Court Opinion

ID: 9689091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:19:21.800749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:44.545853
License: Public Domain

Becker, J.
I dissent. It would appear that the complexity and difficulty of the industrial relations evidenced by this case is an example of the reasons for the rules laid down, and cited by the majority, in United Steelworkers v. American Manu*926factoring Co., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. (citations in majority opinion). After citing the admonitions in those cases, the majority seems to indulge in the close scrutiny of the arbitrator’s reasoning that is expressly warned against by the United States Supreme Court in above noted cases.
It seems to me that the point now decided by this court was brought before us on motion for separate adjudication of law points. We sustained defendant’s position in Local Union No. 721 v. Needham Packing Co., 254 Iowa 882, 119 N.W.2d 141. The matter was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and this court was reversed. Local Union No. 721, etc. v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U. S. 247, 84 S. Ct. 773, 11 L. Ed.2d 680. I can not see that the facts or issues now decided are essentially different after trial from the alleged facts considered by the courts on that prior motion.
As stated by the arbitrator in his opinion, while the Supreme Court did not decide that the grievances here considered were arbitrable, it did decide that the company was not released from its duty to arbitrate on the basis that the union had violated the no-strike clause. The arbitrator then found specifically on a fully developed record: “However, the record does not support a finding that the Union or the employees had so totally breached the contract as to warrant the Company in regarding them as having terminated their relationship with the Company.” Thus we are again deciding the same point as a matter of law that was adversely decided by the Supreme Court as a matter of law and adversely decided by the arbitrator as a matter of law and fact.
“Needham’s allegations by way of defense and counterclaim that the union breached the no-strike clause, supported by such facts as were undisputed on the pleadings, did not release Need-ham from its duty to arbitrate the union’s claim that employees had been wrongfully discharged. On that basis, we reverse and remand to the Iowa Supreme Court for further proceedings. It is so ordered.” 84 S. Ct., at 777.
*9279 Williston on Contracts, Third Ed., Jaeger, section 1023B, page 488 et seq., contains a careful analysis of this entire matter ; quotation of a portion of that work seems apropos:
“3. While failure or refusal to carry out a material term going to the essence of a contract justifies the other party’s rescission, it does not have this effect where there is a breach of a ‘no-strihe” clause in a collective bargaining agreement * * * (emphasis supplied).
“As judicially construed, this clause requires that all disputes or grievances, unless expressly excluded, shall be referred or submitted to an arbiter or arbitral tribunal. In brief, whenever there is room for doubt, arbitration must be ordered. It is hardly possible to repeat this judicially announced ‘canon’ of construction often enough, or to emphasize it sufficiently, although the attempt will be made by an examination and analysis of the case-law in the pages which follow (emphasis by author).
“In summary, then, the function of the judicial forum is strictly limited where the arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement is under scrutiny. Essentially, it is confined to determining whether a party seeking arbitration is making a claim which prima facie is governed by the terms of the contract. Where this is true, the Supreme Court has issued a mandate imposing restraint upon the courts, i.e., a self-denying attitude and affirmatively, prompt reference to arbitration unless there is a clear and explicit provision excluding the question or dispute from arbitration.”
Williston’s analysis is a careful examination of the federal law in this field. It sustains what the arbitrator and the trial court did here.
To me it would appear that every argument now used by the majority was either implicitly or explicitly considered by the United States Supreme Court and rejected. On the same facts we now reaffirm our opposite position. I think we should follow the clear mandate of the court of last resort on this matter.
Mason, J., joins in this dissent.