Court Opinion

ID: 9829213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:05:37.527791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:58.396611
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Appellant calls attention to the case of M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Carter, 95 Tex. 461, 68 S. W. 159. This case was cited in the brief of counsel for appellant, but was not referred to nor discussed by us in the original opinion, because we did not think it should be considered as relevant authority upon the proposition here involved. The facts of that case show that Carter & Bro. were the owners of a sawmill and planing plant situated on a lot adjoining a spur track of the railway company. Their plant, together with a stock of lumber, were burped under circumstances from which it might have been inferred that the fire was due to sparks escaping from a locomotive belonging to the railway company. Carter sued for damages, alleging negligence on the part of the railway company in failing to properly equip its locomotive with a sufficient spark arrester, and on the part of the servants of the railway company in its operation «upon that occasion. Among other defenses, the railway company relied upon a contract by which they were released from any liability for damages resulting from such conduct. The contract recited an agreement by which the railway company was to build the spur track a distance of about 70 feet from the main line at the point where Carter’s plant was situated, and that it was done for the latter’s convenience in shipping lumber and other freight. It is then provided that, in consideration of the premises and of the construction of that side track and switch, the owner of the mill released the railway company from all damages and claims arising from the injuring or killing of stock belonging to him, or his contractors, or employes, or that might be injured or killed by locomotives or trains or cars of the railway company on the line of the road or on its tracks, and for all damages resulting from the injury or destruction of any property whatever that might be injured or destroyed by fire or sparks from any locomotive of the railway company at or about that switch. In reply Carter sought to evade the force of that contract by attacking its validity on the ground that it was opposed to public policy, in that it was a contract exempting a common carrier from the consequences of its negligence. While the case was pending in the Court of Civil Appeals, that question and others were certified to the Supreme Court. Justice Brown, in an opinion sustaining the validity of the contract, says: “A railroad company, when not contracting in its character of common carrier, has the same right of contract as other corporations or persons, and in many instances may make contracts for immunity from liability on account of the negligence of itself and servants.” After referring to a number of authorities, among which are included what are commonly called the “Express Company Cases,” decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, he continues: “We can see no reason why the contract in this case should be forbidden that dpes not apply with equal force to the cases cited. There being no general rule of public policy which will condemn this contract, the inquiry then arises: Is there in the state of Texas any such policy indicated, either by statutory provision, its Constitution, or judicial decisioils, as would establish a right in the public inconsistent with the terms of this contract?” After discussing the principles underlying the proposition, he then says: “We conclude that the contract certified is not violative of the public policy of the state, but is a legitimate exercise of the liberty of contract, by which the appellees voluntarily, and for the purpose of securing the convenience of the railroad at that point, agreed to release the railroad company from liability for injury which might occur to their property by the negligence of the employés of the railroad, or by such unavoidable accident as is frequent by the .escape of fire from the best equipped machinery.”
The effect of that decision is to say that *641one not a common carrier, and even a com-" mon carrier- itself when not contracting as' such, may by contract secure immunity from liability for damages resulting from its negligence or that of its servants. The distinction between that case and the one before us lies in the difference between property and human life. When considered as an object of governmental protection, these are not to be put in the same class. The protection vouchsafed to one in the enjoyment of his property is that he shall not be deprived of it without his consent, except in some manner pointed out in law. It is given for the personal benefit o.f the property owner. All conduct resulting in injury to one’s property or property rights is deemed wrongful only when in opposition to the consent" of the owner. The owner alone, in the eyes of the law, has the right to complain of such injury. But not so with respect to the lives of individuals. In the preservation of these the public at large has an interest. Conduct which results in the destruction of life is not relieved of its culpability by the consent of the victim previously obtained, or by his condonation thereafter given. If the guaranty of public security sought to be made effective by prohibitory legislation is one of the essential and primary duties of government, the observation of the regulations and restrictions imposed for that purpose become the duty of every citizen within the state. If it is made a personal offense to negligently kill another, then it follows that the duty to observe ordinary care not to kill is one imposed by law for the benefit of society. If this be true, can it then be said that this duty may be contracted away? Every tragic death is a shock to society as well as an injury to the individual. A contract, which provides that for a valuable «sonsideration one may relax that degree of prudence and vigilance toward another which the' law enjoins as a guaranty of personal security, necessarily contemplates the doing of -something which the law for a wise purpose has forbidden. It is true that the penalty denounced by law for negligent homicide can be visited only upon the person guilty of the wrongful conduct; but civil courts broaden the ■ range of responsibility and extend it to those whom the- wrongdoer represents. In this case the principal is a corporation which can act only through its agents; but we do not think it could for that reason make this particular kind of a contract. We know of no •reason why a contract, held to be void because opposed to public policy when made by a private person, should not be equally as offensive when entered into for the benefit of a private corporation. It is contended that, if: the appellant could not contract for exemption from its own negligence, it could by that means secure, immunity from liability-; for damages-resulting from the negligence. of' its- servants. We are not referred to any adjudicated case in which such a distinction has been made. The evidence shows that the collision which was the immediate cause of Watson’s death was the result of conduct .initiated by and carried on under the immediate direction of Lockridge, appellant’s general manager.. The case does not furnish .an instance of an injury caused by-the negligent conduct of some subordinate employé, but of the corporate representative .himself, who, upon that occasion, stood in its stead. The act of Lockridge was the act of the company itself.
It may be that the conclusions we have reached in this case are not in harmony with those announced by very eminent authority; it is also possible that our views may not meet the approbation of the court of last resort in this state; but, be that as it may, .we think the principles upon which we have rested our decision should be recognized as sound in law. So thoroughly are we impressed with the justness of that conclusion that we- have determined that, if contracts of this character are to be held valid and binding obligations in this jurisdiction, they must receive their sanction at the hands of some other tribunal to whose mandates we are required to yield obedience-. ■ ■
The motion is overruled.