Court Opinion

ID: 9578404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:44:54.805629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:05.162288
License: Public Domain

Pearson, J.
—Leo Young challenges the trial court's order finding him to be in contempt of court for failure to make payments required under a dissolution property division. We reverse the finding of contempt.
Leo and June Young were married in 1951; their marriage was dissolved in May 1975. As part of the property division, the trial court awarded Ms. Young $48,594.23 as "settlement in lieu of any interest" in her husband's military pension, such sum to be paid her at a rate of $250 per *844month. The trial court also ordered Mr. Young to maintain an insurance policy on his life in the amount of $45,000 as security for the debt. No maintenance was awarded.
In July of 1976, Ms. Young initiated contempt of court proceedings against her former husband on the grounds that he had consistently refused to pay her the $250 per month. The court ordered him to pay the sums in arrears, but declined to find him in contempt because he had cooperated to the extent of maintaining the required life insurance.
Ms. Young initiated a second contempt action in April 1978. According to the affidavit filed in support of the contempt motion, Mr. Young had paid nothing since the first contempt hearing and was $7,576 in arrears. In addition, it was alleged that he had permitted the insurance policy to lapse. The trial court found Mr. Young in contempt and ordered that he be incarcerated in the Pierce County jail until further notice. The court further ruled that he could have the contempt finding purged by making an application for an allotment of $500 per month from his military pension to allow him to pay the amount in arrears and to fulfill the original $250 per month obligation. Mr. Young appeals.
As his first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court's order violates article 1, section 17 of the Washington State Constitution, which states: "There shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of absconding debtors. ''
It is true that early Washington cases, although permitting the use of contempt of court procedures to enforce alimony, child support and child custody orders, absolutely barred their use to enforce property divisions, e.g., State ex rel. Lang v. Superior Court, 176 Wash. 472, 30 P.2d 237 (1934); State ex rel. Ridenour v. Superior Court, 174 Wash. 152, 24 P.2d 418 (1933). See also Robinson v. Robinson, 37 Wn.2d 511, 225 P.2d 411 (1950). In the landmark case of Decker v. Decker, 52 Wn.2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958), however, our state Supreme Court retreated from its earlier position and declared that contempt of court can be used to *845enforce a provision of a property division so long as the provision has a reasonable relationship to the duty to support one's wife or children.1 See also McFerran v. McFerran, 55 Wn.2d 471, 348 P.2d 222 (1960); Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wn.2d 717, 344 P.2d 731 (1959). The Washington rule was commended by Professor Clark in his treatise on domestic relations for recognizing the interrelationship between property divisions and alimony orders. H. Clark, Domestic Relations in the United States § 14.10, at 467 (1968).
We have continued to be sensitive to the realities facing a trial court in attempting to fairly divide a couple's assets while seeking to insure that each party will be provided with adequate means of support. A trial court, both by statute and by case law, is permitted to consider the amount of maintenance it intends to grant when dividing the property. RCW 26.09.080; In re Marriage of Rink, 18 Wn. App. 549, 571 P.2d 210 (1977). See also In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn.2d 649, 565 P.2d 790 (1977). It would be inequitable to allot to a spouse property necessary for his or her support and then prevent him or her from effectively enforcing the property division to obtain such property.
On the other hand, as discussed earlier, only those provisions of a property division which are reasonably related to a support obligation may be enforced by contempt proceedings. Neither the findings of fact and conclusions of law, nor the original divorce decree supports a conclusion that the monthly installments were in any way related to a support obligation in this case. On the contrary, these documents evidence a clear intention that Ms. Young was awarded a lump sum "judgment" based upon a mathematical percentage (community interest) in an actuarially valued asset, namely, Mr. Young's pension. According to the findings of fact, the present value of the pension was *846$133,134.87 "of which the sum of $97,188.46 is a community asset." The trial court also found that
[Ms. Young] should also be awarded the sum of $48,594.23 as a property settlement in lieu of any interest in [Mr. Young's] pension . . . Said sum shall be paid . . . at the rate of $250.00 per month until the full amount has been paid in full.
In addition, the decree ordered Mr. Young to maintain $45,000 insurance until he reached age 55, and $20,000 thereafter, with Ms. Young as the named beneficiary, to insure payment of her judgment. In the face of this clear and unambiguous expression of the dissolution court's intent, we cannot now, even in the face of Mr. Young's blatant refusal to pay the judgment, recharacterize the award as support rather than property settlement. Kinne v. Kinne, 82 Wn.2d 360, 510 P.2d 814 (1973). Accordingly, we must vacate the judgment of contempt as well as the attorney's fee awarded in connection with that judgment.
In another argument, Mr. Young contends that the trial court's order that the contempt finding would be purged upon his making an application for a $500 per month allotment amounted to an attempt to modify the property settlement retroactively. Although we disagree with the argument presented by Mr. Young, we note that this particular remedy is not available, given the nature of the original judgment. Furthermore, a monthly allotment from Mr. Young's military pension as a means of enforcing any contempt order is suspect in view of the recent case of Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 59 L. Ed. 2d 1, 99 S. Ct. 802 (1979).2 In any event, the portion of the judgment requiring the allotment must be vacated since defendant is not in contempt.
*847Therefore all parts of the trial court's judgment entered on July 20, 1978, are vacated except for the following portion which shall remain in full force and effect:
Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the principal amount of the arrearage shall be reduced to judgment in the sum of $8,076.80 plus interest thereon in the sum of $646.14, for a total judgment of $8,722.94 as and for property settlement...[3]
Reversed and remanded.
Reed, C.J., concurs.

Since 1973 either spouse may be charged with an obligation to support a dependent or otherwise deserving partner. RCW 26.09.090.

Courts have split on the question of whether the reasoning of Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 59 L. Ed. 2d 1, 99 S. Ct. 802 (1979), which held that a federal railroad pension was not subject to division as community property, controls in military pension cases. Compare Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 123 Ariz. 466, 600 P.2d 1098 (1979) and Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980), with Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1979).

3Mr. Young's contention that the two judgments finding him in arrears amount to "double liability" was not supported by authority and is deemed waived. Ban-Co Inv. Co. v. Loveless, 22 Wn. App. 122, 587 P.2d 567 (1978).