Court Opinion

ID: 9402114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 14:06:02.18238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.534646
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13356

                   COMMONWEALTH   vs.   ANTHONY DEW.

        Suffolk.       February 8, 2023. - June 15, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. Due Process of Law,
     Assistance of counsel. Practice, Criminal, Assistance of
     counsel. Attorney at Law, Conflict of interest, Attorney-
     client relationship. Conflict of Interest.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on March 11, 2015.

     A motion for a new trial, filed on September 20, 2021, was
heard by Janet L. Sanders, J.

     The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.

     Edward B. Gaffney for the defendant.
     Adam Murphy, of New York (Catherine Logue, of New York,
also present) for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.,
& another.
     Ana M. Francisco (Mirian Albert also present) for Council
on American-Islamic Relations -- Massachusetts & others.
     Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
     Stanley Donald, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
                                                                    2

    WENDLANDT, J.    The defendant, Anthony J. Dew, is a Black

man of the Muslim faith.    Indigent and facing multiple felony

charges, the defendant was appointed counsel who openly posted,

on his social media account, his vitriolic hatred of and bigotry

against persons of the Muslim faith; his unabashed anti-Muslim

rants were matched only by his equal scorn for and racism

against Black persons.     Some of these postings occurred while

counsel was representing the defendant.     Indeed, counsel's

intolerance and prejudice seeped into his representation of the

defendant.   At least twice, counsel chastised the defendant for

wearing religious garb, demanding that the defendant not wear

"that shit" again; once, he refused to speak to the defendant

because the defendant was wearing a kufi prayer cap in

contravention of counsel's directive.     At their final meeting,

counsel advised the defendant to accept a plea deal, which the

defendant did.   Several years later, counsel's bigotry came to

the attention of the Committee for Public Counsel Services

(CPCS), which suspended him for no less than one year as a

result.   After learning of counsel's anti-Muslim, racist

postings, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty

plea and obtain a new trial on the ground that his court-

appointed counsel had an actual conflict of interest.

    We conclude that the conflict of interest inherent in
                                                                    3

counsel's bigotry against persons of the defendant's faith and

race, which manifested during counsel's representation of the

defendant, deprived the defendant of his right to effective

assistance of counsel -- a right upon which our entire system of

criminal justice depends to ensure a "fair trial."   See Gideon

v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).   See also Lavallee v.

Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 235

(2004), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685

(1984).   No additional showing of "prejudice" is required.   The

motion judge's conclusion to the contrary was in error; we now

vacate the defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.1

     1.   Background.   The following facts, found by the motion

judge, are largely undisputed.2   The defendant is a Black man of

the Muslim faith.   In March 2015, the defendant was indicted on

nineteen charges, including five counts of trafficking a person

for sexual servitude, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a)

     1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Council
on American-Islamic Relations -- Massachusetts, the Muslim
Justice League, Lawyers for Civil Rights, Massachusetts Black
Women Attorneys, the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, the
Hispanic National Bar Association, Citizens for Juvenile
Justice, and the Justice Resource Institute; NAACP Legal Defense
& Educational Fund, Inc., and the New England Innocence Project;
and Stanley Donald.

     2 "In examining the defendant's claim that his counsel was
ineffective, we accept the motion judge's subsidiary findings of
fact absent clear error." Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass.
477, 481 (2000), citing Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass.
736, 743 (1990).
                                                                   4

(trafficking charges); and one count of rape, in violation of

G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b) (rape charge).3   In February 2016, Richard

Doyle was appointed to represent the defendant.

     During one of the first encounters between the defendant

and Doyle, the defendant was wearing a kufi prayer cap.   Doyle

demanded that the defendant remove his religious garb,

instructing him, "Don't come in this room like that ever."4   At a

meeting approximately two weeks later, Doyle left without

speaking with the defendant upon seeing that the defendant again

was wearing a kufi.   Doyle again met with the defendant at the

court house shortly before the scheduled trial date in May 2016.

At this meeting, Doyle chastised the defendant, in front of a

     3 The defendant was also indicted on two counts of assault
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation of
G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); one count of assault and battery, in
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A; one count of a second and
subsequent offense of possession of a class A substance with
intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (b);
six counts of distributing a class A substance, in violation of
G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (a); and three counts of distributing a class
B substance, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a).

