Court Opinion

ID: 9732604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:27:20.554432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:30.079604
License: Public Domain

ASHBURN, J.
I dissent. I discover here no basis for a *395holding of waiver or estoppel on the part of the insurance company.
So far as concerns irregular and late payment of premiums, it appears that the application for the policy authorizes the company to charge any unpaid premium as a loan against the policy and the policy itself says that if any premium be not paid within the period of grace the company will charge same against the policy as a loan provided the loan value specified on the fifth page of the policy is sufficient to cover such loan. When the company charged any delinquent premium against loan value of the policy and thereby accepted a belated premium payment it was granting no indulgence to the insured, but was merely performing a legal obligation to accept that sort of payment. The basis for any estoppel was absent. When the loan value was exhausted the insured was notified of the fact and told that unless the January 9, 1958, payment was made the policy would lapse.
The “Telepost” sent by mail on March 28, 1958, by the company to insured and presumptively received on March 31, 1958, was a notice of lapsing only by inference. It stated the full amount due to be $166.94, including interest, when in fact, as later discovered, there was but one premium due, that of March 9, 1958, in the sum of $80.64. The body of the telepost was not a notice of lapse, but a plea for payment and avoidance of a lapse. True there was printed on the back of it an application for reinstatement, which referred to the policy as lapsed and called for health information which would have a direct bearing upon the matter of reinstatement. It looks like a document intended for future use after a lapse had occurred. But it probably should be treated for present purposes as a notice that the policy had lapsed. It could afford only one of the elements of an estoppel. The record is barren of any evidence of reliance upon it and action to the detriment of insured.
Respondent argues that insured, when confronted with this document, must have figured that his disclosure of a whiplash injury in recent years and its sequelae would prevent his obtaining a reinstatement; that he had the ability to pay the premium and was willing to do so, but was deterred by the considerations relating to his health.
The evidence shows that he, on March 19, 1958, borrowed $75 from his sister for the expressed purpose of paying his insurance; on the same day he deposited $81 in his bank ae- ¡ count. This was 12 days before he received the telepost.
*396Before that event occurred he had drawn and used the said money in discharge of other obligations. Apparently he had later ability to pay the $80.64 premium but he surely was not willing to do so.
Humiliation upon his previous intentions or his cogitations upon the possibility of making a health showing sufficient to obtain a reinstatement is but speculation upon possibilities. And such speculation does not amount to any evidence at all. A mere possibility is not an inference and multiplication of possibilities does not create one. “ ‘Whether a particular inference can be drawn from certain evidence is a question of law, but whether the inference shall be drawn, in any given ease, is a question of fact for the jury.’ [Citation.] An inference cannot be based on mere possibilities; it has been held that it must be based on probabilities. [Citations.] This accords with the general principle, enunciated more than once by this court, that in civil eases the rule of decision is a rule of probability only. [Citations.] ” (Sanders v. MacFarlane’s Candies, 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 500 [259 P.2d 1010].) “Liability is never premised upon purely speculative assumptions. [Citations.] ‘An inference cannot be based on mere possibilities ; it has been held that it must be based on probabilities. ’ [Citations.] ” (Brocato v. Standard Oil Co., 164 Cal.App.2d 749, 758 [331 P.2d 111].) Estate of Kuttler, 185 Cal.App.2d 189, 204, 205 [8 Cal.Rptr. 160], says: “Reese v. Smith, 9 Cal.2d 324, 328 [70 P.2d 933] : ‘ “If the existence of an essential fact upon which a party relies is left in doubt or uncertainty, the party upon whom the burden rests to establish that fact should suffer, and not his adversary. (Patterson v. San Francisco etc. Ry. Co., 147 Cal. 178 [81 P. 531].) A judgment cannot be based on guesses or conjectures. (Puckhaber v. Southern Pac. Co., 132 Cal. 363 [64 P. 480].) And, also, ‘A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than on a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence. A majority of chances never can suffice alone to establish a proposition of fact, since the slightest real evidence would outweigh all contrary probabilities. ’ (23 Cor. Jur., § 1750, p. 18.) ” ’ . . . What constitutes substantial evidence, as distinguished from mere possibility or speculation, is clarified in the following passage from Estate of Teed, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644 [247 P.2d 54] : ‘The sum total of the above definitions is that, if the word “substantial” means anything at all, it clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. Obviously the word *397cannot be deemed synonymous with “any” evidence. It must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be “substantial” proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.’ Fewel & Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal.2d 85, 89 [109 P.2d 650] : ‘If, however, the evidence is so slight and tenuous that it does not create a real and substantial conflict the finding may be set aside. (Ibid.) “There must be more than a conflict of words to constitute a conflict of evidence. The contrary evidence must be of a substantial character, such as reasonably supports the judgment. . . .” ’ ” To the same effect see Robinson v. Board of Retirement, 140 Cal.App.2d 115, 118 [294 P.2d 724] ; Rodela v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 148 Cal.App.2d 708, 712 [307 P.2d 436]; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 182 Cal.App.2d 162, 165-166 [5 Cal.Rptr. 738], See also Vernon v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 15 Wn.2d 94 [129 P.2d 801, 805 [5], 146 A.L.R. 642].
As the pleas of estoppel and waiver rest upon nothing more substantial than speculation upon possibilities, I would reverse.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 13, 1962. Ashburn, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 11, 1962. Schauer, J., and MeComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.