Court Opinion

ID: 9863684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:52:53.385445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:08.612067
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
The majority concludes that there is some evidence to support the commission’s percentage rating of petitioner’s disability. I am constrained to disagree. Moreover, the effect of the majority holding is to defeat the principle that dictates that there be uniformity in awards for the same injury, which principle forms the basis of the theory upon which the rating schedules are based.
The problem in this case is to compute a disability rating for loss of speech and hearing sustained at age 5 on the basis of a rating schedule designed for determining the permanent disability rating of a painter who sustains loss of speech and hearing at age 40.
No intelligent use of such a schedule is possible until a common denominator is established between the rating schedule and the disability to be rated. It is not enough that the *367disability to be rated and the occupation involved are identical with those appearing in the schedule. The schedule is predicated upon the assumption that the age, injury and claim for compensation are contemporaneous. In this case the claim for compensation, and hence the age, occurs at a time separate from the time of injury. This difference prevents the use of the schedule until the significance of the difference is analyzed to determine whether it compels a deviation from the percentage ascribed to such injury in the rating schedule. This involves an examination of the rating schedule, the factors considered in preparing the schedule and what it is designed to compensate.
The law provides that where an employee with a preexisting known permanent disability receives a subsequent industrial injury which is independent in its effects and does not aggravate the preexisting permanent disability, but which results in additional permanent disability, the subsequent injuries fund is liable for the combined effect of the injuries if they equal a permanent disability rating of 70 per cent or more of total disability (Lab. Code, §4751). Having created the need for determining the percentage of permanent disability to total disability, the law also, by section 4660 of the Labor Code, prescribes how it is to be computed.
Section 4660, subdivision (b) of the Labor Code authorizes the preparation of “a schedule for the determination of the percentage of permanent disabilities in accordance with this section.” The schedule prepared contains lists of particular injuries to which all injuries may be related, and a list of the more frequently found occupations. These two lists are correlated by means of tables. In addition there are a series of rating tables to correlate the relative severity of an injury with the age of the employee at the time of injury. Percentage values are assigned to each injury and through the use of the tables these percentages are adapted to any given injury.
In arriving at the value of the percentages for each listed injury the architects of the schedule take into consideration the nature of the disability as modified by age and occupation with consideration given to ability to compete in an open labor market. (See Lab. Code, § 4660, subd. [a]; vol. 2, Appendix to Journal of the Senate, California Regular Session, 1951, p. 58 of Partial Report of Senate Interim Committee to the Senate on Workmen’s Compensation Benefits [hereinafter 1951 Partial Report].) Of course, the percentage of *368permanent disability resulting from an injury does not depend entirely on the nature of the disability. Moreover, there are other factors than those of age and occupation entering into consideration, such as the make-up of the man, his desire to recover and his inherent adaptability. However, all of these things affect the individual only and are not capable of objective measurement or determination (1951 Partial Report, supra, 103). As a result only those factors described in section 4660, subdivision (a) of the Labor Code are considered in ascertaining the percentage of disability to attribute to a particular injury. The percentage ratings so specified are considered adequate on the average to compensate for the residual physical disability resulting from the injury and to afford a reasonable period of accommodation to the effect of such injury. (1951 Partial Report, supra, 68.)
This system of disability rating is called the “standard measure for determining percentage of disability to total disability.” (1951 Partial Report, supra, 59.) The reason justifying such standardization is that it makes it possible to obtain uniform evaluation for identical disabilities, avoid unnecessary litigation, and reduce the cost thereof and expedite the promptness of evaluation (1951 Partial Report, supra, 69).
It is through the disability rating schedule that the theory behind the compensation of employees for industrial injuries is implemented. This theory is termed the theory of rehabilitation. It assumes that a permanently injured employee either can or cannot regain his earning capacity and if he cannot he must be pensioned for life. If he can, he must be aided financially during the period of rehabilitation. Where rehabilitation to gainful employment is possible the amount of compensation is obviously contingent upon whether the injury will prevent the employee from assuming his former occupation, and thus, require the development of a new occupational skill, or if he can resume his former job, whether there is any loss of past proficiency and expected potential (see 1951 Partial Report, supra, 102). To illustrate, a bookkeeper who has lost his leg can return to his former work completely rehabilitated in a short time, while the structural iron worker who loses his leg is forever barred from following his former occupation. In the latter case, then, the percentage of disability to total disability would be greater than in the former case, since the rehabilitation period would be more extensive. Therefore, in each case the accuracy and proper *369application of the percentages appearing in the disability schedule must be measured according to the general considerations which prompt the rehabilitation percentage value; that is, must the employee develop a new skill, and if not, what is the extent of the loss of past proficiency and expected potential.
If the principle of uniformity of compensation for the same injury is adhered to, it is only differences in the extent of rehabilitation which can justify a deviation from the percentage assigned an injury in the schedule.
With the revelation of the factors which permit the assignment of a different percentage from that appearing in the schedule, it is now possible to compare the percentage value of the schedule based on age forty with the injury herein, and thus arrive at a percentage of disability for an employee now forty, but who lost his speech and hearing at age five. The basis of comparison is the extent of rehabilitation required. The disability is rated first in accordance with the regularly adopted schedule and then adjusted downward or upward, or possibly with no change at all depending upon the differences in rehabilitation (see Springer v. Subsequent Injuries Fund, 21 C.C.C. 335, 342).
The method of accomplishing this comparison is by hearing evidence, and with all the facts consult the disability schedule, computing a rating which will be in accord with the rehabilitation principle of the schedule. This is true regardless of whether the percentage is to be adapted to a case such as the one now before us (see State v. Industrial Acc. Com., 129 Cal.App.2d 302 [276 P.2d 820]) or if the rating is for unscheduled injuries (see 1951 Partial Report, supra, 58-59).
If it is correct that the sole basis of comparison between the disability schedule and the particular injury involved herein is the extent of rehabilitation required, then it must follow that the only relevant evidence on such issue is evidence that tends to show similarity or dissimilarity between the rehabilitation required in each instance.
The only evidence presented on this issue came from two of petitioner’s witnesses, both of whom qualified as experts in the rehabilitation of deaf-mutes for gainful employment. The witnesses agreed that loss of speech and hearing at age 40 would pose no particular difficulty in an employee’s ability to paint. Such a disabled employee could paint as well after the injury as he did before. The main problem would be placement of the worker, and its solution depends on how well *370the employee could communicate to others and understand in some manner another’s directions. It was noted that even assuming placement was possible the injured employee’s problem would remain communication. In other words to rehabilitate a deaf-mute painter implies that he has some means of communication, and the better he can communicate the more complete the rehabilitation.
Without contradiction the experts concurred in the opinion that lip reading was the most desirable type of communication. It constituted the greatest degree of rehabilitation.
Having established that rehabilitation of a deaf-mute means learning to communicate, witness Becker testified unequivocally and without dispute that a person who becomes a deaf-mute at age 5 is not in as good a position for gainful employment and advancement in an occupation as the person who becomes a deaf-mute at age 40, except in individual cases. The reason being that a person who becomes a deaf-mute at an early age never makes the same adjustment as one who becomes a deaf-mute at age 40. A person who could hear before would have a better chance to go on, whereas the person who is a deaf-mute at age 5 is still fighting the language barrier. He cannot express himself in writing or otherwise as well as one who acquires the loss later. The one who acquires the disability at age 40 can build speech and lip reading more quickly because he has a memory of speech and sound. It is fair to state that a man who became a deaf-mute at age 40 would get along better, or at least as well as one who incurred the disability at age 5.
Witness Jonas’ testimony was substantially in accord with Becker. However, he did state that a person who became a deaf-mute at age 40 might have greater disability for a short time while he is making an adjustment to his mental problem, but he would not have greater disability in his vocational problem because he has a greater ability to read and write. Since the rehabilitation here involved pertains to a return to gainful employment the mental aspect is not relevant.
