Court Opinion

ID: 9954038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 16:04:36.040954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:44.244262
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Mar 25 2024, 8:45 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                     David C. Wanke, Sr.,
                                        Appellant-Defendant

                                                   v.

                                         State of Indiana,
                                          Appellee-Plaintiff

                                           March 25, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          23A-CR-2423
                             Appeal from the Knox Superior Court
                               The Honorable Gara U. Lee, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                         42D01-2207-F1-3

                               Opinion by Judge Mathias
                          Judges Tavitas and Weissmann concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024                       Page 1 of 10
      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   In VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 265-67 (Ind. 2013), our Supreme Court

      held that there must be affirmative evidence in the record that a young child

      understands “the role of [a] medical professional and the purpose of [her] visit”

      with the professional “in order for us to infer that the child was motivated to

      speak truthfully” to that professional for the purposes of medical diagnosis or

      treatment. Here, a five-year-old child, N.W., made statements to a medical

      professional that were incriminating toward her grandfather, David C. Wanke,

      Sr., which statements the trial court admitted into evidence over Wanke’s

      hearsay objection. However, as in VanPatten, here there is no affirmative

      evidence in the record to show that N.W. understood the role of the nurse to

      whom she spoke or the need to speak truthfully to that nurse for the purpose of

      medical diagnosis or treatment. Accordingly, following our Supreme Court’s

      clear precedent, we reverse Wanke’s conviction for Level 1 felony child

      molesting and his adjudication as a habitual offender, and we remand for

      further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Wanke is the paternal grandfather of N.W., and Ashton Wheeler is Wanke’s

      daughter-in-law and N.W.’s mother. In July 2022, N.W. lived with her three

      siblings at her parents’ home in Bruceville. For about two weeks prior to July 8,

      Wanke bought “a bunch of . . . clothing and some toys” for his grandchildren,

      but “99 percent of that stuff was for N.W.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 31.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024       Page 2 of 10
[3]   On July 8, Wanke visited Wheeler’s home. N.W. was wearing a dress. The

      children went outside to play on a trampoline. While N.W.’s siblings played,

      Wanke held N.W. According to Wheeler, Wanke “insisted on continuously

      trying to hold” N.W. Id. at 38. By the trampoline, Wheeler could see that

      Wanke was holding N.W. in a manner that was “not normal.” Id. at 61. N.W.

      was facing toward Wanke, and he had a hand “under her leg” and “right

      beside” N.W.’s buttocks. Id. at 60-61.

[4]   The next morning, N.W. went to the bathroom and started “yelling, ‘Mom.

      Mom. Mom.’” Id. at 25. Wheeler went to the bathroom and saw that N.W.’s

      underwear was “bloody.” Id. N.W. told Wheeler that “something happened the

      day before” with Wanke “near the trampoline.” Id. at 27, 122. Wheeler

      contacted local law enforcement and later took N.W. to a nearby hospital.

[5]   At the hospital, Courtney Benson, a nurse practitioner with specialized training

      in sexual assault, examined N.W. As a routine part of her examinations in

      possible cases of sexual assault involving children, Nurse Benson will ask the

      patient “if [the patient] can explain what happened . . . to make sure [the

      patient] doesn’t have any acute injuries that” Nurse Benson would “need to

      take care of.” Id. at 74-75. This dialogue with the patient also enables Nurse

      Benson to “look for [an] injury that is consistent with what they are telling me.”

      Id. at 77. Nurse Benson later testified that such questioning is for the purpose of

      diagnosis and treatment. Id. at 75.

[6]   When Nurse Benson asked this question to N.W., N.W. responded:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024        Page 3 of 10
              “We were beside the trampoline, and he was holding me.” She
              state[d], “He poked me through my clothes.” She state[d],
              “Grandpa used his nails on me.” And she state[d] she woke up
              with blood in her underwear and yelled for her mother.

      Id. at 80. Nurse Benson then did a physical examination of N.W., including an

      examination of N.W.’s genitals. Nurse Benson located “an abrasion . . . to the

      inner aspect of [N.W.’s] left labia majora.” Id. at 81. Nurse Benson concluded

      that such an injury is not “normal” and could not have been caused by

      “anything besides external force.” Id. at 84.

