Court Opinion

ID: 9930111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 13:07:01.846532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:03:33.425111
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                         No. COA23-612

                                     Filed 6 February 2024

Watauga County, Nos. 22 JA 46-47

IN THE MATTER OF: K.C., M.A.

       Appeal by Respondents from orders entered 21 December 2022, 30 January

2023, and 4 April 2023 by Judge Matthew Rupp in Watauga County District Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 January 2024.

       Fox Rothschild LLP, by Brian C. Bernhardt, for Guardian ad Litem; and Di
       Santi Capua & Garrett PLLC, by Chelsea B. Garrett, for Watauga County
       Department of Social Services, Petitioner-appellee.

        Jeffrey L. Miller, for Respondent-Father-appellant.

       Assistant Parent Defender Jacky L. Brammer and Parent Defender Wendy C.
       Sotolongo, for Respondent-Mother-appellant.

       WOOD, Judge.

                            I. Factual and Procedural History

       Father and Mother (together, “Respondents”) were unmarried partners living

together as a family unit along with their children, Kylie and Martin.1 Father is the

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the juveniles pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 42(b).
                                      IN RE: K.C., M.A.

                                      Opinion of the Court

biological father of Martin and stepparent of Kylie. On 24 August 2022, Watauga

County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed juvenile petitions alleging that

Kylie and Martin2 were neglected juveniles within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. §

7B-101(15)(e). The petitions were based on a report from a third party of possible

domestic violence, improper discipline, and substance use in the home. Kylie was

seven years old, and Martin was two years old at the time juvenile petitions were

filed.   Upon the filing of the petitions, the trial court entered orders for nonsecure

custody as to both children, and DSS removed the children from their home and

placed them in foster care.

         On 31 August 2022, Selena Moretz (“Moretz”), the director of the Children’s

Advocacy Center of the Blue Ridge, conducted a forensic interview with Kylie, which

was videotaped. During the interview, Kylie and Moretz had the following exchanges:

               [KYLIE]: [S]ometimes [Father] hits my mom. . . . And then
               she has a black eye. . . . [T]he reason I know—I know how
               my mommy gets hit by him is because I wake up and I hear
               her screaming. . . . I heard a, no, like a loud no. And then it
               just went quiet. . . . And then I heard my mommy come into
               the bathroom. But then I started to close my eyes so she
               thought I was sleeping, she went into the bathroom and
               shut the doors hard. . . . And the morning I saw a black eye
               on her. . . . So she just said I fell and landed on something.
               . . . [B]ut then we knowed it wasn’t that. . . . [I]t’s been more
               than once.

               ...

2 The original juvenile petition named Martin as an “Unknown male child,” but amended juvenile

petitions were filed on 29 August 2022 and 28 September 2022 adding Martin’s name and identifying
Father as his biological father.

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                      Opinion of the Court

I have seen it with my eyes. . . . [S]o when I was younger
when I was at Valle Crucis School . . . she woke me up and
she had a bruise under her eye and the top of her eye.

...

MORETZ: Uh-huh. But whenever you say that you see him
hit your mom; tell me about where you’re at when you see
that.

[KYLIE]: So I am usually on the couch. . . . But, like, I can
hear her. . . . I can hear her scream no. . . . But when I said
I seen him hit her is . . . I was watching TV and then my
mommy looked on his phone and he had—he had another
girlfriend that my mommy knowed about it and he dumped
her. But then he was texting her and said, I love you, good
night. . . . So then she flipped out and then [Father] got
mad. And then—and then he hit her. And then they went
into the—she wanted me to go into the bathroom some
place where he wouldn’t hurt us. So we—so she took me
and [Martin] in the bathroom and there was blood.

...

MORETZ: Tell me about where the blood was at.

[KYLIE]: It was on the curtains and on the ground, it was
on the bathtub a little bit. It was on the sink, like she was
crying. . . . We stayed there for a couple of more minutes
until it was quiet. Then we went out. . . . [Mother] told us
to just go to bed. And then nothing—and it’s going to be
okay.

...

MORETZ: Has there ever been a time that you’ve been
scared or worried about what [Father] is doing or saying?

[KYLIE]: Yeah. I am scared that one day [Father] is going
to hit me.

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                                  Opinion of the Court

Kylie further told Moretz that Father is “very mean to [Martin.] If he cries when he’s

going to sleep, he will spank him. . . . [H]e won’t say what do you want. He would just

spank him sometimes.” Finally, Kylie stated there was a time when Mother made

breakfast and left for work, planning to bring dinner home that night, and Father did

not allow Kylie or Martin to eat the whole day, except for one snack.

      The adjudication hearing was held 25 October 2022.          DSS presented two

witnesses: Ashley Hartley (“Hartley”), the social worker who filed the juvenile

petitions and initially brought law enforcement with her to Respondents’ home, and

Moretz. As its final evidence, DSS entered the videotape of the forensic interview

into evidence and played it for the court. The entire interview is approximately one

hour. Father testified in opposition to DSS’s case; Mother did not testify. Father

testified he “heard Kylie’s remarks in the video.” Father was asked about Kylie’s

remarks that Mother “was hit and was screaming,” and he testified that he did not

know what Kylie was talking about. Father was asked if he ever observed Mother

with a black eye, and he testified that there was one time Mother had a black eye

after she fell down the stairs and another time when she had a pimple near her eye

that became swollen, turned black, and had to be lanced. Father testified that he was

not responsible for giving Mother a black eye. Father was also asked about Kylie’s

allegation of domestic violence at the time she attended Valle Crucis School, to which

he testified, “that was at the beginning of our relationship where we was barely living

together,” and that it must have occurred before he entered into the current living

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                                   Opinion of the Court

arrangement he had with Mother. Regarding Kylie’s allegations of seeing blood after

an incident between Father and Mother and hearing Mother cry, Father testified he

could not remember any incidents involving blood although he has seen Mother cry

on numerous occasions. In response to Kylie’s allegation of the day Father did not let

her or Martin eat during the day except for one snack, Father testified that the

children had been snacking too much and not eating their regular food.             That

morning, Mother made a big breakfast before she left for work and was going to

return at approximately 5:00 p.m. to make dinner. Father testified that he was firm

that day that the children would only be allowed one snack between breakfast and

dinner.

      At the close of all evidence, counsel made closing arguments. Counsel for

Mother argued:

             We’ve had nothing but this video of the seven-year-old and
             her interpretation of what she may or may not have seen. .
             . . [W]ithout any other evidence and no substantiation of
             any DV other than what was perceived by a seven-year-old,
             again, we would just have to leave that in the Court’s
             discretion.”

Counsel for Father argued, “I believe[ ] that all we really have in this situation is an

interview where a child has made accusations about things, but we’re no further

along in proving that than when we started here today. None of this has been

substantiated.” Counsel for DSS argued:

             We’ve heard that there has been yelling. There was blood
             in the kitchen. . . . And so neither parent has offered an

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                                     Opinion of the Court

             explanation for that incident. And with all due respect, it
             comes down simply to credibility. . . . [W]e have a
             stepfather that said that [Mother] fell down the stairs and
             got a black eye, which is one of the most clichéd things ever
             heard about a reason for someone to get a black eye; and
             then another black eye was because of a stye.

Following all of the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court found DSS had

failed to produce clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the children were

neglected. The trial court stated:

             The case of the Department is based solely upon the video.
             The court finds that [Kylie] . . . is a delightful young lady,
             very articulate; and I believe—probably believed what she
             was saying, but I also believe that the Department could
             have, at a minimum, obtained the medical records relative
             to the mom’s black eye. I never saw that.

             I believe that the Department at a minimum could have got
             a criminal history for [Father]. While I have no reason to
             question his character, but he may—that may be his
             criminal record and it may not. There may have been other
             things that would have shown more light on this
             circumstance.

             Maybe if the burden of proof was by the greater weight you
             might have it. I cannot find and nor can I adjudicate in this
             matter without clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. And
             I don’t believe that I’ve been furnished that and this
             petition is dismissed.

The trial court ordered the children to be reunited with Father and Mother. On 23

November 2022, the trial court filed its written order dismissing the juvenile

petitions.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

      On 1 December 2022, DSS filed a motion pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 59–60 (the

“Rule 59/60 motion”). In the motion, DSS stated, in relevant part:

             1. Pursuant to Rule 59, N.C.R.P., a new trial may be
             granted or this Court may amend its judgment based upon:
             insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or that
             the verdict is contrary to law, or any other reason
             recognized as grounds therefor.

             2. Alternatively, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), N.C.R.P., DSS
             requests relief of this Court’s judgment dismissing its
             Petition if the Court agrees, after a review of the record
             and, specifically the forensic interview recording, that it
             has a justifiable reason to provide DSS the relief sought.

DSS requested that the trial court “reconsider its ruling in light of certain

inconsistencies in between the evidence and the [trial court’s] ruling.” DSS further

stated that it believed in good faith “that certain key evidence, that being a video of

a forensic interview with one of the Juveniles, was difficult to hear when played in

Court and could have contributed to why the Court ruled as it did.” DSS included ten

quotations of portions of the interview, along with the video time stamps showing the

exact time the statements were made. DSS printed some of the quotations in bold

typeface. Finally, DSS requested the trial court to “re-listen to the forensic interview

in chambers, perhaps with headphones (or where it can be more clearly heard) or,

read a transcribed copy thereof, which is in the process of being completed.” (Emphasis

added.)

      The trial court held a hearing on DSS’s Rule 59/60 motion on 16 December

2022. At the hearing, DSS stated that there were “anomalies” for DSS’s counsel and

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                                   Opinion of the Court

for Hartley in that they “found that video somewhat difficult to hear.” The trial court

agreed, stating, “It was difficult to hear, plus the child was so energetic running

around and talking at the same time. It did present an issue for me.” DSS argued

that the trial court was required to make determinations regarding the credibility of

the witnesses due to the conflicting “testimony” between Kylie, as presented through

the videotape, and Father. The trial court stated, “I will go ahead and tell everybody

here right now, my ruling was based on the fact that I didn’t know what that kid was

saying.” The trial court reiterated that “the child . . . . was constantly moving about,

picking this up, running around, talking this quick. . . . I did not hear very much and

I couldn’t understand very much.” Counsel for Father argued that everyone in the

courtroom during the adjudication hearing seemed to be able to hear the videotape

and that the trial court would have made it audible if anyone had claimed it was not

audible. Ultimately, the trial court took the matter under advisement and told DSS,

“I do want that transcript.” Counsel for Respondents objected to the trial court’s

consideration of the transcript of the forensic interview.

      On 17 December 2022, the trial court emailed counsel its ruling granting DSS’s

Rule 59/60 motion. The trial court reversed its earlier ruling and adjudicated the

children neglected. The trial court stated that the videotape of the forensic interview

played at the adjudication hearing had poor sound quality and was difficult to

understand. The trial court reported that DSS provided a transcript of the videotape,

noting the transcript presented the same evidence as did the video. The trial court

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                                   Opinion of the Court

stated the transcript was “clear and understandable, and had it been presented at

trial, the [trial court] would have adjudicated the juveniles as neglected juveniles.”

The trial court directed counsel for DSS to prepare adjudication and disposition

orders.

      On 21 December 2022, the trial court entered its written order granting the

Rule 59/60 motion. In it, the trial court stated:

             2. [The video of the forensic interview] was a pivotal part
             of DSS’s evidence based on the statements of the Juvenile
             therein. The sound quality of the video was poor which
             made it difficult to hear all the statements clearly, and
             depending on one’s hearing and position in the courtroom,
             some of those present were able to hear the video better
             than others.

             3. After reading the verbatim transcript of the videoed
             interview, this Court realized that it did not, in fact, hear
             certain statements that [Kylie] made in the forensic
             interview. The Court was able to hear- though with some
             difficulty- other portions of the forensic interview as it was
             played on the record during the hearing on DSS’s Petition.

             4. Therefore, the undersigned was not aware at the time of
             the Adjudication hearing that he had not heard the several
             key statements of [Kylie] which were pivotal and constitute
             clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in support of DSS’s
             Petition.

             5. As a result, this Court dismissed DSS’s Petition for
             failure to meet the requisite burden of proof- clear, cogent,
             and convincing evidence.

             6. In hindsight, and with the benefit of the verbatim
             transcript of the forensic interview, the Court sees that it
             did have clear[,] cogent[,] and convincing evidence in
             support of DSS’s Petition. Therefore, had it clearly heard

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                                  Opinion of the Court

             the entirety of the forensic interview that was played in
             Court from beginning to end, the Court would have not
             dismissed DSS’s Petition.

             7. After the Adjudication hearing, Counsel for Petitioner,
             DSS, listened to the forensic interview video again to
             confirm the statements made by [Kylie] and filed Motions
             pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 of the North Carolina Rules of
             Civil Procedure. In support of these Motions, Counsel for
             Petitioner offered the verbatim sealed transcript of the
             forensic interview. Counsel for Respondent parents
             objected to the Court’s consideration of the transcript.

             8. The transcript presented the identical evidence as the
             video played in Court, but in a clear and understandable
             manner. Had the Court heard all of the statements of
             [Kylie] in the interview, it would not have dismissed DSS’s
             Petition.

             9. Extraordinary circumstances exist such that equity and
             justice demands this Court grant DSS the relief sought
             from the Court’s prior Order Dismissing Juvenile Petition.

Also on 21 December 2022, the trial court held a hearing on “interim disposition.”

The trial court entered its written order on interim disposition on 22 February 2023

in which it ordered kinship placement of the children with their maternal

grandmother. Mother was permitted to reside with them, and Father was permitted

two hours supervised visitation per week with Martin and no visitation with Kylie.

The permanency plan of care was reunification.

      On 30 January 2023, the trial court entered its order on adjudication, finding

that Father physically abused Mother in the home in the presence of the children and

that Kylie witnessed such abuse, including a black eye, at least once. The trial court

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                                   Opinion of the Court

adjudicated both Kylie and Martin neglected within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. §

7B-101(15). The trial court granted legal and physical custody of the children to DSS.

      On 9 February 2023, Mother filed a notice of reservation of right to appeal the

30 January 2023 order. On 28 February 2023, the trial court held a hearing on final

disposition, and on 4 April 2023, it filed its written disposition order which continued

the children in the custody of DSS and in kinship placement with their maternal

grandmother and retained the permanency plan of reunification.

      On 6 April 2023, Father and Mother filed a notice of appeal of the adjudication

order entered 30 January 2023 and the disposition order entered 4 April 2023.

                                     II. Analysis

A. Petitions for Writ of Certiorari

      First, we must determine whether this Court has jurisdiction to review

Respondents’ appeals on their merits. Both Father and Mother filed petitions for writ

of certiorari because they seek appellate review of judgments they contend are void.

Our Supreme Court has said of void judgments:

             A judgment is void, when there is a want of jurisdiction by
             the court over the subject matter of the action, and a void
             judgment may be disregarded and treated as a nullity
             everywhere. . . . A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
             judgment. No rights are acquired or divested by it. It
             neither binds nor bars any one, and all proceedings
             founded upon it are worthless.”

Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1956) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

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                                   Opinion of the Court

        N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32 authorizes this Court to issue a writ of certiorari “in

aid of its own jurisdiction, or to supervise and control the proceedings of any of the

trial courts of the General Court of Justice.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c).          “The

practice and procedure shall be as provided by statute or rule of the Supreme Court,

or, in the absence of statute or rule, according to the practice and procedure of the

common law.” Id. Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in pertinent

part:

              The writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate
              circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of
              the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right
              to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take
              timely action, or when no right of appeal from an
              interlocutory order exists, or for review pursuant to
              N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c)(3) of an order of the trial court
              ruling on a motion for appropriate relief.

N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1). Our Supreme Court has explained:

              The procedure governing writs of certiorari is found in Rule
              21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. But Rule 21 does
              not prevent the Court of Appeals from issuing writs of
              certiorari or have any bearing upon the decision as to
              whether a writ of certiorari should be issued. Instead, the
              decision to issue a writ is governed solely by statute and by
              common law.

Cryan v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Associations of United States, 384

N.C. 569, 572, 887 S.E.2d 848, 851 (2023) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Our appellate courts employ a two-factor test to determine whether a writ of

certiorari should issue: (1) “if the petitioner can show merit or that error was probably

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                                  Opinion of the Court

committed below” and (2) “if there are extraordinary circumstances to justify it,”

including “a showing of substantial harm.” Id. at 572, 887 S.E.2d at 851 (quotation

marks omitted).

