Court Opinion

ID: 9915891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 22:00:21.973388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:30.247621
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 22-1550

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                           Appellee,

                               v.

                         JASON COLCORD,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

          [Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                   Gelpí, Lynch, and Rikelman,
                         Circuit Judges.

    Andrew Levchuk on brief for appellant.

     Benjamin Block, Assistant United States Attorney, and Darcie
N. McElwee, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

                        January 8, 2024
           GELPÍ,     Circuit     Judge.       Defendant       Jason    Colcord

("Colcord") pled guilty to one count of knowingly accessing with

intent to view material that contained over 900 child pornography

images, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).                     He was

sentenced to 145 months’ imprisonment, near the low-end of his

advisory guidelines sentencing range, followed by five years of

supervised    release.     Colcord      challenges     his    within-the-range

sentence, arguing that the district court’s decision to not impose

a downwardly variant sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Having discerned no error, we affirm.

                                I. BACKGROUND

           We begin with a review of the relevant facts.                As this

appeal follows a guilty plea, we draw the facts from the plea

agreement, the change-of-plea colloquy, the uncontested portions

of   the   presentence     investigation      report     ("PSR"),      and   the

sentencing hearing transcript.          See United States v. Spinks, 63

F.4th   95,   97    (1st   Cir.    2023)     (quoting    United     States    v.

Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277, 280 n.2 (1st Cir. 2017)).

           A. Child Pornography Charge and Plea Agreement

           In January 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

determined that an Internet Protocol ("IP") address located at a

residence in Maine was offering to share child pornography images

through the BitTorrent ("BT") network, a type of peer-to-peer

communication      software.      Law      enforcement       then   downloaded,

                                    - 2 -
reviewed,     and    confirmed       that    the    files     consisted       of       child

pornography        images     and   videos.         On     February 4,       2020,      law

enforcement        verified     that     Colcord     was     associated       with      the

residence and that he has an extensive criminal history including

sexual   abuse      of   a    minor.      Then,     on   February 20,         2020,      law

enforcement searched the residence and interviewed Colcord.

             During      the     interview,        Colcord     consented          to     law

enforcement searching his Samsung Galaxy S9 cell phone and admitted

to   using    BT    to   download      pornography         onto   his    phone.           On

February 26, 2020, the cell phone was sent to the Department of

Homeland     Security        Investigation       ("HSI")    office      in    Boston     to

extract the child pornography images from the phone.                               And on

July 20, 2020, the HSI office in Maine was notified that 710 images

and three videos of prepubescent minors engaged in sexual acts

were extracted from the phone, which the PSR calculated as a total

advisory guidelines quantity of 935 child pornography images. Many

of the images, which Colcord's phone data indicated he viewed

multiple times between December 2019 and February 2020, depicted

pubescent and prepubescent girls engaged in sexually explicit

conduct with adult men.             Many of the images depicted minors who

were under twelve years old.

             On November 19, 2021, Colcord pled guilty to one count

of knowingly accessing with intent to view material that contained

child    pornography           images,      in     violation      of         18    U.S.C.

                                         - 3 -
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement

stated that "the parties agree to make a non-binding recommendation

for a sentence of 120 months imprisonment" and that "the [c]ourt

has the discretion to impose any lawful sentence."                 The district

court then advised Colcord that "any recommendation made to [the

court] at sentencing is not binding" which Colcord stated he

understood.    Colcord also agreed to waive his right to appeal a

sentence of 140 months or less.

                                B. Sentencing

            The PSR provided the calculations for the total offense

level and guideline range which Colcord did not object to.                A total

offense level of twenty-eight combined with a criminal history

category of six resulted in an advisory guideline sentencing range

of 140 to 175 months.        At sentencing, Colcord and the government

did as the plea agreement stated and jointly recommended a sentence

of 120 months.      Colcord argued that 120 months was sufficient and

warranted on account of his family history and his efforts to

support his mother.

