Court Opinion

ID: 9528273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:39:09.061179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:15.277101
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Sullivan, J.
I believe the Indiana Supreme Court opinion in Carlton v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1969), 252 Ind. 56, 245 N. E. 2d 337, requires a result contrary to that reached by the majority opinion. To this extent, therefore, I agree with Judge White’s dissent.
I cannot, however, subscribe to Judge White’s desire to resurrect Inland Steel Co. v. Lambert (1917), 66 Ind. App. 246, 118 N. E. 162, which decision was overruled by Empire Health, etc. Ins. Co. v. Purcell (1921), 76 Ind. App. 551, 132 N. E. 664. In my view, the holding that a finding of “an accident arising out of and in the course of employment” is a finding of ultimate fact, not a conclusion of law, as contained in the latter case, remains cogent, logical and practical.1
*89In Judge White’s view the Carlton case, swpra, requires that the Empire Health decision be overruled and that the Inland Steel precedent be reinstated. His premise, as stated, necessarily depends upon language from Wabash Valley Coach Co. v. Arrow Coach Lines (1950), 228 Ind. 609, 94 N. E. 2d 753, as quoted in the Carlton case and in Footnote 10 .of Judge White’s dissent herein.
I sincerely believe that my learned brother confuses the “conclusion of law” dealt with in the Wabash Valley Coach case with the conclusion of ultimate fact dealt with in the Carlton case.2
*90To be sure, both such conclusions standing alone were insufficient to permit adequate judicial review. Carlton stands for the proposition that neither conclusions of law standing alone, nor conclusions of ultimate fact standing alone will support awards or decisions of quasi-judicial administrative agencies.
In the opinion of this writer this is the only significance which can be read into Carlton’s citation of and reliance upon Wabash Valley Coach Co., supra.
Judge White further, states that reversal of the board’s award is required because conflicts in the evidence make it impossible to “assume that the board found sub silentio, the ultimate facts necessary to support its conclusion.” The latter statement assumes that the Inland Steel case is correct to the extent that a finding of “an accident arising out of and in the course of employment” is a conclusion of law. If, however, as I believe, such finding is one of ultimate fact the Carlton case becomes operative only insofar as it requires detailed findings of fact to support the ultimate fact. I believe the Carlton decision is operative only in this respect. This, therefore, constitutes the substance of and basis for my dissent.
The majority opinion does not apply, distinguish or refer to the Carlton case. It holds, however, that “the findings made are sufficient and are the only findings required by the [Workmen’s Compensation] Act.” To be sure, the zoning statute *91which was involved in the Carlton determination, being Indiana Acts 1955, ch. 283, § 69, as amended, as found in Indiana Annotated Statutes § 53-969 (Burns’ Repl. 1964), specifically requires additional “detailed” findings to support the finding of the five statutory ultimate facts, i.e., “determinations.” No such statutory requirement is here involved. The unmistakable and unambiguous language of the Carlton case, however, clearly requires such additional detailed findings exclusive of statute in order to assure adequate and hopefully intelligent judicial review. It makes little difference to the adequacy of judicial review whether the particular agency whose determination is under examination is a zoning board, and employment security review board, an industrial board or a public service commission.
I wholly fail to understand the majority’s failure to apply the Carlton case. If, as required by that decision, detailed findings are necessary in order to permit full and adequate judicial review of zoning determinations such detailed findings are equally desirable and essential to a review of the determinations of other administrative agencies. The directory language of the Carlton case is not only clear, unambiguous and unmistakable, but is logical and consistent with its result and the reasoning contained therein.
I would, therefore, reverse and remand the cause to the Industrial Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this dissent.
Note. — Reported in 252 N. E. 2d 612.

. An excellent definition of “ultimate fact” was made by the Ohio Court of Appeals in Scott v. Cismadi (1947 Ohio), 74 N. E. 2d 563:
“Ultimate facts lie in the area between evidence and a conclusion of law. They are the essential and determining' facts on which *89the final conclusion of law is predicated. They are deduced by inference from evidentiary facts, which can be directly established by testimony or evidence.”
This court has recognized that the distinction between ultimate facts and conclusions of law is not always clear. See Oliver v. Coffman (1942), 112 Ind. App. 507, 45 N. E. 2d 351. However, in Guevara v. Inland Steel Co. (1951), 121 Ind. App. 390, at pages 396-97, 95 N. E. 2d 714, the following analysis was made:
“* * * It has been said that an ultimate fact is the final or resultant fact that has been reached hy the process of logical reasoning from the detail of probative fact. 41 American • Jurisprudence, Pleading, §7, p. 292; Oliver v. Coffman (1942), 112 Ind. App. 507, 45 N. E. 2d 351; Ultimate facts are determined as a result of an inferential process; the evidentiary facts are the premises and the ultimate facts the conclusions. Therefore, an ultimate fact may be determined as a result of a natural connection of one fact with others by a process of reasoning. A conclusion of law differs in that it is made by attaching a rule of law or legal incident to a particular fact proved. It is the process by which the result is attained which is determinative of the distinction in the particular case. An act or circumstance is none the less a fact merely because it may also be reached or considered as a conclusion of law. Levins v. Rovegno (1886), 71 Calif. 273, 12 Pac. 161; Blake v. Gunderson (1923), 46 S. Dak. 642, 195 N. W. 653.”

. In Wabash Valley Coach Co. v. Arrow Coach Lines, supra, the court quite succinctly stated that it was considering a conclusion of law as follows: •
“The finding upon which the order herein sought to be vacated is based, as above set out, recites only that the application is granted, and that a certificate of public convenience and necessity be issued to Arrow Coach Lines, Inc.; and there are no findings of fact set out in the order upon which an order for a certificate of public convenience and necessity could be based. Kosciusko County, etc. v. Public Service Comm. (1948), 225 Ind. 666, 77 N. E. 2d 572. The finding that a certificate of public convenience and necessity should be granted is simply a conclusion 'from all the evidence without any special finding of fact upon which the conclusion can be reached. *90The Public Service Commission should find the ultimate facts specifically and not generally. The findings of fact must be specific enough to enable the court to review intelligently the Commission’s decision. Kosciusko County, etc. v. Public Service Comm., supra.” (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the mere fact that the Carlton opinion does not specifically label the five requisite statutory zoning determinations as “ultimate facts” does not, in my opinion, change or affect the nature and character of such determinations. They are what they are — findings of ultimate fact.
And like Carlton, Kosciusko Co. etc. v. Public Service Comm. (1948), 225 Ind. 666, 77 N. E. 2d 572, cited therein concerns a conclusion of ultimate fact.