Court Opinion

ID: 9682440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:11:25.741262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:39.383216
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
I question whether an accused charged with a capital offense can waive the right of assistance of counsel. Cf § 600.051, RSMo 1978.
I question also whether an accused charged with a capital offense (or any other felony) can be held to have waived the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Heretofore, this Court has held the view that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are best handled under Rule 27.26. State v. Mitchell, 620 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. banc 1981). However, this is a death penalty case. In my view, it raises a very important issue: May an accused and his counsel engage in a deliberate trial strategy of nonparticipation and thereby assure the reversal of a conviction?
I would step aside and give Harvey the opportunity to proceed immediately to the remedy of habeas corpus provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. If and when his conviction and sentence remain intact, we can re-address this appeal and review the sentence of death as required by § 565.014, RSMo 1978.
I recognize, of course, that at some point in time we must address all issues “in all cases where the punishment imposed is death.” Mo. Const, art. V, § 3. However, “the right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice * * Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 541, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). And, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not establish any right to an appeal * * * and certainly does not establish any right to collaterally attack a final judgment of conviction.” United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323, 96 S.Ct. 2086, 2090, 48 L.Ed.2d 666 (1976).
*295In my view, we should exert every effort to improve post-conviction review in death penalty cases. “[I]t is difficult to explain why a system of criminal justice deserves respect which allows repetitive reviews of convictions * * * where the basis for re-examination is not even that the convicted defendant was innocent.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 275, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2072, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
I respectfully dissent.