Court Opinion

ID: 9428925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:25:09.765157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:16.200798
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
with whom Justice Rehnquist joins,
dissenting.
I
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), establishes that an at-large voting system must be upheld against constitutional attack unless maintained for a discriminatory purpose. In Mobile we reversed a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution because the lower courts had relied on factors insufficient as a matter of law to establish discriminatory intent. See id., at 73 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). The District Court and Court of Appeals in this case based their findings of unconstitutional discrimination on the same factors held insufficient in Mobile. Yet the Court now finds their conclusion unexceptionable. The Mobile plurality also affirmed *629that the concept of “intent” was no mere fiction, and held that the District Court had erred in “its failure to identify the state officials whose intent it considered relevant.” Id., at 74, n. 20. Although the courts below did not answer that question in this case, the Court today affirms their decision.
Whatever the wisdom of Mobile, the Court’s opinion cannot be reconciled persuasively with that case. There are some variances in the largely sociological evidence presented in the two cases. But Mobile held that this kind of evidence was not enough. Such evidence, we found in Mobile, did not merely fall short, but “fell far short[,] of showing that [an at-large electoral scheme was] ‘conceived or operated [as a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.’” Id., at 70 (emphasis added), quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149 (1971). Because I believe that Mobile controls this case, I dissent.
II
The Court’s decision today relies heavily on the capacity of the federal district courts — essentially free from any standards propounded by this Court — to determine whether at-large voting systems are “being maintained for the invidious purpose of diluting the voting strength of the black population.” Ante, at 622. Federal courts thus are invited to engage in deeply subjective inquiries into the motivations of local officials in structuring local governments. Inquiries of this kind not only can be “unseemly,” see Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1163, 1164 (1978); they intrude the federal courts — with only the vaguest constitutional direction — into an area of intensely local and political concern.
Emphasizing these considerations, Justice Stevens, post, at 642-650, argues forcefully that the Court’s focus of inquiry is seriously mistaken. I agree with much of what he says. As I do not share his views entirely, however, I write separately.
*630A
As I understand it, Justice Stevens’ critique of the Court’s approach rests on three principles with which I am in fundamental agreement.
First, it is appropriate to distinguish between “state action that inhibits an individual’s right to vote and state action that affects the political strength of various groups.” Mobile v. Bolden, supra, at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see post, at 632, 637-638, n. 16. Under this distinction, this case is fundamentally different from cases involving direct barriers to voting. There is no claim here that blacks may not register freely and vote for whom they choose. This case also differs from one-man, one-vote cases, in which districting practices make a person’s vote less weighty in some districts than in others.
Second, I agree with Justice Stevens that vote dilution cases of this kind are difficult if not impossible to distinguish — especially in their remedial aspect — from other actions to redress gerrymanders. See post, at 650-653.
Finally, Justice Stevens clearly is correct in arguing that the standard used to identify unlawful racial discrimination in this area should be defined in terms that are judicially manageable and reviewable. See post, at 633, 642-650. In the absence of compelling reasons of both law and fact, the federal judiciary is unwarranted in undertaking to restructure state political systems. This is inherently a political area, where the identification of a seeming violation does not necessarily suggest an enforceable judicial remedy — or at least none short of a system of quotas or group representation. Any such system, of course, would be antithetical to the principles of our democracy.
B
Justice Stevens would accommodate these principles by holding that subjective intent is irrelevant to the establishment of a case of racial vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment. See post, at 637. Despite sharing the concerns *631from which his position is developed, I would not accept this view. “The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). Because I am unwilling to abandon this central principle in cases of this kind, I cannot join Justice Stevens’ opinion.
Nonetheless, I do agree with him that what he calls “objective” factors should be the focus of inquiry in vote-dilution cases. Unlike the considerations on which the lower courts relied in this case and in Mobile, the factors identified by JUSTICE Stevens as “objective” in fact are direct, reliable, and unambiguous indices of discriminatory intent. If we held, as I think we should, that the district courts must place primary reliance on these factors to establish discriminatory intent, we would prevent federal-court inquiries into the subjective thought processes of local officials — at least until enough objective evidence had been presented to warrant discovery into subjective motivations in this complex, politically charged area. By prescribing such a rule we would hold federal courts to a standard that was judicially manageable. And we would remain faithful to the central protective purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.
In the absence of proof of discrimination by reliance on the kind of objective factors identified by Justice Stevens, I would hold that the factors cited by the Court of Appeals are too attenuated as a matter of law to support an inference of discriminatory intent. I would reverse its judgment on that basis.