Court Opinion

ID: 9955513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:12:36.55926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.262245
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Gardner, 2024-Ohio-1158.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                             No. 111506
                 v.                                 :

TIFFANY GARDNER,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.               :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: APPLICATION DENIED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 22, 2024

                           Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                 Case No. CR-21-658922-A
                                 Application for Reopening
                                     Motion No. 565338

                                              Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Rachel E. Cohen, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Tiffany Gardner, pro se.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                 On April 28, 2023, the applicant, Tiffany Gardner, pursuant to

App.R. 26(B) and State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992),

applied to reopen this court’s judgment in State v. Gardner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 111506, 2023-Ohio-307, in which this court affirmed her convictions for murder

and felonious assault. On June 6, 2023, the court struck her 62-page application

because it exceeded App.R. 26(B)’s ten-page limit and allowed her to file an

amended application that complied with the rules.

             On June 20, 2023, Gardner filed an amended application and argued

that her appellate counsel should have argued the following: (1) trial counsel was

ineffective for not objecting to a witness’s lies about her striking the victim with her

hand and later pointing the victim out to two other men, (2) trial counsel failed to

subpoena the 911 call, (3) trial counsel did not argue that she never called anyone

for help as shown by her phone records, (4) trial counsel refused to allow her to

testify, (5) the police failed to investigate the case properly, including allowing false

statements in their witness reports to engage in a cover-up, (6) she was improperly

convicted on a theory of complicity because the other perpetrators were not

identified, (7) the police conducted a search of her house without a search warrant,

(8) trial counsel failed to cross-examine the employee witness properly, (9) the trial

court erred in admitting inflammatory and irrelevant evidence, (10) the prosecutor

failed to correct false testimony, and (11) the prosecutor failed to disclose

exculpatory evidence and made misleading statements to the jury. The state filed

its brief in opposition on July 20, 2023. For the following reasons, this court denies

the application.
Factual and Procedural History

              On April 14, 2021, Tiffany Gardner was shopping at the Family Dollar

Store in East Cleveland. The store’s surveillance cameras recorded some of the

ensuing incident.

               Gardner had a pouch with, by her count, $10,000 cash in it. She

placed the pouch in the child seat section of a shopping cart.        After making

purchases, which required two shopping carts, she exited the store to put the items

in her car, but left the pouch of cash in the cart, which she returned to the walkway

in front of the store.

               Shortly after Gardner returned the cart, Leonard Craddock, a 70-

year-old man, approached the store, retrieved the cart with the pouch in it, and

entered the vestibule of the store. He then saw the pouch of cash and put it in his

waistband. Craddock used a card and cash from his own wallet to pay for the items.

               Gardner realized that she had left her pouch and returned to the

Family Dollar Store and spoke with the manager, telling her that she had $10,000

in there. The manager reviewed the security video and saw that Craddock had taken

the pouch and relayed this to Gardner. Gardner was able stop Craddock as he left

the store and took the pouch from his waistband.

               Craddock then walked across the street to an AutoZone store.

Gardner was screaming and hollering as she got in her car and followed Craddock.

She took a video of herself following Craddock into the store. She repeatedly
demanded, “Why did you try to rob me? Why did you try to rob me?” She shouted

invectives and profanities, as she followed him. Craddock tried to apologize.

              Witnesses inside the store, an employee and a customer, testified that

Gardner was angry, chasing Craddock, and hitting him on the head. The employee

stated she hit him with her whole hand. The customer testified she hit him with her

little wallet that she was holding. The customer added that Gardner said, “[I]f I was

a man I would do some real damage.” The employee testified that he told them to

leave. Gardner left the store, but Craddock stayed saying he needed to catch his

breath. The customer and the employee testified that when Craddock saw Gardner

he would begin to hyperventilate.

              AutoZone’s security camera on the side of the store showed a car drive

into the store’s parking lot and two men exit the car.1 Gardner walked by the two

men and then turned around and started talking to them. After the conversation,

Gardner and the two men went into the AutoZone. The customer testified that the

men referred to Gardner as “auntie.” After looking around, all three left the store.

              The men subsequently went back into the store and went straight to

Craddock. They demanded that he come outside with them. Craddock refused. The

two men “grabbed” and “dragged” Craddock out of the store.

              The customer and the employee testified that once the two men had

Craddock outside, they brutally attacked him by kicking, punching, and stomping

      1 On April 14, 2021, only the side camera was working properly.
on him. The customer testified that after Craddock fell down, the two men picked

up a wallet, keys, and a jacket. After the attack, Craddock attempted to stand but

collapsed to the ground; emergency personnel pronounced him dead at the scene.

When the men finished the attack, they went to their car and left. The video

surveillance showed that Gardner remained at the scene for 12 minutes, the time it

took the two men to confront and attack Craddock. Gardner left the scene at the

same time the two men left.

              Craddock’s autopsy revealed that he had seven rib fractures, some of

which were displaced fractures that punctured the lung causing his death. The

medical examiner determined that Craddock’s cause of death was blunt-force injury

and the manner of death was homicide.

              After Gardner was arrested, the police obtained a search warrant for

her phone. Extracting data from the phone revealed the video of her following

Craddock to the AutoZone store and cursing him. However, the contents of the

phone shed no light on who the two men were. It appears that the police did not

attempt to test DNA from Craddock or from AutoZone. What DNA tests were done

did nothing to further the investigation or help identify the two men. There were

also some irregularities in the investigation. The police detained the customer

witness until the detectives could interview him. The detectives who arrived on the

scene rummaged through Craddock’s clothes without putting on gloves.

              While in jail, Gardner made several phone calls to help her make bail.

During these calls, she stated that an individual she referred to as “Apple Head”
better help pay her bond or she was going to “sing like a bird.” She learned that

“Apple Head” was complaining about paying $5,000 or $10,000 for her bond, to

which she responded, “once it hits, it’s a million dollars for both of them.” Gardner

also stated that she was not going “to do life” for anybody, and if “push come[s] to

shove,” she would “make sure they pop up.” She stated further that Craddock

“caused his s***, he took s*** from me.” The court admitted these recordings into

evidence.

              The grand jury indicted Gardner on two counts of aggravated murder,

three counts of murder, and one count each of aggravated robbery and felonious

assault. Prior to trial, the state dismissed the aggravated murder counts and one of

the murder counts, all of which included “purposely” as an element of the crimes.

              During the trial, the defense established that the two men have not

been identified and that the investigation is still open. The state and the defense

agreed on an extended jury instruction on complicity.

              At the close of the state’s case, the following discussion occurred:

      THE COURT: I’m going to turn to you, Ms. Gardner. You know that you
      could testify in this matter. I know you’ve spoken to your counsel about
      that issue, if you were to choose — you know, of course, you don’t have
      to testify; it’s entirely up to you. I know you’ve spoken to Ms. Tipping
      and Mr. Williams about that issue, but for the record, it’s your choice
      not to testify; is that correct?

      THE DEFENDANT: I mean, I don’t really know what to say.

      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May we have a moment, your Honor?

      THE COURT: You may.

      THE DEFENDANT: I will not be testifying.
      THE COURT: So I’ve given you just a few minutes to speak with your
      counsel again. It’s been my understanding through the entire past few
      days you have not intended to testify; is that correct?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

      THE COURT: Are you sure?

      THE DEFENDANT: (Nodding in the affirmative.)

      THE COURT: Is that a “yes”?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Tr. 570-571.)

                 The defense did not put forth further evidence, other than the DNA

reports.

                 During closing argument, defense counsel concentrated on the state’s

need to prove complicity with evidence beyond a reasonable doubt by arguing the

following: Mere presence is not enough. The state obtained a search warrant for

Gardner’s cell phone, but nothing in the phone indicated that she knew the two men

or called them. There was no audio evidence of what she said to the men. Thus, no

direct evidence of solicitation. There was no incriminating DNA evidence. The state

carefully selected just snippets of the jail calls. The investigation was incomplete

and still open. Evidence of complicity, the defense argued, was so lacking that only

impermissible speculation could link Gardner to the murder.

                 The jury found Gardner guilty of one count of murder and felonious

assault. The trial court merged those two offenses and imposed the required

sentence of life in prison with parole eligibility after 15 years.
               Appellate counsel recognized the essential importance of complicity

and argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove complicity and that the

verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He also argued that the trial

court erred in admitting the jail calls into evidence and that trial counsel was

ineffective for not objecting to their admission.

Analysis of Law

               In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, the applicant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient

and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.             Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley,

42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989); and State v. Reed, 74 Ohio St.3d 534, 660

N.E.2d 456 (1996).

               In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court ruled that judicial

scrutiny of an attorney’s work must be highly deferential. The court noted that it is

all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess his lawyer after conviction and that

it would be all too easy for a court, examining an unsuccessful defense in hindsight,

to conclude that a particular act or omission was deficient. Therefore, “a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be

considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland at 689.
               Specifically, in regard to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the appellate advocate’s

prerogative to decide strategy and tactics by selecting what he thinks are the most

promising arguments out of all possible contentions. The court noted: “Experienced

advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of

winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if

possible, or at most on a few key issues.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-752,

103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). Indeed, including weaker arguments might

lessen the impact of the stronger ones. Accordingly, the court ruled that judges

should not second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on

appellate counsel the duty to raise every “colorable” issue. Such rules would disserve

the goal of vigorous and effective advocacy. The Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed

these principles in State v. Allen, 77 Ohio St.3d 172, 1996-Ohio-366, 672 N.E.2d 638.

               Moreover, even if a petitioner establishes that an error by his lawyer

was professionally unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case, the

petitioner must further establish prejudice: but for the unreasonable error there is a

reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.    Strickland at 694.    A court need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining prejudice suffered by the defendant as

a result of alleged deficiencies. Bradley at 143.
              Appellate review is strictly limited to the record.     The Warder,

Bushnell & Glessner Co. v. Jacobs, 58 Ohio St. 77, 50 N.E. 97 (1898). Thus,

“a reviewing court cannot add matter to the record that was not part of the trial

court’s proceedings and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.”

State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of the

syllabus. “Nor can the effectiveness of appellate counsel be judged by adding new

matter to the record and then arguing that counsel should have raised these new

issues revealed by the newly added material.” State v. Moore, 93 Ohio St.3d 649,

650, 758 N.E.2d 1130 (2001). “Clearly, declining to raise claims without record

support cannot constitute ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” State v.

Burke, 97 Ohio St.3d 55, 2002-Ohio-5310, 776 N.E.2d 79, ¶ 10.

              Gardner first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object when the employee perjured himself by testifying that she hit Craddock in the

head with her hand and then later pointed Craddock out to the two men. She also

submits that all the witnesses lied on the stand as would be shown by the discovery

packet and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by not correcting the false

testimony or revealing exculpatory evidence. However, Gardner fails to indicate

where in the record there is any contradicting evidence that would show perjury.

The discovery packet and the witness statements were not admitted into evidence.

Appellate counsel is limited to the record.

              Moreover, in State v. Powell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107276, 2020-

Ohio-3887, the App.R. 26(B) applicant argued that the inconsistencies between the
victims’ statements and their trial testimony established that the state used perjured

evidence to obtain his conviction; thus, his appellate counsel was ineffective for not

arguing this issue. This court rejected the argument noting “mere inconsistencies in

testimony by government witnesses do not establish knowing use of false

testimony.” State v. Johnson, 144 Ohio St.3d 518, 2015-Ohio-4903, 45 N.E.3d 208,

¶ 83, quoting United States v. Lockmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 822 (6th Cir.1989).

Similarly, the Seventh District held: “Confusing or inconsistent statements within a

state witness’s testimony do not equate with the state suborning perjury.” State v.

Boyd, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 23 MA 0012, 2023-Ohi0-47250. Furthermore, the

trial court reviewed the employee’s witness statement and concluded that there was

nothing materially inconsistent.      (Tr. 363-365.)   Therefore, appellate counsel

properly rejected the argument that the state used perjured evidence or withheld

evidence to obtain the convictions.

              Gardner further proposes that her appellate counsel should have

argued that neither the prosecution nor defense counsel subpoenaed or played the

911 call, which she claims is exculpatory evidence. The argument is self-defeating.

Without the call being in the record, appellate counsel had no foundation to argue

it. Similarly, Gardner’s allegations that the police failed to investigate the case

properly by allowing false statements in their witness reports to engage in a cover-

up fails for lack of record support. The witness statements were not part of the

record.
               Next, Gardner claims that appellate and trial counsel failed to raise

and argue that her cell phone call-log did not reveal that she called anyone to come

help her. This is inaccurate. On cross-examination, Detective Marche admitted that

other than the video, “there was no additional information of value that was scoured

from her telephone.” (Tr. 543.) During closing, defense counsel argued that if there

was anything on Gardner’s phone that supported the idea that she called somebody

for help, the prosecutor would have heralded it. But there is no evidence that she

called anyone. (Tr. 588-589.) In the appellate brief, counsel argued “[t]hat there

was no DNA evidence, no phone calls or texts messages indicating she called these

males to the scene, there was no consideration given for these males to commit a

crime for her, and no proof that she even knew these males.” (Appellant’s brief, pg.

12.)

               Gardner insists that her trial counsel refused to allow her to testify

and that appellate counsel should have argued that trial counsel was ineffective for

doing so. However, the record does not provide a basis for making that argument.

At the end of the state’s case, the trial judge asked Gardner if she was going to testify.

She replied that she did not know what to say. The judge allowed her to discuss that

matter with her attorneys; after which she confirmed twice that she would not

testify. Moreover, deciding whether a defendant should testify is one of the most

important strategic decisions in the course of a trial. State v. Smith, 11th Dist.

Portage No. 2022-P-0034, 2023-Ohio-1533; State v. Mabry, 9th Dist. Medina No.
2514-M, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4420 (Oct. 9, 1996). Following the admonition of

the Supreme Court, this court will not second guess this strategic decision.

              Gardner next argues that she could not be tried or convicted as

complicit without the principals being identified or charged.         However, the

complicity statute refutes her argument. R.C. 2923.03(B) provides: “It is no defense

to a charge under this section that no person with whom the accused was in

complicity has been convicted as a principal offender.” Further subsection (F)

provides: “Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of

an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender.

A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the

principal offense.” The courts of Ohio have long held the principle that a conviction

of the principal is not a prerequisite to trial as an aider or abettor. Hartshorn v.

State, 29 Ohio St. 635 (1876); State v. Graven, 52 Ohio St.2d 112, 369 N.E.2d 1205

(1977). State v. Gowdy, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-06-071, 2009-Ohio-385, ¶ 21 — “the

state was not required to either identify or charge an individual as the principal

offender in order to obtain the conviction of appellant as a complicitor.” Thus, her

argument does not raise a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel.

              Gardner further argues that the police conducted a search of her

home without a warrant. The police arrested her pursuant to an arrest warrant.

(Tr. 527.) The police also obtained a search warrant for her phone. (Tr. 529.) There

was no testimony concerning a search of her house, and no evidence from her home
was put into evidence. Accordingly, appellate counsel had no foundation to argue

this.

               Gardner also alleges that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to cross-examine the employee effectively. However, as the Supreme Court of Ohio

ruled in State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229,

¶ 146, “[t]he extent and scope of cross-examination clearly fall within the ambit of

trial strategy, and debatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of

counsel.”

               Gardner contends that the prosecutor made false, misleading, and

inflammatory remarks, such as “[i]t could have ended right in front of the Family

Dollar when she got her bag back. She could have got into her car and sped off.” The

Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Mauer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 266, 473 N.E.2d 768

(1985), held that “the conduct of a prosecuting attorney during trial cannot be made

a ground for error unless that conduct deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” The

court has reviewed the transcript, the evidence, and the closing arguments and

concludes that the defendant received a fair trial.

               In summary, the gravamen of this case was whether the evidence

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Gardner solicited, procured, aided, abetted

or conspired with the two men to beat and thus kill Craddock. Both trial counsel

and appellate counsel knew this and based the strategy of the case to defeat that

proposition. They endeavored to marshall the facts to create a reasonable doubt but

were unsuccessful. Gardner’s micro-analysis of the evidence does not cast a doubt
about the effectiveness of counsel. As this court concluded in its original opinion,

“even if [the jail calls] had been excluded, the other evidence presented

overwhelmingly supports the conviction.” State v. Garnder, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 111506, 2023-Ohio-307, ¶ 50.

              Accordingly, this court denies the application to reopen.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR