Court Opinion

ID: 9856653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:54:15.295784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:14.057585
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The real issue in this case, which is simply not addressed by the majority, is whether a state administrative agency can award attorney’s fees in carrying out a federal statute which provides for such awards. Every case and authority cited by the majority is irrelevant to this issue. I completely agree that it is the general rule that “attorney fees cannot be recovered in an action unless authorized by statute or by express agreement of the parties.” However, in the present action, all parties agree that attorney’s fees are authorized by statute. Thus, the inclusion of much authority as to the general rule may only lead to confusion.
To my mind the awarding of attorney’s fees, as opposed to creating a right to attorney’s fees, is strictly procedural. The Court is hardly in a position to say otherwise, having promulgated what it denominates as a “procedural” rule which purports to govern the awarding of attorney’s fees, see I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e), while at the same time recognizing that only the legislature or private parties, through contracts, may create a right to attorney’s fees. Id. See Kidwell v. Fenley, 96 Idaho 534, 531 P.2d 1179 (1975). I am at a loss to understand how the Court can characterize the awarding of attorney’s fees as procedural in its own system, but substantive when an administrative agency makes the award pursuant to a statute which creates a right to attorney’s fees.
*755As the majority notes, the IPUC’s statutory authority includes I.C. § 61-501, which provides:
“Investment of authority. — The public utilities commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do all things necessary to carry out the spirit and intent of the provisions of this act.”
I.C. § 61-601 provides:
“Practice — Evidence.—All hearings and investigations before the commission or any commissioner shall be governed by this act and by rules of practice and procedure to be adopted by the commission, and in the conduct thereof neither the commission nor any commissioner shall be bound by the technical rules of evidence.”
Since the IPUC is statutorily authorized to adopt rules of practice and procedure, and is “vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in the state .. .,” I.C. § 61-501, I would hold that the adoption of procedural rules governing the award of statutorily authorized attorney’s fees in an otherwise valid IPUC proceeding is well within the IPUC’s jurisdiction and authority. Furthermore, while the majority is correct in stating that the IPUC may not create new authority or jurisdiction for itself by submitting rules to the appropriate legislative committee, see I.C. §§ 67-5217, 5218, the lack of objection to these rules by the legislature does establish that the legislative mind understood the rules to be procedural, and properly promulgated in pursuit of the IPUC’s statutory authority.
Finally, the fact that it is a federal statute which creates the right to attorney’s fees under these circumstances, and not a state statute, does not change the analysis. The statute clearly creates a right to attorney’s fees for services performed in state administrative proceedings. 16 U.S.C. § 2632(a). The statute then states that these fees may be recovered “in any State court of competent jurisdiction, unless the State regulatory authority ... has adopted a reasonable procedure pursuant to which such authority .. . (A) determines the amount of such fees and costs, and (B) includes an award of such fees and costs in its order . . . . ” 16 U.S.C. § 2632(a)(2)(A) and (B). State courts considering a federally created right of action are bound by the federal law of attorney’s fees associated with the federal right. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2507, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). A federal statute may properly create a right to attorney’s fees for services performed before a state administrative agency in furtherance of a federal statute. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc., v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980). As a general rule, rights created by federal law are enforceable by the state courts in the absence of federal legislation creating exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, or a federal legislative pattern which by necessary implication is so pervasive as to preclude jurisdiction in the state courts. See United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 56 S.Ct. 343, 80 L.Ed. 331 (1936); Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America, 84 Idaho 201, 369 P.2d 1006 (1962). Where the federal law specifically contemplates enforcement by state administrative agencies, the same principle applies. See New York Gaslight Club, supra. Furthermore, principles of comity and federalism support the PUC’s efforts to implement PURPA in the most efficient and cost-effective manner. “Federalism does not preclude cooperative action between the two sovereigns when the interests of both state and nation are thereby served.” Gereau v. Henderson, 526 F.2d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1976).
Although I agree that the statute at issue here does not purport to require state public utilities commissions to adopt rules governing attorney’s fee awards, it clearly contemplates that the public utilities commissions might promulgate procedural rules governing the awarding of fees in these specific PURPA proceedings, and in fact encour*756ages them to do so by specifying criteria to be used in awarding such fees.1
Since the awarding of attorney’s fees is a procedural matter, unless the Court is prepared to hold that PURPA may not be implemented by the IPUC at all, I would not bar the IPUC from awarding the attorneys fees which the statute creates a right to.
I respectfully dissent.

. Obviously, a great deal of time and expense could be saved for all parties involved if the IPUC, to which all of the intervenor’s work is presented, also evaluates and awards attorney’s fees for that work. To force intervenor’s to bring a separate action in state court is duplicative, wasteful and unnecessary.