Court Opinion

ID: 9521633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:09:15.115277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:02.879111
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that this matter should be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. In my view, however, the remand should not be limited to a new sentencing hearing. Woolley should be granted a new trial on the underlying offenses. He is entitled to that retrial because the original proceedings in this case did not comport with the requirements promulgated by our court for the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty. Those requirements are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now coming before us on review, including cases commenced before the rules were enacted. People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 631-36 (2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting); see also People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 196 Ill. 2d 510, 513 (2001). Even if Woolley were not entitled to a new trial, I would regard the majority’s disposition as inadequate. In remanding for resentencing, this court should impose a restriction its present opinion lacks. It should bar the State from seeking the death penalty. As set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Absent a new trial conducted in accordance with the new rules, there is no basis for altering that conclusion. JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree in part with the majority that this cause must at a minimum be remanded for a new sentencing hearing, and I concur in that narrow portion of the majority’s judgment. Nonetheless, I also dissent in part and I urge that defendant should receive a new trial. For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 636-40 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 581-85 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe defendant’s convictions and sentence should also be set aside because the trial proceedings were conducted without the minimum constitutional assurances established by the new supreme court rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents in Hickey and Simpson, I believe that the new rules should be applied retroactively. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 220-21 (1997). Thus, this cause should be remanded for a new trial conducted in compliance with the new rules.