Court Opinion

ID: 9369422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 20:01:59.700747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.889265
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/23 P. v. Ruiz CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H049848
                                                                    (Santa Cruz County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 Super. Ct. No. 21CR03816)

           v.

 EDGAR ALFREDO RUIZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury convicted defendant Edgar Alfredo Ruiz of one count of willful infliction
of corporal injury on a person with whom he had a dating relationship, based on evidence
that he assaulted his former partner in their hotel room before leaving the hotel in her
vehicle.
         On appeal, Ruiz contends his conviction must be reversed due to instructional
error. He maintains the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight as evidence of
consciousness of guilt, despite insufficient evidence to support the instruction. Further,
Ruiz argues the flight instruction unconstitutionally discriminates against people of color
and lowers the prosecution’s burden of proof. Ruiz also contends the trial court
erroneously refused to instruct the jury not to speculate as to whether third party
assailants in the case had been charged. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
                  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. Procedural Background
       In August 2021, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney filed a second-filed
complaint (stipulated by the parties to be treated as the information) charging Ruiz with
willful infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition against Darlene E.,1
a cohabitant with whom he had a dating relationship. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a);2
count 1.)
       A jury found Ruiz guilty of the count charged.
       On February 4, 2020, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed
Ruiz on three years of formal probation, the terms of which included 90 days of home
detention, 20 hours of community service, individual counseling and completion of a
batterer’s intervention program. The court also granted a three-year protective order to
Darlene E. and imposed a restitution fine and other fines and fees totaling $1,070.
       Ruiz timely appealed.
       B. Evidence Presented at Trial3
       On June 9, 2019, Robin C. and her husband were asleep in their hotel room in
Santa Cruz around 3:00 a.m. when the sounds of an argument woke them.4 Robin could
hear “[a]n altercation” in the room adjacent to them with a male voice and a female voice
and what sounded like some shuffling, scuffling, and somebody “getting possibly thrown
up against the wall a couple [of] times” and then again against the outside of their door.
The argument was loud enough to wake Robin and her husband. The male was accusing

       1
         To protect her privacy, we refer to the victim by her first name and last initial.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
       2
         Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
       3
         In addition to the testimony described below, the prosecution presented expert
testimony on intimate partner violence and its effect on victims. That evidence is not
relevant to this appeal.
       4
         To protect her privacy, we refer to the witness by her first name and last initial
and subsequently by her first name. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
                                                  2
the female of infidelity with a woman. The “thunking or hitting” against the wall several
times was hard enough that if the pictures had not been screwed into the wall, they would
have fallen off. The sound of something hitting the wall and the door of their hotel room
was not the sound of a door slamming but sounded like a person getting pushed. Robin
tried to call the hotel management but did not get through to anyone. She then called 911
because it sounded like the fight was escalating and she was concerned for the people
next door.
       That same morning around 3:00 a.m., a resident of downtown Santa Cruz,
Christopher K.,5 was walking home. Christopher saw a woman in the bushes by the Bay
Front Inn.6 It looked “out of the ordinary” so he stopped to see what was wrong. The
woman kept popping her head out from the bush. When Christopher approached, the
woman “didn’t look okay” and looked upset, like she had been crying. She told him that
she and her boyfriend were fighting and she was trying to hide from her boyfriend. It
was dark but, when she came out from the bush a bit more, Christopher could see she had
scratches on her leg. He offered for the woman to come back to his house to be safe and
get away from the area but she did not want to go, so Christopher dialed 911 and let her
use his cell phone. The police arrived, and Christopher left after giving the woman his
phone number in case she needed any other help.
       On the 911 call, Darlene E. told the dispatcher, “I’m calling because I’m
(unintelligible) really beat up.” Darlene E. reported that she was at the Bayside Inn, that
her boyfriend beat her up and left her at the hotel, and that he was driving off in her Jeep
with one of her dogs.

       5
         To protect his privacy, we refer to the witness by his first name and last initial
and subsequently by his first name. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
       6
         The inn or hotel appears variously in the record as the Bay Front Inn, Bay View
Inn, Bayside Inn, and Bay Inn.
                                                 3
       Santa Cruz Police Officer Jeffrey Brouillette responded to the Bay Front Inn at
3:17 a.m. Brouillette waited for a few minutes outside of the hotel and during that time
did not hear any disturbance or see anyone coming or going. He did not see Christopher
or Darlene E. outside. Once other officers arrived, Brouillette knocked on the door of the
hotel room. Darlene E. answered the door and spoke to the officers. No one else was in
the hotel room. Brouillette observed that Darlene E. was crying on and off, shaking, and
“generally acting fearful.” She had “pretty significant injuries” to the right side of her
face, which was swollen on the forehead and cheek bone. She also had several distinct
scratch marks on the right side of her neck, minor bruising on her upper arms, and
significant bruising on her left thigh. One of her pupils was larger than the other, which
can be indicative of a brain injury.
       While they spoke, Darlene E. appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. She
smelled like alcohol, her speech was slurred, and her eyes were glassy and watery.
However, she was not incoherent and did not appear to be falling over or unaware of her
surroundings. Darlene E. did not follow a logical order in relating what had transpired
but jumped around and was difficult to follow. At times “she would say something
happened and then several minutes later say that the opposite happened.” This was
consistent with Brouillette’s training and experience in speaking to victims of domestic
violence. Brouillette’s body-worn camera was recording throughout the conversation
with Darlene E. Records from the Bay Front Inn for the dates in question reflect an
online reservation made by Ruiz.
       Darlene E. testified under subpoena that she has known Ruiz since high school.
They dated for about eight years and lived together for three years with their two dogs.
Around the time of the incident, Darlene E. and Ruiz visited Santa Cruz. They had come
to see a friend and spend time at the beach with the dogs. Later, the three of them went to
a bar in Capitola. Darlene E. had “a lot” of margarita cocktails (“[p]robably over ten”)
and “tons of shots.” Their friend was also drinking, and Ruiz might have had a beer.
                                                  4
       Darlene E. and Ruiz lived in Hayward at the time, so Ruiz booked a hotel to stay
the night. Darlene E. testified that she was “too wasted” to reserve the hotel. She only
recalled dancing at the bar, then getting into an “altercation” with one or two women
outside of the bar, during which they pulled her hair and hit her. The women punched
Darlene E. in her head, her hips, and her leg. She did not know where Ruiz or their
friend was at the time the altercation happened. She testified that she was “super
hammered” and “blurry” about whether she spoke to the police about her injuries. She
only recalled “bits and pieces” of the evening.
       Darlene E. did remember speaking with a defense investigator in September 2019
about the incident and explaining that Ruiz had gone to get pizza when the altercation
with the women happened, and she had been upset with Ruiz because he did not help her
while he was getting pizza. She did not recall anyone helping her or calling 911 after she
got attacked outside the bar. She did not recall returning to the hotel room or what
happened in the hotel room.
       Listening to the 911 recording “[s]omewhat” helped her refresh her memory but
most of the recording did not make sense because she was so intoxicated. She
remembered that she had been angry with Ruiz because he had not been there to protect
her from the bar fight and because he had taken her dog in the Jeep. Seeing the footage
from the body-worn camera also did not help refresh her recollection. Though she told
the officer that for the six months prior Ruiz had started to feel frustrated because they
were not sexually connected, she “wasn’t in [her] right mental state” and “was pretty
angry at him because he wasn’t there to . . . defend [her] when [she] was getting beat up.”
She was “probably saying these things . . . out of anger.” She did not remember telling
the officers that she got thrown down and that Ruiz punched her head and choked her,
and that she was pushing him off, hitting him and telling him to get out.
       Darlene E. also did not remember, as reflected on the body-worn camera footage,
telling the officer that Ruiz kicked her out of the room and she tried unsuccessfully to
                                                  5
find hotel personnel, then hid in a bush and encountered a random passersby. Nor did she
remember saying that she eventually got back inside the hotel room, where Ruiz hit her
again, then left with her other dog. She did not recall telling the police that she was
scared of Ruiz and that she was going to get killed if he were to get arrested. She was
“angry” and “was taking [her] anger out on him.” Since then, Darlene E. testified that
she has been trying to “fix” the situation and get the district attorney to drop the case.
       On cross-examination, Darlene E. repeated that over the long period in which she
had a relationship with Ruiz, he was never physically aggressive or violent. She testified
that she was stating the truth, was not trying to protect him, and is not financially
dependent on him. Although they separated, Ruiz had retained his great relationship with
her family and they remain friends. Darlene E. did not remember what started the fight
with the women outside of the bar but remembered them pulling her hair and hitting her,
and her being on the concrete. That is how she got injured.
       The parties stipulated that Ruiz and Darlene E. were cohabitants at the time of the
incident.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
       Ruiz challenges his conviction on two grounds. First, he contends there was
insufficient evidence to support the flight instruction, which he argues violated his
constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial in that it lowers the prosecution’s
burden of proof and discriminates against people of color. Second, he contends the trial
court violated his right to present a complete defense by refusing to instruct the jury not
to speculate about why other persons (the alleged third-party assailants outside of the bar)
were not charged in the case.
       A. Flight and Consciousness of Guilt
              1. Procedural Background
       During deliberations over jury instructions, outside the presence of the jury, Ruiz’s
counsel objected to the standard jury instruction on flight (CALCRIM No. 372). Trial
                                                  6
counsel argued the instruction was not supported by the evidence, as there was “no
evidence concerning – regarding consciousness of guilt.” The prosecutor countered that
there was evidence that Ruiz beat Darlene E. in the hotel room and left when the police
arrived.
       The trial court ruled that the instruction was supported. It explained, “There is
evidence that there was a[n] altercation within the room, that there was a battery that
occurred within the room. [¶] There is a witness in the form of [Christopher] who
actually says he thought he saw law enforcement arriving at that time, and . . . there was
evidence that Mr. Ruiz left or fled in the Jeep by [Darlene E.]. [¶] And [Christopher] did
not see, I don’t believe, the Jeep leaving, but there is evidence that he did leave the hotel.
He did -- he was not present when law enforcement arrived, the Jeep was not present,
okay. [¶] So [CALCRIM No.] 372 comes in.”
       The trial court instructed the jury that “if the defendant fled immediately after the
crime was committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you
conclude that the defendant fled, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of
that conduct. However, evidence that the defendant fled cannot prove guilt by itself.”
(CALCRIM No. 372.)
       In his closing argument, the prosecutor described the sequence after the altercation
in the hotel room. “We know that the defendant left that hotel with one of the dogs. He
left because he knew he had done something wrong and he didn’t want to get in trouble.
That’s what happened that night. That’s why the defendant is guilty in this case, because
all of the evidence when viewed together corroborates only one reasonable conclusion in
this case, that the defendant beat up his girlfriend that night, that the defendant caused
those injuries, those traumatic conditions.”
              2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       “In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on
general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for
                                                  7
the jury’s understanding of the case.” (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 953.)
The court has a correlative duty “ ‘to refrain from instructing on principles of law which
not only are irrelevant to the issues raised by the evidence but also have the effect of
confusing the jury or relieving it from making findings on relevant issues.’ ” (People v.
Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 681.) “ ‘ “[B]efore a jury can be instructed that it may
draw a particular inference, evidence must appear in the record which, if believed by the
jury, will support the suggested inference.” ’ ” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th
591, 609; Saddler, at p. 681.) A claim of instructional error presents an issue of law,
which we review de novo. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326; People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210 (Cole).)
              3. Analysis
       As a preliminary matter, we agree with the parties that, although Ruiz did not
object in the trial court to the flight instruction on the federal constitutional ground he
raises on appeal, the issue is not forfeited. Ruiz’s counsel specifically objected to the
instruction based on insufficient evidence that Ruiz’s departure from the hotel was due to
consciousness of guilt. After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court ruled
against Ruiz and allowed the instruction. This determination preserved any objection
based on insufficient evidence. (See People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 286
(Gomez).) Further, Ruiz’s claim that the flight instruction violated his right to due
process because it discriminates against people of color and lowers the prosecution’s
burden of proof is reviewable insofar as it is a matter affecting the defendant’s substantial
rights. (§ 1259; Gomez, at p. 287; see also People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 285
(Cage).)
       Turning to Ruiz’s substantive arguments, Ruiz contends that the evidence at trial
was insufficient to support the flight instruction and that the giving of the instruction
violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ruiz
challenges the predicate factual showing of flight to support the instruction. Having
                                                  8
carefully reviewed the record and relevant case authority, we conclude the instruction
was warranted under the facts of this case.
       As our Supreme Court has reaffirmed in several cases, “a flight instruction ‘is
proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under
circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of
guilt.’ ” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055 (Bradford); see also People v.
Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 522 (Abilez); People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328
(Bonilla); Cage, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 285.) Flight need not entail the “ ‘ “physical act
of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven” ’ ” (Bradford, at p. 1055) but only “ ‘ “a
purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The instruction applies
“ ‘whenever evidence of the circumstances of [a] defendant’s departure from the crime
scene . . . logically permits an inference that his movement was motivated by guilty
knowledge.’ ” (Abilez, at p. 522; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 694 (Turner).)
We determine whether the flight instruction is warranted based on the facts of each case
and circumstances of the defendant’s departure. (Abilez, at p. 522; People v. Mason
(1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 941.) When there is evidence of flight, the trial court is required to
instruct the jury that it may consider flight as evidence of guilt, though flight alone is not
sufficient to establish guilt. (§ 1127c;7 see People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 458
(Price).)
       Ruiz contends the evidence is too slight to support the inference that he left the
hotel out of guilty knowledge, since there is no evidence that Ruiz knew the police had

       7
         Section 1127c states, “In any criminal trial or proceeding where evidence of
flight of a defendant is relied upon as tending to show guilt, the court shall instruct the
jury substantially as follows: [¶] The flight of a person immediately after the
commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has been committed, is not
sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may
consider in deciding his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such circumstance is
entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. [¶] No further instruction on the subject of
flight need be given.” (§ 1127c.)
                                                  9
been called (or would be called), nor any indication that he left because he feared
apprehension or arrest. He asserts that the evidence cited by the prosecution and relied
on by the trial court—namely, that Ruiz left the hotel sometime before Darlene E. spoke
to the 911 dispatcher and was not there when the police arrived—does not support the
given inference, since his departure also supports other reasonable inferences (i.e., that he
wanted to get away from an unpleasant situation with an intoxicated person). Ruiz points
out that Darlene E. testified that she remembered him “showing up” at the hotel the next
morning, supporting this alternate inference that he merely left to allow her to sleep off
her intoxication.
       Ruiz’s argument relies on the mistaken premise that where there is no direct
evidence that a defendant’s departure was motivated by consciousness of guilt, and where
there are plausible, alternate or innocent explanations for the alleged flight, it is error to
permit the jury to infer consciousness of guilt. Our high court rejected nearly identical
challenges to the predecessor standard jury instruction on flight (CALJIC No. 2.52) in
Abilez and Bonilla.
       In Abilez, the defendant contended that “giving the [flight] instruction was error
because there were ‘no facts’ suggesting his decision to leave the victim’s home was
motivated by a desire to avoid detection or apprehension for the murder.” (Abilez, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 522.) The Supreme Court disagreed that the facts at trial (showing that
after the victim was killed, the defendant and codefendant loaded items from the victim’s
home into her car and drove off before being apprehended several miles away) were
insufficient to support the instruction. It explained, based on the evidence, that “the jury
could reasonably infer that [the] defendant’s decision not to stay in the house [after the
victim was killed], but instead to leave, manifested a consciousness of guilt.” (Ibid.)
       Similarly in Bonilla, the defendant challenged the flight instruction, claiming
“there was no substantial evidence he fled” after the murder. (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th
at p. 328.) The court clarified that “[t]o obtain the instruction, the prosecution need not
                                                  10
prove the defendant in fact fled, i.e., departed the scene to avoid arrest, only that a jury
could find the defendant fled and permissibly infer a consciousness of guilt from the
evidence.” (Ibid.) Based on evidence that the defendant “immediately left the scene” (id.
at p. 329) and did nothing that “might have led to [his] detection . . . or otherwise
connected him with the attack” (such as calling out or attempting to render aid), the court
concluded it was not error to give the instruction. (Ibid.) In so concluding, the court
reasoned that while “[t]he jury could attribute an innocent explanation to [the
defendant’s] conduct, [] it could also infer that his departure and the circumstances
thereof were consistent with and supported the prosecution’s theory,” thus justifying the
giving of the instruction. (Ibid.)
       Here, the evidence at trial showed that sometime around 3:00 a.m., after an
altercation in the hotel room, Ruiz left the hotel, taking Darlene E.’s Jeep and one of their
two dogs. The altercation was loud enough to wake Robin and her husband, who were
asleep in an adjacent hotel room, and led Robin to call 911 out of concern for the people
involved. Although Darlene E. was injured prior to Ruiz’s departure, there is no
evidence he called 911 or tried to summon medical help for her.
       Around that same time, Christopher spotted Darlene E. in the bushes outside the
hotel, and Darlene told Christopher that she and her boyfriend were fighting and she was
trying to hide from him. On the subsequent 911 call, Darlene E. told the dispatcher she
was “really beat up” and that her boyfriend had beat her up and was driving off in her
Jeep with one of her dogs.8 On these facts, no less than in Abilez and Bonilla, the jury
could reasonably infer that Ruiz’s decision to leave the hotel in Darlene E.’s Jeep,
without securing medical help for her, despite it being the middle of the night and having

       8
         The transcript of the 911 call between the dispatcher and Darlene E. states, in
relevant part, “[Dispatcher]: [] Who is this who beat you up? [¶] [Darlene E.]: My
boyfriend. [¶] . . . [¶] He left me at the hotel and beat me up. [¶] [Dispatcher]: Okay,
but where is he? [¶] [Darlene E.]: He’s in my Jeep driving off with my other dog.”
                                                  11
paid for the hotel room, manifested a consciousness of guilt. (Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 522; see also Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 694.)
       That there may be other plausible reasons for Ruiz having decided to leave the
hotel room does not alter our conclusion that the circumstances were sufficient to permit
an inference that “guilty knowledge” motivated his departure. (Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th
at p. 329; Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 522.) Indeed, the California Supreme Court in
People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 502 addressed this same point in its decision
upholding the trial court’s flight instruction based on CALJIC No. 2.52. The defendant
in Navarette argued that “where the evidence suggests reasons for flight other than
consciousness of guilt, the court should instruct the jury that it must determine whether
the evidence in fact shows a consciousness of guilt.” (Ibid.) The court rejected that
argument, as it had in earlier decisions. (Ibid., citing People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th
1044, 1152 [explaining that the flight instruction, as given, “adequately conveyed the
concept that if flight was found, the jury was permitted to consider alternative
explanations for that flight other than [the] defendant’s consciousness of guilt”]; see also
Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1055 [same].)
       The instruction in this case (CALCRIM No. 372), like the substantially similar
instructions in Navarette and its predecessors on this issue, properly allowed the jury to
consider whether there was proof of flight, and if so, whether that flight showed
consciousness of guilt. These circumstances are markedly different from Gomez and
other cases9 cited by Ruiz for the proposition that giving a consciousness of guilt
instruction is improper where there are plausible alternate reasons for the defendant’s
conduct.

       9
         The other cases cited by Ruiz, including People v. Rankin (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th
430, and People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, are at best only marginally
relevant to the issue before us and do not alter our conclusion set forth above.

                                                  12
       Gomez involved a defendant’s brief refusal to come to court on the second day of
his capital trial, which ultimately had the effect of delaying the proceedings by 38
minutes (the defendant changed his mind and came voluntarily after threatened with an
extraction order). (Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 283–284.) The trial court issued a
consciousness of guilt instruction at the conclusion of trial, stating in part that if the jury
found the defendant “voluntarily absented himself from this trial by refusing to come to
court,” it could “consider that as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of
guilt.” (Id. at p. 286.) On review, the California Supreme Court held the trial court erred
in allowing the jury to consider the defendant’s temporary absence as a basis to infer
consciousness of guilt. (Id. at p. 290.) The court distinguished the defendant’s conduct
from circumstances in other cases found to support the inference, such as where a
defendant seeks to interfere with the production of evidence (e.g., by refusing to
participate in a lineup) or acts in a way inconsistent with innocence (e.g., by tattooing the
number “187” [Penal Code section for murder] on his forehead after a murder). (Id. at
pp. 289–290.) The court reasoned that the defendant’s effort to temporarily disrupt the
proceedings “was not an attempt to elude prosecution or punishment” (id. at p. 289) and
that his brief refusal to appear at trial had no “tendency in reason to prove” (Evid. Code,
§ 210) consciousness of guilt, noting he “may simply have been tired” or “frustrated by
the trial process and wanted to assert more control over it.” (Gomez, at p. 290.)
       We do not construe the Gomez court’s articulation of alternate reasons the
defendant may have temporarily refused to come to court for his capital trial as authority
for the general proposition that a jury cannot be permitted to infer consciousness of guilt
when other plausible reasons might explain the defendant’s conduct. To the contrary, the
court in Gomez recognized the use of permissive inferences to allow jurors to infer
consciousness of guilt when the evidence has some tendency in reason to support the
inference. (Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 288, 290.) We conclude that, as compared to
the Gomez defendant’s short-lived refusal to leave his cell, causing a 38-minute delay in
                                                  13
the trial proceedings, Ruiz’s departure from the hotel in the victim’s vehicle under the
circumstances set forth above was sufficient to support an inference that his flight, if
proven, could reflect consciousness of guilt.
       Moreover, when there is evidence of flight, the trial court is statutorily required to
instruct the jury that, although flight is not in itself sufficient to establish guilt, it may
consider flight as evidence of guilt. (§ 1127c; Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 458.)
Our high court has “construed section 1127c ‘as mandating a rule that if there is evidence
identifying the person who fled as the defendant, and if such evidence is relied on as
tending to show guilt, then a flight instruction is proper.’ ” (Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
pp. 521–522.) The prosecution in this case presented evidence that Darlene E. identified
Ruiz as the person who “beat [her] up” and then left the scene “in [her] Jeep driving off
with [her] other dog.” The prosecutor relied on this evidence, arguing in closing that the
evidence showed “the defendant left that hotel with one of the dogs” and “[h]e left
because he knew he had done something wrong and he didn’t want to get in trouble.”
The trial court therefore did not err under California statutory or decisional law in giving
the standard CALCRIM No. 372 jury instruction on flight as evidence of consciousness
of guilt.
       Ruiz also challenges the flight instruction as a violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process. He contends that, even if there were substantial
evidence to justify giving the instruction (as we have so concluded), the trial court
nevertheless erred because the instruction, as applied to people of color, is discriminatory
and unconstitutional.
       Ruiz argues that, although CALCRIM No. 372 appears neutral on its face, “the
instruction has a disparate impact on Latinos” and other people of color, who comprise
“two-thirds of California felony defendants” and “who have objective reasons to fear
contact with police even when they have done nothing wrong.” He contends that “what
we now know about race and police destroys the inference of consciousness of guilt.”
                                                    14
Ruiz asserts that where, as here, there was “no evidence” he fled the scene based on
consciousness of guilt rather than “just getting away from his drunk and quarrelsome
girlfriend,” the giving of the instruction “invite[d] [the] jurors to draw a conclusion not
based in fact and use that conclusion to find the defendant guilty.” Ruiz argues that
giving the instruction under these circumstances “reduces the People’s burden of proof
and is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence under Sandstrom v. Montana
(1979) 442 U. S. 510.”
       Ruiz further maintains, in light of mounting recognition by courts that a person of
color’s flight from police (in the absence of other relevant factors) does not create
reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop (see, e.g., United States v. Brown (9th Cir.
2019) 925 F.3d 1150, 1156–1157 (Brown); Commonwealth v. Warren (Mass. 2016) 58
N.E.3d. 333, 342 (Warren)), that racially discriminatory law enforcement has “created
reasons for innocent people of color to flee.” He contends that allowing jurors to infer
guilt from a person of color’s alleged flight undermines recent efforts by the California
judiciary to confront racism in the criminal justice system and asks that this court declare
the flight instruction (CALCRIM No. 372) unconstitutional.10
       Ruiz’s arguments concerning the impact of racial disparities in policing are
unavailing in this case because there is nothing in the record that suggests even an
indirect relationship between systemic racial profiling or targeting, or any form of racial
bias or disparate policing, and Ruiz’s departure from the hotel. Ruiz left the hotel in the
middle of the night after an altercation with his girlfriend from which she emerged
injured; from this, the jury was reasonably permitted to consider Ruiz’s departure in
weighing guilt. (§ 1172c.) The same cannot be said for the inferences of reasonable

       10
          Although this single reference in appellant’s opening brief appears to assert a
facial challenge to the standard jury instruction for flight and consciousness of guilt
(CALCRIM No. 372), we do not understand Ruiz’s arguments on appeal to present a
facial challenge, nor has he provided any legal authority or cited appropriate legal
standards to support such a challenge to the standard jury instruction.
                                                 15
suspicion in Brown and Warren, both of which involved investigatory stops prompted by
the Black defendant’s attempted flight from an unexpected encounter with police on the
street in which the police intercepted or sought to contact the defendant.11
       The reviewing courts in Brown and Warren recognized that racial dynamics in
police practices can inform the weight or probative value assigned to a defendant’s flight
or evasive conduct during a police encounter. (See Warren, supra, 58 N.E.3d. at p. 342;
Brown, supra, 925 F.3d at p. 1157.) We do not question the premise underlying those
decisions: Increasing awareness of racial disparities in policing and the broader criminal
justice system may properly “inform the inferences to be drawn from an individual who
decides to step away, run, or flee from police without a clear reason to do otherwise.”
(Brown, at p. 1156.) Here, however, the flight was not from police but from a crime
scene. Far from fleeing “without a clear reason to do otherwise” (ibid.), a reasonable—
albeit entirely permissive—inference based on the evidence was that Ruiz left the hotel in
the middle of the night because he had just beaten up his girlfriend.
       Furthermore, this is not a situation in which the inference of consciousness of guilt
could not be fairly or reasonably directed to the charged offense (cf. United States v.
Myers (5th Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d 1036, 1049), nor a case in which the permissive inference
“ ‘is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the
jury.’ ” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 180 (Mendoza), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 63, fn. 8.) As
explained by the California Supreme Court in Mendoza in relation to a different due
process challenge to the substantially similar predecessor flight instruction (CALJIC
       11
          In Brown, the defendant, a Black male, was walking on the street when he
reacted to an unannounced pursuit by a police cruiser “by running for about a block
before the officers stopped him at gunpoint.” (Brown, supra, 925 F.3d at p. 1151.)
Warren similarly involved two Black males walking down the street when a police
officer, acting on a “hunch” following a reported burglary, called to them from his police
cruiser and initiated pursuit when they jogged away. (Warren, supra, 58 N.E.3d. at
p. 337.)
                                                16
No. 2.52), the instruction does not impermissibly reduce the prosecution’s burden of
proof and is not inconsistent with the presumption of innocence under Sandstrom because
the prosecutor must still prove facts that, if believed by the jury, logically and reasonably
support the proposed inference. (Mendoza, at p. 179.) Citing United States Supreme
Court precedent, the Mendoza court explained that a permissive inference “ ‘still requires
the State to convince the jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based on
the predicate facts proved. Such inferences do not necessarily implicate the concerns of
Sandstrom []. A permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the
suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the
proven facts before the jury.’ ” (Mendoza, at p. 180, quoting Francis v. Franklin (1985)
471 U.S. 307, 314–315.)
       Applying Ruiz’s claim concerning the discriminatory effects of racially disparate
policing to the standard articulated in Mendoza does not support a due process violation
here because Ruiz has not shown that the permissive inference was not justified in light
of the facts presented at trial. Instead, as discussed ante, the evidence at trial provided
sufficient support for the prosecution to argue that Ruiz fled the scene because he “knew
he had done something wrong” and to warrant the flight instruction. (§ 1127c.) There
was no due process violation because “ ‘the suggested conclusion [wa]s [] one that reason
and common sense justif[ied] in light of the proven facts before the jury.’ ” (Mendoza,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 180.)
       Even assuming Ruiz’s arguments are founded on valid considerations regarding
the impacts of racially disparate policing on inferences arising from a defendant’s alleged
flight, nothing in the cited case authority or record of this case supports his assertion that
the giving of the instruction on these facts violated his due process rights. We conclude

