Court Opinion

ID: 9745391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:53:29.459074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:00.028568
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting: Because I believe the trial court improperly denied the State the opportunity to make an offer of proof as to the reliability of bloodhound evidence, I must dissent. As the majority points out, it is error for the trial court to refuse to permit counsel to make an offer of proof. (See People v. Eckert (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 667, 675, 551 N.E.2d 820, 825; In re Estate of Undziakiewicz (1964), 54 Ill. App. 2d 382, 385, 203 N.E.2d 434, 436.) Contrary to the majority’s view, however, I believe the suggested testimony was relevant. Notwithstanding the antiquity of Pfanschmidt, other jurisdictions have admitted bloodhound evidence. (See Annot., 18 A.L.R.Sd 1221 (1968).) Moreover, the very issue is now pending before our supreme court. (See People v. Cruz (199_),_Ill. 2d__) The trial court should have at least permitted the State to present what it had before rejecting the evidence outright. (See Eckert, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 675, 551 N.E.2d at 825.) While I realize the State’s choice of wording may not have been the best possible in this instance, the State’s intent was more than clear. For these reasons, I dissent.