Court Opinion

ID: 9727166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:22:57.210673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:34.359069
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR
concurring.
Although I concur in the result, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim premised upon the admission of his inculpatory statements in violation of the rule enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), is previously litigated. A claim is previously litigated where there has been a ruling “on the merits of the issue[.]” See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a)(2).1 On . direct appeal, Appellant challenged the standard for determining whether a corpus delecti had been established arguing, in particular, that the trial court judge had improperly consid*337ered his admissions prior to being convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the underlying crime was established. See Commonwealth v. Reyes, 545 Pa. 374, 382, 681 A.2d 724, 727 (1996). Presently, the claim concerns whether trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly challenge and litigate whether Appellant’s incriminating statements should have been suppressed because they were elicited during custodial interrogation when he had not been advised of his constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. While I recognize that both the issue on direct appeal and that currently before the Court involve the inculpatory statements made by Appellant, the prior ruling did not implicate the legal and factual grounds necessary for determining the latter. Accordingly, as did the PCRA court, I would address the arguable merit of the underlying claim.
In this regard, Miranda warnings are required only where a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, see Commonwealth v. Smith, 575 Pa. 203, 224, 836 A.2d 5, 18 (2003), with the standard for custody entailing an assessment of objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-23, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). The focus of the test, however, is whether the individual was deprived of his freedom of movement in any significant manner or was placed in a circumstance in which he reasonably believed that his freedom was restricted. See Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 577, 459 A.2d 311, 314 (1983). As the PCRA court found, Appellant arrived at the Chester Police Department on his own and, upon encountering one of the officers, announced, “you want me, I just killed my daughter.” When asked for further details, Appellant stated, “I won’t tell you.” After being advised that he would not be taken into custody without more facts, Appellant was interviewed in the shift commander’s office, where he continued to withhold any details while insisting that he be arrested. During this time, Appellant was not restrained in *338any way and was permitted to leave the office.2 At certain points in the interview, Appellant said, “I won’t tell you anything today, I’ll tell you tomorrow,” explaining that, “I’m going to put pressure on them like they put pressure on me.” Finally, Appellant blurted out, “I put her in the water,” and thereafter prompted the officers to speculate concerning any additional information, ultimately offering as a location, “Eddystone.” Notably, Appellant did not testify at the suppression hearing, trial, or PCRA hearing and, as the PCRA court reasoned, the circumstances surrounding the statements do not indicate a custodial interrogation; indeed, the attending officer repeatedly advised Appellant that he would not be taken into custody absent more information. Accordingly, I would affirm this claim based upon the PCRA court’s disposition.
Justice NIGRO joins this concurring opinion.

. In its simplest form, the inquiry is whether resolution of the current claim on the merits would effectively overrule the prior decision. See generally Commonwealth v. Udeira, 580 Pa. 492, 523-26, 862 A.2d 74, 93-94 (2004) (observing that, "at least where the Court’s reasoning and holding on direct appeal encompass the claim sought to be raised on collateral review, and there is no irrefutable, manifest error in the disposition, the previous litigation doctrine should be deemed to apply")-

. On two occasions, Appellant left the office unaccompanied to use a restroom.