Court Opinion

ID: 9736986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:12:00.217776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:12.388868
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON REHEARING JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court: In granting the State’s petition for rehearing, we granted the State leave to raise an additional issue of whether the Reddick error was harmless in light of the felony-murder charge. We file this supplemental opinion to address this issue.  On rehearing, the State argues that we erred in vacating defendant’s murder conviction because the Reddick murder and manslaughter instruction error is irrelevant to defendant’s murder conviction, since a valid conviction for armed robbery necessarily means defendant is guilty of felony murder. Before addressing the merits of this contention, we first note defendant’s objection to our consideration of this issue because the State has raised the issue for the first time on rehearing. Due to the unique circumstances surrounding our reversal of defendant’s convictions and the fact that our previous Rule 23 order on defendant’s direct appeal did address the felony-murder question, we believe fairness and justice require that we consider the State’s claim here.  Numerous appellate courts have held that a murder conviction need not be reversed despite the existence of a Reddick error if the error can be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Beacham (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 483; People v. Skipper (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 684, 533 N.E.2d 44 (supplemental opinion (1989), 177 Ill. App. 3d 688, 533 N.E.2d 46); People v. Carter (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 593, 532 N.E.2d 531.) In the case at bar, the State asserts that the Reddick error is harmless because it is irrelevant to defendant’s felony-murder conviction. Under the felony-murder rule, a defendant may be found guilty of murder for a death caused during the course of a forcible felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9—1(a)(3)) regardless of defendant’s intent as to the killing (People v. Moore (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 404, 447 N.E.2d 1327; People v. Hickman (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511). Because a defendant’s mental state is not in issue with felony murder, the State argues that the Reddick instructional error would not be grounds for reversing defendant’s murder conviction here. The Illinois Supreme Court accepted a similar argument in People v. Moore (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 404, 447 N.E.2d 1327, under circumstances involving a trial court’s failure to tender a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The State’s harmless error argument rests on its assertion that the jury found defendant guilty of felony murder. At defendant’s trial, the jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery, but the jury was given and returned only a general murder verdict form. The jury instructions, as well as the indictment, however, indicated the alternative theories of murder under the murder statute, including the felony-murder theory. Confronted with these circumstances in Moore, the supreme court determined that the evidence of the armed robbery there was overwhelming so that the jury could not have convicted defendant of anything but felony murder. In the case at bar, however, the question of whether the jury’s finding that defendant committed armed robbery indicates that defendant was found guilty of felony murder is a more difficult one.  The defense theory at trial was that defendant lacked the intent to commit robbery at the time of the victim’s death. While a robbery conviction may be sustained where a defendant does not form the intent to rob until after force was used (People v. Jordan (1922), 303 Ill. 316, 135 N.E. 729; People v. Washington (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 365, 468 N.E.2d 1285), one of the requirements of felony murder is that the death be caused during the course of the forcible felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9—1(a)(3)). Acknowledging the jury’s armed robbery conviction, defendant asserts that we have no way of knowing whether the jury found that the killing was “in the course of the robbery” to constitute felony murder. Before evaluating the trial evidence as it relates to this element, it is necessary that we consider the State’s argument that this court, in the Rule 23 order on defendant’s direct appeal, already found no merit to defendant’s contention that he was not properly found guilty of felony murder. On defendant’s direct appeal, we determined only that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the jury’s murder conviction under both the intent-murder and felony-murder theories. We were not faced with the situation where one of the theories could not sustain the verdict. Where a verdict is supportable on one ground but not another, and it is impossible to tell which grounds the jury selected, the conviction is unconstitutional. Yates v. United States (1957), 354 U.S. 298, 312, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356, 1371, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1073; Stromberg v. California (1931), 283 U.S. 359, 368, 75 L. Ed. 1117, 1122, 51 S. Ct. 532, 535; Cramer v. Fahner (7th Cir. 1982), 683 F.2d 1376, 1379-80.  Reviewing the evidence here, while the State presented overwhelming evidence linking defendant to the scene where the victim was robbed and beaten, it presented no eyewitness account of the occurrence and it presented a statement made by defendant, albeit contradicting an earlier statement, which indicated that he did not form the intent to rob the victim until after the beating. A finding that the death occurred during the course of the armed robbery necessarily turned on the credibility of the defendant. As such, our finding that the trial would not have reached a different result without the Reddick instruction error would be an invasion of the province of the jury. (See People v. Sloan (1985), 129 Ill. App. 3d 242, 249, 472 N.E.2d 93, 98, rev’d on other grounds (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 517.) Thus, unlike Moore, the evidence here was not overwhelming so that the jury could not have found anything but that the victim’s death was caused during the course of the armed robbery. A similar result was reached in People v. Washington (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 365, 468 N.E.2d 1285, where the jury returned verdicts for armed robbery, manslaughter and murder. In holding that the trial court erred in merging the voluntary manslaughter convictions into the murder convictions, the appellate court rejected an argument similar to that advanced here, stating “[bjecause the jury was not given a verdict form for felony-murder, and because the evidence presented here allows for the possibility that a jury could find that the [victim’s death] had not occurred while defendants were ‘committing or attempting to commit’ [citation] an armed robbery, we cannot make a de novo finding of felony murder.” Washington, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 376, 468 N.E.2d at 1293. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a new trial as to the murder charge. Affirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded. CAMPBELL, and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur.