Court Opinion

ID: 9956235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 16:00:52.715731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:15.861993
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     APR 1 2024
                                                                  MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                         FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BBK TOBACCO & FOODS LLP, DBA HBI Nos. 22-16190
International, an Arizona limited liability       22-16281
partnership,
                                            D.C. No. 2:19-cv-05216-MTL
      Plaintiff-counter-
      defendant-Appellant / Cross-Appellee,
                                            MEMORANDUM
  v.

CENTRAL COAST AGRICULTURE, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,

      Defendant-counter-claimant-
      Appellee / Cross-Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Arizona
                  Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

                   Argued and Submitted September 15, 2023
                           Arizona State University

Before: HURWITZ, BUMATAY, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge BUMATAY.

      BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP (“BBK”) distributes and sells “RAW” branded

smoking accessories. It alleges that Central Coast Agriculture, Inc. (“CCA”)

infringed on its “RAW” mark by selling cannabis products with the mark “Raw

Garden.” BBK’s operative complaint alleged seven claims: trademark infringement,
false designation of origin, and anti-cybersquatting under the Lanham Act;

trademark infringement and unfair competition under Arizona common law; a

petition to void several CCA trademark applications due to a lack of bona fide intent

to use the relevant trademark in commerce in violation of the Lanham Act; and false

advertising under the Lanham Act. CCA counterclaimed, seeking to cancel several

BBK trademark registrations for fraud and unlawful use.

      The district court dismissed BBK’s false advertising claim and granted

summary judgment on every remaining claim. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of CCA on BBK’s trademark and unfair competition claims,

holding that there is no likelihood of confusion between BBK’s “RAW” branded

rolling papers and smoking accessories and CCA’s “Raw Garden” cannabis

products. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of BBK on (1)

BBK’s claim to void several of CCA’s trademark applications; 1 and (2) CCA’s

counterclaim to cancel BBK’s trademark registrations for unlawful use. Both parties

appealed.

      We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel,

Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2008). Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse

of discretion, and we reverse only if the exercise of discretion is both erroneous and

1
      In a separately filed opinion, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of BBK on its claim to cancel several of CCA’s trademark
applications.

                                          2
prejudicial. Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011).

Underlying factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. United States v.

Lukashov, 694 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm in part and reverse in

part.

        1.    To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion, we consider

the eight non-exhaustive Sleekcraft factors: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity

of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5)

marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be

exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8)

likelihood of expansion of the product lines. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d

341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated in part on other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v.

Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).

        At minimum, BBK raised material issues of fact regarding the strength of the

marks, relatedness of the goods, marketing channels, likelihood of expansion, degree

of consumer care, and intent to confuse. The strength of BBK’s mark may also affect

the importance of any dissimilarities between the marks. Entrepreneur Media, Inc.

v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1145 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the trademark holder’s mark

were strong, the fact that a consumer would likely notice the difference between two

marks might not suffice for a finding that the marks are dissimilar.”). We have

cautioned that “district courts should grant summary judgment motions regarding

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the likelihood of confusion sparingly,” Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret

Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Thane Int’l,

Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2002)), and that

“[g]ranting summary judgment in cases in which a majority of the Sleekcraft factors

could tip in either direction is inconsistent with that principle.” Id. The evidence

supporting most of these factors is evenly matched or tips only slightly in favor of

either party. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on

BBK’s trademark claims.2

      2.    The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting confusion

evidence from CCA’s experts, Dr. Tulin Erdem and Dr. Elizabeth Honka. BBK’s

objections to specific questions in the survey go to the weight of the evidence, not

its admissibility. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d

832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In considering what weight to give a survey, the court

may consider a variety of factors, including survey design, nature of the questions

asked, and the experience and reputation of the surveyor.”). The district court also

did not clearly err when it found that, although CCA’s counsel had input, they did

not fully design or implement the survey.

2
       We take judicial notice of BBK’s trademark application for the mark “RAW
BLACK” but do not rely on the truth of the contents of the application to establish
likelihood of confusion. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir.
2001).

                                         4
       3.     The district court granted summary judgment on BBK’s cybersquatting

claim on the same likelihood of confusion analysis it applied to BBK’s trademark

claims. Because we reverse the district court’s summary judgment on BBK’s

trademark claims, we also reverse on BBK’s cybersquatting claim. We have also

found the Sleekcraft factors a “poor fit” for the cybersquatting confusion analysis

“because they are designed to address a different social harm than the cybersquatting

statute.” DSPT Int’l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1222 n.28 (9th Cir. 2010)

(instead considering whether the marks were similar and if there was evidence of

customer confusion). We thus remand to the district court to conduct this separate

analysis in the first instance.

       4.     CCA’s unlawful use counterclaim seeks to void BBK’s trademark

registrations by claiming its products are unlawful drug paraphernalia. See AK

Futures LLC v. Boyd St. Distro, LLC, 35 F.4th 682, 689 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[O]nly

lawful use in commerce can give rise to trademark priority.” (cleaned up)). The

Controlled Substances Act defines “drug paraphernalia” to include products

designed to aid in preparing or inhaling a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 863(d).

But it also exempts “any item that, in the normal lawful course of business, is . . .

traditionally intended for use with tobacco products, including any pipe, paper, or

accessory.” Id. § 863(f)(2).

       BBK’s goods, which include rolling papers and other smoking accessories

                                         5
such as rolling trays, cigarette tubes, rolling machines, and shredders and grinders,

fall under the tobacco exception. Although CCA presents evidence that BBK

advertises its products for use with cannabis, BBK’s intent is irrelevant to the

applicability of the exception. Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S.

513, 520–21 (1994) (“An item’s ‘traditional’ use is not based on the subjective intent

of a particular defendant.”).3 We thus affirm the summary judgment on CCA’s

counterclaim for BBK.

      We reverse the district court’s summary judgment on Counts I-V, affirm

summary judgment on Counterclaim I, and remand to the district court for

consideration of any remaining issues consistent with this disposition.

      BBK’s motion for judicial notice (Dkt. 23) is GRANTED.

      AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 4

3
      The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Police Chief
Thomas Tiderington’s expert opinion about whether BBK’s products are illegal drug
paraphernalia because he had no expertise about the tobacco exception.
4
      Each party will bear its own costs on appeal.

                                          6
                                                                              FILED
BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP v. Cent. Coast Agric., Inc., No. 22-16190, 22-16281
                                                                        APR 1 2024
BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
                                                                           MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
      I join the memorandum disposition in (1) finding that the district court’s

evidentiary rulings on the expert witnesses were not an abuse of discretion; (2)

affirming the grant of summary judgment for BBK Tobacco & Foods (“BBK”) on

Central Coast Agriculture’s (“CCA”) unlawful use counterclaim; (3) reversing the

grant of summary judgment on BBK’s cybersquatting claim; 1 and (4) granting

BBK’s motion for judicial notice.

      But I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment against

BBK on its trademark infringement and unfair competition claims.

      1.     The district court properly granted summary judgment on BBK’s

trademark infringement claims. “The core element of trademark infringement is the

likelihood of confusion, i.e., whether the similarity of the marks is likely to confuse

customers about the source of the products.” Brookfield Commc’ns., Inc. v. W. Coast

Entm’t. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999) (simplified). Similarity of the

marks “will always be important” in assessing likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1054.

      1
        I join only to the extent that the district court failed to provide specific
reasons for granting summary judgment on the cybersquatting claim. I take no
position on whether summary judgment may be appropriate under the proper legal
framework for 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) claims.
                                          1
      Here, the lack of similarity of the marks is dispositive. Take a look at the two

marks at issue—

      The two marks look nothing alike. With the exception of one word—

“RAW”—being used in both BBK’s and CCA’s marks, the colors, background, font

type, images, and descriptors are all completely different. And the same goes for

their packaging—

      As the old saying goes, a picture is worth a thousand words. So while one

word is the same, here, we have two very different pictures. So there can be no

consumer mistake because the marks are, quite simply, not similar. Because there is

no likelihood of consumer confusion, our inquiry should be complete. See Arcona,

Inc. v. Farmacy Beauty, LLC, 976 F.3d 1074, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming

grant of summary judgment on likelihood of confusion when “no reasonable

consumer would be confused by these two products because the packaging, size,
                                          2
color, shape, and all other attributes—other than the term ‘EYE DEW’—are not

remotely similar”).

      Of course, the district court went further. It also held that, “[g]iven the

obvious and significant differences between the parties’ marks, the absence of actual

confusion, and the low net confusion rates generated by the parties’ surveys,” no

reasonable juror could find for BBK on the likelihood of confusion issue.

      I would thus affirm the grant of summary judgment on BBK’s trademark

infringement and unfair competition claims.

      For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the

grant of summary judgment on BBK’s trademark and unfair competition claims.

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