Court Opinion

ID: 9724267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:50:35.522635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:58.715007
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I have joined in the separate “Order” because I concur in that part of the Opinion holding that the City of Sheffield is not a “political subdivision” as defined by the Act and its legislative history. I do not concur in that part of the Opinion holding that the Attorney General’s failure to object to the referendum had the force and effect of approving any future changes found desirable for the implementation of the referendum. It seems to me that the Attorney General’s letter of May 23, 1975 expressly conditioned his failure to object to the holding of the referendum by stating that the implementation or enforcement of the change in form of government is subject to the pre-clearance requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
ORDER
This cause came before the Court on the Government’s Rule 59 Fed.R.Civ.P. motion for reconsideration and amendment to this Court’s Order of September 29, 1976. The Court has considered the motion, briefs of both parties, pleadings, affidavits, and the applicable statutory and case law and in accordance with the Memorandum Opinion filed contemporaneously herewith is of the opinion that the Government’s motion is due to be granted to the extent that the Attorney General’s July 6 objection was timely interposed, but that the injunctive relief sought is due to be denied and the complaint dismissed.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Government’s Rule 59 motion be and the same hereby is granted and the previous opinion and order of the Court is withdrawn.
Further, it is ORDERED that the Government’s application for an injunction be and the same is denied and the complaint is dismissed.
Costs are taxed to the Government.
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before RIVES, Circuit Judge, and GROOMS and McFADDEN, District Judges.
McFADDEN, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on the motion of the United States for reconsideration of this Court’s December 13, 1976 ruling. The United States filed suit on August 9, 1976 seeking to enjoin the defendants from changing from a Commission to a Mayor-Council form of government. On September 29, 1976 this Court denied relief and dismissed the complaint upon the ground that the Attorney General, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, had failed to interpose a timely objection to the defendants’ proposed new form of government. The United States moved for reconsideration, and on December 13 the motion was granted in that the Attorney General’s objection was decreed as having been timely filed, but we again denied relief and dismissed the action based on our finding that the City of Sheffield was not a “political subdivision” as defined by the Voting Rights Act and was therefore not subject to the Section 5 pre*791clearance requirements; and on the finding that when the Attorney General approved the referendum to determine whether the City would change to the Mayor-Council government he in effect approved the new form of government.
The Government’s contention continues to be that under the circumstances presented 1 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, is applicable and that defendants have not received federal pre-clearance of the new form of government by either of the two statutorily required methods.
The question presented is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the definition of political subdivision is applicable. We think it is.
The term “political subdivision” shall mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.2
The Government contends that Section 5 applies to all changes which affect voting in a covered State, as compared to one not covered, regardless of whether those voting changes are enacted or implemented in a political entity which is outside the definition. Essentially the contention is that “[i]f an entire state is determined to be covered the ‘or in any political subdivision’ language is not applicable, and the definition of ‘political subdivision’ has no relevance in determining the Section 5 obligations of the covered state.”3
In support of its contention the Government refers us to the language of the Act, its legislative history, the Attorney General’s consistent interpretation of the Act, enforcement of the Act by the courts, the fact that Congress has twice extended and amended the Act with knowledge of its interpretation and enforcement, and the actual number of submissions made to the Attorney General under § 1973c.
The pertinent language of the Act and its formal legislative history are in our judgment sufficient to ascertain the clear meaning of the statute.
Section 5 states in pertinent part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964 .
[Emphasis supplied].
The first sentence of § 1973b(b) triggers the operation of Section 5. It reads in relevant part:4
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply in any State or in any political subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines . and with respect to which (2) the Director of Census determines .
[Emphasis supplied].
The State of Alabama was designated by both the Attorney General and the Director of Census under §§ 1973b(b)(l) and (2);5 therefore, the State of Alabama is clearly subject to Section 5 of the Act. It is also clear that where the State has been designated by both the Attorney General and the Director of the Census, the political subdivisions are also covered by the Act.6
*792The formal legislative purpose of § 1973b(b) reads in pertinent part:
Where an entire State falls within this subsection [§ 1973b(b)(l) and (2)] so does each and every political subdivision within that State.7
[Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, we are still convinced that the term “political subdivision” is relevant and defines the extent of applicability of Section 5 obligations in designated states. We find nothing in the Act, the legislative history,8 or the cases, which take the Section 5 application beyond that point. It is as clear now as before that the City of Sheffield is not a political subdivision. The City neither registers voters nor supervises their registration. The Colbert County Board of Registrars conducts all voter registration for the City thereby excepting Sheffield from the Act’s direct enforcement.9
The Government suggests that the term “political subdivision” has meaning only in a State which has not been covered under § 1973b(b)(l) and (2) of the Act, but in which certain political subdivisions thereof have been designated making them subject to Section 5. This argument is in our judgment untenable, and would lead to anomalous results. It would require the application of Section 5 to all political units within a designated State, such as Alabama, notwithstanding their size, function or the fact that none of them register voters. It would permit a court to exempt such political units in an undesignated State or in a State designated by only the Attorney General or the Director, such as New York,10 even though the political unit involved was within a political subdivision designated by both the Attorney General and Director, or for that matter even if all the political subdivisions of that State had been individually designated by the Attorney General and the Director of Census. This Court simply does not read the language or the underlying legislative intent of the Voting Rights Act as calling for such disparate treatment of political entities.11
Accordingly, for the reasons herein set forth, together with those stated in our Memorandum Opinion of December 13, 1976, the Court is of the opinion that plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is due to be denied.

. See this Court’s Memorandum Opinion, December 13, 1976, for an accounting of the relevant facts.

. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(2).

. Brief of plaintiff at 6.

. The Voting Rights Act is replete with “ . . this section shall apply in any State or any political subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney General determines ... (2) the Director of Census determines . . . ”

. See 30 Fed.Reg. 9897 (August 1, 1965).

. In our December 13 opinion, at pp. 788-789, we said that Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971), “involved the City of Canton, Mississippi, and the [Supreme] Court in a footnote without discussion stated *792that Mississippi and its subdivisions were covered. (400 U.S. 379, n. 2, 91 S.Ct. 431).” Mr. Justice Brennan went on to say however that:
“In his unreported oral opinion granting temporary relief, he [district judge] correctly stated:
‘The only questions to be decided by . . . the three judge court to be designated, [are] whether or not the State of Mississippi or arty of its political subdivisions have acted in such a way as to cause or constitute a voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting within the meaning of Section 5
[Emphasis supplied.]

. 1965 U.S. Congressional and Administrative News, pp. 2456, 2561; see also, Post Trial of pi. at 2.

. The legislative history makes it doubly clear that 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(2) was intended as a restriction on the coverage of the Act. As stated in our December 13, 1976 opinion (p. 788), the pertinent history reads:
“Clause (2) of this subsection is new. It defines ‘political subdivision’ as a county or parish except that in those instances where registration is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term includes any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting. This definition makes clear that the term ‘political subdivision’ is not intended to encompass precincts, election districts, or other similar units when they are within a county or parish which supervises registration for voting.” [Emphasis supplied.]
1965 U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News, p. 2569; see also p. 2464.

. Title 17, § 21, Code of Alabama (Recomp. 1958); Title 37, § 34(35), Code of Alabama (Cum.Supp.1973).

. See United Jewish Organization of Williamsburgh v. Carey,-U.S.-, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977).

. Even though our holding that the Act is inapplicable makes any further finding unnecessary, the majority of the Court remains of the opinion, assuming the applicability of the Act, that the Attorney General’s approval of the referendum constituted approval of the form of government that followed. (See our Memorandum Opinion dated December 13, 1976.)