Court Opinion

ID: 9556992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 13:03:57.01475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:50.585031
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
     Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
     opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
     prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
     official text of the opinion.

     In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                 Decided: August 21, 2023

                     S23A0595. JACKSON v. THE STATE.

     LAGRUA, Justice.

     Appellant Quentin Jackson was convicted of malice murder

and related charges in connection with the shooting death of Darian

Brewster. 1 On appeal, Jackson contends that (1) the evidence was

     1   The crimes occurred on August 20, 2016. On May 2, 2017, a Bibb
County grand jury indicted Jackson and Benjamin Murphy for malice murder
(Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2),
aggravated assault (Count 4), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 5). Jackson was also separately indicted for an
additional count of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (Count 3), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count
6), and two counts of violating the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and
Prevention Act (Counts 7 and 8).
       Jackson was tried alone in August 2018, and the jury found him guilty
on all counts. The trial court merged the felony murder counts (Counts 2 and
3), the aggravated assault count (Count 4), and the possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon count (Count 6) into the malice murder count (Count 1).
Although the trial court merged Counts 2 and 3 into Count 1, they were
actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372-
373 (5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). The trial court also merged Count 6 into Count
1. The State has not challenged the sentences, and we decline to exercise our
discretion to address them. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696-698 (4) (808
insufficient, (2) his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective

assistance in several respects, and (3) the trial court erred by failing

to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration. For the reasons that

follow, these claims fail, and we affirm Jackson’s convictions.

      Background. The evidence at trial showed that in the early

morning hours of August 20, 2016, Brewster was shot while sitting

in a car with two friends, Sandra Thomas Russell and Marilyn

Odom, in the parking lot of a nightclub in Bibb County. Russell and

Odom drove Brewster to a nearby hospital, where he died due to a

gunshot wound to his heart.

      At the hospital, Russell and Odom told Investigator David

Patterson that they had been at the nightclub with Brewster and

Caryn Powell. The four of them left the nightclub and walked to

SE2d 696) (2017).
       The trial court sentenced Jackson to serve life in prison without the
possibility of parole on Count 1, plus five consecutive years to serve on Count
5, 20 consecutive years to serve on Count 7, and 20 consecutive years to serve
on Count 8. Jackson filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended
through new counsel. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the motion for new trial on December 7, 2022. Jackson filed a timely
notice of appeal, and his case was docketed to this Court’s April 2023 term and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.

                                      2
Brewster’s car, although Powell lagged behind. Russell told

Investigator Patterson that she noticed “three guys with blankets

over their heads” while they were walking to Brewster’s car and that

an unknown man asked Brewster for a “light” after Brewster sat

down in the driver’s seat. Russell heard a “pop” and realized that

Brewster had been shot. Odom told Investigator Patterson that she

saw the man who shot Brewster, but she did not know his name.

     Later that evening, Odom reached out to Investigator

Patterson again and told him that: (1) Jackson was the person she

saw shoot Brewster; (2) Jackson was living with his mother on

Lynmore Avenue; and (3) on the night of shooting, Jackson was

driving a champagne-colored Toyota SUV with a temporary car tag.

The next morning, Investigator Patterson located a champagne-

colored Toyota SUV with a temporary car tag parked at Jackson’s

mother’s house.

     Pursuant to a search warrant, Investigator Patterson obtained

Jackson’s phone records, which revealed a couple of calls to

Christopher Finnell in the hours prior to the murder. Finnell told

                                 3
Investigator Patterson that Jackson and Murphy stopped by

Finnell’s house before the murder, and Jackson asked Finnell if he

wanted to participate in a robbery; Finnell declined. Finnell stated

that the day after the murder, Murphy told Finnell that Jackson

“had to burn the [man],” which Finnell understood to mean “shoot.”

Several hours later, Jackson stopped by Finnell’s house, stating,

“You better not run your mouth.”

     At trial, Odom testified that, on the evening of August 19,

2016—the evening before Brewster was shot—Jackson picked her

up and dropped her off to meet up with Russell and Powell to “party.”

Eventually, the three women also met up with Brewster, a known

drug dealer who always carried cash and was generous with his

money. The three women and Brewster then went to the nightclub.

     Odom’s testimony and the nightclub’s surveillance video,

which was played for the jury, showed Odom, Brewster, Powell, and

Russell enter the nightclub at 1:22 a.m. on August 20. At 1:34 a.m.,

Russell left the nightclub when she received a phone call, and she

was seen holding her phone up to her ear as she was leaving. At 1:38

                                   4
a.m., Brewster, Powell, and Odom left the nightclub.

     After leaving the nightclub, Powell saw Murphy in the parking

lot and stopped to talk to him. Powell and Murphy both testified that

they had a brief chat and that Murphy was wearing rubber boots.

     Odom and Russell testified that they walked with Brewster to

his car. Odom noticed Jackson’s champagne-colored Toyota SUV and

saw Jackson on the side of the building “acting like he was using the

bathroom.” Jackson said to the group, “[H]ey, how y’all doing,” and

Brewster responded, “I’m good.” Brewster, Russell, and Odom

walked to Brewster’s car, got in, and waited for Powell. Odom

testified that, while they were sitting in Brewster’s car, Jackson

walked up to the driver-side door and asked Brewster for a lighter.

In contrast, Russell testified that, before they got into the car, an

unknown person asked Brewster for a cigarette and this person was

part of a group of two or three people in the parking lot, who were

wearing “dark gray and black robe[s] like head to toe.”

     Odom testified that, after Jackson asked for a lighter, Jackson

shot Brewster. Murphy also testified that he witnessed Jackson lean

                                 5
into the car and shoot Brewster. Russell testified that an unknown

person opened Brewster’s car door and “a gun went off.” Powell

testified that she saw “a figure coming,” “heard a pop,” Brewster’s

car drove off, and she was left in the parking lot.

     According to Odom, after she and Russell took Brewster to the

hospital, Russell told her, “[T]ake this car somewhere and go

through the car, I know [Brewster] got more money somewhere in

the car.” However, Odom said she simply parked the car and did not

search it. Odom also testified that, after she and Russell left the

hospital, Russell asked Odom if she saw who shot Brewster, and

Odom stated it was Jackson. Russell responded, “Don’t you ever say

his name, I don’t want to hear you say his name.” Russell then called

Jackson and asked, “[B]aby, was you downtown?” Jackson asked,

“Why?” and Russell responded, “[Odom] said she seen you.” Russell

then placed Jackson on speaker phone, and Jackson said to Odom,

“[L]isten here, you fat [b**ch], if you go to them [] folks and say my

name, I know where your fat [b**ch] stay at.” Odom also testified

that Russell told her “to say three guys with some rubber boots on”

                                  6
shot Brewster.2

      Lakeshia Ford testified that the day after the shooting she was

at a social gathering and “it was said that [Jackson] was the shooter

that killed [Brewster].” Ford looked over to Jackson and Russell,

who were also at the gathering, and rolled her eyes. Jackson hit Ford

in the face, telling her “to keep [her] mouth shut, b**ch.”3 During

the trial, the State presented a recording of a phone call made by

Jackson to Russell, during which Jackson asked Russell why she

was “hanging around with [Ford]” and later said, “I need [Ford] . . .

to say she put everything in [Odom’s] head.” Russell responded that

she would speak with Ford and record it.

      Additionally, Finnell testified that, after Jackson was arrested,

Finnell was arrested on unrelated charges, and while he was in

custody, he was attacked by Jackson.

      Finally, Murphy testified that Jackson was associated with the

      2 During Russell’s testimony, she admitted that she called Jackson after

she left the hospital, but she denied that she told Jackson about what, if
anything, Odom saw and denied that Jackson threatened Odom.
      3 At trial, Russell denied that she was present when this was alleged to

have occurred.

