Court Opinion

ID: 9488641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:51:09.461002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:00.414575
License: Public Domain

NIES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The Secretary of the Army, acting as the alter ego of the President, declined to promote Adkins in 1991 and declined to reverse his decision in 1992. According to the majority, the 1992 decision is reviewable for procedural error. I dissent. The President has unfettered discretion in denying a promotion to a military officer under 10 U.S.C. § 629(a). Neither the President’s decision to remove Adkins from the promotion list nor his refusal to put him back on the list presents a justiciable controversy. The majority’s holding that the President’s decision not to reinstate Adkins to the 1988 promotion list is reviewable for procedural error by his alter ego, the Secretary, is astounding. Under binding precedent, heretofore followed by this court, no court may for either substantive or procedural reasons review the exercise of Presidential power over a purely discretionary military decision. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92, 73 S.Ct. 534, 539, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953). As specifically held in Law v. United States, 11 F.3d 1061 (Fed.Cir.1993) it is outside the province of this court to create procedural limitations on the exercise of Presidential power respecting promotions of military officers. The majority creates a conflict with this binding precedent.1
The majority goes on to hold that, if the Presidential decision not to return Adkins to the 1988 list was procedurally flawed, Adkins was illegally retired under 10 U.S.C. § 638a. This second holding of the majority is essential in order to provide Adkins with the monetary claim necessary for suit in the Court of Federal Claims. However, the majority’s predicate is untenable. No statute provides a right to judicial review of the President’s decision not to promote Adkins. To the eon-*1328trary, Congress has given the President complete discretion on this matter in 10 U.S.C. § 629(a). Where the President’s statutory power is unrestricted, absent an error of constitutional dimension, the exercise by the President of his authority, directly or through the Secretary, is beyond the reach of judicial power to review substantively or procedurally. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); Dalton v. Specter, — U.S. -,-, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 1727-28, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). And unless the President’s decision is voided, Adkins was properly retired, and he has no right to reinstatement or back pay.

Background

On August 1, 1992, Adkins was retired in accordance with the special provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 638.2 Under § 638a, a special board, the Selective Early Retirement Board (SERB) may select a lieutenant colonel, such as Adkins, for retirement prior to what would be his mandatory date if the officer has been passed over once and his name is not on a list of officers recommended for promotion. 10 U.S.C. § 638a(b)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1990). On July 22, 1991, the President, acting under 10 U.S.C. § 629, through the Secretary of the Army, removed Adkins’ name from the 1988 promotion list. Adkins has not been on a promotion list since that date.
On March 8, 1992, SERB notified Adkins of his selection for retirement on August 31, 1992. Adkins alleges no procedural or substantive error in the SERB’S selection of him for retirement. He argues that his name should be replaced on the 1988 list because of a decision by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) subsequent to the action by the President which removed his name from the promotion list.
Prior to removal of his name from the promotion list on July 22, 1991, Adkins had applied to the ABCMR for removal of an adverse Officer Evaluation Report (OER) from his official records. At a hearing in October 1991, he also asked for restoration of his name to the 1988 promotion list. The ABCMR gave a favorable recommendation on the purging from his official record of the OER because the rating officer was not privy to the administrative difficulties of his assignment. Two investigative reports (AR 15-6’s) were not part of his Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) but had been considered by the Promotion Review Board (PRB) which recommended his removal from the promotion list. These AR 15-6’s do not relate to the time period of the OER. The ABCMR concluded that the incidents in the AR 15-6’s, one involving damaging an aircraft and the other falsification of medical reports, while not condoned, did not negate Adkins’ professional ethics nor his ability to serve well as a colonel. The ABCMR recommended to the Secretary that the OER be voided and “all obstacles to his restoration to the FY 1988 Colonel, Army Promotion List” be removed “including any references in his Official Military Personnel file to the Army Regulation 15-6 investigations conducted in August-October 1987 and in June-July 1988.”
After consideration of the materials supplied by the ABCMR, the Secretary rejected the recommendations, sending the following final decision to the ABCMR:
After review of the materials pertaining to LTC Terrance [sic] L. Adkins’ ABCMR petition, I have determined that the rater’s portion of the November 19, 1987, through May 1, 1988, Officer Evaluation Report accurately reflects the rater’s view of LTC Adkins’ performance, and that the rater’s view was reasonable. I have further determined that the materials reveal actions by LTC Adkins that raise serious questions concerning his judgment and integrity. These factors have led me to conclude that the relief recommended by the ABCMR is not warranted or necessary. Thus, the ABCMR recommendations are disapproved and LTC Adkins’ petition is denied.
One member of ABCMR dissented from the recommendation on promotion, and properly so. ABCMR has no authority to second guess a President’s decision under § 629. The ABCMR reviews decisions of the agency, not the President. The ABCMR’s recom*1329mendation on promotion was simply gratuitous.

The Dual Roles of the Secretary

The majority’s holding rests on the following conflated analysis of the Secretary’s decisions on the recommendations of ABCMR:
In this case, the Army will have been found to have improperly exercised its authority to retire Adkins pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 638 and 638a — after he was not promoted to colonel following the removal of his name from the promotion list — if it is determined that the Secretary committed harmful error in considering material outside the ABCMR record when he made the decision not to accept the Board’s recommendation in Adkins’s ease. The Army’s authority to retire Adkins will have been improperly exercised because the triggering event for the exercise of the authority — Adkins not being promoted to colonel — will have taken place after harmful procedural error in the process of deciding Adkins’s application to have removed from his OMPF material that caused his name to be taken off the promotion list.
Op. at 1326-27. As is evident, the majority merges the two recommendations of the ABCMR into one, and makes no distinction in the reviewability of the Secretary’s action on each of the recommendations. Clearly this is error. The Secretary operates as both an executive branch department administrator and as the President’s alter ego, depending on what function the Secretary performs. As stated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Craneh) at 165-66:
[Wjhether the legality of an act of the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice or not, must always depend on the nature of that act.
[Wjhere the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable.
Congress has conferred authority on the President to remove names from promotion lists. 10 U.S.C. § 629(a). The statute provides:
The President may remove the name of any officer from a list of officers recommended for promotion by a selection board convened under this chapter.
Since power to remove a name rests with the President, the Secretary was clearly acting as the President’s alter ego under delegated authority when the Secretary removed Adkins from the promotion list.
In contrast, ABCMR is set up pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) (Supp. I 1989) which provides:
The Secretary of a military department may correct any military record of the Secretary’s department when the Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice. Except as provided in paragraph (2), such corrections shall be made by the Secretary acting through boards of civilians of the executive part of that military department. The Secretary of Transportation may in the same manner correct any military record of the Coast Guard.
When the Secretary acts under this section, the Secretary is acting as head of the department, not as the alter ego of the President under a delegation of Presidential discretionary authority. Different rules apply respecting justiciability. The Secretary, in rejecting ABCMR’s recommendation to correct an officer’s records, must act on the record before ABCMR or, if the Secretary has additional information, may refer the matter back to ABCMR for reconsideration. Weiss v. United States, 187 Ct.Cl. 1, 408 F.2d 416, 422 (1969).
The cases cited by the majority as authority to review a Presidential decision are inapt. All merely are precedent for reviewing an administrative decision of the Secretary or even less pertinent, of a Correction Board. See, Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d 871 (Fed.Cir.1993) (reviewing Correction Board), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1402, 128 L.Ed.2d 75 (1994); Dodson v. United *1330States, 988 F.2d 1199 (Fed.Cir.1993) (same); Sargisson v. United States, 913 F.2d 918 (Fed.Cir.1990) (reviewing Correction Board, but not Secretary: “Secretary’s compliance with [regulation governing release of reserve officers] is beyond the ken of judicial competence; it is nonjusticiable.”); Voge v. United States, 844 F.2d 776 (Fed.Cir.1988) (reviewed Correction Board, but held Secretary’s discretionary decision to terminate special pay nonjusticiable), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 941, 109 S.Ct. 365, 102 L.Ed.2d 355 (1988); Koster v. United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 301, 685 F.2d 407 (1982) (reviewing Correction Board); Kreis v. Secretary of the Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508 (D.C.Cir.1989) (Administrative Procedure Act allows review of Correction Board); Watson v. Arkansas Nat’l Guard, 886 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir.1989) (Correction Board procedure reviewable).
Only by ignoring the dual roles of the Secretary can the majority find a way to review procedurally the Secretary’s promotion denial. Specifically, the majority holds that the Secretary is limited to the ABCMR record, even in acting for the President. Contrary to that view, the Court of Federal Claims correctly held that “nothing in the statute or the regulations limits the material that the Secretary may consider when deciding to remove an officer’s name from the promotion list.” As stated in Orloff, 345 U.S. at 91, 73 S.Ct. at 539; “[T]he President of the United States, before certifying his confidence in an officer and appointing him to a commissioned rank, has the right to learn whatever facts the President thinks may affect his fitness.” Here, as in Orlojf, Congress gave the President absolute discretion under section 629 to decide whom to remove from a promotion list. Even if the President had accepted a procedurally flawed recommendation from a Promotion Review Board, the President’s decision is unaffected. As held in Dalton, the President’s decision cannot be upset because it was based on a procedurally flawed recommendation. — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1727. No statute or regulation was violated even if the Secretary, acting as the President’s alter ego, looked to materials outside the ABCMR record in adhering to his decision. The statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1), and Army regulation which the majority cites apply only to administrative —not Presidential — decisions of the Secretary. That the ABCMR made a recommendation supporting Adkins promotion does not make a decision by or for the President reviewable for compliance with those statutory or regulatory procedures.
The majority is in error in holding that the President’s exercise of statutorily unfettered discretion can be procedurally flawed either by his alter ego or others. This is precisely the error which caused reversal in Dalton. As stated by the Dalton Court:
The Third Circuit seemed to believe that the President’s authority to close bases depended on the Secretary’s and commission’s compliance with statutory procedures. This view of the statute, however, incorrectly conflates the duties of the Secretary and Commission with the authority of the President. The President’s authority to act is not contingent on the Secretary’s and Commission’s fulfillment of all the procedural requirements imposed upon them by the 1990 Act. Nothing in § 2903(e) requires the President to determine whether the Secretary or Commission committed any procedural violations in making their recommendations, nor does § 2903(e) prohibit the President from approving recommendations that are procedurally flawed. Indeed, nothing in § 2903(e) prevents the President from approving or disapproving the recommendations for whatever reason he sees fit.
— U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 1728.
The President is as unfettered in his decision respecting promotion of a military officer as he is in deciding not to sign the commission of someone he nominated to be a judge. The President’s power to appoint rests on the Constitution. Aet. II, Sec. 2. Any judicial review with the objective of nullifying the Secretary’s alter ego decision not to promote an officer treads on executive prerogative and violates the separation of powers.
The majority cites Koster v. United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 301, 685 F.2d 407, 412 (1982), for the broad proposition that jurisdiction exists in the predecessor of the Court of Federal *1331Claims “to review procedural aspects of a decision of the Secretary of the Army, acting on behalf of the President.” Op. at 1323. Clearly that ease does not support the broad proposition. First, the court was reviewing an administrative decision, not a Presidential decision. In dicta, the court spoke of executive discretion being subject to constitutional review, but that does not concern us in this case. No constitutional violation is asserted here.
Similarly, Watson, 886 F.2d 1004, offers no support for the decision here. The court opined, in a footnote, that a district court could review the decision of the ABCMR, not the Secretary, for procedural correctness. The merits of the decision not to reinstate the service man into the National Guard was correctly declared nonjusticiable. Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct.Cl. 285, 594 F.2d 804 (1979), merely involved review of a Correction Board. Indeed, Sanders illustrates the majority’s erroneous analysis.3
The majority does not even attempt to distinguish Law v. United States from this ease. It flagrantly ignores the following ruling of this court:
Last, appellant argues that the Secretary’s action in removing his name from the promotion list was defective because he acted without access to Mr. Law’s submissions, without even seeing his service record, without a hearing and without a fair summary of the evidence. Essentially, appellant argues for procedural safeguards against the exercise of the President’s discretionary authority under § 272(a). Appellant’s argument must be rejected. Section 272(a) does not impede the President’s discretion, nor the Secretary’s discretion when acting for the President, to remove a name from the promotion list. Section 272(a) states “The President may remove the name of any officer from a list of selectees established under section 271 of this title.” Congress has not imposed the procedural limitations on the president’s exercise of the authority which appellant asserts. It would be outside our province to create them. [Footnote omitted.]
11 F.3d at 1067-68. As in Law, whether the Secretary did not consider all of Adkins record or considered more than that record or did not follow the procedures applicable to correction of his record on a recommendation of ABCMR does not affect Adkins’ removal from or reinstatement to a promotion list.
Kreis v. Secretary of Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, is cited for holding that a court may determine “whether the Secretary’s decision-making process was deficient, not whether his decision was correct.” Op. at 1323. In Kreis, the D.C. Circuit distinguished between a nonjusticiable promotion decision by the Secretary and a Secretary’s decision not to correct military records. The latter “more modest claim” was held subject to procedural review. However, a “modest” request, that is, merely for correction of records is insufficient in the Court of Federal Claims.
In Murphy, relief was denied by the Claims Court and affirmed on appeal because of the non-justiciability of the relief sought. Citing Kreis, this court noted that perhaps Murphy should have sought Administrative Procedure Act review in a district court, because “the Claims Court has no authority to invoke APA.” 993 F.2d at 874. As in Murphy, correction of records will not reinstate Adkins. Only an error in the SERB action which would negate its decision to retire him would have that effect.
The procedure adopted by Congress for early retirement operates somewhat arbitrarily. The officers considered for early retirement include those passed over who are not on a promotion list. The failure to be on a promotion list may simply be a matter of timing. Further, the statute provides that once a name is removed from a list, the officer must go before another selection board. The statute is very specific on this point.4 ABCMR’s “recommendation” cannot *1332overcome the statute. Thus, even if Adkins had not retired, Adkins cannot be returned to the 1988 list, as ABCMR recommended, in the face of the statutory requirement. He would, at most, be entitled to have another promotion board take a look. The majority sidesteps setting aside the President’s decision to remove Adkins’ name from the promotion list, declaring that decision is not the issue. Yet only if that decision is negated can the SERB action become improper and only if the SERB action was ultra vires does Adkins have a monetary claim.
In sum, even if the President based his decision not to promote Adkins on a recommendation from the PRB based on improper records, the decision to remove Adkins’ name from the promotion list stands and is unre-viewable. Given that Adkins was eligible for early retirement under the statute, the action by SERB in selecting Adkins for retirement is unassailable. 10 U.S.C. § 638a. Adkins was properly retired on August 1, 1992, and, therefore, has no monetary claim assertable in the Court of Federal Claims.

Creation of a Claim against the SERB

But for the majority’s rewriting of Adkins’ complaint, Adkins clearly set out no justicia-ble claim. In his complaint, Adkins asked for an order:
1. declaring unlawful the Secretary’s rejection of the ABCMR recommendation;
2. directing reinstatement and promotion;
3. ordering back pay equal to the difference of a colonel’s pay and what he received as a lieutenant colonel (active and retired);5
Noticeably absent from his prayer for relief is any request concerning the SERB. Indeed, the complaint fails to mention anything concerning SERB action which selected him for retirement.
The majority recasts Adkins’ complaint to seek his reinstatement as a lieutenant colonel and a claim for the difference between active and retired pay. The majority states that if Adkins prevails on the merits, “the Army will have been found to have improperly exercised its authority to retire Adkins pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 638 and 638a.” Op. at 1326-27. That “reasoning” will no doubt come as a great surprise not only to the trial judge but to Adkins. Adkins himself repeatedly disavows improper SERB action. Adkins’ brief disclaims the need for reconsideration as follows:
[T]he government states that LTC Adkins does not challenge the procedural regularity of this selection for retirement pursuant to Section 638. This is a true, but incomplete statement. LTC Adkins argued that he would never have even been before the retirement board but for the Secretary’s arbitrary and capricious action in rejecting the ABCMR recommendation [to restore him to the list]. Because the nature of LTC Adkins[] complaint, and its disposition on motion below, the question of whether his selection comported with procedural regularity was simply not at issue below.
App. Reply Brief at 17, n. 6 (emphasis added). At oral argument, Adkins’ counsel acknowledged that he does not allege that the SERB acted improperly:
I have no evidence, we are unaware of any basis to believe that what happened before *1333the Selective Early Retirement Board was defective in the process that was applied there.
The only reason Colonel Adkins was eligible for selective early retirement, the only reason he went before that board is because he was not on a promotion list for full colonel at the time.
The removal of his name from that list is what generated his eligibility.
But we have no basis to allege impropriety in the conduct of the Board. Rather what we suggest is that he shouldn’t [have] been there.
Before the trial court, Adkins argued similarly:
Plaintiffs was considered, albeit improperly, by the SERB only after the Secretary removed his name from the promotion list. But for this removal, plaintiff would not have been eligible for the SERB.
[T]he Secretary’s decision to remove plaintiff from the promotion list served as the catalyst for plaintiffs erroneous consideration by the SERB pursuant to Section 638(a)(1)(A). In short, if the Secretary had followed the recommendation of this correction board, plaintiff could not have been considered by the SERB.
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Court Order of Sept. 13, 1993, at 13-14 (emphasis added). The trial judge’s thorough and reasonable attempts to determine if Adkins was challenging anything besides the President’s decision to remove Adkins from the promotion list and adherence to that decision were met consistently with answers that directly challenged the President’s decision. As noted above, Adkins’ responses to questions posed by this court evoked similar responses. Adkins does not argue that the SERB reviewed improper records. Instead, Adkins argues that he should never have appeared before the SERB because the President should not have removed his name from the promotion list based on an allegedly flawed recommendation to the President. As indicated above, the President’s decision not to promote Adkins is unaffected by a procedural flawed recommendation.
Redrafting of the complaint is essential to the majority’s decision, because without the made-up prayer for relief which would provide the Court of Federal Claims with Tucker Act jurisdiction, Adkins seeks nothing besides correction of his military records; a classic Administrative Procedure Act claim which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.
Moreover, the ABCMR deliberations did not prevent or delay proceedings by the SERB. Regulations governing the ABCMR explicitly state “application [to ABCMR] will not operate as a stay of any proceedings being taken with respect to the person involved.” 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(c)(4) (1994). No amount of redrafting of Adkins’ complaint can change the fact that Adkins was lawfully retired by the Army. The Army properly removed him according to 10 U.S.C. § 638a.

Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims.

. See, South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed.Cir.1982) (first panel decision on an issue of law is binding on subsequent panels).

. All citations to statute are to the 1988 edition, unless otherwise noted.

. Sanders did not seek retroactive selection for promotion by the Correction Board. Instead he sought another opportunity to go before a promotion selection board without defective military records. Unlike Sanders, Adkins seeks not another promotion selection board opportunity, but he attempts to void the President’s decision not to promote him.

. 10 U.S.C. § 629(c)(1) provides:
An officer whose name is removed from a list under subsection (a) or (b) continues to be *1332eligible for consideration for promotion. If he is recommended for promotion by the next selection board convened for his grade and competitive category and he is promoted, the Secretary of the military department concerned may, upon such promotion, grant him the same date of rank, the same effective date for the pay and allowances of grade to which promoted, and the same position on the active-duty list as he would have had if his name had not been so removed.

. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, Adkins has not abandoned his request for a promotion. The complaint clearly demands a promotion to the rank of colonel and back pay as if Adkins had been appointed to that rank. At oral argument the following discussion occurred:
Court: You [Adkins’ counsel] are asking the Secretary to promote him [Adkins]. Do you want to strike that?
Adkins: No [your honor]. I do not because I believe it would be by operation of law.
The majority overlooks Adkins plain and unambiguous prayer for an order for promotion. Adkins refusal to strike his blatantly improper request for relief, even on appeal, underscores the correctness of the trial court’s decision.