Court Opinion

ID: 9836716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:53.31032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:18.578764
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur with the majority’s decisions and reasoning with regard to Issues I, II, and III, with the dismissal of specification 1, Charge I, and specification 1, Charge IV, and with the decision to affirm the remainder of the findings. Finally, I agree with so much of the majority conclusion as remands this case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for that court to reassess the sentence or refer the case to a convening authority to hold a rehearing on appellant’s sentence.
Regarding Issue IV, I agree with the majority that appellant’s voluntary disclosures in the context of this case constitute a waiver *135of his marital communication privilege. Although not necessary to the disposition of this issue, I fully concur with Judge Sullivan’s view that “[i]t is a crime against the marriage for one spouse to molest the other spouse’s child, ... even though the alleged victim was neither a marital nor adopted child of either spouse.” 54 MJ at 137.
Finally, as to Issue Y, I find no error in the military judge’s decision to admit Dr. Morales’s testimony on appellant’s rehabilitative potential.
A military judge’s decision to admit evidence, to include the testimony of an expert witness, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Raya, 45 MJ 251, 252 (1996); United States v. Sullivan, 42 MJ 360, 363 (1995); Mil.R.Evid. 702, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1998 ed.). His decision to admit evidence will not be overturned “absent a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. Johnson, 46 MJ 8, 10 (1997) , citing United States v. Redmond, 21 MJ 319, 326 (CMA 1986).
“Absent a prohibition in the RCM 1000 series, Manual [,supra,] ... the analytical model for admissibility of expert testimony is set forth in United States v. Houser, 36 MJ 392, 397 (CMA [1993]).” United States v. Prevatte, 40 MJ 396, 397 n. * (CMA 1994). Dr. Morales’s testimony concerning victim impact was admissible under RCM 1001(b)(4), and his testimony concerning appellant’s future dangerousness was admissible under RCM 1001(b)(5). Even if, as the majority finds, Dr. Morales’s testimony was inadmissible pursuant to RCM 1001(b)(5), his testimony could still have been admitted under RCM 1001(b)(4) because the future dangerousness of appellant was related to the impact on the victim. See United States v. Ariail, 48 MJ 285, 287 (1998).
During the sentencing phase of a court-martial, opinion evidence on the issue of rehabilitation potential is admissible. RCM 1001(b)(5). Like other opinion evidence, expert opinion evidence must be based on a proper foundation. RCM 1001(b)(5)(B). To have a proper foundation, the witness’s opinion must be based on “sufficient information and knowledge about the accused to offer a rationally-based opinion that is helpful to the sentencing authority. Relevant information and knowledge include, but are not limited to, information and knowledge about the accused’s character, ... determination to be rehabilitated, and nature and severity of the offense or offenses.” Id.
Expert testimony is permitted in the form of opinion evidence, if the expert’s specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. Mil.R.Evid. 702. The military judge’s role is to screen the scientific evidence and opinion testimony to make sure (1) that the expert is qualified, (2) that the subject of the testimony is within the realm of the expert’s qualification, (3) that the expert has an appropriate basis for the testimony, (4) that the testimony is relevant, (5) that the testimony is reliable, and (6) that the testimony meets the balancing test of Mil.R.Evid. 403. Houser, 36 MJ at 397; see United States v. St. Jean, 45 MJ 435 (1996); United States v. Halford, 50 MJ 402 (1999); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
Appellant does not contend that expert testimony concerning future dangerousness and lack of rehabilitative potential of a pedophile is per se inadmissible. To the contrary, this Court has found such testimony to be both relevant and reliable. See United States v. Stinson, 34 MJ 233 (CMA 1992); United States v. Williams, 41 MJ 134 (CMA 1994); see also United States v. Scott, 51 MJ 326, 330 (1999).
Counsel’s attack in this case on Dr. Morales’s testimony is bottomed on a failure of the Government to establish a proper foundation for his opinion. Dr. Morales never met appellant; never reviewed appellant’s medical or personnel records; and based his opinion on observations at trial (where appellant did not testify) and two interviews (one with the victim and the other with the victim’s mother), as well as some of the passionate letters which appellant wrote to the victim. Accordingly, the defense alleges Dr. Morales had no foundational basis on which to opine about appellant’s “future dangerousness.” *136While predictions of future dangerousness are permissible testimony during sentencing, appellant contends that Dr. Morales’s opinion of appellant’s future dangerousness was predicated on the fact that he, appellant, met the criteria for pedophilia.
Prior to direct examination, trial counsel established Dr. Morales as an expert witness in the field of child psychology. Dr. Morales is a medical doctor with additional specialized training in psychiatry. His first 4 years of residency training included 14 months in inpatient psychiatry, 4 months in inpatient child psychiatry, and 2 months in the psychiatric emergency room. In addition, his 5th year of residency consisted entirely of work in outpatient child and adolescent psychiatry. In his postgraduate years, Dr. Morales served as attending psychiatrist at the National Naval Medical Center, Staff Psychiatrist at Rikers Island Prison, a Qualified Examiner on the Westchester Medical Center Crisis Team, and Psychiatrist On Call at the Danbury Hospital Emergency Room. Dr. Morales has treated “hundreds” of children, about 20 percent of whom were sexual abuse patients. He was assigned at the time of trial as a child psychiatrist at the Yokosuka Naval Hospital.
Dr. Morales never diagnosed appellant as a pedophile, as made clear by the record of trial. In fact, Dr. Morales categorically stated that he could not render a diagnosis of appellant because he had not examined him. Dr. Morales stated only that appellant met the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) criteria for pedophilia.
Clearly, his status as an expert witness enabled him to render this opinion. Based on appellant meeting the criteria for pedophilia, in addition to the insight which Dr. Morales had gained of appellant through reviewing letters that appellant had written to the victim, and interviewing the victim and her mother, Dr. Morales fairly noted that appellant had an inability to recognize the extent of his problem. An inability to recognize the extent of one’s problem certainly translates into a lack of rehabilitative potential, as well as perhaps a future menace to society, in general, and the victim in particular. See RCM 1001(b)(4).
As did the court below, we should apply the test established in United, States v. Stinson to determine the admissibility of Dr. Morales’s expert testimony. See 50 MJ at 831. Clearly, the witness was qualified as an expert. The third prong of the Stinson test was met, as the material on which Dr. Morales relied in fashioning his opinion was both relevant and factually based. The fourth prong of the Stinson test, which we added in United States v. Banks, 36 MJ 150 (CMA 1992), was met in this case, as the judge conducted a Mil.R.Evid. 403 balancing test on the record.
What remains for resolution is the second prong of Stinson: Was the testimony within the limits of Dr. Morales’s expertise? As a medical doctor with additional specialization in psychiatry, Dr. Morales was clearly able to define pedophilia and objectively determine that appellant’s intense desire for the victim (who was 9 years old when the relationship started) not only fit within the boundaries of the definition of pedophilia, but also had a future impact on the victim. See RCM 1001(b)(4) and (5). Unlike the situation in United States v. Latorre, 53 MJ 179 (2000), Dr. Morales’s conclusions and opinion were based upon a definition in the DSM IV, not some study that had not gained acceptance in the scientific community at large.