Court Opinion

ID: 9715526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:07:43.573581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:35.400214
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the defendants’ convictions. The defendants were charged with knowingly cutting timber without the consent of the timber grower. (Emphasis added.) 225 ILCS Ann. 735/5 (Michie 1995). Knowledge generally refers to an awareness of the existence of facts which make an individual’s conduct unlawful. People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281, 288 (1991). I disagree with the majority’s finding that the People failed to prove that the defendants knowingly acted in an unlawful manner. When challenged with a claim of insufficiency of evidence, it is the function of the reviewing court to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). This standard applies to all criminal cases regardless of the nature of the evidence (People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 203 (1991)), and a criminal conviction will not be overturned on grounds of insufficient evidence unless the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261. As the majority points out, knowledge is ordinarily established by circumstantial evidence, and there must be sufficient evidence from which an inference of knowledge can be made. People v. Weiss, 263 Ill. App. 3d 725 (1994). I believe, however, that a review of the record under the Collins standard shows sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have properly inferred that the defendants knew their conduct was unlawful. The evidence established that the defendants cut down five trees. The five trees were located on a strip of land that extended 77 feet west of a fenceline. Two of the trees were located within close proximity to the fence, two were approximately 50 feet west of the fence, and the fifth tree was approximately 75 feet west of the fence. The 77-foot strip of land upon which the trees were growing was titled, by recorded quitclaim deed, to Dianne Meyers. Trent Thomas, Meyers’ son, testified that approximately one week prior to the trees being cut down, he told Calkins and Peter Reviglio that the fenceline was not the property line. He testified that he told them that his mother’s property extended west of the fenceline although he did not state how far west of the fenceline her property extended. Thomas also testified that he told them that there were stakes marking the true boundary line. He told Calkins that the property had recently been surveyed and he offered Calkins and Reviglio a survey map, but they would not take the map. Thomas also testified that there in fact were survey markers west of the fenceline showing where the actual property line was located. Thomas’ sister, Tyra Johnson, corroborated most of her brother’s testimony. Calkins denied being told by Thomas that his mother owned the land west of the fenceline and denied being offered a survey map by Thomas. The parties stipulated that Reviglio, if called to testify, would have corroborated Calkins’ testimony. I believe that a rationale trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knew that the trees they cut were on land owned by Diane Meyers. The People established that the true boundary was marked west of the fenceline and that the defendants cut the trees east of that line. The People also established, through the testimony of Thomas and Johnson, that Calkins was told that Meyers’ property extended beyond the fence-line and was offered a survey map to prove it. When viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the People, a rational trier of fact could properly infer from these facts that the defendants knowingly cut timber without the permission of the timber grower. As that is the standard of review, I believe that the convictions should be affirmed. Like the majority, I am troubled by the trial court’s statements after the verdict was rendered. The majority seems to hold that the trial court’s statement that the defendants should have known the survey stakes were present is inconsistent with a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, the People failed to prove the defendants guilty by the appropriate standard. I would not agree. In order to reverse a conviction based upon statements made by a judge after the verdict has been rendered, the statements and actions of the judge must establish a legal uncertainty as to whether the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Olson, 3 Ill. App. 3d 240, 244 (1971). In Olson, the trial court, having found the defendant guilty following a bench trial, stated on three separate occasions at the sentencing hearing that "he did not know whether defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.” 3 Ill. App. 3d at 244. In reversing the conviction, the appellate court noted that the contra-dieted testimony of the victim, the defendant’s plausible alibi witnesses, "along with the statements and actions of the trial judge,” led to the conclusion that "the proof of guilt was so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of guilt.” 3 Ill. App. 3d at 245. In the matter sub judice, the trial court used the term "should have known” when it discussed whether the defendants had knowledge of one specific fact, i.e., whether they actually saw the survey stakes. I do not believe that this statement expresses sufficient doubt as to the element of knowledge necessary to reverse a conviction. See also People v. Denton, 256 Ill. App. 3d 403, 409-10 (1993) (appellate court found the trier of fact had reasonable doubt about an element of the offense and reversed the conviction where the trial court stated that it had doubts as to whether the defendant had the intent to kill or do great bodily harm, yet convicted the defendant of intentional murder). I believe that in this matter the trial court was merely careless in the use of legal terminology, and I do not believe that the careless turn of a phrase is sufficient to overcome a proper review of the evidence under the Collins standard. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s finding of guilt.