Court Opinion

ID: 9560732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:54:35.747926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:08.927801
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
“More than a century ago [in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)], the [United States Supreme Court] decided that the State denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986). “It is worth remembering that ‘[128] years after the close of the [Civil] War . . . and [113] years after Strauder, racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our society as a whole.’ ” Id. at 106-107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1979)). Oblivious to that history and to current reality, this Court in Winfield v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1049, 421 S.E.2d 468 (1992) (en banc), adopted a rule of absolute deference that shields from appellate review racially discriminatory jury selection practices. Regardless of the evidence of purposeful racial discrimination in the record and regardless of the facial invalidity of the reasons the Commonwealth offers for removing African-Americans from the jury by exercise of peremptory strikes, the majority of this Court again allows an invalid and unreasoned finding by the trial judge to shelter a pernicious practice that Batson sought to end. The decision renders the protections of Batson *557illusory and allows the shameful practice of racial discrimination in the selection of juries to continue in Virginia.
The Supreme Court has mandated that Batson challenges must be decided on a case-by-case basis. 476 U.S. at 96-98. Each case must be decided upon “ ‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.’ ” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). The majority opinion relies solely on the reasons given by the prosecutor without any discussion of the record that conclusively demonstrated the falsity of the reasons for the strikes stated by the prosecutor. The majority simply accepts the trial judge’s finding of no discrimination based upon statements made by the prosecutors that were palpably incorrect and invalid. Following the logic of Winfield, the majority gives absolute deference to findings of the trial judge even when, as in this case, no evidence supports the finding and, indeed, the premises upon which the finding was based have been proved false. The Court has rendered hollow the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
The record in this case established that the prosecutor did not ask a single question of the jurors prior to exercising his peremptory challenges to strike two of the three African-Americans on the jury panel. Indeed, the prosecutor stated that “[t]he Commonwealth is satisfied with the panel,” and then proceeded to remove the African-Americans from the jury. In giving account of his conduct, the prosecutor stated he struck Constance Bowen, an African-American, because of her relative youth and because she had no children. Bowen was twenty-eight years of age. The prosecutor did not strike, however, a twenty-three year old white female juror with no children. Likewise, the prosecutor did not strike a childless white male juror. The record proved that the prosecutor’s stated criteria were not the reasons for the strikes and that the prosecutor engaged in unambiguous racial discrimination in applying the criteria that he asserted he used.
As overtly bigoted behavior has been universally condemned, racial exclusions continue to occur through acts more subtle. ‘ ‘Perhaps today [racial] discrimination takes a form more subtle than before [, but] it is *558not less real or pernicious.” Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1979). Still, the Constitution bars “sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination.” Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). Although the trial judge had before him the data concerning the remaining white jurors, the trial judge made no further inquiry of the prosecutor. Likewise, the trial judge did not state even in a perfunctory fashion the trial tactic that he found to be ‘ ‘legitimate’ ’ and furthered by the strike. The majority does not disclose what salient facts lead it to conclude that the trial judge’s finding is supported by some basis in the record.
The prosecutor stated he struck Richard T. Wright because (1) Wright was wearing a Virginia State University varsity jacket that the prosecutor believed was not appropriate dress in which to serve on a jury, and (2) Wright had a Petersburg mailing address, which, the prosecutor said, suggested that Wright lived near a city with “a significant drug problem” and, thus, would be tolerant of narcotic use. However, the prosecutor provided no explanation why he considered it objectionable for a prospective juror to wear a jacket bearing the logo of Virginia State University, a predominately African-American university located in Chesterfield County. See Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (E.D. Va.), aff’d sub nom. Board of Visitors of the College of William & Mary v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971). Obviously, a jacket is not an unusual choice of clothing for a juror to wear in December. The only rational explanation apparent on the record is that the prosecutor objected to Wright’s perceived affiliation with a university that was historically conceived, operated, and maintained by State law for African-Americans. See Norris, 327 F. Supp. at 1370.
The prosecutor’s objection to Wright’s residence also demonstrates racial discrimination. First, the prosecutor’s assertion that Wright was objectionable as a juror because he lived in the area of Chesterfield County that was near the City of Petersburg simply lacks facial validity. The record proved that the prosecutor’s statement concerning Wright’s address was incorrect. The list of jury panel members shows that Wright has a Richmond mailing address, not a Petersburg mailing address, as stated by the prosecutor. Had the trial judge but looked at the list he would have been aware that the prosecutor’s stated reason was invalid.
Moreover, even if Wright had a Petersburg mailing address, the prosecutor provided neither a rational nor non-racial explanation for *559his assertion that a person who lives in southern Chesterfield County and receives mail delivery through the Petersburg post office is tolerant of narcotic use. All of the jurors lived in Chesterfield County, the jurisdiction where the trial was held. The prosecutor’s suggestion to the trial judge that he struck Wright because he believed that Wright’s mailing address indicated Wright “would be tolerant” of narcotic use reeks of race prejudice. The prosecutor made that assumption because Wright’s postal delivery designation placed Wright in the area of the County near a city that has a large African-American population.3
The history of race discrimination in the United States is replete with examples of devices used to mark people of color with the badge of slavery. Stereotypes have long been the vehicle by which discrimination is conveyed.
Residence, as it were, often acts as an ethnic badge. As study after study has showed, residence, especially in urban centers, can be the most accurate predictor of race - more accurate, indeed, than social class. See, e.g., Kain, The Influence of Race and Income on Racial Segregation and Housing Policy, in Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy 99, 102 (1986); Note - Racial Diversity in Residential Communities: Societal Housing Patterns and a Proposal for a “Racial Inclusionary Ordinance”, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1167-69 (1990). As one commentator remarked, “[Ojne legacy of the [racial] caste system has remained largely intact: the urban ghetto.” Comment - Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The Problem of Fair Housing, 82 N.W.L. Rev. 874, 875 (1988).
United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1992). The purposeful exclusion of African-Americans from juries by the use of residential stereotypes is neither unique nor less pernicious than overt forms of discrimination. “[Wjhere residence is utilized as a surrogate for racial stereotypes — as, for instance, a short hand for insensitivity to violence — its invocation runs afoul of the guarantees of equal protection.” Bishop, 959 F.2d at 826.
The reason given by the prosecutor, that an African-American who lived near (not in, but near) a city with a “drug problem” would be sympathetic to narcotic use, is both irrational and a convenient means by which to mask racial bias. It is simply irrational to suggest that a *560person is tolerant of narcotic use simply because that person is “[l]iving in [a] part of the county” that is near a city with a “drug problem.”
Ultimately, the invocation of residence both reflected and conveyed deeply ingrained and pernicious stereotypes. Government acts based on such prejudice and stereotypical thinking are precisely the type of acts prohibited by the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Bishop, 959 F.2d at 825-26 (citations omitted). “Where the prosecutor’s . . . explanation is an obvious mask for a race-based challenge, the prosecutor has not met his burden under Batson.” Splunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1992). The record established that Wright is forty-six years of age, has sixteen years of education, and has two children ages eleven and twelve. Based on the prosecutor’s asserted, albeit incorrect, explanation for striking Bowen (that she was young and childless), Wright logically should have been a desirable jury member.
The prosecutor’s assumption that Wright and Bowen would be tolerant of drug use was no more than a “surrogate for racial stereotypes.” Bishop, 959 F.2d at 826. The trial judge said that the prosecutor’s decision was prompted by “reasons that may affect [those person’s] view[s] of the testimony.”
But the role of the trial judge in assessing the prosecutor’s motive only kicks in once a race-neutral justification has been offered. Here, ... the justification was tainted by impermissible generalizations regarding racial groups and their environment. The trial judge’s credibility determinations therefore are not in question. We need not reach the issue whether the prosecutor’s explanation was honest or merely a sham; rather, we conclude that, even assuming it was sincere, the government’s explanation is not sufficient to satisfy Batson because ‘ ‘a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation.”
Id. at 827.
The strikes used to exclude African-Americans from the jury were based on premises proved to be invalid and, moreover, upon premises applied to African-Americans but not to the white members of the panel. The only tactic that is obvious from the strike and the reason advanced by the prosecutor is one that is condemned by Batson. *561“|T]he prosecutor may not . . . challenge[ ] jurors of the defendant’s race on the assumption — or his intuitive judgment — that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Batson is clear in its command that the prosecutor does not meet his burden ‘ ‘merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or “affirming] [his] good faith in making individual selections.” 476 U.S. at 98 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
By accepting as dispositive a finding by the trial judge that has no basis in fact or in the record, this Court, as it did in Winfield, has allowed the prosecutor to avoid the mandate of Batson by the use of a “discriminatory racial proxy.” Bishop, 959 F.2d at 826. This Court again sends the message that in Virginia any reason will suffice to remove African-Americans from juries so long as the prosecutor does not admit on the record race as the reason and the trial judge blindly accepts the prosecutor’s assertion that race was not the reason. That message contravenes the principle that “[i]n our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption . . . that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin [or] the accident of birth . . . .” Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976).
‘ ‘The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (footnote omitted). “It would seem equally self-evident that the appearance of discrimination in court procedure is especially reprehensible, since it is the complete antithesis of the court’s reason for being — to insure equality of treatment and evenhanded justice.” State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla.) cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988). “Discrimination within the *562judicial system is [the] most pernicious.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 88. “[B]y giving official sanction to irrational prejudice, courtroom bias only enflames bigotry in the society at large.” Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 21.
“In view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 99. This decision not only has deprived Buck of a right to a fair trial but has also inflicted harm upon the excluded jurors, Bowen and Wright.
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try. Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence presented at a trial. A person’s race simply “is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.” As long ago as Strauder, therefore, the Court recognized that by denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (citations omitted). The exclusion of Bowen and Wright from the jury “is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, and assertion of their inferiority.” Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized the great societal harm that results from this practice.
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Discrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious because it is “a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.”
Batson, 476 U.S. 87-88 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308).
Because the underlying explanations offered for striking the two African-American jurors find no legitimate support in the record and, *563indeed, are contrary to the facts, the trial judge erred in finding that the prosecutor’s explanations were not racially based. For the reasons I have stated here, and for the reasons stated in my dissent to Winfield, 14 Va. App. at 1050-62, 421 S.E.2d at 469-76, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
I dissent.

 1990 U.S. Census Population by Race, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau.