Court Opinion

ID: 9946975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 20:05:20.871568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.208691
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 231287-U
                                             No. 1-23-1287
                                       Order filed March 1, 2024
                                                                                        Sixth Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                                IN THE
                                 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                           FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 6103-07 CLAREMONT, LLC,                                        )   Appeal from the
                                                                )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  )   Cook County.
                                                                )
     v.                                                         )
                                                                )   No. 23 M1 700722
 ANGELA HUNTER and UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS,                           )
                                                                )
           Defendants                                           )   Honorable
                                                                )   James A. Wright,
 (Angela Hunter, Defendant-Appellant).                          )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices Hyman and Tailor concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1        Held: Defendant’s appeal from the portion of the eviction order granting plaintiff
                possession of the apartment unit is dismissed as moot. The circuit court’s monetary
                judgment awarded to plaintiff for unpaid rent and costs is affirmed where defendant
                failed to provide a sufficient record to show the court’s judgment was erroneous.

¶2        In this forcible entry and detainer action, defendant Angela Hunter appeals pro se from an

agreed eviction order entered by the circuit court granting possession of the subject apartment unit
No. 1-23-1287

and a monetary judgment for unpaid rent and costs in favor of plaintiff, 6103-07 Claremont, LLC

(Claremont). On appeal, Hunter contends the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to

dismiss the eviction complaint filed under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)

(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022)) because the pleading was legally and factually insufficient.

Hunter further contends the court violated her right to procedural due process when it ignored her

written request for a briefing schedule to address her motion to dismiss and, instead, denied her

motion sua sponte. Hunter also argues that all the orders entered by the circuit court were invalid

because they did not include language stating that the court was “fully advised in the premises.”

In addition, Hunter argues that the circuit court erred when it failed to recognize that she signed

the agreed eviction order under duress after it disregarded her motion to dismiss, and she feared

becoming homeless.

¶3     For the following reasons, we dismiss as moot Hunter’s appeal challenging the portion of

the eviction order granting possession of the apartment unit to Claremont as the sheriff has already

enforced the eviction order and Claremont has regained possession of the unit. We affirm the

circuit court’s monetary judgment awarded to Claremont for unpaid rent and costs where Hunter

failed to provide a sufficient record to show the court’s judgment was erroneous.

¶4                                      BACKGROUND

¶5     The record on appeal consists only of the common law record. Documents in the record

show that on January 13, 2023, Claremont filed an eviction complaint against Hunter and unknown

occupants alleging that it was entitled to possession of the apartment unit on North Claremont

Avenue in Chicago. Claremont alleged Hunter unlawfully withheld possession of the unit after it

terminated her lease for nonpayment of rent. Claremont indicated that Hunter owed $4940 in rent

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No. 1-23-1287

from October 1, 2022, to January 31, 2023. Claremont requested that the court grant it possession

of the property, the amount of past due rent plus court costs, and any additional rent due to

Claremont through the date of judgment. Claremont used the eviction complaint form approved

by the Illinois Supreme Court and completed each of the four sections of the form.

¶6     Claremont attached to its complaint a copy of Hunter’s apartment lease dated April 18,

2022. The term of the lease began July 1, 2022, and ended June 30, 2023. The monthly rent was

$1300. Claremont also attached a copy of Hunter’s account statement dated January 10, 2023,

showing a balance due of $4940. The statement indicated that the last payment Claremont received

was for $1145 on October 3, 2022, with a reference code of “Cha.”

¶7     In addition, Claremont attached to its complaint a copy of its five-day notice served to

Hunter on January 6, 2023. The notice indicated that Hunter owed Claremont $4940 for past due

rent and demanded full payment of that amount no later than five days after the service date. The

notice stated that if Hunter failed to pay the amount due, her right to possession of the apartment

would be terminated. The notice included an affidavit and proof of service stating that the property

manager delivered a copy of the five-day notice to Hunter on January 6, 2023.

¶8     The record shows that both the Cook County Sheriff and a special process server made

multiple unsuccessful attempts to personally serve Hunter with the eviction summons and

complaint. On April 14, 2023, the Cook County Sheriff served Hunter with notice of the eviction

action via posting and mailed her a copy of the notice. Hunter filed her pro se appearance in the

eviction case on May 3, 2023.

¶9     On May 5, 2023, the circuit court referred the case to the Early Resolution Program (ERP)

for assessment. On June 2, 2023, the court entered an order indicating that the ERP completed

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No. 1-23-1287

their assessment and that the case was not settled. The order transferred the case back to the First

Municipal District for further proceedings.

¶ 10    On June 21, 2023, Hunter filed a pro se motion to “extend” the proceedings to secure legal

counsel. Hunter claimed she was working with ERP and that she had a housing voucher that was

going to expire on June 28. Hunter stated that it was hard to obtain other housing because she was

in eviction court. She claimed her unit passed inspection, but the building failed because the

engineer did not appear. Hunter further claimed the building manager became angry, did not want

to re-do the paperwork, and took her to court when the building went into abatement. Hunter stated

that Claremont put her in a position to be homeless.

¶ 11    On June 27, 2023, the circuit court entered an order continuing the case to July 13, 2023,

for an “in person trial.”

¶ 12    On July 5, 2023, Hunter filed a pro se motion to dismiss Claremont’s complaint with

prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. Hunter argued that the account statement attached

to Claremont’s complaint was, in substance, a pleading against the Chicago Housing Authority

(CHA). Hunter claimed the account statement was a separate claim against the CHA that was

improperly commingled with the complaint. Hunter argued that the complaint violated statutory

pleading standards because Claremont commingled its claims rather than pleading separate causes

of action for any alleged claims against her or the CHA.

¶ 13    Hunter further argued in her motion that Claremont never served her with the complaint or

its five-day notice. She claimed the affidavit of proof of service accompanying the five-day notice

was false. Hunter stated that she became aware of the eviction complaint when she received a

third-party solicitation in the mail during the last week of April 2023.

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No. 1-23-1287

¶ 14   Hunter also alleged that Claremont’s eviction complaint was factually and legally

insufficient because “[Claremont] caused abatement of its own rent from failing CHA’s

inspection.” Hunter argued that the money Claremont alleged it was owed was between Claremont

and the CHA. Hunter claimed Claremont’s complaint and statement document were “illegal” and

that Claremont’s negligence “contributed in whole to the injury of which he now complains, i.e.,

CHA’s abated Rent.” Hunter asserted that Claremont acted in bad faith in filing its complaint

knowing that the property failed CHA’s inspection. Hunter stated that any request to amend the

complaint would be futile and would prejudice her with homelessness. Hunter asked the court to

strike the July 13 trial date, set a briefing schedule for Claremont to file a response to her motion

to dismiss and for her to file a reply, dismiss the eviction complaint with prejudice, and seal the

eviction record.

¶ 15    Hunter attached several exhibits to her motion to dismiss including the eviction complaint

and its supporting documents, the affidavit for service by posting, and the notice by posting

requiring appearance in the pending eviction action. She also attached a solicitation for legal

services for assistance in the eviction action dated January 31, 2023.

¶ 16   In addition, Hunter attached six pages of notices from the CHA regarding inspections at

the subject property. A notice dated August 31, 2022, stated that the property failed an inspection

on August 29 and that property conditions were the owner’s responsibility. Another notice also

dated August 31 stated that the property passed an inspection on August 30. A partial copy of an

undated CHA notice indicated the property failed a re-inspection conducted on September 26,

2022, and the property owner was responsible for the violations. This notice further stated that the

owner’s Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) would be abated effective October 1, 2022, and that

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No. 1-23-1287

Hunter had the right to request moving papers. It also stated that if no one was present for the re-

inspection, the unit would automatically fail and may go into abatement if the inspection was not

rescheduled and passed prior to the expiration of the cure period.

¶ 17   Another page from a CHA notice is not numbered or dated and, thus, this court cannot

determine with which notice it belongs. A box is checked for damages/conditions caused by the

property owner. This section stated that the CHA would provide the property owner with an

opportunity to address the deficiencies in accordance with the terms of the HAP contract. The

section advised that failure to repair deficiencies may result in an abatement with an effective date

of October 1, 2022. It further noted that if payments were abated for 60 days without the

deficiencies being remedied, the HAP contract for either each non-compliant unit or all units would

be terminated. It stated, “[Y]ou are prohibited from requiring the participant to pay any amounts

withheld by CHA.”

¶ 18   On July 10, 2023, the circuit court denied Hunter’s section 2-615 motion to dismiss

Claremont’s eviction complaint. The court’s written order indicates that Hunter and Claremont’s

attorney were present in court when the order was entered. The record before this court contains

no report of proceedings.

¶ 19   On July 13, 2023, the circuit court entered an eviction order granting Claremont possession

of the subject apartment. The written order indicated it was entered “[b]y agreement (the court

having made no factual findings)” and was “[s]igned and agreed to” by [Claremont’s] lawyer and

Hunter. The people present in court were Hunter and Claremont’s lawyer, manager, and engineer.

The order stated that Hunter must move out of the property on or before August 15, 2023, and if

she failed to do so, the sheriff was ordered to evict her. In addition, the order granted Claremont a

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No. 1-23-1287

monetary judgment against Hunter in the amount of $12,740 in rent and $788.89 in court costs

for a total of $13,528.89.

¶ 20   Hunter appeals pro se from the eviction order. In her notice of appeal, Hunter asked this

court to: (1) void the eviction agreement because she signed it under duress and in fear of

homelessness; (2) vacate the eviction order and allow her to maintain possession of the premises;

(3) vacate the monetary judgment; (4) find Claremont’s complaint legally and factually insufficient

on its face pursuant to section 2-615; (5) dismiss the eviction complaint with prejudice; and (6)

order the eviction record sealed. Hunter has filed numerous unsuccessful motions to stay the

eviction order pending the resolution of the appeal in both the circuit court and this court. She also

filed two unsuccessful emergency motions for leave to file a petition for an original writ of

mandamus in the Illinois Supreme Court.

¶ 21   In her emergency motion to vacate the eviction order and “regain possession” filed in this

court on October 16, 2023, Hunter stated that the Cook County Sheriff effectuated the eviction

order on October 13. In a subsequent emergency motion filed in this court on October 26, Hunter

requested an order to “supersede the trespass notice posted on the property” to enter the premises

and retrieve her property. Another division of this court denied both motions.

¶ 22                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 23   On appeal, Hunter contends the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to dismiss

the eviction complaint filed under section 2-615 of the Code because the pleading was legally and

factually insufficient. She further contends the court violated her right to procedural due process

when it ignored her written request for a briefing schedule to address her motion to dismiss, and

instead, denied her motion sua sponte. Hunter also argues that all the orders entered by the circuit

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No. 1-23-1287

court were invalid because they did not include the language that the court was “fully advised in

the premises.” In addition, Hunter argues the circuit court erred when it failed to recognize that

she signed the agreed eviction order under duress after it disregarded her motion to dismiss, and

she feared becoming homeless.

¶ 24   In response, Claremont argues that this court should deny Hunter’s appeal as moot because

she was evicted from the premises on October 13, and therefore, this court cannot grant any relief

regarding the order of possession. Alternatively, Claremont argues that Hunter failed to provide

this court with a sufficient record to review the circuit court’s rulings because she did not include

a report of proceedings. Claremont asserts that this court must presume the circuit court’s rulings

were correct and affirm the judgment. Claremont further argues Hunter presented no evidence or

testimony to establish that she signed the agreed eviction order under duress.

¶ 25   As a threshold matter, we must first consider Claremont’s contention that this appeal is

moot. Generally, courts do not decide moot issues, render advisory opinions, or consider claims

where there will be no change in the outcome, regardless of how the issue is decided. In re Julie

M., 2021 IL 125768, ¶ 21. “An appeal is moot if no actual controversy exists or when events have

occurred that make it impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual relief.” Commonwealth

Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 10. The facts that must be determined

in an eviction action are which party is entitled to immediate possession of the property and

whether there is a defense related to the purpose of the action that defeats the Plaintiff’s asserted

right to possession. Milton v. Therra, 2018 IL App (1st) 171392, ¶ 23.

¶ 26   Here, the eviction order granted Claremont possession of the apartment unit and required

Hunter to relinquish possession by August 15, 2023. Hunter failed to comply with the circuit

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No. 1-23-1287

court’s order to vacate the unit, to which she had agreed. Instead of vacating, Hunter filed a notice

of appeal. On October 13, 2023, the sheriff enforced the eviction order, removed Hunter from the

unit, and Claremont regained possession. Claremont then posted a no trespassing notice on the

property. On October 30, 2023, another division of this court denied Hunter’s emergency motion

to bypass that notice for the purpose of retrieving her property.

¶ 27    Consequently, Hunter’s appeal from the portion of the eviction order which granted

possession of the unit to Claremont is moot because Claremont has already acquired possession of

the property. See Circle Management LLC v. Olivier, 378 Ill. App. 3d 601, 607 (2007) (the appeal

of a forcible entry and detainer action was moot where the circuit court had entered a possession

order, and the appellant had moved out, but the court applied the public interest exception to the

mootness doctrine); see also 2242 Archer Court, LLC v. Roberts, 2023 IL App (1st) 221655-U, ¶¶

14-15 (citing Circle Management in finding the issue of possession of the premises moot because

the defendant had already been evicted from the apartment); Georgakopoulos v. Blake, 2022 IL

App (1st) 210668-U, ¶¶ 26-27 (same).1

¶ 28    In her reply brief, Hunter states that Claremont’s mootness argument is a “Proverbial Red

herring” because it did not address the substantive arguments she raised on appeal. Hunter did not

otherwise reply to the mootness argument or assert that an exception to the mootness doctrine

exists as to the possession order. Accordingly, she has forfeited any challenges to the application

of the mootness doctrine. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (points not argued are

        1
          2242 Archer Court, LLC and Georgakopoulos are cited as persuasive authority pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023), which provides that “a nonprecedential order
entered under subpart (b) of this rule on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes.”

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No. 1-23-1287

forfeited). We therefore find that the appeal from the possession portion of the eviction order is

moot.

¶ 29    The eviction order, however, included a monetary judgment against Hunter for unpaid rent

and costs which was not rendered moot by the enforcement of the eviction order. See Poulos v.

Reda, 165 Ill. App. 3d 793, 798 (1987) (although the issue of possession was moot, the claim for

rent remained a viable issue). Unfortunately, we find that our review of this portion of the eviction

order is hampered by an incomplete record. When reviewing an eviction order entered in favor of

the plaintiff, our standard of review is whether the circuit court’s ruling was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Wendy & William Spatz Charitable Foundation v. 2263 North Lincoln

Corp., 2013 IL App (1st) 122076, ¶ 27. An appellant has the burden of presenting a sufficiently

complete record of the circuit court proceedings to support any claims of error, and in the absence

of such a record, this court will presume that the circuit court’s order conformed with the law and

had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). Any doubts arising

from an incomplete record will be resolved against the appellant. Id.

¶ 30    Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021), the record on appeal shall include

the common law record, including every document filed in the case, and any report of proceedings

prepared in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). Pursuant to Rule 323,

the report of proceedings may be a transcript prepared by court reporting personnel, or in lieu of a

transcript, an appellant may file a bystander’s report (Rule 323(c)) or an agreed statement of facts

(Rule 323(d)). Here, the record does not contain a report of the circuit court proceedings in any

format for the July 13, 2023, trial date when the circuit court entered the agreed eviction order.

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No. 1-23-1287

¶ 31    The record before this court consists of one volume of common law documents, which

alone are insufficient to allow this court to find an error by the circuit court in entering the monetary

judgment in favor of Claremont. The written eviction order entered on July 13, 2023, indicates it

was entered “[b]y agreement (the court having made no factual findings).” The order further shows

that Hunter, along with Claremont’s counsel, manager, and engineer, were present in court. In

addition to granting possession of the subject property to Claremont, the court awarded them

$13,528.89 in rent and costs against Hunter.

¶ 32    Without a report of proceedings, this court has no knowledge of what happened in court

that day. We know that on July 10, 2023, the court heard Hunter’s motion to dismiss the complaint

in which she argued that it was the CHA, not her, who owed the past due rent. The circuit court

denied that motion, and three days later Hunter signed the agreed eviction order. We do not know

what testimony or evidence, if any, was presented by either party or what arguments the parties

made before the court. We do not know why Hunter agreed to the eviction order. We do not know

the reasoning or rationale that provided the basis for the court to enter the order. Hunter claims

that she signed the order under duress and for fear of being homeless, but without a report of

proceedings, there is no evidence to support her assertion. Under these circumstances, this court

must presume that the circuit court acted in conformity with the law when it entered the agreed

eviction order. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156-57 (2005); Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d

at 391-92.

¶ 33    In reaching this conclusion, we find no merit in Hunter’s argument on appeal that the circuit

court’s orders were invalid because they did not include language stating that the court was “fully

advised in the premises.” Hunter claims this language is required pursuant to Foutch, where the

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No. 1-23-1287

Illinois Supreme Court explained that when a circuit court order states that it is based upon the

court having heard the evidence and arguments of counsel “and being fully advised in the

premises” it is presumed the court heard adequate evidence to support its decision. Foutch, 99 Ill.

2d at 394. Hunter has misinterpreted the legal proposition from Foutch. When the quoted language

appears in a written court order, it is an indication that the court heard evidence and arguments that

supported its decision. Such language, however, is not required for an order to be legally valid.

The fact that the circuit court’s orders in this case did not include the quoted language had no effect

on the validity of the orders.

¶ 34    Insofar as Hunter asserts that she was denied due process of law, we need not reach

constitutional questions when the issues can be resolved on other grounds. Carle Foundation v.

Cunningham Township, 2017 IL 120427, ¶ 34.

¶ 35    Finally, we address Hunter’s argument that the circuit court erred when it denied her

section 2-615 motion to dismiss the eviction complaint. Hunter correctly points out that the court’s

ruling on a section 2-615 motion is reviewed de novo, and thus, we do not need the report of

proceedings to review that ruling. See Quiroz v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2022 IL 127603, ¶ 11

(“A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 is reviewed de novo because it challenges the legal

sufficiency of a complaint by alleging defects on the face of the complaint.”). In reviewing the

sufficiency of a complaint, all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from those facts are taken as true. Id. The allegations in the complaint are construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff is not required to present evidence in the complaint

but must allege sufficient facts that present a claim that constitutes a legally recognized cause of

action. Id. at ¶ 12.

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No. 1-23-1287

Here, we find that Claremont’s eviction complaint was legally and factually sufficient, and

therefore, the circuit court’s denial of Hunter’s motion to dismiss under section 2-615 was proper.

Claremont used the eviction complaint form approved by the Illinois Supreme Court, and it is

required to be accepted in all Illinois circuit courts. Claremont completed each section of the form

and provided the address of the property, the reason for the lease termination being nonpayment

of rent, and the amount of past due rent owed for the period of October 1, 2022, to January 31,

2023. Claremont also indicated that it was demanding possession of the property, court costs, past

due rent in the amount of $4940, and rent due through the date of judgment. Finally, Claremont

attached to the complaint the written lease agreement, its five-day notice to Hunter, and its affidavit

of service of that notice. Claremont’s complaint presented the factual details necessary to apprise

Hunter of the eviction action. Hunter’s arguments that it was the CHA who owed the rent rather

than her and that the building failed CHA inspections were defenses she could have raised at trial,

and possibly she did. However, those challenges do not render Claremont’s complaint factually or

legally insufficient.

¶ 36                                      CONCLUSION

¶ 37    For these reasons, we dismiss Hunter’s appeal from the portion of the eviction order that

granted Claremont possession of the unit as moot. We affirm the circuit court’s order in all other

respects.

¶ 38    Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

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