Court Opinion

ID: 9959128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 19:04:08.938122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:28.772359
License: Public Domain

IN THE

   Indiana Supreme Court
             Supreme Court Case No. 24S-CR-123
                                                                           FILED
                     Sabrina L. Dunn,                                  Apr 10 2024, 1:38 pm

                   Appellant (Defendant below)                             CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

                               –v–

                      State of Indiana,
                     Appellee (Plaintiff below)

        Argued: February 15, 2024 | Decided: April 10, 2024

              Appeal from the Orange Circuit Court
                     No. 59C01-2010-MR-720
              The Honorable Steven L. Owen, Judge

     On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                         No. 22A-CR-2416

                     Opinion by Justice Goff
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Molter concur.
Goff, Justice.

   The trial court in this murder case instructed the jury that the State bore
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Sabrina Dunn did
not act in self-defense “and/or” in defense of her dwelling. The same
“and/or” construction appeared elsewhere in the instructions and the
State echoed it in closing argument. We conclude that, on the facts of this
case, the risk of jury confusion about the burden of proof rose to the level
of fundamental error. Accordingly, we vacate the conviction and remand
the case to the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History
   Sabrina Dunn married William “Bill” Dunn in 2005. In 2018, Bill began
using methamphetamine and became erratic and abusive. Sabrina moved
into a separate guesthouse on the couple’s land in Paoli, Indiana, just forty
or fifty yards from the main house, where Bill stayed. 1 Bill would bang on
Sabrina’s windows, tamper with the locks, break in, mess with her car,
and threaten that she would “end up in a body bag” or find herself
breathing “through a straw.” Tr. Vol. V, p. 64. Bill beat Sabrina. He made
her have sex with him to see their daughter (of whom he had custody)
and sent her an intimate video of herself. In 2019, Sabrina obtained a
protective order after Bill said he would kill her if she took their daughter.
The order deemed Bill a “credible threat” to Sabrina or another member of
her household and required him to “stay away” from her home. Ex. Vol. I,
p. 141.

   For about a year and a half leading up to Bill’s death in October 2020,
he and Sabrina collectively made over one hundred calls to 911. Sabrina
repeatedly reported that Bill was violating the protective order. In June
2019, Bill was arrested and charged with invasion of privacy. 2 He then
told Sabrina he would go to jail if she didn’t have the protective order

1   The Dunns’ first names are used for clarity where necessary.
2   See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(1) (2018).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024        Page 2 of 14
dismissed. Sabrina complied, but soon obtained another protective order
(the record does not tell us on what basis). Bill’s criminal case was
eventually resolved by pre-trial diversion.

   For a time, Sabrina lived in a trailer in French Lick, but she was ordered
out because of repeated visits by police when Bill showed up to harass
her. She also lived in an apartment for a while until its owner rented it out
to someone else. With nowhere else to go, she moved back to the
guesthouse on the property she shared with Bill. Sabrina and Bill divorced
in August 2019, but the two of them continued living in the neighboring
houses.

   Bill’s problematic behavior escalated in May 2020. The 911 calls and
police visits became even more frequent. Subject to hallucinations, Bill
would report that people were attacking Sabrina and plotting to kill him,
and that a hostage was being held in somebody’s garage. Given Bill’s
paranoia and mental instability, police took him to the hospital on several
occasions. They twice took guns from him and retained them under court
orders deeming Bill to be “dangerous.” 3 Ex. Vol. II, pp. 72, 81. And while
they would log Bill’s unlawful contacts with Sabrina, they never arrested
him again.

   In September 2020, Sabrina remarked on Facebook that, if Bill tried to
run her off, he should “[b]ring it on” and would need to “survive a shot
gun.” Id. at 45. By October 2020, Sabrina, out of fear of Bill, had secured
her house like “Fort Knox” with deadbolts on the inside of the door and
the windows screwed shut. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 5. She wanted to move out to
get away from Bill. Just two weeks before Bill’s death, Sabrina finally
obtained, as a result of the divorce, a deed to the guesthouse, which Bill
had kept from her until after she filed to hold him in contempt of court.
Sabrina recorded the deed in the hope of securing title and selling the
house so she could move.

3   See I.C. § 35-47-14-6(c) (2020).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024        Page 3 of 14
   During the night of October 20–21, Bill was agitated at seeing Sabrina
having sex with her boyfriend, David Wilson. Early in the morning,
Sabrina was sleeping on her porch when Bill woke her up and said he
wanted to get back together. They went for a drive but, according to
Sabrina, Bill became agitated and threatened to kill her and Wilson.
Sabrina and Bill came back home. Wilson left for work, not believing
Sabrina to be in any danger as she hurried him out of the house. Sabrina
then texted Wilson, criticizing him for not calling 911, although at trial
Wilson denied Sabrina had asked him to do so. Sabrina asked Wilson
where his gun was and fetched it.

   Meanwhile, Bill set about searching the property for some lost car keys,
which he suspected Sabrina had taken. Video footage from his home-
security system shows him cursing and muttering threats about kicking
Sabrina’s door down and cutting Sabrina and Wilson in half. He
apparently believed they had stolen his keys in a plot to provoke him and
thus land him in jail. Eventually, he knocked on Sabrina’s door and asked
for his keys, but Sabrina did not open the door. He later knocked again,
and he and Sabrina talked for a while. Sabrina said she didn’t “want to be
tortured [any] more” by the way he would alternately “push” and “pull”
her. Ex. 71, Video 062647-1, 06:27:48–06:28:05. The conversation ended
after Sabrina told Bill he wasn’t supposed to be there and begged him to
“leave [her] alone and let [her] go.” Id. at 06:29:15–06:29:40.

   An hour later, Bill returned to Sabrina’s door for the last time. After
knocking, he opened the door and entered the unlit house using a
flashlight. Seconds after Bill went in, the videotape recorded the sounds of
Sabrina racking the gun and firing seven shots. Bill wailed and Sabrina
fired three more times. Bill was hit in one arm and in his torso, both front
and back, fatally wounding him. Sabrina testified that Bill had picked up a
“great big knife” she kept in the house and that she feared he was going to
kill her. Tr. Vol. V, p. 90. She called 911 and admitted shooting Bill. Police
and EMS responded but Bill was pronounced dead at the scene. Police
recovered from Bill’s person two knives, a lockpicking kit, and suspected
methamphetamine. They found a third knife under his body. His autopsy
showed moderate methamphetamine toxicity.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024        Page 4 of 14
   The State charged Sabrina with murder. 4 At trial, defense counsel
argued that Sabrina justifiably used deadly force in defense of her
dwelling. The State argued, conversely, that Sabrina had lain in wait for
Bill and killed him according to a plan, rather than out of reasonable
necessity.

   After the close of evidence, the trial court decided of its own accord to
instruct the jury on self-defense as well as defense of dwelling. Sabrina’s
counsel objected to any instruction on self-defense, arguing that the
evidence had not placed it at issue. The trial court overruled the objection
and, following closing arguments, gave Final Instruction 7. This
instruction stated that it was “an issue whether the Defendant acted in
self-defense and/or in defense of her dwelling.” App. Vol. III, p. 194. The
instruction then defined the elements of each defense before specifying
that the State had “the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant did not act in self-defense and/or act in defense of her
dwelling or land adjoining her dwelling.” Id. The jury found Sabrina
guilty of murder and the trial court sentenced her to the maximum sixty-
five-year term. 5

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Sabrina had
waived her challenge to the “and/or” wording of Final Instruction 7 and
that no fundamental error occurred because the instructions as a whole
did not mislead the jury. Dunn v. State, No. 22A-CR-2416, 2023 WL
5425145, at *5–6 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2023). However, the panel
reviewed her sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) and revised it to
fifty-five years with five years suspended. Id. at *7.

4   See I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1) (2018).
5While the jury deliberated, two jurors sent notes to the court. One note said a juror had made
a statement that “did not pertain to the case,” put his finger in the note-writer’s face, and told
him or her to “stop talking.” App. Vol. III, p. 208. The other note attested to “bias in the case.”
Id. at 210. By agreement of the parties, the trial court told the jury to re-read its instruction on
how to deliberate and to “conduct themselves in [an] appropriate and dignified manner.” Id.
at 211.

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  We now grant transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. See
Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standards of Review
   A claim of error in instructing a jury is usually reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022). When the
defendant “fails to object,” however, she “waives appellate review.” Id.
Still, we may review an instruction for fundamental error under a
“narrow exception to waiver.” Id. An error is fundamental if it “made a
fair trial impossible” or constituted a “clearly blatant violation of basic
and elementary principles of due process that presented an undeniable
and substantial potential for harm.” Id. (cleaned up). In evaluating the
degree of error and its impact on the trial, we take account of any
“unusual operative and procedural facts” affecting the case. See Young v.
State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 728 (Ind. 2015).

Discussion and Decision
   This opinion proceeds in two parts. First, we explain that fundamental-
error review applies because Dunn did not specifically object to the
“and/or” language that she now raises as error. Second, after considering
the instructions as a whole and the unusual facts of the trial, we conclude
that the language describing the State’s burden of proof on Dunn’s
defenses was so misleading as to produce fundamental error.

I. Dunn waived her challenge to the instructional
   language.
  Dunn’s appeal focuses on the language of Final Instruction 7. The
applicable standard of review depends on whether the issue was properly
preserved at trial.

   Counsel for Dunn objected to the jury being instructed on self-defense,
arguing that “the only evidence” presented at trial related to “entry into”

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Dunn’s home. Tr. Vol. V, p. 125. Counsel did not object to the “and/or”
language now identified as error. Indiana Trial Rule 51(C) provides that a
party preserves an instructional error for appeal by objecting to it before
the jury retires, “stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
grounds of his objection.” Appellate review is thus waived absent a
“specific objection.” Scisney v. State, 701 N.E.2d 847, 848 (Ind. 1998) (citing
Smith v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1059, 1061 (Ind. 1991); Harvey v. State, 546 N.E.2d
844, 846 (Ind. 1989)). This rule enables the trial court to “avoid error” and
“facilitate[s] appellate review.” Id. And, here, it means Dunn’s challenge
was waived.

   Review is thus available only if the claimed error was fundamental.
Dunn can prevail only if the jury charge as a whole “was so misleading as
to make a fair trial impossible or blatantly violate basic due process.”
Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1285 (Ind. 2014).

II. Fundamental error occurred.
   We review Dunn’s instructional issue for fundamental error in two
steps. We begin by explaining why the use of “and/or” in Final Instruction
7 was ambiguous and misleading. We then address whether, in view of
the entire trial, the instructions rendered Dunn’s proceedings unfair and
subjected her to a substantial and undeniable risk of harm. We conclude
that Dunn’s challenge meets this high bar and merits a rare exception for
relief on an otherwise waived claim.

   A. Final Instruction 7’s use of “and/or” was ambiguous and
      misleading.
   The criminal code provides a number of justifications for the use of
force. Two matter here: defense of self and defense of dwelling. A person
“is justified in using deadly force” and has no “duty to retreat” if “the
person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious
bodily injury to the person” or “the commission of a forcible felony.” Ind.
Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2019). A person is also “justified in using reasonable
force, including deadly force,” if “the person reasonably believes that the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024         Page 7 of 14
force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person’s unlawful
entry of or attack on the person’s dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor
vehicle.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(d).

   The essential point the jury needed to understand here was that Sabrina
Dunn’s use of deadly force was justified if she reasonably believed it was
necessary to defend either herself or her dwelling. See Birdsong v. State, 685
N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. 1997) (stating that “one may use deadly force if he
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend himself or his
property”) (emphasis added). It was the State’s burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt “that the defendant’s use of force was not justified.” Id. 6
Because the trial court determined that self-defense and defense of
dwelling were potentially at issue, the State had to disprove both
justifications to obtain a guilty verdict. The trial court informed the jury in
Final Instruction 7, however, that the State had to prove Dunn “did not act
in self-defense and/or act in defense of her dwelling.” App. Vol. III, p. 194
(emphasis added).

   The phrase “and/or” has excited much debate. A recent commentator
believes that a well-placed “and/or” is “a strong, cogent, and efficient
signal of flexibility.” Ira Robbins, “And/Or” and the Proper Use of Legal
Language, 77 Md. L. Rev. 311, 313 (2018). The majority of opinion is critical,
however. Courts have labeled “and/or” a “verbal monstrosity,” an
“abominable invention,” and worse. See State v. Gonzalez, 130 A.3d 1250,
1255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (citing cases). One style guide
advises: “To avoid ambiguity, don’t use it.” Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s
Modern English Usage 50 (4th ed. 2016). A classic work on legal language
labels it “the repeated and direct cause of uncertainty, litigation, and
courtroom failure.” David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law 307

6In some jurisdictions, the defendant must affirmatively establish self-defense by a certain
quantum of proof. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Homicide: Modern Status of Rules as to Burden
and Quantum of Proof to Show Self-Defense, 43 A.L.R.3d 221 § 2(a) (1972). Indiana’s rule placing
the burden on the State to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt is longstanding.
Johnson v. State, 256 Ind. 579, 581–83, 271 N.E.2d 123, 124–25 (1971); Martin v. State, 28 Ind. 310,
311, 312 (1867).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024                            Page 8 of 14
(1963). If “and/or” has a proper use, it is to signify “A or B, or both.”
Robbins, supra, at 315. But it is clearer to spell the matter out in full, as the
latter wording does.

   We warn against using “and/or,” especially in jury instructions,
because it is ambiguous and potentially imprecise. Where wording
permits “two contradictory interpretations, one correct and one
erroneous,” the jury may be misled as to the law. LaPorte Community
School Corp. v. Rosales, 963 N.E.2d 520, 525–26 (Ind. 2012). Even
commentators who defend the use of “and/or” find it unsuitable for jury
instructions in cases involving “more than one person, victim, or
element.” Robbins, supra, at 320. And courts have reversed judgments
where “and/or” rendered a jury charge ambiguous. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 130
A.3d at 1258, 1259 (where the defendant conspired in or acted as
accomplice to robbery “and/or” aggravated assault); Harris v. State, 937
So.2d 211, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (where the defendant “and/or” his
co-defendant killed the victim). While we do not lay down a bright-line
rule that instructing a jury using “and/or” is always error, we strongly
caution trial courts to avoid this troublesome phrase.

   Here, the presence of “not” in Final Instruction 7 rendered “and/or”
even more ambiguous than usual. The jury needed to understand that the
State had to prove Dunn did not act in either self-defense or in defense of
her dwelling. But Final Instruction 7’s inclusion of an “and” option
opened the door to confusion, suggesting that the State bore the burden of
proving only that Dunn did not act in both self-defense and defense of her
dwelling. Or, to put it another way, the jury may have understood Final
Instruction 7 as giving the State the burden of disproving either self-
defense or defense of dwelling, rather than both. This possibility rendered
the instruction ambiguous and raises the specter of conviction without
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Dunn’s guilt.

   We next evaluate the magnitude of the error caused by Final
Instruction 7’s language and its impact on the outcome of Dunn’s trial.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024            Page 9 of 14
   B. The misleading jury instructions produced fundamental
      error in the context of this trial.
   Several considerations convince us that the ambiguous Final Instruction
7 deprived Dunn of a fair trial. As we explain below, the instructional
ambiguity was reiterated rather than cured, it impaired Dunn’s defense
strategy, and there is a real chance the jury was misled into convicting her.

      1. Neither the jury charge nor the arguments of counsel
         cured the ambiguity of Final Instruction 7.
    We review jury instructions “‘as a whole and in reference to each
other.’” Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1284–85 (quoting Whitney v. State, 750 N.E.2d
342, 344 (Ind. 2001)). An error is reversible only if “‘the entire jury charge
misleads the jury as to the law in the case.’” Id. (quoting same). On
fundamental-error review, we also consider whether the statements of
counsel might have clarified and corrected the jury’s understanding. See
id. at 1286; Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ind. 2002).

   Here, the instructions as a whole failed to remedy the ambiguity
introduced by Final Instruction 7. Indeed, the problematic phrase
“and/or” appeared again in Final Instruction 8. The latter instruction told
the jury that the “self defense and defense of dwelling statute” required
(in part) that Dunn have a “subjective belief” that her force was
“necessary” and “appropriate” to “prevent serious bodily injury and/or
unlawful entry upon her dwelling.” App. Vol. III, p. 195 (emphasis
added). Again, the inclusion of “and” sowed ambiguity, obscuring the fact
that either of the two justifications would negate Dunn’s guilt.

   The instructions nowhere told the jury that the State needed to
disprove both defenses. Consequently, we find it hard to assume that the
jury realized it should read the ambiguous “and/or” construction as “or”
in both Final Instructions 7 and 8. Cf. Garzon v. State, 980 So.2d 1038, 1040,
1044–45 (Fla. 2008) (finding no fundamental error where one instruction
set out the elements of the charges as to each defendant “and/or” their co-
defendants, but another instruction told the jury “to consider each
defendant individually”).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024         Page 10 of 14
   Furthermore, the State explained to the jury in closing argument that
the court’s instructions would say it was “an issue whether the defendant
acted in self-defense and or [sic] in defense of her dwelling.” Tr. Vol. V, p.
181 (emphasis added). The State thus reiterated—rather than clarified—
the ambiguous burden of proof, infecting the most critical issues in the
case. Although the State also conceded to the jury that it bore the “burden
to overcome” the “castle doctrine,” this statement was not explicit enough
to reassure us that the jury understood it. See id.

  Granted, defense counsel argued in closing that, in asserting defense of
dwelling, Dunn did not need “a reasonable belief that [her] life [was] in
danger.” Id. at 163. Counsel made a similar point in his opening statement
too. These comments might have imparted an accurate notion of the law.
However, the jury was told that the “Court’s instructions are your best
source in determining the law.” Id. at 185. And the instructions were the
last thing the jury heard before retiring to deliberate. We presume that the
jury perceived the “special and crucial character” of the court’s
instructions relating to the State’s burden of proof. Abdul-Wadood v. State,
521 N.E.2d 1299, 1300 (Ind. 1988). Ultimately, we lack confidence that
defense counsel’s statements, offered in the course of arguments on
Dunn’s behalf, effectively corrected the ambiguity subsequently
introduced and repeated by both the trial court and the State. Cf. Middleton
v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 438 (2004) (noting as “particularly apt” the
inference that a jury will credit a “prosecutor’s argument that resolves an
ambiguity in favor of the defendant”); Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1286 (noting that
the State quickly and candidly corrected an error in a preliminary
instruction, without contradiction by the defense); Garzon, 980 So.2d at
1044 (noting that the trial court and both sides’ counsel repeatedly
explained the relevant law correctly).

      2. The trial court’s instructions impaired the defense’s
         trial strategy.
  The particular context in which the challenged instruction was given
bolsters our finding of fundamental error. Dunn approached the case,
presumably for strategic reasons, with defense of dwelling as her sole

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024        Page 11 of 14
answer to the charge of murder. Defense counsel’s opening statement set
out his strategy in clear, albeit overstated, terms: “If there is an unlawful
entry into your house you can shoot ‘em.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 77. The defense
opposed any instruction on self-defense, which the trial court gave of its
own accord. While we appreciate the trial court’s concern to instruct the
jury on self-defense—which was plainly an issue within the evidence
presented at trial—particular care was needed when drafting instructions
sua sponte, over an objection, after the close of evidence, and contrary to
the express strategy of the party whom the instructions were supposed to
protect. And it’s especially important to avoid ambiguity when trying the
most serious crimes bearing the highest penalties. See Richeson v. State, 704
N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind. 1998) (noting the severe consequences of jury
confusion in an attempted-murder trial). In these unusual circumstances,
we conclude that the ambiguous instructions so confused the burden of
proof on Dunn’s chosen defense as to impair the fairness of the
adversarial process.

      3. The strength of Dunn’s defense leaves us fearing that
         the misleading instructions affected the outcome.
   Finally, we find undeniable potential for harm here because Dunn
presented such a strong case for her defense-of-dwelling justification. See
Metcalfe v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1236, 1237 (Ind. 1999) (finding fundamental
error where the instructions misstated the mens rea for attempted murder
and the defendant’s “intent was very much open to debate”).

   The jury heard the following evidence in support of Dunn’s defense of
her dwelling. Bill Dunn had a history of breaking into Sabrina Dunn’s
house and tampering with the locks. Even when Sabrina obtained
protective orders barring Bill from approaching her and her home, he
violated them over and over. Sabrina testified that the police would
habitually log Bill’s violations without arresting him. According to
Sabrina, one officer told her he was tired of coming out to her place. Bill’s
delay in signing over the deed to Sabrina’s house prevented her from
moving out. He was mentally unstable and had methamphetamine in his
system that fatal morning. The jury saw on videotape that Bill was

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024        Page 12 of 14
obsessed with finding lost car keys that he believed Sabrina and her
boyfriend had taken to mess with him. In the hours leading up to his
death, Bill had threatened to kill Sabrina and Wilson, muttered about
kicking her door down and cutting them in half, and twice knocked on her
door. The second time he knocked, Sabrina came out and explained at
length why she wanted to be free of him and “tortured no more.” Ex. 71,
Video 062647-1, 06:27:18–06:29:15. She ended by telling him he needed to
leave, her voice quivering with emotion. Finally, after knocking a third
time, Bill entered the darkened house using a flashlight and carrying
knives.

   In sum, Bill interfered incessantly with Sabrina’s life, repeatedly broke
into her home, and constantly harassed her in the face of pleas and
protective orders. He entered her home uninvited in the dark after she
begged him to stay away. The jury could have concluded that Sabrina
reasonably believed nothing short of gunfire would terminate Bill’s
trespass into her dwelling.

   In making this determination, we do not disregard the State’s argument
that Sabrina had no real need to shoot Bill. The evidence could be
interpreted in the State’s favor as showing that Sabrina deliberately
rushed Wilson out of the house, left her door unlocked, waited to shoot
Bill if and when he entered, and then shot him over and over without first
demanding he get out. What’s more, there was conflicting evidence as to
whether Bill was carrying a knife in his hand. And the knife found under
Bill’s body was not the same one Sabrina told police he was carrying,
which raised questions over where it came from.

   It was undoubtedly the jury’s prerogative to evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and resolve any conflicts. Young v.
State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022). But the jury could properly do so
only if equipped with the correct legal standard. Quite simply, the
plausibility of Sabrina Dunn’s defense-of-dwelling claim compels us to
conclude that the misleading jury charge might have determined the
outcome of the trial.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-123 | April 10, 2024       Page 13 of 14
                                      *       *        *

   The ambiguous, repeated, and uncured use of “and/or” to instruct the
jury on the State’s burden of proof impaired the sole defense strategy
Dunn pursued throughout the trial. Because Dunn’s defense had a strong
basis in the evidence, we conclude there is a serious risk she was wrongly
convicted without the State disproving beyond a reasonable doubt that
she acted in defense of her dwelling. On these “unusual operative and
procedural facts,” we find that fundamental error undermined the fairness
of her trial. See Young, 30 N.E.3d at 728.

Conclusion
  For the reasons stated, we vacate Dunn’s murder conviction and
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 7

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Robert G. Bottorff II
Jeffersonville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Kathy J. Bradley
Ian A.T. McLean
Office of the Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

7Because we vacate Dunn’s conviction, we do not review her claim for a sentence revision
under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

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