Court Opinion

ID: 9585097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:56:05.788159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:40.270322
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion in Division 3 that Jones failed to demonstrate that a defense witness was subject to impeachment. In the present case, Jones called Regina Shields, the aunt of Teco Jones, to the stand. Jones’ theory of the case was that *30Teco Jones fired the fatal shots, Shields forged the withdrawal slips taken from the victim’s car, she pressured Jones into taking the blame, and she told him not to implicate her or her family. On direct, Shields denied telling Jones to keep her family’s name out of it. Therefore, I conclude that Jones satisfied the requirement for a prior inconsistent statement and that the trial court properly allowed her to be impeached with felony convictions for forging a stolen check and credit card fraud.
I further disagree with the majority’s suggestions that a prior inconsistent statement is the sole method of impeachment and is always a prerequisite to impeaching one’s own witness. Neither statement comports with the current recognition that the rule against impeaching one’s own witness is to be liberally construed. OCGA § 24-9-81 states that a party may not impeach his own witness “except where he can show to the court that he has been entrapped by said witness by a previous contradictory statement.” However, beginning in 1975 the courts of this state have recognized that the ends of justice are ill-served by a strict application of this statute and, therefore, have substantially liberalized it.3 Thus, there is no longer any requirement that the testimony be affirmatively damaging4 or that the party be “entrapped” or surprised by the testimony.5 In keeping with this trend, I see no rational basis for construing OCGA § 24-9-81 to limit the form of impeachment to a prior inconsistent statement. The plain language of the statute addresses only when a party may impeach his own witness. Other statutes and case law dictate the proper forms of impeachment.6 Furthermore, relying on the statute’s language to require a prior inconsistent statement as a prerequisite is contrary to modern trial practice. It is a commonplace strategy, especially by the state in criminal cases, for a party to “impeach” its own witness with a prior conviction in order to soften the impact of cross-examination.7
For these reasons, I conclude that the trial court was correct in allowing Jones to impeach Shields with her felony convictions. In light of the felony convictions admitted, the exclusion of the misdemeanor convictions was harmless error, even assuming the misdemeanor convictions were for crimes of moral turpitude and therefore *31permissible impeachment material.8
Decided October 5, 1998 —
Reconsideration denied October 23,1998.
C. Jackson Burch, for appellant.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Michael K. Dennard, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, H. Maddox Kilgore, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears and Justice Hines join in this special concurrence.

 Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 474-475 (219 SE2d 756) (1975); Jackson v. Ensley, 168 Ga. App. 822, 825 (310 SE2d 707) (1983) (“It is now settled in this state that OCGA § 24-9-81 does not mean what it was formerly construed to mean [and] has been completely modified.”).

 Wilson, 235 Ga. at 475.

 Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309, 314 (290 SE2d 273) (1982).

 See William Daniel, Georgia Handbook on Criminal Evidence, §§ 6-19 through 6-23.

 Id., § 6-19 at 259.

 Caruth v. Brown, 202 Ga. App. 656, 657 (415 SE2d 470) (1992).