Court Opinion

ID: 9954573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 16:11:28.085875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:55.655642
License: Public Domain

J-A27022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  EILEEN JULIE DOUGHERTY                       :   No. 654 MDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 27, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-35-CR-0000599-2021

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED: MARCH 26, 2024

       The Commonwealth appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following Appellee Eileen Julie Dougherty’s conviction for third-degree murder.

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises a challenge to both the legality and the

discretionary aspects of Appellee’s sentence. After careful review, we vacate

the judgment of sentence and remand for re-sentencing.

       Briefly, Appellee was charged with third-degree murder1 and related

offenses following a 2021 domestic dispute that resulted in the death of

George Shencavitz. On January 13, 2023, Appellee entered an open guilty

plea to one count of third-degree murder. Prior to sentencing, the trial court

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c).
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ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report. Appellee filed a sentencing

memorandum, which the trial court summarized as follows:

      The memorandum, seeking a mitigated range sentence, reiterated
      and expanded upon Appellee’s version of events leading to the
      victim’s untimely death, as indicated in her PSI report. It also
      included attachments apparently submitted in support of her
      assertions: (A) a copy of the petition to obtain a protection from
      abuse order against the victim and executed by his ex-spouse,
      Angela Shencavitz; (B) copies of text messages with [] Jenny
      Erickson, in which the victim mad[e] disparaging remarks about
      his ex-wife; (C) copies of text messages with [] Mary Fitzpatrick,
      in which the victim made disparaging remarks about his ex-wife;
      (D) a photograph purportedly of the victim choking Appellee
      during a sex act, which [was] sealed due to its graphic nature; (E)
      text messages between the victim and Nina Huskic, his alleged
      paramour; and (F) two reports from Lackawanna County House
      Arrest indicating that Appellee requested a transfer due to a
      developing domestic situation at approximately 9:00 p.m. and
      9:20 p.m. [on March 3, 2021].[fn1] The Commonwealth objected
      to the admission of said exhibits at the time of sentencing, and
      [the trial] court overruled.
         [fn1]The instant offense occurred while Appellee served a
         sentence for two prior offenses of abuse of a care dependent
         person, to which Appellee pled guilty on or about September
         9, 2020. The Honorable Michael J. Barrasse imposed
         sentence with respect to the matter, docketed at CP-35-CR-
         873-2020, in the aggregate of eight to 23 months [of]
         incarceration, to be followed by eight years and one month
         of probation on November 17, 2020. On or about December
         23, 2020, the court permitted Appellee’s early release to
         home confinement, which occurred on January 5, 2021.
         Appellee maxed out on the confinement portion of her
         sentence while awaiting disposition of the instant matter on
         or about October 17, 2022.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/5/23, at 4-5.

      At sentencing, after hearing argument from both parties, as well as

statements from members of the victim’s family, the trial court imposed a

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mitigated sentence of seven and one-half to fifteen years of incarceration, to

be followed by ten years’ probation.       The trial court ordered Appellee’s

sentence to run concurrently with a probation sentence that she was already

serving in an unrelated case at Docket No. 873-2020.

      Both parties filed timely post-sentence motions, which the trial court

denied.   The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal and a court-

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a)

opinion addressing the Commonwealth’s claims.

      The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an
         error of law in relying on [Appellee’s] sentencing memorandum
         which contained allegations that had no basis in the record and
         were unauthenticated, unsubstantiated, irrelevant to the
         sentence, and inadmissible, and which the Commonwealth had
         no opportunity to challenge.

      2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a
         sentence in the mitigated range for insufficient reasons where
         the evidence the [trial] court relied on was not supported by
         the record and was only provided at the time of sentencing with
         no opportunity for the Commonwealth to challenge the
         evidence.

      3. Whether the trial court’s sentence in the mitigated range was
         clearly unreasonable under the circumstances of this case,
         considering the need to protect the public; the gravity of the
         offense through which the victim lost his life after being
         stabbed multiple times while attempting to flee; the impact of
         [Appellee’s] crime on the community and the victim’s family;
         [Appellee’s] self-inflicted wounds; [Appellee’s] prior crime for
         which she was on home confinement at the time of the murder,
         and [Appellee’s] demonstration of her inability to rehabilitate.

      4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
         error of law when it ordered that [Appellee’s] sentence be
         concurrent to her sentence of probation on a prior crime.

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Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.

      Because the Commonwealth’s fourth issue challenges the legality of

Appellee’s sentence, we address it first. The Commonwealth argues that the

trial court imposed an illegal sentence by ordering the sentence of

imprisonment in the instant case to run concurrent with a probationary term

Appellee was already serving at Docket No. 873-2020. Commonwealth’s Brief

at 45. The Commonwealth concludes that because this sentence is illegal, it

must be vacated. Id.

      Appellee responds that the Commonwealth “inaccurately argues that the

trial court sentenced [] Appellee to a simultaneous incarceration and

probationary sentence.” Appellee’s Brief at 32. Appellee further argues that

it was “[t]he unambiguous intent of the trial court [] to impose a term of

probation consecutive to Appellee’s term of incarceration, and concurrent to

Appellee’s previously imposed term of probation on [Docket No. 873-2020].”

Id. at 33.

      The principles governing our review are well settled. “[A] challenge to

the legality of a sentence raises a question of law. In reviewing this type of

claim, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 219 A.3d 1207, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted).   “If no statutory authorization exists for a particular

sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence

must be vacated.”      Commonwealth v. Warunek, 279 A.3d 52, 54 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (citation omitted and some formatting altered).

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      This Court has previously considered whether a defendant can

simultaneously serve a term of probation while serving a term of confinement.

Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 33 A.3d 31 (Pa. Super. 2011), overruled on

other grounds, Commonwealth v. Simmons, 262 A.3d 512 (Pa. Super.

2021) (en banc). The Allshouse Court held that there was “no support in the

Pennsylvania statutes that the General Assembly intended to permit

defendants to serve a term of probation and a term of state incarceration

simultaneously.    To do [so] would run contrary to the various policy

considerations underlying sentencing.” Allshouse, 33 A.3d at 36 (footnotes

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 145 A.3d 184, 187-88 (Pa.

Super. 2016) (applying Allshouse and concluding that a defendant may not

serve a term of incarceration and probation concurrently).

      Finally, we note that in general, where there is a discrepancy between

the written sentencing order and the statements at the sentencing hearing, it

is the text of the sentencing order that controls. See Commonwealth v.

Kremer, 206 A.3d 543, 548 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      In Kremer, this Court considered an appeal from an order purporting

to correct an original judgment of sentence imposed over twenty years prior.

Id. at 545. In addressing whether a trial court has the authority to correct a

“clear clerical error,” the Kremer Court held as follows:

      [F]or a trial court to exercise its inherent authority and enter an
      order correcting a defendant’s written sentence to conform with
      the terms of the sentencing hearing, the trial court’s intention to
      impose a certain sentence must be obvious on the face of the
      sentencing transcript. . . . Stated differently, only when a trial

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     court’s intentions are clearly and unambiguously declared during
     the sentencing hearing can there be a “clear clerical error” on the
     face of the record, and the [signed] sentencing order subject to
     later correction.

     If, on the other hand, a trial court’s stated intentions during the
     sentencing hearing are ambiguous, then the terms of the sentence
     in the [signed] sentencing order control, and the trial court cannot
     correct its perceived mistake. See Commonwealth v. Isabell,
     467 A.2d 1287, 1292 (Pa. 1983) ([stating] “Generally, the signed
     sentencing order, if legal, controls over oral statements of the
     sentencing judge not incorporated into the signed judgment of
     sentence”); . . . This is because the alleged error in the sentencing
     transcript is not a “clear clerical error,” but rather, is an ambiguity
     that must be resolved by reference to the written sentencing
     order.

