Court Opinion

ID: 9749123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:24:33.382133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:31.399801
License: Public Domain

*462Daley, J.,
dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority .in its holding that a prior conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, as in the case here, may be admitted in evidence to affect the credibility of a criminal defendant only upon a discretionary ruling by the trial court employing the balancing test set forth in the opinion. The competency of a witness who has been convicted of a crime, as well as impeachment of those witnesses, are matters which the General Assembly has settled in 12 V.S.A. § 1608 and its predecessor statutes. State v. Manning, 136 Vt. 436, 392 A.2d 409 (1978), correctly interpreted the statutory law of this state and the intent of the Legislature, which is to permit the convictions of prior crimes as set forth in 12 V.S.A. § 1608 to be admitted for impeachment as a matter of legal right. This option rests in the defendant as well as the State. The trial court has no discretion whatsoever under § 1608.
In arriving at the result reached, the Court has stretched the rigging to adopt a rule of judicial decision in the face of clear legislative intent expressed in the statute. For over a century the General Assembly has followed its traditional role of enacting statutes governing the competency of witnesses in criminal and civil cases. See 12 V.S.A. ch. 61, subch. 1.
When the Legislature passed § 1608’s first predecessor in 1851, the common law made a person convicted of a crime incompetent to testify as a witness. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 519 (3d ed. 1940). The new statute changed that rule, allowing persons convicted of a crime to testify as a witness, except those convicted for the crimes of perjury, subornation of perjury, or endeavoring to incite or procure another to commit the crime of perjury. 1851, No. 12, § 2. The new act also provided, however, that “the conviction of a witness . . . of any crime involving moral turpitude, may be given in evidence to affect the credibility of such witness.” Id. Apparently, the Legislature wanted to offset the convicted criminal’s new right to testify with the right to use evidence of his conviction to impeach him.
This Court interpreted the statute and its successors as making “it a matter of legal right to attack the credibility of a witness by showing by independent evidence that he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude:” Mc*463Govern v. Hays, 75 Vt. 104, 108, 53 A. 326, 327 (1902). This Court also interpreted the statute to allow impeachment via crimes other than those involving moral turpitude at the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Jacques, 121 Vt. 129, 131, 149 A.2d 358, 359 (1959); Underwood, v. Cray, 94 Vt. 58, 60-61, 108 A. 513, 514 (1920).
In the face of those interpretations, the General Assembly amended the statute in 1959 to provide:
The conviction óf a crime involving moral turpitude within fifteen years shall be the only crime admissible in evidence given to affect the credibility of a witness.
1959, No. 250 (emphasis added). Through the amendment, the General Assembly prohibited the use of crimes, except those involving moral turpitude, for impeachment purposes. This Court recognized the change in State v. Russ, 122 Vt. 236, 167 A.2d 528 (1961).
Presumably, the General Assembly knew when it amended the statute that it had been interpreted by this Court to allow, as a matter of right, impeachment of witnesses by using convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude. If the Legislature had intended that prior convictions under § 1608 would be admissible to affect the credibility of a witness only upon a discretionary ruling by the trial judge, it could have so stated. It did not. The portion of the statute set out in the opinion in this case is clear, plain and unambiguous, reflecting long standing traditional legislative policy not uncommon in other states. See State v. O’Brien, 412 A.2d 231 (R.1.1980); State v. Ruzicka, 89 Wash. 2d 217, 570 P.2d 1208 (1977). The Legislature has never given any indication of an intent to leave the admission or exclusion of such evidence to the discretion of the trial court.
My reading of § 1608 requires me to reach the second issue which the defendant raises, .that is, whether allowing the State to admit prior convictions for purposes of impeachment as a matter of right denies the defendant his constitutional right to testify before an impartial jury. I agree with the holding of the Washington Supreme Court that it does not. State v. Ruzicka, supra, 89 Wash. 2d at 233-34, 570 P.2d at 1216-17. Certainly, if unconstitutionally obtained confessions *464may be used for impeachment purposes, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), I see no reason why prior convictions may not be used for impeachment purposes. See also State v. Kelley, 120 N.H. 14, 413 A.2d 300 (1980); State v. O’Brien, supra, 412 A.2d at 234-35. The jury can be properly instructed to use the evidence only to test the witness’s credibility, and this instruction should safeguard the defendant’s rights.
The majority of the Court, in the face of statutory law silent upon the premise and the history of that statute, has now invaded the province of the Legislature by adopting a doctrine espoused by distinguished legal text writers for several years. This doctrine, it is true, has received favor in several other state jurisdictions. It has been adopted, in part, by Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, although I do not believe Rule 609(a) goes as far as the decisional rule in this case. The majority seems to have been imbued with a drive to further protect the rights of defendants in criminal cases. Salutary as that may be, this Court is not empowered to amend statutory law by a construction which inserts a judicial power not provided by the Legislature.
In my opinion, if a change in the statutory law of impeachment is needed, then the Court should have promulgated a proposed judicial rule for submission to the consideration of the General Assembly. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.