Court Opinion

ID: 95425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:38:13+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:41.651702
License: Public Domain

180 U.S. 402 (1901)
MITCHELL, GOVERNOR, AND BLOXHAM, COMPTROLLER, OF FLORIDA,
v.
FURMAN.
No. 23.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued October 17, 18, 1900.
Decided March 11, 1901.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.
*427 Mr. William Whitwell Dewhurst for appellants.
Mr. Francis P. Fleming for appellees. Mr. Horatio Bisbee, Mr. Francis P. Fleming, Jr., and Mr. C.D. Rinehart were on his brief.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after making the above statement of the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellees submitted motions to dismiss or affirm, the consideration of which was postponed to the hearing on the merits.
The contention is that the appeal should have been taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals and not to this court.
We do not concur in that view. The bill alleged "that this cause arises under the said treaty between the United States and Spain, which ratified and confirmed said grant to the said Joseph Fish, under whom your orators claim title. And the controversy involved in this cause necessarily involves the construction of said treaty."
By motions to dismiss and demurrers appellants set up various objections to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the disposition of which involved the construction of the treaty. These *428 being overruled, appellants by their answer admitted "that the controversy involves the construction of the treaty between Spain and the United States; . . . that perfect or complete grants were recognized by the treaty with Spain, but incomplete grants were ratified by the treaty, to the same extent they would have been valid had the territory remained under the King of Spain."
It was contended on the one hand that the title was absolutely confirmed by the treaty, and on the other that as this was not a suit brought under any of the acts of Congress in that behalf, the treaty could not be held to be self-executing.
The pleadings, the evidence, and the master's report and opinion considered, we think that rights under the treaty were so far set up and relied on as to give jurisdiction to the Circuit Court, and to justify an appeal from its decree directly to this court. The record differs from that in Muse v. Arlington Hotel Company, 168 U.S. 430, which fell short of affording adequate grounds for the maintenance of our jurisdiction.
This is a bill to remove clouds on title, and rests on complainants' alleged legal title, connected with possession.
The general rule is that complainants in such suits must be in actual possession. Frost v. Spitley, 121 U.S. 552. And such is the rule in Florida, where, however, it is enough if the land be wild and unoccupied, or if some independent head of equity jurisdiction exists. Richards v. Morris, 39 Florida, 205; Hughes v. Hannah, 39 Florida, 365, 376; Sloan v. Sloan, 25 Florida, 53.
In this case actual possession was claimed of a plantation styled the Orange Grove, of about one hundred acres, situated on what was called "Fish's" Island, which the master found was not an island in itself, but part of Anastasia Island; and constructive possession of the whole of Anastasia Island, a certain part excepted as reserved. Relief was not sought as to the Orange Grove, and some homesteads, and proof was introduced tending to show that the tracts in controversy were wild and unoccupied. It was insisted as to them that the legal title drew possession to it.
The master found as matter of mixed law and fact that the lands granted to Jesse Fish in 1795 were "an island, well known *429 and designated by name, and entirely surrounded by water," and that they were completely and sufficiently segregated from the royal domain by proceedings taken under the decree of 1795, and Fish placed thereby in possession thereof; that the grant and the segregation of the lands from the royal domain constituted "a complete and perfect title to the said land, to wit, to the whole of the island of St. Anastasia," certain lands, "marked off by the officials as reserved," excepted.
He also found that "on August 31, 1823, Sarah Fish presented her memorial to the board of commissioners appointed by Congress to investigate as to land claims in East Florida, claiming title to the Island of St. Anastasia under the grant to Jesse Fish in 1795, aggregating ten thousand acres of land; that on December 16, 1825, the board of commissioners for East Florida reported to Congress the claim of Sarah Fish, heir to Anastasia Island, for ten thousand acres, as a valid claim for confirmation, and that said claim was reported to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States for confirmation, with his report under date of February 23, 1826."
The master ruled as matter of law "that the grant of Fish, being a valid and complete title, properly segregated from the public domain prior to January 24, 1818, stood ratified and confirmed both by the King of Spain and the United States by virtue of the eighth article of the treaty of cession. That this grant, having been passed upon by the commissioners of East Florida under the acts of Congress and reported by them to Congress for approval as a valid grant in 1826, was further confirmed as to its validity by the United States by the act of Congress of May 23, 1828. That the limitation in the twelfth section of the act of 1828 and the acts supplemental thereto and amendatory thereof, enacted by Congress in regard to private land claims in Florida, did not apply to complete valid grants of land properly segregated from the royal domain and in possession by the grantees prior to January 24, 1818, and therefore did and do not apply to the grant to Fish so as to bar the present action."
If then the limitations of the acts of Congress properly applied to complete and perfect titles and this was such, or if they *430 applied to the claim of Fish because it was not such a title, or under the particular circumstances, the conclusions reached were erroneous, and the decree must be reversed.
And, apart from these limitations, if the grant did not amount to an absolute title, requiring no confirmation, the bill, of course, could not be maintained.
It must be remembered that this is not a suit under any of the acts passed by Congress in reference to the settlement of claims in East Florida, but entirely independent of them. According to the theory of appellees, those acts have no application whatever. Appellees assert their title to have been absolutely perfect and complete prior to the treaty, and, in any aspect, they must stand or fall by their contention that the Fish grant was a complete and perfect royal title.
And while we can perceive that equitable grounds may have justified the recommendation to Congress for confirmation in 1826, we cannot hold as matter of law that a grant couched in the terms of this one, and not made by the governor of East Florida or ratified by him, was an absolute conveyance of the fee.
By the Spanish law the King was the source and fountain of title to all lands, which could only be disposed of by him, or his duly authorized representative. In the Province of East Florida the governor acted in the granting of lands in the name and by the authority of the King as his direct representative. It was in that point of view that Quesada described himself as "vice royal patron and subdelegate of the royal domain." Quesada was governor from July 13, 1790, to July 20, 1796. His last participation in the matter of Fish's application was on March 26, 1795, when the papers were returned to Fish. What appears afterwards purports to have been done by one Morales during an alleged illness of the governor. There is nothing to indicate that Governor Quesada was not in the exercise of the duties of his office during his entire term, except the mere recitation in these papers. There is no evidence that Morales performed the duties of the office of governor unless the single act under consideration is to be so treated, and that would not make out a de facto incumbency, if there could be such, which, *431 as to the exercise of this power, we cannot concede. There is no pretence that Morales was appointed governor pro tempore, and indeed he could not have been save by the King, or the captain general of Cuba and the Floridas, which appointment would have been formally made and duly recorded. 2 White's New Recopilacion, 270, 271. No evidence to that effect was introduced. Morales clearly cannot be held to have had the power to make a royal grant, nor was any ratification of what he did do shown.
In United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, and in United States v. Peralta, 19 How. 343, it was held in view of the rules of decision prescribed by the statutes under which the courts exercised jurisdiction, that it was the intention of Congress that a claimant should not be required to offer proof as to the authority of the official executing the grant, but that the court would assume as a settled principle that a public grant was to be taken as evidence that it was issued by lawful authority. But under the act of March 3, 1891, creating the Court of Private Land Claims, inasmuch as it was made essential before a grant could be held legally valid that it must appear that the title was "lawfully and regularly derived," it was held that such presumption could not be indulged in; that the language of the act imported "that the court must be satisfied, from all the evidence, that the official body or person assuming to grant was vested with authority, or that the exercise of power, if unwarranted, was subsequently lawfully ratified." Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S. 637. The question involved in that case was whether the territorial deputation of New Mexico had authority to make the grant in controversy. Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion, said, among other things: "Further, while it is reasonable to presume that any order or decree of the supreme executive of Mexico conferring authority to alienate the territorial lands or ratifying an unauthorized grant to the extent authorized by law was made matter of official record, the petition does not aver and the grant does not recite, nor was there any evidence introduced showing a prior authorization or subsequent ratification. In fact, it was not even shown that at or about the time of the grant the territorial deputation habitually *432 assumed to grant lands, particularly under circumstances which would justify an inference that the supreme executive was informed of such procedure."
In Crespin v. United States, 168 U.S. 208, which was a case under the act of 1891, it was held that the presumption indulged in United States v. Arredondo could not supply the want of power in the alleged granting officer.
In the case at bar, as we have said, complainants were not proceeding under any act of Congress permitting the United States to be sued, but as at common law, and on the basis of absolute legal title. That title they were obliged to make out, and could only avail themselves of such presumptions as would ordinarily obtain. Without going into the question of the presumptions which might on occasion be indulged in, it is enough to say that it is clear that where the officer who assumed to convey the public domain had no authority ex officio to do so, such authority cannot be presumed from the mere fact of the conveyance in the absence of other evidence.
We do not think that Governor Quesada could have delegated his power as subdelegate, and it cannot be assumed that he attempted to do so.
But, furthermore, we are not persuaded that Morales undertook to make an absolute grant in fee. He did not profess to be acting as "Vice Royal Patron and Subdelegate of the Royal Domain." The grant did not run in the name of the King; did not purport to make the grant as "in absolute property;" did not assert the legal right to make such a grant; and the terms of the paper were consistent with a grant of possession merely, or, at the most, of a concession, which required a title in form to be subsequently issued.
The report of the land commissioners of January 31, 1826, transmitting the Fish claim among others, (4 American State Papers, "Public Lands," D.G. ed., 276,) states: "A royal title is the highest order of title known by any law, usage, or principle, in the province of East Florida. Titles of this description were designed to convey the fee simple to the grantee; they were usually made by the acting governors of the province in the name of the King; they recited the grant to be `in perpetuity,' *433 and also the specific metes and bounds of the land. . . . This title may be said to correspond in character with that of a patent issued by our Government. Concessions without condition are understood to differ from a royal title only in this, that most of the latter recite the metes and bounds, whereas the unconditional concession, although definite in quantity and location of the land, is still subject to a survey; which, when made, was followed up by maturing the concession by a royal title. . . . There is also a peculiarity in the phraseology of a royal title; in all the grants of this nature, the legal right to grant the lands is asserted."
The commissioners regarded the grant in question as a concession without condition, or with conditions fulfilled, and reported it as such for confirmation. They attributed it to the royal order of 1790 in respect of settlers. 1 Clarke's Land Laws, 994, 996; 2 White, 276; United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436.
Referring to class one, being claims to lands not exceeding 3500 acres in quantity, they made the observations already quoted, and further said: "In deciding on the cases comprehended in this class, the board have in all cases of royal titles and concessions without condition, where the documents were found amongst the archives of the country, and no allegations on the part of the United States appearing against them, considered themselves bound to grant certificates of confirmation to the claimants. . . . Number three comprehends claims exceeding 3500 acres, the titles to which were found amongst the public archives of the country, and are ascertained by the commissioners to be valid Spanish grants, and reported accordingly to Congress for confirmation."
The question on this branch of the case is not whether the grant should have been confirmed, but whether it amounted to a complete title without confirmation. At the time of the cession was further action of the government required to perfect it? As it was not in itself a royal title and was neither made nor confirmed by the lawful authorities of the King, we think such action was necessary.
But were this otherwise it seems to us clear that the limitations of the acts of Congress applied.
*434 Articles II and VIII of the treaty between the United States and Spain, concluded February 22, 1819, ratified by Spain, October 24, 1820, and by the United States February 19, 1821, read as follows:
"Article II. His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States, in full property and sovereignty, all the territories which belong to him, situated to the eastward of the Mississippi, known by the name of East and West Florida. The adjacent islands dependent on said provinces, all public lots and squares, vacant lands, public edifices, fortifications, barracks, and other buildings, which are not private property, archives and documents, which relate directly to the property and sovereignty of said provinces, are included in this article. The said archives and documents shall be left in possession of the commissaries or officers of the United States, duly authorized to receive them."
"Article VIII. All the grants of land made before the 24th of January, 1818, by His Catholic Majesty, or by his lawful authorities, in the said territories ceded by His Majesty to the United States, shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty. But the owners in possession of such lands, who, by reason of the recent circumstances of the Spanish nation, and the revolutions in Europe, have been prevented from fulfilling all the conditions of their grants, shall complete them within the terms limited in the same, respectively, from the date of this treaty; in default of which, the said grants shall be null and void. All grants made since the said 24th of January, 1818, when the first proposal, on the part of His Catholic Majesty, for the cession of the Floridas, was made, are hereby declared, and agreed to be, null and void."
In the light of the Spanish text, to the effect that grants should "remain ratified and confirmed," the treaty has been frequently construed as meaning that grants needing no confirmation should stand confirmed, while those requiring confirmation should receive it in due course as might be provided.
