Court Opinion

ID: 9567245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:51:09.008265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:27.798638
License: Public Domain

Harrison, J.,
dissenting.
I would neither abrogate nor modify the impact rule as we have heretofore construed and applied it. The instant case demonstrates its wisdom.
Appellee was frightened and upset by the sight of an automobile accident. Three days later she consulted her family physician complaining of nervousness and other conditions. He apparently did not regard these conditions as so abnormal for three months had elapsed since the birth of her last baby. The doctor prescribed hormones and phenobarbital. He said: “I did not think too much at the time. We all have little incidents that upset us.” However, when she continued to be upset he recommended that she visit a psychiatrist.
The psychiatrist diagnosed her problem as “anxiety reaction”. The treatment prescribed was a sedative and psychotherapy. He translated the latter to mean “talking with her”. Appellee was in his office on five occasions. He said her prognosis “for continued activity and doing the things she should be doing is good unless of course she has some other thing that will stir her up again”. He also said “outside” of what appellee told him he would not have known she had an emotional problem, or what caused it.
*37Applying the majority’s relaxed impact rule, I do not consider the evidence of the physicians sufficient to show that appellee’s diminishing breasts and the resumption of her menstrual period were the natural result of the fright or shock that she experienced on the night of the accident. The testimony established only emotional distress following a frightening experience. Appellee was not hospitalized, her medical bills totaled only $112, and her recovery was $12,000. I would reverse.