Court Opinion

ID: 9939561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:54.413858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:24.581804
License: Public Domain

J-S37023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TERRELL BRIDGET                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 72 EDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 7, 2019
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008648-2017

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TERRELL BRIDGET                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 74 EDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 7, 2019
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008655-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2024

       Terrell Bridget (“Bridget”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his convictions for aggravated assault, possessing an

instrument of crime (“PIC”), rape of a child, and related offenses.1 We affirm.

       The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 907, 3121(c).
J-S37023-23

           [Trial testimony reveals the following.] Natalie Stavas, M.D.
     (“Dr. Stavas”) testified at trial as an expert “in the field of child
     sexual and physical abuse.” She is an attending physician at The
     Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (“CHOP”) and a member of the
     hospital’s “child protection team,” which assesses whether an
     injured child is the victim of neglect or abuse.

           Dr. Stavas examined the two minor victims in this case,
     “N.J.” and “J.J.,” who presented to CHOP [i]n July [] 2017. The
     four-year-old J.J. presented to the emergency room with bruises
     and abrasions that raised suspicions of child abuse. When Dr.
     Stavas’s team examined J.J. on the following day, the child
     informed them that he was “beaten,” “kicked,” “choked,” and
     struck with a belt multiple times by a “man in his home.” Dr.
     Stavas photographed J.J.’s wounds, which included ruptured blood
     vessels in his eyes (subconjunctival hemorrhages), facial
     abrasions, bruising around his neck, chest abrasions, “loop mark”
     bruising on his back indicating he had been struck with an object,
     and extensive bruising on his legs and arms.

           The photographs show “pattern bruising” on J.J.’s legs that
     is consistent with being struck “repeatedly with some sort of
     object that had a linear edge to it[.]” The bruising shape was
     consistent with “a long and double belt.” Crescent-shaped marks
     on J.J.’s back likewise indicated that someone struck him there
     with a belt buckle and bruising around his neck was consistent
     with someone having choked him. Dr. Stavas testified that the
     broken blood vessels in J.J.’s eyes, coupled with the bruising on
     his neck, indicates that J.J. was indeed choked. Blood and enzyme
     testing confirmed that J.J. sustained muscle damage from the
     beatings. J.J.’s injuries “appeared to be at different stages” and
     some were older than others. Based on these extensive injuries,
     Dr. Stavas determined that someone physically abused [J.J.]

           Dr. Stavas also examined the nine-year-old N.J., who
     complained of “significant vaginal pain,” itchiness, and burning
     when she peed. Dr. Stavas noted no abnormalities on N.J.’s
     genitalia. However, she testified that 95% of sexually abused
     children have normal exams, meaning their genitalia contain no
     “evidence of prior injury or penetration.” Moreover, although N.J.
     denied at the time that anyone touched her “private parts,” Dr.
     Stavas ordered lab testing which established that N.J. contracted
     “a sexually transmitted disease called Trichomonas.”

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            Dr. Stavas testified that Trichomonas (“Trich”) is a parasite
     that lives in the genital tracts of men and women, and that the
     most common way to transmit the disease to children is through
     sexual abuse. The disease transmits “through sexual contact with
     infected secretions,” and its symptoms include burning, itching,
     and vaginal pain while peeing. Because [Trich] can survive
     outside the body only briefly, and only in warm and moist
     environments, the parasite does not “live very long on things, like,
     toilet seats or rags.”

            Dr. Stavas testified that there are case reports of adults
     claiming to have contracted [Trich] from towels and toilet seats,
     but there are no reports of prepubescent children contracting the
     STD “from any other way except through sexual transmission.”
     [Trich] is most-commonly transmitted through secretions from
     infected genitalia contacting another person’s genitalia. The only
     other way for a child to be infected is if “a large amount” of
     infected secretion survives on a surface for a short period of time,
     during which the secretion somehow enters the child’s exposed
     “private parts” or is wiped on the child’s genitals with a rag. To
     transmit the infection by a towel or rag, the cloth “would have to
     be wet and moist” and “the secretions would have to be directly
     ... rubbed up into the child’s private part area.”

           Therefore, when Dr. Stavas’s team discovers [Trich] in a
     prepubescent child, they deem it “extremely likely” that the
     disease “was given to them through sexual abuse.”

