Court Opinion

ID: 9713166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:09:47.589753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:17.191935
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because a property right has been snatched from the grasp of its lawful titleholder. The property right is possession of certain real property. When the Thompsons were divorced, the divorce decree settled onee and for all their marital status and their property rights. Custody and the support of children may be an ongoing matter for the trial court to adjust *1338from time to time when a substantial change in circumstances indicate that an adjustment is needed, but finality should be the hallmark of the decree as far as property rights are concerned. Support provisions in a decree for divorce should be clearly defined and set apart from the division of property. This was clearly done in the case before us. Before granting the right of possession, the trial court did not find that the divorce decree was ambiguous nor did it indicate that extrinsic evidence was necessary to express the original intent of the decree. The divorce decree rendered by the trial court is clear and unambiguous regarding custody of the children, support, marital status of the parties, and property division. 'To change the property rights in the original decree, the trial court would have to find fraud. There was none. The trial court should be reversed.
The orders as to property disposition entered under section 9 of this chapter may not be revoked or modified, except in case of fraud which ground shall be asserted within six (6) years after the order is entered.
West's ALC. § 81-1-11.5-17(b) (Supp. 1989)
A review of the original divorcee decree vividly underscores the clarity and unambiguous granting of the right to possession without qualification or condition. In its decree, the trial court made provisions for custody of two minor children, one of the marriage and one of a former marriage. After making the provisions for custody and support, the trial court in a seperate paragraph made a division of the property. It should be especially noted that no provision is made for the change of possession of the residence if and when at some later date there should be a change of child custody.
The Court finds that there was one child born of the parties, namely Paul Daniel Thompson, born February 27, 1978, and Respondent [Paull is hereby awarded the care and custody of said minor child, reserving to the Petitioner [Joyce] reasonable rights of visitation. The Court further finds that legal custody of Michael Ray King, son of the Petitioner, who has been raised by the Respondent since the age of five (5) months, shall be shared jointly by Respondent and Petitioner and Michael Ray King shall be allowed to live with Respondent, if he so chooses. If, at any time, the children wish to live with the Petitioner, the Respondent shall sign over full custody of children without a court hearing. The Court further finds that the Petitioner can see the minor children of the parties for a visit and activities anytime she wishes as long as it doesn't interfere with schooling.
The Court further finds that the control of the property at 2024 Costello Drive, Anderson, Indiana, shall be awarded to the Respondent, but upon the death of either party the property shall go to the survivor. The Court further finds that the property will remain in both parties names as joint tenants, and if ever sold profits shall be equally split. (Emphases added.)
The Majority Opinion relies heavily on Barlow v. Barlow (1978), 56 Ill.App.3d 629, 14 Ill.Dec. 411, 372 N.E.2d 422, an Illinois case to support its position, but Barlow is easily distinguished on several grounds. First, the Barlow Court made a finding that the divorcee decree was ambiguous and needed interpretation, and secondly, the Barlow Court used extrinsic evidence to finally arrive at its conclusion. In the Majority Opinion, the trial court did not make a finding that the divorce decree was ambiguous nor did the trial court resort to the use of extrinsic evidence. Other features in the Barlow decree clearly show that it is inapplicable in the Thompson appeal. For example, in Barlow both parties were to pay half the mortgage and tax payments. In Thompson, the only provision made for the wife to pay anything was in regard to "non-insured medical expenses and other debts" when she became employed. To overcome this hiatus, the Majority Opinion makes a finding of ambiguity for the trial court and then proceeds to search the record to discover where the trial court considered extrinsic evidence.
*1339Without any conditions or limitations placed upon the term of possession, the property settlement is fixed, definite, and beyond modification by the trial court. Provisions for support can be intermingled with the division of real property and the right to possession. Wagner v. Wagner (1986), Ind.App., 491 N.E.2d 549. However, the language used in the divorce decree must be clear and unequivocal as to the support conditions which encumber those rights which normally flow with the title; otherwise, what appears to be a property settlement is not a property settlement at all, and the divorce decree means nothing but additional litigation. Too, attorneys will never be certain about what advice to give their clients-whether the decree really means what it says. There are many other problems created by permitting such permissive modifications. Future alienation of property and further encum-berance of property are just a few of the hazards unnecessarily created.
I would reverse the trial court.