                                      7
Gangster Disciples street gang and Brewster was associated with

the Crips street gang. Additionally, the State presented the

testimony of Investigator Cedric Penson, who was admitted as an

expert in criminal street gang activity. Investigator Penson testified

that the Crips and Gangster Disciples are rival street gangs in Bibb

County. For symbols, the Gangster Disciples used a pitchfork, the

number 74, and the Star of David. Investigator Penson reviewed

Jackson’s tattoos and testified that Jackson had several tattoos

depicting the Star of David and the number 74. Jackson also had a

tattoo depicting tall buildings with the words “GDHQ” written on it.

Investigator Penson testified that “GDHQ” meant “Gangster

Disciples Headquarters” and the tall buildings symbolized Chicago,

where the Gangster Disciples was founded.

     Investigator Penson also testified that, based on phone records,

Jackson appeared to have an association with three other members

of the Gangster Disciples, including the leader of the Blac Team, a

division of the Gangster Disciples. He further testified that Brewster

was associated with the Crips and that he had noticed a trend of

                                  8
gang-affiliated drug dealers getting robbed and that some of these

robberies were committed by rival gang members because

committing a violent crime “increase[d] their status” within the

gang.

     1. Jackson contends the trial court erred in denying his motion

for new trial because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient

to support his convictions. We disagree.

     Evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction

if, “‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Munn v. State,

313 Ga. 716, 720 (1) (873 SE2d 166) (2022) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979)). “This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in

testimony but rather defers to the jury’s assessment of the weight

and credibility of the evidence.” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 692, 695 (878

SE2d 502) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (a) The evidence was sufficient to support the malice murder

                                  9
and firearm convictions.

     The evidence summarized above, including the testimony of

two witnesses who saw Jackson shoot Brewster, was sufficient to

authorize the jury to find Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission

of a felony.

     (b) The evidence was also sufficient to support the convictions

for violating the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act

(the “Gang Act”).

     Jackson was convicted of violating the Gang Act by

participating in criminal gang activity through the commission of

the murder of Brewster while “associated with Gangster Disciples,

a criminal street gang.” Jackson was also convicted of violating the

Gang Act by participating in criminal gang activity through the

commission of “the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon . . . by having in his possession . . . a firearm after having been

convicted of the felony crime of aggravated assault” while

“associated with Gangster Disciples, a criminal street gang.” See

                                   10
OCGA §§ 16-15-4 (a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed

by or associated with a criminal street gang to conduct or participate

in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense

enumerated in [paragraph (1) of Code Section 16-15-3”); 16-15-3 (1)

(J) (enumerated offenses include any criminal offense that involves

violence or the use of a weapon). To convict Jackson, the State had

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Jackson was associated

with the Gangster Disciples; (2) the Gangster Disciples was a

“criminal street gang;” (3) Jackson committed the predicate acts of

murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and (4) the

commission of those offenses was intended to further the interests

of the Gangster Disciples. See Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 706, 709 (1)

(b) (832 SE2d 809) (2019).

     Regarding the first two elements, Murphy testified that

Jackson was a member of the Gangster Disciples, and Investigator

Penson testified that Jackson had several tattoos signifying the

Gangster Disciples. See OCGA § 16-15-3 (3) (existence of a gang

“may be established by evidence of a common name or common

                                 11
identifying signs, symbols, tattoos, graffiti, or attire or other

distinguishing   characteristics”).   Investigator   Penson   further

testified that the Gangster Disciples was a criminal street gang, had

at least three members, and the gang had committed violent crimes,

including aggravated assault and murder. See OCGA § 16-15-3 (3)

(defining a “criminal street gang” as “any organization, association,

or group of three or more persons associated in fact, whether formal

or informal, which engages in criminal gang activity”).

     Regarding the third element, as stated in Division 1 (a), the

evidence authorized a finding that Jackson shot at and killed

Brewster, establishing that he committed the predicate offense of

murder. Additionally, the State presented evidence, as discussed in

Division 2 (b) below, that Jackson was a convicted felon. Thus, the

evidence authorized a finding that Jackson possessed a firearm

while he was a convicted felon, establishing that he committed the

predicate offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

     Regarding the fourth element, the evidence showed that

Brewster was a drug dealer and a member of a rival gang, the Crips.

