Court Opinion

ID: 9581714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:17:44.667279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:12.121998
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the record reflects prejudicial error during both the guilt and penalty phases of appellant’s bifurcated trial. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
GUILT PHASE

Mother’s Testimony

The majority’s finding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting the victim’s mother to testify during the guilt phase of the trial is refuted by the record. Ostensibly, the mother was called to identify a jacket found near the crime scene. After the identification was completed, the solicitor continued the questioning, asking the mother how tall was her daughter, why did she choose to send her daughter to Lander, and was she close with her daughter.
Evidence is relevant if it has a direct bearing upon and tends to establish or make more or less probable the matter in controversy. In State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 401 S.E. (2d) 146 (1991), this Court adopted the rule that although relevant, evidence may be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
There is no showing in the record that the mother’s identification of the jacket constituted evidence even remotely essential to the case. Hence, any probative value of her identification evidence was substantially outweighed by the tendency of additional testimony from the victim’s mother to unduly influence the jury to decide their verdict upon the basis of sympathy. I would hold that the mother’s testimony should have been excluded due to its most probable highly prejudicial effect.

Jury Charge Regarding Miranda Rights

I suggest that by upholding the trial judge’s failure to charge the jury conclusively and unambiguously that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused understood his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. (2d) 694 (1966), the majority now seeks to arbitrarily limit the established law of this state by interject*353ing that an accused’s rights under Miranda are merely “appropriate factors to consider” in deciding whether or not confessions are given freely and voluntarily.
South Carolina law is clear on the prerequisites to be established before a jury may consider the confession of an accused. First, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was given freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances. Second, when the accused is in custody at the time such confession is made, the jury must be convinced that he received and understood his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Miranda. See State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45,406 S.E. (2d) 315 (1991); State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 332, 353 S.E. (2d) 441 (1986); and State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E. (2d) 582 (1981).
I would hold that this limiting charge with regard to Miranda is in derogation of the United States Constitution and South Carolina case law and was prejudicial to the rights of the appellant.

Deadly Weapons Charge

I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the trial judge’s charge that a hand or fist could be used in such a fashion or manner as to constitute a deadly weapon or object.
The majority relies upon State v. Hariott, 210 S.C. 290, 42 S.E. (2d) 385 (1947), which not only states that fists generally are not considered deadly weapons, but has been cited in support of the proposition that parts of the human body are not to be regarded as dangerous weapons. See Commw. v. Davis, 10 Mass. App. 190, 406 N.E. (2d) 417, 420 (1980), and People v. Van Diver, 80 Mich. App. 352, 263 N.W. (2d) 370, 372 (1977).
Moreover, thorough research uncovers no South Carolina case law construction or statutory provision evincing legislative intent to classify human bodily extremities as deadly weapons under the facts herein presented. As noted by the trial judge, “... we deal with unchartered waters and confront a case and issue of novel impression in South Carolina.” For guidance, the trial court looked to the neighboring jurisdiction of Georgia. See Thomas v. State, 237 Ga. 690, 229 S.E. (2d) 458 (1976); Kirby v. State, 145 Ga. App. 813, 245 S.E. (2d) 43 (1978); and Quarles v. State, 130 Ga. App. 756, 204 S.E. (2d) 467 (1974). However, in order to dispose of the issue under *354consideration, we need not address the merits of adopting or rejecting this theory since the trial court was bound by the state of the law as it existed at the time of trial. The trial judge is required to charge the “current and correct law” of the state. State v. Robinson, — S.C. —, 412 S.E. (2d) 411 (1991); S.C. Const. art. V § 21; State v. Adams, supra, 283 S.E. (2d) at 585.
The trial court’s error was compounded by the following prejudicial comments made by the solicitor during summation.
Now, I mention his hands as deadly weapons because if you, the jury, find that he used his hands as deadly weapons that night, both for the hitting, the beating about the face, and if we recall, Dr. Sexton also testified that she had a broken nose and injuries around her nose, cut marks that he said in his opinion were caused not by a rough surface, but what he did say, by a smooth surface, either the hands, the fists, or gloved hands, or fists, causing the injuries. But if you conclude the defendant used his hands as deadly weapons, then you could conclude that there is implied malice in this instance, that these hands were used as deadly weapons, giving rise to malice, giving rise to murder.
I would find as an additional ground for reversal the cumulative prejudicial effect, when considered together, of the solicitor’s jury argument and the trial judge’s erroneous charge which would, in my view, entitle the appellant to a new guilt-phase trial.
SENTENCING PHASE

Waiver of Right to Testify

Finally, I reject the conclusion of the majority opinion that the appellant’s waiver of his right to testify during the sentencing phase of his trial was intelligently waived.
Conversely, I believe the record shows that the appellant was denied the right to testify at the sentencing phase of trial due to trial counsel’s failure to adequately and correctly advise the appellant of the nature of testimony which was permissible. In response to the trial judge’s question concerning appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to testify during the sentencing phase, his trial counsel responded:
*355... I asked him, explained to him what this procedure was the best I could so that he could understand it... I told him this was not the part of the trial to talk about, or have no discussions about guilt or innocence, because that was over. And I told him that where we were at in this portion of the trial was in the area of mitigation and anything he could say about Tommy Lee in terms — that would touch upon this jury in line of mitigation, explained that to him, anything about his background, anything at all about Tommy Lee that this jury may consider in mitigation. I made it very clear that, Tommy, I don’t want you to get up there, or you can’t get up there and talk about the guilt, or innocence, we can’t touch upon that because that’s already behind us. And he understood. And I said, now, considering what the rules of the game are do you want to get up there and talk to the jury and testify. . .
An accused may be prohibited from offering unsworn testimony in his statement to the sentencing-phase jury. However, a defendant may present argument regarding facts in evidence to direct the jury’s attention to the circumstances of the crime or to his personal characteristics since these are proper sentencing considerations. State v. Davis, — S.C. —, 411 S.E. (2d) 220 (1991).
The knowing and voluntary waiver requirement must be satisfied by a full record, and may be established by colloquy between the court and the accused himself, between the court and counsel for the accused, or both. State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185, 403 S.E. (2d) 623 (1991).
Trial counsel’s foregoing statement to the court is, at best, ambiguous and seriously deficient with regard to accuracy. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any indication that either of appellant’s trial counsel informed him that he could discuss the facts of the case as they relate to his plea before the jury seeking mitigation of his sentence. Obviously, the mandate for a full and adequate record becomes singularly crucial in light of the evidence concerning appellant’s mental capacity. See State v. Orr, supra, and State v. Arthur, 296 S.C. 495, 374 S.E. (2d) 291 (1988).
*356I would hold that the record in this case fails to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver by the appellant of his right to testify during the sentencing phase of his trial and that he is, therefore, entitled to a new sentencing-phase trial.
For the foregoing'reasons, I would reverse this case and remand for new trial.