Court Opinion

ID: 9472804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:11:26.45545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:09.507712
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s sound reasoning in section II that the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s ADEA claim was a final judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) and that this court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of that final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Furthermore, I concur with the majority in section III, subsection A, that the filing of a charge with the EEOC under 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) is not a jurisdictional requirement. I dissent, however, with the majority’s conclusion in section III, subsection B, that the plaintiff’s second amended complaint contained sufficient allegations to satisfy the express requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) that a charge be filed with the EEOC before a civil action is commenced.
This lawsuit involves a lengthy and unnecessarily complex procedural history. In January 1982, the plaintiff filed a civil action in Federal district court alleging that the defendant, Consolidated Management, and Rick Levi, an employee of the defendant, had engaged in sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq. (“ADEA”). In February 1982, the defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds that neither defendant had been adequately served with a summons and complaint, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant Levi, and the plaintiff had failed to allege that defendant Levi was an employer for purposes of the Title VII and ADEA claims. In May 1982, the defendants renewed their motions to dismiss and also moved to strike the plaintiff’s allegation of suffering mental distress, pain, and anguish in excess of $50,-000. In August 1982, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to strike and also granted the motion to dismiss for inadequacy of service unless the summons and complaint were properly served before 4:00 p.m. on September 13, 1982.
On September 7, 1982, the plaintiff filed and properly served an amended summons and a first amended complaint, naming Consolidated Management as the sole defendant. One month later, in October 1982, Consolidated Management filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims for failure to commence the actions in a timely fashion and, in the alternative, to dismiss the ADEA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to the defendant, the filing of a charge with the EEOC was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a civil cause of action and the plaintiff’s failure to file such a charge precluded the district court from entertaining the ADEA claim. The plaintiff responded, in December 1982, with a motion for leave to file and serve a second amended complaint.
On the issue of filing a charge with the EEOC, the plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleged that:
1) The plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Rights Division of the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (“WERD”) and indicated that she desired the WERD to refer the charge to any other *1115government agency with jurisdiction over it.
2) On or before September 4, 1980, the WERD sent a copy of the plaintiffs charge of race [sic] and sex discrimination to the EEOC.
3) On September 4, 1980, the WERD sent a copy of the plaintiffs administrative charge to Consolidated Management, and a cover letter indicating that a copy of the complaint was being sent to the EEOC.
4) On September 29, 1980, the EEOC, Milwaukee office, wrote to the plaintiff acknowledging receipt of her charge from the WERD.
In January 1983, one year after the original filing of this civil lawsuit, the district court issued an order granting the plaintiffs motion to file a second amended complaint. The district court ruled that, “[ajlthough counsel for the defendant Consolidated express understandable irritation with the manner in which counsel for the plaintiff has proceeded, it does not appear that defendant Consolidated will be prejudiced by a grant of leave to serve the second amended complaint, and such leave is granted.” In an attempt to “facilitate the progress of this action,” the district court proceeded, within the same order, to review the plaintiffs second amended complaint and determine if it contained sufficient allegations to satisfy the requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) that a charge be filed with the EEOC before a civil action is commenced. The court held that:
“under the circumstances alleged in this [second amended] complaint, there has been no filing with the EEOC within the meaning of § 626(d). The point is that within the time periods prescribed in § 626(d), the EEOC must be given clearly to understand that the grievant is requesting the EEOC, as contrasted with state authority, to provide a remedy. ‘Information copies,’ so to speak, advising EEOC that the grievant has turned to a state authority for assistance are clearly inadequate to alert the EEOC to the fact that it is now being called upon to engage in appropriate conciliatory and mediative action, and to provide the occasion for EEOC to consider and decide whether it should elect itself to initiate some proceeding.
Thus, in the second amended complaint, the plaintiff has failed to allege the facts that supply the jurisdictional underpinning for this action under ADEA.”
Following the district court’s order dismissing the plaintiff’s ADEA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the “EEOC had designated the [Wisconsin] Equal Rights Division as its agent for the purpose of receiving charges pursuant to a Work Sharing Agreement between the two agencies in effect at the time the charge was filed.” Appended to the motion was a copy of the “Work Sharing Agreement” and an affidavit from the plaintiff’s attorney claiming that the “Work Sharing Agreement” was valid and in effect at the time the plaintiff filed her charge with the WERD. In May 1983, the district court considered the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and framed the issue as:
“whether plaintiff should be granted leave — although such, leave is unrequested — to serve and file a third amended' complaint, in which the facts concerning the existence of the work agreement and the memorandum of understanding might be alleged and in which plaintiff might allege facts concerning her actions and those of the state and federal agencies as they bear on the operation of the inter-governmental agreements.”
The district court held:
“I decline to grant such leave. The affidavit of plaintiff’s counsel contains nothing which justifies the failure either to embody the appropriate allegations in the original complaint or in the first or second amended complaint, particularly after defendant had sharply raised the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claim.”
*1116On May 26, 1983, the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her ADEA claim to this court, thus divesting the district court of jurisdiction over the ADEA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
Title 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) provides that:
“No civil action may be commenced by an individual under [the ADEA] until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Commission.”
According to the express language of Congress, this “ ‘charge’ requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an action under the ADEA....” H.R. Conf.Rep. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 528, 534. Thus, I agree with the majority that “the administrative filing requirements of the ADEA are not jurisdictional.” Nonetheless, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) mandates that an ADEA plaintiff file a charge with the EEOC at least sixty days before commencing a civil lawsuit. The narrow issue in this case is whether the plaintiff's second amended complaint contained sufficient allegations to satisfy the charge filing requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
The plaintiff alleges that she filed a charge with the WERD and indicated that the charge should be referred to any other government agency with jurisdiction over it. The plaintiff also alleges that the WERD sent a copy of her charge to Consolidated Management and the EEOC. The plaintiff further alleges that the EEOC wrote to her acknowledging receipt of the charge filed with the WERD. At no time does the plaintiff allege that she intended the WERD charge to also serve as an EEOC charge; that the EEOC considered the WERD charge to be anything more than an informational copy of a charge filed with a state agency; that the EEOC considered the WERD charge to be sufficient for purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); that the EEOC, notified Consolidated Management of a charge filed with the EEOC;1 or that the EEOC attempted to reconcile the alleged discriminatory practice.
According to Congress the purpose of the charge filing requirement “is to provide the [EEOC] with sufficient information so that it may notify prospective defendants and to provide the [EEOC] with an opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation.” H.Conf.Rep. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 528, 534. ' See also Greene v. Whirlpool Corp., 708 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 707, 79 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984). It stands to reason that an ADEA plaintiff’s failure to properly file a charge with the EEOC defeats the very purpose of this legislative scheme. See Comfort v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 575 F.Supp. 258, 260 (N.D.N.Y.1983). Without the filing of a proper charge, the EEOC cannot notify the defendant of the action nor can it attempt to reconcile the alleged discriminatory practice. Thus, I agree with the Third Circuit that “[i]n order to constitute a charge that satisfies the requirement of section 626(d), notice to the EEOC must be of a kind that would convince a reasonable person that the grievant has manifested an intent to activate the Act’s machinery.” Bihler v. Singer Co., 710 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983).
In the instant case, the plaintiff’s second amended complaint contains no allegations that she intended to “activate” the ADEA *1117process, allowing the EEOC to notify Consolidated Management of the ADEA claim and to engage in conciliatory efforts between the parties. Instead, the plaintiff only alleges that she filed a charge with the WERD, in an apparent attempt to resolve the alleged discriminatory practices through a state administrative agency. The allegations of the second amended complaint simply fail to manifest the plaintiff’s intent to file a charge with the EEOC, and thereby activate the ADEA machinery. I thus conclude that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) that a charge be filed with the EEOC sixty days before a civil action is commenced. Cf. Greene v. Whirlpool Corp., 708 F.2d at 130-31; Woodard v. Western Union Tel. Co., 650 F.2d 592, 594-95 (5th Cir.1981); Pieckelun v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 493 F.Supp. 93, 95-97 (E.D.Pa.1980) (oral notification is inadequate means of filing charge).
Unlike the majority, I am compelled to reach the secondary issue of whether the district court erred in denying the plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint, containing factual allegations of the alleged “Work Sharing Agreement” between the WERD and the EEOC. The general rule is that a party is entitled to amend his pleading once as a matter of course and thereafter “a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). According to the Supreme Court:
“In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.' ”
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). This court has added that “[t]he determination of the appropriateness of additional amended pleadings ‘is within the discretion of the trial court.’ ” Mertens v. Hummell, 587 F.2d 862, 865 (7th Cir.1978) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971)). Although the “trial court must respect the underlying spirit of the rule, which is tolerant toward amendments, the right to amend is not absolute.” Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir.1982) (footnote omitted).
In the instant case, the plaintiff filed an original and two amended complaints. The record reveals that the defendants initially raised the issue of a failure to file a charge with the EEOC in October 1982, after receiving the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. It was not until January 1983, after the plaintiff had filed and the district court had dismissed the second amended complaint, that the plaintiff raised the issue of the “Work Sharing Agreement.” The plaintiff offered absolutely no excuse for the undue delay (over one year from the filing of the original complaint) in alleging or acknowledging the existence of the “Work Sharing Agreement.” As this court stated in Shall v. Henry, 211 F.2d 226, 231 (7th Cir.1954), “[tjhere must be an end sometime to applications to amend.” In this case I believe that end has been reached. The plaintiff had over a year to notify the district court of the alleged “Work Sharing Agreement,” but failed to do so. In light of this fact, I cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to file a third amended complaint. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 93-94 (2d Cir.1983); Mercantile T.C.N.A. v. Inland Marine Products, 542 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir.1976); Mooney v. Vitolo, 435 F.2d 838, 839 (2d Cir.1970); Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F.Supp. 600, 617 n. 12 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 612 F.2d 572 (3d Cir.1979); Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corp., 393 F.Supp. 58, 78 (M.D.Pa.1975). Accordingly, with due respect for the majority’s position, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff's ADEA claim.

. The majority refers to a letter that the EEOC sent to Consolidated Management concerning the plaintiffs WERD charge. According to the letter, "[t]he EEOC considers its receipt of a copy of this charge as being sufficient to preserve the charging party's private suit rights under the ADEA.” It is clear that this letter was filed with the district court on January 23, 1984, some eight months after the plaintiff had filed her ADEA appeal in this court. Once the plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of her ADEA claim in March 1983, the district court no longer retained jurisdiction over the ADEA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295. Thus, the alleged letter is not a part of the district court record and no motion was submitted to this court to supplement the record on appeal. See, e.g., Fed. R.App.P. 10(e). Accordingly, the letter has not been properly certified and is not properly before this court for review.