Court Opinion

ID: 9770131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:46:56.732136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:14.633156
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 16. dissenting. The majority’s overly technical and narrow view of an employee’s obligation to inform his employer of problems in the workplace *533results in an unfair denial of benefits to claimant. The undisputed facts demonstrate that claimant suffered through intolerable working conditions at two of employer’s stores and notified employer of these conditions on several occasions. By pretending that employer solved the first abusive situation and thus ignoring that history, the majority unreasonably concludes that claimant was required to make further efforts to resolve the problem at the Essex location. Given that the workplace conditions were intolerable and that any further attempt to resolve this situation would have been futile, claimant had good cause to quit, and I respectfully dissent.
¶ 17. The majority’s decision in this case turns on the facts as found by the hearing officer, which include the following. In employer’s Burlington store, claimant was subjected to profane and threatening comments by the manager. Employer’s answer to claimant’s complaints about this behavior was not to discipline the manager, but to relocate claimant to another store in Essex. Once relocated, claimant suffered through a day-long tirade by his new manager, during which the manager threw items around the store. Claimant did not leave his employment immediately following this episode, but attempted to report the behavior to management by calling and leaving a message with his regional manager. A week later, when the Essex store manager made a threat about killing 100 people, claimant was scared given the angry outburst he had already witnessed. Claimant created an excuse to avoid going to work the following day because he feared the manager. On Monday morning, the next work day, claimant arrived at work and spoke with the regional manager. Claimant raised his concern about the Essex manager’s temper and instability. Claimant did not, however, repeat the Essex manager’s threat to kill. At the end of this conversation, claimant quit his employment.
¶ 18. In addition to these findings, the record reveals the following pertinent facts that the hearing officer did not address. Employer’s only witness, the regional manager, testified that prior to transferring claimant, he knew the Essex manager also had a bad temper and that other employees had previously complained about the' manager being volatile and screaming on the telephone. The regional manager explained that he did not take any disciplinary action against either the Burlington or Essex managers, except to speak with them. He further testified that company policy allows referral of employees for anger management, but he did not do so for either manager in this case. Claimant testified that after he reported the Essex manager’s inappropriate and angry behavior, the regional manager told claimant that things would only get worse and claimant should make a decision. Employer did not offer any conflicting testimony, and the findings do not address the issue. Moreover, the findings do not definitively establish the length or content of this conversation on the morning that claimant left his employment. The hearing officer’s failure to fully resolve the factual discrepancies is troubling because it constrains our review.3 I *534recognize that hearings before an administrative law judge are intended to be summary and short, but there must be sufficient findings to support the decision. When a claimant may be denied benefits for failing to make a very specific statement at a very specific time, it is critical for hearing officers to fully resolve factual disputes in their decisions. In addition, when a case reaches the Board without a proper resolution of key factual issues, the Board should remand the case to the hearing officer rather than proceeding with an incomplete record. Given these shortcomings, at the very least, this case should be remanded for further factual findings to resolve employer’s knowledge of the Essex manager’s prior behavior and the content of claimant’s final conversation with the regional manager.
¶ 19. In any event, the findings as they exist compel a conclusion that claimant had good cause attributable to his employer to leave his employment. The majority’s analysis dismisses the abuse claimant suffered in the Burlington store as irrelevant and concludes that the angry outbursts of the Essex manager do not provide a basis to quit because they were not directed personally at claimant. I disagree with both of these contentions. Claimant’s quit meets the test for good cause, which is “what a reasonable person would have done in the same circumstances.” Isabelle v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training, 150 Vt. 458, 460, 554 A.2d 660, 661 (1988). The behavior of claimant’s managers is beyond what a reasonable person should have to endure in the workplace. Wfiiile the majority excuses the Essex manager’s actions because they were not directed specifically at claimant, there is no requirement that intolerable working conditions result from inappropriate behavior by coworkers or supervisors that is specifically directed at the claimant. See Wetterhahn v. Kimm Co., 430 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that a co-worker’s harassment does not need to be focused on claimant for it to provide an adequate basis for leaving employment). Claimant was not required to continue suffering through another angry and abusive store manager. See Eulo v. Fla. Unemployment Appeal Comm’n, 724 So. 2d 636, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (“An employee is not required to accept undue verbal abuse from an employer.”); Chapman v. Indus. Comm’n, 700 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“When minimum standards of civility in the work place are cast aside by supervisors, workers are not required to bear unreasonable abuse that is heaped on them.”). Not only did the store manager display the same angry temperament that claimant had experienced in Burlington, but the Essex manager also made a disturbing threat to kill. The majority’s claim that this comment was just “blowing off steam” and that claimant did not take it seriously because he returned to work two days later is simply unsupported. Ante, ¶ 8. Claimant missed a day of work because he was so disturbed by the comment. That he returned the following Monday to try and resolve the situation, as he is obligated to do, cannot be counted against him.
*535¶ 20. Furthermore, I disagree that claimant failed to allow employer an opportunity to rectify the situation prior to leaving. See Allen v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training, 159 Vt. 286, 290, 618 A.2d 1317, 1319 (1992). Claimant made several attempts to resolve the hostile situation that he was enduring both in the Burlington and Essex stores. While he was working in the Burlington office, claimant spoke with the regional manager and eventually was transferred to a new store. The majority’s conclusion that this grievance “was resolved,” ante, ¶ 10, and the referee’s assessment that employer’s transfer of claimant to the Essex store demonstrates that employer was “responsive to legitimate concerns” are contrary to the facts. It can hardly be seen as an appropriate response where employer’s resolution of the problem was to put claimant in a store that employer knew was managed by a person with a volatile temper. Employer did not actually respond to the source of the problem — the store manager’s behavior. Employer did not discipline the Burlington manager or refer him for anger management therapy, as company policy allowed. Employer’s sole response was to speak with the manager, something employer had done previously without any resulting change in the manager’s behavior. See Lebakken v. Express-A-Button, Inc., No. A07-1043, 2008 WL 2343269, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jun. 10,2008) (explaining that employer’s act of “simply admonish[ing] a highly disruptive employee in hopes that he or she will improve” does not give victimized employee any reasonable expectation of assistance).
¶ 21. Given this background, claimant made a reasonable attempt to resolve his problems with his Essex manager before leaving. Claimant left a message with management following his Essex supervisor’s day-long tirade on April 23. That management did not receive or failed to respond to this message is not claimant’s fault. Claimant returned to work, despite his fear regarding his store manager’s behavior. On his final morning at work, he met with his regional supervisor and described the angry and volatile behavior of his store manager. Given employer’s failure to adequately address the first hostile work environment in the Burlington location, and employer’s refusal to deal with the management situation at the Essex location, claimant’s assessment that further efforts would be futile was reasonable. See Turco v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 141 Vt. 135, 138, 446 A.2d 345, 347 (1982) (concluding that employee was justified in leaving where there was history of harassment and employer had knowledge of it and refused to address the problem); see also Rushlow v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training, 144 Vt. 328, 331, 476 A.2d 139, 141 (1984) (explaining that an employee must make an effort to remedy poor working conditions unless the effort “would be unavailing”).
¶ 22. While there were additional steps claimant may have taken, claimant was not required to do everything possible to rectify the situation, only what was reasonable. “An employee can be required to do no more than make a reasonable effort ... to bring his grievance to the attention of his employer.” Garcia v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training, 145 Vt. 331, 337, 488 A.2d 762, 766 (1985); see Swain v. Dir., Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 283 S.W.3d 603, 604-05 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (“The law does not require a worker to exhaust every possibility in an effort to rectify mistreatment and abuse, but instead requires only that which would be reasonable for an average employee under the circumstances.”). The unemployment compensation statute is to be read liberally in favor of claimants, Howard v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training, 153 Vt. 614, 616, 572 A.2d 931, 932 (1990), and claimant should not be refused compensation simply because he did not also relate the Essex manager’s threat to kill 100 people. *536Claimant had legitimate concerns about his work environment and made a reasonable effort to explain these problems to management. His effort to resolve the issues was met with indifference from his employer. Claimant’s action was reasonable and he was justified in leaving. I would reverse the Board and award claimant compensation.

 The procedural history of this claim for unemployment compensation followed a routine pattern. Claimant appealed his initial denial of benefits to an administrative law judge. The healing before this judge was informal and over the telephone. Although claimant was represented in his case, most of these hearings are done without counsel. The hearing officer made findings based on the evidence, and ruled against claimant. Claimant then appealed to the Board. The Board reviewed the hearing officer’s findings and adopted them as its own. The Board did not make further findings. Based on the factual record, the Board affirmed the hearing officer. This proce*534dure highlights two additional reasons for the hearing officer to make a complete record. First, because most parties are not represented at the initial hearing, the hearing officer has an obligation to bring out important facts. See Langlois v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training, 149 Vt. 498, 500, 546 A.2d 1365, 1367 (1988) (explaining that the hearing officer owes the claimant “every assistance in presenting his case consistent with the referee’s duty to impartially decide the issues” (quotation omitted)). Second, because the Board simply reviews, and often adopts, the hearing officer’s findings, it is extremely important for the hearing officer to fully develop the facts at that stage of the proceeding.