Court Opinion

ID: 9947287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 16:00:51.758527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:18.186641
License: Public Domain

23-339-cv
    Ngono v. Owono

                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                         FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                            SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

               At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
    Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of March two thousand
    twenty-four.

    PRESENT:
               DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                     Chief Judge,
               RICHARD C. WESLEY,
               DENNY CHIN,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    Andre Marie Ngono,

                      Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                           23-339
                 v.
    Luc Owono, Luckendy Realty, Travsail
    Agency, Inc., Access Transportation
    Services, Inc., Sable Hub, Inc,
                   Defendants-Appellees,

Kamara Youssouf, Africa Employment
Agency,

                   Defendants.

_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                  Andre Marie Ngono,
                                                          pro se, Jamaica, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                 Joseph Carbonaro,
                                                          Carbonaro Law, PC
                                                          New York, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Paul G. Gardephe, Judge; Sarah Netburn, Magistrate Judge).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,          IT   IS   HEREBY      ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      Because we write primarily for the parties, we assume familiarity with the

facts, issues, and procedural history, and recite only what is necessary to explain

our decision. In 2021, plaintiff Andre Ngono, proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis, sued a variety of defendants for alleged human trafficking and forced

labor.    Ngono twice amended his complaint.       Adopting a magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation in part, the district court dismissed Ngono’s federal

claims, declined supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims, and denied

further leave to amend. See Ngono v. Owono, No. 21-CV-00095 (PGG)(SN), 2022

WL 18959568 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2022), report and recommendation adopted in part,

2023 WL 2207587 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023).

         On appeal, Ngono challenges the dismissal of only a single claim against a

single defendant: a Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) claim against

defendant-appellant Luc Owono, whom Ngono alleges was involved in the

trafficking operation. The validity and timeliness of Ngono’s trafficking claim

against Owono depends on whether a 2011 incident, in which Owono asked

Ngono to attend college under Owono’s identity so that Owono would benefit

financially by obtaining federal financial aid, states a valid claim under the TVPA.

         Our review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is de novo. Menaker

v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 29 (2d Cir. 2019). We accept as true all well-pleaded

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facts in the operative complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in Ngono’s

favor. Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740–41 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 1

Because Ngono has been pro se throughout this case, we construe his submissions

liberally to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Meadows v. United

Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

      The TVPA grants a private right of action to victims of trafficking and forced

labor. See Adia v. Grandeur Mgmt., Inc., 933 F.3d 89, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2019); 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1589(a), 1590(a), 1595(a).    A plaintiff asserting a forced-labor claim under

§ 1589 may proceed under several alternative theories, consisting of (1) force,

threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint; (2) serious harm

or threats of serious harm; (3) abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;

1 Although we apply the usual standard of review in this case, we observe that plaintiff
Ngono was convicted by a jury of using defendant Owono’s identity to “enroll in college
and obtain federal student financial aid, unemployment insurance benefits, and
immigration benefits under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program,” a
conviction we affirmed on appeal. United States v. Ngono, 801 F. App’x 19, 20–21 (2d Cir.
2020). Although the defense raised the preclusive effect of this judgment below, the
district court ultimately did not resolve the case on that ground, and Owono does not
press it again on appeal. Because we conclude that the claim fails on the merits, we need
not reach preclusion.
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or (4) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if

that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person

would suffer serious harm or physical restraint. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)–(4). “[I]f

a defendant violates section 1589, he also violates section 1590,” which reaches

recruiting a person in violation of the TVPA, if he “recruited the person to perform

forced labor.” Adia, 933 F.3d at 94.

      With respect to the alleged student loan fraud scheme, Ngono did not allege

specific threats from Owono that would satisfy § 1589 or a separate act of

recruitment under § 1590(a). He alleged that Owono enrolled him in school and

used his student loan money to pay off his own debt, but did not suggest that this

element of the scheme was accompanied by threats or abuse.            Rather, as the

district court reasoned, Ngono alleged broadly that Owono threatened him

between 2006 and 2021. But see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating

a plausible claim “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation”).

      In his brief, Ngono argues that the district court failed to assess his claim in

                                          5
the context of his broader complaint, which alleged that Owono used fraud, deceit,

and threats to extract value from Ngono through labor. He also contends that he

was unaware of student loans, which do not exist in his country of origin. But

even if that were true, Ngono appears to concede that the broader claim of human

trafficking depends on the student-loan aspect of the scheme standing alone as an

independent offense, without which his 2006 claims would not be timely under

the TVPA’s ten-year statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c)(1). Because he

failed to allege facts suggesting the commission of acts prohibited under § 1589(a)

or § 1590, his 2011 claim cannot stand alone.

      Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Ngono failed to state a

TVPA claim. We do not reach Ngono’s argument regarding further amendment

because he failed to object to that portion of the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, despite being warned of the consequences of failing to do so.

Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile,

P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010); Small v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d

15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam). And because the district court dismissed all

                                          6
federal claims, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Souza v. Exotic Island

Enters., Inc., 68 F.4th 99, 123 (2d Cir. 2023).

      Ngono’s remaining arguments are unavailing or without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                         FOR THE COURT:
                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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