Court Opinion

ID: 9749346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:39:22.292959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:47.075729
License: Public Domain

PARRILLI, J .
I concur. I write separately only to briefly note that the trial court’s attempt to uphold the parties’ freedom of contract was not unreasonable. Ordinarily, voluntary contractual waivers should be enforced by the courts. However, in this case the public policy underlying Code of Civil Procedure section 394—to avoid even the appearance of prejudice in the venue for litigation initiated by a local government—must take precedence over the parties’ right to negotiate a convenient and efficient venue for litigating their contract disputes. Setting trial in a county which is itself a plaintiff, and from which the jury and the trial judge will be selected, is a scenario that might “bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” This was the concern that led our Supreme Court to hold contractual venue selection clauses void. (General Acceptance Corp. v. Robinson (1929) 207 Cal. 285, 289 [277 P. 1039].) Thus, even though the venue specified in the parties’ contract was proper under section 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the right of removal conferred by section 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be honored by the courts.