Court Opinion

ID: 9634764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:22:52.616571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:58.327920
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion authored by Mr. Justice Flaherty; I write separately to address issues raised in the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Papadakos and Mr. Justice Cappy. Mr. Justice Cappy writes that “it was entirely reasonable for counsel to have relied upon Poindexter’s own statement that he had been convicted, particularly when, as here, that statement was confirmed by Poindexter’s mother.” Infra at 108 (Cappy, J., concurring). With this statement, I vehemently disagree. Defense counsel had a duty to be aware of any possible impediment that might be raised to challenge his witness. It was improper for the defense counsel to rely upon the opinion of two lay people (i.e., Poindexter and his mother) for determining whether Poindexter was impeachable for the crime of receiving stolen goods. Once he was alerted that Poindexter had been arrested, defense counsel should have undertaken his own independent investigation of Poindexter’s record. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Zapata, 455 Pa. 205, 212, 314 A.2d 299, 303 (1974):
Even if it were established, however, that appellant had told his counsel that sentence had been imposed in the manslaughter cases, this would not have justified bringing out the convictions on direct examination without first verifying their finality, either by checking with appellant’s counsel at the earlier trial or by checking the court records. Thus, counsel’s action at trial can most easily be explained by a *235lack of preparation. Such “explanation” does not constitute a “reasonable basis.”
Thus, there being no reasonable basis for counsel’s actions, and there being prejudice to the defendant, the defendant must be granted relief.
The appropriate relief to be granted in this matter is a new trial. Mr. Justice Papadakos recommends that the prosecution be prohibited from impeaching Poindexter. There is no basis in the law for that type of relief. The defendant here is entitled to a new trial with effective assistance of counsel. That does not mean that defense counsel should have the advantage of presenting unimpeachable testimony by a witness who has been convicted of the crime of receiving stolen goods. The fault in this case lies with the defense counsel and not the prosecutor. This case does not present the type of evidence of 117prosecutorial misconduct that warrants sanctions. Therefore, because the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel which prejudiced his case, he is entitled to a new trial. It is true that Poindexter is now impeachable regarding his conviction for receiving stolen goods. The fact that the fortuitous circumstances may have made it more difficult to proceed in a retrial cannot be assigned to the Commonwealth. Thus there is no predicate for a prophylactic remedy where the original fault stemmed from former defense counsel’s inadequacy and not as a consequence of prosecutorial misconduct.
Accordingly, I join Mr. Justice FLAHERTY’S resolution of this case.