Court Opinion

ID: 9609712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:30:28.653833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:14.711572
License: Public Domain

Ringold, J.
(dissenting) — Again I must disagree with the majority opinion for the reasons expressed in my dissent in State v. Darden, 30 Wn. App. 460, 469, 635 P.2d 760 (1981). The majority errs in approving a reading of CrR 3.3 which contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 616 P.2d 620 (1980) would allow the prosecutor to play fast and loose with the time limits by filing a complaint in district court and not holding a preliminary hearing within any fixed time. My colleagues believe that "the meaning attributed to CrR 3.3 by Edwards is contrary to the rulé's plain language."
The Washington State Judicial Council comments cited by the majority are not authority for the correctness of the majority's reading of CrR 3.3. On the contrary, they merely point out that the state prosecuting attorneys abused the rule in their day-to-day practice. Such practice, avoiding as it does the clear intent of a "speedy trial" rule, did not and cannot establish the meaning of the rule. Under the interpretation urged by the State and the majority herein, the rule would permit the State to file a complaint in district court and, by the simple expedient of refusing to move for a preliminary hearing until convenient, delay the trial date for as long as desired, subject only to the constitutional speedy trial right.1
This result was clearly not intended under the rules. Although JCrR 2.03 did not provide for strict time limits within which a preliminary hearing would have to be held, the clear inference is that it must be held, if at all, "without *900unnecessary delay."
The rules provide for continuances, making them a matter of discretion within the control of the court. CrR 3.3(f) (now at CrR 3.3(h)) provides:
Continuances. Continuances or other delays may be granted as follows:
(1) Upon written agreement of the parties which must be personally signed by the defendant or all defendants and must be approved by the court.
(2) On motion of the state or on its own motion or on the motion of a party the court may continue the case when required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced in the presentation of his defense. The court must state its reasons therefor.
It has long been recognized that speedy trial rules will succeed only if the courts retain control of the scheduling of hearings. A continuance to pursue further investigation is available within the guidelines of the rule, subject to judicial control. The majority reads CrR 3.3 in such a way as to obviate the need for the State to request such a continuance.
The rule means what Edwards says it means. Prior to Edwards no appellate court had passed on the meaning of the rule in a situation where a preliminary hearing and bindover occur after the expiration of the time limit. Edwards represents a definitive statement, by the body which promulgated the rule, as to its meaning and application in this context. It is unambiguous.
The trial courts did not err in dismissing the charges against these defendants. I would affirm.
Reconsideration denied February 23 and 25, 1982.
Review by Supreme Court pending September 10, 1982.

In State v. Darden, 30 Wn. App. 460, 635 P.2d 760 (1981), for instance, the State charged two defendants with the same offense, one in superior court and one in justice court. The superior court charge would háve to be tried within 100 days of arrest. By holding a preliminary hearing 130 days after Darden was arrested, the State was able to avoid the intent of the rule and try Darden in superior court nearly 6 months after his arrest.