Court Opinion

ID: 9847239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:56:22.535114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:04.075881
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice,
dissenting.
“The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth * * *.” (John 3:8) So it is with the writ of certiorari and it is the “whither it goeth” that troubles me.
In the beginning certiorari was a twinkle in the eye of the author of a concurring opinion in State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 (1983). Although the time of conception is uncertain, certiorari was born under suspicious circumstances in City of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983). Its legitimacy is questioned by respectable authority.1 In City of Laramie v. Mengel, the majority of the court on its own motion converted a petition to file a bill of exceptions into a petition for a writ of certiorari.
*160I kept myself unspotted from the foibles of my brethern on the court until State v. Heiner, Wyo., 683 P.2d 629 (1984).2 I then succumbed to the siren song of that temptress, expediency, and voted to grant a writ of certiorari. Having once fallen, it was easy to sin again. I voted to grant certio-rari in State v. Sodergren, Wyo., 686 P.2d 521 (1984). “Commit a sin twice and it will not seem to thee a crime.” (The Talmud)
This court has an addiction for the writ of certiorari and has granted it in situations undreamed of when the first writ issued. This writ is not unlike the “tar-baby” in Uncle Remus.3 Once having gotten ahold of it, this court cannot let go. The court is so enamored by the writ that, in this case, it resurrected a petition for a writ after having killed it. This court’s passion for the writ of certiorari will not be stilled. Under the authority of the certio-rari cases coming out of this court since City of Laramie v. Mengel, a writ of cer-tiorari could be used for any purpose a majority of this court can conceive. It is a utility writ or a writ for all seasons.
Members of this court have professed purity in philosophy with respect to the writ of certiorari; however, each member of this court has voted to grant the writ when it suits his purpose. Here, the majority has established a new scheme to review criminal sentences, and done this without legislation, court rules, guidelines or precedent. Under the authority of this case, a shifting majority could second-guess the trial court’s sentence in a great variety of circumstances.4 The granting or denying of the writ is now governed by the visceral feeling of a majority of the court. The only limitation on what can be done is the imagination of three members of the court.
The majority says, “We do not ignore a concern that this step will produce a flood of petitions for a writ of certiorari.” In the same paragraph, the majority suggests that it is more efficient to enter “orders denying petitions for certiorari” than it is to write an opinion in an ordinary appeal concluding “there was no abuse of discretion.” If a majority wants to give the short shrift to a defendant’s petition for relief, a perfunctory denial of a writ of certiorari will certainly do that.
The majority opinion continues:
“A majority of this court can no more perceive an abuse of discretion in the denial of probation to Grant Alan Wright in this instance than it was able to identify in the cases heretofore decided by this court.”
After making that observation, the majority then finds a “failure of justice” and orders that Wright be put on probation. A more nebulous and open-ended term than “failure of justice” cannot be imagined. “Failure of justice” is in the eye of the beholder. Without guidelines or explanation, the term is meaningless. The majority might just as well have said, “We are the Supreme Court and we will put Wright on probation because we want to.”
The writ of certiorari may be a useful tool if cautiously used in unusual circumstances. However, this court has pounced upon the writ, taken the bit in its teeth and run in all directions with irresponsible and reckless abandon. This case demonstrates that the court cannot be trusted to properly handle the writ of certiorari.
Had I anticipated the quagmire a majority of this court would fall into by granting the writ of certiorari, I would have made a compromise the first time around and opted to reverse because of an abuse of discretion in sentencing. I would not have been happy with this, but in my opinion it would be far better than jumping into the un*161known as the majority has done. The majority has radically changed the law on criminal appeals to accommodate one person, and the criminal jurisprudence of this state will be the worse for it.
I would deny the petition for certiorari.

. 20 Land and Water Law Review, Supreme Court Jurisdiction and the Wyoming Constitution: Justice v. Judicial Restraint, p. 159 (1985). See also, case note, pp. 723-733.

. Perhaps it is better that one guilty defendant walk because of a trial judge’s erroneous ruling than upset a hundred years of criminal jurisprudence.

. Harris, Joel Chandler. Uncle Remus, His Songs and His Sayings (D. Appleton and Company, 1880).

."It must not be; no power in Venice can alter a decree established. 'Twill be recorded for a precedent, and many an error by the same example will rush into the State.’ ” Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act 4, Scene 1.