Court Opinion

ID: 9683325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:26:43.255213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:47.183557
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that “[t]he trial judge erred in not following Art. 200(a), § 6.” That holding is correct. McLeod v. Harris, 582 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.1979):
“We conclude that under the express terms of Article 200a, Section 6, Judge Harris had the mandatory duty to request the Presiding Judge of the Second Administrative District to assign another district judge to hear relator’s motion to recuse.” Id., at 775.1
Notwithstanding, however, the majority excuses breach of such mandatory duty on its own supposition that “the record before us is complete” and does not show bias. Thus, contrary to the very purpose of § 6 and the essential function of having an assigned judge “to hear any motions to recuse” and rule thereon, the majority accepts that which the Legislature expressly rejected in amending § 6, viz:
“It is probably asking too much of judicial impartiality to expect a judge to rule objectively on a motion that he disqualify himself from a cause if he has not already recused himself voluntarily.... A judge should not be placed in the position or be given the opportunity to rule in such cases.”2
Because the majority refuses to enforce a legislative mandate that was not followed, I respectfully dissent.3
TEAGUE and CAMPBELL, JJ, join.

. All emphasis is added throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. From Interim Report of the Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives, 65th Legislature, quoted by the Supreme Court in McLeod v. Harris, supra, at 774.

.Insistence on regular procedure in this cause does not in any way impugn motives and integrity of the trial judge. Indeed, the procedure required and contemplated by § 6 renders such matters immaterial, and they are less likely to be implicated in a dispassionate hearing before an assigned judge.