Court Opinion

ID: 9942636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:10:50.184759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:22.315416
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CHRISTOPHER ROBERSON                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 677 EDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 1, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0007126-2021

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2024

       Appellant Christopher Roberson appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his convictions for persons not to possess firearms, firearms

not to be carried without a license, and carrying a firearm in public in

Philadelphia.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress evidence and raises a challenge to evidentiary rulings

made by the trial court during the suppression hearing. We affirm.

       The underlying factual history of this matter are well known to the

parties. In the instant case, Appellant was charged with multiple violations of

the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) after police recovered a firearm from his

waistband during an investigative detention. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 6108, respectively.
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motion to suppress the firearm in which he claimed that police had neither

reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to seize the firearm.

       Following a suppression hearing on September 29, 2022, the trial court

set forth the following findings of fact:

       [Philadelphia Police Officer Zachary Zgleszewski] testified that on
       June 25, 2021 at approximately 1:15 p.m. he was on duty in an
       unmarked patrol vehicle in the area of 4400 North Gratz Street.
       The officer testified that it was his understanding that Police
       Officer [] Levitt relayed information to him from a Police Officer
       Ajerio, and it was Police Officer Ajerio who told Police Officer Levitt
       that [Appellant] was in the area of 4400 North Gratz Street in a
       Chicago Bulls shirt.[2] At that time this officer, as well as []
       Officers Levitt, Baker, and Stout began looking and surveilling the
       area for an individual matching that description. In the area of
       4400 North Gratz, the officer testified that he saw a large crowd
       of approximately 50 people, as well as [Appellant] in a Bulls jersey
       on the sidewalk holding a child.

                                       *       *   *

       [T]he crowd is made primarily at that time of women that are
       around [Appellant], and [Appellant] is towards to back of that
       crowd holding a child who looks approximately around the age of
       two.

       The officer starts to ask the individuals, the females there to move
       to the side. As he’s doing that, [Appellant] begins handing off the
       child and begins moving his body away. As the officer says, don’t
       do that, [Appellant] then takes off running, passing the child,
       frankly, nearly dropping the child, towards someone else and
       begins to flee. At that point there is a brief foot pursuit.

       [Officer Zgleszewski] indicated that he got hold of [Appellant], []
       Officer Baker then tackled [Appellant], and [] Officer Baker is the
____________________________________________

2  During the suppression hearing, Officer Zgleszewski testified as follows:
“Officer Levitt [] relayed information to me that he spoke with Officer Ajerio .
. . . Officer Ajerio told him that [Appellant] was on 4400 North Gratz wearing
a Chicago Bulls jersey and was armed with a firearm and was prohibited from
carrying a firearm.” N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/29/22, at 7.

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       individual who made the recovery in [Officer Zgleszewski’s]
       presence of the silver and black Smith & Wesson [.]40 caliber
       [firearm] with 14 live rounds in the front waistband area of
       [Appellant’s] pants. . . .

       [Officer Zgleszewski] also testified that the areas of 4400 North
       Gratz, 4500 North Gratz, as well as 19th Street to 17th Street at
       Wingohocking [Street] is a high crime area with a permanent car
       assigned to it due to numerous shootings, homicides, and drug
       sales.

N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/29/22, at 20-22 (some formatting altered).

       At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. Ultimately, following a stipulated

bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the above-referenced

offenses. On March 1, 2023, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence

of eleven months and fifteen days to twenty-three months’ incarceration, to

be followed by three years’ probation. Appellant filed timely post-sentence

motions, which the trial court subsequently denied.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal3 and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court wrote a

____________________________________________

3 The record reflects that the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence
motions on March 10, 2023. On March 7, 2023, Appellant filed a premature
notice of appeal, purporting to appeal from the trial court’s September 29,
2022 order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. It is well settled
that “a direct appeal by a defendant in a criminal proceeding lies from the
judgment of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 562 n.1
(Pa. Super. 2007). Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5), we shall treat Appellant’s
notice of appeal as filed after the entry of the March 10, 2023 order denying
Appellant’s post-sentence motions. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d
999, 1008 (Pa. 2011).

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letter to this Court addressing Appellant’s suppression claim.4

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
          Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress physical evidence in
          finding there was reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause
          to stop, detain, arrest, and subsequently search Appellant’s
          person[?]

       2. Whether the trial court erred in sustaining the Commonwealth’s
          objections to defense counsel’s inquiry into the constitutional
          classification of the encounter with Appellant?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4 (some formatting altered).

       In his first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress.       Id. at 10.     Specifically, Appellant claims that Officer

Zgleszewski “was unable to offer any testimony that presented articulable

facts which supported the reasonable suspicion to stop and seize Appellant.”

Id. at 12. In support, Appellant argues that Officer Zgleszewski relied solely

on a tip from other police officers and “did not conduct any form of an

independent investigation.” Id. at 13 (citing Commonwealth v. Queen, 639

A.2d 443 (Pa. 1994) (holding that a police officer failed to articulate

reasonable suspicion because he relied solely on a tip from another officer
____________________________________________

4 We note that Hon. Mia Roberts Perez presided over Appellant’s suppression

hearing and imposed the instant judgment of sentence. Judge Perez was
nominated for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania by President Joseph R. Biden on July 12, 2022, and was
confirmed by the United States Senate on December 7, 2022. See 168 Cong.
Rec. S3244 (daily ed. July 12, 2022); 168 Cong. Rec. S7017 (daily ed. Dec.
7, 2022). Prior to her resignation from the Philadelphia County Court of
Common Pleas, Judge Perez sent a letter to this Court addressing the claims
raised in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement.

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identifying the defendant as a suspect without any articulable facts justifying

the identification). Appellant also asserts that neither Officer Zgleszewski’s

testimony nor the body cam footage support the trial court’s finding that

Appellant attempted to flee when officers arrived. Appellant’s Brief at 18. In

any event, Appellant argues that even if his actions could be considered

“flight,” there was insufficient evidence establishing that police had reasonable

suspicion. Id. at 19.

      The Commonwealth responds that Queen is distinguishable from the

instant case, as Officer Zgleszewski and his colleagues “did not rely exclusively

on the unverified hunch of another officer.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 13.

      In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our standard of review:

      is limited to determining whether the factual findings are
      supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
      from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression
      court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by the
      record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo.
      Where, . . . the defendant is appealing the ruling of the
      suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
      Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
      remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression
      rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
      evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 715 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations

omitted), appeal granted on other grounds, 305 A.3d 541 (Pa. 2023).

      It is well settled that “Article I, [Section] 8 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution both

protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence

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arising under both charters has led to the development of three categories of

interactions between citizens and police.” Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d

298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

      The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for
      information) which need not be supported by any level of
      suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond.
      The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a
      reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period
      of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to
      constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest
      or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987 (Pa. 2006) (citations

omitted).

      [T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must
      articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
      reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
      reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
      activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in
      that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion
      existed at the time the officer conducted the stop must be
      answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to
      determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a
      particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual
      stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court
      must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to
      the officer at the moment of the stop warrant a man of reasonable
      caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 125 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citations omitted and some formatting altered).

      It is well settled that when determining whether a seizure has taken

place, a court must apply an objective test:

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      [T]o guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has
      been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an
      objective test entailing a determination of whether, in view of all
      surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have
      believed that he was free to leave. In evaluating the totality of
      the circumstances, our focus is whether, by means of physical
      force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in
      some way been restrained. In making this determination, no
      single factor dictates the ultimate conclusion as to whether a
      seizure has occurred.

Commonwealth v. Green, 298 A.3d 1158, 1163 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations

omitted and some formatting altered).

      Our Supreme Court has held that mere possession of a firearm is

insufficient to support reasonable suspicion “[u]nless a police officer has prior

knowledge that a specific individual is not permitted to carry a concealed

firearm, and absent articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a

firearm is being used or intended to be used in a criminal manner[.]”

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 937 (Pa. 2019).

      However, the Hicks Court explained:

      A police officer is trained to assess people and situations for
      danger. An officer responding to a dispatch . . . is capable of
      responding in a manner not amounting to a seizure by observing
      the suspect and the circumstances, by determining whether
      anyone appears to be in danger or whether a crime appears to be
      occurring, and by interviewing witnesses about any crimes that
      may have occurred before the officer’s arrival.               See
      [Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 575 (Pa. 1997)]
      (reasoning that, where the available information does not give rise
      to reasonable suspicion, “the police must investigate further by
      means not constituting a search and seizure.”). Such activities
      preserve peace, law, and order, and do so without depriving
      anyone of his freedom unless there is cause to do so.

Id. at 946.

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      Our Supreme Court has held that unprovoked flight in a high crime area

is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. In

re D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 2001) (applying Illinois v. Wardlow, 528

U.S. 119 (2000)); see also Commonwealth v. Barnes, 296 A.3d 52, 58

(Pa. Super. 2023) (reiterating that “unprovoked flight in a high crime area is

sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion” and that “[w]hile additional facts

may negate reasonable suspicion, Wardlow requires no additional facts to

establish reasonable suspicion” (citations omitted)); Commonwealth v.

Dunham, 203 A.3d 272, 278 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that although “flight

alone is insufficient” to establish reasonable suspicion and that “unprovoked

flight from police in a high-crime area is sufficient to create reasonable

suspicion for police pursuit and will not warrant suppression” (citation omitted

and emphasis added)).

      As noted previously, Appellant relies on Queen in support of his

assertion that Officer Zgleszewski did not have probable cause to effectuate a

seizure.

      In Queen, a police officer conducted a stop and frisk of the defendant

solely based on a detective’s comment that the defendant resembled a male

wanted for robbery. Queen, 639 A.2d at 444. After recovering a firearm

from the defendant’s waistband, the officer placed him under arrest. Id. The

defendant subsequently filed a suppression motion and the trial court

conducted a hearing. Id. After hearing testimony from the police officer, the

trial court denied the motion to suppress. Id. On appeal, the Pennsylvania

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Supreme Court concluded that the suppression court erred in denying the

defendant’s motion because it was the detective, rather than the arresting

officer, who possessed the information which formed the basis for the seizure.

Id. at 445-46.

      In reaching that conclusion, the Queen Court explained that

      [t]o hold otherwise would permit the government to bypass the
      protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, of
      the Pennsylvania Constitution by always having a second police
      officer summoned for assistance for the purpose of making the
      inquiry of a suspect on the basis of an initial police officer’s
      suspicion. At no time would the government have to establish any
      articulable facts, thus completely emasculating the protections
      against illegal searches and seizures.

Id. at 445.

      In the instant case, Officer Zgleszewski testified that he initially began

patrolling the area with two other officers after receiving information from

Officer Levitt, who indicated that Appellant was reportedly “on 4400 North

Gratz wearing a Chicago Bulls jersey and was armed with a firearm and was

prohibited from carrying a firearm.”    N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 7.      Officer

Zgleszewski described 4400 North Gratz Street as a high crime area, with

“numerous shootings, homicides, [and] drug sales.”         Id. at 10.    Officer

Zgleszewski testified that after he arrived at the scene, Appellant saw the

police officers, then immediately attempted to flee. Id. at 8.

      At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court explained:

      While I understand the basis of [Appellant’s] argument that this
      is analogous to Queen, I think there are several circumstances
      happening here. There are elements of this that absolutely mimic

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      that of Queen; however, in this particular case we have the added
      interactions between the officers and [Appellant], in particular
      that before the officers even fully approach or address [Appellant,
      Appellant] begins making movements away from the officer.
      Again, as [the trial court] will emphasize, holding a child and
      almost dropping the child as he’s passing, tossing the child to
      another person, and he begins his flight.

      Based on all of that, I do believe that [Appellant’s] flight was
      irrespective of just the information that was provided to these
      officers regarding the individual in the Bulls shirt. There [are]
      additional elements here. The officers could not even get to
      the next layer before [Appellant] started attempting to flee
      in a high crime area.

      Additionally, I think there is some argument to be made that this
      would be almost similar to that of an anonymous radio call
      followed by the extra layer of flight in a high crime area.

      Because of that, I am going to deny [Appellant’s] motion to
      suppress.

N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 22-23.

      Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s

factual findings are supported by the record, and we discern no error in the

trial court’s legal conclusions.   See Lear, 290 A.3d at 715.        As noted

previously, the trial court credited Officer Zgleszewski’s testimony that

Appellant attempted to flee when the officers began to approach the scene,

which was located in a high crime area. See N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 22.

Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Officer Zgleszewski

had reasonable suspicion to seize Appellant. See Hicks, 208 A.3d at 937;

Queen, 639 A.2d at 445-46.

      Further, unlike in Queen and Hicks, Officer Zgleszewski relied on a

combination of factors in developing reasonable suspicion, which included

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Appellant’s unprovoked flight in a high crime area and the report from other

officers which indicated that Appellant was in the area of 4400 North Gratz

Street wearing a Chicago Bulls jersey and was armed with a firearm that he

was prohibited from carrying. See N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 7. Cf. Hicks,

208 A.3d at 937; Queen, 639 A.2d at 445-46. Under the totality of these

circumstances, the trial court properly concluded that Officer Zgleszewski had

reasonable suspicion. See Dunham, 203 A.3d at 278. Accordingly, Appellant

is not entitled to relief.

                             Scope of Cross-Examination

      In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when

it sustained the Commonwealth’s objections during Appellant’s cross-

examination of Officer Zgleszewski. Appellant’s Brief at 19-20. Specifically,

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by precluding Appellant from

eliciting testimony from Officer Zgleszewski regarding his subjective view of

the type of interaction he had with Appellant. Id. at 22-23. Appellant further

argues that, had he been permitted to pursue that line of questioning, Officer

Zgleszewski would have confirmed that Appellant “was not free to leave

and/or was to be detained pending an investigation[.]” Id. at 23.

      The Commonwealth responds that the testimony at issue was not

relevant and therefore, the trial court did not err when it sustained the

Commonwealth’s objections. Commonwealth’s Brief at 16.

      We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Luster, 234 A.3d 836, 838 (Pa. Super. 2020). It is well

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settled that “[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but

is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of

judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-

will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v.

Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence state that “[a]ll relevant evidence

is admissible,” while “[e]vidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”

Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact

is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401.

      As noted above, this Court employs an objective test to determine

whether a seizure has taken place. See Green, 298 A.3d at 1163. This Court

has further held:

      [T]he officer’s subjective views are as immaterial to the objective
      standard as are [the defendant’s]. See Commonwealth v.
      Lagana, 537 A.2d 1351, 1355 n.4 (Pa. 1988) (citation omitted)
      (“The test of when a person is arrested is an objective one and
      depends upon the reasonable impression conveyed to the person
      seized and not the subjective view of the officers or the person
      being seized.”).

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 273 A.3d 1190, 1201-02 (Pa. Super. 2022),

(quoting Lyles, 97 A.3d at 307 n.6) (some formatting altered), appeal denied

283 A.3d 793 (Pa. 2022). The Lyles Court further held that whether a seizure

occurs is a question of law. Lyles, 97 A.3d at 302.

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     Here, at the suppression hearing, the following exchange occurred

during Appellant’s cross-examination of Officer Zgleszewski:

     Q:    All right. Now, when you approach [Appellant], as you saw
     in the video, you would agree with me that Officer Baker, upon I
     guess getting through the young ladies in the crowd, says, don’t
     move, correct?

     A:    Yeah, as he’s beginning to shuffle.

     [The Commonwealth]: I’m going to object, it goes to the
     ultimate question here, it’s a finding of law.

     The Court: Sustained.

     Q:    Is [Appellant] at that point, is he being detained?

     [The Commonwealth]: Objection; same grounds.

     The Court: Sustained.

     Q:    Are you attempting or your brother officers attempting to
     seize him to perform a frisk?

     [The Commonwealth]: Objection.

     The Court: Sustained. Rephrase, Counsel.

     Q:    What is your intention in this video? We saw the video,
     you’re on scene, what is you[sic] and your brother officers’
     intention at the point that you encounter [Appellant]?

     A:   To talk to him and ask him if he had a firearm, if he does,
     do you have a permit to carry.

     Q:    Sure. And that’s what you classify as a mere encounter;
     correct, sir?

     A:    Correct.

     Q:    And you would agree with me that if it’s a mere encounter,
     he certainly would be free to leave; right?

     [The Commonwealth]: Objection.

     The Court: Sustained.

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N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 14-15 (some formatting altered and emphasis

added).

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to Appellant’s line

of questioning. See Luster, 234 A.3d at 838. As noted above, we apply an

objective standard when determining whether a seizure has occurred. See

Green, 298 A.3d at 1163. Therefore, Officer Zgleszewski’s subjective views

on his interaction with Appellant were “immaterial to the objective standard.”

See Thomas, 273 A.3d at 1201 (quoting Lyles, 97 A.3d at 307 n.6).

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. For these reasons,

we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 2/21/2024

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