Court Opinion

ID: 9686927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:11:29.336915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:23.030794
License: Public Domain

Beasley, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in affirming, but differ from the *76majority in that I would require the trial judge who presided over the trial to impose sentence unless there is good and sufficient reason to substitute another judge.
The majority cite People v McKinley, 5 Mich App 230; 146 NW2d 142 (1966), but that case is distinguishable, the Court saying:
"It appears that Judge Van Domelen had the necessary disability called for by Rule 531 to allow Judge Stephens of the same court to impose sentence upon the defendant.” Id., 235-236.
In the within case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Judge Brezner who presided over the trial was absent or had any disability from imposing sentence. As a matter of fact, the Court in McKinley went on to say:
"Although cases might be imagined in which it would be unfair to a defendant to allow a second judge to sentence him, such is not the case here.” McKinley, supra, 236.
The majority also cite People v Blair, 11 Mich App 649; 162 NW2d 112 (1968). In Blair, the trial judge disqualified himself because he was convinced before trial that defendant was guilty, and the trial was to be nonjury. In spite of this, and in spite of a lack of any showing of unavailability, defendant was sentenced by the same judge who had disqualified himself. I am aware that this Court chose to affirm under those facts. I believe that this was error and that, under no circumstances, should a trial judge who has chosen to disqualify himself ever impose sentence upon a defendant. I would not be inclined to believe that the Blair per curiam opinion constitutes good prec*77edent. The majority also cite People v Collins, 25 Mich App 609; 181 NW2d 601 (1970), where a new judge heard the probation revocation proceeding and sentenced the defendant to 7-1/2 to 10 years in prison. This Court held that neither statute nor court rule require that the trial judge who placed defendant on probation preside over the revocation hearing. However, we note that in Collins, this Court held that the trial judge placing defendant on probation was a circuit judge sitting in Recorder’s Court, and that this Court concluded that under those circumstances, that circuit judge was "absent” for purposes of GCR 1963, 531.
Lastly, the majority say that defendant failed to object at the time of sentence. Realistically, I would not require a defendant about to be sentenced by a substitute judge to seek to disqualify him. Such a procedure places too great and too unfair a burden upon a defendant. I would not hold that failure to object constituted waiver.
In this case, there was no showing under GCR 1963, 531 that the trial judge was "absent”. However, in addition and, perhaps, more important, we have a trial judge who had seen fit to indicate that he was going to give consideration to some of the factors involved in the trial with respect to the sentence. Under these circumstances, I would believe that it was unfair to defendant for reasons undisclosed to substitute another judge who was a total stranger to the proceedings.
I am aware that this type of question often arises in Detroit Recorder’s Court and in Wayne County Circuit Court, both of which courts have been the subject of so-called "crash” programs off and on during the past decade wherein visiting judges in great numbers are brought in to assist in trying to bring dockets up to date. While I under*78stand the authority for and also the need for bringing in visiting judges and, consequently, moving judges around more than is ordinarily the case, I would not permit the substitution of a judge for purposes of sentence except where compliance with GCR 1963, 531 is shown on the record.
The usual practice is for. the judge who has presided over the criminal trial or who has taken the plea to impose the sentence. The reasons would appear obvious. The judge presiding over the trial has a closer acquaintance and a greater familiarity with the defendant and with the issues.
Certainly there is merit in the proposition that the more the judge knows about the defendant and about the case, the better opportunity he has to fashion a sentence which may reach the objectives of indeterminate sentencing, probation departments and possible future parole. In Michigan, our system strives for sentences that will be tailor-made for the particular defendant and the particular offense for which he is being sentenced.
Sentencing is not, and is not intended to be, automatic. The possibility of probation and the possibility of early parole are but two of various situations where familiarity with the defendant and his case are significant to wise application of criminal sanctions.
I would vote to set aside the sentence and to remand for resentence by the judge who presided over the trial, if he is available.