Court Opinion

ID: 9518021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:40:58.168155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:00.223281
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CASTILLE,
concurring.
I join the Majority Opinion, with the exception of its characterization of the Superior Court’s error as “attempting] to promulgate a new rule of criminal procedure” outside of the formal rule-making process. See Majority opinion at 17 & 19, 977 A.2d at 1093 & 1094. The Majority correctly disapproves of the sm sponte decisional “rule” the Superior Court adopted, which would require trial courts to afford criminal defendants the opportunity to forward claims of ineffectiveness in addition to claims of trial court error on direct appeal, i.e., hybrid, unitary review, whenever they determine that a PCRA1 petitioner has proven entitlement to reinstatement of *21direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. In my judgment, the Superior Court’s error did not involve a usurpation of this Court’s rulemaking role, but rather, a good faith but fundamental misapprehension of the governing principles this Court has laid out in cases such as Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002), Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003), and Commonwealth v. OBerg, 584 Pa. 11, 880 A.2d 597 (2005), when faced with circumstances that differed from those discussed in our precedent. I realize that the Commonwealth poses the error as a supervisory one implicating this Court’s exclusive rulemaking role, but I view that as a sound strategic posture deriving from the Commonwealth’s recognition that its chances for review were enhanced by casting its claims as involving more than mere error review.2
I write not only to explain my view of the nature of the Superior Court’s error but also to express my belief that the circumstances in this case provide a greater and additional reason for this Court to counsel the lower courts not to take affirmative steps to accommodate unitary review under the so-called Bomar exception to Grant. In my judgment, the mischief we are called upon to remedy is much more a result of the unintended consequences of Bomar than a result of the Superior Court losing sight of its institutional role and seeking to adopt perceived efficiencies which, unfortunately, failed to fully appreciate other, competing values. Contrary to the Superior Court’s conclusion, our intent in Bomar was never to *22create a “right” to hybrid review. For the reasons I discuss below, and consistently with this Court’s signal in Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 961 A.2d 119 (2008), I would formally limit Bomar to its pre-Grant, unitary review facts, and I would direct trial judges and the Superior Court not to create or indulge unitary, hybrid review in the post-verdict and direct appeal context, unless such review is accompanied by an express, knowing and voluntary waiver of PCRA review. This approach would allow for acceleration of collateral review in some instances, but would not, as would happen here under the Superior Court’s rule, arbitrarily afford certain defendants both accelerated and multiple rounds of collateral review.3
The Superior Court in this case, sitting en banc, undertook to craft an extension of this Court’s decision in Bomar, a capital direct appeal in which this Court passed upon claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which were fully litigated and decided in the court below solely because the trial court proceedings in Bomar were conducted at a time prior to this Court’s decision in Grant, i.e., when ineffectiveness claims were required to be raised immediately by new counsel, under pain of waiver pursuant to Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 *23Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977).4 The Superior Court adopted a “rule” requiring a similar form of unitary review, as of right, governing cases where any PCRA defendant proves an entitlement to reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The Superior Court’s rule is a significant extension of the decision I authored in Bomar. Bomar merely accepted the Hubbard-e ra record presented to it and decided the hybrid case. As I have repeatedly cautioned, however, Bomar’s decision to review the direct appeal and ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal there “did not purport to approve such a review paradigm prospectively, as a post-Grant matter. Rather, this Court merely took the Hubbard-e ra record as we found it in Bomar, and proceeded to determine if direct review, or a pointless deferral to PCRA review, of the collateral claims was appropriate.” Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 933 A.2d 997, 1030-31 (2007) (Castille, J., joined by Saylor, J., concurring) (quoting in part Commonwealth v. O’Berg, 584 Pa. 11, 880 A.2d 597, 603 (2005) (Castille, J. concurring)).5,6
In contrast, the Superior Court here took a post-Grant case that was not ripe for hybrid decision, affirmatively required creation of a hybrid record and issuance of a hybrid opinion, and adopted a rule that would require trial courts in future cases to indulge hybrid, unitary review. In so doing, the Superior Court failed to account for this Court’s post-Grant decisional law, failed to recognize the competing values at stake, and failed to appreciate that its stated goal of efficiency *24would be undermined by its creation of multiple rounds of collateral attack.
In this case, appellee filed a PCRA petition seeking to have his direct appeal rights reinstated nunc pro tunc as well as raising various claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing, at which evidence was taken regarding counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal as well as trial counsel’s conduct at trial.7 At the conclusion of the proceedings the PCRA court granted appellee nunc pro tunc relief and did not issue any rulings with respect to the ineffectiveness claims.
Presented with this situation, the Superior Court raised the question of whether it should address the ineffectiveness claims as “the ineffectiveness claims [were] being raised on collateral review” consistent with Grant. Commonwealth v. Liston, 941 A.2d 1279, 1283 (Pa.Super.2008). And, the panel noted, “as in Bomar” there was a complete record respecting the ineffectiveness claims, which “can be addressed when the collateral review remedy granted is reinstatement of direct appeal rights.” Id. The Superior Court then went on to observe that if the PCRA court had “addressed the claims in an opinion, there would be an adequate record for our review on [direct] appeal.” Id. (citing Bomar). Such a conclusion was guided by its own precedent wherein it had previously reviewed a claim of ineffectiveness on direct appeal when the PCRA court granted the petitioner’s request to reinstate his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, and the PCRA court had reviewed and resolved the ineffectiveness claim during the PCRA proceeding. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 868 A.2d 578 (Pa.Super.2005). Notably, the Miller court proceeded in such a manner and addressed the fully developed ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal in the belief that doing so was consistent with this Court’s directive in Bomar. Id. at 581 (“The Supreme Court carved out an exception to Grant in *25Bomar, permitting review of ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal where a sufficient record concerning the claims had been established. Thus, ineffectiveness claims that were developed in the PCRA court may be reviewed in the mmc pro tunc direct appeal, along with any other appealable claims the appellant chooses to raise.”) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Superior Court correctly concluded that it was facing untraveled territory — not quite Bomar nor Miller, since the PCRA court did not resolve the ineffectiveness claims — but not quite Grant, since the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on the claims of ineffectiveness. Thus, it turned to its own precedent for further guidance.
The Superior Court explained that in Commonwealth v. Miranda, 296 Pa.Super. 441, 442 A.2d 1133 (1982) (en banc), the court confronted the proper scope of review permitted a post-conviction hearing court under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”) when it determined that the petitioner had been denied his direct appeal rights. In Miranda, the Superi- or Court concluded that the “PCHA court must address the other claims (i.e., ineffectiveness claims) raised in the PCHA petition when it is necessary to complete the record for appellate review; but under these circumstances, the PCHA court is merely functioning as an evidentiary tribunal.... The PCHA court is to see to it that the record is made complete on these issues for the purpose of review in the appellate court on the nunc pro tunc appeal.” Id. at 1137-38. According to the Miranda court, proceeding in such a way would avoid the further complication or delay that would result if the appellate court ordered a remand for an evidentiary hearing or a ruling on the remaining claims. Id. at 1139.
Returning to this case, the Liston en banc panel recognized that Miranda was decided at a time when Hubbard was in force, and further noted that the process for raising ineffectiveness claims had changed when Grant overruled Hubbard. The court, however, believed that the concerns underlying the decision in Miranda “with judicial economy and efficiency remain[ed] valid.” Liston, 941 A.2d at 1283. Therefore, following its own Miranda case, the Superior Court concluded *26that reinstating the right to file post-sentence motions at the time the court reinstated the right to file a direct appeal nunc pro tunc would serve the judicial economy and efficiency interests the Miranda court sought to promote.
I understand that in crafting the remedy, the Superior Court believed it was being faithful to our Botnar decision8 as well as its own precedent. See Miller supra. Indeed, the panel essentially undertook to have the trial court make the case ready for Nomar-style unitary review treatment. But the fundamental flaw in the Superior Court’s reasoning was its conclusion that a decision such as Miranda,- which was powered by Hubbard, should have the same force following this Court’s decision in Grant, and our subsequent cases explicating Grant. Applying Miranda in the post -Grant setting gives vitality and primacy to hybrid, unitary review on direct appeal, precisely the type of procedure that Grant sought to prevent. Additionally, the Superior Court failed to account for other concerns in this area.
Specifically, the Superior Court ignored the concerns that pre-PCRA hybrid review raises and that I most recently outlined in my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Rega, supra. Therein, I noted that allowing such claims to be forwarded on direct review leads to avoidable delay, abuse, arbitrariness, and complication. Generally, my concerns were that unitary review builds unnecessary delay into the direct review process, which also increases the potential for abuse, breeds illogical and unfair results by arbitrarily allowing one class of defendants a second round of collateral review, and fosters the requirement that defendants raise “layered” claims of ineffectiveness for purposes of collateral review. Id. at 1032-33.9
*27These concerns can be alleviated by following the statutory scheme authorized by the Legislature, which permits a direct appeal followed by a single collateral attack, via the PCRA, as of right. “[A]ny such unitary review [on direct appeal], should be a substitute for, and not an advance supplement to, PCRA review.” Id. at 1033. These additional concerns and potential consequences outweigh the judicial efficiency and economy interest that the Superior Court perceived would result from the creation of a hybrid review requirement in certain direct appeals.
Significantly, the Superior Court also did not have the benefit of this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Wright, supra, a case arising under the pre-Grant framework. In Wright, this Court confronted the question of whether the ineffectiveness claims were cognizable on direct appeal and, in my view, correctly concluded that the Bomar exception applied and allowed review of claims of ineffectiveness to be forwarded on direct appeal as the case arose before this Court’s mandatory directive in Grant. A majority10 of this *28Court also indicated that it would approve of the position that I forwarded in Rega when it stated, “Prolix collateral claims should not be reviewed on post-verdict motions unless the defendant waives his right to PCRA review, because the PCRA does not afford the right to two collateral attacks.” Wright, 961 A.2d at 148 n. 22.11
For these reasons, like the Majority, I agree that the Superior Court’s remedy is in error. I also agree with the Majority’s observation that the mandatory procedure set forth by the Superior Court in this case is neither commanded nor authorized by this Court’s decision in Grant, and indeed, undermines that decision.
I would go farther than the Majority, however, and consistently with Wright, I would explicitly limit Bomar to Hubbard-era cases, and make clear that there is no “Bomar exception” to Grant. The Superior Court’s opinion in this case, which applies Bomar to a new set of facts and, thus, extends its reach, exemplifies an unintended and unauthorized consequence arising from Bomar’s continued application in the post-Grawi setting and fails to take into account this Court’s shift away from Hubbard-era unitary review and the concerns previously discussed. I have also recognized that unitary review may be appropriate under limited circumstances in order to provide the immediate vindication of a clear claim and noted that there is no such current system in place allowing for such a procedure. Rega, 933 A.2d at 1033. Consistently with this Court’s approval in Wright, however, I would permit hybrid review only when the request for such review is accompanied by an express, knowing and voluntary waiver of further PCRA review. Unless and until we take such steps, we will not be able to give this Court’s corrective decision in Grant its full effect consistently with the terms of the PCRA.
*29Finally, I recognize that Justice Baer argues that it is inappropriate to address the effects of Bomar upon continuing post-verdict practice in this appeal. Indeed, Justice Baer suggests that the only proper time to visit that subject must await a case where Bomar hybrid review has occurred and the defendant has proceeded to PCRA review. Concurring opinion at 31-33, 977 A.2d at 1102-03. I respectfully disagree that we are obliged to allow unintended and problematic applications of Bomar to spin out of control.12 Bomar was a rule of our own creation, arising in a case where the hybrid review below occurred solely because of Hubbard. The parties in Bomar did not argue the effect of Grant> much less did they argue the prospective effect of Bomar itself on cases — unlike Bomar, but like the very case sub judice — litigated under the Grant paradigm, rather than under the Hubbard rule. Nor did Bomar purport to authorize hybrid, unitary review in post-Grant cases.
The issue in this case directly implicates the proper effect Bomar can be said to have on direct appeals and the post-verdict motions practice facilitating those appeals. In addition, the effect of authorizing trial courts to “apply” Bomar and permit unitary, hybrid review in these cases is readily apparent and inescapable. There is no reason, consistent with the PCRA, to authorize trial courts to arbitrarily permit an extra round of collateral attack for some but not all defendants; no rational, fair rule of limitation has been offered to warrant placing our imprimatur upon this unauthorized extension of Bomar; and this Court has the exclusive power to *30supervise such procedural matters. We should take the bull by the horns and correct the problem now.13
Justice SAYLOR and Justice EAKIN join this concurring opinion.

. Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

. The Fayette County District Attorney's office failed to file a Brief before the en banc panel of the Superior Court. We have previously noted that a decision not to file a brief in a matter involving an important legal question does a disservice to the courts of this Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 599 Pa. 617, 962 A.2d 1170, 1173 n. 1 (2009). This failure is especially pointed in this case, since the Commonwealth then filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal seeking to have the “error” of the Superior Court corrected. I recognize that many county prosecutors’ offices face severe budget constraints. But the designation of this case for en banc consideration put the District Attorney on notice of its perceived importance. If the Commonwealth had filed a brief before the Superior Court, the Superi- or Court may have reached a different result and spared the need for further review here.

. In his Concurring Opinion, Mr. Justice Baer characterizes this position as requiring a "forfeiture” of PCRA review and, later, claims that it operates as a "per se” forfeiture. Concurring opinion at 30-33, 977 A.2d at 1101, 1102. The word "forfeiture” is inaccurate. A defendant serving a significant sentence has an of-right entitlement to both a single direct appeal and a single, full PCRA proceeding. The prospect of serial review is limited both substantively and as a practical matter. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 524 (2001) (explaining that the practical effect of the one-year jurisdictional time requirement of the PCRA is to limit the opportunity for collateral relief to a single, counseled petition). The unitary review I have described effectively allows for that full round of direct review and an accelerated, full round of PCRA review in a single proceeding, in an appropriate case, while making clear that such unitary review is not designed to arbitrarily provide what is in effect a third round of review for certain defendants. Meeting the obvious issue square-on and requiring a defendant who requests such accelerated review of collateral claims to recognize that it exhausts his of-right entitlement to pursue PCRA relief does not forfeit PCRA review; it accelerates it. In short, the forfeiture Justice Baer speaks of involves an assumed "right” to multiple, full collateral attacks which has no principled basis in the Pennsylvania collateral review construct.

. In Hubbard, this Court directed new counsel to raise claims of prior counsel ineffectiveness at the first opportunity after new counsel was appointed, including direct review.

. I note that Chief Justice Cappy, who also wrote separately in Rega, indicated that he shared the concern outlined in my Concurrence. 933 A.2d at 1029 (Cappy, C.J., concurring).

. Justice Baer notes that "the Bomar decision itself ... set forth no forfeiture [sic] requirement.” Concurring opinion at 31, 977 A.2d at 1102. Respectfully, as developed in the text, Bomar accepted, and was limited, to the Hubbard-era facts presented to the Court and did not purport to set forth an approved, extra-PCRA, hybrid review paradigm for cases litigated after Grant was decided.

. As I explain below, the trial court was obliged to develop a record on the claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness under Superior Court precedent pre-dating Grant. See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 296 Pa.Super. 441, 442 A.2d 1133 (1982) (en banc).

. Indeed, in extending the grant of relief to include the nunc pro tunc filing of post-sentence motions, the Superior Court stated as much when it said, "[t]he record will also be complete so that this court may review the appellant's ineffectiveness claims on the ensuing direct appeal, consistent with Bomar." Liston, 941 A.2d at 1285 (emphasis added).

. Justice Baer states that he is "not advocating that each PCRA petitioner be afforded two rounds of collateral review,” but only supports *27hybrid review in those cases in which the trial court has reviewed ineffectiveness claims "in its sound discretion.” Concurring opinion at 32, 977 A.2d at 1102. Respectfully, this view neither attempts to square itself with the PCRA nor does it address the fundamental question of arbitrariness. On the latter point, most, if not all, defendants would like as many avenues of review (including new lawyers with each round) as possible. It is difficult to see how it could ever be fair to allow some, but not all, of such defendants an extra round of attack. Certainly, the PCRA does not act so arbitrarily: the rules there apply to all defendants. Furthermore, this Court has previously cautioned against the vesting of such discretion in the courts because it may yield "inconsistent results and uneven justice.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775, 779 (2005) (confirming that the requirement to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal is absolute, since otherwise, the appellate courts may simply review issues on appeal in their discretion and such discretion yields "inconsistent results and uneven justice"). It is notable that Justice Baer never identifies the substantive concerns that would properly cabin the exercise of discretion which is the core of his rule.

. Although Wright was a 3-1 decision because three of the Justices hearing oral argument were no longer on the bench at the time the opinion was filed, this Court has been clear that the standard for determining whether an opinion has binding effect is whether a majority of the participating Justices joined in the opinion. Commonwealth v. Mason, 456 Pa. 602, 322 A.2d 357, 358 (1974).

. Justice Baer suggests that the observation in Wright was dicta because that case involved a direct appeal from the imposition of a sentence of death. Concurring opinion at 3. But Bomar itself, and all of the other capital cases applying the so-called Bomar exception, likewise were direct capital appeals.

. In fact, as a further example of the necessity that this Court act promptly, the Superior Court recently invoked Bomar and Liston to create yet another exception to Grant in cases where the defendant is found in contempt of a PFA order, citing the Liston policy of “judicial economy.” See Commonwealth v. Moore, 978 A.2d 988, 993, 2009 WL 2085686, *4 (Pa.Super.2009) (“Accordingly, where a defendant has been found in violation of a PFA, is sentenced pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114(b), and alleges ineffectiveness of counsel, judicial economy may be best served by the PFA court conducting a post-sentence Bomar evidentiary hearing on a defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

. In light of the expressions by a majority of the Court in Wright, and a majority of the Court in this case, I would refer this matter to the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee with directions to consider and recommend measures to account for the identified concerns with whether, and under what circumstances, hybrid, unitary review should be permitted on post-verdict motions. I have been authorized to state that Madame Justice Greenspan agrees that the matter should be referred to the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee.