Court Opinion

ID: 9901182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 15:14:35.331217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:28.026719
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges Humphreys, Ortiz and Senior Judge Annunziata
PUBLISHED

            Argued by videoconference

            GRAYDON MANOR, LLC
                                                                                  OPINION BY
            v.      Record No. 1012-22-4                                      JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ
                                                                                NOVEMBER 21, 2023
            BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF
             LOUDOUN COUNTY, VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
                                              James P. Fisher, Judge

                             James J. O’Keeffe IV (Nicholas V. Albu; Grayson P. Hanes;
                             Michie Hamlett PLLC; The Albu Firm PLLC; Reed Smith LLP, on
                             briefs), for appellant.

                             Nicholas J. Lawrence (Steven F. Jackson; Heather K. Bardot;
                             McGavin, Boyce, Bardot, Thorsen & Katz, P.C., on brief), for
                             appellee.

                    A motion to strike is available in a writ proceeding under Code § 15.2-2314, allowing

            circuit court review of a decision of a board of zoning appeals. Given that Code § 15.2-2314

            permits the circuit court to take evidence, it necessarily follows that the circuit court is

            empowered to weigh the evidence it receives, and, upon finding the evidence to be insufficient,

            may strike it.

                    On appeal, Graydon Manor, LLC (“Graydon Manor”) argues that the circuit court erred

            when (1) the court granted the County’s motions to strike the evidence, which Graydon Manor

            contends was improper for a circuit court exercising its appellate jurisdiction, and (2) the court

            excluded Graydon Manor’s expert’s testimony. We hold that the circuit court correctly

            considered and then appropriately granted the motions to strike. Even drawing all inferences in

            Graydon Manor’s favor, Graydon Manor failed to prove that its permit application met the
requirements for approval under the ordinance, and Graydon Manor was not aggrieved by the

Administrator’s determinations. Finally, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding the expert testimony of J.W. Cody Francis because such testimony was irrelevant. For

these reasons, we affirm.

                                         BACKGROUND

       This appeal concerns a 131-acre parcel of land owned by Graydon Manor in Loudoun

County, Virginia (the “property”). Graydon Manor purchased the property in 2016 with the

intention of developing it as a “co-housing”1 unit with a brewery and restaurant. The property

sits in an agricultural-rural zoning district called “AR-1.”

       Under Graydon Manor’s plan, the co-housing community would comprise 239 dwelling

units, a brewery, gardens, a greenhouse, an orchard, and a vineyard. The site would also

incorporate common facilities like lounges, a fitness center, meeting rooms, childcare centers, a

tasting room, and a shared laundry room.

       Graydon Manor believed the co-housing plan was not subject to a dwelling-unit density

cap within the AR-1 district. County zoning administrator Chris Mohn directed Graydon Manor

to (1) seek a zoning determination clarifying the density allowed for co-housing and (2) submit a

zoning permit application with a sketch plan. On July 24, 2018, Graydon Manor requested a

zoning determination under Section 6-401 of the county zoning ordinance. Graydon Manor’s

       1
           The ordinance defines co-housing as:

                A residential arrangement on the site of an active agricultural,
                horticultural or animal husbandry operation consisting of more
                than one individually owned dwelling unit and extensive common
                facilities, such as a large dining room kitchen, lounges, meeting
                rooms, recreation areas, library, workshops, childcare, laundry,
                greenhouse, or other facilities for use by the organized group of
                residents living in the co-housing who particulate in the planning,
                design, ongoing management and maintenance of the residential
                arrangement and in the routine activities of household living.
                                                      -2-
request posed 28 questions seeking clarification on the co-housing use type in the AR-1 zoning

district. Before receiving a response to its letter, Graydon Manor filed a zoning permit

application seeking to develop the property for “Cohousing, Restaurant, [and] Limited Brewery.”

The permit application included a drawing of the proposed development, which depicted over

230 single-family dwelling units.

       On November 16, 2018, the County answered each of the 28 questions and maintained

that the ordinance did not allow the proposed co-housing use. The County also denied Graydon

Manor’s permit application. The Administrator noted that he had received comments from

several agencies and that, based on the concerns raised by the agencies, he could not approve the

application.

       Graydon Manor separately appealed both the zoning determination and the permit denial

to the board of zoning appeals (“BZA”), which affirmed the County in both matters.

       Graydon Manor then petitioned the circuit court for writs of certiorari to review the

BZA’s decisions under Code § 15.2-2314. The circuit court granted certiorari in each case and

consolidated the petitions to a single hearing. At the close of Graydon Manor’s evidence, the

County moved to strike the evidence in the permit appeal, case no. CL120682. The County also

moved the court to reconsider its earlier ruling in case no. CL120683 that Graydon Manor was

aggrieved by the Administrator’s zoning determination, and thus that the BZA had statutory

authority to review the zoning determinations in the first instance.

       The court granted both motions and treated the motion to reconsider as a motion to strike.

The court then dismissed both appeals. Graydon Manor now appeals.

                                                   -3-
                                            ANALYSIS

                                I. Availability of Motion to Strike

       A writ proceeding under Code § 15.2-2314 presents a unique circumstance in which,

although the court is hearing an appeal, it is also authorized to take new evidence—a practice

typically prohibited at an appellate hearing. See Code § 15.2-2314 (“In the case of an appeal

from the board of zoning appeals to the circuit court of a decision of the board, any party may

introduce evidence in the proceedings in the court in accordance with the Rules of Evidence of

the Supreme Court of Virginia.”). The court’s ability to take evidence transforms the writ

proceeding from purely appellate in nature to a hybrid trial and appellate hearing. Thus, some

trial procedures, including a motion to strike, may be available.

       The availability of the motion to strike at issue here turns on the characterization of the

circuit court proceedings as trial or appellate. See Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Bd. of Supervisors,

275 Va. 452, 459 (2008). When the circuit court sits in an appellate capacity, traditional trial

court proceedings are generally unavailable. See id. at 454-57. Though statutory writ

proceedings under Code § 15.2-2314 occur at the circuit court level, such proceedings are

primarily appellate in nature. Id. at 459. Specifically, the circuit court is empowered to review

the decisions of the board and may “reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify the

decision brought up for review.” Code § 15.2-2314. “The language of Code § 15.2-2314

demonstrates that a proceeding filed pursuant to this section has an indicia of an appeal in which

the circuit court acts as a reviewing tribunal rather than as a trial court.” Bd. of Zoning Appeals,

275 Va. at 456-57 (noting that the code section refers to the writ process as an appeal “no less

than seven times”).

       A motion to strike is generally applicable in trial settings, but not appellate settings. See

generally Rule 1:11 (describing a motion to strike the evidence “in a civil case being tried before

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a jury”). A court may grant a motion to strike upon a finding that the evidence presented is

insufficient to submit the case or an individual issue to the factfinder, resulting in a full or partial

summary judgment order on the issue or claim. See Claycomb v. Didawick, 256 Va. 332, 335

(1998); Rule 1:11. While it is true that a motion to strike is generally not an appropriate motion

for an appellate court, that unsuitability arises only because appellate courts do not ordinarily

take evidence; rather, appellate courts rely upon the record generated by the courts below. This

same unsuitability does not arise in a hybrid trial-appellate context where the circuit court is

empowered to take evidence.

        In the hybrid context of statutory writ proceedings under Code § 15.2-2314, a motion to

strike must be available. Though the statute is silent as to whether the circuit court may consider

or grant a motion to strike, the statute explicitly permits the court to take additional evidence.

Code § 15.2-2314 (“In the case of an appeal from the board of zoning appeals to the circuit court

of a decision of the board, any party may introduce evidence in the proceedings in the court in

accordance with the Rules of Evidence of the Supreme Court of Virginia.”). While “[t]he

discretionary option of taking additional evidence is insufficient to transform the nature of the

proceeding from an appeal to a trial,” the court must still be empowered to weigh—and in some

cases reject—the evidence that it takes. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 275 Va. at 457. When a party

has failed to adduce sufficient evidence for the court to rule in their favor, a hybrid tribunal may

thus appropriately consider and grant a motion to strike to resolve the case.

        This matter is distinct from the Supreme Court’s determination that a nonsuit is

inappropriate for a writ proceeding under this same code section. See id. A nonsuit motion

allows a party to seek dismissal of an action or claim before an opposing party has made a

motion to strike or the case has been submitted to the factfinder for decision. Code

§ 8.01-380(A)-(B). Though a party in a trial proceeding may take one nonsuit as of right,

                                                      -5-
nonsuits are not available upon appeal. See Code § 8.01-380(B); Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 275 Va.

at 459. As with the motion to strike, Code § 15.2-2314 fails to mention the availability of

nonsuits in writ proceedings. See Code § 15.2-2314. However, unlike a motion to strike, at the

trial level a nonsuit motion has no direct connection to the substance of a case or claim. Rather,

a nonsuit turns merely on the timing in which the party seeks to withdraw. See id.

       In contrast, a motion to strike is substantive and arises directly in response to the court

taking—and evaluating—evidence. See Claycomb, 256 Va. at 335. While writ proceedings are

primarily appellate, they must include those trial court procedures necessary to evaluate and

weigh the evidence presented, consistent with their hybrid nature. As such, a motion to strike

must be available. Thus, we hold that the circuit court acted within its authority when it

considered and ruled on the motion to strike here.

                             II. Motion to Strike Permit Denial Case

       A motion to strike should be granted if the evidence presented is insufficient as a matter

of law to support the plaintiff’s claim, and thus the case or individual issue should not be

submitted to the factfinder. See id. In considering a motion to strike, a circuit court must

“accept as true all the evidence favorable to the plaintiff as well as any reasonable inference a

jury might draw therefrom which would sustain the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id. The same

standard applies to our review. Id. At the close of Graydon Manor’s case, the circuit court

granted the County’s motion to strike the evidence in the permit denial case, ultimately

dismissing the appeal. We hold that the circuit court appropriately granted the motion to strike

here because, even drawing all inferences in Graydon Manor’s favor, Graydon Manor failed to

prove that its permit application met the requirements for approval under the ordinance.

       To prevail in the permit denial case, Graydon Manor needed to show that it had met its

obligations for the issuance of a zoning permit under the ordinance. The ordinance requires that

                                                     -6-
before any zoning permit is issued, (1) the property owner must submit an application,

accompanied by any of a selection of listed documents which “the Zoning Administrator deems

pertinent . . . to determine whether the proposed use or structure will be in compliance” with the

ordinance, and (2) the structure and use of the property contemplated in the permit application

are not in violation of any other law. See Loudoun Cnty., Va. Zoning Ordinance §§ 6-1001

to -1002. Graydon Manor conceded that it failed to submit a site plan with its permit application,

as required by the Administrator, and that it had not addressed concerns raised by other county

agencies about the ability of the proposed development to comply with various laws, including

those relating to stormwater and sewer for the property at the time of the application. As

Graydon Manor failed to introduce sufficient evidence to allow issuance of a permit, the circuit

court properly granted the County’s motion to strike on the permit denial claim.

                        III. Motion to Strike Zoning Determination Case

       We review the circuit court’s legal determinations de novo. VACORP v. Young, 298 Va.

490, 494 (2020). In granting the motion to strike the zoning determination case, the circuit court

determined that, as a matter of law, Graydon Manor was not an aggrieved party because the

Administrator’s zoning determinations were merely an “abstract advisory opinion.” Thus, the

BZA lacked the authority to hear its claim under Code § 15.2-2311. The circuit court’s ability to

hear the appeal was similarly limited. See Parrish v. Fannie Mae, 292 Va. 44, 49 (2016). The

issue is thus whether Graydon Manor was an aggrieved party whose claim was properly before

the court.

       Code § 15.2-2311 holds that an appeal to the BZA “may be taken by any person

aggrieved . . . by any decision of the zoning administrator or from any order, requirement,

decision or determination made by any other administrative officer in the administration . . . of

this article.” Code § 15.2-2314 contains a similar requirement that individuals appealing from

                                                   -7-
the BZA to the circuit court be “aggrieved.” “[A]ggrieved” has a “settled” meaning,

“contemplat[ing] ‘a denial of some personal or property right, legal or equitable.’” See Vulcan

Materials Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 248 Va. 18, 24 (1994) (quoting Va. Beach Beautification

Comm’n v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 419 (1986)). “[U]ntil an application was

pending asking for specific relief, there could be no denial of any personal or property right

resulting from any administrative decision or determination.” Id. In contrast, an administrator’s

interpretation of the zoning ordinance issued while an application for specific relief is pending is

not advisory, and affected individuals are “aggrieved” under the terms of the zoning ordinance.

See Lilly v. Caroline Cnty., 259 Va. 291, 297-98 (2000). To create a right of appeal to the Board

of Zoning Appeals, a zoning determination must have the finality of an “order, requirement,

decision or determination,” rather than constituting a “mere ‘interpretation’ of a zoning

ordinance.” See Bd. of Supervisors v. Rhoads, 294 Va. 43, 53 (2017) (quoting James v. City of

Falls Church, 280 Va. 31, 44 (2010)).

       Here, Graydon Manor submitted its 28 questions to the Administrator on July 24, 2018,

before submitting the permit application at issue in this case.2 See id. Though Graydon Manor

filed a separate zoning application approximately two weeks later, the Administrator’s letter,

dated November 16, 2018, responded to the original request, and was merely advisory in nature.

As no application was pending for specific relief at the time the questions were submitted, the

issuance of determinations in response to the questions cannot have denied any personal or

property right. Thus, Graydon Manor was not aggrieved by the Administrator’s determinations,

and the BZA lacked the statutory authority to hear the appeal in this instance, as did the circuit

       2
         A previous zoning application had been submitted and denied before the July 24, 2018
letter was sent.
                                                 -8-
court. See Code §§ 15.2-2311, -2314. The circuit court thus properly dismissed the zoning

determination case as beyond its jurisdiction.

                                     IV. Exclusion of Testimony

        It is well established that the admission or exclusion of expert testimony is within the

sound discretion of the circuit court. Keesee v. Donigan, 259 Va. 157, 161 (2000). Hence, a

ruling admitting or excluding evidence is reviewed by this Court for abuse of discretion.

Howard v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 739, 753 (2022). Under this standard, an appellate court

can conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion only when reasonable jurists could not

differ on the correct result. Id.

        At trial, the circuit court sustained a relevance objection to Francis’s3 testimony that the

principal outstanding comments to Graydon Manor’s site plan related only to the zoning topics

presently at issue. Francis’s excluded testimony described the unresolved comments to Graydon

Manor’s site plan:

                 The principal outstanding comments are related to the zoning
                 topics that we’re discussing here regarding co-housing.
                 Specifically those comments are related to whether subdivision is
                 required for co-housing, whether co-housing units need to be on
                 individual lots or whether they are individual dwelling units, and
                 whether the co-housing use is composed of whether—the common
                 facilities are separate uses from the dwelling use, so it’s almost as
                 if they’re splitting the use into two different uses. There’s been
                 some zoning comments related to that regarding buffering and
                 such.

        Counsel objected on hearsay and relevance grounds, and the court sustained the objection

on the relevance grounds. The court, explaining its reasoning, stated that, “I just don’t see where

it’s relevant anything that happened in the last year and a half” and that it “see[s] no way that

        3
            Francis was Graydon Manor’s engineer as well as its land use expert.
                                                  -9-
activities carried out, decisions made, or things done after the BZA issued their two different

rulings on two different issues is making it any more probable that they were wrong in doing so.”

       Under Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:401, “‘[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence having

any tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.” In Virginia, the scope of relevant evidence is quite broad but is

not without limitation. The excluded testimony sought to introduce evidence regarding site plans

and subsequent written comments that were submitted to the county after Graydon Manor’s

permit was denied, which were never offered to the BZA for its consideration.

       This testimony was not relevant because it concerned and related to actions taken to bring

the application into compliance after the permit was denied. In fact, the evidence Graydon

Manor sought to introduce were comments on the sixth revision of the proposed site plan—all

comments and facts that were not in existence at the time the Administrator denied the permit.

Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court exceeded its range of discretion in excluding

Francis’s testimony.

                                          CONCLUSION

       The circuit court was within its authority to grant a motion to strike because under Code

§ 15.2-2314 it had the ability to take new evidence, which necessarily implies the ability to

weigh and strike evidence. The circuit court properly granted the motion to strike because

Graydon Manor failed to prove that its permit application met the requirements for approval

under the ordinance and because Graydon Manor was not aggrieved by the Administrator’s

determinations. Finally, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding irrelevant

testimony during the writ hearing. For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is

affirmed.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

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