Court Opinion

ID: 9401215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 13:09:39.386155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.210870
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued June 8, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00155-CV
                            ———————————
 HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND APPRAISAL REVIEW
           BOARD OF HARRIS COUNTY, Appellants
                                        V.
                  CROSSVIEW PARTNERS, LTD., Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 270th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2020-28040

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This is a purported interlocutory appeal from an order that granted a motion

for new trial, vacated two orders granting pleas to the jurisdiction filed by Harris

County Appraisal District (“HCAD”) and the Harris County Appraisal Review
Board (“ARB”), and remanded the matter to the ARB under a provision of the

Texas Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE 42.231.

      Because this appeal is not authorized by a statute creating interlocutory

appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

                                    Background

      Crossview Partners protested HCAD’s 2019 appraisal of its apartment-

complex property. After a hearing attended by Crossview Partners’s tax agent, the

ARB reduced the appraised value of the real property from $8,049,715 to

$6,229,000. The ARB’s order determining protest, dated August 12, 2019, was

sent to Crossview Partners at the address of its tax agent. Crossview Partners

maintains that the tax agent informed it of the determination and date of

determination in an email dated September 3, 2019. Crossview Partners did not file

a petition for judicial review in the district court within the statutory timeframe. In

late November 2019, Crossview Partners filed a second protest with the ARB,

asking it to reissue the order determining protest to reset the clock and permit it to

file a suit for judicial review. The ARB sent Crossview Partners an order of

dismissal dated March 16, 2020, which stated that the ARB “determined that it

does not have jurisdiction to consider or grant the relief requested.”

      In May 2020, Crossview Partners filed suit against HCAD and the ARB

challenging the ARB’s refusal to reissue the order determining protest and

                                          2
challenging the 2019 appraisal as excessive and unequal. The trial court granted

HCAD and the ARB’s pleas to the jurisdiction, dismissing claims against each of

them. Crossview Partners then filed a motion for new trial, asserting that the pleas

to the jurisdiction were based on its failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Crossview Partners reasoned that filing suit for judicial review was a part of the

administrative remedies subject to the exhaustion requirement. Crossview Partners

also asked the trial court to remand the case to the ARB, in accordance with

section 42.231 of the Tax Code, to allow it to cure any jurisdictional defects.

      The trial court granted the motion for new trial, vacated the orders granting

the pleas to the jurisdiction, and remanded the matter to the ARB. Both HCAD and

the ARB appealed.

                                      Analysis

      We have an affirmative obligation to determine whether we have subject

matter jurisdiction over an appeal, “regardless of whether the parties have

questioned it.” City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013)

(quoting In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2010)). We

review this question de novo. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d at 442. In this case, no party has

questioned whether this court has appellate jurisdiction.

      Ordinarily, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final judgments.

Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d

                                          3
385, 390 (Tex. 2020). Statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals are a narrow

exception to this general rule. Id.; Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d

835, 840 (Tex. 2007) (“Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate

appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides such

jurisdiction.”).

       Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes an

interlocutory appeal from an order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction

by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001.” TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE 51.014(a)(8); see id. § 101.001(3) (defining “governmental

unit” to include “a political subdivision of this state” and “any other institution . . .

of government the status and authority of which are derived from . . . laws passed

by the legislature . . . .). Both HCAD and the ARB are governmental units as that

term is defined by section 101.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See

TEX. TAX CODE § 6.01(c) (providing that appraisal district is political subdivision

of state); id. § 6.41 (establishing appraisal review board for each appraisal district);

see also Dallas Cen. Appraisal Dist. v. Hamilton, No. 05-99-01401-CV, 2000 WL

1048537, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 31, 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.;

not designated for publication) (“While an appraisal review board is not similarly

defined by statute, it clearly falls within the statutory definition of governmental

unit.”).

                                           4
      The order from which HCAD and the ARB appeal is not an order granting

or denying a plea to the jurisdiction. It is an order granting a motion for new trial,

which vacated orders that granted the pleas to the jurisdiction and dismissed

Crossview Partners’s claims against HCAD and the ARB. An order like the one in

question in this case that granted a motion for new trial is reviewable by

mandamus but not by interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a)(8). See In re

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 759 (Tex. 2013) (holding that

new trial orders are reviewable on the merits by mandamus). In the interest of

judicial efficiency, a court of appeals may construe an appeal as a petition for writ

of mandamus when an appellant expressly requests such treatment, for example

when the legal environment is uncertain. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d

444, 453–54 (Tex. 2011). Neither HCAD nor the ARB have asked us to assume

mandamus jurisdiction. Accordingly, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction

over this appeal.

                                    Conclusion

      We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

                                              Peter Kelly
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Kelly and Goodman.

                                          5