Court Opinion

ID: 9885726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:12:55.053423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:56.504101
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ADAIR
dissenting:
I dissent.
This is an action to recover damages for the alleged trespass by defendant’s sheep on certain United States Forest Service Lands situate in Powell County, Montana.
While the action at first blush may seem innocuous, yet, in fact, it vitally affects a large segment of one of the basic industries of this state. The ramifications of the somewhat novel holding of the majority opinion herein, written by District Judge William M. Black, are bound to adversely affect practically ever stockman in Montana.
The instant action is one of first impression in this jurisdiction, if not one of first impression in the nation. The research and briefs of the able counsel representing the respective parties litigant have failed to produce any decision or other authority that is factually in point with the facts which obtain in this action.
My own research has likewise failed to reveal any decision involving the law of trespass, wherein the facts are similar to those before us on this appeal.
The lack of authority on the questions here presented is signif*150ieant in that the instant case may be the first in the United States to hold that a person, or a corporation, that goes upon lands with the permission of the owner of such land may nevertheless be guilty of trespass and be held liable in money damages to others who do not own such land.
The particular lands upon which the defendant’s sheep grazed is owned by the United States of America. Such land was and is administered by the United States Forest Service.
In the instant case, the defendant Corporation had paid a monetary consideration to, and received a permit from the owner of the lands, the United States of America, for the privilege and right to be allowed to graze defendant’s sheep upon such federally owned property.
The plaintiffs had located mining claims upon a portion of such federally owned forest service land, which location gave to the plaintiffs the exclusive right to mining privileges on the claims so located. However, the plaintiffs’ location of the mining claims gave to the plaintiffs no more than the exclusive possession of the lands for mining purposes, but such right to such possession for mining purposes did not divest the United States of its legal title. The plaintiffs ■ location of their mining claims did not segregate the unpatented mining claims from the public domain for any and all purposes, nor did such location appropriate the lands to the locators’ sole and exclusive use for any and all purposes. See Teller v. United States, 8 Cir., 1901, 113 F. 273, 280; United States v. Rizzinelli, D.C.N.D. Idaho, 182 F. 675, and United States v. Etcheverry, 10 Cir., 1956, 230 F.2d 193.
Since the plaintiffs here did not acquire or own the grazing rights in, to, and on the surface of these unpatented mining claims, how may it be held that the plaintiffs are entitled to maintain an action for trespass against this defendant, who bargained and paid for the grazing rights and privileges in said land, the true owner being the United States, with whose permission the defendant went upon the land with its livestock ?
*151The plaintiffs asserted damages from loss of the forage, yet they did not own, nor did they possess the forage. They asserted they were damaged by the presence of defendant’s sheep upon the land because of the natural functions of the animals, which were lawfully upon the property by virtue of a grazing permit issued by the United States. If such is to be the rule of law which obtains in Montana, then every stockman using the United States forests will be open and subject to like claims for damages even though he has been issued valid permits to be on the property, and even though, as here, he never commits an unlawful act thereon after he lawfully enters upon the property. Under the rule announced in the majority opinion herein, the stockman will be liable for damages merely because his stock, while grazing, continue to perform their natural bodily functions, and deposit manure upon the lands upon which the animals graze.
This court, in State v. Starkweather, 89 Mont. 381, 297 P. 497, 498, citing Coburn Cattle Co. v. Hensen, 52 Mont. 252, 157 P. 177, and Thrasher v. Hodge, 86 Mont. 218, 283 P. 219, held that “A trespass is the invasion of the possession of another.”
Trespass is defined in 87 C.J.S., Trespass, § 4, page 958, as:
“The gist of trespass is the doing of an unlawful act or of a lawful act in an unlawful manner to the injury of another’s person or property. A cause of action for trespass does not arise from mere omission to perform a duty; there must be some affirmative act by violence or force, direct or imputed, and the injury must be immediate and not consequential.” Emphasis supplied.
The essential elements necessary to constitute trespass are absent in this case. The entry upon the property by the sheep was lawful. While upon the ground the sheep grazed and performed other natural functions, none of which were done in an unlawful manner. The United States, and only the United States, owned the grazing privileges on this land. The defendant paid a monetary consideration for such grazing privileges *152and entered upon the land with the permission of the United States. AVhile so grazing, the sheep at no time interfered in any manner or form with the mining operations or the mining rights of the plaintiffs which were and are the only rights granted to and possessed by the plaintiffs, or as to which the plaintiffs could lawfully complain of trespass.
Here, the plaintiffs as possessors of the mining claims were at no time on the property for the purpose of mining, while defendant’s sheep were grazing thereon. They contend they were damaged solely because the sheep were present on their mining claims. Such contention is untenable in view of the fact that the sheep were present by, and with the consent of, the United States, the dominant owner of the property, and for this reason the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
In my opinion, the judgment of the district court should be reversed, and the action should be ordered dismissed.