Court Opinion

ID: 9470704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:13:49.577143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:03.899790
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Felix David Amezquita-Soto appeals from an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals upholding the immigration judge’s denial of petitioner’s application for suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 *905U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976). I would vacate the order and remand the case for reconsideration.
I.
Mr. Amezquita was born in Peru on May 10,1953. On April 12,1972 at age eighteen he came to the United States on a student visa. After studying for two years at Pas-saic High School, he met Ms. Poshinski, with whom he lived for two and a half years. In 1975 they had a child, Michelle Lee Ann Amezquita. Mr. Amezquita and Ms. Poshinski never married, and she subsequently married someone else and moved to Philadelphia. Mr. Amezquita stayed in Passaic, where his child lived with her grandmother, Mildred Poshinski.
On July 13, 1979 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) sent Mr. Amezquita an Order to Show Cause, which alleged that he was deportable under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because his student visa had expired. Immigration Judge Nathan W. Gordon held a deportation hearing in Newark, New Jersey on December 17,1979. At the hearing, Mr. Amezquita admitted that he was deportable, but asked the judge to suspend deportation or grant voluntary departure. He contended that his child, who was a qualifying family member under section 244(a)(1) of the Act, would suffer extreme hardship if he was deported. Mr. Amezquita presented a birth certificate for Michelle Lee Ann Amezquita which indicated that he was her father. He also presented evidence that the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court of Passaic County had adjudicated him to be the child’s father. According to the testimony of Mr. Amezquita and Mildred Poshinski, Mr. Amezquita lived in Passaic with his sister and visited his daughter on weekends and during the week. The child was dependent upon Mr. Amezquita; he supported the child and provided Mildred Poshinski with anything that she needed for the baby. The mother had no contact with the child. The immigration judge also found that there is great love and attachment between Mr. Amezquita and his daughter.
In an oral decision the immigration judge held that Mr. Amezquita was deport-able for the grounds set forth in the Order to Show Cause. He concluded that extreme hardship had not been established by the separation of Mr. Amezquita from his daughter and denied Mr. Amezquita’s application for suspension of deportation. Finding it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the child was legitimate or illegitimate, the judge held that the child would suffer no hardship because she would continue to be cared for by her grandmother. He also suggested that Mr. Amezquita might get relief in the future, when his sister, who was eligible for naturalization in 1980, could become a citizen and file a petition in his favor. The judge granted Mr. Amezquita’s application for voluntary departure, with deportation following if he did not leave within sixty days.
Mr. Amezquita appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) in December of 1979. He argued that the immigration judge had failed to give adequate consideration to the hardship father and daughter would suffer due to the separation. Under New Jersey law, he contended, illegitimate children are treated the same as legitimates and thus should be similarly treated for purposes of immigration law. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that Mr. Amezquita’s daughter does not qualify as a “child” within the meaning of section 101(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1), because she was illegitimate and had not been legitimated by marriage. Any hardship to Amezquita’s daughter could therefore not be a factor in determining hardship under section 244(a)(1). The Board also found that even if such hardship could be considered, the child would not suffer extreme hardship sufficient to make petitioner statutorily eligible for suspension of deportation because she could continue to live with her maternal grandmother.
II.
Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976) *906(the Act), permits discretionary relief from deportation where the alien is deportable, has been physically present in the United States at least seven years immediately preceding the date of application for suspension of deportation, is a person of good moral character, and is a person whose deportation would “result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child . . . . ”1 The term “child” is defined in part as
an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is—
(A) a legitimate child; or
(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, or under the law of the father’s residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). There is no dispute that Mr. Amezquita meets the physical presence and moral character requirements. The question here is whether Mr. Amezquita’s daughter is a “child” in the meaning of the statute under New Jersey law such that extreme hardship concerning her could be the basis to suspend Mr. Amezquita’s deportation. Our review of questions of law, including statutory construction and interpretation, is plenary. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976); Tovar v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 612 F.2d 794, 797 (3d Cir.1980).
Under New Jersey law, a child born out of wedlock is not legitimated unless her parents subsequently marry. N.J.Stat.Ann. 9:15-1 (West 1976).2 This does not, however, resolve the question whether Mr. Amezquita’s daughter is a “child,” because the Board had indicated that legitimacy may also be found when the law of the relevant domicile draws no distinctions between the treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children:
