Court Opinion

ID: 9914062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 15:05:37.313588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:58.950030
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1526-22

C.B.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

K.S.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
________________________

                   Submitted December 12, 2023 – Decided December 29, 2023

                   Before Judges Whipple and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
                   Docket No. FV-12-0968-23.

                   Destribats Campbell Staub & Schroth, LLC, attorneys
                   for appellant (Raymond C. Staub, on the brief).

                   Lawrence Law, attorneys for respondent (Daniel A.
                   Burton, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
        Defendant K.S.1 appeals from the December 13, 2022 final restraining

order (FRO), entered against him and in favor of plaintiff C.B., under the

Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Because we

conclude the record does not permit meaningful appellate review, we are

constrained to vacate the FRO, reinstate the temporary restraining order (TRO),

and remand for further proceedings.

                                          I.

        The parties briefly dated and lived together, but never married. They have

a one-year-old child. On October 18, 2022, plaintiff sought and obtained a TRO,

alleging that earlier that day defendant committed the predicate acts of

harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, and criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3.

        During the final hearing on December 13, the trial judge heard testimony

from both parties. Plaintiff testified that on October 18, 2022, following an

argument between the parties, defendant picked up their baby's bassinet and

"slammed it down on the ground," causing it to break. According to plaintiff,

defendant also "call[ed her] the [c]-word" before he left their home. Plaintiff

produced a photograph of the damaged bassinet at trial.

1
    We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
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                                          2
      Additionally, plaintiff described a recent history of domestic violence.

She testified that between the months of May and October 2022, defendant: (1)

damaged the parties' master bedroom and closet doors; (2) flipped over an

ottoman with the parties' daughter in his arms, causing a leg on the ottoman to

loosen; (3) broke a towel rack off the parties' bathroom wall; (4) threw a box of

mail at plaintiff during an argument; and (5) called her a "bitch" and screamed

at her to "shut the fuck up" during another argument. During the hearing,

plaintiff produced additional photographs showing the damaged master bedroom

doors, ottoman, and towel rack.

      Defendant admitted "slam[ming the baby's bassinet] down against the

ground" during the October 18, 2022 incident. He also conceded he called

plaintiff "nasty names."   However, he claimed he accidentally, rather than

purposely, damaged the parties' master bedroom and closet doors, and bathroom

towel rack. Defendant also denied throwing a box of mail at plaintiff and stated

it was plaintiff who "flipped the [o]ttoman while [defendant] was sitting on the

couch with [the parties'] daughter."

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      At the conclusion of the trial, the judge granted plaintiff an FRO, finding

defendant committed the predicate act of harassment. 2         In explaining her

decision, the judge cited N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 and the definition of harassment

under the statute. She also credited plaintiff's testimony that defendant damaged

the bassinet during the October 18 incident and "screamed in her face." Further,

the judge accepted plaintiff's testimony that defendant damaged "two different

doors," an ottoman, and a towel rack in recent months, finding "plaintiff more

credible than . . . defendant in that regard, particularly when it comes to the

incident[] with regard to the towel rack." She also stated she "did[ not] find

[defendant's] testimony . . . [that plaintiff was] the one that flipped the ottoman

w[hile he was] holding the child" credible. Additionally, based on a photograph

plaintiff produced of the master bedroom closet door, the judge rejected

defendant's claim that he accidently damaged the door by shoving it.

      Next, the judge acknowledged the parties did not use "the best of language

with each other," and stated, "if that was the only allegation[,] . . . I would not

be entering a[n FRO]." However, she granted the FRO, concluding, "there can

be no purpose to breaking things if . . . not to alarm or annoy another person."

2
  The judge did not address plaintiff's allegation that defendant also committed
criminal mischief during the October 18, 2022 incident.
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Finally, the judge stated there was a "prior history" of domestic violence

between the parties which involved a "series of escalating incidents that . . .

[was] concerning, and, therefore," she "w[ould] enter the restraining order."

                                             II.

      On appeal, defendant argues: (1) "there [wa]s insufficient proof that

[defendant] committed an act of domestic violence"; and (2) "the trial court

failed to engage in [a] proper analysis regarding [plaintiff's] need for protection"

before issuing the FRO. Because we agree with defendant's second argument,

we are constrained to vacate the FRO, reinstate the TRO, and remand this matter

to the trial court for amplified findings of fact and conclusions of law , consistent

with the two-step analysis set forth in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App.

Div. 2006). We add the following comments.

      Our review of an FRO issued after a bench trial is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H.,

463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020).          Findings by a trial court are

generally binding on appeal, provided they are "supported by adequate,

substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)

(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974)); see also Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). An

appellate court should defer to the trial court's findings unless those findings

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appear "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,

relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484).

      "Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because

of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433

N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412).

However, "all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super.

546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App.

Div. 2013)).

      Pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a), a trial court must "find the facts and state its

conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury." As our Supreme

Court stated in R.M. v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 190 N.J. 1, 12 (2007),

factual findings are "fundamental to the fairness of the proceedings and serve[]

as a necessary predicate to meaningful review." "Meaningful appellate review

is inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion."

Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Salch v.

Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990)).

      When considering whether the entry of an FRO is appropriate, a trial court

must engage in a two-step inquiry. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125. First, the

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court "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of

the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A.

2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred."       Ibid.       The trial court should make this

determination "in light of the previous history of violence between the parties."

Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402). Secondly, the court must determine

"whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set

forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)](6), to protect the victim from an

immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29(b) which states, "[i]n proceedings in which complaints for restraining orders

have been filed, the court shall grant any relief necessary to prevent further

abuse"); see also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011) ("[C]ourts must be

careful not to overlook the statutory requirement that there be a finding that

'relief is necessary to prevent further abuse.'") (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)).

Among the factors a judge should consider under the second Silver prong is

"[t]he previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant,

including threats, harassment and physical abuse." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1).

      Mindful of these standards, we are satisfied the judge's incomplete

analysis under the second Silver prong precludes our ability to meaningfully

review the December 13, 2022 FRO.              Although the judge made sufficient

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credibility findings regarding the parties' testimony, and she specifically

addressed the definition of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 before

concluding defendant harassed plaintiff on October 18, 2022 because "there can

be no purpose to breaking things if . . . not to alarm or annoy another person,"

the judge failed to sufficiently articulate her factual findings and conclusions of

law under the second Silver prong. Instead, she made a general finding that

there was a prior history of domestic violence between the parties and the "series

of escalating incidents" plaintiff described were "concerning." The judge made

no findings as to whether restraints were necessary "to protect the victim from

an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at

127. Moreover, she made no findings regarding the factors under N.J.S.A.

2C:25-29(a), such as "[t]he existence of immediate danger to person or property"

or "[t]he best interests of the victim and any child," N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(2) and

(4), notwithstanding the facts elicited during the final hearing.

      In sum, although the record may contain sufficient evidence to sustain the

entry of an FRO, the court's findings are insufficient for effective appellate

review. Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate the FRO, reinstate the TRO,

and remand the matter to the Family Part judge to develop a more complete

record.

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      Vacated and remanded. The TRO shall remain in place until the remand

is completed. We direct the remand hearing to be completed within fifteen days.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

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