Court Opinion

ID: 9453050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:01:03.138763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:54.131184
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          AUG 4 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHERIF A. PHILIPS,                              No. 22-16919

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00014

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
JUDICIARY OF GUAM,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Guam
              Frances Tydingco-Gatewood, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted July 18, 2023**

Before:      SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

      Sherif A. Philips appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims arising out of prior

litigation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a

dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Philips’s action because the action

constitutes a forbidden “de facto appeal” of prior state court and Guam Superior

Court judgments and raises claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those

judgments. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing proper application of the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544

U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments”).

      We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      AFFIRMED.

                                         2                                    22-16919