Court Opinion

ID: 9939543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:27.933012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:24.326349
License: Public Domain

J-S37020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.S., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: A.S., MINOR                       :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 3180 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered November 9, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-JV-0000511-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2024

       A.S., a minor,1 appeals from the dispositional order entered following

his adjudication of delinquency for acts constituting aggravated assault,

conspiracy, terroristic threats, simple assault, and recklessly endangering

another person (“REAP”).2 We affirm.

       The factual and procedural history of this case is as follows: In April of

2022, A.P. (“the victim”) was at his girlfriend’s home when he observed a

group of juveniles approaching the house. See N.T., 9/9/22, at 6-9. The

victim went outside and asked the juveniles what they wanted; A.S. told him

to send the girlfriend’s young nephew outside. See id. at 9-10. The victim

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1 A.S. was fourteen at the time of the incident.     See N.T., 11/9/22, at 6.

2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 903, 2706(a)(1), 2701(a), and 2706.
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asked what was happening, but A.S. refused to answer and, using foul

language, demanded the victim send out the boy. See id. When the victim

refused, A.S. said he was going to “have somebody come here and shoot this

whole block and this house up.” Id. at 11.

      A.S., while talking on his cell phone, walked with his friends to a corner

store. See id. at 12. While staring at the victim, A.S. made and received

multiple cell phone calls to the same number over a twenty-five-minute span.

See id. at 12-14; Commonwealth’s Exhibits C-21A and C-21B. Soon after, a

white car with tinted windows pulled up near A.S.        See id. at 14.    A.S.

approached the car and spoke with the occupants for approximately five

minutes. See id. at 16. A.S. walked away from the car and yelled at the

victim that people “better get in the house, something bad is about to

happen.” Id. A.S. began to leave the scene as the car drove by the victim.

See id. at 16-17. One of the occupants yelled, “Is there a problem, pussy!?”

and shot the victim in the leg, seriously injuring him. Id. at 16-18.

      Portions of the incident were witnessed by the victim’s girlfriend and her

parents. Further, most of the incident was captured on video. An adjudicatory

hearing took place on September 9, 2022. The Commonwealth presented the

testimony of the victim and three other witnesses, as well as A.S.’s cell phone

records, the videos, crime scene photos, and the victim’s medical records.

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A.S. did not testify and did not present any evidence. At the close of the

hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated A.S. delinquent of the above offenses.

The juvenile court ordered a behavioral health evaluation (“BHE”).            In

accordance with the BHE’s recommendations, the probation office attempted

to find a structured non-residential placement for A.S., but was unsuccessful

because of “the seriousness of the crime[,]” and A.S.’s youth. Juvenile Court

Opinion, 2/8/23, at 15; see also N.T., 11/9/22, at 5-6. The juvenile court

therefore issued a dispositional order calling for state placement. A.S. filed a

timely post-dispositional motion, which the juvenile court denied. This timely

appeal followed.3

       A.S. raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a
          matter of law to sustain the verdicts of guilty for the crimes of
          aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit aggravated assault,
          terroristic threats, simple assault, and [REAP]?

       2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was against the weight
          of the evidence to sustain the verdicts of guilty for the crimes
          of aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit aggravated
          assault, terroristic threats, simple assault, and [REAP]?

       3. Whether the disposition imposed was an abuse of discretion?

A.S.’s Brief at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

____________________________________________

3 A.S. and the juvenile court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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      In his first issue, A.S. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. See

A.S.’s Brief at 11-21. This Court’s review of such claims in an adjudication of

delinquency setting is well settled:

      [w]hen a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a
      crime if committed by an adult, the Commonwealth must establish
      the elements of the crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
      When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
      following an adjudication of delinquency, we must review the
      entire record and view the evidence in the light most favorable to
      the Commonwealth.

             In determining whether the Commonwealth presented
      sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, the test to be
      applied is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
      favorable to the Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable
      inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to find every
      element of the crime charged. The Commonwealth may sustain
      its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
      reasonable doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.

            The facts and circumstances established by the
      Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with a
      defendant’s innocence. Questions of doubt are for the hearing
      judge, unless the evidence is so weak that, as a matter of law, no
      probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances
      established by the Commonwealth.

In re V.C., 66 A.3d 341, 348–49 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

      A juvenile may be adjudicated delinquent for conspiracy if “with the

intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (1) agrees with such

other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in

conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit

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such crime; or (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning

or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such

crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a).

      To prove the existence of a criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth

must demonstrate the juvenile: “(1) entered an agreement to commit or aid

in an unlawful act with another person or persons, (2) with a shared a criminal

intent and, (3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 409-10 (Pa. 2018) (citations

omitted). “Once the conspiracy is established beyond a reasonable doubt, a

conspirator can be convicted of both the conspiracy and the substantive

offense that served as the illicit objective of the conspiracy.”     Id. at 410

(citations omitted).   Moreover, the essence of criminal conspiracy is the

agreement between co-conspirators. We have explained:

      [M]ere association with the perpetrators, mere presence at the
      scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is insufficient to establish
      that a defendant was part of a conspiratorial agreement to commit
      the crime. There needs to be some additional proof that the
      defendant intended to commit the crime along with his co-
      conspirator. Direct evidence of the defendant’s criminal intent or
      the conspiratorial agreement, however, is rarely available.
      Consequently, the defendant’s intent as well as the agreement is
      almost always proven through circumstantial evidence, such as by
      the relations, conduct or circumstances of the parties or overt acts
      on the part of the co-conspirators. Once the trier of fact finds that
      there was an agreement and the defendant intentionally entered
      into the agreement, that defendant may be liable for the overt

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      acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of
      which co-conspirator committed the act.

Commonwealth v. Golphin, 161 A.3d 1009, 1018–19 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations omitted).

      A juvenile may be adjudicated delinquent for aggravated assault if he

“(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting

extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a).

“Serious bodily injury” is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial

risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted

loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” See 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. Lastly, “[w]hen a victim actually sustains serious bodily

injury, the Commonwealth can, but does not necessarily have to, establish

specific intent to cause such harm.” Commonwealth v. Sinkiewicz, 293

A.3d 681, 690 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).          A juvenile may be

adjudicated delinquent for simple assault if he, “(1) attempts to cause or

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]” 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2701.

      A juvenile may be adjudicated delinquent for REAP if he: “recklessly

engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of

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death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. “[REAP] requires the

creation of danger, so the Commonwealth must prove the existence of an

actual present ability to inflict harm to another.” Commonwealth v. Shaw,

203 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      A juvenile may be adjudicated delinquent for terroristic threats if he:

“communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to . . . commit any crime

of violence with intent to terrorize another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1). An

individual acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense

when “it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause

such a result[.]”    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1)(i).      Therefore, to sustain a

conviction for terroristic threats, the evidence must demonstrate: “(1) the

defendant made a threat to commit a crime of violence; and (2) such threat

was communicated with the intent of terrorizing another or with reckless

disregard for the risk of causing terror.” In the Interest of L.A., 853 A.2d

388, 391-92 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

      Before proceeding to the merits of A.S.’s sufficiency arguments, we

must first determine whether he has preserved them for our review.

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) provides in a statement of

matters complained of on appeal, an appellant “shall concisely identify each

error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the

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issue to be raised for the judge,” and issues that are not properly raised

are deemed waived.         Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii), (vii).    This Court has

repeatedly stated:

      In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
      on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must state
      with specificity the element or elements [of the challenged
      offense] upon which the appellant alleges that the
      evidence was insufficient. Such specificity is of particular
      importance in cases where . . . an appellant was convicted of
      multiple crimes[,] each of which contains numerous elements that
      the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted,

emphasis added).

      Here, the juvenile court adjudicated A.S. delinquent for five separate

crimes, each of which contained numerous elements. In his Rule 1925(b)

Statement, A.S. simply included a general list of the offenses and failed to

specify which elements of each offense he was challenging for lack of sufficient

evidence. See Statement of [Errors] Complained of on Appeal, 12/21/22, at

1 (unnumbered). Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that A.S. waived

his sufficiency issue. See In Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d at 1189.

      Even absent waiver, however, A.S.’s claim would not merit relief. The

juvenile court adjudicated A.S. delinquent for acts which would constitute

conspiracy, aggravated assault, simple assault, REAP, and terroristic threats.

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A.S. argues there was “insufficient evidence as a matter of law to show an

‘agreement’ required by law between [A.S.] and the unidentified assailant” to

support his adjudication of conspiracy and the derivative offenses. A.S.’s Brief

at 9. A.S. maintains the evidence was insufficient to sustain his adjudication

for terroristic threats because his statements to the victim are “best

characterized as transitory anger” and “spur-of-the-moment threat[s] due to

his childish immaturity.”    Id.   Lastly, A.S. contends the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his adjudication for REAP because it was not his “direct

conduct which created the danger to [the victim] but rather the criminal acts

of an unknown individual whom [A.S.] had no influence nor control upon.” Id.

      Here, in concluding the evidence was sufficient to sustain the

adjudication of delinquency with respect to conspiracy, aggravated assault,

simple assault, and REAP, the juvenile court explained:

      [T]he evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial[] was
      overwhelming[.] . . . It is indisputable [the victim] suffered
      serious bodily injury. The testimony of [the victim] himself, his
      medical records, and photos of the crime scene establish
      substantial loss of blood, and protracted loss or impairment of a
      bodily member, namely his left leg. [The victim] testified when
      asked about his crutches, that his doctors have told him he may
      never walk normally again. He endured multiple surgeries and
      months after the incident still had metal plates and screws in his
      leg to hold his bone together following the shooting injury.
      Because it is clear [the victim] suffered serious bodily injury, the
      Commonwealth did not need to prove specific intent. Regardless,
      multiple witnesses testified [A.S.] said he would have the block

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     and [the victim’s] home “shot up.”               While making these
     statements, [A.S.] was observed taking out his cell phone and
     placing a call. Eyewitnesses, video footage, and cell phone
     records corroborate this fact. Following the phone call, an
     unknown white vehicle approached [A.S.]. Someone in the
     vehicle had a brief exchange with [A.S.].             [A.S.] yelled []
     “something bad is about to happen” when walking away from the
     car, and then [the victim was] shot by someone inside the vehicle.
     The evidence presented demonstrated to the [juvenile] court
     [A.S.] entered [] a conspiracy with the individual(s) in the white
     vehicle. [A.S.] summon[ed] the conspirators in the white vehicle
     by making multiple phone calls, [met and spoke] with the
     individual(s) inside the white vehicle, and finally yell[ed] out that
     something bad [was] about to happen while distancing himself
     from the car. Immediately thereafter, gun shots rang out from
     the white vehicle and [the victim] suffer[ed] a gunshot wound.
     Since an overt act which constitutes a crime was committed, the
     Commonwealth satisfied the three elements [of conspiracy] as
     required by law. Because defendants are culpable for the acts of
     their co-conspirators, even if [A.S.] is not the one who shot the
     gun, he remains guilty of aggravated [and simple] assault due to
     the acts of his co-conspirator(s). [The victim] suffered serious
     bodily injury as a direct result of the shot fired by a gun in a vehicle
     with which [A.S.] had contact mere moments before.                  The
     combined evidence of credible witnesses, surveillance footage,
     medical, and cell phone records, proved beyond a reasonable
     doubt that the offenses of aggravated assault[, simple assault,]
     and conspiracy to commit the same were substantiated.

                                     ****

           In the instant case, it is clear [A.S.] possessed a reckless
     mindset, as the use of a weapon is routinely used to cause death
     or great injury and yet he still sought out an individual to inflict
     such harm on [the victim]. . . . By summoning the conspirator(s)
     to the scene, [A.S.] created substantial and unjustifiable risk of
     great danger for [the victim]. . . . The fact [the victim] was so
     severely injured is indisputable. . . . The record established all
     three elements of REAP.

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Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/8/23, at 9, 13 (citations to the record omitted).

      The juvenile court also found the evidence sufficient to sustain the

adjudication for terroristic threats, stating:

      [M]ultiple eyewitnesses credibly testified [A.S.] verbally in-person
      communicated threats of violence toward the [victim]. [A.S.] and
      [the victim] engaged in a verbal altercation prior to the threat
      being made. [A.S.] stated to [the victim] that he would have both
      his home and the block “shot up” with the intent to terrorize [the
      victim].    [A.S.] consciously disregarded a substantial and
      unjustifiable risk. [A.S.] not only verbally communicated his
      threat, but subsequently carried out his threats by planning and
      aiding his conspirator(s) in the white vehicle [in shooting the
      victim].    The record shows [A.S.] was [] aware of the
      unreasonableness of his own actions, when he yelled out on
      location that something bad was about to happen while distancing
      himself from the shooter inside the white vehicle. [A.S.] was also
      well aware that gunshots are inherently violent and likely to cause
      substantial psychological distress to the witnesses when he made
      verbal threats prior to the shooting. . . . [T]he Commonwealth
      established its burden beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 10-11 (record citations omitted).

      Following our thorough review of the record and the law, we conclude

both support the trial court’s determination that the evidence was sufficient

to sustain A.S.’s convictions for conspiracy, aggravated assault, simple

assault, REAP, and terroristic threats. Thus, even if not waived, A.S.’s first

issue would not merit relief. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 253 A.3d

346, 347-48 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding statement made during an argument

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between a contractor and homeowner that if the victim did not give the

contractor money for supplies, he would “finish” him was not a mere

statement made in anger but was sufficient to sustain a conviction for

terroristic threats where contractor later hit the homeowner in the head with

a tire iron); Commonwealth v. Rosario, 248 A.3d 599, 611-12 (Pa. Super.

2021) (holding the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for

conspiracy and aggravated assault, where appellant and a co-conspirator

communicated by cell phone regarding the victims’ location, they then met

and communicated in person, appellant made verbal threats against the

victim,   and   was   present   when     a   co-conspirator   shot   the   victim);

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation

omitted) (noting the act of pointing a loaded gun at a person is sufficient to

support a conviction for REAP).

      A.S. next argues his adjudication of delinquency was against the weight

of the evidence. Our standard of review is settled:

      [A]n allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A true
      weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence
      exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be
      believed.

           Where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below,
      an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying question
      of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

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      Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court
      palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

             Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and
      see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the
      gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
      trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
      assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower
      court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the
      weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in
      the interest of justice. This does not mean that the exercise of
      discretion by the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
      new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is
      unfettered. In describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we
      have explained, the term “discretion” imports the exercise of
      judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
      conclusion within the framework of the law[] and is not exercised
      for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion
      must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to
      prejudice, personal motivations, caprice[,] or arbitrary actions.
      Discretion is abused where the course pursued represents not
      merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is
      manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where
      the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice,
      bias or ill-will.

            In sum, the juvenile court should reverse an adjudication of
      delinquency when it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock
      one’s sense of justice and the award of a new hearing is imperative
      so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.

Interest of D.J.K., 303 A.3d 499, 506 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal citations,

quotation marks, and some brackets omitted; paragraph indentation altered).

      A.S. complains the victim’s testimony was “void of credibility” because

the victim had a prior conviction for burglary. A.S.’s Brief at 10. He further

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argues the victim’s testimony was “repeatedly incongruent”4 with the video

presented by the Commonwealth. Id.

       The juvenile court considered A.S.’s weight claim and determined it

lacked merit. The court reasoned:

       [T]he [juvenile] court discerned no inconsistencies in the evidence
       presented and found all witnesses credible. Each eyewitness
       corroborated each other’s recollection of the day, as well as the
       video footage corroborated each eyewitness’s recollections. The
       evidence clearly established [A.S.] engaged in a verbal altercation
       with [the victim], who attempted to diffuse the situation. Rather
       than calming down and leaving the scene, [A.S.] instead called
       upon unknown individuals multiples times and those persons
       came to the scene in a white vehicle and shot [the victim],
       resulting in multiple surgeries to his leg and continued pain and
       suffering months after the fact. [A.S.] spoke with the individual(s)
       in the vehicle who then shot [the victim]. The videos corroborated
       the eyewitnesses’ testimony.         [A.S.] did not hesitate in
       approaching the vehicle; rather the vehicle came straight to [A.S.]
       on the street corner. The witnesses were credible, the other
       recorded evidence was credible, and the [juvenile] court did not
       abuse its discretion against the weight of the evidence. The
       [juvenile] court’s decision does not shock one’s sense of justice.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/8/23, at 13-14 (citations to the record omitted).

       We discern no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in reaching its

determination the verdict did not shock its conscience. The Commonwealth

presented direct and circumstantial evidence that showed A.S. confronted the

____________________________________________

4 A.S. does not specify how the video evidence was “incongruent” with the
victim’s testimony. See A.S.’s Brief at 21-23.
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victim, made multiple phone calls to the same number, threatened the victim,

approached, and spoke with the shooter at the scene of the shooting, and,

immediately thereafter, the shooter shot the victim. That the juvenile court

chose to believe the testimony provided by the victim, three eyewitnesses,

and the video evidence was entirely within its province.             A.S. essentially

requests we re-weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses

presented at trial. This we cannot do, as it is a task that is beyond our scope

of review. The juvenile court, as finder of fact, had the duty to determine the

credibility of   the    witnesses   and     evidence    presented at trial.        See

Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[a]n

appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact”).

Questions about inconsistent testimony go to the credibility of the witnesses,

and it is solely for the finder-of-fact to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies,

and to determine how much weight to give to a particular witness’s testimony.

See Commonwealth v. Upshur, 764 A.2d 69, 74 (Pa. Super. 2000). Here,

although A.S. vigorously challenged the credibility of the victim, he chose not

to cross-examine the remaining eyewitnesses, nor did he so undermine the

Commonwealth’s         evidence   as   to   render     it   completely   unbelievable.

Ultimately,   the   juvenile   court   found     the   evidence    provided   by   the

Commonwealth credibly demonstrated A.S. conspired with the assailants to

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shoot the victim.    Accordingly, we decline to disturb the juvenile court’s

rejection of A.S.’s challenge to the weight of the evidence.

      In his third and final issue, A.S. claims the trial court abused its

discretion in committing him to state placement. A.S.’s Brief, at 23-25. We

review “a juvenile court’s dispositional order directing out-of-home placement

for an abuse of discretion.” Interest of D.W., 220 A.3d 573, 576 (Pa. Super.

2019) (citation omitted). We will not disturb the disposition implemented by

juvenile court absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657,

681 (Pa. Super. 2012). “It is well settled that, under Pennsylvania law, an

abuse of discretion occurs when the court has overridden or misapplied the

law, when its judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or when there is

insufficient evidence of record to support the court's findings.” Interest of

D.W., 220 A.3d at 576 (internal brackets and citation omitted). Moreover,

we note, “in a juvenile proceeding, the hearing judge sits as the finder of fact.

The weight to be assigned the testimony of the witnesses is within the

exclusive province of the fact finder.”       Id. (citation omitted).   See also

Interest of C.B., 241 A.3d 677, 681 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that juvenile

courts are afforded broad discretion to craft appropriate disposition).

      Section 6352 of the Juvenile Act sets forth six dispositional options for

juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent, including placement on

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supervision and commitment to a facility for delinquent children.         See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 6352(a). In choosing among these alternatives, a juvenile court

must consider which dispositional alternative is:

      consistent with the protection of the public interest and best suited
      to the child’s treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and welfare,
      which disposition shall, as appropriate to the individual
      circumstances of the child’s case, provide balanced attention to
      the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability
      for offenses committed and the development of competencies to
      enable the child to become a responsible and productive member
      of the community[.]

Id.   Further, when a disposition involves an out-of-home placement, the

juvenile court must explain on the record why such commitment is “the least

restrictive placement that is consistent with the protection of the public and

best suited to the child’s treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and welfare.”

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6352(c). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(3)(i) (providing for

disposition “separating the child from parents only when necessary for his

welfare, safety or health or in the interests of public safety, by doing all of the

following: (i) employing evidence-based practices whenever possible and, in

the case of a delinquent child, by using the least restrictive intervention that

is consistent with the protection of the community, the imposition of

accountability for offenses committed and the rehabilitation, supervision and

treatment needs of the child”).

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      A.S. argues state commitment was not the least restrictive alternative

because he had no contacts with law enforcement prior to this incident and

resided in a stable household with his guardian. See A.S.’s Brief at 24. A.S.

maintains the juvenile court should have placed him on probation. See id. at

25.

      The juvenile court explained its reasoning for committing A.S. to state

custody:

      [A]fter listening to the witnesses’ testimony and viewing all the
      exhibits, including the surveillance videos, the [juvenile] court
      substantiated all the charges against [A.S.] Furthermore, taking
      the same evidence and the very violent nature of the delinquent
      acts perpetrated by [A.S.], the [juvenile] court made a finding
      [A.S.] was in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.
      The [juvenile] court held [A.S.] in custody and ordered a [BHE]
      and for probation to plan for placement. At the disposition date
      of November 9, 2022, the BHE recommended [A.S.] would have
      his needs and treatment met in a structured non-RTF (residential
      treatment facility) placement.      Probation made referrals to
      multiple programs[] that denied [A.S.] placement based on the
      seriousness of his crimes [or his young age]. As a result, the only
      alternative was to commit [A.S.] to [s]tate placement. State
      placement at this time is the leas[t] restrictive disposition
      consistent with community protection.       Given the [juvenile]
      court’s substantial concern about a [fourteen]-year-old’s ability to
      essentially “put a hit on someone and have someone shot in
      fifteen minutes,” it was not possible for [A.S.’s] needs and the
      community’s needs to be met with [A.S.] out of placement living
      at home with his guardian. While in state placement, [A.S.] will
      be able to develop short-term and long-term goals of changing
      and controlling his offender behavior[,] while also developing
      mutual respect for members within the community; work on
      adhering to the rules and accepting responsibility for his actions

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     to facilitate positive moral development and reduce risk of re-
     offending; and forge skills that will allow him to contribute
     positively to the well-being of the community by going to school,
     obtaining pro-social life and employment skills, and mental health
     counseling and therapy. In balancing all the considerations and
     evidence, the [juvenile] court concluded that adjudication of
     delinquency was appropriate, and that treatment, supervision, or
     rehabilitation via state placement was necessary.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/8/23, at 14-15 (citations to the record omitted).

     Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the juvenile

court. The court heard testimony from A.S.’s guardian and from probation

regarding its attempts to secure placement in a non-residential treatment

program for A.S.   See N.T., 11/9/22, at 6-8. It also considered the BHE,

which concluded A.S. needed a structured, therapeutic placement.          See

Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/8/23, at 15. Contrary to A.S.’s assertions, given

the seriousness of the offense and the recommendations of the BHE, his needs

could not have been met simply by placing him on probation and allowing him

to live at home with his guardian. Contra A.S.‘s Brief at 25. Moreover, the

record supports the Juvenile Court’s finding that non-residential programs

concluded they could not meet A.S.’s needs given the seriousness of the

offense and his age and were unwilling to accept him. See N.T., 11/9/22, at

5-6. Thus, we conclude there is no manifest abuse of discretion in committing

A.S. to state placement. See R.D., 44 A.3d at 681.

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J-S37020-23

      For the reasons discussed above, we conclude A.S.’s issues merit no

relief. Accordingly, we affirm the dispositional order.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 2/9/2024

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