Court Opinion

ID: 9527661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:32:25.936324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:03.159966
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting: The majority holds that Calhoun was not entitled to make an election about which statute he was sentenced under because the nature and substance of the reckless homicide statute was changed when the legislature promulgated Public Act 93 — 213 and repealed subsections 9 — 3(b), (c), (e) and (e — 5) and added subsections 9 — 3(e—7), (e — 8) and (e — 9) to the reckless homicide statute. I disagree. I believe that a close reading of the reckless homicide statute reveals that while Public Act 93 — 213 repealed subsections 9 — 3(b), (c), (e) and (e — 5) and added subsections 9 — 3(e—7), (e — 8) and (e — 9), the public act did not amend or change the elements of the offense of reckless homicide codified in subsection 9 — 3(a). Because Public Act 93 — 213 did not amend or change the elements of the offense of reckless homicide codified in subsection 9 — 3(a), the legislature did not change the nature and substance of the statute. Therefore, Calhoun’s due process rights were violated when the trial court did not permit him to elect to be sentenced either (1) under the 2000 law in effect at the time of the offense, or (2) under the 2004 law in effect at the time of sentencing. See also People v. Gancarz, 369 Ill. App. 3d 154 (2006). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. PLAIN ERROR REVIEW The majority holds that the defendant is not entitled to plain error review (1) because the evidence was not closely balanced, and (2) because the error was not so fundamental that it deprived the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. I disagree. Illinois law is clear that a defendant is entitled to be sentenced under either the law in effect at the time of the offense or the law in effect at the time of sentencing. People v. Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d 68, 71 (1972). Moreover, a defendant’s due process rights are violated if (1) he is not advised of his right to elect the statute under which he should be sentenced, and (2) he does not expressly waive that right. Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d at 71. “If, however, the newly enacted statute changes the nature or substantive elements of an existing offense, [a] defendant may be convicted and sentenced under the law in effect at the time the offense was [committed].” People v. Martinez, 371 Ill. App. 3d 363, 371 (2007). The Illinois Supreme Court has held that “[t]he imposition of an unauthorized sentence affects substantial rights” and that plain error review extends to such matters. People u. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1998). Because Public Act 93 — 213 did not change the nature or substantive elements of the reckless homicide statute, and because Calhoun was not permitted to decide under which law he would be sentenced, his sentence was unauthorized and affected his substantial rights. Accordingly, I would review his sentence under the plain error doctrine. See Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d at 545. MARTINEZ AND LUSH DO NOT SUPPORT THE MAJORITY’S POSITION The defendant argues that his due process rights were violated when the court failed to advise him that he had the right to choose between two sentencing options because the sentence he received under the 2000 sentencing law was four times greater than the maximum sentence permitted under the 2004 sentencing law. The majority rejects this argument and cites People v. Martinez, 371 Ill. App. 3d 363, 371 (2007), and People v. Lush, 372 Ill. App. 3d 629 (2007), in support of its position. I think the majority’s reliance on Martinez and Lush is misplaced. In Martinez, this court held that a defendant’s due process rights were not violated by the circuit court’s failure to advise him of the option of receiving a sentence under the statute that was in effect on the date of the offense or the statute that was in effect on the date he was sentenced. Martinez, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 371; 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3 (West 2000). The Martinez court also held that because the amendments to the reckless homicide statute were substantive and thus affected the nature and substance of the crime of reckless homicide, the defendant was barred from choosing under which reckless homicide statute he would be sentenced. Martinez, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 374. The Martinez court noted that Public Act 93 — 213 repealed the enhancing elements (subsections 9—3(e) and (e—5)) in the reckless homicide statute when an individual was convicted of reckless homicide while intoxicated. Martinez, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 374, citing Pub. Act 93 — 213, eff. July 18, 2003. Furthermore, the Martinez court noted that the public act amended section 9 — 3 of the Criminal Code by adding several subsections (subsections 9—3(e—7), (e—8), (e—9)), all of which permitted defendants convicted of reckless homicide to be punished as Class 2 felons under circumstances that were not permitted prior to the amendments. Martinez, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 374. Lastly, the Martinez court found that the legislature created the offense of aggravated driving under the influence and codified it in the Illinois Vehicle Code in order to replace subsection 9 — 3(b) of the Code, one of the sections that Public Act 93 — 213 repealed in the reckless homicide statute. Martinez, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 372, citing 625 ILCS 5/11—501(d) (West 2004). According to the Martinez court, the aforementioned amendments were substantive changes to the offense of reckless homicide that barred Martinez from taking advantage of the more favorable sentencing provisions in the statute in effect at the time he was sentenced. Martinez, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 374. The Lush court agreed with the holding and reasoning of Martinez. Lush, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 638. I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the Martinez and Lush cases, with the majority’s reasoning and construction of the reckless homicide statute and with the majority’s conclusion that the repeal of subsections 9 — 3(b), (c), (e) and (e—5) and the additions of subsections 9 — 3(e—7), (e—8) and (e—9) to the reckless homicide statute affected the substantive elements of the crime of reckless homicide. The majority fails to state in which subsection of the reckless homicide statute the elements are codified. The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed subsection 9 — 3(a) of the reckless homicide statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3(a))1 and held that the elements of reckless homicide are as follows: (1) that the individual was operating a motor vehicle; (2) that the individual unintentionally caused a death while operating the vehicle; and (3) that the acts which caused the death were performed recklessly so as to create a likelihood of death or great bodily harm to some person. People v. Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d 236, 245 (1991), citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3(a). According to Wilson, the elements of the offense of reckless homicide are codified in subsection 9 — 3(a). Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 245. While the supreme court has found that intoxication is not an element of the offense of reckless homicide (Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 245), the court did note that intoxication is probative of the issue of recklessness. People v. Smith, 149 Ill. 2d 558, 563 (1992). Although the Wilson court reviewed the 1987 version of subsection 9 — 3(a) of the Criminal Code (Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d at 245), it should be noted that the language is almost identical in the 1987, 2000 and 2004 versions of subsection 9 — 3(a) of the Criminal Code. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3(a);2 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(a) (West 2002);3 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(a) (West 2004).4 Therefore, because the language in the 1987, 2000 and 2004 versions of subsection 9 — 3(a) of the Criminal Code is almost identical, it is clear that the elements of the offense of reckless homicide did not change after the legislature promulgated Public Act 93 — 213. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3(a); 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(a) (West 2000); 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(a) (West 2004). When Public Act 93 — 213 repealed subsections 9 — 3(b), (c), (e) and (e — 5) and amended section 9 — 3 and added subsections 9 — 3(e—7), (e — 8) and (e — 9) to the reckless homicide statute, it did not change the language or substantive elements that are codified in subsection 9 — 3(a) of the Code. Moreover, when Public Act 93 — 213 incorporated the offense of aggravated driving under the influence into the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11—501(d) (West 2004)), there was no change in the substantive elements in subsection 9 — 3(a), and there was no need to change the elements of reckless homicide because aggravated driving under the influence is a lesser-included offense of reckless homicide. People v. Green, 294 Ill. App. 3d 139, 149 (1997). Finally, if the majority compared the 2000 version of subsection 9 — 3(a) of the Criminal Code to the 2004 version of subsection 9 — 3(a) of the Criminal Code, it would find that the class and sentence for the offense of reckless homicide were not changed by Public Act 93 — 213. Compare 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(d)(2) (West 2000)5 and 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8— 1(6) (West 2000)6 with 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(d)(2) (West 2004)7 and 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(6) (West 2004).8 Accordingly, the majority is in error when it holds that Public Act 93 — 213 changed the substantive elements of the offense of reckless homicide. CONCLUSION In conclusion, Public Act 93 — 213 did not change the language or the elements of the offense of reckless homicide codified in subsection 9 — 3(a) of the Criminal Code and the public act did not change the class of offense or sentence for a person convicted of reckless homicide. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court erred when it denied Calhoun the option of choosing between being sentenced under the 2000 sentencing law in effect at the time of the offense or the 2004 sentencing law in effect at the time of sentencing, and I would affirm his conviction, vacate his sentence and remand his case for resentencing.  Now 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(a) (West 2004).   “A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of driving of a motor vehicle, in which case the person commits reckless homicide.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3(a).   “A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the person commits reckless homicide.” 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(a) (West 2000).   “A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the person commits reckless homicide.” 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(a) (West 2004).   Reckless homicide is a Class 3 felony. 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(d)(2) (West 2000).   For a Class 3 felony, the sentence shall be not less than two years and not more than five years. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(6) (West 2000).   Reckless homicide is a Class 3 felony 720 ILCS 5/9 — 3(d)(2) (West 2004).   For a Class 3 felony, the sentence shall be not less than two years and not more than five years. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(6) (West 2004).