Court Opinion

ID: 9628291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:15:55.199368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:02.836881
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
concurring.
I write separately to emphasize a point which I believe is implicit in footnote 18 of the majority opinion. The point is that the issue in this case is not simply whether there should be review on the record on the one hand or a complete trial de novo on the other. There are various intermediate positions which might better meet the particular requirements of this case.
The norm of judicial review of agency action is that review will be on the record which was developed before the agency and that the standard of review on factual or policy determinations is a deferential one. Under the norm the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, except on questions of law not involving agency expertise. North Slope Borough v. LeResche, 581 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Alaska 1978). This policy is adhered to for reasons of efficiency and because of separation of powers considerations. Of course, the norm of judicial review can be deviated from where circumstances warrant, as they do, for example, where a statute requires some form of expanded review or where the decision maker is biased or where important evidence has been improperly excluded.
*899There are several forms of judicial review beyond the norm. At the extreme is a complete trial de novo where the court substitutes its judgment for that of the agency on matters of fact, law and policy. Where there is a true trial de novo it is as if the agency proceedings had never occurred. A more conservative form of expanded review is review on the record of the evidence developed before the agency where the court makes an independent determination of the facts. As we pointed out in Keiner v. City of Anchorage, 378 P.2d 406, 409 (Alaska 1963) the so-called Ben-Avon doctrine involved just that, although such review was often referred to as a trial de novo. Another intermediate position is to allow augmentation of the record by the presentation of additional evidence before the court. The record as augmented is then reviewed. Augmentation of an administrative record has long been recognized as a technique which can be employed by our superior courts when circumstances warrant. E. g. Keiner, supra; Employers Commercial Union Insurance Group v. Schoen, 519 P.2d 819 (Alaska 1974); AS 44.62.570(d); AS 22.10.020(a).
I think that whenever circumstances justify deviation from the norm of judicial review the assumption should be that the extent of the deviation will be no greater than that required by the circumstances. This is the point implicit in footnote 18 of the majority opinion. Thus if there were a biased fact finder, but no improper limitation on the presentation of evidence the proper course would be to have an independent judicial determination of the facts based on the record. New evidence would not be needed. Likewise, where important evidence has been improperly excluded, augmentation of the record can be accomplished, or, in the alternative, the case might be remanded to the agency for augmentation there. If the record is to be augmented by the court a deferential standard of review should be used if the agency fact finder was not biased; however, if bias exists then the court should exercise its independent judgment on the facts based on the record as augmented. In the absence of a statute or contract provision requiring a trial de novo, it is only where the agency decision maker is biased, or otherwise incompetent to properly decide the case, and where the agency record is so fundamentally flawed as to be considered worthless that a true trial de novo can be justified.