Court Opinion

ID: 2963628
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:14.854431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:29.684554
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1295

                                VINCENT R. TAMBURELLO,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                      COMM-TRACT CORPORATION, JOHN F. POLMONARI,
                          EDWARD MENARD, AND STEVEN DICKIE,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                                Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            and Casellas,* District Judge.
                                           ______________

                                _____________________

               Matthew Cobb, with whom  Law Office of Matthew Cobb,  was on
               ____________             __________________________
          brief for appellant.
               Timothy P.  Van  Dyck, with  whom  Joshua L.  Ditelberg  and
               _____________________              ____________________
          Edwards & Angell, were on brief for appellees.
          ________________

                                 ____________________

                                   October 2, 1995
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

                    TORRUELLA,   Chief   Judge.       Vincent    Tamburello
                    TORRUELLA,   Chief   Judge.
                                 _____________

          (Tamburello) appeals  the dismissal of his  complaint against his

          employer,  Comm-Tract  Corporation   (Comm-Tract),  and   several

          individuals who  were his supervisors at  Comm-Tract.  Tamburello

          alleges that his supervisors engaged in a course of harassment in

          retaliation for  his union  activities as  a  union steward,  and

          seeks damages under, inter  alia, the Racketeering Influenced and
                               _____  ____

          Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.   1962(c) (1988), and

          the  Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), Mass. Gen. L. ch. 12,

             11I (1988).  The district court found that Tamburello's claims

          are preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29

          U.S.C.     151-161  (1988)  (NLRA), and  therefore dismissed  his

          complaint  for failure to state a claim  upon which relief may be

          granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  We affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    We review the dismissal de novo, considering only those
                                            __ ____

          facts  alleged  in  the  complaint, and  drawing  all  reasonable

          inferences therefrom.  Lesser  v. Little, 857 F.2d 866,  867 (1st
                                 ______     ______

          Cir. 1988).   We will  affirm the  dismissal "only if  it appears

          beyond  doubt that [Tamburello] can  prove no set  of facts which

          would entitle him  to relief."  Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355
                                          __          ______    ______

          U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

                    In  July 1991,  Tamburello  became a  union steward  at

          Comm-Tract.    He alleges  that  soon  afterwards the  individual

          defendants   -- the  president, general  manager, and  manager of

          Comm-Tract -- began harassing, threatening and intimidating  him.

                                         -2-

          Specifically,  Tamburello  alleges  that   they  pulled  him  off

          favorable jobs, replacing him with less skilled workers; gave him

          menial  job assignments;  withheld his  personnel file  from him;

          took  him off  jobs to  deny him  overtime pay;  made him  take a

          forced  vacation  or  face  termination; took  away  his  company

          vehicle;  and made threatening anti-union statements.  Tamburello

          alleges  that these  actions "were  solely to  harass, embarrass,

          coerce,  and intimidate [him] into giving up his Steward position

          with  the Union."  As  a result of  this intimidation, Tamburello

          resigned  his   position  with   Comm-Tract  in  May   1993,  and

          subsequently instituted this action.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                    Count  I  of Tamburello's  complaint  alleges that  the

          individual  defendants conducted  the affairs  of  an enterprise,

          Comm-Tract,  through   a  pattern  of  Hobbs   Act  extortion  of

          Tamburello's property rights, in  violation of RICO, 18  U.S.C.  

          1962(c).    Count  II  alleges  that  the  individual  defendants

          conspired to violate RICO by knowingly joining the enterprise and

          by  committing,  or  agreeing to  commit  at  least  two acts  of

          racketeering.   Count  IV  alleges that  all defendants  violated

          Tamburello's  rights under the MCRA.1  We address the RICO claims

          first.

          I.  The RICO Claims
          I.  The RICO Claims
              _______________

                              
          ____________________

          1  Tamburello does  not appeal the district court's  dismissal of
          Counts III and V.

                                         -3-

                    Tamburello alleges that the  actions of his supervisors

          at Comm-Tract constituted  a pattern of extortion  to deprive him

          of his rights to speak out on union matters, his rights under the

          collective-bargaining  agreement, and his right  to his job.  The

          district court  held that Tamburello's RICO  claims are preempted

          by   the  NLRA,   which  "pre-empts   state  and   federal  court

          jurisdiction  to remedy  conduct  that is  arguably protected  or

          prohibited by the Act."  Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. &
                                   ________________________________________

          Motor  Coach Employees  v. Lockridge,  403 U.S.  274, 276  (1971)
          ______________________     _________

          (citing San Diego Bldg.  Trades Council v. Garmon, 359  U.S. 236,
                  _______________________________    ______

          244 (1959)).

                    The NLRA "is a comprehensive code passed by Congress to

          regulate labor relations  in activities affecting  interstate and

          foreign  commerce."  Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235,
                               ____    _____________________

          238 (1967).  The  NLRA reflects congressional intent to  create a

          uniform,  nationwide   body  of   labor  law  interpreted   by  a

          centralized expert  agency -- the National  Labor Relations Board

          (NLRB).    Accordingly, the  NLRA  vests  the NLRB  with  primary

          jurisdiction over unfair labor  practices.  See 29 U.S.C.    158.
                                                      ___

          Applying these principles, the Garmon  Court held that "[w]hen an
                                         ______

          activity  is arguably subject  to   7  or   8 of  the [NLRA], the

          States as well as the federal courts  must defer to the exclusive

          competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of

          state  interference  with  national  policy is  to  be  averted."

          Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.  The Court has interpreted  this to mean
          ______

          that, "as a general  rule, neither state nor federal  courts have
                                                                       ____

                                         -4-

          jurisdiction over  suits directly involving 'activity  [which] is
          ____________

          arguably subject to    7 or   8 of the Act.'"  Vaca v. Sipes, 386
                                                         ____    _____

          U.S. 171, (1967) (emphasis added; and quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at
                                                        ______

          245).  See also  Morgan v. Massachusetts General Hosp.,  901 F.2d
                 ________  ______    ___________________________

          186, 194  (1st Cir.  1990) ("as  a general  rule, the  [NLRB] has

          'exclusive  jurisdiction  to find,  prevent,  and rectify  unfair

          labor  practices'")   (quoting  New   Mexico  Dist.  Council   of
                                          _________________________________

          Carpenters, AFL-CIO v. Mayhew Co., 664 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1981);
          ___________________    __________

          and  collecting   cases)).    A  primary   justification  of  the

          preemption doctrine is  "the need to  avoid conflicting rules  of

          substantive law in the labor  relations area and the desirability

          of leaving  the development of  such rules to  the administrative

          agency created by Congress  for that purpose . . .  ."  Vaca, 386
                                                                  ____

          U.S. at 180-81.2

                    The alleged  wrongful conduct in this  case is arguably

          prohibited by  the NLRA.   Section 8(a)(3)  of the NLRA  makes it
                              
          ____________________

          2  Although the Garmon doctrine, which is rooted in the Supremacy
                          ______
          Clause of  the United States  Constitution, U.S. Const.  art. VI,
          cl. 2, was originally concerned only with  federal supremacy over
          conflicting  state  laws,  it  has  been  extended  to  cover the
                       _____
          relationship between  the NLRA and  other federal statutes.   See
                                                                        ___
          Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1974);
          __________     _______________________
          Morgan,  901 F.2d at 194;  New Bedford Fishermen's  Welf. Fund v.
          ______                     ___________________________________
          Baltic Ent.,  813 F.2d  503, 504-05  (1st Cir.  1987).   But  see
          ___________                                              ________
          United  States  v. Boffa,  688 F.2d  919,  931-33 (3d  Cir. 1982)
          ______________     _____
          (concluding  that Garmon does not  apply to conflicts between the
                            ______
          NLRA and federal  statutes), cert. denied, 460  U.S. 1022 (1983).
                                       _____ ______
          Because the  NLRA's relationship with a  state statute implicates
          the Supremacy Clause, and its relationship with a federal statute
          does  not, some  courts  hold that  the  analysis in  the  former
          situation should  be stricter than in  the latter.  See  Britt v.
                                                              ___  _____
          Grocers Supply Co., Inc., 978 F.2d 1441, 1446-47 (5th Cir. 1992);
          ________________________
          Boffa, 688  F.2d at 931-33.  The facts of this case are such that
          _____
          we need  not at this time  decide whether, or to  what extent, we
          agree with this proposition.

