Court Opinion

ID: 9897691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:23:47.015888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:40.454172
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Fulton
              Argued at Lexington, Virginia

              CALEB RASHAAD NOWLIN
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1691-22-3                                      JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
                                                                                NOVEMBER 8, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY
                                                John T. Cook, Judge

                              Charles F. Felmlee (Chuck Felmlee Law, P.C., on brief), for
                              appellant.

                              Virginia B. Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                              Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a bench trial in the Campbell County Circuit Court (the “trial court”), Caleb

              Rashaad Nowlin (“appellant”) was convicted of raping a child under the age of 13, in violation of

              Code § 18.2-61. The trial court sentenced appellant to 40 years’ incarceration with all but 10 years

              suspended. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to

              sustain his conviction. For the following reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                         BACKGROUND1

        When S.M. was four years old, her father began dating appellant’s mother.2 For several

years, S.M. lived with her father and appellant’s mother in their North Carolina home, where

appellant frequently visited. In October 2019, S.M., her father, and appellant’s mother moved to

Campbell County, Virginia. Appellant followed them to Campbell County in December of that

year.

        S.M.’s relationship with appellant was initially “like brother [and] sister,” but changed when

she turned 11 years old. At that time, appellant had a conversation with S.M. in which he told her

that she was his “girlfriend.” S.M. did not want to be his girlfriend. Appellant also wrote numerous

letters to S.M., wherein he proclaimed his love, complimented her, and reminisced about their

relationship. This inappropriate behavior towards S.M. started in North Carolina and continued

after the move to Campbell County.

        One day during S.M.’s sixth grade school year, she was alone with appellant in her father’s

Campbell County home.3 She was playing a board game by herself in appellant’s bedroom when

appellant suddenly entered the room, pushed S.M. down onto his bed, and began to take her pants

off. He then flipped S.M. onto her stomach, removed his pants, and put his penis inside her vagina.

S.M. attempted to get away, but appellant continued to push her onto the bed, telling her to “shut

        1
         On appeal, this Court recites the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App.
225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). In doing so, this
Court “discard[s] the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and
regard[s] as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences
to be drawn therefrom.” Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323,
324 (2018)).
        2
          S.M. was born in March 2007. This Court refers to the child victim here by her initials
in an attempt to protect her privacy.
        3
         While S.M. could not remember the exact date of the assault, she was certain it occurred
while she was in sixth grade and that she turned 12 years old in the spring of that school year.
                                                -2-
up.” S.M. “blacked out” and could not remember the rest of the assault. As S.M. later recounted at

trial, appellant had sexually assaulted her on both prior and subsequent occasions.

        In May 2021, S.M.’s mother found love letters in S.M.’s room written to S.M. from

appellant. She confronted S.M. about the letters before contacting law enforcement. Campbell

County Sheriff Investigator Guthrie interviewed appellant, who admitted to writing the letters. He

told Investigator Guthrie that he wanted to induce S.M. to fall in love with him as revenge for

perceived mistreatment of his mother by S.M.’s father. When confronted with S.M.’s allegations of

sexual assault, appellant responded that “whatever the evidence shows, . . . that’s what it is.”

        Appellant’s defense at trial rested on the inconsistencies between S.M.’s statements and the

timeline of offenses presented by the Commonwealth. He moved to strike the Commonwealth’s

evidence, arguing that it was insufficient to sustain a conviction because S.M. could not remember

her exact age when the rape occurred. The trial court denied appellant’s motion, but took the matter

under advisement before making a final ruling in the case. The trial court later determined that the

evidence was sufficient and that S.M.’s testimony was credible despite its inconsistencies. The

court then convicted appellant of rape under Code § 18.2-61 and sentenced him to 40 years’

incarceration with all but 10 years suspended. This appeal followed.

                                             ANALYSIS

        “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support

it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting

Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the

relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

                                                  -3-
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting

Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the

conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion

might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72

Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

       Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction

because it did not prove the alleged offense occurred in Virginia. S.M. asserted that the rape

occurred while she was in sixth grade, at which time appellant contends he still lived in North

Carolina. He claims that S.M.’s testimony thus demonstrates that the offense could not have

occurred in Campbell County, Virginia, while she was under the age of 13 because he did not move

there until the following year. Accordingly, appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence

established a set of inconsistent facts—that the sexual assault occurred during S.M.’s sixth grade

year and that appellant did not live at the Campbell County address during that time—which cannot

support his conviction. This Court disagrees.

       A reviewing court “must accept the ‘[fact finder]’s determination of the credibility of

witness testimony unless, “as a matter of law, the testimony is inherently incredible.”’” Hammer v.

Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 239 (2022) (quoting Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App.

740, 759 (2019)); see also Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019) (holding that any

“‘inconsistencies in testimony are resolved by the fact finder,’ not the appellate court” (quoting

Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 292 (2011))). Furthermore, a fact finder’s evaluations

of credibility are not limited to choosing between competing accounts offered by different

witnesses. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 94, 105 (2010). Rather, the fact finder is

often called to resolve conflicts within a single witness’s testimony, as in the case at hand, which

includes the power to accept the parts of the testimony deemed credible and reject the portions

                                                 -4-
deemed incredible. See Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 22 (2011). Here, the trial court—

sitting as trier of fact—determined that S.M.’s testimony was credible and that any perceived

inconsistencies were not fatal to the Commonwealth’s case. This Court finds no basis in the record

for overturning that ruling.

        S.M. consistently testified that the rape occurred in her father’s home in Campbell County,

Virginia. She was also consistent in her testimony that the rape occurred before she was 13 years

old.4 It was uncontested that between December 2019 and March 2020, appellant lived in Campbell

County, and that S.M. was 12 years old. The record reflects that S.M. would have been in sixth

grade for the 2018-2019 school year but would likely have been in seventh grade during the events

she described. Nevertheless, she remained under the age of 13 until March 2020. The trial court

was free to resolve the conflict in the evidence regarding which grade she was in at the time of the

offense without having to find S.M.’s testimony incredible. See McNeal, 282 Va. at 21-22. The

trial court also found that appellant’s love letters and statements to Investigator Guthrie corroborated

S.M.’s testimony regarding her age at the time of the rape.

        In addressing the inconsistency in S.M.’s testimony, the trial court acknowledged that a

fifteen-year-old witness will “say some things that are a little bit different” on cross-examination,

but noted that S.M. “clearly said under oath she was under thirteen” and “there was nothing to

contradict [her].”5 See Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 626 (“Testimony may be contradictory or contain

inconsistencies without rising to the level of being inherently incredible as a matter of law.”).

        4
          Appellant asserts that, during cross-examination, S.M. was unable to remember her
exact age at the time of the offense. That statement, however, is not inherently inconsistent with
her continuing assertion that she was under the age of 13—that age threshold being the relevant
factor in the trial court’s consideration of appellant’s guilt pursuant to Code § 18.2-61.
        5
          The court ruled similarly at a later hearing, indicating that it was “not surprising” that
the testimony of a 15-year-old girl might have “some inconsistencies.” S.M. was 15 years old
when she testified at trial.
                                                  -5-
Moreover, the trial court found that “there was clearly opportunity for [the offense] to [have

occurred] in Campbell County” during one of appellant’s frequent visits to S.M.’s Virginia home,

regardless of when appellant officially changed his own address. Considering the totality of the

evidence and the trial court’s findings, this Court cannot say that no rational fact finder could have

found appellant guilty under Code § 18.2-61 for raping a child under the age of 13.

                                           CONCLUSION

        For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                                                 Affirmed.

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