Court Opinion

ID: 9946777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 15:16:56.076684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:41.743985
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-5

                                   ANA NATAL

                                       vs.

             WEST SPRINGFIELD HOUSING AUTHORITY & others.1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Defendant West Springfield Housing Authority appeals from

 an order of the Hampden Superior Court denying its motion for

 summary judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824

 (1974).2    The defendant asserted that the plaintiff had failed to

 establish that she properly delivered a letter of presentment to

 the defendant pursuant to G. L. c. 258, § 4.3             We affirm.

       A motion for summary judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56

 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002), is appropriate where

 "the moving party . . . 'show[s] that there is no genuine issue

 1 John Does 1-5.
 2 This otherwise interlocutory order on the issue of presentment
 is immediately appealable under the doctrine of present
 execution. See Rodriguez v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1009-
 1010 (2015); Daveiga v. Boston Pub. Health Comm'n, 449 Mass.
 434, 435 n.2 (2007).
 3 The plaintiff has not filed a brief in this appeal.
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law' based on the undisputed facts."

Premier Capital, LLC v. KMZ, Inc., 464 Mass. 467, 474 (2013),

quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c).       We review the denial of a

motion for summary judgment de novo.       DeGiacomo v. Quincy, 476

Mass. 38, 41 (2016), citing Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676

(2007).

    Here, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the

defendant submitted an affidavit of the executive director

denying receipt of any letter of presentment.      The plaintiff

presented evidence of presentment through affidavits from a

managing attorney, manager of paralegals, senior paralegal, and

receptionist of the law firm representing her in the action.

Those affidavits asserted that a presentment letter was prepared

and properly mailed on June 20, 2019.       The motion judge held

that the issue of presentment:

    "[could] not be resolved by way of summary judgment, based
    upon the conflicting affidavits, and since the posting of a
    letter by ordinary first class mail, properly addressed to
    a party at his place of business, is prima facie evidence
    that the correspondence was received in the ordinary course
    of the mails."

We discern no error in the judge's order denying summary

judgment.

    While the plaintiff did not offer an affidavit from the

paralegal who mailed the letter, she produced a copy of the

                                   2
presentment letter and sufficient evidence based on the

affiants' personal knowledge of the file management and mailing

practices of the law firm to create a dispute of fact about

whether a presentment letter was mailed to the defendant.      See

Adams v. Schneider Elec. USA, 492 Mass. 271, 290 (2023)

(circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish dispute of fact

and defeat motion for summary judgment).    The defendant argues

that it was not enough for the plaintiff to establish that she

mailed a presentment letter; rather, that she must establish

that it was received.

    The defendant's reliance on Drake v. Leicester, 484 Mass.

198 (2020), to contend that the mailbox rule does not apply to

letters of presentment is misplaced.   In that case, the letter

was placed in the mail on the last day of the statutory period

for presentment.   Id. at 202.   Accordingly, it was not received

by the proper official until after the statutory period had

passed.   It was within that context that the Supreme Judicial

Court wrote, "[p]lacing the presentment letter in the mail,

certified or otherwise, does not constitute proper presentment

under G. L. c. 258, § 4, as that act alone would not provide the

proper executive officer the opportunity to observe the letter."

Id. at 200.   That is not the case here.   In the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, the plaintiff, the presentment

                                 3
letter was mailed months before the statutory two-year

presentment period expired.4

     The long-standing common-law presumption is that "[t]he

depositing in the post-office of a letter properly addressed,

with the postage prepaid, is prima facie evidence that the

person to whom it was addressed received it."    Briggs v. Hervey,

130 Mass. 186, 188 (1881).     See Commonwealth v. Crosscup, 369

Mass. 228, 239 (1975) ("Proper mailing of a letter is 'prima

facie evidence' in civil cases of its receipt by the

addressee"); Hobart-Farrell Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Klayman,

302 Mass. 508, 509 (1939) ("The mailing of a letter properly

addressed and postpaid does not merely create a presumption but

rather constitutes prima facie evidence of delivery to the

addressee" [citations omitted]).

     The fact that the defendant denies receiving the letter

presents a question of credibility for a trier of fact.     Shawmut

Worcester County Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 398 Mass. 273, 281 (1986)

(on summary judgment, "court does not pass upon the credibility

of witnesses or the weight of the evidence [or] make [its] own

decision of facts" [quotation and citation omitted]); First

4 The alleged injury occurred on or about February 6, 2018. The
affidavits submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment were prima facie evidence that the
presentment letter was mailed on or about June 20, 2019, which
is months before the end of two-year presentment period.

                                  4
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Sheridan, 285 Mass. 338, 339 (1934)

("Whether such prima facie evidence has been overcome and

whether the affirmative defence has been made out so as to rebut

the otherwise conclusive effect of the prima facie case can

rarely be ruled as matter of law.     It is in most instances a

question of fact").

                                      Order denying motion for
                                        summary judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Henry,
                                        D'Angelo & Hodgens, JJ.5),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    March 1, 2024.

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  5