Court Opinion

ID: 9554574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 15:07:11.077494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:12.163061
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1205
                              Filed August 9, 2023

SCOTT PATRICK HASSEL,
    Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, John M. Sandy,

Judge.

      A defendant appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

      Nathan A. Mundy of Mundy Law Office, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
                                          2

GREER, Judge.

       Contending his plea counsel failed to properly explain the terms of the plea

agreements, specifically that his sentences were to run consecutively, Scott

Hassel applied for postconviction relief (PCR) asserting ineffective assistance of

his trial counsel. The State argues Hassel’s claim that he did not understand the

terms of the plea agreement is not supported by the evidence and, after a hearing

on the PCR application, the district court agreed with the State’s characterization

and dismissed the application. Hassel appeals.

       The State charged Hassel with crimes in two separate cases. As the cases

progressed, trial counsel consulted Hassel about entering plea agreements in each

case. Ultimately, Hassel signed two written plea agreements that were filed and

accepted by the district court; Hassel pled guilty to one count of third-degree

burglary, a class “D” felony, in both FECR021717 and FECR021695. Hassel was

sentenced according to the terms of the plea agreements. At sentencing, the

district court explained

       [I]n case number [FECR0]21695, it is the judgment and sentence of
       this court that the defendant is guilty and is convicted of the crime of
       burglary in the third degree, a class D felony, as charged in count I
       of the trial information committed on February 5th of 2017. As
       punishment for that crime, the defendant is sentenced to a term of
       incarceration not to exceed five years. . . .          If [the term of
       incarceration] needs to be served, that term of incarceration shall run
       consecutive with the sentence that will soon be imposed in case
       number [FECR0]21717. However, the serving of that term of
       incarceration and the payment of the fine are all suspended, and the
       defendant is placed on probation under the supervision of the Third
       Judicial District Department of Correctional Services for a period of
       three years.
                                           3

The sentencing court repeated the sentence in similar fashion related to the

second charge. When Hassel was asked if he had any questions concerning the

sentence, he answered “no.”

        In this PCR and in his own words, Hassel described the plea discrepancy

like this:

        I was told [the sentences] were running, as I said, together, and [trial
        counsel] said yes. As I’m signing papers and he just signs me one
        this is just acknowledging the first thing. I sign. I don’t read through
        the small print. I just kept signing and they were [to] run consecutive.
        I find this out when I got to Oakdale when I got my time comp
        sheet[1] . . . .

But Hassel’s trial counsel also testified at the PCR hearing and discussed the

written guilty plea forms signed by Hassel. In doing so, counsel remembered that

he met with Hassel for an hour and discussed the charges against him and what

plea offers were on the table. One consideration was whether a stint in prison

would be urged by the State. Trial counsel proposed a possible plea deal with

concurrent sentences, but the State indicated with that option it would ask for

incarceration rather than suspended sentences. Weighing the various risks, trial

counsel testified he advised Hassel on the best route to avoid prison.

Remembering the full discussion, trial counsel testified that Hassel “elected to

proceed with the consecutive sentencing and a guarantee of probation in lieu of

proceeding with a chance at being sent to prison.” Then, trial counsel further

described the detailed plea proceeding where the district court confirmed the plea

agreement terms. And counsel noted, as was the office practice, Hassel was sent

1 Because both of Hassel’s sentences were suspended, he was placed on
probation. But his probation was eventually revoked, which is when Hassel claims
he realized the sentences would run consecutively rather than concurrently.
                                           4

a letter advising him his “sentence would be served consecutively [if he ever had

to serve it], but that he was placed on probation.” Trial counsel also emphasized,

“He knew the alternative was running two [“D”] felonies concurrently with most

likely he was going to prison because the [presentence investigation report] would

so indicate, or the alternative is he could accept consecutive sentencing with a

guarantee of probation. He knew that.”

       Hassel’s PCR claim centers on his trial counsel’s failure to advise him that

the guilty pleas required that the sentences would run consecutively rather than

concurrently.     We generally review a denial of PCR for errors at law.        See

Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). “[W]hen the applicant

asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo. Thus, we review

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo.” Id. (quoting Ledezma v.

State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001)).

       “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant

must demonstrate both ineffective assistance and prejudice.”         Ledezma, 626

N.W.2d at 142. Proof of both elements must be by a preponderance of the

evidence.   Id.     As for the ineffective-assistance prong, “the applicant must

demonstrate the attorney performed below the standard demanded of a

reasonably competent attorney.”      Id.   To establish the prejudice prong, “the

applicant must demonstrate ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.’” Id. at 143 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).

Here, Hassel failed to prove counsel provided ineffective assistance.
                                         5

       But for Hassel’s protestations over his plea understanding, all of the

evidence presented at the PCR hearing supports the dismissal of the application.

Trial counsel demonstrated reasonable skill in negotiating the plea agreement for

Hassel. He offered Hassel two options—one with a joint recommendation for a

suspended sentence and probation and the other with the State recommending

Hassel serve prison time. Over an hour conference with Hassel, trial counsel set

out the plea agreement options. Hassel2 signed two written plea agreements—

one for each case—which clearly set out that the sentences would be served

consecutively if they were ever served.      At the plea hearing, the prosecutor

confirmed the agreement as set out in the written plea agreements, the plea court

carefully explained the terms and asked Hassel, “[D]o you want to be sentenced

in accordance with those plea agreements if we get to the sentencing portion of

those proceedings?” Hassel responded, “Yes.” Hassel agreed to proceed to

sentencing after pleading guilty, and the court confirmed with Hassel that the

presentence investigation report recommended imprisonment and that Hassel

understood that his attorney negotiated a plea agreement that would allow Hassel

to avoid prison. The sentencing court again summarized the sentences, noting

again they would run consecutively.       Finally, after the plea and sentencing

proceedings, trial counsel sent Hassel the judgment and sentence and confirmed

in writing the specific details of the agreements, including “that the sentence would

be served consecutively, but that he was placed on probation.”

2 At the time he signed the written plea agreements, Hassel was forty-eight years

old, had a college degree, understood the English language, and had extensive
experience in the criminal system. He does not argue he failed to understand the
terms of the agreements and confirmed with the plea judge that he understood.
                                          6

       Based on this record, we agree with the district court’s finding that “there

can be little doubt that Hassel’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.” We

also credit the district court’s determination that trial counsel was more credible

than Hassel. See Cox v. State, 554 N.W.2d 712, 714–15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996)

(deferring to the PCR court’s credibility findings and finding trial counsel to be more

credible). Hassel did not meet his burden of proof to establish his trial counsel

failed to perform an essential duty, thus we do not reach his prejudice claim. We

affirm the dismissal of the PCR application.

       AFFIRMED.