Court Opinion

ID: 9751059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:01:40.269393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:47.712112
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 22-50024

             Plaintiff-Appellee,            D.C. No.
                                         2:07-cr-00168-
 v.                                          DSF-1

MICHAEL JOSEPH PEPE,
                                           OPINION
             Defendant-Appellant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Central District of California
       Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted June 27, 2023
                Pasadena, California

                 Filed August 28, 2023

Before: N. Randy Smith, Kenneth K. Lee, and Lawrence
              VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

              Opinion by Judge VanDyke
2                           USA V. PEPE

                          SUMMARY *

                         Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed Michael Pepe’s jury conviction on
two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) by traveling in
foreign commerce with the purpose of committing illicit
sexual acts and two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)
by crossing a state line to sexually abuse a child under 12
and then so doing.
     Pepe contended that no rational finder of fact could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated §§ 2423(b)
and 2241(c). He argued that the Supreme Court in
Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944), ruled
categorically that a jury cannot rationally find that a
defendant who leaves his home for an innocent purpose on a
round trip returns for a criminal purpose. Declining Pepe’s
invitation to expand Mortensen beyond its rationale and
facts, the panel wrote that Mortensen does not remove from
the jury’s province its ability to rationally find that a person
embarked on a trip with an innocent purpose but returned
home with a motivating purpose of illicit conduct. The panel
held that a jury could rationally find that the sexual abuse of
children was one of Pepe’s primary motivations for returning
from the United States to Cambodia, which is sufficient to
uphold his convictions under § 2423(b) (Counts 1 and
2). Noting that § 2241(c) (Counts 3 and 4) requires the jury
to find a slightly more specific motivating purpose, the panel
held that a rational trier of fact could have found that Pepe’s

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                          USA V. PEPE                         3

charged victims were, in fact, under 12, and that Pepe
crossed state lines with a motivating purpose of sexually
abusing girls under 12.
    Because Mortensen does not preclude the government’s
theory of the case, and Ninth Circuit precedent clearly
establishes that a defendant can have mixed motives for
traveling, the panel held that the district court did not err in
declining to instruct the jury on Pepe’s innocent round trip
theory of defense.
     The panel also held that the district court did not err in
its instructions to the jury on the requisite mens rea. The
panel wrote that Congress’s 2018 amendment of § 2423(b)
is not clearly irreconcilable with this court’s precedent
upholding a “motivating purpose” as sufficient for
conviction, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining Pepe’s request to add a requirement that the
government prove that the criminal sexual activity was “not
merely incidental,” and the district court properly declined
to instruct the jury that the improper conduct must be a but-
for cause of the travel.

                         COUNSEL

James H. Locklin (argued), Deputy Federal Public Defender;
Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal Public Defender; Federal
Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, California; for
Defendant-Appellant.
Elana Shavit Artson (argued), Stephanie S. Christensen, and
Damaris Diaz, Assistant United States Attorneys; Bram M.
Alden, Assistant United States Attorney, Criminal Appeals
4                         USA V. PEPE

Section Chief; E. Martin Estrada, United States Attorney;
United States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, California;
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                          OPINION

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:

     Michael Pepe moved from the United States to
Cambodia in the spring of 2003. Between June 2005 and
June 2006, he sexually abused young girls, eight of whom
eventually testified against him at trial. The government
presented evidence at trial from which a jury could infer that
one of Pepe’s primary activities in Cambodia was molesting
children. A jury convicted Pepe of two counts of violating
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) by traveling in foreign commerce with
the purpose of committing illicit sexual acts and two counts
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) by crossing a state line with
intent to sexually abuse a child under 12 and then so doing.
Pepe appeals the sufficiency of the evidence for each of these
convictions, as well as the district court’s instructions to the
jury. Because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that Pepe was
guilty on all counts and the district court did not err or abuse
its discretion in instructing the jury, we affirm.
                              USA V. PEPE                               5

                         BACKGROUND
    I. Factual Background 1
    Pepe is a citizen of the United States. In March 2003,
when he was nearly fifty, Pepe moved to Phnom Penh,
Cambodia. Pepe told his sister that Cambodia “was a very
dysfunctional country” and that “it was like the wild, wild
west there; … there weren’t any rules.” “He was not very
complimentary about [the Cambodian people]. He thought
that they were a lower class of citizen, that all the police were
corrupt, and that all the ordinary people were peasants who
lived in huts with dirt floors.”
    Sometime after Pepe arrived in Cambodia but before
May 2004, Pepe hired a woman known as Basang as a
prostitute. 2 Basang later procured children for Pepe to
sexually abuse and taught at least some of the children how
to behave when being abused by Pepe. Soon after his May
2005 travel, Pepe received a letter from a pen pal called
“Mack,” thanking Pepe for loaning Mack money. Pepe
would later thank Mack for sending Pepe an “email with
pictures,” an email that “help[ed Pepe] make up [his] mind
to continue to stay … longer.”

1
  Because Pepe appeals the sufficiency of the evidence after his
conviction by a jury, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to
the government. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979);
United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
2
  Although the date of their first meeting is unclear, Basang knew, at the
time of her deposition, about Pepe’s living arrangements prior to his May
2004 move. A jury could rationally infer from her knowledge of his pre-
May 2004 living arrangements and the fact that Pepe hired her as a
prostitute that Basang had visited Pepe’s house before his move in May
2004.
6                            USA V. PEPE

    On May 26, 2005, Pepe returned to his Cambodian
residence from a trip to the United States. Two weeks later,
Basang brought N.P., a young Cambodian girl, to Pepe’s
house where Pepe raped her and, over the span of at least 13
days, took 67 photos of her, including nude photos. 3 N.P.
was the first of eight girls whom Pepe sexually abused and
who ultimately testified at his trial.
    On or before August 6, 2005, Basang brought K.S. to
Pepe’s house. Photos were taken of K.S. at Pepe’s house
with Pepe’s camera on August 6, 2005. Pepe admitted to
taking nude photos of two of Basang’s “nieces” and
acknowledges in his briefing that K.S. was one of Basang’s
nieces. K.S. testified that she stayed in Pepe’s house for
“several months.” Pepe raped K.S., leading her to be
hospitalized for a week.
    On September 3, 2005, Pepe returned to Cambodia from
a trip to the United States. In late October or early
November, Basang brought L.K. to Pepe’s house, where she
remained for “[a]bout eight months” until the Cambodian
police searched the home in June 2006. Pepe took photos of
L.K. and, between November 2005 and June 2006, his
camera captured 493 photos of L.K. Pepe persisted in
“raping [L.K.] the entire time that [she] lived at his house.”
L.K. testified that Pepe raped her once a week, “sometime[s]
every day or once every two weeks.”
    Pepe’s photos of S.R., yet another girl, date from as early
as November 26, 2005, although, as is true for perhaps all of
the girls, the evidence does not precisely establish the date

3
  The jury found, and Pepe does not dispute for purposes of this appeal,
that he sexually abused the young girls. The details of Pepe’s abuse are
disturbing, and are discussed in this opinion only as necessary.
                         USA V. PEPE                        7

when S.R. arrived at Pepe’s house. S.R. testified that Pepe
sexually abused her every night he was home during her time
at his house. Pepe took photos of S.R. and the government
found at least 315 photos of her taken from his camera.
S.R.’s sister, S.S., arrived at Pepe’s house by, at latest,
December 4, 2005, the date of the first photo of her on Pepe’s
camera. The government recovered 278 photos of S.S. from
Pepe’s camera. S.S. testified that Pepe sexually abused her
“frequently.” Meanwhile, Basang taught S.S. to perform
sexual acts with Pepe. Photos of S.S. and S.R. were taken at
Pepe’s house as late as June 11, 2006.
    T.C. spent nearly a month at Pepe’s house, and although
the dates of her arrival and departure are unclear, photos of
T.C. taken at Pepe’s house span from February 14, 2006, to
February 28, 2006. While T.C. was at his house, Pepe raped
her four times.
    N.T.D. arrived at Pepe’s house during the Vietnamese
lunar new year. N.T.D. testified that Pepe raped N.T.D. “[a]t
least one time a day” during her time at Pepe’s house, which
was “[a]bout a week.” She also testified that Pepe brought
in another girl—unidentified here—and sexually abused her.
At least a dozen photos of N.T.D. were taken at Pepe’s house
on April 17, 2006.
    I.T. could not recall when Basang brought her to Pepe’s
house, but photos of I.T. were taken with Pepe’s camera
between April 21, 2006, and May 20, 2006. Pepe raped I.T.
multiple times. Basang eventually took I.T. back home.
When she returned home, I.T. told her grandmother about
pain she was suffering and I.T. later led “the police to
[Pepe’s] house.”
   The Cambodian police, along with a United States agent
observer, arrested Pepe in June 2006. When searching
8                        USA V. PEPE

Pepe’s home, the police found condoms, drugs, KY jelly,
baby oil, rope, and “strips of cloth that were tied together.”
The drugs included Viagra and drugs that, according to an
expert, could be used to sedate a child. The police also found
a bedroom close to Pepe’s bedroom that had stuffed animals,
children’s bedding, and children’s clothes. In the space
between the children’s room and Pepe’s room, there was a
massage table and photos of Pepe’s victims. The police
found digital storage devices that contained more than a
thousand photos, including the photos of the victims
discussed above. Among other items, the police also found
cuttings of newspaper articles discussing pedophiles in
Cambodia. Soon after the police searched Pepe’s house and
arrested him, Dr. Laura Watson, who at that time “work[ed]
at an International Clinic in Phnom Penh, Cambodia,”
examined some of Pepe’s victims on June 20, 2006. She
then reexamined those same victims, as well as several
additional victims she hadn’t examined before, a year later
in June 2007.
    II. Procedural Background
    Pepe was initially tried and convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. § 2423(c). That conviction was vacated on appeal.
See United States v. Pepe, 895 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 2018).
On remand, a grand jury charged Pepe with two counts of
violating § 2423(b) and two counts of violating § 2241(c).
Counts 1 and 2, arising under § 2423(b), charged Pepe with
knowingly traveling in foreign commerce “for the purpose
of engaging in illicit sexual conduct.” The two counts
differed from each other only in the dates of the charged
travel: Count 1 related to travel in May 2005, and Count 2
related to travel in September 2005.
                           USA V. PEPE                            9

    Counts 3 and 4 charged Pepe with violating § 2241(c).
Count 3 charged Pepe with knowingly crossing a state line
in May 2005 “with the intent to engage in a sexual act …
with a person who had not attained the age of 12 years, and
engag[ing] in a sexual act … with K.S., who had not attained
the age of 12 years” when Pepe “engaged in a sexual act with
her.” Count 4 differed only in the time of the travel (August–
September 2005) and the victims, which were S.S., S.R., and
I.T., “each of whom had not attained the age of 12 years at
the time that defendant [Pepe] engaged in a sexual act with
that person.” 4
    At the end of the trial, over Pepe’s objections to the
instructions’ phrasing, the court instructed the jury regarding
the two statutes’ mens rea requirements. Pepe also requested
that the court instruct the jury on his theory of defense—
namely, that he could not have a criminal intent in returning
to Cambodia if his return trip was part of a round trip journey
with an “innocent” beginning (i.e., the outgoing leg of the
trip was taken for a purpose unrelated to his illicit sexual
activity). The court declined to give that instruction and the
court later, after the jury returned its guilty verdict, denied
Pepe’s post-trial motion for acquittal. Pepe now appeals the
district court’s order denying his motion for acquittal, the
district court’s jury instructions, and the jury verdict.
                         DISCUSSION
    Pepe contends that there was insufficient evidence for his
convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(b) and 2241(c) on the
theory that no rational factfinder could have found beyond a

