Court Opinion

ID: 9902702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:22:00.045417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:57.339513
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D22-3046
                 LT Case Nos. 1989-CF-10710-A
                              1989-CF-10618-A
                              1989-CF-010711-A
                 _____________________________

EDDIE JOE RICHARDSON,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County.
Tesha Ballou, Judge.

Mark H. Klein, of MHK Legal, PLLC, Coral Springs, for
Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alyssa M.
Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

                       September 15, 2023

PER CURIAM.

    AFFIRMED.

MAKAR and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.
LAMBERT, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
                        Case No. 5D22-3046
                  LT Case Nos. 1989-CF-10710-A
                               1989-CF-10618-A
                               1989-CF-010711-A

LAMBERT, J., concurring specially.

       Eddie Joe Richardson appeals the denial of his “Motion for
Postconviction Relief to Correct an Illegal Sentence and Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus to Correct a Manifest Injustice.” For
the following reasons, I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the
postconviction court’s denial order.

       Richardson was charged in 1989 by the State of Florida in
three separate cases with committing the crime of robbery with a
firearm. Robbery with a firearm, then and now, is a first-degree
felony, punishable by up to life in prison. See § 812.13(2)(a), Fla.
Stat. (1989).

       Based on his prior criminal history, Richardson also
qualified for sentencing as a habitual violent felony offender
(“HVFO”) under section 775.084(4)(b)1.1, Florida Statutes (1989).
This statute provided that a defendant who committed a felony of
the first degree “may” be sentenced to up to life in prison and shall
not be eligible for release for fifteen years. Pertinent to one of the
issues here, sentencing under the HVFO statute is permissive, not
mandatory. See Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267, 267–68, 271 (Fla.
1992) (holding that while first-degree felonies punishable by a
term of years not exceeding life are subject to enhancement under
the HVFO statute, sentencing under the HVFO statute is
permissive, not mandatory).

      In December 1989, Richardson tendered an open guilty plea
to the sole charge in each case. During the plea colloquy,
Richardson admitted to possessing a firearm when he robbed three
separate convenience stores in Brevard County. The trial court
accepted Richardson’s plea. At the sentencing hearing held the
following month, the court adjudicated Richardson guilty on each
count and sentenced him as an HVFO to serve life in prison, with
the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court found that
the HVFO sentence was necessary to protect the public. It
explained that Richardson had previously been convicted of

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robbery with a deadly weapon for which he had been released from
prison within three years of the instant crimes. The court also
found that Richardson had previously been charged with
committing robbery with a weapon in two other earlier cases, to
which he pled to reduced charges of grand theft and served prison
sentences.

      Richardson appealed his convictions and life sentences. His
sole argument raised on direct appeal for reversal was that the
HVFO statute was unconstitutional.           This court affirmed
Richardson’s judgments and sentences without opinion.
Richardson v. State, 569 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). The
following year, Richardson timely filed a Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, which the lower
court summarily denied. Richardson’s untimely appeal of this
order was dismissed by this court for lack of jurisdiction.

       Over the next two decades, Richardson filed a litany of
unsuccessful, variously-titled pro se petitions and motions
attempting to attack his convictions or sentences. The lower
court’s denials of these petitions or motions were affirmed by this
court on appeal without opinion. Due to Richardson’s numerous
filings, he was eventually barred under State v. Spencer, 751 So.
2d 47 (Fla. 1999), from further pro se filings in this court
challenging his judgments and sentences. See Richardson v. State,
76 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). 1

       Approximately ten years after this bar, Richardson, now
through counsel, filed the previously described “Motion for
Postconviction Relief to Correct an Illegal Sentence and Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus to Correct a Manifest Injustice.” 2 The
relief sought by Richardson was to be resentenced. He made two
arguments. First, Richardson asserted that the trial court’s
comments at both the December 1989 change of plea hearing and
the January 1990 sentencing conclusively showed that when the
court sentenced him as an HVFO to serve life in prison, it did so
under the assumption or premise that Richardson would be

    1 Richardson was later similarly barred in the circuit court.

    2 This was Richardson’s nineteenth postconviction motion.

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eligible for release from prison after serving only fifteen years,
which was not the case. 3 Second, Richardson alleged that based
on its comments at these hearings, the trial court believed that it
was mandatory under the HVFO statute to impose a life sentence
when, in fact, the court had the discretion to impose less than life
in prison. See Burdick, 594 So. 2d at 267–68. Richardson argued
in his motion that as his life sentences were based on these two
fundamentally incorrect assumptions, resentencing is necessary to
correct a “manifest injustice.”

