Court Opinion

ID: 9956073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-31 17:00:46.809493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.008904
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

         JENNIFER BRISCOE, Guardian of the
         Minor Child K.B.,
                      Plaintiff,                                    Civil Action No. 22-3365 (CKK)
                 v.
         DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
                      Defendant.

                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                                           (March 31, 2024)

        On behalf of the minor child K.B., and pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (“IDEA”), Plaintiff Jennifer Briscoe (“Plaintiff”), filed this action against the

District of Columbia (the “District”) to challenge an August 29, 2022 Hearing Officer’s

Determination (“HOD”) that dismissed her administrative due process claim filed against the

District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”). In that HOD, the Independent Hearing Officer

(“IHO”) concluded that: (1) DCPS timely provided Plaintiff with an authorization for her

requested independent educational evaluation (“IEE”); (2) Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that

DCPS’s December 2020 reevaluation of K.B. was inadequate; and (3) DCPS committed a

procedural violation related to the provision of K.B.’s educational records that did not amount to

a substantive denial of free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). See August 29, 2022 HOD,

ECF No. 13-1, at 4-24. DCPS was directed, however, to provide a list of student documents that are

maintained in the Special Education Database (“SEDS”). Id. at 17.

        The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment regarding that August 29,

2022 HOD. In her Points and Authorities in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment,

Plaintiff claims that: (1) DCPS unnecessarily delayed its response to Plaintiff’s request for an

                                                     1
IEE; (2) DCPS refused to authorize a sufficient IEE, which led to a substantive violation of the

IDEA; (3) DCPS failed to prove the 2020-2021 reevaluation was appropriate; (4) the IHO erred

in finding that DCPS’s failure to provide a “SEDS Document Index” was not a substantive denial

of FAPE; and (5) DCPS has not complied with the IHO’s Order to provide the “SEDS Document

Index.” See generally Pl.’s P&A, ECF No. 15-1.             Those five arguments will be addressed

herein.

          In response thereto, the District asserts that Plaintiff has neither established a denial of

FAPE nor that the IHO erred in his decision, which is “entitled to deference because it is

supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.” Defendant’s Cross Motion for

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16, at 4. Furthermore, the District contends that “DCPS complied

with the HOD’s remedial order.” Id. Upon review of the two motions for summary judgment

and the record herein, for the reasons set forth in detail in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court

finds that Plaintiff’s [15] Motion for Summary Judgment shall be DENIED and Defendant’s [16]

Cross Motion for Summary Judgment shall be GRANTED.1 A separate Order accompanies this

Memorandum Opinion.

          I. BACKGROUND

          A. Statutory Framework

          The IDEA was enacted to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them

1
 In connection with this Memorandum Opinion, the Court considered: (1) the Administrative
Record (“AR”), ECF No. 13-1 [indexed at ECF No. 13]; (2) Plaintiff’s’ [15] Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s MSJ”), Plaintiff’s [15-1] Points and Authorities in support thereof
(“Pl.’s P & A”), and the exhibit attached thereto; (3) Defendant’s [16] [consolidated] Opposition
to the Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s
CMSJ”); (4) Plaintiff’s [20] [consolidated] Opposition to Defendant’s Cross Motion and Reply in
support of Motion (“Pl.’s Reply”); and (5) Defendant’s [22] Reply in support of Cross Motion
(“Def.’s Reply”). In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in
this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).

                                                   2
a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that emphasizes special education and related

services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment,

and independent living.” M.G. v. District of Columbia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)), see also Boose v. District of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C.

Cir. 2015). Once a child is identified as disabled, the school district must convene a meeting of a

multi-disciplinary team to develop an individualized education program (“IEP”) for the student.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(2)(A). The IEP “is the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery

system for disabled children[.]” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137

S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (citation omitted). The IDEA requires that a school system “offer an IEP

that is reasonably calculated to enable a [disabled student] to make progress in light of the child’s

circumstances.” Id. at 999. Once the IEP is developed, the school system must provide an

appropriate educational placement that comports with the IEP.

