Court Opinion

ID: 9728743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:15:40.139281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:11.560637
License: Public Domain

*411PASHMAN, J.,
concurring.
I fully concur in the decision of the Court in Parts I, II and III. I write separately to state the bases for my agreement with the result in Part IV, which concerns the retroactive application of today’s decision.
My Brother Handler today asserts, “The coercive potential associated with the objectionable aspects of the Allen charge and their undue repetition * * * directly implicates the deliberative process used to determine guilt or innocence * *.” Ante at 409. Because of the effect of Allen -type charges on the integrity of the fact-finding process, it is possible that the rule which we announce today should be accorded complete, rather than limited retroactive effect. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973). However, since the Court bases the rule on its “own standards for criminal justice” and not constitutional grounds, ante at 409, it is unclear whether complete retroactivity is in fact required. This issue was neither briefed nor argued, and as the Court notes, we are “[wjithout the benefit of data as to the number and kinds of cases that would be affected by a rule of general or complete retroactivity,” ante at 410. I would therefore adopt the position taken by the California Supreme Court in People v. Gainer, 19 Cal.3d 835, 139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997, 1007 (Sup.Ct.1977), and leave resolution of this issue for a case which squarely presents it. The Court has apparently chosen this approach. Ante at 409.
I agree with the Court that some of the questions raised by the Allen charge — involving the accuracy of guilty verdicts — are distinguishable from the issues raised in the exclusionary rule context. However, both the Court’s rule governing Allen -type charges and the exclusionary rule are based on “standards for criminal justice” which are designed to protect fundamental constitutional rights. Thus I continue to subscribe to the view that the “imperative of judicial integrity” militates in favor of limited retroactivity for applications of the exclusionary rule as *412well as today’s decision. State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 578 (1979) (Pashman, J., dissenting). Whatever “different treatment of the issue of retroactivity” may be suggested by the “basic difference in the respective cases,” ante 408, it would not mandate that only prospective effect be given to exclusionary rule decisions. If anything, it might require giving complete retroactive effect to cases such as the one before us.
Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justice SULLIVAN join in this opinion.
For concurrence in result as to Part IV —Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices SULLIVAN and PASHMAN.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK — 6.
For affirmance —None.