Court Opinion

ID: 9369571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 14:01:33.317265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.113718
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1329

        DAVID J. ADINOLFI, II,

                             Plaintiff - Appellant,

                      v.

        NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, an agency of the State of
        North Carolina,

                             Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:18-cv-00539-FL)

        Submitted: January 12, 2023                                       Decided: February 8, 2023

        Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Joseph E. Zeszotarski, Jr., GAMMON, HOWARD & ZESZOTARSKI,
        PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew Tulchin, Special Deputy Attorney
        General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               David J. Adinolfi, II, appeals the district court’s orders granting summary judgment

        to the North Carolina Department of Justice (“DOJ”) on his discrimination claim under the

        Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634, and adopting

        the magistrate judge’s recommendation in part and dismissing his failure-to-accommodate

        claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213.

        Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

               We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, “applying the

        same legal standards as the district court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in

        the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Ballengee v. CBS Broad., Inc., 968 F.3d

        344, 349 (4th Cir. 2020). “Summary judgment is warranted ‘if the movant shows that there

        is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

        matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A genuine question of material fact

        exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court finds that a reasonable jury

        could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”         J.D. ex rel. Doherty v. Colonial

        Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663, 669 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). In conducting this inquiry, courts may not “weigh conflicting evidence or make

        credibility determinations.” Id. But “the nonmoving party must rely on more than

        conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or

        the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v.

        Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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               Adinolfi proceeded under the familiar McDonnell Douglas 1 pretext framework.

        Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc),

        abrogated in part by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); see also Reeves

        v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-42 (2000) (applying McDonnell

        Douglas standard to ADEA claim). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination,

        Adinolfi needed to show: “(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an

        adverse employment action (such as discharge), (3) he was performing his job duties at a

        level that met the employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment

        action, and (4) his position remained open or was filled by a similarly qualified applicant

        outside the protected class.” Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 742 (4th Cir. 2006).

               Here, the DOJ implemented a reduction-in-force (“RIF”), and thus the elements of

        the prima facie case are slightly different. The employee can satisfy the adverse action

        element by showing that he was demoted. Dugan v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d

        716, 720-21 (4th Cir. 2002). For the fourth element, a plaintiff need only show that

        similarly situated younger individuals were treated differently “or there were other

        circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Id. at 721.

               We conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that Adinolfi failed to

        establish a prima facie case. As for the initial loss of his supervisory position, Adinolfi has

        failed to point to a similarly situated younger individual who was treated more favorably.

        While he points to statistics purporting to show the RIF had a disparate impact on older

               1
                   McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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        workers, he does not identify a younger, supervisory employee who was treated more

        favorably than he was. As for the DOJ’s failure to reinstate Adinolfi’s supervisory role,

        the DOJ did not hire a new employee as section head when it first reestablished the section

        it had disbanded. See Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 519 (4th Cir. 2006)

        (holding plaintiff failed to establish “that he was replaced at all, much less by a substantially

        younger employee,” particularly when the plaintiff “admitted that he was not replaced by

        anyone”). Instead, those supervisory duties were given to a higher-level manager. See

        Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 623 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding an employee “is not

        considered replaced when his duties are absorbed by another person or when the work is

        redistributed among other existing employees already performing related work” (internal

        quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment

        order.

                 We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under Fed.

        R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “accept[ing] the factual allegations of the complaint as true and

        constru[ing] them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Rockville Cars,

        LLC v. City of Rockville, 891 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 2018). To survive a motion to dismiss,

        “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

        relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). In other words, “a plaintiff must provide sufficient detail to

        show that he has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.” Upstate

        Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 645 (4th Cir. 2018)

        (cleaned up), vacated on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020).

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               To state a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege:

        “(1) that he was an individual who had a disability within the meaning of the statute; (2)

        that the employer had notice of his disability; (3) that with reasonable accommodation he

        could perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) that the employer refused to

        make such accommodations.” Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir.

        2013) (cleaned up). The ADA defines a “disability” in pertinent part as “a physical or

        mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.

        § 12102(1)(A).

               Adinolfi alleged that he suffered from several conditions that might substantially

        limit a major life activity. But the magistrate judge and district court correctly recognized

        that Adinolfi never alleged what major life activities his disabilities substantially limited.

        While he points to his allegations that he could not safely work in the Criminal Division,

        the magistrate judge and district court correctly noted that Adinolfi alleged he could safely

        work in the Civil Division. And he failed to explain why, leaving the court to speculate

        how the major life activity of working was substantially limited. Thus, we agree with the

        district court that Adinolfi did not plead a viable failure-to-accommodate claim. 2

               2
                 Even if the district court erred in dismissing this claim, we conclude that it would
        have failed at summary judgment. See Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs. LLC, 979 F.3d 1004,
        1011 (4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing reassignment is an accommodation of last resort);
        Belville v. Ford Motor Co., 919 F.3d 224, 236 n.9 (4th Cir. 2019) (declining to address
        claims dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because they would have failed at summary
        judgment based on evidence considered by district court).

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               Therefore, we affirm the district court’s orders. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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