            Colcord      appeared    before    the    district    court   for    a

sentencing hearing on June 29, 2022.                 The district court noted

"that since Kimbrough, a district court makes procedural error

when   it   fails   to   recognize    its     discretion   to    vary   from   the

guideline range based on a categorical policy disagreement with

the guideline."       The district court then acknowledged "that child

                                      - 4 -
pornography     sentencing   guidelines        typically    do   not    actually

reflect   and    determine    the     actual    sentence[,]      at    least   in

non-production cases."       After explaining this, the district court

expressed that the child pornography enhancements as applied to

Colcord were appropriate.

          In imposing the sentence, the district court considered

the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), specifically noting the nature

of the offense and the need to protect the public:

          The nature of this offense, Mr. Colcord, like
          all child pornography cases, shocks the
          conscious.   The images recovered from your
          cell phone which number in excess of 700
          depict child pornography involving abuse of
          pubescent and prepubescent girls, which
          definition meets -- which images satisfy the
          definition of sadomasochism, specifically
          prepubescent   girls   engaged   in   vaginal
          intercourse with adult males.      So, it is
          almost beyond the reach of any mere mortal to
          capture how deeply depraved and terrorizing
          the creation of these images are for the
          sexual edification of a marketplace of
          consumers, and you are one such consumer.

The district court then acknowledged the toll of this offense upon

the   victims    highlighting       their    pain   and    the   "rippling     of

dysfunction" that will permeate the community.             The district court

was clear that "[i]t's not just scrolling and clicking."                       The

district court also pointed out Colcord's role as a consumer which

creates a demand and drives the production of such images.                As for

Colcord's personal history, the district court noted his difficult

past, specifically, how his mother was heavily involved with

                                     - 5 -
alcohol and drugs leading to abuse and neglect, as well as the

time he spent in foster care.                  The district court considered

Colcord's "robust" criminal history "hallmarked by violence" which

included   "sexual     abuse      of    a    minor,     assault,   violations      of

conditions of release, violating protective orders, failure to

register   as   a     sex    offender,        and   domestic     violence"    while

highlighting    the    "significant          concern    [this    criminal    history

causes] for the risk . . . pose[d] to the public."                   The district

court also explicitly spelled the § 3553(a) factors, including the

apparent   "need       for     just     punishment         to    ensure     adequate

deterrence . . . and to protect the public from further crimes by

[Colcord]."     Then,       the   district      court    acknowledged      Colcord's

improvement with his anger management for the past two years, his

lack of recent or significant drug use, and his employment.                    Based

on each of these considerations, the district court imposed a

sentence of 145 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of

supervised release.         Colcord timely appealed this sentence.

                                  II. DISCUSSION

                             A. Standard of Review

           There are two aspects in analyzing the reasonableness of

a   sentence:   procedural        and       substantive.        United    States   v.

Gomera-Rodríguez, 952 F.3d 15, 18-20 (1st Cir. 2020); United States

v. Irizarry-Sisco, 87 F.4th 38, 50 (1st Cir. 2023).                          "If an

appellant makes no claim of procedural [unreasonableness], as is

                                        - 6 -
the   case    here,       we     limit     our        review    to    the       substantive

reasonableness of the sentence."                  United States v. Prosperi, 686

F.3d 32, 42 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Martin, 520

F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008)).                   "We review preserved substantive

reasonableness claims for abuse of discretion."                       Gomera-Rodríguez,

952 F.3d at 20 (citing United States v. Aquino-Florenciani, 894

F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 2018)); see Holguin-Hernandez v. United States,

140   S.   Ct.     762,    766     (2020)       (explaining        that     a    sentence's

substantive      reasonableness           is    preserved      for    appellate        review

"where a criminal defendant advocates for a sentence shorter than

the one ultimately imposed").                   On the other hand, unpreserved

arguments    are    reviewed        for    plain       error.        United      States    v.

Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad, 930 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2019).

                          B. Substantive Reasonableness

             A sentence is substantively reasonable if its rationale

is    plausible       and         resulted        in     a      defensible         outcome.

Gomera-Rodríguez, 952 F.3d at 20.                      "There is no one reasonable

sentence in any given case but, rather, a universe of reasonable

sentencing outcomes."             United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588,

592   (1st    Cir.        2011)     (citing        Martin,      520       F.3d    at     92).

"[R]easonableness is a protean concept," Martin, 520 F.3d at 92,

and "[a]s we have repeatedly emphasized, a challenge to the

substantive      reasonableness            of     a     sentence      is    particularly

unpromising when the sentence imposed comes within the confines of

                                           - 7 -
a   properly        calculated"         advisory      guidelines   sentencing      range.

Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad, 930 F.3d at 9 (quoting United States v.

O'Brien, 870 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2017)).                         "Within-guidelines

sentences are entitled to a presumption of reasonableness," United

States v. Rodríguez-Adorno, 852 F.3d 168, 178 (1st Cir. 2017),

which Colcord has not overcome.                    See also Rita v. United States,

551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) ("The first question is whether a court

of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district

court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing

Guidelines.             We conclude that it can.").

                  Colcord advances three arguments against the presumption

of the substantive reasonableness of his sentence whereas the

government         defends      the     sentence      as   substantively    reasonable.

First, he argues that the district court "conflated [his own]

conduct          with    that   of    those    who    committed    the    more    serious

crimes . . . captured in the images and videos." Second, he argues

that       the    district      court    allotted      insufficient      weight   to   his

personal mitigating circumstances in considering the § 3553(a)

factors.1         Third, he argues that the district court's rejection of

the parties' joint recommendation of a 120-month sentence was not

       Despite Colcord's underdeveloped argumentation concerning
       1

the weighing of § 3553(a) factors, we assume in his favor that it
is not waived. See Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad, 930 F.3d at 8 n.8; United
States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

                                              - 8 -
"convincingly address[ed]."                 We address the deficiency of each

argument seriatim.

            Colcord's conflation argument is a mischaracterization

of the district court's comments on the nature of the offense.

The district court's comments specifically referred to Colcord's

role   as   a    "consumer"      which      added    to     the   "demand"    for   child

pornography.       The district court then emphasized how this demand

results in a "rippling dysfunction" for the victims due to the

Internet's       propensity      to    "last      forever."         The   creation    and

substance of the images were mentioned to highlight how consumers

create   the     demand    for     the      production      of    these   images.     See

Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad, 930 F.3d at 9 (upholding a within-the-range

sentence imposed for a non-production child pornography offense

where the district court weighed the harm the defendant imposed in

"fueling        demand     and     supply"          in     this     illicit    market);

Gomera-Rodríguez, 952 F.3d at 20 (same); United States v. Monroe,

Nos. 19-1869, 19-1872, 2021 WL 8567708, at *2 (1st Cir. Nov. 10,

2021) (upholding an upwardly variant sentence for production and

possession of child pornography).                        This demonstrates that the

district     court       imposed      the     sentence      specifically      based    on

Colcord's own conduct as a consumer rather than the conduct

portrayed in the images and videos.

            Further,       Congress         has   recognized       that   reducing    the

demand for this exploitative market is as necessary as reducing

                                            - 9 -
the supply.       United States v. Blodgett, 872 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir.

2017);     cf.    Osborne       v.   Ohio,     495    U.S.     103,      109-10       (1990)

(recognizing that it is "surely reasonable for the State to

conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography

if it penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby

decreasing demand").             The Internet has become a mechanism for

defendants       to     view    these   distressing          images      "with    virtual

anonymity"       and    re-victimize      these      children      "again    when      these

images of their sexual assault are traded over the Internet in

massive numbers by like-minded people across the globe."                                H.R.

Rep. No.      112-638 (2012)         (quoting     U.S. Dep't of Just.,                 Nat'l

Strategy    for       Child    Exploitation     Prevention         &    Interdiction:      A

Report   to      Congress      (2010)).        The     United      States    Sentencing

Commission       reported       that,     in    2019,       "non-production           child

pornography offense involved a median number of 4,265 images, with

some offenders possessing and distributing millions of images and

videos."         U.S.    Sent'g      Comm'n,    Federal       Sentencing         of   Child

Pornography Non-Production Offenses 4 (2021).                      "We add, moreover,

that the defendant's attempt to downplay the severity of his

conduct because he was a viewer of vile material, not a producer

or distributor of it, is unpersuasive."                 Blodgett, 872 F.3d at 71.

              Colcord     relatedly     argues       that    the       district   court's

decision not to impose a downwardly variant sentence for his

non-production offense, as other courts have done based on a

                                        - 10 -
categorical policy disagreement, is in error.2             At sentencing, the

district court explicitly acknowledged its ability to impose a

downwardly   variant    sentence    based     on     a    categorical        policy

disagreement,   going   so   far    as   to   note       the   2012    Sentencing

Commission   report     which   expressed      that        child      pornography

sentencing   guidelines      may     inaccurately          apply       "so     many

enhancements" in non-production cases.         Yet, even in light of this

discretion, the district court expressed that the enhancements

applied here were warranted due to the quantity of images accessed

"involving abuse of pubescent and prepubescent girls," the nature

of the offense, and its effect on society, reflecting the district

court's thoughtfulness in choosing a sentence that "fit both the

     2 There are two aspects to this specific argument that we
briefly address. First, this argument was not preserved below and
is subject to plain error review.     But even if we assume in
Colcord's favor that the argument is preserved and abuse of
discretion applies, this argument still fails for the reasons we
discuss. Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad, 930 F.3d at 6.
     Second, in making this argument, Colcord makes a cursory
reference to Kimbrough error and yet misunderstands the
circumstances in which a district court can be said to have
committed this error.     Colcord did not pinpoint any specific
comment to show that the district court did not understand its
discretion to vary. Instead, Colcord argues that it was error for
the district court to choose to not have a categorical policy
disagreement with the guidelines as other district courts have
done. We foreclose this line of reasoning by reiterating what we
said before: "While district courts may certainly conclude that
the guidelines sentencing range in child pornography cases is
harsher than necessary in many cases, there is no requirement that
a district court must categorically reject the child pornography
guidelines based on their provenance."    Aquino-Florenciani, 894
F.3d at 8.

                                   - 11 -
offender and the circumstances of the offense."                Clogston, 662

F.3d at 592.      The district court's awareness of its capacity to

impose a downwardly variant sentence is exhibited in the record

and its decision to not impose such a sentence is not error.

United   States    v.   Stone,   575   F.3d   83,   89-90   (1st   Cir.    2009)

(explaining that a district court only commits Kimbrough error

when "it fails to recognize its discretion to vary from the

guideline range" but not when it chooses to impose a sentence

within   the   guideline    range      (citations    omitted)).       We   have

recognized the broad discretion that district courts possess to

agree with the guidelines and continue to do so.             Stone, 575 F.3d

at 90.

           Next,    Colcord's    weight    argument    falls   flat    because

§ 3553(a) does not mandate courts to apply a certain weight to

each factor but only to consider each factor in imposing a sentence

"sufficient, but not greater than necessary." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

"[T]he weighting of those factors is largely within the court's

informed discretion."       Clogston, 662 F.3d at 593.             And Colcord

fails to mention any case stating otherwise.           See United States v.

Morales-Negrón, 974 F.3d 63, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2020) ("But 'a

disagreement with the district court's weighing of the different

sentencing factors' does not alone constitute error." (quoting

United States v. Contreras-Delgado, 913 F.3d 232, 242 (1st Cir.

2019))).   Moreover, the sentencing transcript demonstrates that

                                    - 12 -
the district court considered Colcord's past, highlighting his

rough childhood and his significant criminal history.                   While

Colcord surely would want the district court to give greater weight

to his personal mitigating circumstances, the district court was

entirely within its discretion to find that these mitigating

factors    were   outweighed    by   the   seriousness   of    the   offense,

Colcord's criminal history, and the need to protect the public.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007) ("It has been uniform

and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing

judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every

case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes

mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to

ensue." (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996))).

"That the sentencing court chose not to attach to certain of the

mitigating factors the significance that the appellant thinks they

deserved does not make the sentence unreasonable."             Clogston, 662

F.3d at 593.

            Lastly, Colcord's argument that he should have received

a sentence of 120 months also fails to overcome the presumption of

reasonableness of his sentence. He simply argues that the district

court should have imposed a 120-month sentence as both parties

recommended and that the district court rather chose to impose 145

months    because   of   its   personal    disgust   towards   the   offense.

However, "[t]he customary rule is that the district court is not

                                     - 13 -
bound by the parties' recommendations as to the length of the

sentence to be imposed."         United States v. Rijos-Rivera, 53 F.4th

704, 711 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Mulero-Vargas,

24 F.4th 754, 759 (1st Cir. 2022)).            Nor is there evidence in the

record of "personal disgust" by the district court as Colcord

claims.      See Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad, 930 F.3d at 7 ("And there is no

evidence that the district court imposed the sentence based on

being 'completely offended by the crime,' . . . rather than based

on a reasoned consideration of the relevant sentencing factors.").

               Colcord also asserts that the district court did not

adequately explain why the recommended 120-month sentence would

not have sufficed to meet the goals of sentencing.           He points out

that his pretrial release conditions proved he posed minimal danger

to the community, therefore, imposing a greater sentence due to

such       purported   danger   now   is   inconsistent.3    This   line   of

       Under an abuse of discretion standard, the burden a
       3

defendant must carry to overturn a sentence is an uphill climb and
especially so when the sentence imposed is within the advisory
guidelines range.    That suffices to say that differences in
findings of a defendant's danger to the community -- which is only
one factor of many to consider at sentencing -- for release prior
to sentencing and at sentencing is not enough alone to overcome
the highly deferential review of a sentence. United States v. De
la Cruz-Gutiérrez, 881 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 2018) (emphasizing
the "heavy burden" a defendant must carry to "[s]uccessfully
challeng[e] the substantive reasonableness of a sentence");
Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad, 930 F.3d at 7 ("And generally, the district
court did not need to 'be precise to the point of pedantry' in
explaining its weighing of the § 3553(a) factors." (quoting United
States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2006)).

                                      - 14 -
reasoning, however, ignores the different factors that district

courts consider when deciding to release or detain a defendant

before trial versus imposing a sentence.         In deciding to release

or detain a defendant before trial, the district only considers

whether "the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the

safety of any other person or the community if released."               18

U.S.C.    § 3143(a)(1).    However,    during    sentencing,   knowledge

concerning the specific offense alongside the defendant's personal

history and other factors are taken into consideration to determine

the   appropriate   sentence.   18    U.S.C.    § 3553(a)   (listing   out

factors).    Accordingly, during sentencing, the district court is

within its traditional, discretionary role to utilize the PSR,

arguments from counsel, and facts to impose a sentence that is

sufficient but not greater than necessary.        Koon, 518 U.S. at 113

(explaining the breadth of discretion that lies with the sentencing

judge).

            At sentencing, the district court found that Colcord's

extensive criminal history which involved "sexual abuse of a minor,

assault, violations of conditions of release, violating protective

orders, failure to register as a sex offender, and domestic

violence" combined with the effect of this offense warranted a

with-the-range sentence of 145 months.          In rejecting Colcord’s

request to impose a downwardly variant sentence of 120 months, the

district court explained:

                                - 15 -
          [I]t's rare that I see a defendant stand
          before me for sentencing for this type of
          offense who has a criminal history -- much of
          a criminal history, frankly, never mind a
          criminal history as robust as yours and one
          that is hallmarked by violence, violation of
          court   orders,   including   violations   of
          conditions of release, all of which give me
          significant concern for the risk you pose to
          the public. For those reasons, I'm not going
          to impose a downwardly variant sentence in
          this case.

This leads us to conclude that the district court sufficiently

addressed its decision not to vary downward considering relevant

sentencing   factors,   including    Colcord’s   significant   criminal

history and risk to the public.            Thus, the district court's

explanation concerning these factors, the nature of the offense,

and Colcord's effect as a proponent of demand for child pornography

images, certainly provided a plausible rationale that resulted in

a defensible within-the-range sentence.

                           III. CONCLUSION

          For   the     reasons     stated,    Colcord's   substantive

reasonableness challenge fails, and his sentence is affirmed.

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