Court Opinion

ID: 9687536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:34:20.964134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:28.492789
License: Public Domain

DANIEL P. FOLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I write separately in dissent to express concern over the interpretation that our court consistently gives to appeals in special proceedings.
When given the opportunity to do so, I urge the Minnesota Supreme Court to review the rule concerning appeals in special proceedings and clarify whether adding the phrase, “[l]et judgment be entered accordingly,” renders the otherwise appealable order under Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03(g) nonappealable until judgment has been entered. While acknowledging that orders in special proceedings are appealable under Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03(g), our court holds, as does the majority here, that adding the words, “[l]et judgment be entered accordingly,” renders the appealable order non-appealable until judgment has been entered.
With all due respect to my colleagues, it is my view that this holding is incorrect. In Willeck v. Willeck, 286 Minn. 553, 554, 176 N.W.2d 558, 559-60 (1970), supreme court dismissed an appeal from a judgment entered in a special proceeding for failure to bring the appeal within the time provided by law. There, the supreme court held:
Because this was a special proceeding, the time for an appeal to be taken is 30 days. Rules 103.03(h), 104.01, and 104.03, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure; Minn.St. 605.09(h). This is true even though a judgment was entered.
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An appeal from a judgment made in a special proceeding must be taken within the time limit for an appeal from an order.
Willeck, 176 N.W.2d at 559-560 (emphasis added).
In Pulju v. Metropolitan Property & Cas., 535 N.W.2d 608, 609 (1995), the supreme court admonished this court not to reshape the concept of “special proceedings” contrary to the “cumulative discussions of the nature of ‘special proceedings’ contained in Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 41 N.W.2d 438 (1950) and [Willeck].”
As the majority concedes, the September 11, 1996, order was independently appeal-able. The appeal in this case was not taken *433until January 17, 1997. It is therefore my view that all that took place in this case from a procedural standpoint following 30 days from September 11, or, if it could apply, from October 16, 1996, when judgment was initially entered, was superfluous and deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, and the supreme court as well.
Applying the standard set out by the supreme court, the appeal in this ease was untimely because it was not taken within the time limit for an appeal from an order, and should be dismissed. The September 11 order should be enforced.