Court Opinion

ID: 9840881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 16:09:19.709364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:31.262043
License: Public Domain

J-A20029-23

   NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  ZACHARY A. GORSLINE                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MICHELLE MCMINN                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1591 MDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered November 10, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
         Domestic Relations at No: 00429 S 2020/PACSES 366300403

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED: SEPTEMBER 20, 2023

       Michelle McMinn (Appellant) appeals from the order entered after the

trial court found her in indirect criminal contempt (ICC) of a prior court order,

and sentenced her to serve one week in jail. We affirm.

       On August 18, 2020, Zachary A. Gorsline (Plaintiff), filed a complaint for

child support of the parties’ minor child, who was born in 2007. The trial court

detailed the protracted procedural history:

             [Plaintiff’s] complaint initially resulted in an order for child
       support on the part of [Appellant] in the basic monthly amount of
       $187.00.     Interim Order of Court (hereinafter the “Support
       Order”), 9/16/20. Plaintiff filed a petition for contempt on October
       29, 2020, based on [Appellant’s] failure to pay on the Support
       Order. On November 16, 2020, [Appellant] appeared with counsel
       [at a hearing] on the petition for contempt, and the matter was
       continued. On December 3, 2020, [Appellant] appeared again on
       the petition for contempt for nonpayment of child support, and the

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A20029-23

     case was continued after her counsel indicated she had an
     appointment the next day.

           On December 17, 2020, [Appellant] appeared via
     videoconference after she waived her right to be physically
     present in court due to [] issues related to COVID-19. After
     [Appellant] indicated that she had been referred for an MRI
     scheduled on January 6, 2021, the matter was again continued
     and rescheduled for January 14, 2021. On January 14, 2021,
     [Appellant], after providing documentation showing that she was
     disabled, had her hearing continued to February 25, 2021, via
     Zoom. [Appellant] was notified that at the hearing[,] she must
     provide documentation from her doctor’s appointment on
     February 23, 2021, and that such documentation must include her
     doctor’s opinion on her ability to return to work.

           On February 24, 2021, [Appellant] filed her petition for
     modification of an existing support order, which sought
     termination of the September 16, 2020, order and claimed
     [Appellant had] received a letter from her therapist which said
     [Appellant] cannot work.

            On February 25, 2021, the court issued an order stating that
     the parties had agreed to continue the hearing on the petition for
     contempt and that [Appellant] had a modification conference
     scheduled for March 18, 2021.         Following the modification
     conference, the court set [Appellant’s] financial obligation to zero,
     effective [] December 15, 2020, because she was unable to pay,
     had no known income or assets[,] and there was “no reasonable
     prospect that [Appellant] will be able to pay in the foreseeable
     future.” … On June 25, 2021, the court affirmed the March 18,
     2021, order as a final order, based upon the [] hearing officer’s
     report and recommendation. At the support hearing, [Appellant]
     produced an excuse from Dr. Deluca stating that [Appellant]
     became physically unable to work on the date of her hip surgery,
     April 5, 2021. However, [Dr. Deluca] expected [Appellant] to be
     physically able to return to work by August 12, 2021.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 2-3 (some citations omitted; footnote moved

to body; some capitalization modified).

                                     -2-
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      On August 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed a petition for modification of the

support order. Plaintiff claimed the “excuse” from Dr. Deluca was only “valid”

until August 12th or 13th. Petition for Modification, 8/19/21, at 2. The trial

court scheduled a support conference for October 15, 2021. The trial court

explained that thereafter:

      On October 15, 2021, based on information presented during
      [the] support conference, the court ordered that [Appellant’s]
      monthly support obligation be “$0.00 from August 19, 2021, until
      November 14, 2021,” and that her support obligation increase to
      $187.00 per month on November 15, 2021, “with $20.00 per
      month arrears payment.” … A hearing on Plaintiff’s petition for
      modification was held by the support hearing officer on December
      22, 2021. Following the hearing …, the support hearing officer
      filed a report and recommendation on January 13, 2022, in which
      he concluded [Appellant’s] claim of an inability to work was no
      longer tenable. The court signed an order dated January 13,
      2022, establishing a monthly support payment of $144, effective
      August 18, 2021.

