Court Opinion

ID: 9600816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:31:43.021349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:34.855645
License: Public Domain

HASELTON, J.,
concurring.
I fully endorse the majority’s reasoning, with one exception. The majority, in addressing defendants’ “actual consideration” argument, presumes, as do defendants, that the operative inquiry is whether the promisor (here defendants) gave actual consideration for the promisee’s performance. 135 Or App at 229-30. That has it backwards.
The correct focus is, instead, on whether the prom-isee has given actual consideration. If so, promissory estoppel may be inapposite. Hill v. Mayers, 104 Or App 629, 802 P2d 694 (1990), rev den 311 Or 187 (1991).
That focus derives from the very nature of promissory estoppel, by which the estoppel, arising from the prom-isee’s detrimental reliance, is deemed a substitute for actual consideration. Hill, 104 Or App at 631; City of Ashland v. Hoffarth, 84 Or App 265, 270, 733 P2d 925, rev den 303 Or 483 (1987). Accord Schafer et al v. Fraser et ux, 206 Or 446, 468-72, 290 P2d 190, 294 P2d 609 (1956) (generally describing doctrine). Thus, whether the promisor gave actual consideration is immaterial.
Here, defendants did not assert, much less show as a matter of uncontroverted fact, that plaintiff gave actual consideration for the ownership provisions of their agreement. Accordingly, I concur that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.