Court Opinion

ID: 9674284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:26:03.266671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:26.706023
License: Public Domain

CARNEY, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the foregoing opinion that the decree for specific performance should be reversed but I am of the opinion that the defendant, Mrs. Douglas, did understand that she was signing a contract for the sale of her prop*128erty at $12,000 and was not misled into believing that she was only signing a contract which would give her the option to sell at $12,000.
It was argued by solicitors for complainant that Mrs. Douglas knew or should have known that the new highway was coming by her property and would be located on a cloverleaf intersection because the stakes placed by the highway engineers were in her yard. Under Tennessee law an agent may represent two principals in a transaction involving adverse interests but such agent must disclose to each principal such material facts as will enable the principal to form a reasonably correct opinion and conclusion as to the principal’s best interest. Bell v. Strauch, 40 Tenn.App. 384, 292 S.W.2d 59; McNeill v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., 184 Tenn. 99, 195 S.W. 2d 626. The good faith of the agent or attorney does not determine the legality of the transaction.
I think Mrs. Douglas was entitled to revoke the contract before execution of the deed since Mr. Burcham did not explain to her clearly at the time he contracted with her that he was representing Mr. Cultra as a lawyer and was not representing and advising her as her lawyer. Mrs. Douglas received no down payment at the time she signed the contract. Under these circumstances Mr. Burcham would not be entitled to a degree of specific performance and, of course, Mr. Cultra, as his assignee or unnamed principal, would not have any rights to specific performance greater than Mr. Burcham would have. Kennedy v. Woolfolk, 4 Tenn. 195, 3 Haywood, 195.