Court Opinion

ID: 9400716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 23:04:46.636862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.522222
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/8/23 Stark v. County of Los Angeles CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 REGINALD F. STARK,                                                  B311930

          Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                     (Los Angeles County
          v.                                                         Super. Ct. No. 19STCV39957)

 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

          Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark V. Mooney, Judge. Affirmed.
      Lyon Law, Geoffrey C. Lyon and Henry Harmeling for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi, Paul B. Beach and Oscar A.
Bustos for Defendant and Respondent.

                          ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       Reginald F. Stark appeals the grant of a motion for
summary judgment in favor of the County of Los Angeles (the
County)1 on his complaint alleging several violations of the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
(Gov. Code2, § 12940 et seq.) and another related claim against
the County, stemming from the termination of his employment
with the Los Angeles County Probation Department (the
Department) in November 2018. Stark primarily contends that
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because
there were triable issues of fact regarding the motives underlying
his termination. We disagree, and therefore affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
I.     Stark’s employment with the County
       Stark was employed with the Department from 1987
through his termination on November 27, 2018. Stark began his
career as a night officer, was promoted to a Detention Services

      1The County was erroneously sued as Los Angeles County
Probation Department.

      All undesignated statutory references are to the
      2

Government Code.
      3 At the outset, we agree with the County that the factual
background in Stark’s opening brief is deficient because it
includes only lengthy string citations at the end of each
paragraph, and those citations often fail to support the alleged
facts. These infirmities violate rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the
California Rules of Court, constraining our review and permitting
us to disregard the offending portions of the brief. (See Myers v.
Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745; Regents
of University of California v. Sheily (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 824,
826, fn. 1.)

                                2
Officer (DSO) in 1989, and then, in the mid-1990s, was promoted
again to the title of Senior DSO. Senior DSOs are peace officers
charged with supervising staff and juveniles in juvenile halls.
II.    Stark’s promotion applications
       Stark alleged that he applied for further promotions in
2008, 2016, 2017, and 2018.4 The County’s civil service rules
governed the promotions that Stark sought. Those rules utilize
an examination process and banding system to ensure fair and
impartial consideration. An applicant’s examination score
determines their placement into one of five “ ‘bands.’ ” Those
applicants whose score is greater than 70 percent are placed on a
certification list within their applicable band and are eligible for
appointment to the positions, while applicants with a score of less
than 70 percent are not placed in a band and are ineligible for
appointment. Applications are not anonymous.
       In 2008, a superintendent and director promised Stark a
promotion if he transferred to another facility and “ ‘turned the
building around.’ ” Stark was never promoted despite satisfying
those prerequisites and passing the examination for promotion
and being placed in Band 3. In 2017, Stark took the exam again,
missed a passing score by a few points, but did not appeal his

      4 Stark provided no information regarding his 2016
application and the County presented evidence that it did not
offer examinations in 2015 or 2016, so Stark could not have
applied.

                                 3
score.5 In 2018, Stark did not attend the October 2018 exam that
he was scheduled to take.6
III. Stark’s early disciplinary history
       In 1990, Stark was suspended for inappropriate conduct
after pulling up a minor’s pants when the minor failed to comply
with his instructions to do so. In 1997, Stark was suspended for
failing to maintain employee conduct standards after he was
convicted of driving on a suspended license.
       On June 4, 2010, Stark was discharged from employment
for misuse of force, inappropriate and unprofessional conduct,
falsifying a report, untruthfulness during an official
investigation, interfering with an administrative investigation,
conduct unbecoming a peace officer, and failure to exercise sound
judgment, in connection with a misuse of force incident
surrounding the physical restraint of a minor on June 3, 2009.
Stark appealed his discharge, and, in 2015, the grounds for
discipline were upheld, but the discharge reduced to a suspension
and Stark was reinstated to his position.
IV. Stark’s treatment after reinstatement
       Starting in November 2016, several incidents occurred
between Stark and Supervising DSO LaCour Harrison, who did

     5 Stark alleged he was not permitted to appeal but the
County provided documentary evidence that Stark was advised in
writing of his right to appeal and did not appeal.
     6 Stark claimed that the exam had to be rescheduled, but
the County provided evidence that the exam proceeded as
scheduled and Stark was advised of his right to reschedule the
exam but did not do so.

                                4
not supervise Stark but would occasionally direct Stark when
Harrison served as Officer of the Day.
         According to Stark, in November 2016, Harrison instructed
Stark to attend “staff training” that day. When Stark responded,
“ ‘Okay, I’m just gonna go in my unit and drop my stuff off,’ ”
Harrison told him, “ ‘No, I ordered you not to go anywhere, just
stay right here.’ ” Harrison then stood in front of the door and
said to Stark, “ ‘You’re not gonna go past me.’ ” Stark then
responded, “ ‘Check yourself, I’m gonna go to my unit. I’m
allowed to go to take a dump.’ ” In December 2016, Stark
observed Harrison get frustrated when a coworker to whom
Harrison was attracted praised Stark’s work.
         In January 2017, Harrison allegedly instructed Stark’s unit
by walkie talkie to open a door for a minor. Stark responded,
“ ‘I’ll be right there, I’ll get it,’ ” to which Harrison said, “ ‘Right
now, get your butt up right now and do it.’ ”
         On February 20, 2017, Stark was in his unit when a
coworker asked via radio for assistance transporting a minor.
Harrison came into the unit and yelled at Stark, “ ‘Don’t you hear
that? Go assist her! Do your fucking job!’ ” Harrison appeared to
have his fist clenched and another supervisor had to pull him
away.
         On February 20, 2017, Stark submitted a written
complaint alleging that Harrison was threatening and hostile
toward him.7 One of Stark’s supervisors filed a complaint on

      7 The written complaint alleged a February 14, 2017
incident similar in nature to the February 20, 2017 incident. The
parties’ record citations do not make clear whether these were, in
fact, separate incidents.

                                   5
Stark’s behalf and met with both Harrison and Stark a few days
after the incident to instruct them to be courteous with one
another. Harrison denied the allegations. In September 2017,
the complaint was deemed non-jurisdictional and returned to the
facility to handle. Stark and Harrison were instructed to not
engage in improper workplace conduct. Around the same time,
County headquarters instructed Stark’s supervisor to reassign
Stark to another juvenile hall.
V.     September 17, 2017 incident and resulting November
       27, 2018 discharge
       Before Stark could be reassigned, on September 17, 2017,
Stark and Harrison had a physical altercation which was
subsequently investigated by the Department’s Internal Affairs
Bureau. Harrison alleged that Stark physically assaulted him by
pushing him and knocking him off balance as Stark entered the
unit office. In response, Harrison pushed Stark back to create
space and prevent further physical confrontation. However,
Stark alleged that Harrison had his back to Stark inside the door
to the unit office and was blocking the entrance. As Stark
attempted to pass Harrison, Stark said, “ ‘Excuse me.’ ” Stark
claimed Harrison then turned, knocking Stark’s cup of water
from his hand. Stark alleged that he told Harrison, “ ‘I know you
saw me. You didn’t see me walk in here? You didn’t hear me say
excuse me?’ ” and that Harrison replied, “ ‘I didn’t see you. It was
an accident.’ ” Stark further recalled that, after the cup fell to
the ground, Stark extended his open hand in order to deescalate
the situation.
       Harrison and Stark immediately submitted written
complaints. The written referral of the complaints noted that

                                 6
video evidence was available but the incident was “not
observable.”
       In a July 2018 report, the Internal Affairs investigation
determined that Harrison’s account was supported by the
majority of Department employees who were interviewed. No
employee corroborated Stark’s allegation that Harrison initiated
physical contact. The only witnesses who supported Stark’s
allegation were two juveniles (out of seven juveniles interviewed),
both of whom were under Stark’s direct supervision. Internal
Affairs thus found the allegation of workplace violence against
Stark substantiated, but the allegation against Harrison
inconclusive. The “thorough,” “credible and complete” nature of
the investigation rendered it unnecessary to reinterview
witnesses, although Internal Affairs “[a]t times” did reinterview
witnesses in some cases.
       On or about September 16, 2018, Stark was given written
notice of the County’s intent to discharge him based on his
violation of departmental policies, including workplace violence,
discourtesy to fellow employees, failure to follow established rules
and regulations, and failure to exercise sound judgment. The
County deemed discharge necessary because of the investigative
findings, the offense’s seriousness in relation to Stark’s role as a
peace officer in a juvenile institution, and Stark’s prior history of
serious discipline after similar misuse of force incidents. Stark
was ultimately discharged on November 27, 2018 following a
Skelly hearing8. Stark was 55 years old at the time.

      8 Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 215,
establishes that an agency considering disciplinary action against
a public employee must accord certain pre-removal safeguards,

                                 7
VI.    July 31, 2018 incident and the resulting July 25, 2019
       discharge held in abeyance
       On September 19, 2017, Stark agreed to be reassigned to
another facility—a larger, older, and more challenging work
environment than his prior facility—while the investigation into
the September 17, 2017 incident was carried out. On July 31,
2018, Stark was involved in a physical altercation with another
coworker that resulted in a separate Internal Affairs
investigation. Stark submitted a written complaint regarding the
incident claiming that, after Stark confronted his coworker
regarding the coworker’s alleged inappropriate behavior, the
coworker “ ‘physically assaulted’ him, ‘began to bump his body
into [him],’ and ‘jump[ed] from a seated position in his chair and
push[ed] [him] full force with his body.’ ”
       Twelve witnesses were interviewed and none corroborated
Stark’s account. Video evidence of the incident was available, but
did not depict any physical assault by the coworker. Internal
Affairs therefore concluded that the allegations against Stark of
inappropriate staff relations and knowing falsification of his
report of the incident were substantiated.
       Based on these investigative findings and Stark’s other
history of discipline, the County determined that the July 31,
2018 incident supported Stark’s discharge, as well. On or about
July 25, 2019, Stark was sent a notice advising him of the
County’s intent to discharge him based on his violation of
departmental policies and various grounds, including falsification
of reports or documents. However, because Stark had already

including opportunity to respond to the charges upon which
proposed discipline is based, in order to satisfy due process.

