Court Opinion

ID: 9725872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:17:21.043146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:21.037159
License: Public Domain

RATLIFF, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case in view of the peculiar facts of the case and because of the pronouncement of our supreme court in Calhoun v. Hillenbrand Industries, Inc., (1978) 269 Ind. 507, 381 N.E.2d 1242 (DeBruler and Hunter, JJ., dissenting.) However, I believe that in adopting a definition of “accident” which requires a sudden, unexpected, or untoward event definitely traceable to a precise date, place, and time, we have departed from the underlying philosophy and legislative intent of the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Workmen’s compensation acts are social legislation designed to provide compensation to workers suffering from work-related injuries without meeting the liability requirements of tort law. The test is rot one of fault flowing from a specific event; rather, it is one flowing from the relationship to the employment. 1 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 2.10 (1978).
*280“The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is the belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the consumer of the product.”
Id. at § 2.20.
Most workers’ compensation acts, either by their express terms or by judicial construction, require that the injury be accidental in character. IB A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 37.10 (1980). It is the definition of “accident” or “accidental injury” which has been the source of considerable difficulty to the courts. In general, two lines of authority have developed, one requiring an unexpected, untoward event and the other holding an unexpected result sufficient to meet the requirement of “accident” or “accidental injury.” In other words, do the requirements of unexpectedness and definite time relate to an event, the cause, or are they satisfied by the result? See generally, the discussion in IB A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 37.20 (1980).
The requirement of an unexpected, untoward event, i.e., an unexpected cause, as found in Calhoun v. Hillenbrand, supra, seems to spring from the decision of our supreme court in U. S. Steel Corp. v. Dykes, (1958) 238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111, a case which has been severely criticized. See Note, The Meaning of the Term “Accident” in the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act, 13 Val.U.L.Rev. 535 (1979). It has been said that the requirement of unusual exertion or of an unexpected event makes it possible for a claimant who suffers an injury caused by his work to be denied compensation and that, therefore, the accident requirement should require only that an injury be unexpected. 13 Val.U.L.Rev. 558-559. Justice DeBruler in his dissenting opinion in Calhoun, in which Justice Hunter concurred, stated that the Industrial Board denied compensation because the evidence failed to show an injury by accident, and stated further:
“The evidence was deemed by the Board to be deficient for this purpose because it did not disclose a ‘specific time or incident that can be pointed to that would cause the pain in plaintiff’s back.’ The Board discloses here that it held an erroneous view of the legal requirements imposed upon a claimant to prove an injury by accident. There is nothing in the language of the statute or in reason upon which such a requirement can stand.
“Moreover, such requirement cannot stand upon the case law, as is demonstrated by the principle announced in the case of American Maize Products, Co. v. Nichiporchik, (1940) 108 Ind.App. 502, 29 N.E.2d 801, correctly quoted and relied upon by Judge Lowdermilk in reversing the Board’s decision for the Court of Appeals. There the court said:
“ ‘While it is true that the appellee can point to no particular date nor to a particular blow which produced the resultant injury, yet it is not necessary that the accident occur at any particular or specific time. The series of blows to appellee’s hands produced the injury and loss which was an unintended and unexpected occurrence.’ 108 Ind.App. at 511, 29 N.E.2d at 805.”
269 Ind. at 512, 381 N.E.2d at 1245.
In addition to the case referred to by Justice DeBruler, other cases decided by this court and referred to in the majority opinion would appear to support the unexpected result theory of accidental injury. Indeed, some of the language of our supreme court in Calhoun lends credence to the idea that the unexpected result concept of accidental injury has not been abandoned totally:
“There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that wear and tear because of intermittent bending processes in Calhoun’s work caused or could have caused the condition she had in her back. In American Maize Products Co. v. Nichipor*281chik, (1940) 108 Ind.App. 502, 29 N.E.2d 801, relied on by the Court of Appeals, there was evidence that the particular apparatus used by the claimant produced certain violent trauma to his hands that had the result over thirteen years of causing a disabling condition to exist. The American Maize court found that under those circumstances, the claimant was not bound to show the resultant injury and damage was due to one particular blow which produced the particular injury.” (Citations omitted).
269 Ind. 510, 381 N.E.2d 1244. The court then stated that the evidence was in conflict on that issue, that it was the function of the Industrial Board to determine the issue, and that the Board should not be second-guessed on appeal.
In other words, a disability resulting from ordinary wear and tear may not be compensable. However, if the normal operations of the work increase the likelihood of the disability occurring; if it is established by competent medical proof that such operations did in fact enhance the probability of the disability occurring over and above the normal incidence thereof; and if the disability in fact occurs as a result, there is compensable accidental injury under the unexpected result theory or under the exposure theory of accident.
In this case, I concur in the result reached by the majority because I find the evidence supports a finding that Lovely’s disability was not work-related and because I recognize the applicability of stare decisis and the obligation of this court to follow the decisions of our supreme court. Nevertheless, to the extent we have departed from the unexpected result theory of accident and insist upon the happening of an unexpected event as a prerequisite to finding accidental injury, I believe we have departed from the original intent and purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. We should reexamine our position regarding the definition of “accident” in the light of the obvious intent of the act.