Court Opinion

ID: 9757855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:01:41.186177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:45.002866
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Bell:
I dissent.
The minor plaintiff was semi-paralyzed as the result of diving in defendant’s swimming pool. Anyone who is badly hurt deserves our sympathies, but that is not and should not be sufficient to justify a verdict which is contrary to the evidence or the law, or both. In this case it was contrary to both.
The lower Court correctly summarized the pertinent facts as follows: “He was athletically inclined and wrestled during his sophomore year. He swam in defendant’s pool during the summers of 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963, until the date of the accident [on July 30, 1963]. During the summers of 1961, 1962 and 1963 Darrel used both the one-meter diving board and the diving tower which was 11 feet high. Darrel used the *27pool at least 20 times* per summer and for the past two or three summers used the diving board approximately 8 or 10 times per day. He performed various dives, including a ‘running front dive,’ a ‘cannon ball’ and ‘can opener’ which he described as more of a splash than a dive, a ‘sloppy swan’ and a ‘kamikaze’ in which the diver enters the water head first with arms outstretched in a horizontal manner in imitation of the wings of a descending airplane.”
Furthermore, as the Majority admit: “The Borough of Nazareth employed at least four lifeguards, able, ready and eager at all times to speed to those who falter or weaken in the water, or have any reason at all to need natatorial assistance.”
1. Judgment N. O. V.
It is crystal clear (a) that plaintiff, an exceptionally experienced diver, undoubtedly should have been and actually was aware of the risks that he and every other diver took in this pool with which he was so familiar, and (b) that he voluntarily assumed the risk of injury from diving off this board which he had done myriad times before in this very pool and for these reasons cannot recover. Podvin v. Somerton Springs Swim Club, 406 Pa. 384, 178 A. 2d 615; Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League Club, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 179, 96 A. 2d 181; Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 214 A. 2d 238; Rauch v. Pa. Sports and Enterprises, Inc., 367 Pa. 632, 81 A. 2d 548.
In Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League Club, 173 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, the Court aptly, pertinently and relevantly said (pages 186-187) : “We quote at length from Prosser on Torts at pages 383-384: ‘By entering freely and voluntarily into any relation or *28situation which presents obvious danger, the plaintiff may be taken to accept it, and to agree that he will look out for himself, and relieve the defendant of responsibility. Those who participate [in] or sit as spectators at sports and amusements assume all the obvious risks of being hurt by roller coasters, flying balls, [Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass’n, 105 Wash. 215, 177 P. 776; Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (baseball); Schlenger v. Weinberg, 107 N.J.L. 130, 150 A. 434, 69 A.L.R. 738 (golf); Douglas v. Converse, 248 Pa. 232, 93 A. 955 (polo); Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N.Y.S. 505 (hockey)], fireworks explosions, or the struggles of the contestants. “The timorous may stay at home.” [Cardozo, C. J., in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173.]. . . One who enters upon the premises of another, even as a business visitor, assumes the danger of all known or obvious conditions which he finds there. The consent is found in going ahead with full knowledge of the risk.’ ” (Italics omitted)
It is, we repeat, clear as crystal that • the minor plaintiff is barred from any recovery, because he voluntarily assumed the risk of injury from diving in this, his “home,” pool and the lower Court properly entered judgment n.o.v.
2. New Trial
If the judgment n.o.v. is not affirmed, then I would grant a new trial because the verdict was so clearly and unquestionably against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. ■ The evidence most strongly relied upon by the appellees was the opinion evidence of two “swimming pool experts” as to the proper construction of this and every other stoimming pool. Their testi*29mony is so contrary to tlie actual facts in the instant case — 5,000 dives without injury — as well as to the common knowledge of every layman who ever swam in private or public pools, as to be entitled to little or no weight. The law is well settled that an opinion of an expert is entitled to little weight as against actual facts: Girsh Trust, 410 Pa. 455, 189 A. 2d 852; Sommerville Will, 406 Pa. 207, 177 A. 2d 496; Kadilak Will, 405 Pa. 238, 174 A. 2d 870. Cf. also Richette v. Pennsylvania R.R., 410 Pa. 6, 187 A. 2d 910; Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311, 323, 218 A. 2d 561; Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401. Pa. 242, 164 A. 2d 98.
In Girsh Trust, 410 Pa., supra, the Court aptly said (page 471) : “. . . ‘opinion evidence is generally considered of a low grade, and not entitled to much weight against positive testimony of actual facts’ . . .”
This Court has the power to remand the record to the Court below with directions to consider defendant’s motion for a new trial, or this Court itself can grant a new trial: Clewell v. Pummer, 388 Pa. 592, 600, 131 A. 2d 375; Downes v. Hodin, 377 Pa. 208, 104 A. 2d 495; Richette v. Pennsylvania R.R., 410 Pa., supra; Act of May 20, 1891, §2, P. L. 101.
If the judgment n.o.v. is not affirmed, I would grant a new trial for the reasons above set forth.
3. Remand
If the judgment n.o.v. is not affirmed, and if this Court does not grant a new trial, then I would remand the case to the lower Court to dispose of defendant’s motion for a new trial.

 Italics throughout, ours.