Court Opinion

ID: 9958979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:01:23.162865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:22.026806
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SOPHIA X. HART,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                        SF-0752-22-0558-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: April 9, 2024
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Sophia X. Hart , Arrowsmith, Illinois, pro se.

      Julie Nelson , Golden, Colorado, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction.           For the reasons
discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the
initial decision, and REMAND the case to the regional office for further
adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

                DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      Effective December 6, 2020, the appellant was appointed to a GS-5 Support
Services Specialist position in the excepted service, pursuant to the Schedule A
hiring authority set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u). Initial Appeal File (IAF),
Tab 8 at 8. It is undisputed that the appellant had no prior Federal service and is
not preference eligible. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, Tab 8 at 8. On July 8, 2022, 1 year and
7 months into her employment, the agency notified the appellant that it was
terminating her appointment during her 2-year trial period. IAF, Tab 1 at 8. The
letter notified her that, as a trial period employee, she had no right to appeal her
termination to the Board. Id. Nonetheless, the appellant filed a Board appeal
challenging her termination on August 23, 2022. Id.
      The administrative judge issued a timeliness order and two jurisdictional
orders. IAF, Tabs 3-4, 10. In relevant part, the jurisdictional order explained that
the appellant must make a nonfrivolous allegation that she meets the definition of
an employee with Board appeal rights, as set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C).
IAF, Tab 10 at 1-3.        Both parties submitted numerous responses to the
administrative judge’s orders. IAF, Tabs 5, 7-9, 11, 13-16. Without holding a
hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID). He found that the
appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that she was an employee pursuant to
5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C) because she was not serving under an initial
appointment pending conversion to the competitive service and she had not
completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar position
other than a temporary appointment.      ID at 7-8.    He found that, even if the
appellant was in a position pending conversion to the competitive service,
she failed to nonfrivolously allege that she was not serving a probationary or trial
period. ID at 7-8 n.5. The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency
has filed a response, and the appellant has filed a reply. Petition for Review
                                                                                      3

(PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4. The appellant has also filed a motion for leave to file
additional documents. PFR File, Tab 7.
      An employee in the excepted service, who is not preference eligible, has
chapter 75 rights only if she qualifies as an employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)
(C). We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant has
not established jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii) because she has
not alleged that she completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same
or similar positions. ID at 7. The appellant may establish jurisdiction under
5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) if she nonfrivolously alleges that she was “not
serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending
conversion to the competitive service.”       We disagree with the administrative
judge’s finding that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she was
serving in an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service.
Id.
      However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Van Wersch
v. Department of Health & Human Services, 197 F.3d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1999), held
that an appointment under 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u), the same regulation under
which the appellant was appointed, was an appointment pending conversion to the
competitive service. 2 We also disagree with the administrative judge’s alternative
finding that the appellant failed to allege that she was not serving a probationary
or trial period. ID at 7-8 n.5. Neither the appellant’s SF -50 nor her offer letter
references a probationary or trial period.      IAF, Tab 8 at 8, Tab 9 at 19-20.
2
  The administrative judge found that the agency’s offer letter, which informed the
appellant that there was no right of conversion to the competitive service, was evidence
that the appointment was not pending conversion to the competitive service. ID at 7.
However, that language merely mirrors 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102, which states that an
agency may noncompetitively convert an employee to the competitive service after a
period of satisfactory performance. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u)(6) (emphasis added). We
are unpersuaded that the language in the offer letter requires a different result. See,
e.g., Ferguson v. Department of the Interior, 59 M.S.P.R. 305, 307-08 (1993) (noting
language in the appellant’s SF-50, which stated, “may noncompetitively convert [her] to
a career or career conditional appointment,” and concluding that the appointment was
pending conversion to the competitive service for purposes of jurisdiction).
                                                                                    4

Although, at times, the appellant asserted that she was serving a 2 -year
probationary period, e.g., IAF, Tab 1 at 5, she asserted, at other times, that she
was serving a 1-year probationary period, which she states she completed. E.g.,
IAF, Tab 7 at 4. In support thereof, she filed a copy of the job announcement to
which she applied, that noted a 1-year probationary period, IAF, Tab 9 at 27, and
a message from her supervisor, which is ambiguous and could be read to support
a finding that the trial period was either 1 or 2 years, IAF, Tab 7 at 13. Although
the agency has disputed this evidence, the Board may not weigh evidence at the
jurisdictional stage. 3    See Baldwin v. Department of Veterans              Affairs,
109 M.S.P.R. 392, ¶ 11 (2008).         Thus, we find that the appellant made a
nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction, which entitles her to a jurisdictional
hearing.

3
  To the extent the agency argues that a 2-year trial period is mandated by 5 C.F.R.
§ 213.3102(u), we disagree. IAF, Tab 15 at 4. In Nelson v. Department of Health &
Human Services, 119 M.S.P.R. 276, ¶¶ 10-13 (2013), the Board overruled cases holding
that the entire period of a special appointment, such as an appointment under Schedule
A, was a probationary or trial period and held that the Board must determine whether
the agency required an employee serving under a special appointment to serve a trial
period.
                                                                                         5

                                        ORDER
       For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. 4,5 On remand, the
administrative judge shall afford the parties an opportunity to submit evidence
and argument on whether the appellant was an employee as defined by 5 U.S.C.
§ 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) and shall hold a jurisdictional hearing if requested.

FOR THE BOARD:                            ______________________________
                                          Gina K. Grippando
                                          Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

4
  We deny the appellant’s motion for leave to file additional documents, which she
described as relating to the merits of her termination, because they are not related to the
issue of jurisdiction over this appeal. PFR File, Tab 7; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5).
5
  The administrative judge did not make findings as to the timeliness of this appeal, and
we do not do so in the first instance. If the appellant establishes jurisdiction over her
appeal on remand, the administrative judge shall make findings as to the timeliness of
this appeal.