Court Opinion

ID: 9496098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:18:04.780772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:22.275365
License: Public Domain

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. By failing to apply the full procedural protections afforded by the First Amendment, the majority and concurrence intrude on the field of free expression in two of its most important contexts: consumer protection and public safety.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Supreme Court held that specific constitutional protections of speech limit the state’s power to award damages in libel actions brought by public officials. Id. at 283, 84 S.Ct. 710. One method of protecting speech is the actual malice standard, which is set forth by the majority opinion. Majority Op. at 1133-1134; see also New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86, 84 S.Ct. 710. Another method is the independent examination rule, which requires an appellate court to independently review the whole record, “so as to assure [itself] *1142that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.” New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285, 84 S.Ct. 710 (citation omitted). In adopting the actual malice standard and independent examination rule, the Supreme Court noted the importance of protecting “the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.... ” Id. at 270, 84 S.Ct. 710. The Court also recognized that an “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space they need [ ] to survive.” Id. at 271-72, 84 S.Ct. 710 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The majority and concurrence undermine these procedural protections by erring in their application of both the actual malice standard and the independent examination rule.
1. Independent Examination
The majority and concurrence misunderstand the argument of Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (“Consumers Union”) that we must conduct an independent examination of the record under New York Times. Majority Op. at 1131 & n. 10. While purportedly applying the “independent examination rule,” both the majority and concurrence fail to grasp how the additional procedural protection of the independent examination functions and, thus, are unable to apply the rule properly in this case. Moreover, both Judge Tashima and Judge Graber overlook the ongoing debate among courts and legal scholars regarding the applicability of the “independent examination” rule to appeals from summary judgment motions, commentary which clarifies the significance of the independent examination rule in our analysis at the summary judgment stage.1 Because the majority and concurrence have demonstrated a limited understanding of the independent examination rule, I provide a brief overview below.
From the outset, it is worth noting that prior to our decision in Crane v. Arizona Republic, 972 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir.1992), it was an open question within our circuit whether the independent examination rule applied to appeals from summary judgment. Even after Crane, the Supreme Court has recognized that the scope of procedural protections in First Amendment cases remains unclear. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (recognizing that, although “some procedural requirements are mandated by the First Amendment, and some are not[,]” the Court has not “discovered a general principle to determine where the line is to be drawn.”).
However, the application of the independent review rule to a summary judgment determination is the most logical method to address the concerns regarding the chilling of speech expressed in New York Times. See 376 U.S. at 278, 84 S.Ct. 710 (“Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.”). As a practical matter, the threat and actual cost of litigation, including attorneys fees, inhibit speech. See id. at 278-79, 84 S.Ct. 710; see also Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, *1143623 F.2d 264, 280 n. 76 (3d Cir.1980) (“The cost of litigating a libel action, burdensome on even the largest news organizations, often can cripple smaller news operations.”). At times, the costs of a successful defense can be the same or greater than what the damage awards would have been. See Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35 Am. U.L.Rev. 3, 38 (1985). Moreover, the defense costs prior to trial can be extraordinarily high. See id. at 91.
Because of these costs and their effects on speech, the procedural protection of the independent examination rule is necessary not only for appellate review of post-trial decisions, but also for appellate review of summary judgment decisions.2 The independent examination rule provides an additional level of protection of the media’s First Amendment rights. Moreover, it addresses concerns regarding the chilling effects on speech of successive, costly litigation. See Steaks Unlimited, Inc., 623 F.2d at 280 (“Regardless whether particular statements made by consumer reporters are precisely accurate, it is necessary to insulate them from the vicissitudes of ordinary civil litigation in order to foster [the goals of] the First Amendment....”).
Unfortunately, Crane notwithstanding, the applicability of the independent review rule to appeals from summary judgment remains uncertain within our circuit. See, e.g., Kaelin v. Globe Communications Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir.1998) (failing to discuss the applicability of the independent review rule). While in the instant case the majority and concurrence grudgingly concede that the independent examination rule applies, this concession is empty. Their analysis differs in no meaningful respect from an ordinary summary judgment appeal, thereby stripping the independent examination rule of its intended purpose and meaning. I would find that a correct application of the independent examination rule to the facts before us reveals that the plaintiffs case must fail on summary judgment. There is simply insufficient evidence in the record as a whole that could support a reasonable jury finding that the plaintiff has shown actual malice on the part of Consumers Union by clear and convincing evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
2. Applying the Procedural Protections Mandated by New York Times
The majority and concurrence incorrectly apply the actual malice standard and undermine the importance of independent review. By doing so, Judges Tashima and Graber permit a forbidden and dangerous intrusion on the field of free speech.
Both Judges Tashima and Graber fail to contextualize Consumers Union’s testing of the Samurai within the purpose and mission of the organization. The District Court recognized the importance of doing so when it stated: “The trier of fact could not be expected to disregard the nature of defendant’s business — testing and reporting on consumer products — nor would plaintiff so urge, and it would be error for a court to so instruct. Thus, it is clear *1144that, based on the information CU had gathered, it was concerned about the safety of the Suzuki Samurai.” Viewed in this context, the actions and words of Consumers Union were appropriate. Consumers Union began its investigation of a product with the assumption that it could or might be unsafe. Once the product had performed in a manner that could be deemed unsafe, Consumers Union tested it more rigorously. Although the events that occurred in this case suggest that Consumers Union’s representatives had the intractable, “bulldog” mentality of a consumer advocacy organization, the facts do not evince actual malice as required by the law.
Judge Graber parts with the majority when she concludes that only two of Consumers Union’s statements are potentially actionable. With respect to the first statement,3 Judge Graber notes that “[t]he evidence detailed in the majority opinion is sufficient to allow a rational jury to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that CU developed the short course before discovering a rollover ‘propensity’ and in order to create a rollover propensity, not because of it.” Id. at 1143. Because Judge Graber does not specify the evidence she believes supports a finding of actual malice with respect to this statement, and because Judge Tashima does not analyze Suzuki’s claims sentence by sentence, I can only infer that Judge Graber is referring to the fact that Consumers Union altered the course, as well as the comments made by Consumers Union employees during the testing. This evidence is insufficient to support a finding of actual malice, let alone by clear and convincing evidence. At most, the comments of Consumers Union’s employees give rise to an inference of bias against the Samurai.4 Bias alone, however, cannot support a finding of actual malice. Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 417 (9th Cir.1995).
Moreover, the fact that Consumers Union altered the course cannot supply the “something more” that is required by the exacting actual malice standard. Not only is it undisputed that Consumers Union disclosed the alteration in the article, it is also undisputed that the Samurai tipped over prior to Consumers Union developing the short course. Consumers Union’s proffered reasons for developing the short course are completely consistent with the benign explanation that they were simply seeking confirmation of the existing accusations of rollover propensity against the Samurai, which it had exhibited in the early stages of testing.5
This is not a case in which Consumers Union contrived to make the Samurai roll over. Suzuki admits that there had been four independent lawsuits in which the vehicle rolled over, including one lawsuit by the Attorneys General of seven states. Certainly, when choosing to republish references to the rating, numerous rollover instances such as these reaffirmed Consumers Union’s opinion that the vehicle was “Not Acceptable.” In short, the undisputed evidence reveals no evidence of actual malice with respect to the first *1145statement that Judge Graber finds potentially actionable.
The second statement that Judge Gra-ber identifies as potentially actionable is as follows: “1986 CU buys its own auto test track in rural Connecticut. Two years later, based on tests conducted there, CONSUMER REPORTS discovers that the Suzuki Samurai easily rolls over in turns and rates it Not Acceptable.” Concurrence at 1141. Judge Graber states that “[t]he evidence in the summary judgment record would allow a reasonable jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that what CU discovered was that the Suzuki Samurai did not roll over ‘easily’ in turns, but had to be coaxed.” Id. Because Consumers Union disclosed the basis of the statement, the word “easily” was merely a properly made characterization of the Samurai’s performance during the testing. See Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir.1995) (“Thus, we join with the other courts of appeals in concluding that when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment.”). Moreover, even if reasonable minds differ about whether the Samurai tipping over four times on an altered course constitutes “easy” rollover propensity, this is evidence only of a subjective word choice, not of actual malice as the First Amendment requires.
Judges Tashima and Graber also misconstrue my argument, contending that I apply the independent examination rule in a manner that swallows the summary judgment standard, and thus engage in a forbidden intrusion on the province of the fact finder. Majority Op. at 1131-1133; Concurrence at 1140-1141. Their accusations reveal their lack of understanding of the way the rule interacts with the summary judgment standard, and the analysis that the rule requires that we apply in First Amendment cases. Were we to apply both standards correctly, we would determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to actual malice under the summary judgment standard. However, in doing so, we would conduct an independent review of the entire record “to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited.” Bose, 466 U.S. at 505, 104 S.Ct. 1949; see also Secrist, 874 F.2d at 1251 (stating that a court must “make [its] own independent review of the record to ensure the principles of actual malice are constitutionally applied.”). Because the independent examination rule allows us to view all of the evidence, and not just that which favors the plaintiff, we give maximum protection to the First Amendment. Far from discarding traditional summary judgment rules, my analysis is consistent with the way the independent examination rule has been applied at the summary judgment stage by other circuits. See, e.g., Secrist, 874 F.2d at 1251; Herbert, 781 F.2d at 305, 308. Like in Secrist and Herbert, upon an independent review, the evidence of actual malice in the case before us is paltry and unable to survive a summary judgment motion.
On a broader level, the majority’s decision has troubling implications. If taken to its logical end, the majority’s reasoning will allow any deficiency in a consumer group’s test to become the grounds for litigation. This will inhibit the speech of organizations and individuals who would fear voicing their findings and views because of the threat of litigation. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 278-79, 84 S.Ct. 710. Suppression of such speech will ere-*1146ate less informed consumers and hinder public safety and health. See Steaks Unlimited, Inc., 623 F.2d at 280 (discussing the importance of First Amendment protection for consumer reporting). Moreover, it will give the government the sole voice in this field. In cases, such as this, where the consumer organization disagrees with the government agency’s findings or where the agency criticizes the organization’s findings, companies will be able to use this fact as proof that the organization was acting with actual malice.6
The law is certain that in order to hold Consumers Union is not protected by the First Amendment, there must be clear and convincing evidence that it acted with actual malice toward Suzuki. The appropriate standard on summary judgment in First Amendment cases is not simply whether there are disputed issues of material fact; the test is whether or not a reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that Suzuki proved actual malice on the part of Consumers Union. Here, no reasonable jury could find clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. See Kaelin, 162 F.3d at 1039. After an independent review of the record, it is unquestionable that the District Court constitutionally applied the principles of actual malice. The grant of summary judgment was necessary both to avoid the inhibition of free speech by the media and to protect public safety and health. For these reasons, I would affirm the District Court’s decision.

. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 Yale L.J. 2431, 2432, 2442-45 (1998); Scott Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 Tex. L.Rev. 215, 289-97 (1987); Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35 Am. U.L.Rev. 3, 50-91 (1985). The debate among the circuits is discussed further below.

. In her partial concurrence, Judge Graber contends that “[t]here are good reasons why courts must apply the independent examination rule differently in the summary judgment context than when reviewing a judgment entered after a full trial.” Concurrence at 1140. However, Judge Graber’s analysis fails to consider the purpose and intent of a summary judgment motion, particularly in a First Amendment case. In First Amendment cases, we must be aware of the dangers associated with the cost of litigation which can stifle expression, particularly by those whose interests are in warning of danger to the public safety.

. The first statement by Consumers Union that Judge Graber finds potentially actionable is: "In 1988, we developed the 'short course' because we discovered that the Suzuki Samurai, then undergoing testing, showed a propensity to roll over during our long course AM maneuver." Concurrence at 1143.

. The statements identified by Judge Tashima are as follows: (1) "If you can't find someone to roll this car, I will.” (2) "That's it. That looked pretty good.” (3) "All right Ricky baby.” Majority Op. at 1135.

.It is undisputed that the Samurai tipped during the break-in period, as well on the long course when it was driven by an inexperienced driver.

. This concern is most likely part of the reason that the District Court stated that the NHTSA study was not entitled to greater weight than any other study or opinion regarding testing methods. The majority, however, chooses to give the NHTSA study greater weight and, thus, discourages the nongovernmental voices in the fields of consumer protection and vehicle safety. Majority Op. at 1138.