Court Opinion

ID: 9657533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:29:43.318201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:46.190538
License: Public Domain

RAWLINGS, Justice
(dissenting).
Being unable to agree with the reasoning expressed in Divisions I and II of the majority opinion, and result reached, I respectfully dissent.
I. The question presented is whether chapter 4S5A, Code, 1966, permits the natural resources council to compel compliance with the provisions of that Act by injunc-tive procedure, more specifically by mandatory injunction as to those structures, dams, obstructions,' deposits or excavations, hereafter sometimes referred to as structures, which have been constructed or on which construction has been commenced within any floodway or flood plain in the state subsequent to effective date of the Act. In my humble opinion the council does have such power and authority.
At the outset section 4SSA.2, Code, 1966, provides: “It is hereby recognized that the protection of life and property from floods, the prevention of damage to lands therefrom and the orderly development, wise use, protection and conservation of the water resources of the state by the considered and proper use thereof, is of paramount importance to the welfare and prosperity of the people of the state, and, to realize these objectives it is hereby declared to be the policy of the state to correlate and vest the powers of the state in a single agency, the Iowa natural resources council, with the duty and authority to establish and enforce an appropriate comprehensive state-wide program for the control, utilization, and protection of the surface and groundwater resources of the state. It is hereby declared that the general welfare of the people of the state of Iowa requires that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use, or unreasonable methods of use, of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such water be exercised with the view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people, and that the public and private funds for the promotion and expansion of the beneficial use of water resources shall be invested to the end that the best interests and welfare of the people are served.
“Water occurring in any basin or in any watercourse, or other natural body of water of the state, is hereby declared to be public waters and public wealth of the people of the state of Iowa and subject to use in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, and the control and development and use of water for all beneficial purposes shall be in the state, which, in the exercise of its police powers, shall take such measures as shall effectuate full utilization and protection of the water resources of the state of Iowa.”
With regard to the foregoing it is a well established principle of law that where there is a question as to applicability of a statute to particular circumstances, the purpose of the statutory enactment may be examined in order to determine its proper application. State v. Bishop, 257 Iowa 336, 340, 132 N.W.2d 455; Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 1322-1323, 121 N.W.2d 361; Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co. (8 Cir.), 113 F.2d 52, 56; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 349, page 730; and 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, section 309, page 297.
And the declared purpose of chapter 455A is to correlate and vest the powers of the state in the council, with authority to enforce an appropriate state-zvide program for control of surface and ground waters for benefit and protection of the public.
*121II. Closely related to purpose of legislation is the mischief sought to be remedied by its enactment, which may also be examined in order to determine the proper construction. Appleby v. Farmers State Bank of Dows, 244 Iowa 288, 295-297, 56 N.W.2d 917, and Tallios v. Tallios, 350 Ill. App. 299, 112 N.E.2d 723, 725.
Clearly the mischief here sought to be remedied is the creation by landowners, without a permit by the council, of structures within established floodways or flood plains for protection of the public. The only effective remedy for this mischief is a mandatory injunction to compel removal of offending unlawful structures.
In addition, if reasonably possible, effect should be given to every part of a legislative enactment and related acts. Stated otherwise, in seeking the meaning of a law the entire act and other related acts and statutes should be considered. Ritter v. Dagel, Iowa, 156 N.W.2d 318, opinion filed February 6, 1968; State v. Charlson, Iowa, 154 N.W.2d 829, 831; Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 1288-1289, 136 N.W.2d 410; and Manilla Community Sch. Dist. of Crawford and Shelby Counties v. Halverson, 251 Iowa 496, 501, 101 N.W.2d 705.
And if an act is susceptible to more than one interpretation or application, courts must give to it that interpretation or application which is logical, rather than one that is illogical or which will produce illogical results. Severson v. Sueppel, Iowa, 152 N.W.2d 281, 284; Brandon v. Roy, 259 Iowa 1271, 147 N.W.2d 810, 813; and Hardwick v. Bublitz, 253 Iowa 49, 53, 111 N.W.2d 309.
To hold as does the majority is to me an illogical interpretation of the Act for it denies the council its one effective tool by which to effectuate and carry out the self-evident intent and purpose of the Act, placing an insurmountable obstacle in the path of the council in its efforts to remedy the mischief sought by the Act itself to be prevented.
. III. It is my understanding plaintiff contends relief by mandatory injunction is available, by implication if not expressly, to compel removal of offending structures upon a showing they were established or created within a floodway or flood plain after the effective date of chapter 455A, where the person responsible failed to secure the prerequisite permit. That contention is to me reasonably proper and correct.
The first paragraph of section 455A.33, provides in part: “It shall he unlawful to suffer or permit any structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or excavation to be erected, used, or maintained in or on any flood-way or flood plains which will adversely affect the efficiency of or unduly restrict the capacity of the floodway, adversely affect the control, development, protection, allocation, or utilization of the water resources of the state, or adversely affect or interfere with the state comprehensive plan for water resources, or an approved local water resources plan, and the same are declared to be and to constitute public nuisances, provided, however, that this provision shall not apply to dams constructed and operated under the authority of chapter 469 as amended.” (Emphasis supplied.)
And section 455A.39 makes any violation of the Act an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment.
From the foregoing one conclusion is inescapable. The general assembly, in the exercise of its police powers, made it pun-ishably unlawful, after effective date of the Act, to cause or permit construction of designated structures in or upon any flood-way or flood plain of this state, at the same time making any such structures a public nuisance. See section 657.2(1), (3), (4), Code, 1966; Sparks v. City of Pella, Marion County, 258 Iowa 187, 190¡ 137 N.W.2d 909; Gates v. City Council of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 675, 53 N.W.2d 279; State v. Smith, 82 Iowa 423, 425, 48 N.W. 727; 66 C.J.S. Nuisances §§ 2-3, pages 730-734; and 39 Am.Jur., Nuisances, section 8, page *122285. And as to exercise of police power see generally Benschoter v. Hakes, 232 Iowa 1354, 1361-1364, 8 N.W.2d 481, and City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1103-1104, 184 N.W. 823, 188 N.W. 921.
Furthermore, a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin a public nuisance, the creation or maintenance of which is also a punishable offense. Rule 320, R.C.P.; Harvey v. Prall, 250 Iowa 1111, 1116, 97 N.W.2d 306; 12 Drake L.Rev. 107; and Annos. 75 A.L.R. 1298.
As stated by Beuchert, 4 Natural Resources Journal, 486, 497-498: “The general rule is that the legislature may classify as a nuisance anything which is detrimental to the health, morals, peace, or welfare of the citizens of the state. It may also enlarge the category of nuisances by classifying as nuisances acts or things which were not so at common law. However, the legislature cannot classify as a nuisance something which is not so in fact. But this does not mean that the act or thing must actually be a nuisance at the time it is so classified by the legislature. Whenever a thing is of such a nature that it may become a nuisance, it may be regulated or prohibited. And where there is a substantial difference of opinion as to whether or not there is a real danger of a future nuisance, great deference will be given to the legislature.”
He concludes, loe. cit., 4 Natural Resources Journal 500: “Therefore, it would seem quite likely that legislation declaring that an obstruction of the floodway is a public nuisance would be upheld. * * * the constriction of the floodway may well affect the entire community since * * * ponding is generally not limited to a narrow area. And the entire community will have to bear the cost of any flood relief program, the burden of which is increased in proportion to the increased damage caused by floodway encroachment. Moreover, the remedy in a suit for damages or for an injunction to abate a private nuisance may often be unavailable due to the difficulty of proving any particular damage or causal relationship between any one obstruction and particular realty.”
IV. The foregoing views find support in the second paragraph of section 455A.33, which states: “The council shall have the power to commence, maintain and prosecute any appropriate action to enjoin or abate a nuisance, including any of the foregoing nuisances and any other nuisance which adversely affects flood control.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The words “including any of the foregoing nuisances” clearly refer to the first paragraph, quoted supra, which relates exclusively to post-statutory structures, with respect to which the council has power to commence an action “to enjoin or abate”. This is demonstrated by the fact the same paragraph permits abatement of pre-statutory structures provided the council can establish they constitute a nuisance.
V. In the same vein the third paragraph provides, inter alia: “In the event any person desires to erect or make, or to suffer or permit, a structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or excavation, * * * to be erected, made, used or maintained in or on any floodway or flood plain, such person shall file a verified written application with the council, setting forth the material facts, and the council after an investigation or hearing, shall enter an order, determining the fact and permitting or prohibiting the same, upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This mandatory provision can only apply to post-statutory structures alone.
VI. Then the fourth paragraph of section 455A.33 provides: “The council shall have the authority to maintain an action in equity to enjoin any such person from erecting or making or suffering or permitting to be made any structure, dam, obstruction, deposit, or excavation other than a dam constructed and operated under the authority of chapter 469, for which a permit has not been granted.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*123Here again reference can only be to structures created or commenced after effective date of the Act.
It is to me evident the foregoing clearly discloses the council’s remedy with respect to a post-statutory structure, is “the authority to maintain an action in equity to enjoin it as a public nuisance”.
VII. Finally, the fifth paragraph of this statute provides: “The council shall have the power to remove or eliminate any structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or excavation in any floodway which adversely affects the efficiency of or unduly restricts the capacity of the floodway, by an action in condemnation, and in assessing the damages in such proceeding, the appraisers and the court shall take into consideration whether the structure, dam, obstruction, deposit or excavation is lawfully in or on the floodway.”
I submit this paragraph of section 455A.-33 has no application to post-statutory structures, but applies strictly and exclusively to pre-statutory structures alone.
Stated otherwise, under the language of paragraph five, a pre-statutory structure which is not a nuisance under the Act is a “lawful” structure or a structure “lawfully in or on the floodway.” Its lawful character must be considered in assessing damages upon council removal or abatement by action in condemnation. However, a pre-statutory structure, which is a nuisance under the Act, is neither a “lawful” structure nor a structure “lawfully in or on the floodway.” While the council must still proceed by way of condemnation as to unlawful pre-statutory structures, the fact it is not one “lawfully in or on the flood-way” may be considered in determining the measure of damages. In other words, “unlawful” as used in paragraph one applying strictly to post-statutory structures, and “lawfully” as employed in the fifth paragraph applicable exclusively to pre-stat-utory structures, have separable meanings attributable to the post-statutory or pre-statutory character of the structure in question.
VIII. It is to me evident section 455A.-33, by implication if not expressly, creates a certain reasonable scheme of classification. On one hand, structures, dams, obstructions or excavations in existence prior to effective date of the Act are not necessarily unlawful. Such structures may or may not constitute a public nuisance. On the other hand, structures, dams, obstructions or excavations created without the required permit, after effective date of the Act, are per se unlawful. With regard to such post-statutory structures, they are statutorily made a public nuisance.
In Vartelas v. Water Resources Commission, 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d 822, 824, a case involving construction of legislation similar in language and having a purpose identical with that of the Act here under consideration, the court said: “In authorizing the exercise of the police power with respect to situations where there are no existing structures or encroachments within the lines established or to be established, as in the instant case, and the exercise of the power of eminent domain where there are structures or encroachments in existence within the lines established or to be established, the statute creates a classification within the power of the legislature to make. Between the two situations there is a natural and substantial difference germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation. State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698, 706, 125 A.2d 477; Franklin Furniture Co. v. City of Bridgeport, 142 Conn. 510, 514, 115 A.2d 435; Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 304, 40 A.2d 177, 156 A.L.R. 568; Second National Bank of New Haven v. Loftus, 121 Conn. 454, 460, 185 A. 423; see Chouinard v. Zoning Commission, 139 Conn. 728, 732, 97 A.2d 562.”
I would hold a similar distinction is created by the provisions of section 455A.33, the material portions of which are quoted supra.
*124IX.As to remedy by injunction relative to post-statutory structures, compulsion of some positive nature as to existing conditions is necessary. Stated otherwise some affirmative act or acts are essential in order to effect the required results — protection of the public.
Early restrictions on the form of injunction have given way to a more liberal construction of the court’s power. It is now well settled that unless prohibited from so doing by some constitutional or statutory provision, a court of equity can, and in proper cases will award mandatory, including preliminary mandatory, relief as well as prohibitive injunctive relief.
In other words the court may by its mandate compel the undoing of those acts which have been illegally done. See 28 Am.Jur., Injunctions, section 17, page 506.
The factual circumstances disclosed by the pleadings here make clear the necessity of construing the word “enjoin” in the fourth paragraph of section 455A.33, to include the compelling of some active measures to restore the status quo, to provide preventive relief.
To hold otherwise would emasculate and make operatively meaningless not only the first four paragraphs of section 455A.33, but important provisions of the entire chapter as well.
X.It appears that although plaintiff acted illegally in erecting a post-statutory structure in a floodway or flood plain, the majority now proposes to legalize such conduct by requiring the formality of filing an after-the-act “proper application”. Stated otherwise, the position taken by the majority serves, in effect, to make lawful by an after-the-fact application that which is by statute expressly made unlawful.
Pursuing this theory to a logical conclusion, if plaintiff now files an application and the council refuses him a permit, he may appeal to the district court. But, even though the court, on appeal, agrees with such decision of the council, the offending structure remains. Here another problem is presented. The majority says, at least inferentially, mandatory injunctive relief is not even then available to compel removal of the unlawful structure, the remedy being confined to proceedings in eminent domain.
In fact the majority says, among other things: “The legislature specifically provided and enumerated in this section the grounds upon which the council could obtain abatement of an existing structure. Specifically, it provided relief by way of condemnation in the case of existing objectionable structures. Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that mandatory injunctive relief is also inferentially available under paragraph 4 by merely showing that the defendants’ structures were within the flood plain and built without applying for and obtaining a permit. The trial court did not agree with this contention, and neither do we.” With this statement I cannot agree.
The issue before us is whether the Natural Resources Council has lawful authority to compel removal by mandatory injunction of a post-statutory structure placed in a floodway or flood plain where the statutorily required application for permission to so place such structure has not been filed, as a consequence of which no permit has ever issued.
I am satisfied the council not only has that authority but when it shows to a court having requisite jurisdiction a party has placed a post-statutory structure in a flood-way or flood plain without having first filed the application required by law, and of necessity without benefit of permit, a mandatory injunction not only can but should issue.
XI.It is to me evident the majority opinion opens the door to a race between landowners and the council. If an individual, without obtaining the required permit, is successful in creating that which is punishably unlawful by the provisions of the first paragraph of section 455A.33, and *125section 4S5A.39, before the Natural Resources Council becomes aware of what has been or is being done, the council is relatively powerless to remedy the situation.
Well settled principles of statutory construction do not permit such a self-defeating result.
I would reverse.
GARFIELD, C. J., joins in this dissent.