Court Opinion

ID: 9620788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:47:43.784709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:35.753005
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
dissenting.
The victim and the defendant knew each other, the defendant having cared for the victim’s child. The victim and the defendant had had fights and the victim had obtained a warrant against the defendant. Nevertheless, the evidence against the defendant was entirely circumstantial.
L. B. Lawless was the state’s chief witness. He testified that he and the defendant visited the victim in her motel room at about 3 a.m. on the date of the murder. The victim’s daughter was asleep. Lawless and the defendant returned to his apartment. According to Lawless, the defendant then borrowed his truck saying that she was going back to see the victim. According to Lawless, upon her return the defendant said "I’m in trouble, I need an alibi.” Lawless arranged an alibi for himself and the defendant. Lawless testified that he had been granted immunity.
According to the defendant, upon arriving at Lawless’ apartment Lawless returned to his truck, she went to sleep until the next morning and could not say what Lawless did.
The lady who baby-sat with the victim’s daughter *584after discovery of the body was examined at trial concerning the child’s ability to recognize the defendant. She testified that "... I believe she could identify the killer, is what I believe. If that’s what you are driving at. I believe the child is capable of identifying him.”
The defendant moved for an order prohibiting witnesses from discussing any polygraph tests. The motion was granted. The state’s chief investigative officer heard the court’s ruling as to polygraph tests.
The chief investigative officer testified that Lawless had made a taped statement. The officer was asked when Lawless first told police the story he gave as a witness. The officer answered: "The first time Lawless ever gave any indication of knowing what had happened was immediately after we took a polygraph test and-.” The witness was interrupted by counsel’s motion for mistrial.
The jury could have been under the impression that the state’s principal witness, Lawless, decided to "tell the truth” after taking a polygraph test. However, a person can lie after taking a polygraph test just as he can during or before a polygraph test.
The question related to the first time Lawless told police the story he repeated on the witness stand; the witness’ answer related to the first time Lawless ever gave any indication of knowing what happened; the answer (given by an experienced police officer who had heard the trial judge’s ruling) was unresponsive to the question. I dissent. See Herlong v. State, 236 Ga. 326, 329 (223 SE2d 672) (1976), dissenting opinions by Justice Jordan and this writer.
A new trial being necessary in my view, I would apply Code § 38-1610 which provides: "The court shall, by examination, decide upon the capacity of one alleged to be incompetent from . . . infancy.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court might find that the child would say that a man killed her mother. If so, a jury should not convict this defendant without knowing what the- child would say.
The majority opinion, in my view, overrules or, more likely, overlooks the well-established rule of law that where a judge vested with discretion rules without exercising that discretion, such ruling is erroneous. Ballard v. Waites, 194 Ga. 427, 430 (21 SE2d 848) (1942); *585Stribling v. Georgia R. &c. Co., 139 Ga. 676 (3) (78 SE 42); (1913); Hill v. Wadley Southern R. Co., 128 Ga. 705 (7) (57 SE 795) (1907); Thompson v. Warren, 118 Ga. 644 (2) (45 SE 912) (1903); Fears v. State, 102 Ga. 274 (5) (29 SE 463) (1897).
I would grant the defendant a new trial.