Court Opinion

ID: 9952874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 20:01:32.579368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:19.904942
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
                                     )
STACIA HALL, et al.,                 )
                                     )
                   Plaintiffs,       )
                                     )
      v.                             )   Civil Action No. 23-1261 (ABJ)
                                     )
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA                 )
BOARD OF ELECTIONS,                  )
                                     )
                   Defendant.        )
____________________________________)

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Plaintiffs, seven U.S. citizens who reside in the District of Columbia, 1 brought an action

on March 14, 2023 against the D.C. Board of Elections. They allege that the Local Resident Voting

Rights Amendment Act of 2022 violates their Fifth Amendment guarantees of substantive due

process and equal protection, as well as “the constitutional right of citizen self-government.”

Compl. [Dkt. # 1] ¶ 53. On May 4, 2023, defendant removed the case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a)

and 1446 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c). See Def.’s Notice of Removal [Dkt. # 1] at 1.

       Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that plaintiffs lack standing, and it also seeks to

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss

1      Plaintiff Stacia Hall is a U.S. citizen and D.C. resident registered to vote. Compl. ¶ 13. In
2022, she was the Republican candidate for Mayor in the District. Compl. ¶ 13.

Plaintiff Ralph Chittams is a U.S. citizen and D.C. resident registered to vote. Compl. ¶ 14. In
2018, he was the Republican candidate for an at-large seat on the District’s Council. Compl. ¶ 14.

Plaintiffs Suzzanne Keller, Ken McClenton, Kimberly Epps, Richard Heller, and Nicolle S. A.
Lyon are U.S. citizens and D.C. residents registered to vote. Compl. ¶¶ 15–19.
[Dkt. # 8] (“Mot.”). Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and the matter is fully briefed. See Pls.’ Opp.

to Mot. [Dkt. # 12] (“Opp.”); Def.’s Reply Brief [Dkt. # 15] (“Reply”); Pls.’ Notice of Suppl.

Authority [Dkt. # 16] (“Pl.’s Suppl.”); Decl. of Plaintiff Stacia Hall [Dkt. # 17] (“Hall Decl.”);

Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Suppl. [Dkt. # 18]. 2

       Because plaintiffs lack standing, the Court will grant defendant’s motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(1).

                                          BACKGROUND

       In 2022, the Council of the District of Columbia passed the “Local Resident Voting Rights

Amendment Act of 2022” (“the Act”). Compl. ¶ 3; D.C. Law 24-242, 69 D.C. Reg. 14,601 (Dec.

2, 2022). The Act removed the prior citizenship requirement for voting in municipal elections,

thereby enabling noncitizen residents of the District to vote in local – but not federal – elections.

Compl. ¶¶ 3, 33–34.       Under the Act, noncitizen residents may vote in elections for D.C.

government positions, such as mayor, as well as local initiatives, referenda, recalls, or charter

amendment measures, so long as they satisfy other D.C. voting requirements. D.C. Law 24-242

§ 2(a)(2). The Act also permits noncitizen residents to run for D.C. government positions and to

serve on the District’s Board of Elections. Compl. ¶ 4.

       The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that this enfranchisement of noncitizens “dilutes

the vote of every U.S. citizen voter in the District.” Compl. ¶ 5. Based on that premise, plaintiffs

allege that the Act: (1) infringes on their fundamental right to vote in violation of the Fifth

Amendment guarantee of substantive due process; (2) discriminates against U.S. citizens living in

2       The Court also received an amicus brief in support of defendant’s motion to dismiss from
the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the Washington Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs. See Brief of Amici Curiae [Dkt. # 11].

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D.C. based on their citizenship in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee of equal protection;

(3) discriminates against native-born U.S. citizens living in D.C. based on their national origin,

also in violation of the equal protection clause; and (4) violates the “constitutional right to citizen

self-government.” Compl. ¶¶ 55–70. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit

defendant from implementing the Act, registering noncitizens to vote, and counting votes cast by

noncitizens. Compl. at 16–17.

                                       LEGAL STANDARD

       Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that “a cause lies

outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994) (citation omitted); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of

our jurisdiction.”). “[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘an Art[icle] III as well as a statutory

requirement . . . no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal

court.’” Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003), quoting Ins. Corp.

of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). Moreover, a

federal court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear a case before it may consider

whether plaintiffs have stated a cognizable claim. Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, 830 F.3d 511, 513

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Federal courts cannot address the merits of a case until jurisdiction – the power

to decide – is established.”).

       “To state a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing.”

Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 133 (2011); Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Standing is a necessary predicate to any exercise of federal

jurisdiction; if it is lacking, then the dispute is not a proper case or controversy under the

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Constitution, and federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case. Dominguez

v. UAL Corp., 666 F.3d 1359, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs must show standing for each claim

they assert, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006); Friends of the Earth, Inc.

v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000), and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears

the burden of establishing standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

       To establish constitutional standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he or she has suffered

“injury-in-fact”; (2) that the injury is “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the defendant;

and (3) that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative,” that a favorable decision will redress

the injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; see also Laidlaw Env’t. Servs., 528 U.S. at 180-81.

       To satisfy the first requirement, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they “suffered an invasion

of a legally protected interest that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016), quoting Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). To be “concrete,” the injury “must actually

exist,” meaning that it is real and not abstract, although concreteness is “not . . . necessarily

synonymous with ‘tangible.’” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339–42. And to be “particularized,” the injury

must affect a plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 339. Of significance to this case,

a “plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about [the] government – claiming only

harm to his and every citizen’s interest in [the] proper application of the Constitution and laws and

seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large – does

not state an Article III case or controversy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74; see also Am. Legal Found.

v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (observing that an injury-in-fact requires “more than

allegations of damage to an interest in ‘seeing’ the law obeyed or a social goal furthered”).

                                                  4
        In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must “treat the

complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that

can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted), quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608

(D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011),

quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, the Court need not

accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those inferences are unsupported by facts alleged in the

complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiffs’ legal conclusions. Food and Water Watch, Inc. v.

Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.

2002). Moreover, when considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, unlike when

deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “is not limited to the allegations of

the complaint.” Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other

grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). Instead, “a court may consider such materials outside the pleadings

as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.”

Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000), citing Herbert

v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc.

v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

                                              ANALYSIS

        Plaintiffs maintain that the alleged dilution of their votes as U.S. citizens satisfies the

requirement of the particularized injury-in-fact that gives them standing to invoke the Court’s

jurisdiction. Opp. at 3.

        The Supreme Court has “long recognized that a person’s right to vote is ‘individual and

personal in nature,’” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 49 (2018), citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.

                                                    5
533, 561 (1964), and that “voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as

individuals have standing to sue.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206, 208 (1962) (holding that

qualified voters of various Tennessee counties had standing to challenge an allegedly

unconstitutional statewide apportionment scheme because they had “a plain, direct and adequate

interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes”) (internal citations omitted). For example,

in the context of malapportionment, voter dilution can support standing when a classification

“places [voters] in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a -vis voters in

irrationally favored counties.” Id. at 207-208.

        The Supreme Court has also found the necessary disadvantage to be present when the vote

of one member of a group receives less weight than that of another member of the same group

based on an arbitrary distinction in the gerrymandering context. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common

Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2492 (2019) (noting that partisan gerrymandering could cause an injury

in fact because plaintiffs lived in a district that had been either “cracked” or “packed” to lessen the

weight of their votes); 3 contra United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739 744–745 (1995) (holding

that plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that they had suffered individualized harm in the racial

gerrymandering context when their claims focused on a “majority-minority” district, that is, a

district “in which a majority of the population is a member of a specific minority group,” but they

did not live in that district).

3        A “cracked” district is one in which “a party’s supporters are divided among multiple
districts, so that they fall short of a majority in each,” while a “packed” district is one in which “a
party’s supporters are highly concentrated, so they win that district by a large margin, ‘wasting’
many votes that would improve their chances in others.” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2492 (internal
citations omitted).

                                                  6
       The Supreme Court has also recognized that malapportionment based on a flawed census

could give rise to a cognizable injury. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555, 563 (holding that Alabama

residents and voters had standing to challenge a state reapportionment plan that gave the same

number of representatives to unequal numbers of constituents and noting that “[w]eighting the

votes of citizens differently, by any method or means, merely because of where they happen to

reside, hardly seems justifiable.”); Dep’t of Com. v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316,

331–32 (1999) (plaintiffs satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement for standing when they

demonstrated that it was a “virtual certainty” that Indiana would lose a House seat under the

proposed census plan because Indiana residents’ votes would be diluted by the loss).

