Court Opinion

ID: 9834364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:31:20.369695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:14.183053
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In their motion for a rehearing, counsel for the appellees have presented what we regard as an able and conservative argument defending the ruling of the trial court in excluding the declarations of the testator. They insist that such declarations, when offered as evidentiary statements that an act has been done or has not been done, fall within the general rule of those made by third persons and should be rejected as hearsay. In Scott v. Townsend, previously referred to, it was held on appeal that the declarations of the testator, Scott, as to what his wife has said and done with reference to his making a will should have been excluded as hearsay. On the other hand, in McElroy v. Phink it was held that the declarations of the testatrix as to what she herself nad done were admissible. In the second case the declarations were distinctly narrative of a transaction, and their probative value depended upon the truth of what the declarant had said. The distinction between the two cases above referred to is that-in the first the declarations related to the acts and conduct of a third person, whereas in the second they related to the acts of the testatrix herself. If in this case our holding upon the proposition stated by ap-pellees is in conflict with Kennedy v. Up-shaw, it is in harmony with the ruling of the Supreme Court in the later ease of McElroy v. Phink.
 It is further contended that the declarations of the testator should not be admitted as primary evidence of a fact which the proponent was required to establish— that the will offered -had not been revoked. The argument is that when the will of 1897 was produced in court and its execution proved in the manner required by statute, the burden then shifted to the contestants to prove that it had been revoked. Doubtless that was the practical effect of the proceedings in the trial court. When the proponent produced the will and proved its execution according to the statutory provisions, she made out a prima facie ease which authorized the court to admit the will to probate. She was not required to go further and prove that the will had not been revoked. McElroy v. Phink, supra. But that proof was prima fatíe only, and did not relieve the proponent of the burden of producing a preponderance of the evidence essential to prove the instrument offered by her was the last will of the deceased when the prima facie evidence had been weakened. While the weight of the evidence may shift, the burden of proving a legal right to the relief .sought remains upon the plaintiff throughout the trial. Clark v. Hills, 67 Tex. 148, 2 S. W. 856; Boswell v. Pannell, 107 Tex. 433, 180 S. W. 593; Pierce v. Baker (Tex. Civ. App.) 238 S. W. 699.
However, in determining the admissibility of the declarations here involved, it is immaterial where the burden of proof rested. They were offered as evidence tending to show that the will of 1897 had not been revoked by the making of a subsequent will. If they were admissible for that purpose, it is of no practical importance in this appeal at what stage of the trial those declarations were offered.
If we concede the correctness of the argu*627ment by counsel as to the burden of proof the case presents this situation: Contestants were undertaking to prove the execution of one or more wills by Messerer subsequent to 1897. None of those wills could be produced in court. Under the rule announced in the cases previously cited and discussed, contestants might have claimed the right to offer as evidence any declarations made by the testator which tended to show the making of one or more of those lost wills. If Messerer had made statements expressive of dissatisfaction with his former will, or of hostile feelings toward the sole beneficiary in that will, or of an altered state of his feelings toward his relatives who had not been provided for in that will, and a desire that they share in his estate after his death, such declarations, if offered by contestants, might have been admitted, not as supplying a lack of the proof required by the statute, but as a circumstance tending 'to strengthen that proof. If declarations favorable to the contestants upon that issue were admissible, upon what ground should equally as relevant unfavorable declarations be excluded?
As stated in the original opinion, we think the chief evidentiary value of the declarations made by Messerer consisted of the state of mind which those expressions disclosed. The fact that at such a time and under such conditions he made those declarations in connection with the exhibition of his first will was a circumstance which the proponent had the right to present for the consideration of the jury in determining whether or not the subsequent wills had been executed as alleged. .
The motion is overruled.