Court Opinion

ID: 9909578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 18:07:10.280716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:40.320573
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-4505.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  MAHONING COUNTY

                                          STATE OF OHIO,

                                           Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                   v.

                                     AHMAREON WILLIAMS,

                                        Defendant-Appellant.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                         Case No. 23 MA 0030

                                     Criminal Appeal from the
                            Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division,
                                    of Mahoning County, Ohio
                                      Case No. 2018 JA 702

                                          BEFORE:
                   Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

                                               JUDGMENT:
                                                 Affirmed.

Atty. Gina DeGenova, Mahoning County Prosecutor, and Atty. Edward A. Czopur,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Mahoning County Prosecutor's Office, for Plaintiff-
Appellee and

Atty. Victoria Ferry, Assistant State Public Defender, Office of the Ohio Public Defender,
for Defendant-Appellant.

                                      Dated: December 12, 2023
                                                                                                        –2–

HANNI, J.

        {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant, Ahmareon Williams, appeals the judgment of the
Mahoning County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, lifting a stay of the adult
portion of his Serious Youthful Offender (SYO) dispositional sentence. The court invoked
the stayed portion of the SYO adult sentence and ordered Appellant transferred to the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) to serve 72 months in prison.
For the following reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error lack merit and we affirm the
juvenile court’s judgment.
        {¶2}    On June 4, 2018, the Youngstown Police Department filed a complaint in
juvenile court alleging that Appellant was a delinquent child for committing aggravated
robbery in violation of R.C. 2152.02(C), a felony of the first degree if committed by an
adult. A gun specification in violation of R.C. 2941.145 and R.C. 2152.17 accompanied
the charge.
        {¶3}    On January 2, 2019, the juvenile court filed its judgment entry accepting
Appellant’s admission to an amended charge of second degree kidnapping in violation of
R.C. 2905.01, with a gun specification.               The court had reviewed the charges with
Appellant, informed him of his rights, and found that Appellant knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived his rights and entered the admission.
        {¶4}    The juvenile court proceeded immediately with disposition after Appellant
waived his right to a separate dispositional hearing. The court found that Appellant was
16 years old1 at the time of the offense and he was a SYO under R.C. 2152.11. The court
committed Appellant to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (DYS) for an indefinite
term of 12 months to his twenty-first birthday. The court also committed Appellant to DYS
for a mandatory 36-month period on the gun specification, to be served prior to and
consecutively with the kidnapping disposition.
        {¶5}    The juvenile court further held that it had discretion under R.C.
2152.11(A)(2) and 2151.11(D)(2)(a) to impose an adult sentence and suspend that
sentence if Appellant successfully completed his juvenile commitment. The court found
that Appellant was subject to a mandatory adult prison term under R.C. 2929.13(F),

1 The court issued an amended judgment entry on January 24, 2019 identical to the January 9 judgment

entry, except it corrected the written word “fifteen” stated as Appellant’s age, which was actually sixteen.

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imposed a 6-year adult sentence, and held that in abeyance provided that Appellant
successfully completed his juvenile commitment.
        {¶6}   On November 17, 2021, the court held a hearing and released Appellant to
parole supervision. The court and the DYS parole office continued to monitor Appellant’s
progress through April 2022.
        {¶7}   On May 2, 2022, Appellant’s DYS parole officer filed a charge of
delinquency against Appellant, who was now 19 years old. The charge alleged that
Appellant violated his parole terms after a warrant was issued by the Farrell, Pennsylvania
Police Department for kidnapping. Appellant was appointed counsel and he denied the
charges at his arraignment.
        {¶8}   On August 22, 2022, the Mahoning County Juvenile Prosecutor filed a
motion to invoke the suspended portion of Appellant’s dispositional sentence under R.C.
2152.14. The court held a hearing on the motion with Appellant, his counsel, the assistant
prosecutor, Appellant’s parents, and Appellant’s parole officer present. At the hearing,
Appellant’s parole officer, Renee Blashak, and the victim of the charges in Pennsylvania
testified.
        {¶9}   On January 4, 2023, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry outlining
Appellant’s case and the testimony presented at the hearing.           The court found the
testimony of Officer Blashak and the victim credible and took judicial notice of the charges
filed against Appellant in Pennsylvania.
        {¶10} The court reviewed caselaw and the requirements under R.C. 2152.14(E)
to invoke the stayed portion of the SYO sentence. It cited In re J.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 110394, 2021-Ohio-4313, and noted that a SYO dispositional sentence may be
invoked if the juvenile is: at least 14 years old, serving the juvenile portion of the SYO,
and on parole with DYS. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant
was age 20 at the time of the new charges and would turn 21 in four months.
        {¶11} The court reviewed the new charges of kidnapping, use of a firearm without
a license, conspiracy to kidnap and to inflict terror or injury, robbery, or threats to commit
robbery, theft by law, and aggravated assault. The court found by clear and convincing
evidence that Appellant was serving parole with DYS at the time of the incident, he had

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pending charges against him, and it was unlikely that he would be rehabilitated within the
five months remaining of juvenile jurisdiction.
       {¶12} The court lifted the stay of the adult portion of Appellant’s prison sentence
and invoked the adult portion of the SYO commitment. The court ordered Appellant
transferred to ODRC to serve 72 months in prison, with credit for time served.
       {¶13} On February 21, 2023, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Through
counsel, he filed a brief alleging three assignments of error.
       {¶14} Since Appellant’s first and second assignments of error concern the same
statute, we address them together.
       {¶15} In his first assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

       The juvenile court erred when it determined that Ahmareon engaged
       in conduct that created a substantial risk to the safety or security of
       the community or victim.         RC. 2152.14(E)(1)(c). (1.4.23 Judgment
       Entry).

       {¶16} In his second assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

       The juvenile court erred when it determined, in the absence of clear
       and convincing evidence, that Ahmareon was unlikely to be
       rehabilitated during the remainder of the court’s jurisdiction. R.C.
       2152.14(E)(1)(c). (1.4.23 Judgment Entry).

       {¶17} Both assignments of error concern juvenile court findings required by R.C.
2152.14(E)(1)(c) in order to invoke the stayed adult portion of Appellant’s SYO
dispositional sentence. R.C. 2152.14(E)(1) provides that:

       The juvenile court may invoke the adult portion of a person's serious
       youthful offender dispositional sentence if the juvenile court finds all of the
       following on the record by clear and convincing evidence:

       (a) The person is serving the juvenile portion of a serious youthful offender
       dispositional sentence.

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       (b) The person is at least fourteen years of age and has been admitted to a
       department of youth services facility, or criminal charges are pending
       against the person.

       (c) The person engaged in the conduct or acts charged under division (A),
       (B), or (C) of this section, and the person's conduct demonstrates that the
       person is unlikely to be rehabilitated during the remaining period of juvenile
       jurisdiction.

       {¶18} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that at the time of the
hearing, charges were only pending in Pennsylvania and he was in the process of
litigating them. He cites Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954),
and contends that “clear and convincing evidence” is that “which will produce in the mind
of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” He
also quotes State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 340, 515 N.E.2d 1009 (9th Dist. Wayne 1986),
for the manifest weight standard of review, asserting that we must “review the entire
record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the
witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
       {¶19} Appellant submits that no evidence established that he engaged in
misconduct or behavior that threatened the safety or security of the community or the
victim. He notes that the only evidence presented was the docket of the charges filed
against him in Pennsylvania. He argues that the standard for filing a complaint is probable
cause, which is less than the standard required to invoke a SYO adult sentence.
       {¶20} He further asserts that the victim’s testimony in the Pennsylvania case must
be viewed in the context of pending charges and not a conviction. He explains that the
victim had charges lodged against him in Pennsylvania for sexually assaulting Appellant’s
sister. The incident resulting in the charges against Appellant in Pennsylvania stemmed
from allegations that he met with the victim who allegedly sexually assaulted his sister,
took him to more than one location at gunpoint, made threats to kill him, and stole the
victim’s cell phone.

