Court Opinion

ID: 9655302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:05:17.864576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:17.404403
License: Public Domain

COIL, Commissioner
(dissenting in part).
I dissent from that part of Judge HOLMAN’S opinion which holds that none of the instalments due by virtue of the provisions of the promissory note were barred by the statute of limitations and which holds in connection with that conclusion that the 1919 amendment to present Section 516.100 makes the otherwise settled law inapplicable to instant facts. The essential portions of the promissory note in question are:
“Kansas City, Mo., March 1, 1925
“For value received we promise to pay Henry P. Bowman or order, the sum of Twenty Six Hundred Twenty Seven & 50/Dollars, at the office of R. F. Porter in Kansas City, Mo., in monthly installments, payable as follows, to-wit: Twenty dollars on the 1st day of April 19 - and $20 dollars on the 1st day of each succeeding month thereafter except months of March and September of each year until the whole sum named is fully paid with interest from this date at the rate of 6 per cent per an-num. The interest on each installment and the interest on the unpaid balance of the principal sum are to be paid at the maturity of each installment. If default is made in the payment of any installment when due, then all the remaining installments shall become due and payable at once. Privilege is given to pay two or more installments at any time.
“O. W. Leonard
“Lena Leonard”
There can be no question but that the above note is a contract to pay money in instalments and thus is a divisible contract, and that each default in payment of an instalment is the subject of an independent action if brought before the next instalment becomes due. 1 Am.Jur., Actions, § 107, p. 49. The opinion at page 837 of 322 S.W.2d concedes that the general rule is that “ ‘when recovery is sought on a note or other obligation payable by instalments, the statute of limitations runs against each instalment from the time it becomes due; that is, from the time when an action might be brought to recover it.’ ” The opinion also concedes that Stark Bros, v. Gooding, 175 Mo.App. 353, 162 S.W. 333, is an adjudicated case in this state applying that well-established general rule. Another Missouri case which applies the established rule is Boyd v. Buchanan, 176 Mo.App. 56, 162 S.W. 1075.
Clearly, the fact situation where a note or other contract provides for the payment of money in instalments is no different (in so far as concerns the applicable law) than if the maker or promissor had executed as many separate notes or contracts as there are instalments which come due at stated times under the provisions of the instant divisible contract. In either event, the promisee has a separate cause of action for each note or for each instalment. Grue v. Hensley, 357 Mo. 592, 210 S.W.2d 7, 11 [7] [8]. And the only possible question in this case is whether the promisee had a cause of action by the assertion of which he could enforce the payment of each in-stalment when it became due, or whether the note constituted a single indivisible contract so that only one single cause of action arose and so that only one action could be maintained to recover the full amount of the note, either at its maturity or, at the option of the holder, in accordance with the acceleration provisions thereof. In other words, once it appears (and there is no dispute about it) that the instant contract is divisible and that the promisee had a separate cause of action for the recovery of each instalment when it became due, then it must follow that the cause of action as to each instalment accrued the moment the right to commence each such action came into existence. For it is well settled that a cause of action ac*840crues when a suit may be maintained, and, of course, the statute of limitations begins to run from that time. Hunter v. Hunter, Mo., 237 S.W.2d 100, 103 [4]; Coleman v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 182 S.W.2d 74, 78 [14]; Beard v. Citizens’ Bank of Memphis, Mo.App., 37 S.W.2d 678, 679 [1,2].
I take it that there is no dispute about the proposition just stated, viz., that á cause of action accrues the instant the right to commence an action comes into existence and that the statute of limitations commences to run from that time (Coleman v. Kansas City, supra). If that be true, is it not then apparent that it begs the question to sttggest and hold, as the opinion does at page 838 of 322 S.W.2d that the proviso added by the 1919 amendment to Section 516.100 affects or determines when the cause of action on each instalment accrued? That proviso in pertinent part is, “that the cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when * * * the technical breach of contract * * * occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment, and, if more than one item of damage, then the last item, so that all resulting damage may be recovered, and full and complete relief obtained.” It is apparent to me that the “items of damage” referred to are the “items of damage” that occur under or result from the breach of each separate contract. It is equally apparent that the “last item” of damage means the "last item” under each separate contract. The provisions as to “items of damage” do not and cannot determine whether there is in fact one or two causes of action. In other words, under the provisions of the 1919 amendment a cause of action does not accrue until the “last item” of damage is ascertainable, but that means the “last item” of damage under each separate contract (in the case of divisible contracts, as is the instant one) and the fact that there may be an “item of damage” resulting from the breach of each successive instalment (separate contract) does not determine when the cátese of action accrued as to each complete contract and does not determine whether a particular note or contract was single or divisible.
The basic fallacy of the opinion is that it assumes, contrary to the undisputed fact, .that the note in question constitutes a single indivisible contract. The fact is to the contrary. Admittedly, the contract here is divisible and a separate cause of action arises upon each default in the payment of an instalment. Thus, if one may bring an action on each instalment when it becomes due, then he has a separate cause of action for each instalment and there is only one item of damage involved under each cause of action, and the “last item” proviso is wholly inapplicable. Now, as noted, whether one may bring an action on each instalment depends on whether the contract is single or divisible; it does not depend on whether subsequent instalments are or are not paid. To say that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the last instalment is due is to say, in effect, that the instant contract is a single indivisible contract and that under it only one cause of action ever comes into existence and that to bring an action on that contract prior to the final instalment being due would be splitting the single cause of action. It is to say also that the fact that an item of damage subsequently accrues under a separate and distinct contract, prevents the running of the statute of limitations against a prior separate and distinct contract under which a like item of damages had theretofore accrued.
For the reasons stated, the 1919 amendment is by its terms not applicable to instant facts and, therefore, I would apply the established general rule and hold that recovery of all instalments for which an action was not begun within 10 years of the accrual of the cause of action for each such instalment is barred.