Court Opinion

ID: 9489786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:24:07.487007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:42.883541
License: Public Domain

T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
At the time Mr. Etherton was released by the district court, he had been sent back to prison for violating the terms of his supervised release. The statute the district judge relied on in releasing him provides that a district court may modify a term of imprisonment if it is “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission_” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(e)(2).
The error in the majority’s analysis can be seen by asking and answering three simple questions: ■
1. What term of imprisonment was imposed on Mr. Etherton based on a sentencing range subsequently lowered by the Commission? Answer: Fifty-one months, pursuant to § 2Dl.l(c).
2. What term of imprisonment was Mr. Etherton serving when released? Answer: Seven months for violation of supervised release, pursuant to § 7B1.4.
3. Was the sentencing range under § 7B1.4 lowered by the Commission? Answer: No.
The answers to these questions lead inexorably to the conclusion that the term of imprisonment for violation of supervised release was- not subject to modification by the district court under § 3582(e)(2).
We are not free to ignore the terms of the statute by conflating “sentence” with “term of imprisonment.” While it is correct to say that the -incarceration imposed for violation of supervised release can be considered to be an element of the original sentence, by no stretch of logic, language or precedent can Mr. Etherton’s later incarceration be considered part of the original term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range lowered by the Commission. The seven-month term was separately imposed and was to be separately served based on considerations having nothing to do with the marijuana plant equivalency addressed in Amendment 516.
The district court lacked authority to reduce the term of imprisonment imposed for violation of supervised release. The district court’s unquestioned discretion in sentencing matters cannot supply statutory authority to reduce a term of imprisonment which is otherwise lacking. Allowing defendants to bank time served in this manner removes any incentive for complying with the terms of supervised release.
I respectfully dissent.