Court Opinion

ID: 9670293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:18:19.361961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.675153
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). The test for determining a tribe's reservation boundaries, according to the majority opinion and the United States Supreme Court, is whether Congress expressed its intent to diminish or terminate a reservation. Only Congress can divest a reservations of its land and diminish its boundaries.
The Congressional expression of intent to diminish or terminate a reservation must be clear from the face of the act and the circumstances surrounding the passage of the act, including the legislative history. Hagen v. Utah, 127 L. Ed. 2d 252, 265 (1994); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1984). While in other cases the court searches for clues about legislative intent, in *416diminishment cases the evidence of legislative intent must be clear. Clarity is required, according to the Supreme Court, to overcome the general rule that doubtful legislative expressions are to be resolved in favor of the Indians. See majority op. at 396.
"The most probative evidence of diminishment is, of course, the statutory language used to open the Indian lands." Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 965-66 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 470 (1984)). The Act of 1871 provides for the sale of reservation land, but "the mere fact that a reservation has been opened to settlement does not necessarily mean that the opened area has lost its reservation status." Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586-87 (1977). See also DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 356 (1962). The title to the individual plots in the area is irrelevant; "the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise." Majority op. at 407 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 470).
The parties appear to agree that Congress has not clearly expressed on the face of any act cited that it intended to diminish or terminate the reservation in issue. The thrust of the Act of 1871 was not to dissolve the tribe or its reservation but to emancipate a group of members who no longer wanted tribe membership and who wanted their fair share of the assets before leaving the tribe. The majority therefore must derive the "clear expression" of Congressional intent from the circumstances surrounding the passage of the act.
Although the majority opinion accurately recites the principles of interpreting congressional material for intent of diminishment, it fails to apply them. Instead the majority opinion imputes to Congress an intent to diminish the reservation when no clear evi*417dence of congressional intent exists. The court of appeals' opposing conclusion of congressional intent, inferred from the materials it examines, lends support to the conclusion that the legislative intent is not clearly expressed.
Perhaps the majority's conclusion of congressional intent can be inferred from the circumstances of the enactment of the 1871 legislation the majority examines. However, while the evidence garnered by the majority may tend to support diminishment, it is "hardly dispositive," Solem, 465 U.S. at 475; nor is it "substantial and compelling" as the cases require. Solem, 465 U.S. at 472.
I conclude that, at best, the legislation and the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the legislation are ambiguous regarding congressional intent. I therefore conclude that the state has failed to provide substantial and compelling evidence of a congressional intent to diminish. Solem, 465 U.S. at 472.
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.