Court Opinion

ID: 9744366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:01:30.582854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.795566
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the Attorney General must provide Evans with counsel for defense of the claims brought against him by the State. One of the central tenets of statutory construction is that we must construe statutes to avoid an absurd result or a result that the legislature, as a reasonable body, could not have intended. Emergency Physicians of Indianapolis v. Pettit, 714 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). By requiring the State to pay for the cost of Evans’ defense of claims brought by the State, however, the majority reaches a result that surely was not intended by the legislature.
The majority’s decision turns on its determination that statutes governing the duty of the Attorney General to defend state officers irreconcilably conflict with the statutes governing the duty of the Attorney General to defend judges and prosecutors. Starting from this premise, the majority concludes that statutes governing the Attorney General’s duty to defend judges and prosecutors are the more specific, and thus, controlling statutes. One, though, could just as easily argue that the more specific provision is the one excepting claims filed by the State from those cases for which the Attorney General is required to provide a defense. Ind.Code § 4-6-2-1. However, because I disagree that the two sets of statutes irreconcilably conflict and it is my view that the two sets of statutes can be construed harmoniously, I need not resolve which set of statutes is more specific.
“When two statutes or two sets of statutes are apparently inconsistent in some respects, and yet can be rationalized to give effect to both, then it is our duty to do so. It is only when there is irreconcilable conflict that we can interpret the legislative intent to be that one statute gives way *567to the other.” Simmons v. State, 773 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (quoting Wright v. Gettinger, 428 N.E.2d 1212, 1219 (Ind.1981)). The powers and duties of the Attorney General are defined by statute. See Ind.Code § 4-6-2-1 et seq. In particular, Indiana Code § 4-6-2-1 requires the Attorney General to defend all suits brought against state officers in their official relations, except suits brought against them by the State. Additionally, Indiana Code § 33-2.1-9-1 requires the Attorney General to either defend a prosecuting attorney who is sued for civil damages arising out of an act performed within the scope of his duties as the prosecuting attorney or authorize the hiring of private counsel to provide such a defense.
These two sets of statutes can be harmonized by reading them to require the Attorney General to defend or provide private counsel for prosecuting attorneys, except where the claim is brought by the State. Such an interpretation would not render Indiana Code § 33—2.1—9—1 (c)(2) meaningless because there are instances where the Attorney General would want or need to employ the services of outside counsel other than the conflict of interest situation the majority highlights. For example, the Attorney General may invoke Indiana Code § 33-2.1-9-l(c)(2) when the Attorney General’s Office does not have the staffing or resources to adequately defend a claim, during the change of administration, or when the Attorney General is called on to defend two different state officers who have conflicting interests. Because the provisions can be read harmoniously to avoid an absurd result while still giving effect to the language of both provisions, I respectfully dissent.