Court Opinion

ID: 9607508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:59:19.560654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:39.161755
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
concurring specially.
I write specially because I cannot concur with ad that is stated in Division 2 of the majority opinion. The majority opines that there is “nothing inherent in the attorney-client relationship” to suggest that a spouse will “naturally utter a truthful statement in consulting an attorney about a divorce” and then assumes that clients “often” make “self-serving” statements to an attorney about marital relationships. I disagree with the majority’s cynical assumption and strongly reject the majority’s intimation that victims’ statements to attorneys about domestic violence should be treated as inherently untrustworthy unless a contrary conclusion is demonstrated by other evidence unrelated to the making of the statement.
The statements testified to by Cox were made by Panned in the context of their attorney-client relationship. In considering the trustworthiness of such statements under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule, it has been recognized that
[statements made in the confines of the attorney-client relationship have a particular degree of reliability and trustworthiness. The client is presumed to be looking after her own interest by giving full and truthful information to her attorney.
In re Sean H., 586 A2d 1171, 1175 (Conn. App. 1991). The Nebraska Supreme Court has analyzed the issue in greater depth. That court held that
the statements of the decedent to the attorney were made in the course of a professional consultation for purposes of legal advice and possible litigation. Under such circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that an accurate statement of facts would normally be given.. . . There was no apparent reason to falsify any statement and ample reasons for accuracy and *433truthfulness. The attorney who testified as to the statements made by the decedent was acting in the course of professional employment, was unacquainted with the declarant previously, was a disinterested witness, and can be assumed to have reliably reported the statements made. The evidence of all the surrounding circumstances tends to corroborate the veracity of the declarant’s statements and to indicate the absence of incentives to speak falsely.
Decided January 21, 1997.
Joseph S. Rhymer, for appellant.
Alan A. Cook, District Attorney, Jeffrey L. Foster, Anne M. Templeton, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, H. Maddox Kilgore, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
State v. Beam, 292 NW2d 302, 306 (Neb. 1980). The majority can cite no persuasive authority to the contrary as a review of Mutyambizi v. State, 363 A2d 511 (Md. App. 1976), the sole case cited by the majority that is consistent with its position, reveals only a bare conclusion with no analysis of the issue.
Accordingly, I reject the majority’s position that there is “nothing inherent” in the attorney-client relationship that would support an assumption of trustworthiness. Instead, consistent with the courts in Nebraska and Connecticut, I would assume that a client’s statements made in the course of the attorney-client relationship are trustworthy given the presence of ample reasons for her to be accurate and truthful, in the absence of any evidence to establish a reason for a declarant to falsify her statements. Such a conclusion would not involve adoption of any “bright line” rule inasmuch as a determination of the trustworthiness of a decedent’s statements to her attorney will necessarily depend upon an examination of the facts surrounding those statements presented in every case.
Based on my review of the facts in the case under the standard set forth above, I concur in the majority’s holding in Division 2 that Pannell’s statements to her attorney were admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule. I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 3.