Court Opinion

ID: 9948932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:14:58.020736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:22.106561
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0285-MR

WESLEY G. ALDRIDGE                                                     APPELLANT

                      APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   HONORABLE C. A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 19-CR-00089

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Following a jury trial, Appellant, Wesley G. Aldridge, was

convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree. He makes two

arguments for reversal of his conviction – that the circuit court erred by: (1)

declining to strike a juror for cause; and (2) by admitting evidence of his

participation in previous controlled drug transactions. Finding no error, we affirm.
                                 BACKGROUND

             Morgan Crayne, a confidential informant, contacted Detective Mike

Lantrip on December 21, 2018. Crayne informed Det. Lantrip that Appellant told

him he had methamphetamine for sale. Earlier that month, Appellant had been

party to three controlled drug buys. However, the parties dispute the nature of

Appellant’s participation in these transactions; Appellant asserts Crayne would

take him to a drug dealer’s house and supply him with money so that he could

purchase methamphetamine, while the Commonwealth asserts Appellant sold

methamphetamine to Crayne.

             Lantrip arranged for Crayne to ask Appellant whether he would be

willing to sell methamphetamine to Crayne’s friend in Eddyville. Unbeknownst to

Appellant, the friend was fictitious. Appellant agreed, and Crayne picked up

Appellant in Paducah to drive him to Eddyville. Crayne testified that when he

picked Appellant up, he witnessed Appellant weigh the drugs he intended to sell.

             Crayne drove Appellant to Eddyville, where Lantrip waited in his

marked police vehicle. Crayne pulled up next to Lantrip’s vehicle, and Lantrip and

another police officer removed Appellant from Crayne’s vehicle. Because

Appellant had multiple outstanding warrants for his arrest, Lantrip arrested

Appellant and performed a search incident to the arrest. Lantrip discovered over

two grams of methamphetamine in Appellant’s pockets.

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             Appellant was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance in

the first degree. The Commonwealth notified the court prior to trial of its intent to

introduce evidence of the three previous controlled buys. Appellant objected via a

motion in limine, which the trial court denied.

             Appellant’s case proceeded to trial. During voir dire, the prosecutor

asked whether any of the jurors knew any of the Commonwealth’s witnesses, and

specifically asked them whether they knew Lantrip. One of the jurors, RG,

responded that he did indeed know Lantrip, and also knew another officer involved

in the case. RG was a probation and parole officer with the Department of

Corrections and, therefore, had previously worked with Lantrip. RG stated he did

not believe that having worked with Lantrip or the other officer would affect his

ability to be an impartial juror.

             Appellant’s trial counsel moved to strike RG for cause. The trial

court denied the motion on the basis that RG was not law enforcement and was not

involved in Appellant’s case. Appellant used a peremptory strike to remove the

juror. Appellant’s strike sheet indicates he would have removed a different juror –

JH – had he not been required to exercise a peremptory strike to remove RG.

             At trial, evidence of the prior controlled buy was introduced, and

Appellant again stated his objection. The Commonwealth said the prior controlled

buys demonstrated Appellant intended to sell methamphetamine on the day of his

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arrest. The trial court allowed introduction of the prior controlled buys but

admonished the jury that the evidence was “admitted for the limited purpose for

[the jury] to consider them, if at all, in determining whether [Appellant] had the

intent to sell . . . the methamphetamine that was seized from him here in Lyon

County.”

                The jury convicted Appellant, and he was sentenced to seven years’

imprisonment. He now appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

I. Appellant’s Motion to Strike RG for Cause.

                Appellant first challenges the trial court’s decision to not strike juror

RG for cause. Appellant argues this decision deprived him of his due process right

to a fair trial. Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution provide a criminal

defendant the right to an impartial jury. Fugett v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d

604, 612 (Ky. 2008) (citing Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Ky.

1999)). Per our Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[w]hen there is reasonable ground

to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the

evidence, that juror shall be excused as not qualified.” RCr1 9.36(1).

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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             “A determination whether to excuse a juror for cause lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for a clear abuse of

discretion.” Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 848 (Ky. 2004) (citing Foley

v. Commonwealth, 953 S.W.2d 924, 931 (Ky. 1997)). A trial court abuses its

discretion when its decision “was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported

by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.

1999) (citations omitted). “[I]f a court abuses its discretion in denying a challenge

for cause and the party had to use a peremptory challenge to strike the juror and, in

fact, used all his peremptory challenges, it is reversible error.” Fugett, 250 S.W.3d

at 613 (citing Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 796 (Ky. 2001)).

             The test for whether a court should strike a juror for cause “is

whether, after having heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform

his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.”

Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky. 1994). No one question will

reveal whether a juror ought to be excluded for cause, and the decision, instead,

should be based on the totality of the circumstances. Fugett, 250 S.W.3d 613

(citations omitted). Stated differently, “[t]he court must weigh the probability of

bias or prejudice based on the entirety of the juror’s responses and demeanor.”

Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Ky. 2007).

                                         -5-
             While “the existence of a ‘close relationship’ [is] sufficient to require

the court to sustain a challenge for cause and excuse the juror[,]” Marsch v.

Commonwealth, 743 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Ky. 1987), RG did not have a close

relationship with any witness in the instant case. A juror’s close “familial,

financial or situational” relationship “with any of the parties, counsel, victims or

witnesses” creates a presumption of prejudice. Ward v. Commonwealth, 695

S.W.2d 404, 407 (Ky. 1985) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stamm, 429 A.2d 4, 7 (Pa.

Super. 1981)). Should a close relationship be established, the court should excuse

the juror for cause. Id.

             It cannot be reasonably said that RG having intersected with Lantrip

during RG’s work as a probation and parole officer creates a close relationship

between the two which would have created a presumption of bias.

             In Clay v. Commonwealth, the appellant argued the circuit court erred

when it declined to excuse a juror for cause. 291 S.W.3d 210, 215 (Ky. 2008).

The juror formerly worked as a secretary in the Fayette Commonwealth’s

Attorney’s Office under a previous Commonwealth’s Attorney, served as a witness

in a case which the then-current Commonwealth’s Attorney prosecuted, and

remained friends with a member of the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office’s

administrative staff. Id. at 215-16. Ultimately, these connections were “far too

tenuous” to constitute a close relationship sufficient “to presume bias or

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prejudice.” Id. at 216 (citing Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713

(Ky. 1991); Marsch, 743 S.W.2d at 833). Because no close relationship existed

and the juror testified she could be fair, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion

by not striking the juror for cause. Id.

             In Maxie v. Commonwealth, a juror knew the police sergeant who

helped coordinate a controlled drug buy between the appellant and an informant.

82 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Ky. 2002). The juror’s children and the sergeant’s children

were friends. Id. The juror assured the court she would be able to fairly evaluate

the case, and the circuit judge declined to remove her for cause. Id. The Supreme

Court determined the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not removing the

juror. Id. at 862-63.

             RG’s relationship with Lantrip is about as tenuous as the relationships

presented in Clay and Maxie. RG and Lantrip do not share an employer. RG also

indicated he could be an impartial juror. Though RG’s employment as a probation

and parole officer previously led him to interact with Lantrip, it was not an abuse

of the circuit judge’s discretion to decline to strike RG for cause in the absence of a

more familiar relationship.

II. Evidence of Prior Controlled Buys.

             Kentucky’s Rules of Evidence generally prohibit admission of

evidence of a person’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” for the purpose of proving

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“the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” KRE2

404(b). There are several exceptions to this general prohibition. Such evidence

may be admissible “[i]f offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake

or accident[.]” KRE 404(b)(1). The evidence here was offered to prove intent.

“Rulings upon admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial judge;

such ruling should not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of

discretion.” Simpson v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1994).

                Additionally, even if evidence is offered for one of the permissible

purposes listed under KRE 404(b)(1), the evidence may still be excluded if

potential prejudice from its use substantially outweighs its probative value. KRE

403; Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Ky. 1994). A trial judge has a

“substantial amount of discretion” in balancing probative value against prejudice

pursuant to KRE 403. Doneghy v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 95, 109 (Ky.

2013) (citing Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1997)).

                “Kentucky, like many other jurisdictions, has consistently followed

the general rule that evidence of other criminal acts of the accused is inadmissible

unless it comes within certain well-defined exceptions which must be strictly

construed.” Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Ky. 1985) (citing

2
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                            -8-
Jones v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W.2d 969 (Ky. 1947)). Our jurisprudence supplies

ample analogous cases to illustrate this principle.

             In Hayes v. Commonwealth, a criminal defendant’s prior drug

trafficking conviction was inadmissible as character evidence, but was admissible

to demonstrate motive, intent, and a plan to manufacture methamphetamine. 175

S.W.3d 574, 588-89 (Ky. 2005). In Walker v. Commonwealth, evidence of a prior

controlled cocaine sale involving the defendant was admissible to demonstrate

defendant’s intent to traffic in a controlled substance. 52 S.W.3d 533, 536-37 (Ky.

2001). And, in Howard v. Commonwealth, evidence that a defendant sold

marijuana to an undercover officer after the defendant’s indictment for marijuana

trafficking was admissible to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. 787 S.W.2d

264, 266 (Ky. App. 1989).

             In the current case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by

allowing the jury to hear evidence regarding the prior drug buys. As our cases

demonstrate, a defendant’s previous drug sales are admissible to show that he

intended to do so again. In other words, “‘the relevancy of the extrinsic offense

derives from the defendant’s indulging himself in the same state of mind in the

perpetration of both the extrinsic and charged offenses.’” Walker, 52 S.W.3d at

537 (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978)).

“[B]ecause the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense, it is less

                                          -9-
likely that he had lawful intent in the present offense.” Id. (quoting Beechum, 582

F.2d at 911). Because Appellant’s three prior controlled drug transactions are

relevant to demonstrate his intent to do so again, the circuit court did not abuse its

discretion by allowing such evidence. Nor did the circuit court err in its

application of the KRE 403 balancing test, as the probative value of the previous

transactions – i.e., Appellant’s intent to sell methamphetamine – was not

“substantially outweighed” by any undue prejudice.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Lyon Circuit Court is

affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Adam Meyer                                 Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Stephanie L. McKeehan
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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