Undoubtedly private rights of property to land lying within the territory ceded were entitled to protection, whether they *435 were complete and absolute titles, or merely equitable interests needing some further act of the Government to perfect the legal title. The duty of securing such rights belonged to the political department, and might be discharged by Congress itself, or through the instrumentality of boards, or of strictly judicial tribunals. And even grants which were complete at the time of the cession might be required by Congress to have their genuineness and their extent established by proceedings in a particular manner before they could be held valid. Ainsa v. New Mexico & Arizona Railroad, 175 U.S. 76; Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238; United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436; Glenn v. United States, 13 How. 250.
In United States v. Clarke, the acts of Congress prior to 1834 were considered by Chief Justice Marshall, in the instance of a complete and perfect grant. Referring to the act of May 26, 1830, the Chief Justice said: "It was obviously the intention of Congress to extend the jurisdiction of the court to all existing claims and to have them finally settled. The purposes for which the act was made could not be otherwise accomplished. . . . The words which confer jurisdiction, and describe the cases on which it may be exercised, are `all the remaining cases which have been presented according to law, and not finally acted upon.' The subsequent words `shall be adjudicated,' etc., prescribe the rule by which the jurisdiction previously given shall be exercised." Quoting from the sixth section of the act of May 8, 1822, he said: "The object of this law cannot be doubted. It was to separate private property from the public domain for the double purpose of doing justice to individuals, and enabling Congress safely to sell the vacant lands in their newly acquired territories. To accomplish this object, it was necessary that all claims of every description, should be brought before the commissioners, and that their powers of inquiry should extend to all. Not only has this been done, but, further to stimulate the claimants, the act declares `that any claim not filed previous to the 31st of May, 1823, shall be deemed and held to be void and of none effect.' This primary intention of Congress is best promoted by determining causes finally, where their substantial merits can be discerned." He further *436 quoted the sixth section of the act of May 23, 1828, and from the act of May 26, 1824, (referred to in the act of May 26, 1830,) and as to the latter act said that it "does not define the jurisdiction conferred on the court of East Florida by the act of 1830, but directs the mode of proceeding and the rules of decision."
In Glenn v. United States, Mr. Justice Catron, referring to the case of Arredondo, said: "That proceeding was founded on a perfect title, having every sanction the Spanish government could confer. It was brought before the courts according to the sixth section of the act of May 23, 1828, which embraced perfect titles, and was only applicable to suits in Florida."
The cases of United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691; United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51; United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436, were all instances of complete and perfect titles brought into court under these statutes.
Botiller v. Dominguez was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of California to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action in the nature of ejectment. Plaintiff's title was a grant alleged to have been made by Mexico, but no claim under the grant had ever been presented for confirmation to the board of land commissioners appointed under the act of Congress of March 3, 1851, c. 41, 9 Stat. 631; and no patent had ever issued from the United States to any one for the land or any part of it. The state court held that the title to the land by the Mexican grant was perfect at the time California was acquired, and that the grantee was not compelled to submit the same for confirmation to the board of commissioners. This court ruled that no title to lands in California dependent upon Spanish or Mexican grants could be of any validity which had not been submitted to and confirmed by the board provided for that purpose by the act of Congress, or, if rejected by that board, confirmed by the District Court or by the Supreme Court of the United States. Two propositions were urged in support of the decision of the state court. First, that the statute itself was invalid because in conflict with the treaty with Mexico, and also with rights of property under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Second, that the statute was not intended *437 to apply to claims which were supported by complete and perfect title from the Mexican government, but only to such as were imperfect, inchoate and equitable in their character. As to the first of these propositions, this court held that so far as the act of Congress was alleged to be in conflict with the treaty with Mexico, that was a matter in which the court was bound to follow the statutory enactments of its own Government. As to the second point, it was held that the statute applied to perfect as well as imperfect claims, and Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion, said:
"It was equally important to the object which the United States had in the passage of it, that claims under perfect grants from the Mexican government should be established as that imperfect claims should be established or rejected. The superior force which is attached, in the argument of counsel, to a perfect grant from the Mexican government had its just influence in the board of commissioners, or in the courts to which their decisions could be carried by appeal. If the title was perfect, it would there be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, holding that the claim thus presented was valid; if it was not, then it was the right and the duty of that court to determine whether it was such a claim as the United States was bound to respect, even though it was not perfect as to all the forms and proceedings under which it was derived. So that the superior value of a perfected Mexican claim had the same influence in a court of justice which is now set up for it in an action where the title is contested. Nor can it be said that there is anything unjust or oppressive in requiring the owner of a valid claim, in that vast wilderness of lands unclaimed, and unjustly claimed, to present his demand to a tribunal possessing all the elements of judicial functions, with a guarantee of judicial proceedings, so that his title could be established if it was found to be valid, or rejected if it was invalid. We are unable to see any injustice, any want of constitutional power, or any violation of the treaty, in the means by which the United States undertook to separate the lands in which it held the proprietary interest from those which belonged, either equitably or by a strict legal title, to private persons. Every person owning land or *438 other property is at all times liable to be called into a court of justice to contest his title to it. This may be done by another individual, or by the government under which he lives. It is a necessary part of a free government, in which all are equally subject to the laws, that whosoever asserts rights or exercises powers over property may be called before the proper tribunals to sustain them."
