Court Opinion

ID: 9736543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:59:16.470704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:07.091068
License: Public Domain

REGAN, J.
I concur in the result and do so for the reason that the trial court failed to give the instruction limiting the jury’s use of the questioned testimony for the purpose of impeachment.
I agree that People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 646 [68 Cal.Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111], holds that in criminal trials section 1235 of the Evidence Code cannot be constitutionally invoked for the purpose of permitting a witness’ prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence against the accused; that substantive use of such a statement may deprive the accused of his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witness as delineated in Douglas, Pointer and Bridges.
In Johnson the prosecution introduced the sworn testimony of its witnesses before the grand jury as substantive evidence in the criminal trial. In its opinion in Johnson the court emphasized that these statements constituted the sole evidence that an act of intercourse had taken place as charged. In applying the test laid down in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824], the court then concluded that the People had not proved that the substantive use of the prior inconsistent statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the case before us the prosecution had rested its case, and the defense had then offered testimony by its witnesses to establish the innocence of defendant, when the prosecution called two police officers as rebuttal witnesses for the purpose of impeachment to show prior inconsistent statements made to the police officers were admissible for the purpose of impeachment. It was evidence admitted when the right to confront these witnesses who allegedly made the statements was afforded, to wit, when the trial was in progress. The Sixth Amendment protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution were at all times present during the trial in providing the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination.
The United States Supreme Court announced the confrontation rule in criminal trials in three celebrated cases. I call attention to the factual situation in each.
In Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 151 [89 L.Ed. 2103, 2113, 65 S.Ct. 1443], we note that in this administrative hearing the prior inconsistent statements of a government witness were admitted not for the purposes of impeachment but as *207substantive evidence, and the court then states (at p. 153 [89 L.Ed. at p. 2115]) : “The statements which O’Neil (the government witness) allegedly made were hearsay. We may assume they would be admissible for purposes of impeachment. But they certainly would not be admissible in any criminal case as substantive evidence.” The court laid great stress on the fact that the prior statements of O’Neil were ‘ ‘ unsworn statements. ’ ’
In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 [13 L.Ed.2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065], the Supreme Court in holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of confrontation and cross-examination was denied, pointed out (at pp. 406-407 [13 L.Ed.2d at pp. 927-928]) that "a major reason underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with a crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him,” and concluded that because a transcript of statements amounting to a confession by a codefendant of the petitioner, which had been taken at a preliminary examination before a magistrate where the eodefendants appeared without counsel was read into the record in the absence of the matter of the statements from the trial, “its introduction in a federal court in a criminal case against Pointer would have amounted to denial of the privilege of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” (P. 407 [13 L.Ed.2d at p. 928].) Unlike the case before us, the maker of the statements was not available at the trial for cross-examination.
In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 [13 L.Ed.2d 934, 85 S.Ct. 1074], the petitioner and a codefendant Loyd were tried separately. Loyd was found guilty. At petitioner’s trial Loyd was called as a witness by the state. The state then produced a confession signed by Loyd and under guise of cross-examination to refresh Loyd’s recollection read from the document in its entirety. The document was not offered in evidence. The court states (at p. 418 [13 L.Ed.2d at p. 937]): “We decide today that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is applicable to the States. Pointer v. Texas, ante p. 923. . . . In the circumstances of this ease, petitioner’s inability to cross-examine Loyd as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause. Loyd’s alleged statement that the petitioner fired the shotgun constituted the only direct evidence that he had done so ... a crucial link in the proof of both petitioner’s act and of the requisite intent to murder.” (Italics added.)
I am in agreement with the holding in People v. Alvarez, *208268 Cal.App.2d 297, 299 [73 Cal.Rptr. 753]. The court in considering the contention that the admission into evidence of extrajudicial prior inconsistent statements of an appellant by an extension of the holding of the court in People v. Johnson, supra, 68 Cal.2d 646, was error, states (at pp. 299, 303) : “If the testimony was admitted for impeachment purposes only, the Johnson rules could not apply to the ease at bench. The court in Johnson was careful to point out at page 658: ‘The United States Supreme Court has squarely stated that extrajudicial statements of a witness, while admissible for impeachment purposes, “certainly would not be admissible in any criminal case as substantive evidence. . . .” ’ (Italics added.) The court points out at page 660 that when prior inconsistent statements are introduced for their traditional purpose of impeaching a witness, this may have little effect on the guilt determining process. The court went on to state: ‘ [T]he erroneous admission of such a statement as substantive evidence does not automatically deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and the conviction will be reversed only in those cases in which prejudice ensued. ’

Í

“Even before enactment of the Evidence Code a witness’ prior inconsistent statement could be used to discredit Ms testimony given at the trial. (People v. Orcalles, 32 Cal.2d 562, 572-573 [197 P.2d 26]; People v. Ballard, 218 Cal.App.2d 295, 309 [32 Cal.Rptr. 233].) The case of People v. Johnson, supra, 68 Cal.2d 646, did not alter that rule. ...” (See also, 82 Harv.L.Rev. p. 472.)
The orderly investigation and prosecution of criminal cases I believe requires the result as expressed herein.
Under the facts in the case before us, there was immediate in-court confrontation of the witnesses. The prior extrajudicial statements are admissible for impeachment purposes when the limiting instruction is given.
On February 18, 1969, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 26, 1969.