Court Opinion

ID: 9948771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:10:34.92288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:50.077057
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Contempt of Harden, 2024-Ohio-831.]
                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE CONTEMPT OF
CHERESSA HARDEN                                      :

                                                     :
                                                          No. 112930
                                                     :
[Appeal by Cheressa Harden in the
matter styled: In Re V.H.]                           :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2024

              Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
                                    Juvenile Division
                                Case No. AD-22-900356

                                           Appearances:

                Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                Attorney, and Jake A. Elliott, Assistant Prosecuting
                Attorney, for appellant.

                Kimberly Sims, pro se.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

        {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Cheressa Harden (“Harden”), appeals the trial

court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision determining that Harden was in
indirect civil contempt of a court order. We vacate the trial court’s decision and

remand for further proceedings.

I.    Facts and Procedural History

      {¶2} On May 11, 2023, a hearing was held before a magistrate to determine

if there was a violation of a court order by Harden. The magistrate noted that the

initial order to refer V.H. and his mother, K.S., for counseling services at the

Cleveland Clinic (“the Clinic”) was made on March 29, 2022. According to the

magistrate, there was evidence that V.H. had been in treatment at the Clinic since

the age of three, and the magistrate ordered V.H. and K.S. back to counseling,

ordering Harden to make the referral.

      {¶3} On September 20, 2022, the magistrate noted that V.H. had not been

referred back to the Clinic. The issue was raised again on November 29, 2022, and

according to the magistrate, V.H. and K.S. had still not been referred for counseling

services. At the November 29 hearing, Harden testified that she made two phone

calls to the Clinic but had not received a response back from them. The magistrate

issued a show cause order and scheduled a contempt hearing for May 11, 2023, to

determine whether the order to establish family-counseling had been violated.

      {¶4} On May 11, 2023, at the motion for second extension of temporary

custody hearing, under direct examination, Harden testified that she was assigned

the case in July 2022. Harden stated that family therapy was on V.H.’s case plan

to address the relationship between V.H. and K.S. because there were concerns
that K.S. was unaware of age-appropriate behaviors for and expectations of V.H.

Specifically, there were concerns about the amount and degree of physical

punishment in K.S.’s home involving V.H.

         {¶5} Harden testified that initially K.S. was not referred for mental health

services because she refused to sign a release of information form. However, she

eventually did provide documentation from another agency, Signature Health,

where she engaged in therapy. Harden then referred K.S. to Choices Behavioral

and then the Clinic. When asked if K.S. engaged in family therapy, Harden replied

that she did not engage with Choices Behavioral because there were issues getting

in contact with K.S. in order for her to be assessed for family counseling.

         {¶6} Harden did refer K.S. to the Clinic; however, after the initial

assessment for V.H., the Clinic recommended that family counseling not take

place.

         Attorney:   And why was that recommendation made?

         Harden:     There were some concerns about the child not wishing
                     to be in the presence of his mother.

         Attorney:   So was there a professional opinion that – family
                     counseling not occur at that time?

         Harden:     Yes.

         Attorney:   Okay. Has there been any updates on that?

         Harden:     The recommendation from Cleveland Clinic was that the
                     provider that the child is currently engaged in would
                     make the decision on when family counseling should be
            recommended to start, and that provider, at this time,
            has not recommended that family counseling begin with
            mother and child.

Attorney:   And do you know why?

Harden:     When – Well, the reason that was given was that when
            mother’s name is brought up or anything to that nature,
            the child avoids speaking about mother and always
            changes the subject.

Attorney:   Okay. What’s on the case plan for father?

Harden:     The case plan goal for [Father] is to engage and develop
            a better relationship with his child, which was addressed
            by family counseling.

Attorney:   And did – did the Agency refer father anywhere for
            family counseling?

Harden:     So, yes. Family counseling is taking place with [V.H.’s]
            provider through Ohio Guidestone. Mental health
            provider through Ohio Guidestone.

Attorney:   At Ohio Guidestone?

Harden:     Yes.

Attorney:   Okay. And is there – is there family therapy going on
            between father and the child?

Harden:     At the time when we did make the recommendation for a
            second extension family counseling was occurring.

Attorney:   Okay. And is there visitation going on?

Harden:     Between father and child?

Attorney:   Yes.

Harden:     Yes.
[Cite as In re Contempt of Harden, 2024-Ohio-831.]

Tr. 13 - 15.

        {¶7} Harden further testified that V.H. and K.S. were not participating in

visitation because V.H. did not want to meet with K.S.

        {¶8} Immediately after the extension of temporary custody hearing, the

magistrate conducted the alleged violation of the court ordered hearing. Shelle

Towns (“Towns”), an extended supervisor with CCDCFS testified that she was

Harden’s supervisor. Towns testified that Harden shared with her that she was

having difficulty getting a response back from the Clinic after reaching out to them

to establish services for V.H. and K.S. Harden told Towns that she called Dr. Hilary

Alexander (“Dr. Alexander”) at the Clinic’s intake department and left voicemails,

but her calls had gone unreturned. Towns recommended to Harden that she put a

concurrent plan in place regarding the referral. Harden explained to Towns that

there was another provider, Choices, that they could refer V.H. and K.S. Towns

explained to Harden that Harden needed to reach out to the attorney assigned to

the case to let them know that CCDCFS would make a supplemental concurrent

referral for family counseling.

        {¶9} Towns further explained that this referral did not cancel the referral to

the Clinic, but rather ensured that in case the Clinic does not respond, as they had

not, CCDCFS would still be in compliance with the court order to refer V.H. and

K.S. for services.          Towns testified that if the Clinic responded, then the

supplemental concurrent referral would cease.
      {¶10} Next, Towns was questioned how she learned about Harden’s

“contempt issue.” Tr. 10. Towns stated that Harden and the CCDCFS’s attorney

informed her. She stated, “My understanding is that the Courts were displeased

with the Agency’s efforts with gaining an assessment through Cleveland Clinic.” Tr.

11. Towns then testified that she explained to Harden that she would try to reach

out to the Clinic, since Harden had been unsuccessful. Towns stated that she

attempted to get in touch with the Clinic more than once, specifically reaching out

to Dr. Alexander. Towns made phone calls, left voicemails, and also sent an email

attaching the journal entry and court order.

      {¶11} It was after that communication that Dr. Alexander returned her call.

An assessment was scheduled with V.H., and he attended the assessment. After

V.H.’s assessment, Towns testified that family counseling was not recommended.

Towns reached out to Dr. Alexander to clarify the decision. In an email to Towns,

Dr. Alexander stated that family therapy was not recommended at that time. She

further stated that family therapy would do more harm than good and that V.H.’s

individual therapist could make a recommendation as to when family therapy

should start between K.S. and V.H.

      {¶12} After this testimony, the court asked for clarification as to the timeline

of events, specifically when did Harden communicate with Towns that she was

having difficulty contacting Dr. Alexander. Towns testified that the conversation
took place between September and November, prior to the November 29, 2022

hearing.

      {¶13} After Towns’s testimony, Harden was called to testify. She testified

that after the September 20, 2022 hearing, she placed two calls to the Clinic’s

Adolescent Behavioral Health Department. She spoke to a scheduler, whose

responsibility was to schedule the intake assessment appointment with Dr.

Alexander. The scheduler was unable to open Dr. Alexander’s schedule and sent

Harden to Dr. Alexander’s voicemail. Harden left a message. After Dr. Alexander

did not return Harden’s call, she repeated the same process. Again, she did not

hear back from Dr. Alexander.

      {¶14} Harden spoke to Towns about the fact that Dr. Alexander had not

returned her calls, and Towns suggested contacting CCDCFS’s supportive services

department and the attorney to let them know of the difficulty. Harden did both

in October. Harden also made a supplemental concurrent referral for family

counseling through Choices. V.H. was initially assessed by Choices, but Choices

was unable to make contact with K.S.

      {¶15} After the November 29, 2022 hearing, Harden, again, called Dr.

Alexander and left another voicemail and sent an email. It was not until Towns

made additional phone calls to Dr. Alexander, sent her an email with the court

order attached, and contacted CCDCFS’s attorney that Dr. Alexander responded

on December 7, 2022. Harden testified that Dr. Alexander referred them to
Brianna Eason (“Eason”), a psychologist. Both Towns and Harden attempted to

contact Eason, but Eason never returned their call. As a result, Towns and Harden

reached back out to Dr. Alexander, and she recommended “to just have [V.H.]

come in through a sort of a–a clinic that could take the child for an assessment.”

Tr. 26.

      {¶16} After V.H.’s assessment, Harden received the report that stated family

counseling was not recommended at the time. It was recommended that the V.H.’s

current therapist recommend family counseling when she felt V.H. was ready.

      {¶17} After all parties testified, the court made its ruling stating:

      It has been, since the inception of this case, an ongoing problem with
      getting the Agency to follow this Court’s order. As far back, and
      mother is accurate in what she says, but as far back – it’s been over a
      year that this Court has been trying to get the Agency to re-engage
      this child at the Cleveland Clinic. Initially, there were issues with
      counselors leaving and allowing a placement to change, where he
      would go for his treatments. And he was engaged in a whole program
      at the Cleveland Clinic, and it was verified that he had started there
      at the age of three. And when it gets to September 20th, it is in bold
      print, and I’m not sure how else the Court can do it, but, Worker shall
      immediately contact the Cleveland Clinic, refer the mother and child
      for family counseling at any other identified counseling services is
      recommended, because the testimony had revealed that mother and
      child had both engaged in services jointly and separately. On
      November 20th – The testimony today seemed to be a lot clearer, but
      on November 20th, it was the worker’s testimony that she thought
      she made two calls. She hadn’t noted it in – She didn’t think it was
      in the activity log. She didn’t know – I don’t know, as we sit here
      today, if it’s in the activity log, if it’s noted, because I didn’t hear any
      testimony about it. While I can appreciate contacting your supervisor,
      but if you contacted your legal counsel, when you say you’re not sure
      how else it could have been resolved, when an order can’t be – when
      the Court’s order can’t be followed, counsel for the Agency has
      oftentimes filed a motion with this Court to modify that order based
      on the inability to comply with it. No such motion was filed. The
      parties just came to court and basically had gone again and referred
      this child to another provider. And one of the reasons this Court
      ordered – again ordered the child back to the Cleveland Clinic was
      on September 20th, the worker testified that the child’s counselor did
      not do family therapy, but that mother could provide suggestions for
      providers for consideration as she, the social worker, had not found
      one. And also that mother and the child had been engaged in
      individual and family counseling through the Cleveland Clinic and
      the child was familiar with them and the mother and child were well
      known to them. That was the basis for the order. So while it’s not a
      criminal contempt, it is, in fact, a civil contempt. It’s an indirect civil
      contempt. Because the order is very specific and it’s been ongoing.
      And Ms. Harden has been on the case long enough that that order
      should have been followed. I’m not sure, and I’m not going to
      speculate as to why counsel didn’t file a motion. I’m sure what was
      said or anything. But the Court was never notified. This child should
      have been always maintained in the program he was in from the time
      he was three. He was known to those providers. He’s had in at least
      two different providers since the inception of this case. And I have
      interviewed the child. And I will probably interview this child again.
      But continuity is important and he has been denied that. So I am
      going to find that Cheressa Harden is in indirect civil contempt of
      this Court’s order. It’s a $50 fine and ten days in jail. There is a purge.
      The purge is this. That Ms. Harden has to go for six months without
      violating any of these Court’s orders. And I’m going to tell the–I’m
      still not clear as to why this child is not re-engaged in all the programs
      he was in at the Cleveland Clinic. I still haven’t gotten that answer. Is
      it this counselor now is against family counseling where they were in
      family counseling? Ms. Towns, you’re here. Ms. Konopka, you’re here.
      Review this case from the beginning and you’re going to see the
      problems that there were. And I expect you to address them. Because
      this child is not being served. His best interests are not being served
      with the way this case has been handled.

Tr. 52 – 56.

      {¶18} Harden objected to the magistrate’s decision on May 24, 2023. In her

objections, she argued that the contempt was criminal, not civil, in nature; that she
did not violate the court’s September 20, 2022 order; that establishing family

counseling with the Clinic was impossible based on recommendations from the

child’s medical providers; and that the court set forth a legally deficient purge

condition that purports to regulate future conduct contrary to Ohio law.

       {¶19} On June 6, 2023, the trial court overruled Harden’s objections and

adopted the magistrate’s decision without addressing Harden’s arguments.

Harden filed this appeal assigning one error for our review:

       1.    The trial court erred in adopting the magistrate’s decision of May 11,
             2023.

II.    Standard of Review

       {¶20} “We review a finding of contempt under an abuse of discretion

standard.” In re Contempt of Tracy Digney, 2015-Ohio-4278, 45 N.E.3d 650, ¶ 7,

(8th Dist.), citing In re Contempt of Modic, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 96598, 2011-

Ohio-5396, ¶ 7, citing State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Gibbs, 60 Ohio St.3d 69, 573 N.E.2d

62 (1991). “Likewise, we review a trial court’s decision to adopt a magistrate’s

decision for abuse of discretion.” Id., citing In re A.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99040,

2013-Ohio-5120, ¶ 10, citing Dancy v. Dancy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82580, 2004-

Ohio-470, ¶ 10.

III.   Law and Analysis

       A.    Criminal Contempt
      {¶21} Harden argues that the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate’s

decision because the magistrate found her in contempt for disobeying a court order.

Harden contends that a contempt that punishes disobedience is a criminal contempt,

rather than a civil contempt, as the magistrate stated. “The Ohio Supreme Court has

recognized that a contempt sanction can be both civil and criminal.” Id. at ¶ 8, citing

Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-4783, 979 N.E.2d 297, ¶ 15. “A

defendant must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt to be punished for

criminal contempt.” id., citing Brown v. Executive 200, Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 250, 416

N.E.2d 610 (1980), “while civil contempt must be established by clear and convincing

evidence.” Id., citing Sagan v. Tobin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86792, 2006-Ohio-

2602, ¶ 34. “Clear and convincing evidence implies that the trier of fact must have a

firm conviction or belief that the facts alleged are true.” Id.

      {¶22} “Criminal and civil contempt are distinguished by the character and

purpose of the punishment imposed by the court.” Id. at ¶ 9, citing Brown at 253.

“Civil contempt is enforced with remedial or coercive sanctions and characterized by

conditional sentences while criminal contempt imposes punishment for an act of

disobedience and vindicates the authority of the law and the court.” Id. at id.

“Criminal contempt is characterized by unconditional sentences.” Id. at 254.

“‘Therefore, to determine if the sanctions in the instant cause were criminal or civil

in nature, it is necessary to determine the purpose behind each sanction: was it to
coerce the appellees to obey * * *, or was it to punish them for past violations?’” Id.

at id.

         {¶23} The magistrate stated, “[S]o I am going to find that Cheressa Harden

is in indirect civil contempt of this Court’s order. It’s a $50 fine and ten days in

jail. There is a purge. The purge is this. That Ms. Harden has to go for six months

without violating any of these Court’s orders.” Tr. 56. The court erred in stating

that it found Harden in indirect civil contempt. According to the magistrate’s order,

Harden was punished for criminal contempt because it was a punishment for an act

of past disobedience, violating a court order. As such, the magistrate would have

had to find Harden guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of intentionally disregarding

the magistrate’s order.

         {¶24} The record reveals that Harden made reasonable attempts to contact

the Clinic to establish services for K.S. and V.H. Harden called and left messages for

Dr. Alexander, and Dr. Alexander did not return the calls. For guidance, Harden

notified her supervisor, Towns, about Dr. Alexander’s failure to return her calls, and

under the advisement of Towns, Harden emailed Dr. Alexander and spoke with

CCDCFS’s attorney. Additionally, Harden initiated supplemental services through

Choices for V.H. and K.S. Those services could not move forward because K.S. did

not respond to their communications.
      {¶25} We also recognize that “[t]his is not an instance of a willful violation or

intentional disregard of a court order.” In re Contempt of Tracy Digney, ¶ 12. The

magistrate stated:

      While I can appreciate contacting your supervisor, but if you
      contacted your legal counsel, when you say you’re not sure how else
      it could have been resolved, when an order can’t be – when the
      Court’s order can’t be followed, counsel for the Agency has oftentimes
      filed a motion with this Court to modify that order based on the
      inability to comply with it. No such motion was filed.

Tr. 54. The magistrate’s erroneous shifting of CCDCFS’s attorney’s responsibility

to file a motion onto an individual social worker amounts to an abuse of discretion.

      {¶26} The record does not reflect that the magistrate or the trial court made

a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as it pertains to Harden’s actions.

Therefore, the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate’s decision to find Harden

in civil contempt.

      B.     Civil Contempt

      {¶27} Harden argues that the evidence presented at the hearing conclusively

established that she had not violated the magistrate’s order to establish family

counseling at the Clinic. As previously stated, Harden made reasonable efforts at

establishing family counseling for V.H. and K.S. She made several calls to the Clinic

and sent emails. Eventually, Dr. Alexander returned her call and set up an intake

appointment. Upon the advisement of the Clinic, family counseling was not

recommended.
      {¶28} However, the magistrate still found Harden in contempt and imposed

sanctions. The magistrate stated: “It’s a $50 fine and ten days in jail. There is a

purge. The purge is this. That Ms. Harden has to go for six months without violating

any of these Court’s orders.” Tr. 56. “‘Judicial sanctions for civil contempt may be

employed to coerce a defendant into compliance with the lawful orders of the court.’”

In re G.J.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106132, 2018-Ohio-2838, ¶ 35, quoting Pugh

v. Pugh, 15 Ohio St.3d 136, 140, 472 N.E.2d 1085 (1984). “‘A sanction for civil

contempt must allow the contemnor the opportunity to purge himself or herself of

contempt.’” Id., quoting In re Purola, 73 Ohio App.3d 306, 312, 596 N.E.2d 1140

(3d Dist.1991). “‘The trial court abuses its discretion in ordering purge conditions

which are unreasonable or where compliance is impossible.’” Id. at id. at 313.

      {¶29} The magistrate’s sanction fails to coerce Harden into compliance with

the magistrate’s order because Harden had already established family counseling

for V.H. and K.S. The Clinic recommended that counseling not continue until V.H.’s

individual counselor felt as if he was ready to have counseling with K.S. Harden’s

responsibility was to make the referral. She cannot coerce or force the Clinic to

provide counseling services for V.H. Also, as previously stated, the magistrate’s

sanction punished Harden for disobeying a previous court order, thereby making it

a criminal sanction, and not a civil one.

      {¶30} Therefore, the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate’s decision to

enforce the sanction.
      C.      Impossibility

      {¶31} Harden contends that establishing family counseling at the Clinic was

impossible, which is an affirmative defense to contempt.

      For purposes of contempt, “[a] party must take all reasonable steps
      within [his or] her power to comply with the court’s order and, when
      raising the defense of impossibility, must show ‘categorically and in
      detail’ why [he or] she is unable to comply with the court’s order.”

In re I.L.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109564, 2020-Ohio-5434, ¶ 10, quoting Briggs

v. Moelich, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97001, 2012-Ohio-1049, ¶ 15, citing Lahoud v.

Tri-Monex, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96118, 2011-Ohio-4120, ¶ 54.

      {¶32} The record reflects that once Harden made contact with Dr. Alexander,

V.H. was scheduled for an initial assessment. From that assessment, family

counseling was not recommended. Therefore, establishing family counseling at the

Clinic was impossible. “A trial court abuses its discretion by ordering purge

conditions that are unreasonable or where compliance is impossible.” Allan v. Allan,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101700, 2015-Ohio-2037, ¶ 13, citing Rose v. Rose, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 99933, 2013-Ohio-5136, ¶ 7.

      {¶33} Therefore, the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate’s decision

for contempt when it was demonstrated that compliance with its order was

impossible.

      D.      Purge Condition
      {¶34} Harden argues that the magistrate’s purge condition predicated on

future conduct is defective as a matter of law. “[B]ecause contempt proceedings are

based on the contemnor’s violation of a previous court order, a purge condition that

punishes future conduct is invalid.” Chiro v. Foley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100962,

2014-Ohio-3728, ¶ 24, citing Burke v. Burke, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 24,

2014-Ohio-1402, ¶ 8. “Furthermore, ‘for a purge condition to be valid, it must

provide a clear opportunity to purge the contempt rather than regulate future

conduct.’” Id., citing Frey v. Frey, 197 Ohio App.3d 273, 2011-Ohio-6012, 967

N.E.2d 246, ¶ 37 (3d Dist.).

      {¶35} The magistrate stated: “The purge is this. That Ms. Harden has to go

for six months without violating any of these Court’s orders.” Tr. 54. This purge

clearly regulates Harden’s future behavior and is invalid. Therefore, the trial court

erred in adopting the magistrate’s decision ordering a purge condition on future

conduct.

      {¶36} Judgment vacated and remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P. J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR