Court Opinion

ID: 9948596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 17:09:32.016953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:31:00.595014
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion IS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JAMEL JACQKEY GIBBS, | No. 83672
Appellant,

vs - FILED

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent. | MAR 07 202 .
CLERF Of; SUG AE URT

Y
ee DEPUTY CLERK

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Eighth
Judicial District Court, Clark County; Tierra Danielle Jones, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Law Office of Jeannie N. Hua, Inc., and Jeannie N. Hua, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
Attorney, and Taleen R. Pandukht, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, LEE, and BELL, Ju.

OPINION

By the Court, BELL, J.:
While in pretrial detention, Appellant Jamel Jacqkey Gibbs
spoke with a defense investigator on a recorded phone line. At trial, the

State admitted the recording into evidence over Gibbs’s objection that the

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conversation was privileged. The trial court found that the conversation
was not protected by attorney-client privilege because Gibbs violated jail
policy by using another detainee’s telephone access code and made a three-
way call to connect to his investigator. In this opinion, we examine whether
the district court erred in finding Gibbs waived the attorney-client privilege.
We conclude that a defendant’s call to a defense investigator that is routed
through a three-way call is, alone, insufficient to establish waiver of the
attorney-client privilege absent a showing that the third party remained
present during the conversation. Further, we cannot conclude that
violation of jail telephone policies operates as a waiver of attorney-client
privilege. Accordingly, the district court erred in admitting the recorded
phone call. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse the judgment

of conviction and remand for further proceedings. !
BACKGROUND

The State charged Jamel Gibbs with fatally shooting Jaylon
Tiffith in the driveway of an apartment complex. Gibbs pleaded not guilty
to the charges, and the case was set for trial. The record unambiguously
reflects that defense counsel planned to focus the defense at trial on
mistaken identity and undermine the single witness who identified Gibbs
as the shooter.

While in pretrial detention, Gibbs placed several phone calls
using another inmate's access code. Gibbs called a third party, who then

employed three-way calling to connect Gibbs to the intended receiver.

1Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted in this appeal. Further, because we are reversing on the
ground stated, we need not decide the remaining issues raised in this
appeal.

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During one of these calls, Gibbs spoke with a defense investigator and
discussed details of the case that indicated Gibbs was present at the time of
the shooting. The State moved to admit this recording at trial. Gibbs
objected on the basis that the recorded conversation was protected by
attorney-client privilege. The district court admitted the recording,
concluding that Gibbs waived attorney-client privilege because he violated
jail phone policies by using another detainee’s access code and using three-
way calling.

In addition to this evidence, Tiffith’s cousin, Brionta Terrell,
identified Gibbs as the shooter after viewing a photograph on social media.
Another witness saw the shooting while driving by the apartment complex
but was unable to positively identify the shooter.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Gibbs of second-

degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

The district court abused its discretion in admitting the recorded phone call
between Gibbs and a defense investigator

Gibbs argues that the district court erred in admitting the
recording of the phone call between Gibbs and the defense investigator
because the conversation was protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Decisions regarding the admission of evidence lie within the district court’s
discretion and will not be disturbed absent a showing that the district court
abused that discretion. Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106,
109 (2008). Such an abuse “occurs if the district court’s decision is arbitrary
or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason.” Crawford v. State,
121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005) Gnternal quotation marks
omitted). When the district court’s exercise of discretion relies upon

findings of fact, those findings “are given deference and will not be set aside

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unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence.”
Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 1386 Nev. 247, 251, 464 P.3d 114, 119
(2020).

The attorney-client privilege protects against disclosure of
confidential communications between a defendant and the defendant’s
attorney or a representative of the attorney. See NRS 49.095(1).
Confidential communications are “not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services.” NRS 49.055. Attorney-client
privilege, like all evidentiary privileges, is “not designed or intended to
assist the fact-finding process.” Diaz v. Highth Jud. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 88,
98, 993 P.2d 50, 57 (2000). Rather, the purpose of this privilege is to
“encourage clients to make full disclosures to their attorneys in order to
promote the broader public interests of recognizing the importance of fully
informed advocacy in the administration of justice.” Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 369, 374, 399 P.3d 334, 341 (2017); see Diaz,
116 Nev. at 98, 993 P.2d at 57 (recognizing that evidentiary “privileges are
justified by the publics interest in encouraging socially useful
communications and by certain notions of legitimate privacy expectations’).

For the attorney-client privilege to apply, “the communications
must be between an attorney and client, for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services, and be confidential.” Wynn Resorts,
133 Nev. at 374, 399 P.3d at 341. The attorney-client privilege encompasses
communications with a representative of the attorney, which, here, would
include a defense investigator. See NRS 49.055 (recognizing that
confidential communications include disclosures to parties necessary to

render legal services); NRS 49.085 (“Representative of the lawyer’ means a

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person employed by the lawyer to assist in the rendition of professional legal
services.”); United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 802 (9th Cir. 2015)
(protecting communications with third party acting as counsel’s agent when
communications were necessary for advising and defending client),
abrogated on other grounds by Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443
(2017). A defendant who asserts a privilege bears the burden of showing
that the evidence is privileged and that the defendant has not waived that
privilege. Canarelli, 136 Nev. at 252, 464 P.3d at 120; see also United States
v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a party
asserting privilege must “establish all the elements of the privilege,”
including that it has not been waived); Lowen v. Twedt, 236 F.R.D. 502, 506
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (“A person asserting attorney-client privilege has the
burden of persuasion as to all elements of the privilege, including an
affirmative showing of non-waiver....”). The privilege “should be
interpreted and applied narrowly.” Canarelli, 136 Nev. at 252, 464 P.3d at
120 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court was persuaded that Gibbs’s communications
were not privileged, or that he had waived any privilege, because he
connected his call to the investigator using three-way calling and violated
the detention center’s rules by using another inmate’s access code. We do
not agree.

First, we cannot say that Gibbs’s violation of the detention
center's rules prohibiting using another inmate’s telephone access code
resulted in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Attorney-client
privilege belongs to the client and may only be waived by the client. NRS
49.105(1). The analysis focuses entirely on whether the client intended—

either explicitly or implicitly—to waive the attorney-client privilege.

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Violation of a jail policy alone does not inform the analysis of whether a
defendant intended for an attorney-client conversation to be confidential or
whether the privilege is waived.

Second, we cannot conclude, based on the record before us, that
use of three-way calling alone resulted in waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. Absent a waiver, the communication between Gibbs and the
defense investigator was a confidential communication protected by
attorney-client privilege. The investigator's role was to assist counsel in
preparing a legal defense for Gibbs, and Gibbs’s communications with him
concerned Gibbs’s whereabouts at the time of the shooting, a matter that
was material to his defense.

The record does not indicate that the three-way calling method
used by Gibbs to communicate with the investigator rendered the
conversation nonconfidential. Generally, communications between a client
and counsel in the presence of a third party lack confidentiality. Nev. Tax
Comm’n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 134, 310 P.2d 852, 862 (1957), superseded on
other grounds by statute as stated in M & R Inv. Co. v. Nev. Gaming
Comm’n, 93 Nev. 35, 35, 559 P.2d 829, 830 (1977). The presence of a third
party implies that the client did not intend the communication to be
confidential. See NRS 49.055 (“A communication is ‘confidential’ if it 1s not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to
the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communication.”); Wardleigh v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 111 Nev. 345, 353,
891 P.2d 1180, 1185 (1995) (recognizing that the presence of people who
were not represented clients indicates an intent that a meeting with counsel

is not confidential). Here, though, nothing in the record shows a third party

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listened to or participated in the call. Gibbs called a third party who then
made a three-way call to connect Gibbs to the investigator. Although a third
party was used to connect the call, the transcript of the call does not indicate
that the third party listened to or participated in the conversation with the
investigator.

No other evidence in the record indicates that the third party
remained on the call, either actively listening to the conversation or
passively remaining in earshot of the conversation, see Rogers v. State, 717
S.E.2d 629, 632 (Ga. 2011) (considering whether evidence showed that third
party to attorney-client conference call ceased to listen to call to determine
that party’s presence); see also Manley v. State, 115 Nev. 114, 120, 979 P.2d
703, 707 (1999) (holding that disclosure of some contents of communication
between client and counsel operates as waiver of privilege regarding entire
communication), as opposed to merely connecting the call and either placing
down the handset or disconnecting from the other parties, see Lisle v. State,
113 Nev. 679, 701, 941 P.2d 459, 474 (1997) (holding that merely informing
third party that communication between client and counsel occurred does
not waive privilege regarding conversation), overruled on other grounds by
Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1117 n.9, 968 P.2d 296, 315 n.9 (1998).
Because some telecommunication carriers permit the host of a three-way
call to disconnect and leave the remaining parties connected, see, e.g.,
AT&T, Use Three-Way Calling, http://att.com/support/article/u-verse-voice/
KM1064301/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2024); Xfinity, Use the Three-Way Calling
Feature with Xfinity Voice, http://xfinity.com/support/articles/3-way-calling
(last visited Feb. 21, 2024), the host may have even completely disconnected

after the investigator joined the call.

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The district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to gather
any additional evidence regarding the waiver issue. Given the absence of
information in the record, we cannot conclude that substantial evidence
supports the district court’s finding that Gibbs waived the attorney-client
privilege. See Canarelli, 136 Nev. at 251, 464 P.3d at 119. Thus, we
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
Gibbs’s conversation with the investigator was not protected by the
attorney-client privilege.

The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

The State contends that even if the district court abused its
discretion in admitting the recorded phone call, that error is harmless. “Any
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded.” NRS 178.598. The error here involves the
admission of evidence protected by attorney-client privilege. Because the
error intrudes upon the right to counsel, we can conclude that the error was
harmless only if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Manley, 115 Nev. at 121-23, 979 P.2d at 707-09 (evaluating the improper
admission of evidence in violation of attorney-client privilege for harmless
error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). We cannot
conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here, defense counsel planned a mistaken identity defense and
planned to undermine the single witness who identified Gibbs as the
shooter. No evidence suggested that the witness had met Gibbs before.
After the shooting, the witness used social media to help identify Gibbs at
the scene, demonstrating a lack of familiarity with Gibbs. While the

remaining evidence tying Gibbs to the offense may have been sufficient to

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support a conviction, the evidence was not overwhelming. The evidence at
trial showed no weapon was recovered that could be matched to the casing
left at the scene, the projectile recovered during the autopsy, or the
ammunition recovered from Gibbs’s girlfriend’s apartment. Although the
ammunition recovered from the girlfriend’s apartment was the same brand
and caliber as the casing found at the scene, no forensic evidence was
introduced to suggest a more compelling connection. Gibbs’s statements to
the investigator conceded that Gibbs was present during the shooting. This
evidence directly undermined the theory of defense and necessitated a
change in strategy at the start of trial; therefore, we cannot conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that its admission was harmless. See Carr v. State, 96
Nev. 238, 239-40, 607 P.2d 114, 116 (1980) (concluding that erroneous
admission of hearsay that “directly undermined the defense’s theory of the

case” was not harmless).

CONCLUSION

The district court abused its discretion in admitting a recording
of a phone call between Gibbs and his defense investigator. In reaching this
determination, we conclude that a jail rule violation in and of itself does not
support a finding that the attorney-client privilege was waived. Further,
while we agree that the presence of a third party during a conversation may
waive the privilege, the limited record here does not support such a finding.

Because the conversation was privileged and the admission of the phone

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call was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse the judgment
of conviction and remand for a new trial.
, J.
Bell C/¥7
We concur:
Ab oi-L ,
Stiglich
J.
Lee Yi?
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