Court Opinion

ID: 9540899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:20:35.557688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:32.826978
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE EARNS, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the opinion of the court affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the cause against Mt. Carmel. I dissent from that part of the opinion concluding that a cause of action against Hocking was or could be pleaded by plaintiff under these facts. Courts of this and all jurisdictions have consistently held that an owner or possessor of land has no duty to warn or take precaution against the danger of overhead or nearby electrical transmission lines absent the presence of unusual circumstances (see, e.g., Germain v. Illinois Power Co. (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 977, 451 N.E.2d 903). Under section 343 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a possessor of land has no duty to warn or take precaution against known or obvious dangers unless he should anticipate harm despite the obviousness of the danger. How could Hocking anticipate that plaintiff, an independent contractor and expert in the processing of crude oil stored in tanks, which are necessarily placed adjacent to an electrical power source, would allow a long, metal pole to come in contact with overhead transmission lines? What precautions could it take? Under the reasoning of Genaust v. Illinois Power Co. (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465, which factually closely parallels this cause, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.