Court Opinion

ID: 9709721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:29.685787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:51.058843
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LUND, dissenting: I dissent from that portion of the majority decision which reverses the decision of the trial court and provides for modification of the term for rehabilitative maintenance. I also dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s determination of the amount owed respondent by petitioner for respondent’s share of the Lancaster fee. I agree with reconsideration of the child support, but with specific conditions. I dissent from the order directing the trial court to reconsider its decision, which grants two months’ uninterrupted visitation with Russell during the summer. I. Child Support And The Guidelines I concur with remanding the question of child support back to the trial court, but for reasons different than those given by the majority in section I of that opinion. I question the majority’s suggestion that petitioner’s evidence relating to the 1990 income “most likely does not reflect his actual 1990 income.” (232 Ill. App. 3d at 817, 597 N.E.2d at 855.) I would prefer that credibility be left to the fact finder. Another concern I have is with the blind use of gross income figures from 1986 and 1987. The 1987 tax year included the $233,333 Lancaster fee, one-half of which (after taxes) was owned by respondent. Petitioner had no legal right to spend respondent’s share. Why should it then be included in determining an average child support? Absent one-half of the fee ($116,667), the gross income in 1987 would be reduced to $55,184. How much of the 1986 gross income was attributable to respondent’s 30% share of cases petitioner referred to other firms when he left Illinois? On reconsidering child support, a careful analysis should be made of earned income from the various years. Funds going to respondent should not be considered part of petitioner’s income for purposes of determining his net income to which the child-support guideline should be applied. Setting the child support will require many determinations by the trial court. I suggest specific findings relating to the determinations, so that if review is required we can have the benefit of the fact finder’s reasoning. II. The Trial Court Determination Of The Lancaster Fee Tax Deduction Should Be Affirmed. The trial court awarded respondent one-half the Lancaster fee after the deduction for taxes. That fee, in the amount of $233,333, was received in 1987, and $63,320 was paid by petitioner to respondent. The problem arises because of the computation of the income tax on respondent’s one-half of the fee. A search of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (1988)) fails to disclose a method by which the taxability of a portion of petitioner’s earnings could be transferred to his ex-wife. Several methods of allocation of the tax can be argued — one of which would allow respondent to benefit from petitioner’s substantive expense deductions in 1987. This would result in a tax charged to respondent of substantially less than that suggested by petitioner’s “expert” and adopted by the trial court. It appears that an allocation similar to, but not exactly that of petitioner’s expert, would be the proper method. Petitioner should have the benefit of any of his expenses and deductions which reduced the taxable income below the amount of the total Lancaster fee. His share of the fee and his other earnings were used to pay the amounts which resulted in reducing the taxable income. Respondent’s share was not, and could not be, so used. Why should respondent be allowed to benefit from petitioner’s payments from his own funds? My calculation of what would have been petitioner’s 1987 income tax, if petitioner’s taxable income had been $233,333, is $83,797. Thus, $41,899 would have been deducted from respondent’s $116,667 share. This would result in a tax on respondent’s share equal to 35.9%. Using the 1987 tax rate schedule for a single taxpayer for calculation purposes, the $55,955 tax shown on petitioner’s 1987 Federal income tax return would indicate a taxable income of $161,016. Respondent’s $116,667 is 72.46% of the $161,016; 72.46% of the $55,955 tax is $40,543; and the effective tax rate on respondent’s $116,667 is 34.75%. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Langford, came up with a tax attributable to respondent of one-half of $81,301 ($40,651) using a computation somewhat different than mine. Dr. Langford’s suggestion was followed by the trial court. The difference between $40,651 and $40,543 is nominal and does not justify reversal. I would affirm the trial court on this issue. III. Is The Four-Year Maintenance Term Modifiable? The original dissolution judgment provided for “rehabilitative” maintenance for a period of four years. There was no provision for subsequent review of the maintenance. I disagree with the majority opinion that the term of this maintenance is subject to modification as held in section III of that opinion, and suggest that the issue of reviewability should have been contested by appealing from the initial judgment of dissolution. An award of maintenance is within the court’s discretion and will not be reversed on appeal unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Hart (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 839, 851, 551 N.E.2d 737, 744 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring).) Rehabilitative or time-limited maintenance under section 504(bX2) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 504(b)(2)) is often appropriate. (See In re Marriage of Hackett (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 286, 293-94, 497 N.E.2d 1152, 1155; In re Marriage of Wisniewski (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 711, 719, 437 N.E.2d 1300, 1306-07.) The purpose of such maintenance is to provide incentives for the spouse receiving support to reach self-sufficiency. (In re Marriage of Carney (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 705, 715, 462 N.E.2d 596, 603.) The maintenance should be terminated, even after a long-term marriage, when the spouse receiving the maintenance has become virtually self-sufficient. (In re Marriage of Henzler (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 318, 322, 480 N.E.2d 147, 149-50.) However, even if employment exists, the ability to earn sufficient income to provide reasonable needs must be considered. (See In re Marriage of Ingrassia (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 826, 834-35, 489 N.E.2d 386, 392.) Rehabilitative maintenance came into existence with the passage of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 504(b)). (See also 1 H. Gitlin, Gitlin on Divorce §15.10 (1992).) The concept of marital property as set forth in section 503 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 503) introduced a new concept into the marriage relationship and gave the nontitle-holding spouse property rights not previously existing. The property allocation became a more significant factor in determining maintenance. 1 H. Gitlin, Gitlin on Divorce §15.10 (1992). I agree that maintenance limited for a specific time, without a provision for review, is not given favor over permanent maintenance. (See In re Marriage of Wilder (1983), 122 Ill. App. 3d 338, 351-52, 461 N.E.2d 447, 456; see also 1 H. Gitlin, Gitlin on Divorce §15.10, at 334 (1992).) The decisions in In re Marriage of Hellwig (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 452, 464-65, 426 N.E.2d 1087, 1096, and In re Marriage of Albiani (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524-25, 512 N.E.2d 30, 32-33, are illustrative of situations where maintenance limited to a time period was improper (long-term marriage, spouse older and not in good health) and where it was proper (spouse given maintenance for 24 months was in good health, age 47, had a degree in education, and received property interest). Our court has recognized the obligation of the maintenance-receiving spouse to use existing skills and the ability to obtain future skills so that employment can be obtained. In re Marriage of Mittra (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 627, 634, 450 N.E.2d 1229, 1234. With that premise, I now turn to my reasons for saying that we should not now modify the four-year term for rehabilitative maintenance. Section 504(b) of the Act specifically states that maintenance “may be in gross or for fixed or indefinite periods of time.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 504(b).) A decree is final for appeal purposes, even though there is a provision reserving the right to review the award of maintenance at some specific time in the future. (In re Marriage of Cannon (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 552, 556, 494 N.E.2d 490, 492.) In a case specifically providing for review, the parties are aware of the possibility of review of the time period when the final dissolution is entered and, if unhappy with the review provision, could then seek appellate relief. When, as here, there is no indication of reviewability of the maintenance time period and a fixed time period is set forth, it would appear that modification was not intended. Because maintenance is determined in part by the allocation of property (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 504(bXl)), the party obligated to pay a time-limited maintenance might, because of the limited time maintenance that was awarded, forego appellate review of what may be an unfair property division. Foregoing immediate review of that property allocation bars any future reconsideration of that property allocation. Because the limited term is related to property allocation, that term also should be nonmodifiable after the original dissolution judgment is no longer ap-pealable. While recognizing that section 510(a) of the Act provides in part that “any judgment respecting maintenance or support may be modified” (emphasis added) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 510(a)), I do not conclude that the modification extends to the fixed term of rehabilitative maintenance. The wording of section 510 of the Act is general, while that part of section 504(b) of the Act, which states “may be in gross or for fixed or indefinite periods of time” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 504(b)), is specific. Does the majority suggest that maintenance in gross is modifiable because of the language in section 510 of the Act? I would affirm the trial court’s refusal to modify the original four-year time frame for maintenance and, in so doing, I am well aware of the dictum in Rice v. Rice (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1102, 528 N.E.2d 14, 17, cited by the majority. IV. Petitioner’s Uninterrupted Visitation With Russell. Section 607(a) of the Act provides, in part, as follows: “A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 607(a). Matters of child custody, including visitation, rest largely in the discretion of the trial court, and that court’s decision will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Johnson (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 767, 769-70, 427 N.E.2d 374, 376; Rodely v. Rodely (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 347, 350, 192 N.E.2d 347, 349; Dog-gett v. Doggett (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 868, 871, 366 N.E.2d 985, 987; see generally 1 H. Gitlin, Gitlin on Divorce §14 (1992). The trial court’s opinion in the present case provided petitioner with two months’ visitation in Florida — and prohibited respondent’s visitation during that period of time unless the parties agreed. Respondent argues our decision in In re Marriage of Bush (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 249, 264, 547 N.E.2d 590, 598, requires otherwise. I suggest our decision in Bush is not applicable to the present facts. The child in Bush was born October 10, 1984, and was a child of tender years. The parents lived approximately 50 miles apart. We recently cited Bush in our opinion in In re Marriage of Evans (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 932, where the father had not seen the mentally handicapped 11-year-old child for six years and lives six to seven hours from the financially strapped custodial mother. Here, we have Russell — born January 1981 (11 years of age), evidently of at least average abilities, who has had visitation with his father. The trial court talked with Russell to obtain his thoughts on visitation and the problems between the petitioner and the respondent. I would find that the court’s decision granting two months’ uninterrupted child visitation with petitioner was not an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed.