Court Opinion

ID: 9847511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:01:05.75684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:18.683589
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the defendant was not entitled to the right of confrontation; the hearsay evidence rule has not been violated.
On direct examination, the prosecuting attorney asked Deputy Sheriff Livingston these questions :
“Q. Did you take out the warrants in this case, Mr. Livingston ?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. Did you take it from information you learned in your investigation ?”
(Objection made by defense counsel.)
(Question was repeated and objection was denied.)
“A. Yes, sir, I did.”
After reserving his objection, defense counsel on cross examination asked the following question:
“Q. Now, I want to ask you one question, and you answer it yes or no, will you, sir. Was this warrant taken on information received from Mr. Holtzclaw ?
“A. No, sir.”
The hearsay rule merely prohibits one from proving a fact in the trial of a case by reciting that someone made a *462statement which if believed would prove that fact. Here, the officer only stated in effect that he took out a warrant based on information which he gained in his investigation. It was not submitted for the purpose of proving that the information he received was correct. It was merely for the purpose of indicating the reason for signing the warrant. The testimony was admissible as far as the hearsay rule is concerned. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1789 (3rd ed. 1940, Supp. 1972).
A defendant is not entitled to confront all persons who give to police officers information which brings about an arrest warrant. The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity to cross examine. The basic right which the law of confrontation assures to a defendant is the privilege of cross examination.
“The right to subject opposing testimony to cross examination is the right to have the Hearsay rule enforced; for the Hearsay rule is the rule requiring cross examination . . .”. 5 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1397 (3rd ed. 1940).
Assuming, without so deciding, that the officer’s testimony to the effect that he took the warrant based on information procured, was irrelevant as argued by counsel, there was no prejudice.
It is common knowledge that warrants are taken out by police officers after investigations are made and after information is procured. The fact that a warrant was taken after an investigation was made does not infer guilt any more than the fact that a defendant is being tried infers guilt.
In addition, the question of relevancy is largely within the trial judge’s discretion. 9 South Carolina Digest, Evidence, Key No. 99 (1952, Supp. 1972). The record does not show any abuse of discretion, or any likelihood of undue prejudice.
The argument that the jury concluded that this defendant was guilty because inferentially the investigating officer *463learned enough about the facts to conclude that there was probable cause to swear out a warrant is, in my view, a farfetched interpretation of the evidence. I am more inclined to think that the jury concluded that the defendant was guilty because the victim pointed him out as being a participant in the robbery.
I would affirm.