Court Opinion

ID: 9846936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:50:49.800754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:57.434975
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring.
The people of this state, through their elected representatives in the General Assembly, have determined that all persons sentenced to death for capital crimes committed after May 1, 2000, shall be executed by lethal injection. Ga. L. 2000, p. 947, § 1. This prospective change in the State’s method of execution was made because execution by electrocution offends the evolving standards of decency that characterize a mature, civilized society. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100-101 (78 SC 590, 2 LE2d 630) (1958). The people of this State, through their elected representatives, also have determined that persons sentenced to death for crimes committed before May 1, 2000, such as appellant, will be executed by lethal injection if this Court declares that electrocution violates the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Georgia. Ga. L. 2000, p. 947, § 1.
Thus, this Court is charged with resolving whether the same evolving standards of decency that led to a prospective change in the method of executing condemned persons also require a retroactive change in the method of execution employed by the State. Furthermore, this Court is charged with the responsibility of protecting the State from the indignity of exacting punishment that exceeds the *545bounds of humane sensibilities. See In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 447 (10 SC 930, 34 LE 519) (1890).
Accordingly, it is right for this Court to stay appellant’s execution by electrocution until such time that this Court determines whether electrocution is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, as that phrase is understood under our State and Federal Constitutions.