Court Opinion

ID: 9796029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:45:55.981895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:44:30.981989
License: Public Domain

Davis, J.,
concurring: I concur in the result and agree with the majority opinion that the issue before us is District Attorney Phill Kline’s handling of the records since our decision in Alpha Med. Clinic v. Anderson, 280 Kan. 903, 128 P.3d 364 (2006). Our concern in this case has been and is the “constitutional privacy rights that Kline’s behavior threatens.” 287 Kan. at 406. I disagree with the majority’s analysis on two specific points: (1) the majority’s implicit finding that Kline’s actions constituted the unlawful performance of a public duty or unlawful exercise of public office; and (2) the majority’s characterization of the relief granted against Kline as sanctions rather than an order of mandamus.
First, I disagree with the portion of the majority opinion that concludes in the context of its “ripeness and mootness” discussion that “[w]e must decide whether that handling [of the records] constituted unlawful performance of a public duty or unlawful exercise of public office.” 287 Kan. at 407. The majority uses the phrases “unlawful performance” and “unlawful exercise” numerous times throughout its opinion to describe Kline’s conduct at issue in this case.
The majority acknowledges that Judge David King, who was appointed by this court as a special master to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make factual findings on the handling of the record, reported that the handling of the records was not done in an “ordinaiy manner” and that “ ‘the exchange of records in this case was handled differently than any other such information exchange described by any other witnesses.’ ” 287 Kan. at 399. Despite these observations, Judge Kng concluded and the majority concurred that there were “no written protocols or procedures for exactly how prosecutors are to go about sending investigation materials from one office to another.” 287 Kan. at 399.
*427Because there is no statutory definition of “unlawful performance of a public duty or unlawful exercise of public office,” and given that we have determined that the handling of the records “was not illegal,” 287 Kan. at 414, as there are no laws, protocols, or procedures for how prosecutors should transfer investigation materials to other prosecutors’ offices, I do not think we are in a position to malee a determination as to whether Kline or his employees engaged in the “unlawful performance of a public duty or unlawful exercise of public office.” We are only in a position to determine whether his handling of the records as outlined in the majority opinion violated the constitutional privacy rights of patients.
Second, I would not classify the relief granted against Kline and his employees as sanctions. Rather, this court is in a position in a mandamus action to require a public official to perform his or her duty. See K.S.A. 60-801 (“Mandamus is a proceeding to compel some inferior court, tribunal, board, or some corporation or person to perform a specified duty, which duty results from the office, trust, or official station of the party to whom the order is directed, or from operation of law.”). When Kline removed records from the Attorney General’s office leaving no copy for the incoming Attorney General, he made it difficult if not impossible for the incoming Attorney General to determine his course of action regarding the information within those records. Thus, the relief granted by the majority opinion is appropriate in that the relief directs a public official to perform his duty and restore to the present Attorney General what is rightfully his. Accordingly, I would hold that it is proper, through mandamus, to compel Kline to perform that duty. Cf., State, ex rel. v. Thompson, 135 Kan. 193, 9 P.2d 628 (1932) (mandamus appropriate to compel delivery of property of county treasurer’s office); State v. Lawrence, 76 Kan. 940, 92 Pac. 1131 (1907) (mandamus appropriate to compel delivery of property of county treasurer’s office); Huffman v. Mills, 39 Kan. 577, 18 Pac. 516 (1888) (property belonging to sheriff s office ordered delivered in mandamus action).
The majority opinion’s imposition of sanctions against Kline for his actions before this court presents a problem. While I recognize *428that this court possesses inherent power to impose sanctions in cases falling short of civil or criminal contempt, our exercise of that power must nevertheless be measured by objective standards. The fundamental problem with the majority’s decision to impose sanctions in this case is that there is no objective test — statutory or otherwise — by which the court can measure Kline’s conduct and by which attorneys can avoid such penalties in the future.
A court exercising its inherent powers to sanction “must comply with the mandates of due process.” Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 50, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27, 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991). It is a fundamental principle of due process that “ ‘[a]ll are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.’ ” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 83 L. Ed. 888, 59 S. Ct. 618 [1939]). The due process concept of notice requires that a law “conveyf] a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct” so that those subject to it have the opportunity to conform their conduct accordingly. In re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 199, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) (vagueness challenge to Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972) (laws must “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly” and “provide explicit standards for those who apply them” so as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application). Thus, due process requires that a court-imposed standard of conduct be sufficiently clear so that attorneys have the opportunity to comply with the standard and the court may uniformly apply the standard. Once it is determined that counsel’s action has fallen below this standard the imposition of sanctions is discretionary.
The majority relies upon Wilson v. American Fidelity Ins. Co., 229 Kan. 416, 421, 625 P.2d 1117 (1981), and Knutson Mortgage Corp. v. Coleman, 24 Kan. App. 2d 650, Syl. ¶ 1, 951 P.2d 548 (1997), as support for its exercise of our inherent powers in this case. In both of these cases, however, the court’s inherent powers were used to sanction conduct that ran afoul of specific statutory provisions. See Wilson, 229 Kan. at 418; Knutson Mortgage Corp., 24 Kan. App. 2d at 653. In each of these two previous cases, the *429court used its inherent powers “as a means of enforcing obedience to a law which the court is called on to administer.” Wilson, 229 Kan. at 421. The circumstances giving rise to those cases are in sharp contrast to the case presently before us, where the majority is not measuring counsel’s action against any statute, rule, or other established standard, except to say that counsel Kline has not treated this action or this court with the respect demanded in such a proceeding.
It seems to me that the standard imposed by the court in this case is a standard the court exacts. Under such circumstances a respondent has no standard or rule by which he or she may gauge his or her action. As the United States Supreme Court has cautioned, courts “must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.” Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153, 2 L. Ed. 2d 589, 78 S. Ct. 622 (1958) (criminal contempt case).
I am not unmindful of what the facts in this record demonstrate, but I believe the same result may be reached in granting relief without the resort to sanctions. Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. In that light, we should refrain from imposing sanctions under our inherent powers to punish for bad faith conduct where that conduct can be adequately sanctioned under other rules or procedures. See 501 U.S. at 50.
The facts — without any inferences — speak for themselves concerning the performance of Kline and his employees. I would not attempt to characterize those actions in handling these records and responding to the investigation of this court, as the record speaks loud and clear. I would therefore leave the matter in the hands of the Disciplinary Administrator for an independent judgment as to whether ethical violations have occurred during the course of these proceedings. Otherwise, I agree with the disposition of this case.