Court Opinion

ID: 9959199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 20:09:34.050455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:31.083752
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Feagin v. May, 2024-Ohio-1357.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                     RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE EX REL. ULYSSES L. FEAGIN :                        JUDGES:
                                :                        Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
     Relator                    :                        Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                :                        Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-                            :
                                :
SHARON MAY, HUMAN RESOURCES :                            Case No. 2023 CA 0060
DIRECTOR                        :
                                :
     Respondent                 :                        OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                 Writ of Mandamus

JUDGMENT:                                                Granted

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                        April 10, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Relator                                              For Respondent

ULYSSES L. FEAGIN                                        MEL LUTE, JR. ESQ.
P.O. Box 540                                             Baker Dublikar
St. Clairsville, OH 43950                                400 South Main Street
                                                         North Canton, OH 44720
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060                                                      2

King, J.

         {¶ 1} On October 30, 2023, Relator Ulysses Feagin filed a Complaint in

Mandamus against Respondent Sharon May, Human Resources Director for the City of

Mansfield, Ohio. Feagin filed an Amended Complaint on November 15, 2023. Feagin

seeks to compel the HR Director to provide documents in response to a public-records

request. We deny the HR Director’s summary judgment motion1 and order her to produce

the documents identified in Exhibit B attached to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.

Feagin’s request for statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) is denied.

                                      I. Background
         {¶ 2} Feagin alleges on August 18, 2023, he served a public-records request, by

certified mail, to Lori Cope, Safety Service Director for the City of Mansfield, Ohio. Feagin

received a response to his request on September 13, 2023, from the HR Director, asking

him to revise his request to include more specificity. Feagin did so resubmitting his revised

request on September 18, 2023. The revised request is too extensive to include here but

it generally requested documentation regarding police protocols, police rules and

regulations, police disciplinary procedures, complaints filed against officers and use of

force.

         {¶ 3} At the time Feagin made his public-records request, he was actively

engaged in a lawsuit against the City of Mansfield. See Ulysses Lee Feagin v. Mansfield

Police Dept., et al., U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division,

1 May originally filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2023. Under Civ.R. 12(B), we

converted the motion to a summary judgment motion on December 28, 2023, and gave
the parties additional time to file supplemental briefing and Civ.R. 56(C) evidence.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060                                                    3

Case No. 1:22-CV-1201. Feagin previously made extensive document requests, in the

course of discovery in the pending federal case, pertaining to the same public records

that he now seeks through mandamus in the present matter. The HR Director worked

with outside counsel, in the federal case, to produce the requested documents.

       {¶ 4} On October 18, 2023, counsel for the city of Mansfield responded to

Feagin’s public-records request in a letter referencing the federal lawsuit. Counsel for the

HR Director acknowledges the response to the public-records request did not come

directly from the HR Director. Attached to the HR Director’s Motion to Dismiss is Exhibit

B, which is a list of documents produced in response to Feagin’s September 18, 2023

public-records request. Thus, the HR Director requests dismissal of Feagin’s mandamus

action claiming it is moot since Feagin received the requested records as part of his

federal lawsuit.

       {¶ 5} On December 13, 2023, Feagin filed a Motion in Opposition to

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. On page 3, paragraph 5 of his motion, Feagin states,

“On or about October 25, 2023 Attorney Mel Lute Jr answered the public records request

that was served upon Sharon May, the Mansfield City Human Resource Director.”

       {¶ 6} After the Court converted this matter to a summary judgment proceeding,

in a Supplemental Brief filed by the HR Director, counsel again reiterated that he provided

the requested documents to Feagin. The HR Director also stated the requested

documents were provided to Feagin within 30 business days.

       {¶ 7} Attached to the Supplemental Brief is a letter dated October 5, 2023. It

acknowledges receipt of Feagin’s public-records request and indicates the documents

are already in the process of being produced as part of the pending federal lawsuit. The
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060                                                        4

second document attached to Respondent’s Supplemental Brief is a letter dated October

18, 2023, from counsel representing the city of Mansfield in the federal case, advising

that Feagin’s requested records are enclosed for the public-records request served on

Sharon May, Human Resource Director for the City of Mansfield. Neither letter was

properly authenticated Civ.R. 56(E) evidence.2

       {¶ 8} Feagin filed a memorandum in opposition to Respondent’s summary

judgment motion. Attached to the memorandum is Feagin’s affidavit where he avers in

paragraph 3: “The Relator asserts that Sharon May have (sic) not provided any of the

requested public records documents[.]”

                                         II. Analysis

       A.     Mandamus elements and summary judgment standard

       {¶ 9} Ohio’s Public Records Act requires a public office to make copies of public

records available to any person on request and within a reasonable period of time. R.C.

149.43(B)(1). State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 161 Ohio St.3d 130, 2020-Ohio-3686,

161 N.E.3d 575, ¶ 9. The Ohio Supreme Court construes the Public Records Act

“ ‘liberally in favor of broad access’ ” to public records. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v.

Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996).

       {¶ 10} Under R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b), a mandamus action is the remedy for a person

denied access to a public record. “To prevail on a claim for mandamus relief in a public-

records case, a party must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief and a

2 The proper way to introduce evidence not specifically authorized under Civ.R. 56(C) is

to incorporate the material by reference into a properly framed affidavit. Matrix
Acquisitions, LLC v. Styer, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2010 AP 04 0014, 2010-Ohioo-5343,
¶ 12.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060                                                      5

corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the respondents to provide that relief.” State

ex rel. Penland v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 158 Ohio St.3d 15, 2019-Ohio-4130,

139 N.E.3d 862, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Cuyahoga

Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 128 Ohio St.3d 256, 2011-Ohio-625, 943 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 22-24.

       {¶ 11} Further, we are deciding this matter on summary judgment. A court may

grant summary judgment under Civ.R. 56 if it determines: (1) no genuine issues as to any

material fact remain to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom

the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.

Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). The record

on summary judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing

the motion. Williams v. First United Church of Christ, 37 Ohio St.2d 150, 151, 309 N.E.2d

924 (1974).

       {¶ 12} The moving party bears the burden of identifying the basis for the motion

and those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact

on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280,

292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). Once the moving party has met the burden, the nonmoving

party then has a reciprocal burden of specificity and cannot rest on the allegations or

denials in the pleadings, but must set forth “specific facts” by the means listed in Civ.R.

56(C) showing that a “triable issue of fact” exists. Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112,

116, 526 N.E.2d 798 (1988).

       B.     Factual dispute regarding public-records’ production
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060                                                     6

       {¶ 13} A factual dispute exists regarding whether the HR Director has provided the

public records requested by Feagin. The HR Director claims Feagin’s public-records

request is moot because the records have been provided to him in the federal lawsuit.

Feagin stated in his Motion in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss that Attorney

Mel Lute answered his public-records request that was served upon Sharon May, the

Mansfield City Human Resources Director. However, in a subsequent affidavit, attached

to his opposition to the HR Director’s summary judgment motion, Feagin denied receiving

any of the requested public-records documents from the HR Director.

       {¶ 14} Two recent decisions, from the Ohio Supreme Court, shed light on how to

resolve this dispute. In State ex rel. Ware v. Crawford, 167 Ohio St.3d 453, 2022-Ohio-

295, 194 N.E.3d 323, the Ohio Supreme Court first explained relator has the burden to

plead and prove facts showing that he requested a public record pursuant to R.C.

149.43(B)(1) and that respondent did not make the record available. (Citation omitted.)

Id. at ¶ 14. Relator “also bears the burden of persuasion to show entitlement to a writ of

mandamus by clear and convincing evidence.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

       {¶ 15} The respondent, in Crawford, argued relator did not prove by clear and

convincing evidence that respondent did not send the requested records to relator as

respondent claims to have done. Id. at ¶ 15. The Court ultimately concluded respondent

was in the better position to affirmatively show that she transmitted the records to relator.

Id. The Court explained:

        Just as the custodian is in a better position than the requester to know

        the contents of a record and whether it fits within an exception * * * so
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060                                                  7

        too is the custodian in the superior position to demonstrate compliance

        with the obligation to provide copies of public records [.]

       Id.
       {¶ 16} In Crawford, the Court concluded respondent presented no evidence to

corroborate her assertion that she mailed the documents that relator requested nor did

she submit copies of the documents that she claims to have sent to relator in response

to his public-records request. Id. The Court granted a writ of mandamus regarding records

that were not produced in an initial response. Id at ¶ 17.

       {¶ 17} The second pertinent decision, from the Ohio Supreme Court, is State ex

rel. Ware v. Kurt, 169 Ohio St.3d 223, 2022-Ohio-1627, 203 N.E.3d 665. In Kurt,

respondent made a mootness argument and provided a list of records she allegedly

provided to relator and also included two supporting affidavits. Id. at ¶ 28. The affiants

explained that some documents were sent to relator but that other documents were not

produced because the requests were overly broad and some of the documents did not

exist. Id. The Court noted, “[a]s for the list of records that were allegedly provided,

[respondent] did not submit copies of the documents as corroborating evidence in this

case.” Id.

       The Kurt court further explained:

        Because the record does not clearly demonstrate (1) that [respondent]

        sent [relator] the documents that she claims to have provided to him and

        (2) whether [respondent] had legitimate reasons for rejecting the

        remaining document requests, we decline to resolve the appeal on

        grounds of mootness.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060                                                    8

Id. at ¶ 29.
       {¶ 18} In the present matter, relying on Crawford and Kurt, we find the record does

not clearly establish that Feagin received the requested records. Although we are

permitted to consider facts outside the record to establish mootness, see State ex rel.

Richard v. Wells, 64 Ohio St.3d 76, 77, 591 N.E.2d 1240 (1992), here, the HR Director

submitted no Civ.R. 56(C) evidence establishing production and service of the requested

records. Therefore, Feagin’s writ is not moot.

       {¶ 19} Even if the HR Director had provided an affidavit indicating the requested

documents were produced this does not appear to satisfy the burden placed on a

respondent answering a public-records request. In fact, such an approach was found

insufficient by the Kurt Court. See Kurt at ¶ 28, where the Court rejected two affidavits,

one from an assistant prosecutor and one from the office manager, that indicated some

of the requested documents had been produced in response to the public-records

request. Id.

       {¶ 20} The Court found the affidavits insufficient to establish the documents had

been provided. Id. In refusing to rely on the two affidavits, the Court explained, “[a]s for

the list of records that were allegedly provided, Kurt did not submit copies of the

documents as corroborating evidence in this case.” Id. Based on this language, we

conclude to satisfy the burden of establishing that public records have been provided

pursuant to a request, respondent must provide copies of the documents as corroborating

evidence. Id.

       {¶ 21} We acknowledge the burden this requirement places on a party responding

to a public-records request and the clerks’ offices that have to accept the documents for

filing. For example, recently, in State ex rel. Ware v. Stone, 5th Dist. Stark No.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060                                                  9

2021CA00042, 2022-Ohio-1151, the Stark County Prosecutor’s Office filed an affidavit

with 972 pages of documents attached in order to establish that it had responded to a

public-records request. Id. at ¶ 22.

        {¶ 22} Because Respondent did not provide copies of the produced documents as

corroborating evidence, we must conclude the record does not clearly demonstrate that

the HR Director sent Feagin the documents that are claimed to have been provided.

Therefore, we deny the HR Director's summary judgment motion and grant summary

judgment in favor of Feagin. “When a party moves for summary judgment and the

nonmovant has had an opportunity to respond, a court – after consideration of the relevant

evidence – may enter judgment against the moving party even though the nonmovant did

not file its own motion for summary judgment.” State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cty. Medical

Examiner's Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 1163, 2017-Ohio-8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, ¶ 9, citing State

ex rel. Anderson v Vermillion, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975,

citing Todd Dev. Co., Inc, v. Morgan, 116 Ohio St.3d 461, 2008-Ohio-87, 880 N.E.2d 88,

¶ 17.

        {¶ 23} The HR Director is ordered to provide copies of the documents identified in

Exhibit B attached to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.

        C.    Statutory damages

        {¶ 24} Feagin also claims he is entitled to statutory damages. R.C. 149.43(C)(2)

allows a relator to recover $100 for each business day during which a respondent failed

to comply with the public-records law, beginning on the date of commencement of the

public-records action, up to a maximum of $1,000. A requester qualifies for statutory

damages, under the version of R.C. 149.43 in effect at the time the request is made only
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060                                                      10

when he or she “transmits a written request [for the public records] by hand delivery,

electronic submission, or certified mail * * * to the public office or person responsible for

the requested public records[.]” R.C. 149.43(C)(2).

       {¶ 25} We conclude Feagin is not eligible to receive statutory damages. He has

provided no evidence that he sent the August 18, 2023 request by one of the methods of

delivery authorizing statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Although Feagin avers

in paragraph 3 of his Amended Complaint, paragraph 1 of his Opposition to Respondent’s

January 11, 2024 Motion for Summary Judgment and paragraph 1 of his Sworn Affidavit

that he requested the records by certified mail, there is no evidence in the record

establishing that he in fact did so. “[A] requester who fails to prove that delivery was

accomplished by one of the methods required to authorize statutory damages under R.C.

149.43(C)(2) is ineligible to receive an award of statutory damages.” State ex rel. Reese

v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. Legal Dept., 168 Ohio St.3d 647, 2022-Ohio-2105, 200

N.E.3d 1083, ¶ 34, citing State ex rel. Penland v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 158 Ohio

St.3d 15, 2019-Ohio-4130, 139 N.E.3d 862, ¶ 16.

       {¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we grant Feagin’s writ of mandamus. We deny

Feagin’s request for statutory damages. The clerk of courts is hereby directed to serve

upon all parties not in default notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

See Civ.R. 58(B).

       {¶ 27} RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED, AND

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED IN FAVOR OF FEAGIN.

       {¶ 28} WRIT OF MANDAMUS GRANTED.

       {¶ 29} REQUEST FOR STATUTORY DAMAGES DENIED.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0060   11

      {¶ 30} COSTS TO RESPONDENT.

      {¶ 31} IT IS SO ORDERED.

By Andrew J. King, J.

Delaney, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.