Court Opinion

ID: 9810850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:01:37.871816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:16.736109
License: Public Domain

Faircloth, O. J.,
dissenting: It is agreed that in considering the construction of wills the whole instrument must be considered, and that the primary intent of the testator, when it can be seen, governs the case. It appears from the will and the agreed facts that the widow is amply provided for during her life; that the ultimate remainderman, W. F. Kornegay, was over 50 years of age, and was reputed to be a man of large means; that John Kornegay was of feeble intellect, and that Albert was of tender years, was intelligent and of good habits. From these undisputed facts I infer that John and Albert were the prime objects of the testator’s intent. John having died without issue of course his interest survived to Albert.
The principle oi allowing a devise to vest absolutely at the earliest period, consistent with the will, relieves the estate of conditions and avoids the doctrine of perpetuity and executes the main intent of the testator, when not expressly forbidden by words or controlled by peculiar circumstances.
The case of Hilliard v. Kearney, 45 N. C., 221, was well considered and has been followed ever since. The application of the principles of that case is the only question in subsequent cases. There the gift was to five sisters, and ‘ ‘if either of them die without an heir, (construed to mean child or issue) her part to be equally divided among her other sisters.’ It was held that *204upon the death of the first sister without issue, the life tenant having died, the estate became absolute to the others as tenants in common and the doctrine of successive survivorships to the last was not allowed. The principle there announced is that when there is an intermediate period, between the death of the testator, and that of the legatee, as was the case in Price v. Johnson, 90 N. C., 592, to-wit, “At the age of 25 years,” that time would be adopted, hut if there he no such time, then the estate will become absolute at the death of the testator, ‘ ‘unless there be words to forbid it, or some consideration to turn the scale in favor of the latter,” i. e. the death of the legatee. • There are certainly no words in the will forbidding such a construction and I can see no facts in this case to lead us to a different conclusion. If it he urged that this view cuts off the income to the widow for life, and the ultimate contingent remainder, the answer is that that is the result only of giving effect to the primary intention of the testator, which appears from the will as before stated. The case of Davis v. Parker, 69 N. C., 271, rested solely on the authority of Hilliard v. Kearney, supra. The testatrix said, I give the balance of all mv propertv to Jno. Thomas Hollowell and his heirs “and if he should die and leave no lawful heirs of his body, then in that case, I give Celia Mayo the sum of two thousand dollars, to her and her heirs, and all the balance of mv property I give to my nearest relations, all except Joshua Davis,” etc. John Thomas Hollowell died intestate, without issue. It was held that Hollowell’s estate became absolute at the death of the testatrix. In that case the remainder was to the “nearest relations” of the testatrix, and thát would have been the declaration of the law in Hilliard v. Kearney, cited above, if successive *205survivorships had been allowed and the last surviving sister had died without issue.
In one case the will points to the heirs generally and in the other the law would have designated the same class as the ultimate takers of the estate. Davis v. Parker, supra, seems to fit the case before us.
1 take another view. There is certainly no interest left in the testator and no possibility of any reverter to him or his heirs, as was the case in Trexler v. Holler, 107 N. C., 617. The. interest of W. F. Kornegay is a good contingent remainder, the person being certain, and is mot too remote, even if it could not become a vested estate, as my brethren think, until the death of the widow. Baker v. Pender, 50 N. C., 351. It being admitted by the agreed facts, that the plaintiff is the only brother and heir at law of the remainderman I do not see- why the estate in remainder should not descend to the.plaintiff and become vested,. Code, 1281. That would be the same result as that in my first contention, vesting an absolute estate in'the plaintiff. I do not think that the provision that the widow shall have the income of the land during her life, if she should live after the death of the legatees without issue, conveys to her any estate in the land. Burton v. Conigland, 82 N. C., 99.
My conclusion is that, at the death of the testator, the estate vested absolutely in John and Albert and, by the death of the former, his estate survived absolutely to the latter. If that was not so, I am much inclined to the opinion that upon the death of the remainderman without issue, his interest descending upon the plaintiff, his only heir at law, gave him a fee simple estate.