                                         -5-

          unlawful  for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or

          tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any

          labor organization."    29  U.S.C.    158(a)(3).    The  ultimate

          question   presented  by  Tamburello's   claims  is  whether  his

          supervisors  at Comm-Tract intimidated,  coerced, threatened, and

          harassed him into quitting  his job in retaliation for  his union

          activities as a union steward.   It is beyond dispute  that these

          allegations, if found to be true, would constitute a violation of

          the NLRA.   See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467  U.S. 883, 894 (1983)
                      ___ ______________    ____

          (an  employer  violates   8(a)  (3)  "when, for  the  purposes of

          discouraging  union  activity,  .  . .  it  purposefully  creates

          working conditions so intolerable that the employee has no option

          but  to  resign").3    Unless an  exception  applies,  therefore,

          Tamburello's  RICO  claims  are  subject to  the  NLRB's  primary

          jurisdiction.

                    There are three generally  recognized exceptions to the

          NLRB's primary  jurisdiction.   The first is  where Congress  has

          expressly  carved   out  an  exception  to   the  NLRB's  primary

          jurisdiction.   Vaca, 386 U.S. at 179-80  (citing cases); Brennan
                          ____                                      _______

          v. Chestnut, 973 F.2d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 1992).  Congress has not
             ________

                              
          ____________________

          3  Tamburello's claims are also arguably  subject to   8(a)(1) of
          the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
          to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
          of the rights guaranteed in [  7 of  the NLRA]."  29 U.S.C.   158
          (a)(1).   Section 7 provides,  in pertinent part,  that employees
          shall  have the right to "self-organization, to form, to join, or
          assist  labor  organizations,  to  bargain  collectively  through
          representatives of  their own choosing,  and to  engage in  other
          concerted activities for the  purpose of collective bargaining or
          other mutual aid or protection . . . ."  29 U.S.C.   157.

                                         -6-

          made an  exception to the NLRB's primary  jurisdiction for claims

          alleging    extortion.      Indeed,    the   only   labor-related

          "racketeering"  activity   expressly  listed  as   predicates  to

          liability  under  RICO  are  actions  concerning restrictions  of

          payments and loans to labor  organizations, or those relating  to

          embezzlement  from labor funds.   See 18 U.S.C.    1961(1)(C); 29
                                            ___

          U.S.C.     186, 501(c).  The specific exceptions carved out in   

          186 and 501(c) support the conclusion that Congress intended that

          "violations  of labor laws other than   186 [or   501(c)] alleged

          as  predicate  acts are  preempted."   Brennan,  973 F.2d  at 647
                                                 _______

          (citing Butchers' Union, Local No. 498 v.  SDC Inv., Inc., 631 F.
                  ______________________________     ______________

          Supp.  1001 (E.D.Cal. 1986)).  This  exception therefore does not

          apply.

                    The   second  exception  applies   when  the  regulated

          activity touches "interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and

          responsibility that,  in the absence of  compelling congressional

          direction," courts  "could not  infer that Congress  had deprived

          the  States of  the  power to  act."   Sears,  Roebuck  & Co.  v.
                                                 ______________________

          Carpenters,  436 U.S. 180, 195 (1977) (quoting Garmon 359 U.S. at
          __________                                     ______

          244).  This exception is  inapplicable to plaintiff's RICO claims

          because they  involve the relationship between  two federal laws,

          as opposed to a state and a federal law.

                    The  third exception  holds that  the NLRB's  exclusive

          jurisdiction does not apply if the regulated activity is merely a

          peripheral  or collateral concern of  the labor laws.   Vaca, 386
                                                                  ____

          U.S.  at 179-80; Brennan, 973 F.2d at 646.  Under this exception,
                           _______

                                         -7-

          federal  courts  may  decide   labor  questions  that  emerge  as

          collateral issues  in suits brought under  statutes providing for

          independent federal remedies.   Connell Construction, 421 U.S. at
                                          ____________________

          626;  Britt v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc., 978 F.2d 1441, 1446 (5th
                _____    ________________________

          Cir. 1992).

                    Plaintiff's  allegations arguably  establish violations

          of  both RICO  and the  NLRA --  extortion on  the one  hand, and

          unfair labor practices on  the other.  We must  determine whether

          the issues raised by Tamburello's potential unfair labor practice

          claims are merely  collateral to  the issues raised  by his  RICO

          extortion claims.  In  making this determination, several federal

          courts  take the position that  courts must defer  to the primary

          jurisdiction  of the NLRB if  the underlying conduct  of the RICO

          claim is wrongful only by  virtue of, or reference to, the  labor

          laws.   See Brennan, 973  F.2d at 646;  Talbot, 961 F.2d  at 662;
                  ___ _______                     ______

          Mann v. Air  Line Pilots Assoc., 848 F. Supp.  990, 993 (S.D.Fla.
          ____    _______________________

          1994);  McDonough  v.  Gencorp,  Inc.,  750  F.  Supp.  368,  370
                  _________      ______________

          (S.D.Ill.  1990).   One  federal court  has  framed the  issue as

          follows:

                      RICO should  be read  as  limited by  the
                      exclusive jurisdiction of  the NLRA  only
                      when  the   Court  would  be   forced  to
                      determine  whether  some  portion of  the
                      defendant's  conduct  violated labor  law
                      before  a  RICO  predicate act  would  be
                      established.   So  long as  the predicate
                      act  exists  independent  of  any  unfair
                      labor  practice  resolutions, the  NLRB's
                      exclusive  jurisdiction  is not  violated
                      since the  Court  will not  be forced  to
                      interpret   labor   law   except   as   a
                      collateral  matter.    However,   if  the
                      existence of the  predicate acts  depends

                                         -8-

                      wholly  upon  a   determination  that   a
                      violation of federal labor  law occurred,
                      jurisdiction is preempted.

          MHC  v. Intern. Union,  United Mine  Wkrs. of  Am., 685  F. Supp.
          ___     __________________________________________

          1370,  1376-77 (E.D.Ky. 1988).   Similarly, we have  held, in the

          context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.  

          2000e  et seq., that the NLRA  is the exclusive remedy for claims

          "which  hinge  on  an  unfair labor  practice  having  occurred."

          Morgan, 901 F.2d at 194.
          ______

                    Like  Tamburello,  the  plaintiff  in  Brennan  alleged
                                                           _______

          extortion  as  a  predicate  RICO  act.    In  holding  that  the

          plaintiff's RICO extortion claim  was "preempted" (see supra n.2)
                                                             ___ _____

          by the NLRA, the Eighth Circuit court noted that 18 U.S.C.   1951

          (1988)  is a  generic  law prohibiting  extortion,4 and  reasoned

          that the  court was therefore forced to look to the labor laws to

          define  the alleged  illegal  conduct.   Because the  defendant's

          conduct  was illegal, if at all, only  by virtue of the NLRA, the

                              
          ____________________

          4  18 U.S.C.   1951 provides:

                         (a)  Whoever  in  any  way  or  degree
                      obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
                      the movement of any article  or commodity
                      in commerce, by  robbery or extortion  or
                      attempts  or  conspires   so  to  do,  or
                      commits or threatens physical violence to
                      any  person or property in furtherance of
                      a  plan  or  purpose  to  do  anything in
                      violation of this section shall  be fined
                      not more than  $10,000 or imprisoned  not
                      more than twenty years, or both.

             RICO defines  "extortion" as  "the obtaining of  property from
          another, with his consent,  induced by wrongful use of  actual or
          threatened force, violence,  or fear, or under color  of official
          right."  18 U.S.C.   1951(b)(2).

                                         -9-

          court  concluded  that the  NLRB  had  exclusive jurisdiction  to

          resolve what was, at its essence, an unfair labor practice claim.

          See Brennan, 973 F.2d at 647.
          ___ _______

                    For reasons  similar to those expressed  in Brennan, we
                                                                _______

          conclude  that the  unfair  labor practice  issues implicated  by

          Tamburello's  complaint are  not  merely collateral  to his  RICO

          claims.5  Tamburello alleges  that his supervisors placed  him on

          the  less desirable  work  assignments, reduced  his chances  for

          overtime  pay,   made  him  take   a  forced  vacation   or  face

          termination, took away his  company vehicle, and made threatening

          anti-union activities, all to coerce him into giving up his union

          steward position,  and, eventually,  to resign his  position with

          Comm-Tract.  The problem  is that none of this alleged conduct is

          illegal without  reference  to the  NLRA.   It is  the NLRA  that

          prohibits employers from  creating intolerable working conditions

          to discourage union activities, see 29  U.S.C.   158(a)(3); Sure-
                                          ___                         _____

          Tan, 467  U.S. 894, and it is the NLRA that prohibits an employer
          ___

          from interfering with  an employee's  right to join  a union  and

          engage  in concerted  activities for  mutual aid  and protection.

          See 29 U.S.C.    158(a)(1), 157.  Indeed, one would  presume that
          ___

          Congress passed  the NLRA, at  least in  part, precisely  because

                              
          ____________________

          5    We  note also  that,  in a  general  sense,  claims alleging
          employer retaliation  for  protected  union  activities  are  not
          merely a peripheral concern of the NLRA.  As indicated above, the
          conduct alleged in this case would, if true, constitute an unfair
          labor  practice under the  NLRA.   The authority  of the  NLRB to
          remedy unfair labor practices is central to its purpose.  NLRB v.
                                                                    ____
          State of Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 988 F.2d 735, 739
          ______________________________________________
          (7th Cir. 1993).

                                         -10-

          conduct  such  as  that  complained  of  by  Tamburello  was  not

          theretofore prohibited.  We thus  agree with the district court's

          conclusion that  "the alleged conduct that  led to [Tamburello's]

          termination  of employment is illegal  only by reference to union

          activities."

                    In order to determine whether plaintiff has established

          a RICO predicate act, a reviewing court would be forced to decide

          whether  some portion  of  the defendant's  conduct violated  the

          federal  labor laws.   Because  plaintiff's claim  hinges upon  a

          determination of  whether an unfair labor  practice has occurred,

          we  conclude  that his  RICO claims  are  subject to  the primary

          jurisdiction of the NLRB.6

                    As  a  final  matter,   we  will  briefly  address  two

          additional  arguments  proffered  by   the  plaintiff.     First,

          Tamburello  contends   that  the  NLRA  does  not  apply  to  his

          allegations at all because  his RICO claims are  asserted against

          the  individual defendants,  and  not the  "employer" within  the

          meaning  of the NLRA.  The NLRA expressly provides, however, that

          "[t]he  term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of

          an employer,  directly or indirectly."  29  U.S.C.   152(2).  The

                              
          ____________________

          6   We note  that the question  of whether a  labor law  issue is
          collateral to issues raised  by a claim under another  statute is
          an  intensely fact  driven inquiry.    The focus  must be  on the
          particular  allegations of the plaintiff's complaint to determine
          whether  any or  all  of  the  claims  may  be  resolved  without
          determination of  questions of federal  labor law.   In addition,
          "[i]t is the conduct being regulated,  not the formal description
          of  governing  legal  standards,  that  is  the  proper focus  of
          concern."   Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 292
                      _____________________    _________
          (1971).

