Court Opinion

ID: 9906260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 15:09:17.152016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:12.309254
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1993-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C.O.C.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted October 16, 2023 – Decided December 1, 2023

                   Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 20-01-
                   0038.

                   Nicholas A. Moschella, Jr., attorney for appellant.

                   Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Nancy Anne Hulett, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).

PER CURIAM
      On March 11, 2020, defendant C.O.C. 1 was convicted by a jury of first-

degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1) (count one); second-

degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) (count two); third-degree aggravated

criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (count four); and second-degree

endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) (count five). The

victim was defendant's daughter, A.C. who was twelve to thirteen years old at

the time the offenses were committed.

      Defendant moved for a new trial. On January 14, 2021, the court denied

that motion.   On February 19, 2021, the court sentenced defendant to the

following custodial terms: (1) forty years subject to the No Early Release Act

(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on count one; (2) eight years subject to NERA, on

count two to be served consecutive to count one; (3) four years on count four

to be served consecutive to counts one and two; and (4) eight years on count

five. The court did not impose a consecutive sentence on count five.

      Defendant now appeals from his convictions and sentence, as well as the

order denying his motion for a new trial. Based on our review of the record and

the applicable legal principles, we affirm the conviction and order denying the

1
  We use initials to protect the identity of the child victim of sexual assault. R.
1:38-3(c)(9).
                                                                             A-1993-20
                                        2
motion for a new trial. We also affirm the sentence imposed, but remand for the

limited purpose of providing a statement on the overall fairness of the sentence

pursuant to State v. Torres.2

                                            I.

        A.C turned thirteen in December 2016. The State alleged defendant

committed acts of sexual assault against A.C. from October 1, 2016, until May

9, 2017. At that time, A.C. was living in East Brunswick with defendant, her

twin brother, her sixteen-year-old brother (C.C.), and defendant's girlfriend.

A.C. attended middle school in East Brunswick.

        On the morning of May 9, 2017, A.C. argued with defendant's girlfriend

before A.C. left for school. Defendant, who had already left for work, spoke

with A.C. on the phone about the argument. She told defendant she packed her

bags and was leaving and not returning home.

        A.C. did not arrive at school and school authorities searched for her. A

school security officer found her in a park near the school. She was very upset.

A.C. said she did not want to go home because her father was touching her. The

security officer took A.C. to the school, and school officials contacted the East

Brunswick Police.

2
    State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021).
                                                                           A-1993-20
                                            3
       East Brunswick Police Detective Crispin Ferrace responded to the school

and spoke with A.C.       A.C. was then transported to police headquarters.

Detective Ferrace took a statement from A.C. at police headquarters. A.C. said

her father began touching her several months before, and the touching continued

through May 2017.      She told police the touching started when defendant's

girlfriend went into the hospital.

       Defendant arrived at the police station to retrieve A.C. Detective Ferrace

and Detective Jason Mendelson of the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office

conducted a video recorded interview of defendant. Officers read defendant his

Miranda3 rights. Defendant confirmed he understood his rights and signed the

standard Miranda rights form indicating he understood his rights and agreed to

waive them and speak with the officers. Defendant admitted he touched A.C.

over and under her clothes and performed oral sex on her, and A.C. touched his

penis causing him to be aroused.

       Defendant moved to suppress the statement, and the State moved to admit

the statement pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1). In the alternative, defendant

argued the court should redact "any discussion of [C.C.]; . . . [and] discussion

of any touching by and between the defendant's children."

3
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                                                           A-1993-20
                                        4
      The trial court conducted a two-day Miranda hearing. The court reviewed

the recorded statement and heard testimony from Detective Mendelson.

Defendant did not testify at the Miranda hearing. On May 1, 2019, the court

denied defendant's motion to suppress in an oral opinion finding defendant

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and gave his

statement voluntarily.

      On January 8, 2020, a grand jury indicted defendant on charges of: first-

degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1) (count one); second-

degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) (count two); first-degree aggravated

sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2)(a) (count three); third-degree aggravated

criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (count four); and second-degree

endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) (count five).

      The trial occurred during February and March 2020.           At trial, A.C.

testified that defendant touched her for the first time when his girlfriend was in

the hospital after she attempted suicide. The State established through another

witness that defendant's girlfriend was hospitalized from October 18 until

October 24, 2016.

      On that first occasion, A.C. and defendant were lying on defendant's bed

watching a movie. Defendant "grabbed" and touched her breasts over and under

                                                                            A-1993-20
                                        5
her clothes. He also touched and "rubbed" A.C.'s vagina with his hands and

touched and "licked" her vagina with his mouth. Defendant was holding and

rubbing her legs when this occurred. Defendant later apologized to her, told her

not to tell anyone, and claimed he did it because he was lonely.

      Another incident of abuse occurred soon after defendant's girlfriend

returned from the hospital. Defendant and A.C. were in her brothers' room and

defendant touched and licked her breasts and licked her vagina.

      On one later occasion, A.C. "had to perform oral sex" on defendant for

"a couple minutes." On another occasion, A.C. masturbated defendant's penis

for "like five minutes." The last time defendant touched her inappropriately was

shortly before she ran away on May 9, 2017. The night before she ran away,

defendant told her "he was going to come into [her] room," which meant, to her,

that he was going to come "touch [her] private areas" and "breasts." A.C

testified that defendant touched her private areas and her breasts "probably about

[twenty times]."

      The State moved to admit a redacted version of defendant's recorded

statement into evidence. It was admitted without objection and played for the

jury. The statement was approximately one hour and forty minutes. Before the

video was played, the court read the Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Redacted

                                                                            A-1993-20
                                        6
Recorded Statement of Defendant" (Oct. 2014) and Model Jury Charges

(Criminal), "Statements of Defendant (Allegedly Made)" (June 2010).

Defendant did not raise any objection to those charges.

      Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied ever touching A.C.

inappropriately. He testified that he had never been interviewed by police before

and he was scared. He felt the detectives were trying to get him to confess to

what they believed to be the truth, and he was not treated fairly. He did not ask

for a lawyer because he thought he was only at the police station to pick up his

kids and answer some questions about why A.C. ran away. He believed that if

he confessed, he would be able to take his kids and go home. According to

defendant, his confession was not truthful.

      Before instructing the jury, the court conducted a final jury charge

conference.   Defendant did not raise any objections to the proposed jury

instructions. During deliberations, the jury requested to view "the video of the

confession, starting at the confession point at the [seventy-five]-minute marker."

The court reviewed the jury's request with counsel. Defendant did not object,

and the portion of the recorded statement requested was shown to the jury.

Defendant did not request any additional portions of the statement be played and

did not request any additional jury instructions. The jury resumed deliberations.

                                                                            A-1993-20
                                        7
Later that afternoon, the jury delivered its verdict. Defendant was convicted on

counts one, two, four, and five and acquitted on count three.

      Defendant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 3:20-1. He

argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence based on the

"credibility of the victim" and because "there was some conflict with some

timeline[s], and when these acts alleged[ly] occurred." Defendant also argued

that there was an issue "on duration, scope, and intensity" of the recorded

statement, and playing back a portion of the statement at the jury's request put

"some of the onus . . . on the defendant, and/or . . . against the credibility of the

victim." Defendant claimed that "as far as the inconsistencies . . . portions of

the victim's statement should have been . . . instructed upon differently" and the

court's "limiting instruction did [not] fully . . . make the jury aware, or . . . allow

them to consider it when those inconsistencies arose."

      Following oral argument, the court denied the motion for new trial in an

oral opinion.    The court found the jury reached its verdict after carefully

assessing the evidence including A.C.'s testimony, defendant's recorded

statement, and defendant's trial testimony. It noted that defendant's recorded

statement was consistent in many respects with A.C's testimony. The court also

determined the jury instructions were reviewed and approved by defense counsel

                                                                                A-1993-20
                                          8
and were consistent with the model criminal jury charges. The court found there

was no reason to "second-guess" the jury's verdict.

      On February 11, 2021, defendant was sentenced. On February 19, 2021,

the court entered the judgment of conviction. This appeal followed.

      Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

            Point One

            DEFENDANT WAS FOUND GUILTY AGAINST
            THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND WAS
            ACCORDINGLY DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FULL
            AND FAIR TRIAL ON THE MERITS. . . .

            Point Two

            THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE
            MOTION OF DEFENDANT FOR A NEW TRIAL
            AND FAILED TO PROPERLY ADDRESS
            ARGUMENT OF DEFENDANT AS TO RULE 3:20-
            1. . . .

            Point Three

            THE COURT RELIED ON IMPROPER FACTORS
            DURING SENTENCING AND THEREFORE THE
            SENTENCE     IMPOSED WAS  MANIFESTLY
            EXCESSIVE. . . .

                                      II.

      Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new

trial. Specifically, he argues "the [c]ourt's failure to properly consider the

                                                                         A-1993-20
                                       9
irreparable harm potentially caused by the allowance of the jury to review the

specific portion of [defendant's statement] dealing only with [his] confession"

deprived him of a full and fair trial. Defendant also argues the court should have

granted the motion because of inconsistencies in A.C.’s testimony. We are not

convinced.

      Rule 3:20-1 provides:

             The trial judge on defendant's motion may grant the
             defendant a new trial if required in the interest of
             justice. . . . The trial judge shall not, however, set aside
             the verdict of the jury as against the weight of the
             evidence unless, having given due regard to the
             opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of
             the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that
             there was a manifest denial of justice under the law.

   "[A] motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial

judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with on appeal

unless a clear abuse has been shown." State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 295,

306 (App. Div. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). When the factfinder

rationally concludes the essential elements of the crime are present beyond a

reasonable doubt, a reviewing court will not find a manifest denial of justice as

required by Rule 3:20-1. State v. Jackson, 211 N.J. 394, 413-14 (2012). A

reviewing court will "weigh heavily the trial court's 'views of credibility of

witnesses, their demeanor, and [its] general "feel of the case."'" State v.

                                                                              A-1993-20
                                        10
Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 96 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Sims, 65

N.J. 359, 373 (1974)). "If the trial court acts under a misconception of the

applicable law, however, the appellate court need not give such deference."

State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990).

      The trial court's opinion denying defendant's motion carefully evaluated

the testimony and evidence presented at trial. The court described the demeanor

of the witnesses and noted that the jury intently watched and paid attention to

the testimony. The court reviewed A.C.'s testimony regarding the alleged acts

of touching and other sexual conduct and concluded that the jury found her

credible.

      Defendant's contention that the court failed to consider his arguments

about the playback of his recorded statement finds no support in the record. In

fact, the court expressly considered and rejected defendant's arguments relating

to the statement and the jury instructions the court provided.

      The evidence produced at trial was plainly sufficient for the jury to

rationally conclude the State proved the essential elements of the crimes beyond

a reasonable doubt. A.C. testified defendant touched her breasts and vagina and

performed oral sex on her before and after she turned thirteen. As the trial co urt

noted, defendant's recorded statement was consistent with A.C.'s testimony in

                                                                             A-1993-20
                                       11
many respects. The jury was instructed properly on its role in evaluating the

evidence, including the credibility of the witnesses, and it was the role of the

jury, not the trial judge, to consider the impact of any alleged inconsistencies in

A.C.’s testimony. It was not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant's motion

for a new trial.

                                        III.

      Defendant next contends the trial court failed to consider arguments raised

in his motion for a new trial. Defendant first argues he was not permitted to

present evidence of third-party guilt. This argument is raised for the first time

on appeal and lacks merit.

      When a defendant raises an issue for the first time on appeal, we review

the action or omission complained of for plain error. R. 2:10-2; State v. Macon,

57 N.J. 325, 333 (1971). Under this standard of review, we disregard any error

or omission "unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. "The possibility of an unjust result must

be 'sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a

result it otherwise might not have reached.'" State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389, 407

(2017) (quoting State v. Williams, 168 N.J. 323, 336 (2001)).

             A defendant who does not raise an issue before a trial
             court bears the burden of establishing that the trial

                                                                              A-1993-20
                                        12
            court's actions constituted plain error . . . because "to
            rerun a trial when the error could easily have been cured
            on request[] would reward the litigant who suffers an
            error for tactical advantage either in the trial or on
            appeal."

            [Ibid. (quoting State v. Weston, 222 N.J. 227, 295
            (2015))].

      In support of this argument, defendant contends his son was also charged

as a juvenile with similar crimes against A.C. Defendant then argues "the

scenario existed that [he] was at least putting forth the claim that he in fact

confessed to and was being [p]rosecuted to protect himself and his son from

consequence[s] of false accusations." Defendant, however, never asserted any

such argument in the trial court. In fact, he successfully applied to have any

references to his son redacted from his recorded statement and excluded at trial.

      Defendant does not articulate how such an argument would have

constituted a meritorious third-party guilt defense. A.C. testified defendant

committed the offenses against her and the jury found her credible. There is no

reason to conclude the jury would have reached a different verdict if it learned

defendant's son was also accused of similar acts against her at different times.

      Defendant has not established he was prevented from asserting a

meritorious third-party guilt defense. There is no basis to find error, let alone

plain error. Even if we found error, which we do not, because defendant actively

                                                                           A-1993-20
                                      13
sought to exclude evidence of his son's alleged conduct at trial, defendant's claim

would be barred by the doctrine of invited error. "Trial errors which were

induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel

ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal." State v. Harper, 128 N.J.

Super. 270, 277 (App. Div. 1974).

      Defendant also argues the trial court failed to provide an appropriate

limiting instruction after the portion of his recorded statement the jury requested

was played back.     Specifically, defendant argues "the duration, scope and

intensity of the interrogation was . . . undermined." We are not persuaded.

      Defendant neither objected to the jury's request to play back a portion of

defendant's statement, nor did he request any additional jury instructions relating

to the portion played back. Because these arguments were raised for the first

time post-trial, we review for plain error. R. 2:10-2. When a litigant does not

request a limiting instruction at trial, we review for plain error. State v. Cole,

229 N.J. 430, 455 (2017) (citing State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017)).

      "[T]he response to a jury's request for a readback of testimony or a replay

of a video recording is vested in the discretion of the trial judge." State v. A.R.,

213 N.J. 542, 555–56, (2013). "Generally, once an exhibit has been admitted

                                                                              A-1993-20
                                        14
into evidence, the jury may access it during deliberations, subject to the court's

instructions on its proper use." State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119, 133-34 (2008).

      Defendant has not established plain error.       It was not an abuse of

discretion for the trial court to play back the portion of the statement the jury

requested. The jury previously viewed the entire statement. Playing back the

requested portion did not undermine the jury's ability to assess the nature and

content of the entire statement.

      Defendant does not identify any jury instruction the trial court failed to

provide. The court instructed the jury appropriately regarding the recorded

statement when it was initially played for the jury and again during the court's

final instructions. We do not perceive any error, much less plain error.

                                       IV.

      Defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting his recorded statement.

Defendant did not appeal from the court's May 1, 2019 order denying his motion

to suppress. We will nevertheless consider the merits of his arguments.

      Defendant contends his statement was not given voluntarily, and the

detectives improperly minimized the significance of the Miranda warnings by

referring to them as "protocol." These arguments are not persuasive.

                                                                            A-1993-20
                                       15
   In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit a defendant's statement to law

enforcement, we give deference to the court's factual findings. State v. Elders,

192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007). We do so in recognition of the trial court's

"'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case,

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Id. at 243 (quoting State v. Johnson,

42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). The reviewing court "ordinarily will not disturb the

trial court's factual findings unless they are 'so clearly mistaken that the

interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Goldsmith,

251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014)).

However, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. State v. Radel, 249 N.J.

469, 493 (2022).

      "The administration of Miranda warnings ensures that a defendant's right

against self-incrimination is protected in the inherently coercive atmosphere of

custodial interrogation." State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 397 (2019). Accordingly,

a defendant "must be warned prior to any questioning that [they have] the right

to remain silent, . . . anything [they say] can be used against [them] in a court of

law, [and] . . . [they have] the right to the presence of an attorney . . . ." Miranda,

384 U.S. at 479.

                                                                                A-1993-20
                                         16
      "A confession or incriminating statement obtained during a custodial

interrogation may not be admitted in evidence unless a defendant has been

advised of his or her constitutional rights[,]" and provided a "'voluntary,

knowing[,] and intelligent'" waiver of "any or all of those rights." State v.

Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 265 (2015) (quoting State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 382,

(2014)).   "New Jersey law requires that the prosecution 'prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" A.M., 237 N.J. at 397 (quoting

State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)). "Furthermore, the State bears the

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's confession is

voluntary and not resultant from actions by law enforcement officers that

overbore the will of a defendant." Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 267.

      "[A] valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all

information useful in making his decision." A.M., 237 N.J. at 398 (quoting State

v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 407 (2009)). "Instead, a knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary waiver is determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding

the custodial interrogation based on the fact-based assessments of the trial

court." Ibid. "In the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, courts generally rely

on factors such as 'the suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice as to

                                                                            A-1993-20
                                       17
constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated

and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion

was involved.'"       Ibid. (quoting State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978)).

