Court Opinion

ID: 9689005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:16:03.880659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:26.890848
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, P.J.
(concurring). I agree that the trial court adequately explained its reasons for imposing a prison term of from four to fifteen years and my conscience is not shocked by the imposition of that sentence upon this defendant. People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983). I also join in affirming the order of restitution though my reasons for doing so are different than those relied upon by the majority of this panel.
In ordering restitution, the trial court in this case did not cite the particular statute or statutes relied.upon. It is clear, however, that the appropriate authority is 1985 PA 89, MCL 769.1a; MSA 28.1073, which amends Chapter xi of the Michigan Code of Criminal Procedure and for the first time authorizes a sentencing court to order restitution as part of a sentence where a prison term is also imposed. Prior to July 10, 1985, restitution was authorized only as a condition of probation. MCL 771.3; MSA 28.1133.
Both members of the majority have had occasion to consider the scope of a sentencing court’s authority in ordering restitution in the probation context and have broadly interpreted the phrase "course of conduct which gives rise to the conviction.” See People v Alvarado, 142 Mich App 151; 369 NW2d 462 (1985). My review of the few cases addressing the issue reveals that the weight of authority allows restitution for other embezzlements or thefts which have not resulted in convictions. For example, in People v Alvarado, defendant was convicted of embezzling $200 worth of *734gas from her employer but was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $72,500, representing the value of the gas actually taken over a period of time. In People v Seda-Ruiz, 87 Mich App 100; 273 NW2d 602 (1978), defendant was convicted of writing bad checks in a total amount under $100 but was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $3,299.65, representing the amount of bad checks written by defendant to others. Both panels of this Court affirmed the underlying authority of the trial court to order restitution for losses for which defendants had never actually been convicted. See also People v Nawrocki, 8 Mich App 225; 154 NW2d 45 (1967).
The majority in this case relies upon these probation cases to justify the $15,000 order of restitution entered in this case for defendant’s conviction of having embezzled a stereo video cassette recorder valued at $699. I wish to reserve judgment on this issue as I believe it to be a significant one and this case presents an inadequate vehicle to conduct the appropriate inquiry.
Defendant in this case did not object below to the order of restitution. Defendant has never filed a motion for resentencing challenging the underlying authority of the court to consider embezzlements for which he has not been convicted or challenging the procedural manner in which the trial court arrived at its $15,000 figure.1 Most importantly, however, defendant has not adequately raised on appeal the scope of the sentencing court’s authority to order restitution under MCL 769.1a; MSA 28.1073 or the interpretation to be given the phrase "course of conduct which gives rise to the conviction.” Rather, defendant argues *735on appeal that the trial court relied upon the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.751 et seq.; MSA 28.1287(751) et seq., in imposing restitution, which act does not authorize restitution in excess of the value of the property stolen in this case because the other acts of embezzlement occurred prior to the effective date of the act. See MCL 780.775(2); MSA 28.1287(775)(2). Defendant contends that the effective date of the act is July 10, 1985, and that defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for acts of embezzlement that were commited prior thereto. However, the Crime Victim’s Rights Act did not take effect until October 9, 1985, long after defendant committed the instant offense,2 and it is thus apparent that the trial court did not rely upon this statute in issuing its order of restitution. Instead, the trial court must have relied upon the amendment to Chapter xi of the Code of Criminal Procedure, codified at MCL 769.1a; MSA 28.1073. Defendant’s only argument on appeal is therefore without merit. I would affirm defendant’s sentence on the very narrow issue presented and I concur with the majority opinion on this basis._

 The trial court relied upon the predisposition investigation report rather than on any evidentiary hearing in determining the amount of restitution.

 July 16, 1985.