Court Opinion

ID: 9828848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:47:32.802338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:53.696050
License: Public Domain

On Appellants’ Motions for Rehearing.
Appellants Texas & Pacific Railway Company and Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Company have both filed motions for rehearing, the latter company’s motion being in the main formal. The Texas & Pacific Railway Company’s motion insists that the trial court erred in failing to submit the issue as to whether there was a market value at Dallas for the jaoks which died, and that such failure may be taken advantage of by appellant in the absence of a written request for such submission. That an objection to the issue submitted on the ground stated was sufficient to call the court’s attention to the insufficiency, incompleteness, and error in the issues as submitted, and that no special request for the submission of the issue as to whether there was a market value in Dallas for the jacks in question, was necessary. It is urged that the Supreme Court laid down the rule in G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 113 Tex. 472, 260 S. W. 561, 32 A. L. R. 1183; Id. (Tex. Com. App.) 252 S. W. 737, that when a charge is improper or incomplete, it is not necessary for the party objecting to do more than to object to the manner and form in which the charge is submitted, and there is no duty on appellant’s part to tender a charge or issue which will correct the defect or error in the charge given or proposed to be given by the court.
The Conley Case, opinion by Chief Justice Cureton, involved the giving of a charge which the Supreme Court held was affirmatively erroneous. The Court of Civil Appeals had held that the charge was not affirmatively erroneous, and therefore not reversible error in the absence of a requested instruction by appellant more fully explaining the degree of care required by appellant as a carrier of passengers. The Supreme Court held that this was once the rule with reference to charges affirmatively erroneous: but due, however, to statutory enactments, it is no longer so. The court, after referring to article 2185 (then article 1971 [Rev. St. 1911]), which defines the duties of a judge as to the giving of a charge, and submitting it to the respective parties or their attorneys for inspection, arid providing that “all objections not so made and presented shall be considered as waived,” and article 2190 (then article 1985) providing for the submission of a case upon special issues, said:
“These two statutes were enacted to accomplish the same purpose, and we think a failure to submit any particular issue under either statute can be reviewed on appeal only where the record shows a special charge was tendered on that issue. But in the instance of a defective or erroneous charge on a subject or issue which the court has undertaken to charge upon, the objections required by article 1971 take the
*649place of special charges, and render it unnecessary that the latter be tendered. It is immaterial whether the matter objected to in the court’s charge is a mere defective or incomplete statement of the law or issue to be determined or is affirmatively erroneous; objections which sufficiently specify the error will preserve the point on appeal, without the necessity of again directing the court’s attention to the same subject by special charge.
“Had the Legislature intended that the complaining party should not only make objections, but tender a special charge as well, it undoubtedly would have said so. Having undertaken to state what must be done in this respect, the statute, under a well-known rule of construction must be held to have excluded the necessity of doing anything else. Other cogent reasons are given in the cases cited. Houston & Texas Central Ry. Co. v. Gant [Tex. Civ. App.] 175 S. W. 745; Hines v. Kelley [Tex. Com. App.] 252 S. W. 1033.”
In the instant case the only objections which the Texas & Pacific Railway Company submitted on the submission of special issue No. 6, which inquired as to what was the reasonable cash value of the two jacks at the time of their death, were:
“26. This defendant excepts and objects to the submission of special issue No. 6 of the court’s main charge to the jury, for the reason that the court fails to submit the issue as to whether or not there was any market value at Dallas for the jacks of the kind and character in question herein, and special issue No. 6 thereby becomes a charge on the weight of the evidence.
“27. This defendant excepts and objects to the submission of special issue No. 6 of the court’s main charge to the jury, for the reason that there is no evidence showing that there is a market in Dallas, Tex., and that the testimony as given with reference thereto does not show that these jacks would have had the value as stated if placed on the market at that point. . “28. This defendant excepts and objects to the submission of special issue No. 6 of the court’s charge to the jury, for the reason that the undisputed testimony shows that the plaintiff who testified with reference to market value stated that he had not sold any jacks in Dallas, but that jacks sold by him had been sold at other places, and therefore there is insufficient evidence in this case to show that the jacks in question had any market value in Dallas at the place where the damage is alleged to have been incurred.”
It will be noted that appellant does not object or except to the failure of the court to submit the issue as to whether there was any market value for said jacks in Dallas at the time of their death, but objects only to issue No. 6 as given, because, as charged, such issue, by reason of a failure to submit the issue as to whether there was any market value in Dallas for the jacks, becomes a charge on the weight of the evidence. The majority, at least, have concluded that objection No. 26, set out above, does raise the objection that the submission of issue No. 6, without the submission of the issue as to whether or not there was a market value for said jacks in Dallas at the time, was a charge on the weight of the evidence. Hines, who was the only witness that testified as to the market value, was the plaintiff, and the jury might have disregarded his testimony as to this matter altogether, as held in many cases, such as Ft. W. & D. G. Ry. Co. v. Harle, 240 S. W. 1004, by this court, and cases therein cited. The writer does not believe that the objection or exception to the issue as submitted is couched in such clear and unmistakable terms as such exceptions should be to a charge and that the form of the exception is calculated to mislead the trial court as to its purport. But the majority have concluded otherwise, and the motions for both appellants for rehearing are granted, and the judgment below is reversed and the cause is remanded.
 The majority are of the opinion that the objection made in' paragraph 26 was clearly an objection that the submission of issue No. 6 was a charge on the weight of the evidence, in that it assumed that jacks of the kind and character of those in question had a market value in Dallas at the time of their shipment, and the objection clearly suggested to the court that an issue should be submitted as to whether there was a market value for said jacks'at Dallas at the time of the shipment, that being the only issue of value alleged in the petition. Plaintiffs sued to recover the market value of the jacks, and the burden was on them to show market value. It was not incumbent on defendants to assist plaintiffs in making out their case. For the reasons stated, the majority are of the opinion that the authorities noted above have no proper application.