Court Opinion

ID: 9599668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:20:35.945565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:16.639785
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority’s judgment.
1. “[I]n State v. Allmond, 225 Ga. App. 509 [(484 SE2d 306)] (1997), the Georgia Court of Appeals held, notwithstanding the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994’ that the provisions of the First Offender Act would still be available to the sentencing court, which would mean that a person who committed a serious violent felony could be sentenced to less than the minimum mandatory ten-year sentence. . . .
“[C]ontrary to the decision in State v. Allmond, it is the expressed intent of the General Assembly that persons who commit a serious violent felony specified in the ‘Sentence Reform Act of 1994’ shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of not less than ten years and shall not be eligible for first offender treatment.” Ga. L. 1998, p. 180, § 1, effective March 27, 1998.
This year, the legislature amended both OCGA § 17-10-6.1, the Sentence Reform Act, and OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., the First Offender Act, to specifically state that a defendant who is convicted of one of the serious violent felonies contained in OCGA § 17-10-6.1 will not be eligible for First Offender treatment under OCGA § 42-8-60.
Unfortunately, in the amendment, the legislature continued to use the phrase “any person convicted of a serious violent felony” in *489reference to those affected by the Act. (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1998, p. 181, § 2, amending OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (b). By continuing to utilize the term “convicted,” the legislature did not quite understand the semantic consternation that word has provided in some appellate quarters, i.e., when sentenced under the First Offender Act, a defendant is not “convicted” so as to make applicable the mandatory minimum sentence requirements of the Sentence Reform Act. However, in my view, the legislature’s clear, clear expression of its intent this go-round should now permit us to by-pass discussion of such finer legal points and do our duty as interpreters of the legislative will. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the law and to construe the statute to effectuate that intent.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 267 Ga. 886, 887 (1) (485 SE2d 475) (1997).
(a) As we recently noted, “[i]f it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute, this will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) First Union Nat. Bank &c. v. Collins, 221 Ga. App. 442, 445 (471 SE2d 892) (1996). See also Hicks v. State, 228 Ga. App. 235, 237 (494 SE2d 342) (1997). “It is equally axiomatic that subsequent legislation declaring the intent of a legislative body in enacting an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 237.
Clearly, then, in OCGA § 17-10-6.1, the legislature meant to give the word “convicted” its ordinary, plain meaning. When reviewing a criminal conviction, the members of this Court have, without exception, utilized the word “convicted” to mean “returned a verdict,” as in “the jury convicted” the defendant of the crime(s).1 To convict is “to find a man guilty of a criminal charge, either upon a criminal trial, a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed. In its plain meaning, “convicted” is simply the past tense thereof.
Here, after the jury found Fleming guilty of armed robbery, he stood “convicted of a serious violent felony as defined in paragraphs (2) through (7) of subsection (a) of [OCGA § 17-10-6.1]” for purposes of the sentencing considerations toward which that statute is *490directed. (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (b). Thus, the mandatory minimum ten-year sentence of imprisonment required under OCGA § 17-10-6.1 was properly imposed by the trial court.
(b) As has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Georgia, regardless of its active date, applying an amendment such as the one in the instant case, which simply affirms the legislative intent that existed prior to the amendment, is not a retroactive application of the law; it is simply an expression of what the law was all along. See Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (492 SE2d 665) (1997). This Court’s misinterpretation of OCGA §§ 17-10-6.1 and 42-8-60 so as to permit the First Offender Act to impact on the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements of the Sentence Reform Act did not “create” a new law which superseded the original legislative purpose in enacting those statutes. Thus, recognizing what the law was from the inception and applying it to the instant case is not prohibited as a retroactive application. Porquez v. Washington, supra.
In that regard, the legislature has let this Court know that in State v. Allmond, we incorrectly interpreted its will in enacting OCGA § 17-10-6.1, the Sentence Reform Act, in relation to OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., the First Offender Act. The legislature never intended for those found guilty of serious violent felonies, i.e., “convicted” thereof, to be eligible for First Offender treatment. The legislature made this point by explaining that our decision in State v. Allmond was “contrary” to its original “expressed intent” (past tense) in enacting the Sentence Reform Act of 1994. Ga. L. 1998, p. 181. Thus, State v. Allmond notwithstanding, the trial court correctly determined that OCGA § 17-10-6.1 precluded consideration of the First Offender Act.
Therefore, Fleming’s conviction and sentence should be affirmed under the law.
2. I do not believe this Court should ignore the legislative mandate of Ga. L. 1998, p. 180, § 1. However, should we decide to do so because Fleming’s conviction date precedes the active date of the amendment, it must be recognized that State v. Allmond would still require limitation.
(a) If we are to ignore the legislative intent as expressed, then it must be recognized that under the plain wording of the preamendment statutes at issue, there was never anything inconsistent about the trial court’s ability to utilize discretion and impose the First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60, as long as the term imposed was “as provided by law,” i.e., pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-6.1. See OCGA § 42-8-60 (a) (2).
In this case (as was the case in State v. Allmond), while the trial court would have no discretion as to the mandatory minimum “term of confinement” that must be imposed pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-6.1, *491the trial court would be free to consider, at its discretion, the imposition of the First Offender Act, along with such mandatory term of confinement. State v. Allmond must be limited to the extent that a probated term was permitted, when the mandatory minimum term of confinement “as provided bylaw” is ten years. OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (a) (2). Otherwise, consistent with State v. Allmond, OCGA § 17-10-6.1 on its face would not “curtail the provisions of the First Offender Act.” Id. at 510.
Thus, assuming that the General Assembly’s desires are set aside in this matter, under the pre-amendment statutes when read together, Presiding Judge Pope’s position would be correct that the trial court lacked authority to impose a term of confinement less than the mandatory minimum required by OCGA § 17-10-6.1, and Presiding Judge McMurray’s position would be correct that this case should be remanded because the trial court believed that it could not consider imposition of the First Offender Act, after such was requested by Fleming. Of course, the trial court has the discretion to deny First Offender treatment to Fleming; however, in this case the trial court denied such treatment under an error of law.
It appears to me that in the semantic discussion of the meaning of the word “convicted,” lost were the statutory maxims: “[I]n construing any section of the Code, we must treat it as a single statute forming one homogeneous and consistent body of laws, and each Code section is to be considered in explaining and elucidating every other part of the common system to which it belongs.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Huntsinger v. State, 200 Ga. 127, 130-131 (1) (36 SE2d 92) (1945); Ga. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 205 Ga. App. 458, 460 (422 SE2d 324) (1992). “Statutes should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions, for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation.” Integon Indem. Corp. v. Canal Ins. Co., 256 Ga. 692, 693 (353 SE2d 186) (1987). In the absence of words of limitation, words in a statute should be given “their ordinary and everyday meaning.” Mgmt. &c. Group/Southeast v. United &c. Employee Programs, 194 Ga. App. 99, 101 (2), 102 (389 SE2d 525) (1989).
In my view, OCGA §§ 17-10-6.1 and 42-8-60 should have been read together in State v. Allmond so as to give effect to both. And if the inability to reconcile the two statutes turned on a forced interpretation of the word “convicted” which is alternately capable of a simple, plain, ordinary meaning which would have permitted both Acts to have continued viability, then our decision to opt for the constrained reading needs reevaluation herein.
While a verdict is not a “conviction” pursuant to OCGA § 16-1-3 (4), the return of a guilty verdict means the jury has “convicted” the *492defendant under the common meaning of the term as used by this Court (see n. 1, supra), the legal community, and the legislature so as to permit the trial court to move on to the sentencing considerations which are the subject of both OCGA § 17-10-6.1 and § 42-8-60.2
In fact, our law provides that upon a verdict or plea of guilty, i.e., once a defendant is “convicted,” “the judge fixing the sentence shall prescribe a determinate sentence for a specific number of months or years.” OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1). Those familiar with the realities of trial work realize that sentence is often pronounced following the return of the verdict, i.e., after the jury has “convicted” the defendant. Under the law, then, sentencing options are considered and sentence imposed prior to a formal “entry of judgment,” i.e., the “conviction” pursuant to OCGA § 16-1-3 (4). The Sentence Reform Act contains sentencing provisions', these are applicable after a defendant is “convicted” and prior to the entry of the “conviction.” This entry of judgment is the “conviction” that is withheld under the First Offender Act.
Accordingly, under the pre-amendment statutes, the mandatory sentence contained in OCGA § 17-10-6.1 should be imposed after a defendant is “convicted” of one of the specified crimes, but could be imposed under the First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60. In which case the entry of judgment thereon, i.e., the “conviction,” would be withheld. There never was a conflict between the two statutes. And it is possible that recognizing such would have permitted the coexistence of the mandatory minimum sentence required under the Sentence Reform Act and the ability of a first time offender to escape the permanent consequences thereof after serving the mandatory sentence, by imposition of such sentence under the First Offender Act: a win-win situation now rendered impossible.
I believe that Fleming’s conviction and sentence should be affirmed and thus concur with Presiding Judge Pope’s judgment. Ignoring the legislature only does a disservice to the legal community and is not in our job description. Obviously, the legislature never intended to permit the imposition of the First Offender Act in cases such as this one, and the trial court properly imposed the minimum mandatory sentence demanded by OCGA § 17-10-6.1.
(b) If, however, the legislature is to be ignored by this Court, remand for consideration of the First Offender Act is all that is necessary. Construing together pre-amendment OCGA §§ 17-10-6.1 and *49342-8-60 so as to harmonize both, it appears clear that “under the law” a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years is still required for those “convicted” by a jury of an offense as specified in OCGA § 17-10-6.1, even when such defendant is given the opportunity for First Offender treatment under OCGA § 42-8-60 and “conviction” is withheld.

 See, e.g., Scott v. State, 230 Ga. App. 522 (496 SE2d 494) (1998); Watson v. State, 230 Ga. App. 79 (495 SE2d 305) (1998); Belt v. State, 227 Ga. App. 425 (489 SE2d 157) (1997); Hope v. State, 226 Ga. App. 392 (486 SE2d 658) (1997); Carter v. State, 226 Ga. App. 198 (486 SE2d 79) (1997); Daniel v. State, 224 Ga. App. 673 (482 SE2d 409) (1997); Jessup v. State, 224 Ga. App. 176 (480 SE2d 232) (1996); Strong v. State, 223 Ga. App. 434 (477 SE2d 866) (1996) (Beasley, C. J., dissenting); Carter v. State, 222 Ga. App. 397 (474 SE2d 228) (1996); Raines v. State, 219 Ga. App. 893 (467 SE2d 217) (1996).

 Such sentencing considerations also include the merger of offenses for which the jury “convicted” the defendant so as to preclude the entry of a judgment of conviction for offenses as prohibited by OCGA § 16-1-7. “ ‘It is the conviction of more than one crime established by the same conduct that § 16-1-7 (a) forbids.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Sanders v. State, 212 Ga. App. 832, 833 (2) (442 SE2d 923) (1994).