Court Opinion

ID: 6893903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-23 21:47:31.809981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:05:55.055597
License: Public Domain

By the Court,
Kelly, C. J.:
The respondent, William Steel, on the twenty-seventh day of July, 1875, sold to the appellants, C. G. Capíes and T. A. McBride, a tract of land in Columbia county, containing one hundred and sixty acres, for three hundred and twenty dollars — twenty dollars being paid in cash, and two promissory notes given for the balance. At the same time an obligation was given by Steel to Capíes and McBride to convey the land by deed to them upon the payment of the notes. The first note was paid at maturity, and the second one deposited in the First National Bank of Portland for payment, having been made payable to the order of the cashier of the bank. When it became due it was also paid to the cashier for the respondent, who declined to receive the money.
The respondent alleges in his answer that after the payment of the first note, and before the second became due, he was informed of the existence of a coal mine under the soil of the land in controversy, and that appellants knew before they bargained for it the fact that there was a valuable coal mine on the land. He further alleges that the appellants conspired together to defraud him by concealing this knowledge when they were under obligations to make it known before they purchased the land. The respondent notified appellants that he would not complete the contract, *495and tendered them back the money they had paid him, with interest, and also the second note, which they refused to receive. This suit was then brought to enforce the specific performance of the contract. The burden of proof rests upon the respondent to establish two propositions:
1. That there is a coal mine on the land in controversy;
2. That the appellants perpetrated a fraud upon him in making the purchase.
The testimony is quite voluminous, and much of it irrelevant to the matters in issue, but taking it all together we think the respondent has failed to show that there is any vein or ledge of coal upon the land in question, or even upon the adjacent tracts. Small seams have been discovered within a short distance of the land in controversy, but no vein of any value has been satisfactorily proven to exist either on this or the adjoining tracts, and any increased value which may have been added to the land since the purchase by appellants is purely speculation, and arises altogether from the mere possibility that coal may hereafter be discovered upon it in quantity and quality sufficient to make the mining of it profitable. It is a matter of vague conjecture whether the respondent has or has not suffered any loss on account of the sale to appellants, and courts of equity will not any more than courts of law relieve a party from even a fraudulent act which is followed by no loss or damage. (1 Story’s Eq. Jur. 203.)
We think the evidence equally fails to show that the sale of the land to appellants was procured through any fraudulent act on the part of either of them towards the respondent.
A. person who knows that there is a mine on the land of another, of which fact the owner is ignorant, may nevertheless buy it without disclosing his knowledge of its existence to the owner, and this will be no fraud on the part of the purchaser. (Fox v. McReth, 2 Bro. C. C. 400; Fry on Spec. Perf., sec. 464; Harris v. Tysen, 24 Pa. St. 347.) Where, however, one about to purchase a tract of land, willfully misstates any material fact to the owner, or by any act intentionally misleads him in regard to the value of the land, and through these misrepresentations succeeds in inducing *496the owner to part with his property for less than its value, a court of equity will relieve him, and set aside the contract thus made as a fraudulent transaction.
Tested by the principles here laid down, we are at a loss to perceive wherein the respondent was misled or deceived by any word or act of either of the appellants, or that they acted otherwise than fair in regard to the whole transaction. As stated by himself in his testimony, the respondent was unacquainted with the land, and went to the residence of Dr. Capíes, one of the appellants, and told him that he wanted him, Capíes, to- take him there, and show him the land. This was done in accordance with the request. The timber and the lay of the land were shown so far as it could conveniently be done. And respondent says that Dr. Capíes represented the timber and the quality of the soil as really better than he afterwards found them. This is all he inquired about, or concerning which he expressed a wish for information in regard to the land. If he had inquired of Dr. Capíes whether there were any indications of a coal mine on or near the premises, then it would undoubtedly have been his duty to answer truly or remain silent. But no such question was asked, no such information was sought, and therefore no deception was practiced by Capíes in saying nothing about the efforts which had been made to discover coal on the adjoining tracts of land. Nor was he under any obligation to take respondent to the several places where shafts had been sunk or tunnels run into the ground in prospecting for veins of coal. The principle is well settled in equity jurisprudence, as we have already stated, that a person who knows that there is a mine on the land of another, of which the owner is ignorant, can lawfully and safely buy it without informing the owner of the existence of the mine. A' purchaser is not bound by our laws to make the man he buys from as wise as himself.
The case of Bowman v. Bates, 2 Bibb, 47, has been referred to by counsel for respondent as analogous to the one under consideration. We do not so regard it. There the purchaser, who had discovered a salt spring on a tract of land in Kentucky, by artifice prevented the agent of the *497vendor, who was aware of the fact, from giving that information to his principal, and then sent his brother to Virginia, where the vendor resided, and bought the land at much less than its actual value. It was the deception practiced upon the vendor and the misrepresentations made to him that constituted the fraud for which the deed was very properly set aside.
The decree of the court below is reversed, and it is now ordered and decreed that the respondent execute and deliver to the appellants a deed for the premises described in the complaint within three months from the date of this decree.