Court Opinion

ID: 9731224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:39:26.282242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:16.240959
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
In Zdravkovich v. Bell Atlantic-Tricon Leasing Corp., 323 Md. 200, 592 A.2d 498 (1991), Judge Chasanow, the author of the majority opinion, speaking for the Court, made several insightful comments concerning the application of Maryland Rule 1-341. Beginning the assessment of counsel fees discussion, he observed:
*272“Rule 1-341 can be an effective tool for the deterrence of unnecessary or abusive litigation. Unfortunately, like many tools, if improperly used or if abused, it is capable of inflicting excessive or unwarranted injury.”
Id., 323 Md. at 209, 592 A.2d at 503. Concluding that discussion, Judge Chasanow asserted:
“Rule 1-341 is not intended to simply shift litigation expenses based on relative fault. Its purpose is to deter unnecessary and abusive litigation. The imposition of sanctions requires explicit factual findings supported by the record, as well as a careful exercise of judicial discretion.”
Id., 323 Md. at 212, 592 A.2d at 504.
Judge McAuliffe, speaking for the Court in Tally v. Tally, 317 Md. 428, 436, 564 A.2d 777, 781 (1989), noted that an evidentiary finding of “bad faith” or “lack of substantial justification” is required to be made, and supported, by the trial court:
The justification for this requirement lies not only in the clear language of the rule, but also in the logic that before such an extraordinary sanction is imposed there should be evidence that there has been a clear focus upon the criteria justifying it and a specific finding that these criteria have been met. Moreover, some brief exposition of the facts upon which the finding is based and an articulation of the particular finding involved are necessary for subsequent review.
Thus, we recognized the logic in ensuring that trial judges have the right focus when applying the rule and also the desirability of a trial court articulating the basis of its finding. So, while the earlier cases, e.g. Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 380, 550 A.2d 959, 967 (1989); Yamaner v. Orkin, 313 Md. 508, 509, 545 A.2d 1345, 1345 (1988); Legal Aid v. Bishop’s Garth, 75 Md.App. 214, 220, 540 A.2d 1175, 1179 (1988), are consistent in focusing on the specific finding requirement, I read Tally as also imposing a duty on the trial court to enumerate facts to support them. One basis for such a requirement is the danger of abuse identi*273fied in Zdravkovich. The rule’s purpose provides another. See Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. at 380, 550 A.2d at 967 (“Rule 1-341 is not intended to penalize a party and/or counsel for asserting a colorable claim or defense.”); Yamaner, 313 Md. at 516, 545 A.2d at 1349 (same). See also Needle v. White, 81 Md.App. 463, 474, 568 A.2d 856, 861, cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990), where it is said:
The objective of the rule is to fine-tune the judicial process by eliminating the abuses arising from the tendency of a few litigants and their counsel initiating or continuing litigation that is clearly without merit. The inherent danger in the process is that overzealous pursuit of the objective may result in what the Court, in Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2nd Cir.1985), described as “stifling the enthusiasm or chilling the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law.”
In Bishop’s Garth, 75 Md.App. at 224, 540 A.2d at 1180, the Court of Special Appeals opined that Rule 1-341 is not intended “as a weapon to force persons who have a questionable or innovative cause to abandon it because of a fear of the imposition of sanctions.”
I believe that the facts found by the trial court do not support its bad faith or lack of substantial justification “findings” and that the claims Nilson filed against K. King Burnett did not lack substantial justification as a matter of law.1 Therefore, I dissent.
*274FACTUAL SUPPORT
To be sure, the trial court summarized some—what it characterized as “the major points”—of the facts. Although we may assume that any fact the court mentioned was a fact found, notwithstanding the rather lengthy hearing conducted on the issue, the trial court found precious few facts. At best, the court found the following facts:
(1) there was “a falling out” between Inlet Associates and the Harrisons, which resulted in protracted proceedings before the Worcester County Board of Zoning Appeals and other administrative bodies and the Worcester County Circuit Court.
(2) while the cases were pending either in the Circuit Court for Worcester County or on appeal, Nilson was hired “for the express purpose, that the court finds, to see if there was not some manner in which all the other ongoing litigation could be settled”;
(3) Nils on’s retainer had a bonus provision, which would be effective should the matter be settled within a relatively short period of time; thus, it was “obvious to the court ... time was of the essence”. No settlement was effected within the applicable period of time, however;
(4) a draft copy of a complaint, “with some modifications”, which was ultimately filed, was sent to Burnett. The court found that to be “an obvious act of intimidation to effect a settlement”; and
(5) the court granted Burnett’s motion to dismiss, in its entirety, and the Harrisons’ motion, in part.
The court made no additional findings of fact2 when it separately considered the counts pled. Although it stated *275that it found “that the claim against Mr. Burnett was instituted in bad faith and without substantial justification,” this finding was no more than a conclusion; no facts to support it were supplied. Similarly, addressing the second count of the complaint, the court found no “colorable claim” and “no evidence or allegation of malice, nor was there any substantial justification for filing of that claim.” Again, no supporting findings of fact were provided. Moreover, the conclusion that there was “no evidence or allegation of malice” was wrong. While the second count does not use the word, “malice,” it alleged that the multiple actions were filed “without right or justifiable cause.” In Natural Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 802 Md. 47, 71, 485 A.2d 663, 675 (1984), we equated that phrase with “malice.” In any event, the complaint in its entirety produces a strong inference of malice.
Thus, the court did not provide the “brief exposition of the facts” upon which the findings of bad faith and lack of substantial justification were based. Moreover, the facts it did find do not suggest, not to mention, demonstrate, that the court focused, as required, on relevant facts.
The facts the court summarized do not tell us very much about the appropriateness of the imposition of sanctions in this case. If they are relevant at all, they relate only, and then not very strongly, to the bad faith prong of the rule. None of the facts directly, or indirectly, addresses whether Nilson had substantial justification for filing the complaint. That Nilson was hired to find a way of settling the ongoing litigation between the parties, for example, does not necessarily indicate that he filed the litigation in “bad faith,” and it certainly is not indicative that it was filed without substantial justification. Nor does the presence of a bonus provision in Nilson’s retainer agreement mean that whatever he did pursuant to that agreement was undertaken in bad faith and/or without substantial justification, whether or not, as the court found, time was of the essence. It may be that sending a copy of the draft complaint to Burnett evidenced Nilson’s intent to intimidate Burnett which, when *276coupled with the filing of the complaint, may support an inference of bad faith; that fact does not, however, without more, provide any support for the assertion that the complaint was filed without justification.
The lack of substantial justification prong of the rule was addressed only when the trial court focused on the separate counts of the complaint. Even then, as pointed out, the trial court did little more than merely state the conclusion that Nilson acted without substantial justification.
Apparently, the majority has similar problems with the trial court’s focus and findings. It relies only on the trial court’s conclusions that Nilson acted in bad faith and without substantial justification, not the facts “used” by the trial court to support them. This is most apparent in the case of the bad faith conclusion.
Rather than focus on the trial court’s reasons, the majority scoured the record for facts it believed supported the court’s “bad faith” finding, facts neither explicitly, nor implicitly, relied on, as far as the record reveals, by the trial court.3 Thus, the majority notes that Nilson added Burnett as a defendant in the draft complaint he received from Inlet’s former lawyer and asserts that it is a fact from which the court “could conclude ... that Nilson had no reason to believe that Burnett had the intent to maliciously interfere with prospective business advantage or intent to utilize legal process in an improper manner or for a result not contemplated by law.” Similarly, the Harrisons’ suc*277cessful appeal of the adverse decision rendered by the circuit court in the administrative appeals and the trial court’s finding that the draft complaint naming Burnett as a defendant was mailed to Burnett as an act of intimidation are cited as presenting a permissible inference that Burnett was joined as a defendant for an improper purpose: to force the Harrisons to abandon their legal challenges to the Inlet project. The majority also relies on a letter to Nilson from Inlet’s prior counsel, in which it was suggested that, “if the Harrisons would simply drop their lawsuits in the Circuit Court for Worcester County, the entire matter would go away,” to support the inference of bad faith. As indicated, as far as the record reveals, none of these reasons was relied upon by the trial court.
The majority does not even explain its rationale for adopting the court’s finding with respect to the lack of substantial justification prong. It merely rejects Nilson’s argument that the court applied the wrong standard on the basis that it takes certain of the trial court’s statements out of context and, apparently, presumes that “the trial judge knew and properly applied the law.”
In point of fact, consequently, the majority opinion is strong evidence that the trial court failed to provide its rationale for finding bad faith and lack of substantial justification, as Tally requires,4 necessitating reversal and remand for further proceedings.
*278COLORABLE CLAIMS
The majority opinion focuses most heavily on the bad faith prong of the rule. Implicit in the majority’s position is that use of the word, “or”, permits that prong to stand on its own. From this premise, it follows that, even if one finding, in this case, the substantial justification prong, is deficient, affirmance is nevertheless justified by the other, i.e., the bad faith prong. I am not convinced.
Maryland cases that have addressed Rule 1-341, and its purpose, make clear that the rule is not intended to chill the exercise of rights by one with a “colorable claim.” See Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. at 380, 550 A.2d at 957 (“Rule 1-341 is not intended to penalize a party and/or counsel for asserting a colorable claim or defense.”); Zdravkovich, 323 Md. at 212, 592 A.2d at 504 (Rule 1-341 is not intended to stifle enthusiasm or chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law.); Needle v. White, 81 Md.App. at 470, 568 A.2d at 860; Bishop’s Garth, 75 Md.App. at 224, 540 A.2d at 1180.
The cases do recognize that the rule’s use of the word “or” indicates that its prongs are independent. Thus, in Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. at 380, 550 A.2d at 967, we said: “In order to impose sanctions [Rule 1-341] requires the trial judge to find one or both of two predicates: bad faith or lack of substantial justification.” See also Zdravkovich, 323 Md. at 210, 592 A.2d at 503; Bishop’s Garth, 75 Md.App. at 220, 540 A.2d at 1178. This does not mean, however, that a litigant with a “colorable claim” and an improper motive will, or should, be subject to Rule 1-341 sanctions. That issue was not presented and, therefore, not ruled upon. It was addressed in Needle and Bishop’s Garth.
