Court Opinion

ID: 2963483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:10:36.745217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:41.575874
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1207

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                ANTHONY S. DESTEFANO,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              __________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                     [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                              __________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                              __________________________

               Walter  F. McKee,  with whom  Lipman and  Katz, P.A.  was on
               ________________              ______________________
          brief, for appellant.
               Helene  Kazanjian,  Assistant United  States  Attorney, with
               _________________
          whom Jay  P. McCloskey, United  States Attorney, and  Jonathan R.
               _________________                                ___________
          Chapman, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for the
          _______
          United States.

                              __________________________
                                    July 12, 1995
                              __________________________ 

                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.   A  jury in  the United  States
                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.
                           ______________

          District Court for the District  of Maine found appellant guilty,

          inter  alia, of assisting  an escape in violation  of 18 U.S.C.  
          _____  ____

          752(a).1  Appellant says  that the district court shunned  a jury

          instruction crucial to his  defense.  Discerning no error  in the

          lower court's eschewal of the requested instruction, we affirm.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    Following  Philip DeStefano's arrest  and indictment on

          federal narcotics charges, the government  housed him at a county

          jail.    DeStefano  contacted  his  younger  brother,  defendant-

          appellant  Anthony S.  DeStefano, and  solicited assistance  in a

          contemplated escape.   He  told appellant to  park his  van at  a

          specific  location at  a specific  time, and  await developments.

          Appellant agreed.

                    At approximately 8:30 p.m. on September 8, 1994, Philip

          DeStefano bolted.   After another  prisoner boosted  him over  an

          interior  fence, he  scaled an  exterior  fence topped  by barbed

          wire, took his leave  of the jailhouse grounds, and  followed the
                              
          ____________________

               1The statute of conviction provides in pertinent part:

                    Whoever  rescues or  attempts  to  rescue  or
                    instigates,  aids or  assists  the escape  or
                    attempt to  escape,  of any  person  arrested
                    upon a warrant or  other process issued under
                    any law of the United States, or committed to
                    the custody of the Attorney General or to any
                    institution  or  facility  by his  direction,
                    shall, if the  custody or  confinement is  by
                    virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or
                    conviction  of any  offense, be  [punished as
                    provided by law].

          18 U.S.C.   752(a) (1988).

                                          2

          railroad tracks for a short distance.  As he travelled along  the

          tracks, he  spotted officers  conversing casually near  the jail.

          Realizing  that the guards had not  yet discovered his departure,

          he discarded his distinctively colored prison shirt and sauntered

          across a parking  lot to appellant's van.  The  two brothers then

          drove toward friendlier climes.

                    The  authorities   became  aware   of  the  escape   at

          approximately 11:30 p.m.   By then, the DeStefano brothers  had a

          three-hour head start.  Several  days later, lawmen captured them

          in  New  York.     Federal  prosecutors  charged  appellant  with

          assisting an escape in  violation of 18 U.S.C.   752(a)  and with

          concealing  an escaped  prisoner  in violation  of the  harboring

          statute, 18 U.S.C.   1072.2

                    We  omit   any  exegetic  account  of  the  intervening

          proceedings  and  cut  directly  to  the  heart  of  the  appeal.

          Appellant pleaded not guilty and stood trial.  At trial's end, he

          requested the following jury instruction:

                    When the physical control has ended by flight
                    beyond immediate active  pursuit, the  escape
                    is  complete.   Any  assistance  beyond  this
                    point is not aiding and abetting.

          The  district  court refused  to  give this  instruction  in haec
                                                                       ____
                              
          ____________________

               2The harboring statute provides:

                         Whoever  willfully  harbors or  conceals
                    any   prisoner  after  his  escape  from  the
                    custody  of  the Attorney  General or  from a
                    Federal  penal  or correctional  institution,
                    shall  be  imprisoned  not  more  than  three
                    years.

          18 U.S.C.   1072 (1988).

                                          3

          verba, instead telling the jury that:
          _____

                    The crime  of aiding  or assisting  an escape
                    cannot  occur  after   the  escapee   reaches
                    temporary  safety.     After  that,   aid  or
                    assistance to  a fugitive is no longer aiding
                    or  assisting  his escape,  whatever  else it
                    might be.

          Appellant took a  timeous objection  to the charge,  see Fed.  R.
                                                               ___

          Crim. P. 30, on the  ground that the court should have  given the

          "flight  beyond immediate active  pursuit" instruction,  and that

          its failure to do so undermined the defense.

                    The  jury  found   appellant  guilty  on   both  counts

          (assisting  an  escape  and  harboring an  escapee).    Following

          imposition  of sentence,  appellant  perfected this  appeal.   He

          challenges only his conviction under 18 U.S.C.   752(a).

          II.  DISCUSSION
          II.  DISCUSSION

                    This  is a rifle-shot appeal  that draws a  bead on the

          district court's refusal to  embrace the "flight beyond immediate

          active pursuit" instruction.  The standard of review is ironclad:

          "The  trial  court's refusal  to  give  a particular  instruction

          constitutes reversible  error only  if the  requested instruction

          was  (1)  correct  as  a  matter  of  substantive  law,  (2)  not

          substantially incorporated  into the charge as  rendered, and (3)

          integral to  an important point in  the case."  United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          McGill, 953 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1992); accord  United States v.
          ______                                   ______  _____________

          Nason, 9 F.3d 155, 161 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied,  114 S. Ct.
          _____                                   _____ ______

          1331  (1994); United  States v.  Gibson, 726  F.2d 869,  874 (1st
                        ______________     ______

          Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960 (1984).
                 _____ ______

                    To be sure, a  defendant has a right to  an instruction

                                          4

          on his theory of the case as long as that theory is valid  and is

          supported  by the record.  See United  States v. Flores, 968 F.2d
                                     ___ ______________    ______

          1366, 1367 (1st Cir. 1992).  But, that right is not a license "to

          put words in the judge's  mouth."  McGill, 953 F.2d at  12.  Jury
                                             ______

          instructions  are  intended  to   furnish  a  set  of  directions

          composing,  in the  aggregate, the  proper legal standards  to be

          applied  by lay jurors in  determining the issues  that they must

          resolve  in a  particular case.   See  Calhoun v.  Acme Cleveland
                                            ___  _______     ______________

          Corp.,  798 F.2d  559, 564 (1st  Cir. 1986).   Provided  that the
          _____

          charge  satisfies this  need, the court's  choice of  language is

          largely a matter of discretion.

                    The rule in this circuit, therefore, is that "[s]o long

          as  the charge  sufficiently conveys  the defendant's  theory, it

          need not parrot the exact  language that the defendant  prefers."

          McGill, 953 F.2d at 12; accord United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829
          ______                  ______ _____________    ____________

          F.2d  268, 272 (1st Cir. 1987).  By  the same token, the judge is

          not obligated  to instruct  on every particular  that conceivably

          might be of interest to the  jury.  See United States v. Nazzaro,
                                              ___ _____________    _______

          889  F.2d 1158,  1167  (1st Cir.  1989);  United States  v.  Rule
                                                    _____________      ____

          Indus., Inc.,  878 F.2d 535, 543 (1st Cir. 1989).  On appeal, the
          ____________

          central inquiry reduces to whether, taking the charge as a whole,

          see  Francis v.  Franklin,  471 U.S.  307,  315 (1985);  Cupp  v.
          ___  _______     ________                                ____

          Naughten,  414   U.S.  141,   146-47  (1973),   the  instructions
          ________

          adequately  illuminate  the  law  applicable to  the  controlling

          issues  in  the  case  without  unduly  complicating  matters  or

          misleading the jury.  See United States v. Alzanki, ___ F.3d ___,
                                ___ _____________    _______

                                          5

          ___ (1st  Cir.  1995) [No.  94-1645,  slip op.  at  8]; Davet  v.
                                                                  _____

          Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1992) (listing other cases).
          _________

                    Predictability  and consistency  are  important in  the

          law, and judges  tend to use  the same phrases  over and over  in

          explaining particular concepts to  jurors.  Appellant argues that

          he  wanted no  more  than to  have the  district court  use time-

          honored  language here, and that the court should have yielded to

          his entreaty.   He points to  three precedents that he  says cast

          the  court's disavowal  of  the "flight  beyond immediate  active

          pursuit" articulation  into disrepute.  We examine  each of these

          cases.

                    In Orth v. United States, 252 F. 566 (4th Cir. 1918), a
                       ____    _____________

          prisoner  fled from a Georgia penitentiary.  Four weeks later, he

          appeared on  the defendant's doorstep in  South Carolina, seeking

          asylum.   The defendant lent a helping hand.  A jury subsequently

          convicted Orth on  a charge  of assisting a  convict to  escape.3

          The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that by the time Orth became

          involved,  the event  of escape  had long  since concluded.   The

          court stated:  "When the physical control [over the prisoner] has

          been ended by  [his] flight beyond immediate  active pursuit, the

          escape is  complete."  Id. at  568.  Once that  point has passed,
                                 ___

          assisting the fugitive  can no longer be considered assisting the

          escape.  See id.  A second case that appellant cherishes,  United
                   ___ ___                                           ______

          States  v. Vowiell, 869 F.2d  1264 (9th Cir.  1989), embraced the
          ______     _______
                              
          ____________________

               3The conviction  eventuated under an  earlier, substantially
          similar version of the present 18 U.S.C.   752(a).

                                          6

          reasoning  of the Orth court  in connection with  a discussion of
                            ____

          the issue as  it relates  to the coconspirator  exception to  the

          hearsay  rule.   The Ninth  Circuit agreed  that "[t]he  crime of

          aiding  an  escape  terminates   once  the  escapee  has  reached

          temporary safety," and defined "temporary safety" by  reiterating

          Orth's "flight beyond immediate active pursuit" language.  Id. at
          ____                                                       ___

          1268 (quoting Orth, 252 F. at 568).
                        ____

                    The crown jewel in appellant's trilogy is United States
                                                              _____________

          v. Smithers, 27 F.3d 142 (5th Cir. 1994).  Smithers, charged with
             ________

          aiding  an   escape  under  section  752(a),   requested  a  jury

          instruction  that contained the  "flight beyond  immediate active

          pursuit" language.  The trial court denied the  request, choosing

          instead  to charge according to the letter of the statute itself.

          Following a guilty verdict, Smithers appealed.  The Fifth Circuit

          vacated  the  conviction,   holding  that  defendant's  suggested

          instruction was substantively correct  and that the trial court's

          failure to  give it  impermissibly impaired Smithers'  ability to

          raise his theory of defense.  See id. at 145-46.
                                        ___ ___

                    Although these  cases bear a family  resemblance to the

          case at bar, they are at best cousins once or twice removed.   In

          all three  cases, unlike  here, the relevant  assistance occurred

          days after the  end of any immediate  pursuit, at a location  far

          removed from the  place of liberation.  See  Smithers, 27 F.3d at
                                                  ___  ________

          143-44; Vowiell, 869 F.2d at 1265-66;  Orth, 252 F. at 568.  Over
                  _______                        ____

          and  above  this  salient distinction,  Orth  is  of little  help
                                                  ____

          because the court used the phrase that appellant extols not in an

                                          7

          effort to formulate a  model jury instruction, but in  the course

          of explaining why,  on the  facts of that  case, the  defendant's
                              ___________________________

          conviction  could not  stand.4   Vowiell  is  cut from  the  same
                                           _______

          cloth.  As in Orth, the court gave no consideration either to how
                        ____

          jury instructions should be worded or to what language would best

          fit a  case in which  pursuit had not  yet been mounted  when the

          defendant first aided  the escapee.   Smithers, though closer  to
                                                ________

          the mark, is also inapposite.  While the opinion memorializes the

          need to give a jury instruction regarding the limits to be placed

          on  a  charge of  aiding  an  escape, it  does  not address  what

          language is most  fitting when, as now,  there is no evidence  of

          any  immediate, active  pursuit.   Nor  does  the Smithers  court
                                                            ________

          explore the pros  and cons  of using language  such as  appellant

          tenders as  opposed to the "temporary  safety" language preferred

          by the court below.

                    Since these  precedents are not dispositive,  we take a

          fresh look.   The linchpin of a charge under section 752(a)   and

          the feature that sets it  apart from a charge of  harboring under

          section 1072   is the showing  that the accused aided or assisted

          an  escape rather  than merely  aiding or  assisting an  escapee.
              ______                                               _______

          This requires, of  course, that  a line be  drawn separating  the

                              
          ____________________

               4The circumstances of Orth are such that,  on any reasonable
                                     ____
          view of the statute, the defendant's conviction for assisting  an
          escape could not be  justified.  The fugitive  had been at  large
          almost a month  and had  traveled through two  states before  the
          defendant lifted a finger to help him.  See 252 F. at 567.  These
                                                  ___
          facts placed the defendant well outside the outer boundary of any
          charge  of aiding and abetting  the escape regardless  of how the
          court's opinion might be phrased.

                                          8

          escape    a  discrete event    from  what may  follow thereafter.

          This  task is  perhaps more  difficult than  it appears  at first

          blush, as the  term "escape"    which, after  all, means  nothing

          more  or  less  than  "absenting  oneself  from  custody  without

          permission,"  United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 407 (1980)  
                        _____________    ______

          encompasses  a wide  range of  scenarios.  Moreover,  the general

          definition,  without the  insertion of  limiting  language, would

          make breaking  out of  prison a virtually  endless continuum,  so

          that any person who assisted an escapee, no matter how long after

          the event or how distant from  the place of immurement, would  be

          guilty  of  violating  section  752(a).   To  avoid  the  obvious

          absurdity  inherent in  this  result, the  jury instruction  in a

          criminal  prosecution brought  under section  752(a) must  draw a

          clear, comprehensible line between the discrete event    that is,

          the escape   and what may follow.

                    We think that  the court's decision  here to frame  its

          instruction in terms  of "reach[ing] temporary safety"  furnished

          the necessary guidance  to the jury.5   The instruction described

          an ascertainable point at  which the jury might find  that aiding

          the escape ended and harboring began.  Thus, the delivered charge
                              
          ____________________

               5Our confidence in the term is bolstered by its familiarity;
          the  term  is  regularly  applied  in  other  analogous  criminal
          contexts.  See, e.g., People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302, 1326 (Cal.
                     ___  ____  ______    ______
          1991) (explaining  that  "the crime  of robbery  is not  complete
          until  the  robber  has  won his  way  to  a  place of  temporary
          safety"),  cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992); State v. Hearron,
                     _____ ______                         _____    _______
          619  P.2d 1157, 1159 (Kan.  1980) (holding that  a homicide falls
          within  the  felony-murder rule  if  committed  during escape  or
          attempted  escape, so long as the perpetrator has not yet reached
          a  point of  temporary  safety).   Thus,  the term's  common  law
          history informs the use of it here.

                                          9

          was well within  the realm of the trial  court's discretion.  See
                                                                        ___

          McGill, 953 F.2d at 13; see also Concise Oil & Gas Partnership v.
          ______                  ___ ____ _____________________________

          Louisiana Intrastate  Gas Corp., 986  F.2d 1463,  1474 (5th  Cir.
          _______________________________

          1993) ("In instructing the jury, district judges may select their

          own words and charge in their  own styles.").  And, moreover, the

          court's  language  seems particularly  apt  when contrasted  with

          appellant's alternative formulation.  Where, as here, there is no

          evidence that pursuit had been mounted  at or before the time the

          defendant  rendered assistance,  an instruction  that centers  on

          "flight  beyond  immediate active  pursuit"  risks  confusing and

          confounding the jury without  supplying a scintilla of additional

          enlightment.

                    That ends  the matter.   Clear, easily  understood jury

          instructions are vitally important  in assuring that jurors grasp

          subtle or  highly nuanced  legal concepts.    Partially for  this

          reason, the law is  settled that a trial court  may appropriately

          refuse  to give a  proffered jury instruction  that is incorrect,

          misleading, or incomplete  in some material respect.   See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 738 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
          ______    _____                                     _____ ______

          504 U.S. 955 (1992).  So it is here.

                    We  need go  no  further.   Because the  court's charge

          constituted  a correct statement of  the law, and  would not have

          been  improved by the  substitution or insertion  of the proposed

          instruction,6 we reject appellant's lone assignment of error.
                              
          ____________________

               6We   should  not   be   understood   either  as   banishing
          instructions featuring "flight beyond immediate  active pursuit,"
          or  as relegating  such  instructions to  the  scrap heap.    The

                                          10

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              
          ____________________

          language may have a legitimate place  in certain situations, such
          as in helping the jury to visualize the issue in a case in which,
          unlike this one, immediate active pursuit is underway at the time
          the defendant renders aid.

                                          11