Court Opinion

ID: 9754523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:03:00.81681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:58.402105
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12682    Document: 15-1     Date Filed: 08/28/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12682
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       KENNETH LEE BROWN,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

                                                            Defendants,

       JESSIE WILLIAMS,
       Superintendent, Long State Prison,
       individual and oﬃcial capacities,
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12682

                                                              Defendant-Appellee.

                               ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00002-LGW-BWC
                             ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Kenneth Brown, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se,1 ap-
       peals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 com-
       plaint against Long State Prison Superintendent Jessie Williams.2
       The district court dismissed without prejudice Brown’s complaint
       for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the
       Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). No
       reversible error has been shown; we aﬃrm.

       1 We read liberally appellate briefs filed by pro se litigants.See Timson v.
       Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se
       pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
       1998).
       2 On appeal, Brown raises no challenge to the district court’s dismissal of (1)

       his claims against the Georgia Department of Corrections, (2) his claims
       against Long State Prison, or (3) his official-capacity claims for money damages
       against Superintendent Williams. Those claims are not before us.
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       22-12682                Opinion of the Court                          3

                                             I.
              This civil action arises from a 1 January 2019 incident during
       which Brown was stabbed ﬁve times in the head by a fellow inmate,
       Franklin Wood. According to Brown, Wood made broad threats to
       harm someone if he was not granted parole at his upcoming parole
       hearing. Although Brown told Superintendent Williams about
       Wood’s threats, Brown says no action was taken to protect him or
       other inmates from Wood. After Wood was denied parole, he at-
       tacked Brown.
               In January 2021, Brown ﬁled pro se this civil action in the dis-
       trict court. Brown asserted that Superintendent Williams failed to
       protect him from Wood’s attack. As relief, Brown sought $300,000
       in money damages.
              In his complaint, Brown acknowledged that the prison had a
       grievance procedure and indicated that he was unsure whether his
       failure-to-protect claim was covered by the grievance procedure.
       Brown also stated that he had ﬁled no grievance for the 1 January
       2019 incident.
              Superintendent Williams moved to dismiss Brown’s com-
       plaint on the ground that Brown failed to exhaust his administra-
       tive remedies under the prison’s grievance procedure.
               A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
       (“R&R”), advising the district court to dismiss without prejudice
       Brown’s complaint. The magistrate judge concluded that Brown
       failed to ﬁle a grievance before initiating his lawsuit. The magis-
       trate judge also rejected Brown’s arguments that the prison’s
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12682

       grievance process was inapplicable under the circumstances of this
       case. Brown objected to the R&R, arguing chieﬂy that the prison’s
       grievance process was inapplicable to his claim.
               The district court overruled Brown’s objections. The district
       court adopted the R&R, granted Superintendent Williams’s mo-
       tion to dismiss, and dismissed without prejudice Brown’s complaint
       for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
                                           II.
              We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and ap-
       plication of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See Johnson v.
       Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1155 (11th Cir. 2005).
              Under the PLRA, a prisoner may not ﬁle a section 1983 com-
       plaint about “prison conditions” unless “such administrative reme-
       dies as are available are exhausted.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The
       PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory; “unexhausted
       claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211
       (2007).
              In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust ad-
       ministrative remedies, the district court applies a two-step inquiry.
       See Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). “First,
       the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant’s motion
       to dismiss and those in the plaintiﬀ’s response, and if they conﬂict,
       takes the plaintiﬀ’s version of the facts as true.” Id. At this step,
       “[t]he court should dismiss if the facts as stated by the prisoner
       show a failure to exhaust.” Whatley v. Smith, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209
       (11th Cir. 2015). “Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the
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       22-12682               Opinion of the Court                         5

       prisoner’s view of the facts, the court makes speciﬁc ﬁndings to re-
       solve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based on those ﬁnd-
       ings, defendants have shown a failure to exhaust.” Id. Here, the
       district court dismissed Brown’s complaint at the ﬁrst step.
              The district court committed no error in dismissing Brown’s
       complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. That
       Brown ﬁled no prison grievance related to the 1 January 2019 inci-
       dent is undisputed. Because the facts as stated by Brown show that
       Brown failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the district
       court concluded properly that Brown’s complaint was subject to
       dismissal.
               The district court also rejected properly Brown’s arguments
       that the prison-grievance procedure was inapplicable under the cir-
       cumstances. That Brown’s failure-to-protect claim arose from a
       single assault -- not from a prison-wide condition -- does not render
       the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement inapplicable. The Supreme
       Court has concluded that “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement ap-
       plies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve gen-
       eral circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
       excessive force or some other wrong.” See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
       516, 532 (2002). Brown was also required to comply with the
       PLRA’s exhaustion requirement even though money damages were
       unavailable under the prison’s grievance process. See id. at 524
       (“Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance
       proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite
       to suit.”).
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12682

              Brown also contends that complaints about prisoner vio-
       lence are resolved typically under a prison policy dealing with ad-
       ministrative segregation and protective custody -- Georgia Depart-
       ment of Corrections Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”)
       209.06 -- not through the prison’s grievance process (SOP 227.02).
       Accepting Brown’s assertion as true, we read nothing in SOP 209.06
       that can be construed reasonably as superseding the prison’s griev-
       ance process. Nor do we read SOP 209.06 as preventing a prisoner
       from ﬁling a grievance about prisoner violence or about an alleged
       failure to place an inmate in protective custody.
              Brown argues further that he was not required to ﬁle a griev-
       ance (1) because he did not initiate the complaint about Wood and,
       instead, notiﬁed Superintendent Williams about Wood’s threats
       only after Superintendent Williams asked Brown expressly about
       Wood’s conduct; and (2) because Superintendent Williams failed to
       advise Brown that he needed to ﬁle a written grievance about
       Wood’s threats. We reject these arguments as without merit.
              Brown was required to comply with the prison’s grievance
       process before ﬁling this civil action. Because Brown failed to do
       so, the district court concluded properly that Brown’s complaint
       was subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative reme-
       dies.
             AFFIRMED.