Court Opinion

ID: 9530441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:50.714233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:06.919524
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting) — The majority opinion states:
“When Dr. Borchardt retracted his indispensable testimony: that the exposure to aluminum paint was the most probable cause of the workman’s death, and admitted that it was not the most probable cause, he left the claimant’s case without any factual foundation. Lyle v. Department of Labor & Industries (1956), 49 Wn. (2d) 540, 304 P. (2d) 668; Sawyer v. Department of Labor & Industries (1956), 48 Wn. (2d) 761, 296 P. (2d) 706; Stampas v. Department of Labor & Industries (1951), 38 Wn. (2d) 48, 227 P. (2d) 739; Rambeau v. Department of Labor & Industries (1945), 24 Wn. (2d) 44, 163 P. (2d) 133.”
It seems to me that this demonstrates that the majority *265are weighing and evaluating the evidence. This, I think, is the function of the jury rather than this court on appeal. Inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness are matters affecting the weight and credibility thereof, and these matters are exclusively within the province of the jury. Dupea v. Seattle (1944), 20 Wn. (2d) 285, 147 P. (2d) 272, and cases cited therein. I dissent for this reason.
Rosellini, Foster, and Hunter, JJ., concur with Finley, J.
Foster, J.
(dissenting) — While I have signed Judge Finley’s dissent, I think the reasons for this view are nowhere better stated than by Mr. Justice Brennan in Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U. S. 107, 4 L. Ed. (2d) 142, 80 S. Ct. 173 (Nov., 1959).
The statement is:
“The jury’s power to draw the inference that the aggravation of petitioner’s tubercular condition, evident so shortly after the accident, was in fact caused by that accident, was not impaired by the failure of any medical witness to testify that it was in fact the cause. Neither can it be impaired by the lack of medical unanimity as to the respective likelihood of the potential causes of the aggravation, or by the fact that other potential causes of the aggravation existed and were not conclusively negated by the proofs. The matter does not turn on the use of a particular form of words by the physicians in giving their testimony. The members of the jury, not the medical witnesses, were sworn to make a legal determination of the question of causation. They were entitled to take all the circumstances, including the medical testimony, into consideration. See Sullivan v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 185 Mass. 602, 71 N. E. 90; Miami Coal Co. v. Luce, 76 Ind. App. 245, 131 N. E. 824. Though this case involves a medical issue, it is no exception to the admonition that, ‘It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take the case away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. . . . The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. . . . Courts are not free *266to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.’ Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union R. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 35. The proofs here justified with reason the conclusion of the jury that the accident caused the petitioner’s serious subsequent illness. See Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500.”
September 29, 1960. Petition for rehearing denied.