Court Opinion

ID: 9754223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:50:45.723524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:50.877605
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Musmanno:
The plaintiffs in this case do not question that the Superintendent of Prisons has the right, under the Act of April 14, 1835, to hire and dismiss employes of the prison. I would say that even if the Act did not confer upon him this authority, it would be his because of the intrinsic nature of his duties, which require never-failing vigilance. The keeper of a prison, the inhabitants of which are necessarily men prone to disobedience and potential violence, must have employes who are steadfastly loyal to him and to his trust, and who can be depended on to display courage and strength in any given crisis or emergency. He, therefore, in the dis*617charge of his great responsibilities, should not be restricted in the choosing, suspending and dismissing of employes.
But the immediate right of the Superintendent of Prisons to discharge prison guards is not involved in this litigation at all. What is before us is the right of a labor union to be heard on a specific grievance.
On December 6, 1950, members of the Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania Prisons Employees, Local 620, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, A. F. of L., wrote the Board of Prison Inspectors of the Philadelphia County Prisons, requesting that a panel be appointed under the provisions of the Act of June 30, 1947, P. L. 1183, to hear their grievances having to do with job security, recognition of labor union, activities of labor union members and the discharge of the two plaintiffs, Robert C. Broad-water and Chester L. Alburger. The defendants declined to cooperate in the procedure set up by the Act referred to. They made no answer to the request of the employes for a panel hearing on the subject of job security and labor union recognition, and, with regard to the discharge of the two plaintiffs, contented themselves with averring that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a hearing since they were no longer employed as prison guards.
The majority opinion supports the position of the defendants and states: “We are presently not concerned with the merits of the case.” But why shouldn’t we be concerned with the merits of the case?
A duly constituted labor union, under a definite procedure outlined by a Pennsylvania statute, has made serious charges of unfair labor practices against the defendants. In its letter of December 6,1950, the labor union charges that the defendants are attempting to impair the rights of its employes to join a labor *618union. The union claims further that two employes were discharged because they were active in the formation and continued existence of a labor union. These declarations amount to nothing less than the very serious accusation that the defendants are attempting to destroy the machinery of collective bargaining. This they have no right to do under the law of the land. How can we then refuse to consider the merits of a controversy which revolves around the vital issue as to whether, in today’s jurisprudence, any employer can deny an employe the right to join and belong to a labor union?
It may be that the plaintiffs’ averments made under oath cannot be substantiated, but the Court cannot simply, without any evidence to the contrary, assume the averments to be false. I do not know whether they are true or not. If they do not represent fact, I would dismiss the Complaint, but I cannot make a decision on mere speculation and guesswork. The Act of 1947 supplies a lamp to illuminate controversies of this character between management and employes, but the lamp here has never been lighted — and I refuse to make a decision in the dark.
The majority opinion states: “There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime.” I agree with that statement as I agree with the Ten Commandments and the Declaration of Independence,. but that- proposition is not involved here at all. The plaintiffs did not'go out on strike. The plaintiffs were discharged. For the defendants to say, as they do, that employes are on strike when they are denied access.to their jobs is ifco impart a strange interpretation to the word “strike.” A strike is a voluntary collective cessation of work. It is the laying down of tools. The defendants here snatched the tools from the hands, of the ...plaintiffs, and ordered them out, *619and against tlie attempted return of the plaintiffs to the workshop, the door is shut in their faces. To call that situation a strike is to use language haphazardly.
But if the majority opinion approves the defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs are on strike, then the employes are definitely entitled to a panel hearing. Attorney General Chidsey’s opinion, quoted in the majority opinion, specifically states the following: “No hearing is provided in this section of the act or elsewhere to review a dismissal on any other ground than striking, as defined.” (Italics supplied.)
But whether the plaintiffs were properly or improperly discharged is not the most serious issue in this case. The very serious and grave proposition involved here is the nullification of the Act of June 30, 1947. This Act provides, as the majority opinion shows, that when public employes so request, the governmental agency involved (in this case the Prison Board of Inspectors) shall set up a panel of three members. This direction is mandatory. If the Prison Board may avoid this categorical mandate of the Legislature by the device of discharging aggrieved employees before they have an opportunity to articulate their request for a panel, the Act of June 30,1947, becomes meaningless.
Under the majority opinion an employer may always deny an employe the right to a hearing by the simple expedient of discharging him and then asserting he has no standing because he is not an employe. Suppose the superintendent in this case had said in so many words to Alburger and Broadwater: “I discharge you because you are members of a.labor union and I will not tolerate any union men working for me.” Would this Court say that Alburger and Broadwater, under those circumstances would not be entitled to a panel hearing because they were no longer employes'? '
*620According to the majority opinion the superintendent could discharge the entire force of prison guards because they are members of a labor union, but the guards would have no recourse under the Act because they would then be no longer employes.
How does the purpose of the Act of June 30, 1947, differ from the purpose of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act of June 1, 1937, which aims at peaceable settlement of all labor disputes? If the Prison Board in this case can be authorized to ignore the specific direction of the Act of 1947, private employers can also discharge union, employes and then with logic argue that they are not required to submit to amicable machinery provided by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act and contracts drawn under its aegis, since the complainants are no longer employes.
This decision can give sanction to one of the most dangerous practices that can possibly arise in labor relations. In spite of temporary inconveniences and even hardships resulting from transitory disagreements between employers and employes in the private industrial world, there is a greater stability and orderliness to the entire complex life of today than ever existed in the chaotic, irresponsible pre-union days when both employers and employes were not bound by contract or law to any continuity in production or service to the public.
Congress and every legislature in the United States have now recognized that recognition of labor union makes for peace, progress and prosperity for all concerned. And statutes aimed at establishing more peaceful relations between employers and employes are to be encouraged in the fulfillment of that ideal.
In asserting that public employes have no right to protest through the. medium of mass cessation of work, against unfair or .unjust.treatment,, the.Legislature, of *621Pennsylvania recognized the need to provide a vehicle for the airing of employes’ grievances if and when they should arise. It accordingly established the machinery for a panel which, made up of three members, would provide for hearing of grievances with a report to be made to the Governor, the General Assembly, or head of the agency or political subdivision involved.
To deny Alburger and Broadwater the right to be heard under this Act is like charging a soldier with a serious offense and discharging him dishonorably, but denying him a courtmartial trial in which he might have an opportunity to establish his innocence.
Alburger and Broadwater may have done every; thing that the Prison Board charges them with. I renounce any possible interpretation of defending what they are charged with having done or not done. After six years’ service in the military forces of the United States, I recognize the absolute need for strict discipline in military and quasi-military organizations, but I recognize also the possibility that the two plaintiffs may be innocent. If Alburger and Broadwater are as guilty as the defendants charge, a panel hearing wili establish that fact. An impartial hearing under the machinery provided by the Act will also quickly decide whether the labor union has been threatened by the defendants or not. The time and expense required for such a hearing Avould be insignificant in comparison to the great general harm which is possible as a result of an affirmance of the lower court’s decision.
The majority opinion says that after an employe has been discharged he has no right to participate in the grievance procedure under the Act of June 30,1947. I say that that is when he has the greatest right to participate in the grievance procedure under the Act in question. In nine cases out of ten, that is when the question arises: after the employe has been discharged. *622While he is still employed there may be no grievance for him to complain about. It is the very discharge which gives him his 'grievance. It is after a man has been hurt that he goes into court, not before.
I dissent.