Court Opinion

ID: 9551000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:46:29.641249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:52.311663
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE SHEEHY
dissenting.
Some of the facts in the majority opinion need supplementing. Katherine T. Brady, the owner of the real property involved, signed listing contract with Dickson-Thomas Realty in Missoula, *450wherein she employed the agency as her broker to sell the real property for a price of $32,500.00 plus the real estate commission. Dickson-Thomas procured as buyers, Ray L. Ingalls and Cecil R. Hines (Ingalls testified that he was also a real estate broker) under a sell-purchase agreement dated September 16, 1976. Neither Katherine Brady, who was the owner of the property, nor her husband signed the sell-purchase agreement. Instead, by telegram, she notified Dickson-Thomas Realty that she accepted the offer from “Dickson-Thomas” for $32,500, with $7,000.00 down for her property.
Thereafter, the buyers procured a preliminary title insurance policy, assured themselves of the title that Mrs. Brady was able to deliver and had their lawyers draw up a contract for deed, and notice of purchasers interest which were sent to sellers by their attorney H. J. Pinsoneault. The contract for deed, drawn by buyers’ lawyers, provided for a $7,000.00 down payment consisting of the $100.00 previously paid as ernest money, and the “further sum of $6,900.00 cash paid upon execution of this agreement”.
Mrs. Brady came to Missoula for the purpose of closing the contract. When she arrived there, she discovered that her real estate brokers were claiming a broker’s fee out of the $32,500, although her listing agreement had provided that the commission would be in addition to that purchase price. This dispute was not resolved until the day of the proposed closing, and even on that day, the real estate agency had instructed the closing agent that the agency would retain the $100.00 paid as ernest money for “costs” incurred in handling the transaction.
The closing date was arranged for 11:00 a.m. on October 22, 1976. On the day before, Ingalls came to the office of H. J. Pinsoneault, and there picked up the signed contract, deed, and notice, and took them over to the office of American Land Title Company in Missoula where the closing of the transaction was to take place. At 11:00 a.m. on October 22, Mrs. Brady and her attorney appeared at the title company office. Neither Ingalls nor Hines appeared at that time. It was stated that Hines was unable to appear *451because he had a doctor’s appointment. Ingalls testified that although he had signed the sell-purchase agreement for himself and on behalf of Hines, that it was necessary that Hines be present at the closing transaction. In other words, Ingalls was not empowered to act for Hines at the time of closing.
When neither Ingalls nor Hines appeared at 11:00 a.m; Mrs. Brady picked up her contract, deed and notice, and removed them from the title company office. That afternoon, Pinsoneault received a telephone call from Ingalls that the buyers would not be able to get a cashier’s check for the down payment that afternoon.
Wanda Young, the employer of the title company who was to handle the closing transaction, testified thát she would not disburse funds on the part of American Land Title Company to Mrs. Brady unless the title company had received either cash from Ingalls and Hines or a cashier’s check. Ingalls testified that it was not his understanding that cash would be paid to Mrs. Brady at the time of closing, although in fact his contract, drawn by his attorney, had read that the final part of the down payment was to be in cash, paid upon the execution of the agreements. At no time afterwards did either Ingalls or Hines tender to the seller the amount of money in cash necessary to complete the $7,000.00 down payment on the proposed contract.
Ingalls and Hines brought an action for specific performance against Katherine T. Brady. The district judge dismissed the action and entered judgment in favor of Mrs. Brady on the following grounds: (l)that mutuality did not exist because Ingalls had not signed the sell-purchase agreement; (2) that although Wanda Young, had instructed Ingalls and Hines to bring a cashier’s check to the closing because Mrs. Brady wanted to take the money back with her to New Mexico, plaintiffs did not do so at the time of closing; (3) that the closing time for the contract had been set for 11:00 a.m. on October 22,' 1976 and that plaintiffs had failed to perform at that time. Wanda Yound had testified that she didn’t need the plaintiffs there and could have closed it without them, if she had the cash on hand; (4) Ingalls, who was available and came to the of*452fice at 2:00 p.m. elected not to do anything at that time, to make a tender; (5) that Ingalls at the time contended that until Hines was available, he could not close the transaction and make a binding agreement without the presence of Hines.
It is true that section 17-805, R.C.M. 1947, now section 27-1-417 MCA, provides that a party who has not signed a written contract for the purchase of real estate may obtain specific performance if he offers to perform on his part. We held that the bringing of an action for specific performance was such an offer in Johnson v. Elliot (1950), 123 Mont. 597, 218 P.2d 703.
However, the rest of the objections raised by the District Court in dismissing the action and entering judgment in favor of Mrs. Brady had valid and binding force. In essence, what the District Court has found and relied upon is the fact that the plaintiffs in this case failed to perform their part of the agreement. Under section 17-803, R.C.M. 1947, now section 27-1-414 MCA, no party to an obligation can be compelled specifically to perform it unless the other party thereto has performed. Under section 17-809, R.C.M. 1947, now section 27-1-416 MCA, specific performance cannot be granted in favor of a party who has not fully and thoroughly performed all the conditions precedent on his part to the obligation of the other party. It is in these particulars that plaintiff have utterly failed to comply with or perform their part of the contract. Their right to purchase under the contract depended upon their tender of cash in the approximate amount of $6,900.00. This they did not do. Therefore, they, have failed to perform their part of the contract and are not entitled to receive a deed or contract for deed from Mrs. Brady. They had already approved the title of Mrs. Brady and on October 22, 1976 the only thing remaining to be done under the contract was the payment by them of cash in return for the signed contracts, deed and notice of purchaser’s interest on the party of Mrs. Brady.
This is a case similar to Sidwell v. New Mine Sapphire Syndicate (1956), 130 Mont. 189, 197, 297 P.2d 299, where this court held that a purchaser was not entitled to specific performance if the pur*453chaser had not provided the cash necessary to complete performance before it brought the action. There the court followed the holding in McDonald v. Stewart (1953), 127 Mont. 188, 199, 259 P.2d 799, 805, where this Court held that before specific performance could be obtained by plaintiff, he must show that he had performed his part of the agreement.
In the recent case of Seifert v. Seifert (1977), 173 Mont. 492, 568 P.2d 155, this Court held that before specific performance can be granted, the party seeking the same must show that he has performed his part of the contract, and that under section 17-809, now section 27-1-416 MCA, he may not get specific performance if he has “not fully and fairly performed all conditions precedent on his part to the obligation.” There we said that a party who has not performed his part of the contract does not come into the Court with clean hands, and so cannot recover the equitable remedy of specific performance. 568 P.2d at 158.
“. . . [Generally, whenever the failure to convey land under an executory contract of sale is due solely to the refusal of the purchaser to'pay or tender the stipulated purchase price, according to the terms of his agreement, specific performance will be refused to the purchaser ...” 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific Performance § 65, p. 94.
The net result of the decision by the majority here is that for a payment by Ingalls and Hines of $100.00 to the realty agent (which sum was never received by Mrs. Brady) Ingalls and Hines are entitled to specific performance of a $32,500.00 contract.
I would affirm the District Court in toto.
Mr. Justice GENE B. DALY concurs in the foregoing dissent.