Court Opinion

ID: 9469152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:33:17.124994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:14.943906
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the affirmance of Count One and Counts Three through Six. I also agree that we cannot affirm the conviction on Count Two, for the reasons stated in the majority’s opinion. I dissent, however, from the majority’s decision to remand Count Two for a new trial.
*1251The district court imposed concurrent sentences on the defendant on all six counts. On appeal, the government urged that we apply the concurrent sentence doctrine as to Count Two and affirm the conviction on that count without reviewing it on the merits.1 I agree with the majority’s decision not to utilize the concurrent sentence doctrine in this case. However, I would vacate the unlawful conviction rather than reversing and remanding for a new trial.
Serious questions exist regarding the use of the concurrent sentence doctrine to affirm convictions without reviewing the merits. In my opinion, we should reexamine that practice and determine how best to treat convictions which have no “adverse collateral legal consequences” for defendants. I have recently set forth the reasons why I believe such a reexamination is required. United States v. Barker; 675 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1982) (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting).
I also believe, however, that the majority’s decision to reverse Count Two in order to permit a new trial is anomalous. It illustrates one of the continuing problems we face due to the absence of a clear and well-reasoned policy regarding the review of convictions on which concurrent sentences are imposed. Here, the government has assured us that the conviction on Count Two entails no practical consequences to the defendant. Still, we reverse for a new trial in order to allow the government to try to obtain another conviction on that count — a conviction that, the government tells us, would be meaningless.
A retrial and a new appeal on Count Two, in my opinion, will constitute a wholly unnecessary and unjustifiable waste of judicial resources, will place an unwarranted burden on the defendant, and will be a misuse of our limited prosecutorial time, energy, and talent.2 At oral argument the government requested that we remand Count Two for retrial if we conclude that the conviction on that count cannot be sustained. The only reason the government offered in support of this request was that it wanted a second trial in order to establish a legal principle regarding the elements necessary to show a violation of the particular criminal statute involved. That principle could be established in any number of cases which involve practical consequences for the government and the defendant. I do not think there is any reason to add to the current court congestion in both the trial and appellate courts by encouraging the prosecution of cases in which the government’s sole interest is in obtaining the answer to theoretical questions.
Assuming that the government’s representations, that an additional conviction would not have any consequences for the defendant, are correct, I see no justification for remanding for a new trial and a possible new appeal. Instead, I would vacate the inconsequential conviction. I would afford the government the right to seek a retrial in cases involving concurrent sentences only if it could establish that a new conviction might result in “adverse collateral legal consequences” to the defendant. Such a rule would be consistent with the practice followed in the District of Columbia, United States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604 (D.C.Cir. *12521970), and the technique we have on occasion used ourselves. United States v. Fishbein, 446 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019, 92 S.Ct. 683, 30 L.Ed.2d 667 (1972).
I should add that I have serious doubts as to the correctness of the government’s view that the absence of “adverse collateral legal consequences” (as that term is used for purposes of the concurrent sentence doctrine), means that a conviction involves no practical consequences for the defendant, and that it does not affect the defendant’s rights.3 For that reason, I would probably either reach the merits of a conviction in all cases in which concurrent sentences are imposed, see United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 361 (2d Cir. 1978), or apply the Hooper rule. In any event, the case before us illustrates the necessity for our circuit to develop a reasoned, rational, and consistent policy for dealing with cases in which application of the concurrent sentence doctrine is urged.

. Our reason for setting aside the conviction is that it is clear that, without the disputed stipulation, there is insufficient evidence to uphold it. If it were less clear that the evidence were insufficient, we would probably affirm the conviction under the concurrent sentence doctrine without considering the merits. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1365 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934, 101 S.Ct. 1399, 67 L.Ed.2d 369 (1981); United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 2407, 60 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1979). Similarly, had Count Two been challenged on different grounds, to which the answer was not so apparent, we would probably affirm under the concurrent sentence doctrine.

. As the government said in its reply memorandum, “As a result, judicial resources would further be expended in pursuing what would ultimately be a meaningless issue because, as stated before, even if Cutler prevailed, his sentence would not be effected [sic] in the slightest.” Later in its memorandum the government said that adjudication upon remand would constitute “a meaningless gesture.”

. See discussion in United States v. Vargas, 615 F.2d 952, 959-60 (2d Cir. 1980)..