Court Opinion

ID: 9792807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:37:09.995567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:19.858874
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree fully with the opinion of the court. I write separately merely to note my disagreement with the conclusion of the superior court that reason six of the bill of particulars does not constitute good cause for Kilmer’s termination. Reason six is that Kilmer exercised poor judgment in recommending that he receive pay for another job while he was employed full-time as school superintendent.
Dual office holding with substantially increased compensation is a practice which easily lends itself to abuse. There is much common law, statutory and constitutional authority which prohibits dual office holding by public employees. See Acevedo v. City of North Pole, 672 P.2d 130, 133-36 (Alaska 1983); Begich v. Jefferson, 441 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1968); Knuckles v. Board of Education of Bell County, 272 Ky. 431, 114 S.W.2d 511, 514-16 (1938) (offices of assistant county school superintendent and school principal or teacher incompatible under common law rule prohibiting dual office holding); 3 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 12.66, .67 (3d rev. ed.1990).
We outlined the underlying purposes of the rule prohibiting dual office holding in Acevedo, supra at 134, 135. Among those relevant to the present case are “preventing *768multiple position-holding, so that offices and positions of public trust would not accumulate in a single person; [and] preventing individuals from .deriving, directly or indirectly, any pecuniary benefit by virtue of their dual position-holding....” A strong and justified public reaction to revelations of dual office holding with substantially increased compensation should reasonably have been anticipated by Kilmer.
FABE, Justice, concurring.
I agree with the dissent’s analysis that the trial court improperly characterized this matter as an administrative appeal and that Kil-mer thus had a right to a jury trial in a direct action against the Board. However, I join in the conclusion of the court that Kil-mer waived his right to a jury by stipulating to a bench trial on all issues. Thus, the trial court’s error in holding that Kilmer’s action was an administrative appeal is harmless.