Court Opinion

ID: 998422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:11:11.439575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:22.412761
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 97-4620

BRENDA STEVENS,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                               No. 98-4207
STEVEN KENTA NEALY, a/k/a Jimique
Keys,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville.
Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge.
(CR-97-1-V)

Submitted: April 6, 1999

Decided: April 23, 1999

Before ERVIN, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL

Jeffrey S. Lisson, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Samuel B. Win-
throp, WINTHROP & WINTHROP, Statesville, North Carolina, for
Appellants. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Brenda Stevens and Steven Kenta Nealy were convicted by a jury
of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). Stevens was also convicted of possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1994). On appeal, Stevens and Nealy allege that the evidence was
insufficient to support the findings of guilt. Finding no error, we
affirm.

Stevens, Nealy, and two co-defendants were traveling through
North Carolina when they were stopped by a state trooper pursuant
to a routine traffic stop. Because of the suspicious way in which the
occupants of the vehicle acted and the conflicting answers they gave
to simple questions,1 the officer asked for and received permission to
search the vehicle.2 The trooper found a kilogram of cocaine in a hid-
_________________________________________________________________
1 The occupants of the vehicle appeared very nervous and gave false
names. They also gave conflicting stories concerning where they had
come from, where they were going, and who they were going to see. The
defendants could not give addresses or telephone numbers for the people
they were allegedly going to visit or for themselves.
2 Because Stevens claimed that she borrowed the vehicle from a friend,
the trooper asked her for permission to search.

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den compartment in the trunk, and a later search resulted in the dis-
covery of a second kilogram. Large amounts of cash were also found
on two of the passengers. During the ensuing investigation, the driver
of vehicle ("Dudley") maintained that the drugs belonged to him and
that the other defendants, who were all related to him, knew nothing
about them.3

On direct appeal of a criminal conviction, a "verdict of a jury must
be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support it." Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In the present case, we find that the evidence
supports Appellants' convictions. It is well settled that circumstantial
evidence may be used to prove the existence of, and participation in,
a conspiracy, and this evidence may consist of a defendant's "rela-
tionship with other members of the conspiracy, the length of this asso-
ciation, his attitude, conduct, and the nature of the conspiracy."
United States v. Brown, 856 F.2d 710, 711 (4th Cir. 1988).

We find that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that all of the
occupants of the vehicle were aware of the presence of drugs, and
therefore were part of a conspiracy, based on their suspicious actions,
conflicting answers to simple questions, family relationship, and the
amount of cash found on two of them. We further find that Appel-
lants' reliance on Dudley's testimony at their trial is misplaced.4 As
a threshold matter, credibility determinations are solely within the
jury's province and are not subject to appellate review. See United
States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1087 (1997). More importantly, the district
court later found that this testimony was perjurious, and we upheld
this finding on appeal.5
_________________________________________________________________
3 Dudley, Nealy, and the other passenger are cousins; Nealy is Stevens'
son.

4 Dudley's testimony was consistent with his representations to investi-
gators that the drugs belonged to him and that no one else in the car
knew they were there.

5 See United States v. Dudley, No. 98-4166 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1998)
(unpublished).

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Finally, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the
finding that Stevens possessed the cocaine. She informed the trooper
that she borrowed the car from a friend, and she eventually gave her
consent to search the vehicle. In addition, the other occupants told the
trooper that Stevens obtained the vehicle and then picked them up in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. We find that this evidence,
which established control over the vehicle, combined with Stevens'
contradictory statements and suspicious conduct when questioned by
the trooper, was sufficient to support the jury's finding of actual or
constructive possession of the cocaine.

Accordingly, we affirm Stevens' and Nealy's convictions. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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