Court Opinion

ID: 9833502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:45:53.569657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:03.551073
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for appellant attack the grounds upon which we justified the refusal of the court to give the special charge requested. It is asserted that “in actions of trespass to try title rents or damages are recoverable only as an incident to the.right to recover possession.” That proposition may be correct when applied to cases where the right of possession rests upon and is to be determined by the ownership of the title. But where the landlord resorts to this form of aetipn for ousting a tenant, and at the same time seeks the recovery for rents due, and *302the latter relies for defense upon a lease contract in which he covenants to pay rents, the applicability of the rule might well be questioned.
[4] While the pleadings in this case put both the title and the right of possession in issue, the proof showed that the appellant was only a tenant, and that his right of possession depended upon a lease contract in which he had agreed to pay a monthly rent in advance. Under these facts, a finding that his term had not expired, while protecting his right of possession, would not absolve him from his liability for rents.
[5] Another reason which justified the refusal of this charge is that it ignored the issue of title.
.[6] The pleadings of both parties having put the- plaintiff’s title in issue, a general verdict for the defendant would have resulted in judgment in favor of the appellant for both the title and the possession of the premises. Such a judgment would have been res adjudicata in a subsequent suit between these same parties. Freeman v. McAninch, 87 Tex. 138, 27 S. W. 97, 47 Am. St. Rep. 79. A verdict leading to such consequences would have been unwarranted by the evidence.
The motion is overruled.