Court Opinion

ID: 9840181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 15:11:52.159895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:53.955429
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                 September 15, 2023
                                                                                    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                    OF WEST VIRGINIA

State of West Virginia,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent

vs.) No. 22-0113 (Hancock County CC-15-2020-F-33)

David S.,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner David S. appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Hancock County, entered on
January 13, 2022, sentencing him to consecutive ten- to twenty-year terms of imprisonment for his
convictions of each of 516 counts of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, or custodian in violation
of West Virginia Code § 61-8D-5. On appeal, he asserts a single assignment of error, in which he
argues that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss his indictment or, in the alternative, erred in
failing to order the State to provide a bill of particulars, because each of the counts with which he
was charged were identically worded and, therefore, insufficiently specific to alert him to the
charges against him. Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a
memorandum decision is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21. 1

      In June 2020, petitioner was charged in a 363-page indictment with the more than five-
hundred felony counts described above. The first count charged:

        That on or about a date between February 1, 2015 and January 15, 2020, and on a
        separate date not subsequently referenced in any count of this indictment, in
        Hancock County, West Virginia, DAVID S[.], being a parent, guardian or custodian
        of or other person in a position of trust in relation to the victim . . . , a child under
        his care, custody or control did commit the offense of “Sexual Abuse by a Parent,
        Guardian, Custodian or Person in a Position of Trust to a Child” by unlawfully and
        feloniously engaging in or attempting to engage in sexual exploitation of, or in
        sexual intercourse, sexual intrusion or sexual contact with the victim . . . who was

        1
         Petitioner appears by counsel Gary A. Collias of the Appellate Advocacy Division of
West Virginia Public Defender Services. Respondent State of West Virginia appears by Attorney
General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General R. Todd Goudy. Because this case
involves sensitive facts, we use initials to protect the identity of the victim.

                                                   1
       under his care, custody and control, notwithstanding the fact that the child may have
       willingly participated in such conduct, or the fact that the child may have consented
       to such conduct or the fact that the child may have suffered no apparent physical
       injury or mental or emotional injury as a result of such conduct in violation of West
       Virginia Code Chapter 61, Article 8D, Section 5 and against the peace and dignity
       of the State of West Virginia.

The remaining counts were substantively identical.

        Upon being charged, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment or, alternatively,
for a bill of particulars. He argued that the indictment lacked the necessary specificity to alert him
to the details of the charges. The State filed a response (which it represented could serve as a bill
of particulars) explaining that the counts of the indictment were based on petitioner’s custodial
statement to a West Virginia State Police officer wherein

       [petitioner] admitted to the . . . officer that for the [time from February 1, 2015,
       through January 15, 2020], he had been having Sexual Intercourse with his
       biological daughter [J.S.] in her Anus and her Vagina at least two times a week. . .
       . [Petitioner] also admitted [that] on several occasions he had put his mouth on [his
       daughter’s] vagina and had put his penis in her mouth. . . .

The circuit court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss or for a bill of particulars.

        Corporal R.C. McMahon of the West Virginia State Police testified at petitioner’s trial that
he received a telephone call from the mother of one of J.S.’s classmates that caused him to begin
an investigation. While investigating, Cpl. McMahon interviewed petitioner and petitioner
admitted the conduct described above. Petitioner’s recorded statement was played for the jury. 2 At
the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found petitioner guilty of the 516 counts charged in the
indictment. 3 Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial and a renewed motion for judgment of
acquittal, and the circuit court denied that motion.

        On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
the indictment or for a bill of particulars, because his indictment so lacked specificity that it
violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article III,
section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution, as well as Rule 7 of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure. “This Court’s standard of review concerning a motion to dismiss an
indictment is, generally, de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Grimes, 226 W. Va. 411, 701 S.E.2d

       2
         Petitioner cites the trial transcript to show where the statement was played for the jury,
but does not otherwise direct our attention to a recording or transcript of the statement. We,
therefore, accept the State’s assertion as true; the 516 counts of the indictment were formulated
from petitioner’s report to Cpl. McMahon that petitioner sexually penetrated his victim
approximately twice every week for the 258-week period he described.
       3
           The victim, petitioner’s daughter J.S., was the only other trial witness.

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449 (2009). Furthermore, “the sufficiency of an indictment is [generally] reviewed de novo. An
indictment need only meet minimal constitutional standards, and the sufficiency of an indictment
is determined by practical rather than technical considerations.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Miller, 197 W.
Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996). 4

       Petitioner’s arguments turn on whether we find that the indictment meets minimum
requirements. We described the requirements in State v. Adams, 193 W. Va. 277, 282 n.8, 456
S.E.2d 4, 9 n.8 (1995):

               (1) the indictment must contain a statement of essential facts constituting
       the offense charged; (2) it must contain allegations of each element of the offense
       charged, so that the defendant is given fair notice of the charge that he must defend
       against; and (3) the allegations must be sufficiently distinctive so that an acquittal
       or conviction on such charges can be pleaded to bar a second prosecution for the
       same offense. See W. Va. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
       87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); State v. Knight, 168 W.Va. 615, 285
       S.E.2d 401 (1981).

We later restated these considerations:

               An indictment is sufficient under Article III, § 14 of the West Virginia
       Constitution and W. Va. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) if it (1) states the elements of the
       offense charged; (2) puts a defendant on fair notice of the charge against which he
       or she must defend; and (3) enables a defendant to assert an acquittal or conviction
       in order to prevent being placed twice in jeopardy.

Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Wallace, 205 W. Va. 155, 517 S.E.2d 20 (1999).

        Petitioner acknowledges that we applied these considerations and addressed “the issue of
indictment specificity” in Ballard v. Dilworth, 230 W. Va. 449, 739 S.E.2d 643 (2013), but he
argues that Dilworth is both factually distinguishable from this case and incorrect. As petitioner
notes, we considered in Dilworth an indictment containing ten identical counts charging that the
defendant sexually abused his stepdaughter over a period of several years. As in the case before
us, the defendant in Dilworth admitted to police that he had sexually abused his victim over a
period of years, but he shared no specific information about dates and times. In that case, we found
the indictment sufficient because the defendant “knew the elements of the offenses with which he
was charged and had fair notice of what he had to defend against (particularly given his confession
and the victim's pretrial statements . . . .).” Id. at 458, 739 S.E.2d at 652.

       4
          In addition, “[t]he denial of a motion for a bill of particulars rests in the sound discretion
of the trial court and unless it appears that such discretion is abused the ruling of the trial court
will not be disturbed.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Slie, 158 W. Va. 672, 213 S.E.2d 109 (1975). Because
we find that the indictment adequately advised petitioner of the charges, we find that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a bill of particulars.

                                                   3
        We are not moved by petitioner’s argument that Dilworth is distinguishable because it
involved a “mere ten counts,” inasmuch as we have applied the precepts described in Dilworth to
indictments describing patterns of sexual abuse where far more occurrences are charged. See State
v. Samuel S., No. 11-0877, 2012 WL 5471448 (W. Va. Nov. 9, 2012) (memorandum decision)
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1255 (2013). 5 In Samuel S., we considered the defendant’s argument that
his 140-count “indictment and jury instructions failed to specify any facts that distinguished one
count from another,” after the defendant was charged for a pattern of sexual offenses against his
daughter over ten years. Id. at *2. In that case, the indictment was formed based on the statement
of the victim, and each count “included the crimes with which the petitioner was charged, listed
the victim of the crimes, and the year they were committed.” Id. at *1. The counts were not
identical in Samuel S. As noted, the State described specific years of criminal conduct in the
indictment. Furthermore, the criminal conduct was varied; the defendant was ultimately convicted
of twenty-five counts of sexual assault in the third degree, forty-five counts of incest, and forty
counts of sexual abuse by a parent, but was absolved of thirty counts of sexual conduct in the first
four years of the overall period. Nevertheless, the underpinnings of Samuel S. and the case before
us are the same.

        We emphasize, first, that the indictment for Samuel S. was formulated based on the
statement of the victim. Here, however, each count of the indictment was derived from petitioner’s
statement. His own description of his conduct provided the foundation for his criminal charges. In
this respect, we find petitioner’s indictment on even firmer ground than the indictment in Samuel
S. But we further find that “the indictment was sufficient as it clearly stated the elements of the
offense charged and gave the petitioner fair notice of the charges against which he must defend by
stating the [time period], the offense committed, and the victim.” Id. at *3. In Samuel S., the
indictment included the specific year of the charged criminal conduct. Under the facts before us,
however, it was not fatal for the State to rely on the multi-year period described by petitioner in
his statement to Cpl. McMahon. As we explained in Samuel S.:

               This Court has noted that “[t]ime is not an element of the crime of sexual
       assault, the alleged variances concerning when the assaults occurred did not alter
       the substance of the charges against the defendant.” State v. Miller, 195 W.Va. 656,
       466 S.E.2d 507 (1995). Moreover, “[w]here a particular date is not a substantive
       element of the crime charged, strict chronological specificity or accuracy is not
       required.” United States v. Kimberlin, 18 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir.1994).

Id. The indictment before us was sufficient to alert petitioner that he was charged with a particular
pattern of sexually abusing his daughter over a nearly five-year period, as he himself described to

       5
          We were asked to review Samuel S. for plain error because, unlike petitioner, the
defendant failed to seek relief in the circuit court. However, though we declined to apply the plain
error doctrine, we substantively reviewed the indictment and “found an indictment that meets the
minimum guidelines for charging documents.”

                                                 4
the investigating officer. 6 We find no error in the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment,
which met our minimum guidelines for charging documents.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

ISSUED: September 15, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

       6
        Petitioner argues in his brief that he “is not asserting that all the various counts of the
indictment have to be distinguishable by the exact date or even the approximate date the events
happened, only that they must be distinguishable on some basis.” However, in a case such as this,
where abuse is repeatedly inflicted on a youthful victim, it is the abuser’s pattern itself that makes
the occurrences indistinguishable.
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