Court Opinion

ID: 9485854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:31:58.192759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:24.097572
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I continue to dissent because, for the reasons explained in my prior opinion, Johnson v. Sawyer, 980 F.2d 1490 at 1506 et seq. (5th Cir.1992), recovery herein is based on federal, not Texas, law, contrary to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and no material damage proximately resulting from the violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6103 has been shown.
The majority opinion is a monument to the frailty of the rule of law when subjected to an unrelenting assault of legal inventiveness and verbal facility. The initial majority opinion, though conceding that in the abstract a violation of federal law would not suffice for FTCA recovery, nevertheless found that a violation of section 6103 could be brought within the FTCA by virtue of the general Texas doctrine of negligence per se. The majority now purports to abandon that position, seemingly recognizing that it merely invokes federal law under another name, as the duty relied on is actually found only in section 6103. The majority now claims to fill that local law void by, sua sponte, asserting that the relevant duty is that imposed by the Texas common law tort of invasion of privacy, more particularly the “distinct” variety thereof that establishes the duty to refrain from “public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about” another.1 Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board, 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex.1976). Closer reading of the majority opinion, however, reveals its proper acknowledgement that nothing which was disclosed — however otherwise culpable the disclosure — constituted “embarrassing private facts about” Johnson for purposes of this Texas common law tort. In other words, Texas law imposed no duty not to disclose such information. The majority now fills this gap in local law — just as it did before — by resort to section 6103. The pea gets lost for awhile, but ultimately turns up under shell 6103. Simply put, this is a section 6103 suit — more properly a suit *393under former section 72172 — and not one under Texas law. Dressing it up as “negligence per se ” or “invasion of privacy” does not make it otherwise.
The Disclosure
The majority, assuming arguendo the correctness of the decision in Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 385, 338 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 1931, 104 L.Ed.2d 403 (1989), bases its affirmance solely on the disclosure of information not made public in the proceedings of Johnson’s criminal conviction and sentence.3 The majority describes this information as follows:
“True, several items contained in the press releases (Johnson’s first and last name, the guilty plea to one count of tax evasion, the sentence imposed, and the fact that he was an executive with American National) were part of the trial record. But several other items contained in those releases (Johnson’s middle initial — he was known as ‘E.E.,’ his age, his home address in Galveston, and his official job title with American National) were neither discussed at his arraignment nor sentencing or placed in any public record.” (majority opinion at 394; footnote omitted).4
What we are considering, then, is publication merely of the following four facts: (1) that plaintiffs middle initial was “E” (the criminal information charged “Elvis Johnson, a resident of Galveston,”); (2) that his street address in Galveston was “25 Adler Circle”; (3) that he was fifty-nine years old; and (4) that his executive position with American National Insurance Company was executive vice president.5 Although the majority amazingly, and without explanation, refers to these four items as “the truly significant portions of the released information,” it is nevertheless plain that none of them come even close to meeting the core requirement of the Texas tort sought to be invoked, namely that the publicized information be “private” and “contain highly intimate or embarrassing facts about a person’s private affairs, such that its publication would be highly objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities.” Industrial Foundation, 540 S.W.2d at 683.6
*394The obvious fact that neither a middle initial, age, a street address, nor a job title falls within that classification is readily confirmed by reference both to the authorities and to the evidence in this case. Texas invasion of privacy law in this respect has been guided by Prosser, Law of Torts § 117 (4th ed. 1971) and Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D. See Industrial Foundation, 540 S.W.2d at 682 & n. 21, 684 & n. 22; Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex.App.—Ft. Worth 1982, no writ). Prosser, supra, states “ ‘[t]he plaintiff cannot complain when an occupation in which he publicly engages is called to public attention or when publicity is given to matters such as the date of his birth....’ ” Id. § 117 at 858. An individual “must expect the more or less casual observation of his neighbors and the passing public as to what he is and does” and thus there is no liability for publicizing “that he has returned home from a visit, or gone camping in the woods, or given a party at his house for his friends.” Id. at 857. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D, comment b, is to the same effect, viz: “[t]here is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiffs life ... such as the date of his birth ... [or] the fact that he is admitted to the practice of medicine or is licensed to drive a taxicab ...” and “there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye.” Id. at 385, 386. See also Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Texas Newspapers, Inc. 652 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Tex.App.—Austin, 1983, n.r.e.) (“We do not regard the candidates’ names to be facts of a highly embarrassing or intimate nature”); Vandiver v. Star-Telegram, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 103,106 (Tex.App.—Austin, 1988; no writ); Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 274 (5th Cir.1989) (“name, residence, or ‘identity’ are not easily characterized as ‘private, embarrassing facts.’ ”); Tobin v. Michigan Civil Service Comm’n, 416 Mich. 661, 331 N.W.2d 184, 189 (1982) (“Names and addresses are not ordinarily personal, intimate, or embarrassing pieces of information”). No Texas (or other) authority to the contrary is cited by the majority.
Moreover, there is no evidence whatsoever that Johnson’s middle initial, his age, his title at American National, and his home address, or any of these, were actually secret or concealed, or were regarded by him, or would be regarded by the average person, as private or embarrassing or intimate. To the contrary, they were obviously matters that Johnson, in the words of the Restatement, “leaves open to the public eye.” As to the middle initial, Johnson never complained of its disclosure in the press releases. Rather, he took the position below that his counsel and the Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting the criminal case had “agreed that the criminal information and other papers filed with the Court would identify the Plaintiff as ‘Elvis E. Johnson.’ .. ,”7 Further, the undisputed evidence at trial was that Johnson was listed in the Galveston telephone directory as “E.E. Johnson” with address of “25 Adler Circle” (the directory also separately listed him as “Johnny Johnson,” again showing the same address and the same telephone number). At the time of the events in issue, the Johnsons had lived at the Adler Circle address for at least seven years, during all of which time he had worked as an executive at the American National headquarters, which was in Galveston, and since 1976 was Senior Executive Vice President there. Johnson was the number two executive at American National and re*395ported directly to its board of directors, of which he was one of the ten or twelve members. Because the company’s president did not drink, Johnson was in effect its chief entertainer, and when in Galveston conducted business entertaining almost nightly at his home there. As a result, he said, “my home was sort of Grand Central Station” and his wife became “well known” for her role as hostess on these occasions. Mrs. Johnson described herself as an unpaid “hostess for the Company” who, with her husband, “entertained in our home” and “was expected to be at all entertainment affairs to greet everyone who came in.”
Moreover, Johnson testified that American National was a publicly-held corporation that sent annual reports to its shareholders.8 As such, we judicially know that the company was required by law to file annual reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that disclosed the name, age, and all positions and offices with the company held by each director and executive officer.9
The majority does not deny that items such as middle initial or age or address or job title are neither private nor intimate or embarrassing. Indeed, they rely on the public nature of that information about Johnson in contending that its inclusion in the press releases identified him to the public as the Elvis Johnson convicted of tax evasion.10 The majority suggests that because (in its view) the information publicized in violation of section 6103 — Johnson’s middle initial, age, street address, and executive title— •though not otherwise private nevertheless *396became so because it aided the public in identifying the plaintiff as being the Elvis Johnson of Galveston, an American National executive, who was convicted of tax evasion. But such a causal connection would not make the middle initial, street address, or the like “private” information; to the contrary, it emphasizes the non-private nature of that information. Of course, the publication of non-private information — e.g., a person’s name or other identifying public facts about him — can invade the subject’s privacy where it publicly ties that individual to some private occurrence that is intimate or embarrassing; for example, publicizing that the person who is having the previously secret affair with Mrs. X is the man named Mr. Y who lives at such and such an address. Here, however, the non-private identifying information — middle initial, street address, etc. — ties the subject only to what is properly public (his tax evasion conviction).
