Court Opinion

ID: 9945639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 07:12:01.266948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:35.207031
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 22, 2024

                                          In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-23-00311-CV

                 ISAIAH RAMIREZ, Appellant
                           V.
  BAM! PIZZA MANAGEMENT, INC. D/B/A DALLAS DOMINO’S CO.,
                         Appellee

                On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-12881

               MEMORANDUM CONCURRING OPINION
                 Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy
                    Concurring Opinion by Justice Miskel
      I concur in the judgment but not the majority opinion’s reasoning. I would

affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, because I conclude that the relevant

statements are not even competent evidence that would support a judgment, I believe

we do not need to address their weight or credibility.

      The majority opinion highlights that Ramirez’s only evidence supporting his

request for damages for pain and suffering and physical impairment consisted of two

conclusory statements in his affidavit.
      The Texas Supreme Court has noted that conclusory affidavits are not

sufficient to raise a fact issue. See, e.g., Ryland Grp., Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120,

122 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex.

1984); see also Rivera v. White, 234 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007,

no pet.) (recognizing that the conclusory nature of the plaintiff’s statements set forth

in her affidavit as to the value of her alleged pain and suffering provided no facts to

support rendition of summary judgment).

      Damages for pain and suffering and physical impairment are unliquidated

damages. See, e.g., Rivera, 234 S.W.3d at 806. A court rendering a default judgment

in a personal injury case must hear evidence supporting the award of unliquidated

damages. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 243; Jones v. Andrews, 873 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1994, no writ) (holding that the plaintiff’s sworn affidavit and other

documents represented merely his conclusory allegations regarding his damages and

did not establish a causal connection between the injuries alleged and the event sued

upon). For example, generalized, conclusory descriptions of how an event affected

a person are insufficient evidence on which to base mental anguish damages.

Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 619 (Tex. 2018) (citing Serv. Corp. Int’l v.

Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 232 (Tex. 2011)); Boeke v. Collins, No. 05-22-01066-CV,

2023 WL 7871678, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Here, there was no fact evidence, beyond conclusory statements, to support

an award of damages for pain and suffering. Further, to receive damages for physical

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impairment, the injured party must prove that the effect of his physical impairment

extends beyond any impediment to his earning capacity and beyond any pain and

suffering, to the extent that it produces a separate and distinct loss that is substantial

and for which he should be compensated. Dawson v. Briggs, 107 S.W.3d 739, 752

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). In Dawson, the plaintiff offered only

conclusory testimony regarding physical impairment at the default judgment prove-

up hearing. See id. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff’s testimony

merely agreeing that she had experienced a substantial disruption of, and was not

able to carry on with, her daily activities provided no evidence of past physical

impairment beyond pain and suffering when she did not testify concerning what

daily activities she was unable to perform. Id. at 752–53. Likewise, in this case,

there were no facts supporting an award of damages for physical impairment.

      The general rule is that bare conclusions—even if unobjected to—cannot

constitute probative evidence. See Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum

Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Tex. 2004). In spite of any admission of liability

resulting from the default judgment, Ramirez was still required to present sufficient

competent evidence to sustain his damages claims. Jones, 873 S.W.2d at 107. I

would also affirm the trial court’s denial of Ramirez’s claimed damages for past pain

and suffering and for past physical impairment, but I would do so because his

conclusory allegations regarding his damages are not competent evidence that would

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     support a judgment.

230311cf.p05                 /Emily Miskel/
                             EMILY MISKEL
                             JUSTICE

                           –4–