Court Opinion

ID: 9386149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 17:01:05.410419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.236635
License: Public Domain

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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13990
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        JOHN THOMAS BURNETTE,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cr-00076-RH-EMT-3
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-13990

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
               Real-estate developer John Burnette was convicted on mul-
        tiple counts arising out of his alleged complicity in the bribery of
        Tallahassee City Commissioner Scott Maddox. On appeal, Bur-
        nette challenges his bribery-based convictions on several grounds,
        two of which require us to carefully examine the Supreme Court’s
        decision in McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), which
        explained—and by all accounts narrowed to some degree—the cat-
        egory of “official acts” that can support a federal bribery charge.
        Burnette separately contests his conviction for making false state-
        ments to federal agents during the course of their investigation.
               After careful consideration of Burnette’s McDonnell-related
        arguments, his challenges to two evidentiary rulings, and his attack
        on his false-statements conviction, we affirm.
                                         I
               John Burnette controlled a substantial real-estate syndicate
        in Tallahassee, Florida. In the course of his business, he became
        “friend[s]” with Tallahassee City Commissioner Scott Maddox.
        Doc. 461 at 35. In 2015, the FBI initiated an undercover operation
        to investigate public corruption in Tallahassee. Two agents cre-
        ated a fictitious company called Southern Pines and posed as a
        property developer, Michael Miller, and an investor, Michael
        Sweet. Doc. 456 at 141–43, 161. “Miller” and “Sweet” befriended
        Burnette and, over the course of several months, engaged in
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        21-13990               Opinion of the Court                         3

        discussions about development opportunities with him and Mad-
        dox—many of which the agents secretly recorded. Doc. 456 at
        144–45; Doc. 440-2 passim.
                Burnette, Miller, and Sweet together pinpointed two pro-
        jects for further consideration. First, they would encourage Talla-
        hassee officials to “annex” a parcel of land called Fallschase, which
        was situated just outside the city limits, in order to increase its
        value. Doc. 456 at 173–74 (Miller); Doc. 440-2 at 47–49 (Burnette).
        Second, they would aim to convince officials to approve a Request
        for Proposal authorizing the city to invite potential developers (like
        themselves) to bid for a city-owned property called Myers Park.
        Doc. 456 at 194–95 (Miller); Doc. 459 at 178–79 (Sweet); Doc. 457
        at 14–15 (Miller); Doc. 440-2 at 7–9 (Burnette).
               In recorded conversations in July and September 2016, Bur-
        nette instructed Miller and Sweet that they would need to pay Mad-
        dox for his votes on the Fallschase and Myers Park projects because
        he was “very transactional” and wanted his “piece of pie.” Doc.
        440-2 at 6, 21. In the September conversation, Burnette told the
        agents that while they might be able to persuade the other com-
        missioners “on the merits,” Maddox could “convince[]” his col-
        leagues if the agents paid “$10,000 a month the next 3 years for
        [Maddox] to lobby” on their behalf. Id. at 46–48. Although at one
        point Burnette counseled Miller and Sweet to wait because he
        “hate[d] to see” them “spend money and not know exactly what
        [they were] doing,” he emphasized that it was “money well spent”
        if they were going to “do a deal here.” Id. at 121.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13990

                Maddox subsequently met with Miller and Sweet and agreed
        to “run interference” and help them with “whatever [they]
        needed”—so long as (1) Burnette remained “involved” and (2) they
        paid $10,000 a month to Governance Services, a company run by
        Maddox’s girlfriend, Paige Carter-Smith. Doc. 459 at 163–64; see
        also Doc. 440-2 at 99–102 (Maddox instructing Sweet to pay Gov-
        ernance “so I would not be conflicted out if you had shit coming
        up in front of me” and assuring Sweet that “J.T. [i.e., Burnette] will
        tell you who [Governance] is”); Doc. 453 at 246–50 (Carter-Smith
        testifying that she found it “very curious that [she] was getting paid
        and [she] was not being asked to do anything”). Burnette echoed
        Maddox’s request that Miller and Sweet “run [payments] through
        Governance.” Doc. 440-2 at 125–27; see also id. at 121–22 (same).
        In November 2016, consistent with Maddox’s instructions, the
        agents sent a $10,000 check to Governance, which Carter-Smith re-
        ceived. Doc. 453 at 228–30. Maddox told Burnette about the pay-
        ment. Doc. 461 at 77–78.
               Miller and Sweet arranged a trip to Las Vegas for them-
        selves, Burnette, and Maddox in early December 2016. Doc. 460,
        127–28. While in Vegas, the four discussed both Fallschase and
        Myers Park. In particular, Sweet and Burnette told Maddox (1) that
        they wanted to move forward with the annexation of Fallschase,
        Doc. 440-2 at 151–52, and (2) that they wanted Maddox to “throt-
        tle”—i.e., slow-roll—the Myers Park project “until the time it’s ap-
        propriate for [them] to move on it,” id. at 158. Burnette told Miller
        and Sweet that Maddox would help to ensure that the city annexed
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        21-13990               Opinion of the Court                         5

        Fallschase and delayed the Myers Park RFP. Id. at 151, 155–58.
        One other Vegas-related incident bears brief mention here: Evi-
        dence in the record indicates that during the trip, Sweet bought
        Maddox either a private dance or oral sex (or perhaps both) at a
        strip club. As we’ll explain in due course, the district court’s deci-
        sion to exclude some of that evidence forms the basis for one of
        Burnette’s challenges.
                Following the Las Vegas trip, the agents sent two more
        $10,000 checks to Governance—one in mid-December and another
        in late January. Doc. 453 at 237, 239. To be sure, Burnette occa-
        sionally sent Miller and Sweet mixed messages about the pay-
        ments. He twice insinuated, for instance, that he didn’t “want
        [Sweet] to think that [he] can effectively pay these people and get
        a[ ] vote” and that, if he did, Maddox would “just recuse himself,
        and [not] vote.” Doc. 440-2 at 172; see also Doc. 440-17 at 48–49
        (similar). And Burnette emphasized his above-board wins with the
        commission, once telling Sweet: “5-0 vote, did not pay a $. Talla-
        hassee is just about doing the right thing.” Doc. 460 at 30–31. At
        trial, Sweet testified—over objection—that he considered Bur-
        nette’s comments to be “false exculpatory” statements. Doc. 460
        at 5.
               All the while, though, Burnette reiterated to Miller and
        Sweet that Maddox would move Fallschase through the city com-
        mission in exchange for their money and, in fact, warned the agents
        not to stop sending checks, for fear that Maddox—whom Burnette
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  21-13990

        called “god damn mafia” and “a revengeful mother fucker,” Doc.
        440-2 at 193, 211—might engage in retribution. For instance—
               Sweet:        Are you sending the checks to Maddox?

               Miller:       Yeah. Sending what you told me to
                             send.

               Burnette:     Let me tell you this, don’t stop that.
                             . . . It’ll get done. [Maddox will] get it
                             run through [the city manager] . . . . It’ll
                             be a 3-1 vote.

        Id. at 192; see also, e.g., id. at 193 (Sweet: “Well at this point we’ve
        put him in a paycheck.” . . . Burnette: “You can’t take him out.”);
        id. at 196 (Burnette on January 9, 2017: “$10,000 a month, and it’s
        all going to be okay . . . [Maddox] isn’t going to vote, but he’s going
        to make sure that the votes are enough.”); id. at 198 (Sweet: “So . . .
        keep Maddox on the payroll.” Burnette: “Yeah.”); id. at 203 (Bur-
        nette on March 13, 2017: “I would continue to pay [Carter-Smith]
        the ten thousand dollars . . . .”); Doc. 461 at 87 (Maddox: “I told
        [Carter-Smith] that I thought they were going to move forward
        with Fallschase.”).
               During a meeting in late March 2017, Maddox and Carter-
        Smith both made statements to Miller and Sweet insisting that
        Maddox was only acting in the city’s best interests and that they
        considered the agents’ payments to be for legitimate purposes. Mil-
        ler testified at trial that he thought Maddox was “tr[ying] to
        change” the “way he presented Governance . . . like it was an arm’s
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        21-13990                Opinion of the Court                          7

        length lobbying firm,” Doc. 457 at 59, and Sweet explained his view
        that Maddox “was really making false exculpatory statements
        claiming that he was just doing whatever was best for the city,”
        Doc. 460 at 29. At that point, Miller and Sweet decided to termi-
        nate the undercover operation and shifted to an overt investiga-
        tion. Id. In May 2017, two different FBI agents interviewed Bur-
        nette about his dealings with Maddox, Miller, and Sweet. Doc. 440-
        2 at 223–25.
                A federal grand jury indicted Burnette, Maddox, and Carter-
        Smith for their roles in the alleged bribery scheme. Maddox and
        Carter-Smith pleaded guilty; Burnette didn’t. Following a 17-day
        trial, a jury convicted Burnette on five counts: one of Hobbs Act
        extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); two of honest-services mail fraud, 18
        U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346; one of using a facility of interstate commerce
        to facilitate unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3); and one of
        making a material false statement to the FBI, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).
        The district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 36
        months’ imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release.
               This is Burnette’s appeal. He challenges (1) both the district
        court’s jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence related
        to his extortion and honest-services fraud convictions, (2) two of
        the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and (3) the sufficiency of the
        evidence underlying his false-statements conviction. We will con-
        sider Burnette’s arguments in turn.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 21-13990

                                          II
               Two of Burnette’s challenges—one pertaining to the district
        court’s jury instructions and another contesting the sufficiency of
        the evidence—turn on a definitional provision in the federal brib-
        ery statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 201, and, in particular, on the Supreme
        Court’s interpretation of that statute in McDonnell v. United
        States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016). Although Burnette wasn’t charged with
        bribery per se, all here agree—as they did at trial—that Burnette’s
        alleged attempt to bribe Maddox underlies the Hobbs Act extortion
        and honest-services-fraud charges, and that, for those purposes,
        § 201 provides the relevant definition of “bribery.” See Skilling v.
        United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404 (2010) (defining honest-services
        fraud to include bribery); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260,
        269 (1992) (defining Hobbs Act extortion to include bribery). Be-
        fore addressing Burnette’s particular arguments, we begin with a
        primer on § 201 and the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell.
                 In relevant part, the federal bribery statute’s operative pro-
        vision makes it unlawful for anyone to “corruptly give[], offer[] or
        promise[] anything of value to any public official . . . with intent
        . . . to influence any official act.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A). Im-
        portantly here, the statute defines the term “official act” as follows:
               [T]he term “official act” means any decision or action
               on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
               controversy, which may at any time be pending, or
               which may by law be brought before any public
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        21-13990                Opinion of the Court                          9

               official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such
               official’s place of trust or profit.

        Id. § 201(a)(3).
               In McDonnell, the Supreme Court clarified—and nar-
        rowed—the meaning of the term “official act.” The defendant in
        that case was the former governor of Virginia, who (like Burnette)
        had been convicted of bribery-related Hobbs Act extortion and
        honest-services fraud—there, for accepting some $175,000 in gifts,
        loans, and other benefits from a local businessman in exchange for
        his promise to arrange meetings, organize events, and contact
        other government officials about his donor’s nutritional-supple-
        ment product. See 579 U.S. at 556–61.
               Unpacking the statute’s language, the Supreme Court em-
        phasized that “[t]he text of § 201(a)(3) sets forth two requirements
        for an ‘official act’”:
               First, the Government must identify a “question,
               matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” that
               “may at any time be pending” or “may by law be
               brought” before a public official. Second, the Gov-
               ernment must prove that the public official made a
               decision or took an action “on” that question, matter,
               cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, or agreed to
               do so.

        Id. at 567 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)). The first of § 201(a)(3)’s
        two “requirements” pertains to what we’ll call the “matter” and the
        second to what we’ll call the “act.”
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13990

               The Court went on to detail the characteristics of the cov-
        ered matters and acts. With respect to matters, it made two im-
        portant observations. First, it rejected the government’s conten-
        tion that “nearly any activity by a public official qualifies.” Id. at
        567–68. Rather, employing the familiar noscitur a sociis canon of
        construction, the Court interpreted the general terms “question
        [and] matter” by reference to the more specific terms “cause, suit,
        proceeding [and] controversy.” Id. at 568–69. Because “a typical
        meeting, call, or event arranged by a public official is not of the
        same stripe as”—i.e., is not as serious as—“a lawsuit before a court,
        a determination before an agency, or a hearing before a commit-
        tee,” the Court held those sorts of occurrences didn’t constitute
        covered “question[s or] matter[s].” Id. at 569.
               Second, and separately, the Court held that a covered matter
        can’t be framed at too high a “level of generality”—like, in that
        case, “[e]conomic development.” Id. Rather, it must be more spe-
        cific—i.e., “focused and concrete.” Id. at 570. In particular, the
        Court emphasized § 201(a)(3)’s condition that a matter be either
        “pending” or the sort of thing that “may by law be brought” before
        a “public official.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)). That lan-
        guage, the Court said, “suggest[s] something that is relatively cir-
        cumscribed—the kind of thing that can be put on an agenda,
        tracked for progress, and then checked off as complete.” Id.
               The McDonnell Court separately explained—albeit more
        briefly—what we have called § 201(a)(3)’s act requirement. Recall
        that § 201(a)(3) refers to “any decision or action on” a covered
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        21-13990                Opinion of the Court                        11

        matter. Although, in the abstract, the terms “decision” and “ac-
        tion” could be read broadly to capture ordinary steps like “setting
        up a meeting, hosting an event, or calling another official,” the
        Court held that under its precedents, “something more is re-
        quired.” Id. at 571–72. As examples of qualifying acts, the Court
        used illustrations relevant to the case before it—“[f]or example, a
        decision or action to initiate a research study[,] or a decision or ac-
        tion on a qualifying step, such as narrowing down the list of poten-
        tial research topics.” Id. at 572. Some acts even more clearly qual-
        ify; for instance, although not squarely at issue in McDonnell, no
        one disputes (or could) that casting or abstaining from a vote on a
        covered matter, or agreeing to do either, would constitute the sort
        of act that triggers § 201’s prohibition. See, e.g., United States v.
        Roberson, 998 F.3d 1237, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2021).
                                       * * *
               In sum, then, McDonnell clarified that in order to implicate
        the bribery statute’s prohibition, a public official must either en-
        gage or agree to engage in (1) a sufficiently serious act—casting a
        vote being the quintessential example—(2) concerning a suffi-
        ciently serious and “concrete” matter.
                                          A
               Having set the table, we turn to Burnette’s McDonnell-
        based arguments. We will first address his challenges to the district
        court’s jury instructions, which he contends violated McDonnell in
        two respects, and then turn to his assertion that the government
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13990

        failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions on
        the bribery-related counts.
                                          1
               Burnette raises two challenges to the district court’s jury in-
        struction defining the term “official act”—one general, the other
        more specific. First, and more generally, Burnette argues that the
        instruction failed to give the jury any meaningful guidance about
        what constitutes a § 201(a)(3)-qualifying matter. Second, and more
        specifically, he contends that the instruction elided the require-
        ment—which he grounds in McDonnell and its progeny—that the
        government prove that Maddox agreed, in exchange for payment,
        to provide assistance with “concrete,” identified matters. McDon-
        nell, 579 U.S. at 570. After setting out the official-act instruction’s
        language, we will consider Burnette’s arguments in turn.
              In pertinent part, the district court’s instruction provided as
        follows:
               An “official act” is a decision or action that involves
               the formal exercise of governmental power. This
               case involves only three kinds of possible official
               acts. Unless you find there was an official act of one
               of these three kinds, you cannot find there was an of-
               ficial act.

               The first is a vote on any matter that was pending or
               might later come before a local governmental entity,
               including the City Commission, the Community Re-
               development        Agency,     or    the     Planning
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        21-13990               Opinion of the Court                       13

              Commission. To count as a matter that might later
              come before the governmental entity, a matter need
              not be identified at the time of the payment; it is suf-
              ficient if the payment is made in exchange for favora-
              ble treatment on any not-yet-known matter that
              might later come up for a vote.

              The second kind of official act is abstaining from a
              vote—that is, not voting—on the same kind of mat-
              ter.

              The third kind of official act is pressuring or advising
              another official, including another commissioner or a
              staff member, on the same kind of matter. But Mr.
              Maddox’s advice to a commissioner or staff member
              was an official act only if Mr. Maddox knew or in-
              tended that the commissioner or staff member would
              take formal action based on that advice on a matter
              that could come before the local governmental en-
              tity. Talking to another commissioner or staff mem-
              ber or advocating a course of action, without more, is
              not an official act.

                                      * * *
               Before diving in, we note two hurdles that Burnette must
        overcome on appeal—the doctrines of “invited error” and “plain
        error.” As to the former, we have held that “[w]hen a party agrees
        with a court’s proposed instructions, the doctrine of invited error
        applies.” United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1240 (11th Cir.
        2010). And “[i]t is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13990

        may not challenge as error a ruling” that he invited. United States
        v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
        v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 988 (11th Cir 1997)). All here agree that Bur-
        nette’s trial counsel invited error regarding some aspect of the
        court’s official-act instruction; the only dispute, as we will explain,
        is how far the invited-error bar extends. See Oral Arg. at 1:40–2:40.
        (Burnette’s appellate counsel conceding as much).
                Second, invited error aside, it is undisputed here that Bur-
        nette’s trial counsel didn’t affirmatively object to the court’s in-
        struction on either of the grounds that he argues on appeal. Ac-
        cordingly, even with respect to any aspects of the instruction that
        aren’t covered by the invited-error bar, we may review only for
        plain error. To establish plain error, Burnette must show that “(1)
        an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected his substan-
        tial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the judicial
        proceedings.” United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 822
        (11th Cir. 2014).
                                           a
               Burnette first (and more generally) contends that the district
        court’s official-act instruction failed to narrow or adequately ex-
        plain § 201(a)(3)’s “matter” requirement. The instruction, he com-
        plains, referred to “matter[s]” only in the starkest and most indefi-
        nite way: (1) It adverted to “any matter” that “was pending or
        might later come before a local government entity”; (2) it said that
        “a matter” needn’t be identified at the time of payment but, rather,
        that it was enough that a payment be made in exchange for
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        21-13990                Opinion of the Court                         15

        favorable treatment on “any not-yet-known matter” that might
        later come up for a vote; (3) and with respect to any theory of brib-
        ery that involved one public official seeking to influence another,
        the instruction said only that the former must know or intend that
        the latter would heed his advice on “a matter” that could later arise.
        What the instruction didn’t do, Burnette insists, is capture McDon-
        nell’s requirements that a § 201(a)(3)-qualifying matter be both suf-
        ficiently serious and sufficiently specific. With respect to the for-
        mer, he complains, the instruction didn’t clarify that a covered mat-
        ter must be “of the same stripe as a lawsuit before a court, a deter-
        mination before an agency, or a hearing before a committee.”
        McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 569. And with respect to the latter, it didn’t
        say that a covered matter must be “relatively circumscribed—the
        kind of thing that can be put on an agenda, tracked for progress,
        and then checked off as complete,” advise the jury that a covered
        matter must be “focused and concrete,” or otherwise warn against
        defining the matter at too high a “level of generality.” Id. at 570.
        For all intents and purposes, Burnette asserts, the district court’s
        official-act instruction left it to the jury to define the term “matter”
        however it saw fit.
                We hold that, at least in part, Burnette invited the error that
        he now seeks to challenge. Here’s why: At trial, the government
        proposed an official-act charge that tracked the Eleventh Circuit
        pattern jury instruction. The pattern instruction defines the term
        “official act” by express reference to the three illustrative examples
        mentioned in McDonnell itself—i.e., something similar to “a
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  21-13990

        lawsuit before a court, a determination before an agency, or a hear-
        ing before a committee.” See 579 U.S. at 569. The district court
        refused the government’s request. The court explained its decision
        this way:
              Judges writing opinions are explaining results in a
              case. They are not always trying to express things in
              language that works in jury instructions. I get it that
              it’s generally safe to take the language from the Su-
              preme Court and put it right in the jury instruction.
              So I understand why the government’s experience is,
              we do better on appeal if we just took the language
              right out of [McDonnell]. So part of the language you
              have is: It must be similar in nature to a lawsuit be-
              fore a court, a determination before an agency, or a
              hearing before a committee. That’s clear as mud. I
              mean, it’s clear to a lawyer that reads all of these cases
              and figures out what kind of thing we're talking
              about.

              I think what the Supreme Court was trying to do was
              to tell the Justice Department in bringing prosecu-
              tions and judges in ruling on—lower-court judges in
              ruling on cases what kind of thing we’re talking
              about, so that the government would know whether
              to charge something and courts would know how to
              handle the case. I don’t think anybody on the Su-
              preme Court thought they were writing a standard
              jury instruction. So what I did in the case was take
              that language—like I said, I wrote this instruction
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        21-13990               Opinion of the Court                      17

              with [McDonnell] open on the computer, but I tried
              to apply it to the facts of this case.

              So, “similar to a hearing before a committee,” I don’t
              know if any jurors have ever been to a hearing before
              a committee or knows what kind of thing comes be-
              fore a committee. So, I hear you. And one of the
              judges of this district used to say he's never been re-
              versed for giving a standard instruction. If my main
              goal in the case was not to be reversed, I would just
              give the standard instructions in the case.

        Doc. 463 at 43–44 (emphasis added).
              The government’s lawyer replied that he understood. Im-
        portantly, the court then made pointed inquiries of both sides:
              Court:              But my instruction doesn’t leave
                                  anything out, right?

              [Government]:       No, no. I think the court’s in-
                                  struction is accurate, without a
                                  doubt.

              Court:              You would like it the way it is on
                                  the defense side, I take it. You
                                  didn’t object to the way I had it.

              [Defense]:          No, no. I think, Judge, that you
                                  captured it. Looking at [McDon-
                                  nell], I understand what the court
                                  did.
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13990

        Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
               To repeat, we have held that “[w]hen a party agrees with a
        court’s proposed instructions, the doctrine of invited error applies.”
        Frank, 599 F.3d at 1240. But we have also traditionally construed
        invited errors narrowly, so as to preserve the opportunity for ap-
        pellate review in close cases. See, e.g., Cherry v. Dometic Corp.,
        986 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the invited-error
        bar “is triggered only by unambiguous statements or representa-
        tions”). And to that end, we have drawn some pretty fine lines dis-
        tinguishing between invited and merely-unobjected-to errors in
        jury instructions. Compare, e.g., United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d
        1311, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that defense counsel’s state-
        ment that a district court’s jury instructions “covered the bases”
        triggered the invited-error rule), with, e.g., United States v. Dortch,
        696 F.3d 1104, 1112 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding no invited error and
        reviewing for plain error where counsel said that he “d[id]n’t think”
        he needed to review the instructions again with the court), over-
        ruled in part on other grounds by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
        99 (2013).
               Under our precedent, Burnette’s trial counsel’s concluding
        statement—“[Y]ou captured it . . . . Looking at [McDonnell], I un-
        derstand what the court did.”—clearly constitutes an
        “agree[ment]” to something, and thus clearly invited error with re-
        spect to something. What, though, is that something? The thrust
        of the colloquy between the judge and the lawyers was about
        whether the official-act instruction should include McDonnell’s
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        21-13990               Opinion of the Court                        19

        analogy to lawsuits, determinations, and hearings—which, as
        we’ve explained, bears on the required seriousness of a § 201(a)(3)-
        qualifying matter. Because Burnette’s lawyer expressly “agree[d]”
        that the official-act instruction didn’t need to include the analogy,
        we hold that any error that the court might have committed in re-
        fusing to include it was invited, and that we are accordingly pow-
        erless to review it. In keeping with our precedent, though, we will
        construe the invited error as extending only that far. We will con-
        sider the balance of Burnette’s contention that the instruction failed
        to adequately define covered “matter[s]”—namely, his argument
        that it failed to convey that a matter must be sufficiently specific
        and “concrete”—in connection with his second challenge.
              We proceed, then, to that issue.
                                      b
               Burnette’s second challenge focuses on the following lan-
        guage in the district court’s instruction: “To count as a matter that
        might later come before the governmental entity, a matter need
        not be identified at the time of the payment; it is sufficient if the
        payment is made in exchange for favorable treatment on any not-
        yet-known matter that might later come up for a vote.” Doc. 433
        at 7–8 (emphasis added). By so charging the jury, Burnette con-
        tends, the court impermissibly relieved the government of its bur-
        den to prove that the transacting parties themselves identified and
        agreed on a specific matter (or matters) on which Maddox would
        provide his assistance in exchange for payment.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13990

                As an initial matter, we don’t think that Burnette’s trial
        counsel affirmatively invited that alleged error. Whereas the law-
        suit-determination-hearing analogy that Burnette’s lawyer gave
        away pertains to the seriousness of a § 201(a)(3)-qualifying matter,
        Burnette’s second challenge runs on the matter’s requisite specific-
        ity—i.e., whether it was sufficiently “focused and concrete,” 579
        U.S. at 570—and the timing of its identification. In short, it tees up
        a different McDonnell-related issue. Be that as it may, it is undis-
        puted that Burnette failed to object to the court’s official-act in-
        struction on the ground that he now presses on appeal. Accord-
        ingly, we review only for plain error—which, again, requires proof
        that “(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected
        [Burnette’s] substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fair-
        ness of the judicial proceedings.” Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d at 822.
               On the merits, the parties vigorously dispute McDonnell’s
        meaning, as well as its implications for this case. For his part, Bur-
        nette emphasizes the Supreme Court’s own statements about
        § 201(a)(3)-qualifying matters and their identification. With re-
        spect to the nature of a covered matter itself, Burnette points to the
        Court’s requirement that it be specific—i.e., “focused and con-
        crete.” 579 U.S. at 570. And with respect to identification, he
        points out that the Court observed both (1) that “the Government
        must identify” the covered matter and (2) that “the Government
        must prove”—as relevant here—that “the public official” “agreed”
        to “t[ake] an action ‘on’ that” matter. Id. at 567. The upshot, he
        contends, is clear: In order to secure a bribery-related conviction,
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        21-13990                Opinion of the Court                        21

        the government must establish that the transacting parties agreed
        among themselves that, in exchange for payment, a public official
        would provide assistance on a concrete, identified matter. The dis-
        trict court’s official-act instruction in this case, he says, failed to
        communicate that burden, because it told jurors (1) that the
        § 201(a)(3)-covered matter “need not be identified at the time of
        payment” and (2) that it was “sufficient” that they find that a pay-
        ment was made to Maddox “in exchange for favorable treatment
        on any not-yet-known matter that might later come up for a vote.”
        The instruction, Burnette complains, left the issue of the matter’s
        identification completely up in the air, impermissibly communi-
        cating to the jurors that they could convict him even if they con-
        cluded that Maddox never agreed to assist him, Miller, and Sweet
        with any specific, identified matter.
                The government offers several arguments in response.
        First, it asserts that “a legislator’s promise to vote on future not-
        yet-known legislative bills” in a way that favors his benefactor “will
        always constitute a promise to undertake an official act” because
        “[w]hatever the eventual subject of those bills, the legislator’s vote”
        will necessarily concern a sufficiently concrete matter. Br. of Ap-
        pellee at 25–26. Thus, the argument goes, because the district
        court’s instruction here properly adverted to McDonnell-covered
        acts—e.g., “vote[s]”—it must also implicitly have narrowed the
        range of covered matters. Second, the government insists that
        nothing in either McDonnell or our follow-on decision in Roberson
        necessarily requires it to prove that the parties themselves
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13990

        identified a particular matter at the time of their agreement or pre-
        cludes it from “identify[ing]” the pertinent matter after the fact, so
        to speak, “at trial.” Br. of Appellee at 28 (quoting United States v.
        Van Buren, 940 F.3d 1192, 1204 (11th Cir. 2019)). Finally, and per-
        haps most significantly, the government emphasizes that it “relied
        on an ‘as-the-opportunities-arise’ theory of bribery in this case”—
        which, it explains, “occurs when a person bribes an individual or
        entity in exchange for a continuing course of conduct.” Br. of Ap-
        pellee at 18 (quoting Roberson, 998 F.3d at 1245 n.10). And the
        government notes, correctly, that we observed in Roberson that
        McDonnell “did not reject the retainer theory of bribery,” 998 F.3d
        at 1251—a fraternal (if not quite identical) twin of the as-the-oppor-
        tunities-arise theory.
               As the parties’ competing contentions reflect, there is a lot
        to be said about the meaning and import of the Supreme Court’s
        decision in McDonnell. And there is, we confess, some temptation
        to attempt an overarching explanation of how McDonnell applies
        in cases like this one and, in particular, what it might portend for
        the traditional retainer and as-the-opportunities-arise theories of
        bribery. But the passive virtues are virtues for a reason. We con-
        clude that we needn’t definitively decide at Step 1 of the plain-error
        standard whether the district court’s instruction impermissibly re-
        lieved the government of its burden to prove that Maddox agreed
        to assist Burnette with particular, identified matters, or even, at
        Step 2, whether any such error was “plain”—because we hold that
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        21-13990               Opinion of the Court                        23

        any error that occurred didn’t affect Burnette’s substantial rights at
        Step 3.
               “To show that an instructional error affected his substantial
        rights” at Step 3 of the plain-error analysis, “a defendant must show
        that the error ‘was probably responsible for an incorrect verdict.’”
        United States v. Iriele, 977 F.3d 1155, 1179 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting
        United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019)). Put
        slightly differently, the defendant must establish “a reasonable
        probability of a different result but for the error.” Id.
                Burnette hasn’t met that standard. For reasons that we will
        detail more thoroughly in the next section, addressing Burnette’s
        sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, the proof at trial convinc-
        ingly demonstrated that Burnette facilitated the $10,000 payments
        to Maddox in November 2016, January 2017, and February 2017.
        See Doc. 453 at 228–30, 239, 242. Importantly, the evidence also
        demonstrated that Maddox understood at the time that those pay-
        ments were made in exchange for his assistance with two specific
        development projects—Fallschase and Myers Park. See, e.g., Doc.
        461 at 77–78 (Maddox testifying that he told Burnette about the
        November check to Governance); Doc. 440-2 at 151–52, 155–58
        (Maddox and Burnette discussing Fallschase with the agents in Las
        Vegas after the November check was paid); id. at 192 (Burnette
        confirming that, in exchange for the checks, “It’ll be a 3-1 vote” to
        annex Fallschase); id. at 196 (Burnette stating that it’s “$10,000 a
        month, and it’s all going to be okay” and that Maddox “isn’t going
        to vote, but he’s going to make sure that the votes are enough”).
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        24                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13990

                No one disputes that the Fallschase and Myers Park projects
        constitute concrete, identifiable “matters” within the meaning of
        § 201(a)(3) as interpreted in McDonnell. Accordingly, even if the
        district court had instructed the jury as Burnette says it should
        have—as relevant here, by clarifying that the government had to
        prove that the parties identified and agreed on the particular mat-
        ter(s) that Maddox would seek to influence—it is overwhelmingly
        likely that the jury would have convicted Burnette anyway. And
        where, as here, “the defendant’s guilt would have been clear under
        the correct instruction, he loses under the substantial rights third
        prong of plain error review.” Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1179.
                                       * * *
                For all these reasons, we find ourselves constrained to reject
        Burnette’s challenges to the district court’s official-act instruction,
        though for reasons having little to do with their merits (or demer-
        its). First, to the extent that Burnette now contends that the court
        erred in declining to include McDonnell’s lawsuit-determination-
        hearing analogy as a means of explaining that a § 201(a)(3) matter
        must be sufficiently serious, we hold that his trial counsel invited
        the error. Second, and separately, we hold that we needn’t decide
        whether the court should have more clearly instructed the jury that
        the government had to prove that the parties agreed, in advance,
        that Maddox would provide assistance on concrete, identified mat-
        ters because, in any event, its failure to do so didn’t affect Bur-
        nette’s substantial rights.
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        21-13990                Opinion of the Court                        25

                                          B
               Burnette separately—but relatedly—contends that he was
        entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the bribery-related counts
        because the government failed to prove that Maddox agreed to as-
        sist Burnette with a particular “matter,” as McDonnell defined (and
        as we have explained) that term. We disagree.
                In considering sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims like Bur-
        nette’s, we employ an indulgent standard. “[W]e view the evi-
        dence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and draw ‘all
        reasonable inferences and credibility choices’ in its favor.” United
        States v. Fleury, 20 F.4th 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations omit-
        ted). The evidence need not “be inconsistent with ‘every reasona-
        ble hypothesis except guilt.’” Id. (citations omitted). Rather, it is
        enough that “any rational trier of fact could have found the essen-
        tial element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting
        Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Accordingly, a guilty
        verdict need only “be reasonable, not inevitable, based on the evi-
        dence presented at trial.” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229,
        1253 (11th Cir. 2007).
                Under that standard, the evidence was sufficient to permit a
        reasonable jury to conclude that Maddox agreed to perform an of-
        ficial act in connection with a McDonnell-qualifying matter. Bur-
        nette makes two arguments to resist that conclusion. Neither con-
        vinces us.
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13990

                First, he cites snippets of trial testimony that he claims show
        that the undercover agents purported only “to buy generic ac-
        cess”—an “arrangement with Maddox divorced from any particu-
        lar matter.” Br. of Appellant at 24–25. But the government pre-
        sented ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could have
        found, to the contrary, that Burnette met with both Maddox and
        the agents to arrange for a series of $10,000 payments to Maddox’s
        girlfriend’s company in order to secure Maddox’s vote (or absten-
        tion) in connection with the Fallschase and Myers Park projects.
        See, e.g., supra at 23 (collecting record citations supporting the
        three payments); Doc. 440-2 at 87–89 (Sweet asking how to “fill
        Maddox’s coffers” and Burnette answering that “Maddox has a con-
        sulting [firm]”); id. at 99–100 (Maddox discussing Myers Park with
        Sweet on October 4, 2016 while mentioning “somebody [Sweet]
        can hire” that was “not [Maddox]”); id. at 110 (Maddox: “[T]here’s
        more than that just one deal. There’s [sic] two or three deals here
        that make total sense.”); id. at 151–59 (Maddox, Burnette, and
        Sweet discussing Fallschase and Myers Park in December 2016, af-
        ter the first payment); id. at 51 (Burnette and Sweet discussing seal-
        ing the real-estate deal because “the check’s already been written
        in the back door to Scott Maddox”); id. at 121–22 (Burnette: “[I]t’s
        definitely for Maddox, there’s nobody else in Governance other
        than Paige [Carter-Smith], which is Maddox effectively, indi-
        rectly.”); id. at 125–27 (Sweet: “[D]oes he not want paid?” Bur-
        nette: “No, no, he does. He wants to get paid. . . . Mike and I talked
        about that and run that through Governance.”); Doc. 461 at 87
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        21-13990                   Opinion of the Court                              27

