Court Opinion

ID: 9541538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:26:23.669272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:14.809962
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: The majority has held that “defendant did not sufficiently demonstrate that Monick and Harris utilized generally accepted and empirically tested methods in determining that plaintiff could not have sustained the type of injury claimed.” 324 Ill. App. 3d at 169. I disagree and, therefore, respectfully dissent from that part of its opinion. First, regarding the standard of our review, the general rule provides that the decision to allow an expert to testify in matters of opinion lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Soto v. Gay-tan, 313 Ill. App. 3d 137, 728 N.E.2d 1126 (2000). A trial court’s ruling with regard to the admissibility of expert testimony will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Harris v. Cropmate Co., 302 Ill. App. 3d 364, 702 N.E.2d 55 (1999). Indeed, the Cropmate court, on whose analysis the majority heavily relies, utilized an “abuse of discretion” standard. Without arguing the merits of the proposed new standard of review, I do not believe that the outcome in this case would be different regardless of whether the trial court’s decision is tested as an abuse of discretion, under the broader review adopted by the majority, or de nova. In this case, it is clear from the record that the trial court had several hearings with regard to the testimony of Harris and Monick. During those hearings, evidence was presented regarding the opinions to be offered and the bases for them. After careful consideration of the evidence presented and after conducting a Cropmate analysis, the trial court found that the testimony met the “Frye plus reliability” standard. This standard implies that reliability is not part of the Frye test itself, although a review of the Frye factors clearly shows that it is. Based on my consideration of the evidence presented, I cannot agree either that the trial judge abused his discretion or that his decision was wrong under a broader, less deferential review. The majority finds that the first three steps of the Cropmate analysis regarding (1) the evidence proffered, (2) the assistance of the evidence to the trier of fact, and (3) the fact that the testimony constituted scientific evidence were met by the defendant in this case. Since the trial court drew the same conclusion, no further discussion of those factors is necessary. The fourth inquiry in the Cropmate analysis is whether the proffered scientific evidence is “novel” or is, instead, a firmly established method or technique. The proffered scientific evidence pertained to the G-forces experienced by the plaintiff and whether her alleged long-term injuries were consistent with those forces. The opinions to be rendered in this regard were based on Harris’s own personal experiments and research, along with other literature, including publications of studies conducted by other scientists. In addition, Harris testified that biomechanics and biomedical research and testing (including his) were being relied on by manufacturers to design thousands of products, including automobiles, airplanes, and carseats. Based on this evidence, and contrary to the conclusion of the majority, it certainly cannot be said that the science on which the proffered testimony would be based was novel within Harris’s and Monick’s fields of study. The fifth inquiry suggested under Cropmate is whether the evidence meets the Frye admissibility standard. This factor is only applicable if the evidence is considered novel and, as set out above, I do not believe the record supports a finding that it is. Nevertheless, because biomedical engineers have not traditionally testified regarding the consequences of various G-forces on a plaintiff in a personal injury case, an analysis of this factor may be helpful. Under the Frye admissibility standard, the court must determine whether the proffered evidence is generally accepted within the community to which the witness belongs. In this case, that would require the court to find that the scientific basis for Harris’s and Monick’s testimony is generally accepted within the community of biomedical and biomechanical engineers. According to the record, Harris based his opinions on numerous studies involving actual injuries to individuals involved in automobile accidents, including studies dating back to 1955. In addition, Harris relied on his own research completed for the United States Navy, Office of Naval Research, regarding forces sufficient to cause injuries. Finally, Harris testified that he uses biomechanics and biomedical engineering principles to treat disabled children and to teach orthopedic surgeons. The majority argues that there is no evidence in the record to show whether the studies relied on by Harris were peer-reviewed, or whether his rebanee on photographs and repair estimates is generally accepted in this field of study. However, there is no evidence to the contrary either. Even though it would be reasonable to think that at least some of the articles published since 1955 have been peer-reviewed, I am unaware of any requirement for peer-review in order for a method to be generally accepted in a community. Certainly the continued, practical application of the principles for 45 years would be indicative of some general community acceptance. Moreover, it is entirely reasonable that Harris might rely on photographs and repair estimates, in addition to other evidence, to arrive at his opinions, and such rebanee was certainly subject to cross-examination. The sixth and final step in the Cropmate inquiry is whether the testimony was reliable. As previously indicated, the principles of bio-mechanics and biomedical engineering, which form the basis for the challenged testimony, are relied upon by manufacturers to design thousands of products. In addition, Harris testified that he uses bio-mechanics and biomedical engineering to treat disabled children and teach orthopedic surgeons. If it is reliable enough for the treatment of children and the education of orthopedic surgeons, it would seem that it should be deemed reliable enough for testimony in a personal injury lawsuit. Finally, it is important to note that the Cropmate court specifically pointed out: “[T]he trial court’s inquiry at a Frye hearing should be a flexible one, and the *** fist of questions is intended to help guide the trial court in determining whether the proffered evidence is reliable. It does not constitute a six-part test, in which the proponent of the proffered evidence must answer all of the questions satisfactorily before the evidence is deemed admissible.” Cropmate, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 375, 706 N.E.2d at 65. Based on this language, even if the defendant had not been successful in meeting all six parts of the analysis, a showing reasonably sufficient to satisfy the trial court during the course of its multiple Frye hearings that the evidence was reliable and should be admitted ought to survive a review based on an abuse of discretion, and even a broader standard of review. At the very most, the case should be remanded for another Frye hearing, giving the defendant an opportunity to supplement the evidence to address the concerns raised by the majority. I do not believe that an entire new trial, as prescribed by the majority, would prove necessary. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority reversing the trial court’s admission of the testimony of Harris and Monick. I would find no error on the part of the trial judge on this issue and would affirm the trial court’s decision to allow them to testify as experts. I concur with the remainder of the majority’s opinion regarding the trial court’s ruling on the directed verdict and the admission of the police officer’s testimony.