Court Opinion

ID: 9753861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:33:11.545762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:43.960281
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 Because I believe this appeal should be quashed, I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 The record before this Court reveals that after Appellant filed his appeal, he became a fugitive.5 Because Appellant is an active fugitive, I would find that the applicable rules of appellate procedure and current case law require that his appeal be quashed.
¶3 The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly provide for the quashing of an appeal where the appellant is a fugitive. Pa.R.A.P.1972(6).6 Moreover:
“[t]he rationale behind dismissal of an appeal while a convicted defendant is a fugitive from justice rests upon the inherent discretion of any court to refuse to hear the claim of a litigant who, by escaping, has placed himself beyond the jurisdiction and control of the court, and *266hence, might not be responsive to the judgment of the court.” In Interest of Dixon, 282 Pa.Super. 189, 190, 422 A.2d 892, 893 (1980) (quoting Commonwealth v. Galloway, 460 Pa. 309, 333 A.2d 741 (1975)) (supporting citations omitted).
In the Interest of C.G., 428 Pa.Super. 314, 630 A.2d 1266, 1268 (1993).
¶ 4 In Commonwealth v. Harrison, 289 Pa.Super. 126, 432 A.2d 1083, 1085-1086 (1981), we dealt with an appellant who, “albeit an escapee at one time, is now amenable to the Court’s jurisdiction.” Harrison, 432 A.2d at 1085-1086. We clarified, however, that “if such were not the case the course of action would be clear,” Id. at 1086 (citing Commonwealth v. Tomlinson, 467 Pa. 22, 354 A.2d 254 (1976) (per curiam) (appeal dismissed where appellant, subsequent to filing and submission of briefs on appeal, became and remained a fugitive); In re Dixon, 282 Pa.Super. 189, 422 A.2d 892 (1980) (appeal dismissed when court learned from the district attorney’s office and public defender that appellant was a fugitive); Commonwealth v. Albert, 260 Pa.Super. 20, 393 A.2d 991 (1978) (per curiam) (appeal quashed due to fugitive status of appellant during pendency of the appeal); Commonwealth v. Barron, 237 Pa.Super. 369, 352 A.2d 84 (1975) (en banc) (appeal dismissed because of appellant’s fugitive status)).
¶ 5 We are also guided by the recent case of Commonwealth v. Kindler, 554 Pa. 513, 722 A.2d 143 (1998), involving a convicted murderer who escaped from prison while his post-trial motions were pending. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the post-trial motions, which the trial court granted, and sentencing was deferred. The fugitive was subsequently captured and sentenced, and he appealed the sentence to the Superior Court. In affirming the sentence, the Court determined that it was proper for the trial court to dismiss the post-verdict motions in response to the appellant’s fugitive status. Kindler, 554 Pa. at 519, 722 A.2d at 146. The Superior Court again heard the case when the appellant filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). In its opinion affirming the dismissal of the appellant’s PCRA petition, the Court enunciated the following:
This Court’s decision in Appellant’s direct appeal rested on a firm foundation based, in part, on Commonwealth v. Passaro, 504 Pa. 611, 476 A.2d 346 (1984). In Passaro, this Court decided that a defendant, whose direct appeal was quashed because of his escape from custody during the pendency of that appeal, was not entitled to have his appeal reinstated following his recapture. In so doing we reiterated that, “a defendant who deliberately chooses to bypass the orderly procedures afforded one convicted of a crime for challenging his conviction is bound by the consequences of his decision.” Id. at 613, 476 A.2d at 347.
¶ 6 Kindler, 554 Pa. at 522, 722 A.2d at 147. The Kindler opinion also explained how the Court was persuaded by the logic of Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 90 S.Ct. 498, 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), in which the United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of an appellant who had become a fugitive while his appeal was pending, stating that the appellant’s flight “‘disentitled’ him from calling upon the resources of the Court for the determination of his claims.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 7 In declining to quash the appeal currently before us, the majority cites Commonwealth v. Deemer, 550 Pa. 290, 705 A.2d 827 (1997), a case decided prior to Kindler. I find the majority’s reliance on Deemer to be misplaced. Unlike the case at hand, Deemer clearly dealt with an appellant who was no longer a fugitive at the time of appeal to this Court. In the case sub judice, however, Appellant is still a fugitive. The Deemer case itself makes it clear that the “returned” status of the appellant is of utmost significance: “Returned fugitives should be punished, if appropriate, for violations of court order or statutes which compel their presence in *267court, but they should not be punished additionally by forfeiture of their appellate rights.” Deemer, 550 Pa. at 295, 705 A.2d at 829 (emphasis added). Further, the Court stated:
[A] fugitive who has returned to the jurisdiction of the court should be allowed to exercise his post-trial rights in the same manner he would have done had he not become a fugitive.... In short, a fugitive who returns to court should be allowed to take the system of criminal justice as he finds it upon his return.
Id., 550 Pa. at 295-296, 705 A.2d at 829 (emphasis added).
¶ 8 For the foregoing reasons, I do not find the rationale of Deemer applicable, and I would quash this appeal pursuant to Rule 1972(6) and the applicable cases cited supra7

. The Commonwealth has attached to its appellate brief the affidavit of Edward Poserina, the Associate Director of Operations of the Philadelphia Adult Probation Department, indicating that since September 18, 1997, Appellant has failed to report to his assigned probation officer and is presently considered a fugitive. The affidavit further indicates that on March 18, 1998, judicial "wanted cards” were issued authorizing Appellant’s arrest. On April 29, 1998, the Commonwealth filed a "Motion to Quash Appeal of Fugitive,” which was denied, per curiam, by a Panel of this Court on June 23, 1998, without prejudice to the Commonwealth's right to again raise the issue before the Panel addressing the merits of the appeal. Appellant's counsel does not dispute the Commonwealth’s allegation that Appellant is a fugitive, and there has been no indication that Appellant has been captured or turned himself in to authorities.

.Pa.R.A.P.1972. Dispositions on Motion
Subject to Rule 123 (applications for relief), any party may move:
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(6) To continue generally or to quash because the appellant is a fugitive.

. If I felt it was appropriate to reach the merits of this case, I would agree with the majority's affirmation of the sentencing court. As discussed above, however, because I believe the applicable statutory and case law requires us to quash this appeal, I would not reach the merit of the case.