Court Opinion

ID: 9697825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:32:31.028043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:35.624798
License: Public Domain

RENTTO, Judge
(concurring specially).
While I concur generally in the opinion I think it proper to observe that the 1964 amendment did not remove from our comparative negligence law the concept of the standard of care of the ordinarily reasonable and prudent man. This norm of conduct is still at the heart of our rule. Without it there would be no way in which the contributory negligence of the plaintiff could be determined to be slight, or otherwise, when compared with the negligence of the defendant.
This was well stated by Judge Burns in Nugent v. Quam, 82 S.D. 583, 152 N.W.2d 371, when he wrote:
"For this purpose it seems not only helpful but necessary to start with the standard of care of the ordinarily reasonable and prudent man, not used as an absolute standard of conduct for either one separately, but for a determination of the extent to which each fell below the standard for use in comparing the quantum of want of ordinary care exercised by the plaintiff with the quantum of want of ordinary care exercised by the defendant."
After/'the extent to which each fell below the standard" is determined, the fact trier is then in a position to make the comparison required by the amendment. The manner of comparison is the principal change made by the amendment. This results from adding the requirement that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff be slight "in comparison with the negligence of the defendant."
*102I also feel it should be emphasized that the import and scope of the epithet "slight" in our rule remains as it was before the amendment. This is clear from our decision in the Nugent case. That plaintiff's contributory negligence was less in quantum than the defendant's negligence does not make it "slight in comparison thereto". More is required to warrant that characterization. To bring it within the range of that phrase it must be "small in amount or of little importance or insignificant or unsubstantial or inconsiderable" when compared to the negligence of the defendant.
Eliminating the gross comparison feature from our comparative negligence law altered the quantum of negligence required to hold the defendant liable. However, its removal from the statute, in my view, could not in any way affect the meaning of the phrase "slight contributory negligence". Before the amendment whether the contributory negligence was slight was determined by considering it by itself and separately from the negligence of the defendant. Creager v. Al's Construction Co., 75 S.D. 482, 68 N.W.2d 484. It was not compared with the gross negligence of the defendant then required to make him liable. Rather, it was compared with the conduct of the ordinarily reasonable and prudent man. In other words, under our law before the amendment defendant's gross negligence was not a factor in determining whether plaintiff's contributory negligence was slight.