Court Opinion

ID: 9643866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:42:09.592578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:04.772245
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
McCORMICK, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of felony theft, enhanced by two prior felony convictions, including a 1963 Palo Pinto County conviction. The State introduced pen packets and fingerprint identification testimony to prove the prior convictions. At the time of their introduction, the defendant specifically stated that he had no objection to the pen packets. When the pen packets were introduced appellant did not contend that he was without counsel at the time of his 1963 Palo Pinto County conviction.
Following his conviction,.appellant initiated an Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P., habeas corpus proceeding, claiming that he was indigent and without counsel at the time of his 1963 Palo Pinto conviction. Simultaneously, on appeal in this case, he contends that the use of the 1963 conviction to enhance this conviction renders this conviction defective and, therefore, asks that this conviction be set aside.
The trial court, pursuant to its powers under Article 11.07, supra, found that appellant was indigent and without representation at the time of his 1963 conviction which was used for enhancement. The panel hearing this case, therefore, set aside the 1963 conviction pursuant to the writ and then reversed this case on direct appeal because it utilized the set-aside conviction for enhancement.
It has long been held that a failure to lodge a timely objection to evidence offered during trial precludes a defendant from later complaining, even if the alleged error were of constitutional dimension. See Gibson v. State, 516 S.W.2d 406 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and the cases cited there. See also Shumake v. State, 502 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Ex parte Bagley, 509 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
The original opinion in this case cited Smith v. State, 486 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), as authority for allowing a defendant simultaneously to attack the prior conviction on habeas corpus and then attack the conviction on appeal because an invalid conviction was used for enhancement. The other cases cited in the original panel opinion are inapposite. Ex parte Nivens, 619 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), and Ex parte Howeth, 609 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), both deal with instances in which the underlying conviction was based upon void charging instruments. We need not here address the correctness of those decisions. In Bolton v. State, 619 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), a proper and timely objection was made to the introduction of the evidence of the prior conviction on the ground that appellant had been denied counsel.
It is apparent that this Court went outside the appellate record on appeal in Smith v. State, supra, and considered the writ application concommitant with the appeal because there was a belief that, if the case were affirmed on the basis of the appellate record, the defendant could successfully challenge the conviction by writ, claiming that the conviction used to enhance was invalid.
*524However, after Smith, this Court has made clear that a defendant may not collaterally attack a conviction on the basis that the defendant was without representation at a prior conviction used to enhance the conviction under attack if he did not so object at trial.
Ex parte Reed, 610 S.W.2d 495 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), was a case in which the petitioner attacked his conviction for assault with intent to murder on the ground that the prior convictions used to enhance the felony assault charge was invalid.
This Court, speaking through Presiding Judge Onion, stated:
“With regard to the claim that the allegedly void prior convictions were introduced at his 1972 trial under Article 37.07, supra [V.A.C.C.P.], as part of petitioner’s prior criminal record, we observe that there was no objection to the introduction of the evidence of the prior convictions at the time the exhibits were offered. Therefore, he waived any claim he may now assert to the 1972 conviction. McDonald v. State, 513 S.W.2d 44, 52 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).” 610 S.W.2d at 497.
See Ex parte Sanders, 588 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). In that case, the defendant was convicted of robbery and the punishment was enhanced by proof of a prior felony conviction. On habeas, the defendant challenged the validity of the robbery conviction by contending that the conviction used to enhance was invalid because he had been denied an attorney. The Court held that failure to object at the trial on such ground barred the defendant from later complaining that the conviction was unconstitutional.
This rule has been recognized and approved by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Nichols v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1330, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 744, 54 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978), a petitioner complained that Texas had used an invalid conviction to enhance his punishment. The Fifth Circuit said:
“But petitioner’s counsel failed to object to the admission of the Oklahoma conviction on the ground that counsel had not been provided on appeal. This failure worked a waiver of the constitutional error complained of here.” 556 F.2d at 1331.
See also Loud v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977).
That Smith has not been followed can be seen by examining other Texas cases. See Loud v. State, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); McDonald v. State, 513 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Garcia v. State, 541 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Boss v. State, 489 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Ex parte Gill, 509 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
Ex parte Gill, supra, resulted in Gill v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1976), opinion on petition for rehearing, Gill v. Estelle, 544 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 2199, 53 L.Ed.2d 239 (1977). The Fifth Circuit abandoned its Gill v. Estelle holding after Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977); see McDonald v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.1976), vacated 433 U.S. 904, 97 S.Ct. 2967, 53 L.Ed.2d 1088 (1977), on remand 564 F.2d 199 (1977), and Loud v. Estelle, supra, at fn. 12, p. 1330. In McDonald v. Estelle, supra, the Fifth Circuit had originally granted relief on the basis that an uncounseled conviction was introduced during the punishment phase of the trial, even though petitioner had not objected to the introduction. The Supreme Court thereafter vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Wainwright v. Sykes, supra. As noted above, the Fifth Circuit thereafter altered its view of the effect of a failure to object.
The State has a valid interest in requiring an objection and precluding the defendant from later complaining if no contemporaneous objection was lodged. Some of the reasons for having a contemporaneous objection rule are set out in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, 433 U.S. at 88, 91, 97 S.Ct. at 2507, 2508, 53 L.Ed.2d at 609, 610, not the least of which is that it serves as “a major contribution to finality in criminal litigation.” Allowing attacks on recent convictions on the basis of defects in a conviction *525obtained twenty years ago, when an objection could have been raised at trial, serves, not justice, but mere perserverance. This overburdens the courts and tends to lower the quality of justice dispensed by the courts.
One can imagine how the original panel opinion would encourage the “sandbagging” denounced in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra. During the punishment phase of a trial a defendant would be foolish to attack a prior conviction offered by the State if he could wait a month, attack the prior conviction collaterally, and suddenly be entitled to a complete new trial, including a new attempt at a not guilty verdict. Likewise, defense counsel would have no incentive to even inquire into the validity of the prior conviction at trial.
Therefore, we hold that the failure to object at trial to the introduction of proof of a allegedly infirm prior conviction precludes a defendant from thereafter attacking a conviction that utilized the prior conviction. If an objection is timely lodged on proper grounds, the trial court can finally determine, at trial, whether the prior conviction was permissibly obtained and whether it is admissible as evidence. To the extent that this holding conflicts with Smith v. State, supra, Smith is overruled.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment is affirmed.
ONION, P. J.,- and TEAGUE, J., dissent.