Court Opinion

ID: 9393005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 21:03:08.640844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:50.339414
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220377-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                       NOTICE
 Decision filed 05/08/23. The
                                                                            This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0377
                                                                            Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                            not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                  IN THE                       limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                            under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Madison County.
                                          )
v.                                        )     No. 15-CF-413
                                          )
ANTONIO D. FLETCHER-BEY,                  )     Honorable
                                          )     Janet R. Heflin,
      Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Cates and Moore concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: The trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive
               postconviction petition is affirmed where defendant failed to raise any argument
               regarding prejudice as to his claim of unreasonable assistance by his appointed
               postconviction counsel.

¶2       Following a jury trial, defendant, Antonio Fletcher-Bey, was convicted of aggravated

kidnapping in violation of section 10-2(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/10-

2(a)(3) (West 2004)). Defendant appeals the denial of his motion for leave to file a postconviction

petition. On appeal, defendant argues that his case should be remanded for further proceedings

because his appointed counsel failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July

1, 2017). For the following reasons, we disagree.

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¶3                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On March 10, 2005, defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated kidnapping in

violation of section 10-2(a)(3) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3) (West 2004)). Defendant’s trial,

in which defendant proceeded pro se, was held in December 2006. During the trial, testimony

revealed that Geton Robertson called 911 when she heard a woman yelling “no” in response to a

man telling the woman to get into the trunk of a green car. Officer Eric Smith received the call and

dispatched officers to the Joesting Projects in Alton, Illinois, where Robertson witnessed the

incident. Robert Hill, a 911 telecommunicator, testified that he received two calls from Lindsay

Burnett requesting help. Ms. Burnett provided her name and stated defendant beat her up in the

woods and put her in the trunk of a car. She did not know her exact location during the first call

but advised Hill of her location on Sheppard Street during a second call, after she recognized the

voice of defendant’s girlfriend, Kenya Hamilton, whom she and defendant dropped off earlier in

the evening.

¶5     Sergeant John Wethington testified that he was initially dispatched to the Joesting Projects

but was later dispatched to Sheppard Street. On his way to Shepperd Street, he observed a green

Chrysler and turned around to pursue the car. The vehicle did not stop and tried to elude the police.

The driver jumped out of the car, as did a passenger, leaving the car in drive as it was rolling down

a hill. The car crashed into a pole, trunk first, and then stopped. Officer Wethington jumped out of

his car, put the green car in park, removed the keys from the ignition, opened the trunk, and found

Ms. Burnett, covered in blood and mud. The passenger was arrested at the scene.

¶6     Major Dwynn Isringhausen searched, located, and arrested the driver; he identified the

driver as the defendant. Evidence officer Mick Dooley testified that he and Detective William

Brantley later returned to the woods with Ms. Burnett, who showed the officers where the

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altercation occurred and identified numerous items from her purse that were strewn on the ground.

Officer Dooley performed phenolphthalein testing on items in the trunk and they tested positive

for blood. He also took photographs at the scene, collected evidence at the scene, and took

photographs of the victim. He admitted the scene photographs were erroneously erased and the

date on the remaining photographs was erroneous. He testified that phenolphthalein tests were not

laboratory tests, and the blood stains were not DNA tested.

¶7     The victim, Ms. Burnett, testified about the incident and her 911 calls, and she identified

defendant as the person who attacked her and later put her in the trunk of the car. Defendant’s

girlfriend, Ms. Hamilton, testified defendant showed up to her house covered in blood and told her

Ms. Burnett was in the trunk and he was “going to finish the bitch off.” Ms. Hamilton testified that

she got into the vehicle to prevent defendant from further harming Ms. Burnett.

¶8     Additional testimony was provided by Dr. Maurice Sonnenwirth regarding Ms. Burnett’s

condition at the hospital and Detective Gary Cramner, who seized defendant’s clothing and

assisted in the lineup in which Ms. Burnett identified defendant. Detective Brantley testified that

he interviewed and released Ms. Hamilton following her arrest, interviewed defendant twice, and

accompanied Officer Dooley, Detective Mattala, Ms. Burnett, and several other detectives, to the

woods where the incident started and the items from the victim’s purse were identified and taken

as evidence.

¶9     Defendant did not testify and presented no evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of

aggravated kidnapping and the trial court sentenced defendant to 28 years in the Illinois

Department of Corrections (IDOC). Defendant filed a motion to reduce or modify sentence, which

was denied. Defendant filed a direct appeal and his counsel, the Office of the State Appellate

Defender (OSAD), raised only the issue of whether defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was

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valid. This court affirmed the conviction. People v. Fletcher-Bey, No. 5-07-0186 (2009)

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 10   While the direct appeal was pending, defendant filed a section 2-1401 petition for relief

from judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2008)) in December 2008. The petition argued that his

sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause and the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendant secretly confined Ms. Burnett. The trial court found the filing

untimely and rejected the substantive claims. Defendant appealed. Defendant’s appellate counsel,

OSAD, moved to withdraw arguing the claims had no merit. This court granted OSAD’s motion

and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. People v. Fletcher-Bey, No. 5-09-0377 (2010)

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 11      While the section 2-1401 petition appeal was pending, defendant filed his first

postconviction petition in April 2010. The petition claimed potential juror bias, the trial court failed

to advise him that he had to file a posttrial motion to preserve issues for appeal, the State failed to

prove secret confinement, the State made improper arguments during closing, and his appellate

counsel was ineffective by failing to raise these issues on direct appeal. Defendant was appointed

postconviction counsel, who raised the same claims. The State moved for dismissal which was

granted by the trial court. Defendant appealed and his appellate counsel, OSAD, moved to

withdraw arguing the issues had no merit. This court granted OSAD’s motion and affirmed the

trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition. People v. Fletcher-Bey, 2015 IL App

(5th) 130270-U.

¶ 12   Defendant filed a second petition for relief from judgment in June 2016, arguing the trial

court erred when it allowed prior inconsistent statements to be introduced at his trial and that his

mandatory supervised release (MSR) should be included in his 28-year sentence. The trial court

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dismissed the petition as untimely. Defendant appealed but later moved to voluntarily dismiss his

appeal. This court issued an order granting the motion. People v. Fletcher-Bey, No. 5-17-0026

(2018) (unpublished order).

¶ 13   On October 25, 2017, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition. The motion claimed that defendant just learned of the conviction of Alton

evidence officer Mickey Dooley, and alleged police misconduct based on Dooley’s actions while

gathering evidence and later destroying evidence by erasing photographs. The petition further

claimed that the associate judge did not have authority to preside over his trial and, during

voir dire, the prosecution indoctrinated the jury. He alleged prejudice based on the police

misconduct and stated he was not making an actual innocence claim. Although no ruling was

issued by the trial court on the motion, on February 28, 2018, defendant filed his pro se successive

postconviction petition. On August 30, 2018, a status hearing was held at which time the court

asked defendant if he wanted counsel. Defendant replied in the affirmative and the Madison

County Public Defender was appointed. On November 5, 2018, after noting a conflict between

appointed counsel and defendant, the trial court discharged the public defender and appointed

special public defender Donna Polinske as counsel for defendant. Polinske was ordered to meet

with defendant and review his documents to decide whether she needed to amend his pro se

pleadings or file additional pleadings. Thereafter, despite never issuing a ruling on defendant’s

motion for leave, the trial court issued an order on February 21, 2019, directing the State to

facilitate scheduling and coordination of a video conference with IDOC and defendant’s counsel,

and further directing postconviction counsel to determine whether she was going to amend the

pleadings or stand on defendant’s pleadings after consultation with defendant. The order set a

deadline for the State to file its pleadings once postconviction counsel consulted with defendant.

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On March 21, 2019, postconviction counsel Polinske filed a Rule 651(c) certificate stating she

consulted with defendant, examined the record and the report of proceedings for the “plea of

guilty,” and made amendments to the pro se petition “necessary for the adequate presentation” of

defendant’s contentions.

¶ 14   On November 16, 2020, defendant filed a pro se first amended postconviction petition. The

petition stated postconviction counsel last spoke with him on December 20, 2019, and requested

to proceed to “stage two” proceedings without counsel. Additional motions were filed by

defendant on May 19, 2021, and September 13, 2021, requesting a status review and disparaging

his appointed counsel. On September 27, 2021, postconviction counsel filed a motion requesting

a setting for defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. On

September 29, 2021, defendant moved for a default judgment against the State. On November 8,

2021, defendant filed a request for entry of default. On January 24, 2022, defendant sent

correspondence to the circuit clerk stating that he filed pleadings to discharge his attorney, her

filings were null and void, and directed the clerk not to accept any filings by counsel.

¶ 15   On May 26, 2022, the trial court issued an order acknowledging that counsel was

previously appointed, and hearings were set, but “now realized that it never ruled on the Motion

for Leave.” The order noted that no substantive matters were ever addressed, and the State never

filed any responsive pleading. Upon review of the pleadings, the trial court found there was no

claim advanced which entitled defendant to file a successive petition and denied defendant’s

motion for leave to file a successive petition. Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 16                                    II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17   On appeal, defendant argues this case should be remanded because his appointed counsel

failed to provide reasonable assistance at the “leave to file stage” of his successive postconviction

                                                 6
proceeding. No argument regarding the validity of defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition is presented.

¶ 18    Defendant argues that after postconviction counsel was appointed, counsel did nothing

beyond filing a Rule 651(c) certificate, which was rebutted by the record. The certificate stated

counsel reviewed defendant’s “plea of guilty”; however, there was no plea. Further, while the

certificate claimed counsel amended the petition, no amended petition was filed. Defendant argues

that because counsel failed to provide any meaningful assistance, and the record rebutted the

certificate, the case should be remanded to allow for reasonable assistance. In support, defendant

relies on People v. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, and People v. Walker, 2018 IL App (3d) 150527.

¶ 19    In response, the State argues, citing People v. Moore, 2019 IL App (3d) 170485, that

counsel was under no obligation to perform under Rule 651(c) until the trial court issued a ruling

on the motion for leave to file a successive petition. Defendant replies that Moore was wrongly

decided because it is inconsistent with Johnson. In the interim, the Third District issued its decision

in People v. Garrett, 2023 IL App (3d) 210305. Garrett also involved the premature appointment

of postconviction counsel, and stated Moore was wrongly decided. Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 20    The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides a three-stage process for criminal

defendants to collaterally attack their convictions and sentences when their federal or state

constitutional rights are substantially violated in their original trial or sentencing hearing. People

v. Hatter, 2021 IL 125981, ¶ 22; 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018). The procedure begins

with an initial review of the petition by the trial court to determine if it is frivolous or patently

without merit. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2009). If the petition provides an arguable basis,

either in law or fact, it will pass the first stage; thereafter counsel will be appointed to assist with

amendments to defendant’s initial petition, and “the defendant bears the burden of making a

                                                   7
substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472-73

(2006). Under the Act, counsel is only appointed after a petition is advanced to the second stage

of proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2018). If the petition advances, an evidentiary hearing is

held at the third stage. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473. Generally, the Act contemplates only one

postconviction proceeding. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22. However, the bar against

successive proceedings is relaxed by either (1) a showing of cause and prejudice or (2) a claim of

actual innocence. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Once leave to file is granted, the case proceeds with the same three

stages addressed above.

¶ 21   On appeal, defendant does not dispute that counsel was appointed prematurely. Instead,

defendant argues, pursuant to Johnson, the premature appointment required counsel to perform in

accordance with Rule 651(c) prior to the second stage proceedings. We disagree.

¶ 22   In Johnson, defendant privately retained counsel to assist him with his initial

postconviction petition. Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 5. Following the dismissal of the petition,

defense counsel filed a notice of appeal; thereafter, defendant filed a motion to reconsider claiming

his counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to raise additional claims in the

postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 6. Counsel’s appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded to

allow the trial court to address the reconsideration. Id. ¶ 7. After allowing defendant to supplement

his motion to reconsider, the trial court denied the motion, and on appeal, the appellate court

affirmed the summary dismissal after finding defendant had no right to reasonable assistance of

counsel until the second and third stage of the proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 8-10. On review, the supreme

court found that “[t]he rationale for requiring a reasonable level of assistance from privately

retained counsel at the second and third stages of postconviction proceedings applies with equal

force to first stage representation.” Id. ¶ 18. The court also noted that Rule 651(c), “which requires

                                                  8
counsel to consult with a defendant regarding his postconviction petition, applies only to those

defendants who file their initial petition pro se and are appointed counsel at the second stage.” Id.

(citing People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 41). The court found that to hold that privately retained

counsel had no standard of representation at the first stage was not what the General Assembly

intended. Id. As such, the court held “that a defendant who retains a private attorney at the first

stage of postconviction proceedings is entitled to a reasonable level of assistance of counsel.” Id.

¶ 23.

¶ 23    Here, it is undisputed that no right to appointed counsel exists either at the first stage of a

postconviction petition or to assist with the filing of defendant’s motion for leave to file a

successive petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). The right to counsel for a postconviction

petition is statutory; however, such right is equally dependent on the substance of the pro se

document filed by the defendant and the timing of the court’s ruling on the initial petition. Id.

§§ 122-2.1, 122-4.

¶ 24    A petitioner is not entitled to counsel if his pro se petition is dismissed at the first stage as

frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (1988). Further, if the court

does not rule on the initial petition within 90 days, the petition will automatically advance to the

second stage thereby allowing for the appointment of counsel. People v. Al Momani, 2016 IL App

(4th) 150192, ¶ 11; 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2018). Notably, neither of those possibilities are

available until after a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition is granted.

¶ 25    For leave to be granted to file a successive postconviction petition under the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act, petitioner must make a prima facie showing of both cause and prejudice,

or actual innocence, by submitting sufficient pleadings and documentation to permit the court to

make an independent determination on the legal question raised. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450,

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¶ 24; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). Because the Act is premised on the petitioner’s

satisfaction of showing either cause and prejudice, or actual innocence, a successive

postconviction petition cannot be considered “filed” until leave to file is expressly granted by the

circuit court, regardless of whether the successive petition was filed by the clerk’s office. People

v. LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39, 44 (2007). Further proceedings, which would include the appointment

of postconviction counsel, will not follow until leave is granted. People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150,

161 (2010).

¶ 26    While nothing in the statute provides for the appointment of counsel at the motion for

leave stage (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018)), the lack of a right to obtain appointed counsel is

not dispositive. Illinois courts have long held that trial courts have discretion in deciding whether

to appoint, or deny a request to appoint, counsel. Tedder v. Fairman, 92 Ill. 2d 216, 226-27 (1982);

People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 560-68 (2003). As such, we consider the conflicting decisions

issued by the Third District addressing what duties and level of assistance, if any, arise from the

inadvertent and premature appointment of counsel in postconviction proceedings.

¶ 27   In Moore, the appellate court found defendant had no right to counsel at the motion for

leave stage and, “[t]herefore, defendant cannot complain of the reasonableness of counsel’s

assistance as he did not have the right to counsel.” Moore, 2019 IL App (3d) 170485, ¶ 12.

Conversely, in Garrett, the court noted Moore did not address Illinois Supreme Court precedent

in Johnson and held that prematurely appointed counsel was required to provide reasonable

assistance based on Johnson. Garrett, 2023 IL App (3d) 210305, ¶ 18.

¶ 28   As noted above, in Johnson the Illinois Supreme Court held that retained counsel was

required to provide “reasonable assistance” during the first stage of postconviction actions.

Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 23. As such, we hold that requiring a lower level of required

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performance by erroneously appointed counsel would be inconsistent with the holding in Johnson

and undermine principles of fundamental fairness.

¶ 29   We note, however, that the underlying duties for which counsel is appointed must be

clearly delineated to avoid the confusion seen in both Garrett and Moore. In Garrett, the trial court

advised counsel “to review defendant’s filings” after noting “the difficulty in pursuing a successive

postconviction petition.” Garrett, 2023 IL App (3d) 210305, ¶ 9. The ambiguity of this statement,

and whether it would include a duty to amend petitioner’s motion for leave to file a successive

petition, is unknown. However, based on arguments raised in Garrett, it is apparent defendant

believed that amendment of his motion for leave was included in appointed counsel’s duty.

Similarly, in Moore, the appointment of counsel prior to the ruling on the pending pro se motion

for leave to file a successive postconviction petition left it unclear as to what duties were included

in the appointment, resulting in a claim on appeal that counsel failed to amend defendant’s pro se

motion for leave. Moore, 2019 IL App (3d) 170485, ¶¶ 5-7, 9.

¶ 30   Here, the record is sufficiently clear to determine appointed counsel’s duties. The trial

court’s May 26, 2022, order noted that it previously appointed counsel and only “now realized that

it never ruled on the Motion for Leave.” Such admission clarifies that the premature appointment

of counsel did not include amending petitioner’s motion for leave and was simply an error. We

note, however, that without the statement, the court’s November 5, 2018, order, directing

appointed counsel to meet with petitioner, review his documents, and decide whether the pro se

pleadings needed amending or additional pleadings needed filed, would be as equally confusing

as the directives seen in Moore and Garrett. Here, as in those cases, there was no clarification as

to whether the “pro se pleadings” included defendant’s pro se motion for leave or was limited to

the successive postconviction petition. It is only through the trial court’s subsequent order that it

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is apparent the trial court was only appointing counsel to address the successive postconviction

petition as, by its own admission, the court believed a ruling had already been issued on the motion

for leave. We appreciate the clarification by the trial court as this allows us to determine the scope

of appointed counsel’s duties in this matter; however, we would be remiss in failing to recommend

that the trial court clarify appointed counsel’s duties at the time of the postconviction appointment.

¶ 31   Turning to the arguments on appeal, defendant contends his postconviction counsel “failed

to provide reasonable assistance and abide by Rule 651(c) at the leave-to-file stage of his

successive post-conviction petition.” He argues that counsel failed to “provide any meaningful

assistance and the record rebuts any presumption that she satisfied the requirements of Supreme

Court Rule 651(c).” The initial argument centers on Rule 651(c) and contends the rule

encompasses all of counsel’s assistance, regardless of the level of the proceedings. We disagree.

¶ 32   Rule 651(c) “applies only to those defendants who file their initial petition pro se and who

are appointed counsel at the second stage.” Johnson, 2018 IL 122227, ¶ 18. As defendant’s claim

did not move beyond the motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition stage, neither

counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate, nor Rule 651(c) itself, are applicable in this matter.

¶ 33   Our analysis is therefore governed by the reasonable assistance standard. This standard is

“significantly lower” than the ineffective assistance of counsel standard “mandated at trial by our

state and federal constitutions.” People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30 (citing Pendleton, 223 Ill.

2d at 472). The First District recognized the lack of case law associated with cases involving the

reasonable assistance standard when Rule 651(c) was inapplicable. People v. Zareski, 2017 IL App

(1st) 150836, ¶ 58. It created a “Strickland-like analysis” stating that a reasonable assistance

review considered the failings of counsel in conjunction with whether petitioner was prejudiced

by the alleged failures. Id. ¶¶ 59-61.

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¶ 34   The majority of defendant’s arguments are based on counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate and

her duties thereunder, which as explained above, are inapplicable. The only non-Rule 651(c) claim

raised was that counsel “neglected his case by allowing an unreasonable delay in the resolution of

[defendant’s] motion.” While defendant alleged deficiencies by his counsel in failing to bring the

pending motion to the court’s attention, at no time did defendant argue he was prejudiced by the

delay. Nor does defendant argue that appointed postconviction counsel should have amended his

motion for leave, what amendments—if any—should have been made, or that he was prejudiced

by the lack of any amendment. As such, we hold that defendant failed to show that his appointed

postconviction counsel’s assistance was unreasonable. As no argument was raised regarding the

merits of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction

petition, we affirm the trial court’s denial of said motion.

¶ 35                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 37   Affirmed.

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