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                                                                                          –6–

       {¶21} Appellant contrasts the victim’s testimony against him with the reports of his
time spent in DYS, where he received the highest level of good behavior, showed a
commitment to growth, and completed community service. He notes that the court
granted him early release based on his “remarkable” accomplishments and the “great
steps he had taken.”
       {¶22} The proper standard of appellate review here is abuse of discretion. In re
C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 82 (the juvenile court “has
the discretion not to invoke the adult sentence” under Ohio's SYO scheme); In re J.P.,
11th Dist. Lake No. 2021-L-104, 2022-Ohio-2102, ¶ 19 (citations omitted). Abuse of
discretion “implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.”
State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
       {¶23} A disposition under the SYO constitutes a “‘blended’ sentence: a traditional
juvenile disposition and a stayed adult sentence.” In re D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-
Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, ¶ 2, citing R.C. 2152.13(D)(2). The adult dispositional sentence
is stayed pending a juvenile’s successful completion of the juvenile portion of the
disposition. Id. at ¶ 30, quoting R.C. 2512.13(D)(2)(a)(iii).
       {¶24} Thus, to lift the stay of the adult portion of the SYO dispositional sentence
and invoke the adult portion, the court must find all of the criteria set forth in R.C.
2152.14(E)(1) on the record by clear and convincing evidence. The standard of clear and
convincing is less than the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, but it constitutes more
than the preponderance of the evidence. In re J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961,
979 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 20. Clear and convincing evidence is found when the evidence “‘will
produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to
be established.’” Id., quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954),
paragraph three of the syllabus.
       {¶25} While Appellant asserts that a manifest weight standard applies, “Ohio
courts of appeal that have reviewed a trial court's clear-and-convincing conclusions in
other contexts will not disturb that conclusion when it is supported by evidence that is
legally sufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing standard of proof.” In re M.M., 3d
Dist. Allen No. 1-17-56, 2018-Ohio-1110, ¶ 16, citing e.g., Cross, supra, at 477; State v.
James, 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-00-02, 2000 WL 681646, *2 (May 25, 2000); In re

Case No. 23 MA 0030
                                                                                          –7–

Gambrel, 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-02-32 and 8-02-33, 2003-Ohio-1025, ¶ 6. In considering
a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, “the test is whether after viewing the probative
evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485
N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
       {¶26} Here, the juvenile court cited R.C. 2152.14(E) and found that Appellant was
over 14 years old and serving the juvenile portion of his SYO dispositional sentence as
he was on parole/early release from DYS. This finding is supported by the testimony of
Officer Blashak. (Tr. at 13, 16). The court also cited its prior granting of Appellant’s early
release from DYS and placement on parole. These findings are supported by the record
and meet R.C. 2152.14(E)(1)(a) and the age requirement of R.C. 2152.14(E)(1)(b).
       {¶27} The juvenile court further found that Appellant incurred new charges in
Pennsylvania, which included kidnapping, use of a firearm without a license, conspiracy
to kidnap and to inflict injury or terror, robbery or threaten to commit robbery, theft by law,
and aggravated assault. The court found that the new charges included first, second,
and third-degree felonies, as well as a misdemeanor of the second degree. The court
took judicial notice of the charges as they were attached to Appellee’s motion to invoke
the adult portion of the SYO dispositional sentence. The filing of charges in Pennsylvania
against Appellant is supported by the record through both the testimony of Officer Blashak
and the court summary from the Pennsylvania court showing the various charges.
       {¶28} Appellant asserts that clear and convincing evidence is lacking to show that
he engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk to his community. He contends that
he was merely charged in Pennsylvania and those charges are still pending against him
and will be litigated. He concludes that because only probable cause is required to file
charges, this constitutes less than clear and convincing evidence and therefore does not
meet the requisite evidence that he “engaged in the conduct charged under division (A),
(B), or (C) of R.C. 2152.14(E)(1).” He submits that the testimony of the witnesses should
be viewed in the context of probable cause.          He further argues that Mr. Jackson’s
testimony should be viewed as suspect since he was also facing charges in Pennsylvania
as to the alleged sexual assault of Appellant’s sister.

Case No. 23 MA 0030
                                                                                           –8–

         {¶29} First, as Appellee notes, the State relied upon R.C. 2152.14(B) to invoke
the adult portion of Appellant’s sentence. That section provides in relevant part that:

         The prosecuting attorney may file a motion to invoke the adult portion of the
         dispositional sentence even if no request is made. The motion shall state
         that there is reasonable cause to believe that either of the following occurred
         and shall state that at least one incident of misconduct of that nature
         occurred after the person reached fourteen years of age:

         (1) The person committed an act that is a violation of the conditions of
         supervision and that could be charged as any felony or as a first degree
         misdemeanor offense of violence if committed by an adult.

         (2) The person has engaged in conduct that creates a substantial risk to the
         safety or security of the community or of the victim.

 [emphasis added]. Appellee’s motion asserted that the filing of charges in Pennsylvania
 against Appellant violated his parole conditions and some of those offenses could be
 charged as felonies. This meets R.C. 2152.14(E)(1) as R.C. 2152.14(E)(1)(c) states
 that reasonable cause to believe that either subsection 1 or 2 above have occurred, not
 both.
         {¶30} Moreover, neither R.C. 2152.14(E) nor R.C. 2152.14(B) requires a
conviction to invoke the adult portion of the SYO dispositional sentence.                  R.C.
2152.14(E)(1)(b) identifies “criminal charges.” R.C. 2152.14(E)(1)(c) identifies “conduct
or acts charged under division (A), (B), or (C)” of the statute. R.C. 2152.14(B) refers to
“one incident of misconduct,” and R.C. 2152.14(B)(1) identifies “an act that is a violation
of the conditions of supervision and could be charged as any felony or as a first degree
misdemeanor offense.” Moreover, R.C. 2152.14(B)(2) refers to “conduct” that creates a
substantial risk to the community or the victim. Had the legislature wished to limit these
statutes to convictions, it would have specified such in the statutes.
         {¶31} We acknowledge that in In re T.M., 9th Dist. Lorain C.A. No. 22CA011868,
2023-Ohio-2804, the Ninth District Court of Appeals held that clear and convincing
evidence was lacking for a juvenile court’s invocation of the adult portion of T.M.’s SYO

Case No. 23 MA 0030
                                                                                       –9–

dispositional sentence. Numerous charges were filed against T.M., including murder of
a police officer during a carjacking, arson, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping. Id. at ¶
6. At the invocation hearing, T.M.’s probation officer testified as to the many serious
pending charges and her violation of probation conditions. Id. at ¶ 10-11. The juvenile
court invoked the adult portion of the SYO dispositional sentence based on the charges
and the testimony of T.M.’s probation officer that she confessed to murder.
       {¶32} The Ninth District reversed, holding that:

       [a]lthough the allegations charged against T.M. are egregious, and a
       tragedy has indeed occurred, we must recognize they were unsworn
       allegations at the time of the hearing. Thus, the unsworn allegations made
       against T.M. and T.M.’s alleged confession, which constituted the only
       testimony in this matter and was based on hearsay, do not, under these
       circumstances, establish by clear and convincing evidence that T.M.
       “engaged in the conduct or acts charged under division (A), (B), or (C) of
       this section, and [that T.M's] conduct demonstrates that [she] is unlikely to
       be rehabilitated during the remaining period of juvenile jurisdiction.

T.M. is distinguishable from the instant case. Both witnesses testified under oath in
Appellant’s case. Officer Blashak testified that she was contacted by the Farrell Police
Department as to the charges against Appellant. In addition, the first term and condition
on Appellant’s parole form stated that he would obey all federal, state, and local laws.
(Tr. at 12, 14-20). Mr. Jackson, the victim of Appellant’s pending charges, testified that
he first spoke to Appellant on the phone and then met with him. (Tr. at 31). He testified
that Appellant told him that he knew where Mr. Jackson’s parents lived and Mr. Jackson
perceived that as a threat. (Tr. at 31-32). Mr. Jackson stated he met with Appellant, who
would not allow anyone else to meet with them, and when they met, the conversation
between them was “cool” and Appellant then asked him to take a walk with him. (Tr. at
33).
       {¶33} Mr. Jackson testified that Appellant told him that his cell phone died and he
asked to use Mr. Jackson’s cell phone. (Tr. at 33). He related that when he handed
Appellant his phone, Appellant pulled a gun on him. (Tr. at 33). Mr. Jackson testified that

Case No. 23 MA 0030
                                                                                      – 10 –

Appellant made him walk in front of him while Appellant pointed the gun at his back. (Tr.
at 33-34). He testified that they walked down a hill and when he told Appellant that he
did not sexually assault his sister, Appellant stated that he did not believe him. (Tr. at
34). Mr. Jackson stated that Appellant made him put Appellant’s hoodie over his face so
he could not see and he then told him that he should kill Mr. Jackson for lying. (Tr. at 34).
Mr. Jackson testified that he was scared and they continued to walk to what he thought
was a garage, but he was not sure since he still had the hoodie over his face. (Tr. at 35).
       {¶34} Mr. Jackson further testified that a truck came and they got in and went to
another location. (Tr. at 34-38). He stated that Appellant took the hoodie off of him, made
him sit on the floor, and Appellant scrolled through Mr. Jackson’s phone. (Tr. at 38-39).
Mr. Jackson stated that he charged at Appellant and Appellant dropped the gun and Mr.
Jackson grabbed the gun. (Tr. at 39). He testified that they wrestled around and when
he secured the gun, Appellant bit him on his back and held the bite until Mr. Jackson was
able to get him off of his back. (Tr. at 40-41). He testified that he threw the gun and when
he went to retrieve his phone, Appellant picked up the gun and told him that there was
one bullet in the gun and he was going to shoot Mr. Jackson in the head. (Tr. at 42). Mr.
Jackson related that they shifted to another room and Appellant told him to lay down on
his stomach. (Tr. at 42). Mr. Jackson stated that he knew Appellant was going to shoot
him, so he sat down, but he turned to his right, then his left, and then got up and ran. (Tr.
at 42). Mr. Jackson stated that Appellant did not shoot the gun, so he ran down some
steps and thought he was exiting, but ended up in a closet. (Tr. at 43). He related that
he and Appellant were fighting again, and he was tugging for the door, when Appellant
stopped and went back upstairs. (Tr. at 43). Mr. Jackson testified that he then ran a
number of blocks, called his friend to pick him up, and then later called the police and
made a statement. (Tr. at 46-55, 58).
       {¶35} From this sworn testimony and the charges filed against Appellant, we find
that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding by clear and convincing
evidence that R.C. 2152.14(E)(1)(a) and (b) were met, as well as R.C. 2152.14(E)(1)(c)
concerning acts charged under R.C. 2152.14(B).
       {¶36} The juvenile court then proceeded to find that it granted early release to
Appellant because it believed that Appellant had been rehabilitated based upon his DYS

Case No. 23 MA 0030
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record. However, the court found that Appellant had shown by the new and serious
charges that he could not follow parole rules. The court further found that based on the
testimony of Officer Blashak and Mr. Jackson, Appellant would unlikely be rehabilitated
during the five months remaining in juvenile court jurisdiction.
       {¶37} The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding clear and
convincing evidence that Appellant could not be rehabilitated during the time he had
remaining under juvenile court jurisdiction.     The court acknowledged that Appellant
showed accomplishment in DYS detention. However, the court reasonably concluded
that outside of detention, Appellant could not follow supervision conditions and resorted
to the same misconduct even though he knew the consequences of failing to comply.
The court reasonably concluded that Appellant incurred the very same charge as his
original charge of kidnapping with a gun specification, which showed it unlikely that he
could be rehabilitated within the next four to five months of juvenile jurisdiction remaining.
These findings constitute sufficient evidence to find it unlikely that Appellant could be
rehabilitated within the short time remaining under juvenile court jurisdiction.
       {¶38} Appellant also contends that the juvenile court lacked clear and convincing
evidence to find that he engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk to the safety
or the security of the community or the victim. He quotes R.C. 2152.14, which provides
that one of the factors that a juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence to
invoke a child’s adult SYO sentence is that he engaged in conduct which creates a
substantial risk to the safety and security of the community or victim and the misconduct
shows that the child is unlikely to be rehabilitated during the time remaining under juvenile
court jurisdiction.
       {¶39} The juvenile court also did not abuse its discretion by finding that Appellant
engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk to the safety or the security of the
community or the victim. Mr. Jackson’s testimony constituted sufficient evidence to find
such a substantial risk to both the community and to him. He testified that Appellant
blindfolded him, took him by gunpoint to various locations, and threatened to shoot him
in the head. Forcing a person to walk blindfolded in public with a firearm pointed at his
back and threatening to shoot him in the head suffices to create a substantial risk to both
Mr. Jackson and the public at large.

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       {¶40} Accordingly, Appellant’s first and second assignments of error lack merit
and are overruled.
       {¶41} In his third assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

       Ahmareon was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of
       counsel in juvenile court. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
       U.S. Constitution; Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

       {¶42} Appellant contends that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient
because he failed to file a motion to dismiss under Juv. R. 29(F) at the close of the State’s
case at the invocation hearing. He asserts that counsel should have asserted that the
State failed to prove all elements under R.C. 2152.14(E)(1) because no clear and
convincing evidence existed that he engaged in conduct creating a substantial risk to the
safety of the community or the victim. Appellant also contends that his counsel should
have asserted that the State failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that he was
not likely to be rehabilitated during the remainder of the court’s jurisdiction over him.
       {¶43} This assignment of error lacks merit. In order to demonstrate the ineffective
assistance of counsel, Appellant must show that trial counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonable representation, and prejudice arose from the deficient
performance. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-143, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Both
prongs must be established: If counsel's performance was not deficient, then there is no
need to review for prejudice. Likewise, without prejudice, counsel's performance need not
be considered. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000).
       {¶44} Juv. R. 29 is entitled “Adjudicatory Hearing,” and provides in relevant part:

       (F) Procedure upon determination of the issues. Upon the determination of
       the issues, the court shall do one of the following:

       (1) If the allegations of the complaint, indictment, or information were not
       proven, dismiss the complaint;

       (2) If the allegations of the complaint, indictment, or information are admitted
       or proven, do any one of the following, unless precluded by statute:

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       (a) Enter an adjudication and proceed forthwith to disposition;

       (b) Enter an adjudication and continue the matter for disposition for not more
       than six months and may make appropriate temporary orders;

       (c) Postpone entry of adjudication for not more than six months;

       (d) Dismiss the complaint if dismissal is in the best interest of the child and
       the community.

       {¶45} Appellant supports his assertion concerning the Juv. R. 29 motion by citing
to Standards of Representation of Clients in Juvenile Delinquency Cases. He contends
that these guidelines, found on the Ohio Public Defender website, state that, “[c]ounsel
shall make a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Juvenile Rule 29(F) at the close of the state’s
case.” Id. at 2.
       {¶46} Counsel’s failure to file a Juv. R. 29 motion on the issues advanced by
Appellant did not prejudice Appellant because the juvenile court determined these issues
at the invocation hearing. R.C. 2152.14(E) provides that a juvenile court may invoke the
adult portion of the SYO dispositional sentence if it finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the juvenile is serving the juvenile portion of the SYO dispositional sentence; the
juvenile is over the age of 14 and criminal charges are pending against him; and the
juvenile engaged in acts under R.C. 2152.14(A), (B), or (C); and “the person’s conduct
demonstrates that the person is unlikely to be rehabilitated during the remaining period
of juvenile jurisdiction.”   The juvenile court made these findings and explained its
reasoning. R.C. 2152.14(B) is one of the incidents of misconduct and includes a finding
by the court that “(2) The person has engaged in conduct that creates a substantial risk
to the safety or security of the community or of the victim.” The juvenile court made this
finding as well. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss at the invocation hearing was not
necessary.
       {¶47} Moreover, Appellant’s third assignment of error lacks merit because we find
no merit to Appellant’s first and second assignments of error, upon which Appellant’s third
assignment is based. Thus, counsel was not ineffective by failing to file a Juv. R. 29
motion on issues lacking merit and for which no prejudice resulted to Appellant.

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      {¶48} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error lacks merit and is
overruled.
      {¶49} For the above reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled and
the judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is
affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, J., concurs.

Case No. 23 MA 0030
[Cite as State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-4505.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs
to be waived.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.