                                         -11-

          district court's  finding that  the individual defendants  -- the

          president, general manager, and manager of Comm-Tract -- acted as

          the  agents   of  the  company   is  supported  by   the  record,

          particularly   since  Tamburello's  complaint  alleged  that  the

          individual defendants controlled Comm-Tract.  See American Press,
                                                        ___ _______________

          Inc. v. NLRB, 833 F.3d  621, 625 (6th Cir. 1987) (the test  to be
          ____    ____

          applied is "whether, under all the   circumstances, the employees

          could reasonably believe that  an employee was reflecting company

          policy,  and  speaking  and   acting  for  management")  (quoting

          Aircraft  Plating Co.,  213 N.L.R.B. 664  (1974)).   We therefore
          _____________________

          reject  Tamburello's argument that the NLRA does not apply to his

          RICO claims.

                    Second, Tamburello  strains to fit his  case within the

          exception to Garmon granted  suits alleging a breach of  the duty
                       ______

          of  fair representation under   9(a) of the NLRA.  See Breininger
                                                             ___ __________

          v. Sheet Metal  Workers Int'l Assoc. Local Union No.  6, 493 U.S.
             ____________________________________________________

          67, 74 (1989)  (reiterating rule that Garmon preemption  does not
                                                ______

          apply   to  suits  alleging  a   breach  of  the   duty  of  fair

          representation) (citing  Vaca, 386 U.S. at 181).   Tamburello did
                                   ____

          not  sue  his  union  directly,   but  rather  brought  his  fair

          representation  allegations as part of a  "hybrid" action under  

          301,  which provides  federal jurisdiction  for employees  to sue

          their employer  for breach of a  collective bargaining agreement,

          and  their union for breach  of its duty  of fair representation.

          See 29  U.S.C.   185(a); Vaca,  386 U.S. at 186.   The Breininger
          ___                      ____                          __________

          Court  implied that Garmon would  not apply to  hybrid   301/fair
                              ______

                                         -12-

          representation claims because of the important interest of having

          the  same  entity  adjudicate  a joint  claim  against  both  the

          employer  and  the union.   See  Breininger,  493 U.S.  at 80-84.
                                      ___  __________

          Tamburello argues that the reasoning of Breininger applies to him
                                                  __________

          because  he brought both a  RICO claim and  a fair representation

          claim.

                    Breininger   concerned   hybrid  actions   against  the
                    __________

          employer  for breach  of a  collective bargaining  agreement, and

          against  the union for breach of the duty of fair representation.

          Tamburello's   argument   fails   because   his  duty   of   fair

          representation claim  (Count III)  was dismissed by  the district

          court,  and  is not  prosecuted on  appeal,  and his  RICO claims

          implicate none of the concerns underlying Breininger and Vaca for
                                                    __________     ____

          exempting fair  representation claims  from the Garmon  doctrine.
                                                          ______

          Vaca and Breininger exempted  fair representation claims from the
          ____     __________

          reach of Garmon for two related  reasons.  First, the Court noted
                   ______

          that  the duty of fair representation has judicially evolved, and

          that it predated the prohibitions against unfair labor practices.

          Breininger, 493 U.S.  at 74-79  (citing Vaca, 386  U.S. at  181).
          __________                              ____

          Second,  noting  that fair  representation  claims often  involve

          matters outside  the NLRB's  unfair labor practice  jurisdiction,

          the Court expressed its  doubt that the NLRB brought  any greater

          degree  of expertise to  such claims than  courts.  Id.   Because
                                                              __

          Tamburello has no viable duty of fair representation claim before

          the  court, and  his RICO  claims do  not implicate  the concerns

                                         -13-

          underlying Breininger,  his claims remain subject  to the primary
                     __________

          jurisdiction of the NLRB.

          II.  The State Law Claims
          II.  The State Law Claims
               ____________________

                    In Count IV, Tamburello alleges that the conduct of his

          supervisors violated his rights under the MCRA, Mass. Gen. L. ch.

          12   11, which provides a remedy for the interference "by threat,

          intimidation,  or  coercion"  with an  individual's  "exercise or

          enjoyment  of rights secured by  the constitution or  laws of the

          United States, or of  rights secured by the constitution  or laws

          of  the commonwealth."   Mass. Gen.  L. ch.  12,    11I; Bally v.
                                                                   _____

          Northeastern University, 403 Mass. 713, 717 (1989).  As explained
          _______________________

          above,  the  alleged  conduct  of  Tamburello's  supervisors   is

          arguably subject to    8(a)(3)  of the NLRA,  which prohibits  an

          employer from discriminating against an employee on  the basis of

          union status,  and also to    8(a)(1).   As with the  RICO claim,

          therefore, the question is whether any of the three exceptions to

          Garmon preemption  apply.   The  first  and third  exceptions  do
          ______

          not;7 we address the second exception below.

                    Garmon preemption  does not apply  when the  underlying
                    ______

          regulated activity  touches "interests so deeply  rooted in local

          feeling  and responsibility  that, in  the absence  of compelling

                              
          ____________________

          7   The first exception -- whether Congress has explicitly carved
          out  an  exception to  the  NLRB's exclusive  jurisdiction  -- is
          inapplicable to Tamburello's state  law claims.  With respect  to
          the third  exception, we  concluded above  that the  unfair labor
          practice issues  implicated  by Tamburello's  complaint  are  not
          merely collateral to his RICO claims.  For the same reasons, they
          are  not merely  collateral  to  his  MCRA  claims.    The  third
          exception therefore does not apply.

                                         -14-

          congressional direction,"  courts "could not infer  that Congress

          had deprived the States  of the power to  act."  Sears,  Roebuck,
                                                           _______________

          436  U.S. at  195 (quoting  Garmon 359  U.S. at  244).   In cases
                                      ______

          where, as here,  the underlying conduct is arguably prohibited by
                                                              __________

          the  NLRA,   the  Court  has  identified   two  prerequisites  to

          application of the "local interests" exception.  First, the state

          must have a significant  interest in protecting the  citizen from

          the challenged conduct.   Second, the controversy which  could be

          presented  to the state court  must be different  from that which

          could have been  presented to the NLRB.  Sears, Roebuck, 436 U.S.
                                                   ______________

          at 196-97.  As the Court explained:

                         The  critical  inquiry, therefore,  is
                      not whether the State  is enforcing a law
                      relating specifically  to labor relations
                      or one of general application but whether
                      the  controversy  presented to  the state
                      court is identical to  . . . or different
                      from .  . .  that which could  have been,
                      but  was  not,  presented  to  the  Labor
                      Board.   For  it  is only  in the  former
                      situation that a  state court's  exercise
                      of  jurisdiction  necessarily involves  a
                      risk  of  interference  with  the  unfair
                      labor practice jurisdiction of  the Board
                      which the arguably  prohibited branch  of
                      the  Garmon  doctrine  was   designed  to
                           ______
                      avoid.

          Id. at 197.
          __

                    We assume,  arguendo, that the state  has a significant
                                ________

          interest in  protecting an  employee from  the harassment  of his

          supervisors in retaliation  for his union  activities.  We  agree

          with the district court, however, that "Plaintiff's [MCRA] claims

          raise  the same  question as would  be asked  in an  unfair labor

          practice  proceeding,  namely, whether  [his  supervisors] placed

                                         -15-

          plaintiff on less desirable work assignments, reduced his chances

          for overtime pay, and  harassed him in retaliation for  his union

          activities."  

          Because the controversy which would be presented to a state court

          is identical to that which would  be presented to the NLRB, there

          is a significant risk of state interference with the unfair labor

          practice  of  the  NLRB.    Under   Garmon  and  Sears,  Roebuck,
                                              ______       _______________

          Tamburello's MCRA claims are therefore preempted by the NLRA.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

          court is affirmed.
                   affirmed
                   ________

                                         -16-