Court Opinion

ID: 9928015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 18:01:46.571699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:39.876731
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1099     Document: 010110992182      Date Filed: 01/30/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           January 30, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
  COLORADO,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                        No. 23-1099
                                                  (D.C. No. 1:23-MJ-00055-LTB-1)
  MARCUS ALLEN MURPHY,                                        (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before EID, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Marcus Allen Murphy, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s order

 summarily remanding his criminal case to Colorado state court. We affirm.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

       Mr. Murphy filed a notice of removal (Notice) in federal district court. The

 Notice involved a criminal case filed against him in Colorado state court.

 Mr. Murphy alleged he was a licensed attorney in Colorado and admitted to practice

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1099      Document: 010110992182       Date Filed: 01/30/2024       Page: 2

 before the federal courts in Colorado. He also alleged he was being “unlawfully &

 unconstitutionally incarcerated, without Warrant or Indictment, on Excessive Bail of

 $35K, for 46-days since Wed., Jan. 25, 2023 . . . as the result of a self-help,

 non-judicial botched-Eviction by an out-of-state slumlord & felon-burglar

 maintenance-man/super.” R. at 4.

       Mr. Murphy asserted two statutory bases for removal—28 U.S.C.

 §§ 1442(a)(3) and 1443. Section 1442(a)(3) authorizes removal of civil actions or

 criminal prosecutions filed in state court against “[a]ny officer of the courts of the

 United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of

 his duties.” In pertinent part, § 1443(1) authorizes removal of state civil actions or

 criminal prosecutions “under certain conditions, in light of Title I of the Civil Rights

 Act of 1968,” Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 215 (1975).1

       1
           In full, § 1443 provides:

       Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in
       a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the
       United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is
       pending:
       (1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of
       such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of
       citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction
       thereof;
       (2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for
       equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be
       inconsistent with such law.
        Although the Notice referred to both subsections of § 1443, the record and
 Mr. Murphy’s appellate filings suggest that only § 1443(1) is relevant to removal in
 this case. Therefore, we, like the district court, focus on § 1443(1).
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       Mr. Murphy asserted removal was proper under § 1442(a)(3) because he “is a

 Federal court-officer, who was in the performance of his official-duties, while

 protecting the Presidential-Motorcade during the Marshall-fire tour of Boulder,

 Colorado,” in January and February of 2022. R. at 4–5. And he asserted removal

 also was proper under § 1443 because the Colorado state court was denying his

 constitutional rights to due process, a speedy trial, and equal protection. He

 requested an evidentiary hearing to determine if removal would be permitted.

       The district court entered an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4) summarily

 remanding the case to state court. Section 1455 is titled “Procedure for removal of

 criminal prosecutions,” and § 1455(b)(4) provides: “The United States district court

 in which such notice [of removal] is filed shall examine the notice promptly. If it

 clearly appears on the face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that

 removal should not be permitted, the court shall make an order for summary

 remand.”

       The district court provided two alternative grounds for summary remand.

 First, the court determined Mr. Murphy failed to comply with § 1455(a), which

 requires that a notice of removal must “contain[] a short and plain statement of the

 grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served

 upon [the defendant],” § 1455(a).2 Second, the court concluded Mr. Murphy

 articulated no basis for removal under either § 1442(a)(3) or § 1443(1). As to

       2
         Mr. Murphy did not provide copies of any documents served on him in state
 court or attach anything to his Notice.
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 § 1442(a)(3), the court found Mr. Murphy’s criminal case was unrelated to any

 alleged duties performed as a federal court officer in January 2022 in service of the

 Presidential motorcade. Turning to § 1443(1), the court concluded Mr. Murphy’s

 factual allegations did not meet either prong of the test for § 1443(1) removal:

 (1) that he had been denied rights due to his race, as required under Johnson,

 421 U.S. at 219; or (2) that he could not enforce his federal rights in the state

 criminal proceeding because of “a pervasive and explicit state or federal law,”

 id. at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the district court ordered

 summary remand.

       Mr. Murphy filed a timely appeal from the remand order.

                          II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION3

       We must begin by addressing our appellate jurisdiction. “The authority of

 appellate courts to review district-court orders remanding removed cases to state

 court is substantially limited by statute.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs.,

 Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229 (2007). One such statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which

 generally serves as a jurisdictional bar to appellate review of remand orders unless

 the removal was pursuant to either § 1442 or § 1443:

       An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is
       not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a

       3
          We ordered Mr. Murphy to address any legal basis for this court’s
 jurisdiction over his appeal. He has responded, and we have considered his response.
 Because Mr. Murphy asserts he is a licensed attorney, we decline to construe his pro
 se filings liberally. See Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). Even if
 we did, it would not alter the outcome of this appeal.

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       case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442
       or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
 § 1447(d).4

       But “[d]espite the seemingly unqualified language of the first clause of

 § 1447(d), its prohibition on appellate review applies only if the district court

 remands on grounds permitted by § 1447(c).” Miller v. Lambeth, 443 F.3d 757, 759

 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute provides:

       A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of
       subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the
       notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment
       it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall
       be remanded.

 § 1447(c). The “two categories of remand” within § 1447(d)’s “prohibition on

 appellate review . . . are remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for

 defects in removal procedure.” Miller, 443 F.3d at 759. “Thus, we have jurisdiction

 to review a remand order only if (1) the remand was for a reason other than lack of

 subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal procedure or (2) the ‘except’

 clause of § 1447(d) gives us jurisdiction.” Id.

       We need not decide whether the district court’s first ground for remand

 involves defects in removal procedure that would fall within § 1447(d)’s bar to

       4
        Although § 1447(d) does not contain the word “jurisdiction,” the Supreme
 Court and this court have viewed the section as a jurisdictional limitation. See, e.g.,
 Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 636 (2009) (framing issue
 concerning § 1447(d)’s bar to appellate review as involving “jurisdiction”); City of
 Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 2017) (same).

                                             5
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 appellate review.5 Instead, we conclude Mr. Murphy removed the case “pursuant to”

 § 1442 and § 1443 and therefore § 1447(d)’s “except” clause gives us jurisdiction to

 review both grounds for remand.

       In BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct.

 1532, 1536 (2021) (“BP”), the Supreme Court considered the following question:

 “Does 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) permit a court of appeals to review any issue in a district

 court order remanding a case to state court where the defendant premised removal in

 part on the federal officer removal statute, § 1442, or the civil rights removal statute,

 § 1443?” To answer that question, the Court first examined whether the defendants

 had removed the case under § 1442.6 The Court observed that “[t]o remove a case, a

 defendant must comply with . . . § 1446,” which “requires the defendant to provide

 affected parties and courts with a notice stating its grounds for removal.”7 141 S. Ct.

       5
          Compare, e.g., § 1455(b)(4) (directing district court to “promptly” review
 notice of removal of criminal case and to order “summary remand” if “removal
 should not be permitted”) with Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d
 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding, in civil case, that “[b]ecause § 1447(c) provides
 that a remand based on a defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be
 effected by granting a timely filed motion, an order granting an untimely motion or
 entered without a motion at all does not fall within the scope of § 1447(c) and
 therefore is not barred from review by § 1447(d)”).
       6
         The defendants in BP had relied only on § 1442, but it is clear from the
 question presented and the Court’s discussion that the Court’s analysis and
 conclusions also apply to removals based on § 1443. See 141 S. Ct. at 1538 (noting
 § 1447(d) extends appellate review to “orders . . . remanding a ‘case . . . removed
 pursuant to section 1442 or 1443’” (quoting § 1447(d)).
       7
         Section 1446 provides the procedure for removal of a civil case. Compliance
 with § 1446 effects removal and prevents the state court from proceeding further.
 See BP, 141 S. Ct. at 1539 (“[I]t is generally the defendant’s actions under § 1446
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 at 1538. The Court then concluded that “[t]o remove a case ‘pursuant to’ § 1442 or

 § 1443 . . . just means that a defendant’s notice of removal must assert the case is

 removable ‘in accordance with or by reason of” one of those provisions.” Id. (first

 quoting § 1447(d), then quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). “[T]he

 defendants’ notice of removal did just that by citing § 1442 as one of its grounds for

 removal.” Id. Turning back to the question presented, the Court concluded that once

 the notice of removal cited § 1442 as a ground for removal “and the district court

 ordered the case remanded to state court, the whole of its order became reviewable on

 appeal.” Id. The Court further explained that even the frivolous assertion of § 1442

 or § 1443 as a ground for removal is sufficient to fall within § 1447(d)’s “except”

 clause. See id. at 1542 (rejecting argument that frivolous addition of § 1442 or

 § 1443 to other grounds for removal would “invite gamesmanship . . . with an eye to

 ensuring appellate review down the line if the case is remanded”).

       BP is consistent with the approach we have long taken to determine whether a

 case is removed pursuant to § 1442 or § 1443. In Colorado v. Lopez, 919 F.2d 131,

 that ‘effect the removal,’” and “[o]nce a defendant complies with § 1446, a state
 court may not proceed ‘further unless and until the case is remanded.” (quoting
 § 1446(d))). In contrast, under § 1455’s procedural rules for removal of criminal
 prosecutions, state proceedings may continue up until judgment: “The filing of a
 notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall not prevent the State court . . . from
 proceeding further, except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered unless
 the prosecution is first remanded.” § 1455(b)(3). We see no reason to distinguish
 BP based on this difference. Section 1455(b)(4) and (5) clearly require the federal
 district court to remand the case if warranted, which indicates that removal has
 occurred (at least for § 1447(d) purposes) notwithstanding continued proceedings in
 state court.
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 132 (10th Cir. 1990), we relied on § 1447(d) to exercise jurisdiction to review the

 merits of a district court’s order remanding a criminal prosecution to state court

 because the defendant had “filed a petition for removal pursuant to . . . § 1443.”8 We

 did so again recently in Lopez v. Cantex Health Care Centers II, LLC, No. 23-2038,

 2023 WL 7321637 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 2023) (unpublished), relying on BP. See

 id. at *2 (“Because Appellants asserted § 1442 as a ground for removal, we have

 jurisdiction to review the remand order.”). We take that same approach here. In his

 Notice, Mr. Murphy stated he “submits this Notice of Removal from the [state court]

 per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1443.” R. at 4. We conclude that was a sufficient assertion

 that his case was removable “in accordance with or by reason of” those statutes, BP,

 141 S. Ct. at 1538 (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore have jurisdiction

 over “the whole of [the district court’s] order” and proceed to the merits. Id.9

       8
          Although not always citing Lopez, we have on many occasions applied its
 test, which implicitly deems that removal is “pursuant to” § 1442 or § 1443 if the
 defendant simply asserts either statute as a ground for removal. See, e.g., First Union
 Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting only that the
 defendant had “cit[ed] [§ 1443(1)] as his basis for removal”); Colorado v. Carrillo,
 644 F. App’x 826, 826 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Because Carrillo expressly relied on § 1443
 in his notice of removal, we possess jurisdiction.”).
       9
          In Miller v. Lambeth, decided in 2006, we took a different approach to
 resolving our jurisdiction, concluding that “a bald citation to § 1443” was insufficient
 and instead “review[ed] the record to determine whether [the removing party had]
 alleged a basis for removal under § 1443.” 443 F.3d at 760. When faced with
 conflicting precedent, we should follow the earlier case. See United States v. Suggs,
 998 F.3d 1125, 1137 (10th Cir. 2021) (“In cases of conflicting circuit precedent our
 court follows earlier, settled precedent over a subsequent deviation therefrom.”
 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Lopez constitutes such earlier settled precedent.
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                                       III. MERITS

        Having established our jurisdiction under § 1447(d) to review both grounds for

 remand the district court relied on, we may resolve this appeal on waiver principles.

 Mr. Murphy has not challenged the district court’s first ground for remand—that he

 failed to comply with § 1455(a)’s procedural requirements. He has therefore waived

 appellate review of that ground. See Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1286

 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or

 waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And because the § 1455(a) ground for

 remand was an alternative and adequate ground, Mr. Murphy’s waiver of any

 challenge to it means he necessarily loses on appeal. See Shook v. Bd. of Cnty.

 Comm’rs, 543 F.3d 597, 613 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here a district court’s

 disposition rests on alternative and adequate grounds, a party who, in challenging that

 disposition, only argues that one alternative is erroneous necessarily loses because

 the second alternative stands as an independent and adequate basis, regardless of the

 correctness of the first alternative.”).

        Finally, Mr. Murphy alternatively requests a writ of mandamus to challenge

 the remand order. But mandamus is not available to obtain appellate review of a

 remand order even where § 1447(d)’s general prohibition on appellate review applies.

 See In re Stone Container Corp., 360 F.3d 1216, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting

 request for review of remand order by way of mandamus rather than appeal because

 “[a] remand order terminates the litigation in federal court and therefore . . . is

 appealable as a ‘final decision’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291—unless § 1447(d) forecloses

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  appeal.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1220 (“[A]

  remand order is always final and may be reviewed by appeal when it may be

  reviewed at all.”).

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

         We affirm the district court’s Order For Summary Remand. We grant

  Mr. Murphy’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees. We

  deny his Emergency Motion to Seal Case Records and All Files.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Veronica S. Rossman
                                            Circuit Judge

                                           10