Court Opinion

ID: 9604481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:22:34.379342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:11.992650
License: Public Domain

Miller, J.,
dissenting.
The part of § 33-253, 1956 Cum. Supp., Code 1950, (Acts 1954, Ch. 319, at page 391) that authorizes State ownership and operation of the bus facilities is challenged as violative of § 185 of the Constitu*11tion, because it authorizes the State to become a party to, be interested in, or engage in carrying on work of internal improvement.
When the prohibitive provisions of § 185 were first adopted in the Constitution of 1869, they appeared as Article 10, §§ 12, 14, and 15, and public roads and public parks were not excepted from the general category of works of internal improvement. Recognizing them as internal improvements, the State did not thereafter construct or maintain them. However, in the Constitution of 1902 public roads were excepted from the prohibitive language, and upon amendment of that Constitution in 1928, public parks were excepted. These exceptions show clearly that public roads and public parks were deemed to be internal improvements, and their exclusion from the broad and prohibitive language was necessary to allow the State to construct, maintain and operate them. State v. Babcock, 161 Minn. 80, 200 N. W. 843.
It is conceded by the Comptroller that the construction and maintenance of the tunnel, bridges and approaches that make up and constitute a road across Hampton Roads is not violative of the Constitution. Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 822, 51 S. E. 2d 272. However, it is asserted that the part of § 33-253, Acts 1954, Ch. 319, p. 391, that purports to authorize the Commission to acquire and operate bus facilities, i.e., engage in the bus transportation business for the carriage of persons and property through and over the project as distinguished from the maintenance and operation of the tunnel, bridges and approaches, contravene both the letter and the spirit of the provision in § 185 that forbids the State to “become a party to or become interested in any work of internal improvement, except public roads and public parks, or engage in carrying on any such work.”
I am not unmindful that all Acts of the General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional unless the contrary is made plainly to appear. Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219, 72 S. E. 2d 506; Joyner v. Centre Motor Co., 192 Va. 627, 66 S. E. 2d 469; Smith v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 904; Savage v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 992, 147 S. E. 262; 17 M. J., Statutes, § 29, p. 273. Here, however, for good cause and by plain language prohibition against the State is made absolute and inclusive as to all work of internal improvement with but two exceptions, and they are specific. We must therefore determine (1) whether or not the maintenance and operation of busses and facilities for transportation of the public through and over this *12Bridge-Tunnel Project constitutes “work of internal improvement,” and if so, (2) do the busses and facilities maintained and operated by the Commission constitute a part of this unique stretch of public road comprising the tunnel, bridges and approaches which concededly the State may construct, maintain and operate.
What is “work of internal improvement” within the purpose of the prohibition as used in the Constitution, i.e., what meaning did the framers of the Constitution intend to convey by the use of the term “internal improvement?”
The words used should be given the scope and accorded the meaning that the framers of the Constitution attributed to them, if no violence is done to the language employed.
“The purpose and object sought to be attained by the framers of the constitution is to be looked for, and the will and intent of the people who ratified it is to be made effective. May v. Topping, 65 W. Va. 656, 64 S. E. 848.” Dean v. Paolicelli, supra, at 226.
The evils sought to be guarded against and the history of the development of works of internal improvement in Virginia referred to in Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 91 S. E. 2d 660, and authorities and treatises cited, impel the belief that it was enunciation of a broad principle that the Constitutional Convention had in mind when it adopted §§ 12, 14, and 15, Article 10, of the 1869 Constitution and not prohibitive legislation against particular activities. That being true and the principle having been embodied in the fundamental law of the State, the language used should be given broad meaning and comprehensive application.
“ ‘The Constitution is not to be construed in a technical manner, but in ascertaining its meaning we are to consider the circumstances attending its adoption, and what appears to have been the understanding of the people when they adopted it,’ and we then only announced a rule of interpretation which had been frequently adopted.” Bonsai v. Yellott, et al., 100 Md. 481, 60 A. 593, 594. State v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 151 N. W. 331; State v. Kelly, 71 Kan. 811, 81 P. 450.
In construing the term “internal improvements” in Shenandoah Lime Co. v. Governor, 115 Va. 865, 871, 80 S. E. 753, this court said:
“Each of our Codes, beginning with that of 1819, to and including the Code of 1887, have had chapters entitled ‘Works of Internal Improvement.’ In using this term in article 185, the late Constitutional Convention must be presumed, according to established rules *13of construction, to have used the term only in the definite sense and meaning that had attached to it throughout the history of the State. Its meaning as thus defined and understood throughout the legislation of the State, and the decisions of her courts, has included and had reference to the channels of trade and commerce, such as turnpikes, canals, railroads, telegraph lines, including in more recent years telephone lines, and other works of a like quasi public character. In the past these works, designated as ‘works of internal improvement,’ were sometimes constructed and operated by the State, but generally by corporations composed of private individuals, which, because of the public character of their works, always enjoyed the power of eminent domain, owed duties to the public and were subject to State regulation. These corporations, because of the great need of such improvements at the time, and the difficulty attending the construction of such works, were generally encouraged by State aid, and it was not until the Constitution of 1869 that the State was inhibited from becoming a party to or interested in such works of internal improvement.”
The object and prohibitive purpose of this provision now incorporated in § 185 of the Constitution are further disclosed by the Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1869. When that Convention determined that the State should no longer invest in or compete with private enterprise in promoting or constructing works of internal improvement, it did so upon the recommendation of James H. Clements, delegate from the city of Norfolk, and the city of Portsmouth. Speaking as chairman of the committee on taxation and finance, on the recommendation of that committee, he said:
“* * * [B]ut taking into consideration the general fact that the State has up to this time derived no real benefit from any interests she had in any internal improvement, in connection with the other fact that capitalists are now to such an extent interested in building up marts of commerce at various points, we thought it wise to leave it to the individual interests of the country, believing that any enterprise hereafter mooted, if it possessed within itself genuine merits, would receive such support as would do away the necessity for the State lending her aid to it.” 1 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Virginia (1868) 650.
The Attorney General reminded us that no facilities for pedestrian travel are afforded by the project through the tunnel, over the bridges and trestles, or would be used if provided because of the dis*14tance across Hampton Roads. He then called attention to the fact that vehicular transportation for those using the project is necessary and argues that furnishing this character of transportation is incidental to and thus a part of the conceded authority and power of the State to construct and maintain public roads. The majority opinion seems to adhere to this view. However, in later years we have heard much protest, and justly so, about constitutional amendment for seeming necessity and by judicial interpretation. Even if necessity to amend did exist, it should be accomplished only in the mode provided by law.
The history of Virginia shows that since the middle of the seven' teenth century it has been a responsibility of governmental authorities to construct and maintain roads. I Henning’s Statutes at Large, Act L (1632), p. 199, and Act IX (1657-58), p. 436. Over the years the State and its subdivisions have been active and solicitous of this governmental function. In legislation of January 5, 1786, entitled an “Act Concerning Public Roads,” Revised Code 1803, Ch. 19, p.,26, elaborate provision was made for the construction and maintenance of public roads. It is common knowledge that throughout ensuing years many other acts were adopted authorizing and empowering the State and local governments to construct and maintain turnpikes, roads and highways. Yet in none of these acts that I have seen does it appear, nor has it been asserted, that the maintenance and operation of agencies for the transportation of passengers or property over these roads was deemed or thought to be a governmental function or responsibility, or incidental to maintenance of the road. We do not find that Virginia ever undertook to operate stage coaches, when that mode of travel was in vogue, or in later years provide vehicular transportation (busses) for the carriage of passengers or freight over its system of roads or highways maintained by local governments. The business of furnishing public transportation over the roads was undertaken and developed by private capital and became a major industry. St. Clair: Transportation, Land, Air, Water, 1942; MacGill: History of Transportation in the United States Before 1860, 1917.
The maintenance of roads or a highway system and the operation of transportation agencies along such roads or system are by nature distinctly different functions. Neither expediency nor necessity can blend and make of them one and the same undertaking, though here necessity on the part of the State to furnish transportation does not *15exist for a concededly responsible and efficient common carrier stands ready to furnish the needed service.
