Court Opinion

ID: 9484158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:42:24.814172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:08.092609
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The appellant presents us with the interesting question of whether a federal district court possesses the power to adjust an offender’s sentence in federal court under the special circumstances of this case.
As the majority observes, Deitz faced charges within the state system. These charges were dismissed with prejudice because Arkansas failed to timely prosecute the charges against him. The state prosecutor, having lost his case, turned the matter over to the federal prosecutor, who proceeded with the present prosecution.
Deitz now asserts, in effect, that he is penalized mightily by the federal prosecution. He contends another drug offender in his circumstances would receive a far shorter sentence in Arkansas state court than the three-year, five-month prison term to which he was sentenced in federal court, which the trial court added to the mandatory five-year term for the weapons offense.1 He asserts that, under these facts, the sentencing court should have the power to inquire, and then, if necessary, adjust the sentence for the drug conviction.
The majority rejects this assertion because, in its opinion, “the [Sentencing] Commission must have recognized the possibility that a defendant might be subject to prosecution in both a state and a federal forum for the same criminal activity.” Ante, at 448. The majority cites no authority in support of this assumption, and I have found none.
The majority’s actions here give rise to a larger issue: Shall the sentencing judge have some discrete power to ameliorate the federal prosecutor’s abuse of power in circumstances such as exist in this case.
Under any sentencing regime, the discretion of law enforcement officers and prosecutors is immense in comparison to the *449limited discretion afforded sentencing judges.2 Law enforcement officials decide whom to arrest and when to do so. They also determine whether a case will be referred to state or federal prosecutors and, in joint task force actions, federal and state law enforcement officials make these decisions together. On occasion, the decision of where to prosecute is made for an improper reason.3
The length of time an offender will serve in prison may be the most important decision these officials make. Unfortunately, the decisions vary both from city to city and state to state, particularly with respect to drug cases.
Once a decision is made to prosecute an offender in federal court, the federal prosecutor decides when to charge whom with what. This process frequently results in offenders with like records and similar culpability receiving different sentences. The same phenomenon occurs with respect to plea agreements.4 The prosecutor decides whether to enter into a plea agreement with an offender and what the terms of the agreement will be.
Although the guidelines have dramatically limited sentencing judges’ discretion, there has been little or no restraint on police and prosecutorial discretion. This is indeed unfortunate because a district court’s actions are re viewable, while those of the police and prosecutors are not. The dean of administrative law scholars, Kenneth Culp Davis, a supporter of guideline sentencing, agrees that “[i]n the whole legal system, the worst pockets of injustice are clearly not in the federal or state courts, in federal or state legislative bodies, or in federal agencies. The worst pockets of injustice are probably in the activities of police and prosecutors.” Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law of the Eighties, § 9:1-3, at 280 (1989).
The instant case represents a typical example of how state and federal prosecutors abuse their otherwise unfettered powers. These prosecutors, in effect, thumbed their noses at the state judge who, according to this court’s assumption, ordered the matter dismissed with prejudice because the state prosecutor failed to comply with the Arkansas speedy trial rule. The state prosecutor then persuaded the federal prosecutor to bring an indictment and prosecute this case. The two attorneys acted in concert to thwart an individual’s rights under state law.
In a practical sense, the defendant who asserts rights granted under state law now faces increased penalties in a federal court.
Federal courts recognize and strongly support principles of federalism in the area of criminal law. For example, federal courts, in the name of comity, require exhaustion of state remedies, reject claims for procedural default, accept facts found by state courts, and, in a myriad of other ways, otherwise respect and abide by states’ actions and rulings. Yet, the majority here permits both state and federal prosecutors to flaunt their abuse of Arkansas law and run roughshod over the defen*450dant’s rights. I say it’s time for some braking activity by judicial oversight of federal prosecutors’ awesome powers. And a good place to start is here in this case. The federal sentencing judge should have the discretion to correct a prosecutorial wrong by equitably adjusting Deitz’s sentence to that which he would have received in the state court had the state prosecutor complied with Arkansas law. Such judicial power must be exercised if we are to preserve some fairness in our federal criminal justice system. Affording sentencing judges this discretion does not violate the Sentencing Guidelines, for the Commission, in a statement of policy, asserts: “[T]he Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A4(b).
This is an unusual case. I would give the able trial judge, the Honorable G. Thomas Eisele, the power to ameliorate the unfair penalty by reducing the drug sentence below the guidelines, should he choose to do so.

. Deitz is 49 years old and has no prior convictions. The sentencing judge indicated that he would depart downward from the Guidelines in the sentence were he free to do so.

. The Commission’s guidelines for departure under section 5K1.1, which requires a motion by the government before a downward departure for substantial assistance can occur, only increase the disparity in discretion between prosecutor and judge.

. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, No. 88-CR-499 (S-2) (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 1990) (downward departure due to government’s use of threat of mandatory mínimums to coerce guilty pleas), rev'd, 928 F.2d 575 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 141, 116 L.Ed.2d 108 (1991); United States v. Roberts, 726 F.Supp. 1359 (D.D.C.1989) (narcotics cases moved from D.C. Superior Court to federal court if no guilty plea after one year), rev’d sub nom., United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,-U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 471, 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992); see generally United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317 (7th Cir.1992) (discussing role of mandatory minimums in plea negotiations); United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 963-68 (D.C.Cir.1991) (Edwards, J., concurring) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining and discretion given probation officers in recommending sentences under the guidelines).

.The hidden disparity that results from prose-cutorial discretion is clearly illustrated in the sentences received by participants of a conspiracy trafficking in narcotics in a series of cases that came before this court, discussed in United States v. Hammer, 940 F.2d 1141, 1142-48 (8th Cir.1991) (Heaney, J., concurring).