Court Opinion

ID: 9765082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:50:14.077796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:04.893111
License: Public Domain

Lyle Brown, Justice. This suit in tort was brought by appellant against appellee, City of Farmington. It arose out of a fatal collision between the city marshal of Farmington and appellant’s intestate, a minor. The city’s demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground that municipalities are immune from tort action. Act 165, 1969; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1971). On appeal it is asserted that the recited act makes it mandatory that the State’s political subdivisions carry liability insurance and that failure to do so makes the city amenable to a tort action. In Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W. 2d 45 (1968), we set aside the rule of law established by precedent which granted immunity to municipalities from tort liability. The first session of the General Assembly thereafter, referring specifically to Parish v. Pitts, enacted Act 165 (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 12-2901 — 03) (Supp. 1971): Sec. 1. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Arkansas that all counties, municipal corporations, school districts, special improvement districts, and all other political subdivisions of the State shall be immune from liability for damages, and no tort action shall lie against any such political subdivision, on account of the acts of their agents and employees. Sec. 2. Each county, municipal corporation, school district, special improvement district, or other political subdivisions of the State is hereby authorized to provide for hearing and settling tort claims against it. Sec. 3. All political subdivisions shall carry liability insurance on all their motor vehicles in the minimum amounts prescribed in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (Ark. Stat., § 75-1402 et seq.; Act 347 of 1953, as amended). Sec. 4. It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that because of the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, municipalities and all units of local government are in imminent danger of bankruptcy because of tort lawsuits and vital public services are in danger of being discontinued. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this Act being immediately necessary to protect the public peace, health and safety, shall take effect immediately on its passage and approval. We have had at least three cases in which we have discussed Act 165. Sullivan v. Pulaski County, 247 Ark. 259, 445 S.W. 2d 94 (1969); Chandler v. Pulaski County, 247 Ark. 262, 445 S.W. 2d 96 (1969); Williams v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n., 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W. 2d 243 (1969). In those cases we did not discuss the precise question now before us, namely, that the failure to carry liability insurance makes the political subdivision amenable to a tort action. The preamble to Act 165 states one of the purposes of the act to be “to require all political subdivisions to carry liability insurance on their motor vehicles”. Then Section 3 says “they shall carry liability insurance on all their motor vehicles”. We think it was the intent of the General Assembly to require such liability insurance. Two of the fundamental purposes of Act 165 are (1) to set aside Parish v. Pitts, supra, and (2) to make it possible for persons injured by municipally owned vehicles to have redress for negligence. If we hold that the city of Farmington is entitled to the immunity afforded it under Act 165 and at the same time hold that it is not mandatory that it comply with the liability insurance provision thereof, then we have destroyed the second purpose of the act above enumerated. The mandatory provision for carrying liability insurance is so strongly and clearly stated that we cannot agree to such emasculation. We think, and so hold, that any city which fails to conform to the insurance requirement places itself in the posture of being responsible, as would a self-insurer, in case it is found to be liable, in an amount not to exceed the minimum amount prescribed in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1466 (Supp. 1971). We think it reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended that the public be protected to the extent of the recited limits. That may be done in only one of two ways, namely, insurance or self-insurance. Our interpretation avoids opportunities to evade the act. An interpretation which defeats evasion is favored in the law. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, § 361. Then in Woodruff v. State, 3 Ark. 285 (1840), it was said: “And such construction ought to be put upon it, [the act] as will not suffer it to be eluded”. And in Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) Vol. 2A, § 57.01 we find this significant statement: “No statutory provisions are intended by the legislature to be disregarded; but where the consequences of not obeying them in every particular are not prescribed, the courts must judicially determine them. In doing so they must necessarily consider the importance of the literal and punctilious observance of the provision in question to the object the legislation is calculated to serve.” Reversed and Remanded. Fogleman, J., dissents.