Court Opinion

ID: 9632215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:07:01.925073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:49.920118
License: Public Domain

Abbott, J.,
dissenting: I concur in the dissents of Justice Allegrucci and Judge Bullock.
I write separately to express my concern that this case requires individuals to interpret the law contrary to the expressed intent of the experts who wrote the law, explained it to the legislature in writing, and published their explanation.
My primary concern in this case is that K.S.A. 21-4303 and the Judicial Council Comment are, with two exceptions, exactly as the Advisory Committee on Criminal Law of the Kansas Judicial Council wrote them and presented them to the legislature in writing. The two exceptions are that the original statutory numbers have been changed and “conducting lotteries” as set out in the original Judicial Council notes was edited to read “conduct lotteries.”
For many years I have observed the legislature function. Legislators are extremely busy and must necessarily rely upon experts in drafting highly technical laws. It is impossible for any one legislator to read all proposed legislation with the care and at*223tention that is given legislation in the “real world” after its enactment.
For example, there are some 555 Kansas comments and Judicial Council notes in the criminal law and criminal procedure section alone.
There are comments to Articles 60 through 74 of Chapter 17 of the Kansas Corporation Code. These are the explanations presented in Senate Bill 5 prior to the adoption of the Code. Six appellate court decisions cite and rely upon these comments.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code is accompanied by comments by Barkley Clark and later by Paul B. Rasor that were written after enactment. They were, however, written by authors who aided in the drafting and who actively' advised legislative subcommittees on the subject. We also have cited and relied upon these comments six times.
The Kansas Consumer Protection Act also is accompanied by comments Barkley Clark prepared. We have relied upon and followed these comments eight times. Both the Consumer Credit Code and the Consumer Protection Act are so highly technical that without expert help most legislators (and most judges) would be lost in the subject.
The Uniform Commercial Code comments were prepared by Barkley Clark, Paul B. Rasor, and the legislative committee, and interested legislators had access to these comments prior to. the adoption of the Code. We have cited and relied upon a number of these comments. . .
I point out these examples to emphasize their importance in ascertaining legislative intent in adopting the legislation. I have no quarrel with the concept that the legislature makes the law and an individual or committee cannot change what the legislature clearly has made law.
Our United States Supreme Court recently has filed an opinion concerning whether comments to federal sentencing guidelines that Congress has not approved are binding upon federal courts. Our Supreme Court held the comments that explain or interpret a sentencing guideline are authoritative unless the comments violate the Constitution or a federal statute, or are inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, the guidelines. Stinson *224v. United States, 508 U.S._, 123 L. Ed. 2d 598, 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993).
I would adopt that reasoning in Kansas. If so adopted, it seems to me that one who wanted to gauge one’s conduct by K.S.A. 21-4303(b) would ask, “What is a gambling place?” The comment, Í repeat again, was written by the authors of the statute and approved by the Kansas Judicial Council; the statute with the comment was distributed to the lawyers, judges, and legislators in this state for their input and then submitted WITHOUT CHANGE to the legislature. The legislature admittedly did not ádopt the comments, but the written comments were available to it and haVe remained available to it as a comment to the statute since 1969. Surely, in subsequent revisions of the criminal code the legislature assumed the act prohibited did not differ from the comment.
I therefore would hold “a gambling place” is sufficiently ambiguous that I would read the Judicial Council Comment to determine legislative intent. I would affirm the Court of Appeals and reverse the trial court.
Bullock, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.