Court Opinion

ID: 9448119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:23:49.252154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:18.073496
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the Government’s testimony of unrelated bribery attempts by the defendant, in one instance eleven months and in the other fourteen or fifteen months, after the bribery attempt charged in the indictment, was admissible. The admission of testimony relating to the subsequent bribery attempts constituted prejudicial error requiring reversal and a new trial.
The indictment in the count relating to bribery, charged that the defendant attempted to bribe one Paul M. Judge “on a day in March, 1953”. The Government, during the trial, adduced testimony that the defendant attempted to bribe one John J. O’Donnell in February, 1954 (11 months after March, 1953) and again “several months” later (14 or 15 months after March, 1953). The majority, it must be noted, treated the subsequent alleged bribery attempts as having been committed “several months” after March, 1953 — the critical period charged in the indictment.
In United States v. Stirone, 3 Cir., 1959, 262 F.2d 571, 576,1 we expressed *834our agreement with “the general rule * * * that evidence of other offenses is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution for a particular crime”, except “to prove some specific fact or issue such as intent, plan, scheme or design”, and further stated:
“Evidence of other offenses may be received if relevant for any other purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority holds that the evidence of bribery attempts “tended to show defendant’s intent” and that “It also tended to show a pattern of a type familiar in some decisions involving adultery”. Here, however, the defendant’s “intent” was not placed in issue in this case since he denied, lock, stock and barrel, that he had attempted to bribe Judge in March, 1953, and thus the evidence of the subsequent bribery attempts was not “relevant” to establish “intent”. The sole purpose of the Government’s testimony then was “to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to ' commit the crime [attempted bribery]” and it comes squarely within the interdiction stated in Stirone.
In Stirone, it must be noted, the crime charged was extortion and the defendant had put “intent” at issue; there the defendant admitted having received money but said it was in the course of a business transaction with the one who paid it but denied any intent to “extort”. Under these facts we held that evidence was admissible, on rebuttal, to show that the defendant had attempted to extort money from another person under the same kind of threat (of reprisals) one month after he had received the money figuring in his indictment.
Similarly, in United States v. Prince, 3 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 850, cited by the majority, we held admissible, on the authority of Stirone, evidence that the defendant had figured in another transaction relating to the sale of narcotics with the same federal narcotics agent eighteen days after the narcotics offense charged in his indictment. A period of eighteen days is one thing; eleven to fifteen months is another.
In Waller v. United States, 9 Cir., 1949, 177 F.2d 171, cited by the majority, the defendant was charged with converting potatoes belonging to the Commodity Credit Corporation to his own use on August 22-25, 1948. Evidence of similar conduct on August 25, 1948 was held to be admissible, the Court stating (at page 175):
“Under familiar principles, relevant evidence of other offenses or acts, if similar and not too remote, may be admissible on the issue of fraudulent intent, if such intent is a constituent and disputed element of the crime * * * charged.” (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier stated, intent was not at issue in this case, and again, the second act charged was virtually simultaneous with that embraced in the indictment.
In United States v. Alker, 3 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 135, certiorari denied 1959, 359 U.S. 906, 79 S.Ct. 579, 3 L.Ed.2d 571, cited by the majority, evidence that defendant, in filing his income tax return for 1947, had falsely stated that he had filed a return for 1946, when in fact he had not, was held admissible. Alker was indicted for willful evasion of income tax for 1947 and subsequent years. Alker is inapposite. First, the misstatement was a part of the 1947 tax return concerned in the indictment. Second, the misstatement was also relevant as an element of the crime charged: willfulness ; even so, we said that Alker’s failure to file a return for 1946 could not be used to show willfulness in 1947 but could only show that Alker lied in 1947 when he said that he had filed in 1946. Thus the falsity which the government was allowed to show was concurrent with the crime charged, not 11 and 15 months subsequent.
The “decisions involving adultery”, referred to by the majority are inapposite here, as their content discloses.
For the reasons stated I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to grant a new trial.

. Reversed on other grounds, 1960, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252.