Court Opinion

ID: 9849639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:43:31.045614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.483090
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the jury should not have been permitted to watch the movie Natural Born Killers, I dissent. Whatever relevance the motion picture had to the defendant’s state of mind or motive, viewing the movie in its entirety did nothing more than mislead the jury and prejudice the defendant by blurring the distinction between Ronnie Beasley, the person on trial, and Mickey Knox, the fictional character in the movie.
FACTS
Four witnesses testified at trial that they watched the movie, Natural Born Killers, with Beasley. One witness watched the movie with Beasley a week before Miller’s murder and heard Beasley say that he and his girlfriend were going to be like the people in the movie, go on a rampage, and kill everybody they met. Another friend testified that Beasley, while watching the movie, kept replaying a scene where the two characters break out of jail and the girl beats up the jailer. Following this testimony, the state offered the movie into evidence and announced that it would play the movie for the jury. When the defendant objected on the grounds of relevance, the state *627argued that the movie was relevant because it showed Beasley’s motive. Without previewing the movie, giving any rationale for its decision, or instructing the jury on the purpose of the evidence, the trial court allowed the movie to be shown in its entirety to the jury.
According to reviewers, the movie Natural Born Killers, directed by Oliver Stone, is a “satire of America’s fascination with ultraviolent characters.”8 There is “a story line, of sorts: Mickey, an escaped criminal, meets Mallory, who is sexually terrorized by her slobbering father.”9 After killing Mallory’s parents, the couple kill 52 people during a three-month crime spree that ends after their arrest for robbing a drugstore. They are sent to jail where prison inmates, inspired by a tabloid news show interview of Mickey on Super Bowl Sunday, “riot, allowing Mickey to engineer a reunion with Mallory, who is being sexually assaulted by a deranged expert on mass murderers.”10 “The movie is not simply about their killings, however, but also about the way they electrify the media and exhilarate the public,” generating fame, fan clubs, and t-shirts.11 As one teenager says on the fictional television news, “ ‘[I]f I were a mass murderer, I’d be Mickey and Mallory.’ ”12
At Beasley’s trial the state argued that it was obligated to show the movie to explain Beasley’s motive. During closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury:
We’re not asking you to do anything to Ronnie Beasley because he watched this movie 19 or 20 times. We do think it says a good bit about the motivation. . . . They did what was in that movie. Oh, they did a small time version of it. It wasn’t killing everybody they saw, but that’s exactly what they were doing, that’s exactly how they were heading, that’s exactly the way they did things. ... To ignore the Natural Born Killer element would have been incompetent and unfair to you, because it would have to be going through your minds, Why would anybody do something like this?
The defendant had an alternative theory for the state’s showing of the movie: the state wanted jurors to believe that Beasley turned into “Mickey” because then “you can disguise him, depersonalize him, and *628kill him.” In its final jury charge, the trial court again failed to instruct the jury concerning the movie’s evidentiary role.
MOTION PICTURES AS EVIDENCE
Photographs, audio and video recordings, and motion pictures are demonstrative evidence, defined as “evidence addressed directly to the senses without intervention of testimony.”13 Like other evidence, demonstrative evidence can be classified as either direct or circumstantial. It also may be classified as “real” evidence if it plays a direct part in an incident leading to trial or illustrative evidence if offered to make other evidence more comprehensible to the trier of fact.14 However classified, the admissibility of a photograph, audio and video recording, and motion picture lies within the discretion of the trial court,15 which may consider its length, relevance, and prejudicial effect.
Photographs, audio and video recordings, and motion pictures are treated as real evidence when they capture events or statements related immediately to an event.16 In Gates v. State,17 we held admissible a video recording in which the defendant confessed to the crime, distinguishing his “pictorial confession” from the “posed reenactment of the crimes.”18 Similarly, a video recording of a crime may be admissible under OCGA § 24-4-48 or when a camera operator or eyewitness testifies that the tape recording accurately portrays what the witness saw take place.19 Finally, we have found no error in the admission of four adult movies and a witness’s description of one movie in a murder case involving rape and aggravated child molestation when the movies were not shown to the jury.20
*629Photographs, audio and video recordings, and motion pictures are illustrative evidence when prepared for litigation to aid the trier of fact in understanding the issues and facts at trial.21 In Eiland v. State,22 an early case dealing with the admissibility of a “posed movie” reenacting a crime, the Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the film as evidence because it differed from reality in substantial ways and became an extra witness for the state. The court explained:
photographs and especially movies which are posed, which are substantially different from the facts of the case, and which because of the differences might well be prejudicial and misleading to the jury, should not be used, and this is especially true where the situation or event sought to be depicted is simple, the testimony adequate, and the picture adds nothing except the visual image to the mental image already produced.23
That court concluded that there was no purpose to the film except to make more vivid the state’s argument that the defendant was fleeing arrest because he knew a companion had drugs.
Relying on the Eiland decision, we recently reversed a trial court’s approval in a death penalty case of the state’s use of a video recording that reenacted the defendant’s murder of a deputy sheriff. In Pickren v. State,24 we outlined the criteria for considering when the reenactment of a crime may be admitted as “demonstrative evidence,” whether admitted into evidence or used for illustration only. The party who seeks to use the video reenactment must show that (1) it is a fair and accurate representation of the event in question; (2) the reenactment was filmed under conditions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the event; and (3) the recording’s visual image adds something to the mental image already produced by oral testimony, due either to the event’s complexity or the inadequacy of the testimony.25 This decision is consistent with earlier cases from both appellate courts in this state.26
*630APPLYING THE RULES OF EVIDENCE TO A FICTIONAL FILM
In this case, the movie Natural Born Killers may be classified as both real and illustrative evidence. The actual tape of the movie is “real” evidence in that it is directly related to the crimes at trial. Witnesses testified that Beasley had watched the movie 19 or 20 times, bragged of duplicating the crimes of the fictional mass murderers, and imitated the film’s self-proclaimed natural born killer by referring to his . girlfriend as Mallory and shaving his head. Because of this relevant testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the physical tape into evidence or in allowing testimony related to Beasley’s fascination with the movie.
In contrast to the actual tape, the contents of the movie are illustrative evidence in that the film tells a fictional story, which Beasley admired, of mass murderers who obtain celebrity status. Like the movie reenactments in Eiland and Pickren, the movie here presents the state’s theory that Beasley killed Olin Miller as his petty imitation of Mickey Knox’s crime spree. In the words of the state prosecutor, Beasley “did what was in that movie. Oh, they did a small time version of it. It wasn’t killing everybody they saw, but that’s exactly what they were doing . . . that’s exactly the way they did things.”
In this case, the state failed to meet any of the standards for admission of movies as set out in Pickren. There are, however, substantial differences between showing a “posed” reenactment of a crime and a Hollywood motion picture that foretells a crime. As a result, our decision in Pickren provides only limited guidance in deciding the evidentiary issue in this case.
Rather, the more appropriate test to apply in considering the admissibility of a fictional motion picture is the general one related to relevancy — whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.27 In applying this test, courts should weigh the purpose of the evidence, the adequacy of the direct testimony, and the need for a visual image against the time required to view the movie, the likelihood of jury confusion between fiction and fact, and the unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Considering these factors, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to view the movie Natural Born Killers in its entirety. As an initial consideration, the probative value of the film is questionable. At trial, the state offered the movie to prove motive. What is not clear from the record is whether the state contended that Beasley was seeking to imitate the murders committed in the movie or to emulate the celebrity status of the movie’s mass murderers. If, *631as suggested by the testimony and closing arguments, the state presented the movie to show that Beasley was attempting a copycat killing, then the testimony of the murder was adequate and the motion picture added nothing except the visual image to the mental image already produced.
Perhaps because of the weakness of the state’s rationale at trial, the majority opinion relies on a different purpose, concluding that the movie was relevant to show Beasley’s bent of mind “to commit a violent murder.” It cites the Court of Appeals decision in Turner v. State.28 In that case, the jury was allowed to view a “sex and violence tape” found in Turner’s home because it may have encouraged his perpetration of the crimes of kidnapping, sodomy, and rape. Based on this broad reasoning, any book, movie, record, or television program that includes a crime similar to the one with which an accused is charged would be relevant to show that individual’s bent toward criminal activity. Under this expansive test, reading the works of Nobel prize-winning authors like Toni Morrison and William Faulkner can become evidence that an accused had a “bent of mind” to commit murder. Because this rationale is simplistic and overreaching, I find it unpersuasive as a basis for allowing the jury to view the movie in this case.
The testimony at trial, moreover, was adequate to describe the movie’s connection to Beasley and his crimes. The witnesses detailed Beasley’s obsession with the movie, his boastful claims to be like the movie characters and kill everybody he met, and his symbolic efforts to imitate his fictional hero. It is unclear what critical evidence the moving pictures added to the state’s case other than to become an “extra witness.” As an additional witness, the film presented “evidence” to the jury of murder and mayhem that differed substantially from the reality of the crimes that the defendant was accused of committing. By using “bent of mind” as a rationale for the showing of a gruesome murder film, the majority is allowing a lower standard of relevancy and admissibility for fictional films than for video reenactments of the actual crime in question.
Weighed against the movie’s weak probative value is its prejudicial effect. First, the jury spent two hours watching a movie that was, at best, tangentially related to the accused’s crimes, as well as being forced to view a garish and excessive story that those with strong sensibilities may not have chosen to see voluntarily. Second, given the power of the medium and the length of the film, there is a likelihood that the movie would mislead the jury into confusing the crimes of Mickey Knox with the crimes that Beasley was accused of commit*632ting. Even if the jury could separate the movie crimes from the murder of Olin Miller, the movie tends to obfuscate the issue of what Beasley did with what he said he intended to do.
Decided July 13, 1998
Reconsideration denied July 30,1998.
Stubbs & Associates, M. Francis Stubbs, Layne & Layne, Alan P. Layne, for appellant.
Richard A. Malone, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Deborah L. Gale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Third, the potential for prejudice in this instance was enormous. The name of the movie, much less its portrayal of two mass murderers committing 52 murders, invites prejudice. No court would allow a jury to watch a film about the Holocaust as “evidence” in the trial of a person accused of killing a Jew, even if the defendant had delusions that he was Hitler. “[N]ot only is the danger that the jury may confuse art with reality particularly great, but the impressions generated by the evidence may prove particularly difficult to limit.”29 In this case, the sensational account of 52 murders during a fictional three-month crime spree added little to Beasley’s trial except possible confusion and unfair prejudice. Therefore, the jury should not have been allowed to view the movie.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham and Justice Sears join in this dissent.

 Joseph McBride, Mr. Showbiz Movie Guide: Natural Born Killers chttp:// www.mrshowbiz.coin/reviews/moviereviews/movies/28277.html>

 Hal Hinson, Washington Post, Natural Born Killers, Aug. 26, 1994 chttp:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-snaturalbornkillersrhinson_a0628c.html>

 Id.

 Roger Ebert, Chicago Sun-Times, Natural Bom Killers, <http://www.suntimes.com/ ebert/ebert_reviews/1994/08/937174.html>

 Id.

 Black’s Law Dictionary 389 (5th ed. 1979).

 2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 214 (4th ed. 1992).

 Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 498, 499 (299 SE2d 549) (1983).

 Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 7.3.

 244 Ga. 587, 591 (261 SE2d 349) (1979).

 See also Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 733 (386 SE2d 316) (1989) (trial court did not err is allowing audio recording of filmmaker’s interview in which defendant confessed to four killings and rape).

 See Long v. General Elec. Co., 213 Ga. 809, 810 (102 SE2d 9) (1958) (admitting motion picture film of union members charged with violating injunction after camera operator testified that the film correctly portrayed what he saw as he was filming); see also Tolver v. State, 269 Ga. 530 (500 SE2d 563) (1998) (affirming admission of crime surveillance tape based on the testimony of store supervisor on store procedures, GBI agent who found the stolen tape, photographer who repaired it, and investigator who copied it); Stephens v. State, 239 Ga. 446, 447 (238 SE2d 29) (1977) (admitting film and clerk’s testimony concerning another armed robbery 20 minutes after armed robbery for which defendant was being tried). But see Phagan v. State, 268 Ga. 272, 279 (486 SE2d 876) (1997) (ruling that video recording of defendant and minor engaged in sexual conduct was inadmissible at trial due to lack of authentication).

 See Caldwell v. State, 263 Ga. 560, 564-565 (436 SE2d 488) (1993).

 Milich, supra, note 9, § 7.3.

 130 Ga. App. 428 (203 SE2d 619) (1973).

 Id. at 429.

 269 Ga. 453 (500 SE2d 566) (1998).

 Id. at 455-456.

 See Cornell v. State, 265 Ga. 904, 905 (463 SE2d 702) (1995) (excluding defendant’s computer reenactment of crime for inadequate foundation); Keith v. State, 186 Ga. App. 273, 274 (367 SE2d 255) (1988) (excluding defendant’s videotape of circumstances leading to his arrest); City Council of Augusta v. Lee, 153 Ga. App. 94, 99 (264 SE2d 683) (1980) (excluding posed film of scene at site of collision).

 See Carroll v. State, 261 Ga. 553, 554 (408 SE2d 412) (1991).

 194 Ga. App. 878, 880 (392 SE2d 256) (1990).

 McCormick on Evidence § 214.