Court Opinion

ID: 9447307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:31:25.945183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:58.922482
License: Public Domain

LUMBARD, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
The legal question before us is whether a federal district judge should resolve disputed questions of fact after he has held a hearing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a state prisoner or whether the judge, even after an opportunity to listen to the witnesses and evaluate their credibility, must decide if there has been any violation of a petitioner’s constitutional rights solely by consideration of the undisputed facts.
The task faced by a district judge when he has held a hearing upon a petition for habeas corpus is somewhat different than that faced by a federal court when it has before it only a state court transcript or that of the Supreme Court upon direct review of a state court conviction. Upon direct review or in habeas *307corpus when the only record is that made in the state court, the federal tribunal is bound by the state judge’s or jury’s determination of the historical facts. Only the undisputed facts may be considered in deciding whether the conviction is consistent with the requirements of the federal Constitution. “The rationale behind such exclusion, of course, lies in the superior opportunity of the trial court and jury to observe the witnesses and weigh the fleeting intangibles which may indicate truth or falsehood.” Thomas v. State of Arizona, 1958, 356 U.S. 390, 403, 78 S.Ct. 885, 892, 2 L.Ed.2d 863; see Watts v. State of Indiana, 1949, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801; Gallegos v. State of Nebraska, 1951, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141, 96 L.Ed. 86.
When a federal judge has held a hearing and has himself had the opportunity to listen to the witnesses and weigh their credibility, the rationale of the Thomas decision, and of the many other cases arising solely upon state records, is not applicable. After a hearing it is the duty of the district judge independently to determine the historical facts, whether these facts are disputed or undisputed. The task is most crucial in a case such as that before us, where the state court determination was that of a jury which rendered a general verdict and where evidence not presented to the jury was before the federal judge.1 Congress has directed that the federal judge shall resolve factual disputes in these circumstances, for it has said that “the court shall summarily hear and determine the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. We have ourselves recognized the duty to resolve factual disputes. United States ex rel. Sileo v. Martin, 2 Cir., 1959, 269 F.2d 586, 591; cf. Cranor v. Gonzales, 9 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 83, certiorari denied, 1956, 350 U.S. 935, 76 S.Ct. 307, 100 L.Ed. 816. As I understand the majority opinion in the present case, if too recognizes this duty of a federal district court after a hearing to resolve contested questions of fact.
The majority says, however, that Judge Brennan was aware of the factual contest in this case and carried out his duty to make independent findings upon the disputed facts. Such a reading of Judge Brennan’s opinion is contrary to the plain statements in it and in his earlier opinions in this litigation.
In the second of his three opinions in this case Judge Brennan states it to be his duty after a hearing “to make [his] own independent examination of the record and independent determination on the undisputed facts as to whether or not the constitutional standards of fundamental fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment have been violated.” (Emphasis added.) A few sentences later he observes that “the undisputed facts are crucial in the determination to be made.” (Emphasis added.) If these statements are insufficient to show the trial judge’s misunderstanding of the proper approach to the problem before him, we need only turn to his most recent decision, from which the present appeal is taken. “The existence of bruises or marks on relator’s back,” the opinion states, “ * * * was a disputed fact clearly outlined in the trial record. * * * The testimony of Attorney Dunn at the hearing of May 9, 1958 in no way eliminates that dispute. * * * All of the additional evidence offered is so interlocked with the disputed question of coercion as to be a part thereof. Disputed fact questions afford no basis for relief in this court. (Thomas v. [State of] Arizona, 356 U.S. 290 at [pages] 402-403 [78 S.Ct. at pages 891-892].)” How my brothers can say in the face of these plain words that the trial judge carried out his duty to resolve disputed fact questions I cannot understand. Plainly, the Thomas case relied upon by the district court— and cited by my brothers — is not relevant *308in these circumstances as there, there was only a state court record before the Supreme Court. It is hard to imagine a clearer statement by the district court of its failure to appreciate its duty to resolve such contested issues when a federal hearing has been held and full opportunity afforded the district judge to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.
The charge asserted in relator’s petition is a grave one. It is that his confession, virtually the only evidence against him at trial, was obtained by methods violative of the federal Constitution. In affirming the dismissal of such a claim, we should be certain that the district court applied the proper legal standards in determining the facts. I think the only proper course is to reverse the judgment of the district court discharging the writ and to remand the case with instructions to decide the claim of coercion after resolution of the factual disputes presented by the whole record, which includes the evidence given at the hearing before the district court.

. Compare United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 2 Cir., 1959, 271 F.2d 364, certiorari granted 1960, 361 U.S. 959, 80 S.Ct. 605, 4 L.Ed.2d 541, where, under Connecticut practice, the state court judge had made specific findings of fact on the issue of coercion.