Court Opinion

ID: 9815716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 02:21:02.102966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:19.973744
License: Public Domain

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
No. 3426. Decided Dec. 22, 1941.
BY THE COURT:
The above-entitled cause is now being determined on appellants’ application for rehearing. The reasons for the application are set forth in three separate specifications. We will take these up in order:
“1. It does not appear from the opinion that the Court has passed upon the vital question involved, namely, may a court after the end of the term in which the judgment is rendered by a nunc pro tunc entry substitute another and a different judgment for the one rendered without giving the party in whose favor the judgment was entered notice of its intention to do so?”
Reason No. 1 seems to request our judgment on an abstract proposition and beyond the factual situation of the case being determined. It is a general rule that courts strive to confine themselves to the facts and issues under consideration rather than to branch out on imaginary situations.
It is always better to take these' latter situations up when they arise. We are unable to find that in the motion filed June 23, 1941, by defendants any claim was made of failure to give notice. Plaintiff’s application, under date of June 25, provided for notice. The journalized entry, under date of August 30, 1941, contains a recital that at the time of the hearing and determination of the application for a nunc pro tunc order, counsel for the defendants were present in court, but declined to participate in said hearing.
We think that the original opinion sufficiently covers the situation as presented under the record, and that the trial court had the authority and jurisdiction to make a nunc, pro tunc order.
Reason No. 2 is as follows:
“2. Is such a judgment if entered without service and without notice and v/ithout hearing void or voidable?”
What has been said relative to Reason No. 1 applies to this specification.
Specification No. 3 reads as follows:
“3. If a court may without notice and without a hearing at any time after a judgment has been ■ rendered by nunc pro tunc order change the judgment to one different from that which it entered, then does the 20 day statute apply for notice of appeal, for if that be a fact everyone with an unsatisfied judgment would be compelled to *20search the records of the court every 20 days to see if their judgment has been changed without their knowledge during that period of time.”
This reason again starts out with the proposition that the Court acted without notice and without a hearing, and that the nunc pro tunc order changed the judgment to'one different from that which was originally entered.
We did not at all consider the question on the theory that notice was not given on plaintiff’s application for a nunc pro tunc order. We had no reason to understand that this question was in the case, for the reason that defendants-appellants did not raise it. Furthermore, we observed that the order provided for notice and it also appeared from the court’s entry ’that counsel for the defendants were present in court. We did not pass on the question as to whether or not the nunc pro tunc judgment differed in substance from the' original judgment, but specifically pointed out that if there was a modified judgment which materially affected the rights of defendants, that their remedy would be on appeal from the date of the nunc pro tunc order. We likewise pointed out that there was a difference in procedure as to applications for nunc pro tunc orders and applications for setting aside judgments. The power of a court as to a nunc pro tunc entry is very broad. In the original opinion we referred to Ohio Jurisprudence, Vol. 23 (Judgments), §256, p. 678 and following. We think a careful reading of the text under the pertinent section of Ohio Jurisprudence, together with the cases cited in the notes, will adequately answer any confusion in counsel’s mind as to the proper procedure.
The application for rehearing will be denied.
GEIGER, PJ„ BARNES & HORNBECK, • JJ., concur.