Court Opinion

ID: 9915765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 15:07:54.002432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:27.747703
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeal of City Turf Club Op Co. :           CONSOLIDATED CASES
                                       :
From a Decision of: Zoning Board       :
of Adjustment                          :
                                       :
Appeal of: Packer Park Civic           :           No. 731 C.D. 2022
Association                            :

In re: Appeal of Packer Park Civic             :
Association                                    :
                                               :
From a Decision of: Zoning Board               :
of Adjustment                                  :
                                               :
Appeal of: Packer Park Civic                   :   No. 733 C.D. 2022
Association                                    :   Argued: November 9, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                                            FILED: January 8, 2024

               These consolidated appeals1 involve two separate orders of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Trial Court). Each order deals with a
different aspect of the application of City Turf Club Op Co. (Applicant) to relocate
an existing race and sportsbook operation from its current location at 700 Packer

      1
          This Court consolidated these matters sua sponte by order dated November 4, 2022.
Avenue, Philadelphia, to a new location inside a Chickie’s & Pete’s restaurant
located at 1526 Packer Avenue, Philadelphia (Relocation Application).
              In the first of these two matters, the Philadelphia Department of
Licenses and Inspections (L&I) retracted a notice of referral and issued a notice of
refusal under the Philadelphia Zoning Code (Zoning Code)2 regarding the
Relocation Application. Applicant appealed L&I’s notices to the Philadelphia
Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board), which sustained the appeal. The Trial Court
affirmed the Board’s determination.
              In the second matter, the Board denied Applicant’s Application for
Special Exception. The Trial Court reversed the Board’s decision after determining
that the Board erred and abused its discretion in concluding that Applicant had not
met the standard for the issuance of a special exception.
              Upon review, we affirm the Trial Court’s orders.
                       I. Background and Procedural Posture
              On July 31, 2020, Applicant submitted the Relocation Application to
L&I seeking to relocate its existing race and sportsbook operation from 700 Packer
Avenue (Current Location) to the Chickie’s & Pete’s restaurant located at 1526
Packer Avenue (New Location). See Trial Court Memorandum Opinion dated July
1, 2022 (Trial Court Opinion)3 at 2. The New Location is in a CA-1 zoning district,
where casinos are not a permitted use. See id.

       2
                 PHILA.,     PA.,     ZONING         CODE         (2012),      available      at
https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/philadelphia/latest/philadelphia_pa/0-0-0-203439     (last
visited Jan. 5, 2024).

       3
        The Trial Court adopted the Trial Court Opinion as its Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(a) opinion for both Commonwealth Court Docket Nos. 731 C.D. 2022 and 733
C.D. 2022 prior to this Court’s consolidation of the matters.

                                               2
              On August 13, 2020, L&I issued a Notice of Referral determining that
the sportsbook operation that was the subject of the Relocation Application
constituted an “assembly and entertainment” use requiring a special exception.4 See
L&I Notice of Referral dated August 13, 2020 (Notice of Referral), Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 537a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 2. Based on the Notice of
Referral, on September 11, 2020, Applicant filed a special exception application
with the Board (Special Exception Application). See Special Exception Application;
R.R. at 539a-40a.
              The Board conducted an initial hearing on the Special Exception
Application on December 1, 2020. See Notes of Testimony, December 1, 2020 (N.T.
12/1/2020); R.R. at 20a-112a. At the December 1, 2020 hearing, the Packer Park
Civic Association (Association), through counsel, contested both the Special
Exception Application and L&I’s Notice of Referral. The Association argued that
L&I should have categorized the sportsbook operation as a “casino” use requiring a
use variance as opposed to an “assembly and entertainment” use requiring only a
special exception. At the conclusion of the December 1, 2020 hearing, the Board
scheduled the resumption of the hearing on the Special Exception Application for
February 10, 2021.
              On January 28, 2021, prior to the scheduled resumption of the hearing,
L&I revoked the Notice of Referral and issued in its stead a Notice of Refusal that
explained that “the [Notice of R]eferral [for the Relocation] Application [that] was

       4
         A “referral” is a procedure under the Zoning Code whereby L&I may refer a use permit
application to the Board for a special exception approval determination if an application to the
Board for a special exception is filed within 30 days of the L&I referral. See Zoning Code § 14-
303(7).

                                               3
issued on [August 13, 2020,5] was incorrect. The corrected [Notice of R]efusal was
issued on 1/28/2021.” L&I Notice of Refusal dated January 28, 2021 (Notice of
Refusal), R.R. at 674a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 2-3. Applicant appealed the
revocation of the Notice of Referral and issuance of the Notice of Refusal on
February 4, 2021. See Application for Appeal dated February 4, 2021; R.R. at 671a-
72a.
              The Board conducted further hearings on the matter on February 10,
2021, March 9, 2021, May 25, 2021, and June 9, 2021. See Notes of Testimony,
February 10, 2021 (N.T. 2/10/2021), R.R. at 113a-86a; Notes of Testimony, March
9, 2021 (N.T. 3/9/2021), R.R. at 187a-402a; Notes of Testimony, May 25, 2021
(N.T. 5/25/2021), R.R. at 403a-529a; Notes of Testimony, June 9, 2021 (N.T.
6/9/2021), R.R. at 530a-34a. Thereafter, the Board issued two decisions filed on
February 27, 2022, and March 3, 2022. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law of the Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment filed February 27, 2022
(February 2022 Board Decision); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the
Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment filed March 3, 2022 (March 2022 Board
Decision) (collectively, Board Decisions). In one of the Board Decisions, the Board
reversed L&I on the Notice of Referral/Notice of Refusal issue, determining, as had
L&I initially, that L&I should have referred the Relocation Application to the Board
as an “assembly and entertainment” use to determine whether Applicant could meet
the required burden for the issuance of a special exception. See March 2022 Board
Decision; see also Trial Court Opinion at 3. In the other Board Decision, the Board
determined that Applicant did not meet its burden for the issuance of a special

       5
        The Notice of Refusal erroneously indicated that L&I had issued the Notice of Referral
on September 4, 2020. See Notice of Refusal, R.R. at 647a.

                                              4
exception. See February 2020 Decision; see also Trial Court Opinion at 3. Appeals
to the Trial Court of both the Board’s determinations were filed; the Association
challenged the decision relating to the Notice of Refusal, and Applicant challenged
the decision relating to the special exception determination.
             On July 1, 2022, the Trial Court affirmed the Board’s conclusion in the
March 2020 Decision that the relocated sportsbook operation at the New Location
is an “assembly and entertainment” use as opposed to a “casino” use. However, the
Trial Court reversed the Board’s conclusion in the February 2020 Decision that
Applicant had not met the requirements for the issuance of a special exception. See
Trial Court Opinion at 1-2 & 12. The Trial Court remanded the matter to the Board
with instructions to issue Applicant a special exception allowing for the relocation
of Applicant’s sportsbook operation from the Current Location to the New Location.
See Trial Court Order dated July 1, 2022 (Trial Court Order) at 1-2 (pagination
supplied); see also Trial Court Opinion at 12. The Association appealed to this
Court.
                                       II. Issues
             The instant appeal presents two questions, succinctly summarized by
Applicant as follows: “(a) is the operation of a [s]portsbook located within . . . an
existing restaurant/bar properly considered an assembly and entertainment use; and
(b) if so, did [Applicant] provide sufficient evidence to the [] Board [] to entitle it to
the issuance of a [s]pecial [e]xception[?]” Applicant’s Br. at 2.
             The Association presents multiple alternative theories of Trial Court
error. First, the Association argues that the Board erred by overruling L&I’s
determination that the proposed sportsbook is a licensed gaming facility under the

                                            5
Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act (Gaming Act).6 See
Association’s Br. at 22-30. Second, the Association alternatively argues that the
record contains substantial evidence to support the Board’s denial of a special
exception due to Applicant’s failure to meet its initial burden of production under
the Zoning Code. See Association’s Br. at 30-36. Third, the Association argues
that, if Applicant met its initial burden regarding the special exception application,
the Association produced adequate credible evidence that the existence of a
sportsbook at the New Location would have a detrimental impact on the health,
safety, and welfare of the community, which credible evidence Applicant failed to
rebut. See Association’s Br. at 37-45. Finally, the Association argues, also in the
alternative, that it demonstrated that the relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook
operation to the New Location would fail to conform to the purpose, spirit, and intent
of the Zoning Code. See Association’s Br. at 46-47.
               Applicant counters by arguing that the Trial Court correctly determined
that L&I properly issued the initial Notice of Referral for a special exception rather
than a Notice of Refusal. See Applicant’s Br. at 14-23. Further, Applicant argues
that the Trial Court properly found that Applicant fulfilled all the requirements for a
special exception and that the Association failed to meet its burden to demonstrate
that the relocation of its sportsbook operation to the New Location would adversely
affect the community. See id. at 23-37.
                                    III. Discussion
               Where a court of common pleas takes no additional evidence in
reviewing a land use appeal determination by a zoning hearing board, this Court’s
standard of review is limited to determining whether the local governing body that

      6
          4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1101-1904.

                                           6
issued the challenged decision abused its discretion or committed an error of law.
Miravich v. Twp. of Exeter, Berks Cnty., 54 A.3d 106, 110 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012);
see also Metal Green Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 266 A.3d 495, 513 (Pa. 2021).
Local governing bodies abuse their discretion by making factual findings that are
not supported by substantial evidence. Miravich, 54 A.3d at 110 n.4. “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” In re Rural Route Neighbors, 960 A.2d 856, 860 n.4 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2008).
A. Notice of Referral v. Notice of Refusal
              As the Board noted, because nothing changed between L&I’s issuance
of the Notice of Referral and its subsequent retraction and replacement of the Notice
of Referral with the Notice of Refusal, the legal question before the Board in
Applicant’s appeal was whether Applicant’s proposed sportsbook use for the New
Location was an “assembly and entertainment” use or a “casino” use under the
Zoning Code. See March 2022 Board Decision at 6. This issue presents a question
of statutory interpretation. When interpreting the meaning of a zoning ordinance,
we are guided by the principles of statutory construction with the primary objective
of determining the intent of the legislative body that enacted the ordinance. See
THW Grp., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.3d 330, 336 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
We note that Section 603.1 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
(MPC),7 which provides general principles relating to the interpretation of local
zoning ordinances, states as follows:

       7
        Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L.
1329, 53 P.S. § 10603.1.

                                              7
             In interpreting the language of zoning ordinances to
             determine the extent of the restriction upon the use of the
             property, the language shall be interpreted, where doubt
             exists as to the intended meaning of the language written
             and enacted by the governing body, in favor of the
             property owner and against any implied extension of the
             restriction.

53 P.S. § 10603.1. Generally, a “zoning officer shall administer the zoning ordinance
in accordance with its literal terms[.]” Section 614 of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10614.
Additionally, “[w]here [a] statute or ordinance defines a word or phrase therein the
court is bound thereby.” Hughes v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 108 A.2d 698, 699 (Pa.
1954) (emphasis omitted). As our Supreme Court has explained:

             A legislative body may, in a statute or ordinance, furnish
             its own definitions of words and phrases used therein in
             order to guide and direct judicial determination of the
             intendments of the legislation although such definitions
             may be different from ordinary usage; it may create its
             own dictionary to be applied to the particular law or
             ordinance in question.

Hughes, 108 A.2d at 699 (quoting Sterling v. City of Phila., 106 A.2d 793, 795 (Pa.
1954)). Further, “[w]ith respect to zoning matters, undefined terms are given their
plain meaning, and any doubt is resolved in favor of the landowner and the least
restrictive use of the land.” Kohl v. New Sewickley Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 108
A.3d 961, 968 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (some brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted).
             With this background in mind, we now turn to the Zoning Code and the
relevant definitions contained therein. The Zoning Code defines “assembly and
entertainment” uses, in relevant part, as “[u]ses that provide gathering places for

                                         8
participant or spectator recreation, entertainment, or other assembly activities.
Assembly and entertainment uses may provide incidental food or beverage service
for on- or off-premise[s] consumption.” Zoning Code § 14-601(7)(c). The Zoning
Code further defines a “casino” as a specific type of assembly and entertainment use
as follows: “A licensed gaming facility as authorized by the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania pursuant to 4 Pa.C.S. Part I, the ‘[Gaming Act].’” Zoning Code § 14-
601(7)(c)(.1). The Zoning Code continues to explain that “[a] ‘casino’ may also be
referred to as a ‘licensed gaming facility’.” Id.
              The Gaming Act, on which the Zoning Code’s definition of “casino”
relies, does not include a definition of the term “licensed gaming facility.” The
Gaming Act does, however, define the term “licensed facility” as follows:

              (1) The physical land-based location at which a licensed
              gaming entity[8] is authorized to place and operate slot
              machines and, if authorized by the Pennsylvania Gaming
              Control Board under Chapter 13A (relating to table
              games), to conduct table games and if authorized under
              Chapter 13B (relating to interactive gaming), to conduct
              interactive gaming. The term includes any:

                  (i) area of a licensed racetrack at which a slot
                  machine licensee was previously authorized
                  pursuant to section 1207(17) (relating to
                  regulatory authority of board) to operate slot
                  machines prior to the effective date of this
                  paragraph;

                  (ii) board-approved interim facility or temporary
                  facility;

       8
         The Gaming Act defines a “licensed gaming entity” as “[a]ny slot machine licensee,
manufacturer licensee, supplier licensee or other person licensed by the Pennsylvania Gaming
Control Board [(PGCB)] under this part.” 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1103.

                                             9
                   (iii) area of a hotel which the Pennsylvania
                   Gaming Control Board determines is suitable to
                   conduct table games; and

                   (iv) area of a licensed facility where casino
                   simulcasting is conducted, as approved by the
                   Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board.

               (2) The term shall not include a redundancy facility or an
               interactive gaming restricted area which is not located on
               the premises of a licensed facility as approved by the
               Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board and which is
               maintained and operated by an interactive gaming
               certificate holder in connection with interactive gaming or
               casino simulcasting.

4 Pa.C.S. § 1103.
               Of further relevance, the Gaming Act restricts sports betting to licensed
facilities, temporary facilities, nonprimary locations, and the internet. See 4 Pa.C.S.
§ 13C21(a). The Gaming Act defines a “nonprimary location” as “[a]ny facility in
which pari-mutuel wagering is conducted by a licensed racing entity other than the
racetrack where live racing is conducted.” 4 Pa.C.S. § 1103. The Gaming Act
defines a “licensed racing entity” as “[a]ny legal entity that has obtained a license to
conduct live thoroughbred or harness horse race meetings respectively with pari-
mutuel wagering from the State Horse Racing Commission pursuant to the Race
Horse Industry Reform Act [(Racing Act)].[9]” 4 Pa.C.S. § 1103.10

      9
          3 Pa.C.S. §§ 9301-9374.

      10
         No dispute exists that Applicant, which has owned a live racing track in Bensalem,
Pennsylvania, since 2006, is a “licensed racing entity.”

                                            10
                Based on these definitions, the Board concluded that relocating
Applicant’s sportsbook operation to the New Location would not constitute a
“casino” use, but instead was properly categorized as an “assembly and
entertainment” use. See March 2022 Board Decision at 7. The Board decided that
msthe New Location, by virtue of not having slot machines or table games, would
not have the characteristics of a casino; that the Gaming Act distinguishes between
licensed facilities and nonprimary locations; and that a nonprimary location is not
transformed into a casino simply because sports betting is permitted at the location.
See March 2022 Board Decision at 7;11 see also Trial Court Opinion at 5. In making

      11
           Specifically, the Board explained as follows:

                In reaching this conclusion, the Board finds arguments raised in
                Applicant’s legal memorandum particularly persuasive. Notable
                among these are:

                    a. The Zoning Code defines a casino use by direct reference
                    to and in complete reliance on the [] Gaming Act . . . [and]
                    [t]here can be (and is) no dispute that [] Applicant’s
                    proposed use is not a casino – or “licensed facility” as is
                    the defined term under the Gaming Act.

                    b. The Proposed use will not have the distinctive
                    characteristics of a casino – slot machines and table games.

                    c. The [] Gaming Act distinguishes between licensed
                    facilities and “non[]primary locations.”

                    d. It is inconsequential that the Racing Act’s definition of
                    “nonprimary location” does not specifically reference
                    sports wagering given that the Gaming Act authorizes the
                    activity and permits it at nonprimary locations.

                    e. Section 13C21 of the Gaming Act discusses the locations
                    at which sports betting is authorized and identifies them
                    separately as (i) a licensed facility, (ii) a temporary facility,

                                                  11
this determination, the Board further considered the clarification provided by the
Chief Counsel to the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board that the New Location
will not constitute a “licensed facility” but instead will be a “nonprimary location”
under the Gaming Act.12 In consideration of this statement, the Board rejected the
argument that an applicant must be authorized to operate slot machines – and
therefore be a casino – in order to offer sports wagering at a nonprimary location.
See March 2022 Board Decision at 8.
             We find that the Board did not err by determining that the proposed
New Location is not a “casino” use under the Zoning Code. The New Location is a

                  (iii) online and (iv) a nonprimary location. The only
                  conclusion that could be drawn from this is that a
                  non[]primary location is not the same as a licensed facility
                  . . . and it does not become a licensed facility by the
                  [PGCB] authorizing sports betting to take place there.

                  f. The Gaming Act provision allowing sports betting at
                  non[]primary locations expressly prohibits casino gaming
                  at such locations.

March 2022 Board Decision at 7.

      12
          Chief Counsel to the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, R. Douglas Sherman,
Esquire, explained in a letter to Applicant’s counsel:

             You are correct in your assertion that the [Current Location] is not
             a “licensed facility” as it is not licensed by the [PGCB], it is not a
             Category 1, 2, 3 or 4 licensed facility and is not authorized to operate
             slots machines or table games . . . . [D]ecisions of the locus of
             nonprimary locations under the [Racing] Act are committed to the
             State Horse Racing Commission. If that Commission approves a
             location for a nonprimary location under its governing act, the
             location is considered a “nonprimary location” and is not a “licensed
             facility” under the Gaming Act.

March 2022 Board Decision at 7.

                                               12
proposed relocation of Applicant’s existing use at the Current Location: pari-mutuel
wagering on horse racing and sports wagering at a nonprimary location.              A
“nonprimary location” is separate and distinct from a “licensed facility” under the
Gaming Act, although sports betting is authorized at each. See 4 Pa.C.S. § 13C21.
“Licensed facilities” are those facilities authorized to operate table games and slot
machines, i.e., a traditional casino experience. See 4 Pa.C.S. § 1103. The proposed
New Location will have neither table games nor slot machines. Instead, the New
Location will only have pari-mutuel horse race betting and sports wagering, both of
which are allowed at nonprimary locations. As such, the use proposed by Applicant
for the New Location is that of a nonprimary location as opposed to a casino.
             Further, as the Trial Court observed, the argument that the Zoning
Code’s definition of “casino” was intended to be broad and cover facilities such as
the sportsbook proposed for the New Location is “speculative” and “betrayed by the
[text of the] actual statutes.” Trial Court Opinion at 5. As discussed supra, the
Zoning Code’s definition of casino relies on the text of the Gaming Act, which, when
read as a whole, differentiates between licensed facilities, where traditional casino
activities are permitted, and nonprimary locations, where only pari-mutuel horse
race betting and sports wagering are allowed.
             For these reasons, the Board did not err in sustaining Applicant’s appeal
and determining that L&I erred by withdrawing and replacing the Notice of Referral,
which requires an application to the Board for a special exception, with a Notice of
Refusal, which requires a variance from the Zoning Code.
B. Special Exception Requirements
             The Zoning Code empowers the Board to grant special exceptions in
Philadelphia. See Zoning Code § 14-103(4)(a)(.2). As this Court has explained,

                                         13
             [g]enerally speaking, a special exception is not an
             exception to a zoning ordinance, but rather a use which is
             expressly permitted, absent a showing of a detrimental
             effect on the community. The important characteristic of
             a special exception is that it is a conditionally permitted
             use, legislatively allowed if the standards are met.

Siya Real Est. LLC v. Allentown City Zoning Hearing Bd., 210 A.3d 1152, 1157 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2019) (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). An
applicant for a special exception in Philadelphia bears the initial burden of putting
forth evidence

             that the grant of a special exception will not cause the
             following specific detrimental impacts to the
             neighborhood beyond that which normally might be
             expected from the proposed use:

                 (.a) Congestion in the        public   streets   or
                 transportation systems;

                 (.b) Overcrowding the land;

                 (.c) Impairing an adequate supply of light and air
                 to adjacent property;

                 (.d) Burdening water, sewer, school, park, or
                 other public facilities;

                 (.e) Impairing or permanently injuring the use of
                 adjacent conforming properties;

                 (.f) Endangering the public health or safety by
                 fire or other means; or

                 (.g) Inconsistency with the Comprehensive Plan
                 of the City.

                                         14
Zoning Code § 14-303(7)(e)(.2).
             Once an applicant has met this initial burden, any objectors to a
proposed special exception use then have “the duty of presenting objective evidence,
and the burden of proof, that the proposed use is substantially likely to cause a
detrimental impact on the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood exceeding
that which normally might be expected from the proposed use.” Zoning Code § 14-
303(7)(e)(.3). “The objectors also may present evidence, and have the burden of
proof, that the proposed use fails to conform with the purpose, spirit, and intent of
this Zoning Code.” Id. Objectors must prove “to a high degree of probability” that
the impact from the proposed use will substantially affect the community health,
safety, and welfare to a greater extent than would be expected normally from that
type of use. Tower Access Grp., LLC v. S. Union Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 192
A.3d 291, 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (quoting Blancett-Maddock v. City of Pittsburgh
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 6 A.3d 595, 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)). Further, “an
objector cannot meet his burden with speculation.” Tower Access, 192 A.3d at 300.
             Regarding special exception determinations, the Zoning Code requires
that the “Board shall, in writing, set forth each required finding for each special
exception that is granted, set forth each finding that is not satisfied for each special
exception that is denied, and to the extent that a specific finding is not relevant to
the decision, shall so state.” Zoning Code § 14-303(7)(e).
             To meet its initial burden, Applicant called multiple witnesses to testify
before the Board. First, Chickie’s and Pete’s President and Chief Executive Officer,
Peter Ciarrocchi (Ciarrocchi), testified.      See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 27-42; N.T.
5/25/2021 at 38-40; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 2-3, Findings of Fact (F.F.)
Nos. 13-16 & 100. Ciarrocchi testified that Chickie’s and Pete’s is a restaurant and

                                          15
sports bar located at the New Location since 2003. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 28; see
also July 2021 Board Decision at 2, F.F. No. 14. Ciarrocchi explained his intent to
put a high-end boutique sportsbook into a 2,600-square-foot portion of Chickie’s
and Pete’s to provide his customers with an additional amenity to the existing sports
bar atmosphere. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 28; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3,
F.F. No. 15. Ciarrocchi explained that the introduction of the sportsbook will reduce
the New Location’s seating capacity. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 36. Ciarrocchi also
explained that he is part of the neighborhood and that, if he thought the proposed
relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook operation to the New Location would have any
adverse impact on the neighborhood, he would not do it. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 28
& 37-38. Ciarrocchi further testified that there will be no slot machines or table
games at the New Location, only the sportsbook operation. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at
39; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 16. The sportsbook will not
have a separate entrance and will not be open any time other than when Chickie’s
and Pete’s is open. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 40-41.
             Ronald Davis (Davis), the Director of Diversity and Community
Development for Parx Casino,13 also testified before the Board on Applicant’s
behalf. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 42-48; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F.
No. 18. Davis elaborated on a wide range of community outreach programs in which
Applicant participates and testified that the relocation of the sportsbook to the New
Location would be a great opportunity for the community, in that Applicant would
be able to expand its outreach programs. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 43-47; see also July
2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 18. Davis further testified that there would

      13
        Applicant is the operator of Parx Race and Sportsbook and a subsidiary of parent
company Parx Casino. See July 2021 Board Decision at 1, F.F. No. 1.

                                          16
“definitely” be no harm to public health or neighboring properties from the proposed
relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook to the New Location. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at
48; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 18.
             Matthew Cullen (Cullen), the Senior Vice President of Interactive
Gaming and Sports Wagering for Parx Casino, also testified on behalf of Applicant.
See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 49-58; N.T. 5/25/2021 at 14-37; see also July 2021 Board
Decision at 3, F.F. Nos. 19-24 & 92-99. Cullen testified that the Current Location
is too large a space to continue Applicant’s sportsbook operation, and that relocation
is necessary to preserve the business and its employees. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 49-
52; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 19. Cullen testified that the
New Location will be subject to oversight by multiple state agencies, including the
Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, the Pennsylvania Gaming Control
Board, and the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 52-53;
see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 22. Additionally, Cullen explained
that the New Location will not include slot machines or table games. See N.T.
12/1/2020 at 52-53; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 21. Cullen
further testified that the relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook operation to the New
Location would not harm the local community or neighborhood. See N.T. 12/1/2020
at 53 & 56; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 23. He explained that
the proposed relocation would not increase vehicular traffic in the area or overcrowd
local parking lots. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 54-55; see also July 2021 Board Decision
at 3, F.F. No. 23. Cullen also testified that the relocation would preserve many jobs
for the community. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 55; see also July 2021 Board Decision at
3, F.F. No. 23. Cullen reiterated that the sportsbook operation would not be open
beyond Chickie’s and Pete’s operating hours. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 56.

                                         17
            Applicant also presented the testimony of Jeremy Drummond
(Drummond), the principal architect working with Applicant on the relocation
project. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 59-71; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F.
Nos. 25-29. Drummond testified that the project is intended to downsize Applicant’s
sportsbook operation from the 36,000-square-foot space at the Current Location to
a 2,600-square-foot area in the New Location. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 60-61; see also
July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 26. The entire space would be enclosed,
and, for security purposes and to prevent entry by minors, there would be one
entrance to the sportsbook, when complete. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 62-64; see also
July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 26. Drummond explained that the project
would reduce the number of patrons within the New Location, and that no new
parking would be required to accommodate the sportsbook operation at the New
Location. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 64-67; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F.
No. 27. Drummond testified that the approval of the Relocation Application would
have no detrimental impacts on the surrounding community beyond that which
might normally be expected from the proposed use. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 67 & 69;
see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 29. Drummond explained that the
proposed relocation to the New Location would not cause traffic congestion,
overcrowd the land, or in any way increase burdens on water or sewer systems, local
schools, parks, or other public facilities. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 68; see also July
2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 29. Drummond further testified that the proposed
relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook operation to the New Location is consistent
with Philadelphia’s comprehensive plan. See N.T. 12/1/2020 at 68; see also July
2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. No. 29.

                                         18
             Fred Harran (Harran), Director of Public Safety for the Bensalem
Township Police Department, also testified on Applicant’s behalf.           See N.T.
3/9/2021 at 93-106; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 3, F.F. Nos. 68-72. Harran
testified that community concerns about increased crime in relation to bringing the
Parx Casino to Bensalem had been unfounded, and that crime actually decreased in
Bensalem in the 15 years since the Parx Casino became fully functional. See N.T.
3/9/2021 at 95-98; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 8, F.F. Nos. 69-70. Based
on this experience, Harran testified that he did not believe the relocation of
Applicant’s sportsbook from the Current Location to the New Location would lead
to an increase in neighborhood crime. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 98; see also July 2021
Board Decision at 8, F.F. No. 70. He further testified that he did not believe the
relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook operation from the Current Location to the New
Location would have a detrimental impact on the health, safety, and welfare of the
neighborhood as a whole. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 99; see also July 2021 Board
Decision at 8, F.F. No. 70. On cross-examination, Harran explained that he did not
attribute the decrease in crime in Bensalem to the presence of the Parx Casino but
noted instead that the community’s feared increase in crime never developed. See
N.T. 3/9/2021 at 99-100; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 8, F.F. Nos. 70-71.
             Independent traffic engineer Debbie Ferraro (Ferraro) also testified for
Applicant. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 108-43; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 8-9,
F.F. Nos. 74-80. Ferraro testified that she studied the possible traffic impact of the
relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook to the New Location and determined that an
overall reduction in vehicle trips at the site would occur during peak hours, based on
the reduced seating. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 112-15; see also July 2021 Board Decision
at 8, F.F. No. 74. She concluded that the site has adequate parking, in excess of

                                         19
Zoning Code requirements, for both patrons and employees. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at
116-18, 137 & 142; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 8, F.F. Nos. 74-75. Ferraro
also agreed that the relocation project would not cause unexpected congestion or
traffic in the neighborhood’s public streets or on the local transportation systems,
and that the relocation project would not impose an unexpected burden on local
parks, schools, or other public facilities. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 116; see also July
2021 Board Decision at 8, F.F. No. 75. Ferraro ultimately concluded that the
relocation project would not have a detrimental impact on the health, safety, and
welfare of the neighborhood. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 115; see also July 2021 Board
Decision at 8, F.F. No. 75.
              Jerry Fretz (Fretz), the Director of Security at Parx Casino,14 also
testified for Applicant. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 143-64; N.T. 5/25/2021 at 7-14; see
also July 2021 Board Decision at 9-10, F.F. Nos. 81-87 & 91. Fretz described the
basic security precautions expected at the New Location and testified that the
proposed relocation of the sportsbook to the New Location would have “no impact
whatsoever” on security. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 144-48; see also July 2021 Board
Decision at 9, F.F. No. 81. He testified that the relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook
operation to the New Location would not result in increased criminal activity in the
neighborhood. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 149-50. Fretz also testified that the relocation
of the sportsbook operation to the New Location would not cause impairment to the
surrounding community or neighborhood beyond what would normally be expected
of such a use and was not likely to cause an increased adverse impact on public

       14
          Fretz joined the Parx Casino Team in August of 2008, shortly after having retired from
31 years on the Philadelphia Police Department. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 144.

                                              20
health or safety. See N.T. 3/9/2021 at 148-49; see also July 2021 Board Decision at
9, F.F. No. 84.
               Additionally, Ian Hegarty of the Philadelphia City Planning
Commission (Planning Commission) testified that the Planning Commission
recommended granting Applicant’s Special Exception Application.                        See N.T.
6/9/2021 at 2; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 15, F.F. No. 126.
               To sustain its burden that the proposed use is substantially likely to
cause a detrimental impact on the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood
exceeding that which normally might be expected from the proposed use, the
Association presented the testimony of three witnesses before the Board. See N.T.
5/25/2021 at 41-106; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 11-15, F.F. Nos. 101-24.
First, the Association presented Les Bernal (Bernal), the national director of Stop
Predatory Gambling, a national non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C.15
See N.T. 5/25/2021 at 41-81; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 11-14, F.F. Nos.
101-20. Bernal’s testimony concentrated on the link between sports gambling and
gambling addiction, and the perceived threat and harm of moving the sportsbook
operation to the New Location. See N.T. 5/25/2021 at 41-42 & 45; see also July
2021 Board Decision at 11, F.F. No. 101. Bernal testified generally and broadly
about gambling, the gambling industry, and gambling addiction. See N.T. 5/25/2021
at 52-64; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 12-13, F.F. Nos. 109-14. Bernal
testified that the dangers of gambling presented a problem in this matter by moving

       15
          Bernal has a master’s degree in public administration and has been the executive director
of Stop Predatory Gambling since 2008. See N.T. 5/25/2021 at 42. He has testified before
legislative bodies across the country, including state legislatures, city councils, and the United
States Congress. See id. at 42-43. He has been quoted and cited over 600 times by newspapers
and magazines and has appeared on multiple national television and radio programs. See id. at 43.
He is not, however, a licensed addiction clinician. See N.T. 5/25/2021 at 77 & 79.

                                                21
closer to a residential area and opined that it was “outrageous” to propose relocating
the sportsbook operation to a restaurant in which children were present. See N.T.
5/25/2021 at 64-66 & 71-72; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 13, F.F. Nos. 114-
16. Bernal testified that he has never been to the New Location and has not been
even close to it recently. See N.T. 5/25/2021 at 48; see also July 2021 Board
Decision at 11, F.F. No. 106.
             Kristin Ricchiuti (Ricchiuti), Vice President of the Association, also
testified before the Board. See N.T. 5/25/2021 at 82-85; see also July 2021 Board
Decision at 14, F.F. No. 121. Ricchiuti lives in the neighborhood where the New
Location is located. See N.T. 5/25/2021 at 83; see also July 2021 Board Decision at
14, F.F. No. 121. Ricchiuti expressed her concern that the proposed use at the New
Location would normalize gambling behavior and thereby change the character of
the shopping center where Chickie’s and Pete’s is located and, thus, the character of
the neighborhood, by creating a “sordid atmosphere where [] childhoods advance far
too quickly.” N.T. 5/25/2021 at 84; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 14, F.F.
No. 121.
             Next, the Association presented the testimony of its President Barbara
Capozzi (Capozzi). See N.T. 5/25/2021 at 85-106; see also July 2021 Board
Decision at 14-15, F.F. Nos. 122-24. Capozzi described the shopping center in
which the New Location is located as well as purported neighborhood opposition to
the proposed relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook operation to the New Location
through a petition, Association meetings, and a rally.       Capozzi described the
shopping center in general, and Chickie’s and Pete’s in particular, as a family-
friendly place where people bring their children for all kinds of occasions. See N.T.
5/25/2021 at 91-98; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 14-15, F.F. No. 123. Her

