Court Opinion

ID: 9620977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:50:08.312608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:56.638415
License: Public Domain

Marshall, Chief Justice.
Mr. and Mrs. Fritz were struck and killed on the premises of a “Mr. Pride” car wash by an automobile which was owned by a third party and which just had been pulled mechanically through the car-wash tunnel and was being driven to the “drying bay” by a Mr. Pride employee. The Fritzes’ children brought a wrongful-death action against the car wash, which, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the liability insurer of the automobile in question, appellant Metropolitan. The policy contained the following exclusion: “We do not cover . . . (e) bodily injury or property damage arising out of automobile business operations.” The term “automobile business” was elsewhere defined in the policy as: “[T]he business or occupation of selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles or trailers.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of Metropolitan’s motion for summary judgment and the denial of Mr. Pride’s motion for summary judgment, holding in effect that the exclusion was not applicable. Mr. Pride of Atlanta, Inc. v. Metropolitan Property &c. Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 737 (371 SE2d 211) (1988). We granted certiorari.
We reverse for the reasons given in the dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals, i.e., that the term “servicing” in the exclusion provision reasonably can be construed to include the services which were being performed on the insured automobile, namely: cleaning, waxing, vacuuming, and filling with gasoline.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., who dissents.