Court Opinion

ID: 9388593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 00:00:34.458481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.231894
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30637   Document: 00516720266      Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/20/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                       FILED
                                                                   April 20, 2023
                             No. 21-30637
                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                       Clerk
   Brigith Dayana Gomez Barco,

                                                      Petitioner—Appellant,

                                versus

   Diane Witte; I. Ramos; Merrick Garland; Alejandro
   Mayorkas,

                                                  Respondents—Appellees,

                        consolidated with
                          _____________

                            No. 21-30748
                          _____________

   Sybreg Valentina Castro Balza,

                                                      Petitioner—Appellant,

                                versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General; Alejandro
   Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
   Security; Diane Witte, in her official capacity as Field
   Office Director, New Orleans District of U.S.
   Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal
   Operations; Indalecio Ramos, in his official capacity
Case: 21-30637     Document: 00516720266          Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/20/2023

                                    No. 21-30637
                                  c/w No. 21-30748

   as Acting Warden of South Louisiana Immigration and
   Customs Enforcement Processing Center,

                                                        Respondents—Appellees.

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 6:20-CV-497
                             USDC No. 6:20-CV-866

   Before Jones, Smith, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
          Appellants Brigith Dayana Gomez Barco and Sybreg Valentina Castro
   Balza challenge the denial of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to
   Justice Act (“EAJA”) following their successful habeas corpus actions.
   Because habeas corpus petitions are not purely civil in nature, and therefore
   do not unequivocally fall under the text of the EAJA, the district court
   decisions are AFFIRMED.
                                   Background
          Brigith Dayana Gomez Barco and Sybreg Valentina Castro Balza are
   both citizens of Venezuela. They were both admitted to the United States as
   nonimmigrant visitors and remained in the United States beyond the
   expiration of their authorization to remain.
          In May of 2018, Gomez Barco was convicted of several crimes and
   sentenced to 20 months and 15 days of imprisonment. In June of 2019,
   Gomez Barco was charged by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
   with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and, on July
   19, 2019, was taken into DHS custody. On August 9, 2019, an immigration

                                         2
Case: 21-30637      Document: 00516720266        Page: 3    Date Filed: 04/20/2023

                                   No. 21-30637
                                 c/w No. 21-30748

   judge sustained the charge of removability and ordered Gomez Barco
   removed to Venezuela.
          In May of 2019, Castro Balza was convicted of conspiracy to defraud
   the United States and sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment. After serving
   her sentence, Castro Balza was charged by DHS with removability under the
   Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 21, 2019, an immigration
   judge sustained the charge of removability, denied Castro Balza’s request for
   voluntary departure, and ordered her removal to Venezuela.
          DHS obtained a travel document for Gomez Barco from the
   Venezuelan consulate and informed her that removal to Venezuela was
   “likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Similarly, on December 31,
   2019, DHS submitted a request for travel documents from the Venezuelan
   government for Castro Balza. The Government attested that there was a
   significant likelihood that Castro Balza would be removed in the foreseeable
   future. The Parties dispute whether the Government was substantially
   justified in its conduct.
          Both Gomez Barco and Castro Balza filed a Petition for a Writ of
   Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district courts granted both
   Petitions. Following her successful § 2241 petition, Gomez Barco moved for
   attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA. The magistrate judge recommended
   that the motion be denied based on the finding that the EAJA does not apply
   to § 2241 actions. The district court agreed, but on “alternate grounds.”
   Instead, the district court found that the Government’s position was
   substantially justified and denied attorney’s fees under the EAJA. Similarly,
   Castro Balza moved for attorney’s fees under the EAJA, which the
   magistrate judge recommended be denied because the EAJA does not apply
   to Section 2241 actions. The district court again agreed that the motion for

                                         3
Case: 21-30637      Document: 00516720266          Page: 4     Date Filed: 04/20/2023

                                     No. 21-30637
                                   c/w No. 21-30748

   attorney’s fees should be denied, “but [did] so on alternate grounds,”
   specifically that the “Government’s position was substantially justified.”
                                Standard of Review
          A district court’s decision to award (or not to award) attorney’s fees
   under the EAJA is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Pierce v. Underwood, 487
   U.S. 552, 571 (1988). “A district court abuses its discretion when it makes an
   error of law or if it bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
   evidence.” United States v. Wilcox, 631 F.3d 740, 747 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal
   citation and quotation marks omitted).
                                     Discussion
          “[N]o suit may be maintained against the United States unless the suit
   is brought in exact compliance with the terms of a statute under which the
   sovereign has consented to be sued.” Koehler v. United States, 153 F.3d 263,
   265 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). In order to recover attorney’s fees
   against the Government, Gomez Barco and Castro Balza must show that the
   Government waived its sovereign immunity in this situation. Any waiver of
   the United States’ sovereign immunity must be express, unequivocal, and
   any ambiguity therein strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Lane v.
   Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). The EAJA allows a party who prevails in
   litigation against the Government to recover attorney’s fees. “A plaintiff may
   be considered a ‘prevailing party’ under the EAJA ‘if they succeed on any
   significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties
   sought in bringing suit.’” Sims v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 2001)
   (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
          The EAJA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing for the
   imposition of attorney’s fees and costs against the United States in specific
   civil actions. Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991). The relevant EAJA
   language provides that

                                          4
Case: 21-30637      Document: 00516720266            Page: 5    Date Filed: 04/20/2023

                                     No. 21-30637
                                   c/w No. 21-30748

                 [e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by
                 statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party
                 other than the United States fees and other
                 expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil
                 action (other than cases sounding in tort),
                 including proceedings for judicial review of
                 agency action, brought by or against the United
                 States in any court having jurisdiction of that
                 action, unless the court finds that the position of
                 the United States was substantially justified or
                 that special circumstances make an award unjust.

   28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). To meet its burden that “the position of the
   United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make
   an award unjust,” the Government must demonstrate that its position was
   “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce, 487 U.S.
   at 565. The threshold issue presented here, however, is whether the EAJA
   expressly and unequivocally waives the United States’ sovereign immunity
   regarding attorney’s fees in immigration habeas corpus actions.
          In deciding whether Congress waived the government’s sovereign
   immunity for an award of attorney’s fees in habeas actions, “[o]ur task is to
   discern the ‘unequivocally expressed’ intent of Congress, construing
   ambiguities in favor of immunity.” United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527,
   531 (1995) (quoting United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33,
   (1992)). We must determine whether a statutory waiver of sovereign
   immunity       for     awards       of       attorney’s     fees    in     “civil
   actions” unambiguously covers habeas corpus proceedings.
          This court has recognized the hybrid nature of habeas corpus
   petitions. See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 2001)
   (noting that courts have found that a “§ 2255 motion is a hybrid, with
   characteristics indicative of both civil and criminal proceedings.”); In re
   Crittenden, 143 F.3d 919, 920 (5th Cir. 1998) (“habeas proceedings, though

                                            5
Case: 21-30637         Document: 00516720266              Page: 6       Date Filed: 04/20/2023

                                          No. 21-30637
                                        c/w No. 21-30748

   technically civil, are in reality hybrid cases whose nature is not adequately
   captured by the phrase ‘civil action’”) (citing United States v. Cole, 101 F.3d
   1076, 1077 (5th Cir.1996)). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit held that the
   “EAJA’s waiver of sovereign immunity to awards of attorney[’]s fees does
   not extend to habeas corpus proceedings” because “courts have routinely
   regarded them as ‘hybrid’ actions.” O’Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 505, 508
   (4th Cir. 2005). We agree that habeas corpus proceedings are hybrid actions. 1
           “[A] waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly
   construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane, 518 U.S. at
   192. Since “a habeas corpus proceeding is neither a wholly criminal nor a
   wholly civil action, but rather a hybrid action that is unique, a category unto
   itself[,]” it is not purely a civil action, and the EAJA does not authorize
   attorney’s fees for successful 28 U.S.C. § 2241 motions. O’Brien, 395 F.3d
   at 505. The court does not need to reach the issue of whether the
   Government was substantially justified in its actions. The district courts are
   AFFIRMED.

           1
              We join the Fourth and Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in O’Brien and Ewing v.
   Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987) and reject the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
   Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2005) and the Ninth Circuit in In re Petition of
   Hill, 775 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1985). The reason is straightforward: habeas proceedings are
   not purely civil actions, and the EAJA is clear that attorney’s fees may be recovered only in
   civil actions.

                                                6