Court Opinion

ID: 9701832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:39:58.498607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:30.042275
License: Public Domain

Murphy, C. J.,

dissenting:

I agree with the majority that Rheb v. Bar Ass’n of Baltimore, 186 Md. 200, 46 A. 2d 89 (1946), does not mandate, as an immutable rule of law, that wilful failure to file income tax returns is a crime which always involves moral turpitude; it may or may not, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Where, however, the facts show that wilful failure to file a tax return was “for the purpose of cheating the Government,” the crime is one which does involve moral turpitude; our predecessors *467specifically so stated in interpreting the import of Rheb in Braverman v. Bar Assn. of Balto., 209 Md. 328, 345, 121 A. 2d 473, 481 (1956).
I disagree with the majority that there was no evidence in Walman’s case that his failure to file was accompanied either by a fraudulent or dishonest intent or that he intended to avoid the “ultimate” payment of taxes. In my view, the record before us cries out for a determination that it was Walman’s deliberate intention in not filing tax returns to cheat the government and his fellow citizens by avoiding payment of his proper share of the income tax burden. To conclude, as the majority has, that Walman’s failure to file is attributable solely to his inability to pay, and hence is an offense which does not involve moral turpitude, is to lose sight of the wise admonition in Berry v. State, 202 Md. 62, 67, 95 A. 2d 319, 321 (1953), that “An indispensable ingredient in judgment, in court as well as out of it, is a modicum of common sense.” I, therefore, dissent from the majority’s holding that Walman’s offense did not, on the facts of this case, involve moral turpitude.
Both Rheb and Walman had full knowledge of the requirement to file tax returns and each understood that a tax return could be filed without remitting the tax due. Like Rheb, Walman was charged with failing to file federal income tax returns for a three-year period and each was convicted on one count. Rheb admitted at his disciplinary hearing that he had not filed federal or state tax returns for a total of 10 years prior to his indictment. Walman admitted that he had not filed his state income tax returns for 10 years, beginning in 1965. Rheb was disbarred. The Court held, in the circumstances, that Rheb’s offense involved moral turpitude since he “deliberately failed to make returns or keep records, for the purpose of cheating the Federal Government and the State of Maryland out of taxes justly due.” 186 Md. at 204, 46 A. 2d at 291. The same holding is compelled in Walman’s case.
While fraud may not be an actual element of the crime of which Walman was convicted, it is clear, as the majority acknowledges, that a voluntary, intentional violation of the *468known duty to make a federal income tax return is requisite to conviction (as contrasted with failure to file through accident, mistake or other innocent cause).
Walman’s failure to file federal tax returns for 1967, 1968 and 1969 was not discovered by reason of any voluntary disclosure on his part, but rather as a result of governmental investigation. His failure to file state income tax returns for 10 years was revealed, for the first time, on his cross-examination at the remand hearing. That Walman knew that he was required to file tax returns but need not then remit the tax due is conceded — indeed at one time Walman was employed by H & R Block Company as a tax specialist. These are facts and circumstances which shed light on, and lend meaning to, Walman’s purposeful conduct in not filing his income tax returns; they spell out, in my judgment, a deliberate and unmistakable intention to cheat the government.
Because Walman’s failure to file Maryland income tax returns was not made a specific charge against him in the disciplinary proceedings, the majority holds that it cannot, consistent with procedural due process requirements, consider the effect of this evidence in assessing the disciplinary sanction to be imposed. It relies on In re Buffalo, 390 U. S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), and Bar Ass’n v. Cockrell, 270 Md. 686, 313 A. 2d 816 (1974). Neither of these cases is apposite to the facts of this case.
As we pointed out in Bar Ass’n v. Cockrell, 274 Md. 279, 334 A. 2d 85 (1975), Buffalo involved the disbarment of a lawyer for misconduct for which he had not been originally charged, but which was revealed for the first time by testimony at his disciplinary hearing. As a result, the disciplinary charges were amended to include the additional misconduct, and although the attorney was afforded a continuance to prepare a response to the new charge, the Supreme Court held in reversing the disbarment order, that he had been deprived of due process because there was an “absence of fair notice as to the reach of the grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges.” 390 U. S. *469at 552, 88 S. Ct. at 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d at 123. The Supreme Court said:
“The charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of testimony of the accused. He can then be given no opportunity to expunge the earlier statements and start afresh.” 390 U. S. at 551, 88 S. Ct. at 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d at 122.
We said in Cockrell, 274 Md. at 286, 334 A. 2d at 88, that “if Buffalo is strictly applied as it literally reads, then its broad holding would have a crippling effect on the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings.,We nevertheless applied Buffalo’s principles in Cockrell since, on the facts, the two cases could not be distinguished. We were careful to point out, however, that our reliance on Buffalo "is not to be construed as having any import beyond the particular procedural posture that evolved in this case.” 274 Md. at 287.
I think the majority is unwisely and unnecessarily extending Buffalo in this case. Unlike the facts in Buffalo and Cockrell, no new charges of misconduct were filed against Walman as a result of his testimony at the remand hearing. We are not, therefore, concerned with whether he had notice that his newly revealed misconduct would be charged as a new and separate charge, or whether lack of notice resulted in serious prejudice to his defense, as in Cockrell and Buffalo. That Walman failed to file his state income tax returns for 10 years is plainly relevant and proper evidence to be considered in determining whether failure to file his 1968 federal return, for which he was convicted, as well as his 1967 and 1969 federal returns, was with an intent to cheat the government and thus involved moral turpitude. In other words, nothing in Buffalo or Cockrell precludes the use of Walman's self-incriminatory statements of uncharged crimes or misconduct in assessing the real import of his conduct with respect to the charges under consideration. That this evidence may tend to prove Walman guilty of a crime other than the one for which he *470was convicted does not render it inadmissible, or its use a denial of procedural due process. It is well settled that while guilt cannot be established by proving that the accused has committed other crimes, evidence of acts may be admitted to show motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, or a common scheme. Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A. 2d 680 (1976); King v. State, 190 Md. 361, 58 A. 2d 663 (1948); Purviance v. State, 185 Md. 189, 44 A. 2d 474 (1945).
I conclude that Walman’s conviction for wilful failure-to file his 1968 federal income tax return, considered in the light of the total circumstances revealed by the record, involved moral turpitude since his intention was to cheat the government out of taxes justly due. As to the degree of discipline for which Walman should be subjected, we said in Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A. 2d 811 (1974):
“[W]hen a member of . the bar is shown to be willfully dishonest for personal gain by means of fraud, deceit, cheating or like conduct, absent the most compelling extenuating circumstances, .. . disbarment follow[s] as a matter of course.” 271 Md. at 553, 318 A. 2d at 817.
There being no compelling extenuating circumstances in this case, I think the only appropriate sanction is disbarment.
Judges Smith and Digges authorize me to say that they concur in the views expressed in this dissent.