Court Opinion

ID: 9380723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 12:02:33.125164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.057600
License: Public Domain

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       TIM DUNN v. NORTHEAST HELICOPTERS
              FLIGHT SERVICES, LLC
                    (SC 20626)
                  Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
                          Mullins and Ecker, Js.

                                   Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 31-73 (b)), ‘‘[n]o employer . . . shall, directly or indi-
   rectly, demand, request, receive or exact any refund of wages, fee, sum
   of money or contribution from any person . . . upon the representation
   or the understanding that such refund of wages, fee, sum of money,
   contribution or deduction is necessary to secure employment or con-
   tinue in employment.’’

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the allegedly wrongful termina-
   tion of his employment by the defendant, N Co., claiming that his termina-
   tion was in violation of the public policy articulated in § 31-73 (b). N
   Co., which operates a helicopter flight training school, originally hired
   the plaintiff as a flight instructor and later promoted him to the role of
   chief pilot. The plaintiff was an at-will employee, and his claim was
   based on the cause of action recognized by this court in Sheets v. Teddy’s
   Frosted Foods, Inc. (179 Conn. 471), for the discharge of an at-will
   employee when the employee can demonstrate a demonstrably improper
   reason for the discharge that is derived from the violation of public
   policy. The plaintiff, while employed at N Co., decided to pursue an
   opportunity to become a certified pilot examiner for the Federal Aviation
   Administration (FAA) after discussing the matter with B, N Co.’s owner.
   FAA examiners are sometimes affiliated with flight training schools,
   such as N Co., and charge fees in connection with conducting FAA
   examinations, which are paid directly by students seeking to secure
   pilot’s licenses. B agreed that the plaintiff should pursue the opportunity
   and that having an FAA examiner affiliated with N Co. would benefit
   the company. The plaintiff later asked B for a loan to attend a required
   FAA training program. B responded that he would lend the plaintiff the
   money on the conditions that the plaintiff pay him back with the future
   examination fees the plaintiff would collect after becoming an FAA
   examiner and that, after the loan was paid back, the plaintiff pay N Co.
   50 percent of the future examination fees he collected. The plaintiff did
   not respond to B’s proposal or accept a loan from him. Subsequently,
   the plaintiff explained to R, an employee of N Co. and B’s wife, that he
   chose to pay for the training expenses himself because he did not want
   to share the future examination fees and that he wanted to keep the
   FAA examiner position separate from his employment with N Co. R
   responded by stating that B said that the plaintiff no longer worked for
   N Co. The parties filed separate motions for summary judgment on the
   wrongful termination claim. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion
   and granted N Co.’s motion, and the Appellate Court upheld the trial
   court’s decision, concluding that § 31-73 (b) was inapplicable to the
   undisputed facts of this case because the share of future examination
   fees demanded by N Co. could not be attributed to the employment
   relationship but, rather, involved unrealized funds from a future business
   venture between the parties. In the alternative, the Appellate Court
   concluded that, even if § 31-73 (b) was applicable, the plaintiff failed to
   present sufficient evidence to support his assertion that N Co. violated
   § 31-73. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this
   court.

Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that § 31-73 (b) was
   inapplicable and that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence
   to support his wrongful termination claim:

1. This court concluded that the phrase ‘‘sum of money,’’ as used in § 31-
    73 (b), encompasses any quantity or amount of currency, or a similar
    recognized measure of value, and is not limited to money derived from
    or directly related to the employment relationship, and that the share
    of examination fees demanded by B constituted a sum of money under
    the statute:

   The term ‘‘sum of money’’ set forth in § 31-73 (b) was unambiguous
   insofar as neither the statute’s plain language nor this court’s previous
   interpretations of the statute have limited the form the sum of money
   must take, and the legislature’s use of a series of terms, which ranged
   in specificity from ‘‘wages’’ to ‘‘sum of money,’’ demonstrated that, if
   the legislature had wanted to narrow the application of the statute, it
   could have chosen a narrower term or omitted the broad term ‘‘sum of
   money’’ altogether.

   Moreover, the statutory language did not include any requirement that
   the sum of money be derived from the employment relationship itself, the
   legislature was presumed to have used such broad language to prevent
   an employer from eliciting any form of payment from a prospective
   employee as a condition of employment or from an employee as a condi-
   tion of continued employment, and the legislature’s separation of the
   terms ‘‘sum of money’’ and ‘‘refund of wages’’ in § 31-73 (b) plainly
   manifested its intent to prohibit conduct in addition to that of a request
   or demand for wages.

2. This court concluded that the phrase ‘‘representation or . . . understand-
    ing,’’ as used in § 31-73 (b), encompasses both expressed representations
    and mutual understandings, as well as implicit representations by and
    unilateral understandings of the employer, and that the representation
    or understanding need not be explicitly communicated to the employee,
    but, rather, the employer may have a unilateral understanding that the
    employee’s acquiescence to the demand or request for a sum of money
    is necessary for continued employment:

   As the legislature chose to use both the terms ‘‘representation’’ and
   ‘‘understanding’’ in § 31-73 (b), it indicated an intention for each term
   to encompass different forms of conduct.

   In view of the common usage of the term ‘‘understanding’’ and the
   absence of any statutory language or legislative history to the contrary,
   this court declined to impose a requirement that the ‘‘understanding’’
   contemplated by § 31-73 (b) be mutual and, instead, interpreted the
   statute to permit either a mutual understanding between the employer
   and the employee or prospective employee, or a unilateral understanding
   on the part of the employer, and this interpretation was consistent with
   the statute’s purpose of protecting employees or prospective employees
   from employers who may seek to exploit the asymmetrical power
   dynamic inherent in the employer-employee relationship by conditioning
   employment or continued employment on financial demands or requests.

   Moreover, by including the phrase ‘‘directly or indirectly’’ as a modifier
   to the terms ‘‘demand, request, receive or exact,’’ the legislature signaled
   its intent to protect against not only explicit representations or mutual
   understandings, but also implicit representations or unilateral under-
   standings that the employee’s acquiescence to the demand or request
   for a sum of money is necessary to secure or continue employment.

   Furthermore, the common usage of the term ‘‘representation’’ contem-
   plates an act or statement made with the goal of inducing action, under
   this meaning of the term, a representation may be an implicit or indirect
   representation in the form of contemporaneous termination after an
   employee’s refusal of the demand or request, so long as the employee
   can demonstrate a nexus between the two, and, contrary to the Appellate
   Court’s conclusion, the representation need not be in the form of a threat
   or other explicit communication that the employee must agree to the
   demand or request, or face termination of employment, insofar as the
   language of § 31-73 (b) does not limit the representation to an explicit
   communication or threat, the definition of the term ‘‘representation’’
   includes words or conduct, and such a limitation would render the term
   ‘‘indirectly’’ meaningless.

   Contrary to N Co.’s claim that this court’s interpretation of § 31-73 (b)
   imparts a broader public policy mandate than that reflected in the statute,
   a result that N Co. argued was prohibited by prior decisions of this court,
   the line of cases on which N Co. relied was distinguishable because
   those cases dealt with explicit statutory limitations to the public policy
   implemented by the legislature, which this court refused to disregard,
   whereas § 31-73 (b) contains no such limitation.

3. The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff could not
    prevail on his wrongful termination claim as a matter of law, as the
    record contained sufficient facts on which a reasonable jury could find
    that there was a ‘‘representation or . . . understanding’’ that the plain-
    tiff was required to accept B’s demand for a share of the plaintiff’s
    future examination fees in order to continue his employment with N Co.:

   There was evidence from which a jury could conclude that there was
   either a unilateral understanding on the part of N Co. that, if the plaintiff
   did not agree to give N Co. 50 percent of his future examination fees,
   his employment would be terminated, or that the termination of the
   plaintiff’s employment was a representation by N Co. that the plaintiff’s
   acceptance of the demand for 50 percent of the examination fees was
   necessary to continue his employment.

   Specifically, the record demonstrated that the plaintiff believed that the
   termination of his employment was due to his refusal to agree to pay N
   Co. 50 percent of the fees and that B stated that the plaintiff’s refusal
   was the ‘‘last straw’’ that resulted in the termination of his employment,
   and the record also demonstrated that the plaintiff was discharged imme-
   diately after he noted to R that he did not want to share the examination
   fees with N Co.

   Because material questions of fact remained, summary judgment was
   inappropriate, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court’s
   judgment and remanded the case with direction to reverse the trial
   court’s judgment and for further proceedings.
                (Two justices dissenting in one opinion)
     Argued September 12, 2022—officially released March 21, 2023

                             Procedural History

   Action to recover damages for the allegedly wrongful
discharge of the plaintiff, and for other relief, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland,
where the court, Farley, J., granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment as to the first count
of the complaint and denied the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment; thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew
the second count of the complaint, and the court, Far-
ley, J., rendered judgment for the defendant, from
which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court,
Prescott, Moll and Alexander, Js., which affirmed the
trial court’s judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting
of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; fur-
ther proceedings.
  Michael Reilly, with whom, on the brief, was Megan
L. Michaud, for the appellant (plaintiff).
   Michael C. Harrington, for the appellee (defendant).
                          Opinion

   McDONALD, J. In this appeal, we must consider the
scope of the public policy embodied in General Statutes
§ 31-73 (b) in the context of a common-law wrongful
discharge claim brought pursuant to the principles set
forth in Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn.
471, 474–77, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). In Sheets, this court
recognized a new cause of action for the discharge
of an at-will employee if the employee can prove a
‘‘demonstrably improper reason for dismissal . . .
derived from some important violation of public pol-
icy.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 475. The plaintiff in this
case, Tim Dunn, claims that he was wrongfully dis-
charged when the defendant, Northeast Helicopters
Flight Services, LLC, terminated his employment after
he refused to share fees that he expected to receive as
a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified pilot
examiner, in violation of the public policy embodied in
§ 31-73 (b), which prohibits an employer from demanding
or requesting a sum of money upon the representation
or understanding that acceptance of the demand or
request is necessary for continued employment. In that
regard, we must determine the meaning of the phrases
‘‘sum of money’’ and ‘‘representation or . . . under-
standing,’’ as used in § 31-73 (b). We conclude that the
Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court’s deci-
sion to render summary judgment for the defendant on
the present record because (1) the statutory term ‘‘sum
of money’’ is broad and encompasses any form of money
or funds, regardless of whether it is directly related to
the employment relationship, (2) the phrase ‘‘represen-
tation or . . . understanding,’’ as used in the statute,
encompasses both unilateral and bilateral understand-
ings, as well as implicit and explicit representations,
that an employee’s continued employment is conditioned
on the employee’s acceptance of an employer’s demand
of a sum of money, and (3) the question of whether a
‘‘representation or . . . understanding’’ existed in this
case is one for a fact finder and is not an appropriate
determination for summary judgment because material
issues of fact remain.
   The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. The defendant is
a helicopter flight training school that trains individuals
to become helicopter pilots. In 2006, the defendant hired
the plaintiff as a flight instructor to be paid a salary
and additional hourly wages for time spent flying with
students in the defendant’s program. The defendant
ultimately promoted the plaintiff to the role of chief
pilot—a position he held for approximately eleven years.
The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff did not have
an employment contract with the defendant and was
an at-will employee.
  In order for a student to secure a pilot’s license, the
student must pass a flying examination conducted by
an FAA examiner, who may charge a fee for the exami-
nation. As a result, once a student completes training,
the flight instructor arranges for the student to be tested
by an FAA examiner. Some FAA examiners are affiliated
with a flight school, whereas others, who are not, per-
form examinations throughout a particular region. When
performing examinations, FAA examiners affiliated with
a flight school are not employees of the school but,
rather, are agents of the FAA and charge a fee paid
directly by the student to the FAA examiner. The stu-
dent, separate from the examination fee, directly pays
the flight school to rent a helicopter during the examina-
tion.
   The plaintiff and the defendant’s owner, John Bou-
lette (Boulette), discussed the plaintiff’s desire to become
an FAA examiner and the benefits to the defendant of
having such an examiner on its staff. At the time of those
discussions, the nearest FAA examiner was located more
than two hours away from the defendant’s facilities,
and students often had to wait weeks to schedule an
examination. In 2017, the FAA notified the plaintiff that
an FAA examiner position was available in the region.
The plaintiff notified Boulette, who agreed that the
plaintiff should seek out the opportunity. Boulette and
the plaintiff agreed that having an FAA examiner affili-
ated with the defendant would make the flight school
more attractive to students because the examiner would
be able to offer independent examination services to
any eligible students in the region, including students
of the defendant.
   To obtain his FAA examiner certification, the plaintiff
was required to attend training in Oklahoma City, Okla-
homa. In August, 2017, the plaintiff approached Bou-
lette and asked for a loan to attend the training. Boulette
informed the plaintiff that he would lend him the money
to cover the training but that he wanted the plaintiff
to pay him back with the future examination fees the
plaintiff would collect after becoming an FAA examiner.
Boulette further stated that, after the loan for the train-
ing fees was paid back, he wanted 50 percent of the
future examination fees that the plaintiff collected.1 The
plaintiff left Boulette’s office without saying anything
in response to the request, which Boulette claims he
understood as an indication of the plaintiff’s agreement.
This was the only conversation Boulette and the plain-
tiff had regarding this arrangement. According to Bou-
lette, he assumed that the defendant would pay for the
training in Oklahoma because the plaintiff would be
representing the defendant as an examiner on staff. The
plaintiff claims that, shortly after this conversation, he
spoke with Rhonda Boulette, an employee of the defen-
dant and the wife of Boulette, and he indicated to her
that he was not inclined to agree to the arrangement,
to which she responded: ‘‘[T]hat is fine. Don’t worry
about it.’’
  Following the plaintiff’s return from training, Rhonda
Boulette contacted the plaintiff by text message to ask
why he did not charge any of the training expenses to
the defendant’s credit card. The plaintiff responded that
he chose to pay for the expenses himself because he
did not want to pay the defendant 50 percent of the
future examination fees he received, and he wanted to
keep the FAA examiner position separate from his employ-
ment with the defendant. Rhonda Boulette responded
via text message to the plaintiff, stating: ‘‘[Boulette]
said clean out your desk you do not work for [the
defendant] anymore.’’ The plaintiff responded, ‘‘[w]ill
do.’’
   In November, 2017, the plaintiff commenced the under-
lying action against the defendant, asserting, among
other things, a claim of wrongful discharge under the
judicial exception to the at-will employment doctrine
first established in Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods,
Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 474–77.2 In his complaint, the
plaintiff alleged that the termination of his employment
was unlawful because the defendant had demanded
that he pay the defendant a sum of money—50 percent
of any future proceeds resulting from his independent
examination business on behalf of the FAA—as a
requirement for his continued employment with the
defendant, all in violation of public policy, as articulated
in § 31-73 (b).
   Following discovery, the plaintiff moved for summary
judgment on his wrongful discharge claim. In response,
the defendant also filed a motion for summary judg-
ment. In his memorandum in support of his motion
for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the
defendant admitted that his refusal to pay the fees was a
motivating factor for the termination, and that, although
the defendant did not explicitly tell him that paying
50 percent of the fees was a condition of continued
employment, the only logical inference, based on the
immediate termination of his employment after his
refusal to agree with Boulette’s demand, was that the
payment was, indeed, a condition of continued employ-
ment. The defendant countered that § 31-73 must be
strictly construed and that no violation occurred because
there was no evidence of any mutual ‘‘representation
or . . . understanding’’ that employment was contin-
gent on the fee sharing demand, and that a violation
of the statute cannot be inferred. After hearing oral
argument on the motions, the trial court issued a memo-
randum of decision, granting the defendant’s motion
and denying the plaintiff’s motion. The trial court con-
cluded that the facts, construed favorably to the plain-
tiff, did not establish a violation of § 31-73, and, there-
fore, the plaintiff was unable to pursue a common-law
wrongful discharge claim under the Sheets doctrine.
  Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an appeal with the
Appellate Court, which upheld the decision of the trial
court. See Dunn v. Northeast Helicopters Flight Ser-
vices, LLC, 206 Conn. App. 412, 416, 437, 261 A.3d 15
(2021). The Appellate Court concluded that § 31-73 was
inapplicable to the undisputed facts of this case because
the 50 percent of the future fees demanded by the defen-
dant could not be attributed to the employment relation-
ship but, rather, involved unrealized funds from a future
business venture between the parties. See id., 433. Addi-
tionally, it concluded that § 31-73 (b) does not regulate
an employer’s reason for discharging an employee but,
instead, prohibits the use of continued employment as
leverage to extort a sum of money. Id., 434. The Appel-
late Court thus concluded that § 31-73 (b) could not,
as a matter of law, provide the basis for a wrongful
discharge action. Id., 434–35. The Appellate Court fur-
ther concluded that, even if it deemed § 31-73 (b) appli-
cable, it agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff
‘‘failed to present evidence to support his assertion that
the defendant actually violated § 31-73 and, thus, the
public policy underlying the statute.’’ Id., 432.
   The plaintiff filed a petition for certification to appeal,
which we granted, limited to the following issues: (1)
‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the
public policy contained in . . . § 31-73 (b) is inapplica-
ble to the facts of this case and, as a matter of law,
cannot form the basis for a common-law wrongful [dis-
charge] action?’’ And (2) ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court
correctly conclude, in the alternative, that the evidence
presented at the summary judgment stage failed to sup-
port the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant actually
violated the public policy contained in § 31-73 (b)?’’
Dunn v. Northeast Helicopters Flight Services, LLC,
338 Conn. 915, 915–16, 259 A.3d 1180 (2021). We answer
both questions in the negative.
  We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles
governing our review of the issues on appeal. ‘‘The
standard of review of a trial court’s decision [to grant
a motion for] summary judgment is well established.
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits
and any other proof submitted show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. . . . Our review of the trial
court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is plenary. . . . On appeal, we
must determine whether the legal conclusions reached
by the trial court are legally and logically correct and
whether they find support in the facts set out in the
memorandum of decision of the trial court.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lucenti v.
Laviero, 327 Conn. 764, 772–73, 176 A.3d 1 (2018).
  We next turn to the applicable law governing the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doc-
trine. ‘‘In Connecticut, an employer and employee have
an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a
contract to the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects,
LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697, 802 A.2d 731 (2002). ‘‘Employ-
ment at will grants both parties the right to terminate
the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any
time without fear of legal liability.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 697–98. As an exception to the
general rule allowing at-will employees to be discharged
at any time, for any reason, this court, in Sheets v. Teddy’s
Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 475, ‘‘sanctioned
a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge
in situations in which the reason for the discharge
involved impropriety derived from some important vio-
lation of public policy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC,
supra, 698; see also, e.g., Morris v. Hartford Courant
Co., 200 Conn. 676, 679, 513 A.2d 66 (1986).
   ‘‘The question of whether a challenged discharge vio-
lates public policy . . . is a question of law to be
decided by the court . . . .’’ Faulkner v. United Tech-
nologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
In order to overcome the ‘‘inherent vagueness of the
concept of public policy and the difficulty encountered
when attempting to define precisely the contours of the
public policy exception . . . [w]e look to see whether
the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his discharge violated
any explicit statutory or constitutional provision . . .
or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened
any judicially conceived notion of public policy.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 581.
   On several occasions since Sheets, we have had to
consider the boundaries of the public policy exception.
‘‘[W]e repeatedly have underscored our adherence to
the principle that the public policy exception to the
general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-
will employment relationship is a narrow one . . . .
Consequently, we have rejected claims of wrongful dis-
charge that have not been predicated [on] an employer’s
violation of an important and clearly articulated public
policy.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects,
LLC, supra, 260 Conn. 701. When a plaintiff relies on
a statutory provision articulating the public policy, we
are careful not to read a broader public policy mandate
than that represented in the statute. See, e.g., Daley v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 804, 734
A.2d 112 (1999) (‘‘In declining to recognize an important
public policy to that effect, we are mindful that we
should not ignore the statement of public policy that
is represented by a relevant statute. . . . Nor should
we impute a statement of public policy beyond that
which is represented. To do so would subject the
employer who maintains compliance with express stat-
utory obligations to unwarranted litigation for failure
to comply with a heretofore unrecognized public policy
mandate.’’ (Citation omitted.)). We have declined to
recognize exceptions under the Sheets doctrine when
a plaintiff fails to create a material issue of fact as to
whether a defendant’s conduct violated the statutory
provision on which the plaintiff relied to demonstrate
the important public policy. See, e.g., Burnham v.
Karl & Gelb, P.C., 252 Conn. 153, 170, 745 A.2d 178
(2000) (holding that plaintiff failed to state claim
because allegations of retaliatory discharge did not sat-
isfy requirements of statute on which claim was based).
   Here, the plaintiff claims that the defendant wrong-
fully terminated his employment in violation of the pub-
lic policy embodied in § 31-73 (b). In considering whether
the plaintiff’s claim may survive summary judgment, we
must construe § 31-73 (b) to determine what important
public policy it embodies and whether there exists a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defen-
dant’s conduct violated the statute. The interpretation
of § 31-73 (b) and our review of the trial court’s judg-
ment for the defendant both involve questions of law
over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Peek v.
Manchester Memorial Hospital, 342 Conn. 103, 110, 269
A.3d 24 (2022); Day v. Seblatnigg, 341 Conn. 815, 826,
268 A.3d 595 (2022). Accordingly, we review § 31-73 (b)
in accordance with our familiar principles of statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Sena v. American Medical
Response of Connecticut, Inc., 333 Conn. 30, 45–46, 213
A.3d 1110 (2019).
  Section 31-73 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No
employer, contractor, subcontractor, foreman, superin-
tendent or supervisor of labor, acting by himself or by
his agent, shall, directly or indirectly, demand, request,
receive or exact any refund of wages, fee, sum of money
or contribution from any person, or deduct any part of
the wages agreed to be paid, upon the representation
or the understanding that such refund of wages, fee,
sum of money, contribution or deduction is necessary
to secure employment or continue in employment. No
such person shall require, request or demand that any
person agree to make payment of any refund of wages,
fee, contribution or deduction from wages in order to
obtain employment or continue in employment. . . .’’
   Section 31-73 (b) is remedial in nature. See, e.g.,
Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 160,
793 A.2d 1068 (2002). In interpreting such a statute,
‘‘any ambiguities should be resolved in a manner that
furthers, rather than thwarts, the [statute’s] remedial
purposes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Finkle
v. Carroll, 315 Conn. 821, 831, 110 A.3d 387 (2015). We
have previously stated that the language in § 31-73 (b)
prohibits an employer from demanding or requesting
‘‘any . . . sum of money or contribution from any per-
son . . . upon the representation or the understanding
that such . . . sum of money . . . is necessary to
secure employment or continue in employment.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Mytych v. May Dept.
Stores Co., supra, 166. In other words, § 31-73 (b) pre-
vents an employer from, ‘‘directly or indirectly’’
demanding or requesting any ‘‘sum of money’’ from an
employee or prospective employee upon the ‘‘represen-
tation or . . . understanding’’ that the employee or
prospective employee must comply with the demand
or request to continue or secure employment. We note,
at the outset of our analysis, the legislature’s express
inclusion of the phrase ‘‘directly or indirectly’’ as a
modifier to the terms ‘‘demand, request, receive or exact
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31-73 (b).
This phrase informs our analysis of the remainder of
the statute, insofar as it evidences the legislature’s con-
templation of both explicit communications—such as
overt threats or demands—as well as interactions of a
more tacit or unspoken nature—such as insinuated or
implicit demands or requests. Cf. State v. Phillips, 102
Conn. App. 716, 722, 927 A.2d 931 (giving example of
indirectly threatening language), cert. denied, 284 Conn.
923, 933 A.2d 727 (2007). In order to determine the full
scope of the statute, we must consider this expansive
language alongside the meaning of the phrases ‘‘sum
of money’’ and ‘‘representation or . . . understand-
ing . . . .’’
   Beginning with the term ‘‘sum of money,’’ we note
that, in the absence of a statutory definition, General
Statutes § 1-1 (a) directs us to look to the common
meaning of the words used in the statute. See, e.g.,
Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672,
677–78, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). The term ‘‘sum’’ is defined
in relevant part as an ‘‘[a]mount produced by adding
two or more numbers, magnitudes, quantities, together;
the total . . . [a] quantity, or amount, of money . . . .’’
The Universal Dictionary of the English Language
(1932) p. 1214. The term ‘‘money’’ is defined in relevant
part as ‘‘[g]old, silver, or other metal coined under
[s]tate authority to serve as currency; coin or coins in
general . . . [s]ums of money . . . [a]ny recognized
medium of exchange and measure of value . . .
[w]ealth, property, one’s fortune generally . . . .’’ Id.,
p. 741.
  On the basis of the common usage of the terms, we
conclude that the plain language of the phrase ‘‘sum of
money’’ is unambiguous and encompasses any quantity
or amount of currency or a similar recognized measure
of value. The language of § 31-73 (b) does not limit the
form in which the ‘‘sum of money’’ must be or include
any requirement that the sum of money be directly
related to the employment relationship. Indeed, the stat-
ute was written in ‘‘broad and sweeping language’’;
Lockwood v. Professional Wheelchair Transportation,
Inc., 37 Conn. App. 85, 94–95, 654 A.2d 1252, cert.
denied, 233 Conn. 902, 657 A.2d 641 (1995); in further-
ance of its remedial purpose ‘‘to prevent the employer
from taking advantage of the legal agreement that exists
between the employer and the employee.’’ Mytych v.
May Dept. Stores Co., supra, 260 Conn. 160–61. In Lock-
wood, the Appellate Court determined that ‘‘[§] 31-73
represents a clear public policy prohibiting an employer
from taking advantage of the employment relationship
by using the acquisition or continuation of employ-
ment as a mechanism for exacting sums of money
from an employee.’’ (Emphasis added.) Lockwood v.
Professional Wheelchair Transportation, Inc., supra,
94. In neither the statute’s plain language nor our previ-
ous interpretations of the statute have we limited the
scope of what ‘‘sum of money’’ may refer to, and we
see no reason to do so on this factual record.
  The legislature chose a series of terms ranging in
specificity from ‘‘wages’’ to ‘‘sum of money . . . .’’ Gen-
eral Statutes § 31-73 (b). ‘‘Sum of money’’ is a broad
term. If the legislature wanted to narrow the application
of the statute, it could have chosen a narrower term,
or omitted the broad term ‘‘sum of money’’ altogether,
as it did in the second sentence of subsection (b). See
General Statutes § 31-73 (b) (‘‘[n]o such person shall
require, request or demand that any person agree to
make payment of any refund of wages, fee, contribution
or deduction from wages in order to obtain employment
or continue in employment’’ (emphasis added)). There-
fore, we conclude that a ‘‘sum of money,’’ as used in
the statute, may include earnings or other money,
whether the source is related or unrelated to the
employment relationship at issue.
  Notwithstanding the use of broad terms in the statute
to include payments or extractions other than wages,
the Appellate Court concluded, and the defendant
argues, that § 31-73 (b) does not apply to private busi-
ness dealings between parties, even when an employ-
ment relationship exists. See Dunn v. Northeast Heli-
copters Flight Services, LLC, supra, 206 Conn. App.
432–34. The Appellate Court concluded that, because
the funds at issue related to the plaintiff’s FAA examiner
position, the money could not be reasonably attributed
to the existing employment relationship between the
parties but, rather, to a separate, future business ven-
ture between the parties. Id., 433. As a result, the court
concluded that § 31-73 (b) was inapplicable. Id., 434–35.
We find this reasoning unpersuasive.
   The language of § 31-73 (b) simply does not include
any requirement that the ‘‘sum of money’’ be derived
from the employment relationship itself. We presume
that the legislature intentionally chose broad language,
such as ‘‘sum of money,’’ to prevent an employer from
eliciting any form of payment from a prospective
employee or employee as a condition of employment
or the continuation of employment. See, e.g., King v.
Volvo Excavators AB, 333 Conn. 283, 296, 215 A.3d
149 (2019) (‘‘when the legislature chooses to act, it is
presumed to know how to draft legislation consistent
with its intent’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
   The term ‘‘sum of money’’ is separated from the term
‘‘refund of wages,’’ a drafting choice that plainly mani-
fests an intention to prohibit conduct in addition to that
of a request or demand for wages. Construing § 31-73
(b) to require that the funds be related to employment
would fail to protect employees in many other instances
in which an employer uses the power imbalance inher-
ent in the employment relationship to exact sums of
money from an employee. For example, such a narrow
construction would not protect an employee from an
employer’s demand or request that the employee pay
the employer one half of his income from a different,
weekend job, or one half of the proceeds from a private
sale of his personal automobile. Certainly, the same
concerns that underlie an employer’s demand or request
that an employee turn over his wages would exist in
these examples. In short, the statute is aimed at pre-
venting an employer from exercising authority over an
employee to require that employee to turn over funds
that belong to the employee, regardless of how those
funds are obtained by the employee.
  Having concluded that the term ‘‘sum of money’’ is
not limited to money derived from the employment,
and because there is no issue of fact remaining as to
whether the examiner fees meet this definition, we con-
clude, as a matter of law, that the share of examiner
fees demanded by Boulette constitutes a ‘‘sum of money’’
under the statute.
   We next examine the meaning of the phrase ‘‘repre-
sentation or . . . understanding,’’ as used in § 31-73
(b), which requires a plaintiff to prove that the demand
or request is made ‘‘upon the representation or the
understanding that such . . . sum of money . . . is
necessary to secure employment or continue in employ-
ment.’’ In the absence of statutory definitions, we again
look to the common usage of each term. ‘‘Understand-
ing’’ is defined as an ‘‘[a]ct of one who understands:
mental grasp, comprehension, knowledge: discernment
. . . [i]ntelligence; power, faculty, of comprehension
or thought; sense . . . [a]greement, unity of thought,
feeling . . . that which is mutually agreed [on] or
understood . . . .’’ The Universal Dictionary of the
English Language, supra, p. 1317. Black’s Law Diction-
ary contains a similar definition of the term: ‘‘The qual-
ity, state, or process of comprehending; the mental state
of a person who understands something . . . [o]ne’s
personal interpretation of an event or occurrence . . .
[a]n agreement, [especially] of an implied or tacit
nature.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p. 1837.
‘‘Representation’’ is defined as the ‘‘[a]ct of representing
. . . [a] statement, assertion . . . .’’ The Universal Dic-
tionary of the English Language, supra, p. 1000. Black’s
Law Dictionary defines the term as ‘‘[a] presentation
of fact—either by words or by conduct—made to induce
someone to act . . . .’’ Black’s Law Dictionary, supra,
p. 1556.
   The defendant contends that the statutory language
requires a mutual or bilateral understanding shared by
the parties and argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment because no reasonable person could conclude
that there was an explicit representation or mutual
understanding about the consequences that would
result from the plaintiff’s failure to share the fees, a
subject that was never discussed by the parties prior
to the employment termination. The Appellate Court
likewise determined that ‘‘no evidence was submitted
. . . that tended to demonstrate that the parties ever
reached any mutual ‘understanding’ that the plaintiff’s
agreement to the fee sharing arrangement was a condi-
tion of his continued employment.’’ Dunn v. Northeast
Helicopters Flight Services, LLC, supra, 206 Conn. App.
436. The plaintiff contends that § 31-73 (b) was written
to have a broader scope and that it does not contain any
language requiring that the understanding be mutual
before the adverse consequences of noncompliance
become manifest or that there must be a threat accom-
panying the demand or request. We construe the statute
to be ambiguous in this regard.3 See, e.g., Gonzalez v.
O & G Industries, Inc., 322 Conn. 291, 303, 140 A.3d 950
(2016) (‘‘[t]he test to determine ambiguity is whether
the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
   To properly ascertain the meaning of the text of § 31-
73 (b), we begin by observing that the legislature chose
to use both the terms ‘‘representation’’ and ‘‘understand-
ing’’ in its crafting of the statute. Its use of both terms
indicates an intention for each to apply in separate
instances—to encompass different forms of conduct.
The common usage of ‘‘understanding’’ includes both
a bilateral understanding; see The Universal Dictionary
of the English Language, supra, p. 1317 (‘‘mutually agreed
[on] or understood’’ (emphasis added)); and a unilateral
understanding. See id. (‘‘understanding’’ includes ‘‘[a]ct
of one’’ (emphasis added)). Therefore, we must deter-
mine whether § 31-73 (b) requires a mutual prior under-
standing between the employer and the employee that
the employee’s acquiescence to the demand or request
of the sum of money was necessary to secure or con-
tinue employment. There is no legislative history to
illuminate further whether the legislature intended a
bilateral or unliteral understanding.4
   In the absence of any legislative guidance to the con-
trary, we conclude that the proper interpretation of the
statute is one which permits either a mutual under-
standing between the employer and the employee or a
unilateral understanding on the part of the employer.
We agree with the plaintiff that § 31-73 (b) does not
contain any language requiring that the understanding
be mutual, and we decline to impose such a limitation
when the legislature has not so restricted it.
   There is nothing contradictory or inconsistent between
the two constructions. Indeed, the asymmetrical power
dynamic inherent in the typical employer-employee
relationship weighs strongly in favor of affording greater
protections to employees in order to effectuate the
remedial purpose of the statute. See, e.g., Brown v.
Soh, 280 Conn. 494, 506 n.7, 909 A.2d 43 (2006) (noting
disparity in bargaining power in employment contract
negotiations and ‘‘economic necessity [that] forces the
employee to accept the employer’s terms’’ (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Salehpoor v. New Mexico Insti-
tute of Mining & Technology, 447 P.3d 1169, 1173 n.3
(N.M. App. 2019) (noting ‘‘imbalance of power inherent
in the employer-employee relationship’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Due to this power imbalance,
employees implicitly understand that they must do as
instructed by their employers or risk the termination
of their employment. Section 31-73 (b) seeks to protect
employees from employers who may seek to exploit
this power dynamic by making financial demands or
requests and conditioning employment on such demands
or requests.
  A narrower interpretation that requires a mutual under-
standing between an employer and employee would
enable an employer to demand or request money from
an employee, and discharge an employee who refused,
so long as the employer did not explicitly inform the
employee beforehand that he would be discharged for
his refusal. If the legislature wanted to protect only
communicated threats or explicit understandings, it would
not have included language expressly prohibiting the
employer from ‘‘directly or indirectly’’ making such
demands or requests. The legislature signaled its intent
to protect against not only explicit representations or
mutual understandings but also implicit representations
or unilateral understandings that the employee’s acqui-
escence to the demand or request for a sum of money
was necessary to continue employment.
   We next consider the term ‘‘representation.’’ The com-
mon usage of the term contemplates that a ‘‘representa-
tion’’ is an act or statement made with the goal of
inducing action. We agree with the plaintiff that, under
this meaning of the term, a ‘‘representation’’ may indeed
be an implicit or indirect representation in the form
of contemporaneous termination after an employee’s
refusal of the demand or request, so long as the employee
can demonstrate a nexus between the two. The contem-
poraneous action of termination after the rejection of
the demand or request may signal that the employee’s
acceptance was necessary to continue employment. By
terminating the employee’s employment, the employer
may seek to induce the employee’s acquiescence to the
demand or request in order to have his employment
reinstated.
    We disagree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion
that the representation must be in the form of a threat
or other explicit communication that the employee
agree to the demand or request or face the termination
of his employment. See Dunn v. Northeast Helicopters
Flight Services, LLC, supra, 206 Conn. App. 436. The
language of § 31-73 (b) does not limit the ‘‘representa-
tion’’ to an explicit communication or threat. Rather,
the definition of the term contemplates that a ‘‘represen-
tation’’ may include words or conduct, indicating the
potential for a representation by action. If we are to
accept the Appellate Court’s requirement that the repre-
sentation be explicit, we are left with the incongruous
result of allowing an employer to engage in conduct
that it is prohibited from threatening, a counterintuitive
meaning that we will not attribute to the legislature in
the absence of clear evidence that such a result was
intended. It bears emphasizing again that the statute
prohibits the employer from ‘‘directly or indirectly’’
demanding, requesting, receiving, or exacting a sum of
money from the employee. (Emphasis added.) General
Statutes § 31-73 (b). If the legislature wanted to prohibit
only explicit threats, it could have omitted the term
‘‘indirectly’’ when crafting the statute. It is incongruous
to couple an indirect demand or request with a mutual
understanding or explicit representation. Construing
the phrase ‘‘representation or . . . understanding’’ to
require that a threat or other explicit representation be
communicated to the employee would render the term
‘‘indirectly’’ meaningless. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds,
264 Conn. 1, 135, 836 A.2d 224 (2003) (‘‘[w]e ordinarily
do not read statutes so as to render parts of them
superfluous or meaningless’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614,
158 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004).
   In sum, we conclude that the phrase ‘‘representation
or . . . understanding’’ encompasses both expressed
representations and mutual understandings, as well as
implicit representations by and unilateral understand-
ings of the employer. We also conclude that the repre-
sentation or understanding need not be explicitly com-
municated to the employee, but, rather, under the
language of the statute, the employer may have a unilat-
eral understanding that the employee’s acquiescence
to the demand or request for a sum of money is neces-
sary to continue employment. If the employer has such
an understanding and acts on that understanding by
discharging the employee for his refusal, that conduct
is in violation of the statute, regardless of whether the
understanding was communicated to the employee. The
definitions of the terms ‘‘understanding’’ and ‘‘represen-
tation’’ themselves contemplate agreements of an ‘‘implied
or tacit nature,’’ as well as representations by conduct
or words, indicating that such a ‘‘representation or . . .
understanding’’ need not be mutual or communicated
between the parties. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra,
pp. 1556, 1837. Such unilateral understandings or implicit
representations may be evidenced when, as here, an
employee was discharged immediately after, and alleg-
edly in connection with, his refusal to comply with a
demand or request for a sum of money.
  The defendant contends that our interpretation of
§ 31-73 (b) imparts a broader public policy mandate
than that reflected in the statute—a result prohibited
by Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., supra, 252 Conn. 153,
and its progeny. The Burnham line of cases, however,
dealt with explicit limitations to the public policy imple-
mented by the legislature, which this court refused to
disregard. Section 31-73 (b) contains no such limitation.
   In Burnham, the plaintiff made a claim of retaliatory
discharge in violation of the public policy embodied in
General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 31-51m (b), which
prevented ‘‘employers from retaliating against employ-
ees who report a violation or a suspected violation of
any state or federal law . . . to a public body . . . .’’
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 160. General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 31-51m (a)
(4) contained a limited definition of ‘‘public body’’ as
any ‘‘public agency,’’ as defined in General Statutes
(Rev. to 1993) § 1-18a (a). (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. The plaintiff in Burnham reported an
alleged violation of the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 to the Connecticut State Dental
Association. Id., 155. This court concluded that the
plaintiff failed to argue or present any evidence that
the dental association was a public body under the
limited definition in the statute. See id., 161. Because
we concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a
material issue of fact as to whether the defendant vio-
lated the public policy embodied in the statute, we held
that the plaintiff could not use that public policy to
support her claim of wrongful discharge. See id.
  We reached a similar conclusion in Thibodeau v.
Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 260 Conn.
691, when the plaintiff asserted a common-law claim
of wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy
against sex discrimination embodied in General Stat-
utes § 46a-60 (a) (7). See id., 693–95. Years prior, the
legislature had amended an early version of the act
pertaining to fair employment practices to limit its appli-
cation to employers with three or more employees. See
Public Acts 1967, No. 253, codified at General Statutes
(Cum. Supp. 1967) § 31-122 (f); see also Thibodeau v.
Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 702. The
defendant employer in Thibodeau employed two indi-
viduals. Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects,
LLC, supra, 695. We concluded that the legislature
crafted the act not only to include a principal public
policy against sex discrimination, but also a secondary
public policy that served as a limitation on the first.
See id., 706. The principal policy, advanced by the main
text of § 46a-60, prevented discrimination on the basis
of sex. Id. The secondary policy, which limited the first,
was advanced by the act’s limitation of the term
‘‘ ‘employer’ ’’ and served to protect this state’s smallest
employers from the significant burdens associated with
the defense of employment discrimination claims. Id.,
706–709. Because we determined that the statutory
scheme included an explicit limitation to the principal
public policy against sex discrimination, and given that
the undisputed facts demonstrated that the plaintiff’s
employer did not meet the limited definition of employer
under the act, we concluded that the plaintiff could
not advance a common-law wrongful discharge claim
premised on public policy in § 46a-60 under those facts.
See id., 718.
   Both Burnham and Thibodeau are distinguishable
from the present case because they involved statutes
in which the legislature explicitly limited the scope of
the statute and its public policy. The statutory schemes
in Burnham and Thibodeau included a definition lim-
iting the application of the statute. Here, by contrast,
we have no such limitation imposed by the legislature.
Section 31-73 was written in ‘‘broad and sweeping lan-
guage’’; Lockwood v. Professional Wheelchair Trans-
portation, Inc., supra, 37 Conn. App. 94–95; and does
not include any explicit limitations. In fact, its scope
is broadened by the legislature’s use of the terms
‘‘directly or indirectly’’ to effectuate the public policy
goals expressed in the statute. Therefore, in the absence
of any indication that the legislature intended to limit
the definition of ‘‘representation or . . . understand-
ing,’’ we interpret the statute broadly to effectuate its
remedial purpose.
   To the extent the defendant contends that, despite
this crucial difference between Burnham and Thibo-
deau and the present case, our interpretation of § 31-
73 (b) unduly broadens the statute, we disagree. Our
conclusion, that the phrase ‘‘representation or . . .
understanding’’ may contemplate a unilateral under-
standing or an implicit representation, is applicable in
the wrongful discharge setting only when, as here, there
is a termination of employment allegedly linked to the
demand or request for money. To prevail on a claim of
wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy in
the statute, the employee still must adduce evidence
linking the termination to the demand or request and
demonstrating that the employer in fact understood, or
intended, that the employee’s acquiescence was neces-
sary for continued employment. Such evidence may
include proof that, as here, the employee was dis-
charged immediately after rejecting the demand for the
sum of money. The employer, however, has the opportu-
nity to rebut the employee’s evidence by demonstrating
that the termination and the demand or request were
unrelated.
   We recognize that § 31-73 (b) may have an effect
on the pursuit of entrepreneurial affairs between an
employer and an employee outside of the employer’s
primary business pursuits. We note, however, that bona
fide entrepreneurial affairs and compensation arrange-
ments between an employer and an employee, and the
lawful exercise of managerial discretion, need not be
entirely abandoned. Rather, the statute’s purpose is to
prevent employers from abusing the significant power
imbalance that often exists between employers and
employees in the context of the employer’s primary
business pursuits. The statute prevents employers from
using continued employment as a means to coerce
employees into fee sharing or other wage sharing arrange-
ments for endeavors outside of the employer’s primary
business pursuits. This does not interfere with the par-
ties’ abilities to develop mutually beneficial arrange-
ments, so long as the continued employment of the
employee is not used as a leveraging tactic to achieve
it. Moreover, should the legislature decide that § 31-73
(b) sweeps too broadly and chills legitimate business
pursuits between employer and employee, it is, of
course, free to amend the statute.
   We now turn to the facts of this case to determine
whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that
the plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim as a matter of
law. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, we conclude that
it contains sufficient facts on which a reasonable jury
could find that the defendant, either directly or indi-
rectly, demanded or requested a sum of money from the
plaintiff upon a ‘‘representation or . . . understand-
ing’’ that the plaintiff’s compliance with the demand was
necessary to continue employment. There is evidence
from which a jury could conclude that there was either
a unilateral understanding on the part of the defendant
that, if the plaintiff did not agree to give the defendant
50 percent of his future FAA examiner earnings, the
defendant would terminate the plaintiff’s employment,
or that the termination of the plaintiff’s employment
was a representation by the defendant that the plaintiff’s
acceptance of the demand for 50 percent of the fees
was necessary to continue his employment. The fact
finder must consider all of the facts, including the rea-
sons for termination proffered by the defendant, to
determine whether the termination of the plaintiff’s
employment reflected or constituted a representation
or understanding that accepting the defendant’s demand
was necessary to continue employment. The record
demonstrates that the plaintiff believed that the termi-
nation of his employment was due to his refusal to
agree to pay the defendant 50 percent of the fees and
that the defendant’s owner himself noted that the plain-
tiff’s refusal was the ‘‘last straw’’ that resulted in the
termination of his employment. The undisputed record
also demonstrates that the plaintiff was discharged
immediately after he noted to Boulette’s wife that he
did not use the defendant’s credit card for his travel
arrangements because he did not want to share the
examination fees with the defendant. We believe that
a reasonable jury could infer that a ‘‘representation
or . . . understanding’’ that accepting the defendant’s
demand for 50 percent of the examination fees was
necessary to continue employment existed. Because
material questions of fact remain, we further conclude
that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial
court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. See, e.g., H.O.R.S.E. of Connecti-
cut, Inc. v. Washington, 258 Conn. 553, 565, 783 A.2d
993 (2001); see also, e.g., Feliciano v. Autozone, Inc.,
316 Conn. 65, 88, 111 A.3d 453 (2015).
  The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
reverse the judgment of the trial court and to remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings according
to law.
      In this opinion D’AURIA and ECKER, Js., concurred.
  1
     The parties dispute whether Boulette requested 50 percent of all examina-
tion fees or just those fees from examinations of the defendant’s students.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party,
we treat the facts as a demand that the plaintiff pay 50 percent of all
future fees.
   2
     The complaint also included a claim of failure to pay wages pursuant
to General Statutes §§ 31-58 et seq., 31-71a et seq. and 31-71e et seq. That
claim was subsequently resolved by the parties and withdrawn, and it is
not at issue in this appeal.
   3
     Although we determined in Mytych that § 31-73 (b) was plain and unam-
biguous in the context of determining its overall purpose; see Mytych v.
May Dept. Stores Co., supra, 260 Conn. 166; we now look to the text of the
statute to consider whether the specific phrase ‘‘representation or . . .
understanding’’ is plain and unambiguous. Put differently, although we have
previously concluded that § 31-73 (b) was plain and unambiguous generally,
this case calls on us to address a more specific issue, namely, what is required
to satisfy a particular aspect of the statute. Our previous determination
that the general purpose of the statute was plain and unambiguous is not
dispositive of the issue of whether the phrase ‘‘representation or . . . under-
standing’’ is ambiguous. Cf. State v. Tabone, 279 Conn. 527, 538, 902 A.2d
1058 (2006) (concluding that one sentence of statute was plain and unambigu-
ous, but another sentence of same statute was ambiguous in relevant con-
text).
   4
     The statute has remained largely untouched since its 1939 enactment.
See General Statutes (Supp. 1939) § 1321e. Although the legislation was
referred to the Judiciary Committee during the January, 1939 session, there
is no record of the committee hearings from that year, and therefore no
record of any discussion of this legislation.