Court Opinion

ID: 9949090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 19:03:03.535883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:36.723390
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/24 Construction Employers Assn. v. Cal. Dept. of Industrial Relations etc. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 CONSTRUCTION EMPLOYERS                                                                        C097709
 ASSOCIATION et al.,
                                                                                    (Super. Ct. No. 34-2021-
                    Plaintiffs and Respondents,                                    80003714-CU-WM-GDS)

           v.

 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
 RELATIONS, DIVISION OF LABOR
 STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT et al.,

                    Defendants and Respondents;

 CALIFORNIA STATE PIPE TRADES JOINT
 APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE et al.,

                    Movants and Appellants.

 THE LABORERS TRAINING AND RETRAINING                                                          C097709
 TRUST OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA et al.,
                                                                                    (Super. Ct. No. 34-2021-
                    Plaintiffs and Respondents,                                    80003715-CU-WM-GDS)

           v.

 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
 RELATIONS, DIVISION OF LABOR
 STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT et al.,
          Defendants and Respondents;

                                                             1
    CALIFORNIA STATE PIPE TRADES JOINT
    APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE et al.,

               Movants and Appellants.

    ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS                                    C097709
    OF CALIFORNIA, INC., et al.
                                                              (Super. Ct. No. 34-2021-
               Plaintiffs and Respondents,                   80003735-CU-WM-GDS)

         v.

    CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
    RELATIONS, DIVISION OF LABOR
    STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT et al.,

               Defendants and Respondents;

    CALIFORNIA STATE PIPE TRADES JOINT
    APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE et al.,

               Movants and Appellants.

        In this appeal we consider whether a group of apprentices and apprenticeship
programs should have been granted leave to intervene in three related lawsuits
challenging the validity of regulations pertaining to the employment of registered
apprentices on public works projects. The movant-appellants (Movants) contend that the
trial court should have granted their motion for mandatory or permissive intervention
under Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (d)(1)(B) or (d)(2).1
        We conclude the trial court properly denied mandatory intervention because
Movants failed to show they were not adequately represented by the existing parties. We
further conclude the trial court was within its discretion to deny permissive intervention

1       Undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                             2
on the ground that the reasons for intervention were outweighed by the rights of the
existing parties to conduct the litigation on their own terms. We therefore affirm the
order denying intervention.
                                LEGAL BACKGROUND
       In general, California’s prevailing wage law requires that workers employed on
public works projects be paid not less than the prevailing rate of wages for work of a
similar character in the locality in which the public work is performed. (Lab. Code,
§ 1771.) The prevailing wage law is designed to benefit employees on public works
projects by, among other things, protecting them from the substandard wages that might
otherwise be paid if contractors could hire cheaper out-of-market labor. (City of El
Centro v. Lanier (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1501.)
       Labor Code section 1777.5 is the provision of the prevailing wage law governing
apprentice employment. (Southern California Cement Masons Joint Apprenticeship
Committee v. California Apprenticeship Council (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1531, 1536
(Cement Masons).) Labor Code section 1777.5 promotes apprenticeship by requiring
contractors who hire workers in any “apprenticeable craft or trade” to also hire a certain
number of apprentices.2 (Henson v. C. Overaa & Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 184, 189
(Henson); Cement Masons, supra, at pp. 1536-1537; Lab. Code, § 1777.5, subds. (d), (g),
(i).) For contractors, the major benefit of hiring apprentices is that they can pay them a
special “apprentice wage” rate, which is typically lower than the journey-level prevailing
wage rate. (Lab. Code, § 1777.5, subd. (b)(1); Henson, supra, at p. 189; Associated
Builders & Contrs. of S. Cal. v. Nunn (9th Cir. 2004) 356 F.3d 979, 983.) Only
registered apprentices from approved apprenticeship programs are eligible to receive the

2      “ ‘Apprenticeable craft or trade’ . . . means a craft or trade determined as an
apprenticeable occupation in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the
California Apprenticeship Council.” (Lab. Code, § 1777.5, subd. (d).)

                                             3
lower wage rates, and the employment and training of each such apprentices must be “in
accordance with” either (1) the apprenticeship standards and agreements under which he
or she is training, or (2) the rules and regulations of the California Apprenticeship
Council (the Council). (Lab. Code, § 1777.5, subd. (c).)
       Oversight of apprenticeship standards and programs is vested in two entities
within the Department of Industrial Relations: The Division of Apprenticeship Standards
and the Council. (Henson, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 189-190.) The Division’s
responsibilities include administering the apprenticeship law and investigating standards
for apprenticeship programs. (Henson, at p. 190; Lab. Code, §§ 3073, 3075, 3090.) The
Council’s responsibilities include issuing rules and regulations establishing
apprenticeship standards for minimum wages, maximum hours, and working conditions
in the building and construction trades. (Henson, at p. 190; Lab. Code, §§ 3070, 3071,
subd. (a).) The Council is expressly empowered by statute to promulgate regulations
interpreting the substantive requirements of Labor Code section 1777.5 and defining what
is an “apprenticeable occupation” for purposes of that statute. (Lab. Code, §§ 1777.5,
subd. (d), 1777.7, subd. (g).)
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       This appeal involves a challenge to the Council’s amendments to regulations
pertaining to the employment of registered apprentices on public works projects (Notice
of Approval of Regulatory Action, Off. of Adm. Law, Matter No. 2021-0222-02 (Aug. 6,
2021), amending Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 8, § 202 et seq. (the Regulations). As relevant
here, the amendments made two changes intended to “clarify and make more specific”
the substantive requirements for apprentices to qualify for payment of “apprentice
wages” under Labor Code section 1777.5. The first was to revise the definition of
“ ‘Apprenticeable Occupation’ ” in section 205, subdivision (c) of the Regulations to
expressly tie that definition to “the work processes contained in the approved

                                              4
apprenticeship standards under which [the] apprentices are training.”3 (Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 8, § 205, subd. (c).) The second was to amend section 230.1, subdivision (c) of the
Regulations to require that contractors only assign registered apprentices work that is
included in the apprenticeship standards under which such apprentices are training, and
not any other work. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 230.1, subd. (c).) To qualify for the
special “apprentice wage” rate under the revised Regulations, a registered apprentice
must be performing work that is part of the work processes specifically enumerated in the
apprentice’s approved training program.
       The Council’s initial statement of reasons for the Regulations explained that the
purpose of the amendments was to “ensure that the work performed by apprentices on
public works is a genuine part of their training program leading to journey-level status,
and conversely that apprentices will not be used as a source of cheap labor for work
processes that are not part of their structured and approved training program.”
       Plaintiffs filed three separate petitions/complaints challenging the validity of the
Regulations. The petitions generally alleged that the Regulations were invalid because
the Council exceeded its statutory rulemaking authority and because it failed to comply
with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code,
§ 11340 et seq.) (APA). The trial court ordered the three cases related.
       In September 2021, some of the plaintiffs filed motions for preliminary injunctions
seeking to enjoin the Regulations. The trial court subsequently approved joint
stipulations staying the effect of the Regulations during the pendency of the litigation.
       Movants in this matter consist of a group of apprenticeship committees that
operate apprenticeship programs and individual apprentices enrolled in apprenticeship
programs. On November 24, 2021, Movants filed a motion to intervene as defendants in

3     The challenged Regulations also add new definitions for the terms “ ‘Work
process’ ” and “ ‘Registered Apprentice.’ ” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 205, subd. (p), (q).)

                                              5
the three related cases. Movants argued that they had a mandatory right to intervene
under section 387, subdivision (d)(1)(B) because (1) they have an interest in the benefits
of the Regulations (2) that would be impaired if the Regulations were invalidated and
(3) their interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties. Alternatively,
Movants argued they should be granted permission to intervene under section 387,
subdivision (d)(2).
       Although the Council filed a “Statement in Support” of the requested intervention,
the trial court denied the intervention motion. The trial court reasoned that Movants were
not entitled to mandatory intervention because their interest was adequately represented
by the Council. The court further concluded that permissive intervention was not
appropriate because it would enlarge the issues in the case and because their reasons for
intervention did not outweigh the opposing reasons of the existing parties. Movants
timely appealed the orders denying their intervention motion.
                                        DISCUSSION
       Movants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion for mandatory or
permissive intervention. We disagree.
                                               I
                                   Mandatory Intervention
       A.     Legal Principles
       In the absence of a statute conferring an unconditional right to intervene,
mandatory intervention is governed by section 387, subdivision (d)(1)(B). Under that
section, to establish a right to mandatory intervention, a proposed intervenor must (upon
timely application) establish that (1) it has an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, (2) the disposition of the action may impair or
impede its ability to protect that interest, and (3) the party is not adequately represented
by one or more existing parties. (§ 387, subd. (d)(1)(B); Edwards v. Heartland Payment
Systems, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 725, 732 (Edwards); Carlsbad Police Officers Assn.

                                               6
v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 135, 148; Accurso v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1136-1138 (Accurso), review granted, Nov. 29, 2023, S282173,
briefing deferred.) Failure to satisfy any one of these requirements defeats intervention.
(§ 387, subd. (d)(1)(B); Arakaki v. Cayetano (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3d 1078, 1083
(Arakaki); Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents (9th Cir. 2009) 587 F.3d 947, 950
(Perry).)
       In evaluating these requirements, we may take guidance from federal court
decisions. (Edwards, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 732.) Because section 387, subdivision
(b) is “ ‘in substance an exact counterpart to rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,’ ” California courts have concluded the Legislature must have intended it to
be interpreted consistently with cases interpreting the federal rule. (Edwards, at p. 732;
Hodge v. Kirkpatrick Development, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 540, 556 (Hodge).)
       To satisfy the threshold “interest” test, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that the proposed intervener must have a “significantly protectable interest” that relates to
the subject of the action. (Donaldson v. United States (1971) 400 U.S. 517, 531
[27 L.Ed.2d 580, 589], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Polselli v.
Internal Revenue Service (2023) 598 U.S. 432, 444 [215 L.Ed.2d 410]; Arakaki, supra,
324 F.3d at p. 1084; see Siena Court Homeowners Assn. v. Green Valley Corp. (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424.) The interest in the litigation must be direct and immediate,
rather than contingent or consequential, such that the moving party “ ‘ “will either gain or
lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” ’ [Citation.]” (City and
County of San Francisco v. State of California (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1037.)
       The second element, impairment, is related to the existence of a significantly
protectable interest. (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Com. (10th Cir. 1978) 578 F.2d 1341, 1345.) When a proposed intervenor
establishes a substantial legal interest in an action, courts generally will have little
difficulty concluding that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair

                                               7
or impede that interest. (See State ex rel. Lockyer v. United States (9th Cir. 2006)
450 F.3d 436, 442.)4 But even if a proposed intervenor has a protectable interest that
may be impaired or impeded, a court will not grant mandatory intervention if an existing
party adequately represents that interest. (§ 387, subd. (d)(1)(B).)
       In evaluating the adequacy of representation, federal courts consider three factors:
“(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a
proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to
make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary
elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect.” (Arakaki, supra, 324 F.3d
at p. 1086.) “The most important factor . . . is how the [proposed intervenor’s] interest
compares with the interests of existing parties.” (Ibid., citation omitted.)
       Typically, a party moving to intervene need only show there is a significant
possibility that representation of its interest by existing parties “ ‘may be’ ” inadequate.
(United States v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2002) 288 F.3d 391, 398; Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard Corp.) (1st Cir.
2015) 807 F.3d 472, 475.) However, when the movant and an existing party share the
same interest in the litigation, or the movant seeks to defend a law alongside a
government defendant, a presumption of adequacy arises, and a compelling showing is
required to demonstrate inadequate representation. (Callahan v. Brookdale Senior Living
Cmtys., Inc. (9th Cir. 2022) 42 F.4th 1013, 1020-1021 (Callahan); Prete v. Bradbury (9th
Cir. 2006) 438 F.3d 949, 957 (Prete); Arakaki, supra, 324 F.3d at p. 1086.) When the
parties share the same ultimate objective, mere differences in litigation strategy or legal

4      The most notable exception is when the proposed intervenor has an alternative
forum or other means to protect its interest. (See State ex rel. Lockyer v. United States,
supra, 450 F.3d at p. 442; Hodge, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 550-554.)

                                              8
tactics are not enough to justify intervention. (Callahan, supra, 42 F.4th at p. 1021;
Perry, supra, 587 F.3d at p. 954.)
       While courts have recognized that the requirements of section 387 should be
liberally construed in favor of intervention, the moving party bears the burden of proving
entitlement to intervene as a party. (Accurso, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1137, review
granted.)
       The standard of review for an order denying mandatory intervention is unsettled,
with some courts suggesting de novo review and others abuse of discretion. (Turrieta v.
Lyft, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 955, 976, review granted Jan. 5, 2022, S271721, fully
briefed.) We conclude de novo review is the appropriate standard. We reach this
conclusion because the question is predominantly legal and because we find the de novo
standard more consistent with the legislative intent behind a mandatory right of
intervention. (Accurso, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1136, 1139-1141, review granted;
Perry, supra, 587 F.3d at p. 950; see 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (1994)
8 Cal.4th 216, 271.)
       B.     Analysis
       Movants argue the trial court erred in denying their motion for mandatory
intervention because they have a legally protectable interest as “beneficiaries” of the
challenged Regulations; their interest would be impaired by a decision invalidating the
Regulations; and their interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties. We
are not persuaded. We agree with the trial court’s decision to deny mandatory
intervention because Movants failed to show their interest in the litigation was not
adequately represented by the Council.
       First, because Movants and the Council share the same interest in defending the
Regulations, a presumption of adequacy of representation applies. (See, e.g., Arakaki,
supra, 324 F.3d at pp. 1086-1087; Callahan, supra, 42 F.4th at p. 1021, fn. 5.) To

                                             9
overcome this presumption, Movants were required to make a compelling showing that
the Council’s representation would be inadequate. (Callahan, at p. 1021, fn. 5.)
       Citing Berger v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP (2022) 597 U.S. 179
[213 L.Ed.2d 517] (Berger), Movants argue that the presumption of adequacy should not
apply because Movants’ interest in the Regulations, while similar, is not identical to that
of the Council. In particular, Movants contend their interest is more “ ‘narrow and
parochial,’ ” representing only the apprentices and apprenticeship programs that support
the Regulations, whereas the Council has a broader interest in defending its statutory
rulemaking authority.
       Movants’ reliance on Berger, supra, 597 U.S. 179 [213 L.Ed.2d 517] is misplaced.
Berger expressly did not decide “whether a presumption of adequate representation might
sometimes be appropriate when a private litigant seeks to defend a law alongside the
government or in any other circumstance.” (Id. at p. 197 [213 L.Ed.2d at p. 533].) It
simply held that such a presumption is inappropriate under the facts in that case, where “a
duly authorized state agent seeks to intervene to defend a state law.” (Ibid.)
       In any event, we are not convinced there is any meaningful divergence between
Movants’ and the Council’s interests with respect to the subject of this action. The
questions presented in the action are whether the Council exceeded its statutory
rulemaking authority or failed to comply with the APA’s procedural requirements in
enacting the Regulations. Movants have failed to show that there is any divergence or
potential divergence of interests with respect to these issues. While the Council may
have been statutorily required to balance broader interests when it was crafting the
Regulations, the Council’s interest in this litigation is singular and narrow: to defend and
uphold the Regulations. For Movants, it is the same.5 (Perry, supra, 587 F.3d at

5     Movants claim an interest in upholding the Regulations because they want to
achieve the regulatory benefits that the Regulations will provide, namely expanded

                                             10
pp. 951-952; Prete, supra, 438 F.3d at p. 957; Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC
v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 2020) 960 F.3d 603, 620 (Oakland Bulk); see Washington
Electric Coop., Inc. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Co. (2d Cir. 1990)
922 F.2d 92, 98.)
       Because a presumption of adequacy applies, Movants may only intervene as of a
right upon a compelling showing of inadequacy of representation. Movants failed to
meet that burden. As discussed, when evaluating the adequacy of representation, courts
consider three factors: (1) whether the interest of the existing party is such that it will
undoubtedly make all the proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the current
parties can and will make those arguments; and (3) whether the intervenor offers a
necessary element to the proceedings that otherwise would be neglected. (Arakaki,
supra, 324 F.3d at p. 1086.) In support of their motion, Movants made no attempt to
address either of the first two factors.6 Movants simply argued that representation should
be deemed inadequate because their interests were “qualitatively different” and “ ‘more
narrow and parochial’ ” than the Council. But Movants never explained why the
Council’s status precludes effective representation of their interest in defending the
Regulations. (See Public Serv. Co. v. Patch (1st Cir. 1998) 136 F.3d 197, 207-208.)
Movants did not offer any evidence to suggest that the Council would give Labor Code
section 1777.5 a narrower construction or that it would not mount a complete defense of
its own Regulations. Nor did they identify any argument that the Council would be

opportunities for on-the-job training and protection from exploitation as a source of cheap
labor. This tracks the stated purpose of the Regulations, which Movants helped
formulate.
6      Our review is limited to the evidence before the court at the time of the ruling on
the motion; we need not and do not address claims based on events occurring after the
court’s ruling. (Scates v. Rydingsword (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1085, 1096.)

                                              11
incapable or unwilling to make.7 (Ibid.) As a result, there was no tangible basis—
beyond speculation and conjecture—to support their claim of inadequate representation.
(Public Serv. Co. v. Patch, supra, 136 F.3d at p. 207.)
       As for the third factor, Movants suggested—in a single sentence in their brief—
that they could “augment” the Council’s defense because they “possess significant
experience in apprenticeship training and particular knowledge about the evils that the
Regulations were meant to address.” However, the court rejected a similar argument in
Prete, supra, 438 F.3d 949, concluding that specialized experience or knowledge is
insufficient to demonstrate inadequacy of representation without showing the existing
party lacked comparable experience or knowledge. (Id. at pp. 958-959; accord, Oakland
Bulk, supra, 960 F.3d at p. 621.) In any event, what matters for adequacy of
representation is whether Movants have specialized knowledge or experience relevant to
the issues raised in the action. Movants never explained how their specialized experience
and knowledge would add a new, necessary perspective on the Council’s authority to
adopt the Regulations or its compliance with APA requirements. Movants suggested
nothing that they would bring to the proceedings which the Council, “in its own interest,
would not be equally motivated to urge.” (Dilks v. Aloha Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 1981)
642 F.2d 1155, 1157.) Speculation about possible differences in litigation strategy based
on the notion that the Council represents “broader” governmental interests is not enough
to justify intervention as of right. (Perry, supra, 587 F.3d at p. 954; Daggett v.
Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices (1st Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 104,
112 [general notion that government-defendant represents broader interests at some
abstract level is insufficient]; see Massachusetts Food Ass’n v. Massachusetts Alcoholic

7       We decline to consider Movants’ argument that the Council’s decision to stipulate
to a stay shows a divergence of interests. Movants forfeited this argument by failing to
raise it below. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee
Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

                                             12
Bevs. Control Comm’n (1st Cir. 1999) 197 F.3d 560, 567 [rejecting notion that state
defendant’s representation is inadequate simply because it regulates the entity seeking to
intervene].)
       Movants failed to show why the government would not adequately represent their
interest in these cases. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied their request for
mandatory intervention.
                                               II
                                   Permissive Intervention
       We next turn to the question of whether the trial court improperly denied
Movants’ request for permissive intervention.
       Permissive intervention is governed by section 387, subdivision (d)(2), which
provides in pertinent part, “The court may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to
intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.” (§ 387,
subd. (d)(2).) “Under this provision, ‘ “the trial court has discretion to permit a nonparty
to intervene where the following factors are met: (1) the proper procedures have been
followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action; (3) the
intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the
intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action. [Citation.]” ’
[Citations.]” (Edwards, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 736.)
       “The trial court must balance the interests of those affected by a judgment against
the interests of the original parties in pursuing their case unburdened by others.
[Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion to strike this balance. [Citation.] We thus
review for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (South Coast Air Quality Management Dist.
v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 314, 320 (South Coast Air).) We will
disturb an exercise of that discretion only in the rare case when the court exercised it in
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner resulting in a manifest miscarriage of

                                               13
justice. (Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1434; see
McHenry v. Comm’r (4th Cir. 2012) 677 F.3d 214, 219 [reversal of a decision denying
permissive intervention is extremely rare].) We will presume the court’s judgment is
correct and indulge all reasonable intendments and presumptions in favor of affirmance.
(Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) The burden
of demonstrating error rests on the appellant. (Ibid.)
       We find no abuse of discretion here. Even if we assume the other factors are
met—proper procedures were followed, the movant has an interest in the action, and
intervention will not enlarge the issues—we affirm based on the finding that the
Movants’ reasons for intervention are outweighed by the rights of the existing parties to
conduct the lawsuits on their own terms.
       In South Coast Air, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at page 314, the Second Appellate
District concluded that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying a
union’s motion to intervene in an environmental dispute concerning the Port of Los
Angeles because the union’s participation would have been “largely cumulative and
would unduly complicate an already complicated case.” (Id. at p. 321.) Similar
considerations apply here. The trial court reasonably could have concluded that
Movants’ interest in defending the Regulations was adequately represented by the
Council and that Movants’ participation would be largely cumulative and unduly
distracting. Thus, the trial court’s decision to deny permissive intervention was within
the bounds of reason.8 (South Coast Air, at p. 322; see Coalition for Fair Rent v.
Abdelnour (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 97, 116 [affirming denial of permissive

8      Our decision in People ex rel. Rominger v. County of Trinity (1983)
147 Cal.App.3d 655, does not compel a contrary conclusion. This case is distinguishable
from Rominger because the proposed intervenors, in that case, alleged such a compelling
and discrete interest in the outcome of the litigation, separate from the defendant county,
that denying intervention would be a clear abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 660-661, 665.)
Movants made no similar showing here.

                                             14
intervention where there was “no difference” in the positions of the proposed intervenor
and the respondent]; Ziani Homeowners Assn. v. Brookfield Ziani LLC (2015)
243 Cal.App.4th 274, 282 [“Intervention is not necessary or desirable when the
intervener’s interests are adequately represented, as it would serve only to complicate and
delay the litigation for no good reason.”])
                                      DISPOSITION
       The order denying the motion to intervene is affirmed. Respondents shall recover
their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), & (2).)

                                                        \s\                  ,
                                                   Krause, J.

We concur:

     \s\                    ,
Duarte, Acting P. J.

     \s\                    ,
Renner, J.

                                              15