Court Opinion

ID: 9673632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:15:43.013923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:23.268082
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(for affirmance).
I.
I agree with Justice Black that this Court’s construction of section 3030 of the insurance code of 1956 (CLS 1961, § 500.3030 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev §24,13030]), especially since Darr v. Buckley, 355 Mich 392, DeGroff v. Clark, 358 Mich 274, and Felice v. Weinman, 372 Mich 278, has been such as to ban injection of the element of liability insurance either on voir dire or during trial of a lawsuit.
This broad reading of 3030, as Justice Souris points out, covers much greater territory than the plain language of that section. Whether we should so construe 3030 is a subject upon which I will have more to say later. While I agree with Justice Black’s statement of what the interpretation of 3030 has been, I would not reverse for the error that occurred on the voir dire examination because the defendants were not prejudiced by it.
In denying the motion for a mistrial, the court said:
“I do not think that the question of insurance has been so injected in here that it would require a mistrial.”
This Court might disagree with that assessment. But there is more for us to consider than there was before the judge when he made it. Immediately *528after the ruling, counsel for defendants must have agreed with the trial judge because counsel refused the court’s offer of a new jury. One of the impaneled jurors had to be excused. Judge Gilmore stated that he was willing to:
“First, proceed with 11 jurors; second, bring up a panel and impanel one juror to give us 12; or third, discharge this jury completely and impanel a whole new jury.”
Either counsel desired a mistrial or did not. His action in declining a new jury indicated that he had made the motion for mistrial for the sole purpose of preserving error in the event of an unfavorable verdict. While a party involved in litigation should be protected from reversible error, no party has the right to treat a trial as a form of gamesmanship in which one side attempts to outpoint the other or the judge. Error, reversible error, is not something to be sought but, rather, to be avoided. Defendants should have taken the offer of a new jury panel if they felt their rights had been affected.
This case is similar to Snyder v. Mathison, 196 Mich 378. In that case counsel for the plaintiff attempted to examine a juror about his representation of an insurance company. The court ruled the examination improper. Defense counsel, with peremptory challenges remaining, expressed satisfaction with the jury. On review, this Court said:
“No request to charge on the subject was presented, and we think the subsequent announcement of satisfaction operated as a waiver of the matter. William R. Roach & Co. v. Blair, 190 Mich 11.”
In 89 CJS, Trial, § 658, p 503, it is stated:
“Errors and irregularities in the proceedings preliminary to the trial may be waived and cured by *529some affirmative act of the complaining party amounting to an express or implied assent to the proper procedure.”
And, in 4 CJS, Appeal and Error, § 350, p 1169:
“There may he a waiver of exceptions, even though they have been properly taken and saved in the trial court, thus barring their consideration on appeal. Such a waiver is effected where, on a trial, a party takes a step or adopts a course directly inconsistent with the exception previously taken by him to the ruling of the trial court.”
To the same effect, see 22 MLP, Trial, § 381, p 484; 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, § 562, p 42; 13 A West’s Michigan Digest, Trial, § 406, p 643.
II.
Justice Black makes reference to the financial responsibility section of the motor vehicle code (CLS 1961, § 257:504 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2204]), saying:
“The jury reported a total verdict of $20,000 for the two plaintiffs. That amount is the publicly well known minimal requirement, respecting two or more causes arising out of the same accident, of the financial responsibility act (CLS 1961, § 257.504 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2204]).”
To that section may now be added presumed common knowledge of the provisions of the newly-enacted motor vehicle accident claims act (PA 1965, No 198, as amended by PA 1965, No 389 [CL 1948, § 257.1101 et seq. (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 9.2801 et seq.)] ).*
Insurance is so much a fact of life today it is unrealistic to expect that it can be completely excluded *530from the minds of jurors. One could speculate that the merits of a plaintiff’s case are now circumscribed by the known limits commonly in force in insurance policies, and that consequently the fact of insurance being injected into a case, rather than being advantageous, is detrimental to a badly injured plaintiff. Whether insurance presents “easy-money implications” or a limitation on recovery no doubt depends upon the mind of the particular juror or the composite mind of a particular jury. This is little different from the possibility of prejudice in a lawsuit between a rich defendant and poor plaintiff, or a big corporation and a widow. The focus of a trial ought always to be upon the merits of the controversy and the effect of this “fact” of insurance should be eliminated from the jury’s performance of its duty by a judge’s conduct of the trial.
However, no means has yet been devised to obtain juries completely bereft of all knowledge of the world. A jury forms its judgment not only from the evidence in a case but from its own worldly knowledge — of automobiles, of people, and of pain and suffering. Most juries today are bound to assume, in view of the financial responsibility act, in view of the motor vehicle accident claims act, in view of "the fact of insurance generally, that an invisible party stands behind one or possibly both litigants. This does not mean an end to jury trials or that juries no longer are able to decide issues between actual parties to litigation. Anyone with faith in the fair-mindedness of juries must make the contrary assumption.
The fact that insurance, particularly a juror’s connection with the industry, may be mentioned should be no more reason for a mistrial than the fact that automobiles sometimes run over people, that pain, agony, and even death, result from crushed bodies. Such facts can also prejudice juries.
*531Certainly no particular insurance company that is the insurer of a party should be injected into the voir dire or the trial; but the general fact that insurance is to afford recompense to those who have been injured is bound to be in the minds of jurors whether injected by counsel or not. The attempt of this Court to exclude it by the broad reading it has given section 3030 is foredoomed to failure. I would give that section the construction Justice Souris has set forth in his opinion.
I vote to affirm the trial judge.

 PA 1965, No 198, became effective November 1, 1965.