Court Opinion

ID: 9709289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:44:13.463498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.009749
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DiVITO, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority’s vacatur of defendants’ convictions for aggravated battery of a senior citizen under the one-act-one-crime rule; with its affirmance of defendants’ convictions for aggravated discharge of a firearm; and with its holding that the aggravated discharge of a firearm statute is constitutional. I respectfully dissent, however, from its reversal of defendants’ convictions for aggravated battery with a firearm and from its judgment remanding the cases to the circuit court for resentencing. When two persons are illegally shooting at each other (committing the felony of aggravated discharge of a weapon) and one of them inadvertently shoots an innocent bystander, it is unacceptable that neither should be considered culpable because it cannot be determined whose bullet wounded the victim. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the well-established principle that a "defendant is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts.” People v. Terrell (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 178, 204, 547 N.E.2d 145, 156, cert. denied (1990), 459 U.S. 959, 109 L. Ed. 2d 749, 110 S. Ct. 2567. One natural and probable consequence of two people shooting at each other is that someone is going to get shot. The majority states that it has found no case where, as here, defendants shooting at each other were held accountable for each other’s conduct. Nonetheless, we should so hold in this case. One is accountable for the actions of another when "[ejither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” (720 ILCS 5/5 — 2(c) (West 1992).) The majority correctly states that "[t]he principal attribute of accountability is the showing of affirmative conduct by an accomplice that in some way aids, encourages or incites another to commit a crime.” (273 Ill. App. 3d at 420.) Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that, when someone is shot, each of the participants in an illegal gunfight is guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm both by his own actions and by accountability for the actions of the other. There can be no gunfight without at least two participants, and each participant aids and abets the others in furtherance of a common criminal design. Further, I would also hold the doctrine of transferred intent applicable to this case. Since I would hold each defendant culpable by reason of accountability for the actions of the other, it does not matter which of the defendants actually fired the bullet that struck Reverend Vinson. Whichever one did so is guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm based on the doctrine of transferred intent, and the other is guilty of aggravated battery with a firearm based on a combination of accountability for the actions of the other and the other’s transferred intent. I disagree with the majority that People v. Lopez (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 713, 391 N.E.2d 105, is on point. We should not compare that case, where one of the defendants had to be not guilty, to this one, where each might be held responsible for the natural and probable consequences of his actions. I understand that virtually all of the cases treating factual situations analogous to this one address the issue in terms of accountability or felony murder. Some of the language from the felony murder cases, however, supports the State’s position here. In Terrell, for example, our supreme court held that the murder in that case was sustainable "under any or all three sections of the murder statute.” (Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d at 204, 547 N.E.2d at 155.) In People v. Rosochacki (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 483, 244 N.E.2d 136, the supreme court approved jury instructions on all three versions of murder even though the defendant in that case was charged only with intentional murder. (See also People v. Allen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 865, 42 L. Ed. 2d 102, 95 S. Ct. 120.) Given those cases, the State’s argument here should not be dismissed simply by stating that the cases it cites are dependent on felony murder, as the majority does. In People v. Brackett (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 170, 510 N.E.2d 877, an 85-year-old woman died as a result of choking on her food one month after she had been beaten and raped by the defendant. The defendant was held responsible for her death because her injuries precluded insertion of a nasal feeding tube and caused her to be unable to expel food lodged in her trachea. The supreme court discussed the natural consequences of the defendant’s actions and the fact that the defendant was not relieved of responsibility for murder because he could not foresee the precise manner of the victim’s death. In commenting on the issue of causation and the deference to be afforded the fact finder’s conclusions, the court employed words that apply equally well here: "Causal relationship is a question of fact which should be left to the trier of fact [citation], and we will not disturb this verdict unless this evidence is so unreasonable, improbable and unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt [citation].” Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 177, 510 N.E.2d at 813. I would affirm the judgments for aggravated battery with a firearm.