Court Opinion

ID: 9408212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 20:00:52.654668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:42.795541
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0311n.06

                                        Case No. 21-1724

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                                Jul 11, 2023
                                                  )
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                 DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                  )
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                  )          ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
 v.                                               )          STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
                                                  )          THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
 MARVIN NICHOLSON,                                )          MICHIGAN
         Defendant-Appellant.                     )
                                                  )                                     OPINION

Before: GILMAN, LARSEN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

       NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Marvin Nicholson, proceeding pro se, appeals the

district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release. He argues that the court abused its

discretion when it did not find an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to modify his sentence

after considering a nonretroactive change in the law, his health conditions, and COVID-19.

Because the court acted within its discretion, we affirm.

                                                  I.

       As “national enforcer,” Marvin Nicholson played a key role in the Phantom Motorcycle

Club (“PMC”)—an outlaw motorcycle gang and multi-state racketeering enterprise. United States

v. Nicholson, 716 F. App’x 400, 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2017). The government eventually brought

charges against Nicholson and other defendants for their various roles in the gang.

       A jury found Nicholson guilty on many counts: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Assault with a Dangerous Weapon in Aid of
No. 21-1724, United States v. Nicholson

Racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3); Conspiracy to Assault with a Dangerous Weapon in Aid of

Racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(6); two counts of Use and Carry of a Firearm During, and in

Relation to, a Crime of Violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); Conspiracy to Commit Murder in Aid of

Racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5); Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding Certain Officers or

Employees with a Dangerous Weapon, 18 U.S.C. § 111(b); and two counts of Felon in Possession

of a Firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a sentence totaling 480 months of

imprisonment.

       Nicholson appealed and this Court affirmed his convictions. Nicholson, 716 F. App’x at

423. He subsequently moved to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. And Nicholson’s

appeal of the district court’s denial of that motion is now pending before this Court. See Nicholson

v. United States, No. 21-1768.

       Along with his § 2255 motion, Nicholson also moved for compassionate release under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).    Relying on the COVID-19 pandemic and his health conditions—

including obesity, hypertension, an enlarged thyroid gland, subclinical hyperthyroidism, a plate in

his neck, and a fusion in his vertebrae—he argued that he had extraordinary and compelling

reasons that warranted a sentence reduction.         But the district court disagreed and denied

compassionate release.

       Even so, Nicholson moved the court to reconsider, arguing that he would have been

sentenced to fewer years had it sentenced him after Congress amended the First Step Act. But the

court denied his motion because it was “based upon a non-retroactive change in the law.” (R. 949,

Order). Nicholson timely appealed.

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No. 21-1724, United States v. Nicholson

                                                   II.

       The “rule of finality” counsels that a district court may not modify a sentence “except in

limited circumstances.” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 561, 569 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation

omitted). So much so that we refer to such “[s]entence modifications a[s] the exception, not the

rule.” Id. at 561. With that as the backdrop, compassionate release functions as one exception.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

       A compassionate-release motion involves a “three-step inquiry.” United States v. Elias,

984 F.3d 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). That inquiry requires that the district court

find that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [a sentence] reduction,” ensure “that such

a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,”

and “consider[] the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applicable.”

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). And if each requirement is met, a court may—but need not—reduce

a term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). If any of the requirements are not met,

however, a court cannot reduce a sentence. Id.

       We review the district court’s denial of compassionate release under the abuse-of-

discretion standard. United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2020). That means we

reverse only if the court “relie[d] on clearly erroneous findings of fact, use[d] an erroneous legal

standard, or improperly applie[d] the law.” Elias, 984 F.3d at 520 (quoting United States v.

Flowers, 963 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 2020)).

                                                   III.

       Nicholson argues that the district court abused its discretion by not finding an

“extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction. Specifically, he reasons that the

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No. 21-1724, United States v. Nicholson

court should have found a reason when considering the combination of his health conditions and

a nonretroactive change to the First Step Act.

        Start with his health conditions. The district court, in exercising its “discretion to define

‘extraordinary and compelling’ circumstances,” United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442, 446 (6th

Cir. 2021) (quoting Elias, 984 F.3d at 519–20), explained why Nicholson’s factual considerations

of his health and COVID-19 don’t form an “extraordinary and compelling” reason.

        First off, the court “confirm[ed] that his medical conditions are being satisfactorily treated

by the [Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)].” (R. 874, Order, at 6.) Next, the court considered statistics

about COVID-19 at Nicholson’s facility. In particular, it recognized that “the significantly lower

number of COVID-positives at [the facility] indicate that the BOP has acted aggressively and

successfully to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic at that institution.” (Id.) And although

Nicholson had “previously tested positive for COVID-19,” the court noted that he had “recovered.”

(Id.)

        All in all, “the severity of [his] condition[s] and [their] associated risks are less than clear.”

United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747, 750 (6th Cir. 2021). Indeed, at this point, they have either

been or are being treated. What’s more, he does not point to any medical condition that the court

got wrong. And as far as COVID-19 goes, nothing defeats the fact that “both the likelihood of

contracting [the virus] and [its] associated risks . . . are significantly reduced.” Id. at 751. So

Nicholson’s health conditions alone do not form an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to

modify his sentence.

        Next up, Congress’s 2018 modification to the First Step Act. See Pub. L. 115-391, Title

VI, 132 Stat. 5194. Relevant here, Congress amended the “stacking” provision in 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c), changing how “second-conviction penalties” work. (Appellant Br. at 1–2; see Jarvis,

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No. 21-1724, United States v. Nicholson

999 F.3d at 443 (noting that § 924(c) now “limit[s] the kinds of firearm convictions that would

count as repeat offenses”).) Relying on this nonretroactive change to § 924(c), Nicholson reasons

that he would have received a shorter sentence had he been sentenced today instead of back in

2015. And so, he argues that the change in law, combined with other factors, is an “extraordinary

and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction.1

       His argument fails.      “Nonretroactive legal developments do not factor into the

extraordinary and compelling analysis.” United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, 1066 (6th Cir.

2022) (en banc), cert. denied, No. 22-7210, 2023 WL 3571586 (May 22, 2023); see Jarvis, 999

F.3d at 443, 446 (rejecting that “the COVID-19 pandemic and the First Step Act’s [nonretroactive]

amendments to § 924(c)” create an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to reduce a sentence).

So no “extraordinary and compelling” reason comes out of § 924(c)’s change.

       And that remains true even when combining the change in law with Nicholson’s health

conditions and what remains of COVID-19. See Jarvis, 999 F.3d at 445 (determining that courts

cannot “treat the First Step Act’s non-retroactive amendments, whether by themselves or together

with other factors, as ‘extraordinary and compelling’ explanations for a sentencing reduction”

(emphasis added)). That’s because “adding a legally impermissible ground to other insufficient

factual considerations cannot entitle a defendant to a sentence reduction.” McCall, 56 F.4th at

1
  He cites several district-court and out-of-circuit cases, all of which were decided before this
Court’s decision in United States v. McCall—which settled in our Circuit that nonretroactive
changes in the law cannot form “extraordinary and compelling” reasons to modify a sentence,
whether “considered alone or together with other factors.” 56 F.4th 1048, 1065–66 (6th Cir. 2022)
(en banc), cert. denied, No. 22-7210, 2023 WL 3571586 (May 22, 2023). (See Appellant Br. at 1
(citing United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Taniguchi, No.
2-00-CR-50, 2020 WL 6390061, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2020); United States v. Young, 458 F.
Supp. 3d 838, 840 (M.D. Tenn. 2020); United States v. Moore, 481 F. Supp. 3d 703, 712 (M.D.
Tenn. 2020); United States v. Baker, No. 10-20513, 2020 WL 4696594, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
13, 2020)).)

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No. 21-1724, United States v. Nicholson

1066 (cleaned up) (rejecting the argument that a nonretroactive change in the law “when combined

with COVID-19 and [a defendant’s] rehabilitative efforts” creates an “extraordinary and

compelling reason” for a sentence reduction). So the district court reasonably found that Nicholson

didn’t provide an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduced sentence.

                                                 IV.

       For these reasons, we affirm.

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