Court Opinion

ID: 9748325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:59:56.296039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:34.430404
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
with whom NEWMAN, Chief Judge, MACK, Associate Judge, and KELLY, Associate Judge, Retired, join, dissenting:
The majority concludes that, absent “a ‘special relationship’ ... between the police and a particular individual” that creates “a specific legal duty ... rendering the police liable for failure to act,” ante at 1312, “the police may not be held liable for failure to protect a particular individual from harm caused by criminal conduct.” Ante at 1315. Because the majority finds no such special relationship here, the court holds that appellants may not recover for the Metropolitan Police Department’s negligent failure to prevent the murder of Elton Pinkney and the gunshot injuries to Gar-nett Morgan and her son, John Keith Morgan.
While this court has applied the quoted principle in ordinary cases of failure to respond to citizen complaints, see, e.g., Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C.1981) (en banc), that principle, in my view, is not properly applicable to this case. The negligence complained of here was the police department’s failure to exercise proper supervision over a member of the force, not failure to investigate or prevent crimes by civilians. As. discussed in the division opinion, Morgan v. United States, 449 A.2d 1102, 1108 (D.C.1982), the legal duty at issue here is not a special duty, i.e., a duty dependent on a “special relationship.” Rather, it
is properly characterized as a general duty, owed to the public at large, to use reasonable care in supervising and controlling police officers and their service revolvers. Marusa v. District of Columbia, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 351, 484 F.2d 828, 831 (1973) (“government has a duty *1320to minimize the risk of injury to members of the public that is presented by [its] policy [of requiring police officers to carry service revolvers at all times]”); Carter v. Carlson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 398, 447 F.2d 358, 368 (1971) (“District of Columbia as a corporate entity has a duty to supervise, train and control its police officers”), reversed in part, sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, [93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613] (1973); see District of Columbia v. White, D.C.App., 442 A.2d 159 (1982) (referring to existence of cause of action against police department for negligent supervision of officers); District of Columbia v. Davis, D.C.App., 386 A.2d 1195, 1199-1201 (1978) (same). [Footnote omitted.]
The majority’s “special relationship” or “special duty” analysis is therefore irrelevant. A jury applying the proper standard of reasonable care under the circumstances to Captain Tiernan’s supervisory efforts could reasonably have found negligence. Id. at 1109.
The majority also concludes that Captain Tiernan’s failure to follow established procedures after Garnett Morgan told him of appellant John Morgan’s gun threat did not, as a matter of law, proximately cause the death and injuries. To the contrary, a jury reasonably could find that, far from being “highly extraordinary in retrospect,” ante at 1318,1 “it was reasonably foreseeable under circumstances known to the Department that Morgan ‘might avail himself of the opportunity’ to carry out his threat with the gun” if his superior officers did not take reasonable steps to assess and minimize that risk. Id. at 1113, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448 (citations omitted).
Respectfully, therefore, I dissent for the reasons more fully set forth in the vacated division opinion. Morgan, supra, 449 A.2d at 1102. The trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdicts. I would reinstate- the jury verdicts as to all appellants.

. In its discussion of proximate cause, the en banc court quotes from and confirms the correctness of the test for proximate cause set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435 and applied by the division majority. See ante at 1318; Morgan, supra, 449 A.2d at 1110-11; Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 319-21 (D.C.1980).