Court Opinion

ID: 9523640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:44:56.799318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:03.248544
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). The defendant in the instant case pled guilty of committing larceny in a building (offense 2) while released on bond pending trial on a charge of breaking and entering (offense 1). The defendant pled guilty to both offenses on September 26, 1984. At sentencing for the first offense on October 17, 1984, the judge who had released the defendant on bond sentenced the defendant to two to ten years, the sentence to run consecutively with any sentence imposed for the second offense. We are asked to decide whether the judge imposing the sentence first in time has authority under MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) to impose a consecutive sentence. The majority has construed the statute to limit the discretion for consecutive sentencing to the judge sentencing last in time. I disagree with this conclusion, and find such construction to be inconsistent with the apparent purposes of the statute.
While the evident purpose of the statute is not in dispute, the Legislature’s intention with regard to the exercise of the discretionary authority under § 7b(a) is not apparent. There are three possible constructions of the statutory language: 1) the judge sentencing first in time has the consecutive sentencing authority, 2) the judge sentencing second in time has the consecutive sentencing authority, and 3) either judge is authorized to impose consecutive sentences.
Because there is no express limitation on which *233judge may impose a consecutive sentence in the stated circumstances, and because the policy of deterrence is not best served by the creation of such a limitation, the rule framed today by the majority does not facilitate the aims of the Legislature. That purpose is best effectuated by a construction of the statute that recognizes consecutive sentencing authority in either judge. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
i
In this case, no one disputes that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) was "to deter those charged with one felony from committing another prior to disposition of the first.” People v Smith, 423 Mich 427, 450; 378 NW2d 384 (1985). Opinion differs, however, upon the operational aspect of the statute. Specifically, as between the judge sentencing first or last in time, who is vested with the discretionary authority under § 7b(a) to order a consecutive sentence? While the majority correctly notes that the Legislature has proceeded cautiously when providing for consecutive sentencing, this conclusion "does not require rejection of that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the overall context of the statute[ ] and the end purpose sought to be achieved by such legislation.” People v Hall, 391 Mich 175, 190; 215 NW2d 166 (1974). When a choice is to be made between two possible statutory interpretations, our practice is "to determine which of these conflicting interpretations best effectuates the legislative intent.” People v Smith, supra, p 441. Our focus must therefore be to seek that interpretation of § 7b(a) which best serves its intended purpose.
*234II
The majority concludes that limiting the discretion to impose consecutive sentences to the last-in-time sentencing judge is necessary to afford the defendant consideration of the full effect of the sentences yet to be received. They conclude that such a thorough examination will be lacking if the first-in-time sentencing court is allowed to impose a consecutive sentence when the last-in-time sentence is unknown. No analysis is offered, however, to explain why such consideration is not met if we construe § 7b(a) to allow both sentencing courts authority to impose a consecutive term.
In this case, Judge Benson sentenced the defendant to a term of two to ten years to run consecutively to the sentence Judge Snow was to impose. Judge Snow was informed of these facts prior to his sentencing of the defendant at which time there was ample opportunity for him to examine the full effect of the combined sentences. The majority fails to explain why this does not sufficiently protect the defendant’s interests, or how this concern could not be satisfied without unnecessarily restricting the sentencing discretion of Judge Benson. Further, the majority fails to explain how in any way the construction they would adopt furthers the legislative purpose behind § 7b(a).
The majority also concludes that withholding consecutive sentencing discretion in this instance serves to ensure that judges will exercise sound sentencing practice, citing Commonwealth v Holz, 245 Pa Super 376; 369 A2d 452 (1976), aff'd as modified 483 Pa 405; 397 A2d 407 (1979). In that case, Judge Spaeth concluded that affording the judge sentencing first in time the authority to order consecutive sentences only serves to deprive *235the judge sentencing last in time of such discretion. The logic of this rationale is not apparent when one considers that if a choice is made between two judges, one or the other’s sentencing discretion necessarily will be limited. The proper focus should not be deciding as between judges A and B whose discretion should be limited, but rather how best to effectuate the Legislature’s purpose. The Legislature has decided that a consecutive sentence may result in this instance; our inquiry is restricted to the proper exercise of that mandate. We are not free to pick and choose over various interpretations of "legislative intent” to limit the effect of legislation, the wisdom of which we may question.
The majority’s assumption that authorizing consecutive sentences in either court would maximize the deterrent effect of the statute is factually inaccurate. It is not the potential for a consecutive sentence that maximizes the deterrent effect of the statute but the actual imposition of such a sentence. The maximum deterrent effect is therefore achieved when a judge imposes the maximum possible consecutive sentence with full knowledge of a previously imposed sentence. In contrast, when a judge sentences first in time, the judge takes the risk that the deterrent effect of that sentence will be undercut by a second judge’s imposition of a probationary sentence or a brief period of custody. Thus, it is the construction urged by the majority that makes it most likely that the defendant will sustain the effect of a fully informed consecutive sentence.
The fact, however, that the effect of the sentence imposed first in time may be interfered with by the nature of the second sentence no more invalidates that sentence than it would if the second judge imposed a consecutive sentence and the first *236judge imposed probation. These are simply the consequences of the indeterminate sentencing law in which neither judge can predict what the exact effect of his sentence will be on a given defendant. Thus, while construction of the statute to give each judge consecutive sentencing authority does not assure either judge of the full effect intended by a consecutive sentence, it does assure that either the judge whose conditions of bond have been violated by the defendant’s commission of a subsequent crime or the judge who actually sentences for the subsequent offense will have the opportunity to make the sentence more meaningful to a defendant. That there may be a sound policy reason supporting consecutive sentencing only by the judge sentencing second in time should not obscure other policy considerations, such as a concern for preserving, albeit imperfectly, the potential efficacy of each judge’s sentencing authority.
Such balancing is not within the province of this Court. Once the purpose of the Legislature is identified, our role simply is to construe the provision in such a way as will best effectuate that purpose. We may neither question the wisdom of the enactment nor seek to impose our own view of sound sentencing policy on the Legislature. Such indulgence into "legislative drafting” not only flies in the face of the Legislature’s intention that § 7b be liberally construed, it serves to restrict the sentencing discretion of a trial judge without justification for doing so. In my view, the Legislature struck the policy balance to maximize the trial court’s potential for involvement in the consecutive sentence decision. The statute should not, therefore, be construed to mandate that the judge first imposing sentence upon a defendant who he knows has been convicted of another offense can *237never make his sentence run consecutively to the other.1
hi
The policy of deterrence is best served by allowing both sentencing judges the authority to impose consecutive sentences. While the judge whose bond was violated may have a greater interest in the ability to impose consecutive sentencing than the judge imposing sentence for a subsequent offense,2 this fact alone does not justify limiting the sentencing discretion of the subsequent sentencing court. Conversely, allowing the various sentencing *238schedules among the state jurisdictions to dictate sentencing authority not only is arbitrary, but also signals to the trial judges that they may be helpless to police their bonding decisions when violators are brought before them.
The majority fails to consider the unique problems that can arise when sentencing decisions involve different state jurisdictions or different jurisdictions within this state. In this case, the defendant committed his crimes within the jurisdictional limits of Kent County. Thus, the only question under the sentencing statute is whether Judge Benson encroached upon the sentencing authority of Judge Snow when he ordered a consecutive sentence. The Legislature may well have anticipated that successive criminal acts are not invariably committed within the same jurisdiction. Under the rule framed by the majority, had the defendant committed his second offense in Ohio rather than Michigan, the consecutive sentencing statute would be completely abrogated if the Ohio judge imposed sentence last in time. Regardless of the intentions of Judge Benson to order a consecutive sentence, because the defendant crossed the state border into Ohio, the only chance of a consecutive sentence would be if the Ohio court possessed such authority under its laws and concluded such punitive measures were appropriate. I doubt whether the Michigan Legislature intended that its law be so frustrated.
A similar situation would arise when the crimes are committed in Michigan in different counties. Had the defendant committed his initial offense in Wayne County, been released on bond, and subsequently traveled to a less populous county, where a second offense was committed, there is a likelihood that he would first be sentenced in the latter court, given the likely disparity of case loads and *239correspondingly distinct docket backlog and sentencing schedules. Under the majority’s reasoning, population, docket backlog, and sentencing schedules would play a deciding role in the vesting of sentencing authority under § 7b. I question the wisdom of such a scheme and seriously doubt whether the Legislature anticipated this result when § 7b was enacted.
Consequently, the most prudent choice is to preserve the sentencing power of both judges. Providing dual authority in this instance does not preclude sentence tailoring as feared by the majority. If the first sentencing judge imposes either a consecutive or a concurrent sentence, the second sentencing judge can still give as much of a sentence as is thought merited. If the first sentence is consecutive, the second judge can exercise mercy with a short sentence. If the first sentence is concurrent, the second judge can protect the second sentence by making it consecutive. In short, the sentencing power of the second sentencing judge does not depend on whether the first judge is deprived of the power to have the first sentence served consecutively. Preserving the sentencing power of both judges best fulfills the policy of MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2).
The Legislature presumably considered the policy issues implicated by consecutive sentencing. It provided discretion to sentencing judges to impose consecutive sentences where someone charged with, and ultimately convicted of, a felony commits a subsequent felony. There is no express provision in the statute limiting this sentencing discretion to the judge who imposes the second sentence, and such a limitation would advance neither the policies underlying MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) nor the proper administration of the criminal justice system.
*240Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Bkickley, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 Later amendments of MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) clearly show that the Legislature can limit sentencing discretion with specificity when it so wishes. 1978 PA 77 amended MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) by adding a provision requiring consecutive sentencing where a subsequent offense is a major controlled substance offense: "The sentences imposed for conviction of the prior charged offense and a subsequent offense which is a major controlled substance offense shall run consecutively.” MCL 768.7b(b); MSA 28.1030(2)(b). MCL 768.7b(a); MSA 28.1030(2)(a) retained the previous provisions permitting, but not requiring, consecutive sentencing where subsequent felony offenses are committed pending disposition of an initial felony charge. The absence of a specific limitation on the first sentencing judge’s consecutive sentencing discretion is particularly significant in light of the specific limitation of MCL 768.7b(b); MSA 28.1030(2)(b) of sentencing discretion for major controlled substance offenses committed while released on bond.

 In the instant case, the first sentencing judge imposed the consecutive sentence because the defendant violated his bond:
I am no[w] starting to get tougher on these people getting out and committing crimes on bond. I am very easy to let people out on bond; the jails are crowded. When people are out on bond and committing offenses, I think we ought to get the word out on the streets that they are going to do the[ir] time consecutively.
It is, therefore, the sentence of the Court, Mr. Chambers, that you be committed to the Michigan Department of Corrections to serve a period of time of not less than two nor more than ten years, this sentence to run consecutive to any sentence Judge Snow may give you in Case No. 35567. This will run consecutive to the sentence that Judge Snow may give you.