Id. at 548 (some citations omitted and formatting altered).

     After this Court’s decision in Kremer, our Supreme Court considered a

case in which the record contained two different written sentencing orders.

Commonwealth v. McGee, 302 A.3d 659, 661-62 (Pa. 2023). In that case,

the trial court orally imposed an aggregate sentence of thirty-two and a half

years to sixty-five years’ imprisonment, which was comprised of multiple

consecutive and concurrent sentences. Id. at 661. The trial court also issued

a typewritten sentencing order that was “wholly consistent with the sentence

the trial court orally imposed on the record.” Id. On appeal, our Supreme

Court noted that in addition to the typewritten sentencing order, there was a

handwritten sentencing order. The McGee Court explained that although the

handwritten order had omitted some of the underlying concurrent sentences,

it accurately reflected the aggregate sentence set forth in the trial court’s

typewritten order. Id. at 669. Specifically, our Supreme Court explained:

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      [I]n the limited space available on the pre-printed form, the trial
      court listed the consecutive sentences which resulted in [the
      defendant’s] aggregate sentence of [thirty-two and one half] to
      [sixty-five] years’ imprisonment, a sentence which is not
      disputed. In our view, the trial court’s abbreviated recitation of
      the [defendant’s] sentence on the handwritten sentencing order
      does not render the handwritten and typewritten sentencing
      orders “irreconcilable,” nor does it evidence a patent and obvious
      error in the record.

Id. (footnote omitted and emphasis in original).

      In the instant case, the trial court announced its sentence from the

bench as follows:

      So based upon my review of the [PSI report], all the facts and
      circumstances surrounding this case, it will be the sentence of [the
      trial court] that [Appellee] be sentenced to a term of incarceration
      for a period of seven and a half to fifteen years, followed by ten
      years[’] probation. Pay the cost of prosecution. I want you to get
      a complete mental health assessment and abide by all the
      recommendations. This sentence shall run concurrent to the
      probationary term of eight years and one month that you are
      currently serving.

N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 56-57.

      However, two written orders appear in the record—one order that

includes handwriting from the trial judge (the handwritten order), and one

typewritten order that was produced by the Common Pleas Case Management

System (the typewritten order). The handwritten order is entitled “Sentencing

Order” with handwritten notations from the trial judge, and it was signed by

the trial judge.    Although the handwritten order indicated that Appellee’s

sentences were to be served consecutively, the trial judge also circled the

word “concurrent” and wrote “with [Appellee’s] other sentence” after

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referencing Appellee’s probation sentence in the instant case. See Trial Ct.

Order, 2/27/23 (handwritten order).

       However, the typewritten order indicates that all of Appellee’s sentences

are to be served consecutively.         See Trial Ct. Order, 2/27/23 (typewritten

order).

       On this record, the discrepancy between the handwritten order and the

typewritten order represents a patent and obvious error in the record. Cf.

McGee, 302 A.3d at 669. Although the trial judge indicated that Appellee’s

sentences were to be served consecutively during the sentencing hearing and

in the typewritten order, the handwritten order reflects that the trial judge

circled the word “concurrent,” and wrote “with [Appellee’s] other sentence”

after referencing Appellee’s probation sentence. See Trial Ct. Order, 2/27/23.

Cf. McGee, 302 A.3d at 669.

       Unlike in McGee, in the instant case, there are two written sentencing

orders that are irreconcilable. We are, therefore, constrained, on this record,

to vacate Appellee’s judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing in

order for the trial court to enter clarify its intent in imposing a judgment of

sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand this

case for resentencing.2

____________________________________________

2 Because our disposition vacates Appellee’s judgment of sentence and
remands to the trial court for re-sentencing, we do not reach the
Commonwealth’s issues challenging the discretionary aspects of Appellee’s
sentence.

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      Judgment of sentence vacated.   Case remanded for re-sentencing.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/26/2024

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