Court Opinion

ID: 2964523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:57.161818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:57.351035
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1545

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  WILLIAM A. TWITTY,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Evan  Slavitt, by  appointment of  the  Court,  with whom  Mary P.
            _____________                                              _______
        Murray and Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, were on brief for appellant.
        ______     ________________________
            Michael J.  Pelgro, Assistant  United States  Attorney, with  whom
            __________________
        Dina Michael Chaitowitz, Assistant  United States Attorney, and Donald
        _______________________                                         ______
        K. Stern, United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
        ________

                                 ____________________
                                   January 9, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      ALDRICH, Senior Circuit  Judge.  William A.  Twitty
                               _____________________

            (hereinafter defendant),  caught deep in the  sale of illegal

            firearms, appealed  following the imposition  of a cumulative

            sentence  of  97 months  on  three counts.    His convictions

            stood, but we  held the court had  erred in finding  that his

            participation in  the conspiracy involved lasted  long enough

            to warrant  application of the Sentencing  Guidelines adopted

            on  November 1, 1991.  United States  v. Twitty, 72 F.3d 228,
                                   _____________     ______

            232-34  (1st Cir.  1995).   The earlier Guidelines  were less

            severe.   We  accordingly  remanded for  resentencing on  the

            earlier  version.  On remand,  the same judge,  by adopting a

            different  calculation  for  Count I,  the  conspiracy count,

            reached the same sentence, and thence the original 97  months

            total.   We can  understand defendant's unhappiness  with the

            evaporation  of his  partial  victory.   However, we  affirm.

            Mere appearances do not prevail over  established principles.

            See United States v. Lombard, No. 96-1541, slip. op. at 12-13
            ___ _____________    _______

            (1st Cir. Dec. 4, 1996).

                                          I.

                      At the first sentencing,  the court, believing that

            the conspiracy  shown extended  beyond November 1,  1991, and

            adhering to  the rule that conspiracy should  be grouped with

            other counts  involving  its sole  object, U.S.S.G.    3D1.2,

            assigned thereto  Base Offense Level 14  pursuant to U.S.S.G.

              2K2.1(a)(6) of the November 1991 Guidelines.  It then added

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            four sets of enhancements that brought defendant to Level 28,

            which with Criminal History Category II, produced a guideline

            range of  87 to 108 months.   The court chose  97 months, the

            middle of the range, as the "total punishment."  See U.S.S.G.
                                                             ___

              5G1.2  (providing a  mechanism  for  determining  a  "total

            punishment"  figure in  cases  with  convictions on  multiple

            counts).   On this basis, the court sentenced defendant to 60

            months on  the conspiracy  count, the statutory  maximum, and

            then imposed a consecutive sentence of 37 months on Count II.

            See  United States v. Quinones, 26 F.3d 213, 215-17 (1st Cir.
            ___  _____________    ________

            1994).  A  concurrent sentence of 37 months was  imposed on a

            third count, leaving the total sentence at 97 months.

                      At resentencing, the Base  Offense Level dropped to

            6.   The court retained the  previous enhancements, resulting

            in an adjusted  level of 20 which this time  produced a 37 to

            46  month guideline range, well  under the 60 month statutory

            maximum.    Explaining that  this  range  did not  adequately

            reflect the  magnitude  of  defendant's  conduct,  the  court

            proceeded to depart upward by adding  an additional 8 levels,

            ending  up again  with an  87 to  108 month  guideline range.

            From  this it reimposed the 60 months on the first count, and

            then effected a further upward departure by reimposing the 37

            month consecutive  sentence  on another  count, bringing  the

            ultimate sentence again to 97 months.  It is to be noted that

            the reaffirmed sentences  on Counts II and III were initially

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            imposed on the  basis of  the November  1990 guidelines,  and

            were   appropriate  here,  assuming   the  additional  upward

            departure with respect to Count I.

                                         II.

                      We start with the  general question. Defendant  has

            cited no authority for  the proposition that there can  be no

            greater  sentence after  appeal, here  in effect  obtained by

            upward departure.    He might  have cited  North Carolina  v.
                                                       ______________

            Pearce,  where the  Court held  this to  be improper  after a
            ______

            second trial, if, as  here, there were no new  and subsequent

            justification for  so doing.   395 U.S.  711, 725-26  (1969).

            Pearce  created a  presumption  of  vindictiveness,  viz.,  a
            ______

            judge's irritation at being reversed.  We have held, however,

            that this presumption (and hence restriction) does not apply,

            for  example,  when  the   two  proceedings  are  handled  by

            different judges.  United  States v. Clark, 84 F.3d  506, 508
                               ______________    _____

            (1st  Cir.), cert.  denied,  ___ U.S.  ___,  117 S.  Ct.  272
                         _____________

            (1996).     Under   familiar   principles,  therefore,   that

            defendant's present silence shows  he understands, he  should

            have noted and invoked the presumption, if not when the court

            opened the  hearing, at least  when its action  presented the

            issue.  He did not.

                      We have no  doubt the  court, as a  court, had  the

            discretion  to  depart  upward  and  reimpose  the  97  month

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            sentence.   We  have previously  held that  when resentencing

            under a multi-count conviction,

                      [C]ommon  sense  dictates that  the judge
                      should be free to  review the efficacy of
                      what  remains  in light  of  the original
                      sentencing plan, and  to reconstruct  the
                      sentencing   architecture   upon   remand
                      within   applicable   constitutional  and
                      statutory   limits,   if   that   appears
                      necessary in  order  to ensure  that  the
                      punishment still fits the crime.

            United States v. Dominguez, 951 F.2d 412, 416 (1st Cir. 1991)
            _____________    _________

            (quoting United  States v.  Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d  9, 14
                     ______________     ________________

            (1st  Cir. (1989) (en banc)).   The only  restrictions on the

            court when making an upward departure1 are that it adequately

            explain its  decision and  that the departure  be reasonable.

            United States v. Rosales,  19 F.3d 763, 770 (1st  Cir. 1994);
            _____________    _______

            United  States v.  Rivera,  994 F.2d  942,  946-47 (1st  Cir.
            ______________     ______

            1993).   Here the court expressly  based the upward departure

            on  the large number of  guns and the  endangerment of public

            safety.  After review of the record, we have no basis to find

            this unreasonable.

                      Defendant  also  complains  of "double-dipping"  in

            that the upward departure  imposing an additional penalty for

            endangering public  safety2 was  anticipated by  and included

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Other  than vindictiveness,  presumed, North  Carolina v.
                                                       _______________
            Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), or proven.  See Wasman v. United
            ______                                   ___ ______    ______
            States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
            ______

            2.  We  do  not  address  the three  level  upward  departure
            reflecting  the large number of guns involved as in his brief
            defendant concedes that  apart from the  fact that the  exact

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            within the Guidelines and,  in any event, taken  into account

            by  the enhancements.   We disagree.   While it  is true that

            some of the enhancements  reflected the fact that defendant's

            behavior exceeded Guideline thresholds, the court determined,

            based on  the entirety of defendant's  actions, i.e., putting

            at  least 225  serial  number obliterated  handguns onto  the

            streets,  that  the thresholds  did not  go  far enough.   It

            concluded  that this  is an  unusual case,  placing defendant

            outside  the heartland  of the  Guidelines and  allowing wide

            discretion  in upward departure.  See Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949
                                              ___ ______

            (1st Cir.  1993).  We  can agree.   Moreover, in  Quinones we
                                                              ________

            noted   that  "appellate   review  of   a   district  court's

            determination that a case  is unusual, and therefore warrants

            departure,  must  take place  'with  full  awareness of,  and

            respect  for, the trier's superior "feel" for the case.'"  26

            F.3d  at 218  (quoting United  States v.  Diaz-Villafane, 874
                                   ______________     ______________

            F.2d 43, 50  (1st Cir. 1989)).   We  heed our admonition  and

            affirm defendant's sentence.

                                
            ____________________

            sentence  was  reimposed,  this  departure  could  be  deemed
            reasonable.

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