Court Opinion

ID: 9534059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:36:36.724129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:24.074924
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Following a bench trial, defendant Gary Charles Triptow was convicted of theft, found to be an habitual criminal, and sentenced to a term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison as required by the habitual criminal statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978). He appeals only from the habitual criminal conviction. Triptow asserts that the trial court erred in admitting what purported to be copies of certain public documents containing hearsay as evidence of his prior convictions. He further argues that the State had the burden of proving that he was represented by counsel when he was previously convicted and that absent the challenged hearsay there is no evidence upon which any such finding can be based. We affirm.
Triptow was tried on the habitual criminal charge immediately following his conviction for second degree felony theft. Utah’s habitual criminal statute provides for an enhanced sentence of five years to life for one convicted of either a second or a first degree felony when that person was previously convicted of two felonies of the requisite degree. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978).1 The State attempted to prove Triptow’s prior felony convictions by introducing five sets of copies of public documents (exhibits 7 through 11). Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the documents, arguing that they con*147tained inadmissible hearsay and were not authenticated properly so as to qualify for any of the applicable hearsay exceptions. See Utah R.Evid. 801, 803, 804, 902. The trial court allowed all the documents to be admitted, and Triptow was convicted of being an habitual criminal.
Before this Court, Triptow concedes that one set of documents offered at trial, exhibit 9, was properly authenticated under Utah Rule of Evidence 902 and, therefore, was properly admitted under Utah Rule of Evidence 803(8). However, he contends that the remaining documents, exhibits 7, 8, 10, and 11, were not authenticated and should not have been admitted. We need not decide whether exhibits 7, 8, 10, and 11 were properly admitted because we conclude that exhibit 9 alone contains the evidence necessary to support a finding of guilt on the habitual criminal charge. Any error in admitting the other documents was harmless because they were merely cumulative of what was proven by exhibit 9. Therefore, any error must be disregarded under rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence.
The documents constituting exhibit 9 show that before his theft conviction, Trip-tow had been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed in Utah for felony offenses, including one of the second degree. Trip-tow acknowledges that these express elements of section 76-8-1001 are satisfied by exhibit 9; however, he contends that there is what amounts to another element that must be proven by the State, one implied as a result of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169, reh’g denied, 447 U.S. 930, 100 S.Ct. 3030, 65 L.Ed.2d 1125 (1980), and Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), dealing with the sixth amendment right to counsel.2 According to Triptow, those decisions hold that the use of an uncounseled prior conviction to enhance the penalty for a current offense constitutes an infringement of a defendant’s sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Triptow argues that to assure that the holdings of Balda-sar and Burgett are implemented and the defendant’s rights protected, a court considering an habitual criminal charge must require that before evidence of a prior conviction can be admitted, the State has the burden of showing not only that the conviction occurred, but also that the defendant had counsel at the time of the previous guilt determination.
We believe Triptow reads too much into Burgett and Baldasar. In each of those cases, the prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence of a prior conviction that was obviously uncounseled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding only that unless counsel was knowingly waived, an uncoun-seled prior conviction may not be used in a later prosecution “either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense.” Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115, 88 S.Ct. at 262. In each case, it was plain that the defendant did not have the benefit of counsel during the previous conviction,3 and in nei*148ther case did the Court reach the question of who bears the burdens of pleading and proof on the question of whether the defendant was counseled. That question is pivotal to Triptow’s claim, and we note that neither party to this appeal has adequately addressed it.
Our own research has shown that a number of state courts have considered the question left open by Burgett and Balda-sar, i.e., who bears the burden of proof on the issue of representation or waiver of counsel in prior proceedings leading to a conviction that is used to increase the penalty in a subsequent prosecution? Among those states, we have identified at least three divergent views on the question.4 A significant factor is the degree to which the courts focus on the presumption of regularity that attends any judgment which has not been appealed from. See, e.g., Dunn v. Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 832, 107 S.Ct. 121, 93 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986); People v. Knack, 128 A.D.2d 307, 312, 516 N.Y.S.2d 465, 469 (1987), aff'd, 72 N.Y.2d 825, 526 N.E.2d 32, 530 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1988). Some courts are of the view that after the state proves the fact of a defendant’s prior conviction, this presumption of regularity requires that the defendant prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was an actual lack of representation without a knowing waiver of counsel in the earlier proceeding. See, e.g., Croft v. State, 513 So.2d 759, 761 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (per curiam); State v. Laurick, 222 N.J.Super. 636, 537 A.2d 792 (1987); In re Kean, 520 A.2d 1271, 1278 (R.I.1987). A second group of courts takes the position advocated by Triptow, which is to effectively disregard the presumption of regularity and require as an initial matter that the state affirmatively prove by at least a preponderance of the evidence either that the defendant was represented by counsel or that he or she knowingly waived counsel. See, e.g., State v. Morishige, 65 Haw. 354, 367, 652 P.2d 1119, 1129 (1982); State v. Hicks, 11 Kan.App.2d 76, 85-88, 714 P.2d 105, 113-15 (1986); State v. Elling, 11 Ohio Misc.2d 13, 463 N.E.2d 668 (Com.Pl.1983). A third group of courts takes a middle position. They acknowledge the presumption of regularity but allow the defendant to rebut that presumption by merely raising the issue and producing some evidence that counsel was not present and was not waived. This is enough to shift the burden to the state to affirmatively prove either representation or waiver by at least a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 857, 865 (Ind. 1985); Middleton v. State, 67 Md.App. 159, 161, 506 A.2d 1191, 1200 (1985), cert. denied, 308 Md. 146, 517 A.2d 771 (1986); State v. Smith, 66 N.C.App. 570, 579, 312 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1984).
Although this Court has not directly addressed the issue, we considered a somewhat analogous question in State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1597, 99 L.Ed.2d 911 (1988). In Branch, the State introduced evidence of three prior convictions based on the defendant’s guilty pleas. The defendant attacked his habitual criminal conviction by contending that the State had failed to prove that his prior guilty pleas were voluntary. This Court acknowledged that an involuntary guilty plea could not be used to support an habitual criminal conviction. 743 P.2d at 1192 (citing Bur-gett ). However, the defendant did not assert that his pleas were, in fact, involuntary. Rather he contended that the State *149had failed to affirmatively prove that the pleas were voluntary.
We invoked what was in effect a presumption of the regularity of the proceedings leading to the prior convictions because the defendant had been represented by counsel. We stated:
[I]n the absence of any evidence demonstrating the pleas were involuntary, the pleas are presumed to have been voluntary. See Moxley v. Morris, 655 P.2d 640, 641 (Utah 1982). A defendant can overcome this presumption by presenting to the trial court some evidence of involuntariness, thus shifting back to the State the burden of demonstrating volun-tariness. The defendant is the party who can most readily demonstrate that the pleas were involuntarily made if they indeed were....
Id. at 1192-93; see also State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1985). Similarly, the defendant here is in the best position to raise the issue of lack of counsel for earlier convictions.
We hold that the procedure followed by the third group of courts discussed above most realistically balances the various policies at issue while fully protecting the right to counsel upon which Baldosar and Bur-gett are founded. As we observed in Branch, the defendant is the one best situated to know whether his or her sixth amendment right was infringed in the earlier proceedings; therefore, it is appropriate to presume that the right to counsel has been observed unless the defendant affirmatively contends to the contrary.
To be specific, when a defendant is charged as an habitual criminal, the State bears the burden of proving the prior conviction, sentencing, and commitment as required by section 76-8-1001. A previous judgment of conviction so proven is entitled to a presumption of regularity, including a presumption that the defendant was represented by counsel. This presumption satisfies any initial burden the State may have of proving that the defendant had or knowingly waived counsel. After proof of the previous conviction is introduced, the burden is on the defendant to raise the issue and produce some evidence that he or she was not represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel. Once the defendant has presented some evidence, the presumption of regularity is rebutted and the burden shifts to the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was in fact represented or knowingly waived representation.
Returning to the instant case, once the State introduced exhibit 9, the presumption of regularity applied; Triptow then had the burden of raising the Baldasar-Burgett issue and coming forward with some evidence that he was not represented by counsel during his prior convictions and had not waived counsel. However, he did not raise the issue and failed to proffer any competent evidence to rebut the presumption. Therefore, the presumption of the regularity of the prior convictions stands.
The conviction is affirmed.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur.

. Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for felony offenses at least one of which offenses having been at least a felony of the second degree or a crime which, if committed within this state would have been a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of second degree, and was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a felony of the second degree committed in this state, other than murder in the first or second degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state prison for from five years to life.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978).

. The sixth amendment provides as follows: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const, amend. VI.
The Utah Constitution provides for a similar right. Utah Const, art. 1, § 12, see, e.g., Kuehnert v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 P.2d 839 (1972). However, Triptow has not raised and we do not reach the question of how the state constitutional right would apply in this case. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988).

. In Burgett, the record of the prior conviction on its face raised the presumption that the defendant was denied the right to counsel. 389 U.S. at 114-15, 88 S.Ct. at 261-62. In Baldasar, the state introduced evidence of a prior misdemeanor conviction for the purpose of reclassifying a misdemeanor theft charge as a felony. The record showed that the defendant had not been represented by a lawyer in the prior proceeding and had not formally waived counsel. 446 U.S. at 223, 100 S.Ct. at 1585-86. Under Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), the defendant was not entitled to counsel for the earlier misdemeanor prosecution because he had not been ultimately sentenced to jail. Baldasar turned on whether such an uncounseled, but otherwise valid, misdemeanor conviction could support the reclassification of a subsequent misdemeanor as a felony, not on whether the state had the burden of proving representation by counsel for the prior proceeding. The Court held that the prior un-counseled conviction, even though valid in its *148own right under Scott, could not be used to elevate the subsequent misdemeanor theft sentence to a felony when the consequence was to increase the exposure to jail time. See 446 U.S. at 226, 100 S.Ct. at 1587 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Wang v. Withworth, 811 F.2d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051, 107 S.Ct. 2185, 95 L.Ed.2d 842 (1987).

. Some of the cases cited here have considered the burden of proof question in the same context as the present case — the use of a prior conviction to support an habitual offender determination. Other courts have addressed the question in other contexts, including the use of a prior conviction as an aggravating factor in a sentencing proceeding or for the purpose of raising a subsequent crime from a misdemeanor to a felony. For our purposes, we see no need to distinguish between such cases, as they all address the same central question, although in somewhat different contexts.