      … On January 28, 2022, [Plaintiff filed] a petition for contempt
      for failure to pay child support … against [Appellant]. On February
      1, 2022, [Appellant] filed an exception to the support master’s
      report and recommendation. On March 2, 2022, the contempt
      hearing was continued again, and [Appellant] was directed to
      appear for a hearing on the petition for contempt on March 24,
      2022. The contempt action was rescheduled numerous times
      awaiting the disposition of the exceptions. On September 21,
      2022, [the trial court entered an opinion and order] dismiss[ing]
      the exceptions, and made the January 13, 2022 [support order] a
      final order. The petition for contempt was scheduled for a hearing
      on October 13, 2022. On October 13th, the parties requested
      another continuance. The court ordered [Appellant] to “obtain
      and maintain sufficient wage attachable employment by
      November 10, 2022. Failure to abide with this condition will result
      in criminal contempt charges being filed against her.”

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 4-5 (some capitalization modified).

                                     -3-
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       The trial court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s petition for contempt

on November 10, 2022. The court explained that at the hearing,

       the Commonwealth reminded the court that it alerted [Appellant]
       that if she was going “to continue to aver her total disability[,] she
       must provide documentation and testimony by the physician who
       completes the Physician’s Verification Form.” N.T., 11/10/22, at
       4. Counsel for [the Cumberland County Domestic Relations Office
       (CCDRO)] … stat[ed] that “on October 20, 2022, [Appellant]
       submitted a physician’s form for the first time since this [case]
       was established, completed by Christina Wargo [(Ms. Wargo)],
       Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner of Penn State Medical
       Group [] in Carlisle.” Id. The physician’s form []names four
       mental health conditions[] and indicates [Appellant] has ongoing
       disability and an inability to work dating back to February 4, 2021,
       but refers the reader to a different treatment provider, namely
       Mock-May[]s Associat[es (Mock-Mays), a mental health provider
       located in Carlisle.[1] Id.

              Ms. Wargo was present at the November 10, 2022,
       [contempt] hearing and provided valuable information with
       respect to the Commonwealth’s case.          She testified to the
       following information: Ms. Wargo has been [Appellant’s] treating
       practitioner since 2017. Id. at 7-8. She testified that Merakey
       has diagnosed [Appellant] with bipolar disease, depression,
       anxiety, and [post-traumatic stress disorder].         Id. at 8-9.
       However, Ms. Wargo does not treat [Appellant] for these
       conditions. Id. at 9. [Ms. Wargo testified, “a]ll initiation and
       titrating of those medications [to Appellant] is through Merakey.”
       Id. Ms. Wargo testified that from the time she met [Appellant,
       Appellant] has complained of various aches and pains, including
       ongoing pain in the area around her hips. Id. at 10. [Ms. Wargo]
       noted, however, that [Appellant] was eventually sent to
       orthopedics, where she continues treatment. Id.

             On September 8, 2022, the orthopedist recommended
       physical therapy. Id. When Ms. Wargo saw [Appellant] on
       October 20, 2022, she reaffirmed the recommendation. Id. at 11.
____________________________________________

1 Ms. Wargo testified Appellant “had seen Mock-Mays, which is now Merakey

[Stevens Center]” (Merakey), a mental health provider located in Carlisle.
N.T., 11/10/22, at 8.

                                           -4-
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     In fact, after [Appellant’s] surgeries on May 20, 2021, and June
     16, 2022, the orthopedist recommended physical therapy. Id.
     However, Ms. Wargo said that she could find nothing in the notes
     indicating that [Appellant] ever followed through with any of the
     recommendations. Id. at 12.

            Ms. Wargo also testified that she filled out a physician
     verification form for [Appellant] on October 20, 2022, and she
     completed this form with the information that she had at the time.
     Id. at 13, 14-15. On the form, she indicated [Appellant] is not
     able to work at this time because [Appellant] needs to complete
     the physical therapy and see how that affects her pain overall. Id.
     at 14, 15. Additionally, Ms. Wargo considered a letter[, which she
     was unable to produce at the support hearing, that Appellant]
     provided [Ms. Wargo] from [Appellant’s] psychiatry provider,
     stating that [Appellant] is not in the right mental state to work at
     this time. Id. at 15. However, Ms. Wargo acknowledged that on
     her own assessment[,] she is not able to draw the opinion that
     [Appellant] is unable to work. Id. at 16. In fact, Ms. Wargo
     testified that she had three different sets of notes from psychiatry,
     “and the last one was [July of 2022], which said that [Appellant]
     was more stable and [Appellant was] found [] to be depressed and
     tearful at times and suffering from anxiety related to the external
     stressors in life.” Id. However, the notes from psychiatry also
     stated that [Appellant] was a lot more stable than when they first
     met her. Id. Ms. Wargo testified that [Appellant] has progressed
     over the years and [Appellant’s] mental conditions are more
     stable. Id. Additionally, Ms. Wargo recommended [Appellant]
     “resee psychiatry and get another recommendation from them
     regarding her ability to work.” Id. at 17.

