Court Opinion

ID: 9740560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:37:13.583183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.794466
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
Although the sentencing in this case took place after the effective date of the amendatory legislation concerning the applicable sentencing scheme, our review is appropriately made under the pre-existing statutory framework. Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). See also Patterson v. State, 846 N.E.2d 723 (Ind.Ct.App., 2006). But see Samaniego-Hernandez v. State, 839 N.E.2d 798 (Ind.Ct.App.2005)3
Here, although the presumptive/advisory sentence was imposed, the trial court chose to articulate aggravating and mitigating circumstances and found them to be equally balanced. When a sentencing court articulates aggravating and mitigating circumstances we have held that the court must state its reasons for the sentence imposed. Gasper v. State, 833 N.E.2d 1036, 1044-45 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. Furthermore, it has been held that under the previous sentencing scheme the court was required to identify aggravating and mitigating circumstances “in every instance except when the trial court imposes the presumptive sentence.” Frey v. State, 841 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).4
*348Notwithstanding the fluid status of the requirements for sentencing defendants under the current statutory scheme vis-a-vis the former scheme, the trial court here chose to articulate aggravating and mitigating circumstance in imposing the four-year advisory/presumptive sentence. Appellate case law has not yet developed to give us clear insight into whether under certain, if not all, circumstances the sentencing court is required to articulate the reasons for the particular sentence imposed and whether in doing so it must set forth the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found to exist. Neither has our General Assembly had sufficient time to reflect upon the arguably hasty draftsmanship which led to the statute in its present form and to make changes which are appropriate to the purposes and policies underlying the sentencing scheme for Indiana consistent with U.S. and State constitutional dictates. See Michael R. Limrick, Senate Bill 96: How General Assembly Returned, Problem of Uniform Sentencing to Indiana’s Appellate Courts, RES GESTAE, January/February 2006, at 18.
Subject to the comments herein, I concur in the affirmance of the advisory/presumptive sentence imposed. I further concur in the 'opinion with respect to restitution.

. The difference of opinion reflected by these cases is as to whether the "advisory” sentence amendments to the sentencing scheme previously in place are procedural or substantive and therefore whether the law relating to consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is to be given retroactive effect. I would join the view as set forth in Weaver. Parenthetically, I would observe that Saman-iego-Hemandez is in error in stating that the new scheme provides "a range with an advisory sentence rather than a fixed or presumptive sentence.” 839 N.E.2d at 805 (emphasis supplied). As that very decision notes, the new statute clearly provides that the sentence for all felonies shall be for "a fixed term ” of between [x years or months] and [y years]. Id. at n. 8. See also Ind.Code §§ 35-50-2-3, 35-50-2-4, 35-50-2-5, 35-50-2-6 and 35-50-2-7 (Burns Code Ed. Supp.2005).

. It should be noted that under the current sentencing scheme, Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.1 (Burns Code Ed. Supp.2005), the sentencing court may consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances. However, it is not required to do so. This conclusion is to be derived from the clear provision of sub-section (d) of the statute which provides that a court may impose any sentence authorized by statute and permissible under the Indiana Constitution "regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances.”
The narrow language of Indiana Code § 35-38-1-3 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1998), still in effect under the new "advisory” scheme, would appear to require a statement of the reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes only "[i]f the court finds aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances.” (Emphasis supplied). The case law, however, had developed otherwise, and it was commonly accepted under the prior sentencing scheme that in order to impose more or less than the presumptive sentence the court was required to state its reasons for doing so by articulating aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances. Neale v. State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 637 (Ind.2005).
As I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1 existed prior to the 2005 amendment, the trial court was required to consider certain enumerated factors in determining what sentence to impose. However, other separately enumerated factors were permitted to be considered but not required to be considered. In the latter regard, therefore, the prior statute approximated the statute in its current form. See Anglemyer v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). Whether under the current scheme a court imposing less or more than the advisory sentence is required to state its reasons for doing *348so by referencing aggravators and mitigators is.not made clear either by the statutes in place or by existing case law. But see Angle-myer, supra.