Court Opinion

ID: 9554250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 15:00:26.897989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:22.010721
License: Public Domain

19-3696
     Rivas-Aparicio v. Garland
                                                                                     BIA
                                                                           Christensen, IJ
                                                                            A206 005 981

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of August, two thousand twenty-
 4   three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 8              EUNICE C. LEE,
 9              SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   LUIS RENE DARWIN RIVAS-
14   APARICIO,
15             Petitioner,
16
17                    v.                                         19-3696
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21              Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                    Anne Pilsbury, Central American Legal
 2                                      Assistance, Brooklyn, NY
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brooke Marie Maurer, Trial Attorney; Nancy
 5                                      E. Friedman, Senior Litigation Counsel; Brian
 6                                      Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
 7                                      General, Office of Immigration Litigation,
 8                                      United States Department of Justice,
 9                                      Washington, DC

10         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

11   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

12   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

13         Petitioner Luis Rene Darwin Rivas-Aparicio, a native and citizen of El

14   Salvador, seeks review of an October 23, 2019 decision of the BIA affirming a June

15   16, 2016 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for

16   asylum and withholding of removal. See In re Luis Rene Darwin Rivas-Aparicio,

17   No. A206 005 981 (B.I.A. Oct. 23, 2019), aff’g No. A206 005 981 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.

18   City June 16, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

19   and procedural history.

20         Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as

21   supplemented and modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the findings that the BIA did

22   not adopt. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005); Xue Hong

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 1   Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s

 2   legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. See

 3   Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

 4         To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, an applicant

 5   “must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

 6   group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting

 7   the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Quituizaca v.

 8   Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2022). The BIA did not err in concluding that

 9   Rivas-Aparicio failed to establish that his proposed social group of individuals

10   who cooperate with police was cognizable or that he was or would be targeted on

11   account of his political opinion.

12         A. Social Group

13         To establish eligibility for relief based on membership in a particular social

14   group, an applicant must show that (1) the proposed social group is cognizable

15   (i.e., its members share an immutable characteristic, the group is defined with

16   particularity, and the group is viewed as socially distinct by society), and (2) the

17   harm suffered or feared was or will be on account of membership in that group

18   (i.e., a nexus between the harm and the cognizable social group). See Quintanilla-

                                                3
 1   Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 588–89 (2d Cir. 2021); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.

 2   Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014). Relief “may be granted where there is more than one

 3   motive for mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the mistreatment

 4   is on account of a protected ground.” Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir.

 5   2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

 6         We previously remanded this case for the agency to apply a mixed-motive

 7   analysis to determine whether Rivas-Aparicio established a nexus between gang

 8   members targeting him and his membership in his proposed social group of

 9   individuals who cooperate with police. On remand, the BIA acknowledged that

10   the record contained “material evidence indicating that the gang members may

11   have been motivated in part by [Rivas-Aparicio’s] cooperation with the police.”

12   Certified Administrative Record at 4. Assuming, based on this evidence, that a

13   nexus had been established, the BIA then proceeded to consider the other factor in

14   evaluating a social group claim—whether Rivas-Aparicio’s proposed social group

15   was cognizable. Although the determination of whether a group constitutes a

16   “particular social group” is a legal issue the BIA reviews de novo, the parties

17   correctly contend that the factual findings underlying such decisions are reviewed

18   for substantial evidence and may not be made by the BIA in the first instance. See

                                              4
 1   Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (B.I.A. 2018) (holding that BIA

 2   “review[s] the ultimate determination whether a proposed group is cognizable de

 3   novo,” but “review[s] an [IJ]’s factual findings underlying that determination for

 4   clear error”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A) (“The Board will not engage in

 5   factfinding in the course of deciding cases.”). However, contrary to the parties’

 6   contentions, the BIA did not engage in impermissible factfinding.          Rather, it

 7   reasonably concluded that Rivas-Aparicio had neither alleged facts nor presented

 8   evidence to establish that his proposed social group was socially distinct within

 9   Salvadoran society, and thus failed to satisfy a material element of his claim.

10   Indeed, Rivas-Aparicio did not assert that anyone other than those involved were

11   aware that gang members had stolen from and attacked him or that he had

12   reported the theft to police, and his country conditions evidence described

13   government corruption, collusion, and incompetence related to gangs but did not

14   indicate that those who cooperate with police are perceived as socially distinct by

15   Salvadoran society. See Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]hat

16   matters is whether society as a whole views a group as socially distinct, not the

17   persecutor’s perception.”); Gashi v. Holder, 702 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding

18   group of cooperating witnesses to war crimes in Kosovo socially distinct to both

                                               5
 1   potential persecutors and the wider Kosovar society, given that the names of

 2   potential witnesses were published on a public list and people in the petitioner’s

 3   village knew that he had spoken to investigators and criticized him for it). Given

 4   the lack of any assertions or evidence of social distinction, no findings of fact were

 5   necessary for the BIA to determine that Rivas-Aparicio failed to satisfy his burden

 6   to that extent. Cf. Wallace v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] review

 7   of the factual record by the BIA does not convert its discretionary determination

 8   as to whether a petitioner warrants an adjustment of status into improper

 9   factfinding.”). For the same reasons, the BIA did not err in concluding that Rivas-

10   Aparicio failed to establish that his proposed social group was cognizable. See

11   Quintanilla-Mejia, 3 F.4th at 588–89; Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237.

12         B. Political Opinion

13         For a political opinion claim, “[t]he applicant must . . . show, through direct

14   or circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from

15   the applicant’s political belief,” Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d

16   Cir. 2005), which “must involve some support for or disagreement with the belief

17   system, policies, or practices of a government and its instrumentalities, an entity

18   that seeks to directly influence laws, regulations, or policy, an organization that

                                               6
 1   aims to overthrow the government, or a group that plays some other similar role

 2   in society,” Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2021)

 3   (citations omitted).   “The persecution may also be on account of an opinion

 4   imputed to the applicant by the persecutor, regardless of whether or not this

 5   imputation is accurate.” Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2020).

 6   “[O]pposition to criminal elements such as gangs, even when such opposition

 7   incurs the enmity of these elements, does not thereby become political opposition

 8   simply by virtue of the gang’s reaction.” Zelaya-Moreno, 989 F.3d at 201.

 9         Rivas-Aparicio’s testimony established that gang members targeted him for

10   reporting a theft to police and retrieving some of his stolen property. He did not

11   testify that he expressed an anti-gang opinion, that he would express such an

12   opinion if removed, or that gang members accused him of having such an opinion.

13   Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that he failed to show that he was

14   or would be targeted on account of an anti-gang or an imputed anti-gang political

15   opinion.   See id. at 202–03.

16         Because Rivas-Aparicio did not satisfy his burden of showing that the harm

17   he suffered and fears he would suffer again was or would be on account of a

18   protected ground, the agency did not err in denying asylum and withholding of

                                             7
1   removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A).

2         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

3   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

4                                         FOR THE COURT:
5                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                                         Clerk of Court

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