Court Opinion

ID: 9486902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:03:37.210561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:00.122301
License: Public Domain

CARNES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority opinion, in the course of interpreting the treaty language at issue, has improved it. I describe the majority’s modification of the 1931 Extradition Treaty as an “improvement” because the contracting states obviously view it as such. That much is clear from their recent negotiation and *1569adoption of a new extradition treaty, not retroactively applicable to this case, which incorporates textual revisions similar in result to those that the majority opinion effects through its interpretation of the original treaty. Contracting states are free to alter or amend treaty language in any way they see fit. Courts are not. For that reason, I dissent.
I. THE TREATY’S TEXT
Article 5 of the 1931 Extradition Treaty provides:
The extradition shall not take place if, subsequently to the commission of the crime or offence or the institution of the penal prosecution or the conviction thereon, exemption from prosecution or punishment has been acquired by lapse of time, according to the laws of the High Contracting Party applying or applied to.
Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 22, 1931, U.S.U.K., art. 5, 47 Stat. 2122 (“1931 Extradition Treaty”) (emphasis added). On its face, Article 5 prohibits extradition where, under United States or Bahamian law, “exemption from prosecution or punishment has been acquired by lapse of time” subsequent to: (1) “the commission of the crime or offence”; or (2) “the institution of the penal prosecution”; or (3) “the conviction thereon.” The Speedy Trial Clause of the United States Constitution is a “law” of the United States that, in some circumstances, bars prosecution due to “lapse of time” after “the institution of the penal prosecution.” See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, — U.S.-,-, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2689, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). Thus, the text of the Treaty, if given its natural meaning, would incorporate the Constitution’s speedy trial protections.
“In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning.” United States v. Alvarez-Machain, — U.S.-,-, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2193, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992). When a particular treaty provision is ambiguous or difficult, “we may look beyond the written words” to consider the history of negotiation and other evidence of the parties’ intent. Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534-35, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (internal quote marks omitted). However, “it is particularly inappropriate for a court to sanction a deviation from the clear import of a solemn treaty between this Nation and a foreign sovereign, when ... there is no indication that application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.” Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54, 83 S.Ct. 1054, 1057, 10 L.Ed.2d 184 (1963); see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 325(1) (1986) (“An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose.” (Emphasis added.)).
The majority says that the phrase “lapse of time” has, in other extradition treaties, been “commonly associated with a statute of limitations violation.” Maj. op. at 1567. That is true. But we are not interpreting the phrase “lapse of time.” We are interpreting the phrase “lapse of time” as modified by the phrase “subsequently ... to the institution of the penal prosecution.” The majority points to no case, treatise, or authority of any kind that “associates” this distinctive language with, much less restricts it to, statutes of limitation.
Article 5’s distinctive language — “subsequently to ... the institution of the penal prosecution” — presumably was included for a reason. Treaties, like statutes, should be construed so that no words are treated as being meaningless, redundant, or mere sur-plusage. E.g., Itel Containers Int’l v. Huddleston, — U.S.-,-, 113 S.Ct. 1095, 1100, 122 L.Ed.2d 421 (1993) (refusing to read an international convention in a way that would make some of its language superfluous); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 310-11, 7 L.Ed. 415 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) (“But the insertion of these words materially affects the construction of the article. They cannot be rejected as surplusage. They have a plain meaning.... We cannot say they were inserted carelessly or unadvisedly, and must understand them according to their obvious import.”); Cross v. Washington, 911 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir.1990) (noting *1570that treaties should not be construed so as to render any clause inconsistent or meaningless), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922, 111 S.Ct. 1313, 113 L.Ed.2d 247 (1991); cf. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39, 75 S.Ct. 513, 520, 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955) (“The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute rather than to emasculate an entire section, as the Government’s interpretation requires.” (Citations and internal quote marks omitted.)).
The district court suggested that Article 5’s specific reference to lapses of time that occur after the institution of the penal prosecution was added to clarify that Article 5 incorporates civil law countries’ statutes of limitation, which unlike the statutes of limitation of common law countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, restrict the time in which a person must begin serving his sentence. The district court’s hypothesis is unpersuasive. The 1931 Extradition Treaty was adopted by two common law countries, the United States and the United Kingdom. See 1931 Extradition Treaty. When The Bahamas gained its independence from the United Kingdom, the Treaty was continued in force by an exchange of notes between the United States and The Bahamas. See Agreement for the Continued Application to the Bahamas of the United States-United Kingdom Treaty of December 22, 1931, Mar. 7-Aug. 17, 1978, U.S.-Bah., T.I.A.S. No. 9185. CM law statutes of limitation exist in neither the United States nor the United Kingdom, so such statutes cannot explain why those two nations negotiated a treaty that makes specific reference to lapses of time that occur after the institution of penal proceedings.
Recognizing this weakness in the district court’s analysis, the majority offers its own theory. According to the majority opinion, Article 5’s reference to lapses of time that occur after “the institution of the penal prosecution” was added to clarify that a statute of limitation may continue to run after arrest or after the dismissal of an indictment for failure to prosecute. Maj. op. at 1568. The majority therefore concludes that Article 5’s lapse of time provisions — all three of them— refer to various applications of statutes of limitation.
However, if Article 5 had been intended to refer only to statutes of limitation, it would have been at least eleven words shorter. It would have read:
The extradition shall not take place if, subsequently to the commission of the crime or offence, exemption from prosecution or punishment has been acquired by lapse of time, according to the laws of the High Contracting Party applying or applied to.
Such a truncated version of Article 5 would have covered every possible statute of limitation scenario, including the two posited by the majority. A statute of limitation that applies after arrest or after dismissal of an indictment for failure to prosecute certainly accords “exemption from prosecution or punishment” due to “lapse of time” “subsequently to the commission of the crime or offence.” Thus, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the drafters of Article 5 did not need to specifically “clarify that a statute of limitations can run, in certain circumstances, even after criminal proceedings have begun.” Maj. op. at 1568. That would have been clear under a version of Article 5 that did not incorporate exemptions from “prosecution or punishment” acquired after “the institution of the penal prosecution.”1
However, the actual treaty is not so short. Article 5 refers to lapses of time that occur after commission of the crime, and lapses of time that occur after the institution of penal proceedings, and lapses of time that occur *1571after conviction. The Treaty explicitly and clearly incorporates three different types of lapse of time provisions: one type, commonly referred to as “statutes of limitation,” that applies after commission of the crime but before institution of penal proceedings; a second type, such as Speedy Trial Clause protections, that applies only after the institution of penal proceedings; and a third type that applies after conviction.
The majority’s interpretation of Article- 5 not only fails to explain the particular language at issue in this case — the reference to exemptions from prosecution acquired after “institution of the penal prosecution” — it also ignores Article 5’s reference to time lapses that occur “subsequently to ... conviction.” The majority insists that Article 5 refers only to statutes of limitation, but neither the United States nor the United Kingdom (nor The Bahamas) applies statutes of limitation to post-conviction delay. Although we need not decide what this language means, it must mean something, and that something is clearly not statutes of limitation.2 The words of Article 5 are not only broad enough to include non-statutory limitation periods, they are too broad not to include them.
II. EXTRINSIC SOURCES
The majority opinion relies upon extrinsic sources to justify its interpretation of the Treaty. However, none of the extrinsic sources to which the majority opinion turns suggest that the 1931 Extradition Treaty— the only treaty applicable in this ease — incorporates only statutory limitation periods.
The majority first points to a Ninth Circuit case that interpreted a wholly different extradition treaty, Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817, 105 S.Ct. 85, 85 L.Ed.2d 32 (1984). The U.S.-Australian extradition treaty at issue in Kamrin contained no reference to lapses of time after “the institution of the penal prosecution,” so it is unsurprising that the Kamrin court never considered the question of whether that treaty incorporated Speedy Trial Clause protections. In that ease, Australia sought extradition from the United States of a U.S. citizen accused of crimes in Australia. The relevant treaty language prohibited extradition “ ‘when the prosecution for the offense has become barred by lapse of time according to the laws of the requesting state.’” Id. at 1227 (emphasis added in original) (quoting the U.S.Australian extradition treaty). The Kamrin court held that, on its face, the treaty did not purport to apply the statute of limitation of the requested state, so the American limitation period was inapplicable. Id. Citing a treaty clause that provided that the defendant “ ‘shall have the right to use such remedies and recourses as are provided by’ ” the state from which extradition was requested, Kamrin also argued that the U.S.-Australian extradition treaty incorporated United States due process rights to a timely trial. Id. (quoting the U.S.-Australian extradition treaty). The Ninth Circuit refused to read that vague and general “remedies and re-courses” language as incorporating United States due process protections. Id. at 1228. The Kamrin court’s interpretation of the U.S.-Australian extradition treaty is inappo-site to our analysis of the different and far more specific guarantees of the 1931 U.S.Bahamian Treaty. As the majority itself admits, Maj. op. at 1566, the meaning of Article 5 of the 1931 Extradition Treaty is a question of first impression in this country. Kamrin did not decide it.
The majority opinion next seeks support in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela*1572tions Law, noting that the Restatement’s discussion of extradition treaties makes no reference to Speedy Trial Clause protections. Of course, the Restatement also makes no reference to the particular treaty that we are charged with interpreting, or to any other extradition treaty that contains similar language. What the Restatement says is that, “[u]nder most international agreements ...: (1) A person sought for prosecution or for enforcement of a sentence will not be extradited ... (d) if the applicable period of limitation has expired.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 476 (1986). Given that no reported decision has interpreted treaty language similar to that of Article 5,1 am not persuaded that this treaty language is typical of “most international agreements.” Indeed, the Restatement’s commentary makes clear that it is not discussing the provision we have before us. It says:
For purposes of applying statutes of limitation to requests for extradition in accordance with Subsection (l)(d), the [limitations] period is generally calculated from the time of the alleged commission of the offense to the time of the warrant, arrest, indictment, or similar step in the requesting state....
Id., emt. e. The 1931 Extradition Treaty, by contrast, calls for calculation of three different applicable periods: the period after commission of the offense, the period after institution of penal proceedings, and the period after conviction. Thus, the Treaty at issue in this case envisions something different— something more — than the run-of-the-mill treaty language discussed in the Restatement. The majority’s theory does not account for the differences in the three periods specified in this Treaty.
The majority opinion also claims to find support for its position in the pre-ratification materials accompanying the newly-negotiated 1990 Extradition Treaty between the United States and The Bahamas. Such materials are not probative of the intentions of the drafters of a 1931 treaty, and the 1990 materials do not even purport to reflect such intentions. Instead of supporting the majority’s theory about the 1931 treaty, the 1990 treaty actions actually contradict that theory. The new treaty provides only that “[extradition shall not be granted when all prosecution has become barred by lapse of time according to the laws in the Requesting State.” See Extradition Treaty, Mar. 9, 1990, U.S.-Bah., art. 6, S.Treaty Doc. No. 17, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Thus, in negotiating and drafting the new treaty, the contracting states deleted any reference to post-prosecution and post-conviction lapses of time. This modification is consistent with the contracting states’ intent to incorporate only statutory limitations periods in the new treaty, an intent expressed in pre-ratification materials relating to the new treaty. This modification also bears directly on the meaning of the language found in the 1931 treaty. If the prior language simply meant “statutes of limitation,” as the majority opinion contends, then the drafters of the new treaty would have had no reason to delete that prior language. Yet the prior language was deleted, probably to insure that the new treaty’s lapse of time clause would incorporate only statutes of limitation. Such a change is within the power of the contracting parties, but it is not within the prerogatives of this Court. We must apply the relevant 1931 Extradition Treaty language as it was actually written, before the non-retroactive change was made in the 1990 treaty.
The majority opinion finally claims that its interpretation of the 1931 Treaty is necessary to avoid conflict with the “rule of non-inquiry.” Maj. op. at 1567. That rule originated in Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901), which stated:
When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between that country and the United States.
Id. at 123, 21 S.Ct. at 307 (emphasis added). The majority opinion ignores the italicized language — language that poses, rather than answers, the question of whether the 1931 Extradition Treaty provides for Speedy Trial Clause protections. The non-inquiry doctrine’s rationale is that United States citizens *1573who commit crimes abroad should not be able unilaterally to impose American procedural protections on foreign sovereigns. See, e.g., In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1485 n. 11 (7th Cir.1984). However, that rationale does not address Yapp’s contention that The Bahamas voluntarily agreed, through the 1931 Extradition Treaty, to provide speedy trials to persons whom it wished to extradite from the United States. The Supreme Court, in Neely, specifically acknowledged that a treaty may obligate a foreign sovereign to accord American procedural protections to persons extradited from this nation. The majority opinion recognizes as much, for it concedes that the Treaty applies United States statutes of limitation against The Bahamas in extradition cases. Of course, a nation that has voluntarily submitted to application of United States statutory requirements may likewise agree to follow United States constitutional requirements. The Bahamas did precisely that in the Treaty at issue here.3
III. CONCLUSION
I would apply Article 5 of the 1931 Treaty as it was written, giving effect to each of its clauses. Because Article 5 incorporates Speedy Trial Clause protections, I would reverse the district court’s contrary holding and remand the case in order for that court to determine whether Yapp’s speedy trial rights were violated in this case.

. The 1990 Extradition Treaty between the United States and The Bahamas is even shorter than the “short” version I have set out in the text, but it accomplishes the same puipose. The 1990 Treaty contains no reference to lapses of time that occur after the institution of penal prosecution or after conviction. In addition, the new treaty's lapse of time provision incorporates only the protections of the nation seeking extradition. The new treaty provides: "Extradition shall not be granted when all prosecution has become barred by lapse of time according to the laws in the Requesting State.” See Extradition Treaty, Mar. 9, 1990, U.S.-Bah., art. 6, S.Treaty Doc. No. 17, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).

. This post-conviction language may refer to the British doctrine of "abuse of process,” a doctrine similar in some ways to our Speedy Trial Clause. See Regina v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Sinclair, 2 App.Cas. 64, 2 All E.R. 366 (H.L.1991) (suggesting that Article 5 of the 1931 Extradition Treaty incorporates the British "abuse of process” doctrine, which could bar a signatory from waiting 15 years to extradite a person convicted ip absentia). See generally Denby v. Seaboard World Airlines, 737 F.2d 172, 176 n. 5 (2d Cir.1984) (noting that "respect” is “always due to a decision of the House of Lords”). Of course, if the Treaty's reference to post-conviction delay was intended to refer to the "abuse of process” doctrine, that fact would not also explain the Treaty’s separate reference to lapses of time occurring after the institution of the penal prosecution, a reference I believe can only refer to lapses of time governed by the Speedy Trial Clause.

. As the majority opinion notes, the U.S. Department of State has submitted a declaration stating that the Department interprets Article 5 of the 1931 Extradition Treaty to incorporate only statutes of limitation. The majority has chosen not to consider the Department’s untimely submission. However, even if we were to consider that submission, I would find it unpersuasive. The Department's declaration completely ignores the 1931 Extradition Treaty’s specific and unusual reference to lapses of time that occur after the institution of penal proceedings and after conviction. Instead, and without any reasoning specific to the treaty language at issue here, the Department contends that the Treaty's extradition bar incorporates only statutes of limitation. We should not "read [a treaty's] language ... as encompassing, much less compelling, so significant a deviation from normal word use.” Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 52, 83 S.Ct. 1054, 1056, 10 L.Ed.2d 184 (1963).