Court Opinion

ID: 9471044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:24:17.531744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:15.229905
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The record in this case presents no facts to support the majority’s contention that this case involves “much more than the mere presence of the defendant aboard a vessel carrying marijuana.” Majority opinion at 566. The majority’s summary of the facts is a list of what the government could have established at trial, rather than what was proven to the jury. Moreover, the majority characterizes a 70-foot boat traveling for four or five days as a “small boat” on a “long voyage.” Id. I find this characterization misleading, and intended to stretch the facts of this case into the already overextended test of United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551 (5th Cir.1980).
In United States v. Alfrey, this court first set forth the theory that a permissible inference of guilt in the possession of marijuana could be inferred from the length of the ship’s voyage, the necessarily close relationship between the captain and the two-man crew, and the large quantity of marijuana on board. The facts of Alfrey, however, established more than these minimal criteria. Officers who boarded the ship testified that they smelled marijuana as they escorted a defendant through the wheelhouse and that they found marijuana in the open wheelhouse and in the salon, common working and living areas for the crew.
In subsequent cases affirming convictions based on the Alfrey inference, various additional facts have been present to validate the inference by establishing inevitable knowledge by the defendant of the cargo aboard or criminal purpose of the voyage. For example, in United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir.1980), DeWeese identified himself as the captain of the ship when the Coast Guard officers boarded. When an officer asked to see the vessel’s ice hold, DeWeese responded, “Sure, but you’re not going to like what you find.” 632 F.2d at 1269. Thus, the facts established De-
*567Weese was neither a mere passenger nor ignorant about the ship’s cargo.
In the subsequent case of United States v. Mazyak, 650 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.1981), in addition to the three Alfrey criteria, the government established at trial that Mazyak had lied about his identity and that a letter discovered in the ship’s wheelhouse was addressed to all four defendants, thus linking them together. Additionally, there were marijuana stems and seeds on the deck and marijuana was stored in the engine room. The court accordingly affirmed the defendants’ convictions.
In United States v. Munoz, 692 F.2d 116 (11th Cir.1982), three defendants appealed their convictions for possession of marijuana and conspiracy to import marijuana. In affirming the convictions, this court noted that one defendant, Rivas, was shown to be a member of the crew, and the other two defendants were armed and boarded the ship with the individual who directed the handling of the marijuana and were aboard for the sole purpose of guarding the marijuana.
Where there has been no additional support beyond the three Alfrey criteria, this court has wisely been cautious in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. In United States v. Willis, 639 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1981), while affirming the conviction of the captain, the convictions of two crewmen for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute were reversed because “[d]uring the trial, the government never offered any evidence to support an inference that the two crew members knew that the hold contained marijuana — other than the evidence of their mere presence on the boat.” 639 F.2d at 1338. The present case presents a similar situation. The government completely failed to present evidence that Ville-gas-Rojas had any knowledge of the contents of the hold. As in Willis, there was no evidence before the jury that VillegasRojas had access to the hold, that marijuana was discovered anywhere Villegas-Rojas was known to have been, or that the odor of marijuana was noticed aboard the ship. In Willis, the appellate court knew from a transcript of the pretrial suppression hearing that there was additional evidence of the defendants’ guilt. The court concluded that, nevertheless, the convictions of the crewmen for conspiracy could not be based on mere presence aboard a ship laden with marijuana.
This court again reversed a crew member’s conviction, for importation of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in United States v. MacPherson, 664 F.2d 69 (5th Cir.1981). MacPherson and Underhill were aboard a twenty-five foot boat which was boarded by customs officers. The boat contained 609 pounds of marijuana in a sealed hatch. MacPherson’s conviction was affirmed because of ample evidence that he exhibited control over the boat. The only evidence against Underhill, however, was his presence aboard the boat. There was no evidence that Underhill was a crew member or that the odor of marijuana was detectable on the boat. The court reversed Underhill’s conviction, concluding that “mere presence in an area where drugs are discovered is insufficient to support a conviction.” 664 F.2d at 74.
Despite the expansive interpretation of Alfrey adopted by this court in DeWeese as dictum, I do not agree that it mandates an affirmance of Villegas-Rojas’ conviction. In the present case, the government even failed to show that Villegas-Rojas was a member of the crew of the Red Cloud. Nor did the government present any evidence of when Villegas-Rojas boarded the vessel, what his duties were, or which parts of the ship he had access to. None of the government witnesses testified that the odor or other evidence of marijuana was present outside of the closed hold. This may be a case, like Willis, where the prosecution failed to present all its evidence. Or it may be a case where the only evidence against Villegas-Rojas was his presence aboard the Red Cloud. The latter is all that was presented to the jury and is insufficient to sustain his conviction.
The majority’s summary of the facts pejoratively mischaracterizes the Red Cloud as a “small boat” on a “long voyage” with *568the “obvious stowage” of marijuana in the main hold. In fact, the Red Cloud was a seventy-foot shrimper which had, according to an expert’s estimation, been at sea for four days. There was no evidence that the marijuana stored in the hold could be detected by one aboard the ship. Most important, the majority errs in concluding, “[t]he jury could also take into account the necessarily close relationship between the captain and crew,” majority opinion at 4, where there was no evidence that Villegas-Rojas was a member of the crew.
The majority’s opinion is distressing as much for what it omits, as for what it includes. What the majority fails to consider is whether an innocent individual aboard a seventy-foot boat carrying marijuana may be found guilty of both possession with intent to distribute marijuana and conspiracy solely because of his presence. The holding of the majority answers the question in the affirmative, thus expanding even DeWeese to include individuals not shown to be crew members. Now, despite our prior assertions to the contrary, mere presence on a seventy-foot ship for four days is deemed adequate evidence of guilt.