Court Opinion

ID: 9762691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:29:10.774935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:36.015160
License: Public Domain

LIVINGSTON, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant Earl Bruce Roland appeals from the trial court’s order renewing his commitment for extended mental health services. In three points of error, Appellant complains that his confinement after the previous commitment order expired violated his due process and equal protection rights and that there is no evidence or factually insufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s commitment order. Because I believe Appellant’s confinement is lawful and that sufficient evidence supports his continued commitment, I would affirm the trial court’s order.
TIMELINE
The jury originally found Appellant incompetent to stand trial and the trial court committed him to Rusk State Hospital for an indefinite period in 1984. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02 (Vernon 1979 & Supp.1997). In February 1994, the trial court found Appellant not guilty of attempted murder by reason of insanity and committed him to Vernon State Hospital.1 See Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 46.03, § 4(d)(2) (Vernon Supp.1997). The original trial court has since extended Appellant’s commitment on June 23 of 1994, for a “period of one year,” on June 13 of 1995, for a “period not to exceed twelve months,” and on July 31 of 1996, for a “period not to exceed twelve months.” Prior to appellant’s hearing, an application for renewal had been filed. The application filed on May 17, 1996 states that the order would expire on June 13,1996. The order granting the motion for a sanity exam was signed on June 10, 1996 and the examination took place at the Tarrant County Jail on June 12,1996.2 The doctor’s exam report and certificate were filed on June 17, 1996.
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Appellant complains in his first point of error that the trial court violated his right to due process and equal protection under the federal and state constitutions by conducting the hearing on the State’s application to renew the order for extended mental health services 46 days after the court’s previous order had expired. In support of his argument that such a hearing must be held before the expiration of the previous order, Appellant relies on section 574.066(f) of the Health and Safety Code.3 See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.066(f) (Vernon 1992). Appellant also urges that, under section 574.085 of the Health and Safety Code, the trial court erred in failing to automatically discharge him when the previous order expired.4 See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.085 (Vernon 1992). His emphasis on these provisions is misplaced because these provisions address the procedures dealing with civilly committed patients generally.5
*177As a previously committed patient who has been acquitted of a criminal offense by reason of insanity, Appellant’s confinement and release are governed by the code of criminal procedure. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.03; see also Rodriguez v. State, 899 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 385, 133 L.Ed.2d 307 (1995) (appellant mistaken in premise that articles 46.02 and 46.03 are controlled by requirements in Health and Safety Code); Lopez, 775 S.W.2d at 860 (state not required to comply with provisions of mental health code where proceeding governed by code of criminal procedure). See generally Tex. Govt.Code Ann. § 311.026(b) (Vernon 1988) (specific version of statute controls over general version). In the Rodriguez case, the Court of Criminal Appeals, in an en banc decision, specifically held that articles 46.02 and 46.03 “govern the examination of a defendant for competency and insanity.” Rodriguez, 899 S.W.2d at 660.
In Rodriguez, the appellant was charged with capital murder, and on July 31, 1991, the trial court ordered a competency examination. That exam was not done until December 3, 1991, and the doctor’s medical report determining the appellant to be competent to stand trial was not filed until December 16, 1991, nearly five months later. The appellant specifically attacked the doctor’s delay in examining him as failing to comply with articles 46.02 and 46.03 that required a written report to be forwarded to the trial court within 30 days of the order. The appellant did not object to the doctor’s non-compliance at trial, and the State argued that he forfeited his right to complain of this delay on appeal, citing Marin and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52(a). Tex. R.App. P. 52(a); Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). I respectfully believe, Rodriguez, which held that the appellant had forfeited his right to complain of the delay on appeal, controls. Rodriguez, 899 S.W.2d at 662. “[I]f the mental health expert’s delay will affect the litigants, it is incumbent upon them to bring the delay to the attention of the trial court_ Appellant’s failure to object to the delay of Dr. Sparks has forfeited his right to complain of the delay on appeal.” Id.
Following Rodriguez, I would therefore reach two conclusions. First, the appellant has waived his complaint on appeal. No objection was made at his hearing, he was represented by counsel, and he appeared at the hearing.
Article 46.03 of the code of criminal procedure provides that a person committed after acquittal from a criminal offense by reason of insanity “may only be discharged by order of the committing court in accordance with the procedures specified in this subsection.” See Tex.Code CRiM. Peoc. Ann. art. 46.03, § 4(d)(5). This majority believes that failure to timely hold a hearing requires immediate release. The contradictory language lies in subsection 4(d)(5). First, the court is required to discharge the acquitted person upon expiration of a commitment order. Id. That provision also directs the court to hold a hearing upon receipt of a certificate of discharge by the superintendent of the facility or “upon the expiration of a commitment order,” and to do so “prior to the expiration of the commitment order.” In essence, the court is instructed to hold such a hearing “upon the expiration” of the order but to do so prior to its expiration. Id.
The statute thus creates a mandate that is nearly impossible to comply with, especially in light of the medical examination requirements and the potential requirement of a jury trial. Further, the section allows trial courts to order a renewal regardless of whether the previous order has expired because the court may continue the commitment “until the expiration of the original order, if one is still in effect, or the court shall issue a new commitment order....” Id. (emphasis added). This language anticipates the likelihood of a time gap between the expiration of the order and the new or continued commitment. It also supports a determination that failure to hold a hearing does not require release.
Second, subsection 4(d)(7) states that a person committed under its provisions may not be committed “pursuant to this subsection for a cumulative period of time which exceeds the maximum term provided by law for the crime for which the acquitted person *178was tried.” It then specifies that the person may be further confined “pursuant to civil commitment proceedings.” Id. art. 46.03, § 4(d)(7) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court may commit a person who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity for up to the maximum number of years available for the offense committed, in this case, up to 20 years. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (Vernon 1994). After that term expires, the trial court may continue to confine the person for a longer time, if necessary, under civil commitment proceedings.
The majority believes that the language directing the court to release the acquitted person “upon expiration of the order” is a mandated direction. Further, they believe that once the expiration date passes, the trial court loses its jurisdiction. However, article 46.03, § 4(d)(1) specifically states that the trial court that originally found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity retains jurisdiction over the person so acquitted. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.03, § 4(d)(1) (emphasis added). When subsections 4(d)(5) and (7) are read together, I believe that the trial court had authority to conduct a hearing on the State’s application after the previous commitment order had expired to determine whether Appellant’s commitment should continue. See Lopez, 775 S.W.2d at 858 (renewal hearing held after previous commitment order expired).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would overrule Appellant’s first point of error and address the points of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to continue his commitment.

. During that hearing, the State stipulated that Appellant had previously been found not guilty by reason of insanity of attempted capital murder in 1980.

. At some time prior to the exam — and prior to the expiration of the order — appellant was returned to the Tarrant County jail.

. Section 574.066(f) states:
A court may not renew an order unless the court finds that the patient meets the criteria for extended mental health services prescribed by Sections 574.035(a)(1), (2), and (3). The court must make the findings prescribed by this subsection to renew an order, regardless of whether a hearing is requested or set. A renewed order authorizes treatment for not more than 12 months.

. Section 574.085 states:
The facility administrator of a facility to which a patient was committed or from which a patient was required to receive temporary or extended inpatient or outpatient mental health services shall discharge the patient when the court order expires.

. The Health and Safely Code also generally sets forth the criteria by which the trial court may grant, by clear and convincing evidence, an original application or a renewal for extended mental health services. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.03, § 4(d) (Vernon Supp.1997); Lopez v. State, 775 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ).