Court Opinion

ID: 9941684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 18:13:02.183109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:53.520564
License: Public Domain

02/16/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                           AT NASHVILLE
                        Assigned on Briefs November 1, 2023

                              IN RE AZELEA B. ET AL.

                  Appeal from the Juvenile Court for White County
                   No. JV-2155/5226         John Meadows, Judge

                            No. M2023-00656-COA-R3-PT

In this case involving termination of the father’s and mother’s parental rights to two of
their minor children, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds had been
proven as to each parent by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further
determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the
father’s and mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father and
mother have each appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

       Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court
                            Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.
CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

J. Brad Hannah, Smithville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Issac B.

J. Patrick Hayes, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Heather B.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Kathryn A. Baker, Deputy
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

                                       OPINION

                         I. Factual and Procedural Background

       This case focuses on Azelea B. and Phoenix B., the minor children (“the
Children”) of Issac B. (“Father”) and Heather B. (“Mother”). The Children, who are
twins, were two days old and in the hospital following their birth in April 2021 when the
Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) responded to a referral averring that the
Children had been exposed to drugs. It is undisputed that the Children had tested positive
for opiates and methadone at birth and had been diagnosed with Neonatal Abstinence
Syndrome. DCS subsequently referred the Children to Tennessee Early Intervention
Services (“TEIS”). Although the parents were not married, Father was named on the
Children’s birth certificates, and it is undisputed that he is the Children’s biological
father.

       On May 14, 2021, DCS filed a petition in the White County Juvenile Court (“trial
court”), alleging that the Children were dependent and neglected as to both parents due to
the Children’s drug exposure. DCS averred in the petition that when interviewed by DCS
case manager Emily Lewis, Mother had admitted using drugs during pregnancy, and
Father had admitted knowing that Mother was using drugs while pregnant with the
Children. DCS specifically alleged in pertinent part:

             On April 27, 2021, [Ms. Lewis] contacted [C.F.], a social worker at
      Erlanger Hospital in Chattanooga, Tennessee. [C.F.] reported that [Mother]
      and [Father] were currently present at the hospital for the first time since
      the [C]hildren had been admitted. [C.F.] confirmed that [Mother] and the
      [C]hildren had tested positive for opiates and methadone. [C.F.] advised
      that Azelea was being medicated with morphine and clonidine and Phoenix
      was being given morphine. According to [C.F.], [Mother] admitted to
      using heroin about three weeks prior and to taking pills and methadone
      during her pregnancy. [C.F.] explained that [Mother] and [Father] had
      admitted to a history of drug use.

             On the same date, [Ms. Lewis] observed the [C]hildren. By then,
      both [C]hildren had been placed on morphine and clonidine to ease
      withdrawal symptoms. The [C]hildren were diagnosed with neonatal
      abstinence syndrome, born premature at an estimated [] thirty-five weeks
      and six days, and received little prenatal care.

             On the same date, [Ms. Lewis] met with [Mother] and [Father] at the
      Ronald McDonald House in Chattanooga. [Mother] acknowledged her
      substance abuse. [Mother] stated that she had started attending a
      methadone clinic to combat her addiction. [Mother] reported that she had
      been on buprenorphine in the past but had gone to methadone due to an
      allergic reaction.

      ***

            [Mother] admitted that she had been taking buprenorphine.
      [Mother] further admitted that she had only stayed sober for a while before
                                           -2-
       her relapse, which was on the day before she found out she was pregnant.
       [Mother] further admitted that she had been “snorting” heroin. [Mother]
       explained that she eventually found Volunteer Comprehensive Site in
       Chattanooga for methadone.

               [Mother] admitted that she “used” during her pregnancy anytime she
       had withdrawals, usually every three-to-four days depending on how she
       felt. [Father] claimed that a doctor had instructed [Mother] to use heroin to
       prevent the [C]hildren from withdrawing in utero. [Mother] stated that she
       had quit “using” since being on methadone. [Mother] admitted that she last
       used heroin about one and a half to two weeks ago.

              [Father] admitted to a history of drug use and stated his drug of
       choice was opiates. [Father] claimed that he had not used in three or four
       months. [Father] admitted that he was aware [Mother] had been using
       heroin during her pregnancy.

DCS requested an immediate protective custody order and placement of the Children
with their paternal grandparents, J.B. and B.B. (“Paternal Grandparents”).

       DCS noted in the dependency and neglect petition that it had been involved with
the family in the past concerning the parents’ one-year-old child, Ayra B., who was in the
custody of a maternal aunt, M.W. (“Aunt”). Although DCS was not a party to any
custody action concerning Ayra, DCS had become involved in Ayra’s case because
Mother allegedly had used buprenorphine during her pregnancy with Ayra. Mother also
reported to the case manager at the time of the Children’s removal that she had a five-
year-old child, Lydia B., who was in Mother’s ex-husband’s custody and with whom she
was allowed only supervised visitation.

       The trial court entered an ex parte order on May 14, 2021, bringing the Children
into the protective custody of the court and awarding temporary legal custody of the
Children to Paternal Grandparents. The court directed that all contact between the
parents and the Children must be directly supervised by DCS or an individual approved
by DCS. Setting the case for a preliminary hearing, the court gave notice to the parents
of the obligation to provide child support for the Children and stated that support would
be set during the hearing. The court appointed attorney Macey Gurley as a guardian ad
litem (“GAL”) to represent the Children’s best interest.

        Following two continuances and upon Mother’s waiver of a preliminary hearing,
the trial court entered an order on July 19, 2021, finding probable cause that the Children
were dependent and neglected as to Mother. Following a subsequent hearing, the trial
                                           -3-
court adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected as to Mother in an order entered
on October 5, 2021. According to the adjudicatory order, Mother “neither admit[ted] nor
denie[d] the allegations in the Petition, the [C]hildren being dependent and neglected, and
underst[ood] that the Court [would] adopt the allegations in the Petition as findings of
fact[.]” The court thereby adopted DCS’s allegations of dependency and neglect as to
Mother and also found the Children to be victims of severe child abuse, as defined by
Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(27), perpetrated by Mother.

       Following several continuances and the trial court’s finding that Father had
“fail[ed] to appear or otherwise defend the removal of the [C]hildren” in a preliminary
hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment on October 5, 2021, finding probable
cause that the Children were dependent and neglected as to Father. Following a hearing
during which Father appeared and stipulated to the allegations in the dependency and
neglect petition, the trial court adjudicated the Children dependent and neglected as to
Father in an order entered on December 21, 2021. Having reserved the issue of severe
child abuse as to Father for a subsequent hearing, the court entered an order on April 4,
2022, finding the Children to be victims of severe child abuse perpetrated by Father and
adopting the allegations in the dependency and neglect petition as findings of fact
concerning Father.

        On March 21, 2022, the trial court entered an agreed order divesting Paternal
Grandparents of custody of the Children. Paternal Grandparents admitted that they had
left the Children in the care of the parents, contrary to the court’s prior order, and that
while the Children were in the parents’ care, an incident had occurred that resulted in the
parents’ arrest on criminal charges. According to the agreed order, the facts of that
incident were as follows:

             On March 10, 2022, the U.S. Marshals Service informed [DCS] that
      it was at the home of the parents, [Mother] and [Father], who were being
      arrested.

             On said date, [the Children] were present in the home.

            The U.S. Marshals Service advised that [Mother] was holding
      Azelea and that [Mother] had a significant amount of heroin on her person.

             The U.S. Marshals Service further advised that syringes, burnt
      spoons, and other paraphernalia [were] located in the home within reach of
      [the Children].

                                           -4-
(Paragraph numbering omitted.) In its March 2022 order, the trial court awarded custody
of the Children to friends of the family, M.H. and R.H., as a “kinship placement.”

       The trial court subsequently entered an order on June 21, 2022, divesting M.H.
and R.H. of custody upon finding that they were no longer able to serve as a placement
for the Children. M.H. testified during the termination trial that this was due to health
concerns for her husband, R.H. In the June 2022 order, the trial court awarded custody of
the Children to DCS, and DCS then placed the Children in the care of their current foster
parents (“Foster Parents”).

        DCS developed a family permanency plan on July 5, 2022, which the trial court
ratified on July 18, 2022, and DCS presented as an exhibit at trial. Although their
respective counsel participated in development of the plan, neither parent participated in
its development. According to an affidavit executed by a DCS team leader, DCS sent a
copy of the July 2022 permanency plan to each parent at the parents’ last known address,
which was the same for both parents. DCS staff noted in the plan that on March 23,
2022, Father was in jail with a four-million-dollar bond and that by the time of the plan’s
development, a capias warrant had been issued for Father based on his failure to appear
in criminal court on pending charges. In its ratification order, the trial court found that
neither parent had participated in the July 2022 plan’s development and that the parents’
whereabouts were unknown at that time.

       A family permanency plan had previously been developed on July 13, 2021,
through a child and family team meeting conducted when the Children were in Paternal
Grandparents’ custody. This initial plan indicates that Mother personally participated in
the July 2021 child and family team meeting. Notes from the July 2021 team meeting
indicated that Mother was a disabled military veteran receiving disability benefits and
that Father had recently completed a cosmetology course. During the termination trial,
Mother testified that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) related to
her time in the military and agoraphobia with panic and anxiety disorder.

        The initial plan was reviewed in team meetings held on January 6, 2022, and April
12, 2022. Although counsel for both parents were present at each team meeting, it is not
clear from the record whether Mother personally participated in the meetings reviewing
the initial plan or whether Father personally participated at all in the child and family
team meetings. The parents’ responsibilities as set forth in the initial permanency plan,
prior to the Children’s placement in DCS custody, were consistent with those in the plan
subsequently developed and ratified in July 2022 after the Children entered DCS custody.

      Father and Mother shared essentially the same responsibilities in the permanency
plans. These included: (1) resolving all pending and current criminal charges,
                                           -5-
complying with all orders of the criminal court, refraining from incurring any new
criminal charges, and informing DCS of any new charges or changes in status of past
charges within seventy-two hours; (2) submitting to random and periodic urine and hair
follicle drug and alcohol screens while not chemically altering or shaving hair throughout
the pendency of the case, completing an alcohol and drug assessment and all resultant
recommendations, informing DCS of any substance abuse relapses within seventy-two
hours, refraining from association with known drug users, refraining from using
Cannabidiol (“CBD”) products, and signing any and all releases to allow DCS staff to
speak with alcohol and drug treatment providers; (3) completing a psychological
evaluation with participation in counseling or therapeutic treatment if recommended and
allowing random and scheduled pill counts by DCS of any prescribed medications; (4)
undergoing a clinical parenting assessment and completing resultant recommendations,
completing parenting classes, and applying parenting skills learned to visits with the
Children; (5) obtaining a legal means of income, providing DCS with verification of
employment, completing a budget with a case manager, and informing DCS staff within
seventy-two hours if employment were lost; (6) maintaining visitation with the Children,
including arriving on time for visits and with items the Children might need during the
visits; and (7) maintaining a safe and stable home for the Children and reporting any
change in living conditions within seventy-two hours to DCS. In its order ratifying the
July 2022 plan, the trial court found that “[t]he requirements set out in the plan [were]
reasonable, related to remedying the conditions that necessitate[d] foster care, and in the
best interest of the [C]hildren.”

       DCS filed its petition to terminate the parental rights of Father and Mother to the
Children on August 16, 2022. DCS averred in the petition that since the Children came
into protective custody, Mother had been incarcerated from May 7 to 8, 2022, in Putnam
County, Tennessee, and Father had been incarcerated from March 10 to 18, 2022, and
from April 18 to June 7, 2022, in Putnam County. According to DCS, Mother had been
“incarcerated for offenses including, but not limited to, aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, possession with intent to sell hydrocodone, failure to appear, violation of
probation, driving while license suspended, revoked, and/or cancelled, driving under the
influence, and introduction of contraband into a penal institution.” DCS averred that
Father had been “incarcerated for offenses including, but not limited to, possession[,]
manufacture and delivery, theft of services, failure to appear, possession of a weapon as a
felon, violation of probation, possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of parole, and
attempted introduction of contraband into a penal institution.”

        In the termination petition, DCS alleged statutory grounds against both Father and
Mother of (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to financially support the
Children, (2) abandonment by wanton disregard prior to the parents’ incarceration, (3)
failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans,
                                           -6-
(4) persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the Children, (5) severe child
abuse, and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal
and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. DCS further alleged
that it was in the Children’s best interest for Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to be
terminated. The trial court subsequently entered an order appointing counsel for each
parent and again appointing Ms. Gurley as a GAL to represent the Children. Neither
parent filed an answer to the petition.

        DCS filed a motion to suspend the parents’ visitation with the Children on October
31, 2022, alleging that suspension of visitation was in the Children’s best interest because
the parents had not “not completed any of the requirements” of the permanency plans and
had not visited the Children since the Children entered foster care on June 20, 2022.
Following a hearing during which the parents appeared, the trial court entered an order on
November 21, 2022, granting DCS’s motion to suspend the parents’ visitation upon
finding that the parents were “noncompliant” with the permanency plans and that it was
in the Children’s best interest to suspend visitation. The court directed that Mother’s
visitation would “remain suspended until she provide[d] three (3) results negative for
illegal drugs and the tests shall be random, unscheduled, and the sample shall not be
altered so as to disturb the results.” Mother did not complete this requirement, and by the
time of trial, neither parent had seen the Children for approximately eight months.

       In a review hearing order, also entered on November 21, 2022, the trial court
found that DCS had received “no verification” that Father or Mother had completed any
of the plan requirements. The court further found that the parents had been “evading law
enforcement until recently,” that Mother had been charged in Putnam County with
introduction of contraband into a penal facility, and that Father had been charged in
Putnam County on multiple drug-related offenses. According to an arrest warrant for
Mother presented as an exhibit during the termination trial, Mother had allegedly
attempted “to pass a hypodermic needle and a container of a mix of heroin and fentanyl
and meth to a prisoner upstairs” in the Putnam County Sheriff’s Office Jail on May 7,
2022. Although not specified as the “prisoner upstairs” in Mother’s arrest warrant,
Father was a prisoner in the jail at the time and was subsequently charged with attempted
introduction of contraband into a penal facility.

        The trial court conducted a bench trial on February 3, 2023. At the beginning of
trial, DCS counsel announced that DCS was proceeding on only three termination
grounds for both parents: (1) severe child abuse, (2) failure to substantially comply with
the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans, and (3) failure to manifest an
ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of or financial
responsibility for the Children. DCS presented testimony from April Walker, a DCS
family support services worker who had worked with the family from July 2021 until the
                                            -7-
Children were brought into DCS custody in June 2022; Jamesia Evans, a DCS family
services worker who had worked with the family since June 2022; M.H., the kinship
placement individual who, with her husband, had custody of the Children from March
2022 to June 2022; Aunt; and the Children’s current foster mother (“Foster Mother”).
Mother testified on her own behalf. Although Father appeared for trial, he did not testify.

       At trial, DCS presented as exhibits, inter alia, the dependency and neglect and
permanency plan records, criminal history records for each parent, and a January 2023
order entered by the White County Chancery Court (“chancery court”), terminating the
parental rights of Father and Mother to Ayra upon a petition filed by Aunt and her
husband. The chancery court’s order indicated that both parents had appeared for the
termination proceedings in Ayra’s case and had “agreed with the termination of their
parental rights as to [Ayra].” The chancery court had found clear and convincing
evidence of two statutory grounds related to Ayra: severe child abuse and abandonment
by failure to financially support the child. The chancery court had also found by clear
and convincing evidence that it was in Ayra’s best interest to terminate Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights.

       According to Ms. Evans’s and Mother’s respective testimonies at trial in the
instant action, Mother had made no contact with DCS and had not responded to Ms.
Evans’s attempts to contact her for several months after Mother’s May 2022 arrest on the
contraband charge. Mother testified that she had relocated to Florida at that time to avoid
the temptation to relapse with substance abuse. Mother further testified that while in
Florida from approximately June to September 2022, she worked cleaning houses and
attended Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) and Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”) meetings.
When asked if she had any documentation of her attendance at AA and NA meetings,
Mother acknowledged that she did not. According to Mother, Father joined her in
Florida after his release on bond from the Putnam County jail, and he had worked in
Florida sporadically cutting hair. It is undisputed that in September 2022, law
enforcement in Florida located the parents together, arresting Father on a warrant for
failure to appear in Tennessee and transporting Father and Mother back to Tennessee.
Upon the parents’ return to Tennessee, Mother served approximately ten days in jail, and
Father was incarcerated on felony charges. Ms. Evans testified that when the parents
resurfaced in Tennessee, she met with each of them and explained the ratified
permanency plan in detail.

        Testimony demonstrated that approximately one month prior to trial, Mother had
completed a session of intensive outpatient therapy (“IOP”) for substance abuse. Mother
testified that she was in an “aftercare” substance abuse program, but she presented no
proof of her participation in aftercare. Mother continued to receive veteran’s disability
benefits although the amount had been reduced in the eighteen months since the
                                           -8-
Children’s removal.1 Mother was residing with J.B., the Children’s paternal grandfather
(“Paternal Grandfather”), while Father was incarcerated. The paternal grandmother,
B.B., had since passed away. Father remained incarcerated with pending felony charges
at the time of the termination trial. Mother acknowledged that she had deposited some
funds into Father’s prison commissary account and that she had attempted to assist
Paternal Grandfather in retaining criminal defense counsel for Father.

       The trial court entered a final order on April 3, 2023, terminating Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights to the Children. The court determined by clear and convincing
evidence that DCS had proven the three statutory grounds pursued at trial. The court
further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother each timely
appealed.

                                         II. Issues Presented

        Father presents three issues on appeal, which we have restated slightly as follows:

        1.      Whether the trial court erred in determining by clear and convincing
                evidence that Father had failed to substantially comply with the
                responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans.

        2.      Whether the trial court erred in determining by clear and convincing
                evidence that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness
                to personally assume legal and physical custody of or financial
                responsibility for the Children.

        3.      Whether the trial court erred in determining by clear and convincing
                evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best
                interest of the Children.

Mother presents one issue, which we have similarly restated as follows:

        4.      Whether the trial court erred in determining by clear and convincing
                evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best
                interest of the Children.

1
  Mother testified that she had initially received 100% disability, which had subsequently been reduced to
70% disability, providing her with $1,764.62 per month. She stated that she had filed a petition to
reinstate her 100% disability benefits but that the petition was still pending.

                                                  -9-
        On appeal, Father has not challenged the trial court’s findings regarding the
statutory ground of severe child abuse, and Mother has not challenged the court’s
findings regarding any of the statutory grounds. However, correctly noting that this
Court must “review thoroughly the trial court’s findings as to each ground for [parental
rights] termination and as to whether termination is in the child’s best interest,” see In re
Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 525 (Tenn. 2016), DCS has presented an issue
concerning all of the statutory grounds found by the trial court. We have particularized
those issues not raised by the parents and restated them as follows:

       5.     Whether the trial court erred in determining by clear and convincing
              evidence that Father had committed severe child abuse.

       6.     Whether the trial court erred in determining by clear and convincing
              evidence that Mother had committed severe child abuse.

       7.     Whether the trial court erred in determining by clear and convincing
              evidence that Mother had failed to substantially comply with the
              responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans.

       8.     Whether the trial court erred in determining by clear and convincing
              evidence that Mother had failed to manifest an ability and
              willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of or
              financial responsibility for the Children.

                                 III. Standard of Review

        In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine
“whether the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530
(Tenn. 2006). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record,
accompanied by a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against
those findings. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at
507; In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d at 530. Questions of law, however, are reviewed de
novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524
(citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009)). The trial court’s determinations
regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be
disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v. Garrett, 92
S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

       “Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their
children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling,
                                            - 10 -
92 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tenn. 2002). It is well established, however, that “this right is not
absolute and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence
justifying such termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96,
97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). As our
Supreme Court has explained:

      The parental rights at stake are “far more precious than any property right.”
      Santosky [v. Kramer], 455 U.S. [745,] 758-59 [(1982)]. Termination of
      parental rights has the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a
      complete stranger and of [“]severing forever all legal rights and obligations
      of the parent or guardian of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1);
      see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a decision terminating
      parental rights is “final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and
      consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to
      “fundamentally fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky, 455
      U.S. at 754; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty, N.C.,
      452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to
      fundamentally fair procedures).

             Among the constitutionally mandated “fundamentally fair
      procedures” is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing
      evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. This standard minimizes the risk of
      unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental
      parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).
      “Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief
      or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or
      substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re
      Bernard T. 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-and-
      convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as
      highly probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re
      Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183
      S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

      ***

      In light of the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings,
      however, the reviewing court must make its own determination as to
      whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a
      preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of
      the elements necessary to terminate parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319
      S.W.3d at 596-97.
                                          - 11 -
In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522-24. “[P]ersons seeking to terminate [parental]
rights must prove all the elements of their case by clear and convincing evidence,”
including statutory grounds and the best interest of the child. See In re Bernard T., 319
S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

         IV. Grounds for Termination of Father’s and Mother’s Parental Rights

       Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 (Supp. 2023) lists the statutory
requirements for termination of parental rights, providing in relevant part:

      (a)    The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
             with the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to
             a child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption
             proceeding by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or
             guardianship rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1,
             part 1 and title 37, chapter 2, part 4 . . . .

      ***

      (c)    Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:

             (1)    A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that
                    the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights
                    have been established; and

             (2)    That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the
                    best interests of the child.

The trial court determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported a finding
of three statutory grounds to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights: (1) severe
child abuse, (2) substantial noncompliance with the reasonable requirements of the
permanency plans, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal
and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. We will address each
statutory ground in turn.

                                 A. Severe Child Abuse

        The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that both Father and Mother
had committed severe child abuse. Regarding this ground for termination of parental
rights, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4) provides:
                                          - 12 -
       The parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child
       abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found
       by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition
       for adoption to have committed severe child abuse against any child[.]

As relevant to this action, Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(27)(E) (Supp. 2023)
defines “severe child abuse” as:

       Knowingly or with gross negligence allowing a child under eight (8) years
       of age to ingest an illegal substance or a controlled substance that results in
       the child testing positive on a drug screen, except as legally prescribed to
       the child[.]

As this Court has previously explained:

       [A] parent’s conduct is “knowing, and a parent acts or fails to act
       ‘knowingly,’ when . . . she has actual knowledge of the relevant facts and
       circumstances or when . . . she is either in deliberate ignorance of or in
       reckless disregard of the information that has been presented to . . . her.”

In re H.L.F., 297 S.W.3d 223, 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting In re R.C.P., No.
M2003-01143-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 1567122, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 2004)).
“The most serious consequence of a finding that a parent has committed severe child
abuse is that such a finding, in and of itself, constitutes a ground for termination of
parental rights.” In re Samaria S., 347 S.W.3d 188, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. M.S., No. M2003-01670-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL
549141, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2005)).

       On October 5, 2021, following a hearing upon DCS’s dependency and neglect
petition as to Mother, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding the Children to
be dependent and neglected as to Mother and finding that Mother had committed severe
child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(27)(E). On December
21, 2021, following hearings upon the dependency and neglect petition as to Father, the
trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding the Children to be dependent and
neglected as to Father. On April 4, 2022, the trial court entered a separate order finding
that Father had committed severe child abuse.

       In determining that this ground for termination of parental rights had been proven
by clear and convincing evidence as to both parents, the trial court expressly relied on its
previous findings in the October 2021 order regarding Mother and the April 2022 order
                                            - 13 -
regarding Father during the dependency and neglect proceedings. The trial court also
relied on the chancery court’s January 2023 order terminating Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights to Ayra, their elder daughter, based in part on a finding that both parents
had committed severe child abuse. On appeal, DCS maintains and Father concedes that
these prior orders constituted res judicata on the issue of severe child abuse as to both
parents.2 We agree.

         Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4) allows a trial court to terminate a
parent’s rights on the ground of severe child abuse if the parent “has been found to have
committed severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court”
(emphasis added). It is well settled that a trial court may rely on a prior court order
finding severe child abuse and is not required to relitigate the issue of severe abuse at the
trial to terminate parental rights. See In re Samaria S., 347 S.W.3d at 201; State, Dep’t of
Children’s Servs. v. M.S., No. M2003-01670-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 549141, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2005). As this Court concluded in a comparable situation:

       Because Mother did not appeal the trial court’s finding of severe child
       abuse within the time allowed by law, the order became a final order and
       the finding of severe child abuse is res judicata. Thus, the trial court did
       not err in finding that Mother has committed severe abuse for purposes of
       terminating her parental rights.

In re Serenity S., No. W2014-00080-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 6612571, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Nov. 24, 2014). We therefore affirm the trial court’s determination that this
statutory ground for termination was proven as to both parents by clear and convincing
evidence.

                   B. Substantial Noncompliance with Permanency Plans

       The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father and Mother had
failed to substantially comply with the statement of responsibilities set out in the
permanency plans. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(2) provides as an
additional ground for termination of parental rights:

       There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with
       the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan pursuant to the
       provisions of title 37, chapter 2, part 4[.]

2
  On appeal, Mother has not addressed the trial court’s findings as to any of the statutory grounds for
termination of her parental rights aside from including them in a factual and procedural summary.
                                                   - 14 -
The trial court also expressly found that the requirements of the permanency plans were
reasonable and related to the conditions necessitating foster care. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
37-2-403(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 2023) (providing in part that “the requirements of the
statement” of responsibilities must be “reasonable” and “related to remedying the
conditions that necessitate foster care placement”); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 547
(Tenn. 2002) (holding that a finding concerning whether permanency plan requirements
are reasonably related to the conditions necessitating foster care “must be made in
conjunction with the determination of substantial noncompliance under § 36-1-
113(g)(2).”). We note that the July 2022 permanency plan was the only one developed
while the Children were in DCS custody and was thus the only one ratified by the trial
court. However, during the termination trial, DCS presented three child and family team
meeting summaries indicating that a family permanency plan had been developed in July
2021, while the Children were in Paternal Grandparents’ custody, and subsequently
reviewed twice and renewed during team meetings. The July 2021 and July 2022 plans
included essentially the same set of responsibilities for the parents. Neither parent
disputes the reasonableness of the plan requirements.

      In its final judgment, the trial court detailed specific findings of fact concerning
the parents’ failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency
plans and what the court found to be DCS’s reasonable efforts to assist Father and
Mother with compliance:

             The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [] [Mother]
      and [Father] are in substantial noncompliance with the statements of
      responsibilities in the permanency plans in that the Court ratified the
      permanency plans and found them to be reasonable, necessary, and in the
      best interest of the [C]hildren; that the permanency plans clearly identify in
      writing the statements of responsibilities for [Mother] and [Father]; that the
      requirements in the permanency plans were all reasonably related to
      remedying the conditions that necessitate foster care; that there is little
      likelihood that [Mother] and [Father] will complete the plans in the near
      future; and that [Mother] and [Father] were provided with the Criteria and
      Procedure for Termination of Parental Rights advising them that substantial
      noncompliance with the permanency plans was a ground for termination of
      parental rights.

             April Walker, a family support services worker with [DCS], testified
      that she worked with [Mother] and [Father] for almost [] one (1) year from
      July, 2021, through June, 2022. During that time, a total of four (4)
      permanency plans were developed, all having basically the same action
      steps and statements of responsibilities for [Mother] and [Father].
                                          - 15 -
       The requirements of the plans included the following:

       a)     the parents resolve their pending criminal charges;

       b)     the parents adequately address their substance abuse issues;

       c)     the parents complete mental health and psychological
              evaluations;

       d)     the parents complete parenting assessments, parenting
              education, and demonstrate skills that they have learned;

       e)     the parents have a legal means of income; and

       f)     the parents maintain a bond with the [C]hildren.

       During the period of time that Ms. Walker worked with [Mother]
and [Father], no steps on the permanency plans were completed. [Mother]
and [Father] failed to maintain consistent contact with the [C]hildren, failed
to support the [C]hildren financially, did not take advantage of services
offered by [DCS], and were nonresponsive to attempts to contact them.

      Ms. Walker testified that she had attempted home visits, attempted
text messages and emails, and tried to make weekly contact but [Mother]
and [Father] failed to do their part to maintain contact with [DCS].

       Jamesia Evans, a family services worker with the [DCS], has worked
with [Mother] and [Father] since June, 2022. The record reflects that the
permanency plan dated July 5, 2022, was ratified by the Court on July 18,
2022. Ms. Evans testified that [Mother] and [Father] have not completed
their permanency requirements in that plan. In fact, the only action step
completed was that [Mother] enrolled in an intensive outpatient program in
November, 2022, and completed it, or some of it on December 29, 2022.
However, at the time of the filing of the Petition on August 16, 2022,
[Mother] had not completed any of the action steps. It was not until two (2)
or three (3) months after the Petition was filed that [Mother] took any
action in that regard.

       [Mother] has not completed a psychological evaluation. Although
she did participate in some parenting classes with Omni Visions, [Mother]
                                    - 16 -
      has not completed a parenting assessment. [Mother] and [Father] are still
      unable to demonstrate that they can provide for the [C]hildren physically
      and emotionally, and are still unable to demonstrate that they can provide a
      stable household.

             Therefore, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2), the Court
      finds by clear and convincing evidence that [Mother] and [Father] are in
      substantial noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in
      permanency plans.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.)        Upon careful review, we determine that a
preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Father and Mother
failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities of their permanency
plans.

       In summarizing the parents’ responsibilities under the permanency plans, the trial
court listed six main requirements for the parents. For some of these six requirements,
the plans also delineated more particular responsibilities, which were all essentially
identical for Father and Mother. The parents were required to:

      (1)    Resolve all pending criminal charges, to include: complying with all
             orders of the criminal court, refraining from incurring any new
             criminal charges, and informing DCS of any new charges or changes
             in status of past charges within seventy-two hours;

      (2)    Adequately address their substance abuse issues, to include:
             submitting to random and periodic urine and hair follicle drug and
             alcohol screens while not chemically altering or shaving hair
             throughout the pendency of the case, completing an alcohol and drug
             assessment and all resultant recommendations, informing DCS of
             any substance abuse relapses within seventy-two hours, refraining
             from association with known drug users, refraining from using CBD
             products, and signing any and all releases to allow DCS staff to
             speak with alcohol and drug treatment providers;

      (3)    Complete mental health and psychological evaluations, to include:
             participating in counseling or therapeutic treatment if recommended
             and allowing random and scheduled pill counts by DCS of any
             prescribed medications;

                                          - 17 -
        (4)     Complete parenting assessments,                parenting      education,     and
                demonstrate skills learned;

        (5)     Obtain and maintain a legal means of income, to include: providing DCS
                with verification of employment, completing a budget with a case manager,
                and informing DCS staff within seventy-two hours if employment were
                lost; and

       (6)      Maintain a bond with the Children, to include: maintaining visitation with
                the Children, arriving on time for visits, and bringing items the Children
                might need during the visits.

Additionally, the permanency plans included a seventh overall requirement that the
parents maintain a safe and stable home for the Children and report any change in living
conditions to DCS within seventy-two hours.3 We will address the trial court’s findings
as to each parent in turn.

                                               1. Father

       On appeal, Father acknowledges that he did not “complete[] the plan fully.” He
argues that he “substantially complied with the most important parts of the permanency
plan in that he became sober and was regularly visiting the Children.” In support of his
argument, Father relies on Ms. Walker’s testimony that Father had passed every drug
screen she had administered to him, Aunt’s testimony that Father had passed a nail bed
drug screen at some point during the pendency of the case involving Arya, and Father’s
visits with the Children prior to their coming into DCS custody in June 2022. DCS
responds that Father failed to adequately address his substance abuse issues, maintain a
bond with the Children, or substantially comply with the other requirements of the
permanency plans. We agree with DCS on this issue.

        Ms. Walker was the family’s case manager from July 2021 to June 2022. Ms.
Walker testified that she administered multiple drug screens to the parents while she was
the case manager and that they passed each one. However, Ms. Walker further testified
that although she “would try to do at least monthly drug screens,” “[t]here were times
when [she] couldn’t find the parents, couldn’t reach the parents.” Ms. Walker stated that
she did not know exactly how many drug screens she administered to the parents.

3
  The permanency plans also included a responsibility for both parents to pay child support as set through
the Tennessee Child Support Division. However, although it is well settled in Tennessee that every
parent is presumed to have knowledge of a parent’s duty to support his or her minor children regardless of
whether a court order to that effect is in place, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(H) (Supp. 2023), it is
undisputed that no order was entered setting a child support obligation amount for either parent.
                                                     - 18 -
According to Ms. Walker, the parents made “very little contact” with DCS during the
months of December 2021 and January 2022 particularly.

       Additionally, Father’s criminal history belies his position that he had demonstrated
a resolution of his substance abuse during this time. In March 2022, the parents were
arrested following the U.S. Marshals’ raid at their home, and illegal drugs and drug
paraphernalia were found in the home at that time. Additionally, Father was charged in
May 2022 with attempted introduction of contraband into a penal facility after Mother
allegedly attempted to pass a mix of heroin, fentanyl and methamphetamine, as well as
drug paraphernalia, to him. Concerning Aunt’s testimony regarding the nail bed drug
screen, Aunt did not specify when the screen was performed and reported that it was
during the pendency of Ayra’s placement in protective custody. No documentation of
this nail bed drug screen is in the record before us.

        As to the time period following the Children’s placement in DCS custody in June
2022 and the termination petition’s filing in August 2022, it is undisputed that Father,
while out of jail on bond, relocated to Florida to join Mother there without notifying
DCS. Ms. Evans, who served as the family’s case manager beginning in June 2022,
testified that she could not locate the parents until police officers returned them to
Tennessee in September 2022 after Father was arrested in Florida and extradited to
Tennessee. At the time of trial, Father had been incarcerated since September 2022 and
had not presented any proof of participation in substance abuse treatment. Ms. Evans’s
testimony and Father’s criminal history demonstrated that he had seven pending felony
charges and one pending misdemeanor charge.

       Father also asserts that his visits with the Children during the time that they were
in Paternal Grandparents’ custody and M.H. and R.H.’s custody demonstrate that he was
in substantial compliance with the permanency plans. Ms. Walker testified that Father
and Mother visited the Children regularly “[f]or the most part” while the Children were in
Paternal Grandparents’ custody. However, as Ms. Walker pointed out, Paternal
Grandparents lost custody when they allowed the parents to care for the Children
unsupervised and the incident with the U.S. Marshals occurred in March 2022.

        M.H. testified that during the approximately two months that she and R.H. had
custody of the Children, the parents visited but that the visits were “seldom.” M.H.
reported that Father and Mother were “nodding off” during visits and would spend a
significant amount of time in the bathroom one at a time. M.H. suspected that the parents
were under the influence of drugs during visits. M.H. acknowledged that her husband
had asked the parents to visit at night to help put the Children to bed. However, she
stated that Father and Mother would appear “four or five hours later, maybe eight hours
later” than scheduled, at midnight or later, after the Children were already in bed. M.H.
                                           - 19 -
further testified that Mother visited the Children approximately four times while they
were in M.H.’s custody but that Father was incarcerated some of that time and did not
participate in all of the visits.

       Father’s argument that he substantially complied with the permanency plans by
addressing his substance abuse issues and maintaining a bond with the Children is
unavailing. It is undisputed that by the time of trial, neither parent had seen the Children
in approximately eight months, and Father’s instances of negative drug screens were
punctuated by incidents when he was arrested or simply could not be found to screen.
Moreover, Father presented no proof that he had addressed the other requirements of the
permanency plans, including resolving criminal charges, undergoing mental health and
psychological evaluations, completing parenting assessments, maintaining a legal source
of income, and providing a safe and stable home. Instead, Father accrued more criminal
charges, and as the trial court found, Father completed no steps of the permanency plans.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating Father’s parental rights based
upon clear and convincing evidence of this statutory ground.

                                         2. Mother

        Mother does not address this statutory ground directly on appeal. However, in
support of her argument that it was not in the Children’s best interest for her rights to be
terminated, Mother asserts that although she showed a “lack of progress” on the
permanency plan requirements in the past, she had demonstrated her “current sobriety
and willingness to work the plan now” by the time of trial. Mother points to her
completion of an IOP program and negative urine drug screen in December 2022.
Mother testified at trial that she “want[ed] time to finish [her] plan” in order to prove that
she “deserve[d]” to have the Children returned to her. Mother also posits that at the time
of trial, she had demonstrated a safe and secure living situation because her testimony
indicated that she was residing with Paternal Grandfather in his home.

       As the trial court found, the “only action step completed” by Mother was her
enrollment in and completion of the IOP program. Ms. Evans testified that after the
parents’ return to Tennessee from Florida in September 2022, Mother enrolled in the IOP
program in November 2022, and completed the program on December 29, 2022.
However, as the court noted, Mother had not completed any action steps from the
permanency plans at the time of the termination petition’s filing in August 2022.

       Mother testified that the largest obstacle to her completing her requirements was a
lack of transportation due to the suspension of her driver’s license. She acknowledged
that she owned a vehicle but stated that she needed to pay approximately $200 in fines,
obtain insurance, and have an interlock device installed in her car in order to have her
                                            - 20 -
license reinstated. Mother also acknowledged that the reason for the interlock device was
a prior conviction of driving under the influence. At the time of trial, Mother was
receiving approximately $1,764 per month in veteran’s disability benefits. As Mother
admitted, she had paid funds toward Father’s commissary account in prison and had
attempted to assist Paternal Grandfather in paying to retain an attorney for Father’s
criminal defense. Mother’s testimony demonstrated that she knew the steps she needed
to take to secure transportation and had at least some resources to take those steps but had
not taken them.

       As to Mother’s living situation in Paternal Grandfather’s home at the time of trial,
the court found in a subsequent section of its final order that Paternal Grandfather had
“basically ignored the Order of the Court and allowed the children to remain
unsupervised with [Mother] and [Father] when they were in possession of illegal drugs.”
The court did not find Mother’s residency in Paternal Grandfather’s home to be a safe
and secure living situation for the Children, and the evidence does not preponderate
against this finding.

         We determine that the trial court did not err in finding that Mother had completed
none of the responsibilities of the permanency plans prior to the termination petition’s
filing. Furthermore, Mother’s efforts after the termination petition’s filing were “too
little, too late” to demonstrate substantial compliance. See, e.g., In re A.W., 114 S.W.3d
541, 544-47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming the trial court’s finding that the parent’s
improvements made since the filing of the termination petition were
“‘too little, too late.’”). We conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating
Mother’s parental rights upon clear and convincing evidence of the statutory ground of
failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plans.

              C. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume
                 Custody of or Financial Responsibility for the Children

       The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence to support termination of
Father’s and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-
113(g)(14) (Supp. 2023), which provides:

       A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability
       and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or
       financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s
       legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the
       physical or psychological welfare of the child[.]

                                           - 21 -
      Our Supreme Court has explained the following with regard to this ground for
termination of parental rights:

       Two prongs must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate
       parental rights under this statute: (1) the parent or legal guardian failed to
       manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical
       custody or financial responsibility of the child; and (2) placing the child in
       the parent’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial
       harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.

In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674 (Tenn. 2020).

       As to the first prong, our Supreme Court has held:

       [S]ection 36-1-113(g)(14) places a conjunctive obligation on a parent or
       guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness to personally assume
       legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. If a
       person seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing
       proof that a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or
       willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied.

Id. at 677. Concerning the “substantial harm” requirement of the second prong, this
Court has observed:

       The courts have not undertaken to define the circumstances that pose a risk
       of substantial harm to a child. These circumstances are not amenable to
       precise definition because of the variability of human conduct. However,
       the use of the modifier “substantial” indicates two things. First, it connotes
       a real hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant. Second, it
       indicates that the harm must be more than a theoretical possibility. While
       the harm need not be inevitable, it must be sufficiently probable to prompt a
       reasonable person to believe that the harm will occur more likely than not.

In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 4, 2018) (quoting Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (footnotes
omitted in Maya R.)).

       In its final judgment, the trial court set forth the following specific findings of fact
regarding this statutory ground as to both parents:

                                             - 22 -
       The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [Mother] and
[Father] have failed to manifest, by act or omission, a willingness and
ability to personally assume legal and physical custody and financial
responsibility of the [C]hildren and that placing the [C]hildren in the legal
and physical custody of [Mother] and [Father] would pose a risk of
substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the [C]hildren.

       The Court finds that at some point during the underlying case
[Mother] left Tennessee. [Mother] only came back after being picked up by
law enforcement for a failure to appear on criminal charges that she has
pending in Tennessee. [Father] has either been on the run evading law
enforcement or in jail since Ms. Evans has been assigned the case.
[Mother] and [Father] have felony charges pending, including charges that
[Mother] incurred as a result of attempting to bring drugs into jail to give to
[Father]. [Mother] and [Father] have another child, Ayra, who is in the
custody of [Mother’s] sister. As set forth in [DCS’s] Exhibit 27, the
parental rights of [Mother] and [Father] to Arya have been terminated. Ms.
Evans testified that [Mother] and [Father] have failed to maintain contact.
Ms. Walker and Ms. Evans each testified that the Department made
attempts to contact [Mother] and [Father] but they did not respond. Ms.
Evans further testified that she had sent three (3) certified letters to three (3)
different addresses, made several attempts to contact [Mother] and [Father],
and went to the address where [Father] had been living with his parents, all
to no avail.

       Ms. Evans also testified that she had attempted to drug screen
[Mother] and one (1) test was negative. However, on another attempt, it is
apparent to the Court that [Mother] attempted to alter the test because the
clear liquid and temperature reading was not consistent with someone
giving a true sample.

       Additionally, the record provides that [Mother] and [Father] have
not supported the children financially.

        [Mother] and [Father] have not visited the [C]hildren in over eight
(8) months. [Mother] and [Father] have not done much of anything to
maintain a bond with the [C]hildren. [Mother] and [Father] also left
Tennessee for eight (8) months and did not have any contact with the
[C]hildren at all. [M.H.], the [C]hildren’s former kinship placement,
testified that during the time she served as a caregiver, visits by [Mother]
and [Father] were inconsistent. There were times when [Mother] and
                                      - 23 -
[Father] would show up and it appeared to [M.H.] that they were under the
influence. [Mother] and [Father] would nod off during the visits. [Mother]
and [Father] would tell [M.H.] that they wanted to come help her or [M.H.]
would ask them for help getting the [C]hildren ready for bed. [Mother] and
[Father] would not show up until midnight or 2:00 AM, after the [C]hildren
were already in bed. During some of those times, [M.H.] testified that
[Mother] and [Father] appeared to be under the influence.

        [M.H.] further testified that she had observed the [C]hildren with the
current [Foster Parents]. [M.H.] testified that she believes the [C]hildren
are where they belong and are well cared for. [Mother’s] sister, [Aunt],
testified that the [C]hildren are very bonded with [Foster Parents]. [Aunt]
testified that she has a close personal relationship with [Foster Parents] and
they have a history of maintaining contact with each other so the [C]hildren
can visit and have contact with Ayra, their sibling. [Aunt] testified that she
anticipates that relationship will continue in the future so there will be a
relationship between the siblings. [Foster Mother] testified that she has a
strong bond with the [C]hildren. It is obvious to the Court that [Foster
Mother] cares deeply, loves the [C]hildren, and is committed to adopting
them. The Court is convinced that [Foster Parents] are able to provide the
[C]hildren with security, structure, and a loving home.

       [Aunt] also testified that she is [Mother’s] sister and is aware that
[Mother] has struggled with substance abuse for the past twenty (20) years.
[Aunt] testified that she is further aware that [Father] has had substance
abuse issues for at least seven (7) to ten (10) years.

       [Mother] testified that she left Tennessee because she was in fear of
relapsing. When she was questioned about the incident concerning her
attempt to sneak drugs to [Father] in jail, she [pled] “the Fifth” and the
Court takes a negative inference from that. [Mother] admitted to using
drugs while she was pregnant with the [C]hildren. [Mother] also admitted
that she has not paid child support.

        The Court understands that [Mother] is a veteran of the armed forces
and it appreciates her service. [Mother] admitted that she suffers from post-
traumatic stress disorder as a result of her service. The Court understands
that [Mother] has been determined to be at least partially disabled by
Veterans Affairs and receives approximately $1,700 a month in benefits.
However, no proof was presented that [Mother] has done anything to
address her mental health issues. [Mother] admitted that she still suffers
                                    - 24 -
from mental health problems including anxiety attacks but has not done
anything to address it, which is very concerning to the Court.

        Another issue that concerns the Court is that although [Mother] is
receiving $1,700 a month, she admitted that she has been putting money on
[Father’s] commissary in jail but not providing any support to the
[C]hildren, including in-kind support such as diapers, food, snacks, etc.
[Mother] has the means and ability to at least provide some in-kind support
for the [C]hildren but has not done anything. The testimony provided that
[Mother] bought Christmas presents but refused to give them to the
[C]hildren. [Mother] reported that . . . she was going to keep the presents
until the [C]hildren came home, knowing that is an unrealistic possibility
given the fact that she has essentially not done anything to complete the
steps on the permanency plans. This is a very selfish act by [Mother] who
appears to be more concerned about [Father] and his legal issues than doing
what she needs to do to parent the [C]hildren, and the Court finds this very
concerning.

       As to [Mother’s] leaving Tennessee for several months, it is
important to note that the only reason she came back was because she was
picked up for failing to appear at one of her court dates here. The Court is
not sure that [Mother] would have ever returned to Tennessee or done
anything to work on the permanency plans if not for her arrest.

       As it stands today, [Mother] and [Father] continue to have criminal
charges pending. One of the requirements of the permanency plans was
that [Mother] and [Father] resolve pending criminal charges. The charges
are not resolved. Based upon the actions of [Mother] and [Father], it
appears that they are not doing anything to try to resolve their charges.
This is based upon the fact that [Mother] had a court date and failed to
appear resulting in her arrest. There was also testimony presented that
[Father] had made bond. The Court thinks it was around $600,000.
[Father] skipped out on his bail and had to be picked up again. In all,
[Mother] and [Father] are just making resolution of their criminal charges
more difficult.

       [Mother] testified that she hopes, plans on, or has applied to
participate in the Veterans Recovery Court. The Court finds that would be
wonderful for [Mother] and it hopes she pursues it.

                                   - 25 -
              In addition, [Father] remains incarcerated. [Mother] is still living in
       the home with the paternal grandfather. This is the same home where the
       paternal grandfather basically ignored the Order of the Court and allowed
       the [C]hildren to remain unsupervised with [Mother] and [Father] when
       they were in possession of illegal drugs. The Court does not find that either
       [Mother] or [Father] have a suitable home nor are they able at this time to
       care for the [C]hildren and provide for them.

              [Mother] and [Father] are in substantial noncompliance with their
       statements of responsibilities in the permanency plans. The [C]hildren as
       well as Ayra have been determined to be the victims of severe child abuse
       perpetrated by [Mother] and/or [Father].

              For all of these reasons, the Court finds that [Mother] and [Father]
       have not demonstrated a willingness or an ability to assume custody or
       financial responsibility for the [C]hildren and that placing the [C]hildren
       with [Mother] and [Father] would pose a risk of substantial harm to the
       [C]hildren. The Court finds the proof is overwhelming with respect to this
       ground.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.) Upon thorough review of the record, we determine that
the evidence preponderates in favor the trial court’s findings. We will address the court’s
findings as to each parent in turn.

                                         1. Father

        Father acknowledges that because he was incarcerated at the time of trial, placing
the Children with him would have posed a risk of substantial harm to the Children.
Father thereby concedes that DCS proved the second prong of this statutory ground by
clear and convincing evidence. See In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT,
2018 WL 3058280, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018) (“[P]lacing a child with a
parent who [has] knowingly engaged ‘in repeated criminal conduct that necessitated [the
parent’s] re-incarceration’ would place the child at risk of physical or psychological
harm.” (quoting In re Ke’Andre C., No. M2017-01361-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 587966,
at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2018))). However, Father argues that DCS failed to prove
the first prong of this ground. He maintains that because he purportedly passed a nail bed
drug screen and “multiple other drug screens” and “visit[ed] regularly with the [C]hildren
in the beginning of the case,” he manifested an ability and willingness to assume custody
of the Children. We find Father’s argument unavailing.

                                           - 26 -
         In its findings concerning this ground, the trial court focused on Father’s failure to
resolve his criminal charges, accrual of additional criminal charges after the Children
were brought into protective custody, and absence from Tennessee when he “skipped out
on his bail” in the spring of 2022 and relocated to Florida for several months without
staying in contact with DCS or the Children. Father’s argument that he passed drug
screens and visited the Children focuses solely on the months prior to Father’s
disappearance from Tennessee. As explained in the previous section of this Opinion, the
negative nail bed drug test occurred, according to Ms. Walker’s testimony, at some point
during the pendency of the case involving Ayra, and no documentation of that nail bed
test is in the record for the instant action.

       Furthermore, Ms. Walker testified that there were times during the pendency of
this action when she could not find the parents or reach the parents to administer drug
tests. Ms. Evans testified that she was unable to administer drug tests to Father because
he was out of state and out of contact when she took over the case in June 2022 and
because Father was incarcerated once he was extradited from Florida to Tennessee in
September 2022. As Father avers, his visitation with the Children was consistent while
the Children were in Paternal Grandparents’ custody. However, it was also during this
time period that the U.S. Marshals’ raid occurred in March 2022, revealing that the
parents had violated the trial court’s order by having the Children with them without
supervision and that the parents had endangered the Children by placing them in the
presence of illegal drugs. As the trial court found, Father incurred additional barriers to
completing the requirements of his permanency plans and regaining custody of the
Children rather than bringing himself closer to doing so.

       Moreover, Father clearly did not manifest an ability and willingness to assume
financial responsibility for the Children. Father completed a course in cosmetology at
some point prior to the July 2021 child and family team meeting, and Mother testified
that Father had earned some funds cutting hair in Florida during the summer of 2022.
Nonetheless, undisputed testimony at trial demonstrated that Father had paid no child
support for the Children and provided no in-kind support (such as clothes, toys, or food)
to the Children during the pendency of this case.

       The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings that Father
failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical
custody of or financial responsibility for the Children and that placing the Children in
Father’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological
welfare of the Children. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination by clear
and convincing evidence regarding this statutory ground for termination of Father’s
parental rights.

                                             - 27 -
                                         2. Mother

        Although Mother does not directly address this statutory ground, within her best
interest argument, Mother maintains that at the time of trial, she had demonstrated her
sobriety since returning to Tennessee with the completion of her IOP in December 2022,
her ability to financially support the Children with her disability income, and her “ideal
housing” situation with Paternal Grandfather. Citing her own testimony regarding
transportation, Mother asserts that she “was close to getting” her driver’s license
reinstated at the time of trial so that she would no longer have to rely on others for
transportation and could remove that obstacle from her efforts to complete permanency
plan requirements. In averring that she would now “be able to complete the requirements
on her permanency plan quickly,” Mother implicitly acknowledges that at the time of
trial, and certainly at the time of the petition’s filing, she was not ready to assume custody
of or financial responsibility for the Children.

        Concerning the first prong of this statutory ground, whether Mother had
manifested an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility, the
trial court found that, like Father, Mother had incurred new criminal, drug-related charges
rather than resolving existing ones since the Children were brought into protective
custody. The court particularly noted Mother’s testimony that she would have stayed in
Florida if Father had not been extradited in September 2022. Mother stated that she had
spoken to a lawyer in Florida and that she would have retained counsel and would have
been “fighting for [her] kids” from Florida. However, the evidence indicated that Mother
stayed in Florida for several months without contacting DCS even though DCS, as Ms.
Evans testified, was the parents’ link to maintaining contact with the Children once the
Children were brought into DCS custody and Foster Parents’ care.

        The trial court encouraged Mother in her expressed plan to explore the “Veterans
Recovery Court” program, but Mother had not yet pursued this at the time of trial, and
she had criminal charges pending. Although Mother testified that she had participated in
AA and NA while in Florida and that she was participating in aftercare after finishing her
IOP in Tennessee, she presented no documentation of AA, NA, or aftercare participation.
After the Children were removed from her custody, Mother was allegedly found with
heroin on her person while holding Azelea in March 2022 and allegedly attempted to pass
illegal drugs to Father while he was incarcerated in May 2022. Furthermore, Mother
acknowledged her mental health concerns, testifying that she suffered from PTSD and
agoraphobia with panic and anxiety disorder. Yet, as the trial court found, Mother
presented “no proof” that she had “done anything to address her mental health issues.”

       Although Mother characterizes her living situation in Paternal Grandfather’s home
as “ideal,” the trial court determined it to be an unsuitable home for the Children. The
                                            - 28 -
court noted Paternal Grandfather’s history of ignoring the trial court’s order requiring
supervision of the parents’ visitation, particularly noting that the parents were found with
illegal drugs while alone with the Children after Paternal Grandparents allowed them an
unsupervised visit. The court considered Mother’s veteran’s disability income but found
that Mother had not manifested the willingness to prioritize spending funds on the
Children over Father’s needs while in prison. The evidence preponderates in favor of the
court’s findings that Mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally
assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Children.

         Regarding prong two, the risk of substantial harm to the Children if they were to
be placed with Mother, the trial court found, in addition to concerns related to Mother’s
drug use and criminal charges, that after the Children were removed from Paternal
Grandparents’ custody, Mother failed to maintain a meaningful relationship with the
Children. M.H. testified that the parents’ visits with the Children were inconsistent, that
the parents would often appear late at night after the Children were in bed, and that she
suspected the parents were under the influence of drugs during visits. By the time of
trial, the Children had not seen the parents in eight months. Ms. Evans testified that the
Children did “not know who Father and Mother [were].” The trial court found that the
testimonies of several witnesses, including Ms. Evans, M.H., Aunt, and Foster Mother,
demonstrated that the Children were strongly bonded to Foster Parents. Moreover,
Mother’s history of drug use to the point of perpetrating severe child abuse by exposing
the Children and Ayra to drugs in utero, the Children’s continued exposure to illegal
drugs as illustrated by the U.S. Marshals’ raid in March 2022, and the parents’ repeated
accrual of drug-related criminal charges support the trial court’s finding that the Children
would be at risk of substantial harm if placed in Mother’s custody.

      The trial court found the proof concerning this statutory ground to be
“overwhelming,” and we agree. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination
by clear and convincing evidence regarding this statutory ground for termination of
Mother’s parental rights as well.

                             V. Best Interest of the Children

        When a parent has been found to be unfit by establishment of at least one statutory
ground for termination of parental rights, as here, the interests of parent and child
diverge, and the focus shifts to what is in the child’s best interest. In re Audrey S., 182
S.W.3d 838, 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523
(“The best interests analysis is separate from and subsequent to the determination that
there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination.” (quoting In re Angela
E., 303 S.W.3d 240, (Tenn. 2010))). Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) provides a
list of factors the trial court is to consider when determining if termination of parental
                                           - 29 -
rights is in a child’s best interest. This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not
require the court to find the existence of every factor before concluding that termination
is in a child’s best interest. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523; In re Audrey S.,
182 S.W.3d at 878 (“The relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the
unique facts of each case.”). Furthermore, the best interest of a child must be determined
from the child’s perspective and not the parent’s. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 194
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

       Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i)(1) (Supp. 2023) lists the following
factors for consideration:

      (A)    The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s
             critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the
             child’s minority;

      (B)    The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely
             to have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical
             condition;

      (C)    Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in
             meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety
             needs;

      (D)    Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental
             attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that
             the parent can create such attachment;

      (E)    Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact
             with the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a
             positive relationship with the child;

      (F)    Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

      (G)    Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s
             household trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or
             post-traumatic symptoms;

      (H)    Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with
             another person or persons in the absence of the parent;

                                           - 30 -
(I)   Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with
      persons other than parents and caregivers, including biological or
      foster siblings, and the likely impact of various available outcomes
      on these relationships and the child’s access to information about the
      child’s heritage;

(J)   Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of
      circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial
      for the child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration
      of whether there is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or
      the use of alcohol, controlled substances, or controlled substance
      analogues which may render the parent unable to consistently care
      for the child in a safe and stable manner;

(K)   Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs,
      services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting
      adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

(L)   Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the
      parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in
      the custody of the department;

(M)   Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in
      establishing paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or
      addressing the circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an
      award of custody unsafe and not in the child’s best interest;

(N)   Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the
      home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual,
      emotional, or psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any
      other child or adult;

(O)   Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the
      child or any other child;

(P)   Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic
      and specific needs required for the child to thrive;

(Q)   Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to
      creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and
      specific needs and in which the child can thrive;
                                   - 31 -
       (R)    Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy
              and safe for the child;

       (S)    Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token
              financial support for the child; and

       (T)    Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be
              detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and
              effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the
              child.

The statute further provides: “When considering the factors set forth in subdivision
(i)(1), the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is
presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(2).

      Under the previous statutory scheme utilizing nine similar best interest factors, our
Supreme Court instructed regarding the best interest analysis as a whole:

       These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party to the
       termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor relevant to
       the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523 (citing
       In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). Facts
       considered in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a
       preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In
       re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d [533,] 555 [(Tenn. 2015)] (citing In re Audrey
       S., 182 S.W.3d at 861). “After making the underlying factual findings, the
       trial court should then consider the combined weight of those facts to
       determine whether they amount to clear and convincing evidence that
       termination is in the child’s best interest[s].” Id. When considering these
       statutory factors, courts must remember that “[t]he child’s best interests
       [are] viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re
       Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective of the
       child is the common theme” evident in all of the statutory factors. Id.
       “[W]hen the best interests of the child and those of the adults are in
       conflict, such conflict shall always be resolved to favor the rights and the
       best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

             Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote
       examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.
       And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of
                                           - 32 -
       statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v.
       Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts
       and circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant
       each statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182
       S.W.3d at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a
       factually intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives
       individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are
       terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon
       the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the
       consideration of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the
       analysis.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171
       S.W.3d at 194). But this does not mean that a court is relieved of the
       obligation of considering all the factors and all the proof. Even if the
       circumstances of a particular case ultimately result in the court ascribing
       more weight—even outcome determinative weight—to a particular
       statutory factor, the court must consider all of the statutory factors, as well
       as any other relevant proof any party offers.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

       In its final judgment, the trial court made detailed findings regarding the best
interest factors and concluded that, with the exception of two factors for which the court
made no specific findings regarding either parent and one factor for which the court made
no findings regarding Father, all factors weighed in favor of terminating Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights to the Children. Upon our thorough review of the evidence
presented, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of
Father’s and Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Given the
similarity of the trial court’s analysis as to Father and Mother, we will address application
of the best interest factors to both parents simultaneously, noting distinctions when
needed.

        Factors (A), (C), and (J) are related by reason of their emphasis on the Children’s
stability and safety. The trial court determined that factor (A) weighed in favor of
termination because it would “have a positive impact on the [C]hildren’s critical need for
stability and continuity of placement throughout the [C]hildren’s minority.” The court
found that the Children were “in a good foster home where they [were] well cared for by
pre-adoptive foster parents who [were] committed to them.” Relatedly, concerning factor
(C), the court found that Father and Mother had “not demonstrated continuity and
stability in meeting the [C]hildren’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety
needs.” In determining that factor (C) weighed in favor of termination, the court
particularly noted Father’s incarceration, Mother’s pending criminal charges, Mother’s
                                            - 33 -
living situation in the home of Paternal Grandfather, and the recent termination of
parental rights to the Children’s sister, Ayra.

       Regarding factor (J), whether the parent had demonstrated a lasting adjustment,
the court considered its findings that both parents were in substantial noncompliance with
the permanency plans and that both had failed to demonstrate the ability and willingness
to assume custody or financial responsibility to conclude that the parents had “failed to
demonstrate a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe
and beneficial for the [C]hildren to be in the home with either of them.” The evidence
presented supports the trial court’s findings regarding these statutory factors.

       Pertaining to factor (B), the trial court determined that this factor weighed in favor
of termination because “a change in caregiver and physical environment [was] likely to
have a negative impact on the [C]hildren’s emotional, psychological, and/or medical
condition.” The court found that the parents had “failed to complete services offered by
[DCS], failed to maintain regular visitation, and failed to support the [C]hildren.” In
contrast, the court found that with Foster Parents, the Children were “in the best place for
them right now.” The evidence preponderates in favor of these findings. Testimony
from Ms. Evans, M.H., Aunt, and Foster Mother demonstrated that the Children were
bonded to Foster Parents and thought of them as their parents. Aunt, who had custody of
Ayra, testified that Foster Parents had taken care to include Ayra in events such as
birthday parties with the Children. M.H. testified that the Children were “exactly where
they need[ed] to be” with Foster Parents.

       Although she does not address specific best interest factors on appeal, Mother
contends that by the time of trial, she had established an “ideal” living situation in
Paternal Grandfather’s home. However, the trial court found that Paternal Grandfather’s
home was not a safe and stable situation for the Children due to Paternal Grandfather’s
history of ignoring the court’s prior order regarding supervision of the parents with the
Children. The court also noted that the U.S. Marshals’ March 2022 raid, wherein drugs
were found with the parents and the Children together, occurred while the Children were
in Paternal Grandparents’ custody. For his part, Father acknowledges on appeal that
“some of the [best interest] factors do weigh against” maintaining his parental rights
without specifying which factors. Father does concede in an earlier section of his
argument that due to his incarceration, placing the Children with him at the time of trial
would have placed the Children at risk of substantial harm.

        Regarding factor (B), we conclude that returning the Children to either parent
would have rendered a deleterious effect on the Children’s well-being. Additionally, the
trial court found as to factor (R), concerning the physical environment of a parent’s
home, that Mother’s home was “unhealthy and unsafe” for the Children and that Father
                                            - 34 -
was incarcerated. Considering that Mother relied on her living situation with Paternal
Grandfather and presented no other evidence of a healthy and safe physical environment,
we determine that the evidence also preponderates in favor of this finding.

        Factors (D), (E), (H), and (I) are related due to their emphasis on parental
attachments and relationships. With respect to factor (D), the trial court found that the
parents did “not have a secure and healthy parental attachment with the [C]hildren” and
that there was no “reasonable expectation” that the parents would develop such an
attachment. As to factor (E) and the parents’ visitation with the Children, the court found
that the parents had “not maintained regular visitation or other contact with the [C]hildren
or used it to cultivate a positive relationship with the [C]hildren.” Particularly concerning
Mother after her return from Florida, the court found that although Mother had expressed
a desire to resume visits with the Children, she had failed to comply with the court’s
order requiring that she pass three unannounced drug screens before resuming visitation.

       In relation to the above factors concerning parental attachments, Father argues on
appeal that termination of his parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest because
(1) Mother testified that Father had a bond with the Children, (2) Father (and Mother)
visited the Children regularly before they came into DCS custody, and (3) Ms. Walker
and Ms. Evans each respectively testified that Father asked about the Children and
expressed concern about them while he was incarcerated. Father’s argument fails to take
into account his complete absence from these very young Children’s lives for eight
months prior to the time of trial, as well as what the trial court found to be the
problematic nature of the parents’ visits with the Children in earlier months. Although
Father’s expressions of concern for the Children to DCS case workers do him credit, they
are “too little, too late” to demonstrate a secure and healthy parental attachment with the
Children. See In re A.W., 114 S.W.3d at 544-47.

        Concerning factor (H), the trial court found that the Children had “created a
healthy parental attachment with [Foster Parents] in the absence of [Mother] and
[Father]” and credited Foster Mother’s testimony that she had “a strong bond” with the
Children and was “committed to adopting them.” Likewise, regarding factor (I), the
court determined that the Children had “a bond and relationship with their older sibling,
Arya, because of the foster parents’ relationship with Arya’s custodians.” The court
stated that it was “satisfied that [the] relationship will continue so that Arya and the
[C]hildren will be able to maintain a relationship with each other if the parental rights of
[Mother] and [Father] are terminated.” The evidence preponderates in favor of the
court’s findings as to factors (D), (E), (H), and (I), and we agree with the trial court’s
decision to weigh these factors in favor of terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental
rights to the Children.

                                            - 35 -
       Factors (F) and (G) relate to the Children’s previous experiences in the parents’
home and any trauma resulting from those experiences. The trial court expressly made
“no specific finding(s)” concerning whether the Children were fearful of living with the
parents (factor F) or whether Father’s or Mother’s home would trigger or exacerbate the
Children’s trauma (factor G). Although the court did not state its rationale for apparently
finding these factors to be inapplicable, we note that the Children came into the
protective custody of the court while they were still hospitalized as newborn infants and
that they were then placed with Paternal Grandparents. If the Children had any
experience of the parents’ home, the record indicates that it would have been when the
Children were present at the parents’ home during the March 2022 U.S. Marshals’ raid.
We recognize that the record contains no evidence of trauma suffered by the Children
during this raid although we believe that some resulting trauma could certainly be
inferred. Given the Children’s young age when they may have had any limited
experience of the parents’ home and Ms. Evans’s testimony that the Children did not
know who Father and Mother were at the time of trial, we conclude that factors (F) and
(G) weigh neither for nor against termination.

        Factors (K) and (L) both concern services and assistance offered to the parents.
With respect to factor (K), the trial court found that Mother and Father “failed to take
advantage of available programs, services, and community resources to assist them in
making a lasting adjustment of conduct, circumstances, or conditions.” The court noted
its earlier findings that Mother “did not complete any of the permanency requirements
prior to the Petition being filed” and that Father had “still not completed any of the
requirements.” The court thereby weighed factor (K) in favor of termination. On appeal,
Mother highlights her completion of an IOP in December 2022, several months after the
petition’s filing. Although this progress indicated that Mother had begun to take
advantage of a resource to combat her substance abuse by the time of trial, she did not
present evidence of any action taken prior to the petition’s filing or any evidence of a
lasting adjustment.

        The court also weighed factor (L) in favor of termination, finding that DCS had
“made reasonable efforts to assist [Mother] and [Father] in making a lasting adjustment
of circumstances.” Particularly as to Father, the court noted that “with him being
incarcerated or on the run, he [had] not availed himself of any services that were
available to him.” On appeal, Father posits that DCS “had a difficult time providing
reasonable efforts” to him, referencing Ms. Evans’s testimony that Father’s incarceration
did “present a limitation.” However, as Ms. Evans also testified, it was Father’s own
conduct that caused him to be incarcerated. Moreover, as the trial court found, Father
“skipped out on his bail” and fled to Florida, making no contact with DCS until he was
extradited to Tennessee several months later. The evidence preponderates in favor of the
trial court’s findings that factors (K) and (L) weighed in favor of termination.
                                           - 36 -
        Factors (M), (P), and (Q) all relate to the parents’ actions to meet the Children’s
needs. We agree with the trial court’s determination that all three of these factors weigh
in favor of termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. With respect to factor
(M), the court found that the parents had failed to demonstrate a “sense of urgency in
obtaining custody of the [C]hildren and addressing the reasons that the [C]hildren entered
custody.” The court reiterated that while the Children had been removed from the
parents’ custody for nearly two years, neither Father nor Mother had completed the
requirements of the permanency plans. The parents’ accrual of additional drug-related
criminal charges, lack of contact with DCS and the Children for several months, and
difficulties establishing a safe and appropriate home for the Children all illustrated their
lack of urgency in addressing the circumstances, conduct, and conditions that led to the
Children’s removal from their care. These facts also apply to factor (P), whether the
parents demonstrated an understanding of the basic needs required for the Children to
thrive, and factor (Q), whether either of them demonstrated the ability and a commitment
to creating a home that would meet the Children’s needs. The court further found that the
parents had failed to maintain regular visitation with the Children and failed to financially
support them.

       The trial court also weighed factor (O), whether the parents had ever provided safe
and stable care for a child, in favor of terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights,
finding that the parents had “failed to provide safe and stable care for the [C]hildren and
for Arya.” The court noted the termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to
Arya and the status of Mother’s eldest child, Lydia, with whom Mother was allowed only
supervised visitation. The evidence preponderates in favor of the court’s findings. With
respect to factor (S), the court found that the parents had “failed to provide more than
token financial support for the [C]hildren.” The court acknowledged that the parents had
not been under a court order to pay child support. However, particularly as to Mother,
the court found it “concerning” that Mother had “put money on [Father’s] commissary”
and “spent some of her money to help [Father] with . . . attorney expenses” while not
contributing any funds to the Children’s support. The evidence also does not
preponderate against these findings.

       Concerning factor (T), the parent’s mental or emotional fitness, the trial court
made no findings as to Father. As to Mother, the court determined that factor (T)
weighed against maintaining her parental rights, finding that “the mental or emotional
status of [Mother] would be detrimental to the [C]hildren and/or prevent [Mother] from
consistently and effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the
[C]hildren.” The court explained that Mother had “admitted that she [had] been
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, also suffer[ed] from anxiety attacks, and
that she [had] done nothing to address those concerns.” Mother also testified that she
                                            - 37 -
suffered from agoraphobia. When questioned regarding how she would handle taking the
Children to school and appointments, Mother responded: “Dropping them off where I
don’t have to associate with other people or getting someone that I’m comfortable around
for support.” The trial court’s findings concerning Mother’s mental and emotional fitness
to parent were supported by the evidence.

       The trial court apparently found factor (T) inapplicable to Father, and DCS
presented no evidence of specific mental health concerns for Father. We note, however,
that Father’s history of substance abuse is problematic in terms of his mental fitness to
parent the Children and that Father did not complete the permanency plan requirement of
a mental health evaluation. We therefore determine that factor (T) weights, at best,
neutrally for Father.

      Moreover, the trial court determined that factor (N) weighed in favor of
terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights because both parents had been found to
have committed severe child abuse. The Children were born drug-addicted, and Father
admitted to knowing that Mother had been taking drugs during the pregnancy.
Additionally, the trial court’s order terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to
Ayra reflected that Mother had taken illegal drugs during her pregnancy with Ayra as
well. The court’s findings concerning factor (N) were supported by the evidence.

       In sum, the trial court’s findings that all applicable best interest factors weighed in
favor of termination were supported by clear and convincing evidence. As the trial court
concluded, “The [C]hildren deserve to be able to be in a home where they are provided
with structure, security, love, and a home that is free of drugs, criminal activity, and
things of that sort.” We therefore affirm the trial court’s determination by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to the
Children was in the Children’s best interest.

                                      VI. Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. This case is
remanded to the trial court, pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court’s
judgment terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to the Children and collection
of costs below. Costs on appeal are assessed one-half to the appellant, Issac B., and one
half to the appellant, Heather B.

                                                     s/ Thomas R. Frierson, II____________
                                                     THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

                                            - 38 -