Court Opinion

ID: 9955352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 14:07:59.319588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:35.047561
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1392-22

MICHAEL DUNN,

          Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, DIVISION OF
LAND USE REGULATION,

     Respondent-Respondent.
___________________________

                   Argued March 11, 2024 - Decided March 28, 2024

                   Before Judges Sabatino, Marczyk and Chase.

                   On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
                   Environmental Protection.

                   John Scott Abbott argued the cause for appellant.

                   Bruce A. Velzy, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
                   cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
                   General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant
                   Attorney General, of counsel; Bruce A. Velzy, on the
                   brief).

PER CURIAM
      This appeal concerns the Department of Environmental Protection's

("DEP's") denial of a homeowner's request to build a pier six feet westward of

its previous location when he renovated his bayfront property. Specifically,

petitioner Michael Dunn appeals the DEP's denial of his application for a

Waterfront Development Individual Permit under N.J.A.C. 7:7-8.1. The DEP

denied his application because the pier lost its so-called "legacy status" when it

was moved from its previous location and, consequently, it required the new pier

to be reduced in width to comply with current DEP limitations. We affirm.

      We derive the relevant facts, which are essentially undisputed, from the

administrative record.   Within one year of buying this bayfront residential

property in Avalon in 2015, Dunn obtained a permit from the DEP allowing him

to reconstruct the home, install an outdoor in-ground pool, and modernize his

dock, pier, and boat ramp on the bay (together, the "water structures"). Dunn

replaced the home and water structures and built a pool.

      After completing the construction, Dunn applied to the DEP for a permit

modification to reflect the relocation of the water structures approximately six

feet westward of their previous location. His application was prepared by an

environmental consultant.

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      The DEP denied Dunn's application for a modification because the water

structures' relocation ended their legacy status as structures that had been

"constructed prior to September 1978" under N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(e). According

to the DEP, the loss of legacy status required the new construction to meet

current size limitations. Specifically, that meant that the width of any structure

may not exceed eight feet. The widths of the preexisting and relocated piers

were both 13.94 feet. Hence, Dunn had to reduce the water structures 5.94 feet

in width to comply with the current maximum width of eight feet. The DEP

assigned the matter to its Bureau of Coastal & Land Use Compliance and

Enforcement "for further action for the existing waterfront structures."

      Dunn contested the denial of his permit application. Among other things,

he asserted the relocation of the water structures was necessary "to provide a

direct pathway from the dock to [his] home without needing to go around [his]

newly built in-ground pool."

      The permit dispute was referred to the Office of Administrative Law

("OAL") for presentation to an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Both sides

moved for summary decision, based on the documentary record. 1

1
  A neighbor initially participated in the administrative matter in opposition to
the permit, but is not participating in this appeal.

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                                        3
      In a written decision dated July 8, 2022, ALJ Jeffrey R. Wilson dismissed

Dunn's challenge in a summary decision. The DEP Commissioner adopted the

ALJ's ruling in its entirety in a written final agency decision dated November

21, 2022, which is the subject of this appeal.

      In his brief on appeal, Dunn principally argues the DEP and the ALJ

misinterpreted the pertinent regulations to deny him the right to renovate his

legacy water structures in their same general locations. Based on calculations

by his consultant, Dunn stresses that his rebuilt structures cover thirty percent

less water area than the previous ones. He further asserts his relocation of the

structures was de minimis, and that the DEP's permit denial is arbitrary,

capricious, and unreasonable. Dunn also contends his request must be granted

pursuant to the so-called "Zane Amendments" to the applicable environmental

statutes, codified at N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(b)(1) to (b)(3). 2

      In assessing these arguments on appeal, we are guided by familiar

principles. It is well-established that appellate courts "will not reverse an

agency's decision unless: (1) it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) it

violated express or implied legislative policies; (3) it offended the State or

2
   The Zane Amendments were enacted in 1981 and are named after their
sponsor, Senator Raymond Zane.
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Federal Constitution; or (4) the findings on which it was based were not

supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record." Univ. Cottage Club

of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007).

"Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of

a statute that it is charged with enforcing." Ibid. That said, an appellate court,

however, is not bound "by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its

determination of a strictly legal issue." Ibid. (quoting In re Taylor, 158 N.J.

644, 658 (1999)).

      Summary       decisions   under   N.J.A.C.   1:1-12.5   are   governed     by

"substantially the same [standard] as that governing a motion under Rule 4:46-2

for summary judgment in civil litigation." L.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton, 221

N.J. 192, 203 (2015) (quoting Contini v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 286 N.J. Super.

106, 121-22 (App. Div. 1995)). Courts must determine "whether the competent

evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are

sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in

favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.

520, 523 (1995).

      The present case concerns the Waterfront Development Law ("WDL"),

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                                         5
N.J.S.A. 12:5-1 to -11. The WDL was enacted in 1914 to consolidate oversight

of the growing construction of docks and other water structures for "the principal

concern . . . to promote commerce and navigation." Last Chance Dev. P'ship v.

Kean, 232 N.J. Super. 115, 119-20 (App. Div. 1989). This purpose is reflected

in N.J.S.A. 12:5-2, a section of the WDL that empowers the DEP to "prevent the

encroachment or trespass upon the waterfront" and to "compel the removal of

any such encroachment or trespass."

      Under the WDL, "[a]ll plans for the development of any waterfront upon

any navigable water or stream of this State . . . which involves the construction

or alteration of a dock, wharf, pier, bulkhead, bridge, pipeline, cable, or any

other similar or dissimilar waterfront development shall be first submitted to the

[DEP]." N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(a) (emphases added).

      The DEP reviews waterfront development plans pursuant to the Coastal

Zone Management ("CZM") Rules.              N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1 to -29.10.     These

regulations contain "the procedures for reviewing coastal permit applications"

and "the substantive standards for determining development acceptability and

the environmental impact of projects for which coastal permits are submitted. "

In re Protest of Coastal Permit Program Rules, 354 N.J. Super. 293, 312 (App.

Div. 2002).

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      The DEP promulgates and enforces the CZM Rules pursuant to its

authority under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act ("CAFRA"), N.J.S.A.

13:19-1 to -21, which the Legislature enacted "to protect the unique and fragile

coastal zones of the State." In re Egg Harbor Assocs. (Bayshore Ctr.), 94 N.J.

358, 364 (1983).

      The CZM Rules "are founded on . . . broad coastal goals" including:

protecting "[h]ealthy coastal ecosystems"; "[s]afe, healthy and well-planned

coastal communities and regions"; and maintaining "[m]eaningful public access

to and use of tidal waterways and their shores[.]" N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.1(c). The CZM

Rules further the purpose behind CAFRA, "to protect the unique and fragile

coastal zones of the State." Egg Harbor, 94 N.J. at 364. "[T]he powers delegated

to DEP" under CAFRA "extend well beyond protection of the natural

environment" and require the agency "to regulate land use within the coastal

zone for the general welfare." Ibid.

      There are three exceptions, known collectively as the                 "Zane

Amendments," N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(b)(1) to (b)(3), to the WDL's requirement to

obtain prior approval from the DEP before commencing construction of "a dock,

wharf, pier, bulkhead, bridge, pipeline, cable, or any other similar or dissimilar

waterfront development." N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(a). Relevant here is the first listed

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exception:

             The repair, replacement or renovation of a permanent
             dock, wharf, pier, bulkhead or building existing prior to
             January 1, 1981, provided the repair, replacement or
             renovation does not increase the size of the structure
             and the structure is used solely for residential purposes
             or the docking or servicing of pleasure vessels[.]

             [N.J.S.A. 12:5-3(b)(1) (emphasis added).]

      Here, the applicable regulation, N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5, requires reduction of

legacy water structures to current size limits if, as here, they are relocated. The

regulation states as follows:

             For sites which have existing dock or pier structures
             exceeding eight feet in width over water areas and/or
             wetlands, which were constructed prior to September
             1978 and for which the applicant proposes to increase
             the coverage over the water area or wetland by
             relocating or increasing the number or size of docks or
             piers, the existing oversized structures must be reduced
             to a maximum of eight feet in width over water areas
             and six feet in width over wetlands and intertidal flats.

             [N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(e).]

      N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(g) expressly states the purpose of the size restriction is

to "maximize sunlight penetration into the water and onto the bottom [to] allow

the continuation of photosynthesis by plants underneath the structure. " Dunn

did not present any evidence sufficiently demonstrating a need for oversized

structures that could not be served by the preexisting structures.

