Court Opinion

ID: 9468521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:16:50.462735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:54.329473
License: Public Domain

FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because I conclude that the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) “overinvolvement” in the commission of the crime for which defendant was convicted precludes prosecution under either the due process clause or the Court’s supervisory powers, and because the majority improperly disqualified the district court judge from re-sentencing the defendant, I am unable to agree with the majority’s opinion and therefore respectfully dissent.
Tobias is a 21- or 22-year-old married man employed as a house painter. With the exception of a minor exchange of fisticuffs, he has no prior record of any kind and had never been convicted of a drug related offense. In early 1980 Tobias responded to an advertisement in High Times, an over-the-counter drug culture periodical, and sought information concerning the purchase of chemicals necessary to make cocaine. Defendant requested a catalogue from the chemical supply company and eventually ordered what he thought were chemicals needed to manufacture cocaine. Unbeknownst to Tobias, the chemical supply company, located in a mid-western state, was owned and operated by the DEA. On April 25, 1980, Tobias called the company to cancel his order and spoke to DEA Agent Schabilion. He advised Schabilion that he intended to use the chemicals to manufacture cocaine but had concluded that he lacked the requisite knowledge and equipment necessary to make the drug. Indeed, the record reflects that Tobias was ineptly suited to make cocaine. His education extended only as far as high school, whereas manufacturing cocaine requires a “sophisticated chemical background.” Further, it appears that Tobias never had even a basic understanding of what was needed to manufacture the drug, both in terms of the necessary chemicals and in terms of the necessary knowledge of chemistry.1 During *390the course of the conversation, Schabilion emphasized the difficulty and expense involved in manufacturing cocaine and suggested a number of “cheaper” and “easier” alternatives. “I advised him [Tobias] that almost anything would be cheaper and easier to manufacture than cocaine, and suggested that any of the amphetamines, speed or PCP would be easier.” Until that statement, nothing in the record reveals any intent or disposition on the part of Tobias to attempt the manufacture of any drug other than cocaine. Tobias admitted to Schabilion that there might be a market for PCP in the Mobile area but expressed reservations about making the drug, stating that he had no background in chemistry. At that point in the conversation Agent Scha-bilion explained that manufacturing PCP was as easy as “baking a cake.” The agent, according to defendant, also told him that selling the drug would be profitable. Without any discussion as to particular chemicals or quantities, Schabilion promised to supply Tobias with everything necessary to make PCP, including the formula, at a total cost of $500. Tobias then agreed to purchase the chemicals and delivery was made in Mobile, Alabama, by a DEA agent acting as an employee of a fictitious delivery company. The defendant received two separate deliveries on the same day and paid $101 for the chemicals, the total amount requested by the DEA. The DEA supplied Tobias with all of the necessary ingredients of PCP except diethyl ether, which Tobias obtained at a local chemical supply store.
Utilizing the chemicals provided by the DEA and the formula provided by the DEA, Tobias attempted to manufacture a drug suggested by the DEA. However, the agency’s encouragement, pervasive influence, and active participation did not end there. Still uncertain about how to actually make the drug, from April 29 through May 9 Tobias telephoned the supply company 13 times and his wife called on three other occasions to obtain information and additional advice concerning the procedure at each stage of the manufacturing process. It is undisputed that Tobias did not know how to make PCP and that during those phone calls the DEA agents instructed him as to each step in the process. Agents for the Government, therefore, guided the defendant in every stage of the process, from inception to termination. Tobias was ultimately arrested and, despite his status as a first-time drug offender, his youthful age and his family situation, was cumulatively sentenced to fifteen years’ incarceration and ten years’ special parole.
Government involvement and assistance in the criminal activities of others are sometimes necessary to enforce the laws. The degree of Government involvement is not, however, boundless. In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), and Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), the Supreme Court observed that, when involvement by federal agents in the commission of a crime is so outrageous as to shock the conscience, either due process or the Court’s supervisory powers will preclude prosecution. These decisions make clear that as a general rule infiltration and “limited involvement” by Government agents in a drug related enterprise do not run afoul of the due process clause and in fact constitute a legitimate method of apprehending offenders. The Supreme Court also admonished that due process is not meant to provide federal courts with a “chancellor’s foot” veto over investigatory techniques that lack judicial approbation. The two cases read in tandem demonstrate that only extreme and outrageous Government involvement in the commission of a crime will justify reversing for that reason a conviction under the due process clause.
*391Although providing a rudimentary framework for analysis, neither Russell nor Hampton delineated with clarity the point at which Government involvement becomes shocking and outrageous. However, some lower court decisions have found the requisite level of outrageous involvement and provide useful guidance. In Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971), a case cited by the Supreme Court in Hampton, the defendants contacted a Government agent concerning the possibility of manufacturing and selling bootleg whiskey. The agent represented himself to be a member of the “syndicate” and agreed to both provide financial assistance and buy all of the whiskey produced. Extensive communications transpired between the parties, with the agent providing the defendants with substantial assistance. He helped search for an appropriate site for the still, agreed to provide equipment and an operator for the still, and made available two thousand pounds of sugar at wholesale prices. The agent also tried to prompt the defendants by intimating that he was receiving pressure for the whiskey from his syndicate boss. On appeal, the court noted that the defendants evinced a predisposition to commit the crime and could not, therefore, invoke the “usual entrapment defense.” However, because of the extensive and aggressive overinvolvement by the agent in the crime, the conviction was reversed. “[W]hen the Government permits itself to become enmeshed in criminal activity, from beginning to end, to the extent which appears here, the same underlying objections which render entrapment repugnant to American criminal justice are operative.” Id. at 787.
Similarly in United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), DEA agents initiated contact with the defendants and suggested that they construct a laboratory for manufacturing amphetamines. The DEA agents supplied the defendants with the necessary chemicals at a discount price, supplied a portion of glassware to be used, and provided a barn as the situs for the laboratory. The agents facilitated defendants’ ability to purchase chemicals from other supply companies and made available the necessary funds to make the purchases. A DEA agent also supervised the entire manufacturing process, with the defendants providing only minor production assistance. The Third Circuit rejected the defense of entrapment, finding evidence of predisposition. However, the court reversed the conviction and held that “the nature and extent of police involvement in this crime was so overreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as a matter of law.” Id. at 377. Accord, United States v. Jannotti, 501 F.Supp. 1182 (E.D.Pa.1980) (dismissing indictment on ground that Government’s overreaching violated due process); see also United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime.”).
The cases demonstrate that outrageous involvement turns upon the totality of the circumstances with no single factor controlling. Under such a standard, it is my judgment that the DEA’s overinvolvement in this case requires reversal of the conviction. The DEA agents placed the advertisement for the chemicals in High Times magazine. The majority justifies this conduct by observing that it was for the purpose of pursuing “undercover investigations of clandestine laboratory operators . . . ”. While that may have been the purpose of the operation of the chemical supply house, in this case the advertisement constituted the initial contact with a young man that had up until then indicated no predisposition to manufacture drugs. When it became apparent that Tobias was completely stymied in his predisposition to manufacture cocaine, the agents advanced the idea of manufacturing an “easier” and “cheaper” drug. Tobias was provided with almost all of the necessary chemicals at apparently cut-rate prices, was provided with the formula for manufacturing the PCP and was persuaded to make PCP in part by the statement that the process was no more difficult than “baking a cake.” The DEA agents personally delivered the chemicals to his home and gave technical advice concerning the *392amount and sequence of combining each separate ingredient at every step of the manufacturing process. Admittedly, the agents did not other than the advertisement initiate contact with Tobias, but that fact is not dispositive. See Greene v. United States, supra, 454 F.2d 783.2
This case does not merely involve law enforcement officers supplying Tobias with an “item of value” necessary to make the prohibited drug. Such a practice is universally recognized as an acceptable investigative technique. Here, Tobias amounted to little more than a conduit. Had the Government agents at any point ceased providing Tobias with assistance and encouragement, the record indicates that he would have been incapable of manufacturing the illicit drug. Thus Government agents vicariously manufactured PCP through Tobi-as in order to gather evidence to justify his prosecution. The instant case therefore involves that rare degree of Government involvement in the commission of a crime that Hampton and Russeil intended to prevent.3 I do not, of course, propose that federal courts be accorded a “chancellor’s foot” veto over law enforcement techniques that are disapproved. United States v. Russell, supra, 411 U.S. at 431, 93 S.Ct. at *3931642. I do suggest, however, that the majority goes too far by holding, in effect, that no matter how egregious and shocking the degree of Government involvement in the commission of a crime, neither the due process clause nor the court’s supervisory powers will ever be invoked to preclude prosecution.4
Courts are rightfully loathe to overturn convictions on the basis of Governmental overinvolvement in the commission of a crime, recognizing that law enforcement officials need wide latitude in devising appropriate methods and tactics for apprehending violators. However, judicial tolerance of Governmental involvement in criminal activity should not constitute a carte blanche; there is still a point beyond which law enforcement officials cannot go. As Justice Brandéis observed, “[t]o declare that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal — would bring terrible retribution.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The direct, continual involvement by Government agents in the creation, maintenance and commission of a crime, to the extent reflected in this case, goes beyond the perimeter of permissible conduct and should not be countenanced by this Court.
I am also unable to agree with the majority’s decision to remand the case to a “new judge untainted by improper assumptions” for resentencing. The facts of this case do not justify the majority’s somewhat cavalier decision to disqualify the original district court judge from resentencing Tobias. Generally, judges will be disqualified on one of two grounds: prejudice, see United States v. Long, 656 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1981), or bias, see United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981). Bias is present where the judge has a personal stake in the outcome or displays favoritism or antagonism towards a party. The imposition of a severe sentence will not result in the disqualification of a judge for bias so long as the sentence falls within the statutory limits. United States v. Conforte, 457 F.Supp. 641, 653 (D.Nev.1978), affirmed, 624 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1980). Prejudice occurs where the judge has prejudged the merits of the case.
The facts of the instant case reveal that, at worst, the trial judge made a mistake. He improperly relied upon certain assumptions 5 at sentencing and failed to make the requisite determination concerning the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing under the Youth Corrections Act. Nowhere does the record reveal even one scintilla of evidence indicating bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge, and the majority fails to provide any other reason why disqualification is necessary. Under these circumstances, the appropriate disposition of the case would have been to direct the sentencing judge on remand to correct the errors that occurred in sentencing Tobias.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Tobias originally ordered four chemicals from .the supply company and later added two more. According to counsel for the Government, DEA officials did not ship the chemicals because *390they were unable to tell from the order what Tobias was trying to manufacture. Apparently Tobias’ list of chemicals was either incomplete or inaccurate, indicating that he did not know the proper ingredients. Further, it was Agent Schabilion during the April 25 phone call who had to explain to Tobias about the chemicals, precursors, expense and technical knowledge necessary to make cocaine.

. The majority indicates that the DEA’s failure to provide Tobias with “financial aid” distinguishes the case from prior decisions dealing with Government overinvolvement. The record indicates, however, that the Government did provide Tobias with “financial assistance.” Tobias was originally informed that the chemicals would cost $500'. Nonetheless, when the DEA agent delivered the chemicals, he charged Tobias only $101. Moreover, the DEA agent made a second delivery on the same day and did not charge Tobias anything for the additional chemicals. Thus, although the record is not totally clear, the Government appears to have provided “financial assistance” to Tobias in the form of reduced prices for the chemicals used to manufacture the PCP.

. A significant number of recent decisions have dealt with unsuccessful attempts to show that Government involvement in a drug related offense violated due process. None, however, involved the degree of pervasive involvement found in the instant case. E. g., United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1981) (DEA agent induced defendants to purchase cocaine); United States v. Gentry, 642 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1981) (DEA agents operated chemical supply company and supplied technical information and chemicals to defendant); United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038, 101 S.Ct. 616, 66 L.Ed.2d 500 (1980) (DEA agents aided and assisted marijuana smuggling ring); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 863, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1980) (DEA agents purchased drugs and provided defendant with chemicals); United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980) (DEA agent purchased drugs from defendant); United States v. Till, 609 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 1607, 63 L.Ed.2d 791 (1980) (DEA agents purchased marijuana from defendants); United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975, 99 S.Ct. 1545, 59 L.Ed.2d 794 (1979) (DEA informant sold heroin to defendants); United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978) (State drug enforcement officer purchased cocaine from defendant); United States v. Leja, 568 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1977) (Government informant infiltrated defendants’ drug manufacturing enterprise); United States v. Thomas, 567 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822, 99 S.Ct. 90, 58 L.Ed.2d 114 (1978) (DEA agents contracted with defendants for the importation of cocaine); United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074, 98 S.Ct. 1263, 55 L.Ed.2d 780 (1978) (DEA informant infiltrated drug manufacturing enterprise and DEA agent provided some technical information for manufacturing PCP); United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1976) (DEA agents supplied defendant with chemicals and DEA informant infiltrated drug manufacturing enterprise); United States v. Weber, 518 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 3193, 49 L.Ed.2d 1200 (1976) (DEA informant infiltrated defendants’ drug manufacturing enterprise); United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975) (Government informant infiltrated drug dealing enterprise and supplied defendant with marijuana); United States v. Arias-Diaz, 497 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1002, 95 S.Ct. 1445, 43 L.Ed.2d 761 (1975) (Government informant infiltrated drug ring and flew plane carrying marijuana for defendants); United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 819 (1975) (Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs infiltrated defendant’s drug smuggling ring); United States v. Katz, 509 F.Supp. 998 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (DEA agents aided defendants’ efforts to manufacture drugs); United States v. Campa, 474 F.Supp. 507 (S.D.Fla.1979) (DEA agents infiltrated drug dealing enterprise and supplied defendants with cocaine); McCarroll v. Alabama, 422 F.Supp. 137 (S.D.Ala.1976).

. The majority opinion in effect limits the over-involvement defense to the precise circumstances of United States v. Twigg, supra, 588 F.2d 373. Such an interpretation is far too narrow and if followed would eliminate overin-volvement as a viable defense.

. The majority opinion fairly recites the improper assumption relied upon by the trial judge, i. e., that Tobias’ crime was more egregious and a more severe sentence was required because of the quantity of the controlled substance possessed by Tobias, when the facts reflected that Tobias had nothing to do or say as to the quantity. He simply accepted the chemicals shipped to him by the DEA. The trial judge obviously overlooked the fact that it was the DEA agents who made the determination that chemicals would be shipped to Tobias in sufficient quantity to produce 300,000 units of PCP. Furthermore, it was the DEA agents, through the sixteen telephone conversations, who determined the actual number of units manufactured into liquid form.