Court Opinion

ID: 9896572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 18:11:28.282363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.447694
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re C.B., 2023-Ohio-4089.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               MARION COUNTY

IN RE:                                                       CASE NO. 9-23-28

       C.B.,

[TIM B. - APPELLANT]                                         OPINION
[SABRINA M. - APPELLANT]

IN RE:                                                       CASE NO. 9-23-29

       K.B.,

[TIM B. - APPELLANT]                                         OPINION
[SABRINA M. - APPELLANT]

                 Appeals from Marion County Common Pleas Court
                              Family Court Division
                   Trial Court Nos. 21 AB 0116 and 21 AB 0117

                                        Judgments Affirmed

                          Date of Decision: November 13, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        W. Joseph Edwards for Appellant/Father

        Zebulon N. Wagner for Appellant/Mother

        Charles R. Hall, Jr. for Appellee
Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

ZIMMERMAN, J.

       {¶1} Mother-appellant, Sabrina M. (“Sabrina”), and father-appellant, Tim B.

(“Tim”), appeal the April 24, 2023 decisions of the Marion County Court of

Common Pleas, Family Court Division, granting permanent custody of their minor

children, C.B. and K.B., to Marion County Children Services (the “agency”). For

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

       {¶2} C.B., born in 2015, and K.B., born in 2016, are the minor children of

Sabrina and Tim. This case commenced in 2018 when the agency filed complaints

in other cases involving C.B. and K.B. However, because those cases could not be

adjudicated within the statutory time limits, the complaints were dismissed without

prejudice and the agency filed new complaints in the trial court alleging C.B. and

K.B. to be dependent children under R.C. 2151.04(C) on July 20, 2021. The trial

court granted the agency emergency temporary custody of the children on July 30,

2021

       {¶3} Following a hearing on September 3, 2021, the trial court concluded on

September 21, 2021 that C.B. and K.B. were dependent children, that it was in the

children’s best interest to remain in the temporary custody of the agency, and that

the agency “made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan for and prevent

the removal of the children from their home.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No. 21);

(Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc. No. 19).

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

       {¶4} The trial court appointed C.B. and K.B. a guardian ad litem (“GAL”)

on July 26, 2021, who filed reports throughout the development of the cases.

Notably, in her March 27, 2023 report, the GAL recommended that the trial court

grant permanent custody of the children to the agency because “the parents have not

done the things required under the case plan”—namely, “they have not maintained

suitable housing or maintained regular employment.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc.

No. 60); (Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc. No. 55). Likewise, throughout the pendency

of the cases, the trial court approved the agency’s case plan and semi-annual

administrative reviews, which were submitted to the trial court.

       {¶5} On August 2, 2022, the agency filed motions for permanent custody of

K.B. and C.B. under R.C. 2151.353 and 2151.414. After a permanent custody-

hearing on April 3, 2023, the trial court granted permanent custody of C.B. and K.B.

to the agency on April 24, 2023. (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No. 64); (Case No. 21

AB 117, Doc. No. 64).

       {¶6} Tim filed his notices of appeal on April 26, 2023, Sabrina filed her

notices of appeal on May 23, 2023, and this court consolidated the cases. Sabrina

raises three assignments of error, while Tim raises one assignment of error. For

ease of our discussion, we will begin by addressing Sabrina’s first and second

assignments of error together along with Tim’s assignment of error. Then, we will

address Sabrina’s third assignment of error.

                                        -3-
Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

                       Mother’s First Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court’s Decision Is Against The Manifest Weight Of
       The Evidence By Finding That Permanent Custody To The
       Agency Was In The Minor Childrens [sic] Best Interest
       Amounting To An Abuse Of Discretion.

                      Mother’s Second Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court’s Decision Is Against The Manifest Weight Of
       The Evidence As The Appellant Demonstrated She Was Working
       To Complete The Agency’s Case Plan Amounting To An Abuse
       Of Discretion.

                          Father’s Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court Erred In Finding By Clear And Convincing
       Evidence That It Is In The Best Interest Of The Children That
       Permanent Custody Be Awarded To MCCSB.

       {¶7} In their assignments of error, Sabrina and Tim argue that the trial court

erred by granting permanent custody of C.B. and K.B. to the agency. Specifically,

Sabrina and Tim argue that the trial court’s decisions granting permanent custody

of the children to the agency is against the manifest weight of the evidence because

clear and convincing evidence does not support the trial court’s best-interest

findings.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶8} The right to raise one’s child is a basic and essential right. In re Murray,

52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct.

1208 (1972) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923).

“Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and management

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388

(1982). However, the rights and interests of a natural parent are not absolute. In re

Thomas, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-03-08, 2003-Ohio-5885, ¶ 7. These rights may be

terminated under appropriate circumstances and when the trial court has met all due

process requirements. In re Leveck, 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-02-52, 5-02-53, and

5-02-54, 2003-Ohio-1269, ¶ 6.

       {¶9} When considering a motion for permanent custody of a child, the trial

court must comply with the statutory requirements set forth in R.C. 2151.414. See

In re C.E., 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-09-02 and 5-09-03, 2009-Ohio-6027, ¶ 14. R.C.

2151.414(B)(1) establishes a two-part test for courts to apply when determining

whether to grant a motion for permanent custody: (1) the trial court must find that

one of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) applies, and (2) the trial

court must find that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. In re S.G.,

9th Dist. Wayne No. 15AP0005, 2015-Ohio-2306, ¶ 10. See also In re Brown, 98

Ohio App.3d 337, 343 (3d Dist.1994). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides, in relevant

part, that a trial court

       may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court
       determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section,
       by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the
       child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed
       the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply:

       ***

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

       (d) [T]he child has been in the temporary custody of one or more
       public children services agencies * * * for twelve or more months of
       a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division
       (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
       previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in
       another state.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). See also In re A.W., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011123,

2017-Ohio-7786, ¶ 17 (noting “that the five factors listed in R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) are alternative findings, and that the agency need only prove

one in order to satisfy the first prong of the permanent custody test”).

       {¶10} “If the trial court determines that any provision enumerated in R.C.

2151.414(B)(1) applies, the trial court must determine, by clear and convincing

evidence, whether granting the agency permanent custody of the child is in the

child’s best interest.” (Emphasis sic.) In re A.F., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-11-27,

2012-Ohio-1137, ¶ 55.

       {¶11} “In determining the best interest of a child, a juvenile court ‘may apply

one of two different tests.’” In re S.C., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-203, 2022-

Ohio-356, ¶ 38, quoting In re J.P., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-834, 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39.

“‘Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), the juvenile court weighs multiple factors * * * to

decide whether granting an agency permanent custody of a child is in that child’s

best interest.’”   Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39.      “By contrast, ‘under R.C.

2151.414(D)(2), if the juvenile court makes [each of] the four enumerated findings,

permanent custody is per se in the child’s best interest and the court “shall” commit

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

the child to the permanent custody of the agency.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39.

“These two provisions ‘are alternative means for reaching the best-interest

determination,’ and ‘[w]here a juvenile court employs the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)

[multiple factor weighing] method of determining the child’s best interest, the court

need not also conduct the R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) [four-requisite prong] analysis.’”

(Emphasis added.) Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 40.

       {¶12} In determining whether granting the agency permanent custody is in

the best interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides:

       [T]he court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not
       limited to, the following:

       (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
       parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
       providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the
       child;

       (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or
       through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity
       of the child;

       (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
       been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
       agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months
       of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;

       (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
       whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
       permanent custody to the agency;

       (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
       apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e).

                                          -7-
Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

       {¶13} If the trial court makes these statutorily required determinations, a

reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s decision unless it is not supported by

clear and convincing evidence. In re H.M.K., 3d Dist. Wyandot Nos. 16-12-15 and

16-12-16, 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 43, citing In re Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 195 (3d

Dist.1994), citing In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985) and In

re Adoption of Lay, 25 Ohio St.3d 41, 42 (1986). See also In re A.E., 3d Dist. Seneca

Nos. 13-14-14 and 13-14-15, 2014-Ohio-4540, ¶ 28 (“A court’s decision to

terminate parental rights will not be overturned as against the manifest weight of the

evidence if the record contains competent, credible evidence by which a court can

determine by clear and convincing evidence that the essential statutory elements for

a termination of parental rights have been established.”). “Clear and convincing

evidence is that which is sufficient to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm

belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re S.G., 2015-Ohio-

2306, at ¶ 10, citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of

the syllabus.

                                       Analysis

       {¶14} Here, the trial court granted permanent custody of C.B. and K.B. to

the agency after concluding that such a disposition is warranted under R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(d)—that is, the trial court found that that C.B. and K.B. have been

in the agency’s temporary custody “in excess of [12] months of a consecutive [22-

]month period.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No. 64); (Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc.

                                          -8-
Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

No. 64). Consequently, the trial court’s finding regarding the first prong of the

permanent-custody test—which is unchallenged by Sabrina and Tim—is satisfied

in both of these cases. See id.; In re S.G. at ¶ 11.

       {¶15} Having resolved that the trial court satisfied the first prong of the

permanent-custody test in these cases, we next address the trial court’s best-interest

determination under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Here, Sabrina and Tim argue that the

trial court’s decision to sever parental rights is against the manifest weight of the

evidence because the record does not reflect competent, credible evidence by which

the trial court could conclude that granting permanent custody of C.B. and K.B. to

the agency is in the children’s best interest. However, our review of the record

reveals competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s factual findings

relevant to the best-interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D).

       {¶16} Regarding the best-interest factor under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), the

trial court considered C.B.’s and A.B.’s relationship with their parents and found

that the children care for their parents. Compare In re M.W., 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 19AP-769, 2020-Ohio-5199, ¶ 24 (noting that “the court recognized the

significant relationship between mother and M.W.”). Likewise, the record reveals

that Sabrina and Tim consistently visited the children. “However, while a bond and

relationship of the children to the parents is a factor, it is not controlling.” In re

T.N., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-429, 2022-Ohio-2784, ¶ 54. That is, the

“‘resolution of [R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)] is not limited to merely the bond between

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

child and parent.’” In re B.B., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-488, 2021-Ohio-2299,

¶ 60, quoting In re K.R., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-633, 2019-Ohio-2192, ¶ 81.

       {¶17} Relevant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), the record reflects that the

children have developmental delays and that C.B. is autistic. Regarding those

issues, the trial court found that C.B. and K.B. are “doing well in the care of their

foster parents, but the foster parents are unwilling to adopt the children because they

are unsure they can deal with [C.B.’s] disabilities.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No.

64); (Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc. No. 64). Nevertheless, the trial court found that

C.B. “is progressing in all areas” since he is receiving “physical therapy,

occupational therapy, and speech therapy.” (Id.); (Id.). Significantly, the record

reflects that C.B.’s disability requires that he receive medical care but that his

medical appointments had “been missed multiple times” when C.B. was in the care

of Sabrina and Tim. Likewise, the GAL testified that C.B.’s “needs are severe

enough so that the parents would have a great deal of difficulty meeting them.”

(Apr. 3, 2023 Tr. at 153).

       {¶18} Moreover, contrary to Sabrina’s contention that the trial court’s

finding that the children “were bonded with their foster placement” “is of little

importance,” that finding is indicative of the children’s ability to bond with other

caregivers. (Mother’s Brief at 8).

       {¶19} As to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b)—C.B.’s and K.B.’s wishes—the trial

court found that, even though C.B. “is seven years old” and K.B. “is five years old,”

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

C.B. is autistic and the children were only “recently potty trained.” (Case No. 21

AB 116, Doc. No. 64); (Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc. No. 64). Consequently, while

the record does not reflect C.B.’s or K.B.’s wishes, the trial court found that “the

children seemed happy to see the parents.” (Id.); (Id.).

       {¶20} Nevertheless, the children’s wishes, alone, do not require a trial court

to deny an agency’s motion for permanent custody. In re K.M., 3d Dist. Crawford

No. 3-18-11, 2018-Ohio-3711, ¶ 27, citing In re S.M., 4th Dist. Highland No.

14CA4, 2014-Ohio-2961, ¶ 36. Rather, the children’s wishes are “‘a factor for the

trial court to weigh along with others outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).’” Id.,

quoting In re S.M. at ¶ 36, citing In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶

57. See also In re M.W., 2020-Ohio-5199, at ¶ 26 (concluding that a trial court

cannot give a child’s “wishes under the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) factor greater

weight than the other best interest factors”).

       {¶21} Even though the trial court appears to have weighed this factor in favor

of Sabrina and Tim, Sabrina argues that the trial court best-interest determination is

against the manifest weight of the evidence because the trial court “did not have the

appropriate information to make [the] determination” regarding the children’s

wishes. (Mother’s Brief at 9). However, notwithstanding the trial court’s finding

concerning the children’s wishes, the record reflects that the GAL recommended

granting permanent custody of C.B. and K.B. to the agency.

                                         -11-
Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

       {¶22} Concerning R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c)—C.B.’s and K.B.’s custodial

history—the trial court found that C.B. and K.B. “have been in the custody of [the

agency] for more than twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two month period”—

namely, the children “have been in [the agency’s] custody for approximately [44]

months.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No. 64); (Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc. No. 64).

       {¶23} Based on our review of the record, the trial court’s conclusion that

C.B.’s and K.B.’s custodial history weighs in favor of granting the agency’s motion

for permanent custody is supported by competent, credible evidence. Importantly,

“R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) permits a court to review the broader custodial history of

the child.” In re M.W., 2020-Ohio-5199, at ¶ 30, citing In re S.H., 12th Dist. Butler

No. CA2020-02-023, 2020-Ohio-3499, ¶ 33 (noting the “plain language of R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(c) instructs the court to consider, generally, the custodial history of

the child”) and In re Ca.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108969, 2020-Ohio-579, ¶ 35.

“While the trial court may consider additional facts beyond the 12-out-of-22

circumstance in its analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), the court is under no

obligation to do so.” Id., citing In re T.M., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-943, 2020-

Ohio-815, ¶ 19 (rejecting the contention that a trial court must take other facts

beyond the 12-out-of-22 finding into consideration when considering custodial

history under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c)).

       {¶24} Significantly, prior to this case, C.B. and K.B. “were initially removed

from their parents’ care in late 2018,” but “were returned to the parents when

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

conditions in the home improved.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No. 64); (Case No.

21 AB 117, Doc. No. 64). However, “[t]he children were removed again in about

August of 2019 because conditions in the parent’s [sic] home had deteriorated” and

they “have remained in the custody of [the agency] continuously since.” (Id.); (Id.).

       {¶25} As to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d)—C.B.’s and K.B.’s need for a legally

secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement could be achieved

without a grant of permanent custody to the agency—there is competent, credible

evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s finding that granting permanent

custody to the agency is the only effective means of providing C.B. and K.B. with

a legally secure permanent placement. Critically, the record reveals that Sabrina

and Tim were unable to resolve the issues that led to the removal of the children

from their home—namely, the issues related to providing suitable housing.

       {¶26} Here, Tim challenges the trial court’s finding under R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(d) and asserts that this factor does not weigh in favor of granting

permanent custody of C.B. and K.B. to the agency because there is a low probability

of the children being adopted. Similarly, Sabrina argues that, since C.B. and K.B.’s

current foster family is not interested in adopting them, the trial “court improperly

determined that displacing the Minor Children into a fourth foster home is in their

best interest over being returned to [her].” (Id. at 12-13).

       {¶27} However, “the permanent custody statutes do not require [an agency]

to prove that adoption is likely.” In re C.W., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-309,

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

2020-Ohio-1248, ¶ 76. Indeed, “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) does not require a children

services agency ‘to present concrete proof that the child will be adopted if the court

awards the agency permanent custody.’” In re A.R., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 20AP-

201, 2021-Ohio-1794, ¶ 42, quoting In re R.S.-G., 4th Dist. Athens No. 15CA2,

2015-Ohio-4245, ¶ 52. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that,

“while a juvenile court reviewing a motion for permanent custody was at one time

required to consider the child’s probability of being adopted, * * * the current

statutory framework does not expressly require the court to consider this

information in making a best-interest determination.” In re T.R., 120 Ohio St.3d

136, 2008-Ohio-5219, ¶ 14. Therefore, even though “‘[i]t is true that the likelihood

that a child will be adopted may be considered in determining the child’s best

interest,” “the statutes contemplate that all the statutory best interest factors must be

considered and, although the likelihood of adoptions weighs in favor of such an

award, the absence of the likelihood does not preclude the court from finding that

an award of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest’” In re A.R. at ¶ 42,

quoting In re V.B.-S., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-478, 2013-Ohio-5448, ¶ 51.

Consequently, Tim’s argument is without merit.

       {¶28} We likewise reject Sabrina’s argument that “[t]he trial court failed to

consider that the children would be placed into a 4th foster home with a new family

they do not know, nor bonded to, when considering the best interest of the children.”

(Mother’s Brief at 12). Contrary to Sabrina’s contention, the trial court considered

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

C.B. and K.B.’s chronic foster-placement disruption in its best-interest analysis.

Specifically, the trial court found that “the children’s former foster-home placement

disrupted in August of 2022, and the children were placed in another foster home”

and that “the current foster placement will also be disrupted as the current foster

parents are unwilling to adopt the children because they are concerned about dealing

with [C.B.’s] autism.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No. 64); (Case No. 21 AB 117,

Doc. No. 64). Thus, Sabrina’s argument is misplaced. Indeed, since the trial court

did not weigh C.B. and K.B.’s chronic foster-placement disruption the way in which

Sabrina would have preferred, such does not suggest that the trial court’s decision

granting permanent custody of C.B. and K.B. to the agency is against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

       {¶29} Nevertheless, Sabrina maintains that the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d)

factor does not weigh in favor of granting the agency’s motions for permanent

custody because the trial “court failed to take into consideration [her] efforts to

secure a permanent placement for [C.B. and K.B.]” as well as her “progress within

the case plan set by the Agency.” (Mother’s Brief at 11, 15). Tim alleges that this

factor does not weigh in favor of granting the agency’s motion for permanent

custody for similar reasons. Specifically, Tim argues that the trial court failed to

consider that “[t]hey are in the process of moving into a new home” as evidence that

they “have shown they are willing to make the effort to get their children back in

their home despite the setbacks they have faced.” (Father’s Brief at 8).

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

        {¶30} However, “it is generally accepted that a trial court is not limited to

considering only current compliance with case plan objectives or objectives related

to housing and income in its analysis of the child’s need for a legally secure

permanent placement.” In re W.J., 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-21-29, 2022-Ohio-2449, ¶

72. “Rather, the determination of the best interest of a child and the decision to

terminate parental rights are both governed by statute, and the proper focus of a

challenge to those findings is through an analysis of the relevant statutory factors in

R.C. Chapter 2151.” In re R.L., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27214, 2014-Ohio-3117, ¶

34. Here, the record reflects that—despite Sabrina’s contention that she complied

with many of the case-plan objectives—Sabrina and Tim did not remedy the

primary reason that the children were removed from their home. See id. That is, it

is undisputed that Sabrina and Tim did not remedy the unsuitable conditions of the

home.

        {¶31} Nevertheless, “‘[a] legally secure permanent placement is more than a

house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable environment where

a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for

the child’s needs.’” In re K.M., 2018-Ohio-3711, at ¶ 29, quoting In re M.B., 4th

Dist. Highland No. 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56. Importantly, notwithstanding

Sabrina’s and Tim’s arguments to the contrary, the record demonstrates that Sabrina

and Tim are not able to provide C.B. and K.B. a legally secure permanent placement

due to the deplorable housing they have chosen to provide to these children.

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        {¶32} Moreover, the trial court found that “Sabrina and Tim have had more

than three and one-half years since the children were last removed from their care

to provide appropriate housing. They have failed to do so. Meanwhile, the children

have spent more than half of their lives in foster care. They deserve permanency.”

(Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No. 64); (Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc. No. 64). In

addition to the objective for Sabrina and Tim to provide C.B. and K.B. with

appropriate housing, the trial court addressed Sabrina and Tim’s financial situation

underpinning their inability to provide C.B. and K.B. with a legally secure

permanent placement. In particular, the trial court found that even though “Sabrina

is employed at Bob Evans in Marion,” her expenses exceed her income, and the trial

court found that “Tim has not worked for two years, although he acknowledged he

could have been working.” (Id.); (Id.). Further, the trial court found that “Tim lacks

insight into the necessity of working to provide appropriate housing for his family.”

(Id.); (Id.).

        {¶33} There is competent, credible evidence in the record supporting the trial

court’s findings. In particular, the GAL testified that “these kids need permanency.

They need to be placed in an environment where they have parents who are able to

take care of their needs.” (Apr. 3, 2023 Tr. at 153). Specifically, the GAL stressed

that “[e]ven if the parents do manage to obtain suitable housing * * * , there is no

guarantee that they will be able to maintain that housing” because “[i]t does not

appear from the parents [sic] past behavior and the current situation that the parents

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

will be able to adequately care for the children” since “[t]heir financial situation

remains precarious and they have not managed to secure appropriate housing over

the last three years while the case has been pending.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc.

No. 61); (Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc. No. 55).

       {¶34} Likewise, Mackenzie Magill (“Magill”), the agency’s caseworker

assigned to C.B.’s and K.B.’s cases, testified that “given the significant longevity

of this case and the ample amount of time that [the parents have] had to correct the

safety concerns in the home, they haven’t demonstrated that they can do that yet.”

(Apr. 3, 2023 Tr. at 126). She further testified that she does not “know that they

will be able to do that.” (Id.).

       {¶35} Thus, contrary to Sabrina’s and Tim’s contention that the trial court

did not consider their “upcoming move when examining the need for a legally

secure placement,” the evidence in the record reveals that the agency provided

Sabrina and Tim an extraordinary amount of time to remedy the issues identified in

the case plan as the reason for the children’s removal but they were unable to do so.

Consequently, the trial court’s conclusion that C.B. and K.B. are in need of a legally

secure permanent placement and that type of placement cannot be achieved without

granting the agency’s motions for permanent custody is not against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

       {¶36} With respect to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e)—whether any of the factors

in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply—the trial court concluded that “[n]one of the

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

factors apply to the instant cases.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No. 64); (Case No.

21 AB 117, Doc. No. 64).

       {¶37} Finally, Tim suggests that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing

evidence is too high for this case” since Sabrina and Tim “have shown they can

provide a proper home for their children, but they need another chance and more

time.” (Father’s Brief at 9). Even so, “a trial court can award permanent custody

to the state even in the absence of clear and convincing evidence as to one of the

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors.” In re K.M., 2018-Ohio-3711, at ¶ 37, citing In re

H.M., 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-13-11, 8-13-12, and 8-13-13, 2014-Ohio-755, ¶ 28 (“A

trial court can determine that granting permanent custody to the state is in the child’s

best interest, even with a lack of clear and convincing evidence in a single factor.”).

However, based on the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s

determination that it is in C.B.’s and K.B.’s best interest to grant the agency’s

motion for permanent custody is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s decision to grant permanent custody of

C.B. and K.B. to the agency is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Consequently, the trial court did not err by granting the agency’s motions for

permanent custody.

       {¶38} For these reasons, Sabrina’s first and second assignments of error and

Tim’s assignment of error are overruled.

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

                      Mother’s Third Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court’s Decision Is Against the Manifest Weight of the
       Evidence In Finding That The Marion County Child Services
       Used Reasonable Efforts To Eliminate The Continued Removal
       Of The Children Or To Make It Possible For The Children To
       Return Home Amounting To An Abuse Of Discretion.

       {¶39} In her third assignment of error, Sabrina argues that the trial court

erred by granting permanent custody of C.B. and K.B. to the agency because the

agency failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Specifically, Sabrina

contends that the record reveals that the agency failed to make reasonable efforts

toward reunification because those efforts were not appropriate or reasonable for

her situation.

                                Standard of Review

       {¶40} “We review under an abuse-of-discretion standard a trial court’s

finding that an agency made reasonable efforts toward reunification.” In re A.M.,

3d Dist. Marion No. 9-14-46, 2015-Ohio-2740, ¶ 24. An abuse of discretion

suggests the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

                                      Analysis

       {¶41} “‘Reasonable efforts’ has been defined as the state’s efforts, after

intervening to protect a child’s health or safety, to resolve the threat to the child

before removing the child from the home or to return the child to the home after the

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

threat is removed.” In re I.H., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1062, 2020-Ohio-4853, ¶

23, citing In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 28. However,

       [n]o one section of the Revised Code addresses the concept of
       reasonable efforts. Overall, Ohio’s child-welfare laws are designed
       to care for and protect children, “whenever possible, in a family
       environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only when
       necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety.”
       R.C. 2151.01(A). To that end, various sections of the Revised Code
       refer to the agency’s duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve or
       reunify the family unit.

In re C.F. at ¶ 29. In particular, under R.C. 2151.419, when a trial court

       removes a child from the child’s home or continues the removal of a
       child from the child’s home, the court shall determine whether the
       public children services agency * * * has made reasonable efforts to
       prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, to eliminate
       the continued removal of the child from the child’s home, or to make
       it possible for the child to return safely home.

R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). The Supreme Court of Ohio

       determined that the trial court is not obligated, under R.C. 2151.419,
       to make a determination that the agency used reasonable efforts to
       reunify the family at the time of the permanent custody hearing unless
       the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made
       prior to the hearing.

(Emphasis sic.) In re N.R.S., 3d Dist. Crawford Nos. 3-17-07, 3-17-08, and 3-17-

09, 2018-Ohio-125, ¶ 25, citing In re C.F. at ¶ 41, 43 (concluding that the

reasonable-efforts determination under R.C. 2151.419 does not apply to permanent-

custody motions under R.C. 2151.413 or to hearings on such motions under R.C.

2151.414).

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

        According to the Ohio Supreme Court, the trial court is only obligated
        to make a determination that the agency has made reasonable efforts
        to reunify the family at “adjudicatory, emergency, detention, and
        temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional hearings for
        abused, neglected, or dependent children, all of which occur prior to
        a decision transferring permanent custody to the state.”

In re B.S., 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-44, 2015-Ohio-4805, ¶ 36, quoting In re C.F. at

¶ 41.

        {¶42} In these cases, the trial court made its reasonable-efforts finding under

R.C. 2151.419 in its September 21, 2021 dispositional entries adjudicating C.B. and

K.B. as dependent children and ordering that they remain in the temporary custody

of the agency. Accord In re W.J., 2022-Ohio-2449, at ¶ 87. “Consequently, the trial

court was not required to make any further reasonable-efforts findings.”            Id.

“‘Stated another way, because the trial court previously made the requisite R.C.

2151.419 “reasonable efforts” findings, it was not required to again make that

finding at the hearing on the agency’s motion[s] for permanent custody filed under

R.C. 2151.413.’” Id., quoting In re B.J.P., 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-18-04, 2018-

Ohio-5221, ¶ 18.

        {¶43} Notwithstanding the trial court’s conclusion that the agency exhibited

reasonable efforts to eliminate the continued removal of C.B. and K.B. from their

home, Sabrina contends that the trial court “never actually stated what those

reasonable efforts were” as it was required to do under R.C. 2151.419(A)(1).

Sabrina’s argument is specious. Rather, the trial court extensively documented the

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

reasonable efforts employed by the agency to eliminate the continued removal of

C.B. and K.B. from their home. Specifically, the trial court described that the

agency “offered to provide a dumpster to the parents to remediate the problematic

conditions in the home, and offered bug bombs and professional exterminating

services to eliminate the pest infestation issues if the parents would first remove the

clutter from the home” but they “failed to do so.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No.

64); (Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc. No. 64). Imperatively, the trial court found that

Sabrina and Tim “had over three and one-half years to resolve the issues that

precipitated the removal [in the prior case], and twenty months since the opening of

the current cases” but that they “have not cooperated with [the agency] as

demonstrated by their unwillingness to provide access to their home during the

period from September, 2022 through the end of March, 2023.” (Id.); (Id.). In sum,

the trial court resolved that Sabrina and Tim “did not take advantage of [the

agency’s] reasonable efforts.” (Id.); (Id.).

       {¶44} Nevertheless, Sabrina maintains that the trial court abused its

discretion by concluding that the agency made reasonable efforts toward

reunification because those “efforts were not appropriate or reasonable for Sabrina’s

situation.” (Mother’s Brief at 19). Specifically, Sabrina posits that “[o]ther than a

list of resources for housing, the Agency did not provide [her] with appropriate and

reasonable efforts to secure a safe and habitable home for the Minor Children’s

return.” (Id. at 20). We are not persuaded by Sabrina’s argument. Rather, our

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

review of the record reveals that the agency’s reunification efforts were reasonable

and diligent under the circumstances.

       {¶45} Indeed, “‘“[c]ase plans are the tools that child protective service

agencies use to facilitate the reunification of families who * * * have been

temporarily separated.”’” In re A.M., 2015-Ohio-2740, at ¶ 25, quoting In re T.S.,

3d Dist. Mercer Nos. 10-14-13, 10-14-14, and 10-14-15, 2015-Ohio-1184, ¶ 26,

quoting In re Evans, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-01-75, 2001 WL 1333979, *3 (Oct. 30,

2001). “‘To that end, case plans establish individualized concerns and goals, along

with the steps that the parties and the agency can take to achieve reunification.’”

Id., quoting In re T.S. at ¶ 27, citing In re Evans at *3. “‘Agencies have an

affirmative duty to diligently pursue efforts to achieve the goals in the case plan.’”

Id., quoting In re T.S. at ¶ 27, citing In re Evans at *3. “‘“Nevertheless, the issue is

not whether there was anything more that [the agency] could have done, but whether

the [agency’s] case planning and efforts were reasonable and diligent under the

circumstances of this case.”’” Id., quoting In re T.S. at ¶ 27, quoting In re Leveck,

2003-Ohio-1269, at ¶ 10. “‘“Reasonable efforts” does not mean all available efforts.

Otherwise, there would always be an argument that one more additional service, no

matter how remote, may have made reunification possible.’” In re H.M.K., 2013-

Ohio-4317, at ¶ 95, quoting In re M.A.P., 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2012-08-164

and CA2012-08-165, 2013-Ohio-655, ¶ 47. “‘We also note that the statute provides

that in determining whether reasonable efforts were made, the child’s health and

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

safety is paramount.’” In re A.M. at ¶ 25, quoting In re T.S. at ¶ 27, citing R.C.

2151.419(A)(1).

       {¶46} In these cases, the record reflects that the trial court’s reasonable-

efforts findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Importantly, the

record reflects that the agency attempted to assist Sabrina and Tim; however, the

record further reveals that they declined to heed any such assistance. Indeed, Cecily

Nelson (“Nelson”), a prior caseworker assigned to C.B.’s and K.B.’s cases, testified

that Sabrina and Tim did not make “significant progress towards getting their kids

back” even though they “were significantly utilizing their available parenting time.”

(Apr. 3, 2023 Tr. at 71). According to Nelson, Sabrina and Tim “were not compliant

with” “meeting with [her]” and they did not complete the case-plan objective

concerning the condition of their home. (Id.). Likewise, Magill testified to the

difficulty she experienced making contact with Sabrina and Tim. In particular,

Magill testified she was “able to see Sabrina twice” from April 2022 through April

2023. (Id. at 115).

       {¶47} Nelson testified that they identified that Sabrina and Tim’s debt was

impeding their ability to obtain alternative housing. As a result, Nelson testified

that the agency worked with Sabrina and Tim to learn to manage and mitigate their

debt by “com[ing] up with a plan for putting money towards their debt” but that

“there was never anything specific they were willing to commit to.” (Id.). She

further testified that the agency “offer[ed] to purchase things like a dumpster for the

                                         -25-
Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

home so that they could help get rid of some of the items in the house” but that

Sabrina and Tim rejected that offer because they had “already purged all of the

things they were willing to get rid of * * * .” (Id. at 74). Nelson testified that the

agency also offered to provide extermination services but Sabrina and Tim refused

to “pick up some of the boxes or rearrange” them for the services to be effective.

(Id. at 75).

       {¶48} Magill testified that simply cleaning the home for Sabrina and Tim is

not a realistic resolution to the problem since “they need to be able to show an ability

to maintain it.” (Id. at 118). Imperatively, demonstrating the ability to maintain

adequate housing is critical in this case since C.B. and K.B. were returned to Sabrina

and Tim’s care only to be removed shortly thereafter since “the conditions [of the

home] had returned to a deplorable state and [since] the children were living in

unhealth [sic] and unsanitary conditions again.” (Case No. 21 AB 116, Doc. No.

38); (Case No. 21 AB 117, Doc. No. 34). Specifically, the record reflects that

“Sabrina and Timothy did not make contact with the agency for several months

following the children’s return despite being told the case would remain open” and

“the agency had to contact Law Enforcement in order to get access to the home and

ensure Sabrina and Timothy answered the door.” (Id.); (Id.).

       {¶49} As a result, based on the record before us, we conclude that Sabrina

has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that

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Case Nos. 9-23-28, 9-23-29

the agency made reasonable efforts toward reunification. Accord In re B.S., 2015-

Ohio-4805, at ¶ 40.

       {¶50} Therefore, Sabrina’s third assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶51} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

                                                               Judgments Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

/hls

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