Court Opinion

ID: 9917105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 17:00:58.655387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:00.269913
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11314    Document: 23-1     Date Filed: 01/11/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11314
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MARC VALME,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:97-cr-06007-RNS-5
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11314

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Marc Valmé, proceeding pro se on appeal, appeals the district
       court’s denial of his counseled motion for a reduced sentence un-
       der 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the retroactive amendment to
       the Guidelines in Amendment 782 and under § 3582(c)(1)(A) based
       on the extraordinary and compelling reasons of his medical condi-
       tions. In response, the government moves for summary affir-
       mance, arguing that Valmé’s request based on Amendment 782
       and § 3582(c)(2) is barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine, and as to
       his request under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court did not abuse its
       discretion in determining that Valmé posed a continuing threat to
       the community based on his offense conduct.
               Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
       the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-
       sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”
       or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat-
       ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-
       come of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the ap-
       peal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,
       1162 (5th Cir. 1969). A motion for summary affirmance postpones
       the due date for the filing of any remaining brief until we rule on
       the motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).
              We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-
       tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and, if eligible, will
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       23-11314                   Opinion of the Court                                3

       review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) mo-
       tion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343,
       1345 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion if it ap-
       plies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in
       making its determination, or makes clearly erroneous factual find-
       ings.” Id. We review de novo whether the district court properly ap-
       plied the law-of-the-case doctrine. United States v. Bobo, 419 F.3d
       1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2005).
               The First Step Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to al-
       low a court to reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment upon
       motion of a defendant. See First Step Act § 603; 18 U.S.C.
       § 3582(c)(1)(A). Section 1B1.13, the policy statement applicable to
       § 3582(c)(1)(A), states that a court may reduce a term of imprison-
       ment if extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduc-
       tion, the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person
       or to the community, and the reduction is otherwise consistent
       with the policy statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(1). The Sentencing
       Commission did not immediately amend § 1B1.13 to incorporate
       the statutory amendments in the First Step Act, 1 but we

       1 Because the district court denied Valmé’s motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A)
       based on its discretionary weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, we need not decide
       whether the recent amendments to § 1B1.13, effective on November 1, 2023,
       regarding what circumstances qualify as extraordinary and qualifying apply to
       pending cases on direct appeal. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States
       Courts, 88 Fed. Reg. 28,254, 28,255 (May 3, 2023); see also United States v. Jer-
       chower, 631 F.3d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing when amendments to
       the Guidelines apply retroactively on direct appeal).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11314

       determined that § 1B1.13 applied to all motions for compassionate
       release filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A), including those filed by prison-
       ers, and thus a district court may not reduce a sentence unless a
       reduction would be consistent with § 1B1.13’s definition of “ex-
       traordinary and compelling reasons.” United States v. Bryant, 996
       F.3d 1243, 1252-62 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). A
       district court may grant compassionate release if: (1) an extraordi-
       nary and compelling reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduction
       would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (3) the § 3553(a)
       factors weigh in favor of compassionate release. United States v.
       Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2021). When the district
       court finds that one of these three prongs is not met, it need not
       examine the other prongs. Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348.
              Factors under § 3553(a) that the district court must consider
       in determining whether a sentence reduction is warranted include
       the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history
       and characteristics, the need for the sentence to reflect the serious-
       ness of the crime, promote respect for the law, provide just punish-
       ment, protect the public from the defendant’s crimes, and afford
       adequate deterrence, the kinds of sentences available, the guideline
       range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.
       18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). When the district court analyzes the § 3553(a)
       factors, the weight it gives to any specific factor is committed to the
       sound discretion of the court. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241. A district
       court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to afford consideration
       to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives signif-
       icant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a
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       23-11314               Opinion of the Court                        5

       clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id. (quo-
       tation marks omitted). Where consideration of the § 3553(a) factors
       is mandatory, district courts need not address each of the § 3553(a)
       factors nor all of the mitigating evidence. Id. Instead, an acknowl-
       edgement by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a) fac-
       tors and the parties’ arguments is sufficient. Id. The record must
       indicate that the district court considered a number of the factors.
       Id.
                In Concepcion v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded
       that district courts deciding motions for a reduced sentence under
       § 404 of the First Step Act, which allowed the district courts to im-
       pose a reduced sentence for those sentenced for crack cocaine of-
       fenses before the Fair Sentencing Act changed the enhanced statu-
       tory penalties for crack cocaine offenses, may consider intervening
       changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion. See 597 U.S.
       481, 494-502 (2022). The Supreme Court noted evidence of
       post-sentencing rehabilitation, violence, or prison infractions and
       nonretroactive Guidelines amendments as factors that a district
       court could consider. Id. at 496-99. The Supreme Court also noted
       that Congress had imposed express statutory limitations on district
       courts in sentence modification proceedings under § 3582(c)(1) and
       (c)(2) by providing that they may only grant a sentence reduction
       if it is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
       Sentencing Commission. Id. at 494-95.
              Under § 3582(c)(2), where a defendant has been sentenced
       to an imprisonment term based on a sentencing range that was
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11314

       later lowered by the Sentencing Commission, a district court may
       reduce the defendant’s imprisonment term after considering the
       applicable § 3553(a) factors if such a reduction is consistent with
       applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A defendant is eligible for a sentence reduc-
       tion under § 3582(c)(2) only when an amendment listed in U.S.S.G.
       § 1B1.10(d) lowers his guideline range that was calculated by the
       sentencing court. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1) & comment. (n.1(A)).
       Amendment 782, which reduced by two levels the base offense lev-
       els that apply to most drug offenses under §§ 2D1.1 and 2D1.11, is
       listed in § 1B1.10(d). U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 782 (2014). If a dis-
       trict court determines that a defendant is eligible for a sentence re-
       duction under § 3582(c)(2) because his guideline range was lowered
       by a retroactive amendment, the district court must decide
       whether, in its discretion, to impose a reduced sentence under the
       amended guideline range or retain the original sentence after con-
       sidering the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923,
       927 (11th Cir. 2009). The commentary to § 1B1.10 specifies that a
       district court shall consider the § 3553(a) factors and the danger to
       any person or the community and may consider post-sentencing
       conduct of the defendant when determining whether a sentence
       reduction is warranted. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment. (n.1(B)).
              Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, district and appellate
       courts are generally bound to follow a prior appellate decision in
       the same case and cannot revisit issues that were decided explicitly
       or by necessary implication. Thomas v. United States, 572 F.3d 1300,
       1303 (11th Cir. 2009). There are three exceptions to the
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       23-11314               Opinion of the Court                          7

       law-of-the-case doctrine: (1) the evidence in a subsequent trial is
       substantially different; (2) there is a change in controlling law; or
       (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work man-
       ifest injustice. United States v. Stein, 964 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir.
       2020). We have determined that we may raise the law-of-the-case
       doctrine sua sponte and have affirmed a district court’s denial of a
       § 3582(c)(2) motion under the law-of-the-case doctrine where we
       had previously affirmed the denial of a sentence reduction based
       on the same Guidelines amendment. United States v. Anderson, 772
       F.3d 662, 668-70 (11th Cir. 2014).
               Here, the government’s position is clearly correct as a mat-
       ter of law. Valmé’s request under Amendment 782 and § 3582(c)(2)
       was barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine because we previously
       upheld the district court’s denial of his earlier identical request
       based on Amendment 782 and Valmé failed to show that any of the
       exceptions to the doctrine applied. As to his request based on
       § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court did not abuse its discretion in de-
       termining that Valmé posed a continuing threat to the community
       based on his offense conduct and refusal to accept responsibility for
       his actions. Further, the court considered the evidence Valmé sub-
       mitted when it denied his motion.
             Accordingly, because the government’s position is clearly
       correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion
       for summary affirmance. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.
              AFFIRMED.