Court Opinion

ID: 9847259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:56:43.883696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:04.604312
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority that appellant failed to structure a triable question of fact with respect to his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Appellant complains that he suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the false and insubstantial allegations presented by appellees to his employer, the school district, for the purpose of humiliating him and interfering with his ability to perform his duties as high school principal. Appellant seeks to recover damages for such conduct pursuant to § 46(1) of the Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d (1965). That section provides:
“(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”
The majority, in affirming the summary judgment entered against appellant, hold that no jury of reasonable persons could conclude that appellees’ actions were extreme and outrageous.
The evidence before the court in the form of affidavits, depositions, exhibits, and pleadings establishes that appellees made numerous charges to the school board concerning appellant’s interactions with teachers, staff and students. Many of these allegations are summarized in the majority opinion. Other charges brought by appel-lees against appellant include his making sexual overtures to a student; examining the back of a female student while she was unclad above the waist; ordering teachers to strip-search students; committing assault and battery on a spectator at a basketball game; violating hunting regulations; and harassing and embarrassing students. These alleged incidents span a period of ten years.
Appellant, in his deposition and complaint, contends that the charges against him were distorted or false and were presented to the school board in an effort to embarrass him and interfere with his work. He says that appellees repeatedly raised accusations which the school board had previously considered and found to be trivial or without merit. He complains that appellees publicized numerous trivial accusations against him in order to create a false impression of improper conduct. Appellant asserts that these actions by appel-lees caused him to suffer severe emotional distress.
*194Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the defendants’ improper comments and allegations in the context of employment relationships. In Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 88 Wash.2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977), the plaintiff alleged that during his employment he was continuously humiliated and embarrassed by the racial jokes and slurs made in his presence by his employer’s agents and employees. He further alleged that these individuals had wrongfully accused him of stealing corporate property, thereby subjecting him to public scorn and a denial of employment. The trial court dismissed the claim for failure to state grounds for relief. The Supreme Court of Washington reversed, saying:
“ * * * It is for the trier of fact to determine, taking into account changing social conditions and plaintiff’s own susceptibility, whether the particular conduct was sufficient to constitute extreme outrage.” 565 P.2d at 1177.
Analyzing similar facts, the California Supreme Court in Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.3d 932, 160 Cal.Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58 (1979), upheld a jury’s finding of outrageous conduct. There the defendants had recommended the plaintiff’s dismissal for erroneous reasons and had attempted to humiliate him through the use of racial epithets and the assignment of demeaning tasks. See also Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3rd Cir. 1979).
In view of the foregoing authorities, I am unable to understand how the majority can conclude, as a matter of law, that the conduct of which appellant complains is not “outrageous.” This question is for the finder of fact after full development of the evidence — not for this court upon review of summary judgment. Furthermore, I cannot agree that such conduct, if established as appellant contends, is privileged. To assert a privilege, a party must have acted “in a permissible way.” Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, § 46, comment g. I would have remanded for a trial on the issue of whether appellees’ presentations to the school board constituted extreme and outrageous behavior.