Court Opinion

ID: 9863218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:12:53.638462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:47:55.755412
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
My dissent on the merits is for the reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Conaway v. State, 738 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), further noting that in purporting to present what the plurality in that cause determined to be a working definition of “actual delivery,” the majority here omits the most significant qualifying determinant, to wit: “completely,” as in “completely transferring,” Conaway, at 695, and that in Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, at 220, the Court was quoting a dictionary definition of “delivery ” to determine sufficiency of notice in an allegation of “constructive transfer.”
I also dissent to note 1 for its retrogressive treatment of the standard of review pronounced in Jackson v. Virginia; see my concurring opinion in Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, at 870-872 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). Furthermore, the Supreme Court spoke of “mere modicum” only to demonstrate that the Thompson v. Louisville doctrine “simply fails to supply a workable or even a predictable standard for determining whether the due process standard of Winship has been honored.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S.Ct., at 2790. That is not to say that “more than a mere modicum” of evidence will suffice. Indeed, to show its criterion was not novel, in note 12 the Supreme Court referred to inter alia Glosser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) (verdict must be sustained where “substantial evidence” supports it).