Court Opinion

ID: 9536726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:05:53.580706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:08.647988
License: Public Domain

TOOZE, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. However, I cannot agree with some of the limitations which the majority apparently seeks to place upon the use of a proceeding in the nature of coram nobis.
In Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or 283, 351, 251 P2d 87, 253 P2d 289, 298, I wrote a specially concurring opinion in which I took the position (contrary to that taken by the majority in that ease) that a trial court had the inherent power to act in a proceeding commonly designated as one in the nature of eoram nobis to correct its own record or to set aside an order or judgment which was induced by fraud upon the court or procured in violation of a constitutional right of a party. I suggested that this inherent power of the *421court to correct its own mistakes (errors which inhere in and render a judgment void, rather than merely voidable), to inquire into frauds perpetrated upon it, and to protect the citizen in his constitutional prerogatives and prevent oppression or persecution could not be curtailed or abolished by legislative act or failure to act. Even this court has no right to interfere with it. Sanders v. The State, 85 Ind 318, 329, 44 Am Rep 29; People v. Gersewitz, 294 NY 163, 167, 61 NE2d 427.
It is an inherent power necessary not only to the protection of an individual’s constitutional rights, but also to the protection of the court’s own integrity. In other words, it is a power in which not only an individual may have an interest, but also one in which the court itself has a very vital interest for its own benefit. In my opinion, it is immaterial what legal machinery is employed to invite the court’s attention to the fraud perpetrated upon it, or to the matters resulting in an unconstitutional and void conviction of an individual for crime. I quote from what I said in Huffman v. Alexander, supra:
“However, as I interpret the opinion [majority], the majority would deny the inherent power of a trial court to consider a motion in the nature of coram nobis for the correction of an erroneous judgment of conviction. With this I cannot agree. A motion in the nature of coram nobis is, to all intents and purposes, a delayed motion for a new trial. It is filed in the court where the conviction occurred, and after the time for filing a motion for a new trial and for appeal has expired under the criminal code. It is designed to protect the citizen in his rights, constitutional or otherwise, and to prevent oppression or persecution. It does not supersede the remedy by habeas corpus, nor does it conflict with it. In some respects it might be considered a concurrent remedy, and in others *422a superior remedy. It is a proceeding in the original court and criminal case and is addressed directly to the court that presumably has a better opportunity of securing first-hand knowledge of what occurred prior to and upon conviction than any other court j whereas, habeas corpus, if brought by a prisoner in the state penitentiary, must be filed in the circuit court for Marion county before a judge who may be a stranger to the record. In some cases it may be that habeas corpus would be the more effective remedy, but that is beside the point.
“As authority for the proposition that a proceeding in the nature of coram nobis is not recognized in this state, the majority invites attention to State v. Rathie et ah, 101 Or 368, 369, 200 P 790. I do not so interpret that opinion, but if it does so hold, I would expressly overrule it.” (Italics supplied.)
It is my opinion that inasmuch as consideration of such a proceeding is within the inherent power of the court, it is manifest that the exercise of such power cannot be diminished or restricted by outside considerations such, for example, as the availability of a remedy by habeas corpus. So to restrict the power would be to deny its inherent character. Broadening the field in which habeas corpus may be employed does not in any manner affect inherent powers of a court of justice, this power to correct its own constitutional errors, or any other.
In the instant case the vital question before us is one of jurisdiction of a court, rather than one respecting the rights of an individual, although those rights are involved. We are chiefly concerned with an inherent power of the court and the jurisdiction to' exercise it, an inherent power that is as old as our system of jurisprudence itself. In cases such as this *423the exercise of this inherent power by a court has usually been invoked by a proceeding which, for convenience, has been designated by appellate courts as one in the nature of coram nobis, but the name given it is unimportant. It would seem axiomatic that the inherent power itself and its exercise cannot be affected in any manner by the name arbitrarily given the proceeding in which it is invoked. Obviously, the remedy is not that of the ancient Writ of Coram Nobis, although the proceeding may employ some of the features thereof. I wholeheartedly agree with what was said by the Indiana court in Sanders v. The State, supra, which is quoted in the majority opinion in this case as follows:
"* * * That courts possess inherent powers not derived from any statute is undeniably true. Among these powers are the right to correct their records so as to make them speak the truth, to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes, to prevent the abuse of their authority or process, and to enforce obedience to their mandates. If it were granted that courts possess only such rights and powers as are conferred by statute, they would be mere creatures of the Legislature, and not independent departments of the government. They are not mere creatures of the Legislature, but are coordinate branches of the government and in their sphere not subject to legislative control.” Citing cases.
I am in agreement with the majority that all technical objections that might be raised respecting the right of appeal in this particular case should be disregarded, none having been raised by the parties, and that we should dispose of the matter upon its merits.
The trial court declined to consider Huffman’s motion in the nature of coram nobis upon the sole ground that the court did not have jurisdiction to enter*424tain such a proceeding. In Huffman v. Alexander, supra (the proceeding in habeas corpus), this court determined that Huffman had made a sufficient showing of a denial of constitutional rights as to entitle him to a hearing upon the merits. His discharge from custody before such hearing could be held terminated that litigation as moot. Unless he has a remedy such as that proposed by his motion filed in the trial court, there is no way that his constitutional rights may be vindicated. That is the sole issue before us, and now squarely presented to us is the question whether or not the circuit court (our court of general jurisdiction) has the inherent power to relieve a party from a judgment of conviction which he says was entered against him through fraud or disregard of his constitutional rights.
The majority has properly repudiated what was said in State v. Rathie, 101 Or 368, 200 P 790, and upon which the conclusion in Huffman v. Alexander, supra, respecting coram nobis, was largely based, and now holds that a proceeding in the nature of coram nobis is available in this state. That fully answers the problem confronting us. I am fearful that although recognizing the inherent power of the court to entertain a proceeding in the nature of coram nobis, the majority has now attempted to circumscribe unduly its scope and effect by discussing a number of rules and regulations which might affect its operation. In other words, it is my feeling that the majority after acknowledging the existence of the remedy has then sought to build an unnecessary fence around its use. We should be content simply to decide the precise question before us.
Rossman, J., concurs in this opinion.