Court Opinion

ID: 9765011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:47:55.163419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:03.473676
License: Public Domain

*203NIX, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority in its rejection of the constitutional claims presented in this appeal. This statute1 does not represent a “patently impermissible” attempt to “penalize a criminal defendant for exercising so fundamental a right by imposing costs of the venue charge.” (At 411, Roberts, J., dissenting opinion). Moreover, it does not exert a constitutionally prohibited “chilling effect.” I am satisfied that the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of the question in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), adequately responds to these contentions. It cannot be successfully argued that the right to a change of venue is any more important in assuring a fair trial than the right to counsel.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is important to emphasize that my agreement with the majority’s result is premised upon an interpretation of the statute in question which limits the enforcement of this type of assessment to situations where the defendant has the capacity to meet it without manifest hardship. I note that in this case appellant was provided an opportunity to question the legitimacy of the bill of costs and that the court did, in fact, reduce the figure arrived at by the Commonwealth. I also assume, since there is nothing to the contrary being urged before us, that this defendant has the financial capacity to meet this obligation without manifest hardship.

. The applicable statute is Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, § 64, 19 P.S. § 1223, repealed and replaced, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1726 (effective June 27, 1978).