Court Opinion

ID: 9615671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:39:35.410562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:50.180201
License: Public Domain

TURSI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to Part II of the majority opinion.
Section 16-10-103(1)(k), C.R.S. (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) and Crim.P. 24(b)(1)(XI) state in pertinent part that a trial court shall sustain a challenge for cause if “[t]he juror is a lawyer .... ” There is no legislative or case authority defining the term “lawyer” as used in this statute and rule. However, in the absence of a technical or particular meaning, the terms in a statute are to be *484construed according to their common and generally accepted meaning. Section 2-4-101, C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Vol. IB). See Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973).
In People ex rel. Colorado Bar Ass’n v. Taylor, 56 Colo. 441, 138 P. 762 (1914), the court stated: “Webster defines lawyer as: ‘One versed in the law, or a practitioner of law _Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary 799 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines lawyer as “[a] person learned in the law; as an attorney, counsel, or solicitor; a person licensed to practice law.” Thus, the term “lawyer” is not limited to a licensed practitioner of law. Rather, the term includes persons who are learned in the law.
In viewing § 16-10-103(1)(k), I find no reason for limiting the term “lawyer” to currently licensed practitioners. If the General Assembly wished such a narrow interpretation of the term, it would have so specified.
As I perceive it, the rationale for § 16-10-103(1)(k) is to prevent a jury from being dominated by the opinion of a juror learned in the law. The legislative concern, that the presence of a lawyer during the deliberations of a jury may tend to impinge upon the domain of the court as sole neutral articulator of the law, is a reasonable one. This danger is not eliminated by the fact that the lawyer is unlicensed by choice, suspension, or disbarment.
Therefore, I would conclude that the jur- or, having received a Juris Doctorate Degree, is clearly learned in the law and therefore falls within the definition of the term “lawyer” as used in § 16-10-103(1)(k). The fact that the juror is not currently licensed to practice law is insufficient to defeat the conclusive statutory presumption of bias. Thus, the trial court erred in finding that the prospective juror was not a “lawyer.” See Nailor v. People, 200 Colo. 30, 612 P.2d 79 (1980).
Where, as here, the challenge for cause is based upon status, the trial court must sustain the challenge without regard to any actual bias on the part of the prospective juror. People in Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430, 586 P.2d 46 (1978).
I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.