Court Opinion

ID: 9788954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:23:13.916475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:17.964139
License: Public Domain

DE MUNIZ, P. J.,
concurring.
I write separately to emphasize that we are not holding that the state’s proffered evidence of defendant’s prior statements to the victim necessarily will come into evidence in this case. Our holding is that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s pretrial motion in limine to exclude the evidence. The basis of our reversal is that the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence was not admissible under OEC 404(3) as proof of “plan” or “preparation.” Because this case has not yet been tried, we are operating in the absence of facts, in a netherworld so to speak, and relying on the parties’ *539representations of what they think their evidence will establish. Although motions in limine may serve a valuable function in some cases, a trial court is always free to revisit a pretrial ruling if the facts or theory presented pretrial develop into something else at trial, or if, for example, a proper foundation is not laid for the evidence subject to the pretrial ruling. See generally State v. Foster, 296 Or 174, 182-83, 674 P2d 587 (1983) (whether to rule pretrial on evidentiary motions is left to the sound discretion of the trial court).
In this case, we have concluded that the evidence may fall within the “preparation” or “plan” provision of OEC 404(3) under the state’s “grooming’’ theory. The foundational requirements for “grooming” evidence, however, are a hotly contested issue. In State v. Stafford, 157 Or App 445, 972 P2d 47 (1998), rev den 329 Or 358 (1999), a plurality of four members of this court expressed the opinion that no scientific foundation need be laid for “grooming” evidence of the sort at issue here. Two others agreed with the result on the ground that an adequate scientific foundation had been laid for the evidence. Id. at 460-66 (Deits, C. J., concurring). Three more judges believed that a foundation was required but had not been adequately established. Id. at 470-79 (Landau, J., dissenting). A final judge, myself, would not have reached the question of adequate foundation for the evidence at all because the threshold requirement of relevancy had not been established. Id. at 468-70 (De Muniz, J., dissenting).
In short, the foundational requirements for the type of evidence at issue in this case are an open question. I write to emphasize that, in ruling as we do, we are not foreclosing defendant from challenging the scientific basis of the state’s proffered “grooming” evidence.