Court Opinion

ID: 9534960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:44:05.198944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:08.668467
License: Public Domain

BURMAN, P. J., dissenting: I am of the opinion that this action should not have been determined by summary judgment since the record clearly presents a genuine issue of material fact for a jury as to whether the defendant was “in charge of” the work under the provisions of the Scaffold Act and under Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 22 Ill2d 305, 175 NE2d 785, and the subsequent cases. I do not believe that Gannon and tbe cases decided since Gannon require the narrow construction of tbe Scaffold Act adopted by tbe majority, that is that an owner-contractor has no duty with respect to scaffolds unless be actually supplies or erects them and in fact controls “tbe manner or method in which tbe work involving tbe violation was to be done.” Gannon itself only held that tbe legislature intended to impose liability for wilful violation of tbe statute on those who are in charge of tbe work, but that case did not define “in charge of.” Moreover, if tbe defendants in Gannon could only have incurred liability if they erected tbe scaffold or controlled tbe manner or method of tbe specific work involved, there could have been no point in remanding tbe case for a new trial. Nor did tbe subsequent interpreting cases adopt such a narrow view of tbe act. In Loveless v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 40 Ill App2d 347, 189 NE2d 679, tbe owner was not charged as being tbe contractor nor was tbe case determined by summary judgment. Tbe court there simply held that in tbe absence of evidence that tbe owner at any time bad charge of tbe construction involving violation of tbe Scaffold Act, tbe mere fact that tbe owner might “through notice or otherwise, call attention to and correct a violation of tbe law, does not, of itself, involve any degree of control or supervision.” (40 Ill App2d at 351.) Cannon v. United States, 328 F2d 763, likewise did not involve a summary judgment nor was tbe government-owner charged to be tbe contractor. Tbe court held that tbe fact that tbe owner “bad an inspector who, from time to time, inspected tbe various painting jobs on tbe Depot, did not place tbe United States ‘in charge of’tbe painting work.” (328 F2d at 765.) In Palier v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 47 Ill App2d 334, 198 NE2d 521, tbe court reversed a summary judgment because tbe deposition of tbe assistant to tbe defendant’s president, to the effect that he had authority to order any changes in the work, raised a disputed question of fact that the defendant was in charge of. The court so held although there was no showing that the defendant either supplied or constructed the scaffold. In my opinion, if the Scaffold Act were to receive the narrow construction adopted by the majority, instead of a more liberal construction, then the Act will be stripped of its reason and purpose in a significant class of cases. Where a workman is injured on a scaffold which was erected by his employer, he would have no Scaffold Act remedy against the owner or anyone other than his employer because under the holding of the majority, those parties were not in control of the work since they did not supply or construct the scaffold. The only action possible against these parties would be a common-law negligence action in which, unlike actions under the Scaffold Act, the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are applicable. As against his employer, the one person who is in control of the work because he constructed the scaffold, the workman, generally has only a claim for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act which is his sole and exclusive remedy. He then has no action against others who may have been in charge of the work and wilfully violated the Act. I do not believe that when the legislature passed the Workmen’s Compensation Act it intended thereby to nullify the extra safeguards which the Scaffold Act was intended to give for this hazardous occupation. Furthermore I believe that the pleadings, the affidavit and the depositions in the instant case disclose a question of fact for the jury and that it was therefore improper to grant summary judgment. The purpose of summary judgment is to permit the court to determine only if there is any genuine issue of fact, not to permit it to try issues of fact. Kruse v. Stream-wood Utilities Corp., 34 Ill App2d 100, 180 NE2d 731. On the record in the Gannon case, the court found that it was a question of fact for the jury whether the owner had charge of the work. In the case at bar the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, as the owner of the involved premises, was in the process of erecting and constructing an addition to its property and that the defendant was acting as its own general contractor and that the contractors and subcontractors were under the direction and control of the defendant. In its answer the defendant admitted to being the owner of the premises, hut denied that it was acting as its own general contractor or that it was in control of any work performed on the premises. The deposition of the defendant’s architect shows that he not only prepared the plans, drawings and specifications, hut that he regularly reported to the defendant and selected and hired the contráctors. He admitted that there was no overall supervisor on the job other than himself. He stated that he was on the project regularly, either personally or through someone in his office. He distributed to each contractor on the job his portion of the work schedule and he fitted each contractor’s work in with the others. Of special importance is the fact that the defendant’s contract with the subcontractor, “Airway,” provided that “the architect shall have general supervision of the work.” The act of summarily disposing of the issue as to whether the defendant was in charge of the work solely on the basis of the pleadings, an affidavit and several dispositions does violence to the right of trial by jury. Even if the evidence adduced by the dispositions were the only testimony offered by the parties, which we have no right to conjecture, still whether the defendant was in charge of the work would he a question of fact for the jury. For all of the foregoing reasons, I think that it was error to grant summary judgment for the defendant. The cause should be reversed and reinstated for trial on the merits.