In Needle, the issue was whether the plaintiff's action for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress against her former employer was filed in bad faith and/or without substantial justification. The plaintiff had previously been acquitted of embezzlement and her civil *279complaint had survived motions for summary judgment and for judgment. Following a jury verdict in favor of the former employer, the trial court assessed sanctions, pursuant to Rule 1-341, against the plaintiff and her counsel. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, noting the rule’s purpose to eliminate the initiation or continuance of litigation that is clearly without merit. Id., 81 Md.App. at 470, 568 A.2d at 860. It concluded that before sanctions may be imposed, there must be “clear evidence that the action is entirely without color and taken for other improper purposes amounting to had faith.” (Emphasis added) Id., 81 Md.App. at 474, 568 A.2d at 861.
A similar sentiment was expressed in Bishop’s Garth. There, Bishop’s Garth sued clients of the Legal Aid Bureau in the District Court, alleging breach of their lease. On advice of counsel, the defendants prayed a jury trial, thereby removing the case to the circuit court. Following a two day jury trial, only 63 minutes of which involved the presentation of the defense, the jury, returned a verdict in favor of Bishop's Garth after only 27 minutes of deliberation. The defendants appeal was dismissed for failure timely to order the trial transcript. Bishop’s Garth’s Rule 1-341 motion was granted by the trial court, which found as a fact both that the jury trial and the subsequent ill-fated appeal were taken “for purposes of delay, in bad faith, and without substantial justification [and] that although a jury trial was requested for the purpose of obtaining ‘additional discovery,’ as well as to decide the factual issues, the request was made in order to delay the trial and to intimidate Bishop’s Garth into dismissing its suit against [the defendants].” 75 Md.App. at 221, 540 A.2d at 1178.5
*280The Court of Special Appeals reversed. Relying on the Comment to Rule 3.1 of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,6 it rejected the argument that the purpose of the jury trial prayer was to delay the trial. Id., 540 A.2d at 1199; See also Miller v. Miller, 70 Md.App. 1, 12, 519 A.2d 1298, 1303 (1987) (Where dilatory conduct based on justifiable grounds, Rule 1-341 does not apply.). The court then cautioned against using hindsight, stressing *281that it is the point of initiation, not the result, that is important. 75 Md.App. at 222, 540 A.2d at 1179. Moreover, stating that “Rule 1-341 represents a limited exception to the general rule that attorney’s fees are not recoverable by one party from an opposing party [or counsel],” 75 Md.App. at 223, 540 A.2d at 1179, quoting Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. v. Farmer, 74 Md.App. 707, 722, 539 A.2d 1173, 1180 (1988) (Emphasis in original), it urged judicious use of the rule. Id., 540 A.2d at 1180. Finally, the court asserted:
Maryland Rule 1-341 is not, and never was intended, to be used as a weapon to force persons who have a questionable or innovative cause to abandon it because of a fear of the imposition of sanctions. Rule 1-341 sanctions are judicially guided missiles pointed at those who proceed in the courts without any colorable right to do so. See, e.g., Blanton v. Equitable Bank, National Association, [61 Md.App. 158, 485 A.2d 694]. No one who avails himself or herself of the right to seek redress in a Maryland court of law should be punished merely for exercising that right.
75 Md.App. at 224, 540 A.2d at 1180.
That the party sued ultimately pre"ails in litigation seldom, if ever, justifies imposing sanctions against the party who initiated it. See Needle v. White, 81 Md.App. at 478-79, 568 A.2d at 864.7 Bishop’s Garth, 75 Md.App. at 222, 540 A.2d at 1179. To avoid imposition of sanctions pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341, a party need only initiate or maintain the action with “a reasonable basis for believing that [that] case will generate a factual issue for the trier of fact at trial.” Needle, 81 Md.App. at 476, 568 A.2d at 863. See also Kelley v. Dowell, 81 Md.App. 338, 341, 567 A.2d 521, 522, cert. denied, 319 Md. 303, 572 A.2d 182 (1990). *282Stated differently, a claim has substantial justification if it is “fairly debatable” or “within the realm of ‘legitimate advocacy’ ”, Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 381, 550 A.2d 959, 967-68, quoting Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. v. Farmer, 74 Md.App. 707, 722, 539 A.2d 1173, 1180 (1988), or is “colorable.” Bishop’s Garth, 75 Md.App. at 221-22, 540 A.2d at 1179. Thus, whether a claim lacks substantial justification involves the assessment of the reasonableness of the legal position asserted. If it is “colorable”, “within the realm of reasonable advocacy”, “fairly debatable”, or a good faith argument, either on the merits or in support of an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, see Dent v. Simmons, 61 Md.App. 122, 127, 485 A.2d 270, 272 (1985), then sanctions are inappropriate. Thus, sanctions are inappropriate even where a party has misconceived the legal basis for the claim he or she makes. Century I Condo v. Plaza Condo Joint Ven., 64 Md.App. 107, 119, 494 A.2d 713, 719 (1985).
The reasonableness of the legal position must be assessed at the point when the complaint is filed, not from the vantage point of hindsight. See Bishop’s Garth, 75 Md. App. at 222, 540 A.2d at 1179; Needle, 81 Md.App. at 476, 568 A.2d at 802. Moreover, pursuit of Rule 1-341 sanctions differs from maintaining the underlying action in that the former is a collateral matter. Farmer, 74 Md.App. at 713, 539 A.2d at 1175. Consequently,
the fact that a court rejects the proposition advanced by counsel and finds it to be without merit does not mean the proposition was advanced without substantial justification or in bad faith. There would be no inconsistency whatever in an appellate court affirming the judgment in the underlying action and reversing a Rule 1-341 judgment as an abuse of discretion.

Id.

Whether viewed from the perspective of existing law or an attempt to explore, expand or modify existing law, a claim lacks substantial justification “when there is no basis in law and/or in fact to support [the] claim,” Johnson v. *283Baker, 84 Md.App. 521, 529, 581 A.2d 48, 52 (1990), cert. denied, 322 Md. 131, 586 A.2d 13 (1991), or when it is frivolous. It is frivolous when its proponent cannot make either a good faith argument on the merits or in support of extending, modifying, or reversing existing law. Id., at 529-30, 581 A.2d at 52, quoting Bishop’s Garth, 75 Md.App. at 221-22, 540 A.2d at 1179 (quoting Comment, Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 5th Ed. 601 (1979), which defines a frivolous pleading as one that is “clearly insufficient on its face and does not controvert the material points of the apposite pleading, and is presumably interposed for mere purposes of delay or to embarrass the opponent.” Conversely, a “colorable” claim does not lack substantial justification.
A claim is “colorable” which is “apparently valid, but, which is in reality legally insufficient.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 248 (defining “color”). Where, then, consideration of the allegations underlying the claim and the arguments advanced in support of it reveals an apparent, or prima facie, cause of action, the claim withstands scrutiny under the substantial justification prong of Rule 1-341.
The test of substantial justification cannot have a high threshold. Indeed, reference to the definition of “lack of substantial justification” makes clear that all that is required is “some” basis in law and/or fact. See Johnson v. Baker, 84 Md.App. at 529, 581 A.2d at 52. The question is how much is “some”? This can only be answered in relation to the purpose of Rule 1-341. The more an unsuccessful litigant is required to show to justify filing or maintaining his or her claim, the greater the chilling effect and the more reluctant that litigant will be to file any but the clearest actions. Similarly, the easier it is to assess the losing party with attorneys’ fees, the more the usual rule— that each party pays his or own counsel fees—is undermined.
Moreover, whether a claim has a basis in law and/or in fact is an issue separate and apart from the question *284whether the complaint in which it is pled can survive motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. A claim dismissed for failure to state a claim is not automatically a basis for Rule 1-341 sanctions. That a party inartfully pleads a cause of action or the judge is not inclined to stray from existing law does not mean that the claim has “no” basis in law or fact, for purposes of rule 1-341 sanctions. Similarly, a claim is not ipso facto without basis in law or fact because it did not survive a motion for summary judgment; complaints alleging even the most well established torts, for want of sufficient factual allegations, often do not generate a factual dispute.
I conclude that it is more than the bare complaint or answer, or its disposition that must be considered when Rule 1-341 sanctions are sought. More critical than what motivated the party is what the party knew or should have known concerning the viability of the claim or defense.
In rendering its decision, the trial court paid little or no attention either to the allegations of the complaint or Nil-son’s testimony concerning why he filed it. Indeed, as I have pointed out, it is unclear on what the court focused. All we really know is that the court concluded that the complaint was filed both in bad faith and without substantial justification.
Although as a backdrop for the instant litigation, the majority opinion contains some of the facts and the circumstances surrounding the initiation of the Inlet/Holt’s Landing Project, the Nilson complaint alleges them in greater detail.
The complaint alleged that the Harrisons and Inlet contemplated jointly developing and constructing a marina in front of their adjoining properties. That joint venture never came to fruition because the Harrisons lost litigation contesting a height variance necessary to the construction of a high rise project they contemplated. The Harrisons asked their architect, D’Aleo, who was also a principal in Inlet, to forego some of his fees, threatening that the joint *285venture would continue only if this were done. When D’Aleo refused and subsequently sued the Harrisons, recovering the fees, “the Harrisons mounted an assault on Inlet’s project, which culminated in the filing of multiple actions before the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) of Ocean City and in the Circuit Court for Worcester County.”
Among the actions taken by the Harrisons, according to the complaint, was to petition the City Council to revoke the City’s “consent to transfer certain property to Inlet necessary for completion of its project as it was then planned.” Ultimately, they filed suit in the Circuit Court for Worcester County and obtained an injunction enjoining the transfer. That judgment was affirmed on appeal. Inlet Associates v. Assateague House, 313 Md. 413, 545 A.2d 1296 (1988).
During the trial of Assateague House, with Burnett as counsel, the Harrisons argued that, for Inlet to downscale its project and proceed without the disputed city property, would require only a “minor” change to Inlet’s plans, which had already been approved.8 This position was taken to rebut testimony by Inlet that it would not downscale the project for fear that such a change in the plans would be deemed “major.” Were that the case, Inlet maintained, it would have had to start the process all over again, this time in the face of new, and unfavorable, laws, which would make the project economically unfeasible.
While the Assateague House case was pending on appeal, Inlet revised its plans, downscaling the project as suggested. Although the Zoning Administrator, characterizing the change as a “minor” one, recommended approval of the v downscaled project, according to the complaint:
The Harrisons, almost immediately, launched a formal objection to approval of the revised plan, now calling it a “major change,” and insisting that Inlet should be forced to proceed under the new, less favorable, height and *286density laws. Harrison Inn Inlet, Inc. and Harrison Inn Sixty-six, Inc., at the direction of the Harrisons and with the advice, counsel and encouragement of defendant Burnett, filed two separate actions before the BZA ... attacking the approval of the revised plans. In the process, the Harrisons and their counsel took a position wholly inconsistent with that taken by them in the litigation pending in the Court of Appeals. Indeed, at the same time they were arguing to the BZA that Inlet’s revised plan was a “major change”, they filed a brief with the Maryland Court of Appeals arguing, that, “... Inlet, grandfathered under the old density rules, could build the same project entirely on its own property ...” and insisting that there would be no hardship on Inlet if it were required to do so.
. The Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) ruled against the Harrisons, who, consequently, appealed to the circuit court. Still counseled by Burnett, the Harrisons filed additional, and separate, appeals of the oral and written opinion of BZA.9 The complaint alleged that one of the appeals was taken for the “wholly improper purpose of attempting to achieve a stay in the appeals pending before the circuit court, without posting a bond in those appeals.” After filing the several administrative appeals, the Harrisons, through Burnett, filed yet another lawsuit against Inlet, this one “seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on the same facts underlying their five BZA appeals concurrently pending in the circuit court.”
Finally the complaint alleged that Burnett was an active impediment to resolution of the dispute between Inlet and the Harrisons. Specifically, it stated:
When recently advised of the claims set forth herein, defendant Burnett wrote that “I do not believe that I should represent my client in any settlement negotiations” and, quoting a conflict of interest, that “I cannot *287participate in any settlement negotiations or even advise my client as to whether there should or should not be any such negotiations____”
In my view, it is significant that the Nilson complaint alleged the filing of multiple appeals,10 based, essentially, on the same conduct and, certainly, with the same aim—avoiding the approval and completion of a project the Harrisons opposed. Thus, whether or not the complaint used the word “malice”, to describe Burnett’s actions, as we have seen, Nilson alleged that the multiple appeals and the declaratory judgment action were initiated “without right or justifiable cause”. In any event, the totality of the circumstances alleged presented a reasonable basis for Nilson’s belief that a claim for malicious interference with prospective business advantage and/or abuse or process claim lay against Burnett.11
*288A permissible inference to be drawn from the filing of multiple appeals based on the same subject and acts is that they were filed for an improper purpose—inter alia, to harass, as alleged in paragraph 23 of the complaint, and to cloud Inlet’s title, as alleged in paragraph 27. And, because counsel is not obliged to follow blindly the directions of his or her clients and file lawsuits, the only effect of which is to harass or otherwise injure the defendants, a point I presume the majority does not dispute, that inference applies no less to the lawyer than to the client. Indeed, because Rule 1-341 contemplates sanctioning lawyers who violate it, filing an action against a lawyer who files appeals or complaints to harass is consistent both with its letter and spirit.
There is more in this case, however. In addition to the multiplicity of litigation, counsel made conflicting legal12 arguments, at the same time, albeit before different tribunals. Those arguments are appropriately attributable to Burnett. This is an additional factual circumstance which permits malice to be inferred as to Burnett.
Furthermore, the circuit court judge, before whom the various administrative appeals and the declaratory judgment action were consolidated, found merit in none of the actions. He had little difficulty framing and disposing of the issues presented. Significantly, he found that the downscaling of the Inlet project was, as Burnett originally *289argued and Inlet alleged, a “minor” modification to the project plans. This supports, albeit, indirectly, Inlet’s argument that its claim against Burnett was colorable.
The majority, the Harrisons, and Burnett remind us that the circuit court judgment was reversed by the Court of Special Appeals. It is relevant to note that that decision was based on the ground that a special height exception granted Inlet in 1985 to accommodate the project had lapsed, by operation of law, before Inlet obtained an extension. The issues at the heart of Inlet’s abuse of process and malicious interference action were not reached.
The trial court failed properly to focus on the issue presented in this case. It did not apply the appropriate test in determining whether Inlet had substantial justification for filing the complaint; the court never examined the real issue before it—whether, when filed, the claim was color-able, within the realm of legitimate advocacy. Had it done so, I believe it would have been compelled to conclude that a colorable claim was presented, and, therefore, imposition of sanctions impermissible. Our cases agree.
In Newman v. Reilly, we reversed a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed sanctions imposed against the plaintiff for filing an action to nullify a health claims arbitration award without substantial justification. There, the plaintiff brought an action against one of the physicians who certified the need for the plaintiff’s involuntary commitment, alleging that physician’s failure to follow the statutory procedure for involuntary commitment. Specifically he contended that, because the physician spoke to him only on the phone, he did not “personally examine” him as the statute required. Despite not having an expert to testify that failure personally to examine him was a violation of the applicable standard of care, the plaintiff, who lost in arbitration, continued to make that assertion in the circuit court. That court determined that the plaintiff’s position “was unsupported by any plausible legal argument.” 314 Md. at 380, 550 A.2d at 967. Without deciding the meaning of the term “personal examination”, as used in *290the statute, we held that a theory which would require a doctor to examine a patient who is physically present is a “legitimate one.” Id., 314 Md. at 381, 550 A.2d at 968.
The defendant’s justification for filing a second motion for summary judgment, the court having denied the first one because there was a factual dispute, was at issue in Yamaner v. Orkin. The second motion did not clearly disclose how the grounds asserted differed from those asserted in the first. Upon being assessed counsel fees for filing the second summary judgment motion without substantial justification, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for summary judgment and the imposition of sanctions. In it, he averred that the second motion was based on additional factual material developed at the arbitration hearing, including testimony that the plaintiff’s expert, having isolated the time of injury to a period when the plaintiff was not under the defendant’s care, had changed his mind as to the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The motion also noted the expiration of the discovery deadline without the plaintiff naming any additional expert. We were of the opinion that “Prior to Yamaner’s motion for reconsideration of the sanction, the justification for Yamaner’s September 1986 summary judgment motion might not have been made as clear to Judge McKenna as it could have been, but substantial justification was plainly spelled out in that reconsideration motion and its supporting exhibits.” 313 Md. at 516, 545 A.2d at 1349. We explained (313 Md. at 516-17, 545 A.2d at 1349):
Here Yamaner had two strings to his bow. His legal argument was that res ipsa loquitur does not apply in medical malpractice cases. That argument was reinforced by the discovery deadline which passed after Judge Latham’s ruling. Arguably there was no opinion of Dr. Mayle implicating Yamaner and Orkin had not produced any other expert. From the standpoint of evidentiary material submitted in the record, the facts on the issue of when the injury occurred had also changed. The additional use of Dr. Mayle’s arbitration hearing testimo*291ny arguably eliminated the generality in testimony relied upon by Judge Latham and isolated the time of injury to a period when Yamaner had no responsibility for the positioning of the patient.
The cases decided by the Court of Special Appeals, in which the award of attorney’s fees for bringing an action without substantial justification have been upheld are consistent. Also, they are instructive because, from them, we know the adjudicated parameters of that concept. In Allnut v. Comptroller, 77 Md.App. 424, 550 A.2d 728 (1988), for example, the issue was the validity of Maryland’s personal income tax and, due to the dependency of the Maryland scheme on the federal income tax structure, necessarily, “either the constitutionality of former § 205 of the revised statutes of the United States or the proper ratification of the 16th Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Id., 77 Md.App. at 426, 550 A.2d at 728. “Considering the plethora of recent federal cases, all rejecting the very argument which appellants have asserted and a number of Maryland cases ... explaining the sources of Maryland’s taxing power,” the court found that Allnut’s appeal of the circuit court’s dismissal of the action was taken without substantial justification Id., 73 Md.App. at 430, 550 A.2d at 731.
Johnson v. Baker is another informative case. There, Johnson sued Baker for breach of contract and fraud. Baker moved to dismiss and Johnson countered by amending his complaint to render that motion moot. When Baker moved to dismiss the amended complaint, Johnson amended that complaint. This pattern continued through the third amended complaint; however, the court granted Baker’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, awarding counsel fees to Baker’s attorney and Johnson appealed. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed and this Court denied the requested writ of certiorari. Baker filed a motion seeking sanctions pursuant to Rule 1-341. Granting the motion, the hearing court concluded that Johnson “ignored precedent” and was unable to give Judge Heise any support for his [Johnson’s] proposition.” 84 Md.App. at *292526, 581 A.2d at 51. In affirming, the Court of Special Appeals drew a distinction between the initiation of the litigation and the prosecution of the appeal, noting that, in that case, Johnson was sanctioned for pursuing the appeal when “it had become patently apparent that he had no colorable claim.” 84 Md.App. at 531, 581 A.2d at 51. As to the lack of substance, the court said:
At the trial level, Johnson’s theory of his case was that a third party may sue an attorney for advice which the attorney has given a client on a matter in which the attorney has no personal interest. When pressed by the judge, Johnson could offer no Maryland case law, nor case law from any other jurisdiction, to support that theory. The judge considered Johnson’s proposition a “fundamentally erratical change in the law” which would radically change the nature of attorney-client relationships and create a litigation explosion. The judge concluded that Johnson’s claim was “frivolous ... [and without] any basis in law or in fact based on [Johnson’s] allegations.”
Our prior opinion on this case was part of the record before the circuit court judge at the sanctions hearing. In it, we explained why Johnson had no cause of action and affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Johnson’s complaint and award of attorney’s fees to Blumenthal. In this appeal, Johnson still has not provided us with a viable legal theory or precedent that would justify his pursuit of his prior appeal to us. He begins by claiming that he has a “colorable claim,” which clearly has no basis in fact or in law, and then contends that he was entitled to continue the action because he had one appeal as of right. He appears to assume—erroneously—that an appeal of right can legitimize and give substance to an action that is otherwise without merit. (Footnote omitted)
84 Md.App. at 530, 581 A.2d at 52-53.
In Blanton v. Equitable Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 61 Md.App. 158, 485 A.2d 694 (1985), the defendant appealed the denial *293of his motion for continuance. A motion to dismiss the appeal, and seeking counsel fees, having been filed by the plaintiff, the Court of Special Appeals focused on whether there was justification for the appeal and concluded that there was not. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that appeal from a continuance is neither an enumerated exception to the final judgment rule, 61 Md.App. at 163, 485 A.2d at 697, citing Maryland Courts and Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 12-303 and Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md.App. 543, 280 A.2d 277 (1971), aff'd, 265 Md. 129, 287 A.2d 770 (1972), nor appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 61 Md. App. at 163-165, 485 A.2d at 699-98. This determination was made as a matter of law.
An argument that counsel fees cannot be awarded pursuant to Rule 1-341 to one who is not a member of the bar was considered specious in Kirsner v. Edelmann, 65 Md. App. 185, 197, 499 A.2d 1313, 1319 (1985). That court likewise rejected an argument that advice of counsel supplied substantial justification where it had been previously considered and rejected, albeit in dicta, on a prior appeal. Id., 499 A.2d at 1319.
The Rule 1-341 issue in Century I Condo was multifaceted. As to the claim for fees incurred in the trial court, which the trial judge denied, the Court of Special Appeals refused to hold, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs action was brought or maintained without substantial justification even though, in filing and maintaining it, the plaintiffs “may have been skating on very thin ice.” 64 Md.App. at 119, 494 A.2d at 719. It held otherwise as to part of the costs incurred on appeal—because the decision in a pending appeal decided before oral argument in that case, was res judicata as to that case. 64 Md.App. at 121, 494 A.2d at 720.
What comes through loud and clear is that it is where the law is quite clear and the party initiating or maintaining the action is aware, or should be aware, of that fact that lack of substantial justification is found. To uphold a trial court’s determination under any other circumstance is to place a *294significant damper on litigants and, hence, to retard the development of the law. That is not the purpose of Rule 1-341.
I would reverse.

. I also believe that either the trial court used the wrong standard or was confused as to what standard to apply. With respect to the former, its statement of what it believed the applicable law to be, the references it made to its prior grant of the motions to dismiss, and the different results reached as to the Burnett and Harrisons motions for sanctions lead me to conclude that the court determined that, from the grant of Burnett’s motion to dismiss, both “lack of substantial justification" and "bad faith” inexorably followed. As to the latter, I find persuasive the fact that the facts, on the basis of which the court found "bad faith”, apply as much to the Harrisons as to Burnett, yet only Burnett’s motion was granted.

. The court did assert that Nilson “admitted in oral argument ... that there was no post-process abuse to substantiate the claim for abuse of process.” To the extent that this is a factual finding, it is not supported by the record and, therefore, is clearly erroneous. The record reflects that whether Nilson did agree that the complaint did not allege anything additional to those filings, he, Nilson, at all times, maintained that the filing of the multiple appeals and the declaratory judgment action was, for purposes of the tort, post-process abuse.

. The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s bad faith or lack of substantial justification "finding", applied uniformly by the Court of Special Appeals, e.g., Needle v. White, 81 Md.App. 463, 470, 568 A.2d 856, 859, cert. denied, 319 Md. 582, 573 A.2d 1338 (1990), and adopted by this Court today, is whether it is clearly erroneous. That standard is a deferential one, which may tend to encourage greater use of sanctions. It is interesting that we adopt this standard so soon after we commented, in Zdravkovich v. Bell Atl-Tricon Leasing, 323 Md. 200, 212, 592 A.2d 498, 504 (1991), that "[t]he deterrent purpose of Rule 1-341 should be re-emphasized because, in too many cases, the pleadings that evidence the most bad faith and the least justification are motions requesting costs and attorney’s fees."

. Ordinarily, trial judges are not required to set out the details of their thought processes, but see Smith v. State, 306 Md. 1, 11-12, 506 A.2d 1165, 1170 (1986); it is enough that there is, in the record, evidence to support the result reached. The award of attorney’s fees and costs for the bringing of frivolous or bad faith actions is an extraordinary sanction, Tally v. Tally, 317 Md. 428, 436, 564 A.2d 777, 781 (1989), as well as a deviation from the usual rule that each party pays his or her own attorney's fees. Moreover, because the sanction has been determined not to be intended to stifle creativity or innovation, it must be judiciously, perhaps, even sparingly, used. Consequently, I believe this to be an appropriate instance in which to require more of the trial court—to burden it, if necessary—to ensure that it has appropriately awarded sanctions.

. Like Rule 1-341, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11, the federal counterpart, authorizes federal district courts to impose sanctions upon attorneys, and their clients, who file pleadings not reasonably well grounded in fact or law and for any improper purpose. It provides, in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other *280paper; and that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact ... and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation____
Rather than "bad faith” and “lack of substantial justification”, Rule 11 speaks in terms of pleadings, motions, or other papers being “well grounded in fact” and not filed for "any improper purpose”. Although the language is different, the two prongs of the rules are quite similar. Interpreting Rule 11, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held "that the filing of a complaint that is well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law, cannot as a matter of law constitute harassment for the purposes of Rule 11,” Sheets v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 891 F.2d 533, 538 (5th Cir.1990); Jennings v. Joshua Independent School District, 877 F.2d 313, 320 (5th Cir.1989); Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Alla Medical Services, Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 1476 (9th Cir.1988); Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir.1987); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir.1986). These holdings are supportive of interpreting Rule 1-341 as insulating colorable complaints from the imposition of sanctions based only on the “bad faith" prong of the rule.

. “The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law’s ambiguities and potential for change.
The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.’.’

. It is true that Nilson filed the complaint before the circuit court ruled and, therefore, did not rely on that court’s ruling. Nevertheless, because it is the reasonableness of Nilson’s conclusion, and, hence, the action he filed that renders the claim colorable or not, the circuit court’s ruling indirectly confirmed Nilson’s judgment.

. Burnett elicited testimony to that effect from the Zoning Administrator, whom he called as a witness for the Harrisons.

. One of the appeals to the BZA was from the Zoning Administrator’s signature to Inlet’s plan.

. The majority points out that the five appeals and the separate action filed by the Harrisons were consolidated at the Harrisons’ request. This, it suggests, ameliorates the impact of the separate filings. It may be commendable that the separate actions were, after the fact, consolidated, but that should not deflect attention from the fact that they were separately filed or from consideration of the effect and purpose of those filings. When the Harrisons filed each separate administrative appeal, Inlet was called upon to decide whether to participate and, if so, in what manner. See Maryland Rule B9. Of course, the declaratory judgment action required that Inlet, under pain of default, file an answer.

. Burnett’s argument that count 1 of the complaint lacked substantial justification proceeds on the premise that no process issued against Inlet when appeals were noted from the Board of Zoning Appeals’ decisions. He also argues that the complaint did not allege any post-process abuse. Of significance to Burnett is the narrowness of the term “process” as used in the tort. See Burnett’s brief at 21-22. Whether or not the term “process” as used in connection with the tort of abuse of process is narrowly interpreted in Maryland, there are cases from other states, which indicate that a broader interpretation of the term is appropriate. See e.g. Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348, 651 P.2d 876 (1982); Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association of Oakland, 7 Cal.3d 94, 101 Cal.Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817 (1972). See also Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts, § 4.9 at 495-96, n. 49 (1986). Accordingly, since an attempt to modify or expand existing law is not intended to be stifled by Rule 1-341, the court need not and, indeed, should not have found lack of substantial justification solely *288on the basis that Maryland law does not now explicitly recognize the tort with the contours Nilson sought to achieve.
As to Count 2, the trial court’s determination was presumably based upon Nilson’s failure to allege or present evidence as to, "malice.” As already pointed out, the complaint may well have alleged, albeit not as explicitly as Burnett would like, "malice”, and, in any event, the totality of the allegations presented an inference of "malice”. That, in my view, is a sufficient rebuttal to the court’s finding.
In any event, only if both of the counts fail for lack of substantial justification would Burnett be entitled to sanctions; it is enough that one, not both, of the counts pass muster.

. Whether an amendment to project plans is "major” or "minor" is primarily a legal, rather than factual, issue.