Court Opinion

ID: 9585099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:56:13.082581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:45.872721
License: Public Domain

Fairchild, C. J.
{dissenting). We are not dealing with subjects such as public health, welfare, or nuisances. We are concerned with the right of an individual to choose a calling and to carry on a business consistent with that calling. The law under consideration may provide for proper regulation. The portion of the law which I consider unconstitutional is that portion of sec. 105.13, Stats., which purports to give to the Industrial Commission authority to deny a *259qualified person the right to engage in a lawful business because he seeks to establish himself in a community in which, in the opinion of the commission there is a sufficient number engaged to supply the needs of employers and employees. And it reads that if “it is found and determined that the number of licensed employment agents or that the employment agency operated by the United States, the state, or by the municipality or by two or more thereof jointly in the community in which the applicant for a permit proposes to operate is sufficient to supply the needs of employers and employees.” With that portion of the statute eliminated, there still remains a complete statute for the regulation of such businesses. Standards may be fixed and the applicant for a license be regulated in all particulars to match up to those standards. The case now before us is one in which the applicant is found duly qualified, but permission to carry on his business is denied by the Industrial Commission because in its opinion the field is supplied.
The constitutional aspects of administrative law have been developed by statute and decision, and there has been indicated in a general way the line of demarcation between the kind of legislative power which may be delegated and the kind which may not. The power to declare whether there shall be a law to determine the purpose or policy to be achieved and to fix the limits within which the law shall operate is vested in the legislature and may not be delegated. An administrative agency may be authorized to exercise the necessary power to carry into effect the legitimate and general purpose defined by the legislature. State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929. However, a statute authorizing the Industrial Commission to deny to qualified applicants a right to operate a business on the ground that the field in which the operation is intended to be carried on is already sufficiently occupied is unconstitutional because of a denial of equal pro*260tection and due process of the law. Engberg v. Debel, 194 Minn. 394, 260 N. W. 626.
While the Industrial Commission did afford appellant an opportunity to be heard before denying his application, it is to be noted that the statute does not contain a provision requiring such a hearing. However, because of the hearing afforded by the commission to the appellant, we make no point of that but do regard the statute as deficient in its structure. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 35 Sup. Ct. 625, 59 L. Ed. 1027. The majority opinion of this court affirms a ruling by the circuit court which deferred to the dissenting opinion of the eminent jurists, Stone, Holmes, and Brandéis, in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913. One may well agree that the dissent referred to is sound, for it limits itself to regulation of the evils which were under consideration and were brought about by individuals whose characters were not consistent with good conduct. In the dissenting opinion it seems clear that regulation was held to be proper only for the purpose of fixing standards of conduct and fitness, and in the review of the cases there considered the concern was over the fraudulent charges of commissions by certain agencies. But the doctrine of that dissent stops short of excluding an applicant from certain territory and preventing him from carrying on a lawful business simply because he will be a competitor of those there presently engaged. There is no holding that one, who is qualified equally with others under the standards prescribed to operate a lawful business, is to be denied the opportunity to do so. The part of the dissenting opinion overlooked by the court below and by the majority here reads (p. 372) : “It is of course true that the enactment of a particular type of legislation, even though general, and a widespread and competent opinion that it is wise and necessary, do not establish its constitutionality.”
We are concerned with what may be styled trends which may lead to a controlled economy directly affecting individ*261uals in choosing their calling, profession, or occupation. There are enterprises which, because of their natural characteristics affecting public welfare, are properly subject to limitation, but the basis of that' limitation is not simply that of competition between like enterprises. How much of a step is it from the matter now before us to the thought that a commission could be created and empowered to determine that those who pass the board of bar commissioners may not be permitted to practice in a community where the commission thinks there are already plenty of lawyers? Would it be considered reasonable under any stretch of imagination to say to the law graduates of the University of Wisconsin and the law graduates of Marquette University: “You have qualified, and as soon as opportunity is presented, you may be permitted to practice, but for the present, because of crowded conditions in certain communities, we will withhold the privilege.”
0 It used to be quite clear that the framers of our state and federal constitutions did not incorporate blindly the provisions guaranteeing life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And it is equally clear today that it was not intended by those framers of the constitutions that modern efforts to insure integrity in administrative conduct of business should violate those provisions to the extent of classifying by restriction those who may and those who may not engaged in a lawful calling to be selected by an individual. Competition and individual enterprise have not been entirely written off as obsolete. A conservatism that clings to the broad fundamentals written into our Bill of Rights is well-grounded liberalism. True, the public may be protected against the machinations of men lacking in integrity, but that does not mean that one of several qualified men shall be permitted to enter a legitimate field of enterprise and the opportunity denied to others. In 1 Wait, Practice at Law, in Equity, page 36, we find the doctrine expressed as follows:
*262“ ‘Competition in trade is not actionable. In such a case there is no wrong, for the act done is the mere exercise of an undoubted right which belongs to every member of society. So, if a fisherman fits out a boat with lines and nets, and goes to fish in the high seas, and another fisherman comes and fishes beside him, and with tempting baits, or other contrivances, draws away the fish from the lines and nets of the first comer, with a view of catching them himself, an injury may be done; but there is no tort or wrong, for the one had as much right to fish, and to use fair and reasonable means to catch fish, as the other; . . .’ ” Young v. Hichens, 6 Q. B. 606.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Broadfoot and Mr. Justice Steinle concur in this dissent.