Court Opinion

ID: 9450295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:41:22.835683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:14.523234
License: Public Domain

WASHINGTON
(Circuit Judge, concurring in the result): Since the Commission failed to make findings necessary to support, and thus to enable us to review, its conclusions under the standards ■of the Natural Gas Act, it is not neces.sary to decide: (a) the extent to which the antitrust laws control; (b) if they do ■control, whether regulatory considerations are relevant to determining a violation; (c) whether the P-R schedule here challenged is in violation of the antitrust laws properly construed; and (d) whether this court may or should consider whether the antitrust laws have been violated on a petition to review an order of an administrative agency which does not have jurisdiction to apply (and thus has made no findings under) the antitrust laws. These questions are extremely complex, and should not — I think — be considered where there is abundant reason to reverse the administrative determination on another ground. I therefore do not concur in Judge Fahy’s discussion of these problems in Part II of his opinion, though I do concur in the remainder and in the result reached.
 Whatever the relevance of the antitrust laws, the welfare of the ultimate consumer is the acknowledged desideratum of the Natural Gas Act. See, e. g., Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610, 64 S.Ct. 281, 291, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944): “The primary aim of this legislation was to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies” ; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 300, 169 F.2d 881, 884, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 854, 69 S.Ct. 81, 94 L.Ed. 402 (1948) : “[Njothing in the Natural Gas Act suggests that Congress thought monopoly better than competition or one source of supply better than two, or intended for any reason to give an existing supplier of natural gas for distribution in a particular community the privilege of furnishing an increased supply” ; Public Service Commission of State of New York v. Federal Power Commission, 257 F.2d 717, 720 (3d Cir. 1958), aff’d sub nom. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission, 360 U.S. 378, 79 S.Ct. 1246, 3 L.Ed.2d 1312 (1959); Central Illinois Public Service Co., 4 F.P.C. 1043 at 1044-45 (1945); and Lynchburg Gas Co., 24 F.P.C. 955 at 958 (1960).1 In*950vestors in the natural gas industry, although granted an opportunity for a “fair return”, are by no means guaranteed freedom from risk or competition. Such assurance would, in a ease such as this, deprive competitors of the right to compete, inhibit efficient allocation of resources and deny ultimate consumers the lowest prices to which they are entitled.
In order to determine whether the P-R rate is consistent with the welfare of ultimate consumers, the Board should consider at least the following: (a) The restraint brought about by the P-R rate on the ability of Lynchburg, and other partial requirements customers, to do business with the lowest-cost source of supply, or, put in terms of the exclusive dealing cases, the extent to which the P-R rate forecloses, or tends to foreclose, competitors of Columbia from a substantial share or shares of a substantial market or markets; (b) the individual and total increase in costs which would be borne by full requirements customers in the absence of the P-R rate, if the Commission permitted Columbia to raise its rates to that level which would provide a “fair return” ; 2 (c) if either alternate is substantially restrictive, whether the “fair return” could be appropriately reduced, to minimize the burden to customers.3

. “The evidence shows that the savings in costs will be substantial if Lynchburg is permitted to purchase part of its gas from Transco. Under Lynchburg’s rules and regulations such savings will be passed on to its customers in the form of a reduction in the general sem-ice rate.” This was the Commission’s own language in authorizing service from Transco. (Emphasis added).

. In this connection it is relevant to note Lynchburg’s contention that substantially all of Columbia’s sales are to customers that have access to alternative sources of supply.

. Were it found that the P-R schedule were less restrictive and that the restriction was the minimum compatible with a reasonable concept of “fair return”, it would still be necessary to determine whether Lynchburg was being required to bear an “excessive” sliare of the burden. The Commission should also ascertain so far as it is administratively practicable the extent to which suppliers in competition with Columbia, such as Transco, will bo forced to raise their rates, as a result of the business taken by Columbia under the P-R schedule. And the Commission should also make-clear what it moans by “fair return” and “fair share.”