Court Opinion

ID: 9727921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:52:59.275363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:44.364412
License: Public Domain

LUI, J.
I dissent.
I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the juvenile court abused its discretion in closing the minors’ fitness hearings to the public and press.

*461
The Juvenile’s Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial Is Superior to the Press and Public’s Statutory Right of Access to a Juvenile Fitness Hearing

I differ with the majority as to the showing that the minor must make to sustain a closure motion. The appellate decisions have always balanced the defendant or juvenile’s right to a fair trial over the press and public’s right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings.
In San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 498 [179 Cal.Rptr. 772, 638 P.2d 655], our Supreme Court had occasion to interpret former Penal Code section 868, which then provided, “The magistrate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude from the examination every person except” court staff, counsel of record, the Attorney General, investigating officer, the defendant, and a friend providing moral support to a prosecuting witness.
The court in San Jose Mercury-News rejected the newspaper’s claim that the statute was unconstitutional, reasoning that the federal and state Constitutions give the press and public a right of access to preliminary hearings that may be foreclosed only when outweighed by a defendant’s interest in a fair trial. Our Supreme Court also rejected the newspaper and amici’s argument based on Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (1979) 443 U.S. 368 [61 L.Ed.2d 608, 99 S.Ct. 2898] and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) 448 U.S. 555 [65 L.Ed.2d 973, 100 S.Ct. 2814], which urged that those cases demonstrate that a majority of the United States Supreme Court justices now recognize a constitutional right of public and press access to pretrial criminal proceedings such as a preliminary hearing. Addressing the newspaper’s contention concerning the purported views of the majority of the United States Supreme Court justices, the court noted: “We extract from this welter of views no consensus that there is a right to attend preliminary hearings. Only five of the Gannett court were willing to recognize access rights even to suppression hearings. Four of those (the Blackmun-Sixth Amendment group) expressly distinguished preliminary hearings. The fifth, Justice Powell, also pointed to the unique public importance of the suppression hearing, implying perhaps that he deemed other pretrial matters properly secret.” (San Jose Mercury-News, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 506.)
In 1982, section 868 of the Penal Code was amended; the language providing the defendant with an absolute right to closure was deleted, and language establishing a right of public access to preliminary hearing was added. The amended section 868 now reads: “The examination shall be open and public. However, upon the request of the defendant and a finding by the magistrate that exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial, the magistrate shall ex-*462elude from the examination [all but certain enumerated officials, defendant and his counsel, and the prosecuting witness and a friend]. ...” (Italics added.)
The 1982 amendments to Penal Code section 868 were considered in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 772 [209 Cal.Rptr. 360, 691 P.2d 1026]. Our Supreme Court was faced with deciding the standard upon which preliminary hearings could be closed and the showing necessary to justify such closure. The petitioner in Press-Enterprise Co. urged that recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court1 require repudiation of the conclusion reached in San Jose Mercury-News, supra, that the First Amendment does not provide the right of access to preliminary hearings.
Our Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co., supra, 37 Cal.3d at page 776, concluded that: “Neither case warrants repudiation of the conclusion in San Jose Mercury-News that the First Amendment does not provide a right of access to preliminary hearings. Both cases were concerned with the right of access to trials rather than preliminary hearings. The problem of potential prejudice to the defendant is substantially different in relation to public trials than it is in relation to public preliminary hearings. In Press Enterprise Company the [United States Supreme] [C]ourt emphasized that prejudice to the defendant remains the primary concern, stating: ‘No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial.’’ (464 U.S. at p. 508 [78 L.Ed.2d at p. 637, 104 S.Ct. at p. 823].)” (Italics added.)
Our Supreme Court then stated: “Because the preliminary hearing takes place at an early stage in the criminal prosecution, it may be difficult or impossible for the defendant to make a showing of the prejudice which will occur from publicity. At an early stage, the community reaction and the media attitude may not be clear, and the defendant may have little knowledge of the prosecution’s strategy and evidence. ‘Finally, certain alternate means of preventing prejudice from adverse pretrial publicity, such as gag orders or restraints on publication, can involve equal and even greater intrusions on speech and press rights. (See, e.g., Nebraska Press Assn. [v. Stuart (1976)] 427 U.S. 539, 556-560 [49 L.Ed.2d 683, 695-698]; Brian W., supra, 20 Cal.3d 618, 624, fn. 7.) Changes of venue or continuances may subject the parties and courts to considerable inconvenience or expense and may even violate the defendant’s right to speedy trial in the vicinage. *463(U.S. Const., Amends. VI, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Brian W., supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 625.)’ (San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 511-513.)

“We reject the view that a magistrate in ruling on a request to close the preliminary examination must find that in fact an open preliminary hearing will result in a denial of fair trial. At the time that the magistrate makes the finding predictions must be made as to the amount and nature of publicity which will result from an open preliminary hearing and as to the impact of the anticipated publicity. . . .

“[W]e conclude that the magistrate shall close the preliminary hearing upon finding a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice which would impinge upon the right to a fair trial. Penal Code section 868 makes clear that the primary right is the right to a fair trial and that the public’s right of access must give way when there is conflict.” (Press-Enterprise Co., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 780-781, italics added.)
“Once a defendant establishes a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice, there is a clear and present danger of prejudice, and the prosecution or media may overcome the defendant’s showing by a preponderance of the evidence to the effect that there is no reasonable likelihood of prejudice. But if the showing in opposition fails to overcome the defendant’s showing that there is a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice, it would be improper for the magistrate to jeopardize the fair trial right by permitting a public preliminary hearing. The primacy of the right to fair trial, viewed in the light of the policy consideration in favor of closure set forth above, requires us to conclude that a defendant who has established a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice after all of the evidence is considered may not be compelled to risk his fair trial right by an open hearing. ” (37 Cal.3d at p. 782.)
Our Supreme Court’s holding in Press-Enterprise Co., supra, is premised on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and the lack of a constitutional right of public or press access to a preliminary hearing. Once the defendant makes the requisite showing of necessity for a closed hearing, the statutory right of access of the public and press under Penal Code section 868 must give way. Under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937], this court is bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in Press-Enterprise Co.
*464It is crucial to note that closure in Press-Enterprise Co. was urged by the defendant and not the People. A different question and analysis would be required if the prosecutor seek closure over a defendant’s objections.2
The standards set forth by our Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co. are applicable to juvenile fitness hearings. The juvenile court may close such proceedings at the request of the minor if the court properly determines that there is a “reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice” to the minor if the fitness hearing is open to the public and press. The juvenile court need not find that an open fitness hearing will result in the denial of a fair trial. The juvenile court should consider the nature and magnitude of media coverage of the juvenile proceedings prior to the fitness hearing, whether the coverage of the case has been excessive or sensational, whether the minor’s name had been released to the public, whether there are alternative measures to closure, and whether the proceedings closed to the public and press will be temporary. If the press is able to rebut the minor’s showing of prejudice, the fitness hearing shall be open; otherwise, the hearing shall be closed pending further order of the court.
Since the juvenile has a constitutional right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution and the press and public have only a statutory right of access under section 676, I would not, as the majority does, place as great a burden on the juveniles to sustain a closure of fitness hearings.
The standard for closure laid out by the majority opinion outlines a theoretical framework but pragmatically impossible standard to gain closure because the majority’s standard is anchored by its ultimate position that a large jury pool in a county such as Los Angeles eliminates any possible showing of prejudice.
In my view, Press-Enterprise Co., supra, 37 Cal.3d 772, and the other cases cited above, stand for the proposition that the primary interest of the trial court must be to protect a juvenile or defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial; the public’s right of access must give way when there is a conflict with this constitutional right. That conflict was presented to the court below and the court acted properly in closing the fitness hearing based on the showing made by the parties.
*465The juvenile court is charged with the responsibility of insuring that a minor has a fair and speedy trial. The Juvenile Court Law mandates the expeditious handling of juvenile petitions and fitness hearings. A fitness hearing must be held within 13 judicial days from the date of the order directing detention of a minor in custody (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1346(a)); and a detention hearing must be conducted within 48 hours of the minors’ arrest (see § 631 and rule 1321). Any delay in the holding of a fitness hearing has an impact on a minor’s right to a speedy trial. Therefore, the lack of a more lengthy notice of the motion to the media was not unreasonable.

A Fitness Hearing Is Conducted at the Equivalent Stage of a Preliminary Hearing in an Adult Criminal Matter

The 18 violent offenses enumerated in section 676 involve matters that would be felonies in the adult court. In my view, a preliminary hearing is conducted at the functionally equivalent stage of a fitness hearing in a juvenile delinquency matter.
The purpose of the preliminary hearing in California is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence presented to a magistrate to support binding the defendant over to trial in the superior court.
The purpose of the fitness hearing is to determine whether the minor is a fit and proper subject for juvenile court jurisdiction or whether the minor should be bound over to the adult court for criminal prosecution. If the minor is determined to be a fit and proper subject for juvenile court adjudication, the next phase will be a trial in the juvenile court.
If the minor is determined not to be fit and proper subject for juvenile court jurisdiction, the district attorney is authorized under section 707.1 to file an accusatory pleading against the minor in the adult criminal court. After arraignment in the municipal or justice court, the matter proceeds to a preliminary hearing and the standards set forth in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d 772, apply regarding closing the preliminary hearing to the public and press.
It would be illogical to rule that a fitness hearing is open under a different standard than a preliminary hearing, the minor found unfit, and then sent to the adult court for a preliminary hearing which is then closed under a different standard than that set forth by our Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co., supra.
During the course of the preliminary hearing, it is common for the defense to make suppression motions seeking to exclude evidence seized by the *466police or statements and confessions made by the defendant. The magistrate must consider the necessity of closing the preliminary hearing in order to prevent prejudicial pretrial publicity from damaging the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Similarly, during the course of a fitness hearing conducted on a petition alleging one of the 18 violent offenses, the minor is entitled to have the prosecution prove a prima facie case that the minor committed the offenses before the presumption of unfitness is applied. (See Edsel P. v. Superior Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 763, 779 [271 Cal.Rptr. 869].) During the prima facie hearing, the minor may object and seek to exclude evidence offered by the prosecution on grounds that it was obtained in violation of the minor’s constitutional rights. (Cf. Edsel P., supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 780, fn. 10.)
In our Supreme Court’s recent decision of Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 806-807 [210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789], the court stated: “ ‘The minor who is subject to the possibility of a transfer order [a finding of unfitness] should not be put to the unfair choice of being considered uncooperative by the juvenile probation officer and juvenile court because of his refusal to discuss his case with the probation officer, or of having his statements to that officer used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings.’ [Citation.] ‘The testimony of the juvenile may be relevant in the application of any of [the section 707(c)] criteria. As to the juvenile’s criminal sophistication, his chances of rehabilitation, his past delinquent history and the success of previous attempts to rehabilitate him, the juvenile may be able to rebut the implications of a bare record by cross-examination of the probation officer and testimony of his own witnesses. Significant evidence may well exist only in the knowledge of the juvenile. As to the circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged, the juvenile may be the only witness who can present any mitigating circumstances for the court to consider. Yet such testimony risks giving the prosecutor the advantage of an admission which could be used against the juvenile at the trial on the issue of guilt. ’ (Sheila O. v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 812, 815 .. . .)”
The holding of Ramona R. that a minor’s testimony at a fitness hearing is inadmissible at a subsequent trial, underscores the need to allow the juvenile court discretion to close a fitness hearing upon the proper showing. If the iftinor desires to fully discuss his involvement in order to demonstrate his amenability to juvenile rehabilitation but is nevertheless found unfit in an open and public hearing, extensive media coverage may well impinge on the minor’s ability to obtain a fair jury trial in the adult court.

*467
The Record Supports a Finding of Reasonable Likelihood of Prejudice Which Petitioner Failed to Rebut

The only position submitted by the petitioner at the hearing was that Welfare and Institutions Code section 6763 now gives the public and press a broad right to attend juvenile proceedings involving the 18 violent offenses, and that the minors bore the burden of showing that it could not obtain 12 impartial jurors in Los Angeles County.
The majority concedes that neither the petitioner nor the representatives from the Los Angeles Times (Times) or Herald Examiner (Herald) requested a continuance or objected to the brevity or adequacy of the notice of the closure motion. Despite the lack of any objection or conclusion, the majority concludes that the petitioner did not waive the lack of notice or the adequacy thereof. The majority’s position is contrary to clear appellate precedent which holds that a waiver of the adequacy of any notice of a pending motion occurs when a party appears and fails to object to a proceeding conducted pursuant to the motion. (See Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 561 [194 Cal.Rptr. 773, 669 P.2d 9].)
Additionally, the majority somehow finds that the Times and Herald representatives did not waive the absence of their legal counsel at this hearing. They are not even parties to this petition. In addition, the record is clear and reflects that neither the reporters from the Times or Herald objected to, or sought a continuance to obtain counsel, or even expressed a desire to have counsel present at this hearing.
It is also noteworthy that the respondent court was presented with the minors’ motions to close the proceedings to the public and press during the detention hearings conducted on June 4 and 10, 1985. The juvenile court rejected these motions on these two dates. The media representatives should not have been surprised by the minors’ renewed attempt to gain closure on June 24, 1985.
Based upon the lack of any objection by the petitioner or Times’ and Herald’s representatives, the position that the press was not provided a fair opportunity to participate in the hearing is untenable.
The majority emphasizes that the record below lacks any showing of the circulation of the newspapers in question. It cannot be seriously denied that the Times, Herald and Daily News represent three of the largest newspapers *468of general circulation in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. One must look only to the front page of the Times to determine its daily and Sunday circulation statistics.
What the majority fails to recognize is that the minors asserted that the press coverage had been overwhelming and extensive. The minors presented a number of newspaper articles from each of the three newspapers in question. None of the media representatives present, except Mr. Marhialefsky, challenged the position of the minors that the media coverage was extensive. The record demonstrates that Mr. Marmalefsky was obviously incorrect in stating that there was no publicity of the case in the Times. It is not significant that the minors failed to present circulation statistics to the court once they presented the court with the articles from each of the three widely circulated newspapers.
At the June 24, 1985, hearing, the minors presented numerous newspaper articles which appeared in the Daily News and the Herald which are both widely circulated outside the San Fernando Valley and in the remaining parts of the greater metropolitan Los Angeles area. The minors also presented clippings from the Times which appeared both in the valley edition and the metro edition section of the Times. (See exhibits C and D to the petition filed by minor Michael M.)
The majority completely ignores the inescapable conclusion that the metro edition is widely disseminated in the metropolitan Los Angeles area outside of the San Fernando Valley—a matter which could have been easily refuted by the Times’ representatives who stood mute during the course of the hearing in question. There is simply no basis in the record for the majority’s conclusion that the publicity was apparently limited to the San Fernando Valley.
Michael’s counsel contended that the newspaper articles were prejudicial to Michael’s interest, were erroneous, and contained irrelevant and inadmissible matters; he called the court’s attention to certain newspaper reports. The court noted particularly the June 23, 1985, article from the Daily News which began on the front page of part I, and reported an interview the investigating oificer, Detective Pikor, had with one of the minors as follows: “Pikor said that in an interview ‘the little one’ talked about the excitement involved in the holdups, about ‘how it was funny to see the expressions on people’s faces when you point a gun at them.’”4
*469The petitioner failed to make any attempt to rebut the showing of potential prejudice made by the minors. In particular, the petitioner failed to rebut or even address the potential prejudicial impact of the articles reporting the minor’s admission of involvement to an investigating officer.
The fact that there is a large jury pool in Los Angeles County is not a “catch-all” solution to counter prejudicial pretrial publicity. As the trial court noted, the public should not be required to pay for the costs of the media’s lack of discretion in reporting on potentially inadmissible evidence which could therefore require a more protracted and complex jury selection during trial. Any delay would infringe on the accused minors’ right to a speedy trial and would have, in all probability, increased the parents’ financial burden of defending the charges at trial.
Any closure would be temporary at best. If the minor Michael is found fit, the trial in the juvenile court would proceed almost immediately and be open to the press and public in the same manner as an adult criminal trial.5
If the minor Michael is found unfit, further criminal proceedings would be open, subject to the closure of the preliminary hearing by the magistrate upon a showing of necessity—such necessity may well have dissipated after the holding of the fitness hearing. Thereafter, the remaining proceedings in the adult court would be open.
Further, section 827, subdivision (b)(1)6 retains the right of confidentiality in juvenile court records, including the juvenile proceedings in which the minor is charged with a violent offense. (See §§ 676 and 707, subd. (d).) Such records would include documents and reports filed by a probation officer and psychiatric or psychological reports ordered by the juvenile court. The language in section 827, subdivision (b)(1), adds support to the proposition that the Legislature was cognizant of the need to control the *470public dissemination of information contained in juvenile delinquency records when it amended section 676 because section 827 limits dissemination of such records even as to cases involving a violent offense.7
I do not quarrel with the clear legislative mandate that juvenile hearings involving the 18 enumerated violent offenses are now open under section 676. However, the fact that these juvenile hearings are now open does not mean that they should not be closed upon a proper showing to protect the juvenile’s constitutional right to a fair trial.
The finding made by the respondent court was not couched in the exact language stated in Press-Enterprise Co., supra. Nevertheless, given the facts and circumstances of this case, the finding is the substantial equivalent to that required by Press-Enterprise Co.
The respondent court considered the extent and nature of the considerable publicity in the media concerning these juvenile cases. These articles, unlike those in Brian W., supra, 20 Cal.3d 618, are of the type that seeks to appeal to the public’s thirst for sensationalism. Some of the articles deal extensively with one of the minors’ parent’s criminal record, the minors’ mental and psychological condition before and after the alleged offenses, and characterized the minors as part of or members of juvenile gangs known as “rat packs.” The articles also made extensive use of the minors’ surnames.8
There had been no opportunity, prior to the fitness hearing, for either minor to challenge and rebut the statutory presumption of unfitness that applies because each was a minor over 16 years of age and charged with armed robbery. (See § 707, subd. (b); and Edsel P. v. Superior Court, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 763, 776-777.) The minors may have at, or prior to the fitness hearing, been successful in suppressing evidence seized by or statements made to police officers, including admissions or confessions to such offenses.
The Daily News article of June 23, 1985, was critically prejudicial since it reported one of the minor’s admissions to a police officer. As the majority opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U.S. 368, 378-379 [61 *471L.Ed.2d 608, 620-621, 99 S.Ct. 2898], states: “This court has long recognized that adverse publicity can endanger the ability of a defendant to receive a fair trial.' [Citations.] To safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. [Citation.] And because of the Constitution ’s pervasive concern for these due process rights, a trial judge may surely take protective measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably necessary.
“Publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings such as the one involved in the present case poses special risks of unfairness. The whole purpose of such hearings is to screen out unreliable or illegally obtained evidence and insure that this evidence does not become known to the jury. [Citations.] Publicity concerning the proceedings at a pretrial hearing, however, could influence public opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly inadmissible at the actual trial.
“The danger of publicity concerning pretrial suppression hearings is particularly acute, because it may be difficult to measure with any degree of certainty the effects of such publicity on the fairness of the trial. After the commencement of the trial itself, inadmissible prejudicial information about a defendant can be kept from a jury by a variety of means. [Fn. omitted.] When such information is publicized during a pretrial proceeding, however, it may never be altogether kept from potential jurors. Closure of pretrial proceedings is often one of the most effective methods that a trial judge can employ to attempt to insure that the fairness of a trial will not be jeopardized by the dissemination of such information throughout the community before the trial itself has even begun. [Citation.]” (Gannett Co., supra, at pp. 378-379; italics added.)
The newspaper report of the minor’s admission and the extensive media coverage occurred at a time prior to any judicial determination as to whether the admission was even admissible at trial.

The Majority’s Reliance on Brian W. Is Misplaced

The decision in Brian W., supra, holding that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting the press under former section 676 is premised on the lack of excessive or sensational reporting on that case and the presence of a large jury pool in Los Angeles County.
Brian contended that if he was certified to adult criminal court after his fitness hearing, press attendance at the fitness hearing will yield prejudicial publicity and jeopardize his right to a fair trial. The court stated: “In re*472jecting this argument, the court below found that petitioner failed to establish a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that he will be unable to obtain a fair trial. This finding has ample support. [Fn. omitted.] After reviewing copies of the newspaper articles which deal with petitioner—without naming him— and the crime with which he is charged, we conclude that media coverage in this case has been neither excessive nor sensational; rather, the media appear to have reported responsibly about a matter of legitimate public interest. [Fn. omitted.] Nothing in the record suggests that coverage of the fitness hearing, ordinarily an undramatic event, will be any less responsible.” (Brian W. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 624-625.)
Our Supreme Court in Brian W. took note of the fact that the proceedings would be held in Los Angeles County which had a population of more than 7 million people and that appropriate safeguards could be imposed to make it highly probable that an impartial jury could be impanelled. The court then stated: “We conclude . . . that when past media coverage relating to a case has been neither excessive nor sensational and the jury pool in the jurisdiction is large, a court does not err in refusing to bar press representatives from a juvenile fitness hearing. Adequate safeguards are available [such as postponement of trial, change of venue, searching voir dire, clear and emphatic jury instructions and strict control over the jury], should they be necessary, to protect the defendant’s rights if he is certified to adult court.” (Id., at p. 626; italics added.)
The court’s ruling in Brian W. is premised on a determination that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the press given the magnitude and nature of the press coverage of that case and the availability of safeguards to insure a fair trial for Brian. (Id., at p. 623.)
Section 676 was amended subsequent to the decision in Brian W. The section as amended retains the language dealing with the juvenile court judge or referee’s discretionary power to admit persons to juvenile hearings involving lesser offenses who “may . . . have a direct and legitimate interest in the particular case or the work of the court.” (Italics added.) The Legislature, however, added provisions allowing public access “on the same basis as they may be admitted to trials in a court of criminal jurisdiction, to hearings” involving petitions that allege a minor violated any one of the eighteen violent offenses.
In ruling on the petition presented, an interpretation of the meaning of the added language to section 676 is required. The majority is correct in applying the Press-Enterprise Co., supra, standard and holding that a fitness *473hearing should be open unless a minor can establish a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice to the right to receive a fair and impartial trial.
I would deny the petition and discharge the alternative writ.
A petition for a rehearing was denied October 9, 1985, and the petitions of Tribune Newspapers West, Inc., and Mark B. for review by the Supreme Court were denied January 16, 1986. Bird, C. J., Mosk, J., and Lucas, J., were of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.

Petitioner relied on Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 457 U.S. 596 [73 L.Ed.2d 248, 102 S.Ct. 2613] and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 464 U.S. 501 [78 L.Ed.2d 629, 104 S.Ct. 819], where the court held that an order closing voir dire proceedings was invalid on grounds that the trial judge had failed to consider alternative measures.

Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, 443 U.S. 368, 411 [61 L.Ed.2d 608, 641, 99 S.Ct. 2898], states that the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on “whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits the States from excluding, at the request of a defendant, members of the public from such a [pretrial suppression] hearing.” I have found no subsequent United States Supreme Court decision which has ruled on the question.

Hereinafter, all statutory references shall be to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

The minors had urged the court to cite the officer for contempt for failing to comply with a previously imposed “gag” order.

The United States Supreme Court has refrained from defining the circumstances in which all or a part of a criminal trial may be closed to the public. (See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, 448 U.S. 555, 581, fn. 18 [65 L.Ed.2d 973, 992, 100 S.Ct. 2814].) There is no absolute right to an open trial; the closure of such proceedings “ ‘must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness. [Fn. omitted.]’ ” (See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984) 464 U.S. 501, 509 [78 L.Ed.2d 629, 638, 104 S.Ct. 819].)

Section 827, subdivision (b)(1), provides: “While the Legislature reaffirms its belief that juvenile court records, in general, should be confidential, it is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this subdivision to provide for a limited exception to juvenile court record confidentiality in cases involving serious acts of violence. Further, it is the intent of the Legislature that even in these selected cases dissemination of juvenile court records be as limited as possible consistent with the need to work with a student in an appropriate fashion, and the need to protect potentially vulnerable school staff and other students over whom school staff exercise direct supervision and responsibility.” (Italics added.)

An attempt was made to amend section 827, subdivision (b)(1), at the time section 676 was amended to add the language regarding opening juvenile records involving one of the violent offenses, in the same manner such records were opened in adult proceedings. This attempt, however, was defeated. (Compare Assem. Bill No. 1374 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as originally introduced on Mar. 27, 1979, with the bill as amended in the Assem. on Jan. 8, 1980.)

There probably was no opportunity for either minor to prevent release of the minors’ surnames based on a showing of good cause. (See § 676, subd. (c).)