Court Opinion

ID: 9576771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:28:20.34888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:27.032039
License: Public Domain

*689Blackburn, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree with the judgment reached by the majority, I cannot agree with the analysis used to reach it, and therefore, I specially concur.
The evidence shows that as Reid entered the garage on the day of the attack, Rocky started growling and suddenly rushed at her. Rocky bit Reid’s leg, causing her to fall and break her wrist. Reid testified that, prior to the attack, Rocky’s eyes were red and he had a “devil’s look.” During Rocky’s prior attack, Webb testified that Rocky viciously approached her as she entered the garage. However, Rocky was not able to bite her because she jumped over one of the Safios’ cars and barely escaped injury. Webb testified that, at time of the incident, she could tell from Rocky’s eyes and tail that he was preparing to attack her. Webb told Shirley Safio, her sister, and Waymond Safio, her brother-in-law, about Rocky’s attack upon her. Viewing all evidence in favor of Thurmond, the question is, does Webb’s testimony establish that the defendants had knowledge that Rocky had a propensity to attack and bite persons visiting the premises?
In Georgia, a dog owner is liable for damages only if he has knowledge that his dog has the “propensity to do the particular act which caused injury to the complaining party.” (Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Culver, 172 Ga. App. 183 (322 SE2d 294) (1984).
The owner need not be aware of the dog’s propensity to do the exact same act that caused the injury in issue, but in order to infer the requisite knowledge there must be at least one incident that would cause a prudent person to anticipate the actual incident that caused the injury.
Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 773 (1) (507 SE2d 877) (1998). In applying the first bite rule, two determinations must be made: (1) whether the dog has the propensity to do the act which caused the injury, and (2) if so, whether the dog’s owner had knowledge of the propensity. Rowlette v. Paul, 219 Ga. App. 597 (466 SE2d 37) (1995).
With regard to the first prong, this Court consistently has held that the dog must have, on a prior occasion, done the same act which resulted in the injury comprising the tort action. Johnson v. Kvasny, 230 Ga. App. 162 (495 SE2d 651) (1998); Rowlette, supra; Smith, supra; Banks v. Adair, 148 Ga. App. 254 (251 SE2d 88) (1978); Carter v. Ide, 125 Ga. App. 557 (2) (188 SE2d 275) (1972). Thus, where a dog was known to chase people, but had never chased a car or motorcycle, the owner had no knowledge that the dog might chase a motorcyclist causing him to wreck. McNair v. Jones, 137 *690Ga. App. 13, 14 (2) (223 SE2d 27) (1975). But, summary-judgment granted to the dog owner was reversed where the dog was known to chase people and the plaintiff was injured when she fell while being chased by the dog. Evans-Watson v. Reese, 188 Ga. App. 292 (372 SE2d 675) (1988). Likewise, where a dog had on several occasions grabbed or nipped people, or ripped their clothes without actually biting, there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict which found the owner should have had knowledge of the dog’s propensity to bite. Torrance v. Brennan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 67 (2) (432 SE2d 658) (1993).
Decided June 25, 1999.
Setliff & Hammonds, Carter A. Setliff, William G. Hammonds, for appellant.
Shur, McDuffie, Brockman & Leveille, Reynolds E. Pitts, Jr., Goodman, McGuffey, Aust & Lindsey, James F. Cook, Jr., for appellees.
Hamilton v. Walker, 235 Ga. App. 635-636 (510 SE2d 120) (1998).
In this case, the similarity between Rocky’s attacks on Webb and Reid is striking. Based on Webb’s testimony that Rocky threatened to bite her, it is reasonable to infer that, but for Webb’s evasive maneuver over the Safios’ car, Rocky would have bitten her just as he did Reid. As such, the jury in this case should have been allowed to determine whether the attack on Webb was sufficient to support a finding that the Saffos should have anticipated the subsequent successful attack on Reid. Marshall v. Person, 176 Ga. App. 542, 543 (336 SE2d 380) (1985).
We do not address the opinion in Supan v. Griffin, 238 Ga. App. 404 (519 SE2d 22), as, under a long line of cases, Georgia courts have applied a first bite rule which requires an analysis of the comparable conduct of the animal. Because the present case falls within such holdings, we need not address or rely upon Supan, supra.
Here, the only reason that Rocky had not actually bitten anyone before he bit Reid was because his prior victim had been quick enough to avoid the attack. A prospective victim’s successful thwarting of a dog’s attack should not absolutely immunize the dog’s owners from suit when a second, similar attack results in the victim being bitten.