Court Opinion

ID: 9697312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:12:48.352482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:31.441052
License: Public Domain

Henderson, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion, in which Hammond, J., concurred.
In this case a majority of the court holds that a wife who commits an act of adultery, after she has obtained a decree for divorce a mensa et thoro on the ground of abandonment and desertion by the husband and after the lapse of the statutory period of eighteen months from the decree, forfeits all right to alimony under the decree. In a former appeal in this same case, we held that the husband was not entitled to a divorce, despite proof of the wife’s adultery. Courson v. Courson, 208 Md. 171. The holding was based on the ground of recrimination, the wife having a valid cause of action for a divorce a vinculo before the act was committed and before the husband’s bill asserting a cause for divorce a vinculo was filed. The court applied the rule laid down in the converse situation in Green v. Green, 125 Md. 141, as the settled law of this State, and in accordance with the prevailing view in other jurisdictions. Cf. Williams v. Williams, 156 Md. 10, where it was held that a decree a mensa to a wife was no bar to a bill alleging adultery on her part within the statutory period. Nevertheless, it seems anomalous that the deserting husband, who was denied a dissolution of the marriage bonds, because the wife established her right to an absolute divorce as a defense to his bill, should be relieved of all liability for the wife’s support. He now obtains the monetary fruits of a divorce to which he is not otherwise entitled, even though it has been judicially determined that his abandonment con*190tinued uninterruptedly for at least eighteen months, and is final and deliberate, and the separation of the parties is beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation. The argument is that because the marriage bonds are not severed she owes him a personal and permanent duty of chastity, as distinguished from a general duty to society, and that the duties of chastity on the one hand and support on the other are reciprocal and inseparable. Yet it is perfectly clear that they are married in name only and all hope of reunion is at an end.
This is a case of first impression in this State, and on principle and authority I think the decision is unsound. A right to support may survive a dissolution of the marriage, which would free her from a duty of chastity. It is well settled that alimony may be granted not only after a divorce a mensa, the type granted by the Ecclesiastical courts, but also after a divorce a vinculo, if awarded at the time of the decree or the jurisdiction to award it is reserved. See Johnson v. Johnson, 202 Md. 547, 552, and concurring opinion, p. 559; Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, 180. Cf. Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, and Marshall v. Marshall, 162 Md. 116. Such power is recognized in most of the other states, whether reserved or not. It is generally held that adultery of a wife committed after an absolute decree is not a bar to its enforcement. Cole v. Cole, 31 N. E. 109 (Ill.). Cf. Rang v. Rang, 211 Ill. App. 385; Christiano v. Christiano, 41 A. 2d 779 (Conn.); Suozzo v. Suozzo, 1 A. 2d 930 (N. J.); Hayes v. Hayes, 115 N. E. 1040 (N. Y.). See also Browne, Divorce and Alimony (1890), pp. 16, 296. Other cases are collected in a note, 6 A. L. R. 2d 859. Subsequent to the Hayes case, New York enacted a statute in 1938 providing that a wife who openly lives with a paramour may forfeit her right to alimony. See Waddey v. Waddey, 49 N. E. 2d 8 (N. Y.). Under the statute, a casual or occasional act of adultery would appear to be no bar. Cf. Hart v. Hart, 23 Hawaii 639, and Weber v. Weber, 140 N. W. 1052 (Wis.). In Cariens v. Cariens, 40 S. E. 335 (W. Va.), the general rule was recognized, but it was held that where the adultery was committed after a divorce a mensa, under circumstances that would entitle the husband to a divorce a vinculo, the right was for*191feited. In some states it is held that the courts may exercise discretion in modifying or rescinding an award after an absolute divorce, in cases of flagrant misconduct, such as living with a paramour or in prostitution. Lindbloom v. Lindbloom, 230 N. W. 117 (Minn.) ; Haritos v. Haritos, 202 N. W. 181 (Wis.). In a few states the existence of such resources is merely viewed as bearing upon the need for support, not upon the question of liability.
In many states it is provided by statute that alimony may be granted to a wife even where the husband is granted a divorce on the ground of her misconduct. Some courts reach the same result where the statutes are not explicit on the point. See 17 Am. Jur., Divorce, § 615 and note, 34 A. L. R. 2d 313. This is true even where the wife is found guilty of adultery, although in a few states this type of misconduct is excepted. The English cases follow the general rule. In Ashcroft v. Ashcroft [1902], 71 L. Journal, Prob. 125, (C. A.) it was held under § 32 of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, that a support order was proper even where the husband was granted a divorce on the ground of the wife’s adultery. Frequently, but not invariably, the English courts insert in the decree a limiting clause, dum sola et casta vixerit, while she remains single and chaste. When omitted from the decree, subsequent adultery is no ground for relief. Collins v. Collins, 103 L. T. N. S. 80 [1910]. These decisions rest upon a wide statutory discretion, but the reason for its exercise is that the wife should not be driven into the street to starve, or driven by want to continue in a life of vice. See Graves v. Graves, 108 Mass. 314. These decisions followed the established practice in Parliament in granting legislative divorces, although they are probably inconsistent with the earlier practice in the Ecclesiastical courts. Blackstone, Commentaries (4th Ed.), p. 923, says these courts did not award alimony after a wife’s adultery. But at p. 442, he says alimony is in the discretion of the court in consideration of all the circumstances. “But in case of elopement, and living with an adulterer, the law allows her no alimony.” It seems to be clear, however, that temporary alimony was always allowable regardless of fault.
*192While I assume for present purposes that in Maryland permanent alimony may not be awarded to a guilty wife, we have held that a wife may be entitled to alimony pendente lite, even after an adjudication of her adultery. Dougherty v. Dougherty, 189 Md. 316, 321. Judge Marked, for the court, there said: “We may assume that if this defense [recrimination on the ground of adultery] had prevailed, defendant would not have been entitled to permanent alimony. It does not necessarily follow that plaintiff might not have been compelled to support her, e. g., by criminal proceedings (Code, art. 27, sec. 89, as amended  ) or by actions at law for necessaries. Until a suit for divorce is finally disposed of, maintenance pendente lite can be enforced by the divorce court, without resort to criminal proceedings or actions at law.” See also note, 2 A. L. R. 2d 307.
Even where a marriage has not been dissolved, it has been held that a husband is not necessarily relieved of his duty to support by the adultery of a separated wife. It is generally held that where a husband and wife are living apart under a separation agreement, the husband may not set up adultery by the wife as a bar to payments under the agreement, at least in the absence of a dum casta clause. Whittle v. Schlemm, 109 A. 305 (N. J.); note, 8 A. L. R. 1452. Many English authorities to this effect are cited in this note. In Bishop, Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, (1891), § 1231, it is said that where both parties are in the wrong, as where they have severally committed adultery, and they are living apart, the husband can be compelled to support the wife. The learned author says: “ * * * it is familiar doctrine that, in these circumstances, neither can have a divorce from the other, because neither as plaintiff could come into court with clean hands. But there is room for grave doubt whether this bar is applicable in a suit for necessaries furnished the wife. * * * Besides, in principle, each having a just ground for living apart from the other, or each being a suitable companion for the other, they now stand toward each other the same as though they were living in separation by mutual *193consent, when by familiar law the husband must support the wife. And this is believed to be the true doctrine.” In Rigsby v. Rigsby, 97 S. W. 2d 835 (Ky.), it was held that a wife was entitled to alimony in a situation where, because of recrimination, both were guilty of matrimonial offenses. In Mueller v. Mueller, 282 P. 2d 869 (Cal.), where each party established a right to an absolute divorce, and the rule of recrimination was not applied, it was held that the wife was entitled to alimony.
If the analogy to the situation where the parties are living apart under a separation agreement is pertinent to the situation in the instant case, as suggested by Bishop, our recent decisions in regard to divorces on non-culpatory grounds seem very much in point. In Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, it was held that permanent alimony may be granted to a wife who obtains a divorce on the ground of voluntary separation for the statutory period of five years [now three years]. In Matysek v. Matysek, 212 Md. 44, 51, it was held that a wife was entitled to a divorce a vinculo (and presumably to an award of alimony) on the ground of voluntary separation for at least three years, despite the fact that the husband set up recrimination based on the wife’s adultery within the statutory period. Chief Judge Bruñe, speaking for the court, stated the reason for the rule denying effect to recrimination in suits of this character, quoting from Smith v. Smith, 54 R. I. 236, 172 A. 323, 324: “‘It is evident that the conjugal life and the family life of the parties are permanently disrupted. There is no inclination for and no prospect of a reconciliation. Nothing is left of the marriage relation but the legal tie. Respondent contends that, regardless of these facts, petitioner should be punished for his misconduct by a refusal of the trial justice to dissolve the marriage. If it appeared that there was any advantage to the family or to the state in continuing the marital status, the divorce might well be denied. But no such advantage is apparent.’ ” He also said (p. 54) : “We think that it [the statute] manifests an intention to permit the marriage relationship to be terminated in law, as well as in fact, without regard to fault.”
It may be that a logical application of this reasoning would *194lead to a denial of recrimination as a defense in any divorce proceeding, even on culpatory grounds. Many states have adopted a rule of comparative rectitude under such circumstances. Here, however, we are bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, as well as the law of the case. I see no reason, however, to extend the recrimination theory to the forfeiture of permanent alimony previously awarded. In fact, the weight of authority, as I see it, is to the contrary, and the result does not serve the ends of social justice. In Waters v. Waters, 191 Md. 436, 440, it was said that alimony is never a punitive measure, and should not be increased because of the adultery of the husband. The same reasoning would seem to apply in the converse situation. I think the prior award should not be rescinded, where need is definitely established, because of the act of misconduct established in the instant case. If, as we have held, her act does not entitle him to a divorce because of his equal fault, it should not absolve him from a duty to support a wife who may otherwise become a public charge. If both parties are in pari delicto, they should at least be allowed to remain in statu quo. The decree a mensa is not superseded by any absolute decree, because recrimination bars each party from ever obtaining one. Until superseded, it should not be vitiated except upon a showing of facts relating to need or comparative resources that would call for its modification in the usual course.
For these reasons, I think the Chancellor erred in striking down the award solely because of her adultery, even though he reserved jurisdiction to make a future award. The question whether an award might be terminated under circumstances shocking to the conscience of the court and outraging public morals may be left open. It may be noted that no objection was raised to her continued custody of the child, which might well be changed if she should pursue such a course of conduct.
Judge Hammond authorizes me to say that he agrees with the views herein expressed.