Court Opinion

ID: 9914900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 17:07:25.052214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:21.576114
License: Public Domain

J-S32035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  EDWARD REYNOLDS                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 408 MDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 1, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-22-CR-0000444-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                            FILED: JANUARY 3, 2024

       Appellant Edward Reynolds appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his conviction for possession of a firearm prohibited.1

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts in this matter as follows:

       Officer Farida Kingsboro testified that she was working on July 30,
       2020, when she came into contact with Appellant. She was
       patrolling her jurisdiction when she observed a male that
       appeared to be possibly unconscious on the stoop of a building
       located on the 100[] block of South 17th Street, at around 2:00
       a.m. Officer Kingsboro waited for backup and when the second
       officer[, Officer Garrett Miller,] arrived, the two approached the
       individual. The individual awoke, and Officer Kinsgboro asked for
       his identification. As the individual, identified as Appellant,
       searched for his identification in a plastic bag, Officer Kingsboro
       saw what appeared to be the butt of a pistol in the bag. Officer
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
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      Kingsboro shined her light on the bag and when she confirmed it
      was a gun, she quickly grabbed it as it was within close proximity
      to Appellant.

Trial Ct. Op., 4/27/23, at 2 (unpaginated) (citations to the record omitted).

Officer Kingsboro took Appellant’s identification card to her patrol car, and she

began “running [Appellant’s] information to see if he had a conceal permit.”

N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 23. The trial court continued:

      [Officer] Miller testified that he has been a police officer with
      Harrisburg City for 22 years. On July 30, 2020, he was Officer
      Kingsboro’s backup, and he responded when she called out a
      subject stop. Officer Miller arrived at the scene in a marked police
      car and was in full uniform. The red and blue lights on Officer
      Miller’s vehicle were activated when he arrived; however, he did
      not have his gun drawn. Officer Miller made conversation with
      Appellant while Officer Kingsboro returned to her police vehicle
      with Appellant’s identification. Officer Miller testified that he
      asked where Appellant lived. At some point, Appellant “[w]as just
      rambling on about, you know, he found [the gun] and hope[d]
      there was no bodies on it and said maybe there was [sic] some
      cowboys on it[,] it was so old.” [N.T., Suppression Hearing,
      9/19/22, at 33.] Officer Miller did ask [Appellant] if the gun was
      a .22 [caliber] but did not ask any other questions about the gun.

Trial Ct. Op. at 3 (unnumbered)(formatting altered and some citations

omitted).

      After running Appellant’s information, Officer Kingsboro learned that

Appellant did not have a permit to carry a concealed firearm.         See N.T.,

Suppression Hearing, 9/19/22, at 23-25, 28-29.          Officer Kingsboro then

walked back over to Appellant and Officer Miller, she asked Appellant what he

was doing on the sidewalk and if he had ever been arrested, Appellant

responded that he had been arrested before, and Officer Kingsboro read

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Appellant his Miranda2 warnings and placed him under arrest. Trial Ct. Op.,

4/27/23, at 3-4 (unnumbered); see also N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at

23-25, 28-29.

       Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress “any and all statements”3

he made because Appellant was questioned during a custodial detention and

the officers did not provide Miranda warnings.        See Mot. to Suppress,

9/16/22, at 2-3.       Immediately prior to trial, the trial court conducted a

suppression hearing and denied Appellant’s motion. See N.T. Suppression

Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 45. Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of possession

of a firearm prohibited. See N.T. Trial, 9/19/22, at 160-61. The trial court

subsequently sentenced Appellant to a term of seven and one-half to fifteen

years of incarceration. Sentencing Order, 12/1/22.

       Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court

denied.    Appellant did not file a direct appeal, and on February 24, 2023,

Appellant filed a timely petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 4

(PCRA) requesting the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The trial court

granted Appellant’s PCRA petition and reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal

____________________________________________

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3 Appellant filed a motion to suppress only the statements he made to police,

and he did not challenge the seizure of the firearm. See Mot. to Suppress,
9/16/22, at 2-3.

4 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

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rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed a timely appeal, and both the trial court

and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

      Whether the trial court erred in holding that [Appellant] was only
      detained pursuant to an investigative detention, depriving him of
      the protection of Miranda, when [Appellant] was not free to
      leave, and officers had seized a handgun prior to questioning him?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      Appellant argues that the trial court should have suppressed Appellant’s

statements to the police officers.    Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.    Appellant

contends that “[o]nce Officer Kingsboro seized [Appellant’s] identification, as

well as the firearm involved in this case, he was subject to custodial

interrogation.”   Id. at 11.   Appellant asserts that during this custodial

interrogation, the police failed to provide Miranda warnings or inform

Appellant of his constitutional rights, and he argues that he was “allowed to

ramble by police and asked questions specifically about the firearm.” Id. at

16-18. Appellant also contends that the order denying the motion to suppress

was not harmless error. Id. at 19-21.

      The Commonwealth responds that the police officers were not obligated

to provide Miranda warnings until Officer Kingsboro placed Appellant under

arrest because, until that point, Appellant was not subjected to a custodial

detention.   Commonwealth’s Brief at 10.     Specifically, the Commonwealth

asserts that under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant’s initial

detention was not so coercive that it became the functional equivalent of an

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arrest.   Id. at 10-11.   The Commonwealth notes that the police officers

engaged Appellant in a mere encounter when they approached and asked for

identification, Officer Kingsboro then saw the firearm in plain view while

Appellant looked in his bag for identification, and Officer Kingsboro secured

the weapon because of its proximity to Appellant. Id. It was not until Officer

Kingsboro learned that Appellant did not possess a concealed-carry permit for

the firearm that she placed him under arrest. See id. at 10. Moreover, the

Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s spontaneous statements regarding

the firearm were not made in response to police questioning. See id. Finally,

the Commonwealth contends that any hypothetical error was harmless

because the Commonwealth established Appellant’s possession of the firearm

beyond a reasonable doubt even without Appellant’s statement. See id. at

11. The Commonwealth notes that Officer Kingsboro found the firearm in the

bag   where   Appellant   carried   his   identification,   and   therefore,   the

Commonwealth proved at least constructive possession of the gun. See id.

      “Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a

suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions

drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d

649, 654 (Pa. 2010). Our scope of review “is limited to the evidentiary record

that was created at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Barnes,

296 A.3d 52, 55 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citing In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa.

2013)).

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     Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
     the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only
     if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The suppression
     court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court,
     whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly
     applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the
     courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 201 A.3d 757, 763 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).

     Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth
     Amendment to the United States Constitution both protect the
     people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence
     arising under both charters has led to the development of three
     categories of interactions between citizens and police. The first,
     a “mere encounter,” does not require any level of suspicion or
     carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an
     “investigative detention,” permits the temporary detention of an
     individual if supported by reasonable suspicion. The third is an
     arrest or custodial detention, which must be supported by
     probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

     [T]o establish grounds for reasonable suspicion, the officer must
     articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
     reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
     reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
     activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in
     that activity. The question of whether reasonable suspicion
     existed at the time [the officer conducted the stop] must be
     answered by examining the totality of the circumstances to
     determine whether the officer who initiated the stop had a
     particularized and objective basis for suspecting the individual
     stopped. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court
     must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to
     the officer at the moment of the [stop] warrant a [person] of
     reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
     appropriate.

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Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180, 184 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted).   To conclude that an officer possessed reasonable suspicion, the

officer “must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d

765, 768-69 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      Further, a mere encounter escalates into an investigative detention

where there is an investigation that causes the subject to believe that he is

not free to leave.   See Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1005 (Pa.

2012).

      To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has
      been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an
      objective test entailing a determination of whether, in view of all
      surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have
      believed that he was free to leave.           In evaluating the
      circumstances, the focus is directed toward whether, by means of
      physical force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s
      movement in some way has been restrained. In making this
      determination,    courts     must    apply   the    totality-of-the
      circumstances approach, with no single factor dictating the
      ultimate conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred.

Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 784 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).    Moreover, “[a]n investigative detention may develop into a

custodial detention.” Barnes, 296 A.3d at 59. “The key difference between

an investigative and a custodial detention is that the latter involves such

coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. This

Court considers the totality of circumstances to determine if an encounter is

investigatory or custodial.” Id. (citations omitted).

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      The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality of the
      circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive as to
      constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the basis for
      the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was
      transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether
      restraints were used; whether the law enforcement officer
      showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative methods
      employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.

Id. (citations omitted).

      Statements     made     during      custodial   interrogation   are
      presumptively involuntary, unless the accused is first advised of
      Miranda rights. Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated
      by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
      custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
      significant way.    The Miranda safeguards come into play
      whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
      questioning or its functional equivalent.       Thus, interrogation
      occurs where the police should know that their words or actions
      are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
      suspect.    In evaluating whether Miranda warnings were
      necessary, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.

      Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on
      whether the person is physically denied of his freedom of action
      in any significant way[,] or is placed in a situation in which he
      reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is
      restricted by the interrogation. Moreover, the test for custodial
      interrogation does not depend upon the subjective intent of the
      law enforcement officer interrogator. Rather, the test focuses on
      whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his
      freedom of action is being restricted.

      Said another way, police detentions become custodial when,
      under the totality of the circumstances, the conditions and/or
      duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the
      functional equivalent of arrest. Thus, the ultimate inquiry for
      determining whether an individual is in custody for Miranda
      purposes is whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on
      freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
      arrest.

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Commonwealth v. Sloan, 303 A.3d 155, 167 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 887-88 (Pa. Super. 2009))

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      Here, at the close of the testimony, the [trial] court found that on
      the date in question, Officer Kingsboro stopped to check on an
      individual she observed sleeping on the stoop at 2 a.m. When
      backup arrived, the officers approached the individual (who was
      ultimately identified as Appellant). While initially sluggish and
      confused, Appellant did not appear to be intoxicated to any point
      where he did not understand what was going on. Appellant
      interacted with Officers Kingsboro and Miller and was compliant
      and cooperative during the brief encounter. Appellant provided
      his identification to Officer Kingsboro, and she then observed a
      gun and took it into custody.

      During this time, Appellant and Officer Miller had a casual
      conversation about where Appellant lives. Appellant then segued
      into a conversation about the gun and the only question asked by
      Officer Miller was what caliber the gun was. When Officer
      Kingsboro returns, she asked Appellant whether he has ever been
      arrested. The court found at this point Appellant was being
      detained, was not free to leave, and no reasonable person under
      the circumstances would believe they were free to leave, nor did
      Appellant attempt to leave. However, the court further found that
      a custodial interrogation did not take place. The conversation that
      took place between the officers and Appellant was routine in
      nature, asking him where he lived, whether he had been arrested,
      and what caliber the gun was. The court opined that this line of
      questioning did not rise to any level of custodial interrogation and
      denied the motion to suppress.

                                   *    *    *

      In the instant matter, the contact between the officers and
      Appellant was initiated by Officer Kingsboro’s observation of an
      individual, who she believed might be unconscious, on the stoop
      of a building at 2:00 a.m. Officer Kingsboro did not activate her
      police lights or siren, nor did she or Officer Miller draw their
      weapons. As she and Officer Miller approached the individual, he

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      awoke, and Officer Kingsboro asked to see identification. None of
      the evidence presented indicated that the officers were acting in
      an aggressive or intimidating manner. There was nothing to
      suggest that failure to produce the identification would result in a
      consequence to Appellant. Neither officer told Appellant that he
      was not free to leave, and he was not physically restrained,
      preventing him from leaving. To the contrary, the encounter was
      described as relaxed and casual.

                                   *     *      *

      While Officer Miller acknowledged that he asked Appellant where
      he lived, this inquiry does not rise to the level of a custodial
      interrogation. Further, Appellant, of his own volition, brought up
      the gun and that he had found it. In effect, he volunteered that
      statement. As such, Miranda was not required. Given the time
      of night and the fact that Appellant was possibly unconscious on
      the stoop of a building in a high crime area, it was not
      unreasonable for the officers to approach Appellant and ask for
      identification. . . .

Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5; 6-7 (unnumbered)(formatting altered and citations

omitted).

      After review, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances,

the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and without legal error,

therefore the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.

See Jones, 988 A.2d at 654; see also Green, 168 A.3d at 184.

      As stated, Officer Kingsboro testified that it was 2:00 a.m. in a high

crime area when police saw Appellant, who appeared to be unconscious on a

building stoop. See N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 17. When Officer

Kingsboro initially approached Appellant and asked for identification, the

interaction was a mere encounter, which required no level of suspicion and

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carried no official compulsion to stop or respond. See McAdoo, 46 A.3d at

784.

       During the initial mere encounter and request for identification, Officer

Kingsboro saw that Appellant had a firearm in his bag. See N.T., Suppression

Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 19-23.         After Officer Kingsboro secured the firearm and

obtained Appellant’s identification, she walked back to her car to determine if

Appellant had a permit to carry the firearm. Id. at 20, 23, 28. At that point,

we agree with the trial court that the mere encounter escalated into an

investigative detention because, under these facts, a reasonable person would

not have felt free to leave.          See McAdoo, 46 A.3d at 784; see also

Commonwealth v. Cost, 224 A.3d 641, 651 (Pa. 2020) (stating that in

determining whether there was an investigative detention, “retention by police

of an identification card to conduct a warrant check will generally be a material

and substantial escalating factor within the totality assessment”).

       Further, on this record, we agree with the trial court that there was

reasonable suspicion to support the investigative detention. See McAdoo, 46

A.3d at 784. Officer Kingsboro testified that she encountered Appellant in a

high crime area at 2:00 a.m., at which time she observed a concealed firearm

in Appellant’s open bag.           Accordingly, based on the totality of these

circumstances,5 we conclude that Officer Kingsboro, articulated specific

____________________________________________

5 We are cognizant that possession of a firearm alone is not sufficient to create

reasonable suspicion; however, it is a factor to be considered when
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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observations from which she drew reasonable inferences based on her law

enforcement training and experience, that criminal activity was afoot. See

Green, 168 A.3d at 184.

       Finally, we agree with the trial court that Appellant was not subject to a

custodial interrogation. As noted previously, Officer Kingsboro checked on

Appellant’s welfare because he appeared to be unconscious on a city street at

2:00 A.M. and ultimately discovered that Appellant had a gun.         See N.T.,

Suppression Hr’g, 9/19/22, at 19-20. Additionally, the conversation that took

place between the officers and Appellant was routine and included questions

concerning where Appellant lived, whether he had been arrested, and what

caliber the gun was. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Further, the detention was for

investigative purposes, was not coercive or lengthy, did not involve any

physical restraint or use of force, and did not involve transporting Appellant

to a separate location for questioning. See Barnes, 296 A.3d at 59. Based

on the totality of these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that

because Appellant made statements to police during an investigative

detention, no Miranda warnings were required. See Sloan, 303 A.3d at 167.

____________________________________________

determining whether there is reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the
circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 331 n.4 (Pa.
Super. 2022); see also Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 938-39
(Pa. 2019) (providing that law enforcement officers may consider contextual
factors, such as one’s presence in a high crime area, to reasonably suspect
that a person’s possession of a firearm is unlawful).

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       On this record, we discern no error by the trial court in denying

Appellant’s suppression motion.6         For these reasons, we affirm.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/03/2024

____________________________________________

6 In light of our conclusion, we need not address Appellant’s claim that the

trial court’s error was not harmless error.

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