Court Opinion

ID: 9453805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:24:08.79513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:48.487124
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge
(concurring specially):
Although the events at the Court of Inquiry when measured against the fact that appellant received a fair trial justify affirmance, I am convinced that the procedures of the Court of Inquiry present grave constitutional questions. Appellant contended that he was denied due process since he could not consult with his attorney, confront or cross-examine witnesses, or offer any evidence in his own behalf. The district judge rejected this argument because he viewed the *750Court of Inquiry as an investigatory body. While it is true that due process means one thing for “adjudicative proceedings” and quite another for “investigatory proceedings,” the powers and purposes of this “Court” create a substantial question of where to pigeonhole it. The latest Supreme Court decision is Hannah v. Larche, 1960, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307. There, potential witnesses attempted to enjoin the Civil Rights Commission’s investigation of voting deprivations because they could not cross-examine witnesses or know the names of their accusers. The Court rejected their claim because the Commission’s function was purely investigatory: It could take no affirmative action affecting legal rights and was empowered only to file reports that would form the basis for subsequent de novo action.1 Since the justice of the peace in the instant case had the power to arrest his court was not a passive body.
Another decision might suggest that the power to arrest is not enough. See In Re Groban, 1957, 352 U.S. 330, 77 S. Ct. 510, 1 L.Ed.2d 376. Unlike Groban, however, the Court of Inquiry is not a mere administrative inquiry for securing information useful generally in the prevention of crime, but is aimed toward the apprehension and prosecution of persons believed guilty of certain specific crimes. As the majority indicates, the State admits that people were summoned to see how many were involved in this scandal, what that involvement was, whether there was any criminal activity, and the scope and extent of that criminal activity. Furthermore, the circumstances fostering this proceeding suggest that individual accusations were contemplated. The grand jury had this whole matter under investigation when the court was convened. Yet the State has urged that none of the evidence solicited was introduced before the grand jury or at the trial. One wonders then why this court was necessary and what function it served. Because of the atmosphere and the court’s purpose, it belies reality to say appellant and others were summoned solely as witnesses. Instead, this procedure and publicity surrounding it evince a purpose to expose appellant and others to the public as criminal suspects and to demonstrate not only that they were involved in this scandal but the specifics of their involvement. That factor distinguishes this case from Hannah (voting rights) and Groban (fire prevention) because the sole purpose and intent of the investigations in those cases was not aimed at the production of individual accusations. See Note, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 120, 121 (1960). Indeed, the fact that future prosecutions resulted was merely ancillary to the paramount undertaking. In contrast, the Texas statute creating the Court of Inquiry confirms that its sole purpose and function is to determine if a criminal law has been violated.2
The fact that the proceeding is accusatory may not be decisive so long as Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 1959, 360 U.S. 287, 79 S.Ct. 1157, 3 L.Ed.2d 1234, is the law. See Note, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 120 (1960). There the Supreme Court held that a witness did not have the right to counsel simply because the investigation might lead to future criminal prosecutions. There is a fundamental difference, however, between the Baker investigation into possible unethical practices of law that may lay groundwork for future criminal prosecution and a Court of Inquiry that is a part of the State’s process of criminal prosecutions. The Hannah, Groban and Baker investigations are dif*751ferent from the Court of Inquiry because its sole purpose is to determine if there has been any violation of the criminal law and also because it is conducted as an official segment of the State’s criminal prosecutions. These distinctions prompt my misgiving about the district court’s holding.
Even accepting the district court’s holding, my doubts about this carnival proceeding persist. Additional unfairness stemmed from the fact that it was broadcast live and on tape on both radio and television and that the testimony was printed in the papers. Such publicity seems at variance with elemental requirements of fair play. It was important to the majority in Baker and Groban that any incriminating evidence was not made available to the public. Indeed, these investigations were secret. In Hannah, the Commission’s rules provided that any evidence or testimony that tended to “defame, degrade, or incriminate any person” had to be taken in executive session. Moreover, any witness could refuse to be photographed or televised.3 It would seem that in balancing the State’s interest in investigating crime and the individual’s right to due process, there is no justification for permitting incriminating evidence to be fed to the public. This position does not require secret hearings, but simply demands that there be no open and public accusations of crime and that any incriminating evidence not be broadcast live or put in print and then distributed to the public. Since prohibiting broadcast of proceedings when focused directly on the individual neither disrupts the fact-finding function of the hearing nor causes delays, it is a rational limitation on the State’s power to investigate matters perilously close to the criminal process. However, because I am convinced that appellant received a fair trial in which none of the evidence used against him was discovered originally by the Court of Inquiry, I do not make a final resolution of the constitutionality of these procedures, and therefore concur in the majority’s holding.
The disposition of the grand jury issue causes me more serious problems. Appellant argues that the Court of Inquiry usurped the grand jury’s function and that the publicity invalidated the grand jury indictment system. The majority reasons that because Hurtado held that the grand jury requirement is not binding on the states, the method of investigation is a matter peculiarly within the province of the State of Texas. To me, the question is not whether Texas has to indict by a grand jury, but whether that method, once chosen, must produce an impartial grand jury and whether the publicity in this case destroyed impartiality. Although several Supreme Court decisions suggest that the grand jury must be impartial,4 a recent decision proves that the issue has not been settled. See Beck v. Washington, 1962, 369 U.S. 541, 82 S.Ct. 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98. The argument advanced to support requiring an impartial grand jury is that it has traditionally stood between the prosecutor and the accused in order to prevent unfounded prosecutions. See Hale v. Henkel, supra, at 59, 26 S.Ct. 370.5 The ma*752jority of courts have not followed the Supreme Court’s intimations and have held that there is no constitutional right to an impartial grand jury. Gorin v. United States, 1st Cir. 1963, 313 F.2d 641; United States v. Kahaner, S.D.N.Y. 1962, 204 F.Supp. 921. In Estes v. United States, 5th Cir. 1964, 335 F.2d 609, this Circuit seemed to hold that there is no right to an impartial grand jury. Thus, beyond testing the legal qualifications of the grand jurors and whether they represent a cross-section of the community, the only question is whether the juror voted for the indictment honestly and on competent evidence. See State v. Beck, 56 Wash.2d 474, 349 P.2d 387, 389 (1960).6
These absolute pronouncements have been qualified by courts when confronted with the issue of whether pre-indictment publicity destroyed the impartiality. Thus courts state that no impartial grand jury is required, but then conclude that anyway no prejudice was shown.7 This ambivalence has clouded the issue. Both Beck and Estes take that approach and require a specific showing of bias or prejudice. Estes also suggests that a mere showing of adverse publicity does not itself constitute a showing of prejudice. 335 F.2d at 613.8 The district court followed Beck and Estes and held there was no specific proof of prejudice or bias. My question is whether Estes v. State of Texas, 1965, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543, changes the rules insofar as live television broadcasts are concerned. There the Court held that a television broadcast created such a probability of prejudice that its use was inherently lacking in due process and removed the need to show isolatable prejudice. It could be argued that Beck is therefore not controlling since that investigation was not televised at the time the grand jury was considering his case. Furthermore, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1966, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, the Court adopted the Estes approach where massive pretrial publicity was present. The publicity here is clearly as massive. If there is a right to an impartial grand jury and if the problem is one of proof, then Sheppard and Estes present vexing questions since both reflect a change in judicial thinking since Beck on live television and massive press coverage. It is not clear, however, whether these cases would remove the burden to show specific prejudice in the case of grand jurors. Courts might adhere to the specific proof requirement by holding that the grand juror’s duty to ferret out crime includes using the information that publicity reveals. See Unit*753ed States v. Nunan, 2d Cir. 1956, 236 F. 2d 576, 593. This really implies that there is no right to an impartial grand jury. On the other hand, courts could extend Estes and Sheppard to grand juries by focusing on the parts of those decisions suggesting that because this massive press coverage is increasingly prevalent and difficult to efface, there should be some judicial effort to prevent or neutralize its effect. Here, the lack of judicial control or concern is patent. However, since the decisions hold that there is no right to an impartial grand jury, it is premature to settle the applicability of Sheppard and Estes to the grand jury — -publicity problem. Because the rule today is that the grand jury is an accusatory body which does not have to be impartial and that we depend on a fair trial to secure the liberty promised by the fourteenth amendment, I concur in affirming the judgment of the district court.

. This limited function has served as the main justification for the Hannah holding. See Note, 47 Cornell L.Rev. 71 (1961); Note, 30 U.Cinn.L.Rev. 234 (1961); Note, 12 Syracuse L.Rev. 206 (1960).

. At least one commentator has argued that where a proceeding has for its purpose the sifting of charges that a criminal law has been violated, the witnesses have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. See Note, 12 Syracuse L.Rev. 206, 218 (1960). That factor was important to the majority in Hannah and was also emphasized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence.

. Commentators have uniformly endorsed the view that evidence that focuses on the individual should be taken in executive session. See Note, 47 Cornell L.Rev. 71 (1961); Note, 74 Harv.L.R,ev. 120 (1960). If the fifth amendment is to be the only defense for these persons, it does not seem fair to require them to assert it continuously in front of the public whose most likely reaction will be an inference of guilt from the assertion. See Grunewald v. United States, 1957, 353 U.S. 391, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931.

. See Lawn v. United States, 1958, 355 U. S. 339, 349, 78 S.Ct. 311, 317, 2 L.Ed.2d 321; Costello v. United States, 1956, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L. Ed. 397; Hoffman v. United States, 1951, 341 U.S. 479, 485, 71 S.Ct. 814, 817, 95 L.Ed. 1118; Cassell v. State of Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 298, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L. Ed. 839; Hale v. Henkel, 1905, 201 U.S. 43, 59, 26 S.Ct. 370, 373, 50 L.Ed. 652.

. This view has also been explained by stating that the jurors must be impartial since the grand jury represents the “voice of the community” and its only limi*752tation is the conscience of the members. Goodman, Charge to the Grand Jury, 12 F.R.D. 495 (1952); Note, Some Observations on the Beck Case, 36 Wasli.L.Rev. 134, 139 (1961). Only one decision and the commentators support this position. See Coppedge v. United States, 1962, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 311 F.2d 128; Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 Mich.L.Rev. 453, 474; Note, Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence Before the Grand Jury As A Basis for Dismissing the Indictment, 27 Md.L.Rev. 168, 177 (1967); Note, The Texas Grand Jury Selection System— Discretion to Discriminate, 21 Sw.L.J. 545, 546, (1967); Note, The Grand Jury As An Investigatory Body, 74 Harv.L. Rev. 590, 600 (1961).

. The basis for holding that the grand jurors do not have to be impartial is that the grand jury is considered an accusatory body that does not pass on the guilt or innocence of the defendant but merely determines whether lie should be brought to trial. See Beck v. United States, 9th Cir. 1962, 298 F.2d 622; United States v. Remington, 2d Cir. 1951, 191 F.2d 246, 252; United States v. Knowles, D.C. 1957, 147 F.Supp. 19; United States v. Smyth, N.D.Calif.1952, 104 F.Supp. 283, 302.

. United States v. Osborn, 6th Cir. 1965, 350 F.2d 497; Gorin v. United States, 1st Cir. 1963, 313 F.2d 641; United States v. Holovachka, 7th Cir. 1963, 314 F.2d 345; Beck v. United States, 9th Cir. 1962, 298 F.2d 622; United States v. Baker, D.C.1966, 262 F.Supp. 657; United States v. Hoffa, S.D.Fla.1962, 205 F. Supp. 710; United States v. Dioguardi, S.D.N.X.1956, 20 F.R.D. 33.

. See United States v. Osborn, supra, 350 F.2d at 507; United States v. Baker, supra ; United States v. Hoffa, supra.