Court Opinion

ID: 9897403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:08.032718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.458887
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                           May 11 2023, 8:36 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                             ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Casey Farrington                                                   Theodore E. Rokita
Marion County Public Defender Agency                               Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana                                              Alexandria Sons
                                                                   Deputy Attorney General
                                                                   Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Freida Starks,                                            May 11, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-2190
        v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Charnette Garner,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          The Honorable Ronnie Huerta,
                                                          Magistrate
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D35-2002-F6-6747

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                            Judges Riley and Kenworthy concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023                                    Page 1 of 11
      Case Summary                     1

[1]   On the evening of February 7, 2020, Freida Starks and her cousin visited a

      Little Caesar’s restaurant in Indianapolis. Starks’s ex-boyfriend, Daryl

      Coleman, and his new partner, Gina Watford, were at the same Little Caesar’s

      at the same time. As Starks and Watford approached the restaurant, Starks

      attacked Watford. After Coleman and Starks’s cousin had separated the two,

      Starks entered the restaurant. Starks returned minutes later carrying a handgun,

      which she pointed in Watford’s direction and fired, missing Watford but

      striking her car. The State charged Starks with Level 6 felony criminal

      recklessness (“Count I”), Level 6 felony pointing a firearm (“Count II”), and

      Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief, which the State later dropped. After a

      trial, a jury convicted Starks as charged, and the trial court sentenced her to 730

      days of incarceration, with 640 days suspended to probation on each count.

      Starks argues that her convictions for pointing a firearm and criminal

      recklessness violate Indiana’s double jeopardy prohibition. We affirm in part,

      reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

      Facts and Procedural History

      1
        We held oral argument in this case on April 11, 2023, at Wabash College. We commend counsel for the
      quality of their presentations and extend our gratitude to the students, administration, faculty, and staff of
      Wabash College for their assistance and hospitality.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023                                    Page 2 of 11
[2]   On the night of February 7, 2020, Starks and her cousin visited a Little Caesar’s

      restaurant in Indianapolis. As it happened, Coleman and Watford were visiting

      the same restaurant at the same time. Starks and Watford had “a very bad

      relationship” that included a history of fighting. Tr. Vol. II p. 216. Starks and

      Watford approached the restaurant at the same time and “bumped heads right

      there at the intersection of the door going into Little Caesar’s.” Tr. Vol. II p.

      209. At that point, Starks “attacked” Watford and the two “fell back on top of

      [Watford’s] car.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 209–10. Once Coleman and Starks’s cousin

      had separated the two women and stopped the fight, Starks entered the

      restaurant. Watford stayed outside to “get [her]self together.” Tr. Vol. II p.

      210.

[3]   A few minutes later, Starks emerged from the restaurant carrying a handgun.

      Starks and Watford continued “having cross words back and forth” and “before

      [Watford] knew it,” Starks had raised her handgun and fired. Tr. Vol. II p. 212.

      Coleman had been standing between Starks and Watford and trying to get

      Watford into the car when Starks fired her handgun. Starks’s bullet missed

      Watford and struck her car. Coleman and Watford drove off and called the

      police.

[4]   The State charged Starks with Count I, Count II, and Class A misdemeanor

      criminal mischief. The State subsequently dismissed the misdemeanor charge.

      After a trial, a jury convicted Starks of Counts I and II. The trial court

      sentenced Starks to 730 days of incarceration, with 640 days suspended to

      probation, on each count to be served concurrently.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023             Page 3 of 11
      Discussion and Decision
[5]   Starks argues that her conviction for pointing a firearm should be vacated

      because pointing a firearm, as charged here, is a lesser-included offense of

      criminal recklessness and that both convictions stem from the same act. For its

      part, the State argues that neither conviction is factually included in the other

      and that each conviction stems from a separate and distinct act.

[6]   Whether two convictions constitute double jeopardy is a question of law that

      we review de novo. Carranza v. State, 184 N.E.3d 712, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)

      (citing Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind. 2020)). Where a single act

      violates multiple statutes, we use a three-step analysis to determine whether the

      convictions constitute substantive double jeopardy. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247.

      First, we must review the statutes to assess whether “the language of either

      statute clearly permits multiple punishment, either expressly or by unmistakable

      implication[.]” Id. at 248. Second, if the statutes are unclear or silent on that

      point, then we must determine whether one offense is included in the other,

      either inherently or as charged. Id. Third, if an offense is included, then we

      must consider the underlying facts to determine whether the defendant’s actions

      were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and

      continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. at 249. Both

      parties acknowledge that the statutes at issue do not contemplate multiple

      punishments, so our inquiry starts with step two.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023          Page 4 of 11
      A.      Included Offenses
[7]   Starks contends that, as charged, her conviction for pointing a firearm is a

      lesser-included offense of criminal recklessness. An offense is included when it

              (1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less
              than all the material elements required to establish the
              commission of the offense charged;

              (2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an
              offense otherwise included therein; or

              (3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
              serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or
              public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to
              establish its commission.

      Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168. Starks claims that “[f]actual inclusion is obvious”

      by comparing the charging information:

              COUNT I

              On or about February 7, 2020, FREIDA A STARKS did
              recklessly with a deadly weapon, to Wit: a handgun or gun,
              perform an act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to
              Gina Watford and/or Daryl Coleman, that is: by firing a gun at
              or in the direction of where Gina Watford and/or Daryl
              Coleman were standing;

              COUNT II

              On or about February 7, 2020, FREIDA A STARKS did
              knowingly point a firearm, to-wit: a handgun or gun, at Gina
              Watford[.]

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023               Page 5 of 11
      Appellant’s Br. p. 11; Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 41. Starks points out that the

      State alleges that she (1) committed criminal recklessness by “firing a gun at or

      in the direction of” Watford “and/or” Coleman, and (2) committed pointing a

      firearm by “point[ing] a firearm […] at Gina Watford[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol.

      II p. 41. To fire a gun in someone’s direction, Starks argues, necessarily means

      that the shooter must point the gun at that person; therefore, Count II is

      factually included in Count I. For its part, the State argues that neither offense

      is factually included in the other based on the mens rea element and that the

      physical acts of pointing and shooting a firearm are different.

[8]   In Thurman v. State, 158 N.E.3d 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), we found pointing a

      firearm and criminal recklessness to be included offenses of attempted murder.

      In that case, Thurman appealed his convictions for pointing a firearm and

      criminal recklessness after he had pointed his gun at two different persons and

      fired at both, arguing that under the facts of his case, pointing a firearm and

      criminal recklessness were included offenses of attempted murder. Id. at 373–

      74. We acknowledged that “criminal recklessness may constitute an included

      offense of pointing a firearm[.]” Id. at 377. Thus, we turned to the facts

      underlying Thurman’s offenses and noted that the charging informations did

      not indicate that the facts of the crimes were different and that the prosecutor

      failed to delineate which acts related to which count. Id. at 378. During

      closing, the prosecutor stated simply that Thurman “pulls that gun […] points

      that gun at him, and pulls the trigger.” Id. As a result, we vacated Thurman’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023          Page 6 of 11
       convictions for pointing a firearm and criminal recklessness, concluding that

       those charges were included in his attempted murder charges. Id. at 380.

[9]    Likewise, in Bracksieck v. State, 691 N.E.2d 1273, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), we

       concluded that, under certain circumstances, pointing a firearm and criminal

       recklessness “are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes and the

       defendant cannot be convicted of both without violating both the state and

       federal prohibitions against double jeopardy.” In that case, the State charged

       Bracksieck with Class D felony pointing a firearm and Class D felony criminal

       recklessness after he had pointed a gun at a victim’s head and pulled the trigger,

       although the weapon had failed to discharge. Id. at 1274. We reasoned that

       there “is no situation in which pointing a loaded firearm at another person does

       not also create a substantial risk of bodily injury to that person.” Id. at 1275.

       We concluded that “when a firearm is involved, the elements of both statutes

       consist of (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) pointing a firearm at another

       person.” Id. Thus, under those circumstances, “pointing a firearm, as a class D

       felony, and criminal recklessness, as a class D felony, are the same offense for

       double jeopardy purposes[.]” Id.

[10]   In further support of her argument, Starks draws our attention to Harris v. State,

       186 N.E.3d 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). In that case, Harris was convicted of

       Level 5 felony intimidation with a deadly weapon and Level 6 felony pointing a

       firearm. Id. at 607. We determined that the two offenses were factually

       included because “the evidence presented at trial to support the offense of

       intimidation with a deadly weapon was the same as the evidence to support

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023           Page 7 of 11
       pointing a firearm.” Id. at 611. In other words, “Harris’s act of pointing the

       firearm at [the victim] was the factual basis for meeting the drawing or using a

       deadly weapon element and convicting Harris of intimidation with a deadly

       weapon.” Id. at 612.

[11]   Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, we agree with Starks that

       Counts I and II are factually included as charged. As Starks notes, “the State

       did not prove the two charges by different facts.” Appellant’s Br. p. 11.

       Notably, a “prosecutor cannot secure two convictions for the same act using the

       exact same evidence[.]” Phillips v. State, 174 N.E.3d 635, 647 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2021). The State relied on the testimony of two different witnesses telling a

       single story: Starks “raised, pointed, and fired her gun.” Tr. Vol. III p. 47.

