Court Opinion

ID: 9841723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 20:03:16.049647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:23.417890
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Geay
delivered the opinion of the court.
*436The amount which the plaintiff seeks to recover, and which,, if the tender pleaded is insufficient in law, he is entitled to recover, is $5,100. There can, therefore, be no doubt of the jurisdiction of this court to revise the judgment of the Circuit Court. Act of February 16th, 1875, ch. 77, § 3; 18 Stat. 315.
The notes of the United States, tendered in payment of the defendant’s debt to the plaintiff, were originally issued under the acts of. Congress of February 25th, 1862, ch. 33, July 11th, 1862, ch.' 142; and March 3d, 1863, ch. 73, passed during the war of the rebellion, and enacting that these notes should “ be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States,” except for duties on imports and interest on the public debt. 12 Stat. 345, 532, 709.
The provisions of the earlier acts, of Congress, so far as it is necessary, for the understanding-of the recent statutes, to quote them, are re-enacted in the following provisions of the Revised Statutes:
“Sect. 3579. When any United States notes are returned to the Treasury, they may be reissued, from time to time, as the exigencies of the public interest may require.
“Sect. 3580. When any United States notes returned to the Treasury are so-mutilated or otherwise injured as to be unfit for use, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to replace the same with others of the same character and amounts.
“ Sect. '3581. Mutilated United States notes, when replaced according to law, and all other notes which by law are required to be taken up and not reissued, when taken up shall be destroyed in such manner and under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.
.“Sect. 3582. The' authority given to the Secretary of the Treasury to make any reduction of the currency, by retiring and cancelling United States notes, is suspended.”
' “Sect. 3588. United States notes shall be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except for duties on imports and interest on .the public debt.”
The act of January 14th, 1875, ch. 15, “ to provide for the re*437sumption, of specie payments,” enacted: that on and after January 1st, 1879, “ the Secretary of the Treasury shall redeem in coin the United States legal tender notes then outstanding, on their presentation for redemption at the office of the Assistant Treasurer of the United States in the City of New York, in sums of not less than fifty-dollars,” and authorized him to use for that purpose any surplus revenues in the Treasury and the proceeds of the sales of certain bonds of the United States. 18 Stat. 296.
The act of May 31st, 1878, ch. 146, under which the notes in question were reissued, is entitled “ An act to forbid the further retirement of United States legal tender notes,” and enacts as follows:
“ From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful for the Secretary of the Treasury or other officer under him to cancel or retire any more of the United States legal tender notes. And when any of said notes may be redeemed or be received into the Treasury under any law from any source whatever and shall belong to the United States, they shall not be retired, cancelled or destroyed, but they shall be reissued and paid out again and kept in circulation : Provided,' That nothing herein shall prohibit the cancellation and destruction of mutilated notes and the issue of other notes of like denomination in their stead, as now provided by law. All acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.” 20 Stat. 87.
The manifest intention of this act is that the notes which it directs, after having been redeemed, to be reissued and kept in circulation, shall retain their original’ quality of being a legal tender.
The single question, therefore, to be considered, and upon the answer to which the judgment to be rendered between these parties depends, is whether notes of the United States, issued in time of war, under acts of Congress declaring them to be a legal tender in payment of private debts, and afterwards in time of peace redeemed and paid in gold coin at the TreaSr ury, and then reissued under the act of 1878, can, under the *438Constitution of the United States,.be a legal tender in payment of such debts.
Upon full consideration of the case, the court is unanimously of opinion that it cannot be distinguished in principle from the. cases heretofore determined, reported under the names of the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457; Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604; Railroad Company v. Johnson, 15 Wall. 195; and Maryland v. Railroad Company, 22 Wall. 105 ; and all the judges, except Mr. Justice Field, who adheres to the views expressed in his dissenting opinions in those cases, are of opinion that they were rightly decided.
The elaborate printed briefs submitted by counsel in this case, and the opinions delivered in the Legal Tender Cases, and in the earlier case of Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603, which those cases overruled, forcibly present the arguments on either side of the question of the power of Congress to make the notes of the United States a legal tender in payment of private debts. Without undertaking to deal with all those arguments, the court has thought it fit that the grounds of its judgment in the case at bar should be fully stated.
No question of the scope and extent of the- implied powers of Congress under the Constitution, can be satisfactorily discussed without repeating much of the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall in the great judgment in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, by which the power of Congress to incorporate a bank was demonstrated and affirmed, notwithstanding the Constitution does not enumerate, among the powers granted, that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation.
-The people of the United States by the Constitution established a national government, with sovereign powers, legislative, executive and judicial. “ The.government of the Union,” said Chief Justice Marshall, “ though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action;” “and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land.” “Among the enumerated powers of government, we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to.regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and‘to raise and support armies and navies. The sword and *439the purse, all-, the external relations,, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation, are entrusted to its, government.” 4 Wheat. 405, 406, 407.
A constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring fundamental principles, and creating a national sovereignty, and intended to endure for ages and to be adapted to the .various crises of human affairs, is not to be interpreted with the strict: ness of a private contract. The Constitution of the United States, by apt w;ords of designation or general description, marks the outlines of the powers granted to the national-legislature; but it does not undertake, with the precision and detail of a code of laws, to enumerate the -subdivisions of those powers, or to specify all the means by which they may be carried into execution. Chief Justice Marshall, after dwelling upon this view, as required by the very nature of the Constitution, • by the language in which 'it is framed, by the limitations upon the general powers of Congress introduced in the ninth section of the first article, and by the omission to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation, added these emphatic words: “ In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a cmstituiion we are expounding.” 4 Wheat; 107. See also page 415.
The breadth and comprehensiveness of the words of the Constitution are nowhere more strikingly exhibited than in regard to the powers over the subjects of revenue, finance, and currency, of which there is no other express grant than may be found in these few brief clauses
“ The Congress shall have power
“To lay and.collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States but all duties, imposts and excises' shall be uniform throughout the United States ; . . '
“ To borrow money on the credit of the United States ;
■“ To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes ; ”
“ To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures.”
*440The section which contains the grant of these and other-principal legislative powers concludes by declaring that the Congress shall have power
“ To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”
By the settled construction and the only reasonable interpretation of this clause, the words “necessary and proper” are not limited to such measures as are absolutely and indispensably necessary, without which the powers granted must fail of execution ; but they include all appropriate means which are conducive or adapted to the end to be accomplished, and which in the judgment of Congress will most advantageously effect it.
That clause of the Constitution which declares that “the Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States,” either embodies a grant of power to pay the debts of the United States, or presupposes and assumes that power as inherent in the United States as a sovereign government. But, in which ever aspect it be considered, neither this nor any other clause of the Constitution makes any mention of priority or preference of the United States as a creditor over other creditors of an individual debtor. Yet this court, in the early case of United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, held that, under the power to pay the debts of the United States, Congress had the power to enact that debts due to the United States should have that priority of payment out of the estate of an insolvent debtor, which the law of England gave to debts due .the Crown.
In delivering judgment in that case, Chief Justice Marshall expounded the clause giving Congress power to make all necessary and proper laws, as follows: “ In construing this clause, it would be incorrect, and would produce endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized *441which, was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power. Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it might be said with respect to each, that it was not nécessary, because the end might be obtained by other means. Congress must p'ossess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution. The government is to pay the debt of the Union, and must be authorized to use the means which appear to itself the most eligiblé to effect that object.” 2 Cranch, 396.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, he more fully developed the same view, concluding thus: “We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are 'not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.” 4 Wheat. 421.
The rule of interpretation thus laid down has been constantly adhered to and acted on by this court, and was accepted- as expressing the true test by all the judges who took part in the former discussions of the power of Congress to make the treasury notes of the United States a legal tender in payment of private debts.
■ The other judgments delivered by Chief Justice Marshall, contain nothing adverse to the power of Congress to issue legal-tender notes.
By the Articles of Confederation of 1 WI, the United States in Congress assembled' were authorized “ to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States; ” but it was declared that “each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right which is *442not by this confederation expressly delegated to the’ United States in Congress assembled.” Art. 2; art. 9, § 5; 1 Stat. 4, 7; Yet, upon the question whether, under those articles, Congress, by virtue of the power to emit bills on the credit of the United States, had the power to make bills so emitted a legal tender, Chief Justice Marshall spoke very guardedly, saying : “ Congress emitted bills of credit to a large amount, and did not, perhaps could not, make them a legal tender. This power resided in the States ” Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410, 435. But in the Constitution, as he had before observed in McCulloch v. Maryland, “there is no phrase which, like the Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers ; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the Tenth Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had béen excited, omits the word ‘ expressly,’ and declares only that the powers ‘ not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people; ’ thus leaving the question, whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one government or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument. The men who drew, and adopted this amendment had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the Articles of Confederation, and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments.” 4 Wheat. 406, 407.
The sentence soñietimes quoted from his opinion in' Sturges v. Crowninshield had exclusive relation to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the powers of the States, and especial reference to' the effect of- the clause- prohibiting the States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, as will clearly appear by quoting the whole paragraph: “ Was this general prohibition intended to prevent paper money ? We are not allowed to say so, because it is expressly provided that no State shall ‘ emit bills of credit; ’ neither could these words be intended to restrain the States from enabling debtors to discharge their debts by the tender of property of no real value to the creditor, because for that subject also particular pro*443vision is made. Nothing but gold and silver coin can be made a tender in payment of debts.” 4 Wheat. 122, 204.
Such reports as have come down to us of the debates in the Convention that framed the Constitution afford no proof of any general concurrence of opinion upon the subject before us. The adoption of the motion to strike out the words u and emit bills ” from the clause' “ to borrow money and emit bills on the credit of the United States” is quite inconclusive. The philippic delivered before the Assembly of Maryland by Mr. Martin, one of the delegates from that State, who voted against the motion, and who declined to sign the Constitution, can hardly be accepted as satisfactory evidence of the reasons or the motives of the majority of the Convention. See 1 Elliot’s Debates, 345, 370,376. Some of the members of the Convention, indeed, as appears by Mr. Madison’s minutes of the debates, expressed-the strongest opposition to paper money. And Mr. Madison has disclosed the grounds of his own action, by recording that “ this vote in the affirmative by Virginia was occasioned by the acquiescence of Mr. Madison, who became, satisfied that striking out the words would not disable the government from the use of public notes, so far as they could be safe and proper; and would- only cut off the pretext for a paper currency, and particularly for making the bills a tender, either for public or private debts.” But he has not explained why he thought that striking out the words “ and emit bills ” would leave the power to emit bills, and deny the power to make them a tender in payment of debts. And it cannot be known how many of the other delegates, by whose vote the motion was adopted, intended neither to proclaim nor to deny the power to emit paper money, and were influenced by the argument of Mr. Gorham, who “ was for striking out, without inserting any prohibition,” and who said: “ If the words stand, they may suggest and lead to the emission.” “ The power, so far as it will be necessary or safe, will be involved in that of borrowing.” 5 Elhot’s Debates, 434, 435, and note. And after the first clause of the tenth section of the first article had been reported in the form in which it now stands, forbidding the States to make anything but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, or to pass *444any law impairing the obligation of contracts, when Mr. Gerry, as reported by Mr. Madison, “ entered into observations inculcating the importance of public faith, and the propriety of the restraint put on the States from impairing the obligation of contracts, alleging that Congress ought to be laid under the like prohibitions, ” and made a motion to that effect, he was not seconded. Ib. 546. As an illustration of the danger .of giving too much weight, upon such a question, to the debates and the votes in the- Convention, it may also be observed that propositions to authorize. Congress to grant charters of incorporation for national objects were strongly opposed, especially as regarded banks, • and defeated. Ib. 440, 543, 544. The power of Congress to emit bills of credit, as well as to incorporate national banks, is now clearly established by decisions to which we shall presently refer.
The words “to borrow money,” as used in the Constitution,to designate a power vestéd in the national government, for the safety and welfare of the whole people, are not to re'ceive that limited .and restricted interpretation and meaning which they would have in a penal statute, or in an authority conferred, by law or' by contract, upon trustees or agents for private purposes.
The power “ to borrow money on the credit of the United States ” is the power to raise money for the public use on a pledge of the public credit, and may be exercised to meet either present or anticipated expenses and liabilities of'the government. It includes the power to issue, in return for the money borrowed, the obligations of the United- States in any appropriate form, of stock, bonds, bills or notes; and in whatever form they are issued, being instruments of the national government, they are exempt from taxation by the governments of the several States. Weston v. Charleston City Council, 2 Pet. 449 ; Banks v. Mayor, 7 Wall. 16; Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 16. Congress has authority to issue these obligations in a form adapted to circulation from hand to hand in the ordinary transactions of commerce and business. In order to promote and facilitate such circulation, to adapt them to use as currency, and to make them more current in the market, it may *445provide for their redemption in coin or bonds, and may make them receivable in payment of debts to the government. So much is settled beyond doubt, and was asserted or distinctly admitted by the judges who dissented from the decision in the Legal -Tender Oases, as well as by those who concurred, in that decision. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 548 ; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 616, 636 ; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 543, 544, 560, 582, 610, 613, 637.
It is equally well settled that Congress has the power to. incorporate national banks, with the capacity, for their own profit as well as for the use of the government in its money transactions, of issuing bills which under ordinary circumstances pass from hand to hand as money at their nominal value, and which, when so current, the law has always recognized as a good tender in payment of money debts, Unless specifically objected to a.t the time of the tender. United States Bank v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333, 347; Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447, 451. The power..of Congress to charter a bank was maintained in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, and in Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, chiefly upon the ground that it was an appropriate means for carrying on the money transactions of the government. But Chief Justice Marshall said: “ The currency which it circulates, by means of its trade with individuals, is believed to make- it a more fit instrument for the purposes of government than it could otherwise be ; and if this be true, the capacity to carry on this trade is a faculty indispensable to the character and objects of the institution.” 9 Wheat. 864. And. Mr. Justice Johnson, who concurred with the rest of the court in upholding the poAver to incorporate a bank, gave the further reason that it tended to give effect to “that power over the currency of the country, which the framers of the Constitution evidently intended to give to Congress alone.” Ib. 873.
The constitutional authority of Congress to provide a currency for the- whole country is now firmly established. In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 548, Chief Justice Chase, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “It cannot be doubted that under the Constitution the poAver to provide a *446circulation of coin is given to Congress. And it. is settled by the uniform practice of the government, and by repeated decisions, ■ that Congress may constitutionally authorize' the emission of bills of credit.” Congress, having undertaken to supply a national currency,, consisting of coin, of treasury notes of the United States, and of the bills of national banks, is authorized to impose on all State banks, or national banks, or private bankers, paying out the notes of individuals or of Staté banks, a tax of ten per cent, upon the amount of such notes so paid out. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, above cited; National Bank v. United States, 101 U. S. 1. The reason for this conclusion was stated by Chief Justice Chase, and repeated by the present Chief Justice, in these words: “ Having thus, in the exercise of undisputed constitutional powers, undertaken to provide a Currency for the whole country, it cannot be' questioned that Congress may, constitutionally, secure the benefit of it to the people by appropriate legislation. To this end, Congress has denied the quality of' legal tender to foreign coins, and has provided by law against the imposition of counterfeit and base coin on the community. To the. same end, Congress may .restrain, by suitable enactments, the circulation as money of any notes not issued under its own authority.. Without this power, indeed, its attempts to secure a sound and uniform currency for the country must be futile.” 8 Wall; 549 ; 101 U. S. 6.
By the Constitution of the United States,' the several States are prohibited from coining money, emitting bills of credit, or making anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. But no intention can be inferred from this to deny to Congress either of these powers. Most of the powers granted to Congress are described in the eighth section of the first article ; the limitations' intended to be set to its powers, so.as to exclude certain things which might otherwise be taken to be included in the general grant, are defined in the ninth section'; ■the tenth section is addressed to the States only. This section prohibits the States from doing some things which the United States are expressly prohibited from doing, as well as from doing some things which the United States are expressly authorized; to do, and from doing some things which are *447neither expressly granted nor expressly denied to the United ■ States. Congress and the States equally are expressly prohibited from passing any bill of attainder or ex post facto law, or granting any title of nobility. The States are forbidden, while the President and Senate are expressly authorized, to make treaties. The States are forbidden, but Congress is, expressly authorized, to coin money. The States are prohibited from emitting bills of credit; but Congress, which is neither expressly authorized nor .expressly forbidden to do so, has, as we have already seen, been held to have the power. of emitting bills of credit, and of njaking every provision for their circulation as currency, short of giving'them the quality of legal tender for private debts — even by those who have denied its authority to give them this quality.
It appears to'us to follow, as a logical and necessary consequence, that Congress has the power to issue the obligations of the United States in such form, and to impress upon them sueh qualities as currency for the purchase of merchandise and the payment of debts, as accord with the usage of sovereign governments. The power, as incident to the power of borrowing money and issuing'bills or notes of the government for money-borrowed, of impressing upon those bills or notes the quality of being a legal tender for' the payment of private debts, was a power universally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing and adoption of the Constitution of. the-United- States. The governments of, Europe, acting through the monarch or the legislature, according to the distribution of powers under their respective constitutions, ■had and have as sovereign a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin. This, power has been distinctly recognized > in an important modern case,, ably argued and fully considered, in which the Emperor of Austria, as King-of Hungary, obtained from. the. English Court of Chancery an injunction against the issue in England, without his license, of notes purporting'to be public paper money of Hungary. Austria v. Day, 2 Giff. 628, and 3 D. F. & J; 217 The power of' issuing chills-of credit, and' making them, at the discretion of the legislature, a tendér in ' payment , of private debts, had long been'exercised in this coun*448try by the several Colonies and States; and during the Revolutionary "War the States, upon the recommendation of the Congress of the Confederation, had made the bills issued by Congress a legal tender. . See Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 435, 453; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257, 313, 334-336; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 557, 558, 622; Phillips on American .Paper Currency, passim. The exercise of this power not being prohibited to Congress by the Constitution, it is included in the power expressly granted to borrow money on the credit of the United States.
This position is fortified by the fact that Congress is vested with the exclusive exercise of the analogous power of coining money and regulating the value of domestic and foreign coin, and also with the paramount power of regulating foreign and interstate commerce. Under the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and to issue circulating notes for the money borrowed, its power to define the quality and force of those notes as currency is as broad as the like power over a metallic currency under the power to coin money and to regulate the value thereof. Under the two powers, taken together, Congress is authorized to establish a national currency, either in coin or in paper, and to make that currency lawful money for all purposes, as regards the national government or private individuals.
The power of making the notes of the United States a legal tender in payment of private debts, being included in the power to borrow money and to provide a national currency, is not defeated or restricted by the fact that its exercise may affect the value of private contracts. If, upon a just and fair interpretation of the whole Constitution, a particular power or authority appears to be vested in Congress, it is no constitutional objection to its existence, or to its exercise, that the property or the contracts of individuals may be incidentally affected. The decisions of this court, already cited, afford several examples of this.
Upon the issue of stock, bonds, bills or notes of the United States, the States are deprived of their power of taxation to the extent of the property invested by individuals in' such obliga*449tions, and the burden of State taxation upon other private property is correspondingly increased. The ten per cent, tax, imposed by Congress on notes of State banks and of private bankers, not only lessens the value of such notes, but tends to drive them, and all State banks of issue, out of existence. The priority given to debts due to the United States over the private debts of an insolvent debtor diminishes the value of these debts, and the amount which their holders may receive out of the debtor’s estate.
. So, under the power to coin money and to' regulate its yalue, Congress may (as it did with regard to gold by the act of June 28th, 1834, ch. 95, and with regard to silver by the act of February 28th, 1878, ch. 20) issue coins of the same denominations as those already current by law,- but of less intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less weight of the precious metals, and thereby enable debtors to discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less real value. A. contract to pay a certain sum in money, without any stipulation as to the kind of money in which it shall be paid, may always be satisfied by. payment of that sum in any currency which is lawful money at the place and time at which payment is to be made. 1 Hale P. C. 192-194; Bac. Ab. Tender, B. 2; Pothier, Contract of Sale, No. 416 ; Pardessus, Droit Commercial, Nos. 204, 205; Searight v. Calbraith, 4 Dall. 324. As observed by Mr. Justice Strong, in delivering the opinion of the court in the Legal Tender Gases, “ Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever that pow.er may be, and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that power.” 12 Wall. 549.
Congress, as the legislature of a sovereign nation, being expressly-empowered by the Constitution “to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States,” arid “ to borrow money on the credit, of the United States,” and “ to coin money and regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin; ” and being clearly-authorized, as incidental to the exercise of those great powers, to emit bills of credit, to charter national banks, and *450to provide a national currency for the whole people, in the form of coin, treasury notes, and national bank bills ; and the power to make the notes of the- government a legal tender in payment of private debts being one of the powers belonging to sovereignty in other civilized nations, and not expressly withheld from Congress by the Constitution; we are- irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that the impressing upon the treasury notes of the United States the quality of being a legal tender in payment of private debts is an appropriate means, conducive and plainly adapted to the execution of the undoubted powers of Congress, consistent with the letter'and spirit of the Constitution, and therefore, within the meaning of that instrument, “ necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by this Constitution in the- government of the United States.”
Such being our conclusion in matter of law, the question whether at any particular time, in war or in peace, the exigency is such, by reason Of unusual and pressing demands on the resources of the government, or of the inadequacy of the supply of gold and silver coin to furnish the currency needed for the uses of the government .and of the people, that, it is, as matter of fact, wise and expedient to resort to this means, is a political question, to be determined by Congress when the question of exigency arises, and not a judicial • question, to he afterwards passed upon by the courts. To quote once mop from the judgment in McCulloch v. Maryland: “Where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any óf the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground.”. 4 Wheat. 423.
It follows that the act of May 31st, 1878, ch.,146, is constitutional and valid; and that the Circuit Court rightly held that the tender in treasury notes, reissued and kept in circulation under that act, was a tender of lawful money in payment of the defendant’s debt to the plaintiff.

Judgment affirmed.