Court Opinion

ID: 9897539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:15:53.110518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:34.258832
License: Public Domain

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

                   State v. Cornelius C. Cohen (A-50-21) (084493)

Argued January 4, 2023 -- Decided June 22, 2023

PIERRE-LOUIS, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

      In this appeal, the Court considers whether the odor of marijuana in a vehicle
authorizes a search of the engine compartment and trunk under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement.

       On January 17, 2016, after receiving a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) email
based on a tip from a confidential informant (CI) that defendant Cornelius Cohen
would be traveling to the Carolinas to pick up firearms and bring them back to New
Jersey to sell, State Trooper Charles Travis noticed one of the cars described in the
BOLO email traveling northbound on the New Jersey Turnpike. Trooper Travis
pulled the vehicle over for traffic violations.

       When Trooper Travis approached the vehicle, he noticed multiple air
fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror. The trooper asked defendant and
Najah Baker, who was a passenger in the vehicle, for their credentials. Trooper
Travis testified that he smelled “a strong odor of raw marijuana” in the vehicle
during the stop and observed “greenish-brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and
shirt, which the trooper identified as “shake,” or “the tail-end of marijuana.”
Trooper Travis told a colleague who had followed him to the traffic stop that he
smelled raw marijuana and was going to remove defendant and Baker from the car.
With defendant and Baker handcuffed and in separate patrol cars, Trooper Travis
began a search of the vehicle. He first searched the passenger compartment, where
he recovered from the glove compartment a 9mm spent shell casing. The search of
the passenger compartment did not reveal any marijuana.

       Trooper Travis did not apply for a search warrant based on the information
supplied by the CI, but instead proceeded to the front of the vehicle where he opened
the vehicle’s hood and searched the engine compartment. There he found a rifle and
a revolver. Trooper Travis then moved his search to the trunk, where he found a
duffle bag containing hollow point bullets. No marijuana was recovered from the
car, defendant, or Baker.

                                          1
        Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the car search. The
trial court denied the motion, although the judge expressed that he was troubled by
the “concept of how far [the courts should] tolerate the subjective testimony of the
smell of raw marijuana” when there is “no other evidence to suggest marijuana was
ever in the car.” Notwithstanding those concerns, the trial court held that “[t]he
odor of raw marijuana emanating from a vehicle without a detectible pinpoint
establishes probable cause to search the entire vehicle,” citing State v. Kahlon, 172
N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1980). Defendant subsequently entered a conditional
guilty plea to one count of unlawful possession of a weapon.

       The Appellate Division affirmed the court’s ruling and reliance on Kahlon to
justify extending the search. The Court granted certification. 251 N.J. 14 (2022).

HELD: Expanding the search to the engine compartment and trunk went beyond the
scope of the automobile exception. Although the trooper smelled marijuana in the
passenger compartment of the car, his initial search yielded no results and provided
no justification “to extend the zone of the . . . search further than the persons of the
occupants or the interior of the car.” State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 14-15 (1980). As a
result, the seized evidence should be suppressed.

1. Pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, when the police
have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an
offense and the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and
spontaneous, law enforcement may search the vehicle without first obtaining a
warrant. New Jersey courts have recognized that the smell of marijuana constitutes
probable cause that a criminal offense has been committed and additional contraband
might be present. But a search that is reasonable at its inception may nonetheless
violate the Constitution by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. (pp. 12-13)

2. The Court reviews decisions in which it has endeavored to define the bounds of a
legal search under the automobile exception based on the suspected presence of
marijuana. In Patino, a search of the trunk following the discovery of a plastic
container full of “green vegetation” and a marijuana cigarette in a vehicle’s interior
exceeded the parameters of the automobile exception. 83 N.J. at 12-13. The Court
noted that the officer’s discovery of only “a small amount of marijuana, consistent
with personal use, does not provide [police] with probable cause to believe that
larger amounts of marijuana or other contraband are being transported.” Id. at 13.
In State v. Guerra, on the other hand, the officer’s determination that the apparent
intensity of the marijuana odor in a vehicle he had pulled over for a broken taillight
could indicate only an amount too large to be contained in the bag he saw in the
car’s interior -- combined with the observed presence of a substantial weight in the
trunk, which was “hanging low” -- justified a search of that space, where the trooper
discovered 176.5 pounds of marijuana. 93 N.J. 146, 148-52 (1983). (pp. 13-16)
                                           2
3. In Kahlon, which was decided prior to Patino, an officer searched the interior
compartment of the defendant’s vehicle and found a partially burned cigarette and a
clear plastic bag containing half an ounce of marijuana. 172 N.J. Super. at 336. The
officer then entered the backseat where he noticed a “very heavy odor of unburned
marijuana.” Id. at 337. Having found no additional marijuana in the backseat, the
officer opened the trunk where he found 30 pounds of marijuana. Ibid. The
Appellate Division held that the officer had probable cause to search the trunk in
light of his “inability to pinpoint the source of the smell of unburned marijuana” that
seemed to emanate from the rear of the car “together with the marijuana already
found in the car.” Id. at 338. In sum, cases in which New Jersey courts have upheld
searches of areas beyond the passenger compartment have involved facts beyond
simply detecting the smell of marijuana from the interior of the car. (pp. 16-18)

4. Here, after initiating the traffic stop of the car described in the BOLO alert,
Trooper Travis reported “a strong odor of raw marijuana” in the vehicle as well as
“greenish-brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and shirt. At that point, he had a
reasonable belief that a criminal offense had been committed and that additional
contraband might be present on defendant’s person and in the passenger compartment.
The initial search of defendant, Baker, and the passenger compartment was therefore
valid. After the search of the car’s interior did not reveal marijuana, however, the
police expanded the search to separate areas of the vehicle despite no unique facts
that indicated raw marijuana was in either the engine compartment or trunk. That
expansion went beyond the scope of the automobile exception, and any information
from the BOLO could not contribute to a probable cause determination based on the
smell of marijuana. Comparing in detail the facts of this case to those of prior cases,
the Court finds that the searches of the engine compartment and trunk here were
unlawful and that the evidence seized from them must be suppressed. (pp. 18-23)

5. The Court’s holding does not suggest that areas within the interior of a car would
require separate probable cause findings to conduct a warrantless search. Nor does
it suggest that the warrantless search of a trunk or engine compartment will always
require separate probable cause findings, although a generalized smell of raw
marijuana does not justify a search of every compartment of a car. Finally, although
the search here predated the Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and
Marketplace Modernization Act, the Court anticipates that cases involving the
automobile exception and probable cause to search a vehicle based solely on the
smell of marijuana will likely be few and far between going forward. (pp. 23-25)

      REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, WAINER
APTER, and FASCIALE; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) join
in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion.
                                          3
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-50 September Term 2021
                       084493

                 State of New Jersey,

                Plaintiff-Respondent,

                          v.

                 Cornelius C. Cohen,

                Defendant-Appellant.

        On certification to the Superior Court,
                  Appellate Division .

       Argued                      Decided
   January 4, 2023               June 22, 2023

Raymond L. Hamlin argued the cause for appellant
(Hunt, Hamlin & Ridley, attorneys; Raymond L. Hamlin,
of counsel and on the briefs).

Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
General, attorney; Sarah C. Hunt, of counsel and on the
briefs).

Austin J. Howard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for amicus curiae Public Defender of
New Jersey (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Austin J. Howard, of counsel and on the brief).

Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation,

                           1
            attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on
            the brief).

            Dillon J. McGuire argued the cause for amicus curiae
            Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey
            (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of
            counsel and on the brief, and Dillon J. McGuire, on the
            brief).

         JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

      In this case, we consider whether the odor of marijuana in a vehicle

authorizes a search of the engine compartment and trunk under the automobile

exception to the warrant requirement.

      After receiving a tip from a confidential informant that defendant

Cornelius Cohen regularly traveled out of state to acquire firearms for

subsequent sale in New Jersey, the New Jersey State Police issued a “be on the

lookout” notice for two vehicles defendant was known to use. After spotting

one of the cars on the New Jersey Turnpike, State Trooper Charles Travis

followed the vehicle for a few miles before initiating a traffic stop for failure

to maintain the lane and a suspected toll violation.

      During the stop, Trooper Travis detected the smell of raw marijuana

while speaking with defendant at the window of the vehicle. After searching

the passenger compartment and finding no marijuana, the trooper continued his

search by opening the hood of the car. He discovered a rifle and a revolver

                                         2
nestled in the vehicle’s engine compartment. Trooper Travis then opened the

trunk and found a bag containing hollow point bullets. Despite Trooper

Travis’s detection of the odor of marijuana, no marijuana was found.

      Defendant moved to suppress the items seized during the warrantless

search and the trial court denied his motion. Thereafter, defendant pled guilty

to one count of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and was

sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed

defendant’s conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial court’s

admission of the evidence seized from the engine compartment and trunk.

      We granted certification limited to the issue of whether officers were

authorized to search the car’s engine compartment and trunk based on the odor

of marijuana in the vehicle.

      As detailed below, we reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and

find that the seized evidence should be suppressed.

                                        I.

                                       A.

      We rely on the testimony from the suppression hearing for the following

factual summary.

      In January 2016, Detective Joseph Czech of the New Jersey State Police

received a tip from a confidential informant (CI) that defendant often traveled

                                        3
to the Carolinas to pick up firearms and bring them back to New Jersey to sell.

The CI provided officers with defendant’s name and physical description. The

CI further provided the license plate numbers to the following two vehicles

defendant allegedly used to transport weapons: a gray Infiniti G35 registered

to defendant, and a black Honda Civic registered to Najah Baker.

      Later that month, the same CI advised Detective Czech that defendant

and an associate would be traveling to one of the Carolinas on January 15, and

planned to return to New Jersey on January 17. In response to that

information, Detective Czech entered the license plates for both vehicles into

various law enforcement databases so that he would be notified if the plates

were picked up by a license plate reader or checked by another officer.

Detective Czech’s supervisor, Detective Sergeant John Cipot, sent out a “be on

the lookout” (BOLO) email to State Police stations on January 14, asking

officers to notify Detective Czech if they spotted either of the cars.

      On January 17, State Trooper Charles Travis noticed the black Honda

Civic described in the BOLO email traveling northbound on the New Jersey

Turnpike. Trooper Travis testified that he followed the vehicle for about two

miles and saw the driver repeatedly fail to maintain his lane. According to his

testimony, as the car passed through a toll plaza, the trooper saw the EZ-Pass

indicator display an “unpaid toll” message. Trooper Travis called Detective

                                        4
Czech -- as instructed by the BOLO email -- and told Detective Czech that he

was about to pull the vehicle over for traffic violations.

      When Trooper Travis approached the vehicle, he noticed multiple air

fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror. The trooper asked defendant and

Baker, who was a passenger in the vehicle, for their credentials -- license,

registration, and car insurance information. Defendant told the trooper that he

and Baker were returning from Washington, D.C., where they had been

visiting friends for the weekend.

      Trooper Travis testified that he smelled “a strong odor of raw

marijuana” in the vehicle during the stop. Trooper Travis also observed

“greenish-brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and shirt, which the trooper

identified as “shake,” or “the tail-end of marijuana.” In questioning defendant

and Baker, Trooper Travis testified that he asked defendant whether he smoked

cigarettes because Trooper Travis “wanted to make sure it wasn’t tobacco.”

      Trooper Travis told a colleague who had followed him to the traffic stop

that he smelled raw marijuana and was going to remove defendant and Baker

from the car. During a search of defendant’s person, Trooper Travis found a

cigar and a keychain with an image of a marijuana leaf but did not discover

any actual marijuana.

                                         5
      With defendant and Baker handcuffed and in separate patrol cars,

Trooper Travis began a search of the vehicle. He first searched the passenger

compartment, where he recovered from the glove compartment a plastic bag

containing two shot glasses. One of the shot glasses contained a 9mm spent

shell casing. The search of the passenger compartment did not reveal any

marijuana.

      Trooper Travis did not apply for a search warrant based on the

information supplied by the CI, but instead proceeded to the front of the

vehicle where he opened the vehicle’s hood and searched the engine

compartment. There he found a black canvas bag near the passenger side of

the car “along the firewall of the engine.” Trooper Travis found a second,

smaller bag against the engine’s firewall on the driver’s side. The first bag

contained a rifle; the second a revolver. Trooper Travis then moved his search

to the trunk, where he found a duffle bag containing hollow point bullets. No

marijuana was recovered from the car, defendant, or Baker.

