Court Opinion

ID: 9547707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:50:43.384738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:58.451409
License: Public Domain

LENT, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I concur in the opinion of the court by Justice Tanzer that Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution precludes the trial judge from barring attendance of this defendant’s counsel at the presentence interview.1 I see no reason to rest our decision upon the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; therefore, I do not join in that part of Justice Tanzer’s opinion.
The Sixth Amendment is not by its terms applicable to the states. It is applicable only so far as its protection is necessary under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to ensure that a defendant not be deprived by the state of his “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” This defendant asserts that he has a right to have counsel present by reason of the terms of the Oregon Constitution. The majority of this court agrees and will enforce that right. Where, therefore, can *321there be any cognizable claim that the state is depriving him of life, liberty or property without due process? That claim has become irrelevant because the state is affording him due process under state law. There is no need, in either logic or law, to reach his Sixth Amendment contention.
For this reason, also, the dissent’s argument that the presentence interview is not a “critical stage” in the criminal prosecution does not affect the result. That phrase refers only to the court’s discussion of the federal Sixth Amendment precedents. The right of an accused under Article I, section 11, to be heard by himself or counsel, on which the court’s decision rests, is guaranteed in “all criminal prosecutions,” not limited to “critical stages” of such prosecutions.
Linde, J., joins in this opinion.

 Because I conclude that the defendant must prevail under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, I would not consider it necessary to reach his claims concerning self-incrimination, fundamental fairness and abuse of discretion.