Court Opinion

ID: 9675435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:54:01.333104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:34.567593
License: Public Domain

OPINION
STEPHEN F. PRESLAR, Chief Justice.
This is a civil action for damages resulting from an assault and battery. The question presented is whether there is a fatal conflict between an issue finding that an assault and battery was committed by the Defendant, Mike Brown, and one finding that he acted in self-defense. The trial Court overruled the contention that there was a conflict and entered judgment for the Defendants/Appellees. We affirm.
[I] Appellant sued the Appellees for an assault committed upon him by one of the Appellees in the place of business of the other which resulted in the loss of sight in one eye. Special issues Nos. 1 and 2 submitted to the jury and their answers thereto are as follows:
“QUESTION NO. 1
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant, MIKE BROWN, committed an Assault and Battery upon the Plaintiff, JAMES NORRIS?”
To which the jury answered “Yes.”
“QUESTION NO. 2
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question MIKE BROWN was acting in self-defense, as that term is herein defined?”
To which the jury answered “Yes he was.” Appellant contends that these two issues are in conflict and preclude the entry of judgment for the Defendants/Appellees. He cites and relies on the test laid down in Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985 (1949). To determine whether there is a fatal conflict, the Court said:
“* * * the Court must consider each of the answers claimed to be in conflict, disregarding the alleged conflicting answer but taking into consideration all of the rest of the verdict, and if, so considered, one of the answers would require a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the other would require a judgment in favor of the defendant, then the answers are fatally in conflict. * * *”
Appellant urges that where the jury answered Question No. 1 “Yes” that an assault and battery was committed upon the Plaintiff, and answered Question No. 2 “Yes” that the Defendant was acting in self-defense, such answers present an irreconcilable conflict upon which a verdict cannot be entered. We are of the opinion that there is no conflict because Question No. 2 is in law an excuse or justification under the new Penal Code which became effective in 1974; therefore the assault is not unlawful or tortious where the defendant is acting in self-defense. Tex.Penal Code Ann. Secs. 9.31 and 22.01.
As stated by the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals in Foster v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 548 S.W.2d 769 (1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.):
“It is settled law that, with the exception of the rule of evidence which gives a person accused of a crime the benefit of a reasonable doubt, the law of self-defense is the same in both civil and criminal cases. Fambrough v. Wagley, 140 Tex. 577, 169 S.W.2d 478 (1943); March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372 (1877). Clearly, a defendant charged with an assault under Sec. 22.01 would be entitled to an instruction embracing the element of self-defense as defined under Sec. 9.31 where the evidence raises such issue. Thus, if the defendant was acting in self-defense, the assault would not be unlawful. * *”
“Unlawful” is defined by statute:
“ ‘Unlawful’ means criminal or tortious or both and includes what would be crimi*818nal or tortious but for a defense not amounting to justification or privilege.” Tex.Penal Code Ann. Sec. 1.07(a)(36).
That definition recognizes the defense of justification. Section 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code is entitled “Assault” and among other things it provides that a person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Section 9.31 of the Penal Code is entitled “Self-Defense” and in part provides:
“(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b) of this section, a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.”
The plea of self-defense then is one of justification. It is based on a different set of facts from those establishing assault. As an affirmative defense it is considered as acknowledging the existence of prima facie liability but asserting a proposition which, if established, avoids such liability. Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.1967). Rather than being in conflict with the finding of assault, the plea of self-defense admits it but asserts the existence of other facts which justify or excuse it.
Appellant relies heavily on the case of Pon Lip Chew v. Gilliland, 398 S.W.2d 98 (Tex.1965). The Court there held that there was an irreconcilable conflict between jury findings on a special issue that the defendant had committed an assault on the plaintiff, and one that the defendant was acting in defense of his employer’s property. Long before that case, the opposite conclusion was reached by a holding that there was no conflict between the finding of assault and one of self-defense. Howard v. Howard, 102 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1937). The holding in that case was approved by the Supreme Court by its notation “writ refused.” So far as the issue of conflict is concerned, there can be no distinction between the issue of self-defense and defense of property, so Pon Lip Chew must stand as the Supreme Court’s latest expression. However, that case was decided in 1965 and since then the Legislature has spoken in enacting the Penal Code effective January 1, 1974. We are of the opinion that the correct construction of this case is controlled by those provisions of the Penal Code above discussed. The general rule is that it is the duty of the Courts to construe verdicts as not being irreconcilably conflicting when there is any reasonable explanation of the seeming conflict. Ford v. Carpenter, 147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 558 (1949). We meet that duty by following the law of the Penal Code to resolve any conflict.
The judgment of the trial Court is affirmed.