Court Opinion

ID: 9939780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 19:00:34.890302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:55.072228
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30146     Document: 00517062332        Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/12/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                    FILED
                                                                         February 12, 2024
                                  No. 23-30146                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                    Clerk

   Howard Gary Brown,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   City of Central, a political division of the State of Louisiana; Davis
   and Son’s Fender Fixer, L.L.C.; Joey Doe, Individually and in
   his official capacity as tow truck driver for Davis and Son’s Fender Fixer;
   Roger Lynn Corcoran, Individually and in his official capacity as City
   of Central’s Chief of Police; Noah McKneeley, Individually and in his
   official capacity as deputy of City of Central’s Police Department; Darren
   Sibley, Individually and in his official capacity as Central’s Deputy Police
   Chief; John H. Porche, Individually and in his official capacity as Deputy
   of Central’s Police Department; Alex Doe, Individually; John Doe #1,
   Individually; John Doe #2, Individually; John Doe #3, Individually,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 3:22-CV-264
                  ______________________________
Case: 23-30146          Document: 00517062332             Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/12/2024

                                           No. 23-30146

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
           After Appellant Howard Brown was pulled over and had his
   motorcycle impounded for driving without license plates, he brought suit
   against the officers on the scene, the City of Central, Texas, the tow truck
   company responsible for towing his vehicle, and its employee. Defendants’
   motions to dismiss were referred to a magistrate judge who recommended
   dismissing all claims as barred by the Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive
   period. The district court adopted the recommendation. Brown timely
   appealed.
           We agree that Brown’s claims are time-barred and AFFIRM.
                                                 I.
           On August 6, 2020, Howard Brown was driving a motorcycle on
   Louisiana Highway 37 when he was pulled over for driving without a license
   plate.1 When Deputy John Porche asked Brown for his license and
   registration, Brown refused, stating he “wasn’t exercising the privilege of
   driving in commerce under a license.”2 Porche called for backup and several
   officers responded, including City of Central Police Chief Roger Corcoran,
   Deputy Chief of Police Darren Sibley, Deputy Noah McKneely, State
   Trooper Alex Doe, and three unidentified officers. Ultimately, the officers

           _____________________
           *
               This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
           1
           Brown admits that his license plate reading “NOT4HIRE” was not affixed to the
   motorcycle.
           2
            Instead, Brown provided the officer with a “notarized document as identification
   which contained therein a strongly worded warning to officials not to presume or assume
   anything about [him].”

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                                          No. 23-30146

   towed and impounded Brown’s motorcycle.3 Brown claims that his vehicle
   has not been returned to him.
                                                    A.
           On April 21, 2022, Brown filed suit pro se in the Middle District of
   Louisiana against: (1) the City of Central; (2) Chief of Police Roger Corcoran,
   in his individual and official capacity; (3) Deputy Police Chief Darren Sibley,
   in his individual and official capacity; (4) Deputy Noah McKneely, in his
   individual and official capacity; (5) Deputy John Porche, in his individual and
   official capacity; (6) State Trooper Alex Doe, individually; (7) John Does #1–
   3; (8) Davis and Son’s Fender Fixer, the company used to tow Brown’s
   motorcycle; and (9) Joey Doe, “as an individual, and in his official capacity
   as tow truck driver for” Davis and Son’s Fender Fixer. Brown asserted
   federal causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § § 241–242,
   as well as state law claims of common law conspiracy, trespass, intentional
   infliction of emotional distress, and conversion.4
           In his complaint, Brown suggests the City of Central’s ticketing policy
   is unlawful because it improperly converts drivers into “inhabitant[s] of the
   municipal corporation known as and operating as the CITY OF
   CENTRAL.” Pursuant to this scheme, Brown asserts the officers “used
   coercion and the threat of deadly force to fraudulently convert Plaintiff into
   an inhabitant of the CITY OF CENTRAL municipality; thereby subjecting
   Plaintiff to different punishments, pains, or penalties, than [sic] are

           _____________________
           3
             Brown also claims that the officers asked him to sign three citations that were
   issued to an “Alexander Ryan Gourney,” the motorcycle’s registered owner.
           4
            Brown also alleged that the officers violated numerous provisions of Louisiana
   law and asked the court to “convene a federal grand jury to investigate” these violations.
   Because the lower court did not understand Brown to raise these as distinct causes of action
   and Brown does not raise them on appeal, the Court will not consider these allegations.

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                                          No. 23-30146

   prescribed for the punishment of citizens.” He also accuses the officers of
   conspiring to and engaging in “concerted, unlawful, and malicious conduct”
   intended to deny Brown “his inviolable right to personal autonomy [and]
   right to property”5 and argues that his motorcycle’s impoundment
   constitutes conversion and trespass under Louisiana law.
                                                B.
           Once filed, the case developed a voluminous paper trail. Relevant
   here, the City of Central first appeared by filing its answer on June 8, 2022.
   On August 1, 2022, Corcoran and Porche appeared in their official capacities
   and filed a joint motion to dismiss the claims against them, claiming qualified
   immunity and arguing that Brown’s suit was barred by Louisiana’s one-year
   prescriptive period. The City, McKneely, and Sibley subsequently filed
   motions to dismiss on the same grounds, with McKneely and Sibley filing in
   their official capacities.6

           _____________________
           5
             Brown also characterized the officers’ conduct as that of “an armed street gang”
   who “assault[ed]” him,” “seiz[ed] his only mode of transportation, seiz[ed] his liberty,
   seiz[ed] his papers, and [left] him stranded on the side of the road tens (10s) [sic] of miles
   from his origin or destination.” In later filings before the district court, Brown described
   the officers as “masked bandits [that] did go in disguise on the side of the highway, armed
   with deadly weapons, to seize the liberty and property of plaintiff absent due process or a
   warrant merely at the whim of tyrannical Chief of Police, Roger Lynn Corcoran, who
   declared himself judge and jury in that moment.”
           6
              After Corcoran, Porche, McKneely, and Sibley filed their motions to dismiss in
   their official capacities, Brown sought a default judgment against the officers on the basis
   that they failed to appear in their individual capacities. Brown then moved to “Correct
   Clerk’s Error on Default Judgment,” and the officers filed a motion to dismiss in their
   individual capacities. The magistrate judge recommended the district court deny Brown’s
   motion to “Correct Clerk’s Error on Default Judgment” in part because the individual-
   capacity motions to dismiss mooted the motion. The district court accepted this
   recommendation. However, after Brown served Davis and Sons but the company did not
   appear, the Clerk entered default against the company. Brown failed to serve Alex Doe,
   John Does #1–3, and Joey Doe.

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             The case quickly erupted in a flurry of motions. Brown moved to strike
   the officers’ official-capacity motions to dismiss. He further requested the
   district court judicially estop these defendants from making any statements
   in “stark contradiction to” the City’s answer and maintained that the one-
   year prescriptive period did not apply because he “didn’t have a complete
   cause of action,” “didn’t have the knowledge to be able to file suit and obtain
   relief,” and the City’s law enforcement policies constituted fraud which
   tolled prescription. Brown filed several additional motions, including: (1) a
   motion for “Order to Show Cause for Materially False Statements Made by
   Defense Counsel”; (2) a motion “to Strike New Affirmative Defense by
   Estoppel”; (3) a motion for summary judgment; and (4) a motion for writ of
   fieri facias. Defendants opposed Brown’s various motions and moved to stay
   discovery pending resolution of the motions to dismiss. In response, Brown
   moved to compel discovery. All motions were referred to the magistrate
   judge.
                                           C.
             The more pressing issues were the three sets of motions to dismiss—
   the City of Central’s motion to dismiss, the officers’ official-capacity
   motions to dismiss, and the officers’ individual-capacity motion to dismiss—
   as well as Brown’s responses to and motions to strike the various defenses
   contained therein. In essence, Defendants contended Brown’s suit was
   barred by prescription, and Brown argued this defense was not timely raised.
   Alternatively, Brown contended the prescriptive period tolled either while he
   “spent countless hours, days, and even weeks learning how to assert his
   rights” or until he learned of the City’s fraudulent “Municipality Scheme”
   by which the City issued tickets to drivers who were not “inhabitants” of the
   parish.

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                                          No. 23-30146

           The magistrate judge recommended the district court grant
   Defendants’ motions to dismiss because all of Brown’s claims were barred
   by prescription.7 First, the magistrate judge found the City raised its
   prescription defense in “sufficient time for consideration,” and that Brown
   had adequate time to respond to the defense so that there was no risk of unfair
   surprise.8 Second, the magistrate judge concluded all of Brown’s federal and
   state law claims were subject to Louisiana’s one-year liberative prescriptive
   period.9 Because Brown filed the present suit on April 21, 2022, more than
   one year after the incident occurred on August 6, 2020, the magistrate judge
   concluded that his suit was time-barred. Third, the magistrate judge rejected
   Brown’s arguments that prescription had paused at any point. Finally,
   because Brown’s suit was time-barred, the magistrate judge recommended
   dismissing all claims against all defendants who were not yet served or had
   not yet appeared, including the unidentified police officers, Davis and Sons,
   and Joey Doe.10

           _____________________
           7
             The magistrate judge also noted that Brown’s state civil conspiracy claim and his
   federal claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242 were not cognizable under either Louisiana nor
   federal law.
           8
            Because the City filed its motion after its answer, the magistrate judge considered
   it as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The magistrate judge similarly denied
   Brown’s claim that the officers’ individual-capacity motions to dismiss were untimely.
   Brown does not meaningfully contest this issue on appeal.
           9
            La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492. In addition to being time-barred, the magistrate
   judge also noted that Brown’s claim of conspiracy was “not an actionable claim under
   Louisiana law,” and his claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 also failed because “[b]oth
   Sections 241 and 242 are criminal statutes which do not provide a private right of action.”
           10
             Because “the pleadings establish that Plaintiff’s claims are prescribed,” the
   magistrate judge recommended the district court grant the “motion to dismiss with respect
   to any non-moving defendants sua sponte after giving Plaintiff notice and a reasonable time
   to respond.” The magistrate judge determined that the objection period to its report and
   recommendations satisfied the notice requirement and recommended that the district
   court “dismiss all of the claims against the non-moving defendants based upon the grounds

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                                      No. 23-30146

          Brown filed his objections to the report and recommendation on
   January 24, 2023, reiterating his arguments that Defendants’ prescription
   defense was untimely. For the first time, Brown also argued the limitations
   period paused throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and that his 2020 filings
   in a separate suit he filed caused the limitations period to begin anew.
          The district judge accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation
   and dismissed with prejudice Brown’s claims against the City of Central, as
   well as all claims against Corcoran, Sibley, Porche, and McKneely in their
   official and individual capacities. The court likewise dismissed with prejudice
   all claims against Davis and Son’s Fender Fixer, LLC, Joey Doe, Alex Doe,
   and John Does #1-3 as prescribed. In its opinion, the district court did not
   address Brown’s arguments regarding COVID or Brown’s 2020 filings.
          Brown timely appealed. Although he raises multiple issues on appeal,
   the dispositive question before this Court is whether the district court erred
   in granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss after finding that Brown’s claims
   were barred by Louisiana’s one-year liberative prescriptive period.

          _____________________
   set forth in the motions to dismiss” and dismiss all claims against the unidentified
   defendants for incomplete service of process.

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                                           No. 23-30146

                                                II.
           Grants of a motion to dismiss are reviewed de novo.11 “A motion to
   dismiss may be granted on a statute of limitations defense where it is evident
   from the pleadings that the action is time-barred, and the pleadings fail to
   raise some basis for tolling.”12 A district court’s decisions regarding waiver
   of affirmative defenses, motions to strike, and denials of default judgment are
   reviewed for an abuse of discretion.13
                                                III.
           Brown argues the district court erroneously granted Defendants’
   motions to dismiss for two reasons. First, Brown contends that the district
   court improperly considered the City’s prescription defense because it was
   not timely raised. Second, Brown asserts that the limitations period has not
   yet tolled because of the continuing violation doctrine or, alternatively, that
   the prescriptive period was interrupted.

           _____________________
           11
             Lampton v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Martin K. Eby Constr.
   Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)).
           Because the City filed its motion to dismiss after its answer, the magistrate judge
   properly considered the motion as one for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal
   Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Motions to dismiss and motions for
   judgment on the pleadings are governed by the same standard and both are reviewed de
   novo. See Hale v. Metrex Rsch. Corp., 963 F.3d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 2020) (“We review [R]ule
   12(c) dismissals de novo . . . . The standard for dismissal under Rule 12(c) is the same as
   that under Rule 12(b)(6).”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
           12
              Taylor v. Bailey Tool Mfg. Co., 744 F.3d 944, 946 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones v.
   Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir.2003)).
           13
              Cambridge Toxicology Grp., Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2007)
   (reviewing motion to strike and decisions regarding entry of default judgment for abuse of
   discretion); Smith v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 932 F.3d 302, 308 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing
   Motion Med. Techs., L.L.C. v. Thermotek, Inc., 875 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 2017)); LSREF2
   Baron, L.L.C. v. Tauch, 751 F.3d 394, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2014); Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766,
   767 (5th Cir. 2001).

