Court Opinion

ID: 9750325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:50:09.602536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:07.414181
License: Public Domain

KRIEGLER, J., Dissenting.
The management of the City of Beverly Hills (the City) will undoubtedly be stunned to discover that it is responsible under the workers’ compensation law for an injury suffered by an off-duty police officer engaging in his routine recreational activity of running during a personal vacation in the dead of winter in the State of Wyoming, 1,000 miles from the officer’s place of employment. The City did nothing to lead Officer Dave Tomlin to objectively believe that running while on vacation in Wyoming in December 2005 was an expectancy of his employment. Because Officer Tomlin failed to satisfy the second prong of the “reasonable expectancy” test set forth in Ezzy v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 252, 259-260 [194 Cal.Rptr. 90] (Ezzy), I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the denial of compensation to Officer Tomlin by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.
There is nothing in the record to show that the City had any notice that Officer Tomlin intended to run, on a slippery sidewalk, in the winter in Wyoming. Certainly there is nothing in the record before this court to even *1433remotely suggest that Officer Tomlin could entertain an objectively reasonable belief that running under the conditions in this case was expected of his employment. To hold the City responsible under the workers’ compensation law for Officer Tomlin’s injury runs afoul of the legislative intent behind Labor Code section 3600, subdivision (a)(9).1
An employee “acting within the course of his or her employment” who is injured while “performing service growing out of and incidental to his or her employment,” is entitled to compensation under the workers’ compensation law without regard to negligence. (§ 3600, subd. (a)(2).) “Stated conversely, no recovery may be had where the injury arises from voluntary participation in athletic activities,” subject to exceptions set forth in section 3600, subdivision (a)(9). (Ezzy, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 259.) “Where athletic activities are either a ‘reasonable expectancy of, or are expressly or impliedly required by, the employment’ injuries arising therefrom are compensable.” (Ibid., quoting § 3600, former subd. (a)(8), now § 3600 subd. (a)(9).) The purpose of section 3600, subdivision (a)(9), was to draw a “brighter line delimiting compensability by replacing the general forseeability test with one of ‘reasonable expectancy’ of employment.” (Ezzy, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 261.)
“In applying the reasonable expectancy test, we first consider whether the employee subjectively believed that participation in the activity was expected by the employer. [Citation.] This issue is a question of fact, which we review under the substantial evidence rule. [Citation.] [¶] We then determine whether the employee’s belief was objectively reasonable. [Citation.] This issue is a question of law that we determine independently. [Citation.]” (City of Stockton v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1524 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 474] (City of Stockton).)
The majority’s holding is at odds with the legislative intent of section 3600, subdivision (a)(9), which is “to limit, rather than to expand, the scope of liability that an excessively liberal application of the basic test might support. [Citations.]” (City of Stockton, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524.) Officer Tomlin suffered his ankle injury during the same routine recreational activity he has engaged in for 15 years. Not only was he engaging in a routine activity, Officer Tomlin was 1,000 miles from the City of Beverly Hills, running in the winter in Wyoming, when he fell on a slippery sidewalk. The City provides paid training for Officer Tomlin four days per month, in addition to sending him to other training events. As a matter of law, it is not *1434objectively reasonable to conclude that this specific form of recreational running was expected by his employer.
Despite the majority’s claim to the contrary, the logical extension of its opinion is that injuries suffered during other recreational activities engaged in while on vacation by a SWAT officer would also be compensable under the workers’ compensation law, if related in some way to the fitness test requiring proficiency in running, climbing, and dragging dead weight. Under the majority’s reasoning, injuries suffered during a myriad of recreational activities—including snow skiing, mountain biking, and mountain climbing— would necessarily be covered, as each would assist a SWAT officer in passing the fitness test. That fact alone, however, is “not sufficient for worker’s compensation coverage since that would impose virtually limitless liability for any recreational or athletic activity in which the employee chooses to participate—a result that would run afoul of the limitation set forth in . . . section 3600, subdivision (a).” (City of Stockton, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516.)
The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board’s conclusions on questions of law are certainly not binding on this court. (City of Long Beach v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 298, 316, fn. 5 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 782]; Kuykendall v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 396, 402 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 130].) But in this case, the decision of the worker’s compensation judge was eminently sound. The workers’ compensation judge found that, if it were objectively reasonable for Officer Tomlin to believe he was expected to jog in strange terrain while on vacation in the middle of winter in Wyoming, then every SWAT officer would be covered 24 hours a day, no matter where the officer was located. Such a result is manifestly inconsistent with the legislative intent of section 3600. “To hold otherwise would in effect render the employer potentially liable for any injury sustained in any recreational or athletic activity if the activity contributed to the employee’s physical fitness. Such broad potential liability would be contrary to the legislative intent of section 3600, subdivision (a)(9).” (Taylor v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 211, 216 [244 Cal.Rptr. 643].)
Wilson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 902 [239 Cal.Rptr. 719] relied upon by the majority, is readily distinguishable on its facts. In Wilson, the injured officer finished his shift and drove to a local community college to run on the track, where he injured his ankle. “The legal question here, as in Ezzy v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.[, supra,] 146 Cal.App.3d 252 . . . , is whether petitioner’s participation in the off-duty athletic activity was a reasonable expectancy of his employment by City.” (Wilson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 905.) *1435Wilson concluded it was. However, whatever expectation the City had that SWAT officers maintain a specified level of fitness does not mean that an injury suffered during a voluntary recreational activity while on vacation in another state is compensable. The injury suffered by Officer Tomlin is beyond the scope of section 3600, subdivision (a)(9).
I would affirm the order.
The petition of respondent The City of Beverly Hills for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 30, 2008, SI64647. George, C. J., did not participate therein.

 Statutory references are to the Labor Code.