Court Opinion

ID: 9701113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:05:45.744283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:44.547902
License: Public Domain

COLE, Judge,
dissenting.
The Court holds in this case that defense counsel’s representation of the defendant falls within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Because I believe that trial counsel’s performance here is a textbook example of ineffective assistance of counsel, I respectfully dissent.
I
The sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel applies to the States through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-33, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2009-11, 32 L.Ed.2d 530, 534-36 (1972). This constitutional right to counsel protects the accused’s fundamental right to a fair trial by requiring that counsel’s assistance be effective. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773 n. 14 (1970). Recently, the Supreme Court considered the proper standards for judging a criminal defendant’s contention that the Constitution requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside because counsel’s assistance at the trial or sentencing was ineffective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-93. The Washington Court *725went on to fashion a twofold test to analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
A contention that the Constitution requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside because counsel’s assistance at the trial or sentencing was ineffective consists of a performance and prejudice component. Under the performance component, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Under the prejudice component, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e., deprived the defendant of a fair trial. With these preliminary observations in mind, I turn to the application of those components to the case sub judice.
A.
To state the obvious, one of the main objectives of defense counsel in a capital case is to prevent the imposition of the death penalty on his client. Defense counsel may attain this objective through several means, such as acquittal of the underlying first degree murder charge, or, if the defendant is found guilty of that charge, through strategy geared toward the imposition of a life rather than a death sentence.
In this case, a defense predicated upon an acquittal of the first degree murder charge was not viable. The State had physical and testimonial evidence clearly establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Harris was present at the murder scene. For instance, a robbery victim (Lindley) saw Harris there armed with a handgun; Harris’s tennis shoes contained glass fragments that were consistent with the broken showcase glass; and blood found on the glass fragments at the sporting goods store was not inconsistent with Harris’s blood. These facts should force the conclusion on any trained lawyer that the State could satisfy its burden of proving that Harris was guilty of first degree murder. These facts, however, do not compel the conclusion that Harris was a principal in the first degree rather *726than a principal in the second degree. This distinction is of critical importance and forms the primary basis for my contention that Harris was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution.
When a person is found guilty of murder, Maryland law directs that the court or jury that determined the person’s guilt state in the verdict whether the person is guilty of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree. Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 412(a). When the person is found guilty of first degree murder, a separate sentencing proceeding must be held to determine whether the person shall be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment, provided the State has given the notice required under § 412(b). Id. (1984 Cum.Supp.) § 413(a).
As this Court recently explained, “[i]n Maryland, one must be a principal in the first degree to first degree murder to be eligible for the death sentence.” Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 510, 495 A.2d 1, 12 (1985); see also Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432, 444 n. 5, 468 A.2d 1, 7 n. 5 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2374, 80 L.Ed.2d 846 (1984). We based this conclusion on § 413(e)(1) of Art. 27, which defines “defendant” and “person” to “include only a principal in the first degree.” Thus, a defendant is subject to the death penalty under § 413 when he falls within the definitional purview of a principal in the first degree, which this Court has defined as “one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by an inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent.” State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 197, 396 A.2d 1041, 1046 (1978). By contrast, a principal in the second degree is not subject to the death penalty under § 413. A principal in the second degree is one who aids, counsels, commands, or encourages the commission of the crime in his presence. See Johnson v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 508, 495 A.2d at 12. An exception to the perpetrator requirement is the statutory provision that one who employs another to kill is a principal in the first degree under § 413. See id. at 508, 495 A.2d at 12 (citing Art. 27, § 413(e)(1); § 413(d)(7)).
*727With these distinctions in mind, it is important to understand that Harris had available to him a defense predicated upon the theory that he was a principal in the second degree. This defense was the only feasible one that stood between Harris and his exposure to the death penalty. More specifically, the State’s entire theory that Harris was a principal in the first degree, and thus subject to the death penalty under § 413, rested upon the statements of a fifteen year old high school freshman, Carl Brown. Brown, who had accompanied Harris to the sporting goods store, gave two different versions of who was the triggerman, i.e., the principal in the first degree. Initially, Brown told a police informant that Harris did not shoot the victim. Later, after his arrest, Brown told the prosecutor that Harris was the shooter.1 A closer examination of the circumstances under which Brown made the statements reveals that the latter statement was pregnant with bias and prejudice, and thus fertile for effective cross examination.
Less than a month after the August 9, 1981 murder, members of the Homicide, Narcotics, and Intelligence Sections of the Baltimore City Police Department surreptitiously monitored and recorded a conversation between a police informant and Brown. During the course of this hour long conversation, which transpired on a Baltimore City street, Brown stated that a person known only as “Bozie, Boxie[,] Box or something like that” was the shooter. Several portions of their conversation indicate that, from Brown’s perspective, Harris was not the triggerman:
[INFORMANT]: Did Jackie [Harris] shoot him? Did Jackie shoot him?
BROWN: No.
*728[INFORMANT]: Oh, well it was on you then?
BROWN: No, there was one other person that was with us, right?
[INFORMANT]: Oh, what happened to him?
BROWN: He ain’t, he ain’t gonna get in no trouble.
[INFORMANT]: Young boy?
BROWN: Yeah.
[INFORMANT]: Oh, there was three of you all in the store?
BROWN: Uh huh.
[INFORMANT]: You, Jackie and another boy?
BROWN: Yeah, ’cause see
[INFORMANT]: He was the trigger man?
BROWN: Yeah.
[INFORMANT]: Oh, man (inaudible) do you want a cigarette?
[INFORMANT]: Ummm. So the thing was on you, Jackie and the other boy?
BROWN: Ummm hmmm
[INFORMANT]: Young boy?
BROWN: Yeah.
After this conversation, Brown departed for a few moments. During this interlude, a detective approached the informant and told him to get more detailed information concerning the triggerman. Upon Brown’s return, the informant attempted to do so by suggesting that police had previously shown the informant a list of names, and that the informant wanted to be able to see whether the trigger-man’s name was on that list:
[INFORMANT]: Then they had this whole list of names and shit, right. They had me go down this whole list of names. Keith, this, Kevin this, right? And Mark this, right? What’s the boy’s name? What’s the boy’s whole name? ’Cause I don’t know the boy, right?
BROWN: The boy that was with me?
*729[INFORMANT]: Yeah, I don’t know him, right?
BROWN: No, I don’t even know his whole name. I just know him, you know[.]
[INFORMANT]: What’s his first name, ’cause they might got his, they might got his real name that was on that list.
BROWN: Ummm.
[INFORMANT]: If you know his real name then I could remember[.]
BROWN: I don’t know the nigger’s real name. I ain’t never heard nobody call him his real name I don’t, he ain’t even from up here.
[INFORMANT]: They had nicknames too but they were in parentheses.
BROWN: Yeah.
[INFORMANT]: And the nigger’s real name, right? What’s his nickname?
BROWN: Bozie, Boxie. Box or something like that.
[INFORMANT]: What did you call him?
BROWN: I call him Box. I heard everybody else calling him Boxie or Box, right?
[INFORMANT]: Where does he live at? I mean, he don’t live in town?
BROWN: No, he lives in Baltimore somewhere. The nigger thinks he’s slick.
[INFORMANT]: How old is he about?
BROWN: About 16, 17.
After Brown described other physical characteristics of Boxie, the conversation turned to Harris once more:
[INFORMANT]: Oh, so you had Jackie do it and the other boy.
BROWN: Yeah.
[INFORMANT]: Ah, damn. Then you’re the set up man.
BROWN: Unhuh.
[INFORMANT]: And Jackie just went with you and did it and the other boy did the shooting, huh?
*730BROWN: Jackie was just there.
Shortly thereafter, police arrested Brown pursuant to an arrest warrant. In November, 1981, after Brown met with prosecutors and told them that Harris was the triggerman, Brown and the State entered into a plea agreement under which Brown tendered a guilty plea to first degree murder in exchange for several benefits. First, the State agreed to nol pros the remaining counts with which Brown was charged. Second, the State promised to inform the court of Brown’s actions and conduct after the entry of the guilty plea. Third, the State agreed that Brown was ineligible for the death penalty. Fourth, and finally, the State promised that upon Brown’s incarceration, it would recommend that Brown not be housed in the same institution with Harris. Under these circumstances Brown, with only a life sentence, would be eligible for parole in less than twelve years.
Russell evidently failed to grasp the significance of Brown’s inconsistent statement on such a vitally important matter. Through proper cross examination of Brown, Russell could have delved into Brown’s various stories for the purpose of impeachment. As the Supreme Court remarked, “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1974). In a case where a witness changes his version of the events surrounding the commission of the crime under a plea bargaining agreement, as here, it is obvious that the witness’s version may have been influenced by a promise, hope, or expectation of leniency with respect to the case as a consideration for testifying against the defendant. By contrast, the version of the crime given to an acquaintance during a casual conversation on a city street bears all of the hallmarks of trustworthiness. In that situation, the witness is not subject to the coercive pressures that inhere in the plea bargaining process, and has no obvious reason to tailor his version of the crime to comport with a particular prosecution theory. Between a version related to an acquain*731tance and that given to a prosecutor and his colleagues pursuant to a plea agreement, there is no question that the former bears more indicia of trustworthiness than the latter.
Other than Harris, Brown was the sole available witness who could testify as to who was the triggerman. Given Brown’s gross equivocations on this issue, his testimony that Harris was the shooter could have been considerably discredited by defense counsel by virtue of relentless cross examination. Russell could have very easily brought to the fore that Brown changed his story at the same time he accepted a favorable plea agreement. Such testimony would make it difficult for the State to prove that Harris was in fact a principal in the first degree to this first degree murder.
As I see it, Russell failed to recognize this viable defense theory for the reason that he was unaware of the distinction between a principal in the first degree and a principal in the second degree and the consequences associated with that distinction. When Russell was asked at the evidentiary hearing on the competency of counsel issue as to whether he discussed “the issues of first degree principal and any possible defenses to it that Mr. Harris might develop at a trial of guilt-innocence,” Russell responded that:
We, as I told you before Mr. Saunders, I did explain to Jackie [Harris] that if he were at the scene and participated, he was a first degree participant.
This was an erroneous statement of the law. Russell’s misperception of the critical distinction that lies between a principal in the first degree and a principal in the second degree in the context of capital cases, together with his acceptance of a devastating Agreed Statement of Facts in which Harris admitted to being a principal in the first degree, directly led to the waiver of his right to argue this issue before the sentencer. Russell’s “tactics” left Harris defenseless before the sentencer, while Russell prayed for a compassionate judge.
*732The majority places undue emphasis on Harris’s confession to Russell that he, Harris, had shot the victim. Evidently, Russell believed that he would violate some ethical standard by tendering a not guilty pleá and forcing the State to its proof. For instance, Russell testified that he saw no need to put the State to its burden of proving Harris guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Russell knew that Harris was the triggerman:
Well, I knew that I could use [the body wire]' to cross-examine Carl Brown, but Judge, the key is I knew where the truth was. You know, you draw a line between gamesmanship and pursuing the truth, and I think the greatest service you can perform to the Court is to present and to help them find justice through truth. That would have just been a game. Whenever I have pursued games, knowing that wasn’t where the truth was, in the end it hasn’t worked. I don’t live my life that way. I don’t practice law that way.
What Russell never understood, however, was that he sacrificed no honor and violated no ethical standards by challenging the State’s proof of who was the shooter through rigorous cross examination of Carl Brown. This was not a case where the defendant intended to take the stand and perjure himself, nor was this a case where Russell had to produce exculpatory witnesses. Russell had only to use a good lawyer’s most potent weapon—cross examination—to destroy the credibility of an accomplice who had given two versions of who was the shooter and who had ultimately accepted a deal in exchange for testifying against Harris. That Harris confessed to Russell to being the triggerman in the murder played no part in fulfilling Russell’s foremost duty to advocate vigorously his client’s cause and Russell’s conceded goal of avoiding the death penalty for his client.
In sum, it is clear to me that Russell’s representation of Harris fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. First, Russell failed to recognize a viable defense because of his ignorance of the distinction between a *733principal in the first degree and a principal in the second degree and that only the former is subject to the death penalty. Second, and related to the above, Russell encouraged his client, a criminal defendant against whom the State sought the death penalty, to plead guilty to first degree murder as a principal in the first degree without first exacting some meaningful quid pro quo from the State. More to the point, it is beyond my comprehension that defense counsel would pursue this course without obtaining a promise from the State to withdraw its notice of intent to seek the death penalty. If the State refuses to do so, it is a mark of inexperience and plain ineptitude for defense counsel not to force the State to its proof. After all, the defendant has nothing to lose in that situation. Third, and finally, Russell failed to advocate his client’s cause with the zeal and vigor demanded by our Code of Professional Responsibility. This primary duty of counsel, together with the related duties of exercising skill and knowledge, serve to render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. But that process is entirely compromised when counsel, dumbfounded and confused when his client confesses to him, elects to capitulate unconditionally. This defeatist strategy is no strategy at all. In my view, therefore, Harris has made the requisite showing of deficient performance by Russell in accordance with the performance component of the Washington test. I now turn my attention to the prejudice component.
B.
The Washington test demands that the defendant show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. As Justice O’Connor explained in Washington, “[t]his requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. The Court went on to formulate the test in the following terms: “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but *734for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.
In my view, Harris would have never entered the guilty plea had Russell correctly explained the law governing principals in the first and second degree. In accordance with a proper recognition of this law, Russell should have put the State to its proof and subjected Brown to cross examination. In so doing, Russell would have set the stage for arguing that Harris was not subject to the death penalty because the State had not established that he was a principal in the first degree. By capitulating to the State’s damning version of the facts, Russell forfeited his ability to argue this critically important issue. As a result, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Harris has, in my judgment, affirmatively proved prejudice which denied him the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge ELDRIDGE concurs in the views here expressed.

. Brown gave a third version as to who was the shooter at Harris’s second sentencing proceeding, which was held in 1983. In response to the State’s question as to who was the triggerman, Brown stated, ‘Tm not sure. I can’t really say.” Because this proceeding occurred after Harris’s tender of the guilty plea in early 1982, and thus after Russell’s representation of Harris, I disregard this version of the shooting as recounted by Brown.