Court Opinion

ID: 9523426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:41:52.52314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:35.569771
License: Public Domain

Lynch, J.
(dissenting). For some inexplicable reason it is more acceptable to the court to stop without cause or suspicion and seize average citizens in the course of their lawful activities, Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 98 (1985) (Lynch, J., dissenting, with whom Liacos, J., joins), Commonwealth v. Shields, 402 Mass. 162, 169 (1988) (Liacos, J., dissenting, with whom Lynch, J., joins), than it is for a State agency charged with the duty to regulate horse and dog racing to test for the presence of controlled substances those individuals whose activities are already closely and legally scrutinized. In order to reach this curious result, the court applies the balancing test of Commonwealth v. Trumble, supra, so aptly criticized by Justice Liacos in his dissent in Commonwealth v. Shields, supra.
In so doing, the court examines the reasonable expectation of privacy of jockeys and other licensees of the State Racing Commission (commission) in both the act of urination and the chemical content of their urine. The court bolsters its conclusion by focusing on the fact that the act of urination is ordinarily done in private in order to justify balancing the scales in favor of protecting the privacy interest. This focus is not only mid-Victorian in tone (“ ‘[m]ost people describe [urination] in euphemisms if they talk about it at all,’ ” ante at 699), but also is misdirected. All that is at stake is the expectation of having one’s urine free from chemical analysis for the presence of drugs, not the expectation of privacy during urination. This is so because the monitoring of the act of urination that takes place (having a trooper stand outside the bathroom) is no more of an intrusion on privacy than that which occurs every day at busy restaurants and public functions, if indeed the public facilities are constructed with such solicitude for the sensitivities of the patrons as to permit this degree of privacy.
*709I see no reason why certain individuals, who must be licensed in order to carry on their activities and are required to be fingerprinted and wear identification badges, should be afforded a greater expectation of privacy than patrons of a busy restaurant in downtown Boston. Thus, it is only the manner in which the Commonwealth gathers its information, i.e., urinalysis, that should concern us. It is in this context that the court should determine whether the procedure is too intrusive to be deemed reasonable. See McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987), which is relied upon by the court, and which upheld uniform and random urinalysis of correction officers because, if properly administered, it is not so intrusive as a strip search or a blood test.
The cases cited by the court which discuss the expectation of having one’s urine free from chemical analysis do so in the context of holding that “urinalysis” constitutes a search and seizure. However, the issue before us is not whether urinalysis constitutes a “search and seizure” (which it surely is), but rather whether it passes scrutiny under the balancing test the court fashioned in Commonwealth v. Trumble, supra. The court’s focus on the potential chemical secrets contained in a person’s urine is beside the point. All that this case involves is a test for the presence of certain illegal drugs.
On the other hand, the pervasive harmful influence of drugs on contemporary society cannot seriously be denied. It presents a social problem of at least equal magnitude to operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The Legislature has determined that racing is an activity that can be conducted in this Commonwealth only under carefully prescribed and limited circumstances. Racing is therefore much different from other licensed activities which are carried on by large segments of the population. In view of the problems drug use entails in contemporary society, it is clear that the Commonwealth has a compelling interest in requiring that activities which can be conducted only under its aegis will not be permitted without reasonable assurance that they are free from the pernicious influence of illegal drugs.
*710I would, therefore, balance the scales to permit the random testing by urinalysis of any licensee who could be reasonably expected to have some influence on the integrity of racing. I do not abandon the view of the dissents in Trumble and Shields. I would willingly sacrifice the drug testing of jockeys for the right of citizens to be free from warrantless seizure absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Since I do not have that option, the illusive standards of the court’s balancing test lead me to a contrary result.
In addition, I note that the court rejects the concept of testing on the basis of reasonable suspicion, although all the decisions relied on by the court in rejecting random testing have upheld testing based upon reasonable suspicion and have not required probable cause. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 589 (9th Cir. 1988); Feliciano v. Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 587-590 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Capua v. Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516 (D.N.J. 1986). See also Guiney v. Roache, 686 F. Supp. 956, 959 (D. Mass. 1988) (upholding reasonable suspicion testing while rejecting random urinalysis for members of the Boston police department). I see nothing on the record before us that requires the rejection of all testing based on reasonable suspicion. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Appendix to the Opinion of the Court.
“Human Drug Testing" Regulation
205 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.57 (1986)
(1) No person licensed by the Massachusetts State Racing Commission, while on the grounds of a licensed racing asssociation, shall have present within his/her system any controlled substances as listed in Schedule I through V of the U.S. Code, Title 21 (Food and Drug Section 812) or any prescription legend drug unless such prescription legend drug was obtained directly, or pursuant to valid prescription of order from a duly licensed physician who is acting in the course of his/her professional practice. It will be the responsibility of the licensee to notify the Stewards when requested to do so, on forms provided if they are using any prescription drug.
*711(2) The Stewards or any person designated by the Massachusetts State Racing Commission who as a result of information received, report, or personal observation reasonably suspects that a licensee present on the grounds of a licensed association may have present in his/her system any of the controlled substances mentioned in 205 CMR 4.57(1), shall direct said licensee to deliver a urine specimen to the Commission Steward, or his designee. Said licensee will produce the urine sample without undue delay and may at the discretion of the Commission Steward be required to produce a blood sample taken by a licensed physician or nurse, if unable to produce a urine sample within a reasonable time.
(3) The Stewards, or any person designated by the Massachusetts Racing Commission shall randomly, by lot, at times determined by the Commission, select licensees for drug testing. The Stewards or the Commission designee shall direct said licensee to deliver urine specimen to the Commission Steward, or his designee within a reasonable time.
(4) The Stewards, if they reasonably suspect that a licensee may be impaired in any way because of drugs or alcohol, shall prohibit said licensee from participating in the day’s racing until such time as the licensee produces evidence of a negative drug test result, or pending the outcome of a drug test, appears before the Stewards and is no longer impaired.
(5) Refusal by said licensee to provide the urine sample shall be a violation of these rules and subject said licensee to immediate suspension. The Stewards, after a hearing, shall suspend for thirty days any licensee who refuses to provide a urine sample. At the conclusion of the thirty day suspension, the licensee will not be re-admitted until he/she produces evidence of a negative test result, acceptable to the Stewards.
(6) All urine samples collected at the direction of the Stewards or the Racing Commission designee shall be collected in the presence of a Commission Steward or his designee and will be sealed and identified by said Steward or designee and remain under their control and custody until the sample is transported to the Racing Commission Laboratory for analysis. The sample will be identified by attaching an evidence tag thereto signed by the licensee and the Racing Commission Official witnessing the collection sample.
(7) If after a hearing a licensee is in violation of this rule as a result of a positive test, he/she shall not be allowed to participate in racing until such time as his/her condition has been professionally evaluated to the satisfaction of the Racing Commission.
(a) After such professional evaluation, if said licensee’s condition proves non-addictive and not detrimental to the best interest of racing, said licensee shall be allowed to participate in racing provided he/she can produce a negative test result and agrees to further testing at the discretion of the Stewards or designated Racing Commission representatives, to insure said licensee is no longer using drugs.
*712(b) After such evaluation, if said licensee’s condition proves addictive or detrimental to the best interest of racing, said licensee shall not be allowed to participate in racing until such time as he/she can produce a negative test result and show documented proof to the satisfaction of the Stewards that he/she has successfully completed a certified drug rehabilitation program approved by the Racing Commission. Said licensee must agree to further testing at the discretion of the Stewards or Racing Commission representative to insure said licensee is no longer impaired.
Positive test results will be reported to the Chairman of the Racing Commission and the Commission Steward who will immediately notify the licensee and schedule a hearing.
A licensee may be suspended pending the outcome of a hearing if it is in the best interest of racing to do so. If after a hearing, a licensee is determined to be in violation of this rule he/she will have their license suspended until such time as they comply with 205 CMR 4.57(7) and (8).
(8) For a licensee’s second violation, he/she shall be suspended and allowed to enroll in a certified drug rehabilitation program approved by the Racing Commission. Said licensee will only be reinstated if the Commission, after a hearing, determines that licensing said person is not detrimental to the best interest of racing. If reinstated, said licensee will be subjected to indefinite testing.