Court Opinion

ID: 9761052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:30:09.9154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:21:02.840409
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I understand only enough of the majority opinion to know I disagree with it. The only issue before us, as I understand it, is whether the Commissioner tolled the limitations of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-4715(a) by sending the taxpayers notice of proposed assessment pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-4718. I do not believe he did so. When a statute is plain and unambiguous it needs no interpretation and we cannot seek other aids of interpretation. Ellison v. Oliver, 147 Ark. 252, 227 S.W. 586 (1921). Statutes and constitutional provisions are considered in the same manner. Snodgrass v. City of Pocahontas, 189 Ark. 819, 75 S.W.2d 223 (1934). We approach a statute or constitutional provision with the idea that it says that it means and means what it says. Hargraves v. Solomon, 178 Ark. 11, 9 S.W.2d 797 (1928). We should not be concerned with the wisdom or expediency of the Constitution or legislative enactments. It is our duty to carry out the provisions of the law as indicated by its plain language. Hargraves v. Solomon, supra. If it becomes necessary to construe a statute, it is our duty to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Shinn v. Heath, 259 Ark. 577, 535 S.W.2d 57 (1976). We are dealing here with that part of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-4715(a) which states: “The Commissioner shall not begin court proceedings after the expiration of the three (3) year period unless there has been a previous assessment for the collection of the tax.” The appellant’s whole argument appears to be that this statute does not mean what it says or say what it means. The argument boiled down to its simplest form is that “assessment” means “notice of proposed assessment” as described in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-4718 (a). Both terms are used in the same act; therefore, they surely have different meanings. I think Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-4715 (a) says that the commissioner cannot commence court proceedings unless an assessment was made before the expiration of three years. The statute is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, we should not resort to other aids in interpreting the act. 688 S.W.2d 301 I would affirm the trial court. Hickman, J. joins in this dissent. Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing April 29, 1985 Steele Hays, Justice. In this supplemental opinion we address appellee’s continued insistence that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-4715(a) imposes on the Commissioner of Revenues a duty to issue the final assessment within three years or lose the right to pursue further efforts to collect a deficiency in income tax, an issue which has given us considerable difficulty. Restated, the question is whether the legislature intended by § 84-4715(a) to allow three years in which the commissioner could commence a challenge to the sufficiency of an income tax return, or to allow three years in which the commissioner must complete the process of challenging a return, including any time necessary for administrative review. We held in our opinion on March 11, 1985, that the three year limit applies to the commencement of the process, interpreting the word “assessment,” as used in § 84-4715(a), to refer to the proposed assessment. Of course, if the process must be completed in three years (unless extended by agreement between the commissioner and the taxpayer) then the word “assessment” refers to the final assessment. We adhere to our original position for the reasons stated previously and because we believe the history of our income tax laws supports that conclusion. Our initial income tax legislation, the Income Tax Act of 1929 (Act 118) provided that if the commissioner determined that an income tax return was deficient he had two years within which to act by giving notice to the taxpayer, who then had thirty days in which to confer with the commissioner “as to the proposed assessment.’’ (Our italics.) See Section 26 of Act 118. No other administrative review was provided. Ten years later, Act 140 of 1939 was adopted amending Act 118. As with Act 118, no other administrative review was provided, except that the taxpayer was given thirty days in which to confer with the commissioner over “the proposed assessment. ” The 1939 Act, however, did include a provision permitting the taxpayer and the commissioner to extend the time by written agreement. The amendments included a provision increasing the time allowed the commissioner to commence the process from two years to three years. This same limitation of time was included in the provisions of Act 401 of 1979, “The Arkansas Tax Procedure Act.” The 1939 amendment makes it entirely clear the assessment which must occur within the three years is not the final assessment, as appellee urges, but the proposed assessment, as the amendment uses the identical language used in Act 118, i.e. “The taxpayer against whom such assessment has been made shall have an opportunity within thirty days to confer with the commissioner as to the proposed assessment.” When the Tax Procedure Act of 1979 (Act 401) was adopted, this provision allowing three years appeared in restructured form (See § 15) and the rewording failed to make it clear that the assessment referred to is the proposed assessment and not the final assessment. However, nothing in Act 401 suggests there was any intent by the legislature to shorten the three year period which had prevailed over forty years in which the commissioner could commence his challenge to an income tax return by issuing the proposed assessment. The petition for rehearing is denied.