Court Opinion

ID: 9569131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:10:47.653422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:20:55.301262
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I agree with the lead opinion’s ultimate reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, I respectfully dissent from its holding that the incidents at issue may constitute an *645occurrence under the terms of the liability policy. I would hold as a matter of law that the insured’s intentional discharge of a firearm at the grill of Marzonie’s car was not an accident. Consequently, no "occurrence,” within the meaning of the liability policy has transpired, and it is unnecessary to consider the applicability of the exclusionary clause.
An analysis of insurance coverage must necessarily begin with the relevant contractual language. The applicable provisions state:
This Company agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage . . . caused by an occurrence. [Emphasis added.]
An "occurrence” is defined as "an accident . . . which results ... in bodily injury or property damage.” No one disputes that bodily injury resulted from the unfortunate events of the night giving rise to this case. The key question is whether these events can aptly be characterized as an "accident” under the terms of the policy.
Since the policy fails to define "accident,” the lead opinion notes that the definition of "accident” adopted by this Court in Allstate Ins Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 670; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), applies.1 The lead opinion concludes that "the instant policy language and relevant Michigan precedent” direct us to view the event from the injured’s perspective in determining whether there *646has been an "accident.”2 I cannot agree. I believe the contractual nature of the policy compels us to view the event from the insured’s perspective in determining whether it constitutes an "accident.” This approach is in accord with relevant Michigan precedent and does not subvert the intent of the contracting parties.
Insurance generally can be defined as a contract between two parties, in which one party (the insurer) agrees to assume the risk of another party (the insured) in exchange for consideration, with the insurer distributing the accepted risk across a group of persons similarly situated with respect to the risk insured.3 It is the insured whom the policy is intended to benefit and protect; it is not intended to directly benefit the claimant.4
5As one leading commentator on insurance has noted:
Even though the existence of the policy may make it more probable that [the injured] will be able to receive payment, the injured person is neither an "insured” nor a "beneficiary” in the technical insurance-contract . meaning of those terms. That is, in the absence of a specific contract or statutory provision, the person actually injured is not the party insured, and has no rights, legal or equitable, or any title or interest, against the insurer . . . ,[5]
Recognizing that liability insurance is primarily intended to benefit the insured, as evidenced by his payment of premiums, I believe it is inimical to contract theory to conclude that the injured’s perspective is controlling in determining whether *647an "accident” has occurred under the insurance contract. I would conclude that the contractual nature of the policy compels us to view the action or event from the insured’s perspective.6
Moreover, I do not agree with the lead opinion’s assertion that "relevant Michigan precedent” supports its adoption of the "injured” perspective approach. A closer examination of "relevant Michigan precedent” reveals only that confusion has attended our recent excursions into the abyss of insurance "occurrences.”
The lead opinion asserts that
neither in DiCicco nor in [Group Ins v Czopek, 440 Mich 590; 489 NW2d 444 (1992)] did a majority of this Court specifically address whether the accident should be viewed from the insured’s or the injured person’s perspective .... [Ante at 633.]
Yet I suggest a careful reading of the lead opinion in Czopek discloses that the insured’s perspective was controlling:
In his deposition, Mr. Smith [the insured] admitted that he intended to prevent the arrest. His actions, biting and swinging his arms and legs, were intended to make it impossible for the officers to easily get him into the squad car and on his way to the police station. Because of Arthur Smith’s admission in his deposition, we are unwilling to conclude that his resisting arrest, which resulted in injuries to the policemen, was an "accident.” It clearly was not an undesigned contingency or something that happened by chance. [Id. at 598. Emphasis added.]
On the basis of the insured’s admissions, a major*648ity of this Court concluded that his injury-causing actions could not be deemed an "accident.” Although the majority in Czopek did not expressly declare that the insured’s perspective was controlling, adoption of the insured’s perspective was implicit in its analysis and provided the impetus for the concurring opinion.7 Since the contractual language in Czopek is identical to the language in the case at bar, the position of the lead opinion cannot be reconciled with Czopek. I continue to believe Czopek was correctly decided, and would apply it to the case before us.8
I would analyze this case from the insured’s perspective, focusing on the injury-causing act or event and its relation to the resulting property damage or personal injury. Despite the connotations of the word "accident,” we have recognized that an insured need not act unintentionally in order for an act to be an "occurrence.”9 Consequently, a problem arises in attempting to distinguish between intentional acts that can be classified as "accidents” and those that cannot. I submit that a principled distinction can be drawn by examining the consequences of the action and determining whether such consequences either were intended by the insured or reasonably should have been expected because of the direct risk of *649harm intentionally created by the insured’s actions. When an insured acts intending to cause property damage or personal injury, liability coverage should be denied, irrespective of whether the resulting injury is different from the injury intended. Similarly, I would hold that when an insured’s intentional actions create a direct risk of harm, there can be no liability coverage for any resulting damage or injury, despite the lack of an actual intent to damage or injure.10
These rules comport with the contractual nature of a liability policy and recognize its inherent function to protect an insured from the unintended and unexpected consequences of his actions. Liability insurance does not exist to insulate an insured from the ramifications of his intentional actions designed or reasonably expected to cause property damage or personal injury. Additionally, these rules find support in our decision in Czopek, which was signed by five members of this Court. For these reasons, I would apply these rules to the case at bar.
Oaks testified that he did not intend to shoot Marzonie, but intended only to hit the grill of Marzonie’s car in order to stop it and to call the police. Oaks’ assertion that he did not intend to shoot Marzonie should not remove the bar to coverage arising from his admitted intent to cause property damage. That the nature of the resulting harm differed from the intended harm is irrelevant for purposes of coverage. I would hold that Oaks’ actions cannot be characterized as an accident, and consequently, there has been no occurrence. Accordingly, there is no liability coverage for the resulting injuries.
I would reverse the decision of the Court of *650Appeals and conclude there has not been an "occurrence.”
Cavanagh, C.J., and Brickley, J., concurred with Griffin, J.

 In Freeman, "accident” was defined in this context as:
"an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.”

 Ante at 684.

 See Jerry, Understanding Insurance Law, p 15.

 See 11 Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 44:1, p 185; 7A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 4491, p 4.

 Couch, n 4 supra, § 44:3, p 187.

 See Sosin & Sherburn, Insurance law, 40 Wayne LR 887, 922 (1994).

 See id. at 602 (Boyle, J., concurring).
I write separately to state that because the insurance contract does not require an examination of the accidental nature of the event from the insured’s perspective to determine whether an "accident” that resulted in the officers’ bodily injuries was an occurrence, the accidental nature of the event must be viewed from the officers’ perspective.

 Moreover, I note that this Court’s decision in Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co v Piccard, 440 Mich 539; 489 NW2d 422 (1992), does not support the conclusion of the lead opinion, since only three members of the Court embraced the "injured” perspective.

 See Piccard, supra at 548; Freeman, supra at 670.

 See Piccard, supra at 557 (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting).