Court Opinion

ID: 9899884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:11.439068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.641583
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 P. v. Guzman CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          H047877
                                                                     (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  Super. Ct. No. C1365678)

           v.

 JESUS GUZMAN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Jesus Guzman guilty on 14 counts of sexually assaulting
two child victims. The jury further found Guzman committed 11 of the offenses against
more than one victim, and that he had previously been convicted on two counts of lewd
and lascivious acts against a child under 14 years of age. The trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 1,005 years to life in prison.
         Guzman raises numerous claims on appeal. First, he contends the trial court erred
by admitting testimony by the prosecution’s expert on Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). Second, he contends the trial court erred by
instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1191B that it could infer, based on proof from
some of the offenses, that he was disposed to commit and did commit other charged
crimes. Third, he contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing
argument by repeatedly referring to him as a “sexual predator” and describing him as
unreformed and unrehabilitated. Because defense counsel did not object, Guzman
contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Fourth, he contends his conviction must be reversed based on cumulative prejudice from
the multiple errors set forth above.
       Fifth, Guzman contends his sentence was unauthorized because the trial court
imposed five-year terms for a prior serious felony conviction under Penal Code
section 667, subdivision (a) on eight counts in which the charging document did not
plead the enhancements. Sixth, he argues his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, he argues the trial court erred by
imposing a $10,000 restitution fine without determining whether the had the ability to
pay under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas).
       For the reasons below, we conclude these claims are without merit, and we affirm
the judgment.
                        I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
   A. Procedural Background
       The prosecution charged Guzman with 14 counts: counts 1, 2, 4, and 6 through
13—lewd or lascivious act on a child under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (a))1; counts 3 and 5—aggravated sexual assault on a child under 14 years of age
and 10 or more years younger than Guzman (former § 269); and count 14—lewd or
lascivious act on a child 14 or 15 years of age when Guzman was at least 10 years older
than the child (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)). As to all counts except counts 3, 5, and 14, the
prosecution further alleged Guzman committed the offenses against more than one victim
(§ 667.61, subd. (b)), and that Guzman had been previously convicted of an offense
specified in section 667.61, subdivisions (a), (c), and (d) (“One Strike Law”). As to
counts 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8, the prosecution alleged Guzman had suffered a prior serious
felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a).) Finally, the prosecution alleged Guzman had
suffered two prior strike convictions. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.)

       1
           Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2
       The case proceeded to trial in January 2019. The jury found Guzman guilty on all
counts as charged and found all allegations true.
       The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 1,005 years to life in prison. The
sentence consisted of 11 consecutive terms of 75 years to life for each of counts 1, 2, 4,
and 6 through 13 (25 years to life for each count based on the multiple victims
enhancement, tripled for the strike priors); a consecutive five-year term for each of the 11
prior serious felony enhancements on counts 1, 2, 4, and 6 through 13; 45 years to life for
each of counts 3 and 5 (15 years for each count, tripled for the strike priors); two
consecutive five-year terms for the prior serious felony enhancements on counts 3 and 5;
and 25 years to life on count 14 based on the strike priors.
   B. Facts of the Offenses
       The prosecution alleged Guzman sexually molested his nephew, T.D., and T.D.’s
female cousin A.D., on multiple occasions in 2006 and 2007. T.D. was four to five years
old at the time, and A.D. was 12 to 13 years old. Guzman was 25 years old in 2006.
       Guzman had previously been convicted on two counts of lewd and lascivious acts
on a child under 14 for molesting T.D.’s older sister, N.D., committed in 2003. He was
released from prison in May 2006.
       1. Counts 1 through 7 (Molestation of T.D.)
       T.D. was born in 2001, and he was 17 years old when he testified at trial. His
biological parents struggled with drug abuse and T.D. was separated from them at an
early age. The first home he could remember was that of his Aunt M. T.D. recalled
seeing Guzman there for the first time, and sometimes Guzman would take T.D. and his
brothers to Guzman’s apartment. Guzman was nice to T.D., letting him watch television
there and giving him food. Sometimes Guzman would take T.D. and his brother to the
pool. T.D. sometimes spent the night at Guzman’s apartment.
       T.D. testified about three incidents at Guzman’s apartment. The first time,
Guzman called T.D. into the bathroom, took off T.D.’s clothing, and put him on the floor.

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Guzman then put his penis on T.D.’s buttocks, and T.D. started yelling. Guzman told
him to stop, and Guzman put his hands over T.D.’s mouth. On the second occasion, T.D.
was sitting on the toilet in the bathroom, whereupon Guzman entered and put his penis
into T.D.’s mouth. T.D. did not want to open his mouth, but Guzman grabbed T.D.’s
head and “just started doing it.” On the third occasion, Guzman started touching T.D.’s
penis and buttocks, and Guzman made T.D. kiss him on the mouth. T.D. testified that
over the course of these three occasions, Guzman put his penis in T.D.’s buttocks once;
put his penis in T.D.’s mouth once; touched T.D.’s penis about three times; touched
T.D.’s buttocks about two times; and made T.D. kiss him once. These incidents all
occurred in the bathroom at Guzman’s apartment.
       T.D. never told anyone at Aunt M.’s house about these incidents because he never
talked to anyone there. In October 2007, Aunt M. gave up her rights as a legal guardian
of T.D. and he was placed into emergency custody. In June 2012, T.D. disclosed to his
adoptive mother that Guzman had sexually molested him.
       2. Molestation of A.D. (Counts 8 through 14)
       A.D. was born in 1993. She was 25 years old when she testified at trial. She had
known Guzman since before the sixth grade, when he was hanging around her mother.
Around the time A.D. entered the sixth grade, she and Guzman struck up a friendship.
They talked a lot, and A.D. considered Guzman to be “like my best friend.” He showed
her a lot of attention, and she liked it, so she always wanted to be around him. Around
the time she entered the seventh grade, the relationship started to change. She started
wearing tighter, closer-fitting clothing around the house because he told her he liked it.
They started texting and talking on the phone.
       One day Guzman kissed A.D. She cared about him, and he liked her, so it did not
bother her. He started doing other things to her. He would take off her shirt and play
with her breasts, or she would take off her pants. He would tell her to “hump him” while