       During the State’s opening statement, it claimed that Starks “pointed a firearm

       in the general direction of, uh, [Watford] while [Coleman] was somewhere in

       the middle between the two, and she fired.” Tr. Vol. II p. 190. The State

       further explained that Starks had exited the restaurant with her handgun,

       “point[ed] it at [Watford] with [Coleman] right in between[,]” and “pull[ed] the

       trigger.” Tr. Vol. II p. 191. Similar to the prosecutor in Bracksieck, the

       prosecutor in this case failed to distinguish Counts I and II when she argued in

       closing arguments that “the Defendant doesn’t even deny that she raised,

       pointed, and fired her gun.” Tr. Vol. III p. 47.

[12]   Moreover, looking specifically at the charging information, we have little

       hesitation in concluding that the two offenses are factually included. For

       example, Count I alleges that Starks “perform[ed] an act that created a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023             Page 8 of 11
       substantial risk of bodily injury to Gina Watford and/or Daryl Coleman, that

       is: by firing a gun at or in the direction of where Gina Watford and/or Daryl

       Coleman were standing[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 41. Count II alleges

       that Starks “did knowingly point a firearm, to-wit: a handgun or gun, at Gina

       Watford[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 41. As we concluded in Bracksieck,

       there “is no situation in which pointing a loaded firearm at another person does

       not also create a substantial risk of bodily injury to that person.” Bracksieck, 691

       N.E.2d at 1275. As charged here, the State’s proof of Count I established all

       the material elements of Count II, thus making Count II factually included

       because Count I only required the additional element of Starks firing her

       handgun in Watson’s and Coleman’s direction. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168(1).

       Beyond requiring proof of the additional element of firing the handgun, Counts

       I and II essentially only differ in that “a lesser kind of culpability[,]” i.e.

       recklessness, is required to prove Count I. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168(3).

       Concluding that offenses qualify as included offenses, we now proceed to the

       final step of the Wadle analysis.

       B.      Single Transaction
[13]   In step three, we ask whether the defendant’s actions were “so compressed in

       terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to

       constitute a single transaction.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249. “If the facts show

       two separate and distinct crimes, there’s no violation of substantive double

       jeopardy, even if one offense is, by definition, ‘included’ in the other.” Id. The

       State argues that each conviction stems from a separate act. Specifically, the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023              Page 9 of 11
       State asserts that each conviction relates to a separate act, i.e., discharging a

       firearm for one and pointing a firearm for the other, and, as such, does not

       violate Indiana’s prohibition on double jeopardy. We disagree.

[14]   Instead, we agree with Starks that the facts presented at trial establish a single

       crime. Again, Thurman is instructive. In that case, Thurman pointed his gun

       and fired in quick succession. The prosecutor stated that

               the gun immediately comes out and immediately pointed right at
               his face. And […] he didn’t pull it out and point the gun and say,
               “Get out of there, I’m taking your SUV.” He fired…. He runs to
               the front of the vehicle while [the victim is] trying to slide down
               as low as he can so he’s not a dead man, and he fires again.

       Id. at 379. Based upon the prosecutor’s description and the record, we

       concluded that “Thurman’s actions […] were so compressed in terms of time,

       place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action that they constitute one

       continuous transaction.” Id.

[15]   Likewise, Starks’s actions of pointing and shooting the firearm “were so

       continuous as to constitute a single transaction[,]” not two separate and distinct

       acts. Appellant’s Br. p. 13. Watford testified that Starks had “raised a gun and

       pointed at me and shot it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 213. In fact, the action occurred so

       quickly that “before [Watford] knew it, [Starks] raised a gun at me and shot at

       me.” Tr. Vol. II p. 212. Like the episode in Thurman, we conclude that

       Starks’s conduct was “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023           Page 10 of 11
       purpose, and continuity of action that they constitute one continuous

       transaction.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 255.

[16]   As a result, we conclude that Starks’s convictions for Counts I and II violate

       Indiana’s prohibition on double jeopardy. When a double jeopardy violation

       occurs, the conviction carrying the lesser punishment should be vacated. Jones

       v. State, 159 N.E.3d 55, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Where the

       convictions carry the same sentence, as they do here, we vacate the included

       offense. Snyder v. State, 176 N.E.3d 995, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Spry v.

       State, 720 N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied). Thus, Starks’s

       conviction for pointing a firearm should be vacated and her conviction for

       criminal recklessness should remain.

[17]   The judgment of the trial court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

       with instructions.

       Riley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2190 | May 11, 2023        Page 11 of 11