Court Opinion

ID: 9627506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:46:41.566233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:34.424143
License: Public Domain

GIBSON, C. J., Concurring.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed on the ground that the compensation of an attorney employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged without cause should be measured by the reasonable value of the services performed, not by the fee fixed in the contract. The cases in this state allowing recovery of the full contract fee under such circumstances should be overruled. (Webb v. Trescony, 76 Cal. 621 [18 Pac. 796]; Zurich G. A. & L. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. (2d) 98, 102 [81 P. (2d) 913].) It is true that a majority of jurisdictions permit such recovery. (See cases collected in 136 A. L. R. 242.) But a strong and growing minority hold that under a contingent fee contract an attorney may recover only the reasonable value of services rendered by him prior to discharge. (Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223 [21 A. (2d) 396, 136 A. L. R. 226]; Hubbard v. Goffinett, 253 Ky. 779 [70 S. W. (2d) 671]; Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319 [283 Pac. 487]; Krippner v. Matz, 205 Minn. 497 [287 N. W. 19]; Martin v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 170 [114 N. E. 46]; Wright v. Johanson, 135 Wash. 696 [233 Pac. 16, 236 Pac. 807]; Cavers v. Old Nat. Bank & Union Trust Co., 166 Wash. 449 [7 P. (2d) 23], and other cases cited 136 A. L. R. 254.) Sound reasons of policy and justice support the minority rule and it should be followed by this court. It is recognized as a part of the ethical rules governing the legal profession that an attorney will not sue a client for a fee except to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud. (See American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 14.)
*157The relation of attorney and client is one of special confidence and trust, and the dignity and integrity of the legal profession demand- that the interests of the client be fully protected. (Tomblin v. Hill, 206 Cal. 689, 693 [275 Pac. 941], 1 Thornton, Attorneys at Law, 238.) Without public confidence in the members of the legal profession, which is dependent upon absolute fairness in the dealings between attorney and client, courts cannot function in the proper administration of justice. And inherent in the relationship between attorney and client is the fact that the client must rely almost entirely upon the good faith of the attorney who alone can make an informed estimate of the value of the client’s legal right and of the expense and effort necessary to enforce it. These considerations have given rise to the generally accepted rule that a client may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause. (See Gage v. Atwater, 136 Cal. 170 [68 Pac. 581]; Estate of Cazaurang, 1 Cal. (2d) 712 [36 P. (2d) 1069], 7 C. J. S. 941.) But that is not enough. The right to discharge is of little value if the client must risk paying the full contract price for services not rendered upon a determination by a court that the discharge was without legal cause. The client may frequently be forced to choose between continuing the employment of an attorney in whom he has lost faith, or risking the payment of double contingent fees equal to the greater portion of any amount eventually recovered. (See Estate of Cazaurang, supra.) The uncertain position of the client in such circumstances is illustrated by the record in the present case where the trial court found the discharge was without cause and this court has made a contrary finding and concluded the discharge was justified. Unless a rule is adopted allowing an attorney as full compensation the reasonable value of services rendered to the time of discharge, clientfe will often feel required to continue in their service attorneys in whose integrity, judgment or capacity they have lost confidence.
The principles involved are well stated in the recent case of Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223 [21 A. (2d) 396, 136 A. L. R. 226]: “An attorney at law is an officer of the court; a minister of justice. He is entitled to fair compensation for his services, but since, because of the highly confidential relationship, the client may discharge him even without just cause, he should receive reasonable compensation for the work he has done up to that point, and not the agreed fee he probably *158would have earned had he been allowed to continue in his employment. This rule is not unfair to the attorney. He will receive fair compensation for what he has done; his position as an officer of the court does not entitle him to receive payment for services he has not rendered. ’ ’ These considerations are compelling in their application to the case at bar where under the rule of the Zurich ease, upon the finding of the trial court that the discharge was without cause, the attorney would recover $5,000 for a few hours’ work found to be of the reasonable value of only $300.
Traynor, J., concurred.