Court Opinion

ID: 9850486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:58:03.839158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:37.981790
License: Public Domain

RIORDAN, Chief Justice and STOWERS, Justice (respectfully dissenting). We respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority states: [T]hat to authorize an instruction on intoxication the record must contain some evidence showing or tending to show that defendant consumed an intoxicant and the intoxicant affected his mental state at or near the time of the homicide. (Emphasis added.) However, the effect of the majority’s holding is that an instruction on intoxication is now authorized where there is only evidence showing that defendant consumed an intoxicant. The requirement that there also be evidence that the intoxicant affected defendant’s mental state is no longer necessary under the majority opinion. As stated in the majority opinion, there was evidence that defendant had consumed large amounts of an intoxicant. With a blood alcohol level of 0.18%, the defendant must have been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the murder. However, we do not feel that evidence merely showing that defendant was drunk at the time of the commission of the murder is sufficient to warrant the giving of the instruction absent testimony to show what effect the alcohol had on defendant’s ability to deliberate or to form the intent to take a life. U.J.I. 41.10 reads in pertinent part: Evidence has been presented that the defendant was intoxicated from the use of alcohol. You must determine whether or not the defendant was [intoxicated] and if so, what effect this had on the defendant’s ability to form the deliberate intention to take away the life of another. (Emphasis added). In the instant case there was no evidence presented as to how a 0.18% blood alcohol level would affect a person’s ability to form the deliberate intention to kill. The jury was merely given the fact of the 0.18% blood alcohol level and told that this level is almost twice the legal limit used in DWI cases. Without some expert evidence as to how such a high level of intoxication might have affected defendant’s ability to form the deliberate intent to kill his wife, the jury was left to speculate on the issue and therefore the instruction is not appropriate. The majority analogize the instant case with Poore v. State, 94 N.M. 172, 608 P.2d 148 (1980). However, the two cases are distinguishable. This court stated in Poore: Just as a defendant in a criminal case is protected by the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as opposed to the preponderance of evidence in a civil case, so also should the defendant be accorded some semblance of liberality in having the jury instructed with particularlity as to his defenses that are supported by the evidence. Id. at 174, 608 P.2d at 150 (Emphasis added.) The evidence in Poore supported the elements of the instruction. However, in the instant case the element of the instruction requiring the jury to determine the effect of intoxication on defendant’s ability to form the deliberate intent to kill is not supported by the evidence. There is no evidence on this issue. This case is similar to State v. Lujan, 94 N.M. 232, 234, 608 P.2d 1114, 1116 (1980), where in this court stated: [U]nless there is evidence that the defendant could not have formed the requisite intent, the diminished responsibility instruction is improper. See also State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980) (defendant not entitled to instruction where record did not contain any evidence that defendant’s intoxication rendered him incapable of acting purposefully). By holding as it does the majority is disregarding established case law and the requirements of U.J.I. 41.10. We therefore dissent.