Court Opinion

ID: 9555879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 16:02:06.974457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:03.753245
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 21-30277

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No. 2:21-cr-
                                                 00084-JLR-1
    v.

JASON WILLIAM SADLER, AKA                          OPINION
Dustin Jay Sweeney,

                 Defendant-Appellant.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Western District of Washington
          James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted November 10, 2022
                    Seattle, Washington

                     Filed August 15, 2023

     Before: Sandra S. Ikuta and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit
       Judges, and Sidney A. Fitzwater, * District Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Collins

*
  The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
2                          USA V. SADLER

                          SUMMARY **

                          Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed the sentence imposed on Jason Sadler
following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
    At sentencing, Sadler argued that the district court
should not consider his prior 2004 federal convictions in
determining his sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines because subsequent authority in Rehaif v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (holding that one of the
required elements of a conviction under § 922(g)(1) is that
the defendant knew he belonged to the relevant category of
persons barred from possessing a firearm), made clear that
the guilty plea that produced those prior convictions was not
knowing and voluntary, thereby rendering those convictions
constitutionally invalid.
    The panel held that, under Custis v. United States, 511
U.S. 485 (1994), neither the Constitution nor any federal
statute granted Sadler a right to collaterally challenge the
validity of his 2004 convictions in connection with their use
in enhancing his sentence in this § 922(g) prosecution.
    The panel also held that the Guidelines’ provisions and
commentary did not create any such right. Sadler argued
that the commentary accompanying Guidelines § 2K2.1
requires that any conviction that is disregarded for criminal
history purposes must also be disregarded in applying
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)’s enhanced base offense level for a felon-
**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                        USA V. SADLER                        3

in-possession offense that follows a conviction for a crime
of violence or drug-trafficking crime. The panel held that,
even assuming arguendo that this was correct, the provisions
and commentary governing criminal history contained in
Chapter 4 of the Guidelines do not require that Sadler’s 2004
convictions be disregarded for criminal history
purposes. Specifically, the panel held that application note
6 to § 4A1.2(a)(2) requires that, in order not to be counted, a
conviction must previously have been ruled invalid in a prior
case.

                         COUNSEL

Gregory Geist (argued), Federal Public Defender’s Office,
Seattle, Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.
Teal L. Miller (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;
Jessica Manca, Special Assistant United States Attorney;
Nicholas W. Brown, United States Attorney; United States
Attorney’s Office, Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
4                       USA V. SADLER

                         OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

    After pleading guilty to a single count of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), Defendant Jason Sadler argued at his sentencing
that the district court should not consider certain prior
convictions in determining his sentencing range under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.           According to Sadler,
subsequent case authority made clear that the guilty plea that
produced those prior convictions was not knowing and
voluntary,     thereby     rendering     those    convictions
constitutionally invalid. We hold that the district court
properly refused to entertain such a collateral challenge to a
prior conviction in the context of this federal sentencing
proceeding, and that those prior convictions were therefore
properly considered in determining Sadler’s sentence. We
therefore affirm Sadler’s sentence.
                              I
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sadler pleaded guilty in
November 2021 to a single count of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The conviction was based on Sadler’s possession of a stolen
firearm at the time of his arrest by local police on February
25, 2017, which was after Sadler had incurred two separate
felony convictions in state court in the late 1990s as well as
additional federal felony convictions in 2004. In exchange
for Sadler’s plea, the Government agreed, inter alia, to
dismiss two additional counts pending in the same
indictment as the charge to which Sadler had pleaded guilty.
The plea agreement also reflected that, in light of Sadler’s
promises in that agreement, one local state prosecutor’s
                        USA V. SADLER                       5

office would dismiss related state charges against Sadler and
another local office would recommend that an upcoming
state sentence be made concurrent to any federal sentence in
this case.
    As to sentencing, the plea agreement stated that “[t]he
parties agree that the appropriate term of imprisonment to be
imposed by the Court at the time of sentencing is credit for
time served as of the date of sentencing.” This agreement as
to the recommended sentence was expressly recognized in
the plea agreement as not being binding on the district court.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B). Although the parties thus
agreed that no further imprisonment should be imposed, they
also expressly reserved their respective rights to disagree as
to the calculation of the applicable sentencing range under
the Guidelines.
    In its presentence report, the Probation Office concluded
that, because the instant felon-in-possession offense was
committed after “sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a
controlled substance offense,” the base offense level was 20.
See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Specifically, in November
2003, Sadler had pleaded guilty in federal court in the
Western District of Washington to a four-count superseding
indictment that included one count of possession of heroin
with intent to distribute and an additional count of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, both in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). (The other two counts to
which Sadler pleaded guilty in 2003 were for using and
carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
6                           USA V. SADLER

