Court Opinion

ID: 9669069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:38:40.707913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:51.948973
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR
The state has filed a petition to rehear in this case, asserting two concerns. First, it contends that this Court failed to review the trial court’s refusal to excuse jurors for cause under an abuse of discretion standard. See Burns v. State, 591 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979). The concern is misplaced. The majority opinion is based upon the record reflecting that the trial court relied solely upon the jurors’ responses to voir dire questioning without considering if the information known to jurors was so prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of their judgment being affected, a consideration which Tenn.R.Crim.P. 24(b)(2) inherently requires if the information is inadmissible in the trial of the case. See State v. Kilburn, 782 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Tenn.Crim.App.1989). In holding that the inadmissible information, particularly regarding the defendant’s involvement in another murder, possessed by the jurors was so prejudicial as to require excusing those jurors for cause, it is inherent in the majority opinion that the trial court’s action was viewed as an abuse of discretion.
Second, the state contends that the fact that the defendant did not request a change of venue should have significant bearing on the issue regarding the makeup of the jury. It relies upon United States v. Morales, 815 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.1987) which held that an accused who expressly declines to seek a venue change
carries a significantly heavier burden to show that widespread community publicity concerning the crimes of which he is charged render his trial presumptively un*574fair — that, because of the publicity alone, the jurors drawn from the district where he insists he has a right to be tried are presumptively unfit to meet the “impartial jury” standard of the sixth amendment.
Id. at 739. We note that the publicity in Morales related primarily to the issues on trial and that the federal system has no rule of procedure similar to our Rule 24(b)(2). Again, the state’s concern is misplaced, indicating a misapprehension of the holding in the majority opinion.
The decision in this case is not based primarily upon pretrial publicity about the events on trial or upon the presumption of prejudicial knowledge which may be made from such publicity when the issue relates to a change of venue. Rather, the opinion is grounded upon the knowledge possessed by the jurors who sat in judgment of the defendant. Regardless of there being pervasive pretrial publicity or no publicity at all, a fair and impartial jury, as contemplated by Rule 24(b)(2), would not include jurors who actually possessed knowledge of inadmissible information which is so prejudicial to one of the parties that a substantial risk exists that the jurors’ judgment would be affected. The assessment of prejudice stems from the information known to the jurors and not from presumptions arising from the extent of pretrial publicity. The exclusion of such jurors is not contingent upon a request for a change of venue being made. The petition to rehear is denied.
DWYER, Judge,
dissenting.
Adhering to my views as expressed in my dissent in this record, I would grant the State’s petition to rehear.