Court Opinion

ID: 9572265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:40:12.426973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:11.749455
License: Public Domain

JON P. WILCOX, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I conclude that the unique nature of contact sports calls for the application of a standard of care other than ordinary negligence. I disagree with the majority's basic premise that ordinary negligence is flexible enough to be applied under any set of circumstances. I believe application of the ordinary negligence standard in personal injury actions arising out of participation in contact sports will discourage vigorous and active participation in sporting events. I agree with the majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue and concluded that personal injury cases arising out of athletic events must be predicated on reckless disregard of safety; an allegation of negligence is not sufficient to state a cause of action. See cases cited in the majority opinion at footnote 7; an excellent analysis of many of the cases adopt*915ing the majority rule is provided in Dotzler v. Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990).
The plaintiff in Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.W.2d 94 (Mass. 1989), was "butt-ended" in the abdomen with a hockey stick by the defendant. The court adopted the reckless disregard standard stating:
The problem of imposing a duty of care on participants in a sports competition is a difficult one. Players, when they engage in sport, agree to undergo some physical contacts which could amount to assault and battery absent the players' consent. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 50 comment b (1965). The courts are wary of imposing wide tort liability on sports participants, lest the law chill the vigor of athletic competition. See, e.g., Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo.1982). Nevertheless, "some of the restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete on to the playing field." Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill.App.3d 212, 215, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975). " [Reasonable controls should exist to protect the players and the game." Ross v. Clouser, supra.
The majority of jurisdictions which have considered this issue have concluded that personal injury cases arising out of an athletic event must be predicated on reckless disregard of safety. See., e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 524 (10th Cir.1979); Nabozny v. Barnhill, supra; Ross v. Clouser, supra at 14; Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461, 465, 672 P.2d 290 (1983). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 comments e & g (1965).
We adopt this standard. Allowing the imposition of liability in cases of reckless disregard of safety diminishes the need for players to seek retaliation during the game or future games. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., supra at 521. Precluding the imposition of liability in cases of negligence without reckless misconduct furthers the policy that *916" [vigorous and active participation in sporting events should not be chilled by the threat of litigation." Kabella v. Bousckelle, supra.
Gauvin, 537 N.E.2d at 96-97.
In Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1982), the plaintiff third baseman sustained a severe knee injury during a church league softball game when the defendant runner collided with him outside the base path. Holding that the basis for a cause of action for personal injuries sustained during athletic competition must be recklessness rather than mere negligence, the court stated:
Fear of civil liability stemming from negligent acts occurring in an athletic event could curtail the proper fervor with which the game should be played and discourage individual participation, yet it must be recognized that reasonable controls should exist to protect the players and the game. Balancing these seemingly opposite interests, we conclude that a player's reckless disregard for the safety of his fellow participants cannot be tolerated. If a plaintiff pleads and proves such recklessness, he may seek relief for injuries incurred in an athletic competition.
Ross, 637 S.W.2d at 14, overruling Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
Most courts that have applied the recklessness standard have defined that standard according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 500 (1965), which provides:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical *917harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. (Emphasis added).
The court in Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), further distinguished between reckless disregard and negligence as follows:
Reckless misconduct differs from negligence, in that the latter consists of mere inadvertence, lack of skillfulness or failure to take precautions, while reckless misconduct involves a choice or adoption of a course of action either with knowledge of the danger or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to a reasonable man. Hackbart also held that "[recklessness also differs in that it consists of intentionally doing an act with knowledge not only that it contains a risk of harm to others as does negligence, but that it actually involves a risk substantially greater in magnitude than is necessary in the case of negligence." 601 F.2d at 524.
Kabella, 672 P.2d at 293.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "the negligence standard, properly understood and applied, accomplishes the objectives sought by the courts adopting the recklessness standard. ..." Majority op. at 912. In the instant case, the standard ordinary negligence instruction was read to the jury. That instruction states:
A person is negligent when he fails to exercise ordinary care. Ordinary care is the degree of care which the great mass of mankind ordinarily exercises under the same or similar circumstances. A person fails to exercise ordinary care when, without intending to do any wrong, he does an act or omits a precaution under circumstances in which a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to foresee that such act or omission will subject him *918or his property, or the person or property of another, to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage. (Emphasis added).
Wis. JI — Civil 1005. No instruction was given to the jury setting forth the factors it was to consider in properly applying the negligence standard to this case. The jurors were not instructed that, ”[t]he very fact that an injury is sustained during the course of a game in which participants voluntarily engage and in which the likelihood of bodily contact and injury could reasonably be foreseen materially affects the manner in which each player's conduct is to be evaluated under the negligence standard." Majority op. at 913. While the defendant's action clearly violated a rule of the game, the action occurred during the heat of the game and should not form the basis of a negligence action.
The majority's affirmance of a judgment against the defendant indicates that the majority does not fully comprehend the objectives of other courts in adopting the recklessness standard. The policy objective of other courts is that "vigorous and active participation in sporting events should not be chilled by the threat of litigation." Kabella, 672 P.2d at 294. The unsound and chilling effect of subjecting participants of contact sports to liability for their ordinary negligence can be seen in the following description of the evidence a plaintiff, who was injured in a pickup basketball game, unsuccessfully wanted to offer:
Plaintiff was going to offer the testimony of one Steven Lefler as an expert in the area of pickup basketball. Lefler claimed to have played 15,000 to 20,000 games of basketball of one style or another. According to an offer of proof made following the hearing on defendant's motion in limine and at commencement of the trial, Lefler would testify that he *919was thoroughly familiar with the safety rules and usages of basketball, that he had studied the depositions of the witnesses listed above, and that in his opinion the defendant was reckless in that he was running too fast without watching where he was going or caring where the plaintiff and other participants in the game were located. The defendants motion was sustained.
Dotzler, 449 N.W.2d at 779.
The majority recognizes a judicial trend toward applying the reckless disregard standard in cases involving sports related injuries. Majority op. at 911. The majority chooses to disregard this trend and makes Wisconsin a distinct minority in applying the ordinary negligence standard to personal injury actions arising out of contact sports.
Participants in contact sports assume greater risks than do others involved in non-physical recreational activities. Because rule infractions, deliberate or unintentional, are virtually inevitable in contact games, I believe imposition of a different standard of conduct is justified where injury results from such contact. Oswald v. Township High School Dist. No. 214, 406 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Connell v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). I would adopt the rationale of the majority rule and hold that a participant in a contact sport such as soccer is liable for injuries in a tort action only if his or her conduct is in reckless disregard for the safety of the other player, but is not liable for ordinary negligence. The allegation as to ordinary negligence did not state a cause of action and should have been dismissed.
*920I am authorized to state that Justices STEINMETZ and BABLITCH join in this dissent.