Court Opinion

ID: 9928394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:10:25.454217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:06.906439
License: Public Domain

No. 58              January 31, 2024                 493

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                  In the Matter of K. G.,
         a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                  STATE OF OREGON,
                       Respondent,
                            v.
                          K. G.,
                         Appellant
              Marion County Circuit Court
                   22CC03330; A178907

  Jennifer J. Brown, Judge pro tempore.
  Submitted May 22, 2023.
  Liza Langford filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  JACQUOT, J.
  Affirmed.
494                                              State v. K. G.

        JACQUOT, J.
         In this civil commitment proceeding, appellant
appeals a judgment civilly committing her for a period not
to exceed 180 days. On appeal, in two assignments of error,
she argues that (1) the trial court erred in finding that the
state had met its burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that she was a danger to herself and (2) that the
trial court erred in failing to require the civil commitment
investigator to contact appellant’s counsel in advance of any
interviews with appellant. We affirm.
         On May 31, 2022, appellant was placed on a phy-
sician’s mental health hold after an incident at her moth-
er’s home where she cut her neck and hands with a knife.
She was tazed twice and restrained by police before being
brought to a hospital. Her neck wound required surgical
intervention. Appellant was “combative with staff prior to
surgery.” Appellant had been diagnosed with schizophrenia
and had a history of “medication non-adherence.”
         The court appointed counsel for appellant the
same day that she was placed on a hold. The civil commit-
ment investigator interviewed appellant on June 2 and 3.
Appellant’s counsel was not notified prior to the civil com-
mitment investigator’s interviews with appellant. Upon
receipt of the investigator’s report, filed on June 3, the court
found that there was probable cause to believe that appel-
lant was a person with mental illness, appointed a mental
health examiner, and scheduled a commitment hearing
pursuant to ORS 426.090. On June 6, appellant’s counsel
filed a motion requesting notice of any future interviews
by the civil commitment investigator and objecting to the
use of unadvised statements made to the civil commitment
investigator in the earlier interviews. In the motion, appel-
lant argued that ORS 426.100(3)(f) requires that counsel be
given notice and the opportunity to be present at any inter-
actions between the civil commitment investigator and the
person being considered for commitment.
         On June 6, appellant appeared before the trial
court for the civil commitment hearing. At the hearing, the
court denied appellant’s motion concerning interviews by
Cite as 330 Or App 493 (2024)                            495

the civil commitment investigator, concluding that (1) “the
term ‘examination’ within the statute applies to the exam-
ination that occurs during a hearing” and (2) that there is
not “enough of a parallel” between civil and criminal pro-
ceedings to apply the same standard of due process protec-
tions to people in a civil commitment hearing as to people
in a criminal trial. Following the hearing, the trial court
committed appellant, finding that there was clear and con-
vincing evidence that appellant has schizophrenia, that she
was a danger to self because she was “highly likely to hurt
herself,” and that she was “highly unlikely to take her med-
ications for the mental disorder,” but that there was not suf-
ficient evidence to commit her as a danger to others and that
she was not “unable to meet her basic needs.”
    PRESENCE OF COUNSEL “AT EXAMINATION”
         We begin with appellant’s second assignment of
error. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in fail-
ing to require the civil commitment investigator to contact
appellant’s counsel in advance of any interviews. As we
understand it, appellant argues that under the civil com-
mitment statute providing for counsel for a person under
consideration for civil commitment, ORS 426.100(3)(f), the
phrase “counsel * * * may be present at examination” gives
appellant the right to have counsel present at any interviews
conducted by the civil commitment investigator, meaning
that counsel must be given advance notice of the interview
and the opportunity to be present.
         ORS 426.100(3)(f) provides, “In all cases suitable
legal counsel shall be present at the hearing and may be
present at examination and may examine all witnesses
offering testimony, and otherwise represent the person.”
Appellant argues that the word “examination” applies to the
“interview or examination” conducted by the civil commit-
ment investigator in advance of the civil commitment hear-
ing. ORS 426.074(2)(a) (“The investigation conducted should,
where appropriate, include an interview or examination of
the person alleged to have a mental illness in the home of
the person or other place familiar to the person.” (Emphasis
added.)). Additionally, appellant asserts that she has a due
process right to have counsel present at those interviews
496                                             State v. K. G.

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, and Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution. Therefore, appellant argues, because her
counsel was not given notice of the interview by the civil
commitment investigator in advance due to the trial court’s
failure to instruct the civil commitment investigator to pro-
vide such notice, she was deprived of the opportunity to have
her counsel present and her rights were violated.
        The state argues that the trial court was correct
when it determined that the term “examination” in the stat-
ute refers only to the examination performed during the
hearing by the mental health examiner, and not to inter-
views or examinations by the civil commitment investigator.
Additionally, the state argues that there is no due process
right to counsel during interviews with the civil commit-
ment investigator. Finally, the state argues, even if the trial
court did err, any error was harmless.
         Thus, appellant’s second assignment includes two
arguments: (1) that appellant has a statutorily mandated
opportunity to have counsel present at interviews under
ORS 426.100(3)(f), and (2) alternatively, that appellant has
a constitutional procedural due process right to counsel at
the interviews. As explained below, we conclude that the
statute applies to examinations by the mental health exam-
iner and not the civil commitment investigator. As to the
constitutional argument, appellant has failed to develop
it adequately for our review; she has failed to provide any
support beyond simply asserting that she has such a right
under various constitutional provisions. Therefore, we do not
address it further. See Trent v. Connor Enterprises, Inc., 300
Or App 165, 170, 452 P3d 1072 (2019) (declining to “develop
arguments * * * that have not been briefed sufficiently to
persuade us of their merit, and that raise potentially com-
plicated issues”); Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern
Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 700 n 2, 64 P3d 1193, adh’d to as
modified on recons, 187 Or App 472, 68 P3d 259 (2003) (rec-
ognizing that we will not “develop a party’s argument when
that party has not endeavored to do so itself”). Accordingly,
we conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to
Cite as 330 Or App 493 (2024)                              497

require the civil commitment investigator to notify appel-
lant’s counsel before their interviews of appellant.
         We review the trial court’s interpretation of a statute
for legal error. State v. Davis, 290 Or App 444, 449, 415 P3d
1129, rev den, 362 Or 860 (2018). Our goal is to determine
the legislature’s intent. ORS 174.020; State v. Gaines, 346 Or
160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). We begin by considering
the text and context of ORS 426.100(3)(f). Gaines, 346 Or at
171-72. When a term used in a statute has multiple mean-
ings, we look to the context of the statute to determine which
meaning the legislature intended. State v. Fries, 344 Or 541,
546, 185 P3d 453 (2008). A statute’s context “includes other
provisions of the same or related statutes, the pre-existing
statutory framework within which the statute was enacted,”
as well as prior decisions that have interpreted the term.
Ogle v. Nooth, 355 Or 570, 584, 330 P3d 572 (2014). In addi-
tion to text and context, we consider the legislative history
of the statute and accord it the weight that we consider to be
appropriate. ORS 174.020(3); Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72.
         We begin with some background on the statutory
scheme in which ORS 426.100(3)(f) appears, which distin-
guishes between the investigation by the civil commitment
investigator, including interviews and examination, and the
examination by the mental health examiner. When a per-
son is put on an involuntary mental health hold, the person
or entity initiating the hold must notify the person’s county
of residence. ORS 426.070(1). The county notifies the court,
and an investigation is commenced to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe that the person meets the
legal criteria to be civilly committed. ORS 426.070(3). As
part of that investigation, the civil commitment investiga-
tor reviews medical records, interviews individuals that the
investigator has probable cause to believe have “pertinent
information regarding the investigation,” “where appropri-
ate” performs an “interview or examination” of the person,
and produces an investigation report. ORS 426.074(2). Based
on the investigator’s report, the county makes a recommen-
dation to the court about whether there is probable cause
to believe that the person should be civilly committed. ORS
426.074(3); ORS 426.070(4).
498                                             State v. K. G.

         If the court concludes that there is probable cause
to believe the person meets the criteria, it issues a citation,
schedules a civil commitment hearing, and appoints a men-
tal health examiner. ORS 426.070(5)(a); ORS 426.075(2);
ORS 426.110(1). The mental health examiner reviews med-
ical records; examines the person, which, as discussed
further below, may occur before the hearing; attends the
hearing and examines the person in court; and makes a rec-
ommendation to the court about whether the person should
be committed. ORS 426.120.
         The civil commitment investigator, on the other
hand, may or may not testify at the hearing, but the investiga-
tor’s written report must be provided to the court in advance
of the hearing. ORS 426.095(4)(d)(C); ORS 426.074(3). The
portion of the investigator’s report that is not objectionable
on evidentiary grounds will be introduced into evidence at
the hearing as long as the investigator is present to be cross
examined or the investigator’s presence is waived by the
person. ORS 426.095(4)(d).
        Counsel is appointed for the person “as soon as rea-
sonably possible” when the person is placed on an involun-
tary hold and must be appointed before the hearing. ORS
426.100(3).
         With that context in mind, we turn to the dispute
we must address: whether the term “examination” in ORS
426.100(3)(f) refers to the “interview or examination,” ORS
426.074(2)(a), of the person by the civil commitment inves-
tigator, the examination by the mental health examiner, or
both. As explained below, we conclude that the legislature
intended the term “examination” in ORS 426.100(3)(f) to
refer to the examination performed by the mental health
examiner both before and during the hearing.
         As set out above, ORS 426.100(3)(f) provides, “In all
cases suitable legal counsel shall be present at the hearing
and may be present at examination and may examine all
witnesses offering testimony, and otherwise represent the
person.” The question is what it means that counsel may
be present “at examination.” That text could refer to the
interactions between the person and the civil commitment
Cite as 330 Or App 493 (2024)                            499

investigator, the interactions between the person and the
mental health examiner, or both.
          The state argues that, because the other two phrases
regarding counsel in the statute refer to the hearing itself
and the examination of witnesses, which occurs at the hear-
ing, it is most reasonable to interpret the third as providing
the opportunity to have counsel present at the examination
by the mental health examiner that happens during the
hearing. Appellant argues that because the examination
by the mental health examiner happens during the hearing
where counsel is already required to be present, it would
be redundant to separate the attorney’s duty to be present
at the hearing from their ability to be present at the exam-
ination. Thus, appellant argues, the legislature must have
intended the “may be present at examination” language to
refer to the “interview and examination” by the civil com-
mitment investigator. ORS 426.074(2)(a).
         In 1987, the legislature substantially revised the
civil commitment statutes, including separating the pro-
vision requiring the person’s attorney to be present at the
hearing from the provision allowing their attorney to be
present at the “examination.” Or Laws 1987, ch 903, § 14.
Recognizing concerns about the civil commitment process,
it convened a task force on civil commitment. Task Force on
Civil Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons Recommendations,
House Judiciary Committee, HB 2324, Jan 30, 1987, Ex A, 1
(Task Force Recommendations).
         Prior to the 1987 amendments, examination of
a person by the mental health examiner occurred exclu-
sively during the hearing. See Testimony, House Judiciary
Committee, HB 2324, Feb 10, 1987, Ex C (written testimony
of Charles Williamson for the American Civil Liberties
Union) (“Under the present system the judge and counsel
can see whether the examiners do a careful and complete job
of assessing the problems of the [person].”). The task force
noted that the “current practice of conducting the evaluation
of the [person] in the courtroom is not adequate” and can be
“very superficial,” and it recommended that the legislature
amend the statutes to allow the mental health examiner to
500                                             State v. K. G.

“review the medical record and interview the person prior to
a hearing.” Task Force Recommendations at 22.
          To improve the process, the legislature expanded
the mental health examiner’s role beyond the hearing:
The amendments provide that the mental health examiner
must be appointed “sufficiently in advance of the hearing
so that [they] may begin their preparation for the hear-
ing,” and the examiner must have access to “records * * *
and the [civil commitment investigator’s] report * * * at least
24 hours before the hearing.” Or Laws 1987, ch 903, § 12;
ORS 426.075(2). The examiner must “[i]nitiate the exam-
ination process prior to the hearing,” Or Laws 1987, ch 903,
§ 16(1)(b); ORS 426.120(1)(b), and “[u]pon completion of the
hearing, file the reports,” Or Laws 1987, ch 903, § 16(1)(d);
ORS 426.120(1)(d). The current statute does not clarify spe-
cifically when or where the mental health examiner’s exam-
ination of the person is to take place, but the person and the
state both “have the right to cross-examine * * * [t]he exam-
ining physicians,” presumably during the hearing. ORS
426.095(3)(c). As we understand those amendments, they
require the mental health examiner to begin “the examina-
tion process” before the hearing, which may include examin-
ing the person before the hearing.
         At the same time, the legislature amended the lan-
guage at issue in ORS 426.100(3)(f). Prior to the amend-
ments, ORS 426.100(3)(f) provided, “In all cases suitable
legal counsel shall be present at the hearing and examina-
tion and may examine all witnesses offering testimony, and
otherwise represent the person.” ORS 426.100(3)(f) (1981),
amended by Or Laws 1987, ch 903, § 14 (emphasis added).
Correspondingly, counsel was required to be present at the
hearing and—necessarily, because the examination took
place at the hearing—also at the examination by the mental
health examiner. The legislature amended ORS 426.100(3)
(f) to provide, “In all cases suitable legal counsel shall be
present at the hearing and may be present at examination
and may examine all witnesses offering testimony, and
otherwise represent the person.” (Emphasis added).
        The fact that the legislature separated the oppor-
tunity to have counsel present at the examination from the
Cite as 330 Or App 493 (2024)                            501

requirement that counsel be present at the hearing at the
same time that it made it possible for the mental health
examiner to conduct part of the examination before the
hearing strongly suggests that the separated right was
intended to maintain a person’s ability to have counsel pres-
ent for the examination by the mental health examiner, just
as had been the case before the amendments. The amend-
ments made it possible that the mental health examiner’s
examination would take place, in part, before the hearing,
and, correspondingly, also provided that, if that occurred,
the person had the opportunity to have counsel present
during that examination.
         In the same set of amendments, the legislature also
addressed concerns regarding the civil commitment inves-
tigator’s powers. Those concerns were that the civil com-
mitment investigator’s role was too limited, resulting in
information that was not adequate for making an informed
probable cause determination, and that courts’ treatment of
the civil commitment investigator’s report was inconsistent
across the state. Task Force Recommendations at 17-19. To
remedy those concerns, the legislature expanded the civil
commitment investigator’s access to information to include
interviews with collateral individuals, like family members,
who may have pertinent information, and the person’s med-
ical records for the period beginning when they were placed
on the involuntary hold, without the person’s consent. Or
Laws 1987, ch 903, § 10; ORS 426.074(2). Additionally, the
amendments provided for a standard practice of allowing the
civil commitment investigator’s report and testimony into
evidence subject to evidentiary rules and cross-examination.
Or Laws 1987, ch 903, § 13; ORS 426.095(3), (4).
         Unlike the amendments to the mental health
examiner’s role, the amendments to the civil commitment
investigator’s role did not change the scope or timing of the
investigator’s interactions with the person; instead, they
allowed the investigator to collect information from other
sources and addressed admissibility of the report at the
hearing. Those changes do not suggest any need to expand
or separate the person’s ability to have counsel “at examina-
tion” from the requirement that counsel attend the hearing.
502                                             State v. K. G.

Nor does the legislative history suggest that the legislature
intended the newly separate ability for counsel to be pres-
ent “at examination” to be linked to the changes in the civil
commitment investigation.
         In sum, because the 1987 amendments shifted
the examination by the mental health examiner from an
entirely in-court proceeding to a potentially partially out-of-
court proceeding, and in the absence of any suggestion that
the legislature intended to extend the opportunity to have
counsel present to the preliminary investigation by the civil
commitment investigator, we conclude that the legislature
intended the “may be present at examination” language to
allow a person the opportunity to have their counsel pres-
ent during examination by the mental health examiner if it
occurs before the hearing.
          As noted above, appellant argues that, if “examina-
tion” refers only to examination by the mental health exam-
iner, it is redundant to provide the person with the oppor-
tunity to have counsel present “at examination” because the
person already has counsel at the hearing. However, in light
of the fact that the 1987 amendments created the possibility
that part of the mental health examination could take place
before the hearing, there is no redundancy.
        Thus, we conclude that the “examination” referred
to in ORS 426.100(3)(f) is the examination performed by
the mental health examiner, not the “interview or exam-
ination” performed by the civil commitment investigator.
Additionally, we conclude that ORS 426.100(3)(f) requires
the court to provide the person with the opportunity to have
counsel present during any examination performed by the
mental health examiner—whether it takes place during the
hearing or at another time or place.
         In this case, there is no evidence in the record
that the mental health examiner examined appellant out-
side of the hearing, and appellant does not argue that she
was examined by the mental health examiner outside of
the hearing and outside of the presence of her counsel.
Therefore, we conclude that ORS 426.100(3)(f) was not
violated.
Cite as 330 Or App 493 (2024)                             503

                    DANGER TO SELF
        Turning to appellant’s first assignment of error,
appellant argues that the state did not present sufficient
evidence that she was a danger to herself as a result of a
mental disorder and, therefore, a person with a mental ill-
ness. We disagree.
          In reviewing civil commitments, unless the appel-
lant requests de novo review, we shall “review the trial
court’s legal conclusions for errors of law, but [we] are bound
by its findings of historical fact unless there is no evidence
to support them.” State v. D. R., 239 Or App 576, 579, 244
P3d 916 (2010); State v. M. A., 276 Or App 624, 625, 371 P3d
495 (2016). There is no request for de novo review in this
case.
           To determine whether the evidence was legally suf-
ficient to support the trial court’s disposition, we “view the
evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible
derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the
record was legally sufficient to permit that outcome.” State
v. T. Y., 285 Or App 21, 22, 396 P3d 986 (2017) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). To commit appellant, the state had
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that because of a
mental disorder, appellant was a danger to herself or others,
or that she was unable to provide for her own basic personal
needs. ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A), (B); ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C); State
v. D. J., 206 Or App 146, 152, 135 P3d 397 (2006).
         Appellant has a history of hospitalizations, leav-
ing treatment against medical advice, medication non-
compliance, and self-harm. Her mother testified that appel-
lant has struggled with symptoms of mental illness since her
senior year of high school. The treating physician at the hos-
pital testified that she was “at great risk for hurting herself
in the future” because “[s]he will not take her medications
and those symptoms [of schizophrenia] will come back.” The
civil commitment investigator also testified that appellant
would not be compliant with her medication regime and that
“she would be a danger to herself once she left an * * * inpa-
tient program.” Appellant asserted at the hearing that her
504                                             State v. K. G.

injuries were accidental, and that she would comply with
nonpsychiatric medications for her physical injuries, but
that she did not need to stay at the treatment facility.
         Based on her diagnosis of schizophrenia, her past
medication noncompliance, her lack of insight into her own
condition, and her history of severe self-harm, the trial court
did not err when it found that the state had met its burden
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellant
was a danger to herself as the result of a mental disorder.
                       CONCLUSION
          Because the term “examination” in ORS 426.100(3)(f)
refers to the examination performed by the mental health
examiner, not to the civil commitment investigator, the
court did not violate ORS 426.100(3)(f) by failing to require
the civil commitment investigator to notify appellant’s coun-
sel in advance of any interviews with appellant. Because the
record supports that the state showed by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that appellant was a danger to herself as the
result of a mental disorder, the trial court did not err when
it civilly committed appellant.
        Affirmed.