Court Opinion

ID: 9841197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 16:08:20.923394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:31.196301
License: Public Domain

J-S28035-23

                                   2023 PA Super 173

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TERRANCE LAMONT SLOAN                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1483 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 21, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                      at No(s): CP-65-CR-0004092-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                    FILED: September 21, 2023

       Appellant Terrance Lamont Sloan appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County

following his conviction at a non-jury bench trial on the charges of driving

while under the influence of a controlled substance (“DUI”)-impaired ability-

first offense, possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), possession of

drug paraphernalia, exceeding the maximum speed limit by 33 mph, and

careless driving.1 After a careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant was

arrested and charged with various drug and traffic offenses, including DUI.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2); 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(31) and (32); and 75
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3362 and 3714, respectively.
J-S28035-23

Appellant filed a counseled pre-trial omnibus motion seeking to suppress the

statements made by Appellant, as well as the evidence seized by the police,

stemming from the stop of his motor vehicle on August 1, 2021. On May 9,

2022, Appellant, represented by counsel, proceeded to an evidentiary hearing

on his motion to suppress.

       At the suppression hearing, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Stephen

Rowe testified he was on routine patrol on August 1, 2021, and traveling on

Route 22 in Salem Township in a marked police vehicle with his supervisor,

Corporal Rebecca Fabich.         N.T., 5/9/22, at 15-17.   At approximately 3:06

a.m., he began following a vehicle and, clocking its speed for half a mile, he

determined the vehicle was traveling at a “high rate of speed.” Id. at 17.

Specifically, he clocked the vehicle as traveling 78 miles per hour in an area

properly posted at 45 miles per hour.2 Id. at 18. The trooper testified the

police vehicle’s speedometer had been issued a certificate of accuracy on May

10, 2021, by Rabold Services.3           Id. at 19-20.   The trooper testified the

speedometer was calibrated as a speed timing device within three months

prior to the time of the instant motor vehicle stop. Id. at 22.

____________________________________________

2 The trooper clarified he followed Appellant’s vehicle for several miles but
clocked its speed for approximately half a mile. Id. at 22.

3 The Commonwealth introduced evidence indicating the Department of
Transportation’s regulations list police vehicle speedometers as approved
timing devices and Rabold Services as an approved testing center. Id. at 19.

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      Trooper Rowe testified that, due to the speeding violation, he initiated

a stop of the vehicle. Id. He noted the driver, later identified as Appellant,

initially stopped the vehicle “against the cement barrier in the median between

the eastbound and westbound lanes with part of the vehicle being on the

roadway” as opposed to pulling over to the right side of the road and stopping

on the berm “where there was adequate room for everybody’s safety.” Id. at

22-23. Accordingly, the trooper exited his vehicle and, projecting his voice,

asked Appellant to move his vehicle to a safer location, i.e., a side road that

connected to Route 22. Id. at 24. Trooper Rowe testified Appellant complied

although he stopped the vehicle more in the “middle” of the side road instead

of on the berm of the side road. Id. The trooper testified that Appellant’s

vehicle was now “off the main part of the state highway[,]” and he stopped

the police vehicle, which had its overhead lights activated, directly behind

Appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 24-25.

      Trooper Rowe testified that, at this point, he exited the police vehicle

and approached Appellant’s vehicle, which had its driver’s side window rolled

down.   Id. at 25.      As he did so, he “noticed the odor of burnt marijuana

emanating from within the vehicle.” Id. He noticed the burnt marijuana smell

grew stronger as he walked closer to Appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 26. Upon

arriving at the driver’s side window of Appellant’s vehicle, Trooper Rowe

identified   himself,   as   well   as   requested   Appellant’s   driver’s   license,

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registration, and proof of insurance as “he normally does in every traffic stop.”

Id. at 25.

      As the trooper interacted with Appellant, and Appellant searched for his

documents, the trooper noticed Appellant had “redness of his eyes, bloodshot

teary eyes, glossy eyes. When [Appellant] spoke with [the trooper,] it was in

a slurred speech. Very slow but slurred.” Id. at 26. The trooper recognized

these as signs of possible intoxication from a controlled substance. Id. at 27.

