Court Opinion

ID: 9390267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 14:08:07.251549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:32.676166
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Halpern v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-1370.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STACIE HALPERN, TRUSTEE OF                          :
THE STACIE HALPERN TRUST U/A
JULY 11, 1989,                                      :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                :

                v.                                  :        No. 111896

DEREK SMITH, ET AL.,                                :

                Defendants-Appellees.               :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 27, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-21-944015

                                              Appearances:

                Sonkin & Koberna, LLC, Mark R. Koberna, Sean T. Koran,
                Rodd A. Sanders, and Christopher S. Battles, for
                appellant.

                Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis, Peter Turner, Ronald
                P. Friedberg, and Kathryn E. Meloni, for appellees.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                  Plaintiff-appellant Stacie Halpern, Trustee of the Stacie Halpern

Trust U/A July 11, 1989 (“Halpern”), appeals the decision of the trial court that
granted summary judgment in favor of appellees Derek L. Smith and Rebecca Smith

(“the Smiths”). Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

       I.     Facts and Procedural History

               At the outset, we must emphasize that this is not a case involving a

right of first refusal. It involves a right of first offer. They are decidedly different as

the analysis below will show.

               This case stems from an agreement between the parties for a “Right

of First Offer” (also referred to as an “ROFO”). We have reviewed the evidence in

the record and include a brief overview of some of the facts herein.

               In 2018, the Smiths owned a large parcel of land in Moreland Hills,

Ohio. Halpern resided with her husband, Jeffrey Halpern, on property adjacent to

the Smiths’ property. In March 2018, Halpern purchased approximately 14.5 acres

of land abutting her property from the Smiths, and the Smiths retained their

remaining property. Along with the purchase agreement, the parties entered a

“Right of First Offer Agreement” on the Smiths’ remaining land, which is referred to

as the “option parcel.”

               Section 1 of the ROFO Agreement sets forth the “Right of First Offer”

and provides as follows:

              1.    Right of First Offer. If at any time during the Term
       [defined in Section 2 of the ROFO agreement] Owner shall desire to sell
       the Option Parcel (or sell the direct or indirect ownership interests of
       Owner) to any third party (whether or not such third party is an affiliate
       of Owner) or a Family Member (collectively, the “Third Party”), prior
       to discussing, soliciting or negotiating any such sale with any Third
       Party, Owner shall notify Halpern in writing of its intention to sell.
      Following delivery of such notice, which notice shall include Owner’s
      proposed terms of the sale, Halpern may, but shall have no obligation
      to, make an offer to Owner with respect to a potential purchase of the
      Option Parcel, and for a period of forty-five (45) days thereafter, Owner
      and Halpern shall discuss and negotiate in good faith regarding
      Halpern’s Offer. If the parties fail, despite good faith efforts, to reach
      agreement on such purchase within such forty-five (45) day period,
      then Owner shall thereafter be free to negotiate with any Third Party.
      If Owner fails to sell the Option Parcel within six (6) months of the date
      of notice to Halpern, then before again marketing the Option Parcel to
      a Third Party, Owner shall again give notice to Halpern of Owner’s
      intent to sell in accordance with the terms of this Section 1.

               Additionally, among other provisions of the ROFO Agreement,

Section 5 includes a waiver of compliance when a party fails to require performance

of any provision thereunder and Section 11 entitles a party to seek an injunction to

prevent breaches when a party has not performed in accordance with the specific

terms of the ROFO Agreement.

               The record shows that in October 2019, the Smiths executed an

exclusive “Right to Sell Agreement” with real estate agent Craig Cantrall. Jeffrey

Halpern was verbally informed that the Smiths intended to list the option parcel for

$2,750,000, and the Halperns verbally declined to exercise the ROFO at that price,

which was later followed by an email stating the Halperns had decided not to

exercise the “First Right of Offer to negotiate for the property.” As stated by Halpern

in her deposition, “they came to us through Craig and were wanting to sell the

property at 2.75 and that was a nonstarter.”

               Thereafter, the property was marketed at the same price offered to

Halpern, and real estate developer Jason Friedman expressed interest in purchasing
the option parcel through his company, JAF Acquisitions (“JAF”). The Smiths

began negotiations with JAF, and a purchase agreement was executed between the

Smiths and JAF on January 30, 2020. The purchase agreement with JAF included

a provision that conditioned the buyer’s obligation to close upon a signed written

waiver of the ROFO by Halpern. However, the Smiths’ obligation to close as the

seller was not conditioned upon such a waiver.

              After the Smiths entered the purchase agreement with JAF, the

Smiths sought to obtain a formal, signed waiver of Halpern’s rights under the ROFO.

On March 17, 2020, the Smiths sent a written notice with proposed terms to

Halpern, which stated it “memorializes the prior notice and email communications”

of the parties. On March 18, 2020, Halpern executed a statement indicating she had

decided not to exercise the ROFO.

              The Smiths and JAF entered multiple amended purchase

agreements, but they did not close the sale within six months of the March 17, 2020

notice to Halpern. In November 2020, the Smiths and JAF reached a tentative

agreement to an “Amended and Restated Purchase Agreement,” which included a

purchase price of $1,500,000, a change to the portion of the option parcel being

sold, and other terms. On December 9, 2020, the Smiths sent Halpern a new written

“Notice of First Right of Offer” that included proposed terms, which were consistent

with the Smiths’ tentative agreement with JAF.

              On December 10, 2020, Halpern elected to exercise the right of first

offer, initiating the 45-day negotiation period set forth in Section 1 of the ROFO
Agreement. The Smiths and Halpern engaged in some negotiations. However, JAF

informed the Smiths of its intent “to proceed under the existing purchase agreement

documents (up through the Third Amendment)” for the purchase of the sale

property, effective June 30, 2020. As a result, on December 21, 2020, the Smiths

sent Halpern a letter purporting to revoke the December 9, 2020 notice and

provided an “Updated Notice of First Right of Offer.” After Halpern’s attorney

responded with a letter disputing whether the Smiths had the right to revoke the

December 9, 2020 notice, the Smiths’ attorney represented in an email that the

December 21 notice was rescinded and that the Smiths intended to discuss and

negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement. The negotiations continued, and

Halpern sent draft transaction documents with regard to Halpern’s proposed

purchase, which the Smiths returned with revisions.

              The record reflects that in January 2021, Jason Friedman’s attorney

sent a letter to the Smiths’ attorney indicating that JAF was prepared to move

forward to closing and that the Smiths had a binding purchase agreement with JAF.

The Smiths included preclosing conditions with Halpern that required the receipt of

a release from JAF and a guarantee there would be no litigation with JAF, with

whom the Smiths were under contract to sell the property.

              Halpern and the Smiths were not able to successfully negotiate a

purchase agreement, and Halpern determined it was necessary to file a lawsuit.

Derek Smith attests in a supplemental affidavit that after the lawsuit was filed, the

Smiths entered into a settlement agreement with JAF and JAF no longer has any
rights or claims in the property under the purchase agreement with the Smiths. He

also attests that the Smiths still own the property and acknowledges that the ROFO

Agreement remains in effect.

               Halpern’s complaint, which was filed on February 12, 2021, raises

claims for breach of contract, specific performance, and injunctive relief. The

Smiths filed counterclaims for declaratory judgment and for abuse of process. After

the completion of discovery, the Smiths filed a motion for summary judgment on

Halpern’s complaint and on their counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Halpern

filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her claim for breach of contract as

to liability and on the Smiths’ counterclaims.

               On July 18, 2022, the trial court magistrate issued a decision with

findings of fact and conclusions of law. Halpern filed objections to the magistrate’s

decision, and the Smiths filed a response. On August 22, 2022, upon consideration

of the objections and after an independent review, the trial court issued an order

that adopted the magistrate’s decision, implicitly overruled the objections, and

entered a ruling on the summary judgment motions.1

       1 We note that the trial court did not explicitly rule on Halpern’s objections to the
magistrate’s decision. See Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). However, the court’s order adopting the
magistrate’s decision indicates that the objections were before the court for consideration
and its ultimate judgment reflects the court implicitly ruled on the objections. Other
courts have recognized objections to a magistrate’s decision can be implicitly overruled
by a trial court. See generally Galloway v. Galloway, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-21-043, 2023-
Ohio-29, ¶ 2; Redmond v. Wade, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 16CA16, 2017-Ohio-2877, ¶ 18,
fn. 3; Chatfield & Woods Sack Co., Inc. v. Nusekabel, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-980315,
1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4983, 5 (Oct. 22, 1999). No challenge has been raised herein.
              In part, the trial court determined that “the parties did not enter a

binding and enforceable agreement for the sale and purchase of the option parcel as

essential and material terms were not agreed upon and the terms not agreed to

cannot be defined by the Court because said terms are uncertain and indefinite.”

Additionally, the trial court found “any breaches by [the Smiths] as to the [ROFO

Agreement] were immaterial as [Halpern] eventually exercised the right and the

parties attempted to negotiate an agreement.” Also, the trial court found that

“[Halpern] did not demonstrate compensatory damages” and that Halpern was “not

entitled to specific performance or an injunction.” Ultimately, the trial court (1)

granted the Smiths summary judgment as to the affirmative claims brought by

Halpern and as to the Smiths’ counterclaim for declaratory judgment, and (2)

granted Halpern summary judgment as to the Smiths’ counterclaim for abuse of

process, which was unopposed and granted, and denied the remainder of Halpern’s

motion. The trial court further declared that “the Right of First Offer is a valid and

enforceable contract that remains in place between the parties to the agreement.”

              Halpern timely filed this appeal claiming the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment as to each of the three claims raised in the complaint.

      I.     Law and Analysis

              An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for

summary judgment de novo. Smathers v. Glass, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4595,

¶ 30, citing A.J.R. v. Lute, 163 Ohio St.3d 172, 2020-Ohio-5168, 168 N.E.3d 1157,

¶ 15. The appellate court conducts an independent review without deference to the
trial court’s findings, examines the evidence available in the record, and determines,

as if it were the trial court, whether summary judgment is appropriate using the

standard set forth in Civ.R. 56. Smathers at ¶ 30, citing Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc.,

FSB v. Salahuddin, 2020-Ohio-6934, 165 N.E.3d 761, ¶ 19-20 (10th Dist.). To

prevail under Civ.R. 56, the movant must show that “‘(1) there is no genuine issue of

material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and

(3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion when viewing evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and that

conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.’” Smathers at ¶ 31, quoting Grafton

v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

               We first consider Halpern’s breach-of-contract claim. “A cause of

action for breach of contract requires the claimant to establish the existence of a

contract, the failure without legal excuse of the other party to perform when

performance is due, and damages or loss resulting from the breach.” Lucarell v.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St.3d 453, 2018-Ohio-15, 97 N.E.3d 458, ¶ 41.

               The parties do not dispute that the ROFO Agreement constituted a

valid and enforceable contract between the parties. However, in addition to the

ROFO Agreement, Halpern maintains that the December 9, 2020 notice and

Halpern’s acceptance thereof constituted a valid and binding contract for the sale of

the property. We disagree.

               Initially, we recognize that there is a lack of case law in Ohio dealing

with a right of first offer, which differs from a right of first refusal. Generally, “a
‘right of first refusal,’ is a promise to present offers to buy property made by third

parties to the promisee in order to afford the promisee the opportunity to match the

[third party’s] offer.” Latina v. Woodpath Dev. Co., 57 Ohio St.3d 212, 212, 567

N.E.2d 262 (1991). Here, Halpern had a right of first offer, which gave Halpern the

right to make an offer to the Smiths for a potential purchase of the option parcel

before the Smiths were free to market the property and negotiate a sale with a third

party.2 Although Halpern cites to limited out-of-state authority, the cases she relies

upon are factually distinguishable and are not viewed as controlling authority.3

                Because this is a matter of contract, we apply ordinary contract

principles herein. The construction of written contracts is a matter of law. See Long

Beach Assn. v. Jones, 82 Ohio St.3d 574, 576, 697 N.E.2d 208 (1998), citing Inland

Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321,

322, 474 N.E.2d 271 (1984). “Where terms in an existing contract are clear and

unambiguous, this court cannot in effect create a new contract by finding an intent

       2Unlike the “first right to purchase” language used in Latina, which afforded the
promisee the first opportunity to purchase certain lots, in this matter, the language used
in the ROFO Agreement afforded Halpern the right to “make an offer” with respect to a
“potential purchase of the Option Parcel.” See id. at 214.

       3 For instance, in Kelly v. Ammex Tax & Duty Free Shops W., Inc., 162 Wash.App.
825, 256 P.3d 1255 (2011), the language of the agreement specifically stated a notice of
desire to sell “shall be deemed an offer of the premises,” but the seller failed to offer the
property to the grantee before offering the property to third parties. In Rcm Ls II, LLC v.
Lincoln Circle Assocs., LLC, C.A. No. 9478-VCL, 2014 Del.Ch. LEXIS 133 (July 28, 2014),
the language of the ROFO agreement specifically required all material terms to be
provided in a “Property Offer Notice” and afforded the grantee 30 days to accept the offer
and elect to purchase the property, but the seller agreed to sell the property to a third
party without sending a property offer notice to the grantee. The language of the ROFO
Agreement herein differs as do the circumstances of this case.
not expressed in the clear language employed by the parties.” Id. at 577, quoting

Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 246, 374 N.E.2d 146 (1978).

Moreover, “‘[t]he agreement of parties to a written contract is to be ascertained from

the language of the instrument, and there can be no intendment or implication

inconsistent with the express terms thereof.’” Latina at 214, quoting Blosser v.

Enderlin, 113 Ohio St. 121, 148 N.E. 393 (1925), paragraph one of the syllabus.

               Pursuant to the clear terms of the ROFO Agreement, the Smiths were

to provide written notice of their “intention to sell” with “proposed terms of the sale”

before “discussing, soliciting or negotiating any such sale with any Third Party.”

Halpern had the right to “make an offer to Owner with respect to a potential

purchase of the Option Parcel,” and if she invoked that right, then this triggered a

negotiation period “of forty-five (45) days thereafter,” during which the parties were

required to “discuss and negotiate in good faith regarding Halpern’s Offer.”

(Emphasis added.) If the parties failed, despite good faith efforts, to reach an

agreement within the 45-day period, then the ROFO Agreement provided that the

Smiths “shall thereafter be free to negotiate with any Third Party.” However, if the

option parcel was not sold within six months of the date of notice to Halpern, “then

before again marketing the Option Parcel to a Third Party, Owner shall again give

notice to Halpern of Owner’s intent to sell” in accordance with Section 1 of the ROFO

Agreement.

               It is clear from the express terms of the ROFO Agreement in this case,

that it is merely a contract affording Halpern the right to “make an offer” for the
“potential purchase” of the option parcel upon the notice of intention to sell with

proposed terms that was to be provided by the Smiths before the option parcel was

marketed to and negotiated with a third party. Upon Halpern electing to exercise

this right, the agreement required good faith negotiations on “Halpern’s Offer,” but

also contemplated what would occur if the parties failed to reach an agreement.

There was no requirement for the Smiths to accept the offer made by Halpern or for

the parties to enter a binding agreement. The terms of the contract are clear.

              Consistent with the ROFO Agreement, the December 9, 2020 notice

that was sent to Halpern clearly states: “Pursuant to Section 1 of the [ROFO]

Agreement * * * this notice is to inform you that [the Smiths] (“Owners”), intend to

sell a portion of the Option Parcel * * *.” (Emphasis added.) The notice included a

proposed purchase price of $1,500,000 and other proposed terms of sale, which

generally proposed that the owners would lease two sublots and there would be a lot

split, the owners would retain an option to purchase, and that there would be

easements to be addressed.4 The notice asked Halpern to “[p]lease confirm whether

or not you elect to exercise your first Right of Offer or waive and decide not to

purchase the Sale Parcel pursuant to the ROFO [Agreement] * * *.” On the election

that was endorsed by Halpern, Halpern acknowledged receipt of the written notice

of the Smiths’ “intent to sell” and the “proposed terms” of sale. Although Halpern

elected to exercise what was worded as the “right to purchase,” this was stated “to

      4Although the price was lower than the earlier notice, the proposed terms were
markedly different.
begin the 45-day negotiation period set forth in Section 1 of the ROFO [Agreement.]”

Contrary to Halpern’s assertion, the December 9, 2020 notice and Halpern’s

acceptance thereof did not create a binding contract for the sale of the property.

               The essential elements for formation of a contract include “‘an offer,

acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the bargained-for legal benefit

and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and legality of object and of

consideration.’” Rayess v. Educational Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 134

Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-5676, 983 N.E.2d 1267, ¶ 19, quoting Kostelnik v.

Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 16. Additionally, “[i]n

order to form any contract, there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties

regarding the contract’s essential terms, and those terms must be reasonably certain

and clear.” Bank of New York Mellon v. Rhiel, 155 Ohio St.3d 558, 2018-Ohio-5087,

122 N.E.3d 1219, ¶ 19, citing Kostelnik at ¶ 16-17.

               It is evident from the record that the December 9, 2020 notice was

provided in accordance with Section 1 of the ROFO agreement, and upon Halpern’s

election to exercise her right thereunder, the parties were to begin the 45-day

negotiation period. There was never a meeting of the minds between the parties,

and they never reached a definite and certain agreement.           As the trial court

recognized, the parties did not “divide real estate parcels into Sublots, form legal

descriptions for the parcels when the parcels have not been agreed to and defined

by the parties, and draft licenses and easements. These are material and essential

terms that were not agreed to fully by the parties[.]” As was the case in Kertes Ents.,
L.L.C. v. Sanders, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109584, 2021-Ohio-4308, at most, they

established an intent to form a contract if the parties could agree to the terms. Id.

at ¶ 27. Having failed to agree, they never formed a contract. See id. at ¶ 27-29.

               Upon our review, we determine as a matter of law that Halpern has

failed to establish the existence of a binding and enforceable contract for the sale of

the property. Without an enforceable sale or purchase contract, Halpern cannot

establish her claim for breach of contract thereon, and her claims to any other relief,

including compensatory damages, specific performance, and injunctive relief,

necessarily fail in this regard.

               Because the only enforceable contract was the ROFO Agreement, it is

all we shall further address. A material breach of contract is a breach essential to

the purpose of the contract. Whitt Sturtevant, LLP v. NC Plaza LLC, 2015-Ohio-

3976, 43 N.E.3d 19, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.), citing Software Clearing House, Inc. v. Intrak,

Inc., 66 Ohio App.3d 163, 170, 583 N.E.2d 1056 (1st Dist.1990). Halpern claims the

Smiths repeatedly violated the ROFO Agreement by marketing the option parcel and

contracting to sell it to a third party without providing proper written notice. She

further maintains reasonable minds could determine that the Smiths failed to

negotiate with Halpern in good faith. We have considered Halpern’s arguments,

and it is unnecessary to detail the claimed violations herein.

               Although the Smiths did not strictly adhere to the written-notice

requirements, the record demonstrates that Halpern received notice of the Smiths’

intention to sell and that Halpern declined to exercise the ROFO. Section 5 of the
ROFO Agreement allowed for a waiver of compliance, and the Smiths remained

obligated by the terms of the ROFO Agreement. In fact, Halpern elected to exercise

the ROFO upon the new written notice that was provided on December 9, 2020,

which contained proposed terms in accordance with the ROFO Agreement. Because

it is clear the alleged written-notice violations did not affect the enforceability or

purpose of the contract, even when construing the evidence in a light most favorable

to Halpern, reasonable minds could only conclude the claimed written-notice

violations were not material breaches. Regardless, even if it could be found that

material breaches had occurred in this regard or upon Halpern’s claim that the

Smiths failed to comply with the requirement to negotiate Halpern’s offer in good

faith, Halpern still must be able to show she suffered damages.

               “To recover on a breach-of-contract claim, the claimant must prove

not only that the contract was breached, but that the claimant was thereby

damaged.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Triskett Illinois, Inc., 97 Ohio App.3d 228, 235,

646 N.E.2d 528 (1st Dist.1994), citing Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 30 Ohio App.3d 162,

168, 507 N.E.2d 360 (6th Dist.1985); see also 180 Degree Solutions LLC v. Metron

Nutraceuticals, LLC, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109986, 2021-Ohio-2769, ¶ 54. Upon

reviewing the record herein, Halpern’s claims must fail because she cannot

demonstrate her entitlement to compensatory damages, specific performance, or

injunctive relief.

               Section 11 of the ROFO Agreement reflects the parties agreed that

when a party has not performed in accordance with the specific terms of the ROFO
Agreement, the other party “shall be entitled to seek an injunction or injunctions to

prevent breaches of the provision of this Agreement.” Although Halpern maintains

that at a minimum she is entitled to an injunction to prevent the property from being

sold, the record herein demonstrates that the Smiths are no longer bound by a

purchase agreement with JAF, the property has not been sold, and the parties

remain bound by the terms of the ROFO Agreement that still exists.5 Therefore,

Halpern cannot demonstrate entitlement to injunctive relief, and specific

performance or injunctive relief are not otherwise warranted.

               Monetary damages or damages for loss of value were not

contemplated by the express terms of the ROFO Agreement. Even if we accept that

Halpern may seek such damages for the alleged breaches of the ROFO Agreement,

in order to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of damages and survive

summary judgment, Halpern must set forth specific facts to show that she can

establish, with reasonable certainty, the existence and amount of her loss. See

Cleveland v. Sohio Oil Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78860, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS

5192, 13 (Nov. 21, 2001).

               As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, “‘[i]t is axiomatic that every

plaintiff bears the burden of proving the nature and extent of his damages in order

      5 This case is distinguishable from in Rcm Ls II, cited by Halpern, wherein the court

permanently enjoined a seller from proceeding with the pending sale of the property to a
third party and required the seller to start the process over in compliance with the ROFO
agreement at issue in that case. Rcm Ls II, C.A. No. 9478-VCL, 2014 Del.Ch. LEXIS 133,
at 30. Here, the record demonstrates that there is no longer a pending sale and that the
parties are still bound by the ROFO Agreement.
to be entitled to compensation.’”       Jayashree Restaurants, LLC v. DDR PTC

Outparcel LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-186, 2016-Ohio-5498, ¶ 13, quoting

Akro-Plastics v. Drake Industries, 115 Ohio App.3d 221, 226, 685 N.E.2d 246 (11th

Dist.1996). “Damages that result from an alleged wrong must be shown with

reasonable certainty, and a party cannot base them on mere speculation or

conjecture, regardless of whether the action is in contract or tort.” Id., citing

Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 19 Ohio App.3d 7, 17, 482 N.E.2d 955 (10th

Dist.1983); see also Elias v. Gammel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83365, 2004-Ohio-

3464, ¶ 25.

               Although Halpern provided an expert report on damages, it is not

determinative herein. A review of the ROFO Agreement shows it has no original

contract price and does not provide for any measure of damages. Furthermore,

contrary to Halpern’s argument, there is simply no basis upon which reasonable

minds could conclude the parties more likely than not would have reached a binding

agreement, but for any alleged breach. The ROFO Agreement, by its very nature,

provides Halpern with an opportunity for a potential purchase.             The record

demonstrates the parties were unsuccessful in their negotiations and never reached

mutual agreement with respect to certain essential and material contractual terms.

It would be purely speculative to assume a binding agreement would have been

reached. To the extent Halpern might believe she is entitled to the property on the

terms reached with JAF, we reiterate that she had a right of first offer, not a right of

first refusal. Because Halpern’s assertions are too remote and too speculative to be
proven with reasonable certainty, she has failed to establish a genuine issue of

material fact regarding damages resulting from a breach.

              We have fully considered all issues presented and are not persuaded

by any other arguments made by Halpern that are not specifically addressed herein.

We conclude the Smiths are entitled to summary judgment on all of Halpern’s

claims. Her assignments of error are overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR