Court Opinion

ID: 9394076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 07:11:51.959012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.148144
License: Public Domain

In The

                                 Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                               ________________

                               NO. 09-21-00034-CV
                               ________________

                  LEAFGUARD OF TEXAS, INC., Appellant

                                          V.

                       STEPHEN RAY GUIDRY, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

                     On Appeal from the 60th District Court
                           Jefferson County, Texas
                          Trial Cause No. B-203,669
________________________________________________________________________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Leafguard appeals from a take-nothing judgment as to its claim against Guidry

and a monetary judgment in favor of Guidry on Guidry’s counterclaim. Appellant

raises six issues in this appeal: 1) the court improperly allowed Guidry’s witness to

testify as an expert when Guidry failed to properly designate the witness as an expert;

2) the evidence is insufficient to prove Leafguard breached the contract; 3) the

evidence is insufficient to prove any damages were caused by Leafguard; 4) the

                                          1
evidence is insufficient to support the award of past and future damages to Guidry;

5) there is insufficient evidence to support the attorney fee award; and 6) because

Guidry failed to pay the amount due under the contract, Leafguard is entitled to

judgment for the contract amount. We reverse and remand.

                                   I. Background

      In 2017, Hurricane Harvey damaged Guidry’s home, including portions of the

roof and some interior drywall. Guidry retained Leafguard 1 to make repairs to his

home including updating and replacing his siding and windows at a total contract

price of $34,613.2 After installation, Guidry notified Leafguard of some problems

with the work and Leafguard made further repairs, replaced the siding, and it

replaced several of the windows at its own expense. Guidry argued that despite

Leafguard’s remedial measures, problems remained. For that reason, Guidry did not

pay Leafguard anything for the work and eventually Leafguard filed a lawsuit

against Guidry for the contract price, plus interest and attorney’s fees. In the Original

and Amended Petitions, Leafguard alleged claims for breach of contract, quantum

meruit, unjust enrichment, prompt payment, and sought attorney’s fees, costs, and

interest. Guidry filed a general denial and then counterclaimed, alleging that

      1
        Leafguard’s complete name is Leafguard of Texas, Inc., d/b/a Beldon
Houston.
     2
       There were separate contracts for the siding and the windows, as well as a
change order.
                                       2
Leafguard’s work was not only substandard, but that it caused damage to his home,

requiring him to incur substantial repair costs.

        After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Guidry as to his claims for

breach of contract and awarded Guidry damages in the amount of $26,236 in past

damages and $27,703.20 in future damages, together with attorney’s fees in the

amount of $10,000. The trial court denied any relief to Leafguard on its claims. The

trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment.

Leafguard timely filed a notice of appeal.

                      Summary of Evidence Presented at Trial

A. Christopher Jackson’s Testimony

        Leafguard’s general manager, Christopher Jackson, testified about his

responsibilities in the case, noting that he became involved in the matter only after

Guidry failed to pay for the work that Leafguard had performed. He authenticated

the contracts between Leafguard and Guidry and stated that they reflected normal

rates and materials for the windows and siding that were the subject of the contracts.

Jackson sent technicians to the project location to verify correct sizes and

measurements and indicated that Guidry reported no problems with the work until

Leafguard requested payment of the contract price, in approximately June or July of

2018.

                                            3
      According to Jackson, after payment became an issue, Guidry complained that

the siding was the wrong color and incorrectly installed, and that the windows

leaked. Jackson acknowledged that the siding, as initially installed, was not the color

that Guidry had ordered, the windows were not properly caulked, and that the first

siding subcontractor Leafguard hired had painted the siding, voiding the warranty.

Leafguard consequently removed the siding that was the wrong color and installed

all new siding in the correct color. When removing that siding, Leafguard’s new

siding contractor discovered that Guidry’s house needed additional bracing and

fasteners so that the finished project would meet Texas Department of Insurance

standards for windstorm compliance. This discovery increased the scope of the work

and Leafguard issued a change order, which Guidry signed, for an additional $2500.

