Court Opinion

ID: 9489083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:05:15.171321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:18.615017
License: Public Domain

*1554BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. My review of the entire record on appeal leads me to conclude that the Board’s factual findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
In my view, there is not substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s and the Board’s finding that Ready Mix engaged in unfair labor practices when it suspended and then discharged employee Teter for repeated violations of safety and work rules. Furthermore, Teter was belligerent and vulgar in the workplace. There is no evidence that the company used Teter’s activities to form a union as a reason for his termination. None of the other drivers came forward to support Teter before the Board.
The Board relied on Teter’s testimony and inferences drawn therefrom to support its order. Ready Mix had some 50 drivers. Teter testified that he had spoken to some 29 of them about the union; however, only one driver, John Novak, turned up at the September 13th organizational meeting and even he did not sign a card indicating an interest in the union. A second meeting was called at the union hall on September 15th. Attending were Teter and a Mr. Fraunenfeld, the union organizer. Only one driver, David Fle-ishman, showed up. No further organization meeting was called. The only possible employee support for the union, other than Tet-er, was that indicated by Novak. Thus, the “activity” involved in this case is exclusively that of Teter. After Teter’s discharge, there were no other attempts made to organize the union.
There were no witnesses that Teter’s discharge had any chilling effect on employees’ attitude toward unions or union activity. There was no evidence of any action taken by the company concerning union activity. The burden of proving that a discharge was unlawfully motivated is upon the Board. “A finding of discrimination by the Board must be supported by substantial evidence; it may not rest upon flimsy evidence, mere inference or guesswork.” N.L.R.B. v. First Nat. Bank of Pueblo, 623 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir.1980). Even if we treat this as a “mixed motive” case, the company has carried its burden of showing that Teter would have been discharged absent any protected union activity. See Miera v. N.L.R.B., 982 F.2d 441, 446 (10th Cir.1992)., cert. granted in part sub nom., ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 508 U.S. 971, 113 S.Ct. 2959, 125 L.Ed.2d 660 (1993), and aff'd, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 835, 127 L.Ed.2d 152 (1994). Certainly, there is no evidence here of any company coercion, threats or restraints. See Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Medical Ctr. v. N.L.R.B., 723 F.2d 1468, 1475 (10th Cir.1983).
The company’s actions taken toward Teter were not a pretext for anything Teter did in relation to union activity. In my opinion, the record supports the conclusion that Teter’s termination was fully justified.
I would set aside and vacate the Board’s order and deny enforcement.