                                         22
objection to the proposed sportsbook relocation to the New Location was that
“[g]ambling hurts people. It destroys families. It depletes savings.” N.T. 5/25/2021
at 98; see also July 2021 Board Decision at 14, F.F. No. 122.
            Based on this evidence, the Board voted four to one to deny the Special
Exception Application. See N.T. 6/9/2021 at 2-3; see also July 2021 Board Decision
at 15, F.F. No. 127. The Board explained the denial by concluding:

            13. In this case, [] Applicant did not produce sufficient
            credible evidence to meet the [Zoning] Code’s
            requirements or to persuade the Board to credit the
            evidence which was produced.

            14. [] Applicant’s witnesses employed by [] Applicant – []
            Davis, [] Cullen, [and] Fretz – offered their opinions that
            granting the special exception would not result in
            disqualifying adverse impacts, but they did not provide
            any basis for those opinions.

            15. Similarly, the project’s architect gave his unsupported
            opinion that the special exception would not result in
            disqualifying adverse impacts.

            16. [] Ferraro, a traffic engineer, offered her opinion that
            granting the special exception would not affect the
            neighborhood’s overall traffic operation but also offered
            her unsubstantiated opinion that granting the special
            exception would not have a detrimental impact on the
            neighborhood’s health, safety or welfare.

            17. [] [A]pplicant did not meet its burdens[.]

July 2021 Board Decision at 18-19, Conclusions of Law (C.L.) 13-17.
            On review, the Trial Court granted Applicant’s appeal, concluding that
the Board “abused its discretion and committed fundamental errors of law in its

                                        23
consideration of the testimony and application of the special exception burden
shifting.” Trial Court Opinion at 8. The Trial Court explained that

              the [Board] arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded all of
              [Applicant’s] unrebutted argument and testimony without
              any reasonable explanation.         In the face of no
              contradictory testimony, the [Board] concluded that
              [Applicant] did not meet the criteria for a special
              exception. The [Board] abuses its discretion when it
              capriciously disregards material, competent evidence.

Trial Court Opinion at 8. With regard to Applicant’s initial burden, the Trial Court
stated that

              the [Board] had an obligation to set forth the reason that
              each (or all) of the criteria for a special exception [were]
              not met, or why a criteri[on] was not relevant to the
              decision. The [Board] completely abdicated this role by
              offering no specific explanations whatsoever.

Trial Court Opinion at 8-9. The Trial Court continued:

              With broad general strokes, the [Board] discounted all of
              [Applicant’s] arguments and testimony. The [Board] did
              not make any specific credibility determinations. It simply
              cast aside all of [Applicant’s] testimony. Based on the
              [Board’s] woefully inadequate reasoning and scant
              explanations, the decision appears more result oriented,
              rather than fact driven; no amount of testimony, or no set
              of facts, would have met the impossible standard
              apparently set by the [Board]. Stated another way, the
              [Board’s] conclusions have little to no support, let alone
              the substantial evidence required to support its conclusion
              on this issue.

                                          24
Trial Court Opinion at 9 (citation omitted). Ultimately, the Trial Court found that
the Board “abused its discretion and committed an error of law in finding that
[Applicant] did not meet its initial burden.” Id.
             Continuing its analysis, the Trial Court determined that the record
contained insufficient evidence to conclude that the Association had met its burden
of showing that the proposed relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook operation to the
New Location is likely to cause a detrimental impact on the neighborhood’s health,
safety, and welfare beyond that which might be normally expected from the
proposed use. See Trial Court Opinion at 9-11. The Trial Court found that

             the [Board’s] conclusions of law completely ignore the
             [Association’s] burden, and do not address it at all. The
             [Board] found facts, however, related to the
             [Association’s] arguments. In all, the [Association]
             merely speculate[s] and pose[s] general concerns
             regarding the relocation. The thrust of the [Association’s]
             argument is that moving the gambling facility a few blocks
             away or slightly closer to a residential neighborhood
             would cause the requisite detrimental impact on the health
             and safety of the community. The problem with this
             argument is that gambling is already pervasive in the
             neighborhood, and generally in society.

             [Applicant] is only seeking to move the gambling facility
             a total of [eight] blocks. The [N]ew [ L]ocation, as
             acknowledged by the [Board], is slightly closer to
             residential houses than the [Current L]ocation. The
             [Association] repeatedly offered general testimony
             regarding the negative impacts of gambling on society, but
             this is not the standard. The [Philadelphia] City Council,
             through previously allowing gambling at the [Current
             L]ocation, and allowing the special exception analysis in
             the CA-1 zoned district where the [New Location] is
             located, has implicitly already considered that such a use

                                         25
             satisfies local concerns for the general health, safety, and
             welfare.

             Moreover, the [Association’s] repeated assertions that
             relocating the gambling facility [eight] blocks could
             corrupt children is pure speculation. It is unnecessary to
             look only to the factual record on this point. Common
             sense and general observation confirms that gambling is
             pervasive in modern society. There are ads on public
             transit, billboards on the highway, commercials on
             television and the internet, and numerous sports teams are
             sponsored by and/or collaborate with gambling
             companies. The notion that moving a gambling facility
             [eight] blocks, placing it slightly closer to residences,
             would increase gambling exposure to children is
             unsupported conjecture.

             The [Association] had to show, with a high degree of
             probability, that [Applicant’s] proposal would pose a
             substantial threat to the health and safety of the
             community. The [Association], even fully crediting the
             findings of the [Board], fall[s] short of meeting that
             burden.

Trial Court Opinion at 10-11 (internal citations omitted).
             On review, we observe that Applicant put forth evidence that, on its
face, satisfied the burden set forth in Zoning Code Section 14-303(7)(e)(.2) that
Applicant must demonstrate no detrimental impact to the community beyond that
which normally might be expected from the proposed use. Applicant’s traffic
engineer Ferraro testified that the proposed relocation would not create additional
traffic congestion in the public streets and that, in fact, the proposed project would
result in decreased traffic congestion. Ciarrocchi, Drummond, and Cullen all
testified that the project would not result in overcrowding, as the patron capacity of
the New Location would be lowered from current numbers by the introduction of

                                         26
the sportsbook at the New Location. Applicant’s witnesses further explained that
this reduction in patron capacity would lessen the stresses on water, sewer, and other
public facilities.16 Multiple Applicant witnesses, including Applicant’s Director of
Security and the Director of Public Safety for the Bensalem Township Police
Department, testified that the relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook operation would
not endanger the public health, safety, or welfare of the community by increasing
incidents of crime or fire. Additionally, in recommending approval of the proposed
relocation, Ian Hagerty of the Planning Commission testified that the proposed
relocation was consistent with the City’s comprehensive plan. On its face, this
evidence17 satisfies the requirements of Zoning Code Section 14-303(7)(e)(.2) to
demonstrate no detrimental impact to the community beyond that which normally
might be expected from the proposed use.
              We observe that “[r]eview for capricious disregard of material,
competent evidence is an appropriate component of appellate consideration in every
case in which such question is properly brought before the court.” Ziegler v. City of
Reading, 216 A.3d 1192, 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting Leon E. Wintermyer,
Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478, 487 (Pa. 2002)). As
this Court has observed, “[c]apricious disregard occurs only when the fact-finder
deliberately ignores relevant, competent evidence.” Ziegler, 216 A.3d at 1203.

       16
          We acknowledge that the sportsbook operation would have no bearing on loads placed
on local parks or schools, regardless of where it is located.

       17
           We observe that the relocation involves no proposed exterior expansion of the New
Location to accommodate the sportsbook operation. Therefore, the Section 14-303(7)(e)(.2)
factors of “impairing an adequate supply of light and air to adjacent property” and “impairing or
permanently injuring the use of adjacent conforming properties” are not applicable to the instant
matter.

                                               27
             Here, without making express credibility determinations as to the
witnesses, the Board disregarded Applicant’s material, competent evidence
regarding the Section 14-303(7)(e)(.2) factors, instead simply characterizing
Applicant’s witnesses’ testimony as “unsupported opinions.”               This blanket
characterization leaves a reviewing court to surmise what parts of the witnesses’
testimony the Board regarded as unsupported opinion and further, considering the
witnesses each testified as to their occupation and experience, what additional
support is required to validate their opinions. As the Trial Court noted, the Board
had an obligation to set forth with specificity how Applicant failed to meet each
criterion (or all criteria) for a special exception and/or why a particular criterion was
not relevant to the decision. See Zoning Code § 14-303(7)(e). By offering, without
specific explanations, a blanket finding that the testimony of the witnesses was
unsupported, the Board failed to meet its obligation to explain the failure to grant
the requested special exception, and the Trial Court correctly concluded as much.
See Trial Court Opinion at 8-9; see also Zoning Code § 14-303(7)(e).
             Further, we agree with the Trial Court that the Association failed to
meet its burden of demonstrating that the proposed relocation of the sportsbook to
the New Location would detrimentally affect the health, safety, and welfare of the
neighborhood to a greater extent than would normally be expected from the proposed
use. See Trial Court Opinion at 9-11. The Association’s evidence amounted to
generalized testimony about the possible pitfalls of legal gambling and testimony
from local residents that they oppose the relocation because they feel the character
of the neighborhood may be affected.            The Association’s evidence did not
objectively illustrate to a high degree of probability a substantial likelihood that the
proposed relocation of Applicant’s sportsbook operation from the Current Location

                                           28
to the New Location would cause a detrimental impact on the health, safety, and
welfare of the neighborhood exceeding that which normally might be expected from
the proposed use. In essence, the theoretical visitation of the possible pitfalls of
gambling on the neighborhood’s occupants and the detrimental effects on children
as described and imagined by the Association’s witnesses amount to speculation,
which is insufficient to meet the Association’s burden. Accordingly, the Trial Court
correctly determined that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the
Board’s conclusion that the proposed relocation of the sportsbook operation to the
New Location will cause a detrimental impact on the neighborhood’s health, safety,
and welfare beyond what would normally be expected from such a use.
                                 IV. Conclusion
            For these reasons, we affirm the Trial Court’s orders.

                                      ___________________________________
                                      CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                        29
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Appeal of City Turf Club Op Co. :    CONSOLIDATED CASES
                                       :
From a Decision of: Zoning Board       :
of Adjustment                          :
                                       :
Appeal of: Packer Park Civic           :    No. 731 C.D. 2022
Association                            :

In re: Appeal of Packer Park Civic      :
Association                             :
                                        :
From a Decision of: Zoning Board        :
of Adjustment                           :
                                        :
Appeal of: Packer Park Civic            :   No. 733 C.D. 2022
Association                             :

                                     ORDER

            AND NOW, this 8th day of January, 2024, the July 1, 2022, orders of
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas are AFFIRMED.

                                      ___________________________________
                                      CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge