Court Opinion

ID: 9456173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:44:07.704727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:52.189930
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
On the 21s.t day of October, 1969, appellant was sentenced for second degree burglary to a sentence under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. Thereafter a motion was made, for his release on bail and the trial judge entered the following written order:
Upon consideration of defendant’s motion that he be released on personal bond pending appeal, it appearing to the. Court that the defendant has been convicted of second degree burglary and that he, a 19 year old, has a record of four findings of involvement in housebreakings as a juvenile and an attempted unauthorized use of a motor vehicle conviction as an adult, that he presents a danger to the community; and it further appearing to the Court that there is an outstanding probation commitment issued on March 10, 1969, by Judge Howard,* it is therefore this 24th day of October 1969,
ORDERED that defendant’s motion is hereby denied. (Emphasis added).
This court now proposes to remand the case for an additional inquiry concerning financial and non-financial conditions of release and admonishes the court that the order does not reflect any consideration of a release on conditions per Weaver v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 405 F.2d 353 (1968) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3147, 3148.
It seems obvious to me from the court's order .that it is not in order to consider conditions of release because of the outstanding probation commitment. What is the use of considering release on bail if the United States Marshal is standing by with a commitment order in another case?
The order of attachment for probation violation was not related to the burglary offense but was issued because appellant violated the conditions of his probation by not replying to telephone calls from the probation officer, not reporting to the probation office and by not working. The attachment was not served because the probation officer could not locate appellant until October when the probation office found out that appellant was in jail on the current offense. He is still in jail. The Court of General Sessions is now standing by waiting to serve its order of attachment if he is released on bail. It seems to me that it is a useless function for the District Court and the appellate court to be engaging in this bail proceeding when, even if bail is granted, the Court of General Sessions is sitting back waiting to execute the attachment for the probation violation. Certainly since the issuance of the attachment for the probation violation was not related to the present offense, the probation office is not going to retract the attachment just because they have subsequently learned that appellant has been subsequently convicted of another offense. Actually, the second offense is another violation of his probation and another reason why the attachment order should be served if appellant is released on bail. If this court insists on going ahead with a bail pending appeal hearing in the face of these facts, it should be made clear that same relates to the subsequent offense only and does not constitute any ground to interfere with the execution of the attachment to the probation violation. As for me, I would not *497direct a bail hearing when there is an outstanding attachment order waiting to be executed involving a prior offense in no way related to the offense for which bail is sought. It is an exercise in futility to even explore release conditions in such circumstances when no actual release will occur. Pending disposition of this case I would turn him over to the custody of the General Sessions Court pursuant to its attachment.
The trial court considered affidavits by the director of the Columbia Heights Community Association and appellant’s work counselor and while these were favorable, the trial court might well have concluded in its wisdom, and with the advantage it had of observing the appellant’s attitude and demeanor that his recent favorable conduct did not evidence any permanent change in attitude and propensities, that it was purely temporary, occasioned largely by his precarious position at the jail house door. I also conclude that non-frivolous grounds for appeal were not shown. I would accordingly deny appellant’s request but would permit attachment so he could serve his sentence in General Sessions Court.

 Of the Court of General Sessions.