Court Opinion

ID: 9954450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 14:08:27.517693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:17.642030
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3087-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL ACUNA, a/k/a
MICHAEL S. ACUNA,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted March 19, 2024 – Decided March 26, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Natali.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 16-09-1153.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Steven J. Sloan, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).

                   Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
                   respondent (K. Charles Deutsch, Assistant Prosecutor,
                   of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
        Defendant Michael Acuna appeals from the Law Division's May 2, 2022

order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

                                         I.

        On November 13, 2014, a Bergen County grand jury charged defendant

with third-degree stalking in violation of a court order, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(c);

fourth-degree criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1); and fourth-degree

criminal contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a). On September 20, 2014, defendant

violated a no-contact order entered by the North Arlington Municipal Court as

a condition of his bail by confronting the victim, E.K.,1 at her workplace and

demanding to know why she was "ruining his life."

        Defendant pled guilty on May 15, 2015 to the stalking charge but moved

to withdraw his guilty plea on the day of his sentencing. The sentencing judge

granted defendant's motion and the case proceeded to a jury trial. During jury

selection, however, the State alleged defendant had committed additional

offenses against E.K. As a result, defendant's trial was adjourned, and he was

charged in a superseding indictment with another count of third-degree stalking,

and two more counts of fourth-degree criminal contempt.

1
    We use initials to protect the victim's privacy. R. 1:38-3(f)(4).
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                                         2
      Defendant later entered a guilty plea to count one of the superseding

indictment, third-degree stalking. In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to

recommend a sentence of five years of probation conditioned on 364 days in jail,

and agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the superseding indictment , and

all three counts of the original indictment.

      At the outset of the plea hearing on October 3, 2016, defendant's counsel

explained defendant was "reluctant" to plead guilty to the stalking charge and

contended there was "outstanding discovery," specifically CDs, containing

forensic analysis of defendant's computer and phone. After the State informed

the court the CDs and accompanying report were "on their way," to address the

issues, Judge Christopher R. Kazlau adjourned the proceeding for over an hour. 2

      When the hearing resumed, the parties placed the terms of the plea

agreement on the record. While doing so, defendant informed the court he had

not discussed the underlying police reports or "potential defenses" with his plea

counsel, nor had he sufficiently consulted with her before the hearing. Judge

2
   In a subsequent proceeding, the State represented to Judge Kazlau that the
CDs and report merely contained what its expert testified to before the grand
jury, and as such, defendant was already aware of the contents. Additionally,
defendant's counsel acknowledged on the record this discovery did not contain
any exculpatory evidence.
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Kazlau again adjourned the proceeding to permit defendant to speak to and

discuss the plea with his counsel.

      Approximately two hours later, the hearing resumed and defendant

confirmed he discussed "the facts and circumstances of the case" with his

counsel and reviewed "the police and investigation reports," and "discovery."

He also informed the court his counsel answered all of his inquiries and was

satisfied with her representation of him.

      Defendant also confirmed he understood the terms of the plea and was not

under the influence of any "drugs, alcohol, or medication that would affect [his]

ability to understand" the proceedings. He also confirmed he was entering the

plea voluntarily and it was not the result of coercion. In addition, defendant

admitted his guilt to third-degree stalking, and understood by pleading guilty,

he was relinquishing certain of his rights. Defendant also acknowledged he

reviewed the plea form with his counsel, understood and answered all of the

questions contained therein and his responses were accurate.

      Defendant asked if he could later "take back the plea" in the event of a

"legitimate reason" to go to trial. The following colloquy thereafter occurred:

            COURT: No, after today -- you have to make your
            decision today, okay? . . . If you decide you want to
            plead guilty today and you are able to give me an
            adequate factual basis for the conduct that you did and

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that satisfied what we call the elements of the crime of
stalking and you understood all of the nature and
consequences of your guilty plea and you were telling
me the truth . . . and I accepted your guilty plea, I'd set
it down for sentencing and you'd come back for
sentencing on that day.

DEFENDANT: Okay, I understand. That's fine.

COURT: Okay? Do you still want to proceed with your
guilty plea?

DEFENDANT: I do.

COURT: Are you – I'm going to ask you again: Are
you telling me the truth that you’re guilty of committing
the crime of stalking against the alleged victim in this
case?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: Are you absolutely sure you want to plead
guilty?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

...

COURT: Have you understood everything that we've
talked about on the record thus far?

DEFENDANT: Yeah, I have.

COURT: Are you sure?

DEFENDANT: Positive.

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                            5
            COURT: Do you have any other questions? It's okay
            if you have other questions; I will sit here as long as
            you want me to and do the best I can to answer your
            questions.

            DEFENDANT: I'm fine. I'm good. Thank you.

            COURT: All right. Do you still want to plead guilty?

            DEFENDANT: I do.

      The day before his scheduled sentencing proceeding, defendant again

sought to withdraw his guilty plea.          He argued, without a supporting

certification, that at the time of his plea hearing he was not taking his prescribed

medication, specifically Wellbutrin, which rendered him susceptible to poor

decision-making and impulsivity. He also alleged his mother pressured him, as

she did previously, to plead guilty.             After considering defendant's

representations, Judge Kazlau placed him under oath, and when he was asked

whether his medication "assisted [him] in understanding what's going on,"

defendant replied "I think it makes it easier to cope with what I'm going

through."

      Judge Kazlau denied defendant's motion and determined that defendant

entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. In reaching his decision, the judge

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considered the four Slater3 factors and found each weighed against granting

defendant's application to withdraw his plea.

        On May 5, 2017, defendant was charged in a separate accusation with an

additional count of fourth-degree criminal contempt based on his violation of

the court's no-contact order when he again called E.K., emailed her, and

contacted her on social media. Defendant pled guilty to the accusation, and

when doing so affirmed he was not under the influence of any "drugs, alcohol,

or medication that would affect [his] ability to understand" the proceedings. He

also stated although he was not taking his prescribed medication, that fact did

not impact or affect his ability to plead guilty. Defendant also acknowledged he

understood the terms of the plea, admitted his guilt, understood his rights , and

was entering the plea freely, voluntarily, and it was not coerced.

        Defendant was thereafter sentenced with respect to his plea related to the

June 2016 superseding indictment and the 2017 accusation on the same day he

pled guilty to the new accusation.              Judge Kazlau sentenced defendant—

consistent with the plea agreement—to a five-year probationary sentence with

several conditions, including a no-contact order and 364 days in jail as to the

stalking charge under the June 2016 superseding indictment, to run concurrent

3
    State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).
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                                            7
to his sentence for the contempt charge under the May 2017 accusation for which

defendant also received a five-year probationary, term with 364 days in jail.

      Defendant did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he filed a timely PCR

petition in which he asserted various grounds for relief. Specifically, defendant

asserted he provided his attorneys with proof of his innocence, but they failed

to present it to the court. Defendant also argued the forensic analysis of his

computer and cellphone was not made available to him prior to the May 5, 2017

plea offer, depriving him of necessary "context," and diminishing his ability to

assert a defense. Additionally, defendant stated he was represented by several

different attorneys since 2014, including two public defenders, and argued their

representation of him was constitutionally ineffective due to personal

differences, attorney turnover, and the failure to provide the court with

defendant's attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)/attention deficit

disorder (ADD) diagnosis.     Finally, defendant argued his actions were not

criminal.

      Additionally, in a separate certification, defendant contended his plea

counsel's representation was ineffective because she: 1) failed to investigate

and develop applicable defenses; 2) ignored evidence of his innocence; 3)

pressured him into pleading guilty; 4) permitted him to plead guilty despite

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failing to take his prescribed Wellbutrin for ADHD, and as such was not thinking

clearly; and 5) rejected his intent to proceed to trial to establish his innocence.

