Court Opinion

ID: 9894842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 14:10:09.164968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:51.056860
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2023-CA-0695-WC

JOSEPH LEE                                                        APPELLANT

                 PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
v.             OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
                       ACTION NO. WC-22-00320

W.G. YATES & SONS
CONSTRUCTION CO.;
HONORABLE W. GREG HARVEY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEES

                               OPINION
                       REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Joseph Lee (“Lee”) petitions for review of a decision of the

Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) affirming an administrative law judge’s

(“ALJ”) orders dismissing Lee’s claim for benefits resulting from a motorcycle
accident. Because the ALJ and the Board erred as a matter of law in holding that

Lee’s injuries were not compensable under the “going and coming” rule, we

reverse and remand.

          BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             Lee is a permanent legal resident of Louisiana where he resides with

his wife and daughter. He has worked as a pipefitter, welder, and in the

construction trade. Yates & Sons Construction Co. (“Yates”) is a construction

company based in Mississippi which accepts jobs all over the country. Yates hired

Lee as a general foreman for an environmental job upgrading the ash system at the

Eastern Kentucky Cooperative Plant in Maysville, Kentucky. Lee reported to a

project manager, Charla Davis (“Davis”), the division office manager and HRS

manager at Yates for twenty years. Davis was located in Jacksonville, Florida.

She fell under the supervision of yet another industrial office located in

Birmingham, Alabama. A temporary office was the only physical presence

maintained by Yates at the site of the Maysville project.

             Lee was hired on January 27, 2020, and scheduled to work on the

Maysville job until its completion. The evidence showed that the hiring process

was initiated and conducted by telephone while Lee was still in Louisiana. Lee

first spoke with Ken Milby, who was already working in Kentucky. Davis testified

                                         -2-
that Lee was hired solely for the Maysville project and that he would have been

offered the position over the phone before he traveled there.

               Upon being offered the job, Lee pulled a travel trailer with his pick-up

truck and a motorcycle to a campground located in Aberdeen, Ohio, a few miles

from the work site, where he stayed for the entirety of his employment for this job.

Notably, Lee maintained his residence in Louisiana and maintained a Louisiana

driver’s license. Lee was not reimbursed for his expenses to travel to the job site;

however, to compensate Lee for food and lodging expenditures, Yates provided

Lee a $100 daily per diem. As the Maysville project neared completion, Yates

approached Lee regarding employment for a future project in Hattiesburg,

Mississippi.

               On September 19, 2020, Lee clocked out of work in the early hours of

the morning. That afternoon, around 4:30 p.m., Lee left his trailer to join a friend

for a burger. He was scheduled to begin work later that evening between 6 p.m.

and 7 p.m. En route to the restaurant a vehicle came into Lee’s lane, striking him.

The collision resulted in the loss of Lee’s left leg below the knee and a frozen left

elbow.

               Lee filed a workers’ compensation claim, which by agreement of the

parties was bifurcated to determine the threshold issue of whether the injury

occurred within the course and scope of Lee’s employment. The ALJ concluded

                                           -3-
that it did not, which rendered moot the other issues, including timeliness of notice.

The ALJ based his conclusion on finding that Lee had “relocated” to Aberdeen and

for that reason, the “going and coming” rule meant that his injury was not

compensable. The ALJ further found that neither of the exceptions to the “going

and coming” rule applied in Lee’s case. Both parties filed petitions for

reconsideration. Lee contended that he was a traveling employee exempted from

the going and coming rule. He challenged the ALJ’s finding that he had

“relocated” to Aberdeen, pointing out that he maintained his permanent residence

in Louisiana; maintained his Louisiana driver’s license; lived in a campground in a

“travel trailer”; was paid a per diem; and had no intention of remaining in

Aberdeen beyond the duration of his job with Yates.