The complete fallacy of the majority position in this respect is illustrated by its likening of the present case to one in which a newspaper identifies a woman as having AIDS by referring to her name, age, address, and employment. The majority says this example illustrates how public information (name, age, address, employment) can invade privacy. Similarly, it says, the publication of like information about Johnson (his middle initial, age, street address, position title) invaded his privacy. But in the majority’s hypothetical, what was revealed was the private fact that the woman had AIDS; here what is complained of is the revelation that Johnson was convicted of federal felony tax fraud, which is not — and likely may not lawfully be — a private matter. Moreover, Johnson was not convicted under a pseudonym or concealed identity, but rather in open court— as required by the Constitution — under his own name (Elvis Johnson) pursuant to public proceedings that identified him as a Galveston resident employed as an American National executive having taxable income of $59,784.18 in 1975 (and Johnson himself contemplated that this public proceeding would also include reference to his middle initial “E”). As correctly assumed by the majority, nothing in section 6103 makes such information confidential or its publication unlawful or tortious. The majority’s fallacy in this respect is again illustrated by its analogy to Tex.Code Crim.P. art. 57.02 regarding the use in certain proceedings of a victim’s pseudonym. There is, however, no comparable statute — state or federal — for a felony defendant’s use of a pseudonym. Certainly, section 6103 is not such a statute (and, just as certainly, Johnson did not use a pseudonym).
The majority also contends that section 6103 makes any information disclosed in violation thereof private, intimate, and embarrassing as a matter of law, and that Texas courts would therefore hold that whoever publicizes any information contrary to section 6103 commits the Texas tort of invasion of privacy.
There are several things wrong with this. To begin with, section 6103 does not say that whatever is in a tax return is always private, intimate, and embarrassing. A tax return typically shows the taxpayer’s name, occupation, employer, and address. The majority would therefore have it that the facts that Ronald Reagan was President of the United States and lived at the White House are made private, intimate, and embarrassing by section 6103. Obviously, this is not what section 6103 is concerned with. Section 6103 is a regulation of the conduct of those who in the course of their duties as government employees or contractors glean information from tax returns. The regulation is prophylactic, proscribing disclosure by such an individual of any of such information so obtained by him. Plainly, Congress was not determining that all the information on a tax return would always be truly private and intimate or embarrassing. Rather, it was simply determining that since much of the information on tax returns does fall within that category, it was better to proscribe disclosure of all return information, rather than rely on ad hoc determinations by those with official access to returns as to whether particular items were or were not private, intimate, or embarrassing. Because such determinations would inevitably sometimes err, ultimately a broad prophylactic proscription would result in less disclosure by return handlers of such sensitive matters than would a more precisely tailored enactment.
Unlike section 6103, the Texas tort of “[pjublic disclosure of embarrassing private *397facts about” another, Industrial Foundation, 540 S.W.2d at 682, is not concerned with the identity of the party making the disclosure, or his sources, but merely with whether the information disclosed is both private and intimate or embarrassing, and also not of public concern, none of which factors are relevant under section 6103 as the majority reads it. The Texas tort and section 6103 address totally distinct subject matters and impose distinctly different duties: the latter, applicable only to certain individuals who in connection with their government-related duties obtain tax return information, enjoins them not to disclose any of it so obtained, even though it is not private and not intimate or embarrassing and is of public concern; the former, applicable to all persons and regardless of the source of the information, proscribes publication thereof only if the matter is private and is intimate or embarrassing and is not of public concern.11 Hence what the majority has really done is merely to say that Texas courts would allow recovery for a violation of section 6103. This, in substance, is nothing more than allowing recovery on the basis of section 6103, which the FTCA does not authorize, as explained in my earlier dissent. 980 F.2d 1490 at 1506-1509. As we recently stated in Tindall v. United States, 901 F.2d 53, 56 n. 8 (5th Cir.1990), for purposes of the FTCA “a federal regulation cannot establish a duty owed to the plaintiff under state law.”
Further, the majority not only misconstrues section 6103, but its reading of Texas law is likewise wholly unsupported. In substance, the majority admits that absent section 6103 these facts would not give rise to liability under the Texas common law tort of “public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about another,” because the facts disclosed are not private, are not intimate or embarrassing, and relate to a matter of public concern. But no Texas case is cited in which a statutory duty not to disclose has been allowed to fill these gaps in a Texas invasion of privacy case.12 Moreover, there exists a federal statutory cause of action for a section 6103 violation, namely section 7217, set out in my earlier dissent (980 F.2d at 1509-1510), which the majority concedes “is comprehensive in terms of allowing actions for breaches of section 6103” (n. 103). The majority has yet to cite any Texas case — or, indeed, any case from any other jurisdiction — that allows a common law cause of action based on a statutory violation where there is a comprehensive statutory cause of action for the very same statutory violation. As pointed out in my earlier dissent, 980 F.2d at 1510, this is especially anomalous where, as here, the claimed “per se ” common law cause of action based on statutory violation is a state cause of action, but the statute violated and that creating the statutory cause of action for the violation are both federal. I adhere to the view previously expressed, 980 F.2d at 1510-11, that the concededly compre*398hensive section 7217 preempts any such state law liability for violating section 6103, particularly for violations by federal employees acting in the course of their employment which are condemned by, and only by, section 6103(a)(1). See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 503-507, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 2514-15, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988); Atkinson v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 838 F.2d 808 (5th Cir.1988). But even if section 7217 were not preemptive, so that the Texas courts would be constitutionally free to create a common law cause of action for violating section 6103, there is nothing to indicate that they would do so. To repeat, Texas courts have never created a common law cause of action for a statutory violation for which there is an applicable, comprehensive statutory cause of action. The majority thus departs from our settled jurisprudence that “it is not for us to adopt innovative theories of recovery or defense for Texas law, but simply to apply that law as it currently exists.” Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir.1985) (footnote omitted). Among our many other opinions to the same effect are: Junior Money Bags, Ltd. v. Segal, 970 F.2d 1, 11 (5th Cir.1992); Mitchell v. Random House, Inc., 865 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir.1989); Graham v. Milky Way Barge, Inc., 824 F.2d 376, 381 (5th Cir.1987); Harmon v. Grande Tire Co., 821 F.2d 252, 259 (5th Cir.1987). The district court was indeed correct in declining “to undertake what the Texas courts might well view as an impermissible expansion of this variant of the Texas right of privacy.” 760 F.Supp. at 1232.
Causation
For the reasons stated in my earlier dissent, 980 F.2d at 1511-13, it is evident that Johnson has not proved that the section 6103 violation proximately caused his discharge. Any finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous.
It is well to recall that Johnson, as plaintiff, indisputably had the burden of proof on this issue. It is settled law in this Court that a finding of causation “may not rest on speculation and conjecture.” Nichols Const. Corp. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 808 F.2d 340, 346 (5th Cir.1985). See also id. at 349.
Here no individual who participated in or was privy to the decision to terminate Johnson testified; nor did any person who claimed to have learned the reason for Johnson’s termination from anyone who participated in or was privy to the decision to terminate him. There was no documentary evidence concerning that decision. Apart from Johnson himself, no present or former American National officer, director, or employee testified. Only a majority of the board of directors could terminate Johnson. The general counsel and some directors, but not a majority, knew of his conviction before the first press release. The evidence shows that the entire board, and all the stockholders, would have learned of Johnson’s conviction absent any press release, for Johnson himself testified:
“Q. At some point you were going to tell the Board that you were a tax felon?
A. It would be in the footnotes of the annual report, sir.
Q. And would have gone out to the board of directors?
A. And to the shareholders.
Q. And to the shareholders. And you were going to do that regardless whether there was a press release?
A. It would have to have been done, yes, sir.”
There is no evidence that the entire board and the stockholders would not have learned of Johnson’s conviction absent the press releases or either of them.
The majority infers that the board decided to terminate Johnson because the press releases publicly disclosed his conviction. As explained below, there is no evidence to support this. But even if there were, the only proper question is whether the inclusion in the press releases of the information proscribed by section 6103 — Johnson’s middle initial, his age, his street address, and the title of his executive position with American National — caused this decision. Any other test necessarily imposes liability not for the proscribed disclosures but for those the majority assumes are lawful. The April 17 press release redacted to eliminate this section 6103 material, reads as follows (bracketed material omitted):
*399“INSURANCE EXECUTIVE PLEADS GUILTY IN TAX CASE
GALVESTON, TEXAS — In U.S. District Court here, Apr. 10, Elvis [E.] Johnson, [59,] plead guilty to a charge of federal tax evasion. Judge Hugh Gibson sentenced Johnson [of 25 Adler Circle] to a six-month suspended prison term and one year supervised probation.
Johnson, an executive [vice-president] for the American National Insurance Corporation, was charged in a criminal information with willful evasion of federal tax by filing a false and fraudulent tax return for 1975.
In addition to the sentence, Johnson will be required to pay back taxes, plus penalties and interest.”
There is not one shred of evidence that the inclusion of the bracketed material produced any result that would not have obtained had it been omitted. There is no evidence that anyone even believed that. The majority argues that inclusion of the bracketed material made it easier for the public to further identify the Elvis Johnson who was an American National executive and pleaded guilty to felony tax evasion. There is no testimony that the bracketed material was necessary to so identify him (or in fact actually aided in his being identified).13 The record does not even hint at the possibility that there was any other American National executive named Elvis Johnson, much less one who in April 1981 pleaded guilty to tax evasion in Galveston federal court. It is evident — and would necessarily have been evident to the American National board — that the precise identity of the “executive for the American National Insurance Corporation” named “Elvis Johnson” described in the press releases as having pleaded guilty to federal tax fraud was easily determinable by anyone who read them. To sustain a finding of proximate cause, one must assume, in the absence of any evidence whatever tending to support such an assumption, that the American National board was concerned about publicity that an American National executive vice president named Elvis E. Johnson pleaded guilty to tax fraud but was not concerned about publicity that an American National executive named Elvis Johnson, who was readily identifiable as its executive vice president, did so. If that is not pure speculation and conjecture, then those words simply have no meaning.
Wholly apart from the foregoing, it is also evident — and would have been evident to the American National board — that even without any press release, Johnson’s conviction would have been publicly disclosed. As previously noted, Johnson himself testified that the fact of his conviction would have been included in the company’s annual report sent to all of its shareholders and directors. There is not a shred of evidence, not a line of testimony, that this board of directors, or any board of any publicly-held company, would consider disclosure to its shareholders less significant than to Johnson’s Galveston area acquaintances, or would not consider disclosure in its annual report as the substantial equivalent of public disclosure.
Moreover, federal regulations require that any criminal conviction not more than five years old (other than for traffic or other minor offense) of an executive officer or director of a publicly-held company be recorded in public filings with the SEC if “material to an evaluation of the ability or integrity of’ the officer or director in question. See note 9, supra. Johnson was convicted of felony tax fraud in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201, an offense carrying a maximum five-year prison term. Conviction of this offense necessarily means that the defendant “acted willfully and knowingly with specific intent to evade his income tax obligations.” United States v. Daniels, 617 F.2d 146, 148 (5th Cir.1980). *400And, the information to which Johnson pleaded guilty, and of which the district court convicted him, alleged that he “did willfully and knowingly attempt to evade and defeat a large part of the income tax due and owing by him” by preparing and filing “a false and fraudulent income tax return” that understated both his taxable income and income tax due by severa:! thousand dollars “as he then and there well knew.” It is inconceivable that conviction for such an offense — a conviction that has never been challenged — is not, as a matter of law, “material to an evaluation of the ability or integrity of’ Johnson.14
Press release or no, Johnson’s conviction would have been disclosed, and there is certainly no contrary evidence.
The majority defends its affirmance by asserting that the government may not “rebut Johnson’s probative evidence of proximate cause by mere guess or speculation.” But, there is no probative evidence of proximate cause, rather there is merely speculation and conjecture as to what might have motivated the board. This is an issue on which Johnson has the burden of proof. The government does not have the burden to *401prove that the press releases — more precisely, the miniscule parts of them disclosed contrary to section 6103 — did not cause his discharge; rather, it is Johnson’s burden to prove that they did. Perhaps the possibility of causation is not affirmatively wholly excluded. But that does not suffice. As a distinguished panel said, sustaining a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant: “evidence which does nothing more than show that the injury could have possibly occurred through a certain way or means, cannot justify the conclusion that it occurred that way or by that means.” Green v. Reynolds Metals Company, 328 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir.1964).
Conclusion
The majority wrongfully authorizes FTC A recovery based on liability ultimately imposed only by federal law. Moreover, in the process it finds Texas law in a way no Texas court has ever found it, and, as well, wrongfully concludes that the comprehensive section 7217 does not preempt any state law cause of action for federal employee violation of section 6103(a)(1). Finally, the majority ignores the burden of proof and, without a shred of evidential support beyond the purest speculation and conjecture, sustains the wholly illogical finding that Johnson’s dismissal was caused by the inclusion in the press releases of his middle initial, age, street address, and job title, notwithstanding that the press releases legitimately disclosed his first and last name, that he was an American National executive, and that on April 10, 1981, he pleaded guilty in Galveston federal court to felony tax fraud. I respectfully dissent.
ORDER
Oct. 28, 1993.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, KING, GARWOOD, JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, DUHÉ, WIENER, BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:
A majority of the Judges in active service, on the Court’s own motion, having determined to have this case reheard en banc,
IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the Court en bane with oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a briefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.

