Court Opinion

ID: 9827710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:47:43.977517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:34.996184
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In deference to the earnest and able argument presented by defendant in error in his motion for a rehearing, we deem it appropriate to say that our holding in the original opinion does not have the effect of changing, nor does it in any manner conflict with the doctrine so often expressed by the courts of this and many other jurisdictions to the effect that, under the common law, which by statute is the rule of decision in this state, a common carrier must rebut the implication of negligence created by proof of delivery to it of livestock in good condition and redelivery at the point of destination in damaged condition. Nor do we question the rule that the carrier may exonerate himself only by showing that the damage occurred through *1068one of the excepted causes and that the carrier was not guilty of negligence in connection therewith.
Defendant in error calls our attention to the holding of this court in Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Andrews, 278 S. W. 478, 482, wherein, speaking through Chief Justice Hall, we said: “Where the loss is not due to the excepted causes, proof of negligence is immaterial, and the carrier cannot escape liability by proving reason- ■ able care and diligence.” He suggests that our holding in the instant case is in conflict with our holding in that 'case. In the Andrews case, a different question was being discussed, viz., an injury to the property that was inflicted by an agency outside of, and not included in, the excepted causes. The facts in this case remove it from the rule there being discussed because they show that, when the cattle were delivered to plaintiff in error, they were in good condition and that, when they were delivered at the point of destination, one of them was dead and two others were crippled. The exact nature of the injuries to the crippled cattle was not shown nor was the exact cause of death to the other one explained. The death and injuries were not shown to have resulted from causes other than those which may have been received in an ordinary shipment without negligence on the .part of the carrier. They were such as could have occurred by reason of the nature of the animals which were being transported under the conditions which accompany all shipments of such livestock. In such case the law is well settled that, where the exact cause of the injuries is not known, it will be presumed the injuries occurred through the nature, propensities, weakness ■or inherent vice of the animals involved in the shipment, where the carrier exonerates Itself of any negligence that could have caused the injuries.
In the case of Davis, Director General, v. Sullivan & Opry, Tex.Com.App., 258 S.W. 157, 161, it is said:
“If the carrier has exercised that degree of diligence and foresight in the transportation of live animals as under the particular circumstances of the shipment constitutes ordinary care, and still they are delivered in a damaged condition, the damage sustained would be attributed alone to the inherent vices of the animals, where that is the issue. Or, in other words, the exclusion from the carrier’s liability of such loss and injury as does not arise from, or is not contributed to by, its negligence, merely leaves the shipper without compensation for the loss and damage which, theoretically at least, his cattle would anyhow have sustained on account of their inherent nature, and for which the carrier is not liable in any event. * * *
“When the shippers proved delivery to, and acceptance by, the originating carrier of the cattle, and losses and injuries at destination, a prima facie case was made out such that to relieve themselves of liability the affirmative was on the carriers to show such losses and injuries to have occurred from some of the excepted causes. They could have met or rebutted the prima facie case so made out by showing that they exercised such diligence and foresight in the handling of the cattle as amounted to ordinary care, or that the injuries arose from the negligence of the shippers in overcrowding their cattle in the car.”
To the same general effect are the holdings in the cases of St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Murray, Tex.Civ.App., 40 S.W.2d 949, and Kansas City, M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Cauble, Tex.Civ.App., 286 S.W. 478.
In the early case of Ryan & Co. v. M., K. & T. Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 13, 57 Am.Rep. 589, in discussing this question, our Supreme Court, speaking of the carrier, said: “He may rebut it (the prima facie case) only in one way, and that is by showing that the goods were lost by one of the exceptions known to the common law, or one of the special exceptions reserved in his contract with the shipper. If, by neither a common law exception, or one specially reserved, he is exonerated, he must show that the loss happened without negligence on his part.”
Defendant in error again insists that before it could be exonerated from negligence, plaintiff in error must not only show that it was not guilty of negligence, but must go further and show the specific cause of the injuries to the cattle. As we have stated, the exact manner in which the cattle were injured is not shown by the record but, inasmuch as they undoubtedly could have been injured as they were by the natural disposition of the cattle themselves and the consequences of transporting them and that plaintiff in error proved by uncontradicted testimony that it was not guilty of any negligence in connection with the shipment, following the cases above cited, it will be presumed that the injuries occurred as a natural and ordinary consequence of rail*1069way transportation of live animals and their nature, disposition and propensities. It will be seen, therefore, that the common law rule contended for by defendant in error is upheld rather than ignored by our holding on this question. In other words, the effect of -our holding is that negligence being eliminated, as it was by the proof in this case, the presumption is that the injuries occurred, as they could have occurred, through one of the excepted causes, viz., the inherent vice, the nature or the propensities of the animals involved in the shipment. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Downs, Tex.Civ.App., 70 S.W.2d 318; Leon v. Hines, Tex.Civ.App., 223 S.W. 239; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Helms Bros., Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W. 853; Fort Worth & D. Ry. Co. v. Berry, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W. 125; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 114 Ill.App. 545; Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Teams, 75 Miss. 147, 21 So. 706; Talbott v. Payne, Director General, 90 W.Va. 280, 111 S.E. 328.
The motion for rehearing will be overruled.