Court Opinion

ID: 9741865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:03:15.386619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:26.889239
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court’s decision. Defendant was charged with attempt (murder) as a result of a December 2, 1999, stabbing. Counsel was appointed to represent defendant. Counsel met with defendant and discussed his defense with him. As in Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 305, 794 N.E.2d at 190, “On several occasions, the court provided defendant with a detailed explanation of the proceedings and informed defendant of his rights during those proceedings. Following these admonishments, defendant stated that he understood.” The supreme court in Harris held that the trial court correctly dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition without a hearing. Defendant appeared in open court and entered a plea of not guilty. The matter was set for bench trial. Trial commenced. On May 8, 2000, defendant asked that the trial be halted and that he be allowed to enter a negotiated plea of guilty. As the trial court began to speak to defendant about the plea and what he was charged with, problems apparently developed, and the court continued the matter to the next day. On May 9, the court said to the defendant, “And I guess I don’t need to know what stopped you except that have you discussed whatever it was with your attorney? Whatever it is that stopped you yesterday?” Defendant responded that he had. A discussion then ensued where defendant indicated that he participated in the criminal offense but not the physical act of stabbing. The trial court then gave defendant Rule 402 admonitions (177 Ill. 2d R. 402), and defendant repeatedly told the court he understood. Defendant never made a request for a fitness hearing and never asserted he was unfit until his postconviction petition was filed. Defendant decided to plead guilty in the middle of a trial. This is not a case where defendant was rushed through the system without anybody paying much attention to him. The trial was apparently not going well for defendant. He was able to bring it to a halt with his unexpected plea. Now he wants the State to start over. Defendant was able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. In fact, defendant has been somewhat clever. By refusing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant has preserved the benefit of his plea negotiation and now seeks to get his sentence reduced even further by reneging on that agreement, in violation of People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 327-28, 673 N.E.2d 244, 248 (1996). According to the majority, “When confronted by a defendant who may be mentally retarded, the trial court and both prosecution and defense may not simply rely on affirmative answers to rote questions to conclude the defendant understands the proceedings and the consequences of his plea.” 351 Ill. App. 3d at 307. First of all, I disagree the court asked only “rote questions.” I further disagree with the majority’s statement of when the court must, sua sponte, order a fitness hearing. When a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness to stand trial exists, the court must order a fitness hearing to resolve the question of fitness before the case proceeds any further. 725 ILCS 5/104 — 11(a) (West 2000). Whether a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness has arisen is generally a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Hill, 345 Ill. App. 3d 620, 625-26, 803 N.E.2d 138, 143 (2003) . “Evidence that a defendant suffers from mental disturbances or requires psychiatric treatment does not necessarily establish that he is unfit to stand trial.” Hill, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 628, 803 N.E.2d at 145 (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to sua sponte order a fitness hearing). Even the appointment (at defense counsel’s request) of an expert to conduct a psychiatric examination and the failure to follow through with that examination does not necessarily lead to an abuse of discretion when no fitness hearing is ordered. See People v. Vernon, 346 Ill. App. 3d 775, 805 N.E.2d 1222 (2004) . What should the trial court do in a situation like this? There are no perfect answers. The court can only give the matter its careful attention and do its best. “[Tjhere are ‘no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.’ ” People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 518, 578 N.E.2d 952, 959 (1991), quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 118, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908 (1975). Was defendant able to understand his plea? Perhaps the best thing was to adjourn the matter for a day or two and let defendant talk to his attorney and think about what he was doing. The court did that here. The majority’s decision on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is contrary to the supreme court’s recent decision in Harris. A defendant is entitled to relief from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel only if he shows that the trial court would have found a bona fide doubt of his fitness and ordered a fitness hearing if it had been apprised of the evidence now offered. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 305, 794 N.E.2d at 189. It is not enough that “the facts may have raised a bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness or, at a minimum, required the trial court to go well beyond the standard admonitions,” as the majority found in the present case. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 308. It is not enough that defendant in the present case was admitted to Hartgrove Hospital when he was 15 and 16 years old during 1995 and 1996, and the hospital report concluded that defendant had a low IQ in the mildly mentally retarded range and a history of mental health treatment. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 306. Allegations that defendant suffers from mental impairments do not necessarily establish that defendant was unfit. The issue is whether defendant could understand the proceedings and cooperate with counsel. Fitness speaks only to a person’s ability to function within the context of a trial. It does not refer to sanity or competence in other areas. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d at 305, 794 N.E.2d at 190. Again, Harris, on facts similar to those in the present case, held that the trial court correctly dismissed defendant’s postconviction ineffective-assistance claim without a hearing. We should follow Harris.