Court Opinion

ID: 9494301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:34:35.071012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:20.453485
License: Public Domain

MICHEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I conclude that the Pratt patent, alone, renders the patented invention obvious as a matter of law, I would affirm. I am especially troubled by the implication I see in the majority’s opinion that a general jury verdict on the legal question of obviousness is essentially immune from review by the trial court on JMOL, or by this court on appeal.
The issue presented in this appeal derives from the common, if unfortunate, practice of allowing the jury to render a general verdict on the ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness without requiring express findings on the underlying factual issues through a special verdict or special interrogatories under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49. Nevertheless, since the inception of our court, we have recognized that a court may submit this legal question to a jury and that doing so by general verdict rather than by Rule 49 is not ordinarily an abuse of discretion. Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1515, 220 USPQ 929, 937 (Fed.Cir.1984); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547-48, 220 USPQ 193, 197 (Fed.Cir.1983). We have emphasized, however, that “[tjhere is no question that the judge must remain the ultimate arbiter on the question of obviousness.” Railroad Dynamics, 727 F.2d at 1515, 220 USPQ at 937; see also Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F.3d 1476, 1479, 44 USPQ2d 1181, 1183 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“That an obviousness determination stands upon the relevant facts of the case does not convert the ultimate conclusion of obviousness from one of law into one of fact.”).
*1359The difficulty presented in this appeal is how to separate the role of the jury to find facts (with these findings binding on this court, as well as the trial court, so long as they are supported by at least substantial evidence) from the role of trial judges in reaching, or for us freely reviewing, the ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, vel non. In this case, the verdict form tells us only that the jury found the claimed invention nonobvious in light of Pratt and/or Morgan, with no identification of the jury’s resolution of genuine disputes over material factual issues. We must therefore imply such factual findings, under the legal presumption that the jury found all facts necessary to support its verdict in favor of McGinley. Railroad Dynamics, 727 F.2d at 1516, 220 USPQ at 937 (“[Wjhen a jury returns a general verdict, the law presumes the existence of fact findings implied from the jury’s having reached that verdict.”).
When faced with a general verdict of nonobviousness or obviousness, the categories of facts the court must imply concern the scope and content of prior art; what a prior art reference teaches; the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; the level of ordinary skill in the prior art; and objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966); Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Michigan Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1359, 52 USPQ2d 1294, 1298 (Fed.Cir.1999). In cases such as this where a single prior art reference is alleged to render the claimed invention obvious, there must be a sufficient showing of a suggestion or motivation for any modification of the teachings of that reference necessary to reach the claimed invention in order to support the obviousness conclusion. SIBIA Neuroscis., Inc. v. Cadus Pham. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356, 55 USPQ2d 1927, 1931 (Fed.Cir.2000); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1582, 37 USPQ2d 1314, 1318 (Fed.Cir.1996). This suggestion or motivation may be derived from the prior art reference itself, from the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or from the nature of the problem to be solved. SIBIA, 225 F.3d at 1356, 55 USPQ2d at 1931.
While the trial court must defer to the jury’s factual findings, actual or implied, the court nonetheless has the duty, when presented with a motion for JMOL following a general verdict on obviousness, to review the factual findings for substantial evidentiary support, and the ultimate conclusion on obviousness for legal correctness. Railroad Dynamics, 727 F.2d at 1513, 220 USPQ at 936 (“The moving party is entitled to JNOV when the court is convinced: (1) that reasonable persons could not in light of that evidence have found the facts necessary to support the jury’s verdict; or (2) that the facts properly found cannot in law support that verdict.”). In the present case, the trial court dutifully performed this analysis, citing our precedent, and concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Pratt did not render McGinley’s claimed baseball obvious. I agree.
The only arguable difference between Pratt’s and McGinley’s claimed marked baseballs for student pitchers is that Pratt purportedly lacks a “means for indicating the orientation of the baseball relative to the palm of the hand,” a limitation separately claimed by McGinley. U.S. Patent No. 5,407,193, col. 5, ll. 41-42. There has been no admission, as the majority suggests, that Pratt does not disclose a “means for orienting.” The structures corresponding to this means-plus-function limitation in McGinley’s claimed baseball are sets of finger markings, shaped like tapered eggs, with the direction of the *1360taper indicating the proper orientation of the ball in the pitcher’s hand. That is, the points of the tapers, by extension, lead approximately to the center of the palm. The fingertip placement markings illustrated in Pratt’s diagrams, by contrast, are simple circles with no taper, and thus do not point toward the palm.
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The jury did indeed hear testimony to the effect that Pratt’s rounded fingertip placement indicia would leave a student pitcher confused as to how to grip the ball, as the pitcher would be unsure whether to grip the ball on only one of its hemispheres, or rather to grasp the ball fully across its equator. Mr. Richard Stitt, the attorney who prosecuted the '193 patent, testified that the symmetry of Pratt’s fingertip markings would frustrate gripping the ball “ ‘cause if the opposite side of that ball looks the same as the side we’re looking at, you don’t know which to approach it from, and that’s a critical question.” Trial Tr., Vol. 3, p. 201. Contrarily, Mr. Stitt testified that “if we had a — a taper on one end of this circle, I would know to approach the ball.” Trial Tr. Vol. 3, p. 218.
*1361Such testimony, in my view, is a nullity because it contradicts the teachings of the Pratt patent, which by its very markings necessarily discloses a means for orienting a pitcher’s fingers on the ball “relative to the palm.” As illustrated here, Pratt’s diagrams show multiple sets of fingertip placement indicia, with a single set comprising two circles situated near each other (described in the specification as markers for the pitcher’s forefinger and second finger) and a third spot somewhat removed from the other two (described as a marker for the thumb). As a matter of geometry, there are only two ways for a pitcher to place his or her thumb, forefinger, and second finger on these three spots (barring finger-crossing). One way is to pinch the near hemisphere of the baseball with one’s fingertips. The other way is to grasp the ball near the palm of one’s hand, wrapping one’s fingers across the equator of the ball (ie., the way a baseball is always thrown).
Pratt’s written description tells us that people of ordinary skill in this art (and student pitchers) know generally how to hold and throw baseballs. The patent states that, for a fastball, the ball is thrown with “the usual forearm motion.” U.S. Patent No. 2,925,273, col. 2, 11. 25-26. A fingertip grip on only one hemisphere of the ball would be unworkable, as for a curveball, the patent recites using a “tighter grip,” and throwing the ball with a “conventional wrist snap,” so as to impart a “maximum spin” to the ball. Id at col. 2, 11. 53-54. To do so, the forefinger and second finger must “extend across two sections of the stitches of the seam,” such that the thumb “extends along the seam.” Id at col. 2, 11. 50-52. These instructions, read in view of the finger placement indi-cia, reduce the number of possible palm orientations to one: the ball-in-palm grip. Because Mr. Stitt’s testimony contradicts the express teachings of Pratt, his testimonial evidence is entitled to no weight. I conclude that the express teachings of Pratt, as a matter of law, disclose to persons of ordinary skill a means for orienting the ball in the pitcher’s palm.
Of course, in the context of a means-plus-function claim, the invalidating prior art must disclose not simply a means for achieving the desired function, but rather the particular structure recited in the written, description corresponding to that function, or an equivalent thereof. In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1849 (Fed.Cir.1994). To this end, the Pratt patent discloses more than just circular fingertip markings, as his diagrams also display “phantom lines” (which do not appear on the actual ball covered by the patent) extending tangentially from the fingertip placement circles in the direction that a pitcher’s fingers should be placed. FSI argues here, as below, that these phantom lines would have taught skilled artisans to extend tangentially Pratt’s circular markings to give them directionality.
At trial, Mr. Stitt discounted the importance of these phantom lines, testifying that “[t]hey don’t have anything to do with the invention.” Trial Tr. Vol. 3, p. 183. This remark was legally incorrect, because although the phantom lines do not appear on Pratt’s patented ball, they do comprise part of Pratt’s disclosure. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264, 23 USPQ2d 1780, 1782 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“It is well settled that a prior art reference is relevant for all that it teaches to those of ordinary skill in the art.”). McGinley also argues in his briefing that adopting the phantom lines from Pratt would be unworkable, because these lines would be too long and would obscure other markings on the baseball. The majority accepts this argument. But absolutely no trial testimony — none-— *1362suggests that Pratt’s phantom lines are too long, or that their length as shown in the drawings would have dissuaded a skilled artisan from shortening the finger placement indicia as necessary to avoid obscuring any other markings. Mere attorney argument is no substitute for evidence of record. To support its holding (and its statement that the issue of motivation to modify Pratt’s lines into McGinley’s tapers “so clearly could have been decided by the jury in McGinley’s favor”), the majority combines testimony discussing the elongated finger grooves from Morgan with the testimony concerning the circular fingertip placement markings of Pratt. But by importing testimony regarding Morgan into its Pratt analysis, the majority appears to contradict its own holding that these references are not combinable. Moreover, putting aside the lack of evidence on this point, it hardly matters that the phantom lines as shown are longer than they need be if they were actually drawn onto the ball. An artisan need not copy the lines precisely as shown, but instead would know to optimize the length of the lines to fit the constraints of the other marking on the ball. See In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380, 383, 29 USPQ2d 1550, 1552 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“[A] reference must be considered not only for what it expressly teaches, but also for what it fairly suggests.”) (quoting In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179, 201 USPQ 67, 70 (1979)). Such a design variation would be routine in the baseball design art.
Presumably, the jury found that the phantom lines depicted in Pratt’s diagrams would not have motivated a reasonable artisan to elaborate on Pratt’s circular fingertip placement indicia and break their symmetry. However, the only trial testimony supportive of this finding — ie., Stitt’s comment that the phantom lines have nothing to do with the invention — is legally incorrect. Aside from this remark, and testimony concerning the Morgan patent (which the majority finds to be non-analogous), there is simply no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, in support of the jury’s implicit finding. Moreover, this implicit finding is contradicted by the disclosures of Pratt, itself. Pratt clearly contemplated the possibility that the reader of his patent might not immediately appreciate the proper orientation of a pitcher’s fingers — that is why he added the phantom lines to his drawings. By including these lines in his disclosure, Pratt imposed directionality on his circular markings in the drawings and necessarily communicated to those in his field a suggestion for reshaping the circular fingertip placement indicia accordingly. To the extent the jury’s implicit findings are to the contrary, I find them unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to Pratt’s express and graphic disclosures. To the extent the jury rested its conclusion on such findings, it was legally incorrect.
It is true that the jury found that the Pratt patent does not anticipate McGinley’s invention. I do not dispute that the differences between Pratt’s circular indicia and McGinley’s tapered, egg-shaped indi-cia, may be sufficient to support the jury’s non-anticipation verdict. But obviousness is different. It remains the province of the court to determine, whether in light of all the facts properly, if only implicitly, found by the jury, the claimed invention would have been obvious. Richardsom-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1479, 44 USPQ2d at 1183; Railroad Dynamics, 727 F.2d at 1515, 220 USPQ at 937. We of course must view all supportable facts as found in favor of McGinley, the verdict winner and non-movant. But it is undeniable (by looking at Pratt’s placement of the circular markings, and the accompanying written de*1363scription) that Pratt discloses a means for orienting a pitcher’s fingers around the ball “relative to the palm.” Moreover, the phantom lines suggest altering Pratt’s circular markings to provide them with directionality, and to break the symmetry of the circular fingertip indicia. I acknowledge that there are differences between the scope and content of the prior art and the claimed invention. But this is where the legal analysis, as opposed to the fact analysis, begins. It is the role of the court to assess whether in light of these differences and the suggestion to modify the teachings of Pratt, the claimed invention would have been obvious. Viewing all these factual considerations in context, I cannot shake the conviction that a ball designer of even minimal skill in the art would have found it blatantly obvious to modify Pratt’s circles (with their phantom lines), and reshape them into tapered eggs. Nor do McGinley’s purportedly fabulous sales change my conclusion, because there is no evidence that these sales are due to the markings on the ball, as opposed to Roger Clemens’ endorsement, or advertising. Accordingly, I conclude that McGin-ley’s patent was proven invalid for obviousness.
I am concerned about far more important effects of today’s ruling than whether McGinley’s patent, although invalid, stands to menace still other baseball competitors. Rather, I am concerned that after reading the majority opinion, trial courts and our panels will hereafter consider such general verdicts on obviousness immune from meaningful review and that serious legal errors by juries will thus go uncorrected. The result will be that defective patents will remain to threaten all competitors in an industry. Indeed, I think today’s appeal represents just such a case. More may follow. It is rare to see such a compelling case of obviousness, and yet more surprising to find our supposedly de novo review so limited, despite our settled case law that a jury’s ultimate conclusion on obviousness is a legal question freely reviewable by judges. I therefore respectfully dissent.