Court Opinion

ID: 9368014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 18:00:49.210565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.149780
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 2 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELISSA ANTABLIN,                               No.    21-56349

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. Nos.
                                                2:18-cv-09474-MCS-AS
 v.                                             2:20-cv-08762-MCS-AS

MOTION PICTURE COSTUMERS,
LOCAL NO. 705, International Alliance of        MEMORANDUM*
Theatrical Stage Employees and Motion
Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied
Crafts,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, Presiding

                    Argued and Submitted November 17, 2022
                              Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY,**
District Judge.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
            The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
      Melissa Antablin—a professional costumer and member of Motion Picture

Costumers Local 705—sued Local 705, alleging it retaliated against her for a dispute

she had with union officials by blocking her employment on several productions;

violated its duty of fair representation by allowing the hiring of non-union costumers

for jobs to which she applied; and refused to produce union records she claimed she

was entitled to obtain under federal and state law. The district court granted Local

705’s motion for summary judgment on Antablin’s claims and denied her cross

motion for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

affirm in part and reverse in part.

      1.     Retaliation claim

      Antablin asserted her retaliation claim under section 101(a)(2) and (4) of the

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), (4). The

district court partially dismissed the claim as time-barred and granted summary

judgment for the union on the rest of the claim. We assume for purposes of

discussion, however, that Antablin’s claim was timely in its entirety, because

summary judgment was appropriately granted against her on the merits of her claim.

      Specifically, the district court did not err in finding that there was no evidence

that the union took any action to restrict or influence Antablin’s employment on the

jobs she cited in her retaliation claim.        Antablin identified some arguable

inconsistencies in the employers’ renditions of their dealings with her, but even if

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those explanations were disbelieved it would not amount to evidence of any

retaliatory action by the union. More particularly, Antablin offered no evidence that

the union was aware of her availability to work on the particular productions in

question. Nor did she offer evidence that anyone connected with the union reached

out to any of these employers about her in any way; the only evidence was to the

contrary. Without evidence of retaliatory conduct by the union, Antablin’s claim

could not succeed. See Casumpang v. Int’l Longshoreman’s and Warehousemen’s

Union, Local 142, 269 F.3d 1042, 1058 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that plaintiff

must show she was subjected to retaliatory action to state a cause of action for a

violation of section 101(a)(2)).

      2.     Duty of Fair Representation Claim.1

      Antablin’s second claim is that the union violated its duty of fair

representation by authorizing the hiring of non-union costumers on certain jobs even

though she, as a union member, was available for hiring. The district court held that

no duty of fair representation existed because the union did not operate an

“exclusive” hiring hall.    We conclude that genuine factual disputes preclude

summary judgment on this claim.

1
  The district court suggested that Antablin had “largely conceded” this issue but
then addressed it on the merits, so we will do the same.

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      The Supreme Court has held that a union’s operation of an exclusive hiring

hall gives rise to a duty of fair representation (DFR) on the part of the union to its

members. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 6, 493

U.S. 67, 88–89 (1989). “Exclusive” in this context is “a term of art denoting the

degree to which hiring is reserved to the union hiring hall.” Id. at 71 n.1.

      There is evidence that would permit a reasonable fact finder to determine that

the system established by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Local 705

and maintained by the union—called the Industry Experience Roster (IER)—was

sufficiently exclusive to trigger the union’s DFR vis-à-vis its members. Paragraph

68(c) of the CBA states that “preference of employment in hiring and rehiring shall

be given” by a producer to qualified persons on the IER, and it may be read to allow

the producer to go outside the IER only if there it includes insufficient qualified

workers to meet the producer’s requirements. The CBA also includes a grievance

process applicable when a producer hires without regard to the IER, including a

remedy that would permit a grievance arbitrator to order a producer to “forthwith

employ” a person on the IER and award backpay. Though the IER appears to have

included both union and non-union costumers, a reasonable fact finder, when

reviewing the evidence just discussed, could nonetheless infer that the arrangement

in the CBA was effectively an exclusive hiring hall. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters

Local 492 (Fire and Ice Prods., Inc.), 369 N.L.R.B. No. 75, slip op. at 2-4, 7-8 (2020)

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(quoting Plumbers & Pipe Fitters, 50 F.3d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (finding an

Industry Experience Roster constituted an exclusive hiring hall because producers

were required to exhaust the Roster or invoke an exception before hiring off-Roster,

and failing to do so could lead to a grievance process).2

      To the extent Local 705’s actions related to its operation of an exclusive hiring

hall, it owed Antablin not simply a duty of fair representation, but a heightened duty

of fair dealing that required it to operate by “reference to objective criteria.” Lucas

v. N.L.R.B., 333 F.3d 927, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Under Lucas, when

a union engages in conduct that “causes a worker to be fired or prevents a worker

from being hired, the burden shifts to the union to justify its actions .” Id. at 934. The

record here includes evidence that would permit a finding that the union routinely

granted waivers to producers that permitted them to hire without regard to the IER.

If so, then the heightened duty under Lucas would apply. Because Local 705

contends that it is only subject to the lower, more deferential standard from Air Line

Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991), it does not address the shifted

burden under Lucas. That would require Local 705 to establish that, in granting

waivers, it “acted according to a valid union security clause or that [its] action was

2
 That Local 705 outsourced day-to-day administration of the IER may be a factor
for a fact finder to consider in determining whether the CBA established an
exclusive hiring hall, but on the record before us there is no basis to consider this a
dispositive factor.

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necessary to the effective performance of its function of representing its

constituency.” Lucas, 333 F.3d at 935 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).   Because these issues remain unresolved, summary judgment is not

appropriate.

      For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to Local 705 on Antablin’s duty of fair representation claim and remand for further

proceedings on that claim.

      3.       Inspection Claims

      The district court found Antablin’s record-inspection claims moot because,

during the litigation, she received the records she had requested. A case is moot

“when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally

cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496

(1969). In deciding mootness, “the question is whether there can be any effective

relief.” Nw. Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988)

(citations and internal quotations marks omitted). A case is moot when “there is

no reasonable expectation” that the alleged violation will recur. United States v. W.

T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).

      Antablin’s claims, which arise under both federal and state law, involve the

denial of her requests to inspect specific documents. Because she has received those

documents from the union, she has no claim left to pursue. In other words, there is

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no effective relief a court can provide, and the alleged violation—which is specific

to her—cannot recur. The exception to mootness for some cases involving voluntary

cessation of a practice does not apply here, as there are no “old ways” for the union

to return to. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167,

189 (2000) (referring to “a challenged practice” that could “reasonably be expected

to start up again” and concern that a defendant could “return to his old ways” after

voluntary ceasing the challenged conduct). Antablin attempts to recharacterize her

claim as challenging a larger union practice of denying inspection requests, but she

has offered no evidence that would suggest there is such a practice. Nor can the

union’s interpretation of the relevant statutes as not obligating it to provide members

with copies of records (as opposed to inspecting them)—which seemingly only arose

as a defense to this litigation—warrant keeping the case alive even after Antablin

received the documents she requested.

      For these reasons, the district court did not err in finding that Antablin’s

inspection claims were moot.

      AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED AND REMANDED in part. Each

party will bear its own costs in this Court.

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