Court Opinion

ID: 9854958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:26.610583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:37.543053
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion reversing the trial court’s ruling denying Davis a four-month continuance. The record reveals that the Resource Center sought a continuance on behalf of Davis of the November 1995 evidentiary hearing scheduled by the trial court. The Resource Center contended that its attorney who had originally represented Davis left as a result of lack of funding and the continuance was necessary to enable new counsel to become familiar with the record in Davis’ case. The continuance sought by Davis was until March 1996. The majority contends that under a ruling “limited to the peculiar facts of this case,” the denial of the continuance was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. However, looking to those peculiar facts, it is apparent that Davis, through this Court’s grant of his application for interlocutory review, has in effect obtained a continuance of the evidentiary hearing for a period far exceeding the original four-month period originally requested. Furthermore, Davis *840has not demonstrated any efforts to expedite the appeal, preparation of the record, etc., and has not shown, on this record, adverse collateral consequences. See Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431 (241 SE2d 187) (1978). Aside from the fact that the majority’s opinion is expressly limited to the peculiar facts raised here, there is no reason to conclude that the question raised by Davis is one which can never be decided because it inevitably becomes moot prior to an appeal. See id. Accordingly, because the issue for which Davis’ application was granted has been rendered moot, I would dismiss this appeal. OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (3).