Court Opinion

ID: 9774795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:33:48.206536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:15.911957
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING DECEMBER 13, 1993 Petition for Rehearing denied. Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice. In his petition for rehearing, Bennie Cleveland challenges this court’s holding in Cleveland v. State, 315 Ark. 91, 865 S.W.2d 285 (1993), on the issues of the supplemental jury panel, the application of the Batson principle to gender, and the sufficiency of the abstract. We deny the petition but address the Batson-gender question in order to correct our original opinion. Addressing Cleveland’s third point for reversal, we gave unduly short shrift to his argument that the principle set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), forbidding the state’s exercise of race-based peremptory challenges, should be extended to embrace his claim that the prosecution’s strikes exhibited gender bias. Of the State’s ten peremptory challenges, nine were used to remove women from the jury pool. The jury’s final composition numbered seven males and five females. In our opinion, we stated that Cleveland, as a male, lacked standing to assert a Batson-gender argument. In doing so, we failed to acknowledge the appellant’s citation of Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), in which the United States Supreme Court held that, under the equal protection clause, a white male defendant in a criminal proceeding had standing to object to the State of Ohio’s use of peremptory challenges to remove seven black venirepersons from the jury. Notwithstanding the erroneous statement in our opinion, we conclude that a rehearing is not required because the trial court did not err in refusing to extend the Bat-son doctrine to encompass gender. A division of authority exists at both the federal and state levels concerning the appropriateness of advancing the Batson standard within the realm of gender. As the State has pointed out, the majority of courts that have ruled on the question have declined to do so. Three of the four federal circuits that have considered the matter have held that Batson should not be expanded so far.1 Eight of the thirteen state courts that have dealt with the issue have also rejected arguments that Batson should apply to sex as well as race.2  The United States Supreme Court will have the opportunity to resolve the question during the present term when it entertains the case of J.E.B. v. Alabama, 92-1239. See J.E.B. v. T.B., 606 So.2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. granted, _U.S._, 113 S.Ct. 2330, 124 L.Ed.2d 242 (1993). In Tucker v. State, 313 Ark. 624, 855 S.W.2d 948 (1993), we declined the opportunity to extend Batson to “gender challenges within a racially cognizable group” on the basis that “no reason or authority” had been provided to support the innovation. 313 Ark. at 630, 855 S.W.2d at 951. With regard to Cleveland’s argument, we believe that the weight of reason and authority rests with the State’s position. Of particular significance in the present case is the fact that the gender composition of the jury that was ultimately impaneled here was five females and seven males. Other jurisdictions that have treated the gender issue under similar circumstances offer instructive guidance. In State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App. 1991), the appellate court found it unnecessary even to reach the Batson-gender question because the presence of five women on the jury demonstrated that the use of strikes to keep additional women from being seated was not obvious error. The same approach prevailed in Mowbray v. State, 788 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App. 1990), where eight of twelve seated jurors were women. In State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App. 1989), the appellate court, in rebuffing the Batson-gender argument, noted that five women served on the jury that convicted the appellant. The parallels that may be drawn with the present situation are obvious.  At this point in the development of the Batson doctrine, we consider it unsound to extend the principle to peremptory challenges based on gender, and we so hold. The petition for rehearing is denied.   See United States v. Broussard, 987 P.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988). Only the Ninth Circuit has held that Batson should be extended to gender-based strikes. See United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990), aff’d en banc, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992).    See Murphy v. State, 596 So.2d 42 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991); Potts v. State, 376 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. 1989); People v. Crowder, 515 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. App. 1987); Hannan v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. App. 1989); State v. Adams, 533 So.2d 1060 (La. App. 1988); State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App. 1989); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 1989); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1987). Batson has been extended to encompass gender in Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. 1993); State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40 (1991); People v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S. 279 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1990); City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993); State v. Burch, 830 P.2d 357 (Wash. App. 1992). The decisions in Tyler and Gonzales were based, respectively, on the Maryland and New Mexico state constitutions.