Court Opinion

ID: 9789285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:33:14.19753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:21.272731
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). {33} I respectfully dissent. I. Word Usage {34} For convenience, I refer to one providing an opportunity to engage in recreational activity as an “operator”; an exculpatory contract clause by which an operator disclaims or absolves itself from liability for negligence that causes personal injury or death as a “release”; and an individual who chooses to engage in recreational activity as a “recreation seeker.” II. Introductory Observations {35} The majority holds that public policy imposes on operators a non-disclaimable duty of due care. This means no release is enforceable. Some risk of harm is inherent in most recreational activities. The level of that inherent risk varies depending on the particular activity. Recreation seekers face an enhanced level of risk of harm if the operator is negligent. Recreation is certainly beneficial to our mental and physical well-being. We can, of course, engage in recreational activities on our own. But some recreational activities can reasonably be pursued only when an operator provides or sponsors the activity. {36} In the legal landscape on which we tread, concepts of individual freedom and independence clash with those advanced for full societal protection for people injured as a result of another’s fault. Contract policy faces tort policy. Our historical acceptance in law of express assumption of risk is questioned in the face of resulting personal injury. All this, although the goal of both recreation seeker and operator is the exercise of due care by both. {37} I disfavor the bold jump made by the majority without the issue having been tried below; without the issue having been placed before us by the parties; without the benefit of amicus curiae; without a better explanation of why we should depart from widespread, entrenched law; and without a better understanding of why the policies and law are not better addressed in our Legislature. The issue needs analysis and discussion in the nature of that which preceded and accompanied the groundbreaking cases of Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913), MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). III. What Invalidating All Releases Covers and Affects {38} The sole issue raised in the district court and on appeal is whether the New Mexico Equine Liability Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 42-13-1 to -5 (1993, as amended through 1995), expresses a public policy that is violated by the release signed by Plaintiff. Even allowing a leap over this limited issue, the next issue in line is whether the specific release can be enforced as written and under the circumstances of this case, not that reached by the majority declaring all releases in the entire commercial recreation industry to be per se against public policy and unenforceable. {39} The majority’s all-inclusive determination spreads through the entire spectrum of the recreation provider industry, from small individual operators to high revenue corporate operators. Its determination covers every “commercial” shoestring as well as large scale individuals and organizations providing or sponsoring horseback riding, hunting, scuba diving, river rafting, backpacking (with or without pack horses), walking, swimming, running, bicycling, bungee-jumping, hang gliding, mountaineering, snowmobiling, indoor and outdoor rock climbing, weight training, parachuting, cross-country skiing, downhill skiing, flying, and race car driving. It covers resort, ranch, and health club operators who provide any recreational activity. It covers individuals and organizations who teach, train, and instruct in safety, as well as individuals and organizations who provide the means to engage in a recreational activity. The majority makes no distinction as to level of risk of harm. It makes no distinction as to conduct comprising the lack of ordinary care. {40} The majority opinion does not define “commercial.” The holding is presumably meant to apply to operators engaged in commerce, which includes non-profit entities. If by “commerce” the majority means for-profit operators only, the majority nowhere explains why a distinction should be made between non-profit and for-profit operators. If the fault-based public policy asserted by the majority is as strong as the majority contends, such a distinction, if intended, is unwarranted. IV.The Status of the Law {41} The majority joins a very small and static minority. The majority recognizes that “the clear majority of jurisdictions have upheld the type of release at issue here.” Majority Opinion ¶ 19. The growth of the common law throughout the country has resulted in the widespread general rule that releases are enforceable. Few jurisdictions, and no recent legal commentary that I have seen, have bought into the absolute, end of the spectrum view taken by the majority as a solution to the concerns about releases. Rather, settled exceptions to the general rule have evolved over time. {42} Exceptions were carved out when a release violated law or public policy. Public policy exceptions have been applied to releases protecting employers, manufacturers and suppliers in strict products liability, innkeepers, warehousemen, public utilities, common carriers, banks, and hospitals. An exception exists when a state legislature has enacted legislation regulating safety and allocating responsibility with respect to a particular activity. But the general rule nevertheless remains the rule and it has been, and can continue to be, applied on a case-by-case basis. The majority replaces the general rule with a general rule that no operator release is valid, likely setting us on a course of carving out exceptions on a case-by-case basis to this new general rule. {43} The American Law Institute had every opportunity to significantly change Section 496B (allowing express assumption of risk) in the Second Restatement when it adopted Section 2 in the Third Restatement. Section 496B read: “A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant’s negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B (1964). Recently amended, the Restatement now reads: When permitted by contract law, substantive law governing the claim, and applicable rules of construction, a contract between the plaintiff and another person absolving the person from liability for future harm bars the plaintiffs recovery from that person for the harm. Unlike a plaintiffs negligence, a valid contractual limitation on liability does not provide an occasion for the factfinder to assign a pereentage of responsibility to any party or other person. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 (1999). Comment b to this section reads: Rationale and effect. In appropriate situations, the parties to a transaction should be able to agree which of them should bear the risk of injury, even when the injury is caused by a party’s legally culpable conduct. That policy is not altered or undermined by the adoption of comparative responsibility. Consequently, a valid contractual limitation on liability, within its terms, creates -an absolute bar to a plaintiffs recovery from the other party to the contract. Id., cmt. b. We view “[t]he Restatement of Torts [to be] persuasive authority entitled to great weight.” Moore v. Burn Constr. Co., 98 N.M. 190, 193, 646 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Ct.App.1982). Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(2), (3) (1979) reads: (2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if (a) the term exempts an employer from liability to an employee for injury in the course of his employment; (b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach of that duty, or (c) the other party is similarly a member of a class protected against the class to which the first party belongs. (3) A term exempting a seller of a product from his special tort liability for physical harm to a user or consumer is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the term is fairly bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying that liability. Comment a (rationale) to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reads: “The law of torts imposes standards of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.... [A] party to a contract can ordinarily exempt himself from liability for harm caused by his failure to observe the standard of reasonable care imposed by the law of negligence.” Id., cmt. a (citations omitted). {44} A recent American Law Reports (ALR) annotation, which appears to be the broadest annotation on releases, concludes: A release signed by a patron exempting the owner or operator of [a] ... facility from liability may be enforceable provided that the form and language of the release are in a form which is conspicuous, legible, and recognizable by a reasonable person as a release from liability. Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Agreement Exempting Operator of Amusement Facility From Liability for Personal Injury or Death of Patron, 54 A.L.R.5th 513 (1998). This ALR also states: In general, courts have enforced exculpatory agreements between proprietors ... and their patrons, so long as there is no statutory prohibition against such clauses, the facility is not providing an essential or public service, and there is not a great deal of disparity in bar-gaining power between the sellers and buyers ... as is the case in so-called adhesion contracts. Id. {45} American Jurisprudence’s recent Proof of Facts on “Avoiding the Effect of a Recreational Activity Liability Release” states “[r]eleases of liability in favor of a recreational activity operator are generally enforceable, as it is proper for a participant and the operator to expressly agree in advance that the operator will not be liable for its negligence.” 33 Am.Jur.3d Proof of Facts § 421 (1995). {46} Current law review article authors recommend that various issues relating to releases be addressed and reforms be implemented, but none among the many I reviewed recommends completely scuttling the traditional general rule. See, e.g., Mario R. Arango. & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: Exculpatory Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L.Rev. 1 (1997). {47} The bulk of the case law today enforces operator releases, subject to exceptions. See, e.g., Brooks v. Timberline, 127 F.3d 1273, 1274-75 (10th Cir.1997) (applying Colorado law, snowmobiling); Street v. Darwin Ranch, Inc., 75 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1299 (D.Wyo.1999) (horseback riding); Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628, 631-32 (Alaska 2001) (all-terrain vehicle); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 375-76 (Colo.1981) (en banc) (parachute jumping); Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361, 363 (1984) (horseback riding); Cormier v. Cent. Mass. Chapter of the Nat’l Safety Council, 416 Mass. 286, 620 N.E.2d 784, 786 (1993) (motorcycle safety course); Moss v. Fortune, 207 Tenn. 426, 340 S.W.2d 902, 903-04 (1960) (horseback riding); Murphy v. N. Am. River Runners, Inc., 186 W.Va. 310, 412 S.E.2d 504, 508-09 (1991) (whitewater rafting); Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Wyo.1988) (ski racing at resort); Williams v. Cox Enters., Inc., 159 Ga.App. 333, 283 S.E.2d 367, 369 (1981); Marshall v. Blue Springs Corp., 641 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (scuba diver slip and fall on dock); Dombrowski v. City of Omer, 199 Mich.App. 705, 502 N.W.2d 707, 709 (1993) (crossing-river while hanging from rope stretched across river); Swartzentruber v. Wee-K Corp., 117 Ohio App.3d 420, 690 N.E.2d 941, 945 (1997) (horseback riding); Mann v. Wetter, 100 Or.App. 184, 785 P.2d 1064, 1066 (1990) (in banc) (scuba diving); Boyce v. West, 71 Wash.App. 657, 862 P.2d 592, 596 (1993) (scuba diving). {48} The majority relies on four cases that invalidate releases. One was decided in 1904, another in 1916. One of these involved an employer-employee relationship, the other the railroad transportation of freight. Majority Opinion ¶¶ 18, 19. The two other cases involved operator releases and were premises liability oriented. In Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 164 Vt. 329, 670 A.2d 795 (1995), a skier collided with a metal pole on a ski run. Dalury does not outlaw, on a blanket basis, all releases in the recreation industry. The court in Dalury recognized the wisdom considering various factors “as relevant considerations” in determining the validity of a release. Id. at 798. Further, Dalury concludes that the proper formula is a “ ‘determination of what constitutes the public interest [while] considering the totality of circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations.’ ” Id. (quoting Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522, 527 (1994) (discussing the various factors set out in the widely-cited case Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963) (in bank))). {49} The other, Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass’n, 244 Va. 191, 418 S.E.2d 894 (1992), involved a triathlon sponsored by a community association where the participant hit his head on a rock when starting the swim portion of the event. Hiett simply followed a sleeping 1890 precedent that had not been modified or altered. Id. at 897. The 1890 precedent did not involve recreational activity, but rather an agreement between a railroad company and its employee that specified the railroad would not be liable for injuries or death sustained by its employees occurring from any cause whatsoever. Id. at 896. {50} The overwhelming case law today and for years on end has refused to hold releases per se invalid. See, e.g., Marshall, 641 N.E.2d at 95 (“[I]t is not against public policy to enter into an agreement which exculpates one from the consequences of his own negligence.”); Cormier, 620 N.E.2d at 786 (holding the allocation of risk by agreement is not against public policy); Dombrowski, 502 N.W.2d at 709 (“[I]t is not contrary to this state’s public policy for a party to contract against liability for damages caused by ordinary negligence.”); Swartzentruber, 690 N.E.2d at 945 (holding exculpatory contracts that bar an action in negligence are not per se void as against public policy). V. Rationale and Policy {51} The driving force behind the majority’s holding is that as long as releases are enforceable the public must ultimately pick up the tab for the harm and at the same time subsidize an operator’s negligence. Majority Opinion ¶ 16. From information obtained from a law review article, the majority states equine activities involve thirty million people and result in tens of thousands of head and neck injuries. Majority Opinion ¶ 17. But we have no idea how many equine related injuries are due to the behavior of equine animals for which operators are immune under New Mexico’s Equine Liability Act. See § 42-13-4(A). The majority perceives an “epidemic” use of releases. Majority Opinion ¶ 18. But we have before us no study of the use of releases in the New Mexico recreation industry, the number of people in New Mexico affected by the use of releases, and the extent of injuries received due to New Mexico operator negligence. {52} Nor have we any information on the extent to which a recreation seeker’s own health insurance will pay for medical expenses from a recreational activity injury. Since the majority is not concerned with releases barring liability for economic damages, the risk-taker’s loss of wages should be irrelevant. This leaves damages for pain and suffering, which is not necessarily on the public’s tab. Also missing is any analysis of economic considerations such as cost of operator insurance, risk of business failure due to higher pricing in order to pay for operator insurance, and overall effect on the New Mexico economy. Further, we should not assume that operators are any less likely with a release than with insurance coverage to concentrate on the use of ordinary care. {53} No credence is given to the extent New Mexico citizens value recreational activity and seek adventure, competition, and independence, and to the physical and mental health achieved through such activity, regardless of releases. If the existence or not of releases makes a difference, recreation seekers might prefer the availability of more activities with releases than fewer without releases. The majority does not recognize the citizen’s choice to knowingly and voluntarily engage in recreational activities of their choosing and to assume the risk of and responsibility for the harm that may result. {54} Granted, past views about “freedom of contract” and of assumption of risk have sometimes given way to policies underlying our fault system of recovery. From careful and studied analyses of law and economics, and based on contemporary community standards of morality and right conduct, courts may deem it appropriate to dramatically change the course of the law as occurred, for example, with the adoption of strict products liability. But the general rule permitting releases based on express assumption of risk, while appropriately limited by well-developed exceptions, has not outlived all beneficial life when applied to the recreation industry. The court can still effectively apply public policy and contract validity analyses as each case arises. I see no pressing need to replace the traditional and long-accepted analysis with a blanket outlawing of releases as malum in se. {55} A vehicle has just driven over New Mexico’s express assumption of risk doctrine rendering the doctrine road kill. It has done so by holding “the policies that inform tort law” to be a copyright that cannot be inftinged by contract. The day before the filing of the majority’s decision express assumption of risk was alive. See Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sunland, Inc., 105 N.M. 487, 492, 734 P.2d 267, 272 (Ct.App.1987) (indicating the concept of express assumption of risk still exists in New Mexico). Releases relating to negligence were, and apparently still are, valid when only economic damages are at stake. See State ex rel. Udall v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 112 N.M. 123, 126, 812 P.2d 777, 780 (1991) (implicitly validating release as to negligence in professional services contract and affirming the “countervailing public policy consideration — the freedom to contract”); Omni Aviation Managers, Inc. v. Buckley, 97 N.M. 477, 479, 641 P.2d 508, 510 (1982) (stating “an ordinary bailee ... may limit or disclaim his liability for his own negligence by so providing in the contract of bailment”); Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat’l Bank, 97 N.M. 554, 556, 560, 627 P.2d 1247, 1249, 1253 (Ct.App.1981) (upholding release in escrow agreement against liability for negligence in terminating escrows). Lynch actually relied in its analysis on the widely followed if not leading Tunkl case, which involved the validity of a release asserted by a hospital to bar damages for personal injury. {56} The majority places negligence in recreational activity in the same category as strict products liability presumably based in part on underlying rationale that the cost of injury to consumers of services, just as with the consumers of products, should be borne by the industry through the purchase of insurance. This thinking, of course, can apply to every business in every industry. The majority has chosen the recreation provider industry. While one of the underlying bases for negligence liability may be “the important social functions of redistributing the economic burden of loss from injured individuals on whom it originally fell,” Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 624, 798 P.2d 571, 574 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, I disagree with the majority’s view that this, like the area of strict products liability, see Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 94-95 and Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, § 18 (1997), provides a basis on which to automatically refuse to enforce any release in the entire recreation provider industry. Strict liability is distinct from negligence. Breach is imputed as a matter of law; breach is not based on foreseeability. See Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 402, 827 P.2d 102, 117 (1992). A defective product line presents a considerably different risk to the public in New Mexico than an operator’s employee who may fail on occasion to exercise due care. Recreational services in New Mexico are not of the same significance and proportion as products which, when manufactured, are of a “nature of a thing ... such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, [becoming] a thing of danger,” MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053, thereby requiring this Court to completely undo express assumption of risk and have negligence doctrine fettered only by comparative negligence law. {57} The majority places public policy exclusively within existing tort law ignoring public policy in contract law. Yet “every law is an expression of a state’s public policy.” Reagan v. McGee Drilling Corp., 1997-NMCA-014, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 68, 933 P.2d 867 (1997). The majority says the policies that “inform” our fault system of recovery should prevail over policies that “inform” the contract law of assumption of risk. Yet one can validly argue “exculpatory provisions should be enforced by society because the person releasing another from the consequence of his own negligence, has promised to do so.” Donald E. Lowrey, Shielding Against Future Negligence Liability: The Role of Exculpatory Contract Provisions in Personal Injury Actions, 12 W. St. L.Rev. 819, 834 (1985). “Releases, being contractual in nature, are governed by the laws of contracts generally, as well as any specific legislative acts prescribing the manner by which such agreements may be validated.” Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 98 N.M. 159, 162, 646 P.2d 586, 589 (Ct.App.1982). The public policy that the majority places in second position is the preservation of contract and express assumption of risk permitting adults to knowingly and voluntarily contract in a manner in which risks are understood and assumed and a right to sue thereby given up. The concept of “freedom to contract” has not by any means been eliminated in New Mexico. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 112 N.M. at 126, 130, 812 P.2d at 780, 784 (affirming New Mexico public policy of freedom to contract); see also, e.g., Adams v. Roark, 686 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tenn.1985) (stating “the case law and announced public policy of Tennessee favors freedom to contract against liability for negligence”). {58} Several states have enacted legislation pursuant to which the courts have invalidated releases as violative of the state’s public policy as set by that state’s legislature. See, e.g., Lee, 695 P.2d at 363; Murphy, 412 S.E.2d at 508-09; Milligan, 754 P.2d at 1066. Our Legislature has entered the arena by declaring certain agreements to indemnify for one’s own negligence to be against public policy and void. See NMSA 1978, §§ 56-7-1 (1971), -2 (1999); see also Guitard v. Gulf Oil Co., 100 N.M. 358, 361-62, 670 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Ct.App.1983) (analyzing validity of agreement to indemnify a party for its own negligence under Section 56-7-2(A) and holding indemnification agreement void and unenforceable under statute as to liability for indemnitee’s percentage of negligence). {59} If our Legislature wants to modify the common law to invalidate operator releases in a particular recreational activity or across the board, it presumably can. If the Legislature wants to regulate recreational activity, set safety standards for operators, and establish a public safety policy to which releases would be antithetical, the Legislature can enact such legislation. Note that the Legislature has enacted laws regarding liability in the equine and ski industries. See The New Mexico Ski Safety Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 24-15-1 to -14 (1969, as amended through 1997), and the Equine Liability Act, §§ 42-13-1 to -5. Note, too, our Supreme Court has placed in the realm of the Legislature the issue whether the common law rule that there is no duty to wear seat belts should be overturned with a common law duty to do so, the failure of which would subject a plaintiff to the application of the comparative negligence doctrine. Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 327, 695 P.2d 476, 477 (1985); Norwest Bank New Mexico, N.A. v. Chrysler Corp., 1999-NMCA-070, ¶¶25, 28, 127 N.M. 397, 981 P.2d 1215. {60} The majority opinion finds its primary legitimacy in language quoted from Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 624, 798 P.2d at 574. Majority Opinion ¶ 16. The language says our fault system of recovery serves certain important social functions. Trujillo was a car accident case in which the plaintiff attacked the Tort Claims Act liability cap. Id. at 623, 798 P.2d at 573. The Trujillo Court’s museful statement about the tort system was in the context of the Legislature-imposed cap on damages and the level of scrutiny to employ in determining the constitutionality of the legislation. Id. at 624-25, 798 P.2d at 574-75. Interestingly, the Trujillo Court mentions “[t]he debate over the policy question of whether the tort system is the best mechanism for performing the functions currently allocated to it,” and stated “[i]t is entirely appropriate that policy choices flowing from such debate take place in the legislative sphere.” Id. Trujillo, its context, and its language quoted by the majority, should not instruct the outcome here. Words expressed in one context grafted for use as the bedrock rationale in a completely different context requires a more reasoned application than that found in the majority opinion. Trujillo’s language does not provide a basis for the majority’s holding. {61} Absent violation of a public policy set by the Legislature or the existence of a recognized exception, the enforceability of a release ought to be measured on a case-by-case basis considering the circumstances of the case as a whole. Courts should examine whether a release contains clearly expressed, conspicuous language by which the recreation seeker (1) will understand the risks of injury or death; (2) will understand that he is releasing and giving up the right to sue the operator for damages for personal injuries received as a result of the operator’s and its employee’s negligence in providing the recreational activity, including faulty advice or instruction, improperly maintained or secured equipment, and dangerous premises; (3) is unequivocally told that by signing the release he nevertheless agrees to assume the risk of harm and the financial cost accompanying the harm and agrees not to sue or otherwise look to the operator for any type of damages, including medical expenses and economic damages such as lost wages, as well as damages for pain and suffering; and (4) is unequivocally told he should not and cannot rely on or expect any liability insurance to cover injuries that he may suffer due to the operator’s negligence. These requirements constitute fair notice and fair play. {62} At the same time, releases are not favored and courts should strictly construe releases against the party seeking to enforce them. See, e.g., Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc., 192 Ariz. 313, 965 P.2d 47, 51 (App.1998); Swartzentruber, 690 N.E.2d at 945 (holding releases “are not per se void as against public policy,” but “are not particularly favored in the law” and are to be strictly construed). This is particularly true in examining the legal validity of a release. The traditional, longstanding contract concepts of unconscionability, adhesion, oppression or coercion, misrepresentation, fair notice, and violation of public policy should continue to play an important role in that scrutiny. Included, too, should be appropriate concerns about the opportunity given to the recreation seeker to read the release and discuss the release and any safety concerns with the operator; the clarity of the scope of the release; the extent of the notice of the physical and legal risks the patron is assuming; and the reasonable and objective expectation from reading the release that the operator is under no obligation to exercise ordinary care in regard to any aspect of the activity. In considering the circumstances, the factors such as those in Tunkl, which are set out in Lynch, can be considered. See Lynch, 97 N.M. at 558-59, 627 P.2d at 1251-52. {63} Fair and adequate notice and warning by the operator must go hand in hand with the recreation seeker’s assumption of risk. Both ends must be examined: What and how clearly the operator tells the recreation seeker about physical and legal risks and whether that goes as far as it should, and the extent to which the recreation seeker has a reasonable opportunity to read the release and make an informed and unequivocally expressed decision to assume such risks. {64} Courts will forever be tested when someone receives a devastating injury, and perhaps by its holding the majority hopes to avoid having to face each such test. However, the general rule, properly defined and applied, permits a reasonable balance of risk assumption and tort/fault interests. VI. The Statutory Construction {65} I cannot join in the majority’s engagement in statutory construction to resolve what it sees as an “anomolous situation” relating to proximate cause, and as a lack of clarity in the meaning of “faulty condition,” in the Equine Liability Act. See Majority Opinion ¶¶ 23-27. These statutory construction issues were not raised below or on appeal. Furthermore, the analyses and holdings are not essential to the majority’s affirmance of the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. {66} The district court held as a matter of law that Plaintiffs injury did not occur as a result of equine behavior. The court therefore denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment under the Equine Liability Act. Defendants sought Rule 12-201(C) review in this Court on the ground that none of the exceptions to immunity applied because the undisputed evidence showed the injury resulted from equine behavior only. Plaintiff responded, arguing that material issues of fact existed as to Defendants’ negligence, and also that Defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence for a jury determination of whether the injury resulted from equine behavior. {67} Contrary to the district court’s determination that the injury did not result from equine behavior, and also contrary to Defendants’ contention that the injury resulted solely from equine behavior, the majority has determined that an issue of fact exists regarding whether the injury resulted from equine behavior. Majority Opinion ¶ 28. This ruling, and the ruling that an issue of fact exists as to operator negligence, are enough to affirm the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. {68} The statutory construction issues of proximate cause and faulty condition not having been raised or addressed below or on appeal, and the issues not being necessary for any of the majority’s holdings on appeal, the issues should lay at rest until the circumstances arise for district court adjudication and presentation of the specific issues on appeal to this Court. VII. The Instructions {69} Because the issues that are the subject matter of the jury instructions the majority suggests on remand, Majority Opinion ¶ 30, are those not raised or addressed below or on appeal, I respectfully think we should, under the circumstances, leave the first draft of the instructions to the parties and the district court. VIII. The Issue of the Equine Liability Act as Expressing Public Policy {70} The majority does pause to say that the Equine Liability Act does not express a public policy making the release in this case unenforceable. I agree with that statement, and I would affirm the district court’s summary judgment. Of course, the majority’s ultimate holding makes this issue irrelevant. That is why the majority understandably devotes but a paragraph to rationale, Majority Opinion ¶ 12, and why I devote only one paragraph to my agreement with the majority on the issue. IX.Conclusion {71} For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.