Court Opinion

ID: 9831923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:28:57.59449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:39.458624
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[3] The warranty deed from Gestean to his wife conveyed to her whatever right he had to the land. He undoubtedly had a possessory right, and, when he conveyed the land to his wife, all the rights he had there*1143in became her separate property, and as such separate property was not in any manner affected by the judgment in a case in which she was not a party, and in which her husband had intervened in his own behalf and not as her representative.
Having obtained the possessory right to the land. Annie Gestean could not be disturbed in her possession of the land, except by some one showing title in himself, in a proceeding to which she was a party directly, as through the presence of her husband in the suit asserting her right ' The deed placed the possession of the land in Annie Gestean, and she has the right to retain possession of the land, until dispossessed by some one who has established a perfect title to the land.
There can be no doubt that the deed of Daniel A. Gestean conveyed all of his right, title, and interest in the land to Annie Gestean. Higgins v. Johnson, 20 Tex. 389, 70 Am. Dec. 394; Story v. Marshall, 24 Tex. 306, 76 Am. Dec. 106; Brown v. Brown, 61 Tex. 56. The deed made the property hers, and the fact that he, as her husband, had the management and control of her property, would not affect her rights in the property, whatever they might be. As said in Richardson v. Hutchins, 68 Tex. 81, 3 S. W. 276: “In transactions between husband and wife, when this is made clearly to appear, the contract is held to be consummated, though the paper which evidences the right of the wife was never actually delivered to her or to any third person for her, or though the thing donated has remained in the possession of the husband.” Annie Gestean showed that she had the right to the possession of the land, and her possession could not be disturbed by a writ directed against her husband, even though he was in possession of the property on account of being her husband. Her possession was established before the judgment was rendered against her husband, and he had no possession that could be disturbed because he had no possession in his own right, but only as the agent or trustee of his wife. It would seem to be a preposterous proposition that a wife could be ousted of the possession of her separate property by a writ against her husband, in a suit to which she was not a party, simply because he is given the control and management of her property.
It is said in Read v. Allen, 56 Tex. 182: “No ease has been cited or has come under our observation (and it is believed that no well-considered one can be found) which makes a judgment against the husband alone, and'to which the wife was not otherwise m party, sufficient to divest her title to her separate property.” And yet this is exactly what was attempted in this ease. It has been held that the possession of the wife of her separate property would be so affected by a judgment against the husband as to interrupt the running of the statute of limitation (Burleson v. Burleson, 28 Tex. 383); but such judgment would not affect her title, or right to possession (Allen v. Read, 66 Tex. 13, 17 S. W. 115).
Article 1200, Revised Statutes, clothes the husband with authority to sue either alone or jointly with his wife for the recovery of separate property of the wife; but, clearly, when he sues in his own name, he must set up the claim of the wife in order to bind her by a judgment. If he sues for her property in his name alone, he must by allegation disclose that he is suing for his wife’s property and not his own. This is clearly and unequivocally decided, under similar facts, in the case of Overand v. Menczer, 83 Tex. 122, 18 S. W. 301, hereinbefore cited. The decision in that ease has never been questioned in this state.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.