Court Opinion

ID: 9402621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 14:05:16.88509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:01.405267
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 9, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-0614-MR

WILMA STEPP                                                         APPELLANT

                     APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   HONORABLE OSCAR G. HOUSE, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 14-CI-00224

MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., D/B/A
WILLOWBROOK WOMEN’S CENTER
AND FAMILY PRACTICE, INC.                                             APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, GOODWINE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Wilma Stepp brings this appeal from a September 18, 2019,

order of the Clay Circuit Court granting summary judgment and dismissing Stepp’s

premises liability action against Memorial Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Willowbrook

Women’s Center and Family Practice, Inc. (Memorial Hospital). We affirm.
              The underlying facts are rather straightforward. On the morning of

August 8, 2013, Wilma and her husband, Kenneth Stepp,1 went to the medical

office building of Willowbrook Women’s Center and Family Practice. It is

uncontroverted that Wilma and Kenneth visited the premises for the express

purpose of taking photographs of the outside of the medical office building.

Apparently, Stepp’s mother had previously fallen there and had been injured.

After taking the photographs, Wilma was walking down the steps of the office

building, when she slipped and fell, resulting in a broken leg.

              As a result, on August 5, 2014, Wilma filed a complaint in the Clay

Circuit Court against Memorial Hospital. She filed an amended complaint on

August 8, 2014. In the complaint, as amended, Wilma asserted that she was an

invitee on the business premises at the time of her injury, that Memorial Hospital

was negligent in maintaining the premises, and such negligence caused her fall.

Wilma asserted claims for damages for pain and suffering and physical injuries.

Memorial Hospital answered the complaint and generally denied any negligence.

              In April of 2018, Memorial Hospital filed a motion for summary

judgment. Therein, Memorial Hospital argued that Wilma was on the medical

office premises without express or implied invitation. Memorial Hospital claimed

1
  Kenneth Stepp is an attorney and is representing his wife, Wilma Stepp, on appeal and before
the circuit court.

                                              -2-
that Wilma’s sole purpose was to take photographs, and her presence there was not

related to its business. As a result, Memorial Hospital maintained that Wilma was

a trespasser at the time of her fall. As a trespasser, Memorial Hospital argued that

it could only be liable for injuries intentionally inflicted upon Wilma, which

undisputedly did not occur.

             Wilma filed a response and pointed out that the steps to the office

building did not have “yellow stripes, black stripes, or other painting,” thereby

rendering the steps unsafe and dangerous.

             By order entered September 18, 2019, the circuit court granted

Memorial Hospital’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Wilma’s

premises liability action. It reasoned:

                     This Court finds that [Wilma] was a trespasser
             onto Memorial Hospital’s property, and therefore,
             liability is precluded by statute under the facts of this
             case. Further, even if [Wilma] were not a trespasser,
             Memorial Hospital breached no duty to her, as the
             subject set of stairs are not unreasonably dangerous.
             Accordingly, Memorial Hospital is entitled to summary
             judgment and dismissal of all claims against it.

September 18, 2019, Order Granting Summary Judgment at 1.

             Thereafter, on September 24, 2019, Wilma filed a motion to alter,

amend or vacate the summary judgment. In the multiple pleadings and memoranda

that Wilma would file in the days and months after filing the motion, she argued

that she was not a trespasser as the stairs were open to the public. Wilma also

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submitted various building codes as to stairs, submitted multiple affidavits and

pictures taken at a local zoo, and also filed an expert report authored by an

architect. In addition, she also served additional requests for interrogatories and

document production requests.

             The circuit court ultimately denied Wilma’s motion to vacate by order

entered May 10, 2022. The court reiterated that Wilma was a trespasser at the time

of her fall and that the stairs were not unreasonably dangerous. This appeal

follows.

             Wilma contends that the circuit court erred by rendering summary

judgment dismissing her premises liability action against Memorial Hospital.

             To begin, summary judgment is proper where there exists no material

issue of fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Steelvest, Inc.

v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). All facts and

inferences therefrom are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

And, our review of summary judgment is always de novo. Seiller Waterman, LLC

v. Bardstown Cap. Corp., 643 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Ky. 2022); Cunningham v. Kroger

Ltd. P’ship I, 651 S.W.3d 199, 202 (Ky. App. 2022).

             Wilma asserts that the circuit court erroneously determined that she

was a trespasser at the time of her fall. For the following reasons, we agree.

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             In Kentucky, an individual who enters upon the real property of

another is classified as either an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Carney v. Galt,

517 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Ky. App. 2017). An invitee is one who “enters upon the

premises at the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant on behalf of

mutual interest to them both, or in connection with the business of the owner or

occupant.” Shelton v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 909 (Ky.

2013). A licensee is one “whose presence upon land is solely for his own purpose,

in which the possessor has no interest, either business or social, and to whom the

privilege of entering the premises is extended as mere favor by express consent or

by general or local custom.” Klinglesmith v. Estate of Pottinger, 445 S.W.3d 565,

567 (Ky. App. 2014) (citation omitted). Finally, a trespasser is one who enters

property without permission, consent, or legal right to do so. Kentucky Revised

Statutes (KRS) 381.231; Howard v. Spradlin, 562 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Ky. App.

2018); Carney, 517 S.W.3d at 511. As to summary judgment, the determination of

whether an individual is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser presents an issue of law

if the material facts are undisputed. City of Barbourville v. Hoskins, 655 S.W.3d

137, 141 (Ky. 2022). If the material facts are disputed, such facts must be

submitted to a jury. Carney, 517 S.W.3d at 512.

             In this case, the material facts are undisputed. On the day of her fall,

Wilma had entered upon the front porch of the medical office building for the sole

                                          -5-
purpose of taking photographs related to her mother’s fall days earlier. It is clear

that Memorial Hospital did not grant Wilma express permission or consent to do

so. In fact, Wilma entered upon the front porch before the medical clinic operating

in the building opened for business.

             From the above uncontroverted facts, Wilma would not qualify as an

invitee as her entry was neither connected to Memorial Hospital’s business nor for

the mutual benefit of Memorial Hospital and Wilma. Rather, Wilma qualifies as a

licensee as her entry was for her own benefit and the exterior steps and front porch

of the building were freely open to and customarily accessible by the public. For

these reasons, Wilma is not a trespasser. However, our inquiry does not end here.

             As to a licensee, the possessor of land owes the licensee “a duty . . . to

[not] willfully or wantonly injure the licensee and to warn of dangerous conditions

known by the” possessor. Klinglesmith, 445 S.W.3d at 568. To prevail, the

licensee must demonstrate that the possessor breached the duty of care and that

such breach, in fact, caused his injury. Id. It must be emphasized that speculation

as to the cause of an injury is simply insufficient:

             [n]either courts nor juries are authorized to indulge in
             speculation or guesswork as to the cause of accidents;
             there must be some tangible evidence from which it may
             be fairly said what brought about the accident. It has long
             been the rule in this state that no recovery can be had in
             such cases where the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to
             require surmise or speculation as to how the injury

                                          -6-
              occurred, and that there will be no presumption of
              negligence.

Phelps v. Bluegrass Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 630 S.W.3d 623, 628-29 (Ky. 2021)

(quoting Weidekamp’s Adm’x v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 167 S.W. 882, 884 (1914)).

              In this case, Wilma asserted the steps were dangerous because there

were “no safety markers in the form of yellow stripes, black stripes, or other

painting” on the steps. May 2, 2018, response to summary judgment at 2.

Although not specifically argued, Wilma is generally alleging that the lack of a

painted stripe on each step caused her to fall and to suffer injury. However, Wilma

testified as to the specifics of her fall in her deposition:

              Q      Okay. You looked at the step as you put your foot
                     on to it?

              A      Yeah.

              Q      Okay. And your foot just twisted?

              A      Yeah, I hit –

              Q      Okay.

              A      --the step and it –

              Q      Got it.

              A      --caused me to fall on the concrete.

Wilma’s Deposition at 102. Thus, Wilma stated that she saw the step before her

fall and that her foot twisted causing her to fall. As Wilma visualized the step

                                           -7-
before her fall, it does not appear that the lack of a paint stripe on the step was a

factor in her fall. Rather, Wilma simply failed to negotiate the step which

facilitated her fall.

              After entry of summary judgment, Wilma filed a motion to vacate

under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 59.05, and thereafter, as noted, she filed

the affidavit of an expert witness, other affidavits by her, and numerous

memoranda. The law is clear that a motion to vacate cannot be utilized “‘to

introduce evidence that should have been presented during the proceedings before

the entry of the judgment.’” Buridi v. Leasing Group Pool II, LLC, 447 S.W.3d

157, 177 (Ky. App. 2014) (quoting Gullion v. Gullion, 163 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Ky.

2005)). Therefore, any facts or evidence filed in the record after entry of summary

judgment may not be considered.

              While in recent years the Kentucky Supreme Court has moved away

from the open-and-obvious doctrine where landowners or possessors of land could

not be held liable to invitees or licensees who were injured by an open-and-obvious

hazard, the Court nonetheless has not closed the door to summary judgment in

those cases. Shelton, 413 S.W.3d at 916. If it is unreasonable for a jury to find

breach or causation, summary judgment is still available. Id. There is no evidence

in the record below that the steps were negligently maintained or defectively

                                          -8-
designed. Accordingly, there is no evidence to support a breach of duty owed to

Wilma by Memorial Hospital.

              In summation, we believe Wilma failed to present facts to establish

that a dangerous condition of the steps caused her to fall. Instead, Wilma

presented mere conjecture and speculation, which is insufficient to withstand

summary judgment. See Phelps, 630 S.W.3d at 628.

              We view any remaining contentions of error as moot or without

merit.2

              For the foregoing reasons the order of the Clay Circuit Court granting

summary judgment in favor of Memorial Hospital is affirmed.

              ALL CONCUR.

2
  Wilma also advocates for abrogation of the legal distinction between an invitee, licensee, and
trespasser. However, those distinctions are valid and well-established in the common-law of this
Commonwealth. See City of Barbourville v. Hoskins, 655 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Ky. 2022); Carney
v. Galt, 517 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Ky. App. 2017). Until the Kentucky Supreme Court directs
otherwise, this Court is duty bound to follow those precedents.

                                              -9-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
FOR APPELLANT:
                             Joseph M. Effinger
Kenneth S. Stepp             Ryan D. Nafzinger
Manchester, Kentucky         Matthew A. Piekarski
                             Louisville, Kentucky

                             ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                             APPELLEE:

                             Matthew A. Piekarski
                             Louisville, Kentucky

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