Court Opinion

ID: 9381352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 19:02:51.907296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.914529
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/23 Vopak Terminal Los Angeles v. Santich CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

VOPAK TERMINAL LOS                                       B316032
ANGELES, INC.,
                                                         (Los Angeles County
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                       Super. Ct. No. 21LBCV00283)

         v.

ANTHONY SANTICH,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael P. Vicencia, Judge. Affirmed.

     Newmeyer & Dillion, Michael B. McClellan, Jason L.
Morris, Jason Moberly Caruso and Jack M. Rubin for Defendant
and Appellant.

     Collier Walsh Nakazawa, Joseph A. Walsh II and Ellen E.
McGlynn for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant and appellant Anthony Santich appeals from the
order denying his special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP)1 the
operative complaint, or portions of the complaint, under Code of
Civil Procedure section 425.16.2 In its complaint, plaintiff and
respondent Vopak Terminal Los Angeles, Inc. (Vopak), alleged
Santich, in order to exact revenge for the termination of his
employment, disclosed confidential information to Daniel Xia
(another former Vopak employee). Vopak alleges Santich then
arranged for Xia to meet with public officials at the Port of Los
Angeles to interfere with Vopak’s lease agreement. It is also
alleged that Santich attempted to use the NAACP to harm Vopak
by making false statements about its hiring and diversity
practices to the vice president of the local chapter.
       Santich sought to have these claims struck on the ground
that his conduct was protected under section 425.16. He argued
his communications concerned public issues surrounding the use
of public property and goals for hiring and diversity in
employment. He did not meet his burden, however, because he
failed to show that his conduct contributed to the public
discussion on the public issues he identified.
       We affirm the order denying Santich’s motion.

1     SLAPP stands for strategic lawsuit against public
participation.
2    All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

                                2
                         BACKGROUND
Allegations in the complaint
      Vopak is engaged in storing, blending, and transferring
liquid products, including petroleum, chemicals, and biofuels. It
operates a marine terminal and storage facility near berths 186–
190 within the Port of Los Angeles. During the relevant time
period Vopak was in the process of negotiating a 30-year
extension of Vopak’s lease at the Port.
      Vopak employed Santich from January 2, 2008, until
September 25, 2020. During his employment, Santich agreed to
Vopak’s employee confidentiality policy, which included:
      “Upon becoming an employee of Vopak, an individual
      assumes the obligations not to disclose Vopak’s
      Confidential Information to individuals, businesses,
      governmental entities or any other parties outside of
      Vopak and not to permit Vopak’s Confidential
      Information to be used by any such individuals,
      businesses, governmental entities or parties or by
      Employee for his or her own purposes.”
       Confidential information was defined to mean “all
commercially sensitive, proprietary or otherwise confidential
information of Vopak, including, but not limited to, Vopak’s trade
secrets that have been developed or used or that will be
developed and that cannot be readily obtained by third parties
from outside sources.”
       Vopak terminated Santich’s employment, effective
September 25, 2020. Vopak and Santich entered into a
confidential separation agreement and general release that
included an agreement not to disparage or criticize Vopak’s
management, services, products, or practices and not to damage
its reputation.

                                3
       After his employment was terminated, Santich began
expressing his frustration with Vopak and its management to
Xia. Santich then asked and encouraged Xia to interfere with
lease negotiations between Vopak and the Port of Los Angeles.
Santich promised to employ Xia in a business they would form if
their concerted efforts to oust Vopak from the terminal were
successful. Santich advised Xia that he could not be involved due
to provisions in his separation agreement with Vopak.
       Santich then arranged for Xia to meet with Jacob Haik,
deputy chief of staff for Los Angeles City Councilman, Joe
Buscaino; harbor commissioner for the Port of Los Angeles, Ed
Renwick; and Gene Seroka, executive director for the Port of Los
Angeles. Santich discussed negotiating points with Xia before the
meetings and instructed Xia to tell the officials that they could
extract an additional $75 to $100 million from the lease of
Vopak’s terminals if they sought an open bid instead of
negotiating through Vopak.
       Vopak alleged that these statements and actions caused the
disclosure of Vopak’s confidential information for Santich’s
benefit. This included trade secrets, lease negotiation strategy,
customer information, pricing techniques, financial data, and
Vopak’s valuation of wharfage fees.
       Santich also provided Xia with contact information for
Scott McGowan and Idaho Asphalt Supply, Inc., in order to
encourage them to submit a bid or proposal if the Port of Los
Angeles sought an open bid on Vopak’s terminal at the Port of
Los Angeles.
       In addition to his discussions with Xia, Santich discussed
Vopak’s hiring and diversity practices with the San

