Court Opinion

ID: 9839691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 19:04:12.553917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:01.707741
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 In re K.H. CA4/3
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 In re K.H. et al., Persons Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
 SERVICES AGENCY,
                                                                       G062394
      Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                       (Super. Ct. Nos. 20DP1070,
           v.                                                          20DP1071)

 S.A. et al.,                                                          OPINION

      Defendants and Appellants.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Mary
Kreber Varipapa, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Christy C. Peterson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant S.A.
                   Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant A.H.
                   Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Deborah B.
Morse, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   No appearance for the Minors.
                                             *               *               *
              In August 2020, police investigated a call of suspected child abuse at a
motel room. Three children were present: K.H. (an eight-year-old boy), A.H. (a five-
year-old girl), and P.A. (an 18-month-old girl). The boy and the older girl showed signs
of serious physical abuse that had occurred over a substantial period of time. Police
arrested S.A. (“Mother”), and A.A. (“Father A.”). At that time, A.H. (“Father H.”), the
father of the two older children, was incarcerated in Houston, Texas.
              The Orange County Social Services Agency (the Agency) took custody of
the children and placed them with foster mother D.R. (“Caregiver”), where they remain
to this day and appear to be doing well. The Agency filed a petition charging serious
                                                                                    1
physical harm and four related allegations. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.)
              At a jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found all but one of the five
allegations true. At a later disposition hearing, the court declared the children
dependents, ordered no reunification services for Mother and Father A., ordered
reunification services for Father H. (with a modified visitation order), and denied a
request for placement with Father H.’s aunt S.C. (“Great Aunt”) in Houston, Texas.
              Father H. claims: A) substantial evidence did not support some of the
allegations at the jurisdiction hearing; B) the court did not apply the correct legal standard
at the disposition hearing (regarding his request for custody of the children); C) the court
abused its discretion as to the visitation order; and D) the court abused its discretion by
denying the request for placement with Great Aunt (Mother joins as to this claim).
              We find: A) the first claim is moot because it is undisputed that some of
the claims were supported by substantial evidence; B) the court referenced the wrong
statute regarding Father H.’s request for custody, but there was no prejudice; C) Father H.
forfeited his objection to the visitation order; and D) the court did not abuse its discretion
by denying the request for relative placement. Thus, we affirm the judgment.
1
 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code; the
word “subdivision” and/or its abbreviation will be omitted throughout.

                                              2
                                              I
                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
              On August 24, 2020, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Buena Park police were
dispatched to a motel for a child abuse investigation. Present were an 18-month-old girl,
a five-year-old girl, and a 10-year-old boy. One officer observed the boy had “bruising
and welts to the right side of his face.” The boy also had “extreme bruising and welts” on
his shoulders and arms in a pattern indicating he had been “hit with the studded side of a
belt.” Another officer “discovered more marks on his back, legs and below his armpits.”
              Mother admitted she had “whooped” the boy with a belt for being
disrespectful. Mother said she was aiming for his bottom, but he was moving around, so
she hit him on the arms and the side. Mother also admitted “she was so enraged at [the
boy]’s behavior, while hitting him with the belt, she wasn’t paying attention to the marks
on [his] body.”
              The boy was transported to a hospital. A pediatrician observed “‘numerous
large bruises to his right face, thighs, arms and upper back, many of which are patterned.
Bleeding labs performed are normal, therefore there appears to be no overt problem with
his ability to clot. There has not been accidental trauma history provided to account for
all of these current bruises, especially the patterned bruises. These injuries are most
consistent with inflicted trauma (child physical abuse).’”
              A forensic examination of the older girl showed she “has multiple linear,
curvilinear, looped, red marks that [she] stated are from a whooping with a jump rope on
more than one occasion. The marks are from an object that can be looped and has a small
diameter, which could be a jump rope. The marks are of different ages – acute (fresh)
and some are older (diffuse and/or hyperpigmented). The multiple patterned bruises are
from more than one event of physical abuse.”
              When questioned by a social worker, the boy initially made excuses for the
marks on his body. Eventually he admitted Mother disciplined him with a belt and Father

                                             3
A. hit him with his hands. Sometimes Mother would hit him so hard he bled. The boy
had to be quiet when he was being hit so the neighbors would not contact the police. The
boy was afraid Mother would learn he was telling the social workers what happened;
Mother and Father A. had told the children not to say what went on because they did not
want to go to court.
              The older girl told the social worker she and the boy were regularly beaten
by Mother and Father A. with belts, ropes, and phone charging cords. The abuse had
occurred in California and Texas. Like the boy, the older girl had been told not to tell
anyone about the abuse, and she was afraid Mother and Father A. would whoop her if
they found out she told anyone about the whoopings.

Initial Juvenile Court Proceedings
              On August 25, 2020, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition. The
petition alleged serious physical harm, failure to protect, serious emotional damage, no
provision for support, parental cruelty, and abuse of sibling. (§ 300 (a)-(c), (g), (i), (j).)
              On August 25, 2020, the Agency filed a detention report; Mother and
Father A. had been interviewed at the jail. Mother stated she and Father A. had moved
from Houston, Texas and had been living in the Orange County motel for about three
weeks. Mother said she had no contact information about Father H. The Agency
contacted a child protection agency in Houston, Texas and discovered three prior
allegations of child neglect against Father A.
              On August 27, 2020, the Agency filed a first amended petition and an
addendum report. The report noted the children were to be placed in a licensed foster
home. The report noted Father H. was in custody in Houston, Texas (it was later
discovered this was for a conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon).
              On August 28, 2020, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing.
Mother and Father A. appeared remotely from jail. Mother’s counsel reported Father H.

                                               4
had “paid minimal child support and seen the kids about maybe four times a year
roughly.” The court found “it is of immediate and urgent necessity for protection of the
[children] that the [children] be detained under the protective custody of [the Agency].”
              On September 11, 2020, Mother pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts
of corporal injury on a child. (See Pen. Code, § 273d, subd. (a).) The superior court
granted four years of informal probation with 120 days in county jail.
              On January 12, 2021, the Agency filed a report noting Mother had been
released from local custody and had called from Texas. Mother reported she was
pregnant and asked about the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC).
Father A. was no longer involved in the proceedings.

Later Disclosures of Abuse
              The boy later disclosed he would get “whoopings” with extension cords
when there were any issues with his schoolwork, and the beatings would continue if he
made noise or moved while being beaten. The boy and the older girl were made to stand
in the corner without sitting for hours. They were punished by being given only bread
and water for days at a time. Mother would whip his hamstrings so hard he could not lay
down to sleep at night. Mother punished the older children by making them lie on their
backs and hold their legs slightly off the ground. They would get another beating if they
put their legs down or held “them up too high.”
              During one beating the boy was in so much pain he moved, so Mother
taped his feet to the floor. The boy broke free and started running to his grandmother’s
house, but Mother caught him. She then put super glue on his hands and feet and “stuck
all of them to the floor and then whooped” him. Eventually, Mother used a knife to cut
one of his hands free and gave him the knife to free his other hand and his feet; the boy
cut his hand freeing himself.
              Mother once taped the boy to the couch and beat him with a curtain rod.

                                             5
Mother sat on the boy for an hour while he was face down on the couch; the boy said that
“‘was the worst one ever’” because he could not breathe. Mother sat on the older girl, for
about 20 minutes; she was screaming. Father A. taunted the boy by telling his school
class that he pees on the couch and still has accidents. Father A. beat the boy with a
piece of wood with nails in it.
              On the night the parents were arrested, Mother threatened to kill the boy.
Mother told Father A. “to take over and stated ‘now you’re really going die.’” Father A.
beat the boy so hard “he could feel the hits ‘all the way to my bones.’” The boy
screamed to Mother, “‘help me he’s going to kill me,’” but Mother just stood there
watching. Mother had a pistol in her purse as well as a shotgun, and Father A. had an
assault rifle and an Uzi.
              Mother hit the older girl with a wire hanger. She would be slapped in the
face if she looked down while she was walking. The children would be slapped in the
face if they were not wearing socks in the house. As a punishment, they would have to
hold a watermelon with their arms stretched out in front. Punishment also included being
fed a frozen corn dog and having to wait until it thawed to eat it. They would also be told
when they could use the bathroom.
              The boy said “it was bad living in Houston due to the whoopins, being
slapped in the face and [Father A.] hitting him on the bottom with a metal curtain rod.”
The boy also stated Mother had given Father A. permission to give him “‘whoopins’” and
Father A. hit harder than Mother. Father A. hit him with a belt, metal hangers, and “lots
of other stuff.” On one occasion Father A. slapped the boy across the face, and Mother
put makeup on the mark and told him not to tell anyone about it. When his teacher asked
what happened, the boy did not tell her the truth, but the teacher spoke to Mother about it.
When they got home, Mother hit him on his bottom, legs, and back with a piece of wood,
believing he had disclosed the abuse to the teacher. The boy said he was sometimes
beaten so severely he could not “sit on a chair and had to squat to sit down.”

                                             6
              The boy witnessed domestic violence between Mother and Father A., but
Mother told him not to talk about it. Mother and Father A. fought with their hands and
with other objects; Father A. threw chairs at Mother, pulled her hair, and stood on her
body. Father A. threatened to hurt Mother if she told anyone about the abuse. Once
Mother went to the hospital after a beating due to a “headache.” The boy saw Father A.
hit Mother with the side of a pistol “on top of her head and her jaw.” The boy was scared
and crying in his bed; Father A. pointed the pistol at the boy and threatened to kill him if
he did not shut up. Father A. made the boy “smoke weed.” The boy was crying and got
a headache; Mother put his head in the freezer and said Father A. would make the boy
smoke again if he caught him crying.
              The older girl saw Father A. give the boy “whoopins on his private parts
with a belt.” Father A. gave “most of the whoopins” with a jump rope or “with nails on a
belt.” The older girl witnessed Mother and Father A. throw things at each other and saw
Mother’s injuries, including an injury on her forehead above her eye. She confirmed
Mother carried a gun in her purse and Father A. had a large gun “he shot in the air.” The
older girl said “they received lots of whoopins” while living in Texas.

The Jurisdiction Hearing
              In January 2021, the Agency filed a second amended petition alleging:
(1) serious physical harm (§ 300 (a)); (2) failure to protect (§ 300 (b)(1)); (3) serious
emotional damage (§ 300 (c)); (4) no provision for support (§ 300 (g)); and (5) cruelty
(§ 300 (i)). Each allegation alleged conduct by Mother and Father A. As to Father H., it
was alleged he was presently “incarcerated. [Father H.] is not able to provide for the
safety, support, and protection of the children, and is not available to provide or arrange
for appropriate care for the children.” (§ 300 (g).)
              In March 2021, the juvenile court conducted a jurisdiction hearing. The
court found Father H. to be the presumed father of the boy and the older girl. The court

                                              7
found the allegations in counts one through four of the dependency petition were true by
a preponderance of the evidence, bringing the children within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. (See § 300 et seq.)
              There were several protracted hearings as to whether California or Texas
had subject matter jurisdiction of this juvenile dependency matter under the provisions of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). This court
agreed with the juvenile court that Texas had ceded subject matter jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA to California. (A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504, 509–510.)

The Disposition Hearing
              The disposition hearing began in October 2022, and continued over
multiple dates through March 2023. The juvenile court granted Caregiver’s request for
de facto parent status at the beginning of the hearing. What follows is a brief summary of
the testimony of the five witnesses who testified (the court’s rulings will be summarized
as relevant in the discussion section of this opinion).

              1. The Boy’s Testimony
              At the time of his testimony, the boy was 10 years old. The boy wanted to
live in California with Caregiver because he felt safe with her. The boy called Caregiver
“mom” and hoped she would adopt him and his two younger sisters. The boy gets along
with his sisters and wants to stay together with them. On a scale from one to ten, he rated
the importance of staying together with his sisters as: “Ten.”
              The boy was worried that if he went back to Texas, Mother and Father A.
would find him. On his last video visit with Mother, he noticed she was still wearing an
engagement ring, so he thought Father A. was still around. The boy did not want to visit
with Mother or Father H. because he did not want to experience flashbacks or nightmares
about his physical abuse, as he had in the past. The boy testified that being with Great

                                              8
Aunt also caused him to have flashbacks and bad memories because he thought Great
                                                                                  2
Aunt knew about the physical abuse in Texas but did not do anything to stop it.

              2. The Social Worker’s Testimony
              The Agency’s social worker testified she had been assigned to this case
since the initial detention hearing. Her recommendation was not to offer reunification
services to Mother or Father A. because they had inflicted severe physical abuse on the
older children. Her recommendation was to offer services to Father H. The social
worker felt it was not appropriate to return custody to any of the parents at this time. As
to Father H., “I have asked him to complete a parenting class. That has not been
completed.” The social worker was unable to confirm his drug testing. She noted Father
H. “has been attempting to visit. The children have been declining visits.”
              The social worker was concerned that if the children were returned to
Father H., he would not protect them based on his past conduct. The social worker said
Father H. “had shared with me during one instance he went to pick up the kids, and the
mom came out saying, I’m going to beat [the older girl] if you don’t leave. [¶] And so I
believe he left. [¶] But he didn’t call the police. He didn’t call social services.” She
said she had reason to believe Father H. knew about the abuse going on in the home and
did not do anything to prevent it.
              The social worker did not recommend placement with Great Aunt; she felt
the boy’s concerns about Great Aunt’s knowledge of the abuse going on in the home was
well founded. The social worker recommended the children remain in their current

2
 At the conclusion of the boy’s testimony, the juvenile court asked him what his favorite
subject was in school. He said, “Science and math.” The court asked him what he
wanted to do when he grew up. The boy said, “Three things.” “I would want to be in the
Army.” He also wanted to be a “scientist” and an “astronaut. In the boy’s presence at the
end of the hearings while making its rulings, the court said the boy was “flourishing,”
which the court said is a fancy word for doing “awesome.”

                                             9
placement. She said all three children were bonded to Caregiver, interacted positively,
and showed her respect. She testified the children are attached to each other, and it
would be emotionally detrimental for them to be separated. The social worker said it
would be difficult for the children to be removed from Caregiver because they have
stability, they feel safe, and they do not have a relationship with anyone in Texas.

              3. Caregiver’s Testimony
              Caregiver testified the children were bonded to her and called her “mom.”
She said the boy “is very protective with his sisters. Very, very protective. So he’s
always looking for them.” Caregiver asked for placement of the children with her; she
felt “moving these children back to Texas would be detrimental to their emotional well-
being, physical well-being, well-being in general.”
              Caregiver testified she had spoken to Great Aunt by phone for about an
hour regarding the long-term care of the children. Caregiver said she had concerns about
their safety. Caregiver testified Great Aunt told her she would keep the younger girl “as
long as she could” and would keep the older children “until their father could get them.”
Caregiver said Great Aunt told her she had suspicions about child abuse in the past, but
there were no specifics.

              4. Great Aunt’s Testimony
              Great Aunt said she was surprised to learn of the children being abused.
Great Aunt testified she had no concerns about the children being with Father H., because
“he’s working. He has a steady job. He’s doing well, and he’s in school. He’s trying to
better himself and his career, and I’ve seen him with his newborn daughter.” Great Aunt
said she did not know Father H.’s “criminal background.” Great Aunt testified that if she
found out Father H. was currently on probation for a crime of violence, that would affect
her opinion. Caregiver testified Mother knows where she lives, but Caregiver said she

                                             10
would keep Mother away from the children.
              Great Aunt said the last time she spoke to the boy was about two years ago.
Great Aunt testified when the family lived in Texas, she had about 10 interactions with
the older children at Christmas parties and family gatherings. She said the next occasion
was when she came to California for a face-to-face visit with the children. Great Aunt
testified she would still want to have a relationship with the children even if the juvenile
court determined it would not be in their best interest to live with her.

              5. Father H.’s Testimony
              Father H. testified he had graduated from high school and currently lives in
Houston, Texas with his grandmother. He said he “just kind of started” as a cab driver
and had worked at multiple jobs “on and off” since 2020. Father H. said he had been
taking classes at a community college for about a year in construction management. He
said he and Mother met in high school in 2008 and separated in 2017. Father H. testified
after the separation he saw the children: “Probably every other weekend.” He said
Mother started a relationship with Father A. about a month or two after they separated.
              Father H. testified he never saw any marks on the children when they
visited him. Father H. said Father A. had once threatened him with violence and he
called the police. Father H. said prior to being contacted by the Agency, he did not know
the children had been taken to California. He testified he had been drug testing with his
probation officer since July 2021. Father H. said he currently had a visitation order with
the children twice a week. He testified he had participated in phone or video visits with
the two girls, but he was told that the boy did not want to visit him.

                                             11
                                               II
                                        DISCUSSION
              Father H. appeals claiming: A) substantial evidence does not support some
of the allegations pertaining to him at the jurisdiction hearing; B) the juvenile court failed
to apply section 361.2 at the disposition hearing; C) the court abused its discretion by
changing the visitation order; and D) the court abused its discretion by denying a request
for placement with Great Aunt (Mother joins as to this claim).
              We shall analyze each claim.

A. The Jurisdiction Hearing Findings as to Father H.
              Father H. claims the juvenile court’s findings pertaining to him at the
jurisdiction hearing were not supported by substantial evidence. We find this claim is
moot because it is beyond dispute that the findings regarding Mother and Father A. were
supported by substantial evidence.
              The primary concern of juvenile dependency law is the protection of
children. (In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 202.) “As a result of this focus
on the child, it is necessary only for the court to find that one parent’s conduct has created
circumstances triggering section 300 for the court to assert jurisdiction over the child.”
(In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491.) “Once the child is found to be
endangered in the manner described by one of the subdivisions of section 300 . . . the
child comes within the court’s jurisdiction . . . .” (Ibid.)
              It is a fundamental rule of justiciability that an appellate court will not
address an issue on appeal if the court cannot give the appellant some form of relief. (In
re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315 [“When no effective relief can be
granted, an appeal is moot”].) A jurisdiction hearing in a juvenile dependency
proceeding is for the purpose of determining the truth of the alleged circumstances, and
“it is irrelevant which parent created those circumstances.” (In re I.A., supra, 201

                                              12
Cal.App.4th at p. 1492.) “As a result, it is commonly said that a jurisdictional finding
involving one parent is ‘“good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if
the actions of either parent bring [the child] within one of the statutory definitions of a
dependent.”‘“ (Ibid.) Because of mootness, “an appellate court may decline to address
the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has
been found to be supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.)
              Here, Father H. does not dispute that the allegations concerning Mother and
Father A. (serious physical harm, failure to protect, serious emotional damage, etc.) were
supported by substantial evidence at the jurisdiction hearing. Thus, challenges to the
remaining allegations concerning Father H. (risk of serious physical harm, no provision
for support) are moot. (In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 [“an appellate court
may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings
once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence”].)
              Father H. recognizes the issue of mootness. Nevertheless, he urges this
court to exercise discretion and evaluate whether the allegations as to him at the
jurisdiction hearing were supported by substantial evidence. He argues the findings at the
jurisdiction hearing as to him “serve as the basis for the disposition orders removing the
children from his custody and for a reduced visitation schedule” at the later disposition
hearing. We see no evidence in the record to support Father H.’ s argument. It is true
that some of the same underlying facts generally support the juvenile court’s orders at
both hearings. However, we find no evidence that the court’s findings at the jurisdiction
hearing serve as the basis for any of the court’s orders concerning placement and
visitations about a year later at the disposition hearing.
              Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the moot claims
made by Father H. as to the juvenile court’s findings at the jurisdiction hearing.

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B. Request to Place the Children in Custody of Father H.
              Father H. claims the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard when it
denied his request for custody of the children. We agree that the court referenced section
361 (removal of a child from a custodial parent) when it made its formal findings at the
conclusion of the disposition hearing, rather than section 361.2 (placement of a child with
a noncustodial parent). However, we find the error was harmless.
              In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review general legal principles
concerning placement of dependent children with noncustodial parents; 2) summarize the
juvenile court’s ruling at the disposition hearing; and 3) analyze the facts as applied to the
appropriate laws.

              1. General Legal Principles
              “When the court has found jurisdiction under section 300, it then must
conduct a disposition hearing.” (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248;
§ 358 (a) [“After finding that a child is a person described in Section 300, the court shall
hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the child”].) A
disposition hearing determines “‘where the child will live while under the court’s
supervision.’” (In re A.S. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 237, 247, disapproved on another
ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.)
              “Under section 361, the court removes children from the physical custodial
parent.” (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1422–1423.) Generally, a child
cannot be taken from the physical custody of a parent “unless the juvenile court finds
clear and convincing evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the
minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s
parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361 (c)(1), (d).)

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              “Once removal from the custodial parent under section 361 has occurred,
section 361.2 requires the court to evaluate placement with the noncustodial parent based
on detriment.” (In re Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1422-1423.)
              “If a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall
first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not
residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the
provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent
requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that
placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2 (a), italics added.)
              A juvenile court’s finding under section 361.2 (a) must be made by clear
and convincing evidence and be stated on the record. (In re Marquis D. (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 1813, 1829 [“a finding of detriment pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision
(a) must be made by clear and convincing evidence”]; § 361.2 (c) [“The court shall make
a finding, either in writing or on the record, of the basis for its determination”].) Under
section 361.2, a “court’s inquiry properly is more comprehensive than simply whether a
child will be physically safe with a noncustodial parent or whether that parent has
behaved badly. [Citation.] A court properly may decline placement with a safe and
nonoffending parent if that placement would be detrimental to the child’s emotional well-
being.” (In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38, 46.)
              If a juvenile court commits error under the provisions of section 361.2,
reversal is required only if the error was prejudicial. (See In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 292, 303 [failure to apply section 361.2 (a) is subject to harmless error
analysis].) An error is prejudicial if, after examination of the entire case, “it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in
the absence of the error.” (In re Julien H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1089.)

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              2. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling at the Disposition Hearing
              When evaluating placement with Father H. at the disposition hearing, the
court recognized that he had been “working very hard” despite some challenging
circumstances, which included his physical distance from the children, and “being on
probation.” The court found Father H. had been participating in therapy, as well as drug
and alcohol testing.
              The juvenile court then turned to the issue of “the relationship with
[Father H.] and the children.” The court found during the time Mother and Father H.
were together, “they were together with the children, but when they separated for
multiple reasons, [Father H.] in many ways just stepped back.” The court found as far as
the children, that Father H. had “very little contact. He kind of just stayed out of the way
of the mother. There were multiple reasons . . . , but the relationship before these
proceedings began [between Father H.] and the children . . . was limited.” The court
said: “Either [Father H.] didn’t know what was going on, or he wasn’t involved enough
to see it, but either way, it presents a problem.”
              The juvenile court recalled the boy’s earlier testimony during the
disposition hearing and noted that he “does not feel safe with [Father H.] because
[Father H.] did not protect” the boy. The court noted that the boy looked at his
relationship with Father H. as “limited and not a stable relationship per se.” The court
observed the boy “was able to express he wanted to stay with the caretaker, and wanted
to be with the caretaker because he feels safe and secure.” The court found Caretaker did
not exert undue influence over the boy’s testimony.
              The juvenile court said it was “looking at the relationship, looking at the
needs, looking at potential emotional as well as physical abuse that has happened and
where we are currently, and the court looks, again, at the best interests of the child. [¶]
The court is looking at the fact that these children, again, have been in this current solid
placement. No fault of the relatives, no fault being assessed, but where we are right now,

                                              16
to take those children from their current placement is an extraordinarily dangerous
situation, as far as emotional and physical well-being.”
              At the end of the disposition hearing, the juvenile court found “by clear and
convincing evidence that section 361 (c)[(1)] and (c)[(5)] applies, and that to vest custody
with the parents would be detrimental to the children and to vest custody with Social
                                                                           3
Services Agency Director is required to serve the child’s best interests.” (Italics added.)

              3. Analysis and Application
              Prior to the disposition hearing, Father H. filed a brief asking the court to
place the children in his custody under the provisions of section 361.2 (a). This was an
appropriate request because Father H. was a noncustodial parent with whom the children
did not reside at the time the petition was initiated. But the court stated at the end of the
disposition hearing it was removing the children from both parents’ custody referencing
sections 361 (c)(1) and 361 (c)(5), the provisions concerning custodial parents. The court
did not make a finding under section 361.2 (c). Therefore, the court erred.
              However, we do not find the error to be prejudicial. Generally, a juvenile
court “shall place the child” with the noncustodial parent requesting custody, “unless it
finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2 (a), italics added.) Here, when
considering placement with the parents (Mother or Father H.), the court said that it
“would be detrimental” to place the children with the parents.
              Further, the juvenile court had earlier stated in the disposition hearing that
it would be “extraordinarily dangerous” to remove the children from their current

3
 Under section 361 (c)(1): “There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor
were returned home . . . .” Under section 361 (c)(5): “The minor has been left without
any provision for his or her support . . . .”

                                              17
placement when considering the children’s “emotional and physical well-being.” That is,
although the court did not specifically mention section 361.2 (a) when it formally
announced its ruling, the court applied the correct legal test (detriment) and appropriately
considered the emotional and physical well-being of the children.
              In sum, after examining the entire record, we do not think “it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to [Father H.] would have been reached in the
absence of the error.” (See In re Julien H., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1089.)
              Father H. argues “had the juvenile court applied the correct legal standard,
there is a reasonable likelihood it would have granted [his] request for placement.” We
disagree. In fact, the court applied the correct legal standard (detriment), it just
referenced the wrong statute (section 361, as opposed to section 361.2). Therefore, we do
not think it is reasonably probable that had the court referenced the correct statute it
would have resulted in a result more favorable to Father H.

C. Change in Visitation Terms
              Father H. claims the juvenile court abused its discretion when it changed
the visitation terms at the disposition hearing (from twice a week to every other week, by
phone or video). We find this claim has forfeited, but in any event, we do not find that
the court abused its discretion.
              We review a juvenile dependency court’s rulings regarding parental
visitation terms for an abuse of discretion. (Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 285, 300.) “‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) “It is not
our function to weigh the credibility of the witnesses or resolve conflicts in the evidence.
[Citation.] Rather we must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of

                                              18
the juvenile court and must review the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court’s orders.” (In re Daniel C.H. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 814, 839.)
              In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review general legal principles
regarding parental visitation of dependent children; 2) summarize the juvenile court’s
ruling at the disposition hearing; and 3) analyze the facts as applied to the laws.

              1. General Legal Principles
              “In order to maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to
provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of
his or her parent . . . any order placing a child in foster care, and ordering reunification
services, shall provide as follows: [¶] (1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for visitation
between the parent . . . and the child. Visitation shall be as frequent as possible,
consistent with the well-being of the child. [¶] (B) No visitation order shall jeopardize
the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1 (a)(1)(A) & (B).)
              Generally, a juvenile dependency court has the power and responsibility to
regulate visitation between dependent children and their parents. (In re Moriah T. (1994)
23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374; § 362.4.) To satisfy this responsibility, a court must “define
the rights of the parties to visitation.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752,
757.) The court may then delegate “ministerial tasks of overseeing the right [to
visitation] as defined by the court” to a child protective services agency. (Ibid.)
              Issues regarding visitation in dependency proceedings are forfeited on
appeal by failure to raise the issue or to object in the juvenile court. (Kevin R. v. Superior
Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 685–686 [parent forfeited challenge to unlawful
delegation of visitation authority by not raising issue at trial]; In re Valerie A. (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 987, 1001 [parent forfeited challenge to frequency of visitation by not
objecting to visitation schedule].)

                                              19
              2. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling at the Disposition Hearing
              When making the order for reunification services for Father H., the juvenile
court said it “believes that there are going to have to be specific adjustments to the
service plan, and that is going to be key to this.” The court stated: “We do not want [the
boy] to be in the middle of making huge decisions regarding visitation, and to that, we
shouldn’t place that on the Caretaker. We probably shouldn’t place that on the social
worker. That probably [needs to] be a decision that is done in a therapeutic setting, and it
has been so difficult.”
              The juvenile court said, “as to the conjoint therapy, I need to make it clear.
I’m hoping that [the boy] will work with the therapist. We’re not looking to force [the
boy] into a situation that is going to be negative for him or any of the children, but I need
a therapist to kind of work on those issues.” The court stated, “So, I need Caretaker all
in. I need [the boy] all in on this: Working with the therapist to make things better, and
he has done nothing -- [the boy] has done everything he can to keep working with the
therapist, so we’re in good shape with that.”
              As far as visitation order, the juvenile court said: “It may be that [the boy]
is not ready. It may be that he is ready, but I need a therapist and professional to be in
that position so that we don’t have these issues going forward, and that is not just for [the
boy]. That’s for the other two children as well. [¶] The court is going to authorize that
parenting time or that visitation every other week as monitored by the therapist as
designated and not to happen unless the therapist indicates that [the boy] is ready. [¶]
So, therapist will talk to [Father H.]. The therapist will talk to the children, and then that
will go forward as such.” The court also stated Father H. “should be sending written
letters, and he should be communicating that way with all three children weekly:
pictures, letters, whatever needs to be sent.”
              Father H.’s counsel asked for “clarification as to the changes the court
made to the case plan.” As to the visitation order, the court replied: “The court is going

                                              20
to continue to order and orders visitation every other week with and between [Father H.]
and all three children, but that is to be done with the therapist and with the therapist’s
input. [¶] If the children or the child is not ready for that therapy, then the parenting time
of the visitation would not go forward, but absent a finding by the therapist that they’re
not ready, that that will be court ordered.”
              Father H.’s counsel said, “just to be clear, it was currently weekly
visitation.” The court responded: “I understand. I don’t think we’re going to get a
therapist in conjoint or reunification that can do weekly. So, I don’t want to limit
[Father H.’s] parenting time, but I think that we need to do at a minimum bi-weekly. So,
I’ll make it as a minimum of . . . every other week.”

              3. Analysis and Application
              “When a child refuses visitation, it is the parent’s burden to request a
specific type of enforcement, or a specific change to the visitation order. Absent a
request, it is not the court’s burden to sua sponte come up with a solution to the
intractable problem of a child’s steadfast refusal to visit a parent.” (In re Sofia M. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046.)
              Here, although Father H.’s counsel asked for “clarification” of the visitation
order, counsel did not object to the visitation order on any specific grounds, nor did
counsel request a change in the visitation order. Therefore, we find Father H. has
forfeited his claim regarding the visitation order on appeal. (See In re Alayah J. (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 469, 479 [“the failure to object to a juvenile dependency order on a specific
ground generally forfeits a parent’s right to challenge that order on appeal”].)
              In any event, when fashioning a visitation order at a disposition hearing, a
juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what serves the child’s best interests, and
its decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. (Bridget A. v.
Superior Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 300.)

                                               21
              Here, it is apparent that the juvenile court was attempting to act in the
children’s best interests and within the scope of its discretion when it fashioned the
change in the visitation order. By the time of the disposition hearing, the visitations with
Father H. had effectively ceased, and it is apparent the court’s change in the visitation
frequency was an attempt to facilitate visitations that would have a better chance of
success. In sum, we find that the court did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
That is, even if we were to excuse the issue of appellate forfeiture, we find no abuse of
the court’s discretion. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 [a court
abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary and/or capricious].)
              Father H. relies primarily on In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497,
1505 (Hunter), for the proposition: “The juvenile court cannot impermissibly delegate to
the child’s therapist, [the Agency], or any third person, unlimited discretion to determine
whether visitation is to occur.” We do not find this to be an accurate description of the
court’s visitation order, and we find Hunter to be distinguishable.
              In Hunter, a five-year-old child was detained and placed with a relative
while the mother was incarcerated. (Hunter, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1500-1501.)
When the mother was released over a year and a half later, she entered a rehabilitation
program where she attempted to maintain contact with the child by phone. The child
refused to accept the mother’s calls and stopped responding to her letters. (Id. at p.
1501.) The juvenile court ordered the child protective agency to set up “‘visitation for
[the mother] as can be arranged through her program.’” (Ibid., italics added.)
              The Court of Appeal in Hunter concluded that the juvenile court erred
because the effect of the visitation order was to give the child “virtually complete
discretion to veto visitation, and indeed all contact, with his mother, a discretion he
exercised without any oversight or direction by the court. This was clearly improper.
The juvenile court cannot impermissibly delegate to the child’s therapist, [the child
protective agency] or any third person, unlimited discretion to determine whether

                                             22
visitation is to occur.” (Hunter, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.)
              In this case, the juvenile court did not order visitation “‘as can be
arranged’” as in Hunter. (See Hunter, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1501.) Indeed,
when the court was asked for clarification, it reiterated that its visitation order was to be a
“minimum” of every other week. Of course, the boy (and the other children) could still
refuse these court ordered visitations through their therapists, but the juvenile court did
not appear to impermissibly delegate or give veto authority over its visitation order to the
children, the Agency, or any other person. (Compare In re Christopher H. (1996) 50
Cal.App.4th 1001, 1005, 1009 [order that parent receive “‘reasonable visitation’” was
“‘bare bones’” but nonetheless sufficient because it required some visitation and did not
                                                                                              4
delegate to the social services agency the power to decide whether visits would occur].)

D. Denial of Request to Place Children with Great Aunt
              Father H. claims the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying relative
placement with Great Aunt (Mother joins). We find no abuse of discretion.
              “Custody determinations in dependency proceedings are ‘committed to the
sound discretion of the juvenile court,’ and such rulings ‘should not be disturbed on
appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.’ [Citation.] We will not
disturb a custody determination ‘“‘unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’”‘“
(In re J.M. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 707, 718.)
              In this part of the discussion, we shall: 1) review general legal principles
concerning requests for placement of dependent children with relatives; 2) summarize the

4
  We note that future requests for changes in the juvenile court’s visitation order can be
made based on a change of circumstances. (§ 388 (a)(1) [“Any parent or other person
having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon
grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action
. . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made”].)

                                              23
juvenile court’s ruling at the disposition hearing; and 3) analyze the facts as applied to the
appropriate laws.

              1. Relevant Legal Principles
              “Section 361.3 gives ‘preferential consideration’ to placement requests by
certain relatives upon the child’s removal from the parents’ physical custody at the
dispositional hearing.” (In re N.V. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 25, 30.) The application of
the relative placement preference “require[s] the consideration of multiple factors all
dependent on an examination of evidence relating to the minor’s current circumstances.
Consequently, a reflexive approach that children are always better off with relatives is
incompatible with the governing laws . . . .” (Amber G. v. Superior Court (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 465, 489.)
              Under section 361.3 (a), the relevant factors include: “(1) The best interest
of the child, including special physical, psychological, educational, medical, or emotional
needs. [¶] (2) The wishes of the parent, the relative, and child, if appropriate. [¶]
(3) The provisions of . . . the Family Code regarding relative placement. [¶]
(4) Placement of siblings and half siblings in the same home, unless that placement is
found to be contrary to the safety and well-being of any of the siblings . . . . [¶] (5) The
good moral character of the relative and any other adult living in the home . . . . [¶] (6)
The nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the relative, and the
relative’s desire to care for, and to provide legal permanency for, the child if reunification
is unsuccessful. [¶] (7) The ability of the relative to do the following: [¶] (A) Provide a
safe, secure, and stable environment for the child. [¶] (B) Exercise proper and effective
care and control of the child. [¶] (C) Provide a home and the necessities of life for the
child. [¶] (D) Protect the child from his or her parents. [¶] (E) Facilitate court-ordered
reunification efforts with the parents. [¶] (F) Facilitate visitation with the child’s other
relatives. [¶] (G) Facilitate implementation of all elements of the case plan. [¶] (H)(i)

                                              24
Provide legal permanence for the child if reunification fails. [¶] . . . . [¶] (8)(A) The
safety of the relative’s home.”
              In addition, when considering a relative placement after the disposition
hearing, “the county social worker shall consider whether the relative has established and
maintained a relationship with the child.” (§ 361.3 (d).) “‘Relative’ means an adult who
is related to the child by blood, adoption, or affinity within the fifth degree of kinship,
including stepparents, stepsiblings, and all relatives whose status is preceded by the
words ‘great’. . . .” (§ 361.3 (c)(2).)
              “The overriding concern of dependency proceedings, however, is not the
interest of extended family members but the interest of the child. ‘[R]egardless of the
relative placement preference, the fundamental duty of the court is to assure the best
interests of the child, whose bond with a foster parent may require that placement with a
relative be rejected.’ [Citation.] Section 361.3 does not create an evidentiary
presumption that relative placement is in a child’s best interests. [Citation.] The passage
of time is a significant factor in a child’s life; the longer a successful placement
continues, the more important the child’s need for continuity and stability becomes in the
evaluation of her best interests.” (In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841, 855.)

              2. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling at the Jurisdiction Hearing
              At the conclusion of the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found Great
Aunt’s testimony was “credible . . . and the evidence supports that she was doing
whatever she could . . . to support or to help these children.”
              The juvenile court found Great Aunt “took immediate and absolute steps to
help the children within days of hearing that the children had been detained.” The court
noted “that her home was found suitable, and that she has unique and special skills
regarding her background as an educator, and as a counselor, regarding issues that may or
may not pertain to these children and their particular needs.” The court also found there

                                              25
were no “moral character issues,” and “under all the other criteria,” Great Aunt was
“suitable” for “relative placement.”
               However, the juvenile court stated: “The issue that remains is going to be
the issue of the relationship between the children and her ability to protect and [the] best
interests of those children now.” The court said it considered, “not just the relationship
that exists now, but the relationship that existed prior to those children coming to
California.” The court found Great Aunt had a limited relationship with the children in
Texas as a family member, such as “going to Christmas once a year maybe.” But the
court found Great Aunt had “no indication of any type of abuse with these children. So,
it presents a difficult situation.”
               The juvenile court recalled the boy’s earlier testimony, and his belief that
Great Aunt “knew of the abuse, it’s not that the court takes that as actual knowledge, but
it does take it as where [the boy] is, in feeling safe and understanding how adults in his
world should have or did know what’s happening.” The court found the boy “did not feel
safe. [The boy] does not feel safe. And so I have to look very closely at that issue, and
whether or not it would be detrimental under the circumstances, or whether or not it is in
[the boy’s] and the children’s best interest to be placed with [Great Aunt] under these
circumstances.”
               The court found the boy, who was now 10 years old, to be “extraordinarily
bright. He is very articulate, way past his years, . . . [the boy] presents with a maturity
and with an ability not only to discern right from wrong, for purposes of testimony, but
he did a very credible job and a very good job of describing what this means for him and
why.” The court noted that the boy “was able to express he wanted to stay with the
caretaker, and wanted to be with the caretaker because he feels safe and secure.”
               When announcing its ruling, the juvenile court stated that it had “done an
independent review under the criteria of Welfare and Institutions Code 361.3.” The court
said it was “looking at the relationship, looking at the needs, looking at the potential

                                              26
emotional as well as physical abuse that has happened and where we are currently, and
the court looks, again, the best interests of the child.”
              The juvenile court concluded, “that with all of those considerations, that the
motion to place with the relatives at this time, although so many of those factors have
been found in favor of [Great Aunt], ultimately, the court, making a ruling in the best
interests of the children, denies that motion and finds that it is not in the best interests of
. . . these children to be placed with [Great Aunt] at this time; that the psychological and
emotional stability and the very high complex-trauma nature of this particular case, and
the lack of significant relationship with the [Great Aunt], again, on top of the feelings
expressed by [the boy], support that finding.”

              3. Analysis and Application
              It is readily apparent that the juvenile court carefully considered the
underlying facts, applied the appropriate factors, and came to a reasoned decision within
the bounds of its discretion. That is, the court plainly did not make its custody decision
in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Thus, we find no abuse of the court’s discretion.
(See In re J.M., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 718 [we will not disturb a custody
determination “‘“‘unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination’”‘“].)
              Father H. argues “the juvenile court did not consider all the required factors
under section 361.3.” We see no evidence to support that argument.
              Unless express findings are required, “we presume the court followed the
law in making its determination [citation], including a consideration of the criteria set
forth in [an applicable rule].” (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39
Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699.)
              Here, the juvenile court stated it had “done an independent review under the
criteria of Welfare and Institutions Code 361.3.” The court then referenced several of

                                               27
those criteria (or factors) having to do with relative placement under section 361.3. The
statute requires no statement of express findings; therefore, we presume the court, in fact,
considered all the required factors within the statute.

                                             III
                                       DISPOSITION
              The judgment is affirmed.

                                                   MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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