Court Opinion

ID: 9846265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:38:10.718661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:37.934989
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting).
Being of the view that there was prejudicial error, I most respectfully dissent. The motions for continuance and for severance were addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who, according to the statement of the case, overruled them without hearing them.
“An appeal to a judge’s discretion is an appeal to his judicial conscience, and its valid exercise connotes direction by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result, taking account of the law and the particular circumstances of the case, and precludes capricious or arbitrary action.” 48 C. J. S. Judges § 44, p. 1008.
The refusal to exercise discretion is reversible error and there is soundly reasoned authority for the proposition that it is not proper, orderly procedure for an appellate court to *568pass upon an issue addressed to the discretion of the lower court, unless it appears that such discretion has actually been exercised, the correct procedure being to remand. 5A C. J. S. Appeal and Error § 1585, p. 40. See also cases collected in West’s Decennial Digest, Appeal and Error, —947.
Appellants were entitled to have the motions for continuance and severance fully heard by the trial judge and thereafter entitled to a timely disposition of the same in his sound judicial discretion. This they have not received, according to the record. The merits of these motions have been argued before us, but we should refrain from passing upon the merits. We cannot speculate as to what conclusions His Honor might have reached had he timely and fully heard the motions, let alone determine whether or not the conclusions which he might have reached would have constituted an abuse of discretion. The appellants simply did not receive the judicial consideration of the motions to which they were entitled. The right to have these motions heard was a substantial right, and, under the facts of this case, its denial was reversible error.
With respect to four of the appellants who took the stand, the solicitor endeavored to force them to directly attack the veracity of several State witnesses. Repeated objections to this line of questioning by the solicitor were repeatedly overruled by the trial judge. Typical of the questions asked by the solicitor of appellants are the following:
“Can you give this jury any reason why Mr. Thomas would name you as being one of them up there that morning tearing up that sign shop if you weren’t there?”
“Could you tell this jury why he (Mr. Atkins) should identify you as one of the prisoners who went over the fence in the area where the crowbars and the hammers and other objects and hats were taken?”
Similar questions were pursued at length in an obvious effort to force the several appellants to attack the veracity of several officials of the Department of Corrections who testi*569fied for the State. The line of questioning pursued by the solicitor in this respect cannot be distinguished, I think, from the almost identical line of questioning pursued by the solicitor in State v. Hariott, 210 S. C. 290, 42 S. E. (2d) 385, which was held by this Court to be improper and prejudicial, convictions in the cited case being reversed solely on that ground. See also State v. Warren, 207 S. C. 126, 35 S. E. (2d) 38; State v. Outen, 237 S. C. 514, 118 S. E. (2d) 175.
Various other trial errors are asserted. While the conduct of a trial and the admission or exclusion of evidence have to be left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, a study of the record in the instant case convinces me that, over objection, the prosecution injected into the trial by statements, questions, innuendoes, and intimations, various matters which had no relevancy as to any issue in the case or as to the credibility of any witness. Some of the asserted errors relate to all defendants, while others do not. Some of the asserted errors, considered singly, raise only borderline questions. Collectively, however, they strongly indicate error sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial, even if the appellants were not entitled to a new trial on other grounds.
No good purpose could be served by reviewing in detail what the record discloses. Statements and questions, however, dealt at length with prior records and conduct of the several appellants and their witnesses without any regard as to whether such had any relevance or bearing on credibility, or otherwise. One appellant was improperly accused of being a homosexual, and another of being a dope addict. While they were all convicts, the appellants were, nevertheless, entitled to a fair trial, and totally irrelevant matters which simply went to picture them and their witnesses as bad men had no proper place in the trial.
Being convinced that the appellants did not receive a fair trial, I would reverse the judgment below, and remand for a new trial as to all defendants.
Brailsford, J., concurs.