Court Opinion

ID: 9473697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:37:16.683172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:41.498790
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s well-reasoned analysis in section II of the opinion that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury to continue deliberations after he was unable to contact the defendant’s counsel concerning a question submitted by the jury. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in section III of the opinion that the highly capable, well-respected, and experienced trial judge improperly found the defendant competent to stand trial. I share the majority’s concern that compentency hearings are an important element of the judicial process and must be conducted with fairness and accuracy. See United States v. Gutman, 725 F.2d 417, 422-36 (7th Cir.) (Coffey, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 244, 83 L.Ed.2d 183 (1984). In the present case, however, the record clearly reveals that the Government introduced more than ample evidence to establish that Billingsley was, in fact, competent to stand trial.
I
The record reveals that the plaintiff, Robert Billingsley, consented to the entry of a permanent injunction in April 1965, prohibiting him from offering or selling securities unless registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), or exempt from registration. On September 27, 1982, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois issued an order to show cause why Billingsley should not be held in contempt of court for violating the 1965 injunction. In October 1982, the contempt proceeding was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois and on May 16, 1983, Billingsley’s defense counsel filed a motion for continuance based upon a telegram that he had received the previous day, May 15, from Billings-ley’s privately retained psychiatrist, Dr. Carl Schwartz, stating that:
“I am a forensic psychiatrist and physician and have consulted for several hours with your client, Mr. Robert Bill-ingsley. He is quite emotionally disturbed and suffers from severe diastolic arterial hypertension. Psychiatric symptoms include depression, agitation, memory lapses, insomnia and severe irritability. Progression of symptoms over the past year suggests serious consideration of psychiatric and medical hospitalization to avoid nervous breakdown and heart attack. His current legal situation is a definite aggravation. Court appearances would jeopardize his mental and physical health. If at all possible postponement of any active court participation is advised for at least three to four months. Six months preferably.”
On September 13, 1983, Billingsley appeared in the Circuit Court of Clay County, Illinois, represented by a different defense counsel, and voluntarily pled guilty to a separate and independent charge of issuing fraudulent checks. At the guilty plea hearing Billingsley never informed the Illinois trial judge of Dr. Schwartz’s May 15 telegram and neither Billingsley nor his defense raised the issue of competency. Moreover, the Illinois trial judge thoroughly questioned Billingsley concerning the voluntariness of his plea, the consequences of his decision, the adequacy of representa*1031tion by defense counsel, and his understanding of the proceeding, and at no time did the judge observe any signs of incompetency. Nonetheless, the following day, September 14, 1983, just five days before the SEC contempt proceeding was scheduled to commence, Billingsley filed a motion in Federal court requesting an eviden-tiary hearing to determine if he was competent to stand trial. The Federal trial judge, completely unaware of Billingsley’s voluntary guilty plea in Illinois state court the day previous and his obvious strategy to further delay the SEC contempt proceeding, granted the motion and scheduled a hearing for October 6, 1983.
At the October 6 hearing, the defense counsel informed the court that the only purpose of the proceeding was to determine if there existed sufficient evidence to conduct a full-blown competency hearing at a later date. The defense counsel further stated that:
“I believe the plaintiff’s attorneys also concur that the burden would be upon them, at such a [competency] hearing, to proof [sic] that the defendant’s competency — the defendant is competent to stand trial. This burden is one which must be met by a preponderance of the evidence. The question of competency would be for the Court to decide.”
The trial judge responded that “[a]fter I hear the [testimony], I will determine whether I need the evidence or opinion of another psychiatrist or we will accept the recommendations of the Government as to whether they think they need one.” Thus, the trial judge, as well as the parties, realized that in the event Billingsley introduced sufficient evidence of incompetency at the October 6 hearing to proceed with a full-blown competency hearing, the Government would have the ultimate burden of establishing that the defendant was, in fact, competent to stand trial. The sole purpose of the October 6 hearing was to allow Billingsley to introduce that quantum of evidence necessary to persuade the court to conduct a full-blown competency hearing at a later date.
Billingsley retained a second psychiatrist, Dr. Marvin Ziporyn, for the sole purpose of testifying at the October 6 hearing. Dr. Ziporyn informed the court that he had examined Billingsley for a two-hour period but had taken no notes to refresh his recollection and had prepared no formal report to file with the court. Dr. Ziporyn testified that he administered a “formal mental-status examination”; interviewed Billingsley to test his short-term recall, ability to calculate, and spatial awareness; reviewed the results of an electroencephalogram and CAT scan administered by a Dr. Robert Jeub; and inspected the medical data compiled by Dr. Schwartz concerning Billings-ley’s emotional condition. Dr. Ziporyn observed “defects in memory; ... impairment of judgment; ... difficulty in concentration; ... problems with retention.” Dr. Ziporyn acknowledged, on cross-examination, that at the time of the two-hour examination, Billingsley had a nervous condition that was being treated with prescribed medications which affected his central nervous system as well as his mental alertness. Moreover, Dr. Ziporyn admitted that “there is no major impairment of [Billings-ley’s] logical reasoning ability.” Based upon his limited two-hour observation and his interpretation of the CAT scan, Dr. Ziporyn concluded that Billingsley was suffering from “ ‘cortical atrophy,’ which means a diminution or shrinkage of that part of the brain known as the ‘cortex’; the cortex is an area of the brain which is responsible for abstract thinking, reasoning, judgment, memory.” Dr. Ziporyn believed that Billingsley’s condition was caused by:
“a number of very severe injuries to his head, including a skull fracture and several concussions, and this has caused permanent damage — that is to say, damage that is not reversible.
In addition, he has compounded the problem, over the years, by prolonged ingestion of alcohol. He went for a period of four years where he was ingesting about a pint of whiskey a day.
*1032These two factors, operating in tandem, have resulted in shrinkage of the cortex or damage to the brain.”
Dr. Ziporyn failed to explain the apparent contradiction between his conclusion that Billingsley suffered from “cortical atrophy” and his observation that Billings-ley manifested “no major impairment of his logical reasoning ability.” Moreover, Dr. Ziporyn admitted that “the mere fact that a CAT scan may show cortical atrophy, in and of itself, does not mean that somebody is incompetent,” but Dr. Ziporyn did not administer any medically approved, psychological examinations to substantiate his finding that the cortical atrophy shown on the CAT scan had actually affected Bill-ingsley’s capacity to reason, concentrate, and formulate judgments. I further note that Dr. Ziporyn’s conclusion made no reference to the fact that Billingsley’s mental alertness was obviously affected by the prescribed medications he was ingesting for his nervous condition. Moreover, the only formal psychiatric test that Dr. Zipo-ryn administered was a mental-status examination which positively revealed that Billingsley was “oriented as to time, place and person.” Despite these glaring contradictions, Dr. Ziporyn was of the opinion that Billingsley did not comprehend the contempt charges brought by the SEC, was not capable of rationally understanding his defense counsel, and was not competent to stand trial.
Following Dr. Ziporyn’s testimony, the trial judge found that:
“I must say that the testimony of Dr. Ziporyn, while it establishes a basis for the conclusion that Mr. Billingsley may not be competent to stand trial, I do not regard it as a completely satisfying opinion to reach that conclusion.
And, therefore, I wonder what the Government intends to do.”
The court advised the Government that “I would like to hear one other opinion ... either a Court-appointed examiner or one that [the Government] would procure.” The Government responded that it had two out-of-town witnesses present in court who were prepared to testify that they observed “nothing out of the ordinary” in Billings-ley’s behavior. The court agreed to hear the testimony of these witnesses rather than further delay the proceedings until a Government selected medical expert could examine Billingsley.
Before the Government witnesses testified, Billingsley’s defense counsel informed the court, under oath, that Billingsley evidenced a lack of memory and retention, and “apparently, has no capacity for remembering what I’m telling him____” The defense counsel added that Billingsley also evidenced an inability to concentrate as he would just “star[e] off into the distance [or] interrupt ... in the middle of sentences, going off completely on unrelated subjects.” As a result, the defense counsel stated that “I am not satisfied that he understands either the 1965 order or the present charges that are pending against him.” Following the defense counsel’s remarks, the Government questioned Bill-ingsley’s neighbor, Alan Schwingler, an insurance agent who had issued some forty policies to Billingsley since the summer of 1977 and had met with him an average of three or four times a month during that period. Schwingler testified that in August 1980, Billingsley applied for a health insurance policy, stating on his application that within the past ten years he did not suffer from any mental or nervous disorders and that he had no mental impairments. Similarly, in March 1982, Billings-ley applied for another health insurance policy, again stating on his application that he had never been treated for a mental or nervous disorder and that his only treatment by a physician within the past five years was in August 1981, for an infected toenail. Schwingler added that in his opinion there was “no question” that Billings-ley was able to understand and comprehend what he was doing and what was going on around him.
The Government also questioned Robin Todd, the State’s Attorney for Clay County, Illinois, who had known Billingsley since 1973. Todd testified that in January *10331981, the Clay County State’s Attorney’s Office charged Billingsley with “deceptive practices” — issuing fraudulent checks. Todd explained that on September 13, 1983, the day previous to Billingsley’s filing a motion for a competency determination in the SEC contempt proceeding, Billingsley appeared in Clay County Circuit Court with a defense counsel, voluntarily waived a jury trial, and pled guilty to the charge of “deceptive practices” in open court. Before accepting the guilty plea, the Illinois trial judge questioned Billingsley concerning the voluntariness of his plea, the consequences of his decision, the adequacy of representation by defense counsel, and his understanding of the proceeding. Billings-ley responded to each of the questions in the affirmative, assuring the court that he fully understood and comprehended the nature and implications of his guilty plea. Moreover, Billingsley’s demeanor and actions in the courtroom failed to raise any suspicion in the mind of the trial judge, the defense counsel, or Todd that Billingsley was incompetent to voluntarily and knowingly enter the guilty plea. Indeed, Todd “saw nothing at any time in my contact with Mr. Billingsley or any observations or anything that was reported to me by anyone else to indicate that there was any problem with Mr. Billingsley’s competency.”
At the close of Todd’s testimony, the defense counsel reiterated that the sole purpose of the October 6 hearing was “for the Court simply to rule at this time whether there is some question of competency, sufficient to warrant a hearing____” The district court judge responded:
“what I have heard, to this point, suggests to me that I do not find your burden of proving [Billingsley’s] lack of competence to stand trial having been met. But I have some reservation on the subject, which would cause me to want to hear some other expert, other than the doctor we heard this morning.
Have you arranged for an examination of Mr. Billingsley, on the side of the Government?
I would like one further examination.
When we get that doctor’s report, if you wish a hearing, so that you can examine that doctor, we will have it; and if you wish to produce Mr. Billingsley, at that time, we will — I will be glad to let him testify and let the Government cross examine him.”
Thus, at the close of the October 6 hearing, the district court’s express and sole direction to the parties was to have the Government select a medical expert to examine Billingsley and then to allow Bill-ingsley to question the expert’s report and testify on his own behalf, if he so desired.
In accord with the court’s request to conduct an independent review of Billings-ley’s competency, the Government selected Dr. Aileen Thatcher, a Board certified psychologist, to examine Billingsley. On October 25, 1983, Dr. Thatcher personally observed, clinically tested, and psychologically evaluated Billingsley for some six-and-one-half hours to determine his “1. Fitness to stand trial, and 2. Need for mental treatment.” Dr. Thatcher administered a battery of comprehensive, well-recognized, medically approved psychological tests including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and the Competency Screening Test, reviewed the clinical reports of Drs. Jeub and Schwartz, and thoroughly questioned Billingsley about his personal life and his understanding of the SEC contempt proceeding. Dr. Thatcher compiled her findings and conclusions in an eight-page report that was filed with the district court on November 4, 1983. According to Dr. Thatcher, the results of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory “indicated the defendant was consciously exaggerating or inventing symptomatol-ogy .... Due to the extreme scores on the indices of malingering, it is likely that if any psychopathology exists it would not be as severe as that indicated on the clinical configuration.” Furthermore, Billingsley “exceeded the criterion score needed to be judged competent” on the Competency Screening Test. According to Dr. Thatch*1034er, Billingsley’s performance on the Competency Screening Test “demonstrated an awareness and understanding of the nature and objectives of the proceedings, an understanding of the possible consequences of the proceedings, and an ability to cooperate with his attorney in his own defense.” In addition, Billingsley provided Dr. Thatcher with a detailed narrative account of his personal and professional background, including his relationships with family members, his work experiences, his belief that the sale of securities did not violate the SEC injunction, his nervous condition, and his habit of consuming between “one to two fifths of ‘VO’ per day.”
Throughout the entire examination period, Billingsley evidenced no telltale signs of incompetency. Indeed, Dr. Thatcher found that during the interview, Billingsley:
“was lucid throughout. There was no trace of a formal thought disorder or of delusional thought content although some suspiciousness, possibly appropriate under the circumstances, was evident.
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No difficulties, of any substance, were noted in his memory, concentration or attention. He was able, after two hours, to recall two items that were hidden and one of two names told him as a test of his memory. His ability to abstract, as measured by his understanding of proverbs and analogies, was fair.
Questions on the elements of the criminal justice and trial process systems were accurately answered by the defendant, although he claimed to have trouble remembering the specific charge against him. He indicated his awareness of the pleadings available to him, his knowledge of the possible sentences and of the roles of the judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense in the trial process.”
Based upon the totality of these findings, Dr. Thatcher concluded that:
“A. Fitness to Stand Trial: Based on the comprehensive assessment summarized above, combined with a review of the documents noted, it is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that the defendant is currently psychologically fit to stand trial. He is able to assist in his own defense, is familiar with the roles and responsibilities of various courtroom participants, has a rational understanding of the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him and the possible penalties, and is motivated to act in the self-serving manner needed to assist his counsel in his defense.
B. Need for Treatment: The defendant is not in need of inpatient treatment and is not subject to involuntary hospitalization according to statutory criteria. He would benefit from psychological treatment to assist him in dealing with the depression, anger and insomnia he is experiencing as a result of his current legal situation.”
(Emphasis added). Billingsley never requested a hearing to challenge Dr. Thatcher’s clinically supported findings and conclusions, nor did he appear before the trial court to present testimony on his own behalf. Thus, on November 4, 1983, the highly capable, well-respected, and experienced trial judge found, based upon Dr. Thatcher’s detailed report, that “defendant, Robert H. Billingsley, is presently psychologically fit to stand trial.” The issue before this court is whether the district court erred in finding the defendant competent to stand trial.
II
In United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen, 686 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1982) (“Bilyew ”), this court set forth the basic proposition of law that “the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State or federal prosecution to shoulder the burden of proving that the defendant is fit to stand trial once the issue of unfitness has been properly raised.” 686 F.2d at 1244. Indeed, it would be unreasonable “to impose upon [the defendant] the burden of proving his own incompetence, for the very disability which he would be seeking to prove renders him incapable, either logically or legal*1035ly, of sustaining the burden of proof.” Id. at 1245 (quoting People v. Bender, 20 Ill.2d 45, 58-54, 169 N.E.2d 328, 332 (1960)). In the present ease, the majority concludes that the district court improperly placed the burden upon the defendant to prove his incompetency to stand trial. The majority further reasons that “[t]he evidence on Billingsley’s fitness is too close to allow us to determine, from a reading of the record alone, that the misplacement of the burden was harmless error.” (Footnote omitted). I dissent from the majority’s failure to scrutinize the record in this ease which clearly reveals that the Government did, in fact, satisfy its burden of proving that Billingsley was competent to stand trial. I further dissent from the majority’s reluctance to rule that there is a lack of substantial evidence to support a finding of incompetency, especially when one considers that Billingsley requested a competency hearing in the SEC contempt proceeding just one day after he voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived a jury trial and pled guilty to the charge of “deceptive practices” without ever raising the issue of competency.
According to the record, the district court, as well as the parties, understood that the purpose of the October 6 hearing was simply to allow Billingsley to present that quantum of evidence necessary to persuade the court to conduct a full-blown competency hearing at a later date. The trial judge properly acknowledged that “[a]fter I hear the [testimony of Billings-ley’s psychiatrist], I will determine whether I need the evidence or opinion of another psychiatrist or we will accept the recommendations of the Government as to whether they think they need one.” There is no question in this record, and indeed there never was any question before the trial court, that the Government carried the ultimate burden of persuasion on Billingsley’s competency to stand trial. The parties agreed that if Billingsley introduced sufficient evidence of incompetency at the October 6 hearing, then “the burden would be upon [the Government] ... to proof [sic] that the defendant’s competency — the defendant is competent to stand trial.” Following the October 6 hearing, the trial judge concluded that “I have some reservation on the subject [of Billingsley’s competency], which would cause me to want to hear some other expert, other than the doctor we heard this morning.” The trial judge, in effect, ruled that Billingsley had introduced sufficient evidence to raise the issue of incompetency and thus require the Government to present independent testimony establishing that Billingsley was, in fact, competent to stand trial.
The majority makes much of the fact that upon completion of the October 6 hearing, the trial judge informed the defense counsel that “I do not find your burden of proving [Billingsley’s] lack of competence to stand trial having been met.” Admittedly, these words were less than artfully chosen, as the ultimate burden of proving the defendant’s competency to stand trial lies with the Government, once the issue of unfitness has been properly raised. Despite this inadvertent “slip of the tongue,” the trial judge properly ordered the Government to present further testimony on the issue of competency and, by so doing, the trial judge required the Government to carry the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of Billingsley’s competency to stand trial. At the close of the October 6 hearing, the trial judge directed the Government to introduce additional evidence because of “some reservation on the subject” of Billingsley’s competency. Clearly, if the court believed that the ultimate burden of persuasion rested upon the defendant to show that he was incompetent to stand trial, it would have been illogical and completely inconsistent for the court to require the Government to introduce additional evidence. Instead, the trial judge’s directions to the Government at the close of the October 6 hearing reveal that the defense had sufficiently raised the issue of competency to require the Government to establish that Billingsley was, in fact, competent to stand trial. Thus, unlike the majority, I conclude that once the issue of unfitness was raised at the October 6 hear*1036ing, the highly capable, well-respected, experienced trial judge properly ordered the Government to establish Billingsley's competency to stand trial.
In response to the court’s request, the Government selected Dr. Thatcher, a Board certified psychologist, who conducted a six- and-one-half hour examination of Billings-ley, compiling her findings in an eight-page report that was submitted to the court. Dr. Thatcher concluded that Billingsley “is currently psychologically fit to stand trial.” Billingsley made no attempt whatsoever to rebut this conclusion nor did he comply with the offer of the trial judge to appear in court and present testimony on his own behalf. Thus, based upon Dr. Thatcher’s detailed report, the court found Billingsley “psychologically fit to stand trial.” On appeal, this court will overturn a district court’s finding that the defendant is competent to stand trial only if such a finding is clearly erroneous. United States v. Johns, 728 F.2d 953, 956 (7th Cir.1984) (citing United States v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir.1980)). In the present case, the district court’s finding was not in error.
Billingsley’s personal friend and insurance agent, Alan Schwingler, testified that he had been meeting with Billingsley three or four times a month for a period of some six years and there was “no question” in his mind that Billingsley was able to understand and comprehend what he was doing and what was going on around him. Moreover, Robin Todd, the attorney who prosecuted Billingsley for his fraudulent check scheme in Clay County, Illinois, testified that the day before Billingsley requested a competency hearing in the SEC contempt proceeding, Todd appeared in court with Billingsley and “saw nothing at any time in my contact with Mr. Billingsley or any other observations or anything that was reported to me by anyone else to indicate that there was any problem with Mr. Bill-ingsley’s competency.” Dr. Thatcher personally observed, clinically tested, and psychologically evaluated Billingsley for six- and-one-half hours, administering two comprehensive, medically approved psychological tests including the Minnesota Multipha-sic Personality Inventory and the Competency Screening Test, analyzing the clinical reports of Drs. Jeub and Schwartz, and thoroughly questioning Billingsley concerning his personal background and his understanding of the SEC contempt proceeding. Dr. Thatcher found that the results of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory “indicated the defendant was consciously exaggerating or inventing symptomatol-ogy.” Dr. Thatcher further found that Billingsley “exceeded the criterion score needed to be judged competent” on the Comprehensive Screening Test. Billingsley “demonstrated an awareness and understanding of the nature and objectives of the proceedings, an understanding of the possible consequences of the proceedings, and an ability to cooperate with his attorney in his own defense.” He was able to explain the nature of the SEC contempt proceeding and to discuss his personal background in a detailed, coherent, and lucid fashion. Dr. Thatcher found that “[t]here wap no trace of a formal thought disorder or of a delusional thought content____ No difficulties, of any substance, were noted in his memory, concentration or attention____ His ability to abstract, as measured by his understanding of proverbs and analogies, was fair____ Questions on the elements of the criminal justice and trial process systems were accurately answered by the defend-ant____” In view of this overwhelming evidence establishing that Billingsley was competent to stand trial, the trial judge properly concluded that Billingsley “is presently psychologically fit to stand trial.”
I add that even if I were to agree with the majority and hold that the district court misallocated the burden of proof, which I do not, I would find such error harmless. According to this court’s opinion in Bilyew, under a harmless error analysis, we must determine “whether there is a reasonable possibility that [the defendant] would have been found unfit had the State been given the burden of proving him fit.” 686 F.2d at 1246. The majority asserts that “[t]he evidence on Billingsley’s fitness is too close to allow us to determine, from a reading of *1037the record alone, that the misplacement of the burden was harmless error.” I respectfully disagree. Based upon my reading of the record in the present case, the Government satisfied its burden of proving that Billingsley was competent to stand trial and there is no reasonable possibility that the trial judge would have found Bill-ingsley unfit to stand trial. The only evidence to support a finding that Billingsley was incompetent to stand trial was presented by Dr. Ziporyn and Billingsley’s defense counsel at the October 6 hearing. Dr. Zipo-ryn, a psychiatrist retained by Billingsley solely for the judicial proceeding, examined the defendant for only a brief two-hour period, took no notes to refresh his recollection, and prepared no formal report to file with the court. Dr. Ziporyn concluded that Billingsley experienced impaired memory, reason, and judgment due to a shrinkage of the cortex, but Dr. Ziporyn failed to establish that he had administered any type of psychological test to support this finding. This is a glaring oversight on Dr. Ziporyn’s part, especially in view of his admission that “the mere fact that a CAT scan may show cortical atrophy, in and of itself, does not mean that somebody is incompetent.”
In addition, Dr. Ziporyn contradicted his own diagnosis of impaired mental judgment with an admission that Billingsley manifested “no major impairment of his logical reasoning ability.” The only formal psychiatric test that Dr. Ziporyn administered was a mental-status examination which positively revealed that Billingsley was “oriented as to time, place and person.” On cross-examination, Dr. Ziporyn admitted that the medication Billingsley was ingesting for his nervous condition at the time of his examination affected his mental alertness. Dr. Ziporyn also admitted that this type of medication, when combined with Billingsley’s excessive drinking, “could have an impact on his responsiveness to ... questions.” It does not require the expertise of a physician or psychiatrist to realize that excessive alcohol consumption will compound the effects of medication prescribed for a nervous condition and cause an individual to be noticeably nonresponsive. The combination of medication and alcohol easily explain Dr. Zipo-ryn’s observation that Billingsley had “defects in memory; ... impairment of judgment; ... difficulty in concentration; ... problems with retention.” The mixture of medication and alcohol likewise explains the defense counsel’s testimony that Bill-ingsley evidenced a lack of memory and retention as well as an inability to concentrate. The testimony of Dr. Ziporyn and the defense counsel, when coupled with the fact that Billingsley requested a competency hearing in the SEC contempt proceeding the day after he voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly entered a guilty plea in Illinois state court without ever raising the issue of competency, reveals that Billings-ley simply feared the SEC contempt proceeding and engaged in a calculated delaying tactic, typical of a nervous defendant facing prosecution.
Based upon the incomplete, contradictory, conclusory, and medically questionable testimony of Dr. Ziporyn and the defense counsel, the district court could not have found Billingsley incompetent to stand trial. The trial judge initially admitted to having “some reservation on the subject” of Billingsley’s competency following the testimony of Dr. Ziporyn and the statement of defense counsel. As a result, the trial judge required the Government to present evidence concerning Billingsley’s competency. The Government responded by introducing testimony from Alan Schwingler, Billingsley’s personal friend and insurance agent, that “no question” existed as to Billingsley’s ability to understand and comprehend what he was doing and what was going on around him. The Government also elicited testimony from Robin Todd, the attorney who prosecuted Billingsley for the fraudulent check scheme and who “saw nothing at any time in my contact with Mr. Billingsley or any other observations or anything that was reported to me by anyone else to indicate that there was any problem with Mr. Billingsley’s competency.” Moreover, Dr. Thatcher performed a thorough, six-and-one-half hour *1038psychological examination of Billingsley, administering the comprehensive, medically accepted Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and the Competency Screening Test, analyzing the clinical reports of Drs. Jeub and Schwartz, and conducting an exhaustive interview with Billingsley to learn of his personal background as well as his understanding of the SEC contempt proceeding. Based upon this detailed examination, Dr. Thatcher concluded that Billingsley:
“is currently psychologically fit to stand trial. He is able to assist in his own defense, is familiar with the roles and responsibilities of various courtroom participants, has a rational understanding of the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him and the possible penalties, and is motivated to act in the self-serving manner needed to assist his counsel in his defense.”
Furthermore, Dr. Thatcher recognized, just as Dr. Schwartz had recognized in May 1982, that the SEC legal proceeding was placing Billingsley under a severe psychological and emotional strain. Thus, Dr. Thatcher concluded that Billingsley “would benefit from psychological treatment to assist him in dealing with the depression, anger and insomnia he is experiencing as a result of his current legal situation.”
The majority admits in footnote 26 that the evidence presented on the issue of Bill-ingsley’s competency could differ “based upon various factors (such as witness demeanor) that would lead the trial judge to credit some witnesses’ testimony more than others.” I am convinced that the highly capable, well-respected, experienced trial judge did just what the majority suggests; observed the demeanor of those witnesses who testified, weighed their credibility, considered all the evidence presented, and properly ruled that Billingsley was competent to stand trial. In view of the totality of the evidence, Billingsley’s medication and self-induced drinking habits severely affected his mental alertness and his fear of punishment resulting from the SEC contempt proceeding severely affected his emotional stability. Though such factors may have infringed upon Billingsley’s ability to remember, concentrate, and make well-reasoned judgments, they certainly did not render him incompetent to stand trial. Indeed, a thorough review of the evidence, including the fact that Billingsley requested a competency hearing in the SEC contempt proceeding the day after he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered a guilty plea in Illinois state court without ever raising the issue of competency, confirms Dr. Thatcher’s observation that Bill-ingsley was a malingerer who engaged in a calculated delaying tactic simply to forestall the Government’s prosecution. Thus, even if I were to agree with the majority that the trial judge misallocated the burden of proof, which I do not, such error was harmless because, based upon a review of all the evidence presented at the October 6 hearing, there is no reasonable possibility that the district court would have found Billingsley incompetent to stand trial.