Court Opinion

ID: 9853722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:53:06.731831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:03.037424
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
dissenting,
with whom McCLINTOCK, Justice, joins.
My inquiry into the record — keeping in mind the elements which must be proved in order to sustain a conviction for receipt of stolen property — leads me to the unaltera*701ble conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of guilty knowledge at the time of defendant’s receipt of the stolen property. Without such guilty knowledge at this particular time, the crime of receiving stolen goods cannot — in my view — be committed. This being so, the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for acquittal at the end of the State’s case. Secondly, with respect to the other issues pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence, I must emphatically disagree that the jury’s disbelief of the defendant’s testimony was, in any manner, substantive corroborative evidence of the defendant’s guilty knowledge that the property was recently stolen.
In order to sustain a conviction for receipt of stolen property, there must be evidence, direct or circumstantial, indicating that when he received the goods the defendant had actual knowledge they were stolen.1 State v. Reo, Mo.App., 510 S.W.2d 211, 214. There must be direct evidence or an indication of circumstances which caused the defendant to personally believe the goods were stolen at the time of his receipt. State v. Beale, Me., 299 A.2d 921. Failure to pursue an inquiry as to the source of the goods is not sufficient to satisfy the element of actual guilty knowledge. State v. Rowe, 57 N.J. 293, 271 A.2d 897.
Assuming, arguendo, that there is sufficient evidence pointing to the defendant’s receipt of the stolen property, what was the other evidence extant at the close of the State’s case? It was:
1. Defendant’s possession of stolen property;
2. Defendant’s statement that “it came from Spencer’s car”;
3. Defendant’s attempt to hide money received for the property;
4. A sale price of $50.00; and
5. Evidence that a new manifold would cost around $900.00.2
How does this evidence — viewed as a whole — give rise to a reasonable inference of guilty knowledge at the time of receipt ? It may be persuasively argued that such evidence gives rise to an inference that the defendant had guilty knowledge. It does not, however, in any way point a finger to the time when such guilty knowledge was obtained.
I would agree with the majority’s opinion where it is said that mere possession of recently stolen property is insufficient to show guilty knowledge at the time of receipt. Given the absence of corroborating evidence in this case, the effect of the majority opinion is to make mere possession sufficient for that purpose — regardless of what the majority purports to do. In analysis, I would first challenge the assigning of any significance to the $900.00 replacement cost. Such evidence does not prove the value of the goods at the time of their sale. McGill v. State, 106 Ga.App. 482,127 S.E.2d 332, 334. Even if it did, possession accompanied by a sale at a disproportionately low price is still insufficient to show guilty knowledge at the time of receipt. State v. *702Butler, 9 Ariz.App. 162, 450 P.2d 128, 132. See, State v. Mounts, 120 W.Va. 661, 200 S.E. 53. Defendant’s attempt to conceal the sale monies is incriminating evidence of guilty knowledge, but it does not prove guilty knowledge at the time of receipt. Likewise, even though defendant’s statement as to the origin of the goods is damning evidence of guilty knowledge it does not furnish proof of when that knowledge was obtained. When it is remembered that almost two months elapsed between the manifold-theft and the defendant’s sale thereof — and there being little or no evidence as to any intervening events — it is clear that the jury would have had to indulge in pure speculation in order to come to the conclusion that the defendant had actual guilty knowledge at the time of his receipt of the manifold.
Although this would, for me, be disposi-tive of the appeal, I find it necessary to address another aspect of the majority’s discussion. Concerning the defendant’s second and third issues — the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole — the majority would give corroborative effect to the defendant’s failure to inquire as to the source of the goods and to defendant’s purportedly false exculpatory statements. I have previously indicated that the failure to inquire may not, in my judgment, be equated, for proof purposes, with guilty knowledge at the time of receipt. Most frightening, however, is the majority’s substitution of the jury’s disbelief of a defendant’s explanation of possession of stolen property for the necessary substantive3 evidence of guilty knowledge. As succinctly stated in State v. Taylor, Mo., 422 S.W.2d 633, 637-639:
“ . . . The jury evidently disbelieved his explanation. But in a criminal case, where defendant is presumed to be innocent and where the burden of proof on the state is greater than that on the plaintiff in a civil case, is the effect of disbelief of defendant’s explanation the equivalent of proof to the contrary? We do not believe that defendant’s failure to explain satisfactorily to the jury permits an inference of guilty knowledge on his part at the required time which will take the place of substantive proof. .
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“It is the duty of the state to prove guilty knowledge on the part of defendant, not the duty of the defendant to prove he had no such knowledge. Defendant did not convince the jury of his defense, but this does not establish guilty knowledge on his part or amount to some sort of admission of guilty knowledge sufficient to make a submissive case against him in the absence of substantive proof of the elements of the offense. If so, no defendant, no matter how innocent, could take the stand without fear that if the jury should fail to accept his explanation or defense and find against him, the fact they did not believe him would, if this view were to prevail, be treated as supplying a missing link in the state’s case and as independent evidence of a fact otherwise unproved, so that his conviction would be upheld even if the state had failed to make a submissible case on some material aspect denied by him in his testimony. If disbelief operates as proof, then the jury may always find on any issue unfavorably to a defendant who offers evidence favorable to himself, despite lack of other evidence on the issue. This is not the law. .
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“The effect of disbelief by the jury of the defendant’s testimony is, of course, persuasive in the jury’s arriving at their verdict, but it is not probative and does not constitute substantive proof on a material issue not theretofore proved. The fact is that upon the somewhat bizarre record before us, defendant’s actual knowledge with respect to the engine being stolen at the time he bought or received it remains a matter of speculation *703and conjecture, not stronger than a suspicion of guilt, and this, of course, is not sufficient.” [Emphasis supplied]
See, also, State v. Woods, Mo., 434 S.W.2d 465, 468-469. It may, indeed, be that where there is independent proof of circumstances indicating the false nature of an explanation, then such independent proof may be sufficient upon which to sustain a conviction. See, Carter v. State, 10 Md.App. 50, 267 A.2d 743. But, as here, where we only have a jury’s disbelief of a defendant’s testimony, it is improper to conclude— for the purposes of appellate review — that the defendant’s explanation provides evidence of guilty knowledge at the time when the property was received. Adoption of the principle embraced by the majority — as applied to facts such as these — can only serve to have a chilling effect on a defendant’s decision to take the stand. The cases cited by the majority having to do with the effect of the jury’s disbelief of the defendant’s testimony are distinguishable from this case in fact and law and do not, in my opinion, stand for the principle the majority wants to embrace.
For these reasons, I must refuse to join in the majority opinion.

. This element is not a prerequisite to a charge of selling a stolen automobile part in violation of § 31-11-103, W.S.1977. Section 31-11-103, supra, provides:
“Any person who buys, sells, exchanges, trades, receives, conceals or alters the appearance of an automobile, or any automobile part, equipment, attachment, accessory or appurtenance, the property of another, or any person who attempts so to do, or any person who aids or abets in the commission or attempted commission of such act or acts, knowing or having reasonable cause to know and believe that such automobile or automobile part, equipment, attachment, accessory or appurtenance is stolen property shall, on conviction be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary not less than one (1) year, nor more than ten (10) years.”
I would consider that the effect of the opinion herein is to negate any meaningful distinction between this statute and § 6-7-304, W.S.1977, dealing with the receipt of stolen property.

. The majority apparently gives some significance to the fact that Charles Edwards’ subsequent conviction for perjury was recently upheld by this court. Edwards v. State, Wyo., 577 P.2d 1380. No independent proof of the falsity of Edwards’ or the defendant’s stories was adduced at the defendant’s trial. As a result, I find it entirely inappropriate to make any reference to Edwards’ conviction. To do so goes far beyond the bounds of this record and even further beyond the traditional rules for appellate review.

. It is to be observed that the majority would accept certain of the defendant’s testimony— dealing with loan-collateral situation — as true, thus providing evidence of disproportionate sale values, but would reject the defendant’s explanation as a whole, thus providing evidence of a false exculpatory statement. I don’t think we can have it both ways.