Court Opinion

ID: 9965035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 15:12:55.356142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:56.167052
License: Public Domain

338                    May 1, 2024                   No. 279

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                  Erwin Singh BRAICH,
                in his capacity as the sole
             Trustee of the Peregrine Trust,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
                              v.
                      Ricky SMITH;
                Sable Palm Development,
      a corporation of the Turks and Caicos Islands,
                   British West Indies;
          C & S Mining, LLC; and Janice Cone,
                 Defendant-Respondents,
                            and
                Jane and John DOE 1-20,
                        Defendants.
               Grant County Circuit Court
                   21CV07957; A179038

  Robert S. Raschio, Judge.
  Argued and submitted March 28, 2024.
   Brooks Cooper argued the cause for respondents. Also on
the brief was Matthew Whitman.
  Michael Vergamini filed the brief for appellant.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and DeVore,
Senior Judge.
  EGAN, J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 332 Or App 338 (2024)                                 339

         EGAN, J.
         Plaintiff, as the sole trustee of the Peregrine Trust
(the trust), filed a complaint pro se in the Grant County
Circuit Court, alleging that defendants breached an agree-
ment to sell a gold mine to the trust, seeking specific per-
formance. On defendants’ motion, the trial court dismissed
plaintiff’s claim, and plaintiff appeals. We conclude that the
trial court did not err in dismissing the claim and therefore
affirm.
         ORS 9.320 provides:
       “Any action, suit, or proceeding may be prosecuted or
   defended by a party in person, or by attorney, except that
   the state or a party that is not a natural person appears by
   attorney in all cases, unless otherwise specifically provided
   by law. Where a party appears by attorney, the written pro-
   ceedings must be in the name of the attorney, who is the
   sole representative of the client of the attorney as between
   the client and the adverse party, except as provided in ORS
   9.310.”
Under ORS 9.320, a business trust must be represented by
an attorney, and a nonlawyer may not represent a business
trust before the court. Marguerite E. Wright Trust v. Dept. of
Rev., 297 Or 533, 536-37, 685 P2d 418 (1984); see also Oregon
Peaceworks Green, PAC v. Sec. of State, 311 Or 267, 271, 810
P2d 836 (1991) (same rule with respect to unincorporated
associations). It is undisputed that the trust was subject to
ORS 9.320. The trust was thus required to be represented
by an attorney in order to pursue a claim in a court of law.
Plaintiff’s complaint was signed by plaintiff as trustee and
was not signed by an attorney. Thus, defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint.
         Plaintiff subsequently retained attorney Andrew
Martin. After Martin filed a notice of his representation
of plaintiff with the court, the parties stipulated to a with-
drawal of defendants’ motion to dismiss. The parties then
entered into a written settlement agreement, under which
plaintiff agreed to pay defendants the sum of $500,000, as
earnest money for the purchase of the mine, in exchange for
the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. The settlement agree-
ment stated:
340                                           Braich v. Smith

   “[I]f the earnest money is not deposited within three days
   after the open of escrow this agreement [sic] none of the
   Parties shall have any further obligations under this
   agreement except any lawsuits currently pending between
   the Parties shall be dismissed with prejudice.”
         Plaintiff never deposited the earnest money. Martin,
who had not filed an amended complaint on the trust’s
behalf, withdrew from plaintiff’s representation. Defendants
thus renewed their motion to dismiss, asserting once again
that plaintiff did not have representation by an attorney, as
required by ORS 9.320. As additional grounds for dismissal,
defendants asserted that the complaint failed to state a
claim for breach of a contract to sell the mine, because it
did not allege a written agreement, ORS 41.580 (Oregon’s
statute of frauds), and, further, that dismissal was required
under the parties’ settlement agreement, which defendants
attached to the complaint, after plaintiff failed to deposit
the required sum in escrow.
         On the date of the hearing on defendants’ motion
to dismiss, attorney Sunny Kakwani filed a notice of “lim-
ited scope representation” of plaintiff, for the hearing only.
Plaintiff, again in his capacity as trustee for the Peregrine
Trust, filed a “motion for adjournment,” seeking postpone-
ment of the hearing so that counsel could prepare. The trial
court summarily denied plaintiff’s motion because it had
not been filed by an attorney. Kakwani, appearing at the
hearing on plaintiff’s behalf, did not address the court’s rul-
ing or renew plaintiff’s motion for a postponement.
         Kakwani did not offer any argument on the mer-
its of defendants’ motion to dismiss. He asked the court to
allow the matter to continue, because plaintiff wished to
have time to “unravel” some “malfeasance.”
        The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss
and agreed with defendants that the dismissal should be
with prejudice, as provided in the parties’ settlement agree-
ment. The judgment states that the complaint is dismissed
because plaintiff did not have an attorney, as required by
ORS 9.320, and therefore could not maintain the action.
The judgment further states that dismissal was required
Cite as 332 Or App 338 (2024)                                           341

by the parties’ settlement agreement after plaintiff failed to
deposit the required earnest money.
        Both of plaintiff’s assignments of error on appeal
challenge the trial court’s granting of defendants’ motion
for dismissal. Plaintiff’s first assignment of error asserts
that the trial court erred in determining that the complaint
must be dismissed because plaintiff lacked “capacity” to sue.
However, the basis for dismissal, as stated in the judgment,
was not a lack of capacity; rather, the judgment states that
the complaint was dismissed because the trust was not rep-
resented by counsel, as required by ORS 9.320. We do not
see where in the record plaintiff preserved a challenge to
that determination. But if and to the extent that plaintiff
did preserve the contention, we conclude that the trial court
did not err. Under ORS 9.320, plaintiff could not represent
the trust in court. The complaint was required to be signed
by an attorney, and it was not. The fact that plaintiff had
retained counsel on the day of the hearing for the limited
purpose of attending the hearing did not relieve plaintiff of
that requirement.1
         In his second assignment of error, plaintiff chal-
lenges the trial court’s determination that dismissal was
required by the parties’ settlement agreement. Plaintiff
contends that the trial court’s ruling as to the effect of the
parties’ settlement agreement wrongfully determined a
factual matter that could not be decided on the pleadings,
in essence treating the motion to dismiss as a motion for
summary judgment. It does not appear that plaintiff pre-
served his challenge to the trial court’s ruling. But even if
his challenge is preserved, or if, as plaintiff suggests, we
were to review the assignment as presenting plain error,
we would conclude that, in light of our determination on the
first assignment that the trial court did not err in dismiss-
ing the complaint, which is dispositive, we need not address
the challenge raised by the second assignment.
          Affirmed.

    1
      Under the first assignment, plaintiff also contends that the trial court
should not have denied his “motion for adjournment.” Any argument relating to
that ruling is not preserved and we therefore decline to address it.