Court Opinion

ID: 9901270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 16:08:55.367901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:34.973600
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13429

         JANE K. FURNAS   vs. CATHLEEN M. CIRONE, personal
                           representative.1

        Hampden.    September 11, 2023. - November 21, 2023.

 Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                            & Georges, JJ.

Joint Tenants. Real Property, Joint tenancy, Partition.
     Contempt. Practice, Civil, Contempt, Motion to dismiss.
     Jurisdiction, Probate Court, Equitable. Probate Court,
     Jurisdiction, General equity power. Judgment, Enforcement.

     Petition for partition filed in the Hampden Division of the
Probate and Family Court Department on December 20, 2016.

     A complaint for contempt, filed on January 22, 2021, was
heard by Barbara M. Hyland, J.

     After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

     Talia K. Williams (Jesse W. Belcher-Timme also present) for
the petitioner.
     Mark J. Esposito for the respondent.

    1   Of the estate of Anthony P. Cirone.
                                                                    2

     CYPHER, J.    Anthony P. Cirone and Jane K. Furnas owned a

property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.

Following proceedings to partition the property, they settled on

an agreement whereby Anthony2 would make monthly payments to

Furnas, who would keep the mortgage current and either refinance

or list the property for sale.    After a decree was entered

incorporating their agreement, Anthony passed away.    His

daughter, acting as personal representative of his estate,

sought to hold Furnas in contempt for failing either to

refinance or to list the property for sale.    A judge found

Furnas in civil contempt.

     This case asks us to determine whether Anthony's and

Furnas's joint tenancy was severed by the agreement, thereby

terminating Furnas's right of survivorship.    We also are asked

to determine whether the agreement was enforceable by the

probate court, even if the joint tenancy was not severed.      We

conclude both that the agreement severed the joint tenancy and

that the probate court had jurisdiction to enforce the

agreement.    We therefore affirm the judgment of civil contempt.

     1.   Background.   The following facts were found by the

motion judge after an evidentiary hearing and generally are

undisputed.

     2 Because Anthony P. Cirone and Cathleen M. Cirone share the
same surname, we use their first names for clarity.
                                                                       3

    Anthony and Furnas owned a home in East Longmeadow

(property) as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.      In

December 2016, Furnas filed a petition to partition the property

pursuant to G. L. c. 241, § 1.     On August 9, 2018, Anthony and

Furnas presented a negotiated agreement to a judge of the

probate court.

    Under the agreement, Anthony would make monthly payments to

Furnas in the amount of one-half of the mortgage and remove his

personal belongings from the property.     Furnas was obligated to

keep the mortgage current and either (1) refinance the property

and remove Anthony from the note and mortgage by September 1,

2020, or, alternatively, (2) list the property for sale by

June 1, 2020, with the proceeds from the sale to be divided

between the parties.     The judge approved the parties' agreement,

entering a decree that incorporated and merged the terms of the

agreement.     Neither party appealed from the decree.

    Anthony made seven mortgage payments to Furnas before

becoming medically incapacitated in February 2019.       Thereafter,

his daughter, Cathleen M. Cirone, was appointed as his

conservator.     Cathleen made an additional twelve payments before

pausing payments temporarily to seek a forbearance on the

mortgage.    On June 4, 2020, Anthony died, and Cathleen was

subsequently appointed as personal representative of his estate.

In September 2020, Cathleen brought the payments to Furnas
                                                                   4

current; however, Furnas did not cash the checks because she

claimed that, on Anthony's death, she became the sole owner of

the property by operation of law.

     In January 2021, Cathleen filed a complaint for contempt

against Furnas alleging that she had failed to comply with the

terms of the decree.   Furnas filed an answer, setting forth

affirmative defenses challenging the validity of the agreement,

and a purported counterclaim.3   Furnas also filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint, arguing that the decree did not sever the

joint tenancy and, consequently, that Cathleen and the estate

lacked standing to bring the complaint.

     Following a contested hearing, the judge denied Furnas's

motion to dismiss.   An evidentiary hearing was held, and the

judge issued written findings of fact and rulings of law.   The

judge concluded that the decree destroyed the joint tenancy;

that each party was entitled to the benefit of the agreement;

and that, because the decree constituted a final adjudication of

Furnas's original petition, it resolved all issues relating to

the parties' rights to the property and must be "afforded the

     3 The counterclaim sought a declaratory judgment and a
finding of contempt against Cathleen. At a preliminary hearing,
the judge informed the parties that the counterclaim was
"procedurally ineffective" and instructed Furnas to file her own
complaint. Furnas failed to do so. Nevertheless, the judge
later ruled on the merits of the counterclaim. The parties do
not dispute that the judgment on the counterclaim must be
vacated.
                                                                    5

protection of finality afforded a decree entered after [a]

hearing."   Based on these rulings, and finding that Furnas had

not complied with the provision of the agreement mandating that

she either refinance or sell the property, the judge found

Furnas in civil contempt.4   Furnas appealed, and after review by

the Appeals Court, we granted her application for further

appellate review.

     Furnas presses several arguments for why the judge erred in

finding that the agreement, as merged with the decree, severed

the joint tenancy.5   Because we conclude that the agreement,

which was enforceable, clearly (1) severed the joint tenancy by

destroying the unity of possession and, in addition, (2) waived

the statutory formalities of the partition statute upon its

merger with the decree, Furnas's remaining arguments do not

     4 At the time of the evidentiary hearing, Furnas had not
listed the property for sale, nor had she refinanced the
property or paid off the mortgage in full.

     5 Furnas's many arguments all are derivative of her central
claim that, on Anthony's death, his interest in the property
immediately passed to her by operation of law. See Smith v.
Smith, 361 Mass. 733, 737-738 (1972) (property held by joint
tenancy passes to survivor by operation of law and does not
constitute part of decedent's estate). In support, Furnas
points to the common law of property, the plain language of our
partition statute, G. L. c. 241, and this court's most recent
decision on joint tenancies, Battle v. Howard, 489 Mass. 480
(2022), as standing for the proposition that a joint tenancy
cannot be severed or terminated absent a transfer, conveyance,
or other alienation of interest.
                                                                        6

warrant discussion except to the extent that we address them in

notes 10, 14, 15, and 17, infra.

    2.   Discussion.     a.   Standard of review.   The standard of

review for a judge's decision is well established.       "The

findings of fact of the judge are accepted unless they are

clearly erroneous."    T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank,

456 Mass. 562, 569 (2010).      However, "[w]e review the judge's

legal conclusions de novo."      Id.   See Anastos v. Sable, 443

Mass. 146, 149 (2004).

    b.   Joint tenancy.       Joint tenancy "is a form of coownership

arising under the common law and characterized by the right of

survivorship."   Battle v. Howard, 489 Mass. 480, 483 (2022).

The right of survivorship "grows out of the application of

common law principles wholly independent of statute."       Weaver v.

New Bedford, 335 Mass. 644, 646 (1957).       "The creation and

maintenance of a joint tenancy depends on the existence of four

'unities':   the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity

of time, and the unity of possession.       Battle, supra at 484

(joint tenancy exists so long as coowners of property "have one

and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance,

commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the

same undivided possession" [citation omitted]).       "A joint

tenancy is severed when any one of the four unities is
                                                                     7

destroyed, including due to a unilateral act of one of the

parties."   Id.6

     Here, the unities of time and title are not in dispute

because Anthony and Furnas took title to the property under the

same instrument and at the same time.7     Therefore, the discussion

shifts to the remaining unities:      possession and interest.

     c.   Unity of possession.     There is a lacuna of

Massachusetts cases dealing with the unity of possession; we

therefore look to sister States, as well as esteemed treatises,

for guidance.      As one of the four unities that make up a joint

tenancy, "unity of possession" requires that "each joint tenant

is in possession of the whole estate, and that each is also

entitled to an equal undivided share of the whole."       Swink v.

Fingado, 115 N.M. 275, 286 n.15 (1993), quoting 4A R. Powell,

Real Property ¶ 617[1], at 51-9 (rev. ed. 1992).      7 R. Powell,

Real Property § 51.03[1] (M. Wolf ed. 2023) (Powell).      See

Ogilvie v. Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 99 Idaho 361, 367 (1978)

     6 Generally, in order to sever, the unilateral act "must
clearly and unequivocally signify an intent to sever[; the] mere
expression of intent to sever without a legally sufficient act
does not effectuate a severance." 7 R. Powell, Real Property
§ 51.04[1][a] (M. Wolf ed. 2023).

     7 It is a rare case where the unity of time could seriously
be said to be in dispute. See 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
*133 (unity of time, "which respects only the original
commencement of the joint-estate, cannot, indeed, [being now
past] be affected by any subsequent transactions").
                                                                     8

("The unity of possession essential to the existence of a joint

tenancy means that each joint tenant is entitled to the use and

enjoyment of the whole property, as if a sole owner, subject to

the other joint tenants' equal and undivided rights of

possession").    Unity of possession likewise "requires joint

tenants to have undivided interests in the whole, not undivided

interests in the several parts."    Valdez v. Occupants of 3908 SW

24th St., Okla. City, 2011 OK 99, ¶ 13 n.5.

