Court Opinion

ID: 9606253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:48:27.134431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:35.845542
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
The PSC ruled that the city lawfully provided service initially to the site of the manufacturing plant under construction pursuant to the Act because at the time service was provided to the construction site the connected load was less than 900 kilowatts, “and thus service was provided by the assigned provider, the city. Thus, the question presented is whether an electric supplier who lawfully extends and furnishes electric service to a construction site at which a premises is to be constructed which, at the time of initial full operation, will require 900 kilowatts or greater, may preclude the operation of the ‘customer choice’ provisions of [OCGA § 46-3-8 (a)] by the customer.”
The city contended that its initial providing of electric service to the construction site of the premises constituted service as contemplated by OCGA § 46-3-8 (b) and (f) so as to grant it the exclusive right to continue thereafter to serve the premises. Subsection (b) is the “grandfather” clause. Subsection (f) establishes that “[t]he time at which an electric supplier . . . shall be considered as having the right to extend and furnish . . . service to new premises shall be the time at which written application for temporary construction or permanent service is made to any electric supplier by the consumer utilizing such premises or the time at which construction of such premises is commenced, whichever first occurs. The location of a *64premises for temporary construction service shall be deemed to be the same as the location of the premises which shall require permanent service after construction. ...”
After noting that the Act empowered it to arbitrate disputes and, where there was no clear cut resolution, to resort to statutory construction and common sense application of the Act, the PSC concluded that “to allow the city’s contention to prevail would emasculate the provisions of subsection (a),” and thus “a distinction should be drawn between temporary construction service and permanent service, for purposes of subsection (a) ‘customer choice’ provisions . . . By encouraging healthy competition between electric suppliers for large load customers, electric suppliers will strive to provide reliable electric service at the least cost to the consumer . . . Therefore, in instances where a premises under construction takes temporary or construction service from an electric supplier lawfully authorized to provide that electric service and the premises, at initial full operations, will be utilized by one consumer and have single-metered service of 900 kilowatts or greater, the customer shall be entitled to select an electric supplier for permanent service pursuant to OCGA § 46-3-8 (a), notwithstanding the previous provision of temporary construction service by an electric supplier.” (Indention omitted.)
The city’s argument is that the plain and unambiguous language of the Territorial Electric Service Act, specifically the “grandfather” provision of OCGA § 46-3-8 (b), compels the finding that it had the exclusive right to serve the consumer utilizing the premises from the time the city provided temporary construction service to the site.
While the aims expressed by the PSC in its interpretation of the purposes of the Act may be desirable public policy, they are not in accord with the construction previously endorsed by our Supreme Court and stated in City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. &c. Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 767-68 (5) (a) (213 SE2d 596) (1975), where the Act was unsuccessfully attacked as an unconstitutional restraint of trade. The Court recognized that “under the standards set forth in the Act, even though a particular area may be assigned to an electric supplier, other electric suppliers already serving customers in that area may continue to serve those customers as well as new customers located near their lines.” It explained that the restriction on competition was valid because “unrestricted competition between electric suppliers could injure existing public service and otherwise adversely affect the public interest. . . [t]o the extent the assignment of service areas under the Act restrains competition, the restraint is for the benefit of the public in minimization of duplication of facilities and prevention of other adverse economic and environmental effects.” (Indention omitted.)
Not only was the statutory interpretation reached by the PSC and affirmed by the superior court here inconsistent with the con*65struction of the Act delineated in City of Calhoun, supra, it was inappropriate. “ ‘[W]here the language of an Act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but is forbidden’ [cit.], the only exception being the case where an unequivocal meaning ascribes to the legislature an unreasonable or senseless intent.” Taco Mac v. Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538, 539 (340 SE2d 922) (1986).
Moreover, “statutes must not be interpreted to thwart the avowed purpose of the legislature.” Hardison v. Booker, 179 Ga. App. 693, 696 (4) (347 SE2d 681) (1986). The legislative intent and policy is specifically declared within Section 2 (OCGA § 46-3-2) of the Territorial Electric Service Act, as the Supreme Court pointed out in City of Calhoun, supra at 761 (1). Its purposes include “the orderly furnishing of electric service and minimizing interference.” City of Calhoun, supra at 765. “[The Act’s stated] purposes are put into effect completely and thoroughly by other provisions. The Public Service Commission is delegated the authority only to apply the standards set forth in the Act, to make rules and regulations according to such standards and to administer them.” City of Calhoun, supra at 769.
Bearing in mind the goals of the Act, I conclude that the right of an over-900 kilowatt customer to choose its supplier is made subordinate to the right of an assigned electric service supplier to continue service once it has been lawfully extended and furnished under OCGA § 46-3-8 (f). While this may preclude some 900-plus kilowatt customers from choosing their suppliers, it results from following the Act’s avowed purposes. Thus the strained distinction reached by the PSC between temporary and permanent service in attempting to nullify the specific exception to the “grandfather” provision of OCGA § 46-3-8 (b) exempted by subsection (f) is both unwarranted and unneeded.
“ ‘Service’ means retail electric service and includes temporary or construction service as well as permanent service. . . .” OCGA § 46-3-3 (9). It is undisputed that the city lawfully extended retail electric service to the premises in 1984 and has continuously provided service at all times relevant since then. “ ‘Premises’ means the building, structure or facility to which electricity is being or is to be furnished. ...” OCGA § 46-3-3 (6). In this case the premises is the building that was being constructed while electrical service was being furnished by the city. City of Marietta Bd. of Lights &c. v. Ga. Power Co., 176 Ga. App. 123 (335 SE2d 467) (1985).
The 900-kilowatt “customer choice” exception of OCGA § 46-3-8 (a) is thus made specifically subject to the rights of the electric supplier first providing service to continue to serve the premises. The unavoidable effect of the Act is that customer choice is foreclosed once lawful service, including temporary construction service, has been *66provided to the premises.
Decided November 5, 1987
Rehearing denied November 24, 1987
James R. Lewis, L. Clifford Adams, Jr., for appellant.
Robert P. Edwards, Jr., Charles F. Palmer, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Banke join in this dissent.