Court Opinion

ID: 9561925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:18:50.438574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:58.603377
License: Public Domain

JACOBSON, Judge,
specially concurring:
I agree with the majority opinion as to the disposition of this matter on its merits. Moreover, I reluctantly agree that the hearing officer was required to hear the issue of permanent disability de novo, in spite of two appellate courts having already passed on this issue. This specially concurring opinion is written for the. sole purpose, in the name of effective judicial administration, of again lamenting the sad state of affairs involved in judicial review of Industrial Commission awards.
In 1925, the Arizona legislature provided that review of Industrial Commission awards by the Arizona Supreme Court, would be limited to “enterfing] judgment either affirming or setting aside the award.”1 The statute’s effect is that if the *145award is set aside, the parties are entitled to a hearing de novo before the Commission on the theory that the legal effect of the set aside is as though the award had never been entered. Schnatzmeyer v. Industrial Commission, 78 Ariz. 112, 276 P.2d 534 (1954); Vidal v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ariz.App. 244, 445 P.2d 446 (1968). The parties are entitled to a new hearing on all issues, even though in a multiple issue award, the appellate courts agree with the Commission on some but not all the issues presented. Rutledge v. Industrial Commission, 14 Ariz.App. 317, 483 P.2d 58 (1971), affirmed in part, vacated in part, 108 Ariz. 61, 492 P.2d 1168 (1972).
This case typifies the judicial and administrative waste brought about by the legislature’s refusal to grant to the highest courts of this state the authority to modify or reverse in part or affirm in part awards of the Industrial Commission.
The claimant in this case was injured in 1971. As a result of hearings before the commission, it was determined (1) that claimant suffered no permanent disability as a result of the injury, and (2) that claimant had failed to timely protest a determination of average monthly wage. In 1974, this court in review of that decision (Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 21 Ariz.App. 501, 520 P.2d 1178 (1974)), held the evidence properly supported the commission’s award that the claimant suffered no permanent disability. We also found claimant’s protest to the determination of average monthly wage to be untimely. On petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court (Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 111 Ariz. 364, 529 P.2d 1181 (1974)), that court agreed that claimant suffered no permanent disability attributable to the 1971 injury, but having determined that the untimely protest of the average monthly wage was excusable and having no authority to affirm in part or reverse in part, set aside the entire award.
On rehearing de novo before the commission, the issue of average monthly wage determination was disposed of rather summarily, but the hearing officer was compelled to rehear the issue of permanent disability. Because of this compulsion, the parties were required to incur additional expenses in attorney fees and taking out of state depositions. The hearing officer again concluded that the claimant had suffered no permanent disability.
So here we are in 1977, wrestling with an issue which this court and the Arizona Supreme Court considered and disposed of three years ago, and the issue which resulted in the award being set aside by the Supreme Court is not even before us, because it has been satisfactorily disposed of on an administrative level. By any standard, this is a “hell of a way to run a railroad.”
Whatever the legislative reasons in 1925 were for limiting the scope of appellate review of Industrial Commission awards (reasons I suggest later have now disappeared), the consequences of that limited review must be weighed against the present ever burgeoning appellate case load. At this time, one third of the complement of Division 1, of the Arizona Court of Appeals (three out of nine judges) is primarily engaged in reviewing awards of the Industrial Commission. The entire filings in this court are increasing at the average yearly rate of approximately 17%. Civil litigants are waiting approximately 18 months after their cases are at issue for determination by this court. There is serious consideration being given to requesting the addition of three new appellate judges to this court (with an added increase to the taxpayers of approximately $140,000 annually).
I don’t seriously argue that merely giving the appellate courts the same appellate review power over Industrial Commission awards as we have over other litigation is going to stem the tide of appellate business. However, limiting litigants to one appellate review of their contentions must result in a savings of appellate court time and effort. (I know of • no legal or constitutional requirements which permit a litigant more than one appellate review of his or her contentions.)
Aside from the appellate judicial review savings, requiring the commission to rehear *146issues previously determined (and affirmed by the appellate courts) results in increased administrative expense (translate taxpayer expense) and cost to the litigants themselves.
This court has no actual knowledge as to the cost to the commission and litigants in re-litigating issues previously determined by both the commission and the appellate courts, but if this case is any example, it must be substantial.
Again, aside from the savings in taxpayer and litigant dollars, I strongly suggest that the reason underlying limited appellate review of Industrial Commission awards has disappeared. In 1925 and up until 1973, awards of the Industrial Commission were being entered or at least reviewed by the commissioners themselves. These commissioners were and are now appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate. A.R.S. § 23-101, formerly 1928 R.C. § 1391. Presumably, these commissioners brought to the Industrial Commission an expertise in industrial matters and comprised a non-lawyer body to adjudicate rights of employees and employers. Arguably, the legislature had valid reasons to limit the scope of judicial review of such a body.
However, since 1974, awards of the Industrial Commission are being made by a single hearing officer (who review his or her own award) and who must be a lawyer and a member of the State Bar A.R.S. § 23-108.02.
In short, this court is now reviewing one man decisions dealing with workmen’s compensation. Why more sanctity should be afforded to decisions of appointed lawyer administrative hearing officers than are afforded to decisions of elected superior court judges or juries of our peers is simply beyond me.
The legislature must act to grant to the judiciary the power to review one man awards of the Industrial Commission in the same manner we review decisions of our superior courts.

. 1925 Ariz.Sess.Laws, Chap. 83 § 90 (superceded by A.R.S. § 23-951).