Court Opinion

ID: 9774191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:11:00.198609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:01.645570
License: Public Domain

Burnett, Justice
(dissenting).
I most respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. This opinion holds that it is reversible error for the trial judge to fail to charge the law with reference to circumstantial evidence when the conviction depends on such evidence entirely and the plaintiff in error and his counsel have sat idly by and have not requested the Court to so charge at the conclusion of the general charge of the Court. The Court in the instant case in reaching this conclusion relies upon our opinion in Webb v. State, 140 Tenn. 205, 203 S. W. 955, 15 A. L. R. 1034, as its authority for so holding.
The Court in the Webb case, supra, made no mention of Code Section, Bobbs-Merrill Code, Section 40-2517 or Williams ’ Annotated Code 11750. This section of the Code clearly provides and makes it imperative that “attorneys on either side desire further instructions given to the jury, they shall write precisely what they desire the judge to say further. ’ ’ I think that the provision of this statute is valid and imperative and not merely directory, and must be observed. Newman v. State, 65 Tenn. 164; State v. Becton, 66 Tenn. 138; Duncan v. State, 66 Tenn. 387; State v. Missio, 105 Tenn. 218, 58 S. W. 216; Humphreys v. State, 166 Tenn. 523, 64 S. W. (2d) 5. All of these cases hold that the preceding section of the Code, that is, Williams’ Annotated Code 11749, Bobbs-Merrill 40-2516, are imperative and not directory. The Becton case, as very fully quoted from in the majority opinion herein, holds that the section of the Code, 40'-2517 or 11750, re*435quiring attorneys to Submit a special request in writing is likewise imperative. It seems to me that either section, that is, 11749 or 11750 Williams’ Annotated Code, 40-2516 and 40-2517 of the Code of 1950 (Bobbs-Merrill) are likewise imperative and' that when -a ease is tried and a lawyer sits idly by and does not make an application for the law with reference to circumstantial evidence to be charged that he necessarily waives the matter.
In 23 C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1325, p. 952 it is said:
“It is not error, or at least not reversible error, to fail to give, without request therefor, an instruction on the subject of circumstantial evidence, [citing cases of the United States District Court, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma and our ease of Turner v. State, 171 Tenn. 36, 100 S. W. 2d 236, Texas and Wyoming] unless the prosecution relies exclusively on such evidence for a conviction [citing cases from Georgia and our Webb case, supra, Wyoming as supporting this last rule], and not even in that case, according to some authorities. ” (Citing cases from Kansas and Oklahoma.)
It is up to the Legislative branch of our government to make the law and when the Legislature has enacted a statute the statute is presumed to be good until it is challenged and it is found that it is.contrary or violative of the intent and meaning of our Constitution. The judicial branch of the government declares the law and has the power in a proper proceeding to .declare the statute or Act of the Legislature unconstitutional because the Constitution is a superior law. Therefore if this statute requiring the lawyers or the representatives of the plaintiff in error to make these, special requests in writing is not unconstitutional then it is up to us to enforce this *436statute, Code 11750 or 40-2517. Frankly I see no good reason why we should not do it. The Legislature in enacting the statute made no exception in case of circumstantial evidence or anything else. The statute has been the law for eighty-two (82) years.
Regardless of this statute, in which I feel that we are compelled to follow, it is nothing but fair that before a trial court may be required to give general instructions or is put in error in instructions that are given that the party complaining should notify the trial court as required by this statute and should assist the court (counsel for the party are officers of the court) in the function of instructing the jury. It seems to me that,
“It is an established general rule that when a party is of the opinion that the instructions given by the court are not explicit enough upon certain points or do not cover all phases of the case, he should call the attention of the court to that fact, and tender other and fuller instructions or request the court to give such further instructions as he desires *' * *”
53 Am. Jur., p. 414.
It seems to me that the statute, Williams’ Code, Sec. 11750, Bobbs-Merrill, Sec. 40-2517, means what it says and should be followed, that is, that a duty rests on counsel for the defendant to aid, and not to ambush, the court, and consequently instructions should be requested covering the matter of circumstantial evidence and its meaning in this particular case. This statute applies and prescribes a rule of criminal procedure the benefits of which a defendant may waive, and which he does waive if he does not comply with this statute. Certainly it is counsel’s duty representing a plaintiff in error to aid, and not to ambush, the court. In the instant case no request was made *437for an instruction in respect to circnmstantial evidence. In fact, no instruction of any kind was requested by the defendant. It is in this particular that I disagree with the otherwise very able and excellently reasoned opinion.