Court Opinion

ID: 9460218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:45:00.725294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:31.956584
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge
(concurring in an Opinion in which Circuit Judges LUMBARD and MULLIGAN concur):
I concur completely in every portion of Judge Lumbard’s thorough and carefully considered opinion. I would like to add a few words regarding appellant’s attack upon the propriety of the prosecutor’s summation.
*1011Recently we have had occasion to take prosecutors to task for improperly asserting their personal knowledge of facts or their personal belief as to the credibility of witnesses. United States v. White, 486 F.2d 204, 205-207 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Bivona, 487 F.2d 443, 445-448 (2d Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 370-371 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. LaSorsa, 480 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1973), cert, denied 414 U.S. 855, 94 S.Ct. 157, 38 L.Ed.2d 105 (1973); United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726, 741 n.23 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Miller, 478 F.2d 1315, 1317 (2d Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 851, 94 S.Ct. 144, 38 L.Ed.2d 100 (1973); United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 941, 93 S.Ct. 2779, 37 L.Ed.2d 400 (1973). In at least three of these cases the prosecutor’s intemperate remarks were provoked by or responsive to improper statements made by defense counsel in his summation. See Santana, LaSorsa and Bivona, supra. Yet aside from deploring such defense tactics, we have had little or nothing to say on the subject. I think that it is high time that steps be taken to insure that defense counsel will observe their duties under the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1971), DR 7-106(C)(3), (4),1 and refrain from conduct that not only tends to goad the prosecutor into possible improprieties but to undermine respect for the administration of justice.
In the present case the prosecutor’s summation was clearly within permissible bounds. However, when we look back to the defense counsel’s summation which immediately preceded it we find that appellant’s counsel repeatedly voieed his personal knowledge of facts and his personal opinion of the credibility of witnesses, in total disregard of the Code.2 For instance, referring to an attorney-client conference which he apparently had had with appellant before trial he stated:
“However, James De Angelis didn’t come to me and say ‘Let them prove me guilty. I didn’t do it.’ He said ‘No, no. I want to tell the truth. I want to _ take the stand.’; After I heard the story, I went into the facts of the case. ... I think James De Angelis was an honest witness. . . .” [420]
He continued with several similar statements, including the following:
“On cross-examination we found out it was there on the 11th and the camouflage about pharmaceutical — well, it threw me for a loop until I found out it was just that it was 100 percent purity. I thought they were talking about different cocaine. [416]; I am not even a federal agent and I know all those things. . [418];
* -X- -X- * * -X-
“Only the witnesses you heard for the government, as far as this case goes — I am not interested in the surveillance agents. I have reports. I have a table of reports. [420]
•x- * * -x- * *
“After I heard the story I went into the facts of the case and by the way, the only time I knew about this girl Angel was Thursday or Friday because of one of the reports given to me by Mr. De Petris which, by the way, he is required to do and that report gave a description of this girl. It was only in that way that we locat*1012ed this girl and you heard her testimony. You believe her. [423]
•X- -X- -X- * * -X
“Again it is a normal procedure for an undercover agent to wear a kel set [microphone and recorder], I don’t care what the government says, use your common sense—
“The Court: Stick to the evidence, Mr. Light.
“Mr. Light: There was some testimony there was no kel set to record the conversations. . . . You’re not a witness to it. So, get a recording of what was said and then try to overcome that when your voice is on it. Well, we have nothing like that on April 13. ., . . They want you to believe this and don’t forget we had not [sic] burden of proving ourselves innocent and I think we did a pretty good job. . . . [428-29]
“ . . . Only when I questioned the agent and I was given the report by Mr. DePetris did I found out about May 11 and that is when you found out about May 11. We never knew that the eighth of a kilo was there on May 11.” [430] (Emphasis added)
It is ironic that defense counsel, upon such a record, should have the temerity to attack the prosecutor’s summation. But more important from the standpoint of administration of justice is the fact that such conduct on the part of defense counsel seems to be tolerated as the accepted norm in the defense of criminal cases.
Recently the Chief Justice of the United States and the Chief Judge of this Court have commented upon the necessity for improving the quality of the trial bar, particularly in the defense of criminal cases. See N.Y. Law Journal, Nov. 27, 1973, p. 1, col. 3 (John F. Sonnett Lecture by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger at Fordham Law School); N.Y. Law Journal, Dec. 7, 1973, p. 5, cols. 1-6 (Address by Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman at Annual Dinner of N.Y. County Lawyers Assn.). An important starting point is to curb improprieties on the part of trial counsel of the type revealed here, which seem to be on the increase. This, of course, will require steps to be taken toward more vigorous enforcement of the Code of Professional Responsibility, more active supervision by trial judges and greater education of the trial bar with respect to its ethical responsibilities.

. '“DR 7-106(0) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
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“.(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying as a witness.
“(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein.”

. Appellant is represented by a different counsel on this appeal.