Court Opinion

ID: 9789783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:41:16.241898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.412221
License: Public Domain

*66BUTTLER, J.
Plaintiff filed this action on April 12,1990, for damages that he incurred as a result of the collision of his vehicle and one driven by defendant. The accident occurred at 10 a.m. on May 2, 1988, in front of a public elementary school of which defendant is the principal. Defendant interposed as an affirmative defense that she was a public employee acting in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident and that plaintiff did not file a timely notice of his claim with the school district that employs defendant. ORS 30.275. In his reply, plaintiff denied that defendant was acting in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident, but after defendant’s deposition was taken, it was developed that defendant was so acting. Defendant then moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted that motion, and plaintiff appeals from the resulting judgment. We reverse.
Although plaintiff does not now dispute that defendant was acting within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident, he argues that he is suing her for her negligence as a driver, not for any conduct more specifically related to her work. Therefore, he argues, neither the notice provision nor anything else in the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA) is applicable to the case. Defendant takes the contrary view and relies on the express language of OTCA.
At the relevant time, ORS 30.265(1) provided, in part, that every “public body is subject to action or suit for its torts and those of its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties.” ORS 30.275(1) provided:
“No action arising from any act or omission of a public body or an officer, employee or agent of a public body within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 shall be maintained unless notice of a claim is given as required by this section.”
ORS 30.275(2) required a notice to be given to the public employer within 180 days of the loss or injury and, under ORS 30.285(1), every public employer was required to defend and indemnify its employees for any tort claim “arising out of an * * * act or omission occurring in the performance of duty.”
*67Plaintiff argues that his action is against defendant, not her employer, and that the quoted statutes,
“when read together, appear to apply only to situations where the injured party is seeking compensation from the public body, or is otherwise seeking to establish the liability of the employee in his public capacity. The statute[s] would not appear to apply to situations such as here, where the tortious act of the employee, although technically within the course and scope of employment, has no relationship to her official duties vis-a-vis the injured party.
<<* * * * *
“The liability of the Defendant in this case rests on her general duties as a driver, and is unrelated to her status as an employee of the School District. No claim has been made against the District. The Defendant’s private carrier is defending the claim and providing indemnity. The notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act are inapplicable.” (Emphasis plaintiffs.)
Plaintiff relies on legislative history. Defendant responds that there is no ambiguity in the statutes to be resolved by legislative history or other extrinsic tools of construction. We agree with defendant. The relevant statutes are clear: Public bodies are amenable to action and are required to defend and indemnify for tort claims against employees “acting within the scope of their employment or duties,” and claimants are required to provide the public body with a notice of claim as a prerequisite to bringing an action “arising from any act or omission of a[n] * * * employee * * * of a public body within the scope of’ OTCA. ORS 30.275(1) did not make the notice requirement dependent on whether the public body was joined with its employee as a defendant. See Smith v. Pernoll, 291 Or 67, 628 P2d 729 (1981).
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish defendant’s role as a driver and “her official duties” is unpersuasive. She was driving from her regular work location to a meeting place where she was to perform a work activity. As noted, plaintiff does not contend that defendant was not acting within the course and scope of her employment. His use of the modifier “technically” does not alter that fact. Plaintiff is not aided, with respect to the notice requirement, by his point that, from his standpoint, defendant was engaging in an activity that he perceived as more private than public. OTCA allows for no *68distinction of that kind. It applies to all claims for negligent conduct by public employees acting within the course and scope of their employment. Plaintiff was required to give the statutory notice.1
Plaintiff argues next that, in any event, there is a question of fact as to whether he reasonably should have discovered that defendant was acting within the course and scope of her employment before he took her deposition in December, 1990, after this action was filed and two and one-half years after the accident. By that time, the school district had actual knowledge of the action. Therefore, he concludes, summary judgment was improper, because there is a jury question as to whether the notice period was tolled by the discovery rule. See Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or 344, 838 P2d 600 (1992); Adams v. Oregon State Police, 289 Or 233, 611 P2d 1153 (1980). We review the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, against whom summary judgment is sought. Whitaker v. Bank of Newport, 313 Or 450, 836 P2d 695 (1992).
Within a short time after the accident, plaintiff knew that defendant was employed at the school; that the accident had occurred in front of the school; that the accident was caused by defendant’s making a u-turn into plaintiffs path while she was leaving her parking place near the school; and that the accident occurred during regular school hours. He contends, however, that he had no reason to believe that she was driving on school business rather than on an errand of her own. Defendant’s affirmative defense alleging defendant’s status was filed May 31, 1990, and for the first time alerted plaintiff that OTCA might be applicable. Although defendant asserted the defense of no notice, her insurer did not tender defense of the action to the public body until August, 1990, over two months after filing the answer. *69Defendant did not move for summary judgment until after her deposition was taken on December 10, 1990.
We believe that a reasonable juror could find that, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, plaintiff did not discover until defendant’s deposition was taken that she was traveling on school business at the time of the accident. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact, it was error to grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Peterson v. Mult. Co. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 64 Or App 81, 668 P2d 385, rev den 295 Or 773 (1983).
Reversed and remanded.

 Although plaintiff states that, because defendant’s insurer is defending this action, OTCA is not applicable, he does not rely on, or even cite, ORS 30.287. Arguably, that statute might be applicable if it were clear, which it is not, that defendant’s insurer has accepted its obligation to pay any judgment against defendant without seeking indemnity from the public body. The public body rejected the insurer’s tender of the defense, apparently because it believed that defendant’s insurance policy covered the public body. The record does not resolve that question.
Neither does plaintiff raise a constitutional question.