4
 The government’s theory, as stated in the indictment, was that Pepe
“knowingly crossed a California state line while traveling from New
Mexico to Cambodia through Los Angeles, California.”
10                         USA V. PEPE

reasonable doubt that he traveled to Cambodia with the
intent to sexually abuse children. Although Pepe supplies
reasons that a factfinder could have found in his favor, he
falls short of showing that no reasonable factfinder could
have found he had the requisite intent. Pepe also contends
that the district court erred in instructing the jury but fails to
show any error or abuse of discretion. We affirm Pepe’s
conviction and the district court’s order denying acquittal.
  I. A Rational Trier of Fact Could Have Found Beyond
     a Reasonable Doubt that Pepe Committed the
     Charged Crimes.
     Pepe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, “which
requires a court of appeals to determine whether ‘after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979)). The “reviewing court may not ask whether a
finder of fact could have construed the evidence produced at
trial to support acquittal.” Id. at 1164.
    A person violates § 2423(b), as it was written at the time
of Pepe’s conduct, when that person “travels in foreign
commerce[] for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual
conduct with another person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)
(effective April 30, 2003). According to Ninth Circuit
precedent, a person violates § 2241(c), as it was written at
the time of Pepe’s conduct, when that person “crosses a State
line with intent to engage in a sexual act with a person who
has not attained the age of 12 years” and “knowingly
engages in a sexual act with another person who has not
attained the age of 12 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (effective
                         USA V. PEPE                        11

October 30, 1998); see United States v. Lukashov, 694 F.3d
1107, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (construing these two clauses as
elements of a conviction instead of independent means of
violating the statute).
    For both statutes, the government must prove that the
improper purpose was a “dominant, significant, or
motivating purpose” of the defendant’s travel. Lukashov,
694 F.3d at 1118–19 (discussing § 2241(c)); United States v.
Lindsay, 931 F.3d 852, 864 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing
§ 2423(b)); see also United States v. Flucas, 22 F.4th 1149,
1156–57 (9th Cir.) (noting that although the court in Lindsay
reviewed the district court for plain error, the court “found
none”), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 320 (2022). The government
need not prove that the improper purpose was a “but-for”
cause of the travel. See Lindsay, 931 F.3d at 864. Instead,
the improper purpose can be one of several reasons that the
defendant traveled. See id. (noting the “human ability and
propensity to act in light of multiple motives and purposes”
(quoting Lukashov, 694 F.3d at 1118)).
     Pepe contends that no rational finder of fact could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2423(b) and 2241(c). He first argues that the Supreme
Court in Mortensen v. United States ruled categorically that
a jury cannot rationally find that a defendant who leaves his
home for an innocent purpose on a round trip returns for a
criminal purpose. 322 U.S. 369 (1944). He then proceeds
to argue that, even if Mortensen did not reach so far, no
rational factfinder could have found in this case that he
traveled back to Cambodia with the purpose of engaging in
illicit sexual acts, that he traveled back to Cambodia with the
purpose of sexually abusing children under 12, or that his
victims were, in fact, under 12. Pepe’s arguments fail. He
12                      USA V. PEPE

overreads Mortensen, and the evidence is sufficient to
sustain each of Pepe’s convictions.
     A. Mortensen v. United States Does Not Disturb the
        Ordinary Rule of Deferring to the Jury’s
        Rational Findings.
    Pepe’s first and central argument is that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mortensen v. United States holds that a
rational jury cannot find that a defendant who leaves his
residence on a round trip for an innocent purpose returns for
a criminal purpose. 322 U.S. at 369. Given that categorical
reading of Mortensen, Pepe thus contends that the jury here
could not rationally find him guilty because there is no
dispute that Pepe’s two trips to the United States were for
innocent purposes. But the Court in Mortensen did not
purport to work such a departure from the bedrock principle
that courts defer to the rational findings of the jury when
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919). The Court instead
issued a narrow decision that determined, “under the
circumstances of [that] case,” that the evidence was not
sufficient for a jury to find that the defendants transported
two prostitutes interstate for an illicit purpose. Mortensen,
322 U.S. at 375.
    In Mortensen, the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of a married couple who “operated a house of
prostitution” in Nebraska and took two of their employee
prostitutes on a vacation with them to Utah. Id. at 372. A
jury had convicted the couple of violating section 2 of the
Mann Act, which prohibits a person from knowingly
transporting in interstate commerce “any woman or girl for
the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other
immoral purpose.” Id. at 373–74 (quoting Mann Act, ch.
                          USA V. PEPE                        13

395, § 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910)). The Court explained that for
the jury to rationally find the Mortensens were guilty, “[a]n
intention that the women or girls shall engage in the
[unlawful conduct] … must be found to exist before the
conclusion of the interstate journey and must be the
dominant motive for such interstate movement.” Id. at 374.
     The Court ruled that in the unique circumstances of that
case, a rational jury could not have found such an intention
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Mortensens had
undertaken to give their two employee prostitutes a vacation,
an innocent purpose for their travel to Utah. See id. at 375.
Although the women “resumed their immoral practices after
their return to [Nebraska],” that fact, “standing alone, [did
not] operate to inject a retroactive illegal purpose into the
return trip to [Nebraska].” Id. Critical to the Court’s
reasoning was that, “under the circumstances of [that] case,”
there was an “integral relation” between the return journey
and the “innocent round trip as a whole” that precluded
severing the purpose of the outbound journey from the return
journey. Id. (emphasis added). The Court thus concluded
that, because the Mortensens had an innocent purpose for
bringing the prostitutes to Utah, they could not have had an
illicit purpose in returning the prostitutes to Nebraska. See
id. at 375–76.
    The Court repeatedly emphasized the fact-bound nature
of its decision. See, e.g., id. at 374 (stating that the Court’s
“examination of the record in this case” indicated that the
conviction could not be upheld); id. at 375 (explaining the
conviction could not be upheld “under the evidence
adduced”). And the critical circumstances in Mortensen,
those that gave rise to the “integral relation” between the
outbound journey and return journey, are not present in this
case. Specifically, the Mortensens had been charged with
14                        USA V. PEPE

