Court Opinion

ID: 9684893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:18:12.514257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:00.969829
License: Public Domain

OVERSTREET, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I dissent to the majority’s holding on points four and five which involve the failure to inform the jury that life imprisonment equals 40 years without parole for capital murder.
Appellant argues that a court’s charge informing the jury that life imprisonment is equal to 40 years without parole would be relevant to whether he would be a continuing threat to society. Further, he argues that without this information the jury was prevented from weighing the mitigating effect of punishment testimony.
As I discussed in some detail in my dissent to Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 131-44 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S., 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), I believe that the United States Constitution’s guarantees of due process required appellant’s jury be informed of the 40 year parole eligibility law.
I also note that four members of the Supreme Court have recently commented upon the “[p]erverse[ness]” of our death penalty scheme not letting the jury know when the defendant will become eligible for parole if he *603is not sentenced to death. Brown v. Texas, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 355, 139 L.Ed.2d 276 (1997). I also find rather perverse keeping jurors ignorant and uninformed of such a critical legal fact when making life and death decisions as to whether the death penalty will be assessed. By excluding the fact that life imprisonment is equal to 40 years in prison, appellant was denied due process of law.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s discussion and holding as to points four and five. Otherwise, I concur in the disposition of all other points.