Court Opinion

ID: 9647355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:33:58.897917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:48.431260
License: Public Domain

CARR, Justice.
This appeal is from a decree terminating the parental rights of appellant, Dianna Neal, to her child, J.N.1 The trial court’s judgment is based solely upon Dianna’s affidavit for voluntary relinquishment of parental rights. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(K) (Vernon Supp.1991) & § 15.03 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.1991).
Trial was before the court without a jury. At each of the proceedings below— the trial, the hearing on the entry of judgment, and the hearing on the motion for new trial — Dianna challenged her execution of the affidavit, contending that it was defective and not voluntary because it was the result of undue influence by her husband, Bernard Robaste.2 At each of the proceedings, the trial court found that Dianna had executed the affidavit in question voluntarily.3
In four points of error challenging both the termination decree (points 1-3) and the denial of the motion for new trial (point 4), Dianna presents us with a single disposi-tive issue of whether there was clear and convincing evidence for the trial court to have found that she voluntarily executed the affidavit for relinquishment of parental rights.
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the natural right between parents and their children is one of constitutional dimensions. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.1976). The supreme court has further held that “[t]he termination of this right is complete, final, and irrevocable. It divests forever the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers between each other except for the child’s right to inherit.” In the Interest of G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 (Tex.1980). For these reasons, the proceedings in the case before us must be strictly scrutinized. See id.
Section 15.02(1)(K) of the Texas Family Code allows the court to grant a petition terminating the parent-child relationship with respect to a petitioner who is not a parent if the court finds that the parent has executed before or after the suit is filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by section 15.03 of the Code. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 15.-02(1)(K) (Vernon Supp.1991). The affidavit referred to in section 15.03 is identified as an “affidavit for voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.” TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 15.03(a) (Vernon 1986). Because of the very nature of a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, we find that it is implicit in the language of section 15.03 that such an affidavit be executed voluntarily. Accordingly, we hold that only a voluntarily executed section 15.03 affidavit will support a finding under sec*219tion 15.02(1)(K) of the Family Code. Stated another way, we hold that an involuntarily executed affidavit is a complete defense to a termination suit or decree based solely upon a finding under section 15.02(1)(K) of the Family Code.
The question of whether there is sufficient evidence in this case to support the judgment of the trial court must be based on whether that evidence was “clear and convincing.” TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon 1986); see B.A.L. v. Edna Gladney Home, 677 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“clear and convincing” standard used to determine whether affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights voluntarily signed). “Clear and convincing” refers to that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 11.15(c) (Vernon 1986). We will therefore review the evidence in this case under the clear and convincing standard of proof.
We have before us as part of the record a statement of facts from each of the proceedings before the trial court. Although Dianna was not present at trial, the first proceeding, her counsel objected when the affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights was admitted into evidence. Counsel further informed the court of the following: he was not present when Dianna signed the affidavit; Dianna had a history of mental illness; he had not heard back from Dr. Belvis, a psychiatrist treating Dianna and the child’s legal and biological father, Bernard Robaste, to get a determination of whether they had the mental capacity to execute the affidavit in question; and he had a concern about any undue influence that Bernard might have exercised over Dianna.
The record further reflects that the trial judge withheld a ruling on the objection until he heard evidence on the circumstances surrounding the execution of the affidavit.
The Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS) called two witnesses to support its contention that this case was an uncontested, i.e., voluntary, termination proceeding.4 Tina Jackson, a TDHS caseworker, testified that the affidavit was obtained at Dianna and Bernard’s residence six days before trial; that Dianna was very ambivalent about signing the affidavit; that Bernard wanted to sign the affidavit right away; that Dianna did not want to sign; that there was a thirty-minute period during which Bernard kept telling Dianna why he thought they should sign the affidavit; that Dianna was emotional and upset; that Dianna wanted to go to court and talk with her attorney but not without Bernard; and that Bernard did not want to go to court. Jackson further testified as follows:
Q: Do you feel Bernard may háve exercised some influence over the decision about whether to sign?
A: Yes, he did.
Q: And to what degree of influence do you think he exercised over her?
A: I think she would have waited until today if he had not.
Q: Waited for today to do what?
A: I am not sure if she would have signed today or not. But I could tell he did exercise enough control over her and pressure to get her to sign that day rather than to wait to today for the reason he didn’t want to come to court.
Q: Is there doubt in your mind as to whether this was done voluntarily on Dianna Neal’s part?
A: I am not really sure of this relationship. I am not sure of his dominance over her. I really cannot say. He did influence her to sign, yes, he did do that.
Dr. Belvis testified that in his opinion Dianna and Bernard could have had the intelligence and mental capacity to under*220stand the affidavit to terminate their parental rights had they been taking their medication. The record, however, does not reflect whether Dianna was taking her medicine when she signed the affidavit.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court again heard evidence on the issue of voluntariness and again found that Dianna had executed the affidavit voluntarily. At the motion for new trial hearing, Dianna testified without objection. She testified in part as follows:
Q: Did you sign this affidavit voluntarily?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Did you sign it of your own free will?
A: I signed it but I didn’t want to sign it.
⅜ * * * * *
Q: Did you and [Bernard Robaste] ever have any fights over you wanting to go to court and fight for [J.N.]?
A: Yes.
* # * * * #
Q: Did he influence you in any way in signing the affidavit?
A: He is a little jealous, yes. He told me to sign it.
Q: Has Mr. Robaste ever harmed you physically because you wanted to go to court and keep [J.N.]?
A: Yes. He doesn’t always. Sometimes he realizes what he is doing, sometimes he doesn’t.
Q: I am talking about has he caused physical harm to you because you told him you wanted to keep [J.N.]. Is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you feel that at the time you signed the affidavit that Mr. Robaste might cause you physical harm at some point in time if you did not sign the affidavit?
A: Most of the time I live like that. He would not hurt the children but I know he might hurt me.
* * * * # *
Q: My question is when she presented the affidavit to you for your signature prior to that time did you have any intention of signing it?
A: I wanted to come to court.
(Emphasis added.) Dianna further testified that she had a history of mental illness.
We now address TDHS’s contention that the evidence Dianna presented at the motion for hew trial hearing (1) failed to meet the required standard for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (2) was not timely presented and thus cannot now be considered on appeal.
We dismiss TDHS’s first contention because it is clear from the record that Dianna’s motion is not based on newly discovered evidence nor does Dianna so contend.5 The requirements for seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, as enumerated in Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex.1983), are therefore not applicable to the case before us.
TDHS’s second contention is that Dianna’s testimony at the motion for new trial hearing was untimely because it was not presented at the trial on the merits, and therefore, it cannot be considered by us on appeal. TDHS’s sole authority to support this contention is the following parts of rule 103 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence:
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
* # * # * *
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer.
*221(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The offering party shall, as soon as practicable, but before the court’s charge is read to the jury, be allowed to make, in the absence of the jury, its offer of proof. The court may add any other or further statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may, or at request of a party shall, direct the making of an offer in question and answer form.
TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 103(a)(2), (b) (emphasis added).
We reject TDHS’s rule 103 argument because the error Dianna alleges in this appeal is not predicated upon an erroneous ruling excluding evidence as contemplated by rule 103(a)(2) nor a denial of an offer of proof within the meaning of rule 103(b). In fact, it is clear from the record that the evidence Dianna presented at the motion for new trial hearing was not “excluded” but was actually received without objection, and it is equally clear that the trial court considered this evidence for purposes of deciding the merits of the motion for new trial. Accordingly, we hold that neither rule 103(a)(2) nor 103(b) supports TDHS’s argument. TDHS, moreover, does not direct our attention to any other authority.
In any case, from our research on the subject we find that B.A.L. v. Edna Gladney Home, 677 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.), resolves the issue in favor of Dianna. Both Edna Gladney Home and the instant case involve the termination of parental rights based upon affidavits of relinquishment in which one of the parents of the child, the mother in both cases, alleged undue influence in the execution of the affidavit as a defense. Here, as in Edna Gladney Home, the mother filed her motion for new trial; the trial court held a hearing on the motion and heard the mother’s testimony at the hearing; the motion for new trial was overruled; and on appeal the mother contended that the trial court erred in overruling the motion for new trial. The court held that:
[i]n answering the argument of appellant as to undue influence and overreaching, we must decide from the evidence in the record of the hearing on the motion for new trial if there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court and its implied findings of fact in support thereof.
Id. at 829. Accordingly, in the case before us, we will also examine the record of the hearing on the motion for new trial.
We will now address the issue of whether there was sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s judgment and findings.
In viewing the evidence to determine whether the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Dianna voluntarily signed the affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights, we first note that this is not a case in which Dianna seeks to “revoke” an affidavit she had previously executed voluntarily. In the case at hand, Dianna is not “changing her mind.” Cf. Brown v. McLennan County Children’s Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex.1982) (appellant’s sole reason to set aside termination decree was because she simply changed her mind). The contention in this appeal is that the affidavit has always been defective to the extent that the evidence shows that it was executed involuntarily as a result of undue influence.
The essence of “undue influence” involves overcoming the free will of an individual and substituting the will of another, thereby causing a person to do an act which he would not otherwise have done. Edna Gladney Home, 677 S.W.2d at 831. Exerted influence cannot be branded as “undue” merely because it is persuasive and effective. Methodist Mission Home of Texas v. N.A.B., 451 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1970, no writ). The law, moreover, does not condemn all persuasion, entreaty, cajolery, importunity, intercession, argument, and solicitation. Id.
In this case the only witness to testify at trial as to the issue of undue influence was TDHS caseworker Tina Jackson. She described the degree of influence Bernard exercised over Dianna at the time Dianna *222executed the questioned affidavit by testifying that she thought Dianna would have waited until the date of trial had Bernard not exercised such influence over Dianna. Jackson further testified that she was “not sure” whether or not Dianna would have signed the affidavit at the court. Lastly, when asked directly if there was doubt in her mind as to whether Dianna voluntarily executed the affidavit, Jackson testified that she was “not really sure.”
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Dianna testified as to the issue of undue influence. Dianna’s testimony reflects the following: Dianna was subjected to past physical abuse and harm from Bernard because she wanted to go to court and keep J.N.; Bernard “told” her to sign the affidavit; Dianna “wanted to come to court”; and at the time Dianna signed the affidavit, she feared that Bernard would physically hurt her at some point in the future if she did not sign the affidavit relinquishing her parental rights to J.N. The fear and threat of physical abuse cannot rightfully be considered a type of persuasion, entreaty, cajolery, or the like. Cf id.
When the trier of fact is required to make a finding made by clear and convincing evidence, the court of appeals will sustain an insufficient evidence point of error only if the fact finder could not have reasonably found that the fact was established by clear and convincing evidence. Williams v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 788 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ); In the Interest of L.R.M., 763 S.W.2d 64, 66-67 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record under the clear and convincing standard of proof, we conclude that the record before us does not contain evidence of that effect and quality. From the evidence in the record, we further conclude that the trial court could not have reasonably found by a “firm belief or conviction” that Dianna voluntarily executed the affidavit for relinquishment of parental rights. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 11.15(b), (c) (Vernon 1986) & § 15.03 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.1991).
Accordingly, we grant Dianna’s four points of error. The part of the judgment terminating Dianna’s parental rights to J.N. is reversed and that part of the cause is remanded.
CHAPA, J., concurs and files an opinion.
BUTTS, J., dissents and files an opinion.

. In 1986 the Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS) was appointed temporary managing conservator of J.Ñ. and has retained temporary managing conservatorship of J.N. continuously since that time.

. Bernard Robaste, J.N.’s legal and biological father, having not appealed the decree of termination, is not a party to this appeal.

.The trial court found three times that Dianna had executed the affidavit voluntarily: (1) when it overruled the objection made by Dianna's counsel at the trial on the merits; (2) when it entered judgment containing a finding under section 15.02(1)(K) of the Family Code; and (3) when it allowed Dianna’s motion for new trial to be overruled by operation of law.

. The record reflects that in its petition TDHS pleaded involuntary termination of parental rights based on section 15.02(1)(A), (C), (D), and (E) of the Family Code. On the day of trial, however, TDHS filed the affidavit in question, and based on the affidavit, it contended that the proceeding was one for voluntary termination of parental rights.

. It is undisputed that the evidence appellant presented at the hearing on the motion for new trial was not presented at trial because appellant was unable to appear in court on the date of trial due to lack of promised transportation to court.