Court Opinion

ID: 9564090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:54:13.130376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:13.576486
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting):
For the following reasons, I dissent. The difficulty in reviewing the proceedings of the Juvenile Court in this case involves the failure of that court to adhere to our law,1 which requires “ . . the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, . . . ” Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. This Court has previously admonished the Juvenile Court the law requires written findings and conclusions of law to support an adjudication.2
The only written findings in the record provide as follows:
“Findings And Conclusions: The court finds the petition of December 29, 1978, to be true. That said child comes within Section 16 of the Utah Juvenile Court Act of 1965.”
The petition alleged:
“On or about the 28th day of October, 1978, K. H. did, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or any drug, cause the death of Paul Wilson by operating a motor vehicle in a negligent manner.”
Concededly the court orally discussed his findings as indicated in approximately 3V2 pages of the trial transcript. However, the quality of the transcript reflects the necessity for written findings. For example, the record indicates the Court stated: “ . . .1 feel that physical evidence of the, even the damage of, the injury to the driver, even though of a questionable na*854ture, was not such that I had a doubt that I could say would be reasonable doubt. And to that point, J. W., having also been seriously injured, still her injuries, in examining myself and all of the medical reports, although that typifying myself as a physician to that particular point, the testimony that I have received, Miss W., Miss W.’s injuries were still not consistent with placement of herself between the seats, between the driver and the deceased . [Emphasis supplied.]
By using the term “consistent” rather than the term “inconsistent” the court’s finding had the effect of further substantiating K. K. H.’s claim that the evidence clearly established a reasonable doubt she was guilty of automobile homicide. One of the vigorously contested issues of this case was whether K. K. H. was the driver of the vehicle. One police officer testified the warped condition of the steering wheel was caused by the forces of the body, and the body would suffer similar injuries. Another police officer testified as to the dynamics of the accident as reflected in the physical evidence; the driver would be thrown to the right and go forward; he surmised the driver would hit the steering wheel on the right hand side and go towards the middle of the vehicle. An officer testified J. W. was observed by him with the left part of her body on the driver’s seat and part of her buttock’s resting against but not on the passenger’s seat. Three witnesses who arrived on the accident scene described J. W. as being slumped over the steering wheel, in the vicinity of the driver’s seat. J. W. had serious chest injuries; K. K. H. had none. Thus, the oral finding of the court [although possibly a mistranscription or slip of the tongue] that J. W.’s injuries were not consistent with the position between the two front seats, as claimed by the prosecution, further verifies K. K. H.’s claim.
During the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding in the Juvenile Court, the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.3 K. K. H. urges that the State has not sustained this burden of proof. K. K. H. contends the evidence against her was almost completely circumstantial4 that she was driving the car at the time of the accident. She cites the rule, viz., where the only evidence pointing to an accused’s guilt is circumstantial, to warrant conviction the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the accused’s guilt.5
In State v. Schad,6 this Court stated: “ . where a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the evidence should be looked upon with caution, and that it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of defendant. This is entirely logical, because if the jury believes that there is a reasonable hypothesis in the evidence consistent with the defendant’s innocence, there would naturally be a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Nevertheless, that proposition does not apply to each circumstance separately, but is a matter within the prerogative of the jury to determine from all of the facts and circumstances shown; and if therefrom they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, it necessarily follows that they regarded the evidence as excluding every other reasonable hypothesis. Unless upon our review of the evidence, and the reasonable inferences fairly to be deduced therefrom, it appears that there is no reasonable basis therein for such a conclusion, we should not overturn the verdict.”
In State v. Burch 7 this Court explained: “ . . Where the alleged offense and the accused’s alleged connection *855therewith rest wholly upon circumstantial evidence, which evidence, as a matter of law, is reasonably consistent with the innocence of the accused, then this court must hold that there is not substantial evidence to support the guilt of the accused. . . . ”
The physical evidence of the damages to the vehicle and the injuries sustained by K. K. H. and J. W. and the testimony interpreting this evidence by the investigating officers and the medical expert constitute a reasonable view of substantial, credible evidence which is reconcilable with defendant’s innocence, as a consequence there would be a reasonable doubt as to K. K. H.’s guilt.8
The term “hypothesis” is defined as “a proposition tentatively assumed in order to draw out its logical or empirical consequences and so test its accord with facts that are known or may be determined.”9
The hypothesis urged by K. K. H. was that she was not the driver of the vehicle and was, in fact, in the back seat at the time of the collision. The injuries sustained by K. K. H. included a fractured right femur and a laceration to the anterior right knee. She also sustained a small contusion to her shoulder and small laceration above her eye; her chest was normal. J. W. sustained chest injuries, including broken ribs, and a fractured second vertebra in the neck. She had no head injuries except as she described a cut on her chin. J. W. had a broken left ankle, an injured right foot (no fractures), a fractured pelvis, lacerated buttocks, and fractured left hand.
The medical expert, Dr. Brian, an orthopedic surgeon, testified after observing the deformity of the steering wheel, he would expect fractures to the body from the impact. The doctor described the injuries he would expect a person in the passenger seat to sustain as injuries to the extremities, head lacerations, chest injuries, and multiple fractures to the face. For a person situated in the middle between the passenger and driver seat, he would expect leg and head trauma, multiple lacerations, contusions to face, and broken legs. The doctor further testified that the person in the driver’s seat would sustain most of the chest injuries from the steering wheel. He conceded that a passenger can sustain chest injuries, but it is usually the face and legs which are injured as the person is thrown forward.
The investigating officer testified the main point of impact of the vehicle wa$ the right front side. As noted ante, the dynamics of the accident would thrust the driver forward and to the right towards the middle of the vehicle.
From the foregoing it may be concluded K. K. H.’s hypothesis is in accord with these substantial and credible facts. Since this hypothesis is reconcilable with K. K. H.’s innocence, logically there is a reasonable doubt as to her guilt and the conviction cannot be sustained.
There is another aspect concerning evi-dentiary insufficiency on the face of the record; the Juvenile Court concluded K. K. H. had committed automobile homicide by an act of simple negligence. The court in its oral findings stated:
Now, the question is simple negligence. There was an accident, collision with a wall along the Ogden River. The vehicle did leave the road for some distance, did collide with the, with the wall. The death of the passenger was caused by that particular accident. .
The only evidence in the record concerning the facts leading to impact was testimony that the tracks of the two right tires of the vehicle could be observed in the area beyond the white line marking the right edge of the lane for a distance of 68 feet 9 inches prior to impact. These tracks did not indicate any evidence of evasive action. It should be observed that a vehicle traveling 25 miles per hour moves at the rate of *85636.6 feet per second and one traveling 30 miles per hour at the rate of 44 feet per second. There is nothing in the record to indicate the speed of the vehicle, but if the vehicle had been traveling at the speed of 25 miles per hour, it would have collided with the wall in less than two seconds after the right tires commenced rolling over the area beyond the white line at the edge of the road. The Juvenile Court found that K. K. H. was under the influence of alcohol with a consequent impairment to her coordination and perception. These were the facts to support the court’s finding of simple negligence; the sufficiency of which there need be no comment in light of State v. Chavez.
In the recent decision of State v. Chavez, Utah, 605 P.2d 1226 (1979) this Court ruled negligence is an element of the crime of automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207(1), and such negligence must at least rise to the level of criminal negligence as defined in Section 76-2-103(4) or defendant is guilty of no offense at all. Under the doctrine of manifest error, we must acknowledge one of the elements (criminal negligence) of automobile homicide has not been proven and the finding of the Juvenile Court cannot be sustained. This cause should be reversed and remanded to the Juvenile Court with an order to dismiss the petition.

. 78-3a-39; 78-3a-44(l); Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P.-

. State in the Interest of R.N., Utah, 527 P.2d 1356 (1974).

. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1074, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

. There is in evidence an admission that K. H. first denied and then admitted to the arresting officer in the hospital that she was driving. The officer conceded that she was in a state of shock, and was emotionally disturbed and frightened.

. State v. John, Utah, 586 P.2d 410 (1978).

. 24 Utah 2d 255, 257, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970).

. 100 Utah 414, 419, 115 P.2d 911, 913 (1941).

. See State v. John, note 5 supra, p. 412 of 586 P.2d.

. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.