Court Opinion

ID: 9962285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 14:12:18.423365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:14.507804
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                           San Antonio, Texas
                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                               No. 04-23-00956-CV

                   IN THE INTEREST OF E.S.P., C.S.P., AND U.A.S.P., Children

                       From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                    Trial Court No. 2022-PA-00931
                                Honorable Raul Perales, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 17, 2024

AFFIRMED

           Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to their

children, E.S.P. (born 2020), C.S.P. (born 2020), and U.A.S.P. (born 2022). 1 Mother argues (1) the

evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings under Texas

Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E); (2) the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of the children;

and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in making its conservatorship determination. Father

argues (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings

under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E); and (2) the evidence is legally and

1
  To protect the privacy of the minor children, we use initials to refer to the children and their foster parents; we refer
to their biological parents as Mother and Father. TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of

the children. We affirm.

                                           BACKGROUND

        On June 9, 2022, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the

“Department”) filed its original petition to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights to the

children. As a condition of reunification, the Department created family service plans requiring

Mother and Father to, inter alia, obtain appropriate housing and legal and appropriate employment;

complete parenting classes and psychological evaluations; participate in individual counseling

sessions; submit to a drug and alcohol assessment and follow recommendations; and submit to

random drug testing. The Department ultimately pursued termination of Mother and Father’s

parental rights.

        On August 15, 2023, September 14, 2023, and October 23, 2023, the trial court held a

three-day bench trial. The trial court heard testimony from five witnesses: (1) Mother; (2) Father;

(3) U.A.S.P.’s foster parent, J.B.; (4) E.S.P. and C.S.P.’s foster parent, O.A.; and (5) the

Department’s caseworker, Karina Espinoza. At the conclusion of trial, the court signed an order

terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N),

(O), and (P) and made findings that termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights was in the

best interest of the children. Mother and Father appealed.

                                              ANALYSIS

        Mother and Father both challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the trial court’s findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E); and the legal and

factual sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court relied to conclude that termination was

in the best interest of the children. Mother additionally challenges the trial court’s conservatorship

determination.

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                                       Standard of Review

       The involuntary termination of a natural parent’s rights implicates fundamental

constitutional rights and “divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and

powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit from the parent.” In

re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “As a result, appellate courts must strictly scrutinize involuntary termination

proceedings in favor of the parent.” Id. The Department has the burden to prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, both that a statutory ground existed to terminate Mother and Father’s

parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.206; In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means

the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007;

In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 683.

       When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s order of

termination, we apply well-established standards of review. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263

(Tex. 2002). To determine whether the Department presented clear and convincing evidence, a

legal sufficiency review requires us to “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that its finding was true.” Id. at 266. We “assume that the factfinder resolved disputed

facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92,

98 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). “A corollary to this requirement is that a court should

disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been

incredible.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Nevertheless, “we may not simply disregard

undisputed facts that do not support the finding; to do so would not comport with the heightened

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burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.” In re S.L.M., 513 S.W.3d 746, 748 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). If a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction

that the matter that must be proven is true, then the evidence is legally sufficient. Id. at 747.

       In contrast, in conducting a factual sufficiency review, we must review and weigh all the

evidence, including the evidence that is contrary to the trial court’s findings. In re J.O.A., 283

S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). We consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable

factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the challenged finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at

266. The evidence is factually insufficient only if “in light of the entire record, the disputed

evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant

that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction.” Id.

       In both legal and factual sufficiency review, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge

of the weight and credibility of the evidence. In re A.F., No. 04-20-00216-CV, 2020 WL 6928390,

at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). We must defer to the

factfinder’s resolution of disputed evidentiary issues and cannot substitute our judgment for that

of the factfinder. See, e.g., In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (factual

sufficiency); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (legal sufficiency).

                                  Statutory Termination Grounds

                                           Applicable Law

       In Mother’s first argument and Father’s first and second argument on appeal, Mother and

Father challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

predicate finding under subsections (D) and (E). When, as here, the trial court terminates a parent’s

rights on multiple predicate grounds, we may affirm on any one ground. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at

362; In re D.J.H., 381 S.W.3d 606, 611–12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.).

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       In general, assuming a best interest finding, only one predicate ground under section

161.001(b)(1) is sufficient to support a judgment of termination. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362; In

re A.R.R., No. 04-18-00578-CV, 2018 WL 6517148, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 12,

2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). To be successful on appeal, an appellant must challenge all the

predicate grounds upon which a trial court based its termination order. In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d

at 682. When an appellant does not challenge all the grounds that may support an order of

termination, we typically do not address the sufficiency of the evidence of any of the predicate

grounds for termination. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361–62; In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 682.

Instead, we must accept the validity of the unchallenged grounds and affirm the termination order.

See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361–62; In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 682.

       However, because termination under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) may have

implications for a parent’s parental rights to other children, appellate courts are instructed to

address issues challenging a trial court’s findings under those subsections. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d

230, 236–37 (Tex. 2019). Therefore, we will consider Mother and Father’s sufficiency argument

as to subsections (D) and (E) even though they do not challenge termination under subsections (N)

(constructive abandonment of child in Department conservatorship for not less than six months),

(O) (failure to comply with the provisions of a court-ordered service plan), and (P) (use of a

controlled substance in a manner that endangers health or safety of the child). See In re L.C., No.

12-19-00137-CV, 2019 WL 4727826, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(addressing parents’ sufficiency challenges to subsections (D) and (E) even though they did not

challenge all grounds upon which termination could be supported).

       Subsection (D) allows a trial court to terminate parental rights if it finds by clear and

convincing evidence that the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to

remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the

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child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Under subsection (D), the trial court examines

“evidence related to the environment of the children to determine if the environment was the source

of endangerment to the children’s physical or emotional well-being. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117,

125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). “Environment” refers to the acceptability of the

child’s living conditions and a parent’s conduct in the home. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). “A child is endangered when the environment

creates a potential for danger that the parent is aware of but consciously disregards.” Id. A parent

does not need to know for certain that the child is in an endangering environment. In re R.S.-T.,

522 S.W.3d at 109. Awareness of a potential for danger is sufficient. Id. The relevant period for

review of environment supporting termination under subsection (D) is before the Department

removes the child. In re J.R., 171 S.W.3d 558, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no

pet.).

         Subsection (E) allows a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights if it finds by clear and

convincing evidence that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with

persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the

child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Under subsection (E), the trial court determines

whether there is evidence that a parent’s acts, omissions, or failures to act endangered the child’s

physical or emotional well-being. See In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. “It is not necessary that the

parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually be injured; rather, a child is

endangered when the environment or the parent’s course of conduct creates a potential for danger

which the parent is aware of but disregards.” In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Courts may further consider parental conduct that did not

occur in the child’s presence, including conduct before the child’s birth or after the child was

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removed from a parent’s care. In re K.J.G., No. 04-19-00102-CV, 2019 WL 3937278, at *4–5

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

                                           Application

       Mother and Father argue, rather than being the source of endangerment, they brought

E.S.P. and C.S.P. to the United States to seek better medical care for them after the children were

born blind. They assert dire conditions in Mexico led to the children’s fragility and

malnourishment and are the reason they sought asylum in the United States.

       The trial court considered the following evidence relevant to its determinations under

subsections (D) and (E): E.S.P. faced significant cognitive delays: at 21 months of age, he was

nonverbal, non-mobile, and unable to acknowledge the nurses who spoke to him in Spanish. C.S.P.

likewise faced significant cognitive delays: at 21 months of age, he was nonverbal, non-mobile,

and his only form of communication was crying. At the outset of the case, Mother had significant

untreated mental health needs and tested positive for methamphetamines.

       Mother and Father arrived in the United States a few days before U.A.S.P.’s birth. After

U.A.S.P.’s birth, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines, continued to breastfeed U.A.S.P.

while testing positive for methamphetamines, and attempted suicide, leading to her emergency

detention. During the course of the proceedings, Mother and Father tested positive for controlled

substances as follows:

       •   On March 15, 2023, March 21, 2023, and April 12, 2023, Mother tested positive for
           amphetamines and methamphetamines via hair follicle and urine samples;

       •   On July 17, 2023, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines via urine sample and
           amphetamines and methamphetamines via hair follicle sample;

       •   On July 17, 2023, Father tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines via
           hair follicle and urine samples; and

       •   On the first day of trial, August 15, 2023, Mother was nineteen weeks pregnant with a
           fourth child—therefore, testing positive during her pregnancy.

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Nevertheless, Mother and Father consistently denied any drug use at all stages of the proceeding

and in their sworn testimony at trial and refused treatment for drug use. An unresolved history of

drug abuse exposes the children to danger, potentially destabilizes the home, and exposes children

to physical and emotional harm. See, e.g., In re K.J.G., 2019 WL 3937278, at *8. Moreover,

Mother failed to attend thirty-one drug tests required by the Department, and Father failed to attend

thirty-six drug tests required by the Department. The trial court could have inferred from Mother

and Father’s failures to submit to court ordered drug testing that they were using drugs. See In re

K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (“The trial court may infer

from a refusal to take a drug test that appellant was using drugs.”).

       In addition to continued illegal drug abuse, Mother and Father failed to attend inpatient

treatment and drug therapy (as recommended by their drug assessments) and failed to complete

psychological evaluations. See In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d 257, 273 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022,

pet. denied) (finding endangerment, in part, because appellant did not finish the service-plan

mandated counseling and continued to use drugs in violation of the service plan).

       One of the foster parents, O.A., testified to an incident where Mother and Father attempted

to abscond with E.S.P. and C.S.P. during a visitation. While waiting in the car, O.A. witnessed

Mother and Father running out of the visitation with E.S.P. and C.S.P., followed by the caseworker.

Mother and Father attempted to board a nearby bus with the children. Police arrived to secure the

Department’s possession of the children; however, one of the children was injured during a

struggle between police and the parents. The trial court could have believed the parents’ conduct

in attempting to flee with the children while they were legally in the Department’s care created a

potential for danger disregarded by the parents—a potential that manifested in physical injury to

one of the children. See In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d at 477.

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          After reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standards of review, we conclude that

a factfinder could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that Mother and Father

knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings and engaged in conduct

(e.g., prolonged illegal drug use, including during Mother’s pregnancy with U.A.S.P. and her

unborn child) which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children. Moreover,

we must accept the validity of the unchallenged grounds under subsections (N), (O), and (P) and

affirm the termination order on those predicate grounds. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 361–62; In

re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 682. We overrule Mother’s first issue and Father’s first and second

issues.

                                                      Best Interest

                                                    Applicable Law

          Next, Mother and Father challenge the legal sufficiency of the trial court’s order that

termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the children. There is a strong

presumption that a child’s best interest is served by maintaining the relationship between a child

and the natural parent, and the Department has the burden to rebut that presumption by clear and

convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97. To determine whether the

Department satisfied this burden, the Texas Legislature has provided several factors 2 for courts to

2
  These factors include, inter alia: “(1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and
nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child;
(4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department;
(5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological,
or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the
child’s home; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have
access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have
access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and
ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate
an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive
environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates
adequate parenting skills [. . .]; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family
and friends is available to the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b).

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consider regarding a parent’s willingness and ability to provide a child with a safe environment,

and the Texas Supreme Court has provided a similar list of factors 3 to determine a child’s best

interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

         A best interest finding, however, does not require proof of any particular factors. See In re

G.C.D., No. 04-14-00769-CV, 2015 WL 1938435, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015,

no pet.) (mem. op.). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and

“[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or

conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV, 2018

WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “A trier of

fact may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct [in] determin[ing] whether

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.” In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). This conduct can include drug use, which can destabilize

the home and expose children to physical and emotional harm if not resolved. See, e.g., In re

K.J.G., 2019 WL 3937278, at *8. In analyzing these factors, the court must focus on the best

interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &

Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). Evidence that proves a

statutory ground for termination is also probative on the issue of best interest. In re C.H., 89

S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002).

3
  Those factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the
individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the best interest of the
child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is
not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–
72 (Tex. 1976).

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                                             Application

       In Mother’s second issue and Father’s third issue on appeal, Mother and Father challenge

the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best interest finding.

Desires of the Children

       At the time of trial, the children—aged three, three, and one—were too young to express

their desires. However, the trial court could have considered that the children were bonded with

the foster families, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with their biological

parents. See In re J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied).

       U.A.S.P.’s foster parent, J.B., testified that he has been the foster parent since U.A.S.P.

was approximately two months old. He testified to her developmental difficulties at the time she

entered his care but stated that U.A.S.P. is doing well and that she attends physical therapy to catch

up on where she needs to be for her age. He stated he was willing to adopt U.A.S.P. and believed

he could meet all her physical and emotional needs.

       E.S.P. and C.S.P.’s foster parent, O.A., testified that she had been their foster parent for

over a year by the final day of trial. When they first came into her care, they were very fragile,

severely malnourished, and required a special formula to get their weight up. While in her care,

they have received intensive sleeping, psychological, physical, and occupational therapy. They see

a physical therapist and occupational therapist twice per week. While in O.A.’s care, they have

increased their weight and are “really thriving.” They also underwent surgeries for their eyes (to

address cataracts and retina damage) and ears (tubes) while in O.A.’s care. She stated she is willing

to adopt E.S.P. and C.S.P.

       The trial court could have weighed this factor in favor of termination.

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Emotional and Physical Needs and Emotional and Physical Danger to the Children

       Mother and Father’s extensive unresolved history of drug use, detailed above, exposes the

children to danger, potentially destabilizes the home, and exposes children to physical and

emotional harm. See, e.g., In re K.J.G., 2019 WL 3937278, at *8. Moreover, the children have

extensive medical and developmental needs beyond normal children. The trial court could have

believed Mother and Father are unable to meet the children’s extensive physical needs based on

(1) the parent’s historical inability to meet their needs, (2) their failure to demonstrate a departure

from the status quo by attending court-ordered services, (3) their transience, (4) their lack of

transportation required to take the children to appointments, and (5) their demonstrated failure to

attend visitation with the children—including scheduled electronic visitations. The trial court

could have weighed this factor in favor of termination.

Mother and Father’s Parental Abilities

       In addition to prolonged drug abuse, testimony elicited at trial exposed Mother and Father’s

lack of parental abilities. Although they were almost two years old at the time of their removal,

E.S.P. and C.S.P. could not crawl when they were removed. U.A.S.P. was deemed “failure to

thrive” after she was removed and had to be placed on a special formula to gain weight; notably,

Mother breastfed U.A.S.P. during the time she tested positive for methamphetamines. Mother and

Father also only attended 17 of 35 scheduled virtual visits with their children. The Department

caseworker, Espinoza, testified the parents provided no excuse for most of the missed visits. The

trial court could have weighed this factor in favor of termination.

Programs Available to Promote the Best Interest of the Children

       Espinoza testified the parents completed therapy and a drug assessment. Although the drug

assessment recommended they complete inpatient treatment and drug therapy, the parents refused

because they consistently asserted they did not use drugs and therefore did not require treatment.

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Nevertheless, as discussed above, the parents repeatedly failed to report for drug tests and tested

positive for methamphetamines on every drug test that they submitted to. Although the parents

were successfully discharged from therapy, the therapist stated the discharge was done because he

could not help them until they acknowledged their drug use. They also failed to complete

psychological assessments, despite the Department scheduling assessments for them on four

occasions.

       The trial court could have believed Mother and Father were unwilling or unable to

successfully complete programs available to them, and it consequently could have weighed this

factor in favor of termination.

Mother and Father’s Plans for the Children

       Although Father did not testify to specific plans for the children, Mother testified that she

intended to settle down in San Antonio and secure services to meet the children’s physical needs.

However, the trial court could have considered: (1) Mother’s testimony that she and Father lived

with another family while residing in Houston; (2) Mother’s testimony that they were looking for

a place to live in San Antonio but were unable to secure one by the time of trial; (3) Espinoza’s

testimony that Mother and Father were transient; (4) Father’s testimony that the parents could not

work because of their immigration status; (5) Mother and Father’s lack of transportation; and

(6) the children’s significant medical needs requiring multiple visits with professionals each week.

The trial court could have rationally concluded Mother and Father did not have a viable plan to

take care of the children and weighed this factor in favor of termination.

Stability of Home or Proposed Placement

       For all the reasons outlined, the trial court could have believed Mother and Father could

not provide a safe and stable home for the children. In contrast, the trial court considered evidence

that the children’s foster families provided safe and stable homes that have allowed the children to

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thrive notwithstanding their significant developmental delays and medical issues. The trial court

could have weighed this factor in favor of termination.

         After reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standards of review, we conclude a

reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother and

Father’s parental rights were in the best interest of the children. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

We therefore hold legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s best interest

finding, and we overrule Mother and Father’s arguments to the contrary.

                                          Conservatorship

         In Mother’s third issue on appeal, Mother challenges the trial court’s conservatorship

determination on the basis that conservatorship should be reconsidered where a trial court’s

termination order is reversed on appeal. But because this argument requires Mother to prevail on

one of her other two issues, and because we have overruled those issues, we overrule her final

issue.

                                            CONCLUSION

         Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

                                                   Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

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