Court Opinion

ID: 9861467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:04:47.856484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:31.560454
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting: Contrary to the reasoning of the majority, I believe the 10-year limitation of section 13—206 should apply to a section 19(g) action. I therefore dissent. Section 13—206 provides a 10-year limitations period for actions based on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts or other evidences of indebtedness in writing. A written document qualifies as "other evidence of indebtedness” when one need not resort to parol evidence to establish the vital elements of the agreement and when the document is of the same nature as those written instruments specified. (See Toth v. Mansell (1990), 207 Ill. App. 3d 665, 669-70, 566 N.E.2d 730, 733.) It is true a decision of the Commission cannot be said to be of the same nature as a bond or contract. But, the decision of the Commission here clearly evidences indebtedness on the part of employer and certainly does not need parol evidence to establish its elements. More importantly, however, had claimant’s benefits been "awarded” by virtue of a settlement agreement as opposed to a judgment, the 10-year limitation of section 13—206 would apply. (See Givens v. Givens (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 97, 101, 548 N.E.2d 571, 574.) The length of time an employee has to collect benefits from an employer should not depend upon whether he settled the matter or went through arbitration. Therefore, because I believe the 10-year statute of limitations more closely comports with the intendments of section 19(g) and better satisfies the public policy of ensuring compensation be paid to injured employees, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision in this instance. WOODWARD, J., joins in this dissent.