Court Opinion

ID: 9779788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:45:38.408714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:40.772272
License: Public Domain

MATHIAS, J.,
concurring in result.
I respectfully concur in result. I do so believing that the State's procedural decisions at the trial court level have forfeited its appeal.2
I begin by noting that the State's right to appeal in criminal cases is limited. Simply said, the State may appeal from erimi-nal proceedings only when authorized by statute. State v. Gradison, 758 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (citing State v. Aynes, 715 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ind.Ct.App.1999)); see also State v. Hicks, 453 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind.1983); State v. Pease, 531 N.E.2d 1207, 1208 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (both noting that State cannot appeal in criminal cases unless specifically authorized to do so by statute). Important to our considerations here, when the State is authorized by statute to appeal in criminal cases, the statute is strictly construed because it contravenes common-law principles. Pease, 531 N.E.2d at 1208 (citing State v. Holland, 273 Ind. 284, 286, 403 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1980)).
The Indiana statute governing appeals by the State in criminal matters provides:
Appeals to the supreme court or to the court of appeals, if the court rules so provide,[3] may be taken by the state in the following cases:
(1) From an order granting a motion to dismiss an indictment or information.
*205(2) From an order or judgment for the defendant, upon his motion for discharge because of delay of his trial not caused by his act, or upon his plea of former jeopardy, presented and ruled upon prior to trial.
(8) From an order granting a motion to correct errors.
(4) Upon a question reserved by the state, if the defendant is acquitted.
(5) From an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the order is to preclude further prosecution.
(6) From any interlocutory order if the trial court certifies and the eourt on appeal or a judge thereof finds on petition that:
(A) the appellant will suffer substantial expense, damage, or injury if the order is erroneous and the determination thereof is withheld until after judgment;
(B) the order involves a substantial question of law, the early determination of which will promote a more orderly disposition of the case; or
(C) the remedy by appeal after judgment is otherwise inadequate.
Ind.Code § 35-38-4-2 (2004) (emphasis added).
Here, the trial court granted Renzulli's motion to suppress on October 16, 2009. Because the trial court's order suppressed all evidence stemming from the investigatory stop, it effectively precluded further prosecution and was a final judgment ap-pealable under Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2(5). See State v. Hunter, 904 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Ind.Ct.App.2009); State v. Snider, 892 N.E2d 657, 658 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). It was from this final judgment that the State should have perfected its appeal.
But instead of filing a notice of appeal within thirty days of the trial court's October 16, 2009 suppression order pursuant to Appellate Rule 9(A)(1), the State filed what it titled a "motion to reconsider" almost three weeks later, on November 5, 2009, and the trial court denied the motion one week later, on November 12, 2009.4 It is well settled that a motion to reconsider does not "extend the time for any further required or permitted action, motion, or proceedings." Ind. Trial Rule 53.4(A)5 And, most importantly, because it was filed after the entry of a final judgment, the State's motion should have been treated as a motion to correct error. See Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (a motion to reconsider is proper only before final judgment, and a motion to reconsider filed after final judgment should be considered as a motion to correct error).6
Even as a motion to correct error, and under normal cireumstances, the State would then have had thirty days from the date of the trial court's denial of its motion to file a notice of appeal. See App. R. 9(A){(1). Here, the State's notice of appeal *206was filed on December 14, 2009, just within that thirty-day time period.7
But these are not normal cireumstances because the State's right to appeal in criminal cases is strictly limited by statute. Gradison, 758 N.E.2d at 1010; Aynes, 715 N.E.2d at 948; Hicks, 453 N.E.2d at 1016. As noted above, the governing statute provides that the State may appeal "[from an order granting a motion to correct errors." ILC. § 35-38-4-2(8) (emphasis added). Here, however, the trial court demied the State's motion, and there is simply no statutory authority for the State to appeal from an order denying the State's own motion to correct error.
The clear purpose and structure of Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2 is to provide the State and its citizens with an exclusive list of six instances in which the State is permitted to appeal in a criminal case. There are not many "bright lines" in the law, but Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2 is meant to be one. Interpreting this statute to allow what it does not prohibit would run contrary to both its letter and spirit. See State v. Sterp, 260 Ind. 57, 60, 292 N.E.2d 245, 246 (19783) ("when the state in its sovereign capacity brought a citizen into its own tribunals, before its own officers, and in obedience to its own processes, and lost, its avenging hand should be stayed except in unusual cases where the power to appeal was expressly conferred.") (quoting 92 ALR. 1137 (1934)). Even if it seems unlikely that the General Assembly intended to deprive the State the right to appeal when it chooses to file a motion to correct error, and even if might logically make more sense to read the statute to permit the State to appeal from the denial of its own motion to correct error, the case law is clear that the State's statutory right to appeal in criminal cases is in derogation of the common law and must therefore be strictly construed. See Pease, 531 N.E.2d at 1208.
It is tempting to believe that the effect of the statute is a legislative oversight. But the General Assembly could well have reasonably chosen to allow the State to appeal from the grant, but not the denial, of a motion to correct error. For example, if a defendant chooses to file a motion to correct error after a granted motion to suppress, the defendant is the one choosing to delay the normal appellate process by motion practice. However, if the State files a discretionary motion to correct error after the defendant initially prevails, it is the State who acts to delay the normal appellate process, while the defendant's liberty remains at risk or is perhaps even restrained. In this regard, it is also instructive that the General Assembly has exercised its constitutional, policy-making authority by adding grounds for State appeals in eriminal proceedings over the history of the statute. See, eg., State v. McMillan, 274 Ind. 167, 178, 409 N.E.2d 612, 616-17 (1980) (noting that 1955 amendment to statute permitting the State to appeal from judgment discharging a defendant was in response to previous court holdings that State could not appeal from such judgments); State v. Williams, 445 N.E.2d 582, 583 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (noting that 1981 amendment to statute allowing the State to appeal from interlocutory orders was adopted to expand the limited instances in which the State could appeal).
For all of these reasons, I would hold that although the State had the right to appeal from the trial court's order granting Renzulli's motion to suppress, the *207State's right to appeal was forfeited when it failed to file its notice of appeal within thirty days after that order. The State simply had no authority to appeal from its interim, denied motion to reconsider, a motion that was by operation of law a motion to correct errors. See State v. Buckley, 175 Ind.App. 586, 587, 872 N.E.2d 1241, 1242 (1978) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal by State where controlling statute did not provide State authority to appeal following order granting defendant a new trial).
Although I believe that the State's appeal should be dismissed, the practical effect of such a dismissal would be that the trial court's order granting Renzulli's motion to suppress would remain undisturbed. This is the same result as Judge Riley's conclusion that the trial court's suppression order should be affirmed on the merits. I therefore concur in result.

. Neither party raises the issue of the timeliness of the State's appeal. Nevertheless, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite that can be raised suc sponte even if the parties do not question jurisdiction. Jernigan v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1044, 1046 (Ind.Ct.App.2008); Bohlander v. Bohlander, 875 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied (citing Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind.2003)). Thus, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and courts at all levels are obligated to consider the issue sua sponte. Jernigan, 894 N.E.2d at 1046.

3. "[The clause 'if the court rules so provide' is intended to differentiate between the respective jurisdictions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and thereby act as a guide to counsel for the State as to which appellate court the appeal should properly be filed with. The clause is not ... intended to require the adoption of appellate court rules authorizing appeals by the State" State v. *205Williams, 445 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (referring to predecessor statute).

. As of November 12, 2009, the State still had time to file its notice of appeal within thirty days of the trial court's October 16, 2009 order granting the motion to suppress. See Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1).

. The Indiana Trial Rules apply to criminal proceedings if they do not conflict with any of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind.2004).

. Trial Rule 59 is "expressly incorporate[d]" by Criminal Rule 16(B) "insofar as applicable and when not in conflict with any specific rule adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court for the conduct of criminal procedure." Crim. R. 16(B); Ritchie, 809 N.E.2d at 268.

. The trial court denied the State's motion to reconsider on November 12, 2009, and thirty days after this date is December 12, 2009, which fell on a Saturday, giving the State until the following Monday, December 14, to timely file a notice of appeal.