Court Opinion

ID: 9831300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:00:23.749533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:33.672922
License: Public Domain

*873On. Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant Hanson has filed quite a lengthy motion for rehearing, in which most of the material evidence upon the question of the identification of the truck and driver alleged to have caused the death of the deceased, and upon the issues of negligence submitted to the jury, is set out and discussed, and it is argued with much force that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the finding that the truck was driven by one of Hanson’s drivers, nor the verdict of the jury upon the issues of negligence submitted to it. As shown in our original opinion, no such question is presented in appellants’ brief. The only question presented by the brief, arising upon the evidence, is whether the- trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor of appellant.
The question thus presented only involves the inquiry of whether there is any legal evidence tending to show the existence of the facts sought to he established, or, in other words, raising the issue of the existence of such facts. That this question is different from that presented by the motion, and that we are not authorized, under an assignment complaining of the refusal of the trial court to instruct a verdict for the defendant, to pass upon or consider the question of whether the verdict of the jury is supported by sufficient evidence, or is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, is well settled by the decisions of our Supreme Court. Choate v. Railway Co., 44 S. W. 69, 91 Tex. 406.
Upon the question of whether the driver of the truck was, at the time of the accident which caused the death of the deceased, using the truck for a purpose authorized by appellant, the motion quotes the testimony of appellant to the effect that, from his knowledge obtained from his records, none of his 24 drivers on the day in question would likely have been on Thirty-Fifth street with an empty truck, and that if any driver was driving an empty truck of his at the time and place in question such driver was not engaged in the performance of the duties of his employment. This testimony of appellant, standing alone, might be sufficient to destroy the inference arising from his ownership of the truck and the fact that it was being driven by one of his drivers that it was being used in his business or for a purpose authorized by him.
But this is not all of appellant’s testimony on this point. He further testified:
“No, sir; the men did not report to the stables or garage before g'oing to their meals or upon returning from their meals. They went from their work to their meals and back to their work; yes, sir. They left the .garage in the mornings and came in in the evenings. I had about 24 or 25 trucks at that time. No, sir; I didn’t have about 29 trucks at that time. No; I have no personal knowledge as to where the men were at any time except from the slips. All I can tell you is where they should go. No, sir; I was not in the neighborhood of Thirty-Fifth and Church at that time. I did not say that, Judge, that there was no truck of mine along there at that time. I said there shouldn’t have been, in performing the work they were doing. I am testifying to where they should have been according to the record. I mean that I have a method of handling my business that if they should get to Harriss, Irby & Yose’s at 11:30 or 20 minutes to 12, or 15 min-. utes to 12, they would take a load of cotton there and come away with that load of cotton.”
We think it clear that appellant’s testimony, as a whole, fails to show that his driver was not using the truck for. á purpose authorized by him at the time and place of the occurrence in which deceased met his death.
We adhere to the conclusions expressed in our original opinion, and the motion for rehearing is refused.