Court Opinion

ID: 9726309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:43:25.409116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:25.867730
License: Public Domain

*660Heffernan, J.
(concurring in 'part; dissenting in part). I agree with the major premise of the majority opinion. It sets forth what is now the law of this state— that a journalist may assert a constitutional privilege to protect the confidentiality of his news sources. As a clarification of a significant and fundamental first amendment right of the freedom of press, the opinion will stand as a landmark in legal history.
As the writer of this opinion understands the majority position, we hold that a journalist (including without distinction one of the underground press) shall not be compelled to reveal the confidential associations or confidential information upon which published news stories are based. Such right, however, is made subject to the right of the state to compel testimony in the event that the journalist’s testimony is required in the furtherance of a compelling and overriding interest that cannot be served by any alternate means.
We also hold, following Caldwell, as I understand the majority opinion, that the “compelling and overriding interest” of the state must be demonstrated to the court as a prerequisite for the issuance of a subpoena that would compel the production of either testimonial or documentary evidence.
While the majority holds that the privilege exists subject only to the compelling state interest test, it finds that compelling state interest by the process of judicial notice. It takes notice of disorders that have wracked our society in recent months and the compelling state interest in assuring order and the safety of our citizens.1 *661From this, it properly concludes that the information concerning the arson of a state university building and the bombing of Sterling Hall and the United States Mathematics Research Center on the University of Wisconsin campus are acts fraught with such grave implications to our society that the privilege must fall.2
Up to this point, I am in substantial agreement with the majority opinion, but I believe it fails to properly apply its own test of whether the state’s compelling interest could be served by “alternative means” not requiring an impingement upon constitutional rights.
The majority assumes that no alternative method of getting any of this information is available because, “The mere fact that the culprits are still at large is nearly conclusive proof that the state does not know who they are.”
This writer takes judicial notice of the official records of both the State and the United States that show that officers of both the State and the United States Department of Justice under oath have stated that they now know who bombed Sterling Hall. Federal warrants have been issued for the arrest of the suspects. We cannot conclude, merely because these suspects have not yet been arrested, that the state requires further information as to the identity of the Sterling Hall bombers. The writer of this opinion takes judicial notice of the statement of United States Attorney John Olson declaring that the United States has full information in regard to the identity of the Sterling Hall bombers and that Mark Knops’ testimony in that respect is now superfluous. It thus seems clear that in respect to the testi*662mony sought in regard to the Sterling Hall bombing, the information has already been attained by alternate means. The State of Wisconsin no longer has a compelling state interest in having Knops testify to what is already known.
It continues to have a compelling state interest in the arson of Old Main Hall on the Whitewater campus. Accordingly, I would agree with the majority’s determination to affirm the finding of contempt. However, since the question of Knops’ purging himself in regard to the Sterling Hall questions is now moot, I would return the cause to the trial court for resentencing, bearing in mind that, under the test laid down by the majority of this court, no compelling interest exists for Knops’ testimony in regard to the source of his information about the University of Wisconsin Sterling Hall bombing.
I concur in the affirmance of the finding of contempt, but would remand for resentencing.

 I do not agree with the majority opinion’s generality that freedom of information should be curtailed on the theory that “curtail [ing] in a very minor way the free flow of information . . . will serve the purpose of restoring an atmosphere in which all our fundamental freedoms can flourish.” I know of no period in history where any freedoms have flourished in the face of the state's curtailment of the free flow of information. The majority’s stated generality does not do justice to its own sound position— *661which is not one approving the curtailment of information, but compelling, in the case of overriding state interest, the production of information by proper legal process.

 I do not agree with the majority’s dicta that, merely because a crime is charged, the state meets its burden of proving a compelling interest. The state’s interest is dependent upon the nature of the crime. Here, the nature of the crime satisfies the test.