                                 8
been discharged on November 27, 2018, this discharge was held
in abeyance pending the outcome of any appeal. Stark initially
filed an appeal of his discharge, but later withdrew his appeal
and his discharge became final.
VII. Stark’s medical leave and accommodation requests
       On or about July 27, 2018, Stark visited the emergency
room complaining of migraines. A doctor concluded Stark may
have injured nerves in his neck and shoulder area while
restraining a 17 year old on or about July 23, 2018, and that he
should not go back to work. Stark was placed off of work
intermittently beginning August 1, 2018. Stark was then eligible
for his full FMLA9 entitlement of 12 weeks of leave during a 12-
month period. FMLA leave entitlement and use was calculated
and tracked by the Return to Work Unit using the Department of
Human Resources’ Absence Management System. Because Stark
worked 40 hours per week during this period, his 12-week
entitlement amounted to 480 leave hours.
       Each medical note that Stark presented seeking FMLA
leave was approved until his entitlement was exhausted on
November 19, 2018. Specifically, Stark was granted and took
FMLA leave from August 1 through 4, 2018 (24 leave hours),
August 24 through September 27, 2018 (200 hours), and October
5 through November 19, 2018 (256 hours). Stark was then
granted a medical leave of absence from November 20, 2018
through December 20, 2018. Stark remained on this leave of
absence until his discharge from his employment on November
27, 2018. Apart from his August 1 to November 19, 2018 FMLA

     9 FMLA refers to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.).

                               9
leave, Stark did not request any other FMLA leave in 2017 or
2018.
VIII. Complaint and summary judgment motion
       On November 1, 2019, Stark filed a complaint of
discrimination with the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing (DFEH) and received an immediate right-to-sue letter.
He filed his lawsuit against the County on November 5, 2019
asserting eight causes of action under FEHA—(1) medical leave
retaliation (§ 12945); (2) medical leave discrimination (§ 12945.2);
(3) disability discrimination (§ 12940, subd. (a)); (4) failure to
engage in the interactive process (§ 12940, subd. (n)); (5) failure
to reasonably accommodate and retaliation for requesting and
using accommodations for disabilities (§ 12940, subd. (m)); (6) age
discrimination (§ 12940, subd. (a)); (7) retaliation (§ 12940,
subd. (h)); and (8) failure to prevent discrimination and
retaliation (§ 12940, subds. (j) & (k))—as well as one non-FEHA
claim—(9) whistleblower retaliation (Lab. Code, §§ 1102.5 &
1102.6).
       On January 4, 2021, the County moved for summary
judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication. Stark filed an
opposition on March 5, 2021, and the County filed a reply and
evidentiary objections to Stark’s exhibits on March 12, 2021.
Stark argued that any of the County’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for his discharge were pretextual
because the County did not adequately investigate the September
17, 2017 incident, that Harrison had a “long history” as an
aggressor, and, per the testimony of Stark and three other former
County employees, the Department had a pattern of discharging
or forcing out older employees.

                                10
      The court heard argument from the parties on March 19,
2021. At the outset, Stark’s counsel conceded that Stark’s claims
were based only upon his termination, and that the events that
occurred prior to the termination were only being used to
demonstrate intent. The court concluded Stark failed to present
evidence, or to raise a triable issue of material fact,
demonstrating that the County’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for Stark’s discharge were merely pretext for
discrimination or retaliation. In so holding, the court sustained
the County’s objections to the declarations that Stark submitted
from other former County employees due to a lack of foundation,
relevance, and hearsay, among other reasons.
      Stark timely appealed.10

      10 The court filed a judgment on March 19, 2021 and an
amended judgment on April 7, 2021. The two judgments contain
minor linguistic differences, and the amended judgment contains
a line for a costs award which the trial court left blank. On
March 31, 2021, Stark was served with notice of entry of the
original judgment, and there is no record indication of service of
notice of entry of the amended judgment. Stark’s April 14, 2021
notice of appeal purports to appeal from the March 19, 2021
judgment only. Any failure to appeal the amended judgment
does not affect our jurisdiction because Stark’s appellate claims
concern rulings included in the initial judgment from which he
timely appealed, the amended judgment does not substantially
modify the initial judgment, and Stark’s notice of appeal was
timely as to both judgments. (See Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235
Cal.App.4th 837, 842 [if an amended judgment is not a
“substantial modification” of the original, “any changes are
considered to relate back to the original judgment and the time to
appeal runs from the entry of the first judgment”].)

                               11
                            DISCUSSION
A.     Standard of review
       The applicable standard of review of a ruling on a motion
for summary judgment is well established. “The purpose of the
law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism
to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine
whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to
resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).)
       The moving party “bears the burden of persuasion that
there is no triable issue of material fact and that [it] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 850; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant
moving for summary judgment must “ ‘show[ ] that one or more
elements of the cause of action … cannot be established’ by the
plaintiff. [Citation.]’ ” (Aguilar, at p. 853.) A defendant meets
its burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an
essential element of a plaintiff’s claim. (Guz v. Bechtel National,
Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334 (Guz).) Alternatively, a defendant
meets its burden by submitting evidence “that the plaintiff does
not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence”
supporting an essential element of its claim (Aguilar, at p. 854),
or that “there is a complete defense to that cause of action.”
(Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 997.)
       On appeal from a summary judgment ruling, we review the
record de novo and independently determine whether triable
issues of material fact exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767; Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 334.) We
resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in favor of the
party opposing summary judgment. (Saelzler, at p. 768.)

                                  12
       “In performing an independent review of the granting of
summary judgment, we conduct the same procedure employed by
the trial court. We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the
elements of the claim, (2) the motion to determine if it establishes
facts justifying judgment in the moving party’s favor, and (3) the
opposition—assuming movant has met its initial burden—to
‘decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the
existence of a triable, material fact issue.’ ” (Oakland Raiders v.
National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) “We
need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons
in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial
court, not its rationale.” (Ibid.) Thus, a reviewing court “will
affirm a summary judgment if it is correct on any ground that the
parties had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court,
regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.” (Angelotti v. The
Walt Disney Co. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402.)
B.     Age and disability discrimination/retaliation and
       derivative claims
       In this case, all but one of Stark’s causes of action relate to
violations of the FEHA. Several of those claims, namely
disability discrimination and retaliation for requesting/using
accommodations for disabilities, age discrimination, and
retaliation for opposing FEHA violations, “share[ ] a common
critical component with the others: the action taken by the
employer about which [Stark] complain[s] must have been
motivated by a discriminatory purpose—or retaliatory motive—
against [Stark] because of h[is] protected status.” (Collins v.
Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 76 & fn. 6.) Likewise, as
Stark concedes, his failure to prevent discrimination and
retaliation claim is “derivative” of his discrimination and

