Court Opinion

ID: 9895587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 20:03:44.298218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:36.430578
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/7/23 P. v. Morones CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B326150

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. KA080781)
         v.

MARTIN MORONES,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.

     Law Office of Stein and Markus, Andrew M. Stein,
Joseph A. Markus and Joseph E. Markus for Defendant and
Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Stephanie A. Miyoshi,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     _________________________
       In 2007, defendant and appellant Martin Morones and
Robert Canizalez (Canizalez)1 engaged each other in a high-speed
street race that ultimately killed two young children and their
mother. A jury subsequently convicted defendant on three counts
of second degree murder.2 (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)3 It also
found true the allegations that he personally inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 1203.075, subd. (a)). Defendant was sentenced to
an aggregate term of 45 years to life.4
       This is defendant’s third appeal in this case. In the first,
we affirmed his convictions. (People v. Canizalez (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 832 (Canizalez).) In the second, defendant
appealed from the trial court’s denial of his petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.5 We reversed the trial
court’s ruling and remanded the matter for an evidentiary
hearing per section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). (People v. Morones
(Dec. 7, 2021, B309121) [nonpub. opn.].)

1     Canizalez is not a party to this appeal.

2     The jury also convicted defendant on three counts of
vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence.

3     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

4     The trial court stayed sentencing on the manslaughter
convictions pursuant to section 654.

5     When defendant filed his petition, the relevant
resentencing statute was numbered section 1170.95. Effective
June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6,
with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For simplicity,
we refer to the section by its new numbering.

                                 2
       At that hearing, the trial court again denied defendant’s
petition, finding that he could still be convicted under the
doctrine of implied malice murder. Defendant now appeals for a
third time. We find no error and affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     The 2009 Conviction and First Appeal6
       A.    The Fatal Race
       The fateful car race took place on the streets outside of
Brookside Mobile Home Park (Brookside) in El Monte, California.
“Brookside had approximately 500 units and only one entrance
and exit, which was on Elliott Avenue, east of Parkway Drive.
Proceeding east on Elliott Avenue across Parkway Drive led
directly into Brookside.” (Morones, supra, B309121.) “The posted
speed limit on Parkway Drive was 30 miles per hour. Mountain
View High School was in the area.” (Ibid.)
       “On October 8, 2007, between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., Canizalez
[was] driving a red Mustang and [defendant was] driving a brown
Honda north on Parkway Drive,” about “a quarter of a mile south
of the intersection of Parkway Drive and Elliott Avenue.”
(Morones, supra, B309121.) The Honda had been modified
significantly to increase its speed and maneuverability; it had
been “‘lowered “by changing out the coil springs,” the diameter of
its rims had been changed to lower its height and increase its
maneuverability at high speeds, it had an illegally modified air
intake system, its catalytic converter had been removed, and
there had been “modification of the headers,” part of the exhaust
system.’” (Ibid.)

6     We take many of the facts in this section from our opinion
in Morones, supra, B309121, which itself quoted liberally from
our opinion in Canizalez, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th 832.

                                3
       Defendant and Canizalez stopped their cars side by side at
an intersection with a four-way stop sign. (Morones, supra,
B309121.) They “exchanged words, their tires screeched and they
raced side by side on Parkway Drive, attaining speeds up to 87
miles per hour.” (Morones, supra, B309121.) Two witnesses
reported that defendant’s car quickly took the lead. (Ibid.)
       At the same time, Dora Groce (Groce), a Brookside resident,
was driving her car, “a 2002 Nissan Altima,” out of “Brookside
into the intersection of Elliot Avenue and Parkway Drive,” which
also had a four-way stop sign. (Morones, supra, B309121.) Her
eight-year-old son, Robert, and four-year-old daughter,
Katherine, were in the backseat of the car. (Ibid.)
       As defendant and Canizalez raced north on Parkway Drive,
they drove through the intersection of Elliot Avenue without
stopping. (Morones, supra, B309121.) Two witnesses reported
that “the Honda hit[] the rear of the Altima and then the
Mustang hit[] the front[;]” “[a]nother witness was unable to tell if
one or both cars hit the Altima.” (Canizalez, supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 838, fn. 2.) “‘The Altima was pushed into a
green truck . . . and burst into flames. The truck was turned 180
degrees. The Honda hit a red Nissan Sentra . . . [which] then hit
a red Camaro in front of it.’” (Morones, supra, B309121.)
       A firefighter responding to the scene “‘saw the Altima
“totally involved with fire.” Black smoke and flames were inside
the car, with a burning woman visible in the front seat.’”
(Morones, supra, B309121.) The firefighter heard “‘“[v]oices of
children screaming” . . . from the back of the car. The flames and
intense heat made it difficult to break the windows and
impossible to free the occupants. When the fire was
extinguished, three bodies were found inside the car. The two in

                                 4
the rear had their arms stretched out as if reaching for each
other. The victims were later identified as Groce, Katherine and
Robert.’” (Morones, supra, B309121)
       Immediately after the collision, defendant, aided by
Canizalez, “‘push[ed] the Honda into Brookside.’” (Morones,
supra, B309121.) Defendant “‘fled to Mexico but was later
deported back to the United States.’” (Ibid.)
       B.     The Investigation
       “‘Fontana Police Captain Dave Faulkner, a traffic collision
reconstruction expert, reviewed the investigation file, including
diagrams, police reports and photographs, went to the scene and
took photographs, and inspected the involved cars. He calculated
that the minimum highest potential speed of the Mustang was 77
miles per hour, and could have been as high as 87 miles per hour,
and of the Honda was 80 miles per hour, and could have been as
high as 86 miles per hour. Based upon damage to the two
vehicles, Captain Faulkner believed that, at some point, they had
hit each other.
       “‘In his report, Captain Faulkner stated that the primary
collision factor was attributed to the driver of the Mustang
because it was “his impact and his cause that was the direct
result of your party’s death.” “[T]he Vehicle Code and the
California reporting system that deals with traffic collision
requires [sic] you to pick the one cause.” However, he
nonetheless opined that both drivers shared the cause of the
collision. It was caused by the running of the stop sign by the
two cars and their unsafe speed. While he believed that the
Honda did not hit the Altima, because there was so much damage
from the fire to the back and side of the Altima, “[t]here was no
way to tell.”’” (Morones, supra, B309121.)

                                5
       C.     The Trial
       “The prosecutor proceeded on two theories of murder
liability: implied malice and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The jury was instructed on both
theories.” (Morones, supra, B309121.)
       D.     The First Appeal
       On appeal, “we rejected the argument that there was
insufficient evidence to support the murder convictions for
Canizalez and [defendant] because there was overwhelming
evidence of implied malice as well as ample evidence of
causation.” (Morones, supra, B309121; see also Canizalez, supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 841–846.) We also concluded, among
other things, that sufficient evidence demonstrated that
defendant and Canizalez “were guilty of second degree murder as
joint, direct perpetrators of the deaths of Groce and her children.
As joint perpetrators they were ‘equally guilty’ of the charged
offense.” (Canizalez, supra, at p. 850.)
II.    The Resentencing Petition
       A.     Petition and Second Appeal
       “On July 28, 2020, [defendant] filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 117[2.6].” (Morones, supra,
B309121.) The trial court held a contested hearing to determine
whether the petition established a prima facie showing of
eligibility for resentencing. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
Defendant was represented by private counsel. (Morones, supra,
B309121.) “[T]he trial court denied the petition . . . conclud[ing]
that [defendant] had been convicted of implied malice murder”
and was thus ineligible as a matter of law for resentencing relief.
(Morones, supra, B309121.)

                                 6
       On appeal, we found that “while there was strong evidence
indicating that [defendant] acted with implied malice due to the
danger inherent in his conduct . . . the record of conviction did not
establish as a matter of law that the jury convicted [defendant]
based on an implied malice theory rather than on a natural and
probable consequences theory.” (Morones, supra, B309121.) We
thus remanded for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section
1172.6, subd. (d)(3), at which the trial court could properly
resolve this issue. (Morones, supra, B309121.)
       B.    Evidentiary Hearing
       In October 2022, the trial court held that evidentiary
hearing. Defendant, again represented by private counsel,
submitted a brief arguing, among other things, that the record
contained insufficient evidence to support a conviction on a
theory of implied malice murder. He attached as exhibits our
decision in Morones, supra, B309121, a reporter’s transcript of
the prosecutor’s closing arguments at the 2009 trial, and a
reporter’s transcript of the 2020 prima facie hearing on
defendant’s petition.7 Neither defendant nor the prosecution
presented any new evidence.
       At the hearing, the prosecution argued that defendant
could still be convicted of murder on the theory of implied malice.
The trial court ultimately agreed and denied the section 1172.6
petition, finding that defendant possessed “the subjective
awareness necessary for murder.”

7     At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
indicated that it had “reviewed the paperwork submitted by both
sides.” However, the appellate record does not reflect that the
prosecution submitted any papers in advance of the hearing.

                                 7
         The trial court explained its reasoning at length, beginning
by noting that “you cannot have a speed race without at least two
participants, and each of those participants are equally
responsible for the tragic consequences that took place regardless
of . . . whose vehicle hit the victim[’s] vehicle.”
         The trial court then focused on the nature of defendant’s
conduct, finding that by “speeding . . . the way they did and
[racing] vehicles that were modified to enhance their speed
. . . demonstrates a lack of respect and consideration for
pedestrian traffic and other motorists. That is a disregard for
human safety[,]” particularly since the race “was done . . . at a
period of time in which there is a high volume of traffic because of
the hour of the day.” The court also pointed to defendant’s “post-
accident conduct which . . . demonstrated [a] complete lack of
concern for the victims who were engulfed in flames and trapped
in their vehicle. Instead, he acted for his own protection [by]
concealing his vehicle and ultimately fleeing the jurisdiction.”
         The trial court also “infer[red]” from defendant’s conduct
during the race that he “had that subjective awareness
. . . separat[ing] murder from manslaughter because . . . he was
well aware that this type of conduct is inherently dangerous to
human life, and I think any driver recognizes that . . . . It’s just
common knowledge that you do not engage in this kind of activity
and come back and say I was completely oblivious to how
dangerous my act was to human life.”
         The trial court emphasized that it was “not considering
. . . Canizalez’s conduct . . . and imputing anything upon
[defendant] based upon Canizalez’s activity. . . . This is all
[defendant]’s conduct. And for that reason I think that the law is

                                 8
satisfied even under the new changes that [defendant] is
responsible for the murders of these three victims.”
        Defendant timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
I.      Background Legal Principles
        The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) Among other changes, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended
section 188 to “permit[] a second degree murder conviction only if
the prosecution can prove the defendant acted with the
accompanying mental state of mind of malice aforethought. The
prosecution cannot ‘impute[ ] [malice] to a person based solely on
his or her participation in a crime.’” (People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 846, quoting, § 188, subd. (a)(3).)
        Senate Bill No. 1437 also created section 1172.6, which
“provides a mechanism by which a person convicted of murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory may be
resentenced if they could no longer be convicted of murder
because of the changes to section 188.” (People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, 950–951 (Vargas).)
        Under section 1172.6, a person convicted of murder “may
file a petition with the court that sentenced [him] to have [his]
. . . conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts” if he avers that “[a] complaint, information, or indictment
was filed against [him] that allowed the prosecution to proceed

                                 9
under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime[;]” and that he “was convicted of murder
. . . following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder . . . [;]”
and that he “could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
made” by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
         “Once a petitioner establishes a prima facie case for relief
and the superior court issues an order to show cause, the matter
proceeds to an evidentiary hearing at which it is the prosecution’s
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing. [Citations.] If the superior court
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of
murder notwithstanding the amendments to sections 188 and
189, the petitioner is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
[Citations.]” (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.)
II.      Standard of Review
         “In determining whether a trial court correctly denied a
section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing, ‘“‘we
review the factual findings for substantial evidence and the
application of those facts to the statute de novo.’”’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383.)
         When reviewing the trial court’s factual findings, “‘“we
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] We

                                 10
determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court “presumes in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.”’ [Citations.] Substantial
evidence also ‘“includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.”’ [Citations.]”
(Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.)
III. Analysis
      The trial court found that defendant remains guilty of
murder under the doctrine of implied malice, which is still a
viable theory of liability. (People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
997, 1005 [“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 did nothing to remove implied
malice as a basis for a second degree murder conviction”].) We
conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding.
      A.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Implied
             Malice Finding
      “Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing
is proximately caused by “‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’”’
[Citations.]” (People v. Reyes (2023)14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
      As we noted in Canizalez, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th 832 and
Morones, supra, B309121, the record of conviction in this case
substantially supports findings of both causation and implied
malice. Defendant raced his car, which was illegally modified to
increase its capacity for speed and maneuverability, through a
residential and school neighborhood at speeds exceeding legal