       But not every alleged dilution of voting rights gives rise to an injury that would support a

finding of standing. In Gill, Wisconsin residents complained that partisan gerrymandering left

them with “a less valuable vote.” 585 U.S. at 77 (Kagan, J., concurring). The Court held that the

plaintiffs had not come forward with any evidence to show that they had suffered such an injury;

the only plaintiff to testify at trial about the alleged gerrymander’s effects “expressly

acknowledged that his district would be materially identical under any conceivable map,” meaning

he was not “among the injured.” Id. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Daughtrey v. Carter,

584 F.2d 1050, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in each case, “the determination of injury must necessarily

proceed on an Ad hoc scrutiny of the facts.” (internal citations and quotations omitted).

       Plaintiffs’ complaint, which is more of a memorandum of points and authorities than the

required “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” see

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2), is thin on facts. It posits that “by necessary operation,” the Act

authorizing noncitizens to vote in local elections dilutes the votes of the citizens who reside in the

district. Compl. ¶ 5. But this ipse dixit is insufficient to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction.

                                                  7
       The complaint recites inarguable, important principles – “all qualified voters have a

constitutionally protected right to vote, and to have their votes counted,” Compl. ¶ 45, and “the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting

the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups,” Compl. ¶ 49 –

but it does not include facts showing that plaintiffs’ right to vote has been denied, that they have

been subjected to discrimination or inequitable treatment or denied opportunities when compared

to another group, or that their rights as citizens have been “subordinated merely because of [their]

father’s country of origin.” See Compl. ¶ 51. They identify nothing that has been taken away or

diminished and no right that has been made subordinate to anyone else’s.

       In sum, plaintiffs have not alleged that they have personally been subjected to any sort of

disadvantage as individual voters by virtue of the fact that noncitizens are permitted to vote, too.

They may object as a matter of policy to the fact that immigrants get to vote at all, but their votes

will not receive less weight or be treated differently than noncitizens’ votes; they are not losing

representation in any legislative body; nor have citizens as a group been discriminatorily

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gerrymandered, “packed,” or “cracked” to divide, concentrate, or devalue their votes. At bottom,

they are simply raising a generalized grievance which is insufficient to confer standing. 4

       Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has already specifically rejected the contention that the mere

expansion of the electorate as a whole gives rise to the necessary particularized injury affecting an

existing voter in a personalized and individual way. See Daughtrey, 584 F.2d at 1056-57.

         In Daughtrey, a group consisting of retired and active duty military officers, a civilian

former prisoner of war, the minor child of a prisoner of war who died in captivity, and some of

4        On March 4, 2024, plaintiffs filed a supplemental notice of authority transmitting an
opinion issued by the New York State Court of Appeals. See Pl.’s Suppl. In Fossella v. Adams,
No. 2022-05794, slip. op. (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 21, 2024), the court concluded that the voter
plaintiffs lacked standing for reasons similar to those outlined in this opinion. Id. at 8. However,
it did find that officeholders had standing to challenge New York City’s noncitizen voting law. Id.
at 11. Given that development, plaintiffs submitted a declaration from plaintiff Hall in a belated
effort to base standing on her more recent status as a candidate for the at-large position on the
District of Columbia Board of Education. See Pl.’s Suppl; Hall Decl. ¶ 8.

        The D.C. Circuit has made it clear that “standing is assessed as of the time a suit
commences.” Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316, 324
(D.C. Cir. 2009). The complaint, which was filed in May 2023, simply alleges that “in 2022, Ms.
Hall was the Republican candidate for Mayor of the District of Columbia,” and it made no
reference to any current or impending candidacy. Compl. ¶ 13. In her recently filed declaration,
plaintiff Hall states: “At the time this lawsuit was filed, I was planning to run for public office in
the District in 2024, and was being pressed by other members of the District of Columbia
Republican Party to run for the at-large seat on the District of Columbia Council in the 2024
election.” Decl. ¶ 7 (emphasis added). She asserts that she finalized her plans “[i]n the summer
of 2023,” and she is now “currently a candidate.” Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.

        Even if this out-of-circuit opinion were binding on this Court, the case at hand presents an
entirely different set of circumstances. While the court in Fossella held that the officeholder
plaintiffs had standing because “the record reflects that each of the officeholder plaintiffs intended
to seek reelection,” Fossella, slip. op. at 12, plaintiff Hall was not an officeholder seeking
reelection; at the time of the complaint, she was intending to be a candidate. While the court stated
that “[a]n inaccurate vote tally is a concrete and particularized injury to candidates,” id. at 11, Hall
was not yet a candidate at the time the lawsuit commenced. Moreover, given that the relevant
plaintiffs in Fossella were “individuals who held or had recently been elected to public office,” id.
at 3, and not merely “candidates,” any dicta regarding standing with respect to candidates has no
bearing on the instant case.

                                                   9
their spouses alleged that their votes were unconstitutionally devalued when individuals who had

left the country to avoid military service during the Vietnam War were permitted to return, with

their voting rights restored. Id. at 1054. They challenged then-President Carter’s Proclamation

and Executive Order on the grounds that as eligible voters, their voting rights would be diluted by

the reentry of persons they alleged should remain excluded. Id. The Court of Appeals observed

that the appellants did “not contend that their votes [were] diluted in any particular election or in

any particular geographical area” or that they were an “identifiable group of voters whose votes

are disfavored Vis-a-vis those of some other group.” Id. at 1056.       It added that “at best,” the

complaint could be read to claim that as qualified voters, plaintiffs’ votes were being diluted “as a

result of the reentry into the United States of an admittedly unknown, relatively small number of

persons who allegedly should be excluded, and who therefore should not be entitled to vote.” Id.

Because this did not present a “discrete factual context” within which a “concrete injury” had

occurred, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing.

Id. 5

        Plaintiffs point to a general statement contained in an out-of-circuit case to argue that the

existence of “a point of comparison” means that they have standing. See Opp. at 6-7, citing Wood

v. Raffensperger, 981 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2020) (upholding the dismissal of an individual

5       The Court also concluded that “the dilution of voting rights [appellants] have alleged is so
diffuse, minute, and indeterminable that we must conclude the injury asserted is too speculative to
support standing under the circumstances presented here.” Daughtrey, 584 F.2d at 1056 (internal
quotations omitted). While plaintiffs here have pointed to a more geographically concentrated
impact than the nationwide action challenged in Daughtery, they have made no effort to quantify
the number of noncitizens who will meet the criteria to vote in local elections, much less, do so.
But the Court’s ruling here is based on the lack of a particularized injury recognized in Daughtery
as opposed to the Circuit’s concern about the diffuse or speculative nature of the injury alleged in
that case.

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voter’s challenge to the 2020 presidential election results in Georgia for lack of standing, and

noting that “vote dilution can be a basis for standing. . . [b]ut it requires a point of comparison.”).

They maintain that the “point” at which the strength of their votes was diminished was the date

when the statute was enacted. Opp. at 6. But they have lifted the term out of context, as the

Eleventh Circuit was not talking about a point in time, and it went on to identify examples of the

particular forms of vote dilution that could cause a cognizable injury: “For example, in the racial

gerrymandering and malapportionment contexts, vote dilution occurs when voters are harmed

compared to ‘irrationally favored’ voters from other districts.” 981 F. 3d at 1314, citing Baker v.

Carr, 369 U.S. at 207-08. Here, the power of plaintiffs’ individual votes was not diminished in

any way on that date: plaintiffs’ votes will be counted and weighted exactly as they were before. 6

                                          CONCLUSION

       Because plaintiffs have failed to establish the injury-in-fact element of standing, the Court

will GRANT defendant’s motion to dismiss [Dkt. # 8] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

6        Plaintiffs also cite Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Opp. at 5, but this
case presents an entirely different set of circumstances. In Michel, members of Congress and their
constituents challenged a House rule allowing delegates from D.C. and U.S. territories to vote in
the House Committee of the Whole. Id. at 624–25. The court considered a standing challenge
raised by amici given the jurisdictional nature of the issue. Id. at 625. Notably, the amici did “not
question the congressmen’s standing to assert that their voting power has been diluted.” Id. Given
that the applicability of the vote dilution theory was conceded, the court only needed to decide
whether the private voters had standing as well. The amici argued that the constituents had merely
asserted a “derivative” injury and that the dilution of the voting power of their congressmen was a
generalized grievance suffered by every American voter. Id. at 626. The Michel court held that
the fact that all voters in the 50 states suffered the injury did not render it “abstract,” and that the
private citizens faced the same injury as the representatives: “previously they had a right to elect
a representative who cast one of 435 votes, whereas now their vote elects a representative whose
vote is worth only one in 440.” Id. The opinion went on to observe: “[t]hat an injury is widespread
. . . does not mean it cannot form the basis for a case in federal court so long as each person can
be said to have suffered a distinct and concrete harm.” Id. Here, the ruling that plaintiffs lack
standing is based on the absence of a particularized injury suffered by any of the U.S. citizen
plaintiffs, not the fact that there may be a large number of other citizens residing in the District.

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      A separate order will issue.

                                          AMY BERMAN JACKSON
                                          United States District Judge

DATE: March 20, 2024

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