Court Opinion

ID: 9696123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:37:37.979623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:18.748378
License: Public Domain

KELLY, J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 “The purpose of the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act at 63 P.S. §§ 455.101 - 455.902 is to protect buyers and sellers of real estate from abuse by persons engaged in the real estate business. See Joseph A. Cairone, Inc. v. Edward M. Frey Realty, 715 A.2d 536 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Kalins v. Pennsylvania State Real Estate Commission, [92 Pa.Cmwlth. 569, 500 A.2d 200, 203 (1985) ].” Eill v. Tegler, 722 A.2d 200, 202 (Pa.Super.1998) (Dissenting Opinion per Kelly, J.). The Act was not intended to protect persons not regularly engaged in the sale of real estate from suit by other persons not regularly engaged in the sale of real estate. It was not intended to protect real estate brokers from suit filed by other real estate brokers. Moreover, it was not intended to protect an employer who is engaged in the real estate business from suit by an employee who is also engaged in the real estate business, where the suit arises out of the employment relationship.
¶ 2 In the instant case, the facts as stated in the trial court opinion are as follows. Appellant and his employer negotiated and entered into a written employment agreement under which Appellant was hired as the marketing and sales director for a real estate development known as the “Village at Gwynedd.” The agreement provided that the employer would pay Appellant commissions on sales, with a draw against commissions of $1,000.00, plus $250.00 travel expenses. Appellant asked his employer whether he would need to keep his real estate salesperson’s license current. Appellant’s employer told Appellant that licensure was not necessary to the performance of Appellant’s job function. As a result, Appellant allowed his license to lapse. For some time, the employer willingly paid Appellant’s negotiated compensation, until the pace of sales slowed and business began to lag. By 1997, Appellant had earned in excess of $139,000.00 in commissions on completed sales, for which his employer had not paid him. Such an injustice should not be permitted.
¶ 3 I conclude that the Act does not preclude Appellant’s suit against his employer, the Appellee. Therefore, I am compelled to dissent.