Court Opinion

ID: 9598899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:13:06.399576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:38.550891
License: Public Domain

Green, J.
(dissenting) — I am compelled to dissent. Dennis had three sets of foster parents by the time of trial. He has been in dependent status for 2Vz years. Now we ask *871him to wait another 6 months so that Mr. Ferguson can receive services (the extent of which are undefined) as though all deficiencies will, or indeed can, be corrected within that time. In my view, the trial court arrived at a conclusion which is in Dennis' best interest after applying the clear, cogent and convincing standard of proof to the evidence and weighing all the factors. To overturn the court's decision is to reweigh the evidence, which is not in our province. The court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, and its decision should be affirmed.
The record shows a history of abuse of both children— reports of bruises on their buttocks, legs, welts on Dennis' stomach — all variously explained away by Mr. Ferguson. The Department became involved with the family when complaints were received by the school of bruises on Dawn and disciplinary problems with Dennis. The home was reported as being in "deplorable condition with dirt, filth."5 The children were without proper clothes and were not eating "as well as they could." Mr. Ferguson refused to cooperate with the homemaker services which were offered, and the condition in the home remained unchanged. He thought the home was adequate. Counseling sessions were set up but were interrupted, not through the fault of the Department, but because of another complaint — this time for sexual abuse of Dawn, a process which had been ongoing since she was 2 V% to 3 years of age. Mr. Ferguson then left the jurisdiction. He eventually returned, was convicted of indecent liberties with Dawn, and was incarcerated. He *872denied having committed the crime and refused to become involved in a sexual psychopath program. At the time of the termination hearing, he was unemployed, living in a 1-room apartment and had made no provisions to have Dennis with him. Mr. Williams, the caseworker who observed these children, the home, and both parents, testified the children should not be returned to either parent and final resolution of the issue was important to the children's stability.
Despite Mr. Ferguson's denials and his contention the services offered by the Department were inadequate, the court found he physically abused both children and the services offered were reasonable in light of his incarceration. As the majority recognizes, the pattern of abusive and violent behavior here was sufficient evidence that Mr. Ferguson was an unfit parent.6 Nevertheless, it holds Mr. Ferguson should be given additional time to demonstrate he can be a fit parent. It is not suggested what services should be provided or why postponing disposition for an additional 6 months will correct parenting deficiencies, which apparently have existed throughout the children's lives, and which Mr. Ferguson refuses to recognize exist. In my opinion, the evidence sufficiently shows the futility of offering further services to him. The majority's holding incorrectly places Mr. Ferguson's desires over Dennis' welfare.
RCW 13.34.180(4) provides the state must offer all nec*873essary services which are reasonably available to correct parenting deficiencies within the foreseeable future. Whether this element is met should not be determined in a vacuum, but must be viewed against the paramount consideration of the best interests of the child under the particular facts of the case. RCW 13.34.190(2); In re Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973). While the parents have a fundamental right to custody of their child, it has been consistently recognized that when the parents' rights conflict with the child's best interests, the welfare of the child must control. In re Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980); In re Sego, supra at 738; Todd v. Superior Court, 68 Wn.2d 587, 591, 414 P.2d 605 (1966); In re Schulz, 17 Wn. App. 134, 139, 561 P.2d 1122 (1977).
In In re Aschauer, supra, the court addressed facts similar to this case. There the Court of Appeals, although recognizing the mother had emotional problems, reversed a trial court's termination of her parental rights to give her further opportunity to demonstrate her parenting capabilities. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, stating at pages 694-95:
To postpone [the children's] access to stability in the hope that the mother will be able to correct deep-seated emotional problems and assume the obligations of parenthood, when all the evidence shows that she lacks the capacity to do so, is to ignore the desperate needs of the children.
In J. Goldstein, A. Freud, & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 43 (1973), the authors criticize extending the period of uncertainty for a child in making what are often difficult decisions in child custody matters:
The procedures of child placement are not designed to assure a prompt final decision. The process is characterized by extended periods of uncertainty caused by overcautious and overworked administrative agencies; by courts with overcrowded dockets, extended and oft-postponed hearings; and by judges who are inclined to procrastinate before rendering their decisions at trial or on appeal.
*874The authors further state at page 43:
Whatever the cause of the time-taking, the costs as well as the benefits of the delay to the child must be weighed. Our guideline would allow for no more delay than that required for reasoned judgment. By reasoned judgment we do not mean certainty of judgment. We mean no more than the most reasonable judgment that can be made within the time available — measured to accord with the child's sense of time. Therefore, to avoid irreparable psychological injury, placement, whenever in dispute, must be treated as the emergency that it is for the child.*
* Three months may not be a long time for an adult decisionmaker. For a young child, it may be forever.
The trial court here considered the effect of leaving custody of Dennis with either or both his parents, retaining him in dependent status for a longer period, separating him from his sister, and his potential for being adopted. In light of all those considerations, the court found it was in Dennis' best interest that Mr. and Mrs. Ferguson's parental rights be terminated and that Dennis be placed in a foster home with his sister or in a situation where he could maintain a reasonably normal brother-sister relationship with her. The court further ordered Dennis' status be reviewed every 6 months until he was adopted. The court's resolution was based on all the facts and was designed to bring emotional stability into Dennis' life. My colleagues' decision undoes this resolution based on a restrictive interpretation of the statute.
While our statutes and judicial opinions may set forth the goal, the criteria for establishing the best interests for the welfare of the child are conspicuous by their absence. The complexity of the cases and the need for careful individual treatment militates against the mandatory consideration of certain specified factors in every case. . . . [T]he courts have broad discretion and are allowed considerable flexibility to receive and evaluate all relevant evidence in reaching a decision that recognizes both the welfare of the child and parental rights.
*875... As an appellate court, we are constitutionally unable to substitute our findings for those of the trial court in any case. . . . This is particularly true in child deprivation cases . . .
... As the State Supreme Court has expressed it, "we have often noted what we think is a realistic and rational appellate policy of placing very strong reliance on trial court determinations of what course of action will be in the best interests of the child."
In re Schulz, supra at 139-41.
I conclude there was substantial evidence here showing that the necessity for permanent deprivation was highly probable and would affirm the trial court's resolution of the difficult issues presented in this case.
Reconsideration denied September 15, 1982.
Review granted by Supreme Court December 3, 1982.

Mr. Williams, the caseworker for DSHS, stated: "Condition of the house was very bad. The children were eating a small plate of scrambled eggs. The house was — it's difficult for me to describe, because it conjures up different meanings for different people. But there was debris everywhere, dirt out of flower pots on the floor strewed around, ashes, cigarette butts on the floor. The carpet in that trailer home was just kind of caked with dirt and debris. The cupboard and drainboard were filled with dirty dishes. There is a large dog that was in the house at the time, and I can see that the dog had been eating some meat. There was dog bones, beef bones around on the floor. And there was redness from the blood of the beef that was still on the bones, and the house was just in deplorable condition with dirt, filth."

The record shows Mr. Ferguson would strike Dawn when she refused his sexual advances. Even without the evidence of physical abuse of Dennis, the brutality Mr. Ferguson exhibited toward Dawn would be sufficient to declare Dennis dependent. As was stated in In re Miller, 40 Wn.2d 319, 323, 242 P.2d 1016 (1952):
Where the finding of dependency and the need of removing the children from the custody of their parents is based upon a showing as to the personal traits and characteristics of the parents, we do not believe that there must be specific findings relative to the welfare of each individual child. For example, if the finding that the father is brutal and sadistic is borne out by testimony of brutal treatment of one child, that would be sufficient, in the court's discretion, to warrant removal of all children from his custody. A father does not have the privilege of inflicting brutal treatment upon each of his children in succession before they may individually obtain the protection of the state.