Court Opinion

ID: 2963890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:16:54.55425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:32.417637
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1139

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  WILLIAM H. WALSH,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                             and Keeton,* District Judge.
                                          ______________

                                 ____________________

            James  L. Sultan  with whom  Rankin  & Sultan  was on  briefs  for
            ________________             ________________
        appellant.
            Peter  A. Mullin,  Assistant  United States  Attorney,  with  whom
            ________________
        Donald K.  Stern, United  States  Attorney, and  Pamela Merchant,  New
        ________________                                 _______________
        England  Bank  Fraud  Task  Force, Criminal  Division,  Department  of
        Justice, were on brief for the United States.

                                 ____________________

                                   January 23, 1996
                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

        *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                 BOUDIN, Circuit  Judge.  William Walsh  was charged with
                         ______________

            various offenses  growing  out of  a  bank fraud  scheme  and

            convicted on a majority of the counts.  His present appeal is

            primarily directed at procedural issues.  We affirm.

                                          I.

                 Walsh  was  indicted in  1992,  together  with four  co-

            defendants, and charged  with conspiracy, twenty-nine  counts

            of bank  fraud, and  twenty-nine counts of  false statements.

            18 U.S.C.      2, 371,  1344,  1014.   The substance  of  the

            indictment was that  Walsh carried  out a  scheme to  defraud

            Dime  Savings Bank  of  New York  ("Dime-NY").   He  did  so,

            according to the charge, by directing his employees to obtain

            29  specific  loans through  the  use of  deceptions  so that

            customers  could purchase  condominiums  from  Walsh and  his

            associates.

                 Walsh's  trial  occurred  in  February  and March  1994.

            Taken in  the  light most  favorable to  the verdict,  United
                                                                   ______

            States v.  Tuesta-Toro, 29  F.3d 771,  773  (1st Cir.  1994),
            ______     ___________

            cert. denied, 115 S.  Ct. 947 (1995), the  evidence permitted
            _____ ______

            the  jury  to find  the following.    Walsh was  a Cambridge,

            Massachusetts,  city  councillor,  lawyer,  and  real  estate

            developer.  With a group of investors, he purchased apartment

            buildings  or   complexes,   converted  the   property   into

            condominiums, and  sold the condominiums  to customers, using

            the unit sales to pay off the acquisition financing.  

                                         -2-
                                         -2-

                 Walsh ordinarily served as a trustee of the realty trust

            that acquired  the building,  acted as legal  counsel to  the

            trust, and  usually served  as the trust's  representative in

            the sale  of the individual condominium units.   During 1986,

            sales of units  in one of the projects started to fall behind

            schedule and the trust began to have difficulty  repaying its

            acquisition  loan.   Walsh then  discovered that  Dime-NY had

            recently created a wholly  owned subsidiary, called Dime Real

            Estate  Services  of   Massachusetts,  Inc.  ("Dime-MA"),  to

            originate  mortgage loans  in  Massachusetts.   Dime-MA  made

            mortgage loans  available  rapidly--with no  verification  of

            income,  assets or  down payments--but  the loans  required a

            twenty  percent  down  payment and  secondary  financing  was

            prohibited.

                 On  this failing project, and then  on two others, Walsh

            directed his employees to arrange loans from Dime-MA for unit

            purchasers and  to falsify documents submitted  to Dime-MA to

            conceal  the existence  of secondary  financing (and  in some

            cases  third  mortgages as  well).   In  the  three projects,

            approximately  half  the  customers  defaulted   and  Dime-MA

            incurred  substantial  losses.     An  investigation  ensued,

            followed by  the indictment already described.   Three of the

            four co-defendants pleaded guilty; charges against the fourth

            co-defendant were abandoned.

                                         -3-
                                         -3-

                 Jury deliberations  began on March 22,  1994.  Following

            the  dismissal of a juror during deliberations, the jury (now

            reduced to 11 members)  continued deliberations, and on March

            28, 1994, it returned  41 guilty and 18 not  guilty verdicts.

            Walsh  was thereafter sentenced and now appeals.  Most of the

            claims  of error concern the  dismissal of the  juror and its

            aftermath, so  we begin  with that  subject, starting with  a

            description of the pertinent events.

                                         II.

                 On March 23,  1994, a  note was received  from the  jury

            indicating that one  of the  jurors wished to  meet with  the

            judge,  adding:   "He  has several  questions  and we  cannot

            relate  to him  in  any  way, shape,  or  form."   The  judge

            declined to meet with an  individual juror, but the following

            day a court security officer reported that the foreperson was

            concerned  that  one  of  the  jurors  had  become  "mentally

            unstable."   After consulting  with counsel, the  trial judge

            interviewed   the  foreperson,   and   learned  of   constant

            interruptions by "juror X",  irrelevant statements by juror X

            about events in his past life, and juror  X's efforts to show

            other  jurors  written  materials consisting  of  a  campaign

            brochure and  a newspaper clipping from his  prior efforts to

            win elective office.

                 After consulting  further with counsel,  the trial judge

            interviewed juror  X; as  in the  judge's interview with  the

                                         -4-
                                         -4-

            foreperson,  counsel and  Walsh  himself were  present.   The

            judge  cautioned juror  X not  to indicate  his views  on the

            merits of the case.   The interview, which began  by focusing

            on  the material that the  juror brought into  the jury room,

            involved disjointed and rambling comments  by juror X.  Juror

            X also  mentioned a self-described "nervous  problem" and his

            general discharge from the military.  Some of the questioning

            was  based  on  questions  that  had  been suggested  by  the

            government and defense counsel.  

                 Finally, out of the presence of juror X, the court asked

            both sides for their position as to whether juror X should be

            excused, and  defense counsel  after consultation with  Walsh

            indicated that he "would  not object if the Court  decided to

            keep him or eliminate him.  . . . [Either way] we  would move

            for a mistrial."   The  government said that  it thought  the

            juror  was disabled and should  be excused.   The trial judge

            then  excused the juror, agreeing  that he was  "not a person

            capable of  engaging in  rational discussions based  upon the

            evidence."

                 Thereafter, the remaining jurors  were sent home for the

            rest  of the day.  The following morning Walsh filed a motion

            for  mistrial,  arguing that  the  ability  of the  remaining

            jurors to be impartial and open-minded had been undermined by

            their exposure  to juror  X.   No one at  this point  knew or

            claimed to know how juror X had proposed to vote.   The court

                                         -5-
                                         -5-

            agreed  to question  the remaining  jurors and  solicited and

            received proposed questions from counsel.  

                 Then the district judge, in  the presence of counsel and

            the defendant, questioned each  of the 11 jurors individually

            as to whether juror X had  discussed the merits prior to  the

            jury's  deliberations, had  brought  material  into the  jury

            room,  and had  discussed his  own personal  experiences--and

            whether the juror being questioned could, to  the extent that

            these events had occurred, put them aside and decide the case

            impartially based on  the evidence presented.   Eight of  the

            jurors had been  exposed to  a campaign brochure  and an  old

            newspaper article  about one of  juror X's campaigns;  all of

            the   jurors  had   heard  juror   X  discuss   his  personal

            experiences; and three jurors had heard comments from juror X

            about   the  merits  of  the  case  prior  to  the  start  of

            deliberations.  

                 Each  juror affirmed his or her ability to put aside the

            campaign material,  the personal experiences of  juror X, and

            any comments made by him before deliberations began.  Defense

            counsel  challenged three  jurors who  had heard  comments by

            juror  X before  deliberations  began, the  substance of  the

            comments not being  revealed.   With respect to  each of  the

            three jurors,  the trial judge  made findings that  the juror

            was credible in saying  that the pre-deliberation comments of

                                         -6-
                                         -6-

            juror X would have no effect.  The trial judge  then denied a

            mistrial.

                 At the request of defense  counsel, the trial judge told

            the  jury  that it  could  begin its  deliberations  from the

            beginning if it wished; the court  also told the jury not  to

            discount  a position taken "just because  [juror X] took it."

            The  jurors  then  deliberated  for  the  rest  of  the  day.

            Returning after a weekend break, they continued deliberations

            and asked for reinstruction  on substantive issues.  Late  in

            the same day, they  returned the 41 guilty and  18 not guilty

            verdicts.

                 1.   Walsh's  first claim  of  error is  that the  trial

            court erred in dismissing  juror X.  Walsh argues  that there

            was no  psychological testing  or psychiatric  examination of

            juror X, and  the evidence did  not show that  he was  either

            mentally  incompetent or otherwise  incapable of  engaging in

            rational  decision-making.   In  substance, Walsh  says  that

            juror   X  was   simply  an  unpopular,   perhaps  irritating

            participant who  probably sided with the  defendant and whose

            removal led to a prompt agreement to convict.  

