Court Opinion

ID: 9368006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 18:00:28.008409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.005130
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                  __________

                                       No. 22-1564
                                       __________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                  JASON A. MUSKEY,
                                       Appellant
                                     __________

                       Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                               (D.C. No. 3:15-cr-00018-001)
                       District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson
                                        __________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                 on January 24, 2023

             Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges

                                 (Filed: February 2, 2023)
                                        __________

                                       OPINION*
                                       __________

       *
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

       Jason Muskey appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his motion

for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Because we discern no

abuse of discretion in the District Court’s ruling, we will affirm.1

       A district court “may reduce [a federal inmate’s] term of imprisonment” and

“impose a term of probation or supervised release” if it finds that “extraordinary and

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before

granting compassionate release, however, a district court must also consider the factors

set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent that they are applicable.” Id.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include, among other things, “the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”

§ 3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to

promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; “to afford

adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; and “to protect the public from further crimes

of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).

       Here, we cannot say that the District Court committed a clear error of judgment in

concluding that no extraordinary and compelling reasons supported Muskey’s release.

Although Muskey’s medical conditions place him at a higher risk of serious illness from

       1
          We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s
decision to deny a motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021). Under this standard, “we will not
disturb the court’s determination unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction
that it committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached.” Id. (quotation
marks, alteration, and citation omitted).
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COVID-19, the District Court permissibly weighed that risk against his receipt of a

vaccine and demonstrated ability to manage his conditions in prison. See Garrett v.

Murphy, 17 F.4th 419, 433 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[W]idespread availability of the COVID-19

vaccine . . . eliminates [the] need for compassionate release”) (quotation omitted); United

States v. Broadfield, 5 F.4th 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[F]or the vast majority of

prisoners, the availability of a vaccine makes it impossible to conclude that the risk of

COVID-19 is an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason for immediate release.”). And

while Muskey argues that another outbreak may occur, Opening Br. at 2., the District

Court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the circumstances at the time of its

decision. See generally United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020)

(explaining that “the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it

may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate

release”).

       Nor do we discern any abuse of discretion in the District Court’s analysis of the

sentencing factors under § 3553(a). See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1238-39

(11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (even assuming extraordinary and compelling reasons,

courts may deny release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the § 3553(a) factors alone).

Rather, the Court reasonably concluded that several of these factors—including the need

to reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment, promote deterrence, and

protect the public—militated against a sentence reduction. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C). D. Ct. Dkt. 96 at 4. In weighing these factors, the District Court

highlighted the circumstances of Muskey’s crimes, noted that he had served only half of

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his sentence, and ultimately concluded that it would be inconsistent with the § 3553

factors to reduce his sentence. Id. See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330-31

(3d Cir. 2020) (declining to disturb denial of motion for compassionate release when

significant time remained in defendant’s sentence and the seriousness of his crimes

justified continued incarceration).

       While Muskey argues that evidence of his rehabilitation should outweigh the other

factors, mere disagreement with the District Court’s judgment is insufficient to

demonstrate abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir.

2020); United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).2

       Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

       2
         To the extent that Muskey’s motion could be construed as a request for home
confinement, we note that Congress has conferred the exclusive authority to authorize
home confinement on the Bureau of Prisons. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2); see also CARES
ACT, Pub. L. 116-136, Mar. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 281, Div. B, Title II, § 12003(b)(2) (“[T]he
Director of the Bureau may lengthen the maximum amount of time for which the Director
is authorized to place a prisoner in home confinement under [§ 3624(c)(2)].”).

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