Court Opinion

ID: 9656966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:09:35.888637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:39.230595
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRÁHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). For the reasons set forth in my concurring opinion in Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 287, 470 N.W.2d 869 (1991), I would reverse the order of the circuit court in this case granting defendants' motion to preclude the plaintiffs from naming liability experts essential to the prosecution of their case.
*318The majority opinion concludes that "under the facts of this case, a reasonable judge could conclude that the conduct of the Schnellers in failing to comply with the scheduling order was egregious and without a clear and justifiable excuse." Majority op. at 316.
I believe the circuit court abused its discretion in effectively dismissing the minors' and parents' causes of action because original counsel failed to comply with court orders without considering the Schnellers' (the parents') personal fault for the conduct of the original counsel. Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 287, 470 N.W.2d 859 (Abrahamson, concurring).
The Schnellers' original counsel was substituted on April 28, 1988. Substituted counsel for the Schnellers promptly took steps to remedy the failure of original counsel to comply with the court scheduling order. On June 10, 1988 the circuit court held a hearing on all pending motions, including the defendants' motion to preclude the plaintiffs from naming experts. The Schnel-lers were not present. No evidence was presented; counsel for the parties argued the motions. Substituted counsel for the Schnellers argued to the circuit court that the Schnellers were personally blameless for any problems in pretrial discovery.
The circuit court did not decide the motions on June 10, 1988. It held its decision in abeyance and declared that no further affidavits or proposals, other than proposed findings and orders, should be presented. On June 24, 1988, the Schnellers' substituted counsel requested an evidentiary hearing so that the Schnellers could explain to the circuit court that they were not personally at fault for their original counsel's failure to name liability experts. Counsel filed affidavits from both Schnellers, detailing their care in selecting original counsel, their frequent communications with counsel, and *319their keeping abreast with pretrial discovery, including reading depositions.
On October 3, the circuit court entered its order, along with findings of fact and conclusions of law and an "Amplification of Findings and Conclusions." The circuit court stated that "I do not feel that it is appropriate to meet with the plaintiffs. I do not feel it is appropriate to reopen evidence. At some point responsibility and finality must be ascertained."
I dissent because I conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion by not considering the personal responsibility or fault of the Schnellers for the conduct of the original counsel. The circuit court may in its discretion decide to impute counsel's conduct to the litigant, but a proper exercise of this discretion requires, in my opinion, consideration of the litigant's personal fault or responsibility.
For the reasons set forth above and in my concurrence in Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 287, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991), I dissent.