                 Walsh did  not make a  timely objection on  this ground.

            At the time  of the dismissal, his counsel did  not object to

            excusing  juror  X,  or  argue for  psychiatric  testing,  or

            suggest  that juror  X could  be dismissed  only if  a higher

            degree  of irrationality  were  shown.   Instead, Walsh  made

                                         -7-
                                         -7-

            clear  his intention  to move  for a  mistrial; and  when the

            mistrial motion was filed, the ground--inconsistent  with the

            contention  now  made--was that  juror  X  was someone  whose

            "psychiatric  problems" had  been "clearly  demonstrated" and

            whose "negative influence" on other jurors was apparent.

                 Although, for  these reasons, the objection  now made is

            reviewable only for plain error, the dismissal of juror X was

            not error at all.   Federal Rule of Criminal  Procedure 23(b)

            permits the judge to  excuse a juror "for just  cause" during

            deliberations and to allow the remaining 11 jurors to reach a

            verdict.    The trial  judge  has  substantial discretion  in

            exercising this responsibility and  may remove the juror when

            "convinced that  the juror's abilities to  perform his duties

            [have] become impaired."  United States v. Huntress, 956 F.2d
                                      _____________    ________

            1309, 1312 (5th  Cir. 1992),  cert. denied, 113  S. Ct.  2330
                                          _____ ______

            (1993).   Similarly, in  United States v.  Molinares Charris,
                                     _____________     _________________

            822 F.2d 1213, 1223 (1st Cir. 1987),  we permitted a judge to

            excuse a juror who had taken a tranquilizer pill and appeared

            somewhat unstable.

                 The trial judge carefully  and repeatedly consulted with

            counsel  in determining  the course  of the  inquiry and  the

            questions  to be  put  to  juror X.    See  United States  v.
                                                   ___  _____________

            Chorney,  63 F.3d 78, 81 (1st  Cir. 1995).  The transcript of
            _______

            juror  X's voir dire, which  need not be  repeated in detail,
                       _________

            gave  the trial  judge ample  basis for  concluding  that the

                                         -8-
                                         -8-

            juror was  not able to  perform his duties.   Whether  or not

            juror  X was  incompetent  as  a  juror  under  28  U.S.C.   

            1865(b)(4),  "just cause"  existed under  Rule 23(b)  for his

            removal in this  case.  See  United States v. Reese,  33 F.3d
                                    ___  _____________    _____

            166,  172-73 (2d  Cir. 1994),  cert. denied,  115 S.  Ct. 756
                                           _____ ______

            (1995) (just cause not limited to incompetence).

                 There  is no  evidence that  the trial  judge  knew that

            juror X favored acquittal,  if indeed juror X  did.  Nor  did

            defense counsel  make any such suggestion  when he acquiesced

            in the dismissal of  juror X.  If anything,  Walsh's mistrial

            motion suggested  that  juror X  might  be hostile  to  Walsh

            because  Walsh was a lawyer  and politician.   Dismissal of a

            known holdout  juror raises  an entirely  different question.

            Compare  United States  v. Hernandez,  862 F.2d  17 (2d  Cir.
            _______  _____________     _________

            1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032 (1989).
                   _____ ______

                 2.   Walsh's second  objection is  that even if  juror X

            was  properly removed, the  court erred in  permitting the 11

            remaining  jurors  to return  a  verdict.   Walsh's  broadest

            grounds for this  objection are  legal:  he  claims that  the

            Constitution  does not permit a  jury with only  11 jurors to

            decide  a  federal criminal  case  over  the objection  of  a

            defendant.    He also  asserts  that  Rule 23(b)--which  does

            permit this course--could not be lawfully enacted through the

                                         -9-
                                         -9-

            Rules  Enabling  Act procedures.    18 U.S.C.      3771, 3772

            (1982).1

                 Neither of  these objections was  made at the  time that

            the district  court was determining whether to  permit the 11

            remaining   jurors  to  deliberate   and,  accordingly,  both

            objections are subject to review only for plain error.  It is

            true  that both issues were  raised in the  trial court after
                                                                    _____

            the verdict by a  post-verdict motion for dismissal or  a new

            trial. But the usual rule  is that an objection must be  made

            known  at the time that  the court is  making its decision to

            act, e.g.,  United States  v. Gonzalez-Torres, 980  F.2d 788,
                 ____   _____________     _______________

