Court Opinion

ID: 9627648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:49:33.069075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:48.154074
License: Public Domain

HARTZ, Judge (Specially Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part). I concur in the majority’s opinion with respect to malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and the FELA. I concur in the result with respect to the defamation claim. I dissent, however, from the majority’s reversal of the district court on the negligence claim. The majority fails (1) to recognize an additional source of pre-emption under the RLA and (2) to consider the lack of any non-contractual basis for the alleged duty to investigate upon which , the negligence claim is predicated. Analyzing plaintiff’s defamation claim in light of the additional source of pre-emption leads to the same result as the majority reaches under New Mexico law. On the other hand, because of the absence of a non-contractual duty to investigate and the interference with the policies of the RLA that could flow from recognizing plaintiff’s negligence cause of action, both sources of preemption — the one recognized by the majority and the one it does not recognize — require dismissal of the negligence claim. 1. PRE-EMPTION The majority applies the approach of Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) to determine whether plaintiff’s state tort claims are pre-empted by the RLA. Following Lingle, which arose under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), not the RLA, the majority holds that a claim is pre-empted only if interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement is necessary to decide the merits of the claim. Although I agree that the need for uniformity in interpreting collective-bargaining agreements between railroads and their employees requires that a state-law claim be pre-empted by the RLA if the claim would be pre-empted under the Lingle test, I do not agree that there can be no other basis for preemption under the RLA. The RLA is not identical to the LMRA. Its policies and procedures provide a source of pre-emption not found in the LMRA. Lingle addressed pre-emption only under Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a) (1982). As the Court wrote: “Although § 301 pre-empts state law only insofar as resolution of the state-law claim requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement, and although Section 301 pre-emption is all that is at issue in this case, it is important to remember that other federal labor law principles may preempt state law.” Id. at 409 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. at 1883 n. 8,100 L.Ed.2d at 420 n. 8. Thus, Lingle itself counsels against assuming that pre-emption under Section 301 is identical to pre-emption under the RLA. Only a comparison of Section 301 with the pertinent section of the RLA, as they have been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, can determine whether they preempt state law in identical circumstances. Section 301(a) states: Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. The Supreme Court has found in that section a federal policy in favor of uniform federal interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements. As a result, whenever a state-law claim requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement,. the claim is pre-empted. That is the teaching of Lingle. Rather different language appears in the provision of the RLA governing resolution of employer-employee disputes. 45 U.S.C. Section 153 First (i) (1982) states: The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions * * * shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes. Despite the permissive wording of the statute with respect to referring disputes to the Adjustment Board, the United States Supreme Court in Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 406 U.S. 320, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972) held that the Adjustment Board is the exclusive forum for pursuing such disputes. In other words, under the RLA the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement do not have a choice as to whether to permit resolution of their disputes by court action. The RLA, unlike Section 301, compels the parties to proceed only by that Act’s administrative procedures for disputes covered by the Act. This difference has consequences for pre-emption analysis. As the Court stated in Andrews: [Sjince the compulsory character of the administrative remedy provided by the Railway Labor Act for disputes such as that between petitioner and respondent [regarding an alleged wrongful discharge] stems not from any contractual undertaking between the parties but from the Act itself, the case for insisting on resort to those remedies is if anything stronger in cases arising under that Act than it is in cases arising under § 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 323, 92 S.Ct. at 1565. Accord Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal.App.3d 1390, 244 Cal.Rptr. 414 (1988). Indeed, Andrews went on to say, “A party who has litigated an issue before the Adjustment Board on the merits may not relitigate that issue in an independent judicial proceeding.” 406 U.S. at 325, 92 S.Ct. at 1565 (emphasis added). This language suggests that the RLA pre-empts more than just court litigation of the precise cause of action arbitrated in the RLA proceeding; even a different cause of action may be pre-empted if it raises an issue already resolved through RLA proceedings. This result can be explained by the Supreme Court’s statement that in return for establishment of the RLA scheme for resolving grievances, “employees were willing to give up their remedies outside of the statute.” Union Pacific Railroad v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 613, 79 S.Ct. 1351, 1358, 3 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1959). In Union Pacific Railroad v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94, 99 S.Ct. 399, 402, 58 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978), the Supreme Court expanded on this theme: In enacting this legislation [the RLA], Congress endeavored to promote stability in labor-management relations in this important national industry by providing effective and efficient remedies for the resolution of railroad-employee disputes arising out of the interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements. The Adjustment Board was created as a tribunal consisting of workers and management to secure the prompt, orderly and final settlement of grievances that arise daily between employees and carriers regarding rates of pay, rules and working conditions. Congress considered it essential to keep these so-called “minor” disputes within the Adjustment Board and out of the courts. The effectiveness of the Adjustment Board in fulfilling its task depends on the finality of its determinations. Normally finality will work to the benefit of the worker: He will receive a final administrative answer to his dispute; and if he wins, he will be spared the expense and effort of time-consuming appeals which he may be less able to bear than the railroad. Here, the principle of finality happens to cut the other way. But evenhanded application of this principle is surely what the Act requires. [Emphasis added; citations omitted.] Andrews, Sheehan, and Price imply that the RLA establishes a national policy that in railroad-employee disputes concerning discharge, the dispute should be determined once and for all by the Adjustment Board under RLA procedures. This policy establishes a source of pre-emption in addition to the Lingle test. Identifying a potentially pre-emptive federal policy under the RLA does not, however, answer the question of what particular state causes of action are pre-empted. To determine whether a state tort is preempted requires examining “the state interests in regulating the conduct in question and the potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme.” Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 297, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1062, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977). That examination leads to different results for plaintiff’s defamation and negligence claims. 2. DEFAMATION When the state interests are strong and there is little potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme, federal law does not pre-empt the state tort, because in those circumstances the courts should “ ‘not infer that Congress ha[s] deprived the States of the power to act.’ ” Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 79 S.Ct. 773, 779, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959) (footnote omitted)). Plaintiff’s libel claim meets this test. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966) is instructive. Linn considered whether an employer could maintain a civil action for libel based on defamatory statements allegedly published by a union and its officers during a union-organizing campaign. The Supreme Court noted that the NLRB has afforded wide latitude to employers and employees in debating the issues during such organization campaigns. Permitting state libel suits could obstruct federal labor policy by inhibiting free debate during such campaigns. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that there should be no pre-emption of state civil suits for a particularly obnoxious subclass of libel, malicious libel — “libel issued with knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.” Id. at 61, 86 S.Ct. at 662. In the Court’s view, “a State’s concern with redressing malicious libel is ‘... deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility,’ ” id. at 62, 86 S.Ct. at 663, and “there was little risk that the state cause of action would interfere with the effective administration of national labor policy.” Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S. at 298, 97 S.Ct. at 1062. Similarly, permitting claims of malicious libel allegedly occurring during the investigation of a matter to be decided under the RLA should not undercut the RLA; and compelling state interests favor permitting such claims. So long as plaintiff proves that false statements made during the investigation were made with knowledge of their falsity, or with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false, those claims are not pre-empted by the RLA. This being the conclusion of the majority, I concur in the result with respect to the defamation claim. 3. NEGLIGENCE The majority remands this case to the district court for review of the collective-bargaining agreement to decide whether interpretation of that agreement is necessary for determination of the merits of plaintiff’s negligence claim. But remand is unnecessary. There are two possibilities on remand — either (1) the agreement deals with the employer’s duty in investigating alleged misconduct or (2) the agreement does not address the subject. In either case dismissal is required. If the agreement deals with the employer’s duty to investigate, then the negligence claim is pre-empted under the Lingle test. (The agreement may well have pertinent provisions. See Magnuson v. Burlington N., Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir.) (referring to provision of collective-bargaining agreement prohibiting railroad from disciplining employee “ ‘without proper investigation.’ ”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 318, 58 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978).) On the other hand, if the agreement does not address a duty to investigate, the negligence, claim must be dismissed because no non-contractual duty to investigate allegations before discharging an employee has been recognized in New Mexico. Neither plaintiff’s briefs nor the majority’s opinion recites authority for any such duty. On the contrary, in the absence of a claim of a retaliatory discharge (which is not alleged here) or a contractual right, an employer in New Mexico can discharge an employee “at will.” Chavez v. Manville Prods. Corp., 108 N.M. 643, 777 P.2d 371 (1989). Cf. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. at 1565 (only source of railroad worker’s right not to be discharged is collective-bargaining agreement). A fortiori an employer has the legal right to dismiss an employee on the basis of charges which the employer may not have investigated adequately, unless the contract of employment provides otherwise. In short, remand for review of the collective-bargaining agreement serves no purpose, because either (1) the agreement provides for a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, in which case the cause of action is pre-empted under the Lingle test, or (2) the agreement does not provide for such a duty, in which case plaintiff’s claim fails because there can be no breach of a non-existent duty. Moreover, even if this court could recognize for the first time an employer’s duty to investigate allegations with due care before discharging an employee, a negligence cause of action in this case would be preempted by the RLA. Recognition of a cause of action for negligent investigation by the employer could significantly undermine the RLA policy that grievances regarding discharge be finally decided by the Adjustment Board. Almost any dispute with a factual component (as opposed to one based solely on interpretation of the contractual language) could end up in court. Indeed, an employee would have a colorable claim of negligence against an employer any time a factual dispute was ultimately decided in favor of the employee during RLA arbitration. Thus, state-law negligence claims could undermine RLA policy that disputes be decided with dispatch and finality by the Adjustment Board in order that the nation’s transportation system not be disrupted by festering disputes. At the same time, there is no strong state interest in permitting the negligence claim. Given the failure of New Mexico prior to this case to recognize a cause of action for negligent investigation by an employer, such a cause of action could hardly be described as one “ ‘ * * * deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.’ ” Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. at 62, 86 S.Ct. at 663. Thus, the negligence cause of action is pre-empted because it would upset RLA policy without advancing a compelling state interest. For the above reasons I dissent from the majority’s failure to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the negligence claim.