transporting other people with illicit intent; Pepe was
convicted of traveling—or transporting himself—with illicit
intent. Accordingly, because the relevant inquiry in
Mortensen was into the defendants’ motives for transporting
someone else, the “return journey” could not be “considered
apart from its integral relation with the innocent round trip
as a whole.” Id. (emphasis added). After all, a person who
undertakes responsibility for another’s round trip
transportation on a vacation is likely to have the same motive
for taking that other person to the vacation destination as his
motive for taking that other person home—namely, that the
person desires the other person to take the vacation. Cf., e.g.,
id. at 372 (noting that the Mortensens took their employees
on a vacation at the employees’ request). There is thus an
“integral relation” between the provider of transportation’s
motive in providing the outbound transportation and that
provider’s motivation in providing the return transportation.
Id. at 375.
    But in this case, Pepe did not transport anyone else. He
transported himself. A person’s motives for embarking on
his own round trip are not so tied to his motives for his return
trip that a jury could not rationally find that one of the
person’s motivating purposes for returning is to resume
illegal activity. As many would recognize from common
experience, a person coming to the close of his vacation may
depart for home because of some mix of family obligations,
work, and hobbies—purposes that necessarily differ from
those that prompted the traveler to embark on his trip. The
facts that gave rise to the “integral relation” between the
outbound and return journeys in Mortensen are thus not
present in Pepe’s case.
    Pepe reads Mortensen to preclude a jury from rationally
finding a person guilty of returning home with an illicit
                              USA V. PEPE                              15

purpose when that person undertook the outbound travel for
an innocent purpose. He thus invites us to extend Mortensen
beyond its facts and rationale. But the Court in Mortensen
went out of its way to confine its reasoning to the facts of
that case, explaining that it “would normally be precluded
from reviewing or disturbing the inferences of fact drawn
from the evidence by the jury,” id. at 374; see also, e.g., id.
(noting the “examination of the record in this case” shows
“a complete lack of relevant evidence” (emphasis added)).
We take the Court at its word. Pepe’s proposed reading of
Mortensen would also be in tension with our own precedent,
which establishes that Mortensen does not preclude a jury
from finding that a person traveled with more than one
motive, see Flucas, 22 F.4th at 1160 (interpreting Mortensen
as “requiring that criminal sexual activity be one of the
several motives or purposes” (approvingly quoting United
States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389–90 (1st Cir. 1991))), and
which rejects the proposition that a jury must find that a
motivation to commit illicit sexual acts were a “but-for”
cause of the travel, see Lindsay, 931 F.3d at 864.
    We thus decline Pepe’s invitation to expand Mortensen
beyond its rationale and facts. Mortensen does not remove
from the jury’s province its ability to rationally find that a
person embarked on a trip with an innocent purpose but
returned home with a motivating purpose of illicit conduct. 5

5
  Even if we were to construe Mortensen as establishing a categorical
legal rule about the scope of liability for someone transporting someone
else with unlawful intent, that categorical rule would not apply to Pepe.
That categorical rule would work only to preclude a finding of unlawful
intent when a defendant transports another person somewhere for an
innocent purpose and then returns that same person to the place of origin.
See Mortensen, 322 U.S. at 374 (summarizing the issue in the case as
whether the defendants could be found guilty of “transport[ing] the girls
16                           USA V. PEPE

Neither Mortensen, nor the cases Pepe cites that discuss or
build on Mortensen, reach that far. See Twitchell v. United
States, 330 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1964); Langford v. United
States, 178 F.2d 48, 51–52 (9th Cir. 1949). 6
      B. A Jury Could Rationally Find that the Sexual
         Abuse of Children Was One of Pepe’s Primary
         Motivations for Returning to Cambodia.
    As relevant to each of Pepe’s convictions, a jury could
have rationally found that one of Pepe’s primary motivations
for returning to Cambodia was to sexually abuse young girls.
Pepe had longstanding relationships with two people who
helped or encouraged him to abuse children, he had a house
set up to facilitate the sex abuse, and he remained in
Cambodia—a country he knew had a poor reputation for
stopping child sex abuse—despite speaking ill of the country
generally.
   A jury could rationally find from her knowledge of
Pepe’s pre-May 2004 living arrangements that Basang,

in interstate commerce ‘for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery’
within the meaning of the Mann Act”).
6
 Pepe also relies on the Supreme Court’s summary decisions following
and invoking Mortensen. Becker v. United States, 348 U.S. 957 (1955)
(mem.); Oriolo v. United States, 324 U.S. 824 (1945) (mem.). Although
Pepe is correct that Supreme Court summary decisions are binding, their
“precedential effect … extends no further than the precise issues
presented and necessarily decided by those actions.” Green v. City of
Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784–85 n.5 (1983)). Given the fact-bound
nature of the Mortensen decision, the “precise issues presented and
necessarily decided by those actions” would be just as fact-bound. Id.
Relying on these summary affirmances would require us to improperly
speculate about why the Court deemed Mortensen applicable to those
cases.
                         USA V. PEPE                        17

Pepe’s child broker, and Pepe knew each other for
approximately a year before he returned from the United
States to Cambodia in May 2005 with the charged purpose
of abusing children. And Basang not only procured children
for Pepe to sexually abuse, she trained the children how to
behave during the abuse. A jury could also find that prior to
Pepe’s May 2005 travel, Pepe also knew a man named Mack
who was involved in child sexual abuse. The government
introduced a letter from Mack to Pepe dated June 7, 2005—
just a couple of weeks after Pepe returned to Cambodia on
May 26, 2005—thanking Pepe for lending Mack money.
The jury could also infer from multiple calendar entries in
August and October 2005 relating to Mack that the two had
an ongoing friendship. In one email, Pepe thanked Mack for
sending him “pictures” that “help[ed] [Pepe] to make up
[his] mind to continue to stay [in Cambodia] longer.” The
next sentence in the email, in which Pepe told Mack that
“[t]he sweet things I have with me have the most perfect little
bodies and attitudes,” strongly suggests that the photos Mack
sent Pepe were child pornography.
    The government also presented evidence that, when
Pepe’s house was raided in June 2006, it was substantially
dedicated to abusing children. He had a room furnished and
decorated specifically for children. Near this room was a
massage table where he sexually abused his victims. The
same raid revealed substantial sex paraphernalia and cuttings
of newspaper articles regarding pedophiles. And the
government introduced evidence that Pepe had developed
rules for how his child victims were to behave when living
in the house and that he had written out a “menu” of his
sexual preferences. The government further introduced
evidence of more than a thousand photos of children taken
on Pepe’s camera, including nude photos. And the
18                        USA V. PEPE

government introduced evidence of how the photos were
carefully organized on Pepe’s hard drive and in labeled CDs.
    The jury could also rationally infer that Pepe specifically
chose to return to Cambodia after his visits to the United
States because it would allow him to continue to sexually
abuse children. A tourist map for Phnom Penh, Cambodia,
obtained from Pepe’s house warned in the English language,
“Sex with children is a crime.” The jury could rationally
infer from that tourist map warning that English-speaking
tourists coming to Cambodia to have sex with children was
unfortunately common. Basang and one of Pepe’s child
victims testified to the ubiquity of child sex slavery in
Cambodia. Pepe himself acknowledged the prevalence of
the “sex industry in Cambodia,” and noted it was
“particularly true as regards to younger people.”
    Not only could a jury rationally infer that Pepe was
aware that returning to Cambodia would allow him to
continue sexually abusing children, but a jury could
rationally infer that it was a primary reason for his return.
Pepe told his sister that Cambodia “was a very dysfunctional
country” and that “it was like the wild, wild west there; …
there weren’t any rules.” As for the people, his sister
testified that “[h]e was not very complimentary about them.
He thought that they were a lower class of citizen, that all the
police were corrupt, and that all the ordinary people were
peasants who lived in huts with dirt floors.” Pepe contends
that the jury should not have credited such testimony,
coming from his estranged sister, that he criticized the
Cambodian culture and people. But the jury was entitled to
find her credible. See Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1170.
  Pepe disagrees with this characterization of his life in
Cambodia, contending that “the evidence established that he
                          USA V. PEPE                        19

engaged in a variety of activities completely unrelated to
sex.” There is evidence that Pepe did not solely engage in
child sex abuse during his time in Cambodia. But he does
not point to evidence of activities so substantial that the jury
was required to find that the sexual abuse of children was
only a small part of his life. See id. at 1169 (requiring the
defendant to “point[] to evidence so supportive of innocence
that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt”). The jury could rationally find that one
of Pepe’s primary motivations for returning to Cambodia
was sexually abusing young girls, a finding directly relevant
to the sufficiency of the evidence for each of his charged
offenses.
     C. Counts 1 and 2: Sufficient Evidence Supports
        Pepe’s Convictions Under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).
    The United States charged Pepe in Counts 1 and 2 with
violating § 2423(b) by traveling in foreign commerce with
the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct. Pepe
contends that the jury could not have rationally found that
his purpose in traveling back to Cambodia in either May or
September 2005 was to sexually abuse children. He is
incorrect.
         1. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Conviction
            on Count 1.
    The evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find
Pepe was guilty of traveling in foreign commerce on May 25
and 26, 2005, with the purpose of committing illicit sexual
acts, as charged in Count 1. Along with the evidence
discussed above demonstrating the pervasive role child sex
abuse played in Pepe’s life in Cambodia, the government
presented evidence indicating that Pepe flew back to
Cambodia after a trip to the United States on May 26, 2005,
20                       USA V. PEPE

and that, two weeks later, on June 9, 2005, he was sexually
abusing N.P. Metadata on Pepe’s camera reveals photos
were taken of N.P. until June 22, 2005. This is “relevant
evidence from which the jury could properly find or infer,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty” of
traveling to Cambodia in May 2005 with a motivating
purpose of engaging in illicit sexual acts. Id. at 1165
(quoting United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1242 (9th
Cir. 1969)).
    Pepe disagrees, contending that the lack of evidence of
Pepe sexually abusing a child before his May 2005 travel
means a jury could not rationally find that a motivating
purpose of his return to Cambodia was to sexually abuse
children. But a jury could rationally rely on evidence of
what Pepe did after he returned to Cambodia to discern
whether one of his motivating purposes for returning was to
engage in that conduct. See United States v. Green, 554 F.2d
372, 375 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding the jury’s finding that a
trip was “for the purpose of prostitution” and noting
approvingly the parties’ concession that intent may be
proved by “the conduct of the parties both before and within
a reasonable time after the transportation”). The jury was
especially within its discretion to make such a finding given
the other evidence of Pepe’s activities in Cambodia. See
United States v. Ware, 416 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting that the court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence
“by considering the totality of the trial evidence”).
Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s conviction on Count
1.
                         USA V. PEPE                       21

         2. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Conviction
            on Count 2.
    Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Pepe
was guilty of traveling in foreign commerce in September
2005, with the purpose of committing illicit sexual acts, as
charged in Count 2. Along with the evidence discussed
above, demonstrating at a general level the pervasive role
child sex abuse played in Pepe’s life in Cambodia, the
government presented specific evidence of Pepe’s acts of
sexual abuse leading up to and following his September
2005 travel.
    As noted above, the metadata recovered from Pepe’s
camera reveals photos taken of N.P. for at least two weeks
in June. Pepe’s August 2005 calendar included a “Party with
Mack,” Pepe’s pedophile pen pal, and “Mack’s birthday.”
K.S., one of Pepe’s victims, lived in his house for “several
months,” and Pepe’s camera took photos of her on August 6,
2005. The jury could rationally infer that the “several
months” that K.S. stayed at Pepe’s house overlapped with
August 6, 2005. And whether those months preceded
August 6 or followed it, the timeline strongly suggests that
child sexual abuse was a routine fixture of Pepe’s life at the
time of his early September travel.
   The government also presented evidence indicating that
Pepe returned from the United States to Cambodia on
September 3, 2005, and that, in early November 2005, began
sexually abusing additional victims, starting with L.K. The
government further introduced evidence from which a jury
could rationally find that Pepe sexually abused S.R. starting
in late November 2005, abused S.S. starting in early
December 2005, abused T.C. in February 2006, abused
22                       USA V. PEPE