            791 (1st  Cir. 1992), and  here the proper time  to raise the

            objections  was  when  the  court  was  deciding  whether  to

            continue with 11 jurors.      In this case, in any event, the

            standard  of review does not matter  as to the constitutional

            claim because  in  Williams  v. Florida,  399  U.S.  78,  103
                               ________     _______

            (1970),  the Supreme Court  said that the  12-member jury was

            not required  by the Constitution  and that Congress  and the

            states  could  select  a different  number.    We think  that

            Williams effectively answers the claim that 11 jurors are too
            ________

            few.   A number of circuits  have held that a jury  of 11 can

                                
            ____________________

                 1The separate provisions  enabling the Supreme  Court to
            prescribe rules of criminal procedure were later repealed and
            consolidated with the Rules Enabling Act provisions governing
            the  enactment  of  rules   of  civil  procedure.    Judicial
            Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L.  No. 100-702,
               401-04, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-52 (1988); 28 U.S.C.    2072-
            74.

                                         -10-
                                         -10-

            constitutionally  decide a  federal  criminal  case,  without

            consent  of the parties, where  a juror has  been removed for

            cause.  E.g.,  United States  v. Ahmad, 974  F.2d 1163,  1164
                    ____   _____________     _____

            (9th Cir. 1992).

                 Williams   directly  rejects   the  argument   that  the
                 ________

            historical number of jurors is binding--how many would be too

            few is  not an  issue in this  case--and we  think that  this

            conclusion is not altered by Walsh's attempt  to rephrase the

            challenge as a concern  for a "unanimous" jury.   The Supreme

            Court has  not said whether a  less-than-unanimous verdict is

            acceptable.   Compare Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
                          _______ _______    ______

            But  whether it  is  or not,  we  think that  rendition of  a

            verdict agreed to by all jurors, after one juror with unknown

            views has been dismissed for cause, is a unanimous verdict.

                 The  gist of Walsh's claim under  the Rules Enabling Act

            is  that Congress might be able to alter the requisite number

            from  12 to  11 but  that Rule  23(b) was  adopted--under the

            procedures specified by  the Rules Enabling  Act--by judicial

            action  coupled with  Congress' failure  to veto  the change.

            Inaction, says Walsh, is not enough for a fundamental change.

            The Second  Circuit has concluded, however,  that this change

            can be accomplished through  the enabling procedures.  United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Stratton, 779  F.2d 820, 831 (2d Cir.  1985), cert.
            ______    ________                                      _____

            denied, 476 U.S. 1162 (1986).
            ______

                                         -11-
                                         -11-

                 Rules  that  are "strictly  procedural"  can  be adopted

            through the Rules Enabling Act without an affirmative vote by

            Congress, Burlington Northern Railroad Company  v. Woods, 480
                      _____________________________________    _____

            U.S. 1, 5 (1987), and this extends to rules that fall "within

            the uncertain area between substance and procedure, [but] are

            rationally  capable  of  classification   as  either."    Id.
                                                                      ___

            (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)).  In view
                     _____    ______

            of  the defendant's failure  to make  a timely  objection, we

            need not  decide this claim  outright but are  satisfied that

            the  use  of the  11-member  jury did  not  constitute "clear

            error" based on the Rules Enabling Act claim.2

                 3.   Walsh did make in  timely fashion an objection that

            this  jury was  not  capable  after  juror X's  discharge  of

            rendering  a fair and impartial verdict.  When this issue was

            raised by Walsh immediately after the discharge, the district

            court  properly undertook "an  adequate inquiry  to determine

            [what  had happened and] .  . . whether  it was prejudicial."

            United  States v.  Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996  F.2d 436,  442 (1st
            ______________     ________________

            Cir. 1993), cert. denied,  114 S. Ct. 1368  (1994).  A  trial
                        _____ ______

            judge enjoys discretion to determine the scope of the inquiry

            in deciding whether the jury has been tainted.  United States
                                                            _____________

                                
            ____________________

                 2Since  the issues were first  raised in a  motion for a
            new  trial and rejected on  the merits, one  could argue that
            the  customary  abuse  of discretion  standard  is irrelevant
            because the issues are strictly legal.  But we do not see why
            rejection  of an untimely legal claim  should be reviewed for
            anything  more than  plain error.   See  Gonzalez-Torres, 980
                                                ___  _______________
            F.2d at 791.

                                         -12-
                                         -12-

            v.  Boylan, 898 F.2d 230,  258 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 498
                ______                                  _____ ______

            U.S. 849 (1990).  

                 As already  noted, the district  court judge  separately

            examined each of the jurors, asking his own questions as well

            as various questions suggested by counsel.  In each instance,

            the judge  received a  forthright declaration that  the juror

            was not going to be affected by the personal comments made by

            juror X, by materials he had brought into the jury room, or--

            in the case  of three  jurors--by the comments  that juror  X

            made  about  the  merits  before deliberations  began.    The

            judgment of the trial judge, who can appraise the jurors face

            to face, deserves great weight.

                 Although  Walsh now  complains that  the district  judge

            limited  his own  questioning unduly--in  an effort  to avoid

            learning how the jurors were leaning--Walsh did not press for

            more detailed inquiry  at the time.  The trial judge treads a

            delicate  line in this  kind of  inquiry.   Assuming arguendo
                                                                 ________

            that Walsh is right in saying that Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)  does

            not  apply prior to the verdict, there are still obvious good

            reasons for a trial judge to avoid learning how an individual

            juror  is leaning.  United  States v. Rengifo,  789 F.2d 975,
                                ______________    _______

            985 (1st Cir. 1986).

                 Although Walsh  now argues  that there is  a substantial

            chance that the jurors were prejudiced by juror X, nothing in

            the record  makes this  at all  likely.   In addition  to the

                                         -13-
                                         -13-

            jurors' own denials,  we note that  the brochure had  nothing

            directly to  do with the trial; there is no reason to believe

            that  a newspaper article brought in by a juror regarding his

            prior  political  campaign contained  anything  material; and

            judging by the voir dire of juror X, his personal experiences
                           _________

            were also not germane to the trial.

                 Walsh now argues that juror X was hostile to lawyers and

            politicians (Walsh was both) and that this view may have been

            passed on to the other  jurors.  In fact, juror X's  brochure

            was  more  qualified, expressing  (in  a  description of  X's

            "positions")  objections  to  "the   [unspecified]  unethical

            ethics practiced by certain members  of the bar" and "machine

            controlled politics  and .  . . [unspecified]  dirty tricks."

            The  jurors  said that  they  paid  little attention  to  the

            pamphlet.   Further, it is  Walsh who now  takes the position

            that juror X  favored Walsh, which hardly suggests that juror
                          _______

            X was denigrating Walsh.

                 Finally, Walsh now complains that by discharging juror X

            the  court led the jury to think  that juror X's views should

            be disregarded.   In fact, the judge expressly  cautioned the

            jury not to  discount views simply because  they were earlier

            expressed by juror  X.  Walsh also says that  the jury should

            have  been directed  to start  its deliberations  anew.   The

            judge told the  jury that it was entitled to  start anew.  We

            think  that this was all that was either useful or necessary.

                                         -14-
                                         -14-

            At the time,  Walsh raised no  objection to the  instructions

            given.    4.   Walsh's last claim of error based on the juror

            X episode relates  to a  post-trial event.   According to  an

            affidavit from Walsh's secretary, she received a call a  week

            or so after  the verdict from someone  identifying himself as

            juror X who  said he had been  on the defendant's side,  that

            the  defendant  had  been  "railroaded," and  that  she  (the

            secretary) "would not believe what went on in the jury room."

            About  a  month  later,  Walsh submitted  this  affidavit  in

            support of a request that the jury and juror X  be subject to

            further voir dire or authorized inquiry by counsel.  
                    _________

                 The district court declined  to hold such a post-verdict

            inquiry  or to  authorize discussions with  the jurors  or to

            grant a new  trial based on the affidavit.   Walsh now argues

            that  because  the  parties  were  barred  from  unsupervised

            contact  with the jurors after  the verdict, United States v.
                                                         _____________

            Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 967 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
            _______                                _____ ______

            901 (1985), the trial  court had an obligation to  conduct an

            investigation  itself.   The  abuse  of  discretion  standard

            governs this claim, see Boylan, 898 F.2d at 258, and we think
                                ___ ______

            that there was no such abuse in this case. 

                 The  restrictions  on   post-verdict  contact  and   the

            limitations  on juror testimony  about deliberations, Fed. R.

            Evid.  606(b), exist  to protect  important interests  in the

            finality of the verdict and the privacy of the deliberations.

                                         -15-
                                         -15-

            See  Tanner v. United States, 483  U.S. 107, 120 (1987).  The
            ___  ______    _____________

            affidavit  contains only general rhetoric from juror X and no

            specific allegations of misconduct.   Given what the district

            court  already  knew  about  juror X,  the  telephone  call--

            assuming  (as we  do)  that it  came  from juror  X--did  not

            require any further inquiry.

                                         III.

                 Walsh's brief raises two further  issues, both unrelated

            to  juror X.   The  first claim  relates to  the government's

            admitted failure to turn  over certain documents in  a timely

            fashion.  The documents related to Frances Schwartz, a senior

            attorney  working for  Walsh who  was assigned  to the  three

            development  projects involved  in this  case.   Schwartz was

            indicted with Walsh and was one of the co-defendants who pled

            guilty to the conspiracy count and testified against Walsh at

            trial.  

                 On direct examination, Schwartz gave  damaging testimony

            against  Walsh.    In addition  to  identifying  a  number of

            documents and  describing the  operations of Walsh's  office,

            Schwartz testified  to  discussions and  correspondence  with

            Walsh  that--as  recounted   and  interpreted  by  Schwartz--

            confirmed Walsh's knowing  participation in and direction  of

            the  fraud.   Schwartz'  testimony was  thus quite  damaging,

            although another co-defendant who pled guilty also  testified

            that  Walsh  knowingly   directed  the  concealment   of  the

                                         -16-
                                         -16-

            secondary financing.     Early   in   her  cross-examination,

            Schwartz mentioned that she had "daytimers" or calendars that

            she  had used  to refresh  her recollection.   Later,  on re-

            cross, she  mentioned that she had allowed  the government to

            review  the daytimers and make  copies of them.   The defense

            immediately  objected   that  it   had  never   received  the

            daytimers.   The government said that  these daytimers should

            have  been disclosed  earlier  but had  been overlooked  when

            other  materials from  Schwartz  had been  made available  to

            Walsh's counsel.   Copies of the  daytimers were provided  to

            the defendant later that day.

                 Following a timely  motion by Walsh to  dismiss the case

            because  of this  delay, the trial  court denied  the motion,

            finding   that  Walsh's   strategy   would   not  have   been

            substantially different if  the daytimers had been  disclosed

            earlier.   The court instructed  the jury that the government

            had failed in its discovery obligation, and  it allowed Walsh

            to  recall Schwartz  to continue  her examination,  using the

            daytimers  to  try   to  establish  inconsistencies   between

            Schwartz'  prior  testimony and  the  daytimers.   Walsh  now

            complains that this was inadequate.

                 This court previously  considered the  issue of  delayed

            disclosure  of impeachment material  required to be disclosed

            under  the Jencks Act.   United States v.  Arboleda, 929 F.2d
                                     _____________     ________

            858,  862-65  (1st Cir.  1991).   We  said that  the critical

                                         -17-
                                         -17-

            question   was   whether  the   delay  had   "prevented  [the

            material's]  effective use by  the defense," id.  at 862, and
                                                         ___

            that  some  showing of  prejudice  was  required beyond  mere

            assertions that  the defendant  would  have conducted  cross-

            examination differently.  Id.  at 864.  Cf. United  States v.
                                      ___           ___ ______________

            Lanoue, No. 95-1140, slip op. at 34 (1st Cir. 1995).  Delayed
            ______

            disclosure of  Brady material  is subject  to the same  rule.
                           _____

            See  United States  v. Osorio,  929 F.2d  753, 758  (1st Cir.
            ___  _____________     ______

            1991).  

                 On this appeal, Walsh  argues that if his  trial counsel

            had  received the daytimers earlier, he would have focused at

            the outset on the  alleged inconsistencies between  Schwartz'

            testimony  and the  daytimers instead  of attempting  to cast

            doubt on the reliability of her memory.  In fact, the initial

            cross-examination  did  not  focus  on Schwartz'  memory  but

            rather  on her veracity, which  the defense counsel sought to

            undermine  by emphasizing her  prior drug use  and her desire

            for a lenient  sentence.   And when Schwartz  was subject  to

            further cross after the  daytimers had been produced, Walsh's

            counsel    paid   minimal    attention   to    the   supposed

            inconsistencies.  

                 Walsh says  that when Schwartz was  recalled for further

            cross  after the daytimers had been produced, it was too late

            to cross-examine  effectively on inconsistencies  because she

            had been "well prepared by the government to explain away any

                                         -18-
                                         -18-

            inconsistencies."  As it happens, there is no evidence of any

            such discussion  after the  daytimers first became  an issue.

            As to  preparation prior to the  original direct examination,

            the government  was entitled to prepare the  witness, and the

            risk  of  facing an  initially  prepared  witness would  have

            existed whether or not the daytimers had been produced.  

                 Walsh's  final claim  of error,  a claim  raised  in the

            district  court  and rejected  there,  is  that the  evidence

            failed  to  show  that the  victim  was  a  federally insured

            financial  institution.    At  the  time  of  the  fraudulent

            filings,  18 U.S.C.    1344  aimed at  schemes to  defraud "a

            federally chartered or insured  financial institution" or  to

            obtain  property owned by, or under the custody or control of

            such an institution through falsehoods.  See United States v.
                                                     ___ _____________

            Brandon,  17 F.3d 409, 424 n.11 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115
            _______                                     _____ ______

            S. Ct. 81  (1994).  Walsh's argument  turns on the  fact that

            Dime-NY  was  a  federally  insured  bank,  but  Dime-MA--the

            immediate maker of the loans--was not.  The government quotes

            to  us in response a statement from  Brandon, 17 F.3d at 426,
                                                 _______

            that

                 the government  does not  have to show  the alleged
                 scheme  was  directed  solely  toward  a particular
                                        ______
                 institution;   it  is   sufficient  to   show  that
                 defendant  knowingly  executed a  fraudulent scheme
                 that exposed a federally insured  bank to a risk of
                 loss.

            That  language,   however,  was  directed  to   the  scienter

            requirement,  and not to  the nexus claim  made here.   As it

                                         -19-
                                         -19-

            happens,  the Brandon  court also  rejected a  nexus argument
                          _______

            somewhat similar  to Walsh's  argument here but  on different

            facts.   The intermediaries  with whom defendants  in Brandon
                                                                  _______

            dealt  were  mortgage brokers  who  forwarded the  fraudulent

            applications to the federally insured bank which individually

            approved the  loans  and  forwarded  the money  back  to  the

            mortgage brokers.  See id. at 423, 426-27 & n.16.
                               ___ ___

                 While the nexus in  Brandon was different--one can argue
                                     _______

            about  whether it  was  closer or  more remote--Brandon  does
                                                            _______

            confirm  that  a  defendant   can  violate  section  1344  by

            submitting the dishonest loan  application to an entity which

            is not itself a federally insured institution.  Here, Dime-MA

            was  practically an  alter ego of  Dime-NY:  it  was a wholly

            owned  subsidiary   of  Dime-NY;  all  of   the  subsidiary's

            directors and principal officers were officers of the parent;

            and Dime-MA was  subject to examination  by the same  federal

            bank  examiners  as  Dime-NY  and reported  its  result  on a

            consolidated basis.

                 Further, focusing  on the  loan process, the  connection

            between  the defendant  and the  federally insured  victim is

            even  tighter.  Dime-NY provided all of the funds for Dime-MA

            both  for  its  operating   expenses  and  to  fund  mortgage

            closings.   Dime-NY determined  what loan products  should be

            offered  and,  on  the closing  of  a  loan  by Dime-MA,  the

            mortgage  was  immediately assigned  to  Dime-NY, which  then

                                         -20-
                                         -20-

            serviced  the  loan.     For  most  practical  purposes,  and

            certainly  for  the  purposes  underlying  section 1344,  the

            mortgage fraud perpetrated against Dime-MA was effectively  a

            fraud against Dime-NY.

                 We agree that there must be some outer limits to section

            1344.   For example, ruinous  fraud directed against  a major

            bank  customer, but unrelated to  a customer's deposits in or

            loans from the bank, might  ultimately harm the bank  itself,

            if only through  loss of a valued customer.   But here, as in

            Brandon, "this case presents a situation of direct harm to [a
            _______

            federally  insured bank] resulting from a scheme specifically

            designed  to fraudulently  avoid  the  requirements  of  that

            federally insured  bank in order to  obtain funds originating

            directly from  [that bank]."   17 F.3d  at 427 n.16.   As  in

            Brandon,  we confine our affirmance to  the present facts and
            _______

            decline  to   contrive   general  rules   to  govern   myriad

            variations.

                 Affirmed.
                 ________

                                         -21-
                                         -21-