Court Opinion

ID: 9897349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:29.086539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:00.579907
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Jul 06 2023, 8:37 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nicholas G. Brunette                                         David W. Stone IV
Katherine M. Haire                                           Stone Law Office & Legal Research
REMINGER CO., L.P.A.                                         Anderson, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana                                        Bradford J. Smith
                                                             Ken Nunn Law Office
                                                             Bloomington, Indiana

                                              IN THE
      COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Red Lobster Restaurants LLC,                                 July 6, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                         Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                             22A-CT-2221
and                                                          Appeal from the Marion County
                                                             Superior Court
Progressive Flooring Services, Inc.,
and Dwayne Featheroff,                                       The Honorable Timothy Oakes,
                                                             Judge
Defendants,                                                  Trial Court Cause No.
                                                             49D02-2008-CT-029481
        v.

Abigail Fricke,
Appellee-Plaintiff

                                  Opinion by Judge May
                             Judges Mathias and Tavitas concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023                               Page 1 of 19
[1]   Red Lobster Restaurants LLC (“Red Lobster”) appeals the denial of its motion

      for summary judgment in a personal injury action filed against it by Abigail

      Fricke. 1 Red Lobster raises two issues, which we revise, restate, and reorder as:

                 (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Red

                 Lobster’s motion to strike Fricke’s affidavit opposing the motion for

                 summary judgment; and

                 (2) Whether the trial court erred when it denied Red Lobster’s motion for

                 summary judgment because:

                          (2.1) Fricke was judicially estopped from pursuing her claim

                          against Red Lobster because she belatedly disclosed her claim to

                          the Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee; or

                          (2.2) Fricke lacked standing to bring a claim against Red Lobster.

      We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History                                     2

      1
          Progressive Flooring Services, Inc., and Dwayne Featheroff are not parties to this appeal.
      2
        We heard oral argument in this case on May 19, 2023, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. The event was hosted by
      the Indiana State Bar Association’s Leadership Development Academy (“ISBA LDA”) in the Allen County
      Courthouse. We are grateful to the ISBA LDA event organizers and the Allen County Courthouse
      Administrator for their hospitality in hosting the event. We also thank counsel for their presentations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023                                 Page 2 of 19
[2]   On May 17, 2017, Fricke filed a Chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy in the

      United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The

      petition required Fricke to disclose whether she had any claims against third

      parties, including claims arising from accidents, employment disputes,

      insurance claims, or rights to sue, and Fricke indicated that she did not have

      any such claims. At the time Fricke filed for bankruptcy, she also executed a

      document entitled: “Rights and Responsibilities of Chapter 13 Debtors and

      their Attorneys.” (App. Vol. II at 114) (emphasis removed). It explained the

      various responsibilities of the debtor after the bankruptcy case is filed, including

      agreeing to “[c]ontact the attorney promptly if the debtor acquires any property

      after the petition is filed. Such property might include, but is not limited to,

      personal injury proceeds, inheritances, lottery winnings, etc.” (Id. at 115.)

[3]   On September 8, 2017, the bankruptcy court entered an order confirming

      Fricke’s payment plan. 3 The plan required Fricke to pay $1,350.00 a month to

      the bankruptcy trustee for a period of sixty months. The payment plan also

      3
       A Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan is sometimes called a “wage earner plan” and requires the debtor to make
      payments over a period of several years before the debtor’s debts are discharged:

              A Chapter 13 bankruptcy can be filed by an individual who has unsecured debts of less
              than $100,000 and secured debts of less than $350,000. A Chapter 13 Plan is an
              individual reorganization plan, and proposes a plan for modification of debt and/or
              repayment of debts over a three- or five-year plan. Debts not paid in full under the plan
              are discharged. A Chapter 13 Plan can be withdrawn at any time, which is not true of a
              Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

      Deborah Benoit, Enforceability of Dissolution of Marriage Decrees in Bankruptcy, 48 J. Mo. B. 499, 503
      (1992).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023                                    Page 3 of 19
      provided that “[i]f additional property comes into the estate pursuant to 11

      U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) or if the Trustee discovers undisclosed property of the

      estate, then the Trustee may obtain such property or its proceeds to increase the

      total amount to be paid under the plan.” (Id. at 132.)

[4]   On December 31, 2019, Fricke went to a Red Lobster restaurant in Indianapolis

      and tripped on an unmarked, elevated portion of the floor in the restaurant’s

      lobby. On August 26, 2020, she sued the restaurant alleging Red Lobster

      negligently failed to maintain its premises in a safe condition. 4 During

      discovery, Fricke responded to interrogatories, including:

               2. State whether you have ever been a party, plaintiff or
               defendant, in any lawsuit, whether civil or criminal, or a
               bankruptcy and identify the matter by Court, case number and
               caption. If a criminal case involved conviction for a felony or a
               misdemeanor involving dishonesty or false statements, also
               identify the date of conviction, court, case caption and sentence.

               ANSWER: No, I have not.

      (Id. at 156.)

      4
        Fricke also alleged Dwayne Featheroff and Progressive Flooring Services, Inc., negligently installed the
      floor in the restaurant. Progressive and Featheroff joined in Red Lobster’s motion for summary judgment
      before the trial court but, as noted earlier, are not parties to this appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023                                 Page 4 of 19
[5]   On May 29, 2021, Red Lobster filed a motion for summary judgment. Red

      Lobster asserted: 5

               As a matter of law, Defendant Red Lobster Restaurants LLC is
               not liable for the injuries claimed by Plaintiff Abigail Fricke
               because it is undisputed that Plaintiff has a bankruptcy action
               pending before the United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern
               District of Indiana, and she failed to properly disclose this
               lawsuit therein. As a result, Plaintiff Abigail Fricke is judicially
               estopped and lacks standing to pursue the instant action, and
               summary judgment must be granted.

      (Id. at 42) (emphasis in original).

[6]   On June 11, 2021, Fricke filed an amended schedule of assets in the bankruptcy

      court, and in that schedule, she listed her personal injury action against Red

      Lobster as an asset. Fricke also filed a notice of retention and compensation

      terms in her bankruptcy proceeding. The notice disclosed that Fricke retained

      the Ken Nunn Law Office to pursue her personal injury claim against Red

      Lobster and the terms of her compensation agreement with the law firm. The

      notice also explained:

               4. The Chapter 13 Trustee has been advised of the terms of
               compensation and consents to those terms. The [Ken Nunn Law
               Office] has been advised of the Debtors’ [sic] pending bankruptcy
               case, the obligation to provide information Regarding the Claim

      5
       Red Lobster’s motion for summary judgment also asserted it was entitled to summary judgment on the
      basis that it did not have notice of an unreasonable risk of harm from the elevated floor. However, the trial
      court bifurcated the issues on summary judgment, and Red Lobster appeals from the trial court’s order
      denying its motion for summary judgment on only the issues of standing and judicial estoppel.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023                                   Page 5 of 19
               to the Trustee upon request, and the requirement to hold any
               funds received as a result of the settlement or resolution of the
               Claim until obtaining instructions from the Trustee or the Court.

               5. The Debtor, Abigail Carol Fricke, shall remain in possession
               and control of the Claim and have the authority to settle. The
               Chapter 13 Trustee shall not be named or substituted as a party
               of interest, nor shall the Trustee be required to execute a release
               as part of any settlement of the Claim. The Debtor shall not
               dispose of any funds received [as] a result of settlement or
               distribution before obtaining consent of the Trustee.

               6. If the bankruptcy case is still pending under Chapter 13 at the
               time the Claim is resolved either by settlement or court action,
               the Debtor shall advice [sic] the Chapter 13 Trustee of the
               resolution, including the compensation to be received by the
               [Ken Nunn Law Office].

      (App. Vol. III at 89-90.)

[7]   On July 15, 2021, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to dismiss Fricke’s

      bankruptcy case because Fricke was delinquent in her payments to the trustee. 6

      Fricke initially filed an objection to the trustee’s motion to dismiss in which she

      stated that she desired to come to an agreement with the trustee to resolve the

      6
        The record before us does not include a copy of the motion to dismiss filed by the bankruptcy trustee.
      However, in its designation of evidence, Red Lobster asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the
      records in Fricke’s bankruptcy proceeding, In re: Abigail Carol Fricke, Case No. 17-03681-JMC-13 (S.D. Ind.),
      and those records are accessible via the federal court’s case management system PACER. See Ind. Rule of
      Evid. 201(a)(1)(B) (The court may judicially notice a fact that “can be accurately and readily determined
      from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”) & 201(a)(2)(C) (records of a court of this
      state).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023                                 Page 6 of 19
      motion to dismiss, but Fricke later withdrew her objection. On September 22,

      2021, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion to dismiss.

[8]   On November 4, 2021, Fricke filed her response in opposition to Red Lobster’s

      motion for summary judgment. Fricke noted that “judicial estoppel is an

      equitable doctrine and requires that the Court consider the equities involved.”

      (Id. at 17.) She explained she “mistakenly, without any intent to mislead, did

      not realize that she had to list her personal injury lawsuit as an asset in a

      bankruptcy that she had filed two and a half years earlier.” (Id. at 17-18.)

      Fricke also asserted that Red Lobster’s argument that she lacked standing to

      bring her personal injury claim was moot because her bankruptcy counsel gave

      notice to the bankruptcy court regarding the claim. In her designation of

      evidence supporting her summary judgment response, Fricke included an

      affidavit in which she averred:

              5. At the time of the incident of December 31, 2019 and the
              filing of my lawsuit on August 24, 2020, I did not know that the
              personal injury lawsuit was considered an asset. I did not know
              that I needed to notify my bankruptcy attorney about it or that I
              needed to list it as an asset in the bankruptcy.

              6. I was not trying to mislead anybody. Because I had filed for
              bankruptcy two and a half years earlier, it did not cross my mind
              that I needed to let my bankruptcy attorney know that I was
              involved in an incident on December 31, 2019 or that I was
              pursuing a lawsuit.

              7. When I was answering interrogatory questions with the
              assistance of the Ken Nunn Law Office, I did not realize that the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023            Page 7 of 19
              bankruptcy was considered a lawsuit, because I was not suing
              anyone or being sued by anyone. I overlooked the word
              “bankruptcy” and thought I was answering correctly because I
              was not a plaintiff or a defendant in the bankruptcy. I did not
              mean to mislead anybody by failing to disclose my bankruptcy in
              my interrogatory responses. It was a mistake.

      (Id. at 92-93.) On November 13, 2021, Red Lobster filed a motion to strike

      Fricke’s affidavit from the designation of evidence. Red Lobster argued the

      affidavit should be stricken because it was self-contradictory and contradicted

      Fricke’s prior sworn interrogatory answers. Fricke responded that the affidavit

      provided the court with information regarding her “state of mind and intent,

      which is directly relevant to deciding whether to dismiss her personal injury

      lawsuit based on the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel.” (Id. at 118.)

[9]   The trial court held a hearing on Red Lobster’s motion for summary judgment

      on December 20, 2021. On January 4, 2022, the trial court summarily denied

      both Red Lobster’s motion to strike and its motion for summary judgment. The

      trial court certified the orders denying Red Lobster’s motion to strike and

      motion for summary judgment for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted

      jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal on October 14, 2022. On February 2,

      2023, the trial court entered an order staying proceedings in the trial court

      pending the outcome of this interlocutory appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023          Page 8 of 19
       Discussion and Decision
       1. Motion to Strike
[10]   We first address Red Lobster’s contention that the trial court erred in denying

       its motion to strike Fricke’s affidavit. “The trial court has broad discretion in

       ruling on motions to strike in the summary judgment context. Its decision will

       not be reversed unless prejudicial error is clearly demonstrated.” Hamilton v.

