Court Opinion

ID: 9568306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:02:26.548503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:35.250761
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting) :
Being convinced that the judgment below was erroneous, I must dissent. The opinion of Mr. Justice Littlejohn does not, in my view, state, answer or squarely deal with the serious questions raised in the briefs of the appellants.
Essentially the judgment below, and the opinion affirming the same, rest upon two basic premises or holdings, as follows:
1. Section 7 of Article 8 of the Constitution, as amended, provides authority for an established county government to levy taxes and issue bonds to provide for recreational facili*577ties, thus by implication repealing Section 6 of Article 10 of the Constitution, which as heretofore construed prevents a county from being authorized to levy taxes for such purposes and that further, by implication, the said Section 7 curtailed the long established and recognized plenary power of the General Assembly to create special purpose districts.
2. That the legislative acts under attack were both “laws for a specific county” in violation of Section 7, Article 8.
I most respectfully submit that, under well settled principles of constitutional law, neither of the premises on which the judgment below rests are sound. The first elementary proposition, here applicable, is that every presumption favors the constitutionality of legislative enactments and it is not the province of the court to declare such unconstitutional unless the invalidity thereof so clearly appears as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that such enactment violates the Constitution. See numerous cases collected in West’s South Carolina Digest, Constitutional Law, Key 48-
In construing the Constitution it is the duty of. the court to harmonize, as far as possible, any apparent conflicts in the Constitution so as to give effect to all provisions. See numerous cases collected in West’s South Carolina Digest, Constitutional Law, Key 15.
Repeal, by implication, is not favored in the law and to bring about repeal by implication the two acts or provisions must be directly antagonistic and repugnant and there must be such a positive repugnancy as to admit of no other reasonable construction. Bray v. City Council of Florence, 62 S. C. 57, 39 S. E. 810; State v. Alexander, 14 Rich. 247; State v. Hood, 181 S. C. 488, 188 S. E. 134.
Article 10, Section 6 of the Constitution provides in pertinent part that “The General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any county * * * to levy a tax or issue bonds for any purpose except for educational purposes, to build and repair public roads, building of bridges, to maintain and support prisoners, pay jurors, County officers, *578and for litigation, quarantine and court expenses and for ordinary County purposes, to support paupers, and to pay past indebtedness.” Under the quoted provision it is clear that counties cannot constitutionally levy taxes or issue bonds for recreational purposes. Leonard v. Talbert, 225 S. C. 559, 83 S. E. (2d) 201.
Article 8, Section 16 of the Constitution, as now amended, provides that a county may now acquire and operate certain utilities which have been heretofore impermissible under the provisions of Article 10, Section 6, but said Section 16 of Article 8 does not purport to give a county the right to acquire or operate facilities for recreational purposes.
Article 8, Section 7 contemplates the General Assembly providing counties with “the power to tax different areas at different rates of taxation related to the nature and level of governmental services provided.” The holding of implied repeal of Article 10, Section 6 and the curtailment of the plenary power of the General Assembly to create special purpose districts is predicated solely upon the quoted language, but I find nothing therein which is directly antagonistic or repugnant to the provisions of Article 10, Section 6, or which evinces any intent to curtail the plenary power of the General Assembly with respect to special purpose districts. In my view, it is a perfectly simple matter to harmonize the quoted language with the provisions of Article 10, Section 6.
The quoted language was obviously needed to enable counties to acquire and operate the utilities expressly provided for in Section 16 of Article 8, one obvious purpose of the language being to allow counties to levy a higher rate of tax in the area of a county served by one of the utilities named in Section 16, and a lesser rate of taxation in those areas of the county not served by any such utility. If contra to the provisions of Article 10, Section 6 the framers of the amended Article 8 had intended the counties be vested with the power to tax for recreational facilities such intent could have readily been given effect by including recreational fa*579cilities among the other facilities mentioned in Article 8, Section 16 which counties are now expressly authorized to acquire. The quoted language from Section 7 of Article 8 is readily and easily harmonized with Article 10, Section 6 by construing the same to mean simply that counties shall have the power to tax different areas at different rates of taxation relative to the varying and constitutionally permissible governmental services provided. Such a construction does no violence to the quoted language or any other provisions of the Constitution.
Under settled principles I think it quite clear that the legislative acts here under attack are not “laws for a specific county” but are rather laws having relation to a different political sub-division which only incidentally happens to lie within the borders of one county. “Constitutional limitations upon the legislative power with respect to sub-divisions of the State are applicable only to the sub-divisions named in the respective inhibitory provisions of the Constitution.” Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 211 S. C. 77, 44 S. E. (2d) 88. See also Evatte v. Cass, 217 S. C. 62, 59 S. E. (2d) 638; Berry v. Milliken, 234 S. C. 518, 109 S. E. (2d) 354. It is obvious that the legislation here deals with a sub-division of the state other than a county and hence the acts under attack are not “laws for a specific county” in violation of Section 7 of Article 8 of the Constitution.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Lewis which would affirm the result of the judgment below, but upon a different basis, was written subsequently to the preparation of the foregoing dissent. The holding that Dorchester County can provide recreational facilities in the recreation district under the general law authorized and required by Article 8, Section 7, has to rest upon the basic, and I submit erroneous, premise that said section by implication repealed Article 10, Section 6, which as heretofore construed by this Court expressly pro*580hibits the General Assembly from authorizing a county to levy taxes for recreational purposes.
If Article 10, Section 6, had indeed been repealed, then it might be that the Acts under attack would be in violation of Article 3, Section 34, Subdivision IX, but, in the absence of such repeal, no such issue is presently before us.
I would reverse the judgment of the lower court.
Brailsford, J., concurs.