Court Opinion

ID: 9847894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:09:26.176572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:43.629216
License: Public Domain

Eberhardt, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.  While mention is made in the majority opinion of the verdict on a former trial going out with the jury, and we have held a number of times that it is the better practice to cover or remove former verdicts, yet these rulings are based upon a request made to the court by a party desiring its deletion. Russell v. Brunswick Gro. Co., 120 Ga. 38 (3) (47 SE 528); Ellard v. State, 46 Ga. App. 345 (167 SE 724). A mere inadvertent sending out of the former verdict to the jury along with the pleadings, etc., will not be ground for reversal unless it appears thát the jury read the verdict and were influenced thereby (Fulton County v. Phillips, 91 Ga. 65 (1) (16 SE 260)), nor will it be ground for reversal if the court had instructed the jury to disregard the former verdict. Dawson v. Briscoe, 97 Ga. 408 (2) (24 SE 157). Nothing in this record indicates a request on the court, timely made, for a covering or removal of the former verdict.
There was no competent evidence as to the cost of repairing plaintiff’s broken teeth. Her testimony that an unidentified doctor had said that it would probably cost around $500 was both indefinite and hearsay, and without probative value. Martin v. Alford, 214 Ga. 4, 8 (102 SE2d 598).
Likewise, there was no evidence of any arrangement made by the plaintiff and her sister and brother-in-law concerning pay for the care of her child while she was in the hospital. There is no presumption of an implied promise to pay for such services. Mathews v. McCorkle, 111 Ga. App. 310 (2) (141 SE2d 597). There must have been an intention on the part of all of them that payment would be made, *315and it does not appear. As to herself, plaintiff testified that she had no arrangement with her sister and brother-in-law to pay for the child care and that he had "just told me that I owed him $5.00 a day for keeping the baby.” That is at most a unilateral intention on his part.
There was enough proof to make a jury question on the matter of loss of earnings, but the proof is weak. She testified that she had resigned from her job during the day prior to the accident, but had intended to take another with a drive-in at $50 per week. There was no rebuttal from the management of the drive-in.
There is evidence in the record from which the jury might well very well have concluded that the plaintiff had been independently negligent in getting into the car of her brother-in-law when she knew that he had been drinking alcoholic beverages. That negligence, if the jury had so found, would have justified a finding that she had not been in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety, and would thus have denied her any recovery. Howard v. Georgia R. &c. Co., 35 Ga. App. 273 (1) (133 SE 57); Lazar v. Black & White Cab Co., 50 Ga. App. 567 (3) (179 SE 250); Accord: Eddleman v. Askew, 50 Ga. App. 540 (2) (179 SE 247); Russell v. Bayne, 45 Ga. App. 55, 56 (163 SE 290); Crandall v. Sammons, 62 Ga. App. 1 (1) (7 SE2d 575); Longino v. Moore, 53 Ga. App. 674, 675 (187 SE 203).
But this independent negligence of the guest (not imputed negligence) may not be used as comparative negligence against the driver of the other vehicle involved unless it appeared that it was at least a part of the proximate cause of the event which brought about her injury.
In my view we should apply the ruling made in Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151, 164, and particularly in Georgia Northern R. Co. v. Battle, 22 Ga. App. 665 (1) (97 SE 94); Chalker v. Raley, 73 Ga. App. 415 (37 SE2d 160), where it was recognized that the jury is authorized to place a lower value upon the damages than may be shown by a party’s proof.
I concur in the judgment only.