Court Opinion

ID: 9746292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:11:13.963142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:11.548209
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
dissenting in part.
Unmoved by the absence of both defendant and competent defense counsel at the penalty phase, the Court upholds defendant’s death sentence. In so doing, the Court devalues the need, when a capital defendant’s life is at stake, for a rehable, individualized sentencing determination. The trial court’s uncritical acceptance of defendant’s woefully inadequate waiver was erroneous. Defense counsel’s inability to place any witnesses on the stand prejudicially plagued the penalty phase. Without either defendant or any proficient defense attorneys, the penalty phase was a travesty. Nevertheless, the Court affirms defendant’s death sentence. Consequently, I dissent.
I
Without fully understanding the ramifications of his request, defendant asked to absent himself from the penalty-phase pro-*467eeedings. The trial court, without conducting a voir dire of defendant, ensuring that defendant’s decision was knowing and voluntary, or securing a written waiver, swiftly granted defendant’s request. The court’s response was utterly inadequate, and it precluded defendant from validly waiving his right to be present at the penalty phase of his capital trial.
The colloquy during which the court permitted defendant to absent himself from the penalty-phase proceedings occurred as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. Morton has also requested that I, once again, indicate to the Court that he does not desire to be present during the penalty phase of the case. We have, Mr. Morton has exited the courtroom on several occasions, he has also been appraised by the Court of his various rights, and also, of his discretion not to be present during any aspect of the proceeding. I have gone over those rights once again with Mr. Morton, and he has asked that I, once again, request that he be excused during the penalty phase of the case, although understanding that in the event there is a verdict in the case, or in essence, a sentence decided upon by the Jury, he will be required then to appear.
THE COURT: Okay, and you’ve heard what Mr. Call has said, correct, Mr. Morton?
THE DEFENDANT: That is correct,
THE COURT: And do you wish to be not in the courtroom during the proceedings on the penalty?
THE DEFENDANT: That is correct.
THE COURT: Okay, sir. All right. That is understandable, I know you’ve talked it over with your lawyer, the advantages and disadvantages of that, and I take it to be your decision, which represents a knowing and intelligent waiver of your right to be present, and I will honor your request.
Despite the trial court’s conclusion, this colloquy failed to establish that defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.
I agree with the Court’s holding that defendant’s presence right is fundamental and that the waiver of that right must be knowing and voluntary. See ante at 440-41, 715 A.2d at 257-58; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938) (requiring waivers of fundamental rights to be knowing and intelligent); State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 35, 583 A.2d 747 (1991) (requiring waivers of fundamental rights to be knowing and voluntary); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 672 (9th Cir.1994) (requiring waiver of defendant’s right to be present at *468his capital trial to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1119, 114 S.Ct. 2125, 128 L. Ed.2d 682 (1994). The majority concludes, however, that defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. Ante at 441, 715 A.2d at 258. I do not agree.
Waiving the right of presence at the penalty phase is as rare and as delicate a decision as waiving the right to counsel. The defendant and his counsel form the critical components of the defense team that fights for the defendant’s life. When the defendant tries to sever himself or his counsel from that team, the consequence can be severe; disintegration of the defense team can increase the probability of a death sentence. The right to counsel is a fundamental right that cannot be relinquished without an extensive voir dire and an on-the-record waiver. E.g., Buonadonna, supra, 122 N.J. at 35, 583 A.2d 747. The parallel right to presence at the penalty phase must likewise receive similar safeguards against unknowing or involuntary waiver.
Accordingly, when a capital defendant asks to absent himself from the penalty phase, trial courts must follow procedures similar to those utilized when defendants request to represent themselves. In the context of a defendant seeking self-representation, this Court wrote: ‘“A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances.’ ” State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 510, 608 A.2d 317 (1992) (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L. Ed. 309, 321 (1948)). When a capital defendant moves to waive his right of presence at the penalty phase, the trial court must undertake a similarly probing examination. See Amayar-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 496 (9th Cir.1997) (upholding death sentence despite defendant’s absence where court informed defendant of presence right and cautioned defendant that absence would be disadvantageous), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 1083, 140 L. Ed.2d 140 (1998); Campbell, supra, 18 F.3d at 672-73 (upholding death sentence despite defendant’s absence where de*469fendant signed written waiver and defendant twice discussed with court his decision to be absent); People v. Edwards, 54 Cal.3d 787, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, 450 (1991) (upholding death sentence despite defendant’s absence because of oral and written waiver), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841, 113 S.Ct. 125, 121 L. Ed.2d 80 (1992); People v. Robertson, 48 Cal.3d 18, 255 Cal.Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109, 1134-35 (1989) (upholding death sentence despite defendant’s absence because defendant signed written waiver), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 879, 110 S.Ct. 216, 107 L. Ed.2d 169 (1989); Peede v. State, 474 So.2d 808, 815 (Fla.1985) (upholding death sentence despite defendant’s absence because trial court extensively questioned defendant in on-the-record proceedings at jail to determine if waiver was knowing and voluntary), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909, 106 S.Ct. 3286, 91 L. Ed.2d 575 (1986). “The colloquy between the court and the defendant will test the defendant’s understanding of the implications of the waiver, and will provide appellate courts with an objective basis for review.” Crisafi, supra, 128 N.J. at 511, 608 A.2d 317. “[A] trial judge must engage in a searching inquiry with the defendant to determine whether his waiver is being made knowingly and voluntarily.” State v. Wiggins, 291 N.J.Super. 441, 451, 677 A.2d 800 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 568, 683 A.2d 1163 (1996). Furthermore, the court must inform the defendant of the disadvantages of being absent from the penalty phase. Cf. ibid, (holding waiver of right to counsel invalid because court made no attempt “to determine whether defendant understood the implications of waiving his right to an attorney”). By being absent from the penalty phase, defendant was not able to assist his attorneys with the preparation of mitigating evidence and the cross-examination of State witnesses, and he forfeited the opportunity to impact psychologically the jury through his presence.
“[CJourts must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of’ defendant’s right to be present. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1060, 25 L. Ed.2d 353, 358 (1970); see also State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 35, 697 A.2d 511 (1997) (presuming nonwaiver of fundamental rights); State v. Reed, 133 *470N.J. 237, 265, 627 A.2d 630 (1993) (same); Buonadonna, supra, 122 N.J. at 35, 583 A.2d 747 (same). Because the trial court permitted defendant to relinquish his presence right much too rapidly, that presumption was not overcome.
The trial court’s impetuous acceptance of defendant’s request to be absent from the penalty-phase proceedings fell far short of what was required to effectuate a valid waiver. The court merely asked defendant, through a leading question, if he wished not to be in the courtroom during the penalty phase. Without asking additional questions, the court surmised that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his presence right. The court, finding defendant’s conversation with counsel sufficient, never sought to ensure that defendant understood the ramifications of being absent from the penalty phase. The court’s blind faith in defendant’s comprehension of his absence was particularly problematic because, as mitigating evidence revealed, defendant has borderline intellectual functioning. Moreover, the court never scrutinized whether defendant’s request was voluntary. That error was particularly egregious because defense counsel had previously moved to bar defendant’s presence. During the guilt phase, defense counsel had moved ex parte and in camera to bar defendant from the penalty phase because he feared that defendant, if present, would be dangerous and undermine the presentation of mitigating evidence. In that in camera hearing, defense counsel raised the specter of defendant choking him while co-counsel presented mitigating evidence. In the aftermath of the in camera hearing, the court was on notice that counsel may have strongly pressured defendant to forsake his right of presence. Due to counsel’s conflict of interest in this case, see discussion, infra at 483, 715 A.2d at 279, the need for the court to conduct a probing voir dire to establish the waiver’s voluntariness was especially vital in this case. See Norman, supra, 151 N.J. at 35, 697 A.2d 511 (requiring on-the-record waiver and assurance of defendant’s awareness of “potential hazards” when defendant seeks to relinquish right to conflict-free counsel); State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J. 531, 545, 410 A.2d *471666 (1980) (same). Therefore, defendant’s waiver of his right to be present at the penalty phase was invalid.
The Court, however, concludes otherwise. It disregards the presumption that defendant had not validly waived his fundamental right. Instead, the Court relies on dubious and circumstantial evidence in order to hold that defendant understood the implications of his being absent from the penalty-phase proceedings. The majority points to two other instances in which defendant waived his presence right to establish that defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. In my opinion, the prior waivers did not sufficiently inform defendant of the implications of not being present at the penalty phase or prove that defendant’s waiver was voluntary.
Defendant’s waiver of his presence during the guilt-phase deliberations cannot validate the waiver of his penalty-phase presence. Though the trial court apprised defendant of his rights to be present and to return to the courtroom in case he changed his mind, the court never revealed the ramifications of his waiver. The brief colloquy between the court and defendant did not divulge that defendant’s absence during penalty-phase proceedings would prevent defendant from assisting counsel present mitigating evidence and cross-examine State witnesses and preclude defendant from having a psychological effect on the jury. Of course, the trial court cannot be faulted for not discussing those matters when defendant wanted to be absent from guilt-phase deliberations, a time when no evidence was presented and the jury usually remained in the jury room. Consequently, defendant’s absence during the guilt-phase deliberations does not demonstrate the validity of his waiver of his right to be present during the penalty-phase proceedings.
Likewise, defendant’s absence during part of jury selection does not show that defendant’s waiver of his presence at the penalty phase was knowing and voluntary. When defendant requested to be absent during the remainder of jury selection, the court engaged in an extended colloquy with defendant. The court *472informed defendant that his absence during a trial can be disadvantageous because it would prevent him from observing witnesses and “get[ting] a sense of the situation.” The court added that defendant’s presence during jury selection was less critical than at other points of the trial. The court also told defendant that he could withdraw his waiver of presence at any time. This colloquy failed to prove that defendant validly waived his right to be present at the penalty phase.
While it was more informative that the ensuing presence-waiver colloquies, the colloquy could not establish the validity of defendant’s penalty-phase waiver for several reasons. The jury-selection-presenee-waiver colloquy occurred over two and one-half months prior to defendant’s request to be absent from the penalty phase. In the eleven weeks following the colloquy during jury selection, during which time defendant was tried for and convicted of capital murder, defendant may have forgotten the trial court’s admonition, which did not seem particularly pertinent at the time the court made it.
In addition, the court never explicitly told defendant that his presence would permit him to assist counsel with the presentation of a defense and with the cross-examination of State witnesses. Though the court told defendant that his absence at trial would prevent him from observing testimony, defendant, hampered by borderline intellectual functioning, may not have inferred that his presence at trial would permit him to assist his attorneys.
Most importantly, the court never gave defendant any indication that his presence would have a psychological effect on the jury. Courts have recognized that a capital defendant’s presence has an intangible psychological impact on the jury, which continually observes the defendant, whose life is in its hands, and his human qualities. See United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir.1989) (defendant’s absence “deprived [him] of the ‘psychological function’ of his presence on the jury during a crucial phase of his trial”); State v. Okumura, 58 Haw. 425, 570 P.2d 848, 853 (1977) (holding defendants present at verdict exert psychological *473influence upon juries); cf. State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 429-30, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988) (holding defendant has right to allocution because “it bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sentenced to death by a jury which never heard the sound of his voice” (internal quotations omitted)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1146, 103 L. Ed.2d 205 (1989). By permitting defendant to remain absent at the rendering of the penalty-phase verdict, the court permitted defendant to relinquish his presence right at its most crucial point.
“The presence of the accused is not a mere form. It is of the very essence of a criminal trial not only that the accused shall be brought face to face with the witnesses against him, but also with his triers____ And at no time in the whole course of the trial is this right more valuable than at the final step when the jury are to pronounce that decision which is to restore him to the liberty of a citizen, or to consign him to the scaffold or to a felon’s cell in the state prison.”
[Commonwealth ex rel. Milewski v. Ashe, 363 Pa. 596, 70 A.2d 625, 629 (1950) (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 77 Ky. 769, 771 (1879)) (ellipsis in original).]
The majority underestimates the import of the psychological impact of defendant’s presence at the penalty phase. Defendant had a due process right to “exert a psychological influence upon the jury.” Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d 392, 396 (10th Cir.1990).
A substantial right was affected by [the defendant’s] being absent when the jury returned its verdict. Had he been present he could have insisted on a poll of the jury being taken. While the judge did ask the jury generally if this was their verdict, the members were not polled individually. [The defendant] was deprived of the right personally to confront the jury____ [The defendant’s] absence at the return of the verdict was significant. The psychological distinction between a general poll in his absence, and an individual poll requiring each juror to assume the burden of his decision and affirm it in the defendant’s presence is not a minor one.
[Lee v. State, 509 P.2d 1088, 1094 (Alaska 1973) (footnote omitted).]
Accord Kimes v. United States, 569 A.2d 104, 111 (D.C.1989) (‘When a jury returns to the courtroom, faces the accused, and, typically, is subject to a poll of the verdict, the psychological influence of the eye-to-eye contact between juror and defendant may be significant enough to cause a juror to change his or her mind when outside the pressure of the jury room.”); see also Larson, supra, 911 F.2d at 395-96 (holding defendant’s erroneous absence at closing argument, jury instructions, and verdict was reversible error); Wade v. United States, 441 F.2d 1046, 1050-51 *474(D.C.Cir.1971) (holding defendant’s absence at verdict was reversible error). Thus, the psychological effect of a defendant’s presence can have an impact on the outcome of the penalty phase. Because the court never informed defendant of the benefits of his presence at the penalty phase, defendant’s waiver was not knowing and, therefore, invalid.
The fact that defendant testified at the guilt phase does not nullify the psychological effect his penalty-phase presence may have had. Defendant was absent from the most crucial proceedings that determined whether defendant would be sentenced to death. Moreover, defendant’s penalty-phase absence may have created the impression that he did not care whether he lived or died. Also, defendant forfeited the opportunity to look the jurors in the eyes when they announced the death verdict.
Moreover, in none of the presence-waiver colloquies did the trial court inquire into the voluntariness of defendant’s request to be absent during the penalty-phase proceedings. The voluntariness of defendant’s earlier waivers did not verify the voluntariness of the penalty-phase waiver. When defendant requested to be absent from jury selection and the guilt-phase deliberations, defense counsel had not previously urged the court to bar defendant from the courtroom for those proceedings. In contrast, defendant’s request to absent himself from the penalty phase was preceded by defense counsel’s ex parte and in camera motion to exclude defendant from the penalty-phase proceedings. Defense counsel’s desire, motivated in part by counsel’s personal fear for his own safety, to have defendant barred from the penalty-phase proceedings raised the possibility that counsel unduly influenced defendant to waive his right to be present at the penalty phase. The court erred by not specifically inquiring into whether defendant’s wish to be absent from the penalty-phase proceedings was voluntary.
Therefore, defendant’s waiver of his right to be present at the penalty phase was not knowing and voluntary. It is unlikely that defendant understood all the ramifications of his waiver. Defense counsel did not tell the court that he had discussed with defendant *475the advantages and disadvantages of waiver. Although the court stated that defense counsel had disclosed to defendant the implications of waiver, the record neither supports nor contradicts that assumption. Defendant may have been aware that his absence would prevent him from assisting with the presentation of mitigating evidence or the cross-examination of State witnesses. But, defendant probably did not know that his presence would have a psychological effect by humanising him in the perceptions of the jury. It is impossible to determine definitively whether an understanding of the psychological impact of his presence would have changed defendant’s mind because the court, by its failure to probe defendant’s knowledge and desires, left the record incomplete.
Defendant’s inadequate waiver cannot be deemed harmless. “To hold his absence harmless would be too speculative. It would assume to reconstruct what might have eventuated had he been present, when that cannot truly be reconstructed with a degree of certainty essential to avoid the reasonable possibility of prejudice.” Wade, supra, 441 F.2d at 1051. Defendant, armed with the knowledge that his presence would have a beneficial effect on the jury’s perception of him, may have decided not to relinquish his right to be present at the penalty phase. Had defendant chosen to be present, the outcome of the highly subjective penalty phase could have differed. Perhaps one juror would not have voted to sentence defendant to death if defendant had been present throughout the penalty-phase deliberations or at the penalty-phase verdict. Thus, the trial court’s expedited acceptance, without conducting a voir dire to determine if defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary, of defendant’s request to be absent from the penalty phase was plain error and requires reversal of defendant’s death sentence.
II
A.
The absence of defendant at the penalty phase was compounded by defense counsel’s incompetence. At the penalty phase, defense *476counsel introduced no witnesses. Defense counsel’s failure to call any defense witnesses is inexplicable and inexcusable. Defense counsel’s performance was ineffective per se; accordingly, defendant’s death sentence must be reversed.
Under the federal and State Constitutions, defendant has a right to receive the effective assistance of competent counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L. Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A.2d 336 (1987). I agree with the Court that defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim requires a showing that “counsel’s performance was truly deficient, with such grievous errors that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”, Buonadonna, supra, 122 N.J. at 41, 583 A.2d 747 (internal quotations omitted), and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the jury’s penalty phase deliberations would have been affected substantially,” State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 250, 690 A.2d 1 (1997) (Marshall III), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 140, 139 L. Ed.2d 88 (1997). See ante at 431, 715 A.2d at 252. However, I depart from the Court’s application of the legal standard. In my opinion, defendant has met his burden of proving that his counsel were ineffective at the penalty phase.
Counsel’s failure to call any defense witnesses demonstrates the attorneys’ ineffectiveness. “Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel’s function is to assist the defendant ... [and] advocate the defendant’s cause.” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed.2d at 694.
Defense counsel’s complete reliance on the mitigation book, which included a timeline of defendant’s difficult childhood and defendant’s medical and school records, fell far short of the standards of competence required of capital defense attorneys. Defense counsel had the duty to argue effectively that the jury should not sentence defendant to die.
Defense counsel therefore has both the opportunity and the duty to present potentially beneficial mitigating evidence and to attempt to convince the sentencer *477that, notwithstanding the defendant’s guilt, he or she is a person who should not die. Once the defendant has been found guilty of a capital crime, a life sentence is counsel’s only remaining advocacy goal. As an advocate for life, counsel must attempt to demonstrate that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors and must present the sentencer with the most persuasive possible case for mercy.
[Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 299, 318 (1983).]
Accord, Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 313, 690 A.2d 1 (Handler, J. dissenting) (“The role of counsel at the penalty phase of a capital trial ... requires counsel to construct a sympathetic picture of a defendant’s character.”); James M. Doyle, The Lawyers’ Art: “Representation” in Capital Cases, 8 Yale J.L. & Human. 417, 426 (1996) (“Good capital lawyers collect all of the information — school records, medical history, family memories, the defendant’s own accounts — that bear on the defendant’s humanity. They then present this information in as compelling a form as possible in a ‘case for life.’ ” (footnote omitted)); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: the Evolving. Standard of Care, 1993 U. Ill. L.Rev. 323, 360-61 (1993) (“[A] capital defense attorney’s central mission is to present the defendant’s ‘case for life’ through the introduction of mitigating evidence at the sentencing stage.” (footnote omitted)); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 Iowa L.Rev. 433, 497 (1993) (“Most importantly, the defense lawyer’s role at the sentencing proceeding calls for an unusual exercise of judgment in attempting to persuade the jury that the defendant should not be put to death.”); Goodpaster, supra, 58 N.Y.U. L.Rev. at 338 (“At the penalty phase, defense counsel’s role is no longer merely responsive. Instead, he must now present an affirmative case for the life of a person who has been convicted of a capital crime.”). “In every case, the capital defendant’s attorney should seek to ‘humanize’ the defendant.” White, supra, 1993 U. Ill. L.Rev. at 361; accord Doyle, supra, 8 Yale J.L. & Human, at 426 (“Unless defense counsel act, their client’s humanity will be obscured by the prosecutor’s representation.”); Goodpaster, supra, 58 N.Y.U. L.Rev. at 321 (“To ensure a meaningful penalty hearing in capital cases, it is essential that the *478client be presented to the sentencer as a human being.”); id. at 337 (“[Cjounsel must portray the defendant as a human being with positive qualities.”). Defense counsel gravely breached their duty.
The fact that defense counsel presented some mitigating evidence does not demonstrate their effectiveness. Rather, the quality of the presentation of the evidence was vital. ‘When effectively presented, mitigating evidence can make a difference in any capital ease.” White, supra, 1993 U. Ill. L.Rev. at 365; accord Doyle, supra, 8 Yale J.L. & Human, at 433 (expressing need to present mitigating evidence vividly). Defense counsel’s total reliance on the mitigation book to make defendant’s case for life and humanize defendant was entirely inadequate. While the mitigation book presented useful evidence of defendant’s troubled childhood, a mitigation expert never contextualized the evidence. The mitigation book was too abstract for the jury to comprehend and make meaningful use of the mitigating evidence. Without a mitigation expert, the defense had no ability to link defendant’s difficult childhood to his psychological makeup as an adult. In the absence of a mitigation expert’s testimony, the defense’s presentation was lifeless and hollow. Counsel’s failure to call a mitigation expert seems even more perplexing in light of the fact that a social worker, who presumably could have been called as a mitigation expert, assisted the defense’s mitigation efforts.
Defense counsel’s decision to call no defense witnesses reveals their utter lack of appreciation for the importance of a convincing and vivid presentation of mitigating evidence.
Those who have tried capital cases have found that the competent presentation of [mitigating] evidence often results in sentences less than death. But the right to have any of the “diverse frailties of humankind” taken into account is meaningless if the accused is not provided with counsel capable of finding and effectively presenting mitigating circumstances.
[Stephen B. Bright, Counselor for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1865 (1994) (footnotes omitted).]
Defense counsel apparently failed to recognize that “there is empirical evidence that the quality of defense representation is an important factor in many cases.” Green, supra, 78 Iowa. L.Rev. *479at 498. See also Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L.Rev. 201,202 (1996) (“An examination of the full range of death penalty cases that have been litigated in the past twenty years ... suggests one undeniable truth: in an amazingly high number of cases, the most critical issue in determining whether a defendant lives or dies is the quality of counsel.”); Bright, supra, 103 Yale L.J. at 1841 (“Whether death is imposed frequently turns on the quality of counsel assigned to the accused.”); Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 Harv. L.Rev. 1923, 1932 (1994) (‘When defense counsel does not effectively challenge the prosecution’s ease, fails to put on a defense, and develops no mitigating evidence, a death sentence can seem inevitable.”). A commentator explained why the quality of defense counsel’s presentation of mitigating evidence is critical:
The quality of defense representation is likely to matter in the sentencing stage of the vast majority of capital cases. Because of the breadth of the jury’s discretion and the subjectivity of its decision, the imposition of a death sentence will rarely, if ever, be a foregone conclusion. Moreover, the quality of defense representation plays a critical role because of the vast range of information relevant to the sentencing decision that the jury can learn only through defense counsel’s efforts and because of the jury’s susceptibility to persuasive argument. Thus, in capital cases, more than any other class of criminal eases, the quality of representation will make a difference — and the difference will be between life or death for the accused.
[Green, supra, 78 Iowa, L.Rev. at 499 (footnote omitted).]
Defense counsel’s failure to call mitigation witnesses resulted in a half-hearted and lackluster presentation of mitigating evidence. In light of the understanding among capital defense lawyers that the vivid presentation of mitigating evidence is essential, counsel’s performance was thoroughly deficient.
The Court, however, finds that defense counsel’s decision to call no witnesses at the penalty phase may have been a strategic decision. Ante at 431-32, 715 A.2d at 252-53. I disagree. Due to the importance of a vibrant presentation of mitigating evidence, no strategic decision by defense counsel could justify their decision to present no witnesses. Consequently, no facts revealed at post-*480conviction relief could excuse defense counsel’s defective performance.
In addition, the majority points to the fact that jury did not unanimously reject five catch-all mitigating factors to illustrate defense counsel’s effectiveness. Ante at 431-32, 715 A.2d at 252-53. That argument is fallacious. It assumes, without basis, that jurors nonunanimously found five mitigating factors because of, rather than in spite of, defense counsel’s languid performance. It disregards the possibility that the strength of the mitigating evidence, rather than the quality of defense counsel, impelled jurors to find the mitigating factors. It fails to recognize that had defense counsel called witnesses at the penalty phase, the jury may have found mitigating factors unanimously or, more fundamentally, might not have unanimously sentenced defendant to death.
Therefore, I believe that defense counsel’s performance at the penalty phase was deficient. See State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 625, 577 A.2d 455 (1990) (holding defense counsel’s penalty-phase performance deficient); cf. Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1271 (9th Cir.1998) (holding defense counsel’s failure to call witnesses at penalty phase or introduce mitigating evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1387 (9th Cir.1995) (same); Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 764 (11th Cir.1989) (same); State v. Hamilton, 699 So.2d 29, 34 (La.1997) (holding, on direct appeal, defense counsel’s failure to call witnesses at penalty phase or introduce mitigating evidence comprised ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1070, 140 L. Ed.2d 129 (1998). Because defense counsel introduced no witnesses at the penalty phase, defendant has established the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test.
I also believe that defendant has demonstrated that the ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced him, the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. Accordingly, defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is meritorious and compels reversal of the death sentence.
*481In my opinion, defense counsel’s utterly inadequate performance requires a presumption that defendant was prejudiced. ‘When there are ‘egregious shortcomings in the professional performance of counsel’ a presumption of prejudice arises without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 312, 690 A.2d 1 (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 61, 519 A.2d 336); accord State v. Jack, 144 N.J. 240, 249, 676 A.2d 545 (1996) (“[W]hen the level of counsel’s participation makes the idea of a fair trial a nullity prejudice need not be shown, it is presumed. If this category of ineffective assistance is established, a defendant is not required to show prejudice. That degree of deficient performance is tantamount to a complete denial of counsel.” (citation omitted)). That presumption of prejudice is conclusive. Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 61, 519 A.2d 336. Defense counsel’s failure to call any witnesses at the penalty phase was an egregious shortcoming that triggers the irrebuttable presumption of prejudice.
Even if prejudice is not presumed in this case, defendant establishes the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. To reiterate, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at a capital sentencing proceeding establishes the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test if he shows that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the jury’s penalty phase deliberations would have been affected substantially,” Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 250, 690 A.2d 1. In other words, “if a reasonable juror would have considered the material in his or her deliberative process, then vacation of the death sentence is required.” id. at 310-11, 690 A.2d 1 (Handler, J., dissenting). Defense counsel’s witness-free presentation of mitigating evidence undoubtedly prejudiced defendant.
The testimony of a mitigation expert could have affected the penalty-phase deliberations. The expert witness would have explained to the jury how defendant’s difficult childhood or low intelligence or defendant’s mother’s irresponsible childrearing impacted on defendant’s deathworthiness. Without the testimony of *482a mitigation expert, the mitigating evidence was obscure and devoid of context. Though defense counsel, in the opening and closing statements, attempted to explain the import of the mitigating evidence, the jury, which had been instructed that counsel’s arguments were not evidence, likely gave little weight to those statements. Consequently, defense counsel’s inability to call any witnesses at the penalty phase prejudiced defendant. See Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 310, 690 A.2d 1 (Handler, J., dissenting) (“Certainly, noncumulative,' material mitigating evidence generates the real possibility that it would ‘affect substantially’ ‘penalty phase deliberations.’ ”). In this case, it is possible that defendant was sentenced to death, not on the basis of his crime and his character, but because of his counsel’s pale presentation of mitigating evidence.
Accordingly, defendant’s death sentence lacks reliability. See Note, supra, 107 Haro. L.Rev. at 1934 (noting incompetent counsel can “undermine the reliability of the death sentence”). “Arbitrary results, which are all too common in death penalty cases, frequently stem from inadequacy of counsel. The process of sorting out who is most deserving of society’s ultimate punishment does not work when the most fundamental component of the adversary system, competent representation by counsel, is missing.” Bright, supra, 103 Yale L.J. at 1837. Defense counsel’s performance at the penalty phase was completely incompetent. By presenting no witnesses, the jury was unable to understand and consider fully the mitigating evidence. At a minimum, defense counsel’s ineffectiveness affected the penalty-phase deliberations. Moreover, it may have altered the outcome. “There is no excuse .. .• for executing capital defendants for whom the poor quality of trial counsel meant the difference between life and death.” Green, supra, 78 Iowa. L.Rev. at 504.
Therefore, defense counsel’s inept performance prejudiced defendant. Irrespective of whether prejudice is presumed, defendant’s sentence should be reversed because his attorneys violated his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
*483B.
Furthermore, defense counsel were hampered by a conflict of interest. As recounted above, in the midst of the guilt phase, defense counsel moved ex parte and in camera to proscribe defendant’s presence at the penalty phase. By attempting to ban their client from being present at the proceedings that would determine whether he would be sentenced to death, defense counsel’s interests conflicted with defendant’s interest to be present at the penalty phase. Notably, at the time of defense counsel’s motion, defendant had not expressed on the record a desire to absent himself from the penalty-phase proceedings. Because at the hearing defense counsel did not inform the court that defendant wished to be absent from the penalty phase, defendant likely had yet to inform his attorneys that he did not want to attend his capital-sentencing proceedings.
Because a defendant’s presence is typically beneficial, when defense counsel moves to compel their Ghent’s absence, a conflict of interest arises. When a defendant and defense counsel have conflicting interests, the court must, on the record, inform the defendant of the conflict and ensure that the defendant understands the conflict’s implications. Norman, supra, 151 N.J. at 35, 697 A.2d 511; Bellucci, supra, 81 N.J. at 545, 410 A.2d 666. In a capital case, when the defendant’s interests diverge from defense counsel’s interests, the court must appoint standby counsel to represent the defendant’s interests. See State v. Martini, 144 N.J. 603, 614-15, 677 A.2d 1106 (1996) (Martini III) (requiring trial court to appoint standby counsel to represent defendant’s interest in waiving post-conviction review), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 699, 136 L. Ed.2d 621 (1997). Unless the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to be represented by counsel unimpeded by a conflict, defendant’s counsel is deemed ineffective. Bellucci, supra, 81 N.J. at 545, 410 A.2d 666.
In this case, the trial court did not appreciate the existence of a conflict of interest between defendant and his attorneys, who, rather than attempting to convince defendant to attend the penal*484ty-phase proceedings, sought to bar their client from the penalty phase. The court did not appoint standby counsel or secure a waiver of conflict-free counsel. Consequently, defense counsel’s conflict of interest provides additional grounds for finding a violation of defendant’s right to receive effective assistance of counsel.
Ill
In a case, such as this one, in which the defendant is African American and the victim is white, the court must conduct a probing voir dire with respect to the venirepersons’ racial attitudes. See State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 234-38, 716 A.2d 458 (1998) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 414-20, 680 A.2d 677 (1996) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 507-13, 575 A.2d 435 (1990) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I continue to believe that the failure to conduct a rigorous racial-bias voir dire in a cross-racial capital-murder case comprises reversible error. Even when not requested by the parties, the trial court’s obligation to ensure an impartial jury and fundamental fairness commands the court to voir dire venirepersons rigorously regarding racial bias.
The court’s racial-bias voir dire in this case was not adequate. For example, the court had the following colloquy with a potential juror:
Q: Do you feel the race of defendant should be a consideration in a homicide trial?
A: No.
Q: Do you feel you yourself are able to treat people fairly and equally, regardless of what the race is?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: We need you to respond verbally. I know you’re nodding affirmatively, but we need to get your words down. The decedent—
A: Yes.
Q: —in this case is white, and the defendant is black. If Mr. Morton is found guilty, then this would be an interracial crime. Would that affect your ability to be fair and impartial?
A: No.
*485Although the court did ask prospective jurors whether race would affect their abilities to be fair and impartial, the court improperly elicited merely yes-or-no answers from the venirepersons. That was not sufficient.
This Court has acknowledged the need for a more extensive voir dire regarding racial prejudice.
Racial prejudice may be either blatant and easy to detect or subtle and therefore more difficult to discern. A probing voir dire that elicits more than a “yes” or “no” response will aid the trial court in excusing prospective jurors for cause and will assist the defense in exercising its peremptory challenges.
[State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 428, 550 A.2d 1172 (1988) (Williams 11).]
The trial court’s superficial voir dire was not capable of uncovering venirepersons’ racial biases. In today’s society, overt racism is frowned upon. Only the most rabid racists would be willing to express their prejudices to the court. Further, racism is often unconscious. A potential juror cannot communicate his or her biases of which he or she is unaware. Consequently, a court must ask indirect questions regarding racial bias that can reveal a prospective juror’s racial prejudices.
This case had racial overtones. Carolyn Bennett testified that defendant, knowing that he had killed Eck, said that there was “one less cracker for him to worry about.” During voir dire, the court was aware of defendant’s utterance of the racial slur. The court should have recognized the relevance of race to this case and asked venirepersons several probing questions pertaining to racial prejudice. The magnitude of the court’s error was intensified when Bennett testified on redirect examination that defendant disliked white people.
Because this case involved a cross-racial murder and because race was inextricably tied to the case, State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 246, 524 A.2d 188 (1987), the trial court should have conducted a vigorous voir dire in respect of potential jurors’ racial biases. Though the parties have not raised this issue, the court’s failure to sufficiently probe the prospective jurors’ racial attitudes requires reversal of defendant’s death sentence. See, e.g., Harris, supra, *486156 N.J. at 238-40, 716 A.2d 458 (Handler, J., dissenting) (concluding inadequate racial-bias voir dire was reversible error).
IV
“In a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury, the jury is called upon to make a highly subjective, unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves.” Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33-34, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 90 L. Ed.2d 27, 35 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). In this case, the jury’s sentencing judgment was contaminated by grave errors at the penalty phase. Without conducting an inquiry to determine whether defendant’s request to be absent from the penalty phase was knowing and voluntary, the trial court erred when it immediately accepted defendant’s request to be absent from the penalty phase. Consequently, defendant did not validly waive his right to be present at the penalty phase. The effects of defendant’s absence were escalated by defense counsel’s ineffectiveness. Counsel’s inexplicable failure to call a single defense witness during the penalty phase prevented a reliable sentencing determination. In addition, defense counsel’s interests were adverse from defendant’s. Moreover, the court’s insufficient racial-bias voir dire could not ensure that jurors’ racial prejudices did not affect the highly subjective penalty-phase deliberations pertaining to the cross-racial murder for which defendant was sentenced to die. Individually and cumulatively, these errors require reversal of defendant’s death sentence. I dissent.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ, and Justices POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 6.
For reversal in part — Justice HANDLER — 1.