Court Opinion

ID: 9821900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 08:33:12.932307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:58.265967
License: Public Domain

COMBS, V.C.J.,
concurring specially, with whom WATT, J., joins.
{1 While I agree with the majority that the 180-day limitation provision in 85A 0.8. Supp. 2018 § 2(14) is unconstitutional as applied to. Petitioner on substantive due process grounds, I write separately to emphasize that it also amounts to a denial of equal protection under the law to Petitioner and those similarly situated, in violation of Okla. Const. art. 2, §§ 6&7.1
*108312 In Dean v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2006 OK 78, ¶ 19-22, 145 P.3d 1097, this Court considered whether special treatment of the Multiple Injury Trust fund as compared to other workers' compensation insurers violated, amongst other provisions, Okla. Const. art. 2, §§ 6 & 7. This Court explained:
[iIn testing the validity of a state statute that differentiates in its treatment of one group of individuals over other groups, a common test is applied when considering due process of law, equal protection of the laws, and special as distinguished from general laws: that is whether the classification forming the basis for the differentiation is arbitrary or capricious, and whether it bears a reasonable relation to the object to be considered.
Dean, 2006 OK 78, ¶ 19, 145 P.3d 1097.
In that cause, because of its unique status and continuing problem with timely payment of awards due to lack of funds, this Court determined treating the Multiple Injury Trust Fund different from other workers compensation insurers satisfied the above-quoted standard. Dean, 2006 OK 78, ¶ 22, 145 P.3d 1097.
18 In Gladstone v. Bartlesville Indep. School Dist. No. 30 (I-30), 2003 OK 30, 66 P.3d 442, this Court upheld a classification built into the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) that immunized the state and political subdivisions from lability for on-the-job injuries covered by worker's compensation. Describing the challenged provision, the Court stated: "[in short, while the state and political subdivisions are not lable for injuries to tort claimants who stand covered by the workers' compensation regime, they are legally accountable for the injuries to tort claimants not otherwise protected." Gladstone, 2003 OK 30, ¶ 13, 66 P.3d 442. Describing the appellant's argument, this Court noted:
[tlhe hardship Gladstone complains of is the arguable unfairness in treating governmental tort claimants who are covered by workers' compensation differently from persons without that coverage. The latter class not only may sue in tort to recover damages for the negligent acts of governmental tortfeasors but is also accorded access to collateral indemnity sources without losing the right to press a public tort claim. The critical question here is whether the classification in question rests upon a difference which bears a reasonable relationship to the goals of the GTCA.
Gladstone, 2003 OK 30, ¶ 14, 66 P.3d 442.
In Gladstone, this court determined that excluding liability under the GTCA for injuries covered by workers' compensation was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting the public fise by eliminating public liability for injuries where a collateral source of indemnity was available. 2003 OK 30, ¶ 18, 66 P.3d 442. The Court concluded: "[wle eannot say that the challenged classification so lacks rationality as to amount to a denial of equal protection." Gladstone, 2003 OK 30, ¶ 18, 66 P.3d 442.
14 The classification in the present cause, however, goes considerably further than the one this court analyzed in Gladstone. Title 85A 0.8. Supp. 2018 § 2(14) provides:
"Cumulative trauma" means an injury to an employee that is caused by the combined effect of repetitive physical activities extending over a period of time in the course and seope of employment. Cumulative trauma shall not mean fatigue, soreness or general aches and pain that may have been caused, aggravated, exacerbated or accelerated by the employee's course and seope of employment. - Cumulative trauma shall have resulted directly and independently of all other causes and the employee shall have completed at least one hundred eighty (180) days of continuous active employment with the employer;
Section 2(14) defines "cumulative trauma" in a particular manner; as an injury to an employee that is caused by the combined effect of repetitive physical activities extending over a period of time in the course and scope of employment. It then, however, adds an arbitrary minimum employment period of 180 days. Two claimants may both *1084have injuries caused by the combined effect of repetitive physical activities extending over a period of time in the course and scope of employment, but if one has 179 days of continuous active employment with the employer and the other has 180 days, the former does not have cumulative trauma.
T5 Unlike in Gladstone, where the classification operated to bar public tort liability for individuals who had a collateral source of recovery, the exclusive remedy provision of the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA), 85A 0.8. Supp. 2018 § 5 and the 180-day cutoff in 85A 0.8. Supp. 2018 § 2(14) create a classification that completely bars Petitioner and others in Petitioner's position from recovering for their injuries at all. 'In this regard, the 180-day line separating who may recover for potentially identical injuries on cumulative trauma grounds is not only arbitrary, but fundamentally unjust.
T6' Under the provisions of the AWCA, specifically 85A 0.8. Supp. 2018 § 2(14) and § 5, an entire class of injured employees that includes the Petitioner in this cause are left with no remedy at all, They are barred from recovering for cumulative trauma by 85A 0.8. Supp. 2018 § 2(14)s imposition of an arbitrary 180-day cutoff that has no. reasonable relation to the goals of the AWCA and they are barred from pursuing any tort claim by the exclusive remedy provision, 85A 0.8, Supp. 2018 § 5, This complete bar to recovery implicates the equal protection aspect of Okla. Const. art, 2, § 6 because a subset of injured workers is being denied all access to the courts to attain a remedy available to other injured workers, but denied to them. Barring both a common law tort claim and a workers' compensation claim, leaving claimants in Petitioner's position without any way to recover for their injury, is not reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing workers' compensation fraud,
T7 To facilitate workers' compensation and its objectives, what has often been called the grand (or industrial) bargain was struck: the employee gave up the right to bring a common law negligence action against the employer and in return received automatic guaranteed benefits, The employer gave up the common law defenses and received reduced exposure to liability, See Parret v. UNICCO Service Co., 2005 OK 54, ¶ 20, 127 P.3d 572. The grand bargain is not merely the starting point for an analysis to inform the court of what may or may not be legitimate state interests, but the cornerstone of the entire workers' compensation system's legitimacy. By cutting off all recovery for an infured worker, excluding them from both workers' compensation - coverage and from filing a tort claim, the Legislature has violated the grand bargain and betrayed the fundamental principles of justice that gave rise to it in the first place, _
18 I do not dispute that the State has a legitimate interest in preventing workers' compensation fraud. I also agree with the majority's substantive due process analysis. However, I feel it necessary to further emphasize the injustice that has occurred here. The complete roadblock to any recovery for Petitioner's injury is impermissibly arbitrary and not reasonably related to the purposes of the AWCA.

, As the majority correctly points out, many claims alleging violations of substantive due process also support an equal protection claim, because Okla. Const. art. 2, § 7 has an equal protection component. Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City, 1995 OK 62, ¶ 12, 901 P.2d 800, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029, 116 S.Ct 674, 133 L.Ed.2d 523 (1995). Okla. Const. art. 2, §§ 6, also contains an equal protection component. See Thayer v. *1083Phillips Petroleum Co., 1980 OK 95, ¶¶ 12-15, 613 P.2d 1041 ("The courts must be open to all on the same terms without prejudice.").