Court Opinion

ID: 9740499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:36:32.913444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.557387
License: Public Domain

LOUIS J. CECI, J.,
(dissenting). I dissent on one ground: By declaring 1983 Wisconsin Act 3 to be a valid, enforceable contractual obligation of the state, the majority has authorized a state debt, in violation of the state constitution. Article VIII, sec. 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution specifically provides that, “The state shall never contract any public debt except in the cases and manner herein provided.” By holding that the operating notes are not public debt within the meaning of this constitutional prohibition, the majority has effectively undermined the purpose of this prohibition.
The majority states that the constitution does not define the term “public debt,” but points out that the court has frequently defined the term in past cases. The majority refers to State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 151 N.W. 331 (1915), to conclude that public debt has two components: (1) It must be an absolute obligation to pay money or its equivalent, and (2) the obligation is to be paid from money which is to be funded in the future, or, in other words, money that is not presently available. The majority concedes that the operating notes are clearly intended to be absolute obligations to pay money on the state’s part, as the act in sec. 18.72(2), Stats., provides for purchasers’ remedies against the *383state.1 Thus, the first element of public debt is present in 1983 Wisconsin Act 3. However, because the majority finds that these operating notes are to be paid from money in the “process of collection,” the majority holds that the second element of public debt is missing from the act. It is with this holding that I disagree.
The majority initially relies upon Donald in its analysis of the second component of public debt. However, in that case, the court found the state’s contract to purchase land for reforestation and water-power purposes constituted a public debt within the prohibitions of Wis. Const, art. VIII, sec. 4. This was based upon the fact that the agreements in the contract were “absolute promises to pay sums of money, fixed as to amount, in 'praesenti, with payments deferred and without reference to money in hand or equivalent.” Id. at 61. In the instant case, I believe that the act authorizing the issuance of the operating notes is equivalent to the above contract in the Donald case. The operating notes represent absolute promises by the state to pay money in fixed amounts, and the money to be used for the payments is not “in hand.”
In the Donald case, the court warned that:
“It may well be admitted that courts have been quite, and perhaps too, resourceful in discovering methods of so construing the term ‘debts’ and ‘indebtedness’ as to restrict the meaning thereof so as to meet the exigencies of particular cases.” Id.
I believe that this is what the majority has accomplished by interpreting 1983 Wisconsin Act 3 as a valid, enforceable contractual obligation, in order to meet the exigency of the state’s cash-flow imbalance. Like the Donald court, I submit that the safest way to avoid restricting *384the meaning of the word debt is to “cut quite loose from case law and look to the fair meaning of the constitution itself.” Id.
The meaning of art. VIII, sec. 4 of the state constitution is quite clear. It succinctly states that, “The state shall never contract any public debt except in the cases and manner herein provided.” (Emphasis added.) Concerning the historical background of the constitution, one author has stated the following:
“The delegates also displayed a horror of public debt. An obligation incurred must be met and the people must be taxed to pay it and within a short time after the debt was incurred. Then, as now, men looked askance at taxes. Traditionally in governments especially, those not responsible directly to the people, were engines of oppression and extortion. So, severe limitations were placed upon the power of the state Legislature to incurring public debts. They looked with horror on the idea of one generation imposing liability on the next. A limitation of $100,000.00 public debt was fixed and this debt had to be concurred in by a two-thirds vote of each house, with the imposition of a tax large enough to retire this debt in five years with interest.” J. McGalloway, Historical Background of the Constitution of Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann, Const, 1, 9 (West 1957).
As a result of this attitude, art. VIII, sec. 4 was drafted containing its specific prohibition against the creation of public debt, with the subsections following containing the exceptions to public debt and the limitations on such exceptions. The majority clearly has not found that the operating notes fall within the exceptions to public debt. Rather, the majority finds that the notes are not public debt, thereby ignoring the historical context of art. VIII and authorizing exactly that which the framers strove to guard against.
