Court Opinion

ID: 9896608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 20:06:29.743347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.647277
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220154-U
                                           No. 2-22-0154
                                  Order filed November 13, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                               IN THE

                               APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

In re MARRIAGE OF GENUEL               ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ALMODOVAR, JR.,                        ) of Lake County.
                                       )
      Petitioner-Appellee,             )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 19-D-975
                                       )
JANET ALMODOVAR,                       ) Honorable
                                       ) Charles W. Smith,
      Respondent-Appellant.            ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       PRESIDING JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Schostok and Kennedy concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate equally; the
             trial court’s reservation of maintenance was not an abuse of discretion; where the
             trial court erroneously stated that the wife had not filed a petition for contribution
             for attorney fees, it abused its discretion by denying the wife’s petition. Trial court
             is affirmed, in part and vacated, in part, and the cause is remanded.

¶2     On March 5, 2021, after a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment dissolving the

marriage between petitioner, Genuel Almodovar, Jr. (Mark), and respondent, Janet Almodovar.

Janet appeals, arguing that the trial court erred when it (1) failed to allocate her a greater share of

the marital estate, (2) failed to award her indefinite maintenance, and (3) denied her petition for
2023 IL App (2d) 220154-U

contribution for attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm, in part, vacate in part, and

remand for further proceedings.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     Mark and Janet married in 1981. Two children, each of whom are now emancipated, were

born to the couple. In June 2019, Mark petitioned to dissolve the marriage. The matter proceeded

to a three-day trial on September 29, 30, and October 16, 2020. Prior to the trial, the parties filed

numerous motions mostly related to which party was going to have control of the marital asset,

M&J Machinery (M&J). The parties founded M&J in 2005 and each owned 50% of the business.

M&J is a manufacturer of precision machine components and parts that has employed as many as

18 people, including the parties’ son, Eric. Many of the employees are highly skilled machinists.

¶5                                   A. Pre-Trial Proceedings

¶6     On June 17, 2019, the day before Mark filed his petition for dissolution of marriage, he

filed a verified petition for an order of protection against Janet, wherein he averred that Janet

“attacked [him], hit [him] repeatedly, scratched [him], which caused bruises and scratches to [his]

face and [his] body [and that Janet] has many guns which she keeps in the house.” Mark also stated

that he called the police, and that Janet was arrested for domestic battery.

¶7      On July 8, 2019, the trial court entered an agreed order that provided, inter alia, that Mark

shall have exclusive possession of the marital residence in Antioch.

¶8     On October 4, 2019, Janet filed an “Emergency Verified Petition for Temporary Injunctive

Relief and the appointment of a Receiver” (petition for injunctive relief). Janet alleged that for the

last two years, Mark had only occasionally shown up to work and that when he did, he antagonized

skilled and vital employees. Six valuable employees quit due to Mark’s behavior, which caused

M&J to lose business and revenue. Mark was also antagonistic towards Janet who was M&J’s

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corporate secretary, and Eric, who ran the company in Mark’s absence. Mark also had surveillance

cameras installed on M&J’s premises to remotely monitor everyone at the company. Janet’s

petition filed an order seeking to restrain Mark from acting as an officer and/or director of M&J,

managing or interfering in the management of M&J, retaining any M&J property, and being on

M&J property. Janet also sought an order to appoint Eric as the receiver of M&J.

¶9     On October 15, 2019, the trial court entered an agreed order that “[t]he status quo ante with

the respect to the operation of [M&J] shall be maintained until further court order.”

¶ 10   On October 28, 2019, Janet filed an emergency petition for adjudication of indirect civil

contempt, that recounted the allegations of her petition for injunctive relief and alleged that Mark

violated the court’s October 15 order when he transferred $100,000 from M&J’s checking account

into his personal account.

¶ 11   On October 29, 2019, the trial court entered an order that allowed Janet to run M&J and

restricted Mark from accessing the building with the exception of once per day and in case of an

emergency.

¶ 12   On January 31, 2020, Janet filed a “Supplement to [her]: Emergency Verified Petition for

Adjudication of Indirect Civil Contempt,” wherein she alleged, further instances of Mark’s

misconduct regarding M&J including, his threats to Janet and Eric as they attempted to hire new

employees, pay Christmas bonuses, and pay vendors with the company credit card. Janet also

alleged that Mark stopped paying her salary since December 2019 and “absconded with $250,000

of business funds,” which left M&J without adequate working capital; in early December 2019,

Janet and Eric terminated Mark’s brother, Jeff Almodovar because he routinely showed up to work

with a gun.

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¶ 13   On March 6, 2020, Janet filed a motion to vacate the agreed order dated July 8, 2019, and

asked the court to refer the matter to the Lake County State’s attorney for investigation of perjury

and for filing a false police report. Janet alleged that during Mark’s February 10, 2020, deposition,

he repeatedly impeached himself and contradicted the allegations that he made to the Antioch

police that caused her to be arrested for battery and to be incarcerated overnight. Then, on June

18, 2019, Mark obtained an emergency order of protection based on the false battery charges.

Using the order of protection, Mark manipulated Janet to trade away possession of the marital

home to ensure her freedom and continued employment with M&J. Thereafter, Mark moved his

“paramour” into the marital home.

¶ 14   On March 10, 2020, the court heard testimony regarding Janet’s petition for injunctive

relief. Janet’s counsel asked Mark if he stated under oath in his domestic violence petition, “my

wife has many guns which she keeps in the house.” Mark agreed that he made that statement. He

also agreed that when he made that statement, there were no guns in the house other than the guns

that were in his vault. Mark did not agree that his statement that “his wife has many guns” was

false, because “[g]uns are marital property.”

¶ 15   On June 24, 2020, Janet filed a second supplement to her emergency petition for a

temporary restraining order and appointment of a receiver. Janet alleged inter alia, that Mark

obtained a Payroll Protection Program (PPP) loan in the amount of $217,775, and had used

$36,000 of the PPP loan to pay off the mortgage on the marital residence and $50,000 to pay his

attorney’s fees. Janet also alleged that Mark withdrew $100,000 from the parties’ health savings

account, transferred $100,000 from the parties’ joint account into his personal account, and

withdrew $150,000 from M&J’s business account.

¶ 16                                       B. Testimony

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¶ 17   The parties stipulated that the testimony adduced from the pretrial hearings would be

adopted by the trial court as evidence in the trial. We recite only the testimony and other evidence

relevant to our resolution of the issues raised in this appeal.

¶ 18   Janet, 58 years old at the time of trial, completed school through the 10th grade in Puerto

Rico. She worked all her life. The parties married in 1981 and had two children, Eric, born in 1984,

and Erica, born in 1991. Early in the parties’ marriage, Janet worked at Fox Plastics, running

operations on machines and as an inspector. Later, she worked as a babysitter for various families,

which enabled her to care for the parties’ children. While raising the children, Janet also worked

as a manager at a White Castle restaurant to provide health insurance for the family, while helping

to facilitate the parties’ 2006 launch of M&J. In 2012, Janet began to work fulltime for M&J. She

worked approximately 50-60 hours a week as a “jack-of-all-trades,” with a wide range of

responsibilities including delivery assistance, inventory, business meetings with Eric, and ordering

supplies. Janet also helped inspect machines and manage employees.

¶ 19   Throughout the marriage, including while Janet worked full-time at M&J, she also

maintained and managed the parties’ home life. She raised the children, cooked, cleaned the home,

and did the family laundry. Janet had no help from anyone else, other than the occasional

babysitter.

¶ 20   Mark, 58 years old at the time of trial, testified that he completed one year of college. His

first job was at Titan Tool, where he worked for 25 years. During the parties’ marriage, Mark

worked 12-18 hours a day. Mark described himself as a “master machinist” who has an exceptional

knowledge of the machinist trade and industry. At M&J, Mark designed parts for customers,

worked with the engineering team, and worked on design software. Beginning in March 2018

Mark effectively withdrew from M&J. He did very little with the company, and only occasionally

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showed up to work. Mark spent his time vacationing in his camper in Florida. He testified that his

age and medical issues prevented him from finding another job outside of M&J. Mark admitted

that he had not tried to find another job. Two years before the trial, a doctor told Mark that he

needed a hip and shoulder replacement. But this did not prevent Mark from working out or doing

his job at M&J.

¶ 21   In 2019 each party earned approximately $200,000 from M&J.

¶ 22                                  C. Posttrial Proceedings

¶ 23   In November 2020 Janet filed an emergency motion seeking to bar Mark from having

anything to do with M&J. This motion was filed after Mark showed up at M&J on October 28,

2020, accompanied by two Antioch police officers and attempted to take control of the business.

On November 10, 2020, after a hearing, the trial court granted Janet’s petition for injunctive relief,

and (1) enjoined Mark from, inter alia, entering M&J, harassing and/or intimidating Janet and

Eric, having contact with M&J’s employees, its customers, vendors, bankers, creditors, and/or

service providers; and (2) ordered Mark to be removed from any M&J corporate and/or

employment position, and to return all M&J property.

¶ 24   On January 15, 2021, the trial court entered an agreed order providing, in part, that petitions

for contribution of attorney’s fees shall be submitted by January 19, 2021. On January 19, 2021,

Janet filed a petition seeking contribution for attorney’s fees and costs from Mark. She alleged that

her attorneys attempted to preserve the parties’ business, M&J, despite Mark’s destructive

behavior. Janet alleged numerous detrimental actions taken by Mark. She argued that “Mark’s

attempts to sabotage M&J and subvert Janet and Eric’s efforts to operate M&J unnecessarily

protracted this litigation and substantially increased the costs of this litigation.” Janet argued (1)

that most of the fees she incurred “relate to her attempts to preserve the marital estate”; (2) her

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2023 IL App (2d) 220154-U

financial stability will be undermined without contribution from Mark; and (3) Mark should pay

Janet’s attorney’s fees given the relevant statutory factors and the disparity between the parties’

incomes and assets. Janet noted that her counsel had been paid $128,272 and was owed $294,734.

¶ 25      Mark also filed a petition for contribution of attorney’s fees and costs. Mark alleged that

he owed approximately $200,000 in fees to his current counsel.

¶ 26      On February 19, 2021, the trial court announced its “Findings and Final Order Following

Trial.”

¶ 27      On March 1, 2021, Mark filed a motion to enter a judgment for dissolution of marriage

nunc pro tunc to February 19, 2021. The motion noted that the trial court’s prior order did not

award the parties a judgment of dissolution.

¶ 28      On March 5, 2021, the trial court entered a “Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage”

(judgment). The judgment largely incorporated the trial court’s February 19, 2021, findings and

final order. The judgment awarded each party 50% of M&J. Regarding M&J, the judgment states:

                 “[T]he court will afford each party the opportunity to purchase the other’s stock by

          tendering the other $1,250.000 in cash within 7 days of the entry of this order. Should

          neither party buy the other shares then the court will appoint a Receiver ***. The Receiver

          is to sell the business *** at the highest possible price. After deducting the Receiver’s fees

          and the costs of the sale each party will be entitled to one half (50%) of the net proceeds.”

¶ 29      The trial court divided the parties’ remaining assets equally between the parties and

expressly rejected their arguments that “they should receive a disproportionate share of the marital

assets.” These assets included a house in Antioch (valued at $267,000), retirement accounts, cars,

boats, and a vacation property (time share) in Mexico. The court “reserved maintenance until it is

determined if either party is going to purchase M&J.” Regarding attorney fees, the court

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2023 IL App (2d) 220154-U

recognized that Mark sought contribution from Janet, but it mistakenly stated that “Janet has not

yet petitioned for attorney fees.” The court then found that “[b]oth sides needlessly increased the

cost of litigation [and by] the award of marital assets *** each party has the ability to pay their

own attorneys’ fees.”

¶ 30    On March 12, 2021, the parties informed the trial court that neither of them would buy out

the other’s share of M&J’s stock and that Eric was attempting to obtain the financing to buy the

parties out.

¶ 31    On March 17, 2021, the trial court appointed a receiver for M&J.

¶ 32    On March 24, 2021, Mark filed a motion to reconsider the court’s judgment of dissolution.

Mark argued that the trial court should not have allocated a 2017 Chrysler to Janet, because the

vehicle was an asset of M&J.

¶ 33    On April 5, 2021, Mark filed a second motion to reconsider the court’s judgment of

dissolution, regarding the parties’ time share and boat.

¶ 34    On February 2, 2022, the trial court entered an amended order that, inter alia, granted

Mark’s initial motion to reconsider.

¶ 35    On February 7, 2022, the receiver for M&J filed his report regarding the sale of M&J that

related, inter alia, that Eric’s company (IQM Solutions, LLC) purchased M&J for $2,495,000.

Mark received $1,247,500 in cash from the sale and Janet accepted a promissory note for the same

amount.

¶ 36    On April 28, 2022, the trial court entered an order that, inter alia, granted Mark’s second

motion to reconsider.

¶ 37    Janet filed her notice of appeal on May 10, 2022.

¶ 38                                      II. ANALYSIS

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¶ 39   Before discussing the substance of this appeal, we address Janet’s arguments that Mark’s

introduction and supplemental statement of facts sections contain argument in violation of Illinois

Supreme Court Rules 341(h)(2) and (6). Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(2) and (6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2022). Janet

requests that we disregard the offending portions of Mark’s brief.

¶ 40   While an appellee is not required to submit an introductory paragraph or statement of facts

(see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(i) (eff. Oct. 1, 2022)), if he elects to do so, he must also comply with Rule

341(h)(6). The Illinois Supreme Court Rules are not “mere suggestions” but instead “have the

force of law.” In re Denzel W., 237 Ill. 2d 285, 294 (2010). Where a party fails to substantially

conform to the pertinent supreme court rules, his brief may justifiably be stricken. Steven W. v.

Meeli W., 2021 IL App (2d) 200652, ¶ 37. However, because striking a party’s brief is a harsh

sanction, we will not do so unless the party’s noncompliance with the rules hinders our review. Id.

¶ 41   Here, we agree with Janet that Mark’s introduction section and supplemental statement of

facts improperly contain argument. With that said, the noncompliant portions of Marks’s brief do

not hinder our review, and therefore, we will not strike them. Instead, we simply disregard any

argument contained in these sections and admonish counsel to carefully follow the requirements

of the supreme court rules in future submissions.

¶ 42   Janet contends that the trial court erred because it (1) failed to allocate to her a greater share

of the marital estate, (2)failed to grant her indefinite maintenance, and (3) failed to grant her

petition for contribution to attorney fees.

¶ 43   Mark argues that we should not address these arguments because Janet invited any alleged

errors when she agreed to accept a promissory note to help their son buy M&J.

¶ 44   The rule of invited error or acquiescence is a form of procedural default also described as

estoppel. Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 33.

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The rule prohibits a party from requesting to proceed in one manner and then contending on appeal

that the requested action was error. Id. The reason for the rule is that it would be manifestly unfair

to grant a party relief based on error introduced into the proceedings by that party. Id.

¶ 45     Here, the record does not support Mark’s argument that Janet acquiesced to the alleged

errors she now challenges. Janet filed pleadings requesting 65% of the marital estate, permanent

maintenance, and contribution to her attorney’s fees. Therefore, although Janet agreed to accept

the promissory note, she sought the same relief in the trial court that she now seeks here.

Accordingly, we reject Mark’s argument that Janet invited error in this case.

¶ 46     Mark also asserts that Janet’s arguments are waived because she did not object when the

trial court ordered M&J’s receiver to consummate the sale of the company with Mark receiving

cash and Janet receiving a promissory note. Mark fails to recognize that Janet is not challenging

the trial court’s order regarding the sale of M&J.

¶ 47     In addition, Mark argues that Janet’s arguments are waived or forfeited because she failed

to raise them in a postjudgment motion. We disagree with Mark. Janet’s failure to raise the alleged

errors in a postjudgment motion did not forfeit the issues here: in a civil nonjury case, no

postjudgment motion is necessary to preserve an issue on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(b)(3)(ii)

(eff. Feb. 1, 1994); In re Merilee M., 409 Ill. App. 3d 983, 986 (2011). We now address Janet’s

arguments.

¶ 48                             A. Distribution of Marital Property

¶ 49     Janet contends that the trial court abused its discretion in its 50/50 distribution of marital

property in light of the relevant factors of section 503(d) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West

2022)). Janet argues that the relevant statutory factors weigh in favor of a 65/35 distribution in her

favor.

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¶ 50   The Act requires the trial court to divide marital property in “just proportions,” considering

all relevant factors including, in part, the contribution of the parties to the marital property; the

value of the property assigned to each spouse; the duration of the marriage; the relevant economic

circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective; the age, health,

station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, and employability of the

parties; and the reasonable opportunity of each spouse to acquire capital assets and income in the

future. 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(1), (3), (4), (5), (8), (11) (West 2020).

¶ 51   A trial court’s distribution of marital property will not be reversed, absent an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Klose, 2023 IL App (1st) 192253, ¶ 31. A trial court abuses its

discretion only where its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or where no reasonable person would adopt

the view of the trial court. Brown v. Illinois State Police, 2021 IL 126153, ¶ 49.

¶ 52   Initially, we address Janet’s assertion that “the disparity between Mark’s and ‘her’ financial

circumstance[s] resulting from the trial court’s judgment shocks the conscience, and the court

should have never let that happen.” We also address her contention that she has little cash

compared to Mark because she “had to take” a promissory note for the sale of the business, whereas

Mark received cash. Janet mischaracterizes the facts. The trial court’s judgment did not cause the

disparity between the parties’ financial circumstances. Rather, the court awarded each party 50%

of the business, and if neither party bought out the other, the court would appoint a receiver to sell

the business and award each party 50% of the proceeds. Subsequently, neither party bought out

the other and Janet accepted a promissory note for 50% of the sale price to help Eric’s company

buy the business. Further, the trial court did not order Janet to accept a promissory note instead of

cash for the sale of her half of M&J. Janet cannot claim that the trial court committed error due to

Janet’s voluntary action taken after the court entered its judgment. Therefore, when considering

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the relevant 503(d) factors, the trial court cannot be charged with failing to consider Janet’s

subsequent decision that rendered her with substantially less cash than Mark. Accordingly, we

address only those factors raised by Janet that do not rely on her assertion that she has less cash

($1,247,500) than Mark.

¶ 53   Janet contends that subsections 503(d)(1), (4), (5), (8), and (11) weigh in her favor because

of her contribution to M&J, the length of the marriage, and the parties’ respective skills: Mark is

a self-described “master machinist” while she is skilled at office work. See id. §§ 503(d)(1), (4),

(5), (8), and (11). We reject Janet’s argument.

¶ 54   Here, ample evidence supported the trial court’s determination of the appropriate

distribution of the marital estate, and Janet has not shown that its decision was an abuse of

discretion. Janet argues that her contribution to the parties’ business weighs in favor of a 65/35

distribution in her favor because she worked 50 to 60 hours a week, had a wide range of

responsibilities, and the business would not have been viable without her contribution. However,

Mark testified that at the beginning of the business he brought in the client that was responsible

for 95% of the business, and he ran the business for 15 years prior to these proceedings (he

programmed and operated machines, worked with customers and engineers, and managed the

financial aspects of the business). The trial court found that each party owned 50% of the business,

shared “a tremendous work ethic,” and each drew equal salaries. Therefore, the trial court properly

found that both parties contributed to M&J.

¶ 55    Further, after stating that it considered the factors set forth in the Act, the trial court

concluded that a 50/50 split of the marital property was just. The record indicates that the court

was aware of the parties’ separate contributions to the family business, and the parties’ ages, skills,

lack of formal education beyond high school, the duration of the marriage, and Janet’s contribution

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by “working long hours as a manager at a White Castle while helping Mark start M&J all the time

raising [the parties’] two children.” The trial court considered the relevant 503(d) factors and did

not abuse its discretion when it distributed the marital property equally.

¶ 56                                        B. Maintenance

¶ 57      Janet contends that the trial court erred by failing to award her indefinite maintenance. She

urges us to reverse the trial court’s “refusal” to award her indefinite maintenance. Mark counters

that the trial court properly reserved the issue of maintenance.

¶ 58      In interpreting the provisions of a judgment of dissolution, we apply the rules for the

interpretation of contracts. In re Marriage of Figliulo, 2015 IL App (1st) 140290, ¶ 13. The

primary objective when interpreting a dissolution judgment is to carry out the intent of the court

at the time of entry. Id. The intent of the court is to be determined only by the language of the

dissolution judgment, absent an ambiguity. In re Marriage of Hendry, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1017

(2011).

¶ 59      It is clear from the trial court’s order that it reserved the issue of maintenance and did not

“refuse” to award Janet maintenance. Rather, the trial court’s order states, “Maintenance shall be

reserved until it is determined if either party is going to purchase M&J Machinery.”

¶ 60      The reservation of maintenance has statutory authority. Specifically, section 401(b) states:

                 “Judgment shall not be entered unless, to the extent it has jurisdiction to do so, the

          court has considered, approved, reserved or made provision for *** the maintenance of

          either spouse and the disposition of property. The court shall enter a judgment for

          dissolution that reserves any of these issues either upon (i) agreement of the parties, or

          (ii) motion of either party and a finding by the court that appropriate circumstances exist.”

          (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/401(b) (West 2020).

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We will not reverse the court’s decision to reserve the issue of maintenance unless the court abused

its discretion, which means that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the

trial court. In re Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill. App. 3d 144, 168 (2005).

¶ 61   Here, the trial court reserved jurisdiction on the issue of maintenance because there was

uncertainty regarding the sale of M&J, the parties’ main marital asset. We determine that the trial

court’s decision to reserve maintenance was appropriate and well within the exercise of its

discretion. Neither party purchased M&J. If Janet files another petition seeking maintenance the

trial court shall consider it under the relevant 504(a) factors. 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2020).

Further, the trial court shall make specific findings of fact in accordance with section 504(b-2) of

the Act including its reasoning for awarding or not awarding maintenance and references to each

relevant section 504(a) factor. 750 ILCS 5/504(b-2) (West 2020).

¶ 62                             C. Contribution to Attorney Fees

¶ 63   Janet contends that the trial court erred when it failed to grant her a hearing on her petition

for contribution to attorney fees. At the outset, we note that Mark argues that Janet has forfeited

this argument because she never requested a hearing on her petition. Mark’s argument is

unpersuasive.

¶ 64   Janet timely filed her petition for contribution to attorney fees as directed by the trial court

and section 503(j) of the Act. 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2020). Section 503(j) provides:

                “After proofs have closed in the final hearing on all other issues between the parties

       (or in conjunction with the final hearing, if all parties so stipulate) and before judgment is

       entered, a party’s petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred in the proceeding shall

       be heard and decided.” Id.

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In In re Marriage of Brackett, 309 Ill. App. 3d 329, 345 (1999), we interpreted section 503(j) as

not “requiring an additional hearing, which would further burden already overburdened trial

courts, but, rather, as requiring the trial court to hear, through testimony or otherwise, additional

proofs *** in the context of preexisting proceedings.” In In re Marriage of Hasabnis, 322 Ill. App.

3d 582, 596 (2001), the court recognized the practical reality that, “[i]n most cases, once the trial

court has weighed marital property criteria and, if awarded, maintenance criteria, it will have

enough of a record to determine the contribution amount.”

¶ 65    Here, in its final judgment of dissolution, the trial court erroneously stated that Janet had

not filed a petition for contribution. Yet the trial court ordered that the parties “should each pay for

their own attorney fees.” Thus, although Janet was not entitled to a separate hearing on her petition,

she was entitled to have her petition heard and decided. See Brackett, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 345; 750

ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2020). Because the trial court stated that it did not know that Janet filed a

petition seeking contribution, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her petition. For

this reason, we vacate that portion of the judgment denying Janet contribution for attorney fees

and remand for a hearing on her petition.

¶ 66                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 67    For the reasons stated, we affirm the portion of the judgment of the circuit court of Lake

County, regarding the distribution of marital assets and the reservation of maintenance. Further,

we vacate the portion of the judgment that denied Janet’s petition for contribution of attorney fees,

and we remand for further proceedings.

¶ 68    Affirmed, in part, vacated, in part, and remanded.

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