Court Opinion

ID: 9950709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 17:00:36.17175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:12.571448
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                         FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                             _______________

                                  No. 22-3191
                                _______________

                        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                       v.

                            QUARUAN CHANCE,
                                         Appellant
                              ______________

                 On Appeal from the United States District Court
                    For the Western District of Pennsylvania
                          (D.C. No. 2-20-cr-00002-01)
                  District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
                               _______________

                                     Argued
                                 January 17, 2024
                                _______________

             Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

                            (Filed: March 14, 2024)
                               _______________

Christopher J. Cassar
The Cassar Law Firm
13 E. Carver Street
Huntington, NY 11743

John J. Dowling, III [ARGUED]
Dowling Defense Group
101 N. McDowell Street
Suite 200
Charlotte, NC 28204
      Counsel for Appellant
Laura S. Irwin
Matthew S. McHale [ARGUED]
Office of United States Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
      Counsel for Appellee
                                     _______________

                                        OPINION∗
                                     _______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

       Quaruan Chance appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to suppress

evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Because the police officer involved lawfully

stopped Chance, and because he had a reasonable suspicion that Chance was engaging in

criminal activity when he found the evidence, we will affirm.

I.     BACKGROUND 1

       Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Glenn Adams is a member of the Safe

Highways Initiative through Effective Law Enforcement Detection Unit and has received

over 200 hours of specialized training in interdicting criminal activity on highways. On

the morning of December 30, 2019, he was parked in a marked police car on the shoulder

of the Pennsylvania Turnpike, which he knew was a drug corridor, so called “for [its]

       ∗
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
       1
         The facts, which are undisputed, are taken from the District Court’s findings of
fact, from the suppression hearing held before that Court, and from the dash camera
footage of the traffic stop. Citations to “MVR” are to the dash camera video, followed by
the minute and second mark of the recording.

                                              2
efficiency to transport drugs … across the country.” (J.A. at 104.) The weather that

morning was “somewhat overcast,” and the road was wet. (J.A. at 12.)

       Chance was driving a new Jeep Grand Cherokee when he passed Adams. As he

did so, Adams noticed that Chance sat upright in the driver’s seat, pulled himself closer

to the steering wheel, and slowed down significantly, even though he was driving at the

posted speed limit of 70 miles per hour. After observing what he deemed to be Chance’s

nervous behavior, Adams began following Chance, who was traveling in the left lane.

Chance moved from the left lane to the right lane, directly behind a tractor-trailer, leaving

only about one to two car lengths of space between the vehicles, a distance that Adams

determined to be unsafe and a violation of Pennsylvania traffic law. Chance then moved

back into the left lane, passed the tractor-trailer, and returned to the right lane, directly in

front of the tractor-trailer, and again leaving only about two car lengths of space between

the vehicles. After making the pass, Chance momentarily drifted onto the fog line on the

right side of the road. Adams concluded that the pass and the drifting also violated the

traffic code.

       While watching Chance, Adams observed that the Jeep “was very plain and with

limited exterior personalization” and “the registration … was a New York ‘J-Series’ tag.”

(J.A. at 15.) Those observations were significant to Adams because he knew that

“individuals involved in criminal activity will often use plain vehicles like [the] Jeep to

blend in with the innocent motoring public” and, “at the time of this traffic stop, the State

of New York (which sequentially registers their vehicles) was issuing J-series tags,” so it

was a relatively new registration, and “drug smugglers would flip and re-register

                                               3
registration tags so as to defeat ongoing surveillance techniques[.]” (J.A. at 15 (internal

quotation marks omitted).)

       Adams activated his lights and siren, and Chance pulled the Jeep to the side of the

road. Adams approached the Jeep and told Chance, “Hey, just a couple quick things,

okay, I don’t plan on writing you a ticket or anything.” MVR 01:53-01:59. He then

explained to Chance that he stopped him for not leaving enough space when he moved in

front of the tractor-trailer and asked him to provide his driver’s license, car registration,

and insurance card. Chance was nervous and his hand was shaking when he handed over

the documents. Adams then asked Chance to come to the patrol car, explaining that his

request was for safety reasons, and told him, “I will get you a warning and get you out of

here.” MVR 03:11-03:17. Nevertheless, even after being told he would receive only a

warning, Chance remained nervous.

       When Adams and Chance were in the patrol car, Adams conducted a criminal

history check and a computer database query on the documents he requested from

Chance. Adams also “made conversation” by asking Chance a series of questions about

his background, employment status, family, travel plans, and criminal history, among

other things. (J.A. at 19.) In response to Adams’s questions, Chance said he was from

Brooklyn and was on his way to pick up his son in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania,

explaining that he was planning to sleep there for six hours and then go back to Brooklyn.

When Adams asked him if he had been arrested before, he said “of course” and that it

was for “a weapon[,]” without providing any additional detail. (J.A. at 19). He later told

                                               4
Adams that he was on parole for a firearms violation and that the Jeep was his cousin’s,

who was letting him borrow it.

       Adams did not believe Chance’s story and suspected that he was drug trafficking.

He knew that New York City, including Brooklyn, was a “major narcotics supplier[] to

areas such as … West Mifflin[,]” that West Mifflin “is saturated with narcotics[,]” and

that it is “a destination which relies heavily on cities such as New York City to supply

narcotics[.]” (J.A. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).) He also knew that drug

smugglers would “often take short turnaround trips[,] leaving little time at their

destination to limit the amount of time they could be interdicted by law enforcement[,]”

and that they often “utilize third party vehicles because doing so provides them a defense

and distances them from any contraband that could be located within the vehicle[.]” (J.A.

at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Adams had Chance step out and stand in front

of the patrol car and then called for backup.

       After backup arrived, Adams approached Chance and asked if there was anything

illegal in the Jeep. Chance responded, “no.” (J.A. at 21.) Adams then told Chance, “I’d

like to search the car, okay?” MVR 15:49-50. In response, Chance twice said “Yeah,”

consenting to the search. MVR 15:50-15:52. Adams went into the Jeep, looked in the

dashboard area around the media system, and discovered an aftermarket hidden

compartment. Inside the compartment, he found a kilogram of cocaine in a vacuum-

sealed package. Adams then arrested Chance and recited the Miranda warnings.

       A federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Chance with

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

                                                5
(b)(1)(B)(ii). Chance filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained at the traffic stop.

The District Court held an evidentiary hearing over two days, in which Adams was the

only witness.

       The District Court concluded that Adams made a lawful stop because Chance had

committed traffic violations. It also concluded that Adams did not illegally prolong the

traffic stop because, even while Chance was still sitting in his Jeep, Adams had

developed reasonable suspicion that Chance was engaging in drug trafficking. Therefore,

the District Court denied Chance’s motion to suppress.

       Chance pled guilty to the charge in accordance with a plea agreement that

preserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The District Court

sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment,

followed by four years of supervised release.

       This timely appeal followed.

                                             6
II.    DISCUSSION 2

       A.     Adams Did Not Unlawfully Stop Chance 3

       A police officer is permitted “to initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he

has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of

criminal activity.” Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “[A]ny technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the

stop is merely pretext for an investigation of some other crime.” United States v. Mosley,

454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006). “[A]n officer need not be factually accurate in [his]

belief that a traffic law had been violated but, instead, need only produce facts

establishing that []he reasonably believed that a violation had taken place.” United States

v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006).

       Here, the District Court determined that Adams reasonably believed that Chance

had committed a traffic violation by following the tractor-trailer too closely. The

Pennsylvania Vehicle Code provides that a driver “shall not follow another vehicle more

closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles

and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3310(a).

       2
         The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review factual
findings for clear error.” United States v. Hurtt, 31 F.4th 152, 158 n.45 (3d Cir. 2022).
“We view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the District Court’s
ruling.” Id. (cleaned up).
       3
        A determination of reasonable suspicion is generally reviewed de novo on
appeal. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

                                              7
Chance left only one-to-two car lengths of space between the Jeep and the tractor trailer

while traveling about 70 miles per hour on a wet road. It was not unreasonable for

Adams to believe that following a vehicle that closely at that speed, and under those road

conditions, was a traffic violation.

       Chance asserts that the government “superimposed a speed-to-car-length ratio[] on

top of the text of section 3310(a) as if that were the law.” (Opening Br. at 14.) His

assertion is wrong. The government did not say the statute required at least two car

lengths when following another vehicle; it simply contended that the two-car-length (or

less) space between Chance and the tractor trailer was too short considering the

circumstances at the time. Furthermore, the District Court found that Adams credibly

testified that “based on his training and experience, he did not believe it to be reasonable

for Defendant to follow the tractor-trailer that closely, given the road conditions, and that

even on a nice, sunny day, [he] would not have considered his following distance

reasonable.” (J.A. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).) We

agree with the District Court that Chance’s tailgating violation provided Adams a lawful

reason to stop Chance. 4

       4
          Because Chance’s tailgating violation provided a sufficient reason for the stop,
we need not discuss his two other alleged traffic violations: cutting closely in front of the
tractor trailer and drifting over the fog line.

                                              8
       B.     Adams Did Not Unlawfully Extend the Traffic Stop 5

       “[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop

was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v.

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015). “A seizure justified only by a police-observed

traffic violation, therefore, ‘becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time

reasonably required to complete the mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation” “and

attend to related safety concerns[.]” Id. at 350-51, 354 (cleaned up) (quoting Illinois v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). The instant that a stop ceases to be for activities

related to the traffic stop’s mission is known as the “Rodriguez moment.” United States

v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018).

       “To prolong a stop beyond [the Rodriguez moment], the officer must have

acquired reasonable suspicion during the mission to justify further investigation.” United

States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404, 410 (3d Cir. 2018). If an officer “did indeed possess

reasonable suspicion [prior to the Rodriguez moment], [the defendant] suffered no

constitutional injury in the course of the traffic stop.” Green, 897 F.3d at 179.

       The reasonable suspicion standard requires an officer to “have an objectively

reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity had occurred or was occurring.”

United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 2020). Reasonable suspicion “must

always be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.” Green, 897 F.3d at 183. It

       5
        “Whether a traffic stop was unlawfully extended is a question of law” that we
review de novo. Hurtt, 31 F.4th at 158 n.45.

                                              9
“cannot be defeated by a so-called ‘divide-and-conquer’ analysis, whereby each arguably

suspicious factor is viewed in isolation and plausible, innocent explanations are offered

for each.” Id. And, “when assessing the totality of the circumstances, courts recognize

the particular ability of law enforcement officers, based on training and experience, ‘to

make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them

that might well elude an untrained person.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting United States v.

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

       “In light of Rodriguez, we must first determine when the stop was ‘measurably

extended.’” Id. at 179 (cleaned up). “After determining when the stop was extended[,]

… we can assess whether the facts available to [Adams] at that time were sufficient to

establish reasonable suspicion that [Chance] was involved in drug trafficking.” Id.

       Before the District Court, the parties agreed that the Rodriguez moment was when

Chance stepped out of Adams’s patrol car after he was questioned. Chance’s District

Court brief stated explicitly: “The Rodriguez moment was when Mr. Chance stepped out

of the police car.” (J.A. at 405.) Chance now argues for the first time that the Rodriguez

moment occurred when Adams extended the stop “by asking forty-one questions that did

not have anything to do with the traffic stop.” (Opening Br. at 7 (internal quotation

marks omitted).)

       “It is well-established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are not

properly preserved for appellate review.” Simko v. United States Steel Corp., 992 F.3d

198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021). Accordingly, Chance has forfeited the argument that the

Rodriguez moment occurred before he stepped out of the patrol car.

                                             10
        Having identified the Rodriguez moment as the time Chance left the patrol car, we

must now determine whether Adams had reasonable suspicion at that point to continue

the stop. We agree with the government that “there was ample basis for reasonable

suspicion to investigate possible drug-trafficking,” based upon six factors considered in

their totality:

        (1) unusual nervousness; (2) evasiveness in self-reporting his criminal
        history; (3) a previous drug-related arrest and parole for a firearms
        conviction; (4) travel from a narcotics source city to a destination along a
        known drug corridor; (5) a quick turnaround despite a long drive; and (6) a
        third-party vehicle with recent registration.

(Answering Br. at 34-35.) Chance’s attempt to weaken each individual piece of that

evidence does not alter the total picture when viewing the evidence collectively.

Therefore, we conclude that Adams had reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking by the

time Chance stepped out of the patrol car and that, accordingly, the District Court did not

err in concluding that Adams did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop.

        Even if the Rodriguez moment had, in fact, occurred earlier, however, we also

agree with the District Court that Adams had developed a reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity when Chance was still sitting in the Jeep. The District Court explained:

        At the time of the legal stop, Trooper Adams had already observed: (1)
        Defendant’s behavior upon passing the trooper’s vehicle[;] (2) Defendant’s
        Jeep was very plain and with limited exterior personalization; and (3) that
        the registration of Defendant’s Jeep was a New York “J-series” tag. In this
        same moment, due to his training and experience, including the specialized
        SHIELD training, Trooper Adams knew that: (1) individuals involved in
        criminal activity often use plain vehicles like the Jeep to blend in with the
        innocent motoring public; (2) at the time of this traffic stop, the State of New
        York (which sequentially registers their vehicles) was issuing J-series tags,
        and that drug smugglers would “flip and re-register registration tags so as to
        defeat ongoing surveillance techniques[;]” and (3) illegal drugs are often

                                              11
       transported from New York to Pennsylvania. Thereafter, upon telling
       Defendant as he sat in the Jeep that he was only going to get a written warning
       and not a ticket, Defendant’s nervous behavior did not subside.

(J.A. at 25-26.)

       For the reasons stated by the District Court, we agree that Adams had a reasonable

and articulable basis for why he suspected criminal activity, based on the combination of

the particular road Chance was driving on, his vehicle’s exterior appearance, the specific

series of license plates that were on the vehicle, and Chance’s nervous behavior,

especially after Adams told him that he would only be receiving a warning. Each of the

facts the District Court relied upon may not in itself create reasonable suspicion, but

together, viewed in the light of the District Court’s factual findings, and recognizing

Adams’s ability, based on his specialized training and experience, “to make inferences

from and deductions about the cumulative information available to [him] that might well

elude an untrained person[,]” we too conclude that Adams had a reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity when Chance was still in the Jeep. 6 Green, 897 F.3d at 183 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

III.   CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Chance’s

motion to suppress.

       6
        Because Adams did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop, Chance’s cursory
argument that his “consent to the search was invalid because Chance had been illegally
detained when he gave it” is incorrect. (Opening Br. at 28.)

                                             12