Court Opinion

ID: 9771547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:47:02.061904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:32.808611
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Justice,
concurring
I agree that the summary judgment should be reversed. However, I would hold that the leases are ambiguous, not that payment is required as a matter of law under the gas clause, section 3(b)(1).
I am unwilling to deny either side a trial, based on this ambiguous language that has confounded three able federal judges, as well as three members of this panel, and that presents an important question of first impression in Texas. I cannot declare with confidence, based on this record, that there is no disputed issue of fact and that one side or the other is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A motion for summary judgment should be denied when the court is of the opinion that the particular controversy is such that the public interest is involved, and is better served by a full development of the evidence at trial. Summary procedures present a treacherous record for deciding issues of far-flung import, such as this. 4 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in District and County Courts, § 17.26.12 (rev. 1984). Therefore, I would hold that the lease is ambiguous; that the ambiguity has not been resolved by clear summary judgment evidence; and that the present record does not allow us to determine which clause controls.
I concur.