Court Opinion

ID: 9579441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:55:11.249105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:30.608130
License: Public Domain

Been, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
While the majority may correctly survey the historical duty of care imposed upon a landowner as to a licensee, I believe it ignores the recent trend of the law to date culminating in Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151 (289 SE2d 232) (1982) overruling Gregory v. Johnson, 159 Ga. App. 320 (283 SE2d 357) (1981). My personal observations in the special concurrence therein did not prevail. The Supreme Court in Gregory followed Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and imposed a duty on the landowner to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable injury to trespassing children. Questions of any breach of that duty and any contributory negligence of the parents were designated for jury resolution. The anomalous effect of the majority’s decision here is to impose a lesser duty of care as to a social guest/licensee than the duty owed to a mere trespasser.
“While section 339 is phrased in terms of trespassing children, it is not limited to them. The same principles apply if the child is a licensee or invitee. It would be irrational to impose a higher duty on landowners when the child is a trespasser than when he is a licensee or invitee. Section 343B of the Restatement states that, ‘(i)n any case where a possessor of land would be subject to liability to a child for physical harm caused by a condition on the land if the child were a trespasser, the possessor is subject to liability if the child is a licensee or an invitee.’ While there may be a greater duty owed to licensees or invitees than to trespassers, this section makes it clear that they are entitled to at least as much protection as trespassers.” 34 Mer. L. Rev. 433, 446 (1982). (Emphasis supplied.)
The fact that the doctrine of attractive nuisance was at play in Gregory does not render the case inapposite here; its import is its pronounced consideration of foreseeability and traditional *851negligence concepts in analyzing a landowner’s duty of care. I note further that both the Supreme Court and this court actually have previously applied such considerations in determining the duty of care to licensees. “ ‘A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if, (a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize . . . the danger, and (b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and (c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved.’ ” Patterson v. Thomas, 118 Ga. App. 326, 328 (163 SE2d 331) (1968). The Supreme Court expressly adopted this view in London Iron & Metal Co. v. Abney, 245 Ga. 759 (267 SE2d 214) (1980).
I believe that factual questions existed for jury resolution, regarding the elements of knowledge of the condition and any foreseeable risks created by the condition (as well as any contributory negligence of the parents), and that the trial court properly denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment. I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Quillian, Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Pope join in this dissent.