Court Opinion

ID: 9720226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:21:17.627194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:14.359250
License: Public Domain

Peterson, Justice
(dissenting).
I concur in affirming that part of the trial court’s order enjoining the municipality from awarding the contract to Motorola, Inc., the high bidder.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the reversal of that part of the trial court’s order directing that the defendant municipality'issue a contract to the low bidder, plaintiff Electronics Unlimited, Inc. The majority opinion proceeds from the proposition that the municipality, both by statute and by the express reservation of a right to reject any and all bids, in any and all circumstances retains a residual discretion with which a court may not interfere. Proceeding from the equally valid proposition that discretion is neither limitless nor endless, I reach a contrary conclusion in the particular circumstances of this case.
As we stated in Coller v. City of St. Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 387, 26 N. W. (2d) 835, 841, “[t]he very purpose of requiring competitive bidding is to divest the officials having the power to let contracts of discretion in some respects and to limit its exercise in others.” It is the abuse of discretion in the letting of public contracts at which the statute is aimed, including favoritism or extravagance. The statutory limitations are of such great importance to taxpayers that, as cautioned in Coller (223 Minn. 388, 26 N. W. [2d] 842), they “should receive a construction always which will fully, fairly, and reasonably effectuate and advance, their true intent and purpose, and which will avoid the likelihood of their being circumvented, evaded, or defeated.”
It is generally consistent with the .statutory policy for the municipality to reserve a right reasonably to reject all bids. Where the municipality, as a matter of discretion, determines not to proceed with a project or where it determines, after receiving bids, that the cost of the project exceeds the resources *127that it wishes to commit to it, the public interest is served. Where, however, as in the particular circumstances of this case, there is no objective reason for rejecting the low bid,1 the public interest is not served and the statutory purpose may be subverted. The municipality should not, under such reservation of the right of rejection, be permitted to reject the lowest responsible bidder for no reason or for reasons inconsistent with the statute.
The particular circumstances of this case indicate to me that the municipality had exhausted its discretion. It had determined to purchase the radio equipment for which it had solicited bids. It had not determined to reject all bids for any reason of excessive price. It obviously was not undertaking to avoid litigation. The only act that remained was to determine upon the lowest responsible bidder. Even to the extent that that determination involved any discretion, the trial court found that its action was an abuse of discretion and contrary to statute. Clearly, therefore, all that remained was the nondiscretionary act of awarding the contract to the low bidder.
Permitting the municipality to reject the low bid is, in the circumstances of this case, not required by the statute. Worse, in my view, it tends to frustrate the salutary purpose of competitive bidding for public contracts. It is, of course, well established that the statute was enacted for the benefit of the public, not the bidder. This does not mean, however, that the low bidder is without interest or standing to compel compliance with the statute. As a practical matter, if the thwarted low bidder is, in these cir*128eumstances, denied the award of a contract, enforcement of the statute may be substantially impaired. A mere denial of an award to a competitor is scant solace for the litigant. Although not on all fours, there is an analogy to the situation of a civil litigant who succeeds in overruling a common-law rule of contract or that of a criminal accused who succeeds in establishing a procedural rule of constitutional right. Although in either case the new rule is made only prospective in its application, it is nevertheless, as a matter of public policy, made contemporaneously applicable to the litigant himself so as not to discourage persons from undertaking such litigation.
Otis, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice Peterson.

 The majority opinion intimates that plaintiff may have made a material misrepresentation, which was not discovered until later. If that were a fact, an independently valid reason would exist for rejection or rescission. The trial court, however, did not, and this court cannot, make such finding. If we were to remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the municipality had such an objective reason for rejection, rather than mere favoritism or personal preference, I would concur.