Court Opinion

ID: 9700689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:44:36.94377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:13.586260
License: Public Domain

Peck, J.,
dissenting. Once again a majority of this Court demonstrates its unfortunate dedication to unrestrained activism as one of the primary factors to be applied in reaching its decisions. Without intending in any way to impugn the honesty; good faith or integrity of any of the parties in this specific case, the extreme activism being adopted as a philosophy by this and other courts frequently serves as an open invitation to judicially sanctioned fraud of the most obvious and egregious sort.
I recognize that there are situations in which the existence of a relevant fact is not subject to objective tests or measurements. Nevertheless, any result in the process of litigation which depends entirely on the purely subjective statement or *193judgment of a party, and has no objective support to establish the existence of a relevant fact, should be approached with the greatest caution, giving full consideration to the possibility of fraud, and an initial presumption that the Legislature did not intend such a possibility; it should not simply be swept aside with the indifference demonstrated by the majority in this case.
The majority cites and relies on McClure Bros. v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82, 2 A. 583 (1886); it is the essential keystone to the validity of its long opinion. But McClure is not in point. As the majority correctly describes that case, “the defendant agreed to purchase an organ from plaintiff if, on trying it, he was satisfied with it.” After playing the instrument, defendant declined to complete the purchase because he claimed personal dissatisfaction with its tone. The Court held for the defendant.
Unlike the case before us, there was no mechanical or other ascertainable defect in the organ. Even though an “expert” testified that its tone was good, this Court pointed out that defendant “was the one to be satisfied, and not another for him.” Id. at 87, 2 A. at 584. In short, McClure was one of those few instances in which, absent some actual and determinable defect, the controlling condition in the agreement is entirely subjective and personal to one of the parties; no other test is possible.
Thus, when the opinion claims that in McClure this Court interpreted “a similar use of the term ‘satisfied’ ” to conform to the majority’s subjective interpretation in this case, it sweeps the clear distinction between the two under the rug, or, to mix metaphors, washes it away in a deluge of rhetoric and legalese. A more dissimilar use of “satisfied” is hard to imagine. The whole tone and obvious intent of the controlling statutes are undeniably related to mechanical defects and warranties, and the right of the manufacturer to attempt repairs, including the right to “have one final opportunity to correct and repair the defect.” 9 V.S.A. § 4173(d) (emphasis added).
It is one thing to say that dissatisfaction with a product which is not based on ascertainable and possibly correctable defects can be, or well may be, purely subjective. Such instances are typified by modern advertising practices in which a product, such as a book, is offered for a free examination period, with the right to return the product before the end of the specified period at no cost or other obligation, if the prospective purchaser *194is not satisfied. Dissatisfaction in such instances may be purely subjective; it need not be based on demonstrable defects.
The potential for outright fraud and bad faith* if satisfaction, following success of the final repair effort, as in fact occurred here, is measurable by the purely subjective standard adopted by the majority, constitutes judicial activism at its most unrestrained and inexcusable. It is not difficult to suggest a hypothetical example of an unintended benefit which might be realized by a purchaser under a fact pattern similar to the case before us: the purchaser’s original order, which was duly filled, was for a blue vehicle; during the course of the manufacturer’s efforts to correct a defect, the purchaser decides he prefers a red vehicle. By simply saying he is not satisfied with the correction, and not being obligated to state any reason or even show good faith, he can now satisfy his revised preference for a new red car, or a refund with which to purchase one.
I conclude that McClure is not apposite; it is not on point because of the distinction outlined above. Although the majority opinion is long and replete with argumentative verbiage, McClure remains the underlying basis for the result. But, in fact, it does not support the conclusion reached by the Board or its affirmance by the majority. Assuming good faith, subjective satisfaction in McClure was the only standard available. It is as far removed from the correction of an ascertainable defect, which was not even a factor in McClure, as dark is from light.
There are broad sweeping statements in the majority opinion that are demonstrably questionable at best. To cite one example the majority, admitting some ambiguity in § 4173(d), nevertheless concludes: “the choice of wording is more consistent with a subjective standard than an objective one.” This is simply wrong; there is no better word to describe it.
If a subjective standard (which does not even require a showing that the expression of dissatisfaction is “real and not feigned, honest and not pretended”) was the intent of the Legislature, the language of § 4173(d) which grants the purchaser the *195right to recommence “arbitration,” even after he has expressed satisfaction “if the repair proves unsatisfactory,” is virtually meaningless. It is inconceivable that many consumers will express satisfaction after the manufacturer’s last effort, and risk another painful round of arbitration, when all they need to do is assert dissatisfaction, in order to obtain a brand new vehicle or a refund with which another car may be purchased. Contrary to the majority’s ill-considered comment, the language of § 4173(d) is far moré consistent with an objective standard, and with a logical assumption that the Legislature did not intend to countenance the opportunities for fraud and dishonesty created by the majority.
The majority comments dealing with speedy resolutions of disputes, and the “great” expense to the purchaser of retaining his own expert, are grossly exaggerated for effect. I cannot accept the likelihood that the fees of a qualified mechanic would be as prohibitive as the majority would have us believe, nor does the opinion cite any support for its contention. Moreover, any such expense should be recoverable if the car owner prevails; And finally, I cannot visualize either that the mere presentation of an expert witness at the hearing before the Board will delay the final resolution of the dispute for any measurable period of time, and the insurance against dishonesty and fraud provided by such witnesses for both parties safeguards the integrity of the procedure.
In my judgment the validity of the majority opinion and result crumbles with the fallacy of McClure as the underlying support. The rest deteriorates into an interesting but empty exercise in legal rhetoric which I cannot accept in silence. Accordingly, I dissent; I would reverse and remand.

 Although it is apparently not questioned in this case, it is noteworthy nevertheless that the Court in McClure did in fact require, in subjective cases, that the dissatisfaction must be “real and not feigned, honest and not pretended.” McClure, 58 Vt. at 87, 2 A. at 584.