Court Opinion

ID: 9790653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:56:55.12262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.730139
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice.
Defendant appeals from a divorce decree assailing generally the inequity and injustice of granting a divorce to the plaintiff. He urges that a fair appraisal of the evidence requires (1) denial of a decree to her, (2) granting him a divorce on his counterclaim, and (3) awarding him custody of their two-year-old daughter.
The marriage of this young couple had existed but a few months when obstacles to marital harmony became apparent which the parties finally have found impossible to surmount, stemming largely from the fact that they came from such entirely different home, religious and social backgrounds. The plaintiff was a native of Salt Lake City, having been reared in a comparatively well-to-do family of social standing. She had a college education and had done considerable traveling abroad. She is not affiliated with any organized church and testified that she classified herself as an agnostic. The defendant was reared in Bristol, Connecticut; his parents were Italian immigrants and their pattern of life was quite dissimilar to that of the plaintiff. Although from the record it appears that the defendant was capable and industrious in the various employments he pursued, he has never had the opportunity of a college education. He was a church member and placed considerable importance on religion and especially upon prospective religious training for the infant daughter.
During the comparatively short duration of the marriage, the defendant, for various reasons, changed his employment a number of times: he was ski instructor at the Alta Ski Resort near Salt Lake City; worked for a company making a movie there; worked as a chef in three different restaurants and clubs in Salt Lake City and in a hotel in Aspen, Colorado, where they resided until March, 1956. The parties then moved to Bristol, where the defendant first worked for a short time for his brother-in-law in a collection business and was later employed by the International Harvester Company.
In Connecticut the parties lived in the home of defendant’s mother, which proved to be a very unhappy situation for the plaintiff. She felt that she did not have much in common with other members of the household nor with other people in the area, who were mostly Italian or Polish. Other factors producing discord were his frequent change of employment and the fact that he bought a sports car, plunging into debt before providing themselves with a home. On occasions she indicated a desire for a divorce but each time he talked her out of it, particularly urging that it would not be for the best interests of their child. The tribulations of these parties, which seem to a considerable extent to *189result'from subjective feelings, and viewed objectively, may appear to be of no great consequence to others, were nevertheless sufficiently real to them that the marriage was no longer endurable for the plaintiff.
On July 17, 1956, while the defendant was at work, she took the child and her belongings and boarded a plane for her home in Salt Lake City, leaving a note to “Dear Charlie” and saying, inter alia “ * * * I am sorry to have to run away like this, but neither of us could stand a lifetime * * * don’t blame it on anybody but you and me.” Further indication of the blighted relationship between the parties, and the finality of plaintiff’s decision is reflected in a subsequent letter in which she wrote, “I am very sorry for making a tragedy in your life. You are very good and don’t deserve it, but there was no other way * * *. We simply have to make a clean break * * *. I will love, cherish and bring up Gina properly without hardships, * * * I don’t intend to ask for any alimony or support money, so I hope you won’t have much trouble paying off your debt.”
Defendant makes much of these letters as reflecting lack of fault on his part. This is not without some justification. The truth is that they also reflect some magnanimity on the part of the plaintiff. We divine from the record that, as in most cases, neither party i$ without fault, yet there appears to be much more good in both of them than the other seemed willing to credit. It is quite probable that in this proceeding under our “adversary system,” which sometimes in cases of domestic strife lends itself more to inflaming passions than to pacifying them, considerable animus was engendered between the parties, and perhaps their counsel, which tended to magnify and distort the faults each imputed to the other out of true perspective for the purpose of “winning” the case, an objective that neither could accomplish in reality because the real prize; the harmony and happiness that might have been were forever lost.
The marital relationship having deteriorated to the point where each recognized the folly of attempting to continue it, each seeking a divorce in this action, and grounds for divorce having been established, the trial court had no realistic alternative than to grant a divorce.1
We remain cognizant of the rule that in divorce proceedings which are in equity, this court will review the facts and weigh the evidence and may substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. But even so, the judgment will not be disturbed unless the evidence clearly pre*190ponderates against' the findings.2 As we appraise the entire picture disclosed by the 'record, there would he no purpose useful to either party, that could be- served by further detailing the claimed faults and shortcomings on either side. Nor do we see any practical good except perhaps moral vindiction, that could be accomplished by reversing and ordering the divorce entered for the defendant, were we inclined to do so. Suffice it to- say that there is sufficient evidence which, if believed, justified the granting of a divorce to the plaintiff upon the ground of mental cruelty and which, under the rule of review just stated, we do not see fit to disturb.
Termination of the marriage being inevitable, the object to be desired was to fashion a decree which would be just and equitable under the circumstances and, insofar as possible, minimize the animosities which had developed; and to provide the best possible basis for the parties to reconstruct their lives in a happy and useful manner, with primary concern for the welfare of their child. We remain mindful of.the propriety of indulging deference to the 'judgment 'of ‘the trial court in that -regard' and of' not lightly disturbing it. Yet uhd'er the broad powers óf review in 'equity with which this' court is endowed,3 when a divorce decree' is under attack, it ■has always been regarded as an attack upon the whole decree,4 and when it appears that there is an abuse of discretion so that an inequity or injustice is wrought, the court has proceeded to make such adjustments as it deemed necessary to' do justice between the parties and to give effect to the purpose' just mentioned ' above.5
There is one thing upon which all concerned are in accord: that a precious asset salvageable from the marriage is the little girl. In the undoubted love and concern they each have for her they have a common interest; and a common objective in seeing that she is provided for, not only with the material necessities, but with a wholesome total environment to the end that she may realize her fullest potential in a happy, well-adjusted and useful life. It is to be appreciated that for these people, with such divergent points of view, *191and the troubles that have passed between them, the accomplishment of this purpose will present a formidable challenge tp maturity of mind and character of both of them. Notwithstanding differences on other matters, it must be agreed that one of the indispensable necessities for the child is that she have a loving and respectful relationship with both of her parents.
We can see no reason for disturbing the trial court’s decree in regard to the child. Custody was’ awarded to her mother, where she of course should be,6 subject to the reasonable right of visitation by the defendant. It is also discreet and proper that he be required to pay $50 per month for the child’s support as provided in the decree, but as to certain other provisións we conclude otherwise.
There is considerable disparity between the economic situations of the parties. The defendant felt impelled to quit his job in Connecticut and come to Utah to defend this action, in spite of the plaintiff’s discouraging him from doing so. Under searching examination he could show .only $30; he owes and must pay at least a $500 note the parties signed jointly, and he has -now 'been inducted' into the army (a fact , acknowledged by both counsel in argument and as printed -in plaintiff’s own brief),7 so- that for some time, at least during his term in the army, his income will be very limited. It is- without dispute that he is presently without other economic resources.
On the other hand, the plaintiff appears to be comfortably ' situated economically. The record shows that she owns in her own right' several thousand dollars worth of various stocks and is also the beneficiary of a trust consisting of substantial investments. Fortunately she has a home with her parents which she and her child may rely on until she is able to readjust her’ life-and care "for herself. She appears to be an intelligent, well educated and capable young woman and there is every reason to assume that she will do- so without difficulty. Her own opinion of her independence of any need of monetary aid from the defendant is reflected in her letter that she would “bring up Gina properly and without hardships,” and that she did not “intend to ask for alimony or support money.”
It is undoubtedly true that if the situations of the parties had been reversed and a husband with the financial resources the plaintiff has, had treated his wife in the *192same manner plaintiff treated the defendant, it would have given rise to censure and in all likelihood would have resulted in the imposition of substantial burdens upon him. No undue burden is placed upon plaintiff here. Nor does there appear to be any justification for visiting any upon the defendant. He stated his desire to support his child to the best of his ability and should do so. The award of $50 per month for that purpose should remain undisturbed; likewise the order that he pay the $500 note. After giving due consideration to the facts proper to be taken into account,8 including particularly here the degree of default and the disparate economic circumstances of the respective parties, we think that is the extent of the burden that can fairly be placed upon the defendant.
As to alimony, without injustice or imposition, the plaintiff can be taken at her word. Certainly no penalty should be visited upon the defendant because he thought enough of his marriage, his child and his duties in that regard to go to the time, trouble and expense of coming out to Utah and defend the action. His earnestness and good faith in doing so cannot be questioned. To place the burdens of alimony and attorney’s fees, in addition to those just discussed, upon defendant who is without income except as an inducted G.I. soldier in favor of the plaintiff who is in so much better economic position and has declared her ability to take care of her own needs, is an abuse of discretion which works an inequity so serious that it should be corrected. The decree should be modified by vacating the award of alimony, and by providing that the parties should each bear their own costs and attorney’s fees, both for the proceedings had in the district court and on this appeal. It is otherwise affirmed. No costs awarded.
WADE, J., concurs.
WORTHEN, J., concurs in the result.

. Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418; Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977; Hendricks v. Hendricks, Utah, 257 P.2d 366.

. See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 and authorities therein cited; Steiger v. Steiger, footnote 1, supra.

. Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 9, and cases footnote 2, supra.

. See Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 166 P.2d 516; Griffiths v. Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 82, 278 P.2d 983; Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681, 34 A.L.R.2d 305.

. See e. g. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d 277 Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214; Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977; Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 and cases therein cited; Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 116 P.2d 516.

. See Steiger v. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273; 293 P.2d 418; Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83.

. As to propriety of considering facts thug admitted, see Stuber v. Stuber, 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650, 652; Sova v. Ries, 226 Wis. 53, 276 N.W. 111; Maley v. Mundy, 47 Tex.Civ.App. 630, 107 S.W. 905.

. For a discussion of the factors see MacDonald v. MacDonald, footnote 2, supra; Wilson v. Wilson, footnote 3, supra; Pinion v. Pinion, footnote 3, supra.