            Consistent with Dr. Stavas’s unrebutted expert testimony,
     N.J. testified at trial that [Bridget] did sexually abuse her on
     multiple occasions. [Bridget] would send N.J. to the bathroom,
     close the door, tell her to remove her pants, and insert his penis
     in her anus. [Bridget] assaulted N.J. the same way in other
     rooms, including in the living room and in the bedroom of N.J.’s
     mother. During the abuse, N.J. closed her eyes, cried, and felt
     discharge on her butt from [Bridget’s] penis that she did not see[,]
     but described as “pee.” [Bridget] also inserted his penis inside
     N.J[.]’s mouth and placed his fingers on her vagina. Although N.J.
     told her mother about the abuse, her mother “said she didn’t
     believe [her].”

           On the day that she presented to CHOP, N.J. witnessed
     [Bridget] beat her brother J.J. with a belt, step on his stomach,
     kick him, and choke him around the neck. J.J. and N.J. both cried

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     and pleaded with [Bridget] to stop. When N.J.’s mother returned
     home after the beating, J.J. told her what occurred, and she called
     the police. N.J. testified that she initially denied being sexually
     abused because [Bridget] “told [her] not to tell nobody.”

          J.J. likewise testified at trial that [Bridget] physically abused
     him on multiple occasions, stepped on his stomach and chest, and
     whipped him with a belt.

           The victims’ mother, D[.] Jones (“Ms. Jones”), . . . testified
     and claimed that[,] before her children went to CHOP [i]n July []
     2017, she never saw any marks on them. She testified that
     [Bridget] disciplined the children upon first moving into the home
     in 2015, but that he did not physically abuse them until 2016. Ms.
     Jones allowed [Bridget] to “discipline” her children— i.e., beat
     them with a belt—“because they didn’t have a father figure.”

           Ms. Jones admitted that her daughter N.J. did tell her about
     [Bridget’s] sexual abuse, but she claimed her “depression”
     prevented her from taking N.J. to the hospital. Although N.J. also
     [told her] that her vagina was hurting and burning, Ms. Jones
     claimed a doctor advised it was only bacteria. [Ms. Jones testified
     that she had previously had Trich, which she believed she had
     contracted from Bridget.]

            [Bridget] testified last and denied molesting N.J. [as well as]
     being diagnosed with [Trich]. [Officer Jose Viera (“Officer Viera”),
     who was assigned to the Special Victims Unit and took a statement
     from Bridget in August 2017, testified that Bridget admitted to
     having Trich, which Bridget conceded at trial, though Bridget
     asserted he had previously misspoken. Bridget] testified that he
     “disciplined” the victims with Ms. Jones’s approval and that he
     struck them multiple times with a belt. [Bridget] claimed that the
     day before J.J. presented to CHOP, he spanked J.J. with a belt
     because [J.J.] bit N.J. Ms. Jones came home during the spanking
     but said nothing. [Bridget] testified that the next day, however,
     he and Ms. Jones had an argument[,] and Ms. Jones told him to
     leave her home. [Bridget] refused, and police officers soon after
     arrived.

                                 ****

             [I]n September [] 2018, following a bench trial, the [c]ourt
     found        [Bridget]    guilty     under     docket       number

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        CP-51-CR-0008648-2017 of aggravated assault . . ., strangulation
        (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(a)(1)), endangering the welfare of a child
        (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1)), [PIC], simple assault (18 Pa.C.S.A.
        § 2701(a)), and recklessly endangering another person (18
        Pa.C.S.A. § 2705).

              Under docket number CP-51-CR-0008655-2017, the [c]ourt
        found [Bridget] guilty of rape of a child . . ., involuntary deviate
        sexual intercourse with a child [(“IDSI”)] (18 Pa.C.S.A.
        § 3123(b)), aggravated indecent assault of a child (18 Pa.C.S.A.
        § 3125(b)), unlawful contact with a minor (18 Pa.C.S.A.
        § 6318(a)(1)), endangering the welfare of a child [(“EWOC”)] (18
        Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1)), corruption of minors (18 Pa.C.S.A.
        § 6301(a)(1)(ii)), indecent assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7)),
        and simple assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)).

              On March 7, 2019, the [c]ourt sentenced [Bridget] to an
        aggregate term of twelve (12) to twenty-four (24) years’
        incarceration. On March 13, 2019, [Bridget] filed post-sentence
        motions in each of his cases . . ..

                                   ****

              [Following denial of Bridget’s post-sentence motions, he
        appealed, and on direct review, this Court affirmed in June 2021,
        finding his issues waived for failure to raise them in a Pa.R.A.P.
        1925(b) statement. Bridget] filed a timely PCRA petition [i]n July
        [] 2021. The PCRA petition was granted[, and the PCRA court]
        reinstated [Bridget’s direct appeal rights] [n]unc [p]ro [t]unc. The
        [c]ourt also appointed a new [a]ppellate [c]ounsel.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/19/23, at 1-7 (paragraphs re-ordered for clarity;

internal footnotes and citations to the record omitted). Bridget once again

timely appealed, and both Bridget and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Bridget raises the following issues for our review:

           1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict [Bridget] of
              [PIC?]

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         2. Whether the verdict of guilty with respect to the charges of
            rape of a child, IDSI, aggravated indecent assault of a child,
            unlawful contact with a minor, EWOC, [corruption of
            minors], indecent assault and simple assault is against the
            weight of the evidence to such a degree that it shocks one’s
            conscience in the situation where [N.J.’s] testimony was
            inconsistent to a degree to render it not credible, including
            with respect to the type of sexual abuse that occurred, as
            well as inconsistencies with respect to the physical evidence
            of who had a sexual[ly] transmitted disease and the manner
            in which the disease was transmitted[?]

Bridget’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      In his first issue, Bridget presents a sufficiency challenge to his

conviction for PIC.     Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence

issues is as follows:

             . . . [W]e evaluate the record in the light most favorable to
      the verdict[-]winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
      reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence
      will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes
      each material element of the crime charged and the commission
      thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
      mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is
      to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
      and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact
      can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

            The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
      wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the
      evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is
      circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence
      coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
      overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may
      not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so
      long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable
      to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of
      a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s
      convictions will be upheld.

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Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722–23 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Additionally, the fact-finder is free

to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.        See Commonwealth v.

Greenlee, 212 A.3d 1038, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      For PIC, the Crimes Code provides: “A person commits a misdemeanor

of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to

employ it criminally.”   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).      An instrument of crime is

defined as: “(1) Anything specially made or specially adapted for criminal

use[; or] (2) Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor

under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have.”

Id. § 907(d) (definitions). An object may be an instrument of crime if it is

used toward a criminal end, even if the object is not commonly used for

criminal purposes. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 883 A.2d 479,

487-89 (Pa. 2005) (concluding that a PIC conviction was appropriate where

the defendant swung a baseball bat at two young girls even without a showing

that a baseball bat is commonly used for criminal purposes).

      In his first issue, Bridget asserts the evidence was insufficient to sustain

his conviction for PIC because “there is no evidence that he used a belt to

commit a crime.” Bridget’s Brief at 9. Bridget argues that the use of a belt

“without more, does not lead to a finding of child abuse.” See id. at 10. He

submits that he used the belt merely for disciplinary purposes. See id. at 11.

He points to testimony by Ms. Jones, as well as himself, to the effect that he

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was the disciplinarian of the household. See id. at 11-12. Bridget argues

that while Dr. Stavas testified that there were loop marks on J.J., which

indicated the use of a belt, they were old “and not the result of the current

abusive incident[.]” Id. at 15.

      The trial court considered Bridget’s arguments and concluded they

merited no relief:

            Here, [Bridget] used a belt with the intent to beat J.J. Upon
      examination . . ., the minor victim informed Dr. Stavas’s team he
      had been “beaten,” “kicked,” “choked,” and struck with a belt
      multiple times by “a man in his home.” Loop mark bruising on is
      back indicated J.J. had been struck with an object. The “pattern
      bruising” was consistent with being struck repeatedly.          The
      bruising shape was consistent with a long and double belt.
      Crescent-shaped [marks] on J.J.’s back indicated that J.J had been
      severely beaten with a belt. Though a belt has appropriate lawful
      uses such as wearing as an accessory to holster up trousers, the
      belt was possessed by [Bridget] for criminal purposes. [Bridget]
      used the belt to viciously assault child J.J. Hence, after viewing
      the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
      essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
      doubt.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/19/23, at 12.

      Following our review, we conclude the evidence, in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict-winner, is sufficient to sustain

Bridget’s conviction for PIC. J.J. testified Bridget hit him on the arms and legs

with the belt while J.J. was lying on the floor. See N.T., 9/28/18, at 103-04.

Bridget hit him “hard” more than one time. Id. at 105. This, J.J. explained,

was after Bridget had made him pick up heavy weights. See id. at 109. N.J.

saw Bridget hit J.J. with the belt at the same time Bridget was forcing J.J. to

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do pushups and lift heavy weights, and during the same interaction in which

Bridget stepped on J.J.’s stomach and choked him. See id. at 87-91. While

Dr. Stavas testified there were some marks that were older injuries, “more

like scars or healing marks,” for example, on J.J.’s back, that were consistent

with J.J. being struck by a belt buckle, see id. at 30-31, Dr. Stavas also

testified that there were multiple bruises on J.J.’s leg which were “indicative

of inflicted injury,” and that a belt could have been an object used to inflict

those injuries. See id. at 30. Dr. Stavas contrasted the marks on J.J.’s back,

which were scars or healing marks, with the “bright-red raw marks that we

saw on the legs.” Id. at 31. Thus, the above evidence shows that Bridget

forced the four-year-old J.J. to do pushups, lift heavy weights, and then hit

him on the arms and legs repeatedly with a belt, which left “bright-red raw

marks,” after which he stepped on J.J.’s stomach and then choked him. We

have no difficulty concluding that Bridget employed the belt criminally, as part

of his aggravated assault of J.J.      See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(d) (defining an

“instrument of crime” as, inter alia, “[a]nything used for criminal purposes”);

Magliocco, 883 A.2d at 487-89 (instrument of crime need not be commonly

used for criminal purposes).

      In his second issue, Bridget asserts his convictions arising from his

abuse of N.J. are against the weight of the evidence. Our standard of review

for weight challenges is as follows:

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      A motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict is contrary to
      the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient
      evidence to sustain the verdict but contends, nevertheless, that
      the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The decision
      whether to grant a new trial on this basis rests within the
      discretion of the trial court. A trial court should award a new trial
      on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the
      evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and make the award
      of a new trial imperative so that right may be given another
      opportunity to prevail. The role of an appellate court in reviewing
      the weight of the evidence is very limited. The purpose of that
      review is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion
      and not to substitute the reviewing Court’s judgment for that of
      the trial court. Accordingly, where the evidence is conflicting, the
      credibility of the witnesses is solely for the jury, and if its finding
      is supported by the record, the trial court’s denial of a motion for
      new trial will not be disturbed.

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 663 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. Super. 1995) (internal

citations omitted). “A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict

is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient

evidence to sustain the verdict but claims that notwithstanding all the facts,

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give

them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.” Commonwealth v.

Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal citation and quotations

omitted). One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new

trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the

weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest

of justice. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1187 (Pa. Super.

2018).   Additionally, in assessing a claim that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of

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the factfinder, which is free to assess the credibility of witnesses and to believe

all, part, or none of the evidence presented.            See Commonwealth v.

Fortson, 165 A.3d 10, 16 (Pa. Super. 2017). Inconsistencies in a victim’s

testimony    goes   to   the   factfinder’s    credibility   determination.   See

Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 809-10 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      Bridget argues that N.J. tested positive for the sexually transmitted

disease Trich in her vagina, however, N.J. testified that Bridget did not

vaginally penetrate her, but rather forced her to engage in anal and oral

penetration. See Bridget’s Brief at 17. Additionally, Dr. Stavas testified that

contact with Trich during anal rape would lead to Trich in the anus. See id.

at 18. Bridget additionally notes that Ms. Jones “was the only person in the

home who had a sexually transmitted disease diagnosed by a doctor”; N.J.

testified at trial that Bridget orally raped her when she had previously stated

that Bridget had only anally raped her; and “[a]t the hospital, [N.J.’s] mom

was overheard saying that the victim was making this all about her.” Id. at

18-19.

      The trial court considered these arguments and rejected them:

             . . . The weight of the evidence supports that [Bridget]
      sexually preyed on [N.J.]. . . . [T]he fact that the young child’s
      testimony may contain minor inconsistencies does not shock one’s
      sense of justice to render N.J.’s testimony not credible or disrupt
      the weight of the evidence that soundly establishes [Bridget’s]
      guilt.

            N.J. testified that [Bridget] sexually abused her multiple
      times.   She testified that [Bridget] would send her to the
      bathroom, close the door, tell her to remove her pants, and insert

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      his penis in her anus. [Bridget] assaulted N.J. the same way in
      other rooms, during which she closed her eyes, cried, and felt
      discharge on her butt from [Bridget’s] penis. [Bridget] also
      inserted his penis inside N.J.’s mouth and placed his fingers on
      her vagina. Although N.J. told her mother about the sexual abuse,
      her mother “said she didn’t believe [her].”

             Dr. Stavas corroborated N.J.’s testimony. She testified that
      lab testing established that N.J. contracted [Trich], which is a
      parasite transmitted “through sexual contact with infected
      secretions.” Because [Trich] can survive outside the body only
      briefly, and only in warm and moist environments, the parasite
      does not “live very long on things, like, toilet seats or rags.”
      Additionally, Dr. Stavas testified that [Trich] is most-commonly
      transmitted through secretions from infected genitalia contacting
      another person’s genitalia. There are no reports of prepubescent
      children contracting the STD “from any other way except through
      sexual transmission.” . . . Therefore, when Dr. Stavas’s team
      discovers [Trich] in a prepubescent child, they deem it “extremely
      likely” that the disease “was given to them through sexual abuse.”

             N.J. testified that she was anally raped multiple times. Her
      anus, where [Bridget] repeatedly placed his infected penis,
      obviously is closely aligned with her vagina. It requires no
      farfetched inference to find that [Bridget’s] repeated discharge in
      this proximity was the source of N.J.’s vaginal infection. Indeed,
      as Dr. Stavas’s testimony established, it is far more likely that N.J.
      contracted [Trich] through [Bridget’s] discharge in her anus area
      than that the disease was somehow rubbed into her vagina from
      some other secretion-bearing surface.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/19/23, at 10-11 (citations to the record omitted;

emphasis in original).

      Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court

in denying Bridget’s weight of the evidence claims. N.J. testified that Bridget,

inter alia, anally raped her. See N.T., 9/28/18, at 78-82. It is uncontested

that N.J. contracted Trich in her vagina.     See, e.g., id. at 40 (Dr. Stavas

indicating that N.J.’s lab work “came back positive for [the STD] called

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Trich[]”).2 Officer Viera testified that Bridget admitted to him that he had

Trich. See id. at 141. Bridget, who testified in his own defense, did not deny

that he told Officer Viera he had the STD, but instead downplayed his

admission, saying, “I might have spoke too fast [sic,]” and that he “might

have spoke falsely [sic].”       Id. at 154, 161. That Bridget did not have an

official diagnosis of Trich by a doctor does not undermine his admission that

he had Trich.3     Further, while Dr. Stavas testified that a person, who was

anally penetrated by someone with Trich, would get Trich in their anus, see

id. at 61, Dr. Stavas also noted that, “[e]jaculation, rubbing, there’s a variety

of sexual ways in which, I think, genitals can touch or exchange their fluids,”

resulting in transmission of Trich. See id. at 62-63. Dr. Stavas additionally

explained, “There’s never been a report of a child getting, a prepubescent

child,   getting   [T]rich[]   from    any     other   way   except   through   sexual

transmission.” Id. at 44. Lastly, N.J.’s inconsistency, i.e., her assertion that

Bridget had not only anally, but also orally, raped her, which contradicted her

____________________________________________

2 Dr. Stavas did not test N.J. for Trich in her anus; therefore, the doctor cannot

say whether N.J. had the disease there. See N.T., 9/28/18, at 61. Dr. Stavas
explained that they did not test N.J.’s anus because once the lab work came
back, they started treatment “right away for [the Trich], because it’s very bad
for kids to have it[;] so the medical service team she was on[] immediately
initiated antibiotics, which can cause her test to be negative after that time.”
Id. at 61-62.

3 During this timeframe, Ms. Jones also contracted Trich, which she attributed

to Bridget, because he was the only one she was sexually active with at the
time. See N.T., 9/28/18, at 122-23.

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prior testimony that her anus was “the only place he put it,” was explored

during cross-examination, and was for the fact-finder to resolve in weighing

N.J.’s credibility. See Izurieta, 171 A.3d at 809-10; cf. N.T., 9/28/18, at 94-

95.4 Bridget has thus failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion

in concluding the evidence did not shock its sense of justice. See Holmes,

663 A.2d at 774. For the foregoing reasons, Bridget’s weight of the evidence

challenge merits no relief.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 2/9/2024

____________________________________________

4 We reject Bridget’s argument that Ms. Jones’s statement at the hospital that

N.J. was “making this about her” contributes to the verdict being against the
weight of the evidence. We note that Ms. Jones denied stating this, but,
moreover, even if taken as true, this merely demonstrates Ms. Jones’s
displeasure about N.J.’s disclosure. See N.T., 9/28/18, at 124.

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