Court Opinion

ID: 9643321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:25:41.171497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:59.405726
License: Public Domain

George Rose Smith, J. This proceeding to determine the heirs of Clara McFadden Frazier presents two questions — to some extent novel ones — about the devolution of ancestral property under our statutes of descent and distribution. The facts are stipulated. Clara’s mother, Mamie McFadden, a widow, owned the land in question, as a new acquisition, at her death intestate in 1933. The property was inherited in equal undivided half interests by Mamie’s two daughters, Clara and Algerina. Later on Algerina died intestate, without issue, and her half interest passed to Clara. In 1961 Clara died intestate, without issue. She was survived by cousins on her father’s side, but the most diligent search has failed to produce any collateral kindred on her mother’s side. In this situation the trial court held that all the property passed to the appellees, the heirs of Clara’s husband, Sam Frazier, who died intestate in about 1934. We consider first the half interest that Clara inherited directly from her mother in 1933. Here the question is this: In the complete absence of collateral heirs on the decedent’s maternal side of the family, does property held by the decedent as a maternal ancestral estate cross over to her keirs on tke paternal side of tke family or does it pass to tke keirs of her deceased husband under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 61-107 (Supp. 1963) ¶ We have not previously considered a case involving a total failure of the favored ancestral line, but the statutes and the ■ decisions are so clear that we have no serious doubt about the accuracy of the trial court’s decision to award the half interest now in question to the heirs of the deceased spouse. The statute provides that in the absence of descendants “if the estate come by the father, then it shall ascend to the father and his heirs; if by the mother, the estate shall ascend to the mother and her heirs.” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 61-110 (1947). Of course it is settled that the search is not really for the heirs of the father or mother; it is for the decedent’s heirs on the paternal or maternal side of the family. Oliver v. Vance, 34 Ark. 564. Our entire scheme of descent and distribution was painstakingly analyzed in Kelly’s Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555. The conclusions announced in that opinion have become rules of property to such an extent that no provision in the statutes can be interpreted by itself; it must be read along with what the court had to say in the Kelly case. The court stated unequivocally in the Kelly opinion that an ancestral estate cannot cross over to the opposite side of the family. We first observed, at page 586, that at common law the paternal heirs “shall never inherit” maternal ancestral property, and vice versa. We then went on to declare, at page 591, that under our own statutes ail ancestral estate goes to the line from which it came, ‘ ‘ not in postponement but in exclusion ’ ’ of the opposite line. These words cannot be misunderstood. The statute itself confirms the court’s holding. Two sections indicate the legislative intent. Section 61-111 provides that in certain cases if either line be extinct tke entire estate goes to tke opposite line; but, significantly, this provision “does not apply to ancestral estates.” The other pertinent provision, § 61-107, is even more persuasive in that it refers to kindred who are not ‘ ‘ capable of inheriting. ’' This section originally provided that if there were no descendants, parents, “or any paternal or maternal kindred capable of inheriting,” the estate should go to the surviving spouse, if any; otherwise it would escheat to the State. In 1959 this section was amended to narrow the possibility of an escheat by providing that in the absence of a surviving spouse the property would go to the heirs of the decedent’s deceased spouse. This is the section relied upon by the court below. This reference to kindred who are “not capable of inheriting” provides a clear indication of the legislative intent. “Kindred” must refer to blood kin, not only because that is the ordinary meaning of the term but .also because the original statute dealt exclusively with blood kin, there being no provision for inheritance by the decedent’s in-laws. Yet in most instances blood kin, no matter how distantly related, are capable of inheriting. § 61-101. It is only in the simple instance- of ancestral property that blood kin might be incapable of inheriting. Thus the reference to kindred who are not capable of inheriting must refer to an absence of heirs capable of taking ancestral property, for otherwise the words are meaningless surplusage. It is our duty to. give effect to every word in the statute if possible. The appellants’ only real argument against the trial court’s holding upon this first point is that it would be inequitable for Clara’s property to pass to the heirs of her deceased husband rather than to her blood relatives ■on the paternal side. There is a quick answer to this argument. For more than 120 years — -from the enactment of the Revised Statutes in 1838 until the amendment of § 61-107 in 1959, by which the heirs of a deceased spouse were permitted to inherit — a surviving spouse would take ancestral property if the favored line proved to be extinct. It cannot be seriously contended that a man’s surviving widow is demonstrably less deserving ■of his estate than persons who might be extremely remote blood relatives oil the non-ancestral side of the family. Thus the inequity of which the appellants complain comes not from .the original statute but from the 1959 amendment. We cannot refuse to give effect to the plain language of the 1959 amendment merely because we think it brings about an inequitable result in this particular ease. The second question in the ease concerns the half interest that Clara inherited from her sister Algerina. This second issue differs from the first one in that it involves two intestacies instead of one. That is, Clara received half the property directly from her mother; so the maternal ancestral kindred were necessarily those of Clara’s heirs who were related by blood to Clara’s mother. The second half interest, however, passed successively from Mamie to Algerina and from Algerina to Clara. The question is this: Is Clara’s mother still the stock of descent for the favored line or may the class be enlarged to include Algerina’s blood kin as well? In the latter case the appellants would be capable of inheriting. At common law, as modified by our statutes and by our earlier decisions construing those statutes, the inheriting class would be limited to the blood kin of Mamie McFadden. This is because in the search for that ancestor who would be regarded as the stock of descent the rule was to disregard those who had received the property by descent, as Algerina did in the case at bar. The search continued up the ancestral line until it reached the first person who had acquired the property in any way other than by descent. That person, referred to as the first purchaser (or the last purchaser, if all prior purchasers be considered in chronological order), became the stock of descent, to whom the decedent’s heirs had to be related by blood in order for them to inherit ancestral property. This rule of the first purchaser was fully explained in West v. Williams, 15 Ark. 682; see also Meek, A Memorandum on the Law of Descent and Distribution, par. 20, reprinted in the Arkansas Bar Association Desk Book (1961). In Johnson v. Phillips, 85 Ark. 86, 107 S. W. 170, the court actually reached the right result, in that the decedent’s grandfather, who appears to have been the first purchaser, was held to be the stock of descent. The opinion, however, did not discuss the rule of the first purchaser. Some uncertainty in the law was created by our holding in Carter v. Carter, 129 Ark. 7, 195 S. W. 10. There the court referred briefly to the last purchasing ancestor, but the opinion actually ignored the rule by finding the stock of descent to be Fannie Murphey, who had received the property by descent rather than by purchase. On rehearing- (129 Ark. 573, 195 S. W. 1184) the court adhered to its position and, with no mention of the rule of the first purchaser, overruled Johnson v. Phillips, supra. We consider the Carter decision to be unsound. Despite the passing reference to the last purchasing- ancestor we think it clear that the court overlooked the requirement that the stock of descent be a purchaser. Such an oversight is indicated by the court’s failure to state the substance of the rule and by its failure to express any dissatisfaction whatever with the rule. We are not overruling the Carter case retroactively, as it involved a rule of property, but the case will not be followed with respect to estates that may vest in the future. The appellants insist that, under the Carter decision, Algerina must be treated as the stock of descent with respect to the half interest that she inherited. The holding in the Carter case did not in fact go that far, and we are unwilling to extend beyond its own facts a ruling that we consider to be erroneous. Carter v. Carter dealt with a child’s inheritance from its mother; so the maternal line, as distinguished from the paternal line, was actually involved. The flaw in the opinion was simply that the court selected the wrong- person in the maternal line to be the stock of descent. In the case at bar, however, Algerina and Clara were sisters of the whole blood. If we should hold that Algerina was the transmitting- ancestor whose blood is to determine the course of descent, the fundamental conception of ancestral property is disregarded. This is true because full sisters have exactly the same blood, which makes it impossible to say that property which one inherits from the other comes from one side of the family rather than from the other. We realize that the relationship between sisters may be said to be ancestral within the meaning of onr curtesy statute, as in George v. Alexander, 229 Ark. 593, 317 S. W. 2d 124, but we think it clear that the statutes of descent and distribution did not contemplate the possibility that an ancestral estate might arise from a transfer of property from one full sister to another. We conclude that, with respect to the half interest that Clara inherited from Algerina, the stock of descent was Mamie McFadden. In this view there is no distinction between the two moieties, and the trial court was right in treating them both in the same way. Affirmed. Bobinson, J., dissents.