Court Opinion

ID: 9960984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 17:02:00.110292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:06.750657
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                          No. 22-50262

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 5:22-cr-
                                                   00054-PA-1
    v.

JEREMY TRAVIS PAYNE, AKA                             OPINION
Jeramey Travis Payne,

                 Defendant-Appellant.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Central District of California
          Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted February 14, 2024
                    Pasadena, California

                       Filed April 17, 2024

    Before: Richard C. Tallman and Consuelo M. Callahan,
     Circuit Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik, * District Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Tallman

*
 The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
2                          USA V. PAYNE

                          SUMMARY **

                          Criminal Law

   The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Jeremy
Travis Payne’s motion to suppress evidence.
    Payne, a California parolee, was arrested and charged
with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl,
fluorofentanyl, and cocaine. After the district court denied
his motion to suppress evidence of these crimes that
California Highway Patrol officers had recovered from a
house in Palm Desert, California, he entered a conditional
guilty plea to possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute.
    The panel held that the CHP officers did not violate the
Fourth Amendment in their search, during a traffic stop, of
Payne’s cell phone, made possible by the officers’ forced use
of his thumb to unlock the device. The panel held that,
despite the language of a special search condition of Payne’s
parole, requiring him to surrender any electronic device and
provide a pass key or code, but not requiring him to provide
a biometric identifier to unlock the device, the search was
authorized under a general search condition, mandated by
California law, allowing the suspicionless search of any
property under Payne’s control. The panel concluded that
any ambiguity created by the special condition, when
factored into the totality of the circumstances, did not
increase Payne’s expectation of privacy in his cell phone to
render the search unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The panel further held that the search of the

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                        USA V. PAYNE                        3

cell phone was not unreasonable on a theory that it violated
California’s prohibition against arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing searches. In addition, the search of Payne’s
photos, videos, and maps on his cell phone did not run afoul
of Riley v. California, which held that officers cannot search
the contents of an individual’s cell phone incident to their
arrest, because Riley does not apply to parole searches of a
cell phone.
     The panel held that the CHP officers did not violate
Payne’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when they compelled him to unlock his cell
phone using his fingerprint. Payne established that the
communication       at    issue     was    compelled       and
incriminating. The panel held, however, that the compelled
use of a biometric to unlock an electronic device was not
testimonial because it required no cognitive exertion, placing
it in the same category as a blood draw or a fingerprint taken
at booking, and merely provided the CHP with access to a
source of potential information. Accordingly, the Fifth
Amendment did not apply.
    The panel held that there was sufficient probable cause
to support issuance of a search warrant without regard to
observations CHP officers made during a challenged
protective sweep of the Palm Desert House.
4                       USA V. PAYNE

                         COUNSEL

Caroline S. Platt (argued), Assistant Federal Public
Defender; Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal Public Defender;
Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Haoxiaohan H. Cai (argued), Assistant United States
Attorney, General Crimes Section; Bram M. Alden,
Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Appeals
Section; E. Martin Estrada, United States Attorney; United
States Department of Justice, Office of the United States
Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                         OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

    Appellant Jeremy Travis Payne was a California parolee
when he was arrested and charged with three counts of
possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, fluorofentanyl,
and cocaine. After the district court denied Payne’s motion
to suppress evidence of these crimes recovered from a home
in Palm Desert, California, Payne entered a conditional
guilty plea to possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute
at least 40 grams in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B)(vi). On appeal, Payne challenges the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that
California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) officers violated his
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
                            USA V. PAYNE                              5

                                   I
    In November 2018, Payne was arrested for assault with
a deadly weapon on a peace officer, in violation of Cal. Penal
Code § 245(c).      He was sentenced to three years
imprisonment and later released on parole. On September
23, 2020, Payne signed a one-page “Notice and Conditions
of Parole” document and a separate, three-page “Special
Conditions of Parole” document. Pursuant to Cal. Penal
Code § 3067(b)(3) and 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2511(b)(4),
Payne’s Notice and Conditions of Parole included the
following condition (“general search condition”) 1:

        You, your residence, and any property under
        your control are subject to search or seizure
        by a probation officer, an agent or officer of
        the California Department of Corrections and
        Rehabilitation, or any other peace officer, at
        any time of the day or night, with or without
        a search warrant, with or without cause.

Payne’s Special Conditions of Parole included a more
detailed condition (“special search condition”) concerning
electronic devices:

        You shall surrender any digital/electronic
        device and provide a pass key/code to unlock
        the device to any law enforcement officer for
        inspection other than what is visible on the
        display screen.        This includes any

1
 This general search condition is “mandated as a term of every parolee’s
release” in the State of California. People v. Delrio, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d
301, 305 (Ct. App. 2020); see People v. Schmitz, 288 P.3d 1259, 1264–
65 (Cal. 2012).
6                       USA V. PAYNE

       digital/electronic device in your vicinity.
       Failure to comply can result in your arrest
       pending further investigation and/or
       confiscation of any device pending
       investigation.

    On November 3, 2021, CHP officers Coddington and
Garcia—who were both assigned to the Coachella Valley
Violent Crime Gang Taskforce—were patrolling an area in
Desert Hot Springs, California. They saw a gold Nissan with
what they perceived to be unlawfully tinted front windows
and initiated a traffic stop for a suspected violation of Cal.
Veh. Code § 26708. Officer Coddington approached the
vehicle and asked the driver, Payne, to provide his driver’s
license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Officer
Coddington later reported that Payne was “extremely
nervous,” “trembling as he fumbled for the documents,”
“sweating profusely,” and “stammering when he spoke.”
Payne informed the officers that he was on California parole.
After confirming Payne’s California parole status with
Riverside County Sheriff’s Dispatch, Officer Coddington
asked Payne and his female passenger to get out of the car.
Payne was handcuffed and eventually detained in the back
of a squad car.
    Officers searched Payne’s person pursuant to his parole
conditions and found in his pockets $1,270 cash and a key
ring with several keys, including a key to a BMW. After
searching the vehicle, Officer Coddington asked Payne if he
had a phone. Payne responded that “his phone was in the
driver’s door panel and was green in color.” The phone was
where Payne said it would be. Officer Coddington retrieved
it and asked Payne to provide the passcode. Despite
confirming that he had a phone, and informing officers of its
                            USA V. PAYNE                              7

location and color, Payne changed his story and began
denying ownership, stating “the phone was not his and he
did not have the password.”
    At this juncture, CHP officers would have been justified
under Payne’s special search condition in either
“confiscati[ng] . . . [the] device” or “arrest[ing] Payne
pending further investigation.” Instead, Officer Coddington
forcibly grabbed Payne’s thumb and used it to unlock the
phone via a built-in biometric unlocking feature. 2 Once
unlocked, Officer Coddington opened the phone’s settings
and confirmed that Payne’s full name was listed in the
owner’s information section. Next, he began looking
through the device’s stored media and found two important
videos.
    The first video was recorded on the phone the same day,
November 3, 2021, just three hours before the traffic stop. It
showed the inside of a room with what Officer Coddington
believed to be “a large amount of U.S. currency, several bags
of blue pills (suspected to be fentanyl), and a gold-colored
money counting machine.” An individual, who Officer
Coddington presumed was Payne, could be heard on the
video referring to the room as his “office.” The second video
was taken outside of a residence with a gray-brick wall
around the front. Again, an individual, who Officer
Coddington presumed was Payne, could be heard saying
“life is good in Palm Desert” and “I got the Beamer out

2
 Whether Officer Coddington forcibly used Payne’s thumb to unlock the
phone or Payne “reluctantly unlocked the cell phone using his thumb
print” was disputed before the district court. For the purposes of this
appeal, however, the government—both in its answering brief and during
oral argument—accepted the defendant’s version of the facts, i.e., “that
defendant’s thumbprint was compelled.”
8                        USA V. PAYNE

