Court Opinion

ID: 9630023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:57:49.401901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:29.860230
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join Part I of the majority opinion after reconsideration of our analysis at division. See Quattlebaum v. Kelly, 648 A.2d 950, 954-57 (D.C.1994), vacated, 656 A.2d 728 (D.C. 1995). I also join the part of the disposition in Part III that reinstates the division opinion on the notice issue and remands for further trial court consideration as specified by the division. See id., 648 A.2d at 957-58 & n. 19. I respectfully dissent, however, from Part II of the majority opinion that treats the claimed procedural violation. As I see it, in 1991 the Council of the District of Columbia unlawfully reduced AFDC benefits by reinstating 1989 payment levels without first reassessing the recipients’ “minimum needs,” as D.C.Code § 3-205.44(b) (1994) required.
I. Procedural Requirement of D.C.Code § 3-205.44(b)

The Council’s Required Assessment of “Minimum Needs” Before Reduction of AFDC Benefits

Because the focus of en banc rehearing was the food stamp issue on which the division rested its decision, the court has not adequately considered the other argument that appellants have presented to demonstrate why the Council unlawfully reduced AFDC benefits in 1991: the failure to reassess recipients’ “minimum needs” before doing so. I believe that appellants’ argument here is compelling and thus mandates reversal on this alternative ground.

*891
Congressional Enactment of the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act of 1962

In adopting the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act of 1962, Pub.L. 87-807, 76 Stat. 914, Congress provided in section 5:
(a) The amount of public assistance which any person shall receive shall be determined in accordance with regulations approved by the Commissioners.
(b) Such amount as referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall not be less than the full amount determined as necessary on the basis of the minimum needs of such person as established in accordance with such regulations.
(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall become effective upon enactment.
D.C.Code § 3-204 (1967) (emphasis added).1 Under this regime the District of Columbia’s so-called state plan for public assistance provided benefits until 1970 covering the “full amount” of the recipients’ “minimum needs,” id., established with reference to relevant cost of living indices.2

1967-69: Congressional Adoption of Social Security Act Amendments

The “full amount” principle was not to last. See supra note 2. “In 1967, Congress amended the Social Security Act to require all states to update by July 1, 1969, the standards for assistance to recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to reflect the cost of living then current. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1970). See also 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(ii) (1970).” Junghans v. Department of Human Resources, 289 A.2d 17, 20 (D.C.1972) (footnote and emphasis omitted).3 This amendment provided that
by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established, and any máximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23). The amendment reflected a political compromise. The Johnson Administration initially had proposed legislation that would require the states (1) to establish standards for determining need reflecting the cost of living as of January 1, 1967; (2) to implement a plan that — like the one in the District of Columbia — would meet “all the need[s]” so established; and (3) effective July 1,1968, to provide for the annual updating of these standards by reference to “changes in living costs.” Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 410, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1217, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). Both the House and the Senate balked, however, resulting in an amendment — § 402(a)(23), see supra note 3 — that required the states and the District of Columbia to update the minimum “needs of individuals” to reflect July 1, 1969 “living costs,” but allowed the states and the District to establish “máximums” short of those *892needs (provided any previously established máximums were “proportionately adjusted” to reflect increased living costs as of July 1, 1969).

1969-70: Congressional Waiver of the District’s “Full Amount” Requirement

Consistent with this legislation Congress, in its 1970 appropriations act for the District of Columbia, Pub.L. 91-155, 83 Stat. 433 (Dee. 24, 1969) — and in every appropriations act thereafter — waived the provision of D.C.Code § 3-204(b) (quoted above) that required the District to pay AFDC benefits in the “full amount ... of the minimum needs.”4 Instead, Congress appropriated funds to pay welfare benefits at 85% of minimum needs. See H.Rep. No. 91-680, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1969). Furthermore, presumably in response to the congressional waiver, beginning in 1970 the District’s Commissioners adopted regulations authorizing public assistance payment levels to fall below the “full amount[s]” required by D.C.Code § 3-204 (1967). See supra notes 2 and 4.

1970: Rosado v. Wyman

In the meantime, a class of welfare recipients in New York had filed suit — Rosado v. Wyman — challenging AFDC cutbacks as violations of the Social Security Act amendments, in particular § 402(a)(23), see supra note 3, that required updating of standards of assistance and payment levels by July 1, 1969. The Supreme Court eventually held that New York had “impermissibly lowered its standard of need by eliminating items that were included prior to the enactment of § 402(a)(23).” Rosado, 397 U.S. at 416, 90 S.Ct. at 1219. But in arriving at that result, the Court had to construe a provision it did not consider clear.
The background of § 402(a)(23) reveals little except that we have before us a child born of the silent union of legislative compromise. Thus, Congress, as it frequently does, has voiced its wishes in muted strains and left it to the courts to discern *893the theme in the cacophony of political understanding. Our chief resources in this undertaking are the words of the statute and those common-sense assumptions that must be made in determining direction without a compass.
Rosado, 397 U.S. at 412, 90 S.Ct. at 1218. The Court then concluded that, in order to enact welfare benefits consistent with § 402(a)(23), the states (and the District) first had to establish the recipients’ minimum needs. A second, separate exercise was required to determine appropriate payment levels in light of those needs. More specifically, according to the Court:
Reverting to the language of § 402(a)(23) we find two separate mandates: first, the States must re-evaluate the component factors that compose their need equation; and, second, any “máxi-mums” must be adjusted.
We think two broad purposes may be ascribed to § 402(a)(23): First, to require States to face up realistically to the magnitude of the public assistance requirement and lay bare the extent to which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual needsecond, to prod the States to apportion their payments on a more equitable basis. Consistent with this interpretation of § 102(a) (23), a State may, after recomputing its standard of need, pare down payments to accommodate budgetary realities by reducing the percent of benefits paid or switching to a percent reduction system, but it may not obscure the actual standard of need.
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡
In § 402(a)(23) Congress has spoken in favor of increases in AFDC payments. While Congress rejected the mandatory adjustment provision in the administration bill, it embodied in legislation the cost-of-living exercise which has both practical and political consequences.
It has the effect of requiring the State to recognize and accept the responsibility for those additional individuals whose income falls short of the standard of need as computed in light of economic realities and to place them among those eligible for the care and training provisions. Secondly, while it leaves the States free to effect downward adjustments in the level of benefits paid, it accomplishes within that framework the goal, however modest, of forcing a State to accept the political consequence of such a cutback and bringing to light the true extent to which actual assistance falls short of the minimum acceptable. Lastly, by imposing on those States that desire to maintain “máximums” the requirement of an appropriate adjustment, Congress has introduced an incentive to abandon a flat “maximum” system, thereby encouraging those States desirous of containing their welfare budget to shift to a percentage system that will more equitably apportion those funds in fact allocated for welfare and also more accurately reflect the real measure of public assistance being given.
Id. at 412-14, 90 S.Ct. at 1218-19 (emphasis added).
In holding that New York had “impermis-sibly lowered its standard of need,” id. at 416, 90 S.Ct. at 1219, the Court stressed the importance of the state’s separate analysis of minimum needs as the predicate for setting payment levels.
Section 402(a)(23) invalidates any state program that substantially alters the content of the standard of need in such a way that it is less than it was prior to the enactment of § 402(a)(23), unless a State can demonstrate that the items formerly included no longer constituted part of the reality of existence for the majority of welfare recipients.
Id. at 419, 90 S.Ct. at 1221.
In sum, Rosado confirmed that (1) a state’s standards reflecting the minimum “needs of individuals” for public assistance must be separately “adjusted to reflect fully” the cost of living as of July 1, 1969, and that (2) a state’s previously existing “maximum[ ]” payment levels that fall short of meeting those mínimums must be “proportionally adjusted” upward as a second step. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23). This particular legislation and the Rosado Court’s ruling were limited to July 1, 1969 minimum needs and payment levels, but the two-step procedure was de*894scribed as inherent in the benefit-setting process. The Supreme Court therefore made clear that establishment of minimum needs and creation of payment levels are always separate exercises. Of equal significance, Rosado confirmed the lower courts’ responsibility to enforce the law against any state that violates Social Security Act requirements governing the AFDC program.

