Court Opinion

ID: 9701599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:26:53.472805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:32.339746
License: Public Domain

BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because I fail to perceive how the “totality of the circumstances” standard set forth in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), undermines this court’s original decision in State v. DeMasi, R.I., 419 A.2d 285 (1980), I must dissent. The requirement that the “whole picture” (including the knowledge and experience of the detaining officer) be considered in determining the propriety of an investigatory stop is no revelation to this court,2 and in our original decision in DeMasi we obviously adhered to that standard of review. Taking the officer’s experience into account, however, does not alter the fact that the officer “must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (Emphasis added.) United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S.Ct. at 695, 66 L.Ed.2d at 629. The mere fact that an officer is experienced does not require a court to accept all of his suspicions as being reasonable, nor does his experience and training necessarily mean that the officer’s perceptions are justified by the objective facts. United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1980).
I believe that the facts in this case, even when viewed through the experienced eyes of Officer Calabro, simply do not form a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that defendants were involved in criminal activity. The officer testified that his decision to stop the vehicle was based on the following two factors: (1) the back of the car was so low that it struck the railroad tracks, prompting him to surmise that the trunk was heavily laden; and (2) the back-seat passenger looked back at the patrol car. I am of the belief that the mere fact that a car is heavily laden does not give rise to a fair inference that the contents therein are the product of criminal activity. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 889-90, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2584, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 621 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring). Moreover, as Officer Calabro admitted in his testimony, an overweighted appearance may result from other normally innocent causes, such as a suspension system that is old or in need of repair. Id. Similarly, the passenger’s backward glances at the patrol car hardly constitute an objective basis for suspicion of criminal activity. People simply do take notice when a police car is nearby or is following their vehicle. The act in itself is wholly innocuous and unrelated to any criminal activity. See *1214United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 879 (D.C.Cir.1977); cf. State v. Frazier, R.I., 421 A.2d 546, 550 (1980) (nervous demeanor of motorist stopped at night by police officer is meaningless in determining existence of probable cause for arrest).
I do not dispute that these facts may have constituted sufficient reason for the officer to keep an eye on the vehicle; nor do I deny that these circumstances could be combined with other objective facts to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (heavily laden car, along with other facts, furnished probable cause for arrest). In this case, however, the officer could point to no additional facts between the initial sighting and the actual stop that could be said to have raised his initial hunch to the level of “reasonable suspicion.” The officer testified that he had heard no radio reports of criminal activity in the vicinity. He also stated that the vehicle was not exceeding the speed limit or proceeding substantially below the speed limit, nor was it proceeding erratically. At no time did he observe any other sort of traffic or vehicular violations, and the driver pulled the vehicle over immediately when given the signal by the flashing lights on the patrol cars. All of these facts would tend to allay an officer’s initial suspicions, not confirm them.
The majority places great emphasis on the fact that the officer believed that defendants were trying to elude him, terming the events of that morning a “motorized game of hide-and-seek.” The officer himself, however, testified that he was unsure about whether or not they were attempting to evade him. He stated that he originally lost sight of the vehicle because he had waited for a trailer truck that was traveling approximately forty yards behind defendants’ vehicle to pass. He further testified that at no time did he observe the vehicle accelerate or change its general course of direction. The majority’s firm conclusion that defendants were playing a game of “hide-and-seek” with Officer Cal-abro, therefore, is not supported by the record.
I believe that, looking at the whole picture, the objective facts available to Officer Calabro were such that his level of suspicion could amount to nothing more than a mere hunch that defendants were engaging in criminal activity. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny, such a hunch may not justify the seizure in this case.
Even assuming arguendo that the stop was valid, I believe that once Lanoue produced a valid license and vehicle registration, the continued detention that occurred was not reasonable under the circumstances. See People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal.3d 577, 586-87, 601 P.2d 207, 212-13, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 196-97 (1979); cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82, 95 S.Ct. at 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d at 617 (border officers may stop and question aliens based on reasonable suspicion, but further detention must be based on consent or probable cause). Because there had been no evidence of traffic or vehicular violations before the stop and valid documents had been produced, the officers had no reason to believe that the occupants were the subjects of outstanding warrants. Thus, I would conclude that the detention for the period during which the officers were awaiting the results of the warrant check was an unreasonable governmental infringement of rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.3
ORDER
The above-entitled appeals having been reconsidered in compliance with an Order of the United States Supreme Court issued on June 15, 1981, 452 U.S. 934, 101 S.Ct. 3072, 69 L.Ed.2d 948, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the mandate previously en*1215tered in State v. DeMasi, R.I., 419 A.2d 285, 294 (1980), is hereby vacated, and the mandate shall now read:
The defendants’ appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgments of conviction are affirmed, and the cases are remanded to the Superior Court.

. See State v. Halstead, R.I., 414 A.2d 1138, 1148 (1980).

. It should also be noted that DeMasi’s arrest, which occurred when he was taken into custody was illegal. See State v. Frazier, R.I., 421 A.2d 546, 549 (1980). At that time, the officers had no reason to believe that DeMasi had committed any crime.