Court Opinion

ID: 9838167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 15:01:47.981894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:55.656372
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10479     Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 09/05/2023   Page: 1 of 16

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10479
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        BRYAN ALEXANDER BLOUNT,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER CULLIVER,
        Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        ANGIE BAGGETT,
        Director of Classiﬁcation,
        Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        VIVIAN MCQUEEN,
        Central Review Board,
        Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        JOSEPH H. HEADLEY,
        Warden, Elmore Correctional Facility,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court               22-10479

        Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        MARY COOKS,
        Warden, Draper Correctional Facility,
        Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        CAPTAIN MCKEE,
        Elmore Correctional Facility,
        Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        BRITTNY BATES,
        Classiﬁcation Specialist, Draper Correctional Facility,
        Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        W.M. BURKS,
        Lt., Elmore Correctional Facility,
        Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-00970-WHA-CSC
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Bryan Alexander Blount, an Alabama prisoner proceeding
        pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
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        22-10479                 Opinion of the Court                              3

        the defendants 1 on his Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amend-
        ment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the grounds of qualified
        immunity. Blount asserts that the procedures the defendants fol-
        lowed in finding him guilty of assaulting a fellow inmate and re-
        classifying him twice to close custody 2 were procedurally inade-
        quate, as the defendants lacked sufficient evidence. He also argues
        the district court erred in finding he had not presented evidence
        indicating that the defendants were aware of any harm he suffered
        in solitary confinement or of the substantial risk of serious harm he
        faced. After careful review, we affirm.
                                   I.     Background
               This case arises from an altercation that led to the death of
        inmate Billy Smith on November 13, 2017 at Elmore Correctional
        Facility (Elmore). Video footage was of insufficient quality to iden-
        tify the participants, but witness testimony corroborated the par-
        ticipants’ identities and how the altercation occurred. William Fa-
        vor, a Supervisory Agent with the Alabama Department of Correc-
        tions’ (ADOC) Investigations and Intelligence Division, investi-
        gated Smith’s death. Following his investigation, he determined
        that Blount and Smith had been involved in an altercation in

        1 The defendants include six Alabama Department of Corrections officials: re-

        tired Associate Commissioner for Operations Grant Culliver; Assistant Classi-
        fication Director Angie Baggett; Classification Review Board member Vivian
        McQueen; Warden of Elmore Correctional Facility Joseph Headley; Warden
        of Draper Correctional Facility Mary Cooks; and Captain Charles McKee.
        2 Close custody is the most restrictive custody level for inmates within the

        Alabama Department of Corrections.
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                22-10479

        dormitory A-2, which led to an exchange of blows. Smith then ran
        to the front door of the dorm with Blount and another inmate in
        pursuit. At the front of the dorm, Blount struck Smith multiple
        times, including at least once in the head, which caused Smith to
        fall and strike his head on the concrete floor.
               On December 8, 2017, at Draper Correctional Center
        (Draper) 3 Blount received a copy of a disciplinary report that
        charged him with violating prison regulations by assaulting an in-
        mate. Smith died on December 9 as a result of his injuries—a frac-
        tured skull and a large hematoma to the left temporal area of his
        head.
               The following information comes from Blount’s disciplinary
        report. On November 30, 2017, correctional officer W.M. Burks III
        received information from several confidential informants (CIs)
        that Blount assaulted Smith. These CIs had been used several times
        in the past, their prior information had been truthful, other infor-
        mation had been received to corroborate the CIs’ information, no
        information uncovered during the investigation suggested that the
        CIs had reason to lie, and the information from the CIs was reliable.
               Blount was personally served a copy of the report and was
        informed of his rights to present an oral or written statement at an
        upcoming disciplinary hearing and to provide written questions for
        the witnesses. Blount sought to call three witnesses: corrections
        officer J. McClease, inmate Paul Smith, and inmate Justin Mayes.

        3 Blount was transferred to Draper on November 30, 2017.
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        22-10479               Opinion of the Court                          5

               Captain Charles McKee was assigned as the hearing officer
        for the disciplinary action against Blount. At the December 14,
        2017 hearing, Burks testified that several CIs, who had served as
        reliable witnesses before, informed him that Blount assaulted
        Smith. Upon questioning by Captain McKee, Burks explained that
        he had used his CIs about 10 times in the past, they were present at
        the time of the incident, and they had identified Blount during a
        photographic line-up.
              Blount testified on his own behalf and denied assaulting
        Smith. Blount’s three witnesses declined to appear, but in written
        statements, each denied having any direct knowledge of the inci-
        dent. Burks responded to written questions from Blount, testifying
        that he had used his CIs around 10 other times, the assault hap-
        pened in the bathroom of dorm A-2, it was unknown what Blount
        had used to assault Smith, and his witness statements were corrob-
        orated by several other inmates.
               Captain McKee found that Burks was informed from a relia-
        ble source that Blount assaulted Smith, and the evidence did not
        support Blount’s not-guilty plea. Thus, Captain McKee found
        Blount guilty of assaulting Smith. He recommended the following
        sanctions: loss of canteen privileges, telephone privileges, and vis-
        iting privileges for 45 days; disciplinary segregation for 45 days; and
        a custody review.
              As for the custody review, Blount received advanced notifi-
        cation of his reclassification. The notice stated that Smith had
        passed away, and it explained that Blount would be reviewed for a
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10479

        custody increase to “close” in accordance with the ADOC Classifi-
        cation Manual, requiring 30 months in close custody due to his as-
        saultive behavior resulting in the death of another inmate. Blount
        waived the 24-hour notice requirement by signature. A hearing
        was held where Blount declined to call any witnesses.
                On December 28, 2017, Warden Mary Cooks approved plac-
        ing Blount in close custody at Draper. Blount was transferred to
        Kirby Correctional Center (Kirby) the same day. After ten months
        at Kirby, a “Close Custody Reduction Review Form” was improp-
        erly submitted by classification personnel, indicating that Blount
        was eligible for a custody reduction because he had completed the
        required six months in close custody for assaulting another inmate.
        However, because Smith had passed away after Blount’s assault,
        Blount was not yet eligible for a custody reduction. Assistant Clas-
        sification Director Angie Baggett approved the request, not realiz-
        ing that Smith had passed away.
                On September 24, 2018, Blount was transferred to St. Clair
        Correctional Facility (St. Clair), where, upon review by different
        classification personnel, it was discovered that Blount had been re-
        duced from close custody in error. Because Blount had only served
        10 of the required 30 months in close custody before his reduction,
        St. Clair classification personnel served Blount with notice that he
        be returned to close custody for the rest of the required time.
        Blount again waived the notice requirement by signature, and a
        hearing was held on the reclassification. Classification Review
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        22-10479                Opinion of the Court                          7

        Board member Vivian McQueen approved Blount’s return to close
        custody on October 2, 2018.
                On September 18, 2018, Blount petitioned for writ of certio-
        rari to the circuit court in Montgomery County, challenging the
        resolution of his disciplinary hearing. The circuit court dismissed
        Blount’s petition, and he appealed to the Alabama Court of Crimi-
        nal Appeals (ACCA). The ACCA affirmed the circuit court’s deci-
        sion, finding that Blount had no protected liberty interest in any of
        the results of the disciplinary hearing and thus no right to due pro-
        cess.
                On November 16, 2018, proceeding pro se, Blount sued the
        defendants in their individual and official capacities for violating his
        Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
        The defendants answered and provided supporting affidavits and
        evidentiary materials. Blount responded to those materials. The
        district court converted the defendants’ answer and reports to a
        motion for summary judgment.
                On November 14, 2021, Blount moved to file a second
        amended complaint to add new claims and defendants. The mag-
        istrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) in which
        he recommended granting the defendants’ motion for summary
        judgment and denying Blount’s motion for leave to amend. Be-
        cause Blount failed to meet his burden of showing that the defend-
        ants violated his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments rights, the
        defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
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        8                         Opinion of the Court             22-10479

               Blount timely objected as to the merits of whether qualified
        immunity was appropriate, but he did not object to the recommen-
        dation that his motion to amend be denied, nor did he object to the
        finding that the defendants were acting within the scope of their
        duties at all relevant times. The district court overruled Blount’s
        objections, adopted the R&R, and granted summary judgment to
        the defendants. Blount timely appealed.
                            II.      Standard of Review
               We review “de novo a district court’s disposition of a sum-
        mary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, applying the
        same legal standards as the district court.” Durruthy v. Pastor, 351
        F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate
        when depositions, discovery, and affidavits show that “there is no
        genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
        to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
               Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “a pro se
        litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary judg-
        ment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a
        fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment.”
        Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). “[T]he non-
        moving party may not rely solely on the pleadings, but by affida-
        vits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions must
        show that there are specific facts demonstrating that there is a gen-
        uine issue for trial.” Id. “Conclusory allegations and speculation
        are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Valder-
        rama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 2015).
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        22-10479               Opinion of the Court                          9

                                      III.   Analysis
                                 A. Qualified Immunity Law
               The district court granted the defendants’ motion for sum-
        mary judgment and found that the defendants were entitled to
        qualified immunity from Blount’s Fourteenth and Eighth Amend-
        ment claims.
               To invoke qualified immunity, public officials must first
        show that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary
        authority. Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013).
        The term “discretionary authority” covers “all actions of a govern-
        mental official that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the perfor-
        mance of his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his authority.”
        Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
        marks omitted).
                 If the defendants establish that they were acting within the
        scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plain-
        tiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate. Over-
        coming the defendants’ qualified immunity defense ordinarily in-
        volves a two-part inquiry. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130,
        1137 (11th Cir. 2007). We consider whether (1) “the facts, con-
        strued in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that a con-
        stitutional right has been violated,” and (2) “the right violated was
        ‘clearly established.’” Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 904 (11th
        Cir. 2011) (per curiam). We can decide these issues in either order,
        but the plaintiff must satisfy both showings to survive a qualified
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        10                        Opinion of the Court               22-10479

        immunity defense. Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir.
        2019).
                              B. Qualified Immunity Discussion
                First, we note that it is uncontested that the defendants acted
        within the scope of their discretionary authority. Maddox, 727 F.3d
        at 1120. Nor did Blount object to the magistrate judge’s finding
        that the defendants were acting within the scope of their duties at
        all relevant times, and he has also not raised this issue on appeal.
        See Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149
        (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
        739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, he has abandoned
        any arguments in this respect.
                Next, the burden shifts to Blount to demonstrate that quali-
        fied immunity is inappropriate. Blount argues that the defendants
        violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
        in his disciplinary and reclassification hearings. Blount also argues
        that ADOC officials actually killed Smith, and that he, Blount, was
        assigned to solitary confinement in an effort to conceal that fact.
        Thus, Blount argues, his confinement violated his Eighth Amend-
        ment rights.
               We will address each argument in turn.
                             i.    Fourteenth Amendment
               First, Blount argues that his hearings were constitutionally
        deficient and were used arbitrarily and capriciously to cover up the
        role of the corrections officers in the death of Smith. Second,
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        22-10479               Opinion of the Court                         11

        Blount argues that he was denied due process because the defend-
        ants found him guilty of assaulting Smith at his disciplinary hearing
        without providing “some evidence” on which the hearing officer
        could have based his findings. Specifically, he argues that there was
        no corroboration of the information provided by confidential
        sources as required by Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional In-
        stitution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985).
                 Prisoners may claim the protections of the Fourteenth
        Amendment’s Due Process Clause and “may not be deprived of
        life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Wolff v.
        McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Two situations in which a pris-
        oner can be deprived of his liberty such that due process is required
        are: (1) “when a change in the prisoner’s conditions of confinement
        is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the
        court,” and (2) “when the state has consistently bestowed a certain
        benefit to prisoners, usually through statute or administrative pol-
        icy, and the deprivation of that benefit ‘imposes atypical and signif-
        icant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
        of prison life.’” Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1290–91 (11th Cir.
        1999) (per curiam).
                If a prisoner has a protected liberty interest implicated by a
        disciplinary action, the Due Process Clause requires: (1) written no-
        tice of the charges at least 24 hours before a hearing, so that an
        inmate may prepare a defense; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses
        and present evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement of
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10479

        the evidence relied on and the reasons for the sanctions imposed.
        Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 566.
               Additionally, the disciplinary action must be “supported by
        some evidence in the record.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. In the context
        of revocation of good time, the Supreme Court has elaborated on
        that standard, stating that:
               [T]he requirements of due process are satisﬁed if
               some evidence supports the decision by the prison
               disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This
               standard is met if there was some evidence from
               which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal
               could be deduced. Ascertaining whether this stand-
               ard is satisﬁed does not require examination of the en-
               tire record, independent assessment of the credibility
               of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead,
               the relevant question is whether there is any evidence
               in the record that could support the conclusion
               reached by the disciplinary board.

        Id. at 455–56 (internal quotation marks, citation, and ellipsis omit-
        ted).
               In Young v. Jones, we found that the “some evidence” require-
        ment was satisfied in a disciplinary action for a prison escapee
        where a correctional officer testified under oath that (1) he received
        information from a confidential informant that the plaintiff had at-
        tempted to escape, (2) the confidential informant had been reliable
        in the past, (3) several sources described the escapee as having fea-
        tures similar to plaintiff such as having a “salt and pepper beard,”
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        22-10479               Opinion of the Court                        13

        and (4) one source had stated that the plaintiff had been seen in the
        yard shortly before the escape attempt. Young v. Jones, 37 F.3d 1457,
        1459 (11th Cir. 1994). This Court further specified in Young that
        our role in reviewing a challenged disciplinary action is to deter-
        mine whether an inmate received the procedural protections pro-
        vided by Wolff, and whether the “some evidence” standard of Hill
        is satisfied. See id. at 1459–60.
               First, we turn to Blount’s argument that his hearings were
        constitutionally deficient. Even assuming (without deciding) that
        Blount had a protected liberty interest and was entitled to due pro-
        cess during the contested actions, we conclude that the ADOC
        complied with the requirements of Wolff and satisfied Blount’s due
        process rights.
                For his disciplinary hearing, Blount received detailed written
        notice of the charges against him and of his rights during the inves-
        tigations and hearings. Blount had the opportunity to present evi-
        dence and witnesses, as stated in the notice provided before his dis-
        ciplinary hearings. Blount utilized that opportunity by (1) naming
        three witnesses to testify (even though they ultimately did not tes-
        tify), (2) testifying himself, and (3) providing written questions for
        his witnesses and Officer Burks, who answered the questions.
        Blount also received written statements of the findings against him
        and the evidence relied upon by the disciplinary panel. For his re-
        classification hearings, Blount received notice of those hearings and
        had an opportunity to present evidence.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10479

               Next, we turn to Blount’s argument that the only evidence
        supporting his disciplinary report was sworn testimony by the cor-
        rections officer, which was insufficient because there was no cor-
        roboration of the information. Blount’s argument lacks merit.
        Burks testified that (1) he learned about the assault from multiple
        confidential informants, (2) the confidential informants had been
        reliable in the past, (3) those informants were present at the time
        of the assault and identified Blount in a photo line-up as the assail-
        ant. Thus, as in Young, this testimony likely provided sufficient sup-
        port to satisfy the “some evidence” requirement set forth in Hill.
               Thus, Blount failed to demonstrate that the defendants vio-
        lated Blount’s due process rights, or that the defendants were not
        entitled to qualified immunity concerning his due process claims.
                              ii.   Eighth Amendment
               Blount argues that the district court erred in granting sum-
        mary judgment to the defendants on his Eighth Amendment
        claims. He asserts that his assignment to solitary conﬁnement for
        30 months qualiﬁed as cruel and unusual punishment because
        ADOC oﬃcials falsiﬁed evidence to place Smith’s death on Blount.
        He also asserted that he was kept in a condemned segregation cell
        for 28 days before he set ﬁre to the cell.
               To state an Eighth Amendment claim premised on failure to
        prevent harm, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a substantial risk of seri-
        ous harm existed; (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent
        to that risk . . .; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
        defendants’ conduct and the Eighth Amendment violation.” Bowen
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        22-10479                Opinion of the Court                         15

        v. Warden Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016).
        We use an objective standard to examine the first element—a sub-
        stantial risk of harm—and the plaintiff must demonstrate “condi-
        tions that were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious
        injury to [the plaintiff’s] future health or safety.” Marbury v. War-
        den, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). The second
        element, whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent, in-
        volves an objective and subjective component:
               Subjectively, the oﬃcial must both be aware of facts
               from which the inference could be drawn that a sub-
               stantial risk of serious harm exists, and also draw the
               inference. Objectively, the oﬃcial must have re-
               sponded to the known risk in an unreasonable man-
               ner, in that he or she knew of ways to reduce the
               harm but knowingly or recklessly declined to act.

        Id. (internal quotation marks, footnote, and ellipsis omitted).
                First, Blount alleges several facts, particularly concerning his
        cell’s condition, which he raised before the district court only in his
        second amended complaint. But he failed to object to the magis-
        trate judge’s R&R that his motion to amend be denied, and he fails
        to argue before us that the district court erred in doing so. Accord-
        ingly, he has abandoned any such arguments and we need not ex-
        amine them. Resol. Tr. Corp., 99 F.2d at 1149; Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at
        680; see also United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.
        2022) (en banc).
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        16                    Opinion of the Court                22-10479

               Next, Blount failed to demonstrate a violation of the Eighth
        Amendment, as the district court correctly found that no evidence
        in the record stated that any defendant was aware of him suffering
        any harm in solitary confinement or of a substantial risk that he
        would suffer substantial harm. Thus, Blount failed to show that
        the defendants possessed the required knowledge to support an
        Eighth Amendment claim. Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233.
                                IV.   Conclusion
               We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
        favor of the defendants, having correctly found that the defendants
        were entitled to qualified immunity.
              AFFIRMED.