Court Opinion

ID: 9753680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:22:26.434681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:40.190376
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
JOYCE, J.:
¶ 1 Upon my review of the certified record, I must respectfully dissent from the thoughtful opinion of my esteemed colleagues. I would not address the merits of any of Appellant’s issues without first remanding for an inquiry into whether Appellant’s decision to proceed pro se was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
¶ 2 It is well settled in this Commonwealth that an indigent petitioner is entitled to counsel for his or her first PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Quail, 729 A.2d 571, 572 (Pa.Super.1999); Pa. R.Crim.P. 904(B) (stating “the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the defendant’s first petition for post-conviction collateral relief’). This right to counsel extends throughout the post-conviction proceedings and includes any appeal from the disposition of the petition for post-conviction relief. Quail, 729 A.2d at 572; Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(E) (stating “the appointment of counsel shall be effective throughout the post-conviction collateral proceedings, including any appeal from the disposition of the petition for post-conviction collateral relief’). Nonetheless, our courts have also recognized that a criminal defendant has a firmly established right to dispense with counsel and to defend himself or herself before the court. Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 12, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (1998); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 398 Pa.Super. 538, 581 A.2d 595, 597 (1990) (en *965banc), affirmed, 534 Pa. 176, 626 A.2d 1137 (1993); Pa.R.Crim.P. 121.
¶ 3 Before the PCRA court may permit a defendant to proceed pro se, the PCRA court should conduct an on-the-record determination that the waiver is a knowing, intelligent and voluntary one. Grazier, 552 Pa. at 12, 713 A.2d at 82. To constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver, the PCRA petitioner must be apprised of his right to counsel and of the risks of forfeiting that right. Commonwealth v. Meehan, 427 Pa.Super. 261, 628 A.2d 1151, 1157 (1993), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 667, 649 A.2d 670 (1994) (internal quotation omitted). Such an inquiry would necessarily include whether the defendant understands that (1) he has a right to be represented by counsel; (2) that he will still be bound by all normal procedural rules if he waives this right; and (3) that many rights and potential claims may be permanently lost if the defendant does not timely assert them. Id.; Commonwealth v. Powell, 787 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa.Super.2001).
¶ 4 In the instant case, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant after Appellant filed a pro se petition. Counsel never filed an amended petition, but did appear at Appellant’s evidentiary hearing. After the PCRA court denied Appellant relief, Appellant’s counsel filed a timely notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf. However, on January 17, 2003, counsel filed a motion to withdraw, citing a letter in which Appellant summarily expressed his desire to proceed pro se on appeal. Without conducting a waiver of counsel colloquy, the PCRA court granted this motion on January 22, 2003. In view of these facts, I would remand for a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, supra so that Appellant would be properly advised of his right to counsel and of the inherent risks of forfeiting this right. See Meehan, supra; Powell, supra.
¶ 5 Despite our Supreme Court’s mandate that we remand for such a hearing, the Majority relies upon our Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Brady, 741 A.2d 758 (Pa.Super.1999) for the proposition that an on-the-record colloquy is unnecessary where the petitioner’s actions demonstrate that he is voluntarily proceeding pro se. In reliance upon Brady, the Majority determined that Appellant’s desire to proceed pro se has been entirely voluntary based upon his demonstrated ability to competently represent himself throughout the appellate process. See Majority Opinion, at 959 n. 1. The Majority also emphasized that Appellant has never sought the appointment of counsel and has never argued that the lack of counsel has impaired his ability to prosecute an appeal. Id.
¶ 6 I cannot agree with the Majority’s analysis, or the holding of Brady, for a number of reasons. Foremost, our Court has explicitly held that any shortcoming relative to a waiver colloquy cannot be gauged by the quality of a defendant’s self representation or justified based upon his/ her experience with the system. Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 370 Pa.Super. 65, 535 A.2d 1152, 1163 (1988), appeal denied, 518 Pa. 637, 542 A.2d 1367 (1988). Next, while the formula espoused in Brady might provide us with some indication of whether a defendant is proceeding voluntarily, it provides us with little or no insight into whether a defendant has done so knowingly and intelligently. While we might be able to discern a certain level of legal acumen from Appellant’s pro se filings, we cannot surmise from them whether Appellant appreciates the risks of forfeiting his right to counsel. Further, in Grazier, our Supreme Court has instructed us to hold a hearing in cases of this kind to protect a defendant’s right to proceed pro se and to ensure a defendant understands the risks *966of his decision to proceed without trained counsel. Finally, the panel in Brady cited Grazier for the proposition that an on-the-record colloquy is unnecessary where the cold record demonstrates that the appellant adamantly wished to waive his right to counsel. Brady, 741 A.2d at 763. A careful reading of Grazier reveals that the Supreme Court never made such a declaration.
¶ 7 As I do not find that our Court’s decision in Brady comports with our Supreme Court’s decision in Grazier or with our Court’s decisions in Powell and Mee-han, I would ask this Court to consider overruling it in an en banc session. Consistent with the dictates of Grazier, I would remand for a hearing to determine whether Appellant’s decision to proceed pro se was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.