Court Opinion

ID: 9699084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:09:57.609871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.297683
License: Public Domain

Fairchild, J.
(dissenting). There is evidence to support the following determinations by the jury. For the purpose of the appeal, their truth was virtually conceded: (1) Bergeson was negligent; (2) Bergeson’s negligence caused the impact, and plaintiff’s concussion of the brain; (3) there were stresses in plaintiff’s emotional background, described by Dr. Smith; (4) the concussion made plaintiff vulnerable to an anxiety reaction; (5) the fortuitous resemblance of the Bergesons to plaintiff’s parents triggered the anxiety reaction; (6) plaintiff experiences substantial suffering. On oral argument defense counsel disclaimed any intimation that plaintiff’s illness is fanciful.
The majority of the court rely upon the rule which would apply if plaintiff were a bystander whose emotional peculiarities were triggered by witnessing the injury of people who chanced to resemble his parents.
It is clear that Bergeson’s negligence caused plaintiff’s illness. One element of causation was physical injury produced by the negligence. A concurring element was plaintiff’s observation of the predicament of the injured Bergeson and his wife, a situation immediately resulting from Berge-*274son’s negligence. The only unforeseeable or unusual causal elements were the stresses in plaintiffs emotional background and the resemblance of the Bergesons to his parents. I do not think that these unusual elements constitute public-policy grounds for denial of recovery. See Colla v. Mandella (1957), 1 Wis. (2d) 594, 598, 85 N. W. (2d) 345. Far-more-serious physical injury to plaintiff would not be an extraordinary result of an identical accident.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hallows joins in this dissent.