                                             4
they were sitting on the stairs. When her pants were off, sometimes he used his mouth on
her, and sometimes he would use his fingers and play with her.
        A.D. estimated that between the sixth grade and the eighth grade, Guzman used
his mouth on her “maybe more than ten” times and used his hands on her more than ten
times. He played with her breasts “many times.” A.D. also testified that she gave
Guzman oral sex “a handful” of times. She had testified at the preliminary hearing that
he put his penis in her mouth 20 to 30 times. He tried to have intercourse with her twice
by putting his penis inside her, but “he didn’t want to pop it,” so “he didn’t go all the
way.”
        All these encounters occurred in A.D.’s apartment. She and Guzman discussed
whether she was okay with them having this relationship, because he was worried about
getting in trouble. She was okay with it because she did not mind the attention, but she
never told anyone else about it because she knew it was wrong. One day she was sitting
on his lap in her bedroom, and her mother’s boyfriend saw them kissing. The boyfriend
told Guzman to leave, and A.D. was upset because she did not want Guzman to get in
trouble. The boyfriend told A.D.’s mother about it, but A.D. refused to talk to her about
it. Guzman never came back to the house again, but he and A.D. communicated online,
and they met twice at a McDonald’s. A.D. was sad about the relationship ending because
she felt she was losing her best friend.
        Later, around the time A.D. was a freshman in high school, she told her aunt that
she and Guzman had “messed around and stuff” at A.D.’s house. That was the first time
A.D. told someone else about it. When A.D. was about 20 years old, her cousin (T.D.’s
father) showed up at her house and started asking questions. As a result of the
conversation, A.D. went to the district attorney’s office to tell them her story.
        On cross-examination, A.D. agreed that she had testified at the preliminary
hearing that “it all started” when her sister was about one year old. A.D. was 14 years

                                              5
old at that time, and she was in the eighth grade. On redirect examination, she testified
that the sexual encounters began in the seventh grade, when she was 13 years old.
       3. Defense Evidence
       Guzman testified in his defense. He denied that he had ever molested T.D. or had
any kind of sexual relations with A.D. He conceded he had been convicted of molesting
N.D., but he denied that he had actually molested her.
       The defense presented several witnesses who testified variously that Guzman was
a good father; that they trusted him around their children; that he was not the type of
person who would molest children; or that he had never acted inappropriately around
their children. The defense also presented two expert witnesses—one who testified to the
susceptibility of memories to suggestibility, and a second who testified to the unscientific
nature of CSAAS evidence.
                                       II. DISCUSSION
   A. Admission of Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
      Syndrome (CSAAS)
       Guzman contends the trial court erred by admitting testimony by the prosecution’s
expert on CSAAS. He argues the jurors did not hold any misconceptions about how child
abuse victims react, such that the testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible. The
Attorney General contends the trial court properly admitted the testimony under existing
California Supreme Court precedents.
   1. Legal Principles
       To be admissible, expert testimony must be “[r]elated to a subject that is
sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
trier of fact,” among other criteria. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) CSAAS evidence is
admissible for limited purposes. It may not be used to prove the alleged sexual abuse
actually occurred, but CSAAS is admissible “for the limited purpose of disabusing the
fact finder of common misconceptions it might have about how child victims react to

                                             6
sexual abuse. [Citations.]” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 418.) The
prosecution may explicitly identify misconceptions about victims’ behavior that CSAAS
testimony is intended to rebut. (People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 449-450.)
Such evidence may be relevant and admissible where a victim’s conduct relates directly
to those misconceptions. (Id. at p. 450.) “For instance, where a child delays a significant
period of time before reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an expert could testify that
such delayed reporting is not inconsistent with the secretive environment often created by
an abuser who occupies a position of trust.” (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d
385, 394 (Bowker).)
       “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or exclude
expert testimony [citation], and its decision as to whether expert testimony meets the
standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v.
McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426.) Evidence Code section 352 gives trial courts
discretion to “exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
(Evid. Code, § 352.) “Rulings under Evidence Code section 352 come within the trial
court’s broad discretion and will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of an
abuse of that discretion.” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 43.)
   2. Factual and Procedural Background
       Guzman moved in limine to exclude CSAAS expert testimony on multiple
grounds including, as relevant here, that the evidence would not be “sufficiently beyond
common experience” such that it would not assist the trier of fact under Evidence Code
section 801, subdivision (a). The trial court denied the motion.

                                             7
       Guzman renewed his motion after the jury voir dire, which included the use of
juror questionnaires.2 Guzman argued that the jurors selected for trial had stated they had
no preconceived notions of how an abuse victim acts following a molestation. According
to defense counsel’s motion, “None of the selected jurors stated that they do not believe
that when a child delays reporting or repeatedly alters their descriptions of alleged abuse
that this necessarily means that no sexual abuse happened to that child.” Counsel’s
motion further asserted, “Moreover, the jurors confirmed they give no credence to . . .
commonly held misconceptions.” The motion argued that there was therefore no need for
expert testimony on CSAAS to disabuse jurors of misconceptions because they did not
hold any such misconceptions.
       The trial court denied the renewed motion. The court quoted the questionnaire as
asking jurors, “Do you have any preconceived notions about how alleged victims of
sexual assault should act[?]” The court noted that jurors may not realize they have such
preconceived notions, and that jurors may not be able to accurately state whether or not
they have biases, which may be unconscious or subconscious. The court also found that
jurors did not state whether they would be able to overlook unexpected behavior by
victims or that such behavior would not impact jurors’ ability to assess the victims’
credibility, particularly since the jurors had not yet heard evidence regarding the specific
facts concerning the alleged victims in this case. The court found there was no change in
circumstances that would warrant any change in its initial ruling denying the motion to
exclude.
       At trial, Dr. Blake Carmichael, a clinical psychologist at the U.C. Davis Children’s
Hospital, testified for the prosecution as an expert in CSAAS. Dr. Carmichael testified
that he did not know any of the facts of this case, and he had not read or been given any
information about the case.

       2
        The questionnaires are not in the record, but the trial court quoted one of the
questions at a hearing on the motions in limine.

                                              8
       Dr. Carmichael testified that there are five components to CSAAS: secrecy;
helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, unconvincing, or inconsistent
disclosures; and retraction or recanting. He described each of these components in detail
and testified about common behaviors associated with them. He testified that CSAAS is
not itself a treatment or a diagnosis. CSAAS is an educational tool to give people
information about how sexually abused children behave, and to dispel misconceptions
about how such children tend to behave.
       The trial court instructed the jury twice—first at the start of Dr. Carmichael’s
testimony, and again after the close of evidence—that CSAAS testimony “must not be
considered by you as proof that the alleged victims’ molestation claim is true. [. . .] You
should consider the evidence concerning the syndrome and its effect only for the limited
purpose of showing if it does that the alleged victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the
evidence are not inconsistent with him or her having been molested.”

   3. Admission of Expert Testimony Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
       As he argued below, Guzman contends the trial court erred by admitting
Dr. Carmichael’s testimony on CSAAS because the prosecutor failed to establish that
jurors had any misconceptions about how sexually abused children behave in response to
abuse. He argues that CSAAS evidence is no longer relevant because in recent years, “a
tidal wave of child sexual abuse allegations and revelations has drowned out the
misconceptions CSAAS was devised to refute.” He cites to news articles concerning
allegations of child sexual abuse by members of the Catholic priesthood, celebrities, and
athletic coaches to young athletes including gymnasts and college football players.
Guzman contends that as a result of increased publicity concerning such incidents, “the
general public is now well aware that children who suffer sexual abuse may not report
that abuse for years, and may not do so consistently.” Guzman acknowledges that
existing California case law has historically allowed for the admission of CSAAS
evidence for limited purposes, but he contends it should now be held inadmissible. He

                                             9
relies on case law from other jurisdictions for this proposition. (See Commonwealth v.
Dunkle (1992) 529 Pa. 168, 181-182.)
       However the jurors’ responses to the questionnaire on which Guzman relies are
not in the record, and the unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence. (In re Zeth S.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 414, fn. 11.) And as the trial court aptly noted, a question asking
jurors whether they “have any preconceived notions” seem unlikely to elicit accurate
responses, as it assumes jurors will know their own notions are “preconceived” and
would acknowledge having them.

       The California Supreme Court has recognized that most jurors may lack a
common understanding of how child sexual abuse victims react. In the context of
behavior exhibited by the parents of child victims, where “the rules appear equally
applicable,” the Court has held, “Most jurors, fortunately, have been spared the
experience of being the parent of a sexually molested child. Lacking that experience,
jurors can rely only on their intuition or on relevant evidence introduced at trial.”
(People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1302.) “ ‘Such expert testimony is needed to
disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to
explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching
behavior. [¶] The great majority of courts approve such expert rebuttal testimony.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1301, quoting Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation
(1989) 68 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 89.) Absent evidence in the record showing jurors did not hold
any such misconceptions, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by
adhering to the rationale of the California Supreme Court.
       Guzman further contends the trial court violated his federal due process rights by
admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence under Evidence Code sections 801 and 352.
We conclude above that admission of CSAAS expert testimony did not violate California
rules of evidence, but even assuming it did, the admission of such evidence did not render
Guzman’s trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [the

                                             10
admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process
violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair].) None of the authorities cited
by Guzman would support a contrary conclusion.
       For the reasons above, we conclude these claims are without merit.
   B. Jury Instruction With CALCRIM No. 1191B
       Guzman contends the trial erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No.
1191B that it could infer, based on proof from certain of the charged offenses, that he was
disposed to commit and did commit the other charged crimes.
       Consistent with CALCRIM No. 1191B and Evidence Code section 1108,
subdivision (a), the court instructed the jury, “The People presented evidence that the
defendant committed the crimes of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14, charged
in counts 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, and aggravated sexual assault on a child
under 14 in counts 3 and 5, and lewd and lascivious acts on a child 14 to 15, as charged in
count 14 of the Information. [¶] If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are not required
to conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit
sexual offenses. And that based on that decision also conclude that the defendant was
likely to commit and did commit the other sex offenses charged in this case. [¶] If you
find that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes, that conclusion is only
one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to
prove that the defendant is guilty of another crime. The People must still prove each
charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”
       Guzman acknowledges that the California Supreme Court upheld this instruction
in People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152. He argues that case was wrongly decided,
and he brings the claim in this court to preserve his right to seek review by a higher court.
Because we are bound by California Supreme Court precedent, we find this claim without
merit. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal.2d

                                              11
450, 455 [under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction
are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction].)

   C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Based on Failures to Object to Prosecutorial
      Misconduct During Closing Argument
       Guzman contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument
by repeatedly referring to him as a “sexual predator” and describing him as unreformed
and unrehabilitated. Because defense counsel did not object, Guzman contends counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Attorney
General contends Guzman has not shown any misconduct or error by either the
prosecutor or defense counsel, and that Guzman has failed to show any prejudice.
       1. Legal Principles
       “Prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw inferences from the evidence
at trial.” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 473.) “ ‘A prosecutor is allowed to
make vigorous arguments and may even use such epithets as are warranted by the
evidence, as long as these arguments are not inflammatory and principally aimed at
arousing the passion or prejudice of the jury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10
Cal.5th 1116, 1179 [holding that prosecutor’s fleeting suggestion that defendant was evil,
followed by a call to eradicate such evil, was not grounds for reversal].) “A prosecutor
may ‘vigorously argue his [or her] case and is not limited to “Chesterfieldian
politeness” ’ [citation], and he [or she] may ‘use appropriate epithets warranted by the
evidence.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 580.)
       “ ‘ “A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the
conviction a denial of due process.’ [Citations.] In other words, the misconduct must be
‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.’
[Citation.] A prosecutor’s misconduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair
nevertheless violates California law if it involves ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible

                                                12
methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “It is, of
course, improper [for the prosecutor] to make arguments to the jury that give it the
impression that ‘emotion may reign over reason,’ and to present ‘irrelevant information
or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury’s attention from its proper role, or invites an
irrational, purely subjective response.’ ” ’ [Citation.] We consider the assertedly
improper remarks in the context of the argument as a whole. [Citation.] ‘In conducting
[our] inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury drew the most damaging rather than
the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 894.)
       “However, ‘To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a criminal
defendant must make a timely objection, make known the basis of his objection, and ask
the trial court to admonish the jury.’ [Citation.] There are two exceptions to forfeiture:
(1) the objection or the request for an admonition would have been futile; or (2) the
admonition would have been insufficient to cure the harm occasioned by the misconduct.
[Citation.] A defendant claiming one of these exceptions must find support for it in the
record. [Citation.]” (People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1406 (Dowdell).)

       “ ‘To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. [Citations.] Counsel’s performance was deficient if the
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms. [Citation.] Prejudice exists where there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’
[Citations.] ‘ “Finally, prejudice must be affirmatively proved; the record must
demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘It is the
defendant’s burden on appeal [. . .] to show that he or she was denied effective assistance

                                              13
of counsel and is entitled to relief. [Citations.] “[T]he burden of proof that the defendant
must meet in order to establish his [or her] entitlement to relief on an ineffective-
assistance claim is preponderance of the evidence.” [Citation.]’ ” (Dowdell, supra, 227
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1406-1407.)
       2. Procedural Background
       At the start of her closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “I told you at the
beginning of this trial that this case was about a sexual predator who had previously been
convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of child molest. When he got out of
prison, he continued to prey on members of his own family. That’s what I told you the
case was about, and that’s exactly what the evidence has shown.”
       Later in her closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “We know that [A.D.] didn’t
disclose. She knew it was wrong. She liked the attention. The defendant told her ‘do not
tell or I will get in trouble.’ [¶] [T.D.] was fearful and very ashamed about what
happened to him. The defendant became empowered because they kept it a secret to do it
again and again. [¶] And remember, he only stopped molesting them because he no
longer had the opportunity, not because he chose to stop. He no longer had access to
[T.D.], because [Aunt M.] gave him back to the foster care system. He no longer had
access to [A.D.], because he got caught and was no longer allowed back at their home.
He had a natural inclination to molest children, and that’s why he stopped.”
       At the end of her closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “This is all of the
evidence that you have heard in this case. [T.D.] is credible beyond a reasonable doubt.
[A.D.] is credible beyond a reasonable doubt. You have so much corroborating evidence.
[N.D.], and the fact that she—a jury found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he has
a tendency, a predisposition to molest. He is a sexual predator that could not help himself
and stopped only because he got caught. Make him responsible for his actions, and find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all crimes charged.”
       Defense counsel did not object to any of these statements.

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       3. Defense Counsel Did Not Render Ineffective Assistance
       Guzman contends the prosecutor’s statements constituted inflammatory
characterizations of him that appealed to the passions or prejudices of the jurors. He
argues that the prosecutor’s description of him as “a sexual predator that could not help
himself and stopped only because he got caught” constituted an appeal to jurors’
prejudices to keep a dangerous sexual predator off the street. Guzman argues that
multiple witnesses testified they were comfortable having their children around him and
did not believe he had the characteristics of a child molester. He further contends the
claim that he “stopped only because he got caught” misstated the evidence because the
crimes were alleged to have occurred between 2006 and 2008, while he was not arrested
until 2013.
       Guzman does not dispute that he forfeited any claims of prosecutorial misconduct
by failing to object at trial. Rather, he contends his trial counsel’s failure to object to
these statements fell below the standards required of reasonably competent counsel, and
counsel could not have had any tactical reason for declining to object.
       The Attorney General contends the prosecutor’s characterization of Guzman as a
sexual predator was amply supported by the record, which included a prior conviction for
sexually molesting his niece, N.D. Guzman was not adjudicated to be a sexually violent
predator in that case, but the evidence supported an inference that he started molesting
A.D. within months of his release from prison. The Attorney General argues the jury
reasonably could have inferred that he was a sexual predator based on the prior
conviction as well as the evidence supporting the crimes charged in this case. As to the
prosecutor’s statement that Guzman “stopped only because he got caught,” the Attorney
General argues that, viewing the argument as a whole, the prosecutor meant that Guzman
only stopped molesting the victims because he lost access to them, not because he was
caught by law enforcement. For example, the prosecutor argued Guzman no longer had
access to T.D. because Aunt M. gave him back to the foster care system, and Guzman no

                                              15
longer had access to A.D., because he got caught by the mother’s boyfriend and was no
longer allowed back at their home. The Attorney General argues all these statements
were permissible inferences based on the evidence presented at trial.
       While some of the prosecutor’s statements bordered on inflammatory, we do not
conclude they were so prejudicial or lacking any basis in the evidence that they require
reversal. The evidence in the record supports a reasonable inference that Guzman
stopped molesting T.D. and A.D. after losing access to them, and that he had a tendency
to act as a sexual predator of children. But even assuming the prosecutor’s
characterization of Guzman as a sexual predator constituted prosecutorial misconduct,
defense counsel may have made a tactical decision not to object. The record shows
defense counsel chose to address the prosecutor’s statements in his own closing
argument, which he began by stating, “The hardest part of a trial for me is to sit there in
that chair and listen to closing argument of the district attorney. I can’t even imagine
what it’s like to be sitting in that chair, over there as Mr. Guzman, and sit down and listen
to the things she’s saying. [¶] Sexual predator? Okay. Propensity? A natural tendency
to do something? He can’t help himself? He can’t stop what he’s doing? Ok. Let’s take
that for a second. [¶] We know that nothing could possibly have happened to [T.D.]
after October of 2007 that had anything to do with Mr. Guzman We know that it couldn’t
possibly have—had anything that happened with [A.D.] after November of 2007. [¶]
What did he do in 2008? Where were all the problems that he was having with little
children in 2008? What about 2009? What about 2010? What about 2011? What about
2012? What about 2013, right up to the time where he got arrested? Never a single
problem.” (Italics added.) Defense counsel then argued, “To a T, every single person
that has come in here and said this is not a guy who would do these kinds of things. [¶] I
don’t know what happened to [T.D.]. I’m not here to tell you what happened to [T.D.].
What I’m here to tell you is that Mr. Guzman did not do anything to [T.D.].”

                                             16
       The record shows defense counsel was cognizant of the potentially prejudicial
nature of the prosecutor’s statements, but counsel consciously chose to remain silent
during the prosecutor’s closing, addressing the remarks in his own closing instead.
Counsel may have believed that an objection might not result in a favorable ruling by the
trial court, and that he could more effectively persuade the jury that the prosecutor’s
statements constituted overreaching or a mischaracterization of the evidence if he
addressed them himself without objecting. He may have reasonably determined that even
if the trial court had sustained an objection, the objection itself would have highlighted
his client’s prior convictions for lewd and lascivious acts on a child. He may also have
concluded that no matter what the trial court’s ruling on his objection, at least some jurors
were likely considering the significance of his client’s past conduct as they determined
whether he had committed sex offenses here. It was reasonable under these
circumstances for counsel to use his closing argument to directly counter the prosecutor’s
characterization of Guzman as a predator rather than objecting during the prosecutor’s
closing argument. In short, even if the prosecutor’s comments constituted prosecutorial
misconduct, defense counsel’s tactical election to forego objecting to them did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
       For the reasons above, we conclude this claim is without merit. Guzman further
contends reversal is required by the cumulative effect of prejudice from the alleged errors
discussed above in sections II.A, II.B, and in this section (section II.C). Because we
conclude that none of these claims constituted error, there is no prejudice to cumulate.
   D. Imposition of Five-Year Terms Under Penal Code Section 667, Subdivision (a)
       The trial court imposed five-year terms under section 667, subdivision (a) (section
667(a)) on each of counts 1 through 13 based on the jury’s findings that Guzman had
previously been convicted of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14.
Guzman contends we must strike the five-year terms imposed on counts 3, 5, 7, and 9
through 13 because the information only charged the prior conviction under section

                                                17
667(a) as to counts 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8. The Attorney General acknowledges the prior
conviction under section 667(a) was only charged on counts 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8, but he
argues the trial court was authorized to impose them notwithstanding any deficits in the
pleading.
       1. Procedural Background
       The prosecution alleged Guzman had previously been convicted on two counts of
a lewd and lascivious act on a child under 14. The information alleged these prior
convictions in three ways: as a serious felony prior attached to each of counts 1, 2, 4, 6,
and 8 under section 667(a); as a one-strike allegation attached to each of counts 1, 2, 4, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 under section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d); and as two
violent or serious felonies (“strike priors”) as to all counts under section 667,
subdivisions (b) through (i), and section 1170.12. As to the application of the five-year
enhancement for the serious felony prior under section 667(a), the probation report
recommended consecutive five-year terms on all 14 counts, but the trial court ruled the
enhancement did not apply to count 14.
       At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated, “I want to make a record of the
way we looked at and considered the prior convictions in this case. I’ll give you a chance
to comment.” The court described the three ways in which the convictions had been
alleged in the information, as set forth in the paragraph above. The court then
memorialized discussions the court and the parties engaged in before charging the jury.
The court noted first that the parties agreed that rather than providing the jury with
verdict forms that would require findings on the convictions as charged under each of the
three statutory provisions on each pertinent count, the jury would instead be given a
verdict form that would simply require a single finding as to whether Guzman had been
convicted on each of the two counts of lewd and lascivious acts. The court added,
“Further, we talked about the prior convictions, and while conviction on the same two
priors may have different sentencing ramifications, the parties agree they don’t need to

                                              18
be proved to the jury in more than one way. The court thereafter asked both parties if
they wished to make any further record on that matter and both counsel declined. The
court views this agreement as a stipulation between the parties.” (Italics added.)
       Accordingly, the trial court noted, it provided the jury with two verdict forms—
one for each of the two convictions—that the jury used to find Guzman had previously
been convicted on each of the two counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14.
       The trial court then stated that it revisited the matter after the probation officer
asked how the prior convictions should be used in the sentencing recommendation. The
court stated that it emailed the probation officer’s request to the parties together with a
restatement of the parties’ stipulation—that by finding the prior convictions true, “the
jury necessarily found the same elements of the allegation at issue.” The court’s e-mail
proposed to issue an order to probation that these allegations were proved as a matter of
law and by stipulation between the parties. The court added, “This was discussed in
some detail in chambers and then put on the record. Neither party commented on the
court’s intended action via e-mail.” The court then solicited comments from both parties
on the matter, and both declined.
       Accordingly, the court then ruled, “Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the
penal code section 667.61(d) allegations attached to counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
and 13, as well as the allegation as to all counts with the priors constituted a serious
felony prior, pursuant to penal code section 667(a); that with the exception for count 14
that I just mentioned, are true, and have been found true by the jury as a matter of law.”
Defense counsel did not object to this application of section 667(a). The court then
sentenced Guzman as described above, including the imposition of consecutive five-year
terms on each of counts 1 through 13 under section 667(a).
       2. Legal Principles
       “All enhancements shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading and either admitted
by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.” (§ 1170.1,

                                              19
subd. (e).) “A defendant has a due process right to fair notice of the allegations that will
be invoked to increase the punishment for his or her crimes.” (People v. Houston (2012)
54 Cal.4th 1186, 1227 (Houston).) “Due process of law requires that an accused be
advised of the charges against him so that he has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and
present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.
[Citation.]” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317.) This principle applies to
sentence enhancements as well. “[E]nhanced penalties [are] available only if the
existence of any of those qualifying circumstances ‘is alleged in the accusatory pleading
pursuant to this section, and is either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to
be true by the trier of fact.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Arias (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1009,
1017-1018 (Arias).)
       3. Guzman Stipulated to the Sentencing Enhancements on Counts 1 to 13
       Guzman relies on People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735 (Mancebo). In
Mancebo, the jury found the defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of
the offense, but the prosecution had to choose between using that fact to impose a
determinate-term enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), or a life term
under the One Strike Law (§ 667.61, former subd. (e)(4)). (Id. at pp. 742-743.) The
prosecution had initially intended to use the gun use as an enhancement under the One
Strike Law. But at sentencing, the prosecutor sought to dismiss the gun-use allegation
under the One Strike Law and substitute a multiple-victim circumstance (§ 667.61,
former subd. (e)(5)) so that both the determinate-term enhancement and the life term
could be imposed. The California Supreme Court held that section 667.61,
subdivision (f) precluded the trial court from striking the gun-use allegation to free up
gun use as a basis for imposing lesser enhancement terms under section 12022.5,
subdivision (a), and that the defendant did not forfeit the claim by failing to object at the
sentencing hearing. (Id. at pp. 749-750, fn. 7.)

                                              20
       Guzman also relies on Arias, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 1009. Arias was convicted
on two counts of attempted murder but the charging document failed to allege the
attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (Id. at p. 1017.) After
neither party objected to the trial court’s proposed jury instructions and verdict forms, the
court instructed the jury that if it found Arias guilty of attempted murder, then it must
make a separate finding whether it was done willfully and with premeditation and
deliberation. (Ibid.) After the jury found Arias guilty of “first degree attempted murder”
as to both victims, the trial court imposed life terms for the convictions. (Ibid.) On
appeal, Arias argued the prosecution’s failure to plead that the attempted murders were
willful, deliberate, and premeditated required the life sentences to be set aside. Relying
on Mancebo, supra, the Court of Appeal agreed and struck the sentences. The Court
rejected the Attorney General’s argument that Arias had forfeited his claim that the
indictment was inadequate. (Arias, at p. 1017.)
       The Court of Appeal’s decision in People v. Nguyen (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 260
(Nguyen) is closer on point. A jury convicted Nguyen on various charges arising from
his contracting without a license. He also had a prior first degree burglary conviction that
qualified as an enhancement under three statutory provisions: as a strike prior under
section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i); as a one-year prior prison term enhancement
under former section 667.5, subdivision (b); and as a five-year prior serious felony under
section 667(a). (Id. at p. 262.) The information alleged the fact of the prior conviction
together with the statutory provisions defining a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and a
prior prison term enhancement (former section 667.5, subd. (b)). But the information
“never specifically alleged—either in so many words or by citing the relevant statute—a
prior serious felony conviction enhancement.” (Ibid.) After the jury convicted Nguyen
on the charged counts, he admitted the fact of the prior conviction but he did not
expressly admit its legal effect. At sentencing, the trial court used the prior conviction as

                                             21
both a strike prior and a prior serious felony, imposing an additional five-year term for
the latter. Nguyen did not object. (Id. at pp. 264-265.)
       Relying on Mancebo, supra, the Court of Appeal in Nguyen held the trial court
erred by imposing a five-year term for the prior serious felony conviction. (Nguyen,
supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 265-270.) The Court reasoned, “The information
affirmatively indicated that the prior conviction was being pleaded solely for purposes of
the three strikes law. Significantly, every prior serious felony conviction is necessarily
also a strike prior. [Citations.] Charging language which expressly states that a fact is
alleged to invoke one particular statute does not adequately inform the accused that the
People will use it to invoke a different statute. [Citations.] Accordingly, when, as here,
the People allege a prior serious felony conviction, and when they cite the three strikes
law but do not cite the prior serious felony conviction statute, we can only conclude that
they have made ‘a discretionary charging decision.’ ” (Id. at pp. 266-267.) The Court of
Appeal also held defense counsel did not forfeit the claim on appeal, insofar as the claim
was based on section 1170.1, subdivision (e), because the violation resulted in an
unauthorized sentence. (Id. at p. 272.)
       The Attorney General acknowledges that under Nguyen the prosecution would
have been required to specifically plead the same statutory provision at issue here—
section 667(a)—to support imposition of an enhancement on counts 3, 5, 7, and 9 through
13. Nonetheless, based on the trial court’s memorialization of the parties’ discussions as
set forth above in section II.D.1, the Attorney General contends the sentence was
properly imposed because defense counsel stipulated to the application of section 667(a)
on each of counts 1 through 13. Guzman disagrees. He characterizes the memorialized
discussions as pertaining solely to the verdict forms and what needed to be proved to the
jury. He points out that the parties did not specifically discuss the omission of the prior
serious felony enhancements on counts 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.

                                             22
       We are persuaded by the Attorney General’s position. While the court did not
expressly mention the applicability of the prior serious felony enhancements on the
challenged counts, the court specifically noted that “while conviction on the same two
priors may have different sentencing ramifications, the parties agree they don’t need to be
proved to the jury in more than one way.” Defense counsel did not respond to this
characterization of the memorialized discussion. Similarly, when the trial court asked
counsel for responses to the probation officer’s request about how to use the priors for
sentencing, defense counsel offered no response. Counsel also did not object to the
probation report’s use of the priors to recommend additional five-year terms in the
manner now challenged.
       Ordinarily, a defense attorney’s failure to object at sentencing does not forfeit a
challenge to an unauthorized sentence on appeal. (Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 749,
fn. 7.) But in this case, the effect of trial counsel’s acquiescence with respect to the claim
on appeal is more akin to equitable estoppel or invited error. (See People v. Ford (2015)
61 Cal.4th 282, 284-285 [a party seeking or consenting to action beyond the court’s
power may be estopped from complaining that the resulting action exceeds a court’s
jurisdiction].) “ ‘ “ ‘Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by
taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible
position.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145, 155.) Estoppel “generally
requires a showing that a party’s words or acts have induced detrimental reliance by the
opposing party.” (Lynch v. California Coastal Com. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 470, 475-476.) If,
prior to the jury being instructed, trial counsel had objected to the proposed general
verdict form and the stipulation that the priors had been proved as to each count, the
prosecution could have requested an amendment to the information alleging the five-year
priors on the challenged counts, and the jury could have been provided count-specific
jury forms for the priors. By instead stipulating to the priors being proved with respect to
the relevant counts and agreeing to the general verdict form, counsel was estopped from

                                             23
lodging a later objection at sentencing to the use of the prior as the basis for five-year
terms on counts 1 through 13. Estoppel applies in this circumstance because an objection
lodged for the first time at sentencing, after having entered into the earlier stipulation,
would have come too late to allow for an amended information and count-specific verdict
forms. In other words, counsel’s acquiescence induced the prosecution to forgo any
amendment and rely on a general verdict form—a form of reliance that would have been
detrimental to the prosecution had the trial court upheld an objection to use of the priors
at the time of sentencing. (See also Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1229 [distinguishing
Arias, supra, and holding defendant’s claim of sentencing error was forfeited where the
trial court notified defendant of the possible sentence he faced before his case was
submitted to the jury, and defendant had sufficient opportunity to object to the
indictment].)
       Furthermore, this is not a situation where Guzman could have been prejudiced by
a lack of notice because the information indisputably put him on notice with respect to
each of counts 1 through 13 that he would be required to challenge the fact of the prior
convictions to avoid an enhanced penalty. We have found a lack of notice dispositive in
striking penalty enhancements based on pleading defects where the possibility of
enhanced penalties could have affected plea negotiations. (People v. Jimenez (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 373, 397 (Jimenez), citing Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 752.) In
Jimenez, during pretrial discussions on a disposition, the trial court explicitly
misinformed the defendant of his possible exposure by calculating the possible sentence
based solely on the enhancements as pleaded. But Guzman cites to no such
misstatements by the trial court in this case. Regardless, the additional exposure based on
the enhancements at issue here—five-year terms for each of eight counts, for an
additional 40 years in prison—was insignificant compared with the 965 years of exposure
based on the charges and enhancements as pleaded in the information. It is unlikely this
difference would have affected Guzman’s decisions in any negotiations for a disposition.

                                              24
       Guzman argues that if defense counsel forfeited his claim by failing to challenge
this application of the sentencing enhancements, then counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel. But as explained above, if defense counsel had lodged
a timely objection instead of stipulating to the proposed procedures, the prosecution
could have moved to amend the information, and nothing in the record suggests an
amendment would have been improper. The trial court likely would have granted such
an amendment, and there is no reasonable probability the jury’s findings on the prior
would have been any different if it had been required to make findings on each specific
count. Accordingly, Guzman has not shown that any asserted deficiency in defense
counsel’s performance would have prejudiced him in any fashion. Alternatively, if trial
counsel had instead waited until sentencing to object for the first time, the trial court
would have overruled the objection properly for the reasons explained above. Declining
to lodge a meritless objection does not constitute deficient performance. (People v.
Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587.)
       For the reasons above, we conclude this claim is without merit.
   E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment
       Guzman contends his sentence of 1,005 years to life in prison violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The Attorney General
contends settled law establishes this claim is without merit.
       “A punishment violates the Eighth Amendment if it involves the ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain’ or if it is ‘grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime.’ ” (People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1230.) When the length of a
particular sentence is challenged, “the Court considers all of the circumstances of the case
to determine whether the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.” (Graham v. Florida
(2010) 560 U.S. 48, 59 (Graham).)
       The calculus of whether a sentence is “grossly disproportionate” “must begin by
comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.” (Graham, supra,

                                              25
560 U.S. at p. 60.) “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to
the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” (Rummel v.
Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 272 (Rummel).) If “ ‘[i]n the rare case’ ” an “ ‘inference of
gross disproportionality’ ” can be drawn, “the court should then compare the defendant's
sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with
the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” (Graham, at p. 60.) It
is only where “this comparative analysis ‘validate[s] an initial judgment that [the]
sentence is grossly disproportionate,’ ” that the sentence will be found unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment. (Ibid.)
       Guzman argues his sentence amounts to imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole. The Attorney General does not dispute this. Guzman was 39 years
old at the time of sentencing, and there is no reasonable possibility he would survive long
enough to become eligible for parole. The Attorney General argues that the sentence is
not grossly disproportionate because it serves valid penal purposes: It reflects society’s
strong condemnation of the type of crimes Guzman committed, it serves to deter others
from the committing the same crimes, and it serves a retributive purpose congruent with
the nature of the offenses and the harm inflicted on the victims.
       We do not agree with all the Attorney General’s justifications, but we are bound
by settled law. Guzman cites no case comparable to his wherein a California court has
struck down an effective life sentence as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
“[I]mposition of a sentence of life without possibility of parole in an appropriate case
does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment under either our state Constitution
[citation] or the federal Constitution. [Citation.]” (People v. Byrd (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
1373, 1383.) The United States Supreme Court has upheld life sentences imposed under
state law for such offenses as possession of a large quantity of cocaine (Harmelin v.
Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957), theft of golf clubs (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S.
11), and obtaining money by false pretenses (Rummel, supra, 445 U.S. 263). Guzman

                                             26
relies on Justice Mosk’s concurring opinion in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585.
But a concurring opinion is not binding precedent. “ ‘[N]o opinion has value as a
precedent on points as to which there is no agreement of a majority of the court.’ ”
(Byrd, at p. 1383.)
       For the reasons above, we conclude this claim is without merit.
   F. Imposition of a $10,000 Restitution Fine
       The trial court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4,
subdivision (b). Guzman objected based on his inability to pay, but the court did not rule
on the objection. He now contends the trial court violated his due process rights by
imposing the fine without determining his ability to pay under Dueñas, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th 1157.3 The Attorney General argues the fine was properly imposed.
       Because Guzman was 39 years old at sentencing, and his sentence effectively
constitutes a life sentence, any wages he earns in prison may be used to pay the fine for
an indeterminate number of years, which forecloses any meritorious inability to pay
argument. (People v. Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1035, citing People v.
Hennessey (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1837 [court may consider ability to earn prison
wages in determining ability to pay].) “While it may take defendant some time to pay the
amounts imposed in this case, that circumstance does not support his inability to make
payments.” (People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1077.)
       Accordingly, we conclude any error under Dueñas was harmless. (People v.
Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 139-140 [error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
when defendant was sentenced to eight years in prison].)
                                     III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

       3
       This issue is currently under review in the California Supreme Court in People v.
Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.

                                            27
                                  _______________________________
                                   Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________
  Grover, J.

_______________________________
  Bromberg, J.

H047877
People v. Guzman