Court Opinion

ID: 9946085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 01:09:47.412821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.034030
License: Public Domain

02/28/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT KNOXVILLE
                               January 24, 2024 Session

         STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DARRIUS LEVON ROBINSON

                Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County
                       No. 311966 Boyd M. Patterson, Judge

                            No. E2023-00391-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Darrius Levon Robinson, appeals from his guilty-pleaded conviction for
attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018)
(second degree murder); 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt). The trial court ordered the
Defendant to serve the agreed upon eight-year, Range I sentence in confinement. On
appeal, the Defendant contends the court erred by denying alternative sentencing and
abused its discretion by failing to consider appropriate sentencing factors. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM
GREENHOLTZ and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Melody F. Shekari (on appeal) and Brandy L. Spurgin-Floyd (at plea and on appeal),
Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Darrius Levon Robinson.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline W. Weldon and Courtney N.
Orr, Assistant Attorneys General; Coty G. Wamp, District Attorney General; and
AnCharlene Davis, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
Tennessee.

                                       OPINION

       The Defendant’s convictions relate to the December 25, 2020 shooting of Darrell
Oldham, the Defendant’s then-girlfriend’s father. During a Christmas family gathering at
Mr. Oldham’s home, the Defendant and Mr. Oldham argued. When the argument
escalated, the two men went outside to the front yard. At some point during the argument,
the Defendant retrieved a semi-automatic handgun from his car and shot Mr. Oldham five
times, including after Mr. Oldham had rolled beneath a truck for protection.
       The Defendant was indicted for attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault,
and reckless endangerment. In exchange for the Defendant’s agreement to plead guilty,
the State agreed to the lesser charge of attempted second degree murder and an eight-year
sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. All other charges
were dismissed.

        The record contains the transcript of the February 17, 2023, sentencing hearing, but
it does not contain a transcript of the guilty plea hearing.

       At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Oldham testified that on Christmas Day 2020, he
invited the Defendant, Mr. Oldham’s daughter Jada Oldham, and Mr. Oldham’s two young
grandsons to his home. Mr. Oldham said that he drove the two-year-old grandson to his
home and that the others arrived soon thereafter. Mr. Oldham said that when they arrived,
his wife, daughter Aaliyah Oldham, and Aaliyah’s boyfriend were already there. He
acknowledged that he and the Defendant had been drinking alcohol.

       Mr. Oldham testified that he brought gifts for the children, including a stuffed
dinosaur that scared one of the grandsons, who started “crying and crying.” Mr. Oldham
said that he and the Defendant disagreed regarding how to manage the child’s reaction to
the toy, and an argument ensued. Mr. Oldham said that he asked the Defendant to step
outside because the Defendant “cursed [the child].” Once in the front yard, Mr. Oldham
said that the argument got “heated,” that he and the Defendant “got close to each other,”
that Aaliyah’s boyfriend separated them, and that Mr. Oldham’s wife came out to try to
encourage everyone to leave. Mr. Oldham said that Jada came out, that she hit the
Defendant, that the Defendant went to his car, and that the Defendant pointed a handgun
at Mr. Oldham.

        Mr. Oldham testified that he heard the first gunshot and dropped to the ground,
rolling side to side. He said that he heard more gunshots, that he knew he had been shot,
and that he felt paralyzed and was unable to stand. He stated that he crawled from the front
of the house toward his truck, located toward the back of the house, in order to prevent
shots from being fired toward family members who were inside the front door. Mr. Oldham
stated that the Defendant was running after him. Mr. Oldham said he positioned himself
partially under a truck, but the Defendant shot him again. Mr. Oldham said that he waited
for the Defendant to kill him. Because Mr. Oldham did not hear any more gunshots, he
said that he crawled to the back porch where Aaliyah found him. Mr. Oldham said that he
told her to call 9-1-1 because he was bleeding and “couldn’t breathe.” He said that Aaliyah
told him to “keep breathing.”

        Mr. Oldham testified that he was shot once each in the arm, hip, and back, and twice
in the colon. He said he had surgery followed by rehabilitation requiring a wheelchair and

                                            -2-
a walker. He stated that he had permanent numbness down the side of his left leg where
one of the bullets “knocked a nerve off [his] spine” and that he had residual pain as a result
of his shattered hip. Mr. Oldham said that the shooting had a great impact on his life and
that it was a “rough road . . . to get back to where [he] was right now.” He believed the
Defendant tried to kill him.

       Craig Gregory, the Defendant’s supervisor at MPW Services, testified that he was
a supervisor at a Volkswagen facility where the Defendant had worked full-time for about
a month. He described the Defendant as “stressed, impatient, but eager to make a change.”
Mr. Gregory said the Defendant showed up and performed well at work.

       Jerome Scott testified that he and the Defendant planned to produce rap music until
the Defendant’s “spiritual journey” led him to abandon music with explicit content. Mr.
Scott described the Defendant as being “family-oriented.”

        Jessica Carter, director of the Tennessee Department of Correction Day Reporting
Center (DRC), testified that the DRC was an alcohol and drug rehabilitation program for
individuals on felony probation and parole. She said the DRC also provided mental health,
physical health, and employment assistance. She stated that the Defendant was a “good
fit” for the DRC and would benefit from the DRC’s anger management and GED programs.
Ms. Carter’s assessment of the Defendant for the DRC program was received as an exhibit.

       Jada Oldham, the Defendant’s wife, testified that they had two children and that the
victim was her father. Ms. Oldham stated that she was at her father’s house on Christmas
Day 2020, that the victim and the Defendant began arguing, that the victim asked the
Defendant to step outside, that she went outside, and that she saw them arguing and pushing
each other. She said that she and her sister’s boyfriend tried to intervene, but “it [was] a
losing battle.” She stated that she and the Defendant went toward their car, that she heard
a series of gunshots, and that she saw the victim on the ground. She stated that the
Defendant stayed in one place until the police arrived. She acknowledged that the victim
and the Defendant had been drinking alcohol.

       Ms. Oldham testified that she married the Defendant after the shooting and that she
did not see her family often. She stated that she worked from home and that the Defendant
or his mother were the children’s primary caregivers. Ms. Oldham stated that the
Defendant had steady employment until he received minor injuries in a car wreck. Ms.
Oldham described the Defendant as being family-oriented, spiritual, and apologetic.

       On cross-examination, Ms. Oldham testified that she did not know the Defendant
had a gun in their car. She acknowledged that the victim fled from the front yard to the
back of the house, that she went into the house after the shooting, and that the Defendant
remained in the front yard.

                                             -3-
       Joe Jenkins testified that he started the Building Relationships and Valuable
Encounters (BRAVE) program to provide lifestyle-development coaching to men
reentering society after incarceration. Mr. Jenkins stated that he had been coaching the
Defendant and described him as “accountable,” “credible,” and “transparent.” Mr. Jenkins
said he was impressed by the Defendant’s attitude and commitment to recommendations
and assignments. Mr. Jenkins thought the Defendant could be a BRAVE team member
and said that the Defendant’s life had a good trajectory but that the Defendant could be
impulsive. Mr. Jenkins stated that he had no hesitation or concern working with the
Defendant and recommended the Defendant have a chance to contribute to the community
instead of being incarcerated. Mr. Jenkins’s letter regarding the Defendant’s participation
in BRAVE was received as an exhibit.

       The Defendant provided the following allocution:

              Your Honor, I wrote this letter to express my deep remorse for the
       heinous incident I am guilty of. I had a lot of time to self-reflect. I truly
       apologize to those I have hurt. I come so far just to set myself so far back. I
       take all the responsibility for what I’ve done. Since the incident, I met very
       wonderful people that help me and want to see me doing better. I do want to
       change to show everyone, especially my wife and kids, that my mistakes does
       not define who I am, it’s what I do after that does. Again, I truly apologize
       and wish to have a chance to prove myself.

       The presentence report was received as an exhibit and reflected the following: The
Defendant was age thirty at the time of the offense, dropped out of school in the ninth
grade, and was interested in obtaining his GED. The Defendant’s criminal history from
2009 until 2012 included convictions for ten misdemeanors including criminal trespass,
evading arrest, failure to appear, and unlawful possession of a weapon. He reported “fair”
mental health and “good” physical health. He reported past occasional use of MDMA,
hydrocodone, and cocaine when he was younger and said he had consumed alcohol and
marijuana on the day of the shooting. He reported that he had not used illicit drugs for two
years and that he made a promise to abstain from future drug use. He indicated that he had
never participated in any drug treatment programs.

      The Defendant reported that he lived with his wife and children and that he had a
good relationship with his mother, father, and two half-brothers. He reported that he was
married to Jada Oldham, that they had been in a relationship for six years, and that they
had two-year-old and four-year-old sons. The Defendant’s past employment included part-
time work at car washes, at a restaurant, and doing maintenance work. The Strong-R Risk
and Needs Assessment Tool, which was attached to the presentence report, reflected that
the Defendant had a “low” overall risk score.

                                            -4-
       After receiving the evidence and hearing testimony from the hearing, the trial
court’s primary concern was the need not to depreciate the serious nature of the offense.
The court noted that the parties agreed to an eight-year sentence and that no presumption
of favorability for alternative sentencing applied because the conviction offense was a
Class B felony. The court noted that the 9-1-1 call relayed the “chaos” of the scene as the
victim’s daughter told the victim to keep breathing and that she loved him. The court
credited the victim’s testimony regarding the events that occurred on the day of the
shooting, including his hearing and feeling gunshots while he was rolling on the ground
trying to get away from the Defendant. The court also noted the serious nature of the
victim’s injuries, including permanent numbness from a spine injury and the need for two
surgeries. The court noted that the evidence established that the Defendant was trying to
live a moral lifestyle, that he had a good relationship with his employer, that he would be
a candidate for the DRC, that he was a good father, that he had performed well in the
BRAVE mentoring program, and that he had made positive changes in his life since the
incident. The court found that the Defendant “when he allocated, he expressed remorse,
that he said he’d take responsibility, and he apologized.”

        The trial court acknowledged that the presentence report reflected that the
Defendant was employable and had a low risk of reoffending. The court gave little weight
to the fact that less restrictive measures had been frequently applied when the Defendant
was younger and found the Defendant had a high potential for rehabilitation. The court
found that mitigating factor (11) did not apply because the family gathering was not an
“unusual circumstance.” See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(11) (2019). The court gave little weight
to the Defendant’s criminal history but did apply an enhancement factor for the possibility
of multiple victims because the Defendant fired gunshots in a neighborhood and near a
home filled with people. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(3) (2019). The court gave some weight
to the seriousness of Mr. Oldham’s injuries and found that the Defendant “had no hesitation
about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high.” T.C.A. § 40-35-114(10);
see T.C.A. § 40-35-114(6). The court acknowledged the appropriateness of the
Defendant’s allocution but was not convinced as to its sincerity. The court concluded that
incarceration was necessary because of the seriousness of the offense and the presence of
several enhancement factors, including the use of a handgun. See id. §§ 40-35-103(1)(B)
(2019), -114(9).

       The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
incarceration, rather than an alternative sentence, and that the court failed to consider
appropriate sentencing factors. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the seriousness of
the offense did not merit confinement, that the court incorrectly applied two enhancement
factors, and that the court failed to apply appropriate mitigating factors. The State responds
that no abuse of discretion has been shown. We agree with the State.

                                             -5-
       This court reviews challenges to the length of a sentence within the appropriate
sentence range “under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of
reasonableness.’” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). A trial court must
consider any evidence received at the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report,
the principles of sentencing, counsel’s arguments as to sentencing alternatives, the nature
and characteristics of the criminal conduct, any mitigating or statutory enhancement
factors, statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts as to
sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee, any statement that the defendant
made on his own behalf, the potential for rehabilitation or treatment, and the result of the
validated risk and needs assessment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103, -210 (2019); State v. Ashby,
823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tenn. 1986);
State v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)); see T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (2019).

       Likewise, a trial court’s application of enhancement and mitigating factors are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion with “a presumption of reasonableness to within-range
sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our
Sentencing Act.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 707. “[A] trial court’s misapplication of an
enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial
court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” Id. at 706. “So long as
there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as
provided by statute, a sentence imposed . . . within the appropriate range” will be upheld
on appeal. Id.

       The standard of review for questions related to probation or any other alternative
sentence is an abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Caudle,
388 S.W.3d 273, 278–79 (Tenn. 2012); see Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 708. Generally, probation
is available to a defendant sentenced to ten years or less. T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a) (2014).
The burden of establishing suitability for probation rests with a defendant, who must
demonstrate that probation will “‘subserve the ends of justice and the best interest of both
the public and the defendant.’” State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tenn. Crim. App.
2002) (quoting State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)); see T.C.A.
§ 40-35-303(b) (2019); State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008).

       A sentence is based upon “the nature of the offense and the totality of the
circumstances,” including a defendant’s background. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 168; see State
v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Tenn. 2006). A trial court is permitted to sentence a
defendant who otherwise qualifies for probation or alternative sentencing to incarceration
when:

       (A) [c]onfinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who has
       a long history of criminal conduct;

                                            -6-
       (B) [c]onfinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the
       offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective
       deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

       (C) [m]easures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently
       been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C); see Trotter, 201 S.W.3d at 654. A trial court must consider
(1) the defendant’s amenability to correction, (2) the circumstances of the offense, (3) the
defendant’s criminal record, (4) the defendant’s social history, (5) the defendant’s physical
and mental health, and (6) the deterrence value to the defendant and others. See State v.
Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn. 2017) (concluding that the same factors used to
determine whether to impose judicial diversion are applicable in determining whether to
impose probation); see also State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1998); State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Further, when
the sole issue before the trial court is the manner of service, “information offered on the
enhancement and mitigating factors is relevant to [a] determination of ‘the appropriate
combination of sentencing alternatives that shall be imposed on the defendant[.]’” State v.
Bolling, 75 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (citations omitted).

        The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by finding that confinement was
necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. If probation is denied solely
on the basis of the circumstances of the offense, they “must be especially violent,
horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated
degree,” and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other
than probation. State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)
(citations omitted). This court has recognized, “This standard has essentially been codified
in the first part of [Tennessee Code Annotated] § 40-35-103(1)(B) which provides for
confinement if it ‘is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense.’” Id.
at 375.

        As a prefatory matter, we note that the transcript of the guilty plea hearing is not
part of the appellate record. See State v. Keen, 996 S.W.2d 842, 843-44 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1999) (“[A] transcript of the guilty plea hearing is often (if not always) needed in order to
conduct a proper review of the sentence imposed.”); see also T.R.A.P. 24(b) (stating that
the appellant has the duty to prepare a record which conveys a “fair, accurate, and complete
account of what transpired with respect to those issues which are the bases of appeal.”).
An appellant who fails to include the transcript of the guilty plea hearing in the record risks
waiver of a sentencing issue. Nevertheless, an appellate court will consider on a case-by-
case basis whether a record is sufficient for review. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 279. In the
present case, we will consider the Defendant’s sentencing issue on its merits,

                                             -7-
notwithstanding the absence of the transcript of the guilty plea, because the facts of the
offense are stated in the presentence report and were testified to at the sentencing hearing.

        Although the trial court based its sentencing decision on factors in addition to the
need not to depreciate the seriousness of the offense, the record reflects that the
circumstances of the offense surpass the Hartley threshold. The court found that the
Defendant shot Mr. Oldham five times, including shooting Mr. Oldham while he was on
the ground beneath his truck. The court noted that the incident could have easily ended
with a homicide. The court found that the Defendant chased the victim while continuing
to shoot at him, that the victim feared for his life, and that the victim believed he was going
to die. The court noted that the Defendant shot the victim a total of five times—twice in
the colon and once each in the arm, back, and leg. The court found the 9-1-1 call
“impactful” as it depicted the victim’s daughter telling her father to “keep breathing” and
the father and daughter expressing love for each other not knowing if that would be the last
time they would ever see each other. The court also gave “some weight” to the victim’s
injuries which required two surgeries and left the victim with permanent numbness in his
hip and leg. The trial court was heavily swayed by the circumstances of the offense and
stated on the record that it relied upon the seriousness of this crime in denying alternative
sentencing. The facts support the court’s conclusion in this regard.

       The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by applying enhancement factor
(3), which regards an offense involving more than one victim. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(3).
The State agrees. Under the facts of this case, we agree that enhancement factor (3) does
not apply. However, misapplication of an enhancement factor does not invalidate the
Defendant’s agreed upon eight-year sentence. See Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706.

        The Defendant contends that the trial court should not have applied enhancement
factor (10), which relates to an offense committed without hesitation when the risk to
human life was high, and that the court should have applied mitigating factor (11), which
relates to incidents committed under such “unusual circumstances that it is unlikely that a
sustained intent to violate the law motivated the criminal conduct.” See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-
114(10), -113(11). The court found that enhancement factor (10) applied given the number
of people present at the time the Defendant fired multiple shots. The court found that
mitigating factor (11) did not apply because the family gathering was not the type of
“unusual circumstance” contemplated by the factor and because the facts demonstrated the
Defendant chased Mr. Oldham with the intention of killing him. The court’s decision to
apply enhancement factor (10) and not to apply mitigating factor (11) is supported by the
evidence.

       The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in the limited weight it gave to the
presentence report and the Defendant’s allocution. The record reflects that the trial court
discussed and considered the presentence report’s findings including the Defendant’s past

                                             -8-
employment, criminal history, risk of reoffending, and the Defendant’s potential for
rehabilitation. Based upon the Defendant’s criminal history, the court found that
“measures less restrictive than confinement [had] frequently been applied unsuccessfully;
maybe, but that really [was] something that deserve[d] little weight.” While the record
reflects that the Defendant had completed multiple probationary sentences, the court found
that previous measures less restrictive than confinement failed to prevent the Defendant
from committing additional crimes. See State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. 2000)
(upholding a trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing based on deterrence grounds that
included the need to prevent the defendant from engaging in the same illegal conduct);
State v. William S. Vanwinkle, No. M2017-00812-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 2383613, at *6
(Tenn. Crim App. May 25, 2018) (the record fully supports the denial of all forms of
alternative sentencing where the facts demonstrate that measures less restrictive than
confinement have failed to deter the defendant from continuing criminal activity).

        The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by “considering whether sworn
testimony would be ‘more remorseful’ than an allocution.” See State v. Patrick Wayne
Evans, No. M2015-00897-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 3992524, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. July
21, 2016), no perm. app. filed. The trial court gave less weight to the Defendant’s
allocution because the court indicated that it “would have gotten a better sense of the depth
of [the Defendant’s] remorse if the Defendant had been subject to cross-examination.”
While the Defendant complains of the limited weight given to his allocution, the record
reflects that the court found that “the [D]efendant, when he allocuted, he expressed
remorse, that he said he’d take responsibility, and he apologized.” The court, noting the
allocution was brief, found that the statement contained the “right things,” that “the words
were correct,” but that the court was unsure “how sincere they were.”

        “It is the role of the trial court to assess the credibility and demeanor of the defendant
during the allocution and then make a determination as to remorse.” Id. “[A] trial court’s
findings of fact and credibility determinations at sentencing are generally binding on this
[c]ourt.” State v. Bryan A. Erwin, No. E2021-01232-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 3355024, at
*11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 2022) (citing Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 956). While the court
noted that the allocution was unsworn, effecting the Defendant’s “depth” of remorse, the
record reflects that the court gave less weight to the Defendant’s allocution because it was
brief, did not address the issues in the case fully, and may have lacked sincerity. We will
not disturb the court’s conclusion in this regard.

        In denying alternative sentencing, the trial court acknowledged that the Defendant
was eligible for probation but was not “a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing
options” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-102 (6)(A). “A defendant
. . . who is an especially mitigated or standard offender convicted of a Class C, D or E
felony, should be considered as a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options in
the absence of evidence to the contrary[.] Id. The court stated on the record that it found

                                               -9-
that the nature and circumstances of the offense were “as serious as it gets” and that
confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. The court
also considered that the Defendant’s previous multiple probationary sentences had failed
to prevent the Defendant from committing additional crimes. See State v. Sihapanya, 516
S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tenn. 2014) (where the trial court combines the need to avoid
depreciating the seriousness of the offense with the need for deterrence and the nature and
circumstances of the offense, a heightened standard of review is not necessary and the court
of appeals should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.). The court’s denial
of alternative sentencing is accorded a presumption of reasonableness, and the record
supports the court’s conclusion in this regard. See Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 278-79; Trotter,
201 S.W.3d at 656.

        Upon review, we determine that no abuse of discretion has been shown. The trial
court was heavily swayed by the seriousness of the offense and other factors. The record
reflects that the court stated the factors it considered and its reasons for denying alternative
sentencing.

       In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.

                                              _____________________________________
                                               ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE

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