Court Opinion

ID: 8864603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 18:00:30.353021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:05:57.159384
License: Public Domain

TAFT, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). The law governing the reciprocal duties of employer and employé with reference to the safe condition of the place where the employé is to work, or of the machinery and tools with which he is to do his work, is well settled. It is the duty of the employer to exercise ordinary care to provide and maintain a reasonably safe place in which the employé is to perform his services, so that the employé shall not be exposed to unnecessary and unreasonable risks. The employé has the right to presume, when directed to work in a particular place, that reasonable care has been exercise'd by his employer to see that the place is free from danger, and, in reliance upon such presumption, may discharge his duties in such place, unless there are obvious dangers which would lead a reasonably prudent em-ployé either to refuse to work in the place, or to make complaint of the same to his master. If, however, the danger is not actually known to the employé, or would not become known to an employé of reasonable prudence performing the duties imposed on him, he cannot be charged with contributory negligence in the happening of an injury to him by reason of the condition of the place in which he works. Norman v. Railroad Co., 22 U. S. App. 505, 10 C. C. A. 617, and 62 Fed. 727. In the case last cited, we referred to the clear and comprehensive statement of the law by Judge Sanborn, speaking for the Eighth circuit, in the case of Railway Co. v. Jarvi, 10 U. S. App. 439, 448, 3 C. C. A. 436, and 53 Fed. 68. In that case the *575plaintiff was a miner, who was injured by tlie falling of a large stone from the roof of a mine; and the question was whether the plaintiff had been reckless, in not knowing or discovering the dangerous condition of the roof from which the stone fell. The learned judge, speaking of the obligation of the servant, said:
“ILe cannot recklessly expose liimseli! to a known danger, or to a danger wliieli an ordinarily prudent and intelligent man would, in Ms situation, have apprehended, and then recover of the master for an injury which his own recklessness has caused. * * * But the degrees of care in the use of a place in which work is to he done, or in the use of other instrumentalities for its performance, required of the master and servant in a particular case, may he, and generally are, widely different. Each is required to exercise that degree of «care in the performance of his duty 'which a reasonably prudent person would use under like circumstances; but the circumstances in which the master is placed are generally so widely different from those surrounding the servant, and the primary duty of using care' to furnish a reasonably safe place for others is so much higher than the duty of the servant to use reasonable care to protect himself in a case where the primary duty of providing a safe place or safe machinery rests on the master, that a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily use a higher degree of care to keep the place of work reasonably safe, if placed in the position of the master who furnishes it, than if placed in that of the servant who occupies it.”
The only point upon which we feel the slightest doubt in this case arises upon the motion which was made by the defendant, at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, to take the case away from the jury aud direct a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the plaintiff must have known the dangers incident to the use of the machine from the use of which the injury happened, and must therefore have assumed the risk. Now that the accident has happened, now that the measurements are given, now that the weight of the cores is accurately known, now that the narrow range of the point of equilibrium in the standards, with the use of the wedges, is clearly shown, it may be difficult to understand how any one with 'the slightest knowledge of mechanics could fail to appreciate the dangers arising from the use of this car with the cores adjusted as they were. But it must he borne in mind that the plaintiff was a common laborer, that the question of the safety of the machine had been brought to the attention of the superintendent and managers of the foundry, that the car had been operated for six months without injury, and that the plaintiff had a right to assume that his master would exercise due care in his behalf in keeping the machinery and appliances safe. In the light' of these considerations, we cannot say that the question of plaintiff’s negligence, or the question of the amount of risk which he assumed, was not a question for the jury. It was left to them, with the proper and discriminating statements of the law, and applications of the law to the facts. The jury found that the circumstances were such that he was not charged with the knowledge of the danger incident to the use of that machine. We do not think the course of the court, in leaving this issue open to he settled by tlie jury, was erroneous.
It is argued further that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in running by the side of the car at the time of tlie injury, — a place from which he had been warned by Ms superior, it was said. The question whether he had been warned from this place, and whether *576it was negligence in him to be there, and, indeed, whether it was not necessary, in the discharge of his duty, that he should be there, were all left to the jury by proper charges of the court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.