Court Opinion

ID: 9861895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:53:36.987632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:38.568367
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice.
The district court, sitting in judicial review of an administrative proceeding, determined that authority of the agency to determine the controversy was lost at the administrative level by reason of a failure to give a statutory notice. The petitioner concedes the failure but argues there was substantial compliance and contends the agency should be estopped to deny its authority. We affirm the district court.
Because her wages and hours were substantially reduced the petitioner terminated her employment with Wilson Trailer Company and sought unemployment benefits by filing a claim with the Iowa department of job service. A claims deputy granted the claim in the belief her termination “. . . was for cause attributable to the employer.” This decision was reversed by a hearing officer who found the petitioner had voluntarily quit. On appeal to job service the hearing officer’s decision was affirmed.
Petitioner then filed a petition for rehearing under section 17A.16, The Code 1979. The notice failure occurred at this point. Under section 17A.16 any party may file for rehearing before the administrative tribunal within twenty days of the issuance of a final decision. The statute specifically requires “[a] copy of such application shall be timely mailed by the applicant to all parties of record not joining therein.” This requirement was not fulfilled.
Petitioner has a plausible explanation for the failure. Literature provided her by the department advised she need not employ anyone to help in securing her rights or to collect benefits. In addition a card was mailed by the agency which read in part: “It is not necessary to employ anyone to help you collect benefits. The job insurance representative will advise you and assist you in preparing your claim.” The petitioner says she was also orally advised to the same effect by the agency representative at the close of the interview on her claim. At the close of the interview the representative distributed copies of his notes and the employer’s written submission. According to her affidavit petitioner then asked the representative whether she was obligated to send any future writings to her former employer. The representative is said to have replied, “No, any correspondence to the employer will be handled by job service.”
The department contends its advice was not as misleading as petitioner suggests. The notice and advice was intended only for the administrative proceeding at the hearing stage. The department points especially to the job service appeal board decision which notified the parties that the decision would become final in ten days unless an application for rehearing under section 17A. 16(2) was filed within twenty days. The notice specifically provided: “A copy of the rehearing application shall be promptly mailed by the party initiating the application to all other parties involved.”
In any event the petitioner did not mail the application for rehearing to her former employer. Petitioner’s application for re*204consideration was denied by the department on its merits. This petition for judicial review followed.
The department entered a special appearance contending the district court lacked jurisdiction because of petitioner’s failure to mail her employer a copy of the agency’s rehearing petition. The petitioner has brought this appeal from a trial court ruling sustaining that special appearance.
I. Although the petitioner contends otherwise this challenge to jurisdiction could be raised at any stage in the proceedings. Matter of Estate of Dull, 303 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 1981). A special appearance is most appropriate for that purpose. Iowa R.Civ.P. 66.
II. Section 17A.16(2) plainly requires the mailing of a copy of the application for rehearing to all other parties in the administrative proceeding. Petitioner’s employer, a party, was entitled to and did not receive the copy. Our cases interpreting section 17A.19 (judicial review) leave no doubt that the mailing requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional. Neumeister v. City Development Bd., 291 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 1980); Record v. Iowa Merit Employment Dept., 285 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 1979). In seeking a different interpretation of the notice requirements under section 17A.16(2) the petitioner points out that section 17A.19(2) expressly provides “[s]uch mailings shall be jurisdictional . . . . ” No such phrase occurs in the rehearing section. The distinction between the sections however does not rescue the petitioner.
Under section 17A.19(2) the mailings are mandatory and jurisdictional; under 17A.16(2) the requirements, though not jurisdictional, are nevertheless mandatory. Opinions on the subject often blur the distinction between requirements that are mandatory and requirements that are mandatory and jurisdictional. In both situations the requirements are usually, though perhaps inaccurately, called “jurisdictional.” Though it does not help this petitioner the distinction between mandatory and jurisdictional requirements is apt to be significant. See 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 195, at 542 (1951). The effect of noncompliance with a mandatory requirement similar to the one here was explained in Maquoketa Valley, etc. v. Maquoketa Valley Ed., 279 N.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Iowa 1979). The effect of noncompliance with a requirement that is mandatory and jurisdictional was explained in Dawson v. Iowa Merit Employment Com’n, 303 N.W.2d 158, 160 (Iowa 1981). Under these authorities we have no quarrel with petitioner’s contention that the requirements in the two sections can be distinguished. Petitioner failed in a mandatory requirement, not in a requirement that was mandatory and jurisdictional.
Accordingly the petitioner’s claim of estoppel is not answered by the rule that jurisdiction cannot be established by consent, waiver, or estoppel. Qualley v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 261 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1978). That rule proceeds on the premise that jurisdiction does not attach, nor is it lost, on equitable principles. It is purely a matter of statute.
Petitioner’s estoppel contention must fail on a different basis. She charges one party with excusing her failure in a duty owed to a different party. The notice not given was required in favor of her former employer. The employer, a necessary party to the proceeding, had an independent stake in the outcome. The notice to which the employer was entitled could not be waived by the department. There is no privity between the employer and the department that would support petitioner’s claim of estoppel. Matter of Estate of Herm, 284 N.W.2d 191, 196 (Iowa 1979).
The trial court was correct in determining that, because of the petitioner’s failure to comply with the mandatory notice requirements, petitioner’s right to have a rehearing before the department was lost.
AFFIRMED.
All Justices concur, except LARSON, J., who dissents.