Court Opinion

ID: 9459910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:35:18.839362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:23.621783
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge,
concurring:
This court has rejected a responsibility defense grounded in the compulsion of narcotics addiction, and I am bound by that decision. United States v. Moore, 158 U.S.App.D.C. _, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C.Cir. 1973). I would therefore agree that the Eighth Amendment problems which inhere in applying the criminal sanction to an addict for his mere possession of narcotics are alleviated only where that application is for the purpose of providing treatment.
Current treatment facilities and philosophies are, of course, imperfect.1 But, at present, N.A.R.A. disposition at least opens the door to the possibility of helping the addict found guilty of possession. Unlike imprisonment in an empty cell, it is related to a recognizable goal of the criminal law, that of rehabilitation.2 Particularly with the increasing and commendable concern for available treatment facilities under N. A.R.A., see United States v. Miller, 476 F.2d 555 (D.C.Cir. 1973), this use of the criminal justice system, to the extent that it reflects an honest effort to understand and help the problems of the addict possessor, may well obviate the constitutional infirmities that mere incarceration would present. I therefore concur in the court’s remand for reconsideration of sentence.

. Indeed, the very concept of “treatment” can be abused when ineffective or repressive measures are justified on the ground that they are labelled “treatment” rather than “punishment.” See, e. g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968).

. It would be difficult to say that a five year mandatory minimum sentence for mere possession by an addict satisfies any other goal of criminal justice. The nature of addiction makes the deterrent value of such a sentence doubtful at best, and, as a victimless crime, possession poses no danger to the public demanding incarceration of the offender. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 301-305, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (Brennan, J., concurring).