Court Opinion

ID: 9480819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:59:43.213206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:56.095242
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
I disagree with the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that the District Court had no basis for concluding that defendant Humes joined in defendant White’s motion for a mistrial. I reach this conclusion for three reasons. First, the prejudicial information against which the objection was made directly implicated Humes’ right to a fair trial and, in fact, may have been more prejudicial to Humes than White:
Question (Assistant United States Attorney): And when you were serving that search warrant, did you expect there to be a person in the house with a pistol?
Answer (Witness): Yes, we did.
Question: Did you — Was it not expected that Cardine Humes would be there?
Mr. Duke (Counsel for defendant White): Your Honor, may we approach the bench?
The direct implication of these questions is that the law enforcement official expected to find Humes at the house and expected to find him with a gun. Although it was in fact White who was found with the gun, both were charged with the possession of a firearm during a drug offense. Humes’ counsel’s silence could reasonably be assumed to indicate he joined in any objection to these statements and the need for a mistrial.
Second, and more importantly, in the bench conference Humes’ attorney made no effort to object to the calling of a mistrial in both cases. Although Humes now asserts that there was no time to lodge such an objection, the facts undercut such an assertion. It is true that the bench conference was a short one. Nevertheless, the Assistant United States Attorney against whom the court was venting its frustration did have time to ask the court the basis for its decision to grant a mistrial. It is difficult to understand how a defense attorney who desired to avoid a mistrial and with whom the court was not angry would have less of an opportunity to lodge his objection than the Assistant United States Attorney.
Finally, even after the mistrial was announced to the jury, Humes’ attorney could have requested that his case be severed from White’s and continue in front of the same jury. Since it was inevitable that the jury learn of the mistrial, I see no possible harm to Humes from having the court announce a mistrial in both cases and then later change the ruling to allow Humes’ case to continue. In light of these facts, I conclude that the “circumstances positively indicate [Humes’] willingness to acquiesce in the order.” Jones v. Hogg, 732 F.2d 53, 57 (6th Cir.1984).1
Furthermore, even were I to concur in the majority’s conclusion that Humes did not affirmatively join in the mistrial, I believe that his conviction should be affirmed under the “manifest necessity” test. In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510-14, 98 S.Ct. 824, 832-35, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978), the Court held that a judge’s decision to order a mistrial is entitled to great respect when the mistrial is occasioned by the improper and prejudicial remarks of one of the trial attorneys. In Washington, the Court declined to overturn a defendant’s subsequent conviction on double jeopardy grounds where the trial court declared a mistrial on the motion of the prosecutor during a previous trial. The mistrial had been granted because the defendant’s attorney made comments prejudicial to the prosecution in his opening statements to the jury. The Court noted that “[njeither party has a right to have his case decided by a jury which may be tainted by bias.” Id. at 516, 98 S.Ct. at 835. To protect the public’s interest in the fair administration of justice, the Court concluded that it was *756necessary to “accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge’s evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected by the improper comment.” Id. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 833. A trial court’s decision to call a mistrial should only be reversed if “a trial judge acts irrationally or irresponsibly” or otherwise acts outside his or her “sound discretion.” Id. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 834.2 On this record, I cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in calling a mistrial.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse Cardine Humes’ conviction.

. Even if the majority has some question about Humes’ acquiescence in the mistrial, the appropriate course is to remand for an evidentiary hearing on this issue, not to presume that Humes opposed the mistrial.

. Nor can the sufficiency of the record be challenged solely because the District Court did not analyze the case specifically in terms of the manifest necessity test articulated in Arizona v. Washington. The Court in that case specifically noted that it was sufficient that an adequate record existed from which the Court could discern the basis of the trial court’s decision to grant the mistrial. Id. at 516-17, 98 S.Ct. at 835-36.