Court Opinion

ID: 9912122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 17:09:45.42238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:06.384616
License: Public Domain

J-A17037-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ANTHONY L. FELDER                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 2430 EDA 2021

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 20, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0002334-2020

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ANTHONY L. FELDER                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 2431 EDA 2021

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 20, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0005807-2020

BEFORE: KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                       FILED DECEMBER 21, 2023

       Anthony L. Felder (Felder) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court) following

his bench trial convictions for two counts each of persons not to possess

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A17037-23

firearms and carrying firearms without a license, and one count of possession

of a controlled substance.1 We affirm in part and reverse in part.

                                               I.

                                               A.

       The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as

follows:

       Officer Harley is a patrol officer for the Bensalem Township Police
       Department and has been so employed for approximately two
       years. Prior to his employment with the Bensalem Township Police
       Department, Officer Harley served as a SEPTA Transit Police
       Officer in Philadelphia for approximately three years. Officer
       Harley also testified to his personal experience and knowledge of
       firearms as, not only a seasoned police officer, but also as an avid
       collector. Officer Harley testified that he has owned revolver-type
       firearms in the past and explained that “Generally, a revolver,
       usually metal. Usually has a curved handle, solid curved handle,
       has a cylinder in the middle that holds the ammo. It has the
       hammer on the back that you can use to, you know, cock the
       gun.”

       On May 1, 2020, at approximately 10:31 p.m., Officer Harley
       responded to an “abandoned 911 call” reported from the Knights
       Inn motel room number 163 located at 2707 Lincoln Highway in
       Bensalem Township. Officer Harley testified that by “abandoned
       911 call” what is meant is that someone from room 163 called the
       police 911 line and then hung up.

                                       *       *    *

       Officer Harley arrived on scene at approximately 10:44 p.m.
       Officer Harley parked his Bensalem Township patrol wagon in the
       parking lot of the Knights Inn near rooms 162 and 163. When
       Officer Harley first arrived on scene, he stayed in his patrol wagon
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16),
respectively.

                                           -2-
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     in order to assess the area as Officer Harley did not know what to
     expect given that he was responding to an “abandoned 911 call.”

                                 *    *    *

     Officer Harley testified that he sat in the patrol wagon for
     approximately forty seconds and observed an individual, later
     identified as Melvin Dixon, standing outside of room 163, the room
     from which the abandoned 911 call came. Officer Harley testified
     that he observed Mr. Dixon coming in and out of room 163 at this
     time. Officer Harley also observed Mr. Dixon making gestures
     towards a vehicle—an orange Ford Mustang—parked directly in
     front of rooms 162 and 163, as if an individual were inside the
     vehicle. Officer Harley observed the gestures of Mr. Dixon and
     explained that it appeared as if he was communicating with an
     individual inside the Mustang regarding Officer Harley’s presence
     on scene.      Officer Harley testified that he believed these
     individuals were attempting to communicate about him because
     Mr. Dixon would be “looking in the car at the subject sitting in the
     car, and then he would look at me and kind of shrug his shoulders,
     and then kind of look back at the guy in the car, and then kind of
     look over at me.”

     At this time, Officer Harley exited his vehicle and approached Mr.
     Dixon in front of room 163. As Officer Harley was walking, he
     noticed the individual inside the Mustang making furtive
     movements as if he was putting or grabbing something from the
     driver’s door compartment. Officer Harley shined his flashlight
     into the vehicle through the passenger side window and observed
     Felder … hunched over in the driver seat reaching down into the
     driver’s door compartment area. Officer Harley then asked Felder
     ‘what he was doing’ at which point Felder abruptly exited the
     vehicle, startling Officer Harley, and pointed to room 162 saying
     that was his room. Officer Harley testified … that Officer Harley
     did not ask Felder to exit the Mustang. Officer Harley then told
     [Felder]it looked like he was tucking something in the driver side
     door, which [Felder] denied and then told Officer Harley ‘you can
     search everything.’ Officer Harley then came around the back of
     the Mustang and asked Felder if he had any weapons on him, at
     which point [Felder] put up his hands and said “no.”

                                 *    *    *

     Officer Harley then informed Felder that he was going to pat him

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     down for officer safety.

                                 *    *    *

     From the pat down, which Officer Harley described as running his
     open palms over the silhouette of [Felder’s] body, Officer Harley
     discovered a revolver on the left hip of [Felder], which Officer
     Harley confiscated. Specifically, Officer Harley explained that he
     immediately recognized the revolver from the plain feel on
     [Felder’s] left hip because he “felt a curved shape solid object that
     was consistent with a handle of a revolver that was tight to his
     waist just above his belt line, just above his belt.” Officer Harley
     checked the revolver and found that it contained no bullets.
     Officer Harley then handcuffed [Felder] and called for backup.

                                 *    *    *

     Officer Harley further testified that he was the only officer on
     scene at this point and that he was outnumbered by Felder and
     Mr. Dixon. Officer Harley is approximately 5’ 7” and weighs
     approximately 165 pounds, whereas both Felder and Mr. Dixon
     are larger individuals, with [Felder]—in particular—being
     significantly larger than Officer Harley, as [Felder] is over 6 feet
     tall and weighs over 200 pounds. Officer Harley also testified
     while he was taking Felder into custody, Mr. Dixon also presented
     safety concerns in that he attempted to go back into Room 163
     and Officer Harley told him to stop, because he did not want a
     potential suspect to leave his line of sight, especially by entering
     the very room Officer Harley was there to investigate.

     Once Officer Harley had placed Felder in handcuffs, he asked
     Felder if he had a license to carry the revolver, to which Felder
     initially responded yes. However, Officer Harley then asked
     [Felder]if he had a criminal record, to which Felder said yes. At
     this point, Officer Harley asked Felder how he could have a license
     to carry a firearm if he had a criminal record. Felder said that he
     had his record expunged, to which Officer Harley explained to
     [Felder]that he was going to run a search to essentially discover
     whether or not [Felder] was telling him the truth. [Felder] finally
     responded that he did not have a license to carry the revolver.

                                     -4-
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(Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/2/22, at 6-11) (record citations omitted).2

       After Officer Harley placed Felder in the back of his patrol car, the back-

up officers who arrived at the scene decided to have the Mustang towed. The

trial court explained the circumstances surrounding the tow as follows:

       Officer [Michael] Owen further testified that the officers believed
       they had the authority to conduct an inventory search of the
       vehicle, before towing the vehicle away, because (1) the
       registration on the Mustang did not match the license plate and
       revealed that the license plate belonged to a Lexis owned by a
       different individual (2) a search of [Felder’s] license revealed that
       his license was suspended and expired (3) the VIN number of the
       Mustang was designated as “open” which means the vehicle was
       not registered (4) the inspection stickers on the vehicle were
       invalid or expired and as such it would not be legal for this vehicle
____________________________________________

2  The record on appeal includes the DVD containing Officer Harley’s body
camera footage from his interaction with Felder. This Court reviewed the
footage, which confirmed the suppression court’s findings of fact. Specifically,
the footage revealed that Officer Harley exited his patrol car and walked
toward the passenger side of the Mustang while putting on rubber gloves.
(See Commonwealth’s Exhibit CS-4 at 0:28-0:44). At that point, Mr. Dixon
was not standing outside. After putting on the gloves, Officer Harley
illuminated his flashlight and pointed it at the Mustang’s passenger-side
window. (Id. at 0:45). Felder was inside the Mustang, seated in the driver’s
seat. (Id. at 0:45-0:46). While Felder was making the furtive movements,
Mr. Dixon exited from the motel room. (Id. at 0:46). Officer Harley spoke
first and asked, “What’s going on?” (Id. at 0:48-0:49). Simultaneously,
Felder exited the vehicle. Felder responded, “We’re alright.” (Id. at 0:50-
0:52). Felder made a pointing gesture and told the officer, “This is my
apartment right here.” (Id. at 0:55-0:57). Officer Harley then asked, “What
did you just tuck in the door when I walked up here?” (Id. at 1:01-1:03).
Felder replied, “Nothing. You can search everything, bro. I didn’t touch
nothing.” (Id. at 1:03-1:06). The officer asked whether Felder and Mr. Dixon
were “together,” and he rounded the Mustang to approach Felder, who stood
next to the front door on the driver’s side. (Id. at 1:08-1:12). Officer Harley
asked Felder whether he was carrying any contraband. (Id. at 1:12-1:14).
Felder immediately put his hands in the air, and Officer Harley commenced
the pat down. (Id. at 1:14-1:22).

                                           -5-
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       to be on the roadway (5) there were no individuals on scene that
       could rightfully take control of the vehicle as Mr. Dixon had an
       outstanding warrant and was intoxicated at the time and (6) that
       the Knights Inn is known to Bensalem Police as a high crime area
       where auto-theft and vehicle damage occurs frequently.[3]

       Officer Owen then testified to conducting the inventory search of
       the Mustang before towing the vehicle after receiving instructions
       from his superior officer, Sergeant McGinty. Officer Owen testified
       to completing the vehicle inventory form … while performing the
       inventory search of the vehicle, which is also captured on Officer
       Owen’s body camera footage.            The body camera footage
       demonstrates that the officer is physically conducting the
       inventory search in a manner consistent with an inventory search,
       carefully removing items from the trunk and recording relevant
       information on the required form. The body camera footage,
       along with the testimony of Officer Owen, shows that Officer Owen
       searched the trunk of the Mustang and found a garment bag.
       Officer Owen then felt the green garment bag and stated, on
       video, that it felt like a rifle, based off of the feel, length and
       weight of the item in the bag. Officer Owen then unzipped the
____________________________________________

3 At the suppression hearing, Felder attempted to explain his connection to

the Mustang, stating he was in the process of purchasing the vehicle and he
had already obtained the title. (See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/3/21, at 99-
100).      Despite the issues concerning the Mustang’s ownership, the
Commonwealth did not argue that Felder lacked a privacy interest in the
vehicle. (Id. at 132-58). To the extent that the Commonwealth mentioned
these issues, it did so as a justification for impounding the vehicle and ordering
the tow. (Id. at 149-54). Consequently, we do not address whether Felder
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. See Commonwealth
v. Enimpah, 630 Pa. 357, 368-69, 106 A.3d 695, 701 (2014) (stating it is
the Commonwealth’s burden to present evidence that defendant’s
constitutional rights were not infringed; Commonwealth may concede privacy
interest, choosing to contest only legality of police conduct; if it does so,
defendant’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” need not be established);
Commonwealth v. Peak, 230 A.3d 1220, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2020), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 1426, 209 L.Ed.2d 150 (2021) (stating the
Commonwealth did not make argument regarding Felder’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in vehicle during suppression hearing; for that reason,
the trial court did not address Felder’s expectation of privacy, or lack thereof,
in its opinion, and this issue is waived on appeal).

                                           -6-
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      garment bag and found a large blue fabric case inside, which
      Officer Owen then opened revealing the SKS rifle.

(Id. at 17-18) (record citations omitted).

                                      B.

      On April 23, 2021, Felder filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking the

suppression of evidence.    Felder argued that “Officer Harley did not have

probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that [Felder] was armed

and dangerous,” and the officer conducted an illegal pat down that “was not

incident to a valid arrest or consent.” (Suppression Motion, filed 4/23/21, at

¶24). Felder also argued that the police conducted an illegal search of the

vehicle which “was not pursuant to a lawful consent, a lawful arrest, a search

warrant or a valid inventory search.” (Id. at ¶27). On August 2, 2021, the

court commenced a suppression hearing.          The court received additional

testimony on August 3, 2021.      On August 4, 2021, the court denied the

suppression motion and provided its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

      Felder proceeded to a bench trial, and the parties stipulated to the

incorporation of all evidence produced at the suppression hearing.       At the

conclusion of trial, the court found Felder guilty on all counts. On October 20,

2021, the trial court imposed a sentence of not less than four years to not

more than ten years on each count of possession of firearms as well as a

sentence of not less than two years to not more than seven years on the count

of firearms without a license and two years of probation on the possession

charge. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other. The

                                     -7-
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court sentenced Felder to an aggregate term of four to ten years’

imprisonment, followed by two years of probation. Felder did not file post-

sentence motions.

       Felder timely filed separate notices of appeal at each of the underlying

docket numbers on November 18, 2021. On November 19, 2021, the court

ordered Felder to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. After obtaining multiple extensions, Felder filed his

Rule 1925(b) statement on March 30, 2022. On January 3, 2023, Felder filed

an application in this Court to consolidate his appeals. This Court granted the

application for consolidation on February 6, 2023.

       Felder now raises two issues for this Court’s review:

       Did the trial court err in denying Felder’s motion to suppress the
       illegal detention and search of Felder that resulted in the recovery
       of a handgun on Felder’s person.

       Did the trial court err in denying Felder’s motion to suppress the
       warrantless search of the vehicle he stepped out of and admitting
       the SKS rifle found during said search.

(Felder’s Brief at 4).4

____________________________________________

4 The following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion to

suppress:

       An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
       to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
       whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
       the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
       facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
       the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
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                                               II.

                                               A.

       In his first issue, Felder claims that Officer Harley approached the

Mustang, and “what could have been a mere encounter immediately escalated

into an investigative detention.” (Id. at 27). Felder insists that Officer Harley

did not possess reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support the

investigative detention.       Felder emphasizes that 1) Officer Harley did not

actually see Felder hiding or retrieving an object inside the vehicle; 2) Officer

Harley had no reason to believe Felder’s furtive movements were illegal; and

3) Officer Harley did not know whether a crime had occurred when he first

saw Felder. Felder also asserts that the presence of a parked vehicle “late at

night in a location consistent with criminal activity does not by itself create

suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle is engaged in criminal activity.” (Id.

____________________________________________

       Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
       remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
       a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
       supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
       findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
       erroneous.     Where the appeal of the determination of the
       suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
       suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
       appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
       court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
       of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa. Super. 2017).

                                           -9-
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at 35). Under these circumstances, Felder concludes that the court erred by

failing to suppress the firearm recovered from Felder’s person. We disagree.

       Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general

classifications:

       The first [level of interaction] is a “mere encounter” (or request
       for information) which need not be supported by any level of
       suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond.
       The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a
       reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period
       of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to
       constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest
       or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal

denied, 583 Pa. 668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa. Super. 2000)).

       An “investigative detention” is interchangeably labeled as a “stop and

frisk” or a “Terry stop.”5 Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119 (Pa.

Super. 2020), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 251 A.3d 771 (2021).

       An investigative detention, unlike a mere encounter, constitutes a
       seizure of a person and thus activates the protections of Article 1,
       Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. To institute an
       investigative detention, an officer must have at least a reasonable
       suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion
       requires a finding that based on the available facts, a person of
       reasonable caution would believe the intrusion was appropriate.

                                       *       *    *

       Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to
       articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
____________________________________________

5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

                                           - 10 -
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        reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
        reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
        activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in
        that activity.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal

citations omitted).

                                         B.

        “[T]he question of whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time of

an investigatory detention must be answered by examining the totality of the

circumstances to determine whether there was a particularized and objective

basis    for   suspecting   the   individual    stopped   of   criminal   activity.”

Commonwealth v. Cottman, 764 A.2d 595, 598-99 (Pa. Super. 2000)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 625 (Pa. Super. 2000)).

“These circumstances are to be viewed through the eyes of a trained officer,

not an ordinary citizen.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 907 A.2d 540, 543

(Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 75 (2007).

        In making this determination, we must give due weight … to the
        specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to
        draw from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of
        the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
        examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
        conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when
        taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
        officer.

Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 957 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 591 Pa. 664, 916 A.2d 633 (2006) (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted).

                                       - 11 -
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      “[R]oadside encounters between police and suspects are especially

hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons

in the area surrounding a suspect.” In re O.J., 958 A.2d 561, 564 (Pa. Super.

2008) (en banc), appeal denied, 605 Pa. 688, 989 A.2d 918 (2010). “The

officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue

is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be

warranted in the belief that [their] safety or the safety of others was in

danger.” Commonwealth v. Cooper, 994 A.2d 589, 592 (Pa. Super. 2010),

appeal denied, 608 Pa. 660, 13 A.3d 474 (2010). An officer’s “observation of

furtive movements, within the scope of a lawful stop, [can lead] him to

reasonably be concerned for his safety and therefore justif[y] the Terry

protective frisk.”   Commonwealth v. Simmons, 17 A.3d 399, 404 (Pa.

Super. 2011), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 651, 25 A.3d 328 (2011). See also

Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc)

(stating: “if a suspect engages in hand movements that police know, based

on their experience, are associated with the secreting of a weapon, those

movements will buttress legitimacy of a protective weapons search of the

location where hand movements occurred”); Commonwealth v. Tuggles,

58 A.3d 840, 844 (Pa. Super. 2012) (explaining: “[w]here a person performs

an activity that is indicative of an attempt to [hide] a weapon, that movement,

regardless of whether it is singular or multiple, can support a belief that the

person has a gun”).

                                    - 12 -
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      In this case, the suppression court concluded that Officer Harley

conducted a legal Terry stop:

      In this case Officer Harley was investigating an abandoned 911
      call, specifically the officer was investigating room 163 of the
      Knights Inn. Upon arrival he observes Mr. Dixon making gestures
      to the Mustang parked in front of room 163 and gesturing to
      Officer Harley’s vehicle. When Officer Harley approached room
      163, he observed Felder in the Mustang, with the lights off,
      reaching down and hunched over in the vehicle. Such movements
      are consistent with an individual either concealing or reaching for
      a weapon and thus justify Officer Harley’s reasonable belief that
      … Felder may be armed and dangerous. Moreover, the fact that
      Officer Harley was outnumbered, by Felder and Mr. Dixon, the fact
      that Felder got out of the Mustang, without Officer Harley
      requesting he do so, and the fact that both Felder and Mr. Dixon
      were directly in front of room 163—the room from which the 911
      call originated and thus the subject of Officer Harley’s
      investigation—are relevant to the totality of the circumstances and
      establish that Officer Harley was warranted in his reasonable belief
      that his safety or the safety of others was in danger.

(Trial Court Opinion at 12) (internal citations omitted). Based on our review

of the record, we cannot say that the court erred in reaching this conclusion.

      We emphasize that this case involves a combination of facts that, when

taken together, warranted further action by Officer Harley.       See Young,

supra. Significantly: 1) Officer Harley responded to an abandoned 911 call

after dark; 2) the call originated from a motel room in a high-crime area; 3)

upon arriving at the room where the call originated, Officer Harley was

outnumbered by Felder and Mr. Dixon; 4) Officer Harley observed Felder’s

furtive movements inside the vehicle; and 5) after making the furtive

movements, Felder exited the vehicle without prompting. Under the totality

of these circumstances, Officer Harley’s observations created a reasonable

                                     - 13 -
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concern for officer safety, which justified the Terry stop.   See Simmons,

supra; Cooper, supra. Felder is not entitled to relief on his first claim.

                                     III.

                                      A.

      In his second issue, Felder contends the police opted to tow the

Mustang, even though it was lawfully parked in a parking spot at the Knights

Inn. Although the police claimed to have conducted an inventory search prior

to the tow, Felder maintains that the police engaged in an illegal, warrantless

search.

      Citing Commonwealth v. Brandt, 366 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Super. 1976),

Felder insists there are two requirements that the Commonwealth must

demonstrate to justify an inventory search: 1) the vehicle was lawfully within

police custody; and 2) the search was, in fact, for the purpose of taking an

inventory of the owner’s possessions to protect that property while it remains

in police custody.   Here, Felder maintains that the search was pretextual

because the police made no attempt to take an accurate inventory and protect

the property inside the Mustang. Felder notes that the inventory list prepared

by Officer Owen did not include certain items of value, including a gold chain

hanging from the rearview mirror. Felder also argues that Officer Owen “was

clearly looking for contraband” where the scope of the inventory search

included “the spare tire compartment, the engine compartment, and the door

on the fuel cap[.]” (Felder’s Brief at 47). Under these circumstances, Felder

                                    - 14 -
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concludes that the court erred by failing to suppress the firearm recovered

from the trunk of the Mustang.

     In justifying the search, the Commonwealth contends that search of the

car was voluntarily because Felder informed Officer Harley that he could

“search   everything”   within   seconds   of   the   officer’s   initial   approach.

