Court Opinion

ID: 9585256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:58:21.209938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:08.286511
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion allows police officers, after effectuating a custodial arrest for a violation of a traffic regulation or crime, to conduct warrantless searches of luggage, briefcases, and other containers found in the interior of an automobile, absent any showing of probable cause to believe that those containers hold contraband or evidence of a crime. The majority, while continuing to pay lip service to the exception to the warrant requirement set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), stretches the underpinnings of Chimel so far *185that the court seems to be quickly reaching the point where the rule of the fourth amendment will be war-rantless searches and the exception will be validly executed warrants. Accordingly, I dissent.
The majority, in "affirming" the fundamental principles of Chimel states:
"We do not consider Belton to represent a relaxation of the Chimel test. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, n. 3, specifically stated that: 'Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."' P. 166.
The Chimel exception to the warrant requirement permits police officers who have made a custodial arrest to conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control. This exception was based on two overriding concerns: the safety of the arresting officer(s), and the preservation of easily concealed or destructible evidence:
"When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. .Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an ar-restee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evi-*186dentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule." Chimel at 762-63.
Was the safety of the arresting officers in jeopardy here? Was there any danger that the gun that they were looking for in the locked glove compartment could be seized by the arrestees, concealed, or destroyed? The answers to these questions, as evidenced by the undisputed facts here, is a resounding "no."
At the time of the police entry into Fry's locked glove compartment, the arrestee and his passenger were both handcuffed. They were both in separate squad cars parked some distance from the searched vehicle. While other police officers were engaged in the search of the automobile, Fry and his passenger were both guarded by separate police officers.
The majority's conclusions rest upon the United States Supreme Court's discussion in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Even assuming that the facts of this case fit within the Belton rule,1 Belton provides *187a very shaky basis for the court to rely on. I do not find one commentary favorable to the Belton rule, and there are many which are not.2 The United States Supreme Court continues to be divided on the question, and LaFave predicts that "the rule may well be abandoned." W. LaFave at sec. 7.1 (Supp.).
The rule which permits warrantless noninventory searches of automobiles only when necessary to protect the safety of the arresting officers or to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence has served Wisconsin citizens well since 1969. There is no sound reason to abandon it now. The adoption of this new rule may well lead to pretextual custodial arrests in traffic or minor criminal situations in which the officer would not normally make a custodial arrest, in order to search an interesting looking locked briefcase, piece of luggage or other container. The rule adopted by the majority allows such a search, absent probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of crime will be found within such containers.
1 would do as other states have done when confronted with this question, and continue to pay more than lip service to the sound principles of Chimel. See, State v. Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Wash. 1983), Peo*188ple v. Smith, 452 N.E.2d 1224 (N.Y. 1983) and State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982). I would hold that sec. 968.11, Stats., and art. 1, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution require that warrantless noninven-tory searches of luggage, briefcases or other containers in the interior of an automobile are permissible only if the containers searched are within an area from which an arrestee might gain possession of a weapon, or destroy or conceal evidence. Inasmuch as there was no danger of either presented by the facts of this case, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE NATHAN S. HEFFERNAN and JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON join in this dissent.

 In Belton, the suspects were not handcuffed at the time of the search. Here both arrestees were handcuffed. In Belton, the suspects, not handcuffed, were standing just outside the searched car at the time of the search. Here the two arrestees were inside two separate squad cars being guarded by two separate police officers at the time of the search. In Belton, the area searched was the back seat of the car from which an officer seized and searched a jacket. Here, the area searched was a locked glove compartment.
In Belton there was, at least arguably, an opportunity for one of the suspects to get back into the passenger compartment, the area searched. Here, it was inconceivable that one of the arrestees could have returned to the car, seized the keys from the ignition, unlocked the glove compartment and seized the gun, thereby eluding not only his guard, but the police officers who were in the suspect vehicle as well.

 Y. Kamisar, The "Automobile Search" Cases: The Court Does Little to Clarify the "Labyrinth" of Judicial Uncertainty in The Supreme Court: Trends and Developments, 69 (1982); W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, sec. 7.1 (Supp. 1986); D. Rudstein, The Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest: An Analysis of New York v. Belton, 67 Marq. L. Rev. 205 (1984); W. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307, (1982); Note, Belton, Robbins and Ross: Search and Seizure In Automobiles Revisited, 29 Wayne L. Rev. 241 (1982); V. Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without Justification, 32 Hastings L.J. 127 (1980).