Court Opinion

ID: 9707831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:22:45.060319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:38.686284
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Retired Justice
(concurring in part; dissenting in part).
For clarity and convenience of the reader, and to appreciate the viewpoint of this writer, the trial court’s. Findings of Fact 3 through 8 are set forth, in toto, herein. Conclusions of Law 3 through 5 entered by the trial court, thereafter follow.
FINDINGS- OF FACT
3. One child has been born as issue of this marriage, namely: Lindsey Margaret, born November 19, 1991.
4. The parties presented a Stipulation and Agreement for approval by the Court at the time set for trial herein, which Stipulation and Agreement the Court finds to be an appropriate disposition of the issues addressed therein.
5. In open court and orally, the parties further stipulated that the plaintiff would continue to provide medical insurance for the benefit of the minor child, that the premium for the same attributable to said child would be divided 39% to defendant and 61% to plaintiff, and that any medical, dental, or optical expenses incurred for the benefit of the child and not covered by such insurance would be covered by the same percentages, all in accordance with SDCL 25-7-6.16.
6. Only two issues remained for determination by the Court, namely (1) the last name to be used by the minor child of the parties and (2) whether defendant should be required to pay his child support through an assignment of his wages.
7. With respect to the name, the Court notes that the mother, although unmarried at the time of conception, married the undisputed father of the child, defendant, prior to the birth of the child.
8. The Interim Order of this Court required support to be paid on or before the 10th day of each month. Defendant has been timely in his payments although always paying within the month due. He receives his paycheck on alternate Thursdays and is unable to pay the support with the paycheck he receives earlier in the month because, with his low earnings, he would be unable to pay his rent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

3. The oral Stipulation of the parties with regard to allocation of the cost of medical insurance for the child of the parties and medical, dental, and optical expenses for said child not covered by such insurance should be approved by this Court.
4. Pursuant to SDCL 34-25-13.1 the name of the defendant husband, that *701is, “Gudahl”, shall be the last name of the child and her legal name shall be Lindsey Margaret Gudahl. Further, the name of the father shall be inserted an the birth certificate of the child as her last name and her birth certificate shall be so corrected.
5. Defendant shall not be required to execute a Wage Assignment provided that he make timely payment of the support due from the later of his cheeks each month, the same to be postmarked not later than the Friday following receipt of his paycheck and sent directly to plaintiff.
(Emphasis supplied mine.)
Knowing full well that Timothy A. Gudahl was the father of this child, Jennifer Keegan arbitrarily decided that the father’s name not be mentioned. A name does not just identify you. It signifies a relationship — of family— roots. See Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10, 14 (1978). Natural mother had no superior right to interrupt the inheritance of a surname. Such type of action “is not commensurate with genealogy, history, justice and fairness in the United States.” Montandon v. Montandon, 242 Cal.App.2d 886, 52 Cal.Rptr. 43 (1966). A natural father has a proteetible interest to have a child bear his surname. I refer to Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Rights and Remedies of Parents Inter Se with Respect to the Names of their Children, 92 A.L.R.3d 1091, 1105 (1979).
If a natural mother is the custodial parent and retains her maiden name or takes the surname of another, she risks eroding the natural bond between father and child if she imposes her surname upon the child. Certainly, weakening or severance of that relationship does not serve the child’s best interest. Nay, a child should know of his or her parentage — the name is a link to history. Moreover, it is reality! Recall, she and the father had been married for six months. She unilaterally decided that the child’s birth would be illegitimate and unilaterally named the child Lindsey Margaret Keegan. Thereby, natural mother invaded both the child’s rights and the natural father’s rights. Natural mother attempted to defeat the law, not uphold it. Her action was legally obnoxious. Obviously, this was a social and legal detriment to both the father and the little girl. The best interest of the little girl was to have a legitimate birth. A father of an infant child has a natural right to have a child bear his name. Application of Baldini, 17 Misc.2d 195, 183 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1959). To overcome this, there must be compelling interests to singularly alter the child’s surname. Marshall v. Marshall, 230 Miss. 719, 93 So.2d 822 (1987); Overton v. Overton, 207 Mont. 292, 674 P.2d 1089 (1983); Cohan v. Cunningham, 104 A.D.2d 716, 480 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1984).
This child was not born out of wedlock. Consider Luedtke v. Koopsma, 303 N.W.2d 112 (S.D.1981), which upholds the proposition that children who are born during wedlock are presumed to be the legitimate issue of marriage. Who is this lady who would turn around state law — state decisions — legitimacy — honor—a rightful birth — family relationships — family history? She wants the child’s name to be her current name and that of another child by a different father. Thereby, she would have the family unit (ostensibly) have a more socially acceptable status and all names would be conveniently the same. She wants child support and medical expenses from daddy and has been receiving it, but she does not want the child to have daddy’s name!
Natural mother expresses in her brief to this Court (in her Statement of Facts): “No information regarding the father was contained on the birth certificate at the time it was completed.” Obviously, if she had done so, the child’s surname would have been the same as the natural father: the mother’s husband! In this day of law by acceleration and whirl, augured by the feminist movement in the field of domestic relations, why not make an inaccurate certificate! Excluding information about the known father served some kind of social/status gratification, to her way of thinking. However, by state law, the natural mother was required to attest to the accuracy of the birth. And the statute requires “accuracy!” This statute reflects “the personal data [must be] entered thereon.” See SDCL 34-25-92.
*702Here is the bottom line: She broke the law by excluding information concerning the true father. Omitting the father’s name from the birth certificate was legally obnoxious to the child’s birthright and a denial of Gudahl’s right to freely express that the child is actually his offspring. Divorce breeds hostility which undoubtedly plays a role in mother’s rejection of the natural father’s surname for the child. Hostility cannot change the true parentage of the little girl. Denial of parentage, based on emotion, is not in the best interest of the child, Cohee v. Cohee, 317 N.W.2d 381 (Neb.1982), and in my view is totally against public policy. The preservation and development of the father-child relationship should be a concern to the courts. Daves v. Nastos, 105 Wash.2d 24, 711 P.2d 314 (1985). Mother’s hostility is ill-placed. As a general matter, giving the child the mother’s maiden name to avoid embarrassment, inconvenience, or confusion is of little or no consideration. In re Application of Seif, 40 Misc.2d 596, 243 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1963); Flowers v. Cain, 218 Ya. 234, 237 S.E.2d 111 (1977); Likins v. Logsdon, 793 S.W.2d 118 (Ky.1990); Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 303 Md. 88, 492 A.2d 303 (1985); Annotation, 92 A.L.R.3d at 1100. This latter case expounds the view that the surname of a child, born during marriage, is traditionally that of the father.
Here, the father gives unto his child nourishment. 1 Samuel 1:22. And desires to bestow inheritance. Luke 12:13-14. A child should give honor to parents. Exodus: 20:12. Permit it, under the law and this case, to be done. Proverbs 23:22 expresses: Hearken unto your father who begot you, and despise not your mother when she is old. Children are a heritage of the Lord. Psalm .127:3-5. As a trial judge, I was often told by counsellors that problem children come from the very homes where parents have relinquished their responsibilities of nourishment, training, and overall responsibility. It is obvious this father desires to fulfill a good role. Permit him to do so; permit him to share a heritage with his child. Thereby, this child will not be vulnerable to the strange types of philosophy which attack a firm foundation of right and wrong.
Although I concur with that aspect of the majority opinion which holds that Circuit Judge Srstka has the authority to denominate the father’s surname as the child’s surname, I dissent to return the case to the circuit court for a rehearing “on the best interests of the child.” Judge Srstka had these parties before him; the facts of the case were likewise before him; the parties entered into a stipulation providing for child support (which was timely paid — he declared) and provided for medical, optical, and dental care (to which father was agreeable). The trial court considered all of these facts and the law, whereupon he dictated his rationale in the record, as reflected by the transcript. Proper Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the findings. We should not disturb them upon appeal. Hilde v. Flood, 81 S.D. 25, 130 N.W.2d 100 (1964). These findings support the conclusions of law and judgment. Kirkeby v. Kenaas, 85 S.D. 515, 186 N.W.2d 513 (1971).
Therefore, I would affirm the trial court in all respects, believing we should not march the troops up the hill — to thereafter march them down.