Court Opinion

ID: 9482877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:03:36.25568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:15.898632
License: Public Domain

TROTT, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
While Milner was on bail awaiting trial, he violated the conditions of his release relating to the use of drugs. As a result, he was returned to custody. At trial, he was dressed in civilian clothing, but was in the custody of several deputy United States Marshals dressed in matching blue blazers who sat directly behind him. As one of the marshals left the courtroom during jury selection, the following ensued:
THE COURT: Now somebody is leaving the courtroom. Well, so that the jury. knows, we’re not just seating prospective jurors. The gentleman in question here, the defendant, is in custody and the two persons who are sitting immediately behind him are United States Marshals which we permit for security sake, se*914curity of the jurors, security of the Court, security of everybody.
MR. AMDUR [defense counsel]: Excuse me, Your Honor. May we approach the bench for a moment?
THE COURT: No. No. No. I know defendants don’t like to say that, but it’s true. And I don’t fool around with a lot of gobbly gook.
_ the the only other solution is using handcuffs and leg irons. We don’t do that, try not to, unless we have somebody like Norega [sic], which we don’t have. So let’s remember that.
You can’t show any bias against the man because he is being watched by persons who, at the order of the Court, are participating in what we call security, necessary security, in view of all the facts at the hands of the Court.
That doesn’t mean this is any indication of the guilt of the defendant. Not at all. It means that we just want to be sure that there is no breach of security and no flight. But it does not indicate in the slightest degree any indication of guilt. That’s to be determined by you the jurors under the instructions of the Court that I will be giving you in due course.
(Emphasis added.)
A motion for a mistrial based on this exchange was later promptly made by Mil-ner’s counsel and denied. Members of the jury venire were not questioned regarding their ability to be impartial despite (1) Mil-ner’s custody status and (2) the security precautions requiring that Milner be “watched.” Apparently the deputy marshals remained with Milner throughout the trial. At the close of evidence, the jury was instructed that Milner’s custody should not influence their decision as to guilt or innocence. The instruction did not address the presence of a security force.
A
Milner argues the judge’s statements were improper and deprived him of a fair trial. Because Milner has not shown actual prejudice, we must determine whether the facts were “ ‘so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat’ to the right to a fair trial.” Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1347, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986)). An occurrence such as this in a courtroom “is inherently prejudicial if ‘an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.’ ” Id. (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)).
B
Often a trial court finds itself obligated to simultaneously discharge clashing duties. The trial which engendered this appeal is a good example. On the one hand, it was incumbent upon the court to strive to preserve impartiality and to avoid allowing anything to undermine the defendant’s presumption of innocence. On the other hand, the trial court was charged with the duty to preserve the safety of counsel, jury, witnesses, spectators — in short, everyone inside the courtroom. Our concern is whether in attempting to reconcile the two duties, the lower court abused its discretion and deprived the defendants of a fair trial. Such inquiry depends upon the peculiar facts to which each appeal is wed.
United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439, 442-43 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 963, 97 S.Ct. 391, 50 L.Ed.2d 331 (1976).
Judge Moore’s general observation in Clardy was made more specific by the Supreme Court in Holbrook, when it observed that “it is possible that the sight of a security force within the courtroom might under certain conditions create the impression in the minds of the jury that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy.” 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S.Ct. at 1346 (quotation omitted). What is true with respect to the sight of a security force is also true with respect to the jurors’ recognition that a defendant is in custody. Building on Holbrook, we observed in United States v. Halliburton, 870 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied 492 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3227, 106 L.Ed.2d 575 (1989), that “[a] jury’s *915observation of the defendant in custody may under certain circumstances ‘create the impression in the minds of the jury that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy’ which can unfairly prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial notwithstanding the validity of his custody status.” Id. at 559 (quoting Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S.Ct. at 1346).
C
In the present case, the jury venire did not just see that the defendant was in custody, they were explicitly told by the court of his incarcerated status. The court did not merely advise the jury venire that the defendant was in custody, however, but went on to indicate the reasons for the defendant’s incarceration — security. Moreover, the court singled out and identified the visible security force sitting right behind Milner and told the jury venire that the persons watching him were United States Marshals. A lay person is likely to attach great significance to this impressive title and to infer from it that Milner required special attention even though he was not an internationally known drug trafficker like Manuel Noriega.
In addition, the district court personalized and particularized the security threat by telling the jury venire that the security was “necessary security, in view of all the facts at the hands of the court.” (Emphasis added.) Such a statement could reasonably and easily have been interpreted by the jury venire as meaning the court had learned of facts that made this defendant a security risk, as well as facts showing that he was likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court. The. court also said that the marshals were present to protect not only the general security of the courtroom, but of “the jurors, ... of everybody.” It is highly probable that this was taken by the jury venire to mean the defendant was in custody because he was a present security threat to the jurors themselves, the court, and indeed to the world at. large.
Such an explanation is not proper. Telling jurors that a defendant is in custody because he is a threat to their security is precisely the type of statement that “may affect a juror’s judgment.” Williams, 425 U.S. at 505, 96 S.Ct. at 1693. It poses an unacceptable threat to the “fairness of the fact-finding process,” id. at 503, 96 S.Ct. at 1693, because it “brands” a defendant in the jury’s eyes with “ ‘an unmistakable mark of guilt.’ ” Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 571, 106 S.Ct. at 1347 (quoting Williams, 425 U.S. at 518, 96 S.Ct. at 1700) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Cf. Morgan v. Aispuro, 946 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.1991) (no reason for the jury to infer that the defendant was the reason for security measures). Such a statement erodes the presumption of innocence to which a defendant is entitled. “[Cjourts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process ... [and] guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams, 425 U.S. at 503, 96 S.Ct. at 1693.
Telling prospective jurors that Milner was not as bad as Manuel Noriega, and so handcuffs and leg irons were not necessary, only aggravated the effect of the court’s unnecessary and improper advisement. This gratuitous remark only confirmed Milner as a risk to security by in essence telling the jurors that the marshals were an adequate substitute for leg irons and handcuffs. Moreover, the inappropriate comparison of Milner to Noriega — both of whom were charged with drug trafficking — was hardly designed to cast Milner in a favorable light in the eyes of the jurors. The comparison was tantamount to telling the jurors that a big fish drug trafficker who poses a security threat is held in leg irons and handcuffs (which is untrue), while a little fish drug trafficker can be controlled with a security force sitting right behind him.
The context of this remarkably inappropriate comparison cannot be ignored. It was no accident that the court in January of 1990 referred to Manuel Noriega. The United States invaded Panama on December 20, 1989, in part because of the “anti-American” activities of Panama’s dictator, Manuel Noriega, who had previously been *916indicted in federal court in Florida for drug trafficking. Noriega, however, eluded arrest and a massive manhunt ensued. For days the manhunt was the subject of continuous television, radio, newspaper, and magazine coverage. Unquestionably Noriega was the world’s # 1 drug trafficking fugitive. After he surrendered, he was flown to Florida where he was arraigned in federal court on January 4, 1990, just fifteen days before his fresh and negative image was conjured up for Milner’s jury venire to explain why Milner, although also charged with drug trafficking, was not in leg irons and handcuffs. It is highly probable that each and every prospective juror knew who “Norega” was and about his adventures, his indictment for drug trafficking, his flight from arrest, and his capture. To mention Milner and Noriega in the same category, albeit at different levels, was highly prejudicial.
It is difficult to conceive of a situation where it is appropriate to explain to a jury either the reasons for the custody status of a defendant or for the presence of a defendant-caused security force in the courtroom. The justification for custody necessarily conveys negative information to the jury about a defendant’s behavior or character that impinges on his right to a fair trial, as does the justification for a security force directed at his person. By justifying a defendant’s custody status to a jury in terms of security needs based on “facts” at the hands of the court, a court not only overlooks its responsibility to protect a defendant’s rights, but it creates the very risk that a trial judge must assiduously guard against. Instead, a judge confronted with a need for visible security measures related to a defendant’s custody status must take precautionary steps to ensure that such measures do not infringe upon the defendant’s rights.
D
The district court’s attitude in the present case deserves attention. When Milner’s attorney attempted to approach the bench in response to the court’s erroneous reference to custody and security needs — manifestly trying to protect his client’s right to a fair trial — the district court said, “No. No. No. I know defendants don’t like to say that, but it’s true. And / don’t fool around with a lot of gobbly gook.” (Emphasis added.) The concerns addressed in Holbrook are not gobbly gook. A defendant’s right to a fair trial is not gobbly gook. A trial court’s responsibility to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial is not gobbly gook. It is difficult to discern exactly what the court meant by “gobbly gook,” which is a term that thus far has not made it into Black’s Law Dictionary, but the court’s attitude — including its refusal to permit Milner’s counsel to be heard — betrays an insufficient sensitivity towards the fair trial problems inherent in (1) the presence of security forces in a courtroom, and (2) parading before a jury the fact that a defendant is in custody.
E
The law calls on us to answer this question: Did the trial court’s remarks create an unacceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into play? My answer is yes. The court’s remarks clearly created an unacceptable threat to Milner’s right to a fair trial and thus were inherently prejudicial. The remarks conveyed the idea that Milner was dangerous and untrustworthy. When he testified, he did so with this cloud hanging over his character and his credibility. This was a handicap that is irreconcilable with the presumption of innocence. The curative statements relied on by the government to salvage this case were not sufficient to erase the court’s own mistake or to eliminate this risk. All the court did was tell the jurors not to let the facts that Milner was dangerous and untrustworthy influence their decision on the question of his guilt. Far from curing the mistake, it was left standing. Moreover, the cautionary instruction at the end of the trial spoke only of Milner’s custody status. Not a word was said in the court’s instructions about the security force that had been called in to guard Milner.
When a trial judge attempts to unring an impermissible bell that he himself has *917rung, he sends at best mixed messages. In such situations, a judge’s impartiality and authority is tainted and compromised by his own mistake, especially when the attempted unringing boils down, as it does here, to an ineffective statement that the jurors should separate the security risk presented by the defendant from the issue of his guilt.
This case is distinguishable from Halliburton and those cases where the risk was not created by the trial judge and where the trial judge took immediate and effective steps to cure a problem inadvertently created by others. See United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Acosta-Garcia, 448 F.2d 395, 396 (9th Cir.1971).
F
Milner, in my view, has been convicted without due process of law. He is entitled to a new trial. Therefore, I respectfully DISSENT.