Court Opinion

ID: 9624754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:16:49.70636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:06.205829
License: Public Domain

BIGGS, Judge
dissenting.
Because I believe the defendant offered fair and just reason to withdraw his plea of guilty to first degree murder, I respectfully dissent.
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this Court does not apply an abuse of discretion standard, but instead conducts an independent review of the record. This independent review should consider the reasons offered by the defendant in conjunction with any prejudice to the State, and determine if it would be fair and just to allow defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. State v. Davis, - N.C. App. -, -, 562 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2002).
“A ‘fair and just’ reason for withdrawing a guilty plea is one that ‘essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the [plea] proceeding.” United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Further, although the majority opinion accurately enumerates factors appropriate for a court’s consideration in ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea, “these factors are only balancing considerations,” United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991), rather than a ‘laundry list’ as suggested by the majority. “In general, ‘a presentence motion to withdraw a plea of guilty should be allowed for any fair and just reason.’ ” State v. Davis, - N.C. App. at -, 562 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532, 539, 391 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1990)) (emphasis added).
*586In the instant case, it is undisputed that defendant: (1) had a significant history of substance abuse and emotional problems; (2) had been subject to involuntary commitment proceedings within the two years preceding the subject offense; (3) suffered severe skull injuries in a motor vehicle accident two months before the offense, requiring surgery, and resulting in some cognitive impairment; (4) repeatedly expressed suicidal desires; and (5) explicitly and repeatedly stated an intention to employ the criminal justice system to kill himself, even asking for a “speedy death penalty”. Further, although the Cleveland County forensic examiner and the forensic psychiatrist at Dix hospital reached differing conclusions regarding defendant’s competency to stand trial, the forensic psychiatrist explicitly determined that defendant’s “capacity to proceed [was] contingent upon his taking his medications as prescribed.” The transcript, however, establishes unequivocally that defendant had abruptly discontinued prescribed Prozac a week or so before the entry of the plea:
The Court: When was the last time, if at all, you used or consumed any such substance?
Defendant: This morning.
The Court: And what was that, sir?
Defendant: I took Dilantin, um, Tegretal, Orudis, Prozac.
Mr. Farfour: He did not take his Prozac this morning. He’s been on Prozac up until about a week ago.
The Court: So as a result of an automobile accident you were involved in in October, you have — you have a head injury. Tell me about that.
Defendant: ... I dropped off a fifty foot cliff. I ... I sustained a fractured skull, and . . . and they had to do brain surgery and replace my skull. And basically, I was bleeding from the brain.
Moreover, the plea transcript reveals what the forensic psychiatrist termed defendant’s “suicidal ideation.” Defendant repeatedly expressed to the court during the plea hearing that his aim in pleading guilty was to obtain the death penalty:
Defendant: .... I want to plead guilty to first degree murder and — with the possibility of death. That’s my objective. I mean *587that’s the onliest way I feel like I can make it up to her family, my family, and the community.
Defendant: ... Your Honor, I’m just ready to get this over with as soon as possible so it won’t be no more trauma — I mean, on her kids, especially, and my kids. I think that — I think that death is the onliest way. And I’m saying this from my heart.
The Court: You understand under the law of North Carolina, the maximum punishment for first degree murder may be death?
Defendant: Yes, that’s — that’s what I prefer.
Defendant: Okay, yes, I have one question that I asked my attorneys.
The Court: Yes, sir.
Defendant: I know they came out with new law or something, you know, about a speedy death penalty that — something that you don’t have to — I mean, you can violate — I mean, you don’t have to — you can turn down your appeal. That’s — ain’t that the new law now? That’s why I’m trying to ask. I would like to know.
Defendant: Okay. What I was — I mean — I mean, since this— since I’ve been in Raleigh, and I have a clear mind, I’ve been — I’ve been going to death myself, too. . . . (emphasis added)
Next, in considering the time frame in which defendant moved to set aside his plea of guilty, I find it significant that defendant entered a plea of guilty, against the advice of counsel, just a few weeks after his return from Dix hospital. Defendant pled guilty to first degree murder just two months after his arrest, even before the mandatory Rule 24 conference had taken place. Admittedly, a period of perhaps six months to a year passed, after the plea hearing, before defendant contacted his attorneys seeking to withdraw his plea. However, this is *588consistent with what Dr. Coleman, a forensic psychologist who conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of defendant, described as the “predictable course of recovery of function following brain injury ... [in which] maximum improvement is obtained within eighteen months or so[.]” While the majority opinion stresses the length of time it took defendant to move to withdraw his plea of guilty, it is noteworthy that defendant’s motion was presented two years before his sentencing. Thus, I agree with the majority opinion that no particular prejudice inured to the state by virtue of defendant’s delay.
Defendant has not asserted his factual innocence of the offense • of first degree murder and, based on the state’s proffer of a factual basis for the plea, it would appear pointless to do so. However, due to the substantial evidence in the record of defendant’s mental instability, a trial of this case might well yield a different result.
Finally, like the majority opinion, I reject defendant’s contention of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the record and transcript of plea clearly demonstrate that defendant entered a plea of guilty in order to receive the death penalty, as a means of perhaps carrying out his suicidal ideation; that at the time of entry of plea he was on several psychoactive medications; that he had discontinued one of the medications, notwithstanding the forensic psychiatrist’s opinion that his competency to proceed depended on taking medications as prescribed; that the plea was entered within a few months of his suffering brain injury in an accident; and that the plea was entered against the advice of counsel. Because I believe there is compelling evidence of ‘fair and just’ reason to allow defendant to withdraw his plea, and the state demonstrated no prejudice, I would reverse.