Court Opinion

ID: 9771230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:37:27.456716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:27.201110
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
Believing that Justice Cohen’s Opinion on Rehearing in the Court of Appeals correctly addressed the issue presented here, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s summary remand.
The majority correctly sets forth the facts. What needs to be remembered is that the motion to suppress was based on the theory that the initial traffic stop was illegal. The memorandum of law addressed the lawfulness of the police actions after the initial traffic stop. On the day the hearing resumed, neither party offered testimony, although the appellant offered into evidence Defense Exhibits 2 and 3. Appellant then rested his case and the prosecutor stated she had nothing further on the motion. The defense attorney stated that he had provided a memorandum of law to the trial court, and the trial judge responded that he had read the memorandum of law but announced that he was “going to deny the Motion to Suppress.”
Article 28.01, Section 1, V.A.C.C.P., provides for pretrial hearings on suppression motions.
“When a criminal case is set for such pretrial hearing, any such preliminary matters not raised or filed seven days before the hearing will not thereafter be allowed to be raised or filed, except by permission of the court for good cause shown....” Article 28.01, Section 2, supra.
Appellant’s memorandum obviously was not filed seven days “before the hearing.” Instead, it was filed on the last day of the hearing after the State had presented its evidence in response to the motion to suppress. The trial court gave appellant no permission to raise the new matters contained in appellant’s memorandum, nor did appellant show good cause for his tardiness in raising these claims. According to Article 28.01, appellant failed to preserve error.
Appellant also waived his claims because he did not secure an adverse ruling on his memorandum. In order to preserve error, the defendant must obtain an adverse ruling from the trial court. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 202, 116 L.Ed.2d 162 (1991). In this instance, the trial court ruled on the motion to suppress, not the memorandum of law. Appellant may have hoped for a ruling on the grounds he raised in his memorandum, but he failed to *739secure one. The fact that the trial court admitted to reading the memorandum does not constitute a ruling on it. By its own terms, the memorandum called for no ruling.
Furthermore, one purpose of requiring a specific objection is to allow the opposing party to “remove the objection or supply other testimony.” Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). That purpose was not served in this instance. Appellant did not raise his new grounds until after the State had presented its evidence, and the record clearly demonstrates that the State addressed only the ground raised in appellant’s motion to suppress, that is, the validity of the traffic stop. When the State offered its evidence on the motion to suppress, it had no notice that appellant would contest anything other than the traffic stop.
Appellant waived his point of error, and the Court of Appeals correctly disposed of his contentions on that basis. Appellant’s sole ground for review is without merit and should be refused.
For these reasons, I dissent.
WHITE and MEYERS, JJ., join this dissent.