Court Opinion

ID: 9792416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:29:07.604692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.730428
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion states:
“* * * Because we find that the warrantless seizure of defendant’s shoulder bag at the Portland airport in connection with the stop was unlawful, the motion to suppress should have been allowed, and we reverse. 62 Or App at 800.
* * * *
“Even assuming Terry [v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968)] permits a brief detention of property other than dangerous weapons in connection with stops based on reasonable suspicion, the prolonged seizure of defendant’s shoulder bag cannot be upheld. See United States v. Place, 660 F2d 44 (2d Cir 1981), cert granted 457 US 1312 (1982). * * *” 62 Or App 806. (Emphasis supplied.)
I take the majority language to mean that (1) the seizure of defendant’s bag was per se unlawful and (2) even if the seizure was not per se unlawful, it subsequently became unlawful because the police held the bag for an unreasonable period of time. I disagree on both grounds. I would hold that the finding by the trial judge that the seizure was lawful and that the duration of the detention was reasonable is supported by the record.1
*808It is important to understand initially that this is not a question of taking a person into custody. Defendant was free to leave, and, in fact, he did so. Neither are we initially concerned with a search of defendant’s bag. True, *809the bag was searched later; the majority analysis, however, is not based on any alleged irregularities in that search. It is based on an “unlawful” seizure.
From the few jurisdictions that have considered the narrow questions presented here, the weight of authority is on the side of the state. Indeed, some courts have sustained seizures of property on facts arguably far more favorable to the defendant than are here. In no case cited by defendant or the majority opinion has a court held that the war-rantless seizure of property based on reasonable suspicion that the property contained narcotics was unlawful per se. Rather, the decisions which have allowed suppression have done so on the assumption that a lawful seizure could have been made but that, under the facts in the particular case, the seizure was unlawful for some other reason. Interestingly, defendant contends only that (1) there was no reasonable suspicion on which to base a stop, (2) his bag was seized without probable cause or legal authority and (3) the search warrant was based on a fatally defective affidavit. Specifically, he has never contended that the seizure was unreasonable because of its duration.
In United States v. Martell, 654 F2d 1356 (9th Cir 1981), the court said:
“In our view, however, Terry [v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968)] and Dunaway [v. New York, 442 US 200, 99 S Ct 2248, 60 L Ed 2d 824 (1979)] and their progeny relate to detention of persons and not inanimate objects. The rationale relied upon by the Court in those cases is inappropriate as applied to ‘things,’ a seizure of which constitutes a substantially less serious intrusion upon rights of the individual.” (Footnote omitted.) 654 F2d at 1359.
In Martell, the court sustained the warrantless seizure for investigative purposes of the defendants’ suitcases at an airport on the basis of narcotics agents’ reasonable suspicion that the defendants were engaged in drug trafficking and that their suitcases contained narcotics. Citing United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 US 249, 90 S Ct 1029, 25 L Ed 2d 282 (1970), the court recognized the propriety of detaining property without probable cause when reasonable suspicion exists that the property is involved in a scheme of criminal activity.
*810In United States v. West, 651 F2d 71, 74 (1st Cir 1981) , on facts similar to those here, the court sustained the warrantless seizure for investigation of the defendant’s suitcases at an airport on a reasonable suspicion that the suitcases contained narcotics. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the detention was unlawful because it was not based on probable cause.
In United States v. Viegas, 639 F2d 42 (1st Cir), cert den 451 US 970 (1981), the court sustained the war-rantless seizure of the defendant’s suitcases at an airport after finding that the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying drugs.
In United States v. Regan, 687 F2d 531 (1st Cir 1982) , the court reaffirmed its holdings in United States v. West, supra, and United States v. Viegas, supra. The defendant’s conviction was reversed, however, because the court held that the duration of the detention of the suitcase was unreasonable.
“Our ruling should in no way hamstring law enforcement efforts directed at curtailing the movement of drugs through our nation’s airports. Suspects may be stopped and their bags briefly detained on the basis of reasonable suspicion. A temporary detention sufficient for the bags to be checked by a detector dog on or near the premises will be permitted. This rationale is, however, unavailing to support the 22-hour detention of Regan’s bag. The evidence discovered in that bag should therefore have been suppressed.” 687 F2d at 538.
In United States v. Klein, 626 F2d 22 (7th Cir 1980), the court sustained the warrantless seizure of the defendants’ suitcases at an airport on the basis of narcotics agents’ reasonable suspicion that the bags contained narcotics. The court observed that, under the circumstances, the agents “would have been remiss in not detaining the bags for further investigation.” 626 F2d at 26.
In United States v. Corbitt, 675 F2d 626 (4th Cir 1982), the court followed the precedent established in Mar-tell, Viegas and Klein and held that “reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion was all that was necessary to make the seizure and detention of Corbitt’s luggage reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 675 F2d at 629. *811Detention of the defendant’s shoulder bag for a limited time pending the issuance of a search warrant was a prudent act, the court observed. 675 F2d at 629.
In United States v. MacDonald, 670 F2d 910 (10th Cir), cert den 459 US 1015 (1982), the court stated:
“ * * * Other courts that have addressed the substantive issue have held that so long as the police reasonably suspect criminal activity, they may temporarily detain baggage or move it to permit examination by a drug-detecting dog without violating the baggage owner’s Fourth Amendment interest in privacy. * * * We agree with this general rule. * * (Citations omitted.) 670 F2d at 914.
United States v. Place, 660 F2d 44 (2d Cir 1981), cert granted 457 US 1312, (1982), cited by the majority, is distinguishable. In Place the court found that, even assuming that circumstances justifying an investigatory stop of the defendant existed, “the prolonged seizure of Place’s baggage went far beyond a mere investigative stop and amounted to a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” 660 F2d at 50. The court emphasized that the legality of an investigative stop depends on its brevity and relative unintrusiveness. The court then reviewed the evidence and concluded that the “high-handed procedure adopted by the [police]” was unreasonable under the circumstances. 660 F2d at 52. The majority in Place did not hold that a warrantless seizure based on reasonable suspicion could never be sustained. 660 F2d at 53.
Judge Kaufman dissented in Place. He found “compelling” the public interest in holding the defendant’s suitcase until it could be subjected to a sniff test by a dog trained to detect narcotics. Further, he reasoned that, if the defendant had been allowed to leave with his luggage, “it is likely the evidence would have been destroyed.” 660 F2d 55. He concluded that “the agents would have been remiss in their duty had they not detained Place’s bags.” 660 F2d at 55. In Judge Kaufman’s opinion, the majority in Place “ignored the critical difference between an individual’s privacy interests in the contents of his suitcases as distinguished from the suitcases themselves.” 660 F2d at 55. Citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 US 1, 97 S Ct 2476, 53 L Ed 538 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US 42, 90 S *812Ct 1975, 26 L Ed 2d 419 (1970); and United States v. Van Leeuwen, supra, he argued that “a person’s principal privacy interest lies not in the baggage itself, but in the contents.” 660 F2d at 55. He concluded that “detaining Place’s luggage did not violate his privacy interest.” 660 F2d at 56.
Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491, 103 S Ct 1319, 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983), cited by the majority is also distinguishable. In Royer, the police retained the defendant’s airline ticket and driver’s license, and the defendant was not told he was free to leave while the police detained his luggage for investigation. Without the defendant’s consent, the police retrieved his checked luggage from an airline. At the request of the police, the defendant produced a key and unlocked one of his suitcases, and marijuana was found. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage and that his consent was tainted by the illegality and hence was ineffective to justify the search. None of those facts is found here.
Two recent decisions by this court appear to support the trial court’s order. In State v. Wilson, 31 Or App 783, 571 P2d 554 (1977), rev den 281 Or 99 (1978), we said:
“As a general proposition of constitutional law, official knowledge needed to justify a * * * seizure varies relative to the intensity of the invasion of privacy and the gravity of the police purpose to be served. State v. Evans, 16 Or App 189, 194, 517 P2d 1225, rev den (1974); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). * * *”
Here, the intensity of the invasion of defendant’s privacy was minimal. The gravity of the police purpose was significant. No serious argument can be made that the police lacked a well-warranted suspicion to believe that defendant was transporting narcotics. In State v. Muckleroy, 26 Or App 179, 552 P2d 257, rev den 276 Or 211 (1976), we upheld a search based on an officer’s well-warranted suspicion that the defendant possessed drugs.
I conclude that the seizure of defendant’s bag pending an examination by a narcotics-detection dog while defendant was free to leave was not unreasonable and that the duration of the detention was reasonable and not unlawfully prolonged.
*813While the majority opinion did not consider defendant’s other assignments of error on their merits, I have done so and find no error. I would affirm.

 The trial judge made the following oral findings of fact:
“One, I would find that under the circumstances, where there had been surveillance over a two-day period — let’s call it that — and then the officers followed the defendant and the two females through the terminal, down to the luggage department, and then one of the officers, the State Police Officers, stopped that person and shows a badge and says that they would like to talk to *808. them, I think under these circumstances, I would constitute that as a stop without our statute. I think both under the Federal decisions and under the interpretation of our State Statute, that they recognize three types of invasions, let’s call it that. And one would be based on probable cause. One is the stop that you can make on reasonable suspicion, and the third is, as somebody said, mere conversation. And I would think this is in the second area.
“The Court further finds that under all of these circumstances, that there was reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed, and, therefore, that the stop was proper.
“The Court would find as a part of that detention that it was reasonable considering a busy airport, considering the person, himself, would not want to be interrogated or talked to out in the main part, that it was reasonable that the person go a few feet over to the Port Office, particularly when you consider that it is undisputed that he agreed to do so.
“The Court further finds that the police had the right to detain the bag briefly to make further investigation.
“The Court finds that the action of using a detector dog was not a search.
“The Court finds that there was then probable cause to make a search.
“The Court finds that the warrant contains probable cause and that the warrant was properly issued, and therefore the Court finds that the motion will be denied.
* * * *
“THE COURT: I made a finding that there was a temporary detention of the bag for a reasonable period to make a further investigation.
In its order denying defendant’s motion to suppress, the court additionally found as a fact that “Nancy Dupay and not the defendant purchased the airline ticket.” On the basis of its findings of fact, the trial court made the following conclusions of law:
“1. The ‘stop’ as defined in ORS 131.605 - 131.615 took place at the escalator.
“2. There was reasonable suspicion to believe a crime had been committed and therefore the stop was proper.
“3. It was reasonable to move the defendant to the Port of Portland office.
“4. The police had the right to detain the bag temporarily for a reasonable period of time for investigative purposes.
“5. The activity of the dog was not a search.
“6. Upon the alert by the dog there was probable cause to search the bag.
“7. The affidavit for the search warrant stated probable cause and therefore the search warrant was properly issued.”