Court Opinion

ID: 9610814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:47:45.058541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:04.980186
License: Public Domain

Justice Exum
dissenting:
In my view there was prejudicial error in the trial in the admission of much of the character evidence and in the prosecutor’s closing argument.
The testimony of several of the character witnesses in response to the district attorney’s questions regarding the “basis” for earlier and properly expressed opinions constituted an improper effort by the State to prove, over objection of the defendant, the character of the prosecuting witness by specific acts and personal opinion. The witness Judson was allowed to testify that his opinion of the prosecuting witness’ character was based upon “personal observation” and “upon my own seeing what she has done on her courage and her integrity.” The witness Godwin testified that the prosecuting witness was in his Sunday School Class and the choir which he directed and that she regularly attended meetings every Wednesday night and *659every Sunday and that he could “find nothing wrong with her whatsoever.” The witness Ledbetter said his opinion was based on his “own personal observation.” The witness Reinburger said that her opinion was based on her own “personal observation of the prosecuting witness’ reaction to things.” The witness Riggin testified that she had had the prosecuting witness in her home on Christmas and her opinion of her character was based on “just personal observation.” The witness Harris testified that “in her opinion the prosecuting witness is a fine Christian girl.”
While the State was entitled to prove the character of the prosecuting witness both on the issue of her credibility and on the issue of whether she consented to the sexual intercourse, the only method of proof previously sanctioned by this Court and most other jurisdictions is by showing the general reputation of the witness in the community where she lived. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 93 L.Ed. 168, 69 S.Ct. 213 (1948) ; State v. McEachern, 283 N.C. 57, 194 S.E. 2d 787 (1973) ; State v. Steen, 185 N.C. 768, 117 S.E. 793 (1923). See 1 Stanbury’s North Carolina Evidence, Brandis Revision, § 110 at 336-337, and cases cited, where it is stated:
“There are three' methods by which a person’s character might conceivably be proved: (1) by the opinion of those who know him, (2) by reputation, and (3) by specific acts. Where a character is directly in issue, it seems that all three of these processes are available. But when character is offered as evidence of a person’s conduct on a particular occasion, the first method is not allowed at all, and the third is available only on cross-examination of the person whose character is in question. Therefore the standard method, and usually the only permissible method, of proving character is by reputation.”
It is clear that the character of the prosecuting witness was not directly but only collaterally in issue. Character is directly in issue only when it is one of the ultimate facts to be proved or disproved in the case, for example, in actions for defamation where injury to reputation is one of the principal measures of damage or in prosecutions for the seduction of an “innocent and virtuous woman” under General Statute § 14-180. 1 Stansbury’s North Carolina Evidence, Brandis Revision, § 102. Where character evidence “is offered on the question of a witness’ credibility, or as evidence that a party or third person did or did not do a particular thing” it is only collaterally in issue. Id. § 111, *660n. 5. A criminal defendant may offer evidence of his good character both on the question of his credibility if he testifies and on the question of his guilt whether or not he testifies, but his proof must be limited to his general reputation in the community. Michelson v. United States, supra,; State v. McKissick, 271 N.C. 500, 507, 157 S.E. 2d 112, 118 (1967) ; State v. Sentelle, 212 N.C. 386, 193 S.E. 405 (1937). The Supreme Court of the United States, reviewing the general law on the subject, stated the rule as follows:
“The witness may not testify about defendant’s specific acts or courses of conduct or his possession of a particular disposition or of benign mental and moral traits; nor can he testify that his own acquaintance, observation, and knowledge of defendant leads to his own independent opinion that defendant possesses a good general or specific character, inconsistent with commission of acts charged. The witness is, however, allowed to summarize what he has heard in the community, although much of it may have been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself. The evidence which the law permits is not as to the personality of defendant but only as to the shadow his daily life has cast in his neighborhood.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. at 477, 93 L.Ed. at 174, 69 S.Ct. at 219.
This is also the North Carolina rule stated in State v. Steen, 185 N.C. at 770, 117 S.E. at 794 as follows:
“In North Carolina the testimony of a character witness is confined to the general reputation of the person whose character is attacked, or supported, in the community in which he lives. State v. Parks, 25 N.C., 296; State v. Perkins, 66 N.C., 126 ; State v. Gee, 92 N.C., 756; State v. Wheeler, 104 N.C., 893 ; State v. Coley, 114 N.C., 879, and numerous other cases since. Reputation is the general opinion, good or bad, held of a person by those of a community in which he resides. This is eminently a matter of hearsay, based upon what the witness has heard or learned, not as to any particular acts, but as to the general opinion or standing in the community.”
This same rule has previously been true with regard to the prosecutrix in a rape case. “The State may only prove her general character — it may not offer proof of particular traits of *661character.” State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 192, 111 S.E. 2d 1, 12 (1959).
The reason for the rule limiting character evidence to general reputation is grounded not in logic but in policy and expediency. Michelson v. United States, supra; State v. Adams, 193 N.C. 581, 137 S.E. 657 (1927). Certainly the opinion of a witness who knows the person whose character is in question and prior specific acts of that person are highly relevant on the question of the person’s character. We have said, however, that the rule prohibiting this kind of evidence “is both sound and salutary, for the reason that it obviates a mass of collateral questions which would interminably prolong trials and inevitably result in drawing the minds of the jurors far afield from the merit of the case.” State v. Adams, 193 N.C. at 582, 137 S.E. at 658.
The holding of the majority, I fear, dangerously ignores the policy for limiting character evidence previously recognized by this and other courts. If the good character of the prosecuting witness in a rape case may be shown by the State through the personal opinion of witnesses who know her and by their revelation of her specific acts then the defendant must be allowed to attack her character by the same kind of testimony. The character of a defendant may likewise be proved. The majority opinion takes us back to what Justice Jackson in Michelson v. United States, supra, called “the frontier phase of our law’s development, [where] calling friends to vouch for defendant’s good character, and its counterpart — calling the rivals and enemies of a witness to impeach him by testifying that his reputation for veracity was so bad that he was unworthy of belief on his oath— were favorite and frequent ways of converting an individual litigation into a community contest and a trial into a spectacle.” 335 U.S. at 480, 93 L.Ed. at 176, 69 S.Ct. at 220.
At Stegmann’s first trial character evidence was not offered. The jury was unable to agree on a verdict. The improper admission of this evidence was clearly prejudicial to the defendant.
The district attorney’s argument to the jury, set out verbatim in the majority opinion, to the effect that because of the rules of evidence the State was unable to present certain evidence to the jury and that these rules were for the protection of the defendant was improper. It permitted the jury to speculate on what might have been offered; it allowed the State to *662circumvent the rules of evidence and do indirectly what it could not do directly. The majority justifies the permissibility of the argument on the ground that it was invited by defense counsel and seems to say that it related solely to the question of whether the defendant had previously been arrested for rape. Defense counsel did, indeed, argue that there was no evidence that defendant had been arrested for rape — “just accusation.” There was, however, evidence that he had been so arrested from the testimony of the prosecuting witness herself regarding statements made to her by the defendant. The majority recognizes that testimony of officers for the State and of the defendant “tended to show that he had in fact been arrested for a similar incident.” Defense ' counsel, moreover, argued justifiably the failure of the State to offer into evidence the black underpants of the prosecuting witness. Whatever the district attorney’s intent, the jury may well have understood from his argument that the State, somehow, was precluded by law.from offering this evidence.
This kind of argument by the prosecution has been consistently condemned and held to be reversible error in cases from this and other jurisdictions. State v. Roach, 248 N.C. 63, 102 S.E. 2d 413 (1958) (“I tell you I could get a number of people, at least one hundred, to come in here and testify to his bad character”) ; Ginsberg v. United States, 257 F. 2d 950 (5th Cir. 1958) (“I could probably have fifty people in here who would show that [defendant] isn’t a good character”) ; Snipes v. United States, 230 F. 2d 165 (6th Cir. 1956) (“We could have made thirty or forty counts in this thing, if you had wanted to be here a couple of weeks trying this lawsuit”) ; People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650, 676-677, 245 P. 2d 633, 649 (1952) (“[Argument which] broadly implies the prosecution is possessed of much- evidence tending to show guilt that has not been introduced, is erroneous and prejudicial”). It has been so held even where the argument was prompted by statements made by defense counsel and curative instructions were given by the trial court. State v. Eagle, 233 N.C. 218, 63 S.E. 2d 170 (1951) ; Kitchell v. United States, 354 F. 2d 715 (1st Cir. 1965). But see Commonwealth v. French, 357 Mass. 356, 259 N.E. 2d 195 (1970) (“[Y]ou have to use your imagination. There are many things in a court of law that can’t be introduced.” Held, improper but harmless because of adequate curative instructions.)
In State v. Eagle, supra, a drunk driving prosecution, defendant had argued the failure of the State to introduce into *663evidence a bottle of whiskey referred to in the testimony of State’s witnesses. In his argument to the jury the district attorney explained why the whiskey bottle had not been produced, stated that he had sent for the bottle and had it in a paper sack and was willing for it to be shown to the jury. Defendant objected and moved for an instruction that the jury not consider the argument. The motion was denied but in his instructions to the jury the trial judge told them to disregard that portion of the State’s argument. We, nevertheless, because of this argument awarded defendant a new trial.
In Kitchell v. United States, supra, the government argued:
“ [T]here was a comment made by defense counsel, there is no evidence here that Mr. Kitchell knew of any of the other defendants. I submit to you it is an unfair comment. There are certain rules of evidence, his Honor will instruct you about, what the Government can introduce without prejudice to its case. I submit it is in that light you must consider that comment.” 354 F. 2d at 719.
Upon objection the trial judge immediately instructed Government counsel to make no further argument of that nature. But counsel returned to say to the jury, “The issue is not, does he know these other defendants? If that were the issue, we would bring in an entirely different set of witnesses.” Id. These arguments were held to justify a new trial. The court said:
“Remarks on the availability of unused ‘evidence’ are clearly impermissible. Ginsberg v. United States, 5 Cir., 1958, 257 F. 2d 950; see United States v. Lefkowitz, 2 Cir., 1960, 284 F. 2d 310, 314; cf. Greenberg v. United States, 1 Cir., 1960, 280 F. 2d 472, 475. Conceivably a single error in this regard might have been cured by the court’s sustaining the objection. The Government cannot go on, however, making such remarks and having the court strike them out, and then claim they had no effect.” Id.
In State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 212 S.E. 2d 125 (1975), we held it to be prejudicial error for the State to argue that a person’s criminal record cannot be offered in evidence unless the person testifies on the ground, however, that the remark amounted to an impermissible comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify in his behalf.
Stegmann, through counsel, promptly objected to the prosecutor’s argument here complained of and moved for a mistrial. *664His objection was overruled and motion denied. No curative instructions were attempted. This constituted error, in my opinion, entitling defendant to a new trial.
The evidence in this case is sharply conflicting. The question of guilt hangs largely on the credibility which the jury accords to the prosecuting witness and to the defendant. I am unable to say that the improper character evidence and the improper portions of the State’s closing argument constituted error which was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I also dissent from the imposition of the death sentence for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in State v. Williams, 286 N.C. 422, 212 S.E. 2d 113 (1975).