Court Opinion

ID: 9400888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 17:11:14.938179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:48.670786
License: Public Domain

J-S13029-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                :
                v.                              :
                                                :
                                                :
    WARREN S. EVANS                             :
                                                :
                       Appellant                :   No. 1429 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 27, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0014523-2011

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                   FILED JUNE 9, 2023

        Warren S. Evans (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. Appellant’s appointed counsel, Gary S. Server, Esquire (PCRA

Counsel), has moved to withdraw.               We grant PCRA Counsel’s motion to

withdraw and affirm the PCRA court’s order.

        In August 2012, a jury found Appellant guilty of involuntary deviate

sexual intercourse with a child (IDSI with a child), endangering the welfare of

children, and corruption of minors.1 On December 19, 2013, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 6½ – 13 years of incarceration. The

court also found Appellant met the requirements for classification as a sexually
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b), 4304(a), 6301(a)(1).
J-S13029-23

violent predator (SVP), and required him to register for his lifetime as a sex

offender.   Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied by

operation of law. Appellant timely appealed.

      Thereafter:

             On December 3, 2014, the Superior Court upheld
      [Appellant’s] conviction, but remanded the matter for re-
      sentencing[,] as [Appellant] was sentenced for IDSI forcible
      compulsion, [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(1),] not IDSI with a child ….
      [Commonwealth v. Evans, 135 A.3d 649 (Pa. Super. 2015)
      (unpublished memorandum).] [Appellant] filed a pro se petition
      for [allowance of appeal] to the Supreme Court Pennsylvania. The
      Supreme     Court    of   Pennsylvania   denied   the   petition.
      [Commonwealth v. Evans, 145 A.3d 162 (Pa. 2016).]

            On January 9, 2016, [Appellant] filed a pro se Writ of
      Habeas Corpus, claiming that he was being held unconstitutionally
      because he had not received a docket report with the Superior
      Court’s Order and Opinion from his December 13, 2016 appeal,
      and thus had not been given notice that his conviction had been
      remanded.

             On February 6, 2017, [Appellant] filed a timely pro se PCRA
      petition. On June 23, 2017[,] the [c]ourt resentenced [Appellant]
      upon remand from the Superior Court.              [Appellant] was
      resentenced to six and a half (6½) to thirteen (13) [years in
      prison] for IDSI with a child … rather than IDSI forcible
      compulsion.

            Following this resentencing, [Appellant] filed a pro se
      supplemental PCRA petition on February 13, 2018. On March 18,
      2018, with assistance of his counsel, Peter Alan Levin, Esquire,
      [Appellant] filed an amended PCRA petition on March 18, 2018.

             On May 24, 2018 and June 4, 2018, [Appellant], through his
      counsel, filed copies of a second supplemental amended PCRA
      petition.    On April 22, 2019, [Appellant] filed a pro se
      supplemental amended PCRA.

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PCRA Court Opinion, 11/21/22, at 1-2 (unnumbered) (some capitalization

altered).

      On February 19, 2019, Appellant petitioned the PCRA court for leave to

proceed pro se, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa.

1998).      The PCRA court held a Grazier hearing on October 2, 2020, and

granted Appellant permission to proceed pro se.

      Appellant filed a pro se amended PCRA petition on November 10, 2020.

The Commonwealth filed a motion in opposition on March 18, 2021.            On

February 8, 2022, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its intention to dismiss

the petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.        The court

concluded all of Appellant’s claims were meritless, and stated:

      [Appellant claims his] constitutional rights were violated when he
      was required to submit to Megan’s Law [lifetime sex offender
      reporting] requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and
      Notification Act (“SORNA”)[, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10—9799.42.]
      This argument has no merit due to the Pennsylvania Supreme
      Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602
      (Pa. 2020). In Lacombe, the Court held that the retroactive
      application of SORNA’s Subchapter I does not violate the ex post
      facto laws of the U.S. Constitution and is non-punitive. Id. Here,
      [Appellant’s] SORNA conditions are within the scope of
      Subchapter I. [Appellant] was convicted on August 31, 2012,
      which places him within the scope of retroactive application of
      Subchapter I, enacted by the Pennsylvania Legislature.
      Therefore, under Lacombe, [Appellant’s] retroactive sex offender
      registration under SORNA Subchapter I does not violate ex post
      facto laws.

Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 2/8/22, at 10 (unnumbered) (paragraph breaks

and numbering omitted). Appellant filed a pro se response on March 25, 2022.

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       The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on April 27, 2022.

That same day, the court appointed PCRA Counsel for Appellant. Appellant

timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellant and the PCRA court have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On January 29, 2023, PCRA Counsel filed in this Court a brief and

separate motion to withdraw as counsel, pursuant to Commonwealth v.

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d

213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).2 Appellant filed a motion in opposition to

the Turner/Finley Brief and motion to withdraw on March 24, 2023. Motion

in Opposition, 3/24/23, ¶ 2 (“[PCRA] Counsel … did not make a thorough and

conscientious examination”), and id. ¶ 3 (“[PCRA] Counsel cannot possibly

believe the [a]ppeal in its present procedu[r]al posture is wholly frivolous,

without merit, supporting law or facts.”).

       Appellant presents two issues for our review:

       [1.] Whether the sentence imposed upon the Appellant is illegal,
       null and void where there are conditions of submitting to lifelong
       Megan’s [L]aw requirements pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. Section
____________________________________________

2 PCRA Counsel’s Turner/Finley Brief also references Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), and its progeny. See Turner/Finley Brief at 12-14.
The procedure set forth in Anders is not appropriate for withdrawing from
PCRA representation. See Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940,
947 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Anders briefs are procedurally inappropriate in PCRA
appeals). However, PCRA Counsel correctly observes that in Commonwealth
v. Fusselman, 866 A.2d 1109, 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004), we held:
“[B]ecause an Anders brief provides greater protection to the defendant, we
may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter.” Turner/Finley
Brief at 13; see also Karanicolas, 836 A.2d at 947 (stating that substantial
compliance with requirements to withdraw will satisfy Turner/Finley criteria).

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        9795.1 et seq.[,] where the Appellant was designated as a
        Sexually Violent Predator pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. section 9795.4
        on 12/19/13[,] following the 8/31/12 conviction under Megan’s
        Law III and 18 Pa.C.S. Section 4915 that was thereafter declared
        unconstitutional on 12/16/13 as a violation of Pa.Const. Art. 3
        Sec. 1 pursuant to Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 [A.]3d 603
        ([P]a. 2013[),] which occurred before the Appellant’s final
        judgment of sentence on 12/19/13[,] as the lower court lacked
        the authority to impose an illegal sentence under Megan’s Law III
        because it no longer existed and was stricken as unconstitutional
        by the time that the Appellant was actually sentenced?

        [2.] Whether the PCRA court erred and abused its discretion where
        it denied the Appellant’s request for collateral relief when the
        sentence imposed was illegal and violated the Appellant’s due
        process and other constitutional protections when the court lacked
        the authority to sentence the Appellant and impose lifelong
        reporting conditions on 12/19/13[,] following the Appellant’s
        August 2012 conviction under Megan’s Law III where it was
        declared to be unconstitutional on 12/16/13 pursuant to the
        holding of Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.[3]d 603 (Pa.
        2013)?

Turner/Finley Brief at 6.3

        We first address whether PCRA Counsel has satisfied the requirements

of Turner/Finley in petitioning to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Knecht,

219 A.3d 689, 691 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“When presented with a brief pursuant

to Turner/Finley, we first determine whether the brief meets the procedural

requirements of Turner/Finley.”). This Court has explained:

        A Turner/Finley brief must: (1) detail the nature and extent of
        counsel’s review of the case; (2) list each issue the petitioner
        wishes to have reviewed; and (3) explain counsel’s reasoning for
        concluding that the petitioner’s issues are meritless.
        Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009)
        [(overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Bradley,
____________________________________________

3   Appellant argues his issues together. See Turner/Finley Brief at 13-18.

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     261 A.3d 381, 401 (Pa. 2021) (“we now … abandon Pitts’s …
     approach as the sole procedure for challenging PCRA counsel’s
     effectiveness”) (italics added))]. Counsel must also send a copy
     of the brief to the petitioner, along with a copy of the petition to
     withdraw, and inform the petitioner of the right to proceed pro se
     or to retain new counsel. [Commonwealth v.] Wrecks, 931
     A.2d [717,] 721 [(Pa. Super. 2007)]. If the brief meets these
     requirements, we then conduct an independent review of the
     petitioner’s issues. Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509,
     511 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Knecht, 219 A.3d at 691 (citations modified).

     Our review discloses that PCRA Counsel has complied with the above

requirements.    See Karanicolas, 836 A.2d at 947.            PCRA Counsel’s

Turner/Finley brief (1) sets forth the issues Appellant wants this Court to

review; (2) states PCRA Counsel has conducted a conscientious examination

of the record; (3) determines there are no non-frivolous arguments to support

Appellant’s claims; and (4) explains why Appellant’s claims lack merit. See

Turner/Finley Brief at 13-19. Additionally, PCRA Counsel mailed to Appellant

correspondence informing him of PCRA Counsel’s intention to withdraw from

representation and advising Appellant of his rights, in compliance with

Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607, 614 (Pa. Super. 2006).                See

Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 1/29/23, attachment. As PCRA Counsel has

complied with Turner/Finley, we independently review Appellant’s issues.

     Our standard of review is limited to “whether the PCRA court’s findings

of fact are supported by the record, and whether its conclusions of law are

free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa.

2020).

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     Appellant argues the PCRA court erred in rejecting his claim that his

lifetime sex offender reporting requirement is illegal, because “SORNA

imposes upon him a punitive and unconstitutional ex post facto law….”

Turner/Finley Brief at 16. Appellant “primarily relies upon Commonwealth

v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013)….” Turner/Finley Brief at 16 (some

capitalization altered); see also Neiman, 84 A.3d at 613 (holding that

provisions of Megan’s Law III violated the single subject rule of Article III,

Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).

     Appellant’s claim presents a question of law. Therefore, “our standard

of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth

v. Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440, 456 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (citation

omitted).

     Pertinently, the PCRA court explained:

               The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted Megan’s Law
     III on November 24, 2004. Commonwealth v. Stanley, 259
     A.3d 989, 990 n.2 (Pa. Super. [] 2021). Although the Supreme
     Court of Pennsylvania ruled Megan’s Law III to be unconstitutional
     under Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, by
     the time the law had been struck down, the Pennsylvania General
     Assembly had replaced Megan’s Law III with … SORNA[] in order
     bring the Commonwealth into compliance with the Federal Adam
     Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.                See
     Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013) (striking
     down Megan’s Law III); Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d
     602, 608-09 (Pa. 2020) (providing details about the [o]riginal
     SORNA statute); Stanley, 295 A.3d at 990 n.2 (explaining the
     legislative timeline).

              The Supreme Court [of] Pennsylvania held that provisions
     in the original iteration of SORNA, which retroactively applied to
     defendants convicted before SORNA’s effective date, constituted

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     punishment and violated both the Federal and State ex post facto
     clauses. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1193 (Pa.
     2017) [(superseded by statute as stated in Commonwealth v.
     Lippincott, 273 A.3d 1157, 1162 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc))].
     In response to Muniz and the Superior Court’s ruling in
     Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017),
     which invalidated SORNA’s mechanism for determining … SVP[]
     status, the General Assembly enacted Subchapter I, which
     becomes the “operative version of SORNA for those sexual
     offenders whose crimes occurred between April 22, 1996 and
     December 20, 2012.” Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 616; see also 42
     Pa.[C.S.A.] § 9799.51 (2018); Stanley, 295 A.3d at 991 n.4 (“To
     address ex post facto concerns, the amendment separates the
     provisions into distinct subchapters— Subchapter H, for offenders
     whose underlying conduct occurred on or after December 20,
     2012, SORNA’s effective date, and Subchapter I, for offenders
     required to register under former versions of Megan’s Law.”).
     Among the provisions of the enacted Subchapter I is that
     offenders convicted of one of the triggering offenses must register
     either for a period of ten years or for life. 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] §
     9799.55(a)-(b) (2018). Offenders who are convicted of certain
     crimes, including IDSI, are subject to lifetime registration under
     Subchapter I. [Id.] § 9799.55(b) (2018).

             Here, [Appellant] is subject to the provisions of
     Subchapter I, including lifetime registration, because he was
     convicted of IDSI with a child … on August 31, 2012, which is after
     April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012.            See 42
     Pa.[C.S.A.] §§ 9799.52, 9799.55 (2018).

              In … Lacombe, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
     addressed whether Subchapter I of SORNA, as retroactively
     applied to those convicted prior to its effective date, constituted a
     punitive and unconstitutional ex post facto law. Lacombe, 234
     A.3d at 605-06. The Court concluded that the provisions of
     Subchapter I explicitly do not constitute criminal
     punishment and are not unconstitutional as ex post facto
     laws. Id. at 626-27.

             Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lacombe,
     [Appellant’s] retroactive lifetime sex offender registration
     under SORNA Subchapter I does not violate the prohibition
     against ex post facto laws. See id.; see also 42 Pa.[C.S.A.]

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      §§ 9799.52, 9799.55 (2018). Therefore, the sentence [the trial]
      court imposed was proper.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/21/22, at 4-5 (unnumbered) (emphasis added; some

capitalization altered). The PCRA court’s reasoning is supported by the record

and the law. Contrary to Appellant’s claim, his lifetime sex offender reporting

requirement is lawful. See Lacombe, supra.

      Based on the foregoing, we grant PCRA Counsel’s motion to withdraw

from representation and affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition.

      Motion to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2023

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