Court Opinion

ID: 9395193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 15:00:41.069209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:05.966808
License: Public Domain

20-3130
     Duran De La Rosa v. Garland
                                                                             BIA
                                                                       Aikman, IJ
                                                                     A055 969 548

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 17th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
 8            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
 9            MYRNA PÉREZ,
10                 Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   WANDER DURAN DE LA ROSA,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                     v.                                  20-3130
17                                                         NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20            Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                   Marissa A. Prianti, Kerry W.
25                                     Bretz, Bretz & Coven, LLP, New
26                                     York, NY.
27
28
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:             Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
 2                               Attorney General; Julie M.
 3                               Iversen, Senior Litigation
 4                               Counsel; Arthur L. Rabin, Trial
 5                               Attorney, Office of Immigration
 6                               Litigation, United States
 7                               Department of Justice, Washington,
 8                               DC.

 9       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

10   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

11   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

12   is DENIED.

13       Petitioner Wander Duran De La Rosa, a native and citizen

14   of the Dominican Republic, seeks review of an August 17, 2020,

15   decision of the BIA affirming a February 21, 2020, decision

16   of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying deferral of removal

17   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).     In re   Duran

18   De La Rosa, No. A055 969 548 (B.I.A. Aug. 17, 2020), aff’g

19   No. A055 969 548 (Immig. Ct. Batavia Feb. 21, 2020).        We

20   assume the parties’ familiarity with the case.

21       The Government has moved to dismiss Duran’s petition as

22   frivolous.    Construing the Government’s motion instead as its

23   brief, we deny Duran’s petition on the merits.

24       We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

25   the BIA.     See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d

                                    2
 1   Cir. 2005).    We review factfinding for substantial evidence

 2   and questions of law and application of law to fact de novo.

3    Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 583 (2d Cir. 2021).

4    Under the substantial evidence standard, “we must uphold

5    agency factfinding ‘unless any reasonable adjudicator would

 6   be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (emphasis

 7   omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).        Where, as here,

 8   “a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his failure to adduce

 9   evidence can itself constitute the ‘substantial evidence’

10   necessary to support the agency’s challenged decision.”          Jian

11   Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2008).

12       A CAT applicant bears the burden of “establish[ing] that

13   it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if

14   removed to the proposed country of removal.”                 8 C.F.R.

15   § 1208.16(c)(2).     “Torture” is “an extreme form of cruel and

16   inhuman treatment” and is limited to acts “inflicted by, or

17   at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence

18   of, a public official.”       Id. § 1208.18(a)(1), (2).         A CAT

19   claim   is   “too   speculative”   if   “it   involves   a   chain   of

20   assumptions”; an applicant is required to show that each link

21   in the chain is more likely than not to occur.           Savchuck v.

                                        3
 1   Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks

 2   omitted).

 3       Duran   alleged    that   cartel   members   in   the    Dominican

 4   Republic would try to kill him because they knew or would

 5   know he had cooperated with law enforcement in the United

 6   States   given   the   relatively    light   sentence   he   received

 7   following his last conviction and alleged that one former

 8   associate threatened to kill him and shot at his brother.

 9       Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion

10   that Duran failed to establish that he would more likely than

11   not be tortured if he returned to the Dominican Republic.

12   First, while Duran argued that a former associate believed

13   him to be a snitch and shot at (but missed) his brother, his

14   evidence was not that clear.         He did not identify when the

15   shooting occurred, when a phone call between him and the

16   shooter occurred, why he called the shooter in the first

17   place, whether the shooter still believes Duran is a snitch,

18   whether the shooter would have the means and knowledge to

19   harm Duran if he returned, whether the shooter was still

20   involved with such drug cartels, or whether the shooter was

21   still in the Dominican Republic, at liberty, or even alive.

                                      4
 1   This record does not compel a conclusion contrary to the

 2   agency’s   determination     that     Duran’s    fear     was   “too

 3   speculative.”    Savchuck, 518 F.3d at 123–24; see also 8

 4   U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).      Moreover, Duran’s expert witness

 5   testified that Duran could face harm subject to various

 6   contingencies, variables, and suppositions.       But such hedged

 7   and tentative assertions do not fulfill Duran’s burden of

 8   showing that each link in the chain is more likely than not

 9   to occur and that he would more likely than not face torture

10   in the Dominican Republic.        See Savchuck, 518 F.3d at 123–

11   24; Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)

12   (“In the absence of solid support in the record . . .

13   [petitioner’s] fear is speculative at best.”).

14        Absent a showing that he will more likely than not be

15   tortured, Duran cannot establish a CAT claim.           See 8 C.F.R.

16   §   1208.16(c)(2).   We    have    considered   Duran’s    remaining

17   arguments and conclude that they are immaterial given the

18   conclusion above or lack merit.

                                       5
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3   stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  6