                                 13
retaliation claims. (Featherstone v. Southern California
Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1166;
Glynn v. Superior Court (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 47, 56.) We thus
address these claims together, and conclude for similar reasons
that the trial court properly granted summary adjudication as to
them.
               1. Applicable law
        “ ‘In California, courts employ at trial the three-stage test
that was established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973)
411 U.S. 792, 802, to resolve discrimination claims . . . .
[Citation.] At trial, the employee must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, showing “ ‘ “actions taken by the
employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain
unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions
were ‘based on a [prohibited] discriminatory criterion . . . .’ ” ’ ” ’
(Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 520, fn. 2 (Reid).) A
prima facie claim arises ‘when the employee shows (1) at the time
of the adverse action [he was a member of a protected class], (2)
an adverse employment action was taken against the employee,
(3) at the time of the adverse action the employee was
satisfactorily performing his or her job’ (Hersant v. Department
of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003, fn. omitted
(Hersant)), and (4) the adverse action occurred ‘under
circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.’ (Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine
(1981) 450 U.S. 248, 253.) ‘Once the employee satisfies this
burden, there is a presumption of discrimination, and the burden
then shifts to the employer to show that its action was motivated
by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. [Citation.] A reason is
“ ‘legitimate’ ” if it is “facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and

                                  14
which if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.”
[Citation.] If the employer meets this burden, the employee then
must show that the employer's reasons are pretexts for
discrimination, or produce other evidence of intentional
discrimination.’ (Reid, at p. 520, fn. 2, italics omitted.)” (Nakai v.
Friendship House Assn. of American Indians, Inc. (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 32, 38–39.)
       In the summary judgment context, “ ‘the employer, as the
moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible
evidence showing either that one or more elements of plaintiff's
prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse employment action
was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory [or nonretaliatory]
factors.’ ” (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 830, 861 (Serri).) At this stage, the employer need
only proffer “competent, admissible evidence” of its reasons,
unrelated to bias or retaliatory motive, for the adverse
employment action. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 357.) The
proffered reasons, “if nondiscriminatory [or nonretaliatory] …
need not necessarily have been wise or correct.” (Id. at p. 358;
see Serri, at p. 861 [noting examples of legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for adverse action, like employee’s
failure to meet performance standards or loss of confidence in
employee].)
       If the employer meets its initial burden, the plaintiff must
then “ ‘demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial
evidence that the employer's stated reasons were untrue or
pretextual, or that the employer acted with a discriminatory [or
retaliatory] animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination
[or retaliation] or other unlawful action.’ ” (Serri, supra, 226

                                 15
Cal.App.4th at p. 861; Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 356.) “It is not
sufficient for an employee to make a bare prima facie showing or
to simply deny the credibility of the employer's witnesses or to
speculate as to discriminatory [or retaliatory] motive. [Citations.]
Rather it is incumbent upon the employee to produce ‘substantial
responsive evidence’ demonstrating the existence of a material
triable controversy as to pretext or discriminatory animus on the
part of the employer.” (Serri, at p. 862.)
       Ultimately, “an employer is entitled to summary judgment
if, considering the employer’s innocent explanation for its actions,
the evidence as a whole is insufficient to permit a rational
inference that the employer’s actual motive was discriminatory
[or retaliatory].” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 361.)
“ ‘ “Circumstantial evidence of ‘ “pretense” must be “specific” and
“substantial” in order to create a triable issue with respect to
whether the employer intended to discriminate [or retaliate]’ on
an improper basis.” ’ ” (Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp.
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1182 (Husman).)11 To show pretext,
a plaintiff can use three types of evidence: “(1) direct evidence …
such as statements or admissions, (2) comparative evidence, and
(3) statistics.” (Iwekaogwu v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 803, 816.)

      11 The McDonnell Douglas test does not apply where the
plaintiff presents direct evidence of discriminatory intent. (Trop
v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1133,
1144–1145.) The parties agree there is no such evidence in this
case, and therefore the McDonnell Douglas test applies.

                                16
             2. Stark failed to present substantial evidence
                that the County’s nondiscriminatory reasons
                were pretextual
       As the party seeking summary judgment, the County had
the initial burden of presenting admissible evidence showing
either that one or more elements of Stark’s prima facie case was
lacking or that the decision to terminate his employment12 was
based on legitimate, nonretaliatory factors. (Serri, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at p. 861.) Because the County does not challenge
Stark’s prima facie case in its briefing on appeal, we focus our
analysis on the stated reason for terminating Stark’s employment
(his workplace misconduct) and on Stark’s responsive showing as
to whether that reason was false or pretextual.
       To establish a legitimate reason for a disciplinary action,
the employer must “ ‘ “clearly set forth, through the introduction
of admissible evidence, the reasons for the [termination or
demotion]. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to
justify a judgment for the [employer].” ’ ” (Sada v. Robert F.
Kennedy Medical Center (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138, 149.) There
can be no meaningful dispute that the County did so here,
providing evidence that Stark was involved in a physical
altercation in September 2017 with Harrison that became the
subject of an Internal Affairs investigation. That investigation,
which involved interviews with several witnesses, confirmed
Harrison’s allegation that Stark physically assaulted him, with

      12As below, Stark has not disputed that the only actionable
adverse employment action is his November 2018 discharge,
contending instead that any prior grievances are relevant only to
demonstrate discriminatory intent. We therefore limit our
analysis accordingly.

