Court Opinion

ID: 9739767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:20:36.713254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:13.817420
License: Public Domain

TOMUANOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
Because I would answer all three questions presented in the negative, I respectfully dissent and would hold that Minn. Stat. § 256D.065 (1992) is constitutional.
The right to travel is implicated when a statute actually deters travel, when impeding travel is its primary purpose, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of the right to travel. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 2321, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986).
*204Although the respondents failed to show that they or any other people were actually deterred from migrating or traveling to Minnesota because of section 256D.065, the court of appeals assumed
an indigent who desires to migrate to Minnesota may hesitate if he or she knows only 60 percent of the amount necessary to live in Minnesota will be available. This assumes, of course, that the $203 grant amount available to established Minnesota residents is the amount ‘necessary to maintain a subsistence reasonably compatible with decency and health’ in Minnesota.
Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 902 (citing the purpose of the general assistance statute at Minn.Stat. § 256D.01, subd. 1 (1990)). By this reasoning, if $203 is not sufficient to maintain this subsistence, the entire general assistance statute deters travel and would therefore be unconstitutional. It is a dubious assumption that $203 per month is sufficient to provide food, clothing, shelter and transportation in Minnesota. While I am very concerned about unfortunate people who must rely on this meager amount, a statute is not unconstitutional simply because it is under-funded to fulfill its purposes. Furthermore, the state does not have a legal duty to provide welfare benefits. This is not a case where the state is granting “basic subsistence to one class of needy residents while denying it to an equally needy class of residents.” Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234, 238 (Minn.1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 1231, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971), (quoting Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal.App.2d 430, 440, 78 Cal Rptr. 260, 266-67 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554, 90 S.Ct. 754, 24 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)).
The respondents have failed to show that the intent of the statute is to deter travel. I do not agree that the intent of the legislature was to deter the transient population from coming into the State for benefits, nor to punish the decision of indigents to migrate to Minnesota. Had this been the purpose, the legislature could have enacted legislation to provide vouchers for shelter and other needs in lieu of cash grants, or eliminated the entire general assistance/work readiness grant programs. Rather, the legislature chose to carefully craft the 1991 amendment so as to make the amount of welfare benefits a neutral factor in a person’s decision to migrate to Minnesota. Although it does not totally remove the incentive for all persons, “if the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911). As we noted in another case, the legislature is granted
‘the exercise of a wide scope of discretion * * * i
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[i]f any reasonable distinction between the subjects * * * can be found, the legislative classification should be sustained.
Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 194-95, 32 N.W.2d 538, 543 (1948) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927)).
We further noted that
[I]t is not permissible for the courts to inquire into the motives * * * in enacting the ordinance for the purpose of assailing its validity. The motives * * * are wholly immaterial.
Id. at 226 Minn, at 204, 32 N.W.2d at 548.
Finally, I conclude that a person is never punished for exercising their right to travel by section 256D.065 since an eligible person receives at least as much, if not more, than he or she received in his or her previous state of residence, unless that amount exceeds the statutory maximum. A single person would receive less only if they migrated from a state where they received more than $203, the statutory maximum for residents of longer duration in Minnesota. If a single person migrated from a state where they received less than $122 per month, or no grant at all, he or she is actually rewarded for exercising his or her *205right to travel by receiving a grant of $122 per month for six months in Minnesota.1
The named representatives of the class illustrate this fact. Two each received $122 per month in Minnesota, although they had received nothing at all in their previous state of residence. The other two named representatives received the same amount in Minnesota that they received in their last state of residence. Clearly, of these four respondents, none were penalized and two were rewarded under section 256D.065 for exercising their right to travel to Minnesota.
Although the United States Supreme Court found that a 1-year residency requirement prior to receiving non-emergency care infringed upon the right to travel and was therefore unconstitutional in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), that case is distinguishable. Unlike Memorial Hospital, the respondents do not have to wait one year before receiving any benefits under section 256D.065; grants, albeit at a reduced level, are received immediately if the person is eligible. The court stated that medical care is a basic necessity of life that could not be denied to newcomers in Memorial Hospital; although food and shelter are also basic necessities, the Supreme Court has never imposed a duty upon the states to provide a standard of living for its residents, nor established a right for anyone to receive welfare assistance. See, Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 1010, 1015 n. 9, 47 L.Ed.2d 249 (1976) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)).
There is language in some United States Supreme Court cases which might be read to dictate that the right to travel is implicated whenever a state treats a new resident differently than longer term residents.
[T]he right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same right to vital government benefits and privileges in the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents.
Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 261, 94 S.Ct. at 1084. This statement seems to suggest that the right to travel can be implicated not only if a migrant is treated less favorably in the new state of residence than in the previous state of residence, but also if, within the new state, the newcomer is treated less favorably than other residents. In another case the Court says
the right to migrate protects residents of a State from being disadvantaged, or from being treated differently, simply because of the timing of their migration, from other similarly situated residents.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904, 106 S.Ct. at 2322.2
And then again the Court said
[t]he State may not favor established residents over new residents based on the view that the State may take care of ‘its own,’ if such is defined by prior residence.
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623, 105 S.Ct. 2862, 2868, 86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985).
The use of this language has blurred the distinction between equal protection and the right to travel. However, these are separate challenges which must be analyzed on their own merits. I do not believe that the Court intends to conclude that the right to travel is implicated every time an equal protection challenge is presented. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982). This would open a floodgate of appeals requiring strict scrutiny. Surely the Court does not intend to re-enter the Lochner era.3
*206The right to travel is not implicated by this 1991 amendment because there has been no showing of actual deterrence or that the legislative intent in enacting the 1991 amendment was to deter travel. When determining whether a person is penalized for exercising their right to travel, the appropriate focus is not whether the person is treated differently than longer term residents, but whether the benefits the person is eligible for are less than those received, if any, in their last state of residence. I doubt a person contemplating migration would study the classifications in a state statutory scheme and then “hesitate” to migrate. A person might look at the resources presently available and compare them to what will be available after migration: If he or she would have the same or more resources than at the present, no hesitation would be induced by the 1991 amendment. Unlike the “hesitation” in Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, newly arrived indigents do have the possibility of “falling back on state welfare assistance.”
This is not, as the majority claims, a comparison of indigents newly arrived in Minnesota with indigents in other states, or an attempt to evaluate the cost of living in various states as the California court seems to require in Green v. Anderson, 811 F.Supp. 516 (E.D.Calif.1993). It merely looks at the status of an indigent person’s economic resources immediately before and after the move to Minnesota to determine if that person has been penalized by the 1991 amendment for exercising their right to travel. If an indigent has the same grant both before and after their move to Minnesota, the loss, disadvantage or hardship suffered, if any, is due to the higher cost of living in Minnesota, not because her or his grant level is temporarily lower than that available to longer term residents.
Even if the exercise of the right to travel were implicated, “[N]ot every penalty on interstate travel triggers the compelling-state-interest test.” See Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 192, 210 N.W.2d 221, 225 (1973); see also Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 905, n. 5, 106 S.Ct. at 2322, n. 5. In Davis we held that a 1-year residency requirement before divorce proceedings was constitutional. Davis, supra, at 227. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). In another case, a statute with a 1-year residency requirement for resident tuition at a state university was upheld. Starns, 326 F.Supp. 234; see also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 2236, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F.Supp. 38 (W.D.Wash.1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1057, 94 S.Ct. 563, 38 L.Ed.2d 464 (1973).
Discussing Shapiro, the court in Memorial Hospital said that “any durational residence requirement impinges to some extent on the right to travel” but that “[t]he amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state-interest test was not made clear.” Memorial Hospital 415 U.S. at 256-57, 94 S.Ct. at 1081. The Court said the factors to consider were whether the waiting period deters migration and the extent to which the residence requirement penalized the right to travel. Id. at 257, 94 S.Ct. at 1080. Since there is neither deterrence nor penalty by the 1991 amendment, strict scrutiny is not required even if it “impinges to some extent on the right to travel.”
The cases in which the Court has overturned statutes on right to travel grounds have either involved waiting periods for longer than 6 months or a complete denial of benefits, usually for 1 year. See Shapiro, supra; Memorial Hospital, supra. The 1991 amendment is not that harsh. The residency requirement is for only six months and benefits are not withheld if applicants are otherwise eligible.
The other cases in which the Court has struck down statutes on right to travel grounds involve situations where the classifications created are permanent and the treatment of the classes never equalizes. See Zobel, supra; Soto-Lopez, supra. Our legislature has not created this type of permanently unequal system in which new residents will never “catch up” with longer term residents; benefits equalize after 6 months.
*207Since the respondents have failed to prove that the 1991 amendment implicates the right to travel by any of the means indicated in Soto-Lopez, strict scrutiny is not appropriate. Minn.Stat. § 256D.065 need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose to survive constitutional review. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618, 105 S.Ct. 2862, 2866, 86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1405, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972).
The state has a legitimate purpose to be fiscally responsible and to conserve limited funds. The projected savings of $890,000 in the first fiscal year, and $1 million or more in successive years is directly and rationally related to this purpose. The legislature could have terminated the entire general assistance/work readiness programs, as Michigan has recently done, but instead chose to preserve these grants and maximize the limited welfare resources available. Similarly, we upheld a statutory scheme under which $100 in “gate-pay” was made available to prisoners upon their release from prison, unless they had more than $100 set aside from their work earnings. Thomale v. Schoen, 309 Minn. 285, 244 N.W.2d 51 (1976). We reasoned that the legislature ensured a “greater gratuity than it would have otherwise been able to give if it had provided a flat payment to all parolees regardless of the amount accumulated in their funds.” Id., 309 Minn. at 288, 244 N.W.2d at 53.
Since I conclude that Minn.Stat. § 256D.065 does not implicate the right to travel and survives constitutional scrutiny, I must consider the remaining two questions presented.
The Equal Protection Clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that persons similarly situated be treated alike unless a rational basis exists for discriminating among them. However, the state is not required to treat all citizens identically, rather
[the state] must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982).
Here the respondents’ claim does not involve either a suspect classification, as identified by the United States Supreme Court, nor does it implicate a fundamental right.4 The standard of review to be used when measuring classifications created by a public welfare benefit statute against an equal protection claim was established in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972), and Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153. In Jefferson, the United States Supreme Court used the minimum scrutiny of the rational basis test when it upheld a Texas statute which established a percentage reduction factor to be applied to apportion available welfare benefits among various recipients. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 546, 92 S.Ct. at 1731.
The rational basis analysis is the same as that used in my determination that the right to travel is not implicated. The state has a legitimate purpose in being fiscally responsible, and 256D.065 is rationally related to that purpose.
This is not like the statute in Zobel v. Williams, supra. In Zobel, the United States Supreme Court held that the creation of a fund to pay dividends from oil reserves in different amounts depending on length of residence was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Id. 457 U.S. at 65, 102 S.Ct. at 2315. In Zobel, the classifications were permanent and the dividends were derived from a natural resource and *208were a continuing, permanent entitlement, guaranteed by constitutional amendment. Id. at 56-57, 102 S.Ct. at 2310-11. On the contrary, these general assistance/work readiness benefits involved are not a constitutional right and the classification involved is only temporary.
I am aware of two other states which have considered the constitutionality of somewhat similar statutes. In Opinion of the Justice to the House of Representatives, 357 Mass. 827, 257 N.E.2d 94 (1970), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts gave its opinion on a bill pending before the Massachusetts House of Representatives which would have limited welfare benefits for 2 years to the amount the new resident had received in the state of the person’s last domicile. Id. 257 N.E.2d at 94. The court concluded that if the sole purpose of the proposed bill was to deter the migration of indigent people, it would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 95.
In Jones v. Milwaukee County, 168 Wis.2d 892, 485 N.W.2d 21, 22 (Wis.1992), the statute involved required persons to be residents of the state for at least 60 consecutive days before they would be eligible for any welfare relief.5 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found it to be constitutional under both the state and federal constitutions. Id. 485 N.W.2d at 22. The court relied upon Dandridge, which held that the state could place a ceiling on welfare benefits to encourage employment and avoid discrimination between welfare families and families of the working poor. Id. at 27.
Minn.Stat. § 256D.065 falls between these two examples. The 6-month residency requirement is far less than the 2 years proposed in Massachusetts, but more than the 60 days involved in the Wisconsin statute. However, in Wisconsin, all aid is withheld for 60 days, whereas in Minnesota reduced benefits are granted during the 6 months.
I conclude the statute passes the minimal scrutiny of the federal rational basis test and therefore does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. In doing so I agree with the Dandridge Court, which wrote:
We do not decide today that the * * * regulation is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives * * *, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised. * * * But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court. The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards * * *. But the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487, 90 S.Ct. at 1162.
Plaintiff-respondents further assert, and the court of appeals agreed, that the six-month residency requirement for full general assistance benefits violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. The court of appeals was of the view that our recent case, State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Minn.1991), created an equal protection standard “which is different and more stringent than its federal counterpart,” and that, under this Russell standard, the 1991 amendment must be found unconstitutional. Mitchell, 487 N.W.2d at 904.
Our case law on state equal protection analysis has not always been characterized by doctrinal constancy, and this case seems an appropriate occasion to review briefly and to clarify that analysis. Our equal protection “clause” is an un-enumerated but inherent constitutional right, found and confirmed in Minn. Const, art. 1, § 16 and included in art. 1, § 2. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 893 (Simonett, J., concurring). Under this equality guaranty, “persons similarly situated are to be treated alike unless a sufficient basis exists for distinguishing among them.” Id.
*209As the concurring opinion in Russell points out, over the years our state equal protection approach has at times been intertwined with our constitutional prohibition against special legislation (art. 12, § 1), our state provision for uniformity in taxation (art. 10, § 1), and the federal equal protection analysis. Id. at 893-94. See, for example, Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn.1979). Miller cites Montgomery Ward Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 216 Minn. 307, 12 N.W.2d 625 (1943), which relies on the federal rational basis test, but then also cites Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318 (1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 803, 94 5.Ct. 130, 38 L.Ed.2d 39 (1973) for what has come to be called the “three part test.” Miller, supra at 356. See footnote 5, infra. This “three part test” can be traced back to Loew v. Hagerle Brothers, 226 Minn. 485, 33 N.W.2d 598 (1948), and even beyond; interestingly, Loew was really a special legislation challenge, not an equal protection case. It is this “three part test,” at times slightly reworded, which appears eventually in Russell. Consequently, it is not surprising that the question has been raised whether the state’s “rational basis” test is more strict than the federal rational basis test. See, e.g., McKnight, Minnesota Rational Relation Test: The Lochner Monster in the 10,000 Lakes, 10 Wm.Mitchell L.Rev. 709 (1984); Haskell’s, Inc. v. Sopsic, 313 N.W.2d 921 (1981).
In 1983 we attempted to clarify our equal protection test in AFSCME Councils 6, H, 65 and 96 v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560 (Minn.1983). There we upheld the constitutionality of legislation requiring state employees to make additional payments into a pension fund. The case lent itself to the federal rational basis test. We also upheld the legislation, however, under our state equal protection guaranty and stated:
We therefore reiterate that the prohibitions against arbitrary legislative action embodied in the state equal protection clause * * * are coextensive with those afforded by the federal equal protection clause.
Id. at 570 n. 12. We added:
We have recognized that the standard applied to claims brought under the state equal protection clause * * * is the same as that applied to claims brought under the federal equal protection clause.
Id. at 569 n. 11 (emphasis added). Yet, notwithstanding Sundquist, we again raised, but did not answer, the question whether our state rational basis test was more strict than the federal test in Bernthal v. City of St. Paul, 376 N.W.2d 422, 424-25 (Minn.1985).
This brings us, then, to State v. Russell, supra, where this court applied the “three part test,”6 stating it was “our stricter standard of rational basis review,” and then held unconstitutional a statute that would have survived the federal rational basis test. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889. The particular facts of Russell, however, must be kept in mind. There the state criminal statute made both possession of three or more grams of crack cocaine and possession of ten or more grams of cocaine powder the same third degree offense. The statute was found to have a disparate impact upon African-Americans because crack cocaine was used primarily by blacks while cocaine powder was used primarily by whites. Although the statute was neutral on its face and there was no evidence of any discriminatory purpose, we held that the disparate impact on a suspect class required more than minimal rational basis *210scrutiny. The irony of the statute, we noted, was that “the challenged classification appears to impose a substantially disproportionate burden on the very class of persons whose history inspired the principles of equal protection.” Id. at 889. As Justice Simonett’s concurrence pointed out, the court's analysis was something less than federal “strict scrutiny” and something more than federal “rational basis”; and that this mid-level equal protection scrutiny was appropriate “to preserve a proper regard for the civil liberties of this state’s people while at the same time according the legislative branch the deference which the separation of powers doctrine requires.” Id. at 894.
Equal protection methodology is designed in large part to expand or contract the degree of deference to be accorded the legislative judgment when it creates classes treating persons within and without the class differently. For this purpose, federal equal protection analysis has three “levels” of scrutiny: First is the level of least deference called strict scrutiny for cases implicating fundamental rights or involving suspect classes, where there must be a necessary relation to a compelling government interest and the legislation must be narrowly drawn. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966). Next is a mid-level of intermediate scrutiny for cases involving semi-suspect classes, where there must be shown a substantial relationship to an important government interest. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). Finally, there is the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test for all remaining classes, where all that is required is a rational relation to a legitimate government interest. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972).
What emerges, I think, from our cases and what best reconciles them, is an analysis which places the Russell three part test within the mid-level of scrutiny. In Russell, the facial neutrality of the statute was compromised by the substantial, although inadvertent, disparate impact on a particular racial group; this special situation fits best within an intermediate or mid-level degree of scrutiny. Consequently, I would adopt the following analytical framework for our state constitution’s equal protection analysis. First, strict scrutiny requiring a necessary relation to a compelling state interest should apply when a fundamental right is implicated or if the legislation involves a suspect class. Next, mid-level scrutiny should apply for semi-suspect classes and for legislation which is neutral on its face but which has a disparate impact upon a suspect class. The test for mid-level scrutiny should be the Russell “three part” test. See footnote 5, infra. Finally, for remaining classifications, the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test should apply, requiring a rational or reasonable relation to achieving a legitimate state interest. See AFSCME, 338 N.W.2d at 569.
The “three part test” should be reserved for mid-level scrutiny. A separate minimal level of scrutiny would remain, measured by the traditional rational basis analysis. Actually, this approach has been implicit in the equal protection cases we have decided since Russell, where we have declined to apply the three part Russell test and have instead used minimal rational basis scrutiny. See Clabo v. Bor-Son Constr. Co., 481 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Minn.1992) (use of construction industry weekly wage to determine benefits); Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 423 (Minn.1992) (challenge to statutory ballot form and designation of incumbency). See also John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 497 N.W.2d 250 (Minn.1993) (federal rational basis test used to determine constitutionality of income tax treatment of insurance premium).
I turn now to this case. The statute involved is economic legislation, concerning the allocation of the state’s financial resources to a social welfare program. No fundamental right is implicated nor is a suspect class or semi-suspect class involved. Consequently, I apply the rational *211basis test. The legislation will not be set aside if any set of facts may reasonably be conceived to justify the classification. See, e.g., AFSCME, supra; Thomale, 309 Minn. at 288, 244 N.W.2d at 53. Here the state has a legitimate purpose in safeguarding its financial integrity: The classification on the basis of residency with adjusted benefit levels is rationally related to that purpose. I would hold that Minn.Stat. § 256D.065 (1992) does not violate the equal protection guaranty of our state constitution.

. Many states provide general assistance at an amount less than Minnesota, and many states provide no general assistance whatsoever.

. But in note 5 the same court says that not all waiting periods are constitutionally impermissible.

. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905) lends its name to a period of time for which the Supreme Court has been severely criticized for conducting substantive due process review to invalidate laws that did not involve personal liberties.

. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that there is no constitutional right to welfare benefits, and that states have wide latitude in setting welfare benefits. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 480, 90 S.Ct. at 1159; Lavine, 424 U.S. at 584, n. 9, 96 S.Ct. at 1015, n. 9.

. Several exceptions were provided for by the statute. Id. 485 N.W.2d at 23-24.

. The "three part test” as given in Russell is:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy; and (3) the purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.
State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn.1991), (quoting Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn.1981), which, in turn, quotes Guilliams v. Comm’r of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Minn.1980)).