Court Opinion

ID: 9850157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:52:48.211298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:32.528239
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. First, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the district court erred when it sustained a Bat-son objection to Angus’s peremptory challenge. The majority’s conclusion that the court erred because the circumstances of the case did not raise an inference that the peremptory strike was based on race misapplies our case law and does not give proper deference to the district court’s role as fact finder in determining whether a peremptory strike was racially motivated. Second, because the district court did not improperly admit evidence of Angus’s prior bad acts to show his propensity to commit crimes, I disagree with the majority’s analysis that the, court erred when it admitted the Spreigl evidence of Angus’s prior bad acts. Accordingly, I would affirm.
I.
Whether a peremptory challenge is based on racial discrimination is a factual determination to be made by the district court. State v. White, 684 N.W.2d 500, 506 (Minn.2004). We have consistently given deference to the district court rulings on Batson issues, realizing that the record may not accurately reflect all relevant circumstances that may properly be considered. Id. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that a district court is uniquely situated to determine the challenging party’s motivation in striking a veniremember by examining characteristics such as demeanor and credibility. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111. S.Ct.. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). Here, the majority has largely disregarded our case law, which states that “considerable deference must be given by a reviewing' court to the trial court’s finding on the issue of intent because the finding typically will turn largely on an evaluation by the trial court of credibility.” State v. Gaitan, 536 N.W.2d 11, 16 (Minn.1995) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 366-69, 111 S.Ct. 1859); see also State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 200-01 (Minn.2002) (“[wjhether there is racial discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory challenge is a factual determination to be made by the district court and is entitled to great deference on review”).
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court established a three-part test for courts to follow when a party objects to a peremptory challenge.
First, the [party challenging the strike] must make a prima facie showing that the [party who struck the juror] has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the [party who exercised the peremptory strike] to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the [challenger] has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 253 (Minn.1992) (citing Hernandez and Bat-son). The party who makes a Batson challenge can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing that (1) one or more members of a racial group *124have been peremptorily excluded from the jury, and (2) circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race. State v. DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d 837, 843 (Minn.1999). The first requirement has clearly been met here— veniremember # 38 was the second African-American veniremember whom Angus struck. The district court stated its awareness that the first requirement had been met. The court also stated its “concern that there not be a racial basis for strildng a juror.”
While the district court did not explicitly state that a prima facie case had been established, the outcome of step one was rendered moot because Angus proceeded past the first step by offering a race-neutral reason for strildng the prospective juror without questioning the state’s prima facie showing. State v. James, 520 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Minn.1994) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859); see also State v. Scott, 493 N.W.2d 546, 548 (1992) (holding that “[bjecause the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the question whether the [party challenging the strike] made a prima facie showing is moot.”).1 More particularly, when the state objected to Angus’s peremptory strike of venire-member # 38 as racially motivated, the court requested that Angus respond. Angus did not question the state’s prima facie showing. Rather, he stated that his race-neutral explanation was that he did not find credible the veniremember’s answers that he had not read anything about this case. The court then questioned venire-member #38 to determine whether Angus’s explanation was pretextual. After extensive questioning, the court found that the veniremember’s answers were candid and consistent. The court thus determined that the defense’s explanation that veniremember #38’s answers were not credible was pretextual based on the court’s own inquiry into the consistency of veniremember # 38’s answers. “A juror cannot legitimately be struck from service for being qualified to serve — that is, for being impartial and unbiased.” Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 211 (Page, J., dissenting in part).
Furthermore, though not necessary to reach the conclusion that the district court did not err because Angus proceeded to step two of the Batson three-step test, the circumstances in this case raise an inference of discriminatory exclusion. Jonathan McNeill, the state’s key witness, is African American — the same race as veniremember # 38 — and is the only African American charged with the shooting of Basta. See People v. Jones, 185 Ill.App.3d 208, 133 Ill.Dec. 324, 541 N.E.2d 161, 166 (1989); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (noting that the race of the defendant is not always relevant, “for race prejudice stems from various causes and may manifest itself in different forms.”). McNeill was a key witness for the state who provided a participant’s eyewitness testimony as well as statements contradicting what Angus had told the police. Further, having just presided over Stewart’s trial less than three weeks earlier, the *125presiding judge in Angus’s case already knew the circumstances that surrounded the trial and what McNeill’s testimony was likely to be.
