Court Opinion

ID: 9754419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:00:01.792408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:53.288663
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Colins:
I must vigorously dissent.
The majority’s reliance on 58 Pa. Code §163.315 is misplaced. By its adoption of this regulation, the Commission has, in effect, attempted to supercede Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C. S. §704, through unauthorized fiat. Nowhere in the legislation creating the Horse Racing Commission is there any authority for such a regulation.
The regulation in question is interpretative rather than legislative. This distinction was discussed at great length by our Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth v. DePasquale, 509 Pa. 183, 501 A.2d 626 (1985). In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Larsen noted:
*191Interpretative rules cannot be binding on courts, like statutes, but courts, without being bound by them, may give them authoritative effect that equals or approximates force of law . . . When a rule is issued pursuant to delegated power, the court is bound by it as if it were a statute, and the court can do no more than inquire into its validity. But when a rule is not issued pursuant to delgated power, the courts inquiry is not into validity but is into correctness or propriety; the court may substitute judgment to whatever extent it finds desirable.
Id. at 187, 501 A.2d at 628-29. (quoting K.C. Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise §7:10 at 54, §7:13 at 59 (2d Ed. 1979)).
It is impossible, through the adoption of an interpretative regulation, for any Commonwealth agency to give itself more authority than that generally granted in the Administrative Agency Law.
In State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v. Contakos, 21 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 422, 346 A.2d 850 (1975), this Court held that 2 Pa. C. S. §505, which mandates that the technical rules of evidence are not applicable to proceedings before the Commonwealth agencies, does not abrogate the hearsay evidence rule.
While the report itself in the instant matter may have qualified under the business record exception of 42 Pa. C. S. §6108, there is absolutely no competent evidence of record to indicate that the subject of the report, sample number 12609, was, in fact, taken from the horse, Duke Leon, on the day in question. The sample was not taken by the laboratory which prepared the report. Therefore, the chain of custody must be independently proven before the report may be admitted. The documents stating the source of the sample, without verification, are merely out-of-court hearsay statements. *192See Beard v. Department of Public Welfare, 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 393, 400 A.2d 1342 (1979); Alcoa v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 49 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 152, 410 A.2d 945 (1980).
In Bleilevens v. Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1, 5, 312 A.2d 109, 111 (1973), Judge Rogers of this Court wrote: "The Hearsay Rule is not a technical rule of evidence but a basic, vital and fundamental rule of law which ought to be followed by administrative agencies at those points in their hearings when facts crucial to the issue are sought to be placed upon the record.” In the instant matter, the majority has apparently chosen to abandon this long-standing doctrine.
The effects of a 60-day suspension upon a trainer of Mr. Worthingtons stature are disastrous; yet, this Court has chosen to affirm the Agency’s suspension of Mr. Worthington’s license to practice his livelihood without requiring the Commission to affirmatively establish every element of the charge. There are numerous exceptions to the Hearsay rule which would have allowed proof of the chain of custody of the evidence in question, while only placing a minimal burden upon the Commission. However, the Commission chose not to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the evidence in question, and as such, it should have been excluded.
The State Horse Racing Commission has proven itself to be exemplary in its management, promotion, and regulation of the horse racing industry in Pennsylvania. However, there is no legislative authority to allow the Commission to enjoy a lesser burden of affirmative proof in its administrative hearings than any other Commonwealth administrative agency.
In its decision in the instant matter, and the similar case of Wise v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, 100 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 205, 514 A.2d 308 *193(1986), this Court has chosen to overrule Paoli v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, 81 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 179, 473 A.2d 243 (1984), eviscerate Rleilevens and by implication bypass the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 42 Pa. C. S. §6108, and empower the State Horse Racing Commission with regulatory control enjoyed by no other agency.
Accordingly, I must dissent.