     The agreement, as incorporated and merged with the decree,

states in relevant part:    "[Anthony] agrees to remove his

remaining personal items on or before September 30, 2018."8

Arguing that the decree did not sever the unity of possession,

Furnas makes a distinction between the right of legal possession

(and use) of property and mere physical possession of property;9

specifically that, on signing the agreement, Anthony lost his

right to the latter, not the former.

     We disagree.    A joint tenancy is "terminated by any act

destructive of its constituent unities."    4 Thompson on Real

Property § 31.08(a) (3d Thomas ed. 2021).    Here, the decree

     8   Neither party disputes that Anthony complied with this
term.

     9 Put another way, while Anthony's agreement to vacate the
property may have had an impact on his physical possession, "it
had no impact on [his] legal rights to the [p]roperty,"
inclusive of ownership status or how the property was titled.
                                                                      9

altered Anthony's right to possession, thus severing the joint

tenancy.10    It is true that, at common law, a joint tenant's

decision to move out voluntarily does not destroy the unity of

possession.    See Goetz v. Slobey, 76 A.D.3d 954, 956 (N.Y. 2010)

(commencing partition action and moving out of property did not

sever unity of possession because parties "were each still

entitled to common possession of the entire . . . [p]roperty"

until final partition decree).     However, Anthony did more than

move out.    Per the terms of the agreement, Anthony lost his

legal right to possess and enjoy the whole property prior to

formal conveyance or alienation.     See Ogilvie, 99 Idaho at 367.

In sum, Anthony's legal rights changed:     he could no longer have

his possessions on the property.     Furnas's reliance on the

distinction between legal possession and use versus physical

possession and use therefore is inapt; Anthony clearly lost his

"right" to both upon execution of the agreement.

     10We therefore need not reach the question whether the
decree also destroyed the unity of interest except to note that,
contrary to Furnas's position, it cannot be that conveyance or
sale of the subject property is, in every case, the only means
to sever both the unity of interest and the unity of possession.
If the unity of possession could never be severed without
conveyance, then it would be duplicative of the unity of
interest. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Clark, 222 Mass. 291, 293
(1915) ("A joint tenant . . . always may terminate the joint
tenancy by transfer or conveyance of his interest" [emphasis
added]).
                                                                    10

       d.   Partition.   Further, the incorporation of the parties'

agreement into the decree severed the joint tenancy; parties to

a partition are free to agree to terms different from those

enumerated in the partition statute.

       Since colonial times, a coowner of a property in the

Commonwealth has had "a statutory right to petition the courts

to divide property that he or she no longer wishes to own

jointly with another."     Battle, 489 Mass. at 485, citing Cook v.

Allen, 2 Mass. 462, 469 (1807).     In its current form, the

partition statute allows "[a]ny person, except a tenant by the

entirety, owning a present undivided legal estate in land, not

subject to redemption . . . to have partition."     G. L. c. 241,

§ 1.    Here, Furnas filed a petition to partition the property

under G. L. c. 241, § 1; that petition was resolved two years

later by the parties' negotiated agreement, which was

incorporated and merged with the partition decree.11     Against

that backdrop, Furnas argues that this court's holding in Battle

states that it is conveyance alone that severs the unities, see

generally Battle, supra at 483-485, and because no sale,

conveyance, refinance, payment, or other divestment of the

       The agreement provided in its introductory section that
       11

"[t]he parties . . . hereby agree to resolve the matters
involving the [property] . . . as follows," and concluded with
the provision stating that "[t]he parties agree that this
[a]greement shall enter as the [j]udgment in this case."
                                                                       11

property took place, all legal rights of the parties remained

intact until Anthony's death.      Furnas misapprehends our holding

in Battle.

    In Battle, 489 Mass. at 481, a joint tenant filed a

petition under G. L. c. 241, § 1, seeking a partition by sale.

Pursuant to an interim order, the judge appointed a commissioner

to sell the property.      Id. at 481-482.   After filing a valuation

with the court and obtaining a warrant for the sale, the

commissioner accepted an offer to purchase the property and

filed a motion for authority to enter into a purchase and sale

agreement.   Id. at 482.

    Prior to a hearing on the commissioner's motion, the joint

tenant who filed the original petition died.      Battle, 489 Mass.

at 482.   The court held that the joint tenancy was not severed

because, per the terms of the judge's interim order as well as

the warrant, the final sale remained subject to the approval of

the judge and the parties' right to object.      Id. at 491.12   The

court clarified that, "with respect to a partition by sale, the

operative act that upsets the four unities and severs a joint

tenancy is the commissioner's conveyance of the property by deed

to a buyer."   Id at 487.

    12 Indeed, the warrant expressly provided that the parties
remained free to settle the matter consensually, including "by
terminating the action for partition and maintaining . . . their
joint tenancy." Battle, 489 Mass. at 491.
                                                                  12

     The facts in Battle are readily distinguishable from those

in the case at bar.   While both sets of parties sought to

dissolve their respective joint tenancies and relied initially

on the partition statute, G. L. c. 241,13 to do so, the parties

here resolved their dispute through a private agreement that

expressly resolved the partition action.14   The parties in

Battle, by contrast, did not.   Of course, parties to a partition

may agree to terms different from those enumerated in the

statute; however, on regretting that decision, neither party

     13The partition statute provides for two forms of court-
supervised partition: division and sale. G. L. c. 241, § 18.
The former divides the subject property among the existing
tenants and is binding on the entrance of "a final decree" by
the court. Id. The latter splits the proceeds of sale amongst
the tenants and is binding "at sale." Id. As Anthony was to
receive proceeds for his interest in the property regardless of
Furnas's choice to sell or refinance, only those portions of the
statute concerning partition by sale are relevant here.

     14To the extent Furnas argues that the agreement does not
require her to sell the property ("the agreement only requires
that [she] list the property for sale, because there are no
defined terms requiring acceptance of an offer or the actual
sale, only payment terms if a sale is actually effectuated"),
that argument need not be discussed at length. The agreement,
by its terms, clearly contemplates a sale in the event Furnas is
unable to refinance or pay off the mortgage ("Upon the sale,
each party shall receive . . ."). See Robbins v. Krock, 73
Mass. App. Ct. 134, 139 (2008), quoting Fried v. Fried, 5 Mass.
App. Ct. 660, 664 (1977) ("We are guided by '[j]ustice, common
sense and the probable intent of the parties' when interpreting
the written agreement"); Cadle Co. v. Vargas, 55 Mass. App. Ct.
361, 366 (2002), quoting Fishman v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 247 F.3d
300, 302 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Common sense is as much a part of
contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of
canons").
                                                                   13

should expect to rely on the procedural rights and protections

of the partition statute after electing to contract around it.

See Nichols v. Nichols, 181 Mass. 490, 491-492 (1902) (objection

to partition decree failed where party to partition proceedings

waived statutory right to formal findings by requesting

commissioners partition property certain way and "agreeing that

it was the most advantageous [division] that could be made").

See, e.g., Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 506 (1940) (tenants

in common temporarily may waive right to partition by mutual

agreement).15

     In Battle, we held that "with respect to a partition by

sale, the operative act that upsets the four unities and severs

a joint tenancy is the commissioner's conveyance of the property

by deed to a buyer" (emphasis added).   Battle, 489 Mass. at 487.

For parties relying on the partition statute to effectuate a

partition by sale, see G. L. c. 241, § 18, conveyance of the

property is the sole act whereby all four unities are destroyed

and the joint tenancy is legally severed.   Battle, supra.   See

Cowden v. Cutting, 339 Mass. 164, 169-170 (1959) (property

interests of coowners in action for partition by sale remain

unchanged unless property is conveyed to buyer by commissioner's

     15Consequently, Furnas's subordinate argument that the
decree did not contain all the statutory requirements of
partition under G. L. c. 241, § 10, must likewise fail. See
Nichols, 181 Mass. at 491-492.
                                                                    14

deed).16   Parties are free, however, to destroy the unities in

all the usual ways prescribed by common law, or they may elect

to partition the property through private settlement even after

filing a formal petition.    See Calhoun v. Rawlins, 93 Mass. App.

Ct. 458, 466 n.14 (2018), quoting Ratchford v. Ratchford, 397

Mass. 114, 116 (1986) (public policy of Massachusetts favors

settlement of property disputes).     Here, the agreement signed by

the parties accomplished both:     (i) it resolved all "matters

involving the [property]" on its merger with the decree while

(ii) simultaneously destroying the unity of possession.      See

Battle, supra at 484; Goetz, 76 A.D.3d at 956.

     e.    Enforcement.   General Laws c. 241, § 25, states, in

relevant part:    "The court in which a petition has been brought

under this chapter shall have jurisdiction in equity over all

matters relating to the partition, and, in case of sale, over

the distribution of the proceeds thereof . . . ."     By its terms,

§ 25 "does not address the trial courts' jurisdiction over a

petition for partition.    That is the function of [G. L. c. 241,]

§ 2 ('Probate courts and the land court shall have concurrent

jurisdiction of all petitions for partition')."     Battle, 489

Mass. at 496, quoting G. L. c. 241, § 2.    "Instead, § 25

     16See also G. L. c. 241, § 18 ("The partition by division,
when confirmed by a final decree under [§ 16], or the sale if
partition is made by sale, shall be conclusive upon all persons
named in the petition . . ." [emphasis added]).
                                                                  15

establishes that a court having jurisdiction over a petition for

partition also has supplemental jurisdiction 'in equity over all

matters relating to the partition.'"   Id., quoting G. L. c. 241,

§ 25.

     Here, the probate court entered the decree as a final

judgment.   It is axiomatic that courts have the power to enforce

valid judgments.   See Sommer v. Maharaj, 451 Mass. 615, 621

(2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1235 (2009).   Notwithstanding,

Furnas argues that the decree is not enforceable because the

property vested fully in Furnas on Anthony's death.

Consequently, the estate lacked standing to pursue its claim17

and the probate court relied improperly on its equitable powers

to enforce the agreement.   See Weaver, 335 Mass. at 646.    Furnas

is in error.

     We have observed that "joint tenancies and the right of

survivorship [are] . . . creatures of common law, and they have

existed alongside . . . statutory scheme[s] for partition," such

as G. L. c. 241, since colonial times (footnote omitted).

     17Furnas argues that the trial judge erred in denying her
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because the estate lacked standing. "[S]tanding to bring an
action for partition of land is conditioned on the petitioner's
owning a present undivided legal estate in the land." Battle,
489 Mass. at 485. Based on our discussion infra, because we
hold that Anthony's ownership interest in the property passed to
his estate, Cathleen, as personal representative, had standing
to enforce the decree on behalf of the estate.
                                                                   16

Battle, 489 Mass. at 496.18   Additionally, parties generally may

alter common-law survivorship rights by agreement.   See Finn v.

Finn, 348 Mass. 443, 446 (1965) (separation agreement may

preserve joint ownership of asset after divorce and bypass

common-law rule converting marital joint ownership to

postdivorce tenancy in common).

     Based on the foregoing, the decree destroyed the unity of

possession, thereby severing the joint tenancy and terminating

the right of survivorship.    See Powell, supra at § 51.04[1][a]

(act "that operates to destroy or terminate any one or more of

the essential unities . . . effects conversion of the joint

tenancy into a tenancy in common and destruction of the right to

survivorship").   As the decree entered prior to his death,

Anthony's ownership interest in the property therefore passed to

his estate.   See West v. First Agric. Bank, 382 Mass. 534, 536

n.4 (1981), superseded by statute on other grounds, citing M.

Park, Conveyancing § 125, at 120 (1968) ("at death the interest

of a tenant [in common] descends to his heirs or passes to his

devisees").   See also Yanolis v. Yanolis, 402 Mass. 470, 473

(1988) (if party to divorce dies after entry of judgment but

     18See Cook v. Allen, 2 Mass. 462, 469 (1807) (referring to
writs of partition under English common law prior to enactment
of statute by Parliament); Province Laws 1693, c. 8, § 1
(predecessor to G. L. c. 241). See also Battle, 489 Mass. at
496 n.15 (joint tenancy and right of survivorship briefly
abolished by statute between 1783 and 1785).
                                                                  17

before resolution of appeal, judgment survives death).    The

estate, in turn, was entitled to commence an action to enforce

the decree.   See Sommer, 451 Mass. at 619, 621 (civil judgment

generally enforceable against decedent's estate if decedent dies

after entry of judgment).   Finally, because the issue of the

agreement's effect on common-law survivorship rights is

"'intimately interwoven with the petition for partition,'

exclusive jurisdiction over the [estate]'s claim[] rest[s] with

the probate court under [G. L. c. 241,] § 25."     Battle, 489

Mass. at 497, quoting O'Connor v. Boyden, 268 Mass. 111, 114-115

(1929).

    Contrary to Furnas's position, the probate court had

jurisdiction to enforce the agreement; it did not need to resort

to its general equity powers.   See G. L. c. 241, §§ 2, 25.

    3.    Conclusion.   For the reasons stated, we hold that

Furnas's right of survivorship was terminated and that the

agreement was enforceable by Anthony's estate.     We therefore

affirm the judgment of civil contempt.    The dismissal of the

counterclaim on the merits is vacated, and the case is remanded

for entry of a judgment dismissing the counterclaim without

prejudice.

                                     So ordered.