Court Opinion

ID: 9833690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:56:58.362761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:05.905083
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
It is urged on rehearing that we were not justified in the use of the following language in our original opinion;
“In this case the evidence was developed, and it conclusively shows that the services of flagmen to warn the public were not required constantly during the 17-hour period of day named in the ordinance.”
This language should be modified as follows: The facts were not gone into fully so as to disclose the times of day when trains habitually passed over this crossing. The evidence shows, however, that appellee was familiar with this crossing, and he justifies his failure to observe the approaching train on the occasion of his injury by the statement that he was not looking for any train at that, time of the day, because trains had not been running at that time of day. He also testified, in substance, that he had been going over that crossing for three years or more and knew the time this particular train was due in there, but the schedule had been changed and he was not expecting a train to arrive at that time. All of the evidence indicates that this was a frequently traveled crossing, and there is no indication at all of the fact that trains were passing there with such regularity, and in such close succession to each other, as to require the constant services of a flagman. All the facts negative such a conclusion.
It is stated in the motion that appellee cited numerous cases in his original brief holding that, in order for a litigant to question the validity of a city ordinance on the ground of unreasonableness, the point must be raised by demurrer, and that, since no assignment complained of any ruling of the trial court on demurrers, we were not authorized to pass on the question. In response to this statement in the motion we have re-examined *743appellee’s brief on this question and referred to the only cases cited therein bearing in any wise upon this question, and, to our minds, they fall far short of supporting the proposition contended for.
 Unquestionably, if a defendant desires a more detailed pleading of an ordinance relied upon, he cannot reach his objective by a general demurrer, but must specially except to the pleading on that account. But that is not the question here. The appellee, who was plaintiff below, did not undertake to set out any ordinance in his pleadings, but alleged a duty of appellant, under a city ordinance governing such matters, to maintain a flagman at crossings. There was no special exception to this particular part of the pleadings. We agree with appellee that, if appellant had desired a more particular statement of the ordinance relied upon, it was his duty to point out that fact by a special exception. But we are not passing on that question. We sustained no exception to the sufficiency of the petition in this regard. When the court prepared his charge embodying an instruction to the jury that appellant was guilty of negligence, as a matter of law;, in its failure to observe this ordinance, appellant raised the question of the correctness of the charge and the validity of the ordinance in every way essential to preserve the question of law passed on by this court.
The motion for rehearing has been carefully considered, but will be overruled.