Court Opinion

ID: 9600858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:32:09.011661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:55.938771
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that neither a writ of mandamus nor prohibition is available where the District Attorney is attacking an alleged policy of the magistrate court judges in DeKalb County that, when applicable, automatically results in the dismissal of charges at a preliminary hearing. Remarkably, however, the only appellate decision on which the majority relies for this holding dismissed an appeal by the State from an order addressing an ordinary ruling in a specific criminal prosecution. Howard v. Lane, 276 Ga. 688 (581 SE2d 1) (2003). In Howard, this Court reasoned that the underlying subject matter of the appeal was a particular criminal prosecution and the trial court’s ruling therein, and that the State was attempting to avoid the limitations on its right of appeal in OCGA § 5-7-1. In this case, however, the State did not seek review of an ordinary ruling in any specific criminal case, is not the party bringing this appeal, and, therefore, is not attempting to circumvent statutory appellate procedures.
The reason why a writ of prohibition was not available to the State in Howard was the attempted circumvention of the appellate procedure for obtaining review of a criminal ruling and not the mere fact that the State had no right of direct appeal from the type of ruling at issue. Indeed, the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal is actually a prerequisite to the viability of an action for mandamus or prohibition. Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 273 Ga. 431, 433 (1) (543 SE2d 16) (2001); Jersawitz v. Riley, 269 Ga. 546, 547 (500 SE2d 579) (1998). Thus, a district attorney is authorized to file a mandamus petition seeking to require the trial court to comply with its duty in a criminal case to put an oral order in writing, even though the State did not have a right to appeal from that oral order. State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152, 153 (2), (3) (635 SE2d 716) (2006). Furthermore, a district attorney is authorized to seek mandamus relief compelling a group of public officials to perform the duties that *462the General Assembly has conferred upon them in criminal cases. Moseley v. Sentence Review Panel, 280 Ga. 646 (1) (631 SE2d 704) (2006). Similarly, this Court has authorized the Attorney General and other officials to petition for a writ of prohibition against a trial judge on the ground that she exceeded her jurisdiction in the context of a criminal case. Benefield v. State ofGa., 276 Ga. 100, 101 (1) (575 SE2d 453) (2003). Morrell, Moseley, and Benefield are indistinguishable from this case. Those decisions compel the conclusion that the District Attorney was authorized to challenge the alleged magistrate court policy by filing a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition and was not thereby merely attempting to circumvent OCGA § 5-7-1.
Furthermore, after reviewing the merits of this case, it is my opinion that the trial court was authorized to find that the magistrate court “has a policy or practice wherein probable cause to bind over a defendant to superior court cannot be established solely on hearsay evidence” and that “at a preliminary hearing a magistrate judge does not have the discretion to refuse to admit hearsay evidence or to require evidence in addition to hearsay evidence, if such hearsay evidence by itself establishes probable cause ... .” See Gresham v. Edwards, 281 Ga. 881 (644 SE2d 122) (2007); Uniform Superior Court Rule 26.2 (B) (1); Uniform Magistrate Court Rule 25.2 (C) (1); 4 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure, § 14.4 (b) (3rd ed.). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to the reversal of the trial court’s order.