Court Opinion

ID: 9910458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 18:02:28.953755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:00.528320
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/15/23 P. v. Teague CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   A162458

 v.                                                                   (Contra Costa
 SAMUEL TEAGUE,                                                    County Super. Ct. No.
                                                                   51821628)
             Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Samuel Teague was charged with one count each of forcible
rape, assault with intent to commit a felony, injuring a spouse, assault by
means likely to produce great bodily injury, and false imprisonment, along
with several enhancements and special allegations. A jury convicted him on
all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to 50 years to life.
         On appeal, defendant contends the trial court (1) erred in finding he
waived his Miranda1 rights and admitting statements he made to arresting
officers; (2) abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial based on
one juror’s hesitation during polling; and (3) abused its discretion in declining
to strike his prior felony and sentencing him under the “Three Strikes” law.
         We affirm.

         1    Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).

                                                               1
                                  BACKGROUND
      Jane Doe and defendant began dating in 2011 and have one child
together. She testified that over the years, she sometimes “did not feel safe
around” defendant, such as when he once swung a clothing iron at her,
almost hitting her in the head. On another occasion, defendant put Doe’s
head on the toilet and “smashed it between the toilet seat” and the toilet.
When she was pregnant, defendant “threw hot coffee” at her. On other
occasions, defendant slapped her. She never reported these incidents because
she did not want “people knowing what I was going through.”
      In May 2018, Doe told defendant she wanted to end the relationship.
Defendant did not “accept that,” and he “wasn’t ready to leave.”
      The following month, in June, Doe worked an early morning shift,
which ended around 11:00 a.m., and then went to breakfast with some
coworkers. She had “two or three Mimosas,” left the restaurant around 1:00
p.m., and returned home. When she arrived, she went to sleep on the
downstairs couch.
      She awoke to defendant yelling at her. He was sitting on the stairs,
with Doe’s cell phone in his hands. He was going through her phone and saw
that she had been communicating with a former romantic partner and the
two had been “exchanging messages . . . or some kind of social media.” Doe
walked over to defendant and asked for her phone back. Defendant punched
her in the face. It was like “[n]othing that [she’d] ever felt,” and she fell to
the floor. Defendant “kept punching” her, all the while calling her names
“[l]ike bitch and ho and things.”2

      2Doe is 5’4” tall and weighs 170 pounds. Defendant is 6’1” or 6’2” and
weighed “more than 250 pounds.”

                                         2
      Doe was scared and eventually attempted to run to the front door.
Before she could get out of the house, defendant pulled her by the shirt. He
put his arm around her neck—so that her throat “would have been in the
crook of his elbow or against his forearm”—and squeezed. Doe could not
breathe, and she thought that she “was going to die.” Defendant told her, “he
did not care about my life” and “I don’t care if you die.” Doe lost
consciousness. When she “came to” she was on the floor and defendant was
straddling her and punching her with a closed fist. She noticed her pants
were off. Defendant took off her underwear and removed her tampon. He
told Doe, “he should rape me.” All the while, he “kept hitting” Doe and
kicking her in the head.
      Defendant then put his hands around either side of Doe’s neck and
began “[p]ressing down.” Doe “felt like I was being crushed,” and she could
not breathe. She thought she “was dying,” and she lost consciousness again.
Doe awoke naked, upstairs in bed. When she went to the bathroom and
looked in the mirror, she could only open her eyes “a tiny bit.” She did not
look “like myself at all.” Her face was swollen, her “eyes were shut,” her
“cheek was bleeding,” and even her “ears were swollen.” She “could barely
walk,” and everything on her body hurt.
      She knew she “needed help,” so she grabbed a towel and went to a
neighbor’s apartment. When the neighbor and her boyfriend opened the door
and saw Doe, the neighbor “screamed” and the boyfriend exclaimed, “Oh,
shit.” The neighbor called 911. When police arrived, Doe had to be told she
was speaking to an officer because her eyes were so swollen she could not see.
      The officer asked what she had been hit with, and Doe replied “Fists.”
She also told the officer “[e]verything” hurts, when he asked “what part of
your body hurts?” She was unsure how long “defendant had been beating”

                                        3
her, but told the officer, it felt like hours, “it felt like, I was being tortured,”
and that defendant had “choked” her until she lost consciousness. The officer
did not ask if she had been sexually assaulted or whether she had sex with
defendant. Doe was then taken to the hospital. Prior to that night Doe had
not had “consensual sex” with defendant for two or three weeks.
        The Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a five-count
information alleging one count of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd.
(a)(2)—count 1)3; assault with intent to commit a felony (§ 220, subd. (a)(1)—
count 2); injuring a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)—count 3); assault by means
likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)—count 4); false
imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237—count 5). As to each count, the
information also alleged an enhancement of infliction of great bodily injury
involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), and as to counts 1 and 2, an
enhancement of great bodily injury during a sex offense (§ 12022.8). As to
count 1 there was an additional allegation of infliction of great bodily injury
(§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)). Finally, the information alleged a prior serious or
violent felony for attempted robbery with a firearm. (§§ 667.5, subds. (a) &
(b).)
        At trial, in addition to Doe, the neighbor testified. Doe had previously
told her the relationship with defendant “was finished.” On the morning of
the incident, she awoke to the sound of someone “scratching or knocking at
the door.” When her partner opened the door, he said, “Oh my, God.” She
saw that Doe’s “eyes were completely shut.” Had she “not said her name,”
she would not “have known who it was.” Doe was dressed only in a towel and

       All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
        3

otherwise indicated.

                                          4
said defendant “beat her up.” The neighbor brought her in, called 911, and
got Doe a T-shirt.
      Dr. Jeanne Pae, an emergency medical physician, testified that she
treated Doe on the morning of June 9. Doe had “[s]ignificant diffuse facial
swelling ecchymosis, bilateral paraorbital [sic] ecchymosis and edema,[4] one
centimeter laceration to the left cheek, swelling to the upper and lower lips, V
shaped laceration to the upper lip, right side.” CAT and CT scans showed
Doe had a “large amount of swelling and bruising to the right side of the
neck,” an “[a]cute left medial orbital wall blowout fracture,” meaning the
bones surrounding her left eye and closest to her nose were broken, and there
was bleeding “inside the skull” in “the brain matter” on her right side. Doe
had bruising over the “right part of the abdomen,” on her right shoulder, left
arm, and elbow. She had contusions and scraping on right knee and left
tibia. Doe’s injuries were “[p]ossibly” “consistent with a person being
strangled.”
      Pittsburg Police Officer Colton Harvey testified he responded to the
scene at Doe’s apartment complex around 5:00 a.m. He went inside the
neighbor’s apartment, where he found Doe sitting on the couch. “It was
immediately evident that she had significant blunt force for trauma to her
face.” He noticed both of Doe’s “eyes were swollen shut, significant bruising,
lumps. She was bleeding from one of her eyes.” Doe appeared as if she “had
a lot of difficulty talking and articulating some of the events that had
transpired. It took a while to kind of get the information out.”
      During this initial interview, Doe told Officer Harvey that
“[t]hroughout the physical altercation that occurred, she did lose

      Ecchymosis means bruising, periorbital means “around the eye,” and
      4

edema means swelling.

                                       5
consciousness.” Doe described being choked “about four times.” Officer
Harvey called for a “Code 3” medical assistance, which means “emergency
response, lights, sirens, it requires ‘we need you now.’ ” He only talked to Doe
for about 10 minutes to “develop what happened” and to get “the basics, all
the barebones information” of “how did she sustain these injuries, who was
the responsible person.”
      Officer Harvey next spoke to Doe two hours later in the emergency
room, around 7:18 in the morning. Doe appeared to be in pain and “had
difficulties articulating sequence of events and kind of had some time-lapse
issues which is very common with people that sustain traumatic injuries.”
      Doe said she and defendant had dated for about six years, lived
together, and had one child together but were “in the middle of breaking up.”
On the day of the incident, defendant had seen text messages on Doe’s phone
“regarding another male.” Defendant then “hit her extremely hard in the
face” with a closed fist, which caused her to fall to the floor. Defendant then
got on top of her and began punching and kicking her. Doe stated she was
too “scared to fight back.” She “tried to get up and run away” but defendant
“grabbed her by the throat” and “choked her.” He “choked her about four
times” and she lost consciousness twice. Defendant told her, “I don’t care if
you die.” During conversation, Officer Harvey again questioned Doe about
“how she was hurt” and “who hurt her” but did not ask “about whether she
had had sex with somebody.”
      When Officer Harvey spoke with Doe about 15 minutes later, he had
received some information from Officer Miguel Gutierrez “that there was
potentially sexual intercourse or something like that between Jane Doe and
[defendant].” So, Harvey “questioned her regarding the sexual intercourse
between her” and defendant. Harvey asked Doe if the two had had “sexual

                                       6
intercourse before you guys got in a fight?” Doe responded, “ ‘No, he tried to
rape me.’ ”
      Pittsburg Police Detective Miguel Gutierrez5 testified he arrived at
Doe’s apartment complex shortly before Officer Harvey. While Officer
Harvey went to check on Doe at the neighbor’s apartment, Officer Gutierrez
went into Doe’s apartment. He described the living room as being “in
disarray. There was things moved around. The couch was moved around. It
looked like a struggle or a fight or something had occurred in that living
room.” He also noticed “a little bit of blood on the couch as well as on the
clothes around there.” Later, “a tampon” was found “near the couch.”
Leaving the living room, he saw “other spots of blood in the beginning couple
steps of the first tier of the stairs to go to the second floor.” Gutierrez also
saw “a little bit of blood on the toilet” in the bathroom on the second floor. He
also found defendant on the second floor, “laying on the bed there” asleep.
Defendant was “completely naked” with a blanket over him. There was blood
on the bedroom wall, the bed as well as on the pillow on which defendant was
lying. Gutierrez took defendant into custody and read him his Miranda
rights.
      Officer Gutierrez spoke to defendant twice, once at 6:20 a.m., and the
second time at 8:47 a.m.
      During the 6:20 a.m. interrogation, defendant stated he had gone to
Doe’s apartment at 11:00 p.m. the night before. When he arrived, Doe was
already there, and the two “fucked.” They “had an argument after that.”
When Officer Gutierrez asked him to “explain why there was blood all over

      5 We note Officer Gutierrez’s name is “Gutierrez” throughout the
record on appeal, however, in the transcript for the trial it is spelled
“Gutuirrez.” We use the more common spelling, and accordingly refer to him
as Officer Gutierrez.

                                         7
the house,” defendant “had no explanation to it.” He said, “ ‘I don’t know.
You would have to ask her.’ ” He also said Doe “seemed fine” when they went
to sleep” and that “he was holding her.” When Gutierrez “pointed out to him
that it was a little weird that there was blood all over the house,” defendant
said he did know how Doe got hurt. Defendant explained he “was drunk” but
he later said he “wasn’t even buzzing.” He then admitted “ ‘We had a fight,
bro. I did all that shit to her. I fucked up.’ ” When asked if he caused the
injuries to Doe, defendant stated, “Yeah, I did it, bro.” Defendant said, “I’m
not going to lie about it, bro, because I knew this was going to happen. I
knew I was going to go to jail after what happened and shit. Shit just got too
out of hand. I did too much so I deserve everything I got coming. I ain’t
trippin’. I’ll tell everything I did. I fucked up so I take full responsibility for
all the shit, bro. I really do. It’s on me in a heartbeat.” Defendant told
Gutierrez Doe “was throwing up,” and she “had trouble walking so he would
assist her” to the bathroom, both of which “he attributed . . . to alcohol.” He
said Doe vomited four times.
      Over the course of the interview, defendant went back and forth,
sometimes denying he did things or saying he could not remember.
Defendant denied choking Doe but admitted hitting her. When Officer
Gutierrez asked defendant how Doe was, “[a]fter you beat her up?” defendant
said she wanted to go to the hospital. But defendant also said he and Doe
“had sex throughout the night.” When Gutierrez asked how Doe went from
wanting to go to the hospital to having sex all night, defendant “didn’t have a
good explanation.” Defendant simply said, “We would just sit. We was just
fucking.” Defendant insisted he did not rape or force himself on Doe, and she
did not pass out. Doe “encouraged him to have sex with her.” When
Gutierrez asked defendant, “why she was going along with the sex and if she

                                         8
wanted to,” defendant said, “ ‘No. I guess cause she probably was just, like,
tired of fighting with me.’ ”
      During the second interrogation, defendant told Officer Gutierrez that
he and Doe had “makeup sex.” He again said Doe “was so drunk she couldn’t
walk,” telling Gutierrez “I picked her up, though. I helped her move and stuff
because she couldn’t walk and shit. So I picked her up and maneuvered her
because she wasn’t like walking and shit because she was fucking hella
drunk.” He said he “had been trying to clean her up.” He also acknowledged
Doe “had been trying to get away from him.” When Gutierrez asked
defendant, why she would do that, defendant responded “he believed it was
because he was hitting her.” Defendant continued, “I know she was trying to,
like, stop me from hitting her and stuff.” When she would try to get away,
defendant would try “to fight her.”
      Contra Costa County Senior Inspector Kay Belk testified she spoke
with Doe about three months after the incident. Doe related that after her
overnight shift at work, she and a coworker went to breakfast, and then she
went home. Once there, she fell asleep on the couch. She was awakened by
defendant. He had “her phone on the stairs and he was saying that she was a
bitch and a whore.” While she was still in the living room, defendant
punched her in the face, with a closed fist, “with such force that she fell
backwards.” After he punched her, Doe attempted to get away, but defendant
“used a choke hold to drag her back towards the couch.” Doe “felt a lot of
pressure on her throat.” Doe attempted to leave out of the front door, but
defendant grabbed her shirt and choked her. She felt his “thumbs being
pressed forcibly on her throat and neck with a crushing sensation,” and she
had difficulty breathing. Doe thought “she was going to die.” She
remembered “waking up upstairs in her master bedroom” naked. She had

                                        9
“no memory of who took her clothes off.” She had been on her period on the
day of the incident and had “no recollection of how the tampon was removed
even though she did remember . . . having a tampon on earlier that day.” She
could not remember having sex with defendant. When Belk asked Doe if she
had willingly had sex with defendant, she said, “No.”
      Doe did not know the time but remembered it “was getting dark
outside.” She could not remember if defendant was in the bedroom. She
looked at herself in the mirror and her face was “deformed, her eyes were
swollen shut.” Her first instinct was “to find a safe place and get some
medical attention.” Doe wrapped a towel around herself and went to her
neighbor’s apartment and “told them [defendant] had beat her up.”
      Defendant also testified. He said he had been out watching a
basketball game on the night of the incident. He had “been drinking a little
bit” and was “feeling the effects of the alcohol.” When he returned to Doe’s
apartment, he saw her asleep on the couch, dressed in her work uniform. He
woke her up and she was “groggy and sleepy.” After they talked, the two had
sex in the living room. After they had sex, defendant went to the bathroom.
When he returned, he saw Doe looking through his phone. Defendant
thought she “was jealous” and had a “suspicion I might have been talking to
other people.” He started looking through Doe’s phone, and saw “text
messages from her and another guy.” He “felt like the world just dropped on
my head,” and he “got really angry, really angry.” “I probably never been
that way before. Extremely angry.” When Doe moved toward him, he
“punched her really hard” in her face, and she fell to the ground. He
“continued to hit her in her face,” with a “closed fist.” It “was a barrage. It
was a lot of punches.” He “felt really betrayed.” Doe “tried to run through
the front door,” but he “caught her,” “put my arm around her neck,” and

                                       10
“continued to assault her.” He “dragged her to the ground,” “got back on top
of her,” and “kept hitting her.” He choked her because he “was mad. I was
feeling betrayed.” She lost consciousness.
      After Doe “passed out,” he carried her upstairs in a “stand-up position,”
kind of “pulling her up the stairs.” Doe had a “cut under her” left eye and her
“lip was a little bit, like, busted.” Doe “looked like somebody hit her.” There
was the cut and “a little puffiness on her bottom lip” but her face was not
swollen up “at all.” He took her to the bathroom, “[b]ecause there was blood
all over her face.” So he tried “to clean it up” because there was “just a lot of
blood coming from her eye.” At that point, Doe woke up. “[B]lood was just
everywhere,” and her eye continued to bleed. They were both naked, and
they walked to the bedroom. He went and plugged in her phone because it
“was dead,” and he “wanted to look through it some more.” After he read
more messages, he “got extremely mad again” and “reached over” and
“slapped her hard.” Doe “fell backwards,” and defendant “grabbed her arms,
and I spit in her face” because he “felt betrayed. I was really, really mad.”
He was “calling her names and stuff,” and he “wasn’t thinking.”
      After he “stopped spitting on her,” Doe “sat up on the bed, and she kind
of started throwing up.” Defendant “thought she was drunk.” He also
thought “the way her eye was bleeding. There was so much, like, blood, I
thought it was, like, thin. Because I know that—I heard that when people
are drinking that their blood gets thin.” Defendant put Doe back in the
bathtub because she “was bleeding” and wiped her face and upper body with
a towel, “wherever there was blood on her body.” Once he “started taking
more care of her,” his anger “started subsiding.” Defendant got Doe some
water, and they had a “heart-to-heart conversation” about their relationship.
He said Doe apologized “for lying,” and she told him “she just wanted to be

                                        11
happy and things like that.” She rubbed his shoulders, and he held her.
Defendant “was feeling kind of vulnerable,” and he began “kissing on her”
which “led to us having sex.” After they “had sex a lot,” they “eventually
went to sleep.” He awoke to the police.
      Defendant said Doe wanted to go the hospital but he did not take her
because he “was scared.” He said her injuries were just “a cut on her eye, and
like, a swollen lip.” He had planned to take Doe to the hospital the next
morning. He did not think what he did to Doe “was right” and he felt
“[e]xtremely bad” about it.
      He denied raping Doe, pulling down her pants, taking out her tampon,
or threatening to rape her. He maintained they had consensual sex that
night. He denied ever hitting Doe before, but acknowledged they had
arguments. He said he never threw coffee “at her or anything like that”—
they had argued “and I had the coffee in my hand and some of my body
movements made some of the coffee come out of the cup and get on her.” Nor,
said defendant, did he ever threaten her with an iron—while they were
arguing, defendant “turned around to leave and the iron was on . . . the
dresser, and I just hit it . . . as I was going out.” He denied ever putting her
head on the toilet.
      On cross-examination, defendant admitted he told Officer Gutierrez
that the “beating, had really escalated upstairs.” But defendant then stated,
“I think I just was over exaggerating right there. I didn’t mean it escalated
like that.” He admittedly told Gutierrez Doe tried to get away “several times”
while upstairs and she had “vomited there next to the bed a few times.” He
also said when he “slapped her,” she “kind of backed up from me” because
“she didn’t want to get hit.” But then he spit in her face because he “was
hella mad.” He admitted he never told Gutierrez that Doe began “touching”

                                       12
and “caressing” him, but that was because he never asked. He told Gutierrez
he had not taken Doe to the hospital, not because he was scared but because
they could not find her phone and he thought both of their cell phones were
out of battery.
      The jury found defendant guilty on all charges and found true all
enhancements, and the trial court sentenced him to 50 years to life.
                                  DISCUSSION
Motion to Exclude Statements to Officer
      Defendant made a pretrial motion to exclude his statements to Officer
Gutierrez on the ground he had not waived his Miranda rights.
      The trial court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing at which
Officer Gutierrez testified as follows: After he and defendant arrived at the
Pittsburg Police Department for booking, he read defendant “an
admonishment of [his Miranda] rights.” Gutierrez read from a printed card,
with his body cam turned on. He read the rights, “quickly” and “clearly.”
When he asked defendant if he understood his rights, defendant “nodded
implying that he understood the questions.” Defendant nodded, “[u]p and
down.” The form from which Gutierrez read blocked the bodycam’s view of
defendant’s head, so the video does not show defendant nodding his head.
Gutierrez did not provide a copy of the form to defendant, nor did he have
defendant sign it.
      On cross-examination, Officer Gutierrez acknowledged that in his
written report he wrote defendant “stated he understood his Miranda rights.”
Defense counsel asked, “So when you wrote your report, it would indicate
that [defendant] said ‘yes,’ is that correct that he understood his rights?”
Gutierrez answered, “No. When they give me a verbal confirmation of ‘yes’ or

                                       13
‘yeah,’ I’ll notate and quote them; but that’s not what he did here.” Gutierrez
acknowledged he did not make a written note that defendant “nodded.”
      After argument by counsel, the trial court ruled from the bench and
denied the motion to exclude. The court explained, “I have reviewed my
notes and read the cases that you’ve provided and reread the defense’s brief.
And looking at the totality of circumstances, the defendant did—I wanted to
mention, the defendant did nod his head several times on the video,[6] as well
as the officer saying that he nodded his head to say yes when they did the
waiver of the Miranda rights. The Court does find Officer Gutierrez to be
credible when he said the defendant nodded his head. There is no coercion in
this case. The defendant voluntarily told his side of the story and what
happened. The defendant did not ask any questions after being read his
Miranda rights. There is no requirement that an in-custody accused
expressly waive his right to counsel in silence after being advised of those
rights. [¶] . . . [I]f the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation reveals an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension, the court may conclude the Miranda rights have been
waived. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that, if a suspect
makes a non-coerced decision to speak with authorities with knowledge of the
right to remain mute and to counsel, the ensuing statement is admissible as a
matter of law. The Court finds that the statements of the defendant were not
the product of a deceptive scheme designed to undermine the holdings of
Miranda; and therefore, the statements are admissible in the prosecution’s
case-in-chief.”

      6 The court was presumably referring to the interview video, as it
shows defendant nodding his head up and down a number of times to indicate
affirmative responses.

                                        14
      Miranda serves as a “procedural safeguard[]” to protect the privilege
against self-incrimination and requires that prior to any “custodial
interrogation” a suspect “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” (Miranda,
supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) For purposes of Miranda, “ ‘interrogation’ ” means
“express questioning” or “words or actions on the part of the police . . . that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.” (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300–301.) “After such
warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as
a result of interrogation can be used against him.” (Miranda, at p. 479.)
      “It is well settled that law enforcement officers are not required to
obtain an express waiver of a suspect’s Miranda rights prior to a custodial
interview and that a valid waiver of such rights may be implied from the
defendant’s words and actions.” (People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1216
(Parker); Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 384 [“a waiver of
Miranda rights may be implied”].) “If the State establishes that a Miranda
warning was given and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this
showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of
Miranda rights. [Citation.] The prosecution must make the additional
showing that the accused understood these rights. [Citations.] Where the
prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was
understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an
implied waiver of the right to remain silent.” (Berghuis, at p. 384.)

                                       15
“Although there is a threshold presumption against finding a waiver of
Miranda rights [citation], ultimately the question becomes whether the
Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent under the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” (People v. Cruz (2008)
44 Cal.4th 636, 668.)
      Our standard of review of a trial court’s Miranda ruling is well-
established. “ ‘[W]e accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and
inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial
evidence. We independently determine from the undisputed facts and the
facts properly found by the trial court whether the challenged statement was
illegally obtained.’ ” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 418.)
      Officer Gutierrez’s testimony provided sufficient support for the trial
court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that, given the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights. There is no question Gutierrez read
defendant his rights, and defendant has never claimed he did not understand
English, the language used by Gutierrez. It is also undisputed Gutierrez
asked defendant if he understood his rights, as that is recorded on the
bodycam video. At that time, Gutierrez was holding the advisement card in
front of him, blocking the bodycam’s view of defendant’s head. However,
Gutierrez testified defendant nodded his head “up and down,” and trial court
found Gutierrez’s testimony credible. Gutierrez’s testimony that defendant
responded by nodding was also corroborated by the fact defendant routinely
nodded his head up and down to indicate “yes” during the two subsequent
interviews as shown by interrogation videotape. It is also undisputed that
after Gutierrez read defendant his rights, defendant readily answered
Gutierrez’s questions and provided long and detailed answers. Defendant

                                        16
never expressed any desire to stop talking or made any request for counsel.
Nor was there any evidence defendant was under any kind of distress. In
sum, the record amply supports the conclusion that defendant impliedly
waived his Miranda rights.
      Defendant maintains Officer Gutierrez’s testimony that defendant
nodded his head up and down, indicating agreement that he understood his
rights, was not credible because of the “manner in which Gutierrez read the
Miranda admonitions.” Specifically, defendant claims Gutierrez
“mechanically raced through” the recitation without ever pausing to ask if
defendant understood those rights, “chose not to read the ‘waiver’ portion of
the admonitions form,”7 “never let [defendant] himself read the form,” and
did not have defendant initial or sign the form.
      While it is accurate to describe Officer Gutierrez as “quickly” reading
the admonishment of rights, he did so clearly as the bodycam video shows.
Defendant cites no authority stating Officer Gutierrez was required to do
anything other than what he did. And as we have recited, nothing in the
record suggests defendant did not understand Gutierrez’s admonishment.

      7 The admonishment form had two parts. Officer Gutierrez read from
Part A as follows: “So, gotta read these rights here. You have the right to
remain silent. You don’t have to answer my questions or talk to me.
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You
have a right to talk to a lawyer or have them present while you’re being
questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to
represent you before any questioning, if you wish. You can decide at any
time to exercise these rights and not answer any of my questions or may any
statements. Do you understand?”
      Part B, from which Gutierrez did not read, stated: “After the warning,
and in order to secure a waiver, the following questions should be asked and
an affirmative reply secured to each question.” Question One asks, “Do you
understand each of these rights I have explained to you?” Question Two
asks, “Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to me now?”

                                      17
Defendant was 35 years old, he spoke English, and he was able to
communicate readily with Gutierrez during the interviews. He did not
indicate in any way that he did not understand what Gutierrez read to him.
He also had had prior experience in the criminal justice system, having
previously been convicted of a serious or violent felony. (See Parker, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1216 [“ ‘[T]he question of waiver [of Miranda rights] must be
determined on “the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” ’ ”],
quoting North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 374–375.)
      Defendant also points out that in his report Officer Gutierrez wrote
that defendant “stated he understood his Miranda rights.” On cross-
examination during the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Gutierrez
explained this did not mean defendant verbally confirmed he understood.
“When they give me a verbal confirmation of ‘yes’ or ‘yeah,’ I’ll notate and
quote them; but that’s not what he did here.” Defendant also points out that
at the preliminary hearing—to which defense counsel referred while cross-
examining Gutierrez during the Evidence Code section 402 hearing—defense
counsel asked Gutierrez, “And after you read Mr. Teague his Miranda rights,
did he reply to you in any manner if he was waiving those rights?” and
Gutierrez answered, “I do not recall.” However, on redirect during the
preliminary hearing, the prosecutor clarified, “When you read Mr. Teague his
rights, did he indicate to you that he understood them?” Gutierrez replied,
“From what I recall, yes.”
      In any case, defendant’s challenge to Officer Gutierrez’s credibility is
misdirected. That was a matter committed to the trial court and is not an
issue that can be revisited on appeal. (See People v. Gerson (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079–1080 [“ ‘ “We do not reweigh evidence or

                                       18
reevaluate a witness’s credibility.” [Citations.] “Resolution of conflicts and
inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.
[Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or
inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support
[a trial court’s factual finding.” ’ ”], quoting People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th
86, 106.)
Jury Verdict
      Defendant contends the trial court “committed reversible error by
failing to clarify a polled juror’s equivocal response” and also erred in denying
his motion for mistrial. (Capitalization omitted.)
      During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court that it could not
“come to agreement on the greater of count 1 [and] 2, what should we do?”
The trial court wrote back to the jury that it would declare a “mistrial on
those counts” and asked whether they had reached a verdict on counts 3, 4
and 5. Less than two hours later, the jury notified the court it had reached a
verdict on all counts and requested a break. The court recessed for the day
and called the case the next morning.
      The following morning, the verdict was read finding defendant guilty of
forcible rape (count 1), assault with intent to commit rape (count 2), injury to
a person with a dating relationship (count 3), assault by means likely to
produce great bodily injury (count 4), and false imprisonment (count 5). The
jury also found true that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury
during a sex offense as to counts 1 and 2, that he inflicted great bodily injury

                                        19
as to count 1, and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury under
circumstances involving domestic violence as to all of the counts.
      The court asked the jury if the “verdicts” were their “true and correct
verdicts,” and the jurors responded, “Yes.” Defense counsel requested the
jurors be polled as to counts 1 and 2.
      Beginning with count 1, the court asked each juror, “Is the verdict as I
just read as to Count One your true and correct verdict?” Juror No. 7
responded, “Is there an option?” The court replied, “It’s a yes or no question.”
Juror No. 7 responded, “Yes.” The court and counsel then held an unreported
sidebar. On concluding the sidebar, the court resumed polling. Following
that, the verdicts were recorded, and the jury excused.
      Defense counsel asked to “make a record” and the following exchange
occurred:
      Defense counsel: “I do object to the jury verdicts being recorded. I’m
      not convinced that Juror No. 7 gave her verdict, when asked as to
      Count One, she paused for quite a long time and seemed to be
      quivering on the verge of tears. She seemed very emotional. She did
      not seem to be—that did not seem to be her true and correct verdict.
      And she asked, Do I have an option? What I’m very concerned about is
      the jury came back yesterday saying they were hung on Counts 1 and 2
      and then came back later on saying, We have verdicts. I do object. I do
      object that verdicts are recorded in this case. I think it should be a
      mistrial on Counts One and Two, and I would so request that being
      done. And I believe going forward at this point would be a violation of
      my client’s constitutional rights under both the State and Federal
      Constitutions for a fair trial and due process of law and equal

                                         20
      protection. So we would request that Counts One and Two be declared
      a mistrial.
      “[The Court]: Okay. That motion is denied. And I did indicate to both
      counsel at the bench that it would be denied.
      [¶] . . . [¶]
      “[The prosecution]: . . . Can I just make a statement regarding Juror
      No. 7 very quickly.
      “The Court]: Absolutely.
      “[The prosecution]: I’d just like to clarify or reiterate that when she
      asked, Is there an option? And the Court clarified that the question is
      a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, she immediately responded ‘yes.’ That was
      unequivocal. There was no pause or hesitation at that point. And, also,
      when she was asked regarding Count Two, she immediately responded
      ‘yes’, no hesitation and she seemed to not have any issues there. I
      agree with the Court. I would ask that the motion be overruled.
      “[The Court]: And she also did on the GBI clauses, too.
      “[The prosecutor]: Correct.
      “[Defense counsel]: And I would beg to differ that her reaction was
      immediate. There was quivering in her voice. She seemed very
      unsure. She seemed that that was not what she did wanted [sic] to do.
      She appeared under pressure to me from the way I saw it. And I do not
      agree that when she answered ‘yes’ to Count One that that was
      unequivocal and was immediate.
      “[The Court]: Okay.”
      “Every criminal defendant is entitled to a unanimous jury verdict.”
(Chipman v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 263, 266 (Chipman); see
Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693 (Collins)

                                        21
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Boyette (2002)
29 Cal.4th 381, 462, fn. 19.) To safeguard this fundamental right, the
Legislature has set forth procedures the trial courts “must follow in receiving
a jury verdict.” (People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 530.) Section 1147
provides, “When the jury have agreed upon their verdict, they must be
conducted into the court by the officer having them in charge.” Section 1149
provides, “When the jury appear they must be asked by the court, or clerk,
whether they have agreed upon their verdict, and if the foreman answers in
the affirmative, they must, on being required, declare the same.”
Section 1163 provides, “When a verdict is rendered, and before it is recorded,
the jury may be polled, at the request of either party, in which case they must
be severally asked whether it is their verdict, and if any one answer in the
negative, the jury must be sent out for further deliberation.”
       However, “not every expression of uncertainty during polling requires
that recordation of the verdict be withheld while the jury is sent back for
further deliberations.” (Chipman, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 267.)
       We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 121 [“ ‘We review a ruling on a
mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] A trial court should
declare a mistrial only “ ‘if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges
incurable by admonition or instruction.’ ” [Citation.] “In making this
assessment of incurable prejudice, a trial court has considerable
discretion.” ’ ”].)
       Given the record here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
accepting the juror’s verdict and denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
The juror’s hesitation as to count 1 was momentary, and after the trial court
answered her question, her response was immediate, as were her responses

                                        22
on count 2 and the attendant enhancement allegations. (See People v.
Burnett (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 453, 457–458 [no error where juror responded,
“ ‘How do you do that when you are in doubt? I guess you say “Yes,” ’ ” but
subsequently responded, “ ‘Yes’ ” when asked by the court, “ ‘Well, it is my
verdict’ ” because “ ‘although a juror at first answers evasively or in the
negative, if he finally acquiesces in the verdict, it must be sustained’ ”].)
      Defendant cites to People v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 929. In
that case, one juror stated during polling, “I don’t know how to tell you this.
Should I tell you or—.” The trial court asked again, “Is that your verdict?”
The juror responded, “I didn’t vote on it, your Honor.” (Id. at pp. 930–931.)
After continued questioning, the juror stated he “went along with the
majority.” When the court asked, “Does this verdict express your individual
opinion?” The juror responded, “It does, sir. It does, sir.” The court then
asked, “What is your individual opinion?” The juror responded, “I went along
with the majority of the jury.” (Id. at p. 931.) The court declared a mistrial,
and the People petitioned for a writ of mandate. (Id. at pp. 930–931.)
      The Supreme Court held the trial court acted within its discretion in
declaring a mistrial. (People v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.2d at pp. 932–
933.) The high court explained, “Where, as here, a juror makes equivocal or
conflicting statements as to whether he has assented to the verdict freely and
voluntarily, a direct question of fact within the determination of the trial
judge is presented. The trial judge has the opportunity to observe the subtle
factors of demeanor and tone of voice which mark the distinction between
acquiescence and evasion of individual choice. The trial judge can determine
whether returning the jury for further deliberation is likely to secure a real
verdict, or whether the juror has really disagreed so that the verdict is not
unanimous and not likely to become so.” (Id. at pp. 932–933.)

                                        23
      The circumstances in the instant case are profoundly different. To
begin with, the issue here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying a motion for mistrial. Furthermore, the exchange between the court
and Juror No. 7 was markedly different from the exchange in People v.
Superior Court.
      Defendant’s reliance on People v. Pickett (N.Y. 1983) 92 A.D.2d 843
(Pickett) is likewise misplaced. In that case, when the trial court asked a
juror, “ ‘Mary White, are those your verdicts?’ ” She responded, “ ‘Yes, under
duress. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 843.) The court asked again, “ ‘Are they your verdicts,
yes or no?’ ” At that point, the juror responded, “ ‘Yes,’ ” and after polling was
complete the verdict was entered. (Ibid.) After an off-the-record discussion,
defense counsel stated on the record that he had requested that the court
hold a hearing or question the juror further to “make a determination as to
what the duress consisted of.” (Ibid.) The court stated, in turn, “the jurors
had been instructed at the voir dire, in summations and in the charge, of
their duty to deliberate and exchange views and to adhere to their views after
believing they are right, and after discussion with the other jurors.
Accordingly, the court said he found no basis to conduct any hearing or make
any further inquiry.” (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed, stating, the trial
court “should have done something to satisfy himself that the verdict was the
individual voluntary verdict of that juror.” The court could have exercised its
discretion to order the jurors to resume deliberation, or “alternatively, in the
exercise of discretion, the Judge might have exercised his discretion to the
extent of giving the juror an opportunity to elucidate briefly what she meant
by . . . ‘under duress,’ ” which at the very least carried “the connotation that
the verdict is not voluntary and unforced by circumstances unrelated to the
merits.” (Id. at pp. 843–844.)

                                        24
      The facts here are, again, not comparable. Juror No. 7 did not suggest
in any way that her verdict had been coerced.8

      8  Defendant devotes 13 pages of his opening brief to citing other federal
and out-of-state cases. All are factually distinguishable, and none compel
the conclusion the trial court abused its discretion in this case. (E.g., United
States v. Banks (2020) 982 F.3d 1098, 1101–1102 [risk of juror coercion was
clear and obvious where, among other things, juror initially responded she
was “ ‘Forced into’ ” her verdict when polled and repeated inquires by court
yielded further equivocal answers such as “ ‘I suppose so,’ ” “ ‘I don’t know
how to answer that,’ ” and “ ‘I feel like I need more time’ ”]; United States v.
Morris (1979) 612 F.2d 483, 489 [uncertainty about the verdicts created
where juror “first voted guilty as to [one defendant] in the jury room and then
changed that vote to not guilty by the time of the polling”]; United States v.
Edwards (1972) 469 F.2d 1362, 1366–1367 [trial court committed reversible
error in accepting verdict after juror responded during polling, “ ‘It’s my
verdict, but I’m still in doubt,’ ” and the trial court only clarified, “ ‘The juror
stated that this is her verdict. Is that what you said?’ ” because at no time
did the juror “state unequivocally that she concurred in the verdict”]; People
v. Ramunni (N.Y. 2022) 203 A.D.3d 1076, 1079 [trial court committed
reversible error when accepting verdict, when juror responded during polling
verdicts, “ ‘Um, I’m not sure, with some, but most of them yes,’ ” and the
court’s subsequent inquiry was insufficient, where trial court inquired
whether verdict was her own by asking “ ‘is that a yes or a no’ in the presence
of the remaining jurors” since juror “may have succumbed to pressure to vote
with the majority even though she did not agree with the verdict as to certain
counts”]; People v. Mercado (N.Y.Ct.App. 1998) 695 N.E.2d 711, 712 [the
defendant’s contention—that the trial court erred in failing to make certain
inquires when, during polling, juror initially and “a number of times”
afterwards failed to answer whether the verdict was hers—was forfeited
because he failed to make specific objection at the time]; Lattisaw v. State
(M.D. 1993) 619 A.2d. 548, 549, 552 [trial court committed reversible error in
concluding juror’s verdict was unambiguous where, without further attempt
to clarify and without sending jury back for further deliberations, juror
responded, “ ‘Yes, with reluctance,’ ” when asked whether her individual
verdict was the same as the jury’s verdict]; see People v. Superior Court,
supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 933, fn. 4 [“Both parties rely upon decisions from other
jurisdictions. They are not helpful. Many of them may be reconciled on the
theory that the appellate court was merely upholding a trial court
determination when the juror’s responses were equivocal or conflicting. A

                                        25
Romero Motion9
      Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
him to 50 years to life. Specifically, he claims the trial court should have
exercised its discretion to “disregard a prior strike in the interest of justice.”
      After hearing from counsel as to whether the court should strike
defendant’s prior strike and whether defendant fell within the “spirit” of the
Three Strikes law, the court declined to strike the prior. The court explained,
“I do believe the defendant falls within the spirit of the three-strikes law.
[¶] So, first of all, the defendant is not eligible for probation because [he] is
being sentenced under the three-strikes law. And if the Court were to strike
the priors, the Court would be required to sentence the defendant for Count 1
under the one-strike law.”
      Under section 1385, subdivision (a), a sentencing court may, “ ‘in
furtherance of justice,’ ” dismiss a finding that a defendant has a prior strike.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373 (Carmony); Romero, supra,
13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.) In evaluating a defendant’s request to strike a
prior strike, a court “ ‘must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of [the defendant’s]
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part.’ ” (Carmony, at p. 377.)
      The Three Strikes law, which is “ ‘intended to restrict courts’ discretion
in sentencing repeat offenders’ . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . creates a strong

few of the cases cannot be reconciled on this basis, but each in part depends
upon the particular responses of the juror, and it does not appear that any
sound purpose would be served by discussing the cases individually”].)
      9   People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

                                           26
presumption that any sentence that conforms to [its] sentencing norms is
both rational and proper.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 377–378.)
Thus, “a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior
felony conviction . . . in limited circumstances,” such as where it “considered
impermissible factors in declining to dismiss” the conviction or where “ ‘the
sentencing norms [of the Three Strikes law] . . . produce[] an “arbitrary,
capricious[,] or patently absurd” result’ under the specific facts of a particular
case.” (Id. at p. 378.)
      We review the denial of a Romero motion for an abuse of discretion.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was
irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial
court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives,
and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not
be set aside on review.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 376–377.)
      Defendant claims his case is “an exceptional one in which refusal to
disregard a prior strike in the interest[s] of justice amounts to abuse of
discretion.” He points to the following: (1) That the length his sentence, 50
years to life, is “tantamount to life without [the] possibility of parole for a
man in his mid-30s.” (2) He was not a habitual criminal, having “had only
one prior conviction,” which was a “categorically different offense (attempted
armed robbery),” he had not committed any other offense in the 13 years
preceding this incident. (3) His offenses “in this case were the result of
intense jealously, triggered when he discovered [the victim], the woman he
loved, who was the mother of his young daughter, appeared to be . . . involved
with another man.” (4) The victim “acknowledged that he was a caring
father.” (5) He showed “genuine remorse.”

                                        27
      Even assuming this list suggests sentencing courts could differ on
whether to strike defendant’s prior, it does not establish that the trial court
imposed an “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious[,] or patently absurd” ’ ” sentence.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) A “ ‘ “decision will not be reversed
merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is
neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the
judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 377.) There is a strong
presumption the court’s imposition of the Three Strikes sentence is both
rational and proper unless the court was not “aware of its discretion” to
dismiss (People v. Langevin (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 520, 524) or the court
considered impermissible factors in declining to strike the prior. (People v.
Gillispie (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 429, 434.) Neither exception applies here.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is AFFIRMED.

                                        28
                                           _________________________
                                           Banke, Acting P.J.

We concur:

_________________________
Margulies, J.*

_________________________
Getty, J.**

* Retired Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

**Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A162458, People v. Teague

                                      29