Court Opinion

ID: 9448743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:44:07.795393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:32.624834
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
My brothers “cannot avoid having sympathy for a man sentenced to twenty years in prison, who is now and will likely, during the remainder of his life, be in a wheel chair.” I join them in that expression. Our sympathy, however, will not be much solace to Fallen over the long period of years during which his physical suffering will be aggravated by the loss of his liberty. Our sympathy is gratuitously bestowed without being requested. What Fallen has asked is simple justice under the law. For him to be denied a right of appeal to test the validity of his conviction and twenty-year sentence is, in my opinion, a gross injustice* and one not consonant with the law.
*704My brothers quote from footnote 5 of the very recent opinion of the Chief Justice, speaking for the Supreme Court, in Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 441, 442, n. 5, as follows:
“Although the timely filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite for perfecting an appeal, United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 [80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259], a liberal view of papers filed by indigent and incarcerated defendants, as equivalents of notices of appeal, has been used to preserve the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals.”
My brothers fail to note, however, that among a number of examples which the Chief Justice cites is “Williams v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 212, 188 F.2d 41 (notice of appeal delivered to prison officials for forwarding to District Court).” The present holding is directly in conflict with the Williams case thus recently and favorably cited by the Supreme Court. My brothers do cite the Williams case along with Wallace v. United States, 8 Cir., 1949, 174 F.2d 112, in their footnote 5 appended to the text in which they recognize that “ * * * a more liberal rule may elsewhere prevail.” They might well have noted other cases in support of that text; for example, West v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 1954, 222 F.2d 774, 778, 779; Oddo v. United States, 2 Cir., 1949, 171 F.2d 854, 855; and Remine v. United States, 6 Cir., 1947, 161 F.2d 1020, 1021. In the case last cited it was said:
“The motion of the United States to dismiss this convict’s appeal in forma pauperis is denied. In the circumstances, the timeliness prescribed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 37, 18 U.S.C.A. following section 687, could not reasonably be required of the appellant, confined in a penitentiary of the United States some 2600 miles away from the district court in which he was convicted and sentenced.”
In the instant case, Judge Simpson found:
“It is clear, nevertheless, that twelve days after trial and eight days after sentence, Mr. Fallen desired to enter (a) Motion for New Trial, (b) Notice of Appeal, and (c) to be permitted to appeal in forma pauperis and to receive a copy of the transcript of record.” 1
In view of Fallen’s affidavit offered by his court-appointed counsel on this hearing, and of the failure of the Government to offer any contrary evidence, I would agree with Judge Simpson that on January 23, eight days after sentence, Fallen signed the two letters and turned them over to the prison authorities for mailing. At that time, clearly, he attempted to appeal. If the Government had not, on the day after he was sentenced, moved him from the place of trial to the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, his attempted appeal would have been filed within 10 days after entry of the judgment of conviction. Further, if the prison authorities had promptly mailed Fallen’s letters, then, in due course of mail they would have reached the Clerk’s Office before the expiration of the 10th day. The circumstances of this case are almost as strong as those in Reynolds v. United States, 5 Cir., 1961, 288 F.2d 78, in which we found that the notice of appeal mailed in time to be deposited in the post office box of the Clerk’s Office on the tenth day, which happened to be Saturday on which the office was closed, would be treated as filed within the time allowed by Rule 37(a) (2), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
There is a further circumstance peculiar to this case, which persuades me that the doctrine of Reynolds v. United States, supra, should be extended so as to hold that the notice of appeal should be treated as timely filed. That circumstance centers about the mandatory duty of the district court under Rule 37(a) (2) that, “When a court after trial imposes sentence upon a defendant not rep*705resented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of his right to appeal and if he so requests, the clerk shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant.” That provision was invoked but held inapplicable under the facts in Jackson v. United States, 4 Cir., 1956, 231 F.2d 653. I think that under that requirement a defendant should not be held to the strict requirement of filing his notice of appeal within the 10-day period if: (1) he was not represented by counsel of his own choice, or by court-appointed counsel who remained counsel for the defendant throughout the 10-day period after the judgment of conviction; and (2) the defendant did not know of the 10-day limitation on his right of appeal, and was not so advised either by the court or by his court-appointed counsel.
In the present case, the defendant was obviously ignorant, and actively sought advice from the district court. At the conclusion of the hearing at which he was sentenced, the following colloquy occurred :
“The Defendant: Can I appeal this case, Your Honor, as an insolvent?
“The Court: Beg pardon?
“The Defendant: May I appeal this case as an insolvent?
“The Court: Oh yes; you always have a right to appeal; the Government provides for that. So that will be all. We are through with this case. Mr. Marshal, you may take charge of the defendant.”
The terms of appointment of counsel by the district court do not appear, and it is not clear whether representation under such appointment extended beyond the moment of sentencing when as the Judge said, “We are through with this ease.” Actually, his court-appointed counsel had a further conversation with the defendant which he related in the letter to Judge Simpson referred to in footnote 1 to the majority opinion:
“Mr. Fallen was found guilty on January 11, 1962, and after sentencing on January 15,1962,1 talked with Mr. Fallen approximately an hour and a half. At that time he asked me if I would be interested in representing him if he should decide to appeal the decision in those cases, since he thought he could raise sufficient funds to pay an attorney’s fee in connection with such an appeal. At that time I told Mr. Fallen that the firm with which I am associated did not wish me to undertake any further criminal matters, either by appeal or otherwise, and therefore, I suggested that Mr. Fallen secure another attorney without delay so as not to forfeit his right to appeal.
“Mr. Fallen thanked me very much for my efforts as his court-appointed attorney, and stated that he would secure another attorney.
“I have not represented Mr. Fallen since that conversation.”
Fallen’s affidavit shows that after this conversation, “I was returned to the Duval Medical Center, Jacksonville, Florida, where I was again placed under armed guard and not allowed to have visitors. On the morning of January 16, 1962, I was taken to Atlanta, Ga., to commence my term of imprisonment, where due to my illness and processing, I was unable to write to the court requesting a new trial until the 23rd of January, 1962.”
Rule 37 (a) (2) certainly requires more adequate advice and more effective assistance from the court for a defendant not represented by counsel than appears to have been given in response to the defendant’s request. The defendant did not have counsel of his own choice or court-appointed counsel throughout the 10-day period allowed for filing his notice of appeal. That he was not adequately advised of his rights was recognized by Chief Judge Simpson in the following excerpt from his “Order with Respect to Notice of Appeal” (footnote 1 to majority opinion):
“It would appear from Mr. Moss’ letter that while appeal was dis*706cussed on January 15 with Mr. Fallen, the provisions of Rule 33, F. R.Crim.P. with respect to motion for new trial were not discussed with him. That is to say — that it does not appear that Mr. Fallen was advised that motion for new trial should be made as a basis for Court of Appeals review of the sufficiency of the evidence nor that such motion should be made within five days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the Court may fix during the five-day period.
“Further, it does not appear that Mr. Fallen has been advised of the requirements of Section 1915(a), Title 28, U.S.Code, that affidavit must be made that he is unable to pay costs or give security therefor in order for the Court to authorize his appeal to be taken in forma pauperis.”
A conclusion that the notice of appeal had not been timely filed would give rise to serious questions as to whether Fallen has been deprived of his constitutional rights. For example, due process (and a fortiori the Sixth Amendment) includes the right of an accused to “a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.” Crooker v. California, 1958, 357 U.S. 433, 439, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448. From this record, Fallen was accorded no such opportunity after the services of his court-appointed counsel terminated and before the expiration of the 10 days allowed for the filing of a notice of appeal.
Again, the record shows no specific terms or instructions of the court as to when the duties of the court-appointed attorney terminated. I have found no decision as to whether, in the absence of specific instructions, an attorney appointed to defend an accused upon his trial must continue to represent the defendant after final judgment of conviction and sentence and until a notice of appeal has been filed or the defendant has elected not to appeal. Court-appointed counsel in the present case did not consider that he was under any obligation to continue representing the defendant during this critical intermediate stage after conviction and before appeal.
The annotator in 2 L.Ed.2d 1649 observes that, “Whether an indigent defendant is, as a matter of due process, entitled to the assistance of counsel for the purpose of appealing from his conviction is a question which has not yet been squarely decided by the United States Supreme Court.” After some argument he draws the conclusion that, “Thus, the establishment of the rule that a state must, as a matter of federal constitutional law, provide indigents with the assistance of counsel to prosecute appeals in criminal cases would appear to be no more than a logical extension of the Griffin doctrine,” referring to Griffin v. Illinois, 1956, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891. The Sixth Amendment would seem to require no less in federal prosecutions. See Johnson v. United States, 1957, 352 U.S. 565, 77 S.Ct. 550, 1 L.Ed.2d 593; Ellis v. United States, 1958, 356 U.S. 674, 78 S.Ct. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060; Chessman v. Teets, 1957, 354 U.S. 156, 77 S.Ct. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d 1253.
It is, of course, elementary law that every statute or rule is to be read in the light of the Constitution. McCullough v. Virginia, 1898, 172 U.S. 102, 112, 19 S.Ct. 134, 43 L.Ed. 382. A construction which raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions will not be adopted where some other construction is open to us. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co. v. Boone, 1926, 270 U.S. 466, 472, 46 S.Ct. 341, 70 L.Ed. 688.
Under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, I submit that Fallen’s notice of appeal should be treated as timely filed, and that the motion of the United States to dismiss his appeal should be denied. I respectfully dissent.
Rehearing denied; RIVES, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

. See footnote 1 to majority opinion.