Court Opinion

ID: 9649233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:46:09.08961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:09.198013
License: Public Domain

Brock, J., with whom King, J.,
concurs, issued the following opinion: The critical issue in this case is whether the foster parents stand in loco parentis to Diana P. Under RSA 170-C:4 II, such a relationship must exist in order for the foster parents to have standing to bring this petition.
Reliance upon Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 850 (1947), as authority for holding that the foster parents in this case have standing to bring a petition for terminating parental rights is misplaced. Applying the standard of that case for determining in loco parentis status leads to the conclusion that the foster parents in this case do not stand in loco parentis.
According to Niewiadomski, the term in loco parentis “refers to a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship . . . .” Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d at 686. The incidents of a parental relationship include the duty to educate, care for physical or mental disability, the right to custody and control along with the disciplinary authority over the child. Id. at 686. In the present case, the foster parents, because of the control exercised over them by the department of welfare pursuant to RSA 170-E:1 X, :3, :9, assumed none of these incidents. In a publication entitled Standards for Foster Family Care, the division of welfare has set forth rules and regulations for foster parents.
Under the rules and regulations of the department of welfare, the foster parents do not have the legal authority over Diana P. that a natural parent normally has over his own child. A portion of these rules and regulations in some detail provide:
“F. Relative to Reports and Records
1. Prior to accepting a child from a source other than the agency, foster parents shall notify the agency of their intent and in so doing shall not exceed their licensed capacity.
2. Foster parents shall keep the agency informed of the *801children’s progress while in their care. They shall consult with the agency regarding care, training, education and plans for the child whenever more than day-to-day routine is involved.
3. Foster parents shall secure the approval of the child’s legal custodian before making plans for the care of the child by other persons for any period in excess of 48 hours.
4. Foster parents shall consult with the agency before taking or allowing the child to go on vacation trips or visits. Visits to natural parents shall be according to prearranged plans approved by the agency.
5. Foster parents shall notify the agency as soon as possible or within 24 hours of emergencies involving the foster child. This includes serious illness or injury involving medical treatment, unauthorized absence from the home, or other situations of which prudence suggests the legal custodian be notified. This requirement in no way relieves the foster parents from first taking action, such as obtaining emergency medical treatment for the child.
6. Foster parents shall notify the agency immediately, but not more than 24-hours, in the event of the death of any child in their charge, giving the name of the child, cause and date of death, duration of last illness and addresses of the attending physician and undertaker.
7. Foster parents shall allow the agency a minimum of two weeks to make suitable plans for a child when the foster parents have requested the child’s removal from their home except when removal is related to illness in the foster family.
8. Foster parents shall keep confidential all information concerning the child in their care and his/her family except when such known information is required for treatment of an illness in an emergency.
9. A registry shall be kept by the foster parents containing:
*802a. name and birth date of each child;
b. date of admission and discharge;
c. dates of parents’ and relatives’ visits
10. Foster parents shall provide a safe place to keep important papers given to the foster parents by the agency, school, doctor, or other important resource.
G. Relative to Discipline
1. No child shall be subjected to verbal or physical abuse, derogatory remarks about himself or members of his family or to threats to expel the child from the foster home.
2. No child in care shall be deprived of meals, mail or family visits as a method of discipline.
3. Each child shall be contructively [sic] disciplined according to his age, needs, behavior and customary family patterns or discipline.
4. With the exception of number three (3) above, no corporal punishment shall be administered.
H. Relative to Religion
Foster parents shall be responsible for the protection and fostering of the particular religious faith of the children served, where applicable.
I. Relative to Children’s Rights
1. Foster parents shall keep confidential information about the child and provide such information only to those individuals and agencies which require definite information to meet their responsibilities to the child.
2. Foster parents shall assure legal representation for a child when necessary by notifying the child’s agency, parents, or other person responsible for the child.”
It should be obvious that the foster parents are legally barred from assuming the full responsibilities of parental authority. Those responsibilities are, by law (RSA ch. 170-E), reserved to the *803division of welfare, which in this instance strongly opposes the termination petition. While the foster parents do provide aid and assistance to Diana P., aid and assistance alone is not sufficient to establish the status of in loco parentis. Niewiadomski v. United States, supra at 686. Moreover, a portion of the financial support which the foster parents provide has been reimbursed to them by the division of welfare.
Both the theory that the foster parents have become Diana P.’s “psychological family” and the fact that they must incur out-of-pocket expense have been raised in support of the position that the foster parents here stand in loco parentis. If these criteria are to be determinative, many foster parents could be encouraged to challenge a natural parent’s right to custody. Implicit in the latter argument is the distasteful notion that foster parents may purchase their way into standing under RSA 170-C:4 II. If State v. Robert H._, 118 N.H. 713, 393 A.2d 1387 (1978), remains the law in this State, it is inconsistent to allow foster parents to purchase standing and also to criticize the tendency of social workers “to favor continued placement in foster care with a generally high status family. . . .” State v. Robert H. __, supra at 717, 393 A.2d at 1390.
Under the standard of Robert H., it is error to allow the termination of Beverly P.’s parental rights in this case. In Robert, H., we held that “the government must prove its case under [RSA] chapter 170-C beyond a reasonable doubt before the permanent termination of liberty and natural rights of parents . . . can occur.” State v. Robert H._, supra at 716, 373 A.2d at 1389. We then added that the division of welfare must prove that it has made “every effort” and that it has “worked with the parents” before it can take “so drastic a step as to sever irrevocably the parental ties to the children.” State v. Robert H._, supra at 719, 393 A.2d at 1387. In this case, the division of welfare is contesting the petition for termination of parental rights. It seems only logical that if we are to apply strict scrutiny to parental termination statutes, State v. Robert H. _, supra at 716, 393 A.2d at 1389, then it follows that we must also strictly construe the statutory provisions concerning who has standing to bring such petitions and not take a “broad view” on which parties can bring such a petition.
In Robert H., we directed the division of welfare to “work affirmatively with the [parent] and provide and arrange for the appropriate social service agency intervention” in order to assist the natural parents in becoming responsible parents. State v. *804Robert H. _, 118 N.H. 713, 720, 393 A.2d 1387, 1391 (1978). Here, the termination order is being enforced over the division’s objection and consequently it appears that the division itself does not feel that all appropriate assistance has been given to the natural parent. These two holdings are contradictory. If there is to be a lesser standard in privately brought termination petitions, which does not require the exhaustion of the division’s resources to assist the natural parents, then the constitutional safeguards announced in Robert H. have become meaningless.
There is no fair basis to distinguish between termination petitions brought by foster parents and those brought by the State because “whatever emotional ties may develop between foster parent and foster child have their origins in an arrangement in which the State has been a partner from the outset.” See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977). Such a partnership connotes significant State involvement. In this case, the State’s involvement in the partnership is particularly troubling because no finding has been made that Diana P.’s natural mother is presently unfit to assume her parental duties and obligations. The lack of such a finding is critical because “the Due Process Clause [is offended when] ‘a State . . . attempts] to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.’ ” See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978), quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). This court approved of this very language in State v. Robert H._, 118 N.H. 713, 716, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1978).
Because we are dealing with a fundamental right requiring the application of strict judicial scrutiny, State v. Robert H._, supra at 716, 393 A.2d at 1389, foster parents should also be required to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Diana P.’s natural mother is unfit to reassume her role as the child’s natural custodial parent. This burden must be imposed upon foster parents because their very status has been created by the State. It makes little sense to require the State to demonstrate the unfitness of a natural parent and not to require the State’s designees in custodial arrangement, the foster parents, to meet the same requirement.
The designation of foster parents with the natural parents’ consent should not operate as a waiver of the latters’ natural custodial rights. Bezio v. Patenaude, F. 2161 Mass. Supreme *805Judicial Court, Slip Op. at 17 (Sept. 22, 1980). It should be obvious that the result reached today will only hinder the division of welfare’s efforts to render assistance to natural parents in need of counseling and assistance. New natural parents will have an incentive to cooperate with the division of welfare’s efforts to place their children in foster homes when it is publicized that foster parents have standing to bring a petition to permanently terminate their rights to custody.