Court Opinion

ID: 9717684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:08:39.962687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.715101
License: Public Domain

CONOVER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s holding regarding trial fees. However I dissent from its ruling regarding appellate attorney’s fees. While I agree with the Bank that many states now routinely allow appellate attorneys’ fees, see, e.g., Steele v. Vanderslice, (1961) 90 Ariz. 277, 367 P.2d 636; Cirimele v. Shinazy, (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 50, 285 P.2d 311, Indiana case law does not support such recovery. Kagan v. Auto-Teria, Inc., (1976) 168 Ind.App. 314, 342 N.E.2d 890; Honey Creek Corp. v. WNC Development Co., (1975) 165 Ind.App. 141, 331 N.E.2d 452; Willsey v. Hartman, (1971) 150 Ind.App. 485, 276 N.E.2d 577; McCormick v. Falls City Bank of Louisville, (C.C.D.Ind.1893) 57 F. 107.
In McCormick v. Falls City Bank of Louisville, supra, appellee requested attorneys’ fees on recovery of a debt founded upon a promissory note. There the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana stated:
“The collateral note on which the judgment in this court was rendered contained a stipulation for the payment of attorneys’ fees. This stipulation, under the firmly settled law of this state, was valid. When the bank took judgment in this court on the collateral note, there was included in the judgment the sum of $200 as a reasonable attorneys’ fee for the collection of the same. The stipulation for attorneys’ fees contained in the note was merged in that judgment. The fact that the judgment was appealed from and affirmed gives no right or claim for the recovery of additional attorneys' fees. The amount of attorneys’ fees in all such cases is settled by the judgment of the trial court once for all. Holmes v. Hinkle, 63 Ind. 518.”
The court went on to note “the parties presumably put into the note and contract their entire agreement and understanding on the subject of attorneys’ fees and expenses.” Based upon a theory that the attorneys’ fees merged in the trial judgment, the circuit court denied appellee’s petition for additional fees.
In Honey Creek Corporation v. WNC Development Company, supra, we adopted the circuit court’s reasoning in McCormick. The contract provision at issue in Honey Creek allowed for an award of attorneys’ fees. Attorneys’ fees were granted to the WNC Development Company at trial, and on appeal WNC petitioned this court to allow additional attorneys’ fees for the expense of defending the appeal. In response we held under the theory of merger set forth in McCormick there was no right to a recovery of additional fees.
Appellee Bank argues the rule set forth in Honey Creek was effectively overruled by our decision in Indiana Hospital Licensing v. Womens’ Pavilion, (1981) Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 461 (opinion on rehearing), and Templeton v. Sam Klain and Son, Inc., (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 89. We disagree with appellee’s contention, however, as both cases are distinguishable from the issue before us.
In Indiana Hospital the Indiana Hospital Licensing Council appealed a decision of the trial court refusing to enjoin a first trimes*5ter abortion clinic from operating without a prescribed license. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 420 N.E.2d 1301, and on petition for rehearing Pavillion requested appellate attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We held that Pavillion was entitled to appellate fees under the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards of 1976 which amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The statute provides in part: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorneys’ fee as part of the costs.” We stated, “(u)nder § 1988, Pavillion is entitled to fees for ‘any action’ in which it prevails, including proceedings on appeal, or remand, and in resolution of the fees issue itself.” The legislative history of § 1988 exemplifies a recognition of the need to encourage assertion of fundamental constitutional and statutory rights and to attract counsel sufficiently competent to deal with the intricacies of such suits. Maher v. Gagne, (1980) 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653; Indiana Hospital, supra, at 462.
Since Indiana Hospital deals strictly with interpretation of § 1988, and the allowance of costs therein, we should not extend its holding to set forth a general rule concerning appellate attorneys’ fees.
Templeton v. Sam Klain & Son, Inc. likewise deals with a specific statute interpreted as allowing appellate attorneys’ fees. In Templeton, Sam Klain & Sons recovered judgment and attorneys’ fees in its suit upon a mechanics lien held under Ind.Code § 32-8-3-1 (Bums 1973). Ind.Code 32-8-3-14 allowed “reasonable attorneys’ fees” in pursuance of such a suit. According to our Supreme Court’s interpretation of Ind.Code 32-8-3-14 “reasonable attorneys’ fees” in recovery of a mechanics lien includes those fees incurred in the successful defense of judgment on appeal.
Both cases set forth by appellee-Bank as overruling Honey Creek fail to address the issue of appellate attorneys’ fees based on a promissory note. In Honey Creek we said, “the right to recover attorneys’ fees does not exist in the absence of a statute or some agreement.” Id. at 459.
While the parties in the present case contracted for “reasonable attorneys’ fees,” we have nothing in the record by which we may ascertain whether they intended that phrase to refer only to that amount necessary to recover judgment at trial, or whether they intended to include fees incurred on appeal. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary we are bound to follow Honey Creek, wherein we said:
“We believe that counsel should be paid a fair and adequate amount for the work done in the representation of clients. However under the law in Indiana as heretofore determined, we are constrained to hold W. N. C.’s petition for additional attorneys’ fees which were occasioned by this appeal must be and is hereby denied.”
Finally, I dissent because this Court should not fix fees on appeal. That matter is solely for the trial court after a full and fair hearing.
The trial court is ideally positioned both by geographical and practical experience to determine the reasonable value of an attorney’s services for appeal work in Clay County after a hearing on that subject. Clearly, we are not at this stage of the proceedings. There is no statewide standard or norm for making that determination. It is a local question and should be answered locally, as is the case at the trial level.
We are marching into a quagmire from which it will be difficult to extricate ourselves in the future by adopting this procedure.
Here, the majority would grant appellate fees based upon the Bank’s petition and the affidavit of its attorney without our offering appellants an opportunity to be heard. Granted they filed no response to appellees’ petition for fees, but that should not prevent them from having a hearing on the subject, as is the case when a trial court fixes fees.
Further, how many times are the courts on appeal to entertain petitions for appel*6late fees? Even this segment of the appeal is not now concluded, so far as the attorneys’ work thereon is concerned. Appellants may now file a petition to transfer which, if granted, will require the expenditure of additional time for which counsel is entitled to be paid, according to the majority. The procedure here adopted will return to haunt us in the future. Such determinations are for the trial court at the conclusion of all proceedings on appeal after a full and fair hearing.
I would deny the appellee-Bank’s request for attorneys’ fees in the first instance and remand the case to the trial court for determination of attorney fees on appeal at the conclusion of all matters incident to this appeal, if appellate fees are to be allowed at all.