Court Opinion

ID: 9960155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:11:18.460749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:14.519073
License: Public Domain

J-S40036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DANIEL WILLIAMS                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2331 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 30, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-23-CR-0005530-2019

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                               FILED APRIL 15, 2024

       Appellant, Daniel Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed on him after he was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder,

attempted murder with serious bodily injury, aggravated assault, possession

of an instrument of crime, homicide by vehicle while driving under the

influence (DUI), aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI, and other DUI and

motor vehicle offenses. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

       On the evening of August 22, 2019, Appellant chased Shantel Marie

Harmon (Victim 1) with his pick-up truck and ran his truck into her twice at a

gas station in Tinicum Township, Pennsylvania, killing her and striking and

seriously injuring another woman, Desiree Scott (Victim 2), who was trying to

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S40036-23

help Victim 1. Appellant was charged with first-degree murder, attempted

murder with serious bodily injury, aggravated assault, possession of an

instrument of crime, homicide by vehicle while DUI, aggravated assault by

vehicle while DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, DUI controlled substance,

and DUI controlled substance metabolite.1

       These charges were tried to a jury from July 18 to July 22, 2022. Twelve

witnesses testified for the Commonwealth at this trial, including Victim 2, a

gas station customer who called 911 and followed Appellant’s truck as he fled

the scene, police officers who found Appellant shortly after he fled the scene

hiding near his truck with the keys to the truck in his possession, and Victim

1’s sister, who testified to an argument that she heard between Appellant and

Victim 1 approximately two months before Victim 1 was killed. Trial Court

Opinion at 1-11. In addition to the testimony concerning the events of August

22, 2019, the Commonwealth introduced video recordings from cameras at

the gas station and a camera on the building next door that showed the events

at the gas station. N.T. Trial, 7/20/22, at 53, 73-87; Commonwealth Exs. 3,

6, 7, 16. Evidence from blood test results was also introduced that showed

that Appellant had consumed heroin cut with fentanyl and cocaine prior to

driving his truck at Victim 1.      N.T. Trial, 7/19/22, at 169-75.

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 901(a), 1102(c), 2702(a)(1), and 907, and 75
Pa.C.S. §§ 3735(a), 3735.1(a), 3742, and 3802(d), respectively.

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      On July 20, 2022, the third day of trial, the Commonwealth received a

report from a psychiatrist who had examined Appellant on July 16, 2022

opining that Appellant was not competent to stand trial and notified the trial

court. N.T. Trial, 7/20/22, at 166. The trial court sent the jury home for the

day and held a hearing the next morning, before the jury returned, at which

it heard testimony from that psychiatrist and from a psychologist who

examined Appellant after the court recessed on July 20, 2022. Id. at 167-68;

N.T. Trial, 7/21/22, at 10-37.    Following this hearing, Appellant’s counsel

moved for a mistrial on the ground that Appellant was not competent. N.T.

Trial, 7/21/22, at 37. The trial court ruled that Appellant was competent to

stand trial, denied the motion for a mistrial, and the trial resumed.     Id.

Appellant did not testify or call any witnesses.

      On July 22, 2022, the jury found Appellant guilty of the above offenses.

Verdict Slip. On August 30, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life

imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, a

consecutive term of imprisonment of 20 to 40 years for attempted murder

with serious bodily injury, concurrent terms of imprisonment 5 to 10 years for

both homicide by vehicle while DUI and aggravated assault by vehicle while

DUI and 1 to 2 years for possession of an instrument of crime, and no further

penalty on the remaining convictions on the ground that they merged with the

other offenses, resulting in an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment plus

20 to 40 years.     N.T. Sentencing at 13-14.      At the sentencing hearing,

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Appellant moved before sentence was imposed for a mistrial on the ground of

inconsistency in the verdicts, and the trial court denied that motion. Id. at 3-

6. Appellant filed no post-sentence motion and timely appealed the judgment

of sentence on September 7, 2022.

       Appellant raises the following three issues in this appeal: (1) whether

the evidence was sufficient to prove first-degree murder; (2) whether the first-

degree murder verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (3)

whether the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial on the ground that

Appellant was incompetent to stand trial.2

       Our standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

is well-settled:

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
       to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
       a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
       the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
       addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
       the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
       innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
       resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
       inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
       drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
       may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
       beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
____________________________________________

2 Although Appellant’s statement of questions does not limit his sufficiency
and weight of the evidence issues to the first-degree murder verdict,
Appellant’s Brief at 6, he argues those issues only with respect to the first-
degree murder verdict in the argument section of his brief. Any challenge to
the sufficiency or weight of the evidence with respect his other convictions is
therefore waived.

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       evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
       must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
       considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
       credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
       is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (brackets

omitted).

       Appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove first-degree

murder is without merit. The elements that the Commonwealth must prove

to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder are: (1) that a human being

was unlawfully killed; (2) that the defendant was responsible for the killing;

and (3) that the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.

Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2013); Commonwealth

v. Laird (Laird II), 988 A.2d 618, 624-25 (Pa. 2010); Commonwealth v.

Baker, 201 A.3d 791, 795 (Pa. Super. 2018). The only element that Appellant

asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove was the mens rea element of

specific intent to kill and malice.3

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth argues that this issue is waived because Appellant did

not state what crime and elements he contended that the Commonwealth
failed to prove in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Failure to specify in a Rule
1925(b) statement what elements of a crime were not proven can constitute
a waiver of a sufficiency of evidence claim. Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981
A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. 2009). Such insufficient specificity, however, does
not require waiver where the issue that the defendant is raising is apparent
and the trial court addressed the issue. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 250
A.3d 1209, 1223–25 (Pa. 2021); Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d 1058,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Here, the evidence from the events themselves showed specific intent

to kill and malice. Victim 2 testified that after Appellant hit Victim 1 with his

truck, he backed up and drove his truck a second time at Victim 1, hitting both

her and Victim 1 and throwing them toward the back of the store. N.T. Trial,

7/19/22, at 66-69, 74-76, 88-91.               The video recordings showed Victim 1

getting out of the passenger side of Appellant’s truck and running across the

road toward the gas station convenience store and Appellant’s truck then

making a U-turn, chasing her, and striking her outside the store. N.T. Trial,

7/20/22, at 73-75, 77-79, 81-85; Commonwealth Exs. 3, 6, 7, 16. The video

recordings also showed that after Appellant’s truck hit Victim 1, it backed up

and came at her again, hitting her and Victim 2 and going approximately 15

feet into the store. N.T. Trial, 7/20/22, at 84-85; Commonwealth Ex. 3. This

evidence was plainly sufficient to prove both specific intent to kill and malice.

Commonwealth v. Packard, 767 A.2d 1068, 1071-72 (Pa. Super. 2001)

(evidence that defendant deliberately drove a motor vehicle at a pedestrian is

sufficient to prove specific intent to kill), abrogated on other issue,

Commonwealth           v.   Dantzler,     135     A.3d   1109   (Pa.   Super.   2016);

____________________________________________

1159-60 (Pa. 2007). Here, it was apparent from one of the other issues in
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement that Appellant was challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to prove the mens rea element of first-degree
murder and the trial court thoroughly addressed that issue.           Concise
Statement of Matters Complaint of on Appeal ¶10; Trial Court Opinion at 14-
16. We therefore do not find waiver and address Appellant’s sufficiency of the
evidence issue on the merits.

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Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1219-20 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Pa.

Super. 2011) (proof that defendant knowingly accelerated his truck toward

pedestrians was sufficient to prove malice).

      In addition, there was evidence that Appellant had expressed an intent

to kill Victim 1. Victim 1’s sister testified that Victim 1 and Appellant had been

in a romantic relationship and that in June 2019, she heard Appellant tell

Victim 1 that Victim 1 “couldn’t break up with him,” that “if he couldn't have

her no one could have her,” and that “[h]e would kill her first.” N.T. Trial,

7/19/22, at 185-90, 193-94.

      Appellant argues that the fact that he was under the influence of drugs

at the time and the jury’s verdict that he was guilty of homicide by vehicle

while DUI prevent the evidence from being sufficient to show specific intent

to kill. Neither of these arguments has merit.

      Voluntary intoxication can negate specific intent to kill and reduce a

defendant’s guilt from first-degree murder to third-degree murder only where

the defendant is overwhelmed by an intoxicant to the point of losing his

faculties and sensibilities. Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 465

(Pa. 2019); Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1263 (Pa. 2013).

There was no evidence here that Appellant was intoxicated to that point. To

the contrary, there was evidence that Appellant was in control of his faculties

and sensibilities when he killed Victim 1. The eyewitness who called 911 and

followed Appellant’s truck when it left the scene testified that the truck was

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driving normally as it traveled to the interstate and drove on the interstate.

N.T. Trial, 7/19/22, at 44-45, 54-55. In addition, the video recordings showed

that Appellant was able to maneuver the truck around obstacles in his pursuit

of Victim 1. N.T. Trial, 7/20/22, at 74, 77-79, 82-87; Commonwealth Exs. 3,

7, 16. The jury could properly conclude from such evidence that Appellant

had sufficient control of his faculties and sensibilities to form a specific intent

to kill Victim 1, notwithstanding his intoxication. Laird II, 988 A.2d at 626-

27; Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078, 1085 (Pa. 1993),

overruled on other issue, Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827 A.2d 385 (Pa.

2003).

      Appellant’s argument that the jury’s homicide by vehicle while DUI

verdict precludes specific to kill fails for two reasons. First, there is no such

inconsistency between the two verdicts. The offense of homicide by vehicle

while DUI requires proof that the defendant was at least criminally negligent,

Commonwealth v. Samuels, 778 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 2001), not that the

defendant lacked malice or specific intent.      A defendant therefore may be

guilty of both homicide by vehicle while DUI and offenses that require a mens

rea greater than criminal negligence. Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d

161, 163, 165, 167 n.7, 172 (Pa. 2017) (upholding third-degree murder and

homicide by vehicle while DUI convictions for same death); Commonwealth

v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 748, 757 (Pa. Super. 2014) (same). Indeed,

the jury in this case was instructed that the mens rea they must find to convict

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Appellant of homicide by vehicle while DUI was recklessness or gross

negligence, which the trial court instructed was awareness of and conscious

disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his

conduct. N.T. Trial, 7/22/22, at 80-81. The jury’s verdict on homicide by

vehicle while DUI thus does not suggest any conclusion that the killing was

unintentional.

      Second, inconsistent verdicts do not render sufficient evidence

insufficient or otherwise invalidate a conviction, unless commission of an

offense of which the defendant was acquitted is an essential statutory element

of the offense of which the defendant was convicted. Commonwealth v.

Baker-Myers, 255 A.3d 223, 229-35 (Pa. 2021); Commonwealth v.

Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1246-50 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Laird

(Laird I), 726 A.2d 346, 355 (Pa. 1999). Nothing in the first-degree murder

charge required the Commonwealth to prove any other offense or the absence

of another offense as an essential element of the crime. The homicide by

vehicle while DUI verdict is therefore irrelevant to the validity of Appellant’s

first-degree murder conviction and could not make the evidence insufficient

to support that conviction even if there were any inconsistency. Moore, 103

A.3d at 1250; Laird I, 726 A.2d at 355.

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       Appellant’s argument that the first-degree murder verdict was against

weight of the evidence likewise merits no relief.4 A new trial may be granted

on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence only where

the verdict was so contrary to the evidence that it shocks the trial court’s

sense of justice. Clemons, 200 A.3d at 463; Commonwealth v. Antidormi,

84 A.3d 736, 758 (Pa. Super. 2014). Our review of the denial of a motion for

a new trial based on weight of the evidence is limited. We review whether the

trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the verdict was not against

the weight of the evidence, not whether the verdict, in this Court’s opinion,

was against the weight of the evidence.            Clemons, 200 A.3d at 463-64;

Commonwealth v. Delmonico, 251 A.3d 829, 837 (Pa. Super. 2021).

       Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
       the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
       consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
       judge …. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
       denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict
       was or was not against the weight of the evidence.

Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 758 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049

(Pa. 2013)) (brackets omitted).

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4 A weight of the evidence challenge is waived if it is not raised in the trial

court by oral or written motion before sentencing or by post-sentence motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Commonwealth v. Kinney, 157 A.3d 968, 972 (Pa.
Super. 2017). Although Appellant filed no post-sentence motion, he did raise
the issue that he argues in his weight of the evidence claim as grounds for a
new trial before he was sentenced, and the trial court addressed the issue of
whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. N.T. Sentencing
at 3-5; Trial Court Opinion at 16-17. We therefore do not find this issue
waived and address it on the merits.

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      Here, the trial court reviewed the evidence at length and concluded that

the first-degree murder verdict did not shock its sense of justice. Trial Court

Opinion at 1-12, 16-17. As demonstrated above, the evidence was amply

sufficient to prove first-degree murder and Appellant does not contend any of

the evidence was so implausible that the jury could not find it credible. Rather,

the sole ground on which Appellant argues that verdict was against the weight

of the evidence is the same argument that he made concerning sufficiency of

the evidence, that the homicide by vehicle while DUI conviction was

inconsistent with proof that Appellant had specific intent to kill. As discussed

above, no such inconsistency exists. The trial court therefore did not abuse

its discretion in concluding that the verdict was not against the weight of the

evidence.

      In his remaining, third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred

in finding him competent to stand trial. That argument also fails. A defendant

is presumed to be competent to stand trial and bears the burden of proving

that he is not competent. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 1044

(Pa. 2023); Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1196-97 (Pa. 2014);

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 64 A.3d 715, 720 (Pa. Super. 2013). To

prove he was incompetent to stand trial, the defendant must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that he was either unable to understand the

nature of the proceedings or unable to participate in his defense. Johnson,

289 A.3d at 1044; Commonwealth v. Pruitt, 951 A.2d 307, 316 (Pa. 2008);

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Stevenson, 64 A.3d at 720. Because the trial court had the opportunity to

observe the defendant and to hear the expert testimony concerning the

defendant’s condition, its decision that the defendant was competent is

entitled to great deference and may be reversed only if an abuse of discretion

is shown. Pruitt, 951 A.2d at 316-17; Stevenson, 64 A.3d at 720-22.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant

was competent to stand trial. The trial court heard testimony from two expert

witnesses who had examined Appellant.         The psychologist who examined

Appellant on July 20, 2022 opined that while Appellant suffered from

depression, anxiety, PTSD, and possible personality disorder, he did not suffer

from psychosis and opined that Appellant was fully capable of communicating

with counsel and understanding the court proceedings and was competent to

stand trial. N.T. Trial, 7/21/22, at 21-32. The trial court found that testimony

credible. Id. at 37. While the psychiatrist who examined Appellant on July

16, 2022 opined that some of Appellant’s responses to him were delusional,

that Appellant was suffering from psychosis, and that Appellant was not able

to communicate to him concerning his case and was therefore not competent

to stand trial, id. at 15-18, the trial court was not required to find his opinion

credible. Pruitt, 951 A.2d at 316. Moreover, the psychiatrist testified that

Appellant’s orientation, cognition, and ability to identify himself were adequate

and admitted that he did not know if Appellant’s communications with counsel

had the same problems that he experienced with Appellant, that Appellant

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could have been deliberately making himself appear delusional, and that he

felt that further examination was needed to determine whether Appellant was

competent. Id. at 15-16, 18-19.

      The fact that the evaluations were performed on different dates and that

the psychologist did not evaluate Appellant until the third day of trial does not

invalidate the trial court’s competency ruling. The psychologist opined that

Appellant could not have been suffering from psychosis at the time of the July

16, 2022 evaluation or the first days of trial because a psychotic episode would

take months to resolve. N.T. Trial, 7/21/22, at 29, 32. In addition, the trial

court had the opportunity to observe Appellant’s interaction with counsel

throughout the trial and concluded from those observations that Appellant was

fully able to communicate with counsel and participate in his defense. Id. at

37. Indeed, Appellant’s trial counsel did not assert that Appellant had been

unable to communicate effectively with him. Id. at 34-35.

      Because the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s first-degree

murder conviction and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding

that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and that Appellant

was competent to stand trial, none of Appellant’s issues in this appeal merits

relief. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 4/15/2024

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