Court Opinion

ID: 9410906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 00:00:52.08496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:00.795186
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-50945      Document: 00516831344         Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/24/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                  FILED
                                                                           July 24, 2023
                                  No. 20-50945                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                  Clerk

   Andre D. Boyd,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

   Sheriff Parnell McNamara; Ricky Armstrong,
   Administrator, McLennan County Jail; Robert Dillard, Grievance
   Officer, McLennan County Jail; Officer Jeremy Johnson,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Texas
                             USDC No. 6:19-CV-634
                   ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Ho, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
          Plaintiff Andre Boyd was repeatedly tased while he was a pretrial
   detainee at the McLennan County jail in Waco, Texas. Boyd insists that he
   did nothing to warrant the use of force—that he was neither threatening nor
   resisting the officer who tased him. The principal question on appeal is
   whether Boyd has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment
   on his ensuing civil rights claims.
Case: 20-50945        Document: 00516831344              Page: 2       Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                         No. 20-50945

           He has. The evidence is at least consistent with Boyd’s account of
   what took place, and our precedents conclusively establish that the use of a
   taser on a non-threatening and cooperative subject is an unconstitutionally
   excessive use of force. We therefore reverse in part and remand. 1
                                                I
           The following facts are recounted, as they must be at summary
   judgment, in the light most favorable to Boyd. “In other words, the story
   that follows is one-sided because the posture of the case requires it to be.”
   Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2019).
           Boyd arrived at the McLennan County jail with an injury to his left
   hand “arising from his arrest.” He submitted a request for medical attention
   and was seen by a member of the jail’s staff a few days later. While observing
   the examination, Officer Jeremy Johnson discovered that Boyd’s
   identification armband had been damaged. Johnson asked Boyd to surrender
   the broken band, and Boyd complied “without incident” before being
   escorted back to the cell where he and other detainees were being held.
           Boyd later approached the bars separating him from Johnson to ask
   Johnson if he was going to be “charged” for the armband.                          Johnson
   responded that Boyd would be disciplined based on Johnson’s belief that
   Boyd had intentionally shaved the rivet holding the band together. Boyd
   protested that the damage to the armband was unintentional, contending that
   it had been ripped when it got caught on his bunk. According to Boyd,
   Johnson proceeded to “call [Boyd] all types of lies, saying he could tell the

           _____________________
           1
            Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the timeliness of
   Boyd’s notice of appeal is denied. We construe Boyd’s Rule 59(e) motion as one
   successfully seeking an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. See Rivers v. Lumpkin,
   No. 18-11490, 2022 WL 1517027 (5th Cir. May 13, 2022).

                                                2
Case: 20-50945      Document: 00516831344          Page: 3   Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                    No. 20-50945

   rivet had been shaved,” to which Boyd responded, “don’t call me no
   ‘motherf-----g liar.’”
          What happened next is captured on video. The following is Boyd’s
   account of what that video depicts:
          Johnson instructed Boyd to walk to the cell door and submit
          himself to be handcuffed and escorted out of the dayroom
          [cell]. Boyd complied. As both videos reflect, Boyd walked
          calmly to the cell door, turned around so that he was facing
          away from the door, and placed his hands behind his back.
          Officer Johnson removed handcuffs from his belt, opened the
          cell door, and then forcefully grabbed Boyd’s left hand—i.e.,
          the hand with the fractured pinky finger that Johnson watched
          the nurse examine just moments earlier.                    Boyd,
          understandably, pulled his hand away in pain. He stepped
          away from Johnson, pointed to his left hand, and pleaded with
          Johnson not to grab that hand again and to instead grab his wrist
          when securing the handcuffs. Boyd then returned to his
          previous position, with his back to Johnson and his hands
          behind his back, ready to be handcuffed. Four seconds passed,
          with Boyd continuing to stand with his back to Johnson and his
          hands behind his back, speaking to Johnson over his left
          shoulder.
          Instead of handcuffing the compliant Boyd, Johnson fired his
          taser. He struck Boyd in the back of his left shoulder.
          Immediately afterwards, Johnson “drive stun” tased Boyd in
          the back of his right thigh. As Johnson’s Taser Use Form
          indicates, the taser strikes were entirely on the backside of
          Boyd’s body.
          The force of the taser being pressed against the back of Boyd’s
          thigh pushed him into the dayroom cell, with Johnson (who is
          significantly larger than the 5’ 4” Boyd), continuing to press
          the taser against his thigh. When the taser’s five-second cycle
          completed, Johnson stepped away from Boyd. Boyd managed
          to remove one taser barb from his back, and then stood still with

                                         3
Case: 20-50945      Document: 00516831344          Page: 4    Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                    No. 20-50945

          his back to Johnson, hands behind his back. Two other officers
          then entered the cell, one of whom placed handcuffs on the
          still-compliant Boyd . . . and escorted him out.
   Blue Br. 6–8 (citations and figure omitted).
          Defendants’ account varies from Boyd’s in two important ways.
   Defendants contend that, after Johnson grabbed his injured hand and Boyd
   jerked it away, Boyd not only twisted his head to speak to Johnson over his
   left shoulder, but also moved his right arm out of Officer Johnson’s reach.
   More significantly, Defendants maintain that Boyd became agitated and
   threatening toward Johnson after Johnson grabbed his hand, stating that
   Boyd gestured in an agitated manner and yelled at Johnson.
          The video evidence is consistent with both parties’ accounts, though
   obstructions and the lack of audio make it impossible to determine what was
   said between Boyd and Johnson in the seconds preceding Johnson’s decision
   to tase Boyd. The video does, however, clearly show that Boyd had his back
   to Johnson when Johnson fired his taser, and while Boyd appears to be
   twisting his body to speak to Johnson over his left shoulder, there is nothing
   overtly threatening about Boyd’s stance. Boyd’s hands remain behind his
   back, suggesting that he had submitted himself to be handcuffed before the
   taser was deployed.
          After exhausting his administrative remedies, Boyd filed a pro se
   complaint against Johnson and other jail officials in the Western District of
   Texas, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As relevant here, the
   operative complaint alleged that (1) Johnson’s use of the taser constituted
   excessive force; (2) Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Boyd’s
   medical needs; (3) Defendants, in their official capacities as policy makers for
   McLennan County, have a policy, custom, or practice of using excessive

                                          4
Case: 20-50945      Document: 00516831344          Page: 5    Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                    No. 20-50945

   force against black and Hispanic inmates; and (4) Defendants, in their
   individual capacities, instituted that unconstitutional policy.
          Defendants moved to dismiss and asked the district court to stay all
   discovery pending resolution of their qualified immunity defenses. The
   district court issued an order notifying the parties that it would treat
   Defendants’ motion as a motion for summary judgment and allowed
   additional time for discovery. But when Boyd issued his discovery requests,
   Defendants again moved to stay discovery or, in the alternative, limit the
   scope of discovery to the issue of qualified immunity. The district court
   opted for the latter route, ordering discovery “limited to that which is
   necessary to address the qualified immunity issue.”
          The limited scope of discovery prevented Boyd from compelling
   responses related to his policy and practice allegations. Among these were
   requests seeking “[a]ll incident reports dealing with excessive use of force
   and tasers between 2018–2019,” Defendant “Armstrong’s [personnel]
   reports and incident[] reports dealing with the use of force in jail,” and
   Defendant “McNamara’s reports and incident reports on use of force at the
   jail and taser reports between 2018–19.”
          Following this limited discovery, the district court granted summary
   judgment for Defendants. With respect to Boyd’s excessive-force claim, the
   district court held that “there was no violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional
   rights” because Boyd was “actively resisting” Johnson’s attempt to
   handcuff him when he was tased and because “Johnson’s determination that
   he was threatened was not objectively unreasonable.” Turning to Boyd’s
   deliberate indifference claim, the district court held that there was “no
   summary judgment evidence whatsoever that any Defendant had subjective
   knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff but responded with
   deliberate indifference to that risk.” And as to Boyd’s policy and practice

                                          5
Case: 20-50945        Document: 00516831344             Page: 6      Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                        No. 20-50945

   claims, the district court held that Boyd failed to meet his burden to present
   “adequate summary judgment evidence of any official or unofficial policy”
   depriving him of his federal rights.
           Boyd now appeals.
                                              II
           In reviewing the district court’s summary judgment decision, we must
   consider the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to Boyd,
   drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the conclusion that Boyd has
   raised a jury issue on his claims. Bluebonnet Hotel Ventures, L.L.C. v. Wells
   Fargo Bank, N.A., 754 F.3d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 2014).
           Because video evidence is available, we are required to “view the facts
   in the light depicted by the videotape.” Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 280
   (5th Cir. 2022) (alteration omitted) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
   381 (2007)). 2 Inasmuch as that video evidence is inconclusive, however, the
   ordinary summary judgment standard applies. Aguirre v. City of San Antonio,
   995 F.3d 395, 410 (5th Cir. 2021) (“When video evidence is ambiguous or in
   fact supports a nonmovant’s version of events, or when there is any evidence
   challenging the video’s accuracy or completeness, the modified rule from
   Scott has no application.” (citations omitted)).
           Applying these standards on a careful review of the available evidence,
   we conclude that a rational jury could find that Boyd did not pose a threat and
   was cooperative at the time he was tased. It follows that Boyd’s excessive
   force claim survives summary judgment.

           _____________________
           2
             We share the dissenting opinion’s concern about judicial Monday-morning
   quarterbacking of difficult, split-second decisions by officers in the field. But Supreme
   Court precedent rightly requires us to view video evidence when considering an appeal
   from the grant of summary judgment. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007).

                                              6
Case: 20-50945       Document: 00516831344          Page: 7    Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                     No. 20-50945

                                           A
            We begin with what a rational jury could find. Close inspection of the
   video evidence supports Boyd’s contention that he was nonthreatening and
   compliant throughout his interaction with Johnson.           Starting with the
   question of whether Boyd posed a threat, nothing about Boyd’s posture or
   movements suggest that Boyd was or was about to become dangerous. To
   the contrary, Boyd stood with his back to Johnson and his hands in the
   handcuffing position for a full four seconds before Johnson deployed his
   taser.
            Boyd’s earlier actions likewise support the conclusion that Boyd was
   not a security risk. Cf. Salazar, 37 F.4th at 282 (“But when a suspect has put
   officers and bystanders in harm’s way to try to evade capture, it is reasonable
   for officers to question whether the now-cornered suspect’s purported
   surrender is a ploy.”). While Boyd initially wrenched his hand away from
   Johnson in apparent pain from having his injured finger grabbed, at no point
   does the video show Boyd raising a fist at or approaching Johnson. Instead,
   after pointing to his injured hand, Boyd quickly turned back around and
   reassumed the handcuffing position. And while there is no accompanying
   audio, Johnson has never asserted that Boyd verbally threatened to harm him.
            We also note that “this was not a situation where an officer arrived at
   the scene with little or no information and had to make a split-second
   decision.” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 732 (5th Cir. 2018).
   Johnson had been standing next to Boyd when his fractured finger was
   examined by the jail nurse, so a rational jury could find that Johnson knew
   why Boyd reacted in pain when his finger was grabbed. Boyd had also just
   submitted to Johnson’s authority in turning over his armband and in
   following Johnson’s instruction to turn around to be handcuffed. Johnson
   further knew that, as a pretrial detainee, Boyd was highly unlikely to be

                                           7
Case: 20-50945      Document: 00516831344          Page: 8   Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                    No. 20-50945

   concealing a weapon on his person. A jury viewing this evidence could thus
   conclude that Johnson had nothing to fear from Boyd.
          For much the same reason, a rational jury could conclude that Boyd
   was not resisting Johnson but was instead pleading with Johnson not to grab
   his injured hand. Again, Boyd had been facing away from Johnson with his
   hands behind his back for four seconds before he was tased, as if inviting
   Johnson to apply the restraints. A jury could therefore determine that Boyd
   is telling the truth when he says that where the video shows him turning his
   head, he was telling Johnson how to apply the handcuffs without hurting him.
   In which case, Boyd would have been facilitating rather than hindering
   Johnson’s efforts.
          Our task at this early stage is only to determine what a rational jury
   could find. And in this case, “the district court’s view is not the only view a
   jury could take of the evidence.” Fairchild v. Coryell County, 40 F.4th 359,
   363 (5th Cir. 2022). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Boyd, we
   conclude that a rational jury could find Boyd credible in his assertion that he
   did not threaten or resist Johnson.
                                         B
          Having determined what a rational jury could find, we now ask
   whether those findings would legally support a verdict for Boyd. Because
   Johnson has asserted qualified immunity, Boyd must show the violation of a
   constitutional right and that “the ‘right at issue was “clearly established” at
   the time of [the] alleged misconduct.’” Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870,
   874 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
          An official violates clearly established law if “then-existing
   precedent” establishes that the officer’s conduct constituted a constitutional
   violation. City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021). To provide such

                                         8
Case: 20-50945         Document: 00516831344              Page: 9       Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                          No. 20-50945

   clarity, the precedent must be sufficiently specific: “[i]t is not enough that a
   rule be suggested by then-existing precedent.” Id.
              Boyd has identified three authorities from this court that are
   sufficiently specific to put Johnson on notice that his actions, on at least one
   permissible reading of the evidence, constituted unconstitutionally excessive
   force. 3
              He points first to Ramirez v. Martinez, in which we held that it was a
   violation of clearly established law to tase the plaintiff even though the
   plaintiff pulled his arm from the officer’s grasp, exchanged profanities with
   the officer, and questioned the officer’s presence at his place of business. 716
   F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff alleged that he arrived at his business
   to find officers with their guns drawn and pointed at his employees. Id. at
   372. He then approached one of the officers to ask what was happening and,
   after the two exchanged profanities, the officer told the plaintiff to turn
   around and put his hands behind his back. Id. The plaintiff refused, pulling
   his arm away from the officer when the officer attempted to grab hold of it.
   Id. The officer immediately tased the plaintiff, who at that point stopped
   resisting. Id. Even so, other officers joined in to help force the plaintiff to the

              _____________________
              3
             The cases cited by Boyd address claims of excessive force during an arrest brought
   under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures rather than the
   Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The latter is the locus of the right of a
   pretrial detainee to be free from excessive force and is therefore the source of the right at
   issue here. Nevertheless, the standard for excessive force is the same under either
   provision: “whether the force was objectively unreasonable in light of the ‘facts and
   circumstances of each particular case.’” Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 141 S. Ct. 2239, 2241
   n.2 (2021) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015)). We have previously
   relied on Fourth Amendment excessive force cases to determine whether a right had been
   clearly established for purposes of a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim. See
   Fairchild, 40 F.4th at 366–67.

                                                9
Case: 20-50945     Document: 00516831344            Page: 10      Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                     No. 20-50945

   ground and onto his stomach, at which point the officer who originally tried
   to arrest the plaintiff tased him a second time. Id. at 373.
          We held that the plaintiff’s act of “[p]ulling his arm out of [the
   officer’s] grasp, without more, [was] insufficient to find an immediate threat
   to the safety of the officers.” Id. at 378. We also held that the defendant
   officer could not reasonably conclude that the plaintiff posed a threat merely
   because he exchanged profanities with the officer and questioned the
   officer’s presence at his place of business. Id.
          Boyd next cites Hanks v. Rogers, which held that an officer violates
   clearly established law when he resorts to a sudden use of force on a plaintiff
   who is only passively resisting. 853 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2017). In that case an
   officer ordered the plaintiff to drop to his knees, whereupon the plaintiff put
   his hands behind his back and looked over his shoulder while asking whether
   he was under arrest. Id. at 742. After the officer repeated his instruction
   several times, the plaintiff—still with his hands behind his back—“made a
   small lateral step with his left foot.” Id. The officer then “rushed toward
   [the plaintiff] and administered a blow to [the plaintiff’s] upper back or
   neck.” Id. at 743.
          We held that this officer “applied clearly excessive and unreasonable
   force” under clearly established law. Id. at 746. In doing so, we stated that
   an officer applies unconstitutionally excessive force “if he abruptly resorts to
   overwhelming physical force rather than continuing verbal negotiations with
   an individual who poses no immediate threat or flight risk, who engages in, at
   most, passive resistance, and whom the officer stopped for a minor traffic
   violation.” Id. at 747.
          Finally, in Trammel v. Fruge, we held that an officer’s use of force was
   excessive under clearly established law despite the plaintiff’s failure to follow
   the officer’s instructions.    868 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2017).         The visibly

                                          10
Case: 20-50945     Document: 00516831344            Page: 11   Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                     No. 20-50945

   intoxicated plaintiff told the officer that he was not going to jail and refused
   to obey the officer’s command to place his arms behind his back. Id. at 337.
   Instead, when the officer grabbed the plaintiff’s right arm, the plaintiff
   “immediately pulled back and told [the officer] that it hurt and not to grab
   him there.” Id. Another officer then grabbed the plaintiff’s left arm, but the
   plaintiff “again pulled away.” Id. The officers then executed a knee strike
   before tackling the plaintiff to the ground. Id.
          We held that these actions constituted excessive force and that the
   officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because “the law at the time
   of [the plaintiff’s] arrest clearly established that it was objectively
   unreasonable for several officers to tackle an individual who was not fleeing,
   not violent, not aggressive, and only resisted by pulling his arm away from an
   officer’s grasp.” Id. at 343.
          These three cases put Johnson on notice that he could not
   constitutionally fire a taser at a non-threatening, compliant subject. They
   likewise show that Boyd’s act of jerking his hand away from Johnson, yelling
   in apparent pain, and turning his head did not, standing alone, constitute the
   kind of threatening behavior or belligerence that justifies the use of force. See
   Id. at 341 (“[W]here an individual’s conduct amounts to mere ‘passive
   resistance,’ use of force is not justified.”); Ramirez, 716 F.3d at 378; Hanks,
   853 F.3d at 747.
          Defendants respond by attempting to distinguish these cases from the
   facts here, relying on the rule that precedent does not clearly establish a right
   for qualified immunity purposes unless its facts are sufficiently similar to the
   facts at hand. Bond, 142 S. Ct. at 11. With respect to Ramirez, Defendants
   argue that the circumstances of that case did not involve the unique security
   risks that arise in the prison context. Hanks and Trammel, they say, suffer

                                          11
Case: 20-50945     Document: 00516831344               Page: 12   Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                        No. 20-50945

   from the same deficiency, but are further distinguishable by the fact that they
   do not involve the use of a taser.
          These     distinctions    generate       no     uncertainty   about   the
   unconstitutionality of Johnson’s actions. We have often explained that
   “[t]he law can be clearly established ‘despite notable factual distinctions
   between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long
   as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue
   violated constitutional rights.’” Ramirez, 716 F.3d at 379 (quoting Kinney v.
   Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). The touchstone of the
   inquiry is “fair notice.” Ducksworth v. Landrum, 62 F.4th 209, 218 (5th Cir.
   2023) (Oldham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
   omitted). See also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“[T]he salient
   question that the Court of Appeals ought to have asked is whether the state
   of the law in 1995 gave respondents fair warning that their alleged treatment
   of Hope was unconstitutional.”); Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767
   F.3d 462, 471 (5th Cir. 2014) (“What is crucial is that the Defendants had
   ‘fair warning.’”). Distinctions between cases are thus relevant only if they
   make the applicability of prior precedent unclear.
          The distinctions that Defendants identify do not. With respect to the
   prison context, it is certainly true that we must always consider “the
   perspective of a jailer who is often forced to make split-second decisions in
   tense situations.” Fairchild, 40 F.4th at 363. That is a straightforward
   application of the general rule to a specific context. But the general rule still
   applies. In the jail context as in others, “it [is] well-established . . . that
   officers may not ‘use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has already been
   subdued or incapacitated.’” Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir.
   2016) (alterations omitted). See also Fairchild, 40 F.4th at 361 (“[T]he
   jailers’ continuing to apply . . . force more than two minutes after [plaintiff]
   was subdued would violate clearly establish law.”); Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d

                                             12
Case: 20-50945        Document: 00516831344               Page: 13        Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                           No. 20-50945

   379, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (“So when a prison inmate engages in willful
   misconduct, a prison guard may use reasonable force to restrain him—but
   after the inmate submits, there is no need, and thus no justification, for the
   further use of force.”).
           Here, a jury could rationally conclude that the situation was not tense,
   and that Johnson had ample time to decide whether it was necessary to use
   force against Boyd. It could also conclude that there was no threat to prison
   order that could have justified Johnson’s decision to tase Boyd.
           Neither are Hanks and Trammel rendered inapplicable simply because
   they did not involve the use of a taser. We have previously rejected the
   argument that prior precedent does not clearly establish law in a taser case
   simply because that precedent did not involve a taser, explaining that
   “[l]awfulness of force . . . does not depend on the precise instrument used to
   apply it,” and “[q]ualified immunity will not protect officers who apply
   excessive and unreasonable force merely because their means of applying it
   are novel.” Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 763–64 (5th Cir. 2012).
                                                 C
           Defendants also assert in a footnote that “it is not clear” whether our
   precedents, as opposed to the Supreme Court’s, can clearly establish the law
   for purposes of qualified immunity. A proverbial mountain of binding
   authority is to the contrary. 4 We routinely rely on our own cases to determine

           _____________________
           4
             Williams v. City of Yazoo, 41 F.4th 416, 426 (5th Cir. 2022) (relying on Fifth
   Circuit precedent for the proposition that “[i]t is clearly established that an official who
   refuses to treat or ignores the complaints of a detainee violates their rights”); Crittindon v.
   LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 188 (5th Cir. 2022) (relying on Fifth Circuit precedent for the
   proposition that “it is without question that holding without legal notice a prisoner for a
   month beyond the expiration of his sentence constitutes a denial of due process”); Sims v.
   Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, 951–952 (5th Cir. 2022) (relying on Fifth Circuit precedent for the
   proposition that “a prisoner can show his clearly established rights under the Eighth

                                                 13
Case: 20-50945        Document: 00516831344               Page: 14        Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                           No. 20-50945

           _____________________
   Amendment were violated if a prison official . . . refused to treat [the prisoner], ignored his
   cries for help, and overall evinced a wanton disregard for [his] serious medical needs”);
   Bevill v. Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2022) (relying on Fifth Circuit precedent for
   the proposition that using “government positions to violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment
   rights would be objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time”
   (citation omitted)); Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 416 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting
   that the court “need not rely” on Supreme Court precedent to conclude that the
   defendants’ actions violated clearly established law because “Plaintiffs’ claim that the
   Officers unconstitutionally employed deadly force in the absence of any threat of death or
   serious injury to the Officers or the public presents facts very similar to those found in” a
   Fifth Circuit decision); Timpa v. Dillard, 20 F.4th 1020, 1034 (5th Cir. 2021) (relying on
   Fifth Circuit precedent for the proposition that “the law has long been clearly established
   that an officer’s continued use of force on a restrained and subdued subject is objectively
   unreasonable”); Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 336 (5th Cir. 2021) (relying on Fifth Circuit
   precedent for the proposition that “by May 2, 2017, the day that [the defendant] shot [the
   plaintiff], it was clearly established that after incapacitating a suspect who posed a threat,
   an officer cannot continue using deadly force”); Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 384 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (holding that Fifth Circuit precedent defined “clearly established law in
   sufficient detail to have notified the Officers that their actions were unconstitutional”);
   Amador v. Vasquez, 961 F.3d 721, 730 (5th Cir. 2020) (relying on Fifth Circuit precedent
   for the proposition that “[e]very reasonable officer would have understood that using
   deadly force on a man holding a knife, but standing nearly thirty feet from the deputies,
   motionless, and with his hands in the air for several seconds, would violate the Fourth
   Amendment”); Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 733 (5th Cir. 2018) (relying on
   Fifth Circuit precedent for the proposition that “[t]he law is clear that the degree of force
   an officer can reasonably employ is reduced when an arrestee is not actively resisting” and
   that “at the time of the alleged misconduct it was clearly established that violently
   slamming or striking a suspect who is not actively resisting arrest constitutes excessive use
   of force”); Jauch v. Choctaw County, 874 F.3d 425, 436 (5th Cir. 2017) (relying on Fifth
   Circuit precedent for the proposition it is clearly established law that “prolonged detention
   without the benefit of a court appearance violates the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment
   right to due process”); Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2017) (relying on Fifth
   Circuit precedent for the proposition that “clearly established law demonstrated that an
   officer violates the Fourth Amendment if he abruptly resorts to overwhelming physical
   force rather than continuing verbal negotiations with an individual who poses no immediate
   threat or flight risk, who engages in, at most, passive resistance, and whom the officer
   stopped for a minor traffic violation”); id. at 749 (relying on Supreme Court precedent only
   for the alternative holding that the obvious case exception applies); Trammell v. Fruge, 868
   F.3d 332, 343 (5th Cir. 2017) (relying on Fifth Circuit precedent for the proposition that
   “the law at the time of [the plaintiff’s] arrest clearly established that it was objectively
   unreasonable for several officers to tackle an individual who was not fleeing, not violent,

                                                 14
Case: 20-50945        Document: 00516831344               Page: 15        Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                           No. 20-50945

   whether a rule of law has been clearly established. See, e.g., Fairchild, 40
   F.4th at 368 (“Within the Fifth Circuit, the law has long been clearly
   established that an officer’s continued use of force on a restrained and
   subdued subject is objectively unreasonable.” (citation omitted)); Hamilton
   v. Kindred, 845 F.3d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 2017) (“At the time of the incident, it
   was clearly established in the Fifth Circuit that an officer could be liable as a
   bystander in a case involving excessive force if he knew a constitutional
   violation was taking place and had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the
   harm.”); Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Cooper’s right
   was clearly established. Our caselaw makes certain that once an arrestee
   stops resisting, the degree of force an officer can employ is reduced.”);
   Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Our precedent
   clearly establishes that the Eighth Amendment guarantees inmates a right to

           _____________________
   not aggressive, and only resisted by pulling his arm away from an officer’s grasp”); Cowart
   v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2016) (relying on Fifth Circuit precedent in stating
   “that in 2009, the time of the incident, it was well-established, in sufficiently similar
   situations, that officers may not ‘use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has already
   been subdued . . . [or] incapacitated’” (omission and alteration in original) (citation
   omitted)); Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462, 472 (5th Cir. 2014) (relying
   on Fifth Circuit authority to expand on Supreme Court precedent so as to give the
   defendants the requisite “fair warning” to clearly establish the right at issue in that case);
   Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 379 (5th Cir. 2013) (relying on Fifth Circuit precedent
   to conclude that the plaintiff’s “version of the events violated clearly established law”);
   Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2012) (relying on Fifth Circuit authorities
   for the proposition that “[i]t is beyond dispute that [the plaintiff’s] right to be free from
   excessive force during an investigatory stop or arrest was clearly established in August
   2007”); Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2009) (“As of June 1, 2005,
   Fifth Circuit precedent clearly established that the Fourth Amendment governs social
   workers’ investigations of allegations of child abuse.”); Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404,
   417–18 (5th Cir. 2009) (relying on Fifth Circuit authorities for the proposition that “[i]t
   has long been clearly established that, absent any other justification for the use of force, it
   is unreasonable for a police officer to use deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not
   pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others” and that this rule holds “in the
   more specific context of shooting a suspect fleeing in a motor vehicle”).

                                                 15
Case: 20-50945     Document: 00516831344           Page: 16    Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                    No. 20-50945

   be free from exposure to extremely dangerous temperatures without
   adequate remedial measures.”).
          Finally, we flatly reject counsel’s contention at oral argument that we
   are bound by the district court’s determination that no constitutional
   violation occurred. The fact that “other federal, or state, courts, and the fact
   that a single judge, or even a group of judges, disagrees about the contours of
   a right does not automatically render the law unclear” if this circuit has been
   clear. Safford Unif. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009).
          In conclusion, we hold that a rational jury could find that Johnson’s
   decision to tase Boyd was not justified by any exigency, in which case
   Johnson’s qualified immunity defense would not shield him from liability
   because our precedents clearly establish that resort to force in such
   circumstances is unconstitutional.
                                         III
          Boyd also asks that we reverse the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment on his policy and practice claims. The district court denied Boyd’s
   motion to compel discovery relating to his allegation that Defendants
   instituted and carried out an unconstitutional policy or practice of excessive
   force. It was inappropriate for the court to then dismiss those claims on the
   ground that Boyd failed to present “adequate summary judgment evidence
   of any official or unofficial policy” depriving him of his rights. We therefore
   reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand on those claims. On
   remand, the district court should reopen discovery for a reasonable time.
          We agree, however, with the district court’s conclusion that Boyd
   failed to present adequate summary judgment evidence of his deliberate-
   indifference claim, and therefore affirm the dismissal of that claim.

                                          16
Case: 20-50945    Document: 00516831344             Page: 17   Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                     No. 20-50945

                                 *        *         *
          If a jury finds, as it could, that Johnson tased a non-threatening,
   compliant inmate, then he is not entitled to qualified immunity. We therefore
   REVERSE summary judgment on Boyd’s excessive force claim against
   Johnson and REMAND that claim to the district court for trial. We likewise
   REVERSE and REMAND the district court’s grant of summary judgment
   on Boyd’s policy and practice claims to afford Boyd the opportunity to
   discover evidence relevant to those claims. But we AFFIRM the dismissal
   of Boyd’s deliberate indifference claim. The motion to dismiss the appeal for
   lack of jurisdiction is DENIED.

                                          17
Case: 20-50945     Document: 00516831344          Page: 18    Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                    No 20-50945

   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
   part:
           I agree with the majority that we should remand Andreas Boyd’s
   policy and practice claims and affirm the dismissal of his deliberate
   indifference claim. But I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s
   analysis of the excessive force claim. As to the latter, I have two principal
   reservations.
           First, the majority opinion relies exclusively on circuit precedent to
   clearly establish the law. But the Supreme Court has never authorized this
   approach. See Nerio v. Evans, 974 F.3d 571, 576 n.2 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing
   District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 n.8 (2018) (“We have not
   yet decided what precedents—other than our own—qualify as controlling
   authority for purposes of qualified immunity.”)); see also Rivas-Villegas v.
   Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 8 (2021) (per curiam); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.
   658, 665 (2012). Absent a clear instruction from our Nation’s highest court
   regarding the relevance of circuit precedent, we cannot expect everyday
   officers to draw the necessary inferences from our large, ever-growing, and
   often-contradictory precedents. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
   (2011) (noting that the contours of the right must be “sufficiently clear” so
   that “every reasonable official would have understood that what is doing
   violates that right” (quotation omitted) (emphasis added)); Brosseau v.
   Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (noting that the “focus” of
   qualified immunity is to provide “fair notice” to officers); Malley v. Briggs,
   475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (noting that qualified immunity protects “all but the
   plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (emphasis
   added)). If all circuit precedent is fair game, then how is an officer supposed
   to choose, in a dangerous split-second moment, which case to follow?
   Compare, e.g., Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278 (5th Cir. 2022) (tasing ok, even
   when the suspect stopped the car, surrendered, and laid on the ground with

                                         18
Case: 20-50945     Document: 00516831344            Page: 19   Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                      No 20-50945

   his arms above his head and his legs crossed), and Ramirez v. Escajeda, 44
   F.4th 287 (5th Cir. 2022) (tasing ok, even when the person was unresponsive
   and hanging from a basketball hoop with a rope around his neck), with
   Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013) (tasing not ok when officer
   told the suspect to put his hands behind his back and the suspect refused and
   pulled his arm away).
          Second, I am increasingly concerned that our excessive-force cases are
   governed by Justice Stewart’s unsatisfying standard of “I know it when I see
   it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
   Justice Stewart regretted that statement later in life. See Al Kamen, Retired
   High Court Justice Potter Stewart Dies at 70, Wash. Post (Dec. 8, 1985).
   And that regret is understandable because the statement suggests that
   constitutional questions hinge on in-chambers video viewings and intuition.
   But query how our Fourth Amendment approach is different, especially
   when we combine in-chambers video viewings with the deeply indeterminate
   corpus of circuit precedent. We certainly have an obligation to watch these
   videos, see ante at 6 n.2; but when we are bound only by conflicting circuit
   precedent, it is unclear to me if and how we are bound at all.
                                  *       *         *
          The Supreme Court has told us not to substitute the “20/20 vision of
   hindsight” for “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” who
   must make “split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
   uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97
   (1989); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 399 (2015) (noting that
   these concerns are particularly important in the prison setting); Morrow v.
   Meacham, 917 F.3d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he law must be so clearly
   established that—in the blink of an eye, in the middle of a high-speed chase—
   every reasonable officer would know it immediately.”). Yet I worry that in-

                                          19
Case: 20-50945     Document: 00516831344           Page: 20    Date Filed: 07/24/2023

                                     No 20-50945

   chambers bodycam movie days, especially when combined with our reliance
   on circuit precedent, lead to predictably unpredictable interpretations of the
   “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at
   201 (quotation omitted)); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–84 (2007)
   (noting that there is “no obvious way to quantify” risks to decide whether
   force is reasonable); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“The test of
   reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
   definition or mechanical application.”).
          With deepest respect and admiration for my learned and esteemed
   colleagues, I think it is unwise to give a panel of three judges the power to set
   clearly established law and thereby bind every law enforcement officer in
   three States, governing every conceivable emergency situation in every
   community from El Paso to Pascagoula. And I think it is particularly unwise
   when the underlying legal standard is so open-ended and our precedents are
   so contradictory. If the Supreme Court wants to vest this power in us, so be
   it. But unless and until the Court does, I would not assert it.

                                          20