Court Opinion

ID: 9674754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:34:49.946952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.581851
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Having demonstrated in Compton v. State, 607 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), that the “greater right of possession” theory conceived by the majority is without legislative sanction, there is no need to dwell on the point. Suffice it to say that the fiction of law created by the Compton majority is so contradictory to actual fact that principles of due process are implicated, e. g., fair notice.
Yesterday in Compton, supra, the “owner” was a corporate regional manager;1 today he is a security guard;2 tomorrow in Smallwood v. State, 607 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Cr.App.1979), he will be a loading dock worker.3 Thus, when applied the theory turns into a fairy tale: An accused intends to deprive another of property that is not his-without consent that is not his to give. So much for the mandate to construe provisions of the penal code “according to the fair import of their terms, to promote justice,” V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 1.05(a).
I must and do dissent.

.In that capacity, given his duties and responsibilities and the internal fiscal operations of International Harvester, however, the Court quite properly found that J. Howard Connen was shown to be the “owner” by reason of his possession of the property involved; the “greater right of possession” theory crafted by the majority in Part II of Compton is, therefore, pure obiter dicta.

. Joe Martinez, the alleged owner of the purloined sweaters, was merely on duty at the time; one is left to wonder as to the basis for any right to possession of the sweaters of Martinez.

. Albert J. Turegano, alerted by a security guard, attempted to grab the shoplifter fleeing from an Austin department store.