back with your psychotic mother”.
      N[.] stated he was picked up by his mother after this occurred. N[.] stated
      his father sent him a text message stating he was being manipulated by his
      mother and sister and he should not allow the demons that surround him to
      influence him. This worker asked how his father treats S[.] N[.] stated his
      father often uses the slur “tranny”.

                                            6
                                            ***

               This worker asked if his father ever became physical with him. N[.]
       stated when he was 9 years old, his father hit him on the head with an open
       hand because he said his mother would have taught him how to ride a bike
       better. N[.] denied any other physical altercations with his father and denied
       seeing his father become physical with anyone else. This worker asked if
       N[.] felt safe with his father. N[.] stated not really because his father has
       “anger issues” and makes him feel scared like he may hit him. This worker
       asked what could help N[.] feel safe with his father. N[.] stated his father
       accepting him, getting less angry, and not saying bad things about their
       mother would help him to feel safe.

(Emphasis added.)

       During the social worker’s interview with Mother, Mother told her that she filed the

protective order because Father told her she “would rot in hell if she did not repent[,]” that

he was “not of this world” and he was a “messenger of God” and it scared her. Although

the social worker attempted to schedule an in-person appointment with him, Father was

unwilling to do so. Father told the social worker over the telephone that Mother has

influenced their children to believe that they are transgender and gay by taking them to

pride parades before they have fully gone through puberty. He told her that “no one, not

even a police officer, a judge, or a social services worker, will ever tell him what he is

going to call his children or the pronouns he is going to use.” He mentioned that “God

does not agree with a man laying down with a man” and he expressed “how his faith does

not agree with the LGBTQ+ community.”

       Father testified that since 2019, he has not seen S. nor does he have a relationship

with S. He claims the lack of a relationship has “nothing to do with h[im] wanting to be

called S[.]” or because he identifies as transgender but because Mother “encourages the

                                              7
isolation, alienation, compartmentalization of the [F]ather.” He testified that “most” of the

texts that he has sent to S. over the last couple of years are related to S. identifying as

transgender, and that his texts, which “reflect[] the truth[,]” are sent to present S. with an

opposing view of the transgender community. He also admitted to sending a three page,

single-spaced email to S. on March 5, 2022, which was admitted into evidence, in which

he presented his detailed view of Mother’s faults, the parties’ failed marriage, and why the

parties’ divorced.

       The court asked Father a few questions. The court asked if he and his children were

“just not discuss[ing] the idea of transgender or homosexuality, or [do] you want them to

be tolerant of you not accepting it, . . . are you . . . expecting tolerance both ways, or are

you expecting only tolerance your way?” Father responded that when the children are

older they can all be in the same room and “agree to disagree[,]” but that he texts S. “so

that she has a picture of all sides.” The court then asked Father if he texts S. “about

anything else” and the following colloquy occurred:

       [FATHER]: Uh . . . I could check my phone, Your Honor, but – and I could
       talk for hours about what my beliefs are about –

       THE COURT: I’m not – that’s not – look; this, to me, just so it’s clear to
       everyone in the room, everyone can be – have their own beliefs. That’s fine;
       I’m not one who’s going to tell you what you should believe or shouldn’t
       belie[ve], because some persons believe what’s right or wrong. . . . You’re
       not here to make me have your beliefs or anybody else. You’re not here to
       convince me that their beliefs are right and you[rs] are wrong. I don’t care.
       Right? All I care about is the impact in this circumstance of what is going
       on with regard to your children, and whether I believe they need some
       protection. That’s what I – that’s my job.

              So, I understand your beliefs, and you have very strong Biblical
       beliefs and you are entitled to those. But it’s my question, what I’m trying

                                              8
       to get at, because I believe – and [Father’s attorney], I apologize for asking
       some questions, but I believe that’s really the heart of this case, is what is
       going on when you are communicating with them. Is there any more to you
       [inaudible] other than you trying to show these different views about
       transgender[?]

The court then reiterated its question about whether Father communicates with S. on other

topics or texts him, ‘“I love you’, ‘I miss you’, ‘How are things going?’, ‘How’s school?’”

Father responded, “[t]here hasn’t been much communication[.]”

