Court Opinion

ID: 9531436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:10:55.280581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:26.850879
License: Public Domain

*349Concurring Opinión
Achor, J.
As stated in the majority opinion, the only question reserved by the appellant for consideration of this court is whether loss of profits realized from property appropriated by condemnation is a proper element to be considered in determining the amount of damages recoverable by appellants because of such appropriation.
It is my opinion that loss of profits is not an element of damages properly to be considered under such circumstances, notwithstanding language to the contrary in the.case of State v. Stabb (1948), 226 Ind. 319, 79 N. E. 2d 392. My opinion is grounded upon several reasons:
1. The historical circumstances which apparently gave rise to the amendment of the statute by the addition of the fourth clause thereof [Bums Ind. Stat. Anno. §3-1706 (1946 Repl.)], as enacted in 1905, support this conclusion. The statute, as amended, which now prescribes the method of determining damages in condemnation proceedings, reads as follows:
“First. The fair market value of each parcel of property sought to be appropriated, and the value of each separate estate or interest therein;
Second. The fair market value of all improvements pertaining to the realty, if any, on the portion of the real estate to be condemned;
Third. The damages, if any, to the residue of the land of such owner or owners to be caused by taking out the part sought to be appropriated;
Fourth. Such other damages, if any, as will result to any persons or corporation from the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.”
Prior to the enactment of the fourth clause to the above statute in 1905, this court, in a series of decisions, held that there could be no recovery for damages *350to uncondemned private property which resulted from nonnegligent construction of streets, drains and sewers, or other public improvements. See: Town of Princeton v. Gieske (1883), 93 Ind. 102; Cummins v. City of Seymour (1881), 79 Ind. 491; City of Valparaiso v. Hagen (1899), 153 Ind. 337, 54 N. E. 1062. However, the enactment of clause four appears to express a clear legislative intention that thereafter compensation should be paid to any persons whose property was damaged as the result of some public construction without regard to whether any of his land was taken or not and even though the construction was completed as proposed— that is without regard to any negligence in such construction. This court so construed this clause of the act in the case of State v. Ahaus (1945), 223 Ind. 629, 63 N. E. 2d 199.
The statute uses the phrase “Such other damages, if any, as will result . . . from the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed ...” It is argued that the term “such other damages,” justifies the allowance of damages for loss of profits, good will, etc., from the operation of the business affected. However, the term had a fixed legal meaning at the time which excluded losses of profits, good will or business as damnum absque injuria. See: 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, §13.3, pp. 441-42 (4th Ed. 1962). We must assume that the legislature, when it adopted this clause of the statute, intended that the term “damages” have its accepted legal meaning and it should be so construed by this court. Gross Income Tax Div. v. Colpaert Realty Corp. (1952), 231 Ind. 463, 109 N. E. 2d 415; 26 I. L. E. Statutes, §117, pp. 321-22.
2. The clear and accepted definition of the words used in the fourth clause do not authorize the recovery of damages for loss of good will or business profits en*351joyed on the land appropriated. The fourth clause provides in part for:
"... damages, if any, as will result. . . from the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed...”
Significantly, it does not provide for damages resulting from the condemnation or appropriation of the property, but, rather, damages “as will result” (future tense) from the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed. The word construction has a clear and distinct meaning as contrasted with the words condemnation or appropriation, which was all that was done in the instant case. Construction is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary as follows:
“2 a: the act of putting parts together to form a complete integrated object: Fabrication; b (1): the form or manner in which something has been put together: Design...”
Thus, damages were properly allowed under this provision of the statute in the case of State v. Ahaus, supra (223 Ind. 629, 63 N. E. 2d 199), where lands not appropriated were flooded by reason of the construction of the dam as proposed. However, in this case which involved the demolition of properties in a slum clearance project, no “construction” was involved which thereafter resulted in damage to appellant’s property.
3. It is stated in State v. Stabb, supra (226 Ind. 319, 79 N. E. 2d 392), that a provision similar to that here under discussion which appears in statutes of other states has been liberally construed, leaving the inference that in such states damages for loss of good will, profits or business have been considered proper elements of damage. In support of this proposition the Stabb case cites the cases of Mitchell v. United States (1924), 267 U. S. 341, 69 L. Ed. 644, 45 S. Ct. 293, and City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co. (1915), *352171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705. However, my investigation of these and other cases does not support the conclusion reached in the Stabb case, supra. I find no state in which damages for loss of good will and profits from the operation of a business have been allowed, except and unless a particular statute of that state expressly authorizes such damages. See: Florida Statutes Anno. (1963 Supp.), §73.10(4); see also: 19 Vermont Statutes Anno. §221 (2).
4. The general rule which denies the recovery of damages for loss of good will and business profits, except as expressly authorized by statute, is supported by many substantial reasons: (1) Only the land and improvements thereon are taken by the condemning authority; (2) the good will of business involved and the business ability and personality of the proprietor of that business, which are primary factors in both the amount of business and profits realized therefrom, remain with the proprietor even though the situs of the business is taken. See: 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, §13.31, pp. 452-53, 455 (3rd Ed. 1962); 1 Orgel on Valuation under Eminent Domain §155, p. 646 (2nd Ed. 1953).
We judically know that in many instances the proprietors of businesses, when the properties in which their businesses are operated are taken, relocate such businesses in equal or better locations and continue to enjoy the good will and reputation of their former businesses.
Because personality, business ability and good will created in business play so large a part in determining its value, this court, in the case of Hagemann et al. v. City of Mount Vernon et al. (1958), 238 Ind. 613, 154 N. E. 2d 33 (which superseded the Stabb case, supra), held that loss of business profits was too speculative an item to be considered in determining damages in *353the condemnation proceedings. This decision is in accord with other established authority on the subject. See: United States v. Petty Motor Co. (1946), 327 U. S. 372, 66 S. Ct. 596; Boston Belting Co. v. City of Boston (1903), 183 Mass. 254, 67 N. E. 428; 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain §162; 18 Am. Jur. Eminent Domain §§259, 261.
For these reasons, I would restrict the rule of the case of State v. Stabb, supra, to the facts which were actually before the court, to-wit: That evidence of the volume of business may be admitted to prove the suitability of the property for a particular purpose, but for no other purpose.
Note. — Reported in 204 N. E. 2d 857.