                                 12
Investigator Penson testified that gang-affiliated drug dealers were

getting robbed and that these robberies were committed by rival

gang members because committing a violent crime “increase[d] their

status” within the gang. From this evidence, the jury was authorized

to conclude that Jackson shot and killed Brewster in furtherance of

the interests of the Gangster Disciples because he killed a rival

gang-affiliated drug dealer. See Jackson, 306 Ga. at 709-710 (1) (b)

(affirming convictions for violation of the Gang Act where the

evidence showed, among other things, that the victim was a member

of a rival gang). Based on this evidence, the jury was authorized to

convict Jackson of the violations of the Gang Act for which he was

charged (Counts 7 and 8).

     2. Jackson contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by (a) failing to object to other-acts evidence

under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”) and failing to request a

limiting instruction and (b) failing to stipulate that Jackson was a

convicted felon. These claims fail.

     To prevail on these claims, Jackson must demonstrate both

                                 13
that his trial counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and

that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Bates v.

State, 313 Ga. 57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984)). To establish deficient performance, Jackson must show that

trial counsel performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable

way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms. See id. Establishing deficient performance

     is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong
     presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and [the
     appellant] bears the burden of overcoming this
     presumption. To carry this burden, he must show that no
     reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did,
     or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not. In
     particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy
     may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if
     they were so patently unreasonable that no competent
     attorney would have followed such a course.

Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 740-741 (879 SE2d 400) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, Jackson must

prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial

counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.

                                  14
See Bates, 313 Ga. at 62 (2). “A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

(citation and punctuation omitted). “And, this burden is a heavy

one.” Id. at 62-63 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If an

appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of

the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine

the other prong.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884 SE2d

346) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). “This Court accepts

a trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations on an

ineffectiveness claim unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply

legal principles to the facts de novo.” Bonner v. State, 314 Ga. 472,

474 (1) (877 SE2d 588) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (a) Jackson contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by failing to object to Ford’s testimony about

Jackson hitting her and threatening her on the day after the murder

and by failing to request a limiting instruction. We conclude that

trial counsel did not perform deficiently.

     In Jackson’s view, counsel should have filed a motion to exclude

                                 15
Ford’s testimony under Rule 404 (b) and OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule

403”) because it was “unduly prejudicial” and “offered simply to

suggest propensity.” Because the evidence was properly admitted as

intrinsic evidence, we need not address its potential admission as

extrinsic evidence under Rule 404 (b). See Heade v. State, 312 Ga.

19, 24 (3) (860 SE2d 509) (2021) (holding that Rule 404 (b) is not

applicable to intrinsic evidence).

     Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is an

uncharged offense that arises from the same transaction or series of

transactions as the charged offense, is necessary to complete the

story of the crime, or is inextricably intertwined with the evidence

regarding the charged offense. See Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474,

485 (IV) (d) (807 SE2d 350) (2017). Evidence may be intrinsic if it

“pertain[s] to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and

set-up of the crime” and “is linked in time and circumstances with

the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an

account of the crime.” See Heade, 312 Ga. at 25 (3) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

                                     16
     Here, Ford testified that the day after the shooting she was at

a social gathering and “it was said that [Jackson] was the shooter

that killed [Brewster].” Ford looked over to Jackson and Russell,

who were also at the gathering, and rolled her eyes. Jackson hit Ford

in the face, telling her “to keep [her] mouth shut, b**ch.” After

Jackson was arrested, he called Russell, asked her why she was

“hanging around with [Ford]” and later said, “I need [Ford] . . . to

say she put everything in [Odom’s] head.” Russell responded that

she would speak to Ford and record her.

     Ford’s testimony regarding Jackson’s assault of Ford and

threat that she “keep [her] mouth shut” was evidence of an

uncharged offense, i.e., aggravated assault or battery, arising from

the same transaction as Brewster’s murder. Ford’s testimony

showed Jackson’s attempt to hide his involvement in Brewster’s

murder and explained why Jackson suggested Ford as a person who

could “say she put everything in [an eyewitness’s] head,” i.e., he had

already threatened her. Thus, Ford’s testimony was admissible as

intrinsic evidence. See West v. State, 305 Ga. 467, 473 (2) n.6 (826

                                 17
SE2d 64) (2019) (where an attempt to influence a witness is an

uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of

transactions as the charged offense it would be properly treated as

intrinsic evidence and thus not subject to the limitations and

prohibition on other acts evidence set out in Rule 404 (b)).

      But intrinsic evidence must still satisfy Rule 403. See

Williams, 302 Ga. at 360 (IV) (d). Under Rule 403, “[r]elevant

evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Wilson

v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 738 (8) (a) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (citation and

punctuation    omitted).   “[I]nculpatory   evidence   is   inherently

prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs

probative value that Rule 403 permits exclusion.” Early v. State, 313

Ga. 667, 671 (872 SE2d 705) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). “The prejudicial effect of evidence is unfair if the evidence

has the capacity to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a

ground different from proof specific to the offense charged, or an

undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,

                                  18
though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Wilson, 315 Ga. at 738

(8) (a).

      Here, Ford’s testimony showed that Jackson used the threat of

force to dissociate his name from Brewster’s murder. Evidence that

Jackson tried to conceal his part in the murder was obviously

probative of his guilt. See Richardson v. State, 308 Ga. 70, 72 (3)

(838 SE2d 759) (2020) (reasoning that the defendant’s “attempt to

conceal his involvement in the crimes was evidence of his guilt”).

The probative value of this evidence was very high, and whatever

unfair prejudice may have arisen from it did not substantially

outweigh the high probative value. See Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. 247,

261 (2) (b) (869 SE2d 447) (2022) (concluding the probative value of

the prior witness-intimidation evidence was not substantially

outweighed by unfair prejudice).

      Accordingly, trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing

to file a motion to exclude Ford’s testimony under Rule 404 (b) and

by failing to seek a corresponding limiting instruction because such

actions would have been meritless, and this claim fails. See Williams

                                   19
v. State, 315 Ga. 797, 806 (2) (884 SE2d 877) (2023) (trial counsel’s

failure to file a meritless motion is not deficient performance).

      (b) Jackson contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by failing to stipulate that Jackson was a

convicted felon. Assuming without deciding that Jackson’s trial

counsel performed deficiently, we conclude Jackson was not

prejudiced by the introduction of his prior convictions.

      Jackson was indicted for felony murder predicated on

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3), possession of

a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6), and violating the Georgia

Gang Act predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon

(Count 8). The indictment identified the predicate felony conviction

as aggravated assault in Counts 6 and 8, but not in Count 3.4

      At trial, the State tendered Exhibit 49 as evidence of Jackson’s

convicted-felon status, and it was admitted without objection. In

      4 Jackson does not raise any claim regarding Count 3, which accuses

Jackson of committing felony murder while in the commission of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, without identifying the specific felony of which
he was convicted.

                                      20
presenting Exhibit 49, the prosecutor stated it was a “felony

conviction for [Jackson] . . . for aggravated assault.” Exhibit 49

included a certified copy of Jackson’s 2007 indictment for aggravated

assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime,

and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, predicated on a

felony conviction for possession of cocaine. Exhibit 49 also included

a copy of Jackson’s sentence, which stated that the counts of

possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were nolle prossed. The

State did not present any details concerning the aggravated assault

conviction or other indicted charges, and in closing argument, the

State only referenced Jackson’s aggravated assault conviction in

relation to the charges concerning possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. Jackson argues his trial counsel’s failure to stipulate

to his convicted-felon status prejudiced him because the jury learned

of his convictions for aggravated assault, possession of cocaine, and

                                  21
possession of a firearm. 5

      “A defendant may be prejudiced by the admission of a prior

conviction into evidence when the prior conviction is of the nature

likely to inflame the jury’s passions and raise the risk of a conviction

based on improper considerations.” Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 28 (4)

(a) (880 SE2d 158) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). And

“this Court has held that even violent crimes, crimes involving

firearms, and drug offenses were not likely to inflame the jury’s

passions in murder cases.” Parker v. State, 309 Ga. 736, 745 (5) (848

SE2d 117) (2020).

