Court Opinion

ID: 9960179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 17:01:05.237247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:15.502731
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 15 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRUCE DWAIN COPELAND,                           No.    22-55947

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                2:22-cv-00275-MCS-MAA
 v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION                  MEMORANDUM*
GSAA HOME EQUITY TRUST 2006-12,
Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2006-12,
an Ohio Corporation; DOES, 1-10,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted April 15, 2024**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

      Bruce Dwain Copeland appeals pro se the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action alleging fraud and wrongful foreclosure. We have

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Creech v. Tewalt, 84

F.4th 777, 787 (9th Cir. 2023) (dismissal without leave to amend); Pardini v.

Unilever United States, Inc., 65 F.4th 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2023) (failure to state a

claim); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (res judicata).

We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Copeland’s action in part as barred by

claim preclusion because Copeland raised identical claims in a prior federal action,

which involved the same parties or their privies, and resulted in a final judgment

on the merits. See Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d at 956; Constantini v. Trans

World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982).

      The district court properly dismissed Copeland’s claims alleging wrongful

foreclosure, and to set aside the trustee’s sale, because Copeland failed to plausibly

allege that U.S. Bank caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of

his property; that Copeland suffered prejudice or harm; or that he was excused

from tendering. See, e.g., Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Servs., 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d

382, 390 (Ct. App. 2013) (identifying elements of wrongful foreclosure claim in

California).

      The district court properly dismissed Copeland’s cancellation of instrument

claim, because Copeland failed to plausibly allege that the foreclosure sale was

fraudulent, or that he was prejudiced by the sale. See, e.g., Weeden v. Hoffman,

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285 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 281 (Ct. App. 2021) (elements of cancellation of instrument

claim).

      The district court properly dismissed Copeland’s claim for violation of

California unfair business practices because Copeland failed to plausibly allege his

standing to pursue this claim. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 330, 339

(2016).

      The district court properly dismissed Copeland’s claim for declaratory relief

because Copeland failed to advance an independent, colorable legal theory for

which he could get declaratory relief. See Hood v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d

296, 298-99 (Ct. App. 1995).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend

because amendment would have been futile. See, e.g., Creech v. Tewalt, 84 F.4th

at 787.

      The district court properly denied Copeland’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings, because no claims remained following the district court’s decision to

dismiss.

      We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations made for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      AFFIRMED.

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