Court Opinion

ID: 9679639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:01:10.884988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:17.265842
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority, in permitting the amendment, goes far beyond anything contemplated by CR 15.03(2).
KRS 413.140(l)(e) and (2) apply to discovery of an “injury,” that is, a physical injury, the subject of a malpractice action. Stretching the discovery language to cover this discovery of the alleged misrepresentation by the nurse is not authorized by any reading of the statute. KRS 413.245 provides for bringing action after discovery of the cause of action arising out of rendering or failing to render professional services. It defies all logic that the alleged mistake of this nurse, in saying the doctor was not in the hospital, should be considered an act rendering or failing to render professional services.
In short, the majority ignores the plain language of the statutes in permitting the filing of the amendment. This is not strictly an amendment; it is adding a new party to the suit after the statute of limitations has expired. I am not sure that the hospital will not be unduly prejudiced, but I am certain the nurse will be.
There is even less reason to reverse as to the doctor. CR 43.10 does not have any exceptions as to the necessity for an avowal. In the Kentucky case cited by appellants, an avowal was made. If we are not to insist on following CR 43.10, we should *462abolish it. Appellants make conclusory statements as to what they wished to testify, but we do not know what the testimony would have been. This is the basis for requiring an avowal so that the action of the trial court may be reviewed. This situation does not justify a departure from the rule.
It is interesting that the majority opinion does not cite a case in support of the holding that the trial court erred in declining to permit appellants to bring out that the appellees’ doctor’s medical witness had a malpractice suit pending against him. This evidence is not offered to show bias but a bold attempt to attack the reputation of the medical witness. We do not have a case in this jurisdiction that allows such evidence. The only authorities cited by appellants’ brief are criminal cases where the authorities have some hold over the witness. This is not the case here, and the trial court acted properly.
Accordingly, I dissent.
GANT and VANCE, JJ., join in this dissent.