Court Opinion

ID: 9546718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:34:33.865798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:48.429721
License: Public Domain

*891ZIMMERMAN, Justice,
concurring in result:
I join in reversing and remanding so that plaintiff Williams can have a fair opportunity to present evidence both on the question of whether he had a good defense to the initial suit and on damages. However, I depart to a degree from Justice Howe as to the basis for that result.
Justice Howe goes to great lengths in an attempt to show that the motion for partial summary judgment granted by the trial judge did not reach all issues of liability and that the judge did not decide whether Williams had a good defense to the initial suit in which defendant Barber committed malpractice. I take exception to this approach on two grounds. First, I conclude that the partial summary judgment was intended to dispose of all the elements of the malpractice cause of action. But second, and more importantly, we do not need to reach the issue — much less obscure the law in this area with strained reasoning— because the trial judge was not bound to adhere to his ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment.
Let me explain. I think that William’s motion for partial summary judgment as granted by the trial court included a finding that there was a meritorious defense to the underlying suit. Such a finding is an element of the cause of action and must be determined before liability is established. Despite Justice Howe’s suggestion, nothing indicates that the motion for partial summary judgment was limited to the question of whether Barber was negligent, without regard to whether that negligence caused Barber to incur any liability to Williams, nor is there any indication that at the time the motion was granted, the judge intended to so limit his ruling. And nothing in the law or the facts of this case persuades me that we should take the step of reading a partial summary judgment on the issue of “liability” to exclude a finding on one of the elements of the substantive cause of action.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it appears to me that we need not reach any of this. The partial summary judgment granted by the trial judge on the liability issue was, by the terms of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), interlocutory in character. See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). Interlocutory orders are, by definition, alterable at any time by the trial judge. See, e.g., Jensen v. Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 24, 447 P.2d 906, 906 (1968); In re Blalock, 233 N.C. 493, 508, 64 S.E.2d 848, 858 (1951). In this case, the trial judge had granted a partial summary judgment on all aspects of Barber’s liability for legal malpractice. Apparently, during trial the judge changed his mind and concluded that Williams had not shown that he had a good defense on the merits of the first civil action in which the malpractice was committed. Such a change of mind was entirely within the trial judge’s power under rule 56(c). However, he did not give counsel adequate notice of his change of mind. As a consequence, Williams’ counsel was caught by surprise and, as Justice Howe concludes, Williams was unfairly prejudiced because his counsel was unprepared to proceed on that element. A remand for further proceedings on this point is therefore merited.
For the foregoing reasons, I join in reversing and remanding to the trial court for further proceedings.
HALL, C.J., concurs in the concurring opinion of Justice ZIMMERMAN.