Court Opinion

ID: 9566151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:34:30.337306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:17.787585
License: Public Domain

*410Beasley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all except Division 14. The error in the instructions does not require a retrial because of the high improbability of its misleading the jury. The jury had all of the evidence before it and could see as well as, if not better than, we can that there was no evidence of oral communication of the defamation over the phone. That makes the charge of no significant account.
The judge did not intimate that there was such evidence, but only gave an instruction with regard to what to do if there was. He specifically reminded the jury that such a showing would have to be by a preponderance of the evidence. This affirmed the general charge,, which clearly and unambiguously counseled on plaintiffs’ burden of proof, the meaning of which the court had carefully explained.
The court had also instructed about the nature of evidence and cautioned against employing unfounded inferences or speculation. In its charge it stated: “You’re dealing solely in this case at this time with the question of libel . . . should you find the letters were not libels or they were privileged, the Defendant is entitled to a verdict in the case.” The part of the charge objected to which is quoted in the majority opinion as beginning “[S]hould you find . . .” was preceded by: “All written communication or written defamation constitutes libel, therefore, ...” Written libel was explained and attention was drawn repeatedly to “letters.”
Pivotal is that the primary issue was whether the content of the communication was libelous, not whether the letters were published through the mail. Had the latter been seriously in doubt, then whether there was publication by telephone could have been crucial. But not otherwise.
That the jury was almost assuredly not misled into an unevidenced operative finding is demonstrated by its questions after just twenty-five minutes of deliberation. The inquiries focused on the contents of the written communication, damages, and the definition of libel. Further deliberations took about an hour and twenty minutes.
A consideration of these circumstances and context, and the court’s comprehensive charge after the lengthy trial, together with the jury’s attention to the evidence that was presented, leads to the legal conclusion that the error does not require reversal of the judgment and verdict and the granting of a new trial. Davis v. Davis, 211 Ga. 714 (88 SE2d 377) (1955); Scholle Atlanta Corp. v. Nealy, 110 Ga. App. 775, 778 (140 SE2d 88) (1964).