Court Opinion

ID: 9449500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:14:04.675254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:51.817264
License: Public Domain

HAMLIN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Noble Andre on January 20, 1959, signed an application for life insurance from appellee which contained inter alia the following questions and answers.
“12. Have you ever suffered from any ailment or disease of (a) the brain or nervous system? No
“(b) the heart, blood vessels or lungs ? No
“18. Have you ever had chest pains or heart pains or been under suspicion or treatment for possible heart trouble ? No
“19. Have you ever been an inmate of, or received treatment or cure at an asylum, hospital, or sanitarium? No
The district court made findings that Andre’s answer “to each of these ques*562tions1 was false and was known by Andre at the time it was given to be false.” He further found in Finding—
“7. In December, 1957, a little more than a year before the application, Andre experienced a ten-day episode of chest pains for which he consulted his doctor on December 26, 1957 and was advised by his doctor on December 30, 1957 that such pains constituted angina pectoris and resulted from coronary insufficiency.
“8. The false answers to each of the questions referred to did not result from inadvertence or misunderstanding as to their purport by Andre but were knowingly made in bad faith by him.
“9. Each of these false answers constituted a misrepresentation to the defendant of the state of Andre’s physical condition.”
Dr. Holliger, the personal physician of Mr. Andre, testified that on December 30, 1957 he advised Andre after examining him and listening to Andre’s story of his symptoms that Andre had angina pectoris which was a heart pain, and the doctor further advised him that he had a coronary insufficiency which he described as “an inadequate blood supply to the heart muscle.” A notation of this medical advice appears upon the doctor’s records. The doctor’s records of October 22, 1958 show that Andre had “sudden onset, speech difficulty and incoordination today” and that he had a “cerebral vascular accident” (designated C.V.A.). This was described as a “little thrombosis or a rupture of a vessel in the brain.” In lay language it is sometimes called a “stroke.”
The record shows that Mr. Andre was hospitalized in Hahnemann Hospital as a result of the last above condition from October 22, 1958 to October 24, 1958. The doctor testified that he advised Mr. Andre of the condition of his health. The doctor’s records of October 31, 1958 read in part: “Effects from CVA are daily improving, able to focus better and read now.”
The majority contends that appellee was aware of the fact that Andre had a heart condition and that therefore ap-pellee did not rely on Andre’s statements. Although the appellee was aware that Andre’s heart had been damaged at one time, the evidence did not indicate that the company was aware that he had experienced any of the symptoms of an active heart disease. I therefore feel that there was merit to appellee’s position that the medical picture presented to it was that of one with arrested asymptomatic heart condition and that knowledge of the symptoms of active heart and circulatory disease which had in fact been experienced by Andre would have materially affected the medical evaluation of his condition.2
*563Rule 52(a) provides in part as follows:
“Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.”
It has been held that a reviewing court in considering questions of sufficiency of evidence to sustain the verdict, must take that view of the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party and accept as established all facts which the evidence reasonably tends to prove and give to the prevailing party the benefit of all inferences which may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v. Hayden, 9th Cir., 231 F.2d 595. Wilson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 250 F.2d 649, 8th Cir.
A finding is “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence-to support it the reviewing court upon the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746.
In Bloom v. United States, 9 Cir., 272 F.2d 215 at 223, this court stated:
“Since the finding involved the credibility of witnesses, and since it is supported by substantial evidence, it is conclusive upon appeal. We do not sit to second guess the trial court, nor have we the power to do so under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., unless the findings are ‘clearly erroneous’.”
Under the testimony in this case, a portion of which has been set out above, I cannot agree with the following language contained in the majority opinion —“There is no merit to the defendant’s claim of fraud, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure. They have no support whatever in the evidence.”
*564I feel that there is ample support in the record for the findings of the court, that the findings are not clearly erroneous, and that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed

. Question No. 18 was not specifically referred to in the district court’s findings. However, it was quoted in the court’s order for judgment, and Finding No. 7, quoted below, would logically seem to refer to Question 18.

. In this regard, Hr. Edward Robbins testified as follows:
“A * * * Now the electrocardiogram in 1957, dated 12/26/57, as I stated, shows evidence of damage to the heart, and from this single cardiogram we cannot tell how recent — how old this might be. However, with the knowledge that at this time this man had an episode of ten days of chest pain, then the evaluation of this electrocardiogram assumes very different proportions because a person who has evidence of this much damage, as evidenced by the cardiogram, who is currently having ten days of chest pain, would be presumed to be having a heart attack or more properly, myocardial infarction. The single electrocardiogram does not enable us to say whether this process is going on, but knowing that this man had ten days of chest pain and knowing that he had a previously damaged heart, one would conclude that this man would very probably be. having a new heart attack at this time. And with additional cardiograms available, say, a few days before, a few days after, the cardiogram which we have in hand, these undoubtedly would have shown progressive changes indicating fresh damage to the heart at this time.
“Q Doctor, could we summarize that by saying that it would be the presence of the additional history which would en*563able or which suggests an active symptomatic heart condition?
“A That’s exactly right.
“Q Whereas, without this history we have a picture of a stabilized, arrested, asymptomatic heart condition?
“A That’s right. To repeat, again, the electrocardiogram does not enable us to date the time of the injury to the. heart, and it is only by the addition of clinical historical information that we can tell whether this heart damage is old or recent. Therefore, this information is essential to evaluating the medical status of the patient.
******
“A The knowledge that this man had been hospitalized with symptoms of a stroke in 1958, October 1958 — I believe some few months before this application —would materially affect the medical evaluation of this patient. The reason for that is that the mortality or the life expectancy of a person who has had a heart attack may be said to improve as time goes on if the patient is asymptomatic. If we knew that a person had a heart attack in recent times, his life expectancy would be of a certain order of magnitude. If he lives two or three or four years, his chances for survival increase, and the mortality decreases as one increases the time since the heart attack.
Now the knowledge, however, that the patient had in addition to his heart disease, also had a stroke, which is based upon disease of the arteries to the brain, materially affects the evaluation of this patient because there is a certain mortality associated with people who have diseases of the arteries to the brain and we know that these people die at a rate something like two and a half times the rate of population of same age who do not have hardening of the arteries to the. brain. Therefore, the knowledge that this man had had symptoms of a stroke a few short months before this application in January of 1959, would materially affect one’s evaluation of this man’s medical status because the additional mortality to be expected from his cerebral vascular disease would add to the mortality which could be expected from the heart and would make a rather forbidding medical picture.”
On the basis of the evidence in the record and Dr. Robbins’ testimony, the district court concluded that “defendant relied on the false answers of Andre in issuing the policy and would not have insured his life had it been aware of the true facts concerning his condition which were concealed by his misrepresentations.”