Court Opinion

ID: 9855403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:24:18.472939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:14.397302
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
In Rockdale County, Marvin Turner was indicted for murder. Turner and the State moved to close the pre-trial proceedings to the press and public and, after conducting a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, however, we vacated the trial court’s order and remanded “for consideration of the alternatives to closure.” Rockdale Citizen Pub. Co. v. State of Ga., 266 Ga. 92, 94 (1) (463 SE2d 864) (1995). Even though Turner had been granted a change of venue to Hall County in the meantime, the trial court on remand nevertheless entered a new closure order. A majority of this Court now reverses the trial court’s renewed closure order and I am constrained *582to concur in that judgment of reversal. However, I neither agree with all that is said by the majority nor do I believe that the majority opinion furnishes sufficient guidance for the bench and bar. Accordingly, I must concur specially.
This Court’s opinion in the first appeal establishes as the law of the case that, prior to the change of venue, some remedial measure was necessary, because the highly inflammatory pre-trial publicity constituted “clear and convincing proof’ of “a clear and present danger” to Turner’s right to a fair trial in Rockdale County. Rockdale Citizen Pub. Co. v. State of Ga., supra at 93 (1). Thus, the only question to be addressed by the trial court on remand was whether closure of the pre-trial proceedings was the appropriate remedial measure to protect Turner’s right to a fair trial in Rockdale County. In this state, closure is not an available remedy unless there is clear and convincing proof that no other alternative will protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Rockdale Citizen Pub. Co. v. State of Ga., supra at 93 (1); R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 580 (5) (292 SE2d 815) (1982). A change of venue is one of the remedies which must be considered and eliminated before closure is authorized. Rockdale Citizen Pub. Co. v. State of Ga., supra at 93 (1), fn. 1. Because, subsequent to our remand of the case, the trial court ordered a change of venue, the issue which prompted the remand became moot. There was no longer any question as to whether closure was the appropriate remedial measure to protect Turner’s right to a fair trial in Rockdale County, since he was facing trial in Hall County.
The trial court nevertheless entered another closure order. As the majority recognizes, the proof that the highly inflammatory pre-trial publicity constituted a clear and present danger to Turner’s right to a fair trial in Rockdale County would not support the entry of the new closure order. After changing venue, the trial court was authorized to order closure only upon clear and convincing proof that there was no other alternative to guard against a clear and present danger to Turner’s right to a fair trial in Hall County. Because the trial court was aware that the criminal proceedings against Turner already had been a source of highly inflammatory pre-trial publicity in Rockdale County, it is understandable that it would conclude that the change of venue would not obviate the need for closure and that the lurid details of this particular case would continue to be sensationalized by the Hall County media. As the trial court noted, the requirement that Turner actually be exposed to highly inflammatory pre-trial publicity in Hall County could result in “a cycle of venue changes in an effort to stay one step ahead of prejudicial media coverage.” Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that the trial court’s entry of the closure order now on appeal “clearly violates this Court’s holding in Lumpkin.” To the contrary, I find that the trial court’s comprehen*583sive new order reflects a conscientious effort on its part to follow the mandate of Lumpkin by balancing the right of the press and public to an open trial against Turner’s constitutional right to a fair trial.
Decided April 15, 1996.
Heyman & Sizemore, William H. Major, William B. Brown, for appellant.
Cheryl F. Custer, District Attorney, Calvin A. Leipold, Jr., Martin & McGuire, John J. Martin, Jr., for appellees.
Gerald R. Weber, Alston & Bird, Amy R. Wolverton, Hull, Towill, Norman & Barrett, David E. Hudson, James B. Ellington, Barnes, Browning, Tanksley & Casurella, Roy E. Barnes, Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, Peter C. Canfield, James A. Demetry, James W. *584Kimmetl, Jr., amici curiae.
*583Nevertheless, it is the established law of this state that a trial court has exceedingly limited discretion in ordering closure “because our constitution commands that open hearings are the nearly absolute rule and closed hearings the very rarest of exceptions.” R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, supra at 579 (4). Accordingly, I have to agree with the majority that Turner and the State failed to produce “clear and convincing proof’ that closure was the only means by which a “clear and present danger” to his right to a fair trial in Hall County could be avoided. A viable concern that Turner’s right to a fair trial in Hall County might be violated by future highly inflammatory publicity did not authorize the trial court’s present denial of the right of the press and public to access to the criminal proceedings pending against Turner in that county. Accordingly, I reluctantly concur in the majority’s judgment of reversal.
I would hasten to add, however, that our holding does not prohibit the trial court from ordering closure at some future date. R. W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, supra at 580 (5), fn. 11, provides that “it would be less burdensome for the movant to justify the closure motion in a pre-trial hearing due to the absence of some alternatives at this stage of the proceedings.” This holding in Lumpkin must mean something and is not without relevance in this case. Accordingly, if the perceived threat of highly inflammatory pre-trial publicity in Hall County actually comes to pass, either or both parties could file a new motion to close proceedings. At that time the trial court would be authorized to consider such a motion and to grant it if “clear and convincing proof’ is produced showing that closure is the only means by which “a clear and present danger” to Turner’s right to a fair trial in Hall County could be avoided.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this special concurrence.