       The postconviction court denied Richardson’s motion for four
reasons. First, the court found that to the extent that Richardson
was seeking relief under rule 3.850, his motion was untimely.
Second, citing to Johnson v. State, 114 So. 3d 205, 206 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2012), the court determined that the remedy of habeas corpus
could not be used as a substitute to the filing of a rule 3.850 motion
or to otherwise expand the two-year filing requirement under rule
3.850.

       Third, the court found that Richardson was not entitled to
relief because both of the grounds that he asserted in his motion
had previously been raised and denied in earlier postconviction
proceedings that were later affirmed on appeal. Lastly, the court
determined that Richardson was not entitled to relief under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) because his life
sentences were, in fact, legal.

       As previously indicated, I concur with the majority’s
affirmance. As to Richardson’s claim brought under rule 3.800(a)
to correct an illegal sentence, for a sentence to be correctable under
this rule, it must be one that “imposes a kind of punishment that
no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could
possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances.” Carter v.
State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1181 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Blakley v. State,
746 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). Here, Richardson’s
sentences of life in prison were lawful under the HVFO statute, as

    3   A defendant serving a life sentence under the habitual
offender sentencing statute was ineligible for parole or gain time.
See Lewis v. State, 625 So. 2d 102, 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
(citations omitted).

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well as under section 812.13(2)(a); and his motion to correct an
illegal sentence was appropriately denied by the postconviction
court.

      Next, to the extent that Richardson’s brief reference in his
motion to rule 3.850(m) indicated an intent to seek relief under
this rule, the postconviction court correctly recognized that his
motion was untimely. Rule 3.850 requires that the motion be filed
within two years of the judgment and sentence being final. See
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). Richardson’s judgments and sentences
were final in December 1990 when the mandate issued after his
unsuccessful direct appeal. Moreover, none of the exceptions
under subsections (b)(1)–(3) to the rule’s two-year filing
requirement are applicable here.

      Having addressed these claims, I turn to Richardson’s
primary argument that the lower court erred in denying him
habeas corpus relief to correct the two alleged sentencing errors
previously described. The postconviction court denied that aspect
of Richardson’s motion for two reasons. First, the court found that
these claims now being raised were previously unsuccessfully
raised by Richardson and that his appeals of the denial orders were
later affirmed. In doing so, the lower court correctly recognized
that, to the extent that Richardson’s specific claims had, in fact,
been previously denied and the denial orders were subsequently
affirmed on appeal, it lacked the authority to grant any relief that
would be contrary to the earlier decisions of an appellate court on
the same issue. See Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Rev., 452 So.
2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1984) (recognizing that a lower court is precluded
from granting relief on matters that would be contrary to earlier
appellate court affirmances on the same issues).

      Secondly, to the extent that these claims were being raised
for the first time, the lower court properly determined that habeas
corpus relief is not available as a substitute to litigate claims that
could have been raised in an earlier timely-filed rule 3.850 motion.
See Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Fla. 2004).

      Richardson’s appeal appears to also be some form of petition
seeking habeas corpus relief directed to this court. Richardson
essentially argues that we should correct what he believes were
earlier failures by this court in not granting him relief from these

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alleged sentencing errors. See Singleton v. State, 219 So. 3d 233,
233–34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s
rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence asserting that the
trial court erred in believing it lacked discretion when sentencing
the defendant, a habitual felony offender, to anything below the
statutory maximum, but treating the defendant’s appeal as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.040(c) and denying the petition).

      While Richardson is correct that, in very rare circumstances,
an appellate court may, by way of habeas corpus, reconsider an
earlier decision or opinion on a matter that was decided in the prior
appeal if a “manifest injustice” will result by the failure to do so,
see Vega v. State, 288 So. 3d 1252, 1258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (citing
Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965)), that
circumstance is not applicable here. Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that Richardson is correct that the trial court did
commit sentencing errors back in 1990 when it interpreted the
HVFO statute as requiring that he sentence Richardson to life in
prison but that Richardson would still be eligible for release from
prison after serving fifteen years of his life sentence, these
arguments were not made on direct appeal.

       In other words, we did not err in failing to correct these
alleged sentencing errors during Richardson’s 1990 direct appeal.
This fact distinguishes the decisions of our sister courts in Johnson
v. State, 9 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), and Stephens v. State,
974 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), upon which Richardson relies,
which granted habeas corpus relief to correct a fundamental
sentencing error that each court acknowledged should have been
first recognized and corrected during the direct appeal. Nor, for
that matter, did Richardson seek habeas corpus relief following his
unsuccessful direct appeal for ineffective assistance by his
appellate counsel in not raising these purported sentencing errors
during the direct appeal. See Groover v. Singletary, 656 So. 2d 424,
425 (Fla. 1995) (“A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the
appropriate vehicle to raise claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel.” (citing Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 999 (Fla.
1981))).

      Following his direct appeal, Richardson timely filed a rule
3.850 motion in 1991 seeking postconviction relief. One of the

                                  6
grounds for relief that Richardson raised in that motion was that
his guilty pleas were involuntary due to his being misled by
comments from the trial court that he would be eligible for release
from prison on parole after serving fifteen years of the mandatory
life sentences. Notably, the trial judge who imposed the life
sentences rejected this argument in denying Richardson’s rule
3.850 motion.

      Richardson appealed this denial order, but was untimely in
doing so. Resultingly, his appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. As such, Richardson’s untimeliness back then
foreclosed our jurisdiction, and hence our ability, to correct these
alleged sentencing errors.

       In 1994, Richardson began filing what, over the years, were
variously-titled pro se motions seeking relief. It was not, however,
until 1999 before Richardson arguably attempted to raise the
sentencing errors that he has asserted in the motion now before
us.     By that time, any motion from Richardson seeking
postconviction relief that could have been brought under rule 3.850
was grossly untimely. Moreover, Richardson could not use the
vehicle of habeas corpus in lieu of filing an appropriate rule 3.850
motion for postconviction relief or to otherwise raise claims that
could have been raised in timely postconviction proceedings. See
Zuluaga v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 32 So. 3d 674, 676 (Fla. 1st DCA
2010) (quoting Harris v. State, 789 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA
2001)); see also Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1025 (Fla.
1999) (“[H]abeas corpus petitions are not to be used . . . on
questions which could have been . . . or were raised on appeal or in
a rule 3.850 motion . . . .” (citation omitted)). Richardson was
seemingly aware of these limitations, having titled his motion for
relief filed in 2000 as one seeking “to define or clarify sentence,”
and his motion filed in 1999 as one seeking a “declaratory
judgment.”

      Admittedly, Richardson was not precluded from filing a rule
3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence, even decades after
his judgments and sentences became final. However, rule 3.800(a)
is not the vehicle to be used to challenge the procedure used to
impose punishment. See Martinez v. State, 211 So. 3d 989, 992
(Fla. 2017); Judge v. State, 596 So. 2d 73, 77–79 (Fla. 2d DCA
1992). As is probably apparent, Richardson’s complaint is not that

                                 7
the sentence is unlawful; rather, he contends that the process or
procedure in its imposition was flawed. Because Richardson’s life
sentences are lawful, his various motions that were filed under this
rule over the past decades were necessarily meritless.

      Richardson’s hope is that we essentially conclude that our
court’s long-ago affirmances of orders denying his untimely and
unauthorized motions for postconviction relief were “manifestly
erroneous,” justifying habeas corpus relief in the form of a new
sentencing hearing. I do not, however, equate our earlier
affirmances without opinion (“PCAs”) of appeals from the denial of
such motions as constituting a significant failure on our part that
now justifies habeas corpus relief. See Moultrie v. State, 310 So.
3d 533, 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (dismissing habeas corpus petition
because habeas corpus may not be used in place of raising claims
that could have been brought on direct appeal or in an appropriate
postconviction motion). Had Richardson’s current petition for
habeas corpus been filed directly with this court and had it been
his only postconviction effort since the dismissal of his untimely
appeal in 1991 of the denial of his first rule 3.850 motion, there
would be no basis for granting him relief some thirty years later.
That Richardson has filed numerous untimely and unauthorized
motions in the interim does not change this.

       The purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to inquire into
the legality of a petitioner’s present detention, not to challenge the
judicial action that placed the petitioner in jail or prison. Jones v.
Fla. Parole Comm’n, 48 So. 3d 704, 710 (Fla. 2010). And while the
writ of habeas corpus is one of the most important and protected
rights under the Florida Constitution, id., “the right to habeas
relief, like any other constitutional right, is subject to certain
reasonable limitations consistent with the full and fair exercise of
the right.” Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1992). In my
view, one of these reasonable limitations is that a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is not to be used as a second appeal or “to
litigate or relitigate issues that were or could have been raised on
direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings.” See Denson v.
State, 775 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 2000).

      If Richardson were currently serving a sentence in excess of
what he could lawfully be serving and had our court failed during
an earlier appeal to correct such an error when properly presented

                                  8
to us, then I would agree that this would be one of the “rare
circumstances” for an appellate court to correct its earlier
erroneous decision in the same case. That, however, is not the
present scenario.

                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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