Court Opinion

ID: 9688747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:02:51.743833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:41.757159
License: Public Domain

McFEELEY, Chief Judge,
concurring in the result.
Although I concur with the majority, I write separately to emphasize that under operation of Kansas law Sheila Lampe had an identifiable ownership interest in the farm equipment. Pursuant to Kansas case law, after a marriage, each spouse acquires an inchoate interest in the separate real property of the other. Jackson v. Lee, 193 Kan. 40, 392 P.2d 92, 95 (1964) (interpreting the nature of right of heirship versus the right of inheritance); see also Cady v. Cady, 224 Kan. 339, 581 P.2d 358, 362 (1978) (finding a spouse possesses an inchoate interest in real estate held by the other spouse). The inchoate interest in real property prohibits the alienation of that property without the consent of both parties. While personal property is not similarly restricted, and a spouse may have unfettered control over separate personal property, marriage does confer in a spouse a contingent interest in the separate personal property of the other. This contingent interest vests after either a death or the filing of a divorce petition. See Kan. Stat. Ann § 23 201(b) (1978).1 *216Contingent interests are cognizable property rights. See Kirby v. United States, 329 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir.1964) (“[U]nder Kansas law contingent rights in property may be transferred.”). Here, Sheila Lampe had, at a minimum, a contingent interest in the farm equipment. Although this interest had not vested, it is a property right that she brought into the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); Williamson v. Jones (In re Montgomery), 224 F.3d 1193, 1195 (10th Cir.2000) (Congress clearly intended that contingent interests are to be included in the property of the bankruptcy estate).
Additionally, I note that in reaching its conclusion the bankruptcy court relied on § 23-201(a) to presume that funds derived from separate property remain separate property regardless of the intent of parties. This presumption overlooks the possibility that property may be owned jointly. The Kansas Supreme Court has stated that § 23-201(a) “does not apply to property jointly accumulated during the marriage.” Ackers v. First National Bank, 192 Kan. 319, 387 P.2d 840, 845 (1963).2 However, because the issue was not presented to them, the Kansas Supreme Court declined to consider how property might be jointly acquired or if property acquired through a separate account may, by agreement, be jointly owned after the marriage. In this case, the bankruptcy court also did not consider that question.
Finally, I agree with the majority that the test articulated in Brollier is the best approach for determining co-ownership. This test accommodates the contingent property interest that each spouse has by virtue of the marital relationship and recognizes that property may be jointly acquired during the marital relationship.3

. The contingent interest vests in all property owned by either party whether separate or jointly acquired. In other words, once a divorce petition is filed, everything goes into one marital pot that the court may distribute equitably as it sees fit regardless of the "own*216ership” prior to the filing of the petition. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-201(b).

. Although Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-201 has been amended since Ackers was decided, the amendment did not significantly change the language of § 23-201(a) so as to abrogate Ackers.

. We note that this test is also in accordance with other provisions of Kansas law. For example, in 1994 the Kansas legislature amended the Probate Code to incorporate a comprehensive elective share provision. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-6a201 et seq. (1994). The purpose of the new elective share provision was to acknowledge that "the economic rights of each spouse are derived from an unspoken marital bargain under which the partners agree that each partner is to enjoy a half interest in the fruits of the marriage.” In re Estate of Antonopoulos, 268 Kan. 178, 993 P.2d 637, 642 (1999) (citing the Uniform Probate Code Rev. Art. II, General Comment, 8 U.L.A. 93 (1998)).