Court Opinion

ID: 9713368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:14:23.578195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:18.401105
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT
O’BRIEN, Justice.
This appeal arises from a final decree, entered in the Orphans’ Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, involuntarily terminating the parental *79rights of appellant, L. W., in Infant Male M. a/k/a J. P. M. This appeal followed.1
The facts surrounding this appeal are as follows: Infant Male M. was born on July 27, 1976. The mother, B. A. M., refused at the time of birth to name the father of the child. On July 28, 1976, the mother signed a voluntary entrustment agreement with the Lawrence County Child Welfare Service (Child Welfare), giving custody of Infant Male M. to Child Welfare. On August 26, 1976, a petition for voluntary relinquishment of parental rights was filed by the mother and joined in by Child Welfare. The mother again refused to name the father of her child. On September 10, 1976, an evidentiary hearing was held on the petition of the mother to voluntarily terminate her parental rights. During the hearing, the mother named appellant, L. W., as the father of the child and testified that she did not know the whereabouts of L. W. The parental rights of the mother were terminated. Subsequent to September 10, 1976, Child Welfare determined that appellant had been detained at the Youth Development Center in New Castle, Pennsylvania, but had escaped from that center.
In February, 1977, Child Welfare discovered that appellant was incarcerated in the Lawrence County Jail. On March 17, 1977, a case worker from Child Welfare contacted appellant and informed him that B. A. M. had named him as the father of Infant Male M. Initially, appellant denied knowing B. A. M. Later, however, he indicated a desire to talk to B. A. M. and to an attorney. The caseworker then informed him of the possibilities of voluntary or involuntary termination of his parental rights. Appellant then stated that he wanted to talk to his mother and explore the possibility that she would care for the child. On March 24, the caseworker had discussions with appellant’s mother concerning an arrangement for her to care for the child. Appellant’s mother subsequently informed Child Welfare that she would not take care of the child. On March 29, appel*80lant called Child Welfare and asked that the caseworker go to the jail. Upon the caseworker’s arrival, appellant informed her that he did not want to sign a voluntary relinquishment of his parental rights and that he thought that his mother would take the child. Appellant then indicated that he wanted to talk to his parents again. This was the last contact appellant had with Child Welfare. He never again contacted the agency concerning Infant Male M. and he never inquired as to the well-being of the child nor did he attempt to establish the possibility of visitation with the child.
On August 4, 1977, Child Welfare filed a petition for involuntary termination of the parental rights of appellant. He was served with notice of the petition on August 5, 1977, by the Lawrence County Sheriff. The hearing in the case was originally scheduled for August 31, 1977, but on that date, Child Welfare filed a motion for continuance of the hearing, the reason for the continuance being the illness of the caseworker in charge of this case. On October 4, 1977, Child Welfare filed a motion for a hearing date and the court set November 8, 1977. On that date, both parties agreed to continue the case until December 15, 1977. The joint motion for a continuance indicated that “negotiations between the parties were pending.” On December 15, 1977, an evidentiary hearing was held on the petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights.
In addition to the testimony of the Child Welfare caseworker, appellant testified at the hearing. He indicated that until March 17, 1977, he was unaware that he was the father of Infant Male M. The child’s mother never informed appellant of her pregnancy. Appellant indicated that from February, 1976, and continuing to the time of the hearing, December, 1977, he was either in Forestry Camp near Pittsburgh, the Youth Development Center, New Castle, or the Lawrence County Jail. Appellant further testified that he was informed of his right to contest the petition and was also told the baby was in a foster home. Appellant did testify that the caseworker never informed him of his *81right to visit the child. He did admit that he never asked about the well-being of the child because he thought he would soon be released from the Lawrence County Jail and then he could take care of the child.
On December 20, 1977, the court below issued a final decree terminating the parental rights of appellant. This appeal followed.
Appellant makes two related arguments:
I. That the six-month requirement of § 311(1) of the Adoption Act was not complied with at the time of the filing of the petition and, therefore, the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
II. That the record does not support the court’s determination that appellant had a “settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform duties.”
We do not agree with either contention.
I. Six Month Requirement
On August 4, 1977, Child Welfare filed a petition to involuntarily terminate appellant’s parental rights. After two continuances, the hearing was held on December 15, 1977, pursuant to which the court issued a final decree terminating the parental rights. Appellant argues that because he did not know of the birth of Infant Male M. until March 17, 1977, and since the petition was filed on August 4, 1977, less than six months, as required by § 311(1) of the Adoption Act, had passed and that the court of common pleas did not have subject matter jurisdiction. We do not agree.
Section 311(1) of the Adoption Act provides:
“The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed pursuant to section 312, and a hearing held pursuant to section 313, on the ground that:
*82“(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child, or has refused or failed to perform parental duties . . . .”
The six-month limitation is not a jurisdictional fact which affects the power of the court of common pleas to hear this type of case, but rather is a fact which must be alleged and proved before a court with proper subject matter jurisdiction can grant the necessary relief, i. e., the involuntary termination of parental rights.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the filing of an involuntary termination petition before the six month requirement has elapsed does not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of a court of common pleas but rather goes to the ability of such competent court to grant the requested involuntary termination.
II. Merits
Appellant’s second argument is that the evidence does not support a finding that would permit involuntary termination under § 311(1), supra. We do not agree.
“311. Grounds for involuntary termination
“The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed pursuant to section 312, and a hearing held pursuant to section 313, on the ground that:
“(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child, or has refused or failed to perform parental duties . . . .”
The following elements are necessary for termination under (1) of § 311 of the Adoption Act:
1. The parent, by conduct continuing for at least six months, has:
a. “evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim . . ., or
b. “refused to or failed to perform parental duties.”
*83This court stated in Matter of Adoption of David C., 479 Pa. 1, 7-8, 387 A.2d 804 (1978):
“. . . Because the section is written in the disjunctive, parental rights may be terminated if a parent either evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights or the parent has refused or failed to perform parental duties. In re Adoption of M. T. T., 467 Pa. 88, 354 A.2d 564 (1976).
“. . . Although this Court, in interpreting section 311(1), has recognized ‘that the measures taken by the parent to demonstrate his interest and affection must be viewed in light of the existing circumstances.’ Adoption of R. L., 468 Pa. 287, 297 n.10, 361 A.2d 294, 299 n.10 (1976); In re Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 216, 331 A.2d 652, 655 (1975), certain parental responsibilities must be satisfied. As this Court stated in re: Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S. C. B. and K. T. [474 Pa. 615, 379 A.2d 535], supra:
“ ‘Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive and uninvolved interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance. In re Adoption of Orwick, 464 Pa. 549, 347 A.2d 677 (1976); In re Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 331 A.2d 652 (1975); Appeal of Diane B., 456 Pa. 429, 321 A.2d 618 (1974); In re Smith’s Adoption, 412 Pa. 501, 194 A.2d 919 (1963). This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with the child. In re Adoption of McCray, supra; Appeal of Diane B., supra; In re Adoption of Jagodzinski, 444 Pa. 511, 281 A.2d 868 (1971). Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent “exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.” Appeal of Diane B., supra, 456 Pa. at 433, *84321 A.2d at 620, quoting In re: Adoption of J. R. F., 27 Somerset L.J. 298, 304-05 (Pa.C.P.1972).’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
Our scope of review of the facts in this case was delineated in the case of In re Bums, 474 Pa. 615, 624, 379 A.2d 535 (1977):
“. . . Our inquiry is whether the orphans’ court’s determination that appellant refused or failed to perform parental duties for at least six months is supported by competent evidence. Adoption of M. T. T., supra; Adoption of Farabelli, 460 Pa. 423, 333 A.2d 846 (1975); Sheaffer Appeal, 452 Pa. 165, 305 A.2d 36 (1973). The adjudication of the orphans’ court will not be disturbed if ‘the record is free from legal error and ... if the chancellor’s findings are supported by competent and adequate evidence, and are not predicated upon capricious disbelief of competent and credible evidence.’ Cohen Will, 445 Pa. 549, 550, 284 A.2d 754, 755 (1971); Holtz Will, 422 Pa. 540, 544, 222 A.2d 885, 888 (1966); Hunter Will, 416 Pa. 127, 136, 205 A.2d 97, 103 (1964).”
Applying the above law to the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion that the decree terminating appellant’s parental rights must be sustained.
We will examine and review the record to determine whether Child Welfare produced competent evidence showing either a settled purpose to relinquish or the failure to perform parental duties during a six-month period from the date appellant became aware of his fatherhood to the date of the hearing.
The facts, as reviewed above, reveal that from March 17, 1977, the date appellant was first informed of the birth, until December 15,1977, the date of the evidentiary hearing, appellant performed none of the “affirmative” parental obligations articulated in Adoption of David C., supra.
Appellant in this case never attempted to see the baby, nor did he inquire as to the baby’s health or well-being. Even after being informed of the baby’s placement in a *85foster home, appellant never expressed any interest in the child’s welfare.
He was passive and uninterested in the development of his infant son. The record does show that appellant sought to have his mother care for the child, but when she decided that she could not accept the responsibility, he ceased pursuing the issue.
Appellant argues that because of his incarceration in the Lawrence County Jail, his lack of affirmative parental action should be excused. We do not agree.
In Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 216-17, 331 A.2d 652, 655 (1975), this court, when confronted with a similar fact situation, stated:
“. . . Initially, we note that performance was made more difficult for this appellant as he was in prison and unable to support his family for most of the period under consideration. However, a parent’s absence and/or failure to support due to incarceration is not conclusive on the issue of abandonment. Nevertheless, we are not willing to completely toll a parent’s responsibilities during his or her incarceration. Rather, we must inquire whether the parent has utilized those resources at his or her command while in prison in continuing a close relationship with the child. Where the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness ‘in declining to yield to obstacles,’ his other rights may be forfeited. See In Re: Adoption of J R F, 27 Somerset L.J. at 304.”
Nothing in this record demonstrates that appellant utilized any of admittedly limited resources to take affirmative action to fulfill his parental duties.
Decree affirmed. Each party to pay own costs.
NIX, J., files a dissenting opinion in which MANDERINO, J., joins.
MANDERINO, J., files a dissenting opinion.

. On February 22, 1978, this Court granted appellant’s application for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc.