Court Opinion

ID: 9703373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:53:35.974577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:48.030553
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 26. (concurring). I agree with the majority that a
defendant who misappropriates another's identity and uses it during an arrest and subsequent proceedings to obtain lower bail does so in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.201.
HH
¶ 27. I write separately to reflect yet again on this court's approach to statutory interpretation.1 The majority opinion invokes the plain meaning rule in this case, explaining that it will not look beyond the statutory text to determine a statute's meaning if the language is clear on its face.2 It then announces that "canons of construction. . . are inapplicable when a statute is clear"3 and uses this "rule" as a bar to applying the ejusdem generis canon of construction in the present case.4
*488¶ 28. How strange.5 First, the plain meaning rule is itself a canon of construction.6 Second, many of the other interpretive techniques employed by the majority opinion to construe Wis. Stat. § 943.201 are also canons of construction. For example, the maxim that statutory language is given its common, ordinary and accepted meaning is a canon of construction.7 So is the rule that courts may refer to a recognized dictionary to determine the common meaning of terms,8 and the rule that a statutory definition declaring what a term means is *489binding upon the court.9 The majority opinion openly invokes all of these canons of construction despite concluding that the language is plain on its face.10 It offers no reason why the plain meaning rule permits the use of these canons, but not use of the canon of ejusdem generis.
¶ 29. The majority opinion creates a false division between the plain meaning rule and canons of construction. Proponents of the plain meaning rule reject the use of "extrinsic aids" to construction such as legislative history, history of the enactment process, committee reports, and legislative debates,11 when the language of a statute is "clear and unambiguous."12 The plain meaning rule's advocates do not, however, reject the use of "intrinsic aids" that assist in discerning whether the *490language of a statute is plain on its face, such as other statutes, statutory definitions, and dictionaries.
¶ 30. "Intrinsic aids" to construction, including rules of grammar and generalizations about customary habits in the use of language, are essential to any application of the plain meaning rule.13 "Even when a judge claims not to be construing a statute, he [or she] can not help using what he [or she] has learned about customary language usage and common understanding associated with the relevant text."14 The rules that words should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and that courts may resort to a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of words are simply generalizations about customary habits in the use of language that are part and parcel of the process of interpreting the meaning of a statute's text.
¶ 31. Similarly, ejusdem generis is simply a generalization about the use of words. Ejusdem generis is *491Latin for "of the same kind," and means that when general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.15 For example, ejusdem generis might suggest that the phrase "any other games" in a statute encompassing "baseball, basketball, football, and any other games" would be limited to team sports (like soccer) and not include "games" like chess or video games. An enumeration followed by a "catch all" phrase is a common drafting technique that saves a legislature from having to spell out every contingency in advance.16
¶ 32. Ejusdem generis is not always an appropriate canon of construction, even when a statute includes a list of specific words followed by general words in an enumeration.17 The applicability of this canon must be resolved as part of a court's effort to determine the meaning of a statute's text. The canon is an "intrinsic aid" that is germane to a textualist approach to statutory interpretation; that is, it is both compatible with and necessary to the plain meaning rule, just like the other canons the majority opinion relies on in the present case.18
*492¶ 33. The vast majority of cases coming to this court involve the interpretation of some writing, be it a statute, a constitution, a contract, or some other document. The consistency and coherence of our approach to interpretation is therefore vital. Litigants, lawyers, legislators, judges, and the citizens of Wisconsin deserve to know and understand how we approach interpretation.
¶ 34. As I have stated, proper statutory interpretation requires that a court take a comprehensive view toward discerning legislative intent that begins with consideration of the language of a statute and then looks to all relevant evidence of legislative intent including its scope, history, context, subject matter and purpose.19
¶ 35. Finally, while on the topic of rules, let me turn to another rule. The majority opinion violates a basic rule of appellate decision making: courts are not to reach out and decide issues unnecessary to the case at hand. The majority opinion correctly concludes that a person is guilty of identity theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.201 when he or she misappropriates another's identity to obtain lower bail because bail falls within the statutory words "to obtain credit or money."20 It is thus not necessary to the present case to reach out and further state in what amounts to dicta that the phrase *493"or anything else of value" in § 943.201 is unduly restricted if it is interpreted to include only items with measurable commercial or market value.21 As I have written before, there is a growing tendency for this court to reach out and decide issues that are not squarely presented.22 This tendency is, I believe, detrimental to the development of Wisconsin law.23
*494¶ 36. For the foregoing reasons, I write separately.
¶ 37. I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH joins part I of this opinion and that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins part II of this opinion.
¶ 38. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (concurring). "That depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is." William Jefferson Clinton.
¶ 39. I write only to emphasize that canons .of statutory construction, such as the "plain meaning" *495rule, are tools, not rules. They are all designed to reach one fundamental goal: discerning legislative intent. Ignoring relevant evidence on legislative intent in the name of "plain meaning" will necessarily at times lead to an interpretation that is completely contrary to what the legislature intended.
¶ 40. Language is inherently ambiguous— perhaps not as ambiguous as the quotation above would have us believe, but the quote makes a point: plain meaning is frequently in the eye of the beholder. What is plain to one may be ambiguous to another. If good evidence as to legislative intent is present, why not use it? Accordingly, I join Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence.

 See State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, ¶¶ 45-56, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Fox v. Catholic Knights Ins. Co., 2003 WI 87, ¶¶ 43-48, 263 Wis. 2d 207, 665 N.W.2d 181 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

 Needless to say, "clarity and ambiguity are in the eyes of the beholder." Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 642 n.8, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998).

 Majority op., ¶ 14.

 Majority op., ¶ 14.

 See State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶ 38, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("Rules of statutory interpretation are designed to help courts discern the intent of the legislature, not to serve as blinders.").

 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate ■ Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 403 (1950) ("If language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect" is canon of construction); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 927-934 (1992) (describing inclusio unius, ejusdem generis, and the plain meaning rule as linguistic canons of interpretation); see also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) ('When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon [of interpretation] is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.'"); CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1225 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) (the plain meaning rule "is the largest caliber canon of them all").

 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43 (1979) ("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.").

 JVC Co. of America v. United States, 234 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("A court may rely upon its own understanding of the terms used, lexicographic and scientific authorities, dictionaries, and other reliable information'! to determine the common meaning of a term.)

 Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:07, at 227-28 (6th ed. 2000) (citing Nat'l City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1133 (8th Cir. 1982)).

 See majority op., ¶¶ 14, 19.

 See Courthouse Employees Local 1312, 221 Wis. 2d at 642-43 (giving examples of extrinsic aids).

 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621, 623-24 (1989) ("[N]ew textualism posits that once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant. Legislative history should not even be consulted to confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text. Such confirmation comes, if any is needed, from examination of the structure of the statute, interpretations given similar statutory provisions, and canons of statutory construction."); see also R. Randall Kelso & C. Kevin Kelso, Use of the Plain Meaning Rule to Provide a Structure for Discovering Legislative Intent, 33 Hastings L.J. 187 (1981) ("[M]odern debate over the [plain meaning] rule centers on the permissible use of extrinsic materials to determine legislative intent.") (reprinted in Singer, supra note 9, § 48A:16, at 810).

 Conn. Nat'l Bank, 503 U.S. at 253 ("Canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation."); CBS Inc., 245 F.3d at 1225:
One benefit of applying canons of construction, rather than considering legislative history, is that their application does not require resort to extrinsic material. Instead, the canons of construction focus on the text actually approved by Congress and made a part of our country's laws. As the Supreme Court's recent opinion in [Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)] confirms, where the meaning of a statute is discernible in fight of canons of construction, we should not resort to legislative history or other extrinsic evidence. Canons of construction are essentially tools which help us to determine whether the meaning of a statutory provision is sufficiently plain, in fight of the text of the statute as a whole, to avoid the need to consider extrinsic evidence of Congress' intent.
See also Singer, supra note 9, § 47:01, at 209-11.

 Singer, supra note 9, § 46.02, at 133.

 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114-15; Singer, supra note 9, § 47:17, at 273-74.

 Singer, supra note 9, § 47:17, at 281-82.

 Id. §47:18, at 287.

 See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114-15 ("The wording of [the statute] calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem generis"); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using estab*492lished canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If not — and especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain — we apply that ordinary meaning.

 See Byers, 263 Wis. 2d 113, ¶ 50, (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

 Majority op., ¶ 25.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶ 17:
We disagree with the circuit court's restrictive reading of the identity theft statute. There is nothing in Wis. Stat. § 943.201 that explicitly limits its application to identity thefts that are carried out to obtain something that has ''commercial value" or "market value." Neither does the statute implicitly contain such a limitation.
See also majority op., ¶ 21 ("The circuit court's imposition of a requirement of measurable commercial or market value unduly restricted the statute's application contrary to its terms."); majority op., ¶ 25:
Similarly here, we reject the narrow reading of the identity theft statute adopted by the circuit court. We conclude that the circuit court improperly restricted the scope of the identity theft statute to preclude its application to the facts present in this case. Resort to the doctrine of ejusdem generis to determine the scope of the statutory phrase "or anything else of value" was unnecessary here.

 Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 2003 WI 8, ¶¶ 56, 72, 259 Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).

 The court has treated dicta differently depending on whether it likes the dicta. For an illustration of the difficulties the court faces when it must deal with dicta, see State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996), and State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶ 31, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195.
For discussions of Wisconsin's views on dicta, see, e.g., State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, ¶¶ 60-61 n.16, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381 (reviewing two lines of cases on dicta); State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶ 22 n.16, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341 (same); State v. Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47, 60 n.7, 546 N.W.2d 449 *494(1996) ("[d]icta is a statement... in a court's opinion which extends beyond the facts in the case and is broader than necessary and not essential to the determination of the issues before it"; dicta is not controlling); State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 386 n.12, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988) (it is not inappropriate for a court to evaluate statements in Supreme Court opinions on the basis of whether they constitute dicta); Nicholson v. Home Ins. Cos., 137 Wis. 2d 581, 602, 405 N.W.2d 327 (1987) (disapproving of discussion of reducing clause in Radlein v. Indus. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984), as dicta); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 120 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 356 N.W.2d 175 (1984) (adopting the generally accepted doctrine that "a statement not addressed to the question before the court or necessary for its decision" is dicta, and not binding on the court); Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 474, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980) (same).
But see Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶ 60, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (the rule in Wisconsin is that a discussion of issues not decisive of a controversy is a binding judicial act, not dicta) (citing State v. Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981)); Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d at 392 (quoting Chase v. Am. Cartage, 176 Wis. 235, 238, 186 N.W 598 (1922)):
It is deemed the doctrine of the cases is that when a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses, and decides a question germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision.