Court Opinion

ID: 9471735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:39:54.730491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:32.890573
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with Judge Fairchild’s opinion in its dealing with the non-applicability of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), under the facts of this ease. I would, however, find that Bentley made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to have-counsel present under the circumstances when he executed a written waiver, did not request his attorney’s presence, and voluntarily made a statement to the FBI agent investigating the robbery on the occasions of subsequent meetings, especially when his attorney knew of the interviews and consented to. them. No objection was made to the agent’s testimony about Bentley’s statements, furthermore, by defendant-appellant’s counsel at trial. See Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975).
Even if the majority were correct that the record did not enable this court to make a determination of a knowing and intelligent waiver, I would not find that appellant’s failure to object on this ground at trial constituted “plain error” pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52. I would therefore find that appellant could not raise the issue on this appeal.
Finally, in view of the clear and convincing nature of the proof in this case presented by the prosecution, and no contrary evidence presented by the appellant, I would hold that any error made in admission of Bentley’s statements against his interest was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972); United States v. Charlton, *1131565 F.2d 86, 92 (6th Cir.1977). In my view, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming. The accomplice in the robbery identified appellant, and his testimony about the circumstances was corroborated by several witnesses. Appellant wore no mask; he had long, flowing hair, and the two used a distinctive, easily recognizable care in effectuating the robbery and the get-away.
The accomplice and appellant were fellow employees and appellant’s counsel conceded that appellant cooperated and pleaded guilty to a prior similar charge, involving robbery of a savings and loan, in which the accomplice was also apparently involved. Appellant had changed his appearance substantially when he was at trial with a “close-cut haircut,” (Jt.App. at 84) in contrast to his long hair1 at the time of the robbery. Yet appellant at trial was unequi-vocably identified by an eyewitness, despite the changed appearance, after he had on the day of the robbery a face-to-face confrontation of about ten minutes.
Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction in all respects.

. One witness described the suspect as having hair “a little longer than shoulder length.” (Jt. App. at 71).