Court Opinion

ID: 9854660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:11:10.509558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:12.397726
License: Public Domain

McGRAW, Chief Justice,
concurring:
The controversy in the present case superficially concerns whether the charge levied by the City of Fairmont for fire protection is a fee or a property tax. In reality, however, the larger question is whether the Court should label such charges “fees” in order to avoid the constitutional restrictions placed by the people on the imposition of property taxes.
Any analysis of the relationship between state or local government and its citizenry in West Virginia must begin with art. II, § 2 of the West Virginia Constitution, which provides, “The powers of government reside in all the citizens of the State, and can be rightfully exercised only in accordance with their will and appointment.” In State ex rel. Skinner v. Dostert, 166 W.Va. 743, 278 S.E.2d 624, 629 (1981), the Court discussed the important historical shift in the theory of government which was precipitated by the great American experiment in democracy: “The American constitutional system, under which West Virginia’s government is organized, W.Va. Const, art. 1, § 1, changed substantially the operative theory of sovereignty and identified the sovereign, whose will legitimizes authority, as the people.”
In exercising that sovereign authority, the people of West Virginia, through the Tax Limitation Amendment of 1932, W.Va. Const, art. X, § 1, acted to confine government spending within what was perceived to be reasonable limits. Although there existed a strong belief that essential governmental services should still be provided, the will of the people was that services should be sacrificed when governmental expenditures reached a certain level deemed intolerable. The challenge for government became to provide essential services within these constitutionally mandated limits. Essential local governmental services included provision for the public safety and general welfare — police and fire protection; waste disposal — solid and liquid; and streets. The mandate of the people was that these essential services should be provided first, with other types of nonessential services being provided only if surplus revenues were available. This required that priorities be established to ensure that essential services be provided at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer.
Government, however, failed to rise to the occasion and sought to avoid its constitutional responsibilities. The strategy which evolved was to utilize tax dollars properly meant for the provision of essential services to fund nonessential services. Commenting upon this expansion in local government, one leading authority has noted,
The rapid development of community service and the steady expansion of municipal functions ... has rendered the equitable raising and distribution of funds for public purposes of prime importance. The financial problem ... is among the most serious. As the activities of the city grow the cost of municipal service rapidly advances. Many things essential to urban life, which were formerly in private hands, are now being gradually socialized, and as a result are becoming customary municipal functions. City expenditures expand far beyond the increase of the community in wealth and population .... Continuously increasing pressure for more and better community service ... and the increase of city officers and servants and bureaucratic complications entailed by it, have involved great and increasingly greater expenditures. Hence fresh sources of revenue must be found.
E. McQUILLEN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39.02 at 3-4 (1970).
After diverting tax revenues into these new areas of governmental endeavor, government began charging its citizenry “fees” for the provision of traditional essential services. By attempting to call a spade a shovel, political leaders, pressed by the demands of diverse constituency groups within local governmental entities, have sought to avoid the will of the people *516that the growth of government be limited. Ironically, it was many of these same political leaders who helped spur passage of the Property Tax Limitation [Amendment] of 1982, W.Va. Const, art. X, § lb, which further constrained the ability of local governments in West Virginia to raise revenue. To wiggle off the sharp hook which they have fashioned for themselves, these political leaders now turn to the Court and ask it to label a “tax” a “fee.”
Engaging in this type of subterfuge and sophistry is nothing new to West Virginia where avoiding limitations on revenue-raising ability is concerned. In Bee v. City of Huntington, 114 W.Va. 40, 171 S.E. 539 (1933), local governmental leaders argued that the Tax Limitation Amendment of 1932 only limited the level of taxes levied to current expenses and did not prevent the levying of taxes necessary to meet existing indebtedness even if it meant that total taxes levied would be in excess of the constitutional maximum. Judge Kenna, in a concurring opinion, identified the practical problem facing the Court:
On the one hand, it is urged that we are faced by the possibility of a breakdown of local government in a large number of the taxing units throughout the state through lack of money realized from taxation to provide for their essential functions, and, on the other hand, that the sovereign will of the people, expressed by them in the very instrument to which these taxing units owe their existence, will be thwarted in a matter of vital importance.
114 W.Va. at 50, 171 S.E. at 544.
The majority in Bee correctly identified the Court’s duty in addressing this problematic issue as “ ‘the humble one of construing the constitution by the language it contains.’ ” 114 W.Va. at 46-47, 171 S.E. at 542, quoting, People v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532, 546 (1857). The Court noted the spuriousness of the argument advanced by the local governments involved: “It is argued ... that the limitation should be ignored in levying taxes necessary for orderly government, which would mean that a limitation of levies for the operation of government cannot be effected even by constitutional proclamation. This position ... is without legal basis.” 114 W.Va. at 47, 171 S.E. at 543.
The Court in Bee quoted language used by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in French v. Board of Commissioners, 74 N.C. 692, 696-97 (1876), which when faced with a similar problem stated,
If what are often miscalled the “necessary expenses” of a county exceed the limitation prescribed by law, the necessity cannot justify the violation of the Constitution.... The old proverb, “cut the garment according to the cloth,” has in it much practical wisdom. It is illustrated every day in private life, and is the foundation of individual integrity, contentment and success. (Court’s emphasis).
114 W.Va. at 48, 171 S.E. at 543. Therefore, the Bee Court held that the limitations on assessments prescribed by the Tax Limitation Amendment of 1932 embraced levies for all purposes, including previous bonded debts, and that the various fiscal bodies throughout the state were required to provide for the current requirements of existing contractual obligations before levying for current governmental expenses. Syllabus Point 1, Bee, supra.
As the Court stated in Bee, “The theory of organized society rests in the assumption that the community is capable of self-government.” 114 W.Va. at 49, 171 S.E. at 544. Self-governance, however, can be severely crippled by misguided leadership. Taxation is a necessary prerequisite for the provision of essential services by government. Without revenue, services cannot be provided. Manipulation of labels in order to allow government to raise revenue is a deceitful exercise in which this Court must not engage. If the political leadership insists on capping available revenue through such devices as the Property Tax Limitation [Amendment] of 1982, then they must live with their decision and not expect the Court to bail them out by circumventing constitutional provisions.
An examination of the dissident opinion in the present case reveals a pretense to *517engage in such circumvention because of the underlying social purpose of the fire protection charge and the consequences of labeling it a property tax. While making a stare decisis argument, the primary theme is that the fire protection charge is a fee rather than a property tax. This simplistic rationale is that while police protection is designed to safeguard the person and not the property, thereby making a charge based on property values a tax, fire protection is designed to safeguard property, thereby justifying basing the amount charged on property value. This proposition ignores the fact that most crimes are committed against property, and that fire protection is designed to prevent injury to human beings as well as damage to property.
Our dissident also discloses a more practical reason for his strained analysis. He believes that the Fairmont charge is a rational basis for charging citizens for fire protection and that eliminating this method will make municipal budgeting more difficult. No one would disagree with either of those assertions. However, that is not the question presented to the Court.
Property tax limitation is a fundamental part of our state constitution. Any attempt to avoid its full force and effect is not only unconstitutional, but is an affront to the very integrity of our government and our people. The City’s cry and our dissident’s cry is one of “necessity.” Our state’s founders, however, anticipating that such pleas of necessity could be used by a few to fatally undermine the constitutional foundations of our government, provided that,
The provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and of this State, are operative alike in a period of war as in time of peace, and any departure therefrom, or violation thereof, under the plea of necessity, or any other plea, is subversive of good government, and tends to anarchy and despotism.
West Virginia Constitution, art. I, § 3 (emphasis added). Save for our lone dissident, this Court refuses to stray from the wise course chartered by our founding fathers over a century ago and to avoid the plain language of our constitution under a “plea of necessity.” Integrity in judges and courts is measured by firm allegiance to the language of the people as communicated through the constitution and popular referenda. The majority has vindicated the integrity of the Court.
Political leaders at the local level have made for themselves a bed in which they find it uncomfortable to lie. For example, in 1982, the West Virginia Municipal League, a quasi-public organization funded by tax dollars, W.Va.Code § 8-12-6 (1976), passed “A Resolution To Authorize A Proposed Amendment To The West Virginia Constitution, Property Tax Limitation and Homestead Exemption Amendment of 1982,” which, in part, resulted in the subsequent amendment placing further limitations on the property tax as a source of local government revenue. West Virginia Municipal League, Resolutions and Policy at 2 (August 24, 1982). Ironically, One year later, five of their twenty-one resolutions proposed increases in taxation to increase local governmental revenues. See West Virginia Municipal League, Resolutions and Policy, Resolutions 8, 10, 12, 14 and 19 (August 16, 1983). In fact, in the present action, the West Virginia Municipal League filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the City of Fairmont certified by the Clerk of this Court as weighing one and three-eights pounds — some friend. The primary thrust of its brief distinguishing the instant case from Hare v. City of Wheeling, 171 W.Va. 284, 298 S.E.2d 820 (1982), is that fire service fees are different from police service fees because fire fees go to support firemen, while police service fees go to support policemen. Though this proposition is difficult to reject, it provides little solace, as well as little assistance in the resolution of the legal issue before the Court.
The people have imposed strict taxing limits on the power of government to impose property taxes. It does not matter that the property tax is a rational method of charging for fire protection or that municipal budgeting will be more difficult.
*518The people, guided by their elected leaders, have clearly communicated their priorities. They have instructed government leaders that they must devise new financing methods which do not include increases in property tax. That is the task to which such leaders must devote themselves.
Furthermore, it is not the job of the judiciary to suggest alternative forms of taxation to those found to be unconstitutional, and our dissident’s suggestion to the contrary smacks of apologia. But if we must provide leadership, let us proceed with enlightened wisdom, not political rhe-troic. The lesson to be learned from this case is that taxes upon real property which exceed the limits imposed by the Tax Limitation Amendment of 1932 are not valid. An approach which should work, if properly developed by capable legal minds or a legislative adjustment to the Code, would be one in which municipalities are empowered to levy a tax upon the total insurance coverage of all fire insurance policies sold within their corporate limits. This solution could easily be integrated into our existing tax structure. Such a methodology would be progressive and would tax those who most benefit from good fire protection — insurance companies which sell fire insurance policies. This tax would be easy to collect, given the limited number of fire insurance companies, and would avoid the potential equal protection problems inherent in any scheme based upon square footage.