       Father again admitted that his relationship with his children is “pretty contentious

because of what I would consider to be a concerted effort on their mother’s part to pit one

child against a parent” and to “purposely steer my son into this arena, because it’s to her

liking.” He admitted to calling the police when Mother took the children to the Pride

Parade, after which he called the Crisis Hotline and then Legal Aid. He testified that he is

concerned for his children’s souls and has no intent to harm them.

       After both parties testified, the court interviewed both children privately. After the

interview, the court summarized the interviews. The court stated that S. “is a strong

person[,]” and although S. was “worried” about Father’s behavior in the past, he was not

upset by Father’s current text messages. In contrast, the court stated that N. is “frightened”

by Father’s behavior and “worries” that Father does not believe him around his sexual

identity, believing instead that it has to do with Mother’s “manipulat[ion.]”

       The court granted the protective order petition as to N. but denied the petition as to

Mother and S. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Father “has

repeatedly communicated in person and through text messages homophobic comments and

religious beliefs, causing mental injury to N[.] N[.] communicated to the court that he is

                                              9
fearful of his father because of his father’s anger and aggressiveness in the past and his

reaction to him coming out as gay.” The order provides that Father: 1) shall not abuse or

threaten to abuse N.; 2) shall not enter N.’s residence; 3) may continue to have visitation

as set forth in the previous order but visitation with Father “can only occur if N[.] is

comfortable doing so”; and 4) may call or text N. “but may not use that communication to

abuse N[.] regarding sexual orientation and/or religion.” The order is effective until June

22, 2023.

       Father has timely appealed the court’s order. We shall provide additional facts

below where necessary to address the questions raised on appeal.

                                        DISCUSSION

                                               I.

       Father argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Father inflicted a mental

injury on N. and he advances two contentions. First, Father contends that Mother’s petition

for a temporary protective order was insufficient because it failed to allege facts from which

a court could find that Father’s actions and behavior caused mental injury to N. Second,

Father contends that there was insufficient evidence presented at the final protective order

hearing for the court to find that he caused mental injury to N. or that he did so intentionally.

Mother responds that she sufficiently pled mental injury in her petition for a temporary

protective order, and there was sufficient evidence presented at the hearing from which the

circuit court could find by a preponderance of evidence that Father’s actions caused mental

injury to N. and that those actions were intentional. We agree with Mother. We explain.

                                               10
       Family Law (“FL”) Article, subsection 5 of title 4 of the of the Maryland Code,

governs domestic violence. Its purpose is “to protect and aid victims of domestic abuse by

providing . . . immediate and effective remed[ies]” wide in variety and scope to “avoid

future abuse.” Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122, 134 (2001) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).      “[T]he primary goals of the statute are preventative,

protective and remedial, not punitive.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

       A judge may issue a final protective order if they find abuse by a preponderance of

the evidence. FL § 4-506(c)(1)(ii). ‘“[P]reponderance of the evidence’ means ‘more likely

than not[.]’” State v. Sample, 468 Md. 560, 598 (2020) (citation omitted). “Abuse” of a

child is defined as “the physical or mental injury of a child under circumstances that

indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being

harmed[.]” FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i). See FL § 4-501(b)(1) and (2) (defining abuse and, if the

victim is a child, includes the definition of abuse found in FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i)). See also

Charles Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 300-02 (2004) (holding that the

definition of child abuse for the issuance of a protective order includes the definitions stated

in both FL §§ 4-501(b)(1)(2) and 5-701(b)(1)(i)).

       “Mental injury” is defined by statute as “the observable, identifiable, and substantial

impairment of a child’s mental or psychological ability to function caused by an intentional

act or series of acts[.]” FL § 5-701(r). Both physical and mental harm must be intentional

and cannot be the product of an accident. FL § 5-701(b)(2) (“‘Abuse’ does not include the

physical injury of a child by accidental means.”) and McClanahan v. Washington Cnty.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 691, 705-06 (2015) (holding that a finding of an intent to

                                              11
harm is required in both mental and physical abuse cases). The scienter element of mental

and physical injury can be met by showing a parent acted in reckless disregard for the

child’s welfare. McClanahan, 445 Md. at 712. “Reckless conduct” is conduct that

amounts to a “gross departure from the type of conduct a reasonable person would engage

in under the circumstances.” Id. See also Taylor v. Harford Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

384 Md. 213, 227 (2004) (Reckless conduct “is defined as . . . the creation of a substantial

and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate)

disregard for or indifference to that risk.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

“Allegations of past abuse provide the court with additional evidence that may be relevant

in assessing the seriousness of the abuse and determining appropriate remedies” because

“a history of prior abusive acts implies that there is a stronger likelihood of future abuse.”

Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 257-58 (1996).

       When reviewing the issuance of a final protective order, we accept the circuit court’s

findings of facts, unless they are clearly erroneous. See Md. Rule 8-131(c) and Barton v.

Hirshberg, 137 Md. App. 1, 21 (2001). We “must consider evidence produced at the trial

in a light most favorable to the prevailing party[.]” Friedman v. Hannan, 412 Md. 328,

335 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We defer to the trial court’s credibility

determinations because it “has the opportunity to gauge and observe the witnesses’

behavior and testimony during the trial.” Barton, 137 Md. App. at 21 (quotation marks

and citation omitted). It is “not our role, as an appellate court, to second-guess the trial

judge’s assessment of a witness’s credibility.” Gizzo v. Gerstman, 245 Md. App. 168, 203

(2020). As to the circuit court’s ultimate conclusion, “we must make our own independent

                                             12
appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case.” Piper v. Layman,

125 Md. App. 745, 754 (1999).

                          A. Temporary protective order petition

       Father contends that Mother’s petition for a protective order was insufficient to meet

the applicable statutory requirements. Appellant did not raise this contention below, and

therefore, it is not preserved for our review on appeal. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily,

the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to

have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”). See also DiCicco v. Baltimore Cnty.,

232 Md. App. 218, 224-25 (2017) (noting that a contention not raised or considered below

is not properly before an appellate court). Even if he had, we would find it without merit.

       The primary purpose of pleadings is notice. Tshiani v. Tshiani, 436 Md. 255, 270

(2013). The Supreme Court of Maryland2 has explained that “there need only be [a]

substantial agreement between what is pleaded and what is proved[,]” but there shall be no

“material variance” of the sort that would cause the other party to be “surprised unfairly or

otherwise prejudiced in trying [his/her] case.” Id. at 270. However, evidence in support

of a protective order is not limited to the “four corners” of a petition and “allegations of a

prior history of abuse are admissible at a protective order hearing regardless of whether

such allegations were sufficiently pleaded in the original petition for protection.” Coburn,

342 Md. at 262.

       2
         At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the
Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
                                             13
       In Mother’s pro se petition for a protective order, Mother wrote that “on or about

06/11/22-06/12/22 & on”, Father caused “mental injury” by engaging in the following:

“mental abuse texts sent to the children, emails sent to children, texts sent to Petitioner.”

Under the circumstances, Mother’s petition provided Father with sufficient notice of the

relevant information that would support the issuance of a protective order. Father has never

claimed surprise or unfair prejudice. We are persuaded that Father’s contention regarding

Mother’s petition for a protective order is without merit.

                                 B. Final protective order

       Father argues that there was insufficient evidence presented at the final protective

order hearing to prove that he caused mental injury to N. or that he did so intentionally. In

advancing this argument, Father attempts to redirect the gravamen of the case to the

incident on June 12, 2022. He reframes the incident as not about his reaction to N.’s

statement that he was gay but about N.’s refusal to let him see his phone and TikTok

account, which was a challenge to Father’s authority. Father then argues that his decision

to end the visit was a “reasonable” way to discipline his son for refusing to give him access

to his TikTok account. Father also reframes the court’s conclusion after interviewing N.

that he is “frightened,” “worried,” and “fearful with his [F]ather’s anger,” as a result of the

text message Father sent N. the day before the incident. Father argues that the court’s

conclusion lacked “legal analysis or rational explanation” because the court failed to

explain how the one text message frightened N. or how N.’s fear and worry impacted his

ability to function mentally. Lastly, Father argues that because he specifically testified that

he did not intend to harm N., there was insufficient evidence of the required intent.

                                              14
       We disagree with Father’s arguments and hold that the circuit court did not err in

finding that it was more likely than not that Father’s actions caused substantial risk of harm

to N. within the meaning of FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i), and Father’s actions were intentional or

with reckless disregard as to the consequences of his actions.

       The Supreme Court of Maryland in Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 139, addressed

the standard by which we measure whether a child’s mental or psychological ability has

been impaired by an intentional act or series of acts. The Court stated:

       [A] belief as to imminent danger is necessarily founded upon the defendant’s
       sensory and ideational perception of the situation that he or she confronts,
       often shaded by knowledge or perceptions of ancillary or antecedent events.
       The issue . . . [is] not whether those perceptions were right or wrong, but
       whether a reasonable person with that background could perceive the
       situation in the same way.

             We believe that to be the proper test to be applied in this context as
       well. A person who has been subjected to the kind of abuse defined in § 4-
       501(b) may well be sensitive to non-verbal signals or code words that have
       proved threatening in the past to that victim but which someone else, not
       having that experience, would not perceive to be threatening. The
       reasonableness of an asserted fear emanating from that kind of conduct or
       communication must be viewed from the perspective of the particular victim.
       Any special vulnerability or dependence by the victim, by virtue of physical,
       mental, or emotional condition or impairment, also must be taken into
       account.

Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Under the circumstances presented, we find no error by the trial court in finding that

Father had mentally abused N. The circuit court concluded that N. was “frightened,”

“scared,” and “fearful” of his Father’s anger and his Father’s refusal to accept his sexual

orientation. Contrary to Father’s argument, in reaching that conclusion the court relied on,

among other things, its interview with N. in which the court “saw with my own eyes” N.’s

                                              15
fear about his Father’s anger regarding his sexual orientation; the text message Father sent

N. the day before their interaction on June 12, 2022, in which Father stated “you are being

heavily manipulated and influenced by your mother and sister. . . . Please please do not

allow these demons you are surrounded by influence you. Pray my son. For protection.”;

and the CPS report in which the social worker related that N. told her that he does not feel

safe with Father, and he fears that Father might hit him because Father is angry and does

not accept N.’s sexual orientation.

       The court also heard Mother’s testimony that when she picked N. up from Father’s

house after the incident and asked if N. was okay, N. responded, “I am now[,]” clearly

suggesting that N. was not okay when he had been with Father. Additionally, the court

expressly stated that it did not find credible Father’s testimony that his actions were not

intended to harm his children but were only intended “to just share another view.” In

assessing credibility, the circuit court is “entitled to accept – or reject – all, part, or none

of the testimony of any witness, whether that testimony was or was not contradicted or

corroborated by any other evidence.” Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643, 659 (2011)

(emphasis in original). Moreover, Father’s communications with N.’s sibling and the

resulting harm provided the court with additional evidence that was relevant in assessing

the seriousness of the abuse and the “substantial risk of harm” to N. by Father’s actions.

See Coburn, 342 Md. at 257-58.

       Under these circumstances, we find no error by the circuit court in ruling that there

was sufficient evidence of mental abuse of N. by Father and that these acts were done

                                              16
intentionally or with a conscious disregard or indifference to N.’s welfare.3 See FL § 5-

701(r); McClanahan, 445 Md. at 712; Taylor, 384 Md. at 227.

                                               II.

       Father argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in questioning the children.

He seems to argue that first, the court should not have questioned the children at all, and

second, the court erred when it failed to summarize the questions and responses during the

private, judicial interviews of the children so that the attorneys could “understand what was

asked and answered in order to present additional evidence[.]”                Although Father

acknowledges that the Maryland General Assembly has not set out any rules regarding

judicial interviews of children, he argues that the circuit court should have followed the

guidelines set forth in Karanikas v. Cartwright, 209 Md. App. 571 (2013). We find both

of Father’s arguments unpreserved, and even if he had preserved those arguments for our

review, we would have found them meritless.

       At the beginning of the hearing and prior to taking any testimony, Mother’s attorney

asked the court to speak to the children privately, and, if the court agreed, suggested that

Mother could step out of the courtroom briefly to make arrangements for their presence.

       3
         To the extent that Father baldly argues that only expert testimony can sustain a
finding of mental injury, he cites no case law or rationale for this statement, and we decline
to address it. See Md. Rule 8-504(a)(6) (stating that an appellate brief “shall” include
“[a]rgument in support of the party’s position on each issue”) and Md. Rule 8-504(c) (An
“appellate court may dismiss the appeal or make any other appropriate order with respect
to the case” for noncompliance with this Rule.). See also Oak Crest Vill., Inc. v. Murphy,
379 Md. 229, 241 (2004) (“An appellant is required to articulate and adequately argue all
issues the appellant desires the appellate court to consider in the appellant’s initial brief.”).
                                               17
The court asked Father’s attorney whether he had any objection, and the following colloquy

occurred:

       [FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: I don’t really see any reason why a
       conversation with the children is happening in Chambers. These aren’t two
       young children; they’re a fifteen- and a twelve-year-old.

       THE COURT: Oh, I’m not putting them on the stand. If I’m going to talk
       to them, I’m going to talk to them like I do any child, and that’s going to be
       in the courtroom with all of you outside, and I will summarize what is said
       when we come back in.

       [MOTHER’S ATTORNEY]: That’s what I’m requesting.

       THE COURT: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

       [FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: I would just request, if he wants evidence from
       the kids, that they be required to testify, which is the normal protocol.

       [MOTHER’S ATTORNEY]: That is not the normal protocol in a family law
       case.

       THE COURT: Yeah; I’m not . . . going to do that for 15 and 12, with these
       allegations. I will speak to them privately in the courtroom, and I will do
       what I’m required to do, which is to summarize what it is that [inaudible] so
       everyone can present whatever other evidence they want, and we’ll go from
       there.

Mother then stepped out to arrange for the children’s presence, after which both parties

then testified.

       Following the testimony of both Father and Mother, the following colloquy

occurred:

       THE COURT: All right; this is how this is going to work. I want to make
       this absolutely clear. We are all going to walk down that hallway together.
       I am going to bring the children in, one at a time, and I am going to tell them,
       in front of them, what I am telling you right now, which is, the conversation
       between the two of us will be a conversation between the two of us. I will
       summarize, as I’m required to do, after I have that discussion, when we come
       back into court. But neither parent is to ask either child what I – what
                                             18
       questions I said, I asked, what they responded; that is not a topic of debate
       today or at any point moving forward. Does everyone understand that?

                         (INDISCERNIBLE CROSS-RESPONSE)

       [FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: Is there going to be any cross-examination, or
       is this simply you’re going to –

       THE COURT: Just me.

       [FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: Just the kids?

       THE COURT: Just me. I’ll summarize what was said. Just me.

The transcript reflects everyone left the courtroom at 3:54 p.m.; the court returned to the

courtroom with one child and then the second; and the parties returned to the courtroom

less than 20 minutes later, at 4:13 p.m.

       Once the parties reconvened, the court stated:

       All right; first of all, you have beautiful children; handsome children, very
       nice, educated, smart kids. And I will tell you, I am amazed how well-
       adjusted S[.] is. I’m going to call [him] S[.] because that’s what [he] asked
       me to call [him], so I’m going to call [him] S[.] And [he] really is a strong
       person; right? And I will tell you that based on my conversation with [him],
       I’m going to deny any protective order with regard to S[.] [He]’s fine. [He]’s
       not worried about it; it’s not mentally bothering [him]. [He] says it did, at
       times; [he]’s past that. And that [he] is – [he] loves the messages that you
       send [inaudible] but doesn’t really faze [him] in terms of that. [He]’s not
       upset by them; it doesn’t impact [him] on a daily basis, and it’s not impacting
       [his] – [his] mental health or [his] physical health, and I don’t feel like there’s
       sufficient evidence with regard to mental injury as it’s defined in the statute
       with regard to S[.]

The court then stated its reasonings for also denying a protective order for Mother. The

court then began addressing his assessment of N., stating:

              Now, N[.] is another case. He is – he is not as strong as S[.], at all,
       and I see him based on our conversation, he’s frightened. He – he read a text
       message that, you know, you sent – that worries him about you not believing
       – believing that [inaudible]; you believe they’re all being manipulated by
                                               19
       Mom, and that he needs to separate himself from that and – and things of that
       nature. And I think it’s doing a lot of damage to N[.] right now, and it would
       be damag[ing] mentally if I did not grant a protective order [for N.]

At this point, Father’s attorney asked if he could present a closing argument. The court

said: “You can; sure. Say whatever you want to say.” Father’s attorney then presented

argument that there was no abuse because: if there was abuse, it was an accident for Father

never intended to abuse N., and the CPS Report did not indicate a finding of abuse.

                                             A.

       As to Father’s first argument, i.e., that the court should not have questioned the

children, he supports his argument by stating that had the court utilized the CPS Report, it

could have avoided questioning the children; the court was “hellbent” on questioning the

children; and the court was insensitive to the fact that special arrangements were required

to transport the children to the courtroom for questioning.

       Contrary to his argument on appeal, Father never argued below that the court should

not speak to the children. Rather, he argued that the court should have required the children

to testify in front of everyone by taking the stand in the courtroom. By not arguing below

that the court should not question the children, he has not preserved his argument for our

review. See Md. Rule 8-131(a). Even if he had, we do not believe that the court abused

its discretion in questioning the children. We see absolutely no basis in the record to

believe that the trial court was “hellbent” on interviewing the children or insensitive to the

arrangements that were made to bring the children to the courtroom. Given the issues

before the court, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in deciding to question

                                             20
the children in the manner it did to minimize any further trauma to the children in this

highly charged hearing.

                                              B.

       As to Father’s second argument, i.e., that the court erred when it failed to follow the

guidelines set out in Karanikas for child interviews, Father’s argument is again both

unpreserved and meritless.

       In child custody cases, it is axiomatic that a trial court has “discretion to interview

a child[,]” and we review a trial court’s decision “under an abuse of discretion standard.”

Karanikas, 209 Md. App. at 590-91 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, a

“trial judge has discretion as to the length and content of a child interview.” Id. at 588.

Child interview law generally arises in the context of child custody cases because a child’s

preference to live with one parent over the other is a factor that “may” be considered in a

custody order, although the court is not required to speak to the child. Lemley v. Lemley,

102 Md. App. 266, 288 (1994) (emphasis and citation omitted). We have found no law,

nor have the parties directed us to any, that discusses the parameters of a court’s interview

of a child in the context of a protective order case.

       Our jurisprudence provides that, at least in the context of a child custody case, a

court’s private interview with a child, in the absence of waiver or consent, is proper only

(1) where the court reveals the contents of the conversation prior to making the custody

award; or (2) the award is based on evidence produced in open court rather than on

information obtained in private. Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364, 368 (1973). We

stated that one purpose of this requirement is to ensure that “some means of appellate

                                              21
review of the interview is available.” Id. at 369-70. This procedure is designed to

“minimize[], as much as possible, the psychological impact on the child, and at the same

time allow[] interested parties to produce all the evidence that is necessary to enable the

court to arrive at a fair and just determination in accordance with the best interest of the

child.” Id. at 370.

       Marshall concerned a child custody proceeding brought by parents of two children,

aged 6 and 8, in which a court conducted a private interview that was not consented to by

the mother, the substance of the children’s statements in the interview was not revealed,

and the Chancellor stated in awarding custody of the children to the father that it relied to

a great extent upon information garnered from the interview. Id. at 367-85. The interviews

took place after the father’s testimony, during which the children appeared to have been in

the courtroom. On appeal, we reversed and remanded. We agreed with the mother that

the children were “possibly schooled” by the father’s testimony as they had been in the

courtroom when he testified, and because the mother had a “total lack of knowledge” of

what the children told the Chancellor, found the interview was “fundamentally unjust”

because the circumstances left the mother “in the untenable position of being called upon

to answer, explain, or defend the alleged preferences of her [children] when she did not

know what preferences or ‘desires’ they had expressed.” Id. at 369.

       Karanikas concerned parental requests for a modification of custody and visitation

of the parties’ 9-year-old child. 209 Md. App. at 575. At trial, the father asked the court

to either interview the child in open court or chambers and to ask the child during the

interview whether she preferred to live with one parent over the other.           The court

                                             22
interviewed the child in chambers. Id. at 587. Upon completion of the interview, the court

advised the parties that he had asked the child general questions about her interests and her

custody preference, and she had said that she had no preference for living with either

parent. Id. at 587, 595. On appeal, father argued that the trial court erred because it

conducted the interview in an “‘an extremely limited and unreasonable fashion’” by only

“‘grudgingly’” agreeing to interview the child and refusing to ask the child her custody

preference. Id. at 586, 589. We rejected the father’s arguments. We failed to see any basis

to support the idea that the judge “grudgingly” agreed to interview the child and, contrary

to the father’s argument, the court did ask the child its preference. Id. at 595.

