Court Opinion

ID: 9708975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:36:53.228734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:45.036419
License: Public Domain

Quirico, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the decision of this court upholding the denial of unemployment compensation benefits to the plaintiff. The sole issue in this case is whether, during the period for which the plaintiff seeks benefits, she was “available for work and unable to obtain work” within the meaning of G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b). She was in all other respects eligible for benefits.
The question whether the plaintiff was “available for work” must be answered on the basis of the following subsidiary facts found and reported by the review examiner in his decision sustaining the director’s denial of the plaintiff’s claim: “The claimant and her husband have one car, which the husband uses for transportation to and from his work. The claimant depends on her sister-in-law to take her looking for work unless the employer is located closer to her home. If the claimant were hired, she would have *7to arrange for a ride with a co-worker, or be included in a car pool. The claimant states that, although she does not have transportation of her own, she is willing to accept full-time employment, either day or night, providing transportation arrangements could be made. During the period under review through the week ending July 13, 1974, the claimant, in her efforts to obtain employment, had made some telephone calls, and applied personally to two employers. Beginning with the week ending July 20,1974, the claimant increased her efforts to find work by applying in person to a number of employers in her labor market, and has continued her search for employment in the weeks that followed.”
The plaintiff does not question the review examiner’s subsidiary findings quoted above. However, she does take issue with the conclusions reached by the review examiner on the basis of those findings. His conclusions were the following: “To be eligible for benefits an individual must be capable of and available for full time employment without restrictions____Here, although the claimant did begin to make a satisfactory search for work beginning with the week ending July 20, 1974, during the entire period under review she has placed a restriction on her employability, namely, that her acceptance of any work not within walking distance of her home, depended on whether transportation arrangements could be made, and it is found, therefore, that she does not meet the eligibility requirements of ... [G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (6)].”
The review examiner’s decision was upheld by the three-man board of review, with the chairman dissenting, and by virtue of the applicable statutes the decision was “final on all questions of fact and law,” subject, however, to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, G. L. c. 23, § 9N (6), and G. L. c. 151A, §§ 40-42. The plaintiff sought judicial review in the District Court of Marlborough. The judge of that court concluded that “the decision of the Board of Review is supported by the evidence and... should be and hereby is affirmed, and the Petition is dismissed.” He then reported the case to *8this court for our determination. The case is therefore now before us on the same administrative agency record which was before the District Court judge.
One of our most recent statements on the nature and scope of judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7), of this type of administrative agency decision is to be found in Raytheon Co. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 364 Mass. 593 (1974), cited above in the court’s opinion in this case. In that opinion we said at 595: “To the extent that an agency finding is one of fact, it must stand unless ‘unsupported by substantial evidence.’ Id---- [§ 14 (7) (e) ]____On the other hand, to the extent that an agency determination involves a question of law, it is subject to de nova judicial review. Id____[§ 14 (7) (c) ].” Since the plaintiff does not contend that the agency’s subsidiary findings are “unsupported by substantial evidence,” we are not here concerned with the first part of the prescribed test.
My basic disagreement with the opinion in the present case is that the court seems to apply this same “substantial evidence” test to the administrative agency’s conclusion that on the basis of the subsidiary findings the plaintiff was not “available for work” within the language of G. L. c. 151A, § 24. The court states at 4, that “[t]he question... whether in the circumstances of this particular case the claimant, by making her acceptance of work dependent on whether transportation can be arranged, has so restricted her employability as to remove herself from the labor force and render herself not ‘available for work’ within the meaning of G. L. c. 151 A, § 24 (b) ... is primarily a question of fact that has been entrusted to the informed judgment of the board.” It is my opinion that once the administrative agency has made and reported its subsidiary findings, as it has done in this case, the determination of the legal effect of those facts “involves a question of law, [and] it is subject to de nova judicial review” in accordance with the second part of the test quoted above from the Raytheon decision. That would be in accord with our statement in Lamont v. Director of the *9Div. of Employment Security, 337 Mass. 328, 329 (1958), where, in connection with the review of a decision of the same board of review, we said: “The facts, which are not in question..., have been found by the board. Our duty is to determine what result is required on the facts found.” Applying “de nova judicial review” to the subsidiary findings of the board of review in this case, I would hold that as matter of law the plaintiff was “available for work” within the meaning of those words as used in G. L. c. 151A, 124 (6), notwithstanding the cautious qualifications which she expressed with reference to the availability of transportation as a possible factor in her ultimate decision whether to accept employment which (night become available to her. I see no difference in the position taken by the plaintiff in the present case from that of the employee in the Raytheon case cited above. In the latter case the employee left her employment because “[a] co-worker who had been providing her with passenger service to the plant had been laid off by Raytheon, and she was unable to find other means of transportation, public or private. She requested transfer to the day shift, which would have been accessible to her, but there were no openings.” 364 Mass. at 594. We held that in those circumstances the employee was not disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. The plaintiff in the present case was found to be “willing to accept full-time employment, either day or night, providing transportation arrangements could be made.” I do not believe that her reasonable concern with respect to transportation makes her position any different from that of the employee in the Raytheon case. I would reverse the decision of the District Court judge and of the board of review and hold that the plaintiff was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. I recognize that the Raytheon case reached the judiciary with a board of review decision in favor of the employee, but I do not believe that that difference precludes a holding in favor of the employee in this case.