Court Opinion

ID: 9729046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:25:21.08532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.036390
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, J.
I respectfully dissent. When a dismissal of a juvenile petition alleging a misdemeanor is required because of failure of the “prosecutor” to have the physical evidence necessary to establish the *35charge, the dismissal should operate as a bar to refiling. The legislative dictate in Penal Code section 1387 should be as applicable to a juvenile as it is to an adult. This dictate—in part predicated upon a theory of avoidance of harassment and the right to a speedy trial—makes the principle applicable to all persons through equal protection of the law. This is merely an application of the rationale of Olivas (17 Cal.3d 236 [131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375]). Neil G. as authority should be limited to its facts, i.e., involving a felony.1 The limiting sentence in Neil G. (p. 576) is: “This result follows whether we use as the controlling analogy the law relating to dismissal in civil or criminal proceedings.” This statement is only true when felonies are involved, which that court recognized.
I would have the peremptory writ issue.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 12, 1977. Stephens, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 22, 1977. Bird, C. J., Mosk, J., and Newman, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 The problem involving the granting of a continuance is not before us; hence, it is unnecessary to discuss that aspect of the Neil G. opinion.