Court Opinion

ID: 9559998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:40:30.722921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:57.658442
License: Public Domain

COATS, Chief Judge,
Dissenting.
The Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act requires sex offenders who are physically present in the state to register.1 The statute defines a “sex offender” as “a person convicted of a sex offense ... in this state or another jurisdiction regardless [of the date of the offense].”2 The statute does not define what “convicted” means. Although generally it is clear whether someone has previously been convicted of an offense, there are situations where the term “convicted” is ambiguous. Under AS 12.55.085 the legislature has provided that the court can place a person on probation without imposing sentence. At the end of the probationary period, the court may set aside the conviction. We have previously held that a conviction so set aside does not constitute a conviction for purposes of presumptive sentencing.3 Therefore, a person who has successfully completed his probation under a suspended imposition of sentence and had his conviction set aside has a substantial argument that he has not been convicted.
, The promise of a suspended imposition of sentence provides a substantial incentive and potential reward for a defendant facing prosecution on a criminal charge. If he can complete his probation, his conviction can be set aside. As a consequence, many defendants have entered into plea bargains in order to have the opportunity to have their convictions set aside. Judges use the suspended imposition of sentence as an incentive. If the defendant does not complete his probation, he can potentially be sentenced up to the maximum for the offense. On the other hand, if he successfully completes his probation, his conviction can be removed from his record. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the appellees in this case placed substantial reliance on the fact that since they received a suspended imposition of sentence, it could be removed from their record. They successfully completed their probation and had their convictions set aside. At that time, they could reasonably conclude that their criminal conviction was part of their past, and that, if they continued to be law abiding citizens, they had a good chance of not suffering any disabilities because of this prior prosecution.
The Sex Offender Registration Act imposes substantial obligations and risks on those who are required to register. A major purpose of registration is to inform the public of *895the identity and address of any person who has been convicted as a sex offender so that members of the public can protect themselves from offenders presumed dangerous. It is obvious that this exposure could result in substantial adverse consequences to a convicted sex offender’s privacy, employment and personal safety. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a defendant faced with prosecution for a crime which would, require him to register as a sex offender would take this into account in defending the criminal case. Since the appellees in this case qualified for, and successfully completed a suspended imposition of sentence, it is reasonable to infer that their offenses were relatively minor. Had they been considered more serious offenders, they would have received more severe punishment. This kind of offender, had he been aware of the Sex Offender Registration Act, could very well have negotiated to plead to an offense that would not require him to register. A current example of this kind of disposition is Whitehead v. State, where the defendant entered a plea to an assault charge rather than a sexual assault charge.4 It seems obvious that a major factor in the plea was the defendant’s desire to avoid the Sex Offender Registration Act. The appel-lees in this case had no such choice since the Act was not even in existence at the time they entered their pleas.
The legislature has provided that a defendant who enters a guilty or no contest plea to an offense where registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act is required must be informed of that fact.5 This tends to illustrate the legislature’s under-standing of the significant impact which the Sex Offender Registration Act can have on a person who is required to register. Recently, in Peterson v. State, we held that where a defendant was unaware of his duty to register, he must be allowed to withdraw his plea.6
We have recently upheld the Sex Offender Registration Act against various constitutional challenges.7 Although we upheld the statute, it is obvious that the Act significantly impacts those required to register. We concluded, based on the great weight of authority, that the legislature had the authority to determine that requiring convicted sex offenders to register and publicize their identity was necessary for public protection. But given the substantial impact of the Sex Offender Registration Act on a person who is required to register, it seems to me that the Sex Offender Registration Act, like a criminal statute, should be narrowly read and strictly construed against the government.8
As I have previously pointed out, it is questionable whether the legislature intended to have defendants register who successfully completed a suspended imposition of sentence and had their conviction removed from their record. The majority attempts to get around this statutory ambiguity by defining the problem as a matter of administrative law. The majority relies on AS 18.65.087(a) where the legislature directed the Department of Public Safety to “maintain a central registry of sex offenders.” The legislature also gave the Department the authority to “adopt regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of ... [the Sex Offender Registration Act].”9 The Department of Public Safety has passed a regulation which defines a conviction to include a suspended imposition of sentence, even if the judgment was set aside.10
Given the substantial constitutional questions raised by the Sex Offender Registration Act, and the significant impact of the Act on a person who is required to register, I do not believe that this ambiguous delegation of authority to the Department of Public Safety is *896sufficient.11 In order to carry out the Sex Offender Registration Act, the legislature needed to give the Department of Public Safety the power to adopt regulations. But there is no indication that the legislature intended to allow the Department of Public Safety to define who would be required to register. Given the important constitutional questions raised by the Sex Offender Registration Act, it seems to me that the legislature must determine who is required to register, or at least, that the legislature must make it clear that it intended to delegate this responsibility to the Department of Public Safety. Since I have substantial questions whether the legislature intended to require the appellees to register, I would hold that the law, as it is currently written, does not require them to do so.

. AS 12.63.010(a).

. AS 12.63.100(4).

. See Larson v. State, 688 P.2d 592, 597 (Alaska App.1984).

. See Whitehead v. State, 985 P.2d 1019 (Alaska App.1999).

. See Alaska R.Crim. P. 11(c)(4).

. See Peterson v. State, 988 P.2d 109 (Alaska App.1999).

. See Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007 (Alaska App.1999).

. See State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900, 907 (Alaska App.1985).

. AS 18.65.087(a).

. 13 AAC 09.900(a)(2).

. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (reviewing courts give "narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional").