Court Opinion

ID: 9796046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:46:47.837814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:43.010931
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COATS,
dissenting.
Because I believe the majority extends United States Supreme Court jurisprudence in a way that was never contemplated and would not be sanctioned by that court, and because I believe the majority misapplies even its newly adopted standard of materiality to the cireumstances of this case, I respectfully dissent.
Unlike the majority, I consider it clear that the Supreme Court has never extended a remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel to the plea-bargaining process. In its seminal holding in Hill v. Lockhart, it found simply that a defense counsel's deficiencies could be considered material if they resulted in a mistaken waiver of trial rights and entry of a guilty plea. 474 U.S. 52, 58-60, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Far from holding that the plea-bargaining process itself constitutes a "proceeding" or that a defendant could be entitled to a remedy for his counsel's failure to negotiate or adequately advise him concerning a plea deal, the Supreme Court's holding in Hill rested firmly on its conclusion that a guilty plea cannot be considered voluntary or effective if it would not have been entered but for defense counsel's unreasonably deficient assistance. Id.
Similarly, when the Supreme Court referred in Strickland v. Washington to the likelihood that the outcome of a proceeding might be different, it was embellishing upon its definition of materiality in the ineffective assistance context as an error or deficiency sufficiently grave to undermine confidence in the outcome of a legal proceeding. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The thrust of its holding was that the notion of prejudice goes to the reliability of a defendant's conviction or punishment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052; cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the right to effective assistance is concerned with defendant's right to fair and reliable determination of his guilt or innocence). It nowhere suggested that a criminal defendant is prejudiced, in the constitutional sense, by his counsel's failure, even i#f unreasonable, to avoid a trial proceeding fairly determining the defendant's guilt or innocence of the charges against him.
For purposes of materiality, the question is not whether the "entire plea bargaining process" is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, but assuming it is, what proceeding is it a critical stage of. Unlike the acceptance of a plea offer, which results in the termination of a criminal proceeding by entry of a guilty plea, the rejection of a plea offer permits the criminal proceeding to continue to trial and verdict. Confidence in the outcome of a criminal trial could be undermined by a defendant's failure to accept a plea offer only in the contrived sense that by pleading guilty to something else, he may have been able to avoid a proceeding to determine his guilt or innocence of the more serious offense altogether.
Even if the standard of materiality for deficiencies in plea negotiations adopted in a number of other jurisdictions, and now by *811the majority, were to ultimately be upheld by the United States Supreme Court, I believe the record in this case could not entitle the defendant to relief. Both the plea deal rejected by the defendant and his exposure upon proceeding to trial involved conviction of a felony sex offense, with all that entails, including registration as a sex offender and an indeterminate sentence with life at its upper end. Whether or not this defense counsel fully understood the intricacies of sentencing under the Lifetime Supervision of Sex Offenders Act, he clearly advised the defendant (and the defendant understood) that the plea offer would include a recommendation to probation rather than a prison sentence, which he risked by going to trial, but that he was likely to be sentenced to probation in any event.
The only difference between the defendant's actual sentence and the lowest possible sentence he may have received by taking the plea offer was the discretion to terminate his lifetime sentence to intensive supervision probation after only ten years in the latter case, as distinguished from twenty years in the former. In view of the substantial advantages to be gained and the minimal risks assumed by proceeding to trial, I consider the majority's assessment of the likelihood that the defendant would have chosen to plead guilty, had he understood the disparity, to be unrealistic. I also think its conclusion in this case demonstrates the fllusory nature of the majority's "objective evidence standard."
By accepting the plea deal, the defendant would have foregone the opportunity to establish his innocence, which he steadfastly maintained throughout, and avoid the stigma of being forced to register as a felony sex offender. In exchange, he was likely to gain nothing but the right to be considered for release from probation sooner. The record indicates that despite some deficiencies in his counsel's advisement (although not in the court's Crim P. 5 advisement of the possible sentence he risked), the defendant was correctly advised that even the possibility of earlier release from probation would almost surely be contingent upon his willingness to admit and discuss his sexual offenses as part of his sex offender treatment, which he appeared, at the time, unwilling to do. Where the defendant faced lifetime probation (if not revocation and subsequent imprisonment) in either case, surely the likelihood of his early release would have to be the determinative factor.
Finally, I would not consider the majority's remedy appropriate, even if I believed the constitution provided the defendant a remedy for ineffective plea bargaining. While I agree that the defendant should not be entitled to demand the plea offer he earlier rejected, I fail to see why his conviction should be vacated without regard to his entry of a guilty plea. In the past, where we have found error affecting only a greater offense, we have considered it appropriate to remand for either a new trial on the greater charge or entry of judgment on a lesser included offense, at the choice of the prosecution. See, e.g., Crespin v. People, 721 P.2d 688, 692-92 (Colo.1986); cf. In re: People v. Lopez, 148 P.3d 121, 125 (Colo.2006) (withholding judgment whether same rationale should apply to resentencing following Blakely violation). Where a defendant is prejudiced, if at all, only by unintelligently foregoing a particular plea offer, and the prosecutor is willing to make the same offer, I see no reason why the defendant should be entitled to again reject that offer and proceed to trial a second time.
Unlike the majority, I consider it clear that the Supreme Court has not thus far extended its remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel to include ineffective plea negotiating; and in light of its existing jurisprudence, I do not look for it to do so. In any event, I would not anticipate the Supreme Court's extension of its ineffective assistance materiality standard in a case in which that standard is, in my view, so clearly not satisfied anyway.
I therefore respectfully dissent.