Court Opinion

ID: 9397972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-27 21:00:28.482863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:29.225770
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4157     Doc: 41          Filed: 05/26/2023   Pg: 1 of 6

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4157

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                    Plaintiff - Appellee

        v.

        RICHARD TODD HAAS

                    Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior District Judge. (3:16-cr-00139-REP-1)

        Submitted: April 12, 2023                                       Decided: May 26, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Wilkinson and Judge Harris joined.

        ON BRIEF: William J. Dinkin, WILLIAM J. DINKIN, PLC, Richmond, Virginia, for
        Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United
        States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia,
        for Appellee.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4157      Doc: 41         Filed: 05/26/2023       Pg: 2 of 6

        RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

               For the second time, Richard Haas asks us to vacate a life sentence he received for

        his child-abuse-related convictions. The first time—after holding that the district court

        erred when calculating Haas’s Guidelines range—we vacated his sentence and remanded

        for resentencing. On remand, the district court reimposed a life sentence. This time, we

        affirm. We find no error and the sentence is reasonable.

               Haas was convicted of attempted sex trafficking of a minor and three child-

        pornography offenses. He attempted to pay an adult sex-worker to bring him a young child

        to abuse and use to create child pornography. United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467, 472

        (4th Cir. 2021). Unbeknownst to Haas, the sex-worker was helping law enforcement

        investigate him. Id. During the investigation, law enforcement discovered that Haas—

        separate from his efforts with the sex-worker—was accused of sexually abusing an eleven-

        year-old girl. So they cut the investigation short and sprang into action. They seized Haas’s

        laptops, which revealed 17,846 images and 53 videos of child pornography. Id. at 473.

        Haas was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison. He appealed and we vacated

        his sentence, remanding for resentencing. Id. at 478–80, 482.

               On remand, Haas was again sentenced to life in prison after the district court varied

        and departed upwards from the Guidelines sentencing range. 1 His presentence report

               1
                 These may sound the same, but they’re not. See United States v. Legins, 34 F.4th
        304, 324 (4th Cir. 2022). “Departures are enhancements of, or subtractions from, a
        guidelines calculation ‘based on a specific Guidelines departure provision.’ . . . Variances,
        in contrast, are discretionary changes to a guidelines sentencing range based on a judge’s
        (Continued)
                                                     2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4157       Doc: 41         Filed: 05/26/2023      Pg: 3 of 6

        calculated a Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment. [J.A. 195.] But the

        district court varied upwards to a life sentence, reasoning that this was warranted given

        Haas’s conduct, characteristics, and personal history. In particular, the district court noted

        Haas’s desire to—not just view but—make child pornography, as well as his unrelated

        abuse of an eleven-year-old girl. Separately, the district court departed upward, calculating

        a new, higher sentencing range of 360 months to life based on its reading of United States

        Sentencing Guidelines § 2G2.2 and an accompanying application note. 2 [J.A. 151–52.]

        Haas now appeals this new life sentence.

               Haas argues his new sentence is unreasonable because it is based on an

        impermissible variance. We review criminal sentences only for reasonableness. United

        States v. Tucker, 473 F.3d 556, 560 (4th Cir. 2007). And while a district court’s decision

        to vary is discretionary, Legins, 34 F.4th at 324, for the resulting sentence to be reasonable,

        it must be sufficiently based on the district court’s review of the sentencing factors found

        in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Tucker, 473 F.3d at 561. Thus, absent other errors, a sentence

        imposed based on a variance is reasonable so long as “the reasons justifying the variance

        review of all the § 3553(a) factors . . . .” United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 225–26
        (3d Cir. 2009).
               2
                  Section 2G2.2(b)(7) prescribes enhancements for child-pornography offenses
        involving a large number of images. The maximum enhancement is a five-level
        enhancement for 600 or more images. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D). Haas’s 17,846
        images and 53 videos well exceeded that threshold. So he got the five-level enhancement.
        [J.A. 83.] But an application note instructing judges on how to determine the number of
        images also says that an upward departure may be warranted when “the number of images
        substantially underrepresents the number of minors depicted” or if “the length of the visual
        depiction is substantially more than 5 minutes.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.6(B)(i), (ii). The
        district court relied on this note to upwardly depart.
                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4157      Doc: 41         Filed: 05/26/2023     Pg: 4 of 6

        are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” Id. (quoting United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d

        424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006)); cf. United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011)

        (“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be

        given each of the § 3553(a) factors.”).

               Haas’s sentence is reasonable. The reasons for the variance are plausible and tied

        to the § 3553(a) factors. See Tucker, 473 F.3d at 561. Those factors—including “the nature

        and circumstances of the offense,” “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and

        the need for the sentence to “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “afford adequate

        deterrence,” and “protect the public”—are precisely what the district court cited to justify

        the variance sentence. See § 3553(a). During the sentencing hearing, it noted that Haas

        had a multi-year obsession with obtaining and creating child pornography. It also pointed

        to Haas’s calculated abuse of an eleven-year-old girl. [J.A. 144–48, 152–53, 173.] For the

        district court, these findings showed that Haas was a sexual predator for whom a life

        sentence was “necessary” to deter future crime and protect the public. 3 J.A. 156. [J.A.

        144–48, 152–53, 173–74.] These reasons for varying are plausible, and they are tied to the

        § 3553(a) factors. So the district court’s variance was permissible, and therefore—with no

        need to investigate the departure—the resulting sentence was reasonable. See United States

        v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 528 (4th Cir. 2014) (“If the district court deviates from the

               3
                  Along with its discussion during the sentencing hearing, the district court
        underscored its reliance on the § 3553(a) factors in the Statement of Reasons, explaining
        that the variance was justified because Haas’s behavior revealed “a particularly acute need
        for both specific and general deterrence and to protect the public.” J.A. 172. [J.A. 172,
        174.]
                                                     4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4157        Doc: 41       Filed: 05/26/2023     Pg: 5 of 6

        Guideline range and provides two or more independent rationales for its deviation, the

        appellate court cannot declare the sentence unreasonable if it finds fault with only one of

        the rationales.”).

               Even so, Haas argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the upward variance

        alone does not justify the life sentence. Instead, he argues, it depended on the upward

        departure. And because he says the departure was erroneous, he argues, in turn, that the

        sentence imposed pursuant to the variance was also improper because it was based, at least

        in part, on a flawed departure. Put simply, Haas argues that even if the variance to an

        above-Guidelines sentence was permissible, the sentenced imposed was tainted by the

        purportedly impermissible departure to a higher Guidelines range to begin with.

               But the district court made plain that the variance and departure were separate

        grounds to reach the ultimate sentence. True, the district court noted that a life sentence

        was justified after both departing and varying. See J.A. 174 (“Consideration of the factors

        at [ ]§ 3553(a) . . . indicates that an above-Guideline sentence is merited and that, within

        the range of sentences available to the Court after applying an upward departure and

        upward variance, a life sentence is appropriate” (emphasis added)). Yet that does not show

        that the variance alone failed to support the sentence. Instead, the record shows that the

        variance was a stand-alone justification for the life sentence. The government presented

        the departure and variance as independent grounds for imposing a life sentence. J.A. 41

        (“In the event that the Court denies the government’s motion for an upward departure, the

        United States requests that the Court impose an upwardly variant sentence . . . of life.”).

        And that is how the district court considered and granted the government’s motions. J.A.

                                                     5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4157       Doc: 41         Filed: 05/26/2023     Pg: 6 of 6

        156 (“[H]aving granted an upward departure . . . and having granted an upward variance.”);

        J.A. 171–74 (granting the motions separately and justifying them individually in the

        Statement of Reasons). [J.A. 148–52, 152–52.] The district court also made clear that the

        § 3553(a) factors underlying the variance—standing on their own—justified a life

        sentence. J.A. 156 (listing and considering the § 3553(a) factors before declaring a life

        sentence is necessary). [J.A. 155.] So the district court’s upward variance adequately

        supports the life sentence. 4

                                        *            *              *

               The district court varied upwards for plausible reasons tied to the § 3553(a) factors.

        So the sentence imposed is reasonable. That’s all we require. Accordingly, Haas’s

        sentence is

                                                                                       AFFIRMED.

               4
                 Since we find that the variance is an independent and adequate ground for
        imposing a life sentence, we need not—and do not—address whether the departure was
        also proper.
                                                     6