Court Opinion

ID: 9701988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:47:58.458942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:31.879025
License: Public Domain

WILNER, Judge,
dissenting.
With respect, I dissent. Although I do not necessarily agree with every statement or reason given by the various Federal courts in support of the “sham affidavit” rule, I do believe that, if carefully circumscribed, it is a reasonable and useful approach to protecting both the summary judgment procedure and our case management system against blatant fraud. I would hold, in this case, that the trial court had discretion to strike the two affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing, and that, on the remaining record presented to the court for purposes of the motion, it did not err in granting the motion.
Judge Rodowsky has accurately presented the underlying facts. Although Shari Hall’s deposition testimony, as a whole, was not a model of clarity—a fact that has independent significance—she very clearly did make two points most relevant to this case: (1) that she and her son lived at 1908 Lauretta Avenue for only about two months between December, 1992 and February, 1993, and (2) while living with her mother at 1805 Harlem Avenue, she visited the Lauretta Avenue home, to visit her friend, Rita Porter, at the most three to four times a week for periods of about three hours. Whenever Ms. Hall strayed from that testimony or injected some ambiguity as to the extent of her contact with the Lauretta Avenue property, counsel attempted to pin her down, and she returned to her statement that she resided there for only about two months and had limited contact when not residing there. It was on that premise that Dr. Klein opined that it was unlikely that any lead paint at the Lauretta Avenue property was a major contributor to Terr an Pittman’s elevated lead levels.
Ms. Hall’s later affidavit, claiming that she and her son resided full-time at the Lauretta Avenue property for five- *554and-a-half months and that, when not residing there, she and her son visited the property every day of the week for eight hours a day, is flat-out inconsistent with her deposition testimony. The difference is not one of nuance, of refreshed memory, of new information that would lead to a different conclusion, or of incidental fact. It is a complete and unexplained change of story—of the central facts most relevant to her right to recover. What is perhaps more disturbing is that, in contrast to the rambling nature of her deposition testimony, the affidavit has a polished quality to it, suggesting that it was drafted by counsel and was not merely a recording of her own statements.
As the Court correctly points out, the function of summary judgment procedure is solely to determine whether a triable issue exists. The trial court does that by examining the evidentiary material presented in support of or in opposition to the motion in a light most favorable to the non-movant and deciding whether, if a trier of fact were to credit that evidence, so viewed, it could reasonably and lawfully reach a verdict on the issue in favor of the non-movant. See Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 738-39, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011-12 (1993). If the answer is “no,” the court may, and usually should, enter a summary judgment, for there is nothing to be tried.
Summary judgment procedure is not a substitute for trial, but it does play an important role in weeding out cases, claims, or issues that investigation shows have no merit. Although the device of summary judgment was viewed with some skepticism when initially introduced into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, given the need for efficiency in handling the burgeoning civil dockets of our trial courts, appellate courts throughout the country have, in recent years, begun to look more favorably on the proper role summary judgments play in that winnowing process. The Federal courts, led in some respects by the Supreme Court, have taken the lead in unshackling summary judgment and allowing it to remove cases from the docket that would otherwise eventually be resolved on a motion for judgment during or after trial. Because our summary judgment rule was derived from the Federal rule, *555we have almost always regarded Federal practice and interpretations as persuasive in the interpretation of our rule. See Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 815, 104 A.2d 624 (1954); Metropolitan Mtg. Fd. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 415 A.2d 582 (1980); Beatty v. Trailmaster, supra, 330 Md. at 738 n. 8, 625 A.2d at 1011 n. 8.
A summary judgment may be entered at any time—even during trial—but our rules contemplate that motions for summary judgment be made and decided before trial, usually upon completion of discovery. Maryland Rule 2-504 generally requires that a scheduling order be entered in every civil action in the circuit courts and further requires that such an order contain, among other things, “a date by which all discovery must be completed,” and “a date by which all dispositive motions must be filed.” This is so that, if a case is going to be disposed of on motion, either to dismiss or for summary judgment, the disposition occur as early in the litigation as practicable—that the case not continue to remain on the docket longer than necessary, in competition with other cases needing scarce trial dates.
For the system to work efficiently, as intended, the relevant record upon which the court is to act must be closed as of a certain point, and the court must be able to rely on the evidence presented in that record. That is why the date set in a scheduling order for the filing of motions for summary judgment is later than the date set for completing discovery— so the parties can develop the record and collate, edit, and present it in a way that is relevant to the issues to be raised in the summary judgment proceeding. It is why Rule 2-501 requires that the evidence presented in connection with the motion be supported by affidavit made on personal knowledge by persons competent to testify. It is why, in 1991, we eliminated the trap of allowing anything hidden in some pleading, deposition, or answer to interrogatory to defeat summary judgment and limited the record for summary judgment purposes to those facts presented in the motion or the response. The movant, the non-movant, and the court must be entitled to rely upon the information that is at hand when *556the motion is filed and responded to—the information developed largely through discovery.
The Court rejects the “sham affidavit” approach because of its concern that adopting that approach would improperly allow the court, on summary judgment, to resolve conflicting evidence and make credibility assessments, which are matters for the trier of fact to determine. I share that concern, which is why I do not accept some of the language used and some of the decisions made by the Federal courts. I do not believe that a judge, on summary judgment, should be generically elevating deposition testimony over affidavits or answers to interrogatories or deciding which of two conflicting statements is correct. There are circumstances, however, in which a witness’s testimony, whether presented at trial or, I believe, in connection with a summary judgment motion, is so internally conflicting on a material issue that the testimony in conflict lacks any probative force and is therefore disregarded. As far back as Slacum v. Jolley, 153 Md. 343, 351, 138 A. 244, 248 (1927), we held that “[wjhen a witness says in one breath that a thing is so, and in the next breath that it is not so, his testimony is too inconclusive, contradictory, and uncertain, to be the basis of a legal conclusion.” See also Oberfeld v. Eilers, 171 Md. 332, 189 A. 203 (1937); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Md. 24, 190 A. 768 (1937); Askin v. Long, 176 Md. 545, 6 A.2d 246 (1939); Butler v. Reed-Avery Co., 186 Md. 686, 48 A.2d 436 (1946); and Eisenhower v. Baltimore Transit Co., 190 Md. 528, 59 A.2d 313 (1948), where we actually applied that doctrine. In Kaufman v. Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 141, 145, 78 A.2d 464, 466 (1951), we observed:
“If the testimony of one witness at the trial is legally sufficient, it matters not that this testimony may be contradicted by ten witnesses ... or even that it may be in conflict with statements before the trial, or testimony in a previous trial or other legal proceeding, of the same witness, [citations omitted]. But if any witness’s testimony is itself so contradictory that it has no probative force, a jury cannot be *557invited to speculate about it or to select one or another contradictory statement as the basis of a verdict.”
See also Kucharczyk v. State, 235 Md. 334, 201 A.2d 683 (1964); Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 6 A.2d 48 (1939); Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986) (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
The Kaufman analysis illustrates the point of my disagreement with the majority. When the contradiction is between trial testimony and pre-trial statements, the conflict or inconsistency affects only the credibility of the trial testimony, which is for the trier of fact to resolve. When, however, the testimony contemporaneously presented to a tribunal is itself in such contradiction that both versions cannot be true, the testimony has no probative force and cannot be the basis of a verdict. In that latter circumstance, it is not a matter of making credibility determinations or deciding disputed fact; all of the testimony in conflict is disregarded as non-probative, and the court looks only to what is left. Under the rule established in the aforecited cases, if a plaintiff, at trial, swears in one breath that the light was red for her, which would destroy her right of recovery, she cannot defeat a motion for judgment by swearing in the next breath and without any explanation, that the light was green. Because of the contradiction, neither statement is regarded as probative.
The same principle should apply in a summary judgment proceeding. As noted, the issue there is usually whether the record before the court contains sufficient evidence, if believed, to support a verdict for the non-movant. If, on that record, the only testimony that could support such a verdict is so self-contradictory as to be non-probative, it must be disregarded, just as it would be at trial. Certainly, if the contradiction appeared in a single document offered in opposition to the summary judgment—either deposition testimony or an affidavit—all of the averments in conflict would be treated as non-probative and disregarded.
The wrinkle in this case is that, with what appears to be the post-deposition counseling of an attorney, the plaintiff at*558tempted to inject the contradiction through another document. I quite agree with the Court that she was entitled to file an affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; the filing of an affidavit is not precluded by the scheduling order or by Rule 2-504. What is not allowed, however, is to use the affidavit to present a dramatic change in her sworn testimony, without any explanation. As noted in Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 705 (3d Cir.1988), there are situations in which sworn testimony can quite properly be corrected by a subsequent affidavit. If the witness was confused on the earlier occasion, did not have complete information at the time, confesses in good faith to having simply been mistaken, or offers some other reasonable explanation for the change in testimony, the subsequent statement should be allowed, its effect then being for the trier of fact to gauge. In the absence of any such explanation, however, the court is left only with the proffered contradiction which, if allowed, would render all of the testimony in conflict non-probative.
The issue before us is largely one of law, but it embodies a certain discretionary element as well. When there is an unexplained contradiction in testimony on a critical issue— i.e., the witness has, in fact, actually given conflicting evidence—we have tended to view the effect of the conflict in terms of the legal sufficiency of the evidence and thus as a question of law. When the issue is whether to permit conflicting evidence, however, a measure of discretion is necessary. The court can solicit or require an explanation, in order to make a determination whether the conflict is such as to render the testimony non-probative. If the witness were to be candid and state that he/she has changed the story because he/she is now convinced that victory would be otherwise unobtainable, the court would certainly have discretion to disallow the new testimony. If, on the other hand, the witness gives at least a creditable, even if not entirely credible, explanation, the court should allow the new evidence and let the trier of fact resolve the conflict.
*559Applying this long-established principle to summary judgment proceedings does not intrude upon the prerogatives reserved to the trier of fact. It is a reasonable thing to do; it follows the approach not only of the Federal courts but that of several other States;1 it promotes the utility of summary judgment procedure; and it provides a necessary defense against sharp practice and fraud. In this case, the trial court did not err, in my view, in regarding the last-minute affidavits as an improper end-run around the scheduling order, the underlying case management system, and established summary judgment procedure—as a blatant attempt to reconstruct sworn testimony solely for the purpose of defeating summary judgment and forcing a trial. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judges RAKER and CATHELL have authorized me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion.

. See Hanna v. Cloud 9, Inc., 889 P.2d 529 (Wyo.1995); Robinson v. Hank Roberts, Inc., 514 So.2d 958 (Ala.1987); Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 233 Kan. 38, 661 P.2d 348 (1983); Ellison v. Anderson, 74 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954); Jordan v. State Farm Insurance Co., 515 So.2d 1317 (Fla.Dist.Cl.App.1987); Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., 517 A.2d 690 (Del.Super.Ct.1986); Wachovia Mortgage Co. v. Autry-Barker-Spurrier Real Estate, Inc., 39 N.C.App. 1, 249 S.E.2d 727 (1978), affirmed by 297 N.C. 696, 256 S.E.2d 688 (1979).