Court Opinion

ID: 9777266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:05:15.693503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:51.224541
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting.
Largely for the reasons articulated in my dissenting opinion in In re L.S., 257 P.3d 201 (Colo.2010) (Coats, J., dissenting), I disagree with the majority opinion in this case as well. As I indicated there, I consider our jurisdiction to modify or fail to enforce an initial child-custody order of another state to be governed by our enactment of the UCCJEA, which requires us to accept a determination by that state of its own jurisdiction, as long as that determination was made on the basis of provisions substantially conforming to the procedural requirements and jurisdictional standards of the UCCJEA. See §§ 14-13-206(1), 808(1), C.R.S. (2010). I therefore respectfully dissent.
In addition to the reasons offered in that opinion, I note only that in this case the majority not only challenges the New York Supreme Court's application of the UCCJEA in determining its own jurisdiction, but also the correctness of its refusal to be bound by a ruling of a family law magistrate of its own jurisdiction. There does not appear to be any question that the majority's reversal of the Colorado district court's decision to enforce New York's child-custody determination rests entirely on the earlier declination of jurisdiction by a New York magistrate. The UCCJEA permits a state's exclusive jurisdiction to continue only until a court of that state determines that a parent no longer has a significant connection and evidence is no longer available in that state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships. § 14-18-202(1)(a), C.R.S. (2010); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 76-a(l)(a) (McKinney 2010). Although the New York court's order to return the children to their father preceded any order or assertion of jurisdiction by this state, and therefore may well have been justified on other grounds, its finding of "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction," based on New York's original 2004 custody determination, makes clear that it did not accept the magistrate's earlier ruling.
The majority reviews the New York magistrate's ruling in considerable detail to satisfy itself that the magistrate properly determined that New York no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Although the majority also satisfies itself that a family law referee is a court under New York law, it does not consider whether the magistrate's ruling constituted a final decision of a court of New York, amounting to a binding decision of the state declining jurisdiction as contemplated by the PKPA and UCCJEA, nor should it have done so. Whatever we might consider to be the merits of the New York Supreme Court's decision that it was *1151not bound by the magistrate's earlier ruling, I believe the effect of a ruling by a New York family magistrate on the courts of that state is a matter of state law, to which the New York Supreme Court's resolution is entitled to deference. Of paramount importance, in any event, is the credit to be afforded by this state to the New York court's child-custody determination onee it is ascertained that New York's determination was based on virtually the same provisions of the UCCJEA accepted by this state.
Because I believe the majority errs by going behind the New York court's determination of its own jurisdiction, and particularly so in this case by challenging the New York court's determination that an earlier ruling by a family law magistrate did not constitute the final decision of the state concerning its continuing jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice MARQUEZ joins in this dissent.