Court Opinion

ID: 9563877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:49:00.772629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:06.806164
License: Public Domain

Justice MOORE
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s holding that juror voir dire was properly limited, I respectfully dissent.
In my view, our decision in State v. Bennett, 328 S.C. 251, 493 S.E.2d 845 (1997), is controlling here. In Bennett, we found unqualified a juror who stated he could not go against the majority if the eleven other jurors voted for death. We concluded the juror’s earlier generalized statement that he could “follow the law” did not cure this deficiency. Our holding in Bennett compels the conclusion that a juror’s general statement that he or she could follow the law does not satisfy the specific inquiry defense counsel requested here. Cf. State v. Hill, 331 S.C. 94, 501 S.E.2d 122 (1998) (fundamental fairness not violated by limited voir dire where other questions covered request).
*312Further, as noted by the United States Supreme Court, “The measure of a jury is taken by reference to the impartiality of each individual juror .... each of these jurors must stand equally impartial in his or her ability to follow the law.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). A juror’s ability to decide the case independently of the majority is particularly relevant under our capital sentencing scheme because even one vote for life will defeat a death sentence. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (Supp.2003) (where jury fails to return unanimous verdict, the judge must impose a life sentence).5 It is therefore crucial that the defendant be able to inquire whether a juror has a propensity to follow the majority.
In light of our sentencing scheme, I would hold that fundamental fairness requires that the defense be allowed to probe a juror’s ability to vote independently of the majority. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new sentencing proceeding.
WALLER, J., concurs.

. The jury, however, need not be told the consequences of its failure to agree. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999). Here the jury was charged it must be unanimous in imposing a life or death sentence. -r.