Court Opinion

ID: 9928926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 17:00:57.090757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:23.880684
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1456     Document: 010110993395       Date Filed: 02/01/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         February 1, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  MADISON ROLAND, individually; GINA
  HARRIS, as legal guardian to Layla
  Roland, Joseph Roland, Mason Roland,
  and Lily Roland, minor children of and
  legal heirs to Joseph and Jossline Roland;
  SAMMI HECKERMAN, as personal
  representative of Decedent, Estate of
  Jossline Roland; ROSA BILBREY, as
  personal representative of the Estate of
  Joseph Roland,                                    Nos. 22-1456, 23-1014 & 23-1012
                                                    (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-00899-MEH)
        Plaintiffs - Appellants/Cross-                         (D. Colo.)
        Appellees,

  v.

  LETGO, INC; OFFERUP, INC.,

           Defendants - Appellees/Cross-
           Appellants.

                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Letgo is an online marketplace and mobile application that pairs unaffiliated

 sellers and prospective buyers. Joseph and Jossline Roland used Letgo’s app to

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-1456    Document: 010110993395         Date Filed: 02/01/2024    Page: 2

 arrange for the purchase of a car for their 17-year-old daughter. Tragically, the seller

 of the car was an imposter. When the Rolands met him to consummate the purchase,

 he murdered them both and stole $3,000.

       Plaintiffs—the Rolands’ estate—sued Letgo, alleging a number of Colorado

 state law tort and consumer protection claims, and one claim based on federal law.

 The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ tort claims because they did not plausibly

 allege Letgo made false or misleading representations, increased the risk of harm to

 the Rolands, or caused their deaths. And it dismissed the consumer protection claim

 because plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege Letgo knowingly engaged in a deceptive

 trade practice, that it acted recklessly or willfully, or intended to induce the Rolands

 to transact with Mr. Brown.

       Because we agree the amended complaint fails to plausibly allege a cause of

 action under Colorado law, we AFFIRM.

                                    I.     Background1

           A. The Letgo Platform

       At the time of the crimes, Letgo was a website and mobile application that

 allowed users to “buy from, sell to and chat with others locally.” Aplt. App. at

 00012.2 It allows users to browse items for sale locally, view each other’s profiles,

 1
   These facts are taken from plaintiffs’ amended complaint and documents
 incorporated by reference.
 2
   The other defendant, OfferUp—a similar platform, acquired Letgo shortly before
 this litigation.
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 and send messages to coordinate a purchase. Letgo competed against other online

 marketplaces, such as eBay and Craigslist.

       To distinguish itself, Letgo advertised its “Verified User” feature. After users

 created an account and accessed the Letgo marketplace, they were encouraged to

 “verify” their profile. To receive a “Verified User” badge on your profile, users had

 to supply enough personal information to reach 50 points. For example, a profile

 photo was 10 points, a phone number was 15 points, an email address was 5 points, a

 linked Facebook account was 25 points, and a government-issued ID was 40 points.

 Id. at 00117. The user’s profile would then reflect they were “verified with”

 whatever methods the user chose. If a user submitted an email address or phone

 number, their profile would reflect they were “verified with” an email or phone

 number. But until a user reached 50 points, their profile would prompt other users to

 request that they “verify” their profile. In other words, to become a “Verified User,”

 you would have to supply more than just a phone number and an email address.

       The Letgo website explained it used “machine learning” to identify and block

 inappropriate content (such as stolen merchandise) and worked closely with local law

 enforcement to ensure the “trust and safety of the tens of millions of people who use

 Letgo.” Aplt. App. at 00013. It also promoted “anti-fraud technology” to help detect

 possible scams. But Letgo still encouraged users to only communicate through the

 app and to not share any other personal information. It reminded users to take proper

 precautions when buying or selling online, to meet in a public place during the day,

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 and to consult third party sources to check a vehicle’s history for theft. Aplt. App. at

 00145-46.

       Joseph and Jossline Roland wanted to buy a car for their eldest daughter and

 used Letgo to see if anyone in their area was selling one. They found a listing posted

 by Kyree Brown, who created his user profile under the pseudonym “James Worthy.”