      Here, Jackson has not shown that informing the jury that he

had been convicted of aggravated assault and that he had been

charged with—but not convicted of—possession of a firearm during

the commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, predicated on a felony conviction for possession of cocaine,

      5 However, as noted above, Jackson was indicted in 2007 for possession

of a firearm during the commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, with the predicate felony being possession of cocaine, Exhibit
49 is clear that Jackson was only convicted of aggravated assault and not of
the firearms charges.

                                       22
likely inflamed the passions of the jury, particularly in the light of

the nature of the charges and evidence against him. The evidence

against Jackson was strong. Two eyewitnesses identified Jackson as

the person who shot Brewster. One eyewitness also identified the

vehicle, i.e., a champagne-colored SUV with a temporary car tag,

that Jackson drove on the night of the shooting; this vehicle was in

the parking lot when Brewster was shot and was located at

Jackson’s mother’s house the next day. Further, three people

testified that Jackson threatened them to prevent them from

speaking about the murder. Additionally, as noted above, the

aggravated assault conviction was identified only twice in passing,

i.e., once when Exhibit 49 was introduced and once during closing

argument. The prosecutor did not emphasize the nature of the

aggravated assault conviction and never mentioned that Jackson

was also charged with possession of a firearm during the commission

of a felony and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,

predicated on a felony conviction for possession of cocaine.

     Because the evidence against Jackson was strong and the

                                 23
prosecutor did not emphasize the defendant’s felony conviction when

it was admitted into evidence or during closing argument, see

Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 749 (8) (d) (864 SE2d 85) (2021), we

conclude that even if Jackson’s counsel was deficient for failing to

stipulate to his convicted-felon status, Jackson has failed to show

that there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial

would have been different. See Willis, 315 Ga. at 28-29 (4) (a) (in a

murder case, defendant not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to

stipulate to convicted-felon status, because evidence of guilt was

strong and jury’s passions were unlikely to be inflamed by prior

conviction for possession of cocaine); Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248,

252-53 (6) (a), (773 SE2d 254) (2015) (same, with past convictions

for aggravated assault and burglary with intent to commit

aggravated assault); Bentley v. State, 307 Ga. 1, 8 (2) (834 SE2d 549)

(2019) (same, with past convictions for rape and incest, mentioning

that “[t]he names and nature of the earlier convictions were not

emphasized by the State”). Accordingly, Jackson’s ineffectiveness

claim fails.

                                 24
     (c) Finally, Jackson contends that his trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to request an

accomplice-corroboration instruction with respect to Murphy’s

testimony.

     We note that in his appellate brief, Jackson asserts that trial

counsel’s failure to request an accomplice-corroboration instruction

was deficient, but he does not explain how counsel’s deficiency was

prejudicial. And “[i]t is well established that the burden is on the

party alleging error to show it by the record.” Sillah v. State, 315 Ga.

741, 751 (3) (883 SE2d 756) (2023) (citation and punctuation

omitted). Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that Jackson’s

counsel performed deficiently, we conclude that Jackson has not

established that he was prejudiced.

     OCGA § 24-14-8 provides in pertinent part that “[t]he

testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a

fact. However, in . . . felony cases where the only witness is an

accomplice, the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient.”

“Where accomplice testimony is the bedrock of the conviction, it may

                                  25
be likely that the jury convicted the defendant on the accomplice’s

testimony alone.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 326 (1) (877 SE2d 202)

(2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Here, the most incriminating evidence against Jackson did not

come from Murphy—it came from Odom. Odom told police that

Jackson shot Brewster, described the SUV he was driving the night

of the murder, and that the SUV could be located at Jackson’s

mother’s house, which is where it was found the next day. Odom also

stated that Jackson threatened her after Jackson learned that Odom

witnessed the shooting. Additionally, Finnell testified that Jackson

and Murphy stopped by Finnell’s house prior to the murder and

asked him about committing a robbery. The day after the murder,

Jackson threatened Finnell to keep him from speaking with police,

and Murphy admitted to Finnell that Jackson shot someone. While

Murphy testified that he witnessed Jackson shoot Brewster, he

denied any involvement in the shooting, and he specifically denied

speaking to Finnell about it before or after it occurred.

     Due to the extensive corroboration of Murphy’s limited

                                  26
testimony and the other significant independent evidence of

Jackson’s guilt, there is not a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s alleged deficiency, the outcome of the trial would have been

different. Thus, Jackson has failed to show prejudice, and this claim

fails. See Payne, 314 Ga. at 329 (3) (a) (concluding that the defendant

failed to show he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to request

an accomplice-instruction because “some of the most incriminating

testimony came from witnesses who could not reasonably be

considered accomplices in the murder” and the accomplice’s

testimony was corroborated by those witnesses or other evidence).

      3. In a related claim, Jackson contends that the trial court

plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury on accomplice

corroboration. Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred

by failing to give the instruction, we conclude Jackson failed to show

that it likely affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. 6

      Because Jackson’s trial counsel did not object to the omission

      6 Similar to our note in Division 2 (c), we note that Jackson does not does

not explain how the trial court’s failure to give the accomplice-corroboration
instruction likely affected the outcome of his trial.

                                      27
of the accomplice-corroboration instruction, we review the trial-

court-error claim for plain error only. “To show plain error, an

appellant must show that (1) the alleged error was not affirmatively

waived, (2) it was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and (3) it

affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which ordinarily means

showing that it affected the outcome of the trial.” Willis, 315 Ga. at

26 (3) (b). “This Court does not have to analyze all elements of the

plain-error test where an appellant fails to establish one of them.”

Payne, 314 Ga. at 325 (1).

     This Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain-error

standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. See Payne, 314 Ga. at 329 (3) (a). Thus, even if we

assume that the trial court erred in not giving an accomplice-

corroboration instruction, Jackson has not shown that this assumed

error likely affected the outcome of the proceedings for the reasons

explained in Division 2 (c). See Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 490, 497

(883 SE2d 733) (2023) (concluding that the defendant failed to show

plain error when “all of the material facts from [the accomplice’s]

                                 28
testimony were independently corroborated by other witnesses and

evidence, such that [the accomplice’s] testimony was cumulative of

other evidence properly admitted at trial”).

     4. Finally, because we (a) assumed deficiency in Division 2 (b)

relating to trial counsel’s failure to stipulate to Jackson’s status as

a convicted felon, (b) assumed deficiency in Division 2 (c) relating to

trial counsel’s failure to request an accomplice-corroboration

instruction, and (c) assumed error in Division 3 relating to the trial

court’s failure to give an accomplice-corroboration instruction, we

consider whether the cumulative prejudicial impact of these

admissions requires a new trial. “Under State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10

(838 SE2d 808) (2020), we must ‘consider collectively the prejudicial

effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the prejudice caused by

any deficient performance of counsel.’” Talley v. State, 314 Ga. 153,

165-166 (4) (875 SE2d 789) (2022). To establish cumulative error,

Jackson must show that (1) at least two errors were committed in

the course of the trial; and (2) considered together along with the

entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation

                                   29
that they denied Jackson a fundamentally fair trial. See Flood v.

State, 311 Ga. 800, 808 (2) (d) (860 SE2d 731) (2021). Given our

conclusions above and assuming without deciding that the

evidentiary error and the instructional error could be aggregated for

cumulative-error review, 7 we conclude Jackson has failed to

establish that the combined prejudicial effect of these errors require

a new trial. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 617 (5) n.9 (878 SE2d

505) (2022).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

     7 As we have said,

      Lane involved only evidentiary issues, which usually are easily
      cumulated. Lane, 308 Ga. at 17 (1). We made explicit in Lane that
      “[s]ome other types of error may not allow aggregation by their
      nature, but that question is not presented here.” Id.
Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 617 (5) n.9 (878 SE2d 505) (2022).

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