Court Opinion

ID: 9474783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:08:29.649428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:19.714030
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate. However, I write separately because I believe that a good portion of its analysis is *473unnecessary. I also do not believe that the imposition of attorneys’ fees on the plaintiff, in this case, is compatible with Congress’ intent when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there remains no unresolved issue of material fact or the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights when they falsely arrested him. Probable cause to arrest bars a section 1983 action based on false arrest. Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, 754 F.2d 1336, 1344 n. 10 (7th Cir.1985). I agree with the majority, the defendants’ affidavits in support of their motion for summary judgment established that they had probable cause to arrest Mr. Williams. The plaintiff’s affidavit did not rebut any of the facts that constituted the bases of probable cause. Therefore, no issue of material fact remained unresolved and summary judgment was appropriate. See Strutt v. Upham, 440 F.2d 1236, 1237 (9th Cir.1971).
On appeal, the plaintiff has not argued that he is entitled to summary judgment based on the state court’s finding of no probable cause to bind over. Therefore, this court is not faced with the question of whether the state court finding should be given offensive collateral estoppel effect. Consequently, the court need not engage in the lengthy analysis comparing the standards for determining probable cause to bind over in Illinois with the definition of probable cause to arrest.
There is another compelling reason why we should not undertake this gratuitous analysis. The majority’s opinion quite properly indicates that the law in Illinois on these issues is not clear. Federal courts already make too much state law. This is an unfortunate by-product of our diversity jurisdiction where we are often required to apply state law with very little guidance from the state courts or the legislatures. The federal court’s interpretation and application then influences the future direction of state law. We should refrain from commenting on or interpreting state laws or procedures unless such an analysis is essential to resolving the issue in the case. Here, the majority’s discussion of the collateral estoppel effect of the state court finding of probable cause to bind over requires a decision on an unresolved issue of state procedure and is unnecessary to a resolution of the case. Therefore, we should refrain from gratuitously affecting the content of state law.
The majority also affirms the district court’s decision to award attorneys’ fees to the defendants in this case. Congress granted the district courts discretionary power to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a section 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In providing for attorney’s fees, Congress intended to encourage private litigants to serve the public interest by bringing suit to vindicate civil rights. S.Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5908, 5910; see Hamilton v. Daley, 777 F.2d 1207, 1211 (7th Cir.1985). The Supreme Court has interpreted section 1988 as also permitting prevailing defendants to recover attorney’s fees. However, to ensure that the original congressional intent behind section 1988 is not thwarted, “prevailing defendants are not entitled to fees on the same basis as prevailing plaintiffs.” Hamilton, 777 F.2d at 1212. Defendants may recover attorney’s fees from the plaintiff only if “the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in bad faith.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980). Although we review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 696 (7th Cir.1985), the court must be sure that the record reflects a frivolous, groundless suit.
At least one factor in this case prevents the suit from being frivolous or groundless. The essential element in Mr. Williams’ section 1983 claim was the lack of probable cause to arrest. Mr. Williams knew, at the time that he filed suit, that a state judge had found no probable cause to detain. No *474amount of discovery would have altered the fact that the state judge had reached this conclusion. It was not frivolous, groundless or unreasonable for Mr. Williams to file suit and to continue the action until he received a judicial determination that probable cause to arrest did in fact exist. As noted in Hamilton, 777 F.2d at 1212, “[t]here is no question that the stakes are high in fee cases.” This court should not routinely sanction fee awards to prevailing defendants. Such a practice will discourage plaintiffs from bringing suit to vindicate their civil rights. Fees to prevailing defendants must be awarded cautiously to preserve Congress’ intent when they provided for such awards. In my view, the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees in this case.