Court Opinion

ID: 9684688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:08:17.367275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:58.907414
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ON STATE’S AND APPELLANT’S MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
DAVIS, Commissioner.
Both the State and the appellant have filed motions for rehearing.
The State urges that the witness Feliciana Martinez was not an accomplice witness as a matter of law and, therefore, her testimony need not be corroborated by non-accomplice testimony as required by Art. 38.14, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. The record reflects that the witness was present at the planning of the crime. The witness, appellant and their companions who entered the store and commited the murder and robbery all went to the scene of the crime in the same automobile. Feliciana Martinez and appellant waited for their companions in the getaway car until the crime was committed. The witness received a share of the fruits of the crime, however, slight they may have been. Certainly, there was evidence that the witness Martinez was an accomplice. At the very least, there was evidence which would have required submission of the fact question of whether she was an accomplice witness in the court’s charge to the jury. It follows that we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the witness was not an accomplice. Further, the trial court having charged the jury that Feliciana Martinez was an accomplice as a matter of law, such instruction became the law under which the jury was required to decide the case. For this court to consider the case on the basis that Feliciana Martinez was not an accomplice witness would be placing us in the position of reviewing the case on appeal upon a premise different from that upon which it was submitted to the jury.
Appellant urges this Court to reach a different disposition of the cause than the order of reversal and remand that was entered in the original opinion. Specifically, he requests that this Court either enter a judgment of acquittal or dismissal or that it instruct the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal. This request is based upon the premise that the trial court committed fundamental error when it refused to grant appellant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal following the conclusion of the State’s evidence. At this point in the trial of the cause, the appellant pointed out the fact that the State had failed to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice witness. Therefore, the appellant contends that this court should now “undertake to do what the trial court failed to do.”
This contention, however, is against established precedent and statutory requirement. Article 44.25, V.A.C.C.P., expressly provides that, “The Court of Criminal Appeals may reverse the judgment in a criminal action, as well upon the law as upon the facts. A cause reversed because the verdict is contrary to the evidence shall be remanded for new trial.” (emphasis added). In addition, this Court has held in numerous cases that the proper disposition, upon a finding that the evidence is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice witness, is to reverse and remand that cause for a new trial. See Noble v. State, 100 Tex.Cr.R. 404, 273 S.W. 251; Franklin v. State, 62 Tex.Cr.R. 433, 138 S.W. 112; Durham v. State, 106 Tex.Cr.R. 85, 290 S.W. 1092; Morris v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 384, 120 S.W.2d 592; Donley v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 427, 320 S.W.2d 847.
Appellant also contends that a retrial of this cause would place him in double jeopardy as he was entitled to an acquittal at the conclusion of the State’s evidence. This question is not before us; however compare Dupree v. State, 56 Tex.Cr.R. 562, 120 S.W. *870871 (1909); Andrews v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 436 S.W.2d 546; Whitehead v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 507, 286 S.W.2d 947.
For the reasons stated above, the motions for rehearing are overruled.
Opinion approved by the Court.