Court Opinion

ID: 9661868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:53:40.672481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.680824
License: Public Domain

TODD, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by my respected colleagues.
I take no issue with the authorities cited, but I disagree with the interpretation of the authorities and their application to this case.
First, I do agree that an injured party cannot recover for self-inflicted damages. However, the mere fact that part of a plaintiff’s damages is self-inflicted does not relieve the wrong doer of liability for that part of the damages sustained without fault of the plaintiff.
The general application of the rule applied by my colleagues would produce such a result as the following:
While A is stopped at a red traffic signal, he is struck from the rear by B who is driving while intoxicated. A suffers a broken leg and numerous lacerations. His leg is set and properly treated, but he refuses treatment for the lacerations as a result of which infection produces permanent injuries. Under the rule announced in the principal opinion, A could not collect damages for his broken leg because he neglected his other injuries.
Could this possibly be the law? I cannot agree that it is or could be the law.
Of course, A cannot collect for the aggravation of his damages resulting from his own neglect, but he must be allowed to collect for that part of his damages which he sustained by the negligence of B and independently of his (A’s) own neglect.
Secondly, I agree with my colleagues that the plaintiffs herein are entitled to no compensatory damages (ergo no punitive damages) predicated upon damages sustained because they saw fit to “go through with the deal.” However, I cannot agree that this disentitles plaintiffs to the damages sustained prior to and independently of their decision to “go through with the deal.”
Prior to their knowledge, plaintiffs entered into a bona fide contract with defendant, induced by fraudulent representations. By so doing, plaintiffs acquired a vested right to the benefit of their bargain — not according to the true facts ultimately discovered, but according to the facts as falsely represented by defendant. If plaintiffs had elected to rescind, they nevertheless would have suffered damage, for they would thereby have been deprived of the benefit of the bargain they made. Also, even if they had rescinded, plaintiffs would have suffered other damages involved in the relinquishment of their former home, expense and loss in obtaining another suitable home, and other incidental expense and inconvenience.
*728Stated in other terms, a perpetrator of a fraud must not be permitted to place the victim of his fraud on the horns of a dilemma, saying to him:
Either rescind and relieve me from all liability or “go through with the deal” and relieve me of all liability. This is not and cannot be justice.
If all damages were before this court on appeal, the proper judgment would be that plaintiffs recover reasonable compensation for all losses and damages which they would have sustained if they had rescinded when the fraud was discovered, omitting any further damages sustained because they elected to “go through with the deal.”
Since only punitive damages are before this Court, and since the compensatory damages were fixed upon a partly incorrect basis, a suitable remittitur should be suggested or the cause should be remanded for a trial anew on the issue of the proper amount of punitive damages.