Court Opinion

ID: 9567462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:54:07.640327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:37.243756
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge
(joined by WALTERS, Chief Judge), specially concurring.
We concur in the first part of Judge Swanstrom’s lead opinion, which vacates the award of attorney fees in favor of the defendants (Neff) and against the plaintiff (Bonaparte). We also concur in the result reached by the second part of the lead opinion, which vacates an award of the third-party defendants’ (Ulerys’) costs and attorney fees directly against the plaintiff. However, we respectfully disagree with our colleague’s announcement that he would disallow any such award and, therefore, would favor reversing on this issue rather than remanding for the trial court to exercise its discretion.
In a case like this one, where multiple parties, claims and issues are involved, I.R. C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) vests in the trial court a discretionary power to allocate costs “in a fair and equitable manner.” See Jones v. Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886, 736 P.2d 1340 (Ct.App.1987). The trial court possesses similar discretion to allocate attorney fees under Rule 54(e) — subject, of course, to a requirement that the court find that a non-prevailing party has brought, pursued or defended a claim frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, if the award is made under I.C. § 12-121. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). In the present case, it is within the discretionary authority of the trial court to fashion a just allocation of costs and attorney fees among the nonprevailing plaintiff, the prevailing defendants and the prevailing third-party defendants.
Although today’s lead opinion acknowledges such discretion in theory, it leaves no *68room for discretion in practice. Reversal precludes discretion. The lead opinion suggests that reversal is warranted by the “procedural facts of this case.” But there are no unique “procedural facts” here. The alignment of parties and the relationships among claims are typical of third-party practice. The reasons given by the lead opinion for reversal in this case have the potential to become rules supplanting discretion in a wide variety of third-party lawsuits. We decline to adopt them.
The lead opinion suggests that a nonprevailing plaintiff should not be required to bear, directly or indirectly, any part of the prevailing third-party’s costs or attorney fees because these parties are not “adverse” to each other. In the present case, this characterization is accurate only in the narrow sense that the plaintiffs and third-party defendants did not plead specific claims directly against each other. However, adversity is not to be determined by a formalistic view of the pleadings; it is to be determined in a functional sense by examining the practical effect of the positions taken by the parties. A third-party defendant is “factually adverse” to a plaintiff when the plaintiff’s claim could lead to the third-party defendant being subjected to indemnity or contribution. Wiggins v. City of Philadelphia, 216 F.Supp. 241 (E.D.Pa. 1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 521 (3rd Cir.1964), cited with apparent approval in 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1459, at 317-18 (1971) (hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER). “[Tjhird-party practice clearly recognizes that third-party defendants are in an adverse position to the party asserting a claim for which they may be ultimately responsible.” Pioneer Roofing Co. v. Mardian Construction Co., 152 Ariz. 455, 466, 733 P.2d 652, 663 (Ct.App.1986); Nationwide Resources Corp. v. Ngai, 129 Ariz. 226, 630 P.2d 49 (Ct.App.1981).
Adversity in a functional sense is readily apparent where a plaintiff’s claim against a defendant shares a factual nexus with the defendant’s claim for indemnity against a third-party defendant. This is such a case. As quoted in the lead opinion, the trial judge has found
that it certainly was predictable and foreseeable that the defendants Neff would join their predecessor in interest in defense of the quiet title action brought against them especially where, as here, any prescriptive use by the plaintiff took place prior to the time defendants Neff became owners of the property.
Thus, the judge has determined that the plaintiff’s quiet title action shares a factual nexus with the third-party action. Although the threshold legal dispute in this case is between plaintiff Bonaparte and defendants Neff, the underlying factual dispute has pitted Bonaparte against third-party defendants Ulery. In any realistic sense, the plaintiff and the third-party defendants are adverse to each other.
The lead opinion also states that the defendants alone should absorb any award of costs or attorney fees to the third-party defendants because the defendants filed their third-party complaint as “a matter of convenience, not of necessity.” Assuming (solely for the sake of discussion) that the filing was indeed for “convenience” — and that the third-party defendants were not persons required to be joined if feasible under I.R.C.P. 19 — the fact remains that the existence of a prescriptive easement is an issue common to both the main action and the third-party action. Where common issues exist, it is plainly reasonable — and “foreseeable” as the trial judge noted — for a defendant to make his third-party claim while the main action is pending. Indeed, a fundamental purpose of I.R.C.P. 14, which authorizes such third-party practice, is to promote judicial efficiency by eliminating circuity of actions or piecemeal litigation. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1442 (discussing counterpart federal rule).
The lead opinion draws upon the “convenience” hypothesis to conclude that if a defendant engages in such third-party practice, and if he and the third-party defendant later prevail against the plaintiff on an issue common to the main action and the third-party action, the defendant alone should absorb the burden of any costs or *69attorney fees awarded to the third-party defendant. If we were to adopt this conclusion it would have an obvious chilling effect on third-party practice and could erode one of the most important advances in modern civil procedure.
Although the lead opinion cites two cases in support of its position, we find neither of them to be persuasive. In Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 167 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.1948), the appellate court made an ad hoc, equitable decision regarding cost allocation; it did not adopt any discretion-limiting rule of the type suggested by the lead opinion today. In the other case, Andersen v. Gold Seal Vineyards, Inc., 81 Wash.2d 863, 505 P.2d 790 (1973), such a rule was indeed suggested; however, it was supported by no citation of authority and it appears the case has not been cited with approval on that point in any other jurisdiction.
The better approach, which we adopt, is to allow the trial court to determine what issues are common to the main action and third-party action, to determine on a functional basis which parties are adverse to each other on those issues, and — in the exercise of sound discretion — to allocate the costs and attorney fees relating to those issues. In an appropriate case, the trial court may direct that the burden of a prevailing third-party defendant’s costs and attorney fees on common issues be borne, in whole or in part, by the nonprevailing plaintiff. The court may accomplish this by making a direct award against the non-prevailing plaintiff or by making an award against the defendant, with a right of reimbursement from the nonprevailing plaintiff. Of course, any such award must be tailored to the third-party defendant’s actual and reasonable participation in litigating the common issues.
Nevertheless, in the present case, the award of the third-party defendants’ costs and attorney fees directly against the plaintiff must be vacated for two reasons. First, when a court exercises its discretion to allocate costs and attorney fees, it should strive for a just result in light of the relationships among all the parties. Here, the trial court has not yet determined whether the defendants will have any liability for the third-party defendants’ fees or costs; and our decision today vacates the award of the defendants’ attorney fees against the plaintiff. Secondly, as we have noted, a nonprevailing plaintiff may be required to bear the economic burden of some or all of the third-party defendant’s costs or attorney fees — but only in reasonable measure with respect to those issues which are common to the main action and third-party action. Here, the third-party action embraced not only the issue of adverse use giving rise to a prescriptive easement, but also the issues of guaranty and alleged misrepresentation by the third-party defendants. We cannot presume, upon the instant record, that all of the third-party defendants’ attorney fees or costs were related solely to the common issue of adverse use.
Accordingly, the allocation of costs and attorney fees should be reexamined on remand. If the trial court determines that any award should be made against the non-prevailing plaintiff, the costs or attorney fees of the third-party defendant may be included only to the extent that they relate to the issue of adverse use.