Court Opinion

ID: 9378472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 17:03:13.621837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.526157
License: Public Domain

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

                                            )
ERIC HILLER,                                )
     Plaintiff,                             )
                                            )
            v.                              )     C.A. NO. N21C-12-020 DJB
                                            )
CITY OF REHOBOTH BEACH                      )
             Defendant.                     )

                                   OPINION

                  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss - GRANTED

Michele Allen, Esquire, Michele D. Allen, LLC., Attorney for Plaintiff

Daniel A. Griffith, Esquire, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, LLP, Attorney for
Defendant

BRENNAN, J.
      On September 3, 2017, Plaintiff Eric Hiller (hereinafter “Hiller”), a then-

police officer with the Rehoboth Beach Police Department (hereinafter “RBPD”)

and another officer transported a female defendant to Sussex Correctional Institute.1

Upon arrival, the female defendant accused Hiller of “inappropriate behavior during

the transport.”2 Following the misconduct allegations, RBPD launched an internal

affairs investigation into Hiller.3 Ultimately, Hiller’s employment was terminated.

As an employee-officer of the RBPD, Hiller was a member of the General Teamsters

Local No. Union 326. The Teamsters Union negotiated and operated under a

collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter “CBA”) with the Defendant, City of

Rehoboth Beach (hereinafter “the City”). The Article 7 of the collective bargaining

agreement with RBPD and the General Teamsters Local No. Union 326, affiliated

with The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO (the “Union”) governs

RBPD’s employee disciplinary procedures.4

      Prior to instituting this suit, Hiller challenged his termination in multiple

ways, including filing a Writ of Mandamus in this Court. Following the denial of

that action, the instant suit was filed. Now, Defendant moves to dismiss Hiller’s

Complaint. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.

1
      Id. ¶¶ 16-18.
2
      Id. ¶ 18.
3
      Id. ¶ 23.
4
      Defendant Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B (hereinafter “CBA”) at 1, Mar. 25, 2022 (D.I. 5).
I.    PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      All parties agree that the CBA is the controlling document to this dispute.

Section 7.1 of the CBA provides that the City may discipline police officers “for just

cause as established by substantial evidence.”5 Any disciplinary action should “be

progressive in nature,”6 unless the alleged conduct is “of an extreme nature.”7 In

those extreme cases, the City may issue an emergency suspension.8 Further, Section

7.2 incorporates and adopts Delaware’s Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights

(“DELEOBOR”).9

      If a dispute arises under the CBA, Article 9 sets forth a three-step plan for

resolution. First, if informal resolution discussions fail, either the employee or the

Union must submit a written grievance to the chief of RBPD.10 Following any such

ruling, the Union may appeal the decision to the Defendant’s City Manager.11 If the

Union remains unsatisfied with the City Manager’s decision, the Union may submit

the grievance to binding arbitration with the American Arbitration Association.12

5
      Id. § 7.1.
6
      Id. § 7.10.
7
      Id. § 7.12.
8
      Id.
9
      Id. §7.2.
10
      Id. § 9.3.1.
11
      Id.
12
      Id. § 9.6, 9.13.
      Hiller initially claimed RBPD violated his rights under both DELEOBOR and

multiple sections of the CBA throughout its investigation.13 Hiller was initially

charged with multiple violations of police procedure and policy on July 14, 2018. 14

Ultimately, the investigation continued and on March 12, 2019, RBPD issued its

final investigative findings.15 Three days later, the City, through RBPD, filed

charges against Hiller, including violations of (1) Rule 800 Professional Standards

Investigation; (2) Rule 400 Dishonesty; and (3) Rule 302 Rules of Conduct.16

Pursuant to DELEOBOR, Hiller was entitled to a disciplinary hearing on the charges

against him.17 An impartial board of officers (hereinafter the “Trial Board”)18 held

the hearing on April 29, 2019, and May 19, 2019.19 The Trial Board issued its ruling

on July 12, 2019, which sustained Hiller’s Rule 800 charge, but dismissed the

charges under Rule 400 and Rule 302.20

      The Trial Board further found that RBPD committed multiple violations of

DELEOBOR during its investigation of Hiller.21 Nevertheless, the City terminated

13
      Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-39.
14
      Id. ¶ 28.
15
      Id. ¶ 41.
16
      Id. ¶¶ 42, 45.
17
      See 11 Del. C. § 9203.
18
      The procedures for the hearing, including the selection of the board members, are set
      forth under 11 Del. C. § 9205.
19
      Am. Compl. ¶ 43.
20
      Id. ¶¶ 44-45.
21
      Id. ¶¶ 47-52.
Hiller’s employment on July 17, 2019.22 Hiller appealed his termination, which the

City denied on September 20, 2019.23 Following his appeal, Hiller alleges he

grieved his termination following the procedures outlined in the CBA between the

City and the Union.24

      On October 17, 2019, Hiller filed a Writ of Mandamus in this Court (the

“Mandamus Action”) seeking to reverse the City’s decision to affirm his termination

and requesting reinstatement as an RBPD officer.25 On September 18, 2020, this

Court denied Hiller relief, ruling “…other remedies were available to Hiller;

therefore, the Court declines to exercise the exceptional remedy of mandamus.”26

This Court, however, went on to address the merits of Hiller’s case and determined

that Hiller’s violation of Rule 800 permitted termination as a possible punishment.27

In addressing RBPD’s DELEOBOR violations, the Court found the violations were

“mere technical ones” which did not warrant mandamus relief.28

      On December 2, 2021, Hiller filed the instant breach of contract action,

claiming that the City violated multiple sections of the CBA.29 In addition, Hiller

22
      Id. ¶ 53.
23
      Id. ¶¶ 55-57.
24
      Id. ¶ 58.
25
      Id. ¶ 59. See Hiller v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 2020 WL 5637053 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept.
      18, 2020).
26
      Hiller, 2020 WL 5637053, at *3.
27
      Id. at *4.
28
      Id.
29
      D.I. 1.
asserts RBPD also breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

inhered in the CBA. After the City filed an initial motion to dismiss, the parties

stipulated to the filing of an Amended Complaint.30 Thereafter, the City renewed its

motion and filed the pending Motion to Dismiss.31               Following briefing, oral

argument was held, at which time the Court requested additional briefing on any

arguments under Article 9 of the CBA.32 This is the Court’s decision on the City’s

Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

      When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule

12(b)(6), the court must decide “whether a plaintiff may recover under any

reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof under the

complaint.”33 Under this Rule, the Court must:

             (1) accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2)
             accept even vague allegations as “well pleaded” if they
             give the opposing party notice of the claim, (3) draw all
             reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,
             and (4) not dismiss the claims unless the plaintiff would
             not be entitled to recover under any reasonably
             conceivable set of circumstances.34

30
      D.I. 9, 10.
31
      D.I. 11.
32
      D.I. 15.
33
      Vinton v. Grayson, 189 A.3d 695, 700 (Del. Super. 2018) (quoting Superior Court Civil
      Rule 12(b)(6)).
34
      Id. (quoting Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d
      531, 535 (Del. 2011)) (citing Prince v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166
       “The Court, however, need not accept conclusory allegations unsupported by

specific facts or … draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving

party.”35 “If any reasonable conception can be formulated to allow Plaintiffs’

recovery, the motion must be denied.”36

III.   DISCUSSION

       Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint on several grounds.

First and foremost, it contends Hiller lacks standing to enforce the contractual

obligations of the CBA. Second, even should Hiller did have standing, the CBA’s

terms require disputes to be resolved via binding arbitration and thus prohibits a

private right of action to this Court. Third, it claims the doctrine of collateral

estoppel bars this action. Alternatively, should the Court find that Hiller sufficiently

stated a claim for breach of contract, it contends that the implied covenant claim fails

for the lack of standing and as duplicative of Hiller’s breach of contract claim.

       A.     HILLER HAS FAILED TO PLEAD                THAT HE IS A        THIRD-PARTY
              BENEFICIARY TO THE CBA.
       Defendant argues the Amended Complaint is devoid of factual allegations

establishing Hiller as a third-party beneficiary to the CBA. Rather, it contends that

35
       Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP, 2021 WL 3620435, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16,
       2021) (citing Prince v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011),
       overruled on other grounds by Ramsey v. Ga. S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 189 A.3d
       1255, 1277 (Del. 2018)).
36
       Vinton, 189 A.3d at 700 (citing Cent. Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 535).
the Amended Complaint sets forth bare legal conclusions. By contrast, Hiller

maintains that he has pled sufficient facts to allege standing as third-party

beneficiary to the CBA.

      To have standing to sue for breach of contract, a plaintiff must be a party to

the contract or an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract.37 It is undisputed

that Hiller is not a party to the CBA. Rather, Hiller maintains that he has standing

as a third-party beneficiary. To qualify as a third-party beneficiary under Delaware

jurisprudence:

      (i) the contracting parties must have intended that the third party
      beneficiary benefit from the contract, (ii) the benefit must have been
      intended as a gift or in satisfaction of a pre-existing obligation to that
      person, and (iii) the intent to benefit the third party must be a material
      part of the parties’ purpose in entering into the contract.38

      Here, Hiller alleges that as an RBPD officer, he “was entitled” to the

contractual protections of the CBA.39 Hiller then pleads that he “is a third-party

beneficiary of the [CBA]…and as such, has standing to bring suit.”40

37
      Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Alon USA Energy, Inc., 2019 WL 2714331, at *10 (Del. Ch.
      June 28, 2019) (citing NAMA Holdings, LLC v. Related World Mkt. Ctr., LLC, 922 A.2d
      417, 434 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
38
      Encore Preakness, Inc. v. Chestnut Health & Rehab. Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 5068753, at *4
      (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2017) (quoting Madison Realty Partners 7, LLC v. Ag ISA, LLC,
      2001 WL 406268 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2001)).
39
      Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 64.
40
      Id. ¶¶ 9, 65.
      While it can clearly be said that the contracting parties intended officers to

benefit from the CBA, Hiller cannot meet the remaining requirements. In so finding,

Meades v. Wilmington Housing Authority,41 is instructive. Meades addressed the

issue of whether an aggrieved employee, who was not a signatory to a collective

bargaining agreement, has standing to challenge an arbitration award obtained

pursuant to that agreement. In a matter of first impression for Delaware, Meades

held that in that case, there was nothing in the collective bargaining agreement that

evidenced an intention to permit the employees themselves “to assert grievances

individually, or to arbitrate or challenge the results of such proceeds on their own

behalf.”42 The same is true here. The plain language of the CBA belies Hiller’s

claim that he can qualify as a third-party beneficiary.

      As previously noted, Article 9 of the CBA sets forth a three-step plan for

dispute resolution. It is undisputed that the CBA solely authorized the Union to take

the second and third steps in the grievance process. The parties were given the

opportunity post-argument to address Meade’s application to this case. However,

Hiller’s arguments cannot overcome the fact that the Amended Complaint offers no

factual allegations to support the second and third elements of third-party beneficiary

standing, nor can it possibly given the legal precedent set forth in Meades. As

41
      2003 WL 939863 (Del. Chancery. Mar. 6, 2003).
42
      Meades, 2003 WL 939863 at *3.
Meades noted, an aggrieved employee may have a cause of action against the Union

for inaction, such as Hiller claims and has asserted in briefing, but he has no standing

to individually enforce the CBA or bring suit for alleged violations of the CBA, to

which he was not a party, nor a third-party beneficiary.43

       B. EVEN IF HILLER HAS STANDING, THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER
       HILLER’S CLAIMS.

       Hiller filed this breach of contract action on the grounds that the City violated

multiple express and implied terms of the CBA.44 The City contends that the CBA

establishes a grievance procedure for the Union and the City to follow. Even

assuming Hiller has standing under the CBA, which he does not, Hiller is bound by

the procedure and has failed to abide by the CBA’s terms. Specifically, Hiller never

challenged his termination through a grievance, has not established that the Union

breached a duty of fair representation and most importantly, the CBA’s own terms

require disputes under the agreement to be settled through binding arbitration.

       Article 9 of the CBA delineates the grievance procedure the Union and the

City agreed to. Section 9.2.1 defines a grievance as “any unresolved question or

dispute concerning the interpretation and application of this, Agreement.”45 Here,

Hiller alleges multiple disputes under the CBA. The Amended Complaint states that

43
     Id.; see also Jain v. State of Delaware, Department of Health and Social Services, 2012
WL 2051754 (Del. Chancery June 5, 2012).
44
     Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-83.
45
     CBA § 9.2.1.
the City breached Sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.5, 7.10, and 7.12 of the CBA.46 As a result,

Hiller’s claims are governed by the procedure set forth in Article 9 of the CBA.

Under this step, either Hiller or the Union was required to file a written grievance to

the RBPD Chief if informal discussions to resolve the dispute fail.47 In his Amended

Complaint, Hiller pleads that he “grieved his termination in accordance with the

grievance procedures set forth in the [CBA].”48 Hiller attached the purported

grievance as an exhibit to his supplemental brief.49

          The opening line of the professed grievance states, “I am writing this email to

you to serve as the informal discussion as outlined in the [CBA], per Article 9.3.1.”50

Section 9.3.1 requires employees or the Union to file a written grievance after any

informal discussions fail.51 Even if this document can constitute a grievance as

defined by the CBA, the very terms of the CBA require the ultimate resolution

through arbitration. Therefore, the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this civil

suit.52

46
          Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66-76.
47
          CBA § 9.3.1.
48
          Am. Compl. ¶ 58.
49
          Pl.’s Supplemental Br., Ex. 1, July 29, 2022 (D.I. 16).
50
          Id.
51
          CBA § 9.3.1.
52
          Coronado Coal II, LLC v. Blackhawk Land & Res. LLC, 2022 WL 1772246, at *3 (Del.
          Super. Ct. May 31, 2022) (“Delaware courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to resolve
          disputes that litigants contractually agreed to arbitrate.”).
      Hiller, relying on multiple federal cases construing collective bargaining

agreements under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), contends he is

permitted to file a direct civil action against the City for breach of the CBA and that

such an action can be maintained so long as (1) the employee attempted to exhaust

all grievance procedures set forth under the collective bargaining agreement and (2)

the employee’s union breached its duty of fair representation to the employee.

      As the CBA solely authorized the Union to take the second and third steps in

the grievance process, but did not do so here. As a result, Hiller claims he is now

entitled to bring a direct action against the City due to his attempt to grieve. The

Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations asserting misconduct on behalf of

the Union, much less alleging a breach of duty of fair representation, therefore it

fails to adequately plead this claim. Any amendment to the complaint, however,

would be futile, as the NLRA has no application over public employers in this

State.53 Rather, the General Assembly has enacted the Public Employment Relations

Act (“PERA”)54 to “promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between

public employers and their employees” in Delaware.55

53
      29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (“[t]he term ‘employer’ … shall not include the United States or any
      wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or
      political subdivision thereof…”); Unger v. City of Mentor, 387 Fed.Appx. 589, 2010 WL
      2842742, at *3 (6th Cir. July 21, 2010) (finding NLRA “expressly excludes public
      employees” from its protection).
54
      19 Del. C. §§ 1301-19.
55
      Id. § 1301.
      The Union is an “employee organization” as defined under PERA.56 PERA

confers the Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) with jurisdiction to hear

disputes over unfair labor practices, including claims of breach of duty of fair

representation.57 Under Delaware law, “a party is required to exhaust all available

administrative remedies before bringing a claim before the Superior Court.”58 As a

result, even if Hiller had properly alleged a claim against the Union for breach of

fair representation, that claim should have been brought before PERB first.

Accordingly, to the extent Hiller attempts to allege an unfair representation claim,

this Court remains without jurisdiction.

IV.   CONCLUSION

      As a result of the above dispositive findings, to the extent the parties raised
further arguments, there is no need to address those further. For the foregoing
reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

      IT IS SO ORDERED, this 9th day of March, 2023.

56
      Id. § 1302(i) (“‘[e]mployee organization’ means any organization which admits to
      membership employees of a public employer and which has as a purpose the
      representation of such employees in collective bargaining, and includes any person acting
      as an officer, representative, or agent of said organization.”).
57
      Id. § 1308(a); Kmetz v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 171 A.3d 1116, 2017 WL
      4285128, at *2 (Del. Sept. 27, 2017) (TABLE) (holding PERB has jurisdiction to hear
      unfair representation claims under PERA).
58
      Kmetz, 2017 WL 4285128, at *2.