Court Opinion

ID: 9565434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:21:06.054587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:38.588120
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice,
dissenting, joined by ROONEY, Chief Justice.
The majority adopts a rule that states, “Non-traumatically caused mental injury is compensible 4 4 if it results from a situation or condition in employment that is of greater magnitude than the day-to-day mental stress and tensions all employees usually experience.”
The problem I have is that the majority does not correctly apply the rule it adopts to the facts of this case. The rule adopted by the majority is substantially the rule adopted in School District #1, Village of Brown Deer v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373, 377 (1974):
“4 4 * Mental injury non-traumatically caused must have resulted from a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees must experience. 4 4 ”
The same rule was adopted in Sloss v. Industrial Commission, 121 Ariz. 10, 588 P.2d 303 (1978); Owens v. National Health Laboratories, Inc., 8 Ark.App. 92, 648 S.W.2d 829 (1983); Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Public Safety, Me., 404 A.2d 1014 (1979); Seitz v. L & R Industries, Inc., Etc., R.I., 437 A.2d 1345 (1981); Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 72 Wis.2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976). See also 1B Larson Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 42.23(b), p. 7-639 (1982).
The cases cited above, beginning with the 1974 Wisconsin case, hold that the worker must show more than the ordinary day-to-day stress to which all workers are subjected. The test to determine compensi-ble mental injury announced by the majority is not a subjective test, that is, it is not how the employee reacts to the stress on the job; rather, it is an objective test, that is, whether the duties of the job subject the worker to greater stress than his fellow employees. Pima Community College v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 137 Ariz.App. 137, 669 P.2d 115 (1983).
The majority has decided this case on the basis of a subjective test; in other words, how Mr. Drake, the appellee, reacted to the stress he experienced as a truck driver. This is contrary to cases cited by the majority and other cases I have cited.
The majority has not pointed to any evidence showing that appellee was subject to different or greater stress than his fellow truck drivers. My examination of the record reveals there is no such evidence. In fact, appellee’s own testimony is to the contrary. For example, when appellee was transferred from a bid driver to an extra board driver seven other fellow employees were also transferred. To further illustrate that appellee’s situation was the same as other drivers, he testified at trial:
“Q. Did Consolidated Freightways treat any of the drivers different as to when— or the amount of time they could take for a vacation? In other words, is this two weeks, up to ten years, is that uniformly applicable to all drivers?
“A. Yes.
*880“Q. What about sick leave, is that the same?
“A. That’s the same.
“Q. Do any of the bid drivers in Wyoming know what their hours are?
“A. Just a few, a few of the very top number one bid drivers, they know pretty well just about what time of the day they’re going to go.
“Q. And the rest of them don’t have any idea, do they?
“A. No.
“Q. The extra board drivers don’t have much idea about what their hours are either?
“A. No.
“Q. And that’s uniformly applicable to all extra board drivers?
“A. As far as the rules are concerned, yes.”
“The burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence in worker’s compensation cases is assigned to the claimant.” Randell v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Division, Wyo., 671 P.2d 303 (1983).
Appellee has failed to produce any evidence to show that the stress he was subjected to on the job was greater oor any different than that experienced by his fellow employees.
I would reverse.