           Lastly, Ms. Wargo testified that her opinion from seeing and
     examining [Appellant] is that she does not think a physical job is
     something [Appellant] could do, but if [Appellant’s] mental health
     [provider] feels [Appellant] is stable enough to work, [Appellant]
     could find [employment] outside of a physical[ly demanding job].
     Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 5-7 (footnote added; some citations omitted;

footnote citations moved to body and modified; some capitalization modified).

                                     -5-
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       After the hearing, the trial court found Appellant in contempt of the

October 13, 2022 order, as Appellant failed to obtain and maintain

employment as directed.          See N.T., 11/10/22, at 33-34.    The trial court

immediately sentenced Appellant to one week of incarceration in the

Cumberland County Prison. Id. at 35. The court denied Appellant’s request

to stay the sentence pending appeal. Id.

       Appellant timey filed this appeal on November 16, 2022. Appellant and

the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

       Appellant presents three issues for our review:

       I.    Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to
             prove [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
             specifically, where the Commonwealth did not establish, or
             provide any evidence, that [Appellant] volitionally or
             intentionally refused to comply with the underlying court
             order to maintain wage-attachable employment[,] as is
             necessary to find her guilty of indirect criminal contempt?

       II.   Whether the trial court abused its discretion by holding
             [Appellant] in indirect criminal contempt of the October 13,
             2022 order by placing the burden of production on [Appellant]
             to disprove an element of indirect criminal contempt?

       III. Whether [Appellant’s] due process rights under the
            Pennsylvania and United States Constitution were violated
            where the trial court relied upon facts outside the record to
            make a determination of guilt, and relied on documents
            provided for other procedures in the case[,] which were not
            presented at the hearing and which were not part of the
            record of the indirect criminal contempt case?

____________________________________________

2 CCDRO advised it did not intend to file an appellate brief.    Correspondence,
4/26/23.

                                           -6-
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Appellant’s Brief at 6-7 (capitalization modified).

      Appellant first claims her ICC conviction cannot stand, because “no

rational trier of fact could determine that the elements of indirect criminal

contempt were met beyond a reasonable doubt.”                 Id. at 20 (some

capitalization modified).   Appellant’s claim implicates the sufficiency of the

evidence. When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we consider

      whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
      favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to
      enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. … Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
      may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
      and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
      be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. … Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 618-19 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

and brackets omitted).

      Further, when reviewing a challenge to a contempt conviction,

      much reliance is given to the discretion of the trial judge.
      Accordingly, the appellate court is confined to a determination of
      whether the facts support the trial court decision. We will reverse
      a trial court’s determination only when there has been a plain
      abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 282 A.3d 1161, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations

omitted). An “abuse of discretion on appellate review requires [that] the trial

court’s decision be a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous….”

                                       -7-
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Commonwealth v. Smyrnes, 154 A.3d 741, 760 (Pa. 2017) (citations

omitted); see also id. (“it is not sufficient that an appellate court might have

reached a different conclusion”).

       “Indirect criminal contempt is committed by obstructive conduct that

occurs outside of the court’s presence.” Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 283

A.3d 196, 205 (Pa. 2022). The purpose of ICC is to vindicate the authority of

the trial court and punish willful disobedience. Commonwealth v. Bowden,

838 A.2d 740, 760 (Pa. 2003). To establish ICC, the Commonwealth must

prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

       1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the
       contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the
       contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the
       violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must
       have acted with wrongful intent.

Boyer, 282 A.3d at 1167 (citations omitted); Walsh, 36 A.3d at 619. “Unless

the evidence establishes an intentional disobedience or an intentional neglect

of the lawful process of the court, no contempt has been proven.”           In re

Mandell, 414 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Pa. 1980) (citation omitted).

       Here, Appellant concedes “the first two elements of indirect criminal

contempt were met.” Appellant’s Brief at 21.3 Appellant challenges the trial

court’s determination that the Commonwealth proved the third and fourth

elements discussed in Boyer, supra. Specifically, she contends:

____________________________________________

3 Appellant states she “also did not contest that she had not obtained
employment prior to the [contempt] hearing.” Appellant’s Brief at 21.

                                           -8-
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      [Appellant] did not admit, at any point, that she was volitional in
      disobeying the order or that she acted with wrongful intent in not
      obtaining a job. [Appellant] has, from the inception of this case,
      averred that she was unable to obtain and maintain employment
      because of multiple disabling medical conditions.

Id. at 22. According to Appellant, the “evidence that was produced at the

[contempt] hearing by the Commonwealth was virtually nonexistent.”          Id.

Appellant argues, “Even with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth, it is insufficient for a finding beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id.

      To the contrary, the trial court opined that the Commonwealth

presented sufficient evidence to prove all elements of ICC beyond a reasonable

doubt. Citing our Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court reasoned:

      “In addition to any other remedy available to the court, the court
      may order the respondent to obtain employment with income that
      can be verified and is subject to income attachment.”
      Pa.R.C.P. 1910.25-7. With respect to the court’s ability to order
      incarceration where the respondent willfully fails to comply with
      such an order, the explanatory comment [to] Rule 1910.25-7
      provides, in part, as follows:

          Absent an inability to maintain employment or acquire
          other income or assets, sanction in the form of
          incarceration may be imposed by the court to compel
          compliance and provide an incentive to obey the law.
          The contempt process, which should be used as a last
          resort, is necessary to impose coercive sanctions upon
          those obligors whose circumstances provide no recourse
          to the court to compel payment or a good faith effort to
          comply. Appellate opinions have made it clear that an
          obligor who is in civil contempt cannot be incarcerated
          without the present ability to fulfill the conditions the
          court imposes for release. However, the courts also have
          noted that recalcitrant obligors may be imprisoned for

                                     -9-
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          indirect criminal contempt          if   afforded   the   proper
          procedural safeguards.

      Id. (Explanatory Comment – 2007).

                                     ***

             The third element necessary to prove indirect criminal
      contempt requires the act constituting the violation to have been
      volitional.   An act is volitional if it is knowingly made.
      Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 110 (Pa. Super.
      Ct. 2007). Here, [Appellant’s] willful failure to obtain wage-
      attachable employment constitutes a volitional act. This court
      told [Appellant] she must get a job and if she did not, a
      contempt petition would be filed against her. Moreover,
      the procedural history of this case and Ms. Wargo’s
      testimony demonstrates [Appellant’s] willingness to
      ignore the court and her doctor’s recommendations. Ms.
      Wargo testified that after both of [Appellant’s] surgeries, the
      orthopedist told [Appellant] to attend physical therapy. However,
      there were no notes that [Appellant] complied with her doctor’s
      recommendations. Furthermore, in September of 2022, the
      orthopedist again told [Appellant] to attend physical therapy, and
      despite being in the middle of the civil contempt petition,
      [Appellant] did not comply. Additionally, if [Appellant] made any
      attempts to secure employment, consistent with [the trial] court’s
      directive, she would have promptly told her Domestic Relation
      Officer.    The history of this case and of [Appellant’s]
      unwillingness to follow through with treatment and
      instruction strongly supports this court’s conclusion that
      she willfully violated the October 13, 2022, order of court.
      Accordingly, the third element of contempt has been satisfied.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 10-11, 12 (emphasis added; some

capitalization modified).

      With respect to the fourth element, i.e., whether Appellant acted with

wrongful intent, the trial court explained:

      [I]n “making a determination regarding whether a defendant
      acted with wrongful intent, the court should use common sense
      and consider context, and wrongful intent can be imputed to a

                                     - 10 -
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     defendant by virtue of the substantial certainty that his [or her]
     actions will violate the court order.” Commonwealth v. Reese,
     156 A.3d 1250, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted). Here,
     [Appellant] had notice that she must obtain wage-attachable
     employment before the November 10, 2022, [contempt] hearing.
     Given the length of this support action, and the direct order
     to obtain a job before the next hearing, [Appellant] was
     certain that her actions, or lack thereof, would violate the
     order.

            [Appellant] attempted to rebut the Commonwealth’s
     evidence by showing she was unable to comply with the October
     13, 2022, order based on medical advice. However, Ms. Wargo,
     the nurse practitioner, could not opine that [Appellant] was unable
     to work, without relying on incomplete medical documents from
     multiple other medical professionals. [N.T., 11/10/22,] at 12, 17-
     18. Moreover, Ms. Wargo testified that from her assessment of
     [Appellant], [Appellant] probably could not handle a physical job,
     but may be able to handle another type of job once she is
     reassessed by Merakey. Id. at 17. [Ms. Wargo] further testified
     it had been almost a year since Merakey told [Appellant] she could
     not work, and that is why Ms. Wargo encouraged [Appellant] to
     get another assessment. Id. at 18. [Ms. Wargo testified s]he
     cannot recommend that [Appellant] is able to work because she
     needs to be re-evaluated. Id. at 19. Most[] notable was Ms.
     Wargo’s testimony on cross examination, “As a family practitioner,
     I don’t have the specialties in psychology-type work like they do.
     So I gather the information, and then I depend on them to steer
     the direction. But it also takes cooperation, people going
     back for appointments. … You know what I mean? Like
     making sure that they’re being reevaluated, that type of thing.”
     Id. at 21 (emphasis added). [Appellant] was not cooperating
     with her treatment plan. Instead, she was relying on
     outdated opinions to continue with her assertion that she
     is unable to work.

           Moreover, [Appellant’s] failure to obtain employment before
     the November 10, 2022, [contempt] hearing is considered by the
     court in the context of her failure to make a single [child
     support] payment in 13 months to comply with the child
     support ordered by the court. Therefore, considering both the
     evidence and the context, the wrongful intent element of indirect
     criminal content is satisfied.

                                   - 11 -
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Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 12-14 (emphasis added; footnote citations

moved to body and modified; some capitalization modified).

      Our review discloses that the record and law support the trial court’s

rationale.    Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in finding the Commonwealth proved all elements of ICC beyond a

reasonable doubt. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner, the Commonwealth proved Appellant acted

with wrongful intent in volitionally failing to comply with the trial court’s

directives.   Boyer, supra; Pa.R.C.P. 1910.25-7 (Explanatory Comment –

2007) (“sanction in the form of incarceration may be imposed by the court to

compel compliance and provide an incentive to obey the law.”). Appellant’s

first issue does not merit relief.

      Appellant next argues the trial court abused its discretion in placing the

burden of production on Appellant to disprove her ICC. See Appellant’s Brief

at 24-28. According to Appellant, the contempt hearing

      began with the burden on [Appellant]. … [S]he was presumed to
      be guilty of the contempt and was required to present a defense
      to disprove the contempt. This guilt was presumed without the
      Commonwealth presenting any evidence or testimony to support
      … a prima facie case against [Appellant].

Id. at 26. Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Bishop, 372 A.2d 794 (Pa.

1977), where our Supreme Court stated:

      [A]n accused in a criminal case is clothed with a presumption of
      innocence and the burden of proof in establishing guilt rests with
      the Commonwealth. The quantum of proof necessary to satisfy

                                     - 12 -
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      this burden … never shifts from the Commonwealth to the
      accused….

Id. at 796; Appellant’s Brief at 26.

      “In a prosecution for criminal contempt, the Commonwealth has the

burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

In re Johnson, 359 A.2d 739, 742 (Pa. 1976); In re Mandell, 414 A.2d at

1015 (same). Instantly, the trial court rejected Appellant’s claim, explaining:

      [Appellant] appeared on November 10th for [] indirect criminal
      contempt, for failure to abide by the court’s October 13th order, in
      that she failed to obtain and maintain employment. Additionally,
      she was appearing on a petition for contempt for failing to pay
      support. She was told to bring a physician’s verification form and
      testimony as to her disability as it pertained to her failure to pay.
      [Appellant] specifically requested that the court hear the
      testimony on the indirect criminal contempt first. She presented
      the physician’s verification form and the testimony of [Ms. Wargo]
      because [Appellant] felt she could not abide by the October 13th
      order in that she still was unable to work. While [Appellant]
      presented the testimony of [Ms. Wargo], the court was
      completely within its discretion to consider her testimony
      and the weakness of it. [Ms. Wargo] could not say that from
      October 13th — November 10th, [Appellant] was not able to work.
      [Ms. Wargo] said that she would recommend follow up
      appointments to solidify [Appellant’s] belief that she is still unable
      to work. [Given t]he fact [Appellant] is not following up with
      professional advice, as evidenced by [Ms. Wargo’s] testimony and
      the support hearing officer’s prior findings, the court was well
      within its discretion to consider that [Appellant] willfully ignored
      its October 13th order. The court specified in its order that if
      [Appellant] failed to obtain such employment, criminal contempt
      charges would be filed against her. Having notice of the court’s
      directive, [Appellant] needed only to show the court that she
      obtained wage-attachable employment. Upon recognition that
      [Appellant] failed to obtain the requisite employment, it was the
      Commonwealth who had the burden to prove all four
      elements of indirect criminal contempt, not [Appellant].
      Having determined that the Commonwealth sufficiently proved
      each element of indirect criminal contempt, the court properly

                                       - 13 -
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      found that [Appellant] was in contempt of the October 13, 2022,
      Order.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 15-16 (emphasis added; some capitalization

modified).

      Again, our review discloses that the trial court’s reasoning is supported

by the record and the law. Appellant’s second issue lacks merit.

      In her final issue, Appellant claims the trial court deprived her of due

process by considering facts outside the record. See Appellant’s Brief at 29-

38. Appellant cites our decision in Ney v. Ney, 917 A.2d 863 (Pa. Super.

2007), where we confirmed a “trial court may not consider evidence outside

of the record in making its determination.” Id. at 866; Appellant’s Brief at

31. Appellant emphasizes the “[c]ontempt hearing was presided over by the

same judge who had presided over the exceptions hearing for [Plaintiff’s] civil

case….”      Appellant’s Brief at 30.     Appellant references the trial court’s

statement in the procedural history section of its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

      On April 5, 2021, Plaintiff contacted [the Cumberland County]
      Domestic Relations Conference Officer [assigned to the case via
      letter (Client Correspondence),] and stated [Plaintiff] believed
      [Appellant] was “[doctor] shopping” and that she was “willing to
      say and do anything to get out of supporting our son.”

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 3 (footnote citation omitted); Appellant’s Brief

at 32-33. According to Appellant, the “Client Correspondence … has never

been provided [to her] counsel.” Id. at 33.

      Appellant further claims that because of a breakdown in the trial court’s

operation, she did not timely receive the September 21, 2022, opinion and

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order, which rendered her “unable to properly prepare a defense.” Id. at 37;

see also id. at 36. Appellant argues the “lack of access … [Appellant] had to

the majority of the record created an impossible hurdle in adequately

preparing a defense.” Id. at 37. Finally, Appellant broadly asserts the trial

court deprived her of her constitutional right to confront and cross-examine

adversarial witnesses, namely Plaintiff. Id. at 34; see also Commonwealth

v. Rivera, 773 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa. 2001) (“Under the Confrontation Clause of

the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has a right to confront witnesses

against him [or her].”).

      “As with those accused of any crime, ‘one charged with indirect criminal

contempt is to be provided the safeguards which statute and criminal

procedures afford.’” Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d at 110 (quoting Commonwealth

v. Padilla, 885 A.2d 994, 996-97 (Pa. Super. 2005)); see also Godfrey v.

Godfrey, 894 A.2d 776, 785 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      [T]he essential procedural safeguards which are attendant to a
      criminal contempt proceeding … include: the right to bail, the right
      to be notified of accusations against him or her, a reasonable time
      to prepare a defense, the assistance of counsel, and the right,
      upon demand, to a speedy and public trial before a jury.

Diamond v. Diamond, 715 A.2d 1190, 1196 n.10 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citing,

inter alia, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4136 (governing rights of persons charged with

ICC)).   Furthermore, our Rules of Civil Procedure provide: “No respondent

may be incarcerated as a sanction for contempt without an evidentiary hearing

before a judge.” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.25-5(a).

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      With respect to due process in criminal contempt, our Supreme Court

has stated:

      The Constitution certainly requires that [an] appellant be given
      fair notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to be
      heard. But no need exists to fit criminal contempt … into the mold
      of procedures created for more commonplace offenses. This
      Court has … recognized that due process is a flexible concept and
      not one wed to fixed formalities.

Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 327 A.2d 86, 91-92 (Pa. 1974) (citations and

footnote omitted).

      Our review of the record discloses no support for Appellant’s due process

claim. The trial court afforded Appellant all procedural safeguards attendant

to an ICC proceeding. See Diamond, supra. There is also no support for

Appellant’s claim that the trial court considered evidence outside the record.

Assuming, arguendo, that it did, such error would be harmless, because the

evidence of Appellant’s contempt is overwhelming. See Commonwealth v.

Moore, 937 A.2d 1062, 1073 (Pa. 2007) (“An error may be deemed harmless,

inter alia, where the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt

was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant

by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.”).

Finally, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim regarding her rights under the

Confrontation Clause; Plaintiff’s testimony was not necessary for the trial court

to conclude that the Commonwealth proved all elements of ICC beyond a

reasonable doubt. Thus, Appellant’s third issue does not merit relief.

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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/20/2023

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