Court Opinion

ID: 9538185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:31:52.344899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:37.186598
License: Public Domain

Wright, J.
(concurring)—I concur in the majority opinion herein and have signed the same. I do, however, feel impelled to write a brief concurring opinion. The record in this case is extremely lengthy. The statement of facts is 2,018 pages in 7 volumes. For that reason it would obscure rather than clarify the matters I hope to discuss were I to quote extensively from the testimony.
This is a case of murder in the first degree and the result of the majority opinion will be that a defendant convicted by a jury will go absolutely free. In recent years there has been extensive criticism of the judiciary, especially of the appellate courts, because of freeing of obviously guilty persons on purely technical grounds.
*794This case, however, does not present such a situation. Here there is real doubt if the defendant is in fact the guilty person. The lack of proof of corpus delecti, or of venue will not be extensively discussed. It is one of the requirements of proof of murder that the identity of deceased be established. It is also a requirement in any criminal case that venue be proved. The proof of whose body was found is weak and there is no more than conjecture as to where the killing took place. The lack of proof on either of those items would justify a reversal. Those might, however, be classed as “technicalities.”
My reason for writing this concurrence is to show that doubts in this case go far beyond what could reasonably be called “technicalities.”
Several persons had opportunity to commit the crime. Mary Kupoff, great grandmother of defendant, testified that deceased tried to dominate her and she resented the attempted domination. There were many peculiarities in the testimony of Mrs. Kupoff. By her own testimony the only time in about 3 years she had been upstairs was on the day of the killing, which she said was Monday, October 21, 1974. Mrs. Kupoff stated positively the murder was committed on that Monday night. No one else could place the time the death occurred.
The only substantial evidence to connect defendant with the killing was a questionable comparison of markings on bullets found in the body with samples fired from a gun owned by defendant. Mrs. Kupoff admitted knowing where the gun was kept, and even returning it to that place after having found the dead body, all the while being careful not to put. fingerprints on any part of the gun. She put it back because she said that was where it belonged. She had equal access to that gun with the defendant.
Mrs. Kupoff admitted she knew the body was in the back room. She told no one except her son who apparently thought she was talking of a fantasy and seemed to ignore her statements. She said she did not tell the police because they didn’t ask her and because, she was afraid she would *795not get her pills. The last statement would seem to indicate she expected to be jailed if she mentioned finding the body. Finally, she made many strange and conflicting statements.
Dale Morbeck had formerly occupied the room where the body was found. He had a key to the room and to the building at the time of the killing and returned the key to Mrs. Kupoff later. He had formerly had a knife which he claimed to have lost about the time of the killing. With all of the evidence destroyed there was no way to know if death was from a stab wound in the chest or from the bullet wounds in the back. If the cause of death were in fact a stab wound, and the autopsy testimony indicated it could have been, then there was more reason to suspect Morbeck than to suspect the defendant.
Finally, the outside door was sometimes unlocked and the entire area was accessible to the public from the sidewalk. There was some testimony indicating that on one occasion, at least, a young male had come up the stairs with the obvious intention of having sexual relations with deceased.
Under the strange circumstances of this case, the destruction of evidence deprived defendant of a fair trial. Obviously, for the same reason, it will never be possible for defendant to have a fair trial. Under such circumstances it is a real substantial reason and not a technicality that requires a reversal.
Stafford, C.J., and Hunter, Brachtenbach, and Dolliver, JJ., concur with Wright, J.
Petition for rehearing denied May 5, 1977.