Court Opinion

ID: 9407946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 21:04:21.028732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.953301
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/10/23 P. v. Tran CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061695

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 07WF2294)

 HUY TRONG TRAN,                                                       OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
David A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant Huy Trong Tran filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former
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Penal Code section 1170.95. At the prima facie hearing on the petition, the trial court
found Tran ineligible for relief as a matter of law and denied the petition. Appointed
appellate counsel for Tran filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
(Wende), setting forth the facts of the case. Acknowledging Anders v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appellate counsel has asked this court to review the record
“unfettered by [appellate] counsel’s prior thought processes.”
       While this appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 226 (Delgadillo) and concluded “the procedures set
out in Anders and Wende do not apply to an appeal from the denial of postconviction
relief.” However, the court in Delgadillo set forth “a few basic procedures” Courts of
Appeal should follow when considering an appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6
petition where appointed counsel has found no arguable issues to be pursued.
(Delgadillo, supra, at pp. 231-232.) In such instances, the defendant must be given
proper notice and provided an opportunity to file a supplemental letter or brief, which
Tran did. Under Delgadillo, the Court of Appeal may also conduct its own independent
review of the record in an exercise of its discretion. (Ibid.)
              Exercising our discretion, we have examined the entire record as well as
Tran’s supplemental brief and find no reasonably arguable issue. (Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 232.) We therefore affirm.

1
      Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered section
1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the statute as
former section 1170.95 or section 1172.6. All further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
              In 2008, a jury found Tran guilty of two counts of premeditated and
deliberate attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)), shooting at an occupied
motor vehicle (§ 246), two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd.
(b)), misdemeanor domestic violence (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), and possession of a firearm by
a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found Tran had discharged a firearm (§
12022.53, subd. (c)) in connection with the attempted murder counts and personally used
a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in connection with those as well as the assault with a
firearm counts. The trial court imposed a total sentence of 20 years to life. On direct
appeal to this court, the judgment was affirmed with orders to correct the abstract of
judgment. (People v. Tran (Aug. 23, 2010, G042579) [nonpub. opn.].)
              In April 2022, Tran filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former
section 1170.95. Counsel was subsequently appointed at his request. The People filed a
response to Tran’s petition, arguing it should be denied, and Tran’s counsel filed a brief
in support of the petition. The trial court conducted a prima facie hearing on the petition
and after considering the People’s response, Tran’s counsel’s brief in support of the
petition, and the record of conviction, the trial court found Tran had failed to establish a
prima facie showing for relief. A statement of decision was then issued by the trial court.
Tran appealed.

                                       DISCUSSION
              Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it relates to murder ‘“to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Senate

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Bill No. 1437 also created procedures “for convicted murderers who could not be
convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, at p. 957.) A
subsequent amendment to former section 1170.95 extended relief to defendants convicted
of attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
manslaughter. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) § 1; Stats. 2021, ch. 551.)
              After receipt of a section 1172.6 resentencing petition, counsel shall be
appointed upon petitioner’s request, the prosecutor must then file a response to the
petition, and a reply may be filed by the petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(1)-(3) & (c).)
The trial court shall then “hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief.” (Id., subd. (c).)
              At the prima facie hearing, the trial court may rely on the record of
conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-971.) “The record of conviction will
necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under [former] section 1170.95,
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.) Instructions given to the jury at a petitioner’s trial may be
relied on by the trial court as part of the record of conviction at the prima facie hearing.
(People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055.) “It is only where the record of
conviction establishes the petition lacks merit as a matter of law that the court may deny
the petition without a hearing. [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566,
576.)
              Citing to three cases, People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001
(Montes), People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970 (Ramirez), and People v.
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Rodriguez (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 227, Tran argues the trial court should have issued an
order to show cause because his “intent to kill was imputed” and the trial court engaged
in inappropriate factfinding at the prima facie hearing on his petition.
2
 People v. Rodriguez is no longer citeable authority as it has been depublished by order
of the California Supreme Court. (People v. Rodriguez (Dec. 22, 2021, S266652.)

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              However, Montes and Ramirez are factually distinguishable from the
present case. In Montes, a jury convicted the defendant of mayhem and two counts of
attempted murder, and found true other allegations for which the defendant filed a
petition for resentencing pursuant to § 1172.6. (Montes, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp.
1003-1004.) At the prima facie hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s petition.
(Id. at p. 1004.) However, after reviewing the record of conviction, the Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s denial because the record did not refute the defendant’s claims
of eligibility. (Id. at p. 1007.) Because the “jury was instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine for attempted murder” this was enough to establish a
prima facie showing of eligibility under § 1172.6. (Montes, at p. 1007.)
              In Ramirez, the defendant was convicted of “first degree murder under a
theory of felony murder based on his participation in an attempted carjacking.”
(Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 975.) The defendant in Ramirez filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to § 1172.6. (Ramirez, at p. 982.) After the prima facie hearing,
the trial court issued an order to show cause and an evidentiary hearing was held. (Id. at
pp. 982-983.) At the evidentiary hearing, no additional evidence was presented as the
parties stipulated to the trial court reviewing the record of conviction, including the
“transcripts, and the appellate opinion.” (Id. at p. 983.) After the evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied resentencing relief. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal reversed concluding
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding the defendant acted with “reckless
indifference to human life” by participating in a carjacking in which his codefendant
fatally wounded the victim. (Id. at p. 993.)
              Here, the trial court “[w]ithout considering the factual summary in the
appellate opinion or reweighing the facts of the case,” reviewed the record of conviction,
particularly noting the jury instructions and verdict forms. Unlike the defendants in
Montes and Ramirez, Tran was not convicted under a theory of felony murder, natural
and probable consequences, or aiding and abetting. As noted by the trial court, “[the]

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jury was not instructed on the law defining aiding and abetting principles nor on any
theory of liability requiring that malice be imputed to [Tran] based solely on his
participation in the offenses.” The trial court also stated: “The jury instructions given
make clear that the jury was only instructed on the law defining attempted murder,
deliberation and premeditation, and the related firearm enhancement based on [Tran’s]
role as the direct perpetrator of the offenses.” Since the record of conviction established
Tran was the “direct perpetrator who acted with the intent to kill” and he was not
convicted under a vicarious liability theory, relief was properly denied by the trial court.
              After an independent review of the entire appellate record and Tran’s
written contentions, we find no arguable issues. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
order denying Tran postjudgment relief.

                                      DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order denying the resentencing petition is affirmed.

                                                  MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P.J.

DELANEY, J.

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