Court Opinion

ID: 9660710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:18:51.998213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:21.523378
License: Public Domain

SCHUDSON, J.
(dissenting). As the majority explains, under After Hour Welding v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734, 324 N.W.2d 686 (1982), we must review the trial court's determination of whether the appellants offered clear and convincing evidence of prejudice" 'on the basis of the nature of the matter and its probable effect on a hypothetical average jury.'" See majority op. at 463. I conclude that appellants did so and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial.
I. Background
The majority _ acknowledges that "the juror's research on benchmark awards in medical malpractice cases" was "wholly inappropriate." Id. at 467. The question, then, is whether the jury's or juror's exposure to that information, during deliberations, probably produced prejudice. That, under After Hour Welding, must be measured by (1) "the nature of the matter," and (2) "its probable effect on a hypothetical average jury." After Hour Welding, 108 Wis. 2d at 741, 324 N.W.2d at 691.
To gain perspective on "the nature of the matter," it may be helpful to step back, broaden our view, and observe the following. First, if any party would have moved to introduce evidence of "research on benchmark awards in medical malpractice cases," or the *4781985 "range of jury awards in medical malpractice cases," see majority op. at 462 & 467, the trial court certainly would have excluded such information. Second, if any party would have included that information in closing argument, the trial court, at the very least, would have ordered the jury to disregard the comments.
The reason, I think, is obvious. The very "nature of the matter" — "benchmark awards" and "range of jury awards" — clearly related to the trial subject of damages. While related to that subject, however, the information was irrelevant to the trial issue: what award in this case would fairly and reasonably compensate for pain, suffering, and disability. Accordingly, given "the nature of the matter," the trial court was correct in concluding, "There's no doubt that the material was extraneous and that it was improperly brought to the jury's attention."
Next, then, we must consider the "probable effect" of that extraneous material "on a hypothetical jury." Certainly, the trial court would have excluded such inadmissible information and, had the information been argued, the trial court would have issued a strong, cautionary instruction. The reason, again, is obvious. The information matters. It is not some innocuous detail that would probably pass without notice. Because of their close relationship to the issue of damages, the "benchmark awards" and "range of jury awards" probably would have distracted a jury and influenced its decision.
Here, of course, we have a different situation. This difference, however, is one that places the integrity of a verdict at far greater risk. While the two examples — attempted introduction of evidence, and closing argument — would have allowed for trial court correction, here the juror's "wholly inappropriate" conduct *479brought the improper information to the jury's deliberations. The trial court could not do anything to exclude or reduce the impact of the extraneous material. Now, with that in mind, let us consider the trial court's and the majority's conclusions.
II. All Twelve Jurors and the Last Verdict
Denying the defendants' motion for a new trial, the trial court stated:
Indeed, it is difficult to determine whether the improper materials obtained by one and later supplied to other jurors was not in fact more prejudicial to the plaintiff than to the defendant....
. . .[T]he award . . . was so low as to make the prejudice as to the amount of damages found by the jury in answer to question 3(a) equally applicable to the plaintiff and the defendant.
Without question, then, the trial court found prejudice. The trial court considered whether the plaintiffs or defendants suffered more from the prejudice, and concluded that the prejudice was "difficult to determine" and yet, "equally applicable" to both parties.
The majority assumes that our de novo review, like the trial court's determination, necessarily derives from an analysis of the direction and amount of prejudice; in other words, that the defendants would have had to have suffered, and suffered more than the plaintiffs in order to gain a new trial. The authorities, however, convince me that this is not so.
In After Hour Welding, the supreme court rejected such analysis in favor of a less speculative assessment. Delineating the proper method to evaluate "prejudicial effect," the court explained:
*480Although the court stated in Shefelker v. First National Bank, 212 Wis. 659, 666, 250 N.W. 870, 872 (1933) and State v. Hartmann, 46 Wis. 248, 249, 50 N.W. 193, 194 (1879), that the trial court must determine whether the misconduct had or might have had an unfavorable effect upon the verdict against the moving party moving for a new trial, that statement was made in explanation of a more restrictive common law rule in effect before sec. 906.06(2) was adopted. We find the more appropriate determination whether prejudice resulted is "on the basis of the nature of the matter and its probable effect on a hypothetical average jury." United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 950 (2nd Cir. 1961).
After Hour Welding, 108 Wis. 2d at 741, 324 N.W.2d at 691.
Accordingly, the court in After Hour Welding remanded the case specifically to determine "not as to what effect" the improper information had on the jurors, but rather, "the probable effect... upon a hypothetical average jury." Id.
Thus, in this case, if the extraneous material was prejudicial, and if the direction and relative amount of prejudice was, as the trial court concluded, "difficult to determine" or "equally applicable" to both sides, the prejudice, under After Hour Welding, is "clear and convincing." See id., 108 Wis. 2d at 740-741, 324 N.W.2d at 690. After all, the defendants were one of the two sides prejudiced " 'on the basis of the nature of the matter and its probable effect on a hypothetical average jury.'" Id. An attempt to assess whether that prejudice "might have had an unfavorable effect upon the verdict against the moving party," see id., 108 Wis. 2d at 741, 324 N.W.2d at 691, enters the speculative region that, After Hour Welding explained, is off limits.
*481Although I respect the majority's carefully reasoned explanation of why "the actual outcome in each case" could be considered in evaluating the impact of prejudicial information on a hypothetical average jury, I am not convinced that such consideration is useful or conclusive in any but the more obvious cases, such as those utilized in the majority's examples, see majority op. at 464 n.2. In less obvious cases, speculative conclusions about the direction and relative amount of prejudice are of no legal significance. This became even more clear when, two years after deciding After Hour Welding, the supreme court decided State v. Poh, 116 Wis. 2d 510, 343 N.W.2d 108 (1984). There, the supreme court further explained:
In other words, the circuit court must determine whether it is convinced by clear and satisfactory evidence that the alleged extraneous information reached the jury and could bias the jury against the moving party.
Poh, 116 Wis. 2d at 523, 343 N.W.2d at 115 (emphasis added).
I recognize that Poh's elaboration comes in the context of a criminal case. I also recognize, therefore, that the possibility of prejudice in a criminal case under Poh, and the probability of prejudice in a civil case under After Hour Welding, present distinguishing standards. In this case, however, the distinction produces no difference. In this case, of course, the "extraneous information" about the average range of jury awards "reached the jury" and "could bias" the jury against the defendant. Moreover, in this case, as the trial court concluded, the information did bias the jury against the defendant. That the bias also may have been "equally applicable" to the plaintiff is hardly *482reassuring and, under After Hour Welding and Poh, of no legal consequence.
The majority's analysis quickly reveals the inherent difficulty encountered when moving from the mission of After Hour Welding and Poh to an adventure in speculation. In its effort to support its conclusion, the majority necessarily attempts to assess the improperly introduced information in a way that would remove any probable prejudice against the defendants. The attempt, however, fails:
Although wholly inappropriate, the juror's research on benchmark awards in medical malpractice cases merely extended — by how much is not in the record — the average citizen's awareness of jury verdicts generally, as reported in the lay media. Thus, as Poh teaches, the juror's "discovery" was very little different from what jurors are expected to bring with them into the jury room.
Majority op. at 467.
Although I, like the majority, can point to no authority, I believe that any poll, scientific or otherwise, would disclose that "the average citizen's awareness of jury verdicts generally" ranges somewhere between, "Beats me!" and "How should I know?". The majority's claim that a "publication that pegged the average medical-malpractice award in 1985 at $1.5 million," see majority op. at 462, was "very little different from what jurors are expected to bring with them into the jury room," see id. at 467, is unsupported and unrealistic. While bringing intelligence, experience, and common sense to their jury work, our average citizens bring almost no "awareness of jury verdicts generally."
*483Further, "merely extend [ing]" the "awareness" of jurors is likely to be fatal to the integrity of a verdict when it comes not through evidence that can be challenged or stricken, not through argument that can be answered or instructed away, but through the introduction of inadmissible, prejudicial information through juror misconduct. As the supreme court emphatically declared: "The common knowledge jurors are allowed and encouraged to bring to their deliberations does not include prejudicial information." After Hour Welding, 108 Wis. 2d at 744, 324 N.W.2d at 692.
III. The Offending Juror and All Verdicts
The majority barely addresses appellants' additional argument that even if the prejudicial impact on the other jurors remains uncertain or even accrues to the benefit of the defendants, the offending juror's conduct, if known, would have led to her disqualification. The respondents, and the majority, respond only by maintaining that if the information was more prejudicial to the plaintiffs, the offending juror was no more contaminated than the other eleven. Even if I shared that view regarding the impact of the extraneous material on the other eleven jurors and the last verdict question, I find nothing in the majority opinion to explain how the offending juror survives disqualification from all deliberations. Without that juror, no verdict would have had the minimally required ten votes.
The appellants provide substantial authority in support of Wisconsin's steady allegiance to the five-sixths verdict requirement. See Christensen v. Schwartz, 198 Wis. 222, 223 N.W. 839 (1929); Biersach v. Wechselberg, 206 Wis. 113, 238 N.W. 905 (1931); Scipior v. Shea, 252 Wis. 185, 31 N.W.2d 199 (1948); *484Sec. 805.09(2), Stats. Further, State v. Barthels, 166 Wis. 2d 876, 893, 480 N.W.2d 814, 821 (Ct. App. 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 174 Wis. 2d 173, 495 N.W.2d 341 (1993), rejected the proposition "that the entire jury must be exposed to such information before the verdict may be impeached." Prejudicial information "brought to bear upon any juror" would be sufficient. See sec. 906.06(2), Stats. Even when that conclusion, coming from a criminal case requiring a unanimous jury, would be qualified for a civil case like this one, at most it would require exposure of three jurors (or one or two majority jurors in addition to two or one dissenting jurors). Here, because there were two dissenting jurors, the exposure of the additional, offending juror destroyed the integrity of all the verdicts.
The juror's research located the "Report of the Task Force on Medical Liability and Malpractice" that, among other things, included sections on physicians' duty, standard of care, proximate cause, and damages. As the majority points out, the record does not delineate the exact extent to which the juror read, understood, remembered, or utilized each section. That uncertainty is all the more reason for concern. The question is not whether the evidence confirmed that she was improperly influenced. The question is whether the evidence is clear and convincing that she was probably prejudiced because, after all, such information going to a hypothetical juror would probably have produced prejudice. Given "the nature of the matter," see After Hour Welding, 108 Wis. 2d at 741, 324 N.W.2d at 691, I conclude it probably would have prejudiced the hypothetical, average juror.
Further, if indeed, as the majority would suggest, we indulge additional speculation based on the specific facts and circumstances of this case, I find the rationale *485for a new trial even more resounding. Here, we are not dealing with extraneous information coming to a juror through mere mistake or inadvertence. Here, the information did not arrive at some unknown juncture in the trial, without apparent focus on any issue. Here, instead, the juror, in violation of explicit court orders, initiated the research during closing arguments. Unless we illogically assume that she did so in random fashion, she focused her research on issues where she believed she needed further guidance.
Therefore, I do not agree that more evidence would be needed to establish, in a clear and convincing manner, that the offending juror was prejudiced on all verdicts. Even if the other eleven jurors were untouched by the research, no verdict received more than nine votes from jurors who based their decisions on the evidence, and the evidence alone.
IV. Conclusion
In this case a juror, during a break in closing arguments, accomplished independent, library research on "the range of jury awards in medical-malpractice cases." See majority op. at 462. She had that information throughout her deliberations on all verdicts, and she shared her research notes with other jurors prior to their consideration of the last verdict on damages. The information would not have been allowed in evidence or argument, and was directly related to "a central issue throughout the trial." See State v. Ott, 111 Wis. 2d 691, 694, 331 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Ct. App. 1983).
Apparently, the appellants believe the resulting prejudice accrued to their detriment. The majority, acknowledging the prejudice, would affirm, however, because it believes the prejudice accrued to the detriment of the respondents. What theoretically remains *486for debate, therefore, is which side suffered more from the prejudice. What legally remains beyond any debate, however, is that "wholly inappropriate" juror conduct undermined the integrity of the verdicts. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.