N.T.D. in April 2006, and abused I.T. between April 21,
2006, and May 20, 2006.
   This is “relevant evidence from which the jury could
properly find or infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
accused is guilty” of traveling to Cambodia in September
with a motivating purpose of illicit sexual acts. Nevils, 598
F.3d at 1165 (quotation omitted).
     D. Counts 3 and 4: A Rational Trier of Fact Could
        Have Found that Pepe Violated 18 U.S.C.
        § 2241(c).
    As established above, a jury could rationally find that a
motivating purpose for Pepe’s return trips to Cambodia was
to engage in illicit sexual acts. That is sufficient to uphold
his convictions under § 2423(b). Section 2241(c) requires
the jury to find a slightly more specific motivating purpose:
that one of Pepe’s motivating purposes in crossing state lines
while returning to Cambodia was to sexually abuse children
under the age of 12. Section 2241(c) also requires that Pepe
have sexually abused girls who were, in fact, under 12. To
take those questions in reverse order, the evidence is
sufficient for a rational jury to find both that the charged
victims were under 12 and that Pepe traveled with a
motivating purpose of abusing children under 12.
         1. A Rational Finder of Fact Could Have
            Found that Pepe’s Charged Victims Were,
            in Fact, Under 12.
   To convict under § 2241(c), Ninth Circuit precedent
requires that the government prove that the defendant
sexually abused a person who was, in fact, under 12. See
Lukashov, 694 F.3d at 1121. Count 3 charged Pepe with
sexually abusing K.S. and Count 4 charged Pepe with
                          USA V. PEPE                        23

sexually abusing I.T., S.S., and S.R., all of whom were under
the age of 12. The jury found that Pepe was guilty of both
counts. Testimony from the victims, records, and the
testimony of Dr. Watson—who examined at least some of
the victims in June of 2006 and 2007—all support the jury’s
findings.
             a. K.S.
    K.S. testified that Pepe raped her while she was at his
house for “several months,” months overlapping with
August 6, 2005. The government introduced photos of K.S.
taken on that date into evidence, and she appears to be a
young child. K.S. testified that although she “did not
[originally] know [her] birth date, … [an] organization[]
found [her] family book and that’s when they found out that
[she] was born” in August 1994. The family book was also
entered into evidence. This is sufficient evidence from
which a jury could rationally find that K.S. was under 12
years of age when she was at Pepe’s home, the place where
she was sexually abused.
    Pepe’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Pepe
points out that K.S. had told U.S. agents in September 2006
that she was 13—which would have placed her birthday in
1993, not 1994. But she testified that she “kind of guessed”
when she gave her age to the agents. Pepe claims that K.S.
told an examining physician that she had a 1993 birthdate,
but that allegation conflicts with the family book and K.S.’s
later testimony that her birthday was in August 1994, and the
jury was entitled to rationally resolve the conflict in favor of
the government.
    Pepe also challenges the reliability of the family book
because K.S. could not interpret it and because a U.S. official
stated that its “accuracy is unknown.” Given that K.S. also
24                       USA V. PEPE

testified that she was not literate in Khmer and the family
book was in Khmer, her inability to interpret the book does
not undermine its reliability. True, a U.S. agent applying for
a visa on behalf of K.S. before her family book was located
noted that if the book exists and were obtained, its “accuracy
is unknown.” But the jury need not view this statement as
evidence that the family book was inaccurate—instead, the
jury was entitled to interpret this statement as meaning only
that the officer did not know whether the family book would
be accurate if found, just as any cautious person might
disclaim knowledge of the accuracy of a document that they
do not possess. See Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164 (noting that a
reviewing court “must presume—even if it does not
affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact
resolved any [conflicting inferences] in favor of the
prosecution” (quotation omitted)). Pepe also points to a U.S.
prosecutor’s 2013 declaration stating that K.S. “was
approximately 11 to 12 years old” “[a]t the time of the crimes
charged.” Of course, that is not necessarily inconsistent with
K.S. being under 12 years old when sexually abused. The
government presented the jury with sufficient evidence for it
to rationally find that K.S. was under 12 at the time Pepe
abused her.
             b. S.R. and S.S.
    Testimony and metadata from Pepe’s camera indicate
that Pepe sexually abused S.R. and S.S. in December 2005.
The government introduced family books indicating that
S.R. and S.S. were 9 and 10 years of age in December 2005.
The two girls testified to the same. Pepe contends that this
evidence is insufficient because the family book and the
girls’ testimony give different specific dates of birth. But
that inconsistency is immaterial. The family book and the
testimony agree that the two girls were 9 and 10 at the time
                         USA V. PEPE                        25

they were abused. The jury could rationally find based on
these two sources of evidence that S.R. and S.S. were under
12 years of age when Pepe molested them.
             c. I.T.
    Testimony and metadata from Pepe’s camera indicate
that Pepe sexually abused I.T. between April 21, 2006, and
May 20, 2006. I.T. testified that she was born in the last
quarter of the 1994 calendar year, which would have made
her 11 when Pepe raped her. Consistent with this birthday,
I.T. testified at Pepe’s trial in August 2021 that she was 26
years old. Further, Dr. Watson testified that in June 2006,
I.T. had not yet begun menstruating and had only begun the
“very, very early stages of puberty.” A year later, in June
2007, Dr. Watson examined I.T. a second time and I.T. still
had not had her first period and she had not “advanced
through puberty”—“there weren’t any changes.” The jury
could thus infer from both Dr. Watson’s and I.T.’s testimony
that I.T. was under 12 years of age when Pepe abused her.
    Pepe argues that a jury could not rationally find that I.T.
was under 12 when Pepe abused her because, prior to
testifying that she was born in a month falling in the last
quarter of 1994, she had testified that she was born early in
the 1994 calendar year. But given the presumption that the
jury resolved any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
government, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding
that I.T. was under 12 at the time of the abuse. See Nevils,
598 F.3d at 1164 (citation omitted).
    Pepe further argues there was insufficient evidence of
I.T.’s age because Dr. Watson noted in her June 2006 report
that I.T. was 12 and that I.T.’s “pubertal stage [was]
consistent with stated age of 12.” But Dr. Watson explained
in her testimony that the note of I.T.’s age was based, not on
26                       USA V. PEPE

a precise birthdate, but on the Zodiac year of I.T.’s birth.
And because the Zodiac year begins on April 13, if I.T. was
born later in the year—such as the birthday I.T. testified to—
then she would have been only 11 at the time of the
examination. As for the report’s note that I.T.’s “pubertal
stage” was consistent with the age of 12, Dr. Watson
confirmed in her testimony that “when [she was] examining
[the victims],” she was not “trying to determine their precise
age.” The jury had sufficient evidence to rationally find that
the charged victims were under 12 at the time of abuse.
         2. A Rational Trier of Fact Could Have Found
            that Pepe Crossed State Lines with a
            Motivating Purpose of Sexually Abusing
            Girls Under 12.
    Finally, to convict Pepe of violating § 2241(c), the jury
must have found that a motivating purpose of his travel in
May and September of 2005 was to sexually abuse children
under the age of 12. See Lukashov, 694 F.3d at 1121. As
discussed above, the government presented sufficient
evidence for a jury to find that Pepe traveled with a
motivating purpose of sexually abusing children.
Combining that evidence with additional evidence
indicating that Pepe particularly preferred prepubescent
girls, a jury could rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Pepe traveled in May and September 2005 with a
motivating purpose of sexually abusing girls under the age
of 12.
    The evidence shows that Pepe preferred prepubescent
girls. Pepe handwrote a “Cambo Menu,” presumably
meaning “Cambodian Menu.” That “menu” included
phrases such as “shy little bbs girls bald p[***]y,” “pedo
nudes,” “10 yo lolita kid pedo,” “8–12 years lolitas sex pix,”
                         USA V. PEPE                        27

“preteen c[**]t,” and “cartoons 3d pedo.” The government
also presented evidence that Pepe furnished a room with
décor specifically suited for young girls. As discussed
above, many of Pepe’s victims were under 12. And a jury
could rationally infer that the youth of these victims was not
an accident. S.R., who was nine when she was at Pepe’s
house, explained that she had been “talked to” and she “was
going to lose [her] virginity” a year later and her sister was
going to “lose [her] virginity … in the next three months.”
It was S.R.’s understanding that Pepe “was waiting” because
she “was too little.” A jury could rationally infer that Pepe
wanted to rape young girls at the earliest opportunity that
their physiology would allow.
    Pepe argues that the jury could not rationally find that he
intended to sexually abuse girls younger than 12 years old
because some of the girls that he molested following his
return trips were 12 years or older. As for his May return
trip, Pepe notes that N.P. was over 12 but cites evidence
indicating only that N.P. might have been younger than 16.
Regardless, the government introduced photos of N.P., taken
during the time of the abuse following his May 2005 trip,
and she looked very young. Further, as discussed above, a
jury could rationally find that K.S., whom Pepe abused in the
months following his May 2005 trip, was under 12. As for
his September return trip, Pepe abused multiple girls
following his trip who the jury could rationally find were
under 12 at the time of abuse. This argument fails.
    Pepe also argues that his sexual involvement with two
adult women shows that he merely “liked skinny girls” and
wasn’t specifically targeting girls under the age of 12. Not
so. Even if it is true that Pepe “liked skinny girls,” that is
obviously not inconsistent with the jury rationally finding
28                        USA V. PEPE

that he specifically targeted young girls because, among
other things, they satisfied his “skinny” fetish.
    The jury could rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt
that when Pepe traveled in May and September of 2005, he
did so with at least one motivating purpose of sexually
abusing children under 12.
 II. Pepe Fails to Show Abuse of Discretion or Error in
     the District Court’s Jury Instructions.
    Pepe argues that the district court erred in not instructing
the jury on his innocent round trip theory of defense and that
the district court erred in its instructions to the jury on the
requisite mens rea. The court reviews “the formulation of
jury instructions for abuse of discretion, but review[s] de
novo whether those instructions correctly state the elements
of the offense and adequately cover the defendant’s theory
of the case.” United States v. Koziol, 993 F.3d 1160, 1179
(9th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Liew, 856 F.3d 585,
595–96 (9th Cir. 2017)). Neither of Pepe’s challenges
succeed.
     A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
        or Err in Declining to Give Pepe’s Requested
        Defense Theory Instruction.
    Pepe requested that the district court give the following
instruction to the jury:

       One who takes an innocent round trip—that
       is, leaves his residence to travel elsewhere for
       purposes unrelated to criminal sexual activity
       and then returns to his residence—does not
       travel with the purpose of engaging in illicit
       sexual conduct (as required for Counts 1 and
                         USA V. PEPE                        29

       2) or the intent to engage in a sexual act with
       a person who was under the age of twelve
       years (as required for Counts 3 and 4), even
       if such conduct occurred at that residence
       before the trip and resumed after the trip.

   Pepe offered three alternative instructions that were
substantially the same. The district court declined to give
any of those instructions.
    Pepe argues that the refusal to give the requested
instruction to the jury was error. But Pepe’s requested
instruction would have instructed the jury that an innocent
travel purpose precludes him from also having an illicit
motive.       Because Mortensen does not preclude the
government’s theory in this case, and Ninth Circuit
precedent clearly establishes that a defendant can have
mixed motives for traveling, see Flucas, 22 F.4th at 1155
(citation omitted), Pepe’s requested instruction conflicted
with the law and the district court did not err in declining to
give it. See United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1120
(9th Cir. 2010).
     B. The District Court Did Not Err or Abuse Its
        Discretion in Instructing the Jury on Mens Rea.
    Over Pepe’s objection, the district court gave the
following instruction on the mens rea requirement
for § 2423(b):

       The government does not have to prove that
       defendant traveled in foreign commerce for
       the sole and exclusive purpose of engaging in
       illicit sexual conduct. A person may have
       different purposes or motives for travel and
30                       USA V. PEPE

       each may prompt in varying degrees the act
       of making the journey. For Counts One and
       Two, the government must prove beyond a
       reasonable doubt that a dominant, significant,
       or motivating purpose of defendant’s travel
       in foreign commerce was to engage in illicit
       sexual conduct.

    The court gave a materially identical instruction on the
intent requirement for § 2241(c), replacing “traveled in
foreign commerce” for “crossed a state line” and “illicit
sexual conduct” for “a sexual act with a person who was
under the age of twelve years.” Pepe raises three issues with
the instruction, but he fails to show that the instruction was
an error or abuse of discretion.
    First, Pepe argues that the instruction should have
required the jury to find that his “sole or dominant purpose”
for returning to Cambodia was to engage in illicit sexual
activities, instead of requiring the jury to find that such a
purpose was the “dominant, significant, or motivating
purpose” of his travel. But we have approved jury
instructions on the intent elements of § 2241(c) and
§ 2423(b) that instruct the jury that the government must
prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that a dominant,
significant, or motivating purpose” of the defendant’s travel
was engaging in illicit sexual acts. Lukashov, 694 F.3d at
1118–19 (emphasis added) (§ 2241(c)); see also Lindsay,
931 F.3d at 864 (§ 2423(b)).
    Pepe argues that the instruction was at least wrong as to
the intent requirement for § 2423(b) because Congress later
amended § 2423(b) to specifically add “motivating” before
“purpose,” implying a “motivating purpose” was insufficient
under the former version. Because we have approved
                         USA V. PEPE                        31

“motivating purpose” as an instruction for § 2423(b)’s mens
rea requirement for the pre-2018 version of the statute (the
version Pepe was convicted of violating), see Lindsay, 931
F.3d at 864; Flucas, 22 F.4th at 1156–57, Pepe would need
to show that our prior precedent is “clearly irreconcilable”
with the amendment, Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see Pepe, 895 F.3d at 688
(preferring to read an amendment to “clarify[]” rather than
change a statute’s “scope” when “possible”). He has not
done so.
    Although we often presume that, “when Congress acts to
amend a statute, … it intends its amendment to have real and
substantial effect,” Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129,
145 (2003) (cleaned up), “[t]he mere fact of an amendment
itself does not [always] indicate that the legislature intended
to change a law,” Callejas v. McMahon, 750 F.2d 729, 731
(9th Cir. 1985). After all, Congress may instead intend to
clarify a “dispute or ambiguity, such as a split in the
circuits.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Marquette Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 686 F.2d 608, 615 (7th Cir. 1982)). Congress’s
amendment of this statute is not clearly irreconcilable with
our precedent upholding a “motivating purpose” as
sufficient under § 2423(b) because Congress may have
intended to clarify and confirm what had always been true—
that a “motivating purpose” is sufficient for conviction. See
Lindsay, 931 F.3d at 864; Flucas, 22 F.4th at 1156–57.
    Second, Pepe challenges the formulation of the
instruction, contending that at the end of the instruction, the
district court should have restated the standard as requiring,
“[i]n other words, the government must prove that the
criminal sexual activity was not merely incidental.” But a
jury so instructed may have incorrectly equated “not merely
incidental” with “a motivating purpose” and concluded that,
32                        USA V. PEPE

so long as the illicit sexual acts played any more than a
“merely incidental” role in Pepe’s actions, Pepe was guilty.
See United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir.
2016) (“‘Incidental’ has a flavor that suggests that the
standard is very low, even if that is not true as a definitional
matter.”). So the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining Pepe’s requested addition to the instruction.
    Pepe argues that a jury could think, without his requested
addition, that a “merely incidental” result of a trip is
sufficient to find that a “dominant, significant, or motivating
purpose” of Pepe’s travel was illicit sexual conduct. But the
“meanings [of these terms] are within the comprehension of
the average juror.” United States v. Dixon, 201 F.3d 1223,
1231 (9th Cir. 2000). Pepe also argues that Flucas’s
approval of the inclusion of “motivating purpose” in the
instruction depended on the additional inclusion of “not
merely incidental” to the travel. Although Flucas noted
approvingly the inclusion of “not merely incidental,” it did
not hold that a district court would abuse its discretion by
omitting it. See Flucas, 22 F.4th at 1159–60. More to the
point, Lindsay approved the district court’s instruction to the
jury that the government must prove that “a dominant,
significant, or motivating purpose” of the defendant’s travel
was illicit sexual conduct without any indication in its
opinion that the district court gave the merely incidental
instruction. See 931 F.3d at 858, 864.
     Pepe further argues that the district court could have
satisfied both parties’ concerns by modifying the instruction
to tell the jury that “the government must prove that the
[illicit sexual conduct/engaging in a sexual act with a person
under twelve] was substantially more than merely
incidental.” But that could have confused the jury as they
tried to determine whether “substantially more than merely
                          USA V. PEPE                        33

incidental” requires finding illicit sexual conduct was more
than a “dominant, significant, or a motivating purpose.” The
district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to add
a clarification that could have left the jury confused.
    Third, Pepe contends that the district court abused its
discretion in not instructing the jury that “[o]ne does not
have the requisite purpose/intent if the travel/crossing a state
line would have still taken place even had a sex motive not
been present.” Pepe thus wanted the court to instruct the jury
that the improper conduct must be a but-for cause of the
travel. This court, however, has already established that a
purpose can be “dominant, significant, or motivating”
without necessarily being a “but-for” cause of an action.
Lindsay, 931 F.3d at 864; Lukashov, 694 F.3d at 1118–19.
   Pepe fails to show error or abuse of discretion in how the
court instructed the jury.
                      CONCLUSION
    Sexually abusing children was one of Pepe’s primary
activities during his time in Cambodia. A jury convicted him
of traveling in foreign commerce and crossing state lines
with a motivating purpose of sexually abusing those
children. And also for, in fact, sexually abusing them. The
most Pepe shows in this appeal is that a jury could have
rationally found that he did not commit these crimes. But
that is not the standard. A rational jury could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Pepe committed the charged
crimes and the district court neither erred nor abused its
discretion in instructing the jury.
   AFFIRMED.