Court Opinion

ID: 9678169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:13:21.435079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:02.313295
License: Public Domain

McCRAW, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the opinion of the majority reversing the judgment of the trial court, vacating the permanent injuction, and finding the Board of Adjustment order void. I write to express my disagreement with the majority’s commingling of the proper, abuse of discretion test with the substantial evidence test, in certiorari review of board of adjustment orders.
In my view, the majority properly stated that the correct standard of review of a Board of Adjustment proceeding as per Nu-Way Emulsions, Inc. v. City of Dalworthington Gardens, 617 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.1981), is abuse of discretion. Then the majority overlooks the Texas Supreme Court’s express rejection of the use of the substantial evidence test for reviewing a zoning board’s decisions, Nu-way, 617 S.W.2d at 189 (citing City of San Angelo v. Boehme Bakery, 144 Tex. 281, 190 S.W.2d 67, 71 (1945)), and attempts to wrongfully measure abuse of discretion by substantial evidence standards. In a certiorari proceeding determining whether a city’s Board of Adjustment has abused its discretion, the reviewing court is to consider the verified return along with all the evidence introduced, and from a consideration of the whole, determine whether or not the board abused its discretion. Whether the board abused its discretion is a question of law. The court makes its determination by *811viewing the whole record and upholds the Board’s actions if it could not be held that it had abused its discretion. City of San Angelo, 190 S.W.2d at 70.
In its past decisions, this court has incorrectly applied the substantial evidence test as the standard of review for determining the legality of a Board of Adjustment's order. The substantial evidence test as set out in White v. City of Dallas, 517 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1974, no writ) states that if the evidence before the court, taken as a whole, is such that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion reached by the Board, then the order must be sustained. The substantial evidence test is used in White, 517 S.W.2d at 348; Swain v. Board of Adjustment, 433 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and City of Dallas v. Fifley, 359 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) in reliance upon Jacobson v. Preston Forest Shopping Center, Inc., 359 S.W.2d 156, 159-60 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Jacobson is a writ of certiorari which complains of a decision by the Dallas Board of Adjustment. The test pronounced in that opinion is based upon Thomas v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 145 Tex. 270, 198 S.W.2d 420, 421 (1946) (a Railroad Commission case); Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S.W.2d 424, 440-41 (1946) (a Railroad Commission case); Huguley v. Board of Adjustment, 341 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1960, no writ) (a Board of Adjustment case that cites the above cases); and Board of Adjustment v. Underwood, 332 S.W.2d 583 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1960, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (which merely mentions the substantial evidence test); City of Dallas v. Stevens, 310 S.W.2d 750, 755 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (involving an “administrative agency” — not the Board of Adjustment). These cases are all dependent upon Trapp, a case involving a Railroad Commission decision. In City of San Angelo the Texas Supreme Court expressly states that it does not approve of the court of appeals decision which likened the certiorari procedure in a review of a Board of Adjustment decision to an appeal from an order of the Railroad Commission. The Supreme Court stated that the two proceedings are not strictly analogous. The certiorari proceeding is governed by the zoning statute, and from that statute’s provisions, the courts are to determine the scope of judicial review. City of San Angelo, 190 S.W.2d at 69; see TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 1011a (Pamph.1986). The Railroad Commission’s powers are designated in section 81.053 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. Although the Board of Adjustment and the Railroad Commission are both quasi-judicial bodies with fact finding responsibilities, the Railroad Commission has the additional power to make rules and orders. Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, 81 (1930); TEX.NAT.RES.CODE ANN. sec. 85.202 (Vernon 1978). It may enforce these orders and rules by requiring attendance of witnesses and through its contempt power. TEX.NAT.RES.CODE ANN. sec. 81.053 (Vernon 1978). The Board of Adjustment’s powers are limited to those enumerated by the city’s zoning regulations. Swain, 433 S.W.2d 731. The Dallas Board of Adjustment is merely a fact finding body. Dallas Development Code section 513.102. These differences in conferred powers could explain the Texas Supreme Court’s reasoning in requiring differing standards of review for the Board orders as opposed to those of the Railroad Commission rulings.
The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the evaluator’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Landry v. Traveler’s Insurance Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.1970); Bennett v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, no writ). The Board’s duties at the September 1984 hearing were two-fold: (1) to devise a plan whereby the full value of the structure can be amortized within a definite time period, Dallas Development Code section 51-3.102(c)(4); and (2) to provide a termination date for the nonforming use, having due regard for the investment in the said use, Dallas Development Code *812Section 51-4.704(a)(l). We must review the Board’s actions, and “from a consideration of the whole” determine if the board complied with its duties, or abused its discretion. At the hearing, no plan for amortization of the full value of the structure within a definite time period was devised. I find this to be a “very clear” abuse of discretion. The Board was charged under the code to set a termination date, having due regard for investment. An instanter date was set. I find this action to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. I find the Board’s action exceeded its powers, thereby committing an abusive act. For the above reasons and from a consideration of the whole, I would hold the Board of Adjustment order void.