Court Opinion

ID: 9480396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:47:01.301312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:40.025967
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I would enforce the bargaining order imposed in this case. Montgomery Ward concedes that it committed serious violations of the National Labor Relations Act but contends that a bargaining order is unnecessary to remedy those unfair labor practices given worker turnover and the passage of time. It is clear from the Board’s decision and its order denying the company’s motion to reopen the record that the Board sufficiently examined the facts involved in this case, including the time and turnover issues. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the Board ought to be required to reconsider the appropriateness of a bargaining order in light of these changed circumstances.
A.
The standard of review applicable to this case is familiar and not in dispute. Congress has charged the Board with “the task of devising remedies to effectuate the policies of the Act.” NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346, 73 S.Ct. 287, 288, 97 L.Ed. 377 (1953); see 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). Thus, “ ‘it is for the Board, not the courts, to determine how the effect of prior unfair labor practices may be expunged.’ ” Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704, 64 S.Ct. 817, 818, 88 L.Ed. 1020 (1944) (quoting International Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82, 61 S.Ct. 83, 89, 85 L.Ed. 50 (1940)). The Board makes these determinations “based on its expert estimate as to the effects on the election process of unfair labor practices of varying intensity.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n. 32, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1939 n. 32, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969).
In Gissel, id. at 610-16, 89 S.Ct. at 1938-41, the Court concluded that the effect of such unlawful conduct may be expunged by a bargaining order “where an employer has committed independent unfair labor practices which have made the holding of a fair election unlikely,” id. at 610, 89 S.Ct. at 1938. When examining whether a bargaining order is appropriate, “the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.” Id. at 612 n. 32, 89 *1164S.Ct. at 1939 n. 32. “Once the Board has spelled out the basis for its issuance of a bargaining order, this court’s review is limited to whether the Board abused its discretion,” for “the appropriateness of a bargaining order is, like all remedies, entrusted to the sound discretion of the Board.” Justak Bros. and Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074, 1081-82 (7th Cir.1981).
B.
Changes in circumstances within a company are certainly relevant to the Board’s analysis in fashioning remedies to correct violations of the Act. In this case, the Board explicitly recognized that a good deal of time had passed and determined that “[t]he passage of time since the unfair labor practices occurred, though regrettable, is not a sufficient basis for denying a bargaining order.” Decision & Order at 12 n. 27.1 Balanced against the litany of violations committed by Montgomery Ward,2 the Board concluded that a bargaining order was necessary to remedy the company’s unlawful conduct. Id. at 11-13. In denying the company’s motion to reopen the record, the Board again considered the issue and reiterated that the “passage of time is not a sufficient basis for denying a bargaining order.” Order Denying Motion at 2. Moreover, the Board addressed the company’s complaint regarding the composition of the work force.3 Without reopening the record to admit the evidence proffered by Montgomery Ward, the Board assumed the accuracy of such evidence and determined that it
does not demonstrate that a bargaining order is inappropriate. Notwithstanding turnover in the Respondent’s workforce and management, we maintain, for the reasons set out in our Decision and Or*1165der, that a bargaining order is warranted in the circumstances of this case.
Id.4 Thus, although the unfair labor practices had occurred eight years earlier and the Board accepted that many of the employees exposed to and the management which engaged in the unlawful conduct are no longer associated with the company, the Board concluded that a bargaining order was required.
C.
Recognizing the deference owed to the Board’s conclusions, issuance of a bargaining order in this case did not constitute an abuse of the Board’s discretion. First, we have noted that “[e]mployee turnover should not be a controlling factor,” because “an employer could engage in a scheme of unfair labor practices and yet escape a bargaining order by delaying and waiting for employee turnover. We cannot allow this perversion of the Act’s purpose.” Justak Bros., 664 F.2d at 1082 (citations omitted).5 An employer who destroys the possibility of a fair election after learning that a union has gained majority support should not be permitted to benefit from the vagaries of the administrative process.6
Moreover, with regard to the passage of time, the Supreme Court has concluded that “[ijnordinate delay in any case is regrettable, but Congress has introduced no time limitation into the Act except that in § 10(b) [which limits the Board’s authority to remedy unfair labor practices committed more than six months prior to the filing of the charge].” NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n. 16, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1114 n. 16, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962). In Katz, the Board issued a bargaining order more than three years after the first in a series of unfair labor practices had occurred. See NLRB v. Katz, 289 F.2d 700, 701 (2d Cir.1961). The Second Circuit refused to enforce the order, but the Supreme Court reversed. 369 U.S. at 748, 82 S.Ct. at 1114. Although not a major issue in the case, the employer maintained that imposition of a bargaining order was improper in light of the passage of time between the company’s violations of the Act and the Board’s final decision and order. Id. at 748 n. 16, 82 S.Ct. at 1114 n. 16. The Court concluded that “[t]he argument has no merit.” Id. Similarly, in this case, the passage of time does not prevent enforcement of the bargaining order. The Board did not abuse its broad discretion in determining that Montgomery Ward’s unlawful conduct continues to affect today’s employees. See Decision & Order at 11-13.
D.
The majority is dissatisfied with the degree to which the Board “ ‘spelled out the basis for its issuance of a bargaining order,’ ” slip op. at 1159 (quoting Justak Bros., 664 F.2d at 1082), and believes that the Board failed to analyze properly the adequacy of traditional remedies, id. at 1160. However, I am convinced that the Board sufficiently articulated its rationale. See, e.g., Impact Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 847 F.2d 379, 382 (7th Cir.1988); NLRB v. Berger Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 694 (7th Cir.1982); Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118-19 (7th Cir.1973). The Board enumerated the company’s unlawful conduct, see supra note 2, and determined that the nature of these *1166unfair labor practices “affected the entire bargaining unit and tended to have a lingering effect” such that “the possibility of ensuring a fair election by traditional means is slight.” Order Denying Motion at 2; see Decision & Order at 11-12. The unspoken but inescapable result that flows from that conclusion is that a bargaining order is necessary because traditional remedies will not ameliorate the effects of the company’s unfair labor practices. Thus, even given the passage of time and high employee/management turnover, the Board properly could find that the effects of the company’s repeated and significant violations of the Act so undermined the unionization process that the employees, who expressed their desire to unionize via authorization cards, are best protected by a bargaining order. The Board’s analysis satisfies the standard set forth in Peerless and its progeny.
Based on our decision in Impact Industries, the majority concludes that the Board must reevaluate its determination that a bargaining order is necessary. Slip op. at 1159-1160. I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s reliance on and interpretation of that case. In Impact Industries, the Board had refused even to consider the company’s evidence of work force turnover and the passage of time. 847 F.2d at 383. This court concluded that the Board was required to reexamine the availability of more traditional remedies in light of these changed circumstances: “At a minimum, the Board should have considered all the relevant evidence before determining that a bargaining order was warranted. This it failed to do and for that reason we must remand.” Id. (emphasis supplied). By contrast, in this case, the Board accepted Montgomery Ward’s evidence as accurate and concluded nonetheless that such evidence did not alter the propriety and necessity of the bargaining order, given the nature of the company’s unlawful conduct. The Board examined all relevant evidence and determined that a bargaining order was required. That conclusion was not an abuse of the Board’s discretion and should not be disturbed.
Although the Board delayed in resolving this case, it ultimately considered all the relevant evidence and yet concluded that a bargaining order was required in light of the company’s numerous and flagrant unfair labor practices. The Board was entitled to conclude that these violations had a lasting effect serious enough to undermine a union election, even though the composition of the work force had changed significantly in the intervening eight years. This determination was not an abuse of the Board’s discretion, and “the Board’s reasonable inferences may not be displaced on review even though the court might justifiably have reached a different conclusion had it considered the matter de novo.” Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 898 F.2d 524, 529 (7th Cir.1990). I would therefore enforce the bargaining order.

