Court Opinion

ID: 9513272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:33:32.044791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:48.072973
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶29] For the reasons set forth in my dissent in State v. Trieb, 516 N.W.2d 287, 292-94 (N.D.1994) (Sandstrom, J., dissenting), I dissent.
[¶ 80] The majority writes at ¶ 5:
“The legal maxim, ‘a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement,’ supports our decision that a defendant cannot waive a right the legislature has given to prison administration to utilize for the purpose of inducing good behavior in prison. N.D.C.C. § 31-11-05(4). Further, there can be no waiver of statutory rights if such waiver would be against public policy. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-28. The legislative purpose of good time is to improve prison behavior and thereby improve overall prisoner morale and well being.”
This analysis is seriously flawed for a number of reasons.
[¶ 31] The binding plea agreement in this case was not and is not a “private agreement.” The plea agreement was a binding public agreement, provided for by judicial rale, N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d), and specifically effective only on acceptance and approval of the appropriate public official, the trial judge.
[¶32] The majority’s assertion as to our legislature’s intent is, as in the progenitor opinion, wholly unsupported by reference to the legislative record, contrary to the specific prior holdings of this Court, Matz v. Satran, 313 N.W.2d 740, 742 (N.D.1981) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)) (a prisoner’s right to statutory good time is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Jensen v. Satran, 332 N.W.2d 222, 226 (N.D.1983) (a prisoner has a constitutionally protected right to good time), and inconsistent with the position of the prison officials’ own attorney, the Attorney General, see letter opinion from Deputy Attorney General Calvin Rolfson to the Director of the North Dakota Department of Parole and Probation of February 1985 (prisoner can bargain away statutory right to good time).
[¶ 33] The majority’s assertion that waiver of a statutory right to good time is contrary to public policy is unsupported by a public policy or by logic. Clearly, criminal defendants have a general right to waive their rights. State v. Wilson, 488 N.W.2d 618, 620 (N.D.1992). Thus, there is nothing contrary to public policy in allowing an inmate to waive his rights. What public policy says an inmate, having waived his own right, should be entitled to assert a right of prison administrators? There is none.
[¶ 34] This does not mean the prison administrators could not assert their own rights regarding a sentence; they can. See State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 629 (N.D.1977) (supervisory writ sought relating to sentence.)
[¶ 35] Ostafin bargained away his right to good time and has no standing to assert the rights of prison administrators. I would reverse and reinstate Ostafin’s sentence.
[¶ 36] Dale V. Sandstrom