Court Opinion

ID: 9836788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:03.103609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.892336
License: Public Domain

COX, Senior Judge
(concurring):
I agree with my learned colleague, Judge Gierke, that an officer or, indeed, an enlisted member of the armed forces may be qualified to express an opinion regarding the impact of misconduct on the good order and discipline of a unit. The witness may also be qualified to express an opinion regarding the service-discrediting nature of the misconduct. Likewise, the witness may be qualified to express an opinion regarding the rehabilitative potential of an accused.
Nevertheless, it becomes perilous for the Government to interject the “chain of command” into the process. When the accused’s commanding offer is called upon to express an opinion on one of these nebulous, but essential, elements required to establish guilt under the general articles, Articles 133 and 134, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 933 and 934, it has the potential to cross the razor-thin line between expertise and command influence. This danger of command influence leads me to conclude that the accused’s commanding officer should not be the “expert” witness called upon to express an opinion on such subjective matters as “good order and discipline,” “service discrediting,” or “conduct unbecoming.”
I recognize that there are many circumstances where the commanding officer may be the best witness to testify as to facts from which the members can infer the existence of the essential elements. For example, if an accused officer fraternizes with a junior member of his command, the commanding officer can relate to the members the facts from which the members can conclude that the conduct was disruptive in the unit. My concern is that the commanding officer should not be allowed to express his opinion that, based on the facts, the conduct alleged was prejudicial to “good order and discipline,” “service discrediting,” or “conduct unbecoming.” The members are equally capable of considering the evidence presented and deciding those elements. Since, in this context, the commanding officer’s opinion is not useful to the members, it should not be admissible. See United States v. Birdsall, 47 MJ 404 (1998), citing United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.1993). Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with Judge Gierke’s broad approach to this type of opinion testimony.