Court Opinion

ID: 9851831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:20:20.067971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:16.253586
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially. I concur in the judgment of affirmance but not for the reasons stated in the opinion. The majority opinion might be construed to indicate that a motion for a mistrial must be made immediately upon the happening of the occurrence upon which it is based, otherwise waiver would be effective against a later motion. In Hospital Authority of the City of St. Marys v. Eason, 113 Ga. App. 401, cited and relied upon in the opinion, the motion for mistrial was not made until after the court’s charge and after the jury had retired to consider its verdict. In this case the record shows that the motion was *119made after the evidence was concluded but before the charge of the court and the retirement of the jury, counsel’s motion citing the question asked by the district attorney "just a few moments ago.” In my opinion the motion made here meets the requirement that it must "be timely made” and that here it was made in adequate time for the court to take corrective action, if any was needed.
It is my further opinion, however, that the court did not err in overruling the mption for mistrial. It is well settled that the ruling on such a motion will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion. Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121, 132 (155 SE 11); Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. 333 (6) (72 SE2d 291); Shelly v. State, 107 Ga. App. 736 (4) (131 SE2d 135). Taking into consideration that the State is allowed wide latitude on cross examination to show bias or interest of a witness (Thomas v. State, 213 Ga. 237 (4) (98 SE2d 548); Kimbrough v. State, 9 Ga. App. 301 (70 SE 1127)) together with the fact that no response was made to the question asked (Smith v. State, 104 Ga. App. 217 (2) (121 SE2d 282)), it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.