Court Opinion

ID: 9618189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:08:44.017403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:18.292255
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice
(concurring in the result):
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, but cannot join in all of the discussion of Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. I am persuaded that Rule 702 should be analyzed and applied on its own terms independent of the so-called “Frye test.” That is not to say that general acceptance of a scientific fact or procedure may not have a bearing on reliability. I think the following commentary offers a correct interpretation of the approach (a “relevancy analysis”) courts should take to determine the reliability of novel scientific evidence under Rule 702:
As with other kinds of expert testimony, the relevancy and prejudice analyses implicated in Rule 702’s helpfulness standard must be utilized. First, the court must assess the probative value of the proffered evidence. Although this may often prove difficult, since the court will only rarely have any personal scientific expertise, there are a variety of factors which the court can consider. Whether or not the scientific principles involved have been generally accepted by experts in the field may still have a bearing on reliability and consequent probative value of the evidence. “A technique unable to garner any support, or only miniscule support, within the scientific community, would be found unreliable by a court.” The expert’s qualifications and stature, the use which has been made of the new technique, the potential rate of error, the existence of specialized literature, and the novelty of the new invention, may all enter into the court’s assessment. Opinions which are based in large measure on a subjective analysis may have less probative value because it may be difficult *1362to evaluate the skill of the expert in extrapolating a judgment from the scientific data.
After assessing probative value, the court must also assess the dangers posed by this particular kind of expert scientific evidence. The court will have to evaluate the degree to which the jurors might be over-impressed by the aura of reliability surrounding the evidence, thereby leading them to abdicate their role of critical assessment. In making this determination the nature of the evidence may be significant. Some scientific evidence merely guides the jury in making its own assessment of the evidence; in other instances, the jury may be incapable of estimating the accuracy of the expert’s conclusions by reference to the data on which the expert relies. Confusion of the jury, and the inordinate consumption of trial time are other dangers for the court to consider. See Rule 403.
In balancing the probative worth of the novel scientific evidence against the dangers specified in Rule 403, the court must also consider such factors as the significance of the issue to which the evidence is directed, the availability of other proof, and the utility of limiting instructions. The court may also be influenced by the extent to which the issues posed by this novel evidence were explored prior to trial, and whether the party opposing admissibility is adequately prepared. The availability of competent experts to explore the limitations of the novel technique may also enter into the court’s calculus.
The result under the Frye test or a relevancy analysis will often be the same, but the latter approach gives courts a latitude which they do not possess under the general scientific acceptance rule. Instead of assuming inadmissibility unless the independently controlling standard of Frye is satisfied, the relevancy approach favors admissibility whenever the general conditions for the admissibility of evidence have been met. This approach is in accord with the general tenor of the Federal Rules — which favor the admissibility of relevant evidence — as well as the other rules in Article VII governing the use of expert testimony.
3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶702[03], at 702-18 to 702-21 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
I agree with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that “a particular degree of acceptance of a scientific technique within the scientific community is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for admissibility; it is, however, one factor that a district court normally should consider in deciding whether to admit evidence based upon the technique.” United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1237 (3d Cir.1985). I believe this more flexible approach is in effect what the majority opinion utilizes; however, I feel that the majority’s emphasis on Frye criteria, without fully integrating them into a relevancy analysis, is misleading. I would articulate the test solely in terms of reliability, with general scientific acceptance used only as a factor in the reliability assessment.