Court Opinion

ID: 9860840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:34:03.92191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:45.455153
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I believe a proper application of our standards of review leads to a conclusion contrary to that reached by the majority. The admissibility of a confession is to be determined by the trial court by examining the totality of circumstances. On appeal, we will review the trial court’s determination to determine only whether there was substantial evidence of probative value from which the court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was properly advised of his rights, that he waived his rights, and that the confession was voluntarily given. We will not reweigh the evidence, nor will we disturb a trial court’s judgment when it is based upon conflicting evidence. See, e. g., Holleman v. State, (1980) Ind., 400 N.E.2d 123; Richardson v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 61, 373 N.E.2d 874. With these principles in mind, I shall examine the majority’s opinion and the facts of this case in more detail.
The majority opinion unduly emphasizes the second advisement of rights given to Edwards, and seems to cast off, as unimportant, the first advisement given. I agree that the record reveals precious little specific evidence concerning the content of the second advisement. If this had been the only set of warnings given, we would possibly be presented with a different case. The fact remains, however, that Officer Mak testified that he did fully advise Edwards of his rights. Nonetheless, as the majority opinion acknowledges, the police clearly advised Edwards of his Miranda rights earlier that day. In fact, Edwards executed a waiver of his rights at that time.
*228The majority distinguishes the two interrogation sessions by pointing out that Edwards was not a “suspect” when the first session took place. In the present context, the fact that he was not a “suspect” at that time is irrelevant. His status as a “non-suspect” does not change the fact that he was warned of his constitutional rights and that police took care to obtain a signed waiver of those rights. The police officers’ subjective and preliminary assessment of Edwards’ possible culpability bears no relation to the completeness of the warnings, nor to the validity of the waiver Edwards executed. Undoubtedly, the two questioning sessions appeared — in their procedure and format — very nearly the same to the key figure: Edwards, who, the record reflects, was very cooperative during both sessions.
By emphasizing that Edwards was not a “suspect” at the time of the first interrogation, the majority implies that this session was something less significant than a “custodial interrogation” under Miranda. If the first questioning session was not a “custodial interrogation” then the police officers, by fully advising Edwards of his rights, went further than they were constitutionally required to go; Miranda’s requirements apply only to “custodial interrogations.” The majority now concentrates on the second, apparently incomplete advisement — to the detriment of the first — and thereby holds that there was insufficient evidence to show that Edwards was fully advised of his rights. Under Miranda then, the majority would hold the confession was improperly admitted into evidence. Thus, the majority effectively holds that police behavior which affords greater protection regarding interrogations than Miranda and its progeny require should not be included in the totality of circumstances which the trial court must examine in determining the completeness of the warnings and the validity of the waiver.
If the first questioning session was a “custodial interrogation,” then, under Miranda, the police were required to advise Edwards of his rights. It is undisputed that they did so. Thus, the requirements of Miranda were, in fact, complied with before the confession was obtained. The length of time between Edwards’ first waiver and his confession (assuming the second waiver was invalid due to insufficient warnings) is merely one more factor for the trial court to consider. Thus, the majority’s conclusion, that “[t]he record before us provides no assurance that appellant was completely and accurately advised of rights and matter required by the Miranda case prior to his admission of guilt upon custodial interrogation,” is simply not correct.
The requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, were summarized in that case as follows:
“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive ef-fectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.”
Id. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07.
I do not read Miranda or its progeny as requiring a fresh set of warnings prior to each interrogation session, regardless of when or how frequently those sessions occur, and regardless of other circumstances present in the case. Such a per se rule would tend to exalt form over substance, and would often produce strange results, as *229this case exemplifies. Edwards never indicated “in any manner at any stage of the process” that he did not wish to talk to police or that he wished to talk to an attorney. As the second questioning session began, the police were dealing with an individual who had received the full warnings, had executed a waiver of his rights, and who wished — as he had done all along — to be very cooperative with them. He never indicated that he wished to withdraw the waiver and assert his rights. In the face of these facts, the majority now holds, in effect, that the police were required under Miranda to give Edwards this second set of warnings. Even assuming the second set of warnings was inadequate, the majority does not explain why the first set of warnings and Edwards’ waiver of his rights were no longer valid when the second session began.
Of course, there could be eases where repeating the advisements would be necessary to insure that the accused is aware of his constitutional rights — for example, if a significant period of time elapsed between the first advisement, waiver, and questioning session, and a subsequent session. I certainly do not place this case in that category. Moreover, such cases would not justify a per se rule requiring Miranda warnings on each occasion, as the majority appears to be fashioning here. Each case must be decided by examining the totality of circumstances.
The majority suggests that giving due weight to the first advisement improperly “infers the completeness and accuracy of the oral [second] advisement.” Maj. op. at 226. The first advisement, of course, does nothing of the sort. What it does infer, in looking at all of the facts, is the adequacy of the warnings which were given and the validity of the waiver. The first advisement, which, again, the majority acknowledges was complete under Miranda, is one factor which must be considered in examining the totality of circumstances as they were presented to the trial court.
In fact, the first complete advisement, and Edwards’ subsequent waiver of his rights, arguably obviated the need for the second advisement, which the majority so methodically criticizes. As argued above, Miranda and its progeny do not require that a person must be informed of his right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel each and every time an interrogation session is begun. Of course, the person must be given these warnings before interrogation begins initially. Once a person is fully and properly informed of his rights prior to an interrogation session, and barring intervening circumstances or actions by the accused to the contrary (the lack of which in this case having been mentioned elsewhere in this opinion), we should not conclude that those warnings can have no lasting effect whatsoever, and that the failure to again fully advise the person a short time later prior to a second session means that Miranda was not followed. Such a failure — even assuming there was a failure in this case — was merely one factor to be examined by the trial court in weighing the totality of circumstances. So it is with the second advisement here. The alleged incompleteness of the warnings given prior to the second questioning session must be balanced along with all other factors. Moreover, we must again remember that the police officer testified that Edwards was very well advised.
We must also keep in mind a number of other facts noted earlier in this opinion. Edwards, after being fully informed of his rights, signed an explicit waiver of those rights. At no time thereafter did he ask that he be allowed to exercise those rights by refusing to talk with police or by requesting a lawyer. See Michigan v. Mosely, (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313; Miranda v. Arizona, supra. In fact, his words and actions were to the contrary. See North Carolina v. Butler, (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 97 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286. After giving police the first statement, Edwards was allowed to leave, and then told police where he would be that evening in case they wanted to talk further with him. The evidence reveals that Edwards continued to cooperate fully with the police. He was where he said he would be that evening. He willingly gave police the clothes *230he had worn that day, and willingly accompanied them to the police station. Even though the specific language used was not repeated in court, the evidence shows the police again orally advised him of his rights. This oral advice was apparently repeated before the second interrogation session began. While this evidence might not, by itself, reveal sufficient evidence of compliance with Miranda, this evidence was for the trial court to weigh and consider in light of the complete advisement given to Edwards earlier by the police, and the other facts present here.
The staged identification ploy, while not commendable police behavior, is, again, simply one factor which the trial court was bound to consider in making his judgment. The possible effect of this ploy on Edwards must be judged in light of the rest of the sequence of events. What this sequence of events shows is a totally cooperative individual, not one who was frightened or recalcitrant, before this ploy was used. Edwards’ willingness to cooperate from the beginning was evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that the ploy did not actually psychologically coerce Edwards and thereby render his waiver ineffectual and his confession involuntary.
We are presented here with a record which reveals conflicting evidence on the questions of the adequacy of the warnings, the validity of the waiver, and the voluntar-iness of the confession. Faced with such a conflict, we are bound by well-established law to defer to the judgment of the trial court. I believe there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Edwards was fully advised and warned, that he executed a valid waiver, and that he gave this confession voluntarily. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court on this issue and proceed to consider the other issues presented on this appeal.
GIVAN, C. J., concurs.