Court Opinion

ID: 9927968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 16:18:32.146887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:23.206323
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                        2024 WY 12

                                                       OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                   January 30, 2024

 LFP CONSULTING, LLC, a North
 Dakota limited liability company,

 Appellant
 (Plaintiff),
                                                      S-23-0125
 v.

 DAVID EDWARD LEIGHTON,

 Appellee
 (Defendant).

                            Appeal from the Chancery Court
                          The Honorable Steven K. Sharpe, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Rick Koehmstedt, Judith Studer of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper,
      Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Studer.

Representing Appellee:
      Keith J. Dodson, Thomas W. Rumpke of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C.,
      Casper, Wyoming; Mark Western of Fremstad Law Firm, Fargo, North Dakota.
      Argument by Mr. Western.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final
publication in the permanent volume.
KAUTZ, Justice.

[¶1] LFP Consulting, LLC (LFP), a financial advisory company, employed David
Edward Leighton as a financial advisor. After Mr. Leighton resigned, LFP sued him in
Wyoming chancery court for breach of contract and various torts. The chancery court
dismissed LFP’s complaint for improper venue based upon a clause in the parties’ contract
selecting Minnesota as the forum for disputes between them (forum selection clause). We
reverse and remand because the chancery court erroneously concluded LFP did not have
the right to unilaterally waive the forum selection clause.

                                                ISSUE

[¶2] The dispositive issue on appeal is: Did the chancery court err by dismissing LFP’s
complaint for improper venue based on its conclusion that LFP could not unilaterally waive
the forum selection clause in the parties’ contract?1

                                                FACTS

[¶3] LFP hired Mr. Leighton in June 2018 to work as a “paraplanner” financial advisor
in its Worland office. Because Mr. Leighton was not licensed as a financial advisor and
had no financial planning clients, LFP arranged for him to become licensed through a
Minnesota company, Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. (Ameriprise Financial). Once
licensed, Mr. Leighton entered into an Associate Financial Advisor Agreement (AFA) with
Ameriprise Financial, which provided him with a securities registration and the right to act
as its agent.2

[¶4] Mr. Leighton agreed in the AFA that the records and materials associated with his
financial planning activities belonged to Ameriprise Financial and must be returned to it
upon termination of their contractual relationship. He promised in Section 8 of the AFA
not to divulge Ameriprise Financial’s trade secrets or confidential information or use them
except to perform his duties to Ameriprise Financial. He also agreed that, for one year
after termination of his relationship with Ameriprise Financial, he would not contact,
solicit, or provide services to any of Ameriprise Financial’s clients. Ameriprise Financial
was permitted to seek an injunction “to keep [Mr. Leighton] from violating” the
confidentiality and non-compete provisions of the AFA. Section 11 of the AFA stated it
was governed by Minnesota law, and Mr. Leighton agreed to litigate “any action at law”

1
  LFP also asserts the chancery court erred by ruling its separate claims, which arose from its employment
relationship with Mr. Leighton and were based on Wyoming law rather than the AFA, must be litigated in
Minnesota. Our decision that the chancery court erred by dismissing LFP’s complaint for improper venue
makes consideration of this second issue unnecessary.
2
  Mr. Leighton claims there are other agreements which apply to the substantive issues in this case.
However, those agreements are not at issue in this appeal.
                                                    1
“related to” the AFA in “the State of Minnesota,” which was where Ameriprise Financial
principally conducted business.

[¶5] On November 9, 2021, Mr. Leighton resigned from LFP and Ameriprise Financial.
He immediately began conducting financial advising business through Heart Mountain
Wealth Management (HMWM), a limited liability company he had already registered in
Wyoming. HMWM associated itself with Golden State Wealth Management.

[¶6] Ameriprise Financial assigned some of its rights under the AFA to LFP, including
the right to waive the forum selection clause. LFP filed a complaint against Mr. Leighton
in Wyoming chancery court and attached an express waiver of the forum selection clause.
According to LFP’s complaint, “HMWM perform[ed] the same essential financial
planning and wealth management services as LFP” and was its “direct competitor.” LFP
stated five causes of action against Mr. Leighton including: 1) injunctive relief to restrain
Mr. Leighton from violating the AFA; 2) breach of the AFA by improperly using LFP’s
and Ameriprise Financial’s confidential information and trade secrets, providing financial
planning services to LFP’s clients, and soliciting LFP’s existing and potential clients; 3)
misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, enacted in
Wyoming at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-24-101 through 110 (2023); 4) interference with
contract or prospective advantage; and 5) unfair competition.

[¶7] Mr. Leighton moved to dismiss LFP’s complaint on multiple grounds including, as
relevant here, for improper venue under the AFA’s forum selection clause. The chancery
court dismissed LFP’s complaint, concluding LFP did not have the right to unilaterally
waive the forum selection clause and the clause required LFP to litigate matters arising
from, or related to, the AFA in Minnesota. It also ruled that, “[f]or the purposes of judicial
economy and efficiency,” all of LFP’s claims should be decided together in Minnesota.
LFP filed a timely notice of appeal from the chancery court’s dismissal.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] The AFA is governed by Minnesota law, but Wyoming law applies to procedural
matters including the standard of review. Denbury Onshore, LLC v. APMTG Helium LLC,
2020 WY 146, ¶ 24, 476 P.3d 1098, 1105 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Smithco Eng’g, Inc. v. Int’l
Fabricators, Inc., 775 P.2d 1011, 1018 (Wyo. 1989) (“Clearly, the law of the forum
controls procedural matters.”)).

[¶9] Mr. Leighton moved to dismiss LFP’s complaint under Wyoming Rule of Civil
Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted[.]” He presented several grounds for dismissal, but the chancery court dismissed
LFP’s complaint for improper venue. W.R.C.P. 12(b)(3) governs motions to dismiss for
improper venue. W.R.C.P. 12(b)(3) (a party may present the defense of improper venue
by motion); Ecocards v. Tekstir, Inc., 2020 WY 38, ¶ 10, 459 P.3d 1111, 1115 (Wyo. 2020)

                                              2
(Rule 12(b)(3) governs motions to dismiss for improper venue).

[¶10] To determine whether a case should be dismissed for improper venue, the court
accepts “the well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true.” Ecocards, ¶ 12,
459 P.3d at 1116 (citing Saunders v. Saunders, 2019 WY 82, ¶ 11, 445 P.3d 991, 996
(Wyo. 2019), Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc., 376 P.3d 960, 982 (Or. 2016), and
5B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1352 (3d. ed. 2019) (discussing identical federal rule)). The
court also draws all reasonable inferences and resolves all factual conflicts in favor of the
plaintiff. Ecocards, ¶ 12, 459 P.3d at 1116; Saunders, ¶ 11, 445 P.3d at 996. It may
examine affidavits presented by the defendant which contradict the facts stated in the
complaint regarding venue. Ecocards, ¶ 12, 459 P.3d at 1116; Saunders, ¶ 11, 445 P.3d at
996. In this case, the chancery court considered only the complaint and incorporated
attachments. See SH v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2018 WY 11, ¶ 5, 409 P.3d 1231, 1233
(Wyo. 2018) (reviewing complaint and attachments when deciding a motion to dismiss).

[¶11] We generally review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on a motion
to dismiss based on improper venue. Saunders, ¶ 10, 445 P.3d at 996; Bourke v. Grey Wolf
Drilling Co., 2013 WY 93, ¶ 14, 305 P.3d 1164, 1167 (Wyo. 2013). However, this case
requires that we answer the legal question of whether LFP could unilaterally waive the
AFA’s forum selection clause. We review the trial court’s determinations on questions of
law de novo. Ecocards, ¶ 11, 459 P.3d at 1116 (citing Saunders, ¶ 10, 445 P.3d at 996,
and BTU W. Res., Inc. v. Berenergy Corp., 2019 WY 57, ¶ 14, 442 P.3d 50, 54-55 (Wyo.
2019)).

                                       DISCUSSION

[¶12] The AFA contains a provision directing that Minnesota law governs its “validity,
interpretation, performance and enforcement[.]” We stated in Ecocards that “‘when the
contract contains a choice-of-law clause, a court can effectuate the parties’ agreement
concerning the forum only if it interprets the forum [selection] clause under the chosen
law.’” Ecocards, ¶ 26, 459 P.2d at 1119 (quoting Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428
(10th Cir. 2006)). Thus, “Wyoming courts will enforce choice-of-law provisions and apply
foreign law when doing so is not ‘contrary to the law, public policy, or the general interests
of [our] citizens.’” Finley Res., Inc. v. EP Energy E&P Co., L.P., 2019 WY 65, ¶ 9, 443
P.3d 838, 842 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Res. Tech. Corp. v. Fisher Sci. Co., 924 P.2d 972, 975
(Wyo. 1996)). Consistent with this precedent, the chancery court applied Minnesota law
to the “threshold” choice-of-forum issues. The parties do not dispute that Minnesota law
applies to the issue on appeal. We will, therefore, use Minnesota law to determine whether
LFP could unilaterally waive the AFA’s forum selection provision.

[¶13] The forum selection clause, which is found in Section 11(A) of the AFA, reads:

                                              3
              You expressly (i) consent to personal jurisdiction in the state
              and federal courts located in the State of Minnesota, (ii) waive
              any argument that venue in any such forum is not convenient,
              and (iii) agree that any action at law, suit in equity, judicial
              proceeding, or arbitration arising directly, indirectly, or
              otherwise in connection with, out of, related to or from this
              agreement or any provision hereof, shall be litigated only in the
              appropriate state or federal court in the State of Minnesota,
              County of Hennepin.

[¶14] LFP executed a document, which it attached to the complaint, waiving “the forum
selection and venue provisions stated in Section 11(A) of the AFA[.]” The chancery court
ruled LFP was not entitled to unilaterally waive the forum selection clause because the
clause benefited Mr. Leighton. Since Mr. Leighton did not agree to waive the requirement
that disputes under the AFA be litigated in Minnesota, the chancery court ruled Wyoming
was not the proper forum for LFP’s action and dismissed the case “without prejudice to
LFP refiling in the appropriate jurisdiction.” LFP claims the chancery court erred by
denying it the right to unilaterally waive the forum selection clause and maintain the action
in Wyoming.

[¶15] The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in Miracle Constr. Co. v. Miller, 87
N.W.2d 665, 670 (Minn. 1958), that a party may unilaterally waive a provision included in
a contract for its sole benefit. There, the parties executed a contract for the sale of property
conditioned upon annexation of the property into an adjacent village. Id. at 668. The
annexation was required so the purchaser could secure financing. Id. After the sellers
reneged, the purchaser sued for specific performance of the contract. Id. The sellers
claimed the contract was null and void because the property had not been annexed in
accordance with the terms of the contract. Id. at 670. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
the purchaser could waive the annexation requirement because it had been inserted into the
sales contract for the purchaser’s sole benefit. Id. at 670-71. The court stated the rule of
law as: “[A] party may waive a condition precedent to his own performance of a
contractual duty, when such condition precedent exists for his sole benefit and protection,
and compel performance by the other party who has no interest in the performance or
nonperformance of such condition.” Id. at 670. See also, Dolder v. Griffin, 323 N.W.2d
773, 778 (Minn. 1982) (reciting the unilateral waiver rule from Miracle Constr. Co.);
Columbia Dev., LP v. Minneapolis Park & Recreation Bd., No. 27-CV-09-41, 2010 WL
2650566, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (same).

[¶16] Minnesota case law is in accord with the “well-settled” principle across the country
“that a contracting party may unilaterally waive a provision of the contract, including, as a
general rule, any condition precedent which has been placed in the contract for that party’s
benefit.” 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:24 (4th ed. 2023) (footnotes omitted). See
also, Rizas v. Vail Resorts, Inc., No. 08-CV-139-J, 2009 WL 10664834, at *2 (D.Wyo.

                                               4
2009) (“[T]he law of waiver of contract provisions is widespread and well accepted. A
party to a contract may waive a provision of the contract that was included for his benefit.”
(citing Lanna v. Greene, 399 A.2d 837, 841 (Conn. 1978), and Takahashi v. Pepper Tank
& Contracting Co., 131 P.2d 339, 354 (Wyo. 1942))) (some quotation marks omitted).
However, “it is equally true that ‘a waiver of contract requirements and conditions may not
be made unilaterally when it would deprive the nonwaiving party of a benefit under the
provision in question.’” Avicanna Inc. v. Mewhinney, 487 P.3d 1110, 1113-14 (Colo. App.
2019 (quoting 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:24). “[W]hen one party seeks to enforce
a contract and compel performance by the other party despite the nonoccurrence of a
condition precedent to performance, a determination must be made regarding whether the
condition was inserted in the contract solely for the benefit of the party seeking to enforce
the contract despite its nonoccurrence.” 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:24 (footnotes
omitted).

[¶17] This unilateral waiver principle is applicable to forum selection clauses. See, e.g.,
Avicanna, 487 P.3d at 1113-14; Open Text Corp. v. Grimes, 262 F.Supp.3d 278, 285-86
(D.Md. 2017); Rizas, 2009 WL at *2-3. In Northland Cap. Fin. Servs., LLC v. Robinson,
976 N.W.2d 252, 259-61 (S.D. 2022), a case relied upon by Mr. Leighton and the chancery
court, the South Dakota Supreme Court determined that Minnesota would follow the
general rule that a party to a contract can unilaterally waive a forum selection clause if it
was included for that party’s sole benefit.

[¶18] To determine whether LFP could unilaterally waive the forum selection provision
in the AFA, we must decide which party or parties benefitted from the provision. As
assignee of the AFA, LFP stepped into Ameriprise Financial’s shoes. “An assignment
operates to place the assignee in the shoes of the assignor, and provides the assignee with
the same legal rights as the assignor had before assignment.” Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Glass
Serv. Co., 683 N.W.2d 792, 803 (Minn. 2004). See also, Prancing Antelope I, LLC v.
Saratoga Inn Overlook Homeowners Assoc., Inc., 2021 WY 3, ¶ 37, 478 P.3d 1171, 1181
(Wyo. 2021) (“An assignment is a contractual undertaking by one party of the rights and
obligations of another, such that the second steps into the shoes of the first.”) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). We will consider the interests of the original parties to the
AFA, Ameriprise Financial and Mr. Leighton, keeping in mind that LFP, as the assignee,
ultimately obtains Ameriprise Financial’s rights in this suit.

[¶19] We begin with the express language of the contract. See Avicanna, 487 P.3d at
1113-15 (using the contractual language to interpret an unambiguous forum selection
clause); Open Text, 262 F.Supp.3d at 286 (a party’s ability to waive a forum selection
clause derives from the agreement itself). Minnesota and Wyoming rules for interpreting
contracts are similar. Bradley v. Bradley, 2007 WY 117, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d 537, 542 (Wyo.
2007). “[T]he primary goal of contract interpretation is to determine and enforce the intent
of the parties.” Motorsports Racing Plus, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 320,
323 (Minn. 2003). Interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the

                                             5
court. Staffing Specifix, Inc. v. TempWorks Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 913 N.W.2d 687, 692
(Minn. 2018) (citing Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Minn.
2003)). See also, Hunter v. Reece, 2011 WY 97, ¶ 18, 253 P.3d 497, 502 (Wyo. 2011) (the
interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law for the court).

[¶20] A court determines the intent of the parties to an unambiguous contract “from the
plain language of the instrument itself.” Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683
N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 2004). See also, Linn v. BCBSM, Inc., 905 N.W.2d 497, 504
(Minn. 2018) (“‘[T]he plain and ordinary meaning of the contract language controls, unless
the language is ambiguous.’” (quoting Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn.
2009))); Claman v. Popp, 2012 WY 92, ¶ 26, 279 P.3d 1003, 1013 (Wyo. 2012) (the words
used in a contract are assigned the plain meaning a reasonable person would give them)
(citation omitted). The court interprets the contract “in a way that gives all of its provisions
meaning” and harmonizes all the clauses of the contract. Current Tech. Concepts, Inc. v.
Irie Enters., Inc., 530 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 1995); Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc.,
463 N.W.2d 522, 525-26 (Minn. 1990). See also, Bradley, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d at 542 (under
both Wyoming and Minnesota laws, a “contract is construed as a whole and, if possible,
all parts of the contract are harmonized”) (citations omitted).

[¶21] Neither party claims the AFA is ambiguous. The AFA was an Ameriprise Financial
form, which stated at the outset the term “you” referred to Mr. Leighton. It stated: “[As]
consideration [for] the promises and covenants given by you in [the AFA], Ameriprise
Financial hereby grants to you during the term of this Agreement a non-exclusive, limited,
terminable, royalty-free and non-assignable or transferable license . . . to use the
Proprietary Marks of Ameriprise Financial . . . in the performance of your obligations and
undertakings [under the AFA].” In return for his execution of the AFA, Mr. Leighton was
provided a “securities registration by Ameriprise Financial” and the “right to act as an agent
of Ameriprise Financial . . . .”

[¶22] Mr. Leighton made numerous promises in the AFA which were framed as directives
from Ameriprise Financial to Mr. Leighton. For example, Section 8 of the AFA stated:
“You agree that you will not reveal the contents of any Ameriprise Financial property or
other confidential information . . . except in connection with carrying out your duties
under” the AFA, and “. . . you will not, during the term of this Agreement and for a period
of one (1) year following the termination of your affiliation with Ameriprise Financial”
contact its clients or solicit them “to open an account other than an Ameriprise Financial
account or to sell any investment, financial or insurance products or services other than
through Ameriprise Financial.”

[¶23] The forum selection clause was also phrased as a directive to Mr. Leighton. In it,
Mr. Leighton expressly consented to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota courts, waived any
argument that such venue was not convenient, and “agree[d]” that “any action at law”
“related to” the AFA “shall be litigated only in the appropriate state or federal court” in

                                               6
Minnesota, which was Ameriprise Financial’s principal place of business. The chancery
court ruled that Mr. Leighton and Ameriprise Financial were mutually bound by the forum
selection clause because it used the term “agree.” The court stated that “‘[a]gree’ signals
a mutual understanding between the contracting parties about the . . . choice of forum.” It
pointed to Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “agree” as “[t]o unite in thought; to
concur in opinion or purpose” and “[t]o exchange promises; to unite in an engagement to
do or not do something.” Agree, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). However,
the court failed to recognize that “agree” is also defined, in common parlance, as “to
consent to as a course of action.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agree (last
visited January 29, 2024).

[¶24] There is no question that Mr. Leighton and Ameriprise Financial exchanged
promises in the AFA. However, that does not mean each provision equally bound both
parties or that the inclusion of the term “agree” in the forum selection clause signaled a
mutual obligation. By inserting “You” before “agree,” the parties clearly intended for Mr.
Leighton to consent that “any action at law” “shall be litigated only” in Minnesota.
Critically, the forum selection clause did not contain a reciprocal promise from Ameriprise
Financial to bring suit in Minnesota. Ameriprise Financial, therefore, had the option of
filing suit in Minnesota and holding Mr. Leighton to his promise not to contest venue in
that state or waiving the forum selection clause and filing suit in another state with
jurisdiction over the action.

[¶25] Open Text provides a comparable example. Mr. Grimes worked for Open Text
under a written agreement which contained confidentiality, non-compete, and forum
selection clauses. Open Text, 262 F.Supp.3d at 280-81. The forum selection clause stated
“the courts of the Province of Ontario . . . shall [have] exclusive jurisdiction to determine
all disputes relating to this Agreement and all the rights and obligations created thereby.”
Id. The forum selection clause also included the following promise from Mr. Grimes: “I
hereby irrevocably attorn to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Province of Ontario.” Id.
at 281. Open Text sued Mr. Grimes for breach of the agreement in his home state of
Maryland, and he filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens based upon the forum
selection clause. Id. at 280, 284. The federal district court concluded Open Text could
unilaterally waive the forum selection clause because it was included in the employment
agreement solely for its benefit. Id. at 285-86. Mr. Grimes agreed to “irrevocably attorn
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Province of Ontario,” but Open Text did not, so it
was not foreclosed from filing suit in Mr. Grimes’ home state. Id. at 286. Like in Open
Text, Mr. Leighton promised in the AFA forum selection clause not to object to litigation
of any dispute under the AFA in Minnesota, but Ameriprise Financial did not promise to
file suit in that forum.

[¶26] In comparison, the forum selection clause in Northland Cap. did contain an express
agreement from both parties to the contract to litigate in Minnesota. The provision stated:

                                             7
               It is agreed between the parties that this Lease has been
               negotiated within Stearns County, Minnesota, and finally
               executed within Stearns County, Minnesota, and accordingly,
               the Lease and all related documentation shall be governed by,
               and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of
               Minnesota (without regard to principles of conflicts of laws)
               and any suit by either of the parties pursuant to this Lease shall
               be maintained in and the venue for any such litigation shall be
               in Stearns County District Court, Stearns County, Minnesota.

Northland Cap., 976 N.W.2d at 254. The Northland Cap. forum selection clause clearly
stated “[i]t is agreed between the parties” that “any suit by either of the parties . . . shall be
maintained in . . . Minnesota.” Id. Because it was “agreed between the parties” that “any
suit by either of the parties” would be litigated in Minnesota, the language in Northland
Cap. clearly bound both parties. Id. See also, Imperium Ins. Co. v. Allied Ins. Brokers,
Inc., No. CCB-12-1373, 2012 WL 4103889, * 3 (D.Md. 2012) (forum selection clause
stating that “each party waive[d] any right to object to venue” did not solely benefit one
party).

[¶27] The forum selection language in this case is different. In Northland Cap., there was
an express agreement “between the parties” to litigate “any suit” by “either of the parties”
in Minnesota, while the forum selection clause in this case only bound Mr. Leighton
(“You”) to litigate in Minnesota. Under subsections (i) and (ii), if Ameriprise Financial
decided to bring suit in Minnesota, Mr. Leighton consented to personal jurisdiction in that
state and waived any forum non conveniens argument. Subsection (iii), which states: “You
. . . agree that any action at law . . . shall be litigated only in . . . Minnesota,” contained an
individual agreement by Mr. Leighton to litigate in Minnesota. There was no reciprocal
promise by Ameriprise Financial to litigate only in Minnesota. Because the promise was
not “between the parties” like in Northland Cap., it applied only to Mr. Leighton. The
forum selection clause clearly evinces an intent to benefit Ameriprise Financial by giving
it the option of litigating in its home state. However, because the forum selection clause
did not similarly bind Ameriprise Financial, it does not show an intent to benefit Mr.
Leighton.

[¶28] Mr. Leighton asserts that, when the AFA is read as a whole, it is clear the forum
selection clause was mutually beneficial to him and Ameriprise Financial. He notes that
the introductory section of the AFA stated that “[b]oth you and Ameriprise Financial
promise to comply with the terms of this Agreement . . . .” This provision simply
acknowledges both parties made promises in the AFA. It does not establish the forum
selection clause created a mutual obligation to litigate in Minnesota. As stated above, the
AFA contained many clauses which, in exchange for the licensing and registration rights
provided by Ameriprise Financial, individually bound Mr. Leighton, including the non-
compete and confidentiality clauses.

                                                8
[¶29] In ruling the forum selection clause was not unilaterally waivable by LFP, the
chancery court determined the arbitration provision in the AFA “explicitly subject[ed]
Ameriprise Financial to the forum selection clause.” The arbitration provision stated:
“Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by both parties, you agree to arbitrate any . . . claim
. . . that may arise between you and Ameriprise Financial . . . ; however, the parties agree
that [c]laims brought by Ameriprise Financial pursuant to Section 8 of this Agreement will
not be arbitrated, but shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts as provided in Section
11 of this Agreement . . . .” As stated above, Section 8 of the AFA contained the non-
compete and confidentiality clauses, and Section 11 contained the forum selection clause.
Under the arbitration provision, “both parties” agreed disputes regarding Section 8 would
not be arbitrated. The crux of the provision was to remove disputes over the non-compete
and confidentiality provisions from the arbitration requirement. However, the arbitration
provision did not expand Mr. Leighton’s rights under Section 11. Instead, it simply
referred the parties back to Section 11 which, as we have previously noted, gave
Ameriprise Financial the unilateral option of either requiring Mr. Leighton to litigate in
Minnesota or waive the provision and litigate in another state with jurisdiction over the
dispute.

[¶30] The chancery court also ruled that, if the forum selection clause is interpreted as
unilaterally waivable by Ameriprise Financial, the language requiring “any action at law”
to be “litigated only in” Minnesota would be rendered meaningless. Like Wyoming,
Minnesota law requires a court to interpret provisions of a contract in harmony and to give
each one meaning. Current Tech. Concepts, 530 N.W.2d at 543; Bradley, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d
at 542. However, allowing Ameriprise Financial to unilaterally waive the forum selection
clause does not render any of its language meaningless because it required Mr. Leighton to
litigate “any action at law” in Minnesota, if Ameriprise Financial so chose.

[¶31] LFP, on the other hand, argues the “waiver” provision in Section 11(B) of the AFA
confirms its right to unilaterally waive the forum selection clause. That section states: “If
Ameriprise Financial waives any provisions of this Agreement, the waiver applies only to
that provision, not to any other parts of the Agreement. A waiver is effective only when it
is in writing and signed by an authorized Ameriprise Financial officer.” We do not read §
11(B) as “granting” Ameriprise Financial a right to unilaterally waive the forum selection
provision or, for that matter, any other provision of the AFA. It simply established the
requirements for an effective waiver and recognized that, if Ameriprise Financial waived
a provision of the AFA, the remainder of the agreement would remain enforceable.

[¶32] Nevertheless, the plain language of the AFA, as a whole, and the forum selection
clause, specifically, shows that while Mr. Leighton consented to litigation over the AFA in
Minnesota, Ameriprise Financial did not promise to only litigate in Minnesota. The
chancery court erred by concluding the plain language of the AFA prevented Ameriprise
Financial and its assignee, LFP, from unilaterally waiving the forum selection clause.

                                               9
[¶33] Finally, the chancery court relied on Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab
Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1982), to conclude the forum selection clause
benefited Mr. Leighton because it offered “‘a degree of [jurisdictional] certainty’ and
served to ‘obviat[e] jurisdictional struggles.’” Hauenstein is not on point. That case was
not discussing waiver of a forum selection clause but rather the general policy in favor of
recognizing contracting parties’ right to incorporate forum selection clauses into their
agreements. Id. at 889-90. If we accept the chancery court’s reasoning that both parties to
a contract are always benefited by a forum selection clause because it offers jurisdictional
certainty, then such clauses would never be subject to waiver which is contrary to the law.

[¶34] The court in Open Text, 262 F.Supp.3d at 286-87, was not persuaded by similar
argument from Mr. Grimes. He claimed an interest “in the predictability that the contract
would be litigated in Canada,” the forum identified in the parties’ agreement. Id. at 286.
The court rejected the argument because Mr. Grimes was “not present [in Canada], ha[d]
no interests there, and committed the alleged wrongful actions in Maryland,” where the
action was filed. Id. Looking at the parties’ relationships to the chosen forum and the
forum where suit was filed, the court stated “[a]lthough the interest in predictability is
critical to many commercial contracts, it is of lesser importance when the [plaintiff]
subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the courts where the defendant resides and where, in
view of the tort and statutory claims alleged, the wrongful acts occurred in the jurisdiction
where the suit is filed.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Open Text was the only party to the
contract in that case with ties to Canada -- it was a Canadian corporation headquartered in
Waterloo, Ontario. Id. at 286. “[Mr.] Grimes, by contrast, worked for Open Text in
Maryland and committed the alleged wrongful acts in Maryland.” Id. Mr. Grimes’ lack
of relationship to Canada supported allowing Open Text to waive the forum selection
provision in the parties’ agreement. Id. at 286-87.

[¶35] Rizas offers another example where the court considered the parties’ relationships
to the chosen forum in determining whether a forum selection clause was waivable. The
survivors of a tour company’s clients filed suit against the company in Wyoming federal
district court after the clients were killed in a rafting accident in Wyoming. Rizas, 2009
WL 10664834, *1. The tour company primarily did business in Connecticut, and the
clients had signed an agreement which contained a clause stating that Connecticut law
applied to any legal actions against the company. Id. at *1-2. The survivors advocated for
application of Connecticut law in accordance with the choice-of-law provision. Id. at *2.
The tour company wanted to waive the choice-of-law provision and have Wyoming law
applied to the dispute. Id. at *2-3.

[¶36] The federal district court allowed the tour company to waive the choice-of-law
provision after concluding the provision was included in the contract to benefit the
company. Id. at *2-3. The tour company drafted the contract, which clearly stated that
Connecticut law would apply to “all legal claims . . . against [the tour company].” Id. at

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*2. According to the court, the provision assured the tour company of the option of
litigating claims against it “under the law with which it [was] most familiar.” Id. Any
benefit to the clients or the survivors from the choice-of-law provision was “by
happenstance rather than by intention.” Id. The district court also noted “none of the
[clients] or their survivors” were “residents of Connecticut,” so they would receive “little
to no benefit” from the application of Connecticut law. Id. The clients’ and survivors’
lack of relationships to Connecticut supported the court’s decision to allow the tour
company to unilaterally waive the choice-of-law provision. Id.

[¶37] We agree with the reasoning in Open Text and Rizas; the party objecting to waiver
of a forum selection clause must show a benefit aside from “jurisdictional certainty.” This
will be more difficult when the objecting party has no relationship to the forum identified
in the parties’ agreement and suit is filed in a jurisdiction with ties to the objecting party
and/or the dispute. Here, there is no indication Mr. Leighton had any relationship to
Minnesota. The complaint stated Mr. Leighton was a resident of Wyoming, worked for
LFP in Wyoming, and the “acts and omissions giving rise to [LFP’s] claims against [Mr.
Leighton] occurred in . . . Wyoming.” Mr. Leighton did not have a relationship with
Minnesota to justify the chancery court’s refusal to allow LFP to waive the forum selection
clause.

                                      CONCLUSION

[¶38] The chancery court erred by dismissing LFP’s complaint for improper venue. LFP
was entitled to unilaterally waive the forum selection clause because it was intended to
solely benefit Ameriprise Financial and, thus, LFP. Furthermore, Mr. Leighton had no
relationship to Minnesota which would support venue in that state’s courts.

[¶39] Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

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