Court Opinion

ID: 9369601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 15:02:28.780566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.171500
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ERIC D. LLOYD,                         §
                                       §
                                       §
      Defendant Below, Appellant,      §      No. 79, 2022
                                       §
                                       §
      v.                               §      Court Below: Superior Court
                                       §      of the State of Delaware
                                       §
STATE OF DELAWARE,                     §
                                       §      I.D. No. 2003012388(N)
                                       §
      Appellee.                        §

                            Submitted: January 18, 2023
                             Decided: February 9, 2023

Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices.

On appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for the
Appellant.

Matthew C. Bloom, Esquire, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for
the Appellee.

VALIHURA, Justice:
          In his direct appeal, Eric D. Lloyd (“Lloyd”) argues that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during an administrative search of his

home. He asserts that the probation officer who authorized the search lacked exigent

circumstances and failed to substantially comply with Department of Corrections (“DOC”)

Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 (“Procedure 7.19”). We AFFIRM the denial of the

motion to suppress and his subsequent conviction and sentence.

                              I.      Facts and Procedural Background1

          On September 8, 2020, a Superior Court grand jury indicted Lloyd for Possession

of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Possession of Ammunition by a Person

Prohibited (“PABPP”), Possession of a Controlled Substance, Possession of Marijuana,

and Operation of an Unregistered Motor Vehicle.2

          On September 3, 2021, Lloyd filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during

an administrative search of his living quarters. The court denied the motion. Lloyd filed

a motion for reargument, but the court, by order dated October 29, 2021, denied that

motion. After a two-day jury trial commencing on November 2, 2021, Lloyd was convicted

of the PFBPP and PABPP charges.3

          The State successfully moved to have Lloyd sentenced as a habitual offender

pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4212(d). On March 4, 2022, Lloyd was sentenced to 30 years

1
  The facts, except as otherwise noted, are taken from the hearing transcript and the court’s oral
ruling denying the motion to suppress. See A19–43 (Suppression Hearing Transcript) [hereinafter
Supp. Tran. at _].
2
    A9–11 (Indictment).
3
    The State nolle prossed the drug and traffic offenses.

                                                   2
incarceration at Level 5, followed by various levels of probation.4

         On March 28, 2020, Senior Probation Officer Kevin McClure (“McClure”) and two

Wilmington police officers, Detectives Robert MacNamara (“MacNamara”) and Sean

Nolan (“Nolan”), were working together as part of Operation Safe Streets. 5 The officers

were traveling on Spruce Street in Wilmington when they observed Lloyd operating a beige

Honda with an expired registration.6 Lloyd was the sole occupant. The officers conducted

a traffic stop. McClure recognized Lloyd as a Level III probationer. Lloyd had a pending

violation of probation for his involvement in a hit-and-run accident two months earlier. In

addition, Lloyd had missed several curfews and had a positive urine screen the prior month.

McClure approached the vehicle on the passenger’s side and observed a marijuana cigar (a

“blunt”) in plain view in the center console ashtray.

         Nolan and MacNamara ordered Lloyd out of the vehicle. Upon exiting the vehicle,

Lloyd stated that the only thing he had on him was a blunt. When the door opened,

McClure smelled a “powerful” odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle.

4
  For PFBPP, Lloyd was sentenced, as a habitual offender, to 25 years at Level 5, suspended after
15 years for two years and six months at decreasing levels of supervision. For PABPP, he was
sentenced to five years at Level 5, suspended for two years at Level 3 probation.
5
 As noted in Lum v. State, “Operation Safe Streets is a ‘crime reduction initiative that teams police
with state probation and parole officers’ to ‘conduct unannounced curfew checks on probationers,
surveil high crime areas, initiate investigations of probation violators and their associates, and
follow-up on tips provided by informants.’” 193 A.3d 733, 2018 WL 4039898 at *1 n.1 (Del.
Aug. 22, 2018) (ORDER) (quoting OPERATION SAFE STREETS/GOVERNOR’S TASK
FORCE,         ANNUAL            REPORT          1       (2006),       https://cjc.delaware.gov/wp-
content/upload/sites/61/2017/06/05_OSS_GTF_Annual_Report-min.pdf.).
6
    See A21 (Kevin McClure Hearing Testimony at 4:14–18) [hereinafter McClure Test. at _].

                                                 3
       Because Lloyd’s possession of marijuana constituted a violation of his probation,

McClure directed MacNamara to arrest Lloyd. MacNamara then searched Lloyd incident

to that arrest and found heroin in Lloyd’s underwear.7 The heroin was packaged in baggies

bound together with small, black rubber bands. The officers did not count them at the time

for safety reasons.8 There were no needles or empty baggies in the vehicle that might have

indicated personal use or consumption.

       McClure then decided to seek permission to conduct an administrative search of

Lloyd’s residence located at 2211 North Heald Street. After confirming with another

resident that Lloyd lived there, McClure then called his supervisor, Operations

Administrator Carlo Pini (“Pini”), and held a telephone case conference.

       During the conference, McClure informed Pini about the traffic stop and the

discovery of the heroin and marijuana. Together, they worked through the arrest/search

checklist form.9 McClure checked off every item on the list, except for “informants”

because no informants were involved. Pini approved the search of the residence.

       After receiving authorization, McClure searched the second-floor bedroom where

Lloyd stayed. McClure found documents identifying Lloyd, a marijuana grinder, a black

7
  Seven bags of heroin weighing .049 grams were found.            The marijuana cigar contained
approximately .5 grams of marijuana.
8
   See A28 (McClure Test. at 31:1–4) (“[I]t’s tactically unsound to unpackage that because of
Fentanyl and actually being out on the street with all the environmental factors to actually count
it[.]”). During the suppression hearing, McClure testified that “it looked like -- it was consistent
with a bundle of heroin, a bundle being 13 bags of heroin.” A22 (McClure Test. at 8:11–13).
McClure later noted in his report “that it was seven bags.” A28 (McClure Test. at 31:6–7).
9
 A23–24 (McClure Test. at 13:5–16:10). The checklist was admitted at the suppression hearing.
See B15 (Arrest/Search Checklist).

                                                 4
and silver Smith & Wesson .38 caliber firearm loaded with five rounds of ammunition, and

a box of .380-caliber ammunition. Lloyd was a person prohibited from possessing a

firearm as a result of a prior felony conviction.

         The Superior Court conducted an evidentiary suppression hearing on October 18,

2021. Lloyd’s counsel first argued that there was no probable cause for Lloyd’s arrest

based on the odor of marijuana and the marijuana cigar. More specifically, he argued that

Lloyd was arrested by the Wilmington police and that their arrest of Lloyd did not comply

with our decision in Juliano v. State.10 Lloyd’s counsel did agree that smoking marijuana

while on probation constitutes a violation of probation. The trial court pointed out that

Operation Safe Streets is a joint operation. Lloyd’s counsel argued that the State had the

burden to confirm that Lloyd was arrested for violating his probation but that it did not

meet that burden because only the probation officer and supervisor testified (as opposed to

the Wilmington police officers).11 Lloyd’s counsel also argued that the search was

unreasonable because the information concerning the number of bags of heroin found on

Lloyd was inaccurate.

         Following argument by each side, the Superior Court issued the following oral

bench ruling:

10
  260 A.3d 619 (Del. 2021). A number of facts distinguish this case from Juliano, including the
fact that Lloyd was a known probationer and as a result, was prohibited from possessing and
consuming marijuana as a condition of his probation. He was observed in the car with a partially
burnt marijuana cigar in the ashtray and had made the unsolicited admission to the officers the
only thing he had on him was the blunt. See A22 (McClure Test. at 7:10–11).
11
     See A40 (Supp. Tran. at 79:3–6). Nolan and MacNamara did not testify at the hearing.

                                                 5
         The Court: The Court is duty-bound to deny suppression in this case. The
         PO [Probation Officer] and the Wilmington Police acting in Safe Streets and
         pursuant to Regulation 7.19, United States v. Whren and any other number
         of cases are permitted to pull the defendant over for driving with an expired
         tag. They are permitted to pull him out of the car when they smell of
         marijuana. And he admitted it was a blunt. He’s not allowed to have a blunt.
         They knew he was on probation. Once they were permitted to pull him out
         of the car and arrest him for probation violation, which they said they did,
         Wilmington Police and the probation office was entitled to search him down
         pursuant to the lawful arrest. Upon finding the heroin in his underpants, it
         doesn’t matter how much, they conducted a case conference with the
         supervisor as they are authorized to do under regulation 7.19. Pursuant to
         the regulation 7.19, they were authorized to go search his residence, and the
         search of his residence pursuant to the administrative search that was
         authorized recovered the handgun. There’s nothing that I’ve heard today that
         would warrant suppression of the evidence.12

         Lloyd filed a notice of appeal on March 10, 2022.

                                   II.   Contentions on Appeal

         On appeal, Lloyd raises the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the

motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his home. He claims that his

arrest and the subsequent searches failed to comply with DOC Procedure 7.19 and violated

the United States and Delaware Constitutions. At the core of his argument is his contention

that no exigent circumstances justified the officers’ actions.13

12
     A43 (Supp. Tran. at 91:20–92:20).
13
  As set forth above, McClure did obtain supervisor approval, following a telephonic case
conference, prior to the search of Lloyd’s residence.

                                               6
                                             III.       Analysis

          This Court reviews a trial court’s “denial of a motion to suppress after an evidentiary

hearing for [an] abuse of discretion.”14 We consider legal questions de novo and will

uphold a trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.15

          Lloyd first argues that exigent circumstances were required — but did not exist —

for the officers to arrest Lloyd following the traffic stop. The State contends that Section

4334(b) does not require probation officers to comply with DOC regulations before making

a warrantless arrest. However, it argues that to the extent compliance is required under the

United States and Delaware Constitutions to establish the reasonableness of the warrantless

arrest, the officers substantially complied with the regulations.

          First, we address the different legal framework concerning probationers. The

special nature of probationary supervision, and the conditions imposed on the probationer

under that supervisory relationship, justify a departure from the usual warrant and

probable-cause requirements for searches.16                However, the search or seizure of a

14
     Pendleton v. State, 990 A.2d 417, 419 (Del. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
15
     Rivera v. State, 7 A.3d 961, 966 (Del. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
16
   See Fuller v. State, 844 A.2d 290, 292 (Del. 2004) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
873–74 (1987)). See also Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 319 (Del. 2006) (stating that “[t]he
special nature of probationary supervision justifies a departure from the usual warrant and probable
cause requirements for searches, but a search of a probationer’s home must be reasonable.”)
(internal citation omitted); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 (“These restrictions are meant to assure that
the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by
the probationer’s being at large.”) (internal citation omitted).

                                                    7
probationer must still be based on “reasonable grounds” or “reasonable suspicion” of

criminal activity.17

          Delaware statutory law governs the exercise of the power of probation officers to

search and arrest probationers without a warrant. Probation officers, pursuant to 11

Del. C. § 4334(b), are authorized to arrest probationers, when in the officer’s judgment,

there has been a violation of any condition of probation.18 Pursuant to Section 4321(d) of

Title 11, probation officers “may conduct searches of individuals under probation and

parole supervision in accordance with [DOC] procedures while in the performance of the

lawful duties of their employment[.]”19 The DOC promulgated Procedure 7.19 pursuant

to Section 4321(d). Procedure 7.19 sets forth the guidelines for conducting administrative

searches of probationers and their residences.20 Procedure 7.19 also sets forth procedures

17
   See Murray v. State, 45 A.3d 670, 677–678 (Del. 2012) (stating further that “our law does not
permit suspicionless probationer searches” and that “[a] probation officer must have a reasonable
suspicion or reasonable grounds to justify an administrative search of a residence or car.”) (internal
citation omitted). See also Arbolay v. State, 262 A.3d 1034, 2021 WL 5232345, at *4 (Del. Sept.
14, 2021) (ORDER) (stating that “[a] probation officer may conduct a warrantless search as long
as he has reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity” and noting that Procedure 7.19
“establishes the procedural requirements for administrative searches.”) (internal citation omitted).
18
   See 11 Del. C. § 4334(b) (providing, in relevant part, that “[t]he Commissioner, or any probation
officer, when in the Commissioner’s or probation officer’s judgment there has been a violation of
any condition of probation or suspension of sentence, may arrest such probationer without a
warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of arrest to do so by giving that officer a
written statement setting forth that the probationer has, in the judgment of the Commissioner or
probation officer, violated the conditions of probation or suspended sentence.”). See also Miller
v. State, 653 A.2d 305, 1994 WL 679746, at *1 (Del. Nov. 30, 1994) (ORDER) (“[A] defendant
may be arrested and detained on charges of violating probation based solely on the judgment of
the probation officer that a violation has occurred.”) (citing 11 Del. C. § 4334(b)).
19
     11 Del. C. § 4321(d).
20
     See B4–5 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.A.6.a); B10–11 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.E).
Part VII.6.a. provides:

                                                  8
for probation officers making arrests.21 It states that “[t]he Arrest-Search Checklist form

is to be used for all arrests and searches in the community, unless exigent circumstances

exist forcing the Officer into action.”22

          Before conducting an administrative search, a probation officer should discuss the

          6. SEARCH CHECKLIST
             a. The Officer and Supervisor will hold a case conference using the Search
                 Checklist as a guideline. During the case conference the Supervisor will
                 review the “Yes” or “No” responses of the Officer to the following search
                 decision factors:
                 (1) Sufficient reason to believe the offender possesses contraband.
                 (2) Sufficient reason to believe the offender is in violation of
                 probation/parole.
                 (3) Information from a reliable informant, indicating offender possesses
                 contraband or is violating the law.
                 (4) Information from the informant is corroborated.
                 (5) Approval obtained from Supervisor, Manager, or Director.
B4–5 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.A.6.a)
21
  See B6–10 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.B–D). Part VII.A.5.a. sets for the checklist for arrests
and provides:
          5. ARREST CHECKLIST:
             a. The Officer and Supervisor will hold a case conference using the Arrest
                Checklist as a guideline. During the case conference the Supervisor will
                review the “Yes” and “No” responses of the Officer to the following arrest
                decision factors:
                 (1) Reason exists to believe offender is engaged or about to engage in a clear
                 and substantial risk to the community or their self.
                 (2) An active warrant or capias exists.
                 (3) Offender has a capias history.
                 (4) Offender likely to abscond.
                 (5) Other factors justifying the arrest (list).
B4 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.A.5.a.).
22
     See B3 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.A.1.).

                                                     9
matter with her supervisor, unless exigent circumstances exist.23               During a “case

conference[,]” the supervisor reviews the search decision factors listed on the search

checklist.24

          If the probation officer does not obtain supervisor approval prior to the search, she

must list the exigent circumstances on the search checklist.25 Administrative searches must

be supported by reasonable suspicion to be in compliance with Procedure 7.19. As this

Court stated in Pendleton v. State, “when a regulatory scheme requires reasonable grounds

for a search, compliance with those regulations is sufficient to render the search reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment.”26 We also stated that “probationers’ and parolees’ status

curtails their rights[,]” and thus, “substantial compliance with departmental regulations is

satisfactory evidence of reasonableness in Delaware.”27

          Here, the Wilmington police officers, MacNamara and Nolan, were authorized to

23
     See B10–11 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.E).
24
  As with searches, “[a]bsent exigent circumstances, the decision to arrest an offender should only
be made after discussing the matter with [the] Supervisor, or in their absence, another unit
Supervisor or follow the chain of command.” B6 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.B).
25
     See B11 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.E.5).
26
   990 A.2d at 420 (citing Fuller, 844 A.2d at 292). See also Aiken v. State, 173 A.3d 536, 2017
WL 4792211 at *4 (Oct. 23, 2017) (ORDER) (“When department guidelines require reasonable
grounds for a search, a search is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when those
guidelines are complied with.”) (internal citation omitted); Murray, 45 A.3d at 678 (stating that
“this Court considers probation officers to have acted reasonably so long as they substantially
comply with Delaware Department of Corrections regulations.”) (internal citation omitted);
Griffin, 483 U.S. at, 880 (noting that a state’s operation of a probation system presents special
needs beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and
probable cause requirements and holding that the search of the probationer’s home was reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to a valid
regulation governing probationers).
27
     Pendleton, 990 A.2d at 420 (emphasis in original).

                                                  10
conduct a traffic stop after they observed Lloyd’s beige Honda being operated with an

expired registration. At that point, they had reasonable suspicion to investigate the

violation.28 MacNamara and Nolan were authorized to detain the vehicle and its occupant

for the traffic stop.29

       Police officers “may order the driver or a passenger to exit the car after a valid traffic

stop, and that order is not a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.” 30 After approaching

the vehicle, McClure observed the marijuana cigar in plain view. The officers ordered

Lloyd to exit. When Lloyd opened the door, the “powerful” odor of marijuana was

detected, and Lloyd admitted to possessing the blunt.

       Based upon these uncontested facts, McClure reasonably determined that Lloyd was

violating a condition of his probation and directed MacNamara to arrest Lloyd.31 In Miller

v. State, this Court stated that “[a] defendant may be arrested and detained on charges of

28
   See Gordon v. State, 245 A.3d 499, 509 (Del. 2021) (reaffirming that reasonable suspicion is
the standard by which motor vehicle stops are to be judged). See also Howard v. State, 931 A.2d
437, 2007 WL 2310001, at *2 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007) (ORDER) (“Traffic stops must be supported
by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”) (internal citation omitted).
29
  See 21 Del. C. § 802 (a “police officer is authorized to make an administrative stop for purposes
of enforcing a civil traffic statute, upon a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a violation of
such statute has occurred.”). See also 11 Del. C. § 1902(a); 21 Del. C. § 2101(a); Holden v. State,
23 A.3d 843, 847 (Del. 2011) (“A police officer who observes a traffic violation has probable
cause to stop the vehicle and its driver.”) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)
(“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”)).
30
  Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1174 (Del. 2010) (defendant was lawfully detained as a result of a
valid traffic stop for speeding and was not subject to a “second seizure” when the police ordered
him to exit the vehicle) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107–11 (1977)).
31
   See A26 (McClure Test. at 26:17–23). See also 11 Del. C. § 4334(b); Miller, 1994 WL 679746,
at *1.

                                                 11
violating probation based solely on the judgment of the probation officer that a violation

has occurred.”32

         The State argues that to the extent compliance with Procedure 7.19 is deemed

necessary to establish the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest, McClure substantially

complied.33       The parties’ engagement on this issue centers on whether exigent

circumstances were present. The State correctly points out that Section 4334(b) does not,

by its terms, require compliance with DOC procedures to effect a warrantless arrest.

Section 4334(b) stands in contrast to Section 4321(d) (authorizing searches of probationers

and parolees) which does explicitly require compliance with DOC procedures.34 Rather,

32
     1994 WL 679746, at *1 (internal citation omitted).
33
   The State argues that “to the extent the United States and Delaware Constitutions require
probation officers to abide by DOC regulations for a warrantless arrest to be considered
‘reasonable’ under the regulatory scheme, SPO McClure substantially complied with them.” Ans.
Br. at 18.
34
   We note further that 11 Del. C. § 1904(c) addresses the power of a “peace officer” to make a
warrantless arrest upon a reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
a new offense during a period of probation thereby violating a condition of probation. Section
1904(c) provides:
         (c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, an arrest by a peace
         officer without a warrant for violation of probation is lawful whenever the peace
         officer has a reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
         committed a new offense within or without the State during a period of probation
         and has thereby violated a condition of said probation imposed upon the person by
         a court of this State. A reasonable ground to believe that a person has committed a
         new offense may be based upon, but is not limited to, a finding of probable cause
         to issue a warrant for the new offense made by a neutral magistrate, an indictment
         returned by a grand jury for the new offense or an information for the new offense
         filed in any court.
         Any person arrested pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall be processed
         in accordance with the provisions of § 1909 of this title, at which time bail shall be
         set on both the new offense and the violation of probation.

                                                  12
compliance with DOC procedures in the context of warrantless arrests of probationers is

better viewed as a “best practice” or “safe harbor” to the extent questions of reasonableness

are raised under the Delaware or United States Constitutions.35

       As Lloyd does question the overall reasonableness of the officers’ conduct,36 we put

that issue to rest by observing that the evidence supports a finding of exigent circumstances

for the warrantless arrest of Lloyd.37 For example, McClure testified that Lloyd was

operating a motor vehicle while in possession of marijuana, and he was concerned that

Lloyd might be driving while impaired. McClure also knew that Lloyd did not have a

medical marijuana card.38 In distinguishing earlier events where Lloyd had a positive urine

screen but was not searched, McClure testified:

       A. Okay. Again, this is -- we’re talking about what happened that night.
       This is just -- that’s a technical violation. This is something where I looked

11 Del. C. § 1904(c). Further, Superior Court Criminal Rule 32.1(a) requires that any person taken
into custody for a violation of probation be taken “without unreasonable delay” before a magistrate
or Superior Court judge for the setting of bail or for an adjudication of the violation. Super. Ct.
Crim. R. 32.1(a).
35
  The State agrees that “[g]enerally, probation officers should discuss arrest decisions with their
supervisors before effectuating the arrest—unless exigent circumstances exist.” Ans. Br. at 20.
36
  For example, Lloyd contends that “the probation officer conducted an illegal arrest and search
which did not comply with the reasonableness requirements of the U.S. and Delaware
Constitutions.” Op. Br. at 2.
37
  Procedure 7.19 defines “exigent circumstances” as “[a]n unexpected or urgent event which did
not allow an opportunity for prior planning, and which requires immediate action to achieve a
successful resolution.” B1 (Procedure 7.19 at Part V).
38
  See A29 (McClure Test. at 36:12–15). The Delaware General Assembly amended 16 Del. C.
§§ 4701 and 4764 to decriminalize personal use quantities of marijuana. Possession of personal
use quantities now carries a civil penalty of $100. See 16 Del. C. § 4701 (36); 16 Del. C. § 4764(c);
2015 Del. Laws Ch. 38 (H.B. 39). However, it remains illegal to operate a vehicle while
consuming or smoking marijuana. See 16 Del. C. § 4764(d); Valentine v. State, 207 A.3d 166,
2019 WL 1178765, at *2 (Del. Mar. 12, 2019) (ORDER) (“Use or consumption of marijuana in a
moving vehicle is a misdemeanor.”) (citing 16 Del. C. § 4764(d)).

                                                 13
         at it from a common sense standpoint and said this person’s operating a motor
         vehicle after they’ve admitted to be driving or -- smoking marijuana. They
         have you know -- there’s marijuana in plain view there and the person’s also
         already violated their probation. So that is a decision that I made to make
         the arrest right then and there.

         Q. Did he admit to smoking marijuana or did he just say he had a blunt on
         him?

         A. At the time he said he had a blunt on him. But based upon him being the
         sole occupant of the vehicle and the car smelling like marijuana, I inferred
         that he was smoking marijuana in the vehicle, sir.39

         Later in his testimony, McClure stated:

         Q. If this was your arrest, couldn’t you have then called supervisor -- I mean,
         Mr. Lloyd wasn’t going anywhere. Couldn’t you have called the supervisor?

         ...

         A. Okay. Again, there was no preplanning. I didn’t have -- I didn’t know
         Mr. Lloyd was going to have heroin in his underwear or be smoking
         marijuana and driving a vehicle. There was no preplanning this. I had no
         idea I was going to contact Mr. Lloyd. That’s the exigent -- the exigency of
         the circumstances that I found myself in. I wasn’t going to release Mr. Lloyd
         and, you know, just let him drive away.40

         Pini was also asked to explain the exigent circumstances and testified:

         A. I believe they did a car stop, and there was expired tags, and he smelled
         of marijuana, obviously, and saw a cigarette -- marijuana cigarette in the
         ashtray. Therefore, he was arrested on the scene by Officer McClure for the
         violation status.41

39
     A29 (McClure Test. at 35:14–36:8).
40
     A31 (McClure Test. at 45:2–19).
41
   A33–34 (Carlo Pini Hearing Testimony at 54:23–55:5) [hereinafter Pini Test. at _]. Pini also
testified that the fact that the “bundle” of heroin turned out to be seven bags would not have
affected his decision to authorize the search. See A33 (Pini Test. at 53:7–15).

                                               14
Further, Lloyd already had a pending violation for being involved in a hit-and-run accident

two months earlier. It was reasonable to suspect Lloyd was engaged in, or about to engage

in, conduct that could endanger other drivers, pedestrians, or himself by driving while

impaired. In sum, although Section 4334(b) does not require compliance with DOC

regulations, unlike Section 4321(d), McClure substantially complied with Procedure 7.19,

thus putting to rest Lloyd’s challenge to the reasonableness of the arrest.42 We say McClure

“substantially” complied because he did not identify the exigent circumstances on his

checklist when he later reduced his decisions to writing.43 However, all of the necessary

facts supporting a finding of exigent circumstances were contained in his report.44

         Once the officers lawfully arrested Lloyd, they were permitted to search his person

without a warrant incident to that lawful arrest.45 It was then that they found the heroin in

his underwear.

         At that point, McClure had reasonable suspicion to search Lloyd’s home. Procedure

7.19 allows for a search of a probationer’s “living quarters” if the probation officer: (i) “has

42
   See Pendleton, 990 A.2d at 420 (“[S]ubstantial compliance with departmental regulations is
satisfactory evidence of reasonableness in Delaware”) (emphasis in original).
43
   See A27 (McClure Test. at 30:1–2). See, e.g., Pendleton, 990 A.2d at 420 (noting that “failure
to complete the technical requirement [of Procedure 7.19] does not negate the importance of [the
probation officer’s] discussion of the five factors with [his supervisor].”). Although McClure did
not label the circumstances as “exigent,” he did document all of the relevant facts that form the
basis for a finding of exigent circumstances. See B15 (Arrest/Search Checklist).
44
     See B15 (Arrest/Search Checklist).
45
   See Aiken, 2017 WL 4792211, at *3 (stating that “[a]lthough Aiken does not expressly attack
the search of his person, we note that such search was lawful because it was made incident to his
arrest for violating the terms of his probation” and that “[p]robable cause existed that he had
violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer when required.”).

                                               15
knowledge or sufficient reason to believe the offender possesses contraband”; or (ii) “has

knowledge or sufficient reason to believe the offender is in violation of probation[.]”46

McClure had observed Lloyd in possession of marijuana and heroin. McClure cleared the

search of the residence first with his supervisor, Pini. Thus, the exigent circumstances

requirement is not applicable in the context of the search of the residence. Our case law

supports the conclusion that McClure had reasonable suspicion to search Lloyd’s home.47

The authorized residential search then led to the discovery of the firearm and ammunition

that are the basis for Lloyd’s PFBPP and PABPP convictions.48

46
     B10–11 (Procedure 7.19 at Part VII.E.1–2).
47
   See King v. State, 984 A.2d 1205, 1209 (Del. 2009) (observing that this Court has held that
administrative searches of probationers’ homes require only reasonable grounds and holding that
the factors in King’s case “combine to form a reasonable basis to suspect that King possessed
contraband in violation of his probation.”). See also Jacklin v. State, 16 A.3d 938, 2011 WL
809684, at *2 (Del. Mar. 8, 2011) (explaining that a warrantless administrative search of a
probationer’s home requires the probation officer to have reasonable suspicion for the search and
that reasonable suspicion exists where the totality of the circumstances indicates that the officer
had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing); Sierra v. State, 958 A.2d
825, 828 (Del. 2008) (a probation officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless
administrative search of a probationer’s home “where the totality of the circumstances indicates
that the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
48
   Lloyd’s nighttime search argument is waived. This argument was not presented to the trial
court. See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. See also Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 291 n.4 (Del. 2005) (stating
that the proper presentation of an alleged violation of the Delaware Constitution should include a
discussion and analysis of one or more of the following criteria: textual language, legislature
history, pre-existing state law, structural differences, matters of particular state interest of local
concern, state traditions, and public attitudes or other applicable criteria.). On appeal, there is a
brief mention of Article 1, Section 6 of the Delaware Constitution in Lloyd’s opening brief, but he
does not connect that reference to the nighttime search. The State’s position is that “neither
Delaware precedent nor Procedure 7.19 require exigent circumstances for a nighttime
administrative search.” Ans. Br. at 25. See also King, 984 A.2d at 1209–10. Although we do not
reach the issue, we observe that our Court, in King, said the following:
         King further contends that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to
         suppress because the evidence was seized during a night time search. King cites
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                                        IV.     Conclusion

       Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the denial of the motion to suppress and, as a

result, we affirm Lloyd’s conviction and sentence.

       no Delaware precedent prohibiting such a search. Procedure 7.19 does not require
       exigent circumstances for a nighttime search, but does require completing the
       search checklist before the search. The search checklist that the probation officers
       completed states, “[i]f the time of arrest or search is after 10:00 p.m. and before
       6:00 a.m., then reasons must be stated to justify a night time action.”
984 A.2d at 1209–10 (internal citation omitted). The Court in King found that even assuming
exigent circumstances were required, the record supported the Superior Court’s finding of exigent
circumstances. Id. at 1210.

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