Court Opinion

ID: 2965151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:36:07.043249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:00.193859
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          Nos. 97-1759   97-1780
               97-1760   97-1805
               97-1761   97-1995
               97-1762   97-1996
               97-1763   97-1997
               97-1773   97-2070

                   PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                 DOUGLAS L. PATCH, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE

                  NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees,

                                   _______________

                           CABLETRON SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL.,

                       Applicants for Intervention, Appellants.

                              _________________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux,* U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                             and Tauro,** District Judge.
                                          ______________

                              _________________________

               Steven  S.  Rosenthal,  with  whom  Jeffery  A.  Tomasevich,
               _____________________               _______________________

          Morrison &  Foerster, LLP, F. Anne Ross, F. Anne Ross, P.C., John
          _________________________  ____________  __________________  ____
          J.  Ryan,  Casassa  and  Ryan,  Michael  W.  Holmes,  James  R.M.
          ________   __________________   ___________________   ___________
          Anderson,  Peter H. Grills, David E.  Crawford, O'Neill, Grills &
          ________   _______________  __________________  _________________
          O'Neill, PLLP  and  Thomas I.  Arnold  III were  on  consolidated
          _____________       ______________________
          brief, for all appellants.
               Peter  H.  Grills,  with whom  David  E.  Crawford, O'Neill,
               _________________              ___________________  ________
          Grills & O'Neill,  PLLP and Thomas I. Arnold  III, Assistant City
          _______________________     _____________________
          Solicitor, were on brief, for appellant City of Manchester.
               Philip T.  McLaughlin and Martin  P. Honigberg on  brief for
               _____________________     ____________________
          the State of New Hampshire, amicus curiae.
               Evelyn R. Robinson on brief for  Ohio Consumers' Counsel and
               __________________
          National Ass'n of State Consumer Advocates, amici curiae.
               Dennis Lane,  with  whom Michael  E.  Tucci and  Morrison  &
               ___________              __________________      ___________
          Hecker, LLP were on brief, for defendants-appellees.
          ___________
               Allan B.  Taylor, with whom  John B. Nolan, Gary  M. Becker,
               ________________             _____________  _______________
          and Day, Berry & Howard were on brief, for plaintiffs-appellees.
              ___________________
                              _________________________

                                   February 3, 1998
                              _________________________

          _______________
           *Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
          **Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.   After the New  Hampshire Public
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          Utilities Commission  (PUC) formulated  a plan  to inject  retail

          competition  into the New Hampshire electric power market, Public

          Service  Company of New  Hampshire (PSNH) filed  suit against the

          PUC's  members,  seeking  to  block  inauguration  of  the  plan.

          Several parties  moved to intervene  pursuant to Fed. R.  Civ. P.

          24.   Not all  succeeded.  Six  disappointed would-be intervenors

          appeal from  the denial of  intervention.1  Finding no  sign that

          the district court abused its discretion, we affirm.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    Two  recent  opinions  of  the court  below  thoroughly

          recount  the complicated  background of  this case.    See Public
                                                                 ___ ______

          Serv. Co. v. Patch, 173 F.R.D. 17, 22-24 (D.N.H. 1997) (PSNH II);
          _________    _____                                      _______

          Public Serv. Co. v. Patch, 962 F. Supp. 222, 225-29 (D.N.H. 1997)
          ________________    _____

          (PSNH I).  We draw heavily from those sources as we set the stage
           ______

          for consideration of the instant appeals.

             A.  The Night the Lights (Almost) Went Out in New Hampshire.
             A.  The Night the Lights (Almost) Went Out in New Hampshire.
                 _______________________________________________________

                    PSNH is New Hampshire's largest electric public utility

          and  supplies approximately 70%  of the citizenry's  power needs.

          In  the  early  1970s, management  predicted  that  rising energy

          demands soon would  outstrip PSNH's generating capabilities.   To

          ameliorate  this bleak  outlook, PSNH  undertook  to construct  a

          nuclear power  plant in Seabrook,  New Hampshire.   Because state

          law  prevented it from  factoring the plant's  construction costs
                              
          ____________________

               1Three  of the would-be  intervenors also have  attempted to
          take protective appeals from other orders entered by the district
          court.  We deal with these additional appeals in Part V, infra.
                                                                   _____

                                          3

          into the rate  structure until Seabrook became  operational, PSNH

          relied  primarily  on  commercial  financing  to  underwrite  the

          project.    Regulatory  reform  and  public  opposition  hindered

          Seabrook's  progress to the  point where  the facility  became an

          albatross  wrapped   snugly   around   PSNH's   corporate   neck.

          Management's  forecast  that Seabrook  would be  on line  in 1979

          proved much too sanguine:  construction of the plant's generating

          unit  was not  completed until  1986, and  even then,  commercial

          operation was infeasible.

                    As delays mounted, so too  did PSNH's indebtedness.  In

          1988,  PSNH  no longer  could  service  the  debt and  filed  for

          bankruptcy protection in  the United States Bankruptcy  Court for

          the  District of  New Hampshire.    The State  of New  Hampshire,

          fearful that  its residents might find themselves consigned to an

          unusually  rustic   lifestyle,  intervened   in  the   insolvency

          proceedings.     The  State's  participation  was   essential  to

          resolving the bankruptcy:   as a regulated  utility, PSNH's value

          depends on the rates  that it can charge for electricity, and the

          State sets those rates based on its calculation of the investment

          that PSNH prudently devotes to the provision of  electric service

          (the so-called rate base).

                    In  the end, PSNH's creditors and equity holders agreed

          to  place  a  $2.3  billion  value  on  the  utility     a  value

          significantly   higher   than  its   pre-bankruptcy   rate  base.

          Northeast Utilities (NU) then acquired all of PSNH's stock at the

          capitalized price.   As part and parcel of  this transaction, the

                                          4

          State  executed  a  rate agreement  (the  Agreement)  designed to

          permit NU  to recoup its investment  over time.  To  mitigate the

          impact of  this recoupment  on ratepayers  while still  providing

          meaningful financial relief  to the  rehabilitated bankrupt,  the

          Agreement  preserved  PSNH's  status  as  an integrated  electric

          utility  (i.e., one that engages in the generation, transmission,

          and  distribution of  electric power)  and  promised annual  5.5%

          electric rate increases for the next seven years.

                    The  Agreement  also  made provision  for  the  gradual

          recovery  of PSNH's Seabrook-related costs.  It contemplated that

          NU  would take  over the  operation of  Seabrook via  a corporate

          affiliate, North Atlantic Energy Corporation (NAEC), subject to a

          stipulation, contained  in the  Agreement, that  the State  would

          permit PSNH to buy  Seabrook-generated power from NAEC at  prices

          sufficient to recover the  portion of the rate  base attributable

          to Seabrook over  a reasonable interval.  Finally,  to ensure the

          eventual  recovery  of  PSNH's   entire  capitalized  value,  the

          Agreement allowed PSNH to designate some $400 million of the rate

          base  as  "regulatory  assets."   Under  this  arrangement, these

          regulatory  assets  (which  in  this  case  consisted  mostly  of

          governmentally  mandated  purchase  agreements  with small  power

          producers) became eligible  for amortization, albeit over  a long

          number of years (thus cushioning the impact on electric rates).

                    The  bankruptcy court approved the Agreement, see In re
                                                                  ___ _____

          Public Serv. Co., 114 B.R. 820, 843 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990); the New
          ________________

          Hampshire legislature authorized  the PUC to review  it, see N.H.
                                                                   ___

                                          5

          Rev.  Stat. Ann.    362-C (1995);  the PUC furnished  its seal of

          approval,  see In  re  Northeast  Utils./Public  Serv.  Co.,  114
                     ___ ____________________________________________

          P.U.R.4th  385 (N.H.P.U.C. 1990); the New Hampshire Supreme Court

          upheld the  PUC's action,  see Appeal of  Richards, 590  A.2d 586
                                     ___ ___________________

          (N.H. 1991); and PSNH emerged from bankruptcy.

                              B.  The Concord Tea Party.
                              B.  The Concord Tea Party.
                                  _____________________

                    Due  in part to  the annual rate  increases mandated by

          the Agreement,  New Hampshire  consumers pay  one of  the highest

          average electric  rates in  the nation.   Predictable  discontent

          prompted  the state  legislature to  enact  the Electric  Utility

          Restructuring Act, N.H.  Rev. Stat. Ann.   374-F:1  to F:6 (Supp.

          1997),  a statute designed  to introduce retail  competition into

          the  marketplace as  a means  of  reducing electric  rates.   The

          statute directed the PUC to develop and put into effect  no later

          than January 1,  1998, a restructuring  plan for New  Hampshire's

          electric utility industry.  See id.   374-F:4.
                                      ___ ___

                    The  PUC  conducted  hearings   apace  and  issued  its

          restructuring plan  (the Plan)  on February 28,  1997.   The Plan

          provides  that the  PUC  will continue  to  set all  distribution

          access  rates.  However,  electric utilities must  unbundle their

          generation, transmission, and  distribution services, as  well as

          open their distribution  networks   utility poles and  wires   to

          all  consumers  on   a  nondiscriminatory  basis.     In  theory,

          unbundling will enable customers to select from a roster of power

          generators  whose rates will reflect market prices.  And although

          federal  law  requires  that  transmission  tariffs   remain  the

                                          6

          province  of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the

          Plan seeks to  have the PUC exercise a modicum of control in this

          area as  well by  directing utilities to  obtain PUC  approval of

          proposed tariffs prior to effecting  FERC filings.  Finally,  the

          Plan imports a  market domination deterrent, mandating  that each

          utility choose whether  to operate as a power  generator or power

          distributor, and  precluding utilities  from  continuing to  act,

          directly  or  indirectly,  in both  capacities.    Utilities that

          select  the distribution pathway must divest all power generation

          assets by December 31, 2000,  and likewise must sever contractual

          and corporate ties with utilities that offer competitive electric

          service in  the same  territory.   Similar restrictions apply  to

          utilities that select the generation pathway.

                    Two   aspects  of  the  PUC's  edict  are  particularly

          pertinent  for  purposes of  the pending  litigation.   First, in

          promulgating the Plan, the PUC declined to treat the Agreement as

          a contract that  constrained its actions.  Second,  a side effect

          of   the  Plan's  divestiture  requirement  is  the  creation  of

          "stranded costs."  This phenomenon  will occur because, under the

          Plan's  competitive market paradigm,  the costs of  certain asset

          investments  owned   by  an   integrated   utility  will   become

          unrecoverable from ratepayers when the utility elects between the

          distribution   and  generation  routes.    The  Plan  provides  a

          palliative in the  form of  interim and  long-term stranded  cost

          recovery  charges (SCRECHs).   The PUC will  assess each affected

          utility's  stranded costs and calculate an appropriate SCRECH for

                                          7

          inclusion  in  the   rates  set  for  access   to  the  utility's

          distribution network.   SCRECHs ordinarily will be  calculated by

          means of a cost-of-service ratemaking methodology, but if the PUC

          concludes  that a utility's  costs and  rates exceed  a "regional

          average  rate  benchmark,"  then it  may  deny  the  utility full

          recovery of its stranded costs.   At present, PSNH's rates exceed

          the regional average  rate benchmark, and the PUC  has ruled that

          PSNH may not  recover completely its stranded costs.   Thus, PSNH

          insists  that introduction  of the benchmark  will require  it to

          write  off the  $400 million  in  regulatory assets  and lead  to

          another bankruptcy.2

                             C.  The Empire Strikes Back.
                             C.  The Empire Strikes Back.
                                 _______________________

                    On  March 3,  1997, PSNH,  NU,  and NAEC  (collectively

          "PSNH" or "the plaintiffs") filed suit in New Hampshire's federal

          district court  against the  members of the  PUC.   Their amended

          complaint limns  a litany  of federal preemption  claims.   These

          include a claim  premised on section 201(b) of  the Federal Power

          Act, 16 U.S.C.    824(b) (1994); a claim premised on sections 205

          and  206 of the  same statute, 16  U.S.C.   824(d),  (e); a claim

          premised on the filed rate doctrine, see, e.g., Boston Edison Co.
                                               ___  ____  _________________

          v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 369 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussing doctrine);
             ____
                              
          ____________________

               2On April 7, 1997, the PUC stayed implementation of portions
          of the Plan  to rehear whether the PSNH will in fact be forced to
          write  off  the regulatory  assets.   The  PUC at  the  same time
          announced its intention  to revisit the  question of whether  the
          Plan repudiates an enforceable obligation of the State (i.e., the
          Agreement).    These  developments  clearly   bear  upon  certain
          contested  issues  in  the underlying  case  (e.g.,  ripeness and
          abstention), but they do not possess great significance vis- -vis
          the question of intervention.

