Court Opinion

ID: 9964218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 14:00:43.660629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:14.546413
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12126    Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 04/29/2024     Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-12126
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        JUANA ROSALINDA NOLASCO-NOLASKO,
        SEBASTIAN OTTONIEL NOLASCO-NOLASCO,
                                                                Petitioners,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A209-425-927
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                      23-12126

                                ____________________

        Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Juana Nolasco-Nolasco and her minor son seek review of the
        Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order adopting and affirm-
        ing the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her application
        for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United
        Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
        Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). 1 She raises two is-
        sues. First, she argues that substantial evidence does not support
        the IJ and BIA’s finding that she was ineligible for asylum and with-
        holding of removal because she showed a well-founded fear of per-
        secution on account of her indigenous Mayan Popti race. Specifi-
        cally, she argues that: (1) the systemic discrimination and economic
        social disparities facing indigenous Guatemalans constitute a pat-
        tern or practice of persecution, and (2) the agency should have
        found that her status as an indigenous Mayan was a central reason
        for the criminal violence she fears, as drug traffickers often target
        indigenous Guatemalans. Second, she argues that substantial evi-
        dence does not support the IJ and BIA’s finding that she was ineli-
        gible for CAT relief, and also that the BIA failed to give reasoned

        1 Nolasco-Nolasco’s son is a derivative beneficiary of her asylum claim but did

        not file his own claims for relief from removal, so we primarily focus on Juana
        Nolasco-Nolasco’s claims and arguments.
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        23-12126                Opinion of the Court                          3

        consideration to her CAT claim. After careful consideration, we
        deny Nolasco-Nolasco’s petition.
                                           I
                We review only the BIA’s decision unless the BIA adopts the
        IJ’s decision, in which case we review the adopted portions of the
        IJ’s opinion in addition to the BIA’s decision. Tang v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        578 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2009).
                We review factual determinations under the substantial ev-
        idence standard, “which provides that the decision can be reversed
        only if evidence compels a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise.”
        Lyashchynska v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2012)
        (quotation marks omitted). We must affirm “[i]f the BIA’s decision
        is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on
        the record considered as a whole.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
        “[T]he mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion
        is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings.”
        Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir.
        2007) (quotation marks omitted). We “view the record evidence
        in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and draw all
        reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.” Id. (quotation
        marks and citation omitted).
               To establish eligibility for asylum, a noncitizen must, with
        specific and credible evidence, establish (1) past persecution on ac-
        count of a statutorily protected ground, or (2) a “well-founded fear”
        that the noncitizen will be persecuted on account of a protected
        ground. Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                23-12126

        2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b). The protected grounds include,
        among other things, race and membership in a “particular social
        group.” Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 101(a)(42), 8
        U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b).
                A well-founded fear of future persecution may be estab-
        lished by showing: (1) past persecution, which creates a presump-
        tion of a “well-founded fear” of future persecution; (2) a reasonable
        possibility of being singled out for persecution on account of a pro-
        tected ground that cannot be avoided by relocating within the sub-
        ject country; or (3) a pattern or practice in the subject country of
        persecuting members of a group of which the alien is a part, such
        that the alien faces a reasonable possibility of being persecuted. 8
        C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1), (2). To establish a “pattern or practice” of
        persecution based on membership in a group, the applicant must
        show “extreme and pervasive” persecution. Lingeswaran v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 969 F.3d 1278, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2020). A government’s
        efforts to improve the situation for a minority group weigh against
        a determination that the country has a pattern or practice of perse-
        cuting the group. See id. at 1291 (concluding that the record did
        not compel a finding that there was a pattern of practice of perse-
        cuting Tamils in Sri Lanka after the end of the Sri Lankan civil war,
        despite evidence “that Tamils still encounter[ed] discrimination
        and mistreatment,” and noting the government’s “recognized ef-
        forts to improve the situation for Tamils and reconcile the country
        since the conclusion of the war, albeit slowly”).
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        23-12126                Opinion of the Court                            5

               Persecution is an extreme concept that is evaluated by con-
        sidering the cumulative impact of the harms suffered by the peti-
        tioner. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir.
        2009) (quotation marks omitted). Economic deprivation that falls
        short of depriving a petitioner of any means to earn a living does
        not constitute persecution. Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 275 F.3d
        1334, 1340 (11th Cir. 2001); see Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d
        1283, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2021).
               An alien must prove that he suffered, or will suffer, persecu-
        tion that is “on account of” a protected ground, a connection
        known as the “nexus” requirement. Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        935 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2019). To satisfy the nexus require-
        ment, the protected ground must have been, or will be, “at least
        one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” INA §
        208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). A reason is central if it is
        essential to the motivation of the persecutor, and if the protected
        ground is incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to an-
        other reason for harm, it is not central. Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 998 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021). We have stated that “ev-
        idence that either is consistent with acts of private violence . . . or
        that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal
        activity, does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a
        statutorily protected ground.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d
        1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2006).
             A noncitizen is eligible for withholding of removal if she
        shows that, upon return to her country, she more likely than not
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12126

        will be persecuted there due to a protected ground, such as her race
        or membership in a particular social group. INA § 241(b)(3), 8
        U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Withholding of removal
        contains the same nexus requirement as asylum, and the “more
        likely than not” standard is higher than the “well-founded fear”
        standard for asylum, so an applicant who fails to meet her burden
        of meeting the asylum eligibility test necessarily fails to show eligi-
        bility for withholding of removal. Sanchez-Castro, 998 F.3d at 1286.
               Here, as an initial matter, Nolasco-Nolasco does not chal-
        lenge the IJ and BIA’s determination that the physical violence she
        experienced from her father and Juan Nolasco or the emotional and
        financial abuse she experienced from her mother-in-law, as well as
        her fear of future harm at their hands, was not on account of her
        race or her membership in a particular social group. When a
        noncitizen fails to offer an argument on an issue, or “makes only a
        passing reference” to it in her brief, that issue is deemed aban-
        doned. Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1341; Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). Therefore, she has aban-
        doned any challenge to the IJ’s nexus finding as to harm inflicted
        by these three individuals.
               Substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA’s conclusion
        that Nolasco‑Nolasco was ineligible for asylum and withholding of
        removal because she did not demonstrate an objectively reasona-
        ble fear of future persecution based on her race. Nolasco-Nolasco’s
        contention that the severe poverty experienced by indigenous peo-
        ple is a part of a pattern or practice of persecution by the
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        23-12126                Opinion of the Court                          7

        Guatemalan government has some support from the Country Re-
        port and the OAS Report. But the record does not compel a finding
        either that indigenous peoples in Guatemala face extreme social
        and economic discrimination rising to the level of persecution, or
        that the alleged discrimination faced by indigenous peoples consti-
        tutes extreme and pervasive persecution sufficient to establish a
        pattern or practice. See Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d 1353; Lingeswaran,
        969 F.3d at 1290-91.
                Nolasco‑Nolasco gave limited personal testimony as to the
        economic conditions faced by indigenous people, and the OAS Re-
        port states that the majority of Guatemalans are affected by pov-
        erty, violence, insecurity, and corruption. Moreover, the record
        indicates that indigenous people were provided equal rights by law,
        and the government was required to recognize their customs and
        traditions. And the report notes the efforts of the Guatemalan gov-
        ernment to address poverty and violence in indigenous communi-
        ties with support programs like the National Housing Fund and
        model police precincts, and with expansions in primary education.
        Thus, the record as a whole does not compel a finding that the eco-
        nomic disadvantages experienced by indigenous persons are severe
        enough to constitute the deprivation of any means of earning a liv-
        ing, as required to rise to the level of persecution, or that there is a
        pattern or practice of persecution. See Barreto-Claro, 275 F.3d at
        1340; Lingeswaran, 969 F.3d at 1290–91.
              Substantial evidence also supports the finding that the gang
        violence Nolasco-Nolasco fears would not be on account of her
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12126

        race or ethnicity. Though Nolasco‑Nolasco testified that drug traf-
        fickers use Mayan children to sell drugs and Mayan adults to culti-
        vate drugs, the record does not compel a finding that the indige-
        nous status of such persons is a central reason they are targeted by
        traffickers.
                                          II
                We review legal issues de novo, including whether the BIA
        afforded a petition “reasoned consideration.” Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        931 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2019). To show reasoned considera-
        tion, the BIA need only draft a decision that shows it has “con-
        sider[ed] the issues raised and announc[ed] its decision in terms suf-
        ficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and
        thought and not merely reacted.” Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d
        792, 803 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Seck v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d
        1356, 1364 (11th Cir. 2011)). While the agency has to consider all
        evidence submitted by a petitioner, it need not specifically address
        every piece of evidence. Id.
                To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant must show that
        she more likely than not will be tortured if removed to the pro-
        posed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Reyes-Sanchez
        v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004). In this con-
        text, “torture” means:
               any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
               physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a per-
               son for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or
               a third person information or a confession, punishing
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        23-12126               Opinion of the Court                          9

               him or her for an act he or she or a third person has
               committed or is suspected of having committed, or
               intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person,
               or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
               when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
               instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
               a public official or other person acting in an official
               capacity.
        8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). To acquiesce, an official must, prior to the
        torture, (1) actually know of the torture, or be aware of its high
        probability and deliberately avoid learning the truth, and (2) breach
        his legal responsibility to intervene. Id. § 1208.18(a)(7). An official
        does not acquiesce if he intervenes but is unsuccessful. Id.; Sanchez-
        Castro, 998 F.3d at 1288.
                Here, the record does not demonstrate that the BIA failed to
        give reasoned consideration to Nolasco-Nolasco’s CAT claim. The
        BIA specifically rejected Nolasco‑Nolasco’s argument about willful
        blindness, noted that she reported no past torture, and concluded
        she had failed to establish that it was more likely than not that she
        would be tortured in the future. These findings are sufficient to
        demonstrate the BIA’s reasoned consideration. See Jeune, 810 F.3d
        at 803.
               Substantial evidence supports the determination that No-
        lasco-Nolasco is ineligible for CAT protection because she did not
        demonstrate that she more likely than not would be tortured by or
        with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government. The
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                23-12126

        widespread discrimination and poverty Nolasco-Nolasco raises un-
        der her asylum claims does not constitute torture under the law.
        See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). Furthermore, the record does not com-
        pel a finding that Nolasco-Nolasco will more likely than not suffer
        mistreatment “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the con-
        sent or acquiescence of” a government official. 8 C.F.R.
        § 208.18(a)(1). The record indicates that the Guatemalan govern-
        ment has made efforts to combat poverty, discrimination, and vio-
        lence. The limited success, or lack thereof, of these efforts do not
        support a finding of governmental acquiescence to torture. See
        Sanchez-Castro, 998 F.3d at 1288.
                                      * * *
               Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that No-
        lasco-Nolasco was ineligible for asylum and withholding of re-
        moval. The BIA gave reasoned consideration to Nolasco-Nolasco’s
        CAT claim and substantial evidence supports the determination
        that Nolasco-Nolasco did not demonstrate that she more likely than
        not would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the Guatema-
        lan government. Therefore, we deny Nolasco-Nolasco’s petition.
              PETITION DENIED.