. This theory was rejected by the district court. Johnson v. Sawyer, 760 F.Supp. 1216, 1232 (S.D.Tex.1991). Appellee has never before this Court challenged that determination of the district court or sought to sustain the judgment below on the basis of any Texas invasion of privacy tort.

. 26 U.S.C. § 7217, the text of which is set out in the previous dissenting opinion. Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1509-10.

. See also William E. Schrambling Accountancy Co. v. United States, 937 F.2d 1485, 1488-89 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 956, 117 L.Ed.2d 123 (1992). I am in essential agreement with Lampert. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1046, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975) (the First Amendment prohibits imposition of "sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection’’); Innovative Database Systems v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217, 221-22 (5th Cir.1993) (Texas law unconstitutional to the extent it prohibits sale of truthful motor vehicle accident information obtained from the public records of a law enforcement agency); United States v. Wallington, 889 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir.1989) (construing narrowly non-disclosure provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1905); Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.1989).

. The initial press release also contained a mis-description of the charges contained in the criminal information. The majority does not rely on this, and properly so, for two reasons. In the first place, it is not "return information” under section 6103; and, while it would be actionable under Texas libel law, it is not under the FTC A. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). In the second place, Johnson was not terminated until several days after the second press release, which corrected this error, and there is no evidence that anything contained in the first release, but not in the second, had any relationship to his termination.

. At sentencing in open court the district judge advised Johnson that his probation would be administered so it "will not interfere with the performance of your duties in your position as an executive for the American National Insurance Company, and this, of course, will allow you to travel.”

. Because the only claimed relevance of these four facts is their enhancement of the identification of the plaintiff as the person whom the press release legitimately otherwise described as Elvis Johnson, an American National executive convicted of tax fraud, and because there is nothing otherwise intimate or embarrassing about these four facts, I now have grave doubts that section 6103 prohibited their inclusion in the challenged press releases about Johnson's conviction. This doubt arises not only from Lampert and its direct progeny, but, more generally, from Cox Broadcasting Corp. and the other cases listed in note 3 following its citation there. Because I conclude that in any event FTCA recovery cannot be sustained, I do not ultimately resolve this question. Rather, my dissent proceeds on the assumption, *394arguendo only, that the inclusion of these four facts in the press releases was a violation of section 6103.

. See also note 13, infra. The only plea agreement in the criminal case record does not contain this stipulation or any of the others claimed by Johnson. This written plea agreement, signed by Johnson under oath, provides that the plea agreement is "to this effect, and no further,” namely that Johnson will not be prosecuted for 1974 taxes nor his wife for either 1974 or 1975, and “the Government will not oppose a probated sentence.” It also recites that Johnson is pleading guilty "because I am guilty" and that he has "received no promises of leniency, or of any other nature, from my own attorney, from the attorney of the United States, or from any other person to induce me to plead guilty.”
The agreement claimed by Johnson is one that he asserts was reached between his lawyer and the prosecution. However, neither any prosecutor nor Johnson’s criminal defense counsel testified as to any agreement between them, and Johnson did not claim to have been privy to any such agreement, but only testified to what his own lawyer (not any representative of the prosecution) told him about it.

. He also stated that when he came with the company in 1951 it was the eighteenth largest life insurance company, out of the some 17,000 such companies in the United States and Canada, that it had grown since then, that it had thousands of employees, and that it had made a profit of some $105 million the year before he left.

. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-l requires of publicly held companies the filing each year with the SEC of "an annual report on the appropriate form authorized or prescribed therefor.” The form prescribed for this purpose is the SEC Form 10-K. See Ratner & Hazen, Securities Regulation, Selected Statues, Rules, and Forms (West 1993) at 912-22. Item 10 of the form requires the same information concerning "Directors and Executive Officers” as is "required by Item 401 of Regulation S-K." Id. at 920. Item 401 of Regulation S-K requires, among other things, the listing of “the names and ages of all directors" and "of all executive officers” of the company, with "all positions and offices with” the company "held by each such person.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(a) & (b). Item 401 also provides in part as follows:
"(f) Involvement in certain legal proceedings. Describe any of the following events that occurred during the past five years and that are material to an evaluation of the ability or integrity of any director, person nominated to become a director or executive officer of the registrant;
(2) Such person was convicted in a criminal proceeding or is a named subject of a pending criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations and other minor offenses); ...” 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f).
The same requirements are all applicable to proxy statements, and these too must be filed with the SEC. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3(a); 240.-14a-6; 240.14a-101, Item 7(b). Shareholders must receive proxy statements and annual reports at the same time each year. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b).
We, of course, take judicial notice of federal regulations. See, e.g., McCormick on Evidence § 335 at 939 (3rd ed. 1984).

.The majority (fn. 20) does quote the language in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D comment b that "[i]f a record is one not open to public inspection, as in the case of income tax returns, it is not public, and there is an invasion of privacy when it is made so.” However, this obviously does not mean that whatever appears on an individual's income tax return is therefore necessarily "private” information about him protected by the invasion of privacy tort, else we would have to conclude that whoever publicized the fact that William L. Garwood is a federal judge would thereby have invaded his privacy. What the quoted language does mean is that information that is otherwise "private” in the relevant sense does not lose its character as such by appearing on an official governmental record that is not open to public inspection, although it would lose its character as "private” if the record were open to public inspection. See id. comment d. The majority inferentially recognizes this by its statement in the text (Slip op. p. 386) that comment b uses “income tax returns as an example of records in which one retains a privacy interest.” (emphasis added). Certainly Texas law follows this common sense approach, as the Texas Supreme Court clearly held in Industrial Foundation that information on a governmental record not open to public inspection could be partially non-"private” — such as the name of the person filing and the general nature of the form — and partially "private.” Id. 540 S.W.2d at 686 (but if the government record is open to public inspection, then giving publicity to any of it is not tortious no matter how "private” what is publicized may otherwise be. Id. at 684).

. The district court here found that the press release information was of public concern. 760 F.Supp. at 1232. Despite the fact that no challenge to that determination has been made on appeal, the majority, sua sponte, sets it aside. Two reasons are advanced, neither valid. The first is that the judge who took Johnson's criminal plea "did not find it necessary to include” Johnson's middle initial, home address, age, or the title of his executive position. "Include” in what is not stated. There is absolutely nothing to indicate that the judge ever gave any consideration whatever to such a matter, or that if he did he did not determine that the record was adequate for anyone interested to find out who the defendant was or that this would be disclosed in any event. It is simply preposterous to suggest that a district judge has determined that a felon's job title or middle initial is not a matter of public concern merely because these are not reflected in the record. The second reason advanced by the majority is that section 6103, of its own force, establishes that these matters are not of public concern. But section 6103 does not shield the identity of convicted felons from public concern merely because they file tax returns stating their full name, address, and employment. Moreover, the majority’s reliance on section 6103 in this respect to allow recovery where it would be denied under local law is but another proof that recovery is based on section 6103 and not on local law.

. Of course, as observed in note 10, supra, the Texas common law recognizes that the mere fact that information appears in an official non public record does not preclude its being private and intimate or embarrassing and not of public concern; but it does not make it so. Nor is any Texas (or other) case (or statute) cited for the majority’s implicit proposition that a recent federal felony conviction is a private matter and not a matter of public concern; for these propositions the majority has nothing but section 6103 to rely on (though even it does not support them).

. Moreover, as the district court recognized, 760 F.Supp. at 1221; Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F.Supp. 1126 at 1131 (S.D.Tex.1986), Johnson's suit does not complain of the inclusion in the press releases of his middle initial, and indeed he took the position below that his counsel's agreement with the Assistant United States Attorney was that the criminal information would state his name as "Elvis E. Johnson.”
And, the information to which Johnson pleaded guilty, and which was and remained of public record, described him as "a resident of Galveston, Texas.” His final plea agreement hence could not be inconsistent with public disclosure of that fact.

. The district court determined that omission of Johnson's conviction would not be "material” for purposes of Vernon's Tex.Civ.Stat. ann. art. 581— 29C(3) as it was not a matter "that a reasonable investor would consider ... important in deciding whether to invest." 760 F.Supp. at 1230. However, that is not the test for the specific relevant SEC filing requirement, which is rather the distinctly different, and narrower, test of whether "the conviction” is "material to an evaluation of the ability or integrity of” the particular convicted officer or director. Moreover, there was no evidence that anyone would not consider Johnson’s conviction material (or important) for either purpose. The law has long considered conviction of any felony as material to an evaluation of the integrity of the person so convicted. Cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521-26, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1991-93, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (witness veracity); Tex.Ins. Code art. 21.07-3, § 12(f) (conviction of any felony grounds for revocation of license of managing general agent; while Johnson may not have been a managing general agent, it is undisputed that a major portion of his duties consisted of performing functions very similar to those of a managing general agent as defined in Tex.Ins.Code art. 21.07-3 § 2(a)). See also Huett v. State, 672 S.W.2d 533, 540 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, pet. ref'd) (three prior felony theft convictions, though all on appeal, of senior executive officer are "material” in the sense of important to deciding whether to invest).
The majority's reliance on TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 447, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 48 L.Ed.2d 757 (1976), and Basic, Inc. v. Levison, 485 U.S. 224, 230, 108 S.Ct. 978, 983, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988), is unavailing. The question is not: what is "material”? That is defined in TSC, and reaffirmed in Basic, as "a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder.” TSC, 426 U.S. at 447, 96 S.Ct. at 2132. Rather, the question is: "material” to what? The answer varies with the subject matter (i.e., "deliberations” aboiit what). In TSC "material” meant "material” to "deciding how to vote,” id., not, as the district court and the majority would have it, "deciding whether to invest.” Here the SEC regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f), expressly give us the "material” to what answer, viz: "material to an evaluation of the ability or integrity of any director ... or executive officer.” The district court and the majority err in applying a material to "deciding whether to invest” standard rather than the regulation commanded standard of "material to an evaluation of the ability or integrity of any director ... or executive officer.”
Further, the district court grounded its determination in this regard on the hypothetical "reasonable investor who knew all the circumstances behind Johnson’s conviction.” 760 F.Supp. at 1230. These circumstances, as found by the district court, were that Johnson never knew that his return contained any discrepancies or misstatements (or understatements of taxable income or overstatement or misstatement of deductions), until after it was filed and the IRS began investigating him. But, this is wholly inconsistent with the conviction itself as Daniels, to say nothing of the wording of the information, 'makes plain. See also United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97-98 (5th Cir.1979) ("a negligent, careless, or unintentional understatement of income” does not violate section 7201; rather, "[t]he Government must demonstrate that the defendant willfully concealed and omitted from her return income which she knew was taxable”). It is what Johnson was "convicted” for — not what he says he did — that is subject to the test of whether it is "material to an evaluation of” his "integrity.” And, as the district court recognized, Johnson’s conviction was a matter “of legitimate public concern.” 760 F.Supp. at 1232. In any event, as the government pointed out to the district court, in this suit by Johnson against the United States, Johnson is estopped from taking any position inconsistent with his subsisting section 7201 conviction. Piper v. United States, 392 F.2d 462, 464-65 (5th Cir.1968); Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262, 264-65 (5th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962, 85 S.Ct. 650, 13 L.Ed.2d 556 (1965); United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir.1983). Finally, there is no hint in the evidence that the board would not have deemed Johnson's conviction material for purposes of the referenced SEC disclosure requirements for officers and directors.