Court Opinion

ID: 9954097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:07:29.386108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:50.800941
License: Public Domain

Darrell Eugene Matthews v. State of Maryland, No. 12, September Term, 2023. Opinion
by Eaves, J.

MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE § 8-201 – POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING – EVIDENCE PRESERVATION

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the State’s duty to preserve scientific
identification evidence is limited to those crimes enumerated in § 8-201(j)(1)(ii) of the
Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) and does not extend to all crimes for which a person is
permitted to petition for DNA testing. Although there is a difference between the list of
petition-eligible crimes in CP § 8-201(b) and the list of crimes in CP § 8-201(j)(1)(ii) for
which evidence preservation is required, this difference does not constitute ambiguity. The
plain text of the statute, supported by its historical context, indicates that the General
Assembly intended a broad category of crimes for which convicted persons could petition
for DNA testing, but a narrower category of crimes for which evidence preservation is
required.

MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE § 8-201 – POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING – EVIDENCE PRESERVATION – INCHOATE
OFFENSES

The Supreme Court held that the State’s duty to preserve scientific identification evidence
does not apply to the inchoate offenses of those crimes listed under CP § 8-201(j)(1)(ii).
Because the language of the evidence preservation requirement is clear and unambiguous,
the Court declined to extend the requirement beyond the plain text to attempted murder or
other inchoate offenses.

MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE § 8-201 – POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING – EVIDENCE PRESERVATION – ATTEMPTED
MURDER

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly denied the Petition for Post-
Conviction DNA Testing because the State was not required to preserve evidence related
to Appellant’s attempted murder conviction for the duration of his sentence and because
the evidence Appellant sought to test had been destroyed consistent with the police
department’s evidence retention policy. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court.
  Circuit Court for Montgomery County
  Case No. 114155C
  Argued: December 5, 2023
                                                           IN THE SUPREME COURT

                                                               OF MARYLAND

                                                                     No. 12

                                                              September Term, 2023
                                                    ______________________________________

                                                        DARRELL EUGENE MATTHEWS

                                                                       v.

                                                            STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                    ______________________________________

                                                              Fader, C.J.
                                                              Watts
                                                              Hotten
                                                              Booth
                                                              Biran
                                                              Gould
                                                              Eaves,

                                                                    JJ.
                                                    ______________________________________

                                                               Opinion by Eaves, J.
                                                    ______________________________________

                                                              Filed: March 25, 2024

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

                   2024.03.25
                     13:23:21
                      '00'04-

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
       This case stems from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County’s denial of

Appellant, Darrell Eugene Matthews’s, second Petition for Post-Conviction DNA Testing

(the “Petition”) of a black glove found at the scene of the crime of attempted murder for

which Appellant was convicted. During the trial that led to Appellant’s conviction, the

glove was not marked for identification, offered or admitted into evidence, or discussed at

length. In 2019, after the filing of Appellant’s first petition for DNA testing in 2014, but

before the second petition for DNA testing in 2022, the glove was destroyed in accordance

with the evidence retention policy of the Montgomery County Police Department

(“MCPD”).

       We are asked to decide whether the circuit court correctly denied Appellant’s

Petition. We hold that while the State’s duty to preserve scientific identification evidence

is governed by § 8-201(j) of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) of the Maryland Code,

that duty does not extend to all crimes for which a person is permitted to petition for DNA

testing, nor does it apply to the inchoate offenses of those crimes listed in CP § 8-

201(j)(1)(ii). Further, the circuit court did not err when it denied Appellant’s Petition

because the glove was properly destroyed under the MCPD’s evidence retention policy.

Accordingly, for the reasons we outline below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

                                         I
                                    BACKGROUND

A.     Factual and Procedural History

       In May 2011, Appellant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and four

other charges stemming from an incident in Montgomery County, Maryland, in which the
victim survived two gunshot wounds.1

       At trial, the MCPD detective who served as the lead investigator for the shooting

testified that the victim said that “he believed [the defendant] had a glove” during the

incident. The lead investigator further testified that, on the night of the shooting, a citizen

had turned over a glove to a patrol officer. That officer then delivered the glove to a

forensic technician who was present at the crime scene. On cross-examination, the lead

investigator testified that her understanding of the glove’s significance was that “it might

have . . . belonged to Darrell Matthews.” The investigator explained that she did not order

forensic testing of the glove for two reasons: (1) it was not collected in a standard manner,

and she did not know the glove’s origins, later clarifying, “[the glove] wasn’t recovered by

an officer. I don’t know how many hands it had passed through before it had got into an

evidence bag” and (2) she “had a victim and an eyewitness saying . . . who had shot [the

victim].”

       The victim testified that he had known Appellant for approximately eight to 10

years, “maybe even longer,” before the shooting, Appellant was the shooter, he could see

Appellant clearly when Appellant shot him, and he (the victim) had called two people

shortly after the shooting and told them that Appellant was the shooter. The victim was

also asked at trial about whether he saw a glove and testified, “I don’t remember seeing a

glove.”     Following his conviction, Appellant was subsequently sentenced to life

imprisonment for the attempted murder charge, along with 30 years consecutive for the

       1
         This trial was Appellant’s second; a 2010 trial on these charges resulted in a
mistrial due to juror misconduct.
                                              2
other charges.2

       In October 2014, Appellant filed a pro se petition seeking testing of the glove for

DNA and gunshot residue under CP § 8-201 (sometimes referred to herein as the “DNA

Testing Statute” or the “Statute). The State filed a response in opposition, arguing that

Appellant had not been convicted of any of the crimes for which a convicted person could

petition for testing and that the Statute does not provide for gunshot residue testing.3 The

circuit court denied Appellant’s request for testing in March 2015.4

       Appellant filed a motion in August 2019 seeking the grand jury testimony

transcripts from his case, which the circuit court granted.

       On August 5, 2022, Appellant filed the Petition that is the subject of this appeal.

Therein, Appellant noted that several of his convictions, including attempted murder, made

       2
        Following an appeal, Appellant’s conviction for possession of a regulated firearm
by a prohibited person under § 5-133(b) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code
was vacated, and his sentence was reduced to a life sentence with 25 consecutive years.
See Matthews v. State, No. 1442, Sept. Term, 2011, slip op. at 7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb.
22, 2013). That appeal and the subsequent resentencing are not relevant to the present
appeal.
       3
        At the time of this pro se petition, attempted murder was not included in the list of
crimes for which a person could petition for DNA testing. 2008 Md. Laws, ch. 337.
       4
         Along with his October 2014 petition seeking testing, Appellant filed a pro se
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel and an
amended petition through counsel in February 2015. Among other alleged examples of
ineffective assistance, the petition asserted that trial counsel had failed to request DNA and
gunshot residue testing of the glove. In April 2015, the circuit court denied relief based on
the failure-to-test argument, stating that the decision not to request testing was not
unreasonable. However, the circuit court granted the petition in part on alternative grounds
and allowed Appellant to file for review of his sentence by a three-judge panel. Ultimately,
a three-judge panel affirmed the sentence without a hearing.

                                              3
him eligible to petition for DNA testing under CP § 8-201. He sought DNA testing of the

glove, arguing that such testing was in the interest of justice because “if DNA testing

excludes [him], that evidence would be exculpatory.”

       In November 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on the Petition. While the parties

agreed that Appellant was eligible to petition for testing based on his attempted murder

conviction, the State nonetheless argued that Appellant could not meet the standard under

the statute because any DNA results from the glove would not produce exculpatory or

mitigating evidence. Because the State did not know at that point whether the glove still

existed, the court granted a continuance and ordered the State to determine the status of the

glove. On January 5, 2023, the State filed an affidavit from the MCPD lead investigator, 5

which stated that the time limit under the MCPD’s evidence retention policy (seven years

for attempted first-degree murder) had elapsed, the lead investigator had “authorized

destruction of the glove[,]” and the glove had been destroyed as of November 1, 2019.

       One week later, the circuit court reconvened the hearing on the Petition, in light of

the MCPD’s verification that the glove had been destroyed. Appellant’s counsel argued

that the glove should have been preserved for the duration of Appellant’s sentence and that,

because it had been intentionally and willfully destroyed, the court must reopen the post-

conviction proceeding and order a new trial. The State argued that the statute’s evidence

preservation requirement does not cover attempted murder and reiterated its argument that,

even if it did, the glove would not provide exculpatory or mitigating evidence.

       5
         The individual who filed the 2023 affidavit is the same detective who served as
lead investigator for the 2009 shooting and who testified at Appellant’s 2011 trial.
                                             4
       In July 2023, the circuit court issued an opinion and order denying the Petition. The

circuit court ruled that under the DNA Testing Statute, the State’s destruction of the glove

was not wrongful because the evidence preservation requirement does not apply to

attempted murder convictions. It further stated that under Maryland Rule 4-710, the court

must deny the Petition because the State had searched for the glove, the glove no longer

existed, and there was no evidence that the glove had been intentionally and willfully

destroyed in contravention of the DNA Testing Statute or any applicable protocol. The

court also denied Appellant’s oral motion to reopen a post-conviction proceeding and order

a new trial. Appellant noted his appeal from the order, and the Appellate Court of Maryland

subsequently transferred the appeal to this Court. See CP § 8-201(k)(6).

B.     The DNA Testing Statutory Framework and Crimes of Violence

       An individual may petition for DNA testing in accordance with the following:

       (b) Notwithstanding any other law governing postconviction relief, a person
       who is convicted of a crime of violence under § 14-101 of the Criminal Law
       Article may file a petition:

          (1) for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence that the State
          possesses that is related to the judgment of conviction; or

          (2) for a search by a law enforcement agency of a law enforcement data
          base or log for the purpose of identifying the source of physical evidence
          used for DNA testing.

CP § 8-201(b). The State is required to preserve certain scientific identification evidence

in accordance with the following:

       (j)(1) The State shall preserve scientific identification evidence that:

              (i) the State has reason to know contains DNA material; and

                                              5
              (ii) is secured in connection with a violation of § 2-201 [first-degree
              murder], § 2-204 [second-degree murder], § 2-207 [manslaughter], §
              3-303 [first-degree rape], or § 3-304 [second-degree rape] of the
              Criminal Law Article.

       (2) The State shall preserve scientific identification evidence described in
       paragraph (1) of this subsection for the time of the sentence, including any
       consecutive sentence imposed in connection with the offense.

CP § 8-201 (j). CP § 8-201(j)(3) sets forth the procedure a court must follow if the State

is unable to produce certain scientific identification evidence that it is required to preserve

under subsection (j)(1). It provides:

       (3)(i) If the State is unable to produce scientific identification evidence
       described in [CP § 8-201(j)(1)], the court shall hold a hearing to determine
       whether the failure to produce evidence was the result of intentional and
       willful destruction.

       (ii) If the court determines at a hearing under subparagraph (i) of this
       paragraph that the failure to produce evidence was the result of intentional
       and willful destruction, the court shall:

              1. order a postconviction hearing to be conducted in accordance
                 with subparagraph (iii) of this paragraph; and

              2. at the postconviction hearing infer that the results of the
                 postconviction DNA testing would have been favorable to the
                 petitioner.

CP § 8-201(j)(3). Although this is the current version of the DNA Testing Statute at issue

here, we start with a review of the history of the statute.

       In 2001, the General Assembly enacted a law to permit people to petition for post-

conviction DNA testing of scientific identification evidence related to seven specifically

enumerated crimes: first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, first-degree

rape, second-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and second-degree sexual offense.

                                               6
2001 Md. Laws, ch. 418. The original version of the Statute also required the State to

preserve scientific identification evidence secured in connection with those crimes for three

years after sentencing or for an additional period pursuant to an order from this Court or

the Appellate Court. Id.

       The following year, the General Assembly revised the Statute to extend the length

of time for which the State must preserve scientific identification evidence to “the time of

the sentence, including any consecutive sentence imposed in connection with the offense.”

2002 Md. Laws, ch. 465. This revision to the Statute, however, did not expand the list of

crimes for which the additional length of time applied.

       In 2015, the General Assembly considered a bill to expand the scope of the DNA

Testing Statute as it related to the list of crimes. S.B. 583, 2015 Leg., 435th Sess. (Md.

