Court Opinion

ID: 9916179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 16:03:02.086336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:20.702461
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

               CHRISTOPHER LEE MARINAKIS, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0386
                               FILED 01-09-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2018-108548-001
              The Honorable Frank W. Moskowitz, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Brian Coffman
Counsel for Appellee

Gallagher & Kennedy PA, Phoenix
By Woodrow Thompson, Hannah H. Porter, Joshua I. Fisher
Counsel for Appellant
                          STATE v. MARINAKIS
                           Decision of the Court

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1              Christopher Marinakis (“Marinakis”) appeals his convictions
for manslaughter and endangerment. Marinakis argues the superior court
incorrectly rejected his motion to dismiss both charges or suppress evidence
because the State of Arizona (the “State”) violated his right to counsel.
Marinakis also argues the superior court made evidentiary errors during
his trial, including improperly admitting evidence about Marinakis’ drug
test results and about his prior DUI conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            While driving a truck with a trailer attached, Marinakis
veered into oncoming traffic and collided with two vehicles. An occupant
in one of the vehicles died from his injuries.

¶3            When officers arrived on scene, they observed extensive
damage to the vehicles and found Marinakis out of his truck and talking on
his cell phone. The officers attempted to speak with Marinakis but found
him difficult to understand because he was speaking very fast when
responding to questions. He was also “fidgety” and had bloodshot, watery
eyes. An officer described Marinakis’ actions as different from typical post-
traumatic event anxiety because his pupils were constricted, his fingers
were twitching uncontrollably, and, overall, he displayed manic behavior.

¶4              An officer asked Marinakis if he had taken any drugs, and
Marinakis admitted to smoking medical marijuana the night before. Still
suspicious, the officer asked if Marinakis had taken any pain medication or
methamphetamines because his pupils were constricted. Marinakis said
“no” at first, but then admitted he had “in the past” after experiencing some
personal troubles. The officer asked follow-up questions about that drug
use, but then Marinakis asked for an attorney. The officer placed Marinakis
under arrest.

¶5            The officer testified that it was standard procedure to take an
individual arrested for DUI, who asks for an attorney, to a drug recognition

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                          STATE v. MARINAKIS
                           Decision of the Court

expert (“DRE”) room at the police station. The DRE room has separate cells
with a phone, giving arrestees an opportunity to contact an attorney outside
of police presence.

¶6            Because the officer who questioned Marinakis was a
motorcycle officer, a different officer began transporting Marinakis to the
DRE room. While in transit, Marinakis requested to go to the hospital due
to pain in his head, collar bone, and shoulder area. The officer honored
Marinakis’ request and re-routed to the hospital.

¶7            At the hospital, Marinakis became volatile and agitated. He
complained about his medical treatment and was “flailing around” on the
gurney. He was uncooperative and yelled at hospital staff. The hospital
staff requested someone be continually present with Marinakis because
they felt unsafe. There were concerns about leaving Marinakis alone and
giving him anything that could be used as a weapon.

¶8             Officers testified that, because Marinakis could not be left
alone, he was not able to have a private call with an attorney. But the
interviewing officer also testified that, had Marinakis not made the hospital
staff feel unsafe, he would have been left alone to make a call. Because of
Marinakis’ behavior, however, an officer or security guard always
remained with Marinakis. At one point, hospital staff proposed putting
Marinakis in a four-point restraint but, ultimately, officers kept him
handcuffed to a gurney.

¶9           After obtaining a warrant, an officer read Marinakis his
Miranda rights and obtained a blood sample. Marinakis was then released
from the hospital and officers transported him to jail.

¶10          Officers remained at the scene of the accident for several
hours gathering evidence. Among other evidence, in the subwoofer of
Marinakis’ truck, they found a glass smoking pipe with white residue. The
State charged Marinakis with manslaughter and endangerment.

¶11           Marinakis filed a motion to dismiss or suppress evidence,
arguing the State violated his right to counsel. After a suppression hearing,
the court found that Marinakis requested an attorney while in custody but
his actions “put himself in a situation where the officers could not allow
him to make a phone call alone in a safe and secure manner while at the
hospital” and that the officers did not “interfere with or impede” his right
to counsel. The court further found that Marinakis had an opportunity to
call an attorney at the police station but did not do so.

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                           STATE v. MARINAKIS
                            Decision of the Court

¶12            After a first trial resulted in a hung jury, the State tried
Marinakis a second time. The State filed a motion to admit evidence of
Marinakis’ prior 2011 DUI conviction to demonstrate recklessness.
Marinakis objected, arguing that the DUI was not sufficiently similar and
the potential prejudice outweighed any probative value. The court
admitted the evidence, but instructed the jury that it should only consider
the prior act to determine whether Marinakis acted recklessly.

¶13           When the trial began, the clerk, with the jury present, read the
list of charges against Marinakis from the “grand jurors of Maricopa
County, Arizona.” The court later gave a jury instruction that the charges
were not evidence against Marinakis.

¶14           The State offered expert testimony from a forensic scientist
about the amount of methamphetamines and amphetamines found in
Marinakis’ blood after the accident. The expert explained there is an
“uncertainty budget,” when testing for substances, that accounts for
different variants and provides a range to ensure the amounts are
accurately represented. The expert testified methamphetamine has a 60%
uncertainty budget and amphetamine has a 44.4% uncertainty budget,
meaning that if a blood sample was re-tested, it would produce results
within the uncertainty range of the original test 95% of the time. The expert
relayed that Marinakis’ blood test showed 311.90 nanograms per milliliter
of methamphetamine, with an uncertainty range of 124.76–499.04
nanograms, and 48 nanograms per milliliter for amphetamines with an
uncertainty range of 27.71–71.25 nanograms.

¶15            The expert also testified there is a therapeutic range, which is
a quantity a doctor could prescribe to “have a positive effect on that
person.” According to the State’s expert, the therapeutic range for
methamphetamines is between 10–50 nanograms per milliliter. The
therapeutic range for amphetamines is between 30–110 nanograms per
milliliter. The expert explained that methamphetamines do not have “a
specific level that we can point to and say everyone is impaired at,” but,
while factoring in tolerance, “typically more . . . of an impairing substance
will cause more impairment.”

¶16            Prior to the testimony, Marinakis argued the expert could not
provide proper foundation to demonstrate impairment. After hearing the
expert’s testimony outside the presence of the jury, the court agreed the
expert would not be permitted to testify that Marinakis was impaired. The
court concluded, however, that the data could support both Marinakis’ and
the State’s arguments and thus allowed the jury to evaluate the evidence.

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                           STATE v. MARINAKIS
                            Decision of the Court

¶17           The jury found Marinakis guilty of manslaughter and
endangerment. Marinakis timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See
A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

I.     Right to Counsel

¶18           Marinakis argues the superior court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss or suppress evidence because the State violated his right
to counsel. We review these issues for an abuse of discretion, but we review
legal issues and constitutional claims de novo. State v. Peraza, 239 Ariz. 140,
144 ¶ 4 (App. 2016); State v. Rosengren, 199 Ariz. 112, 115–16 ¶ 9 (App. 2000).
We consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and
view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s
decision. Peraza, 239 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 4.

¶19           The right to counsel “includes the right to consult privately
with counsel . . . as soon as feasible after a defendant has been taken into
custody[.]” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 6.1(a) (emphasis added). Once a suspect
invokes the right described in Rule 6.1, and the situation is such that would
allow the suspect to consult privately with counsel, the state must permit
“access between a defendant and his lawyer . . . when such access would
not unduly delay the [DUI] investigation and arrest.” State v. Holland, 147
Ariz. 453, 455 (1985).

¶20            Marinakis maintains the State violated his right to counsel
before he was in police custody. If not in custody, an individual may
exercise his right to counsel “when and where he wishes.” Kunzler v. Pima
Cnty. Sup. Ct., 154 Ariz. 568, 569 (1987). Marinakis was given that right—
Marinakis had access to his cell phone after the accident and before any
police officer began speaking to him. Tellingly, Marinakis was speaking on
his cell phone when officers arrived on scene. Marinakis did not establish
that the officers prevented him from contacting counsel before placing him
in custody.

¶21           Between the point when police arrested Marinakis and when
he was later booked into jail, police were not able to allow him to consult
privately with counsel. The superior court found that Marinakis was in
custody when he first asked for an attorney. Marinakis argues he should
have been allowed to contact an attorney at that point; instead, police
placed Marinakis in a vehicle and began transporting him to the police
station. The transporting officer testified it was standard procedure to take
DUI arrestees directly to the DRE room to contact an attorney, and it was

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                          STATE v. MARINAKIS
                           Decision of the Court

his intention to do so with Marinakis. But the circumstances of this arrest
dictated otherwise when Marinakis requested to go to a hospital because of
pain. After considering the relevant evidence, the superior court found “the
officer’s conduct did not interfere with or impede [Marinakis’] right to
counsel.” The evidence sufficiently supports that conclusion. See Gutierrez
v. Guterrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347 ¶ 13 (App. 1998).

¶22             Marinakis next contends the State should have allowed him
to consult with counsel while at the hospital. The superior court found that
Marinakis created an unsafe situation at the hospital, and his own actions
necessitated the delay he now complains about. The evidentiary record
from the suppression hearing adequately supports that conclusion. Once
Marinakis requested professional medical attention, the officers were
justified in transporting him to a hospital, rather than to the DRE room, and
prioritizing his medical treatment. Within about twenty minutes of
arriving at the hospital, however, Marinakis became erratic and irrational.
Based on that behavior, the officers reasonably concluded Marinakis could
not be left alone to make a call. This need for constant supervision
prevented Marinakis from having a private conversation with an attorney.
See Holland, 147 Ariz. at 455.

¶23            Marinakis asks us to disregard privacy concerns and hold that
the officers should have allowed him to contact an attorney even if officers
or others might have overheard the conversation. But Rule 6.1(a) protects
“the right to consult privately with counsel.” See id. at 455 (“[I]t is
universally accepted that effective representation is not possible without
the right of a defendant to confer in private with his counsel.” (emphasis
added)). Marinakis could not consult privately with counsel while in the
back of a police vehicle and within earshot of an officer. And he could not
consult privately with counsel while being supervised in the hospital for
safety purposes. We conclude the State did not violate Marinakis’ right to
counsel by waiting for a time when he could contact an attorney without
others listening in. See id. (“Both Arizona caselaw and the Rules of Criminal
Procedure state that the right to counsel includes the right to consult in
private with an attorney.”); see also id. at 456 (dismissing DUI charges when
police violated the defendant’s “right to consult privately with counsel”).
That time did not come until Marinakis arrived at the police station for
booking. Prior to that time, the State did not “withhold counsel,” and thus
the State was not required to establish that “access would not unduly delay
the [DUI] investigation and arrest.” Holland, 147 Ariz. at 455.

¶24          Marinakis lastly argues he should have been allowed to speak
with counsel at some point after he arrived for booking. The superior court

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                            STATE v. MARINAKIS
                             Decision of the Court

found that Marinakis was “given the opportunity to use the phone alone at
the police station and he declined to do so.” The record sufficiently
supports that finding. The transporting officer testified that, while he did
not personally provide Marinakis with a telephone, there were phones
available on the wall at the booking facility and individuals held there
“have an opportunity to call anyone.” During cross-examination, the
officer confirmed that, upon arrival at the facility, Marinakis “could have”
made a private call to an attorney. Given our deferential standard when
reviewing the superior court’s factual determinations, we affirm the
superior court’s factual finding that Marinakis had an opportunity to use a
phone to contact counsel but did not do so. See Peraza, 239 Ariz. at 144 ¶ 4.

¶25           The superior court did not err in denying Marinakis’ request
to dismiss the charges against him or suppress evidence based on the right
to counsel.

II.    Expert Testimony

¶26           Marinakis next argues the court abused its discretion by
admitting expert testimony about the quantity of drugs found in his blood
when the results could not establish impairment. We review the
admissibility of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boyston,
231 Ariz. 539, 544 ¶ 14 (2013).

¶27             A witness is qualified to testify as an expert if their “scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.]” Ariz. R. Evid.
702(a); see also State ex rel. Montgomery v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 289, 298 ¶ 21 (App.
2014). Marinakis relies on State v. Teran, 253 Ariz. 165 (App. 2022), to argue
that the testimony was improper because the expert was not able to connect
any drug quantity to impairment.

¶28          In Teran, the superior court determined an expert was
unqualified to testify about impairment but still admitted testimony about
the quantity of drugs in the defendant’s blood and the expected signs or
symptoms of impairment based on that quantity. 253 Ariz. at 175 ¶¶ 45–
46. This court determined the superior court erred by allowing that
testimony because the expert “was unqualified as an expert on impairment
and should not have been permitted to testify on that topic.” Id. ¶ 46.

¶29            Teran is distinguishable. Unlike the testimony there, the
State’s expert here did not testify that Marinakis was impaired. Instead, the
expert provided details about the amount of methamphetamines and
amphetamines in Marinakis’ system, the uncertainty budget of the drug

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                            STATE v. MARINAKIS
                             Decision of the Court

test, as well as the therapeutic range for the drugs present. While the expert
testified that “typically more . . . of an impairing substance will cause more
impairment,” she qualified that statement by stating there is no “specific
level that we can point to and say everyone is impaired at[.]” These details
provided proper context about what the jury could make of the quantities
of drugs found in Marinakis’ system, without opining whether Marinakis
was impaired.

¶30           The superior court also correctly recognized that the drug
quantity evidence could support Marinakis’ defense theory, and therefore
admitted the evidence to allow the jury to assess its weight. See State v.
Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 230 ¶ 18 (2015) (explaining that the superior court
should “allow the jury to exercise its fact-finding function, for it is the jury’s
exclusive province to assess the weight and credibility of evidence”). And
Marinakis had the opportunity to cross-examine the expert to emphasize
those portions of the evidence advantageous to him and undercut those
portions disadvantageous to him. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.”). The court did not abuse its discretion.

III.   Prior DUI Conviction

¶31            Marinakis argues the court erred by admitting his prior DUI
conviction into evidence because it was not sufficiently like the crime in this
case. We review the superior court’s decision on the admissibility of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 559 ¶ 42
(2014). We affirm if there is “any reasonable evidence in the record to
sustain it.” State v. Butler, 230 Ariz. 465, 472 ¶ 28 (App. 2012).

¶32           Rule 404(b) allows evidence of prior acts if used for the
purpose of proving knowledge. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Evidence of a
previous crime is only admissible if it is “similar to the act for which the
defendant is on trial.” State v. Woody, 173 Ariz. 561, 563 (App. 1992).

¶33           The State used Marinakis’ prior DUI conviction to
demonstrate recklessness. Marinakis argues the facts of the prior and
current act were not sufficiently similar because alcohol and
methamphetamine/amphetamine are different substances with different
side effects—one is a “downer,” the others are “uppers.” We disagree that
the difference in side effects is material to the Rule 404(b) analysis.
Evidence of a “prior act need not be factually identical to the crime at issue”

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                          STATE v. MARINAKIS
                           Decision of the Court

and the reason for admitting the act is to allow a jury to infer a defendant
“had knowledge of its consequences.” Id.; see also State v. Salamanca, 233
Ariz. 292, 296 ¶ 20 (App. 2013) (“It demonstrated his knowledge of the risks
of . . . driving [intoxicated], and therefore bore on whether he committed . .
. manslaughter by recklessly causing the death of another.”).

¶34            Marinakis’ argument takes an overly narrow view of the
comparable facts. A difference in side effects with the same result
(impairment) does not establish an abuse of discretion. Rather, the jury
could conclude that the prior DUI conviction shows Marinakis was aware
of the risk of driving while impaired, regardless of whether the impairment
stems from a stimulant or a depressant. See State v. Woodall, 155 Ariz. 1, 5
(App. 1987).

¶35            Marinakis further argues that admitting the prior DUI
conviction violated Rule 403, which allows the court to “exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of .
. . unfair prejudice[.]” Ariz. R. Evid. 403. Marinakis argues prejudice
because the State lacked additional evidence to demonstrate knowledge
and the prior conviction might have convinced the jury that Marinakis was
a “bad person.” Marinakis’ “bad person” argument can often be made
against 404(b) evidence. “But not all harmful evidence is unfairly
prejudicial” because “evidence which is relevant and material will
generally be adverse to the opponent.” State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 52
(1993). Marinakis does not highlight any prejudicial fact from the prior
conviction other than it occurred and it could show knowledge. This is
insufficient to show an abuse of discretion. The superior court did not err
in admitting the prior conviction, particularly when the court instructed the
jury that it should consider the prior conviction only when deciding
recklessness.

IV.    Grand Juror Language

¶36            Finally, Marinakis argues the court should not have
referenced the “grand jurors of Maricopa County, Arizona” when reading
the list of charges at the beginning of the trial. Marinakis concedes his
argument is foreclosed by State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 320 (1994), which
held that instructing the jury that the indictment “was not evidence against
the accused” eliminated any prejudice. Id.; see also Ariz. R. Crim P.
19.1(b)(1) (“[T]he court reads the indictment, information, or complaint to
the jury[.]”). The court gave that instruction here. Based on Cornell,
Marinakis’ argument fails.

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                  STATE v. MARINAKIS
                   Decision of the Court

                      CONCLUSION

¶37   We affirm Marinakis’ convictions.

                AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                FILED: TM

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