Court Opinion

ID: 9947333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 17:01:35.158261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:21.959186
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 23-2213
TERRI LOBIANCO and LOUIS LOBIANCO,
                                                Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                 v.

BONEFISH GRILL, LLC,
                                                 Defendant-Appellee.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
           No. 1:21-cv-04180 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge.
                     ____________________

   ARGUED FEBRUARY 14, 2024 — DECIDED MARCH 4, 2024
                ____________________

   Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Terri LoBianco slipped and fell in
a Chicagoland Bonefish Grill, dislocating her hip. She later
sued the restaurant, alleging negligent maintenance of the
floor. The district court entered summary judgment for the
restaurant, concluding that LoBianco failed to identify the
proximate cause of her fall and injury. We see the case differ-
ently. During her deposition, LoBianco testified in no uncer-
tain terms that she slipped upon stepping in liquid, only then
2                                                     No. 23-2213

to fall hard to the floor, leaving a wet spot on part of her dress.
That is enough to create a disputed issue of fact. So we reverse
and return the case to the district court for trial.
                                I
                                A
    On July 10, 2019, Terri LoBianco went to dinner with her
two sisters at a Bonefish Grill restaurant in Skokie, Illinois.
After finishing her meal, she went to the restroom. On her
walk back to the table, her foot slipped forward, causing her
to fall. Terri dislocated her hip and, as a result, needed four
surgeries.
    Upon falling, LoBianco felt wetness on her dress, immedi-
ately identifying a pool of liquid as the reason she had
slipped. She was not the only person who reported seeing a
liquid. Following the fall, a Bonefish Grill employee, referring
to the spill, stated that she had earlier “told [somebody] to
wipe that up.” Upon arriving at a hospital, Terri met up with
her husband, Louis LoBianco. He too noticed that Terri’s
dress was wet.
    The LoBiancos sued Bonefish Grill on two claims in state
court brought under Illinois law. Terri alleged that she sus-
tained her hip injury because she slipped and fell on a spill
the restaurant negligently failed to clean. Louis brought a sim-
ilar claim for his loss of consortium with Terri due to her in-
juries. On Bonefish Grill’s motion, Terri’s suit was removed
to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(a).
No. 23-2213                                                      3

                                B
    Bonefish Grill moved for summary judgment following
the close of discovery. The district court granted the restau-
rant’s motion, reasoning that Terri could not establish the
proximate cause required for a negligence claim. The court
concluded that the record did not contain a disputed issue as
to whether Terri slipped in a liquid. In doing so, it focused on
Terri’s testimony during her deposition that she was uncer-
tain if the liquid she slipped in was water (as opposed to
something else) and that she did not feel the wetness on her
dress until after the fall. The district court also dismissed
Louis’s loss of consortium claim since it hinged on the success
of Terri’s negligence claim.
   The LoBiancos now appeal.
                                II
   Our review of the district court’s summary judgment rul-
ing proceeds on “a clean slate, drawing all reasonable infer-
ences from the record in favor of [the LoBiancos] as the non-
movant[s].” Xiong v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 62 F.4th
350, 353 (7th Cir. 2023).
                                A
     With the case proceeding under diversity jurisdiction,
“state substantive [tort] law applies—here, that of Illinois.”
Perez v. Staples Cont. & Com. LLC, 31 F.4th 560, 570 (7th Cir.
2022). In Illinois, negligence plaintiffs must prove “[t]he
elements of … duty, breach, proximate causation, and
damages” to prevail. Enadeghe v. Dahms, 95 N.E.3d 1170, 1175
(Ill. App. Ct. 2017). At issue here is whether Terri has put forth
sufficient evidence that liquid on the restaurant floor caused
her to slip, so this appeal concerns only the element of
4                                                     No. 23-2213

proximate cause. While proximate cause can be further
broken down into cause in fact and legal cause, Jones v. Live
Nation Ent., Inc., 63 N.E.3d 959, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), the
latter—“essentially a question of foreseeability” about the
likelihood of an injury—is not contested. People v. Mumaugh,
94 N.E.3d 237, 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
    To that end, our focus concentrates on factual causation.
The controlling question is whether Terri, in opposing Bone-
fish Grill’s summary judgment motion, put “forth facts [al-
lowing a finding] that her fall was caused by a liquid sub-
stance on the floor ….” Ishoo v. Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 966
N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). To create a jury issue,
she must show “with reasonable certainty that [Bonefish
Grill’s] acts or omissions caused [her]” to slip and fall, Berke v.
Manilow, 63 N.E.3d 194, 204 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted), by “using either direct or
circumstantial evidence.” Barker v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 634
N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
    Illinois slip-and-fall plaintiffs can survive summary judg-
ment when they “repeatedly and conclusively indicate[]”
what caused them to fall. Caburnay v. Nor. Am. Hosp., 963
N.E.2d 1021, 1028–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); see Ishoo, 966 N.E.2d
at 1164. That follows because “the credibility of [a] plaintiff[]”
who is unequivocal in “claim[ing] that her fall was caused by
a liquid substance on the floor cannot be decided in a sum-
mary judgment motion.” Ishoo, 966 N.E.2d at 1164; see also
Caburnay, 963 N.E.2d at 1028–30 (holding that a jury issue ex-
isted about whether a fold in a mat caused a plaintiff’s fall
where he “repeatedly and conclusively indicated that he fell
only after tripping on a fold or bump in [the defendant’s]
mat”). To identify the source of their fall, a plaintiff may use
No. 23-2213                                                     5

their “sensory perception of what caused their fall.” Caburnay,
963 N.E.2d at 1028.
    By contrast, a plaintiff cannot offer only conjecture about
the “mere possibility of a causal connection” between a slip
hazard and injury and advance past summary judgment.
Barker, 634 N.E.2d at 1279. Indeed, plaintiffs who express un-
certainty about what caused their fall are not permitted to as-
sume or infer that a nearby hazard (like a pool of liquid) was
to blame. Id. at 1278; Brett v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 290 N.E.2d
712, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos., 416 N.E.2d
328, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Vance v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 480
N.E.2d 167, 168–70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Nor can a plaintiff cre-
ate a jury issue by offering only after-the-fact speculation
about whether a hazard existed at all. See Palumbo v. Frank’s
Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 1073, 1076–77 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989).
                                B
    Against these principles, we conclude that Terri has cre-
ated a jury issue as to the proximate cause of her fall and re-
sulting hip injury.
    At every turn, Terri has repeatedly—and in no uncertain
terms—identified a liquid as the cause of her fall. Directly af-
ter she fell, Terri told her sister that she “slipped on some wa-
ter.” She repeated this to the restaurant manager moments
later. During her deposition, she underscored the same point
once more, testifying that she slipped in liquid while at Bone-
fish Grill. She explained that her foot “went like lightning” as
she stepped in the liquid, which she described as feeling “slip-
pery and wet” on both her and her dress after she fell. Terri’s
unwavering account reflects her own perception of the liquid
6                                                   No. 23-2213

both during and after her fall. See Caburnay, 963 N.E.2d at
1028 (concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate
when a plaintiff “unequivocally testified as to his sensory per-
ceptions” about his foot getting caught in a mat); Ishoo, 966
N.E.2d at 1164 (finding that a plaintiff’s consistent testimony
about stepping on a liquid substance was sufficient to create
a jury issue of whether she slipped in liquid).
    Third parties provided additional corroboration for Terri’s
account. After seeing that Terri had fallen, one Bonefish Grill
employee stated that she had told somebody to clean the spill
up. The district court concluded that, as an agent of the de-
fendant, the employee’s statement was admissible for its truth
and thus properly considered at summary judgment. See Fed
R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(D); Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 661 (7th Cir.
2023). Bonefish has not appealed that determination.
    At the hospital, Louis also noticed that Terri’s dress was
wet. Together, these facts create a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Terri slipped in liquid at Bonefish Grill. See
Wiegman v. Hitch-Inn Post of Libertyville, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 614,
622–23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff’s testimony
that she slipped, along with wetness on her dress and witness
testimony about the wet floor, was sufficient to survive sum-
mary judgment).
   Bonefish Grill sees the analysis differently, insisting that
Terri speculated that she slipped in water only because she
noticed a wet spot on her dress after falling. Speculation oc-
curs when a plaintiff expresses uncertainty about or cannot
identify why they fell. See, e.g., Kimbrough, 416 N.E.2d at 330
(explaining that the plaintiff stated in her deposition that she
had “no idea” what she may have fallen on); Barker, 634
N.E.2d at 1279 (holding that no genuine issue of material fact
No. 23-2213                                                     7

existed where plaintiff fell on a grocery store floor that was
ordinarily wet but presented no evidence that it was wet
when she fell). In those cases, “the lack of an identifiable de-
fect was the determinative factor.” Canzoneri v. Village of
Franklin Park, 513 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). But
that is not the situation here. Terri consistently and “specifi-
cally pointed to [the liquid] which she claimed caused her to
fall,” so her account roots itself in recalled sensory perception,
not speculation. Id.
    When viewing the record in the light most favorable to
Terri, we see sufficient evidence to create a jury issue about
whether liquid on Bonefish Grill’s floor caused her to slip and
injure herself. So we reverse on Terri’s negligence claim.
                                C
     The district court also granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of Bonefish Grill on Louis’s loss of consortium claim since
that claim depends on Terri’s negligence claim. See Blagg v.
Ill. F.W.D. Truck & Equip. Co., 572 N.E.2d 920, 927 (Ill. 1991)
Because Terri’s claim can advance to trial, we also reverse on
Louis’s loss of consortium claim.
   For these reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.