Court Opinion

ID: 9412769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 16:04:43.039886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:25.040059
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                              In re the Matter of:

               ANGELA M. PALADINO, Petitioner/Appellee,

                                        v.

             RICHARD W. MACGURN, Respondent/Appellant.

                           No. 1 CA-CV 22-0513 FC
                               FILED 8-01-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. DR1997-015572
               The Honorable Melissa Iyer Julian, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Sherman & Howard L.L.C., Phoenix
By Gabriel A. Peraza, Jake Tyler Rapp
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Poli, Moon & Zane, PLLC, Phoenix
By Michael N. Poli, Lawrence R. Moon
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
                        PALADINO v. MACGURN
                          Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Chief Judge David B. Gass and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1            Richard Macgurn appeals the superior court’s determinations
that his ex-wife Angela Paladino properly renewed three monetary
judgments arising from this dissolution of their marriage, and that he failed
to satisfy the judgments. Because the superior court did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm the superior court’s denial of Macgurn’s motions to
invalidate and vacate the three judgments against him.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.     The Superior Court Enters the Decree Judgment, Fee
              Judgment, and Pension Plan Judgment.

¶2            Before the superior court entered the decree dissolving the
marriage between Macgurn and Paladino in 2004, Macgurn filed a written
objection to Paladino’s proposed form of judgment. Macgurn objected to
the two paragraphs in the proposed Decree with text that permitted
prejudgment interest, arguing that “[n]o interest should accrue . . . until the
Decree is entered.” Paladino defended her inclusion of interest predating
the Decree, but after oral argument, the superior court sided with Macgurn
and struck part of the language in ¶ 6 and ¶ 7:

       6. [Paladino] is awarded spousal maintenance in the amount
       of $1,950.00 per month for twelve months commencing March
       1, 2004 with interest thereon at ten percent per annum until
       paid.

       7. [Paladino] is awarded $47,568.75 as a money judgment
       against [Macgurn] as an equalization of the community assets
       awarded above with interest thereon at ten percent per
       annum from February 12, 2004, until paid.

The court filed the Decree Judgment on December 3, 2004 and a related
under advisement ruling stating that it “sustain[ed] the objection to the
inclusion of pre-judgment interest in ¶¶ 6 and 7 of the Proposed Decree.”

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                          Decision of the Court

¶3             The Decree Judgment awarded Paladino $167,941.09,
including: (1) $1,950 per month of spousal maintenance over 12 months
starting March 1, 2004; (2) $47,568.75 as equalization of community assets;
(3) $90,000 of attorneys’ fees; and (4) $6,972.34 of costs. The Decree also
awarded Paladino a portion of Macgurn’s pension plan through a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) that would be issued later to specifically
direct the distribution of those benefits.

¶4          On April 22, 2005, the court awarded Paladino’s share of
pension plan benefits requiring Macgurn to distribute $286,700.29 to her
(QDRO). After Macgurn did not comply, Paladino sought to enforce the
QDRO. The court eventually issued a civil arrest warrant and entered a
monetary judgment awarding Paladino the amount apportioned in the
QDRO (Pension Plan Judgment).

¶5            On October 11, 2006, in a separate judgment, the court
awarded Paladino attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal in the Decree action
totaling $7,382.50 ($6,000 in fees and $1,382.50 in costs) (Fee Judgment).

       B.     Disputes Arise Concerning Renewals of the Judgments.

¶6             Following a Sheriff’s sale on January 23, 2007, Paladino
received $90,000 and filed and recorded a partial satisfaction of the Decree
Judgment in February 2007. On March 12, 2008, after a garnishment,
Paladino received $85,000 and filed and recorded a second partial
satisfaction of the Decree Judgment.

¶7            Paladino renewed all the judgments by affidavit under the
renewal statute, A.R.S. § 12-1612. She renewed the Decree Judgment in
2009, 2014, and 2019. She renewed the Fee Judgment in 2011 and 2016. She
renewed the QDRO apportioning pension benefits in 2010 and 2015, and
the corresponding monetary Pension Plan Judgment in 2012 and 2016.

¶8             In April 2020, Macgurn moved under Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure 60 and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 85 to vacate and
invalidate the Pension Plan Judgment for lack of proper renewal and as
void for lack of service. He filed a similar, separate motion to invalidate the
Decree Judgment and Fee Judgment. He argued that the Decree Judgment
was fully paid on December 5, 2007 from the second partial satisfaction and
that an excess of $3,132.36 should have been, but was not, credited to the
Fee Judgment. Macgurn argued that the Decree Judgment was fully paid
because the court entering the Decree struck the interest provision such that
post-judgment interest did not accrue. He also asserted the Decree
Judgment was improperly renewed because of calculation errors in

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                        PALADINO v. MACGURN
                          Decision of the Court

Paladino’s renewal affidavits and asked the court to declare the Decree and
Remand judgments unenforceable based on violations of the renewal
statute, A.R.S. § 12-1612.

¶9            After briefing and oral argument, the court denied Macgurn’s
motions assailing the Decree Judgment and Fee Judgment and their
renewals. The court determined the Decree Judgment had not been fully
satisfied by the second partial satisfaction because post-judgment interest
was accruing on the judgment by operation of statute at the statutory rate
of 10 percent per year. Thus, the court ruled that the Decree Judgment’s
silence on the accrual of interest did not preclude statutory interest from
accruing.

¶10           The court next determined that Paladino properly renewed
the Decree Judgment. Relying on Triple E Produce Corp. v. Valencia, 170 Ariz.
375, 377–78 (App. 1991) and Fay v. Harris, 64 Ariz. 10, 13 (1945), the court
stated that calculation errors in the amount due as represented in the
affidavit are not necessarily fatal to renewal when it is apparent that the
balance claimed is incorrect. The court explained that when Paladino first
renewed the Decree Judgment the outstanding balance after the partial
satisfactions was $10,342.38, but the affidavit miscalculated the amount by
$588.86 in stating the balance as $10,931.24.1 Nevertheless, the superior
court found that Paladino’s first renewal affidavit contained all the
information needed to provide notice to third parties and the debtor about
the correct amount owed including the original judgment amounts, the
amounts deducted by the satisfactions, and the 10 percent rate of interest.

¶11            The court determined the same was true of Paladino’s second
renewal in 2014, but the third and last renewal of the Decree Judgment in
2019 was “a closer question . . . because it misstates the principal balance of
the debt to include the spousal maintenance award and miscalculated the
interest amount.” However, the court determined there was enough
information to put others on notice of the correct amount due because the
affidavit referenced the judgment and prior renewals including recordation
numbers which are publicly accessible, and included the amount of the
judgment, amounts deducted by the satisfaction payments, and the
applicable 10 percent interest rate.

1The court’s ruling discusses the first Decree Judgment renewal filed on
November 10, 2009 and the contents of the affidavit even though the ruling
mistakenly refers to the renewal occurring on November 10, 2011.

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                        PALADINO v. MACGURN
                          Decision of the Court

¶12          The court similarly determined that Paladino timely and
properly renewed the Fee Judgment ruling, “[t]hough some calculation
errors occurred in the renewal affidavits . . . it is clear on the face of the
renewal affidavits what the actual amount due and owing was
notwithstanding inadvertent calculation errors.”

¶13           The court denied Macgurn’s motions to invalidate the Decree
Judgment and Fee Judgment and rejected his argument regarding the
renewals of the Pension Plan Judgment. But it set an evidentiary hearing
on the issue of a lack of service regarding the Pension Plan Judgment.
Thereafter, in a final signed judgment filed June 16, 2022, the court denied
Macgurn’s motion and claim that the Pension Plan Judgment was void for
lack of service.

¶14            Macgurn timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), and
12-120.21(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

¶15            Macgurn reasserts the claims from his motions to invalidate
the various judgments, though he does not question the adequacy of service
related to the Pension Plan Judgment. Macgurn contends that the superior
court misapplied the facts to the law regarding post-judgment interest and
the renewal statute, and thus abused its discretion in declining to vacate or
invalidate the renewed judgments.

¶16           We review the superior court’s ruling on a Rule 85(b) motion
for an abuse of discretion, see Clark v. Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 272, 275 ¶ 10 (App.
2017), and will not set aside the court’s fact-findings “unless clearly
erroneous,” Ariz. R.P. Fam. Law 82(a)(5). See Ariz. R.P. Fam. Law 85(b)
(providing court “may relieve a party . . . from a judgment”); Quijada v.
Quijada, 246 Ariz. 217, 220 ¶ 7 (App. 2019) (reviewing denial of motion to
set aside decree for abuse of discretion). We review de novo the court’s
interpretation of statutes and rules, and its conclusions of law. Alvarado v.
Thomson, 240 Ariz. 12, 14 ¶ 11 (App. 2016).

I.     Paladino Properly Renewed the Decree Judgment, Upon Which
       Statutory Post-Judgment Interest Accrued By Operation of Law.

¶17           Macgurn advances two arguments that the Decree Judgment
does not include post-judgment interest — first, that the superior court
struck post-judgment interest from the Decree Judgment as entered, and

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                         PALADINO v. MACGURN
                           Decision of the Court

second, that a post-judgment interest does not accrue on a judgment lacking
reference to interest. Both contentions fail.

¶18            First, Macgurn argues that the superior court’s striking and
initialing of text concerning interest in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Decree
Judgment shows that the superior court declined to award any post-
judgment interest. However, the record belies this assertion. The superior
court’s contemporaneous under advisement ruling explained the
strikethrough as “sustaining the objection to the inclusion of pre-judgment
interest in ¶¶ 6 and 7 of the Proposed Decree.” Significantly, Macgurn’s
objection did not argue — or even suggest — that any and all interest on
the judgment be denied. And the judgment itself contains no evidence of
an affirmative decision to decline all post-judgment interest.

¶19           Second, to the extent Macgurn contends that the Decree
Judgment does not award post-judgment interest because it fails to do so
expressly, that is not the law. In 2004, when the court entered the Decree
Judgment, post-judgment interest accrued “at the rate of ten per cent per
annum.” A.R.S. § 44-1201(A). By operation of law, the Decree Judgment
contained an award of post-judgment interest at the then-effective statutory
rate, because the “court ha[d] no discretion to refuse to award such
interest,” Matter of Est. of Miles, 172 Ariz. 442, 445 (App. 1992).

¶20           We affirm the superior court’s determination that regardless
of the Decree Judgment’s silence on the issue of post-judgment interest,
such interest accrues on the Decree Judgment by operation of A.R.S. § 44-
1201 at a rate of 10 percent per annum. We thus also affirm the superior
court’s determination that the Decree Judgment was not fully paid, given
that Macgurn’s arguments that he satisfied the Decree Judgment are
premised on his mistaken view that no interest accrued under it.

II.    Macgurn Properly Renewed the Judgments.

       A.     Paladino Properly Renewed the Decree Judgment Because
              the Correct Amount Owed Was Readily Discernable From
              the Face of Each Renewal Affidavit.

¶21          Macgurn argues the Decree Judgment’s renewal affidavits are
misleading and do not state exact amounts, and thus fail to strictly comply
with A.R.S. § 12-1612. The renewal statutes “are designed to notify
interested parties of ‘the existence and continued viability of the
judgment.’” Fidelity Nat’l Fin. Inc. v. Friedman, 225 Ariz. 307, 311 ¶ 19 (2010)
(citation omitted). The statutory requirements to renew and revive
judgments serve purposes that include notifying the judgment debtor and

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                         PALADINO v. MACGURN
                           Decision of the Court

other interested parties “of the identity of the judgment to be renewed,”
Weltsch v. O’Brien, 25 Ariz. App. 50, 53 (1975), “inform[ing] . . . as to the
present ownership of that judgment so that payment can be properly
made,” and “giv[ing] the judgment creditor the right to renew his judgment
for the amount that is actually due and owing,” Triple E Produce Corp., 170
Ariz. at 378. Accord J.C. Penney v. Lane, 197 Ariz. 113, 119 ¶ 29 (App. 1999).

¶22           Under A.R.S. § 12-1612(B), a renewal affidavit must include
several items of information. The only one Macgurn contends was lacking
here was (B)(5)’s requirement to state “[t]he exact amount due on the
judgment after allowing all setoffs and counterclaims known to affiant, and
other facts or circumstances necessary to a complete disclosure as to the
exact condition of the judgment.”

¶23            Errors in renewal affidavits do not necessarily make a
renewal ineffective. For example, in J.C. Penney, we observed that under
Arizona law “some errors in the affidavits filed may not be considered fatal
if they are not misleading.” 197 Ariz. at 119 ¶ 31. We distinguished those
errors from “Penney’s filing of the affidavit for renewal in a superior court
in a county different from that in which its judgment was docketed,” which
“did not provide reasonable notice to interested persons of the status of the
judgment.” Id. We explained that “the affidavit is to be filed with the clerk
of the superior court in the same county in which the judgment was
docketed so that it can be maintained with the other records concerning that
judgment.” Id. at 118 ¶ 27; id. at 119 ¶ 30 (stating the statute does not intend
for people checking for renewed judgments must check the court records in
all counties).

¶24           If one can ascertain the required information from the face of
the renewal affidavit, then “technical omission or errors in the affidavit will
not defeat the renewal of the judgment.” Weltsch, 25 Ariz. App. at 53 (citing
Fay, 64 Ariz. 10; McBride v. McDonald, 25 Ariz. 207 (1923)). In Fay, the
renewal affidavit overstated the balance owed, but the renewal was
effective because “all of the items of the judgment appeared, all of the
credits were set out, [and] the data appeared on the face of the affidavit,”
allowing calculation of the exact balance. 64 Ariz. at 13–14. Fay thus found
a renewal valid because its reader could ascertain the balance by
eliminating a plainly improper charge, deducting an amount of credit that
was shown but not actually deducted, and then computing interest. Id.

¶25            In Triple E, we observed that ascertaining the exact balance on
the face of the affidavit in Fay still required some legal or special knowledge
as to which items on the affidavit were correctly computed or accounted

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                         PALADINO v. MACGURN
                           Decision of the Court

for. 170 Ariz. at 378 (stating rule in Fay not intended as “an immutable rule
that an error in the computation of the balance is excusable only if the
correct amount can be ascertained from the face of the affidavit”). We thus
held “that where the amount of the balance is incorrectly overstated
because of an inadvertent failure to credit a payment made on the
judgment, the judgment is then renewed only in the correct amount and,
under such circumstances, any interested party would have the right to
correct the judgment on motion and after notice.” Id.

¶26            Here, Macgurn has not shown the court abused its discretion
by determining Paladino properly renewed the Decree Judgment.
Macgurn does not challenge the accuracy of the court’s calculations or the
ability to ascertain the balance owed. The court correctly found that
notwithstanding the calculation error in the 2009 renewal that overstated
the balance owed by $588.86 after the satisfactions, the affidavit still
contained all the information needed to provide notice to third parties and
Macgurn about the correct amount owed including the original judgment
amounts, the amounts deducted by the satisfactions, and the 10 percent
interest rate. See Fay, 64 Ariz. at 13–14; Triple E, 170 Ariz. at 378. We see no
abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling that at the time of the first renewal,
the $10,342.38 balance owed was ascertainable, though the affidavit stated
the balance was $10,931.24.2

¶27           Likewise, we agree with the superior court’s determination
that the second renewal in 2014 also provided the information necessary to
ascertain the correct balance owed. Macgurn argues that the second
renewal incorrectly calculated interest on the award of spousal
maintenance, which was error because that award did not accrue interest
and had long since been paid. However, the interest is readily apparent
and identifiable, and as such, the actual balance owed can be ascertained.
See Fay, 64 Ariz. at 13–14; Triple E, 170 Ariz. at 378. The worksheet for the
second renewal itemized spousal support showing a $0 balance. Further,
the Decree Judgment shows that the 12 months of spousal maintenance
installment payments had nearly concluded by the time the Decree was
entered in 2004. Further, the first renewal did not include interest on
spousal maintenance. Thus, the error is identifiable from the renewal and
not likely to materially mislead, and the balance is ascertainable from the
information therein and the record. See J.C. Penney, 197 Ariz. at 118 ¶ 27

2 The court’s ruling discusses the contents of the first Decree Judgment
renewal filed on November 10, 2009, but mistakenly refers to the renewal
occurring on November 10, 2011, although the date did not affect the court’s
analysis.

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                        PALADINO v. MACGURN
                          Decision of the Court

(determining renewal affidavits are filed “in the same county in which the
judgment was docketed so that it can be maintained with the other records
concerning that judgment”).

¶28            Finally, Macgurn argues the third renewal in 2019 does not
have a worksheet but “avows that the (fully paid) Decree/Judgment is now
up to a balance of $48,847.87.” However, this argument is premised on
Macgurn’s contention about post-judgment interest which we reject for the
reasons previously discussed. Further, on appeal, Macgurn neither
identifies any other errors in the 2019 renewal, nor contests the superior
court’s resolution of this same claim. In ruling on the third and most recent
renewal, the superior court stated that the affidavit incorrectly included the
spousal maintenance amount and miscalculated interest. Nevertheless, like
the other renewals, the court determined that the 2019 renewal provided
sufficient information from which to discern the actual amount. Because
Macgurn does not contest this, he has not shown that the court abused its
discretion by denying his motion based on the renewals.

       B.     Paladino Properly Renewed the Fee Judgment Despite the
              Math Error in Her 2011 Renewal, Because the Reader of the
              2011 Renewal Affidavit and its Attached Worksheet Could
              Readily Ascertain the Correct Amount Owed.

¶29          Macgurn argues that the Fee Judgment filed on October 11,
2006 that awarded Paladino $6,000 in attorneys’ fees and $1,382.50 in costs
on appeal, for a total of $7,382.50, was improperly renewed. Specifically,
he argues that Paladino filed the first renewal in October 2011 stating the
outstanding balance as of October 1 was $17,112.71, which was incorrect
because it added $6,000 “out of thin air” to the balance owed.

¶30            Macgurn, however, acknowledges the renewal includes a
worksheet showing the correct original total balance of $7,382.50 and the
daily interest which he contends is a nearly correct amount resulting in an
approximately $2.00 total discrepancy. The worksheet also reflects that
with the added interest accrued between 2006 and 2011 of $3,730.21, the
total balance due was $11,112.71. Macgurn acknowledges this correct total
is listed on the worksheet before the overstated total of $17,112.71, and he
does not contend this is inaccurate or an amount that cannot be ascertained.

¶31            We agree with the superior court that all information needed
to ascertain the existence of the Fee Judgment and the exact amount owed
was contained in the renewal affidavit and worksheet. True, the renewal
materials did not itemize or account for the additional $6,000. But the

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                        PALADINO v. MACGURN
                          Decision of the Court

affidavit-plus-attached-worksheet provided the correct calculation and
total and simply misstated it as $6,000 more, apparently because whoever
filled it out mistakenly re-added the $6,000 principal to the correct total of
$11,112.71 (which already included the $6,000). The superior court did not
abuse its discretion in ruling that this error does not mislead about the
status and balance owed on the judgment. The $6,000 discrepancy is readily
discernable as an obvious mistake. And the renewal did not purport to
calculate or account for any additional amount. Thus, here, as in Fay, the
renewal affidavit overstated the balance owed, but the renewal was
effective because again “all of the items of the judgment appeared, all of the
credits were set out, [and] the data appeared on the face of the affidavit.”
64 Ariz. at 13–14. Here when considering the affidavit’s appurtenant
worksheet, the reader can readily ascertain the exact balance. See id.

¶32            Moreover, a later renewal expressly corrected this error. In
2016, Paladino renewed the Fee Judgment a second time showing the
outstanding balance as $14,705.37, which did not include the unexplained
excess of $6,000. Macgurn does not argue that the second renewal fails to
appropriately state the exact amount of the balance owed on the Fee
Judgment. And as Macgurn points out, in this litigation, Paladino
acknowledged the $6,000 discrepancy in briefing, showing the record in
context is clear about the exact amount due on this judgment.

¶33          Accordingly, the typographical error overstating the balance
owed on the 2011 renewal of the Fee Judgment did not render the renewals
defective. We find no error in the superior court’s resolution of this claim.

       C.     Paladino Properly Renewed the Pension Plan Judgment
              Because Her Renewals Correctly State the Amount Due on
              the Judgment.

¶34             Macgurn contends that the two renewals related to the QDRO
and two related to the Pension Plan Judgment are confusing and make it
difficult to track the “exact amount due on the judgment” and the “exact
condition of the judgment” as required by the renewal statute, A.R.S. § 12-
1612(B)(5). Macgurn claims Paladino sowed confusion because she was not
required to renew the non-monetary QDRO, but did renew it, and when
renewing, included interest from the date of the QDRO, while the renewals
for the monetary Pension Plan Judgment added interest from the correct
date in 2007. Macgurn’s challenges do not establish grounds to invalidate
or vacate the Pension Plan Judgment as invalidly renewed. Indeed,
Macgurn underscores the accuracy of Paladino’s renewals when he notes
that they all include the correct original amount owed of $286,729. Macgurn

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                       PALADINO v. MACGURN
                         Decision of the Court

thus fails to show any defect in the Pension Plan Judgment renewals or that
the superior court abused its discretion by denying his motion to invalidate
and vacate the Pension Plan Judgment.

                             CONCLUSION

¶35          For the reasons stated, we affirm.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED:    JT

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