§ 922(g)(1).) Sadler was thereafter sentenced in 2004 on
these four counts to 152 months in prison. 1
    The Probation Office also recommended adding two
levels because the firearm Sadler possessed in 2017 was
stolen, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), and then subtracting three
levels for Sadler’s early acceptance of responsibility, see id.
§ 3E1.1(a), (b). The Probation Office thus calculated
Sadler’s total offense level as 19.
    As for Sadler’s criminal history, the Probation Office
concluded that only three of Sadler’s numerous convictions
would count under the Guidelines’ scoring rules. These
consisted of two separate state convictions in 2014 and 2017
that earned a total of four points under the Guidelines, and
the above-mentioned 2004 federal convictions that
warranted three additional points. See id. § 4A1.1(a), (b).
The Probation Office added two points because the instant
offense was committed while Sadler was still on supervision
under his 2014 state conviction, see id. § 4A1.1(d), which
resulted in a total of nine criminal history points. That
number of points corresponds to a criminal history category
of IV. With an offense level of 19, and a criminal history
category of IV, Sadler’s sentencing range under the
Guidelines would be 46–57 months.
    In its sentencing memorandum, the Government agreed
with the Probation Office’s calculations. Indeed, in the plea
agreement, the Government had expressly reserved the right
to argue that the base offense level was 20 and that a two-
level adjustment for a stolen firearm should be applied.
Consistent with its obligation under the plea agreement, the
1
 Although Sadler’s guilty plea was in 2003, we will refer to the resulting
convictions (as the parties do in their briefs) as Sadler’s “2004
convictions.”
                        USA V. SADLER                       7

Government recommended a time-served sentence. The
Government explained that it recommended a time-served
sentence, “rather than a sentence of specific length” within
its calculated Guidelines range, because the parties wished
to make sure that Sadler would thereby receive credit for all
of the time that he had already served in pretrial custody. As
the Government noted, Sadler had been in state pretrial
custody on related charges from February 2017 until his
transfer to federal pretrial custody in May 2021—an
extraordinary pretrial detention of “nearly five years.” The
Government stated that its recommended time-served
sentence would amount to approximately a 58-month
sentence, which was close to the top of the Government’s
recommended Guidelines range of 46–57 months.
    Sadler’s sentencing memorandum took the position that,
for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, his 2004 federal
conviction should be deemed to be “constitutionally invalid”
and therefore ignored for all purposes. In an addendum to
the presentence report that recounted the parties’ respective
positions on this issue, Sadler argued that his entire four-
count guilty plea in federal court in 2003 was invalid because
of an error concerning the felon-in-possession charge.
Specifically, Sadler noted that, at the time of his 2003 plea,
neither he, his counsel, nor the court had understood that one
of the required elements of a conviction under § 922(g)(1) is
that the defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant
category of persons barred from possessing a firearm,”
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019)—
which, in the context of his 2004 felon-in-possession charge,
would require a showing “that he knew he had been
convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in
prison when he possessed the firearm,” United States v.
Michell, 65 F.4th 411, 414 (9th Cir. 2023). Instead, the
8                       USA V. SADLER

controlling law at the time of his 2003 guilty plea was that
the relevant “knowledge requirement applies only to the
possession element of § 922(g)(1), not to the interstate nexus
or to felon status.” United States v. Miller, 105 F.3d 552,
555 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). According to Sadler,
a guilty plea based on a misunderstanding of the elements of
the offense is not voluntary and intelligent and is therefore
“constitutionally invalid.” Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 618–19 (1998). Sadler contended that this error in
the understanding of the elements of the § 922(g)(1) charge
invalidated the entirety of his 2003 plea to all four counts,
including the drug-trafficking charges.
    Sadler argued that, because his 2003 guilty plea was
constitutionally invalid, it could not be considered in
calculating his criminal history under application note 6 of
§ 4A1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which states that
convictions that “have been ruled constitutionally invalid in
a prior case are not to be counted.” And if it is not counted
for criminal history purposes, Sadler argued, then it also
could not be considered in setting his offense level, in light
of application note 10 of § 2K2.1 of the Guidelines. See
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, app. note 10 (stating that, for purposes of
applying § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)’s enhanced offense level for
prior drug-trafficking felonies, “only those felony
convictions that receive criminal history points under
§ 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c)” are considered). Accordingly, Sadler
argued that his base offense level was 14, his final offense
level was 13, his criminal history points were six, his
criminal history category was III, and his Sentencing
Guidelines range was 18–24 months.
   The Government argued in response that Sadler’s
contentions amounted to an improper collateral attack on his
2004 convictions that should not be considered in the context
                             USA V. SADLER                                 9

of this sentencing. The Government also contended that, had
he brought a proper challenge to his 2004 convictions, Sadler
“would not have succeeded in collaterally attacking his
conviction.” Sadler, by contrast, argued that he was “not
collaterally attacking his prior conviction,” but merely
seeking to have the court apply the Guidelines’ rules about
determining which prior convictions to count for purposes of
the Guidelines.
     The district court adopted the Government’s and the
Probation Office’s calculation of the Guidelines range, and
it therefore concluded that the applicable sentencing range
was 46–57 months. With that range in place, the court
agreed that a time-served sentence, which the court
“calculated . . . at 58 months in custody,” was “as
appropriate sentence.” The court also imposed a term of
three years of supervised release. Sadler timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28
U.S.C. § 1291. 2

2
  The Government has suggested in a post-argument filing that Sadler’s
challenge to his underlying sentence is moot. The Government notes
that, earlier in 2023, Sadler’s supervised release was revoked twice, and
in connection with the second such revocation Sadler is now serving a
140-day term of imprisonment to be followed by a new 24-month term
of supervised release. As a result, the Government argues, Sadler “is no
longer serving” the sentence “that is the subject of this appeal,” and any
error in calculating his original sentence “would thus not affect the
sentence he is now serving.” We conclude that the Government—which
has cited no authority that would support this mootness argument—has
failed to carry its burden to show that the case is moot. “[B]ecause
district courts have broad discretion to modify conditions of supervised
release” under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), United States v. Bainbridge, 746
F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2014), there is a possibility that the district court
could reduce or modify Sadler’s supervised release terms in light of a
correction of the calculation of the sentencing range. This ‘“possibility
of the court’s reducing or modifying [Sadler’s] supervised release’
10                         USA V. SADLER

                                  II
    Sadler contends that the district court incorrectly
calculated his Sentencing Guidelines range as 46–57 months
and that the case should be remanded for a resentencing that
would take into account his correct Guidelines range, which
he says should instead have been 18–24 months.3
Resentencing is required, Sadler insists, because the district
court wrongly used his 2004 federal convictions in
calculating his Guidelines range, despite those convictions’
alleged constitutional invalidity. In making this argument,
Sadler again insists that he does not “seek to overturn,
vacate, or collaterally attack” his 2004 convictions. His
argument is that, even though his 2004 convictions remain
in place, the Guidelines’ provisions and commentary dictate
that these convictions be disregarded for purposes of the
calculation of his sentencing range. We reject this
contention.
                                  A
   We begin with some important context about the
constitutional and statutory background to Sadler’s claim.
   We had previously held in United States v. Vea-
Gonzales, 999 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1993), that “the
Constitution requires that defendants be given the

satisfies the case or controversy requirement.” United States v. D.M.,
869 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Thus, Sadler’s
appeal is not moot.
3
  The Government has not contended that the appeal waiver in Sadler’s
plea agreement precludes him from taking this appeal, nor has it argued
that the plea agreement’s time-served recommendation should be
construed as barring Sadler from arguing for a lower range or a lower
sentence. We therefore deem any such contentions to be forfeited. See
United States v. Felix, 561 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2009).
                         USA V. SADLER                        11

opportunity to collaterally attack prior convictions which
will be used against them at sentencing.” Id. at 1333.
However, one year later, the Supreme Court held that, except
for prior convictions involving the “unique constitutional
defect” of “failure to appoint counsel for an indigent
defendant,” there is no constitutional “right to attack
collaterally prior convictions used for sentence
enhancement.” Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496
(1994). Accordingly, Custis specifically held that a
defendant being sentenced for an offense has no
constitutional right, in that sentencing proceeding, to
challenge prior convictions on the grounds that those
convictions involved a “denial of the effective assistance of
counsel” or rest on a “guilty plea [that] was not knowing and
intelligent.” Id.
    In United States v. Price, 51 F.3d 175 (9th Cir. 1995), we
addressed the impact of Custis on our caselaw after the
Supreme Court vacated our earlier decision in Price (which
had relied on Vea-Gonzales) and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Custis. See United States v. Price,
511 U.S. 1124 (1994). We recognized that “Custis
effectively overruled the pertinent aspect of Vea-Gonzales.”
51 F.3d at 177. As we explained, “Custis held that
defendants who wish to challenge the validity of prior
convictions to be used for sentence enhancement have the
constitutional right to do so only through habeas corpus; the
sole constitutionally-mandated exception to this general rule
is an allegedly total denial of the right to counsel in the prior
proceeding.” Id. Because Sadler’s 2004 convictions did not
involve a “total denial of the right to counsel,” id., Sadler has
no constitutional right to attack his 2004 convictions in his
sentencing proceeding in this case.
12                      USA V. SADLER

    We recognized in Price that Custis left open the
possibility that Congress might choose, “in specific
statutes,” to “authorize such collateral attacks during the
sentencing process itself.” 51 F.3d at 177. We held,
however, that “[t]he legislation authorizing the Guidelines,
28 U.S.C. §§ 991 et seq., does not expressly or impliedly
provide defendants with an opportunity to challenge the
validity of prior convictions before the sentencing court may
count them for career offender calculations.” Id. (emphasis
added). Although Price made that observation in the context
of the sentencing of “career offenders,” the same rule applies
to the Guidelines’ authorizing statute more generally.
    The statutory career-offender provision at issue in Price
requires the Commission to ensure a Guidelines sentence of
imprisonment “at or near the maximum term authorized” in
the case of certain offenders who have “previously been
convicted of two or more prior felonies,” each of which is
either a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking offense. See
28 U.S.C. § 994(h)(2) (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1 (implementing this directive). Under our decision
in Price, Congress’s directive to enhance the sentence of a
person who has “previously been convicted” of specified
offenses is thus not sufficient to authorize a collateral
challenge to those prior convictions. We see no basis for
reaching a different conclusion as to the authorizing statute’s
treatment of criminal history more generally.              The
Guidelines’ use of “criminal history” in setting the
applicable sentencing range is based on the statute’s general
directive that the Commission must consider the “criminal
history” of the defendant in establishing sentencing ranges
for particular “categor[ies] of defendant[s].” See 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(b)(1), (d)(10). Nothing in the statute’s mere use of the
term “criminal history” even remotely suggests that
                         USA V. SADLER                        13

Congress has thereby “expressly or impliedly provide[d]
defendants with an opportunity to challenge the validity of
prior convictions before the sentencing court may count
them” for criminal history purposes. Price, 51 F.3d at 177.
    Custis also makes clear that nothing in 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) authorizes a collateral attack, at sentencing, on
prior convictions that are used as sentencing enhancements.
The underlying offense at issue in Custis was a violation of
§ 922(g), and the sentencing enhancement at issue involved
§ 924(e)’s increased penalty for a § 922(g) violator who had
three prior convictions of violent crimes or serious drug
offenses. See 511 U.S. at 487–88. As Custis noted, the
Court had previously held, in construing a predecessor
statute to § 922(g), that nothing in the felon-in-possession
statute “suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage
to persons whose convictions are not subject to collateral
attack.” Id. at 492–93 (simplified) (quoting Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980)); see also Lewis, 445 U.S. at
67 (holding that a felon-in-possession “prosecution does not
open the predicate conviction to a new form of collateral
attack”). Custis further held that § 924(e)’s enhanced
penalty for “‘three previous convictions’ of the type
specified” turns “on the fact of the conviction.” Id. at 490–
91. As such, the Court stated, the language of § 924(e)
provided no basis for concluding that a prior conviction is
“subject to collateral attack for potential constitutional errors
before it may be counted.” Id. at 491. Moreover, as the
Court noted, Congress’s express definition of the predicate
crimes that trigger § 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearms possession
generally excludes only convictions that have been
“expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been
pardoned or has had civil rights restored.” Id. at 491 (citing
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)). This express statement “that a
14                      USA V. SADLER

