Court Opinion

ID: 9949984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 22:02:34.80542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:46.839651
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/11/24 In re S.R. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

In re S.R. et al., Persons Coming                             B325909
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                               (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP02823)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

              Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

Y.R.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Juvenile Court Referee. Dismissed.
     Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    ________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

       Y.R. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings
and disposition orders declaring his children Joshua R. (born
2006), L.R. the elder (born 2007), L.R. the younger (born 2011),
and P.R. (born 2013) to be dependents of the court pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code former section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1), (c), and (j)1 and releasing them to his care
pursuant to a family maintenance plan. Y.R. contends the
evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding
that the four children were at substantial risk of harm based on
Y.R.’s emotional abuse and medical neglect of their older sister
S.R. (born 2005), who is not a subject of this appeal. While this
appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction
over the four children with custody exit orders awarding sole
legal and physical custody to Y.R., and the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (the Department)
moved to dismiss his appeal as moot. Because we cannot grant
effective relief to Y.R., we grant the motion and dismiss his
appeal as moot.

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. Section 300
was amended effective January 1, 2023, after the juvenile court
issued its 2022 jurisdiction findings in this case. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 832, § 1.) The amendments do not impact our analysis.

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      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On September 13, 2022 the Department filed a petition
pursuant to former section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), (d),
and (j), alleging S.R., Joshua, L.R. the elder, L.R. the younger,
and P.R. were in need of juvenile court protection due to Y.R.
sexually, physically, and emotionally abusing S.R. and failing to
appropriately provide for S.R.’s serious mental health needs.
       S.R. was detained from parental custody. The remaining
four children were detained from their mother J.L. and released
to Y.R.’s custody pending adjudication. Y.R. stated S.R.’s
allegations were retaliatory because he would not allow her to
date adult men, she was violent toward family members in the
home, and he wanted S.R. detained by the Department so that
she could get mental health treatment.
       On January 12, 2023 the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The Department reported
the family had 17 prior referrals between March 2012 and
September 2021, with allegations including general neglect of the
children by Y.R. and J.L.; J.L.’s drug use and sexual activity
within earshot of the children; Y.R.’s physical abuse of Joshua;
S.R.’s sexual, emotional, and physical abuse by Y.R., J.L., and
J.L.’s boyfriend; and S.R.’s attempted suicide. Most of those
referrals were closed as “inconclusive.” Y.R. denied any physical
discipline of the children or sexual abuse of S.R. In Department
interviews with the children, S.R. reported Y.R. physically
striking her, emotionally abusing her and the other children with
derogatory names and by mocking her anxiety and ticks, and
sexually abusing her on two instances. She also stated she was
sexually abused by her adult older brother Hennessy when she

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was 11. The other four children denied any abuse by Y.R. and
stated they felt safe with him, and Joshua, L.R. the elder and
L.R. the younger stated S.R. had a history of making allegations
of sexual abuse against Y.R. and an ex-boyfriend. Hennessy
denied sexually abusing S.R., expressed concern for her mental
health, and stated she had previously made sexual abuse
allegations against other people and “‘acts this way when she
doesn’t get her way.’” Both Hennessy and S.R.’s adult sister Alize
also denied any concerns about any type of abuse by Y.R., and
Alize stated that her only concern was S.R.’s mental health.
       The juvenile court dismissed the sexual abuse allegations
under section 300, subdivision (d), and sustained the remainder
of the petition.2 The court declared Joshua, L. R. the elder, L.R.
the younger, and P.R. dependents of the court, removed them
from J.L., placed them with Y.R. under Department supervision,
and ordered Y.R. to participate in family maintenance services.
       On January 13, 2023 Y.R. timely appealed the jurisdiction
findings and disposition orders.

2     As sustained, the relevant portions of the petition as to
Joshua, L.R. the elder, L.R. the younger, and Perseverance
included: counts b-4 (Y.R.’s medical neglect of S.R.’s mental and
emotional needs, placing Joshua, L.R. the elder, L.R. the younger,
and Perseverance at risk of serious physical harm, damage,
danger, and medical neglect); c-1 (Y.R.’s emotional abuse of S.R.);
and j-4 (Y.R.’s medical neglect of S.R.’s mental and emotional
problems, placing Joshua, L.R. the elder, L.R. the younger, and
Perseverance at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger,
and medical neglect). The juvenile court stated it intended to
include all the children in counts b-4, j-4, and c-1 (although c-1,
as pleaded and as sustained, did not include references to Joshua,
L.R. the elder, L.R. the younger, or Perseverance).

                                4
      On July 17, 2023, while this appeal was pending, the
juvenile court issued a custody order granting Y.R. sole legal and
physical custody of the children and terminated jurisdiction.

                          DISCUSSION

A.     The Mootness Doctrine in Dependency Appeals
        “A court is tasked with the duty “‘to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.’”” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) In dependency cases, the reviewing court
decides on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events
render a case moot and whether the court’s decision would affect
the outcome of a subsequent proceeding. (Ibid.) A dependency
case becomes moot when events “‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a]
court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant
him any effect[ive] relief.”’” (Ibid.; see In re N.S. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“the critical factor in considering whether
a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can
provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error”].) To show
the reviewing court can provide effective relief, the appellant first
“must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome [the
appellant] seeks.” (In re D.P., at p. 276.)
       In In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266, the Supreme Court
explained that “relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical,
tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’
[Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the

                                 5
plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from
a change in legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a
parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally
stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to
sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect
on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being redressed by
a favorable court decision.” (Id. at p. 277.) Examples of non-moot
cases include those where a jurisdiction finding affected parental
custody rights, curtailed a parent’s contact with his or her child,
or resulted in disposition orders that continued to adversely
affect a parent. (Id. at pp. 277-278.) In re D.P. further noted that
“speculative future harm” is insufficient to avoid mootness. (Id.
at p. 278.) “[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or
practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal,”
however, “the case is not moot, and merits review is required.”
(Id. at p. 283.)
       “When a parent has not made such a showing, the case is
moot, but the court has discretion to decide the merits
nevertheless.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283, see id. at
p. 282 [reviewing court has “‘inherent discretion’” to reach the
merits of an appeal even where the case is moot].) A reviewing
court decides on a case-by-case basis whether to reach the merits
of a moot appeal. (Id. at p. 287.) Generally “when ‘the case
presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’
‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the
parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s
determination’” courts may appropriately consider the merits of a
moot appeal. (Id. at p. 282.)
       Dependency appeals are uniquely prone to mootness, and
often “[p]arents may appeal an order that is later changed, or

                                 6
jurisdiction over the child may terminate before an appeal is
finally resolved, as in this case.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 285.) Accordingly, In re D.P. identified several additional
factors reviewing courts may consider when deciding whether
discretionary review is warranted. (Id. at pp. 284-286.) First,
whether the challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current
or future dependency proceedings (for example, by influencing a
child protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency
petition or a juvenile court’s determination about whether to
order further reunification services). (Id. at p. 285.) Second,
“whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly
pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.) The
“more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the
parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Third, a court may also consider “why the appeal became moot”:
“[p]rinciples of fairness” may favor discretionary review of cases
rendered moot “by the prompt compliance or otherwise laudable
behavior of the parent challenging the jurisdictional finding on
appeal.” (Ibid.)
       In deciding whether to exercise their discretion, reviewing
courts “should be guided by the overarching goals of the
dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection
for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as
well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-
being of the child.’” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286; see
§ 300.2, subd. (a).)

                                  7
B.     Y.R.’s Appeal Is Moot
       As noted above, in this appeal Y.R. challenges the juvenile
court’s January 2023 jurisdiction findings and disposition orders
as to Joshua, L.R. the elder, L.R. the younger, and P.R.
       His appeal from those orders was rendered moot by the
subsequent July 2023 orders terminating jurisdiction and
awarding him sole legal and physical custody of the children.
       Y.R. did not appeal from the exit orders, which are now
final. As this court explained in In re Rashad D. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 156, “termination of dependency jurisdiction does
not necessarily moot an appeal from a jurisdiction finding that
directly results in an adverse juvenile custody order. But in most
cases . . . for this court to be able to provide effective relief, the
parent must appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and
disposition order but also from the orders terminating
jurisdiction and modifying the parent’s prior custody status.
Without the second appeal, we cannot correct the continuing
adverse consequences of the allegedly erroneous jurisdiction
finding.” (Id. at p. 159.) By not appealing the July 2023 custody
orders, Y.R. “forfeited any challenge to those rulings, including
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to issue them.” (Id. at p. 167;
accord, In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220, 225.) An exit
order is a final judgment and is not subject to collateral attack
through an appeal from a previous disposition order. (See § 302,
subd. (d) [“Any custody or visitation order issued by the juvenile
court at the time the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction . . .
shall be a final judgment and shall remain in effect after that
jurisdiction is terminated.”]; see also Heidi S. v. David H. (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1165 [where the juvenile court terminates its
jurisdiction and issues an exit order, “the exit order ‘shall be a

                                  8
final judgment and shall remain in effect after [the juvenile
court’s] jurisdiction is terminated’”].)
        Because the exit orders are now final, we do not have
jurisdiction to review and change them, and “the juvenile court
has no jurisdiction to conduct further hearings in the now-closed
case.” (In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164; see In re
Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 [“where jurisdiction
has been terminated and is final . . . jurisdiction cannot be
conferred upon the appellate court”]; see also § 304 [juvenile
court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear proceedings regarding
custody “until the time that the petition is dismissed or
dependency is terminated”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.620(a)
[same].) Accordingly, even if we were to reverse the January
2023 jurisdiction and disposition orders, that would have no
effect on the July 2023 exit orders—which in any event provide
Y.R. full legal and physical custody of Joshua, L.R. the elder, L.R.
the younger, and P.R.
        In short, we cannot provide Y.R. any effective relief—that
is, relief that “‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ conduct or legal status.’” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 277.) Y.R.’s appeal of the January 2023 jurisdiction findings
and disposition orders is thus moot. (See id. at p. 276 [a case is
moot when events render it impossible for the court to grant
appellant meaningful relief]; accord, In re Gael C., supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 224.)

D.   Discretionary Review of Y.R.’s Moot Appeal Is Not
     Warranted
     As noted above, the Department moved to dismiss the
appeal as moot and Y.R. opposed, requesting we exercise our

                                 9
discretion to review these orders on the merits under In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th 266. (See id. at pp. 282-287 [detailing
“nonexhaustive” factors court may consider in deciding whether
to exercise discretionary review of a moot dependency appeal].)
Y.R. concedes his appeal of the jurisdiction findings and orders is
moot because there is no “specific legal consequence” this court
could redress or relief we can provide which would alter his
present legal status. However, Y.R. contends discretionary
review is appropriate because (1) the jurisdiction findings
“adjudicating [him] as an emotionally abusive and neglectful
parent” would prejudice him in future dependency or family law
proceedings, (2) his “‘laudable behavior’” warranted termination
of jurisdiction and rendered the appeal moot; and (3) dismissal
would insulate erroneous jurisdiction findings from review.
       After consideration of the relevant factors, we decline to
exercise our discretion to consider Y.R.’s moot appeal. Y.R.’s
appeal does not present circumstances that generally warrant
discretionary review of a moot case, such as an issue of broad
public interest that is likely to recur, the likelihood of a
recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or a material
question that remains for the court’s determination. (See In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.)
       Y.R.’s allegation of speculative future harm also is
insufficient to demonstrate his appeal is not moot or to warrant
discretionary review. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 278.) There is no current proceeding that could be impacted,
and he makes no showing or particularized argument regarding
how the challenged jurisdiction findings could potentially impact
a future dependency proceeding. And even if Y.R. were presented
with a future dependency petition or family law proceedings, he

                                10
will have the opportunity to explain that Joshua, L.R. the elder,
L.R. the younger, and P.R. remained in his care throughout the
proceedings and that jurisdiction was terminated in his favor
with their return to his sole legal and physical custody, reflecting
a court’s determination that he did not pose a continuing risk to
them.
      Also, although the jurisdiction findings involve
“stigmatizing” conduct, it is not sufficiently “egregious” to
warrant exercise of our discretion to reach the merits. While
“stigma alone will not sustain an appeal, a court may consider
the nature of the allegations against the parent when deciding
whether discretionary review is proper.” (In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Here, jurisdiction was based on Y.R.’s
emotional abuse and medical neglect of the children’s older
sibling. While dependency jurisdiction by definition necessarily
involves conduct harmful to children, our assessment of severity
or perniciousness is a relative analysis. We do not find the
jurisdiction findings against Y.R. to be based on such
stigmatizing or pernicious conduct that our concerns over not
insulating erroneous and stigmatizing jurisdiction findings from
review would prompt us to review the merits in light of all other
factors.
      We recognize this is a case that was rendered moot by
Y.R.’s compliance with the case plan, eventually resulting in the
termination of jurisdiction and full custody of the four children to
Y.R. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [court may
consider whether case was rendered moot “by the prompt
compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal”; because “[i]t
would perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine

                                 11
resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional findings
only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the court has
issued additional orders”].) We commend Y.R. for his compliance
with the case plan. However, while expeditious compliance may
favor discretionary review in light of the other factors in this
case, we conclude on balance the factors the Supreme Court
identified in In re D.P. do not warrant discretionary review of
Y.R.’s moot appeal.

                         DISPOSITION

      The appeal is dismissed as moot.

                                      MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

      SEGAL, Acting P. J.

      FEUER, J.

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