"Moreover, courts applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test should look to

whether the defendant has had previous encounters with law enforcement and

the period of time between when Miranda rights were administered and when

defendant confessed." Hreha, 217 N.J. at 383.

      The trial court conducted a two-day Miranda hearing during which it

reviewed defendant's recorded statement and heard testimony from Detective

Mendelson. The court found defendant "from beginning to end, and most

especially at the beginning, was cool, calm and collected[,] . . . [understood]

what his rights were and . . . [understood] the questions that he was being asked

. . . ." "Defendant was read [his Miranda rights], read them aloud as well

himself, acknowledged them verbally and in writing and waived" them. The

court observed defendant "clearly appeared sober and responsive" and he

"[n]ever invoked his rights nor terminated the interview at any point." The court

also observed defendant was "very interactive and comfortable and responsive

to" the detectives.

                                                                           A-1993-20
                                        18
      The court found the statement was given voluntarily and was not the

product of coercion.     The court acknowledged that the "interrogation was

lengthy" but found "during the entirety of the statement, . . . [defendant showed]

that he was a highly intelligent individual and took a thoughtful approach to his

dialogue . . . ." The court also found:

             [A]t all points during the interview . . . [defendant]
             seemed to be in full control of his faculties, decided to
             answer what he wanted to answer, [and] maintained
             control of whatever he wanted to remain in control of.
             Never once did he indicate that his will was[,] or could
             it be perceived that his will was[,] overborne.

      Defendant contends that his statement was not given voluntarily.

Specifically, he argues that at trial he testified he felt coerced and fearful for the

well-being of his family. He contends that he told the officers he wanted to

speak to his mother before he made any incriminating statements, and he was

misled as to the purpose of the questioning. He also contends that he asked the

officers what his "options" were, and the officers did not explain the specific

charges he was facing or the possible consequences of being charged. Defendant

argues he was not dissuaded from the notion that he might have been able to go

home if he confessed.

      The trial court found that defendant's statement was given voluntarily and

was not the product of coercion. The court's decision was based on substantial

                                                                               A-1993-20
                                          19
credible evidence, including the court's assessment of the recorded statement

and the credibility of the testifying detective. Defendant does not point to

anything that would cause us to disturb the court's findings. Defendant never

invoked his right to counsel or asked to terminate the questioning. The officers

did not mislead him in any way about the charges he faced, nor did they tell him

he could go home if he confessed. The officers were not obligated to terminate

the interview because defendant said he wanted to speak with his mother. There

is no basis to disturb the trial court's conclusion that defendant's statement was

given voluntarily and was not the product of coercion.

      Relying on State v. O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 408 (2022), defendant argues the

detectives improperly minimized the significance of the Miranda warnings.

Specifically, the detectives told defendant it was "standard protocol . . . to read

[the Miranda] rights real quick . . . before [they] start[ed] talking" and "this is

just protocol . . . [we need] to make sure you're voluntarily speaking to us."

      In O.D.A.-C., the Supreme Court held law enforcement "repeatedly

undermined [the Miranda warnings] throughout the interrogation" including, for

example, telling the defendant the warnings were "[j]ust a formality" and that

anything they discussed would remain "confidential between [them]." Id. at

412-13 (internal quotations omitted).

                                                                             A-1993-20
                                        20
      The detectives in this case did not undermine the Miranda warnings during

the interrogation. Telling defendant it was "protocol" to read him his rights and

make sure he was speaking to them voluntarily is not akin to referring t o the

warnings as a mere formality. The detectives did not minimize or undermine

the significance of the Miranda warnings by doing so.

                                         V.

      Defendant next contends the court relied on improper factors during

sentencing and the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. We are not

persuaded.

      We employ a deferential standard when reviewing a trial court's

sentencing decision. State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 337 (2015); State v. Fuentes,

217 N.J 57, 70 (2014). We must affirm a sentence unless: (1) the trial court

failed to follow the sentencing guidelines; (2) the court's findings of aggravating

and mitigating factors were not based on competent and credible evidence in the

record; or (3) "the [court's] application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case

makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience."

Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95

N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).

                                                                                A-1993-20
                                         21
      We assess a trial judge's finding of "aggravating and mitigating factors to

determine whether they 'were based upon competent credible evidence in the

record.'" State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010) (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at

364-65).    We are "not to substitute [our] assessment of aggravating and

mitigating factors for that of the trial court." Ibid.

      We are satisfied the court properly exercised its discretion when analyzing

and applying the sentencing factors. The court applied aggravating factor two

based on the gravity and seriousness of harm to a vulnerable victim, aggravating

factor three based on the fact that defendant engaged in this conduct over a

period of several months in various situations and was likely to commit another

offense, aggravating factor four because defendant took advantage of his

position of trust as A.C.'s father, and aggravating factor nine based on the need

to deter. The court gave "great weight" to aggravating factor nine based on the

need to deter defendant specifically, and the need to deter sexual assault of

children generally.

      The court rejected defendant's request for mitigating factor nine because

it found a risk defendant would commit another offense in applying aggravating

factor three. The court could have applied mitigating factor seven because

defendant did not have a criminal record but declined to do so. The court found

                                                                           A-1993-20
                                        22
the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors. The

court's findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were based upon

competent credible evidence in the record and there is no basis to disturb them.

      We are not persuaded by defendant's claim the court erred by imposing

consecutive sentences and rejecting his request for merger. "[T]rial judges have

discretion to decide if sentences should run concurrently or consecutively."

State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 128 (2011); see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a). Judges are

permitted to impose consecutive sentences where multiple sentences of

imprisonment are imposed and after considering the Yarbough factors. See

State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985).

      The Yarbough factors essentially focus upon "the nature and number of

offenses for which the defendant is being sentenced, whether the offenses

occurred at different times or places, and whether they involve numerous or

separate victims." State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 423 (2001) (quoting State v.

Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 180 (1989)). They should be applied qualitatively, not

quantitatively. Id. at 427. A court may impose consecutive sentences even

though a majority of the Yarbough factors support concurrent sentences. Id. at

427-28; see also State v. Swint, 328 N.J. Super. 236, 264 (App. Div. 2000)

(explaining even when "offenses [are] connected by a 'unity of specific

                                                                          A-1993-20
                                      23
purpose,'" "somewhat interdependent of one another," and "committed within a

short period of time," concurrent sentences need not be imposed) (citations

omitted). "When a sentencing court properly evaluates the Yarbough factors in

light of the record, the court's decision will not normally be disturbed on appeal."

Miller, 205 N.J. at 129.

      The trial court carefully evaluated the Yarbough factors and determined

the sentences imposed on counts two and four would run consecutive to each

other and consecutive to count one. The offenses were based on separate and

distinct acts of abuse that occurred at different times. Count one was based on

an act of sexual penetration, oral sex, that occurred before A.C. turned thirteen.

Count two was based on sexual contact, touching A.C.'s breasts and vagina,

before she turned thirteen. Count four was based on an act of sexual contact,

either defendant touching A.C. or A.C. touching defendant, after A.C. turned

thirteen.   The court properly evaluated the Yarbough factors in imposing

consecutive sentences and we will not disturb the court's decision. The overall

sentence does not shock the judicial conscience.

      We also reject defendant's contention that the court erred by failing to

merge counts one, two and four. Under the doctrine of merger, "a separate

sentence should not be imposed on the count which must merge with another

                                                                              A-1993-20
                                        24
offense." State v. Trotman, 366 N.J. Super. 226, 237 (App. Div. 2004). "The

doctrine of merger is based on the concept that 'an accused [who] committed

only one offense . . . cannot be punished as if for two.'" State v. Tate, 216 N.J.

300, 302 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 77

(1975)). The offenses charged in counts one, two, and four each involved

different acts of abuse committed at different times. The trial court determined

correctly those charges do not merge.

      The State asks that we remand the matter for the limited purpose of

providing a statement on the overall fairness of the sentence pursuant to Torres,

which was decided after defendant was sentenced. There, the Supreme Court

held "[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness of a sentence

imposed on a defendant for multiple offenses . . . is essential to a proper

Yarbough sentencing assessment." Id. at 268. Because the trial court did not

have the opportunity to provide an explicit statement explaining the overall

fairness of the sentence as required by Torres, we remand for that limited

purpose.

      To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2).

                                                                            A-1993-20
                                        25
Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                                   A-1993-20
                               26