Court Opinion

ID: 9898520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:15.579997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:34.376347
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          JUNE 1, 2023
                                                                 In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                                WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )
                                               )         No. 38782-8-III
                     Respondent,               )
                                               )
       v.                                      )
                                               )
RAYLIN DWAYNE JAMES,                           )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                               )
                     Appellant.                )

       STAAB, J. — Raylin James appeals his conviction for first degree murder. He

argues there was insufficient evidence of premeditation to convict him as a principal and

insufficient evidence to convict him as an accomplice. We find the evidence sufficient

and affirm his conviction.

                                      BACKGROUND

       The State charged Raylin James with first degree murder of Leroy Scott as a

principal or alternatively as an accomplice. Because James challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence, we set forth the facts in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Salinas,

119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).

       James, Gerald, and Leroy Scott became friends while they were in the military and

were stationed together at Joint Base Lewis McChord (JBLM). The three were close and
No. 38782-8-III
State v. James

called each other brothers. However, according to Scott’s ex-girlfriend, Jazmyn Kelly,

James and Gerald “cared more about each other than they did [Scott]” and “didn’t have

[Scott’s] best interests at heart.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 410. James and Gerald’s behavior

toward Scott worsened over time.

       At some point, Scott moved to a new room in the barracks at JBLM. Before

switching rooms, Scott and Kelly moved all of Scott’s belongings and then thoroughly

deep cleaned Scott’s old room. After Scott moved, marijuana was found in his old room,

and he was discharged as a result. Kelly, Scott, James, and Gerald were the only

individuals who knew the key code for Scott’s old room.

       James and Gerald believed that when Scott had been questioned about the

marijuana, Scott said that the marijuana belonged to James and Gerald.

       While Scott was being discharged, James and Gerald borrowed his car. Scott

asked them to return the key afterwards, but James and Gerald denied having it. When

they would not return the key, Scott informed a military superior of the situation. The

key was ultimately returned, but Scott was now “two times a snitch” in the eyes of James

and Gerald. RP at 416. When Scott was finally able to get into his car, he found that it

had been filled with shredded paper.

       Following Scott’s discharge, he and Kelly moved to eastern Washington. About

four months after his discharge, Scott made plans to travel to Ellensburg and celebrate his

birthday with his friend Hadassah Fisch. Although Scott’s relationship with James and

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State v. James

Gerald remained strained, the two were invited to Scott’s birthday celebration. The

group partied into the early morning hours.

       At some point during the party, Scott appeared to have “lost his energy,” as if

something was off. RP at 461. Around 1:00 am, James, Gerald, and Scott left the party

without saying anything. About an hour later, James and Gerald returned covered in

blood and dirt without Scott. Fisch asked where Scott was, and James responded that he

was in a ditch.

       Approximately two days later, James called Scott’s mother and told her “some

white guys” had beat Scott to death and tried to rape him.

       Scott’s body was discovered by a stranger and reported to the police. The body

was found in a remote area “out in the middle of nowhere” at the edge of a creek next to

the road. RP at 186. Scott’s pants were pulled down to his ankles. Nearby, police found

three rocks and a pointed stick, all with Scott’s blood on them.

       Scott’s body had extensive injuries. The coroner testified that Scott’s injuries

appeared to be the result of several different instruments or surfaces. There were

multiple indications of trauma including lacerations, bruising, redness, and chunks of skin

missing from his neck, ear, and face. This included one wound inflicted with some sort

of instrument, possibly a knife or a sharp rock. Scott’s eyes were swollen shut, and there

were deep injuries to the back of his head. Scott also had dozens of wounds on his face.

His teeth were bloody and appeared to have been pushed up into his jaw that had been

                                              3
No. 38782-8-III
State v. James

detached and was maneuverable. In addition, Scott sustained defensive wounds,

including bruising on his forearms and a torn thumbnail.

       Scott also sustained internal injuries. His shoulder appeared to be either separated

or broken, and his skull was fractured in multiple places.

       A lighter was found near Scott’s body. There was evidence of an attempt to light

his body on fire as a substance containing petroleum distillate, contained in lighter fluid,

was found on his clothing, and his skin appeared to have been exposed to a petroleum

product. Scott’s hair also appeared to have been exposed to a flame.

       The State presented evidence regarding the cell phone data of Scott, James, and

Gerald in the time surrounding Scott’s death. Each of the individuals’ phones pinged

between 1:27 a.m. and 1:53 a.m in the area where Scott’s body was found. Then a ping

of James’ phone from 1:58 a.m. showed that he had left the area. However, Scott’s

phone did not leave.

       Following the discovery of Scott’s body, police spoke with Fisch. Fisch testified

that she initially was not honest with police about events that had transpired around

Scott’s death because she had been “scared for [her] life” and had seen what had

happened to Scott because “he had snitched.” RP at 448. She said that when James

finally left the party she texted him to “get back safe” because she “was pretty scared”

and wanted James to know that things were “cool” between them. RP at 463. Fisch also

said that James and Gerald were closer with each other than they were with Scott.

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No. 38782-8-III
State v. James

       Erika Key, a friend of Scott, also testified. Key said that, although Scott was

excited to see his friends at his birthday party, he was worried about “two individuals.”

RP at 945. Key stated that Scott expressed concern there would be drama at the party

because of “the whole thing with the military” and that Scott had “bad blood with some

people.” RP at 945. She also said that Scott’s concerns were related to the reason he had

left the military.

       During the investigation, police recovered a black bloody jacket from the trunk of

James’ vehicle similar to the one James had been seen wearing just prior to leaving the

party with Scott. The jacket tested positive for Scott’s, and possibly James’ DNA.1

       The trial court instructed the jury on the definition and elements of first degree

murder. “A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree when, with a

premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of

such person or of a third person.” Clerk’s Papers at 296. The trial court also instructed

the jury that it could find James guilty as an accomplice.

       The jury returned a general verdict of guilt against James. The jury did not make a

specific finding as to whether James was guilty as a principal or as an accomplice.

       James appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction.

       1
           Deoxyribonucleic acid.

                                              5
No. 38782-8-III
State v. James

                                        ANALYSIS

1.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897,

903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). Washington follows the standard of review for a challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence as set out in Jackson v. Virginia.2 State v. Green, 94

Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence to prove the elements of an offense, we must determine “whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The purpose of this standard of review is to ensure that the

fact-finder rationally applied the constitutional standard required by the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which allows for

conviction of a criminal offense only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 317-

18.

       In claiming insufficient evidence, the defendant necessarily admits the truth of the

State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.

These inferences “must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly

against the defendant.” Id. Further, we must defer to the trier of fact to resolve

conflicting testimony and evaluate the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v.

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No. 38782-8-III
State v. James

Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990) (credibility determinations cannot be

reviewed on appeal), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crossguns, 199 Wn.2d 282,

505 P.3d 529 (2022). Direct and circumstantial evidence are weighed equally. State v.

Scanlan, 193 Wn.2d 753, 770, 445 P.3d 960 (2019). “[I]nferences based on

circumstantial evidence must be reasonable and cannot be based on speculation.” State v.

Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318 (2013).

2.     FIRST DEGREE MURDER

       James argues that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation to convict him

of first degree murder as a principal. We disagree.

       A person commits the crime of first degree murder when “[w]ith a premeditated

intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or

of a third person.” RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a). The State has the burden of proving

premeditated intent to kill that “involve[d] more than a moment in point of time.” RCW

9A.32.020(1). However, the simple fact that a person had an opportunity to deliberate is

insufficient to show premeditation. State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 644, 904 P.2d 245

(1995). “Rather, premeditation is ‘the deliberate formation of and reflection upon the

intent to take a human life’ and involves ‘the mental process of thinking beforehand,

deliberation, reflection, weighing or reasoning for a period of time, however short.’” Id.

at 644 (quoting State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 597-98, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995)).

       2
           443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
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No. 38782-8-III
State v. James

       The State may use circumstantial evidence to prove premeditation if the inferences

by the jury from the evidence are reasonable and the evidence is substantial. Id. at 643.

“Four characteristics of the crime are particularly relevant to establish premeditation:

motive, procurement of a weapon, stealth, and the method of killing.” Id. at 644. The

factors of procurement of a weapon and stealth can also be combined to show planning.

Id.

       James maintains that the State failed to present evidence of a motive, procurement

of a weapon, stealth, or planning. But examination of the record reveals evidence

supporting each of the four factors relevant to premeditation.

       First, James had a motive to kill Scott: revenge for Scott “snitching” on him and

Gerald. Kelly and Key both testified regarding the “bad blood” between the three ever

since Scott supposedly snitched on James and Gerald regarding the marijuana found in

his barracks and failing to return his key. 3 RP at 422, 945-46. There was evidence that

James and Gerald had previously retaliated for Scott’s “snitching” by filling Scott’s car

with shredded paper. Additionally, Fisch testified that she had not initially been honest

with police regarding the incidents surrounding Scott’s death because she had seen what

       3
         James briefly mentions that Kelly’s testimony regarding motive was hearsay. Br.
of Appellant at 16. However, no hearsay objection was raised below, and James offers
no legal analysis of Kelly’s testimony under the hearsay rule on appeal. Accordingly, we
decline to address this argument. See RAP 2.5(a); RAP 10.3(a); Regan v. McLachlan,
163 Wn. App. 171, 178, 257 P.3d 1122 (2011) (“We will not address issues raised
without proper citation to legal authority.”).

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No. 38782-8-III
State v. James

had happened to Scott because “he had snitched.” RP at 448. All of this testimony

demonstrated that James had a motive to kill Scott.

       Second, there was testimony presented that Scott sustained stab wounds inflicted

by a sharp instrument. This could have been the bloody sharp stick found at the scene, a

knife brought by James or Gerald, or some other instrument. Either way, the use of a

weapon in Scott’s killing was indicative of premeditation because such a weapon would

have had to have been taken up prior to the attack.

       Third, in regard to the stealth factor, the testimony regarding the injuries to Scott’s

body indicated that he may have been thrown from behind and that he had received

severe blows to the back of his head. See State v. Ollens, 107 Wn.2d 848, 853, 733 P.2d

984 (1987) (fact that defendant struck victim from behind tended to show premeditation).

Moreover, the testimony presented at trial showed that James and Gerald drove with

Scott to an isolated location where they then beat him to death. There was also evidence

that they brought lighter fluid with them and attempted to burn Scott’s body after they

beat him. All of this evidence supported stealth because it showed an attempt to conceal

the murder.

       Fourth, the fact that there was evidence that Scott was struck multiple times from

different directions in addition to being cut with a weapon was indicative of

premeditation. Not only did the multiple wounds and injuries demonstrate that the

beating of Scott was committed by several distinct acts, the fact that one wound was

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No. 38782-8-III
State v. James

caused by a weapon and the others appeared not to be, tended to show premeditation. See

id. (fact that defendant not only stabbed the victim multiple times but also subsequently

slit his throat indicated premeditated intent to kill). Additionally, Scott’s defensive

wounds showed that there was a physical struggle, further evidence of premeditation.

See State v. Allen, 159 Wn.2d 1, 8, 147 P.3d 581 (2006) (“a physical struggle over ‘an

appreciable period of time’ prior to strangulation is sufficient evidence of premeditation”)

(quoting State v. Harris, 62 Wn.2d 858, 868, 385 P.2d 18 (1963)).

       In sum, the combined evidence relating to motive, use of a weapon, stealth, and

Scott’s manner of death was sufficient evidence of premeditation to convict James of first

degree murder as a principal.

3.     ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY

       James also argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him as an

accomplice because the evidence did not indicate that he had assisted, encouraged, or

commanded Gerald in any manner before, during, or after the killing. Br. of Appellant at

21. We determine that James’ argument fails.

       “[A]ccomplice liability represents a legislative decision that one who participates

in a crime is guilty as a principal, regardless of the degree of the participation.” State v.

Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 104, 804 P.2d 577 (1991)). “A person is an accomplice if, with

knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he solicits,

commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime or aids or agrees

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No. 38782-8-III
State v. James

to aid another in planning or committing the crime.” State v. Holcomb, 180 Wn. App.

583, 587, 321 P.3d 1288 (2014).

       Accomplice liability is neither an element of a crime nor an alternative means of

committing a crime. State v. Teal, 152 Wn.2d 333, 338, 96 P.3d 974 (2004). Thus,

where a defendant is charged as both a principal and an accomplice, the jury “need not

reach unanimity on whether a defendant acted as a principal or an accomplice in the

crime for which the defendant was charged, so long as ‘it was convinced that the alleged

crimes were committed and that the [defendant] participated in each of them.’” Id. at

339 (quoting State v. Carothers, 84 Wn.2d 256, 261, 525 P.2d 731 (1974)).

       As a result, our Supreme Court has held that where there is evidence to support

either liability as a principal or liability as an accomplice, the State may charge a

defendant as both a principal and an accomplice but need only present substantial

evidence that the defendant acted as either a principal or an accomplice. State v.

McDonald, 138 Wn.2d 680, 686-87, 981 P.2d 443 (1999) (“We also agree that, because

there is substantial evidence of accomplice liability, under the trial court’s instruction we

need not examine whether the evidence supports principal liability as well.”).

       The State points to no evidence here supporting its decision to charge James as an

accomplice as well as a principal. However, under McDonald, as the evidence was

sufficient to charge James as a principal, it was sufficient to charge him as an accomplice

as well. Accordingly, we disagree with James’ argument.

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State v. James

       James points to this court’s prior decisions in State v. Jameison, 4 Wn. App. 2d

184, 421 P.3d 463 (2018) and State v. Luna, 71 Wn. App. 755, 862 P.2d 620 (1993) to

support his argument. In both cases, this court determined that there was insufficient

evidence to support the State’s charge of first degree murder based on the theory of

accomplice liability. Jameison, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 203-09; Luna, 71 Wn. App. at 759-60.

However, both decisions differ from this case because the defendants were charged solely

as accomplices and not as principals. Jameison, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 192; Luna, 71 Wn.

App. at 758. Here, on the other hand, James was charged as a principal and an

accomplice and because sufficient evidence supported a finding that he acted as a

principal, the State was not required to present evidence to support accomplice liability.

       Affirmed.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                              _________________________________
                                                      Staab, J.
WE CONCUR:

_________________________________
      Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.

_________________________________
      Siddoway, J.

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