        (Maddox: “I told [Carter-Smith] that I thought they were going to
        move forward with Fallschase.”).
                Second, and seemingly in acknowledgment of the fact that
        the record contains evidence regarding Fallschase and Myers Park,
        Burnette contends that “[t]o the extent the agents discussed partic-
        ular projects with Burnette or Maddox, those projects did not re-
        quire Maddox’s help.” Br. of Appellant at 25. Two problems. For
        one, in the same way that bribery liability doesn’t depend on
        whether a public official ultimately performed an official act, cf. Ev-
        ans, 504 U.S. at 268, it doesn’t turn on the bribe’s actual or expected
        effectiveness. All that matters is that, in exchange for something of
        value, the official agreed to perform an act concerning a sufficiently
        serious and concrete matter. See McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 572; cf.
        United States v. Kimbrew, 944 F.3d 810, 815–16 (9th Cir. 2019) (“In
        short, execution is immaterial. It logically follows, then, that § 201
        liability is not limited by the odds of success of the quo at issue.”). 1
        For another, there was ample evidence in the record from which a
        reasonable jury could have concluded that neither the annexation
        of Fallschase nor the “throttl[ing]” of the Myers Park RFP was quite
        the fait accompli that Burnette now suggests—or, at the very least,

        1 This case is the flip side of Kimbrew. There, the court rejected a defendant’s
        contention that he couldn’t be held liable under McDonnell where there was
        no evidence that he could have actually achieved the task that he allegedly was
        bribed to do. See 944 F.3d at 814–16. By parity of reasoning, Burnette can’t
        avoid liability by arguing that there was no evidence that Maddox was needed
        for the task that Burnette facilitated bribing him to undertake.
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        28                       Opinion of the Court                   21-13990

        that the payments to Maddox provided some assurance that he
        would undertake official acts in connection with those matters.
        See, e.g., Doc. 456 at 195 (Miller: “[Burnette is] explaining to us that
        Scott Maddox is one of those votes and essentially controls two ad-
        ditional votes.”); Doc. 440-2 at 192 (Burnette confirming that, in
        exchange for the checks, “It’ll be a 3-1 vote”); id. at 196 (“[Maddox
        is] going to make sure that the votes are enough.”); id. at 151–59
        (Maddox, Burnette, and Sweet discussing Fallschase and Myers
        Park in December 2016, after the first payment); id. at 51 (Burnette
        and Sweet talking about sealing the real-estate deal because “the
        check’s already been written in the back door to Scott Maddox”).
               Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the gov-
        ernment—and the verdict—we conclude that a rational jury could
        have found that Burnette agreed to facilitate the bribery of Maddox
        to act on a matter (or matters) that satisfied McDonnell’s require-
        ments.
                                         * * *
               Burnette has presented serious McDonnell-based challenges
        to his extortion and honest-services-fraud convictions. In the end,
        though, we conclude (1) that any uninvited error the district court
        made in instructing the jury regarding the nature of § 201(a)(3)-
        qualifying “official act[s],” even if plain, didn’t affect Burnette’s sub-
        stantial rights, and (2) that the evidence at trial was sufficient to
        support Burnette’s conviction on a proper understanding of the
        term “official act.”
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        21-13990               Opinion of the Court                       29

                                         III
               Burnette next challenges his convictions on two evidentiary
        grounds. First, he contends that the district court erroneously ex-
        cluded salacious evidence about Sweet’s conduct during the under-
        cover investigation. Second, Burnette asserts that the court
        wrongly admitted Sweet’s testimony accusing him of making “false
        exculpatory statements” in an effort to exonerate himself once he
        suspected that Sweet might be operating undercover. We review
        both rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hender-
        son, 409 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). Under the deferential
        abuse-of-discretion standard, “we will affirm even if ‘we would
        have decided the other way if it had been our choice.’” Yellow
        Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 846 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir.
        2017) (citation omitted).
                                         A
                Shortly before trial began, the government disclosed to Bur-
        nette’s defense team that Maddox had informed prosecutors that
        Sweet bought him a private dance and oral sex at a strip club during
        the Las Vegas trip. Confronted with Maddox’s allegations, Sweet
        initially denied them. Prosecutors then sent Sweet an audio re-
        cording from the evening in question in an effort to refresh his rec-
        ollection. On the recording, Sweet can be heard saying, “I just paid
        $750 for [Maddox] to get fucked,” and then someone—either Sweet
        or another agent, the district court couldn’t tell—said, “Well, not
        get fucked.” Having listened to the recording, Sweet admitted to
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        30                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13990

        buying Maddox a dance but denied paying for him to receive oral
        sex.
                In response to the government’s motion in limine, the dis-
        trict court ruled that Burnette’s lawyers could ask Sweet whether
        he bought Maddox a dance, but it prohibited them from question-
        ing him about the oral sex and it excluded the audio recording. The
        court based its decision on Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b) and
        Rule 403. We will address those Rules and their application here
        in turn. Although we are skeptical of the district court’s Rule 608(b)
        ruling, we conclude that Burnette can’t surmount the double hur-
        dle of Rules 608(b) and 403 and that, in any event, the court didn’t
        abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.
               In pertinent part, Rule 608(b) states that “extrinsic evidence
        is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct
        in order to attack . . . [a] witness’s character for truthfulness.” Fed.
        R. Evid. 608(b). Burnette insists that he sought to introduce the
        oral-sex evidence not to impugn Sweet’s general “character for
        truthfulness” but, rather, to “undercut Sweet’s credibility as a sup-
        posedly unbiased witness in this case.” Br. of Appellant at 50. In
        particular, Burnette contends (1) that “Sweet’s actions suggested
        that he was willing to go to extraordinary lengths—even to break
        the law—to get Maddox and Burnette,” (2) that Sweet’s alleged
        lawbreaking “gave him a motive to shade his testimony to harm
        Maddox and Burnette in order to justify his unlawful actions or un-
        dermine the credibility of the allegations against him,” and (3) that
        “his apparent lie to the prosecutors further revealed his bias and
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        21-13990               Opinion of the Court                        31

        would have destroyed his credibility as the government’s star wit-
        ness.” Id. at 51.
               For its part, the government asserts that “[d]espite what he
        claims on appeal,” Burnette actually sought to attack Sweet’s “char-
        acter for truthfulness” within the meaning of Rule 608(b). Br. of
        Appellee at 41. For support, the government points to Burnette’s
        lawyers’ statements to the district court that they would use the
        oral-sex evidence to “impeach” Sweet and show that he had “lied”
        to prosecutors about his conduct during the investigation. Id. at
        39, 42. But those descriptions do not ipso facto show a violation of
        Rule 608(b): “[I]mpeach[ment]” evidence—even impeachment ev-
        idence aimed specifically at demonstrating a witness’s “lie[s]”—
        could bear just as easily on the witness’s credibility and bias as on
        his general character for truthfulness.
               The distinction between a witness’s credibility or bias, on
        the one hand, and his character for truthfulness, on the other, is
        real, as both the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized.
        See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56 (1984) (distinguish-
        ing between extrinsic evidence presented to demonstrate a wit-
        ness’s “bias,” which Rule 608(b) permits, and evidence presented
        to show his lack of “veracity,” which the Rule prohibits); United
        States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005) (“An ‘attack’
        that consists only of ‘[g]overnment counsel pointing out inconsist-
        encies in testimony and arguing that the accused’s testimony is not
        credible does not constitute an attack on the accused’s reputation
        for truthfulness within the meaning of Rule 608.’”) (quoting United
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                21-13990

        States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 1982)). And in-
        deed, Rule 608(b) was amended in 2003 specifically to underscore
        that distinction; its language was altered to substitute the phrase
        “character for truthfulness” for the word “credibility.” See Fed. R.
        Evid. 608(b) comm. note. Accordingly, under the amended Rule,
        “the absolute prohibition on extrinsic evidence applies only when
        the sole reason for proffering th[e] evidence is to attack or support
        the witness’ character for truthfulness.” Id. (emphasis added); see
        also United States v. Carthen, 906 F.3d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir. 2018)
        (W. Pryor, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing that, as amended, “[t]he
        Rule does not speak to anything other than the use of extrinsic ev-
        idence to support or attack a witness’s character for truthfulness”).
                Having said that, the line between evidence used to impeach
        a witness on the ground that he is biased or lacks credibility and
        evidence presented to show that he has a tendency to lie more gen-
        erally is a fine (and hazy) one. The one can very easily bleed into—
        and reasonably be understood as focusing on—the other. And for
        that reason, we have been reluctant to hold that district courts have
        abused their discretion in deciding Rule 608(b) issues. See, e.g.,
        United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1094 (11th Cir. 2019);
        Carthen, 906 F.3d at 1320–21; Drury, 396 F.3d at 1315; United
        States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1004–07 (11th Cir. 2001); United
        States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 836 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on
        other grounds, Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011); United
        States v. Smalley, 754 F.2d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 1985). So too here.
        The district court reasonably (if perhaps incorrectly) concluded
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        21-13990                Opinion of the Court                        33

        that questioning and extrinsic evidence related to Sweet’s alleged
        conduct in purchasing oral sex for Maddox, as well as his subse-
        quent denial, bore on his “character for truthfulness” within the
        meaning of Rule 608(b). Even if we might “have decided the other
        way if it had been our choice,” Yellow Pages Photos, 846 F.3d at
        1163, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
               That is especially so in light of the court’s invocation of Rule
        403 alongside Rule 608(b). The former provides that “[t]he court
        may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
        outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
        prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
        wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed.
        R. Evid. 403. We have repeatedly held that evidentiary determina-
        tions under Rule 403’s balancing test are “largely committed to the
        discretion of the district court[s].” United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d
        1222, 1247 (11th Cir. 2011).
               Burnette insists that “[e]vidence that Sweet broke the law to
        ingratiate himself with and/or ensnare Maddox and then lied after
        being caught was highly probative of his credibility and bias with
        respect to this investigation and its targets.” Reply Br. of Appellant
        at 22. There are, however, two substantial counters. First, the pro-
        bative value of the oral-sex evidence—particularly to Burnette’s
        theory that Sweet sought to “ensnare” either him or Maddox—is
        diminished by the fact, confirmed by Burnette’s lawyers at trial,
        that they were not pursuing an entrapment defense. Second, intro-
        duction of the evidence most definitely risked (at the very least)
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        34                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13990

        “confusing the issues,” “misleading the jury,” and “undu[ly] de-
        lay[ing]” the proceedings. Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also Noel Shows,
        Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 327, 329 (11th Cir. 1983). The district
        court reasonably concluded that if it allowed questioning and ad-
        mitted evidence about Sweet’s alleged sex-act purchase, the pro-
        ceedings would have devolved into a sideshow mini-trial—for in-
        stance, about what the recording actually revealed: Even if Sweet
        said, “I just paid $750 for [Maddox] to get fucked,” who—Sweet or
        someone else—uttered the follow-up, “Well, not get fucked”? And
        if it was Sweet, what import—that he had only purchased oral sex
        rather than intercourse, that he had caught himself and retreated
        having realized that he was on tape, or something else? Cf. Ander-
        son v. WBMG-42, 253 F.3d 561, 567 (11th Cir. 2001) (excluding ev-
        idence that “would have in effect generated a mini-trial on collat-
        eral issues” based on Rule 403). Given the evidence’s limited pro-
        bative value and the specter of a “trial within a trial,” we can’t say
        that the district court abused its considerable discretion in conclud-
        ing that Rule 403 justified its exclusion.
                                          B
               Burnette separately challenges the district court’s refusal to
        exclude portions of Sweet’s testimony in which he opined that Bur-
        nette made “false exculpatory statements” when, having guessed
        that Miller and Sweet were undercover, he seemed to backtrack on
        the bribery scheme. For instance, during a recorded December
        2016 telephone call, Burnette told Sweet that he didn’t want him
        “to think that [Sweet could] effectively pay these people and get a[]
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        21-13990                   Opinion of the Court                            35

        vote.” On direct examination, Sweet characterized Burnette’s re-
        mark as a “false exculpatory statement”:
               I immediately thought [that] this was what we call a
               false exculpatory statement. “Exculpatory” means to
               remove from guilt; “false exculpatory” means it’s a
               false statement being made about guilt, removing
               one’s self from guilt.

               As soon as I heard this phone call and I knew Mr.
               Maddox’s concerns about us being potential FBI
               agents, maybe even having recorded him, I immedi-
               ately thought to myself, okay, this is the false excul-
               patory statement that they are making to me.

        Doc. 460 at 5.
              Sweet followed up by saying that he thought Burnette’s
        statement was part of a “completely . . . false exculpatory tele-
        phone call.” Id. at 13. In the same way, Sweet testified that a text
        message in which Burnette wrote that he “did not pay a $” for votes
        was a “false exculpatory comment[].” Id. at 31.
                Burnette contends that by allowing Sweet’s testimony, the
        district court impermissibly allowed him to opine on another’s
        truthfulness in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 602, and
        608(a). 2 For support, he points, for instance, to United States v.

        2 One housekeeping item:  The government asserts that Burnette failed to pre-
        serve his challenge to Sweet’s “false exculpatory” testimony, both because his
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        36                        Opinion of the Court                      21-13990

        Schmitz, in which we held that Rule 608(a) “does not permit a wit-
        ness to testify that another witness was truthful or not on a specific
        occasion,” that Rule 602 prohibits lay witnesses from testifying to
        matters with respect to which they lack “personal knowledge,” and
        that under Rule 401’s general relevance standard, “one witness’s
        opinion that another person has or has not lied does not make it
        more or less likely that the person actually lied.” 634 F.3d 1247,
        1268–69 (11th Cir. 2011); see also, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 780
        F.3d 1084, 1097 (11th Cir. 2015) (observing that a “prosecutor
        . . . cannot” ask one person—there, the defendant himself—
        “whether a particular witness was lying”).
                For its part, the government points to United States v. Hen-
        derson, in which we held that even though, as a general matter,
        one witness can’t testify about another witness’s truthfulness, a dis-
        trict court doesn’t err when it permits a law-enforcement officer to

        lawyers didn’t object every time Burnette used that term and because, when
        they did, they objected on “speculation” grounds. We hold that Burnette’s
        lawyers did enough. First, having brought the false-exculpatory issue to the
        district court’s attention and obtained rulings on their objections, Burnette’s
        lawyers didn’t need to continue to beat the drum. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(b);
        United States v. Hoffer, 129 F.3d 1196, 1202–03 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
        objections were preserved where they “were sufficient to allow the district
        court to correct any errors”). Second, Burnette’s lawyers’ “speculation”-based
        objections were sufficiently related to—and thus adequate to preserve—the
        improper-opinion-related arguments that Burnette now makes on appeal.
        See, e.g., United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1268– 69 (11th Cir. 2011)
        (holding that one witness’s opinion that another has lied was improper be-
        cause it lay “beyond the personal knowledge of the witness”).
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        21-13990               Opinion of the Court                        37

        explain the manner in which he conducted his investigation, even
        if his testimony incidentally bears on another witness’s credibility.
        409 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005). That, the government says, is
        how to understand Sweet’s false-exculpatory testimony here:
        Throughout the trial, Burnette insinuated that the agents had
        coaxed him to engage in bribery and, indeed, that they had contin-
        ued to pursue him even in the face of his statements disclaiming a
        desire (or need) to pay Maddox. The agents persisted in their in-
        vestigation, Sweet testified, because they thought that Burnette
        was feeding them “false exculpatory statements.”
               We needn’t choose between the parties’ competing inter-
        pretations of Sweet’s testimony or decide whether the district court
        erred in allowing it because we conclude that any error that might
        have occurred was harmless. “An evidentiary error ‘is harmless
        unless there is a reasonable likelihood that [it] affected the defend-
        ant’s substantial rights.’” United States v. Frediani, 790 F.3d 1196,
        1202 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d
        1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, “w[e] need not reverse
        [Burnette’s] conviction if the [alleged] error had no substantial in-
        fluence on the outcome and sufficient evidence uninfected by the
        error supports the verdict.” Id. (quoting Hands, 184 F.3d at 1329).
        In making that determination, we must “weigh[] the record as a
        whole, examining ‘the facts, the trial context of the [alleged] error,
        and the prejudice created thereby as juxtaposed against the
        strength of the evidence of defendant’s guilt.’” Hands, 184 F.3d at
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        38                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13990

        1329 (quoting United States v. Reed, 700 F.2d 638, 646 (11th Cir.
        1983)).
               We think it exceedingly unlikely that the jury’s verdict in
        this case rose or fell on its assessment of Sweet’s false-exculpatory
        testimony. In one of the cases on which Burnette principally relies,
        we observed that “[t]his [C]ircuit has found even prejudicial non-
        constitutional error harmless in criminal cases in which the govern-
        ment has presented highly convincing, admissible evidence of a de-
        fendant’s guilt, such as . . . audiotapes or videotapes of the defend-
        ant engaging in or discussing the alleged criminal activity . . . .” Id.
        (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298,
        1302 (11th Cir. 1998)). There, we found it significant that “[t]he
        government presented no similarly compelling pieces of evidence.”
        Id. Here, by contrast, as already explained in detail in connection
        with Burnette’s other challenges, there is ample evidence—includ-
        ing plenty of recorded audio—detailing Burnette’s involvement in
        the plans to bribe Maddox. See supra at 23, 26–28.
                                          IV
              Burnette raises one final challenge: He contends that the ev-
        idence was insufficient to support his conviction under 18 U.S.C.
        § 1001(a)(2) for making false statements to FBI agents during a May
        2017 interview regarding his involvement in the bribery scheme.
        For the following reasons, we disagree.
              Burnette’s false-statements conviction was based on an-
        swers that he gave in response to five questions the agents put to
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        21-13990                Opinion of the Court                        39

        him. Burnette asserts that all five of the agents’ questions were
        ambiguous—three of them “fundamentally” so and the remaining
        two at least “arguably” so. The distinction between fundamental
        and arguable ambiguity is important because it affects our review
        of the jury’s general verdict on the false-statements count, which
        doesn’t distinguish among Burnette’s five responses.
               The parties here agree that, under our precedent, if a ques-
        tion “is so vague as to be ‘fundamentally ambiguous,’ the answers
        associated with” it are “insufficient as a matter of law to support [a]
        perjury conviction”—or, as here, a false-statements conviction.
        United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097, 1099 (11th Cir. 1991)
        (quoting United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986)).
        Accordingly, and in light of the jury’s general verdict, if even one
        of the agents’ questions to Burnette was fundamentally ambigu-
        ous, the false-statements conviction cannot stand. Cf. United
        States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1210 (11th Cir. 2002) (vacating
        a general verdict for a multiple-object conspiracy on the ground
        that one of the conspiracy theories was contrary to law).
               By contrast, if “a question is only arguably ambiguous and
        ‘an answer would be true on one construction of [the] question but
        false on another . . . the defendant’s understanding of the question
        is a matter for the jury to decide.’” United States v. Swindall, 971
        F.2d 1531, 1553 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Bell, 623
        F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1980) (quotation marks omitted)). “In
        such a situation, we review under the same sufficiency-of-the-evi-
        dence standard used for a jury’s determination of falsity.” Id.
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        40                     Opinion of the Court                  21-13990

        Accordingly, absent any fundamental ambiguity, the jury’s general
        verdict must stand if the evidence is sufficient to support a convic-
        tion based on any of the statements that Burnette made, even in
        response to a question that might have been arguably ambiguous.
        Cf. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1991) (distinguish-
        ing between legal and factual insufficiencies in relation to general
        criminal verdicts).
               We first consider whether any of the questions on which
        Burnette focuses was, as he contends, fundamentally ambiguous.
        A question satisfies the high fundamental-ambiguity bar only if it
        lacked “a meaning about which men of ordinary intellect could
        agree” and couldn’t “be used with mutual understanding by a ques-
        tioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time [the answers]
        were sought.” Manapat, 928 F.2d at 1100 (quotations and citations
        omitted). Burnette highlights three instances in which he says the
        agents asked fundamentally ambiguous questions. First, and with
        our emphasis added—
              Agent:        Okay. Who did you recommend?

              Burnette:     I recommended, uh, Paige Carter-
                            Smith—and—that was it.

              Agent:        Okay. Who, is she with a firm or with
                            . . . Is she on her own?
              Burnette:     She . . . used to be with—I don’t even
                            know the name of the firm.
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        21-13990              Opinion of the Court                      41

        Doc. 440-2 at 223. Second—

              Burnette:    Um, but, like, I mean, I hate to say it.
                           Like, they didn’t know, like, who the
                           right—I mean—like, they hired, like,
                           Adam Corey, okay?

              Agent:       They did hire Adam Corey?

              ***

              Burnette:    So, you know, Adam is a lobbyist. I
                           don’t—I mean, he’s not like the best lob-
                           byist in the world. (Laughter)

              Burnette:    Um, so, I mean, they just—they didn’t
                           really seem to know what they were do-
                           ing.

              Agent:       Okay. Do you know did they retain
                           anybody?
              Burnette:    I do not know who they retained.
        Id. at 223–24. And finally—
              Agent:       Sorry. Corey introduced them to Mad-
                           dox and you did as well?

              Burnette:    I was told that Maddox, they—that they
                           were introduced to Maddox.

              ***
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        42                     Opinion of the Court                21-13990

               Agent:       Do you know the content of their con-
                            versa—what did they want from Mad-
                            dox or what did—
               Burnette:    I don’t know the answer to that.
        Id. at 224.
               None of the questions to which Burnette points was funda-
        mentally—as opposed to just arguably—ambiguous. The last
        seems to us the most ambiguous of the three: “Do you know the
        content of their conversa—what did they want from Maddox or
        what did—?” At worst, though, this question asked one of two
        things: (1) what the agents discussed with Maddox, or (2) what Bur-
        nette understood the agents wanted from Maddox. To be sure, the
        inquiry was imperfectly framed and executed. But it wasn’t funda-
        mentally ambiguous within the meaning of our precedent. Com-
        pare the following question, which we deemed only arguably am-
        biguous in Swindall:
               Do you have a specific recollection about engaging in
               a conversation wherein it was discussed a money trail
               or the ramifications of the money trail from [an
               agent’s] sources to ultimately you and what potential
               liability would exist or you would be exposed to?

        971 F.2d at 1553. If that twisted, asyntactical garble was only argu-
        ably ambiguous, we don’t see how the third of the three questions
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        21-13990                   Opinion of the Court                               43

        that Burnette emphasizes—to say nothing of the first and second—
        could be fundamentally ambiguous. 3
               Because we aren’t confronted with any fundamental ambi-
        guity, the question in reviewing the jury’s general verdict is simply
        whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-
        finder to conclude that Burnette made a false statement in response
        to any of the agents’ five queries. In short, it was. Take, for in-
        stance, the following exchange, which not even Burnette contends
        included a fundamentally ambiguous question:
                Burnette:       [S]o all [Sweet] would do is he hired
                                lobbyists. . . . So they work with lobby-
                                ists in Tallahassee—
                Agent:          Who did he—did he—oh, he did? Who
                                did he hire?
                Burnette:       I—let me say this. I don’t know who
                                they ever wrote a check to.

        3For the sake of completeness, neither of the first two questions is fundamen-
        tally ambiguous, either. With respect to the first, Burnette asserts that because
        Carter-Smith owned and operated Governance, it was fundamentally ambig-
        uous whether she was “on her own” or “with a firm.” Ordinary people,
        though, could clearly agree that the agent wanted to know whether Carter-
        Smith worked as a solo practitioner or with others. With respect to the sec-
        ond, Burnette contends that the word “retain[]” is fundamentally ambiguous.
        Again, ordinary people could certainly agree that it simply meant “hire.” And
        remember, Burnette told the undercover agents to “keep Maddox on the pay-
        roll.” Doc. 440-2 at 198.
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        44                     Opinion of the Court                21-13990

        Doc. 440-2 at 223. A reasonable jury could certainly conclude that
        Burnette’s answer to the agent’s question was false. Audio record-
        ings entered into evidence show (1) that Burnette directed Miller
        and Sweet to write checks to Governance, which Burnette knew
        full well Maddox’s girlfriend Paige Carter-Smith owned, and (2)
        that he knew that the checks would ultimately find their way to
        Maddox. See supra at 23, 26–28.
               Because the FBI agents interviewing Burnette didn’t ask him
        any fundamentally ambiguous questions, and because the jury
        could reasonably conclude that Burnette lied in response to at least
        one of the agents’ queries, we must reject his sufficiency-of-the-ev-
        idence challenge to his false-statements conviction.
                                         V
              In sum, we hold as follows:
              1. We needn’t decide whether the district court erred in in-
              structing the jury regarding the meaning and application of
              the term “official act,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) and
              interpreted in McDonnell, because (1) Burnette invited one
              of the errors that he now alleges and (2) he failed to object
              to the other and hasn’t shown that it affected his substantial
              rights.
              2. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit
              the jury to conclude that Burnette assisted in bribing Mad-
              dox in connection with a § 201(a)(3)-qualifying “official act.”
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        21-13990              Opinion of the Court                        45

              3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
              evidence pertaining to an FBI agent’s conduct during the un-
              dercover investigation. And any error that the court might
              have committed in admitting the agent’s testimony that
              Burnette had made “false exculpatory statements” was
              harmless.
              4. The evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to con-
              clude that Burnette made actionable false statements to FBI
              agents in the course of their official investigation, in viola-
              tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).
              Accordingly, Burnette’s convictions are AFFIRMED.
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        21-13990 Jordan, Rosenbaum & Newsom, JJ., Concurring                  1

        JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, concurring:
               To say that the parties “vigorously dispute” the meaning and
        proper application of the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell
        v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), might be an understatement.
        See Maj. Op. at 20. From their competing briefs, we think it’s fair
        to say that Burnette views McDonnell as a sea-change, while the
        government views it as a ripple. As is often the case, the truth, we
        think, lies somewhere in between.
                To be fair, Burnette’s reading of McDonnell finds ample sup-
        port in the language in the Court’s written opinion. For instance,
        the Court was adamant (1) that a § 201(a)(3)-qualifying “matter”
        must be “focused and concrete,” (2) that “the Government must
        identify” the covered matter, and (3) that “the Government must
        prove,” as relevant here, “that the public official . . . agreed” to
        “t[ake] an action ‘on’ that . . . matter.” Id. at 567–70. Knitting those
        three requirements together, they do seem to impose a burden on
        the government to establish that the transacting parties agreed
        that, in exchange for a thing of value, a public official would pro-
        vide assistance on a particular, ex-ante-identified matter. And it’s
        no stretch to conclude that, by that measure, the district court’s
        instruction here was erroneous: It not only told jurors that the
        § 201(a)(3)-covered matter “need not be identified at the time of
        payment,” but also (and potentially more problematically) told
        them that it was “sufficient” that they find that a payment was
        made to Maddox “in exchange for favorable treatment on any not-
        yet-known matter that might later come up for a vote.”
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        2          Newsom, Rosenbaum & Jordan, JJ., Concurring 21-13990

                We must take care, though, not to overread the Supreme
        Court’s opinion. On the most muscular version of Burnette’s in-
        terpretation, McDonnell requires the government to prove in
        every bribery-related case that the transacting parties made a par-
        ticular, discrete, identifiable project—like, say, Fallschase or Myers
        Park—the explicit focus of their agreement. The government is
        rightly worried that such an understanding of McDonnell would
        upend decades’ worth of settled bribery law. It is particularly con-
        cerned, it seems, about the continuing viability of what it calls the
        “as-the-opportunities-arise” and “retainer” theories of bribery—
        both of which, as it explains, refer to circumstances in which a pay-
        ment is made to a public official in exchange for “a continuing
        course of conduct” rather than a specific, distinct project. Br. of
        Appellee at 18 (quoting United States v. Roberson, 998 F.3d 1237,
        1245 n.10 (11th Cir. 2021)). 1 Before McDonnell, the government
        correctly says, courts applying the as-the-opportunities-arise and
        retainer theories had “coalesced around the principle that the gov-
        ernment need not prove that the briber and the public official had,
        at the time of payment, identified a particular item for the public
        official to influence through these official acts.” Id. at 18–19; see

        1 Courts (and the parties here) sometimes refer to the as-the-opportunities-
        arise and retainer theories of bribery interchangeably, although without fur-
        ther explanation. See, e.g., Roberson, 998 F.3d at 1245 n.10 (“The ‘retainer,’
        ‘as opportunities arise,’ or ‘stream of benefits’ theory of bribery[] occurs when
        a person bribes an individual or entity in exchange for a continuing course of
        conduct.”). We don’t think any distinction that might exist between the two
        matters for present purposes.
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        21-13990 Jordan, Rosenbaum & Newsom, JJ., Concurring                  3

        United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 353 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating
        before McDonnell that the “overwhelming weight of authority”
        concluded that § 201 does not require “identif[ying] a particular
        case that would be influenced” at the time of the agreement). An
        important question, then, is whether McDonnell “thr[e]w all this
        out the window.” Br. of Appellee at 26.
                Our view is that McDonnell is best understood as having
        tweaked, but not scrapped, the as-the-opportunities-arise and re-
        tainer theories. As for the “not scrapped” part, we’ve already said
        as much. In United States v. Roberson, we stated flatly that
        McDonnell “did not reject the retainer theory of bribery.” 998 F.3d
        at 1251. For support, we pointed to the Second Circuit’s post-
        McDonnell decision in United States v. Silver, 948 F.3d 538 (2d Cir.
        2020), in which that court concluded that the as-the-opportunities
        arise theory of bribery had survived McDonnell, albeit in modified
        form. In particular, while it disagreed with the defendant’s conten-
        tion that “McDonnell eliminated th[e] so-called ‘as the opportuni-
        ties arise’ theory” outright, it “agree[d]” that any application of that
        theory had to account for the fact “that [McDonnell] requires iden-
        tification of a particular question or matter to be influenced.” Id.
        at 552 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, the court clarified, in the
        wake of McDonnell, “a public official must do more than promise
        to take some or any official action beneficial to the payor as the
        opportunity to do so arises; she must promise to take official action
        on a particular question or matter as the opportunity to influence
        that same question or matter arises.” Id. at 552–53.
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        4        Newsom, Rosenbaum & Jordan, JJ., Concurring 21-13990

                So, if McDonnell didn’t scrap the as-the-opportunities-arise
        and retainer theories, exactly how did it tweak them? In what form
        do they survive McDonnell’s requirement that the government
        prove that a public official “agreed” to “t[ake] an action ‘on’” a “fo-
        cused and concrete” matter? 579 U.S. at 567–70. As we see it,
        McDonnell likely invalidated one brand of these continuing-
        course-of-conduct theories but left another intact—and the distinc-
        tion lies in the very nature of bribery, whose essence is an agree-
        ment, the corrupt bargain itself. Cf. Evans v. United States, 504
        U.S. 255, 268 (1992) (“[T]he offense is completed at the time when
        the public official receives a payment in return for his agreement
        to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is
        not an element of the offense.”).
               First, then, the invalid brand of as-the-opportunities-arise
        and retainer liability: A bribery-related agreement, like any other
        agreement, requires a bargained-for exchange—a promise of an
        identifiable quid in return for an identifiable quo. If, in exchange
        for a thing of value, a public official pledges only, say, to vote for
        his benefactor on some unspecified, future project that might
        someday come before him, his promise is so vague as to be illu-
        sory—there has been no meeting of the minds, no promised ex-
        change of the sort that is a prerequisite to an agreement. After
        McDonnell, it seems to us that so hazy a promise can’t form the
        basis of a bribery conviction.
              Now for the valid brand: If, instead of promising his assis-
        tance only on some undefined future project, the official commits
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        21-13990 Jordan, Rosenbaum & Newsom, JJ., Concurring                     5

        to vote in favor of his benefactor’s pet projects every time one
        comes up for consideration—or, for that matter, to vote in accord-
        ance with his benefactor’s interests every time an issue comes up,
        no matter whose particular project is involved—he has, to our
        minds, made a corrupt bargain. He has done the dirty deed. In
        those circumstances, there has been a meeting of the minds, and
        the consideration (so to speak) at the heart of the agreement is tan-
        gible and identifiable—no less so, in fact, than had the official com-
        mitted to vote for his benefactor on a specific, discrete, identifiable
        “Project X.” Concurring in Silver, Judge Lohier addressed this very
        scenario, and his words are worth repeating:
               The payment is not in exchange for a vague promise
               to act in the payor’s general interests at discrete mo-
               ments to be determined only at the official’s discre-
               tion . . . . Instead, it solicits a promise that the official
               will filter every official act through the lens of the
               payor’s interests. In other words, the promise is not
               vague, amorphous, or subject only to the official’s dis-
               cretion of when and where to act. Although the mat-
               ter that is the subject of the promise is broad in scope,
               its contours are clearly defined.

        Silver, 948 F.3d at 578–79 (Lohier, J., concurring).
               And to be clear, not only does this “every time” brand of the
        as-the-opportunities-arise theory square with the first principles of
        contract law that underlie bribery liability—it comports with com-
        mon sense. What a topsy-turvy world it would be if the federal
        bribery statute criminalized an agreement in which a public official
USCA11 Case: 21-13990       Document: 65-1        Date Filed: 04/11/2023        Page: 51 of 51

        6         Newsom, Rosenbaum & Jordan, JJ., Concurring 21-13990

        pledged to back his benefactor’s interests on a single, discrete, one-
        off project but didn’t cover an agreement in which that same offi-
        cial pledged to do so without fail on a series of numerous projects.
        The every-time scenario isn’t just “worse” in an absolute sense than
        the one-off scenario—it’s a seriatim repetition of it.2
                                          * * *
               Our point is a simple one: McDonnell arose against a unique
        set of facts, and the Supreme Court was understandably worried
        about sanctioning the criminalization of vast swaths of day-to-day
        lobbying and constituent-relations activity. See 579 U.S. at 574–77.
        There is a risk, though, of over-rotation—i.e., that we might mis-
        read some of the language in the Court’s opinion as having done
        more than the Court intended. Those of us on what the Constitu-
        tion calls “inferior courts,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, would do well
        to tread lightly and await further direction from our bosses before
        concluding that McDonnell revolutionized bribery law as we have
        long known it.

        2 The district court seems to have been concerned about the “every time” phe-

        nomenon, as well. Defending its instruction post-trial, it questioned whether
        the following could possibly not constitute bribery: “I will pay you $10,000
        per month starting now if you will agree that you will vote in my favor when
        my future projects, whatever they may be, come before the commission.”
        Doc. 539 at 18.