Court Opinion

ID: 9402624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 14:05:19.788165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:01.677595
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 9, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-1002-MR

RICHARD A. CASE, II AND
JENNIFER S. CASE                                                   APPELLANTS

                APPEAL FROM ANDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 18-CI-00244

JENNIFER C. HAYS AND
LARRY E. HAYS                                                         APPELLEES

                                OPINION
                        VACATING AND REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: In her Will, a mother split the family farm into three tracts,

one to the north, one to the south, and one in the middle, and divided the three

between two adult children. As three does not evenly divide by two, one child now

possesses two tracts – the northern and the southern tracts. That child wants an
access easement roughly bisecting the middle tract. Though the mother granted

express access easements along the eastern edge, none existed along the one

child’s desired route. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court found a quasi-

easement existed for the route that bisected the middle tract. The owner of the

middle tract appeals, claiming the Trial Court failed to analyze the issue fully and

erroneously found a quasi-easement. We agree, and after a de novo review of the

full legal test, we find no quasi-easement exists. Accordingly, we vacate and

remand for entry of a judgment in conformity with this Opinion.

                                      BACKGROUND

                Richard A. Case, II (hereinafter “Case”) and Jennifer Hays

(hereinafter “Hays”) are siblings1 whose mother, Joyce Case (hereinafter the

“Mother”),2 owned a nearly 400-acre farm in Anderson County, Kentucky. A

portion of the farm located to the east bordered U.S. Highway 127 (hereinafter “US

127”), allowing roadway access. Many years before her death, Mother executed a

Will that would, upon her demise, divide the property into three tracts of roughly

similar acreage, one to the north (hereinafter “Tract 3”), one across the middle

(hereinafter “Tract 2”), and one to the south (hereinafter “Tract 1”). Mother

1
  They are joined on appeal by their respective spouses, and any reference herein to Case or Hays
includes their respective spouses.
2
    The Mother’s husband, Richard A. Case, predeceased her.

                                               -2-
expressed her intention in the Will to grant Case Tract 2 and Hays Tract 3 (as it

could be accessed from Hays’ current residence). Mother further provided in her

Will that the last parcel, Tract 1, which contained the family residence, would be

sold to the highest bidder at a private auction between Case and Hays. The Will

provided that if Hays purchased Tract 1, she would have an access easement for

Tract 1 only across Tract 2 and permitting access to US 127.

              Prior to her death, however, Mother executed a minor subdivision plat

creating the three tracts and conveyed Tract 2 to Case.3 The minor subdivision plat

granted each tract a minimum 50 feet of road frontage, as required by local

regulations, and it also had an 80-foot-wide easement for Tract 3 to access US 127

at the eastern portion of the property. The plat also showed an access easement for

Tract 1 across Tract 2 for access to US 127. Accordingly, one who possessed

Tracts 1 and 3 could travel between them by using these easements or from US

127. The Tract 3 easement was subject to much testimony at the subsequent bench

trial, as portions of it were in the floodplain and creek bed, potentially limiting its

usability.

              Following her death, and per the terms of the Will, the northern tract,

Tract 3, was devised to Hays. At the private auction, Hays was the highest bidder

3
 It appears some measure of distrust arose between Case and Hays leading to the minor
subdivision plat’s creation.

                                             -3-
and purchased Tract 1, the southern tract. Hays then sought to traverse Tract 2

along what has been colloquially called a “farm road,” which roughly bisects Tract

2. Case shut down this access, and Hays eventually filed suit seeking a judicial

determination that a quasi-easement exists.

             Following a bench trial on Hays’ claim, the Trial Court entered a

detailed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. We reproduce the

findings of fact, as they are pertinent to our appellate review of the legal issue:

             1. Joyce Case and her husband Richard A. Case were the
             owners of a farm in Anderson County, Kentucky which
             consists of over 380 acres. Joyce Case and Richard A.
             Case are the parents of Plaintiff Jennifer C. Hays
             (hereinafter “Jennifer”) and Richard A. Case, II
             (hereinafter “Richard”). Richard A. Case predeceased
             his wife Joyce, and Joyce became the sole owner of the
             farm in fee simple pursuant to the survivorship provision
             in the farm’s deed.

             2. Joyce executed her Last Will and Testament on March
             31, 2011. Joyce’s will sought to divide the family farm
             between her children. The Will specifically devised the
             North Parcel, known as Tract 3 during the trial and in the
             parties’ exhibits, to Jennifer and Tract 2, the South
             Parcel, was devised to Richard. Tract 1, where Joyce’s
             home was located, was subject to a private auction
             between Jennifer and Richard, and would be sold to the
             highest bidder. Jennifer was ultimately the highest
             bidder, and she and her husband are the owners of Tract
             1.

             3. Tract 1 was referred to as the “remainder” in Joyce’s
             Will, and it states in pertinent part, as follows:

                                          -4-
      (D) The remainder of the 269 acre parent tract is to
      be sold to either my daughter, Jennifer C. Hays, or
      to my son, Richard A. Case, II, at private auction
      to the highest bidder. In the event my daughter,
      Jennifer C. Hays is the purchaser, the devise to my
      son, Richard A. Case, II, above, shall be subject to
      an ingress-egress easement to access the remainder
      over the existing roadway on the property being
      devised to Richard A. Case, II, and shall further be
      subject to a deduction in area, which deduction
      shall be added to the remainder, to allow the
      remainder to be in compliance with local zoning
      by having fifty (50) feet of road frontage.

4. The Court notes that the above-cited provision of the
Will says nothing about any easement across Tract 2 to
connect Tract 1 and Tract 3. The plain language
indicates that Joyce wanted the devise of Tract 2 to be
subject to an easement (over the existing roadway) to
provide access for Tract 1.

5. The Court notes that the devise of Tract 3 to Jennifer
in Joyce’s Will specifically acknowledges that this parcel
of land is adjacent to property owned by Jennifer and her
husband Larry Hays located at 1090 General Cable
Drive. Jennifer and Larry Hays’s property north of Tract
3 is depicted on the Dan Phillips survey.

6. Tract 3 may be accessed through Jennifer and Larry
Hays adjacent property located at 1090 General Cable
Drive.

7. In May of 2016, Richard retained Dan Phillips of DPS
Land Surveyors, Inc. to survey and prepare a Plat
depicting Tracts 1, 2, and 3. Joyce Case executed a Deed
of Conveyance dated June 23, 2016 to transfer Tract 2 to
Richard, and her signature also appears on the survey
prepared by Phillips.

                           -5-
8. Richard testified that he requested that his mother
transfer the real property to him prior to her death, as
Jennifer was designated as his mother’s executrix, and he
did not trust Jennifer.

9. Jennifer testified that her mother was diagnosed with a
mass in her abdomen in March, 2016, and her mother
refused further medical treatment. Joyce Case was
placed in Hospice care in March of 2016, and she died in
November of 2016. Jennifer testified that she was not
confident in her mother’s fitness to execute the deed to
Richard given her health struggles.

10. The Plaintiffs have not asserted any claim/cause of
action that Joyce Case lacked the capacity to execute the
Deed to Richard or sign the Phillips’ plat.

11. The Deed of Conveyance for Tract 2 does not set
forth any language indicating that the land is subject to
an easement. The Deed does reference the Plat prepared
by Dan Phillips which reflects the “existing gravel lane”
which travels across part of Tract 2 to provide ingress-
egress from Highway 127 to Tract 1. The survey states
that “Tract 1 retains a 30’ foot easement for ingress and
egress along the centerline of existing gravel lane
through Tract 2.”

12. The existing gravel lane links to the 80’ foot [sic]
wide easement reflected on the survey as “80’ Access
Easement for Tract 3” at the existing entrance to the
tracts from Highway 127. This 80’ foot [sic] easement
provides Tract 3 with over fifty-feet [sic] of road
frontage. (Note: The unique contours of Tract 3 was to
ensure the road frontage required by zoning regulations.)

13. The Court finds that the Deed of Conveyance dated
June 23, 2016 to Richard and the survey that was
executed in conjunction with the Deed was consistent
with what Joyce set forth in her.Will [sic]. The survey
reflects the ingress-egress easement along the existing

                           -6-
gravel road to provide access through Tract 2 to provide
access for Tract 1, which is all that was provided for in
Joyce’s Will.

14. To access the bulk of Tract 3 from Highway 127, one
must cross over Hammonds Creek. Defendants’ Exhibit
8A depicts in color the contours of Tract 3, which shows
Tract 3 following along beside Hammonds Creek from
Highway 127, with Tract 3 being approximately 50’ foot
[sic] in width along beside the creek.

15. The Defendants point out that a person may walk or
ride a dirt bike from Tract 1 through Tract 2 to access
Tract 3 utilizing the easements set forth in the Phillips
survey. However, one cannot currently access Tract 3 by
car/truck via this same route because of trees alongside
the creek and the need to cut into the creek bank to create
a crossing.

16. The Defendants elicited testimony from the Plaintiffs
that they own a bulldozer which could perform work to
remove trees and create a crossing across the creek to
utilize the dimensions of Tract 3 and easements depicted
on Phillip’s plat for the Plaintiffs to traverse from Tract 1
to Tract 3.

17. Jennifer Hays and Larry Hays both testified that
accessing Tract 3 from Highway 127 along side the creek
bed was not practical as the area is steep and lined with
tress [sic]. Larry Hays stated that to cut a new creek
crossing would require a permit from the state Division
of Water and there was no guarantee that such permit
would be granted a [sic] Hammonds Creek is a year-
round flowing stream. (No documentation was provided
regarding the requirement of a permit from the Division
of Water.)

18. The creek is a flowing stream which is present year-
round and any path alongside the creek would be located
in the flood plain for the creek. The use and maintenance

                             -7-
of any path alongside or unimproved crossing cut in
across the creek would be impacted by the level of the
creek.

19. Plaintiffs’ suit claims that there is a well-worn “farm
road” which provides access from Tract 1 to Tract 3
through Tract 2 which should be recognized as a quasi-
easement by implication, arguing that it existed, was
manifest and obvious, and was utilized during the parties’
parents [sic] ownership of the farm prior to the division
of the property by their mother, Joyce Case. This alleged
road/easement is depicted by a pink line drawn on the
Phillips’ plat reflected in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2B and
Defendants’ Exhibits 11 and 12. (Note: The alleged
easement is not depicted on the survey plat completed by
Phillips, the pink line was added by the parties’ to depict
the location where the Plaintiffs’ [sic] claim was the
well-worn farm road.)

20. Jennifer Hays testified that her parents acquired the
farm in the 1970s and the farm road on Tract 2 was
utilized by her parents, family, farm hands, and
employees to move farm equipment and crops across the
farm property as a whole. Jennifer Hays testified that the
farm road was used continuously and that it was in
continued use after Joyce Case’s death until Richard
asked Jennifer and her family to stop using the farm road
in September of 2017.

21. Jennifer Hays’ husband Plaintiff Larry Hays testified
that he had worked on the farm when it was owned by
Jennifer’s parents, and that the farm road through Tract 2
was used to move tobacco and hay across the farm
property. Larry Hays stated that the use of the farm road
was continuous, obvious and manifest.

22. Larry Hays testified that Tract 3 can be accessed via
General Cable Drive.

                            -8-
23. Chris Wright, the Plaintiffs’ son-in-law, testified that
he had been a visitor to the land at issue for
approximately 10 years and during that time he witnessed
continuous use of the farm road by Jennifer Hays’s
parents and her family.

24. Allen Hellard, a friend of Plaintiff’s son Joshua Hays,
testified that he went hunting on the land at issue twenty
years ago, and he recalls using the farm road to access
their hunting site on Tract 2.

25. Plaintiffs’ daughter, Rebecca Wright, testified that
she recalls that the farm road has been used continuously
by her grandparents and parents for approximately thirty
years.

26. Another daughter of the Plaintiffs, Sarah Flores,
testified that she can recall her grandparents and parents
continuously using the farm road since the early 1990s.

27. Plaintiffs’ son, Joshua Hays, testified that he recalled
continuous, obvious and manifest use of the farm road by
his grandparents and parents for approximately 40 years.

28. Jennifer Hays and Richard Case’s nephew testified
that he recalled continuous use of the farm road by his
grandparents and Plaintiff and her family since he was a
young child.

29. Defendant Richard A. Case, II testified that there was
never a dedicated, obvious roadway through what
became Tract 2. Richard testified that Tract 2 was
traversed in whatever direction one wished to go and that
there was not a designated pathway. Richard
acknowledged that there was a creek crossing at the
location identified by Plaintiffs as being on the farm road
but indicated that [the] particular crossing was not the
only unimproved creek crossing.

                            -9-
            30. A Google Earth aerial photograph of the land at issue
            was entered as Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3. It is not clear when
            Google Earth captured this aerial image of the land. The
            Google Earth photograph showed what appeared to be a
            vague impression in the ground of a roadway which
            traversed through portions of Tract 2. It is not clear
            enough to determine if the vague impression of a
            roadway on the Google Earth image matches the claimed
            farm road.

            31. Gary Sharp testified that he had permission to hunt on
            Tract 2 in 2017, and that he did not observe a farm road
            on the property. Sharp did not have knowledge of the
            property prior to 2017.

            32. Scott Williams testified about visiting Tract 2 in July
            or August of 2016, and that he did not observe an
            established roadway or farm road on the property.
            Williams occasionally checks on the property for
            Richard, but had not visited the property prior to 2016.

            33. Mark Cox was contracted to cut hay for Richard on
            Tract 2 in either 2017 or 2018. Cox did not observe a
            farm road located on Tract 2. On cross-examination he
            identified a portion of the vague impression of the
            roadway depicted in the Google Earth image as where he
            brought his equipment and hay out of Tract 2. Cox
            indicated that the grass was approximately 2’ tall when
            he viewed the property and there was no roadway
            evident.

            34. Richard’s witnesses indicated that Tract 2 was
            overgrown and “wild”, and that there was not an obvious
            road or pathway present across Tract 2 when they
            observed the property in 2016 through 2018.

            The Trial Court then made conclusions of law. First, the Trial Court

rejected Hays’ argument that her Mother’s Will provided for the farm road as an

                                       -10-
express easement across Tract 2 connecting Tracts 1 and 3. The Trial Court found

that the reference to an “existing roadway” in the Will was to the 30-foot easement

across Tract 2 providing for access to the house located on Tract 1 as shown on the

Phillips’ minor plat. The Trial Court further rejected the assertion that Hays’

parents gave any express, written grant of an easement across Tract 2 for travel

between Tracts 1 and 3.

             The Trial Court then held that a quasi-easement by implication had

been created across Tract 2. The Trial Court reasoned that the aforementioned

farm road met the three requirements of Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484 (Ky.

App. 2001) for proving a quasi-easement by implication, namely: (1) there was a

separation of title from common ownership; (2) before the separation occurred

there was a use which gave rise to the easement that was so long continued,

obvious, and manifest that it must have been intended to be permanent; and (3) the

use of the claimed easement was highly convenient and beneficial to the land

conveyed. The Trial Court also found that use of the farm road was reasonably

necessary to the enjoyment of Tracts 1 and 3:

                     Herein, there was a separation of title from
             common ownership. The Plaintiffs called six witnesses
             at trial who recalled the existence and location of the
             farm road on Tract 2 which provided access from the
             area which is now identified Tract 1 to access what is
             now identified as Tract 3. The Plaintiffs’ witnesses
             testified that the farm road has been in use and existence
             from the 1970s through 2017 when Richard Case asked

                                        -11-
that Jennifer Hays and her family to cease using the farm
road. The Plaintiffs’ witnesses’ testimony was consistent
that the farm road through Tract 2 was a long continued
use which was obvious and manifest. The Court notes
that all the witnesses called on behalf of the defense,
testified that they did not observe the farm road on Tract
2 had only limited familiarity with the property and had
only been on the property from 2016 through the present
time frame. The Plaintiffs also seek to establish the
importance of the farm road to provide access to
Plaintiffs’ Tract 3. Jennifer Hays and Larry Hays have
access to Tract 3 via the property they own which has
road access via General Cable Drive. It is noted that
should Jennifer and Larry Hays ever choose to sell their
property adjacent to Tract 3, they would be able to
reserve an easement across that property to provide
access to Tract 3. The focus herein is on a route between
Tract 1 and Tract 3 through Tract 2. The property was
only separated into the three separate tracts in 2016.
According to the testimony presented by the Plaintiffs,
the farm road they seek to have recognized as a quasi-
easement was continuously utilized when the three tracts
were held under common ownership to traverse the farm
property from the entrance off Highway 127 through
what was later Tract 2 to access the portion of the farm
property which is now Tract 3. The entrance off
Highway 127 provides access to the gravel lane
(recognized as an express easement in Joyce Case’s Will
and on the Phillips’ plat) which provides access to the
house on Tract 1. Thus, with the recognition of the farm
road as a quasi-easement and the gravel lane easement,
the Plaintiffs would have access between Tract 1 and
Tract 3. The Plaintiffs’ witnesses all had great
familiarity with the farm property since it was held under
common ownership and all confirmed that the farm road
was obvious, manifest, and subject to a long continued
use. The Court finds their testimonies to be consistent,
credible and determinative that the use of the farm road
was of a continuous, permanent and apparent nature. The
Court also finds that recognizing the farm road as a

                          -12-
            quasi-easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment
            of Tracts 1 and 3. Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484,
            490 (Ky. App. 2001) provides that “reasonably
            necessary” means “more than merely convenient to the
            dominant owner, but less than a total inability to enjoy
            the property absent the use.” The Court finds that the
            farm road provides more than mere convenience to
            Tracts 1 and 3, continues the long use of the farm road,
            and provides for the beneficial enjoyment and use of
            Tracts 1 and 3 as farm land.

                   There was evidence presented about Plaintiffs
            creating an access point from U.S. Hwy 127 Bypass for
            Tract 3. In its current state, this access cannot be used as
            a practical matter because of the presence of numerous
            trees, steep land. Should a pathway be created in this
            area it would be in the flood plain alongside the creek
            which is a year-round flowing creek. The farm road has
            a creek crossing, but is not in a flood plain and was used
            when the farm was under common ownership to traverse
            across the farm property. This fact lends support to the
            third element to be established for a quasi-easement, i.e.
            that the claimed easement is highly convenient and
            beneficial to the land conveyed. The Court would agree
            that the farm road is both highly convenient and
            beneficial to the land and is reasonably necessary to the
            enjoyment of the quasi-dominant tracts, i.e. Plaintiffs’
            Tract 1 and Tract 3. Based on the foregoing, the farm
            road is hereby recognized as a quasi-easement by
            implication across Tract 2 to provide access between
            Tract 1 and Tract 3.

            The Trial Court further ordered that the width of the easement would

be 15 feet, with the centerline to be determined by a land surveyor and shown as a

recorded amendment to the previously filed, minor subdivision plat.

                                        -13-
                                         ANALYSIS

                Case raises two allegations of error on appeal. First, Case claims that

the Trial Court failed to conduct the second step in the quasi-easement analysis,

namely the five factors that are used to determine the intention of the grantor and

grantee. Second, Case claims the Trial Court made certain errors in its findings of

fact. After laying out the standard of review, we first address the factual claim and

then conduct a de novo review of the legal issue.

         I.     Standard of Review.

                Because the underlying judgment is from a bench trial, we review the

findings of fact for clear error and give “due regard . . . to the opportunity of the

trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” CR4 52.01. Clear error occurs

in factual findings when those findings are unsupported by substantial evidence.

Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003). Substantial evidence is defined

as “that which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient

probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Bowling

v. Nat. Res. and Env’t Prot. Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky. App. 1994)

(citations omitted).

                Our deference under CR 52.01 to the factual findings is largely

because it is the Trial Judge who is in the best position to observe and weigh the

4
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -14-
credibility of witnesses. Bishop v. Brock, 610 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Ky. App. 2020).

We defer to factual findings “[r]egardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the

evidence, or the fact that the reviewing court would have reached a contrary

finding[.]” Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354 (footnotes and citations omitted).

             However, the conclusions of law are not afforded deference and are

reviewed de novo. Hoskins v. Beatty, 343 S.W.3d 639, 641 (Ky. App. 2011)

(citing Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky. App. 2005)).

             Finally, because Hays was seeking an implied easement, she had “the

burden of proving the existence of the easement by clear and convincing

evidence.” Gosney, 163 S.W.3d at 901 (citations omitted). With these standards

in mind, we now review the Trial Court’s judgment.

      II.    The Trial Court’s Factual Findings Were Supported by
             Substantial Evidence.

             Case claims that the Trial Court misstated the facts as they relate to

the express, written easements on the minor subdivision plat. Case requests that

we vacate and remand for the Trial Court to re-address the inconsistency. Hays

responds that Case errs by reading the Trial Court’s conclusions out of context.

We find that while the language used in the Trial Court’s opinion could lead to

some confusion, its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and do

not warrant vacating and remanding for additional findings of fact.

                                        -15-
             In the Trial Court’s conclusions of law, the Trial Court was discussing

whether there was any express, written easement or any understanding that Mother

intended the farm road to serve as an access easement across Tract 2. The Trial

Court reviewed the minor subdivision plat and the deed for Tract 2 and concluded

no easement was created by express, written grant. We believe that such statement

is not a conclusion of law, but a finding of fact, and it is erroneous if unsupported

by substantial evidence. Here, the minor subdivision plat clearly shows an “80’

ACCESS EAEMENT [sic] FOR TRACT 3, EXISTING ENTRANCE TO HWY

127” access easements across Tract 2 and adjacent to US 127 that would constitute

an express access easement between Tracts 1 and 3. However, the Trial Court

correctly concluded that the farm road was not an express easement, as it is not

shown on the minor subdivision plat, not included in the deed conveying Tract 2,

and not included in the Will. Thus, to the extent that the Trial Court found that the

farm road did not constitute an express easement, such finding is supported by

substantial evidence.

             However, and this is the part where the confusion lies, if the Trial

Court’s judgment reads that there was no express access easement at all, such

finding is not supported by substantial evidence. The minor subdivision plat

clearly shows an access easement connecting Tracts 1 and 3 across Tract 2

adjacent to US 127. However, any alleged, factual error on this basis is a non

                                         -16-
sequitur, as the underlying issue regards a quasi-easement, not an express

easement, and the Trial Court simply concluded that there is no express easement

for the farm road. Moreover, the Trial Court’s factual findings described the

express access easement and the challenges inherent with using it. The parties do

not dispute that this access easement exists on the minor subdivision plat, and the

Trial Court’s order does not alter this express easement in any way. Thus, with

this clearer picture of the existing, express easement, we can proceed to a de novo

review of the legal conclusions.

       III.   The Trial Court’s Legal Conclusions Were Erroneous.

              The principal issue before us is whether the Trial Court correctly held

that there existed a quasi-easement across Tract 2 where the commonly referred to

farm road previously existed. We review this conclusion of law de novo.

              “Generally, an easement may be created by express written grant,

implication, prescription or estoppel.” Gosney, 163 S.W.3d at 899 (citation

omitted). A quasi-easement is one of two types of easements that are created by

implication. Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky. App. 2001).5 Quasi-

easements arise “upon a severance of the ownership” after one owner of a tract of

land or two or more adjoining parcels previously used one part such that another

5
 The other easement by implication is an easement or way by necessity. Carroll, 59 S.W.3d at
489. Such easement is not before us.

                                            -17-
part of the land derived a benefit from it of a “continuous, permanent and apparent

nature, and reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the quasi-dominant

portion[.]” Kreamer v. Harmon, 336 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Ky. App. 1960) (citations

omitted).

             A quasi-easement is not borne out of an express, written grant.

Instead, “[t]his theory is based on a legal inference that the original owner intended

to create an easement in favor of one section of his realty.” Cole v. Gilvin, 59

S.W.3d 468, 476 (Ky. App. 2001). “When finding an easement by implication,

courts in effect infer an unarticulated intention by the owner of property that a

particular use of one portion of the property for the benefit of another portion be

continued although one or both segments of the whole are conveyed away.” Bob’s

Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Weaver, 569 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Ky. App. 1978).

             Analyzing whether a quasi-easement exists involves a two-step

process. The first step requires a party to satisfy either two or three threshold

elements before proceeding to the second step. For example, in Bob’s Ready to

Wear, there were two “prerequisites” – common ownership and initiation of use

prior to severance – that had to be established prior to an analysis of at least five

“factors” weighing the intentions of the grantor and grantee in impliedly

establishing an easement. Those “factors” in the second step were:

                    Among the factors bearing upon the intention of
             the grantor and grantee are the following: (1) whether

                                          -18-
               the claimant is the grantor or the grantee of the dominant
               tract; (2) the extent of necessity of the easement to the
               claimant; (3) whether reciprocal benefits accrue to both
               the grantor and grantee; (4) the manner in which the land
               was used prior to conveyance; and (5) whether the prior
               use was or might have been known to the parties to the
               present litigation.

569 S.W.2d at 718-19 (citations omitted).

               In like vein, there were three threshold elements in Carroll that had to

be proven in the first step:

               (1) that there was a separation of title from common
               ownership; (2) that before the separation occurred the use
               which gave rise to the easement was so long continued,
               obvious, and manifest that it must have been intended to
               be permanent; and, (3) that the use of the claimed
               easement was highly convenient and beneficial to the
               land conveyed.

Carroll, 59 S.W.3d at 490 (citing Evanik v. Janus, 458 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. App.

1983), and Bob’s Ready to Wear, supra). Once those three elements were proven,

Carroll likewise proceeded with a review of the five Bob’s Ready to Wear factors

to determine the intentions of the parties. 6

6
  Hays argues that one only need satisfy the first step in order to establish a quasi-easement by
implication. Hays cites to one published case, Cole, supra, to support this argument. However,
Cole does not support Hays’ argument, as it laid out the factors from both steps and stopped after
the first step, finding no quasi-easement existed because the alleged easement was seldom used,
not maintained, and in poor condition. Thus, if the first-step elements are not met, only then may
one terminate the analysis.

                                              -19-
             Though worded differently, there is no substantive difference between

the first-step elements in Bob’s Ready to Wear and Carroll. The latter contains a

third element or prerequisite – that the use was highly convenient and beneficial to

the land conveyed. That element was derived from our Court’s reliance on Evanik,

but that element is not in discord with Bob’s Ready to Wear or our

Commonwealth’s jurisprudence on quasi-easements. That element is a portion of

one of the five factors in the second step, and its inclusion as a pre-requisite or

threshold finding in the two-step analysis serves a valuable purpose of weeding out

meritless claims. Accordingly, it is a distinction without a difference to use either

the two prerequisites or the three elements in the first step of the analysis.

             Once those prerequisites or elements are proven, though, the Trial

Court must then analyze the parties’ intentions under the factors of Bob’s Ready to

Wear. Indeed, the intent of the parties is critical to the analysis, as a quasi-

easement “derives solely from the implied intent of the parties[.]” Carroll, 59

S.W.3d at 490-91. That intention must be analyzed from the fixed point in time of

when the ownership was severed. “Because a quasi-easement involves the

intentions of the parties, the date the unity of ownership ceases by severance is the

point of reference in ascertaining whether an easement has been imposed upon

adjoining land.” Id. at 490 (footnote omitted). Courts should cautiously find

implied easements, as “[e]asements are not favored and the party claiming the right

                                          -20-
to an easement bears the burden of establishing all the requirements for

recognizing the easement.” Id. at 489-90 (footnote omitted).

              With this two-part test in mind, we now turn to Case’s claim of error.

Case argues that the Trial Court erroneously concluded that a quasi-easement

existed because it did not fully conduct the second step of the two-step analysis.

Case requests that we vacate and remand the case for the Trial Court to review all

five factors of the second step. Hays responds with multiple arguments. First,

Hays notes that Case does not contest that the evidence was insufficient to

establish the first step of the analysis. Second, Hays argues that because Case did

not move the Trial Court pursuant to CR 52.04 for findings regarding the second

step of the analysis, and because Case’s brief does not contain a preservation

statement, Case has not preserved his argument and has waived the same. Finally,

Hays notes that even had the Trial Court conducted the second step of the analysis,

it would have nonetheless reached the same conclusion.

              As it relates to Hays’ argument that Case is not contesting the first

step of the analysis, we agree. Case’s argument only relates to the second step of

the analysis. Thus, we are not reviewing whether Hays met her burden of proof on

the first step of the analysis.

              As it relates to Hays’ argument that Case has not complied with the

procedural requirements for appellate review of this issue, we hold that any

                                         -21-
deficiencies were not fatal to appellate review. While Case’s brief does not

contain a preservation statement, it does cite to the judgment, and his argument is

that the judgment is devoid of the second step of the analysis. We do not condone

failures to comply with our briefing rules, but we nonetheless have the discretion

to ignore any deficiency and proceed with review. Ford v. Commonwealth, 628

S.W.3d 147, 154 (Ky. 2021). See also Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky.

App. 2010). Here, the brief contains ample citations to the record and case law,

and because the argument concerns a missing analysis, it would be challenging

indeed to cite to where in the judgment something is not. We may in other

circumstances hold differently, but in this case we elect to analyze the underlying

issue.

              Likewise, we do not find any CR 52.04 error. CR 52.04 “requires a

party to object to the lack of a finding of fact . . . [if] the court fails to include an

essential fact that would make a judgment complete.” Anderson v. Johnson, 350

S.W.3d 453, 458 (Ky. 2011) (emphasis omitted). As shown above, the Trial Court

made extensive factual findings. Case’s argument relates not to the factual

findings, nor to a missing essential fact that would make the judgment complete,

but, rather, to the legal conclusions derived from those factual findings. We

review those legal conclusions de novo on appeal. Indeed, in Knight v. Shell, 313

Ky. 852, 233 S.W.2d 973 (1950), which adopted the five factors, the Court did not

                                            -22-
remand for the Trial Court to make additional findings to resolve the issue; it

simply reviewed those factors. We thus proceed with our de novo review using the

appropriate legal test.

             Under the second step of the quasi-easement analysis, we analyze five

factors to determine whether the parties intended an easement to be created when

the severance occurred. Accordingly, the date of severance is important. Here,

Mother severed the land when she created the minor subdivision plat and conveyed

Tract 2 to Case. The land was further severed months later as the Will devised

Tract 3 to Hays. Finally, the land was completely severed when Hays purchased

Tract 1. With these timeframes in mind, we analyze the five factors.

             The first factor is whether the claimant is the grantor or grantee of the

dominant tract. This factor is significant because courts are more lenient toward

grantees, as grantors have more control over the language that is included in their

deeds of conveyance. Carroll, 59 S.W.3d at 490. In the instant case, the claimant,

Hays, is not the grantor, but she is not similarly situated to many grantees because

when she elected to purchase Tract 1, she knew that the recorded, minor

subdivision plat only showed an express easement from Tract 1 to Tract 3 near US

127. She also knew or should reasonably have known that there was no express,

written easement across Tract 2 for the farm road. Furthermore, she knew that her

Mother’s Will would only give her an easement across Tract 2 for purposes of

                                         -23-
accessing Tract 1, not Tract 3. Thus, while Hays was a devisee or grantee of

Tracts 1 and 3, she became such only after the die had already been cast about

Tract 2 with no express easement relating to the farm road in any document.

Accordingly, this factor weighs against finding that a quasi-easement exists for the

farm road.

             The second factor is the extent of necessity of the easement to the

claimant. Necessity in this sense is reasonable necessity, not strict necessity, but it

does mean “more than merely convenient to the dominant owner, but less than a

total inability to enjoy the property absent the use.” Carroll, 59 S.W.3d at 490.

The Trial Court found this factor weighed in favor of finding a quasi-easement

exists. We hold that this factor weighs both for and against granting a quasi-

easement.

             Weighing against granting a quasi-easement is the fact that Mother’s

Will devised Tract 3 to Hays because it adjoined the real property Hays already

owned, thus providing Hays with access to Tract 3. Furthermore, the minor

subdivision plat permitted 50 feet of roadway frontage in front of US 127 for Tract

3, in addition to providing an 80-foot-wide access easement across Tract 2 near US

127. The minor subdivision plat also connected the aforementioned easement to an

access easement from Tract 1 to Tract 2 near US 127. Accordingly, when Hays

                                         -24-
purchased Tract 1, she already had access to Tract 3 by three means: her property;

US 127; and an access easement across Tract 2.

             Weighing in favor of granting a quasi-easement is the substantial

evidence presented that the existence of floodplain and a “year-round” stream on

the 80-foot access easement rendered access from Tract 1 to Tract 3 challenging if

not impossible at certain times. Additionally, Hays presented substantial evidence

that constructing a vehicular crossing would be challenging if not impossible over

the express access easement. Furthermore, she presented substantial evidence that

it would be challenging and potentially dangerous to take farm implements on US

127 if such path was necessary to take to get between Tracts 1 and 3. Accordingly,

none of the evidence established that there was a total inability to use the property

without the farm road, and while some of the evidence showed that the farm road

was simply a convenient access, other evidence showed the opposite. Thus, the

necessity element weighs both for and against finding a quasi-easement exists for

the farm road.

             The third factor is whether reciprocal benefits accrue to both the

grantor and grantee. This factor weighs heavily against finding a quasi-easement

exists for the farm road. As was noted in Knight in analyzing this factor, “Where

the grantor makes simultaneous conveyances, the inference is strong that the

grantor intends that privileges of use shall exist among the various grantees[.]”

                                         -25-
313 Ky. 852, 233 S.W.2d at 856. Here, there were no simultaneous conveyances.

First, Mother conveyed Tract 2 to Case, referencing a minor plat that shows

separate easements for Tract 3 and Tract 1 across Tract 2 and providing access to

US 127 for each tract. Months later, Mother passed, and her Will devised Tract 3

to Hays, providing her with two means of access to Tract 3 – through her existing

real property and through the easement along US 127 in the aforementioned minor

plat. Hays chose to purchase Tract 1, obtaining per her Mother’s Will an access

easement across Tract 2. As each conveyance or devise occurred separately and

provided means of access, it does not appear that Mother intended reciprocal

benefits. Moreover, any reciprocal benefits did not accrue simultaneously for all

three tracts.

                The reciprocal benefits analysis also looks toward potential future

development and the effects a quasi-easement might have on it. In Bob’s Ready to

Wear, which involved access to a business from a parking lot, the immediate

reciprocal benefits were palpable and substantial and served to “enhance[] the

purchase price paid” and “attract customers to the parking lot thereby enhancing

the value of that property.” 569 S.W.2d at 719. That reciprocal benefit was not

prospective, though, as imposition of a quasi-easement “would be an extremely

heavy burden impeding any future development of this valuable city property.” Id.

at 719-20. In the instant case, the farm road ostensibly bisects Tract 2. The benefit

                                           -26-
appears to be solely for Tracts 1 and 3 and could significantly burden future

development of Tract 2. Accordingly, the reciprocal benefits analysis weighs

against granting a quasi-easement for the farm road.

             The fourth factor analyzes the manner in which the land was used

prior to the conveyance. This factor alone weighs heavily in favor of granting a

quasi-easement for the farm road. Hays presented ample testimony, and the Trial

Court likewise found that the farm road had been used to cross the property for

many years. Moreover, the Trial Court found that for almost a year after the

conveyance and after Mother passed away, the farm road was used on Tract 2. We

have reviewed the trial and note that these factual findings are supported by

substantial evidence; thus, we do not disturb them on appeal even though there was

contrary evidence presented.

             The fifth factor is whether the prior use was or might have been

known to the parties. Hays and her witnesses presented ample testimony that the

use was known. Case testified that there was not one specific path, but he did

admit that he knew that the area in what is now Tract 2 was frequently crossed to

access Tracts 1 and 3. As the Trial Court found, Case testified that “Tract 2 was

traversed in whatever direction one wished to go and that there was not a

designated pathway. Richard acknowledged that there was a creek crossing at the

location identified by Plaintiffs as being on the farm road but indicated that the

                                         -27-
particular crossing was not the only unimproved creek crossing.” Accordingly,

this factor weighs somewhat in favor of finding that a quasi-easement exists.

             Thus, the five factors weigh both against and in favor of finding a

quasi-easement. While the Trial Court emphasized the finding of prior use, that is

neither the only, nor the pre-eminent factor. Ultimately, this case turns on

necessity, the “most important” factor, Cole, 59 S.W.3d at 477, along with

intention and reciprocal benefits. The necessity element only looks at reasonable

necessity, not strict necessity. Nonetheless, even a finding that a portion of the

land becomes “virtually useless” and results in the grantee suffering future

monetary damages is not in and of itself sufficient to find a quasi-easement,

especially where there are other means of access. See, e.g., Bob’s Ready To Wear,

569 S.W.2d at 719-20.

             Here the land is far from useless. The evidence showed multiple

points of access to both Tracts 1 and 3. The Trial Court made such factual

findings, and those are supported by substantial evidence. Likewise, the Trial

Court noted that though there was some work that had to be done to create more

accessible crossings in the existing easements, there was testimony that Hays owns

“a bulldozer which could perform work to remove trees and create a crossing

across the creek[.]” Cf. Knight, 313 Ky. 852, 233 S.W.2d 973 (finding no

necessity when the cost for constructing a new road was substantially less than the

                                         -28-
value of the real property). While there may be some challenges in moving farm

equipment between the two tracts, there still exists some reasonable access without

the farm road. And Hays has ample ability to create more access without imposing

the significant burden she wishes to place on Case and Tract 2 with her suggested,

one-sided solution.

            Furthermore, any reasonable necessity is wholly negated by the

intention and reciprocal benefits factors. The evidence is unrefuted that Mother

clearly did not intend to have the farm road become an access easement, and that

she could have done so easily had she so wished. To the contrary, Mother’s Will

devised Tract 3 to Hays, with access to Tract 3 from Hays’ pre-existing property.

Further, Mother’s express intention in the minor subdivision plat and grant to Case

was to convey Tract 2 with access for Tract 3 to US 127 and an access easement

for Tract 1 across Tract 2. That access easement could later provide access for

Tracts 3 and 1 across Tract 2 using the 80-foot express access easement, should

Hays ultimately purchase Tract 1. The intention is plain – the farm road is not the

intended access easement for Tracts 1 and 3.

            Likewise, bisecting Tract 2 with an access easement undercuts the

reciprocal benefits factor. An access easement along the farm road is a substantial

present and future burden on Tract 2. Accordingly, the factors weigh heavily

against granting a quasi-easement for the farm road. The Trial Court’s conclusion

                                        -29-
to the contrary must be vacated and remanded for entry of a judgment in

conformity with this Opinion.

                                  CONCLUSION

             We reiterate that “[e]asements are not favored and the party claiming

the right to an easement bears the burden of establishing all the requirements for

recognizing the easement.” Carroll, 59 S.W.3d at 489-90 (footnote omitted). In

the instant case, Hays did not wholly establish each of the five factors in the

second step. Moreover, given Mother’s expressed intentions did not include access

via the farm road, and the law favors not granting easements, we hold that the Trial

Court erred by concluding a quasi-easement existed. Accordingly, we vacate and

remand for entry of a judgment in conformity with this Opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

 David M. Ward                             Stewart C. Burch
 Winchester, Kentucky                      Frankfort, Kentucky

                                           William L. Patrick
                                           Lawrenceburg, Kentucky

                                         -30-