Court Opinion

ID: 9545465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:13:05.22454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:51.140277
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Justice,
dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent since it is my view that appellant was clearly intended to be included within that class of individuals who may be made parties to a wrongful death action. I believe the focus of the majority opinion as well as the appellee’s brief is wrong and that as a result both have mischaracterized appellant’s claim.
More background and facts should be supplied in addition to those presented in the majority opinion. The wrongful death action filed in the district court was brought by Frances M. Saffels, wife of decedent at the time of his death, as personal representative of the estate of Loren Harold Saffels and as guardian of the persons and estates of Heidi and Shawn Kornegay, her children by a previous marriage, and Minerva Gertrude Saffels, the appellant here. The wife, the stepchildren and the divorced wife joined together in filing the action. While the title of the action is not proper in that it should have been brought solely in the name of the personal representative on behalf of all those entitled to recovery, § 2-14-202(a), W.S.1977, 1980 Replacement, that is only a formal defect. It is obvious from the allegations that it is a wrongful death action and that the appellant here is a person claiming to be one on whose behalf the action is brought. Section 2-14-202(c), W.S.1977, 1980 Replacement.
The material in the record discloses that appellant had been married to decedent for 21 years prior to their divorce. She is 78 years of age. He was married to his surviving widow, age 43, on September 2, 1978 and his date of death was March 27, 1979, approximately seven months later. He had not adopted the minor children of his widow, on whose behalf the action was also brought.
The motion for partial summary judgment was directed only to appellant and not the stepchildren for whom the decedent had no legal obligation of support. We need make no decision in that regard, but I note this as an incongruity of appellee’s position.
Appellant, pursuant to a divorce action, was awarded alimony to be paid by the decedent Loren Harold Saffels. The award required the payment of $300 per month for *512a period of ten years. Under the decree appellant was still entitled to payments totaling $33,750 at the time of her ex-husband’s death. However, appellant acknowledges the right to alimony as far as the assets of his regular estate are concerned terminates upon the death of either party to the divorce. Warren v. Warren, Wyo., 361 P.2d 525 (1961).1 Accordingly, appellant, as a divorced wife, does not have a claim against the estate which would entitle her to creditor status.
Nevertheless, appellant has been damaged by the negligence of appellee. She has lost her right to the continuation of her alimony payments from her deceased husband. Under § 2-14-202(c), W.S.1977,1980 Replacement:
“* * * The qualifications of the person for whom recovery is sought are those which may establish to the jury an entitlement to a fair and just award of damages. No more. We cannot amend the law to add more than what is clearly said and enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions. [Citation.] The legislature, by amendment deleting any reference to the laws of distribution of a decedent’s estate, has eliminated any question of a relationship between heir-ship and entitlement to damages. Generally, when the legislature, by amendment, has deleted an express provision of a statute, the presumption is that a change was intended. [Citation.]” Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, Wyo., 541 P.2d 39, 43 (1975), 78 A.L.R.3d 1215.
Appellant, therefore, has the qualification intended by the legislature to be a party to the wrongful death action, i. e. damages.2 Her recovery of damages would not deprive the surviving wife of any damages, nor even the stepchildren in that damages to each are separately computed. We cannot deny that appellant is a “person” and that to be fair and just she has suffered a serious loss for which she should receive compensation from the tort-feasor, if fault can be established. The reason for not allowing a recovery of alimony from a deceased husband’s estate does not exist as to a defendant tort-feasor, a stranger to the marital relationship terminated by divorce.
I disagree with the majority’s position that § 2-14-202(b)3 qualifies § 2-14-202(c)4 by restricting recovery to “a husband, wife, child, father or mother.” If that had been the legislative intent, it should have said so by inserting language correlating the two subsections. It did not. Subsection (c) says, “[e]very person for whose benefit the action is brought.” It stretches credibility to even suggest that the divorced wife must seek damages “for loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort,” as inferred by the majority. That applies only to those who suffer such loss. Here, the divorced wife seeks *513only the sum certain for support she has lost with the death of her former husband. The majority has loosely rewritten the statute. We must find legislative intent in the language used, not conjecture, Mahoney v. L. L. Sheep Co., 79 Wyo. 293, 333 P.2d 712 (1958), nor should a statute be construed in such a way that one section destroys another, DeHerrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479 (1977).
We must understand that the “estate” concept that is utilized in a wrongful death action is an entirely different sort of creature than the probate estate which administers the worldly assets left by a decedent. As said in DeHerrera v. Herrera, supra:
“ * * * It must be realized that the wrongful death statutes, §§ 1-1065 and 1-1066 [§§ 2-14-201 and 2-14-202, W.S. 19775], are not part of the probate code, though provision is made for the appointment of an administrator. The designation of an administrator as a trustee is only a device to provide a party to file suit and pay over any damages collected to the beneficiaries designated by statute. The amount recovered does not become a part of the decedent’s estate and is not liable for debts of the estate or subject to estate administration. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, Wyo.1975, 541 P.2d 39, 42.”
The very design of the Wyoming wrongful death statute is to look out for those dependent upon the decedent in some special sort of a way. The legislature was warned in Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, supra, that:
“ * * * We are not prepared to say what other classifications might be included, such as collateral relatives, stepchildren or partners of a decedent but we visualize, without invitation, that imaginative and innovative claims will be made under this amended version of the wrongful death law of Wyoming.”
The legislature has not seen fit since then to narrow the scope by any language to exclude divorced wives claiming alimony ordered by court decree pursuant to § 20-2-114, W.S.1977. It appears, then, that the claim as to each “person” must be considered when raised as to whether he or she is included within the statute. It follows that appellant was a dependent of decedent and entitled to recover that which was taken from her, if appellee was negligent and his negligence caused the death.
I can agree that the purpose of the statute was to permit a remedy for those “who might naturally have expected maintenance or assistance from deceased had he lived * * 4See majority opinion, citing and quoting from 25A C.J.S. Death § 15, p. 592. I would not preclude at this time recovery by a partner or key employee and perhaps others. The statute is broad enough to include those reasonably within its sweep. A jury will wash out silly claims. There is nothing unreasonable about appellant’s claim.
Further, § 1-1-101, W.S.1977 provides that “The Code of Civil Procedure and all proceedings under it shall be liberally construed to promote its object and assist the parties in obtaining justice. * * * ” The majority opinion does not follow this mandate. It instead attempts to niggardly construe the wrongful death statutes and retrench on previous case law which never considered a wrongful death action such as this under presently existing statutes, particularly Wyoming’s. Such an approach is clearly legislative in nature, and one in which I am unwilling to join.
I would have reversed the district court and remanded for trial to include appellant’s damages.

. Dicta in Warren, in that the husband was alive and court decided award to wife was a property settlement not alimony. Anno., 39 A.L.R.2d 1406, indicates this to be the majority view.

. Alaska has a narrower statute requiring an individual to make a showing of dependency upon the decedent before being allowed as a party to a wrongful death action. However, the supreme court there ruled an ex-wife who received no alimony but irregular and voluntary sums from the decedent was a proper party to a wrongful death action. Greer Tank & Welding, Inc. v. Boettger, Alaska, 609 P.2d 548 (1980). Appellee feebly attempted to distinguish the case on the basis that in that case the payments were voluntary. However that distinction in fact indicates that the ex-wife here has a better claim.

. Section 2-14-202(b), W.S.1977, 1980 Replacement:
“(b) If the decedent left a husband, wife, child, father or mother, no debt of the decedent may be satisfied out of the proceeds of any judgment obtained in any action brought under the provisions of this section.”

. Section 2-14-202(c), W.S.1977, 1980 Replacement:
“(c) The court or jury in the action may award such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as it deems fair and just. Every person for whose benefit the action is brought may prove his respective damages and the court or jury may award the person that amount of damages to which it considers the person entitled, including damages for loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort.” (Emphasis added.)

. The physical placement of the wrongful death statutes in the “Wyoming Probate Code” does not change the concept expressed in this excerpt from DeHerrera v. Herrera, supra.