Court Opinion

ID: 9744835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:18:31.553101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:52.342686
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
The statute in question, 1.0. 9-4-183-14, provided that the person only need be "found to be an habitual offender". The majority implies that there must have been "an effective judgment ... entered against him on the underlying HTO charge." Maj. opinion at 889. There is authority to the effect that a mere finding does not constitute a judgment. See Robison v. State (1977) 3d Dist., 172 Ind.App. 205, 859 N.E.2d 924 (Trial court entered finding of guilt but attempted to withhold judgment. Held: There being no appealable judgment, the appeal must be dismissed.); see also to same effect in a civil proceeding Northcutt v. Buckles (1877) 60 Ind. 577. There is, however, authority to the contrary. In Goodwin v. State (1982) Ind., 489 N.E.2d 595, 602, our Supreme Court held: "A judgment of conviction is the mental process of the judge in which he finds that a defendant in a criminal cause is guilty." See also Barlow v. State (1988) 2d Dist.Ind. App., 526 N.E.2d 1212 (Sullivan, J., dissenting); State v. Boze (1985) 3d Dist.Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 276, trans. denied. To the extent, therefore, that there might have been a 1981 finding that Jones was an habitual offender, although not a "judg*890ment" or an "adjudication", such might have nevertheless sufficed for purposes of a subsequent conviction under I.C. 9-4-18-14.
The fact remains, however, that we do not have in the record before us even a finding that Jones was an habitual offender. This alone is reason enough to reverse the denial of post-conviction relief.
Be that as it may, and notwithstanding the message of Goodwin v. State, supra, 489 N.E.2d 595, I share the "grave concerns" expressed by the majority. I further agree that the failure of the trial court to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea requires reversal.
I concur.