We are of opinion that these acts applied and were intended to apply to all claims, whether perfect or imperfect, in that particular resembling the California act; that the courts were bound to accept their provisions; and that there was no want of constitutional power in prescribing reasonable limitations operating to bar claims if the course pointed out were not pursued.
Mrs. Fish naturally took that view and memoralized the commissioners, who reported in favor of the claim, and the report was transmitted to Congress in February, 1826.
The act of May 23, 1828, followed, which confirmed all claims, which had been recommended for confirmation, of which this was one, to the extent of a league square, but provided that the confirmation should not be effectual until all the parties in interest in the original grant had filed a full and final release of all claims to the residue contained in it, with the register and receiver of the district where the grant was situated. We do not agree with the master that the effect of this was to confirm the entire grant, but, on the contrary, we think that by the action of Congress all of the claim except a league square was rejected, and that as there was no release of the excess, the condition of the confirmation failed.
And inasmuch as this was the situation, and claimants had neither accepted the league square nor availed themselves of the legislation providing for resort to the courts, it was held when the matter was litigated in the land department that the claim was barred. The views there entertained were expressed by the Commissioner in his report of August 2, 1890, and by the Secretary of the Interior in his decision of June 22, 1893. 16 Land Dec. 550. The land department was of opinion that even conceding that the claim was a valid grant from the Spanish government for the full quantity of 10,000 acres, *439 and that the act of May 23, 1828, which governed that, among other claims, was in violation of the obligation, of the treaty, the department and the courts were bound to follow the statutory enactments of their own government, and must be controlled thereby, and that regarding the claim as coming within the provisions of the acts of 1827 and 1828, its validity could not be recognized because the claimants had failed to comply with the conditions prescribed by these acts. All claims of every description whatever, whether arising under patents, grants, concessions or orders of survey, were required to be submitted to the board of commissioners for confirmation, or to be submitted to Congress for final action, before their validity could be recognized, and all claims reported upon by the commissioners, whether founded upon a complete or an incomplete title, were subject to the provisions of the act of Congress of May 23, 1828, and barred in accordance with its provisions. If the claim came within the provisions of the second section of that act, its validity was recognized only to the extent of one league square, and upon the condition that the claimant should relinquish all in excess of that quantity on or before May 26, 1831. If it did not come within the provisions of said section, then it was a claim not acted upon by Congress, and was barred by failure to commence the proper proceedings in the courts within the time limited in the sixth section of the act of May 23, 1828.
We accept these conclusions, and with the less reluctance, as if this were a perfect title as contended, resort to the courts might again have been had under the acts of 1860 and 1872.
It seems to us that the Government was unquestionably entitled to demand the seasonable assertion of such claims as this, and that years after the public surveys had been extended over the land, and the maps and plats thereof approved; many reservations made for public purposes; patents issued; homestead entries made and final certificates issued; the exhibition of a bill to set aside the patents of the Government by those who had failed to comply with the statutes came undeniably too late.
In our judgment the bill cannot be maintained because complainants failed to show complete legal title from the King; *440 and because the claim was barred by the statutes to which we have referred.
Decree reversed and cause remanded with a direction to dismiss the bill.
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissented.