Court Opinion

ID: 9844965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:12:37.076686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:48.341016
License: Public Domain

Berry, Judge,
dissenting :
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this proceeding wherein reasons are given for the granting of the writ of prohibition prayed for. The writ of prohibition granted by this Court prohibited the Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County from trying a condemnation proceeding instituted by the petitioners in this proceeding after counsel for the petitioners had requested that the case be continued at a previous time when it was to be tried and had agreed that the case be set down for trial on January 30, 1967. About two weeks after a pretrial conference was held and an order entered with regard to the issues to be tried and the case set on the trial calendar for trial, the attorney for the petitioners came into the Circuit Court and moved for a continuance “until after the construction of the public improvements herein involved are (sic) completed.”, which motion was denied by said court. There was no indication that any such motion would be made by counsel for the petitioners when the case was set down for trial, apparently with his approval.
A few days before the condemnation proceeding was to be tried the petition for a writ of prohibition was filed in this Court and a rule was granted, which in effect made it impossible for the case to be tried on the date it was set for trial. The condemnation proceeding was instituted in the Circuit Court of Ka-nawha County November 16, 1965, and all grading had been completed in connection with the highway *544over the defendant’s property and the only thing that remained to he done was the paving of the highway.
It is the petitioners’ contention in this proceeding that the eminent domain proceeding was instituted under the provisions of Code, 54-2-14, as amended, which allows the petitioners to make an entry upon the property sought to be condemned and to take possession of such property for the purpose stated in the eminent domain proceeding and requires that such a * * * proceeding shall proceed to final award or judgment after a reasonable time has elapsed for completion of the work upon the particular property * * # >> which Was entered upon and taken possession of. It also provides that interest at the rate of six per cent shall be paid to the landowner from the date of the actual entry upon the land so taken. The pleading filed in the Circuit Court when this proceeding was instituted in November, 1965, did not specifically state that the proceeding was brought under Section 14. However, in May, 1966, the petitioners specifically referred to the provisions of Code, 54-2-14a, as amended, and proceeded under the provisions of that Section by paying into the Court on September 9, 1966 the amount of $12,500, the estimated value of the property, as required by Section 14a, and also acquired title to the property as required by such Section. Under Section 14a, which petitioners specifically requested, as indicated by an order entered by the Circuit Court dated May 31, 1966, interest of six per cent should be paid on the entire amount awarded including the $12,500 from the date of the original entry, but not on the $12,500 fro'm the date the landowners received said sum, and such amount should be deducted from the final award.
Section 14a clearly indicates by its heading that it is an “alternative method” for condemnation by the state or its political subdivision. It would therefore clearly appear that even if the original condemnation proceeding was instituted under Section 14, on May 31, 1966, it was converted into the alternative method *545provided for in Section 14a and Section 14a does not provide that the proceeding proceed to final award or judgment “after a reasonable time has elapsed for completion of the work.” Instead, Section 14a, the alternative method, provides that “ * * * snch proceeding shall proceed to final award or judgment * * * ”, and the conclusion of the project is not by the statute a reason for delay as urged by petitioners. The only party that could object to such conversion from Section 14 to 14a would he the landowner and it did not elect to do so.
The petitioners cannot blow hot and cold at the same time. In other words, the petitioners cannot rely on Section 14 and hold up the proceedings on the ground that a final award or judgment cannot be rendered until a reasonable time after the completion of the work which is not even the law under the provisions of Section 14 and also rely on 14a. Section 14 merely states that the proceedings shall proceed to final judgment after a reasonable time has elapsed for the completion of the work. Section 14a provides that petitioner can immediately acquire the title to the property in question and be required to pay interest on any excess from the time of entry if he paid something when he entered.
Petitioners admit in their brief that the original entry was done under Section 14, and this Section requires interest to be paid from the time of the original entry on the entire award. Therefore, the method of paying interest is completely different under the two Sections and certainly interest cannot be computed under Section 14a and procedure conducted under Section 14.
There is no question that the Circuit Court of Ka-nawha County has jurisdiction to hear this eminent domain proceeding instituted in that Court. The only justification for the granting of the writ of prohibition to prohibit such Court from hearing this proceeding would be that it had exceeded its legitimate power. The *546burden rests upon the petitioners to prove by a preponderance of evidence that such Court exceeded its power and there is no proof whatsoever to so indicate. The eminent domain proceeding was instituted in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County almost a year and a half ago, and there is no proof that a reasonable time has not elapsed within which the work in question could have been completed after the original entry. It appears that all of the work has been done except the paving of the highway over the land in question and that apparently there is a factual conflict as to whether all work on said land in question has been stopped. The action of the trial court would, in any event, only be classified as abuse of discretion, which error can be reviewed only on appeal. However, it does not appear from the record presented in this case that the Circuit Court has even abused its discretion and in any event it can not be said that the trial court exceeded its legitimate power in any manner and even if the petitioners are relying on Section 14 they have not shown good ground for the granting of the writ of prohibition to prohibit the eminent domain proceeding from going to final judgment in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County on the date it was set for trial. The state of the record of the eminent domain proceeding is that at the request of the petitioners the eminent domain proceeding was pursued specifically under the provisions of the alternative method of condemnation by the state following the provisions of Section 14a. By the issuing of this writ the proceeding under Section 14a, requested by the petitioners, will have to be treated as never having been requested in order that title to the property in question can be restored to the landowners and the payment into court of $12,500 will have to be returned to the petitioners and they must be required to pay six per cent interest on the entire amount of damages from the date of the original entry, all of which indicates an intention on the part of the attorney for petitioners of not acting in good faith with a con-*547stitutioual court of unlimited jurisdiction in this State. The petitioners, through their attorney, specifically requested the proceeding he proceeded with under the provisions of Code 54-2-14a and then asked this Court to prohibit the Circuit Court from proceeding with the trial under the alternative method as requested, after such request had been granted by the court.
For the reasons herein stated, I would refuse to grant the writ of prohibition and would have allowed the Circuit Court of Kanawha County to proceed to final judgment and if there be any error committed in the proceeding it could properly be taken care of on appeal.