Court Opinion

ID: 9660702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:18:45.453089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:21.464592
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Judge, concurring. Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court should have considered alternative sentencing under § 41-1201 (Repl. 1977), even though “first degree” rape which is mentioned in § 41-1201 is an offense precluded from such sentencing considerations. He reasons that “first degree” rape is different from the crime of rape with which he was charged and convicted under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1803 (Supp. 1983). By way of explanation, first-degree rape was previously defined under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3401 (Supp. 1973), which limited the offense to be by a male against a female. The new § 41-1803, as amended, omitted the words “first-degree,” and broadened the definition of rape to eliminate the gender-based element to cover other deviate sexual acts which were previously classified as sodomy. Hoggard v. State, 277 Ark. 117, 640 S.W.2d 102 (1982). The General Assembly, however, never amended § 41-1201, the alternative sentencing statute, to delete the words “first degree” in front of the word “rape.” Thus, appellant argues the offense with which he was convicted — rape, not first-degree rape — is not excepted under § 41-1201, and as a consequence, the trial court could have given appellant a probated sentence or suspended imposition of his sentence. In other words, appellant urges on appeal that the trial court was not mandated to give him the minimum ten-year sentence required for first degree rape under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-901(l)(a). The State argues that although § 41-1201 was never amended to correlate with the new rape law, § 41-1803, the General Assembly’s intent in passing § 41-1803 was to make sure that offenders convicted of those serious crimes served their sentences. The State’s argument is consistent with Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-803(5) (Supp. 1983) which reflects that the court may suspend imposition of sentence or place the defendant on probation pursuant to § § 41 -1201 et seq. when the defendant is guilty of an offense other than capital murder, treason, a Class Y felony or murder in the second degree. Rape, under the new § 41-1803 is a Class Y felony. To reach and decide the merits of the issue argued by the appellant and the State, this Court must interpret statutes §§41-803,-1201 and -1803. This statutory interpretation is necessary not only because § 41-1803 was amended in 1981 as reflected hereinabove, but also because § 41-803 was amended in 1981. To decide this case as it does, the majority court — although it fails to say so — has ruled § 41-803, as amended, modified or amended § 41-1201 by implication. While I might agree with such rationale, that is an issue which exclusively is within the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Rule 29. Because this case clearly is one of first impression and involves statutory interpretation to decide it on its merits, I suggested unsuccessfully this case be certified to the Supreme Court. Aside from the jurisdiction question, it is doubtful in my mind, at least, exactly what precedential value the majority decision has. I would say none. In conclusion, I have little doubt that the statutory interpretation issue decided by the court did not have to be reached. Therefore, I would affirm this decision on a basis clearly within our power, i.e., the theory now urged by the appellant on appeal is different from that presented below. As we have said so often, an appellant may not change the grounds for his objection on appeal, and if an objection is made on one ground at trial, all other grounds are waived on appeal. Wilson v. State, 9 Ark. App. 213, 657 S.W.2d 558 (1983). Appellant’s argument concerning alternative sentencing under § 41 -1201 was never presented below and we should affirm the cause for that reason. James R. Cooper, Judge, concurring. I disagree with Judge Glaze that the matter of alternative sentencing is being raised for the first time on appeal. After the judge found the appellant guilty, he inquired as to whether either side had anything additional to present. The appellant’s attorney advised the court that the appellant was now away from children, that the appellant’s health was bad, and that the appellant was not opposed to counseling. Counsel observed that, in light of the appellant’s age (he was 76) any incarceration would be ill-advised. Counsel then stated that “I would ask the Court to consider his age and what he has tried to do so that this likelihood would not or could not re-occur.” The prosecutor then noted that the family of the victim did not wish to see the appellant spend the rest of his life in jail, but that they did want his activities to be supervised, that he seek counseling, and stay away from small children. The judge then noted that the court had no power to suspend the sentence because of the actions of the legislature. Although the appellant’s attorney did not use the magic words, “suspend imposition of sentence” or “suspended sentence”, it is obvious to me that both attorneys and the trial judge knew that what was being discussed was some form of alternative sentencing, with conditions which would include supervision and counseling. I think the issue of alternative sentencing was properly raised before the trial court, is properly before us, and involves the application, rather than interpretation, of the relevant statutory provisions, although I concede that the concepts of “application” versus “interpretation” is elusive.