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                                        8
      The DEP's January 7, 2002 comment to the proposed regulation, 34 N.J.R.

74(a), 97, explains why the DEP wants to limit the environmental impact of

"legacy" piers that were built before the eight-foot width limitation was adopted

in 1978. That explanation supports the agency's position that its permit denial

in this case was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

      Dunn emphasizes his relocated structures actually cover less water area

than the old ones. Even if that is true, it does not overcome the plain wording

of the regulation concerning width limitations and the required demonstration

of an applicant's necessity to excuse excessive width.

      The DEP's strict interpretation of N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(e) to treat any

relocation as terminating legacy status is supported by the proposal published in

the New Jersey Register by the DEP before enacting N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5, which

explains the regulatory intention that by "relocating the docks, the existing

structure is no longer the same structure," 34 N.J.R. 74(a), 97 (Jan. 7, 2002).

The DEP's position is also fortified by the definition of a "reconstruction" within

N.J.A.C. 7:7-1.5 as "the repair or replacement of a building, structure, or other

parts of a development, provided that such repair or replacement does not

increase or change the location of the footprint of the preexisting development."

(emphasis added).

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                                        9
      Simply stated, despite his counsel's robust arguments, Dunn's pier lost its

legacy status when he decided to relocate it. Whether such relocation was de

minimis because it was only six feet is inconsequential.

      Because the relocated pier no longer has legacy status, the DEP

appropriately evaluated the pier under N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5(b)—the development

limits on recreational docks and piers—and found deficiencies under (b)(1)

("There is a demonstrated need that cannot be satisfied by existing facilities ")

and (b)(7) ("Under typical circumstances, the maximum width of the structure

shall be eight feet over water").

      The DEP did not unreasonably reject Dunn's stated need of easier access

to the pier to avoid having to walk around his new in-ground pool. In addition,

the DEP's rejection of his post-construction request for a permit modification

was reasonable, given that the WDL specifies that the construction of piers and

similar structures requires pre-construction approval from the DEP.             In

particular, N.J.S.A. 12:5-3 states "No such development or improvement shall

be commenced or executed without the approval of the [DEP] first had and

received, or as hereinafter in this chapter provided." (emphases added). The

focus on pre-construction approval is reinforced by N.J.S.A. 12:5-6(a), which

states "[a]ny development or improvement . . . which is commenced or executed

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                                      10
without first obtaining approval . . . shall be deemed to be a violation under this

section." The DEP is empowered to remedy violations through civil penalties,

removal of offending structures, and other measures. N.J.S.A. 12:5-6(b) to (g).

      We also reject Dunn's argument that the relocation of the pier was

necessary to leave enough space between the pier and other structures to comply

with N.J.A.C. 7:7-12.5 (generally requiring an eight-foot separation between

adjacent structures). Although this point was not addressed in the ALJ's ruling,

it is not apparent from the record supplied on appeal that compliance could not

be achieved by Dunn reducing his pier width to eight feet.

      Lastly, Dunn does not qualify for any of the three statutory Zane

Exemptions that would obviate the requirement to seek DEP approval. Section

12.5(b)(1) is the only exception that applies to piers, and it is not supportive of

Dunn's position. Section (b)(1) exempts the "repair, replacement or renovation"

of preexisting structures. The DEP reasonably determined the exemption does

not apply to Dunn because the statute only exempts the rehabilitation of legacy

structures, not the construction of new structures in the same general area as

preexisting ones.     This interpretation is supported by Governor Byrne's

conditional veto to S. 3231 in 1981, which amended the language of (b)(2) to

mirror (b)(1) by removing "construction" from "repair, replacement or

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                                       11
renovation" so that "repairs to existing waterfront structures be freed from a

burdensome regulatory process . . . [but] new construction of floating docks . . .

should continue to be reviewed by the [DEP]." (Emphasis added). Dunn's new

construction includes not only a floating dock but also a fixed pier and a ramp.

      In sum, the DEP reasonably exercised its regulatory authority to deny

Dunn's permit modification. Its decision was neither arbitrary, nor capricious,

nor unreasonable given the circumstances presented.

      Affirmed.

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