Court Opinion

ID: 9668383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:11:09.34139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:45.113597
License: Public Domain

OPINION
CAMPBELL, Judge.
This is an original mandamus proceeding. Relator Ronald L. Sutton, district attorney of the 198th judicial district, asks this Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing respondent Susan K. Bage, clerk of the Third Court of Appeals, to file the State’s appeal in the underlying criminal action. We will deny the requested relief.
Sometime in 1989, the McCulloch County 1 grand jury indicted Billie Sol Estes and four others for engaging in organized criminal activity. See Tex.Penal Code § 71.02. The defendants subsequently moved to have the indictment quashed. The trial court held a hearing on the defendants’ motion on November 9, 1990. On November 16, the trial court signed a written order quashing the indictment as requested. On November 20, the district clerk of McCulloch County stamped the order “filed.”
On December 4, relator filed the State’s notice of appeal with the district clerk. On January 17, 1991, respondent notified relator by letter that the Third Court of Appeals had instructed respondent “to decline to file the State’s appeal in this cause because the notice of appeal was not filed within fifteen days following the signing of the district court’s order.” Relator then filed a motion in the court of appeals to compel respondent to file the State’s appeal, but the court overruled the motion. On April 8, 1991, we granted relator’s motion for leave to file an application for writ of mandamus.
In his application, relator argues that respondent has no choice but to file the State’s appeal because he (i.e., relator) filed the State’s notice of appeal within the time period established by Article 44.01(d) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.2 More specifically, relator contends that he filed the State’s notice of appeal within fifteen days after the date the McCulloch County district clerk filed — and presumably entered in the minutes of the court — the trial court’s order quashing the indictment. Relator concedes that his filing of the State’s notice of appeal was not timely under Rule 41(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,3 but he contends that that rule is overridden by Article 44.01(d).
Relator also argues that the State has no other adequate remedy at law because “with no docket number and no order to appeal from, an appeal from the actions of the Clerk and the Court of Appeals cannot be perfected.”
Respondent argues, in turn, that the State’s notice of appeal was not timely under Rule 41(b)(1) and that there is no inconsistency between that rule and Article 44.01(d). More specifically, respondent contends that the phrase in Article 44.01(d), “entered by the court,” was intended by the Legislature to mean “signed by the trial judge.” Respondent also argues that, although the record shows that the trial court’s order was “filed” by the district clerk on November 20, 1990, the record does not show when — or even whether— the order was actually entered in the minutes of the court.
*57This Court is empowered by Article 5, § 5, of the Texas Constitution to issue writs of mandamus in all criminal law matters. We have recognized, however, that mandamus is a drastic remedy, to be' invoked only in extraordinary situations. Perkins v. Third Court of Appeals, 738 S.W.2d 276, 284 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). A willingness to issue writs of mandamus in less than extraordinary situations would encourage piecemeal litigation and frustrate the efficient administration of justice.
Consistent with our cautious view of the mandamus remedy, we have repeatedly held that it is available only when the relator can establish two things: first, that under the relevant law and facts, he has a clear right to the relief sought, i.e., the act he seeks to compel is “ministerial”; and second, that no other adequate remedy at law is available. Braxton v. Dunn, 803 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); State ex rel. Wade v. Mays, 689 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); see C. Antieau, 1 The Practice of Extraordinary Remedies §§ 2.01-2.18 (1987). We must first determine, therefore, whether respondent is under a clear legal duty to file the State’s appeal, as claimed by relator. If the answer to that question is “no”, our analysis need proceed no further.
Earlier this term, in State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), we addressed the meaning of the ambiguous phrase, “entered by the court,” in Article 44.01(d). After noting that many in the legal community use such language to mean the act of rendering (or signing) by a trial judge, see Jackson v. Gish, 440 S.W.2d 121, 122-123 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.), we concluded that that was the only sensible interpretation to give the language in Article 44.01(d):
Taking into account both the terms “entered” and “court” in the phrase “entered by the court” in Art. 44.01(d), our reading of this phrase in the context of the statute as a whole leads to an interpretation that in this case the term “entered by the court” encompasses the signing of an order by the trial judge.
* * * * * *
Thus, a timetable based on the date of signature is a logical interpretation of Art. 44.01(d). Establishing a definite starting date for calculating appellate timetables serves the interests of all parties. We therefore find no conflict between Art. 44.01(d), Y.A.C.C.P., and TEX.R.APP.PROC. 41(b)(1) (amended 1989).
Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d at 402.
Given our holding in Rosenbaum, it is clear that the State’s notice of appeal here was not timely under Article 44.01(d) and Rule 41(b)(1). Thus, respondent has no ministerial duty to file the State’s appeal.
The relief requested is denied.
WHITE, J., concurs in the result.

. The 198th judicial district encompasses Con-cho, Kerr, Kimble, McCulloch and Menard counties.

. Article 44.01 provides in relevant part:
(a) The State is entitled to appeal an order of a court in a criminal case if the order:
(1) dismisses an indictment, information, or complaint or any portion of an indictment, information, or complaintf.]
******
(d) The prosecuting attorney may not make an appeal under Subsection (a) or (b) of this article later than the 15th day after the date on which the order, ruling, or sentence to be appealed is entered by the court.
(Emphasis added.)

.Rule 41(b)(1) provides in relevant part:
Appeal is perfected when notice of appeal is filed within thirty (fifteen by the state) days after the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court or the day an appealable order is signed by the trial judge....
(Emphasis added.)