Appellant provided his license and registration to the trooper, but he was

unable to locate his proof of insurance. Id. at 26.

      Trooper Rowe testified that, as soon as he received Appellant’s license

and registration, he asked Appellant, who was alone in the vehicle, “where the

marijuana was.” Id. at 27. Appellant “referenced on the passenger seat, and

[it] was a metal tin sitting on top of the seat. [Appellant] then opened up the

tin which exposed a marijuana blunt.”       Id.   The trooper noted Appellant

opened the tin without the trooper asking him to do so, and as Appellant did

so, Appellant stated, “I have my card, and I am permitted to take my

medication[.]” Id. Appellant volunteered he “smoked 2 hours previous to the

incident and that his doctor informed him that he had to wait at least an hour

before he could drive after taking his medication.” Id. at 33.

      Trooper Rowe testified he understood Appellant to be referring to the

fact he had a medical marijuana card.       Id. at 27.   However, the trooper

testified the packaging of Appellant’s marijuana in the tin was not consistent

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with how medical marijuana is packaged. Id. at 28. He also noted Appellant’s

marijuana was in a “smoked blunt” form, which is not consistent with how

medical marijuana is typically dispensed.4 Id.

       Trooper Rowe testified that, at this point, he asked Appellant to exit his

vehicle to perform field sobriety tests. Id. at 29. He noted Appellant agreed,

but his attitude became “more belligerent.” Id. Appellant stood in front of

and with his back to the police vehicle so that the area was well lit, but the

lights were not in Appellant’s eyes. Id. Trooper Rowe testified he began the

field sobriety tests by holding a pen in front of Appellant, asking him if he

could see the tip of the pen, and then asking Appellant to touch the tip of the

pen with his right index finger. Id. at 30. Although Appellant indicated he

could see the tip of the pen, he “touched his nose instead of the tip of the

pen.” Id.

       Trooper Rowe indicated he explained and administered the “Lack of

Convergence” test on Appellant, but Appellant’s eyes “were unable to

converge or, in other words, unable to cross when following the pen as

instructed to do so.” Id. at 30-31. The trooper indicated this was a sign that

Appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance. Id. at 31. He

next asked Appellant to “pull down on his lower eyelids,” and the trooper

observed “redness of his conjunctiva.” Id. at 32. The trooper testified the

____________________________________________

4Trooper Rowe testified that, in his training and work experience, medical
marijuana is typically dispensed in a pill or liquid form. Id. at 28.

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sign of redness was an indicator Appellant was under the influence of a

controlled substance. Id. He also noted he asked Appellant to stick out his

tongue, and when he complied, Appellant’s tongue had “a green, chalky

substance over three quarters of the length and width of his tongue.” Id.

Based on his training, Trooper Rowe recognized this as an indication that

Appellant “had smoked marijuana within the last four hours, but based on [the

trooper’s] observations and the amount of coverage on the tongue, it would

have to be within the last hour or two.” Id. at 32-33.

      Trooper Rowe testified he then administered the Romberg Balance Test,

which involved asking Appellant to close his eyes, tilt his head back, silently

count to thirty, level his head, open his eyes, and tell the officer to stop

counting in that time frame. Id. at 34. The trooper indicated he explained

and demonstrated the test for Appellant. Id. Appellant indicated he

understood the test and provided no reason as to why he would be unable to

comply.   Id. Nevertheless, Trooper Rowe testified that, during the test,

Appellant had “tremors of his eyelids when they were closed and of his legs.

He was also observed to have a 1 to 2 inch front-to-back sway and a 1 to 2

inch—or approximately 1 to 2 inch side-to-side sway.” Id. He also noted

that, instead of 30 seconds passing, 45 seconds passed before Appellant told

the officer to stop the test. Id.

      Concluding Appellant had failed the field sobriety tests, Trooper Rowe

placed Appellant in the rear of the marked patrol vehicle, and he read

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Appellant his implied consent and O’Connell warnings.        Id. Trooper Rowe

confirmed that, despite going over the implied consent form and O’Connell

warnings with Appellant, Appellant verbally refused to give consent for any

chemical testing, and he refused to sign the forms. Id. at 36. Trooper Rowe

noted he removed the metal tin, which contained the marijuana blunt, from

Appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 37-38.        He opined the metal tin was drug

paraphernalia given that it was not a type of packaging used by a medical

marijuana dispensary or otherwise from a licensed medical professional. Id.

at 38.

         Trooper Rowe testified that, based on his observations, training, and

experience, Appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance when

he was operating his vehicle. Id. at 39. He summarized the basis for his

opinion as follows:

                Based on my personal observations, the odor of marijuana
         or burnt marijuana as I approached the vehicle, that same odor
         emanating from within the vehicle that [Appellant] was in, that
         same odor emanating from [Appellant’s] person and breath after
         he exited the vehicle and while he was performing the field
         sobriety tests, the observations that I made of him to consist of
         the bloodshot glossy eyes, the slurred speech, the redness of the
         conjunctiva, again if I mentioned, the chalky substance on his
         tongue…It was my opinion that he was not capable of safe driving
         at this point.

Id. at 39-40.

         On cross-examination, Trooper Rowe testified that, when he was

following Appellant’s vehicle, he saw no indication that Appellant’s vehicle was

“swerving” or “failing to maintain a lane[.]” Id. at 45. However, he again

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reiterated that Appellant’s vehicle was “going at a high rate of speed.” Id. at

44. Trooper Rowe testified that glassy bloodshot eyes are consistent with the

use of controlled substances, as well as alcohol; however, he smelled no

alcohol during the traffic stop. Id. at 51. He also testified that certain medical

conditions may cause red eyes, as well as lack of sleep. Id. at 52.

      Trooper Rowe explained he received extensive training and education

through the police academy regarding the indicators of marijuana use, and

the amount of the green, chalky substance on Appellant’s tongue is consistent

with his training and experience that Appellant would have smoked marijuana

“within the last hour to 2 hours” prior to the traffic stop. Id.

      Trooper Rowe confirmed Appellant never indicated he had any physical

ailment that would prevent him from completing the field sobriety tests. Id.

at 53. He acknowledged that, aside from the single blunt of marijuana, he

found no other marijuana in Appellant’s vehicle.        Id.    He explained the

marijuana at issue was loose marijuana “within the wrapper of [a] cigar

wrapper itself forming the blunt.” Id. at 54.

      On redirect-examination, Trooper Rowe testified he did not call a drug

recognition expert to the scene of the instant traffic stop because “with [his]

training, education, and knowledge, and the amount that [he has] arrested

over the course of [his] career, [he is] very comfortable based on [his] job

knowledge as well as [his] training…to be able to ascertain if somebody is

under the influence of a controlled substance.” Id. at 55.         Trooper Rowe

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indicated that he never threatened Appellant nor showed him his gun. Id. at

56.

      Trooper Rowe testified that, during the time he talked to Appellant while

Appellant was in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, Appellant was not under

arrest. Id. at 57. He clarified he considered Appellant to be in custody after

Appellant failed the field sobriety tests, at which point the trooper handcuffed

Appellant and placed him in the back of the police vehicle.   Id. at 56-57.

      Trooper Rowe testified that, aside from obtaining the metal tin from the

passenger seat, he neither searched nor seized any evidence from Appellant’s

vehicle.   Id. at 58. On recross-examination, Trooper Rowe noted that

Appellant never produced a medical marijuana card. Id. at 60.

      Appellant testified that, during the traffic stop, he provided Trooper

Rowe with all requested documents, including a medical marijuana card. Id.

at 65. He noted the medical marijuana card is a photo ID, which was valid as

of the time of the traffic stop. Id. Appellant testified he produced the medical

marijuana card because, as soon as the trooper approached the vehicle, he

informed Appellant he smelled burnt marijuana. Id. at 67.

      Appellant testified that, during the traffic stop, he was “threatened” by

Trooper Rowe. Id. at 66. In this regard, Appellant testified the trooper told

him that “if [Appellant] was not going to go ahead and tell [the trooper] where

[his] medical marijuana was that [he] was going to be charged with a DUI.”

Id.

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       On cross-examination, Appellant testified he was issued a medical

marijuana card in February of 2021.        Id. at 68.    He indicated he usually

consumes his medical marijuana with the use of a “vape pen” or “almost

chewed like snuff.” Id. He indicated his medical marijuana is packaged in a

tin can, which contains a label. Id.

       On re-direct examination, Appellant indicated his marijuana use has

never left a chalky residue on his tongue. Id. at 69.

       After receiving all evidence and testimony, on October 21, 2022, the

trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. The parties stipulated to the

trial court using the suppression notes of testimony for purposes of Appellant’s

non-jury bench trial, and, on October 21, 2022, the trial court convicted

Appellant of all offenses set forth supra. Following a hearing, on November

21, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate of seventy-two hours to

six months in prison, to be followed by one year and thirty days of probation.

This   timely,   counseled   appeal    followed,   and   all   Pa.R.A.P.   1925(b)

requirements have been met.

       On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of

the Questions Involved” (verbatim):

       1. Whether the trial court erred by denying the Appellant’s
          omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, for the reason
          that the evidence was discovered during the course of a traffic
          stop, which was unlawfully extended into an “investigative
          detention” without probable cause?
       2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s
          omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress statements, for the

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          reason that the said statements were obtained while he was in
          police custody, and without giving him Miranda warnings?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers

omitted).

       In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his

pre-trial motion to suppress the physical evidence seized by Trooper Rowe.

Specifically, he avers Trooper Rowe unlawfully extended the initial stop of his

vehicle5 and/or began a new investigative detention without reasonable

suspicion.6

       Initially, we note our standard of review of the denial of a motion to

suppress evidence is as follows:

             An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a
       challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
       determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are
       supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
       from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth
       prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the
       evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for
       the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context
       of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual
       findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound
       by those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
       conclusions are erroneous. Where…the appeal of the
       determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
____________________________________________

5 Appellant does not dispute the propriety of the initial stop of his vehicle.

6 In his “Statement of the Questions Involved,” Appellant suggests probable

cause is required for an investigative detention. However, in the argument
portion of his brief, he concedes that an investigative detention needs to be
supported by reasonable suspicion, which requires a lesser quantum of
evidence than probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Chase, 599 Pa. 80,
960 A.2d 108 (2008).

                                          - 11 -
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       legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not
       binding on the appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the
       suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the
       conclusions of law of the trial court are subject to plenary review.
             Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the
       evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a
       ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress. Also, it is within the
       suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the
       credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1108 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal

quotations, original brackets, and citations omitted).

       Here, Appellant acknowledges the legality of the initial traffic stop for

his speeding violation. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-14. However, he claims

that Trooper Rowe unlawfully extended the traffic stop and/or began a new

investigative detention when he asked Appellant about the odor of burnt

marijuana emanating from Appellant’s vehicle and requested that Appellant

perform field sobriety tests. In this vein, Appellant suggests the mere odor of

burnt marijuana was insufficient to provide Trooper Rowe with the necessary

reasonable suspicion to conduct a new investigative detention, and the trooper

improperly extended the traffic stop seeking additional evidence to support a

DUI.

       We review Appellant’s issue with the following legal precepts in mind.

              During a traffic stop, the officer may ask the detainee a
       moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try
       to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s
       suspicions. [I]f there is a legitimate stop for a traffic
       violation...additional suspicion may arise before the initial stop’s
       purpose has been fulfilled; then, detention may be permissible to
       investigate the new suspicions.

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Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(quotations and quotation marks omitted).

             [T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop
      context is determined by the seizure’s “mission” - to address the
      traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related
      safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose
      of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
      that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied
      to the traffic infraction are - or reasonably should have been -
      completed.
            [The Supreme Court has] concluded that the Fourth
      Amendment tolerates certain unrelated investigations that do not
      lengthen the roadside detention. [A] traffic stop can become
      unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to
      complete the mission of issuing a warning ticket….The seizure
      remains lawful only so long as unrelated inquiries do not
      measurably extend the duration of the stop. [A police] officer, in
      other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an
      otherwise lawful traffic stop. [The police officer, however,] may
      not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable
      suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.
             Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic [citation, a
      police] officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the
      traffic stop. Typically[,] such inquiries involve checking the
      driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding
      warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s
      registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same
      objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that
      vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015) (citations,

original brackets, and some quotation marks omitted). See Commonwealth

v. Galloway, 265 A.3d 810, 814-15 (Pa.Super. 2021) (discussing Rodriguez

and holding “a police officer may use information gathered during an initial

traffic stop to justify a second investigatory detention, regardless of whether

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the officer has indicated at some point during the initial stop that the subject

is free to leave”); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142 (Pa.Super. 2021)

(discussing Rodriguez).

       The “new detention” must be supported by reasonable suspicion. See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848 (Pa.Super. 2007).

              To establish grounds for “reasonable suspicion”…the officer
       must articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
       reasonable inferences derived from these observations, led him
       reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
       activity was afoot and the person he stopped was involved in that
       activity.
              In order to determine whether the police officer had
       reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be
       considered. In making this determination, we must give due
       weight...to the specific reasonable inferences [the police officer]
       is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also,
       the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to
       an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
       conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when
       taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
       officer.

Id. at 852 (quotation marks and quotations omitted).

       Recently,    this   Court     held      as    follows   in   Commonwealth   v.

Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 9–10 (Pa.Super. 2022):

             Historically, Pennsylvania courts have held the smell of
       marijuana alone was sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion
       of criminal activity. However, after the passage of the Medical
       Marijuana Act (“MMA”)[7] and legalization of medical marijuana in
       the Commonwealth, our Supreme Court revisited this issue.
            In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 652 Pa. 353, 208 A.3d 916
       (2019), our Supreme Court held that “conduct in which hundreds
____________________________________________

7 35 P.S. § 10231.101 et seq.

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       of thousands of Pennsylvanians are licensed to engage lawfully”
       is, on its own, “an insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion that
       criminal activity is afoot.” Hicks, supra, 208 A.3d at 945.
               Further, in [Commonwealth v.] Barr, [___ Pa. ___, 266
       A.3d 25 (2021)], our Supreme Court recognized that although
       “the MMA makes abundantly clear that marijuana no longer is per
       se illegal in this Commonwealth[,]” the possession of marijuana is
       still illegal under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
       Cosmetic Act[8] “for those not qualified under the MMA.” Barr,
       supra, 266 A.3d at 41. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in
       Barr that “the odor of marijuana may be a factor, but not a stand-
       alone one, in evaluating the totality of the circumstances for
       purposes of determining whether police had probable cause to
       conduct a warrantless search.” Id. In so holding, the Supreme
       Court explained:
              We emphasize that the realization that a particular
              factor contributing to probable cause may involve
              legal conduct does not render consideration of the
              factor per se impermissible, so long as the factor is
              considered along with other factors that, in
              combination, suggest that criminal activity is afoot.
              [T]he      totality-of-the-circumstances     analysis
              encompasses the consideration of factors that may
              arguably be innocent in nature.
       Id. at 41-42.
             This Court has had the opportunity to apply the Hicks and
       Barr decisions to various cases. In Commonwealth v. Dabney,
       274 A.3d 1283, 1289 (Pa.Super. 2022), we assumed, arguendo,
       that Barr applies to a determination of reasonable suspicion for
       an investigative detention, and we held that the officer could
       consider the odor of raw marijuana, as well as other factors, in
       making that determination. In Commonwealth v. Lomax, No.
       470 MDA 2021, 2022 WL 439087 (Pa.Super. filed Feb. 14, 2022)
       (unpublished memorandum),[9] we held the smell of fresh
       marijuana cannot objectively suggest anything more than
____________________________________________

8 35 P.S. §§ 780-101-144.

9  In Cunningham, we noted that, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), non-
precedential decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for
their persuasive value.

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       possession of a substance that many Pennsylvanians can legally
       possess. Therefore, we concluded that it cannot, on its own,
       establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate an
       investigative detention.
             More recently, in Commonwealth v. Felder, No. 1082
       MDA 2021, 2022 WL 3210181 (Pa.Super. filed Aug. 9, 2022)
       (unpublished memorandum), we recognized the MMA does not
       permit the smoking of marijuana; therefore, the police’s
       knowledge that the defendant had paraphernalia for smoking
       marijuana gave the officer reason to believe the marijuana was
       being used illegally. Also, in Commonwealth v. Mercedes, No.
       1275 MDA 2021, 2022 WL 4392687 (Pa.Super. filed Sept. 23,
       2022) (unpublished memorandum), we again recognized the MMA
       does not permit the smoking of marijuana. See 35 P.S. §
       10231.304(b) (“It is unlawful to: (1) Smoke medical marijuana.”).
             Accordingly, we held the police had reasonable suspicion
       that marijuana was being illegally smoked when they smelled
       burnt marijuana and observed the defendant or his companion
       smoking a cigarillo. See Mercedes, supra.

Cunningham, 287 A.3d at 9-10 (footnotes added).10

       In the case sub judice, in finding no merit to Appellant’s suppression

issue, the trial court concluded that, during the valid traffic stop for speeding

and before the initial stop’s purpose had been fulfilled, additional suspicion

arose that Appellant was DUI such that Trooper Rowe legally detained

Appellant to investigate the new suspicions. See Trial Court Opinion, filed

____________________________________________

10 In Cunningham, we held a police officer had reasonable suspicion to
conduct an investigatory detention where he smelled burnt marijuana, which
grew stronger as he approached the defendant who was walking down the
street, the defendant crossed the street in an effort to evade the officer, and
when the officer asked to talk to the defendant, he became aggressive toward
the officer and shouted profanities.

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10/21/22, at 9-10.      Specifically, the trial court relevantly indicated the

following:

             [Whether an officer has] reasonable suspicion of criminal
      activity must be determined by examining the totality of the
      circumstances....To the extent that the vehicle stop turned into a
      [new] investigatory detention, there was reasonable suspicion
      [that arose before the initial stop’s purpose had been fulfilled].
      There was more than just the odor of marijuana. In addition to
      having witnessed the speeding, and the improper initial stop by
      the center median, Trooper Rowe, whom the [trial] court found to
      be a credible witness, noticed that [Appellant’s] eyes were
      bloodshot and glassy and that his speech was slurred and slow.
      As an officer with his experience level, [Trooper] Rowe knew that
      these were physical indicators of someone who is under the
      influence of a controlled substance. Immediately after obtaining
      [Appellant’s] driver and vehicle information, Trooper Rowe
      inquired as to the location of the marijuana [Appellant] had been
      smoking. [Appellant] gestured toward the metal tin on the
      passenger seat and admitted that he had consumed marijuana
      two hours before.       Based upon Trooper Rowe’s warranted
      suspicions, he asked [Appellant] to exit his vehicle and walk to the
      front of the patrol car to perform field sobriety tests. These
      resulted in even more observable indicators that [Appellant] was
      under the influence of a controlled substance.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/21/22, at 10 (citation omitted).

      We find no abuse of discretion or error of law. Specifically, as the trial

court found, when Trooper Rowe initiated the traffic stop for the speeding

violation, he noticed Appellant did not safely pull his vehicle over to the right-

side berm of the road; but rather, he stopped against the cement barrier on

the left-hand side, resulting in part of his vehicle being in the left-hand lane.

Appellant was able to follow the trooper’s instructions to pull off to a safer

location on a nearby side road; however, he stopped his vehicle more in the

middle of the road as opposed to on the berm.

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      Thereafter, as the trooper approached Appellant (the driver and sole

occupant), for the purpose of issuing a citation for speeding, he smelled the

odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. As this Court recognized

in Cunningham, the MMA does not permit the smoking of medical marijuana.

Thereafter, within the context of the “mission” of the initial traffic stop,

Trooper Rowe asked Appellant for his driver’s license, registration, and proof

of insurance. See Rodriquez, supra; Galloway, supra; Malloy, supra.

During this exchange, Trooper Rowe noticed Appellant’s speech was slow and

slurred, and additionally, Appellant’s eyes were red, bloodshot, teary, and

glossy. Trooper Rowe recognized these to be signs of intoxication from a

controlled substance.

      Accordingly, we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances,

and before the initial stop’s purpose had been fulfilled, reasonable suspicion

arose such that Trooper Rowe was permitted to investigate his new suspicions

of DUI, including asking Appellant about his marijuana use and administering

field sobriety tests. See Harris, supra. Thus, we agree with the trial court

that there is no merit to Appellant’s first suppression claim.

      In his final issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his

pre-trial motion to suppress his statements, which he made to Trooper Rowe.

Specifically, Appellant avers he was subjected to custodial interrogation when

Trooper Rowe asked him “where the marijuana was,” and, thus, since

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Appellant did not receive his Miranda11 warnings prior to the question,

Appellant’s statements made thereafter should have been suppressed. N.T.,

5/9/22, at 27.

       This Court has explained:

              Statements made during custodial interrogation are
       presumptively involuntary, unless the accused is first advised of
       Miranda rights. Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated
       by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
       custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
       significant way.    The Miranda safeguards come into play
       whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
       questioning or its functional equivalent.       Thus, interrogation
       occurs where the police should know that their words or actions
       are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
       suspect.     In evaluating whether Miranda warnings were
       necessary, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.
             Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes
       depends on whether the person is physically denied of his freedom
       of action in any significant way[,] or is placed in a situation in
       which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or
       movement is restricted by the interrogation. Moreover, the test
       for custodial interrogation does not depend upon the subjective
       intent of the law enforcement officer interrogator. Rather, the test
       focuses on whether the individual being interrogated reasonably
       believes his freedom of action is being restricted.
             Said another way, police detentions become custodial when,
       under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or
       duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the
       functional equivalent of arrest. Thus, the ultimate inquiry for
       determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda
       purposes is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on
       freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
       arrest.

____________________________________________

11 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 887-88 (Pa.Super. 2009)

(citations, ellipses, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).

      We have further stated:

      The usual traffic stop constitutes an investigative rather than a
      custodial detention, unless, under the totality of the
      circumstances, the conditions and duration of the detention
      become the functional equivalent of arrest. Since an ordinary
      traffic stop is typically brief in duration and occurs in public view,
      such a stop is not custodial for Miranda purposes.

Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 202 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc)

(citations omitted). “An ordinary traffic stop becomes ‘custodial’ when the

stop involves coercive conditions, including, but not limited to, the suspect

being forced into a patrol car and transported from the scene or being

physically restrained.” Id. (citation omitted). To determine whether the

conditions of the detention are the functional equivalent of an arrest, the court

considers, “the basis for the detention; its length; its location; whether the

suspect was transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether

restraints were used; whether the law enforcement officer showed, threatened

or used force; and the investigative methods employed to confirm or dispel

suspicions.” Id. at 200.

      In the case sub judice, in rejecting Appellant’s claim, the trial court

relevantly held as follows:

             [Appellant] was interrogated, but he was never in custody
      [prior to the trooper questioning him about the marijuana]. When
      he made the inculpatory statements about possessing marijuana,
      he had neither been placed in the patrol car nor removed from the
      traffic stop. He was sitting in his vehicle, complying with the

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      statutory obligations imposed on drivers who violate the Motor
      Vehicle Code. The length of time he was interacting with the
      trooper was of short duration. He was never restrained [prior to
      the trooper questioning him about the marijuana] nor was he
      subjected to threats of use of force. Thus, [Appellant] was not
      entitled to the panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda, and
      his statements [were properly] not excluded.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/21/22, at 12.

      We find no abuse of discretion or error of law. Specifically, as the trial

court determined, under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant was not

in custody, or the functional equivalent thereof, when the trooper asked him

about the marijuana.     See Mannion, supra. Trooper Rowe testified that,

during the traffic stop, he asked Appellant about the marijuana as soon as he

received Appellant’s driver’s license and registration.     Id.   At this time,

Appellant was still seated in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, and the trooper’s

questions were brief.    Id. Moreover, Trooper Rowe testified he made no

threats and did not display his weapon. Id.

      Simply put, the trooper’s question about the marijuana occurred during

the course of an ordinary traffic stop, which was an investigative detention,

and not at a time when the conditions/duration of the investigative detention

became the functional equivalent of an arrest. Id. Accordingly, we agree with

the trial court that Appellant’s statements about the marijuana were not

procured in violation of Miranda.

      For all of the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to Appellant’s

suppression issues. Accordingly, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

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     Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2023

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