Court Opinion

ID: 9620921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:49:35.269244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:56.261824
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
During Darren Hereford’s trial, the prosecution called as a witness one of Hereford’s co-defendants, who is mentally *534deficient. After this witness asked to consult his attorney, the trial judge called a brief recess, and Hereford’s attorney left the courtroom to attend to another proceeding. While defense counsel was absent, the trial judge conducted an ex parte bench conference with the prosecution, where the prosecutor revealed the details of a conversation he had just had with the witness, the witness’ mother, and a police detective. The majority wrongly describes this ex parte bench conference a “brief, administrative conference” which was unlikely to hold “significant consequences for the accused.” Majority Op. at 529. Because I do not believe that an ex parte conversation regarding the status and competency of a key prosecution witness can be deemed inconsequential, I dissent.
I.
When a criminal defendant is denied counsel during a part of his trial, the question of whether that defendant is entitled to a new trial often hinges upon whether counsel was absent during a “critical stage” of the proceedings. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Although Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) generally requires a defendant alleging ineffective assistance to show that counsel’s unprofessional errors prejudiced the outcome of the trial, see id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, when a criminal defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage, this alone entitles him to a new trial — no showing of prejudice is required. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039.1
The majority claims that the ex parte bench conference does not constitute a critical stage of Hereford’s trial because it was merely “administrative in nature.” Majority Op. at 530. Yet while the majority is correct that there may be some ex parte discussions, such as a brief conference to discuss scheduling or to request a bathroom break, which “might be so de minim-is that there would be no constitutional significance,” see Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1261 (6th Cir.1987), the ex parte proceeding at Hereford’s trial was nothing of the sort. Hereford’s counsel was absent during a bench conference regarding the status and competency of a key prosecution witness, and such a conference regarding a key witness is categorically a critical stage.2
*535As we noted in Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2007), the Supreme Court has not provided a “comprehensive and final one-line definition of ‘critical stage.’ ” Id. at 312. Instead, the Supreme Court has provided five, at times overlapping, descriptions of what type of proceeding constitutes a “critical stage” of a trial. According to these five descriptions, a critical stage is a proceeding: 1) where “[available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted,” Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 53, 82 S.Ct. 157; 2) “where rights are preserved or lost,” White, 373 U.S. at 60, 83 S.Ct. 1050; 3) where counsel is “necessary to mount a meaningful defense,” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); 4) where “potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights” is inherent in a particular proceeding and the presence of counsel will “help avoid that prejudice,” Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970); or 5) which holds “significant consequences for the accused,” Bell, 535 U.S. at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843. See Van, 475 F.3d at 312 (listing same). In light of this web of Supreme Court precedent defining the phrase “critical stage,” Van attempted to summarize the Court’s jurisprudence under one test: “[i]n order to assess if a given portion of a criminal proceeding is a critical stage, we must ask how likely it is that significant consequences might have resulted from the absence of counsel at the stage of the criminal proceeding.” Id. at 313. So long as there is a “reasonable likelihood” that prejudice will arise in a particular type of proceeding, that proceeding should be considered a critical stage. Id.
A bench conference concerning the status or competency of a key prosecution witness, such as the one in Hereford’s case, is a proceeding that is likely to hold significant consequences for the accused. Such a bench conference not only provides parties with the opportunity to seek important evidentiary or other rulings from the trial judge, but they also may present counsel with a key opportunity to offer objections and thereby preserve issues for appellate review. See, e.g., United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 601 (6th Cir. 2006). If such objections are not lodged during the bench conference itself, they may be deemed untimely and thus be “irretrievably lost.” Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 53, 82 S.Ct. 157. Moreover, even if an attorney who is absent during a bench conference is permitted to lodge a later objection relating to a matter discussed at that conference, he may not even be aware of the need to object, as he was absent during the time when information justifying an objection was discussed or revealed. The potential significance of a bench conference is all the greater when, as was the case during the ex parte proceeding as issue in this appeal, the conference concerns the testimony of a key prosecution witness. Witness testimony, especially the testimony of a prosecution witness, is not always easy for a defense attorney to anticipate. Information revealed during a bench conference discussing that witness may allow defense counsel to draw out crucial testimony at cross-examination which otherwise might have been left unmentioned. Because a defendant cannot predict in advance whether a bench conference will reveal such key information, the presence of counsel is the check our adversarial system provides against uncertain proceedings. Only when a defendant is certain that his attorney will be present at the moment a crucial event occurs during his trial can the defendant be prepared to “mount a meaningful defense” against the prosecution’s developing case. Wade, 388 U.S. at 225, 87 S.Ct. 1926.
*536In holding that the ex parte bench conference at issue in this case did not constitute a critical stage, the majority claims that the conference was only a “brief, administrative conference” in which no important matters were discussed. Majority Op. at 530. This conclusion by the majority, however, wrongly assumes that, even if the important matters discussed in the absence of defense counsel were few in number, the proceedings would have been identical in the presence of defense counsel.3 Hereford’s counsel may have raised a crucial objection had he been present at the bench conference; or he may have asked a significant question which would have revealed information beneficial to Hereford’s case. Perhaps, in light of the prosecution’s indication that the witness did not understand the judge’s questions, counsel would have pursued a different line of questioning on cross-examination that would have seriously undermined the witness’ credibility; or perhaps an adversarial discussion during the bench hearing would have caused the prosecutor to make a damaging admission. Of course, because defense counsel was not present during the bench conference, it is impossible for us to know just what may have transpired had counsel been permitted to attend — and this uncertainty is exactly why Cronic requires us to presume prejudice. 466 U.S. at 659,104 S.Ct. 2039.
Moreover, contrary to the majority’s claim that an ex parte bench conference is somehow less likely to prejudice the outcome of a trial when, as was the case at Hereford’s trial, the judge sits as the finder of fact, see Majority Op. at 533, the opposite is frequently likely to be true. When a jury weighs the evidence against an accused, bench conferences serve the essential purpose of allowing potentially prejudicial matters to be discussed by the court and counsel without revealing their content to the ultimate finder of fact. See United States v. Block, 755 F.2d 770, 776 (11th Cir.1985). When, however, the judge also sits as fact-finder, an ex parte conference allows the attorney fortunate enough to participate an opportunity to shade information presented to the finder of fact, and denies opposing counsel the opportunity to correct the judge’s misim-pressions. Such a one-sided presentation of the issues is likely to color how the fact-finder views the case, and thereby adds to the probability that such a proceeding is prejudicial to the absent party.
Because it is reasonably likely that a bench conference discussing a key prosecution witness will yield valuable information, provide the defense with a crucial opportunity to raise new arguments or objections, or allow the parties participating in the discussion to color the judge’s view of the case, such a discussion obviously constitutes a critical stage of the proceedings. A proceeding which is likely to present such a critical opportunity to the parties necessarily presents a likelihood of “significant consequences” to the defendant, Bell, 535 U.S. at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843; and it only through the presence of counsel that a party can be sure that “potential substantial prejudice” is avoided by properly raised objections and a well-informed defense. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999; see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (“Left without the aid of counsel [a criminal defendant] may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon in*537competent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him”) Accordingly, under any of the descriptions the Supreme Court has provided for what constitutes a critical stage of a criminal trial, a mid-trial bench conference concerning a key prosecution witness qualifies as such stage. See Van, 475 F.3d at 312.
Rather than offer reasons why a mid-trial discussion of a key prosecution witness does not constitute a critical stage of a criminal trial, the majority relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (per curiam) to support its conclusion that an ex parte communication can constitute harmless error. Rush-en’s facts, however, are hardly analogous to those presented by the instant case. In Rushen, a juror twice approached the trial judge outside of the presence of either party’s counsel, and informed the judge that she was emotionally distraught because she had known the victim of a murder which was briefly mentioned during the trial. Id. at 116, 104 S.Ct. 453. The judge asked the juror whether her emotional state would affect her disposition of the case, and received assurances that it would not. Id. In affirming the Rushen defendant’s conviction, the Supreme Court merely held that an ex parte communication between a judge and a juror may be harmless error if a post-trial hearing determines that no prejudice resulted from the communication. Id. at 119-20, 104 S.Ct. 453.
The key distinction between Rushen and the instant case, however, is that Rushen did not involve an injury to the adversarial process. The right to counsel attaches to those proceedings “at which the accused ‘require[s] aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary.’ ” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 289, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313-320, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973)) (emphasis added). The judge in Rushen engaged in an ex parte communication outside the presence of both prosecution and defense counsel; he did not give a comparative advantage to either party.4
When, on the other hand, a judge holds a bench conference with only one party’s counsel in attendance, the judge is potentially permitting that party to hear secrets which could be wielded to the disadvantage of the other party, or is allowing that party to raise issues before the court without giving the other side an opportunity to argue in opposition. Such an exclusive audience with the judge is exactly the sort of lopsided proceeding the Sixth Amendment is intended to prevent. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). Accordingly, *538Rusheris holding, that an ex parte proceeding — conducted away from either party — may constitute harmless error under the facts of that particular case, has no bearing on the instant case. When a judge holds a prosecution-only bench conference to discuss a key prosecution witness, the court leaves the defendant without representation at a critical stage of the trial, and accordingly violates the Sixth Amendment. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039.
II.
Although the majority purports to apply Cronic in deciding the instant case, its analysis more closely resembles the Strickland prejudice test than the presumption of prejudice set out by Cronic. In presuming prejudice when a criminal defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of trial, cases governed by Cronic engage in a fundamentally different inquiry than those governed by Strickland. Strickland’s prejudice inquiry is necessarily a fact-based inquiry; in order to determine whether defense counsel’s unprofessional errors may have affected the result of a case, a court must necessarily ask what errors occurred and how exactly did they impact the trial. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Cronic’s critical stage analysis, however, focuses on the character of a particular type of proceeding. Rather than examining the particular events of a particular defendant’s trial, Cronic looks to the nature of a particular phase of a criminal trial generally, and asks whether denying counsel to criminal defendants in that stage of a trial may cause “significant consequences” for many of those defendants. Van, 475 F.3d at 312-13. This is a categorical inquiry, requiring a conviction to be reversed if counsel was absent during a proceeding which, by its nature, was likely to prejudice the defendant — even if a careful review of the trial transcript reveals that no such prejudice could actually have occurred. See Van, 475 F.3d at 313; id. at 314 (“[T]he overarching legal question of whether a particular proceeding is a ‘critical stage’ of the trial should focus not only on the specific case before us, but the general question of whether such a stage is ‘critical.’ ”)5
The wisdom of such a categorical approach is made clear by the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 348 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc), the infamous “sleeping lawyer” case. In Burdine, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held that a capital defendant whose attorney slept through significant portions of his trial was not entitled to Cronic’s presumption of prejudice because “under *539the specific circumstances of this case ... prejudice cannot be presumed.” Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 964 (5th Cir.2000) (panel opinion) (emphasis in original). The panel opinion reasoned that:
[I]t is possible that unobjectionable evidence (or evidence which [defense counsel] was already anticipating) may have been introduced while [counsel] slept, without having any substantial effect on the reliability or fairness of Burdine’s trial. But, Burdine essentially asks us to assume that [his attorney] slept during the portions of the proceedings for which the transcript reflects no activity by him. In the light of the foregoing discussion and the rather vague testimony of the witnesses at the state habeas evidentiary hearing regarding when [counsel] slept, it would be inappropriate for us to engage in such speculation. In sum, on this record, we cannot determine whether [counsel] slept during a “critical stage” of Burdine’s trial.
Id. at 964 (emphasis added). In other words, because Burdine did not prove that his attorney slept through prejudicial portions of the trial, he was not entitled to a presumption of prejudice.
The en banc court reversed the panel, holding that “[t]o justify a particular stage as ‘critical,’ the Court has not required the defendant to explain how having counsel would have altered the outcome of his specific case. Rather, the Court has looked to whether ‘the substantial rights of a defendant may be affected’ during that type of proceeding.” Burdine, 262 F.3d at 347 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir.1991)) (emphasis added). According to the en banc court, the question of whether counsel’s effective absence actually prejudiced the defendant was not a factor in determining whether counsel was absent during a critical stage of the trial. “Such a standard would require that the defendant, in effect, prove prejudice in order to receive a presumption of prejudice. That was not the standard announced in Cronic.” Id. at 348.
In footnote 4 of its opinion, the majority claims to agree that “critical stages must be assessed categorically.” Majority Op. at 530 n. 4. Yet its analysis hews too close to the kind of fact-based inquiry forbidden by Cronic. The majority conducts a review of the “trial transcript,” and decides that the actual events of the ex parte proceeding “reveals a de minimus communication that was administrative in nature.” Id. at 536. This kind of fact-based inquiry, which looks at an individual trial transcript rather than the nature of a particular proceeding generally, is exactly the kind of inquiry prohibited by Cronic.
Indeed, despite its claim to be following the categorical approach in determining whether defense counsel’s absence took place during a critical stage, the majority does not conduct a categorical inquiry at all. Under the majority’s analysis, we determine whether a particular phase of a trial was a “critical stage” by reading the trial transcript to see whether the particular events of a specific trial prejudiced the defendant. See Majority Op. at 530. Only after we determine that the defendant was prejudiced by the absence of counsel during that phase of the trial do we apply a presumption that the defendant was prejudiced. Such Kafkaesque logic would defeat the purpose of Cronic. If an ex parte proceeding constitutes a critical stage only when a fact-based inquiry reveals that the proceeding actually prejudiced, the defendant, then Cronic’s presumption of prejudice becomes useless. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 348 (“Such a standard would require that the defendant, in effect, prove prejudice in order to receive a presumption of prejudice. That was not the standard announced in Cronic.”) Instead of *540paying lip-service to the correct, categorical approach, while simultaneously engaging in the kind of fact-based inquiry prohibited by Cronic, the majority should have actually followed the categorical approach, and asked whether conferences regarding the competency of a key prosecution witness are reasonably likely to hold significant consequences for the accused. See Van, 475 F.3d at 312.
III.
Moreover, the majority also errs in holding that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), requires deference to the state court’s decision upholding. Hereford’s conviction. Under AEDPA, a federal habeas court may only abrogate a state defendant’s unconstitutional conviction in limited circumstances. Normally, we may only grant habeas relief to a petitioner convicted in state court if the state court’s decision “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (formatting altered). A state decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent when it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth” in the Supreme Court’s eases; or when it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court decision] and nevertheless arrives at a result different” from the Court’s precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state decision involves an “unreasonable application of’ Supreme Court precedent when it “identifies the correct governing legal rule ... but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case;” or when it “unreasonably extends a legal principle ... to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
AEDPA’s requirement that we defer to a state court’s decision, however, does not require us to defer to something that has not actually been decided. Thus, in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), the Supreme Court explained that when the state decision under review in a habeas case only reached the first prong of the Strickland analysis, a federal habeas court applies de novo review with respect to any portions of the Strickland test which were not actually decided in the state court’s opinion. See id. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (“In this case, our review is not circumscribed by a state court conclusion with respect to prejudice, as neither of the state courts below reached this prong of the Strickland analysis.”)
In analyzing the instant case under AEDPA, we must consider the Michigan Court of Appeals decision which upheld Hereford’s conviction, only two paragraphs of which considered the issue of whether Hereford is entitled to a new trial because the trial judge conducted an improper ex parte bench conference:
Finally, defendant claims in his supplemental brief on appeal that his right to cross-examine a witness was diminished because the trial court held a bench conference without defense counsel being present. Defendant asserts that if his counsel was present he would have gained valuable information that would have allowed him to impeach witness and codefendant Smith’s credibility.
We agree with defendant that it was improper to conduct a bench conference *541without defense counsel’s presence. See generally People v. Riggs, 223 Mich.App. 662, 677, 568 N.W.2d 101 (1997) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at “critical stage” of proceedings); People v. Gonzalez, 197 Mich.App. 385, 402, 496 N.W.2d 312 (1992) (improper ex parte communications deny right to fair trial). However, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Watson, 245 Mich.App. 572, 585, 629 N.W.2d 411 (2001) (violation of right of confrontation may not be redressed unless error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). As we have previously stated, disregarding Smith’s entire testimony, the balance of the trial testimony supports defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting an armed robbery. Id. Further, the court, sitting as the trier of fact, was well aware of the problems with Smith’s testimony, and knew from the bench conference that Smith had, in fact, spoken with the detective.
People v. Hereford, No. 227296, 2003 WL 193523, at *3-4 (Mich.Ct.App. January 28, 2003).
Contrary to the majority’s claim that the Michigan Court of Appeals engaged in an objectively reasonable, if “narrower,” reading of Cronic than this Court’s precedents may require, the Michigan court does not appear to have considered Cronic at all. Nowhere in the Michigan court’s opinion does the court decide whether or not Hereford was denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial. Instead, the court appears to leap headfirst into a discussion of whether the trial court’s error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” without even considering if such harmless error analysis is even permissible under Cronic. Hereford, 2003 WL 193523, at *4. Because the state court decision under review did not even consider, must less decide, the issue of whether Hereford was denied counsel in a critical stage of his trial, we have no state court decision to defer to on this point, and “our review is not circumscribed” by a decision that does not actually exist. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527.
Moreover, inasmuch the ex parte bench conference at issue in this case constituted a critical stage of Hereford’s trial, the Michigan court’s holding that depriving Hereford of counsel at this stage of the trial could somehow be harmless error is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cronic. Under Cronic, “[t]he presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.” 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Harmless error analysis is never appropriate when a criminal defendant is denied counsel during a critical stage of his trial, because prejudice is always presumed in such circumstances. See id. at 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (“There are, however, circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”); see also Benitez v. United States, 521 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir.2008) (“A violation of a defendant’s right to counsel at a critical stage is a structural error, and is therefore not subject to an analysis of whether the error was harmless or prejudicial.”) (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006)). Accordingly, AED-PA does not require us to defer to the Michigan court’s decision, as we are not bound by a decision that is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. § 2254(d)(1).
CONCLUSION
When a prosecutor and a judge meet during trial to discuss a key prosecution *542witness, such a discussion constitutes a critical stage of the trial. The possibility that such a discussion will either reveal important information, or provide defense counsel with an opportunity to raise a key objection, is simply too great to allow the defendant to go unrepresented. Moreover, as AEDPA does not require us to defer to the state court’s decision in this case, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to deny habeas relief to Hereford.

. After erroneously concluding that Hereford was not denied counsel during a critical stage of his trial, the majority unnecessarily confuses the issues in this case by focusing on the distinction between structural error and trial error. According to the majority, the district court reasonably concluded that, because the ex parte bench conference only constituted trial error, harmless error analysis applies. Majority Op. at 532-33. Harmless error analysis, however, does not apply to the instant case. Because Hereford alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, if the Court concludes that Hereford is not entitled to a presumption of prejudice, we must apply Strickland's two step inquiry; Strickland analysis, not harmless error analysis, governs all ineffective assistance claims not governed by Cronic. See Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 308 ("Cronic was meant to cover those cases in which prejudice was to be assumed. Strickland would address cases in which prejudice needed to be shown.”)

. In footnote 4 of its opinion, the majority mischaracterizes this dissent as asserting that "it is necessary to aggregate all ex parte communications into one category,” Majority Op. at 530 n. 4, but the dissent makes no such claim. Had Hereford’s counsel been absent during (or, as the majority suggests, slept through) a truly inconsequential portion of Hereford’s trial, Cronic would not be implicated. See 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. In the instant case, however, defense counsel was not absent during an inconsequential phase of the trial; he was absent while the prosecutor and the judge were discussing the competency of a key witness.

. Moreover, the majority is wrong to suggest that only minor issues were discussed at the bench conference. Indeed, the matters discussed at the conference went to the competency of a key prosecution witness, and whether the witness fully understood the proceedings.

. Indeed, as the Supreme Court explained in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), a principal function of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to place a criminally accused on a level playing field with the prosecution:
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the pub-lie's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.
Id. at 344, 83 S.Ct. 792.

. The categorical approach to determining which parts of a trial constitute a critical stage was established by a footnote in the Cronic opinion, which lists several prior decisions that involved denial of counsel "during a critical stage of the proceeding.” 466 U.S. at 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039. In each of the decisions where a portion of a trial was deemed to be a critical stage, the question in determining whether that portion of the trial is "critical” did not hinge upon the particular facts of a particular defendant’s case. Rather, each case declared a particular kind of proceeding to be a critical stage, regardless of what actually transpired at trial. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864-65, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975) (holding that final arguments constitutes a critical stage of a trial); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963) (holding that any proceeding where a criminal defendant "enter[s] a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel,” is presumed to have prejudiced that defendant); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961) (holding that an arraignment constitutes a critical stage of trial); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596, 81 S.Ct. 756, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961) (holding that direct examination of the accused is always a critical stage of trial).