Court Opinion

ID: 9940647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 21:01:30.523026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:12.802168
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284      Doc: 39         Filed: 02/13/2024      Pg: 1 of 6

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-2284

        SCRATCH GOLF, LLC,

                             Plaintiff – Appellant,

                      v.

        BEAUFORT COUNTY; BEAUFORT COUNTY COUNCIL,

                             Defendants – Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort.
        Richard Mark Gergel, District Judge. (9:20-cv-01962-RMG)

        Argued: October 26, 2023                                       Decided: February 13, 2024

        Before NIEMEYER, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Niemeyer and Judge Quattlebaum joined.

        ARGUED: Jeffrey Scott Tibbals, BYBEE & TIBBALS, LLC, Mount Pleasant, South
        Carolina, for Appellant. William Hewitt Cox, III, HOWELL, GIBSON & HUGHES, PA,
        Beaufort, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Evan P. Williams, BYBEE &
        TIBBALS, LLC, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, for Appellant.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284      Doc: 39         Filed: 02/13/2024      Pg: 2 of 6

        RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

               The Beaufort County Council denied Scratch Golf, LLC’s rezoning application.

        Scratch Golf then sued in federal court, alleging that Beaufort County and the Council

        violated its constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to

        state a claim, and we affirm.

                                                     I.

               Scratch Golf owns Hilton Head National Golf Club, an approximately 300-acre

        property in Beaufort County, South Carolina. The property is currently zoned for rural and

        mixed use and, as the name suggests, is primarily used as a golf course. Scratch Golf

        sought to rezone the property to accommodate a large mixed-use development project that

        would include 500 homes, 700 hotel rooms, a theme park, and other commercial uses.

               In Beaufort County, rezoning requests must be approved by the County Council, so

        Scratch Golf submitted a rezoning application for the Council’s consideration. The

        rezoning process for Scratch Golf’s property cleared various administrative hurdles and

        seemed headed toward approval when the Council sent the application to a subcommittee

        for further review. Around this time, residents voiced their opposition to the project and

        progress stalled. Ultimately, the Council voted 9-2 against rezoning.

               Scratch Golf then sued the County and the Council under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

        violations of its substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection

        rights. Scratch Golf also asserted a Fifth Amendment takings claim and a claim for

        estoppel under state law. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all

                                                     2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284      Doc: 39          Filed: 02/13/2024     Pg: 3 of 6

        the federal claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and declined

        to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim.

                                                     II.

               We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under

        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd.

        P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

        must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

        plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

        v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff

        pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

        defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A “formulaic recitation of the elements

        of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “While we must take the

        facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we need not accept the legal conclusions

        drawn from the facts.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc., 213 F.3d at 180.

               We begin with Scratch Golf’s claims that the County Council violated its

        substantive and procedural due process rights under the United States Constitution. To

        adequately plead either, Scratch Golf must allege a property interest in approval of its

        rezoning application that is cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

        Clause. See Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 328 (4th

        Cir. 2005) (elements of substantive and procedural due process claims). “To have a

        property interest in a benefit, a person . . . must have more than a unilateral expectation of

        it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents of State

                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284      Doc: 39         Filed: 02/13/2024        Pg: 4 of 6

        Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). In the context of land-use decisions, whether a

        person “possesses a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit or approval turns on

        whether, under state and municipal law, the local agency lacks all discretion to deny

        issuance of the permit or to withhold its approval.” Gardner v. City of Baltimore Mayor

        & City Council, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992). If the local agency retains significant

        discretion to refuse approval, then the plaintiff has no legitimate claim of entitlement and

        therefore no cognizable property interest. See id. at 69.

               Beaufort County’s Community Development Code commits rezoning decisions to

        the discretion of the County Council. The Code identifies factors to be considered but does

        not require the Council to approve any rezoning application. Scratch Golf makes much of

        the fact that the County Council had previously designated this property as a “Village Place

        Type,” which is a parcel suitable for higher-density mixed-use development.             That

        designation gave Scratch Golf an opportunity to seek a comprehensive zoning amendment,

        but it did not entitle Scratch Golf to rezoning; the Council retained discretion under the

        Code to deny Scratch Golf’s application. Because Scratch Golf did not have a cognizable

        property interest in approval of its rezoning application, it cannot state a substantive or

        procedural due process claim.

               We turn next to Scratch Golf’s allegation that the County Council treated it

        differently from similarly situated property owners and developers in violation of the Equal

        Protection Clause. A zoning authority’s decision “must be upheld against equal protection

        challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational

        basis for the classification.” Pulte Home Corp. v. Montgomery Cnty., 909 F.3d 685, 693

                                                     4
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284         Doc: 39      Filed: 02/13/2024     Pg: 5 of 6

        (4th Cir. 2018); see Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (plaintiff must

        allege “that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment”). The zoning

        authority’s actual motivation is irrelevant. Pulte Home Corp., 909 F.3d at 693.

               Rational bases for denying Scratch Golf’s rezoning application leap off the pages of

        its complaint. For example, the Council cited the unreasonable size and scope of the

        proposed project, its impact on nearby land, public health and safety concerns, and the

        absence of a demonstrated community need, among other things. These reasons amply

        justify denying Scratch Golf’s application even if the Council approved a different

        rezoning request from an allegedly similarly situated developer. Contrary to Scratch Golf’s

        argument, it is not the business of federal courts “to second-guess the wisdom of elected

        local officials in making inherently discretionary zoning decisions.” Id. at 694. The

        Council provided rational reasons for denying Scratch Golf’s application, and that is the

        end of our inquiry.

               Moving to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Scratch Golf alleges that

        the denial of its rezoning application amounted to a regulatory taking of its property

        without just compensation. The parties direct our attention to the Penn Central balancing

        test, which “requires us to consider, at least, three factors of ‘particular

        significance’: (1) ‘the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant’; (2) ‘the extent

        to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations’; and

        (3) ‘the character of the governmental action.’” Blackburn v. Dare Cnty., 58 F.4th 807,

        812 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,

        124 (1978)).

                                                     5
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2284       Doc: 39         Filed: 02/13/2024      Pg: 6 of 6

               All three factors weigh in the defendants’ favor here. First, regarding economic

        impact, Scratch Golf alleges that the rezoning denial prohibits certain economically viable

        uses of its property, but it has not alleged facts establishing that the zoning decision caused

        a “substantial diminution” in the value of its property. Id. Second, investment-backed

        expectations must be “reasonable given the current use of the property” and “founded ‘on

        a preexisting property right.’” Id. at 813 (quoting Clayland Farm Enters., LLC v. Talbot

        Cnty., 987 F.3d 346, 354 (4th Cir. 2021)). We have already determined that Scratch Golf

        lacks a property right in a change of zoning. And although Scratch Golf has a property

        right in its land, the rezoning decision did not interfere with its ability to continue its

        preexisting use of that land as a golf course. Third, as for the character of the governmental

        action, development restrictions “based on density and other traditional zoning concerns”

        adjust “the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good” and so are

        “less likely to be considered a taking.” Quinn v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Queen Anne’s

        Cnty., 862 F.3d 433, 443 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pulte

        Home Corp., 909 F.3d at 696. Weighing these three factors, Scratch Golf has failed to

        plausibly state a claim for relief under Penn Central.

               Finally, the district court acted within its discretion when it declined to exercise

        supplemental jurisdiction over Scratch Golf’s state-law estoppel claim after it dismissed

        all the federal claims. See Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).

               For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is

                                                                                         AFFIRMED.

                                                      6