Court Opinion

ID: 9382288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-26 07:16:19.958406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.339021
License: Public Domain

Reversed and Rendered and Opinion filed March 23, 2023.

                                            In the

                       Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                                 NO. 14-22-00024-CV

                       THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant

                                             V.
                            MONICA GARCIA, Appellee

                      On Appeal from the 165th District Court
                              Harris County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 2020-65304

                                    OPINION

      Plaintiff Monica Garcia alleges that the City of Houston violated the Texas
Whistleblower Act1 by terminating her employment to retaliate against her for
reporting to the Houston City Council her concerns that the City failed to exercise
“oversight of policies that could protect/save lives for City employees” during the
novel coronavirus pandemic. In this interlocutory appeal, the City challenges the

      1
          TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.001–.010.
trial court’s denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction on the grounds that (1) Garcia
failed to initiate a pre-suit grievance or appeal of her termination, and (2) Garcia’s
reports to the City Council were not reports to “an appropriate law enforcement
authority,” as that term is used in the Act. In the dispositive issue, we conclude that
the City has no formal grievance or appeal procedures by which Garcia, as a
probationary employee, could challenge her termination. When there is no
applicable formal procedure to appeal a termination, our precedent requires the
former employee to provide fair notice to the employer of the desire to appeal the
termination before filing suit. Because Garcia did not, we reverse the trial court’s
ruling and render judgment for the City.

                                      I. BACKGROUND

      Before her employment was terminated on July 15, 2020, Monica Garcia
worked for the City of Houston as a “senior human resources generalist” within the
employee-relations division. Being in her first year of employment, Garcia was a
“probationary employee” rather than a “civil service employee.”2 Unlike a civil-
service employee, a terminated probationary employee is not entitled to a review or
hearing before the City’s Civil Service Commission.3

A.    Garcia’s Allegations

      According to Garcia, the City terminated her employment to retaliate against
her for complaining to the City Council that the City was failing to use a
telecommuting policy to curtail the spread of COVID-19. To place her allegations
in context, on March 19, 2020, Governor Abbott issued his first executive order in
response to the pandemic, closing the schools and stating that “every person in Texas

      2
          See HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 14, art. II, § 14-122(a) (2015).
      3
          Id. §§ 14-125(a), 14-182.

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shall avoid social gatherings in groups of more than 10 people.” THE GOVERNOR OF
THE   STATE   OF   TEX., EXEC. ORDER GA-08, 45 Tex. Reg. 2271, 2271 (2020). He
further stated in this order that “government entities and businesses will continue
providing essential services. For offices and workplaces that remain open,
employees should practice good hygiene and, where feasible, work from home in
order to achieve optimum isolation from COVD-19.” Id. Ten days after this
executive order, Garcia emailed Houston City Councilmember Abbie Kamin that
City employees had been told, “everyone is expected to show-up to work, even if
telecommuting is a viable alternative for those who are high-risk for contracting the
virus (over 65, autoimmune compromised, etc.), or even for employees who have
been exposed to the virus, or are experiencing symptoms.” Garcia further stated,
“The lack of transparency and oversight of policies that could protect/save lives for
City employees is something that needs to be elevated to someone in your position.”
It is unknown whether Kamin responded.

       On April 1, 2020, Garcia began a period of paid emergency leave to care for
a child whose school or place of care had been closed. Later that week, Garcia spoke
before City Council “to highlight the inequitable and arbitrary application of the
remote work policies, and how those polic[i]es were placing citizens at risk to
exposure from COVID-19.”

       Garcia had used all her available paid leave by mid-June of 2020, and she
received permission to take unpaid leave through July 12, 2020. Two days before
her unpaid leave ended, Garcia emailed Councilmember Kamin a second time,
stating that she, Garcia, worried about the safety of City employees because
“[e]mployees who exhibited COVID symptoms were not instructed to quarantine.
Employees who did quarantine were threatened with termination.” Again, the record
does not indicate whether Kamin responded.

                                         3
      Two days after Garcia’s period of unpaid leave ended, she emailed her
manager, the manager of the City’s employee-relations division, and the deputy
director of human resources to say she wished to request voluntary furlough and to
ask what information was needed to process her request. The next day, the City
terminated Garcia’s employment.

      Ninety days later, Garcia sued the City, alleging that the City terminated her
employment in violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act (“the TWA” or “the Act”).
Garcia does not contend that she had any communications with the City in the time
between her termination and her filing of this lawsuit.

B.    The City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction

      The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction on the grounds that Garcia had not
satisfied the TWA’s requirements in that (1) Garcia failed to initiate a grievance by
filing a complaint with the City’s Office of the Inspector General (“the OIG”), and
(2) Garcia’s complaints to the City Council are not reports of a violation of law to
“an appropriate law enforcement authority.” Garcia responded that (1) “the OIG
procedure is neither a grievance nor an appeal procedure” required by the Act, and
(2) the Mayor and the City Council have the power to enforce state and federal
statutes imposing on employers the general duty to provide a safe workplace.

      The trial court denied the City’s plea, and the City filed this appeal.

                            II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

      Governmental units are immune from suit unless immunity is waived by state
law. City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2022). The TWA
waives immunity “to the extent of liability for the relief allowed under [the TWA]
for a violation of [the Act].” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.0035. Because immunity is
waived only for viable claims, “the elements of a whistleblower claim are

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jurisdictional facts necessary for ‘determining whether the [plaintiff’s] claim falls
within the jurisdictional confines of section 554.0035.’” City of Fort Worth v.
Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d 176, 181 (Tex. 2022) (quoting State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876,
882 (Tex. 2009)) (alterations in original).

      Being jurisdictional, governmental immunity is properly raised through a plea
to the jurisdiction, which we review de novo. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 528. The
plaintiff bears the burden to affirmatively show waiver of immunity. Id. To
determine whether the plaintiff has met this burden, we may consider the plaintiff’s
factual allegations and the evidence submitted by the parties. Id. When a plea
challenges jurisdictional facts, our review mirrors that of a traditional summary-
judgment motion. Id. When jurisdictional facts are at issue, we take as true all
evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and
resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004).

             III. FAILURE TO INITIATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

      The Texas Whistleblower Act was enacted “to compel the government’s
compliance with law by protecting those who inform authorities of wrongdoing.”
Harris Cnty. v. Davidson, 653 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2022, no pet.). To that end, the TWA provides that a governmental entity may not
take adverse personnel action against “a public employee who in good faith reports
a violation of law by the employing governmental entity or another public employee
to an appropriate law enforcement authority.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002(a). If the
employer takes adverse personnel action against the public employee in retaliation
for making the report, the employee may sue the employer. See id. § 554.0035.
Before filing suit, however, the “public employee must initiate action under the
grievance or appeal procedures of the employing state or local governmental entity

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relating to suspension or termination of employment or adverse personnel action.”
Id. § 554.006(a). The employee “must invoke the applicable grievance or appeal
procedures” within ninety days after the employer violated the Texas Whistleblower
Act, or within ninety days after the employee discovers the violation through
reasonable diligence. Id. § 554.006(b).

A.      A Complaint to the OIG Is Not a “Grievance or Appeal” Under the TWA.
        In the trial court, the City maintained, and Garcia denied, that Garcia had to
file a whistleblower complaint with the City’s OIG in order to satisfy the TWA’s
requirement to initiate the City’s pre-suit grievance or appeal procedure. We agree
with Garcia that no complaint to the OIG was required.

        In arguing that a complaint to the OIG was a mandatory prerequisite to suit,
the City relies on this provision from Mayor Sylvester Turner’s Executive Order No.
1-39:

        A City employee or a former City employee who believes that the City
        has taken an adverse personnel action against him in retaliation for a
        prior complaint made to “an appropriate law enforcement agency” in
        violation of Chapter 554 of the Texas Government Code
        (“Whistleblower Act”) may file a complaint (“Whistleblower
        Complaint”) with the OIG and provide the facts and circumstances
        giving rise to the employee’s belief. OIG investigates Whistleblower
        Complaints but is not “an appropriate law enforcement agency” within
        the meaning of the Whistleblower Act.
CITY OF HOUSTON, EXEC. ORDER 1-39, § 5.1 (2017). We conclude that this provision
does not prescribe a grievance or appeal procedure that is mandatory for employees
to use before filing suit under the TWA.

        The first problem with the City’s argument is that this process is not a
grievance or appeal procedure at all. It is not a grievance procedure, for by ordinance,
a complaint of retaliation for whistleblowing “is not grievable through the grievance
process.” See HOUS., TEX., CODE       OF   ORDINANCES, ch. 14, art. II, § 14-55.7(4)
                                            6
(2016). It is not an appeal, for a termination appeal is filed with, and decided by, the
City’s Civil Service Commission.4

       The OIG’s involvement serves a different purpose from a grievance or an
appeal. The OIG’s function is not adjudicative; it is investigative. The OIG does not
decide whether a terminated employee should be reinstated; its purpose instead is to
“[i]nvestigate allegations of misconduct to facilitate the provision of legal advice to
[the City].” CITY OF HOUSTON, EXEC. ORDER 1-39, § 3 (definitions) and § 4.1.1.2
(responsibilities) (2017). Our sister court reached the same conclusion in rejecting
the City’s identical argument under the 1998 version of Executive Order 1-39. See
City of Houston v. Cotton, 31 S.W.3d 823, 825 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2000, pet. denied) (sub. op.) (“Although the OIG can investigate complaints of
retaliation, its purpose is not to resolve employee problems but to resolve issues for
the City.”). Under the current version of Executive Order 1-39, it cannot truly be
said that the OIG “resolves” Whistleblower Complaints at all, because after an
investigation, the OIG simply reports its findings and conclusions to others. If the
Whistleblower Complaint was made directly to the OIG, the OIG delivers its report
to the director of the department that most recently employed the complainant, and
it is the director who decides the corrective action, if any, to be taken. CITY                OF

HOUSTON, EXEC. ORDER 1-39, § 5.1.4. If the Whistleblower Complaint was part of
an appeal to the Civil Service Commission, then the OIG delivers its report to the
Commission, but the disposition of the appeal remains the Commission’s
responsibility. See id. § 5.2.4.

       4
         See HOUS., TEX., CHARTER, art. V-a, § 3 (1982). As previously mentioned, a terminated
probationary employee is not entitled to a review or hearing by the Commission. HOUS., TEX.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 14, art. II, § 14-125(a) (2015) (“When any employee is removed for
any cause during [the] probationary period, he shall not be entitled to a review or hearing before
the commission.”).

                                                7
       A second, but interrelated, problem with the City’s argument is that the City’s
construction of Executive Order 1-39 would impose a mandatory duty on the
terminated employee but not on the OIG. Executive Order 1-39 specifically states
that “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Executive Order, the Inspector
General may decline to investigate a complaint and instead forward the complaint to
the City’s Human Resources Department or other City department as deemed
appropriate in the sole but reasonable judgment of the Inspector General.” See id.
§ 4.1.4. Thus, the OIG can decline to investigate a Whistleblower Complaint at all.

       In sum, we disagree with the City’s argument that Garcia was required to file
a Whistleblower Complaint with the OIG in order to satisfy the TWA’s requirement
to initiate a pre-suit grievance or appeal procedure. We overrule this part of the
City’s first issue.

B.     Even Absent a Formal Grievance or Appeal Procedure, the TWA
       Claimant Still Must Give the Employer Reasonable Notice of the
       Challenge to the Termination.
       In the trial court, the City’s argument that Garcia did not satisfy the
requirement to initiate a pre-suit grievance or appeal procedure rested solely on
Garcia’s failure to file a complaint with the OIG. In the course of analyzing that
argument, we have shown not only that no complaint to the OIG was required, but
also that Garcia’s termination was neither grievable nor appealable. This brings us
to an additional argument that the City makes for the first time on appeal,
specifically, that Garcia “did not give any notice to Houston before filing her TWA
suit.”5 This argument succeeds only if, despite the absence of an applicable formal

       5
          Emphasis added. See Dall. Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 41 (Tex. 2013)
(per curiam) (appellate courts must consider defendant’s governmental-immunity arguments
raised for the first time on appeal).

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grievance or appeal procedure, Garcia was required to give some notice to the City
that she wanted to administratively challenge her termination.

      Courts of appeals are divided on this issue. Some have held that that when a
governmental employer has no applicable formal grievance or appeal procedure, or
the procedure or its applicability is ambiguous, the terminated employee is not
required to provide the employer with any pre-suit notice of the employee’s desire
to challenge the termination. See, e.g., Perez v. Cameron Cnty., No. 13-17-00581-
CV, 2018 WL 6219630, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 29, 2018,
no pet.) (mem. op.); Leyva v. Crystal City, 357 S.W.3d 93, 103 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2011, no pet.); City of Colorado City v. Ponko, 216 S.W.3d 924, 927–28
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.). Others have held that the complainant
nevertheless is required to give the employer reasonable notice that the complainant
“intends to appeal a specific disciplinary decision and assert a Whistleblower Act
claim.” See, e.g., Douglas v. Houston Housing Auth., No. 01-11-00508-CV, 2013
WL 2389893, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Univ.
of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d 767, 774–75 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (op. on denial of reh’g).

      It is the binding precedent of this Court that the absence of a formal procedure
does not relieve the employee of the requirement to initiate a grievance, even if the
employee must do so informally. See, e.g., Ward v. Lamar Univ., 484 S.W.3d 440,
447–48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (sub. op.); Berry v. Bd. of
Regents of Tex. S. Univ., 116 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2003, pet. denied). “[T]he notice given to an employer must provide fair notice that
the employee desires to appeal the employer’s personnel decision and fair notice of
the decision made by the employer from which the employee desires to appeal.”
Ward, 484 S.W.3d at 447. Thus, if the City is correct that Garcia provided no pre-

                                          9
suit notice that she wanted her termination reversed, then it follows that Garcia failed
to satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit and the City’s immunity remains intact.

      Garcia responds that she “reached out to her manager, Paul Prado, both
verbally and via email, about the status of her employment and her belief that she
may be retaliated against for speaking out against the City.”6 But, such statements
satisfy neither of the requirements described in Ward, for the italicized language
refers only to the possibility that Garcia might be subjected to adverse personnel
action in the future. This is confirmed in that the only evidence Garcia cites of her
communications with Prado that touch on the subject of termination happened
months before she was terminated. Specifically, Garcia initiated an investigation in
March 2020 into the slated termination of a probationary employee for job
abandonment after the employee was instructed by his medical provider to
quarantine due to a family member’s positive test for COVID-19. That employee
shared office space with two other employees who were not notified of their potential
exposure and began to show symptoms of the virus. In a declaration in response to
the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, Garcia describes her conversations with Prado
about these individuals as follows:

      When I elevated their concerns up the chain of command, I was verbally
      reprimanded by my manager, Paul Prado, who initially was supportive
      of my inquiry but later, out of fear that he himself would be terminated,
      instructed me to drop my inquiry. . . . Paul Prado later shared with me
      that Nancy Yue verbally instructed him to instruct me to move forward
      with the probationary employee’s termination.
These conversations concerned only one employee’s actual termination and another
employee’s fear of termination; they did not address Garcia’s termination or notify
the City that Garcia sought administrative review of her termination. Indeed, Garcia

      6
          Emphasis added.

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neither alleged nor offered evidence that she or her counsel spoke or wrote to the
City at all during the interval between her termination her filing of this suit.

      We therefore sustain this argument.

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

      Because Garcia gave the City no pre-suit notification that she wanted her
termination set aside, the jurisdictional prerequisites to suit were not satisfied, and
the City’s immunity remains intact. Thus, without reaching the City’s remaining
arguments, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction
and render judgment for the City. See Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d at 188.

                                        /s/     Tracy Christopher
                                                Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan.

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