Court Opinion

ID: 9688241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:41:39.859613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:36.845666
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
LE BLANC, Justice.
A rehearing was granted in this case restricted however, to a consideration of the plea of ten years prescription liberandi. causa. The case is fully stated in the opinion handed down on the original hearing and it is unnecessary for us to restate it in this opinion.
*488As appears from the original opinion, a plea of prescription of ten years liberandi causa was filed by plaintiff’s counsel after submission of the case to the district court and before a decision had been rendered. The plea is opposed by those defendants who are majors on the ground that the prescription claimed was suspended or interrupted by the orders issued by the Commissioner of Conservation of the State of Louisiana on February 6, 1942 and on March 17, 1942 establishing drilling units of 80 acres in the Haynesville Oil Field in Claiborne Parish. The order of February 6, 1942, Order No. 35, specifically stipulated that the W^2 of the NE% of Section 21, which includes the property involved in this controversy, should constitute a production unit' in accordance with the spacing pattern and that the well then being drilled in the NW% of the NE14 of such Section should serve that unit. On March 17, 1942, the Commissioner issued Order No. 35-5, by which all separate tracts and all separately owned property interests embraced in the W^2 the NE% of Section 21 were pooled and unitized for the production of oil and gas from the Pettit Zone in said unit. That order further provided that such 80 acre tract, for all purposes of the lease-hold contracts affecting it, were to be treated, developed and operated as one lease and one unit.
The plaintiff, W. R. Sanders, was not personally served with a notice of either of the hearings called for the purpose of considering and acting upon the orders that were subsequently issued nor was he personally notified that such orders had been issued and in consequence thereof he contends that he was not affected by either and further that they are both invalid and illegal. This, he further contends, had no effect on the running of the prescription which he pleads and under which he maintains that he owns one-half of the mineral rights in the property.
On the original hearing, although the point had not been urged, we came to the conclusion that the Commissioner of Conservation whose orders were being challenged was a necessary party to this litigation and, on our own motion, dismissed plaintiff’s suit as against all of the defendants, except the two minors who had an interest in the property, as in case of non-suit and, as is further observed, it was stated in the opinion that a decree of that character would permit the plaintiff to pursue further litigation, if he so desired, against the remaining defendants and the Commissioner of Conservation of the State of Louisiana.
Our further consideration of that point in the case has led us to a different conclusion and as we are now of the opinion that the Commissioner of Conservation is- not a necessary party defendant to the litigation, it will become necessary for us to pass also on the further question that is presented with respect to the validity of his orders and whether or not the plaintiff was affected by them.
*490It now also occurs to us that plaintiff was without right or interest to question the orders of the Commissioner because at the time they were issued in February and March of 1942, he had no more than a reversionary interest in the mineral rights he now claims.
As is pointed out in the statement of facts in the original opinion, plaintiff acquired the property on January 28, 1930. That deed contained no reservation of the minerals, but on February 5, 1930 it was corrected by an instrument which recited a specific stipulation to the effect that all oil, gas, and other minerals, in, on and under, and that may be produced from the land were reserved and excepted, with the rights of ingress and egress for the development thereof. As also pointed out, it is the one-half interest of such oil, gas and other minerals which were sold by plaintiff’s grantor, R. P. Bond to T. A. Flowers on March 31, 1921 that is the subject of this contest. In the course of various transactions involving that same mineral interest, two minor children obtained an interest in the servitude by inheritance, one-half thereof on November 14, 1937 and the remainder on October 11, 1943. One o'f these minors became of age December 18, 1946 and the other on March 29, 1950.
During the year 1921 the Ohio Oil Company, under a valid lease then held by it, drilled several wells on the Sj/2 of the NEJ4 of Section 21, including plaintiff’s tract of land, to what is known as the Buck-range Sand and produced oil and gas therefrom continuously until December 1931, at which time, all production ceased.
Between the years of 1937 and 1942 the Ohio Oil Company again acquired certain oil, gas and mineral leases on Section 21 from all of the mineral right holders with the exception of plaintiff and two others, and on January 17, 1942, commenced operations for the drilling of a well located in the approximate center of the NWJ4 of the NEJ4 of Section 21 and succeeded, on February 12, 1942 in completing a producing well in what is known as the Pettit Zone, a formation that is deeper than the Buckrange Sand. The present suit was instituted by plaintiff on May 17, 1946.
Production which had commenced in 1921 in the wells then drilled by the Ohio Oil Company, having ceased by December 1931, prescription would therefore have run by December 1941, unless there had been some form of suspension or interruption. The appearance of the two minors’ interest in 1937 had the effect of constituting a suspension, not only as to them, but at that time, as the law then stood, as to all their major co-owners as well. In 1944 however, the Legislature, by Act No. 232 of that year changed the law as it had been interpreted in the jurisprudence of this State, and discontinued the ' favor which had been accorded to major co-owners by reason of their co-ownership with minors, giving them however, one year from the effective date of the Act within which to *492preserve their interest by making' use of the servitude they enjoyed.1 In the meantime, however, the Commissioner of Conservation had issued the two orders of February and March 1942. Therefore, the Act of 1944 could have had no effect on the status of the servitude in 1937 when the minors’ interest entered into the picture and suspended the prescription in favor of all major co-owners and plaintiff himself had absolutely no interest in the minerals at that time other than a reversionary one and as the orders of the Commissioner were isued in 1942, two years before the passage of Act No. 232 of 1944, the minority interest in the property still suspended prescription in favor of the major co-owners; he was without any right to question those orders and need not, therefore, have been notified of the hearing of the Commissioner before which they were to be considered.
For the sake of considering those issues on which the rehearing was granted, we will assume, however, that because 'of his reversionary interest in the minerals, plaintiff was vested with some right to be notified of the hearing before the Commissioner and will now proceed to discuss those issues.
The first we will take up is the one on which the opinion on the original hearing was based and which resulted in non-suiting the plaintiff on the ground that the Commissioner of Conservation was a necessary party to this litigation.
The test as to whether one should, be made a party defendant in a given case, relates to the interest which he may have in the outcome of the suit and how he would be affected by the judgment to be rendered. For instance, a levee district to which certain lands had been forfeited for the non-payment of taxes, and its transferee of those lands, were held to be necessary parties defendant in a mandamus-proceeding brought by -a former owner tO' compel the Register of the State Land Office to issue a certificate of redemption on the ground that the Acts of the Legislature under which the transfer had been-made were unconstitutional. State ex rel. Woods v. Register of State Land Office, 189 La. 69, 179 So. 38. On the other hand,, it has been held that the tax collector is-not a necessary party to' an action between two individuals to annul a tax sale on the ground that it was made in violation o'f a • State statute, because the tax collector would have no personal interest in a judgment involving the title to the property. Wederstrandt v. Freyhan, 34 La.Ann. 705.
*494In the present case the Commissioner of Conservation has no interest in what the result of the suit and the judgment of the •court will be. Plaintiff is not attacking the orders which he issued nor the substance of those orders and has asked for no relief against him. It is only the method of procedure under which they were granted that is complained of. The judgment to be rendered can only affect the mineral rights of the plaintiff or those ■of the defendants and the Commissioner will harve nothing to give nor will anything be taken away from him regardless of the •outcome of the suit. Obviously the Commissioner of Conservation cannot be expected to appear in court and defend all •of the orders issued by him whenever such orders are collaterally attacked on the basis on, and the manner in, which the orders are being challenged by this plaintiff.
The only effect sustaining plaintiff’s contention that he was not personally notified of the hearings would be to affect the validity of the orders as to' him, in which event it is intimated in the opinion •on the original hearing that he could commence the drilling of a well on his tract of land, contrary to their provisions. But in order to do so it. would be necessary for him to first secure a permit from the Commissioner and in the light of the existing circumstances we do not see how the permission could very well be granted.' Insofar as the orders being effectual as to other land owners in the unit, that is a matter which would rest between those land owners themselves and the Commissioner and with which the plaintiff is not concerned in any manner.
The holding on the original hearing on this point will therefore have to be reversed and we now hold that the Commissioner of Conservation is not a necessary party to this litigation.
Having thus concluded on this point, we now proceed to a consideration of the remaining issue in the case and that is whether or not the plaintiff was entitled tq a personal notice of the hearings, as he contends, in order to be bound by the orders which were issued by the Commissioner. The trial judge held that he was and as he did not receive such notice, he was not bound by them and his rights are the same as though they had never been issued. In this we are unable to agree with the trial judge.
The constitutionality of Act No. 157 of 1940 which was enacted in pursuance of Section 1, Article 6 of the Constitution of 1921, was fully discussed and passed on in the case of Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495. The article of the Constitution created the State Department of Conservation and established the office of Commissioner of Conservation. It ordained the Legislature to enact the necessary laws to carry out the purpose of protecting, conserving and replenishing the natural resources of the State. The Act *496of 1940 prescribed the duties of the Commissioner and granted him broad powers in administering his office. These powers were recognized and upheld in the Hunter case just cited. Among them we find that specifically the Act provides in Section 5 that he “shall prescribe the rules of order or procedure in hearings or other proceedings before him * * The only restriction that is placed on him is, that in the absence of an emergency, he shall not make any rule, regulation or issue any order, etc. “except after a public hearing upon at least ten days’ notice given in the manner and form * * * prescribed by” him. In promulgating the rule regarding the giving of such notice, the Department of Conservation, on March 25, 1948, provided that the notice so required under the Act is to be published in the official journal of the State of Louisiana and in addition thereto' copies of such notice are to be mailed to the interested parties of whom the Department is cognizant. See Tulane Law Review, Vol. 24, page 157, “Conservation Laws and their Administration” by S. L. Digby and staff.
Order No. 35, which is under attack by the plaintiff in this case, itself recites that “pursuant to power delegated by Act No. 157 of the Louisiana Legislature for 1940, following publication of notice of hearing not less than ten days prior to said hearing in the Baton Rouge State Times, the official State journal and a newspaper of general circulation published in East Baton Rouge Parish and in the Haynesville News, a newspaper of general circulation published in Claiborne Parish,, the Commissioner of Conservation held a. hearing at New Orleans, La., on Wednesday, February 4, 1942 * * The subsequent order, Order No. 35-5 contains the recital that pursuant to the provisions of the Act No. 157 of 1940, and in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Order No. 35 theretofore issued by the Commissioner, “and following publication of notice of hearing according to law, the Commissioner of Conservation held a hearing at New Orleans, Louisiana, -on Tuesday, March 17, 1942, * * There was, therefore, a complete compliance with the provisions of the rules prescribed by the Department with regard to giving notice by publication. It is true, that the rule further provides that copies of the notice are to be mailed to interested parties but it is to be observed that that provision relates only to such parties “of whom the Department is cognizant.” As far as the record in this case reveals, there is nothing to indicate that copies of the notice were not mailed to all interested parties the Department knew of. If the plaintiff did not receive a copy by mail it may be for the very fact that the Department did not consider him, as indeed we do not, an interested party.
Pursuing the provisions of the Act a bit further we find in paragraph D. of Section 5, a provision to the effect that *498there may he a notice given by personal service but undoubtedly from the language ■of that paragraph the giving of such notice is a matter which rests solely and entirely with the Commissioner himself for it reads .as follows: “Should the Commissioner elect to give notice by personal service, * * (Our italics.) The paragraph ■then further provides that in case of such election service has to “be made by any •officer authorized to serve process or any .agent of the Commissioner in the same manner as is provided by law for the •service of citation in civil actions in the •district courts.”
The District Judge 'stresses the import.ance on the point of service of the notice by referring to the fact that the Act itself •prescribes the manner in which it shall be made and whilst that is true it is also true ■that such a requirement relates only to service of a personal notice which, as is •readily observed from the language of the paragraph we have quoted, is a matter that .is left to the election and discretion of the Commissioner, himself. Evidently in this • case he did not elect to give notice by personal service and chose rather to follow the form prescribed under the rules of the De•partment of Conservation to give notice by publication which was all that he was re•quired to do.
For the reasons stated, it is now ordered that the judgment appealed from be reversed, avoided and set aside, and if is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that there be judgment in favor of the defendant, rejecting plaintiff’s demand and dismissing his suit at his costs.

. Act No. 232 of 1944 is now incorporated in Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, under Sec. 5805 of Title 9. That section was amended by Act No. 510 of 1950 which does away with the suspension of prescription as to minors, giving thorn, however, one year from -the effective date of the Act in which to exercise their rights.