Court Opinion

ID: 9700565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:35:43.958416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:11.366100
License: Public Domain

YANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s disposition of Issues I and II. I dissent as to issue III, the intentional infliction of emotional distress. I cannot reconcile the language adopted from the Restatement in Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D.1989), “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” with Swenson’s alleged facts in this instance.
If those words from Muchow are to form the basis of an instruction to the jury on the definition of intentional infliction of emotional distress, then in order to reverse the summary judgment, they assume a *190meaning other than their ordinary meaning. If Swenson’s alleged facts constitute conduct so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community, we will need to devise a new tort to encompass conduct that comes within the commonly accepted definition of those terms.
I have a great concern that the precedent established by the majority significantly expands the scope of the tort not only in sexual harassment cases but in cases involving conduct society considered as being unacceptable but not meeting the Muchow definition as it was heretofore understood. The majority acknowledges that a number of jurisdictions require much more than discrimination in employment settings. It candidly admits that the cases to the contrary, and upon which it relies, are stronger on their facts than are the facts in this case, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Swenson.
Assuming, as we must, for purposes of this appeal, that Swenson’s allegations are true, I am also concerned my dissent will be viewed as condoning, or if not condoning, at least tolerating, Krabseth’s conduct. Neither is true. Such conduct cannot be tolerated and must be condemned. One of the ways to show not only a lack of tolerance but condemnation for such conduct would be to conclude that the alleged conduct falls to the extreme defined by the language in Muchow.
But the lack of tolerance and condemnation of the conduct is not the issue before us. Rather, it is whether or not, as a matter of law, the conduct fits the definition of intentional infliction of emotional distress as defined by Muchow. I cannot conclude that it does. Although in this instance, I am tempted to let the end justify the means, that is not good policy. If the courts are to be the engine for social change they should focus the scope of the alteration in a manner which does the least violence to settled law.
Nor is the issue whether sex discrimination is prohibited. It is. Nor is the issue whether some jurors might award damages for this conduct. They well may. The issue is whether the facts of this case, as viewed for purposes of summary judgment, reach the level of conduct defining the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. It appears the majority and concurring opinions hold that all conduct constituting discrimination is encompassed within that definition. As abhorrent as discrimination is, I suggest the definition of the tort was not intended to encompass all discriminating conduct. But, under the majority opinion, it appears to me we will have no choice but to submit the question to the jury.
As the above discussion reveals, I am apprehensive that the precedent established by the majority opinion will make nearly every accusation of intentional infliction of emotional distress a jury question in the hope that the jury, out of sympathy if nothing else, will agree with the plaintiff that the defendant’s conduct goes beyond all possible bounds of decency. If that is indeed the case, we have either a more “decent” society than I imagined or the jury verdicts will be unwarranted. The law defining the tort is surely more principled. Courts do decide whether given facts meet certain definitions. See, e.g., McLean v. Kirby Co., 490 N.W.2d 229 (N.D.1992) [as a matter of law independent contractor’s work involved a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm].
It is unfortunate that the majority needs to seek a vehicle whereby Swenson may recover damages from Krabseth for his alleged conduct toward her. The Legislature has properly designed a remedy which, if it had been available to Swenson at the time of the alleged conduct, would compensate her upon proof of her allegations. See §§ 14-02.4-19, 14-02.4-20, NDCC. For the reason stated in the majority opinion, this law is not available to Swenson; but that does not justify the transformation of the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress into a remedy for that unavailability.
I respect the majority’s position on this matter as well as that of the special concur*191rence. I cannot, in all good conscience, join these positions. I would affirm the summary judgment on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress.