Court Opinion

ID: 9475484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:28:40.06734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:44.523817
License: Public Domain

FLAUM, Circuit Judge, concurring.
This appeal presents a difficult issue that in many ways demonstrates the extent to which “due process” has become an increasingly “legal” concept, removed from ordinary notions of “fairness.” It would doubtless surprise most lay persons (and perhaps many lawyers as well) that Arnold Kramer may be treated by the Parole Commission as if he had evaded a substantial tax liability despite the fact that no determination has ever been made by any judicial tribunal. It is clear, though, that the Commission may do so if Kramer is afforded due process of law. I am constrained in the circumstances presented here to agree that Kramer did receive sufficient process.
In Kramer v. United States, 798 F.2d 192 (7th Cir.1986), referred to by the majority as Kramer III, we directed that the estimate of Kramer’s tax liability be deleted from the presentence report, thus eliminating the presentence report as a source of the estimate which could be used by the parole commission in determining Kramer’s tax liability. The Commission was not precluded from considering that same information, however, if it were obtained from another source and if that source was reli*903able enough to comply with minimal due process requirements. In this respect the Deficiency Notice, the other source considered by the National Appeals Board, was sufficient. These notices are not simply tax bills, but are prepared under specific procedures that govern the underlying tax investigation. Moreover, these procedures afford taxpayers the opportunity to be heard. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require the Commission to adjudicate the validity of the Notice in order to rely on it.
I am concerned, however, with the majority’s discussion of the Parole Commission’s reliance on the Deficiency Notice as being conclusive. The majority’s conclusion may be construed as an inappropriate invitation to the Commission to ignore both the Tax Court’s possible review of the Notice and the Federal Courts’ power to protect the due process rights of potential parolees. The Commission may choose to rely on other agencies’ actions in exercising its authority to make decisions affecting parole; but the Commission must do so in a way that affords the parolee due process of law. If the Tax Court rules in Kramer’s favor, it will eliminate, as we did in Kramer III, a source of the critical information relied on by the Commission. The Commission would have to consider that event, for to ignore it would be to render the process available to Kramer (i.e. the Deficiency Notice and attendant Tax Court review) ineffective, and therefore less than what is due.