Court Opinion

ID: 2963850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:16:14.51841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:47.232618
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

        February 9, 1996        [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1438

                               KAREN STOCKWELL, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                               MICHAEL SWEENEY, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                     [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                                 ____________________

            Neil P. Philbin with whom Kirshenbaum  & Kirshenbaum was on  brief
            _______________           __________________________
        for appellants.
            Joseph F.  Penza,  Jr. with  whom  Olenn  &  Penza, and  Kevin  F.
            ______________________             _______________       _________
        McHugh, Assistant City Solicitor, were on brief for appellees.
        ______

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                      ALDRICH,   Senior   Circuit   Judge.      Plaintiff
                                 ________________________

            appellants  are the widow and administratrix of the estate of

            George  Stockwell  (Stockwell)   and  the  Stockwells'  minor

            daughter.   Defendants  are Michael Sweeney  and the  City of

            Providence, Rhode Island.   On May 6, 1993, while acting as a

            traffic  officer  of  the   City,  Sweeney  shot  and  killed

            Stockwell,  a driver of an  automobile.  Plaintiffs sue under

            42 U.S.C.    1983 and  Rhode Island's wrongful  death statute

            (concededly  raising  the  same  issue),  alleging  that  the

            officer's   use  of   deadly   force  was   an  unreasonable,

            unjustified violation of Stockwell's Fourth Amendment rights.

            Plaintiffs'  appeal, following  a  jury verdict  in favor  of

            defendants,  advances  three  principal   claims:    (1)  the

            evidence  warranted judgment  as  a matter  of  law in  their

            favor, (2) the  court's instructions  regarding deadly  force

            were  too   favorable  to  defendants,  and   (3)  the  court

            erroneously admitted testimony concerning Stockwell's alleged

            belligerent  behavior  shortly before  the  encounter.   They

            further  appeal  denial of  post  trial motions  on  the same

            grounds.  We affirm.

                                   Directed Finding
                                   ________________

                      Plaintiffs introduced eight eyewitnesses, no two of

            whom  fully agreed  with  each other.    All, in  one way  or

            another,  disagreed  with  Sweeney, although  some  partially

            supported him.   Plaintiffs' conclusion that  their testimony

                                         -2-

            was  "unequivocal, uncontradicted  and unimpeached"  and that

            the  finding in favor of defendants was so "nonsensical" that

            it should have been directed for plaintiffs could be answered

            in  one sentence:  We  fully agree with  the district court's

            statement that the evidence  presented a "classic question of

            fact."  It is a  rare case where a verdict can  be ordered in

            favor of the party  having the burden  of proof, and this  is

            far from such.   However, as the evidence bears also upon the

            question whether  plaintiffs' case  was prejudiced by  a less

            than perfect charge, we will recount it to some extent.

                      First,  it was  tacitly or expressly  accepted that

            Sabin Street,  Providence, runs, one  way, east to  west, and

            intersects with  Mathewson; that Sweeney, in  uniform, was on

            duty  at this intersection to direct cars bound west on Sabin

            Street to  turn left onto  Mathewson because of  a children's

            affair ahead on  Sabin, and that Stockwell wished to continue

            on.  At some point the officer  drew his service revolver and

            shot Stockwell in the groin, the bullet "moving from right to

            left,  and  from  front to  back."    (Surgeon).   Stockwell,

            hospitalized, died in a few hours.

                      Concededly this  is an unusual case.   According to

            Officer Sweeney, Stockwell, who was  approaching fast, slowed

            down  at his signal, ultimately  to a pace,  but continued on

            into  the officer,  pushing  him backward  a couple  of feet.

            Sweeney  yelled  repeatedly   for  Stockwell  to   stop,  but

                                         -3-

            Stockwell,  shouting, "Get out of my  way or I'll f'n run you

            over," hit him again, this time causing his torso to collapse

            over the hood and his right leg to rise into the air.  Within

            seconds Sweeney, in  fear, reached  for his gun  and fired  a

            single shot at Stockwell, aiming  through the windshield.  At

            this time the car began turning to the left, in effect moving

            Sweeney  to the  right.   (Cf. Carlson,  post.)   Although he
                                       ___           ____

            insisted  that he  aimed through  the windshield,  the bullet

            came through the open window on the passenger  side.  On this

            discrepancy, though physically understandable on the basis of

            the  car's movement,  plaintiffs hang  their as-matter-of-law

            claim.

                      First, plaintiffs' witnesses, briefly.   (Stockwell

            will  be referred  to  as  the  "car,"  and  Sweeney  as  the

            "officer.")

                      Joanna Johnson (school bus passenger)
                      ______________

                      Officer  stepped away  from  in front  of the  car,

            pushing  his hand  against  the  right  front  fender.    Car

            proceeded  and, after it had passed officer by "a few steps,"

            stopped, at which point officer  drew his gun and "ran up  to

            the passenger side of the car  . . . [and] put his gun in the

            window  . . . and  I  heard a  noise which  I  assumed was  a

            gunshot."

                      Susan Winsor (bus passenger)
                      ____________

                                         -4-

                      First saw officer chasing  car, trying to grab onto

            it  and yelling  "Stop!"  "The  car had turned  onto the side

            street, and the officer was on the passenger side.  He got up

            to about midway, maybe  like at the cross pieces  between the

            two windows.  And he looked like he was trying to  hold on at

            one point with both hands.  And then he slipped away from the

            car and that's when I heard a shot."

                      Kenneth  Carlson  (driver  of  car  directly behind
                      ________________

            Stockwell)

                      Saw  officer  gesture to  car  to  detour but  "car

            accelerated really  quickly, threw the policeman  up onto the

            hood."   Car turned to  the left, throwing  officer around to

            the passenger  side of  the  car, when  Carlson saw  officer,

            previously  empty-handed, holding  a  gun.   On  contemporary

            statement  to police Carlson had stated  that officer had run

            six feet along the side of the car before pulling his gun and

            firing into the car; and by deposition  that he ran after the

            car two or three feet.

                      Melissa Iannotti (automobile driver)
                      ________________

                      Stated on  direct examination she saw  officer make

            slow  run after  the  car, "about  a  few car  lengths."   "I

            remember his hands  on the car  and I heard  pop."  On  cross

            stated she saw the car turn to the right towards the officer.

            Saw him place his hands on  the hood.  Thought maybe his feet

                                         -5-

            were  run over,  and that  the gun  was inside  the passenger

            window of the car when officer fired.

                                         -6-

                      Richard Heines (children's bus driver)
                      ______________

                      Saw officer  with his back against  the back window

            of  the  car, pivot  and  fire  through "the  passenger  side

            window"  and  then rotate  back  again.   (Obviously  car not

            moving.)

                      David Mello (automobile driver)
                      ___________

                      Had passed into Mathewson  Street ahead of car, saw

            officer,  through  side-view mirror,  bumped, hands  onto the

            hood, dead  center.  Officer moved towards passenger side, at

            headlight  was  "bumped again,  a  little  harder this  time,

            causing him to come down  onto the hood this way and  then he

            stepped around  the side of  the car."   The  car was  moving

            slowly and while standing  at fender, passenger side, officer

            drew his  gun and,  after car  moved a  couple of  feet more,

            fired.  Entire incident took about 30 seconds.

                      Kim Maddalena (passenger in school bus)
                      _____________

                      After car took slow left-hand turn onto  Mathewson,

            officer chased  car from  behind.  Then,  "I saw  him take  a

            stance, spread his legs  apart, and take his  gun out of  his

            holster and hold it like this and he  shot into the passenger

            side front window."

                      Debra Lusignan (passenger in school bus)
                      ______________

                      After officer gestured, car stopped.  Saw some kind

            of  argument  between  car  and  officer  that  lasted a  few

            minutes.   Then made tight  left turn, brushing past officer,

                                         -7-

            and officer pushed  himself away.   As car proceeded  officer

            banged on rear window and  yelled stop, and when car  did not

            stop  officer  ran after  it for  two  or three  car lengths,

            drawing  his gun.  He  then stuck gun  inside front passenger

            window and fired.

                                       Comment
                                       _______

                      So  much  for   what  plaintiffs  consider   "minor

            inconsistencies on trivial  matters."  Testimony that  placed

            Sweeney as coming from behind would seem clearly inconsistent

            with a  bullet entering the  front of the  groin and out  the

            back; indeed that  point of  entry might be  thought odd  for

            anyone on foot at the car's side.  Plaintiffs' only reference

            to  the path  of the bullet  is to  say that  "the absence of

            exactitude  in  identifying  the specific  locations  of  the

            parties and  vehicle is . . .  insubstantial on the  issue of

            whether Sweeney had to shoot Stockwell in order to defend his

            life."   Seemingly  there is  no difference  between shooting

            from the  hood when one has  been picked up on  a moving car,

            and shooting from  the side,  after coming from  behind in  a

            chase,  or standing alongside, legs spread, and both hands on

            the  gun.  Again, there  is no difference  between being hit,

            center  hood, by  an oncoming car,  (two witnesses,  one said

            once, one twice)1,  and chasing  a car that  had disobeyed  a

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Plaintiffs' brief characterizes inescapable  testimony as
            "brushes,"  a  word never  used by  a  witness, and  fails to
            mention Sweeney's (inescapable)  medical records, which  show

                                         -8-

            traffic order.  The correctness of  the denial of plaintiffs'

            motion for judgment is manifest.

                                  Jury Instructions
                                  _________________

                      It  is conceded that the court correctly instructed

            the  jury that,  in  order to  establish  that the  officer's

            decision to shoot was an unlawful or unreasonable  seizure in

            violation  of  Stockwell's   Fourth  Amendment  rights,   the

            plaintiffs had  to prove,  first, that "that  Officer Sweeney

            intentionally  shot  Mr.  Stockwell,"  and  second, "that  in

            shooting  [him] Officer Sweeney acted  in a way  that was not

            objectively   reasonable  under  the   circumstances."    The

            establishment  of the  first  element  was  uncontested;  the

            second  received the  following  amplification  by the  court

            (contested portions emphasized):

                           The standard for determining whether
                      the  use of  deadly  force  by  a  police
                      officer  was  objectively  reasonable  is
                      whether    under     the    circumstances
                      confronting  that  officer  a  reasonable
                      police  officer  would  have   used  such
                      force.

                           The  law permits a police officer to
                      use deadly force  to the extent necessary
                      to  protect himself or  others from death
                      or serious bodily injury.

                           The  law  also   permits  a   police
                           ____________________________________
                      officer to use  deadly force  when it  is
                      _________________________________________
                      necessary  to  prevent  the escape  of  a
                      _________________________________________
                      suspected  felon  if   the  officer   has
                      _________________________________________
                      reasonable  cause  to  believe  that  the
                      _________________________________________
                      suspect  poses  a  significant threat  of
                      _________________________________________

                                
            ____________________

            him work disabled for three months.

                                         -9-

                      death  or  serious bodily  injury  to the
                      _________________________________________
                      officer or to other persons.
                      ____________________________

                           Assault with a dangerous weapon is a
                           ____________________________________
                      felony.   Intentionally  striking someone
                      _________________________________________
                      or  attempting to  strike someone  with a
                      _________________________________________
                      motor vehicle constitutes an assault with
                      _________________________________________
                      a dangerous weapon.
                      ___________________

                           In determining  whether a reasonable
                      police officer would  have considered  it
                      necessary  to use deadly  force, you must
                      focus  on  the circumstances  confronting
                      that officer at the time the deadly force
                      was  used,  rather  than  on   how  those
                      circumstances   may   appear  given   the
                      benefit of hindsight which, of course, is
                      always twenty-twenty.  Allowances must be
                      made to the extent that a police  officer
                      is forced to make  split-second decisions
                      under circumstances that may be  tense or
                      uncertain or rapidly changing.

                      The court's  mentioning  the law  as to  preventing

            escape was  irrelevant, but,  by the  same  token, we  cannot

            believe a jury, addressing  itself to Sweeney's asserted fear

            of  serious bodily  injury  would be  led  astray.   Of  more

            possible  concern  is  that  the  court's  definition  of  an

            automobile used for an intentional striking (passing what may

            be implicit in that strong  word) was an incomplete statement

            of Rhode Island criminal law.   In State v. Mercier, 415 A.2d
                                               _____    _______

            465, 467 (R.I. 1980), the court said,

                      An automobile  in and  of  itself is  not
                      considered a dangerous weapon, but it may
                      become  so if  it is  employed in  such a
                      manner to render it capable of inflicting
                      death or serious bodily injury.

            We do not, however, have  a criminal case.  The jury  was not

            concerned with legalese, but with substance -- was Sweeney, a

                                         -10-

            traffic officer assigned  to protect  children from  oncoming

            cars, faced  with a driver so determined that he ran into him

            twice, the second time harder (Sweeney and Mello), reasonable

            in fearing for  his safety?   We cannot  think that  judicial

            definitions  were  in  the  jurors' minds,  or  affected  the

            essential  fairness of the trial.   Elwood v.  Pina, 815 F.2d
                                                ______     ____

            173, 177 (1st Cir. 1987).

                              Evidence of Prior Conduct
                              _________________________

                      Anthony Sajowski,  a  security guard  in  a  nearby

            building,   had  encountered  Stockwell  shortly  before  the

            shooting  incident.     A   conversation   took  place   that

            defendants,  before  trial,  gave  notice  they  intended  to

            introduce.   Plaintiffs filed  a motion in  limine contending
                                                    __________

            that  its  substance  was,  in  effect,  character  evidence,

            Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), and, further,  that it should be excluded

            because   the  danger   of  unfair   prejudice  substantially

            outweighed any probative value.  Fed.R.Evid. 403.   The court

            denied the  motion "without prejudice" to the right to object

            at  trial,  noting  that  "everyone  is  aware  of  what  the

            potential problems are  and we  will just have  to deal  with

            that based  on the evidence  as it is  presented."  At  trial

            Sajowski  testified,  over   periodic  objections  on   other

            grounds,  that  Stockwell  had  disregarded   his  authority,

            rebuffed  his assistance,  was  "aggravated" and  had several

            times "towered over"  and confronted him in a provocative and

                                         -11-

            belligerent  manner,  and  that  he   had  felt  sufficiently

            threatened to request local police assistance.  No objections

            for any of the reasons put forth in the motion in limine were
                                                           _________

            made.  Plaintiffs regard the motion as preserving the  issues

            raised therein for appeal.

                      Our  rule is that the filing and denial of a motion

            in  limine, without  subsequent contemporaneous  objection at
            __________

            trial, will  normally not preserve an  evidentiary ruling for

            appeal.  Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1189-1190 (1st
                     _______    ___________

            Cir.  1994)  (citing cases).    Here the  court  very plainly

            indicated  that plaintiffs  should renew their  objections as

            the evidence  came in.   Undo prejudice, Fed.R.Evid.  403, in

            particular  is a  highly subjective  matter, and  plaintiffs'

            failure to object -- it  is not for the court to  remember --

            deprived the  court of its  requested opportunity to  rule on

            the precise record.   See Freeman  v. Package Machinery  Co.,
                                  ___ _______     ______________________

            865 F.2d 1331, 1337-38 (1st Cir. 1988).

                      Plaintiffs  invoke the doctrine of plain error that

            permits late raising.  See Arrieta-Agressot v. United States,
                                   ___ ________________    _____________

            3  F.3d 525, 528  (1st Cir. 1993); Clausen,  21 F.3d at 1190-
                                               _______

            1191.   The first question  is whether it  was error at  all.

            Plaintiffs have had  a four day  trial, with many  witnesses.

            We  are especially  hesitant  to say  from  our poor  vantage

            point,  see  Reagan v.  Brock, 628  F.2d  721, 723  (1st Cir.
                    ___  ______     _____

            1980), that  plaintiffs should  have a  new trial because  it

                                         -12-

            would  have been an abuse of  discretion for the court not to

            have  found that  the  prejudicial effect  of this  testimony

            substantially exceeded  its possible relevance.   Instead, it

            is  at  least  arguable  that  this  was  not  a  case  where

            defendants  were offering  to show  that Stockwell  was of  a

            belligerent character as permitting  an inference that he was

            in character on this occasion.  Rather, it would be open here

            to  find that actual belligerence  of a few  moments ago does

            not evaporate instanter, particularly when faced with further

            opposition  and  conflict.   The  evidence  could be  thought

            direct, rather than inferential.   On such a basis  there was

            no error.

                      Alternatively, if  it be  thought we  are mistaken,

            and there was  error, the  term "plain error"  means what  it

            says, "clear,"  "obvious," United  States v. Olano,  507 U.S.
                                       ______________    _____

            725, ___, (1993); 113  S.Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993); "particularly

            egregious:" Clausen, 21 F.3d at 1191.  This it was not.
                        _______

                      Affirmed.
                      _________

                                         -13-