[7]   The State charged Wanke with Level 1 felony child molesting and with being a

      habitual offender. At his ensuing jury trial, the State called N.W. as a witness.

      She was six-years old at the time of the trial, and she testified that she did not

      remember anything about the alleged incident. The State did not ask N.W.

      questions about her July 9, 2022, interaction with Nurse Benson.

[8]   Instead, the State called Nurse Benson as a witness and asked her about her

      diagnosis and treatment of N.W., including her questions to N.W. and N.W.’s

      responses. Wanke objected to Nurse Benson testifying to N.W.’s out-of-court

      statements. At no point during Nurse Benson’s testimony did she state that she

      had had any kind of dialogue with N.W. about her role as a nurse, the purpose

      of N.W. meeting with her, or the need to speak truthfully. Nonetheless, the trial

      court overruled Wanke’s objection and permitted Nurse Benson to testify to

      N.W.’s out-of-court statements to her.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024         Page 4 of 10
[9]    The jury found Wanke guilty of Level 1 felony child molesting and further

       found him to be a habitual offender. The court entered its judgment of

       conviction and sentenced Wanke accordingly. This appeal ensued.

       1. The trial court erred when it permitted Nurse Benson to
       testify to N.W.’s out-of-court statements.
[10]   On appeal, Wanke first argues that the trial court erred when it permitted Nurse

       Benson to testify to N.W.’s statements to her at the hospital. A trial court has

       broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and its decisions are

       reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind.

       2021). We will reverse only if the trial court’s ruling was clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and the errors affect a

       party’s substantial rights. Id.

[11]   Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

       asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible. See

       Evid. R. 802. However, Evidence Rule 803(4) permits statements made for the

       purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment to be admitted into evidence, even

       when the declarant is available. As our Supreme Court has explained:

               [Such] statements must be made by persons who are seeking
               medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
               past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or
               general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar
               as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Rule 803(4)’s
               exception is grounded in a belief that the declarant’s self-interest
               in obtaining proper medical treatment makes such a statement
               reliable enough for admission at trial—more simply put, Rule

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024         Page 5 of 10
                803(4) reflects the idea that people are unlikely to lie to their
                doctors because doing so might jeopardize their opportunity to be
                made well. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356, 112 S. Ct. 736,
                116 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1992) (“a statement made in the course of
                procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a
                false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries
                special guarantees of credibility”).

       VanPatten, 986 N.E.2d at 260 (cleaned up).

[12]   To have an out-of-court statement to a medical professional admitted into

       evidence under Rule 803(4), the State must first show that “the declarant [was]

       motivated to provide truthful information in order to promote diagnosis [or]

       treatment.” Id. For most declarants, such as adults, “this is generally a simple

       matter,” as seeking medical treatment in the first instance is usually indicative

       of a subjective belief that statements made to the medical professional will be

       for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment. Id. at 260-61.

[13]   But more is required when the declarant is “a young child brought to the

       medical provider by a parent.” Id. at 261. As our Supreme Court has made

       clear:

                young children may not understand the nature of the
                examination, the function of the examiner, and may not
                necessarily make the necessary link between truthful responses
                and accurate medical treatment. In that circumstance, there must
                be evidence that the declarant understood the professional’s role in order
                to trigger the motivation to provide truthful information. This evidence
                does not necessarily require testimony from the child-declarant; it
                may be received in the form of foundational testimony from the
                medical professional detailing the interaction between him or her and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024               Page 6 of 10
               the declarant, how he or she explained his role to the declarant, and an
               affirmation that the declarant understood that role. But whatever its
               source, this foundation must be present and sufficient.

       Id. (cleaned up; emphases added).

[14]   In VanPatten, our Supreme Court held that the State had not established that

       two six-year-old victims understood the importance of telling a treating nurse

       the truth in order to get accurate medical treatment. Id. at 265. The nurse had

       observed prior police interviews, and the medical examination directly followed

       extensive interviews of the victims by the Department of Child Services.

       Further, the victims did not testify they had understood the nurse’s role. The

       nurse was also unable to testify as to what she had said to the victims, how they

       responded, and if they understood their situation.

[15]   We conclude that VanPatten is controlling authority on this record. The State

       established no record at all as to whether N.W. understood Nurse Benson’s role

       or the role of nurses or doctors in general. Nor is there testimony from any

       witness concerning past experiences N.W. may have had at medical facilities or

       with medical providers from which one may be able to infer that a five-year-old

       child understood why she was being examined. And Nurse Benson, while

       testifying to her usual routine in cases such as this, provided no testimony that

       N.W. in particular, and on this occasion, understood Nurse Benson’s role or

       the importance of being truthful to Nurse Benson for the purpose of diagnosis

       or treatment.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024                 Page 7 of 10
[16]   As in VanPatten, “[s]imply put, there is no evidence that the declarant

       understood the professional’s role in order to trigger the motivation to provide

       truthful information” under Rule 803(4). Id. at 267 (quotation marks omitted).

       Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted N.W.’s

       statements to Nurse Benson under that exception to the prohibition against

       hearsay.

       2. Nurse Benson’s testimony had a significant probable impact
       on the outcome of the trial, and, thus, the error in the
       admission of that testimony is not harmless.
[17]   We next turn to the probable impact of Nurse Benson’s erroneously admitted

       statements to discern if that error is reversible error. As our Supreme Court has

       held:

               When an appellate court must determine whether a non-
               constitutional error is harmless, [Indiana Appellate] Rule 66(A)’s
               “probable impact test” controls. Under this test, the party seeking
               relief bears the burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the
               evidence in the case, the error’s probable impact undermines
               confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below. Importantly,
               this is not a review for the sufficiency of the remaining evidence;
               it is a review of what was presented to the trier of fact compared
               to what should have been presented. And when conducting that
               review, we consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted
               or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all
               the evidence in the case. Ultimately, the error’s probable impact
               is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our
               confidence in the outcome is not undermined.

       Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023) (citations omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024         Page 8 of 10
[18]   The erroneous admission of Nurse Benson’s testimony readily undermines our

       confidence in the outcome of Wanke’s trial. Nurse Benson’s testimony as to

       what N.W. had said to her was unique, specific, and substantial. It was the only

       source in the record in which N.W. had affirmatively stated that Wanke had

       “poked me through my clothes.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 80. It was also the only source in

       which N.W. said that Wanke had “used his nails on me.” Id. Both of those

       statements filled an evidentiary gap in the State’s case that no other witness was

       able to fill, namely, bridging the gap from Wheeler’s observation of Wanke

       holding N.W. by the trampoline in an unusual manner and N.W.’s bloody

       underpants the next morning. Further, those statements surely had a substantial

       impact on the jury’s consideration of the cause of N.W.’s inner-labia injury and

       her bloody underpants. Accordingly, the trial court’s erroneous admission of

       N.W.’s out-of-court statements to Nurse Benson is reversible error.

       3. Retrial is not prohibited.
[19]   Finally, where, as here, the trial court erroneously admits improper evidence

       into the record and the error is not harmless, retrial of the defendant is not

       barred by double jeopardy if the admitted evidence in the first trial was

       sufficient to support the conviction. Gaby v. State, 949 N.E.2d 870, 882 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2011).

[20]   Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the State’s properly admitted

       evidence by itself could have been sufficient to support Wanke’s conviction for

       Level 1 felony child molesting. Wheeler testified that Wanke was holding N.W.

       awkwardly near the trampoline, and the next morning there was blood in
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024          Page 9 of 10
       N.W.’s underwear. And, in his own defense, Wanke told the jury that N.W.

       had reported to law enforcement that something had happened with him while

       he was holding her down by the trampoline. That evidence, while not

       overwhelming, would have been a sufficient basis for a conviction. Cf. Meehan v.

       State, 7 N.E.3d 255, 258-59 (Ind. 2014) (holding that a glove with the

       defendant’s DNA somewhere on it that was found at a crime scene was

       sufficient evidence by itself to convict the defendant of burglary). The State is

       therefore not barred from a retrial of Wanke for Level 1 felony child molesting.

       Conclusion
[21]   For all of the above-stated stated reasons, we reverse Wanke’s conviction for

       Level 1 felony child molesting and his adjudication as a habitual offender, and

       we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[22]   Reversed and remanded.

       Tavitas, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Kay A. Beehler
       Terre Haute, Indiana

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana
       Robert M. Yoke
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2423 | March 25, 2024       Page 10 of 10