                                          8

          a claim premised on section  201 of the Public Utility Regulatory

          Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified

          as  amended in  scattered sections of  15 and  16 U.S.C.);  and a

          claim  premised on the  Public Utility Holding  Companies Act, 15

          U.S.C.     79  to  79z-6  (1994).   The  complaint also  includes

          several constitutional claims, including  three separate theories

          under which the PUC's orders allegedly work an unlawful taking; a

          Commerce Clause  claim to the  effect that the PUC  is attempting

          impermissibly to regulate interstate commerce; a Contracts Clause

          claim  to the  effect that  the Plan  unlawfully compromises  the

          Agreement;   and  a  First  Amendment  claim  that  defies  ready

          comprehension.   Lastly, the  complaint contains claims  that the

          Plan transgresses an  injunction entered by the  bankruptcy court

          in  1990 and  simultaneously violates  42 U.S.C.    1983 (1994).3

          The  complaint prays,  inter  alia,  for  an  injunction  against
                                 _____  ____

          implementation of  the Plan  and a declaration  that the  Plan is

          unlawful.

                    On  March  10,  1997,  the  district  court  entered  a

          temporary  restraining order (TRO)  that enjoined  the defendants

          from  enforcing those  sections  of the  Plan  that purported  to

          restrict  PSNH's ability  to recover  fully  its stranded  costs.

          Four days  later, the  court heard argument  on a  gallimaufry of

                              
          ____________________

               3In the  introductory portions  of their  amended complaint,
          the plaintiffs accuse the PUC of affording them insufficient time
          to make their case administratively, failing to enforce discovery
          rules, and holding  hearings that were a "mere  pretense."  These
          allegations  sound like  a prelude  to a  procedural due  process
          challenge, yet the plaintiffs never make such a claim.

                                          9

          intervention motions  and took  them under  advisement pending  a

          decision  on ripeness and abstention (issues which, if determined

          adversely  to the  plaintiffs, would  render intervention  moot).

          The court scheduled  a hearing on these  issues for March  20 and

          granted  the would-be  intervenors leave  to  file amicus  curiae

          briefs.  On the appointed date, Judge Lagueux heard arguments and

          reserved decision.  The  next day, he amended  the TRO to  enjoin

          portions of  the Plan that,  in the plaintiffs'  view, repudiated

          obligations created by the Agreement.   He then continued the TRO

          "pending further order of the court."

                    In due  course, Judge Lagueux  ruled that the  case not

          only   was  ripe,  but   also  an  inappropriate   candidate  for

          abstention.   See PSNH  I, 962  F. Supp.  at 229-44.   The  judge
                        ___ _______

          simultaneously  signaled his  intent to  address  the motions  to

          intervene without further delay, noted that  the TRO would remain

          in effect pending further order,  and directed the clerk of court

          to schedule a  preliminary injunction hearing in June.4   See id.
                                                                    ___ ___

          at 244.

                    On  June  12,  1997,  the  district  court  denied  the

                              
          ____________________

               4On  May 13,  the parties  to  the case  (not including  the
          applicants for intervention)  agreed to mediation and  stipulated
          to  a stay of proceedings, thereby  obviating the need for a June
          preliminary  injunction hearing.   By its  terms, the  stay would
          expire coincident with the end of the mediation period, which was
          originally  contemplated to  last through  the end  of June.   As
          directed  by  the  May 13  stipulation  and  order, the  mediator
          periodically  reported on the parties' progress.   Based on these
          reports Judge Lagueux twice extended the period.  On September 3,
          1997, the mediator reported that  efforts had failed and the stay
          since  has been  dissolved.   The  would-be  intervenors did  not
          participate in the mediation process.

                                          10

          appellants' motions to intervene.  See PSNH II, 173 F.R.D. at 26.
                                             ___ _______

          The  court held  in  substance that  the appellants'  interest in

          securing  lower electric  rates was  too  generalized to  justify

          intervention  as of  right;  that  the  appellants  retained  the

          ability to protect  their interests in the  Plan's implementation

          regardless of whether  they were  allowed to  participate in  the

          court case;  and that,  in all  events, the  presence of the  PUC

          members  as  defendants  ensured adequate  representation  of the

          appellants' interests  in respect  to  the issues  raised by  the

          complaint.   See id. at 26-27.  The  court did permit three other
                       ___ ___

          parties, Granite State Electric Company,  Unitil Corporation, and

          the  New  Hampshire  Electric Cooperative,  to  intervene  on the

          plaintiffs' side  of the  case.   See id.  at 28.   One  would-be
                                            ___ ___

          intervenor,  the City  of Manchester, moved  for reconsideration,

          but to no avail.

          II.  THE CAST OF CHARACTERS
          II.  THE CAST OF CHARACTERS

                    There are  six intervention-related appeals  before us.

          In an  effort to put  matters into more workable  perspective, we

          profile the identity and interests of the six appellants.

                    1.   Cabletron  Systems,  Inc.  (Cabletron)  is  a  New
                    1.

          Hampshire corporation  with its  principal place  of business  in

          Rochester,  New Hampshire.   It  is  one of  the largest  private

          electricity consumers in New Hampshire.

                    2.  The Office of the Consumer Advocate of the State of
                    2.

          New Hampshire (OCA)  is a state agency statutorily  authorized to

          "petition  for, initiate, appear  or intervene in  any proceeding

                                          11

          concerning rates,  charges, tariffs, and consumer services before

          any board, commission, agency, court, or regulatory body in which

          the interests of  residential utility consumers are  involved and

          to represent the interest of such residential utility consumers."

          N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.   363.28(II) (1995).

                    3.  The City  of Manchester is New  Hampshire's largest
                    3.

          municipality and serves as the administrator of an electric power

          aggregation  program  that  procures  electricity  for  some  260

          municipal, residential, and commercial accounts.

                    4.  The Campaign for Ratepayers' Rights (CRR) is a non-
                    4.

          profit  citizens' group composed of several hundred New Hampshire

          residential and commercial electricity consumers.

                    5.  The  Retail Merchants Association of  New Hampshire
                    5.

          (RMA)  is  a   non-profit  corporation  based  in   Concord,  New

          Hampshire.     RMA  boasts  a  membership  of  approximately  700

          businesses located in the  Concord area.  It acts as  an electric

          load  aggregator.     Under  its  aegis,  members   may  purchase

          electricity at discounted rates.

                    6.  Community  Action Programs of New  Hampshire (CAPS)
                    6.

          is an alliance of six non-profit organizations.   Its constituent

          organizations provide  assistance programs  of  various kinds  to

          low-income families in New Hampshire.

          III.  THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
          III.  THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

                    The   six  principal  appeals  stand  or  fall  on  the

                                          12

          appellants'   entitlement  to  intervene  as  of  right.5    That

          entitlement depends,  in the first  instance, on Fed. R.  Civ. P.

          24(a), which provides in relevant part:

                    Upon  timely  application   anyone  shall  be
                    permitted to  intervene in an action:   . . .
                    (2)  when the  applicant  claims an  interest
                    relating to the property or transaction which
                    is  the   subject  of  the   action  and  the
                    applicant is so situated that the disposition
                    of the  action  may  as  a  practical  matter
                    impair or impede  the applicant's ability  to
                    protect that interest, unless the applicant's
                    interest   is   adequately   represented   by
                    existing parties.

                    A party  that desires  to intervene  in a  civil action

          under Rule 24(a)(2) must satisfy  four conjunctive prerequisites:

          (1) a  timely application  for intervention;  (2) a  demonstrated

          interest relating to the property  or transaction that forms  the

          basis of the ongoing action;  (3) a satisfactory showing that the

          disposition  of  the  action  threatens  to  create  a  practical

          impairment or impediment to its ability to protect that interest;

          and (4) a satisfactory showing that existing parties inadequately

          represent  its  interest.     See  Conservation  Law   Found.  v.
                                        ___  __________________________

          Mosbacher,  966 F.2d 39,  41 (1st Cir.  1992).   An applicant for
          _________

          intervention  as of right must run the table and fulfill all four

          of these preconditions.   The failure to satisfy any  one of them

          dooms  intervention.  See  Travelers Indem. Co.  v. Dingwell, 884
                                ___  ____________________     ________

          F.2d 629, 637 (1st Cir. 1989).

                              
          ____________________

               5In the court  below, the appellants also  sought permissive
          intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).  Judge Lagueux rejected
          those  initiatives.   See  PSNH  II,  173  F.R.D.  at  29.    The
                                ___  ________
          appellants have not pressed the point in this venue.

                                          13

                    The application of this framework to the divers factual

          circumstances  of individual  cases requires  a holistic,  rather

          than reductionist, approach.  See International Paper Co. v. Town
                                        ___ _______________________    ____

          of  Jay,  887  F.2d  338,  344 (1st  Cir.  1989).    The inherent
          _______

          imprecision of Rule 24(a)(2)'s individual elements  dictates that

          they  "be  read  not discretely,  but  together,"  and always  in

          keeping  with a  commonsense  view  of  the  overall  litigation.

          United States  v. Hooker Chems.  & Plastics Corp., 749  F.2d 968,
          _____________     _______________________________

          983 (2d Cir.  1984).  Because small differences  in fact patterns

          can significantly affect  the outcome, the very nature  of a Rule

          24(a)(2)  inquiry limits the  utility of comparisons  between and

          among published opinions.   See Security Ins. Co. v. Schipporeit,
                                      ___ _________________    ____________

          Inc., 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995).
          ____

                    The   district   court's  denial   of   a  motion   for

          intervention as of  right lays  the foundation  for an  immediate

          appeal.  See  Flynn v.  Hubbard, 782  F.2d 1084,  1086 (1st  Cir.
                   ___  _____     _______

          1986).   Although  we review  the  district court's  intervention

          decisions for abuse  of discretion, see International  Paper, 887
                                              ___ ____________________

          F.2d  at 344,  that discretion  is more  circumscribed when  Rule

          24(a)  is in  play,  see Stringfellow  v. Concerned  Neighbors in
                               ___ ____________     _______________________

          Action,  480 U.S.  370, 383  (1987) (noting  that the  nisi prius
          ______

          court  has  less  discretion  in its  disposition  of  motions to

          intervene as of right).  We  will reverse the denial of a  motion

          to intervene as of right "if the court fails to apply the general

          standard provided  by the text of Rule  24(a)(2), or if the court

          reaches a decision that so fails to comport with that standard as

                                          14

          to indicate  an abuse of  discretion."  International  Paper, 887
                                                  ____________________

          F.2d at 344.

                    In  the case  at hand, we  can narrow  the lens  of our

          inquiry somewhat.   For  one thing, none  of the  appellants have

          argued that  the  district court  misapprehended Rule  24(a)(2)'s

          analytic framework  or failed  to appreciate  the rule's  general

          standard.    For   another  thing,  the  appellees   concede  the

          timeliness  of  the  intervention motions.    Thus,  our analysis

          focuses exclusively  on whether  the court  properly applied  the

          other  three elements  of  the test:    sufficiency of  interest;

          likelihood of impairment; and adequacy of representation.6

          IV.  ANALYSIS
          IV.  ANALYSIS

                    We first address the common arguments for  intervention

          pressed  by Cabletron,  CRR, RMA,  and  CAPS (collectively,  "the

          Grouped  Appellants").    We  then  turn  to  the  differentiated

          rationales  for  intervention offered  by  OCA  and  the City  of

          Manchester.

                             A.  The Grouped Appellants.
                             A.  The Grouped Appellants.
                                 ______________________

                              
          ____________________

               6The plaintiffs  argue that  we should  affirm the  district
          court's  denial of the  motions to intervene  filed by Cabletron,
          RMA, CAPS,  and OCA  because each of  those appellants  failed to
          accompany its motion with "a  pleading setting forth the claim or
          defense  for which  intervention is  sought."   Fed.  R. Civ.  P.
          24(c).  We  agree that these parties were  derelict in their Rule
          24(c)  duties, and that such dereliction ordinarily would warrant
          dismissal of their  motions.  See Rhode Island  Fed'n of Teachers
                                        ___ _______________________________
          v.  Norberg, 630  F.2d  850, 854-55  (1st Cir.  1980).   In  this
              _______
          instance, however,  the district  court elected  to forgive  this
          oversight.  See PSNH II, 173 F.R.D. at 24 n.2.  Because we affirm
                      ___ _______
          the  lower court's  denial of  the motions  to intervene  on more
          substantive  grounds,   we  see   no  reason   to  revisit   that
          determination.

                                          15

                    Although   there   are   modest  differences   in   the

          particulars  of  their  respective  situations,  a  common  theme

          pervades  the  arguments of  all  the Grouped  Appellants:   each

          strives to justify intervention as a matter of right by reference

          to  the  same  two  interests.    First,  they  assert  that  the

          plaintiffs' action asks  the district  court to  strike down  the

          Plan, and that such relief, if granted, would sunder their shared

          interest in obtaining lower electric  rates.  Second, they assert

          that their  prior (and  anticipated) participation  in the  PUC's

          administrative proceedings itself  furnishes an independent basis

          for intervention.  We find both assertions wanting.

                    To begin with, the assertion of an economic interest is

          procedurally  vulnerable.     Although  the   Grouped  Appellants

          vigorously pressed this line  of argument in the district  court,

          they   devote   only   cursory  attention   to   it   on  appeal.

          Consequently, it is not preserved for appellate review.  See Ryan
                                                                   ___ ____

          v. Royal Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir. 1990).
             ______________

                    Even  were  the  asseveration  preserved, it  would  be

          unavailing.   While the  type of  interest sufficient  to sustain

          intervention  as  of  right  is  not  amenable  to   precise  and

          authoritative  definition, a putative  intervenor must show  at a

          bare  minimum that it has "a significantly protectable interest,"

          Donaldson v.  United States,  400 U.S. 517,  531 (1971),  that is
          _________     _____________

          "direct,  not contingent,"  Travelers Indem.,  884  F.2d at  638.
                                      ________________

          Though  these  contours   are  relatively   broad,  the   Grouped

          Appellants'  interest in  the lower  electric  rates expected  to

                                          16

          result from restructuring falls well outside the pale.

                    Potential economic harm  to a would-be intervenor  is a

          factor  that  warrants  serious  consideration  in  the  interest

          inquiry.  See  Conservation Law Found., 966  F.2d at 43;  but cf.
                    ___  _______________________                    ___ ___

          New Orleans Pub.  Serv., Inc. v.  United Gas  Pipe Line Co.,  732
          _____________________________     _________________________

          F.2d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding that an economic

          interest  alone is  insufficient predicate  for  a Rule  24(a)(2)

          intervention).   It is settled beyond peradventure, however, that

          an  undifferentiated, generalized interest  in the outcome  of an

          ongoing action  is too  porous a foundation  on which  to premise

          intervention  as of right.  See  New Orleans Pub. Serv., 732 F.2d
                                      ___  ______________________

          at 466;  Athens Lumber Co.  v. Federal Election Comm'n,  690 F.2d
                   _________________     _______________________

          1364, 1366  (11th Cir.  1982); United States  v. American  Tel. &
                                         _____________     ________________

          Tel. Co.,  642 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C.  Cir. 1980).  That principle
          ________

          is  dispositive  here  for  the  Grouped  Appellants'  theory  of

          economic interest  operates at  too high a  level of  generality.

          After all, every electricity consumer  in New Hampshire and every

          person who does business with any electricity consumer yearns for

          lower electric rates.

                    To cinch  matters, the Grouped  Appellants' interest in

          obtaining  lower electric  rates also  has  an overly  contingent

          quality.  This is not a case in which ongoing litigation directly

          threatens an economic right  or benefit presently enjoyed by  any

          would-be  intervenor.   See,  e.g., City  of Stillwell  v. Ozarks
                                  ___   ____  __________________     ______

          Rural Elec.  Coop., 79 F.3d 1038, 1042 (10th  Cir. 1996).  It is,
          __________________

          rather, a  case in  which these  would-be intervenors  root their

                                          17

          professed economic interest in an as yet unrealized expectancy of

          lower  electric rates.   As  the  district court  perspicaciously

          observed,  numerous market  variables will  impact New  Hampshire

          electric  rates even  after the  PUC  implements a  restructuring

          plan.  See PSNH II, 173 F.R.D. at 26.  Whether the interaction of
                 ___ _______

          these  variables actually will  produce lower rates  is anybody's

          guess,  thus demonstrating the  fatally contingent nature  of the

          asserted economic  interest.  See  Travelers Indem., 884  F.2d at
                                        ___  ________________

          638-39.

                    The  Grouped   Appellants  also  claim   a  protectable

          interest within the purview of Rule 24(a)(2) arising out of their

          prior participation, and their anticipated opportunity for future

          participation,  in the  PUC's  administrative proceedings.    All

          profess to  fear that the plaintiffs' suit  will lay waste to the

          efforts that they  expended (culminating in  the Plan), and  that

          this threat entitles them to intervention.

                    We  do not  dismiss  this claim  lightly.   In  certain

          circumstances,  an  administrative-proceeding interest  may  well

          form a sufficient predicate for  intervention as of right.  Since

          this clearly is not  true across the board, we  must evaluate the

          asserted  administrative-proceeding  interest  in  light  of  the

          specific  claims embodied  in  the  lawsuit  pending  before  the

          district court    and we must do so in keeping with the pragmatic

          cast  of  Rule  24(a)(2).    Furthermore, we  must  conduct  this

          assessment  with an awareness  that Rule 24(a)(2)'s  third tine  

          whether  disposition of  the  extant action  may  as a  practical

                                          18

          matter  impair or  impede the  applicant's ability  to protect  a

          cognizable interest   often influences resolution of the interest

          question.  See Conservation Law Found., 966 F.2d at 42.
                     ___ _______________________

                    The plaintiffs' complaint does not frontally attack the

          process through which the PUC  arrived at the Plan,7 but, rather,

          pleads causes of  action that will require the  district court to

          measure  the  submitted   Plan  against  federal   statutory  and

          constitutional  benchmarks.      Hence,   adjudication   of   the

          plaintiffs'  claims  will not  place  the district  court  in the

          position  of having  to rebalance  competing  policy views  anent

          electric utility industry  restructuring or  otherwise to  co-opt

          the
            administrativeproceedingsinwhichthewould-beintervenorsappeared.

                    The  Grouped Appellants  resist  this conclusion.    In

          their estimation,  the  plaintiffs'  challenges  do  not  involve

          "pristine" questions  of federal  law, and  they express  concern

          that the district court  will be forced to immerse itself  in the

          "nitty gritty" of  ratemaking.  We agree that  the district court

          will  have  to  understand  the  Plan in  order  to  resolve  the

          plaintiffs'  challenges, but  we are  confident that  the PUC  is

          fully  capable of  explicating  the interstices  of  the Plan  to

          facilitate  this review.    More  to the  point,  we  deem it  of

          decretory  significance  that  the types  of  viewpoint-balancing

          issues that merited the inclusion  of a wide array of  parties in

                              
          ____________________

               7Although   paragraph  42   of   PSNH's  amended   complaint
          attributes arbitrary and capricious  procedural maneuvers to  the
          PUC, the plaintiffs have not based any of their federal claims on
          these ostensible procedural defects.

                                          19

          the  administrative proceedings  are not  present  in this  civil

          action, and we therefore are  hard-pressed to see how the present

          litigation  will  impair  or  impede  the  would-be  intervenors'

          legitimate interests.

                    The  Grouped Appellants' reliance  on United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 922 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1991),  for
          ____________________________

          the  proposition that  participation in the  PUC's administrative

          proceedings ipso  facto justifies  intervention as  of right,  is
                      ____  _____

          misplaced.  There,  the federal government brought  suit alleging

          that a water  management district's irrigation and  flood control

          policies violated a state environmental statute.  See id. at 707.
                                                            ___ ___

          The United  States asked the district court, inter alia, to set a
                                                       _____ ____

          maximum allowable  concentration of nitrogen  and phosphorous  in

          farm  water  runoff.   See  id.   The  court denied  various farm
                                 ___  ___

          groups'  motions  for intervention  as  of right.    The Eleventh

          Circuit reversed.  It found  that the Florida statute granted the

          farm  groups  a  statutory  right to  participate  in  the  water

          district's  administrative  implementation of  runoff  standards.

          Because   the  federal   litigation   essentially  bypassed   the

          administrative framework, denial of intervention would  eliminate

          the farm groups' role in the  decisionmaking process.  See id. at
                                                                 ___ ___

          708.

                    Such is  not the case  here.  The  would-be intervenors

          heretofore   have  taken  full   advantage  of  their   right  to

          participate in  the  PUC's proceedings,  and  their role  in  any

          future administrative decisionmaking process is not  in jeopardy.

                                          20

          On  the one  hand, if  the plaintiffs  lose,  then the  Plan that

          emerged from the administrative  proceedings probably will remain

          intact   unless the PUC,  in the course of further administrative

          proceedings (in which  the applicants for intervention  will have

          an opportunity to participate), modifies  it.  On the other hand,

          if the plaintiffs  prevail, then the Plan likely  will fall   yet

          the district court will  not replace it with  another of its  own

          creation.   Rather, the  PUC will be  left to  devise a successor

          plan, and  the Grouped  Appellants  will be  able to  participate

          fully  in  any such  efforts.    In  either event,  the  would-be

          intervenors'    administrative-proceeding     interest    remains

          unsullied.8

                    The Grouped Appellants also advance the closely related

          claim that  the TRO  issued by the  district court  impairs their

          right  to  participate  in   ongoing  or  future   administrative

          proceedings before the  PUC.  This claim requires  scant comment.

          It suffices  to say that  the present litigation has  not impeded

          this entitlement in any real sense.  To the extent that the lower

          court  has halted administrative  proceedings, its orders  are of

          universal application:   it did  not bar  the Grouped  Appellants

          selectively  from  participating   in  any  ongoing   proceeding.

                              
          ____________________

               8The  Grouped Appellants  also cite  In re Sierra  Club, 945
                                                    __________________
          F.2d  776, 779  (4th Cir.  1991)  (dictum), in  support of  their
          contention  that  participation in  an  administrative proceeding
          creates  an  interest  that  is  per  se  sufficient  to  warrant
          intervention as of right in  any litigation related to the result
          of  those proceedings.   To  the  extent that  the court's  broad
          language  can be  read as  stating such  a rule,  we respectfully
          decline to follow it.

                                          21

          Indeed, the PUC itself has  suspended reconsideration of the Plan

          pending resolution  of this case.   While the  Grouped Appellants

          undoubtedly would  prefer that the Plan's  implementation proceed

          immediately,  the  current  stalemate  does not  prejudice  their

          ability to  participate prospectively  in resumed  administrative

          proceedings once the litigatory logjam clears.

                    Any  residual  doubt that  might  linger regarding  the

          Grouped Appellants' right  to intervene is assuaged  at the final

          step  of the Rule 24(a)(2)  inquiry.  We  agree with the district

          court that the Grouped Appellants  simply have not shown that the

          defendant commissioners inadequately represent their interests in

          upholding the Plan.

                    To be  sure, an  applicant for  intervention need  only

          make  a minimal  showing  that  the  representation  afforded  by

          existing parties likely will  prove inadequate.  See  Trbovich v.
                                                           ___  ________

          United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972).  Nonetheless,
          ___________________

          the adequacy of interest requirement  is more than a paper tiger.

          A party that  seeks to  intervene as of  right must produce  some

          tangible basis to  support a claim of purported  inadequacy.  See
                                                                        ___

          Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. S. G. Phillips Corp., 610 F.2d 49, 54
          ________________________    ____________________

          (1st Cir. 1979).  Moreover, the burden of persuasion is ratcheted

          upward in this case because  the commissioners are defending  the

          Plan  in   their  capacity   as  members   of  a   representative

          governmental body.  Given this fact,  the Grouped Appellants must

          rebut a presumption  that the commissioners adequately  represent

          their interests.  See Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th
                            ___ _______    _______

                                          22

          Cir.  1996).    This  rebuttal  requires  "a  strong  affirmative

          showing"  that  the  agency  (or  its  members)  is   not  fairly

          representing  the   applicants'  interests.    Hooker   Chems.  &
                                                         __________________

          Plastics, 749 F.2d at 985.
          ________

                    The Grouped Appellants attempt to roll this presumption

          on  its  side.     They maintain  that  the PUC's  status  as the

          principal  protector of the general public interest precludes its

          effective representation of their particularized interests.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Mille Lacs Band of  Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 989 F.2d
          ____  ____________________________________    _________

          994, 1001  (8th Cir. 1993)  (finding the presumption  of adequate

          representation overcome where a suit against the state to enforce

          an   Indian  treaty  implicated   the  intervenors'  interest  in

          preserving fish and  game stock on their private lands).   On the

          facts of the case at bar, however, this resupinate reasoning does

          not withstand scrutiny:   in respect  to the plaintiffs'  claims,

          the PUC's  interests  are perfectly  aligned  with those  of  the

          Grouped Appellants.  We explain briefly.

                    Although  the   motives  that   drive  any   individual

          appellant's support for the Plan  may diverge slightly from those

          of  its fellow  appellants and  also from those  of the  PUC, all

          march  in  legal lockstep  when  defending the  Plan  against the

          plaintiffs'  federal  statutory  and  constitutional  challenges.

          None of  the Grouped Appellants has propounded any legal argument

          that the  PUC members are  unable or  unwilling to make,  or that

          subverts  the  PUC's  institutional  goals.    This  symmetry  of

          interest among the  Grouped Appellants and the  PUC commissioners

                                          23

          ensures  adequate representation.   See  American  Lung Ass'n  v.
                                              ___  ____________________

          Reilly, 962  F.2d 258, 261-62  (2d Cir.  1992); Washington  Elec.
          ______                                          _________________

          Coop. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale  Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 92, 98
          _____    _______________________________________

          (2d Cir. 1990); see generally United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696
                          ___ _________ ____________________    ______

          F.2d  141, 144  (1st Cir.  1982) (discussing  the factors  that a

          federal court must consider in the adequacy of interest inquiry).

                    If that were not enough   and we firmly believe that it

          is    we note  that the PUC  members have  launched a full-scale,

          uncompromising defense of  their Plan.   We think the  likelihood

          that   the  PUC  will  capitulate  cravenly  to  the  plaintiffs'

          onslaught is  extremely remote.   This  circumstance, in  itself,

          weighs  heavily in favor of  denying mandatory intervention.  See
                                                                        ___

          Washington Elec. Coop., 922 F.2d at 98; Natural Resources Defense
          ______________________                  _________________________

          Council, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 834
          _____________    ___________________________________________

          F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1987); cf. Conservation Law Found., 966 F.2d
                                      ___ _______________________

          at  44 (finding  that  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  inadequately

          represented the more parochial  interests of putative intervenors

          because he  agreed, with minimal opposition, to  a consent decree

          drafted by the plaintiffs).

                    Finally,  the  Grouped  Appellants  maintain  that  the

          courts must  accept at  face value the  PUC's declaration  of its

          inability to represent their interests, no questions asked.  This

          is sheer  persiflage.  Here,  as in many other  contexts, actions

          speak  louder  than  words.    In all  events,  neither  the  PUC

          commissioners'  support of and consent to the Grouped Appellants'

          desire to  intervene,  nor the  commissioners' insinuations  that

                                          24

          they, alone, are  not up to the  task of defending the  Plan, can

          strip a federal court of the right and power   indeed, the duty  

          to  make  an   independent  determination  as  to   whether  Rule

          24(a)(2)'s prerequisites are  met.  See International  Paper, 887
                                              ___ ____________________

          F.2d at 340-41; Wade  v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 184  n.3 (7th
                          ____     ___________

          Cir. 1982).

                                       B.  OCA.
                                       B.  OCA.
                                           ___

                    We turn next to OCA's  quest for intervention.  For the

          most part, its arguments parallel those championed by the Grouped

          Appellants   the  six would-be intervenors did,  after all, elect

          to file a consolidated brief   and we reject them for the reasons

          already stated.   We  write separately,  however, to address  one

          idiosyncratic feature.

                    OCA and  two amici, the Ohio Consumers' Counsel and the

          National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates, contend

          that the district  court should have allowed OCA  to intervene as

          of  right because  a New  Hampshire  statute endows  it with  the

          authority  to  represent residential  utility  consumers  "in any

          proceeding  concerning  rates,  charges,  tariffs,  and  consumer

          services  before   any  board,  commission,   agency,  court,  or

          regulatory  body."   N.H. Rev.  Stat.  Ann.    363:28(II).   This

          legislative    directive   requiring    OCA    to   devote    its

          representational  zeal  entirely  to the  cause  of  the consumer

          contrasts with the  PUC's statutory  mandate to  "be the  arbiter

          between  the  interests of  the  customer  and  the interests  of

          regulated utilities."  Id.   363:17a.  Focusing singlemindedly on
                                 ___

                                          25

          these disparate  statutory missions, OCA  and its amici  take the

          position that the PUC cannot adequately represent OCA's interests

          in this case.

                    A  state statute can inform the Rule 24(a)(2) calculus,

          but it cannot displace the requirement that a would-be intervenor

          satisfy each of the  rule's prerequisites.  See  Washington Elec.
                                                      ___  ________________

          Coop., 922  F.2d at 96-98.   Whatever discrepancies exist  in the
          _____

          enabling statutes  of OCA  and the  PUC, respectively,  a federal

          court must  assess adequacy  of  representation in  light of  the

          issues at  stake in the  particular litigation.  For  the reasons

          previously  discussed,  the  differences  in  the  two  agencies'

          statutory missions are without consequence here; like the Grouped

          Appellants, OCA can point neither to any legal argument favorable

          to it  that the commissioners are unwilling  or unable to make in

          defense of  the Plan,  nor to  any legal  position  taken by  the

          commissioners that  compromises OCA's  interests in  any material

          way.  In short, there simply is no divergence of interest between

          the two bodies in respect to the causes of action pleaded in this

          litigation.9

                             C.  The City of Manchester.
                             C.  The City of Manchester.
                                 ______________________

                    Like  the other five appellants, the City of Manchester
                              
          ____________________

               9Our contextualized holding should ease the amici's  concern
          that  failure  to  allow   OCA  to  intervene  will   impair  the
          effectiveness of similar consumer advocacy organizations in other
          litigation.  If, for example,  PSNH had included in its complaint
          claims that would necessitate  a viewpoint-balancing analysis  in
          which consumer concerns  played a significant role,  we would see
          OCA's appeal in a vastly different light.

                                          26

          advances arguments grounded both in an asserted economic interest

          and  an  asserted  administrative-proceeding interest.    To  the

          extent  that these arguments replicate  those made by the Grouped

          Appellants,   we   reject  them   for   the   reasons  previously

          articulated.   Still, the city's position is different in certain

          respects.

                    Manchester  administers  a   municipal  electric  power

          aggregation  program under  which  it  procures  electricity  for

          several hundred municipal, residential,  and commercial accounts.

          The number  of accounts that  it represents imbues the  city with

          sufficient market power  to acquire  substantial rate  discounts.

          Manchester supports the  Plan because it believes  that increased

          competition in the electric power  market will allow it to secure

          even lower  electric rates for the subscribers to the aggregation

          program.    Manchester posits  that this  special interest  as an

          aggregator justifies intervention as of right.

                    Notwithstanding this twist, the  district court did not

          believe that Manchester's interest differed  appreciably from the

          generalized  economic  interest  asserted by  each  of  the other

          appellants.  See PSNH II, 173 F.R.D. at 23, 25-26.  We discern no
                       ___ _______

          abuse  of discretion  in  that ruling.   By  like  token, we  are

          unmoved  by the city's  insistence that, as  administrator of the

          aggregation program, its interest  is not merely in lower  rates,

          but  also in  fostering  an  electric power  market  open to  the

          greatest possible number of competitors.  This recharacterization

          is more froth than brew.   When all is said and done,  Manchester

                                          27

          seeks to  promote a competitive  market because it  surmises that

          such a development will have a salutary effect on electric rates.

                    Manchester also attempts to distinguish its position on

          the ground that, due to the aggregation program, it is registered

          with the PUC as a supplier of electric power.  But this brings us

          full circle.  Manchester does  not assert any interest that stems

          from its role as a supplier other than a desire to purchase power

          at the lowest possible rates and to pass the resultant savings to

          its  subscribers.   Hence, the claimed  distinction fails  to set

          Manchester apart from the other appellants in any material way.

                    Manchester has one remaining bullet in its intervention

          gun,  but it too is a blank.   The city notes that PSNH is one of

          its  largest employers and  taxpayers and, consequently,  that it

          has  a  vital interest  in  PSNH's  ability  to remain  a  viable

          enterprise after  market restructuring.   While  we have  serious

          doubts  that  Manchester's  paternalistic impulses  satisfy  Rule

          24(a)(2)'s interest requirement  at all, we need  not decide that

          issue for two reasons.   First, and most  obviously, PSNH is  the

          party with  the singularly  greatest interest  in preserving  its

          economic survival and  can adequately represent that  interest in

          this case.  Second, Manchester's positions on the issues at stake

          in  this  litigation  align  perfectly  with  those  of  the  PUC

          commissioners.

                    Manchester attempts  to defuse  the suggestion  that it

          stands  shoulder-to-shoulder   with  the  defendants   by  loudly

          proclaiming its disagreement with the PUC's method of calculating

                                          28

          PSNH's  stranded cost  recovery allowance.   This  is a  very red

          herring.  In the context of the lawsuit, the stranded costs issue

          mainly affects  PSNH's takings  claims.   But Manchester, in  its

          proffered answer to PSNH's complaint,  see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c),
                                                 ___

          denies that  any of  the PUC's actions  amount to  a confiscatory

          taking.  At  any rate, PSNH itself adequately  will represent any

          interest  that  the  city  may  have  in  contesting  the  SCRECH

          methodology embodied in the Plan.

                    Refined  to  bare  essence,  Manchester's campaign  for

          intervention as  of right  reduces to its  promise that  it "will

          offer a different angle on  the legal questions in this lawsuit."

          This  campaign promise, unamplified by any specifics, cannot bear

          the  weight of a  claim that adequate  representation is lacking.

          See Moosehead Sanitary Dist., 610 F.2d at 54.
          ___ ________________________

          V.  FLOTSAM AND JETSAM
          V.  FLOTSAM AND JETSAM

                    Cabletron,  RMA, and the  City of Manchester  also have

          attempted  to  appeal  from  orders of  the  district  court  not

          directly related  to intervention.  Because we  affirm the denial

          of their  motions to intervene,  they lack standing to  press any

          other  issues before  this court.    See SEC  v. Certain  Unknown
                                               ___ ___     ________________

          Purchasers of the Common Stock of and Call Options for the Common
          _________________________________________________________________

          Stock of  Santa Fe Int'l  Corp., 817 F.2d 1018,  1021-22 (2d Cir.
          _______________________________

          1987).  Hence, we take  no view of either their  putative appeals

          of  the district  court's  May  13 and  July  7  orders or  their

          characterization  of  those   orders  as  modifications  to,   or

          extensions of, a de facto preliminary injunction.

                                          29

                    In a  closely related  initiative, all the  appellants,

          relying on  Railroad Comm'n v.  Pullman Co., 312 U.S.  496 (1941)
                      _______________     ___________

          and Burford v.  Sun Oil Co.,  319 U.S. 315  (1943), invite us  to
              _______     ___________

          scrutinize  the  district court's  unwillingness to  abstain from

          deciding  this case.   We  decline  the invitation.   A  district

          court's  refusal to  abstain  under  doctrines  like  Pullman  or
                                                                _______

          Burford is not  an immediately appealable event.   See Gulfstream
          _______                                            ___ __________

          Aerospace Corp.  v. Mayacamas  Corp., 485  U.S. 271,  278 (1988).
          _______________     ________________

          Thus, acceding to the appellants' request would place this  court

          in the bizarre situation of deciding a nonappealable order at the

          behest of non-parties.

                    Let  us  be perfectly  clear.   We  recognize  that the

          appellants make some  strong arguments in support  of abstention.

          The  district court,  if it so  chooses, is  free to  revisit the

          issue.  At this point in  the litigation, however, that court  is

          the only tribunal with authority to address the question.

          VI.  CONCLUSION
          VI.  CONCLUSION

                    We need  go no  further.  The  future direction  of the

          electric utility  market in New  Hampshire is a matter  of utmost

          importance, but parties who are merely interested in  the outcome

          of a  case do  not automatically qualify  for intervention  as of

          right   under  Rule  24(a)(2).     Under  the   totality  of  the

          circumstances that obtain here, we discern no abuse of discretion

          in the  district court's  determination that  the appellants  are

          among that number.

                    In Nos. 97-1762, 97-1763, 97-1773, 97-1780, 97-1805 and
                    In Nos. 97-1762, 97-1763, 97-1773, 97-1780, 97-1805 and
                    _______________________________________________________

          97-2070,  the  orders  denying intervention  are  affirmed.   The
          97-2070,  the  orders  denying intervention  are  affirmed.   The
          __________________________________________________________    ___

          remaining   appeals   are  dismissed   for   want  of   appellate
          remaining   appeals   are  dismissed   for   want  of   appellate
          _________________________________________________________________

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          jurisdiction.    Costs shall  be  taxed  in favor  of  plaintiffs
          jurisdiction.    Costs shall  be  taxed  in favor  of  plaintiffs
          ____________     ________________________________________________

          against all appellants.
          against all appellants.
          ______________________

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