Court Opinion

ID: 9898041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:01.986541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:09.088606
License: Public Domain

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                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

          In the Matter of the Personal Restraint
          Petition of:                                            No. 84244-7-I

          DYLAN RAYMOND BECKER,                                   DIVISION ONE

                                 Petitioner.                      PUBLISHED OPINION

                 HAZELRIGG, J. — Dylan Raymond Becker1 seeks relief by way of a

          personal restraint petition. He contends his restraint is unlawful because the

          Department of Corrections is precluding him from participating in the Sex

          Offender Treatment and Assessment Program based on an arbitrary and

          capricious policy. He additionally argues he is being denied visitation with his

          minor son in violation of his fundamental liberty interest in parenting his child.

          We grant relief as to the first issue but deny it as to the second.

                                                     FACTS

                 On January 9, 2020, Dylan Raymond Becker was convicted of rape of a

          child in the first degree and sentenced under the special sex offender sentencing

                 1 As the initial petition notes, Raymond Becker’s name appears in the record as
          Raymond-Becker and Raymond Becker. We use the latter spelling to reflect the petitioner’s brief
          and the manner by which it is set out in the judgment and sentence.
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          No. 84244-7-I/2

          alternative (SSOSA).2 The court imposed an exceptional sentence of 93 months

          based on several aggravating factors; it ordered Raymond Becker to serve 48

          months in prison with the remainder of the time suspended.3 After beginning his

          prison term, Raymond Becker requested to participate in the Sex Offender

          Treatment and Assessment Program (SOTAP).                        The “program provides risk

          assessment, prison-based sexual offense treatment,” and “community-based

          treatment” for “adult sex offenders.” A clinician facilitates twice weekly sessions,

          where group members “reflect upon their values and how past behaviors are

          incongruent with their values,” “verbalize and share feelings and thoughts related

          to risk and develop and practice skills to mitigate risk.” However, the Department

          of Corrections (DOC) denied his request because he is incarcerated pursuant to

          a SSOSA sentence.

                  From the start of his time in prison until September 2021, Raymond

          Becker had several in-person visits with his son O, who is a minor but not

          involved in the crime of conviction. Elizabeth Hainline, the Statewide Visitation

          Specialist for DOC, testified that Raymond Becker was required to have a

          professional visitation supervisor for in-person visits with his son from the

                  2 RCW 9.94A.670.
                  3 Under chapter 9.94A RCW, a sentencing court may “suspend the sentence of a first-

          time sexual offender if the offender is shown to be amenable to treatment and instead require that
          the offender be released into community custody and receive outpatient or inpatient treatment.”
          State v. Wheeler, 14 Wn. App. 2d 571, 575, 474 P.3d 583 (2020). The court “must impose” “[a]
          term of confinement of up to twelve months or the maximum term within the standard range,”
          unless an aggravating circumstance is found, in which case the court may impose a greater term
          of confinement. RCW 9.94A.670(5)(a). The court must also order treatment for up to five years
          as well as a variety of “prohibitions and affirmative conditions relating to the known precursor
          activities or behaviors.” RCW 9.94A.670(5)(c), (d). If the individual violates the conditions of their
          sentence or “fails to make satisfactory progress in treatment,” the SSOSA may be revoked and
          the original sentence of incarceration imposed. Wheeler, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 575-76.

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          No. 84244-7-I/3

          beginning of his incarceration, but “due to an internal error,” this requirement was

          not communicated to Raymond Becker’s wife (O’s mother). Once the error was

          discovered, Raymond Becker’s wife was notified and the requirement was

          enforced.

                 Raymond Becker filed a personal restraint petition (PRP), seeking relief

          from both the decision denying his request to participate in SOTAP and the

          requirement of a professional supervisor for any in-person visitation with O.

                                               ANALYSIS

                 An individual may seek relief from unlawful restraint by filing a PRP. In re

          Pers. Restraint of Sandoval, 189 Wn.2d 811, 820, 408 P.3d 675 (2018). Where

          the petitioner has not had a prior opportunity to raise the issues presented in their

          request for relief, they “need not make any threshold showing of prejudice,” but

          instead demonstrate “that [they are] under an unlawful restraint as defined by

          RAP 16.4.” In re Pers. Restraint of Stuhr, 186 Wn.2d 49, 52, 375 P.3d 1031

          (2016). A restraint is unlawful if “[t]he conditions or manner of the restraint of

          petitioner are in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the

          Constitution or laws of the State of Washington.” RAP 16.4(c)(6); see also In re

          Pers. Restraint of McMurtry, 20 Wn. App. 2d 811, 814, 502 P.3d 906 (2022).

          I.     DOC Policy 570.000(I)(B)(1)

                 Raymond Becker first alleges his restraint is contrary to Washington law

          because DOC Policy 570.000(I)(B)(1) is arbitrary and capricious and, therefore,

          unenforceable. “A decision made by an agency is ‘arbitrary and capricious’ only

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          No. 84244-7-I/4

          if it is ‘willful and unreasoning action in disregard of facts or circumstances.’” In

          re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 143 Wn.2d 384, 395, 20 P.3d 907 (2001) (internal

          quotation marks omitted) (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue,

          102 Wn.2d 355, 365, 687 P.2d 186 (1984)).

                 DOC Policy 570.000(I)(B)(1) categorically precludes SSOSA offenders

          from participating in SOTAP, definitively stating, “Individuals sentenced to the

          Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative per RCW 9.94A.670 are not eligible

          to participate.” Raymond Becker argues it is illogical to prohibit offenders who

          have committed sex offenses which render them eligible for a SSOSA and been

          found to be amenable to treatment from engaging in sex offender treatment while

          incarcerated. DOC responds that the policy is supported because SOTAP does

          not meet the statutory requirements for sex offender treatment for SSOSA

          offenders.

                 RCW 9.94A.670(13) requires that “[e]xaminations and treatment ordered

          pursuant to this subsection shall only be conducted by certified sex offender

          treatment providers or certified affiliate sex offender treatment providers under

          chapter 18.155 RCW.”4 SOTAP providers do not meet this definition because

          not all SOTAP providers have the requisite certifications. Cathi Harris, DOC

          Director of Sex Offender Treatment and Assessment Programs, testified that this

          “precludes the Department from providing such treatment to individuals on

          SSOSA sentences.”5 In reply, Raymond Becker argues that he is not attempting

                 4 Several exceptions are listed, none of which are pertinent to our analysis in this case.
                 5 While Raymond Becker does not challenge this statement, it does appear to be a legal

          conclusion provided by a non-attorney witness.

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          No. 84244-7-I/5

          to receive treatment in order to satisfy any of the treatment requirements of his

          SSOSA sentence, but simply to engage in additional treatment while

          incarcerated.     As Raymond Becker correctly notes, under DOC policy, an

          individual need not be currently serving a sentence pursuant to a sex offense

          conviction to partake in SOTAP: an individual who previously served a sentence

          for a sex offense may participate, and individuals who self-report “having

          committed a sex offense(s) that has not led to a charge/conviction, or who

          believe they may commit a sex offense(s) upon release” may request to join the

          program. Under the plain language of the policy, an individual who has never

          committed a sex offense but simply believes they might commit one upon release

          is not precluded from participating, but any individual who is serving a sentence

          pursuant to a SSOSA may never enroll. In short, DOC at least theoretically

          welcomes those who have never been convicted of, or perhaps never committed,

          sex offenses into its treatment program aimed at providing treatment

          opportunities for adults convicted of sex offenses, but prohibits certain convicted

          sex offenders from participation because they are serving a prison term pursuant

          to a statutory sentencing alternative that expressly emphasizes treatment as a

          means of preventing recidivism.        This is willful and unreasoning action

          disregarding the relevant facts and circumstances.

                  Raymond Becker additionally contends the policy has failed to adapt to

          amendments to SSOSA statutes. DOC Policy 570.000 first became effective in

          1991.    When the DOC policy was enacted, a judge could only sentence an

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          No. 84244-7-I/6

          individual to “up to six months of confinement” under the SSOSA statute.6 In

          2004, the statute was amended to permit judges to “order the offender to serve a

          term of confinement greater than twelve months or the maximum term within the

          standard range based on the presence of an aggravating circumstance.”7

          Because a sentence of one year or less is served in a county jail and a sentence

          of more than one year is served in a state prison,8 an individual serving an initial

          SSOSA sentence in 1991 would not have been confined in a DOC prison facility.

          Rather, any individual in a DOC facility pursuant to a SSOSA sentence during

          that time would only be those serving the remainder of their suspended sentence

          after revocation. Raymond Becker argues that DOC has incidentally combined

          individuals serving the initial term of a SSOSA sentence and those on revocation

          time into the same category and precluded both from participating in SOTAP,

          rather than updating the policy to reflect the ability of judges to sentence

          individuals to serve the first part of their SSOSA sentence in a DOC facility.

                  The policy is also contrary to the intent of our legislature in establishing a

          correctional system. RCW 72.09.010 provides a statement of legislative intent,

          stating the comprehensive “system should be designed and managed to provide

          the maximum feasible safety for the persons and property of the general public,

          the staff, and the inmates.”            RCW 72.09.010(1).           The system should also

          “positively    impact      offenders      by    stressing     personal      responsibility      and

                    6 LAWS OF 1990, ch. 3, § 705(7)(a)(ii)(B).

          https://leg.wa.gov/codereviser/documents/sessionlaw/1990pam1.pdf.
                    7 LAWS OF 2004, ch. 176, §4(4)(a).         https://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2003-
          04/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/2400-S.SL.pdf.
                    8 RCW 9.94A.190(1).

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          No. 84244-7-I/7

          accountability and by discouraging recidivism.”                  RCW 72.09.010(3).            The

          legislature additionally intends for the system to “reflect the values of the

          community,” which includes “[p]roviding opportunities for self improvement. All

          individuals should have opportunities to grow and expand their skills and abilities

          as to fulfill their role in the community.”            RCW 72.09.010(5)(c).          Finally, the

          statute provides that “[s]ince most offenders return to the community, it is wise for

          the state and the communities to make an investment in effective rehabilitation

          programs for offenders and the wise use of resources.”                    RCW 72.09.010(6).

          DOC Policy 570.000(I)(B)(1) contradicts these statements of legislative intent by

          precluding all individuals serving an initial SSOSA sentence, who have

          necessarily been found to be amenable to treatment9 and who will return to the

          community,10 from participating in treatment designed to “provide opportunities

          for offenders to learn the attitudes, thinking skills, and behaviors necessary to

          manage their risk of future sexual offenses.”

                  At oral argument before this court, DOC argued Policy 570.000(I)(B)(1)

          should be upheld as a discretionary decision by DOC about how to best utilize its

          resources.11 It also argued striking the provision would create an unnecessary

          administrative burden. However, removing a categorical barrier to participation

          does not remove DOC’s discretion as to which individual inmates may participate

          in the program based on resources available at the time of each request.

                  9 RCW 9.94A.670(4).
                    10 RCW 9.94A.670(5)(a) (“In no case shall the term of confinement exceed the statutory

          maximum sentence for the offense”).
                    11 In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Raymond Becker, No. 84244-7-I (Jan. 26, 2023), at 17

          min., 7 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network,
          https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2023011361/?eventID=2023011361.

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          No. 84244-7-I/8

          Further, both parties agree that Raymond Becker seems to be the only inmate

          impacted by this categorical bar currently, and in the nearly two decades since

          the SSOSA statute was amended.12 DOC failed to articulate what additional

          burden it would have in investigating whether an inmate is serving more than 12

          months in prison pursuant to a SSOSA compared to the current burden of

          determining whether an interested applicant qualifies for the program, particularly

          in light of the apparently agreed upon fact that this administrative hardship would

          be the result of applications from a highly unique sentencing exception.13 This

          fatally undercuts DOC’s contention that striking the provision would be unduly

          burdensome in terms of its program resources.

                  DOC provides no logical reasoning for the unqualified exclusion of those

          serving SSOSA sentences.               Without any consideration of the facts and

          circumstances of each inmate seeking to participate in SOTAP, DOC Policy

          570.000(I)(B)(1) is arbitrary and capricious to the extent it categorically bars any

          individual serving a SSOSA sentence from admission.                        We reiterate that

          invalidating this portion of the policy as arbitrary and capricious has no impact on

          DOC’s discretion to admit an individual offender into the program.

                  We grant Raymond Becker’s petition as to this issue and strike the

          relevant language of the policy.

                    12 In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Raymond Becker, No. 84244-7-I (Jan. 26, 2023), at 6

          min., 37 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network,
          https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2023011361/?eventID=2023011361.
                    13 Logic dictates that individuals serving a sentence pursuant to a SSOSA are not the

          only inmates who might have less than 12 months of their period of incarceration remaining at the
          time they request to join SOTAP.

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          No. 84244-7-I/9

          II.     DOC Conditions on In-Person Visits

                  Raymond Becker next contends his restraint is contrary to Washington law

          and to the United States Constitution because DOC has disallowed visitation with

          his son, O.      His claim fails on both bases because DOC has not precluded

          visitation; rather, DOC has allowed in-person visits with O, so long as a

          professional supervisor is present, or visitation through a video call with any

          approved visitor supervising (including Raymond Becker’s wife).14                      Raymond

          Becker has two avenues for visitation with O, subject to conditions by DOC which

          are reasonably related to penological interests. His claim fails on this basis.

                  Granted in part and denied in part.

          WE CONCUR:

                  14 Raymond Becker also argues that language in the judgment and sentence expressly

          permits visits with O. He is correct that the language is permissive; it does not order DOC to do
          anything other than to give “special consideration” to “permit contact” between Raymond Becker
          and his son. Again, DOC does permit contact, albeit with restrictions relating to the unique safety
          concerns of a child’s interaction with a carceral setting.

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