Court Opinion

ID: 9949590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 22:01:00.537352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:03.071687
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
            C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                       ________________________

                           No. ACM 40354
                       ________________________

                         UNITED STATES
                             Appellee
                                   v.
                  Leo J. NAVARRO AGUIRRE
         Airman First Class (E-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                       ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                       Decided 11 March 2024
                       ________________________

Military Judge: Elijah F. Brown.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 26 March 2022 by GCM convened at Joint
Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. Sentence entered by military judge
on 12 May 2022: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 2 years and 2
months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to E-1, and a
reprimand.
For Appellant: Major Spencer R. Nelson, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel J. Peter Ferrell, USAF; Major Vanessa
N. Bairos, USAF; Major Olivia B. Hoff, USAF; and Mary Ellen Payne,
Esquire.
Before RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS, and WARREN, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
Judge RICHARDSON and Judge WARREN joined.
                       ________________________

   This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                      ________________________
               United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

DOUGLAS, Judge:
    In a general court-martial, Appellant entered mixed pleas. The trial judge
accepted his pleas of guilty to one specification of failure to obey a lawful order
(violating a no-contact order), and one specification of wrongful use of oxyco-
done in violation of Articles 92 and 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 912a.1 The trial judge also accepted Appellant’s plea
of guilty by exception to one specification of reckless driving, excepting the
words “and aerosol inhalants,” in violation of Article 113, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 913.2 The Government elected to go forward with the excepted lan-
guage in which a panel of officer and enlisted members found Appellant guilty
of the specification of reckless driving, excepting the words “and aerosol inhal-
ants.” Contrary to the remainder of his pleas, the same panel of officer and
enlisted members found Appellant guilty of one specification of wrongful use
of Ambien3 in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ, and one specification of assault
consummated by a battery and one specification of aggravated assault—both
against his spouse and both in violation of Article 128, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928.4
The trial judge sentenced Appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement
for two years and two months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction
to the grade of E-1, and a reprimand.5 The convening authority took no action
on the findings. The convening authority suspended the first six months of the
adjudged forfeiture of total pay and allowances, waived the resulting automatic
forfeitures for six months, and directed the total pay and allowances to be paid
to Appellant’s spouse for six months. Otherwise, the convening authority

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the UCMJ, the Military Rules of Evi-

dence (Mil. R. Evid.), and the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) are to the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.).
2 Specifically, Appellant was charged with “physical[ ] control of a vehicle, to wit: a

passenger car, in a reckless manner by causing the vehicle to block traffic and swerve
on public roadways and by driving the vehicle after using Zolpidem (a Schedule IV
controlled substance commonly referred to as Ambien) and aerosol inhalants.”
3 Charged as “Zolpidem, commonly referred to as Ambien, a Schedule IV controlled

substance.”
4 The convening authority withdrew and dismissed without prejudice one specification

of wrongful use of benzodiazepine, a Schedule IV controlled substance, in violation of
Article 112a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 912a. Appellant was acquitted of several other speci-
fications and charges.
5 The concurrent and consecutive segmented confinement lengths combined for a total

of two years and two months. Appellant was credited with 108 days of pretrial confine-
ment.

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               United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

approved the remainder of the sentence and provided the language for the rep-
rimand.
     Appellant raises three issues on appeal which we have reordered and re-
worded: whether (1) Appellant’s guilty plea for reckless driving was provident,
(2) Appellant’s conviction for wrongful use of Ambien is legally and factually
sufficient, and (3) Appellant was entitled to a unanimous verdict. We have
carefully considered issue (3) and determined it warrants no discussion or re-
lief. See United States v. Guinn, 81 M.J. 195, 204 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citing United
States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A. 1987)). Key to the analysis of the
claims on appeal is the distinction between what Appellant stated in his initial
Care6 inquiry and the re-opened Care inquiry—the details of which were not
before the factfinders—versus the information admitted as evidence before
them. After considering the entire record and finding no error materially prej-
udicial to Appellant’s substantial rights, we affirm the findings and sentence.

                                 I. BACKGROUND
      While addressed separately at trial, the facts of the reckless driving and
wrongful use of Ambien convictions are related. Both involve a single use of
Ambien, which was a contributing factor to Appellant’s reckless driving and
separately charged as a wrongful use of a controlled substance. The specifica-
tion alleging reckless driving charged, inter alia, that Appellant drove “within
the state of Washington, on or about 1 October 2021 . . . in a reckless manner
. . . after using” Ambien. The specification alleging wrongful use charged that
Appellant “did, in or around the state of Washington, on or about 1 October
2021, wrongfully use” Ambien.
    Without a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to reckless driving (ex-
cept the words “and aerosol inhalants”), admitting he was under the effects of
his prescribed Ambien, but he pleaded not guilty to wrongfully using this pre-
scription medication. Appellant elected to inform the panel of his guilty pleas
prior to the Government proceeding on the merits; consequently, the members
knew Appellant had pleaded guilty to reckless driving after using Ambien.
However, the members did not know the underlying facts of the guilty plea
because the details of his plea were not introduced as evidence before the fact-
finders. The Government proceeded on the excepted words of the reckless driv-
ing offense, as well as all charges to which Appellant had pleaded not guilty,
including wrongful use of Ambien.

6 United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969).

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

   In closing, trial defense counsel argued that Appellant’s Ambien use was in
accordance with his prescription, which was admitted into evidence. On ap-
peal, Appellant’s counsel continues to argue the same.
    As background for purposes of our opinion, the undisputed facts common
to both offenses are that sometime after work on Friday, 1 October 2021, Ap-
pellant took Ambien, which he had been prescribed the previous day, and then
drove his personal vehicle.
A. Not Admitted as Evidence: First Providency Inquiry
    After pleading guilty and being placed under oath, Appellant explained the
following to the trial judge during the Care inquiry:
       On 1 October 2021, within the State of Washington, I drove my
       passenger car in a reckless manner after using Ambien. I was
       prescribed Ambien the day before on 30 September 2021. I got
       the prescription to help me sleep. On 1 October 2021, I took the
       prescribed dose of one pill. On 1 October 2021, I left work at Joint
       Base Lewis-McChord and went to my apartment in University
       Place, Washington. I got back around 1430, and I decided to take
       some Ambien and go to sleep, because I hadn’t slept in almost
       two days. Earlier in the day I had been thinking that I needed
       to fill my car with gas. After a little while, I fell asleep in bed in
       my apartment. The next thing I remember is being behind the
       wheel of my car. My car was parked in the parking lot outside of
       my apartment. I remember noticing that I was in the wrong
       parking spot, the vehicle was running, and I had the foot on the
       gas pedal revving the engine, which caused the vehicle to over-
       heat. A police car was behind me. The police officers talked with
       me. There were two officers there. They asked me if I was drunk
       and I told them no, but I said that I had taken Ambien. . . . I do
       not remember driving my car, but I have reviewed the state-
       ments of witnesses and police, and I am aware that my car was
       seen recklessly weaving and blocking traffic. I was discovered in
       my car with the car still running. When I woke up, the car was
       in a different spot than where I had left when I got home from
       work. I was the only one who had keys to my car. The police told
       me a witness saw me hit a lamppost, and when I looked at my
       car, I noticed fresh damage to the front bumper of my vehicle
       that had not been there when I parked it. I believe that I did, in
       fact, drive my car in a reckless manner as the evidence I have
       reviewed says.

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

    Following this explanation, the trial judge questioned Appellant. During
that question-and-answer colloquy, Appellant re-affirmed to the trial judge the
substance of Appellant’s opening explanation, to wit: that Appellant operated
his vehicle within hours of taking Ambien; that he had no independent recol-
lection of his reckless operation of the vehicle (including swerving in traffic and
hitting a lamppost), but that his review of the evidence gathered in the case,
including the police report containing police and witness statements, convinced
Appellant that he did in fact operate his vehicle recklessly as alleged. Appel-
lant further conceded under oath that he felt “dazed, groggy, and slow” when
police confronted Appellant in his apartment complex parking lot. The ques-
tion-and-answer colloquy continued:
       [Military Judge (MJ)]: The next part of the element [of physically
       controlling a vehicle] says that you caused the vehicle to swerve
       on public roadways. What do you know about, if anything, about
       swerving on public roadways?
       [Appellant]: I believe it’s unsafe, Your Honor.
       MJ: And factually, what information do you have from your re-
       view of any of the witness statements or from what the police
       may have told you about any sort of swerving? Like what do you
       know or what do you believe you did based on that?
       ....
       [Appellant]: Your Honor, one witness stated that I was swerving
       on and off roads, switching lanes, and that the swerving is what
       eventually led me to swerve onto the sidewalk and hit the lamp-
       post, Your Honor.
       ....
       MJ: The element continues by saying that this control of the ve-
       hicle was after using Zolpidem, a Schedule IV controlled sub-
       stance commonly referred to as Ambien. Was this after using
       Ambien?
       ....
       . . . What I am trying to determine is just temporally, like how
       long after using the Ambien could it have been when you were
       driving? And I understand you might not have any sort of spe-
       cific timeline, but why do you think you were controlling your
       vehicle after -- well, in a reckless manner part of which was after
       using Ambien? And it looks like your counsel is ready to speak
       with you.

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       United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

....
[Appellant]: Your Honor, I believe it was after arriving home
from work that day. I was still in the same clothes that I had
been wearing at work minus the blouse. There was still light out
and it was the same date. And when I woke up, I had the same
clothes on.
MJ: Do you believe it was the Ambien that led to your not having
a memory of being in control of the vehicle?
[Appellant]: Yes, Your Honor.
....
MJ: So the second element is that, you know, by causing the ve-
hicle to block traffic, swerving on public roadways, and then by
driving the vehicle after using Zolpidem, you controlled the ve-
hicle in a reckless manner. So why do you believe this was reck-
less? That your control of the vehicle, rather, was reckless?
[Appellant]: Because I was not in complete control of my facul-
ties, Your Honor.
....
Your Honor, it was reckless because I was swerving on the road,
blocking traffic, riding up a sidewalk and hitting the lamppost,
and that is unsafe for myself and others.
MJ: So the definition -- the legal definition of reckless is that the
manner of control of the vehicle was under all the circumstances
of such a heedless nature that it made it actually or imminently
dangerous to the occupant, so to you, or to the rights or safety of
others or another. It further says that recklessness is not deter-
mined solely by reason of the happening of an injury or invading
the rights of another nor solely by excessive speed or erratic op-
eration, but these are relevant factors. So, how was it immi-
nently -- actually imminently dangerous to yourself or to the
rights or safety of others, would you say?
[Appellant]: I could have gotten into a car accident, Your Honor.
Well, besides hitting the lamppost, hurting others and myself,
Your Honor.
MJ: Do you think lack of memory as a result of taking Ambien,
do you think the Ambien could have also impacted your ability
to safely control the vehicle?
[Appellant]: Yes, Your Honor.

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

       ....
       Your Honor --
       ....
       -- in addition to when my memory came to, I remember feeling
       dazed, groggy, slow, and having a hard time understanding the
       police officers. I thought the same way I was driving that night,
       I could see how it could affect my ability to safely drive.
       MJ: Do you believe that to be the case, that you would have been
       experiencing affects such as being dazed, groggy and slow while
       driving?
       [Appellant]: Potentially, Your Honor.
       MJ: Do you think you had any legal justification or excuse for
       operating the vehicle in the manner alleged while under -- or
       after taking Ambien?
       [Appellant]: No, Your Honor.
    Counsel for both sides responded in the negative when asked by the trial
judge if they believed further inquiry was required. The trial judge found Ap-
pellant’s pleas provident, accepted the pleas, and advised Appellant that he
may “request to withdraw” the “guilty plea[s] at any time before sentence is
announced,” and the request would be granted if there was “a good reason” for
the request.
B. Admitted as Evidence: Before the Court Members
    After the members were impaneled, the Government presented evidence
on the offenses to which Appellant pleaded not guilty. Specific to reckless driv-
ing, including the words “and aerosol inhalants,” the Government called Spe-
cialist (SPC) MD. On the day in question, SPC MD was driving behind his wife,
who was driving her own vehicle, and they were headed home in the same di-
rection as Appellant. SPC MD testified that at about 1800 hours on 1 October
2021, he saw Appellant in his vehicle at a traffic light that turned green, but
Appellant did not move his vehicle. As a result, “everybody started honking . . .
because . . . everybody gets aggravated.” He then witnessed Appellant “swerv-
ing in and out of lanes” and “slow down, speed up, slow down, and speed up
again,” and SPC MD thought Appellant might be trying to race with him. At
one point, while SPC MD and his wife were both traveling in the left lane of
two lanes, SPC MD noticed Appellant attempted to pass his wife, on the left—
crossing the center line and into a lane with oncoming vehicles. At that time,
Appellant returned to the right lane and sped away. When SPC MD arrived at
his apartment complex, which coincidentally was the same as Appellant’s, he

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

saw Appellant’s vehicle stopped in the turning lane, not moving. At that time,
SPC MD got out of his vehicle to check on Appellant. SPC MD saw Appellant
in military uniform “without the top, just a shirt,” “rocking back and forth,”
with “a can in his lap, and [Appellant] just had like a smile”—causing SPC MD
to think “okay, well, he’s probably high.” SPC MD thought he might help by
driving Appellant’s vehicle, but Appellant did not roll down his window. Ap-
pellant eventually turned into the apartment complex, but then “bumped into
a lamppost,” causing Appellant to stop again for “like, five, ten minutes” before
driving off. SPC MD did not see Appellant again.
    Continuing its case-in-chief, the Government called Deputy MC, who was
one of two responding local, civilian police officers. They had responded to a
report of a traffic complaint with suspicions that the driver was “driving under
the influence.” According to Deputy MC, “a vehicle was traveling . . . driving
into oncoming traffic and possibly causing an accident,” and the complainant
stated, “they had believed the vehicle had struck a pole, and the vehicle had
left.” The police officers determined the residential address from the license
plate information provided by the complainant, but “could not find any damage
to the pole,” so they proceeded to the residential address of the license plate
registration. Deputy MC “saw a vehicle that was parked in a parking stall but
was not completely in the stall. It was like halfway out.” Appellant was in the
car at the time, and the officers “made contact.” Appellant stated that “his ve-
hicle was now broken down” and he “could not get it into the stall completely.”
Deputy MC continued,
       I went through [a] series of questions. Explained what had oc-
       curred. What the report was. My partner and I, you know, estab-
       lished a rapport, and then the conversation led to alcohol, drugs.
       At the conclusion what we ended up finding out is the Airman
       spoke about how he had been on Ambien, had been taking Am-
       bien. I assisted to try to get the vehicle into the driveway. There
       was some type of damage on the undercarriage or whatever. We
       could not get it to function at all, and we could not move it back
       into the parking stall.
    According to Deputy MC, they did not have probable cause to arrest Appel-
lant, so he “made notification to [Appellant’s] supervisor in the military and
[Appellant] was sent on his way back to his residence.” Deputy MC further
described Appellant as “cooperative,” “responsive,” “calm,” and “forthcoming.”
Deputy MC recalled Appellant was “in uniform” and agreed he was “ambula-
tory.” Standardized field sobriety tests were not given because Deputy MC did
not see any indications that would lead him or the other responding officer to
believe they were necessary.

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

    The Government also called Airman First Class (A1C) ASM, a paralegal
assigned to the legal office responsible for prosecuting the Government’s case.
On 15 December 2021, approximately 75 days after Appellant was seen driving
recklessly, A1C ASM went to the last known address for Appellant, found Ap-
pellant’s vehicle, and took photographs. Nine photographs were admitted as
Prosecution Exhibit 5. They included pictures of the outside of Appellant’s ve-
hicle, as well as the inside of his vehicle. From the outside of his vehicle,
through the windows, a written prescription for Ambien was visible; the phar-
macy Appellant used was Walgreens. She agreed that at the time she took the
photographs, Appellant’s vehicle was “fully parked in the parking spot.”
    Further, the Government called Dr. CS, a forensic director for a regional
clinical laboratory in Philadelphia, and qualified him as an expert in forensic
toxicology and criminalistics. Through their cross-examination, the Defense
asked a series of questions related to Ambien use and its effects on a person,
eliciting concessions as to the amnesiac side effects of Ambien (i.e., that after
taking Ambien a person could be capable of performing complex tasks and yet
not remember them).
    Upon redirect examination, the Prosecution elicited testimony as to the du-
ration of the physiological effects of Ambien on the central nervous system,
including that Ambien is a “full night’s rest kind of medication” designed to
induce extended periods of sleep for the user.
   The Government also called Master Sergeant (MSgt) EP, Appellant’s first
sergeant. MSgt EP explained that Appellant worked a standard day shift on
1 October 2021—that generally, he worked from approximately 0630 until
1630. MSgt EP confirmed Appellant worked on 1 October 2021.
    After the Government rested, the Defense called Dr. BW, the psychiatric
nurse practitioner who prescribed Appellant Ambien. Through her testimony,
the Defense admitted Defense Exhibit B, a two-page document that reflected
the prescription she wrote Appellant on 30 September 2021. She agreed that
as of 1 October 2021, Appellant had an active prescription for Ambien, and
would have had a medical purpose and authorization to use the medicine on
that day. The Defense also admitted Defense Exhibit A, a 26-page document
produced by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to inform providers of
the risks and benefits of Ambien. On the front page, highlighted by a box out-
line, was an advisory that indicated a warning for “complex sleep behavior.”
Further, in the FDA advisory, one of the complex sleep behaviors listed was
“sleep-driving.” Trial defense counsel questioned Dr. BW about the advisory:
       Q: All right. So[,] in the upper left-hand page -- I am sorry, the
       upper left-hand quadrant of the first page, it talks about complex
       sleep behaviors. Let’s talk about complex sleep behaviors. And

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

       as the person providing the medication, what does the term com-
       plex sleep behavior mean to you as it relates to Ambien?
       A: Well, in addition to, you know, providing -- since Ambien is a
       hypnotic in addition to providing sleep, it can also have other
       sorts of side effects that can occur when a person is going to sleep
       or when a person is using the medication. Sometimes the com-
       plex -- well, the complex sleep issues can be like a parasomnia,
       which is sort of an unusual reaction to the medication, which has
       a whole list of different things that people could experience po-
       tentially. Not commonly, but potentially.
   During cross-examination of Dr. BW, trial government counsel extracted
concessions on normal patterns of prescribed Ambien use, including the fact
that the normal prescription instructions include a directive for the patient to
take the medication “typically” 30 minutes prior to his intended bedtime and
seven to eight hours before he intends to wake up. She did not state whether
she recalled informing Appellant of this specific set of instructions.
   When trial defense counsel additionally asked, “[i]f a particular person who
has been prescribed Ambien takes it, say, an hour before going to bed, does
that somehow invalidate the prescription, make their use illegal,” Dr. BW re-
sponded, “No.” Dr. BW answered the same when asked about two hours.
    When asked by trial government counsel if people abuse Ambien prescrip-
tions, Dr. BW responded, “Some people do. People have.” Dr. BW provided the
following in response to follow-on questions by trial counsel:
       Q: And could they do that by taking more than they should take?
       A: They could do that.
       Q: And could they do that by taking that at a time when they are
       not trying to go to sleep, but rather trying to have some other
       effect?
       A: I mean, I have not seen that commonly, but I imagine that,
       yes, you could do that.
    The Defense moved for a finding of not guilty under Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 917, claiming the Government had failed to establish Appellant
wrongfully used his Ambien prescription on 1 October 2021. While the Govern-
ment disputed the motion, they admitted their case was based upon circum-
stantial evidence, rather than direct evidence. The trial judge denied the mo-
tion, finding the evidentiary standard had been met through the Government’s
admission of “some evidence,” and cited this court’s opinion in United States v.
Mull, 76 M.J. 741, 746 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (en banc) (overruling a pre-
vious holding “that the use of a controlled prescription drug for an ailment