      Because, as discussed below, we hold the trial court did not possess subject

matter jurisdiction to enter its 21 December 2022 order after its order dismissing the

petition on 23 November 2022, any order entered after the dismissal was void.

Therefore, any notice of appeal by Father and Mother of any order entered after the

dismissal of the petition was ineffective because it was an appeal from a void order,

and “all proceedings founded upon [a void judgment] are worthless.” Hart, 244 N.C.

at 90, 92 S.E.2d at 678. Although Mother filed a notice of reservation of right to

appeal the trial court’s 30 January 2023 order, and both Father and Mother filed

notices of appeal of that same order as well as the dispositional order entered 4 April

2023, N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) does not apply to these particular circumstances. This

is because Father and Mother seek appeal of a void order. Accordingly, we must

determine whether this Court should, “in aid of [our] own jurisdiction,” grant

Respondents’ petitions for writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c).

       Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter orders in this matter

after dismissing the juvenile petition, Respondents’ contention that the trial court

erred has merit. They also make a showing of extraordinary circumstances because

of the substantial harm resulting from the separation of a family due to a void order

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                                   Opinion of the Court

and the lack of finality in a juvenile case. Accordingly, we grant their petitions for

writ of certiorari.

B. The Trial Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction After Dismissal

       Respondents argue: (1) the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction

to grant DSS’s Rule 59/60 motion; (2) even if the trial court did have subject matter

jurisdiction, it abused its discretion in granting the motion; and (3) the trial court

erred in adjudicating the children neglected. Because we hold that the trial court did

not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant the Rule 59/60 motion, we need not reach

the other issues raised.

       “Whether or not a trial court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction is a question

of law that is reviewed de novo. Challenges to a trial court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of proceedings, including for the first time” on

appeal. In re M.R.J., 378 N.C. 648, 654, 862 S.E.2d 639, 643 (2021).

       Respondents argue that N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-201 and 7B-807 provide that a

trial court’s jurisdiction in a juvenile abuse, neglect, or dependency action is

terminated upon the dismissal of a juvenile petition. We agree. Initially, a trial court

obtains jurisdiction over a juvenile abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding when a

petition alleging the same is filed: “The court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over

any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent.”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-200(a). A trial court’s jurisdiction ends, however, when it

dismisses the juvenile petition upon a finding that the allegations contained in the

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                                   Opinion of the Court

petition are unproven. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-201(a) provides, “When the court obtains

jurisdiction over a juvenile, jurisdiction shall continue until terminated by order of

the court or until the juvenile reaches the age of 18 years or is otherwise emancipated,

whichever occurs first.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-201(a) (emphasis added). N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-201(b) further provides that, except in five enumerated circumstances,

which are not applicable to this case:

             When the court’s jurisdiction terminates, whether
             automatically or by court order, the court thereafter shall
             not modify or enforce any order previously entered in the
             case, including any juvenile court order relating to the
             custody, placement, or guardianship of the juvenile. The
             legal status of the juvenile and the custodial rights of the
             parties shall revert to the status they were before the juvenile
             petition was filed, unless applicable law or a valid court
             order in another civil action provides otherwise.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-201(b) (emphasis added). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(a) provides,

“If the court finds that the allegations have not been proven, the court shall dismiss

the petition with prejudice, and if the juvenile is in nonsecure custody, the juvenile

shall be released to the parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §

7B-807(a) (emphasis added). In summary, these statutes provide that the trial court’s

jurisdiction begins upon the filing of a petition and ends when the trial court

dismisses the petition upon a finding that the allegations have not been proven.

      Here, in the original adjudication hearing, the trial court explicitly stated in

open court that DSS’s case was “based solely upon the video” and that DDS did not

prove its case by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, specifically finding that DSS

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                                   Opinion of the Court

could have provided other evidence such as medical records pertaining to Mother’s

black eye as well as Father’s criminal history. Upon dismissing the petition, the trial

court then ordered the children reunited with Father and Mother, as required by N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(a). Finally, the trial court entered its written order summarily

dismissing the juvenile petitions (also as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(a)),

which was an order by the trial court causing the termination of its jurisdiction

because there was no longer a juvenile petition before it. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-201(a)

(“When the court obtains jurisdiction over a juvenile, jurisdiction shall continue until

terminated by order of the court”). Upon the trial court’s dismissal of the juvenile

petition, and the simultaneous termination of its jurisdiction, “[t]he legal status of

the juvenile and the custodial rights of the parties . . . revert[ed] to the status they

were before the juvenile petition was filed.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-201(b). Therefore,

the trial court’s jurisdiction terminated, at the latest, on 23 November 2022 when it

entered the written order dismissing the petitions.

      As a practical matter, it is not immediately apparent on appeal what the

auditory issue was during the adjudication hearing.         The full recording of the

interview was played before the trial court. Aside from the recording, Father testified

that he “heard [Kylie’s] remarks in the video.” He was questioned on direct and cross-

examination regarding the particular allegations contained in the recording of the

interview: that Mother “was hit and was screaming”; whether he ever saw Mother

with a black eye; the allegation of domestic violence while Kylie attended Valle Crucis

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                                         Opinion of the Court

School; the appearance of blood in the home; and the issue of whether Father deprived

the children of proper nutrition while Mother was at work. Even if these particular

allegations could not all be heard properly while the recording was played, there was

a second chance to hear and consider them during Father’s testimony. There was yet

another opportunity to hear and consider such allegations during the attorneys’

closing arguments. Counsel for Mother argued there was “no substantiation of any

DV other than what was perceived by a seven-year-old.” Counsel for DSS specifically

reiterated the allegations concerning yelling, blood, a black eye, and that Kylie herself

witnessed such things. These were further opportunities for the trial court to hear

and consider the allegations, weigh credibility, and make findings of fact, if necessary.

In its oral ruling on the matter, the trial court weighed Kylie’s credibility,

demonstrating its understanding that Kylie made allegations of witnessing Father

commit domestic violence. The trial court even mentioned “mom’s black eye.”

       The Rule 59/60 motion cannot operate as a method to claw back jurisdiction

and reconsider the evidence, as DSS asked the trial court to do in this case. The trial

court may have had second thoughts “[i]n hindsight,” but the Rule 59/60 motion was

the improper method to seek reconsideration, and granting the motion was an

improper method to implement remorse for the trial court’s initial ruling.3 Once the

3 We note that DSS could have appealed the trial court’s initial adjudication decision.N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1001 specifically allows an appeal from an “involuntary dismissal of a petition.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1001(a)(2). We note that “[n]either a Rule 59 motion nor a Rule 60 motion may be used as a
substitute for an appeal.” Musick v. Musick, 203 N.C. App. 368, 371, 691 S.E.2d 61, 63 (2010).

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                                   Opinion of the Court

trial court summarily dismissed the petition due to DSS’s failure to prove its case,

the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction terminated. DSS cannot bypass an appeal

with a Rule 59/60 motion, and the trial court cannot swap its initial adjudication

decision after dismissal of the petition.

      Accordingly, we overrule DSS’s argument that N.C. R. Civ. P. 59(a) and 60(b)

operate to allow a trial court to act on a juvenile petition even after dismissing a

petition for failure to prove the allegations contained within it. Because the trial

court’s subject matter jurisdiction terminated when it entered its order dismissing

the juvenile petition, its order granting DSS’s Rule 59/60 motion, and all subsequent

orders are void ab initio. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 590, 636 S.E.2d 787, 790 (2006)

(“A judgment is void[ ] when there is a want of jurisdiction by the court over the

subject matter. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. No rights are acquired

or divested by it. It neither binds nor bars anyone, and all proceedings founded upon

it are worthless.”) (ellipsis omitted). Regardless of whether or not N.C. R. Civ. P. 59

and 60 may otherwise be applicable in juvenile cases in some limited circumstances,

they are inapplicable here because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order

on the Rule 59/60 motion. Once the trial court divests itself of jurisdiction, it cannot

thereafter revive it.

                                   III. Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we hold the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction

terminated when it dismissed the juvenile petitions following its finding that DSS did

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                                   IN RE: K.C., M.A.

                                  Opinion of the Court

not prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. Because its order granting DSS’s

Rule 59/60 motion and all subsequent orders are void ab initio and must be vacated,

all orders entered after the order of dismissal of the petitions are hereby vacated.

      VACATED.

      Judges FLOOD and STADING concur.

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