Court Opinion

ID: 9771288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:38:34.324584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:28.091175
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which determines that it was reversible error for the trial judge to fail to instruct the jury on mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase of the trial.
My examination of the record indicates that the trial judge properly determined that Smith was not entitled to have the jury instructed on mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase because there was no evidence to support such an instruction. K.R.S. 532.025(2) provides that instructions on mitigating or aggravating circumstances must be supported by evidence. Here the trial judge correctly concluded that there was no evidence to support such an instruction.
The trial judge asked the defense counsel whether there were any objections to the instruction and he was advised that there were no objections.
This Court has previously affirmed decisions by trial judges not to instruct juries on particular mitigating circumstances. Cf. Halvorsen & Willoughby v. Commonwealth, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 921 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has held that the defendant in a death penalty ease may be required to prove the existence of mitigating circumstances to avoid the death penalty. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 at 650, 110 S.Ct. 3047 at 3055, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 at 525 (1990).
In upholding the Pennsylvania death penalty statute, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990), that the death penalty is imposed only after a determination that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, or that there are no such mitigating circumstances. This was held to be sufficient under Lockhart v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). The evidence in this case does not indicate that Smith was acting under any form of extreme emotional disturbance. Wellman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 696 (1985) provided that the evidence must establish that at the time of the homicide, there was some event, act, words or the like to arouse extreme emotional disturbance. This Court has frequently held that the event which triggers the explosion of violence on the part of the defendant must be sudden and uninterrupted. Foster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 670 (1992).
It is interesting to note that the instructions tendered to the trial judge by defense counsel omit any reference to extreme emotional disturbance.
There was no evidence of probative value presented in this case that Smith actually suffered from mental illness or retardation *541as defined in K.R.S. 504.060. The defendant’s irrational behavior at trial is not enough to support a claim of reversible error on the failure to give mitigating instructions. Mental illness or retardation does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. K.R.S. 504.020(2).
There is no evidence in this case that the defendant was intoxicated to the extent of impairing his ability to appreciate the criminal nature of his conduct or that intoxication was any factor. See Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112 at 117 (1990). There were no mitigating circumstances authorized by law which entitled the defendant to an instruction in the penalty phase in this case.
In addition, I do not believe that Smith was unduly prejudiced or misled regarding the intention of the prosecution to seek the death penalty. The proper notice had been filed and was in the record.
SPAIN, J., joins in this dissent.