Court Opinion

ID: 9365606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 17:07:49.404333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:46.351153
License: Public Domain

J-S31018-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    ELSA MERTIRA                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CAMELBACK LODGE AND INDOOR                 :   No. 1193 EDA 2022
    WATERPARK AND CMBK RESORT                  :
    OPERATIONS, LLC                            :

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 31, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s):
                               002031-CV-2021

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                            FILED JANUARY 24, 2023

        Elsa Mertira (Appellant) appeals from the order granting the motion for

summary judgment filed by Camelback Lodge and Indoor Waterpark and

CMBK Resort Operations, LLC (Appellees), in the underlying personal injury

action. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’

motion for summary judgment because the motion was prematurely filed as

discovery had not been completed. Appellant also argues that the trial court

misapplied the hills and ridges and ongoing storm doctrines. Lastly, Appellant

asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude the entry

of summary judgment. We affirm.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S31018-22

        The trial court provided a brief summary of the facts of this case as

follows:

        [Appellant] alleges that she slipped and fell on real property of
        [Appellees] due to ice/snow at approximately 8:30 p.m. on
        January 1, 2021. There is no dispute that [Appellant] fell while
        leaving a restaurant owned/maintained/managed by [Appellees].
        She was accompanied by various family members, some of whom
        saw where she fell. None of the witnesses identified any hills or
        ridges formed by ice or snow. It is undisputed that there was
        precipitation falling in the form of freezing rain and/or snow both
        prior to [Appellant] entering the restaurant, and after she left. It
        is also undisputed that freezing rain and/or snow was still falling
        at the time of [Appellant’s] accident and did not stop until at least
        three hours after her fall. There also was no dispute that
        [Appellant] and her other family members chose to walk on a
        grassy strip, and not on a walkway/sidewalk or parking lot, at the
        time of [Appellant’s] fall.      Finally, it was undisputed that
        [Appellant] slipped and fell in the grassy area between the curb
        and a fence on the property, and not on a walkway, sidewalk or
        parking lot of [Appellees’] property.

Trial Ct. Op., 3/31/22, at 2.

        On February 14, 2022, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.

Therein, Appellees argued that under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, Appellees

did not have a duty to remove ice and snow until a reasonable time after the

winter weather had ended, and that they did not have a duty to remove ice

and snow from grassy areas. See Mot. for Summ. J., 2/14/22, at 8-10; R.R.

at 12a-14a.1,2
____________________________________________

1   We may cite to the reproduced record for the parties’ convenience.

2Appellees attached an expert report prepared by Steven Roberts, a
meteorologist, to their motion for summary judgment. See Mot. for Summ.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -2-
J-S31018-22

       Appellant responded to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment,

arguing that Appellees’ motion was premature because discovery was not

complete, the hills and ridges doctrine did not apply to this case, and there

were outstanding questions of fact regarding the weather and if Appellees

acted reasonably to avoid the accumulation of snow and ice. See Resp. in

Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J., 3/15/22, at 3-11; R.R. at 18a-26a. Appellant

asserted that her requested deposition of a member of Appellees’ maintenance

team was necessary for her to adequately respond to Appellees’ motion. See

id. at 5-6; R.R. at 20a-21a.

       On March 31, 2022,3 the trial court granted Appellees’ motion for

summary judgment and dismissed all claims against Appellees with prejudice.

Appellant filed a timely appeal and a timely court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion adopting its March 31,

2022 opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 5/9/22.

       Appellant presents the following issues for our review, which we restate

as follows:

____________________________________________

J., 2/14/22, Ex. I. On March 7, 2022, Appellees filed an amended version of
Roberts’ expert report.

3 The trial court’s opinion and order are both dated March 30, 2022, but the
trial court notified the parties of the entry of its opinion and order on March
31, 2022. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b); Pa.R.C.P. 236(b). We have amended the
caption accordingly.

                                           -3-
J-S31018-22

       1. The trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motion for summary
          judgment because the motion was premature as discovery had
          not been completed.

       2. The trial court erred in its application of the “storm in progress”
          and “hills and ridges” doctrines to Appellees’ motion for
          summary judgment.

       3. The trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motion for summary
          judgment because there were genuine issues of material fact.

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.4

              Premature Motion and Hills and Ridges Doctrine

       Appellant’s first two issues are interrelated; therefore, we analyze them

together. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting Appellees’

prematurely filed motion for summary judgment. Id. at 11-13 (citing Kerns

v. Methodist Hosp., 574 A.2d 1068 (Pa. 1990)).             Specifically, Appellant

claims that before Appellees filed their motion for summary judgment she had

“requested a deposition of the maintenance team member that responded to

the scene [of her fall].” Id. at 12. However, Appellees did not respond to her

____________________________________________

4 Appellant’s statement of issues on appeal is a single, page-and-a-half-long
paragraph, which we have separated into three distinct issues. See Pa.R.A.P.
2116 (requiring that “the statement of the questions involved must state
concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances
of the case but without unnecessary detail”). Additionally, the argument
section of Appellant’s brief is not divided into separate sections for each issue
we have identified. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating “[t]he argument shall be
divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have
at the head of each part . . . the particular point treated therein, followed by
such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”). We do
not condone Appellant’s failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, but because this noncompliance does not impede our review, we
decline to find waiver. See, e.g., Forrester v. Hanson, 901 A.2d 548, 551
n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006).

                                           -4-
J-S31018-22

request, and instead filed their motion for summary judgment. Id. Appellant

contends that “[a]n important threshold question in the ‘hills and ridges’ and

‘storm in progress’ case law is what actions were taken by defendant and what

effect those actions had on the icy conditions[,]” therefore, deposing a

maintenance team member regarding Appellees’ “procedures and protocols

for ice prevention, ice remediation and removal[]” was “essential” for her to

respond to Appellees’ motion. Id. at 12, 19. Appellant concludes that because

“[d]iscovery was ongoing and was not complete at the time that the motion

was filed[,]” Appellees’ motion was premature and that the trial court erred

by granting the motion instead of denying it to permit the completion of

discovery. Id. at 11; see also id. at 20.

      Further, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding the

“hills and ridges” doctrine applied to this case.   Id. at 13-20. Specifically

Appellant contends that the “‘hills and ridges’ doctrine only applies in

situations where the ice is ‘the result of an entirely natural accumulation’. The

doctrine does not apply when the ice is the result of defendant’s neglect.” Id.

at 18 (quoting Bacsick v. Barnes, 341 A.2d 157, 160 (Pa. Super. 1975)).

Additionally Appellant claims that “[i]f there has been human interaction with

the precipitation which has caused some ice or snow [to] accumulate, the

doctrine does not apply.” Id. (citing Harvey v. Rouse Chamberlin, Ltd.,

901 A.2d 523 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Appellant asserts that because Appellees

run a winter sports resort, they had notice and a duty to ensure that their

walkways are clear of ice and safe for guests to use.        Id. at 15-16, 19.

                                      -5-
J-S31018-22

Appellant also argues that Appellees’ failure to remove ice from the walkway

between the restaurant and the hotel forced Appellant and her family to walk

on the grass adjacent to the walkway, where she fell. Id. at 16-17. Appellant

concludes that the trial court erred in applying the hills and ridges doctrine to

Appellees’ motion. Id. at 18-19.

      This Court has explained:

      Our scope of review of summary judgment orders is plenary. We
      apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all the
      evidence of record to determine whether there exists a genuine
      issue of material fact. We view the record in the light most
      favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
      existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
      against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue
      as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is
      entitled to judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment
      be entered.

      Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly implicate
      the plaintiff[’s] proof of the elements of [her] cause of action.
      Summary judgment is proper if, after the completion of discovery
      relevant to the motion, . . . an adverse party who will bear the
      burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts
      essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial
      would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. Thus a record
      that supports summary judgment will either (1) show the material
      facts are undisputed or (2) contain insufficient evidence of facts
      to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense and,
      therefore, there is no issue to be submitted to the jury. Upon
      appellate review we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions
      of law, but may reach our own conclusions. The appellate court
      may disturb the trial court’s order only upon an error of law or an
      abuse of discretion.

Collins v. Phila. Suburban Dev. Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 73 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citation omitted and formatting altered); see also Kerns, 574 A.2d at 1073

                                      -6-
J-S31018-22

(stating that “the standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a

decision to grant or deny a continuance to complete further discovery under

Pa.R.C.P. 1035(e)[5] is whether the trial court abused its discretion” (citations

omitted)).

       “A fact is considered material if its resolution could affect the outcome

of the case under the governing law.” Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n of Pa.

v. Commonwealth, 77 A.3d 587, 602 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).

       Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.3, which governs responses to motions for

summary judgment, states in relevant part:

       (a) . . . the adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
       or denials of the pleadings but must file a response within thirty
       days after service of the motion . . .

                                       *       *   *

       (b) An adverse party may supplement the record or set
       forth the reasons why the party cannot present evidence
       essential to justify opposition to the motion and any action
       proposed to be taken by the party to present such evidence.

       (c) The court may rule upon the motion for judgment or permit
       affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken or other
       discovery to be had or make such other order as is just.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3(a)-(c) (emphasis added).

       Where the parties have had a reasonable time for discovery and the

party opposing summary judgment fails to demonstrate the materiality of the

requested outstanding discovery, the trial court does not abuse its discretion

____________________________________________

5 Former Pa.R.C.P. 1035(e), rescinded and replaced by Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(b),
(c) (eff. July 1, 1996, am. eff. Sept. 1, 2003).

                                           -7-
J-S31018-22

by denying the request for a continuance to pursue further discovery. See

Kerns, 574 A.2d at 1073-74; see also Manzetti v. Mercy Hosp. of

Pittsburgh, 776 A.2d 938, 950-51 (Pa. 2001) (stating that “[s]ummary

judgment may be entered prior to the completion of discovery in matters

where additional discovery would not aid in the establishment of any material

fact. Thus, the question is whether additional discovery would have aided in

the establishment of any material fact” (citation omitted)).

       This Court has explained:

       For a party to prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove
       that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, that duty
       was breached, the breach resulted in the plaintiff’s injury, and the
       plaintiff suffered an actual loss or damages. A land possessor is
       subject to liability for physical harm caused to an invitee[6] only if
       the following conditions are satisfied:

       [T]he land possessor knows of or reasonably should have known
       of the condition and the condition involves an unreasonable risk
       of harm, the possessor should expect that the invitee will not
       realize it or will fail to protect [herself] against it, and the
       possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee
       against the danger.

       An invitee must present evidence proving either the possessor of
       the land had a hand in creating the harmful condition, or he had
       actual or constructive notice of such condition. What constitutes
       constructive notice depends on the circumstances of the case, but
       one of the most important factors to consider is the time that
       elapsed between the origin of the condition and the accident.

____________________________________________

6 There is no dispute that Appellant was an invitee of Appellees.               See
Appellees’ Brief at 10.

                                           -8-
J-S31018-22

       The hills and ridges doctrine,[7] as defined and applied by the
       courts of Pennsylvania, is a refinement or clarification of the duty
       owed by a possessor of land and is applicable to a single type of
       dangerous condition, i.e., ice and snow.

Collins, 179 A.3d at 73-74 (citations and footnote omitted and formatting

altered).

       However, this Court has also stated that

       the hills and ridges doctrine may be applied only in cases where
       the snow and ice complained of are the result of an entirely
       natural accumulation, following a recent snowfall, as we
       reiterated that the protection afforded by the doctrine [to owners
       and possessors of land] is predicated on the assumption that these
       formations are natural phenomena incidental to our climate.

Harvey, 901 A.2d at 526 (citations omitted and formatting altered, emphasis

in original).

       In order to recover for a fall on an ice- or snow-covered surface, where

the hills and ridges doctrine applies, a plaintiff must prove:

       (1) that snow and ice had accumulated on the sidewalk in ridges
       or elevations of such size and character as to unreasonably
       obstruct travel and constitute a danger to pedestrians travelling
       thereon; (2) that the property owner had notice, either actual or
       constructive, of the existence of such condition; and (3) that it
       was the dangerous accumulation of snow and ice which caused
       the plaintiff to fall.

____________________________________________

7 The hills and ridges doctrine is “a long standing and well entrenched legal
principle that protects an owner or occupier of land from liability for generally
slippery conditions resulting from ice and snow where the owner has not
permitted the ice and snow to unreasonably accumulate in ridges or
elevations.” Collins, 179 A.3d at 72 (citation omitted).

                                           -9-
J-S31018-22

      This Court has further opined that the only duty upon the property
      owner or tenant is to act within a reasonable time after notice to
      remove the snow and ice when it is in a dangerous condition.

                                   *     *      *

      [U]nder prevailing law, a landowner [or possessor of land] has no
      obligation to correct the conditions until a reasonable time after
      the winter storm has ended.

                                   *     *      *

      Further, . . . this Court recognized that a landowner [or possessor
      of land] has no duty to salt or sand a parking lot
      during/immediately after an ice storm. Thus, we find no support
      for [the plaintiffs’] argument that a landowner or possessor of
      land] has a general affirmative legal duty to do so prior to a winter
      storm. In fact, the entire “gist” of the hills and ridges doctrine is
      that a landowner [or possessor of land] has no duty to correct or
      take reasonable measures with regard to storm-created snowy or
      icy conditions until a reasonable time after the storm has ceased.

Collins, 179 A.3d at 74-76 (citations omitted and formatting altered); see

also Alexander v. City of Meadville, 61 A.3d 218, 225 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(concluding that the defendant was not liable when the plaintiff “fell on freshly

fallen snow over a smooth patch of ice due to winter conditions which

permeated the community—not on a hilly or ridged icy accumulation”).

      Here, the trial court explained:

      Precipitation was still falling at the time of [Appellant’s] fall, and
      [Appellees] were under no obligation to do anything until a
      reasonable time after the storm ended. [Appellant] also failed to
      adduce any hills or ridges or any condition other than general
      slippery conditions that existed in the local geographical area.
      [Appellees] also had no duty to keep the grassy area, where
      [Appellant] chose to walk, free and clear from icy/snowy
      conditions. The area was between a curb and a fence, and was
      not a walkway, sidewalk or parking lot. Each of these reasons
      standing alone is sufficient for [Appellees] to prevail on their
      motion for summary judgment.

                                       - 10 -
J-S31018-22

      [Appellant] contends she was forced to walk on the grassy area
      due to ice and snow on the sidewalks and/or parking lot where
      she was initially traversing when exiting the restaurant. However,
      a plaintiff’s choice of travel does not impose liability on a property
      owner simply by claiming the path taken appeared less
      dangerous, and [Appellant] has not cited any case law to the
      contrary. There also was no duty on the [Appellees] to address
      the icy or slippery conditions on a sidewalk or parking lot until the
      winter event had ended and a known dangerous condition caused
      by hills or ridges still existed. Finally, [Appellant] has produced
      no evidence that the area she chose to avoid had anything other
      than general slippery conditions caused by the then falling
      precipitation, as opposed to hills and ridges formed by
      precipitation that had already ended.

      [Appellant] also argues that discovery is not complete and that a
      requested deposition of someone from [Appellees’] maintenance
      team is necessary. [Appellant] asserts such a witness can provide
      information related to the policies and procedures for ice
      prevention/remediation/removal. However, such information is
      irrelevant in light of the other undisputed facts in this matter.
      [Appellees’] policies and procedures in a snow/ice storm have no
      bearing on the fact that there was an ongoing storm at [the] time
      of [Appellant’s] fall, there were generally slippery conditions with
      no hills or ridges present, and [Appellant] fell in a grassy area not
      intended for travel by pedestrians. Each of these conditions bars
      [Appellant’s] claims of negligence.

Trial Ct. Op., 3/31/22, at 4-5 (formatting altered).

      Here, Appellant argues that Appellees had a duty to pre-treat walkways

to prevent the accumulation of ice and snow because they operate a winter

sports resort.   Under Pennsylvania law, an owner or possessor of land

generally does not have a duty to pretreat walkways or take other measures

to prevent the accumulation of ice and snow prior to or during a winter storm.

See Collins, 179 A.3d at 76. Appellant fails to cite to any authority indicating

that this general rule does not apply to Appellees.

                                     - 11 -
J-S31018-22

      Further, Appellant’s reliance on Harvey and Bacsick to support her

argument that the hills and ridges doctrine does not apply to this case is

misplaced. The Harvey Court concluded the hills and ridges doctrine did not

apply because there was undisputed evidence that the co-defendant had

plowed the area where the plaintiff fell, therefore the black ice in that area

was not an entirely natural accumulation. See Harvey, 901 A.2d at 526. In

Bacsick, this Court held that the doctrine was not applicable because the

snow blocking the sidewalk was not an entirely natural accumulation because

municipal plows had deposited some of the snow there. See Bacsick, 341

A.2d at 159-61. Appellant has failed to refer to any evidence in record that

human activity contributed to the accumulation of ice on the path were

Appellant fell. To the contrary, Appellant’s theory of liability is predicated on

the Appellees’ failure to take precautions to prevent the natural accumulation

of ice on that walkway. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court

did not err in concluding that the hills and ridges doctrine applied to this case.

See Collins, 179 A.3d at 73.

