Court Opinion

ID: 9896496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 13:09:21.872344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:04.429342
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued November 9, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-23-00247-CR
                           ———————————
                   DESIREE LYNN JOHNSON, Appellant
                                         V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 19th District Court
                        McLennan County, Texas1
                    Trial Court Case No. 2021-1410-C1

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

1
     Pursuant to its docket equalization authority, the Supreme Court of Texas
     transferred this appeal to this Court. See Misc. Docket No. 23–9017 (Tex. Mar. 21,
     2023); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (authorizing transfer of cases);
     TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
      After appellant, Desiree Lynn Johnson, with an agreed punishment

recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possession

of a controlled substance: namely methamphetamine, weighing less than one gram,2

the trial court deferred adjudication of her guilt, placed her on community

supervision for four years, and assessed a fine of $750.00. The State, alleging

numerous violations of the conditions of appellant’s community supervision, later

moved to adjudicate her guilt. After a hearing, the trial court found the allegations

true, found appellant guilty, and assessed her punishment at confinement for

twenty-four months and a fine of $750.00. In three issues, appellant contends that

the trial court erred in not giving her an opportunity to present “punishment

evidence” before adjudicating her guilty and imposing her sentence and her trial

counsel provided her with ineffective assistance of counsel.

      We affirm.

                                   Background

      On May 20, 2022, appellant pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possession

of a controlled substance: namely methamphetamine, weighing less than one gram.3

The trial court deferred adjudication of appellant’s guilt and placed her on

2
      See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(6), 481.115(a), (b).
3
      See id.
                                         2
community supervision, subject to certain conditions, which stated that appellant

must:

        1.     Neither commit nor be convicted of any offense against the laws
               of [the] State of Texas, or any other State in the United States
               and report any arrest to the Adult Probation Officer within ten
               days[.]

        ....

        12.    Submit to and pay the fee for drug and alcohol testing . . . .

        ....

        16.    Pay the costs and fees of th[e] cause to the District Clerk of
               McLennan County, Texas at the rate of $25.00 per month,
               beginning 60 days from the date of probation, with a like amount
               to be paid each consecutive month thereafter on the same day of
               each month until said amount is paid in full. . . . The Court
               assesses all court appointed attorney’s fees, investigator’s fees,
               and interpreter’s fees as costs in th[e] cause and Orders
               [appellant] to pay the same. . . .

        17.    Pay the sum of $60.00 to the McLennan County Community
               Supervision and Corrections Department each month during said
               term of probation said sum to be used in the administration of
               Adult Probation as provided by law.

        18.    Pay the sum of $65.00 to the McLennan County Community
               Supervision and Corrections Department to defray the cost of the
               Pre-Sentence Investigation at the rate of $5.00 per month,
               beginning 60 days from the date of probation with a like amount
               to be paid each consecutive month thereafter on the same day of
               each month until said amount is paid in full.

        19.    Participate in a community[-]based program by contributing
               through the McLennan County Community Supervision and
               Corrections Department, the sum of $25.00 to Crimestoppers,
               Inc. within 30 days from the date of probation.
                                            3
....

26.    Pay the $750.00 fine through the McLennan County Community
       Supervision and Corrections Department at the monthly rate of
       $25.00 per month, beginning 60 DAYS from the date of
       probation, with a like amount to be paid each consecutive month
       thereafter until said amount is paid in full.

....

29.    . . . [A]ttend and complete the Texas Drug Offender Education
       Program offered through the McLennan County Community
       Supervision and Corrections Department. [Appellant] must
       begin within 90 days from the date of probation, complete the
       program within 180 days, and pay a fee of $90.00. If [appellant]
       is disenrolled from the assigned school, [appellant] will be
       required to pay a fee of $50.00 for each additional school
       assigned.

....

32.    . . . [A]ttend, participate and successfully complete the
       McLennan County Community Supervision and Corrections
       Department’s Cognitive Education – Substance Abuse Program.
       [Appellant] must pay the program fee of $350.00 and if
       disenrolled from the program, []she will be required to pay a fee
       of $100.00 for each additional enrollment.

....

34.    . . . [S]ubmit to an alcohol/drug evaluation conducted by the
       McLennan County CSCD Treatment Program and follow all
       recommendations of the evaluation to include outpatient and/or
       residential treatment. [Appellant] shall be required to pay $25.00
       for the cost of the evaluation within 30 days of the evaluation.

35.    . . . [M]ake full reparation in the amount of $180.00 to be paid
       through the McLennan County Community Supervision and
       Corrections Department in favor of the Texas Department of
                                    4
            Public Safety at the rate of $5.00 per month, beginning
            IMMEDIATELY with a like amount to be paid each month
            thereafter until said amount is paid in full. . . .

      On September 2, 2022, the State moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt,

alleging that appellant had violated eleven conditions of her community supervision

by:

      1.    On or about August 15, 2022, committ[ing] the subsequent
            offense of Falsification of Drug Test Results in McLennan
            County, Texas.

      2.    Fail[ing] to pay the Court Costs assessed by th[e] Court, to-wit:
            [Appellant] failed to pay $962.00 in Court [C]osts as ordered by
            th[e] Court. . . .

      3.    Fail[ing] to pay the sum of $60.00 to the Adult Probation
            Department of McLennan County, Texas, each month during the
            term of probation[,] to-wit: [Appellant] failed to pay []her
            monthly Probation fee. . . .

      4.    Fail[ing] to pay the sum of $5.00 to the Adult Probation
            Department of McLennan County, Texas, each month during the
            term of probation, to-wit: [Appellant] failed to pay []her monthly
            Pre-Sentence Investigation fee. . . .

      5.    Fail[ing] to pay the sum of $25.00 to the Adult Probation
            Department of McLennan County, Texas[,] to-wit: [Appellant]
            failed to pay []her Crime Stoppers fee. . . .

      6.    Fail[ing] to pay the fine assessed against []her by the Court,
            to-wit: [Appellant] failed to pay the $750.00 fine assessed at the
            rate of $25.00 per month, as ordered by th[e] Court. . . .

      7.    Fail[ing] to pay the sum of $90.00 to the Adult Probation
            Department of McLennan County, Texas[,] to-wit: [Appellant]
            failed to pay []her Drug School fee. . . .

                                         5
      8.     Fail[ing] to pay the Screening Fee in the amount of $25.00 as
             ordered by th[e] Court. . . .

      9.     Fail[ing] to pay restitution through the Adult Probation
             Department, to-wit: [Appellant] was ordered by th[e] Court to
             make restitution in the amount of $180.00 through the Adult
             Probation Department of McLennan County, Texas, at a rate of
             $5.00, and continuing in a like amount each month thereafter
             until the full amount was paid. . . .

      10.    Fail[ing] to pay the Cognitive Education Substance Abuse
             Program Fee in the amount of $350.00 as ordered by th[e]
             Court. . . .

      11.    Fail[ing] to pay the sum of $9.50 to the Adult Probation
             Department of McLennan County, Texas each month during the
             term of probation[,] to-wit: [Appellant] failed to pay []her
             monthly Urine Analysis [F]ee. . . .

      On February 23, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to

adjudicate guilt, during which appellant pleaded “true” to the allegations in the

State’s motion. After the hearing, the trial court found all the allegations true, found

appellant guilty, and assessed her punishment at confinement for twenty-four

months and a fine of $750.00.

                                Punishment Hearing

      In her first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing her

an “opportunity to present punishment evidence” before assessing her punishment

at confinement for twenty-four months and a fine of $750.00 because a trial “court

must conduct a separate second phase to determine punishment” after finding true

an allegation of a violation of a condition of community supervision.

                                           6
      After the trial court adjudicates a defendant guilty during a hearing on the

State’s motion to adjudicate, the defendant “is entitled to a punishment hearing,” and

“the trial [court] must allow the [defendant] the opportunity to present evidence.”

Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (emphasis and internal

quotations omitted); Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)

(emphasis omitted); see also TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.110(a).

Although a defendant is entitled to a punishment hearing after an adjudication of

guilt, this right can be waived. Vidaurri, 49 S.W.3d at 885–86. To preserve a

complaint that the trial court erred in failing to hold a punishment hearing, a

defendant must timely object or file a motion for new trial if she was not afforded

the opportunity to object. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d

264, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (objection is timely if it is made as soon as the

ground for the objection becomes apparent); Vidaurri, 49 S.W.3d at 885–86;

Hardeman v. State, 1 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Meserve v.

State, No. 10-12-00415-CR, 2013 WL 5773347, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 24,

2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

      Here, at the hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate, appellant did not

object to the trial court’s failure to allow her to present punishment evidence or hold

a punishment hearing. To the extent that appellant asserts in her briefing that she

was not afforded the opportunity to object and present punishment evidence at the

                                          7
hearing, we note that appellant did not file a motion for new trial raising her

complaint. Thus, we hold that appellant waived her right to a punishment hearing

and appellant’s complaint is not preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., Smith v.

State, No. 10-07-00075-CR, 2008 WL 2133057, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 21,

2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

                         Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      In her second issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel because he failed to request a separate punishment hearing,

object to the trial court’s failure to sua sponte conduct a separate punishment hearing,

or “request a separate punishment [hearing] through a motion for new trial.” In her

third issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of

counsel because he did not “challenge the implicit finding that [a]ppellant had the

ability to pay her court costs and fine.”

      The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right

to the reasonably effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. U.S.

CONST. VI; Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.05; Hernandez v. State,

726 S.W.2d 53, 55–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (test for ineffective assistance of

counsel same under both federal and state constitutions). To prove a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that (1) her trial counsel’s

                                            8
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687–88, 694 (1984); Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

Appellant has the burden to establish both prongs of the Strickland test by a

preponderance of the evidence. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1998). “[A]ppellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates

a court’s need to consider the other prong.” Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

      “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In reviewing counsel’s performance,

we look to the totality of the representation to determine the effectiveness of counsel,

indulging a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance or trial strategy. See Robertson v. State,

187 S.W.3d 475, 482–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). To rebut that presumption, a

claim of ineffective assistance must be “firmly founded in the record,” and “the

record must affirmatively demonstrate” the meritorious nature of the claim. See

Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (internal quotations

omitted).

                                           9
      Notably, the trial record alone is rarely sufficient to show ineffective

assistance. Williams v. State, 526 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2017, pet. ref’d). Generally, a silent record that provides no explanation for trial

counsel’s actions will not overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance.

Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Mata v.

State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting “presumption that trial

counsel’s performance was reasonably based in sound trial strategy”).              Thus,

because the reasonableness of trial counsel’s decision often involves facts that do

not appear in the record, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that trial

counsel should ordinarily be given an opportunity to explain his actions before a

court reviews the record and determines that counsel was ineffective. See Rylander

v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Where, as here, trial counsel

was not given an opportunity to explain his actions, “the appellate court should not

find deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593

(internal quotations omitted); accord Williams, 526 S.W.3d at 583.

      In her second issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel because he, at the hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate

appellant’s guilt, failed to request a separate punishment hearing or object to the trial

court’s failure to sua sponte conduct a separate punishment hearing. Further,

                                           10
appellant asserts that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel

because he did not “request a separate punishment [hearing] through a motion for

new trial.”

      In the absence of evidence of trial counsel’s reason for the complained-of

conduct, we assume a strategic reason for trial counsel’s conduct, if one can be

imagined. Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Grammar

v. State, 268 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008), aff’d, 294 S.W.3d 182

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Here, the record is silent as to why appellant’s trial counsel

did not request a separate punishment hearing, did not object to the trial court’s

failure to conduct a separate punishment hearing, and did not raise a complaint about

the lack of a punishment hearing in a motion for new trial. See Thompson v. State,

9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (where record is silent as to why

defendant’s trial counsel failed to object, appellant failed to rebut presumption that

it was reasonable decision); Grammar, 268 S.W.3d at 778; see also Henderson v.

State, Nos. 10-07-00030-CR, 10-07-00031-CR, 2008 WL 598430, at *2–3 (Tex.

App.—Waco Mar. 5, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(where defendant asserted trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to

object to trial court’s failure to hold separate punishment hearing or allow defendant

to present punishment evidence, holding without record revealing trial counsel’s

                                         11
strategy or motivation, defendant did not defeat strong presumption that counsel’s

actions fell within wide range of reasonable professional assistance).

      Because the record in this case does not evidence the reasons for trial

counsel’s conduct and because the alleged deficiencies in counsel’s performance

could have been the subject of trial strategy not revealed by the record, we hold that

appellant has not established that her trial counsel’s actions fell outside of the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance.4 See Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 68

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding

that [defendant’s] attorney was ineffective when the record provided no explanation

for the motivation behind counsel’s decisions. Each ‘deficiency’ of counsel claimed

by the appellate court could have been an exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.”); Osorio v. State, 994 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (“Due to the lack of evidence in the record concerning trial

counsel’s reasons for the[] alleged acts of ineffectiveness, we are unable to conclude

that [defendant’s] trial counsel’s performance was deficient.”).

4
      Here, we cannot say that trial counsel’s conduct was so outrageous that no
      competent attorney would have engaged in it. See Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d
      591, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Ortiz v. State, Nos. 13-14-00521-CR,
      13-14-00522-CR, 2015 WL 5626174, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
      Aug. 27, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (where defendant
      asserted trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to present
      punishment evidence before trial court assessed punishment after adjudicating her
      guilty, explaining record did not reflect why trial counsel did not present punishment
      evidence and trial counsel’s conduct was not so outrageous that no competent
      attorney would have engaged in it).
                                            12
      We overrule appellant’s second issue.

      In her third issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel because he did not “challenge the [trial court’s] implicit finding

that [a]ppellant had the ability to pay her court costs and fine.”

      As previously stated, to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

appellant must show that (1) her trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694; Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142. Appellant

has the burden to establish both prongs of the Strickland test by a preponderance of

the evidence. Jackson, 973 S.W.2d at 956. “[A]ppellant’s failure to satisfy one

prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.”

Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

      Related to appellant’s third issue, we need not address whether appellant’s

trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when

counsel did not “challenge the [trial court’s] implicit finding that [a]ppellant had the

ability to pay her court costs and fine” because even were we to conclude that trial

counsel’s performance was deficient, appellant, in her brief, does not argue that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694;

                                          13
Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142; see also Ford v. State, No. 01-17-00213-CR, 2018 WL

1473948, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (concluding no need to address first Strickland prong,

where appellant did not adequately brief second Strickland prong); Jones v. State,

170 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d) (not addressing merits of

defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel complaint where defendant’s brief did

not offer any argument that counsel’s purportedly deficient performance prejudiced

his defense).

      In order to assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief “must contain a clear

and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to

authorities.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). And an appellant waives an issue on appeal if

she does not adequately brief that issue, i.e., by presenting supporting arguments,

substantive analysis, and citation to authorities. See id.; Russeau v. State, 171

S.W.3d 871, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 393

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889, 901 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). Although appellant asserts that her trial counsel was

ineffective for not “challeng[ing] the [trial court’s] implicit finding [at the hearing

on the State’s motion to adjudicate] that [a]ppellant had the ability to pay her court

costs and fine,” her brief contains no argument, substantive analysis, or citation to

authorities to show that the result of the proceeding would have been different but

                                          14
for her trial counsel’s purported error. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 694;

Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142; see also Ford, 2018 WL 1473948, at *5. Accordingly,

we hold that appellant has waived her third issue due to inadequate briefing. See

Armendariz v. State, No. 11-18-00361-CR, 2021 WL 2470337, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Eastland June 17, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The

failure to brief both prongs [of the Strickland test] has been deemed to be a waiver

of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Ford, 2018 WL 1473948, at *5.

                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                Julie Countiss
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           15