Court Opinion

ID: 9720413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:29:44.295083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:17.683925
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
The plaintiff has appealed to this Court raising two issues: (1) whether the *4plaintiff’s first complaint to enforce an arbitration award ordering the University of Michigan to reinstate the plaintiff is barred by a period of limitation, and (2) whether the plaintiff’s second complaint, alleging wrongful discharge, breach of contract, discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, and discrimination under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act, is barred by the first complaint to enforce the arbitration award. We hold that the plaintiff’s cause of action to enforce the arbitration award is not barred by the six-month period of limitation applied by the Court of Appeals. Because we resolve the first issue in favor of the plaintiff, we need not reach the second issue. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
i
The plaintiff, employed by the University of Michigan as a bus driver since 1973, was discharged in November 1986 for negligently operating his bus. He filed a grievance under his collective bargaining agreement. The agreement has a three-step grievance procedure. The first step requires an employee to notify his immediate supervisor of the particular problem. If an unsatisfactory oral answer is received, step two permits the employee to file a written grievance to the department head, or designated representative, for a written answer. If an unsatisfactory written answer is received, step three requires the submission of a written grievance from the chairperson of his union bargaining committee to the university review committee for a hearing and a written answer. After a grievance has proceeded through the three-step procedure, the grievance may be *5submitted to arbitration. The plaintiff’s grievance went through the three-step procedure and was taken to arbitration. On April 23, 1987, the arbitrator issued a decision, finding that the plaintiff had operated his bus negligently but that discharge was not an appropriate remedy. The arbitrator ordered the plaintiff reinstated without back pay.
While the plaintiff’s grievance was pending, in December 1986, the plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation petition, alleging that he was unable to work because of an "aggravated hernia condition, blood pressure and ulcer condition due to stress of job.” The plaintiff listed three doctors who had treated him for his condition, Dr. Person-Brown, Dr. Dew, and Dr. Strasius. On May 5, 1987, the defendant’s doctor, Dr. Stunz, examined the plaintiff and concluded that "[o]n the basis of my evaluation of this man’s hypertension, peptic ulcer disease and hiatus hernia, I do not believe he is disabled from performing any and all duties which might be involved in the performance of his job as a bus driver for the University of Michigan.”
Following the examination by the defendant’s doctor, the plaintiff sought reinstatement by the university. On May 12, 1987, the university informed the plaintiff that he would have to submit a university physician’s statement from the three physicians listed on his workers’ compensation petition before he could return to work. The plaintiff submitted a release from Dr. Person-Brown, but not from the other two doctors. Although the defendant had successfully subpoenaed the records of Drs. Strasius and Dew, a further attempt by the plaintiff to be reinstated was again denied. As a result of this denial, the plaintiff filed another grievance on July 24, 1987, which resulted in a third-step hearing being held on August 6, 1987, *6and a decision being issued on September 18, 1987. The university review committee found that
[t]he delays in assessing his ability to return to work are the result of his unwillingness to cooperate in providing the University with necessary medical information on his medical condition. There has been no violation of our Agreement. Therefore, this grievance and requested remedy are denied.
On February 29, 1988, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Claims to enforce the April 23, 1987, arbitration award. The defendant filed a motion for summary disposition on the ground that the lawsuit was barred by a six-month limitation period. The plaintiff responded with two arguments: First, there was no statutory basis for the six-month period of limitation; and second, even if a six-month period of limitation applied, the lawsuit was brought within six months of the September 18, 1987, decision by the university review committee. The Court of Claims granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
The plaintiff filed a second complaint in the Court of Claims, alleging breach of contract, discrimination under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act, discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, and wrongful discharge. The defendant responded with a motion for summary disposition, claiming that another action had been initiated involving the same parties and the same underlying claim.1 The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition of the plaintiff’s second complaint.
The plaintiff appealed both decisions. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and affirmed *7the decision of the Court of Claims, relying on Walkerville Ed Ass’n v Walkerville Rural Communities School, 165 Mich App 341, 345; 418 NW2d 459 (1987). The plaintiff appealed in this Court, and we granted leave to appeal. 439 Mich 922 (1992).
ii
The dispositive issue before this Court is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by a six-month period of limitation. We hold that it is not.
The labor-mediation act, MCL 423.1 et seq.; MSA 17.454(1) et seq., is intended to provide alternatives to resolve labor disputes through mediation and arbitration. The act provides procedures for parties to submit disputes to voluntary arbitration.2 After an arbitration award has been rendered, the award is "enforceable at law or in equity as the agreement of the parties.”3 Absent from the act is any express legislation that limits the period during which a party may enforce an arbitration award. Attempting to remedy the absence of a period of limitation, the Court of Appeals in Walkerville borrowed a six-month period from the public employees relations act (pera).4 Specifically, the Court of Appeals in Walkerville stated:
An arbitration proceeding, being based on an agreement, is contractual in nature. Bay City School Dist [v Bay City, 425 Mich 426; 390 NW2d 159 (1986)]. The difficulty in this case arises because of MCL 423.9d; MSA 17.454(10.3), which, while allowing public labor disputes to be resolved *8by arbitration, does not specify a limitation period for enforcing the arbitration award. Rather, the award rendered "shall be enforceable at law or in equity as the agreement of the parties.” MCL 423.9d(4); MSA 17.454(10.3)(4). This requirement suggests that an arbitration award in the public sector should be subject to the six-year limitation period for contracts contained in the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.5807(8); MSA 27A.5807(8). This limitation period, although perhaps applicable under strict rules of statutory construction, appears to be an unduly lengthy period for enforcing an arbitration award. This is particularly so when viewed with the statutory declaration that the best interests of the people of this state are served by the prompt settlement of labor disputes. MCL 423.1; MSA 17.454(1). Similar policy considerations, under federal labor law, along with a consideration of competing interests affected by the limitation period, have led federal courts to adopt the six-month limitation period contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC 160(b), for arbitration purposes. .See McCreedy v Local Union No 971, UAW, 809 F2d 1232 (CA 6, 1987).
We conclude that the trial court did not err in adopting the six-month limitation period. A six-month period is part of pera; it effectuates the state’s express policy in favor of the prompt resolution of labor disputes in the public sector. Adoption of the six-month limitation period also contributes to statute of limitation uniformity. [Walkerville, p 345.]
We disagree. By its terms, the pera limitation only applies to actions filed with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission.5 Additionally, *9the practice of applying statutes of limitation by analogy does not appear to be applicable in this case.
Rather than seeking money damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff in this case seeks specific performance of the arbitration award that orders his reinstatement as an employee of the defendant. In Keys v Hopper, 270 Mich 504, 507; 259 NW 319 (1935), this Court recognized that "[a] suit for the specific performance of a contract [is] a purely equitable remedy . . . .” (Citation omitted.) As this Court stated in Lothian v Detroit, 414 Mich 160, 170; 324 NW2d 9 (1982),
[C]ourts traditionally have not bent to the strictures of a statute of limitations where the law does not supply relief analogous to that afforded in equity. Thus, it is said that . . . "where the relief sought is in its nature one of equitable and not of legal cognizance, and the remedy is of a purely equitable nature, equity follows its own rules,” Michigan Ins Co [v Brown, 11 Mich 265, 272 (1863).]
Consequently, we find that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the pera six-month period of limitation "by analogy” in this case.
iii
We do not suggest that an arbitration award can be enforced without limitation. We find two time *10limitations applicable to the enforcement of arbitration awards.
The first time restriction applicable to the enforcement of an arbitration award is the six-year period of limitation for breach of contract.6 As this Court has previously recognized, arbitration is a matter of contract.7 It is the agreement that dictates the authority of the arbitrators and the disputes to be resolved through arbitration.8 In this case, the arbitration agreement provides that "[t]he arbitrator’s decision when made in accordance with his/her jurisdiction and authority established by this Agreement, shall be final and binding upon the University, the Union, and the employee or employees.” The university has never challenged the authority of the arbitrator to resolve this labor dispute. Therefore, the university’s alleged failure to comply with the arbitrator’s decision would constitute a breach of that contractual provision and would be subject to the six-year limitation period for breach of contract.
The second time restriction applicable to this case is the equitable doctrine of laches. As previously noted, the plaintiff is seeking specific performance of his arbitration award and specific performance is a "purely equitable remedy.” In defining the scope of the various limitation periods contained in the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.5815; MSA 27A.5815 provides:
The prescribed period of limitations shall apply equally to all actions whether equitable or legal relief is sought. The equitable doctrine of laches *11shall also apply in actions where equitable relief is sought. [Emphasis added.]
In the context of this case, we interpret this statutory provision to require all actions seeking judicial enforcement of arbitration awards to be commenced within six years after the award is granted. Where the award purports to grant relief that is traditionally equitable in nature, the equitable doctrine of laches also applies, requiring the exercise of due diligence to ensure the timely prosecution of the plaintiif’s claim to avoid unduly prejudicing the defendant.
While we find authority for this approach in MCL 600.5815; MSA 27A.5815, we note that this Court had previously recognized that laches can operate to cut short a statutory limitation period when equitable relief is sought. In Olson v Williams, 185 Mich 294, 301; 151 NW 1043 (1915), this Court stated:
The omission to do what one is by law required to do to protect his rights, and which justifies a fair presumption that he has abandoned the same, under circumstances which misled or prejudiced an adverse party, may in equity operate as laches which bar[s] the assertion of such right later under changed conditions, even though the statute of limitations has not run.
IV
We hold that a plaintiif ordinarily has six years to seek enforcement of an arbitration award. We also recognize that in certain cases this time period may be substantially diminished if a plaintiff’s arbitration award grants equitable relief and a delay in its enforcement is shown to *12prejudice the defendant in a way that evokes laches to bar the plaintiff’s claim.9
In failing to raise laches in its responsive pleadings or by motion, the defendant has waived this affirmative defense.10 As a result of this waiver, the plaintiff’s claim in this case is governed solely by the six-year period of limitation applicable to a breach of contract. Because the plaintiff filed his complaint with the Court of Claims well within this six-year period, the plaintiff is entitled to seek enforcement of his arbitration award. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Levin, Brickley, and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

 MCR 2.116(C)(6).

 MCL 423.9d; MSA 17.454(10.3).

 MCL 423.9d(4); MSA 17.454(10.3X4).

 See MCL 423.216(a); MSA 17.455(16)(a).

 MCL 423.216(a); MSA 17.455(16)(a) provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the commission, or any agent designated by the commission for such purposes, may *9issue and cause to be served upon the person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the commission or a commissioner thereof, or before a designated agent, at a place therein fixed, not less than 5 days after the serving of the complaint. No complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of the charge with the commission ....

 MCL 600.5807(8); MSA 27A.5807(8).

 KND School Dist v KND Teachers Ass’n, 393 Mich 583, 587; 227 NW2d 500 (1975).

 Id.

 In this regard, we acknowledge the practical difficulties that an employer may face if required to comply with an arbitration award ordering an employer to reinstate an employee six years after the order was rendered. Enforcing such an award after any period of delay may cause substantial hardship for some employers. In certain circumstances, even a six-month delay may be too long for an employer to hold a position open. Thus, whether laches operates to bar equitable enforcement of an arbitration award before the termination of the six-year limitation period for breach of contract necessarily turns on the individual circumstances of each case.

 MCR 2.111(F)(2), (3); Badon v General Motors Corp, 188 Mich App 430, 436-437; 470 NW2d 436 (1991).