Court Opinion

ID: 9899388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 17:11:10.064656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:22.949084
License: Public Domain

J-S28009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  RUSSELL A. SCHMIDT                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 358 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 27, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0005668-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED: November 16, 2023

       Russell A. Schmidt appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after

the trial court, after a stipulated bench trial, found him guilty of driving while

impaired by alcohol and driving while operating privileges were suspended.

Schmidt argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence of his

inebriation gained after he was stopped because the basis for the stop was an

erroneous PennDOT record summary. We conclude that regardless of any

errors about the status of Schmidt’s license, the officer had reasonable

suspicion for the stop and therefore affirm.

       The factual and procedural history of this appeal are essentially

undisputed; the only relevant disputes concern whether Schmidt’s driving

privileges were suspended at the time of the stop, and whether the arresting
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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officer’s good faith reliance on the information contained in PennDOT records

was sufficient to justify the stop regardless of the accuracy of that information.

With that in mind, we note that on May 6, 2021, Officer Allan Yonek of the

Harmar Township Police Department observed Schmidt driving a vehicle

southbound on Freeport Road. Officer Yonek entered Schmidt’s license plate

number into his computer, which reported that Schmidt’s operating privileges

had been suspended. The computer report contained a picture of Schmidt that

matched Officer Yonek’s observations of the driver. Relying solely on his belief

that Schmidt’s license had been suspended, Officer Yonek stopped Schmidt.

      Based on his interactions with Schmidt, Officer Yonek charged Schmidt

with driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.16% or higher, driving while

impaired by alcohol to an extent that Schmidt could not safely drive, and

driving while his license was suspended. Schmidt filed a motion to suppress

all evidence gained from the traffic stop, alleging that the computer record

indicating that his license had been suspended was incorrect.

      After a hearing, the trial court denied Schmidt’s motion to suppress, and

the parties immediately agreed to a stipulated non-jury trial. Officer Yonek’s

affidavit of probable cause and a lab report indicating Schmidt’s blood alcohol

content from May 6, 2021, were entered into evidence without objection from

Schmidt. The court found Schmidt guilty on all charges and sentenced him to

90 to 180 days of incarceration on the driving with a blood alcohol content

over 0.16% charge, no further penalty on the charge of driving under the

influence of alcohol such that he could not safely drive, and a $200 fine on the

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driving while his license was suspended charge. Schmidt did not file a post-

sentence motion but did file this timely appeal.

      On appeal, Schmidt raises a single challenge to the trial court’s denial

of his motion to suppress. When this Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a

suppression motion, we are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented

at the suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v. Carey, 249 A.3d 1217,

1223 (Pa. Super. 2021). We look to see whether the suppression court’s

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions

drawn from those facts are correct. See id. While we are bound by the

suppression court’s factual findings if those findings are supported by the

record, we are not bound by the suppression court’s legal conclusions. See

id. To the contrary, it is our duty to determine if the suppression court properly

applied the law to the facts. See id.

      Schmidt contends that his license was not, as a matter of law,

suspended on May 6, 2021, and that therefore, the information contained in

Officer Yonek’s computer was incorrect. He argues that since Officer Yonek

relied on faulty information, Officer Yonek, as a matter of law, could not have

had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop him.

      Initially, Schmidt highlights that the April 28, 2021 entry in Schmidt’s

certified driving record references 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4355. Further, Officer Yonek

testified that this entry reflects the issuance of a warning notice, not a notice

of a suspension. See N.T., Suppression Hearing, 12/2/2021, at 14. Under

section 4355, a person who is sufficiently delinquent on a child support

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obligation can have his driver’s license suspended. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

4355(a)(2). However, prior to suspension, the obligor must be given 30 days’

notice before the license is suspended to allow for an opportunity to pay the

necessary arrearages. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4355(b). We also note that neither

the Commonwealth nor the trial court present argument contrary to Schmidt’s

assertion that his license was not suspended on May 6, 2021.

      Since May 6, 2021, was not 30 days after April 28, 2021, we must

conclude that Schmidt’s license was not suspended when Officer Yonek

stopped him. However, this does not necessarily mean that the trial court

erred in denying Schmidt’s motion to suppress. Rather, we still must

determine whether Officer Yonek’s good-faith reliance on the faulty

information in his computer was sufficient to justify stopping Schmidt.

      Schmidt contends that because Pennsylvania does not recognize a good-

faith exception to the exclusionary rule, Officer Yonek’s reliance on incorrect

information is insufficient to justify the traffic stop. While Schmidt is correct

that Pennsylvania does not recognize a good-faith exception to the

exclusionary rule, we note that the boundaries and implications of this

rejection are not entirely clear. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 164 A.3d

1133 (Pa. 2017) (affirming, due to an equally divided Court, an order

suppressing evidence on the basis that information in a search warrant

application, though believed in good faith by the affiant, was fabricated by an

informant). Pennsylvania’s rejection of the good faith exception is based on

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our   state   constitution’s   heightened    guarantee    of   privacy.   See

Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 897 (Pa. 1991).

      Most importantly however, Schmidt has not provided us with any

authority that applies the rejection of the good faith exclusion in scenarios

requiring only reasonable suspicion as opposed to probable cause. See id.

(rejecting good faith exception for search warrant later found to lack probable

cause); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting

good faith exception for trooper relying on incorrect computer report that

appellant had an active arrest warrant); Commonwealth v. Antoszyk, 985

A.2d 975 (Pa. Super. 2009) (rejecting good faith exception for search warrant

where informant lied to affiant); Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d

748 (Pa. Super. 2015) (rejecting good faith exception where officers wholly

failed to comply with the “knock and announce” rule); Commonwealth v.

Carper, 172 A.3d 613 (Pa. Super. 2017) (rejecting good faith exception where

officer used unconstitutional written explanation of rights); Commonwealth

v. Bergamasco, 197 A.3d 805 (Pa. Super. 2018) (rejecting good faith

exception where officer did not have probable cause to believe a crime had

been committed while outside his home jurisdiction).

      Schmidt also fails to argue that Officer Yonek’s stop required anything

other than reasonable suspicion to justify it. Based on our research, we

conclude that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate burden when an officer

suspects a driver may be operating with a suspended license. See

Commonwealth v. Farnan, 55 A.3d 113, 118 (Pa. Super. 2012).

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      We find this distinction to be critical. Reasonable suspicion is a lower

burden   than   probable   cause:   “a   police   officer   may   in   appropriate

circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes

of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable

cause to make an arrest.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa.

1999) (citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion is “a less stringent standard

than probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest[.]” Farnan,

55 A.3d at 116. Reasonable suspicion does not require an officer to delay his

detention of an individual until he has exhausted every other avenue of

investigation. See id. at 118.

      Most importantly, the lesser burden of proof for reasonable suspicion is

based on the lesser intrusion into the individual’s freedom and privacy:

      An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual
      freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each
      is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the
      initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate
      society’s interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably
      accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom
      of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows.
      The protective search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes
      a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity
      of the person. It does not follow that because an officer may
      lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient
      to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing
      a crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of
      evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).

      Under Terry, investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion are

permitted precisely because they involve a lesser invasion of the detainee’s

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privacy. As such, we cannot automatically apply Pennsylvania’s rejection of

the good faith exception in cases that involve a lesser intrusion into an

appellant’s privacy. Rather, we must assess whether the invasion of privacy

caused by the stop is sufficient to violate the Pennsylvania Constitution.

        Officers are rarely certain about their suspicions. And this is why they

are permitted to investigate further with temporary, limited seizures of the

person to perform their investigation. If any factual mistake in the officer’s

rationale automatically required suppression, Terry style investigative stops

would not exist. Here, since Officer Yonek was only engaged in a temporary

stop to investigate whether Schmidt was driving while his license was

suspended. There is no indication in the record that the Officer Yonek’s

investigation exceeded the normal bounds of a Terry stop or otherwise

constituted the functional equivalent of a full arrest. Therefore, the logic

underlying Pennsylvania’s rejection of the good faith exception does not apply.

        Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Yonek’s honest, good faith reliance

on the information from his computer was sufficient to justify his stop of

Schmidt. The trial court therefore did not err in denying Schmidt’s motion to

suppress.

        Judgment of sentence affirmed.

        President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins the memorandum.

        Judge Olson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

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       11/16/2023

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