Court Opinion

ID: 9955157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 19:02:18.351645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:17.904459
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/27/24 Doe v. Regents of the U. of Cal. CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 JOHN DOE,                                                        B327252

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.20STCP01381)
           v.

 REGENTS OF THE
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff , Judge. Affirmed.
      Hathaway Parker, Mark M. Hathaway, Jenna E. Parker for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Quarles & Brady, Sandra L. McDonough for Defendant and
Respondent.
       After his employment at the University of California, Los
Angeles was terminated, appellant Dr. David Baron1 filed a
complaint pursuant to the Personnel Policies for Staff Members
(PPSM) promulgated by respondent Regents of the University of
California. The relevant policy, PPSM-70, provides that written
complaints must be filed within 30 calendar days of an
involuntary separation. Baron filed his complaint 12 days
beyond that timeframe. The university denied the complaint as
untimely filed. Baron appealed the decision to the system level,
where it was upheld.
       Baron subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus.
He alleged he was not given proper notice of the filing deadline
and the university abused its discretion by failing to address his
post-deadline request for an extension and by failing to extend
the deadline. The trial court ordered an interim remand to
clarify whether Procedure 70, the regulation implementing
PPSM-70, gave the university discretion to consider Baron’s
belated extension request. After the university submitted a letter
indicating that it had consistently interpreted Procedure 70 to
afford it discretion only when an extension request was filed
within the deadline, the court denied the writ.
       In this appeal, Baron contends the university had
discretion to extend the deadline and abused that discretion by
refusing to exercise it. He further contends due process requires
that he receive a post-dismissal hearing to “clear his name,” that

1     Baron initially filed the petition under the pseudonym
“John Doe,” but the trial court granted the Regents of the
University of California’s motion to strike the pseudonym and
require Baron to proceed under his true name.

                                2
he exhausted his administrative remedies, and that any failure to
exhaust is excused. We affirm.
                     FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       Baron is a medical doctor who was employed as the Senior
Executive Director of UCLA’s Arthur Ashe Student Health and
Wellness Center. In early August 2016, someone reported to
UCLA’s Title IX office that they saw what they believed to be
pornographic images in Baron’s office, on his personal computer.
Baron was not told about the report, but later that month he and
“Everyone in Ashe” received a general “Reminder about
appropriate workplace behavior” via email. It stated, “please
keep in mind that while incidental personal use of computers is
allowable and even expected (during breaks and lunch), visiting
websites that may have content that is offensive to others is not
allowed. In other words, if your screen is in a public space, or is
visible/may be visible to anyone but you, please refrain from
visiting sites that others may find offensive.”
       On November 8, 2018, UCLA’s Title IX office sent Baron a
letter notifying him that “it was alleged that in 2016, 2017, and
2018, you viewed images of a sexual nature on your laptop during
work hours and that several employees were exposed to these
images in the course of their work with you.” The letter stated
that “[i]f this allegation is true, the reported behavior could
constitute sexual harassment in violation” of the University of
California Policy for Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment
(SVSH). The letter further stated that the Title IX office had
“initiated a complaint on this matter” and would be conducting
an investigation consisting of “interviews and gathering evidence
regarding the allegation and determining from the information
collected whether a violation of the SVSH Policy occurred based

                                3
on the preponderance of the evidence.” The letter advised Baron
that investigations are “typically completed within 60 business
days,” and he would receive written notice of the outcome and a
redacted copy of the report when it was complete. Baron was put
on investigatory leave.
       Due at least in part to staffing changes in the Title IX
office—the initial investigator left the university, and her
replacement died—the investigation was handled by three
different individuals. Baron ultimately was interviewed, in the
presence of his counsel, on March 25, 2019. In the final
investigation report, issued April 26, 2019, the Title IX office
“found by the preponderance of the evidence that (1) Dr. Baron
engaged in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature; (2) that the
conduct was severe and pervasive; that the images were
unwelcome by the witnesses; and (3) [sic] that the images and Dr.
Baron’s conduct interfered with the way the witnesses interacted
with Dr. Baron and how they conducted business in his office.” It
further concluded there was sufficient evidence to find that Baron
violated the SVSH policy. Baron responded to the report and
findings through counsel on May 7, 2019.
       On June 5, 2019, the university’s vice chancellor sent
Baron a Notice of Intent to Terminate his employment, effective
June 15, 2019. The Notice of Intent to Terminate stated that
Baron had “the right to respond either orally or in writing to this
Notice of Intent to Terminate within eight (8) calendar days by
contacting Anthony Solana, Jr., Director of Employee & Labor
Relations,” and provided Solana’s email address and phone

                                4
number. On June 14, 2019, Baron timely responded and
requested a Skelly2 meeting.
       On June 26, 2019, Baron and his counsel attended a Skelly
meeting at which the university’s Employee Relations Consultant
Sara Haider and Assistant Dean of Administration and External
Relations Vina Chin were present. Baron asserts that these
university representatives orally told him “that if the Skelly
review was not in his favor there would be a further hearing, but
no deadline or further procedure were specified.” He further
asserts that “[t]hey did not tell me how to schedule the hearing
and I assumed such information would be forthcoming.” On July
11, 2019, Assistant Dean Chin sent a letter to UCLA Vice
Chancellor Monroe Gorden, Jr., summarizing the Skelly meeting
and recommending that the Notice of Intent to Terminate be
upheld. The letter did not mention any discussion of further
hearings.
       On July 16, 2019, Vice Chancellor Gorden sent Baron a
letter terminating his employment effective that day. As
relevant here, the letter stated: “You have the right to a review of
this action in accordance with PPSM Policy 70 (Complaint
Resolution). If you have questions regarding your appeal rights,
you may contact Ms. Kathleen Shiroma, Employee Relations
Consultant, at [phone number] or [email address].” The footnote

2      Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 215-
216 (Skelly) requires that civil-service employees be given notice
of proposed disciplinary action, the reasons for the action, a copy
of the charges and the written materials upon which they are
based, and an opportunity to respond either orally or in writing.
A Skelly meeting is “an informal probable-cause-type proceeding.”
(Asimow et al., Cal Practice Guide: Administrative Law (The
Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 3:196, p. 3-33.)

                                 5
omitted from the quotation contained a URL that the parties
agree was supposed to lead to the PPSM-70. However, Baron
asserts the link was “dead” and did not provide access to PPSM-
70. There is no evidence in the record indicating that Baron or
his counsel contacted or attempted to contact Shiroma to inquire
about the link, PPSM-70, or any other aspect of the termination
or review process.
      Baron asserts that “a few weeks later,” he “undertook to
find a working link” because he “still had not received notice of a
hearing on the termination decision.” He further asserts “[i]t was
only then that he learned that he was required to submit a
PPSM-70 complaint in order to initiate review of the University’s
termination decision.”3 Indeed, PPSM-70 states, under the
boldface heading “Timeliness,” “The employee must file a written
complaint within 30 calendar days after the date on which the
employee knew or could reasonably be expected to have known of
the event or action that gave rise to the complaint, or within 30
calendar days after the date of involuntary separation from
University employment, whichever is earlier.” PPSM-70 further
provides that a “complaint is considered ‘filed’ on the date it is
postmarked, personally delivered, faxed, or emailed.” The parties
agree that Baron was terminated on July 16, 2019, and that 30
calendar days from that date was August 15, 2019.
      On August 27, 2019, 42 calendar days after his July 16,
2019 termination, Baron emailed a PPSM-70 complaint to “UCLA
LABOR RELATIONS.” In the complaint, Baron alleged that the
university failed to utilize progressive discipline, did not provide

3     In a declaration submitted to and considered by the trial
court, Baron stated that he “determined on my own how to access
the PPSM-70 information.”

                                 6
him a copy of the materials supporting his termination, and
discriminated against him based on his gender. He also alleged
that Gorden “abused his discretion in finding that [Baron] had
engaged in misconduct, based solely on the allegations that were
unsupported by the weight of the evidence in a proceeding utterly
devoid of fairness of [sic] Due Process and against the law.”
Baron further alleged that the university’s “Title IX process was
flawed, unlawful, and utterly lacking in due process” in eleven
different ways. Baron asserted that as a result of his
termination, he suffered financial, reputational, and emotional
damage.
       In a section titled “Timeliness,” Baron noted that Procedure
70, which governs administration of PPSM-70, states that “The
CHR ELR [Campus Human Resources Employee and Labor
Relations] Director shall administer this policy and shall
determine whether a complaint is timely and qualifies for review
at any step of the process. The CHR ELR Director or the HS
ELR [Health System Employee and Labor Relations] Director
may extend the deadlines contained in this procedure.” Baron
continued, “The Title IX investigation in this case lasted for over
five months, with three 60 business-day extensions given to Title
IX investigators, even though Ms. Chris Carrubba-Katz, UC Title
IX Principal Investigator, interviewed no witnesses and met with
Mr. [sic] Baron only once. The five-month delay is far in excess of
the 60 business-day timeframe in the SVSH Policy and the UC
Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment Investigation and
Adjudication Framework for Staff and Non-Faculty Personnel.
[¶] Complainant requests an extension of just 12 calendar days (8
business days) to submit his PPSM-70 complaint. The Notice of
Termination to Complainant from Monroe Gorden did not specify

                                7
the number of days within which a grievance needed to be filed,
and Complainant was not provided a copy of the PPSM-70 policy
or the Complaint Form. Additionally, the link included in the
Notice of Termination to the applicable procedures was a dead
link. There is no prejudice to any party caused by the delay, as
Complainant submits his complaint well within the fifteen (15)
calendar day extension of time to correct or resubmit a defective
or flawed complaint. Please accept this complaint for review.”4
       On September 4, 2019, Employee and Labor Relations
Director Solana sent Baron a letter acknowledging receipt of his
complaint. The letter continued, “The timely filing deadline to
submit a PPSM 70 complaint is contained in PPSM Policy
70.III.B.5. It states, in part, ‘The employee must file a written
complaint within 30 calendar days after the date on which the
employee knew or could have reasonably be expected to have
known of the event or action that gave rise to the complaint, or
within 30 calendar days after the date of involuntary separation
from the University, whichever is earlier.’ (Emphasis added).
Accordingly, the deadline to submit a PPSM complaint contesting
your July 16, 2019 Notice of Termination was Thursday, August
15, 2019. For this reason, your complaint is untimely filed and is
denied for formal processing.”
       The next paragraph of the letter provided instructions on
how to appeal the decision: “If you disagree, you may file an
appeal with the University of California’s Office of the President

4      Procedure 70 states: “If the complaint has been filed within
established time limits, the CHR ELR Director or HS ELR
Director shall grant up to fifteen (15) calendar days extension of
time in order to permit a defective or flawed but timely complaint
to be corrected and resubmitted.”

                                8
regarding my determination that your complaint is ineligible for
review under PPSM 70. If you wish to appeal, you must submit a
complete record of the complaint within twenty (20) calendar
days from the date of this letter by utilizing one of the following
methods,” namely email, fax, mail, or in-person delivery. The
letter also included the contact information for Employee
Relations Consultant Haider, and invited Baron to contact her
with any questions.
       Exactly 20 days later, on September 24, 2019, Baron,
through counsel, emailed his appeal to the University of
California’s Office of the President. In the appeal, Baron
asserted that he “was not provided or given proper notice” of the
30-day deadline for PPSM-70 complaints. He argued that he
“made a good faith attempt to comply with every deadline in this
process,” that “a brief delay in filing the PPSM 70 complaint
causes no prejudice to any party,” and that a “12 calendar day (8
business day) filing delay should not be grounds to invalidate an
employee’s complaint.” He also pointed out that his “request for
an extension was not addressed by Director Solana, Jr.”
       Marie-Ann Hairston, the Systemwide Employee Relations
Director, responded by letter dated December 4, 2019. The letter
stated that Hairston had reviewed the documents and
information Baron sent and “agree[d] with the determination
made by UCLA ELR that the allegations in [Baron’s] complaint
were untimely filed.” It further stated, “This concludes the
review process for this appeal.”
       Approximately one week later, on December 13, 2019,
Baron emailed Hairston a “Request for Reconsideration, PPSM
70 Appeal.” Baron did not receive any response to this request.
The Regents represent in their brief that “the request for

                                 9
reconsideration was not processed” because “the decision was
final and there were no more appeal routes available to Baron.”
                     PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On April 15, 2020, Baron filed a petition for writ of
mandamus in the trial court. He filed the operative verified first
amended petition on January 25, 2021. Baron alleged that the
university denied him due process during the Title IX
investigation and disciplinary proceedings and arbitrarily denied
his PPSM-70 complaint without addressing his request for an
extension. Baron sought relief under both Code of Civil
Procedure5 section 1085 and section 1094.5, though he now
concedes that only section 1085 is applicable.
       In his brief in support of the petition, Baron argued that
the university abused its discretion by providing itself extensions
of time during the Title IX investigatory process but denying him
“the same consideration.” He argued the university further
abused its discretion by failing to “provide any basis for its
decision to deny Dr. Baron’s request for an extension,” by failing
to give him “appropriate notice as to how to appeal,” and by
failing to give him notice “that requests for extensions would not
be granted.” The Regents answered and opposed the petition.
They argued that the university’s interpretation of its policies
and procedures was entitled to strong deference, that Baron was
given proper notice of the appeal process, and that Baron failed to
show that the university abused its discretion in denying his
untimely filed PPSM-70 complaint. Baron filed a reply.
       The trial court heard argument on the matter on November
17, 2021. During the hearing, the court expressed concern about

5    All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

                                10
whether the university “even saw the request to extend,” because
“there’s no reference to it in any of the responses to the appeal
from U.C.L.A. or even the Regents.” The court observed that a
failure to exercise discretion is an abuse of discretion, and stated
that it was inclined to order an “interim remand” to ascertain
whether the university considered the extension request and, if
so, why it was denied. After hearing additional argument, the
trial court made an interim order directing the university to
exercise its discretion to consider Baron’s request for a deadline
extension or describe how it previously exercised that discretion.
       On February 3, 2022, Solana emailed Baron and his
counsel a letter in accordance with the interim order. After
briefly summarizing the pertinent events of the case, Solana
provided the following explanation of how he handled Baron’s
complaint:
       “As UCLA’s Director of Employee and Labor Relations, I
am responsible for the intake of PPSM 70 complaints. I am also
responsible for interpreting and applying UCLA Procedure 70,
which provides UCLA-specific procedural guidelines for PPSM 70
complaints. UCLA Procedure 70.III.E states, ‘the CHR ELR
Director or the HS ELR Director may extend the deadlines
contained in this procedure.’
       “As the CHR ELR Director since 2014, I am familiar with
this campus procedure and it has been my responsibility to
interpret and apply it in numerous cases at UCLA, including
yours. UCLA Procedure 70.III.E only provides me authority to
grant an extension of the initial filing deadline when the
employee both requests an extension prior to the 30-day period
expiring and demonstrates good cause for such an extension. It
does not give me the authority to consider complaints that are

                                11
filed after the deadline, regardless of the reason. This is in
keeping with the portion of UCLA Procedure 70, which
authorizes me to grant an extension of time to correct a ‘defective
or flawed but timely complaint.’
       “Indeed, in the seven plus years that I have served as
Director, I have never granted a request for a retroactive
extension of the PPSM 70 submission deadline after it has
passed. Under UCLA Procedure 70, I did not and do not have
discretion to extend the 30-day filing deadline, as you never
requested an extension of the deadline prior to its expiration
date, so that both your complaint and your request for an
extension were untimely under campus procedures.”
       The parties filed Solana’s letter and supplemental briefing
thereon. In his brief, Baron argued that the plain language of
PPSM-70 and Procedure 70 gave Solana the discretion to extend
the deadline. He further argued that Procedure 70 “is silent on a
good cause requirement, is silent on the timing of a request, and
does not require that an employee make a request in order for
Mr. Solana to extend a deadline.” The Regents responded that
the letter “shows Director Solana did not have discretion,” that
Solana’s interpretations of PPSM-70 and Procedure 70 were
reasonable and entitled to deference, and that Baron failed to
demonstrate a basis for writ relief.
       The trial court held another hearing on the matter on
October 12, 2022. The court denied the writ petition for the
reasons stated in its written tentative decision, which it adopted
as its final ruling. In that ruling, the court concluded that
“PPSM-70 is clear. Certain time deadlines apply to such written
complaints,” and “[t]here can be no dispute Petitioner did not
timely file his complaint (i.e., appeal) under UCLA’s controlling

                                12
policy, PPSM-70.” The court further concluded that “UCLA’s
decision that Petitioner did not timely file his PPSM-70
Complaint is therefore not arbitrary or capricious; it is consistent
with Respondent’s policies.” The court explained that matters
are considered closed under PPSM-70 when the 30-day deadline
passes, and “PPSM-70 does not provide a manner for reopening a
concluded and closed matter.” The court rejected Baron’s reliance
on Procedure 70’s allowance of a 15-day extension to cure
technical problems as well as his tit-for-tat argument about
deadline extensions in the Title IX investigatory process. It also
rejected his contentions that he did not receive appropriate notice
of the appeal deadline or extension policy. The court did not
consider Baron’s substantive arguments about due process
because it found that he “failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies by failing to timely file an appeal UCLA’s [sic] July 16,
2019 termination decision.” The court filed the judgment on
January 19, 2023.
       Baron timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       Under section 1085, “A writ of mandate may be issued by
any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
to compel the performance of an act which the law specially
enjoins.” (§ 1085, subd. (a).) To be entitled to a writ of mandate
under section 1085, a petitioner must demonstrate: (1) the
respondent has a clear, present, and usually ministerial duty to
act; and (2) the petitioner has a clear, present, and beneficial
right to performance of that duty. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma
County Union High School District (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 917.)
“Normally, mandate will not lie to control a public agency’s

                                13
discretion, that is to say, force the exercise of discretion in a
particular manner. However, it will lie to correct abuses of
discretion.” (County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 643, 654.)
       The trial court reviews an agency’s action to determine
whether it was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, entirely lacking in
evidentiary support, contrary to established public policy, or
procedurally unfair. (Vallejo Police Officers Association v. City of
Vallejo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 601, 611 (Vallejo).) The court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency; even if
reasonable minds may disagree regarding the agency’s action, its
determination must be upheld if it is not arbitrary, capricious, or
lacking in evidentiary support. (Id. at p. 612; McGill v. Regents
of University of California (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1776, 1786.)
       We perform the same function as the trial court in a
traditional mandamus action, and therefore we review the
agency’s decision and not the trial court’s findings or conclusions.
(Khan v. Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 98, 105-106.) Baron bears the burden of
establishing that the university’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, unlawful, entirely lacking in evidentiary support,
contrary to established public policy, or procedurally unfair. (Id.
at p. 106; Vallejo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 611.)
II.    Analysis
       Baron contends that the university had discretion to extend
the PPSM-70 complaint filing deadline and abused that
discretion by failing to exercise it. We disagree.
       PPSM-70 provides that complaints must be filed “within 30
calendar days after the date on which the employee knew or
could reasonably be expected to have known of the event or action

                                14
that gave rise to the complaint, or within 30 calendar days after
the date of involuntary separation from University employment,
whichever is earlier.” The PPSM is a uniform systemwide policy.
However, it provides that “[a] designated local official will
administer this policy,” and “will determine whether a complaint
is timely.” It further provides that “[l]ocal procedures must
specify the deadlines for appeal at each step in the process. If an
employee does not appeal by those deadlines, the complaint will
be considered resolved and closed on the basis of the last
University response.”
       Procedure 70 is UCLA’s local procedure implementing
PPSM-70. It echoes the 30-day filing deadline set forth in PPSM-
70. It also provides that “The CHR ELR Director or the HS ELR
Director shall administer this policy and shall determine whether
a complaint is timely and qualifies for review at any step of this
process. The CHR ELR Director or the HS ELR Director may
extend the deadlines contained in this procedure.” Several pages
later, it provides that “[i]f the complaint has been filed within
established time limits, the CHR ELR Director or HS ELR
Director shall grant up to fifteen (15) calendar days extension of
time in order to permit a technically flawed but timely complaint
to be corrected and resubmitted.” It contains no further relevant
provisions about deadlines, extensions, or timeliness.
       Baron contends that the “plain, commonsense language of
the policy confers discretion on Director Solana to extend
deadlines contained in Procedure 70,” and no language in PPSM-
70 or Procedure 70 deprives Solana of that discretion after the
30-day filing period expires. He emphasizes that the “policies do
not state anywhere that the University may only extend
deadlines when a request is made before the deadline lapses,” “do

                                15
not state the University lacks discretion to consider an untimely
PPSM-70 appeal,” and do not “state that a ‘closed’ complaint
cannot be reopened.”
       The Regents interpret PPSM-70 and Procedure 70
differently. They emphasize that PPSM-70 provides that
complaints will be considered closed if no appeal is made by the
deadline, and no provision for reopening a closed appeal exists.
They further assert that, as a matter of common sense, a period
that is expired cannot be extended. The Regents also point out
that Solana has interpreted PPSM-70 and Procedure 70
consistently for years, and contend that their interpretation is
entitled to deference. The Regents have the better argument.
       The California Constitution establishes the Regents as a
“public trust . . . with full powers of organization and
government.” (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 9, subd. (a).) Accordingly,
the Regents may exercise “quasi-legislative powers,” and
“‘[p]olicies established by the Regents as matters of internal
regulation may enjoy a status equivalent to that of state
statutes.’” (Campbell v. Regents of the University of California
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 320 (Campbell).) They also have “‘the
general rule-making or policy making power in regard to the
University [citation], and are (with exceptions not material here)
fully empowered with respect to the organization and
government of the University.’” (Id. at p. 321; see also Kim v.
Regents of the University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160,
165 [“Regents have rulemaking and policymaking power in
regard to the University; their policies and procedures have the
force and effect of statute.”].)
       “Generally, the rules that govern interpretation of statutes
also govern interpretation of administrative regulations.”

                                16
(Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60
Cal.4th 1086, 1097.) Thus, we begin with the plain language of
PPSM-70 and Procedure 70, “giving effect to its usual meaning
and avoiding interpretations that render any language
surplusage.” (Ibid.) We do not consider the language in isolation,
however; “rather, we look to the statute’s entire substance in
order to determine its scope and purposes. [Citation.] That is,
we construe the words in question in context, keeping in mind the
statute’s nature and obvious purposes. [Citation.] We must
harmonize the statute’s various parts by considering it in the
context of the statutory frame as a whole. [Citation.] If the
statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning
controls. If, however, the language supports more than one
reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids....”
(Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v.
Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1107.)
One such extrinsic aid is the Regents’ own interpretation of the
PPSM and Procedures, which we may also use even if the policy
language is unambiguous. (See Akella v. Regents of the
University of California (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 801, 815-816
(Akella).) “The degree of deference to an agency’s interpretation
of a statute or regulation is contextual”; “the deference accorded
to an agency’s interpretation ‘should be dependent in large part
upon whether the agency has a “‘comparative interpretative
advantage over the courts’” and on whether it has arrived at the
correct interpretation.’” (Id. at p. 816.) We also consider whether
the interpretation “is both knowledgeable and sensitive to the
needs of [sic] department and university population to which it
applies,” and “‘whether the agency has adhered consistently to
the interpretation at issue and whether there was an opportunity

                                17
for comment to be made on that interpretation.’” (Id. at pp. 816-
817.)
       Here, PPSM-70 unambiguously sets forth a 30-day filing
deadline and states that a complaint filed after that point will be
considered resolved and closed. These provisions, coupled with
Procedure 70’s mandate that the CHR ELR Director or HS ELR
Director “shall grant up to fifteen (15) calendar days extension of
time in order to permit a technically flawed but timely complaint
to be corrected and resubmitted” underscore the importance of
timeliness. While Procedure 70 generally allows for the
extension of deadlines, it does not suggest that deadlines that
have already expired may be revived. Limiting extensions in this
fashion is a matter of common sense. “[O]nce the period has
expired there is nothing left to extend. Common sense compels
the conclusion that a trial court cannot extend a time period that
has already expired.” (People v. American Surety Insurance Co.
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 719, 727.) Moreover, allowing the Director
to extend the time to appeal after a matter has been deemed
resolved and closed would undermine the complaint and review
process set forth in PPSM-70 and Procedure 70; there would be
no finality for either the complainant or the university. Limiting
the Director's extension authority to Complaints filed within the
30-day appeal period is consistent with PPSM-70’s deadline and
Procedure 70’s cure for technically defective appeals “filed within
the established time limits.”
       The Regents’ (and Solana’s) interpretation is consistent
with this common sense approach. It also appears sensitive to
the need for the expedient resolution of personnel matters, and
has been consistently applied throughout Solana’s tenure as the

                                18
CHR ELR Director. We accordingly afford substantial deference
to that interpretation and find no abuse of discretion here.
       Baron argues that his request for an extension of time is
analogous to a request for relief under section 473, subdivision
(b), which authorizes a trial court to “relieve a party or his or her
legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other
proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” He does not point
to any language in either PPSM-70 or Procedure 70 giving
similar authorization to Solana or any other official; there is
none. Instead, he claims that he “relied upon the assurances
given to him during the Skelly Meeting [sic] … that a hearing
would be held on the termination decision,” and asserts that the
Notice of Termination did not properly inform him what he
needed to do to request a hearing.” This argument is not
persuasive. The Notice of Termination provided Baron, a medical
doctor who was represented by counsel, with the name of the
pertinent policy and the name and contact information of a
person he could contact with any questions. Rather than acting
on this information, Baron waited “a few weeks” before locating
PPSM-70 “on [his] own.”
       Baron also argues that “due process requires the University
to hold a post-dismissal hearing” because “there was no
opportunity under the University’s administrative procedures to
raise legal arguments regarding the constitutionality of the
University’s procedures” and his termination subjected him to
“public embarrassment, shame, and harm to his reputation” akin
to the respondent in Zumwalt v. Trustees of the California State
Colleges (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 665 (Zumwalt). Baron’s assertion
that he lacked the opportunity to raise legal arguments is not

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well taken. PPSM-70 provides that very opportunity; it also
requires that a complaint be timely filed to take advantage of it.
        His reliance on Zumwalt is similarly misplaced. There,
English professor Zumwalt was removed from his position of
department chair. Zumwalt was not given a reason for the
removal, which was accomplished in part by campus police
changing the locks on his office door. (Zumwalt, supra, 33
Cal.App.3d at p. 669.) The appellate court concluded that the
“choice of method for Dr. Zumwalt’s removal exposed him to
notoriety in the academic community, damaged his reputation
and tended to handicap him in career advancements during the
remainder of his academic career,” thus entitling him to “a
hearing at which the administration would be required to prove,
if it could, justification for the procedure and at which petitioner
might prove, if he could, lack of justification. He has never had
that hearing and is now entitled to it.” (Id. at p. 680.) The court
found a basis for the hearing “in the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law,” not in “any of the statutes or rules covering
disciplinary or tenure proceedings,” which it found inapplicable.
(Ibid.) Here, Baron received notice of the university’s policy
regarding the viewing of potentially offensive content in the
workplace, participated in the Title IX investigation and
subsequent termination proceedings, and had an opportunity to
challenge the decision and clear his name in accordance with
PPSM-70 if he believed the proceedings were illegal or against
policy.
        Baron finally contends that he “is entitled to court review of
the termination decision” because he exhausted his
administrative remedies or is excused from doing so. The trial
court concluded that he failed to exhaust his administrative

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remedies by failing to timely appeal the termination decision. We
agree.
       Generally, where a statute provides an administrative
remedy, a petitioner must seek relief from the administrative
body and exhaust this remedy before pursuing legal remedies.
(Campbell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 321.) This fundamental
procedural rule is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial relief
and is binding on all courts. (Ibid.) It is in place to mitigate
damages, recognize the quasi-judicial expertise of administrative
tribunals, and promote judicial economy. (Id. at p. 322.) Here,
PPSM-70 provided Baron with the administrative remedy of a
hearing if he timely filed a complaint. Baron’s failure to do so is
a failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Baron asserts
this failure should be excused “because the University misled Dr.
Baron or failed to inform him of an available remedy.” While “a
government entity will be estopped from asserting as a defense a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies when a government
agent has negligently or intentionally caused a party to fail to
comply with a procedural precondition to recovery” (Shuer v.
County of San Diego (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 476, 486), Baron’s
allegation of such conduct here is unpersuasive. He asserts that
the university “failed to provide [him] with any information
concerning requesting review or a deadline for filing a PPSM-70
Complaint.” As discussed above, the Notice of Termination letter
apprised Baron of the applicable policy and identified a person
who could answer any questions he might have. While this may
have “seem[ed] intentionally vague” to Baron, there is no
indication the university provided him with inaccurate
information, led him astray, or in any way “caused [him] to fail to
comply with a procedural precondition to recovery.” Accordingly,

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Baron’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is not
excused.
                         DISPOSITION
     The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The Regents
may recover their costs of appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                     COLLINS, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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