Court Opinion

ID: 9351893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 07:09:19.022265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:04:17.284910
License: Public Domain

Reversed, Remanded, and Opinion Filed December 30, 2022

                                  S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                              No. 05-22-00072-CV

MARK BAILEY, EDAMAME, INC., ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND
             DEEP ELLUM SUSHI, LTD., Appellants
                            V.
ARMANDO RAMIREZ, JERI CARROLL, FLEUR AUNG, H.A. TILLMAN
      HEIN, MARC BROWN, NINEBOANAS, LLC, Appellees

               On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-15114

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
              Before Justices Molberg, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle
                       Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
      In this interlocutory appeal, appellants Mark Bailey (Bailey) and Edamame,

Inc. (Edamame), on behalf of themselves and Deep Ellum Sushi, Ltd., challenge the

trial court’s January 7, 2022 temporary injunction (the January Injunction), which

enjoins Bailey and Edamame from taking certain actions related to the partnership

interests of appellees Jeri Carroll, Fleur Aung, H.A. Tillmann Hein, and Marc

Brown. In seven issues, Bailey and Edamame assert the trial court abused its

discretion by issuing the January Injunction. We conclude, however, that Bailey and

Edamame’s sixth issue is dispositive because the January Injunction fails to comply
with the specificity requirements of Rule 683 and must be dissolved. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 683. We, therefore, include only those background facts necessary to address

the question of specificity under Rule 683.

                                  BACKGROUND

      The underlying proceeding involves a partnership dispute concerning Deep

Ellum Sushi, Ltd., which operates the Deep Sushi restaurant in Dallas. Appellant

Edamame, Inc. is Deep Ellum Sushi, Ltd.’s general partner, appellant Mark Bailey

is Edamame’s CEO and a controlling limited partner of Deep Ellum Sushi, Ltd., and

appellees Jeri Carroll, Fleur Aung, H.A. Tillmann Hein, and Marc Brown are limited

partners.

      In October 2021, Bailey and Edamame sought an injunction preventing

Carroll, Aung, Hein, and Brown from acting for the Deep Sushi partnership. Bailey

and Edamame also asked the trial court to vacate certain Resolutions purportedly

enacted by Carroll, Aung, Hein, and Brown and enjoin the Resolutions from taking

effect. The trial court granted the requested relief and signed an injunction on

November 22, 2021 (the November Injunction). Appellees did not appeal the

November Injunction. Appellees Jeri Carroll, Fleur Aung, H.A. Tillmann Hein, and

Marc Brown (collectively, Applicants) did, however, apply for a second injunction.

On January 7, 2022, the trial court granted their application and signed the temporary

injunction that is the subject of this appeal (the January Injunction).

                                         –2–
      The January Injunction reinstated Aung, Brown, Carroll, and Hein as partners

of Deep Sushi, and included the following findings:

           Applicants are entitled to the relief sought in their Application
            for Temporary Injunction and an injunction is necessary to
            restrain [Bailey and Edamame] from taking actions prejudicial to
            Applicant’s [sic] rights.

           The Court must immediately enjoin [Bailey and Edamame] from
            (a) terminating Applicants’ Limited Partnership interests, (b)
            redeeming Applicants’ Limited Partnership shares, (c) expelling
            Applicants from the Partnership, (d) otherwise impairing
            Applicants’ Partnership interests pending final resolution of this
            matter.

           Applicants will suffer probable, imminent, irreparable injury
            with no adequate remedy at law because (a) [Bailey and
            Edamame] have sought to terminate the Limited Partner interests
            of Jeri Carroll, Fleur Aung, HA. Tillmann Hein, and Marc
            Brown, the legitimacy of such is a pending issue in this case.
            Further, [Bailey and Edamame’s] putative termination of the
            Limited Partner interests of Jeri Carroll, Fleur Aung, H.A.
            Tillmann Hein, and Marc Brown would deprive Applicants of
            the opportunity to have such determination of legitimacy made
            at trial; (b) Applicants have no adequate remedy at law for loss
            of their Partnership interest.

           Applicants have shown a cause of action and probable right to
            relief.

           The status quo ante of the Partnership is that of the Partnership
            on November 22, 2021. The imminent harm faced by Applicants
            far outweighs the potential harm that could be sustained by either
            [Bailey or Edamame] if this injunctive relief were not granted
            because restoring the status quo ante of the Partnership on
            November 22, 2021 ensures that the Partnership will maintain its
            status before any contested action altering the relationship
            between [Bailey and Edamame] and Applicants.

                                       –3–
The January Injunction included a trial date and bond amount and set out the

following orders:

            [Bailey and Edamame’s] and Applicants’ statuses remain
             identical to their statuses on November 22, 2021 pending
             determination of the legitimacy of the parties’ actions affecting
             Partnership membership and ownership.

            The parties are enjoined from taking any action affecting
             Partnership membership and ownership, the legitimacy of which
             is in question in this case, pending determination of the
             legitimacy of such actions by this Court.

Bailey and Edamame appeal the January Injunction.

                                    ANALYSIS

      We review a trial court’s order granting or denying a temporary injunction for

an abuse of discretion. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002).

To be entitled to a temporary injunction, an applicant must plead and prove “(1) a

cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and

(3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Id.; El Tacaso, Inc.

v. Jireh Star, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Indep.

Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Collins, 261 S.W.3d 792, 794–95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008,

no pet.); Freedom LHV, LLC v. IFC White Rock, Inc., No. 05-15-01528-CV, 2016

WL 3548012, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2016, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.); see

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.011. “For purposes of a temporary injunction,

an injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in

damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard.”

                                         –4–
El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 743. “The general rule at equity is that before injunctive

relief can be obtained, it must appear that there does not exist an adequate remedy at

law.” Id. at 744 (quoting Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 210).

      In relevant part, rule 683 requires every order granting a temporary injunction

to state the reasons for its issuance and to be specific in its terms:

      Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set
      forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall
      describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or
      other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding
      only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
      employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or
      participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by
      personal service or otherwise.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. The requirements of rule 683 are mandatory and must be strictly

followed. El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 745; Indep. Capital Mgmt., 261 S.W.3d at 795.

      “[T]he obvious purpose of [rule 683] is to adequately inform a party of what

he is enjoined from doing and the reason why he is so enjoined.” El Tacaso, 356

S.W.3d at 744 (quoting Schulz v. Schulz, 478 S.W.2d 239, 244–45 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Dallas 1972, no writ)). “A trial court’s order stating its reasons for granting a

temporary injunction must be specific and legally sufficient on its face and not

merely conclusory.” Id. “To comply with rule 683, a trial court must set out in the

temporary injunction order the reasons the court deems it proper to issue the

injunction, including the reasons why the applicant will suffer injury if the injunctive

relief is not ordered.” Id. “Even if a sound reason for granting relief appears

elsewhere in the record, the Texas Supreme Court has stated in the strongest terms
                                       –5–
that rule of civil procedure 683 is mandatory.” Id. at 745. If a temporary injunction

order fails to comply with the requirements of rule 683, it is void. Liberty Fed. Sav.

Bank v. 2908 Lovers Lane Enters., LLC, No. 05-16-00389-CV, 2016 WL 6124139,

at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 20, 2016, no pet.) (first citing El Tacaso, 356

S.W.3d at 745, and then citing Indep. Capital Mgmt., 261 S.W.3d at 795 (“A trial

court abuses its discretion by issuing a temporary injunction order that does not

comply with the requirements of rule 683.”)). As we stated in Independent Capital

Management,

      The temporary injunction order simply sets out the elements necessary
      for injunctive relief. It does not specify the facts the trial court relied
      on, making the trial court’s findings conclusory. It also fails to identify
      the injury appellees will suffer if the injunction does not issue. Merely
      stating that appellees are “suffering irreparable harm” and have “no
      adequate remedy at law” does not meet the rule 683 requirement for
      specificity.

Indep. Capital Mgmt., 261 S.W.3d at 796 (internal citations omitted). In that case,

we concluded the temporary injunction order was void because it did not satisfy the

requirements of Rule 683. Id. Likewise, the temporary injunction order in this case

is void. See id.; see also Vista Bank v. Nelezer, Inc., No. 05-21-00348-CV, 2021 WL

5027764, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Here, the January Injunction states the applicants “are entitled to the relief

sought” and an injunction is “necessary to restrain [Bailey and Edamame] from

taking actions prejudicial to Applicants’ rights.” It does not, however, specify the

facts the trial court relied on to reach those conclusions or provide any reason why

                                         –6–
the applicants are entitled to the relief sought in their application. The January

Injunction does not explain why the four actions being enjoined need to be enjoined

or how those actions could prejudice Applicant’s rights. The January Injunction is,

therefore, conclusory. Further, the January Injunction does not specifically explain

how appellees will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction and why they have

no adequate remedy at law. These conclusory statements are insufficient to comply

with the requirements of rule 683. See Indep. Capital Mgmt., 261 S.W.3d at 796.

Similarly, the January Injunction does not state what cause of action and what

probable right to relief have been shown by applicants. Like the injunction in

Independent Capital Management, the January Injunction does little more than set

out the elements necessary for injunctive relief and fails to meet the specificity

requirements of Rule 683.

      We conclude the January Injunction is conclusory and lacks the specificity

required by Rule 683 and sustain appellants’ sixth issue.

                                 CONCLUSION

      We conclude the injunction lacks the specificity required by Rule 683 and is

void. Accordingly, we sustain appellants’ sixth issue, declare the January Injunction

void, dissolve the January Injunction, and remand for further proceedings. Because

of this conclusion, we do not reach appellants’ remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P.

47.1; see also SISU Energy, LLC v. Hartman, No. 02-19-00436-CV, 2020 WL

4006725, at *17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). We

                                        –7–
further instruct the clerk of this Court to issue the mandate immediately. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 18.6; see also Helix Energy Sols. Grp., Inc. v. Howard, 452 S.W.3d 40, 45

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (dissolving a void temporary

injunction and directing the clerk of the appellate court to issue the mandate

immediately).

                                           /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
                                           ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
                                           JUSTICE

220072F.P05

                                         –8–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

MARK BAILEY, EDAMAME,                        On Appeal from the 160th Judicial
INC., ON BEHALF OF                           District Court, Dallas County, Texas
THEMSELVES AND DEEP                          Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-15114.
ELLUM SUSHI, LTD., Appellants                Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
                                             Kipness. Justices Molberg and
No. 05-22-00072-CV          V.               Carlyle participating.

ARMANDO RAMIREZ, JERI
CARROLL, FLEUR AUNG, H.A.
TILLMAN HEIN, MARC BROWN,
NINEBOANAS, LLC, Appellees

        In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the January 7, 2022
injunction of the trial court is DISSOLVED and this cause is REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings. We further instruct the Clerk of this Court to
issue the mandate immediately.

       It is ORDERED that appellants MARK BAILEY, EDAMAME, INC., ON
BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND DEEP ELLUM SUSHI, LTD. recover their
costs of this appeal from appellees ARMANDO RAMIREZ, JERI CARROLL,
FLEUR AUNG, H.A. TILLMAN HEIN, MARC BROWN, NINEBOANAS, LLC.

Judgment entered this 30th day of December 2022.

                                       –9–