Court Opinion

ID: 9690379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:10:02.611201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:56.283870
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 46. (dissenting). The majority sets forth the test to determine whether, as a matter of law, a police officer's statements given in a criminal investigation are coerced, and therefore sub*663ject to suppression under Garrity v. New Jersey,1 385 U.S. 493 (1967). The majority opinion articulates the test as follows: "in order for statements to be considered sufficiently compelled such that Garrity immunity attaches, a police officer must subjectively believe he or she will be fired for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination, and that belief must be objectively reasonable." Majority op., ¶ 35. The majority then sets forth a framework within which to apply this subjective/objective test:
Under this test, we examine the totality of the circumstances, but an express threat of job termination or a statute, regulation, rule, or policy in effect at the time of the questioning which provides for an officer's termination for failing to answer the questions posed, will be sufficient circumstance to constitute coercion in almost any conceivable situation.
Id., ¶ 3 (emphasis added). I agree wholeheartedly with the test laid out by the majority. I write separately because it is my belief that Vanessa Brockdorf s (Brock-dorf) circumstances fall squarely within that test.2 She received no warnings, either those required by Miranda *664v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 436 (1966) had she been in custody, nor those required by Garrity, and reasonably believed that she could face a criminal charge and ultimately termination of her job as a Milwaukee police officer, if she invoked her privilege against self-incrimination, and thus failed to cooperate by answering the questions posed by the internal affairs detectives. If what occurred here is not coercion, without any of the required warnings, then I don't know what is. Her subsequent statement, given under such circumstances, was properly suppressed by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, since it was not a voluntary statement. Applying a totality of the circumstances approach, what occurred here was clearly coercive in nature, and certainly was not voluntary under the Garrity decision. Consistent with this court's holding in Oddsen v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners for the City of Milwaukee, 108 Wis. 2d 143, 321 N.W.2d 161 (1982), the statement extracted from Brockdorf was "coerced, involuntary, the result of a denial of due process, and contrary to fundamental principles of decency and fair play." Odd-sen at 146.
¶ 47. When Brockdorf arrived at work on October 3, 2002, she was ordered by her sergeant to report to internal affairs. Brockdorf testified that she immediately went to internal affairs, where Detectives Harrison and Wick informed her that they wanted to "requestion [her] regarding the battery, regarding [her] partner."
¶ 48. While it is undisputed that neither Detective Harrison nor Detective Wick made any statement to the effect that Brockdorf would be terminated if she refused to answer their questions, as the majority has explained such an express threat is not necessary to support an objectively reasonable fear of termination. *665Any "regulation, rule, or policy in effect at the time of the questioning which provides for an officer's termination for failing to answer the questions posed, will be sufficient circumstance to constitute coercion in almost any conceivable situation." Majority op., ¶ 3. The Milwaukee Police Department Policies and Procedures themselves clearly lend ample support to the objective reasonableness of Brockdorf s subjective belief that she would ultimately be fired, if she did not answer the questions of the detectives from internal affairs.
¶ 49. The undisputed facts show that upon arriving at work, Brockdorf was ordered by her supervisor to report to internal affairs. After requesting the presence of a police union representative, she sat for an hour without responding to the internal affairs detectives' questions. Brockdorf soon became a target of the investigation, contrary to the initial representations of Detective Harrison. Further, Brockdorf was threatened with a charge of obstructing an officer if she failed to cooperate by providing a statement.
¶ 50. At the hearing on the motion to suppress her October 3, 2003 statement, the following occurred:
[Attorney Kohler:] Be specific on who said what to you, if you recall.
[Officer Brockdorf:] Well what I recall is I remember I was up there for like an hour before I even said anything, because I said, "I don't want to talk without a union rep." And I don't remember who said it, but they were both saying to me — I remember they both said to me, "If you don't talk now, you're going to get charged with obstructing." And I went back and forth on if I should wait. But then I was like, well, I don't want to get charged with obstructing.
Q Did you feel as a police officer you had to answer their questions?
*666A Yes. Because I would have been charged with obstructing if I didn't.
Q Is that the only reason you answered their questions?
A Yes.
Q Did you think what would happen to you if you were charged with obstructing?
A Well they always say in the academy that you get fired for lying, that it's a grave disqualification.
Q Other than being charged [with obstructing], did you fear for your job at that point?
A Yes, because I didn't — first I wasn't the target, and then all of a sudden I became the target of this investigation.
Q What did you think was going to happen to you if you didn't talk to them, other than being charged with obstructing?
A I figured I'd later be fired.
Q So are those the two reasons why you consented to the interview?
A Yes.
¶ 51. Wisconsin Stat. § 946.41 (2003-04) provides, in relevant part: "Resisting or obstructing officer. (1) Whoever knowingly resists or obstructs an officer while such officer is doing any act in an official capacity and with lawful authority, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." Being charged with a Class A misdemeanor violates Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) Policies *667and Procedures,3 Rule 2/015.00, which requires that "[m] embers of the police force shall... conform to, abide by and enforce all the criminal laws of the State of Wisconsin and the ordinances of the city of Milwaukee. ..." Furthermore, as a member of the MPD, Brock-dorf was required to "promptly obey any lawful order emanating from any officer of higher rank...." MPD Policies and Procedures, Rule 4, Section 2/030.00. A Milwaukee police officer may be terminated based upon the violation of such rules. Rule 1, Section 1/010.20 provides, in relevant part, "[t]he Chief of Police may at his discretion punish by dismissal, demotion, or suspension any member of the Department guilty of violating any of its rules and regulations." In addition, obstructing or failing to give the statement demanded could place Brockdorf in violation of Rule 4, Section 2/010.00, which states in relevant part "Failure on the part of members of the Department to acquaint themselves with and abide by the provisions of the Department's Rules and Procedures Manual as hereby directed shall be considered neglect of duty and shall subject such members to disciplinary action."
¶ 52. Similarly, a charge of obstructing or failing to give the statement demanded could also violate Rule 4, Section 2/110.00, requiring that "Members of the Department shall communicate promptly to their commanding *668officer all catastrophes, crimes ... which may come to their attention. Members shall not withhold 'tips' or information with a view to personal achievement or for any other reason." In addition, obstructing or failing to give the statement demanded could be considered a violation of Rule 4, Section 2/035.00, which requires that members of the MPD "promptly communicate in writing to their commanding officer any violation of the Department Rules and Procedures Manual or disobedience of others by any other member that may come to their knowledge." Moreover, obstructing or failing to give the statement demanded could legitimately be considered "shrinking] from ... responsibility" in violation of Rule 4, Section 2/050.00, which results in one being "considered guilty of gross neglect of duty and unworthy of a place in the service."
¶ 53. Brockdorf knew that internal affairs wanted to meet with her. She was told that if she failed to respond to the investigators' questions, she would be charged with obstructing. In light of the MPD Policies and Procedures, it was objectively reasonable for Brock-dorf to believe that she faced a Gamiy-like choice of self-incrimination or job forfeiture. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 469. As the Garrity Court explained, "[wjhere the choice is 'between the rock and the whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the other." Id. at 498.
¶ 54. The majority emphasizes the fact that "Brockdorf was questioned pursuant to a criminal investigation as opposed to a personnel investigation." Majority op., ¶ 39 (emphasis in original). Only in personnel investigations, the majority opinion claims, does the MPD Policies and Procedures Manual require Garrity warnings.4 Id. Therefore, the majority con-*669eludes, it was unreasonable for Brockdorf to believe she faced termination if she failed to answer internal affairs' questions. However, the majority opinion fails to be persuasive when it claims that Brockdorf knew she was being interviewed only as part of a criminal, rather than a personnel, investigation. Where in the record is it established that she understood such meaningful distinction where internal affairs was involved? Nowhere in the record before us.
¶ 55. The direct examination of Detective Harrison establishes that the internal affairs division has responsibility to investigate both personnel and criminal matters.
[Mr. Reddin:] How long have you been a Milwaukee police officer?
[Detective Harrison:] In April it will be 11 years.
Q And what is your current duty assignment?
A I'm a detective in internal affairs division.
Q And are you in the personnel side or the criminal side?
A Criminal side.
We again emphasize that nothing in the record shows that it was made clear to Brockdorf that the investigation by internal affairs was criminal, and not a personnel matter. As Detective Harrison further testified:
[Attorney Reddin:] And did you advise her prior to speaking to her about the nature of the investigation?
*670[Detective Harrison:] Yes.
Q What did you tell her?
A I advised her that we wanted to question her regarding a use of force complaint and that she was not the target of the investigation.
Such a statement certainly does not clearly indicate that the investigation was criminal in nature. It appears that no one explained to Broekdorf the difference between a criminal and a personnel investigation by internal affairs.
¶ 56. It is also apparent from Brockdorfs own testimony that she was confused as to the nature of the investigation that resulted in her questioning by internal affairs.
[Officer Broekdorf:] I said I didn't want to talk without a union rep.
[Attorney Kohler:] And why did you want a union rep?
A Because I didn't know what was going on, and I should have had a union rep the first time they talked to me.
Furthermore, although the detectives might have indicated the questioning concerned the actions of her partner, during the course of her interview with internal affairs, as noted previously, it became clear to Broekdorf that she, herself, had now become the target of an investigation — one that she subjectively, and reasonably, believed could ultimately lead to her termination as a Milwaukee police officer.
¶ 57. Therefore, while the record may arguably show that Broekdorf was interviewed on October 3, 2003, as part of a criminal, rather than a personnel, *671investigation, nothing establishes that Brockdorf herself understood such a significant distinction, nor could she reasonably be expected to understand the difference under the totality of the circumstances that occurred here.
¶ 58. The MPD Policies and Procedures contain several rules that a charge of obstructing or failing to give the statement demanded could have violated, thus subjecting Brockdorf to disciplinary charges. That, coupled with the fact that such disciplinary actions for such violations could result in termination, clearly establishes that "a. . . regulation, rule, or policy... which provides for an officer's termination for failing to answer the questions posed" was in effect at the time Brockdorf was forced to choose. Majority op., ¶ 3. Her impossible choice was between self-incrimination and the resulting criminal charge of obstructing, or a charge of obstructing or failing to give the statement demanded. Either way, the likely result was the ultimate termination of her job as a Milwaukee police officer. Under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable that Brockdorf subjectively believed she would ultimately face termination for failing to answer questions of the detectives from internal affairs, and her answers were, therefore, coerced, and Garrity applies. Her statement was correctly suppressed by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, since it was inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
¶ 59. For the above stated reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 60. I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. PROSSER and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion.

 In Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), the United States Supreme Court considered a case in which police officers who were the subject of an investigation were given the choice to incriminate themselves or to face termination. The Supreme Court held that, under those circumstances, the confessions elicited from the officers were coerced, and therefore inadmissible in any subsequent criminal prosecution under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

 The majority opinion appropriately concludes that Vanessa Brockdorf (Brockdorf) satisfied the subjective portion of the test. See majority op., ¶ 37. I take issue only with the majority's conclusion that Brockdorfs subjective belief was objectively unreasonable. Majority op., ¶ 43.

 The several Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) regulations, rules and policies I cite are variously referred to in MPD materials as "General Rules and Regulations," "Rules & Procedures," and "Policies and Procedures." For the sake of consistency, I will refer to them, collectively, as "Policies and Procedures." The MPD Policies and Procedures referred to in this opinion were either submitted by the parties, or were taken from the Milwaukee Police Department web site. Available at: http://www.city.milwaukee.gov/display/router.asp?docid=5011.

 The Garrity warnings used by the MPD provide " 'Refusal to respond during this investigation, or any response which is *669untruthful, could result in your suspension or termination from the Milwaukee Police Department.'" Majority op., ¶ 39 n.8 (citation omitted).