Court Opinion

ID: 9409411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 12:06:34.855428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:33.011390
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA22-839

                                 Filed 18 July 2023

Mecklenburg County, Nos. 19CRS246618-20

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

WANG MENG MOUA, Defendant.

      Appeal by Defendant from Order entered 15 March 2022 by Judge Lisa Bell

and Judgment entered 2 May 2022 by Judge Karen Eady-Williams in Mecklenburg

County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 March 2023.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Tirrill Moore
      and Special Deputy Attorney General Kristin J. Uicker, for the State.

      BJK Legal, by Benjamin J. Kull, for the Defendant.

      RIGGS, Judge.

      Defendant Wang Meng Moua appeals the order denying his motion to suppress

evidence which was entered prior his guilty plea for trafficking in methamphetamine

by transport, trafficking in methamphetamine by possession, and keeping or

maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling methamphetamine. Mr. Moua argues he

has an appeal of right under N.C. Gen. Stat § 15A-979(b) (2021), even though he did

not notify the court and the prosecutor of his intent to appeal prior to his entry of a

guilty plea. But on the chance that this Court concluded he did not have a statutory
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right of appeal, Mr. Moua also submitted a petition for writ of certiorari to consider

the merits of his claim. We granted certiorari review in our discretion under separate

order.

         After review of the record, we hold that the search was not consensual, and

accordingly, we reverse the denial of the motion to suppress and vacate the judgment.

                     I.   FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         At 12:59 a.m. on 5 December 2019, Sgt. Garrett Tryon and Officer J. Housa,

with Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Police Department, initiated a traffic stop of Mr.

Moua, for speeding on North Tryon Street near the Interstate 85 connector in

Mecklenburg County.        Sgt. Tryon stopped Mr. Moua, who was driving with a

passenger, on a side street and told Mr. Moua that he had paced him at fifty miles

per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone on North Tryon Street. Sgt. Tryon asked

Mr. Moua for his license and registration, and he also asked the passenger to provide

his license.    Both Mr. Moua and his passenger cooperated and provided their

identification; both Sgt. Tryon and Officer Housa were calm and professional in

executing the stop, which was recorded on bodycam.

         Sgt. Tryon went back to his vehicle and ran the information through different

law enforcement databases while Officer Housa stood by the passenger door of Mr.

Moua’s car, shining his flashlight into the vehicle.      After about two minutes of

checking, Sgt. Tryon learned that Mr. Moua was on active probation and had prior

charges; however, Mr. Moua did not have any active warrants. Sgt. Tryon then

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returned to Mr. Moua’s car and said, “Sir come out and talk to me real quick.” As he

was speaking to Mr. Moua, Sgt. Tryon reached through the open window, unlocked

and opened the door.

      As soon as Mr. Moua walked to the back of the vehicle, Sgt. Tryon handed back

Mr. Moua’s license and registration. Sgt. Tryon had the following conversation with

Mr. Moua:

            SGT. TRYON: Come over here. Here is your stuff back,
            man. Um. Look. You gotta slow down. 35 is 35, right? I
            get it, North Tryon used to be, like 55, like three years ago.
            You’ve been living out here for a while?

            MR. MOUA: Yeah.

            SGT. TRYON: All right. Um. I see you got some charges
            in the past, you’re on probation.

            MR. MOUA: Yeah.

            SGT. TRYON: You squared away? You straight now?

            MR. MOUA: Yeah.

            SGT. TRYON: All right. You been checking in?

            MR. MOUA: Oh yeah.

            SGT. TRYON: Are you unsupervised or –?

            MR. MOUA: Supervised.

            SGT. TRYON: Supervised. Out of Mecklenburg County or
            –?

            MR. MOUA: Ah it’s Cabarrus.

            SGT. TRYON: Cabarrus County. Cool. Hey, man, you
            have anything on you or in the car –

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             MR. MOUA: No.

             SGT. TRYON: –that I should be worried about?

             MR. MOUA: No.

             SGT. TRYON: You wouldn’t mind if I check, right?

             MR. MOUA: Ya, go ahead.

             SGT. TRYON: Mind if I pat you down really quick?

             MR. MOUA: Ya.

      Sgt. Tryon performed a pat down that did not uncover any contraband. After

the pat down, Sgt. Tryon began to search the vehicle; meanwhile, Mr. Moua smoked

a cigarette on the side of the road. Within fifteen seconds of initiating the search,

Sgt. Tryon noticed a bag sticking out from under the driver’s seat containing a white

powdery substance. After discovering the bag, Sgt. Tryon walked over to Mr. Moua,

placed him in handcuffs, and then continued to search the vehicle.

      On 16 December 2019, Mr. Moua was indicted on one count each of trafficking

methamphetamine (more than 200 but less than 400 grams) by transport, trafficking

methamphetamine (more than 200 but less than 400 grams) by possession and

keeping or maintaining a vehicle for keeping or selling methamphetamine. On 26

April 2021, the State filed superseding indictments on the two trafficking counts to

lower the mass of methamphetamine to more than 28 but less than 200 grams.

      Mr. Moua moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The

trial court heard this motion on 10 March 2022. During that hearing, Sgt. Tryon

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testified that he typically asks people to get out of the vehicle either for officer safety

or privacy reasons. He testified that in this case, he asked Mr. Moua to step out of

the vehicle so that he could ask him about his probation away from the passenger.

Additionally, Sgt. Tryon testified that in his experience, owner-operators are more

likely to consent to a search of the vehicle when they are separated from their vehicle.

During his testimony, Mr. Moua’s counsel asked Sgt. Tryon about his reason for

questioning Mr. Moua about his probation; Sgt. Tryon testified that it was “a

conversation piece.” Sgt. Tryon testified that, in his opinion, the purpose of the traffic

stop concluded when he returned Mr. Moua’s driver’s license and registration.

       After the motion to suppress hearing, the trial court issued an order denying

the motion to suppress. In that order, the court made twenty-one findings of facts,

including:

              8. Upon re-approaching the [D]efendant, Sgt. Tryon
              requested the [D]efendant step out of the vehicle to speak
              with him, which the [D]efendant consented to doing. Sgt.
              Tryon said it was common practice for him and officers to
              ask occupants out of their vehicles during traffic stops for
              safety and privacy purposes.

              10. Almost immediately upon the [D]efendant and Sgt.
              Tryon getting to the back of the [D]efendant’s vehicle, Sgt.
              Tryon returned all of the documents back to the
              [D]efendant and the two briefly discussed the [D]efendant
              speeding and Sgt. Tryon gave him a warning for the
              speeding.

              11. After concluding the purpose for the stop, Sgt. Tryon
              engaged in a consensual conversation with the
              [D]efendant about his probation and asked for consent to

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             search his car and person.

             12. The [D]efendant freely and voluntarily gave consent
             for Sgt. Tryon to search his car and person.

The trial court also made twelve conclusions of law, including:

             4. Almost immediately upon stepping out of the vehicle,
             Sgt. Tryon handed the [D]efendant his documents back and
             gave him a verbal warning for speeding.

             5. At that point in time, this [c]ourt finds the reason for
             the traffic stop was concluded. The following conversation
             and actions after were a consensual encounter between
             Sgt. Tryon and the [D]efendant. A reasonable person in
             the [D]efendant[’]s position would have felt free to leave or
             free to refuse to cooperate at that point and terminate the
             encounter.

             12. In viewing the totality of the circumstances and the
             evidence before this [c]ourt . . .. Sgt. Tryon returned the
             [D]efendant[’]s documents to him almost immediately and
             the traffic stop concluded once Sgt. Tryon handed the
             [D]efendant back all of his documents and gave him a
             verbal warning for speeding. The conversations and
             actions beyond that point were consensual in nature.
             Thereafter, the [D]efendant was no longer seized, the
             [D]efendant[’]s Constitutional rights were not violated
             within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the
             [D]efendant[’]s consent to search his vehicle and person
             was freely and voluntarily [sic].

      After the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Moua subsequently pleaded

guilty as charged to all charges on 2 May 2022. Mr. Moua did not seek nor secure

any agreement with the prosecutor to reduce or dismiss the charges. At the plea and

sentencing hearing, the State submitted, as a factual basis for the plea, the gallon-

sized Ziploc bag which Sgt. Tryon found under the seat containing 194.21 grams of

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methamphetamine. The State indicated that after Sgt. Tryon completed the search

of the car he read Mr. Moua his Miranda rights, and then Mr. Moua confessed that

the methamphetamine in the vehicle was his; neither event appears on the video

recording of the stop. Mr. Moua did not indicate his intent to appeal the motion to

suppress prior to pleading guilty, and neither the colloquy nor the plea transcript

asked Mr. Moua if he wished to reserve any rights to appeal or enter a conditional

plea. However, Mr. Moua made an oral notice of appeal on the record during this

sentencing hearing.

                                II.     ANALYSIS

      Mr. Moua argues that he has the right to appeal the denial of the motion to

suppress upon entry of his guilty plea according to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b)

(2021). Generally, notice of intent to appeal is required to ensure the right to appeal

under the statute; however, this Court held in State v. Jonas, that notice of intent to

appeal is not required when a defendant does not negotiate a plea agreement and

simply pleads guilty as charged. State v. Jonas, 280 N.C. App. 511, 516, 867 S.E.2d

563, 567 (2021), review allowed, writ allowed, 876 S.E.2d 272 (2022). The ruling in

Jonas is currently stayed; therefore, Mr. Moua also filed a petition for writ of

certiorari. In our discretion, we granted his petition for writ of certiorari under

separate order.

      On appeal, Mr. Moua argues that at the time he gave consent to search his car,

he was unlawfully seized, and therefore, his consent was invalid. We agree.

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A. Appellate Jurisdiction

      In North Carolina, a defendant’s right to pursue an appeal from a criminal

conviction is a creation of statute. State v. McBride, 120 N.C. App. 623, 624, 463

S.E.2d 403, 404 (1995). Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty does not have a

statutory right of appeal. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e) (2021). However, the

General Assembly has, by statute, allowed a defendant to appeal an adverse ruling

in a pretrial suppression hearing despite the defendant’s conviction based upon a

guilty plea.   State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 395, 259 S.E.2d 843, 852 (1979).

According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b), an order denying a motion to suppress

evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction, including a

judgment where the defendant pleads guilty. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b) (2021).

This statutory right to appeal is conditional and not absolute. State v. McBride, 120

N.C. App. 623, 624, 463 S.E.2d 403, 404 (1995).

      The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that when a defendant intends to

appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b),

they must give notice of their intent to the prosecutor and the court before plea

negotiations are finalized, or they will waive the appeal of right provisions of the

statute. State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. at 397, 259 S.E.2d at 853. The Court reasoned

that the plea-bargaining table is not a “high stakes poker game;” it is much closer to

arm’s length bargaining. Id. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for defendants to

keep their intent to appeal a secret during negotiation to get the benefit of the bargain

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and then surprise the prosecution with an appeal of the conviction. Id.

      In December 2021, this Court addressed the notice requirement in the context

of a unilateral guilty plea given absent any bargaining with the State. This Court

held that where a defendant does not plead guilty pursuant to a plea arrangement

with the State, the defendant is not required to give notice of intent to appeal prior

to the plea of guilty to invoke his statutory right to appeal. State v. Jonas, 280 N.C.

App. 511, 516, 867 S.E.2d 563, 567 (2021). The Court reasoned that the concerns the

Supreme Court was addressing in Reynolds are not present in a scenario where a

defendant is not receiving any benefit of a plea agreement; the State has not been

“trapped into agreeing to a plea bargain only to later have [d]efendant contest that

bargain.” Id. We agree with this analysis.

      Jonas, however, was stayed by our Supreme Court on 21 December 2021. State

v. Jonas, 380 N.C. 301, 865 S.E.2d 886 (2021). Whether the mandate in a stayed

decision is binding precedent is unclear in North Carolina jurisprudence. Mr. Moua

points to Hunnicutt v. Griffin, which says that a case becomes binding upon filing.

Hunnicutt v. Griffin, 76 N.C. App. 259, 263, 332 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1985). Thus,

Hunnicutt would suggest that the rule in Jonas confirms Mr. Moua’s right of appeal.

In contrast, the State argues that according to State v. Gonzalez a stayed case does

not have precedential authority. 263 N.C. App. 527, 530, 823 S.E.2d 886, 888 (2019).

In State v. Gonzalez, though, this Court addressed a conflict in precedent between

several Court of Appeals decisions and declined to follow the stayed case because it

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conflicted with prior precedent. Id.

       Strictly speaking, Jonas does not conflict with the ruling in Reynolds; the latter

did not address the type of unilateral guilty plea in the former. Jonas only clarifies

the universe of scenarios in which the Reynolds notice requirement applies. Further,

at the time of the plea and sentencing hearing in this case, the Supreme Court had

not issued an opinion in Jonas.

       The facts in this case are similar to Jonas. Mr. Moua did not negotiate any

plea agreement with the State, and he did not receive any benefit from the State. The

State argues that even when a defendant does not negotiate a plea with the State, a

defendant is still required to provide notice of intent to appeal in addition to the notice

of appeal. At oral argument, the State asserted that even without a plea agreement,

Mr. Moua needed to give notice of intent to appeal as he was pleading guilty “prior to

pronouncement of sentence” in addition to giving notice of appeal at the conclusion of

the hearing to meet the requirements under Reynolds. We fail to see any meaningful

value to the State in requiring a defendant, who is unilaterally pleading as charged,

to provide notice of intent to appeal as he enters his plea in addition to providing

notice of appeal only a few minutes later in the same hearing.

       However, because Jonas has been stayed by the Supreme Court, we considered

Mr. Moua’s petition for writ of certiorari as an alternate and appropriate basis for our

review. In light of the unsettled law in this area, and our ultimate holding, we

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granted certiorari under separate order to consider the merits of his appeal.1

B. Motion to Suppress

       Mr. Moua argues that his consent to search the car was not voluntary because,

at the time he gave consent, he was unlawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment.

He challenges several findings of fact—which the trial court used to support the

denial of the motion to suppress—as unsupported by competent evidence and argues

that several findings of fact are in reality conclusions of law that this Court should

review de novo.

       After review, we agree that Mr. Moua was unlawfully seized when the police

asked for consent to search his car. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, a

reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate this encounter and a search

of the car was not within the scope of the original stop. Therefore, his consent was

not voluntary and the motion to suppress was erroneously denied. While we hold

that the trial court had competent evidence upon which to base its findings of fact,

the trial court comingled conclusions of law with findings of fact. Accordingly, we

consider those conclusions of law de novo.

   1. Standard of Review

       This Court’s review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is strictly

limited to determining whether the trial court’s underlying findings of fact are

       1  Judge MURPHY dissented from this grant of certiorari in the order and would have found
jurisdiction existed on the grounds described supra.

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supported by competent evidence and whether those factual findings, in turn, support

the ultimate conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618,

619 (1982). Where the trial court’s findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, they

are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and binding on appeal. State v.

Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735–36 (2004). The trial court’s

conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. 299, 304,

612 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2005).

      When a trial court’s findings comingle findings of facts with conclusions of law,

we give appropriate deference to the findings of fact and review the portions of those

findings that are conclusions of law de novo. State v. Icard, 363 N.C. 303, 308, 677

S.E.2d 822, 826 (2009). The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined findings of

fact as statements of what happened in space and time. State v. Parisi, 372 N.C. 639,

655, 831 S.E.2d 236, 247 (2019). A conclusion of law, however, requires the exercise

of judgment or the application of legal principles to the facts found.        State v.

McFarland, 234 N.C. App. 274, 284, 758 S.E.2d 457, 465 (2014) (internal quotes and

citation omitted). Therefore, when statements identified as findings of fact required

the trial court to exercise its judgment or apply law to come to a determination, those

statements are considered as conclusions of law.

   2. Findings of Fact

      Mr. Moua specifically challenges the trial court’s finding of fact 10 that Sgt.

Tryon had given Mr. Moua a warning for speeding as unsupported by evidence. The

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finding states that: “Almost immediately upon the [D]efendant and Sgt. Tryon getting

to the back of the [D]efendant’s vehicle, Sgt. Tryon returned all of the documents back

to the [D]efendant and the two briefly discussed the [D]efendant speeding and Sgt.

Tryon gave him a warning for speeding.”

      However, the competent evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing

supports this finding. The video footage of the incident, which was introduced as

evidence during the motion to suppress hearing, shows that Sgt. Tryon said to Mr.

Moua “You gotta slow down. 35 is 35, right? I get it, North Tryon used to be, like 55,

like three years ago.” The bodycam footage provided the trial court with competent

evidence as to what Sgt. Tryon said and the statement plainly put Mr. Moua on notice

to slow down and desist from going faster than the current speed limit on North Tryon

Street. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court had competent evidence upon which

to make the finding of fact that Sgt. Tryon gave Mr. Moua a warning. However, the

key issue, which we discuss later, is whether this warning is sufficient, under the

totality of the circumstance, to communicate to a reasonable person that the purpose

of the stop had ended, and the person was free to terminate the encounter.

      Additionally, Mr. Moua challenges finding of fact 13 that Mr. Moua “freely and

voluntarily” consented to the search by arguing that the finding is actually a

conclusion of law. The “question of whether consent to a search was in fact voluntary

or was the product of duress or coercion, expressed or implied, is a question of fact to

be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Hall, 268 N.C.

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App. 425, 429, 836 S.E.2d 670, 674 (2019) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412

U.S. 218, 227, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 863 (1973)). Here, the competent evidence does not

support the finding of fact that Mr. Moua “freely and voluntarily” consented to the

search. Mr. Moua had just been separated from his vehicle through a show of force

by Sgt. Tryon, where Sgt. Tryon had reached through the car window, unlocked and

opened the car door. Sgt. Tryon was questioning Mr. Moua behind the car about his

probation status with the State while his partner was shining his flashlight in the

car.   Sgt. Tryon presented the questions in a rapid-fire manner which quickly

transitioned into a request to search the car.           Based upon the totality of the

circumstances, this finding of fact is not supported by competent evidence.

   3. Conclusions of Law

       Additionally, Mr. Moua argues that the trial court comingled findings of facts

with conclusions of law. Specifically, Mr. Moua asserts that findings of fact 11 and

12—that the stop concluded prior to Sgt. Tryon's request to search and the request

came during a “consensual” conversation—are actually conclusions of law. These

items appear in the order as both findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ultimate

conclusion of the trial court was that the purpose of the traffic stop ended when Sgt.

Tryon returned Mr. Moua’s documents, and the ensuing conversation were

consensual; therefore, when Mr. Moua gave consent to search the car it was voluntary

and consensual because a reasonable person would feel free to leave or refuse to

cooperate. We review these conclusions de novo. See State v. Reed, 257 N.C. App.

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524, 530, 810 S.E.2d 245, 249, aff”d, 373 N.C. 498, 838 S.E.2d 414 (2020) (explaining

that while a traffic stop only concludes and becomes consensual after an officer

returns the detainee’s paperwork, the governing inquiry is whether under the totality

of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the detainee’s position would believe

they are free to leave). See also State v. Icard, 363 N.C. at 308, 677 S.E.2d at 826

(stating that whether an officer’s actions amount to a show of authority is a conclusion

of law).

   4. Consent to search was not valid

       On appeal, Mr. Moua argues that when he gave consent to search his car, he

was still “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the traffic

stop was unlawfully extended. Therefore, his consent was invalid. We agree.

       The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “the right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . ..” United States v. Mendenhall, 446

U.S. 544, 550, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 507 (1980).              Similarly, the North Carolina

Constitution, Article 1, Section 20 guarantees the right of people to be secure in their

person and property and free from unreasonable search. State v. Arrington, 311 N.C.

633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984).

       When a party gives consent to a search while they are seized or when the

bounds of an investigative stop have been exceeded, the consent is invalid. Florida

v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 239 (1983) (emphasis added). Stopping

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an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660,

667 (1979). A traffic stop is permitted when an officer sees a motorist committing a

violation or when the officer has a reasonably articulable suspicion that there is

criminal activity afoot. State v. Heien, 226 N.C. App. 280, 286, 741 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2013).

Generally, the allowable duration of police inquiry in the traffic-stop context is

determined by the seizure’s “mission”—e.g., to address the traffic violation that

warranted the stop or to attend to related safety concerns.2 State v. Bullock, 370 N.C.

256, 258, 805 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2017).

       The return of documents would render further interaction voluntary and

consensual only if a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that

they are free to leave or disregard the officer’s request for information.” Id. (quoting

State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94, 99, 555 S.E.2d 294, 299 (2001)). Once the purpose

of the traffic stop has concluded, there is nothing that precludes a police officer from

asking questions of a citizen; however, the interaction must be consensual and devoid

of a show of authority or force on the part of law enforcement in order to avoid

becoming a seizure within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. United States v.

       2 The State submitted a Memorandum of Authority presenting cases that justify the request
for a motorist to exit the car during a traffic stop for safety concerns. The State did not advance that
argument at the trial court level or in its appellate brief. The Rules of Appellate Procedure do not
allow parties to add additional arguments through a Memorandum of Additional Authorities. N.C. R.
App. P. 28(g) (2022). The scope of appeal is limited to issues presented in the briefs. N.C. R. App. P.
28(a).

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Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 508.

      Here, it is undisputed that the initial traffic stop was lawful. However, the

scope of detention for this traffic stop, “must be carefully tailored to its underlying

justification.” State v. Morocco, 99 N.C. App. 421, 427–28, 393 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1990)

(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 75 L.Ed.2d at 238). Sgt. Tryon had the

authority to stop Mr. Moua for speeding when he paced Mr. Moua driving fifty-five

miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone. Beyond determining whether to

issue a traffic ticket for the infraction, the reasonable duration of a traffic stop may

include ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop including checking the driver’s

license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and

inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. State v. Bullock, 370

N.C. at 257, 805 S.E.2d at 673 (2017) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348,

355, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492, 499 (2015)). Sgt. Tryon completed all these tasks. He ran the

driver’s information through different law enforcement databases. After about two

minutes of checking, Sgt. Tryon learned that Mr. Moua did not have any active

warrants.

      When Sgt. Tryon returned the documentation to Mr. Moua and gave him a

verbal warning about speeding, the authority for the seizure ended. Sgt. Tryon

needed reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime to extend the stop beyond that

point and the State has not argued that reasonable articulable suspicion existed to

extend the traffic stop. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. at 354, 191 L. Ed.

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2d at 498; See also State v. Myles, 188 N.C. App. 42, 45, 654 S.E.2d 752, 754 (holding

that when the original purpose of the stop has been addressed, there must be grounds

that provide a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify further delay) aff”d per

curium, 362 N.C. 344, 661 S.E.2d 732 (2008).

      Therefore, to determine whether the encounter was unlawfully extended, as

Mr. Moua argues or a voluntary encounter, as the State argues, we consider whether,

based upon the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free

to leave prior to the request to search. In a scenario where a reasonable person would

feel free to leave, the encounter after the documents were returned would be a

voluntary encounter, and the consent may be valid. State v. Heien, 226 N.C. App.

280, 287, 741 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2013). However, if the seizure was unlawfully prolonged,

then consent was invalid. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. at 351, 191 L. Ed. 2d.

at 496. Neither the subjective beliefs of law enforcement nor those of the defendant

is dispositive of the question of whether a defendant is seized within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment; instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable

person would believe they are free to terminate the encounter. State v. Freeman, 307

N.C. 357, 360, 298 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1983).

      The return of the documents is not a bright line that automatically and

inarguably turns a seizure into a consensual encounter. We must consider the return

of the document in the context of the entire encounter. Moments before the return of

the documents, Sgt. Tryon had made a show of authority to remove Mr. Moua from

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                                        STATE V. MOUA

                                       Opinion of the Court

his vehicle and instructed him to stand behind the vehicle. The video shows that Sgt.

Tryon did not phrase his direction as a question, instead directing, albeit politely: “Sir

come out and talk to me real quick.” Further, Sgt. Tryon reached into the car,

unlocked, and opened the door, further suggesting that whether to exit the vehicle

was not up to Mr. Moua. The second uniformed police officer was still standing by

the passenger side of the car, shining his flashlight into the car. Sgt. Tryon did not

tell Mr. Moua that the purpose for the traffic stop had concluded or even ask if he

could question him about other topics. During the motion to suppress hearing, Sgt.

Tryon testified that he removed Mr. Moua from his car, not for safety reasons but for

privacy reasons and because people are more likely to consent to a search when they

are separated from their vehicle.3 No written citation or warning was issued, nor was

there any indication from Sgt. Tryon that the traffic stop had ended. Sgt. Tryon

immediately began questioning Mr. Moua about his probation status and whether he

was compliant with the terms of his probation—questions directly implicating Mr.

Moua’s continued supervisory relationship with the State.

       In the United States, the social contract that underpins our system of

government is one premised on the fact that we cede the absolute nature of some of

our individual rights in order to secure group safety and order. See United States v.

       3 Although this fact may be viewed as one reflective of the subjective intent of Sgt. Tryon,
which we have identified as not part of the Fourth Amendment analysis, we think it provides context
for how certain patterns and practices are employed in attempts to obtain consent that may impact
how reasonable people perceive their ability to withhold consent.

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                                     STATE V. MOUA

                                   Opinion of the Court

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 615 (1975). That agreement

creates an inherent power differential between law enforcement and citizens. Even

if Sgt. Tryon intended to have a consensual conversation with Mr. Moua, we must

objectively consider whether a reasonable person who is being questioned about their

probation status on the side of a dark road in the middle of the night after being

pulled out of their vehicle by a uniformed police officer would feel free to turn his back

on the officer, walk back to their car, and drive away. After a review of the totality

of this four-minute and forty-second encounter, we hold that a reasonable person in

this situation would not have felt free to terminate the encounter even after the police

officer returned his driver’s license and registration four minutes and twelve seconds

into the encounter. Therefore, the seizure was not rendered consensual by the return

of the documents, the request to search was during an unlawful extension of the

traffic stop, and Mr. Moua’s consent to search was invalid.

      In its brief, the State argues that the encounter between Sgt. Tryon and Mr.

Moua was consensual based upon United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 64 L.

Ed. 2d 497 (1980). However, the facts in Mendenhall are distinguishable from the

facts in this case. In Mendenhall, two plainclothes officers, who did not have any

visible weapons, approached the defendant in the Detroit Metropolitan airport

concourse during the morning. Id. at 555, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 510. The officers requested,

not demanded, to see the defendant’s identification. Id. The Court held that the

officer’s conduct without more was insufficient to find a constitutional infringement.

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                                    STATE V. MOUA

                                   Opinion of the Court

Id. By contrast, the instant case presents those facts that would convert Mendenhall

into a constitutional infringement. Here, the uniformed police officers displayed,

although they did not draw, weapons. The encounter occurred on a dark street,

largely deserted, in the middle of the night. Further, in a show of authority, Sgt.

Tryon reached into the window, unlocked and opened the car door, and told

Defendant to get out of the car—essentially taking away any option for Mr. Moua to

decline to follow Sgt. Tryon’s instructions. Sgt. Tryon’s conduct was sufficient to

establish that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter.

      The State also points to State v. Kincaid and State v. Heien to support their

contention that a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate this type of

encounter. The State’s argument is not persuasive. In State v. Kincaid, the police

officer specifically told the defendant the reason for the stop had concluded, and the

officer asked if he could question the defendant on another topic. State v. Kincaid,

147 N.C. App. at 100, 555 S.E.2d at 299. Here, Mr. Moua was not told that the reason

for the stop had concluded, and Sgt. Tryon did not ask to question him on other topics.

In State v. Heien, this Court held that a short encounter after the return of the license

was consensual. 226 N.C. App. 280, 289, 741 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2013). However, the

defendant in Heien was not the driver of the automobile, and the police officer told

the driver that he was free to leave before asking the defendant, who was the

passenger and owner of the vehicle, for consent to search the vehicle. State v. Heien,

214 N.C. App. 515, 516, 714 S.E.2d 827, 828 (2011) rev’d, 366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d

                                          - 21 -
                                          STATE V. MOUA

                                        Opinion of the Court

351 (2012). Here, Sgt. Tryon never told Mr. Moua that he was free to leave. Thus,

we find the facts here render Heien largely inapplicable.

       As to the appropriate remedy, the State, for the first time at oral argument,4

argued that even if this Court reversed the order denying the motion to dismiss, we

should not vacate the judgment because it is based upon a guilty plea. However, the

Legislature specifically created the right to appeal a denial of the motion to suppress

from a guilty plea or a conviction, and the right does not exist until there is a guilty

plea or conviction. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b). This Court only gains jurisdiction

to consider the denial of the motion to suppress when the trial court entered a final

judgment. State v. Horton, 264 N.C. App. 711, 714, 826 S.E.2d 770, 773 (2019). The

plain language of the statute controls, and it explicitly provides relief after a guilty

plea. Therefore, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the judgment and remand.

       Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the seizure was

unlawfully extended, and Mr. Moua was not engaged in a consensual conversation

with law enforcement. A reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate this

encounter, rendering Mr. Moua’s consent invalid. Therefore, we hold that he was

unlawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment, and the consent to search the

vehicle was not freely and voluntarily given.

       4 As previously noted, the addition of new arguments not contained in the brief is a violation
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate procedure. It was improper for the State to raise this new
argument at oral argument because it was not included in their brief.

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                                      STATE V. MOUA

                                     Opinion of the Court

                              III.     CONCLUSION

         Upon careful consideration of the issues presented, we hold that at the time

the police officer asked for consent to search his car, Mr. Moua was unlawfully seized

under the Fourth Amendment and did not, as a matter of law, freely and voluntarily

give consent to the requested search. Therefore, the search violated his Fourth

Amendment rights.       Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the motion to

suppress, vacate the judgment, and remand for further proceedings before the trial

court.

         REVERSED AND VACATED.

         Judges MURPHY and ARROWOOD concur.

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