Court Opinion

ID: 9427108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:45.192782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:04.897606
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the result.
Once again the Court is called upon to adjudicate the constitutionality of one of New York’s many statutes that impose *301a requirement of citizenship for occupational activity.* Although I have joined the Court in striking down citizenship requirements of this kind, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717 (1973); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572 (1976), including, specifically, some imposed by the State of New York, see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973); and Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1 (1977), I have no difficulty in agreeing with the result the Court reaches here.
The Court’s prior cases clearly establish the standards to be applied in this one. Mauclet, of course, decided just last Term, is our most recent pronouncement in this area of constitutional law. There, citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372, we observed once again that a State’s classifications based on alienage “are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny,” and, citing Flores de Otero, 426 U. S., at 605, we went on to say that “ ‘the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to determine whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.’ ” 432 U. S., at 7. In the same opinion, however, limitations were intimated when, citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S., at 642 and 647, we said:
“[T]he State’s interest ‘in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within “the basic conception of a *302political community"' might justify some consideration of alienage. But as Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State’s historical and constitutional powers to define the qualifications of voters, or of 'elective or important nonelective’ officials 'who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.’ [413 U. S.], at 647. See id., at 648.” 432 U. S., at 11.
When the State is so acting, it need justify its discriminatory classifications only by showing some rational relationship between its interest in preserving the political community and the classification it employs.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the State of New York has vested its state troopers with powers and duties that are basic to the function of state government. The State may rationally conclude that those who are to execute these duties should be limited to persons who can be presumed to share in the values of its political community as, for example, those who possess citizenship status. New York, therefore, consistent with the Federal Constitution, may preclude aliens from serving as state troopers.

One of the appellees in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1 (1977), listed a succession of New York statutes requiring citizenship, or a declaration of intent to become a citizen, for no fewer than 37 occupations. Brief for Appellee Mauclet, O. T. 1976; No. 76-208, pp. 19-22, nn. 8-44, inclusive. Some of the statutes have been legislatively repealed or modified, or judicially invalidated. Others, apparently, are still in effect; among them are those relating to the occupations of inspector, certified shorthand reporter, funeral director, masseur, physical therapist, and animal health technician.