Court Opinion

ID: 9791960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:21:04.958159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.770744
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur in the well-reasoned majority opinion but dissent from the disposition to the extent that it permits the award of attorney fees in the Court of Appeals.
I. (Dissent) Attorney Fees in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals denied defendant Dwight's attorney fees on a ground which we now reverse, but, additionally, held that defendant would not be entitled to attorney fees in any event because of its failure to comply with RAP 18.1. I would give deference to that ruling by the Court of Appeals because it is correct. On remand I would exclude any award by the trial court for the $33,919.42 sought by Dwight's in the Court of Appeals.
II. (Concurrence) Limitations on Attorney Fees.
I concur with the majority, except as indicated, but write separately to express my conviction of the extreme importance of the two limitations on awards of attorney fees set forth by the majority at page 120. These limitations are essential; without them plaintiffs may forgo pursuing otherwise valid claims for fear of substantial and unpredictable fees. To not so limit such fees would thwart the legislative intent to allow full exercise of state jurisdiction to the extent allowed by due process.
This case is a perfect illustration of an outrageous abuse by a defendant which chose to escalate a simple jurisdictional issue into a predatory legal foray.
The transaction underlying this suit is factually uncomplicated. The Spokane distributor for Kirby called Dwight's in Texas and offered to sell 120 vacuum cleaners; Dwight's accepted. The president and owner of Dwight's came to Spokane, with two cashier's checks issued by a Texas bank. *126One check paid off the security interest of a Spokane bank, the other paid Weeks' "profit." The bank authorized release of the vacuum cleaners from a commercial warehouse to Weeks or her designee. At the warehouse Dwight's affixed shipping labels for transportation of the vacuum cleaners to Texas. Kirby notified the warehouse of a claimed interest in the vacuum cleaners; the warehouse refused delivery absent a court order.
These facts are mainly uncontested, yet Dwight's declaration of war leads to an incredible claim of $180,913.79 in fees and costs. Dwight's was awarded $116,785.54 in the trial court and seeks $33,919.42 in the Court of Appeals and $30,206.83 in this court.
This action was filed in July 1986; in October 1986, Dwight's filed an 88-paragraph, 21-page answer, including one paragraph alleging lack of jurisdiction. Not until the second trial date (the first trial date was stricken on Dwight's motion), February 9, 1987, did Dwight's file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
This single transaction took place over several days, yet this uncomplicated set of facts has produced 410 pages of clerk's papers and a 200-plus-page transcript. Dwight's Texas counsel claims in the trial court, $11,125 in fees for taking depositions, $14,375 for briefing and $11,875 in preparation for trial. These figures represent only minimum amounts, limited to those where the affidavit clearly identifies those categories. Incredibly, Texas counsel sought at least another $14,400 for briefing on appeal to the Court of Appeals solely on the issue of jurisdiction. Likewise, I am astonished at a claim of at least an additional $8,650 for briefing on the single-issue petition for review even though no new citations or theories arose from the Court of Appeals decision. These claims are exorbitant. Defendant could have and should have asserted its jurisdictional issue by motion. CR 12(b)(2). The operative facts could have been presented by affidavit as indeed they were eventually in a 10-page affidavit by the president of defendant.
*127I agree completely with Justice Durham's statement that "Fees awards to defendants who prevail jurisdictionally thus should reflect only that amount of lawyering that reasonably should have been necessary to prevail on the jurisdictional defense." Majority, at 122. Defendant's claims herein warrant strict scrutiny.
Dolliver, Dore, and Andersen, JJ., concur with Brach-TENBACH, J.