Court Opinion

ID: 9847918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:09:56.471903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:46.426519
License: Public Domain

Holmes, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion the automatic incarceration of an insanity acquittee, as contemplated by the trial court and the majority of this court in their construction of K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 22-3428, violates both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The vital language of the statute provides in pertinent part:
“(1) When a person is acquitted on the ground that such person was insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime the verdict shall be ‘not guilty *113because of insanity,’ and the person so acquitted shall be committed to the state security hospital for safekeeping and treatment(Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 22-3428a(l) provides that any person lodged in the state security hospital may, after the expiration of one year and annually thereafter “request a hearing to determine whether or not such person continues to be dangerous to the patient’s self or others.”
It is obvious the intent of the statutes is to provide treatment, if necessary, for the acquitted defendant and protect such person and society from any violent or dangerous acts which he or she might be inclined to do because of mental illness.
The statute requires commitment for safekeeping and treatment. The corollary of this provision is that no commitment is required if the acquittee constitutes no danger to himself or others which would require “safekeeping” and if no “treatment” is required. To mandatorily place the acquittee in the state security hospital without a hearing to determine the need for safekeeping and/or treatment is violative of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, 92 S.Ct. 1845 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the statutes of Indiana under which Jackson was indefinitely committed, based upon a determination that he was incompetent to stand trial, violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the constitution. Admittedly, the factual circumstances and statutes involved are quite different than those before this court. However, certain language and the holding of the court are persuasive, if not controlling.
“. . . Jackson was not afforded any ‘formal commitment proceedings addressed to [his] ability to function in society,’ or to society’s interest in his restraint, or to the State’s ability to aid him in attaining competency through custodial care or compulsory treatment, the ostensible purpose of the commitment. At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” 406 U.S. at 738. (Emphasis added.)
The provisions of the statute, in my opinion, also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Civil commitment under K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq., requires stringent hearing requirements even though the person may be dangerous to himself or others. As stated by one commentator on Kansas criminal law:
*114“In Kansas a person is automatically committed after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. This raises a serious equal protection problem that should be considered by the legislature. ... A person found not guilty by reason of insanity is automatically committed, but there is no specific finding that the defendant is presently dangerous. A hearing, however, is required for involuntary civil commitments, which squarely raises the equal protection problem.” K. Meyer, Survey of Kansas Law: Criminal Law and Procedure, 27 Kan. L. Rev. 391, 402 (1979).
See also the equal protection portion of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 723.
In the case at bar, Jones faces the possibility, if not the probability, of spending over a year at the state security hospital without any prior determination that safekeeping and/or treatment are necessary and, under the majority’s interpretation of the statute, without any procedure whereby he may demand a determination. Such a procedure bears no reasonable relationship to the ostensible objectives sought by the statute, that is, safekeeping and/or treatment. In fact where it has been shown, as in this case, that the acquittee requires neither safekeeping nor treatment by the state, such incarceration amounts to nothing more than punishment by way of confinement for the alleged commission of a crime of which the defendant has been acquitted.
In view of the amendment to K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 22-3428(1) by the 1980 Legislature (L. 1980, S.B. 536), it would serve no useful purpose to extend this dissent by further citation of authorities or argument. It is interesting to note, however, that the amendment provides in part: “A finding of not guilty because of insanity shall be prima facie evidence that the acquitted person is presently dangerous to the person’s self or others or property of others.” (Emphasis added.) Query: As “prima facie evidence” merely creates a presumption which may be overcome by evidence from the other party (in this statute, the insanity acquittee), does not the new amendment imply or contemplate a prior hearing to allow the “prima facie evidence” to be rebutted or contradicted? Black’s Law Dictionary 1353-1354 (4th ed. rev. 1968). This is a determination which will probably be before this court at some later date.
In my opinion the writ of habeas corpus should issue.