Court Opinion

ID: 9790164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:47:34.587002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.870460
License: Public Domain

DEAN KING, District Judge:
I am dissenting in this case, not because I think an injustice has been done, but because I think it establishes a legal precedent which if followed will have a very adverse effect upon judicial proceedings in Montana designed to settle disputes and secure justice as between litigants. Our code system of pleading was adopted as an improvement on the old common-law system in which the pleadings were largely formal and largely legal conclusions. The complaint in this action is similar to but not sufficient as a common-law complaint.
I believe that the more fully the facts are set forth in the pleadings the better it is for the parties, the courts, and the taxpayers. Under the code, where the facts constituting the cause of action are to be set forth in the complaint, denials, admissions and allegations of new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim are required to be set forth in the answer, and demurrers to all pleadings are provided for. Many of the important legal questions which may arise in a given case are decided before trial, when witnesses and jurors are not in attendance, and the judge is not under pressure for an immediate decision. Sometimes those decisions determine the ease. Some times they are such that they enable the parties to get together on a settlement and avoid the trial altogether. Trials are expen*384sive. To wait for the calling of a jury is sometimes a hardship upon a litigant. The more that is decided in advance of a trial the better for all concerned.
Also I have' found in decided cases that sometimes when I start to write my findings of fact and conclusions I think the decision should go one way. By the time I have completed them I see it must go the other way. Writing findings of fact and conclusions of law is the logical procedure for a judge to follow in arriving at the proper judgment. The statute requires it. I do not believe the statutory requirement for writing them should be a mere formality to be brushed aside except in eases where it could clearly serve no purpose.
I think our codes were enacted for the purpose of achieving those results. They require the complaint to state the facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language. Some Montana eases, including this, have added to that requirement “so that the man on the street may know what he is charged with.” I cannot see that that in any way either enlarges or limits the code provision. If the facts constituting the cause of action are set forth in ordinary and concise language he should understand what he is charged with. If they are not, he probably will not so understand.
In this case the complaint alleges only that defendants are indebted to plaintiff $302.74, being the balance due on a sale of stumpage purchased from plaintiff. On direct examination plaintiff testified that he sold the stumpage to one defendant, Oscar Tillman, but did not testify to any agreed price. He further testified that the reasonable value of the stumpage was a certain amount. On cross-examination he further testified that he and Tillman agreed to á price which was the same amount as his testimony showed to be the reasonable value. The findings do not show whether the conclusions and judgment are based on his testimony as to the reasonable value or the agreed price. The law is that if they did not agree on the price that Tillman was indebted to plaintiff for the reasonable value of *385the timber; that if they did agree on a price, no matter if that agreed price was exorbitant, Tillman was indebted to plaintiff for that agreed price. The amount of the indebtedness is based on the facts and law as applied to those facts. It is a conclusion of law as the cases almost universally hold.
Under this decision the majority holds that the result or effect of the facts and the applicable law may be stated in a complaint, and that that result or effect is a statement of the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action. If that principle is applied in all eases it completely destroys our system of pleading designed to keep the law and facts separate, so that much of the law in a case may be decided in advance of the trial.
About the time that California adopted their codes of pleading — the same as ours — judges and lawyers were familiar with common-law pleading. Code pleading was new. The early courts held that pleading according to the common-law counts was sufficient. They have followed that holding although the judges adhering to it frequently have expressed dissatisfaction •with it, and have practically ceased to contend that allegations such as in this case are anything but conclusions of law. The decisions of that state are in confusion. This is discussed further on with regard to Smith v. Bentson, 127 Cal. App. Supp. 789, 15 Pac. (2d) 910.
This decision is somewhat like those California decisions and must lead to the same result — confusion. We cannot cover the whole field of confusion but one phase of it is this. Montana has held that you cannot show the defenses of payment, of a stated account, statute of limitation, and similar defenses, under a general denial. In California, where the complaint is pleaded as a common count the defendant may urge such defenses under a general denial. DeSantis v. Miller Petroleum Co., 29 Cal. App. (2d) 679, 85 Pac. (2d) 489, 491; Evans v. Zeigler, 91 Cal. App (2d) 226, 204 Pac. (2d) 902, 905; Wallace v. Crawford, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 394, 69 Pac. (2d) 455, 461. Also in Heaton-*386Hobson Associated Law Offices v. Arper, 145 Cal. 283, 78 Pac. 721, the syllabus of Pacific Reporter reads:
“In an action for the reasonable value of services, an answer denying that ‘defendant is indebted to the said plaintiff in the sum of $699, or in any sum, ’ is sufficient to present an issue in the-case.”
Another difficulty will arise. If this or any other case with similar pleading is tried with a jury, the jury must determine the facts. The court must instruct them as to the law applicable to those facts. Eliminating the cross-complaint and supporting testimony of defendant, before this decision, we district judges would have instructed the jury in effect, “Defendant has admitted the purchase of timber from plaintiff. If you find that they agreed on the price of the timber sold you will find for the plaintiff in the amount of the agreed price less any payments made by defendant. If you do not find that they agreed on the price you will find for plaintiff in the amount of the reasonable value of the timber taken, less any amount paid by defendant.” Under this decision perhaps we should instruct the jury, “Defendant has admitted the purchase of the timber. Therefore you will find for plaintiff in the amount that defendant owes him.” It is for the jury to determine the ultimate facts. Under this decision the only ultimate fact for the jury to determine is the amount that defendant owes the plaintiff.
Under this Montana decision the whole field of special defenses ,and counterclaims will need to be covered by supreme court decisions, and until those decisions are made, district courts -will be in the dark with regard to what evidence should be admitted on a general denial of complaints similar to this.
•. The majority opinion states that in this case “plaintiff has based his complaint upon the action on account, or as it is commonly known, on an ‘open account’.” I cannot find that we haye, in Montana “the action on account.” All that I can find is the general rule for pleading all actions and section 93-3804, *387R. C. M. 1947, which, relieves the pleader, in setting forth the facts of the existence of an account, from setting forth the items of that account. I do not think the Georgia rule cited in the majority opinion of Taylor v. Sterns Coal Co., 44 Ga. App. 662, 162 S. E. 838, to the effect that “In a suit on account, ‘only slight averments are necessary to state a cause of action’ ” should influence the decisions in Montana. Under our codes an action on an account stands on the same footing as one on any other contract.
I agree with the disposition in this case so far- as the defendant, Mrs. Oscar Tillman, is eonéérned. I also agree that there is sufficient competent credible evidence to support the judgment of the district court against Oscar Tillman, and that a case should never be reversed on the evidence where that is the case.
"While I do not think this complaint states a cause of action, I do agree that the judgment cannot be reversed on that ground. Sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment was admitted without objection.
I agree that generally and, at least so far as this case is concerned, a finding that the allegations of the complaint are true constitutes sufficient findings of fact to support a judgment based on the complaint if the complaint states a cause of action which is the basis for that judgment. I also agree that, in .order for findings of fact based on the complaint to be sufficient the complaint must state a cause of action. This rule is subject to the exception, implicit in the statement in the majority opinion that “where a finding, if made, would necessarily have been against appellant, he cannot complain of the lack of such finding.”
This case is an action by the seller, of the right to cut and remove trees from land owned by plaintiff and his wife as tenants in common. The complaint does not allege either' or both the defendant purchased the stumpage and does not allege that delivery. However, defendant, Oscar Tillman, did allege and *388prove those facts, and accordingly no findings are necessary as to those facts.
However, there is no allegation in the complaint, and consequently no finding of fact as to what the reasonable or agreed value of the stumpage was. There is no finding of the amount that defendant, Oscar Tillman, promised expressly or impliedly to pay for the stumpage.
Plaintiff, on direct examination, testified that the stumpage was of the reasonable value of $15 a thousand feet for white pine, and $6 a thousand feet for other timber. On cross-examination he testified that his agreement with Oscar Tillman was that Tillman was to pay him that amount. Oscar Tillman testified that the reasonable value of all the stumpage was $2.75 a thousand feet, and that that was what he agreed to pay. There was only about ten thousand feet of white pine and about one hundred thousand feet of other timber. Tillman had paid $500 on the stumpage, and claimed that he had overpaid before finding out the small amount that he had taken.
I cannot understand how this court can say:
“Furthermore, a cursory examination of the record would make it amply apparent that any change in the findings as requested by defendant would not aid his cause, because there is insufficient evidence to sustain any finding in favor of appellant.”
The testimony of neither the plaintiff nor defendant as to the agreed price was impeached other than by the contradictory testimony of the other. The testimony of each as to the reasonable value was corroborated by considerable other testimony. The price or value of the timber was the only issue in the ease.
In Chealey v. Purdy, 54 Mont. 489, 492, 171 Pac. 926, 927, the court, speaking through Chief Justice Brantly said: ‘ ‘ These rules apply to all actions, whatever their nature, for the provisions of the Codes on the subject of pleadings [cited supra], furnish the exclusive guide as to what pleadings are required or are permitted in this jurisdiction. As applied to an action on a *389contract resting in parol, the plaintiff must allege the contract upon which he seeks to recover, a substantial performance of it according to its terms, a breach by the defendant, and the facts showing the amount he is entitled to recover. ’ ’
For the seller to recover on the sale of goods he must prove either an agreed price or the reasonable value of the goods sold. He must also allege it. In a case tried without a jury on proper demand the court must find either the agreed price or the reasonable value. The findings in this case do not contain such a finding because they are based on a complaint that has no such allegation.
The majority opinion apparently holds that this complaint does contain that allegation by way of inference from the allegation that defendants are indebted to plaintiff $302.74, for a balance due on the sale of stump age purchased from plaintiff.
In support of that position the majority opinion cites section 93-3804. As I read that section it merely provides that it is not necessary in a pleading to set forth the items of the account. It does not relieve the pleader of the obligation to allege the total agreed price or the reasonable value of the property sold.
The majority opinion also cites three California cases, one Georgia case, and one Louisiana case. I do not have the Georgia case or the Louisiana case, and do not have their statutes available, but why go back to Louisiana? I thought their law was based on the Code Napoleon. Why rely on Georgia without citing their codes? Of the California cases cited, two sustain the position. I submit that Tillson v. Peters, 41 Cal. App. (2d) 671, 107 Pac. (2d) 434, does not. Farwell v. Murray, 104 Cal. 464, 38 Pac. 199, is a common count pleading. Epley v. Cunningham, 134 Cal. App. (2d) 769, 286 Pac. (2d) 380, a court of appeals case, does sustain the contention, but why rely on these California cases. The California cases are inconsistent, not only with Montana, but with each other. Smith v. Bentson, supra, was against husband and wife. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment in favor of the wife. The complaint alleged that de*390fendants “became indebted to tbe plaintiff in tbe sum1 of $75 professional services rendered by plaintiff” to tbe'husband. The court gave very careful consideration to the question of the sufficiency of the complaint, considered it first, as a pléading under the code which requires the facts to be pleaded, and then held it insufficient because the allegation that defendants’ became indebted was a conclusion of law. Next it considered it as a common-law pleading, and again held it insufficient. It cites about thirty California cases on the proposition that- a ‘ ‘ complaint which states a fact essential to the cause of action only by way of a conclusion of law is sufficient.” [127 Cal. App. Supp. 789, 15 Pac. (2d) 910.] About half held such a complaint sufficient,- half held it insufficient. In Epley v. Cunningham, supra, the court does not indicate whether the complaint was sustained because it considered the allegation that defendant became indebted to plaintiff was an allegation of an ultimate fact or because it considered the allegation sufficient although it was a- conclusion of law.
Montana has consistently held that an allegation of a conclusion of law does not aid the pleader. The last case was Waite v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 132 Mont. 220, 315 Pac. (2d) 989. However see Mining Securities Co. v. Wall, 99 Mont. 596, 45 Pac. (2d) 302, which is apparently inconsistent insofar as some of the general statements are concerned. Long ago when courts and lawyers .understood the rules of common-law pleading and the rules of. code pleading were new, it was held by many courts that the allegation of an indebtedness in accord with common-law pleading was sufficient under the code, and in some of those states, particularly California, we find considerable confusion resulting from the attempt to permit pleading of legal conclusions under the common-law forms,, and still in other cases recognizing the code. Montana has an early case where this influence appears, Herbst Importing Co. v. Hogan, 16 Mont. 384, 41 Pac. 135. However, the complaint in that case was held bad on another ground. Twenty-four years after the--decision *391in the Herbst case the supreme court in an able and extensive opinion, Truro v. Passmore, 38 Mont. 544, 100 Pac. 966, in which the authorities were reviewed, held that money obtained through fraud could not be recovered under the common-law count for money had and received. The opinion was by Judge Henry C. Smith, concurred in by Justice Holloway and Chief Justice Brantly. In the course of the opinion it is said in 38 Mont. at page 549, 100 Pac. at page 968:
“ * * # A complaint, fashioned after a common-law count, may or may not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the Code. It would be unprofitable to examine all of the common-law counts, and determine which, if any of them, would or might be sustained as a sufficient statement of facts to constitute a cause of aetion under our system, and we do not therefore decide that any of them may be sustained; neither do we at this moment think of any which, in our judgment, could be sustained. Suffice it to say that there is in this state no action for the money had and received, as such, and there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the Code. (Revised Codes [1907], Sec. 8060 [now R. C. M. 1947, sec. 12-104.]) The common counts have been superseded by our system of code pleading. A complaint, under this latter system, must contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise language. (Revised Codes [1907], sec. 6532, supra [now R. C. M. 1947, sec. 93-3202].) If the phraseology of any common count is adequate in the particular ease to bring the pleader within the code rule, then his pleading is sufficient.; otherwise it is not. Where a pleader elects to employ the language of a common count, he subjects himself to the rules governing the construction and sufficiency of complaint under the Codes; that is to say, if a common count will in fact state his cause of aetion in ordinary and concise language, it is good. If it will not, it is bad.”
The Supreme Courts of Idaho and Washington followe_d that ca.se with thorough approval of the reasoning therein. Moser *392v. Pugh-Jenkins Furniture Co., 31 Idaho 438, 173 Pac. 639, L. R. A. 1918F, 437; Ludwig v. Hollingsworth, 153 Wash. 654, 280 Pac. 60. It has never been reversed in Montana. The allegation of the rehso'nable or agreed value or price of the property sold is certainly as necessary an allegation of fact required in an action to recover that price or value as are the facts constituting fraud in a fraud case. In the case under consideration we have no allegation of the price or value, only the allegation of the legal conclusion that there is a balance of $302.74 due and owing on stump-age purchased from plaintiff. In Medford Furniture & Hardware Co. v. Hanley, 120 Or. 229, 250 Pac. 876, the complaint had exactly the same defect, but far more complete allegations as to the transaction than does this complaint. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the allegation that there was a balance due plaintiff from defendant on a sale of goods and materials was a conclusion of law, and reversed the judgment because there was no- allegation of the reasonable or agreed value of the goods furnished.
Connelly Co. v. Schlueter Bros., 69 Mont. 65, 69, 220 Pac. 103, 104, states that defendants’ “general denial of the legal conclusion contained in the complaint ‘that the said purchase price of $2,199.53 is now long past due and owing from defendants to the plaintiff’ did not raise an issue of fact.” That statement was necessary to sustain the ruling of the court in that case. It was not dictum.
Chesney v. Chesney, 33 Utah 503, 94 Pac. 989, holds that an allegation of indebtedness in a certain amount is a legal conclusion insufficient to support a judgment. Beginning on page 991 of 94 Pac. it cites many authorities to the same effect.
In Thompson v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 110 Mont. 521, 524, 105 Pac. (2d) 683, it is indicated that an allegation that the balance due had been tendered is a conclusion of law.
I think that the findings of fact, being based on a complaint that does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action are insufficient to support the conclusion of law and judgment. *393I think that defendant has taken the necessary steps to be entitled to a finding as to the price or value of the stumpage sold, and that in the absence of such finding the judgment should be reversed.
On another matter appearing in his case I am not clear. The plaintiff himself testified in effect that he alone sold the stump-age involved to be cut from land owned by himself and wife as tenants in common. His wife was not a party to the sale. She is not a party to this action. There was no testimony that she even knew of the sale, the cutting of the timber, or of the action. It seems to me that after this judgment is paid and satisfied in full that she can still recover from defendant for her interests in the timber or damage to her property. However, it seems to me that plaintif should not be allowed to recover without making her a party. However Courtney v. Gordon, 74 Mont. 408, 241 Pac. 233, seems to be against me. As to that question I will not dissent — but neither do I concur.