      The IDEA and accompanying regulations provide that once a child is determined to have a

disability, a reevaluation is required to determine whether the child continues to present with a

disability and that the child shall be assessed in all areas of suspected disability during this

reevaluation.   34 CFR 300.304(c)(4). The reevaluation shall occur if the parent requests a

reevaluation. 34 CFR 300.303(a)(2). The reevaluation must occur at least every 3 years unless

the parent and the public agency agree that a reevaluation is unnecessary. 34 CFR 300.303(b)(2).

The reevaluation is comprised of a variety of tools, including, inter alia: (1) assessments tailored

to assess specific areas of educational need; (2) review of existing data; (3) classroom-based

assessment; (4) observations by teachers and related service providers; (5) input from the parents.

34 CFR 300.304(b)(2).      Pursuant to 34 CFR 300.502(b)(1), “[a] parent has the right to an

independent educational evaluation [“IEE”] at public expense if the parent disagrees with an

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evaluation obtained by the public agency.” After the parent requests an IEE, the school system

has two choices: “(i) [f]ile a due process complaint to request a hearing to show that its evaluation

is appropriate; or (ii) [e]nsure an independent educational evaluation is provided at public

expense.” 34 CFR 300.502(b)(2). If the hearing officer finds that the evaluation comports with

the requirements of the IDEA for an initial evaluation or reevaluation, the parent is not entitled to

an independent educational evaluation at public expense.

      B. Factual History

      In April 2017, the District of Columbia Superior Court Youth and Family Services Division

referred K.B. for a psychoeducation evaluation, which showed overall average cognitive

functioning and moderately impaired to average academic functioning. See AR, ECF No. 13, at

51, 63-64. The evaluator concluded that K.B. had symptoms consistent with ADHD, Combined

Type, and K.B. was diagnosed also with an Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Disturbance of

Emotions and Conduct and recommended for tutoring and counseling. Id. at 63-64, 66-67.

      K.B.’s initial IEP was developed in January 2018, when the student was in fifth grade

attending the Children’s Guild Public Charter School, its own Local Educational Agency (“LEA”)

under the IDEA, id. at 99, and she was determined eligible for special education services as a

student with Multiple Disabilities (Specific Learning Disability/Other Health Impaired). AR at

89-111. K.B. began attending DCPS Eliot-Hine Middle School (“Eliot-Hine”) for the 2020-2021

school year. AR at 188. Elliot-Hine provided virtual instruction that entire school year because of

the pandemic. Id. at 660. In December 2020, K.B.’s IEP team conducted a reevaluation to see if

K.B. remained eligible for special education, id. at 193, and the team determined that K.B.

remained eligible with the disability classification OHI/ADHD. Id. at 201.

      K.B. next attended Paul PCS-International High School (“Paul PCS”), which is its own

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    LEA under the IDEA. AR at 246. On January 19, 2022, through counsel, Plaintiff contacted the

    principal of Eliot-Hine requesting that DCPS fund an IEE. Id. at 284. The principal responded on

    January 20, 2022, informing Plaintiff that K.B. was no longer a student at Eliot-Hine. Id. at 286.

    On January 26, 2022, Paul PCS informed Plaintiff that it would conduct a comprehensive

    psychological evaluation and a functional behavioral assessment (“FBA”) but would not fund an

    IEE. Id. at 271.

          On February 2, 2022, Plaintiff completed an application for K.B. to attend Coolidge High

    School (“Coolidge”), a DCPS school. Id. at 273-275. On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff emailed

    Coolidge requesting that DCPS fund an IEE. Id. at 287. On February 10, 2022, DCPS issued an

    authorization letter for Plaintiff to obtain an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation,

    and DCPS issued a second authorization letter for Plaintiff to obtain an independent speech

    language evaluation and an independent assistive technology evaluation. Id. at 278, 280.2 DCPS

    convened an IEP meeting on March 16, 2022, and DCPS agreed to conduct an occupational

    therapy (“OT”) assessment and an FBA. Id. at 282. On June 16, 2022, DCPS issued a third

    authorization letter, with funding for independent comprehensive psychological, speech language,

    occupational therapy, and assistive technology testing. Id. at 300. That June 16, 2022 letter

    voided the two February 10, 2022 authorization letters. Id.

          On February 10, 2022, Plaintiff requested a copy of K.B.’s educational records. Id. at 391.

    Plaintiff made several requests for records during the period February 2022-July 2022, AR at 394-

    413, including a motion to compel the records.3 On April 7, 2002, DCPS provided the majority of

    K.B.’s educational records in a zip file. Id. at 307. DCPS provided K.B.’s fourth quarter service

2
  While the second authorization was dated February 10, 2022, the attorney for DCPS
acknowledged at the due process hearing that this was not provided to Plaintiff until March 16,
2022, when counsel realized that letter had not been received previously. AR at 722-723.
3
  This motion was denied as a pre-hearing matter by the IHO. AR at 8.
                                                    5
    trackers and IEP progress reports by June 2022 and enrollment documents in July 2022. Id. at

    715, 474.

          1. Due Process Proceeding

          On April 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed an administrative due process complaint alleging that

    DCPS denied K.B. a FAPE by: (1) failing and refusing to agree to fund an IEE; (2) failing and

    refusing to conduct an appropriate reevaluation in December 2020; (3) developing an IEP that was

    based on an inappropriate reevaluation;4 and (4) failing to provide a complete copy of K.B.’s

    educational records. Id. at 308-315. By way of relief, Plaintiff requested an order that DCPS: (1)

    immediately fund an IEE; (2) convene an IEP meeting to review the IEE, find K.B. eligible for

    special education, and develop an IEP; (3) order a compensatory education assessment, review the

    assessment, and incorporate the assessment’s results into the IEP; and (4) provide K.B.’s

    educational records. AR at 313-314. An administrative due process hearing was held on July 26,

    2022. Id. at 614.

          Plaintiff was the only witness presented on her own behalf. She testified that: (1) she

    received the February 10, 2022 letter authorizing an independent psychological evaluation but

    never had K.B. evaluated, id. at 679-680; (2) during a March 2022 meeting, DCPS offered to

    conduct a speech language evaluation, OT evaluation, and an assistive technology evaluation but

    her attorney rejected DCPS’s offer, id. at 673-674; and (3) she received the June 16, 2022 letter

    authorizing her to obtain an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation, speech

    language evaluation, OT evaluation, and assistive technology evaluation, but Plaintiff never tried

    to have K.B. evaluated. Id. at 679-680. There was no testimony by Plaintiff about K.B.’s

    educational records.

4
    This claim was withdrawn on July 15, 2022.
                                                   6
      On behalf of DCPS, Resolution Specialist Alexis Thom was the sole witness, and she

testified that her duties include reviewing parental requests for IEEs. Id. at 693-694. In response

to a parental request for an IEE, she issues a letter authorizing funding for various assessments

and then waits to receive the assessments from the parents. AR at 696-697. IEEs generally

include standardized and informal testing, class observations, parental input, and teacher input.

Id.   at 700-701.   An independent psychological assessment usually includes the student’s

behavioral history and the parent’s rating of the student’s behavior. Id. at 701. Ms. Thom

testified that she received Plaintiff’s request for an IEE in February and issued authorization

letters that month for psychological, speech language, and assistive technology assessments. AR

at 704-705. A third authorization letter was issued in June 2022, and that included an OT

assessment in addition to the three other assessments. Id. at 708. Ms. Thom testified that

Plaintiff requested no other assessments, including an FBA, after DCPS issued the June 2022 IEE

authorization letter. Id. at 713, 726. Ms. Thom explained that FBAs are conducted at the school

and behavioral intervention plans are created after the FBA. AR at 727-728.

      Regarding educational records, Ms. Thom testified that Ms. Dabney, the LEA

representative for Coolidge, provided K.B.’s educational records to Plaintiff in a zip file on April

7, 2022, and Ms. Thom provided K.B.’s fourth quarter service trackers and IEP progress reports

sometime between May 13 and June 16, 2022, and K.B.’s enrollment documents on July 19, 2022.

Id. at 714-716. Production of the enrollment documents was delayed because hard copies were

maintained by the school registrar, who had been on leave. AR at 716.

      Ms. Thom testified further that DCPS student educational records are contained in “SEDS”

and “Aspen” databases that do not completely overlap in content, and a “SEDS Index” would not

capture a complete list of educational records. Id. at 717-719. Furthermore, a “SEDS Index” is

                                                7
    not an actual document that can be printed; rather, a document tab in SEDS lists a student’s

    educational records contained in SEDS, but SEDS does not generate a printable list. Id.; see also

    AR at 729, 731. Accordingly, a user would need to take multiple screenshots of their computer

    screen while scrolling the tab in order to create such a list and then separately upload the

    screenshots into the SEDS database. Id. at 717-719.

          2. HOD

          IHO Coles Ruff, Esq. issued his HOD on August 29, 2022, and an amended version of the

    same (correcting typographical errors) on August 31, 2022. AR at 4-24.5 The IHO concluded

    that: (1) DCPS provided the requested IEP without unnecessary delay; (2) Plaintiff failed to meet

    her burden on the inappropriateness of the December 2020 evaluation; and (3) Plaintiff

    established a procedural violation regarding the provision of K.B.’s educational records, with

    reference to the list of documents available in SEDS, but that procedural violation did not

    constitute a denial of FAPE. AR at 8-9, 11. The IHO ordered DCPS to provide to Plaintiff the

    complete list of documents pertaining to K.B.’s educational history, which were available through

    SEDS (SEDS Documents Index). AR at 9, 17.

          Pending before this Court are the Plaintiff’s [15] Motion for Summary Judgment, requesting

    that this Court reverse the IHO’s HOD, and Defendant’s [16] Cross Motion for Summary

    Judgment, asking this Court to affirm the HOD. The parties’ respective cross motions are fully

    briefed and ripe for this Court’s review.

           II. LEGAL STANDARD

           “Although motions for review of an HOD are called motions for summary judgment, the

    Court does not follow ‘a true summary judgment procedure.’” Middleton v. District of Columbia,

5
    The Court references that amended version herein.
                                                   8
312 F. Supp. 3d 113, 128 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting L.R.L. ex rel. Lomax v. District of Columbia,

896 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D.D.C. 2012)); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Rather, in a civil action brought to

challenge a Hearing Officer’s determination pursuant to the IDEA, “[a] motion for summary

judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidence comprising the record and any

additional evidence the court may receive.” D.R. v. District of Columbia, 637 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16

(D.D.C. 2009). When neither party has requested that the court hear additional evidence, the

motion for summary judgment is “the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case

on the basis of the administrative record.” Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th

Cir. 1997); M G. v. District of Columbia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017) (citations omitted);

Thomas v. District of Columbia, 407 F. Supp. 2d 102, 109 (D.D.C. 2005) (same).

       The party challenging the underlying HOD bears “the burden of persuading the

[reviewing] court that the hearing officer was wrong.” Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887

(D.C. Cir. 1988). A court reviewing an administrative IDEA determination “shall grant such

relief as the court determines is appropriate,” based upon “a preponderance of the evidence.” 20

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.,

Westchester Cty. v . Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205–06 (1982). Courts, however, must refrain from

“substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities

which they review.” Id. at 206. Accordingly, “[c]ourts sitting on an IDEA appeal do not have

unfettered review but must . . . give due weight to the administrative proceedings and afford

some deference to the expertise of the [independent hearing officer] and school officials

responsible for the child’s education.” Gill v. District of Columbia, 751 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108-109

(D.D.C. 2010) (citing Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414, 418 (D.D.C. 1993) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). As a general matter, factual findings from the administrative proceeding are to

                                                9
be considered prima facie correct. District of Columbia v. Ramirez, 377 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67

(D.D.C. 2005). Furthermore, “a hearing officer’s findings ‘based on credibility determinations of

live witness testimony’ are given ‘particular deference’ where there is no supplementation of the

record.” R.D. ex rel. McAllister v. District of Columbia, 45 F. Supp. 3d 72, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2014)

(citation omitted). Nonetheless, “a hearing decision ‘without reasoned and specific findings

deserves little deference.’” Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F. 3d 516, 521 (D.C.

Cir. 2005) (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation

marks omitted)). “[A] court upsetting [a hearing] officer’s decision must . . . explain its basis for

doing so.” McKenzie, 862 F.2d at 86.