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

other than the one for which the drug was prescribed cannot be punished under
Article 112a, [UCMJ]”).
    In closing argument, trial government counsel theorized Appellant misused
his Ambien prescription for its mood-altering effects when he stopped at
Walgreens and took the medicine in his car after leaving work but before ar-
riving home. Conversely, the Defense argued Appellant had a prescription for
Ambien which he used in accordance with its intended purpose, but the medi-
cation caused him to be sleepy while driving. They specifically argued Ambien
did not cause him to be “passed out” while driving. According to the Defense,
Appellant driving recklessly and while sleepy did not equate to misusing the
prescription and the Government had “no proof” that Appellant took the Am-
bien for any other reason than to “go to sleep.”
   The members found Appellant guilty of reckless driving, except the words
“and aerosol inhalants,” as well as guilty of wrongful use of Ambien. After find-
ings were announced, Appellant chose sentencing by the trial judge alone. The
panel members were then permanently excused.
C. Not Admitted as Evidence: Second Providency Inquiry
    At the beginning of the sentencing phase of the trial, the Defense moved
for a finding of not guilty under R.C.M. 917 for a second time, claiming the
Government had failed to prove Appellant wrongfully used his prescription
Ambien on 1 October 2021. Further, the Defense argued the trial judge should
consider the facts as explained by Appellant during his Care inquiry; specifi-
cally, that he took the Ambien after getting home because he “wanted a nap”
and then “woke up in his car hours later.” The trial judge denied the motion
again, specifying he did not consider the Care inquiry. However, because of
trial defense counsel’s argument on this motion, and after an additional review
of Defense Exhibit A (the FDA advisory), the trial judge reopened Appellant’s
Care inquiry as to the reckless driving. The trial judge was concerned that trial
defense counsel had raised the legal defense of an involuntary act, or “autom-
atism.” He explained that while there was no requirement to remember crimi-
nal conduct to plead guilty to it, the criminal act must have been voluntary.
The following exchange occurred between the trial judge and Appellant during
the re-opened Care inquiry:
       MJ: . . . [O]ne thing I want to ask you about is, essentially, why
       you believe you are guilty of [the reckless driving] charge. Again,
       excepting the words “and aerosol inhalants,” and essentially, it’s
       the part of that charge that says you were in physical control of
       the vehicle. So I’ll inform you that voluntary intoxication, so if
       you voluntarily take, whether it’s alcohol or a drug, if you take a
       drug voluntarily is not a defense. That’s just what the law is.

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       United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

And the law also recognizes that just because you don’t remem-
ber something, doesn’t mean that you can’t plead guilty to doing
something, provided you can articulate or explain why you think
you are guilty.
....
Why do you think that your control of the vehicle was voluntary
if you were under the influence of Ambien and have no memory
of the driving?
[Appellant]: Your Honor, before my memory blacks out, I was
laying in bed in my apartment with my shoes off and my blouse
off. To get to the point where I was at, I would have had to put
some kind of shoes on, get my car keys, get in my car, start my
car, turn music on, because there was music playing, which
doesn’t automatically start, at least not from my phone. From
witness testimony, I stopped at stoplights, right, I had to put my
car in gear and pulled out of the spot. The car was also parked
differently than how I left it when I got home from work. When
I get home from work I usually pull in reverse to my parking
spot. And when I come to with the conversation with the police
officers, my car is just pulled in forward. Again, from witness
testimony, I was driving somewhat normal at some points. Also,
my feeling of when my memory kicks back in, it does [sic] didn’t
feel like waking up from sleep. It feels more like I just wasn’t
storing what was going on. Kind of feels like a blackout from
drinking alcohol. Like a slide show and there are just some slides
missing. Also, previously I was aware that Ambien was pretty
potent stuff, and I know it made sleeping [—] could have effects
on your driving, operating machinery and whatnot. I believe
that’s all, Your Honor.
....
MJ: . . . Why do you believe you’re responsible for your actions
while driving after taking Ambien?
....
[Appellant]: Your Honor, um, previously before coming to, I do
remember that my car was running low on gas, and I had been
thinking about getting gas, so it’s possible that I went out and
dr[o]ve voluntarily to prepare for the night to get gas. I think
that was my motive behind driving voluntarily. I just don’t re-
member the facts. And upon coming to, it didn’t feel like I was

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

       asleep. Just felt more like my memory just kind of kicks back in
       for a period.
       MJ: So, although you don’t have a memory of driving, do you
       believe that during the time you don’t have a memory, that you
       were aware of what you were doing?
       [Appellant]: Yes, Your Honor.
       MJ: And why do you believe that?
       [Trial defense counsel]: May we have a moment, Your Honor?
       MJ: You may.
       ....
       [Appellant]: I believe that I was aware of where I was at stop-
       lights. I was aware of the honking. I was able to get back home.
       I know music was playing. I believe those are voluntary actions.
       That’s why, Your Honor.
   Counsel for both sides responded in the negative when asked by the trial
judge if they believed further inquiry was required. The trial judge again found
Appellant’s pleas provident, accepted the pleas, and advised Appellant that he
may “request to withdraw” the “guilty plea at any time before sentence is an-
nounced,” and the request would be granted if there was “a good reason” for
the request.
    Neither Appellant nor his trial defense counsel requested to withdraw the
guilty plea prior to announcement of the sentence. After a presentencing hear-
ing, the trial judge sentenced Appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confine-
ment for two years and two months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, re-
duction to the grade of E-1, and a reprimand.

                                II. DISCUSSION
A. Providency of Reckless Driving Plea
   1. Law
    We review a military judge’s decision to accept the accused’s guilty plea for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115, 119 (C.A.A.F. 2013)
(citing United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008)). “An abuse
of discretion occurs when there is ‘something in the record of trial, with regard
to the factual basis or the law, that would raise a substantial question regard-
ing the appellant’s guilty plea.’” Id. (quoting Inabinette, 66 M.J. at 322). The
military judge’s legal conclusion about the providency of the plea is reviewed
de novo. United States v. Harris, 61 M.J. 391, 398 (C.A.A.F. 2005).

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

    Appellate courts will not speculate on the existence of facts that might in-
validate a plea especially where the matter raised post-trial contradicts an ap-
pellant’s express admission on the record. See United States v. Johnson, 42
M.J. 443, 445 (C.A.A.F. 1995). “[W]hen a plea of guilty is attacked for the first
time on appeal, the facts will be viewed in the light most favorable to the
[G]overnment.” United States v. Arnold, 40 M.J. 744, 745 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994)
(citation omitted).
   “This court must find a substantial conflict between the plea and the ac-
cused’s statements or other evidence in order to set aside a guilty plea. The
mere possibility of a conflict is not sufficient.” United States v. Hines, 73 M.J.
119, 124 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We apply a
“substantial basis” test by determining “whether there is something in the rec-
ord of trial, with regard to the factual basis or the law, that would raise a sub-
stantial question regarding the appellant’s guilty plea.” Inabinette, 66 M.J. at
322.
    In reviewing the providence of an appellant’s guilty pleas, “we consider his
colloquy with the military judge, as well any inferences that may reasonably
be drawn from it.” United States v. Timsuren, 72 M.J. 823, 828 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 2013) (quoting United States v. Carr, 65 M.J. 39, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2007)).
    Appellant pleaded guilty to reckless driving, in violation of Article 113,
UCMJ. To be found guilty, Appellant’s plea inquiry must provide factual sup-
port for each element of the offense: (1) that Appellant was in physical control
of a passenger car; and (2) that Appellant physically controlled the car “in a
reckless manner by causing the vehicle to block traffic and swerve on public
roadways[,] and by driving the vehicle after using Zolpidem.” See Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) (MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 51.b.
    An Appellant “cannot be held criminally liable in a case where the actus
reus is absent because [the appellant] did not act voluntarily, or where mens
rea is absent because [the appellant] did not possess the necessary state of
mind when he committed the involuntary act.” United States v. Torres, 74 M.J.
154, 157 (C.A.A.F. 2015). “However, even if the military judge did not abuse
his discretion in accepting the plea, we still may set aside the plea if we find a
substantial conflict between the plea and [an appellant’s] statements or other
evidence in the record.” United States v. Rothenberg, 53 M.J. 661, 662 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 2000) (citing United States v. Garcia, 44 M.J. 496, 498 (C.A.A.F.
1996)).
   2. Analysis
   Appellate defense counsel asks us “whether [Appellant’s] guilty plea for
reckless driving was provident when he took his prescribed dose of Ambien,

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

fell asleep in his bed, and ‘the next thing [he] remember[ed] is being behind
the wheel of [his] car.’” We answer in the affirmative.
    This assignment of error questions whether, despite his plea at trial, Ap-
pellant committed an involuntary act when he drove his vehicle recklessly on
1 October 2021. Whether the Ambien caused involuntary “actus reus” on Ap-
pellant’s part was not raised by evidence introduced at trial and was explicitly
denied by Appellant.
    Appellant explained he was driving his vehicle after work, and before
speaking with police officers. He had the keys, he was seated in the driver’s
seat, and no one else was with him. These facts were not disputed or contra-
dicted. Appellant explained he understood he was witnessed driving recklessly
by causing his vehicle to block traffic at a stop light when the light turned
green, and when he stopped his vehicle in a turning lane instead of turning
into his apartment complex, and by hitting a lamppost. Appellant explained
that he understood he was seen swerving between lanes by at least one witness
while on public roadways in the state of Washington. He had discussed his case
with his trial defense counsel and had been told of the evidence gathered in
this investigation. He admitted under oath that he took his prescription dose
of Ambien and intended to “take a nap” but later found himself behind the
wheel of his vehicle.
    Appellant asserted to the trial judge that he acted voluntarily and had a
lack of memory—not a lack of awareness of all his actions while driving. Ap-
pellant admitted that he heard “honking” from other vehicles while he was
stopped, remembered hearing his music playing, and knew he must have put
his “shoes” back on, procured his keys, and drove his vehicle most likely to “get
gas for the evening.” Appellant believed his loss of memory, while attributed
to the Ambien, did not “feel” like sleep. Comparing Appellant’s statements in
his first Care inquiry to his statements in his second Care inquiry, we do not
find conflicts, but additional details.
    On appeal, Appellant highlights evidence presented in findings that is in-
consistent with his guilty plea. The Defense admitted the FDA advisory on
Ambien, which included a reference to sleep-driving. The Defense cross-exam-
ined the Government’s toxicologist who agreed Ambien could cause sleep-driv-
ing. The Defense called the provider who prescribed Appellant Ambien, who
agreed involuntary acts while on Ambien were documented, though “not com-
mon.” What was not demonstrated at trial, however, was that Appellant was
sleep-driving. The witness testimony strongly supported an inference that Ap-
pellant was awake while driving. Moreover, during the Care inquiries, Appel-
lant disavowed that he was asleep while driving. Appellant never withdrew his
guilty plea, despite being specifically advised by the trial judge that he could
do so before sentencing, twice.

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

   We will not speculate on the existence of facts that might invalidate a plea
especially where the matter raised post-trial contradicts an appellant’s ex-
pressed admission on the record. See Johnson, 42 M.J. at 445. Further, we do
not find a substantial conflict between Appellant’s guilty plea and other evi-
dence because the record lacks evidence Appellant was sleep-driving. See
Rothenberg, 53 M.J. at 662. We find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
B. Sufficiency of Wrongful Use of Ambien Conviction
   1. Law
    We review issues of legal and factual sufficiency de novo. United States v.
Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation omitted). “Our assess-
ment of legal and factual sufficiency is limited to the evidence produced at
trial.” United States v. Rodela, 82 M.J. 521, 525 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021)
(citation omitted).
    “The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Robinson, 77 M.J. 294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (quoting United States
v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). “The term reasonable doubt, how-
ever, does not mean that the evidence must be free from conflict.” United States
v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (citing United States v.
Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684 (A.F.C.M.R. 1986)), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
“[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound to draw every rea-
sonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.”
United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted).
The evidence supporting a conviction can be direct or circumstantial. See
United States v. Long, 81 M.J. 362, 368 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citing R.C.M. 918(c))
(additional citation omitted). “[A] rational factfinder[ ] could use his ‘experi-
ence with people and events in weighing the probabilities’ to infer beyond a
reasonable doubt” that an element was proven. Id. at 369 (quoting Holland v.
United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)). As a result, “the standard for legal
sufficiency involves a very low threshold to sustain a conviction.” United States
v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (alteration and citation omitted).
     “The test for factual sufficiency is whether, after weighing the evidence in
the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed
the witnesses, [we are ourselves] convinced of the [appellant]’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Rodela, 82 M.J. at 525 (alterations in original) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “In conducting this unique appellate role, we take
‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’ applying ‘neither a presumption of in-
nocence nor a presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our] own independent determi-
nation as to whether the evidence constitutes proof of each required element

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                United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Wheeler, 76 M.J. at 568 (alteration in original)
(quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at 399).
    To convict Appellant of wrongful use of Zolpidem (Ambien), the Govern-
ment was required to prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Ap-
pellant used Zolpidem, a Schedule IV controlled substance, in or around the
state of Washington on or about 1 October 2021; (2) he actually knew he used
the substance; (3) he actually knew that the substance he used was Zolpidem;
and (4) Appellant’s use was wrongful. See MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 50.b.(2).
    Use of a controlled substance is wrongful if it is without legal justification
or authorization. See id. Use of a controlled substance is not wrongful if the
controlled substance is prescribed by a doctor and the use of the substance is
for the medical purpose prescribed. See id. However, if a prescribed substance
is used for a purpose other than that for which it is prescribed, it is wrongful.
Mull, 76 M.J. at 746.
   This court
       may affirm only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such
       part or amount of the sentence, as [this court] finds correct in
       law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record,
       should be approved. In considering the record, [this court] may
       weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witness[es], and de-
       termine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial
       court saw and heard the witnesses.
Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1).
    “A guilty plea and related statements to one offense cannot be admitted to
prove any element of a separate offense.” United States v. Flores, 69 M.J. 366,
369 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (footnote omitted). “A military judge who advises [an ap-
pellant] that [he] is waiving [his] right against self-incrimination only to the
offenses to which [he] is pleading guilty must not later rely on those statements
as proof of a separate offense.” Id. at 369–70 (citing United States v. Resch, 65
M.J. 233, 237 (C.A.A.F. 2007)). However, in circumstances where an accused
pleads guilty to a lesser included offense, that accused’s statements during his
guilty plea may be used to establish facts and elements common to both the
greater and lesser offense within the same specification. See United States v.
Grijalva, 55 M.J. 223, 227–28 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted).
   2. Analysis
    At trial, and on appeal, Appellant submits the Government could not, and
did not, provide sufficient evidence to prove wrongful use of Ambien. We find
the evidence presented on the merits supports a finding that Appellant used
Ambien wrongfully, that is, not for the purpose of sleep.

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

    Although Appellant chose to inform the members of his guilty pleas at the
onset of the litigated findings, neither the Defense nor the Government admit-
ted as evidence before the court the details described by Appellant of his Am-
bien use during his providency inquiries. Specifically, his explanation of taking
the prescribed dose while in his apartment after arriving home from work, for
the purposes of taking a nap, were facts not in evidence before the panel as to
the offense of wrongful use of Ambien.
    The facts that were admitted into evidence and before the court-martial
members include that Appellant was prescribed Ambien on 30 September
2021. According to his first sergeant, Appellant normally worked from 0630 to
1630. On 1 October 2021, a work day for Appellant, he was seen driving reck-
lessly in his car, on the public roadways, driving in the direction leaving the
base, after normal hours but before the sun went down, wearing his uniform
(except for his outer blouse). In addition to being seen rocking back and forth
in the driver’s seat and appearing to have a smile on his face, he was observed
swerving on the road, blocking traffic, driving up on a sidewalk, hitting a lamp-
post, and then attempting to park in a parking stall near his apartment build-
ing. When confronted by the police, Appellant told them that he had taken
Ambien. A receipt from Walgreen’s pharmacy filling Appellant’s prescription
was seen in his car, face up on the front passenger seat. In his interactions
with the police, he was calm, responsive to their questions, cooperative, and
ambulatory.
    As to legal sufficiency of this specification, after a thorough review of the
evidence and evaluating it in the light most favorable to the Prosecution, we
find any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Robinson, 77 M.J. at 297–98. While the
evidence admitted is circumstantial, reasonable inferences drawn from it es-
tablish the trier-of-fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
ingested the Ambien wrongfully. See Barner, 56 M.J. at 134.
    As to factual sufficiency, we have taken “a fresh, impartial look at the evi-
dence, applying neither a presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt
to make [our] own independent determination as to whether the evidence con-
stitutes proof of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wheeler,
76 M.J. at 568 (alteration in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
SPC MD witnessed Appellant driving his personal vehicle in the state of Wash-
ington, on 1 October 2021, and Appellant informed the responding police offic-
ers that he used Ambien (element one). One police officer testified Appellant
stated he actually knew he used Ambien (element two). The prescription re-
ceipt was found in Appellant’s vehicle, which demonstrates Appellant knew
the substance he used was Ambien (element three). And Appellant took the
Ambien sometime during the day, before driving home, while still in uniform,

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              United States v. Navarro Aguirre, No. ACM 40354

without preparing himself for a full seven to eight hours rest, which demon-
strates that Appellant’s use was not consistent with preparing for sleep within
30 minutes and for seven to eight hours, which was not in accord with his pre-
scription and was therefore, wrongful (element four). See MCM, pt. IV,
¶ 50.b.(2).
    Appellant would have us consider his statements during the Care inquiry
to find his conviction for wrongful use of Ambien legally and factually insuffi-
cient. Appellant misapprehends the boundaries of the law. Consistent with the
principles articulated in Flores, Appellant is not entitled to rely upon Care in-
quiry statements as substantive proof in an effort to refute the evidence actu-
ally admitted at findings. While the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces in Flores found error in the Government’s invocation of that ap-
pellant’s Care inquiry statements to support proof of a separate offense, 69
M.J. at 370, the Flores opinion does not suggest an accused may use this
“shield” as a “sword” and endeavor to use Care inquiry statements for his own
purposes of challenging a separate offense.
   We are convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Rodela, 82 M.J. at 525. We find Appellant’s conviction for wrongful use of Am-
bien is both legally and factually sufficient.

                               III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Ar-
ticles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the find-
ings and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

                     FOR THE COURT

                     CAROL K. JOYCE
                     Clerk of the Court

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