Court Opinion

ID: 9662886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:20:55.729415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:43.501065
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, concurring. The court’s opinion correctly concludes that Isaac Colbert raised an “inference, if not a presumption, that the race of the jurors . . . [peremptorily struck] was a factor in the decision to strike.” The court’s opinion also correctly concludes that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), required the prosecution to offer racially neutral explanations why the black jurors were struck. The opinion observes that explanations, which were “racially neutral,” were given by the prosecutor. It is then observed that the explanations were “thin,” and the court’s decision, which I believe to be correct, is to reverse and remand the case. While I agree with all of the above, I cannot agree it is proper for the opinion to go out of its way to strike with crippling blows our opinions in Ward v. State, 293 Ark. 88, 733 S.W.2d 728 (1987), and Mitchell v. State, 295 Ark. 341, 750 S.W.2d 936 (1988) . This case is a good example of the kind in which the requirement for a sensitive inquiry by the trial court is proper, and it is a good example to show why it is required. My reading of the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Batson case differs materially from that of the majority. The majority opinion quotation that “the defendant ‘has established purposeful discrimination’ ” is taken from part “B” of the Batson case opinion in which the Supreme Court reviews a number of its cases on the general issue of racial discrimination in the judicial context. 476 U.S. at 93. Also a part of that review is the reference to a “sensitive inquiry” which first appeared in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). The majority opinion reference to the language, “When circumstances suggest the need. . . .” also comes from that review of other cases. 476 U.S. at 95. The majority opinion seems to suggest that these statements take something away from our decision in the Ward and Mitchell cases. Not so. They were used by the Supreme Court only as preliminaries to the resolution of the issue presented in the Batson case. While the defendant may have an overall burden of proof on the issue of discrimination in the selection of jurors, I believe it is clear, and the majority opinion here recognizes, that once the prima facie display has been called to the court’s attention, the burden of going forward with the evidence clearly shifts to the prosecution. When a pattern or other evidence of discrimination, either in the case at hand, or historically, appears, the defendant has demonstrated the need for a factual inquiry. In deciding both the Ward case and the Mitchell case, we thought the sensitive inquiry was a requirement regardless of racially neutral explanations the prosecution may have had for peremptorily striking black jurors. We were correct. The majority opinion recognizes that the trial court in this case had a duty to do more than accept without comment, inquiry, or finding of fact the prosecutor’s explanation. To say that such an explanation, or any other explanation, may be regarded as sufficient without any judicial inquiry makes a mockery of the essence of the Batson decision. Had the trial court inquired behind the prosecution’s racially neutral explanations, we w.ould probably not have this issue before us. While I agree with the majority opinion that the explanations appear to be “thin,” given other facts in the record, I am not certain that they might not have been wholly racially neutral. The problem is that the trial court, despite his much better position than ours for doing so, did not attempt to find out. Surely any prosecutor can offer neutral reasons, such as one offered in the Mitchell case, i.e., that he did not believe the prospective juror was telling the truth. Dudley and Glaze, JJ., join in this concurrence.