Court Opinion

ID: 9942575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:05:24.695155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:15.878557
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                                State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 21, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                              No. 3D23-461
                       Lower Tribunal No. 22-12584

                        Stefan E. Brodie, et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                      vs.

 Bayside Village East Condominium Association, Inc., et al.,
                                  Appellees.

    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michael A.
Hanzman, Judge.

     Joel S. Perwin, P.A. and Joel S. Perwin; Minsker Law PLLC and
Jonathan E. Minsker; MoloLamken LLP, Steven F. Molo, Mark W. Kelley,
and Alex C. Eynon (New York, NY); MoloLamken LLP and Megan Cunniff
Church (Chicago, IL), for appellants.

      Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Scott A. Cole, and Carly M. Weiss;
Crabtree & Auslander, LLC, John G. Crabtree, Charles M. Auslander, and
Brian C. Tackenberg, for appellees.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and LINDSEY, JJ.
      PER CURIAM.

      Affirmed. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla.

3d DCA 2007) (“[O]ne who publishes defamatory matter concerning another

is not liable for the publication if the matter is published upon an occasion

that makes it conditionally privileged and the privilege is not abused.”); Cape

Publ’ns, Inc. v. Reakes, 840 So. 2d 277, 280 (Fla. 5th DCA

2003) (“The issue of whether this qualified privilege exists is not a jury

question when the circumstances surrounding the communication are

undisputed; the question should be decided by the court.”); Nodar v.

Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803, 810 (Fla. 1984) (“The determination that a

defendant’s statements are qualifiedly privileged eliminates the presumption

of malice attaching to defamatory statements by law. The privilege instead

raises a presumption of good faith and places the upon the plaintiff the

burden of proving express malice . . . .”); Lewis v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 489,

492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (“[T]he mere fact that a defamatory statement was

made does not imply that the speaker was motivated by malice if the

statement was made on a privileged occasion, and therefore malice will not

be presumed as a matter of law, even though the statement . . . is otherwise

defamatory per se.”); Boehm v. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp., Inc., 557 So. 2d 91,

94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“It is insufficient that the speaker have

                                       2
generalized feelings of hostility and malice towards the Plaintiff. Only if the

Plaintiff demonstrates the primary motivation for the statements uttered was

express malice, is the privilege overcome.”) (emphasis in original).

                                       3