Court Opinion

ID: 9736877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:08:54.2239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:54.680740
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). Once again this court claims exclusive judicial authority and declares a statute unconstitutional.1 This court's expanding concept of its own exclusive judicial authority creates the danger of unchecked power in this court. The legislature, bench, bar and public should be concerned.2
The issue presented by the case is whether the legislature may impose educational requirements on certain *107guardians ad litem. Section 757.48(l)(a), Stats. 1987-88, requires that circuit courts appoint as guardians ad litem for children in actions affecting the family only those attorneys who "have completed three hours of approved continuing legal education related to the functions and duties of a guardian ad litem under ch. 767."3
The majority opinion chooses to characterize sec. 757.48(1)(a) as regulating the practice of law and concludes that any statute regulating the practice of law is unconstitutional.
I share the majority's doubts about the wisdom of sec. 757.48(1)(a).4 Nevertheless I conclude that sec. 757.48(1)(a) is constitutional. A statute is presumed constitutional; the opponents of legislation bear the burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable *108doubt. In Matter of E.B. v. State, 111 Wis. 2d 175, 180, 330 N.W.2d 584 (1983). No such showing has been made in this case.
When determining whether a statute is unconstitutional as a usurpation of judicial powers, I believe the court should, following our earlier cases, consider four questions. First, is the subject matter of the statute within the legislature's constitutional charge to promote the general welfare? Second, is the subject matter within the court's constitutional grant of judicial power? Third, is the subject matter properly characterized as falling within the area of powers shared between the legislature and the courts or does the subject matter fall within the court's exclusive authority? Fourth, what is the effect of the statute on the administration of justice?
Although I believe this court may be better qualified than the legislature to deal with the issue of educational requirements for guardians ad litem, this court need not claim exclusive authority or declare the" statute unconstitutional to take advantage of its expertise.
HH
The Wisconsin legislature has plenary power to enact legislation for the general welfare. Except for the argument on separation of powers, the parties do not cite any state or federal law that would prevent the legislature from regulating the educational qualifications of guardians ad litem who represent children in an action affecting the family.
I conclude that the legislature clearly acted under its constitutional plenary legislative .powers to protect the general welfare.
*109HH HH
No one disputes this court's power to regulate the educational requirements of attorneys who are appointed guardians ad litem to represent children in an action affecting the family. The constitutional grant of judicial power extends beyond the power to decide a particular case. It encompasses those powers necessary for the court to efficiently perform its adjudicatory role. These powers are known as incidental, implied or inherent powers. State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1981); In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 393-95, 240 N.W. 441 (1932); State v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385 (1929); State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536-537, 221 N.W. 603 (1928). In the past, the court has exercised its incidental, implied or inherent judicial powers to regulate the court's budget, regulate pleading, practice and procedure, appoint counsel at the public's expense, create a judicial code of ethics, and discipline judges. See Rules of Court, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931); Holmes, supra, 106 Wis. 2d at 45 n.11 and the cases cited therein; In Matter of E.B., supra 111 Wis. 2d at 181-82.
HH hH
The majority opinion characterizes sec. 757.48(1) (a) as regulating the practice of law, an area it labels as exclusively within the judiciary's power under the separation of powers doctrine. As I explain later, see Part IV below, the cases do not support the conclusion the majority reaches.
The majority opinion ignores the broader purposes and other possible characterizations of the legislation.
I would characterize sec. 757.48(l)(a) as protecting children in court, protecting families, regulating guardi*110ans ad litem, governing pleading, practice and procedure, and incidentally affecting lawyers. The judiciary does not have the power, exclusive of the legislature, to act in any of the forementioned areas. I therefore conclude that sec. 757.48(1) (a) falls within the powers shared by the legislature and the judiciary.
This court has declared in numerous decisions that the doctrine of separation of powers is not an absolute rule but a working principle of government. The doctrine is applied to maintain the balance of power among the three branches of government, to preserve their respective independence and integrity, and to prevent the concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one branch. In Matter of E.B., supra 111 Wis. 2d 181; In Matter of Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 790 n.4, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
Relying on the separation of powers doctrine, this court has guarded the judiciary's independence and has been unwilling to sanction any legislative attempt to interfere with the essence of judicial power — a court's ability to decide the merits of a dispute under law, independently, impartially and free from coercion from another branch of government. At the same time the court has been reluctant to draw absolute boundaries between legislative and judicial powers because of the amorphous nature of the separation of powers doctrine. Davis v. The President and Trustees of the Village of Menasha, 21 Wis. 497 [*491], 501 [*495] (1867). In Matter of E.B., supra 111 Wis. 2d at 181.
The primary sources for interpreting the separation of powers doctrine sire the practices before and at the time of the adoption of the constitution and the earliest interpretation of the provision as manifested in the first laws adopted by the legislature. Rules of the Court, 204 *111Wis. 501, 505, 236 N.W. 717 (1931); State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984); State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 361, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989) (overruling State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987)).
History supports my conclusion that sec. 757.48(1) (a) is properly characterized as falling within the area of shared powers. Wisconsin legislative enactments on the subject of children in court and guardians ad litem predate statehood. In 1837, the territorial legislature required courts to appoint guardians ad litem for minors who were parties to litigation. Laws of 1839, p. 160. In 1849 the newly formed state legislature enacted a similar statute. Laws of 1848, ch. 88, sec. 35. In 1887, the legislature required that guardians ad litem be attorneys. See 1887 R.S. ch. 295, sec. 1. See Hohmann and Dwyer, Guardians ad Litem in Wisconsin, 48 Marq. L. Rev. 445 (1965).
The legislature's longstanding and continuing involvement in defining when a court should appoint a guardian ad litem and the qualifications and responsibilities of the guardian ad litem justifies concluding that the regulation of guardians ad litem falls within the area of powers shared by the legislature and the courts, not within the exclusive domain of this court.
If a law falls within an area of shared authority, as I believe sec. 757.48(1) (a) does, the law is constitutional unless it unduly burdens or substantially interferes with the judicial branch. State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42, 68, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1981). Petitioners argue, but never demonstrate with the requisite degree of certainty, that sec. 757.48(1) (a) would place an undue burden on or substantially interfere with the circuit court or this *112court.5 The majority opinion fails to consider whether any significant impairment exists.
The legislative requirement that guardians ad litem who represent children in any action affecting the family take three hours of approved continuing legal education credit fits with the court's rules requiring every lawyer to take a prescribed number of credit hours of continuing legal education. SCR ch. 31. The legislative requirement parallels this court's own order requiring lawyers to "attend as part of the continuing legal education requirement of SCR 31.02 three hours of approved continuing legal education credits on the subject of the new Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys." Supreme Court Order, In the Matter of the Amendment of Supreme Court Rules: SCR Chapter 20: Code of Professional Responsibility, June 10, 1987, p. 5.6
The shared powers approach respects the expertise and institutional ability of both the legislature and the courts. If the court believes sec. 757.48(1) (a) is unsound or can be improved, the court should not declare the statute unconstitutional but should hold a public hearing and amend or suspend the statute pursuant to its rule-making powers under sec. 751.12, Stats. 1987-88.7
*113IV.
The majority contends that the court possesses the exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law to the complete exclusion of the legislature. Our case law provides no support for holding that this court shall, in the absence of legislative interference with the judicial branch, exclusively regulate the practice of law. The court stated in Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 50, 11 N.W.2d 604, 12 N.W.2d 689 (1943), "it is quite obvious from a study of the history of the bar and the consideration of judicial decisions that the line of demarcation between the legislative field and the judicial field in mat*114ters relating to the bar is not a straight line or even a fixed one."
I can find no unified theory in our cases explaining the court's and legislature's spheres of authority in matters relating to admission to the bar, practice of law or disbarment. The court has followed a pragmatic approach to statutes relating to these subjects, seeking to accommodate the legislature's concerns for the general welfare, to defer to reasonable legislative enactments, and to avoid conflict with the legislature. See, e.g., Application of Lavinia Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1875), 48 Wis. 693, 81 N.W. 551 (1879); State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603 (1928); In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932); State ex rel. Junior Assn of Milwaukee Bar v. Rice, 236 Wis. 38, 53, 294 N.W. 550 (1940); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1960).
The majority opinion contends that In re Cannon, 206 Wis. at 396, and State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d at 206, prohibit the legislature from regulating the practice of law. I disagree.
Cannon's reach is significantly more limited than the majority opinion suggests. The Cannon court merely held that the legislature may not enact a statute admitting a single individual as a member of the bar, namely Raymond Cannon, whom the court had suspended from practice of law. The court reasoned that the legislature may establish minimum criteria for bar admission so long as the criteria apply generally to all attorneys and do not interfere with the court's power to enact further requirements for admission or to discipline individual attorneys. Cannon does not suggest the legislative interest ends with lawyers' admission to the bar.
Similarly, the majority opinion's reliance on Dinger is misplaced. In Dinger, the court considered whether *115the real estate brokers could complete title transfers and real estate documents for their clients or whether these activities constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The court stated in dictum that it has the exclusive power to regulate the practice of law. It also stated, however, that its power did not displace the role of the legislature or an administrative agency to adopt laws and regulations that might affect the legal profession or that aids the court in its constitutional powers affecting the legal profession. Dinger, supra 14 Wis. 2d at 203, 206. The Dinger court held that the court retains the final power to modify any rule, law, or regulation which interferes with the court's function in the administration of justice.
Even if the court were to determine that the sec. 757.48(1) (a) falls within the exclusive power of the court under the separation of powers doctrine, the statute is not necessarily unconstitutional. When the court has claimed an area as exclusive to the judiciary, the court has turned to principles of comity, recognizing the legislature's power and duty to declare itself on questions relating to the general welfare. This rationale for the judicial policy of comity is set forth in State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d at 46 (quoting Integration of the Bar Case, 244 Wis. at 52):
While the legislature has no constitutional power to compel the court to act or, if it acts, to act in a particular way in the discharge of the judicial function, it may nevertheless with propriety, and in the exercise of its power and the discharge of its duty, declare itself upon questions relating to the general welfare .... The court, as has been exemplified during the entire history of the state will respect such declaration and, as already indicated, adopt them so *116far as they do not embarrass the court or impair its constitutional functions.
Accordingly, this court has consistently held that even if a law falls within the court's exclusive authority, the court will uphold the law if this court accepts it as an aid to the court's power; it is invalid if this court determines that the law thwarts the administration of justice. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
The majority opinion makes no effort to demonstrate that sec. 757.48(1) (a) thwarts the court's authority or the administration of justice. There is nothing in the record to show that sec.,757.48(l)(a) thwarts the administration of justice or impedes or interferes with the administration of justice. I therefore conclude that the statute is constitutional.
V.
I do not join the majority opinion because it improperly and unwisely closes the people's access to the legislature by characterizing the statute as falling within this court's exclusive powers. Neither the majority opinion nor the cases it cites defines the phrase practice of law. For the difficulty of defining what constitutes the practice of law, see Dinger, supra. The court arbitrarily claims the power to place vast areas of the law beyond the power of the legislative and executive branches by characterizing a statute as regulating the "practice of law."
As a result of this opinion, the only recourse for those seeking to improve the quality of performance of guardians ad litem who represent children in an action affecting the family is to petition this court to adopt rules. I do not believe the court's rule-making process *117should supplant the right of the people to act through their elected representatives.
The court's rule-making procedures are, unfortunately, confusing and shrouded in secrecy. Some rules fall within sec. 751.12, Stats. 1987-88. Others fall within the Supreme Court Rules. Still others fall within the court's Internal Operating Procedures. The procedure for petitioning the court for the different types of rules is not clear. The court holds hearings on some rules, not on others. Hearings are open to the public. The decision-making process on all rules and internal operating procedures is presently closed. In the past the court usually has not explained its adoption of a rule or refused to adopt a proposed rule. See, e.g., In re Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 216-18, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). The public's need for access to this court's decision-making process concerning rules and administrative matters becomes all the more important as the court declares its powers to be exclusive of the legislature.
At times this court must assume exclusive power to ensure the orderly administration of justice. In my opinion, this case is not one of those times. The majority opinion departs from time-honored principles of shared powers between two equal and coordinate branches of government and the spirit of comity. Justice Crownhart's words in 1929 chastising the court for assuming powers are applicable in this case: "The court is the sole judge of its powers, without guide or compass. I would think that this court would not wish [to exercise] arbitrary power, for arbitrary power begets arbitrary use *118or abuse of power." State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534 (1929) (Crownhart, J., dissenting).
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

 See also In re Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 790, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984).

 For a discussion of the dangers of courts' increasingly declaring their exclusive prerogative of regulating lawyers, see Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation — The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 1 (1989-90). Professor Wolfram (Charles Frank Reavis, Sr., Professor of Law, Cornell Law School) views the judicial exclusivity aspect of the separation of powers doctrine as "a powerful barrier shielding the legal profession from any of its critics who wish to urge legislative reform of the profession.”
For a discussion of the relations of the Illinois Supreme Court and Illinois Legislature on the court's claim of exclusive power, see Chicago Tribune, May 4, 1990, sec. 1, p. 7.

 Section 757.48(l)(a), 1987-88, provides:
Guardian ad litem must be an attorney. (1) (a) Except as provided in s. 879.23 (4), in all matters in which a guardian ad litem is appointed by the court, the guardian ad litem shall be an attorney admitted to practice in this state. In order to be appointed as a guardian ad litem under s. 767.045, an attorney shall have completed 3 hours of approved continuing legal education relating to the functions and duties of a guardian ad litem under ch. 767.

 The Judicial Council filed a petition for rule-making with this court on June 19, 1989, to amend various provisions governing guardians ad litem for minor children. While the Judicial Council did not propose an educational requirement for the guardians ad litem, other persons filed proposals and requested the court to adopt educational requirements for guardians appointed in chapter 48 proceedings. Public Hearing on October 10, 1989. In closed discussion of the proposed rules, the court refused to adopt educational requirements, but gave no reason for its action. Order in the Matter of Rules Pertaining to Guardians ad Litem: Secs. 48.02(9), 48.23(1), (3) and (4), 48.235, 48.41(30), 767.045, 809.85, 813.122(3), 880.33(2)(c) and 880.331, Stats., dated October 26,1989.

 If a circuit court could not find an attorney with the appropriate CLE accreditation, the requirement would obviously give way to the circuit court's inherent power to appoint counsel for the proper administration of justice. Contempt in State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987).

 Petitioners have also argued that the statute is impermissi-bly vague. I find this contention without merit on the basis of our own 1987 order requiring continuing legal education credits on the new attorneys' professional conduct code.

 Section 751.12, Stats. 1987-88, provides:
751.12 Rules of pleading and practice. The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by it from time to time, regulate *113pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for the purpose of simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. The rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. The effective dates for all rules adopted by the court shall be January 1 or July 1. A rule shall not become effective until 60 days after its adoption. All such rules shall be printed by the state printer and paid for out of the state treasury, and the court shall direct the rules to be distributed as it deems proper. All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure may be modified or suspended by rules promulgated under this section. No rule modifying or suspending such statutes may be adopted until the court has held a public hearing with reference to the rule. Notice of public hearings shall be given by publication of a class 3 notice, under ch. 986, the expense of the publication to be paid out of the state treasury. Notice shall also be given in an official publication of the state bar of Wisconsin, the notice to be published not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of hearing. The state bar of Wisconsin shall not charge the state treasury for publication of this notice. Proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be set forth in full in the notice. This section shall not abridge the right of the legislature to enact, modify or repeal statutes or rules relating to pleading, practice or procedure. The judicial council shall act in an advisory capacity to assist the court in performing its duties under this section.