Court Opinion

ID: 9899260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 16:10:53.287598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:14.897713
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Dix, 2023-Ohio-4123.]

                                    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                  :

                 Plaintiff- Appellee,           :
                                                             No. 112458
                          v.                    :

WILLIAM DIX,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.           :

                                     JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 16, 2023

              Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                 Case No. CR-22-668168-A

                                           Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Megan Helton, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Robert McCaleb, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J.:

                  Defendant-appellant William Dix appeals from a judgment of the trial

court convicting him of attempted rape and other related offenses after a jury trial.
Dix was indicted for these offenses after his biological daughter, B.D., who was seven

years old at the time of the incident, revealed at a game during school recess that her

father “put his pee-pee in her butt.” On appeal, Dix argues the prosecutor’s

suggestive comments about his silence at trial constituted reversible error and his

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to those

comments. He also argues his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and

is also against the manifest weight of the evidence. Having reviewed the record and

applicable law, we find no merit to these claims and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

               Dix was charged with five counts based on B.D.’s disclosure. Under

Count 1, he was charged with rape, a felony of the first degree, in violation of

R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). The state alleged that, sometime between May 27, 2019, and

November 14, 2020, Dix engaged in sexual conduct, to wit: anal penetration, with

B.D., born November 2012 and younger than 13 years of age at the time of the

offense. Count 1 included a furthermore clause that Dix “purposely compelled the

victim,” who was under ten years of age, “to submit by force or threat of force.”

               Count 2, as amended by the state, charged Dix with attempted rape

in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and 2923.02 (the attempt statute), a first-

degree felony. The count included an attempted rape specification pursuant to

R.C. 2941.1419(A). R.C. 2941.1419 mandates an indefinite prison term of ten years

to life when an offender is convicted of attempted rape and the victim is under ten

years old at the time of the offense.
             Dix was additionally indicted for gross sexual imposition in violation of

R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a felony of the third degree (Count 3); endangering children in

violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), a felony of the second degree (Count 4); and

endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A), a felony of the third degree

(Count 5).

Trial Testimony

             The matter proceeded to a jury trial in January 2023. B.D., ten years

old at the time, testified. Also testifying for the state were the vice principal of her

school, her mother, a SANE nurse who examined her, two social workers from the

Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”), and the

detective in the case. Their testimony indicates that the sexual incident that led to

the indictment against Dix first came to light in November 2021 when nine-year-old

B.D., a third-grader, revealed the incident to another child at school. The school’s

vice principal became aware of the disclosure and, after talking to B.D., reported the

incident to CCDCFS, which in turn reported the matter to the police.

             B.D. was the first witness to testify. Her parents had been separated

since 2017, and she lived with her mother. The incident occurred when she and her

11-year-old brother, A.D., and 13-year-old brother, W.D., had an overnight visit with

Dix at Dix’s friend’s residence, where Dix stayed at the time. W.D. slept on the

couch, and B.D. and A.D. slept with Dix in Dix’s bed. B.D. was between A.D. and

Dix. Describing the incident, B.D. testified that “I tried to go to sleep and my dad

pulled down my underwear and put his pee-pee in my butt, kind of,” and that “[h]e
put his private, tried to put it in my butthole.” She explained that his “private” meant

his “pee-pee” and it felt “hairy.” When asked how her butt felt, she stated “[l]ike it’s

pushed in” but it did not hurt; his “pee-pee” was “soft” and he was not “doing any

movement with it.” She said to him, “Daddy, stop,” and he stopped. B.D. also

testified there was no blood on her and there was no liquid coming out of Dix’s “pee-

pee.”

             B.D. then went to the living room to lie down on the couch where W.D.

was sleeping. She recalled she almost fell off the couch because it was very small.

B.D. testified that she slept on the same bed with her father “all the time” but this

was the only incident. She never talked to Dix or anyone else about the incident and

tried to keep it a secret. When asked why she did not tell her mother, B.D. stated

that she kept it a secret to herself because she thought she would get in trouble. B.D.

testified that she loves her father and misses him, and she wrote a letter to Santa

about him.

             Two years later, in November 2021, B.D. mentioned the incident in a

“truth or dare” game at a school recess, telling a friend that “I had sex with my dad.”

By the end of the day, the school administration became aware of B.D.’s disclosure.

             The school’s vice principal testified that he learned from a teacher

about B.D.’s statement. He talked to B.D. to make sure she knew what “sex” meant.

Based on her disclosure, he contacted CCDCFS and B.D.’s mother. B.D.’s mother

testified that B.D. loves her father. She learned about the incident only when the

social workers from CCDCFS came to her residence to ask about what B.D. had
revealed at school that day. She then took her daughter to the police station for an

interview and later to Rainbow Babies & Children’s Hospital for an examination.

The day before Dix’s arraignment, Dix came to her residence. B.D. told Dix what he

had done, and what she stated was consistent with what B.D. told the police.

               Social worker Stephanie Moore, a child protection specialist, testified

she went to B.D.’s home and interviewed her on the same day of B.D.’s disclosure at

school. B.D. stated that while visiting her father on one occasion, “he was in bed

with her and that he put his penis in her bottom.” She interviewed her again at the

Child Advocacy Center with the help of a diagram, which confirmed her disclosure.

Another child protection specialist, Chanelle Childers, testified that she was

involved in the investigation of B.D.’s allegation and the case was classified by the

agency as “indicated,” which meant that, although there was no evidence beyond the

child’s statement to support the allegation, the child’s disclosure has been

consistent.

               The SANE nurse at Rainbow Babies & Children’s Hospital who

examined B.D. also testified. B.D. told her that her father had his “pee-pee in her

butt one time when [she] was seven. He did it in the summer when [she] was seven.”

B.D. stated that “he put this” — while pointing to a penis on the male diagram —

“in this” — pointing to a butt on the female diagram. B.D. described her body as

feeling “weird and wiggly.” B.D. also told her that she did not feel safe with her father

“because he did that to me and I’m never going over there again.” The SANE nurse

also testified that B.D.’s word for “buttocks” were “butt or bootie” and, when they
were going over the terms for different body parts, B.D., unprompted, suddenly said

“he just put it in my butthole.”

               After the state’s case in chief, the trial court granted the state’s

motion to dismiss Count 4 (endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1))

and the furthermore specification in Count 5 (endangering children in violation of

R.C. 2919.22(A)) based on a lack of evidence for serious physical harm.

               The defense did not offer witnesses to testify on Dix’s behalf. The jury

found Dix not guilty of rape, but guilty of attempted rape as well as gross sexual

imposition and endangering children. These counts were merged into Count 2

(attempted rape) for sentencing. Prior to sentencing, Dix addressed the court,

claiming that this criminal case stemmed from a retaliation by B.D.’s mother, who

fabricated the allegation because he reported her drug-abuse problem to the

authorities. Dix was sentenced to a life sentence with the eligibility of parole after

ten years.

               On appeal, Dix raises the following four assignments of error for our

review:

      I. The government’s suggestive statements about Mr. Dix’s silence
      constituted reversible error.

      II. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the government’s suggestive
      comments concerning Mr. Dix’s silence constituted ineffective
      assistance of counsel.

      III. The convictions in this case were obtained upon insufficient
      evidence.
      IV. The convictions in this case were obtained upon insufficient
      evidence against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For ease of discussion, we first review the third and fourth assignments of error and

discuss these claims jointly.

Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

               When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we

review the evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence, if

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),

paragraph two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. A reviewing court is not to assess “whether the state’s evidence is to be believed,

but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a

conviction.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

               Dix was convicted of attempted rape. R.C. 2907.02(A)(1), governing

rape, states, in pertinent part: “(1) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with

another * * * when * * * (b) The other person is less than thirteen years of age * * *.”

“Sexual conduct,” in turn, is defined in R.C. 2907.01(A) as

      vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse,
      fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and,
      without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part
      of the body * * * into the vaginal or anal opening of another.
      Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal
      intercourse.

(Emphasis added.)

               “Sexual conduct” is to be contrasted with “sexual contact” prohibited

under R.C. 2907.04, the gross sexual imposition statute. “Sexual contact” is defined

as “any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the

thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the

purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B).

               Pursuant to the applicable statutes, therefore, to prove “sexual

conduct” in this case, the state is required to present evidence that Dix attempted

“the insertion, however slight” of his penis into the anal opening of B.D.

R.C. 2907.91(A). B.D. testified that while she was trying to go to sleep, Dix pulled

down her underwear and “tried to put [his private] in my butthole.” She testified

that her butt did not hurt but it felt “pushed in.” Her testimony in addition reflects

that Dix stopped the sexual activity when she told him to stop. The account of the

incident was similar to what she provided to the social workers and the SANE nurse.

               Dix argues that there is insufficient evidence for attempted rape

because B.D. testified Dix’s penis felt “soft,” he was not “doing any movement with

it,” and her butt did not hurt. He claims B.D.’s testimony at best described “sexual

contact” prohibited in R.C. 2907.05, the gross sexual conduct statute.

               Our review of B.D.’s testimony indicates that she testified that Dix put

his “pee-pee” in her “butt,” which constitutes evidence of “sexual contact” as defined
in R.C. 2907.01(B). However, B.D. also testified at trial more specifically that Dix

put his “pee-pee” in her butthole (which is consistent with her disclosure to the

SANE nurse), her butt felt “pushed in,” and he stopped only when she asked him to

stop — evidence which, if believed, could constitute evidence that Dix attempted to

insert his penis into B.D.’s anal opening, which is “sexual conduct” as statutorily

defined.

               Dix cites In re D.C., 2018-Ohio-163, 104 N.E.3d 121 (8th Dist.), to

support his claim that there is insufficient evidence for attempted anal rape. The

testimony in D.C. is substantially different from this case. In that case, the 12-year-

old victim alleged that the defendant made the victim insert his own finger into his

own anus. The victim testified that “[h]e held my hand and he held it up to my

bottom, and then * * * [i]nto my bottom.” Id. at ¶ 5. This court reversed the

defendant’s anal rape conviction, determining that there was insufficient evidence

to establish the penetration of the anal opening. This court reasoned that “without

additional context, we cannot conclude that the word ‘bottom’ meant anal opening

as opposed to merely between the cheeks of the victim’s buttocks.”

               The instant case is distinguishable from In re D.C. Dix was not

convicted of rape but attempted rape. The state here was not required to establish

a penetration of the victim’s anal opening but only an attempt to do so. The victim’s

testimony that Dix put his penis in her “butthole” and her butt felt “pushed in” before

she asked Dix to stop constitutes sufficient evidence for attempted anal rape.
               Dix also argues the evidence is insufficient for his conviction of gross

sexual imposition. Dix argues the evidence is insufficient because there was no

testimony to establish that the “sexual contact” was made for the purpose of sexual

arousal or gratification. While the Ohio Revised Code does not define sexual arousal

or sexual gratification, R.C. 2907.01(B) “‘contemplate[s] any touching of the

described areas which a reasonable person would perceive as sexually stimulating

or gratifying.’” State v. Tate, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98221, 2013-Ohio-370, ¶ 18,

quoting State v. Astley, 36 Ohio App.3d 247, 250, 523 N.E.2d 322 (10th Dist.1987).

In proving gross sexual imposition, “‘there is no requirement that there be direct

testimony regarding sexual arousal or gratification.’” Id. at ¶ 19, quoting State v.

Meredith, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2004-06-062, 2005-Ohio-2664. Dix’s claim

regarding his conviction of gross sexual imposition is therefore without merit. His

claim that insufficient evidence supports the endangering children offenses —

predicated on his insufficient-evidence claim regarding the attempted rape and

gross sexual imposition — is similarly without merit.

               Dix also contends that his conviction is against the manifest weight of

the evidence. While the test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the

state has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight challenge questions

whether the state has met its burden of persuasion. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at

390, 678 N.E.2d 541. While “sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to

whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, * * *

weight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.” State v.
Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing

Thompkins at 386-387. When a defendant argues his or her conviction is against

the manifest weight of the evidence, the court,

      “reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
      inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines
      whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its
      way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the
      conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.                The
      discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in
      the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
      conviction.”

Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d

717 (1st Dist.1983). This case hinges on the credibility of B.D., who was ten at the

time of the trial. When assessing the credibility of witnesses, we will keep in mind

that the jurors are “uniquely positioned to view the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures,

facial expressions, and voice inflections.” State v. Hester, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

108207, 2019-Ohio-5341, ¶ 20.

              We recognize that the only evidence for Dix’s conviction is B.D.’s

disclosure about the incident two years later. However, she testified in person at

trial and appeared to have a good recollection of the event, providing details such as

Dix pulled down her underwear, his penis was “hairy” and “soft,” her butt felt

“pushed in” but did not hurt, she had no blood on her and no liquid came out of Dix’s

penis, and she almost fell off the couch when she went to lie down on the couch

where her older brother was sleeping. Her account of the incident was consistent

with what she told the social workers first in her home and later at the Child
Advocacy Center, as well as what she told the SANE nurse when interviewed.

Specially, she stated Dix put his penis in her butthole both at the SANE nurse

interview and at trial.

               Having thoroughly reviewed the trial transcript, weighed the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, and considered the credibility of witnesses, we are

unable to conclude that the jury clearly lost its way in this case and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that Dix’s conviction must be reversed. The third

and fourth assignments of error are without merit.

Alleged Comments on the Defendant’s Silence

                The first and second assignments of error concern Dix’s claims that

the prosecutor made “suggestive” statements about his silence at trial and that his

trial counsel’s failure to object to the comments constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel. We address these claims jointly. Dix claims that the following comments

made by the prosecutor during the closing argument improperly implied that his

silence is evidence of guilt:

      There is no evidence this didn’t happen. There is no evidence [B.D.]
      misinterpreted what happened. There’s been no evidence that
      something else could have happened. * * * The defense voir dire’d on
      misinterpreted actions. Could a child misinterpret something? Not a
      shred of evidence that this was a misinterpretation of what happened.

               It is well established that direct comments on an accused’s failure to

testify violate the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.            Griffin v.

California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), syllabus.

“Prosecutors’ comments on a defendant’s refusal to testify have always been looked
upon with extreme disfavor because they raise an inference of guilt from the

defendant’s decision to remain silent.”        State v. Morton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 109200, 2021-Ohio-581, ¶ 17, citing State v. Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 14, 514

N.E.2d 407 (1987).

                 However, as the Supreme Court of Ohio explained:

         A reference by the prosecutor in closing argument to uncontradicted
         evidence is not a comment on the accused’s failure to testify, where
         the comment is directed to the strength of the state’s evidence and not
         to the silence of the accused, and the jury is instructed not to consider
         the accused’s failure to testify for any purpose.

State v. Ferguson, 5 Ohio St.3d 160, 450 N.E.2d 265 (1983), paragraph one of the

syllabus. See also State v. Jackson, 2023-Ohio-455, 208 N.E.3d 1010 (8th Dist.),

¶ 36; Morton at ¶ 18; State v. Hall, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25794, 2014-Ohio-

2094, ¶ 22; State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89374, 2008-Ohio-1715, ¶ 13;

and State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88371, 2008-Ohio-3657, ¶ 76.

                 Our review of the comments challenged by Dix indicates that the

prosecutor was not making impermissible comments about Dix’s failure to testify

but rather making permissible reference to the uncontradicted evidence presented

by the state. The prosecutor was remarking on the strength of the state’s case, and

furthermore, the jury was properly instructed by the trial court that Dix “has a

constitutional right not to testify. [And] [t]he fact that he did not testify must not to

be considered by you for any purpose whatsoever.” Accordingly, we reject Dix’s

claim that the state’s suggestive comments about his silence constituted reversible

error.
               Dix also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

of counsel in failing to object to the state’s “suggestive” comments. To establish

ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must prove (1) his counsel was

deficient in some aspect of his representation, and (2) there is a reasonable

probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have

been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d

674 (1984). Counsel’s performance will not be deemed ineffective unless the

performance is proven to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable

representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel’s performance. State

v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 105, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001).

               Because, as we have determined, the prosecutor’s remarks were not

improper comments on Dix’s failure to testify, Dix’s trial counsel did not provide

ineffective assistance in failing to object. In any event, we note that “[t]he failure to

object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.” State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831 (1988).

“[T]actical decisions, such as whether and when to object, ordinarily do not give rise

to a claim for ineffective assistance.” State v. Miner, 2020-Ohio-5600, 164 N.E.3d

512, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210, 2006-Ohio-6404,

858 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 139-140. In this case, it is likely that Dix’s counsel may not have

wanted to draw further attention to the prosecutor’s remarks about the

uncontradicted evidence presented by the state. Our review does not reflect that

Dix’s trial counsel was deficient in not objecting to the prosecutor’s comments
during the closing argument. The first and second assignment of error are without

merit.

                 Judgment affirmed.

         It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

         The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

         It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.              The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

         A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR