Court Opinion

ID: 9834564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 00:02:22.191825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:22.705294
License: Public Domain

POWERS, C. J.,
dissents on the interpretation of the tax statute involved.
*525On MotioN FOR Reargument.*
Moulton, J.
The plaintiff has moved for a reargument of this cause. The defendant objects that the motion comes too late, since it was not made until after the mandate had been sent down and entered in the court of chancery. But the final decree had not been enrolled and so the objection is unavailing. P. L. 1327.
The ground for the reargument is that in construing P. L. 1228 we have improperly invoked the rule which requires us if possible so to construe a statute that its constitutionality will be sustained. It is claimed that this doctrine is inapplicable to the situation, since the meaning of the word “use” involves, in this case, no constitutional question.
In the brief filed by the plaintiff when the cause was argued it is said that ‘ ‘ the word ‘ use ’ in ordinary usage means the consumption and enjoyment of property,” that “the word ‘use’ means consumption and nothing else,” and that “the ‘use’ intended by the plaintiff was consumption of gasoline in interstate commerce.” In the opinion, we called attention to the fact that if only this meaning should be given to the word, the statute would be invalid as applied to such transportation, and in this connection we stated the rule requiring a constitutional interpretation. That a recognized construction of “use” includes withdrawal from storage, under such circumstances as here disclosed, is shown by the authorities cited, and so, even without recourse to the rule to which reference has been made, there is a sufficient basis for our decision.

Motion for reargument denied. Let full entry go down.

Powers, C. J., dissents.

 Opinion on motion for reargument filed May 4, 1937.