Court Opinion

ID: 9374202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 17:03:41.196492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.522181
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-0489
                            Filed February 22, 2023

MATHEW JOSEPH LLOPIS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

ELIZABETH ERIN BLACK,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Sean McPartland,

Judge.

      Mathew Llopis appeals from a district court decree of paternity establishing

custody, visitation, and support for the parties’ child. AFFIRMED.

      Mathew Joseph Llopis, Casa Grande, Arizona, self-represented appellant.

      Chad E. Schneider of Hastings, Gartin, and Boettger LLP, Ames, for

appellee.

      Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

       Mathew Llopis and Elizabeth Black lived together in Arizona. Black returned

to Iowa when she was “roughly 18 weeks pregnant” and gave birth to a child in

early 2019.

       The following year, Llopis filed a petition to establish custody and visitation.

The parents stipulated to joint legal custody and Black’s retention of physical care.

They agreed to a gradual increase in Llopis’ visits, disagreeing only on the details

of a visitation plan. The parents also stipulated to Llopis’ net monthly income and

to the fact that Black did not earn wages. They disagreed on the amount of child

support to be paid by Llopis.

       The case proceeded to trial on visitation and child support. Following trial,

the district court imposed a visitation schedule more closely aligned with Black’s

proposal. The court ordered Llopis to pay child support in an amount that deviated

from the guideline amount proposed by Black but was more than the amount

proposed by Llopis.

       On appeal, Llopis challenges (I) the visitation schedule; (II) the amount of

child support and the district court’s failure to allocate his transportation costs; and

(III) decisions made at the pretrial conference and with respect to the admission of

certain exhibits.

I.     Visitation

       The district court set forth four “stages” of visitation for Llopis and imposed

“visitation terms,” which included “general requirements and conditions to
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advance” to the next stage as well as “consequences of an adverse event” that

would cause Llopis to revert to the prior stage.1 The stages were as follows:

1  The court defined an “adverse event” in the decree. Although the court
gave Black preliminary authority to terminate a visit upon a “reasonable
belief” that an adverse event occurred, the court specified the
circumstances that would constitute an adverse event and required her to
file “a written request supported by an affidavit under oath” and obtain a
judicial determination of an adverse event. That language distinguishes
decrees found to have impermissibly delegated discretion to control visits
to the opposing party. See In re Marriage of Jenkins, No. 22-0656, 2023
WL 382301, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2023); In re Marriage of
Kanetomo, No. 19-2008, 2020 WL 5650593, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 23,
2020).
                                            4

       Llopis argues the stages provided for an “alarmingly excessive” number of

supervised visits. In his view, “ordering an entire year of minimal supervised

visitation” “before he can have unsupervised visitation with the child” was “an

abuse of discretion.” On our de novo review, we disagree.

       Llopis acknowledged a history of alcohol and methamphetamine use that

resulted in convictions on driving under the influence (DUI) related charges. He

further acknowledged a sobriety date of well under a year. He admitted to a

pending criminal charge and his placement on intensive supervised probation for

prior convictions, all of which prevented a move to Iowa in the near term. Most

critically, Llopis only saw his child once prior to the paternity trial. Given his limited

contact, he “100 percent agree[d]” to “getting parenting time in stages.” He also

conceded his “criminal history” provided grounds for a gradual plan.              Llopis’

concessions support the district court’s decision to require supervised visits for a

year. See In re Jensen, No. 11-1418, 2012 WL 837208, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar.

14, 2012) (stating the visitation schedule should be “tailored to the best interests

of” the child).

       Llopis next contends he should have received “equal or as equal as possible

parenting time with the child.” The district court defined “regular parenting time” in

the fourth stage as “regular every-other weekend overnight visitation from 5:00 pm

(or after school) on Friday until 5:00 pm on Sunday and on [h]olidays.” The court’s

definition comported with Llopis’ stipulation to Black’s exercise of physical care.

The stipulation, together with uncertainties associated with Llopis’ move to Iowa,
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supported the district court’s decision to limit his regular parenting time to every

other weekend.

II.    Child Support

       A court may deviate from the child support guidelines with a written finding

“that the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate” because “[s]ubstantial

injustice would result to the payor, payee, or child(ren)” or “[a]djustments are

necessary to provide for the needs of the child(ren) or to do justice between the

parties, payor, or payee under the special circumstances of the case.” Iowa Ct.

R. 9.11(1), (2).

       At trial, Llopis asked the district court for an order requiring him to pay $201

per month in child support. He arrived at the figure by factoring in his travel costs

from Arizona to Iowa, together with his employment income. He suggested that, if

minimum-wage income were imputed to Black, his requested amount would be

reasonable.

       Black, in contrast, sought $570 per month in child support. She pointed out

that she did not earn wages and Llopis at one time had two jobs.

       The district court ordered Llopis to pay $375 per month. The court stated,

“To the extent that such amount represents a deviation from the calculation of child

support based upon Child Support Guidelines proposed by either of the parties . . .

such deviation is appropriate in the best interests of the child and to do justice

between the parties . . . .”

       On appeal, Llopis contends “the special circumstances of this case,

including that [he] has to fly from Arizona to Iowa every 6 weeks for visitation,
                                          6

warrant a variation from the Iowa Child Support Guidelines and calculate a new

child support amount accordingly.” The district court accepted Llopis’ calculation

of child support based on an imputation of minimum-wage income to Black. The

court stated, “[t]o the extent that such amount represents a deviation from the

calculation of child support based upon Child Support Guidelines proposed by

either of the parties,” the “deviation is appropriate.” On our de novo review, we

conclude the court’s child-support determination inured to Llopis’ benefit, whether

or not transportation costs were factored into the calculation. See Jass v. Atkinson,

No. 18-1790, 2019 WL 2371925, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. June 5, 2019) (concluding

reduction of child-support obligation to accommodate transportation expense “was

an equitable solution to the transportation dilemma”). A further reduction would

not have served the child’s best interests.

       Relatedly, Llopis asked the district court to require a thirty-percent

contribution from Black toward his travel costs. See id. In an order on a request

for reconsideration, the court clarified that Llopis’ imminent move to Iowa served

as grounds to deny the request. We conclude the court’s decision was equitable.

See In re Marriage of Galleger, No. 20-0302, 2020 WL 6480120, at *5 (Iowa Ct.

App. Nov. 4, 2020) (concluding an order with respect to transportation expenses

was equitable).

III.   Pretrial Conference/Exhibits

       Iowa Court Rule 1.602(1) allows a court “in its discretion” to “direct the

attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a

conference . . . before trial.” Any interested counsel or the court may ask a reporter
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to record the conference. Iowa Ct. R. 1.603. Following a conference, “an order

shall be entered reciting the action taken.” Iowa Ct. R. 1.604. Llopis argues the

conference was “untimely” and the district court failed to “record[]” its order on “the

removal of exhibits, or . . . that no witnesses could testify.”

       Rule 1.602(1) afforded the district court discretion to set a pretrial

conference and schedule the time. The court scheduled one for the day before

trial. The following day, at the beginning of trial, the district court summarized what

took place at the pretrial conference. The court cited “extensive conversations

with” the parties regarding “how things would go” at trial and expressed a belief

that the conversation “was productive in narrowing some of the issues” for trial.

The court noted that each of the parties had filed a “specific request for relief” and

a stipulation. The court summarized the procedure that would be used at trial,

“consistent with [the] conversation” the previous day. The court’s summary of what

transpired at the pretrial conference was an effective substitute for the pretrial

conference order required by rule 1.604.2 We discern no abuse of discretion in the

district court’s scheduling of the conference or the court’s handling of matters at

the pretrial conference as documented in the trial record. See, e.g., In re Marriage

of Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 469 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (“We review evidentiary

rulings and other matters relating to the course and conduct of a trial, not regulated

2 After Llopis filed his notice of appeal, he sought to amend the record with respect
to the way the pretrial conference was conducted and with respect to one of the
exhibits. The district court filed an order memorializing what was clear from the
record.
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by statute, for abuse of discretion.” (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted)).

          Llopis also argues certain exhibits were missing “factual information”

relating to “visitation with the child and the extent of [his] criminal background.” In

his view, the exhibits “lacked trustworthiness.” The challenged exhibits were (1) a

copy of a public case search of Llopis’ name on an “Arizona Judicial Branch–Public

Access” website; (2) a photograph of text messages between the parties, including

one in which Llopis referred to a pending assault charge; (3) a photograph of a

police log describing Llopis’ arrest for assault; (4) Llopis’ “Criminal Court Case

Information–Case History”; (5) a picture from the Public Access website detailing

Llopis’    DUI-related    charges;   (6) photographs   of   bruises;   and   (7) notes

commending Llopis’ lawn care skills. The district court overruled authentication

and hearsay objections to the exhibits and noted the last challenged exhibit was

offered by Llopis himself.

          We assume without deciding that Llopis’ objections to the exhibits were well

taken. See Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.801(c) (defining “hearsay” as a statement “[t]he

declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing” which “[a]

party offers into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the

statement”), 5.802 (stating “[h]earsay is not admissible,” subject to certain

exceptions), 5.901 (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an

item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”); cf. Iowa R.

Evid. 5.801(d)(2)(A) (defining as non-hearsay statements “offered against an
                                            9

opposing party” that were “made by the party in an individual or representative

capacity”). Even if the exhibits were improperly authenticated or amounted to

hearsay, the evidence entered the record without objection through the testimony

of Llopis and Black.3 Because the exhibits were cumulative of that testimony,

admission was nonprejudicial. See State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa

1998).

         We affirm the district court’s decree.

         AFFIRMED.

3 The first exhibit corroborated Llopis’ assertion that the pending assault charge
referenced in the first, second, third, and fourth exhibits was dismissed. As for the
photo of bruises, Llopis filed a motion to amend the record to reflect that the bruises
had nothing to do with Black. Post appeal, the district court filed an order granting
the request to amend the description of the bruises as Llopis requested.