Court Opinion

ID: 9472090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:49:07.696211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:44.421281
License: Public Domain

TATE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
A pickup truck was stopped at about 11:30 p.m. by border patrol agents on an Interstate Highway in Texas some 115 miles north of the Mexican border. So far as the agents were able to glimpse, there were three women in the front seat of the truck cab and five or six men in the back seat. To the pickup truck was affixed a heavily loaded camper attachment. The essential issue concerns the lawfulness or not of the stop of this vehicle. Believing that, stripped to its essence, the stop was based upon no more than the border patrolmen’s speculation that poor and dirty Hispanic appearing persons might possibly be Mexican aliens who had crossed the border illegally some 115 miles south of the stop, and that “reasonable suspicion” of illegal alien entry cannot be based upon the mere cir*1229cumstance that a crowded pickup truck of dirty appearing Hispanic-descended workmen is traveling on an Interstate highway at 11:30 in the evening, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which, I concede, is excellent and thorough and has fairly presented the factual picture.
I.
The essential issue facing this court today is whether roving border patrol agents may stop persons who appear to be of Hispanic descent and who appear to be poor and dirty, wherever and however spotted, because those agents claim to have the “expertise” to distinguish between the characteristics of those travelers who are illegal aliens and those who are lawfully present in the United States. Quite unfortunately, we have the opportunity only to review the successful guesses of these agents; we are never presented with the unconstitutionally intrusive stops of Hispanic residents and citizens that do not result in an arrest. Differentiating the United States from police states of past history and the present, our Constitution in its Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches protects all our residents, whether middle-class and well-dressed or poor and disheveled, from arbitrary stop by governmental enforcement agents in our travel upon the highways of this nation.
The perceived social problem in controlling the hordes of illegal migrants from Mexico, does not, in my opinion, justify stopping people of Hispanic-descent appearance far from the border, simply because the hour is late and they appear to be poor and dirty working people, any more than it would justify the similar arbitrary stop of any native-born or naturalized American simply because he has the same characteristics of appearance. A few of the decisions of this circuit that have upheld stops by immigration agents have come perilously close to ignoring this fundamental constitutional concept, in relying upon one slight circumstance or another, in conjunction with the totality of its context, as entitling these agents to a stop-justifying “reasonable” suspicion. In the present instance, based upon an addition of some slight circumstances relied upon in these other scattered decisions, not of themselves sufficient (out of their context) to justify reasonable suspicion, the majority nevertheless finds the stop justified, although in the present context these circumstances do not add up to reasons justifying reasonable suspicion of illegal entry.
To its credit, the panel majority has tried to apply the precedents of this circuit in a principled way to the present facts. I am afraid, however, that this attempt has only succeeded in differentiating otherwise irreconcilable precedent of this circuit through an unsteady calculus of what factors may permissibly be considered when determining whether border patrol agents have an objectively “reasonable suspicion” to make a stop. With great respect for the views of my brethren in the majority, I must dissent.
II.
The majority correctly notes that this stop by a roving border patrol requires the application of the multi-factorial test of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2582, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Accordingly, we must assess the lawfulness of the stop in light of the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the stop. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. at 2582 n. 10. A vital element of this test is whether the agent who made the stop had “reason to believe that the vehicle [in question] had come from the border.” United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1979). The defendant Garcia was stopped on an interstate highway in Texas 115 miles north of the Mexico/United States border. As the majority candidly admits, nothing in this case suggests that the agents had any reason to believe that Garcia’s truck had come from the border.
In the absence of an inference that the vehicle to be stopped came from the border, the remaining factors known to the *1230agents must be carefully examined to determine whether “other articulable facts ‘reasonably warrant suspicion' United States v. Pena-Cantu, 639 F.2d 1228, 1229 (5th Cir.1981). In the present case, the remaining factors relied upon by the majority included: other illegal aliens had been seized near the location where the agents encountered Garcia; the interstate highway on which Garcia was traveling was “a common smuggling route”; the occupants of Garcia’s truck were unwashed and unkempt; the type of truck driven by Garcia, a pickup truck with a camper shell attached to the back of it, is often used to transport illegal aliens; the windows of the camper shell attachment appeared to be fogged, suggesting that the camper carried living cargo; the lateness of the hour at the time of the stop; the scrambling of the occupants of the truck when the border patrol agent shined his flashlight at them; the seemingly heavy load in the truck; the speed of the truck; and the specialized training of the border patrol agents involved in the stop. Because I believe that the consideration of several of these factors departs from the precedents of this circuit, despite the majority’s distinguishment of them as not controlling, and that the remaining factors cannot, standing alone, support the stop of Garcia’s truck, I cannot join the opinion of the panel majority, excellently reasoned as it is.
The majority notes that a relevant consideration in its analysis was the apparent heavy load carried by Garcia’s truck. Although we have been loath to give any weight to the “heavy load” factor in the past, see United States v. Orona-Sanchez, 648 F.2d 1039, 1042 (5th Cir.1981) (stop held illegal, under facts quite similar to the present); United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.1980), the majority offers the distinction that “here, by contrast, the testimony reflects a degree of loading that is more than merely heavy, but is indeed over loading.” (Maj. op. at 1225 n. 2).
As an initial matter, the distinction between “heávy-loading” and “overloading” is dubious and more semantic than real. More importantly, however, the rejection of “heavy” or “over”-loading as a factor rests on considerations of substance, not of degree. The factor is irrelevant as a consideration to support reasonable suspicion because a “heavy load” is just as consistent with innocent conduct, e.g., a heavy load of produce or livestock, as it is with culpable conduct, e.g., smuggling illegal aliens, especially when we cannot infer that the truck in question had come from the border.1
We have also refused to accord weight to the observations of border patrol agents that a vehicle’s occupants “hunkered down” when the agents passed or were sitting low so as to avoid detection, see United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 86-87 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Pena-Cantu, 639 F.2d 1228, 1229-30 (5th Cir.1981), or that the occupants of a vehicle were startled by the beam of a border patrol agent’s flashlight. United States v. Orona-Sanchez, 648 F.2d 1039, 1041-42 (5th Cir.1981). The majority reasons that these decisions are inapposite since the occupants of Garcia’s truck “did much more than merely avoid eye contact with [the agent’s] flashlight.” (Maj. op. p. 1224 n. 1). The agents testified that the occupants were “moving and slouching low as to get out of the light trying to hide.” Agent Baron testified that, after he shined his flashlight into the truck, “they were scrambling around trying to get lower than the windows were so that ... I couldn’t see them with a flashlight. They were scrambling around in the interior there.” The *1231majority considered this testimony relevant since “ducking and scrambling around is certainly less typical of innocent passengers than slouching or hunkering down.” (Maj. op. p. 1225).
A factor affecting the lawfulness of a stop should not rest on the subtleties of the difference, if indeed there is one, between “ducking and scrambling” and “slouching and hunkering down.” The essence of the majority’s distinction unfortunately rests not on the physical actions of the occupants of the truck, which can be observed by border patrol agents, but on the motives for which the occupants took those physical actions (their desire to hide), something which could not be observed by the agents. The “undisputed” testimony of the agents was that this “ducking and scrambling” took place immediately after they had shined their flashlight into the dark cabin of the truck. The physical reactions of the occupants may have been a response to the beam of the flashlight, a circumstance which the majority concedes would render their conduct irrelevant. See United States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir.1977) (finding that “reasonable suspicion should not turn on the ophthalmological reactions of the appellant”). Of course, the agents here also testified that an additional motive of the occupants’ actions (beyond reacting to the light) was “to conceal themselves” so as to avoid detection.
I am unwilling to believe that, based upon a fleeting moment of observation, border patrol agents are able to accurately assess that the occupants of a vehicle are “trying to hide” rather than reacting to a bright light. Furthermore, I cannot distinguish the “ducking and scrambling” in this case from the “slouching and hunkering down” that we previously refused to consider as a factor supporting the reasonableness of a stop. See Pacheco, supra, 617 F.2d at 86-87; Pena-Cantu, supra, 659 F.2d at 1229-30. Where, as here, a great deal of physical movement occurs in the interior of a vehicle at night immediately after a bright flashlight is directed at the occupants, I cannot in a “chary” review of the facts (as required where the stop is made miles and miles from the border, see decisions cited, supra) conclude that the truck occupants’ reaction to the beam of the agent’s flashlight should be weighed as a significant factor supporting a reasonable suspicion that the truck was transporting aliens.
Another factor relied upon by the majority is also, in my view, unworthy of meaningful weight. The court refers to the lateness of the hour as a relevant consideration adding to reasonable suspicion. We have held, however, that a “decision to travel such roads at less busy hours should not be the difference — constitutionally speaking — determinative of the right of the officers to stop vehicles.” United States v. Frisbie, 550 F.2d 335, 338 (5th Cir.1977).
Admittedly, however, other factors relied upon by the majority perhaps do merit consideration, e.g., the previous experience of the agents with illegal alien traffic on the highway, the type of vehicle driven by Garcia, and the unkempt appearances of the truck’s occupants.2 Carefully weighing these remaining factors, I conclude that the officers had insufficient articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that the truck driven by Garcia was transporting illegal aliens. Foremost among my concerns are (1) the distance between the border and the point at which the stop occurred, and (2) my hesitation to credit the ability of border patrol agents to distinguish an illegal alien from a lawful resident, based on physical appearances, after a few quick glimpses while traveling at considerable speeds on a highway.
*1232That the highway on which Garcia was stopped and that the type of truck she was driving are commonly used for the smuggling of aliens must be insufficient, standing alone, to support reasonable suspicion for a stop, unless, of course, we are willing to permit all vehicles commonly used for smuggling (of which there are an increasing number) to be stopped at any distance over 115 miles from the border on designated highways — subject only to the discretion and availability of border patrol agents. The controlling factor in this case, if the stop was lawful, must be the unkempt appearance of the truck’s occupants, which is alleged to be consistent with the appearance of illegal aliens. In short, we must rely on the ability of a border patrol agent to discern whether the appearance of the Hispanic occupants of a given vehicle are more or less like that of the typical illegal alien, rather than that of any other poor and disheveled American of Hispanic descent. I cannot accord controlling weight to this factor.
Whether a person appears “dirty” or “unkempt” varies greatly with the subjective perceptions of the person making the assessment. The standard will differ with each agent’s experience and attitude about the typical appearance of an illegal alien. While I concede that this factor is worthy of some consideration, I cannot contribute controlling weight — in the sense of the constitutionality of a stop — to the hygienic appear anees of a vehicle’s occupants as interpreted by border patrol agents.3
I do not mean to suggest that this combination of factors (the reputation of the highway as a common smuggling route, the type of vehicle driven by the defendant, and the appearance of the vehicle’s occupants) could never constitute reasonable suspicion for a stop by border patrol agents if at a distance closer to the border than that involved here. Nonetheless, when a vehicle is traveling 115 miles from the border and no permissible inference can be made that it came from the border, I conclude that the factors presented to this court that are worthy of consideration in light of the precedents of this circuit, as I view them, cannot rise to the level of reasonable suspicion without also subjecting innocent persons who lawfully reside in this country to intrusive stops by border patrol agents based primarily on their appearance as being of Hispanic descent.

Conclusion

For these reasons, and with great respect for the contrary views of my brethren, I dissent.

. Other factors also persuade the majority of the relevance of the heavy-load factor, such as the squashed tires of the truck, the angle upward of the truck’s headlights, the slow speed of the truck, and the weaving of the truck. While it is true that a heavy truck may have squashed tires and angled headlights and be difficult to manuever, these facts have no bearing on the basic principle that operating a heavily loaded truck is no more consistent with guilty conduct than it is with innocent conduct. It is also possible, of course, that the tires may have been under-inflated and that the headlights were improperly aligned, indicating the questionable relevance of these factors when viewed "charily”, as our precedents require.

. Under the circumstances of this case, I can attribute no weight to the officers’ observance that the windows of the camper shell on the truck appeared to be fogged. Under a cautious view of the facts I simply cannot infer that the appearance of a fogged window on a cold night would be caused solely by living, breathing cargo. Even if I were to accept that inference, I cannot find any basis for the further conclusion that the living cargo was human and illegally attempting to enter the United States.

. The majority notes that all of the relevant factors must be viewed in light of the specialized experience and training of the border patrol agents. To the extent that the experience of these agents contributes to the assessment of particular highways as smuggling routes and particular vehicles as common modes of transporting aliens, it is indeed a factor which we must consider. See Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at 885, 95 S.Ct. at 2582. On the other hand, the subjective knowledge or beliefs of the border patrol agent can add nothing to our objective determination of whether the officer had reasonable cause to stop the vehicle. As we stated in United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir.1979),
We have little difficulty in accepting as a fact that [the agent] honestly believed the car to be carrying illegal aliens. Indeed the conviction of the appellant on four counts of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) is evidence of the absolute correctness of his belief. If the reasonableness of a stop depended on the border patrol agent’s subjective beliefs our inquiry would end here. The Fourth Amendment, however, requires us to test this stop in a different manner.
See also United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 412 (5th Cir.1984). Thus, I am unable to derive any support for the stop from the majority’s description of the expertise of the agents, the number of arrests in which they have participated, or their ability to speak Spanish. These facts do not enhance the other facts relied upon by the majority, nor do they persuade me of the agents’ superior ability to distinguish illegal aliens from lawful residents — at least without evidence showing the number of erroneous stops made by these same agents.