Court Opinion

ID: 9459666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:27:46.687473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:16.394591
License: Public Domain

VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
In United States v. Welty, 468 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1972), this court held that resentencing was not always required when sentences under counts charging crimes under various subdivisions of. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 had been amended, prior to our decision in United States v. Corson,1 449 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1971), to accord with the basic principle of Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L. Ed.2d 370 (1957), that penalties under such subdivisions may not be cumulated where a single bank robbery is the subject matter of all counts in this case, the amending sentence of February 9, 1970, was entered prior to Corson and was in effect a general sentence of 15 years on all counts. If, as I believe, such a sentence could have been validly imposed in 1970 on Count I 2 of the indictment, I *983believe the case should be remanded so that the sentencing judge has the option of either amending the February 9, 1970, sentence to delete all words after “years” 3 or to vacate that sentence and bring the defendant back before him for resentencing, in the discretion of such sentencing judge.4
I believe that the record justified the district court’s finding and conclusion that the Government had met its burden of showing a voluntary and knowing plea to Count I of the indictment.5 As stated in Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 963 (3d Cir. 1970), in regard to a plea entered prior to McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), “[a]n examination of the record discloses that substantial evidence supports the District Court's conclusion that the plea was entered voluntarily.” Also, defendant-appellant has made no allegation that would lead to a different result as to the plea to Count I.6
The elements of the crime with which the defendant-appellant was charged in Count I are (1) knowingly and unlawfully entering the bank, and (2) such entry being with intent to commit larceny. At the sentencing in April 1969, appellant’s counsel conceded, in the presence of appellant, that he was representing the appellant at “this sentencing on the bank robbery. This involved the bank robbery, involved the institution in *984South Philadelphia where the defendants were apprehended in the bank” (page 2 of transcript of sentencing proceeding of April 15, 1969). The appellant has never contended that he did not enter the bank with intent to commit larceny or that he was not apprehended with his co-defendants in the bank. He relies solely on his contention that no one explained to him at the time of his plea the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime. In Woodward this court held that it was proper to consider a colloquy taking place, prior to the pronouncement of sentence and during the sentencing procedure, in determining whether a defendant-appellant had voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea with an understanding of the nature of the charge.
Appellant contends that since he was informed at the arraignment that he could be sentenced to 55 years (as opposed to the correct maximum term of 25 years), he was not adequately informed of the consequences of his plea. On the facts presented by this record, I would apply the holdings in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits that misinformation, given to a defendant at arraignment by a district judge, which indicates a possible longer sentence than the law permits does not invalidate a plea of guilty entered after receipt of such misinformation. United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1329 (5th Cir. 1971); Murray v. United States, 419 F.2d 1076, 1079 (10th Cir. 1969).7 In United States v. Woodall the court said:
“Isolating all other factors that could influence a defendant in determining to enter a plea of guilty, the court is of the opinion that even if Woodall had been told the district judge could pyramid the maximum sentences under each of the separate counts of the two indictments to which he pled, this factor would not invalidate his plea. The probability such information would have influenced Woodall not to change his plea so far outweighs the possibility that the prospect of stiffer punishment may have caused the change that we refuse to consider the latter as relevant.”
Relying on Shutz v. United States, 432 F.2d 25, 29 (10th Cir. 1970), appellant contends that the conviction under Count I merged into Count II. After careful consideration, I reject this interpretation of Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957). Judge Rosenn’s opinion in United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 551 (3d Cir. 1971), makes clear that “the only practicable way of implementing Prince is to impose a general sentence on all counts for a term not exceeding the maximum permissible sentence on that count which carried the greatest maximum sentence.” Since it is clear that the conviction on Count I for an offense providing for a 20-year maximum supports the 15-year sentence imposed by the district court, it is not necessary to consider defendant’s contention that the record does not support an explanation to the defendant at the time he entered his plea in May 1968 of the elements of the charges under Counts II and III. If a sentence does not exceed that which might have been imposed on any one valid count, the judgment and sentence remain in full force and effect, regardless of the disposition of other counts. See Glazerman v. United States, 421 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1970).8
This court has held on a record virtually identical9 with the one now before the court that the plea of appellant’s codefendant Lindsey was entered *985knowingly, voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of the charges in the indictment. See Lindsey v. United States, 453 F.2d 867, 868-869 (3d Cir. 1972).
I would vacate that portion of the district court order from which this appeal is taken, which denies appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to Counts II and III of the indictment, and direct the district court to set aside such pleas, but in all other respects I would affirm such order.10

. It is noted that the author of the Corson opinion was a member of the panel which joined in the opinion in 'Welty, supra.

. The three-count indictment, to which defendant-appellant entered guilty pleas to each count, charged, inter alia:
Count I. “. . . on or about April 24, 1968, . . . ALFRED X JASPER, BERNARD HARRIS and MELVIN LINDSEY, did knowingly and unlawfully, enter the Citizens Bank and Trust Company, 1849 South Street, Philadelphia . . . , with intent to *983commit larceny; the deposits of said bank being insured by the [F.D.I.C.] . . . ,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
Count II. “. . . ALFRED J. JASPER, BERNARD HARRIS and MELVIN LINDSEY, did knowingly and unlawfully take and carry away with intent to steal . . . $54,221.00, . belonging to and in the care . and possession of the Citizens Bank . . . ,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b).
Count IH. “. . . on or about April 24, 1968 . . . ALFRED J. JASPER, BERNARD HARRIS and MELVIN LINDSEY, did knowingly and unlawfully put in jeopardy by the use of dangerous weapons, to wit: a shotgun in the possession of . ALFRED J. JASPER and a revolver in the possession of BERNARD HARRIS, the lives of employees and customers of the Citizens Bank . . . ,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d).

. The sentence would then read:
“It is adjudged that the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for a period of fifteen (15) years.”

. Although we recognize that United States v. Corson, supra, 449 F.2d at 551-552, stated that resentencing is the better practice in most cases, it would exalt substance over form to require defendant to be brought halfway across the country from Leavenworth, Kansas, to Philadelphia, Pa., in order to have the sentence of February 1970 reworded to comply with Corson and delete any reference to counts in the sentence. I see no reason to require that defendant should have been present in February 1970 (prior to Cor-son) when that sentence was entered, reducing the sentence previously imposed in April 1969. See United States v. Welty, supra.

. Count I of the indictment is based on 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), which provides, inter alia: “Whoever enters . . . any bank . . . with intent to commit in such bank . . . any larceny shall be . . . imprisoned not more than twenty years. . . .” The indictment based on the above language is set forth in note 2 above.

. Accepting appellant’s allegation (page 5 of Motion) that his counsel informed him in a conference a week before arraignment that “if he were to enter a plea of guilty that he probably would not receive a sentence in excess of ten (10) years” (emphasis supplied), the imposition of a 15-year sentence does not make the plea involuntary. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1969), The use of the word “probably” shows that counsel was only giving an estimate of the length of the sentence the district court might impose if a plea were entered. Furthermore, subsequent to the entry of a guilty plea to this indictment and prior to the April 15, 1969, sentencing, defendant had entered a guilty plea to a charge of escaping from the custody of an authorized representative of the U. S. Attorney General (Cr.No.23,320, E.D.Pa.), so that the sentencing judge was entitled to consider this additional crime in imposing sentence.

. In the Woodall ease, the defendant was informed that the maximum term was 45 years, and in Murray he was informed that the maximum was 35 years (as opposed to the correct maximum of 25 years in both eases).

. See footnote 4 above.

. Prior to accepting appellant’s plea, the trial judge specifically pointed out to him the separate penalties provided for the crimes described in each count of the indictment, whereas this procedure was not followed in the trial judge’s colloquy with Lindsey.

. As noted above at page 2, the district court has the option of vacating the entire sentence and providing for return of the defendant-appellant for resentencing in its discretion, if this is deemed necessary under all the circumstances, since part of the language in the February 1970 sentence can be construed as “illegal.” Of. F.R.Crim.P. 35 and 28 U.S.O. § 2255.