Court Opinion

ID: 9950703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 16:16:48.948015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:48.611935
License: Public Domain

J-A03013-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 MICHAEL LEE FOUST                        :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 706 WDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 17, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-16-CR-0000094-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                         FILED: March 14, 2024

      Michael Lee Foust appeals from the judgment of sentence of seventy-

two hours to six months of incarceration for his first offense of driving under

the influence of a combination of alcohol and drugs (“DUI”). We affirm.

      We glean the following history from the certified record. At 6:00 p.m.

on November 12, 2021, Pennsylvania State Police were dispatched to the

intersection of Cemetery Road and Craig Road, in Licking Township, for a

report of a male passed out in the driver’s seat. Trooper Shawn Floor arrived

on scene at 6:04 p.m., and observed Appellant, alone, slumped and

unresponsive in the driver’s seat. After Appellant failed to stir in response to

verbal commands, the trooper reached through the open window to shake

Appellant awake. When Appellant regained consciousness, he was confused

and drowsy, had glassy bloodshot eyes, and emitted a faint odor of alcohol
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when he spoke. Trooper Floor asked Appellant to exit the vehicle, and he

complied.

         Trooper Joshua McGinnis arrived on scene at 6:20 p.m., after Appellant

had exited his vehicle.     The trooper immediately smelled the odor of an

alcoholic beverage on Appellant’s breath, and observed Appellant’s speech as

“slow and sluggish,” his eyes to be “extremely bloodshot,” and his eyelids

tremoring. See N.T. Bench Trial, 2/13/23, at 14. When Trooper McGinnis

asked Appellant, who lived in Kittanning, what he was doing in this remote

stretch of farmland within an Amish community, Appellant responded that he

had “pulled over on the side of the road because he just got done working a

lot of hours.”     Id. at 15.   Appellant underwent field sobriety tests and

consented to both a preliminary breath test, which was presumptively positive

for alcohol, and a blood draw, which revealed the presence of fentanyl,

amphetamine, methamphetamine, and alcohol. Appellant reported that he

had “recently” used methamphetamine, but was unsure when, and had a

couple of beers at an undisclosed time. Id. at 30. Before arranging for the

vehicle to be towed, the trooper collected the keys and Appellant’s phone from

inside. Undefined “needles” were recovered during a subsequent search. Id.

at 28.

         Based on the foregoing, Appellant was charged with DUI and illegal

parking. Appellant proceeded to a bench trial, where he conceded impairment

but contested whether the Commonwealth had proven he was in control of

the vehicle. The court disagreed, convicting him of DUI but acquitting him of

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the summary offense. Appellant was sentenced as indicated hereinabove and

ordered to pay the costs of prosecution.

       This timely appeal followed. Appellant filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement, and the trial court responded with a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

In this Court, Appellant has narrowed his issues on appeal to a single question:

“Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Commonwealth had

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant drove, operated[,] or was

in actual physical control of his vehicle while impaired?” Appellant’s brief at 5

(unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       We review Appellant’s issue in light of the following legal precepts:

       When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
       must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all
       reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light
       most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support
       the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is
       sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element
       of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the
       sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail. This standard applies
       equally where the Commonwealth’s evidence is circumstantial.

Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099, 1105 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up).

       Appellant was convicted of DUI pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(3),

which provides as follows:

       (d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive,
       operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
       vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

             ....

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            (3) The individual is under the combined influence of alcohol
            and a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which
            impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be
            in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(3).

      Here, Appellant challenges whether the Commonwealth proved beyond

a reasonable doubt that he operated, drove, or was in actual physical control

of the vehicle. In that regard, we have provided the following guidance:

      The term “operate” requires evidence of actual physical control of
      either the machinery of the motor vehicle or the management of
      the vehicle’s movement, but not evidence that the vehicle was in
      motion.     The Commonwealth can establish through wholly
      circumstantial evidence that a defendant was driving, operating[,]
      or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. Courts review a
      combination of the following factors to determine whether a
      person had “actual physical control” of an automobile: the motor
      running, the location of the vehicle, and additional evidence
      showing that the defendant had driven the vehicle.                A
      determination of actual physical control of a vehicle is based upon
      the totality of the circumstances.

Fallon, 275 A.3d at 1105 (cleaned up). We reiterate, “the suspect location

of the vehicle, which supports an inference that it was driven, is a key factor

in a finding of actual control.” Commonwealth v. Brotherson, 888 A.2d

901, 905 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citations omitted).

      Appellant assails the Commonwealth’s lack of testimony about how long

his vehicle had been parked on the roadway and contends that “merely being

in the driver’s seat while impaired does not establish actual physical control.”

Appellant’s brief at 13. Instead, he posits that the Commonwealth must prove

additional facts, such as the keys being in the ignition, the engine running, or

illuminating the vehicle’s lights. Id.

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      For support, Appellant cites this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Price, 610 A.2d 488 (Pa.Super. 1992). In Price, the jury specifically made a

finding that Price had not been driving the car while impaired and that his

girlfriend had instead been driving when she hit a pothole, incapacitating the

car. Since he did not drive the car, the evidence had to establish that Price

was in actual physical control of the car after it had broken down in order to

sustain his DUI conviction.   Considering this sub-element, the Price Court

clarified that “[t]here must be some indicia that the intoxicated person, who

was seated in the car, had actual physical control of the vehicle.” Price, 610

A.2d at 490. Reviewing our prior case law, we held that “at a very minimum,

a parked car should be started and running before a finding of actual physical

control can be made.” Id. (cleaned up). Ultimately, this Court concluded that

Price’s presence in the driver’s seat and possession of the keys while the car

was inoperable and not running were insufficient because he “was not driving

the car before it became inoperable, and he could not drive the car after it

became inoperable.” Id. at 491 (emphases in original).

      We determine Price to be an inapt comparison. Here, Appellant was

not merely sitting in an inoperable vehicle while intoxicated. Furthermore, the

factfinder did not determine that someone other than Appellant had parked

the vehicle. Although we do not know precisely when Appellant pulled over,

nor when he ingested the drugs and alcohol, Appellant admitted that he drank

some beers and had taken methamphetamine “recently.” In making these

admissions, he in no way indicated that he had done so after parking the

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vehicle, much less offer evidence of so doing. While there was testimony that

nondescript “needles” were located inside the vehicle and an argument made

that they were used to inject methamphetamine after pulling over, there was

no testimony as to when they were used or for what purpose.                   As for

Appellant’s alcohol consumption, the troopers did not recover any beer

containers from within the vehicle, which one would expect to find if Appellant

had imbibed alcohol after pulling over.

         Critically, Appellant lived in Kittanning but his vehicle was parked, during

the evening hours, in a relatively far and remote area. Appellant told the

troopers that he had pulled the vehicle over after a long workday, and the

keys were located inside the vehicle, where Appellant had been found

unconscious behind the steering wheel. Further, the location of the stopped

vehicle supported the inference that Appellant had driven the vehicle while

impaired. Appellant declined to safely park off the roadway in the adjacent

field.    Instead, he stopped in the middle of the travel lane, dangerously

obstructing an intersection frequented mainly by horse and buggy, and

neglected to activate his hazard lights to warn of the vehicle’s presence in the

darkening roadway. This evidences a hasty stop due to impairment, not a

plan to park in the middle of an Amish community, imbibe alcohol and drugs,

and then sleep in the shut-down vehicle, in November, until sober.              See

Brotherson, 888 A.2d at 905 (concluding that “[t]he highly inappropriate

location of the car-on the basketball court of a gated children’s playground-

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created a strong inference that it was an already intoxicated [defendant] who

had driven the car to that spot”).

      Given the totality of the circumstances after reviewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence in the case sub

judice was sufficient to establish that Appellant had driven the vehicle while

intoxicated to the point of being unable to safely drive. Accordingly, we affirm

Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 03/14/2024

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