Court Opinion

ID: 9893875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 19:05:47.529669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:53.448478
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/30/23 P. v. Carpenter CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084532
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. VCF416723)
                    v.

 ROBERT HERRON CARPENTER,                                                                 OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan G.
Leedy, Judge.
         Carlo Andreani, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A.
Martinez and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                                INTRODUCTION
         Appellant Robert Herron Carpenter appeals his jury conviction of aggravated
kidnapping, forcible sexual penetration by foreign object, forcible oral copulation,
forcible spousal rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and corporal injury to a spouse.
Appellant was sentenced to life with possibility of parole plus 12 years.
       On appeal, appellant first argues, substantial evidence does not support his
aggravated kidnapping conviction. Second, the court’s jury instruction on the aggravated
kidnapping was erroneous. And third, his sentence is unauthorized pursuant to Penal
Code section 6541, or alternatively that the case should be remanded due to the changes
to section 654 enacted by Assembly Bill No. 518. We affirm.
                               PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       In a complaint filed in 2021, the Tulare County District Attorney charged
appellant with kidnapping to commit spousal rape (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 1); sexual
penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 2); forcible oral copulation
(§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 3); forcible spousal rape (§ 262, subd. (a)(1); count 4);
assault with intent to commit a felony (§ 220, subd. (a)(1); count 5); and corporal injury
to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 6.)
       It was further alleged that counts 2 and 3 were ineligible for probation or
suspension of sentence pursuant to section 1203.065, subdivision (a).
       In October 2021, a jury found appellant guilty of all charges.
       In May 2022, appellant was sentenced to life with possibility of parole as to count
1, the middle term of six years for count 2, the middle term of six years for count 3 to run
consecutive to count 2.2 Appellant was further sentenced to the middle term of six years
for count 4, the middle term of four years for count 5, and the middle term of three years
as for count 6, to run concurrently.
       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2      A full, separate, and consecutive term is authorized for counts 2 and 3 pursuant to
section 667.6, subdivision (c).

                                             2.
                               STATEMENT OF FACTS
       Appellant was the victim’s husband. They were married for a second time in
2004. Before that, appellant and the victim were married for 19 years, then separated for
10 years. Appellant and the victim lived together in a two-story house.
       On the morning of February 21, 2021, the victim was in bed when appellant
approached her and told her, if she disrespected him, he was going to “beat the crap” out
of her and sodomize her with a sex toy, and she would “get no warnings.” Appellant then
left the house to go to a golf tournament.
       The sex toy was a penis extender appellant had previously attempted to use during
intercourse with the victim. The victim refused to have sexual intercourse with the sex
toy and told appellant “under no circumstance[s]” would she have intercourse with it.
She demanded appellant throw it away.
       Appellant came home around 3:30 p.m. He appeared agitated and rammed the
front gate with his car. The victim was in the kitchen, and heard appellant yell at her to
“open the fucking door” when he could not open the front door. Appellant then came
into the kitchen and began preparing himself some food. He also repeated that the victim
should choose her words very carefully because he was going to “beat the crap” out of
her and sodomize her. He put his fist in the victim’s face, telling her “this is what they
get” when someone disrespects him.
       At this point, the victim was standing in the corner of the kitchen, and appellant
was moving between the kitchen and the living room. The victim said, “So you’re going
to be a wife beater.” Appellant replied “Yes,” and that the victim better not mention this
to their two oldest sons, or else appellant would “beat the crap out of them” and shoot the
victim.
       Appellant then went back into the kitchen and told the victim, “In fact, right now,
get down on your knees and suck my dick.” The victim said, “No, this isn’t right.” As
the victim responded, appellant knocked her to the ground and unzipped his pants, yelling

                                             3.
“Suck my dick.” When the victim refused, appellant said, “I’m going to twist your hand”
and “I’m going to sock you in the head.” Appellant then twisted the victim’s right hand
and punched her on the left side of her head, all while yelling, “Suck my dick.” When
the victim continued to refuse, appellant yelled, “I’m going to pull your hair” and “I’m
gonna sock you in the rib,” and he grabbed the victim’s hair and punched her in the ribs.
       The victim began praying loudly, and appellant said, “God will not help you” and
said he would punch her in the nose. The victim said she knew if he hit her in the nose
she would lose consciousness, so she started orally copulating appellant. When the
victim stopped, appellant said “[L]et’s take this upstairs.” Appellant also told the victim
“We’ll do this whether you’re conscious or unconscious.”
       The victim walked out of the kitchen with appellant behind her. Appellant walked
her away from each of the house’s three exits — one in the kitchen, one in a bathroom,
and the front door. All of the exits were on the first floor. At the foot of the stairs,
appellant stood next to the victim and reminded her that he would knock her unconscious
if she did not comply.
       Appellant and the victim went upstairs and into the bedroom. In the bedroom,
appellant told the victim to take off her pants. The victim took off her pants and shoes,
and appellant undressed completely. The victim got on one side of the bed, and appellant
walked around to the other side and pulled out the sex toy.
       The victim began to cry because she knew appellant was going to force her to
have intercourse using the sex toy. Appellant sprayed the sex toy with something, and
put lubricant all over the victim. Appellant then roughly grabbed the victim’s legs and
yelled at her to put her knees up to her ear which the victim could not do. Appellant
repeatedly forced the victim to get off the bed and bend over, then get back on the bed
while he tried to penetrate her. Appellant tried to penetrate the victim’s anus, but the
victim was squeezing her buttocks. The victim then used her hand to move the sex toy to
her vagina.

                                              4.
       Appellant lost his erection and the sex toy fell off. Appellant said, “Well, we’ll do
this later,” and wiped the lubricant off of his penis onto the victim’s hair. Appellant then
left the room, saying “We’re going to do this later, and you better do what I like, and you
better not squeeze your buttocks together.”
       The victim put on her pants and shoes, and walked calmly out the front door at the
foot of the stairs so appellant would not hear her. When she opened the door, she ran,
believing if she stayed she would lose her life.
                                      DISCUSSION

I.     SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE SECTION 209, SUBDIVISION
       (b)(1) AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING CONVICTION
       Appellant argues there is not substantial evidence to support an aggravated
kidnapping conviction. Appellant asserts that there was not substantial evidence that the
victim was moved a substantial distance that was not merely incidental to the target
crime, and that the movement substantially increased the risk of harm. We disagree.
       A.     Legal Standard
       “A person who kidnaps or carries away an individual to commit robbery, rape,
oral copulation, sodomy, or any violation of [enumerated statutes], shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole.” (§ 209, subd.
(b)(1).) “This subdivision shall only apply if the movement of the victim is beyond that
merely incidental to the commission of, and increases the risk of harm to the victim over
and above that necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense.” (§ 209, subd.
(b)(2).)
       In 1997, the Legislature amended the aggravated kidnapping statute. (People v.
Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 979 (Robertson).) In doing so, the Legislature
codified the two-prong test of asportation for kidnapping set out in People v. Daniels

                                              5.
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 11193 in section 209, subdivision (b), but omitted the word
“substantial” from the second prong. Thus, the modified asportation standard eliminated
the requirement that the movement of the victim “substantially” increase the risk of harm
to the victim. (Robertson, supra, at p. 980; See People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830,
869, fn. 20; People v. James (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 446; People v. Ortiz (2002) 101
Cal.App.4th 410.)
       On appeal, this court “must determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could
have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) We “examine the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that
a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. (In re
Michael D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 126.)
       B.     Analysis
       “Kidnapping to commit rape involves two prongs. First, the defendant must move
the victim and this asportation must not be ‘merely incidental to the [rape.]’ ” (People v.
Shadden (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 164, 168, (Shadden).) “Second, the movement must
increase ‘the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the
[rape.]’ ” (Ibid.) “For the first prong, the jury considers the distance the defendant
moved the victim and the ‘scope and nature’ of the movement. [Citations.] For the

3      “[T]he intent of the Legislature in amending Penal Code section 209 in 1951 was
to exclude from its reach not only ‘standstill’ robberies [citation] but also those in which
the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and
do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in
the crime of robbery itself.” (People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1139.)

                                             6.
second, it considers whether the movement gave the defendant ‘the decreased likelihood
of detection’ and an ‘enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes.’ ” (Ibid.)
       These two aspects are not mutually exclusive, but are interrelated. (People v.
Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1152, (Dominguez).) “The essence of aggravated
kidnapping is the increase in the risk of harm to the victim caused by the forced
movement.” (Ibid.) A jury should consider various circumstances, including “whether
the movement decreases the likelihood of detection, increases the danger inherent in a
victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape, or enhances the attacker’s opportunity to commit
additional crimes.” (Ibid.)
       “The appellate court must consider ‘how all the attendant circumstances relate []
to the ultimate question of increased risk of harm.’ [Citation.] Although the ‘actual
distance the victim was forced to move’ is a ‘relevant factor,’ the Supreme Court has
‘repeatedly stated no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation
requirement.’ Actual distance ‘must be considered in context, including the nature of the
crime and its environment….’ ” (Robertson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) The
movement must be substantial. (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1152.) Substantial
movement in this context is movement that is “ ‘more than slight, brief or trivial.’ ”
(Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 169.)4 Further, the increased risk of harm may be
of either physical or psychological harm. (Robertson, supra, at p. 984.)
       Appellant relies on People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, and People v.
Perkins (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454 (Perkins) for the proposition that appellant’s
movement of the victim was not substantial and did not substantially increase the
victim’s risk of harm. Appellant’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. Stanworth

4      In Shadden, this language is in reference to the jury instruction CALJIC No. 9.54.
(Shadden, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 169.) An instruction using the same language was
given in this case.

                                             7.
predates the 1997 amendment to section 209 and relies upon the “substantial risk of
harm” standard now superseded by statute.
       In Perkins, the defendant was found guilty of two “one strike” enhancements
pursuant to section 667.61: the aggravated kidnapping enhancement pursuant to
subdivision (j)(1), and the simple kidnapping enhancement pursuant to subdivision (j)(2).
(Perkins, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 463.) The aggravated kidnapping enhancement
requires that the movement of the victim substantially increase the risk of harm to the
victim. (Id. at p. 465.) The simple kidnapping enhancement requires that the defendant
move the victim a substantial distance. (Id. at p. 464.) Because Perkins analyzes the
“substantial risk of harm” standard, its analysis is not instructive on that issue.
       As to movement, the Perkins court concluded that the victim’s movement was not
substantial when “[a]fter sodomizing he victim, defendant ordered her to move from the
apartment’s only bathroom to the apartment’s only bedroom, a distance between only 10
and 30 feet.” (Perkins, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 470.) However, the one-bedroom
apartment in Perkins is not comparable to the two-story house in this case. Perkins is
therefore distinguishable on its facts.
       Appellant argues that because the prosecution failed to establish the actual
distance appellant moved the victim, this forecloses that the distance was substantial. We
find no legal support for this proposition. To the contrary, it is well established that
actual distance is only one relevant factor, which must be considered in context with the
nature of the crime and its environment. (Robertson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.)
       Robertson is instructive. In Robertson, the defendant conducted Christian services
inside his detached garage, which was outfitted with several rows of pews, a pulpit and a
large rectangular wooden tub that resembled a coffin. The tub was lined with black
plastic and filled with water. (Robertson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 972.) The
defendant lured the victim, a member of his congregation, into the detached garage and
raped her. (Id. at p. 972.) Prior to raping her, the defendant forced the victim to move

                                              8.
from the back of the detached garage to the front, past two rows of pews and toward the
tub. (Id. at p. 973.)
       This court concluded the movement from the back of the garage to the front was
not merely incidental to the rape. (Robertson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) This
court found “ ‘[w]here a defendant drags a victim to another place, and then attempts a
rape, the jury may reasonably infer that the movement was neither part of nor necessary
to the rape.’ ” (Ibid.) Likewise, that the movement occurred inside a garage was not
dispositive. (Id. at p. 986.) “ ‘Where the movement changes the victim’s environment, it
does not have to be great in distance to be substantial.’ ” (Ibid.) This court then noted
that “[o]nly when [the victim] was as far away from the back door as possible and near
the tub did [the defendant] order her to undress and then raped her.” (Id. at p. 985.)
       In this case, appellant moved the victim from the kitchen in their two-story house,
away from each exit on the first floor, up the stairs, and into a bedroom. Although the
prosecution did not elicit an exact measurement of the distance between the kitchen and
the bedroom, the jury was shown diagrams of the house and could draw the reasonable
inference that the distance was not “slight, brief or trivial.” (Shadden, supra, 93
Cal.App.4th at p. 169.) Likewise, substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that
the movement was not incidental to the rape, because appellant did not begin to rape the
victim with the sex toy until he forced her into the bedroom.
       In Robertson, this court then concluded that the movement increased the risk of
harm to the victim. (Robertson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 985.) This court found
moving the victim away from the back door reduced the possibility the victim could
escape. (Ibid.) The movement also decreased the likelihood the detection because it was
less likely that the victim’s son could have heard her if she screamed for help. (Ibid.)
       This court further found that moving the victim to the front of the garage next to
the tub increased the defendant’s opportunity to commit additional sexual crimes.
(Robertson, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 985.) The defendant “positioning of the victim

                                             9.
in a secluded place by a full tub of water increased his ability to perform multiple
unwanted sex acts without resistance or interruption.” (Ibid.)
       In this case, appellant moved the victim upstairs, not only away from the house’s
three exits but onto a different floor than the exits. The bedroom appellant moved the
victim to was also more secluded than the kitchen where he began his assault. This both
decreased the likelihood of detection and reduced the possibility the victim could escape.
Likewise, the jury could also reasonably conclude that moving the victim to the bedroom,
which gave appellant access to a bed, enhanced appellant’s opportunity to commit
additional crimes. We therefore find substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
the movement increased the risk of harm to the victim, and in whole substantial evidence
supports appellant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping.

II.    THE COURT’S SECTION 209, SUBDIVISION (b)(1) JURY INSTRUCTION
       DID NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
       Appellant argues the court’s instruction on count 1 was erroneous, because it
permitted the prosecution to prove a violation of section 209 based on kidnapping to
commit spousal rape, oral copulation or sexual penetration, when the information only
charged a violation of section 209 based on kidnapping to commit spousal rape. For
purposes of our discussion, we presume that despite his failure to raise this claim below,
appellant has not waived his argument. We conclude the instruction was not erroneous.
       A.     Background
       The information filed September 23, 2021, stated in relevant part:

             “On or about February 21, 2021, in the County of Tulare, the crime
       of KIDNAPPING TO COMMIT ANOTHER CRIME, in violation of
       PENAL CODE SECTION 209(b)(1), a FELONY, was committed by
       ROBERT HERRON CARPENTER, who did unlawfully kidnap and carry
       away [the victim] to commit SPOUSAL RAPE, A VIOLATION OF
       SECTION 289.”
       The court instructed the jury in relevant part:

                                             10.
            “The defendant is charged in Count 1 with kidnapping for the
      purposes of rape, oral copulation or sexual penetration in violation of Penal
      Code Section 209 (b).

             “To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
      prove that:

            “Number one, the defendant intended to commit rape, oral
      copulation or sexual penetration;

            “Two, acting with that intent, the defendant took, held or detained
      another person by using force or by instilling a reasonable fear;

            “Three, using that force or fear, the defendant moved the other
      person or made the other person move a substantial distance;

             “Four, the other person was moved or made to move a distance
      beyond that merely incidental to the commission of a rape, oral copulation
      or sexual penetration;

           “Five, when the movement began, the defendant already intended to
      commit rape, oral copulation or sexual penetration;

             “Six, the defendant did not consent to the move;

             “And, seven, the defendant did not actually or reasonably believe the
      other person consented to the movement.

              “As used here, substantial distance means more than a slight or
      trivial distance. The movement must have increased the risk of physical or
      psychological harm to the person beyond that necessarily present in the
      rape, oral copulation or sexual penetration. [¶] …[¶]

             “To be guilty of kidnapping for the purpose of rape, oral copulation
      or sexual penetration the defendant does not have to actually commit the
      rape, oral copulation or sexual penetration.”
      B.     Legal Standard
      Section 209, subdivision (b)(1) states “A person who kidnaps or carries away an
individual to commit robbery, rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or any violation of Section

                                           11.
264.1, 288, 2895, or former Section 262, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for life with the possibility of parole.”
       A challenge to the jury instructions raises a mixed question of law and fact that is
predominantly legal, and we review it under the de novo standard. (People v. Waidla
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733.)
       C.      Analysis
       Appellant does not appear to argue that the court’s instruction on section 209
misstates the law, omits an element of the offense, or includes a theory of liability
unsupported by the evidence. Appellant argues the error lies in the difference between
the charges levied in the information and the language of the jury instruction. The
Attorney General interprets this as a due process argument regarding fair notice of the
allegations.

              “ ‘It is a fundamental rule of due process that a defendant must be
       given fair notice of any alleged crimes in order to mount a possible
       defense.’ [Citation.] A defendant's right to fair notice applies equally to
       ‘allegations that will be invoked to increase the punishment for his or her
       crimes.’ [Citation.]

               “California law provides that: ‘In charging an offense, each count
       shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains in substance, a statement
       that the accused has committed some public offense therein specified.’
       (§ 952.) The accusatory pleading does not have to state the number of the
       statute, it may be ‘in any words sufficient to give the accused notice of the
       offense of which he is accused.’ [Citations.] …

              “Indeed, even if the People allege the wrong numbered statute, the
       pleading is still valid if it alleges facts sufficient to give the defendant fair
       notice of the alleged crime and/or sentence enhancement and the defendant
       was not prejudicially misled.” (In re Vaquera (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 233,
       238-239.)

5      Sexual penetration by a foreign object is a violation of section 289, subdivision
(a)(1)(A).

                                              12.
       In this case, appellant does not appear to argue that the information did not give
him fair notice of the charge of aggravated kidnapping based on rape, or oral copulation
or sexual penetration. We nonetheless briefly address this issue because it implicates
appellant’s due process rights.
       Section 209, subdivision (b)(1) clearly states the offenses which may form the
basis for an aggravated kidnapping charge. While the information filed September 23,
2021, alleges appellant “did unlawfully kidnap and carry away [the victim] to commit
spousal rape,” it also specifies the charge as “KIDNAPPING TO COMMIT ANOTHER
CRIME, in violation of PENAL CODE SECTION 209(b)(1).” Appellant was therefore
put on notice of the statute which the aggravated kidnapping charge was based on.
       Appellant was also charged with oral copulation in violation of section 287,
subdivision (c)(2)(A) and sexual penetration in violation of section 289, subdivision
(c)(1)(A). Both of these crimes are listed in section 209, subdivision (b)(1) as qualifying
target offenses for aggravated kidnapping. We therefore find the information alleged
facts sufficient to give appellant fair notice that he could be convicted of kidnapping to
commit spousal rape, or oral copulation or sexual penetration.
       Appellant argues that the jury instruction could have led the jury to erroneously
convict appellant of aggravated kidnapping on a legally invalid basis. However, as
discussed above, the mere fact that a jury instruction that properly states the law and legal
elements of a crime diverges from the exact words used to describe that offense in the
information, does not render that jury instruction erroneous, so long as appellant had fair
notice of the charges levied against him.
       We will address one additional issue which implicates appellant’s due process
rights, and may arise when an allegation in an information diverges from the jury
instructions — the issue of unanimity.
       “As a general rule, when violation of a criminal statute is charged and the
evidence establishes several acts, any one of which could constitute the crime charged,

                                            13.
either the state must select the particular act upon which it relied for the allegation of the
information, or the jury must be instructed that it must agree unanimously upon which act
to base a verdict of guilty.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679.)
       However, the jury need not agree unanimously on exactly how a crime was
committed. (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1135.) For example, if a defendant
is charged with first degree murder, and the jury is instructed on multiple theories of first-
degree murder (for instance, premeditation and felony murder), no unanimity instruction
is required if there was evidence of only one murder. The jurors need not agree on the
theory. (People v. Chavez (1951) 37 Cal.2d 656, 670–671.)
       “The key to deciding whether to give the unanimity instruction lies in considering
its purpose. The jury must agree on a ‘particular crime’ [citation]; it would be
unacceptable if some jurors believed the defendant guilty of one crime and other jurors
believed her guilty of another. But unanimity as to exactly how the crime was committed
is not required. Thus, the unanimity instruction is appropriate ‘when conviction on a
single count could be based on two or more discrete criminal events,’ but not ‘where
multiple theories or acts may form the basis of a guilty verdict on one discrete criminal
event.’ ” (People v. Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1134–1135.)
       In this case, there was only one act of kidnapping, one discrete criminal event.
There were multiple theories on how the kidnapping was committed — whether, in
kidnapping the victim, appellant intended to commit rape, or oral copulation, or sexual
penetration. But there was only one act — the kidnapping. Thus, a unanimity instruction
was not necessary and the jury did not need to unanimously decide whether the
kidnapping was for the purpose of committing spousal rape or oral copulation or sexual
penetration.
       Additionally, failure to give a unanimity instruction was harmless error. “The
failure to provide a unanimity instruction is subject to the [Chapman v. California (1967)

                                              14.
386 U.S. 18,] harmless error analysis on appeal.” (People v. Curry (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 766, 783.)
       “Where the record indicates the jury resolved the basic credibility dispute against
the defendant and therefore would have convicted him of any of the various offenses
shown by the evidence, the failure to give the unanimity instruction is harmless.”
(People v. Thompson (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 843, 853.)
       In this case, appellant was in fact convicted of spousal rape, oral copulation and
sexual penetration. Therefore, the jury necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant “intended to commit rape, oral copulation, or sexual penetration” as instructed
by the trial court. Because the jury convicted appellant of each of the various offenses
which could be the basis for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, failure to give the
unanimity instruction was harmless error.

III.   APPELLANT’S SENTENCE WAS NOT UNAUTHORIZED PURSUANT TO
       SECTION 654
       Appellant argues the consecutive sentences on count 1 and count 2, and the
concurrent sentence on count 4 violated section 654’s prohibition against multiple
punishments for a single indivisible course of conduct. Appellant then argues that he is
entitled to “retroactive” application Assembly Bill No. 518’s ameliorative amendment to
section 654. We disagree.

       A.     Section 667.6 Allows Multiple Punishments for Enumerated Sex Offenses
              Committed During An Indivisible Course of Conduct
       Generally, “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).)
“[T]he statutory reference to an ‘act or omission’ may include not only a discrete physical
act but also a course of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single
objective.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.)

                                            15.
        Section 667.6 carves out an exception to this general provision for certain
enumerated sex offenses. “In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, separate,
and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of an offense specified in
subdivision (e) if the crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion.” (§ 667.6,
subd. (c).)
        The enumerated sex offenses include, in relevant part, sexual penetration in
violation of section 289, subdivision (a) (§ 667.6, subd. (e)(8); count 2), forcible oral
copulation in violation of section 287 (§ 667.6, subd. (e)(7); count 3), and forcible
spousal rape in violation of former section 262 (§ 667.6, subd. (e)(2); count 4).
        It is well established that “the only reasonable interpretation of section 667.6(c) is
that it permits imposition of consecutive full-term sentences, notwithstanding the
provisions of section 654, when the defendant is convicted of an offense enumerated in
section 667.6 [subdivision] (c), based upon the commission of a separate act that
constituted part of an indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th
784, 792.)
        Appellant acknowledges that count 1, count 2, and count 4 were based on separate
physical acts.6 Therefore, there is no dispute that count 2 and count 4 were offenses
based upon the commission of separate acts against the same victim that constituted part
of an indivisible course of conduct. Section 667.6, subdivision (c) excepts count 2 and
count 4 from section 654’s general prohibition against punishment of a single course of
conduct under multiple provisions of law.
        Ordinarily, “[w]e review under the substantial-evidence standard the court’s
factual finding, implicit or explicit, of whether there was a single criminal act or course
of conduct with a single criminal objective.” (People v. Moseley (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th

6       Specifically, appellant states “counts one, two and four were not a single physical
act.”

                                              16.
1598, 1603.) However, there is no arguable error here. The court properly imposed a
full, consecutive sentence as to count 2 and a full concurrent sentence as to count 4
pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (c).
       B.     Appellant Received the Benefit of Assembly Bill No. 518
       Prior to January 1, 2022, section 654, subdivision (a) read “[a]n act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under
the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment….”
       On January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 518 amended section 654, subdivision (a)
to read “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of
law may be punished under either of such provisions….” (Emphasis added.)
       Generally, amendments to statutes that reduce punishment for a particular crime
apply to all defendants whose judgements are not yet final on the amendment’s operative
date. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.) This retroactive principle “applies to
ameliorative changes in enhancements as well as to substantive offenses [citation], and to
changes in the law that merely allow for a possibility of reduced punishment.” (People v.
Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 666.)
       However, appellant was sentenced on May 23, 2022, almost five months after the
amendments to section 654 went into effect. “The general rule is that a trial court is
presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.” (People v. Mosley
(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496.) “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed
correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to
which the record is silent and error must be affirmatively shown.” (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564, original italics.)
       On May 23, 2022, the court had the following exchange:

              “THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. I agree with you. I
       would not characterize incarceration in the state prison as minimal. It’s
       hard for me to understand any type of prison sentence Mr. Carpenter is
       looking at would be minimal, but is he even eligible for probation?

                                              17.
             “MS. YOON: I would argue he is given the new law, the changes in
      654, which allow for the court to not — before, the court was limited to
      sentencing under the most serious charge, and the new changes allow for
      the court to sentence under any of the provisions.

              “And so my argument would be that the forcible rape and oral
      copulation are 654 with spousal rape, and the court can stay the sentences
      in the forcible penetration and oral copulation and sentence on the spousal
      rape.”
      The record clearly shows the court was informed of, and therefore aware of its
discretion under the amended section 654. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, we presume the court properly considered and exercised that discretion when
sentencing appellant. Therefore, appellant has already received the benefit of Assembly
Bill No. 518’s amendment of section 654, and remand is not necessary.
                                    DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                      FRANSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

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