Further, the majority utilizes cases dealing with debts of Municipalities in order to determine whether or not *385the operating notes are funded by “current revenues collected or in process of immediate collection.” Earles v. Wells, 94 Wis. 285, 298, 68 N.W. 964 (1896). See also, School Dist. v. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank, 9 Wis. 2d 400, 101 N.W.2d 112 (1960). However, what the majority fails to grasp is that the constitution of Wisconsin originally contained no limitation on the borrowing capacity of municipal operations. School Dist. v. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank, 9 Wis. 2d at 404. Obviously, the framers were not as concerned with debts of municipalities as they were with debts of the state, or such a limitation would have been included at the time of the original drafting. In 1874, art. XI, sec. 3 of the constitution was amended to place the limitation upon municipal debts. Id. The majority cites to State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 352, 65 N.W.2d 529 (1954), for its argument that because the terms “debt” and “indebtedness” as used in arts. VIII and XI of the constitution have the same meaning, indebtedness for municipalities and the state is the same. I am unable to make this leap, for the simple reason that the framers originally included no limitation for municipality debt, yet found it necessary to include an express bar upon state indebtedness, except in very extreme and well-delineated circumstances. Because of this very fundamental difference in the history of the two provisions, I believe that although the terms “debt” and “indebtedness” may be used in identical contexts, municipal and state debt are not the same and, thus, should not be treated identically. Therefore, I am unable to accept the majority’s contention that municipal debt considerations should control in state debt issues.
Along this same line of reasoning, the majority refers to Earles v. Wells, 94 Wis. 285, to support its argument that the operating notes do not constitute public debt. However, Earles dealt with the issue of whether a municipality could contract for the construction of waterworks, *386through authorizing the firm with which it contracted to issue bonds in order to raise money for the construction, for which the city was to be considered a party to the bond. In that case, the court stated that:
“So long as the current expenses of the municipality are kept within the limits of the moneys and assets actually in the treasury, and the current revenues collected or in process of immediate collection, . . . .”
No indebtedness had occurred, and the municipality could be regarded as doing business on a “cash basis.” Id. at 298 (emphasis added). Once again, I submit that the majority opinion errs in applying this “cash basis” theory to the issue of state indebtedness. I believe this because it is clear to me that the framers had no such theory in mind when they drafted the constitution. Rather, they envisioned an absolute bar on the creation of state debt except in the express exceptions for which the framers provided. However, assuming arguendo that the debts of municipalities and the state should be treated identically, I believe that the majority further erred when it interpreted the language of the Earles decision dealing with the “cash basis” theory.
Initially, I would stress that as the Earles decision held that the ordinance in question was void because it exceeded the constitutional limitations, the court stated that:
“The method by which the attempt was made may be regarded as ingenious, but it should be remembered, . . . that the city could not do by indirection what it could not do directly.” Id. at 299.
I believe that this is what the legislature has attempted to do in 1983 Wisconsin Act 3. It has created public debt, yet attempted to disguise it by stating that the notes are created for the purpose of funding state operating deficits or, in other words, to ease cash-flow imbalances, *387sec. 18.71 (4) (a), Stats., and are not public debt, sec. 18.71 (4) (c). However, once the legislature is allowed to create such a debt, it can continue to create them in the future as it desires, and the constitutional prohibition becomes meaningless.
The majority has stated that because the operating notes are to be paid from money in the process of collection, they are not public debt. This rationale is based upon the language in the Donald case, which states that “money presently available or in process of collection and so treatable as in hand” does not constitute “debt.” State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. at 59. The Donald case cites the Earles v. Wells decision, which, as I have pointed out above, deals with “current revenues collected or in process of immediate collection.” Earles v. Wells, 94 Wis. at 298 (emphasis added). The language concerning “the process of immediate collection” has been interpreted in numerous later cases; see, School Dist. v. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank, 9 Wis. 2d at 405; Balch v. Beach, 119 Wis. 77, 95 N.W. 132 (1903) ; and Rice v. The City of Milwaukee, 100 Wis. 516, 76 N.W. 341 (1898). In the Marine case, after citing from the Earles decision, the court concluded that the school district’s budget included an amount sufficient to cover the debt in question, that the tax levy included such an amount, as did the “tax roll which ha [d] been delivered to the city treasurer with a warrant for collection.” 9 Wis. 2d at 405. The Marine case also refers to the prior decision of Batch v. Beach, 119 Wis. 77. In the Batch case, the court interpreted “in process of immediate collection” to mean the following:
“Taxes in immediate process of collection do not include taxes merely voted. Taxes are not in immediate process of collection till the tax roll shall have been placed in the hands of the proper collecting officer with authority to receive, and with the right of the taxpayer to pay, the tax.” Id. at 82.
*388In both the Marine case and the Balch case, it is clear that the funds were “in the process of immediate collection” because a tax roll had been delivered to the proper authority for collection. Tax roll is defined as:
“A schedule or list of the persons and property subject to the payment of a particular tax, with the amounts severally due, prepared and authenticated in proper form to warrant the collecting officers to 'proceed with the enforcement of the tax.” Black’s haw Dictionary 1194 (5th ed. 1979). (Emphasis added.)
I believe that the funds to be used to reimburse purchasers of the operating notes issued pursuant to 1983 Wisconsin Act 3 are not “in the process of immediate collection.” The secretary of administration does not have a form which authorizes the secretary to “proceed with the enforcement of the tax.” Rather, the secretary is authorized to impound moneys of the general fund at future dates, sec. 18.75(4), Stats., with the final im-poundment occurring on May 15, 1984. Such future im-poundments do not constitute moneys “in hand” or “in the process of immediate collection.” The Marine court, upon which the majority bases its holding, clearly states that when loans are made prior to the delivery of a tax roll to the treasurer with a warrant for collection of the taxes, indebtedness occurs. “The anticipated revenues were not ‘taxes in immediate process of collection’ . . .” 9 Wis. 2d at 406 (Emphasis added.) It is clear to me that the earlier cases contemplated tax rolls which could be proceeded upon immediately for collection of taxes, which must be delivered prior to the creation of the obligation upon the state. Under 1983 Wisconsin Act 3, the operating notes are issued and the obligation created prior to any impoundment by the secretary. Thus, the funds from which the principal and interest on these notes are to be repaid are not “taxes in the immediate *389process of collection,” but are merely “anticipated revenues.”
Further, it appears that the majority is basing its holding upon dicta from Rice v. The City of Milwaukee, 100 Wis. 516. In the Rice decision, after referring to the Earles decision, the court held that liquor licenses to be paid in the future did not constitute funds in the process of collection. The court stated the following:
“[T]he moneys to be derived from these sources are entirely indefinite and uncertain. They were not in the process of collection, and could be collected only at the will of the parties who sought privileges for which license charges were made, and for that reason could not be considered as available assets or resources. The ‘revenues’ mentioned in [the Earles'] decision had reference only to such revenues as the corporation had levied, and had a legal right to enforce, regardless of any one’s [sic] will or pleasure.” Id. at 521.
It appears that the language upon which the majority relies regarding “anyone’s will or pleasure” is dicta, since the Rice court had decided that the taxes were not in the process of collection.
The final reason for which I feel the majority erred is in analogizing income, gift, inheritance, and sales tax revenues collected by the state to property tax revenues collected by the municipality. Article XI, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution reads as follows:
“(2) No county, city, town, village, school district, sewerage district or other municipal corporation may become indebted in an amount that exceeds an allowable percentage of the taxable property located therein . . .”
Clearly, this constitutional provision contemplates loans based upon property taxes, which are fairly fixed and ascertainable from year to year. This fits within the rationale behind the strict circumstances set out in the above case law as to when loans may be made without *390incurring indebtedness: Only when a tax roll for an ascertainable amount has been placed in the hands of the proper authority with the power to begin enforcement of the tax. I do not believe that this should be extended to encompass taxes such as gift, income, inheritance, and sales taxes, since, as the respondent has pointed out, these may vary from year to year and may depend upon contingencies which the state has no way of accurately predicting, such as the economy, number of people in the work force, etc.2 Clearly, then, the revenues upon which the legislature has relied are not definite and certain within the Rice criteria. Rice v. The City of Milwaukee, 100 Wis. at 521.
Although the presumption of constitutionality attaches to 1983 Wisconsin Act 3 and the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality is beyond a reasonable doubt, I am unable to overcome the obstacles which I have stated in order to find the act constitutional. State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 47, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973). In conclusion, I believe that 1983 Wisconsin Act 3 authorizes an enforceable contractual obligation in violation of Wis. Const, art. VIII, sec. 4. I base this contention upon the grounds that municipal debt considerations should not be applied to state debt issues because of the historical contexts surrounding the two separate articles, and because of the actual structure of Wis. Const, art. XI, sec. 3, centering around property taxes. Also, even should one decide that state debt and municipal debt should be treated identically despite these considerations, I feel that the majority further erred by finding that the revenues utilized to fund the operating *391notes are “in the process of immediate collection.” I do not believe that future impoundments of anticipated revenues may be reconciled with the court’s past determinations of which taxes are in the process of immediate collection. For these reasons, I dissent.

 See, State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 428, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973), and Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Auth. v. Earl, 70 Wis. 2d 464, 482, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975).

 Respondents cite to the Annual Fiscal Report, State of Wisconsin, Department of Administration, 1981, for their argument that the revenues relied upon to fund 1983 Wisconsin Act 3 are “uncertain and speculative.” They point out that in 1980-81, the state revenue projections erred by $157,966,019.