Court Opinion

ID: 9898146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:46.098876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:11.945817
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          No. 84331-1-I

                         Respondent,           DIVISION ONE
               v.

 LUCAS KYLE CARTWRIGHT,                        UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                         Appellant.

       SMITH, C.J. — Following Lucas Cartwright’s conviction of unlawful

possession of a firearm in the first degree, the trial court entered a no-contact

order prohibiting Cartwright from contacting the victim, Christopher Logan, by any

means, including via third parties, for ten years. Around the same time, based on

the events underlying the no-contact order, Logan initiated a civil suit against

Cartwright’s parents. On appeal, Cartwright contends that the ten-year

prohibition on contacting Logan, particularly through third parties, violates his

constitutional right to access our court system. He argues that the no-contact

order would prevent him from accessing the courts if Logan testified in the

ongoing litigation or if Logan decided to sue him. Because we find the no-contact

order reasonably necessary and crime related, we affirm.

                                       FACTS

       In early 2020, Lucas Cartwright was living with his mother and stepfather

in Everett, Washington. Cartwright had befriended his neighbors, Christopher

Logan and Susan Schmitt, and frequently visited with them. Cartwright, Logan,
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and Schmitt occasionally used methamphetamine together, though Cartwright

testified that he was not a “heavy” user like Logan and Schmitt. The night before

the incident in question, all three had been using methamphetamine.

        On May 5, Cartwright received a phone call from a close friend, asking

him to help wire her money in jail. The friend instructed Cartwright to use her

laptop to access her bank account for the wire transfer but forgot to give

Cartwright the computer password. Unable to unlock the computer, Cartwright

asked Schmitt—who he testified was an “evil guru” with computers—for help.

Because it was late at night, Cartwright left the laptop with Schmitt and went

home.

        The next morning, Cartwright called Schmitt several times without answer.

On the fourth or fifth call, Schmitt’s friend answered and informed Cartwright that

Schmitt was at a Western Union making a money transfer using the information

Schmitt had pulled from the laptop. Cartwright testified that he “freaked” and

went over to Logan and Schmitt’s house to retrieve the laptop.

        Logan was home, working on a car in the driveway, when Cartwright

arrived. Cartwright told Logan: “Hey, Chris. You’re tripping about the computer.

I got to get it.” Logan replied that he did not care. Cartwright then ran inside and

upstairs to find the computer. But on his way back down the stairs, Logan

confronted him, shoving Cartwright down to the ground with a metal tool.

Cartwright managed to get up, ran back around the house to another entrance,

and then ran upstairs to retrieve Logan’s gun.

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       After he retrieved the gun, Cartwright grabbed the computer and fled the

house. Logan, in an effort to keep Cartwright from escaping, charged at him and

grabbed him around the throat. Cartwright then hit Logan in the head with the

gun, and while backing away, warned Logan, “I will shoot you,” several times.

Logan continued to advance and Cartwright shot him in the leg. While Logan

was on the ground, Cartwright quickly got in his car and drove away.

       Cartwright was later charged with assault with a firearm in the first degree

and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. At trial, Cartwright

asserted self-defense. On cross-examination, Logan testified that he was suing

Cartwright’s parents over the incident. Cartwright testified that he believed the

lawsuit against his parents was “frivolous” and a “money grab.”

       Cartwright was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first

degree but acquitted of assault with a firearm in the first degree. At sentencing,

the court imposed a ten year no-contact order protecting Logan, to which

Cartwright’s counsel did not object. Cartwright appeals.

                                    ANALYSIS

       The only issue before us on appeal is whether the no-contact order is

overbroad. Cartwright contends that the prohibition on contacting Logan via third

parties interferes with his fundamental right to access the courts because he

might be called as a witness in the ongoing litigation between Logan and his

parents. He also asserts that the no-contact order will infringe on his right to

access the courts in the event that Logan decides to sue him. We disagree.

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No. 84331-1-I/4

       The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 authorizes trial courts to impose

“crime-related prohibitions” as a part of any sentence. RCW 9.94A.505(9). A

“crime-related prohibition” is “an order of a court prohibiting conduct that directly

relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been

convicted.” RCW 9.94A.030(10). Crime-related prohibitions are generally

upheld if reasonably crime related. State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d

940 (2008). No-contact orders that protect witnesses are also crime-related

prohibitions. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 113, 156 P.3d 201 (2007).

Conditions that interfere with fundamental constitutional rights must be

“reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the State and public

order” and “sensitively imposed.” Warren, 165 Wn.2d at 32.

       We review the imposition of sentencing conditions for an abuse of

discretion. In re Pers. Restraint of Rainey, 168 Wn.2d 367, 374, 229 P.33d 686

(2010). The same standard applies even when crime-related prohibitions affect a

fundamental constitutional right “because the imposition of crime-related

prohibitions is necessarily fact-specific and based upon the sentencing judge’s

in-person appraisal of the trial and the offender.” Rainey, 168 Wn.2d at 374-75.

       In this case, no fundamental right is implicated. Although due process

requires litigants be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard, “ ‘[t]here is no

absolute and unlimited constitutional right of access to courts. All that is required

is reasonable right of access—a reasonable opportunity to be heard.’ ” In re

Marriage of Giordano, 57 Wn. App. 74, 77, 787 P.2d 51 (1990) (alteration in

original) (quoting Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548, 554 (3d

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Cir. 1985). When “access to the courts is not essential to advance a

fundamental right, such as the freedom of association or disassociation . . . ,

access may be regulated if the regulation rationally services a legitimate end.”

Giordano, 57 Wn. App. at 77. “Access to the courts is not recognized, of itself,

as a fundamental right.” Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 115 Wn.2d 556, 562, 800

P.2d 367 (1990).

       Here, Cartwright does not identify a fundamental right that court access is

necessary to advance or protect. For this reason, his reliance on State v.

McGuire, 12 Wn. App. 2d 88, 456 P.3d 1193 (2020) is unpersuasive. In

McGuire, the defendant challenged a no-contact order prohibiting all contact with

his ex-girlfriend, with whom he shared a child, on the grounds that it

impermissibly interfered with his right to parent. 12 Wn. App. 2d at 94-95. The

court agreed that the no-contact order was overly broad, reasoning that it

precluded the defendant from exercising his constitutional right to access the

courts to protect his fundamental right to parent. McGuire, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 95-

96. McGuire is readily distinguishable from the facts at hand. This case does

not involve a fundamental right, such as the right to parent, free speech, or

marriage. Thus, absent implication of a fundamental constitutional right,

Cartwright’s right to access the courts may be regulated.1 And because the

       1  We note that if Cartwright were called as a witness in the civil
proceeding, nothing prevents him from seeking a modification of the no-contact
order from the court. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Megrey, 93 Wn. App. 391, 396,
968 P.2d 900 (1998) (“Where [the parties’] interests conflict, the proper solution
is to seek permission from the court which issued the [] order to modify the order
to allow the appropriate action.”).
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no-contact order protects a witness in this case, it is reasonably necessary and

crime-related.

      Affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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