                               4
Pedro/Wilmington branch of the NAACP. Santich allegedly did
this to disparage Vopak’s reputation in the community.
       Vopak sent a cease-and-desist letter on March 23, 2021, to
Xia. At Santich’s request, Xia deleted his records and
correspondence. Santich also constructed a false narrative and
timeline with Xia who was instructed to keep Santich’s name out
of any discussions with Vopak.
       On May 24, 2021, Vopak filed its complaint against Santich
alleging six causes of action.
       Vopak incorporated all of its general allegations into each
of its causes of action, including the allegations that Santich
engaged in speech directed to public officials and the NAACP
branch.
       In its first cause of action Vopak alleged Santich breached
the employee confidentiality policy by aiding the disclosure of
Vopak’s confidential information to port officials and Haik “as
detailed in paragraphs 5 - 75, above.” Vopak added that copies of
its employee handbook and Santich’s signature acknowledging
receipt of the employee confidentiality policy are attached as
exhibits A and B to the complaint. The exhibits were not
attached, however.
       In its second cause of action, Vopak alleged Santich
breached the separation agreement by aiding the disclosure of
Vopak’s confidential information to port officials and Haik “as
detailed in paragraphs 5 - 75, above.” Vopak alleged that a copy
of the separation agreement is attached as exhibit C to the
complaint, but no exhibit was attached.
       In its third cause of action, Vopak alleged Santich’s
individual or concerted actions with the Port of Los Angeles
harbor commissioners and city council representatives have made

                                5
Vopak’s existing contractual performance more difficult and
expensive.
       In its fourth cause of action, Vopak alleged that Santich
interfered with the negotiations between Vopak and the Port of
Los Angeles concerning a lease agreement. Vopak alleged that
Santich “aided and abetted the misrepresentation of Vopak’s
financial position and related information, Vopak’s terminal
regulatory requirements and compliance, the value of the Vopak
terminal, the process of the leasehold negotiations and Vopak’s
strategies to the staff of the Port of Los Angeles, Port Officials
and members of the City Council, for the purposes of convincing
the Port of Los Angeles to remove, evict or otherwise force Vopak
out from the terminal lease for the express commercial benefit of
Defendant and other financially interested ‘industry players.’”
Vopak also alleged that Santich “disparaged Vopak such that it
caused or contributed to the local chapter of NAACP further
disparaging Vopak’s reputation in the community with regard to
its hiring and diversity practices.”
       In its fifth cause of action, Vopak alleged that Santich
misappropriated its trade secrets when he acted alone or in
concert with Xia and disclosed or caused to be disclosed Vopak’s
trade secrets.
       In the sixth cause of action, Vopak alleged Santich
conspired with Xia to disclose Vopak’s confidential information
and that Santich knew Xia planned to misrepresent Vopak’s
information and negotiating strategy to the Port of Los Angeles
and city council representatives.
       The complaint includes a signed verification from Vopak’s
general manager, Michael LaCavera.

                                6
Anti-SLAPP motion
       Santich filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the entire
complaint, each cause of action, or the allegations in paragraphs
69 and 97 concerning his statements to the NAACP. Santich
argued that Vopak’s claims arose from statements made in
connection with public issues of port income at the Port of Los
Angeles and the hiring and diversity practices at Vopak. He
argued that Vopak’s damages in each cause of action arise from
the alleged effect his statements had on Vopak’s lease
negotiations with the Port of Los Angeles, i.e., his statements
encouraged the Port of Los Angeles to extract more income from
leases at the port. He asserted that he had met his burden under
section 425.16 because Vopak’s claims arose from conduct
protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
       The anti-SLAPP motion was supported by the declaration
of Attorney Michael McClellan, which provided a foundation for
the printout of the “About” page of the Port of Los Angeles Web
site. This showed the importance of the Port of Los Angeles to the
community. No other facts were included.
       Vopak opposed the motion, arguing that none of the claims
in its six causes of actions arose from protected activity. Instead,
they arose from Santich breaching contracts, misappropriating
trade secrets, and interfering with business conduct.
       Vopak also asserted that Santich offered no evidence that
his claims were done to advance any public issue. On the
contrary, it argued that Santich conspired with private citizens to
further his own self-interest and to punish his former employer
for terminating his employment.
       Vopak then offered its evidence to show it had met its
burden of establishing a reasonable probability of prevailing on

                                 7
the merits. Vopak referred to its verified pleadings and the
declarations supporting its opposition, including the declaration
of its attorney, Joseph Walsh. Walsh provided facts as foundation
for the two declarations of Xia that were attached as exhibits.
       In these two declarations, Xia described in detail his
communications with Santich, including Santich’s frustration
with Vopak and its decision to terminate his employment,
Santich’s request for assistance in convincing public officials that
it was in the best interest of the city and the Port of Los Angeles
to have an open bid process on the lease of terminals used by
Vopak, and Santich’s activities to assist Xia in this endeavor. Xia
stated that Santich advised him that he and Santich could assist
a bidder on the terminals and be hired as consultants.
       Xia also mentioned that Santich expressly told him that
Santich had requested the local chapter of the NAACP to
complain about Vopak’s hiring practices to the Port of Los
Angeles.
       Xia added that, after he received the cease-and-desist letter
from Vopak’s attorneys, Santich advised him to delete all e-mails
and text messages related to his communications with Santich
and the port officials. He also stated that they discussed how to
respond to the cease-and-desist letter and that Santich asked Xia
to keep Santich’s involvement confidential.
       In his two declarations Xia provided detailed information
on how he learned confidential information about Vopak and how
he disclosed or used this confidential information in his meetings
with port officials. Xia also discussed how his statements to the
port officials were incomplete and misleading, e.g., he did not
disclose that Vopak owned the assets at the wharves and his
claim that the Port of Los Angeles could extract an additional $75

                                 8
to $125 million was an embellishment made without any true
calculation.
      In addition to the declarations of Walsh and Xia, Vopak
provided the declaration of LaCavera, the managing director of
Vopak. LaCavera established that the statements made at
Santich’s urging were untrue and disclosed Vopak’s confidential
information, e.g., its financial modeling and revenue projections.
      In his reply, Santich provided additional evidence and
made written objections to Vopak’s evidence. Santich argued that
section 425.16 should be construed broadly and that his conduct
of encouraging another to communicate with port officials was
protected. He also argued that Vopak had not met its burden,
because it had failed to provide any admissible evidence. He
claimed the declarations of Xia were hearsay because they were
attached as exhibits to the Walsh declaration.
      On August 12, 2021, Santich filed additional papers five
days before the August 17, 2021 hearing, to request judicial
notice of video recordings of Port of Los Angeles public meetings.
Vopak filed an objection the next day.
      The August 17, 2021 hearing was continued to
September 14, 2021, and Vopak was allowed to file a sur-reply.
      Vopak filed its sur-reply on September 3, 2021, addressing
whether the NAACP claim should be stricken. A declaration
from Hugo Teste, general counsel for Vopak, that included
e-mails showing Santich had commended Vopak on its diversity
programs was included. Also provided was the declaration of Kyle
Zandy, director of human resources for Vopak, who described
Vopak’s hiring practices and noted Santich had not raised any
concerns with him about Vopak’s hiring practices or minority
representation. There was an additional declaration from

                                9
LaCavera containing facts showing Vopak had safe and fair
hiring practices and that Santich never reported any concerns
about Vopak’s management or hiring practices.
      The hearing on the motion was held on September 14,
2021. The trial court sustained three of Santich’s objections to
Vopak’s evidence and overruled the other 92. It overruled Vopak’s
objections to Santich’s reply and declined to take judicial notice of
the public meetings. Santich’s motion was then denied in its
entirety.
      Santich filed a timely notice of appeal on September 30,
2021.

                           DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable law and standard of review
       A special motion to strike under section 425.16, also known
as the anti-SLAPP statute, allows a defendant to seek early
dismissal of a lawsuit involving a “cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
       Actions subject to dismissal under section 425.16 include
those based on “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any
written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public

                                 10
interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
       “A SLAPP is subject to a special motion to strike ‘unless the
court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’ (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).) Thus, evaluation of an anti-SLAPP motion requires
a two-step process in the trial court. ‘First, the court decides
whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the
challenged cause of action is one “arising from” protected activity.
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has been
made, it then must consider whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.’” (Nygård,
Inc. v. Uusi–Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1035
(Nygård).) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the
anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or
petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to
being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29
Cal.4th 82, 89.)
       “‘Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike
under section 425.16 is de novo. [Citation.] We consider “the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits . . . upon which
the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)
However, we neither “weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight
of the evidence. Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence
favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s
evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by
the plaintiff as a matter of law.”’” (Nygård, supra, 159
Cal.App.4th at p. 1036.)

                                 11
II.    Santich fails to show his conduct is protected under
       section 425.16
       The threshold question in evaluating Santich’s anti-SLAPP
motion is whether Vopak’s complaint arises from protected
activity. (Nygård, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1035.) In making
this determination, the trial court may consider the pleadings
and supporting and opposing affidavits setting forth the facts
upon which the liability or defense is based. (Equilon Enterprises
v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)
       Santich, therefore, had the initial burden of showing that
the causes of action against him arose from protected activity.
(§ 425.16, subd. (e).) He argues that Vopak’s claims arise from the
alleged damages caused by two general categories of conduct: (1)
statements to Xia for Xia to convey to public officials and the port
officials regarding how the port could extract additional rent from
Vopak if the port would seek an open bid instead of negotiating
with Vopak and (2) statements to the vice president of the San
Pedro/Wilmington branch of the NAACP regarding Vopak’s
hiring and diversity practices. He asserts both these categories of
statements are protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4),
because they are statements “in connection with a public issue or
an issue of public interest.”3

3      At oral argument, counsel for appellant argued that
Santich’s conduct was protected under section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(2) on the theory that the discussions with public officials were
written or oral statements or writings made in connection with
an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive,
or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law. This is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, it was not raised
in the papers filed with the trial court. Because this theory is

                                12
      The inquiry under this catchall provision calls for a two-
part analysis rooted in the statute’s purpose and internal logic.
(FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149
(FilmOn).) “First, we ask what ‘public issue or . . . issue of public
interest’ the speech in question implicates—a question we answer
by looking to the content of the speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the
speech and the public conversation about some matter of public
interest. It is at the latter stage that context proves useful.” (Id.
at pp. 149-150; see Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1243
[describing FilmOn’s two-part test as: “first, we ask what public
issue or issues the challenged activity implicates, and second, we
ask whether the challenged activity contributes to public
discussion of any such issue”].)
      The catchall provision demands “‘some degree of closeness’”
between the challenged statements and the asserted public
interest. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.) So even if the Port
of Los Angeles’s ability to extract additional income from the port

presented for the first time on appeal, we will not consider it.
(Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th
820, 847 [permitting a party to adopt a new theory on appeal is
not only “unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the
opposing litigant”].) Second, no evidence was offered to show that
the port was considering or reviewing any change to how it leased
the port facilities. Santich’s conduct was intended to persuade the
port to do an open bid process rather than negotiate the existing
lease with Vopak. Since Santich did not show that the port was
considering or reviewing an open bid process, he did not show his
conduct was protected under 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). Thus,
even if we consider this new theory, it does not meet Santich’s
burden on prong one.

                                 13
or Vopak’s hiring and diversity practices are in fact issues of
public interest, “it is not enough that the statement refer to a
subject of widespread public interest; the statement must in some
manner itself contribute to the public debate.” (Wilbanks v. Wolk
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898; see Dyer v. Childress (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 1273, 1280 [“[t]he fact that ‘a broad and amorphous
public interest’ can be connected to a specific dispute” is not
enough].)
      What it means to “‘contribute to the public debate’” depends
on the state of public discourse at a given time and the topic of
contention. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 150-151.) We are not
concerned with the social utility of the speech at issue, or the
degree to which it propelled the conversation in any particular
direction; rather, we examine whether a defendant—through
public or private speech or conduct—participated in, or furthered,
the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest. (Ibid.)
Defendants cannot claim their conduct involves a public interest
merely by defining their narrow dispute through its slight
reference to the broader public issue. (Ibid.)
      Santich discussed FilmOn in his reply brief, but not the
two-part analysis required to meet his burden under section
425.16. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 150-151.) In FilmOn, the
defendant provided reports on Web sites to its clients. The
Supreme Court applied the two-part analysis by finding that the
reports contained information relevant to public concern over
adult content and copyright on the Internet. (Id. at p. 152.) It
then found that the defendant had not shown these reports
contributed to the public debate on these issues because the
information in its reports did not enter the public sphere and the
parties never intended them to do so. (Id. at p. 153.)

                               14
      Santich addressed only the first part of FilmOn’s test when
he argued that his conduct implicated public issues. He did not
address the second part and thus, did not meet his burden under
section 425.16 with allegations or evidence showing that his
conduct contributed to the public debate on the public issues he
identified, i.e., the public debate on the lease of port facilities or
the hiring and diversity practices of Vopak.
      When resolving Santich’s appeal, it is critical to apply our
Supreme Court’s guidance to consider “whether a statement—
including the identity of its speaker, for example, or the audience
sought—contributes to or furthers the public conversation on an
issue of public interest. It is by carefully observing this wedding
of content and context that we can discern if conduct is ‘in
furtherance of’ free speech ‘in connection with’ a public issue or
issue of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 154.)
      A.      Santich’s conduct implicates public issues
      Santich’s conduct includes attempts, using Xia as his
spokesperson, to persuade port officials to extract additional rent
from Vopak and statements to the vice president of the NAACP
branch at San Pedro/Wilmington regarding Vopak’s hiring and
diversity practices. Both implicate public issues.
      Santich’s efforts to increase Vopak’s rent by persuading the
port official to use an open bid process implicate the public
interest in avoiding favoritism and maximizing income from
public lands. (See, e.g., City of Inglewood-L.A. County Civic
Center Auth. v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 861, 866 [finding
that competitive bidding prevents favoritism, fraud, and
corruption when awarding public construction contracts].)
      Santich’s statements to the vice president of the NAACP
branch also implicate a public interest, which is requiring fair

                                 15
employment practices in a tenant of a public entity. (See e.g.,
Connick v. Myers (1983) 461 U.S. 138, 148, fn. 8 [finding racial
discrimination is a matter inherently of public concern].)
Santich’s reply includes facts showing that the vice president of
the San Pedro/Wilmington branch of the NAACP had concerns
over race-based discrimination in the hiring of workers at the
Port of Los Angeles.
       B.    Santich’s conduct did not contribute to public
             discussion of these issues
       Although Santich showed that his conduct implicated
public issues, he did not make the threshold showing that a
“functional relationship” exists between his conduct and the
“public conversation” on the issues of avoiding favoritism,
maximizing income, and fair employment practices at the port. In
determining whether a defendant has sustained its initial
burden, the court considers the pleadings, declarations, and
matters that may be judicially noticed. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
       A defendant’s supporting evidence must be filed with its
moving papers and evidence presented for the first time in reply
papers may be disregarded. (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 1522, 1536.) Here, the trial court exercised its
discretion and considered the evidence in Santich’s reply, and
continued the hearing to allow Vopak to submit a sur-reply to
avoid prejudice. Neither the pleadings nor his evidence showed
Santich contributing to the public debate on the identified issues.
       Vopak’s complaint alleges that, after his employment was
terminated, Santich solicited Xia to contact port officials in order
to interfere with Vopak’s lease negotiations with the Port of Los
Angeles and that Santich disclosed to Xia that Santich was
prevented from disparaging or criticizing Vopak by a

                                16
nondisparagement clause in his separation agreement. There are
no allegations that these communications entered the public
sphere or were intended to enter the public sphere. Instead, the
allegations are that Santich arranged private meetings between
Xia and public officials.
       Vopak also alleged Santich solicited Joe Gatlin, the vice
president of the NAACP branch at San Pedro/Wilmington, to
disparage Vopak’s reputation in the community based on false
pretenses. Santich allegedly asked the NAACP to send a letter to
Vopak to raise questions about its hiring and diversity practices.
There are no allegations that this letter entered the public sphere
or was even intended to enter the public sphere.
       Further, when Vopak sent a cease-and-desist letter to Xia,
the allegations are that Santich requested Xia to delete all
e-mails, text messages, or tangible records of their dealings and
efforts. This is another basis to find that the communications
were not intended to enter the public sphere.
       These allegations are that Santich’s conduct was not
related to any public conversation on the public issues. Instead,
Santich was seeking to harm Vopak by interfering with Vopak’s
lease agreement with the Port of Los Angeles and causing Vopak
to suffer ostracism due to suspicions about its hiring and
diversity practices.
       Santich failed to offer any evidence in either his moving or
reply papers that his conduct was undertaken in connection with
the identified public issues, e.g., he intended for the information
to enter the public sphere and inform the public about favoritism,
the potential for increased income, or lack of fair employment
practices at the port.

                                17
       Santich did offer facts in a declaration to deny he made any
statements that violated his employment agreement, violated his
separation agreement, disclosed Vopak’s trade secrets, or
interfered with Vopak’s contracts. His attorney, Jack M.Rubin,
describes an online article found in “Random Length News” about
the lawsuit and the author’s discovery, through reading the
pleadings, that the Port of Los Angeles does not normally use
competitive bidding. Gatlin, from the NAACP, describes his
concern about hiring practices at the Port of Los Angeles and his
efforts to gain information about Vopak’s hiring practices after
President Biden was elected.
       None of these declarations show that Santich’s conduct
contributed to or furthered the public conversation. Instead, they
concern Santich denying that he breached the employment and
separation agreement. The online article summarizing the
pleadings in this lawsuit shows that port operations are of public
interest, not that Santich contributed to the public debate on that
topic. Finally, the declaration of Gatlin includes facts that there
was a public issue concerning the hiring and diversity practices
and that the NAACP sought to gain information about these
practices. It does not show that Santich contributed to the public
debate on this issue.
       Santich, therefore, failed to make a threshold showing that
the challenged causes of action arise from protected activity. His
arguments and evidence addressed the first part of the FilmOn
analysis. Since he did not address the second part, he did not
meet his burden of showing that the conduct was protected under
section 425.16. His entire motion, therefore, was correctly denied.
       In addition to challenging the trial court’s ruling on the
motion, Santich argued the trial court’s denial of his request for

                                18
judicial notice was an abuse of discretion. Ordering the trial court
to grant his request for judicial notice would serve no purpose.
We decline to review an issue that will have no effect on the
parties. (See Civ. Code, § 3532 [“The law neither does nor
requires idle acts.”]; Garibaldi v. Daly City (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d
514, 517 [“An appellate court will not determine a question which
will have no effect upon the status of the parties.”].)
      The trial court did not err by granting the anti-SLAPP
motion.

                        DISPOSITION
     We affirm the trial court’s order. Respondent, Vopak
Terminal Los Angeles, Inc., is to recover its costs of appeal.

                                      ________________________
                                      CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, J.

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