Court Opinion

ID: 9686728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:04:00.81386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.748439
License: Public Domain

Dethmers, C. J.
Plaintiff’s automobile and the tractor of defendant corporation, driven by defendant Hansen, hereinafter called defendant, were involved in a collision described in plaintiff’s declaration as “head-on.” Plaintiff sued for resulting damages, the ease was tried to a jury which was discharged after being unable to agree on a verdict, and the court then granted defendants’ motion for a directed verdict of no cause for action pursuant to CL 1948, § 691.701 (Stat Ann § 27,1471). Plaintiff appeals.
The accident occurred at 2:40 a.m. on a north and south, 40-foot, 4-lane, concrete highway, which was icy at the time. Plaintiff’s theory of the case, as alleged in his declaration and sought to be proved by his unsupported testimony, is as follows: as he drove his automobile south at about 30 miles per hour on the innermost of the 2 southbound lanes, he saw defendants’ tractor approach from the south on the east side of the center line, but when it was about 50 feet distant it took an angle right at him, crossing-over the center line of the highway; plaintiff then turned his wheel quickly to the left to avoid an accident but his automobile had not yet crossed east of the center line when a big crash occurred.
Defendants’ theory, according to the allegations in their answer and the testimony of defendant Hansen, is that while he was driving the tractor north at about 25 miles per hour in the most easterly of the 2 northbound lanes plaintiff’s automobile skidded sideways, in a southeasterly direction, from the inner southbound lane, across the center line and the inner *674northbound lane, and hit defendants’ tractor broadside in the east lane, the right rear fender and door of plaintiff’s automobile striking the left front fender and bumper of defendants’ tractor.
Here, as in Carlson v. Brunette, 339 Mich 188, 190, “The controversy revolves around the question whether the accident occurred on plaintiff’s or on defendants’ part of the highway. The answer to that question decides whether the defendant driver was guilty of negligence, and whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.” The parties’ conflicting claims and theories of the case being as above noted, it is obvious that rejection of plaintiff’s theory must result in judgment for defendants. As we said in Hormel Estate v. Harris, 348 Mich 201, 206, “Plaintiff must stand or fall on its [his] pleadings, proofs and theory of the case presented thereby.”
Plaintiff refers to the “scintilla of evidence doctrine,” citing Davis v. New York Central R. Co., 348 Mich 262, which speaks in no such terms, but, rather, reiterates our long standing rule that on appeal from directed verdict for defendant we view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and draw the reasonable inferences therefrom which are in his favor. This rule we have applied, even though the case be one of direction of verdict after jury disagreement. Levesque v. LaFortune, 348 Mich 443, and cases therein cited. With that rule in mind, plaintiff’s theory of the case boils down to this — that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, the collision occurred on his side of the center line of the highway while he was driving where he had a right to be without any negligence on his part whatsoever, the accident being caused by defendant’s negligence in driving onto the wrong side of the highway and, hence, the court erred in directing a verdict for. defendants.
*675Defendants respond that the undisputed physical facts refute plaintiff’s theory of the case, establish that of defendants, and, therefore, require a holding in defendants’ favor as a matter of law. Those undisputed physical facts are the following: immediately after the accident plaintiff’s auto-mobile came to rest on the east shoulder of the highway, facing-southwest, and defendants’ tractor was up against and west of plaintiff’s car, facing southeast, with its front and left side off the pavement and its right rear on the east lane of the pavement; there were skid marks on the pavement extending from the inner southbound lane southeasterly to the point in the east lane where the impact occurred as determined by location of debris; such debris, consisting of bumpers, bumper braces, glass from headlights, dirt from underneath fenders, a car seat, a jack, pieces of metal and “stuff that had fallen off the car,” lay only on the most easterly lane and the east shoulder of the highway at the point where the automobile and tractor had come to a stop and there was none west of the center line; plaintiff lay on the ground east of and near the left front fender of his automobile.
The rule that, in considering whether defendant is entitled to a judgment of no cause for action as a matter of law, we take the view of the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, stems from the necessity of having a determination by someone of what the facts are to which the relevant law is to be applied and from recognition of the right of plaintiff, in case of conflicting testimony or evidence from which more than 1 conclusion might be drawn, to have that determination of facts made by a jury, whose province is not, on appeal, to be invaded or usurped by us; and, consequently, if there is any credible testimony which the jury might properly believe and which would permit it to find for plaintiff, he is entitled *676to have it accepted by us as the truth to which the law is to be applied. When, however, the case is not one in which the sole source of information for the jury is disputed and conflicting testimony, but added thereto are undisputed physical facts permitting of but one conclusion, utterly inconsistent with and flatly contradictory to plaintiff’s theory of the case, these may not be disregarded and credence be given only to the inconsistent, disputed testimony which is most favorable to plaintiff in determining the rights of the parties as a matter of law. Plaintiff has no constitutional right to have a determination of facts by a jury inconsistent with the undisputed physical facts of the case. On the contrary, such facts overcome testimony inconsistent therewith and are controlling of decision, leaving a jury determination with respect to facts established by the undisputed physical facts unnecessary. Champaign v. Detroit United Railway, 181 Mich 672; Molby v. Detroit United Railway, 221 Mich 419; Downey v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 230 Mich 243; Molda v. Clark, 236 Mich 277; Rushford-Surine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 239 Mich 19; Brady v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 248 Mich 406; Richman v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co., 254 Mich 607; DePotty v. City of Detroit, 258 Mich 657; Heintzelman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 260 Mich 688; Rybarczyk v. New York Central R. Co., 276 Mich 131; Carlson v. Brunette, 339 Mich 188. In Brady we said (p 407):
“The court still heeds physical facts, even though disputed by testimony.”
In DePotty we said of the testimony of a plaintiff that it (p 658) “does not raise an issue of fact if such testimony is contrary to the physical facts.” Concerning this rule that the undisputed physical facts control, announced in Champaign and followed *677in the other cases above cited, we may say here as we did in Molby (p 421):
“The rule announced in the Champaign Case is applicable to the facts in the instant case. It has been adopted by this Court and is the only safe rule unless we desire to put a premium on perjury.”
In the case at bar the only reasonable conclusions that can be drawn from the undisputed physical facts are inconsistent with plaintiff’s theory of the case. Cited by plaintiff, but not in point, is Albrecht v. Pritchard, 347 Mich 166, in which we said (p 171):
“Indeed, and in the present case, the trier of facts would have been justified in finding that located presence of such debris is just as consistent with plaintiff’s theory as with that of defendant.”
Heré the location of the skid marks, debris and the 2 vehicles immediately following the accident is absolutely inconsistent with plaintiff’s theory that the accident happened in the west half of the highway and establishes, instead, defendants’ claim in that regard. It follows that the court was correct in directing a verdict for defendants' because the state of the récord would not have permitted a jury finding of defendant’s negligence or' plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence.
Plaintiff also complains of error in the trial court’s rejection of an offer of proof, contained in a special record, that'his brother-in-law visited the scene of the accident some 5 or 6 hours after its occurrence and found fragmentary pieces of glass and chrome on the center line of the highway or west of it. In view of the undisputed testimony that there was none there immediately following the accident and that a short while later, at the direction of police officers, *678debris was removed and the pavement was swept at tbe scene of the accident by a person who found no glass or debris on the west half of tbe pavement, the fact that the highway involved is a much travelled trunk line, and the utter lack of testimony that no change in location of debris had occurred from time of the accident until arrival of plaintiff’s brother-in-law more than 5 hours later, it must be held that the court was right in ruling, the testimony inadmissible as too remote. Billingsley v. Gulick, 252 Mich 235; Hakkers v. Hansen, 337 Mich 620.
Claim of error in instructions to the jury need not be considered in view of the above disposition.
Affirmed, with costs to defendants.
Carr and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, C. J.