Court Opinion

ID: 9578948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:49:56.692551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:42.021533
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting) :
This case does not involve, I think, any complex issue of statutory construction, strict or otherwise. Under the settled law of this State governmental entities have no business except “official business” and therefore the statu*376tory phrase “while in and about the official business of such governmental entity” merely imposes the requirement that the employee be about the business of the employer. If such language had been omitted I think the meaning and effect thereof would have to be implied.
The purpose of code section 10-2623 is to put governmental entities, subject to certain statutory limitations, in the same position as such would have occupied if private employers. By waiving sovereign immunity the state did not waive its other substantive defenses. See 81 C. J. S., States, § 220(b) ; West’s Decennial Digest, Key No. 198. Part of the body of substantive law is the doctrine of respondeat superior, and the requirement quoted from section 10-2623 does nothing more than limit liability to cases where the governmental entity, as employer or master, would be liable for the acts of the servant under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the same as if such governmental entity were a private employer.
It is elementary that in considering whether there was any competent evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that the patrolman was in and about the business of his master at the time of the fatal accident, the entire evidence and all the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom have to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff-respondent. We proceed to state the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light of that principle.
The patrolman was in uniform and was operating a marked Highway Patrol vehicle owned by the South Carolina Highway Department, on one of the principal highways of the state. He had his patrol radio on to keep him in contact with the tower and he turned on his blue light after the accident and death of the plaintiff-respondent. He used his radio to call in for assistance.
He admittedly was driving the partol vehicle with the full knowledge and consent of his superiors and customarily did so whether its use was private, official or both. All gaso*377line and maintenance of the vehicle were furnished by the department. It is admitted that the patrolman was empowered to make an arrest at any time and that his mere presence on the highway in uniform and in a patrol vehicle served to promote safer driving by other motorists whether or not the patrolman was, at the moment, on a specified duty assignment. Under code section 46-854 it is the duty of patrolmen to patrol the highways of the state for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the state relative to highway traffic and motor vehicles. From the practice of the Highway Department of allowing patrolmen to use without limitations the patrol cars assigned to them, for private purposes, at no cost whatever to the patrolmen for either fuel or maintenance, it is readily inferable that the department encourages the practice of patrolmen operating marked motor patrol vehicles, whether on or off of a duty assignment, for the purpose of creating an appearance of a large number of officers patrolling the highways to further the purpose of controlling traffic and promoting safety.
From the foregoing I conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that at the time of the accident the patrolman was in and about the business of his employer, the Highway Department, despite his testimony that he was on a personal mission and not expected to return to assigned duty until several hours later.
It might not be amiss to point out that the jury was not required to believe the testimony of the patrolman to the effect that he was on a strictly personal mission at the time, but even if it be assumed that a predominant motive of the patrolman in making the trip was a personal one, such is not at all conclusive of the matter. I quote the following from Davis v. Littlefield, 97 S. C. 171, 81 S. E. 487, 488:
“When a master sends his servant to town on the master’s business, we know of no court that has held that, if the servant is induced to go mainly because he wants to make purchases for himself, the private purpose of the ser*378vant will relieve the master from liability for the negligence of his servant in the conduct of the master’s business.”
In Carroll v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 207 S. C. 339, 35 S. E. (2d) 425, the court pointed out that it was a tribute to the author of the opinion in Davis that the principle enunciated there had been adopted by the American Law Institute as a part of its Restatement of the Law of Agency, Volume 1, Pages 530, 531 (2d Edition, Page 523) where the rule is stated as follows:
“The fact that the predominant motive of the servant is to benefit himself or a third person does not prevent the act from being within the scope of employment. If the purpose of serving the master’s business actuates the servant to any appreciable extent, the master is subject to liability if the act otherwise is within the service, * *
The case of League v. National Surety Corporation, 198 S. C. 289, 17 S. E. (2d) 783 was concerned with liability under the official bond of a highway patrolman and accordingly not legally precisely in point with the instant case. The language of the opinion, however, is graphically depictive of the status of the patrolman in the instant case and strongly persuasive of the fact that the evidence here quite sufficiently forms the basis of a reasonable inference that the patrolman was in fact in and about the business of his employer at the time of the fatal accident. We quote therefrom as follows:
“It is a matter of no importance that Thompson was off duty; this did not strip him of his office. His official status continued and could be exercised and brought into play whenever the public need or his duty required it. If on this occasion, and the circumstances had warranted it, he had stopped the two trucks in question and had arrested the drivers for a violation of the traffic law, no one would be heard to question the legality of his act as an officer. His appearance in official uniform, with all the accoutrements and insignia of his office, on the public highway, carried the *379full assurance to the traveling public that he was in the discharge of his duties, and that he was what his uniform and badge represented him to be.
* * *
“Thompson was on the public highway, in his own bailiwick, where the law charged and enjoined that his duties be performed, and where the public would expect to find him.
The law, Section 6005, 1932 Code, directs that patrolmen shall ‘at all times, when in the performance of their duties, wear a complete uniform, with a badge conspicuously displayed on the outside of the uniform, and they shall remain on the highways or roads at all times while in the performance of their duties * *