Court Opinion

ID: 9780966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 14:11:58.624936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:45.665781
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph Penta,                         :
                   Petitioner         :
                                      :   No. 54 C.D. 2022
            v.                        :
                                      :   Submitted: February 17, 2023
City of Philadelphia                  :
(Workers’ Compensation                :
Appeal Board),                        :
                   Respondent         :

BEFORE:     HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
            HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
            HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                              FILED: August 30, 2023

            In this workers’ compensation (WC) case, Petitioner Joseph Penta
(Claimant) petitions for review of the December 27, 2021 Opinion and Order of the
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which affirmed the July 21, 2021
Decision and Order of Workers’ Compensation Judge Karen A. Wertheimer (WCJ).
The WCJ granted the Petition to Modify Compensation Benefits (Modification
Petition) filed by Respondent City of Philadelphia (Employer) and modified
Claimant’s WC benefit status from total to partial based on an Impairment Rating
Evaluation (IRE) performed on September 16, 2020.       At issue in this appeal,
fundamentally, is whether Section 306(a.3) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WC
Act),1 also known as Act 111, constitutionally may be applied to Claimant’s injury and
associated receipt of WC benefits. Upon review, we affirm the Board.
                    I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
              The facts material to the issue presented in this appeal are undisputed. On
May 30, 2011, Claimant suffered a right ankle injury when he ran off of a curb in the
course and scope of his employment as a police officer for Employer. (Board Op. at
1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 29a.) On June 16, 2011, Employer issued a Notice of
Compensation Payable (NCP), which described Claimant’s injury as a right ankle
sprain. (WCJ Finding of Fact (FOF) 1; R.R. at 16a.)
              Several years later, on September 16, 2020, Dr. Guy W. Fried (Dr. Fried)
conducted an IRE of Claimant pursuant to Section 306(a.3) of the WC Act. In his
subsequent report, Dr. Fried concluded that Claimant has a whole-person impairment
rating of 11%, based upon the Sixth Edition, second printing of the American Medical
Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides). (FOF
1(d), 4; R.R. at 17a.) Based on Dr. Fried’s evaluation, Employer filed its Modification
Petition on October 20, 2020, in which it sought to reduce Claimant’s WC benefit status
from temporary total disability (TTD) to temporary partial disability (TPD). Before
the WCJ, Claimant presented no evidence and asserted only constitutional challenges
to Act 111. (FOF 3; R.R. at 17a.) The WCJ granted Employer’s Modification Petition,
concluding that Claimant’s challenges to the constitutionality of Act 111 were beyond
her jurisdiction. Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed. Claimant now
petitions for review in this Court.

       1
        Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended. Section 306(a.3) was added by the Act of October
24, 2018, P.L. 714, No. 111 (Act 111), 77 P.S. § 511.3.

                                                2
                                  II.      ISSUE PRESENTED
               Claimant presents a single, overarching issue for our review, namely,
whether Act 111 may constitutionally be applied to his injury, which occurred before
Act 111’s effective date. He argues, as he did before the WCJ and Board, that
retroactive application of Act 111 violates due process and the Remedies Clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.2 Although he acknowledges that this Court rejected these
very arguments in Pierson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Consol
Pennsylvania Coal Co.), 252 A.3d 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), he nevertheless argues
that we should reconsider Pierson and invalidate Act 111.
                                        III.   DISCUSSION3
               On September 18, 2015, almost four and one-half years after Claimant’s
injury, this Court issued its decision in Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(Derry Area School District), 124 A.3d 406 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (Protz I), affirmed in
part and reversed in part, 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017) (Protz II), declaring former Section
306(a.2) of the WC Act4 void in its entirety. In Protz II, the Pennsylvania Supreme

       2
         The Remedies Clause provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll courts shall be open; and every
man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course
of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay. . . .” Pa. Const. art. I, § 11.

       3
         Our review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported by
substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether constitutional rights were
violated. Phoenixville Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Shoap), 81 A.3d 830, 838
(Pa. 2013). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” City of Philadelphia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(Kriebel), 29 A.3d 762, 769 (Pa. 2011).

       4
         Section 306(a.2), formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2, was repealed by Act 111 and replaced by Section
306(a.3). Section 306(a.2) provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
               When an employe has received total disability compensation pursuant to
               clause (a) for a period of [104] weeks . . . the employe shall be required to
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                    3
Court held that the General Assembly, in authorizing the application of future versions
of the AMA Guides without review, had unconstitutionally delegated its lawmaking
authority in violation of the non-delegation doctrine.5 161 A.3d at 840-41. The Court
invalidated Section 306(a.2) in its entirety.
              On October 24, 2018, in response to Protz II, the General Assembly
passed Act 111, which replaced former Section 306(a.2) of the Act with Section
306(a.3). Section 306(a.3) reads in relevant part:
              (1) When an employe has received total disability compensation
              pursuant to clause (a) for a period of one hundred four weeks . .
              . the employe shall be required to submit to a medical
              examination . . . to determine the degree of impairment due to
              the compensable injury, if any. The degree of impairment shall
              be determined based upon an evaluation by a physician . . .
              pursuant to the [Sixth Edition, second printing of the AMA
              Guides].

              (2) If such determination results in an impairment rating that
              meets a threshold impairment rating that is equal to or greater
              than [35%] . . . , the employe shall be presumed to be totally
              disabled and shall continue to receive total disability
              compensation benefits . . . . If such determination results in an

              submit to a medical examination . . . to determine the degree of impairment
              due to the compensable injury, if any . . . . The degree of impairment shall
              be determined based upon an evaluation by a physician . . . pursuant to the
              most recent edition of the [AMA Guides] . . . (2) If such determination
              results in an impairment rating that meets a threshold impairment rating that
              is equal to or greater than [50%] . . . the employe shall be presumed to be
              totally disabled and shall continue to receive total disability compensation
              benefits. . . . If such determination results in an impairment rating less than
              [50%] impairment . . . the employe shall then receive partial disability
              benefits under class (b) . . . .
Former 77 P.S. § 511.2.

       5
        Pa. Const. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a
General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”).

                                                  4
              impairment rating less than [35%] impairment . . . , the employe
              shall then receive partial disability benefits under class (b) . . . .
77 P.S. § 511.3. Section 3 of Act 111 further provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
              (1) For the purposes of determining whether an employee shall
              submit to a medical examination to determine the degree of
              impairment and whether an employee has received total
              disability compensation for the period of 104 weeks under
              [S]ection 306(a.3)(1) of the [WC A]ct, an insurer shall be given
              credit for weeks of total disability compensation paid prior to the
              effective date of this paragraph. This section shall not be
              construed to alter the requirements of section 306(a.3) of the
              [WC A]ct.

              (2) For the purposes of determining the total number of weeks
              of partial disability compensation payable under [S]ection
              306(a.3)(7) of the [WC A]ct, an insurer shall be given credit for
              weeks of partial disability compensation paid prior to the
              effective date of this paragraph.
77 P.S. § 511.3, Historical and Statutory Notes.
              In Pierson,6 the claimant sustained a work-related injury on August 13,
2014. The employer acknowledged the injury via an NCP, and the claimant received
TTD benefits. 252 A.3d at 1171-72. On December 21, 2018, the employer filed a
modification petition pursuant to newly-enacted Section 306(a.3) seeking to change the
claimant’s benefits from TTD to partial disability based on an IRE performed on
December 19, 2018. Id. at 1172. The claimant lodged constitutional challenges to
Section 306(a.3) before both the WCJ and the Board, both of which declined to address
the challenges. Id.7     On appeal to this Court, the claimant argued that (1) Section

       6
        Although Pierson initially was filed as an unpublished memorandum, on application of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association Workers’ Compensation Law Section, we ordered publication on April
26, 2021. See Pa. R.A.P. 3740.

       7
         The claimant in Pierson also challenged the credibility of the physician performing the
subject IRE, an issue not before us in this appeal.

                                               5
306(a.3) is unconstitutional “on its face,” and (2) Section 306(a.3) cannot be applied
retroactively to claims that originated (i.e., have an injury date) prior to October 24,
2018, the effective date of the new IRE mechanism. The claimant further argued that
Act 111 involved a change in substantive law, that Protz II invalidated any IRE
mechanism that could apply to his claim, and that the application of Act 111 to his
claim retroactively violates vested rights specifically secured by due process and the
Remedies Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 1174-76.
             We rejected the claimant’s arguments, relying chiefly on our prior
decisions in Pennsylvania AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 219 A.3d 306 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2019), and Rose Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Espada), 238
A.3d 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). Because our analysis in Pierson is controlling here, we
quote it at length:
             In [Pennsylvania AFL-CIO], we determined [that] Act 111 was
             not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, as the
             prior IRE provision of the [WC] Act was determined to be. . . .
             Our opinion in Pennsylvania AFL-CIO was affirmed by a brief
             per curiam order of our Supreme Court. . . . Although we
             acknowledge that the determination in Pennsylvania AFL-CIO
             was relative to whether Act 111 was an unconstitutional
             delegation of legislative authority, it was nevertheless a test of
             [the] [ ] assertion that Act 111 is unconstitutional “on its face,”
             and the consensus was that it is not. . . .
             In addition, and in regard to the issue of the retroactive
             application of the 104-week and credit provisions of Act 111, we
             first address [the] [ ] contention that Protz II rendered former
             Section 306(a.2) of the Act void ab initio . . . .
             In [Warren v. Folk, 886 A.2d 305 (Pa. Super. 2005)], the
             Pennsylvania Superior Court explained that it, and our Supreme
             Court, had considered the issue of retroactivity in terms of
             whether the statute in question affects vested rights and
             determined that

                                           6
      [w]here no vested right or contractual obligation is
      involved, an act is not retroactively construed when
      applied to a condition existing on its effective date
      even though the condition results from events prior
      to that date. . . . A “vested right” is one that “so
      completely and definitely belongs to a person that it
      cannot be impaired or taken away without the
      person’s consent.”
While [the] [c]laimant, here, argues that he has a right to benefits
as calculated at the time of injury, there are reasonable
expectations under the [WC] Act that benefits may change. We
acknowledge that a claimant retains a certain right to benefits
until such time as he is found to be ineligible for them. However,
claimants, such as the one in the matter before us, did not
automatically lose anything by the enactment of Act 111. Act
111 simply provided employers with the means to change a
claimant’s disability status from total to partial by providing the
requisite medical evidence that the claimant has a whole[-]body
impairment of less than 35%, after receiving 104 weeks of TTD
benefits.
As this Court opined in Rose Corporation, the General Assembly
made it clear in [Section 3 of] Act 111 that weeks of TTD and
partial disability paid by an employer/insurer prior to the
enactment of Act 111 count as credit against an employer’s new
obligations under Act 111. In Rose Corporation, we said, in
reference to Act 111:
      The plain language of Section 3 establishes a
      mechanism by which employers/insurers may
      receive credit for weeks of compensation previously
      paid.     First, Section 3(1) provides that an
      employer/insurer “shall be given credit for weeks of
      total disability compensation paid prior to the
      effective date of this paragraph” for purposes of
      determining whether the 104 weeks of total
      disability had been paid. This 104 weeks is
      important because, under both the former and
      current IRE provisions, a claimant need not attend
      an IRE until after the claimant receives 104 weeks

                               7
                   of total compensation. 77 P.S. § 511.3(1); former
                   77 P.S. § 511.2(1). See Section 3(1) of Act 111.
                   Therefore, pursuant to Section 3(1), an
                   employer/insurer will receive credit towards this
                   104 weeks for any weeks of total disability benefits
                   that were previously paid prior to Act 111’s
                   enactment. Second, an employer/insurer will be
                   given credit for any weeks of partial disability
                   compensation paid prior to enactment of Act 111
                   “for the purposes of determining the total number of
                   weeks of partial disability compensation payable
                   under Section 306(a.3)(7) of the WC Act.” Section
                   3(2) of Act 111. In short, any weeks of partial
                   disability previously paid will count towards the
                   500-week cap on such benefits.
            [Rose Corporation], 238 A.3d at 561-62. [W]e also added:
            “Through the use of very careful and specific language, the
            General Assembly provided employers/insurers with credit for
            the weeks of compensation, whether total or partial in nature,
            previously paid.” [Id.] at 562.
            ....

            [The] [c]laimant, herein [ ] argues that the General Assembly
            cannot take away his “vested rights” and that it did not explicitly
            express an intent to apply the provisions of Act 111 in any sort
            of a retroactive fashion. As we noted above, [the] [c]laimant’s
            “vested rights” have not been abrogated by Act 111. Further, we
            believe it is clear that the General Assembly intended for the 104-
            week and credit weeks provisions of Act 111 to be given
            retroactive effect, where, as we noted in Rose Corporation, it
            stated in plain language it was doing so. Thus, [the c]laimant
            does not prevail in his arguments relative to the constitutionality
            of Act 111, and we see no reason to disturb the Board’s Order
            affirming the WCJ.

Id. at 1178-80. See also DiPaolo v. UPMC Magee Women’s Hospital (Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board), 278 A.3d 430, 432-38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022), appeal
denied, 290 A.3d 237 (Pa. 2023).

                                          8
               Claimant argued throughout the proceedings before the WCJ and Board,
and argues again here, that Act 111 is unconstitutional. He does not challenge the
WCJ’s determination on any other grounds. Because this case is controlled by Pierson,
which we again reaffirm, we must conclude that Claimant’s arguments are without
merit. We accordingly affirm the Board.8

                                                  ________________________________
                                                  PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

       8
          Although Claimant asserts in his petition for review that the WCJ’s and Board’s decisions
are not supported by substantial evidence and err as a matter of law, he did not preserve these issues
before the Board, see R.R. at 21a-22a, and did not brief them in this Court. They accordingly are
waived. Starr Aviation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Colquitt), 155 A.3d 1156, 1162
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (where a claimant has failed to raise an issue in any manner before the Board, the
issue is waived); Wirth v. Commonwealth, 95 A.3d 822, 837 (Pa. 2014) (where issues raised on appeal
are not adequately briefed pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(a), they are
waived).

                                                  9
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph Penta,                       :
                 Petitioner         :
                                    :    No. 54 C.D. 2022
            v.                      :
                                    :
City of Philadelphia                :
(Workers’ Compensation              :
Appeal Board),                      :
                   Respondent       :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 30th day of August, 2023, the December 27, 2021
order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board hereby is AFFIRMED.

                                        ________________________________
                                        PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge