Court Opinion

ID: 9793955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:55:45.116123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:08:51.622380
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I cannot agree that the trial court’s error in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing in regard to Mattern’s suppression motion was harmless error. According to Mat-tern’s supportive documents, the police *237“made a cursory search of the vehicle from the outside by shining a flashlight beam therein.” Other than the mention of a jug of whiskey, nothing was observed as a result of the outside search by the officers. Mattern further asserts that, without his permission, one of the officers, “opened the front door (right side) of said truck; climbed in and searched it with the aid of a flashlight; and thereupon found and seized the property which is the subject matter of the motion to suppress.” The prosecution, in its opposition to the motion to suppress, filed the affidavit of Ketchi-kan Police Sergeant Roy Edwardson. The only relevant portion of this affidavit reads, “ . . . I observed through the side window, women’s garments and what appeared to be a wig in the defendant’s vehicle.1
Criminal Rule 37(c) (5) requires that, “The judge . . . shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.” Since Mattern’s motion asserted facts which would require suppression and the prosecution’s opposition controverted Mattern’s assertions, an evidentiary hearing was required. Thus, I am of the view that the case should be remanded to the superior court for the purpose vof holding an evidentiary hearing. This evidentiary hearing should be conducted by a superior court judge other than the trial judge in this case. Reassignment is necessary because the trial judge previously determined credibility issues, solely from affidavits, against Mat-tern.2
I find the court’s conclusion that “even under Mattern’s fact description the search was valid” is not warranted by the record. One of the rationales offered for the court’s harmless error conclusion is that the officers’ entrance into the van was lawful because he feared that his life was endangered by accomplices possibly hiding within the van.3 A reading of Sergeant Edwardson’s affidavit fails to disclose a basis for the conclusion that any of the officers had reasonable grounds to fear physical danger from the accomplices possibly hidden inside the van.4 Significantly, a *238pat down of Mattern disclosed that he was armed with two Tampax pads. The majority also asserts that entry into the van to protect against hidden accomplices was required because “the structure of the van was such that, according to the appellant, the police did not have a clear view of its interior.” This statement is not borne out by the record. My reading of the relevant portions of the record shows that the police were amply protected from the threat of potential accomplices, by looking through the side windows of this particular vehicle. From these vantage points, they had unobstructed views of the floorboard to the rear of the vehicle. No evidence indicates a reasonable basis for the officers’ fear of physical danger. Nor does the evidence show that they could not have seen an accomplice hidden in the interior of the vehicle by looking through its side windows. Therefore, I cannot agree that the superior court’s ruling refusing to grant Mattern an evidentiary hearing was harmless error.5 I concur in the court’s disposition of the sentence appeal aspect of this case.

. I do not believe that Justice Erwin’s characterization of the police conduct in question here as a stop and frisk, rather than an arrest, is of assistance in analyzing the search and seizure issue presented in the case at bar.

. Sergeant Edwardson’s affidavit reads in part as follows:
1. That I am a Sergeant on the Ket-chikan Police Department.
2. That I arrived at the scene of the alleged burglary at approximately 4:15 a. m. on the date in question.
3. That I instructed the officers under my charge to advise the defendant of his constitutional rights immediately after he was apprehended.
4. That I observed, through the side window, women’s garments and what appeared to be a wig in the defendant’s vehicle.
5. That I was aware the vehicle being operated by the defendant was the property of the Ketchikan School District.
6. That I advised the officers under my charge to take the subject into custody. The subject was under arrest at that time and would not have been allowed to leave.

. The trial judge, in denying Mattern’s suppression motion, stated in part:
Well, let me say that I believe the statement of the sergeant under oath where he said that I observed through the side window women’s garments and what appeared to be a wig in the defendant’s vehicle. I believe that there’s credence in this testimony.
The motion to suppress is denied.
After the state had presented its case-in-chief, Mattern’s trial counsel renewed his motion to suppress. I do not view this renewal as a waiver of any objections Mat-tern had to the trial court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing. At no time was Mattern afforded the opportunity of testifying as to his version of the events which took place after his vehicle was stopped.

. The court’s reasoning appears somewhat inconsistent. It escapes me how one can say that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, and in the same breath conclude that Mattern’s moving documents show no basis for the granting of a suppression hearing, after stating that an evidentiary hearing must be held when the movant alleges facts that, if proved, would require granting the motion.

. Review of the testimony at trial yields a similar result. There simply is no indication that the officers had a reasonable basis to fear violence from the hands of any hidden accomplice of Mat-tern.