Court Opinion

ID: 9698124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:42:34.580281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:38.567618
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Jones:
I fully concur in the majority opinion and would like to add these few additional words. The declaratory judgment act is a uniform act, and as such it should be interpreted and construed so as “to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the States which enact it and to harmonize, as far as possible, with Federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees.” 12 P.S. §845. Although this Commonwealth was one of the first to adopt the uniform act, our courts early engrafted two conditions precedent to the use of the declaratory judgment procedure which have remained unique to Pennsylvania: (1) that there must not be established an existing common law or equitable remedy; and (2) that there must be no dispute of fact in the case. See P. Amram, A Look at Declaratory Judgments In Pennsylvania Today, 41 Pa. Bar Ass’n Q. 384 (1970). As the majority points out, these court-made limitations are inconsistent with the statute as originally enacted and amended.
*102In Friestad v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 452 Pa. 417, 306 A. 2d 295 (1973), tbis Court finally abandoned tbe first of these aberrant limitations;1 I am pleased to see that the Court today discards the other. The existence of a factual question can no longer remove the trial court’s discretion to allow a declaratory judgment proceeding. To the contrary, following today’s decision, the existence of a factual dispute can play no part in the exercise of the trial court’s discretion in this regard.

 See also Johnson Estate, 403 Pa. 476, 171 A. 2d 518 (1961), overruled sub silentio by McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644, 179 A. 2d 222 (1962).