Court Opinion

ID: 9950169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 15:05:16.511762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:04.754044
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                               SABA SHAH,
                                Appellant,

                                     v.

                             ALI R. SIDDIQUI,
                                 Appellee.

                             No. 4D2023-1125

                             [March 13, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Darren Shull, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502021DR008080.

    Morgan L. Weinstein of Twig, Trade, & Tribunal, PLLC, Fort Lauderdale,
for appellant.

   Jessica L. Underwood and Robin Bresky of Schwartz Sladkus Reich
Greenberg Atlas LLP, Boca Raton, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

   In this dissolution action, the former wife appeals from the circuit
court’s final order granting the former husband’s motion to dismiss the
former wife’s post-final judgment motion requesting the circuit court to
determine and award the amount of the former wife’s attorney’s fees and
costs in the entire action. The circuit court reasoned it lacked jurisdiction
to determine and award the amount because the circuit court’s final
judgment “lacked the requisite language needed to reserve jurisdiction.”

    We disagree with the circuit court and reverse the order on appeal.
Although the final judgment did not specify the circuit court had “reserved
jurisdiction” to determine and award the amount of the former wife’s
attorney’s fees and costs, the circuit court, in a pre-judgment order on the
former wife’s request for temporary attorney’s fees and costs, and in the
final judgment itself, already had determined the former wife was entitled
to an award of her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the entire action.
Thus, the circuit court necessarily retained post-judgment jurisdiction to
determine and award the amount of the former wife’s reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs.
   Our conclusion is consistent with a number of our cases where we have
reversed the denial of the moving party’s request for attorney’s fees and
costs, where the moving party had requested attorney’s fees and costs, but
the circuit court failed to address the request before entering final
judgment. See, e.g., Flores v. Flores, 82 So. 3d 838, 839 (Fla. 4th DCA
2011) (“Where the trial court fails to address a request for attorney’s fees
and costs or to reserve jurisdiction to consider the issue, the final
judgment should be reversed and remanded for entry of a corrected
judgment reserving jurisdiction to address the request for attorney’s fees
and costs.”) (citing, inter alia, Singer v. Singer, 38 So. 3d 889, 890 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2010), and Perez v. Perez, 846 So. 2d 685, 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

   The instant facts present an even more compelling case for reversal.
Here, the circuit court twice addressed the former wife’s request for
attorney’s fees and costs, in both the circuit court’s pre-judgment order on
the former wife’s request for temporary attorney’s fees and costs, and in
the final judgment itself, by finding the former wife was entitled to an
award of her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The circuit court’s only
post-judgment task was to determine and award the amount of the former
wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the entire action. Thus, we
must reverse and remand for entry of a corrected final judgment reserving
jurisdiction to determine and award the amount of the former wife’s
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the entire action. Flores, 82 So. 3d
at 839.

   The cases upon which the former husband relied in the circuit court
and in his answer brief pre-date our more recent cases above, and are
otherwise distinguishable in certain respects. See, e.g., McCallum v.
McCallum, 364 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (where the former wife filed
a modification petition but did not include a request for attorney’s fees,
and did not file a motion to tax attorney’s fees until after the rehearing and
appeal time had run on the order granting her petition, the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction to consider the former wife’s request for attorney’s fees).

   On all other arguments which the former husband has raised seeking
to affirm the order on appeal, we find those arguments lack merit without
further discussion.

   Based on the foregoing, we reverse the order on appeal, and remand for
the circuit court to: (1) enter a corrected final judgment reserving
jurisdiction to determine and award the amount of the former wife’s
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the entire action; and (2) conduct
an evidentiary hearing to determine and award by final order the amount

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of the former wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in the entire
action.

  Reversed and remanded with instructions.

DAMOORGIAN and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

                          *           *      *

  Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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