Court Opinion

ID: 9370623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 14:11:31.658287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:22.711313
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Humphreys, AtLee and Raphael

              TAJ SHAQUILLE JOHNSON
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0355-22-1                                         PER CURIAM
                                                                                FEBRUARY 14, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
                                               John W. Brown, Judge

                               (Michelle C.F. Derrico, Senior Appellate Attorney; Virginia Indigent
                               Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; David A. Mick, Assistant
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Taj Shaquille Johnson appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of

              Chesapeake revoking his previously suspended sentence and resuspending all but one year.

              Johnson argues that the court failed to give appropriate weight to mitigating evidence when it

              invoked an active period of incarceration that exceeded the sentencing guidelines. After

              examining the briefs and record, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary

              because “the dispositive issue” in this appeal has “been authoritatively decided, and the appellant

              has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” Code

              § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                         BACKGROUND

                     “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party [below].” Poole v.

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469,

472 (2018)). In doing so, we “discard the evidence of the [appellant] in conflict with that of the

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and

all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Gerald, 295 Va. at 473 (quoting Kelley v.

Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463, 467-68 (2015)).

       In 2016, Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of grand larceny. The trial court sentenced

Johnson to five years in prison, with four years and two months suspended, and placed him on an

indeterminate period of supervised probation. In September 2020, Johnson’s probation officer

prepared a major violation report detailing Johnson’s two new misdemeanor convictions in the

Norfolk General District Court for driving on a suspended license (fifth offense) and speeding.

The major violation report also noted that Johnson tested positive for THC three times and that

he had pending misdemeanor charges in Chesapeake and Portsmouth for traffic offenses and a

failure to appear.

       An addendum to the major violation report, dated May 14, 2021, reported that Johnson

was arrested in the City of Norfolk and charged with felony possession of marijuana with intent

to distribute. An addendum dated September 1, 2021, said that Johnson was found guilty of

misdemeanor possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and sentenced to twelve months in

jail, with all of that time suspended. An addendum dated November 15, 2021, informed the

court that Johnson was charged with reckless driving in Henrico County and later convicted of

that charge. The sentencing guidelines recommended a range of punishment of “time served to

six months.”

       Johnson pleaded guilty to the probation violation and offered mitigating evidence at the

sentencing hearing on December 9, 2021. He presented a letter from his probation officer, Tierra

Nicholson, which stated that she started supervising Johnson in July 2021 and that Johnson had

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“maintained contact with her, reported to appointments as scheduled and tested negative for

illicit substances.” Johnson also submitted evidence that he had obtained his driver’s license and

completed an alcohol-safety action program. Johnson then tendered proof of his employment

with ITT services and proof that he completed a AAA driver’s improvement course, a

reckless-driving-education program, and an anger-management class. Johnson’s mother,

Lashawn Johnson-Bethea, testified that Johnson has three children he sees regularly.

       The Commonwealth asked the trial court to impose “a sanction consistent with the

guidelines at least.” Johnson asked the trial court to resuspend the balance of his time in its

entirety and release him from supervised probation. The trial court considered Johnson’s prior

criminal record and the “slew of traffic charges” he accumulated while on probation. It

explained that in fashioning the sentence, it also considered “the whole history of the defendant”

and recognized “what he [has] done positively, which are reflected in the exhibits” admitted by

the court. But the trial court found that Johnson’s new misdemeanor convictions for traffic

offenses and possession with intent to distribute marijuana warranted a departure from the

guidelines. It revoked Johnson’s original suspended sentence of four years and two months and

resuspended three years and two months on the same terms and conditions.

                                             ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring his

mitigating evidence and giving unreasonable weight to his criminal history. We disagree.

       “Whether to revoke the suspension of a sentence lies within the sound discretion of the

trial court, whose findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed absent a clear showing of an

abuse of discretion.” Keeling v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 312, 315 (1997). “[T]he abuse of

discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary

decisionmaker’s judgment that the [reviewing] court does not reverse merely because it would

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have come to a different result in the first instance.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 73 Va. App.

121, 127 (2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 212

(2013)).

               [A] court abuses its discretion: “when a relevant factor that should
               have been given significant weight is not considered; when an
               irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant
               weight; and when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are
               considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a
               clear error of judgment.”

Lawlor, 285 Va. at 213 (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282

Va. 346, 352 (2011)). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of

discretion has occurred.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting

Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)).

       “[I]n any case in which the court has suspended the execution or imposition of sentence,

the court may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that

occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the

court.” Code § 19.2-306(A).1 “It is beyond question that ‘[a] court which has ordered a

suspension of sentence undoubtedly has the power to revoke it when the defendant has failed to

comply with the conditions of the suspension.’” Russnak v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 317,

321 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 349, 354 (1964)). In

       1
           Under the revocation statute in effect when this proceeding began, once the trial court
found that Johnson had violated the terms of the suspension, it had to revoke the suspended
sentence, at which point “the original sentence shall be in full force and effect.” Code
§ 19.2-306(C)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2020). Although Code § 19.2-306(C) was amended effective July
1, 2021, Johnson does not argue that the amended statute applied in his case, and this Court
recently held that it did not apply when, as here, the probation violations occurred and the
revocation proceeding began before the effective date of the amendment. See Green v.
Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 69, 84 n.4 (2022). And even under the new statutory framework,
the trial court has discretion to impose the balance of a previously suspended sentence when a
probationer commits a new offense during the suspension period. See 2021 Va. Acts Sp. Sess. I
ch. 538; Code § 19.2-306.1(B).
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such case, “the trial court has the power to revoke the suspension of the sentence in whole or in

part . . . for ‘any cause deemed by it sufficient.’” Alsberry v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 314,

320 (2002) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)). We will not reverse a

trial court’s sentencing decision without any abuse of its “judicial discretion, the exercise of

which ‘implies conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.’” Id. (quoting Hamilton v.

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 327 (1976)).

       Here, the record fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking

Johnson’s previously suspended sentence and resuspending all but one year. The evidence

established that, while on probation, Johnson incurred new misdemeanor convictions for driving

on a suspended license, speeding, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and reckless

driving. He committed the reckless-driving offense while out on bond pending his probation

violation. The major violation report also said that Johnson tested positive for marijuana three

times and that he had made no payments toward fines and costs. Additionally, as the trial court

found, Johnson failed to report to probation for six months before his arrest on the

probation-violation capias, and Johnson had five prior felonies and eleven prior misdemeanor

offenses on his record.

       Contrary to Johnson’s assertion, the trial court did not ignore his mitigating evidence.

The trial court listened to arguments from both sides of the controversy and stated that it

recognized Johnson’s “positive efforts.” But the trial court considered other factors as well,

including Johnson’s prior criminal history and his failure to comply with the terms of probation.

The court concluded that a sentence within the suggested guidelines was inappropriate. While

the trial court had “a duty to consider mitigating evidence along with other evidence in

determining the appropriate sentence,” it was “not required to give controlling effect to the

mitigating evidence.” Reid v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561, 569 (1998) (quoting Correll v.

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Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 468-69 (1987)). By revoking Johnson’s suspended sentence and

resuspending all but one year, the trial court “did nothing more than confirm that the conditions

of probation were in fact conditions of probation.” Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443,

449 (2008).

                                          CONCLUSION

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a sentence that exceeded the

range recommended by the sentencing guidelines. We therefore affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

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