Court Opinion

ID: 9957642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 19:00:50.751419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:31.861342
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 24a0153n.06

                                       Case No. 23-3265

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                  FILED
                                                                                   Apr 04, 2024
                                                    )                      KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                    )
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                         )
                                                               ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                    )
 v.                                                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                    )
                                                               COURT     FOR      THE
                                                    )
 WILLIAM SIDNEY HITCHINGS, V,                                  SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
                                                    )
                                                               OHIO
        Defendant-Appellant.                        )
                                                                              OPINION
                                                    )

Before: GRIFFIN, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

       MATHIS, Circuit Judge.         William Hitchings pleaded guilty to receipt of child

pornography. He now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements he

made during a February 2021 interrogation by law enforcement officers. Hitchings argues that the

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officers violated his Fifth

Amendment rights during the interrogation. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

                                               I.

       Law enforcement obtained a warrant to search Hitchings’s home after suspecting him of

sending and receiving child pornography. In February 2021, the FBI, with the help of local police

in Troy and Dayton, Ohio, executed the warrant during the early morning hours. Officers observed

Hitchings leave through his home’s back door as they approached, and they apprehended him as

he attempted to flee from the house. The officers handcuffed Hitchings, who was not wearing

shoes, and placed him in the back seat of an unmarked police vehicle. Task Force Officer Jeffrey
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

Kunkleman of the Troy Police Department (“TPD”) and Special Agent Andrea Kinzig of the FBI

then transported Hitchings to the TPD’s police station to question him.

       Kunkleman and Kinzig escorted the still handcuffed and shoeless Hitchings into an

interview room around 6:27 a.m. The interviewing officers left Hitchings alone in this room with

the door closed. Around 6:32 a.m., the interviewing officers re-entered the room, removed

Hitchings’s handcuffs, and provided him with a bottle of water. Then, they told him he was not

under arrest, that he was free to leave at any time, and that they brought him in just to talk.

       Kinzig established several things during the initial stages of Hitchings’s interview and

before she advised him of his Miranda rights. She asked Hitchings if he was currently under the

influence of any drugs.        Hitchings told her that he had smoked both marijuana and

methamphetamine just before officers arrived at his home that morning. When Kinzig inquired

about his ability to think clearly and understand her questions following his drug use, Hitchings

unequivocally stated that he was “fully cognizant,” he had no trouble understanding what was

going on, and that he was “so here right now it’s not even funny.” Kinzig also established that

Hitchings spoke English, could read and write, and had received a high school diploma with

vocational training in computer networking. Kinzig explained to Hitchings that she typically

advises interviewees of their Miranda rights before she asks any questions. Before she read

Hitchings his Miranda rights, however, he stated that he was not waiving his rights but that he

understood them. Kinzig then read Hitchings his rights. After that, Hitchings signed a form

confirming his understanding of those rights and confirming that he would answer questions

without an attorney present.

                                                  2
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

       After being read his rights, Hitchings answered most, but not all, of the interviewing

officers’ questions. He answered Kinzig’s questions about his upbringing, education, and work

history. He also answered her questions about his past drug addictions and completion of drug

rehabilitation programs. He provided Kinzig with his email addresses and his phone number. Still,

Hitchings would not answer Kinzig’s questions about the email address and phone number he used

to sign into his Facebook account, the password to his computer server, or where officers could

locate the footage from his home’s surveillance cameras.

       Early in the interview, Hitchings oscillated between calmly answering questions and

extreme frustration. For example, he expressed frustration with what he viewed as pointless

questions and inquired what purpose the interviewing officers had behind their inquiries. Still, at

other times, he asked for a moment to compose himself so that he could continue answering the

interviewing officers’ questions. When he made such a request, the interviewing officers allowed

him the time he needed to calm down, encouraged him to drink water, and offered him a snack.

