Court Opinion

ID: 9698532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:52:47.976907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:41.688680
License: Public Domain

SCHREIBER, J.,
dissenting.
The “strong public policy underlying the public bidding statutes,” ante at 369, with its necessary corollary that “statutory exceptions to public bidding requirements should be strictly *377construed,” ante at 370, two principles enunciated by the majority, when applied to the facts of this case, compel the conclusion that public bidding is in order here. .
The statute governing the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority provides that:
... no contract on behalf of the authority shall be entered into for the doing of any work, or for the hiring of equipment or vehicles, where the sum to be expended exceeds the sum of $2,500.00 unless the authority shall first publicly advertise for bids therefor, and shall award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder; provided, however, that such advertising shall not be required where the contract to be entered into is one for the furnishing or performing services of a professional nature .... [N.J.S.A. 5:10-21; emphasis supplied]
This bidding statute is to be “construed as nearly as possible with sole reference to the public good.” Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic Cty. Sewerage Auth., 67 N.J. 403, 409-410 (1975). Accordingly, we have held that the public good is best served by curtailing “the discretion of local authorities by demanding strict compliance with public bidding guidelines.” Pucillo v. Mayor and Council of Borough of New Milford, 73 N.J. 349, 356 (1977). There can be no doubt that the exception from public bidding in N.J.S.A. 5:10-21, “services of a professional nature,” should be strictly construed.
The statute does not define “services of a professional nature” and we must therefore seek assistance elsewhere. There has been a paucity of litigation on what constitutes professional services, probably because until today it was understood to have referred to services of a character involving “peculiar professional education and experience.” Heston v. Atlantic City, 93 N.J.L. 317, 320 (Sup.Ct.1919). Thus it has been held to include an engineer, Franklin v. Millville, 98 N.J.L. 262 (E. & A.1922), an accounting auditor, Heston v. Atlantic City, 93 N.J.L. 317 (Sup: Ct.1919), a physician, Auerbacher v. Smith, 19 N.J.Super. 191, 195 (Ch.Div.1952), an attorney, In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 548 (1953), and an architect, Furlong v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 132 N.J.Eq. 341, 343 (Ch.1942). It has never been held to include services of skilled mechanics or technicians. Cf. Burlington Tp. v. Middle Dep’t Inspection Agency, 175 N.J.Super. 624 (Law Div. *3781980) (inspection of electrical equipment not a professional service).
Some guidance as to what the Legislature meant by professional services may be found in the Local Public Contracts Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et seq., setting forth competitive bidding requirements for municipalities and counties. This was enacted about the same time as the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority Law.
Both statutes have the same basic purposes in providing for competitive bidding for public contracts and in excepting therefrom “professional services.” Therefore it is appropriate to examine the exception in one to determine the extent of the exception in the other. It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended that the extent of the professional service exemption be the same in both areas. If the legislative intent had been otherwise, one would expect some express language so indicating. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973), § 51.02 at 290; cf. Galloway Tp. Bd. of Ed. v. Galloway Tp. Ed. Ass’n, 78 N.J. 1, 10 (1978) (where an analogous federal statute used to ascertain meaning of statutory language); Gorton v. Reliance Insurance Co., 77 N.J. 563 (1978).
Under the Local Public Contracts Law “professional services” are expressly excepted from competitive bidding.1 N.J.S.A. 40A:ll-5. Professional services are defined as those “performed by a person authorized by law to practice a recognized profession, whose practice is regulated by law, and the performance of which services requires knowledge of an advanced type in a field of learning acquired by a prolonged formal course of specialized instruction and study as distinguished from general *379academic instruction or apprenticeship and training.” N.J.S.A. 40A:ll-2(6).
Under the contract between American Totalisator Company, Inc. and the Authority, the Company agreed to lease and install a computerized pari-mutuel totalisator system. The Company was also obligated to maintain the system throughout the lease period. To that end the Company contracted “[t]o furnish an adequate staff of technicians to service and maintain the System in good and accurate operating condition.” (emphasis supplied). If the Authority believed the staff of technicians was inadequate, then the Company would furnish three individuals, one of whom would be a systems manager with at least three years’ experience and one a totalisator technician with at least one year’s experience. Only servicing and maintaining the System were required after installation of the hardware and the programming. Nowhere in the contract were these services described as professional.
Services of this nature do not fall within the category of professional services. For example, not one of the three definitional requisites under the Local Public Contracts Law is met or satisfied by these technicians. Holding that specially trained personnel who operate sophisticated computer equipment provide professional services broadens that concept, contrary to the basic principle that a narrow construction be applied to that exception from public bidding. It disserves the public interest and opens the door to an escape from competitive bidding for a wide range of services of highly skilled technicians.
Moreover, application of the exception to this equipment leasing contract fails to recognize that a substantial part of the cost was attributable to the equipment, not the maintenance services. It is undisputed that specifications covering the equipment could be drawn. The public bidding statute is avoided by combining some maintenance services with the lease of the equipment. A recent Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision, Datatrol, Inc. v. State Purchasing Agent, 400 N.E.2d *3801218 (Mass.1980), refused to succumb to that technique and should serve as an apt precedent for us today.
The Massachusetts State Lottery. Commission, after negotiation, entered into a contract with the American Totalisator Company to furnish and service a highly sophisticated electronic data processing system for handling betting on various games with 300 to 500 terminals at various locations. A competitor, Datatrol, attacked the validity of the contract for violation of competitive bidding requirements. The Massachusetts court found that competitive bidding was applicable. It held that leases for equipment were subject to competitive bidding; otherwise long-term leases could be used “to evade the competitive bidding requirement.” Id. at 1227.2
Nothing in the legislative history indicates an intent to exempt from competitive bidding the type of contract in this case — leasing and maintenance of equipment. It is for the Legislature to decide whether there is a desire and need “to *381keep pace with scientific developments in business and commerce,” ante at 371, so as to exempt contracts of this type from competitive bidding. Moreover, no contention is made that adequate bid specifications could not have been prepared and submitted.
The statute authorizes the Authority to enter into contracts without competitive bidding where the “public convenience” or an “exigency” so requires. The majority claims that the pressing time constraints justified invoking the “public convenience” exception. However, there was no showing that in October 1978 competitive bidding was not feasible. Even if there may have been some additional delay so that the system may not have been installed by September 1979, the situation was not so desperate as to warrant avoidance of competitive bidding. Moreover, the requirement of N.J.S.A. 5:10-21 that the Authority adopt a resolution reciting that such an exigency existed was not satisfied. Indeed, this “public convenience” argument was not advanced by the Authority until the contention appeared in its brief filed with this Court.
The concurring opinion’s definition and application of “public convenience” fails to recognize that the plans and specifications of the system were to be determined by the Authority. Public competitive bidding would be open to all, and not limited to Autotote Limited and the American Totalisator Company. Moreover, the Authority must award the contract not simply to the lowest bidder, but the lowest responsible bidder. To read the statutory exception in the broad manner suggested would substantially impair the public good safeguarded by public competitive bidding.
I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division invalidating the negotiated contract.
PASHMAN, J., concurring in the result.
*382For reversal — Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD and POLLOCK — 4.
For affirmance — Justice SCHREIBER — 1.

Also excepted are “extraordinary, unspecifiable services.” These are services “specialized and qualitative in nature requiring expertise, extensive training and proven reputation in the field of endeavor.” N.J.S.A. 40A:~11-2(7). The Legislature chose not to expand the exceptions in the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority Law to include extraordinary unspecifiable services.

The majority’s reliance upon Waste Management v. Wis. Solid Waste, etc., 84 Wis.2d 462, 267 N.W.2d 659 (Sup.Ct.1978), is misplaced. The statute there, ch. 499, excepted from competitive bidding those services enumerated in Section 499.07(27). The Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted this exception:
“To contract for services in the performance of architectural and engineering design, the supervision of design and construction, system management and facility management; and for such other professional or technical services as may require either prequalification of a contractor or the submission by any person of a proposal in response to an official request for proposal or similar written communication of the authority, whenever such services are, in the discretion of the authority, deemed necessary, desirable or convenient in carrying out the purposes of the authority." [267 N.W.2A at 664; emphasis supplied by the court] American Totalisator Co. v. Western Reg. Betting Corp., 44 App.Div.2d
750, 396 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1974), also relied upon, concerned a contract exclusively for computer services and involved a statute requiring competitive bidding “for construction or any other work.” The opinion discusses, in dictum, what the legislature intended to be included in “work.” The New York statute does not contain any exception like that in the New Jersey statute of “services of a professional nature.” Everyone assumes that absent this exception (none of the other express statutory exceptions being applicable), the agreement would be subject to competitive bidding.