Court Opinion

ID: 9627938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:59:58.737517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:37.347389
License: Public Domain

Marquardt, J.,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding.
The courts throughout our country seem to have difficulty in deciding which legal theory applies to ownership of an engagement ring when the engagement is broken. Is the engagement ring a gift or is it used as consideration for the promise to be engaged? If it is a gift, why is it not a completed gift? If it is a conditional gift, what makes it conditional? May a court infer a condition on a gift that was intended to be given and was delivered and accepted? If the ring is consideration for a contract, why not apply breach of contract rules?
“[W]here a transfer of property is made without consideration, the inference is that a gift was intended, not that the grantee was to hold the property for the benefit of the grantor.” Hansen v. Walker, 175 Kan. 121, 123, 259 P.2d 242 (1953); see Fooshee v. *938Rosenberg, 152 Kan. 100, Syl. ¶ 2, 102 P.2d 995 (1940). Where there is an intent to make a gift, the gift is complete when it has been delivered and accepted. Dubowy v. Baier, 856 F. Supp. 1491, 1499 (D. Kan. 1994). In applying gift law, Heather s position that the ring is a valid inter vivos gift is supported in that the engagement took place. As far as we know from the limited record, the gift was complete; all the conditions were met. Jerod, without fraud or coercion, intended to make the gift, and the ring was delivered by him and accepted by Heather.
In Bolen v. Humes, 94 Ohio App. 1, 7-8,114 N.E.2d 281 (1951), the court held that when a prospective husband delivers an engagement ring to his prospective wife, it is an irrevocable gift.
“ ‘In the normal [relationship] of the contracting parties to a future marriage, the man occupies the dominant position, and, in the absence of evidence that this [relationship] has been reversed, a completed gift made by him to his [fiance] cannot be revoked at his option, even though . . . improvidently made . . . .”’94 Ohio App. at 7 (quoting 24 Am. Jur., Gifts § 51).
See also 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Gifts § 38 (containing similar language). I would apply this rule to engagement rings.
Jerod makes no assertion that he told Héather that if the marriage did not take place, she would have to return the ring. The majority asserts that the condition was inferred and, as such, it was a revocable gift, stating: “In the absence of a contrary expression of intent, it is logical that engagement rings should be considered, by their very nature, conditional gifts given in contemplation of marriage.” Those jurisdictions that rely on the analysis that an engagement ring is a conditional gift ignore general gift law, which holds that a gift is complete if there is intent, delivery, and acceptance. Herman v. Goetz, 204 Kan. 91, 96, 460 P.2d 554 (1969).
We get into legal contortions when we adopt the majority’s view that “an engagement ring is the symbol of the parties’ mutual promises to marry.” This statement indicates that the majority views the giving of an engagement ring as consideration for a contract. It is difficult to reconcile contract principles with this statement. If the parties have exchanged mutual promises, the consideration for the woman’s promise to marry is the man’s promise to marry. Under this analysis, the ring is transferred without consid*939eration and is a gift. The majority then disregards the “mutual promise” statement and finds that an engagement ring is a conditional gift in contemplation of marriage.
A conditional gift is one that is conditioned or qualified, and the title does not vest in the donee. See 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Gifts § 81. The majority states: “The engagement period is one where each party should be free to reexamine his or her commitment.” Although that may not be the way some people view the engagement period, it has no bearing on the ownership of an engagement ring when an engagement is broken. The majority seems to intertwine the commitment to be engaged with the commitment to be married. The law does not ordinarily become involved with engagements; however, public policy mandates that the law be involved in the breakup of marriages. The commitment to be engaged is given at the time of the engagement, while the commitment to be married is given at the wedding ceremony.
The parties stipulated that the ring was given in contemplation of marriage. This stipulation does not lead to the conclusion that the ring was a conditional gift. Using the majority’s analysis, the words “contemplation of marriage” are considered synonymous with “conditioned upon the marriage taking place.” I disagree with this legal conclusion as there was no evidence to support such an interpretation here. This case was disposed of by the district court on the stipulated fact that the ring was given in contemplation of marriage. The district court did not consider the issue of intent. If intent was an issue, then the district court should not have disposed of the case on stipulated facts, and a trial should have been held to determine the factual issue of intent.
Applying the “no fault” concept to the ring does not take into account the many expenditures made by the woman in contemplation of marriage. What is the woman to do when she buys a costly dress that cannot be returned? In addition, a bride-to-be may make deposits on a place for the ceremony, a caterer, a reception hall, and entertainment; buy items to be used joindy after the marriage; move from one city, to another; etc. — all of which are cosdy and for the most part, nonrefundable. This court’s ruling implies that these expenditures are irrelevant. Although Jerod is *940made whole, there is no attempt to put Heather back to her preengagement position, despite the fact that he breached the engagement agreement.
Douthitt v. Applegate, 33 Kan. 395, 6 Pac. 575 (1885), involving a gift of land given in contemplation of marriage, turned on the issue of fraud. The Douthitt court ordered that the land be returned because of fraud, not because it was a gift in contemplation of marriage. The court made an equitable order so that “the parties [would] be placed back as near to their original condition as possible.” 33 Kan. at 400.
Most of the other jurisdictions cited by the majority that have dealt with rings and broken engagements hold that if the engagement is unjustifiably broken by the donor, the donor is not entitled to the return of the ring or other gifts. See, e.g., Spinnell v. Quigley, 56 Wash. App. 799, 785 P.2d 1149 (1990). This interpretation incorporates fault grounds while supporting a breach of contract concept.
Why should Jerod be rewarded for having broken the engagement contract? Returning the ring to Jerod rewards him for breaking the engagement. A party who breaches a contract is not usually rewarded for the breach. An engagement ring should not be given special treatment.
In the event of a broken engagement, the engagement ring should be considered a completed inter vivos gift. Regardless, Heather is entitled to keep the engagement ring whether this case is analyzed on the principles of gift law, contract law, or equity.
Lockett, J., joins the foregoing dissent.