The term “legitimate” as used in section 101(b)(1)(A) normally refers to a child born in wedlock. See Matter of James, 15 I & N Dec. 544 (BIA 1975); Matter of Dela Rose, 14 I & N Dec. 728 (BIA 1974); Matter of Kubicka, 14 I & N Dec. 303 (BIA 1972). However, when the country where the beneficiary was born and resides eliminates all legal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children, all natural children are deemed to be the legitimate or legitimated offspring of their natural father from the time that country’s laws are changed. See Chin Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d 543 (2 Cir.1977); Matter of Sanchez, 16 I & N Dec. 671 (BIA 1979); Matter of Wong, 16 I & N Dec. 646 (BIA 1978). The test we have applied for preference immigration purposes is equality of filial rights when compared with those of children born in wedlock. Compare Matter of Sanchez, supra, with Matter of Clahar, 16 I & N Dec. 484 (BIA 1978); Matter of Reyes, 16 I & N Dec. 475 (BIA 1978).
*907Matter of Hernandez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 7, 8 (1979).
In New Jersey the courts and legislature have eliminated legal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children where the natural father admits paternity. The New Jersey Superior Court recognizes that “[¿distinctions affecting the substantial rights of either a child or its natural parents based upon the illegitimate status of the child have been held to be violative of the [Constitution].” E v. T, 124 N.J.Super. 535, 543, 308 A.2d 41, 45 (Ch.Div.1973); see also Matter of Adoption of B, 152 N.J.Super. 546, 549, 378 A.2d 90, 91 (Union Cty.Ct. 1977). The New Jersey statute which allowed an illegitimate child to inherit from its mother but not its father, N.J.Stat.Ann. 3A:4-7 (West 1953),3 was repealed in 1977 after the New Jersey Superior Court held that where paternity is shown all illegitimate children have the same right to intestate inheritance from their parents as legitimate children. Matter of Estate of Sharp, 163 N.J.Super. 148, 151, 394 A.2d 381, 382 (App.Div.1978). Under the recodi-fied statute effective May 1, 1982, a child born out of wedlock has a right to inherit from the father once paternity is established.4
Similarly, legitimate and illegitimate children are treated the same with regard to support and education, N.J.Stat.Ann. 9:16-2 (West 1976),5 and custody and visitation for the father whose parenthood has been established. N.J.Stat.Ann. 9:16-1 (West 1976);6 see also E v. T, 124 N.J.Super. 535, 543, 308 A.2d 41, 45 (Ch.Div.1973); R v. F, 113 N.J.Super. 396, 408, 273 A.2d 808, 814 (Juv. & Dom.Rel.Ct.1971) (where father admits paternity, statute excluding putative father from custody or control of illegitimate child is not applicable). Thus, where, as here, paternity has been acknowledged by the father and even adjudicated by a domestic *908relations court, New Jersey law provides for equality of filial rights between children born in and out of wedlock. Therefore, the daughter is “legitimate” and a “child” whose hardship must be considered in this petition to suspend deportation.
The Board’s reliance on the child’s illegitimacy was a legal error. Because its exercise of discretion was colored at least in part by its erroneous view as to the significance of illegitimacy, at the very least a remand is appropriate for reconsideration of the father’s application. We should not hold that the Board’s exercise of discretion would be the same had it properly understood New Jersey law.
III.
Despite its finding that it could hot as a matter of law consider the hardship to petitioner’s daughter, the Board went on to state that the hardship was insufficient to justify suspension of deportation. The Board reasoned that hardship was minimized by the fact that the maternal grandmother could take care of the daughter. However, Bastidas v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 609 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1979), teaches that such considerations are not pertinent in making hardship determinations. In Bastidas we said:
The family and relationships between family members occupy a place of central importance in our nation’s history and are a fundamental part of the values which underlie our society. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977). Accordingly, we view the separation of family members from one another as a serious matter requiring close and careful scrutiny. Although we do not go so far as to hold that the separation of a father from his child is, as a matter of law, extreme hardship for purposes of § 244(a)(1), we do hold that where a father expresses deep affection for his child and where the record demonstrates that his actions are consistent with and supportive of his expression of affection, a finding of no extreme hardship will not be affirmed by this court unless the reasons for such a finding are made clear.
Id. at 105. The Board must make a fresh determination of hardship which reflects consideration of the importance of the separation of family members from each other and the emotional hardship which such separation causes. See id.; see also Tovar v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 612 F.2d 794, 798-99 (3d Cir.1980) (fresh determination of hardship required where Board’s conclusion that insufficient hardship existed may have been colored by erroneous legal conclusion that hardship to grandchild could not be considered).
The majority attempts, unconvincingly, to “distinguish” Tovar and Bastidas, on the basis of the child’s residence with a maternal grandmother. The majority’s reliance on that factor demonstrates just how far removed federal appellate judges are from the day to day problems of lower income single parents. The majority opinion permits the Board to attach legal significance to the fact that a single working parent, having great attachment to his child, has chosen to rely upon a maternal grandparent for child care instead of attempting the extremely difficult task of maintaining a home for her and at the same time providing for infant day care during working hours. Safe and competent infant day care is both difficult to find and costly. For most single parents among the working poor there is no real alternative for child care other than reliance upon the voluntary assistance of a willing relative. Reliance upon this patent necessity to deprive the child as a matter of law of the protection Congress intended in section 244(a)(1) is an example of judicial heartlessness.
IV.
Accordingly, I would vacate the order denying suspension of deportation and remand the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals for reconsideration of the extreme hardship claim.