      Defendant thereafter filed a counseled brief in which he reprised the

arguments contained in his petition and certification and further contended his

plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the two-part test established

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984),4 as she pressured

defendant to plead guilty prior to receiving full discovery from the State and

failed to develop defenses. Defendant argued such errors, coupled with the

effects of him not taking his prescribed Wellbutrin, resulted in pleas that were

neither knowing nor voluntary.

      Judge Kazlau heard oral arguments and denied defendant's petition

without an evidentiary hearing and issued a comprehensive May 2, 2022 written

opinion explaining the reasons for his decision. The judge found defendant did

not establish either the performance or prejudice prongs of Strickland, as he

"failed to demonstrate that his attorney's performance at the 2016 plea was

4
   To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must
satisfy the two-part test enunciated in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, by
demonstrating that: 1) counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) the deficient
performance actually prejudiced the accused's defense. The Strickland test has
been adopted for application under our State constitution. See State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
                                                                              A-3087-21
                                         9
defective and that but for counsel's unprofessional errors the result would have

been different." The judge noted although defendant asserted counsel was

ineffective for failing to develop applicable defenses, he did not establish any

such defense would likely have been successful.         Further, with respect to

defendant's claims that he did not receive and review relevant discovery, Judge

Kazlau found his counsel reviewed the discovery with him prior to the 2017 plea

hearing, and stated based on the record, it did not contain exculpatory evidence.

In addition, at that proceeding, defendant stated he had the opportunity to review

the discovery with counsel.

      Judge Kazlau also found defendant "provided a factual basis for his plea,

was aware of the charges, and was aware of the consequences of his plea ," and

explained he questioned defendant "extensively" during both plea colloquies.

With respect to the October 3, 2016 plea hearing, the judge stated defendant

represented he was not forced or pressured into pleading guilty, and

acknowledged he had the opportunity to confer with counsel, and was satisfied

with counsel's representation. In addition, defendant stated he wished to plead

guilty, and was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or medication.

Because defendant did not present evidence he misunderstood the court's

questions, Judge Kazlau found "[t]here is nothing in the or record or

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                                       10
[defendant's] current submission that supports his claim that his 2016 plea was

not knowing and voluntary, or that allowing him to withdraw the pleas would

prevent a manifest injustice."

      With respect to the May 5, 2017 plea, the judge found although defendant

told the court he was not taking his prescribed Wellbutrin, he also stated that

fact did not affect his decision to plead guilty.     Further, the judge noted

defendant did "not provide[] any evidence that a lack of Wellbutrin could have

affected his ability to understand the court's questions, the charges, or the

consequences of the plea." The judge explained defendant again indicated he

was not forced or pressured into the plea, that he reviewed discovery and

possible defenses with counsel, and ultimately informed the court he wanted to

plead guilty. Judge Kazlau also noted at no time did defendant indicate he was

mentally unstable, pressured by others, or dissatisfied with his counsel, despite

"numerous opportunities to do so at both plea colloquies," and as such concluded

there was nothing to support defendant's claim his 2017 plea was not knowing

and voluntary.

      This appeal followed in which defendant raises the following arguments 5:

5
  Before us, defendant has not asserted all of the contentions he raised before
Judge Kazlau. As he has failed to reprise the remaining ineffective assistance

                                                                           A-3087-21
                                      11
            I. THE PCR COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN
            DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR
            POST-CONVICTION     RELIEF     WITHOUT
            AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
            TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION HE WAS
            PROVIDED WITH INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
            COUNSEL.

                   1. This matter must be remanded for an
                   evidentiary hearing since plea counsel was
                   ineffective for failing to investigate
                   defendant’s mental state and order a
                   psychiatric evaluation to determine if his
                   mental state allowed him to enter a
                   voluntary plea and the PCR court used the
                   wrong standard in denying relief.

                   2. Plea counsel was also ineffective for
                   failing to review all of the discovery with
                   defendant, failing to discuss trial strategy
                   with defendant, and for applying undue
                   pressure on defendant to plead guilty.

      Defendant further explains these points in his merits brief by arguing his

plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental health and order

a psychiatric evaluation, failing to discuss trial strategy and review discovery,

and by pressuring him into pleading guilty. Defendant asserts because his claim

of counsel claims, we accordingly deem those unbriefed arguments waived. See
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2024) ("[A]n
issue not briefed is deemed waived."); Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of
Taxation, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2012) (deeming a contention
waived when the party failed to include any arguments supporting the contention
in its brief).
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                                       12
depends on evidence outside the record, that is, testimony from defendant and

his plea counsel, the PCR court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing.

      Defendant also asserts, as he did before Judge Kazlau, because he was not

taking prescribed Wellbutrin, among other medications, he was unable to think

clearly when entering his guilty plea, and, if he had known his plea exposed him

to a 364-day sentence and five years of probation, he would not have entered the

plea. Additionally, defendant argues because he was not taking his medication,

his plea was not voluntary. Defendant also contends, relying on Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690-91, and State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594 (1990), his counsel's failure

to investigate his mental health, constitutes prima facie evidence of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

      Further, defendant argues his counsel did not fully develop and discuss

with him all possible defenses and strategy and maintains he wished to proceed

to trial but needed more time to confer with counsel and consider the relevant

discovery. Defendant also contends counsel pressured him into pleading guilty.

                                       II.

      "[W]e review under the abuse of discretion standard the PCR court's

determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v. Brewster,

429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013). "If the court perceives that holding

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                                      13
an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant

is entitled to post-conviction relief, . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be

granted." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89,

158 (1997)). We review the denial of a PCR petition with "deference to the trial

court's factual findings . . . 'when supported by adequate, substantial and credible

evidence.'" State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415 (2004) (alteration in original)

(internal citation omitted).

      Where, as here, "no evidentiary hearing has been held, we 'may exercise

de novo review over the factual inferences drawn from the documentary record

by the [PCR judge].'" State v. Reevey, 417 N.J. Super. 134, 146-47 (App. Div.

2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Harris, 181 N.J. at 421). We also review

de novo the legal conclusions of the PCR judge. Harris, 181 N.J. at 415-16.

      Simply raising a PCR claim does not entitle a defendant to an evidentiary

hearing as a defendant "must do more than make bald assertions that he was

denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). Rather, trial courts should grant evidentiary hearings

and make a determination on the merits only if the defendant has presented a

prima facie claim of ineffective assistance, material issues of disputed facts lie

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                                        14
outside the record, and resolution of the issues necessitates a hearing. R. 3:22-

10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013).

      Having considered defendant's contentions in light of the record and the

applicable law, we affirm the denial of defendant's PCR petition substantially

for the reasons detailed at length in Judge Kazlau's thorough written opinion.

As the judge correctly noted, although defendant argued counsel did not develop

applicable defenses, he failed to establish any of those defenses had a likelihood

of success.

      We agree with Judge Kazlau there is nothing in the record to support

defendant's assertion he entered his pleas unknowingly or involuntarily. Indeed,

Judge Kazlau extensively and patiently questioned defendant during both plea

hearings at which defendant stated he understood the terms of the plea, was not

pressured into the plea, and was not under the influence of any substance that

would impact his ability to understand the proceedings.

      With respect to the consequences of defendant not taking his prescribed

Wellbutrin, defendant stated at the May 5, 2017 hearing that fact did not affect

his decision to plead guilty. Further, as Judge Kazlau correctly stated, defendant

failed to provide any evidence his failure to take Wellbutrin would have affected

or impacted his ability to understand the proceedings and consequences.

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                                       15
Defendant's bald assertions to the contrary do not establish a prima facie

Strickland claim, see Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170, especially when the

assertions are belied by defendant's previous in-court statements as "[s]olemn

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." State v. Simon,

161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74

(1977)).

      As such, we discern no abuse of the court's discretion in denying

defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing as defendant failed to satisfy

either the performance or prejudice prong of the Strickland test. See State v.

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).

      Affirmed.

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