Court Opinion

ID: 9809390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:11:19.902163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:56.703772
License: Public Domain

Clare:, C. J.,
dissenting: There is, strictly speaking, no property in a dead body, though' its possession can be recovered. This is not an action to recover the possession of the body, but an action of tort for the mental anguish caused the mother by the wrongful mutilation of the body of her son.
The statute of distributions has no application. In Kyles v. R. R., 147 N. C., 394, it was held that the widow could recover punitive damages for mutilation of the dead body of her husband. This proves that an action for. the tort is not required to be brought by the next of kin, for the widow is not the next of kin of her husband. This action is a tort to be sued for by the person who most naturally would have suffered mental anguish by reason of the wrongful mutilation and indignity inflicted oh the body of the dead son. He was 18 years old and the support of his mother. Her husband is an invalid, but was joined as a plaintiff as in Price v. Electric Co., 160 N. C., 450.
In that case, where the husband was joined in an action with his wife to recover damages for a personal injury to them both arising from the same negligent act, and' his counsel withdrew all claim for damages for him, and the action was successfully prosecuted to recover damages for the injuries inflicted on the wife, including personal and physical anguish and loss of time, the Court held that she could recover. This case is exactly like that, and the judgment in her favor could be recovered, even as the law formerly stood.
But in fact the position of the wife is rendered much stronger by the act which was immediately passed as soon as the next General-Assembly met, chapter 13, Laws 1913, which provides, among other things: “Any damages for personal injuries or other tort can be recovered by her suing alone.”
This is a tort pure and simple, and the wife is entitled to recover for it just as she has recovered in actions for failure to deliver a telegram whereby she as-well as her husband has suffered mental anguish. Gerock v. Tel. Co., 147 N. C., 7. This action is for mental anguish and damages suffered by her and not by the estate of her son, who was 18 years of age. If an action had been brought for his wrongful death, it should have been brought by the administrator.
The court granted a nonsuit upon the ground that the wife was not the “next of kin,!’ but that the husband was. If so, he was also a party. The statement is incorrect as a matter of fact. It is true that chapter 172, Laws 1911, does amend the statute of distributions, by pro*63viding that the father shall receive “all the personal property of any of his children who shall die intestate, without wife or children,” thereby giving him preference over the wife and to her total exclusion in his favor. Whatever may be said as to the justice or injustice of such provision, it does not enact an untrue statement of fact by saying that the father is nearer of kin to the child than the wife. That statute has no application to an action of this kind, which is a tort for the anguish suffered by the mother by reason of the mutilation of the body of the son whom she brought into the world and nourished. Great Nature tells us that her suffering is something apart from and usually greater than that of her husband. It is for this wrong that she has sued, and not for a' share in his estate. Indeed, he had none, being a boy 18 years old, the sole support for her and her invalid husband, and of course the pride of her heart.
The plaintiff is entitled to recover as a matter of justice and of right under the legislation enacted for the benefit of married women in such cases under chapter 13, Laws 1913.