Court Opinion

ID: 9847451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:00:05.941205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:13.198024
License: Public Domain

Stolz, Judge.
This is a products liability case. Mariah Verddier sued Frantz Manufacturing Co., the *322manufacturer; Neal Blun Co., its alleged agent and distributor of its products in the State of Georgia; and George Doukas, the owner of the property in whose home she was employed as a maid, and where she was injured by the use of the product on the day the alleged injury occurred. Plaintiffs injury occurred when her finger was amputated in the closing of a garage door. Certain aluminum strips in the door became a lethal instrument as she attempted to close the garage door and the folding panels of the door amputated her finger.
Based upon the pleadings, interrogatories and certain affidavits in the record, Neal Blun Co., moved for judgment on the pleadings, which was treated as a motion for summary judgment. The motion was sustained and judgment entered dismissing this defendant from the proceeding. Appeal is from that judgment. Held:
In her complaint, insofar as it relates to defendant Neal Blun Co., the plaintiff alleges that Blun "is and was at all times material to this action the agent of the above named corporate defendant [defendant Frantz Manufacturing Co.], engaged in distributing the products of the latter.” In answer to an interrogatory the plaintiff stated that Blun was sued as "the supplier of the garage door.” No acts of negligence are alleged against Blun in the complaint or are shown in any of the answers to interrogatories and affidavits in support of or opposing the motion for summary judgment. Certain negligent acts are alleged against the manufacturer (defendant Frantz Manufacturing Co.) but not against the alleged agent and distributor, Blun. It is elementary that the principal is liable for the torts of its agent committed within the scope of his authority. Code §§ 105-108, 4-311. However, it is generally recognized that an agent is not liable to third persons for the failure of the principal to discharge *323affirmative duties which the principal may owe. Kimbrough v. Boswell, 119 Ga. 201 (45 SE 977). It thus appears that there is no basis for an ex delicto action by the plaintiff against defendant Blun.
As the same applies to actions ex contractu, the plaintiffs claim against defendant Blun is controlled by Code Ann. § 109A-2 — 318 (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 156, 191) to wit: "A seller’s warranty whether expressed or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.”
The evidence, construed most favorably for the plaintiff and against the defendant as movant for summary judgment, at most shows that the garage door was manufactured by defendant Frantz Manufacturing Co., which sold the same to Neal Blun Co., which in turn sold the same to one Terry Harmon, a subcontractor on the house being constructed by one Dan McGee, which said house was subsequently purchased by defendant Doukas, the plaintiffs employer.
It is uncontroverted that the plaintiff was employed by defendant Doukas as a maid at the time she sustained the injury complained of. As such, the plaintiff simply does not fall into the category of persons benefiting from an implied warranty under Code Ann. § 109A-2 — 318, supra. Further, under this statute, a warranty does not run with the article sold except as specified therein. See Smith v. Williams, 117 Ga. 782, 784 (45 SE 394, 97 ASR 220) for the rule prior to Ga. L. 1957, p. 405 (formerly Code Ann. § 96-307) which was repealed with enactment of the UCC in 1962 (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 156, 427).
In this case there is no privity between the plaintiff and *324the defendant Neal Blun Co., as heretofore noted. No negligence is alleged against defendant Neal Blun Co. in the plaintiffs complaint or shown by any evidence.
Argued September 5, 1972
Decided February 28, 1973.
Calhoun, Sims & Donaldson, R. B. Donaldson, Jr., Alton Kitchings, for appellant.
Falligant, Doremus & Karsman, Stanley Karsman, for appellees.
Consequently, the trial court was correct in sustaining the defendant Neal Blun Co.’s motion for summary judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

Bell, C. J., Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, P. J., Deen, Quillian and Clark, JJ., concur. Pannell, J., concurs in the judgment only. Evans, J., dissents.