Court Opinion

ID: 9480096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:38:09.766169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:28.977947
License: Public Domain

JON 0. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Though I agree that the circumstances of this case would readily support a finding that the defendant is a risk to flee, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s conclusion that Judge Leisure was clearly erroneous in finding that the demanding conditions of bail that he ordered sufficed to assure that the defendant is not a risk to flee.
The defendant has been convicted of conspiring to import cocaine into the United States and aiding and abetting importation. He wishes to appeal so that he can challenge the instruction that informed the jury, in answer to its specific inquiry, that knowledge that the cocaine was destined for the United States was not required for conviction. Judge Leisure has concluded that this issue is substantial. See United States v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145, 156 (2d Cir.) (drug laws apply “to citizens of any country, acting anywhere in the world, as long as there is an intent to import the controlled substance into the United States”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 110, 93 L.Ed.2d 58 (1986).
Having reached that conclusion, which the Court does not disturb, Judge Leisure then examined a proposed combination of bail release conditions that included the posting of a $1 million bond co-signed by his sister and brother-in-law who reside in the United States, the security of their home in California, which has been appraised at more than $1.4 million and has equity in excess of $1 million, the monitoring of defendant’s whereabouts by use of a luma phone, the surrender of defendant’s *331passport, and the execution by the defendant of a waiver of extradition. The District Judge found, based on his assessment of the credibility of the family members and other character witnesses who testified at trial, that the bail release conditions adequately assured that the defendant would not flee. He made these findings by the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3148(a) (1988).
“[I]n reviewing detention and release orders, the clearly erroneous standard applies.” United States v. Gotti, 794 F.2d 773, 778 (2d Cir.1986). We have regularly applied that standard in upholding district court findings that a defendant was likely to flee. See United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 5-7 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Gonzales Claudio, 806 F.2d 334, 338-39 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 994-95 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1146-47 (2d Cir.1986). We have also faithfully applied that standard in the rare instances where the Government has appealed a district judge’s finding that conditions of bail sufficed to assure that a defendant was not likely to flee. See United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405-06 (2d Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 99-100 (2d Cir.1985) (rejecting as clearly erroneous findings that conditions of bail were sufficient to protect the community from a defendant found to be dangerous if released).
In the one reported instance where we have rejected a finding that a defendant would not flee, we emphasized the district court’s failure to accord proper significance to the defendant’s four-year status as a fugitive and his defiant and frivolous refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the district court. See United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 198-201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 840, 108 S.Ct. 128, 98 L.Ed.2d 85 (1987). No circumstances like those in Shakur are remotely present in this case. On the contrary, during the more than two year period after the Government’s filing of a complaint and seizure of the cocaine, which surely alerted all the conspirators to their vulnerability to arrest, the defendant pursued his regular occupation as a pilot for Avianea Airlines, flying into the United States, either as a pilot or a passenger, more than 65 times. On each occasion, he was subject to the scrutiny of agents of the United States Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He was also issued a visa by the State Department.
Despite the rigor with which we have applied the clearly erroneous standard to findings of flight, the Court rejects Judge Leisure’s finding that this defendant is not a risk to flee. The Court recites several factors that point toward risk of flight and would surely support a finding of such risk: The defendant has been convicted of a serious drug offense, he faces a minimum ten year sentence, and he has the skills and resources to fly out of the country. Mention could also be made of the fact that the defendant is a Colombian citizen. However, the Court dismisses rather casually the critical factor that persuaded Judge Leisure that the defendant is not likely to flee: The forfeiture, in the event of flight, of the valuable home of his sister and her husband. The Court apparently believes that the defendant is perfectly willing to see his sister lose her home. In the Court’s view, Judge Leisure’s positive assessment of the family members and their close ties may be discarded because the defendant did not inform them of his criminal activity, and the prospect of losing the sister’s principal asset will not deter the defendant because the sum of money involved in the conspiracy far exceeds the equity in the home.
Having never seen the defendant nor heard the testimony of his sister, the other family members, and the distinguished character witnesses, I do not know whether he is willing to see his sister lose her home, but I have no adequate basis for concluding that Judge Leisure was clearly erroneous in finding that he is not. The fact that the family members did not know of his crime does not undermine their tangible display of faith in him now that they are aware of the jury’s verdict. And though the conspiracy involved large sums, we have been given no reason to believe that this defendant gained or has access to profits that will enable him to buy his sister another $1 million home.
*332The Court thinks the defendant is likely to flee and precipitate the loss of his sister’s home. Judge Leisure, who saw the family members and heard their testimony, thinks that the prospect of forfeiting that home, together with the other stringent conditions of release, makes it unlikely that he will flee. In the absence of any reason to think that the able District Judge misunderstood the relevant legal standards or arbitrarily overlooked significant evidence or relied on evidence that we can confidently say is worthless, it is his call. In the context of reviewing a district court’s findings as to risk of flight, we have explicitly emphasized “the deference to the district court that the clearly erroneous rule embodies.” United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d at 1147. That standard has heretofore been faithfully observed no matter which way a district court ruled. I regret that such even-handedness in reviewing bail findings is one of the early casualties in the war on drugs.