1982 and 1991: District Council’s Enactment and Reaffirmation of the Public Assistance Act of 1982, Particularly D.C.Code § 3-205.U

As I have noted, as early as 1962 the District of Columbia Code, unlike the law of New York adjudicated in Rosado, has provided for AFDC benefit levels that fully match the minimum needs established by the Council, even as those needs increase beyond the July 1, 1969 levels established as the mind-mum “needs of individuals” pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23). Indeed, the eongressionally enacted D.C.Code § 3-204 quoted at the outset of this opinion — adopted as part of the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act of 1962, Pub.L. 87-807, 76 Stat. 914 — remained on the books until 1982, when the Council of the District of Columbia reenacted it virtually verbatim in the Public Assistance Act of 1982, D.C.Law 4-101, § 544, 29 DCR 1060 (April 6, 1982). Presently, it is codified as D.C.Code § 3-205.44 (1994):
(a) The amount of public assistance which any person shall receive shall be determined by the Council.
(b) Such amount as referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall not be less than the full amount determined as necessary on the basis of the minimum needs of such person as established by the Council.
More recently, in § 505a of the Public Assistance Act of 1982 Budget Conformity Amendment Act of 1991 (“1991 Act”) — the Act at issue in this case — the Council expressly reaffirmed § 3-205.44 by incorporating it into a new program of General Assistance for Children. See D.C.Code § 3-205.5a(e) (1994).
Interestingly, in this 1982 Act the Council incorporated standards of assistance, coupled with lower payment levels, just as the local regulations had earlier. See Public Assistance Act of 1982, D.C.Law 4-108, § 3, 29 DCR 1413 (May 19, 1982), presently codified at D.C.Code § 3-205.52 (1994); supra notes 2 and 4.5 Accordingly, the D.C.Code began to incorporate ostensibly inconsistent provisions: one calling for payments in the “full amount” of “minimum needs” (§ 3-205.44), the other permitting “payment levels” lower than the mínimums indicated by the prescribed “standards of assistance” (§ 3-205.52).

Issue Presented: How to Reconcile D.C.Code § 3-205.U With Annual Congressional Appropriations Acts Purporting to Waive It, and With D.C.Code § 3-205.52 Prescribing Payment Levels Lower than the Standards of Assistance

Despite the continuity between Congress’s enactment of § 3-204 and the Council’s adoption of its successor, § 3-205.44 — both having the “full amount” requirement — we have seen that for every fiscal year beginning with 1970, Congress has placed language in its appropriations acts for the District providing that appropriations shall be available for the payment of public assistance without reference to the “requirement” of § 3-205.44(b). See supra note 4. Other provisions of local regulations and the D.C.Code have reflected this relaxation of the “full amount” principle in § 3-205.44(b). The question, then, is how § 3-205.44(b) fits with appropriations acts that purport to waive it and with D.C.Code provisions that are inconsistent with it. More precisely, does § 3-205.44 — despite the District’s appropriations acts and Code provisions that limit its application — retain vitality which should have affected the Council’s 1991 legislation that effectively reduced AFDC benefits to 1989 levels without reassessing minimum needs?

*895
The Parties’ Contentions

Appellants contend, the trial court agrees, and none of my colleagues disputes that § 3-205.44(b) incorporates two obligations the Council imposed on itself in adopting the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act of 1982: to assess “the minimum needs” of persons eligible for public assistance, and to set benefit payment levels at the “full amount” of those needs. The first has been called a “procedural” requirement, the second a “substantive” requirement. These requirements reflect the two components — the two legislative exercises — the Supreme Court in Rosado identified in § 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23). This court itself, in fact, has said as much. In 1972, while the Council and the Mayor-Commissioner were administering the AFDC statute adopted by Congress, we noted in dictum the separateness of setting minimum needs and the ensuing payment levels:
The substantive legal issue [not reached] ... servefs] to point up how important are the decisions by the Council and the Commissioner 1 to fix a welfare payment formula and 2 to establish a public assistance standard of need. When called upon to review their actions, we are mindful, too, that the Supreme Court has ascribed to the Congress an intention to require each state, including the District, “to face up realistically to the magnitude of the public assistance requirement and lay bare the extent to which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual need,” and to “paying the political consequences of such disclosure.”
Junghans, 289 A.2d at 22 (quoting Rosado, 397 U.S. at 412-13, 90 S.Ct. at 1218).
Appellants acknowledge that, through the District’s appropriations acts, Congress annually has waived the Council’s substantive obligation under § 3-205.44(b) to pay AFDC benefits in the “full amount” required by the recipients’ “minimum needs.” But appellants argue that elimination of this substantive obligation does not affect the procedural requirement and, indeed, makes that procedure — that reassessment of “minimum needs” — all the more significant for an obvious reason: if benefit “payment levels” are to fall below “minimum needs,” then it is especially important to assess exactly what those minimum needs are so that the Council members clearly understand, and face up to, just how far below those needs they are willing to permit AFDC payments to fall. See Rosado, 397 U.S. at 413, 90 S.Ct. at 1218; Junghans, 289 A.2d at 22.
The District replies that, because each annual appropriations act permits AFDC payments “without reference to the requirement of § 3-205.44” (emphasis added), see supra note 4, this use of the singular negates any two-requirement interpretation, and thus eliminates any sound basis for identifying a separate “procedural” requirement in § 3-205.44(b).

Three Reasons Why D.C.Code § 3-205.44 Mandates Reassessment of “Minimum Needs” Before the Council Can Lawfully Reduce AFDC Payment Levels Under D.C.Code § 3-205.52

Contrary to the District’s contention, I agree with appellants and the trial court that § 3-205.44(b) includes a procedural requirement that is wholly separate from the substantive requirement, and that the annual congressional appropriations act waives the latter without affecting the former. In the first place, D.C.Code §§ 3-205.44 and 205.52 are District of Columbia statutory provisions that implement § 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23). The first calls for determination of “minimum needs” and for payments of “not ... less than the full amount” so determined; the second actually establishes those minimum needs, called “standards of assistance,” as well as “payment levels” reflecting a percentage of those standards. Accordingly, these provisions reflect the “two separate mandates,” Rosado, 397 U.S. at 412, 90 S.Ct. at 1218; see Junghans, 289 A.2d at 22, required for establishment of AFDC benefits. As to the second mandate, however, the payment level, § 3-205.44(b) (“full amount”) and § 3-205.52(c) (percentage approach) are inconsistent with each other — the latter apparently being in*896tended to reflect the ongoing appropriations act waiver. See supra note 4.6
As we recognized in Junghans, no one can seriously dispute that, after Rosado, D.C.Code § 3-205.44 mandates the two requirements which the parties to this litigation have called procedural (establishing “minimum needs”) and substantive (setting “payment levels”), respectively. This two-requirement analysis can be illustrated by the fact that the Council, in 1982, enacted § 3-205.44 (in effect reenacting the previous D.C.Code § 3-204) despite full awareness that Congress routinely waived that “requirement” in the annual appropriations act, see supra note 4, and that local regulations reflected the waiver. The Council, in fact, expressly incorporated § 3-205.44 by reference, once again, in provisions of the 1991 Act establishing a new program of General Assistance for Children. These 1982 and 1991 actions may mean, in part, that the Council wished to keep the “full amount” norm of § 3-205.44 in place, despite the failure to implement it since at least 1970. But it has to mean more. For there to be any real purpose in keeping § 3-205.44(b) on the books, in light of its substantive inconsistency with congressional waivers and with § 3-205.52(c) payment schedules, one can only infer that the Council has continued to rely on § 3-205.44(b) to preserve the procedural requirement — the first Rosado obligation — to reassess “minimum needs” before payment levels are adjusted.
In Rosado the Supreme Court stressed that “the courts should construe all legislative enactments to give them some meaning.” Id., 397 U.S. at 415, 90 S.Ct. at 1219. Keeping that admonition in mind, I conclude that, in view of 25 years of congressional waiver of § 3-205.44(b) in the annual appropriations act, the Council’s 1982 enactment and 1991 reaffirmation of § 3-205.44 have to mean something more than adoption and confirmation of a meaningless norm that is inconsistent with other statutory provisions enacted by Congress and the Council itself. This is especially true because the Council has continued to recognize the validity of § 3-205.44 by actually assessing minimum needs from time to time as Rosado requires (more later) while at the same time regularly (1) adopting lower statutory payment levels and (2) initiating the financial waiver of § 3-205.44 through the annual budget request acts submitted to Congress.7
There is a second reason why the procedural requirement of § 3-202.44 survives. In addition to the Council’s own affirmation of a two-step Rosado obligation under § 3-205.44, the annual congressional waiver of § 3-205.44 itself has always been limited to payment levels; nothing in that legislation purports to compromise the Council’s adoption of the § 3-205.44 procedural (“minimum need”) requirement. According to the trial court — and I agree—
[t]he legislative history of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1969 (the first to suspend part of what is now § 3-205.44) demonstrates that Congress intended only to permit the District to pay less than the full amount of the standard of assistance. See H.Rep. No. 91-680, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1969) (“[l]anguage has been included in the bill ... to permit paying less than 100 percent as required by ... [the D.C.Code]. Limited revenue in the District has influenced the modified position of paying only 85 percent.”). The language of the 1969 Act is identical to the language of The District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1990 which provides that appropriations “shall be available ... without reference to ... [D.C.Code § 3-*897205.44].” There is nothing in the legislative history of the 1990 act which indicates that congress intended to go farther and this time to repeal the procedural requirement of D.C.Code § 3-205.il.
Quattlebaum v. Dixon, 120 D.W.L.R. 1925, 1930 (Sept. 9,1992) (emphasis added).
Finally, in the past the District has routinely honored the two requirements of § 3-205.44 and thereby demonstrated its own understanding of the law: that a minimum needs assessment must precede a change in benefit levels. In 1979 and in 1982, for example, the Council established a “100% Scale Standard of Assistan[ce]” based on the February 1977 Cost of Living Index and the February 1981 Consumer Price Index, respectively, and then created a lesser “Current Payment Level” as to each. See Public Assistance Payments Act of 1979, D.C.Law 3-3, § 2, 25 DCR 9639, 10876 (June 7,1979); Part IVA.., District of Columbia AFDC State Plan § 2, TN # 79-4 (July 1, 1979); Public Assistance Act of 1982, D.C.Law 4-108, § 3, 29 DCR 1413 (May 19, 1982), codified at D.C.Code § 3-205.52 (1984 Supp.); Part IV. A, District of Columbia AFDC State Plan, § 2, TN #82-1 (Feb. 1, 1982). Again in 1984 the Council raised the standards of assistance by reference to the February 1983 cost of living index, with corresponding increases in payment levels that remained below the standards of assistance (minimum needs). See Public Assistance Payments Increase Act of 1984, D.C.Law 5-100, § 2, 31 DCR 2896 (Aug. 10, 1984), codified at D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) (1985 Supp.). Finally, in 1986, the last time payment levels were adjusted, the Council separately reassessed minimum needs “based on the February 1985 cost of living index.” Public Assistance Amendments Act of 1986, D.C.Law 6-124, § 2(c), 33 DCR 2940, 2942 (June 25, 1986), codified at D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) (1987 Supp.); see id § 3-205.52 (1994 Supp.). The Council’s own practice, therefore, illustrates and validates the survival of the procedural (“minimum needs”) requirement despite the appropriations process. There obviously is no inconsistency between an appropriations act waiving the “full amount” requirement of § 3-205.44 and the Council’s continuing to honor Rosado’s procedural (assessment of “minimum needs”) requirement before approving a lesser amount — as the 1986 actions by Congress and Council respectively demonstrate.
The District’s argument that § 3-205.44 contains only one, substantive requirement, as evidenced by the appropriations acts’ routine references to that “requirement” in the singular, see supra note 4, is unpersuasive. Although purporting to be a “plain language” argument, it ignores the fact that a “requirement” can contain more than one element. But even more to the point, the appropriations act language dates back to 1969, see supra note 4, before Rosado made clear— and legally essential — that AFDC determinations involve two separate kinds of calculations. The fact that the boilerplate waiver language has remained the same after Rosa-do, therefore, indicates only that the Rosado issue never arose in the District of Columbia until the present case has revealed that the § 3-205.44 “requirement” is a big one, with two components.
In sum, (1) the Council enacted § 3-205.44 in 1982 and expressly reaffirmed that provision as recently as the 1991 Act itself, despite years of annual appropriations act waivers by Congress and of local statutory reductions of payment levels below the “full amount” required to meet “minimum needs”; (2) the legislative history indicates that the annual appropriations act waiver applies only to payment levels; and (3) the Council has routinely followed the practice of reassessing minimum needs as it did, for example, in 1979, 1982, 1984, and 1986. These developments combine to convince me that the so-called procedural requirement of § 3-205.44(b), derived from Rosado, has survived the congressional appropriations and local legislative processes.
II. Council’s Failure To Comply With § 3-205.44(b) Procedural Requirement in 1991

The En Banc Majority’s Position and Summary of Its Defects

In its haste to deal with a fiscal crisis in 1991, the Council simply ignored a legal requirement that Congress, and then the Coun*898cil itself, had enacted to assure that minimum needs are calculated — and carefully considered — before a reduction of AFDC payment levels. No one disputes that the Council failed to assess minimum needs expressly before passage of the 1991 Act. The trial court itself noted that, “during the roughly 36 hours of hearings, meeting[s], and budget debates on the Act, only 26 minutes of those events touched on AFDC benefits.” Quattlebaum v. Kelly, 170 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 1925, 1930 (1992). None of that time was spent on minimum needs.
The en banc majority — employing an analysis neither raised in the trial court nor argued on appeal — opines that the Council in fact can be said to have reassessed minimum needs in 1991 because, as far back as 1986, the Council had added an annual cost of living increase in “payment levels” to the same legislative package in which the Council had expressly reassessed minimum needs (“standards of assistance”). According to the majority, therefore, over the ensuing years “[t]he ratio has thus been maintained between the needs of recipients in real dollars and the District’s willingness to fund those needs.” Ante at 17-18. I gather this means the majority believes that in 1991, before reducing AFDC payment levels, the Council realized, and thus implicitly decided, that minimum needs had in fact increased at the same CPI rate that payment levels had increased since 1986, even though the detailed “standards of assistance” (minimum needs) in § 3-205.52(c), as formally revised in 1986, had remained unchanged in the statute itself.
There are four problems with the majority position: First, in 1986, when expressly increasing minimum needs and AFDC payment levels in § 3-205.52(c) over those established in 1984 — and then legislating automatic annual increases in payment levels by amending § 3-205.52(d) to incorporate the Consumer Price Index (CPI) — the Council did not address recalculation of minimum needs in the future. The Council in 1986, therefore, cannot be said to have repealed its traditional ad hoc approach to reassessment of minimum needs under §§ 3-205.44 and 3-205.52(c), reflecting Rosado’s procedural requirement. Second, in 1991, in amending § 3-205.52(d) to reduce AFDC payment levels to those used in 1989 (as well as to suspend future CPI increases in payment levels until 1993), the Council neither expressly nor impliedly amended the procedural requirement of § 3-205.44 and the related “standards of assistance” (minimum needs) in § 3-205.52(c). Third, increases in minimum needs, as defined in the § 3-205.52(c) “standards of assistance,” are not necessarily reflected in automatic CPI increases in AFDC payment levels; the Council’s employment of the CPI to calculate annual payment increases does not inherently reflect annual increases in statutory minimum needs. Finally, the majority’s automatic cost-of-living increase approach to minimum needs does not, in any event, satisfy the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rosado.

Statutory History of D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) and (d) from. 198k

In order to make clear why the foregoing analysis — not the majority’s — is correct, I believe it is important to lay out the statutory history in some detail.
In 1984, the Council increased AFDC “standards of assistance” (minimum needs) and corresponding AFDC “payment levels” as follows:
(c) The standards of assistance, based on the February, 1983 cost-of-living index, are set forth in the following table and include basic costs of food, clothing, shelter, household and personal items, certain transportation costs, and life insurance when paid by the Mayor.
[[Image here]]
(d) The table set forth in this section shall be used for all payments and eligibility determinations made after September 30, 1984.
Public Assistance Payments Increase Act of 1984, D.C.Law 5-100, § 2, 31 DCR 2896 *899(Aug. 10, 1984), codified at D.C.Code § 3-205.52(e) and (d) (1985 Supp.).
The law remained unchanged in 1985. See D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) and (d) (1986 Supp.).
In February 1986, the Mayor signed the Council’s temporary legislation again increasing minimum needs and payment levels:
(e) The standards of assistance, based on the February 1985 cost of living index, are set forth in the following table and include basic costs of food, clothing, shelter, household and personal items, certain transportation costs, and life insurance when paid by the Mayor.
[[Image here]]
(f) The table set forth in subsection (e) of this section shall be used for all payments and eligibility determinations made after March 31,1986.
Public Assistance Payments Increase Temporary Act of 1986, D.C.Law 6-106, § 2(e) and (f), 33 DCR 1165 (Feb. 14, 1986); see D.C.Code § 3-205.52 (1987 Supp.) (annotation: “temporary amendment of section”).
Soon thereafter the Council considered proposed amendments to the temporary legislation that increased the scheduled payment levels even further and provided thereafter for annual increases in payment levels determined by reference to the percentage increase, if any, in the U.S. Department of Labor “consumer price index for urban consumers for all items” (hereafter “all items” CPI).8 See Bill 6-280, “Automatic Cost of Living Increase for Public Assistance Grants Act of 1985,” referred to in Committee Report on Bill 6-379, Public Assistance Amendments Act of 1986 (Feb. 27, 1986). These amendments were adopted as part of the Council’s permanent legislation, subsections (e) and (d), which renumbered and amended the temporary legislation, D.C.Law 6-106, § 2(e) and (f), as follows (in relevant part):
(c) The standards of assistance, based on the February 1985 cost of living index, are set forth in the following table and include basic costs of food, clothing, shelter, household and personal items, certain transportation costs, and life insurance when paid by the Mayor.
[[Image here]]
(d) The table set forth in subsection (c) of this section shall be used for the fiscal year beginning October 1, 1986. On or before January 31st of each year, beginning January 31, 1987, the Mayor shall calculate and submit to the Council a de*900termination of the percentage increase, during the preceding calendar year, in the consumer price index for urban consumers for all items, as published by the United States Department of Labor (“Consumer Price Index”). The level of public assistance payments for assistance units set forth in subsection (c) of this section shall be increased annually as of October 1st of each year, beginning with October 1, 1987, by an amount equal to the percentage increase, if any, in the consumer price increase as determined by the Mayor. The Mayor shall publish notice of this annual increase in public assistance payments in the D.C. Register within 30 days of the increase. The increase in public assistance payments provided by this subsection shall be in addition to any other increase in public assistance payments otherwise provided by law....
Public Assistance Amendments Act of 1986, D.C.Law 6-124, § 2(c) and (d), 33 DCR 2940, 2943 (June 25, 1986), codified at D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) and (d) (1987 Supp.) (emphasis added).
The statute remained the same until 1991, although AFDC payment levels increased each year in accord with the “all items” CPI. See id. In 1991, however, the Council enacted emergency and temporary legislation to roll back AFDC payments to 1989 levels and to suspend consumer price indexing until October 1,1993. See Omnibus Budget Support Emergency Act of 1991, D.C.Act 9-37, 38 DCR 3390, 3392-93 (May 17,1991); Omnibus Budget Support Temporary Act of 1991, D.C.Law 9-19, 38 DCR 4066, 4068-69 (June 21,1991). This legislation did mention “standards of assistance” (minimum needs); it expressly retained, without change, the standards of minimum need in effect since 1984. See D.C.Law 9-19, 38 DCR at 4069; D.C.Act 9-37, 38 DCR at 3393. The Council then reenacted these provisions as permanent legislation two months later, as follows (in relevant part):
(c) The standards of assistance are set forth in the following table and include basic costs of food, clothing, shelter, household and personal items, and certain transportation costs, and life insurance when paid by the Mayor.
[[Image here]]
(d) The table set forth in subsection (c) of this section shall apply to payments made beginning July 1, 1991. On or before January 31st of each year, beginning with January 31, 1993, the Mayor shall calculate and submit to the Council a determination of the percentage increase, during the preceding calendar year, in the consumer price index for urban consumers for all items, as published by the United States Department of Labor (“Consumer Price Index”). The level of public assistance payments for assistance units set forth in subsection (c) of this section shall be increased annually as of October 1st of each year, beginning with October 1, 1993, by an amount equal to the percentage increase, if any, in the consumer price increase as determined by the Mayor. The Mayor shall publish notice of this annual increase in public assistance payments in the D.C. Register within 30 days of the increase. The increase in public assistance payments provided by this subsection shall be in addition to any other increase in public assistance payments otherwise provided by law....
Public Assistance Act of 1982 Budget Conformity Amendment Act of 1991 (“1991 Act”), D.C.Law 9-27, § 2(g), 38 DCR 4205, 4207-08 (Aug. 17, 1991), codified at D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) and (d) (1992 Supp.) (emphasis added). The 1991 Act, like the emergency and temporary legislation that immediately preceded it, also established a new program of General Assistance for Children that expressly incorporated § 3-205.44, thereby preserving the procedural requirement derived from Rosado. See D.C.Law 9-27, § 2(d), 38 DCR at 4205-06; D.C.Code § 3-205.5a (1992 Supp.).

*901
1986: Council’s Reassessment of Minimum Needs and Enactment of Annual increases in AFDC Payments By Reference to “All Items” CPI

From this brief statutory history, it is clear that in 1986 the Council reassessed and increased minimum needs (“standards of assistance”), as it had in 1984, before finalizing payment levels. The Council then enacted an “all items” CPI provision in a separate subsection to provide — expressly—for an automatic “annual increase in public assistance payments” without providing expressly for an automatic recalculation of minimum needs. D.C.Code § 3-205.52(d) (1987 Supp.). More specifically, (1) the very 1986 process of addressing minimum needs first, followed by (2) an amendment (to the temporary legislation) providing for CPI increases in future AFDC payments alone, without reference to minimum needs, while (3) retaining the scheduled minimum needs in the permanent legislation, taken together reflect a legislative mindset that kept minimum needs assessment and payment level calculations altogether separate. This approach made sense in that annual increases in payment levels did not require regular reassessments of minimum needs, for it was obvious from § 3-206.52(c) that payments lagged far behind needs, and thus that increased payments were inherently salutary from a recipient’s viewpoint. A reduction of payment levels, however, given Rosado and § 205.44, was an altogether different story not before the Council in 1986.
In sum, in 1986 the Council enacted annual increases in AFDC payment levels for the future, based on the “all items” CPI, wholly apart from its earlier, ad hoc reassessment of minimum needs and payment levels that year. There is no indication that the Council intended its 1986 addition of an annual cost-of-living increase in AFDC payments to provide a future substitute for needs reassessments, which had always been a wholly different, ad hoc procedure that remained unchanged in the statutory language itself in 1986 and thereafter. Compare D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) (1987 Supp.) with id. § 3-205.52(e) (1992 Supp.). The majority provides no basis from statutory language or legislative history to dispute this analysis as of 1986.

1991: En Banc Majority’s Erroneous Ruling that Council Impliedly Amended Procedure for Reassessing Minimum Needs

The en banc majority nonetheless rejects the notion that the Council’s ad hoc procedure for reassessing minimum needs — employed consistently in 1979, 1982, 1984, and 1986 — is the only way the Council can lawfully reassess minimum needs before reducing AFDC payment levels. My colleagues conclude that automatic annual application of the “all items” CPI to AFDC payment levels is also an objectively reliable — or at least a reliable enough — indicator of increasing minimum needs. From this view of what could be lawfully enacted, the majority takes an unwarranted step in concluding that in 1991 an automatic needs reassessment was enacted simply because the Council, presumably by calculating a string of CPI increases between 1986 and 1991, must be said to have informed itself about welfare recipients’ minimum needs when it reduced 1991 payment levels to those used in 1989. See ante at 18. I reject this argument. There is no evidence the Council relied on such CPI calculations for that purpose in 1991. Without saying so, therefore, the majority invokes — I believe improperly — the doctrine of implied repeal.
In particular, by concluding that the Council in 1991 “indirectly” (the majority’s word) reassessed minimum needs through automatic application of the “all items” CPI, the majority essentially holds that, by relying on § 3-205.52(d) to ascertain minimum needs, the Council impliedly repealed the procedural requirement of § 3-205.44, as previously implemented ad hoe through § 3-205.52(c), and thus has substituted a less exacting requirement. That purported substitute fails because it does not satisfy the criteria for implied repeal.
In analyzing the majority’s approach it is important, first, to reemphasize that in 1991 the Council itself unquestionably kept the “procedural requirement” of § 3-205.44 alive by expressly incorporating § 3-205.44 into the new General Assistance for Children provisions of the 1991 Act, despite the appropri*902ations act waiver of the “full amount” requirement of § 3-205.44. There can be no implied repeal of a provision the Council explicitly embraces. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1890, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (“intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest”).9 The question, then, is whether there is any basis for inferring that, in reducing AFDC payments levels in 1991 to those used in 1989, the Council can be said, before doing so, to have repealed its approach in 1986 (and earlier) under §§ 3-205.44 and 3-205.52(c) for reassessing minimum needs. I believe not.
No one contends the Council in 1991 expressly repealed the ad hoc procedural requirement of § 3-205.44, based on Rosado and implemented, as needed, by amendment of § 3-205.52(e). See supra note 9. For the Council to have amended this procedural requirement, therefore, it had to take two steps: (1) construe the 1986 language of § 3-205.52(d) that provides for an “annual increase in public assistance payments,” derived from the CPI, to mean, more broadly, an “annual increase in public assistance standards of assistance [minimum needs] and related payments” (new language italicized); and (2) intend this added, implied language to repeal the interpretation therefore given to §§ 3-205.44 and 3-205.52(c), derived from Rosado. That exercise could work only if justified as a valid, implied repeal and amendment. That, I suggest, did not happen.
“[Rjepeals by implication are not favored, and whenever possible statutes should be read consistently.” Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1164 (D.C.1991) (quoting Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523-24,106 S.Ct. 768, 771-72, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986)). Such repeals are recognized only if the statutes (or provisions) at issue are inherently irreconcilable, such that one must be said to trump the other. See Speyer, 588 A.2d at 1165. (“One who claims that a later statute has repealed an earlier one by implication must show that the two acts ‘are irreconcilable, clearly repugnant as to vital matters to which they relate, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.’”) (citation omitted).10 There is no irreconcilable conflict between § 3-205.44, as interpreted by reference to Rosado and § 3-205.52(c), and the CPI amendment to § 3-205.52(d). The latter provision can be implemented, according to its terms (referring only to annual increases in “payments”) without affecting the Rosado procedure for reassessing “minimum needs” traditionally used under § 3-205.44.
We have seen that, after reassessing minimum needs in 1986, the Council enacted a separate bill amending § 3-205.52(d) to increase “payments” each year by reference to the “all items” CPI. At that time the Council manifested no intention to repeal its usual way — the Rosado way — of reassessing minimum needs under §§ 3-205.44 and 3-205.52(e), as it had just accomplished for the 1986 legislation on public assistance. Thus, in reducing AFDC payment levels in 1991, the Council faced no hurdle that required its abandonment of a traditional needs assessment in favor of a new approach based on CPI calculations.
Applying the principles we have expressed in Speyer, this court should conclude that adoption of the CPI amendment affecting annual AFDC payment levels did not impliedly repeal the ad hoe procedural requirement of §§ 3-205.44 and 3-205.52(c), as interpreted by reference to Rosado. Rather than repealing and amending the law, the Council violated the law.11

*903
Annual Application of “All Items” CPI Does Not Necessarily Reflect Annual Increases In Minimum Needs

There is another reason why the majority’s analysis falls short. The cost-of-living mechanism at issue here does not provide the information the majority assumes it does. Pursuant to D.C.Code § 3-205.52(d) (1987 Supp.), AFDC payment levels have increased annually since 1986 (until 1991) by reference to the “all items CPI.” See supra note 8. Contrary to the majority view, these CPI increments do not necessarily reflect annual increases in minimum needs (statutory “standards of assistance”), and therefore do not necessarily satisfy the § 3-205.44(b) procedural requirement mandating reassessment of minimum needs before reduction of AFDC payment levels.
Over the years, standards of assistance (minimum needs) have been calculated with reference to the “basic costs of food, clothing, shelter, household, and personal items, certain transportation costs, and life insurance.” D.C.Code § 3-205.52(e) (1994); id. § 3-205.52(c) (1984 Supp.). Sometimes this provision of the statute has referred to a particular February “cost of living index.” See, e.g., D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) (1987 Supp.) (“February 1985”); id, § 3-205.52(e) (1984 Supp.) (“February, 1977”). Later, the reference to “cost of living index” was removed. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) (1992 Supp.). In any event, even if we assume that a “cost of living index” applies and that the one designated for use in § 3-205.52(c) is the CPI for urban consumers referred to in § 3-205.52(d), there is no assurance that the particular items from the CPI list used to calculate statutory standards of assistance (minimum needs) are the same as those covered by the “all items” CPI. See supra note 8. The latter includes items such as “new cars” and “entertainment,” which are not referred to in § 3-205.52(e), and the former includes “insurance,” which is not reflected in the CPI. See The WORLD Almanac at 102-03 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1994); supra note 8. These distinctions are important because the individual components of the “all items” CPI and of the statutory standards of assistance, respectively, will have different increases and decreases that result, in the aggregate, in different percentage changes in the two categories over time. These differences, perhaps, may not be great, but the conceptual distinction leads to three conclusions:
(1) Annual use of the “all items” CPI to increase payment levels under § 3-205.52(d) may be useful in helping AFDC recipients keep up with inflation (to the extent they are subsidized), but that particular CPI does not reflect the mix of items traditionally used to calculate minimum needs. Accordingly, the Council’s use of the “all items” CPI to calculate payment levels does not automatically reflect a calculation of minimum needs based on the “fewer-than-all items” of the CPI that comprise the § 3-205.52(e) “standards of assistance” (minimum needs).
(2) In calculating minimum needs, the Council presumably addresses at the outset the particular components of need specified in the statutory standards of assistance. See *904§ 3-205.52(c). But the Council is not limited to the statutory categories currently specified; the Council is free to amend those categories as costs or needs change. Furthermore, even if the Council were to retain the present standards of assistance categories, the Council may add or subtract items within established categories, e.g., within the “household and personal items” or within “certain transportation costs.” Such changes could further distort reliance on the “all items” CPI for assessment of minimum needs.
(3) Recently, moreover, as indicated earlier, the Council has omitted reference to the cost of living index in describing the categories of standards of assistance. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 3~205.52(c) (1992 Supp.). This suggests the possibility that the Council may recognize the value of indices other than, or in addition to, the CPI when standards of assistance are calculated in the future.
In short, whether we focus on the statutory standards of assistance in § 3-205.52(c) as published, or on the need for adoption and application of amended standards that may be more appropriate for the future, the “all items” CPI number is not automatically applicable. Reassessment of minimum needs— the “standards of assistance” prescribed by statute — before AFDC benefit levels are reduced inherently involves ad hoc, not programmed, decision-making.
Amended Procedure for Reassessing Minimum Needs by Reference to “All Items” CPI Violates Rosado v. Wyman
Finally, even if an “all items” CPI has a place in a minimum needs calculation, and even if in 1991 the Council impliedly abandoned its traditional approach to minimum needs assessment, that repeal would not be in keeping with Rosado. The kind of minimum needs assessment reflected “indirectly” (as the majority would have it) in annual application of the “all items” CPI to the statutory payment levels amounts, at best, to a kind of vague awareness of needs that does not come close to Rosado’s mandate that Council members “face up realistically to the magnitude of the public assistance requirement and lay bare the extent to which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual need,” id, 397 U.S. at 412-13, 90 S.Ct. at 1218 — an exercise the Council has regularly conducted before 1991 when reassessing minimum needs (in 1979, 1982, 1984, and 1986).12 I do not believe that the procedural requirement of § 3-205.44 can be satisfied “indirectly,” ante at 17, by a less scrutinizing, casual reference to the “all items” CPI authorized years earlier as a substitute for the deliberative, ad hoc minimum needs analysis that Rosado has long been understood to require before AFDC payment levels can be reduced.
III. Conclusion
The plaintiffs-appellants, a class of AFDC recipients, complain of a law violation — a short-circuiting of the legislative process— that has repudiated their statutory rights as residents eligible for public assistance. When that happens, as Rosado makes clear, the courts have a responsibility to declare the violation and order a remedy, not walk away. That is what courts are for. This court abdicates that responsibility today by manufacturing an argument for affirmance that no one has proffered to the court. It is an argument that, in my judgment, amounts to a clever, but fallacious, way to bail out the Council from its careless failure to comply with the law.
Respectfully, therefore, I must dissent.

. After governmental reorganization, the word "Commissioners" in subsection (a) was changed to “District of Columbia Council.” See D.C.Code § 3-204(a) (1973).

. Compare Reg. No. 69-59, § 1, proposed at 16 DCR 187 (Dec. 1 1969), approved in Order No. 69-689 (Dec. 31, 1969), D.C.Code and DCRR Updater, p. 11 (June 1979) (authorizing "full allowance for basic requirements for the number of persons in the assistance unit as specified in the Standard for Requirements,” with specified exceptions) with Reg. No. 70-36, § 1, 17 DCR 49 (Aug. 1, 1970) (providing Director of Department of Human Resources shall determine "basic requirements of individuals and families receiving public assistance based upon the February, 1970 cost of living” and "shall compute public assistance grants at a percentage of the cost of living of February, 1970, commensurate with available funds”) and Reg. No. 72-17, §§ 2 and 5(a), 19 DCR 211 (Oct. 1, 1972) (establishing standards of assistance for Public Assistance based on 1970 cost of living and providing for payments derived by subtracting "available resources ... (after applicable disregards)” and computing "75% of the remainder”) and Reg. No. 74-42, §§ 1-3, 21 DCR 1524 (Jan. 1, 1975) (revoking Reg. No. 72-17, §§ 2 and 5(a); setting standards of assistance based on February 1973 Cost-of-Living Index; determining payment levels by subtracting “available resources ... (after applicable disregard)” and computing "85% of the February 1973 costs”; and authorizing "payment up to 100% of needs based on availability of funds”).

.The amendment reflected in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) was enacted as § 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, 81 Stat. 898.

. Section 17 of the 1970 Appropriations Act, Pub.L. 91-155, 83 Stat. 433 (Dec. 24, 1969), provided in relevant part:
Appropriations in this Act should be available for the payment of public assistance without reference to the requirement of subsection (b) of section 5 of the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act of 1962 [§ 3-204(b)].
The same or similar provisions were included every year thereafter in the following appropriations acts:
1971 — Pub.L. 91-337, § 15, 84 Stat. 437 (July 16, 1970).
1972 — Pub.L. 92-202, § 14, 85 Stat. 687 (Dec. 18, 1971).
1973 — Pub.L. 92-344, § 12, 86 Stat. 455 (July 10, 1972).
1974 — Pub.L. 93-91, § 11, 87 Stat. 310 (Aug. 14, 1973).
1975 — Pub.L. 93-405, § 8, 88 Stat. 827 (Aug. 31, 1974).
1976 — Pub.L. 94-333, § 8, 90 Stat. 791 (June 30, 1976).
1977 — Pub.L. 94-446, § 109, 90 Stat. 1494 (Oct. 1, 1976).
1978 — Pub.L. 95-288, § 208, 92 Stat. 281, 287 (June 5, 1978).
1979 — Pub.L. 95-373, § 208, 92 Stat. 699, 704 (Sept. 18, 1978).
1980 — Pub.L. 96-93, § 208, 93 Stat. 713, 717 (Oct. 30, 1979).
1981 — Pub.L. 96-530, § 108, 94 Stat. 3121, 3126 (Dec. 15, 1980).
1982 — Pub.L. 97-91, § 108, 95 Stat. 1173, 1180 (Dec. 4, 1981).
1983 — Pub.L. 97-378, § 108, 96 Stat. 1925, 1932 (Dec. 22, 1982).
1984 — Pub.L. 98-125, § 108, 97 Stat. 819, 826 (Oct. 13, 1983).
1985 — Pub.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (Oct. 12, 1984) incorporating H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 107(1984).
1986 — H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985).
1987 — Pub.L. 99-500, § 107, 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-189 (Oct. 18, 1986); Pub.L. 99-591, § 107, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-189 (Oct. 30, 1986).
1988 — Pub.L. 100-202, § 107, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-98 (Dec. 22, 1987).
1989 — Pub.L. 100-462, § 107, 102 Stat. 2269, 2269-8 (Oct. 1, 1988).
1990 — Pub.L. 101-168, § 107, 103 Stat. 1267, 1275-76 (Nov. 21, 1989).
1991 — Pub.L. 101-518, § 107, 104 Stat. 2224, 2234 (Nov. 5, 1990).
1992 — Pub.L. 102-111, § 107, 105 Stat. 559, 567 (Oct. 1, 1991).
As indicated above in note 2, these congressional appropriations acts freed the local government to establish payment levels as percentages of the standards of assistance, rather than as the "full amount[s]” of those standards required by D.C.Code § 3-204(b) (1967). Thus, beginning in 1970, District regulations were facially inconsistent with the D.C.Code.

. The Council, in fact, had adopted statutory payment levels lower than the prescribed standards of assistance at least as early as 1979. See Public Assistance Payments Act of 1979, D.C.Law 3-3, § 2, 25 DCR 9639, 10876 (June 7, 1979).

. D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) sets forth a table prescribing the "standards of assistance” and corresponding "payment levels" for families of different sizes, from one to 19 persons. D.C.Code § 3-205.44(b) requires that payment levels “shall not be less than the full amount ... of the minimum needs.” All parties agree that the “minimum needs” referred to in § 3-205.44(b) are the "standards of assistance" established in § 3-205.52(c).

. See, e.g., Fiscal Year 1981 Budget Request Act, D.C.Act 3-294, § 108, 27 DCR 5315, 5329 (Dec. 5, 1980) (“Appropriations in this Act shall be available for the payment of public assistance without reference to the requirement of section 5(b) of the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act of 1962”); Fiscal Year 1983 Budget Request Act 4-162, § 108, 29 DCR 1283, 1301 (March 1, 1982) (same); Fiscal Year 1991 Budget Request Act, D.C.Act 8-188, § 107, 37 DCR 2589, 2599 (April 13, 1990) (same).

. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bulletin No. 24414, Handbook of Methods 176 (1992):
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is a measure of the average change in the prices paid by urban consumers for a fixed market basket of goods and services. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) calculates the CPI monthly and publishes it about two weeks after the end of the month to which it refers.
BLS calculates the CPI for two population groups, one consisting only of wage earners and clerical workers and the other consisting of all urban consumers. The Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) is a continuation of the historical index that was introduced well over a half-century ago for use in wage negotiations. As new uses were developed for the CPI in recent years, the need for a broader and more representative index became apparent. The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) introduced in 1978 is representative of the buying habits of about 80 percent of the noninstitutional population of the United States, compared with 32 percent represented in the CPI-W. The methodology for producing the index is the same for both populations and is described in detail in part II of this chapter.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics compiles CPI indices showing annual percentage changes by category (e.g., food, shelter, medical care) over the base years 1982-84. The BLS also creates a CPI for "all items” or categories for urban consumers taken together. See The World Almanac 102-03 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1994). This is the "all items" compilation referred to in D.C.Code § 3-205.52(d).

. The District contends that the procedural requirement of § 3-205.44 is entirely inconsistent with — and thus implicitly repealed by — the 1991 reduction of AFDC payments to 1989 levels. The majority, I believe correctly, has not accepted that argument. See ante at n. 13.

. See also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 149 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 382, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (1971) (per curiam) (by enacting authorization and appropriations legislation for underground test of nuclear warhead, Congress did not impliedly repeal National Environmental Policy Act requirement subjecting underground test to environmental impact statement).

.The majority opines that the Council in 1991 reinterpreted the § 3-205.44 procedural requirement by reference to the “all items” CPI, but concludes that this reinterpretation cannot be an implied repeal because that would be an "unorthodox notion." Why unorthodox? Because, *903says the majority, the characterization of the Council’s 1991 action as a partial, implied repeal overlooks the Council’s 1986 establishment of the annual cost-of-living adjustment "to account for increases in recipient needs in 1987 and each year thereafter.” Ante at 19. It is interesting to note that the majority carefully avoids saying that the 1986 Council enacted a new mechanism for reassessing “minimum" needs. More to the point, there can be no doubt that, when a court says the legislature has reinterpreted a statute, without expressly amending it, to impose a requirement that materially differs from the statute’s longstanding interpretation, the legislature will have effected — with judicial blessing — an implied repeal, since "x ” no longer means "x," it means “y Here, the majority imputes to the Council in 1991 an intention to reinterpret, and thus partially repeal by implied amendment, the procedural requirement of § 3-205.44, even though there is not a shred of evidence the Council intended to do so. The evidence is, rather, that the Council in 1991 plainly forgot to undertake a separate reassessment of minimum needs that the Council has required of itself under a regularly followed procedure the Council has required of itself under a regularly followed procedure the Council had never changed. The majority does not deny that it imputes an intention to the Council that, in light of past practice, reflects a procedural change the Council itself has never acknowledged. Nor could the Council so acknowledge, since the new “all items” CPI language in § 3-205.52(d), added in 1986, expressly referred only to an "annual increase in public assistance payments," not additionally to the related but separate category, "standards of assistance” (minimum needs).

. The District's argument that the Council, in 1991, did engage in a minimum needs assessment by listing the standards of assistance and the corresponding payment levels in the 1991 Act is frivolous. The "standards of assistance” in the 1991 Act were established in 1986 based on the 1985 cost-of-living index. See Public Assistance Amendments Act of 1986, D.C.Law 6-124, § 2(c), 33 DCR 2940, 2942 (June 25, 1986), codified at D.C.Code § 3-205.52(e) (1987 Supp.). Nothing of record indicates that the Council reevaluated the validity of these standards for 1991. See D.C.Code § 3-205.52(c) (1994). The Rosado approach — mandated by the Social Security Act— has been firmly embedded in our law since 1970, and the Council has followed this procedure virtually as a matter of local due process in providing statutory AFDC entitlements. Simply to ignore this procedure would be to ignore the fact that the Council reaffirmed it by referencing § 3-205.44 in the 1991 Act itself in creating the new program of General Assistance for Children.