Court Opinion

ID: 9637350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:04:13.393738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:55.519442
License: Public Domain

On Petition by American Stevedores, Inc., for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
This petition for rehearing is limited to so much of our decision as grants full, rather than one-half, indemnity to the United States against the impleaded respondent, American Stevedores, Inc. The petitioner argues that our opinion is erroneous in applying common law principles of contribution to a suit in admiralty in which we have affirmed findings that the libellant’s injury resulted from the concurrent negligence of both the respondent and the impleaded respondent. We are by no means convinced that the rule of The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540, 19 S.Ct. 491, 43 L.Ed. 801, which was not previously called to our attention, is controlling in a situation such as this, but the point may be considered left op»en since determination of the right of contribution is not essential to decision as to indemnity under the respondent’s contract.
The petitioner asserts that our interpretation of the indemnity contract is contrary to the authorities in this and other circuits. We do not so read them. Shamrock Towing Co. v. City of New York, 2 Cir., 16 F.2d 199, is the case cited from our own circuit. There a libel was filed against the city for breach of charter in failing to return the chartered scows in good condition. The city impleaded a corporation which was employed under contract to unload the scows. The chartered scows were damaged by fire and both the city and the contractor were liable to the libellant for negligent failure to supply fire jirotection at the dumping ground. A further question was whether the contractor was bound to stand the whole loss because of its agreement to hold the city harmless for damages caused to the scows “by the negligent acts or omissions of the contractor.” We held the contract to cover only “cases in which the city’s liability to the scow owners arose without fault on its own part.” Since the city might be liable to the scow owner under its charter without fault on its part, it was possible to limit the indemnity provisions as we did without depriving them of all utility. In the case at bar, however, the United States could be liable only if itself at fault; hence a similar construction here would make the indemnity provision meaningless. Without analyzing the authorities from other circuits cited by the petitioner it will suffice to say that none of them, in our opinion, is contrary to the decision we have reached. Nor need we be troubled by doubt as to admiralty jurisdiction extending to a contract of indemnity, since jurisdiction could rest on the fact that the indemnitee is the United States, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1) ; see Tuthill v. United States, D.C.N.D.Ill., 38 F. 538, appeal dismissed, 136 U.S. 652, 10 S.Ct. 1075, 34 L.Ed. 557.
Petition for rehearing denied.