Court Opinion

ID: 9840953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:04:51.474484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:31:57.582111
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 Remnant and Outcasts Church of Christ v. Lee CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 REMNANT AND OUTCASTS                                                B316499
 CHURCH OF CHRIST,
                                                                     (Los Angeles County
          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   Super. Ct. No. BC696166)

          v.

 THOMAS LEE et al.,

          Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mel Red Recana, Judge. Affirmed.
     Pacific Rim Law Group and Miao Yu for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     Wong & Mak and Fred A. Wong for Defendants and
Respondents.
                    ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       Plaintiff and appellant Remnant and Outcasts Church of
Christ (the Church) appeals from a judgment following a bench
trial in favor of defendants and respondents Thomas Lee, Fred
Wong, and Wong & Mak, LLP (collectively respondents). The
parties tried a single cause of action under Business and
Professions Code section 17200.1 The Church argues the trial
court erred in finding the statute of limitations barred the claim.
It also asserts the trial court erred in crediting certain witness
testimony and in finding no evidence of damages. We affirm the
judgment.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Thomas Lee v. Tony Ing, et al.
       In 2011, Lee filed a complaint against Tony Ing. Wong and
the law firm of Wong & Mak represented Lee; attorney Ramon
Barredo represented Ing. The case concerned $1 million Lee gave
to Ing and his company, Hypo Capital. Ing was the pastor at
Lee’s church, and he also held himself out as a businessman and
experienced investor. In the lawsuit, Thomas Lee v. Tony Ing, et
al. (the underlying lawsuit), Lee contended he gave Ing the
$1 million for Ing to invest it on Lee’s behalf. Ing argued the
funds were payment for business services he had rendered.
       At the beginning of the July 2013 bench trial, the parties
stipulated that “the total amount of money [Lee gave Ing] was
not invested by Ing for Lee, but was all spent by Ing for his own
personal purposes and not for the benefit of Lee.” Barredo,
Wong, and the trial court also discussed this stipulation on
July 29, 2013, in open court, during a pause in Ing’s testimony
and while he remained on the witness stand.

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Business and Professions Code.

                                2
       At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court ruled in favor
of Lee, finding that Ing intentionally misrepresented to Lee that
he would invest the money, and he instead used it “for the
purchase and/or renovation of . . . real property.” The statement
of decision referred to the aforementioned stipulation. The court
issued a judgment that placed a constructive trust on the
Church’s property.
The Church’s Current Action
       The Church and several of its individual members filed a
complaint in March 2018, naming as defendants Lee and two
companies related to him, Steven Hashimoto, Fred Wong, and
Wong & Mak. The complaint asserted four causes of action, only
one of which was litigated at trial.2 The plaintiffs alleged Lee
and Wong bribed Ing’s attorney, Barredo, to enter into the
stipulation in the underlying lawsuit, thus engaging in a
fraudulent business practice in violation of section 17200.
Trial, Findings of Fact, and Judgment
       In early August 2021, the trial court conducted a bench
trial. The court heard testimony from several witnesses,
including Barredo, Ing, Lee, and Wong.
       Ing testified that he met with Barredo in June and October
2017, and during each of those meetings Barredo signed a
declaration regarding the stipulation. The Church submitted
both declarations into evidence at trial. In the declarations,

2     The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary adjudication of the second through fourth causes of
action. Defendant Hashimoto was dismissed from the complaint
as a result. Some of the individual plaintiffs’ claims were also
dismissed. None of the individual plaintiffs are parties to this
appeal.

                                  3
Barredo states that he was “induced by Plaintiff’s counsel to
enter into” the stipulation and he was “induced” to enter into the
stipulation by “plaintiff,” explaining he was “financially
influenced to do so.” Neither declaration elaborates further on
the alleged inducement or financial influence. Barredo testified
at trial that he was not bribed.
       The court found, in relevant part, that Ing was not credible;
Ing was aware of the stipulation because he was on the witness
stand on July 29, 2013 when it was discussed; Ing was the pastor
of the Church at the time of the trial in the underlying lawsuit;
the statute of limitations ran before the Church brought the
action; and Lee and Wong did not bribe Barredo to enter into the
stipulation in the underlying lawsuit.
       Based on these findings of fact, the trial court entered a
judgment in favor of respondents. The Church timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
       Finding That the Statute of Limitations Barred the
       Church’s Claim
       The Church argues the trial court erred in finding the
statute of limitations expired before it filed this action. We find
no error.
       “Resolution of a statute of limitations issue is normally a
question of fact,” and a trial court’s finding as to the date of
accrual for a cause of action is a factual question. (Pearce v.
Briggs (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 466, 474.) On appeal, we determine
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that a claim was brought outside of the limitations period. (Ibid.)
We further note that when, as in this case, “a statement of
decision is not issued, the appellate court applies the doctrine of

                                 4
implied findings, meaning that we presume the trial court ‘made
all factual findings necessary to support the judgment for which
substantial evidence exists in the record. In other words, the
necessary findings of ultimate facts will be implied and the only
issue on appeal is whether the implied findings are supported by
substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]” (LSREF2 Clover Property 4,
LLC v. Festival Retail Fund 1, LP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1067,
1076.)
        Pursuant to section 17208, the statute of limitations for a
section 17200 claim is four years. (§ 17208 [“Any action to
enforce any cause of action pursuant to this chapter shall be
commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued”];
Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th
163, 179 [“Any action on any [Unfair Competition Law] cause of
action is subject to the four-year period of limitations created
by . . . section [17208]”], original italics.)3 “A plaintiff must bring
a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of
action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797,
806 (Fox).) “Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the
time when the cause of action is complete with all of its
elements.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “An important exception to the
general rule of accrual is the ‘discovery rule,’ which postpones
accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has

3      The Church argues the four-year limitations period set
forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 343 applies. This is “a
catchall provision that provides a statute of limitations in
situations where no specific limitations period applies.” (Geneva
Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 773.) Although we conclude the more
specific statute of limitations under section 17208 applies, we
note that both provisions establish a four-year limitations period.

                                  5
reason to discover, the cause of action.” (Id. at p. 807.) “A
plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she
‘has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court has explained that the
discovery of the “elements” of a claim does not require a
“hypertechnical approach,” but instead mandates an examination
of whether the “plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a
type of wrongdoing has injured them.” (Ibid.)
       The basis for the Church’s section 17200 claim is Lee and
Wong’s alleged bribery of Barredo, which resulted in the
stipulation. While Ing may not have been aware of the alleged
wrongful conduct—the bribery—when it occurred, substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s determination that Ing knew
or should have known of the stipulation, which he claimed was
the result of the bribery and compromised his legal rights, no
later than July 2013. On July 29, 2013, Ing was on the witness
stand while his attorney (Barredo), Wong, and the court
discussed the stipulation. Ing thus had reason to suspect his
alleged injury on that day. The complaint in this matter was
filed March 2, 2018—over four years and seven months from the
date Ing learned or should have learned of the stipulation. The
trial court properly found the limitations period expired well
before the Church filed its complaint.
       The Church does not argue that it did not have reason to
discover the stipulation when Ing was on the witness stand on
July 29, 2013. Instead, the Church asserts the statute of
limitations began to accrue on December 13, 2014, when Lee
allegedly recorded a corrected judgment that was issued in the
underlying case imposing a constructive trust on the Church’s
property. The Church contends this commenced the limitations

                                6
period because it was “[t]he last discoverable event affecting and
damaging, impairing the property of the appellant church.” This
argument misapprehends the statute of limitations. As
explained above, the limitations period begins to run when the
cause of action accrues, or when “plaintiffs have reason to . . .
suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them” (Fox, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 807), not when the last consequences of the
alleged wrongdoing occur.
       Substantial evidence supported the trial court finding that
the Church’s section 17200 cause of action accrued, at the latest,
when Ing was on the witness stand while the stipulation was
discussed. The Church does not specifically address the trial
court’s finding except to argue, without citation to any legal
authority, that the recording of the judgment was the accrual
date. This is insufficient. The Church has failed to demonstrate
error in the trial court’s ruling. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [appellant must overcome presumption of
correctness by affirmatively showing error and supporting
contentions with argument and citations to authority]; Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Hernandez v. First Student, Inc.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 276–277.)
       We additionally note that even if the trial court’s findings
regarding the statute of limitations were in error, the Church
cannot establish prejudice. “ ‘No form of civil trial error justifies
reversal and retrial, with its attendant expense and possible loss
of witnesses, where in light of the entire record, there was no
actual prejudice to the appealing party.’ [Citation.]” (Cassim v.
Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 801.) To determine if
there was error, we must inquire whether a different result
would have been probable if the error had not existed. (Id. at

                                  7
p. 802.) Here, the trial court not only found the statute of
limitations barred the Church’s claim, it also rejected the claim
on the merits. The court found that “[Lee and Wong] did not
bribe [Barredo] to submit the stipulation [in] the underlying
lawsuit.” As discussed below, we find no error in the trial court’s
assessment of the evidence. Thus, any error in the trial court’s
ruling as to the statute of limitations would not provide a basis
for reversal.4
II.    The Trial Court Did Not Err With Respect to
       Barredo’s Testimony
       The Church also contends the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting or crediting Barredo’s testimony, which it
claims contradicted his previous sworn declaration and other
evidence at trial.
       “ ‘[A]n appellate court reviews any ruling by a trial court as
to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.’
[Citation.]” (Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855,
861.) “ ‘ “An abuse of discretion occurs if, in light of the
applicable law and considering all of the relevant circumstances,
the court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason and results in a
miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] This standard of review
affords considerable deference to the trial court provided that the
court acted in accordance with the governing rules of law. We
presume that the court properly applied the law and acted within
its discretion unless the appellant affirmatively shows
otherwise.” ’ [Citation.]” (Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 329, 378.) “The abuse of discretion standard
applies ‘even [when] the evidence is of such a nature that

4      We therefore need not address the Church’s argument that
the trial court erred in finding no evidence of damages.

                                  8
reasonable minds would possibly differ regarding the facts.’
[Citation.] ‘ “The test is not whether we would have made a
different decision had the matter been submitted to us in the first
instance. Rather, the discretion is that of the trial court, and we
will only interfere with its ruling if we find that under all the
evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s
action, no judge reasonably could have reached the challenged
result.” ’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86,
103–104.)
       As an initial matter, the Church does not challenge any
specific evidentiary ruling regarding Barredo’s testimony and has
offered no legal basis to support its argument that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the testimony. Instead, the
Church appears to argue that the trial court simply erred by
finding Barredo credible. However, this court “ ‘is not a second
trier of fact,’ ” (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th
1509, 1531) and “ ‘ “ ‘[t]o warrant the rejection of the statements
given by a witness who has been believed by a trial court, there
must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or
their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or
deductions.’ ” ’ ” (Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
729, 750 (Bloxham).) No such circumstances exist here.
       Barredo testified that when he said in his declaration that
he was “financially influenced” to enter into the stipulation, he
meant that he thought he would lose the trial if he did not sign
the stipulation and then would not be paid for his representation
of Ing. Barredo explained that Wong had shown him evidence
documenting Ing’s use of the $1 million for jewelry and other
personal expenses. Barredo testified that he asked Wong to enter
into the stipulation, which he did to prevent Wong from

                                9
introducing evidence of Ing’s personal expenses, while still
maintaining Ing’s defense that he had the right to spend the
money as he wished because it was a payment for his services,
not for investing on Lee’s behalf. Barredo explicitly testified that
neither Wong nor Lee ever offered him any money.5
        Ing, however, testified that Barredo confessed to him that
he was “induced” by Wong and Lee to enter into the stipulation.
Ing said Barredo described needing money to pay back a debt,
and Lee offered to “give him the money . . . to win the case.”
        After hearing the evidence, the trial court did not find Ing
credible, and determined Lee and Wong did not bribe Barredo.
We infer that the trial court found respondents’ evidence credible
on this point. “ ‘ “ ‘Conflicts and even testimony which is subject
to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment,
for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to
determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of
the facts upon which a determination depends.’ ” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (Bloxham, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 750.)
Further, “we do not second-guess the calls the trial court made
regarding credibility.” (Barboni v. Tuomi (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
340, 349.) Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
findings, and, to the extent the trial court found Barredo credible
or relied on his testimony in reaching its decision, it did not
abuse its discretion.

5      Respondents indicate that Lee and Wong also testified at
trial and both denied that they bribed Barredo. The Church does
not dispute this description of the record.

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                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are to recover their
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                        ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 EDMON, P. J.

                 LAVIN, J.

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