Court Opinion

ID: 9726421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:48:20.773777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.947710
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: The appropriate standard of review for the division of marital property under section 503(c) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 503(c)) according to Justice Mills’ majority opinion is: “Whether — after considering the factors enumerated in section 503(c) — the trial court abused its discretion.” Justice Trapp, in his special concurrence, states that he does not concur with Justice Mills on the abuse of discretion standard if it means that there is no review of the trial court’s action as long as “reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court.” Rather, Justice Trapp suggests, “That ‘abuse of discretion’ as a standard of review is better defined as either a departure or deviation from the rationale of the case law and statutes which amounts to error at law, or is clearly against the evidence in the case.” In In re Marriage of Glidden (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 376, 379, 389 N.E.2d 657, 659, the court affirmed the trial court’s division of marital property. It stated: “[T]he trial court’s order incorporated the scheme of distribution contemplated by section 503(c) in its division of the marital property and that no abuse of discretion occurred here.” (71 Ill. App. 3d 376, 379, 389 N.E.2d 657, 659.) In In re Marriage of Stallings (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 96, 393 N.E.2d 1065, the trial court awarded all marital property to the wife. The court affirmed the lower court’s disposition of property because it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence nor contrary to section 503(c) of the Act. This court, in Ayers v. Ayers (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 936, 940, 378 N.E.2d 792, 794, affirmed the trial court’s disposition of property because it was “justified by the evidence presented.” Recently, in In re Marriage of Lee (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 1123, 398 N.E.2d 126, the court held that the trial court’s disposition of property was not an abuse of discretion and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Inter alia, the Lee court said this about determining whether a trial court abuses its discretion: “It would seem that if reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.” 78 Ill. App. 3d 1123, 1127, 398 N.E.2d 126, 129. As pointed out by Justice Mills, there does seem to be confusion as to what standard should be applied when reviewing a trial court’s award of property. But I think the majority opinion has only added to the confusion. Justice Mills cites 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation §933 (1966) for the proposition that “the overwhelming majority of appellate courts in this country apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the adjustment of property rights in divorce cases.” While this is a correct statement, it is not too revealing and perhaps misleading. As this American Jurisprudence section and its footnotes point out, not only is there a wide variation between the States’ different statutes, but there is also a wide variation in the way the different States define their “abuse of discretion” standards. This truism is underscored by the difference of opinion in Justice Trapp’s special concurrence as to what constitutes an abuse of discretion. In other words, to imply that the different States review the disposition of property the same way simply because their standards of review can be lumped under the appellation of “abuse of discretion” is tantamount to saying that the laws governing divorce in the various States of the Union are the same simply because all the States have divorce laws. Ostensibly, Justice Mills does not choose to define the abuse of discretion standard he would use to review the lower court’s disposition of property under marital dissolution. It has been said that a subject that cannot be defined cannot be intelligently discussed, nor the principles governing it assigned to their proper places. (Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts (unpublished Nat’l College of State Trial Judges 1969).) Such an empty standard does not even attempt to give any guidance to the trial courts which must divide the parties’ property upon dissolution. Consequently, the fruition of case law precedent, by which the administration of justice is greatly served, has little hope under this undefined standard of review. Irrespective of the standard of review employed, the trial court must divide the parties’ marital property according to the dictates of section 503(c) of the Act, which, in pertinent part, reads: “It also shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors, including: (1) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit; (2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse having custody of the children; (5) any obligations and rights arising from a prior marriage of either party; (6) any antenuptial agreement of the parties; (7) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; (8) the custodial provisions for any children; (9) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; and (10) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital assets and income.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 503(c). The new Act has abolished any use of a jury. Thus, the trial court must make factual determinations as well as rulings of law when it divides marital property. As one can see by looking at the dictates of section 503(c) of the Act, the division of marital property results from a decisional process where the trial court makes factual findings pursuant to the 10 factors it must consider. After considering these facts, the trial court must divide the property in “just proportions” without regard to marital misconduct. A trial court’s finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although the above sentence is not meant to be a revelation, it does point out that one possible standard of review of the trial court’s disposition of marital property will be a manifest weight standard. If the trial court record indicates that the trial court’s disposition of marital property was based upon factual determinations that are clearly against the evidence presented, then the disposition should not stand under a manifest weight standard of review. In a similar vein, it is a well-accepted principle that an appellate court has an unfettered review over pure questions of law. Thus, no matter what other standards of review are employed, when reviewing the disposition of marital property, the appellate courts may always review any factual findings upon which the ultimate decision rests under a manifest weight standard, and it may review, without any restraint, any pure questions of law. To the extent Justice Trapp, in his special concurrence, is delineating the above analysis, I agree. However, assuming that the trial court’s findings of fact are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it has applied them to the correct legal standards, the trial court has “discretion” to divide marital property under section 503(c) of the Act. But, the majority opinion’s mere incantation that the trial court’s division of property will not be upset unless it “abused” its discretion is of little help in this area of the law. Nor is Marshall Auerbach’s suggestion that section 503(c) of the Act allows the trial court to exercise “an enlightened discretion” of any help. Auerbach, An Introduction to the New Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 66 Ill. B.J. 132, 137 (1977). To say a trial court abused its discretion without any elucidation is nothing more than saying it made an erroneous decision, or a judgment rendered in violation of the law. Or, when the reviewing court decides that the trial court has not abused its discretion, the meaning is that the ruling complained of was not erroneous and it will accordingly be sustained and cloaked under the term “judicial discretion.” Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts §11, at 307 (unpublished Natl College of State Trial Judges 1969). “Judicial discretion” is an unfortunate appellation for a legal concept that means little more than that the trial court’s actions are not clearly proscribed by the law in the sense that the trial court can make alternative decisions without offending the law. Although the term “judicial discretion” is entrenched in legal jargon, it always should be remembered that any discretion a judge may exercise properly must be legal. Indeed, judicial power, as distinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. (Discretio est discerne per legem quid sit justum.) Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts §10, at 306 (unpublished Nat’l College of State Trial Judges 1969). Of course, a broadly defined abuse of discretion standard (e.g., no abuse as long as reasonable men could differ) has its place in American jurisprudence. It is particularly well suited to reviewing decisions in areas of trial and administrative procedure. These are areas where the appellate courts have no particular expertise and judicial economy favors little interference. Also, rarely will a trial court’s ruling in these areas affect the individual’s right to justice concerning the underlying cause, which is largely why an abuse of discretion standard is usually associated with questions of procedural — not substantive — law. However, in Hubbard v. Hubbard (1904), 77 Vt. 73, 78, 58 A. 969, 970, the court stated: “Instances are not wanting, however, in the field of substantive law. Whether specific performance shall be decreed is said to be a matter of discretion, but the rules governing the exercise of the discretion have become so well fixed and understood that the conditions determining the right to a decree are almost capable of being stated in the form of a rule. [Citations.] We are not aware of any instance where the law has attempted to subject the right of a person to retain his estate to the decision of a magistrate unguided and unregulated save by his own sense of fairness and justice. The grant of discretionary power in the legal sense apparently implies the existence of certain well understood principles within which it should be exercised.” As the above quote points out, when the trial court has discretion in matters of substantive law, its “discretion” is bounded by “well-understood principles within which it should be exercised.” Another overlapping area where a broadly defined abuse of discretion standard is appropriate is where there is no special governing statute or rule. The very word “discretion” implies the absence of restraint, which is exactly what the trial courts do not have a great deal of when they are dividing marital property pursuant to section 503(c) of the Act. This is not an area of wide discretion and obviously it is not a question of procedural law. Section 503(c) places explicit restraints upon the trial court’s authority. The Illinois Supreme Court, discussing section 503 of the Act in Kujawinski v: Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, 576, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1388, stated: “The primary legislative objective is to create a system of property division upon dissolution of marriage that is more equitable than that which previously existed in this State. It is evident that the legislature recognized glaring inequities in the earlier law and favored change. For instance, by giving both spouses an interest in ‘marital property’ upon dissolution of marriage, the legislature sought to award economic credit in the distribution of property for indirect or domestic contributions to the accumulation of property and sought to replace the concept of post-marital support through alimony with one of post-marital stability through a just distribution of marital property and assets.” I conclude that an abuse of discretion standard of review which is undefined or which will not disturb the trial court’s division of marital property as long as reasonable men could disagree as to the propriety of the action is not the appropriate standard of review in light of the purpose and objectives behind the Act. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, pars. 102, 503; Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 576, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1388.) When it comes to the division of property, a court’s power needs to be bounded by more than “arbitrary” and “capricious” conduct standards. To only bind the trial court’s discretion by an undefined, or a broadly defined abuse of discretion standard is not an appropriate protection for the division of what could be the product of years of hard work. Kenneth Culp Davis, in his book on discretion, stated: “Discretionary power can be either too broad or too narrow. When it is too broad, justice may suffer from arbitrariness or inequality.” “In today’s American legal system, the special need is to eliminate unnecessary discretionary power, and to discover more successful ways to confine, to structure, and to check necessary discretionary power.” Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969). Looking to section 503(c) we note that marital property must be divided in “just proportions” without regard to marital misconduct. We also note that this decision must be arrived at after consideration of all relevant factors, 10 of them proscribed by law. Marital property is all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except for the few limited exceptions listed in section 503(a) of the Act. In the words of the Illinois S.upreme Court, the legislature, by giving both spouses an interest in marital property upon dissolution of marriage, sought “to award economic credit in the distribution of property for indirect or domestic contributions to the accumulation of property and sought to replace the concept of post-marital support through alimony with one of post-marital stability through a just distribution of marital property and assets.” Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 576, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1388. The starting point for any “just” division of property acquired during marriage should be an equal split. This equal starting point is needed in order to ensure that the purpose of the Act, specifically section 503(c), is carried out. Of course, after considering the 10 enumerated factors, the trial court upon the basis of compelling evidence may decide to redistribute the property in some other ratio in order to achieve a just result. The only source of the trial court’s power for dividing the parties’ marital property is section 503(c) of the Act. We have no inherent power to deal with other people’s property. Therefore, for purposes of review, I would find that the trial court was in error if it did not properly comply with the statutory standards of section 503(c). It must divide the marital property in just proportions without regard to marital misconduct after considering all relevant factors, including the 10 factors enumerated in section 503(c). Of course, the trial court must articulate its legal reasoning behind its division of property in order for us to review its decision in light of the mandates of section 503(c) of the Act. As indicated, the starting point for a “just” division of property acquired during marriage should be an equal split. Because the evidence received by the trial court does not justify a deviation from an equal division of marital property, I would reverse and remand the trial court’s division of marital property.