Court Opinion

ID: 9786541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:57:41.098723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:46.248803
License: Public Domain

*1245LEHMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
[160] I respectfully dissent. I agree with the portions of the majority's opinion that affirm the district court's decisions and find no abuse of discretion. I likewise agree that it was improper for the district court to exclude Dr. Green's standard-of-care testimony. As the majority discussed in 133, there does not appear to be a meaningful distinction between the qualifications of Dr. Green and Dr. Stevens, and both doctors are sufficiently familiar with the standard of care that their testimony would assist the jury in determining the facts at issue. However, I would find that the district court's error was not prejudicial to the appellants and would therefore affirm this case in its entirety.
[461] An error warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects the appellants' substantial rights. Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo.1996) (quoting Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo.1995)). Generally, to be prejudicial an error must "cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process ... [or possess] a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result." Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1188 (Wyo.1994) (citations omitted). In this case, I cannot conclude that the error caused a miscarriage of justice or compromised the fairness of the proceedings, and I consequently do not be-Hieve the error requires reversal.
[162] My review of Dr. Stevens' testimony shows that, although it was determined at the pretrial hearing that Dr. Stevens could testify about the standard of care, he never expressly testified on that subject. Dr. Steven's testimony, as a whole, centered on causation. He mainly testified as to when he believed Mr. Armstrong contracted the infection and why he believed that. Dr. Stevens' conclusions in this area were based on the history of the events from February 28 to March 8. As a result, Dr. Stevens discussed some of the tests performed and the care given to Mr. Armstrong during this time. Because such a discussion is intertwined to some extent with the standard of care, Dr. Stevens' testimony certainly danced around the standard of care topic. However, the ultimate point of Dr. Stevens' testimony was that of causation.. The defendant did not elicit standard of care opinions from Dr. Stevens, and it appears he never expressly offered such opinions.
[163] A review of Drl‘ Green's testimony shows that although the district court ruled that Dr. Green could not testify about the standard of care, he did continue to testify about his conclusions regarding Mr. Armstrong's infection. Similar to Dr. Stevens, Dr. Green did not expressly. offer a standard of care opinion. Nevertheless, Dr. Green did offer extensive testimony. Included in this testimony was his opinion as to whether Mr. Armstrong had the infection on February 28 and why he concluded this. Dr. Green's testimony in this area similarly included elements of the standard of care but to a much greater extent than the testimony of Dr. Stevens. In fact, Dr. Green testified about what questions should have been asked of Mr. Armstrong, about what symptoms should have raised a red flag that there was an infection, that a blood test would have shown abnormalities,’ that antibiotics would have helped, and that Dr. Hrabal had the "golden moment" to prevent Mr. Armstrong's infection. While this testimony was not an express opinion on the standard of care either, it was significantly closer to such testimony than that of Dr. Stevens. I would consider this testimony, combined with the testimony of Dr. Tredal, sufficient to counter the testimony offered by Dr. Rosen, the appellee's standard of care expert. f
[T64] Thus, considering the trial as a whole, I cannot conclude that there was a miscarriage of justice or that the appellants were denied a fair trial due to the district court's error. I would therefore hold that the district court's error was not prejudicial to the appellants. As a result, T would affirm this case in its entirety.