Court Opinion

ID: 9488019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:33:58.013196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:38.334755
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in all parts of Judge Enslen’s opinion, but I write separately with regard to part H.C., which deals with double counting.
The difficult part of this case involves the five-point enhancement for “brandishing” a firearm. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) increases five levels “if .a firearm was brandished, displayed, or possessed” in the underlying robbery offense. This increase follows a descending order: (2)(A) calls for a seven-level increase for discharge of a firearm; and (2)(B) a six-level increase “if a firearm is otherwise used.”
The guidelines, on their face, make brandishing, displaying or possessing a firearm as equivalent offenses providing the same enhancement. In application note 2, § 2B3.1, it is stated that “when an object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed or possessed, treat the object as a dangerous weapon.” Once again, these terms, “brandish, display, or possess” are used to indicate the same level of offense.
On the other hand, the term “brandished” is defined in application note 1(c) to § 1B1.1 “means that the weapon was pointed or waived about, or displayed in a threatening manner.” As a matter of common sense, “brandished,” as thus defined, indicates a more serious and threatening action than mere “possession” of a weapon. It is true that “possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title”1 is an element of the *750offense of carjacking, 18-U.S.C. § 2119. Several district court cases have held that a defendant may not be punished both for “use” of a firearm during carjacking, a “crime of violence,” and also the use of a firearm penalty under § 924(c).
The first of these published -cases, United States v. Singleton, 824 F.Supp. 609 (E.D. La.1993), concluded “the two statutes involved do not reflect a clear intent by Congress to impose cumulative punishments.”2 That décision was reversed, however, in 1994 by a unanimous court which held that “§ 924(e) clearly indicates Congress’ intent to punish cumulatively violations of § 924(c) and 2119.” United States v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419, 1425 (5th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 244, 130 L.Ed.2d 166 (1994).
Shortly thereafter, this court adopted the same position as the Fifth Circuit in construing the effect of the two statutes. United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 108 (6th Cir.1994). (“Congress intended to impose additional punishment for the same conduct”) Were I deciding this issue on a clear slate, I would hold that cumulative firearm punishment should not be imposed because the statutes involved appear to be ambiguous and unclear about congressional intent. Johnson, however, clearly holds that Congress had in mind imposing “additional punishment” in this situation.
I, therefore, concur also as to part II.C.

. A firearm is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) as “any weapon .-.. which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive."

. The other cases, also holding against cumulative punishment, United States v. Smith, 831 F.Supp. 549 (E.D. Va.1993), and United States v. Moore, 832 F.Supp. 335 (N.D.Ala.1993), pre-date the circuit court decisions to the opposite effect.