Court Opinion

ID: 9620755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:47:03.313778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:54.011460
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reason that heretofore, in order for a judgment of divorce to be entered, a trial has been *752required in all cases, Code Ann. §§ 30-101, 30-113, except where both parties wanted a divorce, Friedman v. Friedman, 233 Ga. 254 (210 SE2d 754) (1974) (both parties sought divorce on ground that marriage was irretrievably broken); Marshall v. Marshall, 234 Ga. 393 (216 SE2d 117) (1975) (wife sought divorce on ground of cruel treatment, husband sought divorce on ground of cruel treatment and marriage irretrievably broken); Hodges v. Hodges, 235 Ga. 848 (221 SE2d 597) (1976) (both parties sought divorce and admitted marriage was irretrievably broken); Little v. Little, 236 Ga. 102 (222 SE2d 384) (1976) (both parties sought divorce and admitted marriage was irretrievably broken); Whitmire v. Whitmire, 236 Ga. 153 (223 SE2d 135) (1976) (both parties sought divorce on ground that marriage was irretrievably broken); Loftis v. Loftis, 236 Ga. 637 (225 SE2d 685) (1976) (husband sought divorce on ground that marriage was irretrievably broken, wife sought divorce on ground of cruel treatment); Goulart v. Goulart, 237 Ga. 174 (227 SE2d 51) (1976) (both parties sought divorce) .
The rationale underlying those cases allowing divorce without trial was that where both parties want and sue for a divorce, the marriage is irretrievably broken and a trial to determine whether a divorce should be granted is an expensive and unnecessary domestic fight in public.
The majority in this case go further and hold that where one party wants and sues for a divorce, it may be granted on summary judgment, without a trial, over the opposition of the other party. The rationale of this case is that where one party seeks a divorce, the marriage is irretrievably broken.
The majority rely upon McCoy v. McCoy, 236 Ga. 633 (225 SE2d 682) (1976). There was a trial in McCoy. The evidence showed that Mr. McCoy wanted a divorce so that he could marry the woman he had been living with for two years. Mrs. McCoy did not, as Mrs. Manning does here, offer evidence that there were prospects for reconciliation. In my view, there is a genuine issue of material fact in the case before us as to whether the marriage is irretrievably broken and the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus in my view it was error to grant a *753summary judgment of divorce.
Moreover, Code § 30-113 provides that no judgment of divorce by default shall be taken in any case; the allegations of the pleadings shall be established by evidence.1 Where a spouse sues for divorce and moves for summary judgment on the ground that the marriage is irretrievably broken, and the defendant does not answer, under the majority opinion summary judgment must be granted but under Code § 30-113 it must not. I dissent because in my view the decision to allow contested summary judgment divorces is wrong as a matter of summary judgment law, wrong as a matter of divorce law, and wrong as a matter of public policy.
I am authorized to state that Justice Jordan joins in this dissent.

Admissions in pleadings are evidence. Thus where both parties seek a divorce there is evidence that the marriage is irretrievably broken. Friedman v. Friedman, supra, and its progeny do not violate Code § 30-113.