Court Opinion

ID: 9693481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:44:31.749445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:46.856596
License: Public Domain

POLLOCK, J.,
dissenting.
The issue on this appeal is whether a county welfare board has met its burden of proving that allegiance to the county chairman of a political party is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the office of legal assistant to the board. As a matter of law, the majority concludes that alle*68giance to the county chairman, who was not a member of the board, is an appropriate requirement for the office. I dissent.
Because we are reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we must assume as true all facts set forth in opposition to the motion and accord the opposing party the benefit of all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from these facts. Thus viewed, the relevant facts are that in June, 1977 Battaglia was appointed to a one-year term as a legal assistant to the Union County Welfare Board. In May, 1978, a majority of the members of the Board assured him that he “would have no difficulty being reappointed.” The membership of the Board did not change at any material time. In June, 1978, notwithstanding the opposition of Battaglia, his wife and others, Harry Pappas was elected Democratic county chairman. Pappas refused to submit Battaglia’s name to the Board for reappointment. Thereafter, Battaglia called several members of the Board who told him that they could not vote for him because Pappas had told them he should not be reappointed. One member explained his refusal by stating as “a matter of party discipline, he had to vote the way the County Chairman [Mr. Pappas] told him.” Pappas’ instructions were the only reason the Board failed to reappoint Battaglia. Battaglia’s dispute was not with the Board, but with Pappas. No one questioned his competence as a legal assistant or manifested any lack of confidence in him.
Neither Pappas nor any member of the Board submitted any affidavit contradicting Battaglia’s statement of the facts. The majority finds the uncontradicted facts to be unpersuasive because of the written description of the position of legal assistant.
As with other attorney-client relationships, confidence by members of a public body in their counsel is essential. See Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook Cty., 508 F.Supp. 1063, 1069 n.12 (N.D.Ill.1981). Because a difference in party affiliation may affect the confidence of a public body in its counsel, political patronage may have a role in the selection of attorneys for public bodies. In this case, however, there is not a *69single fact justifying the conclusion that the Board lacked confidence in Battaglia. On the record before us, the opposite is true. The Board believed Battaglia to be competent and, if left alone, it would have continued his employment. The sole reason the Board failed to continue Battaglia’s employment was that as a matter of party discipline, the county chairman wanted to punish Battaglia. Consequently, this case differs from cases where, because of political differences, a mayor or governing body does not want to employ an attorney.
Two decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish the degree to which freedom of speech and thought are guaranteed to government employees whose jobs are imperiled by political patronage. In both decisions, the Court placed a higher value on freedom of political thought than on political patronage. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), the majority opinion limited patronage dismissals to policymaking and confidential positions. In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 1294, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), the Court expanded protection of government employees by stating that the emphasis should not be whether the employee was in a policymaking position, but “whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”
The line delineating policymaking positions is hazy, as is the determination whether party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of a public office. See Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193 (5 Cir. 1981) (political demotion of sheriff sergeant impermissible); Garretto v. Cooperman, 510 F.Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (political dismissal of compensation judge permissible) (Branti test is dicta); McMullan v. Thornburgh, 508 F.Supp. 1044 (E.D.Pa.1981) (political dismissal of dept, of health registrars impermissible); Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 508 F.Supp. 1063 (N.D.Ill.1981) (simply showing employee occupies a highly confidential position of significant policymaking not enough to justify political dismissal) (dicta); McMahon v. Board of Selectmen of Town of *70Newtown, 506 F.Supp. 537 (D.Conn.1981) (political dismissal of grants administrator and assistant to first selectman impermissible). Courts have had particular difficulty with the Elrod and Branti tests in cases involving attorneys for public bodies. Compare Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517 (3 Cir. 1981) (political dismissal of city solicitor proper) and Bavoso v. Harding, 507 F.Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (political dismissal of corporation counsel proper) with Layden v. Costello, 517 F.Supp. 860 (N.D.N.Y.1981) (political dismissal of counsel to Department of Social Services improper).
In assaying the validity of political retaliation as a cause for the termination of public employment, courts have considered various elements, including the structure and duties of the public body employing the dismissed employee, Bavoso v. Harding, supra, 507 F.Supp. at 316; and the nature and duties of the employee’s position, see e.g., Ness v. Marshall, supra; Garretto v. Cooperman, 510 F.Supp. 816, 818 (S.D.N.Y.1981). Another consideration is whether the political allegiance of the dismissed employee or of the controlling members of the public body has shifted from one party or one faction within a party to another. We next discuss the application of those considerations to this case.
Like many public bodies, welfare boards have some policymaking authority. Unlike the broad discretionary powers of municipalities, N.J.S.A. 40:48-1 and —2, and of county boards of chosen freeholders, N.J.S.A. 40:20-1, however, a welfare board has limited discretion. For the most part, welfare boards serve to administer programs funded by federal, state and county government. Accordingly, a board’s discretion is severely restricted by state and federal regulation.1
*71Aside from its duties, the structure of the board indicates a legislative intention to insulate the board’s activities from county politics. Although board members are appointed by the board of chosen freeholders, N.J.S.A. 44:1-11 (Supp.1981), their appointments are for five-year terms that expire seriatim. N.J. S.A. 44:1-12. Because the board contains from five to seven citizen members, N.J.S.A. 44:1-11 (Supp.1981), it would take at least three years for a new political group to control the board. The apparent intent is to prevent a freeholder board from gaining control of a welfare board in any single year. In addition each board must appoint a director of welfare to serve as its chief executive. N.J.S.A. 44:7-11 (Supp.1981). As chief executive, the director may influence and must implement decisions of the board. Removal, as well as appointment of the director is controlled by civil service laws, not political patronage, and the political allegiance of the director will not subject him to a patronage dismissal. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that the political allegiance of an assistant counsel so imbues the performance of his duty that he is subject to a patronage dismissal. In the absence of factual support, I do not share that conclusion, particularly here where the county chairman was not a member of the Welfare Board or of the Board of Freeholders. In any event, the Board never stated that Battag*72lia’s political beliefs affected, or even might affect, the effective performance of his duties.
The majority hypothesizes from the job description of a legal assistant sufficient policymaking duties to justify a political dismissal. One can search that description in vain for any reference to the word “policy.” Indeed, at oral argument the attorney for the Board conceded that Battaglia was not a policymaker. Nonetheless, the majority speculates that Battaglia or someone else in the position of legal assistant might be asked to serve as a policymaker. Although it is conceivable that Battaglia, as the majority speculates, might have been asked to offer counsel on policymaking, it remains that Battaglia was not a policymaker and would not have become one if his employment had been continued. As a matter of law, without according him a hearing to test those speculations, the majority deprives Battaglia of his employment. I respectfully submit that decision contravenes Elrod and Branti, supra.
The majority decision deprives Battaglia of his employment without a plenary hearing on critical factual questions such as (1) whether the Board retained its confidence in him, after Pappas became county chairman but refused to appoint him in blind allegiance to Pappas; (2) whether allegiance to the chairman of a political party is an appropriate requirement for the performance of the duties of legal assistant to the Board where the chairman is not a member of the board; (3) whether any Board members were allied with Pappas in his candidacy for county chairman and whether his election signalled any change in Board policy; and (4) whether the position of legal assistant to the Board is a confidential or policymaking position. Where members of a county welfare board and one of its legal assistants are members of the same political party, and the board wants to continue the employment of the assistant, the employment should not be terminated solely because of a political difference between the attorney and the party chairman who is not a member of the board.
*73Freedom of political belief has been planed high in the constitutional firmament by the United States Supreme Court. Without adequate factual justification, this Court should not tarnish that freedom to accommodate political punishment.
After the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and while the appeal was pending in the Appellate Division, the United States Supreme Court decided Branti. Relying on that decision, the Appellate Division reversed the summary judgment and remanded the matter for a plenary hearing. Accord, DeLong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4 Cir. 1980) (although court agreed with trial court decision based on Elrod, case remanded for reconsideration in light of Branti). In the present case, the majority decision improperly relieves the Board of its burden to justify Battaglia’s political dismissal. The effect of that decision is to preclude both the public and Battaglia from learning the facts underlying the termination of his employment. Where a government employee, albeit an attorney, has lost his job because he exercised his freedom of political belief, a legalistic construction of a job description is no substitute for full disclosure of the relevant facts. A remand for a plenary hearing is neither an indictment of political patronage nor an extension of Branti.' I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the matter to the trial court.
Justice CLIFFORD joins in this dissent.
For reversal —Chief Justice WILENTZ, Justices PASHMAN, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and O’HERN — 5.
For affirmance — Justices CLIFFORD and POLLOCK — 2.

See N.J.A.C. 10:81-1.2 (Aid to Families With Dependent Children) (AFDC); N.J.A.C. 10:83-2.5 (Medical Assistance to the Aged) (MAA); N.J.A.C. 10:87-1 (Food Stamps) and N.J.A.C. 10:89 (foreword) (Energy Assistance). The Department of Human Services’ regulations are extensive, covering every phase of the programs from eligibility, N.J.A.C. 10:81-3.1 to -3.39 (AFDC); *71N.J.A.C. 10:83-5.1 to -6.21 (MAA); N.J.A.C. 10:87-3.2 to -5.10 (Food Stamps); N.J.A.C. 10:89-2.1 to-2.3 (Energy Assistance), to recovering fraudulently received payments, N.J.A.C. 10:81-7.4D to .42 (AFDC) (board’s role limited to determining whether there is a basis for believing fraud occurred; matter is then referred to prosecutor to determine what further action shall be taken); N.J.A.C. 10:87-11.2 to —11.9 (Food Stamps) (board’s counsel to help decide which cases to refer but establishing state policy that board should initiate court action in cases involving more than one act of fraud or large amounts of money). Federal statutes and regulations are also extensive. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et seq. (Supp.1981); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.1 to 279.10 (1981) (Food Stamps); 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq. (1974 and Supp.1981), 45 C.F.R. §§ 224.0 to 235.40 (1980) (AFDC); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 et seq. (1974 & Supp. 1981); 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.0 to 456.657 (1980) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C.A. § 8612 et seq. (Supp.1981); 45 C.F.R~ $$ 260.1 to 260.314 (1980) (Energy Assistance).