Court Opinion

ID: 9724123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:45:24.71796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:56.189123
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result, and write separately to emphasize the lack of support in the record for the finding of contempt.
The trial court’s seminal findings of fact are as follows:
1) That on or about March 26,1993, defendant Driver made two phone calls to the personal residence of “patient X” and left a message to call her back.
2) That on or about March 26, 1993 or March 27, 1993, defendant Driver entered onto private property of “patient X” and placed material of a sensitive and personal nature on “patient X’s” doorstep.
3) That on March 27, 1993, defendant Driver made a telephone call to a number she believed was that of the parents of “patient X.”
4) That the phone call was made under the auspices of there being an emergency relating to their daughter, “patient X.” This statement was predicated on a false belief.
5) That these contacts with “patient X” are in violation of the January 11, 1993 Permanent Injunction, specifically paragraph (10) dealing with the harassment of patients of the Clinic.
(Emphasis added.)
The “paragraph 10” of the permanent injunction, which the trial court specifically referred to for the underpinnings of its contempt order, provides:
Harassing, taunting, or shouting at individuals by “Pro-Life” demonstrators; “Pro-Choice” demonstrators; “Clinic” employees, agents, representatives, or volunteers; and “Organizations” employees, agents, representatives, or volunteers is prohibited within the entirety of “Zone A” and constitutes a violation of this Order.
Thus, the trial court’s findings of fact are precise and a model of clarity. They set out telephone calls on two specific dates, March 26 and March 27, and one instance at or about the same time when material was left at the home of patient X. Those specific findings are not ambiguous and cannot be misunderstood. Those findings then relate back to paragraph 10 of the permanent injunction dated January 11, 1993. Paragraph 10 is not ambiguous, and is clear that harassing, taunting, or shouting at specific classes of people within “Zone A” "will constitute a violation of the order.
As the majority cogently points out, nothing ever happened within Zone A. The trial court never found that anything happened in Zone A. In addition to that lack of an essential finding, both parties at oral argument, candidly and with professional courtesy, told this court on the record that not only is there no evidence that patient X lives in Zone A, but all the information they have is to the contrary.
Further, paragraph 10 specifically delineates what would be a violation of the order, harassing, taunting, or shouting. There is no specific finding by the trial court that the phone calls to patient X’s residence or the delivery of material to her residence constituted “harassing, taunting, or shouting.” The majority correctly points out there is no evidence to support a finding that patient X did not wish to receive the message in the telephone calls; and we are not in a position *94to impose a “prior restraint” on speech where the record is lacking.
Since the trial court tied its specific contempt findings to a specific paragraph in a prior permanent injunction, the record on appeal must be judged within those narrow boundaries. I agree with the majority that the finding of contempt must be reversed.