Court Opinion

ID: 9533250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:29:51.781696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:58.859400
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I concur that negligence of Mrs. Brint cannot be imputed to Mr..Brint. I dissent on the point that the trial court correctly entered a directed verdict on the question of liability of the estate of Mrs. Brint. The reasons are, (1) that Teague’s nonexpert opinions should have been admitted in evidence, and (2) the evidence was sufficient to create an issue of fact of Mrs. Brint’s negligence. Directed verdicts, like summary judgments, must be cautiously and sparingly used. “Where the burden is upon the moving party and he seeks to sustain it by the testimony of witnesses, a directed verdict will seldom be granted.” McMullen v. Ursuline Order of Sisters, 56 N.M. 570, 246 P.2d 1052, 1056 (1952). Was there an issue of fact on the question of Mrs. Brint’s liability? The Brints died. The two witnesses who contributed to the issue were Pavlos and Teague. They both saw the accident. The most favorable testimony and reasonable inferences in their strongest light which favor Mrs. Brint, including opinions of Mr. Teague which were not admitted, are as follows: Mrs. Brint was 60 or 61 years of age, a normal person in reasonably good health. She was driving her husband and retarded child northward toward Socorro. There was a clear view on this straight highway, and each operator could see vehicles travelling on either lane. At the time and place of the accident, the wind was blowing strong and terrific, and created dust devils. Right about the time of impact, there was a dust devil. Mrs. Brint’s car came out of one of the cuts in the hills and one of the gusts of wind hit her car. When she was 75 or 50 feet in front of Pavlos’ car in the opposite lane, the dust devil caused Mrs. Brint to swerve severely to the left into and across the wrong lane directly in the path of Pavlos. The wind was blowing strong all the way in through there, and anybody could have lost control of a car. It was all like an unavoidable accident. There is no testimony that Mrs. Brint willfully, wantonly, recklessly, deliberately or inadvertently made a severe swerve from the right-hand side of her lane to the left across the wrong lane directly in front of Pavlos’ automobile to cause three deaths in her car. A “dust devil” appears to be a matter of common knowledge in the southwest. It is a product of hot and dry desert country. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines “dust devil” as follows : “[A] small whirlwind 10-100 feet in diameter and from several hundred to 1000 feet high, common in dry regions on hot, calm afternoons and made visible by the dust, debris and sand it picks up from the ground.” A “whirlwind” is defined as: “1. any of several small masses of air rotating rapidly around a more or less vertical axis and advancing simultaneously over land and sea, as a dust devil, tornado or waterspout. “2. anything resembling a whirlwind, as in violent action, destructive force, etc.” The term “dust devil” should be construed in its popular seiise as referring to any character of a windstorm, distinguished by its concentrated force and violence, so resistless as to make it especially destructive in its narrow pathway; as a small whirlwind or a violent and destructive windstorm. When Teague was asked what his observation was about the location of the dust devil, he said: “At that time I would say there was one coming in that area right about the time of the' impact.” [Emphasis added.] When he offered testimony that “ * * * one- of the gusts hit her car and caused her to swerve * * * ”, a reasonable inference is that he meant the “dust devil.” The lay opinions of Teague were admissible in evidence, tie was a school teacher, impartial, and actuated by a desire to tell the truth. He was not a hired and generally biased expert. The “ ‘ordinary witness is permitted to sum up the total remembered and unremembered impressions of the senses by stating the opinion which they produced. To allow less may deprive a party of important and valuable evidence that can be got at in no other way.’ ” Territory v. McNabb, 16 N.M. 625, 636, 120 P. 907, 910 (1911). Without Teague’s opinion, the jury would not be able to form an intelligent decision on the fact that her car suddenly swerved to the left. The rule is settled that “ ‘Where mere descriptive language is inadequate to convey to the jury the precise facts or their bearing on the issue, the description by the witness must of necessity be allowed to be supplemented by his opinion in order to put the jury in position to make the final decision of the fact’ * *" State v. Cooley, 19 N.M. 91, 109-10, 140 P. 1111, 1117, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 230 (1914); Skala v. New York Life Ins. Co., 24 N.M. 78, 83, 172 P. 1046 (1918). See § 21-1-1(43) (a), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 4). It is wise to remember that the trend in American jurisprudence is toward the greater admissibility of evidence. We must not “close any reasonable avenues to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. In doubtful cases the doubt should be resolved in favor of its admissibility.” Brown v. General Insurance Company of America, 70 N.M. 46, 53, 54, 369 P.2d 968, 973 (1962); Lopez v. Heesen, 69 N.M. 206, 214, 365 P.2d 448 (1961). Even though a broad discretion is allowed the trial court in passing on the admissibility of evidence, its discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised so as to impede either party in adequately presenting his case. The trial court failed to distinguish between the admissibility of Teague’s evidence and the weight or credibility attached thereto. City of Santa Fe v. Gonzales, 80 N.M. 401, 456 P.2d 875 (1969). When Teague judged that the impact was “like an unavoidable accident * * ”, he was speaking in layman’s language not in legal language. He was not giving an opinion on a matter of law, but on a matter of ultimate fact. By “unavoidable accident,” Teague probably meant he did not see Mrs. Brint or Pavlos do anything wrong. See Ferguson v. Hale, 66 N.M. 190, 344 P.2d 703 (1959); Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 66 N.M. 424, 349 P.2d 337, 84 A.L.R.2d 1269 (1960). His testimony was not speculation or conjecture in the sense of “guess.” “Speculation” is the act of theorizing about a matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge. LeGrand v. U-Drive-It Co, 247 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Mo.1952). Teague saw both the vehicles. He relied on facts such as the dust devil hitting the Brint car, climatic conditions, the movement of the vehicles, the topography. These facts and inferences do not make his ■opinions inherently improbable, but, if some doubt should exist, the determination is for the jury, not the courts. The jury weighs the evidence and determines the credibility of witnesses, not the courts. Teague did not theorize. A rule has developed in New Mexico ■called “The Burden of Explanation.” What it means is, that when the undisputed evidence puts the operation of defendant’s vehicle in the wrong lane, the defendant has the burden of going forward with the evidence to explain in order to avoid negligence per se. The rule began with Frei v. Brownlee, 56 N.M. 677, 248 P.2d 671 (1952). The court said the defendant had a duty to explain her presence on the wrong side of the road without her negligence. Frei relied on Purdie v. Brunswick, 20 Wash.2d 292, 146 P.2d 809 (1944). That case speaks in terms of “travelling” on the wrong side, not severely swerving across the wrong lane. Perhaps, under normal circumstancets, travelling or swerving both constitute statutory or common law negligence per se. Both can be excused if the party on the wrong side goes forward with the evidence to explain why the event occurred. In Martinez v. Scott, 70 N.M. 354, 374 P.2d 117 (1962), the court said: “ * * * [Tjhere is a total absence of proof or permissible inference * * * to excuse or explain the presence of decedent’s car in the wrong lane.” In Paddock v. Schuelke, 81 N.M. 759, 473 P.2d 393 (Ct.App.1970), the court said, “ * * * there is no explanation.” Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Horne, 65 N.M. 440, 338 P.2d 1067 (1959), appears to hold that the decedent travelling on the wrong side is negligent as a matter of law when there is “no evidence tending to explain” a violation of statutes. State v. Rice, 58 N.M. 205, 269 P.2d 751 (1954), seems to say that the evidence must show that a party is travelling or driving in the wrong lane without explanation. What is sufficient to avoid a directed verdict? How much proof or permissible inference is necessary to excuse or explain the presence of Brint’s car in the wrong lane? If the evidence or inference appears, if an explanation is made, does this mean Mrs. Brint was not negligent as a matter of law, or does it mean it created an issue of fact for the jury? To me, it should create an issue of fact under all of the facts, circumstances, inferences and presumptions of the case. The Supreme Court has held that where a driver is confronted with a sudden emergency, it is a sufficient explanation for leaving his lane of travel. Burkhart v. Corn, 59 N.M. 343, 284 P.2d 226 (1955). Under this circumstance, it follows that the driver had not been travelling on the left side. White v. Montoya, 46 N.M. 241, 126 P.2d 471 (1942), so that where the driver suddenly turns into the wrong lane, negligence and proximate cause are questions for the trier of the facts in the light of all the facts, circumstances and presumptions presented by the evidence. McDonald v. Linick, 58 N.M. 65, 265 P.2d 676 (1954). See Martin v. Gomez, 69 N.M. 1, 363 P.2d 365 (1961). From all of the foregoing, I conclude: 1. The lay opinions of Teague were admissible in evidence. 2. Mrs. Brint was not “travelling” on the wrong side of the road. The presumption of due care operates to protect her because there is no credible and substantial evidence which would support a finding to the contrary. We cannot read Mrs. Brint’s mind, nor define her control of the car so as to declare her negligent as a matter of law. Negligence and causation are questions of fact for the jury in the light of all the facts, circumstances, inferences and presumptions presented by the evidence. 3. If the “burden of explanation” doctrine applies, there is evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to explain or excuse the presence of her car in the wrong lane. The issue of reasonable care under the circumstances is a question of fact for the jury. The jury had the right to believe or disbelieve Teague and the right to find Mrs. Brint negligent or free of negligence. The trial court erred in disallowing Teague’s opinion testimony, in declaring Mrs. Brint negligent as a matter of law, and in directing a verdict for plaintiffs on the question of liability. For these reasons, I dissent.