Court Opinion

ID: 9677672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:57:10.527745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:30.227745
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Defendant’s motion for rehearing complains of our ruling that proof of decline in market value for the period of the delay establishes plaintiff’s damages prima facie, and that the burden shifted to defendant to show that the amount of plaintiff’s loss was less than such decline. Defendant insists that it has been deprived of due process because it had no information as to whether plaintiff actually lost profits when it sold the cotton and the trial court refused to permit cross-examination of plaintiff’s chief witness, Rufus McClung, in this respect.
The claim of denial of due process fails for several reasons.
First. This contention is another form of defendant’s principal argument that plaintiff’s loss must be determined by loss of profits rather than by decline in market value. We adhere to the views expressed in our original opinion. Since the action is in contract, plaintiff is entitled to have its loss determined by the contract measure of damages, that is, it is entitled to be put in as good a position as if defendant had performed promptly. Whether plaintiff made a profit or loss on sale of a particular bale of cotton is immaterial to a damage question. If plaintiff bought a bale in December for $850 and would have sold it in January at its market value of $900 if defendant had weighed and sampled it promptly, but had to sell it in March when it first became available for sale, for $750 because of decline in market price, the amount of plaintiff’s damage is not $100 but $150. This damage is not theoretical, but the actual amount necessary to put plaintiff in the position he would have been in if defendant had performed promptly. Furthermore, if plaintiff decides not to sell in March for the price then prevailing, but to wait for a better market, and sells in June, the correct amount of damages is still $150, whether the actual sale price is $800 or $700. Since the owner takes the risk of subsequent loss from market fluctuation, he, rather than the wrongdoer, should get the benefit of subsequent gain. In this connection plaintiff’s transactions with respect to cotton other than the cotton in question are immaterial.
We have held that decline in market value is prima facie evidence of damages for delay in performance rather than the controlling measure because the owner may not choose to take the risk of further price fluctuation. If he decides not to wait for a better market, but sells promptly for the best price obtainable, his loss is the difference between the market value when performance was due and the actual sale price, even if that price is above current market quotations.1 Defendant would have *747been entitled to present this kind of evidence to show that plaintiff’s loss was less than the market value, but it made no attempt to do so.
Second. The record fails to show that defendant was deprived of the right to present any relevant evidence. The cross-examination to which objection was sustained did not inquire into the amount for which the cotton was sold, but concerned plaintiff’s profit for the entire 1967-68 season. Plaintiff’s overall profit for the year would have no bearing on the question of whether plaintiff sustained a loss because of defendant’s delay in weighing and sampling the particular cotton. Defendant has not called our attention to anything in the record showing that it has been denied the right to prove the price at which the cotton was sold, even if the sale price were relevant. Whether such evidence would be relevant would depend on various factors, such as whether the sale was too remote in time.
Third. Defendant had the opportunity to raise here by cross-point any ground that would require a new trial rather than rendition of judgment on the verdict, but has failed to do so. Upon the record as it comes to us, we cannot remand for a new trial for improper restriction of defendant’s right to cross-examine or for exclusion of any relevant rebutting evidence. If the trial court erred in that respect, but then rendered judgment non obstante veredicto in defendant’s favor, defendant was not required to file a motion for new trial, but it was required under Tex.R.Civ.P. 324 to raise this ground by cross-point in its brief in this court. By the express provision of that rule, failure to bring forward by cross-points such grounds as would vitiate the verdict is deemed a waiver of such grounds. Consequently no denial of due process is shown.
Defendant contends further that even under the market value measure of damages plaintiff has failed to prove its damages because its evidence does not allow for commissions, brokerage fees, freight charges, tare weights, etc. Figures for these factors were before the jury, and defendant quotes some of them in its motion. If we understand defendant’s argument correctly, it is not that these factors were not proved, but rather that the jury did not deduct them in figuring the damages. In this connection defendant points out that the damages found by the jury amount to exactly 2½ cents per pound for 8,485 bales at 500 pounds a bale. Defendant does not point to any evidence that brokerage and commission charges in March would have varied from those in January. The weights of each bale and the tare weights were before the jury for its consideration in determining whether the net weight of the bales averaged as much as 500 pounds. The jury’s failure to make deductions for these factors would raise at most a question of excessiveness of the damages, rather than one of no evidence of damages, and no cross-point complaining of exces-siveness has been presented to us.
Defendant repeats its argument that under the market value measure, the value of each individual bale must be established according to its particular specifications, and that evidence of actual sales rather than opinion evidence is required to establish the market value. No authority is cited in support of this argument. Defendant’s objections in these respects go to the weight of plaintiff’s evidence rather than competency to prove damages. We hold only that the evidence before the jury was some evidence to support the verdict.
Finally, defendant contends that in allowing plaintiff recovery of interest as general damages on the value of the cotton *748for the period of delay as well as decline in market value we have allowed a double recovery because interest, if recovered as general damages, is the sole measure of the loss. This contention also is overruled. These are two separate items of damage. If plaintiff’s sale of the cotton was delayed from January to March because defendant failed to furnish weights and samples promptly, plaintiff was entitled to interest for the period of delay even if no market decline had occurred, since it was deprived of the proceeds of sale of the cotton for that period. As we held in the original opinion, plaintiff is limited to the legal rate of interest unless it actually paid interest at a higher rate and defendant had notice that such higher interest would be paid. Regardless of whether the recovery of interest was at the legal or some higher rate, plaintiff has not only been deprived of the proceeds of the sale for the period of delay, for which interest is proper compensation, but has an additional loss in that the amount for which it could sell the cotton has been reduced. Both items of damage are recoverable.
Motion for rehearing overruled.

. The case is'analogous to one in which a buyer of goods wrongfully refuses to accept them. The seller has a choice of remedies. Under the decisions, he is not limited to a recovery based on the actual amount he realizes from a sale to another *747buyer, but may treat the goods as his own and recover damages based on the market price at the time and place fixed for delivery. Waples v. Overaker, 77 Tex. 7, 13 S.W. 527 (1890) ; Marion v. Bowers, 371 S.W.2d 575 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1963, no writ, per Denton, C. J.). Cf. Tex.Bus. and Com.Code § 2.708 (1968), Y.T.C.A.