Court Opinion

ID: 9950831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:11:31.660338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:52.646694
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Givens v. Longwell, 2024-Ohio-948.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  BELMONT COUNTY

                                          CAROL GIVENS,

                                         Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                                   v.

                                        JOHN LONGWELL,

                                       Defendant-Appellee.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                         Case No. 23 BE 0023

                                    Civil Appeal from the
                        Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
                                    Case No. 22 CV 332

                                            BEFORE:
                           Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Judges,
            William A. Klatt, Retired Judge of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
                                     Sitting by Assignment.

                                               JUDGMENT:
                                                 Affirmed.

Carol Givens, Pro se, Plaintiff-Appellant and

Atty. M. Winiesdorffer-Schirripa, Atty. G. Thomas Smith, Smith Law PLLC, and Atty.
Bradley A. Powell, Droder & Miller, Co., L.P.A., for Defendant-Appellee.

                                        Dated: March 14, 2024
                                                                                       –2–

HANNI, J.

       {¶1}   Plaintiff-Appellant, Carol Givens, appeals from a Belmont County Common
Pleas Court judgment dismissing her complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) against
Defendant-Appellee, John Longwell.
       {¶2}   This case centers around a house located at 3735 Highland Avenue in
Shadyside (the House). The House was owned by Joseph and Mary Givens from 1987
until their deaths. Joseph Givens died in 2007 and was predeceased by his wife. Greg
Givens is Joseph’s and Mary’s grandson. Appellant is Greg’s mother. It has been alleged
throughout these proceedings that the House was devised to Greg by Joseph; however,
Joseph’s will was never probated.
       {¶3}   The House was severely delinquent on property taxes and was subject to
tax foreclosure proceedings. Appellee purchased the House at the resulting sheriff's sale
on May 5, 2022. The deed transferring title was filed on June 28, 2022.
       {¶4}   Greg Givens, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against Appellee in July
2022. On August 22, 2022, the trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for
failure to pay the security deposit for court costs. On August 22, 2022, the probate court
denied Greg Givens’ attempt to reopen his grandfather’s estate. Givens then refiled his
complaint against Appellee but the trial court again dismissed the complaint, this time with
prejudice. Givens v. Longwell, Belmont C.P. No. 22 CV 00242 (Oct. 25, 2022). This
Court recently affirmed this judgment. Givens v. Longwell, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 22 BE
0056, 2023-Ohio-3379.
       {¶5}   Appellant then filed the instant complaint against Appellee on November 23,
2022, titled “Constitutional Claims” and making multiple unclear allegations that Appellee
violated her rights by possessing the House (Case No. 22-CV-332). That same day,
Appellant filed another complaint against Appellee titled “Damages, Claims” (Case No.
22-CV-331). Sixteen of the 19 numbered paragraphs in the complaint in Case No. 22-
CV-332 are identical to the paragraphs in the complaint in Case No. 22-CV-331.
       {¶6}   Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6)
on December 22, 2022, asserting Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. Specifically, Appellee claimed the complaint failed to comply with Civ.R.
8(A)(1), in that it was unclear what claims Appellant was asserting against Appellee in

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                           –3–

this matter. He argued Appellant’s claims were conclusory in nature and contained no
specific factual allegations that would allow Appellant to recover under any legal theory
against Appellee.
        {¶7}   On February 15, 2023, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint in
Case No. 22-CV-331, finding that Appellant lacked standing as she was not the real party
in interest. Appellant appealed that decision to this Court and we recently affirmed the
trial court’s judgment. Givens v. Longwell, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 23 BE 0008, 2023-Ohio-
4516.
        {¶8}   Meanwhile, Appellant filed affidavits of disqualification of the trial court judge
in this case with the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court denied Appellant’s affidavits.
        {¶9}   Subsequently, on May 17, 2023, the trial court sustained Appellee’s motion
and dismissed the complaint. The court stated that Appellant appeared to allege that
Appellee “through fraud, deceit, theft, breaking and entering, harassment, breach of
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, falsity, economic
duress, and other wrongful conduct, has deprived her of her real/personal property.” The
court found that Appellant’s complaint was internally inconsistent. It cited numerous
instances throughout the complaint where the “Plaintiff” is referred to as “Mr. Givens,”
where the Plaintiff is referred to as a holdover tenant from “his grandparents”, and
otherwise referred to the Plaintiff as a “he.” The trial court found that based only on the
allegations in the complaint, Appellant could prove no set of facts entitling her, rather than
the male person she repeatedly refers to, to the requested relief. The court did not specify
if the dismissal was with or without prejudice. But pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(3), a dismissal
is with prejudice unless the court specifies otherwise. Thus, the trial court’s dismissal
here was with prejudice.
        {¶10} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 31, 2023. She now raises
eight assignments of error.
        {¶11} After filing this appeal, on July 20, 2023, the Belmont County Common
Pleas Court declared Appellant to be a vexatious litigator. This designation requires
Appellant to obtain leave of court to proceed with this appeal. On September 6, 2023,
this Court granted Appellant’s motion for leave to proceed.

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                          –4–

       {¶12} On December 5, 2023, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment
dismissing Appellant’s complaint in Case No. 22-CV-331. Givens, 2023-Ohio-4516. The
eight assignments of error in the present case are virtually identical to the eight
assignments of error in that case. Thus, our resolution of this case mirrors that in Givens,
2023-Ohio-4516.
       {¶13} We will address Appellant’s assignments of error out of order for ease of
discussion.
       {¶14} Appellant’s third assignment of error states:

       TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT FOR REASONS
       NOT PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT(S), IN MOTION TO DISMISS, OR BY
       SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

       {¶15} Here, Appellant argues she has standing to bring this complaint because
she made payments “in entitlement to the property.”
       {¶16} We addressed this argument/assignment of error in Givens, 2023-Ohio-
4516, ¶ 10-15, 19, as follows:

              Civ.R. 17(A) requires that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the
       name of the real party in interest.” Civ.R.17(A). Indeed, “if a claim is
       asserted by one who is not the real party in interest, then the party lacks
       standing to prosecute the action.” Myers v. Evergreen Land Dev. Ltd., 7th
       Dist. Mahoning No. 07 MA 123, 2008-Ohio-1062, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel.
       Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998).

              A real party in interest is “one who has a real interest in the subject
       matter of the litigation, and not merely an interest in the action itself, i.e.,
       one who is directly benefitted or injured by the outcome of the case.”
       (Emphasis sic.) Shealy v. Campbell, 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 24, 485 N.E.2d 701
       (1985), quoting West Clermont Edn. Assn. v. West Clermont Bd. of Edn. 67
       Ohio App.2d 160, 162, 426 N.E.2d 512 (1980).

              The purpose of the standing requirement is to “enable the defendant
       to avail himself of evidence and defenses that the defendant has against

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                          –5–

      the real party in interest, and to assure [the defendant] finality of judgment,
      and that he will be protected against another suit brought by the real party
      at [sic] interest on the same matter.” Shealy at 24-25, quoting In re Highland
      Holiday Subdivision, 27 Ohio App.2d 237, 240, 273 N.E.2d 903 (4th
      Dist.1971).

               To determine whether a plaintiff is a real party in interest, “courts
      must look to the substantive law creating the right being sued upon to see
      if the action has been instituted by the party possessing the substantive
      right to relief.” Id. at 25. As we have noted in the past, “the test for
      determining who is a real party in interest is: ‘Who would be entitled to
      damages?’” Myers, supra, at ¶ 14. When the facts are not in dispute, the
      trial court’s determination that an individual is not a real party in interest is
      reviewed de novo. Id. at ¶ 15. If it is determined that the plaintiff does not
      have standing, the complaint must be dismissed, and appellate courts will
      uphold such dismissals on appeal.          Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v.
      Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 42.

               In this case, Appellant raised several causes of actions in her
      complaint: grand theft, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
      dealing, breach of contract, economic duress, and promissory fraud and
      misrepresentation. All of her claims depend on the fact that the claimant
      possess a legally protected interest in the property. Because Appellant
      does not have a legally protected interest in the property in this case, she
      is not the real party in interest and lacks standing.

               As the trial court noted, Appellant’s complaint is rife with references
      to her son, Greg Givens: it names him as the plaintiff in some spots;
      consistently uses masculine pronouns when it should use feminine
      pronouns; and contains facts that are applicable only to her son, and not
      Appellant. It appears that, aside from minor editing, Appellant simply signed
      her name on the complaint that Greg Givens earlier twice unsuccessfully
      filed.

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                       –6–

      ***

      Appellant does not have standing to sue because she is not a real party in
      interest with a direct, actual stake in the outcome of the litigation. She has
      no legally protected interest in the disputed property and can receive no
      relief from contesting the tax foreclosure sale.      Because she has no
      standing, the trial court’s decision to dismiss her complaint was not error.

      {¶17} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
      {¶18} Appellant’s first assignment of error states:

      THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN TREATMENT AND
      DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT FOR REASONS AND PREJUDICES
      STATED IN ARBITRARY AND UNIQUE ORDERS TO DEFENDANT [sic]
      GIVENS ALONE, SO DENYING DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE
      EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW REQUIRED TO THE DEFENDANT [sic],
      CAROL GIVENS, IN VIOLATION OF THE U.S. BILL OF RIGHTS, AND
      ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, JUDICIAL
      CANNONS.

      {¶19} Appellant argues here that the trial court erred in determining the probate
estate was dismissed because Greg Givens failed to comply with the probate court’s
orders. She states that matter is currently on appeal.
      {¶20} We addressed this argument/assignment of error in Givens, 2023-Ohio-
4516, ¶ 21, as follows:

             This assignment of error lacks merit because this appeal does not
      involve Greg Givens as a party and clearly does not involve an appeal of a
      probate judgment. Appellant’s lack of standing prevents her from making
      arguments as to the merits of the instant case, much less a completely
      different case in probate court. We must also note that this Court has
      already dismissed Mr. Givens’ appeal in his probate case. In re Estate of
      Givens, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 22 BE 0045 (Oct. 31, 2022).

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                           –7–

       {¶21} Accordingly, Appellant’s argument is moot and her first assignment of error
is without merit and is overruled.
       {¶22} Appellant’s second and sixth assignments of error are based on the same
argument. Thus, we will address them together.
       {¶23} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:

       TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AND IN FAILURE TO
       ADHERE TO, AND OBEY OHIO STATUTE, HIGHER COURT OPINIONS,
       DETERMINATION, MANDATES OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT, AND
       DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS, ISSUED ACCORDINGLY, AND IN
       ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

       {¶24} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error states:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE AND DUTY TO CORRECT
       JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF, AND ADHERE TO LOCAL RULE
       23 OF THE BELMONT COUNTY COURT, COMMON PLEAS, IN ITS
       RULINGS.

       {¶25} Appellant seems to argue here that she was entitled to Civ.R. 60(B) relief
from judgment in her tax foreclosure case.
       {¶26} We addressed these arguments/assignments of error in Givens, 2023-
Ohio-4516, ¶ 30-31, as follows:

                In order to invoke an appellate court’s jurisdiction, “a party must file
       a notice of appeal in compliance with App.R. 3(D).” In the notice of appeal,
       an appellant must “designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed
       from.”    App.R. 3(D).     Failure to do so divests the appellate court of
       jurisdiction. “[A]n appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review a judgment or
       order that is not designated in the appellant’s notice of appeal.” State v.
       McGarvey, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 14 MA 153, 2016-Ohio-771, ¶ 8.

                Here, Appellant designated Common Pleas Case No. 22-CV-332 in
       her notice of appeal. She did not include her tax foreclosure case. Her

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                        –8–

       second and sixth assignments of error deal exclusively with the court’s
       decision on Appellant’s motion for relief from judgment in her tax foreclosure
       case. Because Appellant has only appealed the court’s decision in Case
       No. 22-CV-332, we lack jurisdiction over any judgment rendered in her tax
       foreclosure case.

       {¶27} Accordingly, Appellant’s second and sixth assignments of error are without
merit and are overruled.
       {¶28} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states:

       TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ARBITRARY RULINGS
       AND SUA SPONTE OPINIONS DIRECTED TO THE CLERKS AGAINST
       PLAINTIFF, WITHOUT HEARING OR OPPORTUNITY FOR INQUIRY AS
       TO PLAINTIFF, WHO IS SEVENTY-FIVE (75) YEARS OF AGES [sic], ON
       A WALKER, AND REQUIRED BY IMPLICATION, COURT ORDER FOR
       PLAINTIFF TO COURT, MORE THAN TWELVE (12) MILES AWAY FROM
       THE COURTROOM, SUBJECTING PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OF
       PLAINTIFF, PRIOR TO OBJECTIONS, DISCOVERY, OR TRIAL, NOT
       SIMILARLY IMPOSED UPON THE DEFENDANT, JOHN LONGWELL,
       DEPRIVING PLAINTIFF OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OVER TO THE
       FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT, AND CONTRARY AGAINST THE
       PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND
       THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AND AS RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY
       ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION, U.S. CONSTITUTION,
       AND THE CANNON OF JUDICIAL CANNON [sic] AND CONDUCT, AND
       IN DETERMINATION OF COSTS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.

       {¶29} Here, Appellant alleges the trial court judge violated various Cannons of the
Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct. She further claims the judge became a “very outspoken
critic” of Greg Givens.
       {¶30} We addressed this argument/assignment of error in Givens, 2023-Ohio-
4516, ¶ 23, as follows:

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                       –9–

             Because Appellant had no standing to file her complaint, any further
      arguments regarding this complaint are moot. Regardless, the question of
      judicial misconduct is beyond this Court’s jurisdiction. “Appellate Courts
      have consistently recognized that any allegation that the trial judge violated
      the Code of Judicial Conduct, acted in a manner demeaning to the judiciary,
      and engaged in unethical misconduct are not properly brought before the
      court of appeals.” In re J.J.M, 7th Dist. Harrison No. 12 HA 2, 2012-Ohio-
      5605, ¶ 23.

      {¶31} Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
      {¶32} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error states:

      THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE AND DUTY TO RECUSE,
      HOLDING EACH AND EVERY CASE OF THE PLAINTIFF, AND LACKING
      RANDOM STRAW POLL OF JUDGES.

      {¶33} In this assignment of error, Appellant seems to allege that the trial court
judge should have recused himself.
      {¶34} We addressed this argument/assignment of error in Givens, 2023-Ohio-
4516, ¶ 24-25, as follows:

             [Appellant] fails to provide any reasoning or argument, and fails to
      supply citations to any authorities or references to relevant parts of the
      record. These omissions clearly violate App.R. 16(A)(7) and are reason
      enough to overrule the assignment of error. “It is the duty of appellant, not
      this Court, to demonstrate [her] assigned error through an argument that is
      supported by citations to legal authority and facts in the record.” Midkiff v.
      Kuzniak, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 06 MA 66, 2006-Ohio-6243, ¶ 11 citing
      State v. Taylor, 9th Dist. [Medina] No. 2783-M, [1999 WL 61619 (Feb. 9,
      1999)]. The fact that Appellant is a pro se litigant does not excuse her from
      complying with App.R.16(A)(7). “It is well established that pro se litigants
      are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                          – 10 –

       they are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by
       counsel.” State ex rel. Neil v. French, 153 Ohio St.3d 271, 274, 2018-Ohio-
       2692, 104 N.E.3d 764.

                 Nevertheless, this assignment of error is also moot, given our
       conclusion that Appellant had no standing to file her complaint.

       {¶35} Accordingly, Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
       {¶36} Appellant’s seventh assignment of error states:

       TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
       NOT BACKED IN FACT, OR IN EVIDENCE.

       {¶37} Appellant simply asserts here that the trial court erred in taxing costs of this
action to her.
       {¶38} We addressed this argument/assignment of error in Givens, 2023-Ohio-
4516, ¶ 32-35, as follows:

                 As a preliminary matter, we once again note that Appellant failed to
       comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant does not present
       “the reasons in support of [her] contentions, with citations to the authorities,
       statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” App.R. 16(A)(7).
       Appellant cites no standard of review, no authority in case law whatsoever,
       no statutory provisions, and no evidence in the record to show that the trial
       court’s order was in error. The entirety of this assignment of error reads:
       “The Trial Court erred in its determination, that Costs are taxed to Carol
       Givens. Citations Sic passim. Ibid.” (Appellant Br. at 8). Appellant cannot
       rely on this Court or Appellee to make her argument for her. Midkiff, 7th
       Dist. Mahoning No. 06 MA 66, 2006-Ohio-6243, ¶ 11.

                 The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure direct trial courts to order parties
       to pay court costs. “Except when express provision therefor is made either
       in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                      – 11 –

      unless the court otherwise directs.” Civ.R. 54(D). The rule “gives the trial
      court broad discretion to assess costs” and “the court’s ruling will not be
      reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Keaton v. Pike Community Hosp.,
      124 Ohio App.3d 153, 156, 705 N.E.2d 734 (4th Dist. 1997) citing Vance v.
      Roedersheimer, 64 Ohio St.3d 552, 555, 597 N.E.2d 153 (1992). Abuse of
      discretion connotes more than an error of judgment; it implies that the
      court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Johnson
      v. McClain, 164 Ohio St.3d 379, 2021-Ohio-1664, 172 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 20.

             Although Appellant filed an affidavit of indigency with her complaint,
      this does not change our analysis.      “The mere filing of an affidavit of
      indigence does not constitute an automatic waiver of court costs.” Yeager
      v. Moody, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 11 CA 874, 2012-Ohio-1691, ¶ 8.           An
      indigency filing only waives the requirement of an advance deposit to secure
      court costs. Costs may still be assessed at the conclusion of the case.
      Crenshaw v. Howard, 2022-Ohio-3914, 200 N.E.3d 335, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.).

             The trial court possesses broad discretion to recoup court costs from
      litigants, even pro se indigent litigants.    Appellant has presented no
      argument or citation to the record that the court's decision was
      unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.

      {¶39} Accordingly, Appellant’s seventh assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
      {¶40} Appellant’s eighth assignment of error states:

      TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY JOINDER, AND IN
      DISMISSAL OF BELMONT COUNTY COURT, COMMON PLEAS, CASES
      21-TF-0004 WITH 22-CV-0331, AND IN CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOT
      BACKED IN FACT, OR IN EVIDENCE.

      {¶41} In her final assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court incorrectly
joined the present case with Case No. 22-CV-331 and with her tax foreclosure case.

Case No. 23 BE 0023
                                                                                            – 12 –

       {¶42} We addressed this argument/assignment of error in Givens, 2023-Ohio-
4516, ¶ 27, as follows:

              Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2), we must overrule this assignment of
       error at the outset because it “fails to identify in the record the error on which
       the assignment of error is based * * *.” Appellant has raised a bare claim
       devoid of context. She provides no discernable argument. There is no
       indication in the record that the court joined the cases Appellant references.

       {¶43} Accordingly, Appellant’s eighth assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
       {¶44} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.
Klatt, J., concurs.

Case No. 23 BE 0023
[Cite as Givens v. Longwell, 2024-Ohio-948.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against
the Appellant.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.