Court Opinion

ID: 9353583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 02:01:36.086171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:08:19.253352
License: Public Domain

JUDGE VOGT,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 48 I agree with the majority that, under Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014), the district court could not assert personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants based on their defamatory statements. I also agree that the two statements attributed to the Colorado defendant, Martin, were constitutionally protected statements of opinion that could not afford a basis for liability for defamation. Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s resolution of the issues addressed in Parts II and III of the opinion. I do not agree that dismissal of all the remaining claims was warranted at this stage in the litigation, and I therefore respectfully dissent from Part IV of the majority opinion.
*871I. Additional Factual Background
¶ 49 In addition to the facts set forth in the majority opinion, the following facts are relevant to the non-defamation-related claims asserted by plaintiffs and dismissed by the trial court.
¶ 50 As set forth above, plaintiffs sued numerous named and unnamed defendants, asserting that the defendants had set out to destroy plaintiff Giduck’s business by publishing defamatory statements about him on various websites. They alleged that defendants’ campaign had been largely successful, causing plaintiffs Giduck and Archangel to lose nearly $500,000 in annual profits. In addition to detailing the defamatory statements, plaintiffs described other actions engaged in by defendants, including the following: (1) in January 2012, someone — following up on a suggestion made on soenet.com— “went to Giduek’s home while he was out of town, slashed his tires and set a mattress next to his house on fire”; (2) defendants threatened to kill Giduck and, to effectuate their threats, “kept Giduck’s residence under surveillance, to include [sic] driving up his driveway in a remote wooded area late at night when they have known that he was traveling for work and that his wife and small child were home alone”; (3) defendants also attacked plaintiff Nicoletti (Giduck’s wife), physically threatened and intimidated her and her children, “including posting that they would kill her three-year-old son’s pony,” and caused problems for her at her place of employment by contacting the employer and stating that Nicoletti and. her daughter should lose their top secret security clearances; and (4) defendants published photographs of Nicoletti and her children on the Internet and published her home address, all for the purpose of harassing her and increasing the risk to her safety and that of her family.
¶ 51 In addition to their defamation claims, plaintiffs asserted other tort claims based in whole or in part on the actions described above. Claim 3 (trespass) incorporated the previous factual allegations and asserted, in relevant part, that “[defendants intentionally entered onto Giduck’s and Nicoletti’s property, or caused others to intentionally enter onto Giduck’s and Nicoletti’s property to slash his tires and set a mattress on fire,” thereby causing damage to plaintiffs’ property. In claim 4 (assault), plaintiffs asserted that defendants intended to, and did, place them in apprehension of harmful physical contact by the actions described above. Claim 8 (extreme and outrageous conduct) cited both the. defamatory statements and defendants’ other conduct (trespassing, assaulting, and threatening) in support of their allegations that defendants “engaged in the extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent of causing .Giduck and Nicoletti severe emotional'distress,” and that they did cause such distress. Claim 10 alleged that defendants had aided and abetted other defendants in committing the. enumerated torts, including trespass and assault. In claim 12 (violation of the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act), plaintiffs again cited both defamatory statements and the other tortious conduct described above in support of their allegations.
¶52 As noted in the majority opinion, when defendants moved for a more definite statement under C.R.C.P. 12(e), the trial court granted the motion, observing that “the defendants’ motion is requesting a more definite statement as [to] which individual defendant posted which specific'defamatory comment and approximately when it occurred,” and finding that the “complaint lacks sufficient definiteness and particularity to enable the defendants to respond to and defend against each alleged wrong-doing.” Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint citing some 174 defamatory statements made by specific defendants. Other than incorporating by reference the new factual allegations, plaintiffs did not further supplement the allegations in claims 3 through 12. However, when some defendants sought a more definite statement as to these claims, plaintiffs responded: “[T]o the extent that [plaintiffs misinterpreted the Court’s Order, and it required that all the allegations be amended, and not just the allegations regarding the quoted defamatory statements, [plaintiffs request another opportunity to ame,nd.”
¶ 53 The trial court did not grant them such opportunity. Rather, finding that plain*872tiffs had ignored its original order and still had not alleged -wrongdoing by specific defendants in their third through twelfth claims for relief, the trial court dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim,
II. Analysis
¶ 54 Whether the order dismissing claims three through twelve is interpreted as a C.R. C.P. 12(b)(5) dismissal for failure to state a claim (as the majority and some of the defendants ■ interpret it) or as a sanction under C.R.C.P. 12(e) (as plaintiffs and defendant Monger interpret it), I do- not agree with the majority that the order of dismissal should be affirmed in its entirety.-
¶ 55 I note at the outset that certain of the claims were properly dismissed, albeit not for the reason cited by the trial court. Claims 5, 6, 7, and 11 sought relief, on other tort theories or in the nature of injunctive relief, based specifically on defendants’ defamatory statements. As a division of this court has recognized, when defamation claims are properly dismissed, ancillary claims seeking recovery on other theories based on the same defamatory statements must also be dismissed. Fry v. Lee, 2013 COA 100, ¶¶ 60-62, 408 P.3d 843. Further, claim 9 (civil conspiracy) had to be dismissed because there was no allegation that a Colorado resident performed acts in Colorado in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Gognat v. Ellsworth, 224 P.3d 1039, 1053-54 (Colo.App.2009). However, claims 3 (trespass) and 4 (assault) did not seek recovery based on defendants’ defamatory statements, and claims 8, 10, and 12 were based in part on actions other than defamation. Those claims should not have been dismissed under any theory at this stage in the litigation.
A. Dismissal pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5)
¶ 56 Motions to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim are disfavored in Colorado. Qwest Corp. v. Colo. Div. of Prop. Taxation, 2013 CO 39, ¶ 12, 304 P.3d 217. Such motions may be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim which would entitle him or her to relief. Id. In evaluating the motion, a court must accept’ as true all averments of material fact and must view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hemmann Mgmt. Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc., 176 P.3d 856, 858 (Colo.App.2007).
¶ 57 Under these standards, plaintiffs’ trespass and assault claims, as well as the claims relying in part on the acts constituting trespass and assault, were sufficient to state a claim for relief. Indeed, neither the trial court nor the majority has identified any element of the respective torts that plaintiffs failed to allege, or any lack of specificity (other than identity of the particular tortfea-sors) in the .underlying factual allegations. Rather, dismissal was ordered by the trial court, and is affirmed by the majority, based simply on the fact that plaintiffs have not identified which specific defendants committed which tortious acts. I do not agree that that lack of identification warranted dismissal in the circumstances presented here.
¶ 58 Plaintiffs state that, in part because of defendants’ use of false identifying information on their web postings, they have been unable to- discover the full extent of each defendant’s participation in the tortious conduct; thus, because “much of the evidence necessary to prove plaintiffs’ claims remains in the exclusive control of others,” it is “a factual impossibility for plaintiffs to uncover the full extent of each of the [defendants’ actions without discovery.” In such circumstances, the trial court should have allowed plaintiffs to undertake limited discovery to identify specific tortfeasors, to the extent such information was not known to them, rather than imposing the drastic sanction of dismissal. See, e.g., Shockley v. Georgetown Valley Water & Sanitation Dist., 37 Colo.App. 434, 436, 548 P.2d 928, 929 (1976) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim even though complaint did not set forth certain matters, including precise relationships between- the defendants and the individual committing the tortious acts, and observing that a plaintiff need not set forth with particularity underlying acts giving rise to the claim, “especially as to those matters reasonably unknown to him and within the cognizance of the defendants”); see also Edmond *873v. City of Colo. Springs, 226 P.3d 1248, 1264 (Colo.App.2010) (citing cases in which Colorado courts have allowed plaintiffs to name unknown defendants in complaints); Rauen v. City of Miami No. 06-21182-CIV, 2007 WL 686609, at *4 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 2, 2007) (refusing to dismiss based on plaintiffs’ inability to identify the specific defendants involved in the alleged deprivation of their rights, and stating: “Accepting Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against any of the Defendants because of Plaintiffs’ inability to identify specific officers would require the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ case in its entirety. Such a result is clearly not in the interests of justice, for it would reward Defendants for their uniform method of dress ... which makes it virtually impossible for an observer to identify the officers or departments behind each face shield”).' The Rauen court added: “Of course, as discovery progresses, the parties may identify information that would support the dismissal of (or entry of summary judgment on) claims against particular Defendants.” Id.
¶ 69 Rauen is an unpublished decision, as are the federal decisions relied on by the majority. However, I am persuaded that its approach, rather than that taken in the cases cited by the majority, is consistent with Colorado law disfavoring dismissals for failure to state a claim. It also furthers the interests of justice in a case where evidence of which individual committed’ which act is, at this point, likely to be “reasonably unknown to [plaintiffs] and within the cognizance of ... defendants.” Shockley, 37 Colo.App. at 436, 648 P.2d at 929. As in Rauen, if discovéry reveals that a defendant had no involvement in the non-defamation-related activities, dismissal or summary judgment for that defendant would be warranted. Conversely, if nonresident defendants are identified as having been involved in those activities, the court may have personal jurisdiction over them upon a showing that they committed intentional tortious actions expressly aimed at causing a harmful effect in Colorado. See Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233, 239 (Colo.1992); Vogan v. Cnty. of San Diego, 193 P.3d. 336, 340 (Colo.App.2008).
B. Dismissal as a Sanction under C.R.C.P. 12(e)
¶ 60 Nor can the order of dismissal be upheld as a sanction for plaintiffs’ failure to identify the specific individuals responsible for the conduct described above.
¶ 61 C.R.C.P. 12(e) permits a party to request a more definite statement of any matter not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity. The rule further provides that, if the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed, “the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.” While rulings on C.R.C.P. 12(e) motions and responses to them are committed to the discretion of the trial court, that discretion is not absolute. See Morgan v. Brinkhoff, 145 Colo. 78, 80, 358 P.2d 43, 44 (1960) (bill of particulars under Rule. 12(e) “ordinarily should not be utilized to unduly expand the pleadings where discovery is the proper method for obtaining information falling outside the category of ultimate facts”); Unigard Ins., Co. v. Mission Ins. Co. Trust, 12 P.3d 296, . 301 (Colo.App.2000) (where response to C.R.C.P. 12(e) motion was untimely, division “[could not] say that the court’s decision, to strike the fraud counterclaim ... was manifestly arbitrary,” but noted that trial court was free to revisit the decision on remand).
¶ 62 Construing the analogous federal rule, federal courts have recognized that “ ‘[w]here a motion for a more definite statement is justified and an effort is made to comply with the order of the court granting it, the insufficiency of the effort does not justify automatic dismissal of the action.... The draconian remedy of dismissal of the action, should be invoked only as a last resort.,.” Pardee v. Moses, 605 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir.1979) (quoting Schaedler v. Reading-Eagle Publ’n, Inc., 370 F.2d 795, 798-99 (3d Cir.1967)); see 2A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.20 at 2417-18'(2d ed.1979).
¶ 63 As set forth above, plaintiffs complied -with the trial court’s order for a more definite statement by filing a significantly more detailed amended complaint; when defendants subsequently requested further detail, *874plaintiffs requested an opportunity to provide such detail if they had misunderstood the scope of the initial order — a not unreasonable request, in my opinion, given the wording of the initial order. In these circumstances, sanctioning plaintiffs by dismissing their entire remaining complaint, rather than allowing plaintiffs to supply the identity of the defendants if it was known to them or engage in discovery to learn that identity if it was not, was an abuse of discretion.
III. Conclusion
1164 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, whose factual allegations must be accepted as true at this stage in the proceedings, avers that defendants have damaged them by a course of conduct that, in my view, can fairly be characterized as vicious. Under the trial court’s orders and the majority’s decision affirming those orders, plaintiffs are left with no remedy in Colorado courts for their losses. While I agree that the defamation claims cannot be maintained for the reasons stated by the majority, I would reverse the order dismissing the non-defamation-related claims and allow plaintiffs the opportunity to seek redress on these claims. It follows that I would also revisit the decision to award defendants the full amount of their attorney fees.