Court Opinion

ID: 9387532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 14:00:43.922763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.089535
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13377    Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2023    Page: 1 of 36

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13377
                           ____________________

        NORTHERN ILLINOIS GAS COMPANY,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        USIC, LLC,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-05147-CC
                           ____________________
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                   21-13377

        Before ROSENBAUM and LAGOA, Circuit Judges, and SINGHAL, ∗ Dis-
        trict Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
               In 2016, an explosion occurred near Plaintiff-Appellant
        Northern Illinois Gas Company’s (doing business as Nicor Gas
        Company (“Nicor”)) gas line when other utilities were working in
        the area. The explosion caused catastrophic injuries and property
        damage, which led to numerous lawsuits against Nicor. But Nicor
        had previously entered into a Master Locating Service Agreement
        (the “Agreement”) with Defendant-Appellee USIC, LLC, which
        governed USIC’s relationship with Nicor as it concerned USIC’s
        agreement to provide gas-line-locating services to those excavating
        in the area of Nicor’s lines. In that Agreement, USIC agreed to in-
        demnify, hold harmless, and defend Nicor from any and all manner
        of losses and damages. So Nicor filed suit in the Northern District
        of Georgia to enforce this indemnity provision.
                In the district court, the court determined that the indem-
        nity provision violated Georgia’s public policy, O.C.G.A § 13-8-
        2(b), and was unenforceable. According to the district court’s read-
        ing, the Agreement required USIC to defend Nicor in all suits, even
        if the alleged acts were based on Nicor’s sole negligence—and that
        was contrary to Georgia’s public policy. So the district court

        ∗ The Honorable Anuraag Singhal, U.S. District Judge for the Southern Dis-
        trict of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        21-13377               Opinion of the Court                        3

        granted summary judgment for USIC. Now on appeal, Nicor ar-
        gues that the district court erred in granting USIC’s motion for
        summary judgment because (1) USIC’s duty to indemnify and de-
        fend are based on the actions of only USIC, and (2) the insurance
        exception to O.C.G.A § 13-8-2(b) applies. In the alternative, Nicor
        contends that (1) the duty to indemnify remains enforceable be-
        cause Paragraph 9.1 of the Agreement explicitly states that USIC is
        not required to indemnify Nicor if Nicor is solely negligent, and (2)
        the Agreement allows this Court to sever any unenforceable pro-
        visions or portions thereof from the remainder of the agreement.
              After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argu-
        ment, we reverse the judgment as it relates to USIC’s duty to in-
        demnify, and we affirm it as to USIC’s duty to defend.

                                I.   BACKGROUND

               Nicor is an Illinois corporation that owns and operates a nat-
        ural-gas distribution system. In 2014, Nicor and USIC, a Delaware
        limited-liability company providing utility-line-locating services,
        entered into the Agreement. The Agreement was in place from
        January 1, 2014, to January 1, 2018. As part of the Agreement, USIC
        agreed to perform locating services on Nicor’s behalf whenever lo-
        cating requests were received by excavators at or near utilities
        owned by Nicor.
              In 2017, Michael J. Smith, on behalf of Thomas Smith, filed
        a complaint in Illinois state court against Metro Fibernet, LLC
        (“Metronet”), ACO Cable Construction, Inc. (“ACO”), and USIC
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  21-13377

        arising from injuries suffered from a gas explosion that occurred in
        Romeoville, Illinois. According to Thomas Smith, sometime be-
        fore October 11, 2016, Metronet contracted with ACO to perform
        directional boring to install fiber-optic cable. Thomas Smith alleges
        that he suffered catastrophic injuries when an ACO cable struck a
        Nicor gas line, causing an explosion. Metronet, ACO, and USIC
        each filed third-party complaints against Nicor, seeking contribu-
        tion in the event that any were found liable for Thomas Smith’s
        injuries. Additionally, on April 2, 2018, various insurance compa-
        nies filed suit against Metronet, ACO, USIC and Nicor, seeking
        compensation for property damage caused by the explosion.
               Following the filing of these various Illinois lawsuits, Nicor
        sued USIC for breach of contract in the Northern District of Geor-
        gia. Nicor alleged that USIC was obligated to defend and to indem-
        nify Nicor against all claims asserted in the Illinois lawsuits. In sup-
        port of its claims, Nicor relied on Paragraph 9.1 of the Agreement:
               To the fullest extent permitted by law, [USIC] shall
               defend, indemnify and hold harmless [Nicor], its affil-
               iates, successors and assigns, and its employees,
               against any and all manner of losses, costs, expenses,
               damages, and fines or penalties, including without
               limitation, reasonable attorneys’ fees, which [Nicor],
               its affiliates, successors and assigns, and its employ-
               ees, suffer or incur as a result of any claim, demand,
               suit, action, cause of action, investigation, levy, fine,
               penalty or judgment made or obtained by any indi-
               vidual, person, firm, corporation, [USIC] employee,
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        21-13377              Opinion of the Court                         5

              contractor, governmental agency, or other person or
              entity in connection with, arising from, or in any
              manner related to any actual or alleged act or omis-
              sion [(the “Indemnification Provision”)] of any one or
              more of the following:
                    (a) [USIC] and any subcontractor of [USIC],
              and any officers, directors, agents, representatives or
              employees of [USIC] or of any such subcontractor in
              any manner arising from, connected with, or related
              to any Services performed or contracted to be per-
              formed pursuant to this Agreement; and
                     (b) [Nicor], its successors and assigns, and its
              officers, directors, agents, representatives or employ-
              ees, to the extent that it shall be claimed that any of
              them are liable for any reason because of any such act
              or omission of [USIC] or any subcontractor of [USIC],
              or any officers, directors, agents, representatives or
              employees of any of them, whether or not such offic-
              ers, directors, agents, representatives or employees
              are claimed to be agents or employees of [Nicor].
              Provided, however, that [USIC] shall not be responsi-
              ble to indemnify or hold harmless [Nicor] for losses
              or damages caused by the sole negligence of [Nicor],
              its agents or employees [(the “Exculpatory Clause”)].
        Doc. No. 33-1, at 23 (emphases added).
              Nicor also relied on Paragraph 8, the Insurance Provision:
              Unless otherwise agreed to in writing, [USIC] will, at
              its own expense, carry and maintain during this
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-13377

               Agreement the insurance coverage (with companies
               satisfactory to [Nicor]) in amounts no less than what
               is specified on Exhibit C attached hereto and incorpo-
               rated herein. All insurance policies or bonds required
               by this Agreement will be issued by insurance compa-
               nies licensed to do business within the State of Geor-
               gia and any other state in which the Services are to be
               performed with an A.M. Best Rating of not less than
               “A-VII.” [USIC] will also be responsible for ensuring
               that its subcontractors comply with the insurance re-
               quirements of this Section.
        Id. at 22.
                        A. Motion to Stay Proceedings

               In the district court, USIC moved to stay the proceedings
        because, it argued, its duty to defend and indemnify Nicor in the
        underlying Illinois lawsuits was dependent on Nicor’s portion of
        the fault. Relying on the last sentence of Paragraph 9.1 of the
        Agreement, USIC claimed that if the acts underlying the Illinois
        suits were based on Nicor’s sole negligence, then by the terms of
        the Agreement, it was not obligated to defend or indemnify Nicor.
        USIC asked the district court “not . . . to dismiss the present suit”
        but to stay the federal proceedings until the “Illinois suit[s] re-
        solv[ed] key question[s]” on which the merits in this case depended.
        Doc. No. 9-1, at 8.
              Nicor opposed USIC’s motion to stay the proceedings and
        argued that if Nicor were solely liable in the underlying Illinois
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        21-13377                 Opinion of the Court                            7

        lawsuits, then USIC would not have to indemnify Nicor because of
        the last sentence in Paragraph 9.1, which we refer to as the “Excul-
        patory Clause.” But USIC would still have to defend Nicor because
        the Agreement contained no “sole negligence” exception govern-
        ing USIC’s duty to defend Nicor. So, Nicor reasoned, “whether the
        court in the [Illinois lawsuits] determines that the damages were
        caused by the sole negligence of Nicor has no bearing on USIC’s
        duty to defend Nicor,” and there was no reason to stay the federal
        proceedings. Doc. No. 14, at 6.
               USIC replied that the entire Indemnification Provision in
        Paragraph 9 of the Agreement violated Georgia’s public policy and
        was therefore unenforceable under O.G.C.A. § 13-8-2(b). Section
        13-8-2 states, in relevant part, that “[a] contract that is against the
        policy of the law cannot be enforced,” and a contract to “indem-
        nify, hold harmless, . . . or defend” a party for its “sole negligence”
        is against Georgia’s public policy. 1 In the alternative, USIC sug-
        gested, the “sole negligence” Exculpatory Clause in Paragraph 9.1
        should also limit USIC’s duty to defend Nicor.
              The district court partially granted USIC’s motion to stay the
        proceedings. On the one hand, it stayed Nicor’s claims relating to
        USIC’s duty to indemnify Nicor “pending [the] relevant final deter-
        minations” in the Illinois lawsuits. Doc. No. 32, at 2. But as to

        1 The Agreement is governed by Georgia law. See Doc. No. 33-1, at 26 (“This
        Agreement will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of
        the State of Georgia, without reference to conflict of laws principles.”)
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 21-13377

        Nicor’s claims based on USIC’s duty to defend Nicor, the district
        court denied USIC’s motion to stay the proceedings. Instead, the
        district court ordered the parties to continue with litigation over
        the application of O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) to the duty to defend and
        the duty to indemnify.
                           B. Summary-judgment Proceedings

               Following the district court’s order on the motion to stay,
        USIC and Nicor cross-moved for summary judgment. USIC ar-
        gued that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
        because the Indemnification Provision violated O.C.G.A § 13-8-2.
        As a reminder, this statute states that an agreement to indemnify a
        party for its “sole negligence” violates Georgia’s public policy, so it
        “cannot be enforced.”
               So USIC asserted that the Agreement violated Georgia’s
        public policy because USIC was required to defend Nicor against
        any and all claims, including those based on Nicor’s sole negli-
        gence. As a result, USIC contended that it “ha[d] no duty to defend
        or indemnify Nicor in the underlying cases.” Doc. No. 35-8, at 9.
              In Nicor’s motion for summary judgment, it argued that
        “USIC ha[d] two separate and independent obligations under the
        [Indemnification Provision]: (1) a duty to defend Nicor from [the]
        underlying claims, and (2) a duty to indemnify Nicor from such
        claims.” Doc. No. 38-3, at 7. In Nicor’s view, the district court
        could decide whether the duty to defend applied independently of
        whether the duty to indemnify applied. As Nicor saw things, the
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        21-13377                   Opinion of the Court                               9

        district court did not need to wait for the Illinois state proceedings
        to end because USIC’s obligation to defend did not depend on the
        outcome of the Illinois lawsuits; rather, it depended solely on the
        plaintiffs’ allegations in the Illinois complaints. As for O.C.G.A.
        § 13-8-2(b), Nicor argued that the statute did not apply because
        only USIC’s acts or omissions triggered the Indemnification Provi-
        sion.
                At this point, the procedural history gets a bit messy. The
        district court held a summary-judgment hearing in March 2019. At
        the hearing, the district court orally “granted” USIC’s motion for
        summary judgment. The court reasoned that the Indemnification
        Provision violated O.C.G.A § 13-8-2(b) because the language of the
        Agreement required USIC to defend Nicor even if Nicor were
        solely negligent in causing the gas-line explosion at issue in the Illi-
        nois lawsuits. The district court also declined to apply the insur-
        ance exception to O.C.G.A § 13-8-2(b) 2 because USIC’s insurance

        2 Section 13-8-2(b) provides that this section
                shall not affect any obligation under workers’ compensation
                or coverage or insurance specifically relating to workers’ com-
                pensation, nor shall this subsection apply to any requirement
                that one party to the contract purchase a project specific insur-
                ance policy, including an owner’s or contractor’s protective in-
                surance, builder’s risk insurance, installation coverage, project
                management protective liability insurance, an owner con-
                trolled insurance policy, or a contractor controlled insurance
                policy.
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b).
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                21-13377

        coverage did not provide coverage for Nicor’s acts or omissions.
        At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court instructed USIC
        to prepare an order consistent with the court’s ruling. At that time,
        the district court did not enter an order or a judgment. The only
        entry on the docket was a minute entry.
                USIC submitted its proposed order to the district court on
        April 22, 2019. The proposed order contemplated awarding USIC
        judgment in full. Nicor opposed the proposed order and argued
        that it was not consistent with the district court’s oral ruling be-
        cause the district court hadn’t granted summary judgment in full.
        Nicor pointed out that the court had stayed its claims related to
        USIC’s duty to indemnify and took the position that, in any case,
        USIC’s duty to indemnify Nicor was enforceable and could be sev-
        ered from any portion of the Agreement deemed to be void as
        against public policy.
                On September 2, 2021, the district court adopted USIC’s pro-
        posed order and issued its opinion. First, the district court ex-
        plained that, to be prohibited by O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b), “an indem-
        nification [and defense] provision must (1) relate in some way to a
        contract for ‘construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of cer-
        tain property and (2) promise to indemnify [or defend] a party for
        damages arising from that own party’s sole negligence.” Doc. No.
        87, at 14 (alteration adopted) (quoting Kennedy Dev. Co. v. Camp,
        719 S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ga. 2011)). The district court concluded that
        the Agreement satisfied the first condition because it related to a
        “construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building
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        21-13377                Opinion of the Court                         11