In the majority opinion it is stated that 3,000 pedestrians use the ferries each day, and about 1,800 of them will use the busses when operated. The annual cost of the proposed bus operation is estimated at $155,000, and the estimated revenue is $165,000, thus leaving a profit of $10,000. No doubt the inference is that the margin of profit is small when considered with reference to the passengers to be transported. I am at a loss to understand what the State’s margin of profit, meager though it be, in this business enterprise has to do with the constitutionality of the act. Although it be conceded that the profit is small, that merely tends to show that the bus operation is welfare in character which renders it but the more objectionable.
The majority opinion says that constructing and operating the terminal and bus system is a governmental function and likens it to the construction, maintenance and operation of the State Capitol, Supreme Court-Library building, and other similar buildings. There is, however, a vast difference between the maintenance of a road and operating a bus system thereon, and the maintenance of the State Capitol, Supreme Court-Library building, and like governmental facilities and functions. Historically, maintenance and operation of these buildings have always been governmental functions, but I have never known the State to furnish transportation to these buildings and facilities or charge the public a toll to go through them.
A fleet of busses by which individuals or property are transported over the roads is physically distinct from the road upon which the vehicles operate and move. Not for governmental or any other purpose do I find that a fleet of busses and the facilities incident and necessary to their maintenance and use have ever been deemed a part of the road or highway system or their operation thereon considered incidental to the authority to construct and maintain the road or highway upon which the busses travel.
“Authority to construct and maintain highways and authority to transport passengers by hire upon said highways are in their nature and have been in practice radically distinct. The latter authority does not pass as an incident to the grant of the former.” Attorney General, ex rel. v. Common Council of the City of Detroit, 148 Mich. 71, 111 N. W. 860, 864.
No other enterprises more typically exemplify what constitute and are termed works of internal improvement within the meaning of a *16constitutional prohibition such as that contained in § 185 than do public transportation agencies. The exception of roads from the prohibitive language does not indicate an intent to permit the State to operate busses or a bus system though the contemplated area of operation be comparatively limited and the character of the project be unique.
Street railway, railroads, canal boat systems, and bus systems all serve the same general purposes, and the clear object of the constitutional prohibition is to forbid the State to engage in or become interested in these non-governmental functions and activities. It is, I think, a dangerous departure from the principle proclaimed and a palpable evasion of the purpose and intent of § 185 to allow the State to maintain the necessary facilities and operate a bus system for the transportation of passengers and property over the public highways for compensation, but forbid it to operate a street railway.
The contemplated activity is not and never has been a governmental function. The bus system (its garage, busses and terminals) is a work of internal improvement, and its operation over the project is not incidental to the maintenance of the road, which is actually and historically separate from it; nor does its operation over the project make it a part of the road.
In my opinion, that part of the Act of 1954, Ch. 319, which undertakes to authorize and empower the Commission to acquire, maintain and operate bus facilities for the transportation of passengers through or over the Bridge-Tunnel System Project is violative of § 185 of the Constitution of Virginia and void. However, it is clear that this provision is distinct and severable from other parts of the act, and its elimination would not affect them.
“The rule is that an act may be valid in one part, and invalid in another, and if the, valid is severable from the remainder, that invalid part may be ignored, if after such elimination the remaining portions are sufficient to accomplish their purpose in accordance with the legislative intent. Only if the void portion is the inducement to the passage of the act, or is so interwoven in its texture as to prevent the statute from becoming operative in accordance with the will of the legislature, is the whole statute invalid. Thus, when a part of an act is invalid but the remainder reflects the legislative intent and is complete in itself, then the remainder will be upheld.” 17 M. J., Statutes, § 28, p. 270. New v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., et al., 186 Va. 726, 43 S. E. 2d 872; King v. County of Arlington, 195 Va. 1084, 81 S. E. 2d 587.
*17The other parts of the act are clearly sufficient to accomplish their purpose in accordance with the legislative intent when this invalid provision is severed from them.
I am unwilling to ride the State Welfare Bus authorized by the majority opinion; I much prefer a bus operated by private enterprise, and think the writ of mandamus should be denied.