Court Opinion

ID: 9575480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:14:09.850304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:13.971472
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent as to Division 1, but concur fully in Divisions 2 and 3.
Ordinarily, “questions of negligence, diligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, and the exercise of ordinary care for one’s protection, ... are to be decided by a jury.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Tisdale v. Johnson, 177 Ga. App. 487, 488 (339 SE2d 764) (1986). However, in this case I agree with plaintiff that the charges on contributory and comparative negligence were not authorized.
Firstly, I do not believe that plaintiff’s alleged failure to disclose certain information about her condition constituted negligence in the case at bar. Distilled to its essence, defendant’s argument amounts to but one conclusion, to wit, that plaintiff should have been able either to diagnose herself, or at a minimum, should have been able to determine what was or was not pertinent information concerning her illness. This the law does not require. “[A patient is] under no general duty to diagnose her own condition or to volunteer information.” Mackey v. Greenview Hosp., 587 SW2d 249, 255 (Ky. App. 1979), cited in Hawkins v. Greenberg, 159 Ga. App. 302, 308-309 (283 SE2d 301) (1981). See also 70 CJS 483, Physicians & Surgeons, § 80 (a). Compare Haynes v. Hoffman, 164 Ga. App. 236 (2) (296 SE2d 216) (1982), in which this court held that a patient’s failure to disclose known drug allergies, after being specifically questioned about allergies by the defendant/doctor, would authorize a charge on contribu*661tory negligence.
Although somewhat more problematic, I also believe that the evidence concerning plaintiff’s failure to seek additional medical care care, did not, under the facts of this case, authorize the complained of charges. The evidence presented at trial shows plaintiff was informed she should follow-up with another physician in five or six days or in a shorter period if her symptoms persisted or worsened. Plaintiff was also informed she should “recover completely in 2-3 days” and was advised to be rechecked if she suffered sudden worsening of abdominal pain, dizziness or fainting, persistent vomiting or if blood appeared in vomitus or stool. The record shows that plaintiff’s condition did not dramatically worsen until Wednesday, approximately two days after being examined by defendant. At that time plaintiff did seek additional medical care, by calling an ambulance, but decided after talking with emergency medical personnel, who reviewed the instructions given to her by defendant, not to be transported to the hospital at that time. However, approximately five hours later, at 4:45 a.m; on Thursday morning, another ambulance was summoned and plaintiff was transported to the hospital where she was diagnosed as suffering from shock and diffuse peritonitis caused by a ruptured appendix. The record shows, therefore, that plaintiff sought additional medical treatment less than seventy-two hours after being treated by defendant, and that she acted in accordance with the instructions given to her in seeking follow-up medical care.
This case is thus distinguishable from those in which we have held that a charge on contributory negligence was authorized by evidence showing that the plaintiff/patient failed to follow post-treatment or post-operative instructions. For example, in McMullen v. Vaughn, 138 Ga. App. 718, 720 (2) (227 SE2d 440) (1976), this court held that a charge on comparative negligence was authorized by evidence showing that plaintiff failed to perform prescribed post-operative exercises. Likewise, in Anglin v. Grisamore, 192 Ga. App. 704 (1) (386 SE2d 52) (1989), the evidence showed without dispute that plaintiff did not benefit as intended from the surgical procedure designed to help her lose weight because of her inability or unwillingness to follow post-operative instructions. Such, in my opinion, was not the situation in the case at bar.
“A charge which injects into the case and submits for the jury’s consideration issues not made by the pleadings or the evidence tends to confuse the jury as to the true issue in the case, is probably harmful to the [plaintiff], and is error requiring the grant of a new trial.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Koppar Corp. v. Robertson, 186 Ga. App. 856, 858 (1) (368 SE2d 807) (1988). In my opinion the charge on contributory negligence was harmful error in this case; consequently, the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded *662for a new trial. Accord Overstreet v. Nickelsen, 170 Ga. App. 539, 540 (1) (317 SE2d 583) (1984).
Decided July 31, 1990
Rehearing denied August 20, 1990 — Cert, applied for.
Kilpatrick & Cody, Alan R. Perry, Jr., Doffermyre, Shields & Canfield, Robert E. Shields, for appellant.
Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Roger Mills, Glen E. Kushel, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke and Judge Cooper join in this dissent.