Court Opinion

ID: 9386596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 22:00:47.09486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.562377
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    MAKYA LITTLE,

                Plaintiff,

         v.
                                                         No. 22-cv-1511 (DLF)
    MERRICK B. GARLAND,
    U.S. Attorney General

                Defendant.

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Plaintiff Makya Little brings this employment action against the United States Attorney

General. Before the Court is the Attorney General’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively,

for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. 10. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the

Attorney General’s motion and dismiss parts of the complaint.

I.      BACKGROUND 1

        At all relevant times, Little, an African-American woman, was employed at the Federal

Bureau of Investigation. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 35, Dkt. 1. From 2017 to 2020, she served in a joint duty

assignment at the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. ¶ 34. Her first-line supervisor at the FBI was

Katherine Cole. Id. ¶¶ 36. Starting around May 2019, Little started raising concerns within the

FBI about “unfair practices of promotion discrimination against African Americans.” Id. ¶ 38.

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  In resolving the District’s motion to dismiss, the Court has assumed the truth of the material
factual allegations in the complaint, see Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C.
Cir. 2011), and any documents incorporated by reference to the complaint, see EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
       Around June 2019, A. Tonya Odom, the then-Section Chief of the FBI’s Office of Diversity

and Inclusion, received a copy of Little’s resume, id. ¶¶ 40, 42, and discussed its contents with

Sonya Holt, the CIA’s Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, id. ¶ 46. Odom informed Holt that

Little had misrepresented on her resume that she was a co-founder of the Diversity Agent

Recruitment Program. Id. ¶ 47. In a January 2020 conversation, Odom told Little to stop referring

herself to a co-founder of the program, even though the other co-founder of the program had mailed

Odom a letter of recommendation confirming that Little was a co-founder. Id. ¶¶ 79–83.

       On December 19, 2019, Little was not selected for two positions at the FBI: the Human

Resources Division Assistant Section Chief position and the Counterterrorism Division Unit Chief

position. Id. ¶ 60. According to Little, she was not chosen because Odom had told Cole that Little

made false statements on her resume, and Cole in turn “held her own animus against [Little] for

her engagement in [equal employment opportunity] activity.” Id. ¶¶ 63–65. Similarly, in January

2020, Little was not selected for the National Security Branch Unit Chief position, id. ¶ 95, and,

in April 2021, also was not selected for the Section Chief position in the Office of Diversity and

Inclusion, id. ¶ 108. For the latter position, Odom was a member of the interview panel but did

not recuse herself. Id. ¶ 106.

       At a January 23, 2020, meeting, Little requested “diversity-related data” from the Human

Resources Division in order to “discuss . . . recommendations for how to enhance equity in the

promotion process.” Id. ¶ 87. Her request was denied, and she never received the relevant data or

an explanation for the denial. Id. ¶¶ 88–94.

       Finally, in 2021, Little applied for and received a verbal offer for a job position with Bravo

Consulting Group, LLC. Id. ¶ 52. But Bravo rescinded the offer, allegedly because it had received

negative information about Little from Holt. Id. ¶¶ 54–57.

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       On January 30, 2020, Little filed a complaint in case number 570-2021-00432X (Case 1)

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding her non-selection for

three positions in December 2019 and January 2020, as well as the denial of her request for

diversity data. Id. ¶¶ 8–12. On April 21, 2021, Little filed a second EEOC complaint in case

number FBI-2021-00130 (Case 2) regarding the hiring process for the Office of Diversity and

Inclusion position for which she was not selected in April 2021. Id. ¶ 21–24.

       After she did not receive a final agency decision in either of these EEOC cases, id. ¶¶ 19,

29, Little filed a complaint in this Court against the Attorney General. Dkt. 1. She alleges causes

of action for race-based discrimination, gender-based discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work

environment in violation of Title VII. Id. ¶¶ 110–157. The Attorney General filed a partial motion

to dismiss, or alternatively, for partial summary judgment. Dkt. 10. He asks the Court to dismiss

Little’s hostile work environment and denial of “diversity-related data,” Compl. ¶ 87, claims for

failure to state a claim. See Def.’s Mem. at 1–2, Dkt. 10. He further seeks dismissal of her hostile

work environment and gender discrimination claims arising out of Case 1 for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. See id.

II.    LEGAL STANDARDS

       Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim is

one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard does not amount

to a specific probability requirement, but it does require “more than a sheer possibility that a

                                                   3
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). A complaint need not

contain “detailed factual allegations,” but alleging facts that are “merely consistent with a

defendant's liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (cleaned up).

       Well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to [an] assumption of truth,” id. at 679, and

the court construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471,

476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The assumption of truth does not apply, however, to a

“legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). An

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is not credited; likewise,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

III.   ANALYSIS

       A.      Claims Arising Out of Failure to Provide Data

       To state an unlawful discrimination claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must plausibly allege

that “(i) [she] suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of [her] race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin.” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

The Circuit recently clarified that, to constitute an adverse action sufficient to support a

discrimination claim, an employer’s action need only “affect[] an employee’s ‘terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment.’” Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870, 877 (D.C. Cir.

2022) (en banc) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). For a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege

more—namely, that she suffered a materially adverse action that “well might . . . dissuade[] a

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reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662

F.3d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Chambers, 35 F.4th at 877. The

action need not “affect the terms and conditions of employment,” Baird, 662 F.3d at 1249 (quoting

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006)), but it must “result in tangible

job consequences like a change in pay, position, or promotional opportunities,” Heavans v.

Dodaro, No. 22-cv-836, 2022 WL 17904237, at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2022).

        The Attorney General’s alleged refusal to give Little diversity-related data that she

requested, see Compl. ¶¶ 87–94, does not constitute an adverse action sufficient to support either

a discrimination or a retaliation claim. Even under the “capacious” standard adopted in Chambers,

“not everything that happens at the workplace affects an employee’s terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment.” Chambers, 35 F.4th at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted). As

courts, including the Supreme Court, have “oft-repeated,” “Title VII is not a ‘general civility code’

that makes actionable ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.’” Heavans, 2022 WL 17904237,

at *8 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). Little has alleged no

facts to establish that the Attorney General’s refusal to provide diversity-related data either

affected her terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, see Garza v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-2770,

2023 WL 2239352, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2023) (proposed letter of reprimand not adverse action

because plaintiff did “not state that the [letter] . . . resulted in . . . anything to suggest that the terms

and conditions of her employment were affected at all”); Heavans, 2022 WL 17904237, at *8 (act

that did not affect any aspect of employment cannot be adverse action), or had sufficiently adverse

consequences to support a retaliation claim, see Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1233

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (act not adverse action because it did not “result in significantly different

responsibilities or objectively tangible harm” (cleaned up)). Little has not alleged, for example,

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that having access to the data was a privilege of her employment, or that her inability to view the

data prevented her from completing her job. And she cannot fix the absence of such allegations

in her complaint by adding, in her opposition briefs, an allegation that the denial of data

“prevent[ed] her [from] serv[ing] as a certified and experienced Diversity and Inclusion

Practitioner.” Pl.’s Opp. at 8, 13, Dkt. 12. “It is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended

by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Coleman v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 94

F. Supp. 2d 18, 24 n.8 (D.D.C. 2000) (cleaned up). To be sure, evidence relating to the Attorney

General’s alleged failure to provide Little with the requested data may be relevant to her other

claims, including her rejection from other positions, see, e.g., Pl.’s Opp. at 13. But, at least as

alleged, the act cannot by itself constitute an actionable adverse action. The Court will therefore

dismiss, under Rule 12(b)(6), any alleged race- or gender-based discrimination or retaliation claim

arising out of the Attorney General’s failure to provide Little with data.

       B.      Gender Discrimination Claims Arising Out of Case 1

       A federal employee bringing claims under Title VII must timely exhaust administrative

remedies before filing suit in federal district court. See Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1349

(D.C. Cir. 2012). For such Title VII claims, a “plaintiff’s . . . failure to exhaust her administrative

remedies does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction.” Morris v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., No. 20-cv-

0016, 2021 WL 2188143, at *4 (D.D.C. May 28, 2021); see also Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S.

Ct. 1843, 1846 (2019). The Court will thus evaluate the Attorney General’s exhaustion arguments

under Rule 12(b)(6). Carter v. Carson, 241 F. Supp. 3d 191, 195 (D.D.C. 2017). To do so, the

Court “may consider a plaintiff’s EEO complaint and notice of charge without converting [the]

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because such records are public documents

of which a court may take judicial notice.” Spence v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-2919, 2020 WL 6075727,

                                                  6
at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2020) (cleaned up). In this Circuit, the exhaustion requirement limits the

scope of an employee’s complaint in federal court “to claims that are like or reasonably related to

the allegations of the [EEOC] charge and growing out of such allegations.” Park v. Howard Univ.,

71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (cleaned up).

        As an initial matter, with respect to Little’s gender discrimination claim arising out of the

acts described in her first EEOC complaint in Case 1, Little has conceded the Attorney General’s

exhaustion argument by failing to address it in her opposition. See Pl.’s Opp.; Hopkins v. Women’s

Div., 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (“It is well understood in this Circuit that when a

plaintiff files an opposition . . . and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a

court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”). And even had

she not, the Court would dismiss her claim on exhaustion grounds because her EEOC complaint

in Case 1 contains no reference to any gender-based discrimination. Corado Decl. at FBI 39–42,

Dkt. 11. Little checked only “race” and “reprisal” as alleged bases for discrimination—not gender.

Id. at FBI 73. Because a gender discrimination claim is not like or reasonably related to a race

discrimination or retaliation claim, Little did not properly exhaust any gender discrimination claim

arising out of the acts identified in her first EEOC complaint. See Proctor v. District of Columbia,

74 F. Supp. 3d 436, 455 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Courts in this district have not permitted suits to proceed

. . . where a plaintiff files a suit alleging a new substantive theory of discrimination that was not

addressed in the original EEOC charge . . . .”); Mogenhan v. Shinseki, 630 F. Supp. 2d 56, 60–61

(D.D.C. 2009) (“Discrimination claims based on race and disability are different from

discrimination claims based on gender and retaliation.”); Brown v. District of Columbia, 251 F.

                                                  7
Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D.D.C. 2003) (gender discrimination and retaliation claims not exhausted

where plaintiff only checked boxes for race and disability discrimination). 2

       C.      Hostile Work Environment Claim

       To state a hostile work environment theory in support of either a discrimination or

retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that her employer “subjected [her] to

‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that [was] ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of [her] employment and create[d] an abusive working environment.’” Baloch

v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510

U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). The acts in question must be both (1) of sufficient severity or pervasiveness

and (2) “adequately linked such that they form a coherent environment claim.” Menoken v.

Dhillon, 975 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). As to the former requirement, the conduct

“must be [so] extreme [as] to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of

employment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. In assessing whether a hostile work environment exists,

“courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’”

Richardson v. Petasis, 160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 126 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S at 23).

       Little alleges that Attorney General subjected her to a hostile work environment by not

giving her requested diversity-related data, falsely stating that she made misrepresentations on her

resume, not selecting her for certain positions, and giving a potential employer negative

2
  The Attorney General also seeks dismissal of Little’s hostile work environment claims on
exhaustion grounds. See Def.’s Mem. at 3–5. But the Court need not reach this argument because
Title VII exhaustion is not jurisdictional. As explained, see infra section III.C, the Court will
instead dismiss Little’s hostile work environment claims for failure to state a claim.

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information about her. See Compl. ¶¶ 149–157. As discussed above, Little has not alleged that

the Attorney General’s refusal to provide data affected her conditions of employment. And the

remaining actions are mere “work-related actions by supervisors.” Munro v. LaHood, 839 F. Supp.

2d 354, 366 (D.D.C. 2012). Without more, such actions are “typically” not “sufficient for a hostile

work environment claim” because they are not so severe as to rise to the level of a hostile work

environment. Id.; see also Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing

hostile work environment claim based on employer’s “interference with [the plaintiff’s] work,”

“multiple failures to promote,” denial of leave requests, and “discussions to end [the plaintiff’s]

eligibility for workers’ compensation and to terminate his employment”); Laughlin v. Holder, 923

F. Supp. 2d 204, 216, 219–21 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing hostile work environment claim where

the employer repeatedly failed to promote the plaintiff, interfered with her efforts to hire staff,

“manipulated her performance evaluations, denied her bonuses to which she was entitled,” and

more); Outlaw v. Johnson, 49 F. Supp. 3d 88, 91–92 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing claim where

plaintiff “was denied promotions, hired at a lower initial grade, and given subjective job-

performance reviews”). Nor are the handful of acts identified, which occurred across over two

years, “fairly characterized as pervasive.” Laughlin, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (acts that were

“relatively infrequent” and “span[ned] a period of several years” too isolated to support hostile

work environment claim). Because Little has not alleged actions sufficiently severe or pervasive

to create a hostile work environment, the Court will dismiss Count IV of the complaint for failure

to state a claim.

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                                       CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Attorney General’s partial motion to

dismiss. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.

                                                           ________________________
                                                           DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
                                                           United States District Judge
April 12, 2023

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