                                11
limits by over 50 miles at peak traffic hours. As the trial court
noted, any driver, including defendant, must understand the
danger inherent in this conduct. (People v. Murphy (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 713, 728 [“‘It takes no leap of logic for the [trier of
fact] to conclude that because anyone would be aware of the risk,
[defendant] was aware of the risk.’ [Citation.]”].)
       Defendant led the race as he and Canizalez approached the
intersection near Brookside, which was populated by several
other cars, including the victims’ Altima. He and Canizalez both
sped through the stop sign at that intersection and promptly
crashed into multiple cars. The crash caused the Altima to burst
into flames, consigning all three victims to a fiery grave.
       Moreover, immediately following the crash, defendant
made no attempt to help the bystanders or first responders who
jumped into action and tried to rescue the screaming woman and
children from their burning car. (People v. Palomar (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 969, 978 (Palomar) [failing to assist a wounded
victim manifests “a callous indifference to human life”].) Instead,
defendant attempted to hide evidence by dragging his car away
from the accident site and then fled the country. (People v.
Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 35 [trier of fact may “infer
consciousness of guilt from any attempts by defendant to conceal
evidence”]; People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 607 [same, as to
a defendant’s flight after the crime].)

                                 12
       B.    Defendant’s Counterarguments
       Defendant raises three counterarguments, all of which are
meritless. We address each in turn.
             1.     Implied malice vs. imputed malice
       Defendant claims that the trial court’s implied malice
findings improperly impute malice to him solely because he
committed various traffic crimes, such as street racing and
speeding. But “[i]mplied malice is not imputed malice. It
requires that the perpetrator actually and personally harbor
malice.” (People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 139 (Carr).)
That is precisely what the trial court found here, expressly
concluding “that the subjective awareness necessary for murder
exists on the part of defendant.”
       Defendant maintains that the trial court’s only basis for
this finding is his violation of traffic laws and argues that mere
“participation in a drag race without more does not form a
predicate for murder.” But defendant’s conduct went far beyond
breaking a few traffic laws. In the analogous situation of a
defendant who kills a person while driving under the influence,
courts have noted that “implied malice may be inferred from a
defendant’s conduct before, during, and after driving drunk—not
imputed from the bare fact of driving drunk.” (Carr, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 136, citing, People v. Watson (1981)
30 Cal.3d 290.) Similarly, the trial court inferred implied malice
not from the “bare fact” of defendant’s participation in an illegal
street race, but from his flagrantly egregious conduct during and
after that race.
             2.     Proximate causation
       Defendant insists that he cannot be found to have caused
the victims’ murders because his car did not actually collide with

                                13
theirs.8 We refer defendant to our analysis in Canizalez, supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 845: “[E]ven if the [trier of fact] concluded
that [defendant’s] car did not hit the Altima, the evidence was
still sufficient to support a finding that he caused the victims’
deaths. It is proximate causation, not direct or actual causation,
which together with the requisite mental state determines the
defendant’s liability for murder. [Citation.] . . . . The People’s
burden of proving causation is met if evidence is produced from
which it may be reasonably inferred that the defendant’s act was
a substantial factor in producing the result of the crime.
[Citation.]” “Canizalez and [defendant] were . . . jointly engaged
in a speed race that led directly to the fatal collision and deaths.
Captain Faulkner testified that the cause of the accident was the
running of the stop sign by the Honda and the Mustang and their
unsafe speed and that both drivers were responsible. [Another
officer] concluded in a report that the primary cause of the
collision was street racing. The evidence amply supports that
[defendant’s] actions were a proximate cause of the victims’
death.”9 (Canizalez, supra, at p. 846.)

8     Defendant claims that the trial court found that his car did
not collide with the victims’ car. The court made no such
determination at the evidentiary hearing; it merely stated that
both defendant and Canizalez were “equally responsible for the
tragic consequences that took place regardless of . . . whose
vehicle hit the victim[s’] vehicle.”

9     Defendant argues that our opinion in Canizalez, supra,
197 Cal.App.4th 832, “IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THIS
APPEAL[,]” but offers no cogent reason as to why our prior
conclusions about proximate causation do not apply equally here.

                                 14
       Defendant argues that our Supreme Court’s recent opinion
in Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981 undermines our reasoning in
Canizalez, since it establishes that “acts [which] merely create a
dangerous situation in which death is possible depending on how
circumstances unfold do not, without more, satisfy th[e] causation
requirement” of implied malice murder. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 989.)
       Reyes is readily distinguishable. The Reyes Court found
that there was insufficient evidence of causation when the
defendant’s only acts were to bike into a rival gang’s territory
and, with other gang members, chase after the victim’s car.
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.) The Reyes Court found it
significant that “[t]here was no evidence that [the defendant’s]
acts precipitated or provoked the shooting” that caused the
victim’s death, and determined that “there is no reason to believe
that the killing of [the victim] would not have occurred if [the
defendant] had not accompanied his fellow gang members on the
ride or participated in the chase.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the Reyes
Court concluded that “any causal link between [the defendant’s]
conduct and [the victim’s] death is tenuous at best.” (Ibid.)
       In stark contrast, there is an obvious and direct link
between defendant’s actions and the deaths of Groce and her
children. There is ample evidence that the street race he both
participated in and encouraged caused the crash that killed the
victims; Captain Faulkner opined as much in his accident report.
And if defendant had not participated in the race and, by his
participation, encouraged Canizalez to continue racing, the crash
would not have occurred, and the victims would still be alive.
Accordingly, the record amply supports the trial court’s finding
that defendant proximately caused the victims’ deaths.

                               15
             3.    Disregard for human life
       Lastly, defendant argues that the record does not
sufficiently prove that he “personally harbored a conscious
disregard to human life[;]” instead, Captain Faulkner’s testimony
and report show that defendant “committed an act that negates
implied malice” by “slamm[ing] [the] brakes,” slowing down, and
“turn[ing] the wheel to avoid hitting the Altima.” Defendant
avers that he “personally reduced the ‘probability that death
would result’ from the [race] by avoiding the Altima.”
       This argument is flawed for several reasons. For one,
defendant cites no legal authority for the proposition that taking
one potentially protective action (amidst many other reckless
ones evincing wanton disregard for human life) has the power to
“negate” the presence of implied malice. (See People v. Stanley
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [“‘[E]very brief should contain a legal
argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none
is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]’
[Citations.]”.)
       Leaving that aside, defendant’s argument fails on the
merits. Under our substantial evidence standard of review, “‘we
cannot reverse [the trial court’s] order if there is substantial
evidence or a reasonable inference to be drawn from it which
supports the order. Where two conflicting inferences may be
drawn from the evidence it is our duty to adopt the one
supporting the challenged order.’” (People v. Harvey (1984)
151 Cal.App.3d 660, 667.)
       The evidence that defendant relies on to show his lack of
malice—slamming on the brakes before the collision, decelerating
speed at the moment of impact, and swerving away from the

                               16
Altima—could equally give rise to an inference supporting the
existence of implied malice. Given Captain Faulkner’s testimony
that defendant and Canizalez’s cars hit each other at some point,
the trial court could reasonably have inferred that defendant hit
the brakes, slowed down, and turned his wheel in an attempt to
regain control of his car after hitting (or being hit by) Canizalez.
From this perspective, defendant’s actions would not evince
concern for others, but for himself. Since this inference supports
the trial court’s order, we must adopt it and disregard
defendant’s contrary interpretation of the evidence.
       And we cannot overlook that this inference is lent even
greater credence by the record of defendant’s actions immediately
following the collision. He made no attempt to help the victims of
the crash but thought only of himself, working to conceal
evidence of his involvement while abandoning Groce and her
children to burn to death. From this, the trial court was more
than justified in concluding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
defendant acted with the very hallmark of implied malice: an
“abandoned and malignant heart.” (§ 188; see also Palomar,
supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 978.)

                                17
                          DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                _____________________, Acting P. J.
                                ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

________________________, J.*
KWAN

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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