Court Opinion

ID: 9735874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:33:48.823943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:02.092414
License: Public Domain

*261SUNDBY, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). Section 174.04, Stats. (1979-80), requires that Monroe, as the owner of a biting dog, pay Michael treble damages. Carl Dostal is liable to Monroe for forty percent of Michael’s actual damages, but is not liable for any portion of the enhanced damages. I concur that there need be no proof of the owner’s knowledge of prior "mischievous” conduct by the dog, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the new trial to the issue of damages only, and that Michael’s closing argument presents no grounds for reversal. However, the trial court erred in striking the jury’s award of Michael’s future medical expenses.

AMOUNT TO BE TREBLED

Sec. 174.04, Stats. (1979-80), provides:
Any person suffering personal injury by any dog in the manner set forth in s. 174.01 may give notice to the owner or keeper of the act done, and if after such notice such dog shall injure any person, or wound or kill any horses, cattle, sheep or lambs, or do any other mischief or injury the owner or keeper shall be liable to pay to the person injured thereby treble damages.
The dog owner’s liability under this section does not depend upon fault, but solely upon ownership of a dog which has previously injured someone under the statutorily defined circumstances. In Cieslewicz v. Mutual Service Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 267 N.W.2d 595, 600 (1978), the supreme court said:
For the purpose of awarding treble damages under sec. 174.04, Stats., all that is necessary is that it be shown that the dog had previously injured some*262one under the statutorily defined circumstances and that the owner had notice of the previous injury. Whether the dog is known to be violent and vicious, so that the owner’s conduct in not restraining the dog is extreme recklessness, or whether the dog is normally gentle, but has had one prior incident, makes no difference for the purpose of the statute. Treble damages are awarded in either case.
It is undisputed that Monroe owned the dog, that he knew the dog had previously bitten someone, and the dog bit Michael. The requirements of the statute are satisfied. Section 174.04, Stats. (1979-80), assesses statutory multiple damages. Id. at 101, 267 N.W.2d at 600. Common law punitive damages are assessed in the discretion of the jury, while statutory multiple damages are automatically assessed. "Rich and poor pay the same amount, as the statute provides simply for an automatic multiplier of the compensatory damages. In this case, on an arbitrary and statutory basis, the damages are trebled.” Id. at 102,267 N.W.2d at 601.
Application of the laws of comparative negligence are antithetical to the purposes of a statute which imposes statutory multiple damages for its violation. Multiple damages imposed pursuant to statute such as sec. 174.04, Stats. (1979-80), are punitive in nature. Cieslewicz, 84 Wis. 2d at 103, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
The purposes of punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others from like conduct. Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 81, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965). Punitive damages are also intended to have the effect of punishing types of conduct which are oppressive and hurtful to the individual but which frequently go unpunished by *263the public prosecutor. Kink v. Combs, supra, 28 Wis. 2d at 80.
Id. at 100, 267 N.W.2d at 599. The purposes of deterrence and punishment would be compromised if the doctrine of comparative negligence was applied.1
In Sprague v. Sprague, 132 Wis. 2d 68, 389 N.W.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1986), we held that the laws of comparative negligence operated before the doubling of damages under sec. 174.02(1)(b), Stats. (1981-82), which replaced sec. 174.04 (1979-80).2 In reaching that conclusion we stated: "The dog owner’s liability should have some relation to his or her responsibility.” Sprague, 132 Wis. 2d at 73, 389 N.W.2d at 824. That would be true if the basis for liability under the statute is negligence. The language of sec. 174.02(l)(b) (1981-82) may permit that construction.3 However, the language of sec. 174.04 (1979-80) is unambiguous. That statute provides that if a person is injured and the statute applies the owner or keeper "shall be liable” for treble damages.
We adopted the interpretation we did in Sprague so as to avoid what appeared to be the absurd result of a dog owner being substantially liable for damages when the owner was only minimally negligent. Id., 132 Wis. 2d at 72, 389 N.W.2d at 824. That interpretation is logical only if the foundation of the liability is *264negligence and not public policy. I believe the legislative policy expressed in sec. 174.04, Stats. (1979-80) is that a dog owner whose dog has demonstrated a vicious propensity keeps that dog at his peril. The majority expresses dismay with the result I believe the statute requires and, to ameliorate that result, converts the basis of liability thereunder from strict liability to negligence. But yet, the majority explains: "The special statutory liability for multiple damages is grounded solely upon ownership of a dog known to have bitten in the past.” (Emphasis added.) Majority opinion at page 8.1 agree. If the result of predicating liability upon ownership of a biting dog and not negligence in restraining the dog is unacceptable, the legislature is the proper forum to change the result, not this court.

CONTRIBUTION

I believe the trial court correctly concluded that the defendants are entitled to contribution from Carl Dostal only with respect to Michael’s compensatory damages. This is consistent with the strict liability imposed by the statute.

STRIKING AWARD OF FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES

In its new-trial order, the trial court ordered:
3. That the motion of the plaintiffs that the verdict as to damages as to injuries to the plaintiff Michael C. Dostal be set aside is granted, the answers to questions 8(a) and (b) of the special verdict are set aside and a new trial ordered as to such damages. (Emphasis added.)
*265The jury verdict questions 8(a) and (b) related only to past and future pain, suffering, and disfigurement. No evidence was introduced at the first trial as to future medical expenses. That issue was tried in the second trial and a question as to such expenses was included in the special verdict. However, on motion, the trial court struck the jury’s award.
The new-trial order could be interpreted one of two ways: that "such damages” referred to the damages for injuries to Michael, or that such reference was to the special verdict questions as to damages. The trial court adopted the latter interpretation. Obviously the trial court is the best judge of what it intended in its new-trial order.
While I agree that the trial court had the right to interpret its new-trial order as it did, I agree with Michael that the defendants waived their right to object to a special jury verdict question on the issue of future medical expenses when they failed to object to that testimony at the time of trial. As Michael points out, the case was tried on the theory that Michael’s future medical expenses were properly an element of his damages. Michael disclosed that the surgeon would be an expert witness. A report of the surgeon’s conclusions was provided to all counsel. His deposition was taken. No objection was made to receipt of his testimony at the time of trial. Objection was raised at the time of the verdict conference and in posttrial motions. The failure to object to the evidence at the time of trial constituted a waiver. Ollinger v. Grall, 80 Wis. 2d 213, 223, 258 N.W.2d 693, 699 (1977).
The defendants argue that they were prejudiced by the admission of this evidence because it revealed to the jury that Michael would need cosmetic surgery and necessarily resulted in a higher jury award for *266pain and suffering. Michael points out, on the other hand, he was prejudiced because with the scar revi-sional surgery his award for future disfigurement and future pain and suffering after the surgery would be less. Michael argues that striking the jury award unfairly punishes him for mitigating his damages by seeking future medical treatment.
To allow evidence as to future medical expenses to be presented to the jury and to influence its determination of future pain and suffering and disfigurement, and then to strike the jury award constituted an abuse of discretion. I believe this portion of the judgment should be reversed.

 In Dawson v. Jost, 35 Wis. 2d 644, 151 N.W.2d 717 (1967), where a fifty percent negligent plaintiff was denied recovery, the court was not asked to consider whether sec. 174.04, Stats., was founded on negligence or strict liability.

 Among other changes, ch. 285, Laws of 1981, reduced the statutory enhancement of damages from treble to double.

 1985 Wis. Act 92 makes the contributory negligence statute, sec. 895.045, Stats., applicable to actions under sec. 174.02(l)(a) and (b), Stats.