             The ALJ sustained both petitions in part, making additional findings

that although the terms of Lee’s employment contract with Yates did not

specifically require him to relocate, once Lee had arrived in Aberdeen, Ohio, the

only travel required of him was to and from a static jobsite in Maysville. The ALJ

did not alter his conclusion that Lee’s injury was not compensable. The Board

unanimously affirmed the ALJ’s opinion that the injury did not occur within the

course and scope of employment and consequently made no ruling on the

timeliness of notice, holding that the issue was moot. Lee now appeals to this

                                         -4-
Court as a matter of right. Having reviewed the record and the law, we reverse and

remand for further proceedings.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             The ALJ has “the sole discretion to determine the quality, character,

weight, credibility, and substance of the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from the evidence.” Bowerman v. Black Equipment Co., 297 S.W.3d

858, 866 (Ky. App. 2009). “If the reviewing court concludes the rule of law was

correctly applied to facts supported by substantial evidence, the final order of the

agency must be affirmed.” Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v. Cecil, 381

S.W.3d 238, 246 (Ky. 2012) (citing Brown Hotel Co. v. Edwards, 365 S.W.2d 299,

302 (Ky. 1962)). “Substantial evidence means evidence of substance and relevant

consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable

men.” Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chemical Co., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971)

(citation omitted). “However, a reviewing court is entitled to substitute its

judgment for that of the agency where the agency’s ruling is based on an ‘incorrect

view of the law.’” Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. Mitchell, 507 S.W.3d

15, 19 (Ky. App. 2016) (quoting Kentucky Bd. of Nursing v. Ward, 890 S.W.2d

641, 642 (Ky. App. 1994)). Thus, our review of a decision of the Board is limited

to whether “the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or

precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause

                                         -5-
gross injustice.” Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky.

1992). Regarding proper interpretation of the law or its application to the facts, we

are not bound by the decisions of an ALJ or the Board. In either case, the standard

of review is de novo. Bowerman, 297 S.W.3d at 866. With these standards in

mind, we now turn to the merits of the present case.

                                    ANALYSIS

             The Workers’ Compensation Act compensates workers for injuries

arising out of and in the course and scope of their employment. Kentucky Revised

Statutes (“KRS”) 342.0011(1). However, when an employee is injured while

commuting from home to work or from work to home, compensation is denied.

                    The general rule is that injuries sustained by
             workers when they are going to or returning from the
             place where they regularly perform the duties connected
             with their employment are not deemed to arise out of and
             in the course of the employment as the hazards ordinarily
             encountered in such journeys are not incident to the
             employer’s business.

Receveur Const. Company/Realm, Inc. v. Rogers, 958 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Ky. 1997).

This rule is known as the “going and coming” rule, and it applies to bar

compensation for injuries sustained while the employee is traveling to and from a

fixed place of employment. Husman Snack Foods Co. v. Dillon, 591 S.W.2d 701

(Ky. App. 1979).

                                         -6-
             Kentucky courts have recognized several exceptions to this rule,

including the “traveling employee” and the “service to the employer” exceptions.

See Black v. Tichenor, 396 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Ky. 1965); Receveur, supra.

                      i. The “traveling employee” exception

             The traveling employee exception was outlined in Gaines Gentry

Thoroughbreds/Fayette Farms v. Mandujano, 366 S.W.3d 456 (Ky. 2012). In

Gaines Gentry, a groom employed at a horse farm in Lexington, Kentucky,

requested time off to work at horse sales in New York, where he would be paid

substantially more than at the farm. His employer agreed and asked him to travel

to the sales with the farm’s horses in order to look after them. The groom agreed

and the employer paid him $200 for the trip. After working at the sales in Saratoga

Springs, New York, for several days, the groom was injured in an automobile

accident on the return journey to Lexington. The Court, holding that the injury

was indeed work-related, explained:

                    Kentucky applies the traveling employee doctrine
             in instances where a worker’s employment requires
             travel. Grounded in the positional risk doctrine, the
             traveling employee doctrine considers an injury that
             occurs while the employee is in travel status to be work-
             related unless the worker was engaged in a significant
             departure from the purpose of the trip.

Id. at 462 (footnotes omitted).

                                        -7-
             In his initial opinion and order, the ALJ found that the travel

exception did not apply to Lee’s case, stating:

             I find he was actually residing in Aberdeen, Ohio and his
             work did not require him to travel away from his regular
             place of employment located in Maysville, Kentucky. As
             the injury occurred while he was riding his motorcycle to
             a burger joint, it is clear he was not on a business trip at
             the time, but instead on a personal venture to eat prior to
             going to work.