2015) (as introduced and assigned to the S. Jud. Proc. Comm., Feb. 9, 2015). The bill

originally proposed extending the ability to petition for DNA testing to convictions for any

“crime of violence under § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article.” Id. At the time of this

bill’s introduction, § 14-101 included more crimes of violence or categories of crimes of

violence than the seven crimes enumerated in the original DNA Testing Statute; in addition

to murder, rape, first- and second-degree sexual offense, and voluntary manslaughter, the

“crimes of violence” list included, and continues to include, abduction, first-degree arson,

robbery, two carjacking offenses, several assault offenses, and other crimes. Md. Code

Ann., Crim. Law (“CR”) § 14-101(a) (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol.). Notably, the list of crimes

of violence also includes attempt offenses for many of the enumerated crimes, including

attempted murder. Id. § 14-101(a)(19).

                                             7
       The bill as originally introduced also proposed extending the evidence preservation

requirement to all of these crimes, including attempted murder. S.B. 583, 2015 Leg., 435th

Sess. (Md. 2015) (as introduced and assigned to the S. Jud. Proc. Comm., Feb. 9, 2015).

During the legislative process, however, the bill was changed to reduce the list of crimes

for which the State was required to preserve scientific identification evidence throughout

the term of a sentence. S. Jud. Proc. Comm. Rep. 32, 435th Sess. (Md. 2015). Specifically,

the amendment limited the evidence preservation requirement to those crimes for which

evidence preservation was already required under the statute (i.e., first-degree murder,

second-degree murder, manslaughter, first-degree rape, second-degree rape, first-degree

sexual offense, and second-degree sexual offense). Id. Ultimately, while the final bill

significantly expanded the list of offenses for which a person was eligible to petition for

DNA testing, it left unchanged the list of offenses for which the State was required to

preserve scientific identification evidence.6 2015 Md. Laws, ch. 369 (codified as revised

at CP § 8-201(b), (j)).

       Therefore, since 2015, the DNA Testing Statute has permitted a person to petition

for testing based on any crime of violence listed in CR § 14-101, including the inchoate

offense of attempted murder. But the Statute requires the State to preserve scientific

       6
         There have been other revisions to the DNA Testing Statute beyond the ones
summarized here. See CP § 8-201 (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.). Those amendments—which
address technical revisions and expand the ability to petition to searches of law
enforcement databases or logs, clarify the statute’s applicability to guilty pleas and other
pleas, modify the requirements for a court to order testing and the requirements for a
subsequent order, and establish the procedure following intentional and willful destruction
of evidence—are, however, not relevant to this appeal.

                                             8
identification evidence only for the duration of a convicted person’s sentence for five

crimes: first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, first-degree rape, and

second-degree rape.7 CP § 8-201(j)(1)(ii).

        Once a petition for DNA testing has been filed and the court has held a hearing, 8

Maryland Rule 4-710 governs how the court must proceed. The Rule provides in pertinent

part:

        (a)(1) The court shall deny a petition for DNA testing if it finds that:

            (A) the State has made an adequate search for scientific identification
            evidence that is related to the judgment of conviction, that no such
            evidence exists within its possession or within its ability to acquire from
            a third party on its own initiative or by court order, and that no such
            evidence that the State was required by law or applicable protocol to
            preserve was intentionally and willfully destroyed; or

            (B) scientific identification evidence exists but the method of testing
            requested by petitioner is not generally accepted in the relevant scientific
            community, or that there is no reasonable probability that DNA testing
            has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence
            relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing.

With the framework of the DNA Testing Statute, its application to crimes of violence, and

the procedural rule in mind, we turn now to an analysis of the case before us.

                                         II
                                 STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Because Appellant’s Petition rests on an interpretation of the DNA Testing Statute,

        7
          In 2017, the General Assembly reclassified first- and second-degree sexual offense
as first- and second-degree rape, respectively. 2017 Md. Laws, ch. 161; see also 2017 Md.
Laws, ch. 62, § 6.
        8
       In certain circumstances, a hearing is not required after the filing of a petition. See
Md. Rule 4-709(b).
                                               9
this Court reviews the circuit court’s decision de novo. See Edwards v. State, 453 Md. 174,

185 (2017) (“Because we are asked to interpret the language in the post-conviction DNA

testing statute . . . our review is plenary.”). For factual findings that do not rely on this

Court’s statutory interpretation (e.g., whether the State has made an adequate search for

scientific identification evidence), we apply a clearly erroneous standard. See Phillips v.

State, 451 Md. 180, 189 (2017) (“The trial court’s determination . . . to the extent that [it]

is a factual finding, will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”).

                                            III
                                         ANALYSIS

       In urging this Court to reverse the circuit court’s denial of his Petition, Appellant

first argues that he is eligible for post-conviction DNA testing because he was convicted

of a crime of violence under CR § 14-101 and because there is a reasonable probability that

the testing has the potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. See CP § 8-

201(d)(1). Next, Appellant asserts that the State was required to preserve the glove as

scientific identification evidence because the evidence preservation requirement logically

follows from a person’s ability to petition for DNA testing. Appellant also contends, albeit

briefly, that his attempted murder conviction is covered by the State’s duty to preserve

evidence for murder convictions, noting that attempted murder is the inchoate offense of

murder and carries the same penalty. The Statute requires evidence preservation when the

scientific identification evidence is secured, he argues, “in connection with a violation” of

the listed crimes, which includes both first- and second-degree murder. Appellant argues

that the statute is ambiguous and that it should be construed in his favor based on the rule

                                              10
of lenity. Finally, Appellant reasons that because the State had a duty to preserve the glove

as scientific identification evidence for the duration of his sentence, its willful destruction

means that the court must grant a post-conviction hearing and infer that the results of the

testing would have been favorable to him. See CP § 8-201(j)(3)(ii) (“If the court determines

. . . that the failure to produce evidence was the result of intentional and willful destruction,

the court shall . . . order a post-conviction hearing . . . and . . . at the post-conviction hearing

infer that the results of the post-conviction DNA testing would have been favorable to the

petitioner.”).

       The State argues that the evidence preservation requirement in the DNA Testing

Statute applies only to certain completed offenses and, therefore, the State did not violate

the statute when it destroyed evidence related to an attempted murder conviction. Under

the plain text of the statute, the State contends, there is a clear distinction between the list

of crimes for which DNA testing petitions are permitted and the list of crimes for which

evidence preservation is required. Attempted murder is a crime for which a convicted

person may petition for DNA testing, but it is not a crime for which the State is required to

preserve the evidence throughout the duration of the sentence. The State also points to the

2015 revision of the DNA Testing Statute to support its argument that the General

Assembly “specifically and intentionally declined to expand the evidence retention

requirement” to attempted murder and other crimes. According to the State, because it was

not required to preserve the glove as scientific identification evidence, the circuit court

correctly denied Appellant’s Petition under Maryland Rule 4-710.

       We hold that the DNA Testing Statute’s evidence preservation requirement does not

                                                11
apply to an attempted murder conviction. To begin, we disagree with Appellant that CP §

8-201 is ambiguous as to whether the State’s duty to preserve scientific identification

evidence for the duration of the sentence applies to an attempted murder conviction. We

have long adhered to the principle that “[t]he best source of legislative intent is the statute’s

plain language, and when the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily

ends there.” Smith v. State, 399 Md. 565, 578 (2007) (citations omitted). In addition, we

“neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not

reflected by the words the [General Assembly] used or engage in forced or subtle

interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.”               Taylor v.

NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181 (2001).

       Here, the statute is clear and unambiguous. It expressly lists the crimes for which

the State is required to preserve evidence throughout the individual’s sentence: “The State

shall preserve scientific identification evidence that . . . is secured in connection with a

violation of § 2-201 [first-degree murder], § 2-204 [second-degree murder], § 2-207

[manslaughter], § 3-303 [first-degree rape], or § 3-304 [second-degree rape] of the

Criminal Law Article.” CP § 8-201(j)(1). Attempted first-degree murder—a violation of

CR § 2-205—is not included in this list. In light of this unambiguous statutory text, this

Court cannot engage in “[a] forced . . . interpretation” to extend the evidence preservation

requirement to attempt offenses. Taylor, 365 Md. at 181.

       The DNA Testing Statute’s historical amendments, which are a part of

understanding the context of the statutory scheme, further support our interpretation of its

                                               12
plain text.9 The 2015 revision is remarkably on point. Therein, the General Assembly

considered S.B. 583, which, as originally introduced, would have extended the evidence

preservation requirement to additional crimes, including attempted first-degree murder.

However, as noted above in Section I.B., the General Assembly ultimately amended the

bill to keep the evidence preservation requirement unchanged—a decision that specifically

omitted the inchoate offense of attempted first-degree murder. From this statutory context,

we conclude that the General Assembly considered—but ultimately rejected—a proposal

to extend the evidence preservation requirement beyond the statute’s current scope.

       This interpretation is also consistent with our prior case law. In Washington v. State,

we held that conspiracy to commit murder was not a petition-eligible offense under CP §

8-201, even though murder and attempted murder are included on the statutory list of

crimes of violence. 450 Md. 319, 331 (2016). We noted that because the General

Assembly knows how to draft legislation that includes conspiracy, but had declined to do

so in this statute, we were prohibited from interpreting the statute beyond its plain meaning

and legislative intent. Id. at 334–35. Just as in Washington, where we reasoned that the

list of specific petition-eligible offenses within the statute does not encompass any related

inchoate offenses, here we conclude that the offenses enumerated in CP § 8-201(j)(1)(ii),

for which evidence preservation is required, do not encompass their related inchoate

       9
        As we discussed in Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, we “may
and often must consider” certain evidence that provides context for the statutory language,
including “amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature[.]” 309 Md. 505,
515 (1987); cf. Williams v. Morgan State Univ., 484 Md. 534, 557 n.13 (2023) (examining
revisions to the Maryland Tort Claims Act as part of the statute’s historical context).
                                             13
offenses.

       Second, we reject Appellant’s argument that the rule of lenity should apply in this

case. Citing Quansah v. State, 207 Md. App. 636 (2012), Appellant argues:

       The statute, being somewhat ambiguous, should be governed by the Rule of
       Lenity and fundamental fairness, and construed in favor of the Appellant.
       When an ambiguity exists, the rule of lenity applies. For example, if there is
       doubt as to the penalty, the law directs that his punishment must be construed
       to favor a milder penalty over a harsher one.

       The rule of lenity is a principle of statutory construction. White v. State, 318 Md.

740, 746 (1990). Under that rule, when there is an “otherwise unresolvable ambiguity” in

a criminal statute, this Court will employ the interpretation that favors the defendant.

Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. 673, 681 (2015). We have cautioned, however, that “[i]t is a

tool of last resort, to be rarely deployed and applied only when all other tools of statutory

construction fail to resolve an ambiguity.” Id. Here, reliance on the rule is not appropriate

because there is no ambiguity; the legislative intent is clear based on both the statutory text

and historical context. Therefore, we decline Appellant’s invitation to apply the rule of

lenity in this case.

       The authority to extend the evidence preservation requirement to attempted murder

rested with the General Assembly when it revised CP § 8-201 in 2015, and that authority

remains with the General Assembly today. If Appellant or others similarly situated believe

that the evidence preservation requirement should extend to certain attempt offenses,

including attempted murder, they can urge the General Assembly to make that change.

However, this Court declines to do so by judicial fiat.

                                              14
       After considering the clear and unambiguous text of CP § 8-201, examining its

historical amendments, reviewing our analysis in Washington v. State, and reasoning that

the rule of lenity does not apply, we hold that the State’s duty to preserve scientific

identification evidence is limited to those offenses enumerated in CP § 8-201(j)(1)(ii) and

does not extend to all crimes for which a person is permitted to petition for DNA testing.

Furthermore, we hold that the duty to preserve scientific identification evidence does not

apply to the inchoate offenses of those crimes listed in CP § 8-201(j)(1)(ii).10

       Finally, Appellant also contends that the State’s willful and intentional destruction

of the glove means that the circuit court was required to grant a post-conviction hearing

and infer that the results of the testing would have been favorable to him.11 Essentially, he

suggests that, because the glove was destroyed after he filed a motion in August 2019

seeking grand jury testimony transcripts from his case, the State willfully and intentionally

destroyed the glove to thwart his effort to have it tested. We find no merit in Appellant’s

argument.

       10
          The only exception is where an inchoate offense is specifically enumerated. For
instance, the first-degree murder statute states that “[a] person who solicits another or
conspires with another to commit murder in the first degree is guilty of murder in the first
degree if the death of another occurs as a result of the solicitation or conspiracy.” CR § 2-
201(c). Because the statute explicitly includes these two inchoate offenses, if a person is
convicted of first-degree murder under CR § 2-201, the State has a duty to preserve the
scientific identification evidence related to that conviction, even if the murder was
accomplished through solicitation or conspiracy.
       11
          It is unclear if this is connected to Appellant’s argument that the rule of lenity
applies or if it is a separate contention. Nonetheless, we will address it separately.
                                             15
       The relief Appellant seeks is grounded in subsection (j)(3) of the DNA Testing

Statute which states:

        If the State is unable to produce scientific identification evidence
        described in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court shall hold a hearing
        to determine whether the failure to produce evidence was the result of
        intentional and willful destruction.

       In order for the Appellant to be entitled to such a hearing, the State must be unable

to produce scientific identification evidence that it was statutorily required to preserve. CP

§ 8-201(j)(1) requires the State to preserve evidence only when it has reason to know it

contains DNA material and it was secured in connection with one of the offenses

enumerated in the statute.     Because attempted murder is not one of the statutorily

enumerated offenses, the State had no duty to preserve the glove. Accordingly, the circuit

court was not required “to determine whether the failure to produce the evidence was the

result of intentional and willful destruction.” CP § 8-201(j)(3).12 Having determined that

       12
         We note that Maryland Rule 4-710 further supports our conclusion that the glove’s
intentional and willful destruction is immaterial in this case. That Rule, in pertinent part,
provides that the

       court shall deny a petition for DNA testing if it finds that:

       the State has made an adequate search for scientific identification evidence
       that is related to the judgment of conviction, that no such evidence exists
       within its possession or within its ability to acquire from a third party on its
       own initiative or by court order, and that no such evidence that the State was
       required by law or applicable protocol to preserve was intentionally and
       willfully destroyed[.]

Md. Rule 4-710(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Here, as explained, the State was not “required
by law or applicable protocol to preserve” the glove. In addition to there being no statutory
requirement for the preservation of the glove, the uncontroverted evidence was that the
                                             16
the glove the Appellant sought to test had been destroyed and that retention was not

required, the circuit court correctly denied the Petition pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-710(a).

                                           IV
                                       CONCLUSION

       We hold that the State was not required to preserve scientific identification evidence

related to Appellant’s attempted murder conviction.           Maryland Rule 4-710(a)(1)(A)

requires a court to deny a petition seeking DNA testing if it finds that the State has

adequately searched for scientific identification evidence, the evidence is neither in the

State’s possession nor obtainable from a third party, and the State did not intentionally and

willfully destroy any evidence that it was required by law or protocol to preserve.13 The

circuit court correctly found that the State had searched for the glove, the glove had been

glove was destroyed in conformance with the Montgomery County Police Department’s
Retention Policy.
       13
           At the November 7, 2022, hearing on Appellant’s Petition—prior to the discovery
that the glove had been destroyed—the State argued that there was not a reasonable
probability that the testing would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence because
“there’s . . . no chain of custody for this glove beyond the officer receiving it from
someone[.]” In the original statute from 2001, an unbroken chain of custody was an
explicit requirement for testing. See 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 418 (codified at CP § 8-201)
(“[A] court shall order DNA testing if the court finds that . . . the scientific identification
evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody . . . that is sufficient to establish
that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material
aspect . . . .”). However, in 2003, the General Assembly significantly reduced the
requirements to petition for testing, including eliminating the chain of custody requirement.
See 2003 Md. Laws, ch. 240; see also Jackson v. State, 448 Md. 387, 405-06 (2016) (“In
2001, the standards governing when DNA testing could be ordered were rigorous[,]” but
“the 2003 amendment relaxed the standard for entitlement to DNA testing[.]”). We,
therefore, caution the State against relying in the future on the argument that testing need
not occur solely because of a chain of custody issue, given the General Assembly’s decision
to eliminate that requirement.

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destroyed, and the State was not required to preserve it by law or applicable protocol. The

circuit court was, therefore, required to deny the petition under Maryland Rule 4-

710(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery

County.

                                                          JUDGMENT     OF THE
                                                          CIRCUIT COURT FOR
                                                          MONTGOMERY COUNTY
                                                          AFFIRMED. APPELLANT
                                                          TO PAY COSTS.

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