Court Opinion

ID: 9416665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:51:25.885401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:30.483462
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice CATRON
delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question presented on the record is, whether this court has jurisdiction to examine and revise the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas by writ of error, under the 25th section of the judiciary act? The question arises on the following facts:
Nathan Cloyes, ancestor of the principal complainants, entered as an occupant, at a land office in Arkansas, a fractional quarter section of land, in 1834, under the pre-emption acts of 1830 and 1832. The fraction adjoined the village of Little Rock on its eastern side, and was for twenty-nine acres. The same land had been patented in 1833 by the United States to John Pope, Governor of the Territory of Arkansas, to be appropriated to the erection of public buildings for said Territory. The heirs of Cloyes claimed to have an earlier equity, by force of their pre-emption right, than that of the Governor of Arkansas.
They filed their bill in equity in the proper State court, to enforce this equity. That bill contained appropriate allegations to exhibit an equitable title in the plaintiffs, and the opposing right of the patentee, and thus to enable the courts to compare them. Some of the defendants demurred to the' bill; others answered, denying the facts of the settlement and cultivation, and pleading the bona fides of their purchase and the statute of limitations.
The courts of Arkansas dismissed the bill on the demurrer; which judgment was reversed in this court, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 How., 314. It was prepared for hearing a second time, and the courts of Arkansas have again dismissed the bill, and the cause is a second time before us.
The cause was fully heard on its merits below: and the claim of Cloyes rejected, on the ground that he obtained his entry by fraud in fact and fraud in law; and the question is, can we take jurisdiction, and reform this general decree? Tt *203-ejected the title of Cloyes; and, in our opinion, it is not material whether the invalidity of the title was decreed in the Supreme Court of Arkansas upon a question of fact or of law. The fact that the title was rejected in that court authorizes this court to. re-examine the decree. 14 Peters, 360.
The decision in the Supreme Court of Arkansas drew in question an authority exercised under the United States, to wit: that of admitting Cloyes to make his entry;, and the decision was against its validity, and overthrew his title, and is therefore subject to be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in this court, on all the pleadings aqd proofs which immediately respect the question of the proper exercise of authority by the officers administering .the sale of the public lands on the part of the United States.
In the case of Martin against Hunter’s Lessee, (1 Whea., 352,) the foregoing construction of the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789 was recognised, and has been followed since, in the eases of Choteau against Eckhart, (2 How., 372,) Cunningham against Ashley, (14 How., 377,) Garland against Wynn, (20 How., 6,) and other cases.
Another preliminary question , is presented on this record, namely: whether the adjudication of the register and receiver, which authorized Cloyes’s heirs to enter the land, is subject to revision in the courts of justice, on proof? showing that the entry was obtained by fraud and the imposition of false testimony on those officers, as to settlement and cultivation. We deem this question too well settled in the affirmative for discussion. It was so treated in the case of Cunningham against Ashley, (14 How., 377;) again, in Bernard against Ashley, (18 How., 43;) and conclusively, in the case of Garland against Wynn, (20 How., 8.)
The next question is, how far we can re-examine the proceedings in the State courts.
In their answers, the respondents rely on the act of limitations of the State of Arkansas for protection. As this is a defence having no connection with the title of Cloyes, this court cannot revise the decree below in this respect, under the 25th section of the judiciary act.
*204Many of the defendants also relied in their answers .on the fact that they were bona tide purchasers of the lots of land they are sued for, and therefore no decree can be made here to oust' them of their possessions. The State courts found that a number of the respondents were purchasers without notice of Cloyes’s claim, and entitled to protection as bona tide purchasers, according to the rules acted on by courts of equity. With this portion of the decree we have no power to interfere, as the defence set up is within the restriction found in the concluding part of the 25th section, which declares “that no other error shall bo assigned or regarded by this court as a ground of reversal, than such as immediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity or construction of the Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities, in dispute.” Mr. Justice Story comments on the foregoing restraining clause, in the ease of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, (1 Whea., 358,) which construction we need not repeat.
Whether Cloyes imposed on the register and receiver by false affidavits, when he made proof of cultivation in 1829, and residence on the land in dispute on the 29th of May, 1830, is the remaining question to be examined. He made oath (23d April, 1831) that he did live on said tract of land in the year 1829, and had done so since the year 1826. Being interrogated by the register, he stated: I had a vegetable garden, perhaps to the extent of an acre, and raised vegetables of different kinds, and corn for roasting-cars; and I lived in a comfortable dwelling, east- of the Quapaw line on the before-mentioned fraction. Being asked, did you continue to reside, and cultivate your garden aforesaid, on the before-named fraction, until the 29th of May, 1830? he answers: “I did; and have continued to do so until this time.”
John Saylor deposed on behalf of Cloyes in effect to the .same facts, but in general terms. Nathan W. Maynor and Elliott Bursey swore that the affidavit of Saylor was true On the truth or falsehood of these depositions the cause depends.
In opposition to these affidavits, it is proved, beyond dispute, Unit Cloyes and his family resided af a house, for apart of the *205year 1828, occupied afterwards by Doctor Liser. In tbe latter part of 1828, they removed from that place to some log cabins, situate on the lots afterwards occupied by John Hutt, and where the Governor of Arkansas resided in 1851, when the witnesses deposed. Both places were west of the Quapaw line — the cabins standing probably one hundred yards west of the line,,and which line was the western boundary of the fractional quarter section in dispute. Cloyes resided at these cabins when he swore at Batesville, before the register; and -continued to reside there till tbe time of his death, which occurred shortly after his return from Batesville, say in May or June, 1831, and his widow and children continued to reside at the same cabins for several years after his death.
Cloyes was by. trade a tinner, and in December, 1826, rented of William- Russell a small house, constructed of slabs set upright, in wíiich he carried on his business of a tin-plate worker. He covenanted to keep and retain possession for Russell of this shop against all persons, and not to leave the house unoccupied, and to pay Russell two dollars per month rent, and surrender the house to Russell or his authorized agent at any time required by the lessor.
Under this lease, Cloyes occupied the house until the 19th. day of June, 1828, when ho took a lease from Chester Ashley for the same, and also for a garden. He covenanted to pay Ashley one dollar per month rent; to put and keep the building in repair; to keep and retain possession of the same, until delivered back to said Ashley by mutual consent, either party having a right to terminate the lease on one month’s notice. Thé house and garden were rented by the month. ,
Under this lease, Cloyes occupied the house, as a tin-shop, to the time of his death. 'Both the leases state that the shop was east of the Quapaw line, aud on the public lands.
This slab tenement was built by Moses Austin, about 1820. On leaving Little Rock, he sold it to Doctor Mathew Cunningham; it passed through several, bands, till it was finally owned by Col. Ashley. Buildings and cultivated portions of the public lands were protected by the local laws- of the Ai kansas Territory; either ejectment or trespass could have *206been maintained by Ashley against Cloyes to recover the premises, nor could an objection be raised by.any one, except the United States, to these transfers of possession — neither could Cloyes be heard to disavow his landlord’s title. He held possession for Ashley, and was subject to be turned out on a month’s notice to quit.
Cunningham and other' witnesses depose that the shop rented to Cloyes stood west of the Quapaw line. It however appears, from actual survey, that it was on the section line, which ran through the house, taking its southeast corner on the east side, but leaving the greater part of the shop west of the line.
Another pertinent circumstance is, that when Cloyes heard the pre-emption law of 1830 was about to pass, or had passed, (it is uncertain which, from the evidence,) he removed his wife and children, with some articles of necessary furniture, to the tinner’s shop, from his residence at the Hutt place, and kept his family at the shop for a few months, and then they returned to their established home. This contrivance was probably resorted to at the instance of Benjamin Desha, who had agreed with Cloyes to pay into the land office the purchase money, and all incidental expenses, to obtain a title from the Government for an interest of one-half of the laud. These evasions were mere attempts to defraud the law, and to furnish some foundation for the necessary affidavits to support his pre-emption claim at the land office.
On this aspect of the case, the question arises, whether Cloyes’s possession as lessee and tenant of Ashley, occupying a shop as a mechanic, the corner of which accidentally obtruded over the section line, upon the public land, and who' was subject to removal by his landlord each month, was “a settlement” on the public lands, within the true intent and meaning of the act of May, 1830 ?'
That Cloyes never contemplated seeking a home on the public lands as a cultivator of the soil, is manifest from the proof; he worked at his trade, when he worked at all,, (say the witnesses,) and followed no other avocation. Our opinion is, that the affidavits, on which the occupant entry was1 found*207ed, were untrue in fact, and a fraud on the register and receiver; and that Cloyes had no bona fide possession as tenant of the tinner’s shop, within the true meaning of the act • of 1830.
We áre also of opinion, that the affidavits are disproved, as respects the fact of cultivation in 1829. There was no garden cultivated in that year, adjoining or near to the shop. To say the least, it is quite doubtful whether there was such cultivation east of the Quapaw line; and the State courts, having ■found that there was none, it is our duty to abide by their finding, unless we could ascertain, from the proof, that they were mistaken, which we ■ cannot do; our impressions being to the contrary.
The question of cultivation in May, 1830, depended on parol evidence of witnesses. The judges below knew them; they decided on the spot, with all the localities before them; and as the evidence is contradictory, it would be contrary to precedent for this court to overrule the finding of a mere fact by the courts below.
Oh the several grounds stated, we order that the decree of the-Supreme Court of Arkansas be affirmed, with costs.
Mr. Justice McLEAN and Mr. Justice CLIFFORD dissented.