The conclusions to be drawn from this testimony are self-evident. It would appear that Gonzales’ disability rating can be no less than that of a man incurring the injury at 40.
The evidence upon which the majority relies to uphold the panel’s finding is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of a comparison between the rehabilitation problems of a man who incurs loss of speech and hearing at age 40 and a man age 40 who incurred a similar injury at age 5. This evidence reads *371as follows: “. . . petitioner had been a deaf-mute from the age of five years and was unable to read lips; that he. had learned the painting trade when he was 14; that he had been a prize fighter and an aircraft worker during the war; and that in 1944 he joined the painters’ union and had worked steadily from that time until the accident. It further discloses that since his recovery he has worked as steadily as any other member of the painters’ union.” Although it is not entirely clear, the majority apparently utilizes this evidence to demonstrate that Gonzales is rehabilitated to a greater degree in comparison to a man who at 40 becomes a deaf-mute. If I have correctly perceived the use of this evidence then it is patently clear that the use of it by the majority is incorrect. In fact the evidence is not a comparison at all, but merely the biographical facts of Gonzales’ life. By themselves they are no more significant than anyone else’s past employment history.
The essential element to be established is whether Gonzales has been vocationally rehabilitated to a greater degree than an employee who lost his speech and hearing at age 40. The evidence used by the majority is only probative on this point if we accept the premise that because a deaf-mute has had 40 years to adjust to his disability he has accomplished greater rehabilitation than one who at age 40 incurs such a disability. According to the uncontradicted expert testimony in this case the premise is false. Quite unfortunately it was first propounded in State v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra. At the time it was made there was no basis in the record for such a conclusion. Upon remand of the case to the commission it appeared that the premise was to be buried after expert evidence had refuted the truth of it (Springer v. Subsequent Injuries Fund, supra, 338). The expert evidence in that case was substantially the same as the expert testimony herein. Thus, the attempt by the majority to resurrect this premise leads to an untoward and ill-advised result, and it should be scrapped for the same reason it was in Springer v. Subsequent Injuries Fund, supra.
If the evidence upon which the majority relies is to have any relevance at all, it must be to show that Gonzales is an exceptional individual with better powers of adjustment than the average person incurring such disability at age 40. Such proof would then justify a deviation from the disability schedule which is based upon the average individual and be in keeping with the expert testimony which likewise was phrased *372in terms of the average. However, here again the evidence is not susceptible to such an inference. In order to show that Gonzales is exceptional there must be either a comparison with an average person, or a demonstration that his past actions are so remarkable that he may be called exceptional. Since the record is devoid of any evidence of a comparison, this ground cannot form the basis for a finding that Gonzales was exceptional. We do know that Gonzales, in addition to being a painter, was a prize fighter and aircraft worker. But this evidence, without more, does not tell us that he was exceptional. He could have been inept in all fields. In view of the false premise that was unwisely announced in State v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, we should remain circumspect in making any such assumptions from the history of past employment without any elaboration in the record to support it.
Fortunately we need not rely on lack of evidence to prove irrelevance, for there is affirmative, uncontradicted evidence that shows Gonzales is no more than average. This evidence is the fact that Gonzales cannot lip read. It is true that past acts do show some measure of adjustment, at present he can at least hold a position, but the experts all agree that the failure to lip read will always prevent rehabilitation to the degree one may attain if the injury is incurred at age 40.
The error of the majority is that it equates the length of time since the injury with vocational adjustment. One does not necessarily follow from the other. It is not time that promises proficiency, but the dimension of the disability.
Moreover, if the majority opinion is allowed to stand it will undermine the theory supporting a uniform disability schedule. In the Springer case, which the majority concedes is factually indistinguishable from the instant case, an award against the subsequent injuries fund was upheld (21 C.C.C. 335, 337). If this is correct, then what rational basis can there be for not allowing an award here ? If the principle of uniformity in awards for the same injury is to have any efficacy the result in the Springer case should be followed.
For the foregoing reasons I would annul the decision of the commission and remand the proceeding.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied June 25, 1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.