Court Opinion

ID: 9859921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:58:15.361377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:09:53.803721
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NASH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion holding that armed violence may be properly predicated upon the offense of attempt armed robbery. In People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261, 278, 422 N.E.2d 627, our supreme court determined that the act of using a dangerous weapon could not be applied to both raise the misdemeanor offense of battery to felony aggravated battery and then again cause enhancement of the penalty for defendant’s conduct to armed violence. The court noted that the armed violence statute required that there be “the commission of a predicate offense which is a felony without enhancement by the presence of a weapon.” This language has been given two different interpretations in the appellate court: that the predicate offense may be any felony which has not been first raised from a misdemeanor by the presence of a weapon (People v. Viens (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1026-27, 441 N.E.2d 660, appeal denied (1983), 93 Ill. 2d 578; cert. denied (1983), 461 U.S ___, 77 L. Ed. 2d 287, 103 S. Ct. 1900; People v. Goodman (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 203, 209-10, 440 N.E.2d 345), and that the predicate offense, additionally, may not have been raised from a lesser felony to a greater felony, also by reason of the presence of the weapon (People v. Lucien (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 412, 419, 440 N.E.2d 899, appeal denied (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 570; cert. denied (1983), 459 U.S. 1219, 75 L. Ed. 2d 459, 103 S. Ct. 1223. In People v. Viens the court concluded that the armed violence statute did not provide for an enhanced penalty for commission of a felony while armed with a dangerous weapon but, rather, established a new substantive offense, thus avoiding double enhancement of penalty. However, in People v. Donaldson (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 164, 168, 435 N.E.2d 477, our supreme court found that armed violence was not a separate substantive offense but provides for enhancement of the penalty for felonious conduct while armed. See also People v. Wisslead (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 190, 193, 446 N.E.2d 512. In People v. Haron the court referred, inter alia, to Simpson v. United States (1978), 435 U.S. 6, 15-16, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70, 78-79, 98 S. Ct. 909, 914-15, and Busic v. United States (1980), 446 U.S. 398, 404, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381, 388, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 1752. In Simpson defendants were convicted of bank robbery, aggravated by use of weapons. The United States Supreme Court determined defendants could not be convicted and sentenced under title 18, section 924(c) of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. sec. 924(c) (1976)), a sentence-enhancing provision similar to the Illinois armed violence statute, as that would constituted double enhancement of penalty. In Busic the United States Supreme Court again held that prosecution and enhanced sentencing under section 924(c), rather than as provided for the predicate felony, was “not permissible where the predicate felony statute contains its own enhancement provision.” See State v. Workman (1978), 90 Wash. 2d 443, 584 P.2d 382 (sentence enhancement statute may not be applied to attempt robbery wMle armed), also noted in People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261, 275, 422 N.E.2d 627. As applied in this case, the presence of the weapon served first to enhance the offense of attempt robbery (Class 3) to attempt armed robbery (Class 1); it again served to enhance the penalty for defendant’s conduct to that provided under the armed violence statute (Class X). This constitutes, in my view, a double enhancement of penalty which was not intended by the legislature as recognized by the court in Harón. I see no logical distinction in the facts of this case which would permit a different rule. This question would be avoided had the State chosen to predicate the armed violence charge upon attempt robbery rather than attempt armed robbery; then double enhancement of penalty would not occur and the Harón standard would be met.