 Mr. Brown posted a 2017 Toyota Rav 4 LE AWD for sale. The advertised car had

 been stolen a few days before. His profile indicated he was “verified with” his phone

 number, but users were prompted to “ask [him] to verify [his] profile.” He had no

 profile photo, no reviews, and no “Verified User” badge:

                                  Aplt. App. at 00079.

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           B. The Murders

       On August 14, 2020, the Rolands agreed to meet Mr. Brown in a PETCO

 parking lot at 11 p.m. to purchase the car. When Mr. Brown arrived, he said he

 brought the wrong title for the car and asked the Rolands to follow him to his

 fictitious residence so he could retrieve the correct title. But Mr. Brown did not have

 the vehicle title because the car was stolen. The Rolands agreed to follow him to the

 second location. When they arrived at an apartment complex, Mr. Brown approached

 the driver’s side window with a handgun and demanded the money. Mr. Roland

 attempted to grab the gun. Mr. Brown, intending to shoot Mr. Roland, accidentally

 struck and killed Mrs. Roland. He then killed Mr. Roland and stole the $3,000 they

 brought to purchase the car. Law enforcement found Mr. and Mrs. Roland

 unresponsive in their vehicle. They were declared dead just after midnight on

 August 15, 2020, leaving behind five minor children.

       Law enforcement made contact with the Roland residence and obtained access

 to Mr. Roland’s iPhone and reviewed the communications with Mr. Brown via the

 Letgo app. Letgo gave law enforcement the information it had on the “James

 Worthy” account—which was only an email address. Meanwhile, Mr. Brown set the

 car on fire and deleted his “James Worthy” account. To engage in further criminal

 activity, Mr. Brown created another Letgo account using a different pseudonym with

 the same photos of the stolen (and now destroyed) car.

       Twelve days after the murders, Verizon Wireless confirmed the location data

 of the phones used in the PETCO parking lot, at the apartment complex, and at the

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 location the car was destroyed. Law enforcement obtained the location of Mr. Brown

 and arrested him. His conviction included two counts of first-degree felony murder.

                                        II.    Discussion

        Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in granting Letgo’s motion to

 dismiss. They argue that Letgo’s business model and representations created a duty

 under Colorado law to provide adequate safety precautions to prevent bad actors from

 misusing the app.

        We review dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo,

 accepting all well-pled factual allegations as true and construing them in the light

 most favorable to plaintiffs. S.E.C. v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014)

 (citations omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

 sufficient factual matter . . . ‘to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”

 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To satisfy the plausibility standard, “the complaint must

 plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matney v. Barrick Gold of N. Am.,

 80 F.4th 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). We may consider

 “documents incorporated by reference in the complaint; documents referred to in and

 central to the complaint, when no party disputes its authenticity; and ‘matters of

 which a court may take judicial notice.’” Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 63

 F.4th 1264, 1275 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 708 F.3d

 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2013)).

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       In a diversity case, we apply the substantive law of the forum state, Colorado,

 to analyze each claim. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dish Network, LLC,

 17 F.4th 22, 29 (10th Cir. 2021).

       Plaintiffs have asserted five claims3 under Colorado law:

                   Negligence

                   Fraud

                   Negligent Misrepresentation

                   Wrongful Trade Practices under the Colorado Consumer
                    Protections Act (CCPA), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-101

                   Wrongful Death, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-201

       We review each in turn.

           A. Negligence Claim

       Under Colorado law, “[t]o recover on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must

 establish that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty of care; (2) the

 defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff was injured; and (4) the defendant’s

 breach caused that injury.” N.M. by & through Lopez v. Trujillo, 397 P.3d 370, 374

 (Colo. 2017) (citing Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 325 (Colo. 2004)). “In

 determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a particular plaintiff, the law

 distinguishes between acting and failure to act, that is, misfeasance, which is active

 misconduct that injures others, and nonfeasance, which is a failure to take positive

       3
         Plaintiffs fail to address the district court’s dismissal of their gross
 negligence and loss of consortium claims and therefore waive an appellate challenge
 to those claims.
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 steps to protect others from harm.” Smit v. Anderson, 72 P.3d 369, 372 (Colo. App.

 2002). When a defendant fails to preserve the status quo, the claim is based on

 nonfeasance. Id. But when a defendant makes a representation that creates or

 increases the risk of harm, the claim is based on misfeasance. Id. at 373.

       Plaintiffs contend the district court erroneously categorized their negligence

 claim as one based on nonfeasance, and allege Letgo made three representations that

 actively increased the risk of harm to users like the Rolands: (1) it worked closely

 with law enforcement and used machine-learning technology to identify and block

 inappropriate and stolen merchandise, (2) it designated users as “verified with”

 certain personal information, and (3) it advertised its verification features and

 promoted the platform’s safety.

       According to plaintiffs, Letgo created an illusion that accounts like Mr.

 Brown’s could be trusted but undertook no actual verification procedures. Thus,

 plaintiffs argue Letgo increased the risk that users like the Rolands would purchase

 stolen products or meet a seller who would cause them harm. We find this argument

 unpersuasive.

       To determine whether a representation increases the risk of harm, we must

 look at the representation in context. For example, in one illustrative Colorado case,

 Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. App. 2009),

 the plaintiff claimed defendants negligently failed to detect drainage design flaws in

 a public works project and increased the risk of harm by misrepresenting such

 conditions. The plaintiff alleged the defendants put their “imprimatur on the project”

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 by stating in a letter that “[o]ther than a few minor issues, we believe that the

 drawings and specifications will be adequate to successfully complete the project[.]”

 Id. at 296. The court, however, found this did not constitute misfeasance because, in

 the context of the entire letter, the statement was not an expression of approval that

 created or increased a risk. Id. The letter explained that the defendants “had not

 been involved in the planning and design phases of the project, but . . . had a good

 understanding of what will be expected and what will be involved in constructing this

 project.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the letter made clear

 defendants were not giving firm assurances, but instead qualified their approval, the

 court determined they did not increase or create any risk of harm.

       Here, all three of Letgo’s alleged representations fail for the same reason.

 First, the representation concerning its work with law enforcement and use of

 technology to locate inappropriate or stolen items did not increase any risk of harm to

 the Rolands. Letgo had safety guidelines on its platform, warning users to take steps

 to protect themselves before buying or selling online, to meet in a public place during

 the day, to find another buyer or seller if there are any doubts about a user’s

 authenticity, and to take proper precautions even if most Letgo users are trustworthy.

 Aplt. App. at 00145-46. Thus, in context, Letgo’s statements are not an expression

 of approval that its platform is safe and that all users are trustworthy.

       Second, the representation that Mr. Brown was “verified with” his phone

 number is similarly not a stamp of approval. His profile, taken as a whole, shows the

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  opposite conclusion. Letgo prompted users in red font—and at the top of his

  profile—to ask “James Worthy” to verify his profile. The profile had no reviews and

  no profile photo. The designation on Mr. Brown’s profile that he was “verified with”

  his phone number, taken in context, is not an expression of approval that he was

  trustworthy and did not increase the risk of harm to the Rolands.

        Third, Letgo’s advertisements about its verification procedure did not create or

  increase a risk. Plaintiffs allege certain unspecified advertisements made by Letgo

  increased the risk of harm to the Rolands because Letgo was not actually verifying

  users. But no facts are alleged that Letgo misapplied, or failed to apply, its

  verification procedures. Instead, Letgo designated Mr. Brown’s profile as “verified

  with” his phone number—because he entered his phone number and confirmed

  receipt of a text message—but still prompted users to ask him to verify his profile

  because he had yet to reach 50 points. Further, any statements about its verification

  procedures increasing safety would have to be read in context. Letgo’s website made

  clear there were always risks involved with transacting with strangers online.

        Although plaintiffs attempt to frame their negligence claim as one based on

  misfeasance, the representations they highlight are not expressions of approval that

  increased or created a risk to the Rolands. To the contrary, their claim boils down to

  an allegation that Letgo failed to protect the Rolands from harm, and that claim is

  grounded in nonfeasance. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint makes this clear because

  they alleged Letgo had a duty (1) to assure the identity of sellers were not false, (2) to

  ensure all products were legitimate, (3) to vet individuals who attempt to become

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  “verified sellers,” and (4) to ensure a purchase through the app would not create an

  unreasonable risk of injury. See Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Wagner,

  467 P.3d 287, 295 (Colo. 2020). These allegations concern what Letgo did not do. It

  is therefore proper to construe them as assertions of nonfeasance.

         Because plaintiffs allege nonfeasance, the analysis ends here. In nonfeasance

  cases, there must be a special relationship between the parties, and plaintiffs concede

  there is no special relationship. See Smit, 72 P.3d at 372 (“In nonfeasance cases, the

  existence of a duty has been recognized only in a limited number of special

  relationships between the parties such that social policy justifies the imposition of a

  duty to act.”).

         If we assume, however, that Letgo owed the Rolands a duty of care based on

  misfeasance, the claim still fails because plaintiffs do not plausibly allege Letgo’s

  representations caused the Rolands’ deaths. For plaintiffs to prevail on causation,

  they must show Letgo’s negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing the Rolands’

  deaths. Smith v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 749 P.2d 462, 464 (Colo. App. 1987). But “if

  an event other than the defendants’ negligence appears predominant, the defendants’

  negligence cannot be considered a substantial factor.” Id. The Rolands’ decision to

  follow Mr. Brown to a second location and Mr. Brown’s decision to murder them

  “loom larger as substantial factors.” Id. Under these circumstances, Letgo’s conduct

  in putting a “verified with” designation on Mr. Brown’s profile, and its statements

  about safety and its verification procedures, were insignificant and not a substantial

  factor in causing the murders.

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            B. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims

        Next, plaintiffs contend Letgo committed fraud and misrepresentation by

  publishing false or misleading statements about the safety of its platform.

        In Colorado, to establish fraud, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant

  misrepresented a material fact; (2) the defendant knew the representation was false;

  (3) the claimant did not know the representation was false; (4) the defendant made

  the misrepresentation intending that the claimant act on it; and (5) damages resulted

  from the claimant’s reliance.” Loveland Essential Grp., LLC v. Grommon Farms,

  Inc., 251 P.3d 1109, 1116 (Colo. App. 2010) (citations omitted).

        Similarly, the elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation require

  plaintiff to show: “(1) one in the course of his or her business, profession or

  employment; (2) makes a misrepresentation of a material fact, without reasonable

  care; (3) for the guidance of others in their business transactions; (4) with knowledge

  that his or her representations will be relied upon by the injured party; and (5) the

  injured party justifiably relied on the misrepresentation to his or her detriment.”

  Allen v. Steele, 252 P.3d 476, 482 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (citations omitted).

        The heightened standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applies to

  fraud claims. “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the

  circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs must

  “set forth the time, place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the

  party making the false statements and the consequences thereof.” Schwartz v.

  Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Lawrence

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  Nat’l Bank v. Edmonds (In re Edmonds), 924 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1991)). “Rule

  9(b)’s purpose is to afford [a] defendant fair notice of a plaintiff’s claims and the

  factual grounds supporting those claims.” Clinton, 63 F.4th at 1277 (internal

  quotation marks omitted). The heightened standard in Rule 9(b) may apply to a

  negligent misrepresentation claim when it rings of fraud. Compare, e.g., Benchmark

  Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 2003) with, e.g.,

  Tricontinental Indus., Ltd v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 833 (7th

  Cir. 2007). We need not address this issue because plaintiffs’ negligent

  misrepresentation claim fails under either pleading standard.

        Plaintiffs allege the same three representations were false or misleading: (1)

  that Letgo worked closely with law enforcement and used technology to spot

  inappropriate or stolen items, (2) that it marked users as “verified with” some

  personal information, and (3) that its advertisements promoted its verification

  features were safe and could be trusted. Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege these three

  representations constitute fraud or a negligent misrepresentation.

        Causation is an element of both fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and the

  lack of factual allegations in plaintiffs’ amended complaint warrant dismissal of these

  claims. Plaintiffs only offer conclusory statements that Letgo’s representations were

  the proximate cause of the Rolands’ deaths. But a complaint must include “factual

  content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

  liable for the misconduct alleged.” Clinton, 63 F.4th at 1280 (citations omitted).      At

  oral argument, plaintiffs alleged the Rolands told their eldest daughter that they

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  relied on Mr. Brown’s “verified with” designation, as well as other statements made

  by Letgo about its safety and verification features before pursuing the sale of the

  vehicle. But plaintiffs do not allege this reliance caused their deaths. Instead,

  plaintiffs allege only that but for reliance on these statements, the Rolands would not

  have transacted with Mr. Brown. Plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims across the

  line from conceivable to plausible,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, and we “will not

  supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a

  legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf,” Whitney v. State of N.M., 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74

  (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, we find the amended complaint fails to plausibly allege

  causation.

               C. Colorado Consumer Protection Act Claim

          Plaintiffs similarly allege Letgo’s misrepresentations constitute a deceptive trade

  practice. “The CCPA was enacted to regulate commercial activities and practices which,

  ‘because of their nature, may prove injurious, offensive, or dangerous to the public.’”

  Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142, 146 (Colo.

  2003) (quoting People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gym of America, Inc., 177 Colo. 97, 112, 493

  P.2d 660, 667 (1972)). To prove a claim for relief under the CCPA, a plaintiff must

  show:

                 (1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive
                 trade practice; (2) that the challenged practice occurred in
                 the course of defendant’s business, vocation, or occupation;
                 (3) that it significantly impacts the public as actual or
                 potential consumers of the defendant’s goods, services, or
                 property; (4) that the plaintiff suffered injury in fact to a

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                 legally protected interest; and (5) that the challenged
                 practice caused the plaintiff’s injury.

  Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted).

         The heightened pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

  may apply to this claim as well because it alleges fraud, but there is some question

  whether it applies to an alleged CCPA violation. See State ex rel. Suthers v.

  Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc., 260 P.3d 9, 13 (Colo. App. 2009). The district court

  applied the heightened pleading standard and plaintiffs argued the same in their

  opening brief. See also HealthONE of Denver, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 805 F.

  Supp. 2d 1115, 1120 (D. Colo. 2011) (“[A] plaintiff must meet the heightened

  pleading requirements pursuant to Rule 9(b) to prove a deceptive or unfair trade

  practice.”).

         To establish a deceptive trade practice, a plaintiff must point to “a false

  statement of fact that either induces the recipient to act or has the capacity to deceive the

  recipient.” Rhino Linings USA, 62 P.3d at 144. A plaintiff can also “establish a

  deceptive trade practice by proof that a defendant knowingly made a misrepresentation

  that induces a party’s action or inaction.” Id. at 147. “Thus, a plaintiff may satisfy the

  deceptive trade practices requirement . . . by establishing either a misrepresentation or

  that the false representation had the capacity or tendency to deceive, even if it did not.”

  Id. at 148.

         Plaintiffs contend Letgo made the following false or misleading statements: that

  Mr. Brown was a “verified” seller, that it had certain verification procedures in place, that

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  it used technology to spot inappropriate or stolen items, and that it worked closely with

  law enforcement. But plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to show such representations

  were false or misleading.

         First, Mr. Brown’s profile indicated he was “verified with” his phone number, and

  plaintiffs offer no evidence demonstrating such a designation was false or misleading.

  And plaintiffs do not dispute Letgo’s claim that it sent a text message to Mr. Brown’s

  phone to confirm the phone number. Second, plaintiffs allege no facts that Letgo

  misapplied, or failed to apply, its verification procedures. Letgo’s website explained

  its point system, and what was required to become a “Verified User.” It is not clear

  why such statements were false or misleading. Third, plaintiffs provide no evidence

  Letgo failed to work with law enforcement or utilize technology to spot stolen items.

