Court Opinion

ID: 9546496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:30:36.372886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:31.642316
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent. The main opinion sounds plausible, for one reason only, — that one of the trial judge’s orders, apparently of a dispositive nature was under question on a subsequent motion, but that the ordering judge, for an undisclosed reason, placed the matter on the law and motion calendar, and thus left his judgment under a new scrutiny. This may have been done because of illness or other legitimate reason for aught we know, but the fact remains that another district judge reversed his colleague on what appears to have been an appealable matter.
The action of the second judge in reversing the first has been condemned by *315this court more than once.1 To say as does the main opinion, that the third judge was not justified in reversing the second because of those authorities mentioned herein in footnote 1, simply is to destroy them by saying they were inapplicable to the first reversal but dispositive in the second, based on the reasoning applied in justification of the first.
My opinion would be either to apply the principle to both sets of circumstances, or simply junk the rule and permit district judges to reverse each other ad infinitum.
TUCKETT, J., concurs in the view expressed in the dissenting opinion of HEN-RIOD, C. J.

. Harward v. Harward, Utah, 526 P.2d 1183 (1974); State v. Morgan, Utah, 527 P.2d 225 (1974) and cases therein cited; Peterson v. Peterson, Utah, 530 P.2d 821 (1974).