       Hamilton, 132 N.E.3d 428, 431-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[11]   “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court will consider only

       properly designated evidence which would be admissible at trial.” Seth v.

       Midland Funding, LLC, 997 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Trial Rule

       56(E) requires affidavits designated either in support of or in opposition to a

       motion for summary judgment be made on personal knowledge, set forth facts

       as would be admissible in evidence, and affirmatively show that the affiant is

       competent to testify to the matters therein. These requirements “are mandatory

       and a court considering a summary judgment motion should disregard

       inadmissible information contained in supporting or opposing affidavits. The

       party offering the affidavit into evidence bears the burden of establishing its

       admissibility.” D.H. by A.M.J. v. Whipple, 103 N.E.3d 1119, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2018), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

[12]   In Gaboury v. Ireland Rd. Grace Brethren, Inc., our Indiana Supreme Court

       explained “contradictory testimony contained in an affidavit of the nonmovant

       may not be used by him to defeat a summary judgment motion where the only

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023          Page 9 of 19
       issue of fact raised by the affidavit is the credibility of the affiant.” 446 N.E.2d

       1310, 1314 (Ind. 1983) (quoting Wachovia Mortg. Co. v. Autry-Barker-Spurrier Real

       Est., Inc., 249 S.E.2d 727, 732 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978), reh’g denied. Likewise, in

       Chance v. State Auto Ins. Co., we stated: “A party cannot create an issue of

       material fact for summary judgment purposes by contradicting a prior sworn

       statement.” 684 N.E.2d 569, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), reh’g denied, trans.

       denied. Thus, Red Lobster contends the trial court erred in denying its motion

       to strike Fricke’s affidavit because the affidavit “contradicted Fricke’s prior

       sworn interrogatory response and was inherently irreconcilable with itself.”

       (Appellant’s Br. at 27.) The restaurant asserts Fricke’s statement that she “did

       not realize that the bankruptcy was considered a lawsuit” and her statement

       that she “‘overlooked the word ‘bankruptcy’’” in answering the interrogatory

       “are in direct conflict with each other.” (Id. at 29-30) (quoting App. Vol. III at

       92-93). Red Lobster argues: “Fricke could not have simultaneously overlooked

       the word ‘bankruptcy’ yet also been able to contemplate that her bankruptcy

       was not subject to disclosure regardless simply because she believed that she

       ‘was not suing anyone or being sued by anyone.’” (Id. at 30.)

[13]   However, Red Lobster’s argument misses the boat. Fricke is not using her

       affidavit to contradict her prior sworn testimony. She is using the affidavit to

       explain her own mindset and intentions. While Fricke’s averments are self-

       serving, a party may use “a perfunctory and self-serving” affidavit to

       demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact requiring resolution at trial.

       Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014). Fricke has consistently

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023           Page 10 of 19
       asserted that her failure to notify the bankruptcy court earlier about her personal

       injury suit was nothing more than a good faith mistake. Both of Fricke’s

       explanations for incorrectly answering the interrogatory—that she overlooked

       the word bankruptcy and that she did not think of her bankruptcy as a lawsuit

       because she was not suing anyone or being sued by anyone—explain why she

       believed she did not need to disclose the bankruptcy. They convey that Fricke

       was acting in good faith rather than trying to hide her bankruptcy. Therefore,

       we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Red Lobster’s

       motion to strike. Cf. Bunger v. Brooks, 12 N.E.3d 275, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)

       (holding trial court abused its discretion in striking doctor’s affidavit because the

       affidavit did not contradict the doctor’s deposition testimony).

       2. Motion for Summary Judgment
[14]   Our standard of review following a trial court’s order on summary judgment is

       well-settled:

               When we review a grant or denial of a motion for summary
               judgment, our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial
               court. Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012). The
               moving party must show there are no genuine issues of material
               fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the
               moving party carries its burden, then the nonmoving party must
               present evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of
               material fact. Id. In deciding whether summary judgment is
               proper, we consider only the evidence the parties specifically
               designated to the trial court. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C), (H). We
               construe all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party
               and resolve all doubts regarding the existence of a material issue
               against the moving party. Reed, 980 N.E.2d at 285.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023          Page 11 of 19
       Asklar v. Gilb, 9 N.E.3d 165, 167 (Ind. 2014). “We ‘consciously err[ ] on the

       side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk

       short-circuiting meritorious claims.’” Brown by Brown v. Southside Animal Shelter,

       Inc., 158 N.E.3d 401, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at

       1004), aff’d on reh’g, 162 N.E.3d 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

       2.1 Judicial Estoppel

[15]   Red Lobster first argues it is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the

       doctrine of judicial estoppel. “Judicial estoppel is a judicially created doctrine

       that seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position inconsistent with one

       asserted in the same or a previous proceeding.” Robson v. Texas E. Corp., 833

       N.E.2d 461, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. It “is not intended to

       eliminate all inconsistencies; rather, it is designed to prevent litigants from

       playing ‘fast and loose’ with the courts.” Id. “The basic principle of judicial

       estoppel is that, absent a good explanation, a party should not be permitted to

       gain an advantage by litigating on one theory and then pursue an incompatible

       theory in subsequent litigation.” Id. “Judicial estoppel only applies to

       intentional misrepresentation, so the dispositive issue supporting the application

       of judicial estoppel is the bad-faith intent of the litigant subject to estoppel.” Id.

[16]   We apply a burden shifting test to determine whether judicial estoppel should

       bar a cause of action that was not scheduled as an asset in a bankruptcy

       proceeding. Morgan Cnty. Hosp. v. Upham, 884 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2008), trans. denied. “An inference of bad faith arises when the party asserting

       judicial estoppel demonstrates that a debtor-plaintiff had knowledge of an
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023            Page 12 of 19
       unscheduled claim and motive for concealment in the face of a duty to

       disclose.” Id. If the party asserting judicial estoppel presents sufficient evidence

       to create an inference of bad faith, the debtor-plaintiff then has the burden of

       presenting evidence that the nondisclosure was made in good faith. Id. “While

       knowledge and motive are important in establishing judicial estoppel, the

       inquiry does not end there if the debtor-plaintiff comes forward with evidence

       indicating that the non-disclosure was made in good faith.” Id. The “ultimate

       purpose” of the burden shifting test “is to determine the actual presence of bad

       faith.” Id.

[17]   When assessing whether to apply judicial estoppel, “we must give due

       consideration to all of the circumstances of a particular case.” Id. It “is not

       meant to be a technical defense for litigants seeking to derail potentially

       meritorious claims.” Id. In Spaine v. Cmty. Contacts, Inc., the Seventh Circuit

       explained that “[c]ourts do not apply judicial estoppel for the benefit of the

       defendant but try to protect courts and creditors from deception and

       manipulation. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to induce

       debtors to be truthful in their bankruptcy filings.” 756 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir.

       2014) (holding factual issue regarding whether Chapter 7 debtor intended to

       conceal employment discrimination claim precluded summary judgment)

       (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

[18]   Red Lobster argues Fricke had a duty to disclose her personal injury claim in

       the bankruptcy proceeding. See, e.g., Cowling v. Rolls Royce Corp., No. 1:11-cv-

       01719, 2012 WL 4762143 at *2-4 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2012) (determining debtor-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023         Page 13 of 19
       plaintiff had a duty to disclose in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding an

       employment discrimination claim that the debtor-plaintiff acquired while his

       Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding was pending); Rainey v. United Parcel Serv.,

       Inc., 466 Fed. Appx. 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Debtors have a continuing duty

       to schedule newly acquired assets while the bankruptcy case is open.”). Yet,

       Red Lobster contends, despite this duty, Fricke did not disclose her personal

       injury claim to the bankruptcy trustee until after Red Lobster filed its motion for

       summary judgment. Fricke disputes whether she had a legal duty to amend her

       schedule of assets in the bankruptcy court to include her tort claim, but she

       disclosed the claim nonetheless.

[19]   In Upham, Upham sued Morgan County Hospital and several of its doctors

       alleging medical malpractice in the death of her husband. 884 N.E.2d at 277.

       Upham did not list the claim as an asset when she filed for bankruptcy, and she

       only amended her schedule of assets when her bankruptcy came to light in the

       medical malpractice action. Id. at 278. Thereafter, the bankruptcy court issued

       an order that any sums obtained by Upham as a result of the medical

       malpractice action were to be reported to the court and the trustee and

       distributed to her creditors. Id. The hospital moved for summary judgment on

       the basis that Upham’s claim was barred by judicial estoppel. Id. In response to

       the hospital’s motion for summary judgment, Upham submitted an affidavit in

       which she attested that she did not intend to mislead the bankruptcy court, and

       she did not realize the medical malpractice claim was an asset. Id. at 278-79.

       The trial court denied the hospital’s motion. Id. at 279.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023          Page 14 of 19
[20]   We affirmed the trial court’s denial of the hospital’s summary judgment motion

       because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Upham’s

       failure to disclose the medical malpractice action was a good-faith mistake. Id.

       at 283. We then went on to explain that judicial estoppel is an equitable

       doctrine, and “[b]efore applying judicial estoppel, a court should consider all of

       the equities, which would include the interests of the plaintiff/debtor’s

       creditors.” Id. We observed that “[a]pplication of judicial estoppel in this case

       could potentially have negative consequences for Upham’s creditors by denying

       them an opportunity to recoup their losses should Upham prevail in this

       action.” Id. We also noted the hospital failed to explain how Upham’s belated

       disclosure in the bankruptcy action prejudiced the hospital. Id. Therefore, we

       concluded that “we perceive no practical or equitable reason for awarding

       summary judgment to the Appellant’s [sic] based on the fortuitous (thus would

       it be, from the Appellants’ perspective, if we reversed on this basis) existence of

       Upham’s bankruptcy action.” Id.

[21]   Like in Upham, Fricke averred that she did not intend to conceal her personal

       injury suit from the bankruptcy court. Consequently, a factual dispute exists

       regarding whether Fricke intentionally concealed the personal injury suit from

       the bankruptcy court. Moreover, the bankruptcy trustee moved to dismiss

       Fricke’s bankruptcy petition after Fricke disclosed the personal injury suit to the

       trustee, and we fail to see how any of Fricke’s creditors were harmed by her

       failure to disclose the suit earlier. Thus, as in Upham, we affirm the trial court’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023          Page 15 of 19
       denial of Red Lobster’s motion for summary judgment based on judicial

       estoppel. 7

       2.2 Standing

[22]   Red Lobster also argues it is entitled to summary judgment because Fricke did

       not have standing to initiate suit. “Standing refers to whether a party has an

       actual demonstrable injury for purposes of a lawsuit. The primary purpose of

       standing is to [ensure] that the party before the court has a substantive right to

       enforce the claim being made.” In re G.R., 863 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2007) (internal citation omitted).

       7
         During oral argument, Red Lobster also analogized the instant case to Williams v. Hainje, 375 Fed. Appx.
       625 (7th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied. In Williams, a police dog bit Anthony Williams, and Williams
       initiated a civil rights suit against the police officer who released the dog. Id. at 626. While the civil rights
       suit was pending, Williams filed a petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Id. Williams did not disclose his civil
       rights claim when he filed his bankruptcy petition, but he nonetheless sought relief in the bankruptcy court
       from the medical debts he incurred after the police dog bit him. Id. The police officer in the civil rights
       action moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and the trial court granted
       the police officer’s motion. Id. at 627. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 628. Even though the
       bankruptcy court dismissed Williams’s Chapter 13 petition while his appeal in the civil rights case was
       pending, the Court observed “Williams still received significant financial benefits during his short stint in
       bankruptcy.” Id. at 627. Moreover, the Court held the district court reasonably inferred Williams made a
       knowing misrepresentation when he failed to disclose his civil rights claim to the bankruptcy court. Id. at
       628.

       However, unlike Williams, Fricke’s personal injury claim arose after she filed her Chapter 13 bankruptcy
       petition, and the record does not indicate that Fricke tried to use her bankruptcy petition in one forum to
       avoid certain debts while at the same time, in a second forum, seeking recovery from an alleged tortfeasor for
       those debts. In addition, the trial court in Williams found that he intentionally concealed his civil rights claim
       when he omitted it from the schedule of assets he filed with the trial court, and the Seventh Circuit held that
       finding was not clear error. Id. Here, the trial court made no similar finding, and the parties dispute whether
       Fricke intentionally concealed her tort claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. Where, as here, genuine issues of
       material fact exist, denial of summary judgment is appropriate.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023                                    Page 16 of 19
[23]   Red Lobster asserts a lack of standing because Fricke sued in her own name

       rather than in the name of the bankruptcy estate. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy

       Procedure 6009 provides:

               With or without court approval, the trustee or debtor in
               possession may prosecute or may enter an appearance and
               defend any pending action or proceeding by or against the
               debtor, or commence and prosecute any action or proceeding in
               behalf of the estate before any tribunal.

       In Cable v. Ivy Tech State Coll., the Seventh Circuit explained that “[t]he Chapter

       13 debtor has standing to bring claims that benefit the estate.” 200 F.3d 965,

       967 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Hall v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d

       965, 967 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013). Other United States Circuit Courts of Appeals

       have likewise held Chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring suits in their own

       names on behalf of the estate. See, e.g., Dufrene v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 196 F.

       Supp. 3d 979, 982 (D. Minn. 2016) (“[A]t least six circuit courts of appeals have

       concluded that Chapter 13 debtors have standing to pursue causes of action in

       their own name on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.”).

[24]   Nevertheless, Red Lobster contends a debtor can only act on behalf of the estate

       when the debtor has disclosed the cause of action to the bankruptcy court,

       trustee, and creditors. Therefore, Red Lobster argues, Fricke was not acting on

       behalf of the estate when she brought the instant personal injury suit in her own

       name. We disagree.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023          Page 17 of 19
[25]   Fricke had standing because she sustained a direct injury. Lorenz v. Anonymous

       Physician #1, 51 N.E.3d 391, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“the bankrupt party does

       have standing to sue because he is the party who sustained a direct injury as a

       result of the conduct at issue”). We also do not accept Red Lobster’s argument

       that Fricke was not acting on behalf of the estate in pursuing her personal injury

       lawsuit. The trustee did not intervene when Fricke disclosed the nature of her

       personal injury claim and the terms of her compensation agreement with the

       law firm representing her in the personal injury action. Fricke remained “in

       possession and control of the Claim and [had] the authority to settle.” (App.

       Vol. III at 90.) Fricke was also under an obligation to advise the trustee upon

       the resolution of her claim and to not dispose of any funds without first

       obtaining the consent of the trustee. Thus, had Fricke’s bankruptcy petition not

       been dismissed, any recovery would have been available to satisfy her creditors.

       The trial court properly rejected Red Lobster’s argument that Fricke lacked

       standing. See, e.g., Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1030 (Ind. 1995)

       (holding bankrupt party had standing to sue and motion to amend complaint to

       substitute name of bankruptcy trustee as real party in interest related back to

       filing of original complaint).

       Conclusion
[26]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Red Lobster’s

       motion to strike Fricke’s affidavit. The trial court also did not err when it

       denied Red Lobster’s motion for summary judgment because Fricke had

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023         Page 18 of 19
       standing to bring suit in her own name and a genuine issue of material fact

       exists regarding whether Fricke intentionally concealed her personal injury

       lawsuit from the bankruptcy court. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.

[27]   Affirmed.

       Mathias, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2221 | July 6, 2023      Page 19 of 19