Court Opinion

ID: 9555048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 16:08:37.612091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:01.764119
License: Public Domain

J-A08012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CURTIS MAHAFFEY                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1328 WDA 2021

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 7, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
              Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0004685-2003

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED: August 10, 2023

       Appellant, Curtis Mahaffey, appeals from the October 7, 2021 order of

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissing his petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

46.1 Counsel for Appellant has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a

no-merit letter in accordance with Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927

(Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the order denying

Appellant’s petition.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant filed a petition “for Subpoena of an Official’s Misconduct
Records/Reports,” which, as discussed infra, the PCRA court properly treated
as a PCRA petition.
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       The factual and procedural background of the instant appeal are not at

issue here.    Briefly, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-

degree murder and conspiracy.             On November 20, 2003, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.          On direct

appeal we affirmed the judgment of sentence.            See Commonwealth v.

Mahaffey, No. 2279 WDA 2003 (Pa. Super. filed July 20, 2005). Our Supreme

Court denied Appellant’s petition for leave to file a petition for allowance of

appeal nunc pro tunc on October 6, 2005.               See Commonwealth v.

Mahaffey, 68 WM 2005 (Pa. 2005).2

       From 2006 through 2019, Appellant filed several PCRA petitions, none

of which were successful.          On September 21, 2021, Appellant filed the

underlying petition (which, as noted above, Appellant identified as a “Petition

for Subpoena of an Official’s Misconduct Records/Reports”). In his petition,

Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the affidavit of probable cause for

Appellant’s arrest and the truthfulness of Detective Logan, the affiant. On

October 7, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as an untimely PCRA

petition. This appeal followed.

       We first address counsel’s application to withdraw. In order for PCRA

counsel to withdraw under Turner/Finley in this Court:

____________________________________________

2 Because Appellant failed to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal, and

the Supreme Court denied his request to file nunc pro tunc, the judgment of
sentence, for purposes of the PCRA, became final on August 19, 2005, upon
expiration of the 30-day period to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal.

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      (1) PCRA counsel must file a no-merit letter that details the nature
      and extent of counsel’s review of the record; lists the appellate
      issues; and explains why those issues are meritless.

      (2) PCRA counsel must file an application to withdraw; serve the
      PCRA petitioner with the application and the no-merit letter; and
      advise the petitioner that if the Court grants the motion to
      withdraw, the petitioner can proceed pro se or hire his own lawyer.

      (3) This Court must independently review the record and agree
      that the appeal is meritless.

Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817-18 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      Upon review, we conclude that counsel complied with the procedural

and substantive requirements for withdrawal. Counsel stated in his letter to

Appellant that Appellant’s issues lacked merit after conducting a review of the

record. Application for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, Exhibit A, 11/7/22.

Counsel advised Appellant that he could retain private counsel or proceed pro

se, id., Exhibit B, and provided Appellant with a copy of the brief, which

summarizes the facts and procedural history, includes issues that could

arguably support Appellant’s appeal, and explains why the issues are

meritless.

      Having concluded that counsel’s petition to withdraw is Turner/Finley

compliant, we conduct an independent review of the record in light of the

PCRA petition and the issues set forth within it, as well as of the contents of

the petition of counsel to withdraw. If we agree with counsel that the claims

are without merit, we will permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Park, 2021 WL 4477468 (Pa. Super. filed

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September 30, 2021).3 Appellant responded to counsel’s petition to withdraw,

in which he rehashed his arguments as set forth in the petition at issue here.4

        Appellant presents the following issue for our consideration: “[W]hether

the PCRA court properly denied [Appellant]’s ‘Petition for Subpoena of an

Official’s Misconduct Records/Reports’ as an untimely PCRA.” Appellant’s Brief

at 7.

        We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
        light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
        Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super.
        2010). This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and
        the evidence of record. Id. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
        ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
        error. Id. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any
        grounds if the record supports it. Id. We grant great deference
        to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
        findings unless they have no support in the record.
        Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011).
        However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.
        Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011);
        Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007).
        Further, where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard
        of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
        Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010).

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

____________________________________________

3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the
Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).

4 See Appellant’s January 19, 2023 “response to application to withdraw,”
which Appellant renewed on February 23, 2023. See Appellant’s “Motion to
Response to Turner/Finley,” 2/23/23. Appellant’s February 23, 2023,
motion is hereby granted.

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       Counsel first noted that the PCRA court correctly identified the above

petition as a PCRA petition. To this end, counsel noted that the PCRA court

properly treated Appellant’s petition as a PCRA petition, relying on

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007), for the

proposition that any petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes

final will be treated as a PCRA petition.

       We agree with the PCRA Court’s and counsel’s characterization of

Appellant’s petition as a PCRA petition.5         Indeed, it is undisputed that

Appellant’s judgment of sentence is final.6      We must determine, however,

whether the relief requested falls within the scope of the PCRA.

       Appellant claims that he discovered that Detective Logan had “a history

of being an unreliable witness,” that the Commonwealth was aware of it but

failed to disclose it to Appellant, and that trial counsel failed to conduct proper

discovery to find out about Detective Logan’s history of untruthfulness. With

____________________________________________

5 Regardless of how a petition is titled, courts are to treat a petition filed after

a judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if it requests relief
contemplated by the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287,
1289 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also Commonwealth v. Torres, 223 A.3d 715,
716 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating, “so long as a pleading falls within the ambit
of the PCRA, the court should treat any pleading filed after the judgment of
sentence is final as a PCRA petition” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v.
Hromek, 232 A.3d 881, 884 (Pa. Super. 2020) (affirming the Wrecks holding
that regardless of how a filing is titled, a petition should be treated as filed
under the PCRA if it is filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final and
seeks relief provided under the PCRA).

6 As noted above, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on August

19, 2005.

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this   background,      Appellant    filed     the   underlying   petition   seeking   to

substantiate his Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Ultimately, Appellant intends to use this information about Detective Logan

for purposes of impeaching his credibility. Petition, 9/21/21, at 3.

       At its core, Appellant is attacking his conviction and sentence, which is

exactly what the PCRA is intended to address.               See Commonwealth v.

Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2008); Burkett, 5 A.3d at 1274 (Pa. Super.

2010). Additionally, it is well-established that both ineffective assistance of

counsel and Brady violations are cognizable under the PCRA.                  See, e.g.,

Commonwealth ex rel. Dadario v. Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126, 130 (Pa.

2001) (“all constitutionally-cognizable claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel may be reviewed in a PCRA petition”); Commonwealth v. Simpson,

66 A.3d 253, 264 n.16 (Pa. 2013) (“A Brady claim is cognizable on collateral

appeal under the PCRA”) (citation omitted).             Accordingly, we conclude that

the petition falls within the scope of the PCRA.

       In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in

treating the Petition for Subpoena of an Official’s Misconduct Records/Reports

as a PCRA petition.7

____________________________________________

7 To the extent Appellant argues that the underlying petition is merely a
request for relief to obtain information necessary for the filing of a PCRA
petition, see Appellant’s Response to Application to Withdraw, dated 1/12/23,
at 2, neither we nor the PCRA court can entertain the request. The PCRA
provides a mechanism for seeking discovery after the petition has been filed
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Next, counsel argues that the PCRA court did not err in finding the

instant petition untimely. We agree.

       Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on August 19, 2005.

Appellant, therefore, had until Monday, August 21, 2006, to file a timely PCRA

petition. Appellant filed his current petition in 2021, which is patently untimely

by about 15 years.

       Appellant apparently attempts to invoke the newly discovered fact

exception,8     see    Petition   for   Subpoena   of   an   Official’s   Misconduct

____________________________________________

if the petitioner can establish exceptional circumstances. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
902(E)(1). Prior to that time, “[n]o court shall have authority to entertain a
request for any form of relief in anticipation of the filing of a petition under
this subchapter.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(a).
8 Appellant claims that the evidence about Detective Logan constituted “newly

discovered evidence.” We construe the claim as alleging that the evidence
constituted newly discovered facts for purposes of establishing an exception
to the timeliness rule set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). The exception
requires a petitioner to plead and prove two components: 1) the facts upon
which the claim was predicated were unknown, and (2) these unknown facts
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. See
Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 638 (Pa. 2017).

To the extent Appellant instead claims after-discovered evidence, Appellant
would not be entitled to relief on that ground.

First, a facially untimely PCRA petition, as the instant one, attempting to raise
a substantive after-discovered evidence claim must first establish jurisdiction
by pleading and proving an exception to the PCRA time-bar. See, e.g.,
Burton, 158 A.3d at 629 (Pa. 2017); Commonwealth v. Brown, 11 A.3d
171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015). As discussed above, Appellant failed to do so.

Second, the requirements of an after-discovered evidence claim include, in
relevant part, that the new evidence is not to be used for merely cumulative
or impeachment purposes. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Heaster, 171 A.3d
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Records/Reports, 9/21/21, at 2.           Indeed, he alleges that the discovery of

Detective Logan’s history of untruthfulness, constituted “newly discovered

evidence,” which he intends to use to “impeach the credibility of Detective

Logan’s truthfulness.” Id. Appellant, however, does not explain when he first

became aware of the allegations he makes in his current petition. Additionally,

he does not explain why he could not have discovered those facts in a timely

manner nor the efforts he put forward to discover those facts.9

____________________________________________

268, 273 (Pa. Super. 2018). Here, Appellant would not be entitled to the
evidence sought because, as Appellant states, he intends to use the evidence
to impeach Detective Logan’s truthfulness. Petition for Subpoena of an
Official’s Misconduct Records/Reports, 9/21/21, at 2.
9 It should be noted that Appellant’s issues with Detective Logan’s affidavit of

probable cause supporting Appellant’s arrest were raised and disposed of on
the merits on direct appeal. There, Appellant unsuccessfully argued that the
affidavit of probable cause was premised on false information provided by a
witness. In the instant petition, Appellant argues that the affidavit of probable
cause was premised on Detective Logan’s untruthfulness about Appellant’s
statements made to Detective Logan during the interview. We see two
additional problems with the current petition. First, “[a] petitioner is not
entitled to relitigate a claim every time he offers a new theory or argument
which he had not previously advanced.” Commonwealth v. Tenner, 547
A.2d 1194, 1197 (Pa. Super. 1988), appeal denied, 562 A.2d 826 (Pa. 1989);
see also Commonwealth v. Fuller, 509 A.2d 364, 366 (Pa. Super. 1986).
Second, Detective Logan’s alleged untruthfulness about what Appellant stated
at the time of Appellant’s interview was known to Appellant since before the
trial; yet he, inexplicably, decided to raise it only now. Additionally, Appellant
did not need the evidence sought here to challenge Detective Logan’s
truthfulness. Indeed, as acknowledged by Appellant, the evidence is sought
merely for purposes of impeachment. As noted above, even if the request for
discovery were included in a timely PCRA petition, Appellant would not be
entitled to the evidence sought because it does not qualify as after discovered
evidence.

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      Thus, given that the instant petition is facially untimely, and given that

Appellant failed to prove the applicability of the “newly discovered facts”

exception, we conclude we have no jurisdiction to entertain the instant

petition. The record supports the PCRA court’s determinations, and we agree

with counsel that Appellant’s claims lack merit. Moreover, having conducted

an independent review of the record in light of the PCRA petition, as well as

the contents of counsel’s petition to withdraw and brief, we agree that the

PCRA petition is meritless and that counsel is entitled to withdraw.

      Motion to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/10/2023

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