Court Opinion

ID: 9381894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 05:04:50.827126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.303419
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re J. O. MONDRAGON, Minor.                                        March 23, 2023

                                                                     No. 361396
                                                                     Oakland Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2021-882703-NA

Before: PATEL, P.J., and SWARTZLE and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Petitioner removed respondent’s biological child from her care when the child was taken
to a hospital with several injuries indicating that he had suffered from “shaken baby syndrome.”
The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the child. We affirm.

        When the child was approximately one-month-old, his pediatrician examined him and
stated that he was healthy without any concerns. Approximately two weeks later, respondent
stated the child was staying awake for 48 hours straight, refusing to eat, barely moving, and not
urinating or defecating properly. Respondent also stated that the child stopped urinating altogether
six days later, and respondent took the child to a doctor two days after that.

        The child was admitted to a hospital, and he was diagnosed with a left parietal bone
fracture, a bilateral subdural hematoma, bleeding in the brain, healing fractures of the ulna and
radius of the forearm, rib fractures on the posterior of his ribs, broken femurs, compression
fractures in his neck, and ligament injuries in his neck. It was reported that the child was close to
death when he was admitted to the hospital. Two years later, the child was nonverbal, could not
walk or stand, and had trouble moving his limbs because of the injuries he sustained when he was
two-months-old.

        Respondent and the child’s biological father were the only caretakers of the child after the
child was born. The child’s biological father was criminally charged with first-degree child abuse
after he admitted to dropping the child into a “bouncer” and watching the child fall head first onto
a hardwood floor. Respondent stated, to several authorities, that she saw the child’s biological
father drop the child into his crib and squeeze his chest often.

                                                -1-
       The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to the child under MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), and (j). Respondent argues on appeal that there was not sufficient
evidence to support any of these statutory bases.

        A trial court must find that at least one statutory ground for termination has been
established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights. In re
Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court’s findings regarding the
statutory grounds are reviewed for clear error. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id. (cleaned up).

       MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j) states:

       (3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds,
       by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

                                              * * *

               (b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or
               physical or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following
               circumstances:

                                              * * *

               (ii) The parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical
               injury or physical or sexual abuse failed to do so and the court finds
               that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury
               or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.

                                              * * *

               (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity
               of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is
               returned to the home of the parent.

        In this case, the infant child was so injured that it was reported that he was close to death
when he was admitted to the hospital. Even though she now contends that her statements were
coerced, respondent stated to several authorities that she saw the child’s biological father drop the
child into his crib and squeeze the child’s chest tightly. Further, respondent admitted that she
waited more than a week before taking the child to a doctor after the child first presented with
physical complications. Therefore, this Court does not have a definite and firm conviction that the
trial court made a mistake when it held there was clear and convincing evidence respondent had
the opportunity to prevent the physical abuse of her child and failed to do so because she did not
intervene when the child’s biological father was dropping the child into a “bouncer” or the child’s
crib. Additionally, the trial court did not err when it found that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the child will suffer injury in the foreseeable future if placed in respondent’s home because
respondent failed to provide proper medical care for the child in a timely manner. Thus, MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j) were appropriate bases to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

                                                -2-
        Having concluded that at least one statutory ground supports the termination of
respondent’s parental rights to the child, we need not address whether clear and convincing
evidence support the trial court’s finding of statutory grounds under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and
(g). In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).

       Affirmed.

                                                          /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                          /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                          /s/ Noah P. Hood

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