Court Opinion

ID: 9687064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:15:14.373668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:24.023588
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
This writing is directed to issue 4 as raised by Hughes on his personal liability. Digesting the treatment of this issue, it appears that we decide this issue on procedure. Was Judge Davis’ declaration for Hughes to release the fund an (a) Order or (b) a Judgment? At first blush, I assumed that if it was an Order, Hughes did not have to provide a written notice of the filing of the Order; however, if it was a judgment, to set the time running, he had to serve a notice of entry of judgment on his adversary. It seemed to me that our decision, concerning this legal point, all hinged on procedural responsibility. However, Hughes’ brief camped down on the premise that Hughes was not liable because he relied upon the direction of a circuit court judge to release the money in question.
At oral argument, counsel for Hughes strongly advocated that Hughes relied upon Judge Davis’ court order. In effect, that he dare not be in violation of the court order or he could be held in contempt of court. As Justice Sabers brought out in oral argument, the court order was reversed. Nonetheless, Hughes’ counsel, although agreeing to that statement, expressed that Hughes relied on it at the time of its entry and that later on, it was reversed. This issue has been particularly troubling. So I went to the record and to the law on garnishment to quiet my troubled countenance.
Ordinarily, the garnishee’s duty is to comply strictly with the orders of the court. City and County of Honolulu v. Kam, 48 Haw. 349, 402 P.2d 683 (1965); Savard v. Physicians’ Casualty Co., 124 Neb. 627, 247 N.W. 567 (1933); 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 185 (1943). Pursuant to Judge Davis’ July 24, 1989 Order, Hughes strictly complied and released the entrusted funds to RIA. However, as a consequence of our reversal in Wasserburger I, CMC rather than RIA has been declared the true owner of those funds. Hughes, as I have earlier expressed, now seeks to avoid being held personally liable for the $350,000, relying upon a circuit court’s mandate.
At trial, the jury was instructed as to RIA’s claim to the funds and that Hughes returned the entrusted money to RIA. Furthermore, Hughes had in his control property belonging to CMC.
Instructions 2 and 3 are the pertinent instructions which address the liability aspect and are attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. A special verdict was submitted to the jury and is also attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof. According to the special verdict, the jury was asked only if the garnishee account contained the property of CMC. Nowhere in the instructions will you find notice that Hughes relinquished the funds solely upon order of Judge Davis. This information was omitted. Hughes failed to retain the funds pending final appeal and failed to place this information in the instructions by proper request. This could have been his saving grace. Nevertheless, whereas possible defects in the instructions were not objected to, the trial court was not advised of possible errors. Hughes’ counsel did object to one instruction which was not germane to this point. A jury can only act on the instructions. Therefore, the jury did not have before it the legal concept/alternative that the garnishee is duty bound to follow the order and directives of the judge. In my opinion, Hughes did not preserve the appellate record on the point he advances, namely that Hughes was exonerated. To advance this point at appellate level, Hughes should have placed the court order into the in*264structions, or at least tried to, by a requested instruction. Hogg v. First National Bank of Aberdeen, 386 N.W.2d 921 (S.D.1986); Schmidt v. Wildcat Cave, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 114 (S.D.1977); accord: Weaver v. Boortz, 301 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1981) (Issues not briefed or presented are not preserved for appeal.) Hughes remains personally liable.
APPENDIX
INSTRUCTION NO. 2
This is an action brought by plaintiff, Wayne Wasserburger, d/b/a Southern Hills Trenching & Construction, by which the plaintiff seeks garnishment of a sum of money to satisfy a judgment entered by this court in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, Consolidated Management Corporation.
The plaintiff claims that he has a judgment against the defendant, Consolidated Management Corporation which remains unsatisfied. The plaintiff has initiated garnishment proceedings against John T. Hughes, the former attorney for the defendant, Consolidated Management Corporation. The defendant, John T. Hughes, by answering affidavit, has admitted that the plaintiff obtained a judgment against his client, Consolidated Management Corporation, which was entered on July 8,1988, but has denied that any funds were held in his trust account on behalf of Consolidated Management Corporation, alleging instead that the $350,000 sum was held in trust for Recovery Investment Associates, and that such funds were to be disbursed to creditors of Consolidated Management Corporation only after certain conditions were met.
Recovery Investment Associates previously intervened in the present action for the purpose of obtaining the return of the $350,000.00 held by John T. Hughes. The intervenor claims that the funds held by John T. Hughes belonged to Recovery Investment Associates and held for the purpose of paying creditors of the defendant, Consolidated Management Corporation, only if certain conditions were met, and that such conditions were not met and therefore, the funds were returned by John T. Hughes pursuant to the terms of the trust set up for that purpose.
INSTRUCTION NO. 3
In civil actions, the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue must prove that issue by a preponderance of the evidence.
By a preponderance of the evidence is meant such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein. In the event that the evidence is evenly balanced so that you are unable to say that the evidence on either side of an issue preponderates, that is, has the greater convincing force, then your finding upon the issue must be against the party who had the burden of proving it. In this action, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the following issue:
1. That the garnishee, John T. Hughes, at the time he was served with the garnishee summons, was indebted to or had property, real or personal, in his possession or under his control belonging absolutely and unconditionally to said defendant, Consolidated Management Corporation.
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Was the $350,000.00 on deposit in the garnishees’ (John T. Hughes) trust account on May 31, 1989, absolutely and unconditionally the property of the defendant, Consolidated Management Corporation?
YES (Insert “yes” or “no”).
Dated this 22nd day of July, 1991.