Court Opinion

ID: 9786751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:02:14.239556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:48.276242
License: Public Domain

Becker, J.,
with whom Rose, J., agrees,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects save one: the excessiveness of the death penalty. I do not condone Rhyne’s actions. His senseless murder of Mr. Brown and the grief Rhyne has caused to Mr. Brown’s family are certainly reprehensible. However, the Constitution of the United States prohibits the automatic imposition of the death penalty on persons convicted of first-degree murder.1 Because of this, the United States Supreme Court has consistently stated that death penalty cases warrant a higher level of scrutiny because, as Justice Stewart stated in Furman v. Georgia:2
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice.
The concept that death is different has been the backbone for high court decisions emphasizing that procedures, evidentiary rules or doctrines permissible in non-capital cases may violate the constitutional prohibitions when applied to capital punishment prosecutions.3
To survive constitutional scrutiny, death penalty statutory schemes must narrow the class of individuals eligible to receive a death sentence. They must also provide for “guided discretion” in the imposition of the penalty. The goal is to ensure individualized sentencing and eliminate the possibility that the death sentence is being imposed automatically, mechanically or arbitrarily.4 *16Thus, an individual is not eligible for the death penalty simply because he or she commits a brutal first-degree murder. There must be something more, either in the defendant’s history, or in the commission of the murder, that warrants the ultimate and irrevocable sanction of death.
Moreover, state courts have the responsibility for ensuring that statutory aggravators are not so liberally construed that the narrowing function of the statutory scheme is circumvented or eliminated.5 Finally, in states where the statutes require the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, an appellate court cannot simply assume that the invalidity of an aggravating circumstance would not affect the sentencing body’s decision to impose the death penalty. Whenever a statutory aggravator is invalidated on appeal, the appellate court must either: (1) remand the case for a new penalty phase, (2) reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances itself, or (3) determine that any error in the aggravating circumstance is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.6
In Nevada, there are fourteen circumstances by which first-degree murder may be punishable by death.7 Because of the large number of aggravating circumstances, it is essential that this court construe these aggravators to avoid undermining the constitutionality of our death penalty scheme. These same considerations should, and do, govern our review of death sentences for excessiveness.
We have recognized that the facts surrounding an aggravating circumstance are important in reviewing the appropriateness of the death penalty.8 In addition, we have noted that, when considering whether the death penalty is excessive, we will look at various other objective factors such as the influence drugs or alcohol may have played in the commission of the crime, the treatment of co-defendants, the mental state of the defendant, the nature and quantity of the defendant’s prior history of violence, and the age of the defendant. The mere presence of any of these factors is not controlling. Instead, we must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant and the crime in making a determination of excessiveness.9
*17Two categories of aggravating circumstances are present in Rhyne’s case: (1) the murder was committed by a person who had been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another, and (2) the murder involved mutilation of the victim. The underlying facts supporting these aggravators, together with the disparate treatment given to co-defendant Mendenhall, and Rhyne’s significant history of mental illness, are the reasons I conclude that the death penalty is excessive in this case.
As to the first aggravating circumstance, Rhyne was previously convicted of battery by a prisoner and attempted assault with a deadly weapon. The ‘ ‘battery’ ’ consisted of Rhyne throwing a cup full of feces on a fellow inmate through the food slot of his cell door. It is technically a felony involving the use of violence, but it is hardly the type of violence that should provide a threshold for the imposition of the death penalty.
The attempted assault with a deadly weapon presents a closer issue. Two independent witnesses, tourists from California, observed a confrontation between Rhyne and a group of teenagers in downtown Reno. According to this couple, Rhyne was mumbling to himself when he was surrounded by the teenagers who appeared to be taunting him. The teenagers claimed Rhyne swung at or hit one of their friends. The teenager fell and was seriously injured when his head hit a concrete projection. The tourists claimed Rhyne never attempted to hit the teenager. Instead, the teenager, who was shadowboxing around Rhyne, tripped and fell. A glove containing a rock constituted the deadly weapon.
Rhyne entered an Alford10 plea, against the advice of counsel. I agree with the majority that a conviction based upon an Alford plea is sufficient to support an aggravating circumstance. However, it is a factor to be considered when reviewing a death sentence for excessiveness. Given the testimony of the independent witnesses, I conclude that this is also not the type of violent history which should provide a threshold for the death penalty.
The second aggravating circumstance involves our holding in Browne v. State.11 I agree that the definition of mutilation given in Browne and in the jury instruction in this case, that mutilation is disfiguration beyond the act of killing, meets constitutional muster. However, I am concerned with the application of the definition in cases like this which involve killing by blunt force trauma. Nevertheless, the evidence certainly supports a finding of mutilation under Browne.
For purposes of evaluating the excessiveness of the punishment, the question is whether that mutilation was primarily caused by *18Rhyne. The most significant damage to the victim’s head, the area which would support a finding of mutilation, was to the side of the head. The mark of Mendenhall’s boot, not Rhyne’s tennis shoe, was placed firmly over this area. The marks attributed to Rhyne’s tennis shoe were on the victim’s face, not the side of his head. Mendenhall’s explanation that he accidentally stepped on the victim’s face while helping Rhyne dispose of the body is incredible. The significant involvement by Mendenhall in the mutilation is an important factor when reviewing Rhyne’s death sentence.
Mendenhall’s disparate sentence is also a significant factor in evaluating Rhyne’s sentence. Despite substantial evidence linking Mendenhall to first-degree murder, he was allowed to plead to second-degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Mendenhall testified that he had nothing to do with the murder and that he only helped to dispose of the body. During arguments, the State repeatedly claimed Mendenhall was a credible witness and downplayed his participation in the offense. Yet the eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (the amount of blood on Mendenhall’s clothes, the boot mark, etc.) belie Mendenhall’s version of the events. In addition, if the State truly thought Mendenhall was credible, then he should not have been charged with first-degree murder or convicted of second-degree murder. Moreover, aside from the weak aggravators discussed above, there is no reason for the disparate treatment between these two equally culpable murderers.
Finally, there is the issue of Rhyne’s severe mental illness. The jury found two mitigating circumstances: that Rhyne committed the murder while under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that Rhyne suffered a serious mental disorder during his life. Rhyne’s entire involvement with the criminal justice system is directly a product of his mental illness. Since the age of seventeen, Rhyne has suffered from a bipolar disorder. On occasion, this has escalated into paranoia.
Moreover, the record reflects Rhyne’s illness is of the most severe form. It is not completely treatable. As a result, Rhyne’s mood swings and unexpected behaviors are not fully controlled, even with medication. In addition, like many individuals with severe bipolar disorder, Rhyne’s mental condition destabilizes quickly when he does not take his medication or when he mixes his medication with alcohol or other drugs. Rhyne’s mental condition was the heart of the State’s future dangerousness argument. He cannot be completely controlled, nor can he always be isolated from his fellow inmates. He might irrationally attack another inmate or a guard because he doesn’t like what someone said or how a person looked.
*19While it is tme that Rhyne’s mental condition makes him a more difficult and time-consuming inmate to control, the record reflects that his incidents with fellow inmates have been few and of a minor nature (feces throwing, spitting, etc.). Rhyne is no different now than he has been his entire adult life, and his actions during that life are, at least in part, a product of the deficiencies in our mental health system.
Like many states, Nevada’s statutes and mental health system are not designed to deal with individuals like Rhyne. Rhyne was institutionalized on several occasions because he posed a threat to himself or others. In each case, once he was partially stabilized, he was released from custody to a least restrictive environment as required by law. The problem is that persons like Rhyne cannot function very well in an unsupervised setting. They begin to destabilize, make threats or commit crimes, and then end up back in custody. They become part of a revolving door syndrome that tragically escalates into more violent crimes. If Rhyne had a history of violence unrelated to his illness, or if his previous convictions were based on more significant facts, the future dangerousness argument might be more compelling. Given the testimony in Rhyne’s case, however, it appears to be no more than an argument to execute someone because they are mentally ill and tiresome to handle. A death penalty based on such concerns is excessive.
Rhyne should never, under any circumstance, be released from prison. But for the reasons outlined above, I conclude that Rhyne’s sentence of death is excessive. I would vacate the judgment of death and impose a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.

 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death penalty system held invalid).

 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972).

 Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (hearsay rules could not be applied to exclude defendant’s mitigation evidence); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (confidential presentence investigation report procedure violates due process in capital sentencing context).

 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).

 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).

 Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992).

 NRS 200.033.

 Haynes v. State, 103 Nev. 309, 739 P.2d 497 (1987); Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 944 P.2d 805 (1997) (in light of mitigating circumstances, death penalty was not warranted where only aggravating circumstances were armed robbery convictions over fifteen years old).

 Dennis v. State, 116 Nev. 1075, 13 P.3d 434 (2000).

 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

 113 Nev. 305, 933 P.2d 187 (1997).