Court Opinion

ID: 9764392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:20:35.877864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:32.745523
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE CULVER,
joined by JUSTICES GRIFFIN and SMITH, and CHIEF JUSTICE CALVERT, dissenting.
Petitioners, Anderson et al., at the hearing on their application for temporary injunction, introduced in evidence the plat of Tall Timbers Section of River Oaks Addition, together with a document filed in connection with the plat entitled “Reservations, Restrictions and Covenants in Tall Timbers Section of River Oaks.”
No other evidence was presented by petitioners except a copy of their petition filed in this case, certain correspondence passing between the parties introduced for the purpose of showing a threat on the part of Tall Timbers to proceed with the project and the ordinance of the City of Houston denying to any person the right to lay out a street within the city limits without first obtaining the consent of the City Council.
In his opening statement the attorney for petitioners advised the trial judge as follows:
“So that, Your Honor, it follows that since these two documents are unambiguous and plain on their face, the meaning of these two documents presents a legal question, and a question solely for the Court.”
*454The Court of Civil Appeals agreed that only a question of law was presented and on the authority of Southland Life Insurance Co. v. Egan, Tex. Com. App., 86 S.W. 2d 722, correctly announced the rule to be:
“It is true that there is a bona fide dispute between the parties, but the existence thereof is no proper ground for granting injunctive relief if the facts and law in the case are undisputed.”
Aside from the matter of obtaining a permit from the City of Houston for the purpose of opening the street, the reasons assigned by the trial court for granting the injunction were (1) that the opening of the street on the easement would cause the destruction of a number of beautiful shade trees and alter the contour and present conditions and the “status quo” of the land and result in irreparable damage to the adjoining landowners; (2) that the opening of the street to travel by the public would cause irreparable detriment to the petitioners and other home owners in the Tall Timber Section; (3) that said easement was created or reserved for the purpose only of installing and maintaining utilities; (4) that there appears to be a bona fide controversy as to whether Tall Timbers has the right to open a street along and over the easement; (5) that the status quo should be maintained until such time as the controversy can be brought on for hearing and determination on the merits. Obviously the only question involved in the case is the asserted right on the part of Tall Timbers to open a street over the easement. If that right exists it is immaterial that the shade trees will be destroyed and the contour of the land altered. The trial court construed the plat and the reservations, restrictions and covenants and concluded as a matter of law that the easement was created and reserved for the sole purpose of installing and maintaining utilities. The court found no other ground upon which to deny the right of Tall Timbers to open up the easement for public travel nor any facts that would give rise to a probable right on the part of petitioners to object. The Court of Civil Appeals held contrary to the trial court on this point of law.
The majority of this court are content to rest upon the general statement that there are “sufficient merits and property rights” involved to sustain the granting of this temporary injunction without disclosing what those merits may be. So far as any fact issues are concerned the cases cited in support of that statement are not particularly helpful and do not announce *455any proposition of law contrary to that in the Egan case. In Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v Jones, 160 Tex. 104, 327 S.W. 2d 417, the court points out that the testimony upon the temporary injunction herein was conflicting with respect to the effect of the cloud-seeding practice adopted for the purpose of producing rainfall and that the cases involved complicated scientific problems as well as the legal determination of property rights.
In the City of Lubbock v. Stubbs, 160 Tex. 111, 327 S.W. 2d 411, there were presented issues of fact. The principal question involved was whether or not those facts had been determined in a prior case so that the rule of res judicata would apply.
The question in Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W. 2d 549, was whether the administrative order of the Railroad Commission was supported by substantial evidence and while that is a question of law it could only be determined from a review of the entire record after a full and final hearing. In the case before us it would not appear that two trials should be necessary to construe the plat and the accompanying restrictions and reservations.
Since both courts below have proceeded on the theory that only a question of law is involved, I think this court should do likewise.
While it does appear that Tall Timbers has no intention of proceeding with this project until a permit has been secured from the City, I agree with the majority that no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court is shown in so far as the temporary injunction restrains Tall Timbers until such time as a permit has been secured, and I concur, with the majority to that extent.
In my opinion the holding in Pittman et al v. State, Tex. Civ. App., 234 S.W. 2d 436, cited by the Court of Civil Appeals, does not apply to the right of the City for injunctive relief to prevent a violation of this ordinance. The rule is stated in 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, § 152:
“Where an injunction is necessary for the protection of public rights, property or welfare, the criminality of the acts complained of does not bar the remedy by injunction, and *456the court will consider the criminality of the act only to determine whether, under the particular circumstances, equitable intervention is necessary. * *