Court Opinion

ID: 9883837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:22:03.914834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:32.006645
License: Public Domain

LESLIE, Judge
(dissenting).
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that respondent’s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations, I respectfully dissent. In my opinion the bad faith claim against appellant was an asset which was omitted from the winding up of the corporation and could be, and was, validly assigned to respondent. To hold otherwise would allow an insurer who acted in bad faith to protect itself by using its insured corporation’s dissolution as a weapon to escape liability.
Minn. Stat. § 301.56 (1980) (repealed 1981) states in part that:
The title to any assets omitted from the winding up shall vest in the trustee or trustees, or receiver or receivers, for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto and shall be administered and distributed accordingly.
The bad faith law suit against appellant was clearly an asset of the corporation which was omitted from its winding up. As such, the suit vested in the trustee who properly assigned it to respondent. The fact that this occurred after three years from the date of the corporation’s termination is not dispositive because § 301.56 clearly does not limit itself to three years.
I find no Minnesota cases that are controlling' on this issue. In other jurisdictions, however, corporations have been in*860volved in actions after the time limit prescribed by corporate survival statutes. See Saletri v. Clark, 13 Wis.2d 325, 108 N.W.2d 548 (1961); Addy v. Short, 47 Del. 157, 89 A.2d 136 (1952); Woman’s Relief Corps No. 1 Michigan v. South Haven City & Township Library Board, 313 Mich. 85, 20 N.W.2d 820 (1945). Although appellant contends that these cases are distinguishable because they deal with real property, Minn. Stat. § 301.56 gave the trustee the right to administer any “asset,” and was clearly not limited to real property.
Further, in other cases corporations have been involved in actions which did not pertain to real property. See Striker v. Chester, 42 Del.Ch. 578, 217 A.2d 31 (1966); Ross v. Venezuelan-American Independent Oil Producers Association, 230 F.Supp. 701 (D.Del.1964); Wyoming-Indiana Oil & Gas Co. v. Weston, 43 Wyo. 526, 7 P.2d 206 (1932). I would follow these cases and hold that respondent’s claim is not barred.
Because I believe that the corporation’s trustee validly assigned the claim to respondent I would affirm the trial court on that issue and address the remaining issues unanswered by the majority opinion.