Here, after extensive questioning of the challenged veniremember, the district court concluded that Angus’s reason for exercising a peremptory challenge was based on the veniremember’s race and therefore unconstitutional. But the majority is concerned that the court faded to make a sufficient record of its findings. While I agree that district courts should make particular findings on Batson challenges and should go through each of the three steps, we have not stated that particularized findings on the record are absolutely required. See State v. Reiners, 664 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn.2003) (“observing]” that it is “important” for the district court to analyze each of the steps).
I am sympathetic to the majority’s desire to have district courts precisely follow the three-step process first articulated by the Supreme Court in Batson; but, in its attempt to achieve this goal, the majority ignores a well-established body of law. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859; James, 520 N.W.2d at 402; Scott, 493 N.W.2d at 548. In its attempt to get around Hernandez, James, and Scott, the majority fundamentally alters the Batson test. Hernandez renders step one of Bat-son moot if the party who exercised the peremptory strike offers a step-two race-neutral reason for striking the venire-member without first challenging the pri-ma facie showing. 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859. But the majority ignores Hernandez when it inserts step one of Batson into step three in cases where step one was rendered moot.
The majority essentially makes the third step of Batson into a two-part test by requiring that the district court first find that the response in step two is pretextual and then, second, explicitly state on the record that the challenging party has made a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Under Batson, however, step three specifically requires the court to determine whether the state has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination, which the court does when it determines whether the reason given in step two is pretextual. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (stating that the “decisive question” in a typical peremptory challenge inquiry “will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.”). If the court determines, as it did here, that the reason given in step two is pretextual, then under step three the court may determine that the state has established purposeful discrimination. By reversing the district court and ordering a new trial, the majority has ignored prior ease law that provides that, under the facts and circumstances of a case such as the one before us today, step one is moot. The majority then inexplicably and needlessly confuses this area of the law by converting step three of Batson into a two-part test.
After applying our prior case law, giving proper deference to the district court’s ability to observe the participants and examining the entire record, I conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Angus’s use of the peremptory challenge was a pretext for racial discrimination.
II.
Although the majority’s analysis regarding the Spreigl evidence is offered only to guide the district court in the new trial, I conclude it is necessary to address the majority’s determination that the court erred by admitting Angus’s three prior bad acts because the jury might use the *126bad acts for the improper purpose of proving Angus’s propensity to commit crime. I conclude that the court did not err because the three Spreigl incidents were necessary to prove that Angus had the intent to kill Anthony Basta.
A defendant’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts are not admissible “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). But prior acts may be admissible for the limited purpose of showing “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Id. In State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965), we articulated the five-prong test the district court must undertake when examining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b):
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence; (2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and (5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its potential prejudice to the defendant.
State v. Asfeld, 662 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2003). Angus does not dispute that the state has met the first two prongs of the test concerning notice of and purpose for the Spreigl acts. Angus also concedes that two of the Spreigl acts, the burglary and the terroristic threats incidents, were shown by clear and convincing evidence (third prong). I would conclude that the murder-for-hire scheme, as testified to by Tonya Achenbach and supported by the burglary, was proven by clear and convincing evidence; but I will focus my analysis on the fourth prong (relevance) and the fifth prong (prejudice).
The majority questions the relevance of the Spreigl evidence by stating that the relationship between Angus’s three prior bad acts and Basta’s shooting is not sufficiently close for the evidence to be admitted under Spreigl. I disagree. Here, the Spreigl evidence was introduced to rebut Angus’s claim that he lacked the intent to commit the murder. At the Spreigl hearing, the state argued that Angus had attempted to portray himself as “as a dreamer, somebody who comes up with ideas and schemes, but doesn’t follow through on them.” The state contended that the burglary and murder-for-hire evidence was necessary to show that Angus could form the intent that he claimed he could not have formed. The state argued that the terroristic threats evidence was relevant and admissible under several of the prongs of Rule 404(b) to show that Angus had directed others to do criminal activity on his behalf. The district court found that proof for each of the three acts was clear and convincing and admitted the evidence to help the jury determine Angus’s intent: “did he conspire to kill or was he an innocent bystander as has been the defense position?”
We have stated that the district court may determine the relevancy of Spreigl evidence by considering “the issues in the case, the reasons and need for the evidence, and whether there is a sufficiently close relationship between the charged offense and the Spreigl offense in time, place, or modus operandi.” Pierson v. State, 637 N.W.2d 571, 580 (Minn.2002). The Spreigl incident, however, need not be identical to the charged offense nor must it be proximate in time if other factors indicate clear relevancy. State v. Washington, 693 N.W.2d 195, 203 (Minn.2005); Asfeld, 662 N.W.2d at 543. In State v. Berry, we upheld the admission of three prior incidents “which bore little resemblance to *127each other or to the charged offense of first-degree premeditated murder” because they showed the “ ‘similarity of the way [the defendant] behaved when trying to maintain control of the people with whom he worked.’ ” Asfeld, 662 N.W.2d at 543 (quoting State v. Berry, 484 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn.1992)). In Berry, we said,
[t]he Spreigl evidence was necessary to prove that Berry was not just blowing off steam, but in fact, carried out his threats. It filled in the picture of Berry as a man who was not well disposed to those who snitched on him, who threatened others verbally and physically, and who carried out his threats.
Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 17.2 Thus, while a close relationship under Spreigl includes similar events and proximity in time, it also includes prior acts that show the defendant’s ability to form an intent he claims he could not have formed. This is not character evidence to show that the defendant is a bad person, but the permissible use of prior bad acts to show intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
Angus’s intent on the night of the shooting was crucial to the state in demonstrating that Angus was not just an innocent bystander and had not attempted to dissuade Stewart from shooting Basta. While the burglary did not involve a threat to another person, the evidence was relevant in countering Angus’s claim that he only fantasized about criminal behavior, but would never follow through on it. The terroristic threats were against other persons and involved a gun and another person who wielded a gun at Angus’s direction. Angus directed Raymond to show the gun to Boettcher and Sherman and to hold the gun to Sherman’s head. The testimony demonstrated that Angus was in control of the situation. Again, the relevance of this evidence becomes apparent when juxtaposed against Angus’s defense theory that he was an immature “Peter Pan” who had a rich “fantasy life.”3
The analysis must also determine whether the probative value of the Spreigl evidence is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. Pierson, 637 N.W.2d at 580; Minn. R. Evid. 403. In State v. Bolte, we reiterated that prejudice “does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” 530 N.W.2d 191, 197 n. 3 (Minn.1995) (quoting State v. Cermak, 365 N.W.2d 243, 247 n. 2 (Minn.1985) (in turn quoting 22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure — Evidence § 5215, at 274-75 (1978))).
*128The state’s request for the Spreigl evidence was not for illegitimate purposes. In opposition to the picture painted by Angus, the Spreigl evidence was needed to show that Angus was capable of actively planning and carrying out criminal- activity, that others would follow his instructions, and that he had the requisite, intent and capability to follow through on. his plans and words. The Spreigl evidence rebuts Angus’s depiction of himself as an inactive bystander during the shooting. It supports the state’s contention that Angus’s initial leadership influenced Stewart to shoot Basta.- Moreover, the actions taken by the district court minimized the potential for this evidence to persuade by illegitimate means. The court held a hearing on the evidence and then withheld its decision until the end of the state’s case. After permitting the state to use the evidence, the court gave the jury cautionary instructions both when the Spreigl evidence was introduced and again at the close of the trial. Therefore, I would conclude that the admission of the state’s Spreigl evidence was for a proper purpose and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the result reached in the district court.
Finally, I also join in the observations and sentiments expressed by Justice Russell A. Anderson in his separate dissent.

. The majority misstates our conclusion in State v. Stewart, in which we determined that no racial overtones existed where both the defendant and the victim were white and the type of questions asked of the Native American venireperson struck mirrored those asked of other jurors. 514 N.W.2d 559, 563 (Minn. 1994). In Stewart, our holding on Batson was not based on the absence of racial overtones. We concluded that "because the trial court proceeded to the second step in the [Batson ] process, we need not address whether appellant established a prima facie case of the discriminatory use of the peremptory strike.” Id.

. The three prior incidents in Berry were (1) a house break-in in which a gun may have been fired; (2) threats by Berry against a woman who he believed had "snitched” on him; and (3) threats and pointing a gun at the head of an acquaintance. Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 16-17.

. I also disagree with the majority’s analysis that Angus could escape accomplice liability only fay abandoning the plan and making a reasonable effort to prevent the murder. The majority’s analysis is correct only if Angus had the requisite intent to be an accomplice in the first place. Minnesota Statutes § 609.05, subd. 1 (2004), states, "A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” To prove accomplice liability, the state must show that the defendant played a knowing role in committing the crime, as distinguished from mere presence, inaction, knowledge, or passive acquiescence. State v. Gates, 615 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn.2000). If Angus had no intent, he could not be an accomplice.