Court Opinion

ID: 9490825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:55:43.801359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:20.308630
License: Public Domain

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge
(Concurring).
Even though the majority’s limited interpretation of 46 U.S.C.A. § 10908 (Supp. 1997 — Title 46 Partial Revision) goes far in reducing the potential for disrupting the maritime industry that was portended by the government’s and district court’s interpretation of that statute, I cannot join the majority without reservation. I write separately because, with respect, I believe my colleagues are in error in declaring that prosecutions under section 10908 may be instituted without a prior finding of unseaworthiness pursuant to the procedures set forth in Chapter 109, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 10901-08. This interpretation improperly excises section 10908 from the statutory scheme of which it is a part and runs contrary to the legislative intent that guided the recodification of these safety regulations. Most importantly, the majority’s views are counterproductive to the remedial ends pursued by Chapter 109.
Section 10908 is the ultimate sanction for a violation of the procedures set forth in Chapter 109. When a vessel appears to be unfit to be sent to sea, its chief and second mates, or the majority of its crew, may file a complaint with the vessel’s master before the vessel leaves the harbor. § 10902. The master then applies to a district court for appointment of independent surveyors, id., whereupon they file a report with the court. § 10903(a). The court then rules whether the vessel is fit to proceed on the voyage. § 10903(b). If deficiencies are found and corrected, the crew must proceed on the voyage or forfeit their unpaid wages. § 10904. If deficiencies are found but not corrected, and the ship is in a foreign port, a seaman may request to be discharged and is entitled to one month’s pay in addition to wages owed. § 10906. Furthermore, if deficiencies of such gravity “that [they are] likely to endanger the life of an individual” are found and not corrected, and the vessel is nevertheless sent to sea, criminal sanctions may be imposed. § 10908.
The majority, however, contends that section 10908 is a criminal sanction of general applicability that is unconnected to the Chapter 109 procedures. My colleagues begin and end their analysis of section 10908 by relying on the maxim of statutory interpretation that when the “plain meaning” of a statute “is clear on its face, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” Ante at 223. They argue that we are bound by this “plain meaning” or “plain language” canon to interpret section 10908 without reference to Chapter 109’s procedures.
As the majority acknowledges, ante at 224, precedent from both the United States Supreme Court and this Circuit establishes that the “plain language” rule requires the examination of a statute’s textual context. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515, 113 S.Ct. 1562, 1564-65, 123 L.Ed.2d 229 (1993) (the “cardinal rule [is] that a statute is to be read as a whole ..., since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context”); Skidgel v. Maine Dept. of Human Services, 994 F.2d 930 (1st Cir.1993). Nevertheless, my brethren “find no aid to construction in the provisions surrounding section 10908” because in this case “the relevant ‘context’ is subject to different interpretations.” Ante at 225. Thus, “[tjaking section 10908 at face value, without limitations, avoids any uncertainty.” Ante at 225.
I disagree with my colleagues’ appraisal of the usefulness of context in this case. Although the language of section 10908 is plain, its meaning can only be determined by reference to the text of the surrounding provisions. The majority implicitly concedes the point when it notes that “Section 10908 does not apply to fishing vessels or yachts.” Ante at 229. It arrives at this conclusion, not from any language found in section 10908, but rather irom the text of the first section of Chapter 109, which reads: “This chapter applies to a vessel of the United States except a *233fishing or whaling vessel or yacht.” 46 U.S.C.A. § 10901 (Emphasis supplied.) It is not an insignificant coincidence that sections 10901 and 10908 were both extracted from former section 658. Thus, the need to refer to section 10901 to interpret the “plain language” of section 10908 suggests that Chapter 109 is to be read and applied cohesively.
The placement of section 10908 within Chapter 109 is in itself a telling sign. Chapter 109, entitled “Proceedings on Unseaworthiness,” is located within Part G, “Merchant Seamen Protection and Relief,” of Subtitle II of Title 46. The provisions of Part G form an interlocking whole and are exclusively concerned with regulating the relationship between seamen and the masters and owners of the vessels in which they set out to sea. Thus, the placement of a generally-applicable criminal statute anywhere within Part G, let alone within Chapter 109, would have made little sense.15
Similarly, Part G codifies many of the requirements covered by the traditional warranty of seaworthiness.16 Indeed, a vessel is unseaworthy in precisely the same circumstances in which, for purposes of section 10902, it is unfit to proceed on its intended' voyage. Consequently, the reference in section 10908 to unseaworthiness can only be interpreted in the light of the other provisions of Chapter 109 and Part G.
Reading Chapter 109 as a whole reveals why, as admitted by the government, there has never been a criminal prosecution pursuant to either section 10908, or its predecessor statute, section 658. See Appendix. The goal of Chapter 109 is to correct unseawor-thy conditions before they pose a serious danger at sea. Section 10908 serves as a deterrent, providing seamen with the leverage to force their vessel’s master to comply with Chapter 109. Sections 658 and 10908 have never been used because, once the court-appointed marine surveyors have found a vessel to be unseaworthy, only the most reckless of masters would insist on setting out to sea without first repairing the vessel. Moreover, the master may not even be able to set out to sea in the face of such a finding because the seamen may choose to remain on land and receive one month’s wages as severance pay. § 10906. Unfortunately, my brethren’s insular interpretation of section 10908 replaces the corrective focus of Chapter 109 with a punitive one, since civil sanctions cannot be imposed unless the civil complaint procedures are followed, while criminal sanctions are always available.
An examination of section 10908’s predecessor statute, 46 U.S.C.A. § 658 (1958), es*234tablishes even more clearly that the civil procedures of Chapter 109 must be initiated before section 10908 may be invoked. In 1983, Congress recodified much of the law as to seamen, and in doing so split section 658 into sections 10901, 10906, and 10908. Pub.L. No. 98-89 (1983). Section 658 established the penalties that would attach if court-appointed inspectors were to find a vessel unseaworthy in some respect. The inclusion of both civil and criminal penalties within the same section was a clear indicator that the criminal penalties were the ultimate sanction for violations discovered pursuant to the civil complaint procedures.
Section 10908 should be understood in the context of section 658 because no substantive change was intended to result from the recodification, as is evident from the history of Public Law 98-89. See H.R.Rep. No. 98-338 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924. House Report No. 98-338 states that:
The ultimate aim of this legislation is three fold: to make maritime safety and seaman protection law easier for the Coast Guard to administer, to make it less cumbersome for the maritime community to use, and to make it more understandable for everyone involved.
Id. at 113, 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 925. During the hearings held by the House, an interesting exchange took place between Congressman Studds of Massachusetts, and Admiral Lusk of the Coast Guard, the agency entrusted with enforcing the statute:
Mr. Studds: Some have expressed concern that this recodification may prompt a series of long and expensive court cases initiated for the purpose of testing the judicial interpretation of terms and concepts contained in the revised law. Do you see any risk that this sort of scenario might unfold as a result of the enactment of this bill?
Admiral Lusk: I don’t think so sir. I understood that it was to be made so clear everywhere that we weren’t trying to make any substantive changes of a controversial nature.
Hearings of H.R. 2247, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98 Cong., 1st Sess. at 455 (Add. p. 1). This is confirmed by the Report that accompanied this recodification, which stated:
Although the Committee realized that many substantive changes would inevitably be made in any effort to simplify and modernize the maritime safety laws, it intended to make no changes that would prove to be detrimental to or adversely impact upon the industry governed by these laws. More specifically it sought to insure that this bill not take away any existing rights, benefits or privileges from any person, nor place any greater duties or obligations on any person.
H.R.Rep. No. 338, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 118-119 (1983), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 930-931 (Add. pp. 11-12). Thus, Congress simply took the then-existing legislation and rearranged it in a more comprehensible manner. Id.
The “plain meaning” rule does not govern reeodification statutes such as Pub.L. No. 98-89. As the Report correctly points out, in the usual kind of amendatory legislation, “a change of language is intended to change substance. In a codification statute, however, the courts uphold the contrary presumption: no change in law is intended unless clearly expressed.” Id. at 118-119 (Add. at 11-12). The Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that:
[T]he change of arrangement, which placed portions of what was originally a single section into separated sections cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the enactment. For it will not be inferred that Congress in revising and consolidating the laws intended to change their effect, unless such intention is clearly expressed.
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227, 77 S.Ct. 787, 790-91, 1 L.Ed.2d 786 (1957) (citing United States v. Ryder, 110 U.S. 729, 740, 4 S.Ct. 196, 201, 28 L.Ed. 308 (1884)); see Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553-55, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 2009-10, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 467-74, 95 S.Ct. 2178, 2185-89, 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975); Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162, 93 *235S.Ct. 408, 415, 34 L.Ed.2d 375 (1972); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 198-99, 32 S.Ct. 626, 630, 56 L.Ed. 1047 (1912). Since the House Report does not even discuss the purported change in the law urged by the government, let alone clearly express an intent to enact such a change, one may safely conclude that no substantive change in this section was ever intended.
Furthermore, we should be guided by our own precedent that counsels examination of statutes as a whole, and that due weight be given “to design, structure and purpose as well as to aggregate language.” O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir.1996) (citation omitted); United States v. Falvey, 676 F.2d 871 (1st Cir.1982). Falvey involved a prosecution for possession of counterfeit foreign coins under a statutory scheme first enacted in 1877 but extensively rephrased in 1965. 18 U.S.C. § 185. Until 1965, the statute’s scope had been limited, to foreign coins in actual use and circulation as money within the United States. However, because the 1965 version of the law simply made it a felony to counterfeit silver coins, the government sought to apply the statute to counterfeit foreign currency that was not either in actual use or circulation in the United States.
This court rejected the government’s contention, which was principally based on minor references to section 185 in the legislative history. Speaking for this court, Judge Campbell said:
From this slender reed, the government constructs its argument that in 1965, Congress intended, in a minor provision of an act with an entirely different purpose, to make a major change in a statute dating back to 1806. We cannot accept such an argument.
... [I]n the complete absence of any evidence that the wording was aimed at bringing about substantive changes other than the one expressly reflected in the legislative history, the most plausible explanation of the revised phraseology is that it was simply intended to eliminate the awkwardness of expression that was introduced in 1877 and carried through the 1948 version. The draftsman, we surmise, merely sought to “clean up the language” — falling into the trap, as can easily occur where statutory language is rephrased, of unintentionally suggesting a substantive change. In light of the history of this statute and the absence of any indication of an intention in 1965 to change its scope, it would be anomalous to read the amended statute as broader in coverage than its predecessors ... Cases construing changes in statutory language tend to rely in part on evidence of congressional intent or at least attention to the change in deciding whether to give the change its literal effect ... In the absence of these factors, courts are not bound to read a statute literally in a manner entirely at odds with its history and apparent intent.
676 F.2d at 875.
My colleagues view the legislative history in this case as sending “mixed signals,” ante at 226, with some of it suggesting that the purpose of the legislation was simply to reco-dify the then-existing law, with no changes intended, and other parts indicating that “[t]he bill ... [did] in fact make a great many substantive changes to the present law ... [which] should be understood ... [as] intended by the [Congress].” See H.R.Rep. No. 98-338 at 113, 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 925. They further quote from that Report to the effect that neither logic nor case law “mandate ... reliance on legislative history to reach a result contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.” Id. at 120, 932.
These references miss the point. They are only applicable to substantive changes in Chapter 109. Can it be seriously argued that merely moving text from section 658 to a separate section, section 10908, with virtually identical language, constitutes a substantive change in that statute? With due respect, I think not.17 See Finley, supra; Fourco Glass Co., supra; Muniz, supra; *236Falvey, supra. In fact, those provisions of Chapter 109 that are substantive changes from the prior statute are readily apparent from a comparison of both laws. See Appendix. One of these is the section immediately preceding section 10908, § 10907, which prohibits a master from impeding a seaman from making “a complaint authorized by this chapter,” and provides a civil penalty for such conduct. Section 10907 does not appear in the old text.
Thousands of vessels take to sea every day throughout the United States, and surely many of them do so in an “unseaworthy state that is likely to endanger the life of an individual.” The fact that there has been no prior invocation of either section 658 or section 10908 thus easts further doubt on the view that Congress by this recodification intended to enact a major change in the maritime law, without making any specific statement to that effect. Although I would be the last to condone sending an unseaworthy vessel to sea, and sincerely hope that deliberate environmental damage does not go unpunished, the imposition of criminal sanctions under the present circumstances constitutes a radical departure from what has been the custom and practice in the maritime world to the present time.
Notwithstanding that the majority’s holding on the sufficiency of the evidence ameliorates the impact of this new interpretation of the statute, it nonetheless poses a substantial threat of converting untold numbers of unsuspecting persons into prospective felons. Although Congress could very well enact a statute with the reach envisioned by the majority, I am hard pressed to accept such a significant break with the past, particularly where criminal sanctions are at stake, absent a clear indication that such construction is the intended result of what appears to be a mere reshuffling of a longstanding maritime safety statute. See Falvey, supra.
Finally, the fact that the interpretations of section 10908 proposed by Rivera and the government are “both ... consistent with what [the majority] see[s] as the overall purpose of the legislation,” ante at 225, should at the very least suffice to trigger the operation of the rule of lenity, which “commands that genuine ambiguities affecting a criminal statute’s scope be resolved in the defendant’s favor,” ante at 227 n. 9 (quoting United States v. Bowen, Nos. 96-2289, 90, slip. op. at 15 (1st Cir. Sept. 5, 1997)). The majority refuses to apply the rule because “[t]he plain language of section 10908 is not ambiguous.” Ante at 227 n. 9 (emphasis added). However, in applying the rule of lenity the inquiry is not whether the language of the statute is plain, but rather whether its meaning is clear. See United States v. O’Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 301 n. 10 (1st Cir.1993) (the rule is applicable when “at the end of a thorough inquiry, the meaning of a criminal statute remains obscure”) (emphasis added). The meaning and scope of section 10908 can hardly be described as unambiguous when, as the majority admits and this concurrence has shown, it remains subject to two reasonable but competing interpretations. Thus, if Congress accepts the majority’s invitation to look into this matter, ante at 228, I also suggest that it define unambiguously the nature of the relationship between Chapter 109’s civil and criminal provisions.
*237Appendix: A Comparison of Provisions
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. In contrast, the other two statutes under which the government could have proceeded in this case are located in much more appropriate contexts. Thus, 46 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b), which makes it a misdemeanor to operate a vessel in a grossly negligent manner, appears in Title 46, Subtitle II, Part A — General Provisions, Chapter 23 — Operation of Vessels Generally. Similarly, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1115 (Supp.1997), which makes it a felony when the negligence of a ship's officer results in the loss of human life, appears in the United States Criminal Code.
Sections 2302(b) and 1115 are also much broader in scope than section 10908. The former are both applicable to all vessels in U.S. waters, whether inland or coastal, and whether sailing under U.S. or foreign flags. Section 10908, on the other hand, excludes foreign vessels, fishing vessels, and yachts, as well as other vessels operating in harbors and inland waters, which makes sense only for a statute concerned exclusively with seamen.
The majority admits to being puzzled by the limited scope of section 10908, and recommends that Congress consider making “safety standards more consistent across categories of vessels and in all locations.” Ante at 229. The apparent inconsistency disappears under my reading of the statute. Thus, the exclusion of foreign vessels follows from the fact that Part G's provisions apply only to vessels sailing under the United States flag. It is also understandable that fishing vessels, harbor vessels, private yachts, and vessels on inland waterways are excluded from section 10908. Such vessels are excluded from most of the provisions of Part G because they usually set out to sea only for short voyages, rendering unnecessary the detailed statutory scheme established by Part G for seamen going out to sea on intercoastal or ocean voyages.

. The warranty of seaworthiness provides that the owner of a vessel owes an absolute duty to seamen to provide a ship’s hull, gear, appliances, ways, and appurtenances which are reasonably fit for their intended purpose, Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941 (1960), as well as to appoint a competent master and a crew adequate in their number and competent for their duty, Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 91 S.Ct. 514, 27 L.Ed.2d 562 (1971).

. The case relied upon by the majority, United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.1979), is inapposite. The Third Circuit was there faced with the task of interpreting the Clean Water Act. That statute, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq., which is of relatively recent vintage (1972), contains neither procedures similar to those in Chapter 109, nor is it the result of a recodification scheme.