Court Opinion

ID: 9956495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 14:09:25.404671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:33.994858
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2979-21

ALLISON RODEN,

         Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GREGG MISTRETTA,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted December 11, 2023 – Decided April 2, 2024

                   Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Bishop-Thompson

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
                   Docket No. FD-04-1925-17.

                   The Marks Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant
                   (Erika Rene Marks, on the briefs).

                   Stockton Family Law, LLC, attorneys for respondent
                   (Kathleen Pasquarello Stockton and Jessica Ann
                   Beardsley, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Gregg Mistretta appeals from an April 20, 2022 Family Part

order denying his motion to terminate child support as of May 2020, to

determine a fixed amount of college expenses, denying his request for attorneys'

fees, and granting plaintiff Allison Roden's attorneys' fees. Having considered

the record in light of applicable legal standards, we affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand.

                                       I.

      We glean the following facts from the record of the six-day plenary

hearing, during which the court heard testimony from the parties, the parties'

daughter, and Mistretta's business partner, Brian Lourenco.

      The parties were never married, but have a daughter, A.R., who was born

in 2002. Each party is currently married with children; Roden has one teenager

and Mistretta has three young children.

      On May 17, 2004,1 the parties entered a consent order for parenting time

and child support. The consent order obligated Mistretta to pay $1,400 per

month in child support. Mistretta's obligation was modified in September 2016,

and child support was reduced to $1,350 per month.

1
  The consent order is dated May 17, 2004; however, the order was filed on June
22, 2004. As such, the portions of the record and the Family Part's order use
June 22, 2004 as the controlling date for the 2004 consent order.
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      The consent order also addressed the parties' obligations toward college

expenses.    Each party agreed to deposit $2,400 into A.R.'s college fund,

increasing that amount by $200 per year until each party contributed $3,600

maximum per year until A.R. began college. The parties also agreed to pay the

balance of any college expenses based on their respective ability to pay for

college. A.R. was to incur student loans in the event the college fund was

"insufficient" to cover the full cost of college.

      On August 25, 2016, the parties entered another consent order that

directed Roden to transfer $5,000, previously deposited by Mistretta, from

A.R.'s college account held by her into Mistretta's college account for A.R. The

order expressly provided that "[p]ursuant to the June 22, 2004 consent order,

each parent [was] required by August 31, 2020 to have at least $57,000 available

to contribute to [A.R.'s] college education expenses." Lastly, the parties agreed

Mistretta's child support obligation would be recalculated upon A.R.'s

graduation from high school.

      Although both parties were involved in A.R.'s college search, they

separately took A.R. on college tours. A.R. applied to ten colleges and was

accepted into her first-choice college, a public university in South Carolina.

Mistretta testified that he told A.R. on multiple occasions that he and Roden had

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saved $60,000 each for college and that she would be responsible for any costs

greater than $114,000. Mistretta claimed that he did not have any specific

discussions with Roden concerning A.R.'s selection of the university. He further

claimed that he did not participate in the free application for federal student aid

application process nor was he privy to any financial documents associated with

A.R.'s college enrollment.

      In contrast, A.R. testified that both parents were "pretty active in the

decision-making process" of her enrollment decision. A.R. ultimately decided

to attend college in South Carolina and told Mistretta of her choice. She also

stated that she received federal grants and loans and worked while in college.

      Mistretta timely paid his child support obligations prior to A.R.'s

graduation from high school.       Following A.R.'s graduation in June 2020,

Mistretta, then self-represented, moved to terminate child support and

emancipate A.R. He believed that his child support "payments were due to stop

when [A.R.] [was] emancipated." The record shows after the filing of that

application, their father-daughter relationship fractured.

      Mistretta claimed that he had experienced "financial distress" related to

the COVID-19 pandemic.        He testified that he was self-employed and his

entertainment business – a "DJ business and nightclub styled venue" were

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reduced to "almost zero money" due to "mass cancellations" related to the

pandemic.    Mistretta also owned a commercial building that housed the

nightclub, which had been vacant since the start of the pandemic, and he had not

made mortgage payments on the nightclub in fifteen months as of the date of the

hearing. Mistretta claimed that in 2020, the business had "zero" future bookings,

he was not collecting deposits, and he had no cash flow. According to his case

information statement, Mistretta received $52,000 in unemployment benefits in

2020 and continued to receive them in 2021.

      Mistretta also received $200,000 in paycheck protection program (PPP)

loans, the majority of which has been forgiven. Most of the funds were used to

pay the business credit card, a "couple of mortgage payments," employee payroll

for several months, and employee benefits. He also received two COVID-19

economic injury disaster loans (EIDL) for each business, totaling $300,000 that

had to be paid back. Lourenco corroborated Mistretta's testimony that the

companies suffered financial distress during the pandemic and received two

"unforgiveable" EIDL loans.

      As of August 2020, Mistretta had complied with the 2016 order and

funded $61,000 in A.R.'s college fund while Roden had saved only $5,000.

Mistretta believed A.R. was not entitled to the entirety of the $61,000 that was

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previously held in her college savings account because that money belonged to

all his children. Mistretta testified using all of the college fund solely on A.R.'s

education because she chose to attend a more expensive school was not fair to

his other children, and he closed the college fund designated for A.R. So, by

October 2020, Mistretta had deposited the $60,000 from A.R.'s college fund

account into the other children's college fund totaling $100,000.

      Five months later, Mistretta, represented by counsel, again moved to

terminate child support, and requested that his college contribution be deemed

sufficient to support A.R. Roden cross-moved, seeking Mistretta's cooperation

with the forensic accountant she had retained, requiring payment of A.R.'s

spring 2021 college tuition, and requiring the return of funds Mistretta removed

from A.R.'s college fund account. Mistretta was ordered to pay A.R.'s Spring

2021 tuition without prejudice.

      Four additional orders followed in January, July, September, and October

2021. In each instance except for July, the court required Mistretta to pay A.R.'s

college tuition.

      Roden testified that she and Mistretta had agreed in 2017 to send A.R. to

private school for the remainder of her high school education and that Roden

could use her portion of A.R.'s college fund to pay for it. After Mistretta

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declined to share A.R.'s high school tuition expenses, Roden testified that she

spent $35,000 towards A.R.'s private high school tuition, limiting her ability to

save for A.R.'s college education.     However, she promised that she would

contribute the $57,000 in compliance with the 2016 consent order. Roden also

testified that she retained a forensic accountant, who prepared an expert report.

Based on Mistretta's records reviewed by the accountant, he opined that in 2018,

Mistretta's gross income was $243,214 and net income was $199,435; in 2019,

his gross income was $196,215 and net income was $160,896; and in 2020, his

gross income was $94,711 and net income was $77,683.                The forensic

accountant noted that the pandemic "significantly impacted" Mistretta's business

operations. The forensic accountant further opined that Mistretta's 2021 income

would meet or exceed that of 2020, but "not at a material level."

      Following the plenary hearing, the court rendered an oral decision, which

summarized its findings of facts and reasoning. The court rejected Mistretta's

argument that his estrangement from A.R. and the trial court's citation to

Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982) in the July 15, 2020 order required the

application of the Newburgh factors. The court noted that the law was clear that

Newburgh does not apply when there's "an agreement, a consent order, and a

court order" as long as the terms are "equitable and just."

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      The court found the Newburgh factors did not apply because Mistretta had

agreed to contribute towards A.R.'s education in the parties' 2016 consent order

and was involved throughout A.R's college selection process. The trial court

further determined Mistretta's Newburgh argument was "disingenuous" because

both parties envisioned paying for A.R.'s college tuition as evinced in the 2016

consent order. The court found Mistretta had the money, "collected the money,"

made an application to the court certifying that he had the money, and the first

case information statement showed he had the money. However, when his

application to terminate child support was denied, he unilaterally closed A.R.'s

account. In sum, the court found that Mistretta's testimony was "contradictory,"

"not credible," and the closure of A.R.'s college account was done in "bad faith"

and "really [out of] spite."

      Nevertheless, the court addressed each Newburgh factors, finding the

parties had an expectation that A.R. would attend college and there was "no

question" Mistretta would have contributed to A.R.'s college education had she

resided with him, given the parties' consent orders. The court also found that

the record did not support Mistretta's argument that he was unaware of A.R.'s

higher education pursuits.      A.R.'s commitment and aptitude for higher

education, along with her conversations with Mistretta, established a reasonable

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expectation that she would attend college and knew how much her parents had

saved for college. Further, A.R. informed Mistretta when she made her choice

to attend college in South Carolina.

      Citing Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109 (App. Div. 2012), the court

explained that there was no presumption that a child's required financial support

lessens because the child attends college.       The court noted that despite

explaining that legal principle to Mistretta on numerous occasions, he "refused

to pay." The court considered that Mistretta lived a "very nice lifestyle" with

income close to $300,000, had family vacations, made contributions to his

savings and retirement accounts and the children's college funds, drove "fancy

cars" and paid car loans, and his young children attended day care, camps, and

private schools. The court then enforced the 2016 consent order and directed

Mistretta to pay $8,673 towards A.R.'s college expenses after considering his

prior contributions of $48,327, Roden to pay an additional $31,981.74 towards

A.R.'s college expenses, and A.R. to be responsible for any additional college

expenses.

      After considering the relevant law and statutes, the court then computed

child support based on A.R.'s status as an out-of-state college student and her

continued reliance on Roden's New Jersey residence. The court determined

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                                       9
A.R's expenses totaled $2,485 per month and apportioned the expenses evenly

between the parties. Mistretta was ordered to pay $1,242.50 per month in child

support, retroactive to September 2020.

      The court also granted Roden's request for attorneys' fees. In analyzing

the factors outlined in Rule 5:3-5(c), the court found Mistretta could pay Roden's

fees because he had his own fees reimbursed by his father. The court also found

that Mistretta took unreasonable positions and lacked good faith throughout the

litigation. Based on Roden's submissions, Mistretta was ordered to pay $16,450

of her attorney's fees.

                                       II.

      On appeal, Mistretta presents three arguments. First, the trial court erred

in enforcing the August 2016 order regarding college contributions based on his

changed circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and Roden's lack of

compliance with the court orders. Second, the court erred in establishing a child

support award in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a. Third, the court abused

its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to Roden and denying his "good faith"

application for attorneys' fees.

      Our review of Family Part orders is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.

394, 411 (1998). Appellate courts accord the trial court's factual findings after

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a bench trial substantial deference when "'supported by adequate, substantial,

credible evidence' in the record." Landers v. Landers, 444 N.J. Super. 315, 319

(App. Div. 2016) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)). Deference

does not extend to legal issues, which are subject to de novo review. Ricci v.

Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017). "[W]e do not overturn those

determinations unless the court abused its discretion, failed to consider

controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or unsupported

by competent evidence." Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J. Super. 464, 479 (App. Div.

2004). The same standard guides our review of an award of attorneys' fees.

Diamond Beach, LLC v. March Assocs., 457 N.J. Super. 265, 285 (App. Div.

2018).

      We defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial court because

the trial court "'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them

testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the

veracity of a witness.'" Gnall, 222 N.J. at 428 (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412).

But "[a]ll 'legal conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the

facts, are subject to our plenary review.'" Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. at 344-45

(quoting Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).

                                         A.

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      New Jersey's legislature and courts "have long recognized a child's need

for higher education . . . ." Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 542 (2005). As such,

courts should consider the non-exhaustive factors delineated in Newburgh when

evaluating a claim for contribution towards the cost of a child's higher education.

Id. at 543. When there is an agreement between the parties regarding the child's

college education and the agreement is clear as to how expenses should be

divided, Newburgh is inapplicable and the "court should enforce the agreement

as written." Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 591 (App. Div.

2016) (citations omitted).

      Applying these governing principles, we conclude the trial court did not

abuse her discretion in enforcing the 2004 consent order. The parties' 2004

consent order, reaffirmed in the 2016 order, expressly and unambiguously bound

the parties to contribute $57,000 towards A.R.'s college tuition based on their

respective incomes. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied that the trial

court correctly followed the 2016 consent order and concluded the Newburgh

factors were not applicable, based on Mistretta's involvement in the college

process, conversations with A.R. concerning her college fund, and his

certification that he had the funds when he filed his first application to

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emancipate A.R. The court found Mistretta not credible, and we discern no error

in that finding.