     4 The motion judge found that, at this meeting, Doyle said
"not to wear that shit in a courtroom." The record supports
that Doyle made this statement; however, at the hearing on his
motion, the defendant testified that Doyle made the statement
not to "wear that shit in court at all" at a later meeting
during which he advised the defendant to accept the plea offer
and said, "Don't come in this room like that ever," at this
initial meeting. Accordingly, we defer to the motion judge's
finding as to Doyle's statements; however, the additional
finding as to when the statements were made was clearly
erroneous. See Smiley, 431 Mass. at 481.
                                                                   5

court officer, not to wear "that shit" -– an apparent reference

to the defendant's kufi -- in court.   Doyle also advised the

defendant to accept a plea offer and informed him that any

attempt to seek new appointed counsel would likely be futile on

the eve of trial.

     In June 2016, the defendant pleaded guilty to all but the

rape charge as part of a plea agreement pursuant to which the

prosecutor agreed to dismiss the rape charge.5   The trial judge

conducted a colloquy during which the defendant stated that he

was satisfied with counsel's representation and that no one had

pressured him into pleading guilty.    As was recommended in the

agreement, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to concurrent

terms of from eight to ten years in State prison for four of the

five counts of trafficking a person for sexual servitude, in

violation of G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), and the count charging a

     5 The prosecutor summarized the facts supporting the charges
as follows: "The [d]efendant . . . organiz[ed] and r[an] a
human trafficking and drug distribution operation . . . out of
two apartments in Dorchester . . . [between] sometime in 2014
and January 15, 2015." The defendant allegedly attempted to
recruit one victim "to work for him as a prostitute," offering
to provide her housing and heroin. The prosecutor alleged that
the defendant assaulted this victim and that the defendant had
multiple persons "prostituting for him" in exchange for illegal
drugs. A search of the defendant's home pursuant to a search
warrant, the prosecutor described, led to the discovery of
several items, including heroin, a digital scale, and certain
"indicia of prostitution." The prosecutor considered it "a
strong case for the government" because, inter alia, the
complaining witnesses were willing to testify.
                                                                     6

second and subsequent offense of possession of a class A

substance with intent to distribute, in violation of G. L.

c. 94C, § 32 (b).    On the remaining counts, the judge sentenced

the defendant to seven years of probation from and after his

incarceration.

     Unbeknownst to the defendant, from at least 2014 through

2017, including during the time Doyle represented the defendant,

Doyle made and shared6 numerous racist and bigoted public7

postings on his social media account, reflecting prejudice

against Black persons and persons of the Muslim faith.       These

posts, which we set forth in the margin,8 included a variety of

anti-Muslim slurs and statements calling for violence against

and celebrating the death of persons of the Muslim faith,9 posts

     6 A "shared" post occurs when a user shares on his or her
own page (or "Feed") a post originally written and posted by
someone else; shared posts can be preceded by the user's own
commentary. See Facebook Help Center, How Do I Share a Post I
See on My Feed on Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help
/163779957017799 [https://perma.cc/NX9V-RFAL].

     7 Doyle's account was "public"; accordingly, his posts were
available to anyone using the social media platform regardless
of whether Doyle had designated the viewer as a "friend."
Additionally, CPCS determined that some of Doyle's approximately
700 "friends" were former clients.

     8 We include descriptions of the posts because Doyle's own
words best capture the depth of his bigotry.

     9   Doyle's anti-Muslim posts included the following:

     1.    A shared post of a photograph of a pig with engorged
                                                                  7

mocking Black individuals,10 and comments, some apparently made

     testicles, captioned, "Dear Muslims . . . Kiss our big
     bacon balls";

     2. A post stating, "I just became a bigger Hockey fan
     . . . I guess Canadians want to protect their citizens, I
     wish our government would . . . ," accompanying a
     photograph of a Canadian hockey announcer, with a
     quotation: "If hooking up one raghead terrorist prisoner's
     testicles to a car battery to get the truth out of the
     lying little camel shagger will save just one Canadian life
     then I . . .";

     3. A shared post of a picture of a pointing military
     officer, captioned, "You tell those goat fuckers with the
     laundry on their heads that it's wash day, and we're
     bringing the fucking Maytag!";

     4. Doyle's statement, "Allah be praised. Go meet your 72
     fat, smelly virgins, asshole," accompanying a shared post
     of a video recording apparently depicting the death of a
     man while attempting to use an explosive device, with a
     description saying, "When goat fuckers use mortar hahaha";

     5. A shared post stating, "In Islam, you have to die for
     Allah. The God I worship died for me";

     6. A shared post depicting a cartoon figure of a man
     sitting at a desk, captioned, "Let's not jump to
     conclu. . . aaaaand it's Muslims"; and

     7. A shared post of a drawing of a man stating, "When
     liberals aren't busy bashing peaceful Christians, they're
     making excuses for Muslims cutting people's heads off."

     10   Doyle's racist posts included the following:

     1. A shared post of a poster for the movie "The WaterBoy,"
     with the name and face of Colin Kaepernick, a Black
     football player and civil rights activist;

     2. A shared post of a collage of three photographs -- one
     of Black men wearing shirts with the words, "Trump &
     Republicans Are Not Racist," one of a Black man in a "Make
                                                                   8

at a State court house,11 seemingly referring to Doyle's clients

as "thugs"12 and suggesting that Doyle's nonwhite clients were

criminals.13

     America Great Again" hat, and one of two Black men wearing
     cowboy hats and a shirt and bandana with the confederate
     flag -- captioned, "5 minutes after Trump legalizes weed in
     all 50 states"; and

     3. A shared post of two photographs, one depicting Black
     men posing with guns captioned, "Don't glorify shooting
     people," and the other showing distraught Black men
     captioned, "Then cry like a bitch when someone you love
     gets shot."

     11Some posts indicate that Doyle's "check in" location was
a State court house. "A . . . check in is a post linked to a
location . . . ." John, How to Check in on Facebook from a
Desktop or Mobile Device, Bus. Insider (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/guides/tech/how-to-check-in-on-
facebook [https://perma.cc/9WHS-5FAE].

     12The term "thug" has been described by one linguist as a
"nominally polite way of using the N-word." The Racially
Charged Meaning Behind the Word "Thug," NPR (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.npr.org/2015/04/30/403362626/the-racially-charged-
meaning-behind-the-word-thug [https://perma.cc/34K5-VD4C].

     13   Doyle's court house posts included the following:

     1. Doyle's statement referencing winning a trial for a
     seventy-six year old Italian national stopped for speeding,
     followed by Doyle's comment stating, "I can walk away from
     this one without feeling dirty. Doesn't happen much," and
     Doyle's reply of "Hell yeah" to a comment asserting, "U
     love bathing in the filth, as long as it's green";

     2. Doyle stating, "Beat another gun case today," followed
     by a comment stating, "It was someone else's shotgun.
     Client not a bad guy," and Doyle's response
     "Absofuckinglutely right, Chief! Job security in the
     Roxbury District Court" to a comment that stated, "Don't
     worry he'll be retaining you again soon";
                                                                   9

     In 2017, CPCS investigated a complaint against Doyle and

concluded, based on the social media posts, that Doyle violated

his duty of loyalty to his Muslim and "other non-Caucasian"

clients; CPCS suspended Doyle from criminal case assignments for

a period of one year and required Doyle to take ethics and

cultural competency courses.14

     The defendant was unaware of Doyle's bigotry until 2021,

well after his agreement to the plea deal, when he was shown

Doyle's posts; prior to that time, the defendant did not

attribute Doyle's comments regarding the defendant's religious

garb to racism or to animus against persons of the Muslim faith.

     3. Doyle's statement, "Not Guilty. Firearm. Makes you
     feel a whole lot safer, huh?" along with a series of
     comments in which Doyle stated, "I went to the dark side,"
     "Between you and me, he should stop gang-banging," and "He
     wanted his cell phones (with business contacts, no doubt)
     and his baseball hats back. I told him to go home and
     Jerry off. . . . Jerk off, that is";

     4. A "check in" by Doyle at "Suffolk County Superior
     Court," stating, "Poor, misguided children," and a comment
     by Doyle stating, "Waaaaaahhhhhh!!!!!!";

     5. A "check in" by Doyle from "Suffolk County Courthouse,"
     stating, "Assorted thugs and bad guys"; and

     6. Doyle's statement, "Yesterday, a 21 y.o. punk client
     told me: 'I don't like your attitude, Doyle,'" followed by
     Doyle's comments saying, "I told him to come back with a
     new lawyer or a toothbrush," and ". . . soap on a rope for
     a going away present . . . ."

     14Doyle died in March 2021, before the defendant filed his
motion for a new trial.
                                                                  10

After learning of the posts, the defendant filed a motion for a

new trial and for leave to withdraw his guilty pleas; he

claimed, inter alia, that Doyle had an actual conflict of

interest and thus Doyle's representation of him violated his

right to the effective assistance of counsel under art. 12 of

the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution.

     After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge denied the

motion.   She concluded that absent a showing of prejudice or

"any showing that [Doyle's] views affected [his] representation

of the defendant," the defendant was not entitled to withdraw

his guilty plea.15   Rejecting the defendant's argument that

     15Applying the usual framework to assess claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires determination
"whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or
inattention of counsel -- behavior of counsel falling measurably
below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible
lawyer -- and, if that is found, then, typically, whether it has
likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available,
substantial ground of defence," Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366
Mass. 89, 96 (1974), the motion judge found no evidence to
suggest that the defendant was coerced into accepting the plea
or that the plea offer was unreasonable. Notably, the
trafficking charges carried a minimum sentence of five years in
State prison and a maximum sentence of twenty years. G. L.
c. 265, § 50 (a). The rape charge, which was dismissed pursuant
to the parties' plea deal, would have carried a term of "not
more than twenty years" in State prison. G. L. c. 265,
§ 22 (b). See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 183
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47 (2011),
abrogated in part by Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342
(2013) (typically prejudice prong requires showing that "there
is a reasonable probability that a different plea bargain . . .
                                                                     11

nonetheless he was entitled to withdraw his plea because Doyle

had an actual conflict of interest in representing Black, Muslim

individuals, the judge explained that defense counsel and his or

her client need not "share the same worldview," that "criminal

defense attorneys often have to represent people who in their

opinion have committed reprehensible acts," and that "a lawyer

who expresses racist views in his personal life" is not

"presumed ineffective any time that he or she represents a

client of color."16     The defendant timely appealed, and this

court granted his application for direct appellate review.

     2.   Discussion.    a.   Standard of review.   "[W]e review a

judge's denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial to

determine whether there has been a significant error of law or

other abuse of discretion."     Commonwealth v. Tate, 490 Mass.

501, 505 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 487 Mass.

370, 374 (2021).   "Where an evidentiary hearing is conducted on

a motion for a new trial, we 'accept the [judge's] findings

where they are supported by substantial evidence in the record,'

could have been negotiated at the time").      The defendant does
not challenge this conclusion on appeal.

     16The judge found "[p]erhaps most important" that "the
defendant himself did not draw a connection between Doyle's
expressed distaste for his wearing a kufi and any advice that
Doyle gave him in accepting a plea," concluding that "no matter
how disturbing Doyle's personal views were, there [was] no
indication in the factual record . . . that they influenced
Doyle's representation of the defendant."
                                                                  12

and we 'defer to the judge's assessment of the credibility of

witnesses.'"   Tate, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 488

Mass. 597, 600 (2021).   However, we "make an independent

determination as to the correctness of the judge's application

of constitutional principles to the facts as found."    Caldwell,

supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205

(2011).

     b.   Effective assistance of counsel.   It is difficult to

overstate the essential importance of the right to counsel17 in

our adversary system of criminal justice.    See United States v.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (accused person's right to

counsel "is a fundamental component of our criminal justice

system").   The procedural and substantive safeguards that define

our criminal justice system and are designed to assure that the

accused receives fair proceedings and a fair trial largely would

     17 The fundamental right to counsel has "deep roots in
Massachusetts history": "[a]s early as the 1790s, this court
began appointing defense counsel for defendants in capital cases
tried before it." Carrasquillo v. Hampden County Dist. Courts,
484 Mass. 367, 371 & n.4 (2020), citing Commonwealth v. Hardy, 2
Mass. 303, 303 (1807). The right to counsel is secured both by
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence," and by art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, which provides that "every subject shall have a right
. . . to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his
counsel at his election." We have often noted that art. 12
provides "greater safeguards" than those provided by the Sixth
Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 169
(1982).
                                                                   13

be for naught if the accused were left to fend for him- or

herself without the assistance of counsel to navigate and

exercise his or her rights.   Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-345.   See

Cronic, supra at 653-654 ("Of all the rights that an accused

person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the

most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other

rights he may have" [citation omitted]; counsel's assistance is

"the means through which the other rights of the person on trial

are secured").   The right to be heard, and even the right to a

trial itself, "would be, in many cases, of little avail if it

did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."   Powell v.

Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).   See Cronic, supra at 653

n.8, quoting Powell, supra at 69 (accused person "requires the

guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against

him").18

     "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal

     18See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973) ("The
function of counsel as a guide through complex legal
technicalities long has been recognized by this Court");
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) ("The assistance
of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair
trial"). See also Commonwealth v. Leiva, 484 Mass. 766, 779
(2020) ("The right to counsel is critical to secure a
defendant's right to a fair trial"); Abodeely v. County of
Worcester, 352 Mass. 719, 723 (1967) ("The defence and trial of
a criminal case today is a complicated and time-consuming
business. If we are to provide proper prosecution we must also
provide appropriate defence under the Constitution as it has
been interpreted").
                                                                  14

justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will

best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted

and the innocent go free."19   Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,

862 (1975).   "Unless the accused receives the effective

assistance of counsel, 'a serious risk of injustice infects the

[criminal] trial [process] itself.'"20   Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656,

quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980).      See

United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973), quoting Johnson

v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-463 (1938) (right to counsel

"minimize[s] the imbalance in the adversary system" and

"embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the

average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to

protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to

take his life of liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented

by experienced and learned counsel").    In short, lawyers in

criminal cases are "necessities, not luxuries."   Cronic, supra

     19See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The
system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance
the public interest in truth and fairness"); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (plurality opinion) (affirming "belief
that debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-
seeking function of trials").

     20Relevant to the issues presented by this case, the right
to effective assistance of counsel attaches well before trial
and applies to the plea-bargaining process. See Commonwealth v.
Fernandes, 390 Mass. 714, 715 (1984) ("the plea is valid only
when the defendant offers it . . . with the advice of competent
counsel"). See also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012)
(right to counsel "extends to the plea-bargaining process").
                                                                  15

at 653, quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.    See Gideon, supra (it

is "an obvious truth" that "in our adversary system of criminal

justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a

lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is

provided for him").21

     c.   Conflict of interest.   Given the primacy of counsel

towards the realization of fair proceedings and a fair trial in

our adversarial system, the constitutional guarantee entitles an

accused person "to the untrammeled and unimpaired assistance of

counsel free of any conflict of interest and unrestrained by

commitments to others" and other causes (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 167 (1982).    See

     21Because of the special value we place on the role of
counsel in ensuring that the accused receives the benefits of
the procedural and substantive safeguards that define our
criminal justice system, the "constitutional guarantee of the
assistance of counsel 'cannot be satisfied by mere formal
appointment.'" Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 235, quoting Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). Instead, the constitutional
right to counsel "entitle[s] a defendant to the effective
assistance of counsel" (emphasis added). Commonwealth v.
Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 850 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v.
Martinez, 425 Mass. 382, 387 (1997). See Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 686, quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970) (right to counsel in criminal case is "right to the
effective assistance of counsel"). In other words, "[a]n
accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether
retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure
that the trial is fair." Lavallee, supra, quoting Strickland,
supra at 685. "To hold otherwise, 'could convert the
appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a
formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an
accused be given the assistance of counsel.'" Cronic, 466 U.S.
at 654, quoting Avery, supra.
                                                                  16

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ("Counsel's function is to assist

the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of

loyalty . . ."); Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 850

(2008) (defendant must "be able to seek the advice and guidance

of his attorney and . . . to rely on the undivided loyalty of

his counsel to present the defense case with full force and

zealousness" [citation omitted]).   See also Commonwealth v.

Leiva, 484 Mass. 766, 779 (2020) ("That foundational proposition

tying partisan advocacy to just results demands an accused's

access to defense counsel who projects [t]he manifest appearance

of a believer in the defendant's chosen plea of 'not guilty'

. . . and delivers on the constitutional guaranty that a

defendant need not stand alone against the State at any stage of

the prosecution . . . where counsel's absence might derogate

from the accused's right to a fair trial" [quotations and

citations omitted]).

     Accordingly, "under art. 12, if a defendant establishes an

actual conflict of interest,[22] he is entitled to a new trial

     22An actual conflict of interest arises where "the lawyer
has a competing interest or responsibility that 'will materially
interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in
considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that
reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.'"
Perkins, 450 Mass. at 851-852, quoting Comment [4] to Mass. R.
Prof. C. 1.7, 426 Mass. 1330 (1998). See Perkins, supra at 854
(counsel had actual conflict of interest where he agreed to wear
wireless microphone during trial permitting documentary producer
                                                                    17

without a further showing; he need not demonstrate that the

conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance[23] or

resulted in actual prejudice," Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass.

811, 819 (2010); the standard from Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366

Mass. 89, 96 (1974),24 which generally governs ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, is inapt because, where counsel

has an actual conflict of interest, the criminal trial process

"loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries,"

Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-657.    See id., quoting United States ex

rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied sub nom. Sielaff v. Williams, 423 U.S. 876 (1975) ("While

a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are

expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither

is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators").    See

also Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 196 (2014) (such

to record interactions, including privileged discussions, with
defendant). See also Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 820
n.19 (2010) ("Courts frequently consult standards laid out in
applicable codes of professional ethics in considering whether
an actual conflict exists"). The analysis whether an actual
conflict arose is case-specific. See Commonwealth v. Cousin,
478 Mass. 608, 618 (2018), S.C., 484 Mass. 1042 (2020) ("We look
to the attendant facts and circumstances surrounding the claimed
actual conflict").

     23By contrast, a defendant asserting an actual conflict of
interest under the Sixth Amendment must show that the conflict
"adversely affected" counsel's representation, although
"prejudice" need not be shown. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-350.

     24   See note 15, supra.
                                                                   18

errors "render the adversary process itself presumptively

unreliable" such that "a criminal trial [is] fundamentally

unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or

innocence" [quotations and citations omitted]); Commonwealth v.

Goewey, 452 Mass. 399, 403 & n.3 (2008) ("relief can be granted

without consideration of the merits of the defendant's

underlying claims" in "limited class of cases" in which "the

attorney abdicated his responsibility as the defendant's

advocate").

    A defense counsel makes countless choices, on and off the

record, to protect a defendant's rights, and we rely on

counsel's zealous advocacy, unimpeded by a conflict of interest,

to ensure that no person is punished without fair proceedings;

when a counsel's professional judgment is impaired by an actual

conflict of interest, every action, and inaction, is called into

question, and we cannot be confident that the outcome of the

proceedings is fair and just.   "[T]he effect of the conflict on

the attorney's representation of the defendant is likely to be

pervasive and unpredictable, while the difficulty of proving it

may be substantial, 'particularly as to things that may have

been left not said or not done by counsel.'"   Mosher, 455 Mass.

at 819, quoting Hodge, 386 Mass. at 170.   In other words, "[i]t

is impossible to know what different choices [a nonconflicted]

counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of
                                                                  19

those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings."

Commonwealth v. Francis, 485 Mass. 86, 101 (2020), cert. denied,

141 S. Ct. 2762 (2021), quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,

548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).   See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.

475, 490-491 (1978) (conflict bears on what "the advocate finds

himself compelled to refrain from doing" and so is "difficult to

judge intelligently" because "to assess the impact of a conflict

of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions

in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible," requiring

"unguided speculation").

    In such circumstances, the conflict has "infect[ed] the

defendant's representation to the point where 'prejudice is

"inherent in the situation," such that no impartial observer

could reasonably conclude that the attorney is able to serve the

defendant with undivided loyalty.'"   Commonwealth v. Cousin, 478

Mass. 608, 617 (2018), S.C., 484 Mass. 1042 (2020), quoting

Mosher, 455 Mass. at 819-820.   See Perkins, 450 Mass. at 850

(defendant "must be able to rely on the undivided loyalty of his

counsel" [citation omitted]).   See also Commonwealth v. Goldman,

395 Mass. 495, 508, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 906 (1985)

("Counsel's undivided loyalty to the client is crucial to the

integrity of the entire adversary system").   Accordingly,

"[w]here the defendant's counsel has labored under an actual

. . . conflict, . . . we are unwilling to put a defendant 'to
                                                                  20

the burden, perhaps insuperable, of probing the resolve and the

possible mental conflict of counsel.'"25,26   Mosher, supra at 819,

quoting Commonwealth v. Cobb, 379 Mass. 456, 461 (1980), vacated

sub nom. Massachusetts v. Hurley, 499 U.S. 809 (1980), appeal

dismissed, 382 Mass. 690 (1981).   See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658

     25We have acknowledged an actual conflict of interest --
requiring no showing of prejudice -- in several circumstances.
See Commonwealth v. Leslie, 376 Mass. 647, 653 & nn.11, 12, 13
(1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 910 (1979). An actual conflict
of interest exists when the attorney represents a codefendant
with inconsistent or contradictory lines of defense. See id. at
653 n.11, citing Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 375 Mass. 530, 540-543
(1978); Bolduc, supra at 540-541 ("The joint representation of
clients with conflicting interests is a denial of Sixth
Amendment rights"). Similarly, a conflict exists when the
attorney maintains an attorney-client or direct and close
personal relationship with a material prosecution witness. See
Leslie, supra at 653 n.13, citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 362
Mass. 782 (1973); Smith, supra at 784 ("An attorney representing
both the defendant and a prosecution witness who is awaiting
sentence may be hindered in the cross-examination of the
witness"). And we have found that a conflict exists when the
attorney has business or personal reasons for preferring a
verdict unfavorable to the defendant. See Leslie, supra at 653
n.12, citing United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.
1976), and People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 719-727
(1978); Hurt, supra at 166 (appellate counsel argued rehearing
while being sued by trial counsel for libel as to appellate
argument); Corona, supra at 704, 719-720 (trial counsel's
literary contract "called for . . . holding a lengthy and
sensational trial at any price . . . to increase the financial
potential of the acquired publication rights," and to forgo
defenses of mental incompetence or legal insanity).

     26 Where no actual conflict exists, "an attorney's personal
interests or obligations may still give rise to a 'potential'
conflict," Mosher, 455 Mass. at 823, which requires reversal
upon an additional showing of "material prejudice," Tate, 490
Mass. at 509, quoting Commonwealth v. Shraiar, 397 Mass. 16, 20
(1986).
                                                                   21

(representation by conflicted counsel is "so likely to prejudice

the accused that the cost of litigating [its] effect in a

particular case is unjustified").

     d.    Racist, anti-Muslim animus.   Doyle's animus against

persons of the Muslim faith and his racism against Black

persons, demonstrated by his social media posts (some of which

were made at the court house while he was serving clients in his

professional capacity), and manifest in his treatment of the

defendant -- a Black, Muslim man -- during the representation,

presented an actual conflict of interest in this case.27    Doyle's

social media postings "exhibited an intensity of bias that

cannot be squared with []neutral decision making," Ellis v.

Harrison, 947 F.3d 555, 563 (9th Cir. 2020) (Nguyen, J.,

concurring), as his other overt acts during the representation

confirm.   The defendant has shown that Doyle's biases infected

his representation of the defendant.     The record developed by

the defendant shows more than a few stray social media postings,

or comments made in the wake of highly charged emotional or

shocking events, untethered to Doyle's conduct during the

     27We reference these manifestations, as does the defendant,
to demonstrate the defendant's showing of an actual conflict of
interest. Because he has shown an actual conflict of interest,
he need not show any prejudice, as discussed supra. We need not
reach the hypothetical question, raised by the concurring
justice, whether, in the absence of this evidence, a
hypothetical defendant would have met his or her burden to show
an actual conflict.
                                                                    22

defendant's representation.   See id. ("I do not suggest that

every attorney who utters a racial epithet will be unable to

adequately defend clients of a different race").    Instead, the

defendant has shown a pattern of posts reflecting the intensity

of Doyle's bias, coupled with a record that Doyle was unable to

divorce his animus from his conduct as the defendant's counsel.

    Although we cannot know with certainty whether Doyle's

actions or inactions during the course of the representation

were "motivated by anything other than [the defendant's] best

interest," Hodge, 386 Mass. at 168, on the record before us, we

cannot credibly assume that Doyle's representation was not

affected by his virulent anti-Muslim and racist views, see

Ellis, 947 F.3d at 562 (Nguyen, J., concurring) (when defense

counsel makes "discretionary decisions in disregard of the

client's interests on account of counsel's racism, the

cumulative effect will be to impair the defense, but there is no

way to pinpoint how it does so").     Importantly, we cannot know

whether an attorney who did not share the animus Doyle harbored

for persons of the Muslim faith and Black persons would have

negotiated a better plea agreement.    Nor can we know whether

Doyle's other actions in the case were unaffected by his views

regarding Black, Muslim individuals.    Where, as the record shows

was the case here, counsel harbors a deep-seated animus for
                                                                  23

persons of the defendant's race28 or religion, we cannot presume

zealous advocacy; nor can we ask the defendant to prove how his

counsel's bigotry might have affected the plea deal or otherwise

impaired the representation, especially in view of the record

that Doyle's bias reared its head in connection with his

treatment of the defendant.29   There are "many invisible ways in

which counsel's bias could have affected the [proceeding],"

Ellis, supra at 563 (Nguyen, J., concurring), and the defendant

need not engage in "a speculative inquiry into what might have

occurred in an alternate universe" had he been appointed

unbiased counsel, Francis, 485 Mass. at 101, quoting Gonzalez-

Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.

     28Notably, Gideon and other seminal cases involving the
right to counsel were decided during the heart of the civil
rights era, as courts considered the protection of a broad range
of rights, including the right to equal protection of the law.
See Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to Counsel, 54 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 649, 649 & n.3 (2017), citing Neuborne, The
Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 59, 86 ("Decided during the heart of the Civil Rights era,
[Gideon was] implicitly -- although not explicitly -- concerned
about the way [B]lack defendants were treated in the criminal
and juvenile justice systems . . ."). See also Chin, Race and
the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 Yale L.J. 2236, 2239 &
n.5 (2013) (collecting scholarship concluding that "Gideon was a
race case" despite Gideon himself being white).

     29That the defendant here had a particularly thick skin and
did not recognize Doyle's bigotry at the time is of no import.
The standard for a conflict of interest is whether "no impartial
observer could reasonably conclude that the attorney is able to
serve the defendant with undivided loyalty." Mosher, 455 Mass.
at 819-820.
                                                                    24

     We recognize that "[c]riminal defense attorneys are

accustomed to representing individuals who commit reprehensible

acts, and we assume that they can set aside any personal

distaste for such clients during the representation."30    Ellis,

947 F.3d at 563 (Nguyen, J., concurring).   Here, however, Doyle

did not leave his deep-seated bigotry at the court house door,

despite his duty of loyalty to the defendant; to the contrary,

consistent with his contemporaneous anti-Muslim, anti-Black

social media postings and his court house "check ins," Doyle

ordered the defendant to stop wearing his religious garb and

refused to meet with the defendant, choosing instead to forgo

the opportunity to discuss the merits of the criminal case, upon

seeing that the defendant was wearing his kufi.   Our confidence

that the defendant was afforded a constitutionally fair process

is necessarily undermined.   See id. at 562 (Nguyen, J.,

concurring) ("A trial is fundamentally unfair if defense counsel

harbors extreme and deep-rooted ill will toward the defendant on

account of his race").   Given Doyle's treatment of the

defendant, we conclude that the defendant has more than met his

burden to establish that Doyle's representation of him was

     30Doyle did not simply adhere to a different "worldview" or
merely dislike the offenses the defendant was accused of
committing. Racism and bigotry -- here, disdain for persons
because of their race and religion -- are different in kind from
disapproval of a person's actions or opinions.
                                                                   25

impaired by an actual conflict of interest.    See Commonwealth v.

Shraiar, 397 Mass. 16, 20 (1986) (defendant bears burden to

establish actual conflict of interest).

     3.   Conclusion.   The order denying the defendant's motion

for a new trial is reversed.31   The defendant's convictions are

vacated, the defendant is to be permitted to withdraw his guilty

plea, and the case is remanded for a new trial.

                                     So ordered.

     31Because we hold that defense counsel had an actual
conflict of interest mandating reversal, we need not address the
defendant's alternative arguments that the appointment of Doyle
violated his rights to equal protection and due process.
    CYPHER, J. (concurring).    The numerous, severe, and cruel

racist and anti-Muslim social media posts and commentary by

Attorney Richard Doyle recited by the court easily establish an

actual conflict of interest that deprived the defendant of his

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.     I

agree with the court that no impartial observer reasonably could

conclude that counsel was able to serve the defendant with

undivided loyalty.   See Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811,

819-820 (2010).

    I write separately to emphasize that once an actual

conflict has been established there is no need to prove that the

actual conflict prejudiced the defendant.    There is a clear line

between actual and potential conflicts of interest and Attorney

Doyle's behavior toward the defendant, which, while adding

context to the discussion, is not necessary to determine whether

there was an actual conflict.   Cf. Ellis v. Harrison, 947 F.3d

555, 563 (9th Cir. 2020) (Nguyen, J., concurring) ("I do not

suggest that every attorney who utters a racial epithet will be

unable to adequately defend clients of a different race").

Where the defendant has demonstrated an actual conflict of

interest, art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights

requires neither a showing of prejudice nor a showing that the

conflict adversely affected counsel's performance.    Commonwealth

v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 806 (2008).     See Commonwealth v.
                                                                     2

Cousin, 478 Mass. 608, 617 (2018) (actual conflict requires no

showing of prejudice by defendant because prejudice is

inherent).   Compare Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 235

(2015) ("If a defendant establishes only a potential or tenuous

conflict of interest, however, the conviction will not be set

aside unless the defendant demonstrates that the conflict

resulted in actual prejudice" [emphasis added]), with Mosher,

455 Mass. at 819 (where defendant "establishes an actual

conflict of interest, he is entitled to a new trial without a

further showing").

    I also write separately because the nature of this conflict

and its potential scope require that we recognize that not only

the defendant is affected.    Public confidence in the integrity

of the criminal justice system is essential to its ability to

function.    See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992).   We

must be aware of and concerned with the confidence of not just

this defendant, and not just all Black and Muslim clients

represented by Attorney Doyle, but rather all Black persons and

members of the Muslim faith in our community, not simply those

who have come into contact with the criminal justice system.

See Commonwealth v. Goldman, 395 Mass. 495, 508 (1985) (defense

counsel's undivided loyalty to client is crucial to integrity of

entire adversarial system).    In fact, all of the people of the

Commonwealth can be affected by a loss of confidence in the
                                                                  3

justice system in circumstances such as these when they come to

light.   The court's decision today serves to encourage us all

that the court system is able to respond in a manner that

strengthens that confidence.