Court Opinion

ID: 9742026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:05:33.540497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:27.908722
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, P. J.
(dissenting). As the estimable and Very Honorable Justice Michael D. O’Hara was wont to say, this is jurisprudential old hat. Either there was or there was not enough evidence to make a jury submissible question of breach of implied warranty. Unfortunately, like beauty, such evidence is sometimes in the eye of the beholder. In my eye, there was very clearly a jury question framed by the testimony of the plaintiff-driver, her passenger, the police officer, and the mechanic. To pin a directed verdict on the question of rapid acceleration as the majority does, is a rude invasion of the jury’s right to assess credibility. It seems to me the majority has weighed the evidence and found it wanting. Exactly what an appellate court should not do. The evidence should not be read selectively to exclude the testimony favorable to plaintiffs.
Testimony was adduced by the plaintiff that the *230vehicle was being operated in a safe manner at a reasonable speed. A police officer testified he did not believe that the road condition had been a factor in the accident. The accident occurred as a result of the vehicle pulling to the left, crossing the center line, leaving the road and striking a rock. It was plaintiff’s testimony that this was caused by the vehicle’s steering wheel locking and that she couldn’t stop it because the brakes failed at the same time.
Not wishing to add further to the literature that Justice O’Hara has described as "the skyscraper high pile”1 of these product liability cases, if McKinch v Dixon, 391 Mich 282; 215 NW2d 689 (1974), is still good law, there is ample factual justification for sending this case to the jury and the verdict should be affirmed.
The letter from Chevrolet Motor Division, referring to the defect, implies that the engine mounts could be separated and the vehicle still driven successfully, but that such separation coupled with rapid acceleration or sharp turns increased the hazard. It seems to me the majority reads that as saying creates the hazard.
Paragraph 4 of plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 is as follows:
"The possible safety hazard referred to exists when, as a result of fatigue or collision damage, the rubber portion of an engine mount has separated. When this condition exists, very rapid acceleration of the vehicle from a stop or from very low speeds can result in the engine rotating sufficiently to interfere with the accelerator linkage and to cause the throttle to be held open temporarily. This can occur suddenly and without warning when the vehicle is in either forward or reverse gear. A sharp left turn during forward accelera*231tion can increase the possibility of engine rotation if the left engine mount has separated.”
It seems to me that the evidence was competent and sufficient to support the jury determination. I would affirm.

 Holloway v General Motors Corp, 60 Mich App 208, 211; 230 NW2d 380 (1975), lv granted, 394 Mich 824 (1975).