       Here, the court revealed the overall substance of its interview of the children, and

the parties were given an opportunity to respond prior to issuing its order. While the court

did not give a detailed, word-for-word question/response recitation of the interviews, the

court revealed to the parties the gist of the interviews as related above. We note that what

the court related about the interviews with the children was not surprising or new evidence

to the parties. Before the interviews occurred, evidence was elicited that N. had stated to

both his Mother and a social worker that he was fearful of Father because of his statements,

actions, and texts regarding his views. Therefore, the general summation by the court about

its interview with N. did not prevent Father from addressing N.’s concerns, and in fact,

Father did address N.’s concerns by recasting and minimizing them. We think that under

the circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in interviewing N. and allowing

Father to respond to the gist of what was revealed. Accordingly, we hold that nothing more

                                             23
was required under the circumstances presented, and we find no abuse of discretion by the

court in its conduct of the interviews.

                                             III.

       Father argues that the circuit court erred because its order was “only intended to

punish [Father] for his unpopular parenting style and not to prevent future harm to N.”

According to Father, if the court believed Father might inflict mental injury on N., the court

should have granted a “no contact” order. We disagree. We are persuaded that the relief

granted was well-tailored to prevent future abuse.

       Protective orders are intended “to protect any person eligible for relief from abuse.”

See FL § 4-506(c)(1)(ii). The Supreme Court of Maryland has said:

              The purpose of the domestic abuse statute is to protect and “aid
       victims of domestic abuse by providing an immediate and effective” remedy.
       Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 620, 623 (1988). The statute provides for a wide
       variety and scope of available remedies designed to separate the parties and
       avoid future abuse. Thus, the primary goals of the statute are preventive,
       protective and remedial, not punitive. The legislature did not design the
       statute as punishment for past conduct; it was instead intended to prevent
       further harm to the victim.

Coburn, 342 Md. at 252. Once a finding of abuse has been established, “the court’s focus

must be on fashioning a remedy that is authorized under the [domestic abuse] statute and

that will be most likely to provide that protection.” Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. at 136-37.

“Prior abuse and the nature and severity of abuse may be relevant to certain types of

relief[.]” Id. at 132 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although issuance of a

protective order may have consequences in subsequent litigation, “[t]hat is not the concern

of the court[.]” Id. at 137 (emphasis in original). Rather, the concern is doing “what is

                                             24
reasonably necessary – no more and no less – to assure the safety and well-being of those

entitled to relief.” Id. (emphasis in original).

       Here, the court ordered the following relief:

       1. Father “shall not abuse, threaten to abuse N[.]”

       2. Father “shall not enter the residence of N[.] at [address omitted] or
          wherever the person eligible for relief resides.”

       3. “Custody shall remain as set forth in previous order, however, visitation
          with [Father] can only occur if N[.] is comfortable doing so.”

       4. Father “may communicate with N[.] through phone calls and/or text
          messages but may not use that communication to abuse N[.] regarding
          sexual orientation and/or religion.”

(Capitalization omitted.) We think the relief ordered was reasonable and well-tailored to

the facts presented.

       It was N.’s fear and worry regarding Father’s views about N.’s sexual orientation

and Father’s seeming inability to see that his views caused and could cause a substantial

risk of harm to his son that the court attempted to address in its order. See Boswell v.

Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 221 (1998) (“[W]hen the child’s health or welfare is at stake[,]

visitation may be restricted or even denied.”). We find the court’s relief went to addressing

the substantial risk of harm to N. and the risk of future harm.4 Father has put forth no

evidence or argument that would convince us to the contrary.

                                         JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
                                         ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED.
                                         COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.

       4
         The parties do not raise in their appeal nor shall we address any constitutional
rights regarding the freedom of religion or parental rights.
                                              25