Court Opinion

ID: 9729769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:48:14.287675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:01.064824
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. To hold that a home rule unit may by its zoning ordinance nullify the decision of the Environmental Protection Agency concerning the location of a landfill effectively thwarts the declared legislative intent that those decisions be made in accordance with a unified statewide program for environmental protection. The General Assembly specifically found: “(i) that environmental damage seriously endangers the public health and welfare ***; (ii) that because environmental damage does not respect political boundaries, it is necessary to establish a unified state-wide program for environmental protection and to cooperate fully with other States and with the United States in protecting the environment; (iii) that air, water, and other resource pollution, public water supply, solid waste disposal, noise, and other environmental problems are closely interrelated and must be dealt with as a unified whole in order to safeguard the environment.” 111. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 11114, pars. 1002(i), (ii), (iii). In the implementation of its program the General Assembly drew a clear distinction between the powers of the Pollution Control Board applicable to particular pollution problems. In section 10 of the Environmental Protection Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1010) relevant to the control of air pollution and section 13 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1013), which relates to water pollution, the broad powers conferred upon the Board for the adoption of regulations do not specifically provide that it may promulgate standards for the location of those facilities. In contrast, section 17 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1017), concerning public water supply, and section 22 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1022), concerning land pollution and refuse disposal, specifically confer upon the Board the power to adopt regulations prescribing standards for the location of such sites and facilities. Further, section 39 of the Act contains a provision applicable only to refuse disposal facilities; upon receipt of a request for a permit the Agency is required to notify “the State’s Attorney and the Chairman of the County Board of the county in which the facility is located and each member of the General Assembly from the legislative district in which that facility is located and *** the clerk of each municipality any portion of which is within 3 miles of the facility.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1039.) It should be further noted that the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly rejected the attempt to amend section 22 to provide: “Nothing in this Act is a limit on the power of any unit of local government to pass and enforce zoning ordinances; provided, that no unit of local government is here granted power over any other unit of local government or school district or their contractors, whether within or without the boundaries of such other unit of local government or school district. To the extent that any of such powers are exercised by the Environmental Protection Agency or the Pollution Control Board and a unit of local government, such powers shall be exercised concurrently.” Amendment No. 1 to House Bill 3955, 79th Gen. Ass’y. Nothing in any case decided by this court since the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act lends support to the majority’s holding that the control of landfills is a function pertaining to the government and affairs of a local unit of government. On the contrary, in Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 256, the court specifically held that the city’s permit requirement did not extend to a regional sewage treatment plant and in City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 1, we held that an ordinance dealing with noise emission exceeded the home rule powers of that municipality. The majority cites in support of “this court’s recognition of local concern over garbage disposal” (75 Ill. 2d at 511-12) the cases of Montgomery v. City of Galva (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 562, Strub v. Village of Deerfield (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 401, and Consumers Co. v. City of Chicago (1924), 313 Ill. 408. Although these cases are authority for the proposition that under its police power a city may regulate the collection and disposal of garbage, they do not support the conclusion that the location of a sanitary landfill pertains to the government and affairs of a local unit of government. It should be noted that the only legislation concerning the dumping of garbage (“An Act to prohibit open garbage dumps or sites,” approved August 26, 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 111½, par. 461 et seq.), repealed (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1050)) specifically provided that it did not apply “to the sanitary land fill and incinerator methods or garbage disposal” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 111½, par. 461). By some convoluted reasoning the majority concludes that the following language from section 27(a) limits the power of the Board and the designation of sites for landfill. Section 27(a) in pertinent part provides: “In promulgating regulations under this Act, the Board shall take into account the existing physical conditions, the character of the area involved, including the character of surrounding land uses, zoning classifications, the nature of the existing air quality, or receiving body of water, as the case may be, and the technical feasibility and economic reasonableness of measuring or reducing the particular type of pollution. The generality of this grant of authority shall only be limited by the specifications of particular classes of regulations elsewhere in this Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 111½, par. 1027(a). The majority concludes: “The power of the Board to set uniform, statewide environmental standards and the power of the County to zone property within its boundaries are therefore evidenced as distinct but concurrent powers that must be exercised cooperatively in the interest of environmental protection. To this end, the County, in zoning land for landfill sites, must adhere to the environmental regulations adopted by the Board, while the Agency, operating under the Board’s regulations, must comply with the County’s zoning ordinance when issuing permits for landfill sites. Thus, the authority granted the Board under the Act and the home rule authority granted to the County under the Constitution’s article VII, section 6, can be exercised in unison to accomplish the public policy expressed in article XI, section 1, of the 1970 Constitution.” (75 Ill. 2d at 516-17.) Having expressed this hope for harmony, the majority fails to indicate what course is to be followed when the parties are unable to resolve the confrontation arising from antipodal grants of authority to the Board and the county. The majority’s attempt to distinguish Carlson v. Village of Worth (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 406, on the basis that the county is a home rule unit cannot withstand scrutiny. Carlson did not involve solely the village’s zoning power; the ordinance sought to impose a permit requirement which, inter alia, included compliance with the village zoning ordinance. The county zoning statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 34, par. 3151 et seq.) has for many years provided: “For the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals, comfort and general welfare, *** the board of supervisors or board of county commissioners *** shall have the power to regulate and restrict the location and use of buildings, structures and land ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 34, par, 3151.) This broad grant of authority obviously confers upon a county the same zoning powers conferred by the Constitution upon a home rule unit. Amendments enacted since the effective date of the Constitution of 1970 have not amended or modified these provisions. Apposite here is our statement in O’Connor v. City of Rockford (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 360, 367: “[T]o hold here that the city’s use of the proposed site as a landfill may be permitted only upon issuance of a conditional use permit by Winnebago County, or that the county, by reason of its zoning ordinance may prohibit such use, contravenes the clearly expressed legislative intent that such operations be conducted only upon issuance of a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency. By the enactment of the Environmental Control Act, the General Assembly has expressly declared the need for ‘a unified state-wide program’ and provided the means for issuance of appropriate permits under regulations promulgated after taking into account precisely the conflicting interests shown by this record.” MR. JUSTICE CLARK joins in this dissent.