Court Opinion

ID: 9384674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:07:33.761892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.578464
License: Public Domain

J-S02045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JORDAN RAYMOND SANCHEZ                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1059 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 27, 2020
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-54-CR-0001910-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                       FILED: APRIL 4, 2023

       Appellant, Jordan Raymond Sanchez, appeals nunc pro tunc from the

judgment of sentence entered on August 27, 2020, after a jury convicted him

of Aggravated Assault, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, Simple

Assault, Receiving Stolen Property, and Possessing Instruments of Crime.1

Appellant challenges the weight that the factfinder placed on the victim’s

testimony and the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence to convict him

of Aggravated Assault. Appellant also raises an after-discovered evidence

claim. After careful review, we affirm.

       On September 28, 2019, Appellant, with the help of his girlfriend Nicole

Finken, lured Samuel Rodriguez (“Victim”) into a dark basement. Once there,

Appellant pulled out a handgun and fired one shot into the wall behind Victim.
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2705, 2701(a)(1), 3925(a), and 907(a),
respectively.
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Appellant then asked Finken to move further away from Victim and fired a

second shot into Victim’s left knee. As a result, Victim “suffers from gunshot

injuries to his leg, nerve damage to both legs, a torn tibia, torn femur in his

[left] leg, and nerve damage in his right leg as well as severed blood vessels

and arteries” and uses a wheelchair. Trial Ct. Op., 9/19/22, at 7 (citing N.T.

Trial, 6/25/20, at 69-70).

       On June 25, 2020, at the conclusion of a one-day trial, the jury convicted

Appellant of the above charges. On August 3, 2020, the court sentenced

Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 7 to 14 years of incarceration.2

       On July 7, 2022, the trial court reinstated Appellant’s appellate rights

nunc pro tunc, after which Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. Appellant

and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises three issues for our review:

       [1.] Whether the victim’s testimony was substantial for a
       conviction when considering his inconsistent statements that he
       gave to police?

       [2.] Whether the Commonwealth was able to show that
       [Appellant] acted with intent to cause serious bodily injury?

       [3.] Whether [Appellant] is entitled to a new trial based on the
       after[-]discovered evidence indicating that [Victim] was going to
       beat up [Appellant] and saying [Appellant’s] girlfriend would have
       never gotten out of there on the night in question?

Appellant’s Br. at 4.

____________________________________________

2 On August 27, 2020, the court issued a modified sentencing order in
response to Appellant’s Motion to Modify Sentence. The order did not alter
Appellant’s aggregate term of incarceration.

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                                               A.

       In his first issue, Appellant argues that because Victim testified at trial

in a manner that was allegedly inconsistent with statements he provided to

the police, his testimony “le[ft] reasonable doubt as to what really did happen

in the basement.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. Although he purports to contest the

sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Appellant in fact assails the

factfinder’s credibility determinations and weight that it placed on Victim’s

testimony. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 692 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa. Super.

1997) (“[C]redibility determinations are made by the fact finder and []

challenges thereto go to the weight, and not the sufficiency, of the evidence.”)

       Appellant did not, however, raise and preserve his weight challenge in

the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 497 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (explaining that an appellant must preserve a weight challenge

before sentencing or in a post-sentence motion). As a result, this issue is

waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).3

                                               B.

       In his second issue, Appellant asserts that insufficient evidence supports

his Aggravated Assault conviction because the Commonwealth did not prove

____________________________________________

3 Moreover, Appellant’s argument is woefully underdeveloped. He has failed
to properly develop this issue for our review by supporting his argument with
citation to the record and pertinent authority. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). This Court
will address only those issues properly developed for our review.
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007).

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that he possessed the specific “intent to cause serious bodily injury.”

Appellant’s Br. at 4. Considering well-settled case law, we conclude that

Appellant’s argument is meritless.

      A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict

is a question of law subject to plenary review. Commonwealth v. Mikitiuk,

213 A.3d 290, 300 (Pa. Super. 2019). We examine whether the evidence at

trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict

winner, is sufficient to establish each element of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa.

Super. 2014).

      A person commits Aggravated Assault if he “attempts to cause serious

bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or

recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value

of human life[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is “[b]odily

injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,

permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of

any bodily member or organ.” Id. at § 2301.

      To prove Aggravated Assault based upon an attempt, i.e. where the

assaultive conduct did not cause the victim to suffer a serious bodily injury,

“the Commonwealth must show that the accused acted with specific intent to

inflict serious bodily injury.” Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 673 A.2d 962,

966 (Pa. Super. 1996). Where, however, the victim actually sustains a serious

bodily injury, “the Commonwealth is not required to prove specific intent.”

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Commonwealth v. Patrick, 933 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2007). See

also Commonwealth v. Burton, 2 A.3d 598, 602 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“When

a victim actually sustains serious bodily injury, the Commonwealth can, but

does not necessarily have to, establish specific intent to cause such harm.”).

       The trial court in the instant case explained that the Commonwealth’s

evidence at trial proved that Victim suffered a serious bodily injury from the

shooting. Trial Ct. Op., 9/19/22, at 7. The record supports this finding. See

N.T. Trial, 6/25/20, at 69-70 (Victim’s uncontested testimony regarding

injuries suffered from the shooting). Thus, the Commonwealth was not

required to prove that Appellant possessed the specific intent to cause serious

bodily injury. Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence fails.4

                                               C.

       In his final issue, Appellant argues that he is “entitled to a new hearing

based on newly discovered evidence.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. In support,

Appellant has attached to his brief printouts of over 20 Facebook messages

allegedly exchanged between Victim and Finken (Appellant’s girlfriend) in

____________________________________________

4Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence to
prove that he acted with malice. Appellant’s Br. at 14-16. Appellant did not,
however, raise this issue in his Rule 1925(b) Statement and, as a result, it is
waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

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2021.5 Id. at Appendix A. Appellant has identified 3 of the messages as

relevant to the instant appeal:

       [T]hat’s why he shot me, he knows what the fuck it was he was
       going to get beat the fuck up in there that little bitch ass[.]

                                          ***

       Pussy had to shoot me cuz i beat that bitch ass n**** the fuck
       up.

                                          ***

       The reason the bitch did that cuz i done smack that lil whore b4
       that’s y he had to shoot me him or u would of never got out of
       there bitch.

Id. at 10-11, Appendix A. Appellant alleges that these messages prove that

he acted in self-defense when he shot Victim. Id. at 13-14.

       An appellant may properly raise a claim of after-discovered evidence for

the first time on direct appeal. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(C), cmt.6 To warrant relief,

the appellant must prove, inter alia, that “the evidence is of such a nature and

character that a different outcome is likely.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939

A.2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super. 2007).
____________________________________________

5 These messages are included in the certified record as attachments to
Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement.

6 Generally, when an appellant raises an after-discovered evidence claim for
the first time on direct appeal, we remand to the trial court for it to rule on
Appellant’s claim. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 cmt. We then review the trial court’s
ruling for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Woeber, 174 A.3d
1096, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2017). Here, however, since Appellant raised this
claim for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) Statement, the trial court was able
to address it. As such, and in the interest of judicial economy, we need not
remand. We will instead review the trial court’s reasoning in its Rule 1925(a)
Opinion for an abuse of discretion.

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      The trial court found that Appellant failed to prove that the Facebook

messages are of such a nature that they would change the outcome of trial.

It explained that the “incoherent[ and] profanity laden” Facebook messages,

consisting largely of “derogatory racial slurs and incomprehensible rambling,”

do not prove that Appellant acted in self-defense. Trial Ct. Op. at 12. We

agree.

      Self-defense is the justifiable use of force where “the actor believes that

such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself

against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present

occasion.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). Importantly, the actor must have been “free

from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the use of

deadly force” and have not “violate[d] any duty to retreat or to avoid the

danger.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citation omitted). The actor must retreat when “he can avoid the necessity of

using such force with complete safety by retreating[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. §

505(b)(2)(ii).

      Here, the evidence adduced at trial proved that Appellant (1) provoked

the conflict with Victim, and (2) did not retreat when he could have done so.

Appellant and Finken lured Victim into a dark basement, where Appellant

brandished a firearm and shot once at Victim, missing him. N.T. Trial at 76-

80. Appellant then paused, asked Finken to move further away from Victim,

and shot Victim in the leg. Id.

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       When viewed in the context of the evidence, the Facebook messages do

not prove self-defense. They do not address the fact that Appellant provoked

the conflict with Victim. They likewise do not obviate Appellant’s failure to

retreat when he could have done so. These messages are, thus, not the type

of evidence that would make a different outcome at trial likely. As a result,

this claim fails.7

                                               D.

       In sum, we conclude that Appellant waived his challenge to the weight

of the evidence, and his sufficiency and after-discovered evidence claims lack

merit. As a result, we affirm.

       Judgment of Sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

____________________________________________

7 Additionally, Victim’s statements are inadmissible hearsay that do not fall
within an exception. Pa.R.E. 802-804. Appellant, thus, could not utilize these
statements at trial as direct evidence. The only use for these statements would
be to impeach Victim’s testimony. It is axiomatic, however, that after-
discovered evidence will not provide a basis for relief where the proposed
evidence is solely for impeachment purposes. Rivera, 939 A.2d 359.

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