Court Opinion

ID: 9615121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:31:26.57453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:41.789550
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent because the numerous burden shifting charges left the jury without appropriate guidance in deciding this case.
In Division 2 (b) the majority acknowledges that the trial court’s charge on the .burden of proof for seven felony counts is error, but harmless. However, there is no way for this Court to know whether the jury followed the few correct charges or the court’s erroneous *710charges that the jury was authorized to acquit if it “should find that the defendant did not commit [the seven charged felony offenses] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Additionally, in Division 2 (f) the majority acknowledges a Sandstrom violation, which, like the other seven erroneous charges, also shifts the burden of proof on the material element of intent.37 Without being a mind reader, I see no logical or legal way to conclude that these egregious errors on the fundamental element of the state’s burden of proof are harmless, and, therefore, I would reverse.
Decided November 24, 1997.
Jonathan D. Gaul, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, District Attorney, Carl P Greenberg, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Allison B. Goldberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Another concern in this case is the mere fact of 11 errors of a substantial nature. The fact that the record in this case is so rife with errors reinforces the plea made in Massey v. State38 against the use of magistrates to conduct complex felony cases.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham joins in this dissent.

 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 513 (99 SC 2450, 61 LE2d 39) (1979).

 265 Ga. 632 (458 SE2d 818) (1995) (Fletcher, J., concurring specially).