Court Opinion

ID: 9699936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:59:16.812725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:00.877455
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(dissenting in part). I knew of no better way to legalize the Jarndyced mulct of a testator’s fat estate than to lay down an unqualified rule that his collaterally distant heirs, all of whom have been previously and steadily disinherited by a series of produced, proven, and fully residuary testaments, are eligible as contestants of what purports to be his latest will. Such rule, adopted today, aligns Michigan with that strange notion — originating in Kansas —that an unprobated earlier will, however valid and probatable that will may have been had death ensued prior to its legal revocation, is a “mere scrap of paper” having no force as evidence of a want of “interest” on the part of would-be contestants of a proffered-for-probate later will. It means, too, for this spinster’s estate, years of costly contention in 3 separate courts until some sure and final judgment of testacy is entered. The only alternative is a tributary settlement no estate should be compelled to make.
These contestants and 7-times disinherited relatives of the testatrix, having been sought out and marshalled in court by an “heir-hunting” corporation,1 are — in my view at least — possessed of no “interest” in her estate. They are possessed, today’s majority opinion considered, of a salable product which in most Michigan law offices is known by the expression “predatory nuisance.” The price of that product appraises high with release of these opinions; a price this estate must pay (necessarily in *236accordance with the so-called Dodge act of 19212) on penalty of meeting the vexatious cost of defending 1 or more additional will contests should the prosecuting attorney’s present contest prove successful.
The habit of conformity may suggest concurrence with such business. Nevertheless, and assuredly in this case of Powers, I insist on resistance of what can easily become a bad habit in appellate court quarters.
Today’s majority looks at 5 cases decided respectively in Kansas, Kentucky, Georgia, Tennessee, and Louisiana (Marr v. Barnes, 126 Kan 84 [267 P 9] ; Murphy’s Ex’r. v. Murphy, 23 Ky L Rep 1460 [65 SW 165]; Stephens v. Brady, 209 Ga 428 [73 SE2d 182]; Cowan v. Walker, 117 Tenn 135 [96 SW 967], and Feitel’s Succession, 187 La 596 [175 So 72]). Thereupon, having declared the first 3 as “preferable,” the Court announces that the mentioned heirs are “not barred as contestants by prior unprobated wills.”3 With this I cannot agree, and turn first to our venerable statute (CL 1948, § 702.29 [Stat Ann-1943 Rev § 27.3178(99)]) and the construction this Court has steadily placed thereon.
Butts v. Ruthven, 292 Mich 602, 608, declares:
*237“Tbe question of ‘all concerned’ and ‘any person aggrieved’ have been ruled upon by our Court.
“In In re Estate of Matt Miller, 274 Mich 190, 194, we said:
“ ‘The question of who may be aggrieved was settled in Labar v. Nichols, 23 Mich 310. To be aggrieved, one must have some interest of a pecuniary nature in the outcome of the case, and not a mere possibility arising from some unknown and future contingency. This is th'e general rule. * * * It is -well settled that the parties in interest in a proceeding to probate a will are the beneficiaries under the will and those upon whom the law would cast the property in the event the will was set aside.’
“In In re Zinke’s Estate, 235 Mich 201, 205, the Court said:
“ ‘If the contestant would be entitled to no share in the estate if the will was disallowed, and could take nothing from the estate under the statutes of descent and distribution, he is not an interested party.’ ”4 .
In the Zinke Case it was shown that the testator, previous to execution of his submitted-for-probate will, made an estate-releasing, advancement to his son, Paul Zinke. Paul predeceased the testator, leaving a minor son, Julius Zinke. . The will made due reference to Paul’s advancement and left nothing *238to Julius. Julius (claiming as heir under Paul) sought to contest the will. The question of Julius’ right to contest was raised and decided against him on ground that the advancement eliminated Paul’s “interest,” hence the “interest” of Julius, and that Julius would succeed to nothing even if successful with such contest.
The Zinlce Case establishes that any act of a testator which validly effects a total disinheritance of his legal heirs renders them ineligible as contestants of his subsequently executed will or wills. In such case the heirs become legal strangers to the estate the same as if, for proper consideration, they had released all interest in the estate or had assigned such interest to others (as in In re Vanden Bosch’s Estate, 207 Mich 89; cited and followed in Butts, cited above).
The reasoning of the cases my Brothers have decided to follow is summarized best in Marr v. Barnes, supra (p 87):
“How an unprobated will could be said to be a valid will and used in litigation as a valid will to the prejudice of an heir who has never had a chance to question its validity calls for a subtlety of reasoning which we would not care to follow.”
I answer that these heirs were given full opportunity below to make some showing, prima facie at least, that each of the previous disinheriting testaments would not have been entitled to probate had the testatrix died shortly after its execution. To such opportunity the heirs rose with a concession that all such testaments were validly executed and attested.5 **But even if they had conceded nothing, the proponent’s showing cast upon them the burden of overthrowing or at least neutralizing the rather *239sure conclusion that contest upon contest would, sooner or later, result in a final judgment that Dr. Powers died testate.6 When in support of his challenge the proponent produces and proves — not for probate but as evidence of “no interest” of the heirs —several preceding testaments disinheriting the testator’s heirs, it is up to such heirs to show that their quest is not that of “a mere possibility arising from some unknown and future contingency.” (Labar v. Nichols, quoted above in Butts v. Ruthven.) They did not do so here, and stood upon the naked rule of Marr, Murphy, and Stephens.
As against the “scrap of paper” doctrine of Marr, I “prefer” the thoughtfully reasoned opinions of Cowan v. Walker and Feitel’s Succession, supra.
In Feitel especially, duplicating this case of Powers, the court was called upon to consider the utter absurdity of ruling that a series of valid previous wills (not just one as in Marr, Murphy, and Stephens), shown in evidence for the purpose of proving disqualification of the contestant, failed to effect such disqualification because no one of such wills had been submitted for probate. The court said (pp 622, 623):
“If we maintain, in a case like this, that the court cannot consider a previous will merely because it has not been probated, in determining whether the plaintiff has a right of action, and if the plaintiff should succeed in annulling the last will, the plaintiff would have to bring another suit to annul the nest preceding will, when probated; and, if the plaintiff should succeed also in annulling that will, he or she would have to bring another suit to annul *240the next preceding will, when probated, and so on down the line; and, if the plaintiff should eventually come to a valid will, all of his or her victories— and all of the time and trouble given to the litigation — would be in vain. We must bear in mind that, in a case where the testator has made several wills, in each of which he has revoked the preceding will or. wills, the only one that can be probated is the last will. In this case, for instance, Irvin S. Feitel, although he is the residuary legatee and testamentary executor named in all of the wills, cannot ask to have one of the previous wills of the testator probated unless and until the last will is annulled.”
Where, as here, a former and fully residuary testament is revoked by a subsequent like instrument or instruments, such testament is not entitled to probate because it is not the testator’s final will. Nevertheless, when such former testament is proved for any relevant purpose and the attesting proof is not questioned, it becomes valuable evidence of intention as well as legal testacy: A familiar example is the case where undue influence or fraud is charged in bringing about execution and attestation of an instrument in contest. Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich 459, 485;7 In re Loree’s Estate, 158 Mich 372, 377; In re Jennings’ Estate, 335 Mich 241, 246 (per Dethmers, J.) ; 57 Am Jur, Wills, § 442, p 313, and annotation in 82 ALR 963, headed: “Admissibility and weight on issue of mental capacity or undue influence in respect of will or conveyance, of instruments previously executed by the person in question.” And see Kashouty v. Decp, 75 App DC 259 (126 F2d *241233, 234), where the plaintiff heirs, assigning undue influence, sued to set aside a conveyance by the decedent to his nephew. The realty conveyed was the decedent’s entire estate. It was shown that a will of the decedent had been filed with the “Register of Wills” but had not as yet been probated. The will directed the executor to sell all real estate and to distribute the proceeds, together with the decedent’s personal property. On this showing the question of eligibility of the plaintiff heirs to- maintain the suit was raised and decided this way:
“We cannot presume that the will is invalid. Until it is proved to be so, in proceedings brought for that purpose in accordance with the statute, the heirs and next of kin have no standing to maintain this suit.”
I hold for stated reasons that the assembled heirs of Dr. Powers are ineligible as present contestants. In all- other respects I concur with the reasoning of and conclusions reached in the majority opinion.

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 Re-enacted and now incorporated in the probate code of 1939 as CL'1948, §§ 702.45-702.48 (Stat Ann 1943 Rev §§ 27.3178[115]-27.3178[118]). The hapless probate or circuit judge, called upon to certify that the presently considered caveat or some future caveat of these heirs “appears” to be in good faith, doubtless will stiffen his stomach muscles for the ordeal of judicial signature.

 To set right the numerical score of these State court cases I would add In re Peterson’s Estate, 202 Or 4 (271 P2d 658), holding that previously disinherited contestants “have no standing in court to contest the will in question as under the state of the reeord they would have no financial interest in the estate”, and In re Livingston’s Estate, 179 Iowa 183 (153 NW 200). In Livingston the court adopted the reasoning of Wilcoxon v. Wilcoxon, 165 Ill 454 (46 NE 369), and held that the contestants of a second codicil were ineligible to contest because the testator’s will and first codicil, shown and proven as valid, left them nothing.

 If the 1955-1956 instruments now in contest are denied probate, the residuary estate of Dr. Powers will be east upon the tax-exempting beneficiaries designated for selection by her will of 1952; not these collateral relatives. And if the will of 1952 should be denied probate, the estate would be cast upon the beneficiaries designated in the second will of 1951, rather than such relatives, and so on down the weary course of disgraceful litigation.
“The little plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new rocking horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away into the other world. Pair wards of court have faded into mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of chancellors has come in and gone out; the legion of bills in the suit have been transformed into merely bills of mortality; * * * but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the court, perennially hopeless.” (Dickens’ Bleak House, eh 1.)
Our hoary eyrie, atop this venerable capitol, must not become known as Michigan’s “Bleak House.”

 These previous heir-clisiuhoriting testaments were executed and attested respectively i11 1935, 1940, 1947, March 11, 1951, June 5, 1951 and February 2, 1952.

 The question of eligibility of these heirs to contest was properly raised by motion in advance of trial (In re Elliott’s Estate, 285 Mich 579, 582 and eases therein cited). Such practice is not exclusive, of course. The question may be raised during trial of a will contest whenever, by proof, concession, or opening statements of counsel, it appears that the contestants have no “interest” and so are not “concerned.”

 “The former wills, and other pecuniary arrangements for Mrs. Beaubien, connected with them, were properly received in evidence. It is true, of course, that making one will does not, of itself, render it at all unlikely that another will may be substituted; but previous preferences and plans may have a plain bearing upon an issue, where the question arises whether the testator has understandingly, and of his own free will, changed his settled views. No case has been cited holding such proof inadmissible. It is of very frequent occurrence in the cases reported: (citing cases).”