Court Opinion

ID: 9777731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:21:57.724818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:00.358679
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would deny the writ of habeas corpus.
Griffin claims, and the court holds, that he was denied his constitutional right to a trial by jury. Griffin must show that the lack of a jury trial was fundamental error, since he did not request one prior to trial.
Contempt proceedings are normally considered to be either civil or criminal in character. Ex Parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex.1976). Proceedings which are punitive in nature, punishing past infractions which affront the dignity and authority of the court, are criminal contempt proceedings. Unquestionably, the case at bar arose from such a proceeding. In criminal contempt proceedings, however, the right to a jury trial is not absolute. It is conditioned upon a characterization of the punishment imposed as being for either a “serious” or a “petty” offense. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975); Werblud, 536 S.W.2d at 547.
Muniz involved a labor union and an individual that had violated the orders of a court which was seeking to control picketing activities during a labor dispute. Prior to criminal contempt hearings these two parties requested that they be tried before a jury. This request was denied by the trial court. A probated sentence was subsequently imposed on the individual, and a $10,000 fine was levied against the union. The Muniz Court addressed the right to a jury trial in the contempt proceedings, and drew a distinction between the imposition of fines and imprisonment.
With punishment by imprisonment, Mun-iz has established, and this court has approved, a “bright-line” standard by which a court may determine if the contemnor has committed a serious offense. Imprisonment for more than six months establishes that the offense is a serious one and entitles the contemnor to a jury trial as a matter of constitutional right. Muniz, 422 U.S. at 475-6, 95 S.Ct. at 2190; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974). Werblud, 536 S.W.2d at 547. Moreover, the right to a jury trial in contempt proceedings is dependent solely on the actual punishment imposed, rather than the punishment possible. Taylor, 418 U.S. at 496, 94 S.Ct. at 2702; Werblud, 536 S.W.2d at 547.
The delineation of “serious” and “petty” offenses becomes much more difficult when a fine is imposed against a con-temnor. The courts in Muniz and in Wer-blud declined to establish a “bright line” rule to aid a trial court in its determination of the distinction between the two types of offenses when a fine is involved. Some subsequent eases indicate that a $500 fine assessed against an individual is the dividing line between serious and petty offenses. See United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772 (10th Cir.1980); Girard v. Goins, 575 F.2d 160 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1977). Douglass v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 543 F.2d 894 (D.C.Cir.1976). These opinions seemingly draw a distinction between those cases in which a fine is assessed against an individual and those involving other legal entities. See McAlister, 630 F.2d at 774.
Muniz, on the other hand, does not offer the clear guidance which these courts would provide. In considering a statute which authorized the same punishment for *264contempt as Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1911a, § 2, the court stated that
... it is one thing to hold that deprivation of an individual’s liberty beyond a six-month term should not be imposed without the protection of a jury trial, but it is quite another to suggest that, regardless of the circumstances, a jury is required where any fine greater than $500 is contemplated.
Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477, 95 S.Ct. at 2191. This distinction between punishment by fine and punishment by imprisonment led the court to state that the two are “intrinsically different.” Id.
Hamdan and its progeny assert that they properly draw a distinction between individual contemnors and other entities based on the facts of Muniz ($10,000 fine assessed against labor union with 13,000 members). See Hamdan, 552 F.2d at 279. Muniz does not suggest such a distinction. The Muniz court stated that the argument that a $10,000 fine posed a “serious risk” to a large union was “untenable.” Muniz 422 U.S. at 477, 95 S.Ct. at 2191. Indeed, Muniz seems to require an inquiry by the court into the financial ability of the con-temnor to pay the imposed fine before the court is bound to declare an offense a “serious” one entitling the contemnor to the constitutional right to trial by jury. Muniz, 422 U.S. at 476-8, 95 S.Ct. at 2190-91. In Werblud, this court acknowledged Muniz and recognized that a $1,000 total fine did not necessitate a trial by jury, as it remained in the category of petty offenses. Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542.
In the instant case the trial court imposed a fine of $104,000 against Griffin: $500 for each of the 208 violations of the injunctive order against him. The court fails to note that Griffin’s gross revenues from the prohibited sales totaled over $96,-000, representing a profit of over $67,000. When balanced against the amounts Griffin would not have realized had he not violated the clear order of the trial court, the $104,-000 fine is reduced to a net fine of just $8,000. The punitive effect of the fine and the ability of the contemnor to pay may be considered in light of the revenue raised through a violation of the order of the court. U.S. v. Troxler Hosiery Co., Inc., 681 F.2d 934 (4th Cir.1982) (gross revenue —$60,000; profit — $15,000; fine — $80,000 plus costs); Musidor, B. V. v. Great American Screen, 658 F.2d 60 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S.Ct. 1440, 71 L.Ed.2d 656 (1982) (2 sales in violation of injunction — gross revenue of $60,000-75,-000 at one of the sales; fine — $10,000 for each violation).
In light of the net fine imposed, it is doubtful that Griffin was absolutely entitled to a jury trial as a constitutional right. It is not clear that such a right even exists in civil proceedings to assess criminal contempt punishments through fines. The question was expressly left open by the Supreme Court in Muniz in such a way as to indicate that the existence of that right is as open to question as the extent of that right. See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 476, 95 S.Ct. at 2190.
Griffin had been ordered not to sell to these companies; he knew that if he violated this order he would be held accountable for his actions; and still, he wilfully affronted the dignity and authority of the court by engaging in prohibited sales.
Since Griffin did not demand a jury trial, this court has had to resort to the questionable doctrine of “fundamental error” to reverse the judgment. This court assumes that the trial court would have denied Griffin a jury trial had he requested one. Griffin has had a fair and impartial hearing. I would therefore remand him to the Sheriff of San Patricio County.1
SPEARS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Relator was released on bond pending this appeal.