Court Opinion

ID: 9703190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:44:17.325534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:46.382369
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
For the reasons set forth in the opinion of Chief Justice Eagen in Commonwealth v. Brocklehurst, 491 Pa. 151, 420 A.2d 385 (1980) (Eagen, C. J., joined by Roberts & Nix, JJ., dissenting), it must be concluded that this trial was not commenced within the 180-day period permitted under Pa.R. Crim.Proc., 1100(a)(2). Appellee moved to dismiss the charges 271 days after his initial arrest. Even excluding the twenty days between the dismissal of the first complaint and the filing of the second, see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 487 Pa. 197, 409 A.2d 308 (1979), trial here would have been untimely.
As Chief Justice Eagen observed, “the cases have consistently attempted to effectuate the policies behind Rule 1100 which include the placing of limitations on ‘disruption of employment, curtailment of associations, subjection to public obliquy, and creation of anxiety.’ ” Brocklehurst, supra, 491 Pa. at 159, 420 A.2d at 390. As in Brocklehurst, here the majority “[fails] in [its] attempt to effectuate the policy underlying the rule because [it fails] to acknowledge that during the lifé of the first complaint an accused is confronted with the factors which the rule should limit.” Id.
Unlike the approach of the majority here and in Brockle-hurst, the approach of Chief Justice Eagen does not permit the prosecution to subject the accused to multiple, unsuccessful efforts to initiate charges with impunity. Instead, his approach, which excludes only that period between the dismissal of a first complaint and the filing of a second, *74properly gives full effect to the interests embodied in Rule 1100.
Because the interests of Rule 1100 have been frustrated here, the order of the trial court dismissing the charges against appellant should be affirmed.