Court Opinion

ID: 9666434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:14:52.105487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:28.790336
License: Public Domain

Jim Hannah, Chief Jupart. I concur in the concurring in part; dissenting in part. I concur in the court’s decision on admission of evidence under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) based on the principle of stare decisis. I dissent to the court’s decision that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-345 (Repl. 2002) permits admission of testimony from victims of prior juvenile delinquency adjudications in subsequent adult criminal proceedings concerning unrelated crimes. Section 9-27-345 provides as follows: (a) Juvenile adjudications of delinquency for offenses for which the juvenile could have been tried as an adult may be used at the sentencing phase in subsequent adult criminal proceedings against those same individuals. (b) (1) No other evidence adduced against a juvenile in any proceeding under this subchapter nor the fact of adjudication or disposition shall be admissible evidence against such juvenile in any civil, criminal, or other proceeding. (2) However, the evidence shall be admissible where proper in subsequent proceedings against the same juvenile under this sub-chapter. The majority concludes that subsection (b)(1) is the source of contention. I disagree. Subsection (a) is dispositive of this issue. Bell correctly argues that the only evidence admissible under section 9-27-345 in an adult criminal proceeding is the fact and the nature of the juvenile adjudication. Subsection (a) is at issue. Bell’s separate arguments about any effect of subsection (b) are superfluous and irrelevant to this discussion. The majority errs in discussing subsection (b). As the majority notes, Bell does not dispute the admissibility of his juvenile adjudication of delinquency based on rape. Subsection (a) plainly makes certain “[j]uvenile adjudications” admissible at subsequent adult criminal proceedings. Rape is included because Bell certainly could have -been prosecuted as an adult for that crime. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (Repl. 2006). There are no opinions of this court interpreting the meaning of the term “[jjuvenile adjudications.” “An ‘adjudication’ is simply a judicial determination.” Sikes v. Gen. Publ’g Co., Inc., 264 Ark. 1, 6, 568 S.W.2d 33, 35 (1978) (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 33 (2d ed. 1939)). The term adjudication is not defined in our Juvenile Code. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303 (Supp. 2003). An “[ajdjudication hearing” is defined in the juvenile code as “a hearing to determine whether the allegations in a petition are substantiated by the proof.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-345(4) (Supp. 2003). Thus, at a hearing, the evidence is admitted and a decision is reached. As stated in Sykes, supra, that decision constitutes an adjudication. In Utah, “ ‘Adjudication’ is a defined term both in the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure and in related statutes that refer to a finding by the court, incorporated in a judgment or decree, that the facts alleged in the [petition alleging the court’s jurisdiction] have been proved.” Office of the Guardian Ad Litem ex rel. S.M., 154 P.3d 835, 848 (Ut. 2007). It is clear that the term “[j]uvenile adjudications” as used in section 9-27-345 refers to admission of the prior convictions and their nature. This is consistent with similar provisions in the Criminal Code: The trial court shall then instruct the jury as to the number of prior felony convictions and the statutory sentencing range. The jury may be advised as to the nature of a prior felony conviction and the date and place of a prior felony conviction; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-502(3)(A), (B) (Repl. 2006). Section 9-27-345 authorizes the circuit court to inform the jury of the juvenile adjudications and their nature. It does not permit the prosecuting attorney to put witnesses on the stand from the earlier cases to testify as to the facts of the earlier crimes. Even though the evidence was admitted in sentencing, the inadmissible evidence could influence the jury to sentence for the prior juvenile offense rather than for the offense charged. It puts the criminal defendant again in jeopardy on a crime for which he or she has already been convicted. This is an issue exclusive of section 9-27-345 that would have to be considered regardless as it implicates both double jeopardy and res judicata. See Mason v. State, 361 Ark. 357, 206 S.W.3d 869 (2005). This case should be reversed for resentencing. Danielson, J., joins.