       About an hour into the interview, Kinzig asked Hitchings if he had any idea why she and

Kunkleman wanted to speak with him. Hitchings did, and this conversation ensued:

                      Kinzig:         Okay, well, do, can you share with me what your
                                      thought is?
                      Hitchings:      Certain content, certain data. Is that what it is about?
                      Kinzig:         It is.
                      Hitchings:      Okay, then yeah, it’s me.
                      Kinzig:         What, now what data are we talking about?
                      Hitchings:      Um, illegal content.
                      Kinzig:         And what kind?
                      Hitchings:      Underage and uh, probably bestiality.
                      Kinzig:         Are we talking about pornography?
                      Hitchings:      Uh huh. And that is the only thing that I have, that’s,
                                      that’s it.

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No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

                        Kinzig:       Okay, so when we are talking about underage
                                      pornography, um, what devices are those on?
                                      Because we really don’t want to take all of the
                                      computers in the house.
                        Hitchings:    I understand. It’s um, (bangs head on the table).
                        Kinzig:       Let’s not do that. Let’s not do that William.
                        Kinzig:       Is it on your laptop or your phone or on the server?
                                      Because again, we don’t want to take that server if
                                      we don’t have to.
                        Hitchings:    Lawyer. I have to have a lawyer from this point on.
                                      Don’t I?
                        Kinzig:       It’s up to you.
                        Hitchings:    I want to help you, but it doesn’t matter. I’m already
                                      dead anyway, so it doesn’t fucking matter. I’m not
                                      answering questions anymore until you find me an
                                      attorney. Please find me an attorney.

At this point, Hitchings put his head down on the table in front of him. Kinzig responded by saying

“okay,” put away her pen, and closed the notebook she was using to document the interview.

Seconds later, Hitchings asked the officers if he was supposed to request an attorney, and they

explained that it was his choice. Hitchings then asked for the officers’ “honest[]” opinions on

whether he should request an attorney, and Kunkleman responded that, in his opinion, “it’s always

better to cooperate.”

       A few moments later, Hitchings began punching himself in the head; Kinzig and

Kunkleman then handcuffed him. As they did so, Hitchings and Kunkleman argued about

Hitchings’s behavior.

       Meanwhile, Kinzig finished handcuffing Hitchings, packed up her belongings, and left the

room. Kunkleman did not follow her out of the interview room. Instead, he continued to argue

with Hitchings, pushed the interview table out of Hitchings’s reach, and sat on the table to face

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No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

Hitchings. Kinzig returned after a few seconds and gestured to Kunkleman to exit the room with

her. As she was about to leave the room for a second time, Hitchings said “wait, wait, wait.”

       Kinzig stopped to hear what Hitchings had to say. He apologized to the officers for his

outburst. Hitchings turned to Kinzig and calmly said “Please sit down. I’ll tell you . . . I’ll tell

you whatever you want to know.”

       While still standing in the doorway, Kinzig explained to Hitchings that if they continued

the interview, he would remain handcuffed for his own safety. Hitchings agreed to that condition

multiple times.   Still, Kinzig indicated that she was not comfortable continuing with the

interrogation because Hitchings had requested an attorney; Hitchings nevertheless insisted that he

did not need an attorney. For the next few hours, Hitchings made several inculpatory statements,

including extensive details about his digital child pornography collection. Several hours into the

interview, Kinzig provided Hitchings with a pair of his shoes.

       Kunkleman and Kinzig questioned Hitchings for nearly six hours. Once they concluded

the interview, Hitchings was arrested.

       A federal grand jury indicted Hitchings on several charges. A superseding indictment

eventually charged Hitchings with possessing child pornography, possessing a gun while using

controlled substances, two counts of receiving child pornography, and transporting child

pornography.

       Hitchings moved to suppress his inculpatory statements made to the officers during the

interrogation. He argued that the interviewing officers obtained those statements from him in

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The district court held a hearing on Hitchings’s

suppression motion where Kinzig testified about the interrogation.          The government also

                                                 5
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

introduced, and the district court admitted, the video recording of the interview during the

suppression hearing.

        The district court denied Hitchings’s motion, finding: Hitchings was subject to custodial

interrogation during the interview; Hitchings voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his

Miranda rights; Hitchings made an unequivocal request for counsel, but then he reinitiated the

interview and waived his rights again; and Hitchings made his admissions during the interview

freely, voluntarily, and without improper influence.

        Thereafter, Hitchings pleaded guilty to one count of receiving child pornography pursuant

to a plea agreement which preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to

suppress. After the district court sentenced Hitchings, this appeal timely followed.

                                                  II.

        When considering a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we review

findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th

522, 528 (6th Cir. 2022). “When a district court has denied a motion to suppress,” as the district

court did here, “we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United

States v. Long, 464 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

                                                  III.

        Hitchings contends that he was interrogated in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-

Incrimination Clause. This clause provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. To make this right meaningful, the

Supreme Court has held that, prior to a custodial interrogation, law enforcement officials must

inform the individual to be interrogated that: (1) he has the right to remain silent; (2) his statements

may be used against him in court; (3) he has a right to an attorney during questioning; and (4) if

                                                   6
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 479 (1966). “Statements made by a defendant in response to interrogation while in

police custody are not admissible unless the defendant has first been apprised of the constitutional

right against self-incrimination and has validly waived this right.” United States v. Cole, 315 F.3d

633, 636 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79). The government bears the burden

of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant has made a knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).

                                                          A.

         We first consider whether Hitchings was in custody when Kinzig and Kunkleman

interrogated him.1 An accused must be “in custody” before officers are required to provide

Miranda warnings and thereafter interrogate the accused. United States v. Levenderis, 806 F.3d

390, 400 (6th Cir. 2015). Courts “must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the

interrogation” to determine whether “an individual was in custody.” Stansbury v. California, 511

U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam). This determination “depends on the objective circumstances

of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the

person being questioned.” Id. at 323. “The ultimate inquiry is whether, under the totality of the

circumstances, the interviewee’s freedom of movement was restrained to a degree associated with

formal arrest.” United States v. Luck, 852 F.3d 615, 621 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v.

Panak, 552 F.3d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2009)).                     We generally consider the following four,

1
  The district court found that Hitchings was in custody during the entire interview, yet both parties contend on appeal
that Hitchings was not in custody during the initial portion of the interrogation before he was handcuffed. Whether a
person was “in custody” during an interrogation is a “mixed question of law and fact” that we review de novo. United
States v. Zabel, 35 F.4th 493, 501–02 (6th Cir. 2022). The parties do not truly dispute the facts, most of which are
captured on video. And “[w]e are not bound to accept what in effect was a stipulation on a question of law.” United
States v. Wilson, 978 F.3d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). Therefore, we analyze whether Hitchings
was in custody for the entirety of the interrogation.

                                                           7
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

nonexhaustive factors when making the in-custody determination: “(1) the location of the

interview; (2) the length and manner of the questioning; (3) whether there was any restraint on the

individual’s freedom of movement; and (4) whether the individual was told he or she did not need

to answer the questions.” Levenderis, 806 F.3d at 400 (quoting United States v. Hinojosa, 606

F.3d 875, 883 (6th Cir. 2010)). Considering these factors, we agree with the district court that

Hitchings was in custody for the entire period of the interrogation.

       Location of the interview. Kinzig and Kunkleman interrogated Hitchings at the police

station after transporting him there in the back of a police car in handcuffs.

       Length and manner of questioning. The interview lasted approximately six hours. And

the questioning resembled a custodial interrogation in almost all respects. Kinzig and Kunkleman

read Hitchings his Miranda rights at the beginning of the interview and had Hitchings sign a form

indicating that he understood and waived those rights. The officers spent most of the interview

time questioning Hitchings about subjects related to their child pornography investigation that led

to the execution of a search warrant at his residence earlier that day.

       Restraint on freedom of movement. This factor is tricky under the circumstances in this

case. But it generally leans in favor of the district court’s finding that Hitchings was in custody

for the entirety of the interrogation. As mentioned above, when the officers executed the search

warrant at Hitchings’s residence, they handcuffed him, transported him to the police station, and

placed him in an interview room. A few minutes after Hitchings was placed in the interview room,

Kinzig and Kunkleman entered and removed the handcuffs. The door to the interview room

remained closed during the interrogation. That said, at the beginning of the interview, the officers

advised Hitchings that he was free to leave at any time. But Hitchings did not have his shoes on

during his transport to the police station, nor was he wearing shoes when his interview began.

                                                  8
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

In fact, Kinzig did not return with his shoes until approximately four hours into the interview. It

is hard to imagine that someone in Hitchings’s position would feel free to leave under those

circumstances.    Additionally, approximately one hour into the interrogation, Kunkleman

handcuffed Hitchings after he had an emotional outburst.

       Whether Hitchings was told he did not have to answer questions. Kinzig and Kunkleman

told Hitchings that he did not have to answer questions, so this factor weighs in favor of Hitchings

not being in custody. But as we have explained previously, “the existence of such advice is one

factor among many.” Panak, 552 F.3d at 467. What is more, “[i]t would be strange, indeed, to

say that a telltale sign of whether an individual must be Mirandized is whether the officer gave the

individual one of the Miranda warnings—that []he need not answer questions.” Id.

                                          *      *       *

       The first three factors weigh in favor of Hitchings being in custody, while the last one does

not. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances reveals that Hitchings was in custody throughout

the interrogation by Kinzig and Kunkleman.

                                                B.

       We next consider whether Hitchings waived his Miranda rights during the interrogation.

A valid Miranda waiver requires an individual to waive his right against self-incrimination

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 260–61 (6th Cir.

2009). Two “dimensions” guide our inquiry into “whether a defendant freely and knowingly chose

to talk with police despite Miranda protections”—“voluntariness and comprehension.” United

States v. Abdalla, 972 F.3d 838, 852 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Garner, 557 F.3d at 263).

Voluntariness requires “a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or

deception.” United States v. Lawrence, 735 F.3d 385, 437 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moran v.

                                                 9
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). Comprehension requires an accused’s “full awareness of both

the nature of the right” he chooses to abandon and “the consequences of” his “decision to abandon

it.” Id. (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421). Put differently, “[t]he question is not whether

[Hitchings] knew and understood every possible consequence of a waiver, but rather whether he

knew that he could choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel present,

or to discontinue talking at any time.” Id. (quoting Garner, 557 F.3d at 261). An individual validly

waives his Miranda rights when “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation”

reveals he voluntarily chose to do so while comprehending the nature of that choice. Moran, 475

U.S. at 421 (quotation omitted); Garner, 557 F.3d at 260–61.

       The district court concluded that Hitchings voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently

waived his Miranda rights. The evidence showed that officers began interviewing Hitchings

approximately 30 minutes after they apprehended him. Before questioning him, Kinzig and

Kunkleman removed Hitchings’s handcuffs and gave him a bottle of water. Both officers were

wearing plain clothes and did not brandish their guns at any time during questioning.

       The first ten minutes of the recorded interview are revealing. During that part of the

interview, Kinzig, in a calm and conversational tone, established that Hitchings spoke English,

could read and write, and had a high school education with vocational training in computer

networking. She also asked Hitchings whether he was under the influence of any drugs. Hitchings

admitted that he had taken a small amount of marijuana and methamphetamine that morning, but

he insisted more than once that he was able to understand what was happening to him. According

to Kinzig, who testified that she had experience interacting with people under the influence of such

drugs, Hitchings did not seem impaired during the interview despite his drug use. In fact, she

testified that “he spoke very intelligently and articulately throughout the interview.”

                                                 10
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

       After establishing that Hitchings could comprehend what was going on, Kinzig read

Hitchings his Miranda rights. Hitchings then signed a form that set forth those rights. That form

also confirmed that he understood his rights and that he was willing to answer questions without

an attorney present. During the next 40 minutes, Hitchings refused to answer several of Kinzig’s

questions, including questions that could have led to potentially incriminating evidence. He also

expressed frustration with what he viewed as irrelevant questions and repeatedly asked the

interviewing officers to reveal the real reason they wanted to speak with him.

       The district court did not err in finding that Hitchings waived his Miranda rights. First,

there is no evidence that the interviewing officers intimidated, coerced, or deceived Hitchings into

signing the waiver form or into responding to their questions. In fact, Kinzig told Hitchings several

times that he did not have to answer their questions. Every time Hitchings asked if he should have

an attorney present, the interviewing officers told him that the choice was up to him. The evidence

instead suggests that Hitchings freely and deliberately chose to waive his rights—he said he

wanted to answer the interviewing officer’s questions and explained his desire to help the officers’

investigation more than once. What is more, the interviewing officers remained calm throughout

the interview, though they reasonably reacted to Hitchings’s emotional outburst. Once the officers

handcuffed Hitchings following the outburst, however, the questioning resumed its earlier

conversational tone.

       Second, the evidence suggests Hitchings comprehended his rights. True, Hitchings seemed

confused about the interviewing officers’ role in informing him whether he might be incriminating

himself. For example, he asked: “[H]ow far do I incriminate myself telling you things that are

personal? You know, like, before I actually do need one of those attorneys. I, I need to understand

it.” But a valid waiver does not require Hitchings to understand “every possible consequence” of

                                                 11
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

such a choice. See Lawrence, 735 F.3d at 437. A valid waiver instead requires that he understood

he could “choose not to talk to law enforcement officers” or “discontinue talking at any time.” Id.

(quotation omitted). Hitchings’s refusal to answer some of the interviewing officers’ questions

while choosing to answer others demonstrates he understood that requirement. A valid waiver

also requires that Hitchings understood he could choose to have counsel present. Id. The

interviewing officers reminded him of this choice every time he asked if he needed an attorney.

        Hitchings also argues that Kinzig and Kunkleman should have readvised him of his

Miranda rights after his emotional outburst when they handcuffed him. This argument fails

because we, like the district court, conclude that Hitchings was in custody for the entirety of the

interrogation. We require additional Miranda warnings only “if the circumstances seriously

changed between the initial warnings and the interrogation.” Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 432

(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 47 (1982)). Courts have, moreover,

“generally rejected a per se rule as to when a suspect must be readvised of his rights after the

passage of time or a change in questioners.” United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir.

1997) (quotation omitted).

       Kinzig and Kunkleman interrogated Hitchings immediately after advising him of his

Miranda rights.    Thus, the circumstances did not change between the warnings and the

interrogation.

                                                C.

       Next, we must decide whether Kinzig and Kunkleman violated Hitchings’s Fifth

Amendment right to counsel during questioning. Hitchings argues that he invoked his right to

counsel during the interrogation, but the officers continued to question him.

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No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

       An accused subject to custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers has the right to

consult with an attorney and to have counsel present during questioning. Davis v. United States,

512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994). Law enforcement officers must explain this right to an accused before

questioning begins. Id. The right to counsel established in Miranda was one of a “series of

recommended procedural safeguards” that “were not themselves rights protected by the

Constitution but were instead measures to insure [sic] that the right against compulsory self-

incrimination was protected.” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1974) (quotation

omitted).

       “The right to counsel recognized in Miranda is sufficiently important to suspects in

criminal investigations” that the Supreme Court has afforded it “the special protection of the

knowing and intelligent waiver standard.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona,

451 U.S. 477, 483 (1981)). If a suspect validly waives his right to counsel after receiving Miranda

warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question the suspect, and the suspect is free to

respond to questions from the officers. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372–76 (1979).

       But when a suspect requests an attorney, officers must stop interrogating him. Fare v.

Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) (“[A]n accused’s request for an attorney is per se an

invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease.”). In Edwards,

the Supreme Court explained that “it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the

authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his

right to counsel.” 451 U.S. at 485. So “when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel

present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing

only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been

advised of his rights.” Id. at 484. Edwards further held “that an accused . . . having expressed his

                                                 13
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the

authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates

further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. at 484–85. The Edwards

rule embodies two independent inquiries:

               First, courts must determine whether the accused actually invoked
               his right to counsel. . . . Second, if the accused invoked his right to
               counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only
               on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police,
               and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.

Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

       “If the police do subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming

there has been no break in custody), the suspect’s statements are presumed involuntary and

therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver

and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.”           McNeil v.

Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991). “This is ‘designed to prevent police from badgering a

defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.’” Id. (quoting Michigan v. Harvey,

494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)). Once a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel regarding one

offense, he may not be re-approached regarding that offense or any other offense unless counsel is

present. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1988). This is a “bright-line rule.” United

States v. Potter, 927 F.3d 446, 450 (6th Cir. 2019).

       To benefit from this rule’s protection, however, a defendant must clearly invoke his right

to counsel. That is, he “must make a ‘statement that can be reasonably construed to be an

expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’” United States v. Zakhari, 85 F.4th 367,

375 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459).

                                                 14
No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

       Here, Hitchings unequivocally invoked his right to counsel when he said: “I’m not

answering questions anymore until you find me an attorney. Please find me an attorney.” Seconds

later—and before the interviewing officers asked him any further questions—Hitchings asked:

“That’s what I’m supposed to do, right?” The officers replied by telling Hitchings that it was up

to him to have an attorney present. And then this exchange happened:

                      Hitchings:      Tell me honestly, like what do you think I . . .
                                      (indecipherable).
                      Kunkleman:      Look I’m going to tell you honestly, okay. You want
                                      my opinion?
                      Hitchings:      I do.
                      Kunkleman:      I think it’s always better to cooperate. I think it goes
                                      better in the court system.

Based on the above exchange, Hitchings immediately reinitiated discussions with the officers after

he invoked his right to counsel.

       This case is like the underlying circumstances in Bush v. Warden, Southern Ohio

Correctional Facility, a habeas case where we declined to grant the petitioner relief because the

police likely did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. 573 F. App’x 503, 512–13 (6th Cir.

2014). There, we found that Bush, an accused who earlier invoked his right to counsel, reinitiated

questioning and subsequently waived his right when he asked the interviewing officer,

unprompted, “would it look better for me if I just go ahead and just tell you all? I mean, would it

be better for me?” Id. at 505. The interviewing officer and Bush then had this exchange:

                      Interviewer:    You want my personal opinion?
                      Bush:           Yeah, truthfully.
                      Interviewer:    The truth is always going to be better. That’s my
                                      personal opinion.

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No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

Id. Because the “accused himself initiate[d] further communication, exchanges, or conversations

with the police,” his earlier invocation of the right to counsel no longer controlled. Id. at 513

(alteration in original) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85). We also explained that this

exchange was not “indicative of the circumstance which the prophylactic rule in Edwards was

designed to prevent” because the officers “were not badgering Bush to waive his invocation of

right to counsel in any way.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Like the statements in Bush, Hitchings’s statements were “not prompted . . . by police

interrogation,” but suggest “a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the

investigation.” United States v. Ware, 338 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks

omitted); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983) (plurality op.) (opining that the

suspect’s question—“Well, what is going to happen to me now?”—demonstrated “a willingness

and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation”). The district court therefore did

not err in finding that Hitchings reinitiated his conversation with law enforcement.

       Hitchings validly waived his right to counsel after reinitiating discussions with the officers.

As mentioned above, Kinzig advised Hitchings of his Miranda rights during the first few minutes

of the interrogation.    About 40 minutes later, Hitchings invoked his right to counsel and

subsequently reinitiated conversation with the officers. Then, he started repeatedly hitting himself

on the head, and the officers handcuffed him. Once he regained his composure, he asked Kinzig

not to leave the interview room and said: “Please sit down. I’ll tell you . . . I’ll tell you whatever

you want to know.” Before Kinzig asked Hitchings any further questions, she asked him several

times if he wanted an attorney. Hitchings explained that he wanted to continue the interview and

that he did not want an attorney before doing so. Kinzig expressed her discomfort with continuing

the interview because Hitchings had asked for an attorney, and then this exchange took place:

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No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

                       Kinzig:         Again, I’m not feeling very comfortable right now
                                       because you asked for a lawyer. But if you want to
                                       talk to us, we’ll talk to you. But I’m not feeling real
                                       comfortable.
                       Hitchings:      I will talk to you, I will talk to you.
                       Kunkleman:      I, I want, you know how you wanted your questions
                                       answered? William, I want my question answered.
                                       Yes or no, do you want a lawyer now?
                       Hitchings:      I do not need a lawyer, no. I don’t need a lawyer[.]
                       Kunkleman:      Yes or no, do you want a lawyer now?
                       Hitchings:      No, I do not need a lawyer, no.

       The totality of the circumstances show that Hitchings waived his right to counsel after he

was advised of his Miranda rights. He later invoked his right to counsel during the interrogation

but reinitiated discussions with the officers and, again, knowingly and voluntarily waived his right

to counsel.

                                                  D.

       Finally, Hitchings argues that the district court erred by finding that his confession was

voluntary. A defendant’s confession is admissible at trial only if he makes it “freely, voluntarily,

and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.” Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623

(1896). Although we look to the totality of the circumstances to assess the voluntariness of a

confession, “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not

voluntary.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Police action is only

coercive when it ‘overbear[s] the accused’s will to resist.’” United States v. Jacobs, 63 F.4th 1055,

1058 (6th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1067

(6th Cir. 1994)). Police action overbears the will of the accused if: “(1) the police activity was

objectively coercive; (2) the coercion in question was sufficient to overbear [the] defendant’s will;

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No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

and (3) [the] defendant’s will was, in fact, overborne as a result of the coercive police activity.”

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Rigsby, 943 F.2d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 1991)).

        Hitchings cannot show that the interviewing officers’ actions were objectively coercive.

As discussed above, the officers spoke to Hitchings in a conversational tone for most of the

interview and they never brandished their weapons nor threatened Hitchings. No officer told

Hitchings he had to talk to law enforcement. In fact, they told him several times he could refuse

to answer questions as he wished. The only time the officers raised their voice or otherwise applied

force against Hitchings was during his emotional outburst.            Kinzig testified that she and

Kunkleman handcuffed him during this outburst only because Hitchings was “hitting his head on

the table and hitting his head with his fist.” After his outburst, the interview returned to its earlier

conversational tone. Although the interview lasted for almost six hours, the interviewing officers

gave Hitchings water, offered him food, and took several breaks throughout the questioning.

Further, when Hitchings requested time to think, the interviewing officers always complied. These

actions are like conduct “we’ve previously held is not coercive.” Jacobs, 63 F.4th at 1058–59

(citing Luck, 852 F.3d at 623).

        Without evidence of coercion, Hitchings cannot show that the district court erred by finding

his confession admissible. This conclusion is true even though the recorded interview shows that

Hitchings was suffering from some degree of emotional distress and that he had used both

marijuana and methamphetamine before officers apprehended him. See Luck, 852 F.3d at 623

(“[E]ven if [a] defendant’s cognitive or volitional capacity was impaired, that ‘is never, by itself,

sufficient to warrant the conclusion that his confession was involuntary for purposes of due

process; some element of police coercion is always necessary.’” (quoting United States v.

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No. 23-3265, United States v. Hitchings

Newman, 889 F.2d 88, 94 (6th Cir. 1989)). We therefore conclude that Hitchings voluntarily

answered the interviewing officers’ questions.

                                                 IV.

       For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Hitchings’s motion to

suppress.

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