Court Opinion

ID: 9909199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 18:02:24.450619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:19.918102
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/12/23 In re S.A. CA4/1

                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re S.A., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                 D082538
 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
 AND HUMAN SERVICES
 AGENCY,                                                         (Super. Ct. No. NJ13627I)

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 A.M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Nadia J. Keilani, Judge. Affirmed.
         Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
       A.M. (Stepfather) appeals the juvenile court’s order denying him
presumed father status under Family Code1 section 7611, subdivision (d) and
excluding him from the dependency proceeding for his wife’s minor daughter,
S.A. He contends the juvenile court’s order is not supported by substantial
evidence. He further asserts that the juvenile court erred by improperly
requiring him to show a specific duration that he acted as S.A.’s parent and
by improperly assuming his drug use disqualified him from presumed father
status. After Stepfather appealed, the Agency moved to dismiss, contending
the order was interlocutory and not appealable because it preceded the
juvenile court’s dispositional order, which the Agency argues is the first
appealable order in a dependency proceeding. On the merits, the Agency
contends the order is supported by substantial evidence and the court did not
err.
       We agree with Stepfather that the order denying him presumed father
status is appealable as a final judgment against him because it was “the end
of the matter” for him in the dependency proceeding. (See In re Sheila B.
(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 197 (Sheila B.) [predisposition order dismissing
petition on the merits is appealable because “[i]t is the end of the matter”].)
On the merits, however, we agree with the Agency. The juvenile court’s order
was supported by substantial evidence, and the record does not compel a
finding that Stepfather openly held out S.A. as his own child, as required by
section 7611, subdivision (d). We also disagree with Stepfather that the court
imposed an improper duration requirement or concluded that Stepfather’s
drug use disqualified him from presumed father status. Therefore, we affirm.

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
                                        2
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Agency Investigation and Proceedings Before Paternity Determination
      Late at night in early February 2023, police found five-year-old S.A.
and Stepfather asleep in a vehicle parked at a casino. Stepfather appeared to
be under the influence, and officers found bags of fentanyl in his pocket and
bags of methamphetamine on the vehicle’s floor. Officers also found cans,
bleach, and other dangerous chemicals in the vehicle, which were accessible
to S.A. and could have caused her serious injury or death. After locating
Mother in the casino, police arrested her and Stepfather for child cruelty,
among other charges, and detained S.A.
      The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency),
which had previously opened an investigation regarding S.A. after Mother’s
arrest for shoplifting in late December 2022, continued its investigation.
Until Mother and Stepfather’s arrests on February 3, 2023, the Agency had
been unable to locate them or S.A. A few days later, the Agency filed a
juvenile dependency petition on S.A.’s behalf. At the detention hearing,
Mother identified M.M. as S.A.’s likely biological father. She asserted,
however, that Stepfather qualified as S.A.’s presumed father under section
7611, subdivision (d) because he lived with S.A. in early 2020, provided for
her, and acted as her father figure. The juvenile court designated Stepfather
and M.M. as alleged fathers and ordered them both to appear at the next
hearing.
      According to the Agency’s detention report, S.A. reported that
Stepfather spit on, choked, and physically intimidated Mother, which made
S.A. feel “horrible.” Mother had a history of substance abuse, criminal
activity, and domestic violence, and nine of her children were removed from
her care between 2002 and 2017. Mother reported that S.A. was enrolled in

                                       3
school when she lived in Texas, and she claimed the methamphetamine that
police found belonged to Stepfather.
      When the Agency first spoke with Stepfather in late February 2023, he
asked to be involved in S.A.’s dependency case. He was appointed counsel on
March 1, 2023. Like Mother, Stepfather had a child welfare history. In 2017,
he lost parental rights to one child, and his other child had lived with his
mother since 2016.
      The Agency’s jurisdiction and disposition report indicated that Mother
confirmed M.M. was S.A.’s biological father. M.M. was in prison and had met
S.A. only one time on the day he was sentenced. S.A.’s birth certificate did
not list either Stepfather or M.M. as parents.
      Throughout the Agency’s investigation, Mother, S.A., and Stepfather
provided differing information about where S.A. had lived and when. S.A.,
reported that she had lived in a car before the investigation. S.A. also said
she and Mother had lived at her grandfather’s house in Mexico. Meanwhile,
Mother told the Agency that she and S.A. lived with maternal grandfather in
Texas until December 2022 and that they moved to San Diego so that S.A.
could see Stepfather and Mother could try to visit with her other children.
Through counsel, Mother also stated that Stepfather had started living with
S.A. in 2020. Her counsel additionally stated that Mother and S.A. were in
California from December 2020 until December 2022 but were only in San
Diego for the holidays in early 2023 and intended to leave the night Mother
was arrested. Mother later reported that she had been living “back and
forth” with maternal grandmother in Florida and maternal grandfather in
Texas. In contrast, Stepfather claimed he met and began living with S.A.
from the age of three in May 2020, but on his parentage inquiry form, he
stated that he lived with S.A. from September 2020 to April 2022 and again