  Plaintiffs argue Letgo misrepresented Mr. Brown’s car was not stolen. But Letgo’s

  website specifically instructed users to consult third party sources to check a

  vehicle’s history for theft. And plaintiffs concede Letgo worked with law

  enforcement after the murders.

         Thus, even without the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard, plaintiffs fail to

  allege Letgo’s representations constitute a deceptive trade practice.4

         4
           We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ wrongful death
  claim. “[T]he right of the heirs to collect damages in a wrongful death case does not
  arise from a separate tort, but instead is wholly derivative of the injury to the
  decedent.” Steedle v. Sereff, 167 P.3d 135, 140 (Colo. 2007). And “[t]he cause of
  action created by this statute arises out of tortious acts which injured the decedent
  and resulted in the decedent’s death.” Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. Keefe, 900 P.2d 97,
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            D. Section 230

        Letgo cross appeals the district court’s refusal to find immunity under Section

  230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. Section 230 “creates a

  federal immunity to any state law cause of action that would hold computer service

  providers liable for information originating with a third party.” Ben Ezra, Weinstein,

  & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984–85 (10th Cir. 2000). Letgo is a

  computer service and will not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of any

  information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.

  § 230(c)(1). But a computer service “that is also an information content provider of

  certain content is not immune from liability arising from publication of that content.”

  F.T.C. v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009). That is, Letgo will

  not be liable for the content posted on its platform by a third-party buyer or seller.

  But if Letgo “is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of

  information” provided on the platform, it may be liable. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).

        The district court determined Letgo was not entitled to Section 230 immunity

  because it acted as a publisher or speaker. It found that although Letgo is a computer

  service that hosts third-party content, it is also an information content provider of

  certain other content. Specifically, the court held Letgo contributed in part to the

  production of the “verified with” designation on Mr. Brown’s profile. Letgo argued

  the “verified with” designation was the sole product of Mr. Brown entering his phone

  102 (Colo. 1995). Because plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege Letgo committed a
  tortious act, they also fail to allege a derivative wrongful death claim.
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  number, and that Letgo passively displayed the designation. But the court, relying on

  Accusearch, Inc., determined Letgo contributed in part because it sent a text message

  to Mr. Brown to confirm his phone number existed, and subsequently created and

  placed the “verified with” designation on his profile. Thus, the court determined

  plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded, for a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), that Letgo

  contributed in part to the “verified with” designation.

        We need not reach this issue. Since we affirm the district court’s rulings on

  the state law claims, we need not resolve the federal law cross appeal.

            E. Leave to Amend

        Finally, plaintiffs contend the district court erred in denying leave to amend

  their complaint to cure any deficiencies. The district court refused leave to amend

  because it would be futile.

        “We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.”

  See Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1313 (10th Cir. 2010). “But, we exercise de

  novo review when a court denies a request to amend on the ground that amendment

  would be futile.” Nakkhumpun v. Taylor, 782 F.3d 1142, 1146 (10th Cir. 2015)

  (citing Merida Delgado v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 2005)). Because

  the district court determined an amendment would be futile, we review the denial of

  leave to amend de novo.

        We agree an amendment would be futile in these circumstances. Plaintiffs

  already had one opportunity to amend their complaint, and do not set forth additional

  facts on appeal that they claim would cure the deficiencies identified by the district

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Appellate Case: 22-1456    Document: 010110993395         Date Filed: 02/01/2024   Page: 19

  court. Even so, additional facts would not cure the flaws in their complaint. No

  additional facts would turn plaintiffs’ nonfeasance claim into one based on

  misfeasance, nor would it turn Letgo’s representations into a substantial factor that

  caused the Rolands’ deaths for purposes of fraud or negligent misrepresentation.

  And plaintiffs cannot plausibly allege Letgo made knowing misrepresentations for

  purposes of plaintiffs’ CCPA claim.

        The district court did not err in denying the motion for leave to amend.

                                      III.   Conclusion

         We affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                              Circuit Judge

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