Court Opinion

ID: 9673451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:12:02.963817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.318073
License: Public Domain

*98Riley, J.
(dissenting). Although I agree with the majority that a defense of proper supervision should not bar a claim of a true building defect under the public building exception to governmental immunity, I do not believe that plaintiffs pleaded a claim of a building defect that inhered in the building itself. The majority wrongly refused to address this argument, claiming that it is “not before this Court,” see ante, p 96, despite the fact that defendant preserved this contention and argued it on appeal. I would reach this issue and conclude that there was no building defect as a matter of law. Hence, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision to uphold the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant.
ANALYSIS
I. PUBLIC BUILDING EXCEPTION
As the majority properly notes, see ante, pp 90-91, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability under MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1) for actions taken while performing governmental functions. Jackson v Detroit, 449 Mich 420, 427; 537 NW2d 151 (1995). This broad immunity is subject to a number of narrowly drawn exceptions, including an exception for public buildings under MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106). Section 106 provides in pertinent part:
Governmental agencies have the obligation to repair and maintain public buildings under their control when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building if the governmental agency had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the condition or to take action *99reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition.
This Court has established a five-part test to determine whether the public building exception governs a particular case. A plaintiff must prove:
(1) a governmental agency is involved, (2) the public building in question is open for use by members of the public, (3) a dangerous or defective condition of the public building itself exists, (4) the governmental agency had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged defect, and (5) the governmental agency failed to remedy the alleged defective condition after a reasonable period of time. [Jackson, supra at 428, citing Hickey v Zezulka (On Resubmission), 439 Mich 408, 421; 487 NW2d 106 (1992).]
The duty relates to the dangers presented by the building itself. Jackson, supra at 428. The purpose of the public building exception is to promote the maintenance of safe public buildings, not to provide for safety in public buildings. Id. A public building may be dangerous or defective where there is an improper design, faulty construction, or the absence of safety features. Hickey, supra at 422, citing Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 730; 275 NW2d 268 (1979). However, a court must look to the uses or activities for which that part of the building is assigned to determine if a dangerous or defective condition exists. Id. The question is whether the physical condition was dangerous or defective under the circumstances presented. Hickey, supra at 422, citing Reardon v Dep’t of Mental Health, 430 Mich 398, 410-411; 424 NW2d 248 (1988).
We have also stated on several occasions that where proper supervision would have eliminated the *100alleged defects in the design of the building, the public building exception does not apply. See Jackson, supra at 428,1 quoting Hickey, supra at 426.2 See also the companion case to Reardon, Schafer v Ethridge, supra at 417.3 I agree with the majority’s decision to repudiate this principle because the issue whether there is a valid claim of a building defect under the public building exception is a separate matter from whether proper supervision would have prevented the alleged injury from occurring. Ante, p 95. Even if the governmental agency was negligent in failing to provide proper supervision, the injured party would bring a valid claim under the public building exception if the building’s dangerous or defective condition also caused the injury to occur. There may be multiple causes for an injury. See id., pp 91-92, citing Williamson v Dep’t of Mental Health, 176 Mich App 752, 758; 440 NW2d 97 (1989). The majority’s analysis persuasively demonstrates that in each case in which this *101Court stated that proper supervision would have eliminated the “shortcomings” of the building, we did so only where there was no defect in the building itself as a matter of law. See ante, pp 92-95. Hence, this Court’s statements regarding the role of proper supervision in public building defect cases were dicta, and I join in the majority’s decision to set the principle aside.
E. DE SANCHEZ — THE MAJORITY’S DECISION NOT TO ADDRESS
DEFENDANT’S CLAIM THAT THERE WAS NO BUILDING DEFECT
In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that there was a design defect in the psychiatric hospital’s restroom where there was a toilet stall that contained an overhead dividing bar from which decedent hanged himself while he was unsupervised.4 At the trial court level, defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the allegations really amounted to a claim of lack of supervision, not a defect in a public building. The trial court originally granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis that plaintiffs failed to allege a building defect. The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling. See 161 Mich App 245, 253; 410 NW2d 803 (1987).5 On defendant’s *102appeal from this ruling to this Court, we remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Reardon among other cases. 430 Mich 894 (1988). The Court of Appeals then affirmed its decision on the issue whether plaintiffs adequately pleaded a claim of design defect, but remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the issue whether proper supervision, as stated in Reardon, would have offset the alleged defect. See 179 Mich App 661, 669-670; 446 NW2d 538 (1989).6 On remand from the Court of Appeals, the trial court granted summary disposition for defendant because proper supervision would have offset any of the shortcomings of the configuration of the room, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In affirming, the Court of Appeals again *103noted its previous decision that there was an adequately pleaded complaint:
There is no indication that the design of the stall posed a danger when used as it was intended. When this Court previously reviewed this case, the question was whether, in light of the assigned use of the room for the population of the mental hospital, the design was dangerous or defective because the overhead bar afforded a person bent on committing suicide an implement which could be misused to accomplish that intention. In our earlier opinions in this case, this Court determined plaintiffs’ allegations sufficiently alleged a claim within the building exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106). We are bound by the law of the case to accept this conclusion. [Unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, decided November 29, 1994 (Docket No. 158052).]
Hence, the Court of Appeals has ruled against defendant on three occasions on the issue of the adequacy of plaintiffs’ allegations pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) that there was a building defect under the public building exception.
On plaintiffs’ appeal from that decision, the majority claims that because “the issue whether a defect existed was not fully briefed or argued,” it is unable on appeal to determine whether a building defect existed as a matter of law. See ante, p 85, n 1. The majority seeks to avoid the question whether plaintiffs have adequately alleged whether there was a building defect in the instant case so that, instead, it may solely answer defendant’s response regarding proper supervision. These inquiries, however, cannot be isolated from one another. The only circumstances in which this Court has referred to the fact that proper supervision may defeat a claim of a building defect has been in cases in which this Court was *104resolving whether there was a dangerous or defective condition in a building under the public building exception to governmental immunity. See Jackson, supra at 429 (“the only question presented by this case is whether a dangerous or defective condition existed”); Hickey, supra at 422-423. There is no support for the majority’s decision to isolate the question whether there was a properly alleged building defect from the question whether proper supervision would have eliminated an alleged shortcoming.
In remanding this case to the trial court, the majority provides that the trial court may grant summary disposition to defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if, on remand, the court continues to believe that the overhead bar in the restroom “ ‘did not fail in its purpose’ ” and that “ ‘its mere presence does not constitute a building defect.’ ” Ante, p 97, n 32, quoting the trial court’s October 8, 1992, order. However, the majority is leaving unchanged the three Court of Appeals decisions, two of which were published, in which that Court concluded that there was an adequate allegation of a dangerous condition in the building under MCR 2.116(C)(8). See 161 Mich App 245, 249-253; 410 NW2d 803 (1987), 179 Mich App 661, 667-669; 446 NW2d 538 (1989), and unpublished per curiam opinion (Docket No. 158052). On remand, the trial court is bound under the law of the case to adhere to these three Court of Appeals decisions. The trial court is still bound because the majority has not vacated these earlier decisions. See Johnson v White, 430 Mich 47, 52-53; 420 NW2d 87 (1988).7 Although these decisions would not bind the trial court with *105regard to a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) for summary disposition, I believe that if this Court is interested in receiving further briefing and argument before deciding the question whether there is an issue for the trier of fact on plaintiffs’ building defect claim, this Court should specifically remand the issue to the trial court and vacate the three outstanding decisions of the Court of Appeals under MCR 2.116(C)(8) so that the trial court may examine the issue under MCR 2.116(C)(8) or MCR 2.116(C)(10) unfettered from past decisions.
Moreover, I do not believe that a remand is necessary. This case was begun in March 1984 and has been to the Court of Appeals three times already. There is no dispute about the factual record. The trial court has issued an opinion on the question whether there was a building defect as a matter of law. See ante, p 96, n 32.1 believe this issue is properly before this Court and that we should address it now, not three years from now when it returns on appeal.
m. de SANCHEZ — BUILDING DEFECT
I believe that the restroom was neither dangerous nor defective as a matter of law in light of its intended use as a restroom for patients in a psychiatric hospital. There was no actual defect in the physical condition of the room itself. Rather, the decedent was using the restroom for something other than its *106intended function when he hanged himself on the dividing bar inside the toilet stall.8
In examining plaintiffs’ complaint, plaintiffs suggest a broader purpose for the psychiatric hospital’s restroom than merely the general purpose of any restroom, but that, because it is a psychiatric hospital, it is a room that should be safe for suicidal patients. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the facts of this case are more analogous to the facts of Lockaby v Wayne Co, 406 Mich 65; 276 NW2d 1 (1979), than to Hickey. In Lockaby, supra at 74, n 1, a prisoner knocked himself unconscious in the Wayne County jail causing himself spinal injury resulting in a total paralysis of his body below the neck. The plaintiff alleged that the cell was defectively designed because the jail failed to provide sufficient padding for a cell that was designated for “mental” inmates. Id. at 74-75.9 In Hickey, supra at 415-416, a man was arrested by an officer of the Michigan State University Department of Public Safety for intoxicated driving and was ultimately placed in a holding cell at the Department of Public Safety. The man soon afterward committed suicide by hanging himself with his own belt from one of the four metal brackets that held a heater and extended one or two *107inches from the wall. We noted that the temporary lockup for arrestees was specifically used and assigned for only temporary detention. Id. at 426.10
We should reject plaintiffs’ argument because the better analogy to the instant case is the recent decision, Jackson, a case that plaintiffs neglected to brief, also involving an attempted suicide in a public building. In Jackson, supra at 423-424, Louis Jackson was arrested for intoxicated driving and placed in a cell of a police station in the City of Detroit. Jackson attempted to commit suicide by hanging himself from the exposed overhead bars of his cell with some material, possibly his pants. This Court concluded that the suicide attempt did not come within the public building exception:
Jackson’s suicide attempt does not relate to the maintenance of a safe building for the specific use and purpose for which it was assigned. It relates to safety in public buildings, and thus does not come within the narrow confines of the public building exception to governmental immunity. [Id. at 429 (emphasis added).]
Like the instant case, the employees of the police station knew that Jackson was suicidal. However, unlike this case, there had been a significant number of attempted suicides in that very police station (thirteen attempts over the previous four years). See id. at 429, n 12.11 Nevertheless, we decided that there was *108no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the City of Detroit was subject to liability.12
The Court’s reasoning in Jackson is equally applicable to plaintiffs’ claim here, particularly where one replaces the restroom stall in the psychiatric hospital for a jail cell in the police station:
“To suggest that any physical feature of a jail cell, otherwise benign, that can conceivably become part of a plan of one who is desperately driven to self destruction can become a ‘dangerous or defective condition’ under the public building exception statute, simply crosses the outer limits of any reasonable reading of the intent of that statute when considered in the context of its history, purpose, and wording.” [Jackson, supra at 429, quoting Hickey at 426.]
In the instant case, as in Jackson, there was no dispute that suicidal persons would use this restroom, but that these were not the only people who would use the room. This really is only a claim of negligence. like Jackson, I would conclude in the instant case that defendant was not subject to liability as a matter of law. There is no valid claim for a building defect as a matter of law under the public building exception to governmental immunity for an allegation of a design defect where the building was not used for its intended purposes and there was no actual physical defect in the building itself.
*109conclusion
Although for different reasons than those given by the Court of Appeals, I would affirm the trial court’s decision to grant defendant summary disposition.
Weaver, J., concurred with Riley, J.

 In Jackson, supra at 428, this Court stated:
[WJhere proper supervision would have “offset any shortcomings in the configuration of the room,” the public building exception does not apply. [Quoting Hickey, supra at 422.]

 In Hickey, supra at 422, this Court stated:
[W]e held [in Schafer v Ethridge, 430 Mich 398, 417; 424 NW2d 248 (1988)] that where proper supervision would have “offset any shortcomings in the configuration of the room," the public building exception does not apply. [Emphasis added.]

 In the companion case to Reardon, Schafer v Ethridge, supra at 417, this Court distinguished a previous Supreme Court case:
As distinguished from Bush, where no amount of supervision would have compensated for the lack of safety features, proper supervision would have offset any shortcomings in the configuration of the room.

 In the complaint against defendant Michigan Department of Health, plaintiffs alleged, among other claims, that defendant violated its duties to the decedent:
(16)(k) In the Defendant failing to properly design its restrooms by installing bathroom stalls within the Ypsilanti Regional Psychiatric Hospital that had dividing bars across the top of said bathroom stalls, which would allow in-patients such as the decedent to make suicide attempts by trying to han[g] themselves from said dividing bars, when the Defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that such design defects would cause serious harm and death to the decedent ....

 The Court of Appeals stated:
*102We conclude that plaintiffs’ complaint in the Court of Claims sufficiently pled facts in avoidance of immunity under the defective buildings exception by alleging a structural defect in the hospital in light of the uses or activities for which the wards in the hospital were specifically designed. [Id. at 252-253.]

 In reaffirming its decision on the adequacy of the pleadings for the building defect claim, the Court of Appeals stated:
[W]e are persuaded that our earlier decision upholding the second allegation — the dangerous condition resulting from the dividing bars placed over bathroom stalls — remains correct in light of Rear-don. Given that the rest room was assigned for use by potentially suicidal patients at a mental hospital, this condition was potentially dangerous in and of itself. Because the dangerous condition was inherent in the structure of the stall, we believe that a sufficient allegation concerning the defective nature of the building has been pled.
The Court reversed its decision with regard to the first allegation, i.e., that there was a failure to design the restroom so that patients may be observed by staff, because the Court concluded that the allegation failed to raise a claim that there was a defective condition in the building itself. Id. at 668.

 In Johnson, supra at 52-53, this Court stated:
*105As a general rule, an adjudication on an issue in the first appeal is the law of the case in all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same. . . . Rulings of [an] intermediate appellate court . . . remain the law of the case insofar as they are not affected by the opinion of the higher court reviewing the lower court’s determination. [Emphasis added.]

 Defendants originally brought their motion for summary disposition pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1), the precursor of MCR 2.116(C)(8). Under MCR 2.116(C)(8), a motion for summary disposition is tested on the pleadings alone, and all factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as true. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 654; 532 NW2d 842 (1995). A trial court should grant this motion only where the claim is so unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. Id.

 In three opinions, this Court reversed the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition in favor of Wayne County by concluding that this was a claim that came under the public building exception. Id. at 76-77 (Levin, X, plurality opinion), 81-82 (Wiliiams, X, concurring), 84 (Blair Moody, Jr., X, concurring).

 This Court concluded that there was no building defect as a matter of law. Id. at 427.

 The Court stated in Jackson that “the officers involved were on notice both that the cell could be dangerous, as evidenced by numerous successful and attempted suicides, and that this particular detainee was in fact suicidal.” There were 128 suicide attempts in Detroit police lockups between 1978 and 1983, and there were thirteen attempts in the seventh *108precinct station alone from June 1980 to December 1984. Jackson attempted to commit suicide in the seventh precinct in December 1984. Id. at 423-424.

 The defendant’s motion for summary disposition in Jackson was brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), not MCR 2.116(C)(8). Id. at 425. Nevertheless, I believe that this analysis is relevant for the inquiry whether plaintiffs’ complaint alleged a valid claim of a building defect under MCR 2.116(C)(8).