Court Opinion

ID: 9368233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 15:05:28.001049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.418927
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2021-CA-0925-MR

KEVIN MASTER                                                       APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE KATHLEEN S. LAPE, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 19-CR-01762

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                        VACATING AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CETRULO, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Appellant Kevin Master (“Appellant KM”) appeals from a

judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court denying his motion to suppress evidence

seized from his property pursuant to a search warrant. For the reasons explained

below, we vacate the judgment and remand.
                       I.     FACTS AND BACKGROUND

             In October 2019, a detective with the Kentucky State Police (“the

Detective”) submitted an affidavit seeking a search warrant for Appellant KM’s

residence. The affidavit provided by the Detective stated the following in support

of the warrant:

             [T]he U.S. Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and
             [Border] Patrol (USCBP) alerted [the Detective] that a
             package believed to contain a child-sized sex doll was
             being shipped to [Appellant KM at his home address in]
             Kentucky. The package originated from a company in
             China and was shipped to the United States via FedEx.
             USCBP Officer Monique Ford noticed discrepancies
             between the shipping manifest description of the contents
             and the actual size of the package. The package was
             opened by USCBP and found to contain an anatomically
             correct child size doll manufactured for purposes of
             sexual gratification. . . . [The Detective’s] investigation
             revealed [Appellant KM] does, in fact, live in the
             apartment to which the package is addressed. [The
             Detective] conducted surveillance on the residence and
             noticed a vehicle registered to [Appellant KM] parked
             outside the residence as recently as October 5, 2019.

             [The Detective] has been employed with the Kentucky
             State Police for 25 years. [The Detective] is assigned to
             the ICAC [Internet Crimes Against Children] Task Force
             and is specially trained in offenses involving the abuse
             and exploitation of children, including but not limited to
             child pornography and child sexual abuse. Based upon
             [the Detective’s] training and experience, [the Detective]
             believes any person who orders a child sex doll from
             China has gone to great lengths to achieve sexual
             gratification for a sexual attraction to children. [The
             Detective] believes anyone who orders a child sex doll is
             also likely to be downloading, viewing, sharing, and/or

                                         -2-
             manufacturing child pornography. [The Detective]
             knows child pornography to be readily available via the
             internet from the same types of illicit websites that sell
             child sex dolls. [The Detective] also knows computers,
             smart phones, and other electronic devises often contain
             the illicit images even after being “deleted” by the user.
             [The Detective] also knows people who look at child
             pornography often store collections of the matter for
             future use.

             Based upon all of the above, [the Detective] requests that
             the search warrant be issued to search [Appellant KM’s
             residence] in order to further [the Detective’s] continuing
             investigation.

             Based on that affidavit, a district court judge (“the warrant-issuing

judge”) signed a search warrant for Appellant KM’s residence. During the search,

police found additional sex dolls and child pornography on Appellant KM’s

electronic devices. Appellant KM was arrested and charged with 20 counts of

matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. Appellant KM filed a motion

to suppress, arguing lack of probable cause to search his residence.

             In September 2020, the circuit court held oral arguments to determine

if a testimonial hearing on the motion to suppress was necessary. During those

contentious arguments, the parties disagreed as to the circuit court’s standard of

review and the existence of probable cause. The Commonwealth argued that

ordering a child sex doll is indicative of a sexual attraction to children and such a

buyer is more likely than not to possess child pornography. Conversely, Appellant

KM argued the Detective “failed to engage in any meaningful investigation that

                                          -3-
could be used to support any of his suspicions or assumptions,” and ownership of a

child sex doll does not create a legal nexus to ownership of child pornography.

             Ultimately agreeing with the Commonwealth, the circuit court denied

the motion to suppress. In an order entered in October 2020, the court found that

             [the Detective] states that he is an experienced police
             officer who has trained in and worked on internet crimes
             involving child pornography. Based on his experience,
             Chinese web sites that sell the type of child sex doll
             purchased and received by [Appellant KM] also contain
             child pornography. He also attests that, in his
             experience, a person who goes through the lengths that
             [Appellant KM] went through to obtain such a
             prepubescent sex doll from China does so for sexual
             gratification for a sexual attraction to children and has
             likely downloaded, viewed, shared, and/or manufactured
             child pornography.

             This court finds [the Detective] established a substantial
             basis for a reasonable belief by the warrant-issuing judge
             that because [Appellant KM] ordered and received a
             prepubescent sex doll designed for sexual gratification
             from China, likely through a web site containing child
             pornography, there is a fair probability that he
             downloaded, viewed, shared and/or manufactured child
             pornography and evidence of same would likely be found
             in his home and/or on his electronic devices.

             After the court denied the motion to suppress, Appellant KM made a

conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression denial. He

was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                                         -4-
                          II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

             “It is well established that ‘[s]earch warrants must be supported by

probable cause to satisfy the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.’” Minks v.

Commonwealth, 427 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Ky. 2014) (quoting United States v.

Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996)). Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.

Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), provided the proper standard to review a

decision to issue a search warrant, and was adopted by the Kentucky Supreme

Court in Beemer v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1984). Commonwealth

v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43, 47-48 (Ky. 2010). In Pride, the Kentucky Supreme Court

relied upon Gates, wherein the United States Supreme Court had held:

             [t]he task of the [warrant] issuing magistrate is simply to
             make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
             all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
             including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of
             persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
             probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
             found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing
             court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
             “substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]” that probable
             cause existed.

Id. at 48 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. at 2332).

             Therefore, at the circuit court level,

             The trial court judge faced with a motion to suppress
             evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant should
             apply the Gates standard, and determine whether under
             the “totality of the circumstances” presented within the
             four corners of the affidavit, a warrant-issuing judge had

                                         -5-
               a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
               existed.
Id. at 49.

               Here, the circuit court applied that standard of review. At the

appellate court level,1

               [t]he proper test for appellate review of a suppression
               hearing ruling regarding a search pursuant to a warrant is
               to determine first if the facts found by the trial judge are
               supported by substantial evidence, [RCr 8.272] and then
               to determine whether the trial judge correctly determined
               that the issuing judge did or did not have a “substantial
               basis for . . . conclud[ing]” that probable cause existed.
               . . . In doing so, all reviewing courts must give great
               deference to the warrant-issuing judge’s decision. We
               also review the four corners of the affidavit and not
               extrinsic evidence in analyzing the warrant-issuing
               judge’s conclusion.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

                                         III.    ANALYSIS

               The Fourth Amendment to the United States. Constitution and Section

10 of the Kentucky Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and

seizures. A search is reasonable if it is supported by a warrant and an

1
 We do not agree with Appellant KM that a de novo review is appropriate for this appeal. A
warrantless search requires a de novo review. For a search based on a warrant, a “de
novo review of the facts contained in the affidavit supporting a search warrant is inappropriate
and tends to lead to overly technical analysis . . . .” Id. at 48 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103
S. Ct. 2331).
2
 Effective January 1, 2015, Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 8.27 superseded
RCr 9.78; however, the standard for appellate review remained unaffected. Gibson v.
Commonwealth, No. 2014-SC-000158-MR, 2015 WL 9243583 (Ky. Dec. 17, 2015).

                                                 -6-
accompanying affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause. Pride, 302 S.W.3d

at 50. An affidavit supporting a search warrant must “reasonably describe the

property or premises to be searched and state sufficient facts to establish probable

cause for the search of the property or premises.” Guth v. Commonwealth, 29

S.W.3d 809, 811 (Ky. App. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Coker v.

Commonwealth, 811 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Ky. App. 1991)).

               On appeal, Appellant KM argues there was not a substantial basis for

finding probable cause existed based on the affidavit submitted by the Detective.

               At the time [the Detective] sought the search warrant
               there was never any evidence that the internet was used
               to order a sex doll. It was surmised by [the Detective],
               but he did no investigation prior to seeking the search
               warrant to determine if this was even true. [Appellant
               KM] could have used an 800 number. There was simply
               no investigation other than confirming [Appellant KM’s]
               address.

               Appellant KM argues there is no nexus between ordering a child sex

doll – which is legal– and owning child pornography. Also, Appellant KM argues

the good faith exception is not applicable because the Detective knew ordering a

child sex doll was legal3 and failed to investigate beyond confirming Appellant

KM’s address. Appellant KM does not allege that the affidavit contained false

statements or omitted facts, but that the affidavit – on its face – was not sufficient.

3
 The Detective participated in a similar case one year prior, discussed in more detail below.
Commonwealth v. Phillips, No. 18-CR-01315, Kenton County.

                                               -7-
Finally, Appellant KM argues the five-year conditional discharge was applied in

error.

              On appeal, the Commonwealth argues the circuit court properly

denied the motion to suppress. Based on the Detective’s 25 years of training and

experience, he concluded that the act of ordering a child sex doll “was indicative of

the fact that [Appellant KM] was sexually attracted to children.” The

Commonwealth argues it is reasonable to conclude that a person who is sexually

attracted to children – as is proven by ordering a child sex doll – is “likely to also

be downloading, viewing, sharing or manufacturing child pornography in

furtherance of their attraction to children.” The Commonwealth argues the good

faith exception could apply but would require a remand to circuit court for an

evidentiary hearing. Also, as a point of accord, the Commonwealth agrees that the

circuit court improperly imposed a five-year conditional discharge period at

sentencing.

                A. Search Warrant Fails for Lack of Probable Cause

              Applying the standard of review put forth in Pride, Beemer, and

Gates, we review the denial by the circuit court of Appellant KM’s motion to

suppress evidence – obtained pursuant to a search warrant – in two stages. First,

we look to see if substantial evidence supported the circuit court’s overall factual

findings. Pride, 302 S.W.3d at 49. This step gives us pause because there were

                                          -8-
very few factual findings . . . because there were very few facts. While we must

give deference to the warrant-issuing judge’s decision, we are also limited to the

four corners of the affidavit. Id.

             In the order on appeal, the circuit court walked through what few facts

we have: a child sex doll was sent to the residence of Appellant KM; ordering and

possessing a child sex doll is not illegal, but “[t]he facts contained in a warrant do

not have to be illegal in and of themselves, rather they must establish the

probability that contraband will be found.” The circuit court then reiterated the

Detective’s assessment – not of Appellant KM specifically – but his general

conclusions about the people and the circumstances surrounding the purchase of a

child sex doll. That was it. Then, the court determined

             the affidavit established a substantial basis for a
             reasonable belief by the warrant-issuing judge that
             because [Appellant KM] ordered and received a
             prepubescent sex doll designed for sexual gratification
             from China, likely through a web site containing child
             pornography, there is a fair probability that [Appellant
             KM] downloaded, viewed, shared and/or manufactured
             child pornography and evidence of same would likely be
             found in his home or and/or on his electronic devices.

             And yet, Appellant KM did not receive the doll; law enforcement

intercepted the doll and did not forward it to the residence of Appellant KM. The

circuit court stated that based on the Detective’s experience “Chinese web sites

that sell the type of child sex doll purchased and received by [Appellant KM] also

                                          -9-
contain child pornography.” However, the affidavit provides no proof the doll was

purchased through a web site or that Appellant KM ordered the doll. The affidavit

does not point to empirical data, cite to previous cases, or in any way support the

presumption that web sites selling these dolls also sell child pornography. We are

mindful that this deplorable area of the internet could be difficult to research, and

examples could be hard to find, so we continue with our analysis.

              The circuit court stated the Detective believes “a person who goes

through the lengths that [the Appellant KM] went through to obtain such a

prepubescent sex doll from China does so for the sexual gratification for a sexual

attraction to children and has likely downloaded, viewed, shared, and/or

manufactured child pornography.” Again, the Detective showed no direct

connection to Appellant KM beyond his address being on the mailing label. 4

Neither the Detective, nor the circuit court, gave any hint as to what “lengths” the

buyer went through to order the doll. There was no data, no research, and no

evidence supporting the presumption that ordering such a doll was part and parcel

to downloading, viewing, sharing, and manufacturing child pornography. There

was no information in the affidavit supporting the contention that using a child sex

doll for sexual gratification escalates this abhorrent attraction or leads to

4
 Although we find the example extreme, we cannot rebut Appellant KM’s suppression hearing
argument: if this search warrant stands, law enforcement would only need to send a child sex
doll to someone’s home in order to obtain a search warrant for a private residence.

                                            -10-
downloading, viewing, sharing, and manufacturing child pornography. Again, this

may be because the subject matter was difficult to study; privacy considerations

may have limited examples, and statistical data may not be feasible in this area, but

the Commonwealth did not address any such issues.

             The affidavit relies – almost exclusively – on the Detective’s training

and experience, a knowledge base we do value. The Commonwealth noted that the

Detective’s 25 years of “seasoned experience and specialized expertise were given

due consideration here.” However, it is that breadth of experience that also gives

us pause: wouldn’t an officer with this level of experience know to investigate

prior to applying for a search warrant for a private residence? Thankfully, we need

not address that issue directly, because here, the circuit court failed the second

aspect of our analysis: the circuit court incorrectly determined that the warrant-

issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

             We agree that “the expertise and experience of the law enforcement

officer involved in the matter may be a relevant consideration in the determination

of probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 199 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Ky. App.

2006) (citation omitted). And yet, while we respect the importance of law

enforcement experience, what are missing are facts specific to Appellant KM. See

Hensley v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3d 572, 576 (Ky. App. 2007) (“nothing more

than conclusory allegations” were insufficient to support a finding of probable

                                         -11-
cause). Here, the affidavit does not state that Appellant KM had a criminal history.

The affidavit does not refer to any reports of suspicious behavior nor complaints

from neighbors about Appellant KM. Law enforcement did not previously

subpoena his internet search history from his internet service provider. The

affidavit does not refer to any police surveillance of Appellant KM beyond driving

by his parking lot to confirm the presence of his vehicle.

             Moreover, “[a]n officer seeking a warrant must produce adequate

supporting facts about the underlying circumstances to show that probable cause

exists to support the particular search requested.” United States v. Hodson, 543

F.3d 286, 293-94 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372,

1377 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added)). In Hodson, the Sixth Circuit addressed

“whether a suspect’s ostensibly admitting to having engaged in child molestation is

sufficient, without more, to establish probable cause to search that suspect’s home

for child pornography.” Id. at 286.

             Specifically, during online chats with an undercover detective,

Hodson admitted his attraction to underage children and stated that he had acted on

his attraction in the past. Id. at 287. Based primarily on those online

conversations, the detective prepared an affidavit. Id. The detective’s affidavit did

not “establish, allege, or even suggest any basis for a finding of probable cause to

believe that Hodson had ever been involved in child pornography in any manner.”

                                        -12-
Id. at 289. Nonetheless, the magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the

immediate search of Hodson’s residence. Id. Police found images of child

pornography on Hodson’s seized computer and charged him with receiving and

possessing child pornography. Id. Hodson moved to suppress the evidence seized

during the search. Id. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and

recommended that the district court deny the motion to suppress the pornography

evidence because the warrant was defective. Id. at 290-91.

             Next, the district court held a hearing and adopted the magistrate

judge’s recommendation. Id. Finally, the Sixth Circuit agreed, stating “it is

beyond dispute that the warrant was defective for lack of probable cause – [the

detective] established probable cause for one crime (child molestation) but

designed and requested a search for evidence of an entirely different crime (child

pornography).” Id. at 292. The Sixth Circuit determined “it was unreasonable for

the officer executing the warrant in this case to believe that probable cause existed

to search Hodson’s computers for child pornography based solely on a suspicion –

albeit a suspicion triggered by Hodson’s computer use – that Hodson had engaged

in child molestation.” Id. at 293.

             Similarly, here, the affidavit contained no basis to support the

Detective’s contention that people who purchase child sex dolls also possess child

pornography. The Commonwealth attempts to distinguish Hodson, arguing that

                                        -13-
the Hodson warrant failed because the supporting affidavit “offered no assertion”

of a connection between child molestation and child pornography. The

Commonwealth argues that merely making an assertion that a connection existed is

sufficient under Hodson.

             However, we disagree; “asserting” a connection exists – without any

supporting evidence – is not enough. The Sixth Circuit in Hodson stated there may

be a logical inference between conduct and pornography, but that inference “is not

self-evident.” Id. at 290. We too find it a logical step from such conduct – buying

a child sex doll – to child pornography, but we cannot leap across a fact-less void.

We agree with the magistrate judge in Hodson that a warrant-issuing judge may

make reasonable inferences based on common sense, but that judge cannot supply

an empirical link between sexual deviance, or even sexual attraction, and

pornography possession. Id. at 291.

             It is this link that the parties disagree upon, using different verbiage to

describe the “nexus” requirement. Appellant KM argues “the probable cause

standard in an affidavit must minimally show a sufficient nexus between the illegal

activity and the place to be searched” citing United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490,

496-97 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Because the purchase of a child sex doll

was not illegal, Appellant KM argues there was not a sufficient nexus between the

legal purchase of the doll and a search for child pornography. We agree; like in

                                         -14-
Hodson, the activity that prompted the affidavit and search was separate from the

crime being searched for in Appellant KM’s residence.

             The Commonwealth uses different verbiage to describe the nexus:

“an affidavit for a search warrant must provide a ‘nexus between the place to be

searched and the evidence sought.’ Elders v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.3d 495, 500

(Ky. App. 2012) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

2004)).” The Commonwealth attempts to create the nexus based solely on child

pornography: the police sought child pornography, which is stored on electronic

devices, devices which are located in the home. Yes, there is a nexus between

child pornography and electronic equipment, but still missing are any facts

connecting Appellant KM to child pornography.

             Moreover, if we trace the Commonwealth’s referenced precedent, the

complete Sixth Circuit quote in Carpenter is consistent with the verbiage argued

by Appellant KM, “[t]o justify a search, the circumstances must indicate why

evidence of illegal activity will be found ‘in a particular place.’ There must, in

other words, be a ‘nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence

sought.’” Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted). No matter the verbiage

preference, here, there is no nexus, no connecting facts, between Appellant KM’s

residence and child pornography.

                                         -15-
             Therefore, here, the trial judge incorrectly determined that the

warrant-issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause

existed.

    B. Circuit Court Must Determine Applicability of Good Faith Exception

             Because there was not a substantial basis for concluding that probable

cause existed, the circuit court must suppress the evidence if the Detective did not

act in good faith. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed.

2d 677 (1984). In Leon, the Unite States Supreme Court

             determined that evidence seized by police should not be
             excluded if it is obtained pursuant to a search warrant
             which may later be determined to be flawed if the
             officers executing the warrant had an objectively
             reasonable good-faith belief in the probable cause
             determination by the magistrate and the sufficiency of the
             warrant. In such cases, the evidence will not be
             suppressed.

Moore v. Commonwealth, 159 S.W.3d 325, 327 (Ky. 2005) (citing Leon, 468 U.S.

897, 104 S. Ct. 3405).

             The circuit court did not allow oral arguments on the good faith

exception, so we remand to give the parties an opportunity to do so. The order on

appeal found that “the good faith exception is not in issue and no analysis of same

will be had” due to the court’s finding that the warrant-issuing judge had a

substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. On remand, the

                                        -16-
Commonwealth faces a tough challenge to prove the Detective acted in good faith

because of his familiarity with similar such facts and expectations.

                 In September 2018, United States Customs Enforcement notified the

Department of Homeland Security of a package shipped from China to Scott

Phillips (“Phillips”) containing a child sex doll. The Department of Homeland

Security contacted the Kentucky State Police who facilitated the delivery to

Phillips. Based on that information, the State Police and the Detective – the same

detective discussed in the order on appeal here – sought a search warrant for

Phillips’ home. The district court granted the search warrant. The search

discovered two child sex dolls. Phillips was charged in district court in September

2018 with one count of possession of a matter portraying a sexual performance by

a minor. After a preliminary hearing, the defense moved for a dismissal of the

felony charge5 due to a lack of probable cause. The district court agreed with the

defense and dismissed the felony charge.

                 The wheels of justice continued to turn, and the Commonwealth –

based on evidence discovered during the search of Phillips’ home – brought forth

additional charges against Phillips. In March 2020, the defense moved to suppress

the evidence found during the search. After a hearing on the matter, the Kenton

5
    Phillips also had minor drug-related charges.

                                                    -17-
Circuit Court granted the motion to suppress because it found there were

insufficient facts to establish a fair probability that law enforcement would

discover evidence of a crime. The circuit court stated:

             [The Detective] implied his belief that a person
             possessing such sex dolls would also be in possession of
             a matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor.
             However, he offered no basis to support his suspicion
             that the Defendant would probably have child
             pornography in his possession. He provided no scientific
             or empirical evidence that would establish a nexus
             between possession of a child sex doll and possession of
             internet child pornography. In United States v. Edwards,
             823 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2015), the Court found the
             possession of erotica would not provide sufficient
             probable cause that child pornography would be found in
             a defendant’s home. See also, United States v. Hodson,
             543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008).

             ....

                    The Detective’s belief or opinion that the
             possession of the sex doll would establish probable cause
             to search the Defendant’s devices must fail. No credible
             proof has been presented to establish a required nexus
             between possession of the doll and possession of internet
             child pornography. See U.S. v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591
             (6th Cir. 2004); Beckam v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
             284 S.W.3d 547 (2009). The officer’s speculation or
             conclusory allegations do not support probable cause in
             this case. Hensley v. Commonwealth, Ky. App. 248
             S.W.3d 572 [(2008)].

             ...

             [T]he legal possession of the doll would not support the
             issuance of a search warrant for electronic devices which
             could contain pornography. The search warrant herein,

                                        -18-
             which sought devices to establish [Phillips] to have
             searched for and purchased sex dolls, does not allege
             facts that would constitute a crime.

Commonwealth v. Phillips, Kenton County No. 18-CR-01315, order (filed Aug. 4,

2020).

             On remand, the circuit judge may consider matter outside the affidavit

for the good faith analysis. Moore, 159 S.W.3d at 328 (citations omitted).

“[W]hen assessing the objective good faith of police executing a warrant, we must

look to the totality of the circumstances, including any information known to the

officer but not presented to the issuing magistrate.” Id. (citing United States v.

Simpkins, 914 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1990)).

                   C. Conditional Discharge Must Be Discharged

             Also on remand, the circuit court must correct a sentencing error, an

error to which the Commonwealth has conceded. The five-year conditional

discharge is not applicable, and the circuit court must vacate that aspect of

Appellant KM’s sentence. Appellant KM pled guilty to 20 counts of possession of

a matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor under Kentucky Revised

Statute (KRS) 531.335, but the conditional discharge statute KRS 532.043(1) does

not include KRS 531.335. See also Chames v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.3d 519

(Ky. App. 2012).

                                         -19-
                                  IV.    CONCLUSION

             The parties are well acquainted with the Phillips case, but we find the

district court’s words – in the Order6 dismissing the charges against Phillips for

lack of probable cause – worth repeating.

             As repulsive as the court find this doll and [Phillips’]
             actions and shares the Commonwealth’s concerns
             regarding the exploitation of children, it is the role of the
             Court to apply the law as written and follow precedent of
             the Kentucky and Federal Appellate Courts and not to
             make law or be a judicial activist by basing a ruling upon
             their personal belief and/or moral judgment.

             Therefore, we VACATE the Kenton Circuit Court Order denying the

motion to suppress and REMAND for an evidentiary hearing on the good faith

exception. Additionally, we VACATE the improperly imposed conditional

discharge aspect of Appellant KM’s sentence and REMAND for a corrected

sentence.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Karen Shuff Maurer                           Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                          Attorney General of Kentucky

                                             Christina L. Romano
                                             Assistant Attorney General
                                             Frankfort, Kentucky

6
  Commonwealth v. Phillips, Kenton County No. 18-F-01698, order dismissing and remanding
(filed Sep. 27, 2018).

                                           -20-