Court Opinion

ID: 9682110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:05:30.25137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.510155
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The legislature has not provided for a private cause of action for unfair *138claim settlement practices under either the DTPA or the Insurance Code. In finding such a cause of action, the majority has had to resort to a tortured reading of the DTPA, the Insurance Code, and Vail’s pleadings, and has ignored our recent opinion in Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.1987). I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.1
There is nothing in the legislative history of section 17.50(a)(4) of the DTPA or article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code to suggest that the legislature intended to provide a private cause of action for unfair claim settlement practices.
If the legislature had intended to create a private cause of action for unfair claim settlement practices, it would have listed unfair claim settlement practices as a specific subdivision of section 17.46 of the DTPA or article 21.21 of the Insurance Code. It did neither. Instead, the legislature enacted article 21.21-2 to deal with unfair, claim settlement practices, an act which did not provide for a private cause of action but only authorized the State Board of Insurance to issue cease and desist orders upon a finding that an insurer has engaged in unfair claim settlement practices.
The majority is not satisfied to hold for Vail under just one theory of recovery. Because of the apparent weakness and convoluted reasoning of the majority’s opinion, the court has found it necessary to “throw everything including the kitchen sink” in its opinion. For example, Vail’s live pleadings are devoid of any allegations that Texas Farm violated an unlisted deceptive act or practice. However, the court pretends that this was an integral part of Vail’s pleadings. Also, the majority’s opinion contravenes our recent decision in Chitsey.
In Chitsey, the plaintiff sought to state a cause of action based on the definition of unfair claim settlement practices found in Board Order 41454. 738 S.W.2d at 641. That Order stated:
No insurer shall engage in unfair claim settlement practices. Unfair claim settlement practices means committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the following: ....
(15) refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information.
State Bd. of Ins., Amendment of Unfair Competition & Practices of Insurers Rules, Docket No. 41454 (Aug. 10,1982) (emphasis added).
This court found in Chitsey that, absent a showing that the insurance company refused to reasonably investigate “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice,” there can be no recovery under Board Order 41454. 738 S.W.2d at 643.
The majority claims that it is following Chitsey, insofar as the Vails attempt to establish a cause of action using the definition of unfair claim settlement practices found in Board Order 41454. However, when faced with identical language defining unfair practices in article 21.21-2, the majority permits recovery. To do so, it employs what I believe is a false distinction, holding that “frequency” is not a requisite element of the acts defined in article 21.21-2 as unfair claim settlement practices.
Article 21.21-2 states, in pertinent part: Any of the following acts by an insurer, if committed without cause and performed with such frequency as determined by the State Board of Insurance as provided for in this Act, shall constitute unfair claim settlement practices:
(d) not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear.
Tex.Ins.Code art. 21.21-2 (emphasis added). It is apparent that while “frequency” may not be a requisite of the actual acts, those acts must be performed with “frequency” *139if they are to be elevated to the status of an “unfair claim settlement practice.”
Also, in Chitsey, we rejected the argument that a jury finding of an insurer’s failure to use due diligence in determining the amount of its insured’s loss is a “determination by law” creating a cause of action. Instead, we held that “a jury finding that one has engaged in prohibited conduct cannot be substituted for a declaration of what conduct is prohibited.... The words ‘determined by law’ call for at least a state agency, if not legislative, determination and not just a jury finding.” Id. at 643.
The majority in its opinion states: “While a jury finding does not constitute ‘a determination of law,’ this court is empowered to determine whether conduct constitutes an unfair or deceptive act.” 754 S.W.2d at 135. This does not distinguish Chit-sey; this contravenes Chitsey. Because I cannot distinguish Chitsey, I would hold the Vails have not stated a cause of action under section 17.50(a)(4) of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act through the incorporation of article 21.21 § 16 of the Insurance Code and section 4 of Insurance Board Order 18663. I would also hold that the Vails have failed to plead an unlisted deceptive trade practice.
I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

. Texas Farm admits that it owes Vail $35,000 which represents the full amount of the policy; $25,000 for the dwelling and $10,000 for the contents. Thus, the sole issue on appeal is whether Vail is entitled to treble damages under the law.