Court Opinion

ID: 9697223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:08:56.335619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:30.016318
License: Public Domain

HESTER, Judge,
dissenting:
In Commonwealth v. Roots, 482 Pa. 33, 39, 393 A.2d 364, 367 (1978), the supreme court adopted an illustrative list of factors which the trial court should consider in determining whether a prior conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes.
1) the degree to which the commission of the prior offense reflects upon the veracity of the defendant-witness; 2) the likelihood, in view of the nature and extent of the prior record, that it would have a greater tendency to smear the character of the defendant and suggest a propensity to commit the crime for which he stands charged, rather than provide a legitimate reason for discrediting him as an untruthful person; 3) the age and circumstances of the defendant; 4) the strength of the prosecution’s case and the prosecution’s need to resort to this evidence as compared with the availability to the *30defense of other witnesses through which its version of the events surrounding the incident can be presented; and 5) the existence of alternative means of attacking the defendant’s credibility.
I am constrained to agree with appellant that his 1976 conviction for retail theft and 1977 conviction for robbery are too remote to reflect accurately on his veracity and tend to suggest more the likelihood that he committed the robbery here than to reflect upon his veracity. I also agree with appellant that the Commonwealth had a strong enough case without having to resort to these impeachment tactics.
I find both Commonwealth v. Canada, 308 Pa.Super. 494, 454 A.2d 643 (1983), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 273 Pa.Super. 389, 417 A.2d 704 (1980), to be persuasive. In Canada, the Commonwealth was permitted at trial to use convictions which were five and eight years old for impeachment purposes. In reversing the trial court, the Canada court noted that the Commonwealth had the testimony of other witnesses to impeach the defendant and that there was a greater need for the jury to hear the defendant’s version of the facts.
In Williams, the trial court also denied the defendant’s motion to suppress his prior convictions. This court reversed on the basis that the prior convictions were for the same crime for which the defendant was being tried. As a result, there was a strong suggestion that the defendant had a propensity to commit that crime again. The Williams court also noted that the Commonwealth had other witnesses through which to present its case whereas a defense could only be presented by the defendant taking the stand himself.
Here, the Commonwealth had the trolley operator and a passenger as prosecution witnesses, both of whom had made positive identifications of appellant, Moreover, the Commonwealth had the testimony of the arresting and investigating officers. Finally, the Commonwealth had the *31alternative of rebutting appellant’s testimony with the testimony of his codefendant who had earlier pled guilty.
On the other hand, appellant had one defense witness, other than himself, who could recount the events of the crime. He had also been a passenger on the trolley. Although he testified that appellant was not one of the perpetrators, his testimony was discredited due to his criminal record and his admission that the perpetrator wore a hood which covered part of his face. I also note that one of the crimes to be used for impeachment was robbery, which was identical to the charge here.
Finally, there is no indication that the Commonwealth could not procure the testimony of appellant’s codefendant. Since the codefendant had pled guilty prior to appellant’s trial, it follows that the Commonwealth could use him to testify in order to impeach appellant.
I disagree with the majority on the applicability of Commonwealth v. Kearse, 326 Pa.Super. 1, 473 A.2d 577 (1984). In Kearse, the Commonwealth had only one eyewitness and he was unable to identify the defendant from a photo array; the witness did not make a positive identification until the preliminary hearing. Also, the defendant’s fingerprints on a bag in Kearse were discredited because some were smeared, indicating that someone else may have used the bag in the robbery following the lawful use of the bag by the defendant. Lastly, the prosecution in Kearse had no other means of impeaching the defendant or of cross-examining him on his alibi defense.
Here, conversely, the Commonwealth had three primary witnesses: two eyewitnesses who did not falter in identifying appellant, and appellant’s codefendant for impeachment purposes. Although appellant had two alibi witnesses, they were discredited because they were not certain of the date they saw appellant at home. Unlike the case sub judice, the Commonwealth in Kearse had a much weaker case in chief and no alternative means of impeaching the defendant.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.