(Commonwealth’s Brief at 10). The Commonwealth emphasizes that Officer

Harley did not coerce Felder’s consent where “[t]he officer did not have a

weapon drawn, did not yell, [and] did not issue commands of any kind.” (Id.

at 10-11).    The Commonwealth posits that Felder gave consent to search

“without limitation and, based on the surrounding circumstances, clearly

contemplated a search of the car that [Felder] had just come out of[.]” (Id.

at 36).      Moreover, the Commonwealth contends that Felder did not

subsequently withdraw his consent.         The Commonwealth contends that

concludes that the police legally searched the Mustang pursuant to Felder’s

consent, and this Court should affirm the denial of the suppression motion on

this basis of the voluntariness of the search.        Before addressing Felder’s

argument that the inventory search was pretextual, we will first address the

Commonwealth’s contention.

                                      B.

     “Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee individuals

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.”            Commonwealth v.

                                     - 15 -
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Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 502 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc), appeal denied,

___ Pa. ___, 279 A.3d 38 (2022).       “As a general rule, ‘a warrant stating

probable cause is required before a police officer may search for or seize

evidence.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 40 A.3d 1245, 1248

(Pa. Super. 2012)).    Regarding automobiles, “Article I, Section 8 affords

greater protection to our citizens than the Fourth Amendment, and … the

Pennsylvania Constitution requires both a showing of probable cause and

exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of an automobile.”

Commonwealth v. Alexander, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 243 A.3d 177, 181 (2020).

      “Absent the application of one of a few clearly delineated exceptions, a

warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable.” Heidelberg,

supra at 502 (quoting Commonwealth v. Whitlock, 69 A.3d 635, 637 (Pa.

Super. 2013)).      “One such exception is consent, voluntarily given.”

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 56, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (2000).

“Whether an individual has voluntarily consented to a search ‘is [a question

of] fact which must be determined in each case from the totality of the

circumstances.’” Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 A.2d 341, 349 (Pa. Super.

2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 691, 897 A.2d 455 (2006) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Mancini, 490 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Pa.Super. 1985)).

      “The central Fourth Amendment inquiries in consent cases entail

assessment of the constitutional validity of the citizen/police encounter giving

rise to the consent; and, ultimately, the voluntariness of consent. Where the

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underlying encounter is found to be lawful, voluntariness becomes the

exclusive focus.” Strickler, supra at 56-57, 757 A.2d at 888-89 (internal

citations and footnote omitted).

      [T]he Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a
      consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
      choice—not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied,
      or a will overborne—under the totality of the circumstances. As
      noted, while knowledge of the right to refuse to consent to the
      search is a factor to be taken into account, the Commonwealth is
      not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to
      establishing a voluntary consent. Additionally, although the
      inquiry is an objective one, the maturity, sophistication and
      mental or emotional state of the defendant (including age,
      intelligence and capacity to exercise free will), are to be taken into
      account.

Id. at 79, 757 A.2d at 901. “The test for the validity of a consent to search

is the same for both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, i.e., that

the consent is given voluntarily.” Commonwealth v. Mack, 568 Pa. 329,

334, 796 A.2d 967, 970 (2002).

                                       C.

      Officer Harley testified that he arrived at the scene of the abandoned

911 call and he stopped his vehicle “just shy of being right in front of the

room” where the call originated. (N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/2/21, at 52).

From his patrol car, Officer Harley observed Mr. Dixon standing in front of the

door to Room 163.      Mr. Dixon was “making gestures” to Felder, who was

“sitting in a car which was parked directly in front of the door of 163.” (Id.

at 54). Officer Harley exited his patrol car and “proceeded to walk to Room

163.” (Id. at 57). As he walked past the passenger side of Felder’s vehicle,

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Officer Harley observed Felder making furtive movements while seated in the

driver’s seat. At that point, Officer Harley pointed his flashlight toward the

Mustang and asked Felder if he was reaching for anything.          Without any

prompting from Officer Harley, Felder exited the vehicle and said, “You can

search everything.” (Id. at 62). Thereafter, Officer Harley conducted the

frisk and detained Felder.

      Felder also testified at the suppression hearing. On direct examination,

Felder explained that he first noticed Officer Harley “when he put his flashlight

in my face.” (N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/3/21, at 95). Felder looked “to see

where the light was coming from,” and he exited the vehicle. (Id.) Felder

acknowledged that Officer Harley asked whether he had tucked something

into the compartment of the driver’s side door. Based upon the officer’s “tone

of voice,” Felder believed that he was not free to leave, and the officer was

“interrogating” him. (Id. at 96). On cross-examination, Felder elaborated on

his subsequent offer to search the vehicle:

      I said in regards to the door and the compartment. I told him he
      can search everything as far as the door and the compartment,
      not me or not—I didn’t—I wasn’t referring to me, or I wasn’t
      referring to anything else as far as the car, because my car door
      was already open. He had already—I seen he had already had the
      flashlight through the other window on the door compartment
      looking in the compartment as I was getting out the car. So that’s
      why I told him, I said, I’m not hiding nothing. You see what I’m
      —you see I’m getting out the car. I’m not hiding nothing. You
      can look and search right here, search everything.

(Id. at 109).

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     The trial court initially indicated that Felder did not limit the scope of his

voluntary consent:

     There’s also an important factual thing, which is, when Officer
     Harley walks around the back of the Mustang and is asking, “Do
     you have any weapons,” and has already asked, “What were you
     tucking into the door,” and [Felder’s] own testimony was that he
     says, “You could search any—everything.”

     Now, [Felder] says he meant, like, the area of the door, which is
     where Officer Harley has some concerns, or expressed some
     concerns, but he didn’t say—he didn’t limit that. He said, “You
     could search everything.”

(N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/4/21, at 26).

     While the trial court initially made that statement, it walked back that

statement by declining to reach that the issue was consensual, stating:

     There’s also an important factual thing, which is, when Officer
     Harley walks around the back of the Mustang and is asking, “Do
     you have any weapons,” and has already asked, “What were you
     tucking into the door,” and Felder’s own testimony was that he
     says, “You could search any— everything.”

     Now, Felder says he meant, like, the area of the door, which is
     where Officer Harley has some concerns, or expressed some
     concerns, but he didn’t say—he didn’t limit that. He said, “You
     could search everything.”

     Now, the case doesn’t really turn on any kind of consensual
     search idea, but in theory it could have. I don’t know what
     that means, You can search everything. That might have
     been consent to search the vehicle. It might have constituted a
     consent to pat-down or whatever. And it’s—the Court has to
     consider that possibility.

N.T., 8/4/21, at 26-27 (emphasis added).        The trial court also declined to

make an explicit finding that Felder consented to the pat down search, though

it acknowledged the possibility.   Id. at 32 (“And Felder puts his hands up

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immediately and says, You can search everything. And so, is the pat-down a

consensual pat-down? Maybe.”). Finally, in its opinion pursuant to Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(a), the trial court discussed the inventory search at

length without relying on Felder’s purported consent to explain why

suppression was denied. Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/22, at 13-22. Based on this

full context, I would not elevate the trial court’s initial comments about

Felder’s consent to a factual finding that is binding on this Court on appeal.

      Additionally, we share the trial court’s hesitation to find that Felder’s

statement, uttered immediately upon being approached by Officer Harley,

constituted voluntary consent to search the entire vehicle after he had been

placed under arrest. For consent to search to be constitutionally valid, it must

be given intelligently and voluntarily. Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d

855, 862 (Pa. 2018) (quotations & citation omitted). A consent search must

be limited to the scope of the consent given, and that scope is determined

based on a standard of objective reasonableness. Id. “We do not ascertain

the scope of consent from the individual’s subjective belief or the officer’s

understanding based on his or her training and experience, but based on what

the typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange

between the officer and the suspect.” Id. (cleaned up; citations omitted).

Thus, the scope of consent provided is a fact-specific inquiry.

      Felder cooperated with Officer Harley when he was approached. Officer

Harley first said, “What did you just tuck in the door when I walked up here,”

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to which Felder replied, “Nothing. You can search everything, bro. I didn’t

touch nothing.”     Commonwealth Exhibit 4 at 1:01-1:06.          Felder then

acquiesced to the pat down search, complying fully with Officer Harley’s

instructions, and was placed under arrest. Officer Harley did not search the

driver’s side door at that time.

      After Felder was arrested and placed in the back of the police van,

however, Officer Harley again asked for consent to search the vehicle. At that

juncture, when the coercive pressure of the situation had increased from the

initial interaction, Felder responded to Officer Harley’s multiple requests for

consent by stating that the vehicle did not belong to him. Id. at 10:12-11:02.

Later, Felder asked Officer Harley to retrieve his cell phone from the vehicle

and give it to one of his companions at the Knights Inn, again stating that the

car did not belong to him. Id. at 24:15-24:45. At that point, Officer Harley

approached the sergeant on scene and stated that he had permission to enter

the car to look for Felder’s phone, and another officer informed him that the

phone was already in evidence. Id. at 24:55-25:32. The officers then decided

to inventory and tow the vehicle. None of the officers on scene appeared to

be proceeding on the belief that Felder had consented to a search.

      Based on these circumstances, a reasonable person would not view

Felder’s initial statement to Officer Harley as blanket consent to search the

entire vehicle, particularly after he had been placed under arrest and

disclaimed ownership of the vehicle. Valdivia, supra. At best, once he was

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placed under arrest, Felder authorized Officer Harley to retrieve his phone if

it was in the car; when Officer Harley learned that the phone had already been

placed into evidence, that consent was no longer relevant. As the record does

not support the conclusion that Felder gave consent to search the entire

vehicle, and the trial court did not make this factual finding, we decline to

affirm the trial court’s order on that basis.

                                       IV.

                                        A.

      Now to the issue which the trial court decided whether the search of the

vehicle was legal, which is whether the inventory search of the vehicle was a

pretext to conduct an investigatory search for further evidence of a crime.

Based on my review of the testimony, body camera footage, inventory policy

and form, I conclude that it was.

      Our Supreme Court has set forth the standards governing inventory

searches of vehicles, which are distinct from investigatory searches intended

to uncover evidence:

      The purpose of an inventory search is not to uncover criminal
      evidence, but to safeguard items taken into police custody in order
      to benefit both the police and the defendant. In the seminal case
      of [South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)], the
      high Court observed that inventory searches of impounded
      vehicles serve several purposes, including (1) protection of the
      owner’s property while it remains in police custody; (2) protection
      of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen
      property; (3) protection of the police from potential danger; and
      (4) assisting the police in determining whether the vehicle was
      stolen and then abandoned.

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      An inventory search of an automobile is permissible when (1) the
      police have lawfully impounded the vehicle; and (2) the police
      have acted in accordance with a reasonable, standard policy of
      routinely securing and inventorying the contents of the impounded
      vehicle. In Commonwealth v. Henley, [909 A.2d 352, 359 (Pa.
      Super. 2006) (en banc)], the Pennsylvania Superior Court, citing
      Opperman, explained:

        In determining whether a proper inventory search has
        occurred, the first inquiry is whether the police have lawfully
        impounded the automobile, i.e., have lawful custody of the
        automobile. The authority of the police to impound vehicles
        derives from the police’s reasonable community care-taking
        functions. Such functions include removing disabled or
        damaged     vehicles    from     the   highway,    impounding
        automobiles which violate parking ordinances (thereby
        jeopardizing public safety and efficient traffic flow), and
        protecting the community’s safety.

        The second inquiry is whether the police have conducted a
        reasonable inventory search.        An inventory search is
        reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to reasonable standard
        police procedures and in good faith and not for the sole
        purpose of investigation.

      A protective vehicle search conducted in accordance with standard
      police department procedures assures that the intrusion is limited
      in scope to the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking
      function.

Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 102-03 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up;

citations omitted).

                                      B.

      Here, because Felder’s argument focuses on the second inquiry –

whether the search was conducted in good faith – it is necessary to address

the first inquiry to fully assess the reasonableness of the search because “[a]

questionable impoundment is one factor of circumstantial evidence of

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improper motive.” Henley, supra, at 365 (citation omitted). Because the

vehicle here was legally parked at the Knights Inn, did not raise any public

safety issues, and Felder’s companion was staying at the hotel, we find the

decision to impound the vehicle to be at least “questionable.”

      When a law enforcement officer discovers that a vehicle is unregistered

on a “highway or trafficway” or the driver cannot legally operate the vehicle,

he or she must immobilize the vehicle or, “in the interest of public safety,”

impound    the   vehicle.    75   Pa.C.S.      §   6309.2(a)   (emphasis   added).

Immobilization differs from impoundment in that the former refers to merely

stopping the vehicle in place, such as with a boot device, while the latter refers

to towing and storing the vehicle in a secure area. Lagenella, supra, at 100.

If a vehicle is immobilized, the operator or owner has 24 hours to appear at

the relevant judicial office to furnish proof that the pertinent defects have been

remedied and obtain a certificate of release. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2(b). If he

or she has not done so within 24 hours, only then will the vehicle be

impounded. Id.

      Impounding a vehicle may serve legitimate community-caretaking

purposes such as protecting public safety.         Lagenella, supra, at 102-03.

“While it may be true that an arrestee’s vehicle may be exposed to danger if

it is left legally parked on the public street in a high-crime area, this concern,

standing alone, is inadequate to override the reasonable expectations of

privacy enjoyed by our citizens, defendants and non-defendants alike.”

                                      - 24 -
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Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 259-60 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Thus, “where the sole issue is the safety of a defendant’s legally parked vehicle

pending an arrest, the police do not have the authority to impound said vehicle

absent some reasonable nexus to the alleged crime or to a community care-

taking responsibility.” Id.

      On the record before us, impounding the vehicle as opposed to

immobilizing it for the statutory 24-hour period was not required under the

police’s community-caretaking function. Nothing in the record suggests that

any employee of the Knights Inn requested that the vehicle be removed

following Felder’s arrest. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3353(b)-(c) (related to unattended

vehicles on private property); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3352(c)(4) (removal by police of

vehicles on private property). The vehicle was legally parked and could have

been immobilized to allow Felder or someone else of his choosing to remedy

the title defects that had been uncovered and have a licensed driver appear

at the district court office to retrieve the vehicle. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6309.2(b).

In the meantime, valuables in the vehicle could have been secured, again, by

someone of Felder’s choosing, such as Mr. Dixon. As can be seen, there was

no reason for the police in this instance to immediately impound the vehicle

rather than simply immobilizing it for 24 hours or to seek a search warrant to

conduct an investigatory search.

      Moreover, the officers’ concern about releasing the vehicle to Mr. Dixon

was not justified. They explained that Mr. Dixon was intoxicated and not able

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to safely drive the vehicle, with Officer Harley going so far as to suggest that

he could be liable if Mr. Dixon harmed someone while driving under the

influence. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/2/21 at 144, 147-48. While this might

have been a colorable concern if the vehicle was parked at a gas station,

restaurant or bar, here, the vehicle was legally parked at a hotel. Patrons of

hotels routinely spend the night or even several days on the premises without

moving their vehicles. Nothing in the record suggests that if the keys to the

vehicle had been released to Felder’s companion, he would have operated the

vehicle while intoxicated rather than simply returning to his own hotel room.

While there were concerns arising from the vehicle’s title defects and Felder’s

statements at the scene, the decision to impound the vehicle was

“questionable” and casts doubt on the validity of the officers’ motives for

conducting the inventory search. Henley, supra.

                                      C.

      Now as to whether the inventory search was, in fact, a pretext for an

investigatory search.   Felder maintains that the search did not protect the

property in the vehicle or adequately protect the officers from claims regarding

lost or stolen property. He highlights that the inventory sheet completed by

Officer Owens failed to note a gold chain and ring hanging from the rearview

mirror of the vehicle. He argues that the search was extensive, including the

engine compartment, the door on the fuel cap and the trunk, but nonetheless

failed to note this item of clear value located in plain view. Accordingly, he

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concludes that the officers were not, in fact, motivated by community-

caretaking concerns.

      The Bensalem Township Police Department’s motor vehicle inventory

policy (the Policy) provides that an inventory search “will extend to all areas

of the vehicle where personal property or hazardous materials may reasonably

be found, including but not limited to, the console, passenger compartment,

trunk, glove compartment, storage compartments and any containers.”

Commonwealth Exhibit CS-6, 8/3/21, § II.E.2. “Items of personal property

that are of significant value will be removed from the vehicle and secured for

safekeeping,” and such items must be noted on a Property Receipt and Vehicle

Inventory Form submitted to the department’s Evidence Custodian.           Id.,

§ II.F.3 & F. The Inventory Form must include a “detailed description of the

items discovered and a detailed description of where the item was located in

the motor vehicle.” Id., § IV.B.1. The Policy also requires a Property Receipt

to be completed for any items removed from the vehicle, id., § IV.C, but the

Inventory Form must additionally list items that remain in the vehicle, id.,

§ IV.B.2.a.

      Discrepancies between the body camera footage of the inventory search

and the Vehicle Inventory Form completed in this case lead me to conclude

that the search was not reasonable or conducted for community-caretaking

purposes. The form includes two categories of property: items seized and

items remaining in the vehicle. For items seized, Officer Owens listed only the

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rifle at issue in this case.    For items remaining in the vehicle, he wrote:

“trunk—various books and misc junk items including fire extinguisher, tools,

books, cleaning supplies.” Exhibit DS-1, 8/2/21.

      The gold chain and ring are not included on the form, nor does the list

separately account for the myriad of items left in the vehicle or for their

specific location therein as required by the Policy. At the suppression hearing,

Officer Owens admitted that he did not itemize everything in the vehicle but

instead   generalized   his    findings,   apparently   in   contravention   of   the

requirement that the form include a “detailed description of the items

discovered and a detailed description of where the item was located in the

motor vehicle.” Commonwealth Exhibit CS-6, 8/3/21, § IV.B.1; N.T., 8/3/21

at 46. If the purpose of the impoundment and inventory search was to protect

Felder’s possessions, a gold chain and ring of actual value would have been

important to seize and note on the Inventory Form and Property Receipt. That

this item was overlooked when it was hanging from the rearview mirror in

plain view while the officers spent much of the search rifling through the

detritus in the trunk and passenger compartment without itemizing what they

found indicates that the purpose of the search was to locate contraband.

      Officer Owens also acknowledged on cross-examination that the Policy

requires an officer to stop the search and contact the on-call assistant district

attorney if contraband is found during an inventory search, and “there is

sufficient probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and that

                                       - 28 -
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further evidence or fruits thereof may be found in the motor vehicle.” See

Commonwealth Exhibit CS-6, 8/3/21, § II.E.4; N.T., 8/3/21 at 71-72. He did

not, however, stop searching the vehicle upon discovering the rifle. He also

did not consult with his supervising officer who was on scene to decide whether

to obtain a search warrant in accordance with the policy. N.T., 8/3/21 at 72.

Rather, he continued the search on the assumption that his supervisor would

have instructed him to stop if he felt it was necessary to obtain a warrant. Id.

(“I did not, but based off of prior experiences with my supervisor, if he felt,

he would have stopped.”). The trial court explained that “the search [got] a

little more aggressive after they [found] that rifle” and postulated that it may

have suppressed any additional evidence if it had been uncovered after that

point. N.T., 8/4/21, at 46-47. However, what the failure to seek a search

warrant at this juncture indicates is that the purpose was not to conduct an

inventory search but had been investigatory since its inception.

      To summarize, several circumstantial factors lead to the conclusion that

the search of Felder’s vehicle was a warrantless, investigatory search rather

than a constitutional inventory search.       First, impoundment of the vehicle

rather than immobilization was not supported by statute or necessary under

the specific circumstances of this case, rendering the decision to impound the

vehicle questionable. Second, the Inventory Form does not comply with the

Policy by itemizing in detail the items left in the vehicle. Third, the officers

did not find or seize items of value in plain view—the gold chain and ring on

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the rearview mirror—despite the stated purpose of the inventory being to

safeguard Felder’s possessions. That they searched the engine compartment

and fuel door cap without noticing the gold chain and ring demonstrates that

the focus of the search was uncovering contraband. Finally, the officers did

not comply with the Policy to seek a warrant or even discuss doing so

immediately after uncovering contraband in the vehicle. Based on these facts,

we reverse trial court’s denial of Felder’s motion for suppression of the rifle.

      Accordingly, we reverse the counts involving the rifle at No. 2334 of

2020 for carrying firearms without a license and at No. 5807 of 2020 of

persons not to possess firearms.     However, because the reversal of those

counts does not upset the sentencing scheme since both of those counts ran

concurrently with the other counts involving possession of firearms, we need

not remand for resentencing.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and reversed in part.

      Judge Sullivan joins the Memorandum.

      Judge King Noted Dissent.

Date: 12/21/2023

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