Court Opinion

ID: 9646480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:00:49.605313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:38.488767
License: Public Domain

DELAHANTY, Justice,
with whom ARCHIBALD, J., concurs, concurring in result:
I agree with the majority that the appeal herein must be sustained. I do not believe, however, that it is necessary — in fact, in these circumstances it may be presumptuous for want of an articulated Rule 609 evaluation below — to reach the issue upon which the majority rests its reversal. With deference, I would rely on what appears to be prosecutorial “overkill.”
True, our Maine Rules of Evidence recognize that within the limits of Rule 609, the prosecution may use evidence of a prior conviction to impeach the credibility of a defendant who testifies in his own behalf. Assuming, for the nonce, that the presiding Justice correctly ruled under M.R.Evid. 609 that the defendant could be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction, an issue that need not be reached, the State exceeded the permissible scope of cross-examination.
In State v. Toppi, Me., 275 A.2d 805 (1971), we suggested a permissible form of questioning on cross-examination when attacking a witness’ credibility by evidence of a prior conviction.
Are you the same . . . who was convicted of the crime of ... in the Superior Court for . . . County on . ... Id. at 813.
In the instant case, the prosecution did not so confine the cross-examination but also inquired into the length of the defendant’s conviction. More egregiously, the question disclosed details of the crime including the relationship of the defendant to the female victim and her name and age. Given the circumstances of this case, the nature and breadth of such inquiry were highly improper and alone are sufficient to warrant a new trial.
Tangential questioning is considered impermissible for two reasons:
First, it leads to an unnecessary delay in the trial.
Second, it introduces extraneous and possibly prejudicial or inflammatory matters unrelated to the effort of properly discrediting the defendant as a witness. Martin v. United States, 404 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1968).
Although we have never intimated that the form of question approved in State v. Toppi, supra, is a shibboleth which must be blindly and precisely followed, in the absence of extenuating circumstances any substantial departure from inquiring about the name of the crime and the time and place of conviction is improper for the above-mentioned reasons. Accordingly, the gross departure by the prosecution from acceptable inquiry is quite sufficient to warrant reversal.