Court Opinion

ID: 9718569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:27:17.290822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.401453
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KOEHLER, dissenting: The State contends that an officer may search a car and seize contraband found within pursuant to the arrest of the driver on a warrant later found to have been erroneously not recalled. The majority in affirming the Whiteside County circuit court’s suppression of this evidence concludes that the exclusionary rule should apply to the evidence seized because a Lee County prosecutor failed to notify the Lee County circuit court of the outstanding warrant at the defendant’s court appearance prior to his arrest. In so holding, the majority focused its analysis on the prosecutor’s duty as part of the law enforcement team. However, the appropriate analysis where an officer arrests a suspect based upon a warrant obtained by someone other than the arresting officer is to determine whether the warrant was valid at its source. People v. Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d 299, 312, 642 N.E.2d 1235, 1241 (1994) (holding that issuing a second arrest warrant on identical charges after the defendant has been arrested and released on bond produces a warrant that is invalid ab initio). The appropriate focus for such an inquiry is not on the conduct of the arresting officer, but on the conduct of those who obtained the warrant and on the police department that informed the executing officer of its continued vitality. Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d at 312, 642 N.E.2d at 1241. If facts are available from which a court of review can determine whether those obtaining the warrant—either the State’s Attorney’s office or the police department—was aware or should have been aware that the warrant was invalid at its source, then an objective belief that the warrant was valid could not be reasonably held. Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d at 312, 642 N.E.2d at 1241. In his affidavit, Lee County Assistant State’s Attorney William Brozovicy stated that the origin of the defendant’s arrest warrant was the defendant’s failure to appear on a prior DUI case. Consequently, those who sought the warrant and the circuit court judge who issued the warrant had an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was valid at its source. The defendant does not claim that the source of the warrant—his failure to appear—was invalid or that the State lacked probable cause. Whiteside County Deputy Glen Estrada testified that when he stopped the defendant for speeding, the department informed him of an arrest warrant, possibly for a failure to appear on a DUI offense. Estrada testified that the warrant was in the computer and that he relied on it. The defendant does not allege, nor does the record suggest, that the police who informed Estrada of the warrant were aware or should have been aware that the warrant should have been recalled or that they acted in bad faith. Evidently, the police who attested to the warrant’s continued vitality had an objectively reasonable belief in its validity. In sum, under the Turnage analysis, when Whiteside County Deputy Estrada arrested the defendant based upon the Lee County warrant that was valid at its source, and neither Estrada nor his police department was aware of any subsequent invalidity of the warrant, the exclusion was not necessary because the requirements for a good-faith exception are met. Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d at 313, 642 N.E.2d at 1241, citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 699, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3421 (1984). However, the majority determined that prosecutors are part of “the law enforcement team” against whom the deterrent effect of suppression must be applied. In its attempt to find support for its determination, the majority cites two dissenting opinions filed in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995). Although our Supreme Court in Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d at 311, 642 N.E.2d at 1240-41, lent some support for the majority’s conclusion that State’s Attorneys are part of the “law enforcement team,” Turnage limited the exclusionary rule’s application to a warrant invalid at its source and refused to extend the rule’s application to actors anywhere along the line. After all, the majority’s application in the present case is contrary to the reasoning of Leon, 468 U.S. at 924, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 3421. First, the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct (Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 3417), not mistakes by the State’s Attorney’s office. Second, the defendant offers no evidence that State’s Attorneys’ offices are inclined to ignore or subvert the fourth amendment or that lawlessness among State’s Attorneys requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 3417. Third, and most important, there is no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in the present circumstances will have a significant effect on State’s Attorneys or an arresting officer. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 102 S. Ct. at 3417. Even if the Lee County State’s Attorney’s office was responsible for the erroneous entry on the police computer, and for purposes of argument only, the State’s Attorney’s office is part of the law enforcement team, the application of the exclusionary rule could not be expected to alter Estrada’s behavior. As the Whiteside County circuit court concluded, Estrada acted in good faith. Moreover, he would have been derelict in his duty if he failed to arrest. Instead, he acted objectively and reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record. Application of the Leon framework supports a conclusion that (1) Estrada’s conduct was objectively reasonable, (2) he acted as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances, (3) excluding the evidence would not affect his future conduct except to make him less willing to do his duty, and (4) excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule—deterring police misconduct—in any appreciable way. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 696-97, 104 S. Ct. at 3419; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990-91, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737, 745, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3429 (1984). In sum, marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, valid at its source but subsequently invalidated, cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 3420. In further support of this conclusion, I note that the Illinois legislature recognized and codified the Leon good-faith exception in sections 114—12(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114—12(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 1996)). Section 114—12(b)(1) provides that a court should not suppress otherwise admissible evidence if a police officer seized the evidence in good faith. Section 114—12(b) (2) (i) sets forth the definition of “good faith” applicable to the case at bar: “ ‘Good faith’ means whenever a peace officer obtains evidence; (i) pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant obtained from a neutral and detached judge, which warrant is free from obvious defects other than non-deliberate errors in preparation and contains no material misrepresentation by any agent of the State, and the officer reasonably believed the arrant to be valid.” 725 ILCS 114—12(b)(2)(i) (West 1996). The actions of the police in this case meet this definition of good faith. The record reveals that the warrant issued at the order of a neutral and detached judge after the defendant failed to appear in his Lee County DUI case; the warrant was free from obvious defects; the warrant contained no material misrepresentations; and the police could have reasonably believed the warrant to be valid. Consequently, I cannot join the majority judgment affirming the circuit court’s decision, and respectfully dissent.