Court Opinion

ID: 9855431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:24:42.017106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:42.147777
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
An accused is entitled to an appropriate instruction telling the jury the law applicable to his theory of the case, provided evidence is adduced supporting the instruction. Banner v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 640, 645-46, 133 S.E.2d 305, 309 (1963); Wade v. Com*350monwealth, 202 Va. 117, 123-24, 116 S.E.2d 99, 104 (1960); Jones v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 133, 144-45, 45 S.E.2d 908, 913 (1948). Furthermore, “it is well settled that each party has the right to have presented to the jury its contention upon vital points in language to be chosen by it, provided such language is in keeping with the law.” Jeffress v. Virginia Ry. & P. Co., 127 Va. 694, 714, 104 S.E. 393, 399 (1920).
In the present case, Williams contends that the victim’s own actions were the proximate cause of his death. There was testimony that the victim said “that he didn’t have a damn thing to live for” and immediately thereafter he “jumped right out in the road in front of the car, and the car hit him.” Additionally, the evidence indicates that the victim was highly intoxicated. Clearly, therefore, the defendant presented evidence supporting his theory of the case.
Nevertheless, the majority says that the trial court did not err in refusing Instruction E because “the instruction was defective in form.” The instruction “assumed that Reeves was intoxicated, and, therefore, it would have usurped the jury’s prerogative to decide whether he was intoxicated or not.” Nothing in the record indicates that the Commonwealth voiced any objection to the form of the instruction or that this was the basis for the trial court’s ruling. To the contrary, the court refused the instruction “on the grounds that the contributory negligence, if any, of the decedent has no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused.” Obviously, the instruction relates to proximate cause and not to contributory negligence.
The majority, therefore, finds other grounds for affirming the trial court. The undisputed evidence established that the victim was intoxicated; therefore, the defect the majority finds in the form of the instruction is patently innocuous. The majority also holds that the court properly refused the instruction because five granted instructions “encompassed the theory of proximate cause.” Consequently, the majority reasons, “Williams could have argued and the jury could have found that Reeves’ conduct, and not Williams’ negligence, was the proximate cause of the accident.” However, none of the instructions focused upon proximate cause according to the defendant’s theory of the case, i.e., that the victim’s actions were the proximate cause of his death.
The present case is analogous to Wade. Wade also was tried on a charge of involuntary manslaughter for alleged criminal negli*351gence in the operation of a motor vehicle. The court refused an instruction which accurately defined criminal negligence from the defendant’s perspective. It refused another instruction which would have told the jury that if it had a reasonable doubt as to who was driving the motor vehicle, it must find the defendant not guilty.
Because three granted instructions also defined criminal negligence and told the jury of the elements of the offense, the Commonwealth contended on appeal that the court did not err in refusing the two instructions offered by the defendant. We rejected this contention, saying that the refused instructions “set forth defendant’s theory of the case in a positive way.” Id. at 124, 116 S.E.2d at 104.
Likewise, the refused instruction in the present case was the only one which set forth Williams’ theory of the case in a “positive way,” and I believe its refusal constituted reversible error. Therefore, I would reverse the case and remand it for a new trial.