                                                  17
that the trial court did not err on evidentiary or constitutional grounds by giving the flight
instruction.12
       B. Other Perpetrators
                 1. Procedural Background
       In light of Darlene E.’s testimony that she had fought with two women outside of
the bar while Ruiz was away getting pizza, Ruiz’s trial counsel asked the trial court to
instruct the jury on “other perpetrators” based on CALCRIM No. 373. The requested
instruction states: “The evidence shows that other persons may have been involved in the
commission of the crime charged against the defendant. There may be many reasons
why someone who appears to have been involved might not be a codefendant in this
particular trial. You must not speculate about whether those other persons have been or
will be prosecuted. Your duty is to decide whether the defendant on trial here committed
the crime charged.”
       The trial court initially noted its intent to give the instruction based on the
evidence at trial that “other perpetrators” may have been involved in causing the injuries
to Darlene E. and charged against Ruiz as caused by a domestic battery. The prosecutor
objected to the proposed instruction and argued the “ ‘other perpetrator’ ” instruction is
intended for circumstances involving accomplices, coparticipants, or codefendants and
“doesn’t apply to a case where the [d]efense theory is simply that some other unidentified
unknown person committed the crime.” The prosecutor further argued that the
instruction would be confusing to the jury because it would suggest that another person
was involved in the commission of the crime when the defense’s theory was that the
commission “had nothing to do with the defendant.” Defense counsel countered that the
instruction is “mandatory if requested in appropriate situations” and that the prosecutor’s

       12
          Given our decision that the trial court did not err in giving the flight instruction,
which was supported by sufficient evidence in the record and consistent with Ruiz’s
rights to due process, we need not address the question of prejudicial error.
                                                  18
arguments about scenarios involving coparticipants or codefendants “doesn’t negate the
fact that in this instance it is also appropriate.”
       After further review of the relevant case authority, the trial court reevaluated its
initial decision to include the CALCRIM No. 373 instruction. The court noted that unlike
in the cited cases, where “the contended other perpetrators were all directly related to the
actual events for which the defendant was on trial” in the manner of “an accomplice, an
actual co-defendant, or aider and abettor,” Ruiz’s theory of defense was that an
“unknown third party” inflicted the injuries. Defense counsel disagreed with the court’s
assessment and argued that the instruction “should be given upon request.”
       The trial court declined to give the instruction. It reiterated that in claiming that
“individuals completely unrelated at different locations and different time” were
responsible for Darlene E.’s injuries (as opposed to another person within the context of
the charge against Ruiz), Ruiz’s defense relied on “a different factual scenario than is
anticipated and discussed in relationship to the other perpetrator instructions.”
               2. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       “A trial court has a duty to instruct on general principles of law that are ‘closely
and openly connected to the facts before the court and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.’ ” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 554; accord People
v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 996.) Furthermore, “ ‘a defendant has a
constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the
evidence.’ ” (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) “That duty extends to ‘ “instructions
on the defendant’s theory of the case, including instructions ‘as to defenses “ ‘that the
defendant is relying on . . ., or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a
defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the
case.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Anderson, at p. 996.) A criminal defendant also “has the right to
instructions that pinpoint the theory of the defense case.” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28
Cal.4th 557, 660.)
                                                      19
       Whether to give a particular instruction in a particular case “entails the resolution
of a mixed question of law and fact that . . . is [] predominantly legal.” (People v. Waidla
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733 (Waidla).) We independently review a trial court’s decision
not to give a requested instruction and decide, based on the entire record, whether
sufficient evidence existed to warrant giving the omitted instruction. (Cole, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 1215; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162.) In deciding
whether a requested instruction should be given, the trial court resolves any doubts as to
the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions in favor of the accused. (People v.
Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 944 (Tufunga).) But “ ‘[a] party is not entitled to an
instruction on a theory for which there is no supporting evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)
              3. Analysis
       Ruiz contends the trial court erred because there was substantial evidence at trial
to give the requested defense instruction directing the jury not to consider whether
Darlene E.’s alleged female assailants were charged. He asserts that an instruction not to
speculate about other perpetrators was required, consistent with Darlene E.’s testimony at
trial that two women attacked her outside the bar and the defense’s theory that Ruiz did
not cause Darlene E.’s injuries. According to Ruiz, CALCRIM No. 373 is the only
standard jury instruction that seeks to prevent jurors from speculating about possible third
party perpetrators and whether they have been charged. He maintains that without the
instruction, “a jury considering whether to credit [Darlene E.]’s testimony would
naturally give undue weight to inappropriate factors such as whether the parties she
testified had assaulted her had been or would be charged with the crime, and if not, why
not.” He maintains that the court’s refusal to give the instruction violated his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to present a complete defense.
       The Attorney General counters that CALCRIM No. 373 would not have served as
a proper pinpoint or defense instruction in this case and that those cases in which the

                                                 20
instruction has been given have all involved coconspirators, accomplices, or aiders and
abettors.
       Having considered the evidence at trial, Ruiz’s theory of defense, and the
requested instruction, we conclude that Ruiz was not entitled to the CALCRIM No. 373
jury instruction because it has no application to the facts of this case. CALCRIM
No. 373 refers to evidence that others “may have been involved” in committing the crime
charged against the defendant but do not appear as codefendants in the trial and directs
the jurors not to speculate about whether those persons have been or will be prosecuted.
This wording strongly suggests that the instruction applies when there is evidence of an
uncharged coparticipant; it is not an alternative perpetrator instruction. As indicated by
the California Supreme Court’s analysis of CALJIC No. 2.11.5 (the predecessor to
CALCRIM No. 373), it pertains to “unjoined perpetrators of the same crime.” (People v.
Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918 (Farmer), disapproved on other grounds by Waidla,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724, fn. 6; see also People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1218
[same].) The Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 373 also describe it as an instruction on
“unjoined co-participants.” (Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 373.) As our high court
stated in Farmer, “the instruction does not tell the jury it cannot consider evidence that
someone else committed the crime. [Citation.] It merely says the jury is not to speculate
on whether someone else might or might not be prosecuted.” (Farmer, at p. 918, italics
omitted.)
       The instruction thus appears intended for circumstances in which a person who
appears to have been an accomplice is not on trial with the defendant. Although there
appear to be no reported cases in which courts have addressed a trial court’s refusal to
give the “other perpetrators” instruction when requested, those that address the
instruction in other contexts (particularly in its predecessor CALJIC No. 2.11.5 form)
support this assessment of the instruction and its nonapplication here. For example, in
Farmer, evidence at trial suggested another perpetrator participated in the homicide, and
                                                21
that individual was tried in a separate proceeding. (Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 900
[footprints linked to the defendant and second individual, tried separately].) So too, in
People v. Sanders (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 350, the court upheld the giving of the
instruction since there was “evidence that a person other than the shooter may have been
involved in the crime.” (Id. at p. 360.) Darlene E.’s testimony that she got into a fight
with two unknown women who assaulted her outside the bar while Ruiz was away
getting pizza constituted an alternative explanation for her injuries apart from the crime
charged against Ruiz and did not amount to factual support for an unjoined coperpetrator
theory like in Farmer and Sanders.
       Absent evidence of an accomplice or coparticipant in the charged domestic assault
at the hotel, an instruction telling the jury not to consider “why someone who appears to
have been involved might not be a codefendant in this particular trial” and “whether those
other persons have been or will be prosecuted” (CALCRIM No. 373) would have served
no purpose. We conclude there was no evidence in the record to warrant giving the
omitted instruction. (See Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 944.) Because the requested
instruction’s formulation was inapposite to Ruiz’s theory of defense, the court’s refusal to
give the instruction also did not violate his right to present a complete defense. (Cf.
Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690.) Indeed, even if Ruiz had requested a
pinpoint instruction applicable to his theory that he did not commit the charged offense
(i.e., directing the jury to consider whether evidence of Darlene E.’s alleged female
assailants raised a reasonable doubt about Ruiz’s guilt), such an instruction would have
been duplicative of the standard instructions on reasonable doubt, which already “impress
upon the jury that evidence of another party’s liability must be considered in weighing
whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof.” (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49
Cal.4th 472, 504; see also People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 720–721.)

                                                22
       We decide the trial court did not err in refusing to give CALCRIM No. 373. Our
decision that the trial court did not err in declining to instruct on other perpetrators makes
it unnecessary to consider whether the refusal to give the instruction was prejudicial.
                                    III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 23
                           ______________________________________
                                      Danner, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Lie, J.

____________________________________
Wilson, J.

H049848
People v. Ruiz