Court Opinion

ID: 9585720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:03:13.301176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:57.582040
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. I concur in Division 1 of the majority opinion.
2. I respectfully dissent as to part of Division 2, which addresses the enumeration that the court erred “when it permitted, over repeated objection, prosecution witnesses to give their opinions that the victim had been sexually abused.”
The portion with which I cannot concur relates to Dr. Campion’s testimony: “I believe there was a sexual involvement between her and her stepfather on more than one occasion from a period of her first grade up until and including the fourth grade.” The majority holds that in allowing this testimony, the court erred because the expert gave his opinion on the ultimate issue in the case, i.e., defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charged crime of molesting his stepdaughter in a specific way and with a specific intent.
Defendant’s counsel expressly did not have objection to the question whether the expert had an opinion as to whether or not the child had been “sexually involved.” During argument before the trial court, a distinction had been made between that word description and “molested,” which defendant contended called for an opinion as to whether defendant had committed a crime. The trial court had accepted the defendant’s argument that the use of “molested” invaded the jury’s province, because one of the charges was “child molestation.” So the substitute words were used.
The question, then, is whether Dr. Campion was legally permitted to testify that, based on his professional training and experience and application thereof in interviewing, testing, and evaluating the child, it was his opinion that the child had experienced sexual involvement with her stepfather. The trial court allowed this identification because identity of the person was part of the objective of the professional examination and an inextricable part of the professional conclusion reached by the application of professional means.
The trial court was correct. “The opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions shall always be ad*593missible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses.” OCGA § 24-9-67.
Dr. Campion’s opinion that there had been a sexual involvement between the child and her stepfather was based on psychological testing and professionally structured interviews from which a layman could not knowledgably draw conclusions insofar as their results and the interpretations thereof are concerned.
Dr. Campion gave a detailed account and explanation of the basis for his opinion and how it was arrived at, with no objection as the methods and tests were described and what the child told him was repeated. To ask the jury to step into the shoes of this expert to analyze the results of the tests and the interviews and the demeanor of the child during these would require the jurors to apply the same expert training and experience, which they did not have, to reach the conclusions of fact which the expert reached. Just because the objective of the interviews and tests was to ascertain whether the child had been sexually abused by the person she identified, and this depended on whether the expert found verity in the child’s statements, does not detract from the fact that this was a question where “skill” and “science,” in the words of the statute, were employed. The expert offered “a method of proving the fact” which was beyond the average layman’s comprehension in the testing context. Cf. Williams v. State, 254 Ga. 508, 511 (330 SE2d 353) 1985.
Even if the strictly opinion testimony had been excluded, it is perfectly clear that the opinion of this witness, as well as two other expert witnesses, was that the child had been sexually involved with Mr. Miller. The whole tenor of their testimony showed that. Each acted on the information received from the child in a manner consistent only with the belief that sexual abuse had occurred as she claimed. Each dealt with the child as a victim of sexual abuse.
It remained with the jury to determine ultimately whether defendant did in fact commit acts of child molestation and aggravated sodomy as explicitly charged in the indictment. State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448 (349 SE2d 684) (1986). The jurors were free to reject the opinions of the expert, as the court charged. The defendant was free to attack the expert’s methods of deducing his opinion, which was a professional opinion arrived at on the basis of training and experience and which was not binding on the jury. “[T]he opinion was one of fact, and was not inadmissible as a legal conclusion ... or a conclusion constituting. a mixture of law and fact ...” State v. Butler, supra at 450.
Were the majority and concurring opinions correct, the testimony of an expert such as the psychologist in particular could never be utilized in child molestation cases, because to allow the psychologist to describe all the tests administered and the course of the scientifically-*594devised interview without the psychologist’s analysis would require an untrained jury to make that analysis itself. Better it is for the expert to give the results which he has reached, let them be attacked by a thorough and sifting cross-examination, and leave to the jury the acceptance or rejection of such results upon an application of the rules relating to evidence as given in charge.
Moreover, it was abundantly clear from other unobjected-to testimony that Dr. Campion had concluded that the identity of the person with whom the child experienced sexual involvement was her stepfather. At the outset of his testimony he stated that the purpose of his evaluation of the child was to give his impressions with regards to allegations of sexual abuse from her stepfather. He examined the child at the request of her mother, her mother’s attorney, her father’s attorney, and a judge. He described in great detail the method of interview, the reasons for certain approaches, the tests given plus their results and meanings, and the statements made and behavior exhibited by the child. This was not objected to.1
In the test in which she was asked to draw a family tree, he stated: “The family constellation was that she did not include her stepfather as part of her bonding process and that she included her natural father, . . . she did not include her stepfather in that picture. The purpose of that is to attempt to establish the bonding process, who she sees as the individuals in her life that are significant to her in terms of important relationships.”
He conducted tests on other family members which excluded them.
In explaining that portion of the interview of the child on the subject of sex abuse, Dr. Campion testified that: “I open up with questions that I would hope would not be leading. The kind of questions I ask are, ‘How do you get along with your stepfather,’ and ‘Is there anything that’s ever happened between you and your stepfather that concerns you’ — that type of question. With [child’s name] the rapport was established rather quickly and she was able to respond that there had been something that happened between her and her stepfather that wasn’t right, and she began to relate an incident that occurred earlier in the summer; I believe it was in June, approximately that, sometime around that time in 1986; and we began from that point, then.”
In explaining the interview process which is conducted by the professional as part of his attempt to verify or discredit the child’s *595story, he described some of the checks and balances used to validate it, such as the asking of professionally developed questions which would elicit answers “that a child would not be able to fabricate.”
He described the three areas he wanted “to check out rather quickly,” this being a “sexual abuse” case: “Number one, did this occur with the alleged perpetrator, or did it occur with some other child; was this a part of the sexual play with some child. Is this a result of watching an X-rated movie or late-night HBO or something. Is this a result of seeing some dirty magazine or whatever. I want — or, in number three I want to make sure, is this something that happened to the child or is this something that a vengeful parent brain-washed the child into saying.”
After further explication along this line, Dr. Campion testified: “In my opinion, to summarize that, I do not believe that her story is a result of confusion with somebody else, some other age mate or someone else; I don’t believe that it was a result of watching TV or reading some pornographic literature, nor do I believe that she was, quotes, brain washed into saying this. I think this is a spontaneous answer — a spontaneous relating of an event that happened.” He then was asked, and talked about, cases in which the children’s stories were found to be false, relating how falsity is detected.
In the effort to ferret out falsity, he described giving the child in this case the task of drawing her family. He explained: “they will draw who they consider to be their family and they’ll put in that picture who they’re bonded towards. Now, that’s just part of a lot of things we look at in the pictures, but in this case, that’s significant. If [child’s name] would have included her stepfather in the pictures as somebody who is — as somebody she’s bonded to, it would have made me very suspicious as to any problems going on between them, because a child’s not going to include somebody who they — they’re having significant problems with.”
He also related other tests and evaluations he conducted to verify her story that she had sexual contacts with her stepfather, and he stated that he found verification. (T 169) In concluding this line, he stated: “I felt that she was responding in a typical way that a child with her abilities would respond. She was fairly accurate in her accounts of recalling what happened, . . . .” He testified in detail what the child told him had happened in relation to defendant, and how she communicated this to Dr. Campion.
He described a test conducted during clinical interview in which he asked the child what she would wish for if she had three wishes. One was that she would not have to continue to be with her stepfather, which Dr. Campion considered out of the ordinary. Then comes the objected-to question and the long hearing outside the jury’s presence, which has been described.
*596Defense counsel thereafter cross-examined the witness at length about the methods he used in his evaluation and about his conclusions. He also sifted through what and who prompted the evaluation and what its purpose was, asking many questions to undermine the psychologist’s conclusion that the child was relating what actually happened to her insofar as sexual contact with her stepfather was concerned.
For example: “. . . [the prosecutor] . . . asked you whether it was not a fact that the conclusions that you’ve drawn in this case, the very essence of the conclusions that you have drawn in this case, necessarily depend on the truthfulness of [child’s name]? Answer: “It depends on her ability to understand and relate truth; yes. That’s a — I hate to use the word truth because that’s a very philosophical statement, but I would say it’s her ability to perceive reality would be a better way to put it and to accurately report reality.” Question: “Doctor, are you suggesting that there would be a speck of validity to your conclusions if [child’s name] had been lying?” Answer: “If she was not perceiving reality correctly, there would be no basis to, you know, to accept information from her.”
In addition to cross-examining about the verification methods used with respect to the identity of assailant as defendant, he also cross-examined about the doctor’s exclusion of other males.
One of defendant’s exhibits is a letter from the doctor to the attorney for the child’s mother. It quotes a part of a letter from that attorney to the doctor: “she requested and the Court ordered your examination of the child for the purpose of trying to determine if there is any truth to the matter set forth in the petition.” The doctor writes further in his letter: “The releasing of reports to appropriate individuals may be something that should be taken in context with regards to the whole issue of confidentiality and privileged communication. The Confidentiality Act requires a psychologist to report abused or neglected children that he comes in contact with in regards to his professional or official capacity. The psychologist is protected from liability under the Confidentiality Act ... , if he reports such information. There are also references made to this in the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. . . Because I was aware of the situation through my professional capacity, I probably have referred this material to an appropriate authority such as a judge.”
With all of this unobjected to and deliberately introduced evidence before the jury, it simply cannot be said that the jury learned about the psychologist’s opinion of who the perpetrator was, or learned any more about this opinion, when the psychologist made the statement which now is being held to require retrial.
In sum, there was no reversible error in this connection, for three reasons:
*5971) The belief of the expert, that there had been a sexual involvement between the child and her stepfather during a particular period of time, was a factual conclusion “which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman.” Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (277 SE2d 678) (1981). The jury would not be equipped to apply the professional tools which the psychologist testified were used as a basis for his conclusion, analyze and decipher them as though the jurors were trained and experienced professionals, and reach a conclusion whether the subject of the examination was relating reality. There is no violation of OCGA § 24-9-67.
Even though his opinion approached the ultimate issue of whether defendant had committed the crimes of child molestation and aggravated sodomy as alleged in detail in the indictment and as legally defined, it would not be inadmissible, according to Smith. It was not a legal conclusion, as differentiated in State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 450, supra.
2) If it was error to permit the jury to consider the statement, the error is harmless. Throughout cross-examination, defense counsel attacked the witness’ “conclusions” and elicited testimony about them, including the identity of the perpetrator. Robinson v. State, 229 Ga. 14, 16 (1) (189 SE2d 53) (1972); Chalker v. State, 184 Ga. App. 596, 597 (2) (362 SE2d 152) (1987); Fields v. State, 180 Ga. App. 771 (350 SE2d 488) (1986).
3) Considering the setting in which the statement was made, and the context in which it was spoken, it is harmless error if error. As to setting, the witness had been called as a State’s witness, and he had testified at great length about how he had verified the child’s story. It would be preposterous to say that the jury did not know, but for the statement, that the psychologist who tested the little girl’s story upon request of a court, drew the professional conclusion that her naming the man on trial was a statement of reality.
The second material fact about setting is that the court fully charged the jury that the weight and credit to be given to expert witness’ opinion is for the jury to decide. “You’re not bound or concluded by the opinion testimony of any witness, expert or otherwise,” the court made clear as part of its instructions to the jury on this subject, and “You are made by law the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility or believability of the witnesses.” Thus there was no invasion of the jury’s domain by the expert’s statement.
As to context, the witness had said the same thing though in different words, over and over again without objection. The jurors were not told any more about the doctor’s opinion as to the identity of the perpetrator, by this statement, than they already knew and defense counsel’s later questioning elicited in repetition.
*598Decided November 22, 1988 —
Rehearing denied December 12, 1988
Herbert Shafer, for appellant.
Frank C. Winn, District Attorney, for appellee.
The whole point of the examination and evaluation was to verify the child’s story that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather. That is what the psychologist verified. It was left up to the jury to accept or reject his verification. That part of it which included the identity of the perpetrator does not decide the legal issue of guilt or innocence of a legally-defined crime for the jury. Instead, it gave them expert opinion with respect to truth or falsity. They were charged to accept or reject this evidence as they deemed it deserved.
Identity is an issue of fact and may be proved indirectly, by circumstantial evidence which tests the veracity of the accuser. And if there is an expert way to test that veracity, the expert opinion is relevant, albeit not determinative of the final verdict. The defendant had explicitly accepted this, insofar as the child’s claim of sexual involvement itself was concerned.
It is not necessary to retry this case because of one statement which was an express form of what had already been said, even if in different words and actions. We are not dealing here with the question of a fair trial, or a constitutional infirmity, but with a rule of evidence which the Supreme Court of Georgia has departed from at least to some degree. It chose instead to hold “in accord with the modern view as exemplified by Rules 702, 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, . . . .” Smith, supra at 619. The Court expressly reiterated its more open position in State v. Butler, 256 Ga. 448, 450, supra, and it further clarified it in Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 852 (3-5) (353 SE2d 805) (1987). We should follow.

 As to the testimony of the experts, defense counsel explained his position: “. . .1 have not protested when people who have the discipline that relates to the nature of the offense committed here where information has been imparted to them as part of ongoing treatment or evaluation and so on. I believe that that may properly come in.”