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                                             No. 23-30146

                                                 A.
           The City of Central filed its answer on June 8, 2022, but did not assert
   the prescriptive bar. It did address the issue, however, after Corcoran and
   Porche raised prescription in their motions to dismiss. Brown moved to strike
   the City of Central’s motion, objecting that the prescriptive defense was not
   raised in the City’s answer. The district court denied Brown’s motion after
   finding the City raised the defense at a “pragmatically sufficient time.”
   Brown now contends the denial of his motion to strike was in error.14 We
   disagree.
           Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires defendants to assert any
   affirmative defenses, including that the statute of limitations has expired, in
   their responsive pleading, i.e., their answer.15 A “[f]ailure to timely plead an
   affirmative defense may result in waiver and the exclusion of the defense from
   the case,” but “[a] defendant does not waive a defense if it was raised at a
   pragmatically sufficient time and did not prejudice the plaintiff in its ability
   to respond.”16 This “play in the joints” is acceptable because “Rule 8(c)’s
           _____________________
           14
               Below, Brown also moved to strike officers Corcoran, Porche, Sibley, and
   McKneely’s individual-capacity motions to dismiss as untimely; his motion was denied. To
   the extent that he appeals the district court’s denial of his request, this argument is forfeited
   for inadequate briefing. “Parties forfeit contentions by inadequately briefing them on
   appeal.” Guillot on behalf of T.A.G. v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 751 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation
   omitted). “To be adequate, a brief must address the district court’s analysis and explain
   how it erred.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal
   quotation and citation omitted). This rule applies to all parties, including pro se plaintiffs.
   E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014), as revised (Sept. 18, 2014)
   (“Despite our general willingness to construe pro se filings liberally, we still require pro se
   parties to fundamentally abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.”) (internal
   citation and quotation omitted). Brown’s appellate brief fails to explain how the district
   court erred on this point.
           15
                Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(c)(1).
           16
              LSREF2, 751 F.3d at 398 (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also Pasco
   ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572, 577–79 (5th Cir. 2009). “The terms waiver and

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                                              No. 23-30146

   purpose is to give the plaintiff fair notice.”17 So, “the prejudice inquiry
   considers whether the plaintiff had sufficient notice to prepare for and
   contest the defense, and not simply whether the defense, and evidence in
   support of it, were detrimental to the plaintiff (as every affirmative defense
   is).”18
             The district court determined the City raised the defense in
   “sufficient time” and that Brown would not be prejudiced by the delay. We
   find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown’s
   motion to strike and considering the City of Central’s prescription defense.
   Rule 8(c) is designed to give parties notice, and Brown received both fair
   notice of the City’s defense and an adequate opportunity to respond. First,
   by the time the City filed its motion to dismiss, two other defendants—
   Corcoran and Porche—had already raised the defense in their own motions
   to dismiss. Therefore, as the district court determined, Brown “cannot claim
   unfair surprise by the City of Central’s assertion of the same defense.”
   Second, in the four months between when the City submitted its motion and
   the magistrate judge issued his report and recommendations, Brown filed at
   least three motions addressing the limitations defense. In his “Motion to
   Strike Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss,” Brown addressed the merits of the
   claim and argued the prescriptive period did not begin until he had “the
             _____________________
   forfeiture—though often used interchangeably by jurists and litigants—are not
   synonymous. ‘[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right [;] waiver is
   the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Hamer v. Neighborhood
   Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17, 20 n.1 (2017) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
   725, 733 (1993)). It may be more accurate to describe the untimely assertion of defenses as
   having been “forfeited” rather than “waived,” but this opinion need not delve into the
   semantics in this instance because the conclusion is the same: the City raised its defense in
   sufficient time.
             17
                  Thermotek, 875 F.3d at 771 (citation and quotation omitted).
             18
                  Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 2008).

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   knowledge to be able to file suit and obtain relief.” Clearly, he had ample time
   to consider and respond to the defense. Without evidence that Brown was
   prejudiced by the City’s tardiness, the district court did not abuse its
   discretion by considering the prescription defense. 19
                                                B.
           Brown next contends the district court erred because his claims are
   not time-barred. First, Brown argues his causes of action have not yet accrued
   under the continuing violation doctrine because he continues to incur
   damages from the impoundment of his motorcycle. Second, Brown contends
   the prescriptive period was tolled pursuant to Louisiana’s equitable contra
   non valentem doctrine. Neither argument is persuasive.
                                                1.
           Louisiana law establishes a one-year prescriptive period for
   “delictual” actions.20 Delictual actions are torts, and because all of Brown’s
   state and federal claims sound in tort, each claim is subject to the one-year
   liberative prescriptive period.21 State law further provides that a cause of

           _____________________
           19
              Allied Chem. Corp. v. Mackay, 695 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Bradberry
   v. Jefferson County, 732 F.3d 540, 553 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding district court decision to
   consider affirmative defense raised in amended answer because plaintiff had opportunity to
   respond and was not unfairly surprised).
           20
              La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492 (“Delictual actions are subject to a liberative
   prescription of one year. This prescription commences to run from the day injury or
   damage is sustained.”).
           21
             See Dual Drilling Co. v. Mills Equip. Invs., Inc., 98-0343 (La. 12/1/98), 721 So. 2d
   853, 857 (explaining delictual actions are “available to an owner dispossessed as a result of
   an offense or quasi-offense or, in other words, a ‘tort’”); Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536,
   538 (1989) (“Because no federal statute of limitations governs, federal courts routinely
   measure the timeliness of federal civil rights suits by state law.”); Bourdais v. New Orleans
   City, 485 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (“In § 1983 claims, the applicable

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                                             No. 23-30146

   action accrues, or “commences to run[,] from the day injury or damage is
   sustained.”22 According to his complaint, Brown’s injuries stem from his
   August 6, 2020 encounter with Defendants. However, the present suit was
   not filed until April 21, 2022, over one and a half years later. By the face of
   his complaint, Brown’s suit is prescribed.
           However, Brown disputes that his claims accrued on August 6, 2020.
   Because his motorcycle has not been returned, Brown maintains that this
   “continued deprivation of [his] property”23 constitutes a continued violation
   of his rights. Under the federal continuing violation doctrine, Brown asserts
   that his “motorcycle necessarily needs to be returned before tolling can begin
   in this matter [sic].”
           The continuing violation theory is a federal common law doctrine that
   governs when federal claims accrue.24 Federal claims typically accrue “the
   moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has
   sufficient information to know that he has been injured.”25 The continuing
   violation theory, however, “can relieve a plaintiff of showing that all of the
   defendant’s conduct occurred within the prescriptive period, but only if the

           _____________________
   statute of limitations is that which the state would apply in an analogous action in its
   courts.”).
           22
                La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492
           23
                “Tolling, which interrupts the statute of limitations after it has begun to run,
   is . . . a matter of state law,” although “accrual of a section 1983 claim, which determines
   when the statute of limitations begins to run, is governed by federal common law.” Heath,
   850 F.3d at 739. This Court understands Brown to argue that his claim has not yet accrued
   under the continued violation doctrine.
           24
              Heath, 850 F.3d at 740; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (“While we
   have never stated so expressly, the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of
   federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”).
           25
                Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

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   plaintiff can show ‘a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within
   the limitations period.’”26 Louisiana law includes a similar “continuing tort”
   doctrine, which provides that “where the operating cause of injury is a
   continuous one and gives rise to successive damages, prescription dates from
   the cessation of the wrongful conduct causing the damage.”27
           It is unlikely that the continuing violation doctrine applies here. The
   federal continuing violation theory is typically invoked in either hostile work
   environment or employment discrimination cases, and this Court has
   previously questioned whether the doctrine applies outside the
   discrimination context.28 Brown has offered no case law suggesting
   application in an analogous case, and we too find none.
           Assuming arguendo that either doctrine applies, Brown’s argument
   still fails because the conduct complained of did not constitute a violation of
   his rights, much less a continuing violation of his rights. Both doctrines
   require plaintiffs to allege underlying wrongful conduct. Here, Brown claims
   that he was pulled over pursuant to an illegal “Municipal Scheme” and that
   the resulting impounding of his vehicle was unlawful. He is incorrect. Brown
   admits to driving a motorcycle without license plates. Doing so violates
   Louisiana law requiring all vehicles to be properly equipped with a

           _____________________
           26
              Montgomery v. La. ex rel. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., No. 01-31458, 2002 WL
   1973820, 46 F. App’x 732, *2 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 134–35
   (5th Cir. 1997)).
           27
            Crump v. Sabine River Auth., 98-2326 (La. 6/29/99), 737 So. 2d 720, 726 (citing
   South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 418 So.2d 531, 533 (La. 1982)).
           28
              See McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Sup’rs, 3 F.3d 850, 866 n.27 (5th Cir. 1993)
   (“In fact, courts, including this one, are wary to use the continuing violation doctrine to
   save claims outside the area of Title VII discrimination cases.”).

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   “permanent registration license plate.”29 The law further authorizes police
   officers to “immediately impound” vehicles in operation without license
   plates.30 So, because Brown was operating a motorcycle without a permanent
   license plate, Defendants were legally authorized to pull him over and
   impound the vehicle. Because there was no unlawful act in the first instance,
   there has been no ongoing tort or violation of Brown’s rights.31
           Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that Brown’s
   federal and state law claims accrued on August 6, 2020.
                                                2.
           Additionally, Brown argues that the prescriptive period was
   interrupted both as an equitable and statutory matter. First, Brown seeks
   equitable tolling under Louisiana’s contra non valentem doctrine due to the
           _____________________
           29
                 La. Stat. Ann. § 32:53(a)(2) (stating all motor vehicles, including
   motorcycles, must be equipped with a “permanent registration license plate”). Contrary
   to Brown’s assertions, this law applies to all, not merely City of Central residents. See La.
   Stat. Ann. § 32:53(A)(1) (“No person shall drive or move, nor cause or knowingly
   permit any vehicle owned or controlled by him to be driven or moved, on any highway of
   this state, at any time, any vehicle or combination of vehicles which is in such unsafe
   condition as to endanger any person or property, or which does not contain those parts or
   is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment, in proper condition and
   adjustment, as required in this Chapter, or which is constructed or equipped in any manner
   in violation of this Chapter, and no person shall do any act forbidden or fail to perform any
   act required under this Chapter.”).
           30
             La. Stat. Ann. § 32:57(A)(2) (“For any violation of [La. Stat. Ann. §]
   32:53(A)(2), the vehicle may be immediately impounded.”).
           31
                McGregor, 3 F.3d at 867 (“We must be careful not to confuse continuous
   violations with a single violation followed by continuing consequences; only continuous
   unlawful acts can form the basis of a continuous violation.”) (emphasis added); Crump, 737
   So. 2d at 728 (“A continuing tort is occasioned by unlawful acts, not the continuation of the
   ill effects of an original, wrongful act.”) (emphasis added); Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009-
   2632 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So. 3d 991, 1003 (“The inquiry is essentially a conduct-based one,
   asking whether the tortfeasor perpetuates the injury through overt, persistent, and ongoing
   acts.”) (emphasis added).

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                                          No. 23-30146

   COVID-19 pandemic. Because of the pandemic, he argues the “Middle
   District was closed and inaccessible to Plaintiff free of discrimination until
   March 29, 2023.”32 Second, Brown argues that his 2020 filings in a separate
   suit interrupted the limitations period while the case was pending. Third,
   Brown argues that prescription tolled until he discovered the City’s allegedly
   fraudulent “Municipality Scheme,” i.e., the practice of issuing traffic tickets.
           Brown’s first argument—that the COVID-19 pandemic suspended
   Louisiana’s prescriptive period—was not raised before the magistrate judge.
   Our precedent establishes that issues raised for the first time in an objection
   to a report and recommendation were not properly before the district court
   and should not be considered on appeal.33 Thus, this argument is forfeited.34

           _____________________
           32
              Brown’s statements regarding “discrimination” seem to refer to his earlier
   claims that Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick, to whom his case was originally assigned, and the
   Middle District of Louisiana generally subjected him to “34 months + of [] continued
   discrimination” by “forc[ing] medical decisions upon the general public” and requiring
   “the Plaintiffs [sic] and others similarly situated, to either take experimental drugs or wear
   a mask to enter the Federal Courthouse.” Brown later sought to disqualify and recuse all
   judges in the Middle District from hearing his case. The district court judge denied the
   motion because Brown failed to meet the recusal standards outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 144 and
   28 U.S.C. § 455. Despite devoting six pages of his opening brief to this issue, Brown offers
   no argument indicating he appeals the denial of his motion to recuse. Thus, to the extent he
   appeals this decision, this issue is forfeited. Guillot, 59 F.4th at 751.
           33
              United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992); Finley v. Johnson,
   243 F.3d 215, 219 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001); Banks v. Dretke, 383 F.3d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 2004);
   see also Rodriguez v. Apfel, No. 95-50703, 1998 WL 127813, *3 (5th Cir. 1998) (unpublished);
   Buchanan v. CCA/Tallahatchie Cnty. Corr. Facility, 704 F. App’x 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (applying rule to pro se plaintiff); Omran v. Prator, 674 F. App’x 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2016)
   (same).
           34
              This argument also fails on the merits. The COVID-19 pandemic, as applied to
   Brown’s case, does not fall within the statutory suspension established by La. Stat.
   Ann. § 9:5829. The statute suspended prescription from March 17, 2020, through July 5,
   2020; thus, the suspension ended before Brown’s interaction with the police officers on
   August 6, 2020, and cannot provide relief. See La. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:5829, 9:5830. Brown
   also failed to establish that the pandemic is encompassed by the contra non valentem

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                                            No. 23-30146

           The second argument fares no better. In November 13, 2020, Brown
   filed suit in the Middle District of Louisiana alleging substantively identical
   issues as in the present case. He now argues that the 2020 filing interrupted
   the prescriptive period. Although Louisiana Civil Code article 3462 states
   that prescription is “interrupted” by the filing of suit in a court of competent
   jurisdiction and venue, Brown first raised this argument in his objections to
   the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Like his COVID-19
   argument, this contention is forfeited.35
           Finally, Brown argues that prescription paused pursuant to the
   equitable doctrine of contra non valentem until he “discovered” Defendants’
   allegedly fraudulent practice of issuing traffic tickets. Throughout his
   pleadings, motions, and briefing on appeal, Brown contends that Defendants

           _____________________
   doctrine. To the extent that he argues the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a “cause which
   prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiff’s
   action,” under the doctrine, he has provided no explanation as to how the pandemic limited
   his access to the courtroom. Even if contra non valentem covered the pandemic, a “plaintiff
   must establish not only the occurrence of a catastrophe but also a factual impediment to
   filing suit.” Anding o/b/o Anding v. Ferguson, 54,575 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/6/22), 342 So. 3d
   1138, 1150 (citations omitted). Although Brown claims the “Middle District was closed and
   inaccessible to Plaintiff free of discrimination until March 29, 2023,” he offers no further
   explanation on this point and, thus, has failed to establish how he was actually impaired in
   accessing the courtroom.
           35
               La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3462; Armstrong, 951 F.2d at 630. This argument
   also fails on the merits. Prescription is interrupted when plaintiffs file suit but if a plaintiff
   “abandons the suit, voluntarily dismisses the suit at any time either before the defendant
   has made any appearance of record or thereafter, or fails to prosecute the suit at the trial,”
   then “[i]nterruption is considered never to have occurred.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art.
   3463. Brown’s 2020 suit was dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b),
   and the Fifth Circuit has held that dismissals under Rule 41(b) constitute “abandon[ment]
   of the suit” under the Louisiana code. Hilbun v. Goldberg, 823 F.2d 881, 884 (5th Cir. 1987)
   (finding dismissal under Rule 41(b) was analogous to abandonment under Louisiana
   procedure). Therefore, “[i]nterruption is considered never to have occurred.” La. Civ.
   Code Ann. art. 3463.

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                                            No. 23-30146

   can only issue tickets to drivers who are “inhabitant[s] of the municipal
   corporation known as and operating as the [City of Central].” Accordingly,
   he claims the City’s policy of ticketing any driver “forc[es] inhabitation upon
   those in its territory, [and] unlawfully converts Peacekeepers into Revenue
   Agents.” Brown categorizes this practice as “blatant and continuing
   FRAUD” and, citing to the Supreme Court case of Merck & Co., Inc. v.
   Reynolds,36 he asserts the “bar of the statute of limitations does not begin to
   run until the fraud is discovered.” Consequently, Brown claims the
   limitations period did not run until he discovered the City’s fraudulent
   scheme “in January of 2022 with his reading of the municipalities section of
   American Jurisprudence.”
           While timely raised, this argument is meritless as Brown
   misunderstands both the contra non valentem doctrine and the relevancy of
   Merck. Contra non valentem is “a judicially created exception to prescription”
   “based on the civil doctrine of contra non valentem agere nulla currit
   praescriptio, which means prescription does not run against a party who is
   unable to act.”37 The doctrine recognizes four instances in which
   prescription is suspended, the fourth of which is “[w]here the cause of action
   is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his
   ignorance is not induced by the defendant.”38 This “is equivalent to the
   discovery doctrine,”39 which provides that a “cause of action does not

           _____________________
           36
                Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010).
           37
              In re Med. Rev. Panel for Claim of Moses, 2000-2643 (La. 5/25/01), 788 So. 2d
   1173, 1178 n.10 (citation omitted) (hereinafter “Claim of Moses”); Fontenot v. ABC Ins. Co.,
   95-1707 (La. 6/7/96), 674 So. 2d 960, 963.
           38
             Corsey v. State, Through Dep’t of Corr., 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979) (surveying case
   law and establishing the four categories).
           39
              Claim of Moses, 788 So. 2d at 1178 n.10 (“As noted, the fourth category is
   equivalent to the discovery doctrine. Under the discovery doctrine, “prescription does not

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                                           No. 23-30146

   mature (so prescription does not begin to run) until it is known or at least
   knowable.”40 However, Brown conceded he “knew he had been injured” on
   August 6, 2020. Thus, the one-year period began to run the day he was
   injured, and the discovery rule is inapplicable.41
           Merck does not change this conclusion because it did not expand
   Louisiana’s contra non valentem doctrine and is inapplicable to this case.
   Merck was a securities fraud case and addressed the statute of limitations
   under 28 U.S.C. § 1658.42 Because this case does not concern securities fraud
   and Brown’s claims are subject to a state, not federal, statute of limitations,
   Merck is inapposite.
                                                 3.
           In conclusion, Brown’s causes of action accrued on August 6, 2020.
   He has failed to identify a basis by which the one-year prescriptive period
   tolled, specifically because the continuing violation or continued tort theories
   do not apply, he forfeited his arguments regarding COVID-19 and his 2020
   lawsuit, and any allegations regarding Defendants’ allegedly fraudulent
   ticketing practice do not fall under the rubric of the contra non valentem

           _____________________
   begin to accrue until the plaintiff should have discovered that he had a reasonable basis for
   pursuing a claim against a specific defendant.”) (citation omitted).
           40
              Corsey, 375 So. 2d at 1322 (“This fourth or more modern situation, which has
   been judicially characterized as a Contra non valentem exception [sic] to the running of
   prescription, is generically similar to instances provided by statute where prescription does
   not begin to run until the claimant has knowledge of his cause of action. In these, the cause
   of action does not mature (so prescription does not begin to run) until it is known or at least
   knowable.”).
           41
                La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492.
           42
                Merck, 559 U.S. at 648.

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                                           No. 23-30146

   doctrine. Because Brown filed suit more than one year after he knew of his
   injury, we conclude that his claims are prescribed.
                                                IV.
           Finally, Brown maintains that the district court erred by denying his
   motion for default judgment as to Davis and Sons and by sua sponte
   dismissing these claims.43 We find no error.
           Plaintiffs are “not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right,
   even where the defendant is technically in default.”44 Importantly here,
   default judgment is only appropriate where the pleadings provide a sufficient
   basis for relief.45 As discussed, Brown’s pleadings do not state a claim for
   relief against any party in this case, including Davis and Sons, because his
   claims are time-barred. It is no matter that the prescription defense was not
   raised by Davis and Sons because “where ‘a defending party establishes that
   plaintiff has no cause of action . . . this defense generally inures also to the
   benefit of a defaulting defendant.’”46 Furthermore, the district court could
   dismiss these claims sua sponte “as long as the procedure employed is

           _____________________
           43
              The district court dismissed with prejudice Brown’s claims against Davis and
   Son’s Fender Fixer, LLC, Joey Doe, Alex Doe, and John Does #1-3 after finding “those
   claims have prescribed [sic].” Alternatively, the claims were dismissed these claims
   without prejudice for failure to serve. However, although there is no indication that “Joey
   Doe, Alex Doe, and John Does #1-3” were served, the record indicates that Davis and
   Son’s Fender Fixer was served on May 18, 2022. Nevertheless, because Brown’s claims
   are prescribed, any error is harmless.
           44
                Lewis, 236 F.3d at 767.
           45
              Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 496 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (citation omitted).
           46
              Lewis, 236 F.3d at 768; id. (“Several courts have held that where a defending
   party establishes that plaintiff has no cause of action . . . this defense generally inures also
   to the benefit of a defaulting defendant. We agree with these other courts and accordingly
   adopt their holding.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

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                                          No. 23-30146

   fair.”47 We find that the objections period following the magistrate judge’s
   report and recommendations constitutes fair procedure because it gave
   Brown adequate time to lodge a complaint on this issue.48
           Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

           _____________________
           47
              Lozano, 489 F.3d at 642; id. (“We have held that a district court is authorized to
   consider the sufficiency of the complaint on its own initiative. And if the court finds the
   complaint fails to state a claim, it may dismiss as long as the procedure employed is fair.”)
   (internal citations and quotations omitted).
           48
              To the extent Brown argues the district court improperly denied his motions for
   default judgment against the officers in their individual capacities, his claim fails for the
   same reason.

                                                20