      III. ANALYSIS

      A. Did DCPS unnecessarily delay its response to Plaintiff’s request for an IEE?

      If the parent requests an IEE, the public agency “must, without unnecessary delay,

either file a due process complaint to request a hearing to show that its evaluation is appropriate

or ensure that an IEE is provided at public expense.”          34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)(i), (ii).

Plaintiff contends that “Defendant acted with unnecessary delay in responding to Plaintiff’s

request for funding for an Independent Educational Evaluation[.]” Pl’s P&A, ECF No. 15-1, at 9.

In this case, the IHO found that “authorization for independent assessments that DCPS provided

Petitioner in response to her counsel’s request were provided promptly without unnecessary

delay and that those assessments satisfied the requirements pursuant to 34 CFR 300.502.” HOD,

ECF No. 13-1, at 14.

      Plaintiff argues that “the Hearing Officer provided no rational or factual basis for [his]

conclusion,” but this argument misstates the record in this case and is non-persuasive. The IHO

first discussed “unnecessary delay” and determined that it is an inquiry addressed case-by-case.

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HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 13 (citing J.P. ex rel., E.P. v. Ripon United School Dist., 2009 WL

1034993 (E.D. Cal. 2009)) (noting that the facts of the case are critical). The IHO next looked

for guidance in the IDEA and its implementing regulations but found none. Hill v. District of

Columbia, No. 14-CV-1893 (GMH), 2016 WL 4506972, at *19 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2016) (noting

no guidance as to “unnecessary delay” in the IDEA and its regulations). The IHO looked then

for case law to interpret the IDEA’s requirement of “prompt resolution of disputes involving the

educational placement of learning-disabled children.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 13. The IHO

noted that undue delay that constitutes a procedural violation of the IDEA must have “affected

the student’s substantive rights” to be a denial of FAPE. Smith v. District of Columbia, Civil

Action No. 08-2216, 2010 W.L. 4861757, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2010). The IHO noted that

“[a] delay does not affect substantive rights if the student’s education would not have been

different had there been no delay.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 13 (citing D.R. ex rel Robinson v.

Gov’t of Dist. of Columbia, 637 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.D.C. 2009)). In contrast, “[a] delay of

more than 2-3 months is likely fatal to the [school] district’s case, although the exact length will

depend on the circumstances rather than being a bright-line test.”      HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 14

(citing Hill v. District of Columbia, No. 14-cv-1893 (GMH), 2016 WL 4506972, at *19 (D.D.C.

Aug. 26, 2016)).

      In this case, Plaintiff contends that the request for an IEE was initially made on January

19, 2022, and again on February [7], 2022, but DCPS did not make its position known until

February 10, 2022, which is 22 days after the initial request and “constitute[s] unnecessary

delay.” Pl’s P&A, ECF No. 15-1, at 9-10. Plaintiff does not cite to any case law establishing

that a 22-day period (if even applicable here since Plaintiff’s initial request was directed to Eliot-

Hine when K.B. was no longer a student there) constitutes “unnecessary delay.”

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      On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff emailed Coolidge – where K.B. was enrolled as of February

2, 2022, AR at 273-275 – to request that DCPS fund an IEE. AR at 287. Plaintiff’s request did

not identify any specific testing or assessments for K.B. Id. Three days later, DCPS responded

and issued an authorization letter for Plaintiff to obtain an independent comprehensive

psychological evaluation, and DCPS issued also a second letter for Plaintiff to obtain

independent speech language and assistive technology assessments. Id. at 278, 280. Plaintiff

acknowledged receipt of these two February 2022 letters (although the second letter was not

received by Plaintiff until March 16, 2022), and she admitted she never used them to have K.B.

independently evaluated. Id. at 679-680.

      DCPS convened an IEP meeting in March 2022, and at that time offered to conduct an OT

assessment and an FBA, both of which needed to be done at Coolidge. AR at 282. These

assessments were not completed because K.B. became ill shortly after enrolling at Coolidge in

February 2022, and the student did not attend school in March, April, or May 2022. Id. at 671-

672. In June 2022, DCPS issued a third authorization letter in June 2022, which permitted

Plaintiff to obtain an independent OT assessment in addition to the comprehensive

psychological, speech language, and assistive technology testing. Id. at 300. Plaintiff indicated

that she received the June 2022 authorization letter but “took no action to obtain any of the

assessments that DCPS has already authorized.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 14; AR at 679-680. By

way of explanation, Plaintiff asserts that she was “advocat[ing] for a complete IEE, not just

funding for several assessments.” Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 20, at 2. Ms. Thom testified that there

were no additional requests for assessments made by Plaintiff after the issuance of the June 2022

letter. AR at 713, 726.

      After examining the facts of this case, the IHO concluded that “authorization for

                                               12
independent assessments that DCPS provided Petitioner . . . were provided promptly without

unnecessary delay and that those assessments satisfied the requirements pursuant to 34 C.F.R.

300.602.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 14. Furthermore, the IHO noted that he “did not find the case

law cited [by Petitioner, in support of her position that the requested IEE was not provided] to be

on point.” Id. Finally, he stated that “the other actions that Petitioner asserts are to be taken in

an IEE are actions DCPS cannot and will not take, including conducting a review of the

assessment data, until Petitioner has taken action to obtain the independent assessments that have

already been authorized.”    Id. Accordingly, the IHO concluded that Petitioner did not sustain

her burden of proof.

      The undersigned finds that the IHO’s conclusion that DCPS did not act with unreasonable

delay in responding to the Plaintiff’s IEE request and that K.B. was not denied a FAPE is

supported by the factual record and applicable law. DCPS responded promptly to Plaintiff’s

request and subsequently attempted to collaborate with the Plaintiff on the parameters of the IEE,

even during the time that K.B. was out of school for a three-month period. And Plaintiff

admittedly took no actions to effectuate any of the authorized testing for K.B. Accordingly, the

HOD is upheld regarding this issue.

   B. Did DCPS refuse to authorize a sufficient IEE?

      Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. §300.303(a), “a [local education] agency shall ensure that a

   reevaluation of each child with a disability is conducted . . . if the child’s parent or teacher

   requests a reevaluation” and that the reevaluation must be conducted at least once every three

   years. Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c), a school district must ensure that a student has

   been appropriately evaluated in all areas of suspected disability. The IHO considered these

   regulations and looked also at regulations governing the evaluation process, including what

                                                13
information needs to be gathered to determine the content of the IEP and what needs to be

done during an initial evaluation or reevaluation. See HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 15. The

evaluators shall use “a variety of assessment tools and strategies [to] gather relevant

functional and developmental information about the child, including information provided by

the parent, and information related to enabling the child to be involved in and progress in the

general curriculum[.]” D.C. Mun. Regs. Title 5E § 30005.9(b). All areas “related to the

suspected disability” should be assessed, D.C. Mun. Regs Title 5E § 30005.9(g), and the

evaluations must be “sufficiently comprehensive to identify all of the child’s special

education and services needs.” D.C. Mun. Regs Title 5E § 30005.9(h).

  The IHO then noted that DCPS did a triennial evaluation in this case, in December 2020,

while K.B. was enrolled at Eliot-Hine, AR at 193, and he concluded that “[t]here was no

evidence presented including testimony, that sufficiently supports a finding that DCPS’s

reevaluation was inappropriate,” although he did note that Petitioner opined that there was

little data available to the school because of the virtual learning due to the pandemic. HOD,

ECF No. 13-1, at 15. The IEP team reviewed K.B.’s classroom-based assessments, first

semester IEP progress report, a September 2020 IReady beginning of the year assessment, a

December 2019 Reading Inventory Assessment, classwork samples, previous IEPs, and

parental input. AR at 195-198, 205. DCPS points out that while Plaintiff argues that the

reevaluation was incomplete and “lists several items that were not included” therein, Pl’s

P&A, ECF No. 15-1, at 18-19, that list also “includes items that were considered by the IEP

team” such as classroom-based assessments in math and reading, work samples in written

expression, teacher observations, and current IEP progress reports. Def.’s CMSJ, ECF No.

16, at 20-21. Looking at the record in this case, there is no indication that the IEP team did

                                            14
not analyze existing data during the reevaluation. And while, for example, Plaintiff points to

the failure to analyze vision or hearing screening, there is no suggestion that analysis of this

data would have affected the determination of special education for K.B. (insofar as there is

no indication of any issue with vision or hearing either in the record or alleged by Plaintiff).

  The IEP team determined that K.B. remained eligible for special education under the

classification Other Health Impairment/ADHD. Id. at 201. The IHO looked at the data that

was considered during the reevaluation and concluded that such reevaluation was

“appropriate and sufficient to determine Student’s continued eligibility for special education

services.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 16. DCPS notes that [t]here is no evidence that Plaintiff

requested any additional assessments after the team made this determination.” Def.’s CSMJ,

ECF No. 16, at 20; see AR at 9, 16; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.305(d). “Nor does Plaintiff

identify any evidence to rebut the hearing officer’s finding that she did not request for the

team to conduct additional assessments in these areas, or any areas, once the IEP team

reviewed existing data.” Def.’s CMSJ, ECF No. 16, at 21, see AR at 9 (Finding of Fact No.

6). Accordingly, upon review of the HOD and the record in this case, the Court concludes

that the IHO’s decision on this issue should be upheld as it is supported by substantial record

evidence and is in accordance with the law.

   Furthermore, while Plaintiff asserts that DCPS should bear the burden of proving the

appropriateness of the reevaluation, Pl.’s P&A, ECF No. 15-1, at 17-18; Pl.’s Reply, ECF

No. 20, at 4, the IDEA only requires an LEA to justify the appropriateness of its own

evaluation via its due process complaint if it refuses to authorize an IEE, and that was not the

situation here. See 34 C.F.R. §502(b)(2)(i); HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 16 (where the IHO

asserted that “DCPS is only required to defend the validity of its evaluation when it has failed

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   to timely respond to a requested IEE pursuant to 34 CFR 300.502” and noted that was not the

   case here). It is Plaintiff who bears the burden of proof on this claim because she challenged

   the appropriateness of the reevaluation. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62

   (2005); D.C. Code Section 38-2571.03(6). Accordingly, the Court upholds also the IHO’s

   determination that Plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proof on this issue.

   C. Was DCPS’s failure to provide a “SEDS document Index” a substantive denial of
   FAPE?

   In this case, Plaintiff requested a copy of K.B.’s educational records on February 10, 2022.

AR at 391. On April 7, 2022, DCPS provided the majority of K.B.’s educational records in a zip

file. Id. at 307. In June 2022, DCPS provided K.B.’s fourth quarter service trackers and IPE

progress reports (which were developed after April 7, 2022), and in July 2022, K.B.’s enrollment

documents were provided. Id. at 715, 474. Ms. Thom testified that the delay in providing

enrollment documents was attributable to the registrar being on leave. AR at 716. During the

hearing, Defendant acknowledged that the “SEDS Document Index” had not been provided to

Plaintiff, and Plaintiff agreed that this was the only educational record that had not been provided.

AR at 626, 725, 730-731.

   IDEA regulations provide parents and legal representatives an opportunity to inspect and

review all education records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational

placement of the student and provision of FAPE to a student. See 34 C.F.R. §300.501(a);

Friendship Edison Public Charter School Collegiate Campus v. Murphy, Civil Action No. 05-

2109 (RMU), 2006 WL 2711524, at *4 (D.D.C. 2006). DCPS must permit parents to inspect and

review any educational records relating to their children that are collected, maintained, or used

by the agency. See 34 C.F.R. §300.613(a). Pursuant to the District of Columbia Municipal

                                                16
Regulations (“DCMR”), DCPS must honor the records request as soon as possible, but in no case

more than 45 calendar days, 5E DCMR §2600.6, and failure to timely comply with a parent’s

request to inspect educational records is a procedural violation of the IDEA. N.P. v. E. Orange

Bd. of Educ., No. CIV. 06-5130 DRD, 2011 WL 463037, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2011).

   If a procedural violation is alleged, a hearing officer may find that a child did not receive

FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies impeded the child’s right to a FAPE, significantly

impeded the parent’s opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process on provision of

FAPE, or caused the child to be deprived of educational benefits.      An IDEA claim is “viable

only if [the] procedural violations affected the student’s substantive rights.” Lesesne v. District

of Columbia, 447 F.3d 828, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

   The IHO found that DCPS provided Plaintiff’s counsel with K.B.’s educational records apart

from a document sometimes referred to as a “SEDS document index.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at

17. The IHO agreed that Plaintiff made a “legitimate argument that such a document has been

provided by DCPS in other instances.” Id. As such, the IHO directed that DCPS provide

Plaintiff with this list so that she could be sure she had been provided all educational records.

The IHO did not, however, find that non-production of this list was anything other than a

procedural violation. The IHO found that “there was insufficient evidence that DCPS[‘s] [failure

to provide a SEDS index] significantly impeded Petitioner’s opportunity to participate in the

decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to Student or caused Student a

deprivation of educational benefits.”     HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 17. Accordingly, the IHO

concluded that while Petitioner sustained the burden of persuasion on this issue, there was no

denial of FAPE. Id. at 16.

   The Court has reviewed the argument proffered by Plaintiff in support of her contention that

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non-provision of the SEDS index resulted in a substantive violation. See generally Pl.’s P&A,

ECF No. 15-1, at 23-25. This Court finds that while Plaintiff makes conclusory statements about

procedural violations rising to the level of substantive violations, and statements regarding the

general importance of the SEDS index, Plaintiff does not identify any way in which DCPS’s

actions deprived K.B. of educational rights or impeded Plaintiff from participating in the

educational process attributable to the SEDS index. Nor was there any testimony by Plaintiff

during her direct examination regarding K.B.’s educational records. Accordingly, Plaintiff has

failed to demonstrate the DCPS’s omission of the SEDS index from the records produced

affected K.B.’s education in any way. Lattisaw v. District of Columbia, No. 1:22-CV-510, 2023

WL 3719814, at *3 (D.D.C. May 30, 2023) (citations omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff has not

carried the burden of demonstrating a substantive violation, and as such, the Court upholds the

IHO’s findings on this issue, which are supported by the record evidence and statutory authority.

   D. Did DCPS violate the HOD?

   In the August 29, 2022 HOD, the IHO directed that “DCPS, within ten (10) business days of

the issuance of this order [ ] provide Petitioner the list of documents for Student available

through SEDS, sometimes referred to as the SEDS document index.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at

17. Plaintiff acknowledges that “[o]n or about September 9, 2022, DCPS provided Plaintiff with

a list of documents that DCPS had developed” but argues that it was not a copy of the SEDS

document index. Pl.’s P & A, ECF No. 15-1, at 26 (referencing a comparison of a SEDS

document with what was provided). DCPS labels this claim as “baseless” and explains that:

   As explained by [Ms.] Thom, the SEDS database cannot generate a “SEDS Document
   Index.” ¶¶ 8-9. And instead of saving or printing multiple screenshots of the documents
   viewable in the system, which could provide an incomplete, and possibly inaccurate
   accounting of the documents that are included in the student’s file, Thom manually reviewed
   [the] student’s entire profile in SEDS and then created a document identifying and listing
   every document maintained in SEDS for K.B. during his time with DCPS, which she
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       provided to Plaintiff’s counsel. ¶¶ 10-13.

    Def.’s CMSJ, ECF No. 16, at 23-24. DCPS asserts, and this Court agrees, that this document

    produced by DCPS satisfies the directive in the HOD, which ordered the provision of a “list of

    documents for student available through SEDS, sometimes referred to as the SEDS document

    index.” Accordingly, this claim by Plaintiff is denied.6

          IV. CONCLUSION

          The Court has reviewed the four claims set forth by Plaintiff, which challenge the IHO’s

    findings in his HOD. As explained herein, regarding each claim, the Court has found that the

    IHO made specific and reasoned findings that were based on the factual record and consistent

    with relevant legal authority. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment shall be

    denied, and Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment shall be granted. A separate

    Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

                                                ____________/s/__________________
                                                COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
                                                UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6
 DCPS notes in its CMSJ, ECF No. 16, at 23, that Plaintiff seeks enforcement of the HOD, but 20
U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(A) “does not provide a cause of action to enforce school district compliance
with a hearing officer’s decision.” B.D. v. District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792, 803 (D.C. Cir.
2016). Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is without merit, the Court need not address
whether Plaintiff has adequately raised this claim in her Complaint, pursuant to her mention of 42
U.S.C. §1983.
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