Court Opinion

ID: 9697065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:05:01.544719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:28.979908
License: Public Domain

*245Spencer, J.,
concurring.
I fully concur with the opinion herein. I do disagree, however, with the concurring opinion of Brodkey, J., suggesting that the defendant was acting as a “merchant,” as defined in the code, when he entered into the oral contract. I agree that courts in other jurisdictions are sharply divided on whether a farmer who sells the crop he raises is a merchant under the Uniform Commercial Code.
I am in full agreement with the five cases cited by the concurring opinion that a farmer who only sells his crop annually is not a professional with respect to such sales but is merely a casual seller within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code. I do not believe we should extend the Uniform Commercial Code by construction to cover an area which was not specifically considered by its drafters. I am certain it was not considered by our legislators when the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted in Nebraska.
Of the eight cases cited by the concurring opinion for the other view, I call attention to the fact that three of them are federal decisions, two from federal District Courts, and one from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. I believe the cases denying the application of the term “merchant” to a farmer who sells his own products state the better rule for a farm state like Nebraska.
In Lish v. Compton, 547 P. 2d 223 (Utah, 1976), the Utah court, in passing on this point, said: “ * * * we think it is neither consistent with the intent and purpose of the statute, nor with the ordinarily understood meaning of its language, to apply it (the term ‘merchant’) to anyone such as this defendant who simply sells his crops annually.”
The Alabama Supreme Court reached a similar result in Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975), where the court held that the framers of the Uniform Commercial Code did not contemplate that farmers should be included among *246those considered to be merchants. The Alabama court relied heavily on the fact that the defendant sold only products which he raised. The court said: “Although there was evidence which indicated that the appellee here had a good deal of knowledge, this is not the test. There is not one shred of evidence that appellee ever sold anyone’s cotton but his own. He was nothing more than an astute farmer selling his own product. We do not think this was sufficient to make him a dealer in goods.”
In Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S. W. 2d 555 (1965), the Arkansas court concluded that the statutory provision in question was not intended to include a farmer within the designation of “merchant.” In that case the court relied heavily on the fact that the farmer dealt only in commodities which he had raised.
Another case supporting this conclusion is Decatur Cooperative Assn. v. Urban, 219 Kan. 171, 547 P. 2d 323 (1976). The Kansas court said: “The concept of professionalism is heavy in determining who is a merchant under the statute. The writers of the official UCC comment virtually equate professionals with merchants — the casual or inexperienced buyer or seller is not to be held to the standard set for the professional in business. The defined term ‘between merchants’, used in the exception proviso to the statute of frauds, contemplates the knowledge and skill of professionals on each side of the transaction. The transaction in question here was the sale of wheat. Appellee as a farmer undoubtedly had special knowledge or skill in raising wheat but we do not think this factor, coupled with annual sales of a wheat crop and purchases of seed wheat, qualifies him as a merchant in that field.”
In Sand Seed Service, Inc. v. Poeckes, 249 N. W. 2d 663 (Iowa, 1977), the Iowa court held: “ * * * we hold a farmer, in order to be held as a merchant, must be (1) a dealer who deals in the goods of the *247kind involved, or (2) he must by his occupation hold himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction, or (3) he must employ an agent, broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction.” The Iowa court held that where the undisputed facts only showed that Poeckes was a farmer who annually sold what he himself grew, this would not bring him within the definition of the term “merchant” in the ucc.
The question as to whether or not a farmer in a particular instance is a merchant is a question of fact. If the farmer bought products only for his own use and sold only the products he raised himself, regardless of how much knowledge he might have in those two activities, I would not consider him a merchant. It would be in the instance where he was dealing with farm products raised by others that I would so consider him.
As our opinion notes, it was not necessary to reach this question in the opinion. The question should be reserved, as it has, for another day where the question is decisive of the appeal. We should not foreclose a full discussion of the issue by an advisory opinion in a case where the issue is not decisive.