Court Opinion

ID: 9943556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 20:01:04.876626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:18.943658
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10702    Document: 47-1      Date Filed: 02/23/2024   Page: 1 of 11

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10702
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        ERICA REGINA HICKS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant,

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20814-BB-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10702

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Erica Hicks appeals her total sentence of 30 months’ impris-
        onment for conspiracy to commit device access fraud and aggra-
        vated identity theft, arguing that her sentence is both procedurally
        and substantively unreasonable. After review, we aﬃrm.
            I.    FACTUAL        BACKGROUND           &    PROCEDURAL
                  HISTORY
                In 2019, a federal grand jury issued a superseding indictment
        charging Hicks with one count of conspiracy to commit access de-
        vice fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2) (Count 1); three
        counts of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        §§ 1028A(a)(1) and 2 (Counts 2, 3 and 4); and one count of posses-
        sion of 15 or more unauthorized access devices, in violation of
        18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(3) and 2 (Count 5). Hicks ultimately pled
        guilty to Counts 1 and 2, and the government dismissed the remain-
        ing charges.
               Hick’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) outlined the
        following regarding Hicks’s criminal conduct dating back to De-
        cember 2014 when a loss prevention oﬃcer at Macy’s observed
        Hicks and Rayveen Hicks (“R. Hicks”) randomly selecting clothing
        items without checking sizes or prices, behavior consistent with
        fraudulent activity. Hicks approached the register and paid $156.45
        for the randomly selected items with a Macy’s credit card embossed
        with the name of someone with the initials L.B. After the ﬁrst
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        22-10702               Opinion of the Court                        3

        purchase was approved, Hicks and R. Hicks began selecting addi-
        tional items from another area in the store. Hicks purchased an-
        other $446.28 worth of items and then attempted to make a third
        purchase worth $299.29, all with the same credit card. However,
        before the third purchase was completed, the cashier, acting on a
        recommendation from the loss prevention oﬃcer, asked Hicks to
        provide identiﬁcation, but she could not do so. The loss prevention
        oﬃcer contacted law enforcement, who arrested Hicks. In a post-
        arrest statement, Hicks told the oﬃcers that she purchased all the
        items with her grandmother’s Macy’s credit card. However, Hicks
        could not provide any information about L.B., and L.B. denied
        knowing Hicks or ever opening a Macy’s credit account.
                The PSI further stated that police oﬃcers obtained a search
        warrant for Hicks and R. Hicks’s car, in which oﬃcers found mul-
        tiple pieces of mail, a receipt for a Macy’s purchase from three days
        prior using L.B.’s credit card, and a U.S. Postal Service envelope
        with the personal identifying information (“PII”) of two other in-
        dividuals. Oﬃcers also recovered a second envelope with the PII
        of another person, and a credit card with yet another person’s
        name on it. In all, oﬃcers discovered four social security numbers
        and eight account numbers not belonging to Hicks or R. Hicks in-
        side the car. Police also found approximately 110 social security
        numbers and other PII belonging to other individuals at Hicks’s
        residence. The state charged Hicks for these oﬀenses, but the case
        was “no actioned” in January 2015. Later, Hicks was indicted on
        the present federal charges.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10702

               For Count 1, the PSI calculated Hicks’s total oﬀense level as
        14. The PSI also set Hicks’s criminal history category at II based on
        several prior misdemeanors. One of Hicks’s past oﬀenses was
        from 2017, in which she was convicted for grand theft and fraudu-
        lently using another’s PII and a credit card. Hicks was sentenced to
        probation for 24 months, which she successfully completed. The
        PSI also noted that, in March 2019, Hicks was arrested for grand
        theft, petit theft, criminal use of personal identiﬁcation, and the
        unlawful use of a two-way communication device. According to
        the police report, Hicks added herself as a signatory to the victim’s
        accounts and fraudulently transferred $25,000 from the victim’s
        savings account to his credit accounts. Hicks also allegedly inter-
        cepted a package intended for the victim, valued at $135, and
        signed for the package. However, those criminal charges were ul-
        timately dropped.
               The PSI noted that the statutory imprisonment range for
        Count 1 was zero to ﬁve years, while Count 2 carried a mandatory
        consecutive sentence of two years. Based on the total oﬀense level
        of 14 and a criminal history category of II, the PSI set the guideline
        imprisonment range at 18 to 24 months, plus the consecutive 24
        months for Count 2.
                Hicks moved for a downward variance. She asked the dis-
        trict court to impose a total sentence of 24 months based on the 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, her age at the time of the oﬀense, and her
        current health issues.
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        22-10702               Opinion of the Court                        5

               At the sentencing hearing, the district court conﬁrmed that
        no parties had objected to the PSI, and it adopted the facts and cal-
        culations in the PSI. The court noted that Hicks had submitted a
        statement of acceptance of responsibility and applied a 2-level re-
        duction, which decreased her guideline range to 12 to 18 months’
        imprisonment, plus a consecutive 24 months for Count 2. Hicks
        then reasserted the arguments she made in her motion for a down-
        ward variance, which the government opposed. The government
        argued that, because of Hicks’s ongoing fraudulent conduct, she
        should receive a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment followed by
        the two-year mandatory consecutive sentence, for a total of 36
        months’ imprisonment.
               Ultimately, the district court imposed a total sentence of 30
        months’ imprisonment, consisting of 6 months for Count 1 and a
        consecutive 24 months for Count 2, followed by 2 years of super-
        vised release. In imposing the sentence, the district court ﬁrst
        acknowledged that at the time of the oﬀense, Hicks was 24 years
        old and was now 31, stating that age would normally be an im-
        portant consideration. However, it noted that Hicks’s behavior be-
        tween the instant oﬀense and sentencing by continuing to engage
        in fraudulent activities showed that she did not change her behav-
        ior. It then explained that the current oﬀense involved not just 1
        fraudulent credit card, but the improper possession of more than
        100 pieces of PII. The court noted that the incident that gave rise
        to her conviction two years later was the same conduct of using a
        fraudulent credit card and PII, which indicated that Hicks did not
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10702

        learn from her 2014 arrest and continued to engage in criminal ac-
        tivity.
               The district court stated that, based on Hicks’s continued
        criminal activity of the same nature, the variance Hicks requested
        was not appropriate. The court acknowledged that Hicks would
        serve 24 months in detention for Count 2 and that it had to deter-
        mine what sentence would be suﬃcient but not greater than nec-
        essary to serve the goals of sentencing, such as promoting respect
        for the law and adequate deterrence to Hicks and others contem-
        plating this behavior. With respect to rehabilitation, the court did
        not identify any recent incidents involving in the same type of be-
        havior. It stated that an appropriate sentence would serve the goals
        of sentencing but take into consideration her young age at the time
        and the fact that she would be required to serve 24 months in
        prison. The court noted that this would be Hicks’s ﬁrst signiﬁcant
        sentence in custody and that it wanted to make sure she received
        medical care for her health condition.
                The district court explained that it had considered all the par-
        ties’ statements, the PSI, and the statutory factors in § 3553(a), and
        imposed the 30-month total sentence. Hicks did not object to her
        sentence or the manner in which it was calculated. She now ap-
        peals.
            II.   STANDARDS OF REVIEW
               We review “de novo whether the district court stated a spe-
        ciﬁc reason for imposing a sentence outside the guideline range as
        required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), even when the defendant did not
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        22-10702                Opinion of the Court                          7

        object on this ground before the district court.” United States v. Stei-
        ger, 83 F.4th 932, 936 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Parks,
        823 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2016)). However, we review other un-
        preserved challenges to a sentence’s procedural reasonableness,
        such as an argument that the district court failed to adequately con-
        sider the § 3553(a) factors, for plain error. Parks, 823 F.3d at 994-96.
        A district court commits plain error if it (1) erred; (2) the error was
        plain; and (3) the error aﬀected the defendant’s substantial rights.
        United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014).
               We review for an abuse of discretion challenges to a sen-
        tence’s substantive reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
        51 (2007); see also Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762,
        767 (U.S. 2020) (holding that appellate courts still review substan-
        tive reasonableness challenges for an abuse of discretion even in in-
        stances where a defendant did not necessarily object to their sen-
        tence but advocated for a shorter sentence). “The party challeng-
        ing the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasona-
        ble.” United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2016).
           III.    DISCUSSION
                   A. Hicks’s Sentence is Procedurally Reasonable.
                On appeal, Hicks argues that her sentence is procedurally
        unreasonable because the district court did not suﬃciently explain
        its reason for imposing the chosen sentence under § 3553(c)(2). She
        also asserts that the district court did not appropriately weigh the
        § 3553(a) sentencing factors in imposing her sentence.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10702

               A district court imposes a procedurally unreasonable sen-
        tence if it miscalculates the advisory guideline range, treats the
        guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, im-
        poses a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to ade-
        quately explain the chosen sentence. Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936. Un-
        der § 3553(c)(2), when a “district court imposes a sentence outside
        the guideline range, it must state in open court the speciﬁc reason
        for imposing that sentence.” Steiger, 83 F.4th at 937 (citing 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(c)(2)). The court’s reasons must be suﬃcient to allow this
        Court to engage in a meaningful review of the sentence. Id.
                Additionally, the § 3553(a) factors a district court must con-
        sider include the criminal history of the defendant, the seriousness
        of the crime, the promotion of respect for the law, just punishment,
        and adequate deterrence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although the district
        court is required to consider the § 3553(a) factors, it is not required
        to discuss each of the factors, nor must it state that it explicitly con-
        sidered each of the factors. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321,
        1326 (11th Cir. 2013).
                Here, the district court did not impose a procedurally unrea-
        sonable sentence. As to Hicks’s § 3553(c)(2) challenge, which we
        review de novo, the district court suﬃciently explained its reasons
        for why it imposed a below guidelines sentence. Steiger, 83 F.4th at
        937. The district court gave a detailed explanation as to what fac-
        tors it considered, including Hicks’s age, history and characteris-
        tics, criminal history, and the general need for deterrence and jus-
        tice. Thus, the district court did not err in this respect.
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        22-10702                Opinion of the Court                          9

                Hicks’s remaining challenge to her sentence under § 3553(a)
        fails for the same reason. Although the district court was not re-
        quired to do so, it stated on the record the § 3553(a) factors it con-
        sidered in imposing Hicks’s sentence. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1326.
        The district court’s statements show it considered many of the
        § 3553(a) factors in crafting Hicks’s sentence. As such, Hicks can-
        not establish that the district court imposed a procedurally unrea-
        sonable sentence, and we aﬃrm on this issue.
                   B. Hicks’s Sentence is Substantively Reasonable.
              Hicks also challenges the substantive reasonableness of her
        sentence, contending that the district court failed to consider rele-
        vant mitigating factors when it imposed her sentence.
                For substantive reasonableness challenges, the “district court
        abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to aﬀord consideration to rel-
        evant factors that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant
        weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear
        error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States
        v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
        marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174
        (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). We defer to the district court’s ability to
        consider and weigh the proper sentencing factors and will only va-
        cate a sentence if we are left with a deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction
        that the district court clearly erred in weighing the § 3553(a) fac-
        tors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018).
        In considering the § 3553(a) factors, a district court does not have
        to give all the factors equal weight, for the court is given discretion
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10702

        to attach great weight to one factor over another. United States v.
        Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015).
               An indicator of a reasonable sentence is one that is well be-
        low the statutory maximum for the crime. United States v.
        Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). “We ordinarily ex-
        pect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.”
        United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). It is
        rare for a sentence to be considered substantively unreasonable.
        United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1256 (11th Cir. 2013).
               The statutory term of imprisonment for conspiracy to com-
        mit access device fraud is zero to ﬁve years’ imprisonment. 18
        U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), (b)(2), (c)(A)(i). The statutory term of impris-
        onment for aggravated identity theft is two years’ imprisonment,
        which must run consecutively to any other term of imprisonment.
        18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b)(2).
               Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sen-
        tencing Hicks to a total of 30 months’ imprisonment. Hicks’s con-
        viction for only 6 months’ imprisonment for her Count 1 oﬀense
        of conspiracy to commit access device fraud is well within the stat-
        utory range and below the guideline recommendation. Moreover,
        Hicks’s two-year term of imprisonment for her aggravated identity
        theft oﬀense in Count 2 is also within the statutory range. Thus,
        her sentences are presumptively reasonable. Dougherty, 754 F.3d at
        1364; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Additionally, the district court
        clearly considered all applicable § 3553(a) factors in imposing
        Hicks’s sentence, and there is no indication that the court gave too
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        22-10702               Opinion of the Court                       11

        much or too little weight to any particular factor. Irey, 612 F.3d at
        1189.
           IV.     CONCLUSION
             For the reasons set forth herein, Hicks’s sentences are
        AFFIRMED.