Court Opinion

ID: 9668461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:15:49.123019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:45.585669
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, dissenting. Although I generally agree with the dissent by Justice Hickman, I want to add a few words of my own. It is true, as the majority states, that the Supremacy Clause, Art. 6, Cl. 2 of the Constitution of the United States declares that the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land. I agree with this statement. I do not believe the Depository Institutions Deregulation & Monetary Control Act of 1980 was enacted pursuant to the United States Constitution. Congress may do only those things which the United States Constitution authorizes it to do. I cannot find any authority in the Constitution or the amendments thereto which I interpret to authorize the Congress to regulate interest rates between contracting parties in the various states. Any such authority must be read into some part of the Constitution. The majority seem to base their decision upon the Commerce Clause of Art. 1, § 8, even though they set out the Supremacy Clause as part of the opinion. The Commerce Clause states that Congress has power to: (3) to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes; . . . Certainly, nothing in the foregoing clause mentions usury or interest rates. The question then is: What is commerce? We all know that the shipment of goods and chattels across state lines is commerce. There must be some place where transations between parties are no longer a part of commerce. In my opinion, the limits have already been reached. The federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have gone far afield in classifying transactions and activities as coming under the Commerce Clause Act, Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 3, United States Constitution. However, they have not yet gone so far as to declare a loan between two parties in Arkansas to be a part of commerce. Art. 19, § 13, Arkansas Constitution, states: All contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten percent per annum shall be void, as to principle and interest, . . . The contract here in question undisputedly charged a rate of interest in excess of our constitutional limit. In fact, it has been determined that the case was a test case. Had this court been aware of this fact I believe we would not have considered it. In my opinoin, the Constitution of the State of Arkansas is binding upon this court until such time as it is shown that it conflicts with the United States Constitution or the laws passed by Congress in pursuance thereof. I do not believe the Depository Institutions Deregulation & Monetary Control Act of 1980 is such a law. How can it be said that an act which attempts to regulate interest between banks, savings and loan associations and qualified millionaires is a fair and reasonable law? Certainly, there is no justification for allowing a person or corporation which sells a million dollars’ worth of property a year to charge over the legal rate of interest and prohibit individuals or corporations selling less than a million dollars a year from exceeding the constitutional limit on interest. There is an equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Clearly, it cannot be argued that the act under consideration treats parties equally. I find no provision in either the state or federal Constitutions which provides a millionaire should be given different treatment from that of other citizens. Until the people of Arkansas change their constitution, I will continue to uphold it unless I am convinced that there exists a clear conflict between it and the United States Constitution or a law passed by Congress in pursuant thereof. I believe the people of Arkansas have recently indicated an intention to retain their present constitutional provision relating to interest rates. In any event, it is not the duty of this court to change the laws of the State of Arkansas and certainly not to strike down any provision of the Constitution unless it is specifically required under circumstances as set out above. Therefore, I would deny the rehearing.