Court Opinion

ID: 9574653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:06:46.441193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:04.327103
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
Contrary to the holding of the majority, it was not the Court of Appeals which misapplied this Court’s decision in Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 468 (1) (a) (532 SE2d 377) (2000), but the majority which does so in this case. The salient issue on which Johnson was decided was not, as the majority asserts, whether the defendant had to disclose the substance of his alibi testimony prior to trial, but whether Johnson was required to give notice to the State of any alibi testimony he might give at trial on his own behalf. This Court unanimously ruled that he did not because the statute relied upon by the majority in this case was inapplicable to the alibi testimony of a defendant, overruled a prior decision by the Court of Appeals to the contrary (Todd v. State, 230 Ga. App. 849 (498 SE2d 142) (1998)), and reversed Johnson’s conviction. Today, however, the majority ignores that holding and, without overruling Johnson, declares a diametrically opposed rule.
The ruling of the majority, in addition to violating the principle of stare decisis, elevates form over function by requiring a defendant to give the State information it already has. It is evident from the statement of facts that Charbonneau told the investigating officer enough of the substance of his alibi defense to permit that officer to determine it lacked credibility.
In a case such as the present, where the only question is whether a defendant is required to give notice of an alibi defense of which the State is already aware and which it has already investigated, the *50“common sense” approach would not require the useless act of disclosure, would not limit the defendant in his own testimony from testifying he was where he told the investigator he was when the crime was convicted, and would not require the distortion of a prior decision of this Court. Because the majority opinion defies both common sense and unanimous precedent from this Court, I must dissent.
Decided October 2, 2006.
Scott L. Ballard, District Attorney, Cindy L. Spindler, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Walter M. Chapman, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein joins this dissent.