Court Opinion

ID: 9746991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:51:16.593153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.133243
License: Public Domain

ZEBROWSKI, J.,
Concurring. — Normally it is permissible to follow the case management order (CMO) procedures which have become common in complex litigation. CMO’s are designed to streamline case processing, to control delay and expense, and to promote just results. A CMO often includes or incorporates a confidentiality order. Confidentiality orders often allow either side unilaterally to designate documents as confidential. Such unilateral designation subjects a designated document to whatever protections are provided by the confidentiality order. The instant case proceeded similarly to this common practice up to this point.
Missing from the instant case, however, are the “declassification” provisions commonly found in CMO’s and related confidentiality orders. Confidentiality orders generally do allow initial unilateral classification as confidential, and hence do allow a document initially to be unilaterally subjected *1147to protection. For example, a typical CMO clause might provide that after classification as confidential, “the document and the information so classified shall be protected in accordance with this order until the court enters an order changing the classification,” or similar language. However, such CMO’s commonly also contain procedures for declassification. These procedures allow a party or intervener to apply for a ruling that a particular document or category of documents initially classified as confidential is not entitled to that protection. Notice and an opportunity to respond are provided, the burden is placed on the proponent of confidentiality to demonstrate good cause, a hearing follows and the court rules. (Cf. Fed. Jud. Center, Manual for Complex Litigation (3d ed. 1995) § 21.43, p. 65.)
In the instant case, there were no declassification provisions in the confidentiality order proposed by Southern California Gas Company. Although the trial court edited the proposed order, the trial court did not insert declassification provisions. In addition, the transcript of the hearing leading to the entry of the order suggests that the trial court did not intend to be further involved after unilateral classification. I agree that a court cannot delegate to a party the court’s ultimate obligation to make decisions in this regard. However, if the trial court had included declassification provisions and had shown an intent to apply them, I would find this common CMO procedure proper and unobjectionable.
Los Angeles Superior Court Rules, rule 7.19 (Local Rule 7.19) (Court Rules Service (L.A. Daily J.)) does not change this conclusion. Local Rule 7.19 is ironically contained in chapter 7, “Trial Court Delay Reduction,” although it can only reasonably be seen to promote the opposite effect. Notwithstanding that a state statute provides for protective orders, Local Rule 7.19 announces the policy of the Los Angeles Superior Court that “confidentiality agreements and protective orders are disfavored.” It further provides that “[sjuch agreements will not be recognized, or approved by this court absent a particularized showing (document by document) that: HQ (a) Secrecy is in the public interest; and HQ (b) The proponent has a cognizable interest in the material. . . or is otherwise protected by law from disclosure; and HO (c) That disclosure would cause serious harm.” (Italics and underlining added.) Local rules such as this are enforceable so long as not in conflict with some higher law. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 575.1, 575.2.)
Local Rule 7.19 seems to give inordinate weight to the values of open discovery, and little or no weight to the interests of cost control and judicial economy. The time which might be consumed by “a particularized showing (document by document)” regarding each of the thousands of documents which a party might seek to protect could almost certainly be spent more *1148productively on other judicial or legal business. Recognizing this, common CMO procedure focuses on those documents as to which a confidentiality classification is disputed. Nevertheless, as a general matter, a superior court is entitled to elevate a preference for open discovery above the value of cost control and judicial economy, to reject established procedures for the management of complex cases, and to replace them with idiosyncratic procedures such as the “particularized showing (document by document)” called for by Local Rule 7.19.
Nevertheless, if Local Rule 7.19 were interpreted to restrict the granting of a protective order even when needed, it might (as applied) conflict with Code of Civil Procedure 2031, subdivision (e). That section authorizes protective orders to protect a party or natural person from “undue burden and expense.” To the extent that Local Rule 7.19 precluded a trial judge from protecting a party or natural person from “undue burden and expense” by requiring a “particularized showing (document by document)” even when the making of that showing would itself impose undue burden and expense, Local Rule 7.19 would be invalid as applied. However, although Local Rule 7.19 “disfavors” both confidentiality agreements and protective orders, it provides that only “[sjuch agreements” will not be recognized or approved without the “particularized showing (document by document).” The rule does not literally require “a particularized showing (document by document)” before the court can enter a protective order, as opposed to “recognizing or approving” an “agreement.” Local Rule 7.19 thus appears literally to allow, although it may “disfavor,” a standard CMO confidentiality provision which allows initial unilateral classification, followed by declassification procedures as needed. Courts handling complex litigation would be well advised to follow this tested CMO practice.
Most superior courts around the state will have no “particularized showing (document by document)” requirement, and hence will clearly be free to employ the procedures provided in typical CMO’s used around the country as discussed above. (Cf., e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (3d Cir. 1986) 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 [document-by-document approach not mandated by federal rule].)
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 20, 1999.