Court Opinion

ID: 9634373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:09:39.955972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:27.097124
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Although there are several contentions which merit review, suffice it to say that only one is necessary for the purpose of reversal.
I must disagree with the majority’s analysis of the change of venue issue in light of our holding in Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 392 A.2d 287 (1978). The *140majority would now hold a two-step analysis is required before finding that pretrial publicity is of such a prejudicial nature as to warrant a change of venue even where that publicity is found to be inherently prejudicial. While this two-step approach may be correct in certain instances, the facts of the instant case certainly do not require such an approach.
The majority holds that the particular article in question, after a factual analysis, was inherently prejudicial, yet it now attempts to separate this prejudice on the basis of an inquiry into the effects of the article upon the jury. This approach is incorrect.
Black defines inhere, the root of inherent, as “existing] in and inseparable from something else.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 921 (4th Ed.1951) (Emphasis added). Therefore, where we find publicity to be inherently prejudicial, it becomes irrelevant to attempt to then separate that prejudice from those who may or may not have been affected by it.
What the majority fails to consider is our holdings in Commonwealth v. Frazier, 471 Pa. 121, 369 A.2d 1224 (1977), and Commonwealth v. Pierce, 451 Pa. 190, 303 A.2d 209 (1973), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 164, 38 L.Ed.2d 124 (1973).
In [Pierce ] we held that there can be pretrial publicity so sustained, so pervasive, so inflammatory, and so inculpatory as to demand a change of venue without putting the defendant to any burden of establishing a nexus between the publicity and actual jury prejudice. See also Commonwealth v. Brado [470] Pa. [306], 368 A.2d 643 (1977). In Pierce we found that the pretrial publicity itself constituted a denial of due process; the denial of due process was inherent in the publicity.
Frazier, supra, 471 Pa. at 127, 369 A.2d at 1227 (emphasis in original).
In Casper, we did not overrule Frazier or Pierce. Rather, we distinguished cases of inherently prejudicial publicity from those cases, such as Casper, where additional inquiry *141was required because all the elements of inherently prejudicial publicity were not present.
Since the majority’s definition of “inherently prejudicial” includes a finding of pervasiveness, I must assume by concluding that the publicity here was inherently prejudicial, the majority also found it to be pervasive. I would agree with this conclusion on the basis that the article was published, circulated and contained each of the elements deemed necessary to find it inherently prejudicial, thus requiring a change of venue without further inquiry.
For this reason alone, I would reverse the holding of the Superior Court.