Court Opinion

ID: 9884087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:35:14.158155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:47.533561
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Justice
(dissenting) :
Defendant assigns for error the action of the trial court in overruling defendant’s motion for new trial. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling those grounds of the motion wherein defendant asserts that Melinda Weaver Wilkes was a member of the venire from which the jury was chosen and failed to answer questions propounded to the venire by the trial court on voir dire and that, because of the failure of Melinda Wilkes to answer, defendant was prejudiced. Ground 50 of the motion recites:
“50. For that information has come to the defendant since the trial of this cause that juror Melinda Weaver Wilks (sic), a member of the Petit Jury in the trial of this cause, had complained of high bills to personnel of Alabama Power Company’s District Office in Phenix City, Alabama, in July, 1972, and September, 1972, and said juror failed to respond to the Court’s question on voir dire examination when the jury venire was questioned as to whether or not any one of them had ever complained of high bills or had any other dispute with the defendant, Alabama Power Company.”
Melinda Wilkes did serve as a member of the jury which returned the verdict against defendant.
The trial began October 5, 1972. The record discloses that the trial court, on voir dire examination of the venire, made the following statement:
“ . . . How many of you are customers of the Alabama Power Company? Start here. Just stand and give your name.”
Then follows a list of twenty-three names, including the name: Melinda Wilkes.
The court then said to the venire:
“THE COURT: Now, then, whether you are customers now or even if you have been customers in the past, during such time have you ever had occasion to make a complaint — I wouldn’t want to know what it was — either with reference to service or a bill or whatever, make some sort of complaint of some kind? I just want to know whether you have had occasion to make a complaint. All right,
“Do any of you know of any reason why you could not be fair and impartial if selected to serve as a juror in this case?
“I will expand the question before that one. I asked you if you had ever had occasion to question something. Has any member of your - immediate family ever had such an occasion, your own family or perhaps your parents or someone? ...”
The record indicates that four jurors (Rushin, Mathews, Funderburk, and Allen) responded to the court’s question by giving their names.
On the hearing of the motion for new trial, four employees of defendant testified.
*5941. Annelle Webb testified that she is employed in the accounting department; that she talked with Melinda Wilkes after Melinda Wilkes made a complaint on September 14, 1972; that the conversation was “Somewhere between this date and the end of the month”; that the complaint of September 14 was “a high bill complaint”; that the conversation was by telephone; and that the witness “Just informed her (Melinda Wilkes) that we had checked her meter and that it was reading correctly.” (Par. Supplied)
2. Wylean Lunsford testified that she is a customer contact clerk; that a first cousin of Melinda Wilkes is married to a brother of the witness; that the witness talked to Melinda Wilkes by telephone about the first or second week of July, 1972; that the witness was at work; that the substance of the conversation was that Melinda Wilkes had been having trouble with her air conditioner; that defendant’s repairman had been to the house of Melinda Wilkes and had told her that it would take about three weeks to obtain a part for the air conditioner; that it had been more than three weeks at the time of conversation; and that Melinda Wilkes “ . was unhappy about the air conditioner not being repaired.”
The witness testified that Melinda Wilkes called again within a week or maybe less, and that the substance of the conversation was as follows:
“A. Well, she told me her air conditioner had not been repaired yet, and that she didn’t want to get ugly about it but she felt like that we had had more than enough time to get the part in and it still had not been repaired.”
The witness testified that on July 19, Melinda Wilkes called the witness “to complain about her bill”; and that the substance of the conversation was as follows:
“A. Well, she told me that her air conditioner had been out of order and she had not used it any during this billing period and that she felt her bill was much too high because the air conditioner had not been used.”
The witness testified that Melinda Wilkes called again on September 14, 1972, and the substance of the conversation was as follows:
“A. Well, she felt that her bill — there was so much difference in her bill the month before and that month, and that it was much too high, and she didn’t feel that she had possibly used that much current.”
The witness testified on cross examination that Melinda called later in October about the repair bill which was “In the neighborhood of $90.00.”
On redirect, the witness testified that on the first three occasions Mrs. Wilkes “sounded upset” but she did not sound upset on the last occasion.
3. Arthur Kelley testified that he talked with Melinda Wilkes by telephone on August 7, 1972, in response to a complaint about her bill; that he advised her that “the billing in question was correct.” On cross examination the witness testified:
“A. No, she was not upset. She just questioned the bill.”
4. Billy B. Norris testified that he was employed by defendant as an appliance repairman ; that he talked with Melinda Wilkes in June, 1972, about a window air conditioning unit; that the motor was bad; that it was necessary to order a new motor; that it took about a month to get it; that he put it in the air conditioning unit in “the latter part of June or the first of July”; that he talked with Mrs. Wilkes at her house; and that she called several times about the part, when it would come in or why it took so long to get it.
The witness testified that no unpleasantness was involved as far as he was con*595cerned; that she did “express concern over the bill”; and when he went out to make the repair, “She was perturbed, yes, sir.”
Melinda Wilkes testified that in July or August, 1972, her air conditioner would not run and she called Norris and asked him to come out and check the air conditioner; “He said he could but it would be the Alabama Power Company. And I said that would be fine.”; that the period of time between the first call and the actual repair was about two and a half to three months during the summer; that she made one or more calls checking to see when the work would be done; that she always called Mrs. Lunsford, who was a friend; that she asked Mrs. Lunsford could we get an itemized statement and she said yes; that the witness said “ ‘It seems, you know, high.’ ”; that she got a statement but she does not remember how it was itemized; that when she would look at a bill and consider it to be possibly high she would use another statement, a prior bill, and “We have a folder and we keep all our bills.”
The witness testified that she remembered the judge asking questions about whether any of the potential jurors had filed a complaint with defendant, but she did not stand up and inform the judge that she had complained; and that she did not know that she was complaining.
On cross examination, Melinda Wilkes testified:
“Q. And if testimony was given about a number of phone calls to the Power Company inquiring about bills, you would agree with that. You don’t deny you made the calls ?
“A. I made the calls.
“Q. But you don’t call them complaints ?
“A. No. I just like to know.
“Q. You were questioning the bill, then?
“A. No. I just like to make sure.
“Q. You were questioning the amount of the bill, was what you considered yourself doing ?
“A. Yes.”
As stated above, the trial began October 5, 1972. Mrs. Wilkes acknowledged that she had made numerous “calls” to the office of defendant during the three preceding summer months. She testified that her air conditioner would not run; that two and a half months’ delay occurred between her first call to defendant about the air conditioner and its actual repair. She had made numerous calls in which she “questioned” the correctness of bills she had received from defendant. As noted above, she called Wylean Lunsford on September 14, 1972, three weeks before the day of trial with respect to a bill, and “Well, she felt that her bill — there was so much difference in her bill the month before and that month, and that it was much too high, and she didn’t feel that she had possibly used that much current.”
The testimony on the hearing of the motion can lead only to the conclusion that Mrs. Wilkes had had such experiences in her dealings with the defendant during the summer immediately preceding the trial in October that, at the least, would produce feelings of frustration and resentment, and in most persons would naturally result in hostility and prejudice against defendant.
Nevertheless, she did not respond to the inquiry by the court asking jurors whether they had made “some sort of complaint” against defendant, or “had occasion to question something.” As a result of her failure to answer, defendant was denied the right to advisedly exercise its peremptory strikes in selection of the jury. If de*596fendant had been informed that Mrs. Wilkes had made complaints or “questioned” the amount of her bills as shown by the evidence on the hearing of the motion, prudence would have required defendant to regard her as a juror biased against defendant. See Title 30, § 52. In reversing for failure of jurors to answer on voir dire, this court has said:
“We agree with defendant’s contention that parties have a right to have questions answered truthfully to enable them to exercise their discretion wisely in the use of their peremptory strikes. Section 52, Title 30, Code of Alabama, 1940, as last amended. When jurors fail to answer questions correctly, a party is denied the exercise of that right. Morris v. Zac Smith Stationery Co., 274 Ala. 467, 149 So.2d 810; Parkinson v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 4, 88 So.2d 793; Leach v. State, 31 Ala.App. 390, 18 So.2d 285, cert. den. 245 Ala. 539, 18 So.2d 289; Birmingham Electric Co. v. Yoast, 256 Ala. 673, 57 So.2d 103, 30 A.L.R.2d 907.
“Our courts have held that the concealment by a juror of information called for in voir dire examination need not be deliberate in order to justify a reversal, for it may be unintentional, but insofar as the resultant prejudice to a party is concerned it is the same. Leach v. State, supra.
“While some of the failures to answer on voir dire might reasonably be explained away, we feel counsel in this case were deprived of their right to true and correct answers to the questions propounded. This constitutes reversible error.” Sanders v. Scarvey, 284 Ala. 215, 219, 224 So.2d 247, 251.
I am of opinion that the trial court erred to reversal in overruling those grounds of the motion for new trial such as Ground 50 quoted above, and that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for another trial.