Court Opinion

ID: 91415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:03:20+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:58.083085
License: Public Domain

114 U.S. 642 (1885)
EX PARTE REGGEL.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted April 15, 1885.
Decided May 4, 1885.
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH.
*648 Mr. Arthur Brown for petitioner.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:
This case arises under §§ 5278 and 5279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provide:
"SEC. 5278. Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the State or Territory making such demand shall be paid by such State or Territory.
"SEC. 5279. Any agent, so appointed, who receives the fugitive *649 into his custody, shall be empowered to transport him to the State or Territory from which he has fled. And every person who, by force, sets at liberty or rescues the fugitive from such agent while so transporting him, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year." 1 Stat. 302, ch. 7, §§ 1, 2.
It is not necessary to consider the question suggested by counsel as to the right of the governor of the Territory to have withheld the papers upon which he based his warrant for the arrest of the accused; for, the record shows that the requisition and the accompanying papers from the governor of Pennsylvania constituted the evidence upon which he acted, and were submitted to the court to which the writ of habeas corpus was returned.
Under the act of Congress, it became the duty of the governor of Utah to cause the arrest of Reggel, and his delivery to the agent appointed to receive him, when it appeared: 1. That the demand by the executive authority of Pennsylvania was accompanied by a copy of an indictment, or affidavit made before a magistrate, charging Reggel with having committed treason, felony, or other crime within that State, and certified as authentic by her Governor. 2. That the person demanded was a fugitive from justice.
The first of these conditions was met by the production to the governor of Utah of the indictment (duly certified as authentic) of the grand jury of the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the City and County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, wherein the accused was charged with having committed the crime of obtaining by false pretences certain goods with the intent to cheat and defraud the persons therein named; which offence, as was made to appear from the statutes of that Commonwealth (a copy of which, duly certified as authentic, accompanied the indictment), is a misdemeanor under the laws of Pennsylvania, punishable by a fine not exceeding $500, and imprisonment not exceeding three years.
It was objected in the court of original jurisdiction, that there could be no valid requisition based upon an indictment for an offence less than a felony. This view is erroneous. It *650 was declared in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 99, that the words "treason, felony, or other crime" in section 2 of Article I. of the Constitution include every offence, from the highest to the lowest, known to the law of the State from which the accused had fled, including misdemeanors. It was there said by Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the whole court, that, looking to the words of the Constitution, "to the obvious policy and necessity of this provision to preserve harmony between the States and order and law within their respective borders, and to its early adoption by the Colonies, and then by the Confederate States whose mutual interest it was to give each other aid and support whenever it was needed, the conclusion is irresistible, that this compact engrafted in the Constitution included, and was intended to include, every offence made punishable by the law of the State in which it was committed." It is within the power of each State, except as her authority may be limited by the Constitution of the United States, to declare what shall be offences against her laws, and citizens of other States, when within her jurisdiction, are subject to those laws. In recognition of this right, so reserved to the States, the words of the clause in reference to fugitives from justice were made sufficiently comprehensive to include every offence against the laws of the demanding State, without exception as to the nature of the crime.
Although the Constitutional provision in question does not, in terms, refer to fugitives from the justice of any State, who may be found in one of the Territories of the United States, the act of Congress has equal application to that class of cases, and the words "treason, felony, or other crime," must receive the same interpretation, when the demand for the fugitive is made, under that act, upon the governor of a Territory, as when made upon the executive authority of one of the States of the Union.
Another proposition advanced in behalf of appellant is, that the indictment which accompanied the requisition does not sufficiently charge the commission of any crime; of which fact it was the duty of the governor of Utah to take notice, and which the court may not ignore in determining whether *651 the appellant is lawfully in custody. In connection with this proposition, counsel discusses, in the light of the adjudged cases, the general question as to the authority of a court of the State or Territory, in which the fugitive is found, to discharge him from arrest, whenever in its judgment, the indictment; according to the technical rules of criminal pleading, is defective in its statement of the crime charged. It is sufficient for the purposes of the present case to say that, by the laws of Pennsylvania, every indictment is to be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law which charges the crime substantially in the language of the act of assembly prohibiting its commission and prescribing the punishment therefor, or, if at common law, so plainly that the nature of the offence charged may be easily understood by the jury; and, that the indictment, which accompanied the requisition of the governor of Pennsylvania, does charge the crime substantially in the language of her statute. That Commonwealth has the right to establish the forms of pleadings and process to be observed in her own courts, in both civil and criminal cases, subject only to those provisions of the Constitution of the United States involving the protection of life, liberty and property in all the States of the Union.
The only question remaining to be considered, relates to the alleged want of competent evidence before the governor of Utah, at the time he issued the warrant of arrest, to prove that the appellant was a fugitive from the justice of Pennsylvania. Undoubtedly, the act of Congress did not impose upon the executive authority of the Territory the duty of surrendering the appellant, unless it was made to appear, in some proper way, that he was a fugitive from justice. In other words, the appellant was entitled, under the act of Congress, to insist upon proof that he was within the demanding State at the time he is alleged to have committed the crime charged, and subsequently withdrew from her jurisdiction, so that he could not be reached by her criminal process. The statute, it is to be observed, does not prescribe the character of such proof; but that the executive authority of the Territory was not required, by the act of Congress, to cause the arrest of appellant, *652 and his delivery to the agent appointed by the governor of Pennsylvania, without proof of the fact that he was a fugitive from justice, is in our judgment, clear from the language of that act. Any other interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the mere requisition by the executive of the demanding State, accompanied by the copy of an indictment, or an affidavit before a magistrate, certified by him to be authentic, charging the accused with crime committed within her limits, imposes upon the executive of the State or Territory where the accused is found, the duty of surrendering him, although he may be satisfied, from incontestable proof, that the accused had, in fact, never been in the demanding State, and, therefore, could not be said to have fled from its justice. Upon the executive of the State in which the accused is found, rests the responsibility of determining, in some legal mode, whether he is a fugitive from the justice of the demanding State. He does not fail in duty if he makes it a condition precedent to the surrender of the accused that it be shown to him, by competent proof, that the accused is, in fact, a fugitive from the justice of the demanding State.
Did it sufficiently appear that the appellant was, as represented by the executive authority of Pennsylvania, a fugitive from the justice of that Commonwealth? We are not justified by the record before us in saying that the governor of Utah should have held the evidence inadequate to establish that fact. The warrant of arrest refers to an affidavit taken before a notary public of Pennsylvania showing Reggel's flight from that Commonwealth. There was no such affidavit; but the reference, manifestly, was to the affidavit made by Frederick Gentner, which recited the finding by the grand jury of the City and County of Philadelphia, of a true bill of indictment charging Reggel with "the crime of false pretences," and stating that he "is a fugitive from justice," and was then in Salt Lake City, Utah Territory. This is sworn to, and is attested by the seal of the Court of Quarter Sessions  the court in which the prosecution is pending. It is not entirely clear from the record, as presented to us, what is the official character of the person before whom the affidavit was made. The reasonable *653 inference is, that the affidavit was made in the court where the prosecution is pending, and that it is one of the papers accompanying the requisition of the governor of Pennsylvania, and which he certified to be authentic.
It is contended that Gentner's affidavit that Reggel is a fugitive from justice is the statement of a legal conclusion, and is materially defective in not setting out the facts upon which that conclusion rested. Although that statement presents, in some aspects of it, a question of law, we cannot say that the governor of Utah erred in regarding it as the statement of a fact, and as sufficient evidence that appellant had fled from the State in which he stood charged with the commission of a particular crime, on a named day, at the City and County of Philadelphia; especially, as no opposing evidence was brought to his attention. If the determination of that fact by the governor of Utah upon evidence introduced before him, is subject to judicial review, upon habeas corpus, the accused, in custody, under his warrant  which recites the demand of the governor of Pennsylvania, accompanied by an authentic indictment charging him, substantially in the language of her statutes, with a specific crime committed within her limits  should not be discharged merely because, in the judgment of the court, the evidence as to his being a fugitive from justice was not as full as might properly have been required, or because it was so meagre as, perhaps, to admit of a conclusion different from that reached by him. In the present case, the proof before the governor of Utah may be deemed sufficient to make a prima facie case against the appellant as a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the act of Congress.
Judgment affirmed.