Court Opinion

ID: 9456245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:46:37.638496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:54.189963
License: Public Domain

NEVILLE, District Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur in the affirmance of defendant’s conviction, though I do so reluctantly as to point V in the majority opinion. Were this a case of first impression and had this court not rendered several rather clear prior decisions, I would vote to reverse. I cannot escape the conclusion that the trial judge in effect and for all practical purposes directed a verdict of guilty for the government against defendant when he said:
“I have my own opinion what that evidence shows, and I don’t mind telling you, as what I say is not binding on you in any way. I think the evidence shows far beyond a reasonable doubt this defendant did make himself unavailable to notice * * *. And as I told you, under the law I think it would be a fair finding that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he deliberately left Norborne, Missouri, absented himself from there * *
I recognize that the trial judge told the jury on more than, one occasion that “Any such comments are only an expression of the judge’s opinion as to the facts and the jury may disregard them ■entirely”; “What I say is not binding on you in any way”; and “My opinion * * makes no difference whatsoever in the case”. As I read the three prior Eighth Circuit cases cited in the majority opinion which rely on. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1327 (1933), and other United States Supreme Court cases, the use of the above language by the trial court prevents a reversal. In my opinion the trial court nevertheless led, or may well have led the jury to its conclusion of conviction despite the use of such cautionary instructions.
Weight is given in the majority opinion to the fact that the evidence demonstrates clear guilt. I agree. The record demonstrates a strong case for guilt. The same verdict of guilty undoubtedly would have been returned had the trial judge not made the comments and expression of opinion he did. Nevertheless I am persuaded by the reasoning in Judge Lay’s dissenting opinion in Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 1966). Every trial lawyer recognizes the importance of the trial judge’s comments to the jury. The judge is revered by many jurors, and they hang on his every word. Commenting as this trial court did, and as many before him apparently have done, seems to me at the least to be every bad practice. The fact that the evidence of defendant’s guilt is substantial does not equate with granting him a fair trial.
Though I accord with the reasoning in Judge Lay’s dissenting opinion aforesaid, I recognize as a trial judge (sitting by special appointment with the Court of Appeals), that a dissent may be *556but a voice in the wilderness and that were I sitting on this case at the trial level, certainly I would be bound by and would be required to follow the several prior determinations of this court. Therefore, though with such reservations, I concur in the affirmance.