      Further, based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of

discretion by the trial court in addressing the merits of Appellees’ motion for

summary judgment instead of denying it as premature and permitting

Appellant to depose Appellees’ employee. As stated above, Appellees did not

have a duty to remove ice and snow during a winter weather event nor did

they have a duty to pre-treat walkways or take other preventative measures.

See Collins, 179 A.3d at 75-76. Appellant’s proposed deposition of a member

                                     - 12 -
J-S31018-22

of Appellees’ maintenance team regarding protocols for ice prevention would

not establish any material facts as to weather conditions on the date of

Appellant’s fall or the existence of accumulations of ice and snow into hills and

ridges. See Kerns, 574 A.2d at 1073-74 (explaining that a party opposing

summary judgment on the grounds that discovery is incomplete must

establish that the requested discovery is material); see also Manzetti, 776

A.2d at 950-51. Therefore, we conclude that the motion was not premature,

and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding the motion on the

merits. See Kerns, 574 A.2d at 1073. For these reasons, Appellant is not

entitled to relief on these claims.

                             Material Issues of Fact

      Appellant also argues that material issues of fact exist regarding the

weather   conditions   and    the     reasonableness   of   Appellees’   omissions.

Appellant’s Brief at 9-10, 13-15, 17-18, 20. Specifically Appellant contends

that Appellees’ meteorology expert report establishes that there were gaps in

the precipitation and that this raises a material issue of fact regarding the

weather conditions on January 1, 2021. Id. at 13-14, 17. Appellant further

asserts that whether the ice had accumulated into hills and ridges and whether

the Appellees’ failure to take measures to prevent/remove the accumulation

of ice on the walkways was reasonable are material issues of fact. Id. at 14-

15, 18. Therefore, Appellant concludes that the trial court erred in entering

summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Id. at 20.

                                        - 13 -
J-S31018-22

      As stated above, under the hills and ridges doctrine, an owner or

possessor of land does not have a duty to remove ice or snow that has

accumulated until a reasonable time after the winter storm has ended. See

Collins, 179 A.3d at 75-76. Additionally, an owner or possessor of land is

only responsible for keeping parking lots, sidewalks, and other areas intended

for pedestrian travel clear of ice and snow after the owner or possessor has

notice of the hazardous condition. See, e.g., Heasley v. Carter Lumber,

843 A.2d 1274, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2004) (explaining that the hills and ridges

doctrine “was intended to protect property owners from the undue burden of

ensuring that open spaces such as sidewalks and parking lots are

constantly kept clear of snow and ice” (emphasis added)); Gilligan v.

Villanova University, 584       A.2d   1005, 1007-08      (Pa. Super. 1991)

(concluding that the defendant university was not liable when the plaintiff

departed from a sidewalk and fell on a snow-covered grassy area of the

campus because requiring a landowner to clear snow and ice from the entire

property “would be impracticable and absurd”).

      At the outset, we note that although Appellant identifies multiple issues

that she claims are material questions of fact, she has failed to support her

arguments with citations to the record. See Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065,

1079 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting that it is not the duty of the reviewing court

to develop an argument for an appellant or to scour the record to find evidence

to support an argument); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (requiring a party to

support its arguments with relevant citations). Therefore, we conclude that

                                    - 14 -
J-S31018-22

Appellant has waived this claim. See Milby, 189 A.3d at 1079 (holding that

an appellant’s failure to develop arguments in a brief results in waiver); see

also Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29 (Pa. Super. 2006) (providing that

arguments that fail to adhere to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure

and are not developed are waived).

      In any event, were we to reach the merits of this claim, we would affirm

on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/31/22, at 4-5;

see also Collins, 179 A.3d at 74-75 (explaining that under the hills and ridges

doctrine, an owner or possessor of land is not liable when “the accident

occurred at a time when general slippery conditions prevailed in the

community as a result of recent precipitation”, and further that an owner or

possessor of land has no duty to remove ice and snow “until a reasonable time

after the winter storm has ended” (citations and quotation marks omitted));

Gilligan, 584 A.2d at 1007-08 (concluding that the defendant was not liable

when the plaintiff departed from a sidewalk and fell on snow that had

accumulated on a grassy area of the defendant’s property).

      For these reasons we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse

its discretion in entering summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Therefore,

we affirm the trial court’s order.

      Order affirmed.

      President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins the memorandum.

      Judge Bowes files a concurring memorandum.

                                     - 15 -
J-S31018-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/24/2023

                          - 16 -