Court Opinion

ID: 9663000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:25:38.006468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.694617
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
The issue is prevarication, not prostitution.
“The character of a witness for truthfulness or mendacity is relevant circumstantial evidence on the question of the truth of particular testimony of the witness.” McCormick on Evidence § 41 at 89 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Therefore, Rule 608(2), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-608(2) (Reissue 1979), permits cross-examination through use of a specific instance of a witness’ conduct to demonstrate the truthful or untruthful character of the witness. Cf., United States v. Nogueira, 585 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Estell, 539 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1976) (application of Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)). Under Rule 608(2) a cross-examiner can question a witness about a specific instance which adversely reflects on the witness’ character for truthfulness. Previous misconduct may discredit a witness, when such misconduct has probative value that the witness is not one to be believed.
*592In determining whether to allow cross-examination to impeach credibility through use of a specific instance of a witness’ misconduct, the following factors should be considered in measuring the scope of cross-examination: (1) The relevance of the misconduct to a witness’ truthfulness; (2) The importance of the testimony to the cross-examiner’s case; and (3) The danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay raised by the evidence intended to be adduced in cross-examination. United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715 (4th Cir. 1981); McCormick on Evidence § 42 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Some other factors affecting cross-examination are found in Rule 611, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-611 (Reissue 1979) (mode of interrogation during cross-examination), and Rule 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 1979) (overriding protection afforded by the balancing test regarding relevancy and unfair prejudice), of the Nebraska Evidence Rules.
Was testifying falsely under oath relevant to Davis’ truthfulness? A witness’ response to the question whether that witness has told the truth on a previous occasion could well be probative of the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1980). See, also, United States v. Cole, 617 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1980); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 982 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970). Disdain for truth in sworn testimony and deliberate disregard of obligatory veracity consequent to an oath are probative of a witness’ untruthfulness.
Was existence of Davis’ previous falsehood important to Williams’ case? Davis was the State’s principal witness, the only eyewitness, and Williams’ accuser. Existence of incriminating fact or inference was related to Davis’ credibility, perhaps even in direct proportion. As a very practical matter, conviction or acquittal depended on the jury’s assessment of Davis’ credibility.
. When placed on a balance, the final factor — the danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay — is outweighed by the importance of cross-examination in the present case. If Davis admitted she had testified falsely at Williams’ preliminary hearing, impeachment of her credibility would have been *593finished and the trial would have moved on, with the jury-taking the admission of falsehood into account when evaluating Davis’ credibility. No minitrial or further questioning on Davis’ credibility was needed if the specific instance of Davis’ previous falsehood was conceded. On the other hand, were Davis to deny her previous falsehood, there still would have been no great amount of time lost, because Williams was not entitled to present extrinsic evidence in the form of rebuttal evidence to contradict Davis’ denial of falsehood. Rule 608(2). See, also, State v. Tainter, 218 Neb. 855, 359 N.W.2d 795 (1984). However, in Williams’ case the trial court prevented Williams from even asking the question about Davis’ previous falsehood. What would have been Davis’ response is absolute speculation.
It is “extrinsic evidence” on credibility that is prohibited by Rule 608(2), not cross-examination to impeach credibility by an attack from the appropriate base, namely, evidence probative of untruthfulness. When we enter an era wherein an oath of a witness becomes just whimsical words in some perfunctory promise to tell the truth, perhaps then, and only then, will a witness’ falsehood under oath be an insignificant index to test or doubt a witness’ credibility. In prohibiting Williams’ cross-examination into Davis’ character for veracity, the trial court abused its discretion. Williams was prevented from exercising his right of cross-examination as a fundamental requirement in a fair trial. See State v. Thaden, 210 Neb. 622, 316 N.W.2d 317 (1982). A new trial should be granted.
White, J., joins in this dissent.