Court Opinion

ID: 9928275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 15:03:06.870655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:45.073015
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed January 31, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1267
                      Lower Tribunal No. F98-2097B
                          ________________

                           Jonathan Sawyer,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Andrea R.
Wolfson, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Linda Katz, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

Before MILLER, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      Appellant, Jonathan Sawyer, challenges a life sentence imposed

following an individualized resentencing hearing ordered pursuant to

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460

(2012), and section 921.1401, Florida Statutes (2022). On appeal, Sawyer

contends the trial court erred in failing to credit rehabilitation after conviction

and affording little or no weight to youth and its attendant circumstances. As

to the former assertion, the trial court holistically considered the rehabilitative

testimony but simply gave it little weight and, in doing so, tacitly recognized

that statutory resentencing factors are directed at the circumstances that

existed at the time of the original sentencing. See Falcon v. State, 341 So.

3d 386, 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (Makar, J., concurring). “They do not

include the wider range of factors related to rehabilitation and demonstrated

maturity that are considered in a subsequent sentence review proceeding.”

Id.; see also § 921.1402(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“[T]he court shall consider

any factor . . . including . . . [w]hether the juvenile offender demonstrates

maturity and rehabilitation.”); Bellay v. State, 277 So. 3d 605, 608–09 (Fla.

4th DCA 2019) (“The question as to whether a juvenile has in fact been

rehabilitated comes from section [921.1402], which applies to subsequent

judicial review of a sentence. . . .          For resentencing, [a]ppellant’s

‘performance in prison’ was one part of the equation in considering . . . ‘[t]he

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possibility of rehabilitating the defendant.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting

§ 921.1401(2), Fla. Stat.)); Calabrese v. State, 325 So. 3d 938, 942 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2021) (“Rehabilitation is not the sole focus of section 921.1401. Rather,

it is one of the statutory factors to be considered at sentencing . . . . In

contrast to section 921.1401, evidence of rehabilitation and the juvenile's

maturation play a much greater role in the subsequent sentence review

hearing held pursuant to section 921.1402.”). Regarding the latter, a careful

review of the detailed and reasoned order on appeal, along with the

developed record of the proceedings below, yields the inescapable

conclusion the trial court considered “[t]he defendant's age, maturity,

intellectual capacity, and mental and emotional health at the time of the

offense[,]” “[t]he effect, if any, of immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to

appreciate risks and consequences on the defendant's participation in the

offense[,]” and “[t]he effect, if any, of characteristics attributable to the

defendant's youth on the defendant's judgment[,]” as required by section

921.1401(2), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, we discern no error and affirm

the order under review.

     Affirmed.

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