However, when the ALJ made additional findings upon Lee’s motion for

reconsideration, he emphasized that Lee was a permanent legal resident of the state

of Louisiana. “The ALJ did not find Lee abandoned his residency in Louisiana or

procured an Ohio or Kentucky driver’s license. Further, the record does not

dispute he was paid a per diem[.]” Confusingly, the ALJ, following this recitation

of facts, concluded Lee “relocated to Aberdeen, Ohio,” and doubled down on his

conclusion that the traveling exception does not apply, and that the dismissal of his

claim was warranted. Throughout his opinion, as affirmed by the Board, the ALJ

relied on the interpretation of Lee’s living situation as a “relocation,” although

neither party contests the facts as outlined above. And, while Lee provides extra-

jurisdictional support for the premise that his claim should be upheld, we need look

no further than to the thoughtful application of the law to the facts in Gaines

Gentry to resolve this issue.

                                          -8-
              The ALJ maintains Lee’s “relocation” makes application of the

traveling doctrine inappropriate. However, we are hard pressed to find any statute

or case wherein “relocation” is defined, much less used as a reason to deny a claim.

The only distinguishing factor between the situation in Gaines Gentry, and the

facts in consideration by this Court, is the length of time the employees remained

out-of-state. The ALJ reiterates throughout his opinion that the controlling fact is

the “relocation” of Lee. We disagree. It is inconsequential where Lee chose to lay

his head. The significant controlling factor was not where he temporarily resided

but that, in order to accomplish the job for which he was hired, he was required to

temporarily lodge somewhere other than his permanent residence. It is absurd that

an employer would expect his employee, a resident of Louisiana, to travel daily to

the job site in Maysville, Kentucky. And, no one has argued that such an

unreasonable condition was an expectation of employment. In fact, in

consideration of the fact that Lee would require lodging, the company paid him a

daily per diem of $100 for food and lodging.1 Moreover, Davis, Lee’s supervisor,

testified that the crux of the company’s business plan was based on recruitment of

workers from all over the country:

1
  The General Services Administration defines per diem as “an allowance for lodging, meals, and
incidental expenses. The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) establishes the per diem
reimbursement rates that federal agencies use to reimburse their employees for subsistence
expenses incurred while on official travel within the continental U.S.” Frequently Asked
Questions, Per Diem, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, https://www.gsa.gov/travel/
plan-book/per-diem-rates/faq#1 (last visited Oct. 19, 2023).

                                             -9-
             We would have called him or one of the other
             supervisors or someone from the site. Word of mouth,
             we do a lot of hiring of people that have worked with
             other people before by reference and whatnot.

             So, we would have called him, offered him a position and
             talked to him and if it came out where we offered him a
             position in Kentucky he would have went to the job site
             there and we would have hired him on if he showed up.
             That’s how we hire all of our field workforce.

It is inconceivable that the law would allow a worker to be recruited as out-of-state

talent; to work at a job hundreds of miles away from their home; to be paid a per

diem for food and lodging; and then to simply be denied a workers’ compensation

claim by designating him as a non-traveling employee because he lodged in one

location for eight months of work. Clearly, Lee was a traveling employee.

             In contrast, the Board’s opinion never mentions “relocation” in

affirming the ruling of the ALJ. However, it applied the same logic when

comparing the facts in Standard Oil Company (Kentucky) v. Witt, 283 Ky. 327, 141

S.W.2d 271 (1940), to the case sub judice. Witt was a construction foreman who,

like Lee, did not work from the main office but at various job sites some distance

from home. Specifically, Witt worked for a company based in Louisville, while

the greater part of his time was spent on company business outside Louisville. He

was paid a daily per diem for room and board when away from home on business.

Upon Witt’s death as a result of a fire which broke out in his lodging, the company

discovered Witt would make the Mitchell Tourist Home in Barbourville his

                                        -10-
temporary abode anytime he had work in that area of the Commonwealth. In other

words, Witt “relocated” to the lodging of his choice. Like Yates, Standard Oil

insisted Witt’s death did not occur in the course of his employment because he

maintained a “temporary place of abode by choice.” Id. at 274. In upholding the

decision for the claimant, the Court held:

             Witt met his death during the course of his employment.
             That is clear. His employment was such that he was
             required to spend considerable time away from home.
             Provision was made for him to stay in hotels when away
             from home, though only $2.50 per day was allowed for
             his meals and his lodging. While the selection of his
             stopping places was left to him, it was known that certain
             risks were necessarily involved in his stopping at small
             town and inexpensive hotels. He was subject to call at all
             times and when he met his death he was at a place where
             he was expected and required to be by the nature of his
             employment. While hotel fires may be infrequent, so are
             many peculiar accidents in which workers receive
             compensable injuries. Certainly[,] Witt’s employment
             subjected him to risks greater than those to which the
             general public is ordinarily subjected.

Id. at 275-76.

             The Board attempted to distinguish Lee’s case by the fact that Lee

reported to the same job site every day. This analysis is a misunderstanding of

Witt. Clearly, the Court cared little about Witt’s choice of “temporary abode” and

placed its emphasis on the nature of his travel. Here, as in Witt, the employee’s

injury arose out of, and in the course of, his employment.

                                        -11-
                   ii. The “service to the employer” exception

             The Board also relied on Olsten-Kimberly Quality Care v. Parr, 965

S.W.2d 155, 158 (Ky. 1998), in which a certified nursing assistant working for a

home health care provider was injured in an automobile accident returning home

from a patient home visit. The Parr court acknowledged that “work-related travel

has come to mean travel which is for the convenience of the employer as opposed

to travel for the convenience of the employee.” Id. (citations omitted). As

explained by our highest Court:

             [A]lthough the employer did not provide transportation
             and claimant was required to find [his] own mode of
             conveyance, “travel” was necessitated by, and in
             furtherance of, the business interests of the employer, and
             was an essential element required for completion of the
             essence of claimant’s assignments. Therefore, it is clear
             that claimant was providing a service to the employer at
             the time of the incident and, hence, that this situation fell
             within the service to the employer exception to the going
             and coming rule of noncompensability.

Id. at 158. Because Lee’s overall travel to the Maysville site was in furtherance of

the business interests of the employer, Lee’s injury falls squarely in the “service to

the employer” exception to the “going and coming” rule. Lee was in Maysville

solely at the behest of his employer and in his employer’s service.

             However, the analysis does not end here. Once the employee is

deemed a traveling employee, the court must determine whether the injury

                                         -12-
occurred when the employee was engaged in an activity which was a distinct

departure or deviation on a personal errand.

              [W]hen travel is a requirement of employment and is
              implicit in the understanding between the employee and
              the employer at the time the employment contract was
              entered into, then injuries which occur going to or
              coming from a work place will generally be held to be
              work-related and compensable, except when a distinct
              departure or deviation on a personal errand is shown.

Id. at 157.

              Generally, “injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels or

eating in restaurants away from home are usually held compensable.” Tichenor,

396 S.W.2d at 797 (citations omitted). Lee’s injury arose out of the necessity of

eating dinner at a restaurant while away from his home in Louisiana. His presence

in Kentucky was entirely for the benefit of Yates, who was responsible for Lee’s

presence there, was “abundantly aware” that Lee was in Kentucky solely for work-

related purposes and acquiesced to such by providing him with a per diem. See

Dee Whitaker Concrete v. Ellison, 641 S.W.3d 142, 148 (Ky. 2022).

Consequently, Lee’s injury was within the course and scope of his employment.

                                   CONCLUSION

              For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the May 11, 2023 opinion of the

Board affirming the opinion and orders of the ALJ and remand the case to the ALJ

for further proceedings.

                                          -13-
             MCNEILL, JUDGE, CONCURS.

             CETRULO, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES A SEPARATE
OPINION.

CETRULO, JUDGE, DISSENTING: With great respect and appreciation for the

analysis and Opinion reached by the majority herein, I disagree and would affirm

the Workers’ Compensation Board. Our review is limited to whether “the Board

has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an

error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” W. Baptist

Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). I do not find that the Board

overlooked or misconstrued precedent, but rather it attempted to apply precedent to

the somewhat unique facts of this case. Likewise, the Board herein upheld the ALJ

decision denying benefits because the ruling of the ALJ was supported by

substantial evidence. Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986).

             Yates & Sons is a Mississippi-based construction company which

obtains contracts nationwide and then hires workers to perform the contract. Lee

had not performed a job for Yates & Sons for approximately 30 years. He had

worked for other on-the-road construction companies across the country, although

he and his family resided in Louisiana. He became aware of the contract afforded

Yates & Sons in Kentucky through a phone call in January 2020. He drove his

camper to Kentucky from Louisiana, doing so uncompensated, and set up a

temporary residence in Ohio near the job site. The testimony before the Board was

                                        -14-
that he did not start work for them until he was hired at the Kentucky job site.

Once hired, his job was as a general foreman on the construction site in Maysville.

He was not required to travel from that location and worked the night shift from

7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. He was paid an hourly rate for his services.2 He had

worked that shift the night before the accident and thus was not on his way to work

when the accident occurred around 4:30 p.m. Rather, he left his home, on a

motorcycle, met a friend, and was traveling to eat at a restaurant in Ripley, Ohio.

                 As the majority notes, the “going and coming” rule, well established

in compensation law across the country, generally states that injuries sustained

when workers are going to or coming from their worksite are not deemed to arise

out of the course of employment. Such journeys are not deemed incidental to the

employer’s business. Kaycee Coal Co. v. Short, 450 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1970).

                 However, the Supreme Court has recognized two specific exceptions

to the “going and coming” rule. The first, known as the “traveling employee”

exception, occurs when:

                 1) a worker’s employment requires travel, and,

                 2) when an injury occurs while the employee is in travel status, unless

the worker was engaged in a significant departure from the purpose of the trip.

Gaines Gentry Thoroughbreds/Fayette Farms v. Mandujano, 366 S.W.3d 456,

2
    As the majority notes, Lee did receive a $100.00 per diem rate in addition to his hourly rate.

                                                 -15-
462-63 (Ky. 2012).

             In Gaines Gentry, the employer asked an employee to travel to

yearling sales with its horses. The employee was injured while traveling back to

Lexington from the sale. The Court held that the accident was compensable

because he was in the act of completing the journey which he undertook for his

employer. Clearly, the Court found that the employment task 1) required travel,

and 2) that the injury occurred while he was in travel status and not engaged in a

significant departure from the employer’s purpose.

             That “traveling employee” exception was further and more recently

explained in Dee Whitaker Concrete v. Ellison, 641 S.W.3d 142 (Ky. 2022). In

that case, the employee Ellison was leaving a jobsite where he was required to go

for work and traveling back to the employer’s premises in a company-owned

vehicle, along with several other employees. The truck in which he was riding left

the road and overturned, causing serious injuries. Both the ALJ and Board found

his injuries to be compensable as falling within the “traveling employee” exception

to the “going and coming” rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, noting that all of

Ellison’s work occurred away from the actual jobsite where he initially reported.

Furthermore, the employer provided company vehicles and paid for gas for the

vehicles that transported employees to the jobsites, providing substantial evidence

that Ellison qualified as a “traveling employee.”

                                        -16-
             In contrast, the ALJ and Board in this case found that Mr. Lee was not

a “traveling employee” because travel was not required of him in order to do the

job that he was hired to perform. Rather, he temporarily relocated to an area to

take a job that had set hours and required no travel. He was not coming from or

going to work when the accident occurred.

             Similarly, I cannot agree that the facts of this case fall within the other

exception to the “going and coming” rule, the “service to the employer” exception.

In Ellison, the Court also noted that this exception applied to afford coverage, as

Ellison’s travel was “a service” to Whitaker Concrete because its employees would

arrive to the jobsite on time and as a group. With the facts supporting the

application of both of those exceptions in Ellison, the Supreme Court upheld the

findings of the ALJ and Board and afforded coverage.

             Both Ellison and Gaines Gentry relied upon an earlier decision of the

Supreme Court in Receveur Construction Company/Realm, Inc. v. Rogers, 958

S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1997). In Receveur, the Board and ALJ had again afforded

compensation benefits, and both this Court and the Supreme Court affirmed. In

Receveur, the employee (Rogers) had worked for the company for 13 years; was

recently promoted to superintendent; and was issued a company truck that he was

permitted to drive to and from both home and various job sites under his

supervision. In addition, the company paid for gas for the vehicle. Rogers was

                                         -17-
killed in a traffic accident while leaving a job site on his way home. The Court

upheld the award of survivor’s benefits to his widow, finding that the employee’s

death fell within the second exception to the “going and coming” rule, which

affords coverage for transitory activities of employees if they are providing some

service to the employer. In Receveur, Rogers’ use of the company truck was of

benefit to the company since it allowed him to be productive for longer hours, and

the work itself required a truck. Id. at 19.

             The majority also relied upon Standard Oil Company v. Witt, 283 Ky.

327, 151 S.W.2d 271 (1940) which upheld a decision for the claimant whose

employment required him to frequently travel throughout the state. The employer

paid for his lodging and meals, and he was subject to call at all times. He met his

death during the course of his employment when there was a fire in the hotel where

he was staying. Again, the facts are distinguishable from the facts herein. Witt

was necessarily required to travel and stay in different lodging to accomplish the

specific task at hand and was on call at all hours. Id.

             It must be first determined that work-related travel is for the

convenience of the employer, such as a traveling nurse assistant for a home health

care provider. Olsten-Kimberly Quality Care v. Parr, 965 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Ky.

1998). See also Brown v. Owsley, 564 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. App. 1978). Based upon

our precedent, I cannot agree that Lee was a traveling employee or was providing a

                                         -18-
service to the employer.

             The majority herein found that Lee was in Maysville “at the behest of

his employer and therefore in his employer’s service.” However, a reading of the

cases clearly shows distinguishing facts that do not exist in this instance. Lee’s

motorcycle ride to a restaurant with a friend was nowhere close in time to his work

shift; it was not part of the service for which he was employed; and it was not of

any benefit to the employer.

             While I certainly sympathize with Lee, who sustained serious injuries,

the evidence was substantial that he was not even employed by Yates & Sons until

after he had relocated to Kentucky. As the factfinder noted, he was not required to

be available between his scheduled shifts. He was not driving a company vehicle.

He was not on his way to the job site where he had worked for eight months. He

was not performing a service for Yates & Sons, or driving a company vehicle. To

extend coverage under these circumstances would require employers to provide

workers’ compensation coverage to an employee even during wholly recreational

trips or activities if they simply assert that they relocated in order to secure the job.

Lee relocated to Kentucky for his benefit, not for the employer’s benefit.

             Finally, I would further suggest that he was engaged in an activity that

was a distinct departure from any arguably work-related travel. The cases suggest

that the focus should be on the nature of the activity and the activity’s purpose. A

                                          -19-
personal errand and/or recreational activity such as riding motorcycles would not

seem to require an employer’s compensation.

               In conclusion, Lee asserted that there is a dearth of Kentucky

authority on the applicable exceptions to the “going and coming” rule and

encouraged this Court to consider cases from other jurisdictions and “find that the

Board’s application of the traveling employee exception was too narrow.”3 I agree

with the majority Opinion that Kentucky law does provide sufficient guidance on

this issue. I simply disagree that the Board erred or misconstrued that precedent so

as to require reversal. I would affirm.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                             BRIEF FOR APPELLEE W.G.
                                                 YATES & SONS CONSTRUCTION
Scott C. Justice                                 CO.:
Louisville, Kentucky
                                                 Michael P. Neal
                                                 Louisville, Kentucky

3
  The Board, in its opinion, did consider cases from other jurisdictions, some of which would
support the application of the traveling employee exception to these facts. However, the Board
distinguished those out-of-state cases relied upon by Lee, finding that his job, once he was hired,
required no travel and that there was no inducement of travel-related expense or direction in the
means of travel for him to relocate to the job site. If the Commonwealth is to further expand the
exception, the Supreme Court must do so.

                                               -20-