Court Opinion

ID: 9558436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:09:39.209171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:13.590606
License: Public Domain

Davis, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse the Court of Appeals’ opinion and affirm the district court. I agree with the principle of law that an employee’s failure to disclose a prior, material work-related injury on employment forms is misconduct under K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 44-706(b)(1). However, I do not believe the evidence in this case establishes that Pouncil’s failure to disclose was material.
In her dissent from the majority decision of the Court of Appeals, Judge Royse highlights tire difficulty I have with the majority opinion in this case:
“I cannot concur with the majority’s determination that these two transitory episodes involving a bruise and inflammation amount to material injuries which Pouncil had a duty to disclose. The test of materiality, the majority seems to say, is whether the employer requires knowledge of the injury in order to assure that the employee is not put at risk of aggravating a preexisting condition or injury. Under that test, tírese injuries were not serious. Pouncil sustained no preexisting condition or injury which could be aggravated; she had recovered. While the referee and the majority appear to assume that there is a connection between Pouncil’s right wrist problems in 1993-94 and her subsequent claim for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, tire record contains no evidence to support that assumption.” 25 Kan. App. 2d at 751-52.
The majority opinion of this court makes the same assumption:
“After only 1 week of employment Pouncil allegedly sustained a work-related injury to her right wrist, tire very same wrist for which she sought and obtained medical treatment for a work-related injury just IV2 years earlier.”
However, the evidence of record fails to establish a connection between Pouncil’s present and past injuries. Absent such evidence I would conclude that the statements made are not material.
The majority opinion rests upon that principle that an employee’s responses to post-employment medical questionnaires are material because the employer uses this information to “make ap-
*487propriate work assignments.” It may be said that any medical information concerning past injuries or the past medical condition of an employee will always provide valuable information to an employer in making appropriate work assignments. However, if such information would have no effect upon the employer’s placement of the employee, it should not be considered material.
The two past injuries addressed in the majority opinion amounted to a bruised wrist and a swelling of the right wrist. Both occurred approximately a year and a half before Pouncil’s carpal tunnel injury to the same wrist. The past injuries were not permanent, and Pouncil fully recovered from those injuries. There is no evidence to suggest that her past injuries created a weakened condition in her right wrist. Thus, her past injuries did not create preexisting problems or problems that might be aggravated by a new injury. It is difficult to conclude disclosure of the past injuries in this case would have caused the employer take any action other than allowing Pouncil to commence the work she had already been hired to do.
The majority appears to adopt the rule from Sill-Hopkins v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 128 Pa. Commw. 506, 563 A.2d 1288 (1989), providing that unemployment benefits may be denied when a claimant’s discharge stems from a false or incomplete statement on an employment application where such misrepresentations were knowing and material to the employees’ qualifications for the job at issue. The majority then concludes that the wrist and hand injuries were material to Pouncil’s work as a janitor because Pouncil used her wrists and hands on the job. However, because there is no evidence that Pouncil’s prior injuries made her more vulnerable to or increased her risk of future injury, I would hold that her statements were not material to her qualifications for the job at issue.
Lockett and Allegrucci, JJ., join in the foregoing dissent.