Court Opinion

ID: 9679465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:53:41.71636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:13.857695
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). As the author of this Court’s opinion in People v Moore, 96 Mich App 754; 293 NW2d 700 (1980), I considered the question of whether persons incarcerated in this state who commit crimes are entitled to the benefits of the 180-day rule. I concluded that they were and have not been persuaded that that view is incorrect.
*636The majority mistakenly assumes that the purpose of the 180-day rule is only to insure concurrent sentencing. In People v Hill, 402 Mich 272, 280; 262 NW2d 641 (1978), the Supreme Court found that the purpose of the 180-day rule was to "secure to state prison inmates their constitutional right to a speedy trial”. Persons incarcerated in the various institutions of this state are as much entitled to speedy trials as those who are not.
Further, the statute embodying the 180-day rule, MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1), does not except incarcerated defendants from its provisions. Plain language of the statute applies to all persons charged with crimes. In People v Loney, 12 Mich App 288; 162 NW2d 832 (1968), this Court carved an exception into the 180-day rule on the basis of what it found to be the intent of the Legislature, to protect an inmate’s right to concurrent sentencing. When critically examined, it is evident that the Loney opinion involves a situation of the tail wagging the dog. That is, on the basis of a finding of legislative intent not expressly stated in the statute, this Court has altered the expressed language of that statute.
It is the function of this Court to apply unambiguous statutes as written. The plain language of the 180-day rule applies to this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the lower court’s order that denied defendant’s motion to dismiss.