Court Opinion

ID: 2963586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:12:27.775656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:43.351267
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1031

                             LOCAL 285, SERVICE EMPLOYEES
                            INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                         NONOTUCK RESOURCE ASSOCIATES, INC.,

                                Defendant - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                _____________________

               David  B. Rome,  with whom  Lois  Johnson, Angoff,  Goldman,
               ______________              _____________  _________________
          Manning, Pyle, Wanger & Hiatt, P.C., were on brief for appellant.
          ___________________________________
               Albert R. Mason for appellee.
               _______________

                                 ____________________

                                   August 31, 1995
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.   Local 285, Service  Employees
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
                               ___________

          International  Union,  AFL-CIO,  CLC  ("the  Union"),   submitted

          grievances for  two discharged  employees, Justin  Onanibaku (the

          "Onanibaku grievance") and Mildred Singh (the "Singh grievance"),

          pursuant to the grievance/arbitration procedure contained  in its

          collective   bargaining   agreement    with   Nonotuck   Resource

          Associates,  Inc. ("the Company").   The Union  alleged that both

          employees  were discharged  without "just  cause."   The  Company

          refused  to  submit  to  arbitration,  maintaining  that  neither

          grievance   was  arbitrable   under  the   collective  bargaining

          agreement.  The Union then filed the instant action in the United

          States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, pursuant

          to    301 of the Labor Management Relations  Act, 29 U.S.C.   185

          (1982), to compel the Company to arbitrate both grievances.  Upon

          cross-motions for  summary judgment,  the district court  ordered

          the  Company to  arbitrate  the  grievances,  and  rejected  both

          party's  motions for  attorneys'  fees.   The  Union appeals  the

          denial  of its  request  for  attorneys' fees.1    We affirm  the

          denial of attorneys' fees with  respect to one of the grievances,

          reverse the denial  of attorneys' fees with respect  to the other

          grievance,  and remand  the case  to the  district court  for the

          calculation of fees.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                              
          ____________________

          1  The Company does not appeal the district court's decision that
          the grievances are arbitrable.

                                         -2-

                    In deciding not to award the Union its attorneys' fees,

          the district  court reasoned  that "even  though [the  Company's]

          contentions fell short -- a good faith dispute existed as  to the

          proper  venue for  this case."   We  review the  district court's

          decision  only for  "abuse  of  discretion."    Crafts  Precision
                                                          _________________

          Indus., Inc. v.  Lodge No. 1836, Int'l Assoc.  of Machinists, 889
          ____________     ___________________________________________

          F.2d 1184, 1186 (1st Cir. 1989).

                    A.   The Proper Standard
                    A.   The Proper Standard
                         ___________________

                    As  an  initial  matter,  the  Union  argues  that  the

          district court analyzed the question  of attorneys' fees under an

          improper standard.  The Union argues that the court's  use of the

          phrase "good faith dispute" indicates that it improperly required

          the Union  to show  bad faith  on the  part of  the Company  as a

          prerequisite to a fee award.  The Union maintains that, under the

          proper standard,  all it  needed to show  was that  the Company's

          refusal  to  arbitrate  was objectively  "without  justification"

          under  the terms  of  the  collective  bargaining  agreement  and

          controlling law, and that the Company's subjective good faith  is

          therefore irrelevant.   The  Company, on  the other  hand, argues

          that the district court correctly applied a bad faith test.

                    Under  the   so-called  "American   Rule,"  absent   an

          authorizing   statute   or  contractual   commitment,   litigants

          generally  bear  their  own  costs.    Aleyska  Pipeline  Co.  v.
                                                 ______________________

          Wilderness  Soc'y,  421  U.S.  240,  257  (1974).    One  of  the
          _________________

          exceptions to  this rule, however, is that  a court may award the

          prevailing party  its attorney's fees  if it determines  that the

                                         -3-

          losing  party  has  "acted  in bad  faith,  vexatiously,  or  for

          oppressive reasons . . . ."  Id. at 258-59 (quoting F.D. Rich Co.
                                       __                     _____________

          v. United States  ex rel. Indus.  Lumber Co., 417  U.S. 116,  129
             _____________  __________________________

          (1974)).   See also  Cote v. James  River Corp., 761  F.2d 60, 61
                     ________  ____    __________________

          (1st Cir. 1985).   "[T]he term 'vexatious' means  that the losing

          party's  actions  were   'frivolous,  unreasonable,  or   without

          foundation,  even though not  brought in subjective  bad faith.'"

          Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. Service  Employees Int'l Union, 746 F.2d
          _____________________    ______________________________

          1503, 1510 (D.C.  Cir. 1984) (quoting Christiansburg  Garment Co.
                                                ___________________________

          v. EEOC, 434  U.S. 412, 421 (1978)).  See  also Crafts Precision,
             ____                               _________ ________________

          889 F.2d at 1186.

                    It  is clear, therefore, that contrary to the Company's

          assertions, subjective bad  faith is not a prerequisite  to a fee

          award.  Moreover, contrary  to the Union's suggestions, we  think

          that  the district  court's citation  to  Courier-Citizen Co.  v.
                                                    ___________________

          Boston Electrotypers  Union No. 11,  702 F.2d 273, 282  (1st Cir.
          __________________________________

          1983), which  recites a  "without justification"  test, indicates

          that the court  understood the proper  standard, and merely  used

          the term "good faith dispute"  to refer to what it considered  an

          objectively  and  subjectively  reasonable  dispute  between  the

          parties  over  the interpretation  of  the collective  bargaining

          agreement and controlling law.   We therefore reject the  Union's

          argument that  the district court applied an improper standard of

          review.

                    B.   The Two Grievances
                    B.   The Two Grievances
                         __________________

                                         -4-

                    The Company  refused to  arbitrate either grievance  on

          the grounds that they were not  arbitrable under the terms of the

          collective-bargaining  agreement.    The question  on  appeal  is

          whether either or both of  the grievances were so clearly subject

          to arbitration  under  the collective  bargaining  agreement  and

          controlling law  that we can  say that the district  court abused

          its discretion in concluding that the Company's refusal to submit

          to  arbitration  was  not  frivolous,  unreasonable,  or  without

          justification.

                    We begin  by recognizing the  general rule that  when a

          collective bargaining  agreement contains an  arbitration clause,

          such as the one in this case, "a presumption of arbitrability [is

          created]  in  the  sense  that  '[a]n  order   to  arbitrate  the

          particular grievance should  not be denied unless it  may be said

          with  positive assurance  that  the  arbitration  clause  is  not

          susceptible  of  an  interpretation   that  covers  the  asserted

          dispute.  Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.'"  AT &
                                                                       ____

          T Technologies,  Inc. v. Communications Workers of  Am., 475 U.S.
          _____________________    ______________________________

          643,  650  (1986)   (quoting  Steelworkers  v.  Warrior   &  Gulf
                                        ____________      _________________

          Navigation Co., 363 U.S.  574, 582-83 (1960)).  It  is also true,
          ______________

          however, that  "arbitration is a  matter of contract and  a party

          cannot be required to submit  to arbitration any dispute which he

          has  not agreed  so to submit."   Id.  at 648 (quoting  Warrior &
                                            __                    _________

          Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582).
          ____

                      1.  The Onanibaku Grievance
                      1.  The Onanibaku Grievance
                          _______________________

                                         -5-

                    The  Company   argued  on  summary  judgment  that  the

          Onanibaku  grievance was  not  arbitrable  under the  collective-

          bargaining   agreement   because  Onanibaku   alleged   that  his

          discipline  was discriminatorily  motivated.   Article  5 of  the

          collective  bargaining  agreement  provides  that  "[n]o  dispute

          regarding alleged discrimination shall be subject to grievance or

          arbitration  unless no remedy  therefore is provided  by State or

          federal law."   The Union argues that the  Company's position was

          without justification because the terms of the grievance filed by

          the  Union on  behalf of  Onanibaku  alleged merely  that he  was

          discharged without just cause; it did not mention discrimination.

          The   Union  points  out   that,  as  the   certified  bargaining

          representative,  the labor organization, not the employee, is the

          master of the grievance.  See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
                                    ___ ____________________    ______

          U.S. 650, 653  (1965) (union has no duty  to pursue unmeritorious

          grievances); Miller v. United States Postal Serv., 985 F.2d 9, 12
                       ______    __________________________

          (1st Cir.  1993).  The  Union also points  out that it  wrote the

          Company a letter  specifically stating that  it was not  alleging

          discrimination.

                    We think the district court acted within its discretion

          in concluding that  the Company's defense to the arbitrability of

          the  Onanibaku grievance was  not so frivolous,  unreasonable, or

          without  justification as  to  warrant  imposition of  attorneys'

          fees.  The fact is that Onanibaku alleged, prior to the filing of

          the   grievance,  that   his   discipline  was   discriminatorily

          motivated.   Moreover, he filed  a charge with  the Massachusetts

                                         -6-

          Commission  Against   Discrimination,  and  filed   civil  rights

          complaints  with  the  Northampton   Police,  alleging  that  the

          disciplinary action was discriminatorily  motivated.  Under these

          circumstances, we do not find  it so unreasonable for the Company

          to assert the position that a claim  of discrimination was at the

          heart  of  the Onanibaku  grievance, and  that the  grievance was

          therefore  not arbitrable.   This  was  an issue  of "substantive

          arbitrability," thesignificance ofwhich weshall presentlydiscuss.

                      2.  The Singh Grievance
                      2.  The Singh Grievance
                          ___________________

                    The Company refused to arbitrate the Singh grievance on

          the  grounds  that  it  was  not filed  within  the  time  limits

          established in Article 20 of the collective bargaining agreement.

          Article 20 provides  that any grievance must be  presented to the

          employee's appropriate  supervisor "no  later  than fifteen  (15)

          calendar  days  following  the  date  of  the  grievance  or  the

          Employee's  knowledge  of  its  occurrence."    Article  20  also

          provides:  "The  time   limits  provided  in  this   article  are

          conditions  precedent for the filing and processing of grievances

          under  this Article."   The  district court  held that  the Singh

          grievance   was   arbitrable,   reasoning   that   "because    an

          'untimeliness'  defense   is  a   classic   case  of   procedural
                                            _______

          arbitrability  that should  be decided  by  the arbitrator,  [the

          Company's] contention  to the contrary will  prove unsuccessful."

          (emphasis added).   Again, the court declined to  award the Union

          its attorneys'  fees.   Our discussion of  this issue  must begin

          with the  distinction  between  "substantive  arbitrability"  and

                                         -7-

          "procedural arbitrability."   Substantive arbitrability refers to

          whether a dispute involves a subject matter that the parties have

          contractually agreed to submit to arbitration.  See International
                                                          ___ _____________

          Bhd. of Elec.  Workers, Local 1228, AFL-CIO v.  WNEV-TV, New Eng.
          ___________________________________________     _________________

          Television Corp., 778 F.2d 46, 49 (1st  Cir. 1985).  For example,
          ________________

          the   Onanibaku  grievance   raised   a  matter   of  substantive

          arbitrability   --  the  parties  to  the  collective  bargaining

          agreement  specifically   agreed  not  to   arbitrate  grievances

          alleging discrimination.   Thus,  the question  for the  district

          court was whether the Onanibaku grievance alleged discrimination.

          Procedural arbitrability, on the other hand, concerns such issues

          as to "whether grievance procedures or some part of them apply to

          a  particular dispute, whether such procedures have been followed

          or  excused, or  whether  the unexcused  failure  to follow  them

          avoids the duty  to arbitrate."  John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,
                                           _________________    __________

          376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964).  See also Beer Sales Drivers, Local 744
                                     ________ _____________________________

          v. Metropolitan Distribs.,  Inc., 763 F.2d 300,  302-03 (7th Cir.
             _____________________________

          1985).  In John Wiley,  the Supreme Court established that issues
                     __________

          of substantive  arbitrability are  for the  court to  decide, and

          issues  of procedural  arbitrability are  for  the arbitrator  to

          decide.  "Once it is determined [by a court] that the parties are

          obligated  to  submit  the  subject   matter  of  a  dispute   to

          arbitration, 'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute

          and  bear  on  its  final  disposition  should  be  left  to  the

          arbitrator."  376 U.S. at 557.

                                         -8-

                    Thirty years of Supreme Court and federal circuit court

          precedent have established that  issues concerning the timeliness

          of a  filed grievance  are "classic"  procedural questions to  be

          decided  by an arbitrator, a description appropriately adopted by

          the district court.  See  supra p.7.  Unfortunately, the district
                               ___  _____

          court  failed  to   properly  apply  the  consequences   of  this

          description.  Because  the law  is clear on  this issue, and  has

          been  for some  time, the  Company was  without justification  in

          refusing  to arbitrate  the Singh grievance,  and in  forcing the

          Union  to litigate its  arbitrability in federal  district court.

          We  conclude that  the  district court  abused its  discretion in

          holding to the contrary.

                    The Company argues that the timeliness requirement  was

          a  bargained-for   "condition  precedent"   to  arbitration   and

          therefore that it  is for the court to decide whether the parties

          intended to arbitrate  this particular grievance.  In  support of

          this  argument, the Company  notes the Supreme  Court's statement

          that  "[i]n  the absence  of  any express  provision  excluding a

          particular  grievance  from arbitration,  .  .  . only  the  most

          forceful  evidence  of  a  purpose  to  exclude  the  claim  from

          arbitration can prevail."   AT & T Technologies, 475  U.S. at 650
                                      ___________________

          (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 584-85).  The Company argues
                   ______________

          that  this  is  a  case  of  an  express  provision  excluding  a

          particular  grievance from  arbitration,  and  maintains that  to

          conclude otherwise is  to deprive the Company of  the benefits of

          its bargain.

                                         -9-

                    The  Company's position  misapprehends the  distinction

          between substantive and procedural arbitrability.  In John Wiley,
                                                                __________

          the employer maintained that it had no duty to arbitrate because:

          (1)  the collective  bargaining agreement  set  out a  three-step

          grievance  procedure, and  the  first  two  steps  had  not  been

          followed, 376 U.S. at 555-56;  and (2) the union allegedly failed

          to  comply with the following provision of the agreement: "Notice

          of  any grievance must  be filed with  the Employer  and with the

          Union Shop Steward within four  (4) weeks after its occurrence or

          latest  existence.   The  failure  by either  party  to file  the

          grievance  within this time limitation shall  be construed and be

          deemed to be an abandonment of the  grievance."  Id. at 556 n.11.
                                                           __

          As noted,  the Court  held that  once it  is determined  that the

          parties are  obligated to  arbitrate the  subject  matter of  the

          dispute, then any procedural questions growing out of the dispute

          and  bearing on  its  final  disposition should  be  left to  the

          arbitrator.  Id. at 557.
                       __

                    The John Wiley Court reasoned that, because the role of
                        __________

          a reviewing court is only to determine whether the subject matter

          of the dispute is arbitrable under the agreement, and not to rule

          on the merits  of the dispute,  and because procedural  questions

          are often inextricably  bound up with the merits  of the dispute,

          procedural  questions should be  decided by the  arbitrator along

          with the merits.  See id. at 557.
                            ___ __

                    There is no  principled distinction between the  timing

          issue deemed  procedural in  John Wiley and  the timing  issue in
                                       __________

                                         -10-

          this case.   Both are "conditions precedent"  to arbitration; but

          the  fact that something is a  condition precedent to arbitration

          does not  make  it  any less  a  "'procedural'  question[]  which

          grow[s] out of the dispute and bear[s] on its final disposition .

          . . ."  The dispute in this case concerns whether Singh was fired

          without just cause --  a cause of  action clearly covered by  the

          arbitration clause  contained in  the agreement.   The  Company's

          timeliness defense is merely a procedural question arising out of

          that dispute.

                    Supreme Court and circuit  court cases demonstrate that

          this  rule  is  clear  and  well-established.    For example,  in

          International  Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Flair Builders, Inc.,
          ________________________________________    ____________________

          406 U.S. 487  (1972), the Supreme Court held that  once the court

          determines that the subject matter of a dispute is covered by the

          collective  bargaining  agreement, then  a  claim by  one  of the

          parties  that the particular grievance is barred by the equitable

          defense of  laches is  a question for  the arbitrator  to decide.

          Id. at 491-92.   Similarly, in Trailways v.  Amalgamated Ass'n of
          __                             _________     ____________________

          Street,  Elec. Ry.  & Motor  Coach Employees,  343 F.2d  815 (1st
          ____________________________________________

          Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 879 (1965), this court rejected the
                 ____________

          employer's  argument  that  the  union  failed  to  file  certain

          grievances within the  time conditions imposed by  the collective

          bargaining agreement.   We cited  John Wiley for  the proposition
                                            __________

          that: "The company's contention that the union failed to file the

          grievances  relating to  discharge of  the  employees within  the

          requisite  time limits,  is without  merit.   It  can raise  that

                                         -11-

          defense before the arbitrator but not before this court."  Id. at
                                                                     ___

          818.   See also Bechtel  Constr., Inc. v. Laborers'  Int'l Union,
                 ________ ______________________    ______________________

          812 F.2d 750, 753 (1st Cir. 1987) (failure to submit grievance to

          committee, as required by step grievance procedure, is "a classic

          question of  'procedural  arbitrability' for  the  arbitrator  to

          decide").

                    The  employer in Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local
                                     ______________________________________

          Union 765 v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 625 F.2d  1092 (3d Cir. 1980),
          _________    ____________________

          made  an argument almost identical to that of the Company in this

          case.   The employer argued  that a grievance was  not arbitrable

          because the submission  to the  American Arbitration  Association

          was untimely, and maintained "that the court, not the arbitrator,

          must make the determination that all preconditions to arbitration
                                               ____________________________

          have been met."   Id. at 1093 (emphasis added).  The court easily
                            __

          rejected this argument:

                      [T]he  significance   of  a   default  in
                      literal  compliance  with  a  contractual
                      procedural   requirement   calls   for  a
                      determination  of  the intention  of  the
                      parties  to   the  contract.     Such   a
                      determination  is  no different  in  kind
                      from   a  dispute   over  a   substantive
                      contract  provision.     Both   types  of
                      determinations are,  under the  governing
                      case law, matters for the arbitrator.

          Id.
          __

                    A plethora of circuit court cases have interpreted John
                                                                       ____

          Wiley in the  same or  similar fashion.   See, e.g., Denhardt  v.
          _____                                     ___  ____  ________

          Trailways, Inc., 767  F.2d 687, 689 (10th Cir.  1985) (dispute as
          _______________

          to employer's compliance with time limit for conducting a hearing

          is a procedural matter for arbitrator); Beer Sales Drivers, Local
                                                  _________________________

                                         -12-

          744 v.  Metropolitan Distribs., Inc.,  763 F.2d 300,  302-03 (7th
          ___     ____________________________

          Cir.  1985) (union's  alleged  failure  to  submit  its  members'

          grievances  within time limitation  specified in agreement  is an

          issue of procedural arbitrability for arbitrator); Nursing Home &
                                                             ______________

          Hosp. Union 434 v. Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094, 1097 (3d
          _______________    _____________________

          Cir.  1985)  ("the  law  is  clear  that  matters  of  procedural

          arbitrability,  such as  time  limits,  are to  be  left for  the

          arbitrator");   Automotive, Petroleum  & Allied Indus.  Employees
                          _________________________________________________

          Union, Local 618 v. Town & Country  Ford, Inc., 709 F.2d 509 (8th
          ________________    __________________________

          Cir. 1983) (whether grievance was  barred from arbitration due to

          union's  alleged failure to  submit complaint to  employer within

          five days from notice of  discharge, as required by agreement, is

          question of procedural arbitrability for arbitrator); Hospital  &
                                                                ___________

          Inst. Workers Union Local 250 v. Marshal Hale Memorial Hosp., 647
          _____________________________    ___________________________

          F.2d 38, 40-41 (9th Cir. 1981) (alleged noncompliance with timing

          requirements of a  multiple step procedure is a  question for the

          arbitrator); United Rubber,  Cork, Linoleum & Plastic  Workers v.
                       _________________________________________________

          Interco, Inc.,  415 F.2d 1208, 1210 (8th  Cir. 1969) (arbitration
          _____________

          ordered despite  union's failure  to file  arbitration within  90

          days).  The Company has directed us to no cases to the contrary.

                    In  Washington  Hospital  Center,  supra, the  employer
                        ____________________________   _____

          argued that  a  grievance was  not arbitrable  because the  union

          failed  to follow the  timing requirements of  the step-grievance

          process.   Relying on John  Wiley, the  Court of Appeals  for the
                                ___________

          District  of Columbia found  that the employer's  position on the

          grievance was "sufficiently frivolous and unreasonable to warrant

                                         -13-

          a  fee award."   Washington Hosp. Ctr.,  746 F.2d at  1510.2  The
                           _____________________

          court reasoned  that the  employer's position  was frivolous  and

          unreasonable since  it made  no attempt  to distinguish its  case

          from the facts  of John Wiley, and relied solely on an inapposite
                             __________

          case from another circuit.  Id. at 1510-11.
                                      __

                    The Union in this case  relied heavily on John Wiley in
                                                              __________

          its memorandum  in support  of its motion  for summary  judgment.

          Nevertheless, the  Company made  no attempt  to distinguish  John
                                                                       ____

          Wiley  in its  responsive memorandum.   Indeed,  it did  not even
          _____

          mention   the  case.    Instead,  it  relied  almost  exclusively

          (although cursorily)  on a case  from the Massachusetts  Court of

          Appeals decided under  state, not federal law.   The Company does

          little  better  on  appeal,  citing  two  pre-John  Wiley  cases,
                                                        ___________

          including one  from this circuit, for the proposition that: "This

          court has held  that it is for  'the courts to  determine whether

                              
          ____________________

          2  The  court noted that John  Wiley created a clear  and certain
                                   ___________
          rule with regard to procedural  arbitrability.  We agree with its
          comment that:

                      The benefits  of the rule's  certainty --
                      that  all   disputes  as   to  procedural
                            ___
                      arbitrability are  for the  arbitrator --
                      outweigh any countervailing  factors.  As
                      the  Supreme  Court  said in  Wiley,  any
                                                    _____
                      other rule would engender  delay with the
                      potential  to  'entirely   eliminate  the
                      prospect   of    a   speedy    arbitrated
                      settlement   of  the   dispute,  to   the
                      disadvantage of  the parties  .  . .  and
                      contrary  to the  aims of  national labor
                      policy.'"

          Id. at 1512 (quoting John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 558).
          __                   __________

                                         -14-

          procedural   conditions  to  arbitrate  have  been  met.'"3    As
          _______________________

          demonstrated above,  it is clear  that this  proposition did  not

          survive John Wiley.  Moreover, in its sole attempt to distinguish
                  __________

          John Wiley, the  Company compares the time bar  provisions of its
          __________

          collective-bargaining agreement with a wholly immaterial contract

          provision from John  Wiley.4  Finally,  the Company has  directed
                         ___________

          this court to  no federal circuit or district  court precedent to

          support its position.
                              
          ____________________

          3  The two cases cited are Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance
                                     _________________________    _________
          Agents Int'l  Union, 258  F.2d 516  (1st Cir.  1958) and  Brass &
          ___________________                                       _______
          Copper Workers Fed. Labor Union  No. 19322 v. American Brass Co.,
          __________________________________________    __________________
          272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363  U.S. 845 (1960).
                                        _____ ______
          The  Company also  indicates that  one  of these  cases --  it is
          somewhat unclear which -- is "quoting from" John Wiley.  This is,
                                                      __________
          of course,  a rather  dubious proposition  considering that  both
          cases were decided  before John Wiley.  We will  give the Company
                                     __________
          the benefit of the doubt that it  intended to say "cited in" John
                                                                       ____
          Wiley, as  both cases are  cited therein as examples  of circuits
          _____
          that have held that  it is for the court  to determine procedural
          questions,  John  Wiley,  376 U.S.  at  556  n.12, a  proposition
                      ___________
          rejected by John Wiley and its progeny.  Supra.
                      __________                   _____

          4  The Company's brief states:

                      "Compared with  the defendant's  contract
                      language which  plainly states  'The time
                      limits  provided  in   this  Article  are
                      conditions precedent  for the  filing and
                      _________________________________________
                      processing  of   grievances  under   this
                      _________________________________________
                      Article
                      _______
                      .  .  .,  we  submit  that  there  is  no
                      comparison or similarity  to Wiley, who's
                                                   _____
                      [sic] contract language  simply holds 'No
                      dispute alleging discrimination  shall be
                      subject  to   grievance  or   arbitration
                      unless no remedy therefore is provided  .
                      . .'"  (emphasis in original).

             In fact, the actual time bar  at issue in John Wiley was  very
                                                       __________
          similar to that  in this case.   It stated that: "The  failure of
          either party to  file the grievance  within this time  limitation
          shall  be construed  and be  deemed to  be an abandonment  of the
          grievance."  373 U.S. at 556 n.11.

                                         -15-

                    Under these  extraordinary circumstances, we  think the

          Company's position  regarding the  Singh grievance  has been  and

          continues to be frivolous,  unreasonable, and without foundation.

          We conclude  that  the district  court abused  its discretion  in

          deciding to  the contrary.5   Accordingly, we remand the  case to

          the district court to assess and impose attorneys' fees and costs

          upon   the  Company  for  its  refusal  to  arbitrate  the  Singh

          grievance.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    For  the reasons  stated herein,  the  decision of  the

          district court is affirmed in part and reversed in  part, and the
                            ________________     _________________

          case is remanded  to the district  court for further  proceedings
                  ________

          consistent with this opinion.

                              
          ____________________

          5  In making this determination, we find some significance in the
          fact  that the district court offered  virtually no rationale for
          its decision not to award attorneys' fees on the Singh grievance,
          despite  its recognition  that "an  'untimeliness'  defense is  a
          classic case of  procedural arbitrability that should  be decided
          by the arbitrator . . . ."

                                         -16-