Court Opinion

ID: 9689493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:36:43.844148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:48.994217
License: Public Domain

TOM GRAY,
dissenting.
Why should the written report containing the opinion of a Texas Department of Public Safety officer about the cause of a wreck be allowed into evidence without any showing of the predicate normally required for the admission of an opinion? The majority opinion holds that being included in a public report is enough. If we go down this road Daubert1 and du Pont2 will be substantially eroded because the predicate for the qualifications of an expert witness and the basis of the expert’s opinion, are not subject to being tested and need not be proven. On these facts, I would hold that Rule 803(8)3 does not override the 700 series of the rules of evidence and that a predicate is necessary for the admission of expert opinions contained in public records and reports.
THE FACTS
The relevant facts are simple. McRae attempted to pass a fork lift traveling in the same direction on a public highway. Before the pass was complete, the fork lift turned left into her path. She hit the forks on the fork lift, jostling the operator. The operator, Echols, sued McRae, alleging her negligence caused him personal injuries.
An officer with the DPS investigated the accident. The officer prepared a written report. The officer’s opinion contained in the report was that the cause of the wreck *802was McRae “failed to pass to left safely.” Although designated as an expert witness, the officer was not called to testify. The report was admitted into evidence. Based upon a review of the entire record, the report was crucial to the jury’s determination of negligence. It was heavily relied upon by Echols as being prepared by a disinterested person whom the jury should trust. It was referred to numerous times during Echols’s opening and closing argument to the jury.
THE OBJECTION
The report was admitted just before Echols took the stand as the last witness. In a mass offer of documents involving medical records proved up with business records affidavits, photographs of the scene of the accident and other exhibits, the following exchange took place:
Mrs. Thomas (Echols’s attorney): And we offer Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, which is the peace officer’s accident report regarding the subject incident.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅝
Mr. Crossland (McRae’s attorney): And, Your Honor, we do have an objection to Number 5 to the extent that the accident report tends to relate facts; it’s hearsay, not subject to cross examination. And to the extent it purports to contain conclusions, the predicate for those conclusions has not been presented.4
The Court: And that objection is overruled. It’s received as an official record.
Having been admitted, Echols proceeded to use it extensively while McRae attempted to mitigate its effect upon the jury.
THE ISSUES
The issues as presented by McRae in her first issue on appeal are whether the DPS investigative report was improperly admitted into evidence over the objections of (1) hearsay; and (2) lack of predicate for expert opinion testimony. Because of the importance of the second issue, it will be addressed first.
OPINION TESTIMONY IN PUBLIC RECORDS
Just because a document meets the requirements as an exception to the hearsay rule does not mean that it is not subject to all the other rules of evidence.5 The majority opinion relies primarily on Beech6, a United States Supreme Court opinion interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) from which the Texas Rule 803(8) was adopted in 1983.7 The majority opinion *803holds that if a record or report is determined to meet the requirements of Rule 803(8), the entire record or report, including any opinions contained in it, are admitted into evidence as part of the record or report.
The majority’s holding presents tremendous potential for abuse. Without the proponent giving any prior notice, a public record or report that contains expert opinions can be offered and admitted as evidence. There is no requirement that such a report be filed ahead of trial or notice of its intended use be provided to opposing counsel. In many cases, the expectation that the witness will be presented live to prove up the document and be subjected to cross examination is reasonable. But, the admission of the “public report” without a sponsoring witness comes as a complete surprise. See Desrosiers v. Flight International of Florida, Inc., 156 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.1998) (Court excluded reports where the lack of trustworthiness was demonstrated in cross examination of the sponsoring witness.)
Nevertheless, if a litigant finds a public record or report that supports their case, they can lie behind the log and ambush their opponent at a point in the trial when their opponent has insufficient time or opportunity to test the origin and trustworthiness of the record or report and the opinions contained therein. Given the explosion of information and the volume of records and reports public agencies may require to be filed or which they may have prepared for their individualized purposes, it is an unwieldy process to require a litigant to anticipate every such report from any agency across the United States or the world. See Wolfe v. Wolfe, 918 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1996, writ denied) (New Zealand judgment admitted. The judgment contained the New Zealand Judge’s comments upon and opinion of some of the evidence).
To prevent this type abuse, I would hold that admission of a public record or report is subject to a proper objection raised under the other rules of evidence, specifically including those which allow the opponent to challenge the opinion or underlying facts and data in support of the expert opinion in accordance with Daubert8 and its Texas progeny.9 Thus, until such time as there are other changes to the rules regarding notice of intent to offer into evidence a public record or report so that the resisting party has the opportunity to test the trustworthiness of the document, upon proper objection to the lack of predicate, I would leave the burden upon the party offering the document to prove the reliability requirements (primarily Rules 702 and 705) for the use of opinion testimony.
As applied to the case before us, we do not know the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education of the DPS officer. Tex.R. Evid. 702. Additionally, we do not know all the underlying facts or data he is aware .of that he contends support his opinion. Tex.R. Evid. 705. With no prior notice, and by not calling the officer to testify, McRae was denied the opportunity to test the officer’s opinion as Rule 705(b) allows.
OPINION v. FACTUAL FINDINGS
In support of this conclusion, I note that the rules draw a distinction between the business records exception for hearsay *804“opinion” evidence in 803(6) and “factual findings” in Rule 808(8). While the Supreme Court in Beech spends a good deal of time relating the legislative history and why these two terms mean the same thing, there are critical distinctions when trying to apply their legislative history to our rules. Even if we were bound by their construction, which we are not, as noted above Beech did not address the specific issues presented to us.10
First, basic rules of construction dictate that if different words are used, presumptively they mean different things. See Guarantee Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Harrison, 358 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) Under the majority analysis the distinction is entirely lost. Under established Texas precedent, we do not turn to legislative history unless the words cannot be reconciled without a deeper inquiry. Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 868 (Tex.1990); McLendon v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 985 S.W.2d 571, 581 (Tex.App.— Waco 1998, no pet.).
Second, by the time Texas adopted the rules of evidence in 1983, the potential for different interpretations of 803(8) was well known.11 Thus we must presume that by using the different words, the authors of our rules intended the rules to apply to different types of information. If they intended both rules to apply to “opinions” and not just “factual findings,” it is presumed they would have resolved the conflict by using the same term in Rule 803(8) as they used in 803(6).
Third, there is some indication the drafters contemplated a live witness to present the hearsay exception evidence required by Rule 803(8). Documents containing opinions which are business records exceptions to the hearsay rule under 803(6) can meet the admissibility requirements for both authentication and as a hearsay exception by an affidavit in conformity with Rule 902(10) without the need for a sponsoring witness to appear live at trial. While a public record may be authenticated without a sponsoring witness under Rule 902(l)-(4) there is no provision similar to Rule 902(10) for the proof necessary to show a hearsay exception for a public record under 803(8). This is a strong indication that the authors of the rules thought a live sponsoring witness was necessary for the latter.
Finally, as the lower court in Beech noted, the federal courts have a very powerful tool to limit unreasonable reliance on such reports. They can comment on the weight to be given such reports and caution the jury that they are not to surrender their decision making responsibility to the author of such a report. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498, 1515 (11th Cir.1987). Obviously this option is not available in Texas state courts, because trial court judges are prohibited from commenting upon the weight to be given any evidence. Tex.R. Civ. P. 227; Redwine v. AAA Life Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1993, no writ). Thus, there are sound reasons to require satisfactory proof under the 700 series of the rules of evidence of the need for and reliability of opinions before they are admitted even if the public records exception to the hearsay rule, 803(8), or any other hearsay exception, has been satisfied.
HEARSAY
Additionally, I find nothing in this record to establish that Exhibit 5 met the requirements of Rule 803(8). Unlike the medical records that were admitted under Rule 803(6), which are supported by a self proving business records affidavit under Rule 902(10), there is no evidence of each *805element necessary to establish that Exhibit 5 is a public record as defined by Rule 803(8). Further, the exhibit is not “certified” in any manner. In fact it is stamped “FIELD COPY — NOT FROM CUSTODIAL [illegible-FILE?].” McRae specifically noted she was not challenging authentication but she did raise a hearsay objection to the document which was overruled. Therefore, I would hold that the hearsay objection should also have been sustained.
CONCLUSION
Exhibit 5 should not have been admitted. It was compelling evidence used by Echols to prove he was not neghgent and that McRae was neghgent. I would hold that the error in admitting the exhibit was harmful, reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.

. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1995).

.All references herein to Rules, or rules of evidence, refer to the Texas Rules of Evidence unless otherwise specifically noted.

. I agree with the majority analysis in footnote number 3 that this second part of the objection is an objection to lack of predicate for the admission of expert opinion testimony under rule 702. Tex.R. Evid. 702.

. Everyone at the trial tacitly agreed that just because a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule does not mean that the other rules of evidence would not apply to keep some portions of the document out of evidence. The trial court was not going to admit the document if the information about the traffic citation and insurance were not removed. Echols did not question removing the insurance information from the report. Nor did Echols seriously question the removal of the information regarding that a traffic citation had been issued to McRae. Echols wanted to be sure that the officer's opinion about the cause of the accident was in the report and admitted into evidence. It was.

. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988).

. The issue before the Supreme Court was limited to a hearsay objection that 803(8) did not authorize the admission of opinions in public reports as an exception to the hearsay rule. From a reading of both of the opinions of the 11th Circuit, the panel opinion, Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 784 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir.1986) and the en banc opinion, Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.1987), there was no objection based upon the lack of a predicate for the admission of expert opinion. The only objection that was made was that the document contained inadmissible "opinions” rather than "factual findings” which are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). Beech was decided solely on the 803(8) issue. In fact the lower court pointed out that objections under rule *803702 and 705 would be proper to test the reliability of the report. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498, 1514 (11th Cir.1987). Further, the Supreme Court’s opinion expressly states that the only reason they reference the expert opinion rules is to show the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules in allowing all types of opinions into evidence. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169, 109 S.Ct. 439, 450, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988).

. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1995) and the many Texas cases now citing and following du Pont.

. Even if we adopt their construction of 803(8) that "factual findings" and "opinions” mean the same thing, we still do not have to admit opinions for which no predicate has been presented. See footnote 7.

. Note, The Scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), 59 Texas. L.Rev. 155 (1980) (advocating narrow interpretation).