Court Opinion

ID: 9529819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:54:30.378971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:55.657851
License: Public Domain

SINGLETON, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the court’s disposition of the case. A few additional remarks are, in my opinion, necessary.
Koteles argues that presumptive sentencing violates article I, § 12 of the state constitution, which provides in relevant part that “[pjenal administration shall be based on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public.” Ko-teles argues that this provision mandates that any sentence imposed upon him consider both his rehabilitation and community protection. He interprets presumptive sentencing as being aimed at retribution or, at the very least, community protection, and contends that it disregards rehabilitation. Consequently, he concludes it is unconstitutional. Koteles misunderstands the drafters’ intent in enacting this constitutional provision.
As originally drafted, the relevant language appeared in proposed § 10 of the declaration of rights rather than § 12 and provided as follows: “The administration of criminal justice shall be founded on principles of reformation, and not vindictiveness.” 6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention (Appendix V) 65 (December 15, 1955). This proposal was debated on January 5, 1956, and at the request of Convention Vice-President Ralph Rivers was amended to read: “The administration of criminal justice shall be founded upon the principle of reformation as well as upon the need to protect the public.” 2 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 1308 (January 5, 1956).
The discussion that ensued establishes that the original provision was taken from the Indiana Constitution, id. at 1309. The present Indiana provision provides: “Reformation as basis of penal code. — The penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” Ind. Const, art. I, § 18.
Some delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention feared that adoption of this Indiana provision would preclude capital punishment. They were assured by the chairman of the committee that the Indiana Supreme Court had held to the contrary. 2 Proceedings, supra, at 1309.
The chairman no doubt referred to Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 332 (1855), Driskill v. State, 7 Ind. 338, 343 (1855), and McCutcheon v. State, 199 Ind. 247, 155 N.E. 544, 549 (Ind.1927), where the Indiana Supreme Court found that community protection and reformation were included in the Indiana constitutional scheme and concluded that if either goal was furthered by a particular sentence, the sentence was constitutional. The court *1202determined that capital punishment could be found to serve the goal of general deterrence and thereby protect the public. But see Adams v. State, 271 N.E.2d 425, 431-33 (Ind.1971) (DeBruler, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that capital punishment is inconsistent with article I, § 18 of the Indiana Constitution), modified, 284 N.E.2d 757 (Ind.1972). In summary, it appears that the language chosen by the Alaska Constitutional Convention was intended to leave open the possibility of legislative authorization of capital punishment. Consequently, the Convention made explicit what the Indiana Supreme Court had found implicit in the predecessor provision, namely that a sentence which addressed either reformation or community protection would be constitutionally valid. If capital punishment is constitutional, a fortiori, presumptive sentencing is constitutional since presumptive sentencing is aimed at special and general deterrence of repeat offenders and the isolation of those repeat offenders who cannot be deterred or reformed. Thus, even if we assume that the presumptive sentencing scheme favors community protection over rehabilitation, it is not unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, a sentence of imprisonment, particularly for a multiple offender, may be necessary for his rehabilitation. State v. Lancaster, 550 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Alaska 1976). Consequently, we should not conclude that such a sentencing policy which requires a short period of imprisonment for those previously convicted of felonies is necessarily inconsistent with rehabilitation. Where it is, the legislature has provided a safety valve in the form of a reference to a three-judge panel. See AS 12.55.165-175. I join in the court’s conclusion that presumptive sentencing does not violate article 1, § 12 of the state constitution. See Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361, 1368-69 (Alaska App.1982).
The debates at the constitutional convention serve to refute Koteles’ equal protection argument as well. He contends that no valid governmental purpose is served by treating repeat offenders more severely than first offenders. As the previous discussion indicates, general deterrence, special deterrence and reaffirmation of community norms,1 serve the valid governmental purpose of community protection. By publishing the fact that repeat offenders in Alaska will go to prison, the code serves to discourage repeat offenses. Since a substantial percentage of criminal activity is the work of repeat offenders, this is a valid governmental purpose.
Koteles argues that drunks cannot be deterred, but as we noted in Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1226 (Alaska App., 1983), those who drink knowing that they have committed crimes when drunk in the past, as well as those who drink knowing that they will be driving or handling weapons, commit a malum in se act by their drinking. This justifies punishment on that basis alone, when after they drink they engage in conduct harmful to others. See Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 396-97 (Colo.1982) (self-induced intoxication is culpable conduct which constitutes mens rea making criminal an actor’s harmful conduct when intoxicated). See also Morgan v. Municipality of Anchorage, 643 P.2d 691, 692 (Alaska App.1982) (intentionally drinking and driving establishes mens rea of driving while intoxicated). Cf. Model Penal Code § 2.08 commentary at 8-9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (discussing principles of liability for intoxication). Widespread publicity that intoxication does not excuse crime in Alaska may well deter those who habitually get drunk and injure others from taking the first drink. If it does not, then isolation of those offenders will ensure that they harm no one during the period of their isolation.

. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).