Court Opinion

ID: 9467791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:57:00.203602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:32.279545
License: Public Domain

DUMBAULD, Senior District Judge
(dissenting):
I would reverse. The District Court granted habeas corpus upon the ground that the identification procedures leading to appellant’s conviction in state court were impermissibly suggestive. No fresh testimony was taken before the District Court, and its conclusions were not based upon personal evaluation of the demeanor or credibility of witnesses, but merely upon the same record from the state court which is before us for review.
I am convinced by scrutiny of the record that it was the victim of the crime herself who singled out the appellant as a suspect, as the result of her examination of some 200 photographs, without any influence or persuasion by police officers. The police, indeed, had no specific suspect in mind, and they merely located, apprehended, and brought in for trial the individual identified by the victim as the perpetrator of the offense. While the police work in the case might perhaps be criticized as lackadaisical and unimaginative, it was certainly not im-permissibly suggestive; and its shortcomings are not of constitutional magnitude, and cannot be characterized as amounting to denial of due process of law. In fact the victim’s identification testimony measures up favorably when appraised in accordance with the standards set forth in the leading Supreme Court decisions on the subject.
I. THE CRIME
On October 7, 1974, at the office of Dr. Jean-Louis Casseus, 1895 Grand Concourse at Tremone Avenue in the Bronx, Mrs. *1189Nancy Padovani, the doctor’s secretary, at 4:15 p. m. answered the intercom and signaled to release the latch on the locked door when a voice asked to see a person, supposedly a patient, though the name was not recognized by Mrs. Padovani as that of any of the doctor’s patients. Three black youths entered the office, one wearing a hood. He took a gun out and said: “This is a stick-up. Give me your money. Where is the doctor?” Thereupon he accompanied her into the doctor’s office, and at gunpoint robbed the doctor of $50 and his watch (permitting him to keep a ring). He likewise took Mrs. Padovani’s watch and money. Then he had her open a closet, in which he locked the doctor and a patient sitting in the waiting room. Before Mrs. Padovani was inside the closet, he said “No, you come back.” She was forced down to her knees, and was raped by all three men. In addition, one of them subjected her to anal sodomy, and one of them holding her by the ear (injuries to which resulted in infection) pulled up her head and put his penis in her mouth. While the hooded assailant was having sexual intercourse with her, one of his two accomplices ran outside to get a cab, and the other held the office door open (because if it closed it would lock). They called to the third rapist to “Hurry up, Kenny, hurry up.” When he had concluded, the three fled in a cab. (The license number was observed by the patient’s sister, Mrs. Marie Glass, parked outside the building, but neither she nor the taxi driver nor the patient identified the defendant at trial.1) Mrs. Padovani had been in close proximity to the hooded intruder during the whole time he was in the office, approximately fifteen minutes. The office was well lighted during the entire period.
After the departure of her assailants, Mrs. Padovani rearranged her clothing, released the imprisoned doctor and patient from the closet, and called the police. She was taken to Morrisania hospital for examination and treatment. Scientific tests revealed the presence of semen and spermatozoa on the clothing she wore at the time of the robbery. At the hospital she was interviewed by Lieutenant Lawrence Doherty of the Bronx sex crime squad, and gave a description of her assailant.
II. THE INVESTIGATION
On the day after the crimes occurred, Mrs. Padovani at the 48th Precinct office was shown two trays of “mug shots,” one was the sex tray — negro male, and the other the robbery tray — under five feet eight inches height. Each tray contained over a hundred photographs. She selected five, and then with respect to one of them requested Doherty to make a copy of it on which she could sketch a hood on it. After drawing the hood she made a positive identification of that suspect.
The police had no particular suspect in mind, and, as the trial court found, made no attempt to persuade the victim to select any particular picture.
After she had selected the picture (which turned out to be of defendant Kenneth Solomon) Doherty turned it over and retrieved the data relating to defendant, and subsequently located and arrested Solomon.
On October 17, Mrs. Padovani was notified of the arrest and called to the police station. While there she called her husband’s attention to the photograph of defendant which had been placed on the bulletin with a thumb-tack. The arraignment did not take place that night, but on the following day defendant was arraigned. Doherty had the photograph in his hand on that occasion, but Mrs. Padovani does not remember his showing it to her. Perhaps she saw the picture again at the time of testifying before the grand jury, though it is her recollection that Doherty was off duty that day and that the prosecuting attorney did not show her any pictures.
*1190At the arraignment defendant was present and Mrs. Padovani could observe him. She signed the affidavit for the complaint. Doherty asked her if she had gotten a good look at the defendant and if he were the right man. She answered “Yes” to both questions.
Later Mrs. Padovani attended several lineups. At one on November 19, 1974, she identified one Clayton Smalls as one of the three participants in the crime. On January 16, 1975, three lineups were held. At the second one, Mrs. Padovani identified one Kenneth Anscombe as the gunman, but immediately retracted that identification, realizing that Anscombe was heavier than her assailant. Anscombe weighed 147 pounds, defendant 130. A third lineup was then held, composed of defendant and four other persons ranging from 146 to 195 pounds, and Mrs. Padovani identified the defendant.
At the Wade hearing2 and at the trial Mrs. Padovani positively identified defendant.
Lieutenant Doherty also had Dr. Casseus view some photographs at the police station and later at the doctor’s office. The doctor selected defendant’s photograph, but it is not certain whether or not when he first looked at the pictures the copy with the hood drawn by Mrs. Padovani was included in the display, though he did certainly see the photograph with the hood at one time or another. At the Wade hearing Dr. Cas-seus could not be certain that defendant was the robber because in the courtroom defendant was not wearing a hood as the robber did. At the trial Dr. Casseus, after stepping down from the witness stand and looking closely at defendant, positively identified defendant as the gunman. He attributed his uncertainty at the Wade hearing to lack of a good opportunity to see the defendant clearly.
III. THE LAW
The case at bar being a collateral review by habeas corpus of a criminal conviction in state court, it is appropriate to begin consideration of applicable legal doctrine by recalling the fundamental principle that federal courts have no business interfering with state criminal proceedings unless there is established a violation of federally protected constitutional rights which amounts to deprivation of due process of law in one form or another.3
This is particularly true in a matter such as is here involved, where the judicial interference would negate the exercise by a jury of its traditional function of weighing evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of testimony. Our people’s time-honored commitment to the policy of jury trial ranks high in our catalogue of constitutional safeguards, and should not lightly be disturbed in reliance upon dubious assumptions that judges can better determine the reliability of witnesses. U. S. v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280 S, 618 F.2d 453, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1980).
On the other hand it must be remembered that identification testimony is often the least reliable and most suspect type of evidence employed to convict a defendant in a criminal case. Legal scholars have often observed that most of the spectacular miscarriages of justice have been due to mistaken identification of a defendant as the perpetrator of a crime. Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108, 110 (2d Cir. 1978); U. S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). Hence where the police procedures employed in effecting an identification are so impermissibly mislead*1191ing and suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, the courts may exclude the tainted testimony. Simmons v. U. S., 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968).
Indeed, in some Circuits a special charge is required, directing the jury’s attention to the need for alert scrutiny of the value of eyewitness identification testimony. U. S. v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3rd Cir. 1971).4
Many dramatic illustrations of the unreliability of such eyewitness testimony could be compiled. A recent example appeared in the New York Times of August 31, 1980. Under the heading “Guilty as Perceived” the item states:
Seeing is believing, as Jeffrey Streeter ought to know. Last month, three eyewitnesses to a case of assault and battery identified Mr. Streeter as the perpetrator in a nonjury trial before Polk County (Fla.) judge Edward Threadgill, and Judge Threadgill found Mr. Streeter guilty. But the witnesses were mistaken, since Mr. Streeter was not the real defendant; he had agreed to sit in for him in a judicial prank conceived by Warren Dawson, attorney for the defendant, Marvin Lee Anderson. The point, of course, was to show that the eyewitnesses could not correctly identify Mr. Anderson. Last week, after letting Mr. Streeter stew a while, Judge Threadgill reversed the verdict and ordered the authentic Mr. Anderson to stand trial.5
Nevertheless, as a general rule it is necessary to rely on the traditional fact-finding procedure of entrusting to the common sense of the jury, under appropriate instructions, the sensitive issue of identification. Only where police or prosecutorial misconduct or ineptitude results in a high degree of probability that improperly suggestive procedures have caused irreparable and irreversible misidentification should courts interfere with the jury’s exercise of its normal function as fact-finder charged with the responsibility of weighing evidence and determining the credibility and reliability of eyewitness testimony. As stated by the Supreme Court in Manson v. Brath-waite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), “Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh. We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.”
In Manson the Court reiterated the factors for gauging reliability:
We therefore conclude that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall confrontations.6 The factors to be considered are set out in Biggers. 409 U.S., at 199-200, 93 S.Ct., at 382. These include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confron*1192tation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. [432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253]
As indicated in Manson, the sedes materi-ae for the specification of the factors to be weighed is found in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). The “central question” for determination, it was there held, is whether
under the “totality of circumstances” the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive. [409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382]
A similar catalogue of relevant considerations appears in U. S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1939, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), including the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification.
It should be noted that in the case at bar there was really no attempt by the police to influence the identification by the witness. Hence the occasion for determining whether the in-court identification can be shown to be based upon independent sources other than the impermissibly suggestive influence does not really arise.7 Nevertheless, upon scrutiny of Mrs. Padovani’s testimony with respect to factors specified by the Supreme Court, I find that it measures up favorably.
The most plausible contention advanced by Solomon is that his appearance at arraignment was an “uncounseled show-up” violative of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. It was stated in U. S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1930-1931, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), that the right to counsel is guaranteed at “critical” stages of a criminal prosecution, and that some types of arraignment (as in Alabama) where rights may be foreclosed if not then asserted, constitute critical stages of the prosecution. See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1956, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) [using the phrase “post-indictment pre-trial lineup” as identifying a “critical stage”]; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972), and Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 224-31, 98 S.Ct, 458, 462-466, 54 L.Ed.2d 4¿4 (1977) [showing that not indictment but “initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings” is the critical time].
The language in Kirby (406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. at 1882) that right to counsel attaches only “at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings— whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment” [italics supplied] could be taken to mean that if the prosecution began when the arraignment was completed the defendant should be represented by counsel during the entire course of the arraignment.
However, from a practical standpoint arraignment is ordinarily not a critical stage where advice of counsel is important but merely a formality or historical relic. As explained by Blackstone8 at arraignment the defendant’s name is called and he raises his hand. This is to identify the person brought into court as the person against whom the charges are being brought. It is also the time when the defendant “puts himself upon the country” or accepts trial by jury of his case.
*1193If the defendant refused to plead and put himself upon the country, he was subjected, under the harsh rules of the English common law, to peine forte et dure. He was laid on his back, naked to the waist, his limbs stretched and tied to the four corners of the room, and weights were placed on his chest, as heavy as he could bear, and heavier, “till he died, or (as anciently the judgment ran) till he answered.” For the sake of their heirs, defendants would undergo this torture so as to prevent a conviction which would entail forfeiture of their estates. In 1772 peine forte et dure was abolished, and a refusal to plead treated as a plea of guilty; after 1827 as a plea of not guilty.9
The antiquarian ceremony of arraignment thus has little meaning for modern law. Our attention has not been called to any legal rights forfeited by a defendant under New York law if his counsel does not claim them at arraignment. Even if the doctrine of Wade and subsequent cases is applicable, there is no substantial ground for excluding Mrs. Padovani's in-court testimony. It was clearly based upon independent observation and admissible under the Wade rule as well as later leading cases such as Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Blackmun (432 U.S. at 113, 97 S.Ct. at 2252) “The standard, after all, is that of fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” under “the totality of the circumstances.” The crucial question is reliability.10
Particularly when the facts in the case at bar are scrutinized, it is plain that the “un-counseled show-up” at arraignment had no impermissible suggestive effect on the reliability of Mrs. Padovani’s in-court identification. If there was any error it was harmless, under the doctrine of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
Solomon, having been arrested in consequence of Mrs. Padovani’s photographic identification, was naturally present at the arraignment, for otherwise there would have been a violation of the right of every defendant to be present at every stage of the proceedings. It was necessary for Mrs. Padovani to be there in order to execute the complaint. There was nothing improper or suggestive in detective Doherty’s inquiry after she had had an opportunity to see the defendant: “Did you get a good look at him?” Upon her affirmative response he asked “Is that him?” and she replied “Yes.”
It is obvious that this discussion was not an effort on Doherty’s part to persuade Mrs. Padovani to identify Solomon. She could have answered “No” as readily as “Yes.” She knew that Doherty was genuinely seeking information when he asked her the questions, that he wanted her truthful answers, not fabricated answers to suit his wishes.
She knew that her testimony was the crucial link connecting Solomon with the crime; the police did not attempt to influence her judgment or to bolster her conviction by informing her of the existence of other evidence of defendant’s guilt (cf. 432 U.S. at 118, 97 S.Ct. at 2254 and 434 U.S. at 230, 98 S.Ct. at 465) — there was no other evidence of anyone’s guilt. Mrs. Padovani, like the public generally, surely knew, too, that under our system of law a defendant is presumed innocent until duly found guilty — that regardless of any putative desires of the police her response was to be truthful and in accordance with her best recollection, and uninfluenced by any wishes or desires on Doherty’s part to “nail” a particular suspect. But in fact Doherty had no suspect — he had merely located the suspect selected by Mrs. Padovani herself from an unsuggestive collection of some 200 photographs.
*1194Passing on from the confrontation at arraignment, we proceed to scrutinize Mrs. Padovani’s testimony under the rubrics enumerated in Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite, supra.
1. The opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime. Mrs. Padovani had a good opportunity to view the criminal from the time the three men entered the office until they left. She was right beside the hooded assailant during the robbery in the doctor’s office, and then in close contact during the rape. The premises were well lighted, and her eyesight was good.
2. The degree of attention on the part of the witness. Mrs. Padovani was certainly scrutinizing intently the gunman for he was brandishing a weapon, and alert attention to his behavior was an indispensable precaution for her safety. The robbery and other crimes perpetrated certainly constituted the most prominent event taking place in the doctor’s office, and there were no competing attractions to divert her attention.
3. The accuracy of her prior description of the criminal. According to the description attributed in the police report to all the witnesses, the gunman was described as a black male, age 21, height 5'6". Solomon was a black male, age 16, height 5'6". Allowing for normal human errors in reporting and recording, this appears to be an adequately accurate description.
4. The level of certainty displayed by the witness. Mrs. Padovani indicated no doubt or hesitation in her identification. The only deviation from unwavering certitude is found in her temporary identification (at the second line-up on January 16, 1975) of Kenneth Anscombe (aged 18, height 5'6") as the gunman. She immediately recanted this conclusion, however, upon realizing that Anscombe (weight 147 pounds) was heavier than her assailant (Solomon weighs 130 pounds).
Much is made in argument of this temporary aberration. It is contended that Mrs. Padovani meant that Anscombe was heavier than Solomon, that she was thinking of Solomon, the defendant she had seen at arraignment, whose picture she had seen several times, and that she had grown “accustomed to his face” and compared An-scombe with him rather than with the hooded rapist.
This argument seems to be straining at gnats, however; for there was no need for Mrs. Padovani to be thinking of pictures of Solomon when evaluating Anscombe’s weight. No one could know better than she did whether her assailant was heavier or skinnier — for paraphrasing the poet Edna St. Vincent Millay (The Harp Weaver and Other Poems) she had had occasion “to bear his body’s weight upon her breast.” Her judgment as to the avoirdupois of her assailant was based, in Wigmore’s phrase, upon “autoptic preference” and her own bodily senses rather than upon recollection in her mind’s eye of the mug-shot of Solomon which had led to his arrest.
It is unfortunate that the police did not have the ingenuity to conduct a line-up containing both Anscombe and Solomon, but in any event it can not be said that Mrs. Padovani’s level of certainty was substantially impaired. Her identification of Solomon was completely certain save for a fleeting instant, and she corrected immediately her temporary aberration.
5. The time between the crime and the confrontation. It was on the day immediately after the crime that Mrs. Padovani selected Solomon’s picture from a field of 200.
When she first saw him in the flesh at the arraignment it was only eleven days since the crime. The line-ups were held three months and nine days after the crime. When Mrs. Padovani identified the defendant at the Wade hearing nine months and a day had elapsed since the offense occurred; and her identification at the trial took place a week later. These periods of time are consistent with a reliable identification, especially in view of the prompt recognition of defendant’s photograph on the day following the robbery and rape.
Thus it is clear that there was no impermissible persuasion (or indeed any persua*1195sion at all) exercised by law enforcement officials to influence Mrs. Padovani’s identification of defendant. It was based on her own recollection of her assailant’s appearance, and she promptly selected his photograph from among a large number in an admittedly unsuggestive procedure. Later developments did not diminish to any substantial degree the reliability of her in-court identification. Measured by the standards specified by the Supreme Court, her testimony withstands scrutiny. It was based on her own sensory recollections. She had ample opportunity to observe closely during a considerable period of time under good light. She selected the defendant as a suspect the very next day after the crime. Her identification was not substantially weakened by any inconsistent identifications except for a brief aberration, which she instantly corrected, based on her assailant’s weight (which she had had a good opportunity to know at first hand). Her testimony properly was for. consideration by the jury. (The testimony of Dr. Casseus was likewise admissible, but was merely corroborative or cumulative, and did not contribute materially to Solomon’s conviction).
Hence, I respectfully dissent.

. Mrs. Glass and the taxi driver could not make an identification. The testimony of the patient, Henrietta Clark, was excluded, as although she picked out the defendant in a line-up she did so on the basis of a photograph marked by Mrs. Padovani rather than on the basis of her recollection of the crime.

. This expression refers to a hearing held, as required in U. S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1940, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), to determine “whether the in-court identifications had an independent origin.”

. Under the “selective incorporation” theory, the Fourteenth Amendment is currently regarded by the Supreme Court as making applicable to the states under the due process clause, some of the substantive safeguards prescribed by the first ten Amendments with respect to federal action. See' Henkin, “ ‘Selective Incorporation’ in the Fourteenth Amendment,” 73 Yale L.J. (November, 1963) 74. In the case at bar appellee thus invokes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “for his defence” in “criminal prosecutions.”

. Four factors are stressed: (1) the opportunity of the witness to observe; (2) the degree of positiveness in the identification; (3) whether the testimony is weakened by prior failure to identify or inconsistent identification; (4) whether the witness is unshaken after cross-examination.

. The writer of this opinion, in a District Court criminal trial, once permitted a defense attorney to practice a similar stratagem. However, the witness correctly identified the defendant sitting among spectators at the back of the courtroom. In Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 230, 98 S.Ct. 458, 465, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), Justice Powell suggests that counsel could have asked “that petitioner be seated with other people in the audience when the victim attempted an identification.”

. This is a reference to Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), “when we first gave notice that the suggestiveness of confrontation procedures was anything other than a matter to be argued to the jury.” [Nell v. Biggers] 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382. The Stovall trilogy decided June 12, 1967, included V. S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178.

. In the case at bar only in-court identification is involved. The prosecution did not offer at trial any proof as to photographic or line-up identification, and defense counsel for tactical reasons did not go into that subject. Hence the distinction urged by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Manson v. Brathwaite (432 U.S. at 121-24, 97 S.Ct. at 2256-2258) has no pertinence here.

. 4 Bl.Com. 322-29.

. Donald Veal, The Popular Movement for Law Reform 1640-1660 (1970) 27, 235.

. This seems to be true whether the case involves due process simpliciter or “incorporation” of right to counsel, and whether a pre-trial identification or an in-court identification is involved. In the case at bar, as previously noted, only in-court identification is at issue. See note 7 supra.