Court Opinion

ID: 9546277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:26:44.379171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:13.163623
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
The well-reasoned dissent of the Chief Justice reaches a conclusion consistent with the duty of a democratic society to protect malpractice victims and to refrain from creating specially favored economic insulation for those who commit malpractice.
I part company with the Chief Justice only in regard to the equal protection test employed. The case before us is a paradigm demonstrating the impracticality of either the strict scrutiny or the rational relationship test. My colleagues persist in denying the existence of an intermediate test, and cling to the inflexible two-tier rule with a tenacity that suggests it originated with the Delphic oracle. Yet an intermediate test of equal protection has *179received frequent approval from many reputable sources. (See the numerous authorities cited in my separate opinion in Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 595-603 [150 Cal.Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916].)
Now an intermediate test has been adopted by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in one of the most persuasive opinions in the country invalidating legislative provisions comparable to MICRA in California. In Carson v. Maurer (1980) 120 N.H. 925 [424 A.2d 825, 831, 12 A.L.R.4th 1], the court held that in determining the validity of MICRA-type legislation, “the test is whether the challenged classifications are reasonable and have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. [Citations.] Whether the malpractice statute can be justified as a reasonable measure in furtherance of the public interest depends upon whether the restriction of private rights sought to be imposed is not so serious that it outweighs the benefits sought to be conferred upon the general public.”
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded that the act “arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminates in favor of the class of health care providers. Although the statute may promote the legislative objective of containing health care costs, the potential cost to the general public and the actual cost to many medical malpractice plaintiffs is simply too high.” (Id. at p. 836.)
Once again we have an opportunity to employ a test carefully crafted to avoid the rigid extremes of the anachronistic two-tier test of equal protection. As I wrote in Hawkins, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 595, “the ultimate acceptance of an intermediate test is foreordained in Supreme Court opinions: the question is not whether, but when, the third test will become standard. I regret that our court has failed to forthrightly assume leadership among the states on this important question of constitutional law.”
The petition of plaintiff and appellant for a rehearing was denied April 4, 1985. Bird, C. J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.