Court Opinion

ID: 9602237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:52:36.464402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:01.644657
License: Public Domain

*11Dore, J.
(concurring) — Defendant raised the issue of intoxication as an affirmative defense. Because defendant was arrested inside the newspaper office, the main issue the jury had to decide was whether defendant, at the time of breaking into the building, was so intoxicated that he couldn't formulate an intent to commit the crime of burglary. If he was, then under the court's instructions as to the law, he should have been acquitted.
One of the more important ways to test sobriety is one's speech, reflecting a person's state of mind. If one is articulate and easily formulates concepts and is responsive to questions, obviously he is not intoxicated.
The jury could have found that Officer Heitman's testimony that defendant didn't want to make a statement, after having been given his Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966)), was evidence indicating defendant understood his rights, but that he wisely didn't want to make damaging statements as to his guilt; that he was alert; had full command of his faculties, and that he fully comprehended his situation and was sober. On the other hand, if the defendant had spoken to the arresting officer in an irrational manner, the jury permissibly could infer defendant was intoxicated and not able to formulate a criminal intent to commit the crime of burglary.
In Williams v. State, 242 Ga. 757, 760, 251 S.E.2d 254 (1978), the defendant had pleaded insanity at the time of commission of the acts charged in the indictment. The testimony was admitted over objection that it was opinion evidence, to show the mental awareness of the defendant at the time of his arrest. The Georgia court found no error and stated:
In the present case the witness' comment was: "Well, Detective Lewis was advising him of his rights and asked him if he wanted to make any statements and he refused to make any statement."
The testimony was allowed for the purpose of showing appellant's awareness and mental competence at the time *12of arrest and its introduction does not deny appellant due process under Doyle [v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976)].
In United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1975), the court held that a criminal defendant may, by his conduct, make otherwise constitutionally inadmissible evidence admissible for certain purposes.
Miranda establishes that the prosecution may not use as a part of its case in chief a criminal defendant's silence following his arrest and warning. This evidence, even though it might be relevant and probative, is normally excluded. But it is important to note that it is excluded for the purpose of protecting certain rights of the defendant. It is not excluded so that the defendant may freely and falsely create the impression that he has cooperated with the police when, in fact, he has not. After getting Agent Israelson to admit that his client had no previous criminal history and had voluntarily provided handwriting samples, Fairchild's counsel attempted to create this impression when he asked, "During the period of time that this investigation has been going on, to your knowledge has Mr. Fairchild cooperated fully with the FBI and U. S. Attorney's office in responding with anything that you all wanted?" Having thus raised the question of his cooperation with the law enforcement authorities, Fairchild opened the door to a full and not just a selective development of that subject. United States v. Paquet, 484 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1973). . . . The fact that Fairchild's silence would have been excluded for constitutional reasons does not change the situation. Constitutional rights, like others, may be waived; and a criminal defendant may, by his conduct, make otherwise constitutionally inadmissible evidence admissible for certain purposes. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). Here the evidence of Fairchild's Miranda silence was admissible for the purpose of rebutting the impression which he attempted to create: that he cooperated fully with the law enforcement authorities. Thus, it was not error for the trial court to admit Detective Hobbs' testimony concerning Fairchild's silence at the police station following his Miranda warnings.
(Footnote omitted.)
In the subject case, defendant produced a number of *13witnesses as to his intoxication earlier in the evening, including his brother who stated that they were so drunk when they broke into the building they were only looking for a place to "pass out".
When defendant offered such testimony he waived his constitutional right regarding silence and made otherwise constitutionally inadmissible evidence admissible for the purpose of showing his sobriety and understanding of what he was doing, which evidenced his intent to commit the crime of burglary. Defendant, of course, was entitled to a limiting instruction to the jury that the defendant's statement could only be taken into consideration on the affirmative defense of intoxication.
Conclusion
I find no error in the prosecution asking questions to elicit defendant's postarrest statements, after he was given his Miranda warnings, when he pleaded "intoxication" as an affirmative defense and introduced testimony affirmatively as to that subject matter.
Reconsideration denied October 21, 1981.