Court Opinion

ID: 9541367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:24:50.355527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:47.508751
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE REID, dissenting: I dissent. The majority correctly identifies the controlling law in the area of will contests. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, “[t]he right to contest the validity of a will is purely statutory,” and “must be exercised by the person or persons, in the manner, and within the time prescribed by the Probate Act.” In re Estate of Schlenker, 209 Ill. 2d 456, 461-62 (2004), citing Handley v. Conlan, 342 Ill. 562, 565 (1931). However, I believe that, even back in the days of In re Estate of Spaits, 104 Ill. 2d 431, 433 (1984), when the right to contest a will was held to be constitutionally based, the supreme court recognized the time limit as a condition precedent to filing and thereby giving notice to the interested parties and the trial court. Regardless of whether Schenkler or Spaits was the controlling law at the time, the purpose of the time limit, in addition to the orderly administration of estates, is one of jurisdiction and notice. The general rule is that “[a]n action to admit a will to probate cannot be expanded to constitute a will contest.” In re Estate of Mayfield, 288 Ill. App. 3d 534, 538 (1997), citing In re Estate of Marcucci, 54 Ill. 2d 266, 270 (1973). “Nevertheless, if no direct proceeding to contest the will is brought within the statutory period, the validity of the will is established for all purposes.” Estate of Mayfield, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 538, citing Robinson v. First State Bank, 104 Ill. App. 3d 758, 761-62 (1982), rev’d in part on other grounds, 97 Ill. 2d 174 (1983). Normally, where a potential contestant was attempting to expand the formal proof of a will process to include a petition to contest, I would not hesitate to apply Marcucci, and Mayfield as those cases interpret the plain, unambiguous language of section 8 — 1 of the Probate Act. 755 ILCS 5/8 — 1 (West 2002). However, this is not a normal case. Though not technically required, Thinschmidt interposed her request for leave to file the will contest petition within the statutory time frame. This request for leave took place in the context of a contested hearing regarding the formal proof of will. At that point, when the trial court was asked by Thinschmidt for leave to subsequently file a physical document memorializing her intention to contest the will, the trial court was made aware that there was a party who objected to the will. I find it irrelevant that the proceedings stemming from the will contest petition were heard by a judge other than the one who granted leave to file. “Illinois circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction having original jurisdiction over all justiciable controversies (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9), except (1) cases over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction (The Moses Taylor v. Hammons, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 416, 18 L. Ed. 397 (1867) (the judicial power of the federal government is exclusive in some cases and, under the United States Constitution, may be made exclusive in all other cases at the election and discretion of Congress)), (2) matters committed to administrative tribunals (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9), and (3) those matters committed by the Illinois Constitution to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Illinois Supreme Court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9). See 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice §§ 1.2, 2.1 (1989).” Russell v. Kinney Contractors, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 666, 670-71 (2003). This court has consistently recognized “Illinois’ long-standing policy favoring the orderly administration of estates.” In re Estate of Jeziorski, 162 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1062 (1987), citing In re Estate of Moerschel, 86 Ill. App. 3d 482 (1980). “We further recognize the purpose of [the] legislature[ ] in passing probate acts is to ensure that all claims relating to the administration of estates are handled in the probate proceedings, thereby providing a single forum for settling the rights of the parties.” Estate of Jeziorski, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 1062, citing G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 477 (rev. 2d ed. 1978). Here, Thinschmidt was late in getting her physical document filed before the court. However, it cannot come as a surprise to the court or the parties that the document was coming. The entry of the order granting leave clearly contemplates that the parties praying for said leave will actually do that which was asked for in the petition for leave of court. I might feel differently had there been no request for leave. Because there was such a timely request for leave, I feel it would be wrong to exalt form over substance. From a jurisdictional perspective, Thinschmidt declared her intention to subsequently file thereby invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. While better practice would have been to file the physical document within the statutory time frame, I believe her oral motion backed up by a written court order was sufficient.