                                       4
from December 2022 to her removal. Meanwhile, Stepfather’s parole agent
reported that Stepfather did not meet Mother until December 2022.
      Stepfather and Mother began supervised visits with S.A. in late
February 2023. Stepfather asked the Agency if he could bring homemade
food that he knew S.A. liked. Mother reported that S.A. was very close to her
and Stepfather and that S.A. was “always” asking to return home to them.
      In mid-March 2023, the Agency suspended Stepfather’s visits after
learning of a Criminal Protective Order prohibiting him from contact with
S.A. unless the juvenile court ordered otherwise. During the same period,
S.A. asked to visit Stepfather and expressed that she would like to live with
Mother and him. In the same conversation, S.A. also said that she would like
to live with maternal aunt and uncle and her sibling, with whom she was
later placed.
      On April 5, 2023, Stepfather filed a parentage inquiry form providing
information about his relationship with S.A. It indicated that he and Mother
married on April 9, 2021, and that S.A. lived with him from September 2020
through April 2022 and from December 2022 until her removal in February
2023. Stepfather confirmed that he had never been ordered to pay child
support for S.A., never signed a paper or declaration stating he was S.A.’s
father, was not on S.A.’s birth certificate, and that a court never adjudicated
him as S.A.’s father. In response to a question asking if he told anyone he
was S.A.’s father, Stepfather checked the box for “Yes.” When asked to list
the names, relationships, and addresses of those individuals, he wrote in
“[f]amily, friends,” but did not provide any names or addresses. In response
to a question asking if he had supported S.A. and in what way, he wrote,
“Provided food, shelter, clothing, emotional support and nurturing, teaching
her things (alphabet/counting).” He stated that he would present witnesses

                                       5
who knew that he claimed S.A. as his daughter and that she identified him as
her father.
      At a hearing the same day, M.M. provided the juvenile court with a
June 2021 judgment of paternity from the family court. M.M. and Stepfather
both requested presumed father status, and Mother joined Stepfather’s
request. The court deferred the issue of paternity but granted the Agency
discretion to permit supervised visitation for Stepfather.
      In an interview two weeks later, S.A. said she was happy in her
placement but wished she could visit with Stepfather, whom she referred to
as her “dad.” When the Agency later informed Stepfather he could begin
video visits with S.A., he cried and expressed appreciation and excitement.
During those twice-a-week video visits with Stepfather and Mother, S.A.
often baby-talked, babbled, and made screaming and screeching noises. At a
visit in late April 2023, she shouted that she was “done visiting,” and she did
not want to visit again for 10 days.
      The following month, S.A.’s caregivers—maternal aunt and uncle—
reported concerns that nearly six-year-old S.A. had trauma related to food
because she constantly asked for food, hid food in her room, requested a
snack a few minutes after eating a meal, and struggled to understand which
meals occurred at which times of day. They also reported S.A. did not know
how to write her name correctly, did not know the full alphabet, and was
behind in learning numbers. S.A.’s school counselor similarly reported that
S.A. was behind academically, had not previously attended school, did not
discuss Mother or Stepfather, and instead referred to maternal aunt and
uncle as her parents.
      During a late May 2023 video visit with Mother, S.A. asked where
Stepfather was. Although she referred to him as a parent, she also asked to

                                       6
speak to her “real dad,” M.M. At a June 1, 2023 visit, S.A. expressed sadness
that Stepfather had missed a prior visit but informed him that M.M. was her
“real dad” and disputed that Stepfather held this position. When asked by
Mother, S.A. claimed she disliked M.M. and preferred Stepfather. However,
S.A. later told maternal aunt that she liked M.M., wished to visit him, and
did not want Mother and Stepfather to know her feelings about M.M.
      At a video visit about a week later, Stepfather and S.A. played with
Legos. Then S.A. repeatedly told Stepfather and Mother to “go to jail” and hit
herself with her fists on the sides of her face.
II.   Paternity Hearing and Determination
      At the July 19, 2023 contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
juvenile court continued its decision on disposition due to outstanding issues
under the Indian Child Welfare Act, but it went forward with evaluating
paternity and jurisdiction. In support of Stepfather’s request for presumed
father status, the court received into evidence Stepfather’s parentage inquiry
form and a screenshot from the sheriff’s website estimating Stepfather’s
release date as August 1, 2023.
      Stepfather testified at the hearing that he had met and lived with S.A.
since the age of three in 2019 or 2020, and that S.A. called him “dad.” When
asked what kinds of things he did with S.A. while acting as her father,
Stepfather responded that “[s]he had everything she needed” and that he
provided a home and emotional support for her. When his counsel asked if he
provided food and clothing for her, Stepfather responded, “That little girl had
everything.” As for family activities, Stepfather testified that they went to
the park and he bought toys for S.A. He testified that they loved to draw,
worked on the alphabet and numbers, and discussed S.A.’s schooling.

                                         7
      On cross-examination, Stepfather testified that when he met S.A. for
the first time, she asked if he was her dad, and he and Mother said “no.” He
explained that he and Mother “hung out and stuff,” and S.A. “just decided
[he] was going to be her dad.” He said “it took a minute for [him] to accept
it . . . [b]ut she grew onto [him].” He testified that he lived apart from S.A.
and Mother twice—once during a seven-day incarceration and once for about
a month.
      During closing arguments, Stepfather’s counsel asked the juvenile
court to elevate Stepfather to presumed father status under section 7611,
subdivision (d). The Agency argued that the juvenile court should deny the
request under In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202 (T.R.) because the
conditions S.A. was found in, including Stepfather being under the influence
of fentanyl and having drugs in the car, showed that Stepfather had acted
“contrary to being a father.”
      After hearing the parties’ arguments and considering the evidence, the
juvenile court issued its ruling. The court first observed that it “did not hear
any testimony as to when [Stepfather] began to see himself in a paternal role
to [S.A.]” and that it did not hear any testimony regarding “when he began to
see [S.A.] in a way to indicate that he held her out as his own or viewed
himself in a parental role to her.” The court stated that Stepfather “need[ed]
to openly receive [S.A.] into his home” and “openly hold her out as his natural
child.” It observed “[t]here simply was not enough information provided . . .
to be able to put a time line on that.”
      The court further noted the conditions S.A. was found in, including that
drugs were accessible to her while Stepfather was under the influence. The
court continued, “I know that [Stepfather’s] testimony is that [S.A.] had
everything she wanted whenever she wanted . . . [b]ut based on the

                                          8
conditions that she was found under and the fact that [he] was, in fact,
charged with felony child cruelty and child abuse, his characterization of how
[S.A.] was cared for by him is belied by the facts in this case.” The court
concluded Stepfather had not met his burden by a preponderance of the
evidence and denied his request to elevate him to presumed father status. It
then struck Stepfather as an alleged father from the petition, removed him
from the proceedings, and ordered his counsel relieved “upon notice of a filing
of a notice of appeal” or within 60 days.
      Stepfather appealed.
                                  DISCUSSION
I.    Appealability
      We first address the threshold question of appealability. The Agency
argues that Stepfather’s appeal must be dismissed as being from a
nonappealable interlocutory order because Stepfather appeals from a
predisposition order, even though the disposition order is the first appealable
order in a juvenile dependency case. We disagree.
      Appeals in dependency proceedings are governed by Welfare and
Institutions Code section 395, subdivision (a)(1), which provides that “[a]
judgment in a proceeding under Section 300 may be appealed in the same
manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed as
an order after judgment.” The juvenile court’s disposition order, and not its
jurisdictional finding, is generally considered the “ ‘first appealable order’ ” in
a dependency proceeding. (In re Nicholas E. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 458,
463.) Nonetheless, appellate courts have concluded that predisposition
orders can be appealable where they are sufficiently “final.” (See, e.g., ibid.;
Sheila B., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 197.) That conclusion is consistent
with Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a), which permits an

                                         9
appeal “[f]rom a judgment,” defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 577 as
“the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or
proceeding.”
      In Sheila B., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 197, for example, the appellate
court concluded that an order dismissing a dependency petition on the
merits—despite occurring before the court’s disposition order—was
appealable because “[i]t [wa]s the end of the matter, and the child goes
home.” (Ibid.) Similarly, the court’s order here, which denied Stepfather
presumed father status and relieved him of counsel, was “the end of the
matter” for Stepfather because it excluded him from the dependency
proceeding without further recourse in the juvenile court. (See ibid.)
      We recognize, as did the court in Sheila B., that allowing an appeal
from a predisposition order is not a perfect solution, particularly given the
passage of time before an appeal can be concluded and the potential for
disruption in the event of a reversal. (See Sheila B., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 197–198.) But the alternative—waiting until the juvenile court issues a
disposition order—is even less attractive. As was the case here, disposition
hearings are often continued, sometimes for extended periods. Postponing an
appeal until after a disposition order would cause even more delay, making a
reversal even more disruptive. Moreover, because Stepfather was excluded
from all further proceedings and his court-appointed counsel was relieved,
there was no practical way that he could learn when the disposition order
had been issued, and at that point, he would not have any counsel to file his
notice of appeal.
      Accordingly, we conclude the court’s predisposition order denying
Stepfather presumed father status and excluding him from further

                                       10
proceedings is appealable, and the Agency’s motion to dismiss is denied. We
next consider the merits.
II.   Presumed Father
      A.    Applicable Law
      In dependency proceedings, “the premise behind the category of
presumed father is that an individual who has demonstrated a commitment
to the child and the child’s welfare—regardless of whether he is biologically
the father—is entitled to the elevated status of presumed fatherhood.” (T.R.,
supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1211–1212.) Section 7611, subdivision (d)
provides that someone is a child’s presumed father if he both “receives the
child into their home and openly holds out the child as their natural child.” It
is the burden of the person claiming entitlement to presumed father status to
establish these facts by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Spencer W.
(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1653 (Spencer W.); § 7611, subd. (d).)
      When determining whether a person has satisfied the statutory
requirements of receiving the child into his home and openly holding out the
child as his own, courts have considered a number of factors, including
“whether the man actively helped the mother in prenatal care; whether he
paid pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his ability to do so;
whether he promptly took legal action to obtain custody of the child; whether
he sought to have his name placed on the birth certificate; whether and how
long he cared for the child; whether there is unequivocal evidence that he had
acknowledged the child; the number of people to whom he had acknowledged
the child; whether he provided for the child after it no longer resided with
him; whether, if the child needed public benefits, he had pursued completion
of the requisite paperwork; and whether his care was merely incidental.”
(T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.) No single factor is determinative,

                                      11
and the court may consider all the circumstances in making its decision.
(R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 774 (R.M.).)
      B.    Standard of Review
      We review a juvenile court’s determination of presumed father status
for substantial evidence. (Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
361, 368 (Charisma R.).) Under the substantial evidence standard, “[w]e
must accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the
evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and
decision, resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 369.)
      Because Stepfather bore the burden of establishing presumed father
status, and the juvenile court found that he failed to meet his burden, the
substantial evidence standard requires him to demonstrate that the evidence
compels a finding in his favor. Specifically, the question becomes whether his
evidence was (1) uncontradicted and unimpeached; and (2) of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it
was insufficient to support a finding in his favor. (Kinder v. Capistrano
Beach Care Center, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804, 811.)
      To the extent Stepfather claims that the juvenile court considered
impermissible factors in its evaluation, we review his claims de novo.
      C.    Analysis
      Stepfather contends the juvenile court erred by not elevating him to
presumed father status under section 7611, subdivision (d). We disagree.
      First, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Stepfather
failed to meet his burden of showing that he openly acknowledged S.A. as his
own child. Although he checked a box in his parentage inquiry form
indicating that he told others he was S.A.’s father, short of vaguely
referencing “[f]amily, friends,” he failed to identify any of these purported

                                       12
individuals by name, relationship, or address, as the form asked. Nor did he
offer any testimony at the hearing that he had held out S.A. as his child or to
whom he had done so. (Cf. Charisma R., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 375
[nonbiological parent held out child as her own in birth announcement, online
message board for women trying to conceive, and communications with
visiting former coworker, the nurse at a medical visit, and strangers in the
street].) There was also no evidence that, for example, Stepfather named
S.A. as his child on insurance or other paperwork. (Cf. In re L.L. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 1302, 1314 [evidence sufficient to support court’s finding that
man held out child as his own where he named child as his own on insurance
and employment forms; told family, friends, and strangers that child was his;
and filed action to obtain joint legal custody].) For these reasons alone, the
evidence did not compel a finding that Stepfather “ ‘openly and publicly’ ”
acknowledged S.A. as his child. (Spencer W., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1652.)
      Stepfather argues that the juvenile court erred by finding there was
“not enough information” as to “when [Stepfather] began to see himself in a
parental role to [S.A.]” or “when he began to see [S.A.] in a way to indicate
that he held her out as his own.” We disagree with Stepfather’s contention
that the court’s comments show it imposed an impermissible “duration
requirement” on his relationship with S.A. (See Jason P. v. Danielle S. (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1021 (Jason P.) [“ ‘A party seeking to establish he is a
presumed parent is not required to show that he acted as a parent to the
child for a specific period.’ ”].) Rather, the court was merely articulating the
lack of clarity surrounding the nature of Stepfather’s purported parental
relationship with S.A. and at what point it came about. Other courts, too,
have considered evidence regarding the “timeline” of a purported parental

                                       13
relationship and the specific periods of time during which an individual
“received” a child into his home or as his own. (See, e.g., In re M.R. (2017)
7 Cal.App.5th 886, 899 [in concluding substantial evidence supported court’s
presumed father finding, appellate court recounted specific time periods and
dates during which presumed father “received” child into home or visited
child].) We see no error in the juvenile court’s observation that the evidence
of a parental relationship fell short because it was not sufficiently clear and
unambiguous. (See Jason P., supra, at p. 1023 [under section 7611,
subdivision (d), “ ‘receipt of the child into the home must be sufficiently
unambiguous as to constitute a clear declaration regarding the nature of the
relationship, but it need not continue for any specific duration’ ” (italics
added)].)
      Moreover, construing the evidence in favor of the judgment as we must,
the record demonstrates other factors, too, weighing against a finding of
presumed father status. For example, Stepfather’s relationship with S.A.
could reasonably be considered only “incidental” to his relationship with
Mother. (T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.) “ ‘Section 7611,
subdivision (d) . . . requires . . . “someone who has demonstrated an abiding
commitment to the child and the child’s well-being” regardless of his
relationship with the mother.’ ” (W.S. v. S.T. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 132, 144-
145.) Yet, Stepfather offered no evidence of any instances during which he
spent time with S.A. on his own or cared for her outside of his relationship
with Mother. (See R.M., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 777 [person seeking
presumed parent status under section 7611, subdivision (d) must have a fully
developed parental relationship with the child; a caretaking role and/or
romantic involvement with the child’s parent is insufficient].)

                                        14
      Stepfather sees the evidence differently. But each of his arguments
requires that we impermissibly reweigh the evidence against the juvenile
court’s order or construe inferences in his favor. That is not our role when
reviewing an order for substantial evidence. (Charisma R., supra,
175 Cal.App.4th at p. 369 [“ ‘It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes
in the evidence,’ ” and we instead “ ‘[m]ust accept as true all evidence and all
reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the correctness
of the trial court’s findings and decision, resolving every conflict in favor of
the judgment.’ ”].)
      As one example, Stepfather emphasizes evidence that he gave S.A.
“everything she needed,” including “food, shelter, clothing, emotional support
and nurturing.” Yet, evidence also showed that after S.A. was detained with
her caregivers, she constantly asked for food, hid food in her room, requested
a snack a few minutes after eating a meal, and struggled to understand how
mealtimes worked. Thus, the juvenile court could reasonably infer
Stepfather had not, in fact, given S.A. “everything she needed” as he
claimed—especially considering the circumstances surrounding the discovery
of Stepfather asleep and under the influence in a vehicle with five-year-old
S.A. and easily accessible bags of fentanyl and methamphetamine and
dangerous chemicals. (See Charisma R., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 369
[“ ‘Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or uncontradicted, if two
or more different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence this
court is without power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for those
of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in the
absence of a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn’ ”].)
      In a related argument, Stepfather asserts the juvenile court erred by
adopting the Agency’s argument at the hearing, based on T.R., supra,

                                        15
132 Cal.App.4th 1202, that Stepfather should be “disqualified” from
presumed father status because of his drug use. While we agree that “a
parent need not be a perfect parent to be found to have received a child into
his . . . home” (Jason P., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 1023), we disagree with
Stepfather that the juvenile court required such perfection of him or that the
record shows the court considered his drug use as a basis to disqualify him
from presumed father status. On the contrary, the juvenile court discussed
Stepfather’s drug use and “the conditions that [S.A.] was found to be living
under” to explain why it did not find credible his testimony that S.A. had
“everything she needed.” Moreover, there is simply no indication that, in
reaching its decision, the juvenile court relied on the Agency’s arguments
under T.R.
      As another example, Stepfather points to evidence showing he helped
S.A. with learning the alphabet and numbers, and discussed school with her.
But again, other evidence undermined that testimony. S.A. told the Agency
that she had not been to school in a long time, and her school counselor
reported that S.A. had not previously attended school until her placement
with maternal aunt and uncle. Evidence also showed that S.A. could not
write her name, did not know the alphabet, and was behind in learning
numbers. Accordingly, the court was not required to find Stepfather’s
testimony credible. Although Stepfather suggests that S.A.’s learning deficits
could be explained by a potential learning disability or other obstacle, we
must construe all inferences and conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
court’s order, not in favor of a finding for Stepfather.
      Stepfather further highlights evidence that S.A. called him “dad,”
wanted to live with him, and asked to see him for visits. Other evidence,
however, indicates that S.A. similarly referred to her maternal aunt and

                                        16
uncle as her parents and to her biological father as her “real dad.” Although
evidence surrounding S.A.’s view of Stepfather as her parent and Stepfather’s
view of S.A. as his child was relevant to the paternity determination, the
totality of the evidence did not compel a finding in his favor on presumed
father status. We cannot conclude the juvenile court erred in finding such
evidence insufficient to show Stepfather carried his burden under section
7611, subdivision (d). (See R.M., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 774 [no single
factor is determinative, and the court may consider all the circumstances in
making its decision.].)
      For the same reasons, we are unpersuaded by Stepfather’s arguments
regarding when he claims to have lived with S.A. Stepfather contends it is
“undisputed” that S.A. lived with him and Mother from 2020 through her
detention in February 2023. Although Stepfather testified to having lived
with S.A. beginning in May 2020 through her removal, the record is replete
with evidence contradicting that timeline, including Stepfather’s own
statement in the parentage inquiry form that he lived with S.A. from
September 2020 to April 2022 and again from December 2022 until her
removal. Meanwhile, S.A. reported that she and Mother lived at her
grandfather’s home in Mexico. Mother, too, claimed a number of
contradictory timelines and residences, including that she and S.A. had lived
back-and-forth with maternal grandmother in Florida and maternal
grandfather in Texas, including from December of 2020 to December 2022—
without mentioning that Stepfather lived with them during these periods.
Accordingly, the juvenile court could have discounted Stepfather’s testimony
and inferred that the evidence was too conflicting to determine whether,
when, or for how long Stepfather lived with S.A. (Charisma R., supra,

                                      17
175 Cal.App.4th at p. 368 [substantial evidence review requires resolving
evidentiary conflicts in support of judgment].)
      For all these reasons, we conclude substantial evidence supports the
court’s findings that Stepfather had not received S.A. into his home and had
not openly held her out as his own child. We further conclude that the
juvenile court did not consider impermissible criteria in making this
determination.2
                                DISPOSITION
      The July 19, 2023 order is affirmed.

                                                          BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

2     Because we affirm, we need not address Stepfather’s additional
argument that the juvenile court on remand must consider whether S.A.
would suffer detriment by only recognizing two parents under section 7612,
subdivision (c) before determining whether S.A.’s biological father’s judgment
of paternity would have rebutted Stepfather’s presumed parent status under
section 7612, subdivision (d). (See id., subd. (c) [“a court may find that more
than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if
the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the
child”]; id., subd. (d) [“Unless a court orders otherwise after making the
determination specified in subdivision (c), a presumption under Section 7611
is rebutted by a judgment establishing parentage of the child by another
person”].) As Stepfather concedes in his reply brief, the juvenile court’s
finding that Stepfather did not qualify for presumed father status meant that
a detriment analysis under section 7612, subdivision (c) “would have been
purely academic.”
                                      18