Court Opinion

ID: 9380483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 08:08:20.975761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:25.278834
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-22-00098-CR
     ___________________________

  SERGIO VALDESGALVAN, Appellant

                     V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 432nd District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 1658901D

  Before Birdwell, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
        Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                                      OPINION

      Appellant Sergio Valdesgalvan 1 appeals his conviction for aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01, 22.02(a). In his sole point

on appeal, Valdesgalvan argues that Article 38.371 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure is facially unconstitutional. We will affirm.

                                    I. Background

A.    Events Giving Rise to the Present Case

      On August 6, 2020, the complainant went to a MetroPCS store to purchase a

new cell phone. Before she could complete her purchase, Valdesgalvan—with whom

the complainant had had a romantic relationship—arrived at the store and

approached her.     As soon as the complainant noticed Valdesgalvan, she began

screaming and attempting to get away from him. Valdesgalvan then forced the

complainant out of the store and began trying to convince her to get back together

with him. Edgar Chairez, the manager of the MetroPCS store, followed them out of

the store but went back inside after Valdesgalvan threatened him.

      After the complainant resisted Valdesgalvan’s attempts to convince her to leave

with him, their conversation became heated.           The complainant testified that

      1
        In the record and the parties’ briefs, Appellant’s surname is variously reflected
as “Valdesgalvan,” “Valdezgalvan,” and “Valdes Galvan.” We will refer to him as
“Valdesgalvan,” as this is the spelling that seems to appear most frequently in the
record, including in the indictment and judgment of conviction.

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Valdesgalvan eventually pulled out a knife and stabbed her in the stomach and “breast

area.”

         After the confrontation outside the store, Valdesgalvan ran away. Chairez

testified that he observed “something shining” in Valdesgalvan’s hand as he ran away,

but he could not tell exactly what it was.

         A store employee called 9-1-1, the complainant was taken by ambulance to the

hospital, and the police began an investigation. Valdesgalvan was ultimately arrested

and charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

B.       Admission of Extraneous Offense Evidence

         At trial, to help the jury better understand the complainant’s fear of

Valdesgalvan, the State sought to introduce evidence that the two of them had been in

a violent relationship. However, before allowing the State to introduce evidence

concerning the nature of the complainant’s relationship with Valdesgalvan, the trial

court held a hearing outside the jury’s presence.

         At the hearing, the State proffered the complainant’s testimony and explained

that she would testify about prior abuse.2 Specifically, the State’s proffer showed that

       The State also sought to introduce testimony from Chairez concerning the
         2

abusive nature of the complainant’s relationship with Valdesgalvan. However, the
trial court ruled that Chairez’s statements regarding the complainant and
Valdesgalvan’s relationship were hearsay and not admissible under Article 38.371 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure or Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of
Evidence. Nevertheless, the trial court deemed Chairez’s testimony about what he
had heard on August 6, 2020, admissible under the excited utterance exception to the

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the complainant would testify about the following events that had occurred during her

relationship with Valdesgalvan:

      •      The reason that the complainant had gone to the MetroPCS store on
             August 6, 2020, was that Valdesgalvan had taken her phone away during
             an incident several days before;

      •      On March 6, 2020, Valdesgalvan had pushed the complainant to the
             ground after she told him that she did not want to have sex with him;

      •      On May 16, 2020, after complainant again refused Valdesgalvan’s
             request for sex, he reached into her car to take her keys and then “pulled
             back on the glass window, which shattered.” He then punched the
             complainant in the back of the head;

      •      From June 1 to June 3, 2020, Valdesgalvan “told [the complainant]
             where to go and what to do” and “had someone watch her” while he
             was at work;

      •      On June 2, 2020, while they were inside a car in a church parking lot, the
             complainant refused to have sex with Valdesgalvan, and he proceeded to
             rip her clothes, pull her on top of him, and have sex with her;

      •      On June 3, 2020, after the complainant told Valdesgalvan that she
             wanted to leave him, he punched her in the nose, making her bleed. He
             then reached over and grabbed her neck “and squeezed with heavy
             pressure.” Later, at the hospital, it was discovered that the complainant’s
             eye socket had been fractured.
Overruling Valdesgalvan’s objections to the facial constitutionality of Article 38.371

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court determined that this evidence

was admissible and allowed the complainant to testify about each instance of abuse.

hearsay rule. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(2). Valdesgalvan does not challenge the trial
court’s ruling concerning the admissibility of Chairez’s testimony on appeal.

                                           4
      The jury found Valdesgalvan guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon

and assessed his sentence at eighteen years’ confinement. The trial court sentenced

him accordingly. This appeal followed.

                                   II. Discussion

      In a single point, Valdesgalvan argues that Article 38.371 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure is facially unconstitutional. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

38.371. Specifically, Valdesgalvan asserts that the admission of extraneous offense

evidence under Article 38.371 violates a defendant’s right to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV,

§ 1. Valdesgalvan’s argument lacks merit.

      We review a constitutional challenge de novo as a question of law, presuming

that the statute is valid and that the legislature has not acted unreasonably or

arbitrarily. Goyzueta v. State, 266 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no

pet.). As the accused, Valdesgalvan bears the burden to establish the statute’s

unconstitutionality. Id. “With the statute’s presumed constitutionality, [Valdesgalvan]

already faces a high burden. But because [he] has launched a facial challenge, he bears

an even greater burden.” Allen v. State, 614 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

To successfully challenge the constitutionality of Article 38.371 on its face—as

opposed to merely challenging whether it was constitutionally applied in this particular

case—Valdesgalvan must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which

the statute would be valid. See id. at 741; Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex.

                                            5
Crim. App. 2015). “Given this high burden, a facial challenge is ‘the most difficult

challenge to mount successfully.’” Allen, 614 S.W.3d at 741 (quoting United States v.

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987)).

         Article 38.371 provides as follows:

         (a) This article applies to a proceeding in the prosecution of a defendant
         for an offense, or for an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense, for
         which the alleged victim is a person whose relationship to or association
         with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b),[3] 71.003, or
         71.005, Family Code.
         (b) In the prosecution of an offense described by Subsection (a), subject
         to the Texas Rules of Evidence or other applicable law, each party may
         offer testimony or other evidence of all relevant facts and circumstances
         that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the actor
         committed the offense described by Subsection (a), including testimony
         or evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between the actor
         and the alleged victim.
         (c) This article does not permit the presentation of character evidence
         that would otherwise be inadmissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence
         or other applicable law.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371. Thus, as relevant here, in cases in which the

complainant is in a dating relationship with the accused, Article 38.371 expressly

allows for the admission of extraneous offense evidence to show the nature of their

relationship. James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 546 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no

pet.).

        Section 71.0021(b) describes a “dating relationship,” which it defines as “a
         3

relationship between individuals who have or have had a continuing relationship of a
romantic or intimate nature.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 71.0021(b).

                                               6
      As noted above, Valdesgalvan’s facial challenge to Article 38.371 is rooted in

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no state

shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property[] without due process of law.”

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

      The Supreme Court has interpreted this language as encompassing both
      substantive and procedural components. Washington v. Glucksberg,
      521 U.S. 702, 719–720, 117 S. Ct. 2258, [2267] (1997). In Glucksberg, the
      Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees
      more than fair process, and the liberty it protects includes more than the
      absence of physical restraint. The Clause also provides heightened
      protection against governmental interference with certain fundamental
      rights and liberty interests.” Id. at 719–20, 117 S. Ct. [at 2267] (citations
      omitted); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02, 113 S. Ct. 1439,
      [1447] (1993). A statute that infringes upon a fundamental right or
      liberty interest is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires a reviewing
      court to assess whether “the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
      compelling state interest.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 117 S. Ct. [at
      2268]. On the other hand, a statute that infringes upon a non-
      fundamental right must merely meet the standard of “rationally
      advancing some legitimate governmental purpose[.]” Flores, 507 U.S. at
      306, 113 S. Ct. [at 1449].

Schlittler v. State, 488 S.W.3d 306, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

      Though Valdesgalvan does not explicitly assert that Article 38.371 should be

subject to strict scrutiny, he implies as much by his assertion that “[t]he right to a fair

trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.” See id. (“A

statute that infringes upon a fundamental right or liberty interest is subject to strict

scrutiny . . . .”). However, as one of our sister courts recognized when presented with

a similar facial challenge to Article 38.371, while a defendant has a fundamental right

to a fair trial, he does not have a fundamental right to a trial free from the

                                            7
introduction of extraneous offense evidence. See Thomas v. State, 651 S.W.3d 102, 108

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Harris v. State, 475 S.W.3d

395, 401 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d)); cf. De La Paz v. State, 279

S.W.3d 336, 342–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (recognizing that although “evidence of

other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible ‘to prove the character of a person in

order to show action in conformity therewith,’” such evidence “may ‘be admissible

for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” (quoting Tex. R. Evid.

404(b))). Thus, we agree with the Fourteenth Court of Appeals that in order to

withstand a facial constitutional challenge, Article 38.371 must merely satisfy the

rational basis test, meaning that we will uphold the statute as long as it is “reasonable,

not arbitrary, and rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Thomas, 651 S.W.3d

at 108 (first citing Schlittler, 488 S.W.3d at 315; and then citing Jackson v. State, 807

S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d)).

      Although Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence precludes the admission

of evidence of a crime, wrong, or act solely to prove a person’s character to show that

he acted in conformity with that character on a particular occasion, it allows for such

evidence to be admitted for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Those listed purposes “are neither mutually exclusive nor

collectively exhaustive.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343. As we have previously

                                            8
recognized, “Article 38.371, which applies to family-violence prosecutions, provides

another   non-character-conformity     purpose   for   admitting   extraneous-offense

evidence”—to show the nature of the relationship between the complainant and the

accused. James, 623 S.W.3d at 545 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371).

      The State has a legitimate—even compelling—interest in decreasing domestic

violence, see Webb v. Schlagal, 530 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, pet.

denied) (citing United States v. Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004)); cf.

Ex parte Poe, 491 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, pet. ref’d)

(recognizing “the State’s legitimate and compelling interest in protecting its citizens

from potential harm”), and evidence regarding the nature of a family or dating

relationship can play an important role in domestic violence cases. As the Fourteenth

Court of Appeals has recognized,

      complainants in family-violence cases often do not testify at trial. The
      nature of the relationship between the actor and alleged victim may be
      relevant to, among other things, confirm the alleged victim’s initial—and
      later recanted—statements to police, or to explain the alleged victim’s
      unwillingness to cooperate with law enforcement or prosecution.
Gonzalez v. State, 541 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no

pet.) (citation omitted). Additionally, such evidence can provide context that assists

the trier of fact in understanding the actions of both the accused and the complainant.

See Gaulding v. State, No. 02-21-00096-CR, 2022 WL 17986026, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Dec. 29, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting

that the “probative force” of the State’s Article 38.371 extraneous offense evidence

                                          9
“was strong because it provided context and insight into [the appellant’s] motivation

for striking the complainant and showed how the abuse had escalated over time until

the complainant had had enough”).          Thus, Article 38.371’s purpose—allowing

extraneous offense evidence to show the nature of a family or dating relationship in

domestic violence cases—is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Thomas,

651 S.W.3d at 109.

      Moreover, Article 38.371 explicitly incorporates the procedural safeguards

provided by the rules of evidence to ensure that a defendant’s right to a fair trial is

protected. See id. Indeed, the statute expressly states that it “does not permit the

presentation of character evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible under the

Texas Rules of Evidence or other applicable law.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 38.371(c). Thus, contrary to Valdesgalvan’s assertion, 4 Article 38.371 does not

allow the admission of extraneous offense evidence to show character conformity—a

use explicitly proscribed by the rules of evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). In addition, a

defendant is entitled to reasonable notice upon request of the prosecution’s intent to

introduce extraneous offense evidence. Id. Further, a trial court may exclude Article

      4
        Valdesgalvan’s brief is inconsistent on this point. Although he initially
characterizes Article 38.371 as a “specific and limited exception” to Rule 404(b)’s
general prohibition on the use of character evidence and acknowledges that it “allows
introduction of extraneous offenses between a defendant and a person with whom he
has a dating relationship for the limited purpose of showing the nature of the
relationship between the actor and the alleged victim,” he later incorrectly asserts that
Article 38.371 “would purport to admit” extraneous offense evidence “for the sole
purpose of general character propensity.”

                                           10
38.371 extraneous offense evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed

by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.”

Tex. R. Evid. 403. Given these procedural safeguards, we cannot conclude that

Article 38.371 is arbitrary or unreasonable. See Thomas, 651 S.W.3d at 108.

       Joining the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, we conclude that Article 38.371 does

not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 109. As our

sister court aptly and succinctly stated:

       The statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest—to allow the
       State to present evidence (1) explaining why a complainant in a domestic
       violence case may be uncooperative, (2) confirming the veracity of a
       complainant’s initial but later recanted statements to police, and
       (3) contextualizing the nature of the relationship. And the statute
       includes proper procedural safeguards to prevent the admission of
       evidence of the person’s character in violation of his due process rights.
Id.

       We overrule Valdesgalvan’s sole point.

                                     III. Conclusion

       Having overruled Valdesgalvan’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                       /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                       Wade Birdwell
                                                       Justice

Publish

Delivered: March 16, 2023

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