Court Opinion

ID: 9543774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:49:06.992677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:10.756275
License: Public Domain

Arthur H. Healey, J.
(dissenting). I would not reach the merits of this appeal because I believe the appeal is moot. This court has recently adopted *442and adhered to the principle, expounded by the United States Supreme Court; see Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 46 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1975); that, in the absence of a class action, a case is not moot if, inter alia, there is a “ ‘reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’ ” Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 17, 21, 411 A.2d 1 (1979) ;1 see CEUI v. CSEA, 183 Conn. 235, 249-50, 439 A.2d 321 (1981); DeFonce Construction Corporation v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 177 Conn. 472, 475, 418 A.2d *443906 (1979); Rosnick v. Zoning Commission, 172 Conn. 306, 309, 374 A.2d 245 (1977). Even if we are to assume, as the majority notes, that Connecticut Foundry did not overrule our two earlier cases, Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 372 A.2d 102 (1976), and Liistro v. Robinson, 170 Conn. 116, 365 A.2d 109 (1976), in those cases we specifically noted that the issue to be resolved “might well” or “could very well” affect the plaintiffs. See Taylor v. Robinson, supra, 695; Liistro v. Robinson, supra, 121-22.
Even under a very liberal interpretation of the “reasonable expectation” standard, I fail to see how the plaintiff in this case may well be subject to the same statute in question, i.e., General Statutes § 18-97, when, as the statute now provides, and as the majority opinion points out in footnote 4, the statute is not applicable to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1981. Absent an indication in the record before us to the contrary, there is little, if any, chance that the plaintiff will again be subject to the statute he now challenges. Moreover, this same observation applies to the other unnamed inmates referred to in the majority opinion. It is my view that the parameters of the “reasonable expectation” standard, as elucidated in our prior cases, are so broadened by the majority as to blur the predictable limitations of the mootness doctrine.
Therefore, I dissent and would dismiss this matter as moot.

 We specifically stated that, “in the absence of a class action, the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ doctrine was limited to the situation where two elements combined: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 17, 20-21, 411 A.2d 1 (1979), quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 46 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1975).
In Connecticut Foundry, supra, the defendants, although conceding that their appeal may have been moot, urged us to address the issue raised in their appeal and “to provide a definitive interpretation of the statute in question so as to preclude the recurrence of any similar dispute in the future and to protect labor generally from the abuses of unrestrained issuance of injunctions in industrial controversies.” Id., 20. We dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that such a reason was insufficient to meet the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” standard since the record before us was “devoid of any evidence demonstrating the existence of a ‘reasonable expectation’ that these defendants will again be subjected to the action complained of here.” Id., 21.