Court Opinion

ID: 9821498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 08:09:51.085889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:48.522085
License: Public Domain

In The

                              Court of Appeals

                   Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                            __________________

                            NO. 09-21-00106-CR
                            __________________

                        BRIAN ROLLINS, Appellant

                                        V.

                 THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
                      Jefferson County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 19-31017
__________________________________________________________________

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted Brian Rollins of murder. In two issues on appeal, Rollins

contends we should reverse his conviction because (1) the evidence didn’t allow

reasonable jurors to reject his claim that he killed the victim under duress, and

because (2) the jury didn’t receive instructions on involuntary intoxication as a

defense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1). For the reasons discussed below,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                        1
                                 BACKGROUND

      In 2019, a grand jury indicted Rollins for murdering K.L. 1 The indictment

alleges that Rollins, on December 29, 2018, intentionally and knowingly caused

K.L.’s death by shooting her with a firearm. See id. After Rollins pleaded not guilty,

his cases proceeded to trial. The jury heard testimony from sixteen witnesses,

including two eyewitnesses, who testified they saw Rollins shoot K.L.

      The testimony in the trial shows that Rollins and K.L. were neighbors and

friends. The evening the incident occurred, Rollins was visiting K.L. at her house

when K.L. asked Rollins to go to the store and buy some beer. Rollins told K.L. he

would send a friend, and he walked back to his house. Less than twenty minutes

later, Rollins returned to K.L.’s house, knocked on her door, and shot K.L. in the

head with a pistol. The gunshot wound to K.L.’s head caused K.L.’s death. Rollins

then ran to a nearby ditch, where he was arrested by police.

      During trial, the defense conceded Rollins shot K.L., but alleged that he had

done so under duress. At the State’s request, the trial court admitted a video

statement Rollins gave detectives almost eighteen months after the shooting. The

defense pointed to the recording as evidence that Rollins shot K.L. under duress. In

      1To protect the privacy of the victim, we refer to her by her initials, as the

Texas Constitution grants crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and
with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process[.]” Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1).
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his recorded statement, Rollins said three men held him and his children hostage in

his house and had threatened to kill them unless he killed K.L. Rollins told detectives

in the recording that a “man in black” was outside K.L.’s house waiting on him to

kill K.L. Rollins also told detectives that when he walked across the street, the “man

in black” pulled a gun on him, so he knocked on K.L.’s door and shot her. According

to Rollins, after he shot K.L., the “man in black” chased him with a gun, so he ran

until he fell in the ditch. Rollins added that he could not provide his statement to

detectives immediately following the shooting because he was “confused.” Rollins

also told detectives that before the shooting, he ingested synthetic marijuana, which

one of the men gave him, and the drug was “laced.” As Rollins told it to the detective

in the recording, the drug did not take effect until after the shooting.

       The parties agreed Rollins’s recorded statement warranted charging the jury

on duress as an affirmative defense, but the prosecution disagreed with Rollins’s

attorney that an instruction on involuntary intoxication was warranted. The trial

court denied Rollins’s request to instruct the jury on his involuntary intoxication

defense. But the trial court included an instruction on the affirmative defense of

duress.

      When the jury returned with its verdict, it rejected Rollins’s duress defense

and convicted him of murder. The jury assessed Rollins’s punishment at fifty years

in prison. See id. § 19.02(b)(1), (c).

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                                    ANALYSIS

      In issue one, Rollins complains the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction of murder because he proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, the

affirmative defense of duress. Rollins argues the evidence established that he was

compelled to engage in the conduct by the threats of imminent death and serious

bodily injury to himself and his family members, the compulsion was of the type

that would render a reasonable person incapable of resisting the pressure, and he did

not place himself in the position to be subjected to such compulsion. Rollins

contends the evidence that he and K.L. were friends, he believed someone was

threatening to kill him, and he remained faced down in a ditch by the scene, shows

the jury’s rejection of his duress defense is unjust and shocks the conscience.

       We review the jury’s decision to reject an affirmative defense for legal and

factual sufficiency of the evidence. Butcher v. State, 454 S.W.3d 13, 20 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of an affirmative defense, we review

the record for a scintilla of evidence favorable to the factfinder’s finding and

disregard all evidence to the contrary unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id.

(citing Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 669–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). A

factfinder’s rejection of an affirmative defense should be overturned for lack of legal

sufficiency only if the appellant establishes that the evidence conclusively proves

the affirmative defense, and no reasonable factfinder was free to determine

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otherwise. Id. (citing Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 670). In reviewing the factual

sufficiency of a finding rejecting an affirmative defense, we examine the evidence

in a neutral light. Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671. “A finding rejecting a defendant’s

affirmative defense cannot be overruled unless, ‘after setting out the relevant

evidence supporting the verdict, the court clearly states why the verdict is so much

against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-

shocking, or clearly biased.’” Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20 (quoting Matlock, 392

S.W.3d at 671).

      Duress is an affirmative defense to a prosecution and requires a defendant to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed the offense “because

he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to

himself or another.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.05(a); see Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at

667 (citation omitted). Compulsion “exists only if the force or threat of force would

render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure.” Id. §

8.05(c). Evidence that a defendant had a generalized fear of imminent harm is

insufficient to raise the issue of imminent harm, which is required to warrant an

affirmative finding on duress. Brazelton v. State, 947 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1997, no pet.).

      Here, the evidence allowed the jury to reject Rollins’s duress defense. First,

the evidence allowed the jury to find intoxication, not duress, compelled Rollins to

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shoot K.L. The evidence indicates Rollins and K.L. were friends who socialized

multiple times “like normal” on the day of the shooting, and before the shooting, no

one noticed anything unusual about Rollins’s behavior. The evidence shows Rollins

ingested synthetic marijuana before the shooting, and an eyewitness testified the

person who shot K.L. was “tripping” like “he might have been on something.” That

testimony is consistent with an officer’s testimony that Rollins appeared intoxicated

at the scene, and Rollins admitted he was confused and unable to stand up after the

shooting.

      Second, the evidence allowed the jury to reject Rollins’s claim that three men

threatened to kill him and his children unless he killed K.L. Rollins claimed the men

held him hostage for two hours as he held his children and begged the men to stop,

but an officer who had responded to the call for assistance at the scene where the

shooting occurred testified in the trial that the children appeared “fine” and “didn’t

seem to even know what was going on at the time.” Additionally, the children

testified that the day the incident occurred, they had “a good day” and didn’t observe

anything “weird” or “out of the ordinary” until police arrived.

      Third, the evidence allowed the jury to reject Rollins’s claim that a “man in

black” forced him to kill K.L. In his video statement, Rollins said the “man in black”

compelled him to shoot K.L. by threatening him at gunpoint outside K.L.’s house,

and he also stated that the men who held him hostage were in the ditch threatening

                                          6
to shoot him. However, no other witnesses corroborated Rollins’s testimony. For

example, an eyewitness to the shooting testified they didn’t recall anyone near

Rollins when Rollins walked to K.L.’s door and shot her. Nor did the eyewitness

recall anyone running after Rollins as he ran to the ditch. Additionally, when a

detective questioned Rollins about why the “man in black” did not shoot him, Rollins

said the “man in black” was not there, contradicting his previous statement that the

“man in black” chased him into the ditch.

      While the jury might have chosen to believe that Rollins's acted under duress

for the reasons he gave the police, as the factfinder it wasn't required to do so and by

its verdict rejected his claim. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the

verdict, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict rejecting

Rollins’s affirmative defense of duress. See Butcher, 454 S.W.3d at 20. Accordingly,

we overrule issue one.

      In issue two, Rollins complains the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the

jury on involuntary intoxication. The State argues that Rollins did not raise an

insanity defense, and despite that failure, Rollins failed to show that he was

involuntarily intoxicated because he exercised judgment in taking the intoxicating

substance.

      We review the alleged jury charge error using a two-step process, first

determining whether the charge was erroneous and, if so, whether the error caused

                                           7
sufficient harm to require reversal. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015). Unless a defendant pleads guilty, the trial court in a criminal trial must

provide the jury with a written charge distinctly setting forth the law appliable to the

case[.]” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14. A trial court must instruct a jury on

every defensive issue raised by the evidence whether the evidence “‘is strong, feeble,

unimpeached, or contradicted, and even when the trial court thinks the testimony is

not worthy of belief.’” Maciel v. State, 631 S.W.3d 720, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)

(quoting Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

      Involuntary intoxication is an affirmative defense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §

8.01(a) (“It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct

charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that

his conduct was wrong.”); Mendenhall v. State, 77 S.W.3d 815, 817–18 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002) (stating it is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the defendant did

not know his conduct was wrong at the time of offense because of severe mental

defects caused by involuntary intoxication). A defendant is entitled to the instruction

when the evidence shows the defendant exercised no independent judgment or

volition in taking an intoxicant, and as a result of intoxication, the defendant didn’t

know his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the

requirements of the law. Mendenhall, 77 S.W.3d at 817–18. Courts recognize

intoxication can be involuntary when it arises because of, among other things, force,

                                           8
duress, or fraud. Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

(Cochran, J., concurring).

      In requesting an involuntary intoxication instruction, Rollins relies on isolated

statements in his video statement that he ingested synthetic marijuana given to him

by one of the men holding him and his kids hostage, and that the synthetic marijuana

ended up being “laced.” Rollins argues those statements constitute evidence that he

did not exercise independent judgment or volition in taking the synthetic marijuana,

which resulted in him becoming intoxicated and killing K.L. Therefore, Rollins

asserts he was entitled to an instruction on involuntary intoxication as an affirmative

defense. We disagree.

      To prevail on his involuntary intoxication defense, Rollins had to do more

than offer evidence that he was intoxicated when he killed K.L. Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 8.04(d) (defining “intoxication” as the “disturbance of mental or physical

capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body”). Rather,

Rollins had to offer evidence that the intoxication had so affected the capacity of his

mind and so deranged his rational thinking at the moment he shot K.L. that he was

unable “to know what he [was] doing and that it [was] wrong.” Farmer, 411 S.W.3d

at 915 (Cochran, J., concurring).

      We reviewed the entire recorded statement Rollins voluntarily gave the police.

Rollins repeatedly stated he was compelled to kill K.L. because three men threatened

                                          9
to kill him and his kids if he didn’t. Rollins also stated another man was outside

K.L.’s house with a gun waiting on him to kill K.L. Rollins stated, more than once,

the synthetic marijuana given to him by one of the men didn’t take effect until after

he shot K.L. In fact, Rollins stated that the synthetic marijuana didn’t take effect

until he was being chased into the ditch, where it “hit him like a ton of bricks.” He

stated, when first responders arrived at the scene, the effects of the synthetic

marijuana prevented him from reporting the men who threatened to kill him and his

kids if he didn’t kill K.L. But nowhere in the video statement does Rollins express

killing K.L. because he didn’t know what he was doing or that killing K.L. was

wrong. Therefore, viewing the evidence in a light favoring an involuntary

intoxication instruction, we cannot say the trial court erred in refusing the

instruction. See Maciel, 631 S.W.3d at 722. We overrule issue two. Having overruled

both of Rollins’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                    _________________________
                                                      W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                           Chief Justice

Submitted on February 1, 2023
Opinion Delivered August 30, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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