Court Opinion

ID: 9553983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:38:35.336975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:42.897335
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting:
I dissent as to part TV, REPAIR OF THE ELEVATOR. The trial court held that Kim-*383bah fulfilled its contract to repair the elevator to a “safe operating condition” but that Tsern did not meet his lease requirement that he repair the elevator to “good working order.” I cannot agree with the explanation offered by the trial court or with the lead opinion of this court as to why these holdings are not inconsistent.
The parties admit that the phrases “safe operating condition” and “good working order” are not recognized terms of art; they have no readily understood meaning outside of the contracts in which the parties inserted them. Because the meaning of these terms is uncertain, the trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence to determine what the parties intended them to mean. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass’n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995).
The parties testified as to their intended meaning of the terms. However, in referring to Joseph Nicksic, the senior elevator inspector for the State of Utah, the court made the following finding:
The Court finds that Mr. Nicksic, a witness for the plaintiffs, was the most credible witness on the point of “good working order.”
The court went on to summarize Mr. Niek-sie’s opinions as to the meaning of that term.
In interpreting a contract term, the intentions of the parties are controlling. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991); C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah Ct.App.1995). Where a contract term is not a term of art or one of common use in a particular industry, a trial court should not allow an expert to testify as to what the parties intended the term to mean. Brecher v. Gleason, 27 Cal.App.3d 496, 502, 103 Cal.Rptr. 831, 835 (1972) (An “expert cannot tell us the specific intent of the parties in the particular case.”); Fiscus Motor Freight, Inc. v. Universal Sec. Ins. Co., 53 Wash.App. 777, 770 P.2d 679, 682-83 (1989) (insurance underwriter’s opinion as to meaning of contract term is not evidence of intent of contracting parties). Thus the trial court erroneously relied on an expert as “the most credible witness” on the meaning of “good working order” as contained in the lease.
Strangely, the lead opinion appears to indirectly concede this trial court error by not even examining it. While it is perhaps true that “[w]e need not rely on the trial court’s reasoning in support of its holding but may affirm the trial court’s holding ... on different grounds,” that does not mean that we should ignore the trial court’s reasoning in support of its holding.
In addition, the reasoning of the lead opinion’s alternative argument is faulty. Without examining the trial court’s analysis, the lead opinion simply finds that “Tsern and Kimball effected a modification of their contract and the term that it had employed — ‘safe operating condition’ — became meaningless.” The trial court did not make such a finding. On the contrary, it found just the opposite in its written findings of fact: “[T]he duty that ... Kimball Elevator had to perform to Mr. Tsem ... was to provide an operative elevator and a safe elevator.”1
The lead opinion errs in finding a contract modification, a question of fact solely for the district court. “Whether a contract has been modified by the parties thereto is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of fact, as where the evidence is conflicting or the terms of the agreement are equivocal or uncertain.” Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 679 P.2d 640, 645 (1984) (citing 17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 465 (1964)); accord Wolin v. Walker, 830 P.2d 429, 432 (Wyo.1992) (“The question of whether the alleged modification of the written agreement has been *384proved by the required quantum of evidence is one to be decided by the trier of fact.”); see also Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1004 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (“Generally, it is a question of fact as to whether the parties acted in a manner to create implied contractual terms.”).
No evidence adduced at trial supports the lead opinion’s finding that Tsem and Kimball modified their contract, thus rendering the meaning of the term “safe operating condition” irrelevant. The December 12, 1991, repair contract between Tsem and Kimball required Kimball to bring the elevator up to a “safe operating condition.” Kimball did not immediately sign the contract but proceeded to work on the elevator. Nevertheless, Brent Russon, Kimball’s General Manager, sent Tsern a letter dated January 22, 1992, in which Russon wrote:
As authorized in our original proposal, we agreed to complete specified work and deliver the elevator in a safe, operating condition, so that the tenant might use it safely. Please be aware that we have completed this requirement in our agreement.
Thus Kimball bound itself to the “safe operating condition” term, even though Russon later tried to remove it from the contract.2
The trial court erroneously relied on an expert as “the most credible witness” in determining that Tsem failed to meet his lease requirement that he repair the elevator to “good working order.” Because this error may have infected the final judgment, I would reverse the judgment against Tsem and remand the case to allow the trial court to make new findings of the parties’ intent regarding the meaning of “good working order” without relying on Mr. Nicksic’s testimony. Only after these new findings are made can the issue of inconsistency which Tsern has raised on this appeal be determined.

. The December 12, 1991, repair contract between Tsem and Kimball contained the following notations:
Special Conditions:
1. It is understood that upon completion of specified work, the elevator should be in safe operating condition; hence, the tenant [Barton] may use it safely.
2. Kimball Elevator Company will contact the State Agency for a safety inspection and follow up said inspection.
The trial court found that without advising Barton, Tsem told Kimball not to call for an inspection. Thus although Tsem relieved Kimball of its duty to perform the second special condition of their contract (to have the elevator inspected), the first special condition (to restore the elevator to "safe operating condition”) remained in force.

. On January 24, 1992, Tsem met with Russon to have Russon sign the contract. At first Russon refused to do so. When Tsem insisted, Russon consulted his attorney. Russon then blacked out the words "safe operating condition” and “safely,” replaced them with "serviceable” and "to move freight,” and signed the contract. Tsem objected and refused to initial the changes.