Court Opinion

ID: 9479819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:29:47.222678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:40.087849
License: Public Domain

Opinion Per Curiam.
Statement concurring in the result filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.
PER CURIAM:
In affirming Lugg’s conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, we upheld the district court’s decision that two witnesses’ fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination “continued after the entry by [each of them] of a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement to drop all other charges.” Panel op. at 102. This conclusion rested upon two independent grounds that distinguished it from our earlier decision in United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 542-47 (1980): (1) “although each witness had entered a plea agreement and pleaded guilty, neither had been sentenced”; and (2) although the Government, as part of the plea agreement with the witnesses, had agreed to drop the charges against them, those charges “had not yet been dismissed.” Panel op. at 103. Lugg’s petition for rehearing now presents a strong reason for thinking that the second basis for our decision was incorrect.
Once the witnesses agreed to plead guilty to one count in exchange for the Government’s promise to dismiss the other charges against them, the Government was bound by the agreement and could not then *105decide to try them for the charges that it had agreed to dismiss. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Pardo, 636 F.2d at 543. Moreover, the Government was so bound regardless of whether the charges had been formally dismissed. See United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1336-40 (D.C.Cir.1982). Thus, assuming that no problem arose to release the Government from its agreement, the Government apparently could not have prosecuted the witnesses for the charges that it had agreed to dismiss even in the absence of a formal dismissal of those charges.
On the other hand, if something did arise that required the district court to release the witnesses from their plea agreement (for example, a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the time that they entered into the agreement), the Government could likely have reinstated the charges that it had agreed to dismiss, regardless of whether the district court had already entered the dismissal. See, e.g., Fransaw v. Lynaugh, 810 F.2d 518, 523-29 (5th Cir.1987). We have no occasion to comment on whether, if the witnesses had testified by that time, their testimony could be used against them once the charges were reinstated; we see no reason, however, why the answer to that question would turn on whether the dismissal had ever been entered.
Lugg may therefore be correct that the district court’s not having entered the dismissal of the charges against the witnesses at the time of his trial has no bearing upon whether they retained their fifth amendment privilege. It is not necessary for us to resolve the matter at this time, however. As noted above, our decision also rested upon the independent ground that the witnesses had not yet been sentenced at the time of Lugg’s trial. They certainly had a fifth amendment privilege on that account, and thus there was no error in excusing them from testifying at Lugg’s trial.

Petition denied.