Court Opinion

ID: 9774444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:20:53.559199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:08.274118
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
TEAGUE, Judge.
On original submission, a panel of this Court held that the construction of the Texas Controlled Substances Act, see Art. 4476-15, V.A.C.S., which allowed prosecution for the delivery or possession of the substance phentermine, as an isomer of methamphetamine, see Ex parte Ashcraft, 565 S.W.2d 926 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), could not be reasonably foreseen, and thus prosecution under this theory had an ex post facto effect on any delivery or possession of phentermine which occurred prior to our rendition of Ex parte Ashcraft, and served to deny appellant here of the due process of law guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964).
In its motion for rehearing, the State asserts: 1) the panel opinion allows prosecution for salts, isomers, and salts of isomers of substances set forth in the Controlled Substances Act only after a judicial edict that such variations of a designated substance are included in the Act’s proscriptions, resulting in an untenable result; 2) there is no showing in the record that appellant knew that the substance he delivered was “phentermine”, let alone an “isomer of methamphetamine”, so lack of notice, pre-Ashcraft, is not relevant; and 3) Ash-craft was not an unforeseeable construction of a plain, unambiguous, and narrowly-drawn statute, such that it amounted to “judicial legislation.” The State thus argues that Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, is inapplicable to this cause.
We disagree with the State’s arguments and will overrule its’ motion for rehearing.
Resolution of the issues raised in this cause requires analysis of ex post facto law, and a review of the Controlled Substances Act as it pertains to the substance phenter-mine.
*271I. EX POST FACTO LAW
Although the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution “is addressed at legislative action only,” and does not reach erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the courts, Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915), the principles embodied in the clause are applicable to judicial actions through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977); Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra; also see Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 93 S.Ct. 2199, 37 L.Ed.2d 52 (1973).
Ex post facto considerations come into play when legislation or judicial action detrimentally affects a person, and the legislation or judicial action relates to acts of that person committed before the legislation came into force or before the judicial action occurred. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). These considerations affect only substantive, not procedural, matters. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). In other words, legislation and judicial action may not retroactively subject a person’s actions to criminal prosecution, see Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, and may not retroactively subject criminal actions to a potentially more onerous punishment, see Weaver v. Graham, supra, but may change the procedures whereby it is determined whether a person has committed a criminal act, or what punishment is appropriate, see Dobbert v. Florida, supra.
Judicial action must be analyzed for its ex post facto effect where a court interprets narrow and precise legislation in a manner which cannot be reasonably foreseen, Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, or when a court is interpreting legislation that is broad and sweeping in its language, such that judicial interpretation is necessary to define its boundaries, and a subsequent opinion expands the boundaries set out in the previously controlling opinion beyond what could be reasonably foreseen. Marks v. United States, supra. In a similar vein, legislation which is unnecessarily complex, such as the Controlled Substances Act, frequently requires judicial interpretation to define what actions are covered within its language, as is demonstrated by this Court’s opinions in Riddle v. State, 560 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Lumberas v. State, 560 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and Ex parte Ashcraft, supra.
Both Riddle and Lumberas, supra, held that, as of August 28, 1973, neither possession nor delivery of phentermine was subject to any penalty. However, Ex parte Ashcraft, supra, effectively overruled both Riddle and Lumberas, supra, holding that possession or delivery of phentermine could be prosecuted as an isomer of methamphetamine — if such was both alleged and proved. Appellant in this cause delivered 181 capsules of phentermine after we issued our opinions in Riddle and Lumberas, supra, but before Ex parte Ashcraft, supra, was decided.1 To decide this cause it is thus necessary to ask the question: Could appellant have reasonably foreseen the holding in Ex parte Ashcraft ? The answer to this question: A resounding NO.
II. FORESEEABILITY OF ASHCRAFT
The Controlled Substances Act came into effect on August 27, 1973. On that date phentermine was not listed by name in either the Dangerous Drug Act, Art. 4476-14, V.A.C.S., or anywhere within the Act, although it was indirectly included in the Act as an isomer of methamphetamine.- Isomers of methamphetamine were, and still are, included under Schedule II, subsection *272(d)(2),1a and under Penalty Group I, subsection (6), so possession and delivery of phen-termine were then punishable under Sections 4.04 and 4.03 of the Act, respectively. However, the next day, August 28, 1973, the Commissioner of Health, pursuant to Sections 2.09 and 2.13 of the Act, placed phentermine, by name, in Schedule IV, subsection (d)(2), thereby evidencing a judgment that phentermine had a lower potential for abuse than the general class of isomers of methamphetamine, which have at all times been maintained in Schedule II. See the panel opinion in this cause and Judge Clinton’s concurring opinion in Ex parte Wilson, 588 S.W.2d 905 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and his dissenting opinion in Grady v. State, 634 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).
 It is well settled that when a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, the special or local provision controls unless there is a clear indication that the general provision is to prevail. Ex parte Harrell, 542 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Art. 5429b-2, Sec. 3.06, V.A.C.S. (The Code Construction Act). Thus, when both a proscription for a general class of acts, such as theft, and one for a specific form of that general class of offenses, such as welfare fraud, conflict as to the range of punishment, the more specific statute will prevail. See Tawfik v. State, 643 S.W.2d 127 (1982); Williams v. State, 641 S.W.2d 236 (1982; rehearing denied November 24, 1982); Jones v. State, 552 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
An analogous situation exists within the Controlled Substances Act, in that different controlled substances are deemed to constitute varying degrees of harm to society in their illicit uses, so differing punishments are authorized for the illicit use of the various controlled substances. When the Commissioner of Health classified phenter-mine by name within Schedule IV, phenter-mine was determined to be less harmful than the general class of isomers of methamphetamine listed in Schedule II. It was therefore reasonable to believe that possession and delivery were not to be punished as isomers of methamphetamine, despite the failure to list phentermine within any Penalty Group. The failure to include phenter-mine within a Penalty Group cannot necessarily be viewed as a mere oversight, in that by its inclusion within a Schedule, phenter-mine became a controlled substance, Sec. 2.01, bringing it within the controls established by Subchapter 3 of the Act, and creating offenses involving it under Sections 4.08 and 4.09.
Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the law subsequent to the inclusion of phen-termine within Schedule IV, but prior to Ex parte Ashcraft, supra, was that delivery of phentermine was not an offense2 and possession of phentermine was an offense, but with no penalty,3 except as it may have related to commercial, see Sec. 4.08, or fraud, see Sec. 4.09, offenses. The Court’s opinions of Riddle and Lumberas, supra, serve to support such a view of law.4 The holding of Ex parte Ashcraft, supra, therefore, could not have been reasonably foreseen by the appellant.
III. ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OP THE STATUS OF THE LAW
We do not believe it matters whether appellant had actual knowledge of the status of the law at the time he delivered the methamphetamine because of the following principle of law:
The determination whether a criminal statute provides fair warning of its prohi*273bitions must be made on the basis of the statute itself and the other pertinent law, rather than on the basis of an ad hoc appraisal of the subjective expectations of particular defendants. Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra, fn. 5.
IV. FAILURE TO SPECIFICALLY NAME A SUBSTANCE WITHIN A PENALTY GROUP
The failure to specifically name a substance within a Penalty Group does not prevent prosecution for its delivery or possession if it is otherwise included in a Penalty Group, provided the reason it is included is both alleged and proved, see Wilson v. State, supra, unless the substance is specifically named in another Schedule or Penalty Group. It is only in the latter situation that a judicial decision, (that notwithstanding its inclusion in a Schedule, the failure to specifically include a controlled substance in a Penalty Group allows its prosecution under a broader, general classification), must be limited so that it does not serve as an ex post facto law.
V. OUR CONCLUSION AND HOLDING
In light of the foregoing, due process of law does not allow prosecution for possession or delivery of phentermine under Sections 4.03 and 4.04 of the Controlled Substances Act, if the offense occurred between the time when Riddle and Lumberas, supra, were decided and when Ex parte Ashcraft, supra, was decided.
We therefore find that the panel opinion was correctly decided. The State’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
W.C. DAVIS, McCORMICK and CAMPBELL, JJ., dissent.

. The date of appellant’s offense was November 18, 1977. Ex parte Ashcraft, supra, was handed down by a panel of this Court on April 26, 1978. The defendant’s motion for rehearing was denied without opinion on June 7, 1978. In pertinent part, the indictment in this cause alleges that the appellant did “intentionally and knowingly deliver to Eddie Hebisen, a controlled substance, namely Phentermine, an isomer of Methamphetamine.”

. Unless otherwise noted, all section references hereinafter refer to the Texas Controlled Substances Act, supra.

.Under Sec. 4.03, only delivery of controlled substances listed in Penalty Groups 1-4 are offenses.

. Under Sec. 4.04, possession of any controlled substance is an offense unless obtained pursuant to a valid physician’s order, but no penalty attaches unless the substance is in a Penalty Group.

. Thus it does not matter that the offense occurred before the mandates in Riddle and Lumberas had been issued.