Court Opinion

ID: 9552698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:15:20.849592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:39.513171
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Presiding
Judge, dissenting:
I dissent. In my opinion, the closing argument by Assistant District Attorney Chris Ross was so improper that “the lack of contemporaneous objection is not controlling ... [as] the errors complained of are fundamental and prejudicial to the appellant’s right to a fair trial” Langdell v. State, 657 P.2d 162, 164 (Okl.Cr.1982).
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, adopted by this Court in Tart v. State, 634 P.2d 750 (Okl.Cr.1981), provide-that it shall be unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to “express his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.” ABA Standards, § 5-8(c). Yet, from the outset of his summation, the prosecutor claimed “[t]he Defense wants you to believe the story, Ladies and Gentlemen, a fairy tale involving explicit, illicit sexual affair.” (Emphasis added). From that beginning, the prosecutor referred to the appellant’s defense as “an unbelievable fairy tale this man and his friends have told you.” He called appellant’s testimony “so unbelievable ... completely and totally unbelievable.” Assistant D.A. Ross also claimed that the appellant “ridiculed [the victim] through the slanderous lies of [appellant] and his friends.” We have re*1292peatedly held that accusations an appellant has lied are improper. See Cowles v. State, 636 P.2d 342, 345 (Okl.Cr.1981). See also Cobbs v. State, 629 P.2d 368, 369 (Okl.Cr.1981). This line of argument is equally improper when directed to the testimony of defense witnesses. Ray v. State, 510 P.2d 1395 (Okl.Cr.1973). Furthermore, the prosecutor twice accused defense counsel of attempting to “blur [the jury’s] focus” of the issues. This argument was improper. See Cannon v. State, 507 P.2d 584 (Okl.Cr.1973). See also Fulks v. State, 481 P.2d 769 (Okl.Cr.1971), (accusing counsel of creating a “smokescreen”). Finally, the prosecutor ought to vouch for the veracity of the victim, a practice we have repeatedly decried. See Sisk v. State, 487 P.2d 1003 (Okl.Cr.1971); Payne v. State, 520 P.2d 694 (Okl.Cr.1974). I am also particularly concerned by the prosecutor’s claim that “this isn’t the first time she (the victim) told this story. She told it to me. She told it at the preliminary hearing and that was a year and a half ago.” We have previously condemned similar comments. See Cole v. State, 83 Okl.Cr. 254, 175 P.2d 376 (1946) (prosecutor’s claim that the witness’s statement “was the same as it was the first time he hold it to him,” held improper).
The State responds, in part, that these arguments were not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Brief of Appellee, p. 15. Although I do not believe the evidence here can fairly be called “overwhelming,” the State is directed to recall our statement in Ward v. State, 633 P.2d 757 (Okl.Cr.1981), that even if the evidence is overwhelming, “in such cases ... where the whole closing argument is fraught with error, the proceedings take on a fundamental unfairness which this Court cannot condone.” Id. at 759. A denial of fundamental fairness constitutes a denial of due process under our State and Federal constitutions. Ross’ argument was replete with improper comments. This case should be reversed, and appellant afforded a trial free from prejudice.