                                       B.

      On October 17, 2016, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment

charging defendant with second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon,

third-degree possession of a weapon, and fourth-degree possession of a

prohibited device.

                                        6
      Defendant filed three pre-trial motions: a motion to suppress the

firearms and ammunition seized during the car search, a motion to suppress his

on-scene statement to police, and a motion to reveal the identity of the

confidential informant. The trial judge held a four-day hearing on those

motions. Only the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the car is

relevant to this appeal.

      Much of the suppression hearing focused on whether Trooper Travis

actually smelled marijuana, and whether the search was based on

unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances as required by State v. Witt, 223

N.J. 409 (2015), given the BOLO that had been issued three days prior to the

stop. Trooper Travis testified that he smelled raw marijuana and explained,

based on his experience, that he searched the car hood because marijuana “can

fit in the engine compartment. And what will happen is it will get sucked into

. . . the air vents.” Baker testified that when they were stopped, neither she nor

defendant had consumed marijuana that day or had marijuana in their

possession.

      The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, although the

judge expressed that he was troubled by the “concept of how far [the courts

should] tolerate the subjective testimony of the smell of raw marijuana” when

there is “no other evidence to suggest marijuana was ever in the car.”

                                        7
Notwithstanding those concerns, the trial court, in a written decision, credited

Trooper Travis’s testimony and concluded that the search was lawful, so the

seized evidence was admissible. Based on the dashcam video of the stop, the

trial court found that a second officer corroborated Trooper Travis’s smell of

marijuana. Citing State v. Kahlon, 172 N.J. Super. 331 (App. Div. 1980), the

trial court held that “[t]he odor of raw marijuana emanating from a vehicle

without a detectible pinpoint establishes probable cause to search the entire

vehicle.”

      Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of

second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and was sentenced to five

years’ imprisonment with 42 months’ parole ineligibility. Defendant’s

sentence was stayed pending appeal.

                                       C.

      On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court incorrectly interpreted

Kahlon to stand for the proposition that the smell of marijuana permits a

search of the entire vehicle. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division

affirmed the trial court’s ruling and reliance on Kahlon to justify extending the

search from the passenger compartment to the hood and trunk of the car.

                                        8
                                        D.

      We granted defendant’s petition for certification limited to the issue of

whether officers had probable cause to search the vehicle’s engine

compartment and trunk under the automobile exception to the warrant

requirement. 251 N.J. 14, 14-15 (2022).

      We also granted the applications of the Office of the Public Defender

(OPD), the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL),

and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) to participate

as amici curiae.

                                        II.

                                        A.

      Defendant argues that the smell of marijuana did not provide police with

probable cause to search the engine compartment and trunk of his vehicle.

Defendant contends that the trial court and the Appellate Division unfairly

broadened the holding of Kahlon. Defendant distinguishes this case from

Kahlon by highlighting the fact that no marijuana was found in the interior of

his car and insists the State did not put forth “any facts supporting the

suspicion of a drug cache in the trunk or the hood of the automobile .”

Defendant further argues that the “shake” of dried marijuana leaves are, at

best, indications that Cohen might have a small amount of marijuana for

                                        9
personal use which is not enough to justify expanding the search to the car’s

trunk or engine compartment under State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 13 (1980).

      Several amici support defendant’s position. The OPD argues that, in

pre-legalization cases, the odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search

only the areas of a vehicle from which the smell seems to emanate and insists

this Court’s jurisprudence on the automobile exception has been faithful to that

specificity requirement. The ACLU argues that the seized evidence must be

suppressed because the smell of marijuana does not authorize invasive

searches beyond the passenger compartment of a vehicle. The ACDL

expresses concern that, under the Appellate Division’s rule, an officer could

falsely claim to smell marijuana to enable a full-scale automobile search. The

ACDL urges this Court to suppress any non-drug evidence seized in a search

initiated by smell and prevent any officer with knowledge of an existing

investigation from searching a subject’s car without a warrant.

                                        B.

      The State urges the Court to affirm the Appellate Division and hold that

Trooper Travis had probable cause to search the engine compartment and

trunk. Comparing this case to State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146 (1983), the State

argues that Trooper Travis had probable cause to expand his search after ruling

out all other possible sources of the odor.

                                        10
                                       III.

                                        A.

      Our standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential , and we

“uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court’s decision so long as

those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.”

State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J.

224, 243 (2007)). We defer “to those findings in recognition of the trial

court’s ‘opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.’” Ibid. (quoting Elders, 192 N.J.

at 244). This Court ordinarily will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings

unless they are “so clearly mistaken ‘that the interests of justice demand

intervention and correction.’” State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014)

(quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). “A trial court’s legal conclusions, however,

‘and the consequences that flow from established facts,’ are reviewed de

novo.” Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 609 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263

(2015)).

                                        B.

      The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable

searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable

                                        11
under both constitutions. See State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022).

Before conducting a search, the police must obtain a warrant from a neutral

judicial officer “unless the search falls within a recognized exception to the

warrant requirement.” State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282, 298 (2019). “When no

warrant is sought, the State has the burden to demonstrate that ‘[the search]

falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant

requirement.’” State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004) (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482 (2001)). The State

must show “by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no

constitutional violation.” Id. at 20 (quoting State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 13

(2003)).

      The exception to the warrant requirement at issue in this case is the

automobile exception. This Court has held that under our State Constitution,

“when the police have probable cause to believe that [a] vehicle contains

contraband or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to

probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous,” law enforcement may

search the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant. Witt, 223 N.J. at 447.

The automobile exception is premised on three rationales: (1) a vehicle’s

inherent mobility; (2) “the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile

compared to a home”; and (3) “the recognition that a Fourth Amendment

                                       12
intrusion occasioned by a prompt search based on probable cause is not

necessarily greater than a prolonged detention of the vehicle and its occupants

while the police secure a warrant.” Id. at 422-23.

      Our courts have long recognized that the smell of marijuana “constitutes

probable cause ‘that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed and that

additional contraband might be present.’” State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290

(2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515-16

(2003)). That said, “a search which is reasonable at its inception may

[nonetheless] violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable

intensity and scope.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968); accord Patino, 83

N.J. at 10-11. Although both federal and state constitutional law recognize an

automobile exception to the warrant requirement, “it is well known that our

State Constitution ‘provides greater protection against unreasonable searches

and seizures than the Fourth Amendment.’” See State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156,

165-66 (2023) (quoting State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 504 (2021), and

discussing numerous examples). This Court has recognized that “[g]reater

individual protections exist for automobile searches, too” under our State

Constitution. Id. at 166.

      In prior decisions, this Court has endeavored to define the bounds of a

legal search under the automobile exception based on the suspected presence

                                       13
of marijuana. In Patino, after pulling the defendant’s vehicle over, a state

trooper noticed a clear plastic container full of “green vegetation” on the floor

near the front seat. 83 N.J. at 5. The trooper searched the interior of the

vehicle and recovered a marijuana cigarette. Ibid. The trooper continued

searching, examining the glove compartment and ashtray, but found nothing

further. Id. at 5-6. Finally, the trooper searched the trunk and discovered

cocaine. Id. at 6.

      This Court held that the search of the trunk exceeded the parameters of

the automobile exception. Id. at 12-13. The Court noted that the officer’s

discovery of only “a small amount of marijuana, consistent with personal use,

does not provide [police] with probable cause to believe that larger amounts of

marijuana or other contraband are being transported.” Id. at 13. The Court

concluded that the search was unlawful because, under the automobile

exception, not only must an officer have probable cause to believe that

contraband is present in the vehicle, “but the search must be reasonable in

scope” and must be “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which

rendered its initiation permissible.” Id. at 10-11 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at

19). The Court noted that a search that is initially reasonable “may become

unreasonable because of its intolerable intensity and scope.” Ibid. (citing

Terry, 392 U.S. at 18). Accordingly, the Court held, officers must “provide

                                       14
justification to extend the zone of the exigent search further than the persons

of the occupants or the interior of the car.” Id. at 14-15.

      Three years later, the Court held that an officer lawfully extended the

scope of a search to the vehicle’s trunk after detecting the odor of marijuana.

Guerra, 93 N.J. at 150. In Guerra, the defendant was pulled over for a broken

taillight. Id. at 148-49. The trooper detected a “strong odor of raw unburned

marijuana emanating from the interior of the car” and noticed a small “suitcase

which he concluded could not have been the source of the odor.” Id. at 149.

The trooper remarked that the car was “hanging low in the trunk” and

expressed his intention to look inside the trunk. Ibid. Upon searching the

trunk after obtaining a telephonic search warrant, the trooper discovered 176.5

pounds of marijuana. Id. at 149-50. The motion court found that the search

was justified under the automobile exception “because the smell of ‘the

marijuana, coupled with the vehicle riding low certainly constituted probable

cause to search the trunk.’” Id. at 150. The Appellate Division reversed,

determining that insufficient grounds existed for the issuance of a telephonic,

as opposed to a written, warrant. Ibid.

      The primary question in Guerra before this Court was whether the

officers properly obtained a telephonic warrant prior to searching the vehicle at

police headquarters. Id. at 148. While the Court agreed with the Appellate

                                        15
Division that the telephonic warrant was defective, we ultimately held that the

search was nonetheless permissible under the automobile exception. Id. at

151-52. The Court found that after making a lawful stop, “[t]he troopers then

detected a strong odor of marijuana which, as found by the trial court, could

not have emanated from the small suitcase in the car’s interior.” Id. at 150. In

contrast to the setting of Patino, in which the confirmed presence of a quantity

of marijuana consistent with personal use did not justify the search of a car

trunk, Guerra arose from the officer’s determination that the apparent intensity

of the marijuana odor could indicate only an amount too large to be contained

in the bag in the car’s interior -- combined with the observed presence of a

substantial weight in the trunk -- justified a search of that space. Accordingly,

the Guerra Court held that the officer had probable cause to search the trunk.

Ibid.

        The Appellate Division has similarly addressed the extent to which the

odor of marijuana provides probable cause to extend the scope of a vehicle

search beyond the passenger compartment under the automobile exception. In

Kahlon, which was decided prior to this Court’s decision in Patino, after

pulling a motorist over, the officer smelled marijuana and the defendant

admitted to smoking marijuana. 172 N.J. Super. at 336. The officer searched

the interior compartment of the vehicle and found a partially burned cigarette

                                        16
and a clear plastic bag containing half an ounce of marijuana. Ibid. The

officer then entered the backseat where he noticed a “very heavy odor of

unburned marijuana.” Id. at 337. Having found no additional marijuana in the

backseat, the officer opened the trunk where he continued to smell the heavy

odor of marijuana and found a cardboard box from which the smell of

unburned marijuana emanated. Ibid. The officer opened a bag in the box and

found 30 pounds of marijuana inside. Ibid.

      The trial court suppressed the marijuana found in the trunk, but the

Appellate Division reversed, holding that the search was lawful. Id. at 338.

The Appellate Division held that the officer’s

            inability to pinpoint the source of the smell of unburned
            marijuana while in [the rear interior] of the automobile
            although it appeared to emanate from the rear of the
            vehicle, together with the marijuana already found in
            the car, reasonably could leave him to conclude, as he
            did, that the odor came from the car’s trunk and
            accordingly established probable cause to search the
            trunk for such marijuana.

            [Ibid.]

      In State v. Sarto, the Appellate Division upheld the search of a trunk

when “the strong odor of unburned marijuana gave police probable cause”

because the odor “could not have emanated from the small plastic bag found in

the vinyl bag” in the passenger compartment. 195 N.J. Super. 565, 574-75

(App. Div. 1984). Officers discovered a knife in plain view during a vehicle
                                       17
stop and subsequently arrested the defendant for a weapons violation. Id. at

567. While retrieving the knife, the officer detected a strong odor of marijuana

and found a partially opened clear plastic bag containing marijuana. Ibid.

Citing to Guerra and Kahlon, the Appellate Division held that the strong odor

of unburned marijuana “gave police probable cause to search the trunk for

evidence of contraband.” Id. at 574. Similar to Kahlon, the officers in Sarto

initially found marijuana in the passenger compartment prior to extending the

search to the trunk, and similar to Guerra, the strong odor of marijuana that

remained after that discovery could not be explained by the contents of the

passenger compartment of the vehicle. Ibid.

      In sum, cases in which our courts have upheld searches that extended to

the trunk or other areas beyond the passenger compartment have involved facts

indicating something more than simply detecting the smell of marijuana from

the interior of the car.

                                       IV.

      Applying those principles and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey

Constitution to this case, we find that the officers did not have probable cause

to search the engine compartment or the trunk and thus exceeded the scope of

the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

                                       18
      Upon noticing the black Honda Civic described in the BOLO alert that

was issued after the CI’s firearms trafficking tip, Trooper Travis followed

defendant’s vehicle for about two miles. After initiating a traffic stop, Trooper

Travis reported detecting “a strong odor of raw marijuana” in the vehicle as

well as “greenish-brown vegetation” on the driver’s beard and shirt. At that

point, Trooper Travis had a reasonable belief “that a criminal offense had been

committed and that additional contraband might be present” on defendant’s

person and in the passenger compartment. See Walker, 213 N.J. at 290. We

therefore find that the initial search of defendant, Baker, and the passenger

compartment was valid under the automobile exception because the officer had

probable cause to initiate that search.

      After the search of the car’s interior did not reveal marijuana, however,

the police indiscriminately expanded the search to separate areas of the vehicle

-- beyond the compartment from which Trooper Travis initially detected the

smell -- despite no unique facts that indicated raw marijuana was in either the

engine compartment or trunk. After searching the passenger compartment,

Trooper Travis then searched under the hood of the car, an arguably unlikely

locale for storing personal items in a vehicle, including illegal narcotics.

Within the engine compartment, the trooper found a bag containing a rifle and

a second bag containing a revolver. Trooper Travis next searched the trunk,

                                          19
where he discovered a bag containing hollow point bullets. No marijuana was

found anywhere in the car, or on defendant or Baker.

      We hold that when Trooper Travis expanded his search to the engine

compartment of the car, he went beyond the scope of the automobile

exception. Although he smelled marijuana in the passenger compartment of

the car, the trooper’s initial search yielded no results and provided no

justification “to extend the zone of the . . . search further than the persons of

the occupants or the interior of the car.” See Patino, 83 N.J. at 14-15. Had the

smell of raw marijuana emanated from under the hood of the vehicle, that

could have justified expanding the search. Prior cases from this Court and the

Appellate Division that upheld searches beyond the interior of the vehicle

illustrate that something more than just a general smell of marijuana

underpinned the holding in those cases. Similarly, had Trooper Travis

indicated that the smell was of such magnitude as to necessarily emanate from

a large cargo space such as a trunk, the question of probable cause would have

been closer. Here, however, Trooper Travis made no such observation that the

marijuana smell was stronger in certain areas of the car and provided no

reasoning for expanding the search to the hood and the trunk.

      This holding is consistent with this Court’s and the Appellate Division’s

decades-old precedent. In Patino, although not a case involving the odor of

                                        20
marijuana, this Court invalidated the search of a vehicle’s trunk after the

officer actually found a marijuana cigarette and a plastic container of “green

vegetation” in the interior of the vehicle. 83 N.J. at 5, 11-13. In Kahlon, the

Appellate Division upheld the search of the trunk after the officer (1) smelled

marijuana upon pulling the car over; (2) the defendant admitted to smoking

marijuana; (3) the officer found a plastic bag containing half an ounce of

marijuana and a marijuana cigarette in the interior compartment; and (4) the

officer detected a very strong odor of unburned marijuana in the area of the

backseat. 172 N.J. Super. at 335-37. Similarly, in Sarto, officers also found

marijuana in the passenger compartment before extending the search to the

trunk. 195 N.J. Super. at 567-68. In those cases, although the extended search

was invalidated in one matter and upheld in the others, the facts supporting

probable cause to search the trunk were much stronger than the facts in this

case, with Trooper Travis only generally smelling “a strong odor of raw

marijuana” in the vehicle’s interior.

      Although the State equates this case to Guerra, the circumstances of the

search in Guerra, as well as the arguments considered by the Court, are

distinguishable. Unlike this case, in Guerra, the officers obtained a search

warrant prior to searching the trunk of the car; this Court granted certification

after the Appellate Division found that warrant to be invalid. 93 N.J. at 148.

                                        21
Moreover, much of the Court’s analysis in Guerra focused on the validity of

the telephonic search warrant, and the consequences of finding a warrant

invalid. See id. at 152-53. Although the Court invalidated the warrant, we

ultimately held that the search of the trunk was nevertheless permissible based

on the automobile exception. Id. at 150-52. The Court did not conduct a

robust analysis of the issue, instead relying primarily on Kahlon -- which, as

we have explained, is factually distinguishable from the present case . See id.

at 150. The Court also cited to Patino for the general proposition that the

“extent of [the] search of an automobile depends upon the degree of the

probable cause.” Ibid.

      Additionally, the facts establishing probable cause in Guerra are

distinguishable from the present case as well. In Guerra, the officers detected

an odor of raw marijuana apparently too strong to have emanated from the

small suitcase in the car. Ibid. And evidence indicated that the trunk was

hanging low as if carrying significant weight, a fact that the trial court found

persuasive. See ibid. Here, there is no claim that Trooper Travis considered

whether the odor he smelled could or could not have emanated from the

vehicle’s interior. Rather, he testified only to generally detecting the scent of

marijuana in the car’s interior prior to expanding his search beyond the

occupants and the passenger compartment. On that basis, the degree of

                                        22
probable cause was insufficient to justify searching the engine compartment

and the trunk. There is certainly a difference between generally detecting the

smell of a prohibited substance and detecting a smell of the substance of suc h a

magnitude as to immediately suggest to officers that vast quantities of the

substance were present, coupled with observation that the car’s trunk appeared

to be hanging low due to heavy weight.

      Here, Trooper Travis had no definitive information that defendant

possessed marijuana because his initial search did not reveal any illegal

contraband. Neither the smell nor the “shake in defendant’s beard” fulfilled

the Patino requirement that an officer have specific justification to extend a

search under the automobile exception beyond the defendant’s person and the

passenger compartment. And any information contained in or suggested by the

BOLO could not contribute to a probable cause determination based on the

trooper’s smell of marijuana. Accordingly, we find that Trooper Travis’s

searches of the engine compartment and trunk were unlawful, and the evidence

seized from those illegal searches must therefore be suppressed.

      This holding in no way suggests that areas within the interior of the car

would require separate probable cause findings in order to conduct a

warrantless search. We are not dividing up the interior of vehicles such that an

officer would need to establish different or additional probable cause to search

                                       23
the front seat as opposed to the back seat, for example. Pursuant to the

automobile exception, if an officer has probable cause to search the interior of

the vehicle, that probable cause encompasses the entirety of the interior.

      We are also not suggesting that the warrantless search of a trunk or

engine compartment will always require separate probable cause findings.

Instead, we reiterate that a warrantless search of a car “must be reasonable in

scope” and “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered

its initiation permissible.” Patino, 83 N.J. at 10-11. However, a generalized

smell of raw marijuana does not justify a search of every compartment of an

automobile.

      We briefly note the important changes to the Criminal Code regarding

marijuana with the Legislature’s passage of the Cannabis Regulatory,

Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA),

N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, in 2021. Through CREAMMA, the Legislature

fashioned “a new approach to our marijuana policies” and “legaliz[ed] a form

of marijuana, to be referred to as cannabis.” N.J.S.A. 24:6I-32(a).

CREAMMA’s amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10 largely decriminalized the

possession of unregulated marijuana occurring on or after its effective date of

February 22, 2021. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4)(b).

                                       24
      CREAMMA further added a new section in the Criminal Code stating

that neither “the odor of cannabis or burnt cannabis,” nor the “possession of

marijuana or hashish without evidence of quantity in excess of any amount that

would exceed the amount . . . which may be lawfully possessed,” “shall,

individually or collectively, constitute reasonable articulable suspicion of a

crime” except on school property or at a correctional facility. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

10c. Though N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c has no bearing on our present probable cause

analysis because the search at issue predated the passage of CREAMMA,

going forward, we anticipate that cases involving the automobile exception and

probable cause to search a vehicle based solely on the smell of marijuana will

likely be few and far between.

                                       V.

      For the foregoing reasons, the motion to suppress should have been

granted, so we reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and remand the

matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand,

defendant shall be given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

      CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON,
WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily
assigned) join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion.

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