Court Opinion

ID: 996855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:56:45.798364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:35:31.264179
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 98-4273

DAVID STINNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
 Graham C. Mullen, District Judge.
(CR-96-142-MU)

Submitted: October 20, 1998

Decided: November 12, 1998

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Randolph Marshall Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Brian Lee Whisler, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTOR-
NEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

David Stinnett appeals from the district court judgment sentencing
him for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distrib-
ute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1994). His
attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), addressing whether the district court erred in refus-
ing to depart more than it did from the sentencing range prescribed
in the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1997). Counsel
asserts that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Stinnett was
informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, which he
failed to file. Because our review of the entire record reveals no
reversible error, we affirm.

At sentencing the district court granted Stinnett a downward depar-
ture for substantial assistance in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1
(1997) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994).* Stinnett does not contend
that the district court erroneously refused to depart on any other basis,
but merely claims that the district court should have further departed
below the statutory minimum and applicable Guideline range.
Because the district court understood its discretionary authority to
depart, Stinnett is foreclosed from challenging the court's refusal to
depart more than it did. See United States v. Hill, 70 F.3d 321, 324-
25 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding defendant generally may not appeal extent
of downward departure).

In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire record in
this case and find no reversible error. We therefore affirm Stinnett's
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client in writing
of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for fur-
ther review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. See
Local Rule 46(d). Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof
_________________________________________________________________
*The departure reduced Stinnett's sentencing range from fifty-seven to
seventy-one months to thirty to thirty-seven months. The district court
then sentenced Stinnett to thirty months imprisonment.

                     2
was served on the client. See id. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court, and oral argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3