        structure, appurtenances, or appliances, . . . including . . . excavat-
        ing connected therewith.” Id. at 15 (alterations in original) (quot-
        ing O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). As to the second requirement, the district
        court determined that the Agreement’s duty to defend required
        USIC to defend Nicor against claims arising from Nicor’s sole neg-
        ligence, and “[n]othing in the language of Paragraph 9.1 limit[ed]
        the scope of the duty to defend (or the duty to indemnify) to the
        acts or omissions of USIC alone.” Id. at 22 (citation omitted).
        Therefore, the court held, the duty to defend violated Georgia pub-
        lic policy. Id.
                The district court then turned to Nicor’s arguments about
        the insurance exception to the public policy. It said that O.C.G.A.
        § 13-8-2(b)’s insurance exception applies if a contract includes an
        insurance clause that shifts the risk of loss to an insurer. But the
        district court determined that the Agreement did not unequivo-
        cally shift the risk of loss incurred by both parties to the insurer, so
        the insurance exception from O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) did not apply.
        Because (1) USIC was required to defend Nicor for any and all
        claims, including those relating to Nicor’s sole negligence, and (2)
        the insurance exception did not apply, the district court held that
        the entire Indemnification Provision (as it related to not only the
        duty to defend but also the duty to indemnify) was unenforceable.
        The district court entered judgment in full in favor of USIC on the
        same day. Nicor now appeals the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                21-13377

                          II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

                We review grants of summary judgment de novo, using the
        same legal standard as the district court. Ireland v. Prummell, 53
        F.4th 1274, 1286 (11th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is appropri-
        ate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
        material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
        law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
        U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judg-
        ment, “we resolve all ambiguities and draw reasonable factual in-
        ferences from the evidence” in favor of the non-moving party.
        Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Moore, 763 F.3d 1265, 1268
        (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 686
        F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2012)).
                The interpretation of a contract is also a matter of law sub-
        ject to de novo review. See Tims v. LGE Cmty. Credit Union, 935
        F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2019).

                                III.   DISCUSSION

              We divide our discussion into two parts. In Part A, we show
        that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. In Part B we discuss
        the merits of this appeal.
                     A. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

              Before reaching the merits of this appeal we must assure
        ourselves that we have jurisdiction. After all, “[j]urisdiction is a
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        21-13377                  Opinion of the Court                              13

        prerequisite to the legitimate exercise of [our] judicial power.” Cas-
        tleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 779 (11th
        Cir.2005).
               We have appellate jurisdiction over “appeals from all final
        decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The term “final
        decisions” ordinarily refers to those decisions that “end[] the litiga-
        tion on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to do but exe-
        cute the judgment.” Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund
        of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs & Participating Emps., 571
        U.S. 177, 183 (2014). We have explained that “[t]he desire for judi-
        cial economy and the avoidance of unnecessary piecemeal appeals
        underlies our final judgment rule.” United States v. Gurney, 558
        F.2d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977), overruled on other grounds by
        Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 3
                Our jurisdiction also depends on whether a party files a no-
        tice of appeal within the time limits that Federal Rule of Appellate
        Procedure 4(a) sets forth. Castleberry, 408 F.3d at 779. The Su-
        preme Court has reiterated that compliance with the requirements
        of Appellate Rule 4(a) is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” See
        Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (quoting Griggs v. Prov-
        ident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)); see also Green

        3 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981, con-
        stitute binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
        661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                      21-13377

        v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 606 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010). 4 Ap-
        pellate Rule 4 mandates that a “notice of appeal . . . must be filed
        with the district clerk within 30 days after [the date of] entry of the
        judgment or order appealed from.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
              A judgement or order, which Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
        dure 58 says requires a separate document, is entered for the pur-
        poses of Appellate Rule 4(a) when:
               the judgment or order is entered in the civil docket
               under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a) and when
               the earlier of these events occurs:
                   • the judgment or order is set forth on a separate
                     document, or
                   • 150 days have run from entry of the judgment
                     or order in the civil docket under Federal Rule
                     of Civil Procedure 79(a).
        FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii).
               But if a party files a timely motion listed in Appellate Rule
        4(a)(4)(A)—a “motion for judgment under Rule 50(b), a motion to
        amend or make additional factual findings under Rule 52(b), some

        4 While time limits based on court-created rules aren’t jurisdictional, the time
        limit in Appellate Rule 4 derives from a statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). The
        Supreme Court has explained that time limits Congress has prescribed are ju-
        risdictional in nature. Compare Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209 (explaining that Ap-
        pellate Rule 4(a) comes from a statute), with Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous.
        Servs., 138 S. Ct. 13, 22 (2017) (concluding that Appellate Rule 4(a)(5)(C) is
        judge-made and is therefore a claims-processing rule).
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        21-13377                   Opinion of the Court                              15

        motions for attorney’s fees under Rule 54, a motion to alter or
        amend the judgment or for a new trial under Rule 59, or certain
        motions for relief from the judgment under Rule 60,” see Green,
        606 F.3d at 1301–02—then the appeal period runs from the entry of
        the order disposing of that last remaining motion. FED. R. APP. P.
        4(a)(4)(A). Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) also requires these motions to
        be timely. Green, 606 F.3d at 1302. For example, a motion to alter
        or amend a judgment must be filed within 28 days after the entry
        of the order or judgment to toll the appeal period. FED. R. CIV. P.
        59(e); Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 615 F.3d
        1352, 1359 n.15 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that an untimely post-judg-
        ment motion does not toll the time to appeal).
               USIC challenges this Court’s jurisdiction over Nicor’s ap-
        peal. According to USIC, the district court’s March 2019 oral ruling
        was a final decision, and Nicor failed to file a timely appeal within
        180 days of its entry onto the civil docket.5 Because the appeal was
        not filed within that period, USIC contends that we lack jurisdic-
        tion. USIC is mistaken.
               As we’ve noted, the district court issued an oral ruling on
        March 29, 2019, granting USIC’s summary judgment motion in its
        entirety. Later that same day, a minute sheet about the hearing
        was entered onto the civil docket. Nicor did not file its notice of

        5 As Rule 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) notes, when no separate judgment or order is set forth,
        once 150 days pass after the entry of a judgment or order that is otherwise
        appealable onto the civil docket, a party has 30 days to file a timely appeal.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13377

        appeal until September 29, 2021, after the district court issued its
        order and opinion on September 2, 2021.
               We have yet to determine whether an oral ruling coupled
        with a minute entry onto the civil docket counts as a judgment that
        triggers the 150-day clock for entry of a judgment and the 30-day
        appeal period. And we need not do so today. Instead, even assum-
        ing that the March 2019 oral ruling was a final order that Nicor
        could appeal, and the minute entry was an entry of judgment, we
        construe Nicor’s Objections to USIC’s Proposed Order as a Rule
        59(e) motion for reconsideration.
                “Whether a motion for post-judgment relief can be catego-
        rized as a Rule 59 motion is not determined by whether the movant
        so labels it.” Wright v. Preferred Rsch., Inc., 891 F.2d 886, 889 (11th
        Cir. 1990). Rather, we must evaluate independently “what type of
        motion was before the district court, depending upon the type of
        relief requested.” Id. Rule 59 applies to motions for reconsidera-
        tion on matters dealing with the merits of a decision. Finch v. City
        of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir.1988).
               Nicor’s objections to the proposed order attacked the district
        court’s decision to dismiss all Nicor’s claims—including those
        based on the duty to indemnify. So, for example, Nicor challenged
        the district court’s ability to dismiss all the claims, given the previ-
        ously imposed stay. Alternatively, Nicor alleged that its duty-to-
        indemnify claims should not have been dismissed because they
        were severable from the duty-to-defend claims and did not violate
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). Even though not all Nicor’s objections
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        21-13377                  Opinion of the Court                              17

        attacked the merits of the district court’s decision, they did not
        need to. What matters is that some of its objections challenged the
        merits of the district court’s decision. And because they did, we
        construe Nicor’s objections to USIC’s proposed order as a motion
        for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59.
                Finally, as we have explained, if a party files a timely Rule
        59(e) motion, then the appeal period runs from the entry of the
        order disposing of the last remaining motion. It is undisputed that
        Nicor filed its objections on April 22, 2019, well within the 28-day
        deadline, making its motion for reconsideration timely. And the
        district court implicitly ruled on the motion on September 2, 2021,
        when it entered judgment in favor of USIC. See United States v.
        Stefan, 784 F.2d 1093, 1100 (11th Cir. 1986) (“We conclude that the
        district court, by failing to make a ruling, implicitly overruled ap-
        pellants’ objection and denied their motion for a mistrial.”). The
        30-day clock to file an appeal therefore did not begin to run until
        September 2, 2021, and Nicor filed an appeal on September 29,
        2021, safely within that period. Because Nicor’s timely objections,
        which we construe as a motion for reconsideration, tolled the time
        to appeal the district court’s March 2019 oral ruling and subsequent
        minute entry onto the civil docket, we have jurisdiction to consider
        the merits of this appeal. 6

        6 USIC further argues that construing Nicor’s objections as a motion for re-
        consideration raises an additional problem. According to USIC, Nicor failed
        to appeal the district court’s March 2019 oral ruling on USIC’s motion for sum-
        mary judgment and instead addressed only the September 2021 Opinion and
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        18                          Opinion of the Court                        21-13377

              B. The district court erred in dismissing Nicor’s duty-to-in-
                                  demnify claims.

                Now that we have satisfied ourselves of jurisdiction in this
        case, we move on to the merits. On appeal, Nicor contends that
        the district court erred in concluding that Paragraph 9.1 of the
        Agreement, the Indemnification Provision, violated O.C.G.A. § 13-
        8-2(b)—Georgia’s public-policy statute on unenforceable construc-
        tion contracts. Nicor makes separate arguments as to USIC’s (1)
        duty to defend and (2) duty to indemnify Nicor in connection with
        the Illinois suits. So we, too, divide our review in two parts—

        Order that memorialized it. So USIC contends that we should review the dis-
        trict court’s decision for abuse of discretion. We disagree. Federal Rule of
        Appellate Procedure 3 requires an appellant to file a notice of appeal, which
        “designate[s] the judgment—or the appealable order—from which the appeal
        is taken.” FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B). Although Nicor did not include the March
        2019 ruling in its notice of appeal, we must “liberally construe the require-
        ments of [Appellate] Rule 3.” Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). “[I]n
        this circuit, it is well settled that an appeal is not lost if a mistake is made in
        designating the judgment appealed from where it is clear that the overriding
        intent was effectively to appeal.” Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d
        734, 738 n.1 (5th Cir.1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
        “This has resulted in the liberal allowance of appeals from orders not expressly
        designated in the notice of appeal, at least where the order that was not desig-
        nated was entered prior to or contemporaneously with the order(s) properly
        designated in the notice of appeal.” McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1474
        (11th Cir.1986). We see no reason not to liberally construe Nicor’s notice of
        appeal to include the March 2019 oral ruling.
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        21-13377               Opinion of the Court                        19

        whether the Agreement violates O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) with respect
        to each of the two duties.
               We start with O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). “As a general rule[,] a
        party may contract away liability to the other party for the conse-
        quences of his own negligence without contravening public policy,
        except when such agreement is prohibited by statute.” Lanier at
        McEver, L.P. v. Planners & Eng'rs Collaborative, 663 S.E.2d 240,
        242 (Ga. 2008) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). In this case, the par-
        ties agree that the public-policy statute guiding our interpretation
        of the Agreement is O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). As applicable here, the
        2011 version of O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) provided, in relevant part:
              A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in
              or in connection with or collateral to a contract or
              agreement relative to the construction, alteration, re-
              pair, or maintenance of a building structure, appurte-
              nances, and appliances, including moving, demoli-
              tion, and excavating connected therewith, purporting
               to require that one party to such contract or agree-
               ment shall indemnify, hold harmless, insure, or de-
               fend the other party to the contract or other named
               indemnitee, including its, his, or her officers, agents,
               or employees, against liability or claims for damages,
               losses, or expenses, including attorney fees, arising
               out of bodily injury to persons, death, or damage to
               property caused by or resulting from the sole negli-
               gence of the indemnitee, or its, his, or her officers,
               agents, or employees, is against public policy and void
               and unenforceable.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                21-13377

        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (emphases added).
               To “fall within the ambit of the statute, an indemnification
        provision must (1) relate in some way to a contract for ‘construc-
        tion, alteration, repair, or maintenance’ of certain property and (2)
        promise to indemnify [or defend] a party for damages arising from
        that own party’s sole negligence.” Kennedy Dev. Co. v. Camp, 719
        S.E.2d 442, 444 (Ga. 2011) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b)). The first
        prong is self-explanatory. As to prong two, the statute voids as un-
        enforceable all indemnity provisions purporting to indemnify an
        indemnitee’s sole negligence. Of course, if the indemnitee knew it
        wouldn’t have to pay for any of its negligent actions, the indem-
        nitee might have less incentive to act carefully.
               This Georgia public policy applies both to indemnity provi-
        sions explicitly claiming to indemnify or defend claims based on the
        indemnitee’s sole negligence, see Hartline–Thomas, Inc. v. Arthur
        Pew Constr. Co., 260 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (finding a
        contract clause that sought to indemnify contractor for its own
        negligence void as against public policy), and also indemnity provi-
        sions that use the phrases “any” or “all” claims, see Frazer v. City
        of Albany, 265 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Ga. 1980) (deeming “void as con-
        trary to . . . public policy” an indemnity provision for “all
        claims . . . arising from . . . any work or thing done on the project”
        and another one for “any loss or damage to property, or any injury
        to or death of any person that may be occasioned by any cause
        whatsoever pertaining to the project”); Lanier, 663 S.E.2d at 241–
        42, 244 (voiding an indemnity provision that purported to hold
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        21-13377                Opinion of the Court                        21

        indemnitee harmless from “any and all claims, losses, costs, dam-
        ages of any nature whatsoever” and “any and all liability or cause
        of action however alleged or arising, unless otherwise prohibited
        by law”).
               And in determining whether an indemnity provision falls
        within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b), our analysis is limited to
        “the language of the contract or agreement itself, and not other ex-
        traneous language . . . characterizing or making demands pursuant
        to it.” Milliken & Co. v. Ga. Power Co., 829 S.E.2d 111, 115–16
        (Ga. 2019) (emphasis in original).
                On appeal, Nicor does not challenge the district court’s de-
        termination that the Agreement relates to a construction contract
        (prong 1). Nicor challenges only the district court’s conclusion that
        both the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify kick in under
        the Agreement for losses that are based on Nicor’s (as the indem-
        nitee’s) sole negligence. We start with the duty-to-defend clause.
                 1. The Duty-to-Defend Clause is Unenforceable.

                First, we consult the text of the Agreement. Paragraph 9.1
        requires USIC to defend Nicor “against any and all manner of
        losses, costs, expenses, damages, and fines or penalties, including,
        without limitation, reasonable attorneys’ fees,” in connection with
        or arising from the actual or alleged acts related to (1) services USIC
        performed or contracted to be performed under the Agreement or
        (2) Nicor’s alleged liability, if liability is based on USIC’s acts or
        omissions. Doc. No. 33-1, at 23 (emphasis added). Even if the
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        22                        Opinion of the Court                     21-13377

        claims are based on Nicor’s sole negligence, this language requires
        USIC to defend Nicor against “any and all” claims of loss or dam-
        ages.
               Georgia law is clear: where an indemnity provision shifts all
        the liability to the indemnitor or requires the indemnitor to defend
        against all claims regardless of who is at fault, that indemnification
        provision cannot stand. 7 See Big Canoe Corp. v. Moore &
        Groover, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 564, 565–66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
        indemnity provision for “all claims, suits, damages, costs, losses
        and expenses arising from injury to any person, persons or property
        occurring on or about the said premises and relating to the perfor-
        mance of this Agreement” was unenforceable); Nat’l Candy
        Wholesalers, Inc. v. Chipurnoi, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 303, 304, 306 (Ga.
        Ct. App. 1986) (finding indemnity provision for “any claim by any
        of the exhibitor’s agents or employees for injury, loss or damage”
        was unenforceable). And because Georgia courts have interpreted
        indemnification provisions covering “any and all losses” as implic-
        itly indemnifying claims relating to the indemnitee’s sole negli-
        gence, see Lanier, 663 S.E.2d at 243, we must follow their lead and
        conclude that USIC’s duty to defend Nicor “against any and all
        manner of losses, [etc.],” violates O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). Therefore,

        7 Under the 2011 amendments to the statute, a promise to defend the indem-
        nitee violates O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b), if the indemnitor’s promise to defend co-
        vers claims relating to the indemnitee’s sole negligence.
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        21-13377                  Opinion of the Court                           23

        USIC’s duty to defend Nicor is unenforceable as against public pol-
        icy under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2. 8
               Nicor responds with two counterarguments: first, that ac-
        cording to the recent Georgia Supreme Court case Milliken &
        Company v. Georgia Power Company, 829 S.E.2d 111 (2019), in-
        demnification provisions that tie an indemnitor’s obligations to its
        own actions do not violate O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b), and second, that
        the insurance exception to O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) applies. We are
        not persuaded.
                         i.     Milliken does not apply here.

               Nicor contends that the duty-to-defend clause does not vio-
        late O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) because recently, in Milliken, the Georgia
        Supreme Court determined that an indemnity clause that expressly
        conditioned indemnification on the acts or omissions of the indem-
        nitor did not violate O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). 9 829 S.E.2d at 116–17.

        8 By its terms, Paragraph 9.1’s Exculpatory Clause does not apply to USIC’s
        duty to defend. The Exculpatory Clause specifically states,
               “[USIC] shall not be responsible to indemnify or hold harmless
               [Nicor] for losses or damages caused by the sole negligence of
               [USIC], its agents or employees.”
        (Emphasis added). The Clause, whether mistakenly or intentionally, excludes
        the duty to defend.
        9 USIC urges this panel to find that Nicor has forfeited this argument. We
        disagree. During the summary-judgment proceedings at the district court,
        Nicor argued that “O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) [was] not applicable because the In-
        demnity Provision only required [USIC] to indemnify and defend Nicor under
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        24                         Opinion of the Court                       21-13377

        Nicor says that describes the situation here. According to Nicor,
        the duty to defend in the Agreement is not unlimited but is instead
        premised on USIC’s acts or omissions in connection with or related
        to the Agreement. We disagree.
               In Milliken, by contract, Georgia Power erected a power-
        transmission pole on Milliken’s property, at Milliken’s request. Id.
        at 112. Following a plane crash, the victims of the crash and their

        two scenarios: (1) pursuant to subpart (a), where claims are asserted against
        Nicor arising out of services to be performed by USIC; and (2) pursuant to
        subpart (b), where claims are imputed to Nicor arising out of actions or failures
        to act of USIC.” Doc No. 38-3, at 18 (emphasis in original). Thus, Nicor as-
        serted, the Agreement did not contemplate “USIC defending or indemnifying
        Nicor for claims arising from the sole negligence of Nicor.” Id. at 19. This is
        the same argument that Nicor advances on appeal; the only difference is that
        Nicor cites to Milliken as support for its argument. But we have explained that
        parties are free to raise new arguments on appeal; they just can’t raise new
        issues. Pugliese v. Pukka Dev., Inc., 550 F.3d 1299, 1304 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (“Although new claims or issues may not be raised, new arguments relating
        to preserved claims may be reviewed on appeal.” (emphasis and citation omit-
        ted)). Here, Nicor has raised only a new argument.
        Alternatively, USIC encourages us to hold Nicor to what USIC says Nicor’s
        position was during the stay proceedings. USIC contends that Nicor unequiv-
        ocally stated that “the duty to defend is not subject to any exception, only the
        duty to indemnify.” Appellee Br. 33–34. But judicial estoppel is not warranted
        here because Nicor has not changed its position. During the stay proceedings,
        USIC argued that the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify were both
        subject to the Exculpatory Clause. Nicor responded that the duty to defend
        was not subject to the Exculpatory Clause. On appeal, Nicor still asserts that
        the Exculpatory Clause does not apply and further argues that it need not ap-
        ply because the Indemnification Provision is triggered by only the acts or omis-
        sions of USIC.
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        21-13377                Opinion of the Court                         25

        families sued Milliken and Georgia Power for erecting the pole in
        the airport’s protected space. Id. Milliken sought indemnification
        from Georgia Power. Id. The indemnity provision “require[d]
        Georgia Power to hold Milliken harmless from ‘any damages to
        property or persons . . . which result from [Georgia Power] Com-
        pany’s construction, operation or maintenance of its facilities on
        said easement areas.” Id. at 114 (second alteration and emphasis in
        original). And the provision appeared in an agreement that did not
        include a clause expressly excluding any damages arising from Mil-
        liken’s sole negligence.
                But that did not matter to the analysis. As the Georgia Su-
        preme Court explained, “the plain terms” of the indemnification
        provision “indemnifie[d] Milliken for damages resulting from
        Georgia Power’s acts or omissions,” not for damages resulting
        from Milliken’s sole negligence. Id. So, the court said, the indem-
        nification provision “d[id] not do that which [O.C.G.A § 13-8-2(b)]
        prohibits.” Id.
             Milliken’s facts are materially different from the facts here in
        two ways. First, unlike in Milliken—where the indemnification
        provision did not, by its terms, purport to make Georgia Power
        liable for anything Milliken did—the Indemnification Provision
        here expressly makes USIC liable for the acts and omissions of
        Nicor “to the extent that it shall be claimed that [Nicor is] liable for
        any reason because of any such act or omission of [USIC] or any
        subcontractor of [USIC].” And second, unlike in Milliken, the In-
        demnification Provision here contains an Exculpatory Clause,
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                21-13377

        which expressly states that USIC “shall not be responsible to in-
        demnify or hold harmless [Nicor] for losses or damages caused by
        the sole negligence of [Nicor], its agents or employees.” (Emphasis
        added).
               As the Georgia Supreme Court has explained with respect
        to contract interpretation, the cardinal rule is to “ascertain the in-
        tention of the parties, and to this end the whole contract must be
        considered.” Denise v. Paxson, 413 S.E.2d 433, 434 (Ga. 1992)
        (quoting Hull v. Lewis, 180 S.E. 599, 601 (Ga. 1935)). And when
        we look at the whole contract, we must presume that all provisions
        are “inserted with a purpose and are to be given some meaning.”
        Harper v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 126 S.E.2d 916, 918 (Ga. 1962). That
        means, we will not construe a contract, unless its terms necessarily
        require it, “to render useless and meaningless a particular provision
        in the contract.” Id. So given that Paragraph 9.1 requires USIC to
        “defend, indemnify, and hold harmless,” the language of the Excul-
        patory Clause—which does not refer to the duty to defend—nec-
        essarily means that USIC “shall be responsible to defend [Nicor] for
        losses or damages caused by the sole negligence of [Nicor], its
        agents or employees.”
               So, under Georgia’s rules of contractual interpretation,
        USIC’s duty to defend is unlimited and requires USIC to defend
        Nicor against all claims of damages even those based on Nicor’s
        sole negligence. That construction violates Georgia public policy
        and is therefore unenforceable.
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         21-13377                Opinion of the Court                         27

        ii.   The insurance exception to O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) is inapplica-
                                         ble.
               In the alternative, Nicor argues that the duty-to-defend
         clause is enforceable because of the insurance exception to
         O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). Once again, we disagree.
                 Under Georgia law, under certain circumstances, when a
         contract includes an insurance clause that shifts risk of loss to an
         insurer, O.C.G.A. 13-8-2(b) does not apply. See, e.g., ESI, Inc. of
         Tenn. v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 562 S.E.2d 198, 199 (Ga. Ct. App.
         2002); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. F.S. Assocs., L.P., 571 S.E.2d
         527, 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). In particular, Georgia courts permit
         the enforcement of an indemnity clause when the contractual
         terms “unequivocally express the mutual intent” of the parties “to
         shift the risk of loss and to look solely to insurance coverage for loss
         or damages incurred by either party.” May Dep’t Store v. Ctr.
         Devs., Inc., 471 S.E.2d 194, 197 (Ga. 1996) (holding that clauses in
         leases and other contracts pursuant to which parties clearly express
         their mutual intent to shift the risk of loss to insurance do not vio-
         late O.C.G.A § 13-8-2(b)).
                But a requirement that insurance be purchased is not “auto-
         matically a panacea for the dangers proscribed by the enactment of
         O.C.G.A § 13-8-2(b).” Federated Dep’t Stores v. Superior Drywall
         & Acoustical, Inc., 592 S.E.2d 485, 488 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). “In-
         stead, the type of insurance and the intent of the parties in mandat-
         ing the purchase of insurance must play a part in the analysis.” Id.
         That is so because, again, the contract containing the indemnity
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        28                     Opinion of the Court               21-13377

        clause and insurance requirement must “look solely to [the] insur-
        ance policy obtained in order to cover loss or damages incurred by
        both parties.” Id.
                For example, in Federated Department Stores, a woman
        tripped on a pole that the building owner had placed to help hide
        ongoing construction by a subcontractor inside a department store.
        Id. at 485–86. The woman sued the department store and the build-
        ing owner, and the subcontractor was joined as a third-party de-
        fendant, based on a contract between the building owner and the
        subcontractor. Id. at 486. The contract contained an indemnifica-
        tion clause under which the subcontractor agreed to indemnify the
        building owner and the department store for all damages resulting
        from or arising out of the subcontractor’s work. Id. at 487. Besides
        that, the contract required the subcontractor to obtain contractor’s
        general liability insurance. Id.
               The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that the indemni-
        fication clause violated Georgia public policy as embodied in
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). Id. And it rejected the department store and
        building owners’ argument that the contract’s insurance require-
        ment freed them of that conclusion. Id. at 488. Viewing the con-
        tract as a whole, the court noted that nothing in the contract re-
        quired the subcontractor to buy insurance that covered the acts or
        omissions of anyone other than the subcontractor. Id. In fact, the
        court continued, the subcontractor purchased the required type of
        policy—contractor’s general liability insurance, which covered
        only the subcontractor’s acts and omissions. Id. And as the
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        21-13377                   Opinion of the Court                                29

        contract also required, the subcontractor provided the department
        store with a “certificate ‘satisfactory to [the department store]’
        showing that [the subcontractor’s] insurance was in force.” Id. Be-
        cause the subcontractor conducted the contracted work at the de-
        partment store, the court concluded that the department store
        found the subcontractor’s policy to be satisfactory. Id. Given these
        facts, and as relevant here, the court concluded that the department
        store and building owner could not “credibly assert[] that the intent
        of the parties was for such insurance to also cover the negligent acts
        of [the department store].” Id.
               The Agreement here suffers from a similar problem. As in
        Federated Department Stores, nothing in the Agreement expresses
        the parties’ intent to shift all the risk of both parties to the insurer
        or for the insurance to cover losses or damages caused by Nicor’s
        sole negligence. The insurance policy USIC purchased covered
        Nicor as an additional insured only to the extent that the damages
        or losses were caused by USIC’s acts or omissions. 10 The policy
        did not cover Nicor’s acts and omissions. Because the policy was
        not intended to and did not cover both parties’ acts or omissions, it
        cannot qualify under Georgia law for the insurance exception to
        O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b).

        10 Under the policy, Nicor was listed as an additional insured covered “only
        with respect to liability for [covered types of damage] caused in whole or in
        part, by: 1. [USIC] acts or omissions; or 2. The acts or omissions of those acting
        on [USIC’s] behalf.” Doc. No. 42-3 at 14.
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        30                         Opinion of the Court                     21-13377

               In short, we conclude that the duty-to-defend requirement
        included in the Indemnification Provision violates O.C.G.A. § 13-
        8-2(b) and is unenforceable.
                  2. The duty-to-indemnify clause is enforceable.

               Finally, Nicor challenges the district court’s dismissal of its
        claims related to USIC’s duty to indemnify Nicor. Nicor argues
        that the duty to indemnify that Paragraph 9.1 of the Agreement
        requires does not violate O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) because the Excul-
        patory Clause explicitly states that USIC is relieved of any duty to
        indemnify or hold harmless Nicor for any losses or damages based
        on Nicor’s sole negligence. We agree.
                As we have explained, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) invalidates in-
        demnity provisions that expressly or implicitly purport to indem-
        nify claims relating to the indemnitee’s sole negligence. Lanier, 663
        S.E.2d at 241–44. But because of the Exculpatory Clause in Para-
        graph 9.1, the Agreement’s Indemnification Provision does not
        purport to indemnify claims relating to Nicor’s sole negligence. In
        other words, the parties agreed that the duty-to-indemnify clause
        does not apply to claims based solely on Nicor’s negligence. Thus,
        the duty-to-indemnify clause does not violate O.C.G.A. § 13-8-
        2(b). 11

        11 Nicor devoted a substantial portion of its briefing to arguing that USIC vi-
        olated the district court’s stay order by moving for summary judgment to dis-
        miss all Nicor’s claims, including those related to USIC’s duty to indemnify.
        We disagree. District courts are vested with broad discretion to stay
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        21-13377                    Opinion of the Court                                31

               But this conclusion does not end our discussion. USIC ar-
        gues that the duty-to-indemnify clause cannot be severed from the
        duty-to-defend clause, as Paragraph 9.1 includes them both. So,
        USIC’s reasoning goes, the two duties must stand or fall together,
        and because the duty to defend is unenforceable, the Indemnifica-
        tion Provision is unenforceable in its entirety. 12 We disagree.

        proceedings and authority is incidental to their inherent powers to control
        their dockets. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (“The Dis-
        trict Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power
        to control its own docket.”); Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int'l,
        Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts have inherent, dis-
        cretionary authority to issue stays in many circumstances.”). And when the
        district court entered its stay order, it retained jurisdiction over that order and
        could modify or amend that order by dismissing all previously stayed claims.
        See generally Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. & Assoc., 743
        F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that a district court’s decision to
        stay the federal proceedings is not a final decision because the lower courts
        retain jurisdiction for later disposition of the merits). USIC’s motion for sum-
        mary judgment seeking dismissal of all Nicor’s claim did not violate the district
        court’s stay order, as USIC filed its motion with the district court (which is the
        court that entered the stay order). And it was within the district court’s dis-
        cretion to choose to implicitly modify its stay order and address USIC’s argu-
        ments for dismissal.
        12 USIC contends that Nicor has forfeited any argument as to the severability
        of the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. Forfeiture “is the failure to
        make the timely assertion of a right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
        733 (1993). “[A]ppellate courts generally will not consider an issue or theory
        that was not raised in the district court,” and newly raised issues are considered
        forfeited. Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting FDIC v.
        Verex Assurance, Inc., 3 F.3d 391, 395 (11th Cir.1993)). Although Nicor did
        not raise its severability arguments during the summary-judgment
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        32                         Opinion of the Court                     21-13377

               Under Georgia’s rules of contractual interpretation, “[i]f a
        contract is severable, the part of the contract that is valid will not
        be invalidated by a separate and distinct part that is unenforceable.”
        Vegesina v. Allied Informatics, Inc., 572 S.E.2d 51, 53 (Ga. Ct. App.
        2002) (emphasis added); see also O.C.G.A § 13-1-8(a). We deter-
        mine whether a contract is severable based on the parties’ intent.
        Vegesina, 572 S.E.2d at 53. “The parties’ intent may be expressed
        directly, through a severability clause, or indirectly, as when the
        contract contains promises to do several things based upon multi-
        ple considerations.” Id. (citation omitted).
              As always, we start with the text of the Agreement. Para-
        graph 17 of the Agreement, the Severability Provision, states,
               Severability. If any provision of this Agreement is
               found by a proper authority to be unenforceable or
               invalid, such unenforceability or invalidity will not
               render this Agreement unenforceable or invalid as a
               whole; rather, this Agreement will be construed as if
               not containing the particular invalid or unenforceable
               provision or portion thereof, and the rights and obli-
               gations of the parties hereto will be construed and en-
               forced accordingly. In such event, the parties will ne-
               gotiate in good faith a replacement provision that
               would best accomplish the objectives of such

        proceedings, likely because it thought that claims relating to the duty to in-
        demnify were stayed, Nicor did raise these arguments in its Objections to
        USIC’s Proposed Order. As a result, the severability issue is not forfeited be-
        cause the issue was raised in the district court.
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        21-13377               Opinion of the Court                       33

              unenforceable or invalid provision within the limits
              of applicable law or applicable court decisions.
        Doc. No. 33-1, at 25–26 (emphasis added). This provision evi-
        dences the parties’ intent to sever unenforceable portions of the
        Agreement, while leaving the remainder intact.
               Because there is an express severability provision, the next
        question we must answer is whether we can excise the duty to de-
        fend from the Indemnification Provision and still preserve the re-
        mainder of Paragraph 9.1. See AMB Prop., L.P. v. MTS, Inc., 551
        S.E.2d 102, 104 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“The question then becomes
        whether the court could excise the indefinite language and still pre-
        serve the language regarding the last year’s base rent as the sole
        controlling language for determining the rent for the renewal
        term.”). We conclude we can and, in fact, we must.
               For starters, the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify
        are distinct concepts, and Georgia courts have recognized that
        these duties represent independent contractual obligations. See
        ALEA London Ltd. v. Woodcock, 649 S.E.2d 740, 746 & n.31 (Ga.
        Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that the duty to defend and the duty to
        pay are independent contractual obligations and citing approvingly
        to our holding in Trizec Properties v. Biltmore Construction
        Co., 767 F.2d 810, 812 (11th Cir.1985), that the duty to defend is
        separate and apart from the duty to indemnify); Nationwide Mut.
        Fire Ins. Co. v. Somers, 591 S.E.2d 430, 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“An
        insurer’s duty to defend and its duty to indemnify are separate and
        independent obligations.” (citation omitted)); City of Atlanta v. St.
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        34                      Opinion of the Court                21-13377

        Paul Fire & Marine Cas. Ins. Co., 498 S.E.2d 782, 785 (Ga. Ct. App.
        1998) (“An insurer’s duty to defend and its duty to indemnify are
        separate and independent obligations[;] . . . the existence of [the
        duty to defend] does not necessarily mean that [the insurer] was
        required to indemnify the City.”).
                Besides the fact that Georgia courts have recognized that
        these duties are distinct and separate, the duty to defend and the
        duty to indemnify require different obligations. For example, the
        duty to defend encompasses USIC’s duty to appoint counsel and
        defend claims against Nicor. See Christopher K. Pfirrman & Mi-
        chael DeMarco, The duty to defend, 2 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING
        BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL, § 25:8 (2021). On the
        other hand, the duty to indemnify relates to USIC’s obligation to
        pay all covered claims and judgments against Nicor. See Steven
        Plitt et al., Duty to defend distinguished from duty to pay on policy,
        14 COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 200:3 (2022).
               Because these are distinct and separate obligations, if USIC’s
        duty to defend is unenforceable, that does not affect USIC’s duty to
        indemnify Nicor or the remainder of USIC’s obligations under Par-
        agraph 9.1. When distinct parts of an agreement are not necessary
        for other clauses in a provision to operate on their own, severability
        is possible. See AMB Prop., 551 S.E.2d at 104.
               And here, the text of the Severability Provision requires sev-
        erance. As a reminder, it provides for severability of “the particular
        invalid or unenforceable provision or portion thereof.” Doc. No.
        33-1, at 25 (emphasis added). Of course, the duty to defend is “a
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        21-13377               Opinion of the Court                       35

        portion” of the Indemnification Provision. Thus, the Agreement
        contemplates that the duty to defend may be severed from the re-
        mainder of the Indemnification Provision. So given that language
        and that the duty to defend is a distinct concept from the duty to
        indemnify, we conclude that the Severability Provision requires
        severance of the duty to defend from the rest of Paragraph 9.1 and
        the Agreement.
                Unsatisfied with this conclusion, USIC argues that the duty
        to defend cannot be severed from the duty to indemnify because
        courts can strike only distinct provisions of a contract and not iso-
        lated language in a single provision. USIC relies on SunTrust Bank
        v. Bickerstaff, 824 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) for support.
        USIC’s reliance on SunTrust is misplaced.
                In SunTrust, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
        class-action waiver included in SunTrust’s rules and regulations for
        deposit accounts was unconscionable and unenforceable. Id. at
        722. Because the unenforceable class-action waiver clause was con-
        tained in the same section as the jury-trial waiver clause, the court
        also had to determine whether the jury-trial waiver clause could
        still be enforced. The court concluded that the two clauses were
        not severable. Id. at 722–23. In reaching this conclusion, the court
        looked to the severability provision, which said that “[a] determi-
        nation that any part of this agreement is invalid or unenforceable
        will not affect the remainder of this agreement.” Id. at 722 (altera-
        tion in original). Based on this language, the court determined the
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        36                     Opinion of the Court                21-13377

        agreement did not authorize the court to excise a single sentence
        from an integrated provision. Id. at 722–23.
               But that’s not the language that the Agreement before us
        contains. Rather, as we have noted, the Agreement expressly con-
        templates that any “particular invalid or unenforceable provision
        or portion thereof,” Doc. No. 33-1, at 25 (emphasis added), will be
        severed. The parties’ intent controls our interpretation of the
        Agreement. And based on the Severability Provision, the parties
        intended to sever not only whole provisions that were deemed un-
        enforceable but also invalid portions of provisions, such as the duty
        to defend. For this reason, we sever the duty to defend from Para-
        graph 9.1 and conclude that the Indemnity Provision is otherwise
        enforceable. Thus, USIC’s duty to indemnify Nicor remains intact.
              As a result, the district court erred in dismissing Nicor’s
        claims related to USIC’s duty to indemnify Nicor.

                               IV.   CONCLUSION

              For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of summary
        judgment on Nicor’s duty-to-defend claims, as the clause is unen-
        forceable pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b), and we reverse the
        judgment on Nicor’s claims related to USIC’s duty to indemnify
        and remand for further proceedings.
              AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.