Court Opinion

ID: 9662749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:17:10.837632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:42.051615
License: Public Domain

GLADWIN, J., dissenting. I believe that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s denial of benefits; therefore, I respectfully dissent. The Commission found that appellant failed to prove that his carpal-tunnel syndrome was work related. In addition to the facts set out in the majority opinion, Ms. Finchera also testified about the operation of the roto as follows: The roto is operated by him, but it’s not a tight hand-on, squeeze motion. You can really relax your hands. The machine vibrates and your hand is there to control it. You don’t grip onto it and you know real hard.... You’re basically there to guide it.... You don’t ever grab hold of a roto and try to clamp down, because it will get away from you. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support decisions of the Commission, we view evidence with all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence, i.e., evidence a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Singleton v. City of Pine Bluff, 97 Ark.App. 59, 244 S.W.3d 709 (2006). We will |9not reverse the Commission’s decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sands, 80 Ark.App. 51, 91 S.W.3d 93 (2002). Where as here, the Commission has denied a claim because of the claimant’s failure to meet his burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires that we affirm if the Commission’s opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Williams v. Ark Oak Flooring Co., 267 Ark 810, 590 S.W.2d 328 (Ark.App.1979). Questions of weight and credibility are within the sole province of the Commission, which is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief. Strickland v. Primex Technologies, 82 Ark.App. 570, 120 S.W.3d 166 (2003). Once the Commission has made its decision on issues of credibility, the appellate court is bound by that decision. Cottage Café, Inc. v. Collette, 94 Ark.App. 72, 226 S.W.3d 27 (2006). Here, the Commission weighed the evidence and found that appellant “cannot prove that his injury arose out of his employment.” It gave more weight to appel-lee’s employer’s testimony than to appellant’s. Clearly, the Commission is entitled to weigh the evidence. Matters of credibility are squarely within the Commission’s domain, Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 319 Ark. 126, 890 S.W.2d 253 (1994), and the testimony of an interested party is always considered controverted. Cooper v. Hiland Dairy, 69 Ark.App. 200, 11 S.W.3d 5 (2000). | mThe Commission had the right to weigh the testimony of all witnesses, just as it did. Because our standard of review leaves questions of weight and credibility within the sole province of the Commission, we should not re-weigh the evidence. Accordingly, I would affirm. HENRY, J., joins.