Court Opinion

ID: 9709870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:56:35.158444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:52.257762
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting: In the all-too-numerous instances where this court has imposed sanctions on attorneys for converting client funds, it has repeatedly emphasized that, “in the absence of mitigating circumstances, such conversion is a gross violation of the attorney’s oath, calling for the attorney’s disbarment.” (In re Stillo (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 49, 54. See also In re Woldman (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 248, 257; In re Smith (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 134, 142.) “ ‘Other offenses might be excused, but conversion to his own use of the property of his client is an offense that cannot in any degree be countenanced.’ ” (In re Stillo (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 49, 54, quoting People ex rel. Black v. Smith (1919), 290 Ill. 241, 251.) Considering the “gross violation of the attorney’s oath” which occurred here and the lack of any circumstances which would excuse or justify respondent’s actions, I would follow the hearing and review boards’ recommendations that the respondent be disbarred. This court has recognized that every attorney disciplinary case is unique and that a case must be judged according to its own particular circumstances. (In re O’Hallaren (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 426, 433.) However, “predictability and fairness require a degree of consistency in the selection of sanctions for similar types of misconduct.” (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 275.) As such, “where the facts are similar to those in other cases, a uniform standard of discipline should be sought.” In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7, 11. See also In re Enstrom (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 410, 416; In re Woldman (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 248, 257-58. In In re Smith (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 250, the attorney, with his client’s consent, deposited a $69,999 settlement check in his personal bank account. It was agreed that he would hold the client’s share of the settlement proceeds until the client reached the age of 21. After paying a $9,000 debt owed by the client out of the settlement proceeds, the attorney made unauthorized use of the balance of the funds. Only after the commencement of disciplinary proceedings was the client fully reimbursed. The record in Smith also revealed that the attorney had serious personal, family and financial problems at the time he converted the money, including the suicide of his daughter, a divorce, and the foreclosure of his house. He also related that following the suicide of his daughter he had been “drinking heavily” but since then had been able to “ ‘turn himself around.’ ” (In re Smith (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 250, 255.) While the court acknowledged that he was “experiencing severe financial and emotional problems at the time of the settlement',” and that he had converted the funds of only one client, it nonetheless concluded that his disbarment was necessary to “ ‘safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of the legal profession and to protect the administration of justice from reproach.’ ” 63 Ill. 2d 250, 255-56. The misconduct of the respondent is at least as serious, if not more so, than the misconduct of the attorney in Smith. The record shows that respondent converted large sums of money from two persons, that he refused to repay any of the converted funds for almost four years despite repeated demands for return of the money, and that respondent made partial restitution of the money only after Louise Korb and Bresler filed a lawsuit against him and only after the Hearing Board had concluded the hearings in this disciplinary action. Moreover, respondent admitted before the Hearing Board that he still owed Louise Korb and Bresler each $6,000. No evidence has been presented which shows that he has repaid this money. Finally, although respondent had some financial and personal problems at the time he converted the money, these problems certainly were not more serious than the circumstances of the attorney in Smith. Since the facts here are very similar to those in Smith, I think that “predictability and fairness” require us to order respondent’s disbarment. For the reasons stated, I must respectfully dissent. JUSTICE MILLER joins in this dissent.