Court Opinion

ID: 9544576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:57:14.58544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:14.346466
License: Public Domain

McCLINTOCK, Justice,
specially concurring.
Although I agree that reversal of this case is proper, I am compelled to specially concur in the result. The time-honored rule in summary judgment cases is that it is only when the moving party has established a prima facie case that the non-moving party is required to present evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Moore v. Kiljander, Wyo., 604 P.2d 204, 207 (1979). As I read the majority opinion, taken in conjunction with our recent decision in Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747 (1981) (released for publication 3/20/81), this court, in medical malpractice cases, will ignore this requirement and will test the right to summary judgment by the degree to which the plaintiff *774supports his case by affirmative evidence. The majority do not explain this departure and I find it ill-advised.
No one seems to quarrel with the rule which I have found best expressed by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Daboll v. Hoden, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 727, 734 (1974):
“A prima facie case of medical malpractice must normally consist of evidence which establishes the applicable standard of care, demonstrates that this standard has been violated, and develops a causal relationship between the violence and the harm complained of.... ” (Emphasis added.)
This burden is clearly with the plaintiff upon the trial of the case, but, as pointed out by the Florida Court of Appeals in Matarese v. Leesburg Elks Club, Fla.2d DCA, 171 So.2d 606-607 (1965), “a motion for a summary judgment puts the movant in the unenviable position of having to prove a negative, the non-existence of an issue.” This statement was carried forward by the Supreme Court of Florida into a medical malpractice case, Holl v. Talcott, Fla., 191 So.2d 40, 43 (1966), to reach this conclusion:
“... [Bjefore it becomes necessary to determine the legal sufficiency of the affidavits or other evidence submitted by the party moved against, it must first be determined that the movant has successfully met his burden of proving a nega-tive_”
I cannot agree with the majority that the defendant physician can meet this burden by merely offering an expert witness’ bare opinion that the defendant did follow the relevant standard of care, without specifically setting forth what that standard is.
I believe that to present a prima facie case showing the non-existence of medical malpractice, the movant must first establish the relevant standard of care followed by physicians in good standing in the community under similar circumstances, and then the movant must establish that his actions conformed with this standard. Hurtt v. Goleburn, Del., 330 A.2d 134, 135 (1974). If the defendant cannot show that his actions conformed to this standard, he is then required to demonstrate that the non-conformity was not the cause of the injury complained of. Daboll v. Hoden, supra, 222 N.W.2d at 735. Once the movant has established the non-existence of medical malpractice in this manner, then, and only then, does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact.
After reviewing the affidavits and depositions submitted in the case at bar, I find that appellees have failed to establish the relevant medical standards of care that are adhered to by physicians in good standing in the community. The majority also recognize this deficiency and then go on to sanction it by concluding the expert witnesses’ conclusions that defendant’ actions conformed to the recognized medical standards of care were sufficient on a motion for summary judgment.
The trial judge, upon summary judgment, must determine whether the case presents a genuine issue of material fact. I find it unacceptable to conclude, as the majority have done, that the trial judge, when faced with a motion for summary judgment, must blindly accept the expert witnesses’ opinion as to whether or not the defendants’ actions did or did not conform to the relevant medical standard of care. This court has held that an expert witness’ opinion that is not supported by facts in the record is not competent. In Chicago and North Western Railway Co. v. Hillard, Wyo., 502 P.2d 189, 192 (1972), this court stated:
“... A rather general statement of the rule is that the record must show sufficient facts upon which the judgment and opinion of the expert were based. A witness who asserts an opinion ... not supported by facts is not competent, and an expert’s opinion is not substantial evidence unless he can give a satisfactory explanation of how he arrived at his opinion.... ”
While I recognize that Chicago and North Western Railway Co., supra, was decided before this court adopted the Wyoming *775Rules of Evidence in 1978,1 believe that the rule set forth in Chicago and North Western Railway Co., supra, is still viable in summary judgment actions, even in light of Rule 705, W.R.E. Rule 705, W.R.E., provides:
“The expert may testify'in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.”
Rule 705 does allow an expert witness to testify as to his opinion without giving his reasons; however, this rule also allows a court to require in certain instances that an expert reveal the reasons for his opinion and that on cross-examination, if requested, the expert must also reveal the reasons for his opinion. When a party is relying upon an affidavit to support a motion for summary judgment or to oppose a motion for summary judgment, I believe that a court must require the expert to specifically state the reasons upon which he based his opinion.
As the court, in Downs v. Longfellow Corporation, Okl., 351 P.2d 999, 1004 (1960), points out:
“ ‘... The reasons given in support of the opinions rather than the abstract opinions are of importance, and the opinion is of no greater value than the reasons given in its support. If no rational basis for the opinion appears, or if the facts from which the opinion was derived do not justify it, the opinion is of no probative force, and it does not constitute evidence sufficient to authorize submission of the issue to the jury or to sustain a finding or verdict, * * *’ ”,
cited with approval by the Wyoming Supreme Court in North Western Railway Co., supra, 502 P.2d at 192.
The abstract opinions presented by the affidavits in the case at bar are of no value. What is important are the facts and reasons supporting the experts’ opinions, because without these facts the movant has not presented a prima facie case and, therefore, the movants have failed to meet their initial burden.
Not only am I at a loss to understand why the majority have decided to relax the requirements for summary judgment in medical malpractice cases, but I also do not know what the majority believe constitutes a prima facie case of medical malpractice. It is now sufficient for a plaintiff to merely present the bare opinion of a medical expert that the relevant medical standard was no adhered to, or is a plaintiff’s burden somehow different than the burden of a party moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action? I find that the majority have not given the litigants and lower courts involved in a medical malpractice action any direction as to the proof required to support such an action and as a result I can easily envision a myriad of interpretations with resulting widespread confusion among the bench and bar. I think that this confusion would be avoided by a clear-cut statement requiring proof of the applicable standard, whether a trial is involved or a summary judgment is sought.
Because the movants failed to provide the relevant medical standard, I would have held that the movants were not entitled to summary judgment because they failed to present a prima facie ease.