Court Opinion

ID: 9659838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:55:50.149145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:12.022195
License: Public Domain

PEEPLES, Justice,
dissenting.
It is one thing to hold that a written waiver of service signed by a respondent mentioned in Probate Code § 130(c)1 is not enforceable. Therefore I do not challenge default judgment reversals such as Dyer v. Wall, 645 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ), on which the majority relies. A respondent might not understand the legal effect of the instrument and a default judgment might result.
But the rule should be different when the respondent enters an appearance by attorney. Here the respondent has been aggressively defended by retained counsel, who answered, filed several motions,2 appeared in court on her behalf, scheduled hearings, submitted orders to the court, and then belatedly filed and presented the motion to dismiss for lack of personal service that brought about this appeal. The respondent herself has appeared in court and has been interviewed by the judge. Her rights could not possibly have been better protected by personal service.
I would hold that the respondent has appeared through her attorney and is before the court under TEX.R.CIV.P. 121 and TEX.PROB.CODE ANN. § 34. I dissent from the holding that § 130(c) requires the legal system and the applicants for guardianship to start all over with personal service and a new lawsuit.

. The statute, quoted in the majority opinion, requires personal service on certain minors, and on those alleged to be of unsound mind or in need of a guardian.

. The Respondent's law firm has filed a motion to vacate, a motion to transfer, two motions to dismiss, an amended motion to dismiss, and a motion for protective order.