That change order and the agreements for the work were entered into evidence

without objection. According to the original agreement, the scope of the work

included removal of the existing vinyl siding and application of “Hardie” “autumn

tan” siding for $14,900; the installation of 14 “AMI 2000 series beige” windows for

$17,203; and a subsequent change order to replace fascia and soffits for $2500. The

work orders reflect the dimensions and location of each window, as well as the

lengths of the fascia, soffits, and frieze boards to be installed.

      Jackson denied that Leafguard or its contractors disturbed Guidry’s roof while

installing, removing, or reinstalling the siding or the windows.

                                            4
      According to Jackson, Guidry’s complaints about window leaks prompted

Leafguard to attempt to identify the problem, but it was unable to do so.

Notwithstanding Leafguard’s inability to identify the alleged window leaks, it

replaced six of the fourteen windows it had installed, at no additional cost to Guidry.

Although the windows passed inspection for hurricane compliance purposes, the

reinstalled siding was not inspected because Guidry did not permit the inspector to

perform the inspection. Jackson explained the procedures by which the fascia and

soffits were installed by Leafguard’s contractors, and how they accomplished the

installation without lifting the shingles; he insisted they did not disturb the roof.

B. Stephen Guidry’s Testimony

      Guidry, the defendant and counter-plaintiff, testified that although he did sign

the contracts with Leafguard, the Leafguard salesman misrepresented various

unspecified contractual terms. Guidry further testified that Leafguard’s

workmanship was unacceptable, in that Leafguard damaged his roof, causing it to

leak, and he testified that “some of the windows” that Leafguard installed also

leaked. He further stated that the material Leafguard used was thicker than the vinyl

siding that previously was installed on his house. Guidry stated that the use of this

thicker material resulted in the roof failing to overhang the fascia, which caused

water to leak into his house. He denied that his prior vinyl fascia boards were

composed of a thin sheet of vinyl wrapped around a board, rendering the vinyl fascia

                                           5
material approximately the same thickness as the new siding material that Leafguard

installed. He further stated that leaks developed only after Leafguard performed its

work. Guidry acknowledged that after Hurricane Harvey, C & H Roofing repaired

sections of his then three-year-old roof. He stated, however, that because only a

small portion of the roof needed repair after the hurricane, he neither needed nor

received a new windstorm certificate for his roof when C & H completed its repair

work. He also testified that C & H installed a new roof after Hurricane Harvey, and

that it was windstorm certified at that time. Guidry testified later that he did not

receive a new windstorm certification after Hurricane Harvey for the limited amount

of repair work C & H performed.

      Guidry explained that he took photographs of the work but he was unable to

state whether the pictures were taken before, during, or after Leafguard performed

work on the property. He also confirmed that he had not paid Leafguard any money

for the work and averred that all the windows needed replacement—even though

only two of them leaked. Guidry’s testimony contradicted his earlier testimony that

six of his windows leaked after Leafguard replaced them. Although Guidry insisted

that Leafguard had raised the shingles on the roof, thereby damaging his roof, he

could produce no evidence that it occurred.

                                         6
C. Kenneth McCurtain’s Testimony

      McCurtain, a carpenter, testified that although he had performed previous

work for Guidry, he became familiar with the issues relevant to this case when

Guidry called him to evaluate some cosmetic issues in Guidry’s kitchen. At that

time, Guidry apprised the witness of his complaints of roof and window leaks.

McCurtain inspected the eaves and windows and concluded the windows were

improperly installed. McCurtain testified that due to shoddy workmanship, the

overhang eaves were rotting, and the fascia boards were incorrectly installed and

were “too far out[]” for the roof decking to cover them. In his opinion, this

shortcoming permitted water to leak into Guidry’s house. He testified the proper

remedy would require the replacement of the entire roof.

      McCurtain testified that he did not remedy the leaks around the windows, but

instead performed interior drywall work, which he identified in Guidry’s photos. He

indicated that the only way to address the air and water leaks would be to install new

windows because the current windows might bend or break during the reinstallation

process. He also stated that all Guidry’s windows leaked.

      When asked about the price of the repair work, McCurtain testified that the

repair estimates he provided in July of 2019, over a year before the trial date, were

reasonable at the time and place given, but the estimates should be adjusted upward

twenty percent to account for increased material and labor costs. In addition, he

                                          7
testified that Guidry paid him $5462 and $5874, for repair projects that he completed

on Guidry’s residence.

                              II. Standard of Review

      Leafguard’s arguments fall into two categories: abuse of discretion as to

evidentiary rulings, and sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s

judgment.

      As for the legal sufficiency challenges to the judgment, evidence is legally

insufficient to support a finding when: (1) the record discloses a complete absence

of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from

giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence

offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence

establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P.

v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 613 (Tex. 2016) (citation omitted). Evidence is also

considered legally insufficient if it is conclusory, meaning that it “asserts a

conclusion with no basis or explanation.” Windrum v. Kareh, 581 S.W.3d 761, 768-

70 (Tex. 2019).

      In a bench trial, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to give their testimony, the trial court may choose to believe one witness and

disbelieve another. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005). The

trial court also “may disregard even uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony

                                           8
from disinterested witnesses.” Id. at 820. But it is “not free to believe testimony that

is conclusively negated by undisputed facts.” Id. In our appellate review, we “credit

favorable evidence if [a] reasonable [trier of fact] could, and disregard contrary

evidence unless [a reasonable trier of fact] could not.” Id. at 827. “The final test for

legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable

reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” Id.

      In challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adverse

finding on which Leafguard did not have the burden of proof at trial, Leafguard must

demonstrate that there is insufficient evidence to support the adverse

findings. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983); Am. Interstate Ins.

Co. v. Hinson, 172 S.W.3d 108, 120 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet.

denied). When reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider and weigh all

the evidence in support of and contrary to the trial court’s finding. Maritime

Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex. 1998). We set aside a finding

only if it “is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly

wrong and unjust.” Dyson v. Olin Corp., 692 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. 1985) (citation

omitted).

                                    III. Analysis

      We will first consider the sufficiency of the evidence points raised by

Leafguard in its second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth issues. Guidry’s theory of the

                                           9
case is that Leafguard materially breached its contract with him, thereby excusing

his admitted failure to pay the contract price and exposing Leafguard to liability for

its alleged damage to his home.

A. The Contract

      In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that

Leafguard materially breached its contract with Guidry, thus excusing Guidry’s

further performance under the parties’ contract, including Guidry’s payment for the

materials and installation services that Leafguard provided. Assuming, for purposes

of this analysis, that the trial court correctly determined that Leafguard materially

breached the contract before Guidry’s payment became due, the inquiry does not end

there; Leafguard’s material breach, if any, would not necessarily excuse Guidry’s

failure to pay the contract amount if Guidry treated the contract as continuing. See

Long Trusts v. Griffin, 222 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

      Guidry contends that a material breach by one contracting party will excuse

further performance by the other party. We agree that a material breach may entitle

the non-breaching party to terminate the contract and sue the breaching party for the

breach if he chooses to do so. See id. (citation omitted). When, however, the

nonbreaching party decides to treat the contract as continuing, even after the other

party materially breached the agreement, the nonbreaching party may not then seek

to excuse his own nonperformance. See Dowtech Specialty Contractors, Inc. v. City

                                         10
of Weinert, 630 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, pet. denied). Here, the

record reflects that Guidry chose to continue the contract and therefore he was not

excused from paying Leafguard under the contracts. Specifically, we note that

Guidry did not elect to terminate the contract, bring in a new contractor to do the

job, or file suit as soon as he learned that Leafguard had installed the wrong siding

on his house. Instead, he claimed the benefit of his contractual bargain and requested

Leafguard to provide and install the siding specified in the contract. Guidry likewise

requested and received replacement windows for the windows that were alleged to

have been improperly installed, and he gave Leafguard the opportunity to cure its

defects. Guidry did not sue Leafguard until December 5, 2019, nearly eight months

after Leafguard sued Guidry for payment. Given this evidentiary and procedural

posture of the case, we hold Guidry treated the window and siding contracts as

ongoing, and therefore may not refuse payment based on Leafguard’s previous

material breach.

   Guidry counterclaimed for breach of contract. “There are two measures of

damages for the breach of a construction contract: (1) remedial damages, which is

the cost to complete or repair less the unpaid balance on the contract price, and (2)

difference-in-value damages, which is the difference between the value of the

building as constructed and its value had it been constructed according to the

contract.” (citations omitted). See McGinty v. Hennen, 372 S.W. 3d 625, 627 (Tex.

                                         11
2012) (per curiam). The trial court found in favor of Guidry and made the following

findings regarding damages: “[past damages] in the amount of $26,236.00…[and]

future [damages] in the amount of $27,703.20 payable to Guidry. It appears that

Guidry attempted to establish, to some extent, a claim for remedial damages through

McCurtain’s testimony about various costs to repair the alleged damage. The

damages award is not supported by the evidence.

      Guidry’s evidence alleging faulty installation of either the siding or windows

caused damage to the interior of his home are not supported by evidence that such

costs were reasonable and necessary. It is not sufficient that the costs were of a

nature and character that they were necessary and an amount was actually paid for

them. Evidence showing the amounts paid were “reasonable” is also required. Id.,

citing Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex.

2004) (per curiam).

B. Legal and Factual Sufficiency

      Leafguard contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the trial court’s judgment awarding damages to Guidry. We will “sustain

a legal-sufficiency challenge to an adverse finding if our review of the evidence

demonstrates a complete absence of a vital fact, or if the evidence offered is no more

than a scintilla.” Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 259 (Tex. 2014). A factual

sufficiency challenge, on the other hand, requires us to evaluate the evidence as a

                                         12
whole, and determine whether it supports the judgment. Maritime Overseas Corp.,

971 S.W.2d at 406-07. When both legal and factual sufficiency are in dispute, we

first address the matter of legal sufficiency. See Windrum, 581 S.W.3d at 781.

      1. The Windows

      McCurtain and Guidry testified that some of the windows leaked, and

McCurtain opined the windows were improperly installed because they were not

installed with the top of each window above the frieze board, and that this error

permitted rainwater to enter Guidry’s house. This testimony is legally sufficient

evidence that the windows were not correctly installed. We therefore must proceed

to review the factual sufficiency of the evidence question.

      The record contains evidence that there was leakage around some of the

windows. Despite the contrary evidence that the windows did not leak when

Leafguard tested them on multiple occasions, the trial court, as trier of fact, could

have believed that there was leakage around some of the windows. Because windows

would not be expected to leak, absent a construction defect, the trial court could have

made an implicit finding that Leafguard improperly installed the windows, that

improper installation proximately caused the leaks, and that Leafguard therefore was

liable to Guidry for any resulting damages.

      The damage evidence regarding the windows consists of McCurtain’s

testimony that his company performed interior drywall finish work at a cost of

                                          13
$5,874. McCurtain testified that all new windows would need to be installed because

the existing windows, if removed and reinstalled, “can break, they can bend, they

could - - anything could happen to them to where they’re not as sturdy as they were

before.” Guidry’s evidence was factually insufficient to show the price paid for the

work performed was reasonable and necessary. See McGinty, 372 S.W.3d at 627

(describing the measure of damages). Absent evidence that the amount paid was

reasonable, no damages can be awarded based on the evidence in the record. Id. In

addition, we note that in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court

found that Guidry had sustained incidental damages, notwithstanding the fact that

the parties’ contracts conspicuously disclaimed liability for incidental or

consequential damages. For this additional reason, the trial court erred in awarding

the enumerated elements of incidental/consequential damage. Therefore, any award

of consequential damages is disallowed. We sustain Leafguard’s fourth point. We

will remand the case to the trial court for a new trial to determine whether and to

what extent any windows must be replaced and the reasonable and necessary cost

therefor.

      2. Soffit and Fascia

      Guidry’s complaint was that the Leafguard product, workmanship, or both,

somehow caused the fascia boards to extend farther toward the outermost edge of

the roof shingles than they previously had, and that this change caused water to leak

                                         14
into Guidry’s home. Specifically, Guidry contended that the new fascia boards that

Leafguard installed were thicker than the prior fascia boards, and that Leafguard had

installed “kickers” that lengthened the rafter tails, thus extending the roof line

beyond its earlier profile.

      The evidence is legally sufficient to support Guidry’s position, in that Guidry,

himself, testified regarding the thickness of the new fascia boards Leafguard

installed, and further testified that Leafguard’s work extended the rafter tails. This

evidence alone, if believed by the trial court, is legally sufficient to support the trial

court’s finding. As Leafguard has observed, however, a comparison of the “before”

and “after” photographs indicates that both of Guidry’s theories of recovery are

factually inaccurate, thus extinguishing any possibility that the trial court’s judgment

is supported by factually sufficient evidence. In particular, we note that the

photographs taken before Leafguard’s work commenced show a certain amount of

shingle overhang, and the photographs taken after McCurtain’s work was completed

show the same,3 thereby belying the argument that the outer edge of the newly

installed fascia boards was somehow closer to the edge of the shingles than were the

      3
         The new windows had beige frames, as required by the terms of the contract.
It is therefore a simple matter to identify the old windows as being the ones with the
brown frames. Because Guidry stated that Leafguard performed the window
replacement work before performing the siding and fascia work, we can identify the
old siding, fascia, and shingle overhang by viewing the photographs showing the old
windows.
                                           15
old fascia boards that Leafguard had replaced. The evidence actually shows the

opposite fact of what the court found. Therefore, we find the evidence factually

insufficient to support this finding.

      Even if this evidence were factually sufficient to support a decision that

Leafguard’s fascia work required remediation, the evidence fails to show the

reasonable cost of doing so. Here, as with the windows, the evidence shows only the

amount paid for the work. Absent evidence that the amount paid was reasonable, no

damages can be awarded based on the evidence in the record. Id. We sustain

Leafguard’s second point. We will remand the case to the trial court for a new trial

to determine whether and to what extent remediation is required by the installation

of the fascia and soffits and, if found, the reasonable and necessary cost therefor.

See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).

      3. The Overhang 4

      McCurtain’s testimony arguably constitutes some evidence that Guidry’s

overhang was “inadequately built.” His testimony further supports the proposition

that in 2019, $9658 would have been a reasonable cost to repair Guidry’s overhang

and that this figure would have increased twenty percent by the time of trial.

Guidry’s testimony does not, however, establish that Leafguard built, or contracted

      4
        In the context of this case, it appears, but is not certain, that Guidry, Guidry’s
attorney, and McCurtain were using the term “overhang” to refer to plywood roof
decking.
                                            16
to build, the overhang on Guidry’s house. Instead, the evidence establishes the

opposite fact. Photos produced by Guidry show deteriorated, old decking which no

longer reached the edge of the roofline. The contract did not provide for Leafguard

to replace any roof decking. This defect would have been hidden from Leafguard

when installing the fascia, and there is evidence this defect was within the purview

of the roofing company that replaced all, or part of, the roof after Hurricane

Harvey—depending upon which version of Mr. Guidry’s testimony is accepted.

Given the lack of evidence that Leafguard was in any way responsible for the

allegedly substandard construction of the overhang, Leafguard cannot be held liable

for the cost of modifying it to meet an acceptable standard. For this reason, the trial

court erred in awarding Guidry the estimated cost of repairing the overhang.

      4. The Roof

      The record contains unsupported accusations by Guidry that Leafguard

damaged Guidry’s roof “by lifting the shingles” in some places when applying the

fascia and soffit boards. This evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial

court’s judgment.

      The trial court awarded Guidry the entire cost of replacing his roof as that

figure was established by McCurtain’s testimony. The record, however, lacks

factually sufficient evidence to show that Leafguard damaged the roof or that Guidry

needed a new roof. Quite the contrary, Guidry’s testimony indicates that he wanted

                                          17
a whole new roof at least partially so that there would be no areas of nonmatching

shingles. McCurtain’s testimony regarding the possible need for a new roof is

conclusory, at best, in that it omits an explanation of how Leafguard actually caused

the damage to the roof and why the entire roof, or any part of it, ostensibly needed

replacement. This testimony therefore constitutes no evidence of probative force

upon which the trial court could have found that Guidry’s roof needed to be replaced,

and it consequently was error to award Guidry this element of damages.

      Although Guidry’s testimony also suggests that he wanted, or needed, a new

roof so that his roof would qualify for a windstorm inspection certificate, the

evidence in the record is factually insufficient to establish that Leafguard caused the

alleged damage to Guidry’s roof. Instead, it is equally likely that the roof issues were

attributable to residual, unrepaired hurricane damage. Guidry’s argument that his

roof did not used to leak is not evidence of Leafguard’s supposed malfeasance, but

instead relies on the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc. Because mere chronology

will not support a finding of causation, we must reverse the trial court’s implicit

finding that Leafguard damaged Guidry’s roof to the extent that Guidry needed a

new roof. See Wortham Bros., Inc. v. Haffner, 347 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. App.—

Eastland, 2011, no. pet.) (Generally, expert testimony is required to establish the

necessity and reasonableness of subsequent roof replacements); see also Cain v.

Bain, 709 S.W.2d at 176 (the court of appeals must consider and weigh all the

                                          18
evidence, and should set aside the verdict only it if is so contrary to the

overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust) (citations

omitted).

       We sustain Leafguard’s second and third points of error and remand these

issues to the trial court for a new trial.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

       Having sustained Leafguard’s issues two through four, we will not address

the issues of damages and attorney fees and remand those issues to the trial court for

determination at a new trial.

       Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court, and conclude that

under the rationale of Long Trusts, Guidry is obligated to pay Leafguard at least

some amount of the contract price of $34,613,5 plus interest and attorney’s fees as

contractually provided. See Long Trusts, 222 S.W.3d at 415-16; Rohrmoos Venture

v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 488-89 (Tex. 2019) (noting that

parties may contractually provide for a reasonable attorney’s fee). This sum should

be offset by Guidry’s reasonable and necessary repair costs, if such costs are raised

by Guidry’s pleadings and properly substantiated by the evidence. See McGinty, 372

S.W.3d at 627 (describing the measure of damages).

       This figure represents the siding cost of $14,900, the window cost of
       5

$17,213, and an agreed change order for $2500.
                                       19
                                  IV. Conclusion

      The judgment of the trial court is not factually supported by the evidence.

Leafguard conclusively established that Guidry failed to pay the contract price for

the work it performed; and Guidry’s evidence in support of his counterclaims lacks

sufficient factual support to sustain the judgment in this case. Having sustained

issues two through four, we decline to reach issues one, five and six as ruling on

those issues would not afford the Appellant any greater relief. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

This case is reversed and remanded for a new trial to establish the contractual

liability of Guidry to Leafguard and to determine any reduction of the contract price

to which Guidry may be entitled, including either party’s reasonable and necessary

attorney fees, consistent with this opinion.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

                                               ________________________________
                                                       JAY WRIGHT
                                                          Justice

Submitted on June 2, 2022
Opinion Delivered May 11, 2023

Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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