Court Opinion

ID: 9628511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:22:53.291883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:19.075897
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the judgment of guilt. I also reluctantly concur in the reversal of the judgment insofar as it relates to the special circumstances finding and penalty, under compulsion of People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539 [205 Cal.Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826], a case which, in my view, was incorrectly decided. (See People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724, 749 [205 Cal.Rptr. 810, 685 P.2d 1161] [dis. opn.].) The present case involves a coldblooded, execution-style murder, and it is inconceivable to me that the jury would have failed to find an intent to kill had it been instructed on that *160subject. Under Garcia's “reversible per se” rule, however, the judgment must be reversed.
In addition, I dissent to the majority’s further holding that the so-called “Briggs Instruction” is unconstitutional, a holding which seemingly will result in summarily reversing 20 to 30 other capital cases wherein similar instructions were given. I suggest that such a wasteful result is wholly unjustified in light of the harmless contents of the challenged instruction.
Nearly three years ago, a majority of this court ruled that the Briggs Instruction was invalid under the federal Constitution, despite Justice Richardson’s admonition, in dissent, that no case had ever suggested any constitutional infirmity in informing the jurors regarding the Governor’s commutation power. (People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 602-603 [Ramos I].) The case was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court where, as the dissent had predicted, the majority’s holding was firmly discredited. (California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992 [77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 103 S.Ct. 3446].) In the meantime, of course, this case (and dozens of other automatic appeals raising the same issue) sat in abeyance, gathering dust.
Today, the majority attempts to resurrect its prior holding by relying upon the state Constitution, an issue left open in Ramos I (see 30 Cal.3d at p. 600, fn. 24). In other words, by reason of the majority’s initial refusal to confront the independent state ground issue, the parties have wasted about three years which could have been spent retrying this case and all other affected cases.
In any event, the majority now reiterates its Ramos I analysis to the effect that the Briggs Instruction denied the accused due process because it is “misleading” and invites the jury to “speculate” regarding future exercise of the commutation power. Both points are convincingly refuted by the high court’s contrary analysis in California v. Ramos, supra, and by the dissent in Ramos /. Accordingly, I only briefly discuss those points here.
1. Instruction Not Misleading
The majority contends that the Briggs instruction is misleading because it fails to inform the jury that the Governor may commute a death sentence as well as a life-without-parole sentence. There are two conclusive responses to that argument: First, most jurors already know of the Governor’s commutation power, a matter of common knowledge in the community. (See Ramos I, 30 Cal.3d at p. 604, and cases cited [dis. opn. by Richardson, J.].) Second, any instruction which attempted to emphasize the Governor’s power to commute a death sentence would be declared invalid as tending to *161minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility. (See id., at pp. 603-604; California v. Ramos, supra, at p. 1011 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp, 1186-1187, 103 S.Ct. at pp. 3457-3458].) As stated by the high court in rejecting this precise argument, “A jury concerned about preventing the defendant’s potential return to society will not be any less inclined to vote for the death penalty upon learning that even a death sentence may not have such an effect. In fact, advising jurors that a death verdict is theoretically modifiable, and thus not ‘final, ’ may incline them to approach their sentencing decision with less appreciation for the gravity of their choice and for the moral responsibility reposed in them as sentencers.” (Id., at p. 1011 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 1187, 103 S.Ct. at p. 3458].)
2. Instruction Not an Invitation to Speculate
The majority also suggests that the Briggs Instruction invites the jury to speculate regarding an irrelevant factor, namely, the possible future exercise of the Governor’s power to commute a sentence of life without parole. As the Ramos I dissent pointed out, “To the contrary, the instruction is purely informational, explaining to those jurors who might otherwise be misled that a sentence denominated ‘life imprisonment without possibility of parole’ is nonetheless subject to possible commutation by the Governor. [Citation.]” (30 Cal.3d at p. 603.)
The United States Supreme Court agreed, observing that the challenged instruction “was merely an accurate statement of a potential sentencing alternative. . . . The Briggs Instruction thus corrects a misconception and supplies the jury with accurate information for its deliberation in selecting an appropriate sentence.” (463 U.S. at p. 1009 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 1186, 103 S.Ct. at p. 3457].) As the high court explained, the instruction brings to the jury’s attention “the possibility that the defendant may be returned to society,” thereby properly inviting the jury “to assess whether the defendant is someone whose probable future behavior makes it undesirable that he be permitted to return to society.” (Id. at p. 1003 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 1182, 103 S.Ct. at p. 3454].)
3. Conclusion
As I have indicated, the majority now relies exclusively upon the state Constitution to support its invalidation of the Briggs Instruction. In my view, not only does this holding come three years too late, but it also frustrates the spirit, if not the letter, of the very Constitution on which the majority so belatedly relies. Article I, section 27, of the California Constitution, adopted in 1972 by the people of this state, was intended to reinstate the death penalty “to the extent permitted by federal constitutional law.” *162(People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 186 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587], italics added; see People v. Superior Court (Engert) 31 Cal.3d 797, 814 [183 Cal.Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76] [dis. opn. by Richardson, J.].) Federal constitutional law, as interpreted by this nation’s highest court, now clearly permits the jury in a death penalty case to be informed of the Governor’s commutation power. (California v. Ramos, supra, 463 U.S. 992 [77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 103 S.Ct. 3446].) Accordingly, by reason of article I, section 27, we have no authority to impose additional restrictions or procedures not required by federal law.
In my view, the Briggs Instruction is constitutional. The majority’s contrary holding ignores the people’s will as expressed in their own Constitution. I respectfully dissent to that holding.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 13, 1984. Lucas, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.