Court Opinion

ID: 9731421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:45:03.208441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:20.810879
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
In State v. Hersch, 445 N.W.2d 626, 630-31 (N.D.1989), “guided by the principle that statutes of limitation are to be construed liberally in favor of the accused and against the prosecution,” we held that an amendment to a statute of limitations does not apply to a case involving criminal conduct that occurred before the amendment. That is because all statutes, whether procedural or substantive, are to be applied “only to causes of action that arise after the effective date of the statute, unless the legislature clearly expresses that they are to be applied retroactively.” Reiling v. Bhattacharyya, 276 N.W.2d 237, 240-41 (N.D.1979).
The majority, citing to a pre-Reiling case, In re W.M.V., 268 N.W.2d 781 (N.D.1978), for the contradictory proposition that there need be no express legislative declaration of retroactivity, apparently overrules Reiling and Hersch, and, contrary to their teaching, applies a series of amended statutes of limitations to criminal conduct that occurred before the effective dates of the amendments. In so doing, it undermines precedent and ignores the value of the bright-line test enunciated in Reiling. After all, it is a rather . simple matter for the legislature to expressly state that an amendment is to be retroactive, and indeed, it has done so when that has been its intent. E.g., NDCC § 14-09-08.2(3) [making retroactive procedure for enforcing child support orders for adult children]. The omission of that declaration in the amendments involved in this case indicates the intent not to apply them retroactively. See Reiling, Hersch, supra.
In promoting the dicta of State v. Thill, 468 N.W.2d 643, 647 (N.D.1991), to overrule precedent, the majority also resuscitates and relies on State v. Pleason, 56 N.D. 499, 218 N.W. 154 (1928), quoting from it approvingly. However, in Hersch, we distinguished Plea-son as being “not controlling because it involved only the issue of an ex post facto law and not our recent decisions construing Section 1-02-10, N.D.C.C.” Hersch at 630 n. 6.
Nor does the majority’s reliance on State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D.1986), justify its departure from Reiling. In Cummings, supra at 472, we carefully crafted an exception to Reiling ⅛ requirement of an express declaration of retroactivity, in the case of “an ameliorating amendment to a criminal *692statute.” Cummings involved the question of whether a statute reducing the penalty for an offense, but enacted after defendant had committed the offense, should nonetheless be applied to that offense. In Cummings, the exception we drew protected the defendant from a result that would have deprived him of the legislature’s beneficence. We thus construed the statute “liberally in favor of the accused and against the prosecution.” Here, the majority creates an exception that not only devours the Reiling rule, but does so to favor the prosecution. It thus turns Cummings on its head.
Insofar as the majority decision overrules Reiling and Hersch, I dissent.
However, I do concur in the majority’s Rule 12 analysis, and therefore, I agree that the dismissal should be reversed. But I disagree that the trial judge should apply any statutory limitation that was enacted or amended after the defendant’s alleged sexual conduct occurred. See Hersch, swpm.