Court Opinion

ID: 9768478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:05:30.882988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:41.265441
License: Public Domain

WADDILL, Commissioner.
The question presented on this appeal is whether an employee is entitled to benefits under our Workmen’s Compensation Act, KRS 342.001 et seq., for injuries received in the course of his employment from a fall against a hot stove, or upon hot sand, during a fainting spell which was subsequently diagnosed as an epileptic seizure. The compensation board held the injury noncompensable, and the circuit court affirmed its finding.
The accident of which the appellant complains occurred on October 4, 1950, the first day of his second employment with the appellee. The appellant was given a physical examination by the company doctor at. 9:00 a. m., and the accident occurred about 11:30 p. m., shortly, after he had checked in for work. When the appellant reported to work he was taken to the brass department and was . given. a respirator which he put over his mouth to prevent the inhalation of dust. The foreman had gone to get a shovel for appellant to use in shoveling sand. While the appellant was waiting, one of the other employees was showing him how to operate the shaker machine. Suddenly, the appellant’s eyes became glassy, and he fell; his arms and legs were shaking and froth appeared at his mouth. In falling, appellant either struck a hot stove or scraped his arms in *723the hot sand, causing serious abrasions and burns on his arms and hands.
The lay evidence, and the medical evidence, was to the effect that he suffered an epileptic seizure. The appellant admitted that he had suffered one other attack of unconsciousness while he was in the Armed Forces. However, he maintains that he was not advised, nor did he know that he was afflicted with epilepsy. An electro-en-cephalograph was made of appellant, and it was found that he has epilepsy of the grand mal type. The medical evidence indicates that his epileptoid condition is congenital.
A workman is not entitled to an award under our Workmen’s Compensation Act by merely proving that he was injured while in the course of his employment. He also has the burden of proving that the injury arose out of the employment, and this means that he must prove a causal connection between the employment and the injury. KRS 342.005(1). Draper v. Railway Accessories Co., 300 Ky. 597, 189 S.W.2d 934; Standard Oil Co. v. Witt, 283 Ky. 327, 141 S.W.2d 271; Billiter, Miller & McClure v. Hickman, 247 Ky. 211, 56 S.W.2d 1003. Since it was clearly established that appellant .was injured in the course of his employment we will not discuss that phase of the case.
Accidents arising out of the employment are those in which it is possible to trace the injury to the nature of the employee’s work or to the risks to which the employer’s business exposes the employee. Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp. v. Foster, Ky., 277 S.W.2d 14. The accident must be one resulting from a risk reasonably inci-_ dent to the employment. Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp. v. Stewart, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 912. It arises out of the occupation when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the servant works and the resulting injury. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W.2d 87; Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 P. 212, L.R.A. 1916F, 1164.
Where, as here, the claim for compensation is based upon the ground that the injuries sustained were caused by the physical aspects and hazards of the place where the workman was required to perform his services, the particular physical conditions may constitute a risk incident to the employment. In determining whether the risk exists, consideration must be given to the nature of the employment, the method by which the work is performed and the dangers attending its execution. Varao’s Case, 316 Mass. 363, 55 N.E.2d 451; General Ins. Corp. v. Wickersham, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 215. Regard must also be had to the impetuosity and heedlessness of youthful employees, and to the disabilities and infirmities of aged employees, because the compensation' act covers both classes of employees, and is not limited to employees who are in good health. Hendricks v. Kentucky & Virginia Leaf Tobacco Co., 312 Ky. 849, 229 S.W.2d 953; Cusick’s Case, 260 Mass. 421, 157 N.E. 596.
The place of employment may be structurally sound and in good condition and yet constitute a source of danger to one hired to work there and if the place may be fairly said to be the efficient and operative cause of the injury, then the employee is entitled to compensation, even though some infirmity or disability not traceable to the employment may be remotely connected with the injury. As is said in National Automobile & Casualty Ins. Co., v. Industrial Accident Commission, 75 Cal.App.2d 677, 171 P.2d 594, 595, “the authorities are overwhelming that where the injury is contributed to by some factor peculiar to the employment it arises out of the employment even though the fall has its origin solely in some idiopathy of the employee.”
In United States Casualty Co. v. Richardson, 75 Ga.App. 496, 43 S.E.2d 793, where an employee was afflicted with an epileptoid *724condition and was seized with an epileptic attack while in the course of his employment which caused him -to fall against a-sharp edge of a table, producing an injury when striking the table, the court held that it was a compensable accident arising out of and; in the course of the employment within the meaning o,f the Workmen’s Compensation, Act.
In Rockford Hotel Company v. Industrial Commission, 300 Ill. 87, 132 N.E. 759, 760, 19 A.L.R. 80, the court said:
“* * * Some cases hold • that, where an. employee is seized with a fit and falls to his death, the employer is not liable, because the injury did not arise out of .the employment (Van Gorder v. Packard Motor Car Co., 195 Mich. 588, 162 N.W. 107, L.R.A., 1917E., 522; Brooker v. Industrial Accident Comm., 176 Cal. 275, 168 P. 126, L.R.A.1918F., 878); but a majority of the courts, American .and English, hold that, if the injury was due. to -the fall, the employer is liable, . even though the .fall, was caused by a pre-existing- idiopathic condition. * *
Also,see, Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 740, p. 50, and Sec. 12.11, pp. 158—160, where the author considers “mixed risks” and the “increased danger rule applied to idiopathic falls.”
The conflicting views in cases where the employee is injured by falling on the floor or ground, as. distinguished from falling from ladders, or- into holes, or against, objects other than the floor or- ground, are exemplified by the majority -and dissenting opinions in Andrews v. L. & S. Amusement Corporation, 253 N.Y. 97, 170 N.E. 506, where compensation , was ' denied, and in Savage v. St. Aeden’s Church, 122 Conn. 343, 189 A. 599, where compensation was awarded.
It is necessary, in order to decide the instant case, to choose between the two conflicting'lines of authority. While we do not undertake to say here whether or not a recovery should be allowed in every case in which an employee, due to illness or for some other similar reason, suffers injuries in a fall, we do think that the evidence is sufficient in the present case to support an award of compensation. The appellant does not claim compensation for injuries caused by his - idiopathic condition, but seeks compensation for severe burns he received from falling into the hot stove, or the hot sand. McCarthy v. General Electric Co., 293 Pa. 448, 143 A. 116, 60 A.L.R. 1288. The fall was brought about by either a personal cause, or an employment cause, or á combination of both, -The law does not weigh the relative importance Of - the two causes, nor look for primary and secondary causes, it merely inquires whether the employment was a contributing factor. ' See,’ Larson’s Compensation Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 7.40, p. 50.
The 'appellant was hired to work in appellee’s plant after passing a pre-em-ployment physical examination; he was required to wear a 'special face mask to protect his respiratory system; there were unusual hazards and risks in the physical conditions of his place of work; and he became unconscious while performing his duties and fell into a hot stové or hot sand and suffered severe burns. ''Therefore, under these facts the only fair and reasonable finding that could be made was that the peculiar hazards of his employment were a contributing factor to his' accident and injury. We think there affirmatively appears a clear causal connection between the conditions under which the appellant was working and the occurrence of the injury. By approving compensation,'this opinion is in accord with the modern trend toward liberality in favor of the workman.
The judgment is reversed, with directions to remand the case to the compensation board for an award not inconsistent with this opinion.
SIMS and MONTGOMERY, JJ., dissent.