Court Opinion

ID: 9782165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:04:00.870211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:50.497672
License: Public Domain

Maupin, J.,
concurring:
I concur in the majority analysis of the “last injurious exposure” rule. This latest articulation of the rule clarifies one aspect of a very complex statutory framework for compensating injured Nevada workers.1 I write separately to note my concern over the evolution of that framework, and to urge that the Nevada Legislature commence a reexamination of it.
In Las Vegas Housing Authority v. Root,2 we idealistically observed that “[t]he last injurious exposure rule . . . frees the employee from the burden of allocating responsibility for his disabil*292ity and forestalls any determination regarding which employment was the ‘primary cause’ of a work-related disease or injury.”3 If the case currently before us has any meaning at all, the last injurious exposure rule has done nothing of the kind. In short, this claimant’s “burden” has been considerable.
The complicated analytical exercise performed by the majority in this matter typifies our recent attempts at interpreting the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act.4 Such descriptives as “last injurious exposure” and “primary causation” are themselves demonstrative of the many obscure concepts that permeate this legislation. In short, the current statutory scheme has so evolved that workers’ compensation claims have become “dances upon the heads of pins,” choreographed in hyper-technical jargon. The resulting systemic difficulties affect virtually all of the participants in the claims process: employers, insurers, claims administrators, expert witnesses, administrative law judges, and most importantly, injured workers.
Many of the current legislative formulations for compensating injured workers came about in response to a fiscal crisis that developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. To address the crisis in part, the 1993 Legislature enacted NRS 616A.010(2), which abrogated the previous common-law rule requiring broad or “liberal” construction of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act in favor of injured or disabled employees. This provision was calculated to “neutralize” the rules of interpretation of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act, has governed our decision making process up to the present, and was implicitly applied in the instant case. Unfortunately, as the complex analytics of the majority in this matter demonstrate, the neutrality rule provides precious little guidance to administrative law judges charged with deciphering confusing fact patterns and medical issues. Certainly, on remand, the administrative tribunal will find that the neutrality doctrine will, in opposition to its common-law predecessor, muddle rather than facilitate the ultimate resolution of this particular claim. In my view, this rule of interpretation, in its relation to an already complex statutory scheme, has created an atmosphere in which our workers’ compensation claims process often becomes more about principle than about the people involved.
I want to stress that the problems exemplified by this case are not the fault of any functionary or participant in the workers’ compen*293sation claims process. These problems are likewise not the fault of the authors and proponents of the 1993 legislative amendments, who were tasked with salvaging a financially-strapped system for compensating injured workers. To me, it is time to look again at ways to upgrade the fairness of this very important program.
Because our role is limited to interpreting the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act, we must await intervention by the Legislature to address these issues. I take this opportunity to express my hope that the Legislature will commence a process of reevaluation of the Nevada workers’ compensation system at the earliest possible time.

 Here, NRS 616C.390.

 116 Nev. 864, 8 P.3d 143 (2000).

 Id. at 869, 8 P.3d at 146.

 See, e.g., Ayala v. Caesars Palace, 119 Nev. 232, 71 P.3d 490 (2003); Construction Indus. v. Chalue, 119 Nev. 348, 74 P.3d 595 (2003); McClanahan v. Raley’s, Inc., 117 Nev. 921, 34 P.3d 573 (2001); SIIS v. Engel, 114 Nev. 1372, 971 P.2d 793 (1998); Rosser v. SIIS, 113 Nev. 1125, 946 P.2d 185 (1997); SIIS v. Bokelman, 113 Nev. 1116, 946 P.2d 179 (1997).