Court Opinion

ID: 9841637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 20:00:18.709962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:24.505624
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice CATRON.
I agree the points certified must be answered favourably to the complainants; but I do not altogether agree with the reasoning that has led a majority of my brethren to this conclusion.
The answer to the second question, controls the answers to the others; it is, “ Can the Circuit Court entertain jurisdiction of this case, without probate of the will set up by the complainants, and which they charge'to have been destroyed, or suppressed?”
The will of 1813, cannot be set up, without a destruction of. the will of 1811; this will has been duly proved,, and stands as a title to the succession of the estate of Daniel Clark; nor can the Circuit Court of the United, States set the probate aside:■ this can only be done by-the Probate Court.
Nor can the will of 1813, be set up in.chancery, as an inconsistent and opposing succession to the estate, .while the will of 1811, is standing in full-force. Such is the doctrine in the English Court of Chancery, as will be seen by the cases of Archer v. Mosse, 2 Vern. 8; Beale v. Plume, 1 P. Wms. 388—and which are confirmed by the case of Kenrick v. Barnsby in the House of Lords, 7 Bro. P. Cases, 437. Nor do the doubtful suggestions of Lord Hardwicke in Barnsby v. Powel, 1 Ves. sen., 119, 284, conflict with the previously settled doctrine, as I understand that-case. The argument that a fraudulent probate is a fraud on the living, and therefore Chancery can give relief by setting aside such probate, is «.mistaken idea of the chancery powers. Surely the probate of á fraudulent or forged paper, is a fraud on the living, as much as the suppression of the last will, and the causing to be proved, a revoked one; still chancery has not assumed *652jurisdiction to set aside the probate of a will alleged to have been forged, or to be fraudulent, after the testator’s death '; as will be seen by the cases cited; although he who committed the fraud, or forgery, procured the probate to be had of the paper, in the Probate Court.
It by no means follows, however, that the court below has no jurisdictión of the case made by the bill-in one of its aspects. Mrs. Gaines claims,to be the only child and lawful heir of ’Daniel Clark. This we must .take to be true. By the Civil Code of 1808, ch. 3, sec. 1, art. 19, p. 212, it is declared “ That donations either inter. vivos, or mortis causd, cannot exceed the fifth, part of the property of the disposer, if he leaves at his decease one or more legitimate children or descendants, born or to be bom.”
By the case made in the bill, Mr. Clark could only dispose of one-fifth part of his property at the time of his death; provided he had no wife living; and if she was living, then only of the one-fifth part of one half. It follows, if the will of 1811, is. permitted to stand as Daniel Clark’s last and only will, that Mrs. Gaines can come in as heir for the four-fifths. On this aspect of the bill she can proceed to establish, and enforce her rights as heir, without making probate of the will of 1813 — and the second question must be answered in the affirmative.
. By the will of 1811, Mary Clark is the principal devisee. Shfc made her will and died; by this will, Caroline Barnes is entitled to part of Daniel Clark’s estate, and ought to be before the court to maintain her rights. I, therefore, do not concur that as to her the bill is multifarious. As to the purchasers from the executors, I have more difficulty. I agree, where there is one common title in the complainant; and this could only be the true source of all the titles in all the defendants, and they have not obtained the first link in the chain of title; that than the true owner may sue them together in chancery, although they claim by separate purchases from a spurious source. Such is the genefal rule; nor do I think the purchasers frcm Chew and Relfe, are exempt from its operation, on the ground that they have no concern with the settlement of the accounts growing out of the 'administration. I therefore concur in answering the first question — that the bill is not mfiltifarious.
The third question presents no difficulty as to the executors; they are properly sued in chancery for distribution beyond doubt: and so I imagine are the devisees of Mary Clark; they being'by the will- of *653Mrs. Clark co-distributees with Mrs. Gaines under the will of 1811, as to the one-fifth part of Daniel Clark’s estate.
The purchasers are charged with having purchased with knowledge of Mrs. Gaines’s superior title; and with having fraudulently purchased from the executors with such knowledge; there being jurisdiction to grant relief against the. executors, in chancery, thé same court can grant' relief against the purchasers, involved in the fraud of the executors. If they could be compelled to account in regard to the real estate when it remained in their hands; purchasers with .notice of Mrs. Gaines’s rights; and who purchased with the intention to defeat her rights and deprive her of them, can stand in no better situation than the executors, and must account .likewise; both being held in a court of equity equally as trustees for the true owner. Therefore, on the face of the bill, a-court of equity has jurisdiction; and a court of law has not exclusive jurisdiction, and thus the third point ought to be certified.
ORDER.
This cause came on to be heard- on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, and on the points and questions which-were certified to this court for its opinion agreeably to the act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, It is the opinion of this court that the first question should be answered in the affirmative; but that the bill should be so amended in the Circut Court as to avoid both of the exceptions stated in the opinion of this court, and that the second and third questions should also be answered in the affirmative, ’’Cvith the qualifications stated in the opinion of this court. Whereupon, it is now here ordered and adjudged, that it be so certified to the judges of the said Circuit Court.