Court Opinion

ID: 9829118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:00:44.231625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:57.555823
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
The following provisions of article 8306, § 12, R. C. S. 1925, viz.: “In all cases of permanent partial incapacity it shall be, considered . that the permanent loss of the use of the member is equivalent to, and shall draw the same compensation as, the loss of that member; but the compensation in and by said schedule provided shall be in lieu of all other compensation in such cases. * * * For the injuries enumerated in the following schedule the employee shall receive in lieu of all other compensation except medical aid, hospital services and medicines as elsewhere herein provided, a weekly compensation equal to sixty per cent, of the average weekly wages of such employee, but not less than $7.09 per week nor exceeding $20.00 per week, for the respective periods stated herein, to wit * ■ * * for the loss of a hand, sixty per cent, of the average weekly wage during one hundred and fifty weeks,” we' hold, apply to and control the amount of compensation ap-pellee was entitled to, and under the terms of which the trial court should have adjudged compensation to appellee. Therefore it was error to award him compensation for 15 weeks at $20 per week, on account of temporary total loss of the use of his hand, as a part of -the compensation adjudged to him. This because the following provision of said section 12, viz.: “The compensation in and by said schedule provided shall be in lieu of all other compensation,” restricted hiis compensation to 60 per cent, of his average weekly wage, viz. $15, for 150 weeks, or a total sum of $2,250. The jury found that appellee sustained permanent partial loss of the use of his right hand to the extent of 75 per cent., which was but in effect a finding that by said injury to hjs hand appellee was permanently partially incapacitated. This holding, we think,' but a logical deduction asserted automatically by the following provision of section 12, supra; “That the permanent loss of the use of the member is equivalent to and shall draw the same compensation as the loss of that member”; it appearing therefrom that the terms “permanent partial incapacity” and “permanent partial loss of thé use of a member,” are interchangeably' vised and are convertible terms, in'-that, for permanent páríial incapacity to exist, it' would not be necessary for one to suffer the pérmanent total loss of the use of a member _ either by an injury thereto or a complete sev*682erance thereof; for instance, in so far as its usefulness as designed by its construction for manipulation etc., a severed band is no more a loss of that member than a permanent total loss of its use would be, and in neither event would there exist a mere condition of permanent partial incapacity. It is the condition created by an injury, viz. a permanent partial incapacity, that shall be considered equivalent to the permanent loss of the use of the member and thereby draw the same compensation as the loss of that member. The loss of a hand would produce a case of permanent total incapacity and not one of total partial incapacity, and likewise a case of total partial incapacity does not include a total permanent loss of the use of the member either by its severance or by an injury thereto. A member, the use of which has been permanently and totally destroyed other than by severance, would be a permanent total loss of the use thereof, and not a case of permanent partial incapacity.
It is true the word “partial” is not included in the expression, “It shall be considered that the permanent loss of the use of a member is equivalent to”; 'however, that language is not to be interpreted so as to give same the effect as if it in fact read “that the permanent total loss of the use,” when to do so would be to hold that the word “partial” used in the opening sentence, viz. “In all cases of permanent partial incapacity it shall be considered,” had reference .to and only included cases of permanent total incapacity. It is the permanent loss of the use of a member through an injury producing permanent partial incapacity that said section provides “shall draw the same compensation as the loss of that member.” While incapacity is only required to be partial, same must be permanent; therefore, to withhold from the word “partial” its commonly accepted meaning would prevent said provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, in which said word “partial” is used, from accomplishing the purpose for which it was undoubtedly included in said act, viz. to take care of all other cases of permanent partial incapacity not included in any other provision of said act— cases of permanent partial incapacity produced by injury to d member resulting, not in the loss of that member, but a permanent partial loss of its use, for it is only where an injury produces permanent partial loss of the use of a member that permanent partial incapacity can exist.
The word “incapacity” is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (Ed. 1927) in part as follows: “State of being incapacitated, want of capacity, lack of physical power, of natural qualification” ; and the word “partial” is defined by the same authority to mean, among other things, “of, pertaining to or affecting a part only; not general or universal, as a partial eclipse of the moon.” We therefore hold the meaning of “partial incapacity,” as used in said statute, to be a lack of physical power in part only, or physical inability in part only of an injured member.
The construction we place upon the quoted provisions of said section 12, we think, is in harmony with the purpose fop which said statute was enacted, an’d but a proper recognition of the value of the language employed to provide prompt, speedy, and effectual means by which an employee, injured in any one of the industries of the state, shall be awarded compensation as fixed within the terms of said act. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Dewey Adcock, 27 S.W.(2d) 363, decided March 22, 1930, and cases cited.
We hold, therefore, that compensation for the permanent partial loss of the use of a member is provided for by the quoted provisions of said section 12, and is fixed for a period of 150 weeks at 60 per cent, of the average weekly wage of an employee so injured. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted to the extent of reforming the judgment so as to award appellee compensation at $15 per week for 150 weeks, with costs of appeal adjudged against appellee, and, as so reformed, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and appellant’s motion in all other respects overruled.
Overruled.