                               17
no Probation Department employees corroborating Stark’s
allegation that Harrison was, in fact, the aggressor. Based on
these findings, as well as the seriousness of the offense and
Stark’s other disciplinary history including other misuse of force
incidents, the County determined that discharge was
appropriate. For these reasons, we are satisfied that Stark’s
employment was terminated because he violated the County’s
policy against workplace violence on at least one occasion (i.e.,
September 2017). Violation of an employer’s workplace violence
policy is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination.
(Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 168.)
       Nonetheless, Stark argues that the September 2017
incident with Harrison was pretext for age and/or disability
discrimination and retaliation because “Harrison has a long
history of being the aggressor” during several other incidents
between Stark and Harrison, because there were conflicts in the
witness statements related to the September 2017 incident,
because the County delayed its disciplinary action for nine to 12
months after its investigation concluded and failed to verify the
validity of the investigation, and Stark’s termination was
inconsistent with his prior suspensions for similar conduct.
Further, there were three other individuals who Stark identified
in his summary judgment opposition, appending their testimony
by way of declarations or deposition transcripts, suggesting that
the Department had a practice of pushing out older employees
using false charges and investigations as they neared retirement
age.13 We address each category of evidence in turn, and

      Although the factual recitation in Stark’s opening brief
      13

summarizes the denials of his promotion requests at length,

                                18
conclude that taken as a whole the evidence was insufficient to
permit an inference of discriminatory or retaliatory motives.
(Husman, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1182.)
      Stark’s contentions regarding Harrison’s prior aggressive
behavior, inconsistencies among the statements of witnesses to
the September 2017 incident, the inadequate verification of the
investigation into the September 2017 incident, and inconsistent
discipline are merely attempts to undermine the integrity of the
County’s investigation, which does not ordinarily suffice to defeat
summary judgment. (See Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 863
[under California law, it is not enough for a plaintiff to “simply
show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since
the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus
motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise,
shrewd, prudent, or competent”].)
      In any event, Stark’s arguments lack merit. As we have
noted, the County conducted a thorough investigation of the
incident, including interviews of at least a dozen witnesses,
including Stark, as well as review of video footage.14 Nearly all of

Stark presents no argument as to the bearing of these facts on his
legal claims. In the absence of such argument, we decline to
address the allegations further. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C) [appellant must demonstrate error with
specific arguments under specific headings marshalling specific
facts]; see Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99
[“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or
supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider the
issues waived”].)
      14 Though Stark appears to complain that the Department
failed to “preserve video surveillance of the [September 2017]

                                19
the dozen or so witnesses interviewed, except for two juveniles
under Stark’s supervision, corroborated Harrison’s account.
Some of the purported inconsistencies in the evidence that Stark
raises are based on incomplete or mischaracterized accounts of
the witnesses’ statements.15
       Even accepting Stark’s characterization of his prior, largely
uncorroborated interactions with Harrison as a “long history” of
aggression by Harrison, Internal Affairs afforded Stark ample
opportunity to account for any such incident(s) in his interview,
and its resulting written report recounted in detail Stark’s prior
complaints regarding Harrison, as well as the Department’s
efforts to remedy the issues, including interviewing the parties
and issuing reprimands. Thus, the Department gave due
consideration to any history between Stark and Harrison, which
had not, up until that point, resulted in physical contact to the
extent that occurred in September 2017.
       That the County did not verify or reinterview witnesses
suggests no irregularity. Indeed, the decisionmaker testified that
verifying witness statements was not necessarily common, and

incident”, the record suggests otherwise. Per the referral of the
complaints, video evidence was available but the incident was
“not observable.”
      15For example, Stark suggests that “all of the staff
interviewed” were doing other things when the incident occurred
and did not see “anything until the cup hit the floor.” However,
Stark references only the statements of three staff members, and
the Internal Affairs report establishes that each of those
witnesses fully observed the incident from the outset, even though
they stated that they were initially doing other things when their
attention was drawn to Stark and Harrison.

                                20
was especially unnecessary in a case such as this, which involved
a “thorough,” “credible and complete” investigation where the
conclusions were corroborated by the vast majority of witnesses.
       Stark further contends that his discharge was pretextual
because it was “internally inconsistent” with punishment—
namely, shorter periods of suspension—he had previously
received for like incidents. (See, e.g., Chuang v. University of
California Davis (9th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 [petitioner
may show that employer’s proffered explanation is pretextual by
establishing that it is internally inconsistent or otherwise
unbelievable].) This argument—asserted in the first instance in
Stark’s reply brief—is both forfeited (see, e.g., Employers Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. (2008) 169
Cal.App.4th 340, 350 [argument first raised in a reply brief is
forfeited on appeal]) and meritless. The disparities in
punishment, culminating in the decision to terminate Stark for
his escalating misconduct, were eminently rational under the
circumstances, and hardly reflective of pretext for a
discriminatory or retaliatory motive, even despite any temporal
proximity with the protected conduct alleged by Stark. (See, e.g.,
Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 354
[reasoning that employers must be afforded latitude to terminate
employees engaging in improper conduct, otherwise it “would
unnecessarily tie the hands of employers”].)
       Stark’s further suggestion that the discharge decision was
pretextual because the County did not discharge him for nine to
12 months after the conclusion of the investigation into the
September 2017 incident lacks support in the record. The County
official who made the ultimate decision to discharge Stark
testified that she made her decision nine to 12 months after the

                               21
September 2017 incident, rather than nine to 12 months after the
investigation had concluded. This testimony comports with the
date of the July 2018 written report documenting Internal
Affairs’ conclusions with respect to the September 2017 incident.
Thus, Stark vastly overstates any delay between the conclusion of
the investigation and his discharge.
      Finally, the accounts of three other former County
employees attached to Stark’s opposition papers likewise fail to
provide substantial evidence of pretext. The declaration of
former Senior DSO George Graves stated that Graves retired at
age 62 as a result of “false accusations and investigation”
stemming from a workplace violence allegation. Graves was
transferred to another location with a longer commute during the
investigation. After the investigation concluded without any
disciplinary action, Graves “felt as though the investigation was
trying to prove that [he] did something rather than trying to find
out what happened” and decided to retire early. Graves
“observed a pattern within the Department, where [the
Department] would try to find ways to force employees out when
they get close to retirement age.” Graves insisted this happened
with “a few other [Department] employees” but provided no
further details.
      The declaration of former Senior DSO Byron Atkins
similarly stated that Atkins retired at age 55 as a result of “false
accusations and investigation” stemming from an allegation of
excessive force in the workplace. During the investigation,
Atkins was reassigned to another position and told by a
superintendent and director that it was “ ‘time to retire.’ ” After
the investigation concluded, Atkins “chose to retire because [he]
believed the Department would punish [him] even if they found

                                22
that [he] had done nothing wrong.” Atkins believed this because
he “noticed a pattern” of pushing out older staff with
unwarranted discipline, but Atkins provided no further details
regarding this “pattern.”
        Stark also provided deposition testimony from a third
former employee, Keith Flanagan, who stated during his
deposition that “there are a lot of people that had—when I say ‘a
lot,’ I would say from my opinion—from my opinion, without
knowing all of the things because my own investigation
mushroomed into many other investigations and the County had
an unprecedented way of discharging more than—I think it was
more than 10 supervisors that all were above 40 or 50. And I
don’t—I can’t speak for the age of the subordinates; subordinates
were under that. And that includes one director, as well, that is
above 50.”16
        As an initial matter, the trial court sustained the County’s
objections to the bulk of this evidence. Stark does not challenge
those evidentiary rulings on appeal, and he has therefore
forfeited review of those materials. (Frittelli, Inc. v. 350 North
Canon Drive, LP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 35, 41.)
        Even were that not the case, the evidence—which only
truly pertains to Stark’s age discrimination/retaliation claims—
was, in some cases, equivocal, and otherwise at most established
the declarants’ “subjective beliefs” that they were discriminated
against for their age, which does not “create a genuine issue of

      16 Although Stark alleges that Flanagan was himself
subject to age discrimination when he was terminated in 2017,
the deposition excerpt that Stark cites does not address
Flanagan’s termination, much less Flanagan’s age or position
with the Department.

                                 23
fact” in the absence of corroboration. (King v. United Parcel
Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433.) Stark presented
no such corroboration, whether in the form of statistics or other
context regarding the trends and practices of the Department
with respect to resignations and termination decisions. Thus,
Stark’s evidence was, at most, anecdotal, and therefore raised “at
best, only a weak suspicion that discrimination [or retaliation]”
motivated his termination, which is insufficient to withstand
summary judgment. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 369
[summary judgment proper despite plaintiff-employee’s inclusion
of further information regarding the pool of employees by which
to judge comparators allegedly subject to age discrimination,
reasoning that samples did not demonstrate statistically reliable
discriminatory pattern]; Gibbs v. Consolidated Services (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 794, 801 [similar].)
       In sum, Stark failed to present substantial evidence that
the County’s nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging him were
pretextual. (Husman, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1182.) We
therefore conclude summary adjudication of Stark’s disability
discrimination and retaliation for requesting/using
accommodations for disabilities, age discrimination, and
retaliation for opposing FEHA violations claims was proper.
(Collins v. Hertz Corp., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 76–77 &
fn. 6.) By extension, summary adjudication of Stark’s
“derivative” failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation
claims was also appropriate. (Featherstone v. Southern
California Permanente Medical Group, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1166; Glynn v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 56.)

                                24
C.     California Family Rights Act (CFRA) claims
       Next, Stark raises two claims related to his exercise of his
rights under the CFRA. We agree with the trial court that
summary adjudication of both claims was appropriate.
       “In 1991, the Legislature enacted the CFRA. (§ 12945.2.)
The CFRA, which is contained within the FEHA (§ 12900 et seq.),
‘is intended to give employees an opportunity to take [leave] from
work for certain personal or family medical reasons without
jeopardizing job security.’ [Citation.]
       “Generally, the CFRA makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer of 50 or more persons to refuse to grant
a request by an employee to take up to 12 workweeks in any 12-
month period for family care and medical leave. [Citation.] By
prohibiting ‘employment discrimination based upon family and
medical leave, the CFRA strengthens the FEHA’s general goal of
preventing the deleterious effects of employment discrimination,
and also furthers the CFRA’s specific goal of promoting stability
and economic security in California families.’ [Citation.]” (Faust
v. California Portland Cement Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 864,
878 (Faust).)17
       There are two types of actionable CFRA claims. An
“interference” claim is based on the employer’s interference with
an employee’s rights under the CFRA. (Faust, supra, 150
Cal.App.4th at p. 879.) Such a claim does not involve the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, but “ ‘simply

      17 The FMLA is the CFRA’s federal counterpart. To the
extent that they are not inconsistent with California law, the
federal regulations interpreting the FMLA have been
incorporated by reference into the CFRA. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2,
§ 11096.)

                                25
requires that the employer deny the employee’s entitlement to
[CFRA leave].’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       The second category of claims involves retaliation or
discrimination for exercising one’s CFRA rights. By contrast,
these claims implicate the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. (Faust, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 885.) To make
out a prima facie case of CFRA discrimination or retaliation, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant was a covered employer;
(2) the plaintiff was eligible for CFRA leave; (3) the plaintiff
exercised his or her right to take a qualifying leave; and (4) the
plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because he or
she exercised the right to take CFRA leave.” (Rogers v. County of
Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 480, 491, italics omitted.)
       Here, Stark has alleged separate causes of action for CFRA
interference18 and retaliation. Regarding the former, Stark
argues that he was “notified” he had exhausted his CFRA leave
when he had not, in fact, exhausted his leave. He further

      18 The second cause of action is formally denominated as a
“medical leave discrimination” cause of action, but factually
alleges that Stark was “discouraged … from taking and denied …
medical leave … in part by terminating [Stark’s] employment”
without mention of discrimination. We therefore construe the
purported “discrimination” cause of action as an interference
claim, just as the parties have at the summary judgment stage
and on appeal. (See, e.g., Comunidad en Accion v. Los Angeles
City Council (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1125 [substance of
allegations in pleading “delineates the scope of issues before a
court on summary judgment”].) However, to the extent Stark’s
complaint can be construed to also allege medical leave
discrimination, such a claim fails for the same reasons Stark’s
retaliation claim fails.

                                26
contends that he was terminated before his CFRA leave
completed and therefore he was denied the CFRA leave to which
he was entitled. These arguments are belied by the record. The
County’s summary judgment motion included documentary proof
conclusively establishing that none of Stark’s CFRA leave
requests in 2017 and 2018 were denied and that he exhausted his
FMLA leave before he was terminated. Stark points to no
contrary evidence in his reply brief. Because Stark was never
denied CFRA leave, summary adjudication of his CFRA
interference claim was appropriate. (Faust, supra, 150
Cal.App.4th at p. 879.)
       Stark’s CFRA retaliation claim fares no better. Stark
appears to suggest that he was terminated in retaliation for
exercising his rights to CFRA leave because of the “temporal
proximity” between the termination and his taking leave.
However, the authorities Stark cites for this proposition merely
establish that temporal proximity between a protected activity
and an adverse employment action may suffice to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation. (See, e.g., Morgan v. Regents of
University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69 [“ ‘ “causal
link” ’ ” essential to prima facie case can be demonstrated by
circumstantial evidence including “ ‘ “ ‘proximity in time between
the protected action and allegedly retaliatory employment
decision’ ” ’ ”].) Stark’s cases thus do not stand for the proposition
that temporal proximity alone suffices to withstand summary
adjudication under California law. Indeed, it is well established
that, while evidence of temporal proximity is relevant as to
pretext, it is not sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.
(Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 353; see

                                 27
Chen v. County of Orange (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 926, 931 [“[m]ere
sequence is not enough”].)
       Further, as the County notes, the investigation that led to
Stark’s termination preceded the injuries that undergird his
disability and medical leave-related claims. “Evidence that the
employer had been concerned about a problem before the
employee engaged in the protected activity undercuts the
significance of the temporal proximity.” (Smith v. Allen Health
Systems, Inc. (8th Cir. 2002) 302 F.3d 827, 834.)19 We also note
that the County was required to complete its investigation of
allegations of misconduct within one year under the Public Safety
Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) (§ 3304,
subd. (d)(1)). (Alameida v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 46, 60–63.) The notice of intent to discharge was
issued exactly one day before the one-year mark after the
incident, strongly suggesting that it was the incident—and not
Stark’s disability or resulting leave—that motivated the decision
to terminate his employment. For these reasons and the several
other reasons articulated in the preceding section, Stark failed to
present substantial evidence that his termination for misconduct
was merely a pretext for retaliating against him for exercising his
CFRA rights.20

      19 This logic applies equally to Stark’s disability
discrimination and retaliation claims discussed in the preceding
section. (See, e.g., King v. United Parcel Service, Inc., supra, 152
Cal.App.4th at p. 436 [pretext claim is undercut by the fact that
dispute preceded disability in time].)

       The parties dispute whether the County’s decisionmaker
      20

was aware of his medical leave and/or whether such knowledge

                                 28
        Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary
adjudication of Stark’s CFRA interference and retaliation claims.
D.      Failure to engage in the interactive process and
        failure to reasonably accommodate
        We next assess whether the trial court properly granted
summary adjudication as to Stark’s further FEHA-based claims
that the County failed to reasonably accommodate his disability
and failed to engage in the interactive process. We conclude that
it did.
        “Under section 12940, it is an unlawful employment
practice ‘to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known
physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee’ unless
the employer demonstrates doing so would impose an undue
hardship. (§ 12940, subd. (m).) The essential elements of a
failure to accommodate claim are: (1) the plaintiff has a
disability covered by the FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified
individual (i.e., he or she can perform the essential functions of
the position [with accommodation]); and (3) the employer failed to
reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability.” (Wilson v.
County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1192.) “A
reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment to the
work environment that enables the employee to perform the
essential functions of the job he or she holds or desires.” (Nealy v.
City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 373.)
        Section 12940, subdivision (n) imposes an additional and
“separate” duty on employers to engage in an interactive process

can be legally imputed to them. Our conclusions assume for
argument’s sake that the County’s decisionmaker was aware of
his medical leave.

                                 29
regarding reasonable accommodations. (Scotch v. Art Institute of
California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1003.) That provision
establishes that it is an unlawful practice for an employer “to fail
to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the
employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations,
if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by
an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability or
known medical condition.” (§ 12940, subd. (n).)
       Stark’s argument as to both of these claims is virtually
identical, namely that the County’s decision to terminate him
prior to the conclusion of his medical leave constituted a failure
to reasonably accommodate his disability and engage in the
interactive process. We disagree.
       At the outset, we note that Stark has not identified a
reasonable accommodation that would have been available to him
during the interactive process. (See, e.g., Nealy v. City of Santa
Monica, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 379 [employee must
specifically identify available reasonable accommodation at
summary judgment stage].) To the extent that the reasonable
accommodation was remaining in his position, the County
sufficiently demonstrated that such an accommodation was not
reasonable because Stark’s misconduct rendered him unable to
perform the essential duties of his position. (See Wilkin v.
Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 806, 829 [being placed on medical leave instead of
discharge for misconduct is not reasonable accommodation under
California law; “ ‘[s]ince reasonable accommodation is always
prospective, an employer is not required to excuse past
misconduct even if it is the result of the individual’s disability’ ”].)
Stark’s process-based claim fails for the same reason. Because

                                  30
the misconduct that led to his termination occurred well before
his disability and accommodation requests, “[n]o reasonable
accommodation could have cured those violations at that point.”
(Id. at p. 830 [rejecting failure to engage in interactive process
claim].)
       For these reasons, the trial court did not err in summarily
adjudicating Stark’s reasonable accommodation and interactive
process causes of action in favor of the County.
E.     Whistleblower retaliation
       We turn finally to Stark’s sole non-FEHA claim for
whistleblower retaliation (Lab. Code, §§ 1102.5 & 1102.6). The
County contends—and we agree—that summary adjudication of
this claim was appropriate because Stark failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
       “ ‘The Government Claims Act (§ 810 et seq.) “establishes
certain conditions precedent to the filing of a lawsuit against a
public entity. As relevant here, a plaintiff must timely file a
claim for money or damages with the public entity. (§ 911.2.)
The failure to do so bars the plaintiff from bringing suit against
that entity. (§ 945.4.)” [Citation.]’ ” (J.J. v. County of San Diego
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219.)
       “Where a claimant has attempted to comply with the claim
requirements but the claim is deficient in some way, the doctrine
of substantial compliance may validate the claim ‘if it
substantially complies with all of the statutory requirements …
even though it is technically deficient in one or more particulars.’
[Citation.] ‘The doctrine is based on the premise that substantial
compliance fulfills the purpose of the claims statutes, namely, to
give the public entity timely notice of the nature of the claim so
that it may investigate and settle those having merit without

                                 31
litigation.’ ” (Connelly v. County of Fresno (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th
29, 38, quoting Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education
(1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 713.) Nonetheless, this doctrine
“cannot cure the total omission of an essential element from the
claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully with
the statute.” (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189
Cal.App.3d 27, 37; Loehr v. Ventura County Community College
Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1083.)
       Furthermore, under section 911.2, subdivision (a), “[c]laims
for personal injury must be presented not later than six months
after the accrual of the cause of action, and claims relating to any
other cause of action must be filed within one year of the accrual
of the cause of action.” (California Restaurant Management
Systems v. City of San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1581, 1591.)
“ ‘Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural
requirement, but is a condition precedent to the claimant’s ability
to maintain an action against the public entity. [Citation.] “Only
after the public entity’s board has acted upon or is deemed to
have rejected the claim may the injured person bring a lawsuit
alleging a cause of action in tort against the public entity.”
[Citation.]’ ” (J.J. v. County of San Diego, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1219.) “ ‘The failure to timely present a claim to the public
entity bars the claimant from filing a lawsuit against that public
entity. [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.) “Accrual for purposes of the Act is
the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of
limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants.”
(Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1118.)
       Here, Stark acknowledges he did not file a claim with the
County, but contends that his DFEH complaint substantially
complied with the Government Claims Act. Stark cites no

                                32
authority for the proposition that a DFEH complaint may suffice
to exhaust administrative remedies under section 911.2. In fact,
several cases suggest otherwise. (See, e.g., Olson v. Palm Drive
Hosp. (N.D.Cal. Feb. 10, 2012, Civ. A. No. C-11-4606 MMC) 2012
U.S.Dist. Lexis 16564, *7–9 [collecting cases].)
       Even were that not the case, as the County further argues,
Stark’s DFEH complaint was filed on November 1, 2019, more
than six months after Stark’s November 27, 2018 discharge, and
was therefore untimely. (§ 911.2, subd. (a); see Le Mere v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 246
[section 911.2, subdivision (a)’s six-month presentation
requirement applies to Labor Code violation].)21 Stark does not
argue otherwise in his reply brief.
       We therefore discern no error in the trial court’s summary
adjudication of Stark’s whistleblower retaliation claim.

      21 Because Stark sought noneconomic damages in the form
of “past and future emotional distress,” the six-month deadline
applicable to personal injury claims applies here. (Willis v. City
of Carlsbad, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1118 & fn. 9.)

                                33
                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their
own costs.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           HEIDEL, J.*

We concur:

                  LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                  EGERTON, J.

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

                                34