Court Opinion

ID: 9765450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:03:09.243611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:10.046975
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
HILL, Justice.
Upon their motion for rehearing, Doctors Robin Schlaudt, Arthur Garcia, and Anna Lozano contend in seven points of error that this court erred by reversing the summary judgment that the trial court granted them. The Tarrant County Hospital District urges in three points of error on rehearing that we erred by reversing the summary judgment in favor of it and the physicians. We overrule all points of error and deny both motions for rehearing.
We shall first consider the points of error of the physician appellees. In their points of error numbers one, two, and three on rehearing, they urge that we erred in holding that they are not protected by the doctrine of official immunity since they have failed to present summary judgment evidence establishing as a matter of law that their duties were uniquely governmental in nature.
As we understand their contentions, they assert that we erred by disregarding established Texas law and by relying on a few, isolated cases from other jurisdictions. They also argue that the evidence did show that their duties are uniquely governmental in nature.
We first consider the appellees’ argument that we are disregarding established Texas law. The underlying basis for our opinion was that the purpose of official immunity, which is to allow public officials to perform their duties free of the threat of lawsuits, is not served when the duties of a public employee are basically the same as those performing the same function in the private sector, and those duties are not uniquely governmental in nature. We reach this conclusion because in such a situation the threat of a lawsuit would not deter the public employee in the exercise of his or her duties more than it would someone performing the same duties in the private sector.
If our conclusion is correct, then the ap-pellees are contending that Texas law has always sought to apply the doctrine of official immunity to those whose duties make the application of the doctrine inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the doctrine. We have not found any Texas case which has held that the doctrine of official immunity is to be applied to an employee whose duties are discretionary, even if the nature of his duties make the application of the doctrine inconsistent with its basic underlying purpose. The appellees have yet to present one ease, and we are not aware of any, that applies the doctrine to an employee whose duties are not uniquely governmental in nature. Even if there is such a case, we would think it unlikely that the issue presented here was raised.
We note that on rehearing the appellees present us with several cases in which they contend the doctrine was applied to those whose duties are not uniquely governmental in nature. The cases the appellees present are Torres v. Owens, 380 S.W.2d 30, 33-34 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dallas County Flood Control District v. Fowler, 280 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.); and Wyse v. Department of Public Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.App.-Waco 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The Torres case involved commissioners of a navigation district, while the Dallas County Flood Control District case involved the directors of that district. The Wyse case involved a district attorney and law enforcement officers. All of those positions are positions which we would hold to be *310uniquely governmental. We also note that there is no indication that anyone contended in any of those cases that official immunity should not apply to those whose duties made the underlying basis for the immunity inapplicable.
The appellees correctly point out an error in our original research in connection with the case of Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich.App. 291, 335 N.W.2d 481 (1983). Subsequent to that decision, the Michigan Supreme Court decided the ease of Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). In that ease, it was decided that a public employee or an official’s decision to engage in a particular activity and how best to carry it out is a discretionary activity, whereas the actual execution of the decision is a ministerial act, even though some discretion might be involved in the process of carrying out the original decision. Rather than receive the appeal in Davis, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in view of Ross. Davis v. Lhim, 422 Mich. 875, 366 N.W.2d 7 (1985). In its second opinion, the Court of Appeals reached the same result but changed the rationale of its decision denying immunity from that upon which we rely to the rationale that the doctor’s decision was ministerial because, as a professional, he did not have the discretion .to depart from the appropriate standard of care. Davis v. Lhim, 147 Mich.App. 8, 382 N.W.2d 195 (1985). On an appeal in which the decision was considered along with several others, the Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals, holding that the Court of Appeals was in error because their opinion confused the separate inquiries of immunity and negligence. Canon v. Thumudo, 430 Mich. 326, 422 N.W.2d 688 (1988).
We decline to adopt the holding of the Michigan Supreme Court because application of that rationale to the facts before us would result in an application of the doctrine of official immunity in a manner inconsistent with the basic purpose of the doctrine.
The appellees argue that our Kansas case is distinguishable because it is based upon a statute. A close examination of the opinion reveals that it is also based upon the common law. Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan. 484, 673 P.2d 86, 94 (1983).
The appellees contend that our Illinois and Wisconsin cases are distinguishable because those states do not treat the operations of a public hospital as governmental functions. They rely on the cases of LeRose v. City of Zion/Police Depart., 696 F.Supp. 1222, 1230 (N.D.Ill.1988); and Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 125 Wis.2d 62, 370 N.W.2d 803 (1985). We note that these two cases do not hold that those states do not treat the operations of a public hospital as governmental functions. Even if they did, in seeking to make these distinctions, the appellees confuse the difference between the governmental and proprietary function distinctions in questions of sovereign immunity with the official immunity requirement that the duties of the public official or employee must be uniquely governmental in nature. A public hospital might be termed as a governmental function for the purpose of sovereign immunity, as opposed to a proprietary function, even though its employees, if their duties are not uniquely governmental, might not be entitled to the invocation of the doctrine of official immunity.
The appellees contend that there are a growing number of cases from other jurisdictions holding that physicians employed by a governmental hospital are engaged in “discretionary” as opposed to “ministerial” conduct in rendering medical care. They refer us to the cases of Sorey v. Kellett, 849 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.1988); Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d 209 (4th Cir.1987); Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C.App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985); Marshall v. Chawla, 520 So.2d 1374 (Miss.1988); and Hall v. Roberts, 548 F.Supp. 498 (W.D.Va.1982).
Sorey v. Kellett and Marshall v. Chawla are both Mississippi cases. We acknowledged in our original opinion that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion in Marshall v. Chawla was inconsistent with the result we have reached. Currie v. United States and Pangburn v. Saad are both North Carolina cases. In Pangburn, the *311court held that a staff psychiatrist at the state hospital was immune for ordinary negligence in releasing a patient. The decision was based on a statute which extended such qualified immunity. The court held that the statute did not provide immunity for gross negligence or intentional torts. The opinion of the Fourth Circuit in Currie was based on the statute and the opinion in Pangbum. In Hall v. Roberts, a Virginia case, the court held that an intern could be entitled to immunity, particularly where the intern was closely supervised, could not choose his patients, and was not paid by them. In its discussion, the court distinguished the case from the case of James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 267 S.E.2d 108 (1980), the case which we cited in our original opinion. In James, the Virginia Supreme Court denied official immunity to several doctors in a medical malpractice action. Except for the Mississippi cases, we do not view any of these cases as inconsistent with the doctrine as we stated it in our original opinion. We believe that although expressed in other terms, the Federal Court in Hall found that the nature of the intern’s duties were uniquely governmental.
The appellees insist that the record shows that their duties are uniquely governmental, since it shows that they were resident physicians who were being supervised by the teaching staff of the hospital, and because they were treating the needy and indigent of Tarrant County. The record does not reflect any difference between a residency in a governmental hospital, as opposed to a private one, with respect to an increased risk of liability. The record does not reflect any difference between the treatment of indigent patients, as compared with the treatment of those who have the means to pay, with respect to an increased risk of liability. The appellees may ultimately prove to be correct in their assertion that their duties are uniquely governmental. It may be that the indigent have greater health problems than those who are not indigent, and that those who treat them in public hospitals have a greater risk of liability, as compared to those in the private sector, who might have the choice of not accepting them as patients. If that be so, it is not reflected in this record. Therefore, we overrule points of error numbers one through three on rehearing.
In point of error number four on rehearing, the appellee physicians urge that by requiring the appellees as physicians to establish that their duties are uniquely governmental before they are entitled to official immunity, we have created an arbitrary and unreasonable classification constituting a denial of due process, a denial of equal protection of the law and impairment of privileges and immunities under the Texas Constitution, article I, sections 3, 13, and 19, and the Bill of Rights, and amendments V and XIV of the United States Constitution. This entire argument appears to be based on the premise that we have established a rule that applies to physicians and not to others similarly situated. In fact, nothing contained in the original opinion indicates that the rule as set forth applies only to physicians. We have applied the rule here to physicians, because this case involves physicians. The rule would apply equally well to others whose duties are not uniquely governmental in nature.
The appellee physicians contend that we are depriving them of a defense retroactively. First, we'have not deprived them of a defense; we have only held that the appellees have not established as a matter of law that they are entitled to such a defense. Second, if the duties of the appel-lees are such that the underlying purpose of official immunity is not served by the application of the immunity to them, then we would assert that the immunity was never intended to be applicable to them and that our saying so does not constitute any change in the law. We overrule point of error number four on rehearing.
The appellee physicians assert in points of error numbers five and six that we erred in holding that there was an issue of material fact raised in connection with the waiver of sovereign immunity, because there was no summary judgment evidence that use of the vacuum extractor caused the infant plaintiffs damages, and that we erred in holding that the action against the *312appellees was not barred by section 101.106 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, because the Hospital District was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We find these issues to be adequately addressed in our original opinion. Thus, we overrule points of error numbers five and six on rehearing.
Finally, the appellee physicians insist in point of error number seven on rehearing that we erred in holding that Dr. Lozano was not entitled to summary judgment since the evidence conclusively established that Dr. Lozano did not participate in the use of the vacuum extractor or delivery of the child. Dr. Lozano did not urge this as a basis for summary judgment in her motion presented to the trial court. Therefore, we cannot affirm the summary judgment on a ground not presented in the original motion. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(d) and Roling v. McGeorge, 645 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1983, no writ). See also Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1989). Dr. Lozano also bases this point of error on a supposition that the summary judgment in favor of the hospital district with respect to hospital records and procedure manuals is still outstanding. Although we did not sustain appellant’s points of error as to those allegations, we reversed the summary judgment in favor of the hospital based on other grounds. In doing so, we did not sever out the claims concerning hospital records and procedure manuals, and sustain the summary judgment with respect to them. Therefore, we overrule point of error number seven on rehearing.
The Hospital District presents three points of error on rehearing in which it contends that we erred in reversing the summary judgments of the District and of the physicians because (1) the summary judgment proof established as a matter of law that there was no use or condition of tangible property proximately causing Allen’s alleged injuries; (2) the physicians are entitled to summary judgment if the Hospital District is entitled to summary judgment, based on TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. sec. 101.106 (Vernon 1986), and TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4494t, sec. 6 (Vernon Supp.1989); and (3) the physicians are entitled to rely on the doctrine of official immunity. We find that these arguments have been adequately addressed in our original opinion and in this opinion on rehearing. We therefore overrule all of the Hospital District’s points of error on rehearing.
We deny the motions for rehearing of all appellees.