Court Opinion

ID: 9739676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:19:21.819877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:13.410449
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
“There is a strong presumption that the decision of the school board [here, Board opted to renew all of Riter’s contract except his position as head boys basketball coach] was made in good faith and that members of the school board acted in good faith at all times.” Jones v. Sully Buttes Schools, 340 N.W.2d 697, 700 (S.D.1983); Moran v. Rapid City Area School District, 281 N.W.2d 595, 600 (S.D.1979). As reflected below, the presumption was not overcome.
The majority opinion first spins its wheels upon the assertion that “actual bias” toward Riter existed on the part of four of the five members of the Woonsock-et School Board. Then, because the Board did not entirely dismiss Riter, apparently due to satisfactory work in several other areas, the majority cries “arbitrary.” Overall, the writing completely ignores the findings of the lower court, as well as the reasons for not renewing the contract in question. I disagree with majority’s thesis and thus dissent.
Important procedural history below:
• Pursuant to SDCL 13-43-9.1, Riter received Board’s Notice of Intent to Not Renew.
• Informal conference was thereafter held with Riter.
• Following a formal hearing on April 17, 1991, Board reaffirmed its earlier determination. SDCL 13-43-10.1.
• Board entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
• Riter filed a Notice of Appeal in the Circuit Court under SDCL 13-46-1.
*578• Circuit Judge conducted a trial de novo on October 24, 1991.
• Circuit Judge entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law affirming the Board’s decision.
• Conclusion: All the necessary statutory steps were taken and Riter had due process hearings.
Trial court made the following findings:
1. There were chain of command problems which existed between Riter and the school administration.
2. Coach Riter did not supervise his players.
3. Coach Riter permitted his players to violate rules.
4. There was a failure by Riter to (a) supervise and (b) to exercise authority over the assistant coach.
5. Coach Riter failed to exercise proper supervision over the players’ sideline behavior and sportsmanship.
6. There were curfew and drinking rules which Coach Riter failed to enforce.
7. Board’s findings were supported by evidence as regards the following:
(a) Coach tolerated vulgar and obscene language by players through lack of supervision;
(b) Coach failed to attend a coaching clinic. He attended one of two clinics.
(c) Public relations problems existed with parents and referees.
8. Board acted in good faith throughout the non-renewal proceedings.
A trial de novo, conducted pursuant to SDCL 13-46-6, granted the circuit judge the power to independently inquire into the facts, but “only for the purpose of passing on the legality of the Board’s decision.” Dale v. Board of Education, Lemmon Independent School District, 316 N.W.2d 108, 111 (S.D.1982). In the end, the trial court deemed that the entire record supported the school board’s decision to non-renew, thus it was legal.
School board members should not be judicially examined and determined to be biased because of knowledge of affairs within the school district. They live in the community and are destined to know practices within the framework of the district’s activities. Here, Riter would lead us to conclude that school board members should be oblivious to any facts involving the basketball program. Not so.
If the requirements of a fair tribunal include the condition that the members of the Board must have had absolutely no prior knowledge of the facts that might make it advisable not to renew a teacher’s contract and that they must have not discussed the matter and not have formed at least some tentative opinion that the teacher’s contract not be renewed prior to the conference with the teacher, then as a practical matter the nonrenewal provisions of the continuing contract law are not available to a school board.
Jones at 700; Schneider v. McLaughlin Ind. Sch. Dist., 90 S.D. 356, 363-64, 241 N.W.2d 574, 577 (1976). The circuit judge, having independently reviewed this factual scenario, could not find actual bias. Despite being non-hired as head basketball coach, Riter still retained his position as a tenured teacher for the school district. Obviously the school board acted legally.
In finding that Riter’s constitutional right to due process was violated, the majority opinion asserts that the “record clearly establishes actual bias toward Ri-ter” by four board members.
The standard to be applied is whether the record establishes either actual bias on the part of the Board or the existence of circumstances that lead to the conclusion that an unacceptable risk of actual bias or prejudgment inhered in the Board’s position. (Citations omitted.) The United States Supreme Court has observed, however, that a school board is not disqualified as the decisionmaker solely because of prior involvement in a dismissal case. Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Assoc., 426 U.S. 482, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). Pre-decision involvement “is not enough to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers with decisionmaking *579power.” Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 497, 96 S.Ct. at 2316.
Strain v. Rapid City School Board, 447 N.W.2d 332, 336 (S.D.1989). Unless Riter can show that the Board has the kind of personal or financial stake in the decision showing a conflict of interest, he will fail to prove actual bias. Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 492, 96 S.Ct. at 2314; Jones at 700. Majority relies upon the fact that some Board members disagreed with coaching decisions made by Riter. Motive may exist, but such does not necessitate actual bias.
Our scope of review set forth in Moran, cited above, compels this Court to determine if the decision of the Woonsocket School District was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The majority exemplifies “arbitrariness” by the fact that Ri-ter “was, and continues to be, a tenured social science teacher, junior varsity girls basketball coach, 7th and 8th grade basketball coach and boys track coach.” Riter was denied the renewal of the one coaching position due to his actions in that same coaching position. To have dismissed him from his duties as a social science teacher for his misdeeds as the head boys basketball coach would support the prime example of arbitrary and capricious behavior that the majority is on a quest to find. Furthermore, the fact that his coaching position was removed from his variety of duties did not affect his job security in teaching nor did it make a “hollow joke” out of tenure, which he still retains. See Jager v. Ramona Bd. of Educ., 444 N.W.2d 21, 28 (S.D.1989). Both Riter and the majority writing have floundered in sustaining the burden.
When reviewing a school board’s decision under the arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion test, we must determine if there is substantial evidence to support the school board’s decision. Moran at 599; Huffman v. Bd. of Education, 265 N.W.2d 262 (S.D.1978). As outlined above, there exists substantial evidence. Thus, Board’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Strain at 336. In piercing the clearly erroneous standard, we are to determine if we, on this Court, are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, and not if we would have made the same decision as a school board member. Id.
The members of this Court should not judge school board members under the same scrutiny of professional people. These school board members are elected and are, ordinarily, lay people from different walks of life. In Strain, we held:
School Boards are creatures of the legislature and are part of the legislative branch of government. Therefore, the judiciary may not invade the province of the school board’s decision making unless such decision making is done contrary to law.
At both the Board hearing and the trial court, the factfinder had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and judge their credibility. Strain at 38; Jager at 25. The trial court found a fair tribunal, good faith and no actual bias. We should respect its decision.
Under the text of my writing, the issue of reinstatement and back pay would not be addressed.
“The power to contract with teachers is vested in the school board and the decision to renew or not renew a teacher’s contract is not one for the judiciary.” Moran at 598; Mortweet v. Ethan Bd. of Ed., 90 S.D. 368, 241 N.W.2d 580 (1976). As no mistake or error has occurred, I would affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice MILLER joins this dissent.