Court Opinion

ID: 9627541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:47:32.652621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:46.822358
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a criminal case. The issues presented are:
1. Is a minute entry signed by the judge sufficient to dismiss a criminal case?
Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that it is not.
2. Is an order dismissing a criminal case nunc pro tunc effective to dismiss the case as of a prior date, where the judge announced his intention to dismiss the case on the prior date and where an order carrying out this intent was not entered through inadvertence? We hold that the nunc pro tunc order is effective to dismiss the case.
3. Was any violation of I.C. § 19-3501(2) proved by Horsley?
We hold that no violation of I.C. § 19-3501(2) was proved.
4. Is an affidavit from the director of a private laboratory reporting the results of DNA-based genetic tests on body fluids admissible under I.C.R. 5.1(b) as showing the existence or nonexistence of “medical facts or records?”
We hold that the affidavit is not admissible.
5. May hearsay evidence be admitted under I.R.E. 803(24) when there are not specific findings that each of the five requirements of the rule have been fulfilled?
We hold that the hearsay is not admissible.
*922I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.
In April 1987 a woman was raped in her home in Sandpoint by an intruder. The victim promptly reported the rape and was given an examination to determine the presence of evidence of the perpetrator’s identity. Semen was identified in the vaginal secretions that were taken from her. She also gave a sample of her blood.
Todd Horsley had previously lived next door to the victim, but had moved before the rape. Suspecting that Horsley was the perpetrator, police officers went to his home. They told Horsley that he was suspected of raping a woman. They asked him if he was willing to take a blood test in order to exculpate himself. Horsley voluntarily gave the officers a sample of his blood.
The police sent blood samples of the victim and Horsley and vaginal secretions of the victim to Lifecodes Corporation in the state of New York. Lifecodes is a private DNA-based genetic diagnostic and research laboratory that uses the DNA-PRINT identification test to identify and compare body tissues and fluids. The test takes the biological evidence and examines it at its most fundamental level — the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecule — to uncover the genetic code of the person whose tissue or fluid is being tested.
The director of Lifecodes’ clinical laboratory sent an affidavit to the police stating that he oversaw the conduct of the “scientific analysis” of the samples sent to Lifecodes by the police and authored a report attached to the affidavit. The report stated that the DNA-PRINT pattern seen in the vaginal secretions of the victim matched the pattern from Horsley’s blood sample. The report concluded: “This pattern would occur in the population in 1:12,-678,667.”
A criminal complaint was filed charging Horsley with raping the victim. A preliminary hearing was held at which the affidavit of the director of Lifecodes’ laboratory was admitted over Horsley’s objection. Horsley was bound over for trial. An information was filed on August 26, 1987 (the first case). Trial was set to begin on December 15, 1987.
Horsley moved to suppress the results of the analysis by Lifecodes of the blood samples and vaginal secretions. On December 10, 1987, a hearing was held on the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. An issue also arose in the hearing concerning whether defense counsel had received background materials about Lifecodes. The prosecutor then stated:
I advised [defense counsel] in court today, that I will not know until tomorrow morning because of the delay in time awaiting this motion hearing as to whether or not Dr. Baird and his supervisor are available from Lifecodes. I anticipate they will be but I cannot give that guarantee because I could not make the financial obligation requirements to guarantee the days at trial. Collateral to that if we are going to have a challenge to that or request for continuance for the defense based on [defense counsel’s] representation that he has not received Lifecodes material, I think it’s something that needs to be addressed today or tomorrow. I don’t want to spend a couple thousand dollars of taxpayers money to have the people get here and five-hundred dollars a day.
While they were still in the hearing, the prosecutor delivered the background materials about Lifecodes to Horsley’s attorney, who then moved to suppress the materials. The trial court denied the motion and inquired whether there were any other motions. Horsley’s attorney declined to move for a continuance. The judge said the trial would begin as scheduled on December 15th.
On December 14, 1987, the prosecutor moved to continue the trial until after January 1, 1988, on the grounds that the two essential witnesses from Lifecodes were not available to testify at the trial. Horsley objected to a continuance, and the trial *923court denied the motion to continue. The prosecutor then moved to dismiss the case without prejudice to refiling the charge, on the ground that the state could not proceed “because of the unavailability of the witness or witnesses from the State of New York.” Horsley’s attorney objected on the ground that the motion was “just nothing but a motion to nolle prosequi to suspend prosecution,” which he said had been abolished by statute in Idaho.
The trial court orally dismissed the case under I.C.R. 48: “The dismissal is without prejudice and the reason for the dismissal is the basis that the State has indicated that it is not prepared to proceed in the absence of a continuance and in the absence of the two witnesses from Lifecodes.” The trial court directed the prosecutor to prepare an order for his signature. The court minutes of this hearing prepared by the deputy clerk note: “Court grants Prosecutor’s Motion to dismiss in re Rule 48C — dismissal is without prejudice. Mr. Robinson [the prosecutor] to prepare Order.” The district judge signed the minutes at the bottom of this page, which was the second of two pages of the minutes, opposite the printed words: “APPROVED as to Pages_through__” No order of dismissal appears in the record until one signed by the district judge on April 21, 1988, on which is added in handwriting: “nunc pro tunc Dec. 14, 1987.”
On December 17, 1987, the prosecutor signed a new complaint charging Horsley with the same crime as was charged in the first case. The complaint was filed on January 4, 1988, and a summons issued for Horsley to appear on January 19, 1988. Horsley was arraigned on January 19th. A preliminary hearing was held on February 3, 1988.
At the preliminary hearing on this new complaint the prosecutor offered in evidence the same affidavit of the director of Lifecodes’ clinical laboratory that was admitted in the preliminary hearing in the first case. Horsley’s attorney objected to the admission of the report attached to the affidavit on the ground that the report contained the results of a scientific examination of evidence which was not admissible under I.C.R. 5.1 as an exception to the hearsay rule unless the examination was made by a state or federal agency or official. The magistrate admitted the report under I.C.R. 5.1, as evidence showing “the existence or nonexistence of business or medical facts and records.” The magistrate also found the source of the evidence to be credible, based on the testimony of a police officer and exhibits concerning the background of Lifecodes. Based in part on the Lifecodes report, the magistrate found probable cause to believe that Horsley had raped the victim and bound him over for trial.
On February 8, 1988, the prosecutor filed an information charging Horsley with raping the victim in April 1987 (the second case). Trial was set for May 10, 1988.
Horsley filed a motion to dismiss the new information on the ground that the state had denied him his right to trial within six months from the filing of the information as provided in I.C. § 19-3501. In support of the motion Horsley argued that (1) the first case was still pending because no order of dismissal had been signed or filed in the first case and (2) the second case was a duplicate of the first case and should not have been filed. He contended that dismissal of the second case would leave the same charge pending, but would allow him to protect his constitutional rights and remedies. He also argued that the conduct of the prosecution in dismissing the first case coupled with the refiling of identical charges had denied him due process of law and deprived him of speedy trial rights.
The trial court ruled that the first case had been dismissed since December 14, 1987, and directed the prosecutor to prepare an order dismissing the first case without prejudice, effective on December 14,1987. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that Horsley had not presented any evidence that he had been prejudiced by the delay in his ability to present a defense to the charge. The order dismissing the first case “nunc pro tunc Dec. 14, 1987” was signed by the district judge the same day.
*924Horsley then moved to quash the order binding him over for trial and to dismiss the information in the second case. The basis for this motion was the admission at the preliminary hearing of the report from Lifecodes. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the report was admissible at the preliminary hearing under both I.C.R. 5.1 and I.R.E. 803(24).
Horsley entered a conditional plea of guilty under I.C.R. 11(a)(2), reserving the right to challenge on appeal: (1) the trial court’s denials of his motion to dismiss the information for lack of a speedy trial and because there was more than one action pending and (2) the trial court’s refusal to quash the order binding him over for trial and refusal to dismiss the information after the admission of the report from Lifecodes in the preliminary hearing.
The trial court sentenced Horsley to a term of not less than three nor more than seven years and retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Pursuant to his conditional plea, Horsley’s attorney filed a notice of appeal from the denial of the motions to dismiss and to quash.
While his appeal went forward, Horsley began to serve his sentence. At the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the trial court relinquished any further jurisdiction of the case without changing the sentence. Horsley personally filed a second notice of appeal in which he appealed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.
The appeal was argued before this Court on April 5, 1988. At the argument we considered only the issues raised in the brief filed by Horsley’s attorney based on the first notice of appeal. Subsequently, a brief prepared by Horsley himself was filed in which he raised issues related to the relinquishment of jurisdiction by the trial court.
Following the death of our colleague Justice Allan G. Shepard and the resignation of our colleague Justice Robert C. Huntley, the remaining three members of the Court were unable to reach a decision in this case. In September 1989 the Court, with two new members, agreed that this appeal would be decided on the issues raised in the brief submitted by Horsley’s attorney, based upon the briefs filed by the parties and upon the tape of the oral argument on April 5, 1989. By our decision today we express no opinion on the merits of the issues raised in the brief filed by Horsley himself. Those issues are moot in any event, because we vacate Horsley’s conviction and sentence.
II.
THE MINUTE ENTRY SIGNED BY THE JUDGE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DISMISS THE FIRST CASE.
Horsley asserts that the first case was not dismissed by the minute entry of the deputy clerk, approved by the district judge. We Agree.
Horsley contends that an order of the trial court must be in written form as specified in I.C.R. 12(c). That rule refers to the form of pleadings and documents in criminal proceedings. It requires that “[ejvery ... order of the court shall be typed with black ribbon or produced by a computer or word processor type printer of letter quality on white paper____” The minute entry by the deputy clerk on December 14, 1987, that was signed by the district judge indicating his approval did not comply with this requirement.
Also, the minute entry approved by the district judge did not comply with the requirement of I.C.R. 48(b): “Order of dismissal. When a court dismisses a criminal action upon its own motion or upon the motion of any party under this rule, it shall state in the order of dismissal its reasons for such dismissal.” The minute entry here merely stated: “Court grants Prosecutor’s Motion to dismiss in re Rule 48 C (sic) — dismissal is without prejudice. Mr. Robinson [the prosecutor] to prepare Order.” This minute entry did not comply with the requirement of I.C.R. 48(b), since it did not state the reasons for the dismissal.
More than seventy years ago this Court held that notations in court minutes do not *925constitute a judgment from which an appeal may be taken. State v. Barnard, 13 Idaho 439, 90 P. 1 (1907). Barnard was cited in State v. Mason, 102 Idaho 866, 867 n. 2, 643 P.2d 78, 79 n. 2 (1982), for the proposition that “a minute entry reciting an order of the district court was not a judgment appealable to this Court.” Our Court of Appeals cited both Barnard and Mason in State v. Gissel, 105 Idaho 287, 289, 668 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Ct.App.1983) (review denied), for the proposition that “a premature notice of appeal is a nullity and does not vest jurisdiction in the appellate court, notwithstanding a subsequently entered written judgment.”
There is no indication in the opinion in Barnard whether the judge had signed the minute entry in question. However, we need not consider whether the signature of the judge in this case approving the minutes distinguishes this case from Barnard. Even if we were to construe the minutes as an order of dismissal, the order would be ineffective. It does not state the reasons for the dismissal as required by I.C.R. 48(b).
We conclude that Horsley could not have appealed from the “order of dismissal” to which the minute entry referred. Therefore, we hold that the minute entry was not effective to dismiss the first case.
AS TO PART II:
BISTLINE, JOHNSON, BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.