. Section 244(a)(1) of the Act provides:
(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and—
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such application and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence....

. N.J.Stat.Ann. 9:15-1 states:
Any child heretofore or hereafter born out of wedlock shall be legitimated by the intermarriage of his natural parents and their recognition and treatment of him as their child. A child so legitimated is entitled to all rights and privileges which he would have enjoyed had he been born after the marriage, his status being the same as if he were bom in lawful wedlock.

. N.J.Stat.Ann. 3A:4-7 (West 1953) read as follows:
For the purpose of descent and distribution under this chapter to, through and from an illegitimate child, such child shall be treated the same as if he were the legitimate child of his mother, so that he and his issue shall inherit and take from his mother and from his maternal kindred, including his maternal ancestors, descendants and collaterals; and they, from him and his issue. When parents of an illegitimate child shall marry subsequent to his birth and recognize and treat him as their child, such child shall be deemed to have been made the legitimate child of both of his parents for the purpose of descent and distribution to, through and from him under this chapter.

. N.J.Stat.Ann. 3B:5-10 (West 1983) reads as follows:
If, for the purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine succession by, through or from a person, a child born out of wedlock is a child of the mother. That child is also a child of the father, if:
a. The natural parents, before or after the birth of the child, participated in a ceremonial marriage or shall have consummated a common-law marriage where the marriage is recognized as valid in the manner authorized by the law of the place where the marriage took place, even though the attempted marriage is void; or
b. The paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, except that the paternity established under this subsection is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly treated the child as his, and has not refused to support the child.

. N.J.Stat.Ann. 9:16-2 reads:
A child born out of wedlock shall be entitled to support and education from its father and mother to the same extent as if bom in lawful wedlock.

. N.J.Stat.Ann. 9:16-1 states:
The mother of an illegitimate child, whether married or single, shall have the exclusive right to its custody and control and the putative father of such child shall have no right of custody, control or access to such child without the mother’s consent. If, however, it is proved that the mother is unfit to have the custody and control of such child, the Superior Court or any other court which may have jurisdiction in the premises may make any order touching the custody or control of such child which might heretofore have been made.
This section is intended to be declaratory of the existing law upon this subject and it shall, under no circumstances, be construed as an implication that the rights of such a mother have hitherto been less than as herein above defined.