Court Opinion

ID: 9767928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:35:32.666443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:34.924232
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing
Appellee in his motion for rehearing complains that we erred in holding that the trial court should have given the instruction quoted in our original opinion as to how a will may be revoked. His position is that, as applied to the facts of.this case, the requested instruction is not substantially correct and to have given it would, because of the peculiar facts of this case, have been misleading and confusing to the jury.
We have concluded that appellee is correct and that his motion for rehearing should be granted and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Rule 279, T.R.C.P., provides that the failure of the trial court to give a definition or explanatory instruction shall not be error unless a substantially correct definition or explanatory instruction has been requested in writing and tendered by the party complaining of the judgment. See discussion in Hodges on Special Issue Submission in Texas, Sections 65, 66 and 67. The first paragraph of the explanatory instruction requested was a quotation of Section 63 of the Probate Code and states the various ways in which a will may be revoked. A will or any clause or devise therein can be revoked only in the following ways:
1. Execution of a subsequent will, codicil or declaration in writing, executed with like formalities.
2. By the testator destroying the will or causing its destruction in his presence.
3. Cancellation by the testator or by his causing it to be cancelled in his presence.
The requested instruction is correct as an abstract proposition of law, but is too *607broad as applied to the facts of this case. Only such explanatory instructions should be given that are material to the case on trial.
In this case the only issue raised by the evidence was whether there had been revocation by execution of another will. If the first paragraph of the requested instruction had explained that a will or any devise therein could only be revoked by a subsequent will in writing executed with like formalities, it would have been correct as applied to the facts of this case, and, when coupled with the second paragraph of the requested instruction would have been a complete and appropriate instruction.
Peculiar to this case, however, is the well supported finding of the jury that the words, “I also bequeath all real and personal property” contained on the first page of the will were not there prior to the date the testator signed the will. Further, there was the finding that the words, “son, Leon Mitchell” contained in paragraph VII in the will, had not been erased prior to the execution of the will and replaced by the words, “brother, Arthur L.”
Since the requested explanatory instruction included the statement that a will or a devise therein could be revoked by “cancellation”, the jury might reasonably conclude that these changes in the will were a revocation through cancellation. Yet we know such is not true under the cases cited in the last paragraph of our original opinion.
We remain of the view that a proper explanatory instruction on how a will can be revoked should be given on proper request.
Appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled.
Appellee’s motion of rehearing is granted, our judgment reversing and remanding the case is set aside and the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.