      Even if Newburgh was applicable, the court found Mistretta did not

present credible evidence of an inequity or a substantial change in circumstances

which would relieve him from his obligation to contribute towards A.R.'s

college expenses and shifting the sole responsibility to Roden and A.R. The

court evaluated Mistretta's claim that he could not afford to pay any further child

support because he has three additional children, and determined the children

did not demonstrate a change in circumstances sufficient to require a

modification of his child support.     We also add that based on the record,

Mistretta has a "reasonable and fairly balanced plan" as shown by the college

funds established for each of his three young children. See Black v. Black, 436

N.J. Super. 130, 153-155 (Ch. Div. 2013). Assuming Mistretta's three other

children aspire to attend college, he has a reasonable amount of time to continue

to contribute toward their college funds in preparation for their future education

pursuits. See Enrico v. Goldsmith, 237 N.J. 572, 577 (App. Div. 1990). Lastly,

assuming any estrangement by A.R., it is but one factor within a twelve-factor

Newburgh analysis, which was not sufficiently supported by the record. We see

no reason to disturb the trial court order enforcing the 2016 consent order and

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finding Mistretta remained financially responsible for his share of A.R.'s college

expenses.

                                       B.

      Mistretta argues the trial court failed to analyze the factors in N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23a in recalculating his child support obligation. Instead, the trial court

considered A.R.'s unverified expenses and incorrectly charged him for off-

campus housing when he paid for campus room and board. We are persuaded

by Mistretta's arguments.

      The obligation of a parent and the right of a child to support may give rise

to "the duty to assure children of a college and even of a postgraduate education"

Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 544. It is well-established that college contribution differs

from child support of a college student. See Hudson v. Hudson, 315 N.J. Super.

577, 584 (App. Div. 1998) ("Child support and contribution to college expenses

are two discrete yet related obligations imposed on parents.").

      As explained to Mistretta by the Family Part court on numerous occasions,

there is no presumption a parent's child support obligation will decrease because

the child is attending college.   Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at 113.       Since the

"payment of college costs differs from the payment of child support for a college

student," an obligor's costs may even rise. Id. at 121. When determining the

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amount of support, courts should evaluate the parties' circumstances based on

the factors in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23a, as well as the child's continued need for a

local residence during school breaks and between semesters and other "costs

associated with supporting a college experience." Id. at 121-22.

      Here, the record shows the trial court mistakenly applied the statute and

corresponding legal principles in reviewing A.R.'s expenses as a college student

and found most of the expenses to be reasonable. In contrast, the court correctly

found gas, restaurants, vacations, and entertainment expenses to be

unreasonable, and therefore should be paid by A.R. Second, Mistretta has not

offered evidence showing that A.R.'s needs have lessened since attending

college. Lastly, even at the peak of the pandemic, Mistretta earned more than

Roden, had monthly expenses of over $20,000 per month, and retained over

$200,000 in various savings and retirement accounts. We, however, conclude

the trial court mistakenly included A.R's $750 monthly rent for her apartment

and her $75 in monthly food expenses in the court's child support calculation.

Although the 2004 and 2016 consent orders did not allocate college expenses,

"[t]he typical college expenses associated with college attendance include

tuition, registration fees, lab costs, housing, board, books, and computer costs."

Jacoby, 427 N. J. Super. at 121. Therefore, we reverse the provision of the April

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20, 2022 order, and remand to the Family Part for further analysis consistent

with those governing principles.

                                       C.

      Under Rule 4:42-9(a)(1), attorney's fees are allowable "[i]n a family

action . . . pursuant to Rule 5:3-5(c)." Rule 5:3-5(c) provides in part that the

court, in its discretion, may award attorney's fees to be paid by any party in a

Family Part matter who succeeds on "any . . . claims relating to family type

matters." The trial court appropriately considered the Rules of Professional

Conduct 1.5 factors and rejected Mistretta's claim that he filed his motions in

good-faith to determine his child support and college tuition obligations. We

agree. As we have discussed, Mistretta routinely refused to abide by the 2004

consent order, was repeatedly ordered to pay A.R.'s college tuition, and

unilaterally closed A.R.'s college fund account. Accordingly, we affirm the

awarding of attorneys' fees to Roden and the denial of attorneys' fees to

defendant.

      To the extent we have not specifically discussed any remaining arguments

raised by Mistretta, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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