Court Opinion

ID: 9377311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 16:10:15.497982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.325891
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges O’Brien, Causey and Friedman
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

              ENTREPRENEUR DREAM TEAM
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0546-22-1                                  JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN
                                                                                 MARCH 7, 2023
              ANCHOR ASSETS V, LLC AND
               COMMONWEALTH ASSET SERVICES, LLC

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
                                               Mary Jane Hall, Judge

                               Henry W. McLaughlin (Law Office of Henry McLaughlin, P.C., on
                               briefs), for appellant.

                               David M. Zobel (Sykes, Bourdon, Ahern & Levy, P.C., on brief), for
                               appellee Anchor Assets V, LLC.

                               No brief or argument for appellee Commonwealth Asset Services,
                               LLC.

                     Entrepreneur Dream Team (“Entrepreneur”) appeals a final order granting summary

              judgment to Anchor Assets V, LLC (“Anchor Assets”) and dismissing Entrepreneur’s claim for

              damages from loss of equity in foreclosed property.

                     Entrepreneur defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust. This appeal concerns

              whether the trustee’s noncompliance with a recording provision in the deed of trust precluded the

              lender from foreclosing. There is no dispute that the trustee Commonwealth Asset Services,

              LLC (“CAS”)1 did not comply with the deed of trust provision (“Paragraph 18”) requiring it to

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
                     1
                      CAS did not participate in this appeal. Before the summary judgment hearing, the court
              dismissed as settled Entrepreneur’s claim against CAS for breach of fiduciary duty. Despite
              naming CAS in its notice of appeal, Entrepreneur did not assign error to the court’s dismissal of
record a notice of default in public land records. The lender Anchor Assets foreclosed

nevertheless, after providing Entrepreneur with several copies of that notice of default by

certified and first-class mail and multiple opportunities to cure. Additionally, CAS sent

Entrepreneur a notice of the foreclosure date in accordance with the applicable statute in effect at

the time.

       Entrepreneur contends the court erred by finding that compliance with Paragraph 18 was

not a precondition of foreclosure. Specifically, in its first two assignments of error, Entrepreneur

challenges the court’s findings that Paragraph 18 did not require Anchor Assets to provide a

notice of default and did not require the trustee to record that notice in public land records before

foreclosure.

       The third assignment of error contests the court’s finding that Entrepreneur’s knowledge

that Anchor Assets started foreclosure proceedings essentially “mooted” any contention that

Entrepreneur was nevertheless entitled to recordation of the notice of default in public land

records.

       Fourth, Entrepreneur contends the court erred in finding that it did not show any harm

suffered from the trustee’s failure to record the notice of default. Entrepreneur contends that it

created a jury question about its ability to cure the default and prevent foreclosure if the notice

had been recorded, a prerequisite to recovery under Young-Allen v. Bank of America, 298 Va.

462 (2020).

       Because Entrepreneur failed to create a genuine dispute for trial that it suffered harm

from any noncompliance with the deed of trust, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to

Anchor Assets.

CAS from the lawsuit and has not raised any issue concerning CAS’s nonparticipation in this
venue.
                                              -2-
                                          BACKGROUND2

        In November 2017, Anchor Loans, LP (“Anchor Loans”) loaned Entrepreneur $104,500

to buy a residential lot on Ballentine Boulevard in Norfolk (“the Ballentine property”).

Alexander Battle, as Entrepreneur’s president, signed the promissory note and a deed of trust to

secure the loan, using the Ballentine property as the security. Anchor Loans subsequently

assigned the note and deed of trust to Anchor Assets, but Anchor Loans continued to service the

loan.

        The note required Entrepreneur to make monthly, interest-only payments of $1,045 for

ten months beginning January 1, 2018, followed by a final balloon payment. Although payments

were due the first day of each month, Entrepreneur had a ten-day grace period before default.

The note did not require notice of default and allowed Anchor Assets to collect interest on the

entire unpaid balance. Entrepreneur expressly waived any rights to have Anchor Assets

“demand payment of amounts due” or “give notice that amounts due have not been paid” or

“obtain an official certification of nonpayment.”

        The deed of trust addressed default in Paragraph 18. It identified events that constituted

default, including “a default in the payment, when due, of principal or interest on the Note or any

other sum secured hereby.”

        Paragraph 18 also addressed Anchor Assets’ option, in the event of default, to accelerate

the loan and instruct the trustee to foreclose on the property:

               Upon the occurrence of any default under this Deed of Trust,
               Lender may, at its option, declare all sums secured hereby
               immediately due and payable by delivery to Trustee of written

        2
          In granting Anchor Assets’ motion for summary judgment, the court considered the
parties’ pleadings, affidavits with attached exhibits, and factual matters established by requests
for admission. See Rule 3:20; Code § 8.01-420(C) (allowing affidavits at summary judgment
when the parties are business entities and the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000).
Entrepreneur did not dispute that it failed to answer Anchor Assets’ requests for admission, and
the court deemed them admitted.
                                                 -3-
               declaration of default and demand for sale and of written Notice of
               Default and of election to cause to be sold said property, which
               notice Trustee shall cause to be filed for record.

Paragraph 18 further specified that, if Anchor Assets opted to foreclose and authorize a sale, the

“Trustee shall provide such notice [of a Trustee’s Sale] and shall advertise a Trustee’s Sale in the

manner required by applicable law.”

        Entrepreneur made its January 2018 payment, although not until January 19, 2018.

Entrepreneur made no further monthly payments.

        On May 11, 2018, Anchor Loans sent Entrepreneur a “NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND

INTENT TO ACCELERATE,” advising that Entrepreneur could cure the default and reinstate

the loan by paying $6,844.75 within ten days. Anchor Loans sent the notice by first-class mail

and certified mail, return receipt requested. Entrepreneur admitted that both Alexander Battle

and Sherry Battle-Edmonds—the registered agent, CEO, and CFO of Entrepreneur—received

this notice.

        From May through July 2018, Anchor Loans representative Danielle Gates exchanged

several emails with Alexander Battle. On May 21, Gates emailed Battle that the foreclosure

process had begun. On June 5, she informed him that Entrepreneur could pay $9,320.41 to

reinstate the loan, explaining that this amount reflected the note’s default interest rate and would

be “good through 6/8/18.” Battle responded that evening that Entrepreneur had wired $5,000 to

Anchor Loans. Gates advised that the payment would “be held in trust towards the

reinstatement” because it was insufficient to stop foreclosure, and she inquired when the

remaining $4,320.41 would be sent. Battle did not respond.

        On June 12, Gates asked again when the outstanding balance would be sent and advised

that Entrepreneur had until the close of business on June 14 to complete the payment. Gates

                                                -4-
emailed, “If the remaining funds are not received by 5pm 6/14/18[,] the foreclosure will resume

and the trustee fees for the reinstatement will increase.” Battle did not respond.

       On June 14, Gates emailed Battle a reminder that if he did not pay the remaining

$4,320.41 by 5:00 p.m., “the noteholders will resume the foreclosure.” Battle did not respond.

       On June 18, Entrepreneur paid an additional $2,000, which Anchor Loans placed into the

trust account. Gates emailed Battle advising that the $2,000 “will be kept in trust” because

Anchor Loans “does not accept partial reinstatement” and “the foreclosure process will

continue.”

       Entrepreneur sent another payment of $1,060 on July 23. Again, Anchor Loans placed

the money into the trust account because it was insufficient to reinstate the loan. When Battle

emailed Gates on July 24 about the payment, Gates acknowledged receipt and advised that the

total amount in the trust account was now $8,060. She reminded Battle that the full

reinstatement amount as of June 8 had been $9,320.41 and agreed to calculate an updated

reinstatement amount; however, she advised that the foreclosure process would have to continue.

       On July 25, Gates informed Battle that the new reinstatement amount was $7,403.26,

attaching to her email the calculation breakdown. In response to Battle’s inquiry about an

increase in trustee fees, Gates explained that “[a]s we are now closer to the sale date, [the trustee]

fees have increased significantly.” Anchor Loans received no further payments from

Entrepreneur; Battle and Gates exchanged no further emails.

       Both Battle and Battle-Edmonds lived on Boissevain Avenue in Norfolk and had

provided that address in Entrepreneur’s loan application. At Anchor Assets’ request, the trustee

CAS sent a foreclosure notice to that address on July 25, 2018, by both first-class mail and

certified mail, return receipt requested. The foreclosure notice was addressed to Entrepreneur

“c/o Alexander Battle, President.” Entrepreneur admitted that Battle received the first-class

                                                -5-
version of the foreclosure notice, as well as a United States Postal Service notice that certified

mail was waiting for him at the local post office, but he never went to claim the letter. The

notice from CAS advised that the foreclosure sale was scheduled for August 14, 2018, at

9:31 a.m. on the front steps of the Norfolk Circuit Court clerk’s office.

       CAS sent the same foreclosure notice directly to the Ballentine property. No one lived at

the Ballentine property, and Entrepreneur never arranged for mail to be forwarded from that

address. Consistent with its notice, CAS conducted the foreclosure sale of the Ballentine

property on August 14, 2018.

       Entrepreneur filed a two-count complaint in September 2020. Count I sought

compensatory damages against Anchor Assets for breach of the deed of trust. Entrepreneur

argued that Anchor Assets foreclosed without complying with Paragraph 18’s requirement for

CAS to record any notice of default in public land records. Entrepreneur argued that this

recordation requirement was a “precondition[] to foreclosure.” Count II sought compensatory

damages against CAS for breach of fiduciary duty.

       CAS demurred, arguing that Count II failed to state a claim because Entrepreneur did not

allege an “ability to cure its default and/or that it informed CAS it had the ability to cure its

default prior to foreclosure.” The court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.

       In its amended complaint, Entrepreneur added allegations concerning its ability to cure

default, including that Battle-Edmonds owned a million-dollar home “free of any mortgage

loan.” Entrepreneur alleged,

               If anyone on behalf of the lender had notified [Entrepreneur] that a
               foreclosure was intended for August 14, 2018, [Entrepreneur]
               would have prevented the foreclosure . . . by action by
               Battle-Edmonds (as sole owner of [Entrepreneur]) to obtain a loan
               on her home (even, if absolutely necessary to obtain quick funds

                                                 -6-
               from a hard money lender) to pay the loan in full to prevent
               foreclosure.3

       In its answer to the amended complaint, Anchor Assets admitted that CAS never recorded

a notice of default but denied that this inaction constituted a material breach of the deed of trust.

Anchor Assets also denied that Entrepreneur could cure its default by Battle-Edmonds obtaining

a loan on her personal home.

       Anchor Assets and CAS jointly moved for summary judgment. They argued that, based

on the undisputed facts, no genuine issues remained for trial: Entrepreneur defaulted in its

payments due under the note; Anchor Assets’ loan servicer regularly communicated with Battle

to inform him of the specific amounts required to reinstate the loan, but Entrepreneur failed to

pay those amounts; CAS sent the required notice of the date and time for the foreclosure sale,

which Entrepreneur admitted receiving; and Entrepreneur failed to show that it could bring the

loan current, and only claimed that Battle-Edmonds could have taken action to bring the loan

current. They further argued that Paragraph 18 did not impose preconditions to foreclosure and

therefore CAS’s failure to record any notice of default did not affect the validity of the

foreclosure sale.

       CAS subsequently settled with Entrepreneur and was dismissed from the lawsuit.

       Following a hearing, the court granted summary judgment to Anchor Assets. In a letter

opinion, the court noted that Entrepreneur did not dispute that the loan was in default and that

Battle received the July 25, 2018 foreclosure notice at the address listed in Entrepreneur’s loan

application.

       3
         Entrepreneur also alleged it could have used insurance proceeds from a fire on the
property, but Anchor Assets’ evidence in support of summary judgment showed those funds
were either unavailable or insufficient. In its briefing to this Court, Entrepreneur no longer
claims that the insurance proceeds would have helped cure foreclosure.
                                                 -7-
        The court determined that Paragraph 18 did not require Anchor Assets to provide a

written notice of default to Entrepreneur, but that Anchor Assets did so “at its option.” The court

also found that Paragraph 18 did not require CAS to record the notice of default prior to any

foreclosure sale, stating that “[a] trustee’s failure to record a notice that the lender had no

obligation to provide but nonetheless did provide, cannot be construed as an unmet condition

precedent to foreclosure.” The court reasoned that Paragraph 18 was merely “a contractual

provision that, if breached, could form the basis of a cause of action for breach of contract.” The

court found that under the deed of trust, the only “precondition to foreclosure” was an

“occurrence of default,” which had indisputably occurred due to Entrepreneur’s deficient loan

payments.

        Even assuming CAS was required to record the notice of default before foreclosure, the

court still found that summary judgment was warranted under Young-Allen, which requires a

borrower contesting foreclosure to establish an ability to have cured the default if the lender had

complied with all notice requirements. 298 Va. at 471-72. The court concluded that

Entrepreneur did not show “that it could have cured its default if the trustee had recorded the

notice of default.” Quoting the amended complaint, the court noted that Entrepreneur claimed

only “that it would have come up with the money to prevent the foreclosure ‘if anyone on behalf

of the lender had notified [Entrepreneur] that a foreclosure was intended for August 14, 2018.’”

The court concluded that Entrepreneur, based on its own admission, did receive written notice of

the foreclosure sale by CAS’s letter dated July 25, 2018, yet it did not cure the default and

therefore created no factual dispute for trial.

        In its letter opinion, the court wrote, “If recording the notice of default was, as

[Entrepreneur] characterizes, a ‘precondition to foreclosure,’ [Entrepreneur] must nonetheless

allege something that would have been different had the [t]rustee complied with that

                                                  -8-
precondition.” The court found no “genuine issue of material fact regarding [Entrepreneur’s]

receipt of notice” of the foreclosure sale. The court concluded that “the omission by the trustee

to record the May 11, 2018 notice of default[] caused no harm to [Entrepreneur] and cannot

support the request for monetary damages to compensate [Entrepreneur] for lost equity in the

property.”

                                             ANALYSIS

                                      A. Standard of Review

       Entrepreneur’s first two assignments of error challenge the court’s interpretation of the

deed of trust. “A deed of trust is construed as a contract under Virginia law . . . .” Squire v. Va.

Hous. Dev. Auth., 287 Va. 507, 515 (2014) (quoting Mathews v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 283 Va.

723, 733 (2012)); see also Jim Carpenter Co. v. Potts, 255 Va. 147, 155 n.4 (1998). As with all

contracts, we review a lower court’s interpretation of a deed of trust de novo. Beeren & Barry

Invs., LLC v. AHC, Inc., 277 Va. 32, 37 (2009).

       Entrepreneur’s third and fourth assignments of error concern the court’s granting of

summary judgment. Entrepreneur argues that genuine issues of material fact remained in

dispute. See Rule 3:20 (“Summary judgment may not be entered if any material fact is genuinely

in dispute.”). On appeal, “the trial court’s determination that no genuinely disputed material

facts exist and its application of law to the facts present issues of law subject to de novo review.”

Mount Aldie, LLC v. Land Tr. of Va., 293 Va. 190, 196-97 (2017).

                                   B. Assignment of Error 1:
          Whether the deed of trust required sending a notice of default to Entrepreneur

       Entrepreneur first challenges the court’s conclusion that the deed of trust did not require

Anchor Assets to provide a written notice of default, but merely allowed Anchor Assets to give

this notice “at its option.” Entrepreneur contends that although Anchor Assets had the option to

accelerate the loan and foreclose, “exercise of [that] option required such notice.”
                                                -9-
       Paragraph 18 of the deed of trust defined events that constituted default, including “a

default in the payment, when due, of principal or interest on the Note or any other sum secured

hereby.”

       Paragraph 18 also identified actions Anchor Assets could take upon default, including

accelerating the loan and instructing the trustee to foreclose on and sell the property. If Anchor

Assets opted to foreclose and authorize the sale, the deed of trust specified that the “Trustee shall

provide such notice [of a Trustee’s Sale] and shall advertise a Trustee’s Sale in the manner

required by applicable law.” As trustee, CAS sent this foreclosure notice on July 25, 2018, and

Entrepreneur admitted receiving it.

       The portion of Paragraph 18 at issue here addresses an earlier step—when Anchor Assets

chose to accelerate the loan and instructed the trustee to initiate foreclosure:

               Upon the occurrence of any default under this Deed of Trust,
               Lender may, at its option, declare all sums secured hereby
               immediately due and payable by delivery to Trustee of written
               declaration of default and demand for sale and of written Notice of
               Default and of election to cause to be sold said property, which
               notice Trustee shall cause to be filed for record.

Although capitalized, “Notice of Default” is not defined in Paragraph 18 or elsewhere in the deed

of trust. It is also not defined, mentioned, or required in the promissory note secured by the deed

of trust. Cf. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Simmons, 275 Va. 114, 121 (2008) (construing a

deed of trust provision that expressly required specific terms in a lender’s notice of default to the

borrower).

       “Every deed of trust to secure debts . . . is in the nature of a contract and shall be

construed according to its terms to the extent not in conflict with the requirements of law.” Code

§ 55.1-320; see Squire, 287 Va. at 515-16. “Basic contract interpretation principles dictate that

. . . ‘[n]o word or clause in the contract will be treated as meaningless if a reasonable meaning

can be given to it, and there is a presumption that the parties have not used words needlessly.’”
                                                - 10 -
Orthopaedic and Spine Ctr. v. Muller Martini Mfg. Corp., 61 Va. App. 482, 490-91 (2013)

(second alteration in original) (quoting Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284

Va. 382, 392 (2012)).

       Anchor Assets’ obligation to send a notice of default to Entrepreneur may be reasonably

inferred from Paragraph 18. Although Paragraph 18 provided that Anchor Assets “at its option”

could accelerate the loan in the event of Entrepreneur’s default, once Anchor Assets in fact

exercised this option, it had to perform specific actions to authorize the trustee’s foreclosure sale.

These actions included “delivery to trustee . . . of written Notice of Default.” Delivering this

document to the trustee implies first sending it to Entrepreneur. To construe these actions as

optional, simply because Anchor Assets’ decision to accelerate the loan was itself optional, treats

the disputed language in Paragraph 18 as meaningless. See id. Additionally, although the

promissory note included language purporting to waive Entrepreneur’s right to notice of default

and amounts due, the notice requirement in Paragraph 18 remained effective because all loan

instruments “will be construed together to determine the intent of the parties.” Daugherty v.

Diment, 238 Va. 520, 524 (1989).

       In fact, it is undisputed that Anchor Assets did send Entrepreneur a written “NOTICE OF

DEFAULT AND INTENT TO ACCELERATE” on May 11, 2018. Entrepreneur admitted that

both Battle and Battle-Edmonds received it. The notice advised that Entrepreneur could cure the

default and reinstate the loan by paying a certain amount within ten days. Having received that

notice, Entrepreneur knew Anchor Assets would accelerate the balance due if Entrepreneur

failed to cure its default. Anchor Assets sent several follow-up emails, often in response to

Entrepreneur’s partial payments that were never enough to reinstate the loan. Anchor Assets

kept the partial payments in a trust account and consistently advised Entrepreneur that the

foreclosure process would proceed.

                                                - 11 -
          Paragraph 18 required Anchor Assets to send the notice of default. Although the court

misconstrued this provision as optional, we find no reversible error because Anchor Assets in

fact complied with the deed of trust by sending the notice as required.

                                      C. Assignment of Error 2:
         Whether the deed of trust required pre-foreclosure recordation of the notice of default

          Entrepreneur next argues the court erred in finding that Paragraph 18 permitted recording

the notice of default after foreclosure. Entrepreneur challenges the following sentence from the

court’s letter opinion: “The deed of trust does not stipulate that such recordation must happen

before sale; presumably the trustee can record it at any point in time, even perhaps after the

sale.”

          Entrepreneur faults the court’s reasoning because “pre-foreclosure recordation . . . was

the only way prospective buyers could determine there had been compliance with the deed of

trust’s requirement of such recordation.” Entrepreneur argues that any ambiguity on the timing

of recordation must be construed against Anchor Assets, the drafter of the document, and that

summary judgment is not appropriate when “the timing of the recordation language in the deed

of trust could be determined by parol evidence.”4

          Paragraph 18 specified that the trustee “shall cause” the notice of default “to be filed for

record.” The word “shall” imposed a mandatory requirement on the trustee to record in public

land records the notice of default that Anchor Assets sent to Entrepreneur. See TM Delmarva

Power, LLC v. NCP of Va. LLC, 263 Va. 116, 121 (2002) (stating that “the word ‘shall’ is

primarily mandatory in effect” when used “in a will, a contract, or a statute” (quoting Pettus v.

Hendricks, 113 Va. 326, 330 (1912))). Although Paragraph 18 does not specify that this

          4
        Entrepreneur made no proffer of parol evidence to construe the recordation provision of
Paragraph 18. Failure to proffer parol evidence constitutes a waiver of the issue for appeal.
Campbell v. Corpening, 230 Va. 45, 48 (1985).
                                              - 12 -
recordation must occur before foreclosure, the purpose of recording information in land records

is to provide at least constructive notice to the public about the legal status of property. See, e.g.,

Beck v. Smith, 260 Va. 452, 457 (2000) (stating that a buyer is on notice of those matters shown

by the public land records, but not of matters that are “outside the scope of the title

examination”); Givago Growth, LLC v. iTech AG, LLC, 300 Va. 260, 266 (2021) (noting that a

lis pendens filed in public land records “provides notice of [a] pending lawsuit to parties who

may be interested in the property underlying the suit”). Recording a notice of default after a

foreclosure sale, which terminates the borrower’s interest in the property and therefore

eliminates its opportunity to cure the default, would misinform the public about the legal status

of the property.

       We note that Virginia’s foreclosure statute does not require recordation of notices of

default; the statute requires advertising the foreclosure sale as the method for giving public

notice about properties encumbered by a loan in default. See Code § 55-59.2 (effective July 1,

2018 to September 30, 2019, and now codified as the substantively similar Code § 55.1-322).

But the lack of any statutory recordation requirement is not dispositive here; parties are free to

include and enforce non-statutory obligations in their contracts. See Simmons, 275 Va. at 121-22

(enforcing contractual condition precedent to foreclosure in a deed of trust despite a statutory

cure available in former Code § 55-59.1(A)).

       Despite Anchor Assets foreclosing without CAS’s compliance with the recordation

requirement, Entrepreneur failed to show that it suffered any harm from that breach of the deed

of trust. See Young-Allen, 298 Va. at 470 (holding that a borrower must plead and eventually

prove harm from a bank’s breach of contract by demonstrating a capacity to have cured the

default). Instead, Entrepreneur only argued that, if it had received notice that the foreclosure sale

                                                - 13 -
was intended for August 14, 2018, it would have taken steps to cure the default. There are at

least three problems with that argument.

       First, recordation of the notice of default would not have informed Entrepreneur of the

date of the foreclosure sale. The May 11, 2018 notice of default that should have been recorded

said nothing about the time, date, or location of the foreclosure sale. That information came

from CAS in its July 25, 2018 foreclosure notice to Entrepreneur.

       Second, Entrepreneur is charged with knowledge of the contents of the July 25

foreclosure notice because CAS sent it in compliance with Code § 55-59.1(A), the statute in

effect at the time. That statute required the trustee to “give written notice of the time, date[,] and

place of any proposed sale in execution of a deed of trust” by mail to the property owner’s “last

known address as such owner and address appear in the records of the party secured.” Code

§ 55-59.1(A) (effective July 1, 2018 to September 30, 2019). Further,

               Mailing of a copy of the . . . notice . . . to the owner by certified or
               registered mail no less than 14 days prior to such sale . . . shall be a
               sufficient compliance with the requirement of notice.

Id.5

       Here, CAS complied with this statutory requirement. Its July 25, 2018 foreclosure

notice, which cited former Code § 55-59.1, advised that the foreclosure sale would occur more

than 14 days later, on August 14, 2018 at 9:31 a.m., outside Norfolk Circuit Court. Entrepreneur

admitted that Battle received both the first-class version of the letter containing the notice and

the USPS notice that certified mail was waiting for him at the local post office. Thus, no genuine

issue of material fact about receipt of the notice exists. It is of no import that Entrepreneur

claimed it lacked actual notice of the foreclosure sale because no one opened or retrieved the

       5
         Code § 55-59.1 is now codified at Code § 55.1-321 and also provides that mailing a
foreclosure notice by certified or registered mail more than 14 days before the sale equates to
“sufficient compliance with the requirement of notice.”
                                               - 14 -
mailings from the trustee; CAS’s compliance with the applicable statute satisfied the notice

requirement. See id.

       Third, the undisputed facts establish that, despite receiving the notice of default and the

notice of foreclosure sale, Entrepreneur did not cure the default. Entrepreneur failed to show that

recordation of the notice of default would have made any difference. It only represented that

Battle-Edmonds would have refinanced her personal home or obtained some other loan if

Entrepreneur knew the foreclosure date. But Entrepreneur admitted that it received the notice of

the foreclosure date, not to mention ample notice of the default and opportunity to cure, yet it

never came into compliance. At the summary judgment hearing, Entrepreneur did not explain

why Battle-Edmonds took no action to refinance her home or obtain another loan despite all the

other forms of notice established in the record.

       Although Paragraph 18 obliged the trustee to record the notice of default before Anchor

Assets’ foreclosure, we nevertheless affirm because Entrepreneur failed to demonstrate that it

suffered harm resulting from this breach.

                                  D. Assignment of Error 3:
           Whether Entrepreneur’s knowledge that Anchor Assets initiated foreclosure
                 “mooted” any right to additional notice in public land records

       Entrepreneur next contends the court erred by finding that Entrepreneur’s knowledge that

Anchor Assets had started the foreclosure process “mooted” its right to additional notice in

public land records. Entrepreneur argues that “it was a jury question” whether (1) Entrepreneur

would have learned of the foreclosure if the notice of default had been recorded and

(2) Entrepreneur would have been able to cure the default if notified by recordation.

       Entrepreneur admits that it received Anchor Assets’ May 11, 2018 notice of default by

mail. Nevertheless, in this assignment of error, Entrepreneur essentially insists that it did not

have to take this notice seriously unless or until the trustee recorded it in public land records in

                                                - 15 -
accordance with Paragraph 18. That interpretation of Paragraph 18, however, renders

meaningless the first step of the lender sending a notice of default directly to the borrower and

characterizes that action as having no legal consequence without recordation. Nothing in the

loan documents or Virginia law would justify Entrepreneur simply disregarding the May 11

notice until it was recorded, and principles of contract interpretation dictate that no provisions

should be construed as meaningless. See Westmoreland-LG & E Partners v. Va. Elec. & Power

Co., 254 Va. 1, 11 (1997) (“No word or clause in the contract will be treated as meaningless if a

reasonable meaning can be given to it, and there is a presumption that the parties have not used

words needlessly.” (quoting D.C. McClain, Inc. v. Arlington Cnty., 249 Va. 131, 135-36

(1995))).

        Also unpersuasive is Entrepreneur’s contention that a jury should decide whether

recordation would have notified Entrepreneur of the August 14, 2018 foreclosure date. It is

uncontested that the May 11 notice of default—the document to have been recorded—did not

specify the foreclosure date. Accordingly, recording the May 11 notice of default could not have

changed Entrepreneur’s understanding of the foreclosure date; that information was in CAS’s

July 25 foreclosure notice, which, as discussed above, was statutorily compliant and thus

sufficient to convey notice of its contents.

                                E. Assignment of Error 4:
       Whether summary judgment was appropriate under Young-Allen v. Bank of America

        Entrepreneur argues the court erred in holding, pursuant to Young-Allen, 298 Va. 462,

that it failed to create a jury question of whether it was harmed by the failure to record the notice

of default.

        In Young-Allen, a borrower sought rescission of a foreclosure sale based on the bank’s

breach of a deed of trust. Id. at 466. The borrower alleged that the bank did not send her the

required contractual notices, including the “right to cure,” “the amount that must be paid and
                                                - 16 -
where it must be sent,” and “the date by which that figure is good to reinstate/cure.” Id. at 470.

But the complaint “did not allege that [the borrower] had the ability to cure her default” or “that

she could have cured her default and prevented the foreclosure sale if she received the notices at

issue.” Id. The Supreme Court held that “[w]ithout such an allegation, the complaint did not

establish that the alleged breach caused any harm” and the circuit court appropriately denied the

“drastic remedy of equitable recission.” Id.

       Entrepreneur claimed monetary damages, not rescission of the foreclosure sale, premised

on a breach of the deed of trust. Nevertheless, Entrepreneur was subject to the same requirement

to plead and be able to prove that the breach caused it harm. See id. at 469 (noting that rescission

is a remedy for breach of contract and therefore has the same underlying elements, including

“injury or damage . . . caused by the breach of obligation” (quoting Ramos v. Wells Fargo Bank,

289 Va. 321, 323 (2015))). To show harm, Entrepreneur needed to demonstrate its ability to

have cured the default and prevent foreclosure if it had received the notice at issue. See id. at

470. Here, the court gave Entrepreneur the chance to plead sufficient harm under Young-Allen,

after sustaining the trustee’s demurrer with leave to amend. In its amended complaint,

Entrepreneur added allegations attempting to illustrate that the failure to record the notice of

default prevented Entrepreneur from averting foreclosure. Specifically, Entrepreneur alleged

that because the notice of default was not recorded, no one on behalf of Entrepreneur “had any

knowledge of the August 14, 2018 purported foreclosure until after it occurred,” and if it had

been notified of the foreclosure date, Battle-Edmonds would have refinanced her home or

“obtain[ed] quick funds from a hard money lender” to “pay the loan in full to prevent

foreclosure.”

       At the summary judgment hearing, Entrepreneur added that Battle-Edmonds is a “widow

of a former circuit court judge” and “she gets notified about things that happen at the clerk’s

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office if they affect her.” Entrepreneur represented that Battle-Edmonds therefore would have

become aware of a properly recorded notice in public land records and would have raised and

paid sufficient funds to prevent foreclosure.

       Entrepreneur argues that these representations created a factual dispute over whether the

failure of recordation did it any harm. We disagree.

       Young-Allen was decided at the demurrer stage of litigation. 298 Va. at 466-67. Both the

trial court and Supreme Court were presented with the issue of whether the borrower had alleged

sufficient facts that, if true, could support her theories of recovery against the lender. Id. at

467-70. Here, by contrast, the parties reached the summary judgment stage. Therefore, on

appeal, we are reviewing the court’s ruling that Entrepreneur would be unable to prove, as a

matter of law, any harm or damages arising from the claimed breach of contract. See Klaiber v.

Freemason Assocs., Inc., 266 Va. 478, 485 (2003) (distinguishing between appellate review of a

demurrer and summary judgment rulings). Accordingly, we must consider the entire record—the

pleadings, orders, admissions, affidavits, and exhibits—to determine whether Entrepreneur could

have proved any harm or damages at trial. See id.; see also Rule 3:20. Although we review the

record in the light most favorable to Entrepreneur, the party against whom summary judgment

was granted, we do not simply accept as true all its allegations in the amended complaint, nor

Entrepreneur’s unsupported representations to the circuit court, but must consider them in the

context of the entire record. See Klaiber, 266 Va. at 481-83, 485.

       To survive summary judgment, Entrepreneur needed to show a genuine factual dispute as

to whether something would have been different had the trustee complied with the recordation

provision in Paragraph 18. See Rule 3:20. We find the record supports the court’s conclusion

that Entrepreneur would be unable to prove, as a matter of law, that the recordation failure

caused it any harm.

                                                 - 18 -
       In its amended complaint, Entrepreneur alleged that recordation would have notified it of

the August 14, 2018 foreclosure date. Entrepreneur would not be able to prove this at trial. As

previously discussed, the document to have been recorded did not specify the foreclosure date.

Thus, recordation could not possibly have changed Entrepreneur’s understanding of the

foreclosure date even assuming Battle-Edmonds had particular familiarity with filings in public

land records.6

       Nor did Entrepreneur create a jury question about its ability to cure default. Entrepreneur

never alleged, nor presented evidence in opposition to summary judgment, that it could have

cured its default if CAS had recorded the notice of default. Instead, Entrepreneur only

represented that it would have obtained the money to prevent foreclosure if it had known the

foreclosure date. But, again, Entrepreneur is charged with notice of the contents of the July 25,

2018 letter from CAS, which it admitted receiving. That Battle failed to open or retrieve the

letter did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Entrepreneur’s knowledge of the

foreclosure sale because CAS sent the letter in compliance with the deed of trust and controlling

Virginia law. See Code § 55-59.1(A) (effective July 1, 2018 to September 30, 2019) (mailing

foreclosure notice more than 14 days before foreclosure sale “shall be a sufficient compliance

with the requirements of notice”). “[I]mmaterial facts genuinely in dispute . . . do not preclude

the entry of summary judgment.” AlBritton v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 392, 403 (2021).

       Moreover, the emails attached to Anchor Assets’ summary judgment motion establish

that Entrepreneur knew foreclosure was imminent and what was required to reinstate the loan,

yet repeatedly failed to pay the requisite amount. Nothing in the record shows that Entrepreneur

       6
         Furthermore, Entrepreneur’s claim that recordation would have notified it of the
foreclosure date is inconsistent with the purpose of recording documents in public land records,
which is to notify third parties about the legal status of property. See, e.g., Beck, 260 Va. at 457;
Givago Growth, LLC, 300 Va. at 266.
                                                 - 19 -
would have done anything differently, such as have Battle-Edmonds refinance her home, if only

the trustee had recorded the May 11, 2018 notice of default. Entrepreneur took none of these

actions despite receiving notice of the foreclosure date.

       Finally, we note that many of the undisputed facts supporting summary judgment came

from Entrepreneur itself, by virtue of its wholesale failure to respond to Anchor Assets’ requests

for admission. See supra n.2. By not responding, Entrepreneur made crucial admissions

concerning its receipt of the May 11, 2018 notice of default and the July 25, 2018 foreclosure

notice. It also admitted to the specific emails that Battle exchanged with Anchor Loans about the

default, the reinstatement amounts, and the ongoing foreclosure process.

       Given this record, the court did not err in finding that Entrepreneur failed to create a jury

question concerning its ability to cure the default, had the notice of default been recorded.

                                           CONCLUSION

       For these reasons, we find that the court did not err in granting summary judgment for

Anchor Assets and affirm the judgment below.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

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