Court Opinion

ID: 9789782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:41:14.556887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.410836
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s decision to “reasonably infer” that the arresting officer subjectively believed that a crime had been committed by defendant from the officer’s confronting, handcuffing and advising him of his Miranda rights. Under State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 204, 729 P2d 524 (1986), the subjective component of probable cause to arrest is focused on the arresting officer’s subjective belief at the time that he acts, not what a Active reasonable officer could have believed:
“Probable cause under the Oregon Constitution has both a subjective and an objective component. An officer must subjectively believe that a crime has been committed and thus that a person or thing is subject to seizure, and this belief must be objectively reasonable in the circumstances. The test is not simply what a reasonable officer could have believed when he conducted a warrantless search or seizure, but it is what this officer actually believed, based upon the underlying facts of which he was cognizant, together with his own training and experience. Neither is the test whether the officer articulates to the suspect the basis for a second ground for arrest. What is required is that the officer formulates *146such a basis to himself at the time he acts.” (Emphasis in original.)
In this case, the officer’s behavior does not prove that the officer subjectively believed that defendant was subject to seizure for committing a crime. The officer testified that he told defendant that he was not placing him under arrest. See State v. Morgan, 106 Or App 138, 142, 806 P2d 713, rev den 312 Or 235 (1991). The state makes no argument that that erroneous statement was designed to fulfill a law enforcement objective, such as calming an agitated suspect. On this record, the officer’s testimony is meaningless if the officer in fact believed that he could arrest defendant. The majority points out that the officer might have had reasons other than his lack of a subjective belief that he had probable cause when he delayed arresting defendant. That might be true, but it does not relieve the state of its burden to establish that the officer had a subjective belief that defendant had committed a crime. The majority’s analysis disregards the state’s burden to show that “the officer formulates such a basis to himself at the time he acts.” State v. Owens, 302 Or at 204. We cannot ignore that requirement. The arrest was unlawful, because the subjective component required for probable cause was not established.
Defendant’s consent to a search immediately followed the illegal arrest. He was incorrectly told that he was not under arrest, yet he was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car. No circumstance intervened to attenuate the taint of the illegal arrest. The state has not shown that defendant gave consent voluntarily and did not simply acquiesce in the officer’s assertion of authority over him. On similar facts, State v. Bea, 107 Or App 118, 122, 810 P2d 1328 (1991), and State v. Morgan, supra, 106 Or App at 143, required suppression of the evidence seized. I would follow those cases.
I dissent.