Court Opinion

ID: 9952626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 14:10:43.062634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:48.347362
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1484-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JEFFREY PICKETT, a/k/a
ABDULLAH AB, TONY MCCOY,
TERRY MCCOY, TERY MORGAN,
TERRENCE MORGAN, JERAD
PICKETT, JEFF PICKETT, and
RODNEY PICKETT,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________

                   Submitted February 27, 2024 – Decided March 20, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos.
                   93-05-1733 and 93-05-1734.

                   Jeffrey Pickett, appellant pro se.

                   Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E.
             Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
             Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Now his fifth time before this court concerning his 1994 convictions,1

defendant Jeffrey Pickett appeals from the December 16, 2022, Law Division

order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).

We affirm.

      Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of three counts of first-

degree attempted murder and related offenses stemming from him opening fire

on three Newark police officers attempting to detain him.2 After determining

that defendant was extended-term eligible either as a persistent offender under

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), or as a second Graves Act offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

3(d),3 the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate extended term of life

1
   See State v. Pickett (Pickett I), No. A-4277-93 (App. Div. July 19, 1996),
certif. denied, 148 N.J. 459 (1997); State v. Pickett (Pickett II), No. A-4552-06
(App. Div. June 30, 2008), certif. denied, 196 N.J. 465 (2008); State v. Pickett
(Pickett III), No. A-2335-10 (App. Div. Jan. 13, 2014), certif. denied, 218 N.J.
531 (2014); State v. Pickett (Pickett IV), No. A-1329-21 (App. Div. Dec. 15,
2022), certif. denied, 255 N.J. 377 (2023).
2
  After the trial, defendant also entered a negotiated guilty plea to a related
certain persons offense charged in a separate indictment.
3
   As we discussed in our prior unpublished decision, "[p]rior to his 1994
convictions, defendant had a significant criminal history," including "a 1983
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imprisonment, with a thirty-five-year period of parole ineligibility.           The

sentence encompassed consecutive terms for two of the attempted murder

convictions and one extended term.

      Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing, among other

things, that his sentence was excessive and illegal.          We determined the

imposition of "an extended term," "consecutive terms," and "maximum ordinary

terms" were justified, and affirmed the convictions and sentence. Pickett I, slip

op. at 5-6. Our Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Pickett, 148 N.J.

459 (1997).

      Since then, defendant has filed two petitions for post-conviction relief

(PCR), one in 2004 and one in 2007, and two motions to correct an illegal

sentence, one in 2005 and one in 2019. All applications have challenged in some

form or another the legality of defendant's sentence, and all applications have

been denied by the trial court as procedurally barred, see R. 3:22-5, or

conviction for receiving stolen property"; "a 1984 conviction for possession of
a controlled dangerous substance"; and "a 1987 conviction for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, . . . first-degree robbery, . . . fourth-degree
aggravated assault, . . . and fourth-degree resisting arrest." Pickett IV, slip op.
at 3-4.

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substantively without merit.4 Other than the 2004 PCR petition that was not

appealed, in unpublished decisions, we have universally affirmed the trial courts'

rulings and upheld defendant's sentence. See Pickett II, slip op. at 5; Pickett III,

slip op. at 7; Picket IV, slip op. at 10. And our Supreme Court has denied

certification. State v. Pickett (Pickett II), 196 N.J. 465 (2008); State v. Pickett

(Pickett III), 218 N.J. 531 (2014); State v. Pickett (Pickett IV), 255 N.J. 377

(2023).

      In Pickett IV, we noted that "[d]espite defendant's repackaging of the

issue . . . , he clearly continues to maintain that the sentencing court erroneously

deemed him extended-term eligible by improperly treating him as a repeat

offender under the Graves Act."        Id. at 8.   Notwithstanding Rule 3:22-5

precluding defendant "from re-raising arguments that have been resolved

previously against him," ibid., we concluded that "defendant's qualifying

convictions pre-dating his 1994 convictions . . . clearly qualified [defendant] as

an extended-term eligible persistent offender," id. at 9. Therefore, "his sentence

was rendered in accordance with applicable law" because "the court had

4
  Defendant also unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the denial of the
2019 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
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independent grounds to sentence defendant to an extended term as a persistent

offender." Ibid.

      The subject of this appeal is defendant's third motion to correct an illegal

sentence, filed on September 22, 2022. In the motion, defendant argued that his

sentence was excessive and should not have been consecutive. Defendant also

asserted that the sentencing court failed to provide a statement regarding the

overall fairness of the sentence in accordance with State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246,

268 (2021). On December 16, 2022, the motion judge issued an order and

accompanying letter opinion denying the motion.

      In the opinion, the judge recounted the facts and applicable law, positing

that "[defendant's] arguments amount[ed] to a continuing disagreement with the

Appellate Division ruling on direct appeal." Citing Rule 3:22-5, the judge

determined that defendant's arguments were "barred" as "they ha[d] already been

conclusively determined adversely to [defendant]," and the judge "ha[d] no

authority to address the sentence, as both the terms of each sentence and the

propriety of them being consecutive were decided on direct appeal."

      The judge also explained that because "Torres did not express a new rule

of law regarding the imposition of consecutive sentences," but "merely

emphasized what has always been required under the Code and [State v.

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Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985)]," there was no retroactivity. See State v. Feal,

194 N.J. 293, 308 (2008) (explaining that "[a] case announces a new rule of law

for retroactivity purposes" if "'it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation

on the States or the Federal Government . . . [or] if the result was not dictated

by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.'"

(omission and second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State

v. Lark, 117 N.J. 331, 339 (1989))); State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 403 (1981)

(stating "retroactivity can arise only where there has been a departure from

existing law"). Therefore, according to the judge, defendant's sentence was "not

illegal" and "no resentencing [was] required." This appeal followed.

      On appeal, defendant raises a single point for our consideration:

            THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED
            THE SENTENCING MOTION CITING THE
            PROCEDURAL BAR OF [RULE] 3:22-5. THIS BAR
            DOES NOT APPLY TO [RULE 3:21-10(b)(5)].
            THUS, THE ORDER SHOULD BE VACATED AND
            THE MATTER REMANDED FOR FURTHER
            PROCEEDINGS.

      Under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5), "[a] motion may be filed and an order may be

entered at any time . . . correcting a sentence not authorized by law including

the Code of Criminal Justice." See State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 437 (2017) ("A

defendant may challenge an illegal sentence at any time." (citing R. 3:21-

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10(b)(5))). Whether a defendant's sentence is illegal is an issue of law subject

to de novo review. State v. Drake, 444 N.J. Super. 265, 271 (App. Div. 2016).

                  There are two categories of illegal sentences:
            those that exceed the penalties authorized for a
            particular offense, and those that are not authorized by
            law. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 308 (2012).
            Those two categories of illegal sentences have been
            "defined narrowly." State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246
            (2000).

            [State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 145 (2019).]

"A sentence 'not imposed in accordance with law' includes 'a disposition [not]

authorized by the Code.'" Drake, 444 N.J. Super. at 271 (alteration in original)

(quoting Murray, 162 N.J. at 247).

      "[M]ere excessiveness of sentence otherwise within authorized limits, as

distinct from illegality by reason of being beyond or not in accordance with legal

authorization, is not an appropriate ground of post-conviction relief and can only

be raised on direct appeal from the conviction." State v. Clark, 65 N.J. 426, 437

(1974).   Even consecutive sentences that "[run] afoul of the Yarbough

guidelines" are not "cognizable in post-conviction relief proceedings because it

does not relate to the legality of the sentences imposed." State v. Acevedo, 205

N.J. 40, 46 (2011) (quoting State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 596 (App. Div.

1988)). "[S]uch claims have historically been characterized as relating to the

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'excessiveness' of the sentences, rather than their legality." Flores, 228 N.J.

Super. at 596.

      Defendant's sentence does not fall into either category of illegal sentences

to warrant correction under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). Defendant claims that the

sentencing judge failed to provide "an explicit explanation for the overall

fairness of [the] sentence," Torres, 246 N.J. at 271, and "fail[ed] to give a

statement for the consecutive sentence that was imposed." Even if true, such

omissions do not render defendant's sentence illegal. Hyland, 238 N.J. at 146.

As our Supreme Court has explained, "even sentences that disregard controlling

case law or rest on an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court are legal so

long as they impose penalties authorized by statute for a particular offense and

include a disposition that is authorized by law." Ibid.; see also Acevedo, 205

N.J. at 47 ("[A]s defendant's contentions regarding consecutive sentences or the

absence of reasons for imposition of the consecutive sentences do not relate to

the issue of sentence 'legality' and are not cognizable on PCR, or under the

present Rule 3:21-10(b)(5), the Appellate Division erred in modifying the

sentence.").

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      Defendant argues that the motion judge's "decision to procedurally bar his

motion is misplaced, as the procedural bars of [Rule] 3:22 only appl[y] to PCR

petitions, and not sentencing motions filed pursuant to [Rule] 3:21-10(b)(5)."

      Under Rule 3:22-2(c), a "petition for [PCR] is cognizable if based upon"

the "[i]mposition of sentence in excess of or otherwise not in accordanc e with

the sentence authorized by law," but only "if raised together with other grounds

cognizable" under Rule 3:22-2. Although Rule 3:22-2(c) is similar to Rule 3:21-

10(b)(5), they are separate and distinct. Indeed, when not "raised together with

other grounds cognizable under" Rule 3:22-2, "a claim alleging the imposition

of sentence in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with the sentence

authorized by law shall be filed pursuant to [Rule] 3:21-10(b)(5)." R. 3:22-2(c).

      Under Rule 3:22-5, "[a] prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground

for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the

conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to this rule or

prior to the adoption thereof, or in any appeal taken from such proceedings." As

such, "[PCR] is not a substitute for direct appeal; nor is it an opportunity to

relitigate a case on the merits." State v. Szemple, 247 N.J. 82, 97 (2021) (citing

State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 310 (2014)). That said, although a PCR petition

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may be procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5, defendant is correct that Rule

3:22-5 does not explicitly address a motion brought under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).

      Nevertheless, defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence fails

because his sentence is not illegal. Therefore, defendant's motion was properly

denied because he failed to demonstrate the sentence either exceeded the

penalties authorized for the offenses for which he was convicted or was not

otherwise authorized by law. See Hyland, 238 N.J. at 145.

      Affirmed.

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