Court Opinion

ID: 9427530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:06.382734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:07.785766
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Powell,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to elaborate on what is said in Part IV. I do not see my obser*178vations as being inconsistent with the Court’s opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional point that, in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment interests as well as the private interests of the plaintiff.
I agree with the Court that the explicit constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in a case of this kind, as articulated by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), should not be expanded to create an evidentiary privilege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding, whatever protection the “exercise of editorial judgment” enjoys depends entirely on the protection the First Amendment accords the product of this judgment, namely, published speech.1 As the Court makes clear, the privilege respondents claim is unnecessary to safeguard published speech. This holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court notes, however, that whether “the trial judge properly applied the rules of discovery,” as a nonconsti-tutional matter, is not before us under the question certified pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), ante, at 177. I assume, therefore, that the litigation will continue and the District Court will review the interrogatories and questions which respondents declined to answer.
*179Earlier this Term, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U. S. 1081 (1979), I had occasion to comment upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. Id., at 1086-1088. At the 1946 Term, just a few years after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court stated “that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 507 (1947). The bar and trial courts understandably responded affirmatively. As the years have passed, discovery techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litigation art — one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage of justice. As the Court now recognizes, the situation has reached the point where there is serious “concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery.” Ante, at 176.2 In view of the evident attention given discovery by the District Judge in this case, it cannot be said that the process here was “uncontrolled.” But it certainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all concerned.3
Under present Rules the initial inquiry in enforcement of any discovery request is one of relevance. Whatever standard may be appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a district court should measure the degree of relevance required in light of both the private needs of the parties and the public concerns implicated. On the one hand, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the solicitude for First Amendment rights evidenced in our opinions reflects concern for the *180important public interest in a free flow of news and commentary. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 781-783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 862-863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). On the other hand, there also is a significant public interest in according to civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process of weighing these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function customarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of the law. In performing this task, trial judges — despite the heavy burdens most of them carry — are now increasingly recognizing the “pressing need for judicial supervision.” AFC Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, supra, at 1087,4
The Court today emphasizes that the focus must be on relevance, that the injunction of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1 must be heeded, and that “district courts should not neglect their power to restrict discovery” in the interest of justice or to protect the parties from undue burden or expense. Ante, at 177; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c). I join the Court’s opinion on my understanding that in heeding these admonitions, the district court must ensure that the values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed carefully in striking a proper balance.

 Our decisions in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94 (1973), provide no support for the theory that the prepublication editorial process enjoys a special status under the First Amendment. Rather, those decisions rest on the fundamental principle that the coerced publication of particular views, as much as their suppression, violates the freedom of speech.

 See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 F. R. D. 159, 191-192 (1976); Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F. R. D. 277, 288-290 (1978); Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response from the United States Department of Justice, 76 F. R. D. 320, 328 (1978); Powell, Reforms — Long Overdue, 33 Record of N. Y. C. B. A. 458, 461-463 (1978).

 See ante, at 176 n. 25.

 In some instances, it might be appropriate for the district court to delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other developments in discovery might reduce the need for the material demanded. It is pertinent to note that respondents here had not sought summary judgment on any issue at the time discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery should be postponed until other issues on which liability depends are resolved.