Court Opinion

ID: 9628343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:17:23.448948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:04.396879
License: Public Domain

McCLINTOCK, J.,
dissenting, with whom THOMAS, J., joins.
I too dissent from the opinion of the court but will express my views in a somewhat different manner from my Brother Thomas. As I view the case, our borrowing statute, § 1-3-117, W.S.1977, provides that if a cause of action is barred in the state where it arose it is likewise barred in this state. Inherent in this statute is the philosophy that if one has unduly neglected to *400assert his rights in the state where the cause of action arose, he should not be permitted to do so in Wyoming. But this necessarily presupposes that there existed a right which the party could have so enforced. If the right asserted in our court is one which could not have been enforced, there is then nothing upon which the foreign limitation could operate. It therefore cannot be used to defeat an action in Wyoming that only its courts could entertain.
I believe it unquestioned law that the validity, effect and enforcement of mortgages on real property in Wyoming are a matter of Wyoming law. Insofar as the plaintiff in this case sought to foreclose its mortgage on Wyoming property there was no cause of action that it could have asserted in Colorado. I shall not attempt an exhaustive analysis of the authorities, but the principle is fully explained in Beach v. Youngblood, 215 Iowa 979, 247 N.W. 545 (1933). A note payable in Iowa and mortgage had been executed in that state but the mortgaged property was located in Minnesota. Upon default in payment of the note, the holder thereof brought action in Iowa, seeking to foreclose the mortgage upon the Minnesota land. The trial court entered judgment for the amount of the note, declared the mortgage a lien superior to the claims of all other parties, and directed the county sheriff in Iowa to advertise and sell the Minnesota property in the same manner as sales are made of Iowa property. The owner of the property was ordered at the end of the period of redemption to deliver possession of the premises to the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale. On appeal it was argued that the Iowa court had no jurisdiction of the foreclosure phase of the action, wherefore the order of foreclosure was a nullity.
The Iowa Supreme Court discusses the applicable principles at some length, referring to numerous cases, all of which deny the power of the courts of one state to decree a foreclosure on property within another state, and in the course thereof makes these pertinent statements:
“It is a well and universally established principle that the disposition of real estate, either by deed, descent, or any other method, must be governed by the law of the state where the same is situated.” 247 N.W. at 549.
The court then points out that under Iowa law an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property shall be brought in the county where the property or some part thereof is situated. (Justice Thomas has pointed to a similar Wyoming statute.)
“ . [I]t follows that a decree of court in this state cannot [ajffect the title to real estate in another state, or in Minnesota. Id. at 549-55Ó.
“We hold that, under the circumstances in this case, the plaintiff could not foreclose in the courts of this state against lands in the state of Minnesota, and that, in entering its decree directing foreclosure, the court transcended its powers, and all that was done in that regard was void; and the order of the district court directing the sheriff of Cerro Gordo county to sell the Minnesota lands was utterly void.” Id. at 550.
I have found no case or authority that in any way denigrates this holding and on the basis of the principle enunciated I submit that no cause of action for the foreclosure of the mortgage existed in Colorado. The question of limitations must therefore be decided on the basis of the applicable Wyoming statute, which admittedly is ten years, and the action was therefore timely filed.
The judgment of the district court must be affirmed unless we can say as a matter of law that the barring of action upon the promise to pay (which I concede should be governed by the law of Colorado) had the effect of discharging the obligation in such a way that the condition of the mortgage permitting foreclosure did not exist. The majority rule is that the barring of the note itself does not operate as such a discharge. In McCarty v. Goodsman, 39 N.D. 389, 167 N.W. 508, 506 (1918) the rule is stated that
“A mortgage may be foreclosed, for instance, after the statute of limitations has barred an action on the notes fpr *401which the mortgage is security. See Satterlund v. Beal, 12 N.D. 122, 95 N.W. 518, and this rule has the support of the decided weight of authority. See Jones on Mortgages, § 1204; also numerous cases cited in the note in 95 Am.St.Rep. 664.”
and in Lundberg v. Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, 299 Minn. 46, 216 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1974) we find this more recent statement:
“[T]he mortgage is an independent contract, though collateral to the instrument which it secures, and, as such, may be foreclosed even though the action on the notes is barred.”
This court in National Tailoring Co. v. Scott, 65 Wyo. 64, 196 P.2d 387 (1948) discussed at length the relation of a statute of limitations barring recovery on the note or contract to the right to foreclose by advertisement as permitted in the mortgage. The opinion cites the rule set forth in 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 9, p. 928 as the majority rule, that is, that the fact that the debt is barred by limitations does not operate to defeat the remedy on the mortgage. While this case involved foreclosure by advertisement and not by action, I cannot read the ease in any way except as holding that barring the debt represented by the note does not operate as a discharge of the obligations. In other words, under Wyoming law the mortgage is not merely an incident to the debt, wiped out when the promise itself is unenforceable.
I would affirm.