Court Opinion

ID: 9658208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:51:14.212333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:52.869584
License: Public Domain

DYK.MAN, J.
(dissenting). The majority differentiates between information received from third parties and internally-generated information. It concludes that information received from an employe that the employe had engaged in illegal activity is not an “arrest record” as defined by 111.32(5) (h), Stats. (1979-80).
Section 111.32(5) (h), Stats. (1979-80) broadly defines “arrest record.” It states that the term “includes but is not limited to” a number of actions which would not, at first glance, appear to fit the definition of “arrest record.” (Emphasis supplied.) For example, an individual who has been questioned for any offense is defined as having an “arrest record” despite not having been arrested, nor having a record.
I conclude that internally-generated information that an employe has engaged in illegal activity is similar enough to that information received from third parties that LIRC could rationally conclude that the city’s ac*368tions fell within the definition of discrimination because of arrest record.
The majority recognizes that we should not substitute our judgment for that of an agency on a question of law if the agency’s interpretation has a rational basis and does not conflict with the statute’s legislative history, prior appellate decisions, or the constitution. The majority concludes, however, that because LIRC did not discuss the issue whether a discharge based upon an internal investigation is discriminatory, no deference should be given LIRC’s interpretation of the law.
I conclude that LIRC necessarily determined that the city’s actions fell within the area of prohibited conduct.
LIRC said:
“This definition (of “arrest record”) is so broad that Bentzen’s situation clearly falls within the definition of ‘arrest record.’ Bentzen was asked to give a statement about his alleged involvement in the racing incident for which his brother-in-law had been apprehended on the night of April 29. He was in effect questioned within the meaning of this provision . . . .”
We should defer to LIRC’s interpretation of sec. 111.32 (5) (h), Stats. (1979-80), because it is rational. Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. ILHR Dept., 90 Wis. 2d 408, 417, 280 N.W.2d 142, 147 (1979). Even if the question is very nearly one of first impression, we are to accord the agency’s interpretation “due weight.” Berns v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm., 99 Wis. 2d 252, 261, 299 N.W.2d 248, 253 (1980). Even if we give no weight to the agency’s interpretation of sec. 111.32(5) (h), I conclude that Bentzen’s termination for engaging in illegal activity falls within the broad prohibition of sec. 111.32 (5) (h)2. Accordingly I dissent from the majority opinion.
The city argues that because Bentzen was a probationary employe, it should be permitted to discharge him *369at the first sign of impropriety.1 It contends that this is necessary because of the vital place law enforcement plays in society. The legislature presumably was aware of the need for propriety on the part of law enforcement personnel when it passed the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. No exception appears in the act for law enforcement agencies.2 It is not up to this court to generate such an exception.

 Because the majority decided this case in favor of the city on another ground, it did not have to address this argument.

 Section 111.32(5) (h)2.a. and b., Stats. (1979-80) provide for exceptions not relevant to this appeal.