. Indeed, we recently enforced a bargaining order issued nearly seven years after the labor violations had occurred. See May Dept. Stores Co. v. NLRB, 897 F.2d 221, 223-25 (7th Cir.1990) (merger election took place in August, 1981 and bargaining order was issued in June, 1988). Although the precise issue of passage of time apparently was not before the court and the delay was not caused by the Board’s inactivity, the time gap found fatal to enforcement of the Board’s order by the majority in this case did not preclude enforcement in May Department Stores.

. In considering the proper remedial order, the Board stated:
With respect to the appropriateness of a bargaining order, a number of factors lead us to conclude that the Respondent’s unfair labor practices “have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election processes" and, consequently, require a bargaining order remedy.
First, the Respondent engaged in a significant number of incidents of surveillance and interrogation. These incidents involved both individual employees and groups of employees and were so numerous that their effects extended beyond the employees directly involved. Second, the Respondent threatened employees with loss of work hours that, like similar threats of job loss and plant closing, "once conjured up [are] not easily interred.” Third, the highest-ranking officials at the Respondent’s store engaged in the unlawful conduct, thereby implying the threats represented overall company policy and causing employees to regard them most seriously. Fourth, the Respondent unlawfully discharged employees Javier Del Castillo and Mary Guerra, the former being the leading activist in the organizing effort. Termination of the leading union adherent necessarily has a lasting effect on other employees and serves as an example of the retaliation that can result from union activity. Finally, the Respondent initiated a pervasive program of grievance solicitation and wage increases. The former, effected by means of an opinion survey and related meetings, had an impact on each individual in the unit. The latter involved the granting of 210 wage increases in the unit of approximately 280 employees. The solicitation of grievances and promises to remedy them, and the grant of wage increases, have a strong coercive effect on employee freedom of choice because they eliminate primary reasons for organization. Moreover, as the increases regularly appear in paychecks, they are a continuing reminder that "the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.”
Decision & Order at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).

.Montgomery Ward also argues that a bargaining order is inappropriate because there is no evidence of prior or subsequent union animus. Assuming that this claim is accurate, as the Board did, the company has not asserted, much less produced evidence, that union organization attempts or pro-union activity of any kind took place in its Pharr, Texas store before or since 1980. Absent such proof, the fact that the company has not demonstrated anti-union sentiment is virtually meaningless.

. With regard to the "circumstances of the case,” see supra note 2.

. See also Amazing Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 328, 330 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 1477, 108 L.Ed.2d 614 (1990), where a bargaining order was enforced even though there was an almost complete turnover of personnel within the bargaining unit. The court noted that "[wjhere the Board finds that a practice is particularly pervasive or enduring, it need make only minimal findings that the effects have not been dissipated by subsequent employee turnover." Id. at 331.

.This is not to say that a bargaining order could be enforced in all instances where there has been delay between the unfair labor practices and the Board’s decision and order. See, e.g., Impact Indus., Inc., 293 NLRB No. 99 (1989). However, in cases like this one, where the Board concludes that the circumstances that changed during that delay do not sufficiently dissipate the effects of the employer’s unlawful conduct, a bargaining order may be enforced.