Court Opinion

ID: 9602702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:59:00.878606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:05.708933
License: Public Domain

OPAL A, Justice,
with whom LAVENDER, V.C.J., joins, dissenting.
This case is not about judicial responsibility to compel legislative obedience to the single-subject command in Art. 5, § 56, Okl. Const.,1 but about the extent of constitutionally permissible judicial intrusion into the internal management of the legislative department.
The specific issues presented here are: (a) Does a legislator have proper standing to press a challenge to a bill for noncompliance with the § 56 mandate? (b) Must the substantive-law provisions of the challenged appropriations bills be invalidated under the teachings of Johnson v. Walters ?2 (c) Does the separation-of-powers doctrine require this court to adopt a standard of review for gauging § 56 conformity that gives due deference to each house of the legislature to allocate subjects within a bill? and (d) Is a § 56 defect cured by the act’s inclusion into the next decennial recompilation? I would answer all four questions in the affirmative.
Although standing to challenge an enactment’s validity for § 56 nonconformity has not been challenged, I would resolve this issue sua sponte for future guidance.3 My counsel to the court is that a legislator who complains that his/her voting power was impermissibly harmed or impaired by an improper combination of subjects in viola*264tion of § 56 standards has standing to challenge the enactment’s validity.
If an appropriations bill clearly violates the § 56 mandate but its funding provisions are beyond the scope of review because of the mootness doctrine, I would follow the teachings of Walters and invalidate the bill’s substantive-law components. Today’s opinion, which applies the mootness doctrine to all the provisions (meaning appropriations as well as substantive-law portions) in both Senate Bill 142 [SB 142]4 and Senate Bill 725 [SB 725]5, falls short of giving the parties a complete remedy to which they are entitled under the court-crafted standard of review.
The court today adopts the germaneness test6 — expressly rejecting the functionality approach7 — for determining a bill’s conformity to the § 56 single-subject command. In applying the germaneness test, the court holds that both bills offend the § 56 standard.
I must recede from that part of today’s pronouncement which adopts germaneness as the sole test for § 56 compliance. Though I join the court’s resolve to enforce the single-subject mandate, I would adopt a test that will insulate us from day-to-day entanglement in the political thicket rather than one that saddles the court with the task of micromanaging another department of government. The proper allocation of a bill’s content is a managerial prerogative of each house.
My counsel is that both the germaneness and functionality tests be allowed to coexist side by side. If a bill’s conformity to § 56 strictures is “fairly debatable” when gauged by either test, I would abstain from interfering with the legislature’s managerial judgment. This approach would allow the contested legislation to pass constitutional muster under both the functionality and germaneness tests. It is, in my view, fairly debatable whether the various agencies grouped in both of these bills under attack are functionally interlocked in furtherance of a common purpose and whether the subjects are reasonably related to a common theme.
The final issue I would consider today is whether a § 56 defect in combining unrelated subjects is cured by the act’s inclusion into the next decennial recompilation. Because each compilation cures any defect in form that may taint a bill, I would not allow any legislation to become the target of invalidation for noncompliance with § 56 *265once an act has been carried into the succeeding decennial compilation.
For all of these reasons, I would assume original jurisdiction but deny the petitioners’ quest for relief.
I.
A LEGISLATOR HAS STANDING WHEN HIS/HER VOTE ON A BILL HAS BEEN DILUTED AS A RESULT OF IMPERMISSIBLY COERCED DECISION-MAKING
A.

The History of Standing

Standing in the federal-court system owes its origins to an historic practice by the English parliament of “allowing only those opponents of legislative proposals ... or interests [who] were directly and specially affected to be heard.” 8 Under this legislative procedure an opponent affected by the proposed legislation was said to have locus standi.9 The English judiciary adopted these interest-in-legislation criteria and required that the parties have an interest in the litigation. American courts did not embrace the doctrine until the early twentieth century.10
B.

Federal Standing

Standing for any party to sue is part and parcel of the larger requirement of “justici-ability”. Four components of the justicia-bility doctrine are (1) ripeness, (2) mootness, (3) political question, and (4) standing.11 If a party can show that he/she passes muster under all of these justiciable factors, then a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction and can address the merits of the ease.
Litigants who seek access to federal court for resolution of their dispute face two hurdles in meeting the threshold requirement of standing — “constitutional limitations of federal courts’ jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.”12 The constitutional aspect of standing is “whether the plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III.”13 “[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. Ill requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant14 ... and that the injury ‘fairly can be traced to the chal*266lenged action’ and ‘is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision....’” 15
The “prudential” aspect of the standing doctrine addresses itself to the self-restraint by which federal courts limit their jurisdiction. Generally, the plaintiff can only assert that his own interests and legal rights have been injured, and not those of third parties.16 In addition, the plaintiff must show that his asserted injury would not be better addressed “in the representative branches of government,” and that his injury falls within the zone of interest protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee upon which his claim is based.17 Only if these aspects are met will the court balance the prudential considerations in evaluating whether to grant standing.18
C.

Oklahoma Standing Requirements

Standing in Oklahoma refers to the legal rights of a person to challenge the conduct of another in a judicial forum.19 The issue of standing may be raised at any stage and at any time during the judicial process by any party or sua sponte by the court.20 This threshold inquiry must reveal that the party has alleged: (1) an actual or threatened injury, i.e. injury in fact; (2) the relief sought would remedy the injury; and (3) the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of interest protected by statute or by the constitution.21 These interests must not only be “direct, immediate and substantial”,22 but are limited to those people who actually suffered the injury.23 Because these requirements coincide with the federal requirements, federal, jurisprudence construing standing for legislators is instructive.
D.

Standing For Legislators

When a member of the law-making assembly initiates legal proceedings in his representational capacity as a congressman or a state legislator, he/she holds no elevated status in establishing standing. He/she must meet the same requirements for standing as any other litigant.24
In order to satisfy the constitutional aspect25 some type of redressible injury must be alleged. Injuries suffered by legislators fall within three basic categories:26 (1) diluted vote, (2) usurpation of legislative power, and (3) diminished effectiveness in *267carrying out legislative duties absent a judicial declaration.
Legislators have, unequivocally, a “plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes."27 Any intrusion that works to squelch or infringe upon this core legislative function operates to dilute the constitutional 28 voting equality among legislators. Such an intrusion is a direct injury to a legislator’s interest in casting a meaningful vote.29
In this case, the legislators assert they have been injured by being forced to vote “up” or “down” legislative bills which offend the § 56 single-subject mandate. Basically they claim that certain subjects were impermissibly combined, leaving them without the opportunity to segregate out the impermissible parts of each bill. Ac*268cording to these legislators, they were forced to vote for all of the bills’ contents in order to secure passage of the parts that benefited their constituency. Because the last sentence of § 56 mandates that certain subjects be voted on in separate bills, these legislators have an interest in this court determining whether their votes have been diluted.
To satisfy the prudential aspects of the test for standing the legislators must claim: (a) they, rather than their constituency, were injured; and (b) they fall within the zone of interest to be protected under statutory or constitutional law.30
The legislators assert here that their voting interest has been directly affected and that this interest falls within the zone of interest protected by Art. 5, § 56. Standing is implicit in any legislator’s complaint when a bill is challenged for any § 56 mis-combination of subjects. Such a complaint will always raise the issue of vote dilution. The burden is on the respondent to deny that it has occurred. Because these legislators have shown that their voting rights are protected by § 56, they fall within the zone of interest to be protected.
II.
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF § 56’s SINGLE-SUBJECT COMMAND
A.
The First-Generation Approach— Johnson v. Walters31
The purpose of the last sentence of § 5632 — the single-subject mandate — is (a) to prevent legislators from having their vote impermissibly coerced or impaired by being confronted with improper choices and (b) to prevent the legislature from defeating the governor’s veto power in the same manner. In either case an elected official may be required to vote in favor of one provision which he disfavors in order to enact provisions which he supports. In both instances, an affirmative vote is the product of impermissibly coerced decision-making. Miscombination of subjects often leads to “logrolling” or improper inducement into voting for the lesser of the evils in the bill. The § 56 single-subject mandate was designed to prevent this kind of intimidation to make a bill saleable.
Our jurisprudence teaches that in a pure (general) appropriations bill, agencies with unrelated functions may be included without offending the § 56 single-subject mandate.33 It is only when substantive-law components are included within an appropriations bill that the § 56 command is implicated. In Walters34 the court became belatedly converted to the concept of rigorously enforcing the § 56 single-subject mandate, announcing for the first time since statehood mandatory compliance with the § 56 strictures. In accordance with Walters, if a bill fails to pass constitutional “single-subject” muster, the governor must condemn it by the use of an appropriate veto message and return the bill to the legislature.35 Walters expressly overruled Wiseman v. Oklahoma Board of *269Corrections,36 which gave birth to the rule that the governor must either accept or reject in toto a bill’s substantive-law provisions (Art. 6, § 11 veto power)37 and confined his line item veto power solely to the appropriation items (Art. 6, § 12 veto power).38
While I joined the court’s “Rip Van Winkle conversion”, I counseled in Walters (a) against overruling Wiseman’s teaching and (b) against pronouncing that the governor must declare the bill violative of the single-subject command.39
B.

Post-Walters Conversion

The court’s pronouncement today allows the substantive-law provisions of SB 142 and SB 725 to survive despite its alleged commitment to Walters. To be true to Walters, the appropriation provisions of a constitutionally infirm bill may escape the law’s sanction because of mootness, but its substantive-law component can be condemned as violative of § 56. By applying the mootness doctrine to both the appropriations and substantive-law portions of SB 142 and SB 725, the court in effect withholds from the petitioners the very remedy the teachings of Walters intended to afford.
C.

The Constitutional Standard For Gauging § 56 Single-Subject Compliance

In this case we are faced with a new era and a first-impression question on the proper standard for gauging a bill’s conformity to the single-subject mandate. I would join the court in enforcing § 56 but by a different test. The court applies a germaneness test as the sole gauge for § 56 conformity to the single-subject mandate. The artificiality of today’s test rejecting the tendered functionality approach40 and adoption of *270the germaneness test for § 56 compliance will ultimately lead to judicial micromanagement of legislative decision-making on allocation of subjects among and within the bills to be processed. This strict test places the court in the political position of a floor manager charged with directing the legislative components of each bill. In addition, the germaneness approach provides the legislature with little guidance as to what subjects are properly includable within special appropriations bills. I would not put the legislature in a straitjacket by foisting on that department semantical word games.
For these reasons, I would adopt both the germaneness and functionality approaches. If the § 56 conformity of subjects within a bill is fairly debatable, the legislature’s allocation presents a judgment call and falls within the protection of the managerial prerogative of each house in which the bill arises. In that event, we should abstain from judicial intervention.41 The principle, crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court for testing the validity of legislative zoning regulations,42 requires that courts defer to the policy-making judgment of the zoning boards where unconstitutional invasion of property rights is at issue, if the question is fairly debatable. This standard will shield us from stepping into a political fray to referee disputes between the departments of government or between or among members of different political parties.
D.

The Separation-of-Powers Mandate

Judicial invasion into the legislature’s managerial prerogative to allocate subjects within a bill offends the separation-of-powers doctrine enjoined on this government by Art. 4, § 1, Okl. Const.43 No depart*271ment of government may possess “directly or indirectly an overruling influence over the others.”44 Each branch has a right to manage itself free from the intrusion of the others. The fairly-debatable standard of review gives due and proper deference to the legislature’s managerial prerogative — a by-product of its constitutional liberty to govern itself. Although each branch of government is not “hermetically sealed from one another”, “[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted,”45
Courts should not be drawn into the political process and into interparty disputes on issues of policy unless there is a clear constitutional violation.46 The germaneness test is neither explicitly nor implicitly mandated by § 56 or by any other constitutional provision; neither is it a test to which this court has previously committed itself. The teachings in Rupe v. Shaw47 are consistent with the view I espouse today and vary from that of the court. I would counsel that if the allocation of subjects within a bill presents a fairly debatable issue, the court should abstain from judicial intervention.
E.

Application of the Single-Subject Mandate Should Be Consistent Throughout the Oklahoma Constitution

Legislative bills as well as initiative measures are bound by a similar single-subject mandate.48 It is my counsel that the court adopt a uniform method, using both the germaneness and functionality tests when examining the single-subject rule under either Art. 5, § 56 or Art. 24, § l.49 It is *272only logical that the court should adopt but one single-subject rule that would be uniformly applicable to legislative and people-generated lawmaking alike.50
In addition, I espouse that a uniform fairly debatable standard be adopted in order to keep the court from politically entangling itself in both legislative and initiative measures. In Rupe this court cautioned against declaring legislative acts void for noncompliance with the single-subject command.51
In In re Initiative Petition No. 349,52 I counseled the court to refrain from invalidating “as-yet-unenacted [initiative] measures in the political process” in order to distance the court from matters of policy. The fairly debatable approach would let the people and the elected lawmakers legislate in a more reasonable way.
III.
SB 142 and SB 725 ARE FREE OF CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY
I counsel today that the germaneness and functionality approaches may stand side by side. It is my firm belief that the court should interfere with the content of a bill only in a case of clear noncompliance.

It Is Fairly Debatable Whether SB 142 Meets the Functionality and Germaneness Tests

If it is fairly debatable whether the provisions assigned to a bill are “reasonably related to a common theme or purpose” 53 or “contemplate some functional interrelationship or interdependence”,54 I would allow the legislation to pass constitutional muster. Both SB 142 and SB 725 meet the germaneness and functionality tests, given the fairly debatable constitutional threshold.
When analyzing whether a bill is germane, courts look to whether “[e]ach of [the measure’s] several facets bears a common concern, general object or general subject” 55 or whether the bill is reasonably related to a common theme. SB 142’s title indicates that the agencies included in that act are grouped together according to their function as “state cultural entities”. The “common concern” or “common theme or purpose” of SB 142 is the appropriation of monies for state cultural activities. It is fairly debatable whether all of the provisions in this legislative initiative do relate to its common theme and are hence germane to one another. Whether for the purpose of tourism and recreation, libraries, arts council, or historical society, all of the subjects are related to appropriating monies for cultural activities. The same can be established for SB 725 in providing for the appropriation of state business regulatory agencies in that all of the provisions are related to the appropriation of monies for agencies which regulate business within the state.
Using a strict germaneness test, the court singles out four sections of SB 142 as offensive to the single-subject mandate: (a) § 16 reappropriates monies from the Oklahoma Department of Tourism and Recreation [Tourism Department]; (b) § 17 reap-propriates funds to the Tourism Department from the Department of Commerce which relate to the development of an industrial airpark economic study; (c) § 20 prohibits the closing of state parks without specific authorization of the legislature; and (d) § 23 establishes an internship pro*273gram for tourism management by the State Regents of Higher Learning in conjunction with the Tourism Department.
My own analysis of these provisions leads me to conclude that they could all meet the germaneness rule, if the fairly-debatable standard is applied. This is so because they are related to a common theme or purpose. Section 20, for example, prohibits the Tourism Department from closing state parks for one year effective July 1, 1992, ostensibly because funds have been appropriated for that purpose. It is debatable whether state parks are reasonably related to cultural development and hence the inclusion of § 20 meets the ger-maneness standard. I would conclude it is fairly debatable whether all of these disputed subjects are reasonably related to this common theme or purpose of appropriating monies for the Tourism Department, and hence to cultural activities.
The functionality test requires that the provisions of a bill “effectively interlock in a functional relationship”.56 The courts look to whether the measure is “functionally related in furtherance of a common underlying purpose.”57 This test determines whether an action or activity is appropriate58 to further the underlying common purpose. Again, it is fairly debatable whether the action taken by the legislature in allocating the subjects within SB 142 and SB 725 “contemplate some interrelationship or interdependence” and are functionally related in furtherance of a common purpose of appropriating monies to provide for cultural activities or the regulation of business, respectively.59 For example, as provided for in SB 142, ensuring that the state parks are not closed is functionally related to, or an appropriate action in furtherance of, the underlying purpose of the bill which is providing access to this cultural activity whether it be hiking, boating or camping.
By strictly applying the germaneness test without the fairly debatable test, we arrive at a reductio ad absurdum: If these four provisions of SB 142 are nonger-mane within that bill, they are, for the reasons explained in the footnote, also potentially nongermane to any other legislation.60 The court’s germaneness analysis leaves the legislature without a workable standard to manage its own affairs. This will inevitably place the court in the position of having frequently to revisit these issues and will multiply the number of challenges made to legislative allocations.61
*274IV.
THE CURATIVE EFFECT OF A DECENNIAL RECOMPILATION
Both a defect in title and noncompliance with the single-subject command are objections to the form of an act rather than to its substance or content. Allen v. Retirement System for Justices and Judges62 teaches that a bill, defective when passed for want of a good title, becomes impervious to attack after it is carried into the next decennial recompilation. Under the constitutional mandate of Art. 5, § 43, Okl. Const.,63 the legislature must revise Oklahoma laws every ten years. If the substance of the revision is not otherwise prohibited by the Constitution the revision will stand as authorized.64 A statute’s incorporation in a decennial recompilation purges or cures any defect present in that enactment’s title.65 By relation back the incorporation gives the statute validity from the date of the original enactment in a flawed form.66
Any legislation that contains miscombi-nations of discrete subjects that may be challenged for noncompliance with the § 56 single-subject command under the ger-maneness standard should be deemed cured with the offending act’s inclusion into the next decennial compilation. I would not — under Allen’s teachings — allow an act to be the target of invalidation for noncompliance if the act had been carried into the 1991 recompilation.
SUMMARY
A § 56 challenge triggers four threshold issues: (1) whether a legislator has proper standing to press a challenge for noncompliance with the § 56 single-subject command; (2) whether the non-mooted substantive-law provisions of the challenged bill must be invalidated under the teachings of Walters; (3) whether a standard of review must be adopted which gauges § 56 conformity with due reference under the separation-of-powers principle to the legislature’s power to allocate subjects within a bill; and (4) whether a § 56 defect may be cured by the act’s inclusion into the next decennial recompilation.
Standing is a general requirement for any suit. Legislators who complain in this case that their vote has been impaired by the miscombination of subjects in a bill in violation of the single-subject mandate of Art. 5, § 56 have standing to seek relief.
In following the -teachings of Walters, the court can condemn the substantive-law provisions of a constitutionally infirm bill, while the appropriation portions may escape § 56 sanction because of the mootness doctrine. If, as here, an appropriations bill were clearly violative of the § 56 mandate but its funding provisions were beyond the scope of review, I would nonetheless invalidate the bill’s substantive-law components.
The necessity of compelling legislative compliance with Art. 5, § 56 cannot be questioned, but imposing a strict (germaneness) standard for its enforcement would entangle the judiciary in the allocation of subjects within a bill without due deference to another department. What may at first blush appear as a beneficial tool for curb*275ing logrolling becomes of secondary significance if viewed as intruding into the preserve of a separate service. The germaneness test alone puts this independence at risk. The level of judicial scrutiny should depend upon the threshold question of whether the allegedly defective bill meets the germaneness or functionality tests. If it is fairly debatable whether it meets either the germaneness or functionality tests, the bill passes § 56 strictures.
I would hold that it is fairly debatable whether SB 142 and SB 725 meet the functionality and germaneness approaches for gauging § 56 conformity. To foist on the legislature a tougher standard would be to invite the court’s entry into the political thicket. In a debatable case a neutral court would stay out of partisan fights.
Lastly, recompilation cures any defect in form. Should a legislator challenge a constitutionally infirm bill after its inclusion in a decennial recompilation, its nonconformity, if any, should be deemed corrected by the act of recompilation.
For all of these reasons I would assume original jurisdiction but deny the writ.

.The terms of Art. 5, § 56, Okl. Const., are:
"The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the expenses of the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the State, and for interest on the public debt. The salary of no officer or employee of the State, or any subdivision thereof, shall be increased in such bill, nor shall any appropriation be made therein for any such officer or employee, unless his employment and the amount of his salary, shall have been already provided for by law. All other appropriations shall be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject. ” (Emphasis added.)

. Okl., 819 P.2d 694 (1991).

. Standing may be raised at any stage of the judicial process or by the court on its own motion. Matter of Estate of Doan, Okl., 727 P.2d 574, 576 n. 3 (1986).

. SB 142, 2nd Regular Session, 43rd Legislature (Okl.Sess.L.1992, Ch. 333), an act relating to “state cultural entities," contains appropriations for the following state agencies: State Arts Council, Oklahoma Department of Libraries, Will Rogers Memorial Commission, J.M. Davis Memorial Commission, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma Tourism and Recreation Department, and Oklahoma Educational Television Authority.

. SB 725, 2nd Regular Session, 43rd Legislature (Okl.Sess.L.1992, Ch. 337), an act relating to "state business regulatory agencies," contains appropriations for the following state agencies: Banking Department, Department of Commerce, Commission on Consumer Credit, Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission, State Insurance Department, Department of Labor, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Board, and Oklahoma Securities Commission.

. The germaneness test, as elucidated in Legislature of State of Cal. v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 294, 816 P.2d 1309, 1320 (Cal. 1991), is met when all of the parts of a measure are "reasonably germane” to each other and to "the general purpose or object" of the measure.

. The functionality approach "contemplates some functional interrelationship or interdependence" of the bill. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal.3d 336, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 334, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Cal.1990). This standard requires that the provisions of a bill "effectively interlock in a functional relationship”. Eu, supra note 6 at 1321. The test is met when the measure is "functionally related in furtherance of a common underlying purpose." Fair Political Practices Com’n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.3d 33, 157 Cal.Rptr. 855, 872, 599 P.2d 46, 63 (1979) (Manuel, J., dissenting).
Before making the germaneness test exclusive, Eu, supra note 6 at 1321, the California Supreme Court upheld both the functionality and germaneness tests. Amador Valley Joint Union High Schl. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 248, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290 (1978). There, the court stated that the provisions of the initiative measure satisfied both standards in that the provisions "are both reasonably germane to, and functionally related" to the subject of property tax relief. Id., 149 Cal.Rptr. at 248, 583 P.2d at 1290.

. Benck, Standing For State And Federal Legislators, 23 Santa Clara L.Rev. 811, 813 (1983) citing J. Vining, Legal Identity 55, 55-56 (1978).

. Benck, supra note 8, at 813 n. 17. Black's defines locus standi as "[a] place of standing; standing in court. A right of appearance in a court of justice, or before a legislative body, on a given question.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 848 (5th Ed. 1979).

. Some conflict exists among scholars about when the concept of "standing” actually came into being. See Burger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions; Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 Yale L.J. 816, 818-19 (1969), where the author asserts that Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923), was the first application of the standing doctrine. But cf., Note, Standing To Sue For Members of Congress, 83 Yale L.J. 1665, 1667-68 (1974). Benck, supra note 8 at n. 18, observes that the word “standing” first appeared in a headnote in 1903 in Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 23 S.Ct. 498, 47 L.Ed. 778 (1903). Citing Mississippi & Mo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 17 L.Ed. 311 (1863), he notes that it was generally understood that a person must show injury or damage as a prerequisite to being heard in a federal court.

. Benck, supra note 8 at 811, citing L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 3-9 to 3-17 (1978 & Supp.1981).

. Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

. Warth, supra note 12, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. at 2205; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2873, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976).

. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), quoting from Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1707-08, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986).

. Valley Forge, supra note 14, 454 U.S. at 472, 102 S.Ct. at 758, quoting from Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 1925, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976).

. Valley Forge, supra note 14, 454 U.S. at 474, 102 S.Ct. at 760; Worth, supra note 12, 422 U.S. at 500-501, 95 S.Ct. at 2205.

. Valley Forge, supra note 14, 454 U.S. at 475, 102 S.Ct. at 760.

. Id.

. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Okl. Tax Com'n, Okl., 653 P.2d 1230, 1232 (1982); Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy D., Okl., 742 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1987).

. Doan, supra note 3 at 576 n. 3.

. Independent School Dist. No. 9 v. Glass, Okl., 639 P.2d 1233, 1237 (1982).

. Underside v. Lathrop, Okl., 645 P.2d 514, 517 (1982); Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep, Okl., 652 P.2d 271, 274 n. 13 (1982); Doan, supra note 3 at 576.

. Independent School Dist. No. 9 v. Glass, supra note 21 at 1237.

. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C.Cir.1977).

. See supra Part 1(B). Although Oklahoma courts are not bound by the Art. Ill "case or controversy" standard, we use the same test for gauging standing. The "constitutional aspect” in the federal courts is the first prong of the standing test relating itself to injury in fact and redressibility. See supra notes 14 and 15. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that these are implicit policies of the Art. Ill “case or controversy". See Valley Forge, supra note 14, 454 U.S. at 471, 102 S.Ct. at 758. Oklahoma standing requirements are aligned with this first prong — i.e., the constitutional aspect. See Independent School Dist. No. 9, supra note 21 at 1237, which shows that injury in fact and re-dressibility is the first prong of the Oklahoma test. I refer to constitutional aspect in this manner for simplicity and consistency.

. Bench, supra note 8 at 821. One author categorizes the injuries as: (1) standing based upon an injury derivatively suffered by a congressman due to an injury inflicted upon the Congress, (2) standing based upon the congressman’s status as a representative of his or her constituents, and (3) standing based upon an injury suffered directly by the congressman. *267Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote is This, Anyway?, 62 Notre Dame L.R. 1, 13 (1986). Another commentator categorizes them as "capacities in which a legislator may bring suits: (1) as an advocate of traditional individual interest that happens to be connected with legislative activities; (2) as a representative of his or her constituents; (3) as an officially designated representative of a legislative body, typically challenging allegedly unlawful executive action; or (4) as a vindicator of his or her alleged personal interest in full exercise of official legislative powers.” L. Tribe, supra note 11 at § 2-20 (Supp.1988).

. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438, 59 S.Ct. 972, 975, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939). In Coleman twenty state senators from Kansas maintained that the effectiveness of their votes against state ratification of the Child Labor Amendment had been diluted by the voting process. The vote on the proposed amendment resulted in a tie. The lieutenant governor broke the deadlock by casting a vote in favor of the amendment. The senators maintained that the lieutenant governor was not part of the "legislature" under the constitution and therefore could not vote for the proposed amendment. Apart from this issue, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the senators, in having alleged a direct injury to their voting rights, had enough of an interest in the action to give them standing.

. See Art. 5, § 31, Okl. Const., which implicitly provides that every representative shall have one vote. Fractional votes are inconsistent with Art. 5, § 31. Brown v. State Election Board, Okl., 369 P.2d 140 (syllabus 8) (1962). Voting equality among legislators is a constitutional command and cannot be intruded upon.

. Other than Coleman, supra note 27, which involved state legislators, the U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed standing for U.S. senators or representatives. (1) Several federal courts in recent years have been inundated with legislators claiming to have been injured in their capacity as lawmakers. In Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C.Cir.1974), a U.S. Senator alleged that the President’s use of the 'pocket veto’ was illegal and as a result the legislation that the senator voted for did not become law. The court found that by the President not vetoing or signing the bill that was presented to him, the senator’s vote was effectively nullified. (2) Other federal cases have been able to establish standing resulting from injuries to legislators’ voting rights. See Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 550-551 (7th Cir.1991) (state legislators had standing to challenge the governor’s partial veto power); Clarke v. United States, 705 F.Supp. 605, 608 (D.D.C.1988) (District of Columbia city councilmen have standing to challenge law that violates their First Amendment right to vote); Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 630-31 (3rd Cir.1984) (territorial legislators had standing to challenge a gubernatorial appointment of a government officer on grounds that they were denied the right to confirm the nominee). (3) Several cases in which legislators brought actions have failed to establish an injury. See Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1205 (11th Cir.1989) (U.S. senator was denied standing because he had not shown that his vote had been diminished by voting for a detention center for aliens that was being operated contrary to the enacted law); Harrington, supra note 24 (U.S. representative was denied standing because he could not show that a mere potential vote for impeachment was impaired as a result of the CIA’s activities); Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271, 1277-78 (5th Cir.1975) (state legislator denied standing because his complaint alleged no specific voting infringement); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2nd Cir.1973) (a U.S. representative was denied standing because her vote was not impaired on whether to send military troops to fight in Cambodia).
Some state courts have been confronted with the issue of standing for legislators. See Zemprelli v. Thornburg, 73 Pa.Cmwlth. 101, 457 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1983) (state legislators had standing because they alleged they were denied their right to vote to confirm nomination submitted to them by the governor); Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 516 (Col.1985) (the general assembly had standing to challenge the governor on the basis that he was exercising a legislative function in violation of the state constitution). Other state courts have found that a legislator has not shown that he has been injured. See Wilt v. Beal, 26 Pa.Cmwlth. 298, 363 A.2d 876, 881 (1976); Posner v. Rockefeller, 26 N.Y.2d 970, 311 N.Y.S.2d 15, 15, 259 N.E.2d 484, 485 (1970).

.In every case it is imperative that a legislator show that he was injured qua legislator and that there is a legally protected right conferred upon him by statute or by the constitution that affords this voting protection. Risser, supra note 29 at 550 (legislators rely on the constitutional provision that guarantees a republican form of government); Clarke, supra note 29 at 608 (the First Amendment is relied upon); Dennis, supra note 29 at 631 (territorial legislators rely on the advice-and-consent clause of the state constitution); Kennedy, supra note 29 at 434 (U.S. senator relies on the separation-of-powers doctrine). The District of Columbia Circuit has developed an additional prudential requirement called "equitable discretion.” Helms v. Secretary of Treasury, 721 F.Supp. 1354, 1357-1359 (D.D.C.1989).

. Supra note 2.

. For the pertinent text of Art. 5, § 56, Okl. Const., see supra note I.

. Draper v. State, Okl., 621 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1980); Walters, supra note 2.

. Supra note 2.

. The Governor cannot approve the bill's interrelated substantive law provisions and line item veto the appropriation provisions. Ordinarily, the governor may veto any subset of the provisions in the appropriation portions of a bill, though he is limited to rejecting the substantive law portion as written.

. Okl.,. 614 P.2d 551 (1980).

. The terms of Art. 6, § 11, Okl. Const., provide in pertinent part:
Every bill which shall have passed the Senate and House of Representatives, and every resolution requiring the assent of both branches of the Legislature, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor; if he approve, he shall sign it; if not, he shall return it with his objections to the house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large in the Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected to that house shall agree to pass the bill or joint resolution, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; and, if approved by two-thirds of the members elected to that house, it shall become a law, notwithstanding the objections of the Governor.... If any bill of resolution shall not be returned by the Governor within five days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not become a law without the approval of the Governor. No bill shall become a law after the final adjournment of the Legislature, unless approved by the Governor within fifteen days after such adjournment.” (Emphasis added.)

. The terms of Art. 6, § 12, Okl. Const., are:
"Every bill passed by the Legislature, making appropriations of money embracing distinct items, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor; if he disapproves the bill, or any item, or appropriation therein contained, he shall communicate such disapproval, with his reasons therefor, to the house in which the bill shall have originated, but all items not disapproved shall have the force and effect of law according to the original provisions of the bill. Any item or items so disapproved shall be void, unless repassed by a two-thirds vote, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the preceding section in reference to other bills: Provided, That this section shall not relieve emergency bills of the requirement of the three-fourths vote.” (Emphasis added.)

. Walters, supra note 2 at 710 (Opala, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). There, I counseled against requiring the governor to give a declaratory judgment upon an act's constitutional validity. In my view if the governor is forced to declare a bill violative of § 56 because of improperly combining subjects, he would first have to seek a judicial declaration of invalidity.

. The affidavit of one legislator explains that the functional appropriation methodology is a budget management tool that enables the legislature (a) to control and manage appropriations by affording an overview of all funding for an entire government function and by setting up priorities within the function and (b) to appro*270priate to the various agencies which perform that function. This functional or common-purpose basis for grouping government agencies within an appropriations bill is similar to the test followed by the California Supreme Court in Amador, supra note 7. That test "contemplates some functional interrelationship or interdependence” of the bill. Raven, supra note 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. at 334, 801 P.2d at 1085.

. The U.S. Supreme Court gave similar deference to an Oklahoma statute challenged under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491, 75 S.Ct. 461, 466, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), the Court reasoned that if a regulation has any "rational relation to that objective” then it is within constitutional bounds. Similar deference was granted by this court in Kimery v. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, Okl., 622 P.2d 1066, 1069 (1981), where we stated “a legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and will be upheld unless it is clearly, palpably and plainly inconsistent with the Constitution.” In Reherman v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., Okl., 679 P.2d 1296, 1300 (1984), we held that "whenever possible, statutes should be construed so as to uphold their constitutionality." For a like construction, see Gilbert Cent. Corp. v. State, Okl., 716 P.2d 654, 658 (1986); Black v. Ball Janitorial Service, Inc., Okl., 730 P.2d 510, 512 (1986). Minnesota similarly applies a “hands off” approach in construing its one-subject rule, except when “the challenged statute embodies the mischief sought to be prevented ... prohibiting the fraudulent insertion therein of matters wholly foreign, and in no way related to or connected with its subject ...” Wass v. Anderson, 312 Minn. 394, 252 N.W.2d 131, 134, 135 (1977) (emphasis mine). One commentator expresses the view that historically courts gave “judicial deference to the legislature's judgment" with regard to the one-subject rule. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 Minn.L.Rev. 389, 448 (1958) (emphasis mine).

. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1927); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328, 47 S.Ct. 594, 595, 71 L.Ed. 1074 (1927); Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust, 168 Okl. 609, 35 P.2d 435, 439 (1934) (overruled in part on a different point of law in Oklahoma City v. Harris, 191 Okl. 125, 126 P.2d 988, 989 (syllabus 2) (1942). "The statement of the rule in Zahn remains viable today: 'The most that can be said [of this zoning ordinance] is that whether that determination was an unreasonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise of power is fairly debatable. In such circumstances, the settled rule of this court is that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the primary duty and responsibility of determining the question.’ ” Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 514, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1943 n. 1, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting from Zahn, supra, 274 U.S. at 328, 47 S.Ct. at 595.

. Art. 4, § 1, Okl. Const., which expressly establishes a tripartite division of government functions, is offended whenever one governmental branch-is allowed to usurp powers expressly delegated to another. The terms of § 1 are:
*271“The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and except as provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others."

. State ex rel. York v. Turpen, Okl., 681 P.2d 763, 767 (1984); Bailey v. State Board of Public Affairs, 194 Okl. 495, 153 P.2d 235, 239 (1945).

. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2784, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (emphasis mine).

. Rupe v. Shaw, Okl., 286 P.2d 1094, 1099 (1955).

. Supra note 46.

. The pertinent terms of Art. 24, § 1, Okl. Const., are:
“* * * No proposal for the amendment or alteration of this Constitution which is submitted to the voters shall embrace more than one subject and the voters shall vote separately for or against each proposal submitted; provided however, that in the submission of proposals for the amendment of this Constitution by articles, which embrace one general subject, each proposed article shall be deemed a single proposal or proposition.” (Emphasis mine.)
In re Initiative Petition No. 348, Okl., 820 P.2d 772, 776 (1991); In re Initiative Petition No. 314, Okl., 625 P.2d 595, 600 (1981), teaches that Art. 24, § 1, Okl. Const., is applicable to initiative petitions. For legislative bills, see Art. 5, § 56, Okl. Const., supra note 1, and Walters, supra note 2.

. For the text of Art. 5, § 56, Okl. Const., see supra note 1; for the text of Art. 24, § 1, Okl. Const., see supra note 48. In the past the single-subject rule has been applied inconsistently to initiative measures. In Rupe, supra note 46 at 1097, this court “recognized that such constitutional provisions [i.e., Art. 24, § 1] are to receive a liberal, rather than a narrow or technical construction." (Emphasis mine.) In In re Initiative Petition No. 271, State Question No. 408, Okl., 373 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1962), the court followed Rupe, stating that Art. 24, § 1 “is to receive a liberal rather than a narrow or technical construction. It is a cardinal rule that such a restrictive provision shall not be so construed as to hamper and unreasonably restrict legislation.” In In re Initiative Petition No. 314, supra note 48 at 607, the court examined the dual approach of Amador, supra note 7, and found that Amador fully supports its single-subject analysis, but opined that courts “examine the inherent nature of the provisions to determine whether they are subjects which are separate and independent from each other so that each could stand alone, or fall as a whole”. (Emphasis mine.) In In re Petition No. 319, State Question No. 563, Okl., 682 P.2d 222, 224 (1984), the court opined that it “can apply to this question no more restrictive test than the one approved in both Rupe and in In re Petition No. 271." In more recent cases, the court applies the single-subject analysis contained in In re Petition No. 314, supra note 48 (see In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question No. 640, supra note 48 at 776).

. The single-subject mandate is found in both Art. 24, § 1, Okl. Const., supra note 48, and Art. 5, § 56, Okl. Const., supra note 1.

. Rupe, supra note 46 at 1099. For a similar analysis, see Draper, supra note 33; Massey v. Farmers Ins. Group, Okl., 837 P.2d 880 (1992).

. Okl., 838 P.2d 1, 18-19 (1992) (Opala, C.J., dissenting).

. Eu, supra note 6, 286 Cal.Rptr. at 294, 816 P.2d at 1320.

. Raven, supra note 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. at 334, 801 P.2d at 1085 (see Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal.3d 236, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal.1982)). Even though the California court rejected the more strict approach, I would adopt both approaches to work side by side.

. Raven, supra note 7, 276 Cal.Rptr. at 332, 801 P.2d at 1083.

. Eu, supra note 6, 286 Cal.Rptr. at 295, 816 P.2d at 1321.

. Amador, supra note 7, 149 Cal.Rptr. at 248, 583 P.2d at 1290; Fair Political Practices Com'n, supra note 7, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 870, 599 P.2d at 63 (Manuel, J., dissenting).

. The term function is derived from Latin “functus", the past participle of the verb “fun-gor” which means to perform, execute, administer. The nature and proper action of anything. Fulfillment of a definite end or set of ends by the correct adjustment of means. Black’s Law Dictionary, at 605 (5th Ed. 1979).

. Fair Political Practices Com’n, supra note 7, 157 Cal.Rptr. at 870, 599 P.2d at 63 (Manuel, J., dissenting).

. For example, § 16 of SB 142 provides for monies originally appropriated to the Department of Tourism and Recreation to be reappro-priated to provide for a state match to the federal Bureau of Reclamation Matching Fund Program funds. If this provision were to be placed in the appropriations bill for "natural resource regulatory" functions (HB 2424), it is arguable that because these funds are related to the Tourism Department as originally appropriated they should not be deemed germane to HB 2424. The court’s strict application of the germaneness rule leaves the legislature without a workable standard to manage its own affairs. Even worse, this standard, as strictly applied by the court, leaves these provisions without action because they are potentially nongermane to any legislation.
A similar argument could be made about § 23 of SB 142. That section provides for funding for a student tourism internship program. If this provision were to be placed under the State Board of Education appropriations bill, then it could be argued that it would not be germane to the common theme of education because it is an internship for students pursuing a degree in tourism management to be ultimately carried out within the Department of Tourism. In my view, under the strict approach this subject would be more appropriately placed under the Department of Tourism and not the State Regents for Higher Education as suggested by the court.

.Without the fairly debatable standard, the arbitrariness of the germaneness standard standing alone leaves the legislature without a workable principle to manage its affairs.

. Allen v. Retirement Sys. For Justices and Judges, Okl., 769 P.2d 1302, 1305 (1988).

. The terms of Art. 5, § 43, Okl. Const., are: "The Legislature shall, in the year nineteen hundred and nine and each ten years thereafter, make provision by law for revising, digesting, and promulgating the statutes of the State.” (Emphasis added.)
For the current “recompilation act”, see 75 O.S. 1991 §§ 171 et seq.

. See Allen, supra note 62 at 1305; Jamison v. Admiralty Zinc Co., 186 Okl. 13, 96 P.2d 26, 28 (1939); Hines v. Harmon, 178 Okl. 1, 61 P.2d 641, 644 (1936) (overruled in part on a different point of law in McConnell v. Goucher, 188 Okl. 293, 108 P.2d 174, 176 (1940); Hart v. State, 59 Okl.Cr. 396, 60 P.2d 411, 412 (1936); Crowdis v. State, 59 Okl.Cr. 297, 58 P.2d 154, 156 (1936); Ex Parte Autry, 58 Okl.Cr. 88, 50 P.2d 239, 241 (1935).

. See Bernstein v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Company, Okl., 315 P.2d 232, 233 (1957); Bandy v. R.H. Fulton and Company, Okl., 312 P.2d 875, 879 (1957); Atchley v. Board of Barber Examiners of State, 208 Okl. 453, 257 P.2d 302, 305 (1953); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Rose, 196 Okl. 592, 166 P.2d 1011, 1014 (1946).

. See Allen, supra note 62, and cases cited in supra note 64.