court may not count a conviction ‘which has been . . . set
aside’ creates a clear negative implication that courts may
count a conviction that has not been set aside.” Id.
    Accordingly, neither the Constitution nor any federal
statute grants Sadler a right to challenge the validity of his
2004 convictions in connection with their use in enhancing
his sentence in this § 922(g) prosecution.
                              B
    Against this backdrop, the question is whether Sadler is
right in contending that, even if neither the Constitution nor
any federal statute grants him a right to challenge his prior
convictions at his sentencing proceeding, the Guidelines’
provisions and commentary nonetheless grant him such a
right in this case. We conclude that the Guidelines’
provisions and commentary do not create any such right.
    As in the district court, Sadler’s argument for
disregarding his 2004 convictions under the Guidelines rests
on a two-step syllogism. Specifically, Sadler argues that
(1) the provisions and commentary governing criminal
history contained in Chapter 4 of the Guidelines require that
his 2004 convictions be disregarded for criminal history
purposes; and (2) the commentary accompanying § 2K2.1
requires that any conviction that is disregarded for criminal
history purposes must also be disregarded in applying
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)’s enhanced base offense level for a felon-
in-possession offense that follows a conviction for a crime
of violence or drug-trafficking crime. Even assuming
arguendo that Sadler’s second premise is correct, we
conclude that his first one is wrong.
   As noted earlier, the governing statute directs the
Sentencing Commission to consider “criminal history” in
                        USA V. SADLER                       15

establishing the sentencing ranges for particular
“categor[ies] of defendant[s].” See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1),
(d)(10). That directive is implemented in Chapter 4 of the
Guidelines, which provides the rules for determining a
defendant’s criminal history category, which will then be
used to select the relevant sentencing range from the
sentencing table. Under Chapter 4, a defendant’s criminal
history category is generally determined by first totaling,
subject to certain limitations and adjustments, the applicable
number of criminal history “points” applicable to “each
prior sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 (emphasis added). More
serious offenses, involving lengthier prison sentences,
receive more points, and shorter prison sentences and non-
carceral sentences receive fewer. Id. Once the relevant total
number of points has been calculated under all of the
applicable Guidelines provisions, the criminal history
category is the particular category (from I through VI)
associated with that point total. A total of zero or one point
corresponds to criminal history category I, while a total of
13 or more points corresponds to category VI. See U.S.S.G.,
Sentencing Table.
    The Guidelines define a “prior sentence” for these
purposes as “any sentence previously imposed upon
adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial or plea of
nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). The actual Guidelines themselves
do not specifically define what counts as an “adjudication of
guilt.” In particular, except for stating that “expunged
convictions are not counted,” see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j), they
do not expressly address whether a conviction that has been
set aside, vacated, or impugned should continue to be treated
as an “adjudication of guilt” for purposes of the Guidelines.
That subject is instead covered by the commentary to the
16                      USA V. SADLER

Guidelines, specifically application note 6. That note states,
in relevant part:

       Reversed, Vacated, or Invalidated
       Convictions.      Sentences resulting from
       convictions that (A) have been reversed or
       vacated because of errors of law or because
       of subsequently discovered evidence
       exonerating the defendant, or (B) have been
       ruled constitutionally invalid in a prior case
       are not to be counted. With respect to the
       current sentencing proceeding, this guideline
       and commentary do not confer upon the
       defendant any right to attack collaterally a
       prior conviction or sentence beyond any such
       rights otherwise recognized in law (e.g., 21
       U.S.C. § 851 expressly provides that a
       defendant may collaterally attack certain
       prior convictions).

Id. § 4A1.2, app. note 6 (emphasis added).
    Sadler does not contend that his 2004 convictions have
been “reversed or vacated” within the meaning of clause (A)
of this application note. Instead, he argues only that his 2004
convictions “have been ruled constitutionally invalid in a
prior case.” According to Sadler, Rehaif and Bousley are the
“prior case[s]” that have effectively “ruled” that his 2004
convictions are “constitutionally invalid.”           U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2, app. note 6. That is true, he argues, because
(1) under Rehaif, an element of his § 922(g) charge when he
pleaded guilty in 2003 was that he knew that he had been
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in
prison, see 139 S. Ct. at 2200; (2) under Bousley, the
                           USA V. SADLER                           17

omission of that essential element under then-applicable
Ninth Circuit law assertedly renders his guilty plea to that
charge in 2003 “constitutionally invalid,” 523 U.S. at 618–
19; and (3) the invalidity of his plea to the § 922(g) charge
in 2003, in his view, invalidates the entirety of his 2003
guilty plea as to all counts, including the drug-trafficking
offenses used to enhance his Guidelines range here. We
need not decide whether any of these premises are correct,
because none of them provide grounds for disregarding his
2004 convictions in connection with his sentencing here.
    As noted earlier, the relevant text of application note 6
effectively construes the phrase “adjudication of guilt” in
§ 4A1.2(a)(1) as excluding a “conviction[] that . . . ha[s]
been ruled constitutionally invalid in a prior case.” 4 By its
terms, this latter language requires that the “conviction[]”
have been ruled “invalid” in a “prior case,” and not merely
that there is precedent that, through a process of inference,
undermines the foundations on which that conviction rests.
The language thus contemplates that the defendant will first
obtain a “rul[ing]” that his or her conviction is
“constitutionally invalid” and then, armed with that “prior”
ruling, will thereby establish, without any further showing,
that the conviction cannot be counted under the Guidelines.
Put another way, the language of application note 6
envisions that the defendant will first file the necessary
collateral proceeding to constitutionally invalidate the prior
conviction, obtain a favorable ruling, and then simply
present that ruling to the federal sentencing court. Cf. Custis,

4
 Neither Sadler nor the Government has contended that application note
6 reflects an impermissible reading of the relevant language of the
Guidelines themselves. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42–
43 (1993); United States v. Castillo, 69 F.4th 648, 655–56 (9th Cir.
2023).
18                           USA V. SADLER

511 U.S. at 497 (stating that defendants remain free to attack
their prior convictions in state court or through habeas
corpus and then apply for relief in connection with a federal
sentencing in which those convictions are used as
enhancements). The federal court thus does not itself
consider the merits of the collateral challenge, but simply
gives effect to the ruling in such a previous challenge.
    That reading of application note 6 is strongly confirmed
by the second sentence of that note, which expressly
confirms that, “[w]ith respect to the current sentencing
proceeding, this guideline and commentary do not confer
upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior
conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise
recognized in law.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, app. note 6. As we
held in Price, the addition of this second sentence to
application note 6 in 1993 made it “considerably more
explicit” that the Guidelines do not “provide defendants with
an opportunity to challenge the validity of prior
convictions.” 51 F.3d at 177 & n.1.
   Under this construction of the Guidelines and its
commentary, Sadler’s effort to challenge his 2004
convictions here fails. Sadler cannot point to any ruling
from a prior case that already has determined that his
conviction is “constitutionally invalid.” 5 Instead, he has
provided only an assortment of arguments by which he

5
  As the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Gill, 824 F.3d 653 (7th
Cir. 2016), the requisite invalidation of this defendant’s conviction may
take the form of a facial invalidation of a criminal statute, at least where
the established effect of such a facial invalidation under the governing
law is to render all convictions under that statute automatically void. Id.
at 662–63. Sadler’s case does not involve any such facial invalidation
of a statute, much less one that automatically voids, without further
analysis, all convictions rendered under that statute.
                       USA V. SADLER                      19

might obtain such a ruling. That is not enough under
application note 6. What Sadler seeks is for his federal
sentencing court to make the “ruling” that his prior
conviction is “constitutionally invalid.” But that would
require his current federal sentencing court to entertain a
collateral challenge to his prior conviction, and the
Guidelines simply do not authorize any such collateral
challenge. Any such right to assert a collateral challenge to
a prior conviction at a federal sentencing must come from
“rights otherwise recognized in law,” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, app.
note 6, and as we have explained at length, no source of law
recognizes any such right here.
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Sadler had no
ability to challenge the validity of his 2004 convictions
during his sentencing proceedings below. The district court
therefore properly took those convictions into account in
determining Sadler’s criminal history category, his base
offense level, his Guidelines range, and his ultimate
sentence. Accordingly, Sadler’s sentence is affirmed.
   AFFIRMED.