Court Opinion

ID: 9741471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:56:18.282924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.318137
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court: In addition to the issues addressed in our original opinion, defendant has filed a petition for rehearing in which he requests a reduction in the degree of the offense. Defendant recognizes that because he has not previously raised this issue, it would ordinarily be waived. But given the unprecedented application of the residential burglary statute in the context of a violation of an order of protection under the Domestic Violence Act, we choose to address defendant’s argument to make certain that all issues are fully examined.  Under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3), a reviewing court may reduce the degree of the offense of which an appellant was convicted. (107 Ill. 2d R. 615.) This power is only available where a lesser-included offense is involved and should be used with extreme caution and only in rare instances. (People v. Kick (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 787, 576 N.E.2d 395; People v. Jackson (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1051-52, 537 N.E.2d 1054; People v. Coleman (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 989, 398 N.E.2d 185.) Defendant requests that this court reduce his offense to either unlawful restraint or violation of an order of protection. He cites Jackson to support his argument that a reduction in offense has previously been made in a residential burglary case to ameliorate the harshness of the result where, though the evidence was sufficient, the court found evidentiary weakness as to some elements. All three of the cases acknowledge that there are two relevant factors in assessing the reduction of an offense: (1) whether an evidentiary weakness exists and (2) whether the trial judge expressed dissatisfaction with imposing the mandatory sentence. Both factors were present in Jackson and Coleman; however, in Kick, no evidentiary weakness was apparent and notwithstanding the trial court’s reluctance to impose a mandatory sentence, the conviction was affirmed. Kick, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 792-93. Kick and other cases state that Rule 615(b)(3) may not be read to allow a reduction in the degree of the offense merely out of a sense of “merciful benevolence.” (Kick, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 792; People v. Munday (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 971, 481 N.E.2d 338; People, v. Man (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 924, 411 N.E.2d 323.) The Kick court observed that it is the legislature’s prerogative to establish sentences and Rule 615(b)(3) may not be construed to sanction any circumvention of the mandatory minimum sentence corresponding to an offense of which a defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Kick, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 793.  We find that a defendant’s offense may be reduced only where there is an evidentiary weakness with regard to an element of the offense charged and where the trial judge has expressed dissatisfaction with imposing the mandatory minimum sentence. In the present case, while there may be some question of defendant’s intent as he entered the premises through the basement window, we find no evidence in the record that the trial judge was dissatisfied with the required imposition of the four-year mandatory minimum sentence. Therefore, we find defendant is not entitled to a reduction in degree of the offense of which he was convicted. The petition for rehearing is denied. Petition denied. CERDA, P.J., and RIZZI, J., concur.