Court Opinion

ID: 9875438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 22:33:47.83401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:00.967651
License: Public Domain

Sandstrom, Surrogate Judge,
concurring specially.
[¶ 22] The majority and dissent ignore a rule of jurisprudence nearly as old as the republic to unnecessarily and inappropriately decide an unresolved constitutional issue. The United States Supreme Court traces to Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. 2 Dall. 408, 1 L.Ed. 436 (1792), the rule that an unresolved constitutional issue is not to be unnecessarily decided. Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947).
[¶ 23] In Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the constitutional question of whether pre-arrest a driver can be legally required to take an onsite screening test on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than the greater requirement of probable cause.
[¶ 24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a driver’s breath based on reasonable suspicion the driver was driving while impaired.” On the basis of a different constitutional interpretation, the dissent would “hold the on-site screening test cannot be demanded under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, absent probable cause or a DUI-related arrest.”
[¶ 25] Whether facts rise to the level of probable cause is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Stewart, 2006 ND 39, ¶ 6, 710 N.W.2d 403.
The existence of probable cause to arrest is a question of law. See Mayo v. Moore, 527 N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1995); *895City of Langdon v. Delvo, 390 N.W.2d 51 (N.D. 1986). Questions of law [are] fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1995).
Moran v. North Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 543 N.W.2d 767, 769 (N.D. 1996).
[¶26] Not disputed by the dissent, the majority opinion says, at ¶2, “In June 2015, a law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle driven by Barrios-Flores for speeding. The officer testified at an administrative hearing that Barrios-Flores had watery bloodshot eyes, appeared confused, admitted consuming alcohol, and appeared to have difficulty maintaining a normal walk while exiting his vehicle.” The foregoing facts establish probable cause for driving under the influence. See Moran, at 770. Indeed, they would be sufficient to sustain a criminal verdict of guilty of driving under the influence. See, e.g., State v. Kisse, 351 N.W.2d 97, 101 (N.D. 1984); State v. Glavkee, 138 N.W.2d 663, 667 (N.D. 1965); State v. Hanson, 73 N.W.2d 135, 140 (N.D. 1955).
[1Í27] Because in this case there was probable cause, it is not necessary to answer the question of whether reasonable suspicion would have been sufficient.
[¶ 28] In Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 569, 67 S.Ct. 1409, the United States Supreme Court explained:
[Constitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined in friendly, nonadversary proceedings; in advance of the necessity of deciding them; in broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied; if the record presents some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of; at the instance of one who fails to show that he is injured by the statute’s operation, or who has availed himself of its benefits; or if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.
[¶ 29] In Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 814 (N.D. 1985), this Court held:
Like the United States Supreme Court, we do not.decide the issue presented. There are adequate grounds for reversing the commitment in this case, without addressing a fundamental constitutional issue. It is a cardinal rule of decision making to avoid constitutional confrontations where there are appropriate alternative grounds to resolve the case before us. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 102 S.Ct. 2442, 73 L.Ed.2d 16 (1982); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); State v. King, 355 N.W.2d 807, 809 (N.D.1984); State ex rel. Stutsman v. Light, 68 N.D. 513, 281 N.W. 777, 780 (1938) (a constitutional question will be decided only ivhen it is properly before the court and the question must be decided in order to resolve the controversy).
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 30] The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently reiterated:
“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). “This rule must bind not only the courts, but also the administrative agencies which they review, for if it did not, such agencies, ‘by unnecessarily deciding constitutional issues, would compel the courts to resolve such issues as well.’” Gutierrez v. INS, 745 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Tung Chi Jen v. INS, 566 F.2d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 1977)).
*896Xiong v. Lynch, 836 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 2016).
[¶ 31] The Eighth Circuit has explained the “foundational principle in our legal system,” saying:
It is a foundational principle in our legal system, enunciated by Justice Brandéis in a familiar concurrence, that courts must make every effort to avoid deciding novel constitutional questions. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-47, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). “It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.” Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295, 25 S.Ct. 243, 49 L.Ed. 482 (1905) (emphasis added). A corollary to Burton’s cardinal rule is that if a case may be resolved on easy and settled constitutional grounds, the court should do so instead of deciding the case on difficult and novel constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346, 56 S.Ct. 466 (Brandeis, J., concurring). “[C]ourts should think hard, and then think hard again, before turning small cases into large ones.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2032, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011). Rather than rushing to decide a difficult First Amendment question of first impression in this circuit, we begin with “the threshold jurisdictional question: whether” the consumers “ha[ve] standing to sue.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).
Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 747 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2014).
[¶ 32] This Court’s consistent jurisprudence reaches back a century:
It is requested that we first determine the constitutionality of the statute. A constitutional question does not arise merely because it is raised and a decision thereon sought. A party who assails the validity of a statute on constitutional grounds must show that he is prejudiced by the alleged unconstitutional provision, and that a decision on the constitutional question is necessary in order to protect him in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
“Courts will not assume to pass upon constitutional questions unless properly before them, and the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered and determined by the courts as a hypothetical question. It is only when a decision on its validity is necessary to the determination of the cause that the same will be made, and not then at the instance of a stranger, but only on the complaint of those with the requisite interest. These principles have been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States. That tribunal has announced that it rigidly adheres to the rule never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it, never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied, and never to consider the constitutionality of state legislation unless it is imperatively required.” 6 R.C.L. § 74, pp. 76, 77.
“And where a case may be decided on either one of two grounds, and one of these does not involve the constitutionality of a statute the court will decide it on that ground.” 6 R.C.L. § 75, p. 77.
Olson v. Ross, 39 N.D. 372, 167 N.W. 385, 386 (1918) (emphasis added).
[IT 33] This Court for more than one hundred years has reiterated the principle that courts do not decide unresolved constitutional issues if a case may be resolved on other grounds. For example: Frokjer v. *897North Dakota Bd. of Dental Examiners, 2009 ND 79, ¶ 20, 764 N.W.2d 657 (“This Court will not consider or decide questions, particularly constitutional questions, that are not necessary to the determination of an appeal.”); State v. Friedt, 2007 ND 108, ¶ 7, 735 N.W.2d 848 (“This Court will refrain from deciding constitutional questions if it can decide a dispute on other grounds.”); Billey v. North Dakota Stockmen’s Ass’n, 1998 ND 120, ¶ 23, 579 N.W.2d 171 (a court generally will not decide constitutional questions which are not necessary to its decision); Glaspie v. Little, 1997 ND 108, ¶ 15, 564 N.W.2d 651 (“We inquire into the constitutionality of a statute only to the extent required by the case before us.”); State v. Waters, 542 N.W.2d 742, 745 (N.D. 1996) (refrain from deciding constitutional questions .if they can decide a dispute on other grounds); Little v. Graff, 507 N.W.2d 55, 59 (N.D. 1993) (“Courts refrain from deciding constitutional questions if they can decide a dispute on other grounds.”); Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347, 350 (N.D. 1986) (we refrain from deciding constitutional issues where appropriate alternative grounds to resolve the issue exist); Bismarck Pub. Sch. v. Walker, 370 N.W.2d 565, 566 (N.D. 1985) (“It is a well-settled rule of decision making that a court will refrain from deciding constitutional issues where there are appropriate alternative grounds to resolve the case before it.”); Tooz v. State, 76 N.D. 599, 38 N.W.2d 285, 287 Syll. 3 (1949) (“As a general rule a court will inquire into the constitutionality of a statute only to the extent required by the case before it and will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it, and will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”); Goodman v. Christensen, 71 N.D. 306, 300 N.W. 460, 467 (1941) (“A court will not assume to pass upon a constitutional question unless the question is properly before it and this does not occur unless the constitutional question must be decided in order to determine the controversy before the court.”); Reeves & Co. v. Russell, 28 N.D. 265, 148 N.W. 654, 655 (1914) (the court will decline to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute when it is unnecessary to a decision).
[¶ 34] Courts do not unnecessarily decide unresolved constitutional issues even if,, as is often the case, the parties would like the constitutional issue resolved, and no party raises the firmly established rule of jurisprudence to the contrary. In Bulman v. Hulstrand Construction, 503 N.W.2d 240 (N.D. 1993), the parties argued the continued viability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but the Court on its own declined to address the constitutional issue raised:
The possibility that a need for review might become moot by future developments in the trial' court • supports the normal postponement of review until the entire case is decided. Peterson v. Zerr, 443 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 1989).
“Furthermore, it is well established that we will refrain from deciding constitutional issues ... unless required to do so by the case before us.” State v. Wilt, 371 N.W.2d 159, 161 (N.D. 1985). Because of the possibility that trial of this case against the remaining defendant might make the constitutional issue raised in this appeal moot, we will refrain from deciding the constitutional issue presented.
Bulman, at 242. In State v. King, 355 N.W.2d 807, 809 (N.D. 1984), both parties wanted the constitutional questions answered, but this Court sent the case back saying, “The production of evidence will enable the parties as well as the county court to more precisely delineate the actu*898al issues involved and might obviate the necessity of ruling on a constitutional question.”
[¶ 35] In Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157, 104 S.Ct. 2267, 81 L.Ed.2d 113 (1984), the United States Supreme Court said, “It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, however, that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Seeking to avoid the necessity of deciding the constitutional question, the high court said, “The same prudential rule is properly employed in this case” and remanded the case to this Court for an additional determination. Id. at 158-59, 104 S.Ct. 2267. Further, in cases involving statutes and constitutionality, the doctrine of abstention absent necessity of deciding unresolved constitutional issues goes to the very heart of the constitutional system of separation of powers. Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 568-72, 67 S.Ct. 1409. Parties may want courts to decide unresolved constitutional questions, but not doing so unnecessarily is a jurisprudential rule—like the requirements of jurisdiction and finality— which courts have a duty to apply regardless of whether they have been raised by a party. See id.
[¶ 36] In conclusion, this Court should not decide whether reasonable suspicion would have been sufficient to require Barrios-Flores to take the onsite screening test or face the consequences of refusal, because there was the probable cause which the United States Supreme Court has already said in Birchfield is sufficient. I would affirm.
[¶ 37] Dale V. Sandstrom, S.J.