front,” referring to a parked BMW vehicle shown in the
video.
    Finally, Officer Coddington opened the maps application
on Payne’s cell phone, which showed a pin dropped to a
parked vehicle on a street called El Cortez Way in Palm
Desert, California, about twenty-five miles away. Despite
what Officer Coddington found on the phone concerning the
parked car in Palm Desert, Payne insisted that he resided
with his mother at her home in Indio, California; Payne’s
female passenger told officers the same thing in a later
interview. Based on what CHP officers found on Payne’s
person and phone, they drove Payne to the location of the
parked car on El Cortez Way.
    When the officers arrived, they saw a silver BMW
parked in front of a house. The car was registered to Payne
and the BMW key recovered from Payne’s person unlocked
it. Before obtaining a warrant, Officer Coddington walked
to the front door of what was marked Unit B and unlocked
the door with one of the keys from Payne’s keyring. Officers
entered the home and conducted what they reported as a
“security sweep” to “make sure there was no one inside the
residence who could possibly come out of the residence and
harm [the officers].” During this initial search of the home,
officers observed in plain sight several bags of blue pills they
suspected of being fentanyl and a money-counting machine,
consistent with what they had earlier observed in the first
video on Payne’s cell phone.
     Officer Coddington then wrote a search warrant
application for the house on El Cortez Way. The application
listed all the information that Officer Coddington had
learned from his search of Payne’s cell phone. The
application also attested that Officer Coddington:
                        USA V. PAYNE                       9

(1) observed a BMW outside of Payne’s residence that the
key recovered from Payne’s person unlocked; (2) confirmed
the BMW was registered to Payne; (3) accessed Unit B with
another key on Payne’s keyring; and (4) saw several bags of
blue pills (suspected to be fentanyl) and a gold money-
counting machine during the initial sweep of the residence.
Two hours later, a Riverside County Superior Court judge
authorized the search warrant.
    The search of El Cortez Way under the authority of that
warrant was more thorough. Officers found several
documents, including pieces of mail, bearing Payne’s full
name. They also discovered a “white powdery substance”
throughout the home and a total of 104.3 grams of blue pills
marked “M/30.” The pills and powder were later confirmed
to be fentanyl, fluorofentanyl, and cocaine. In addition to
the drugs, officers recovered a total of $13,992 in cash, a
digital scale, the gold money-counting machine, and six cell
phones. Payne was arrested following the second search.
    On February 23, 2022, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment charging Payne with: (1) possession with intent
to distribute a mixture and substance containing fentanyl in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vi);
(2) possession with intent to distribute fluorofentanyl in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and
(3) possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Payne filed a motion to
suppress the evidence seized from the house on El Cortez
Way on April 25, 2022. He primarily argued that the
searches of his phone and the house on El Cortez Way
violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
   The district court denied Payne’s motion in an oral ruling
on May 24, 2022. The court found that the search of Payne’s
10                      USA V. PAYNE

cell phone was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
given that Payne was on parole in California and subject to
California’s standard search conditions that covered his
electronic devices. Further, the court determined that the
compelled use of Payne’s thumb to access the phone was a
nontestimonial act, placing it outside of Payne’s Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court
found no separate Fourth Amendment violation for the first,
warrantless search of the house on El Cortez Way for two
reasons. First, because the search was justified under
Payne’s parole conditions and, second, because the search
warrant officers later obtained would have still been valid
after excising the information included in the warrant
application from the protective sweep of the home.
    Payne was sentenced on November 7, 2022, to 144
months in prison. After the district court entered final
judgment, Payne filed a timely notice of appeal. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
                             II
    We begin with Payne’s Fourth Amendment challenges
to the CHP officers’ search of his cell phone. Given Payne
raises his Fourth Amendment claim in the context of a
challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress, we review the denial of that motion de novo and
the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United
States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 632–33 (9th Cir. 2015).
    The general suspicionless search condition in Payne’s
Notice and Conditions of Parole is mandated by California
law. See Cal. Penal Code § 3067(b)(3); 15 Cal. Code Regs.
§ 2511(b)(4). The California Supreme Court held the
condition was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, in
large part because parolees, who enjoy only “conditional
                        USA V. PAYNE                        11

freedom,” have a significantly diminished expectation of
privacy, while the government has a strong interest in
assessing parolees’ rehabilitation and reentry while
simultaneously protecting the public. People v. Reyes, 968
P.2d 445, 450–51 (Cal. 1998); People v. Bryant, 491 P.3d
1046, 1054 (Cal. 2021) (“[A] warrantless search of a
parolee’s property or residence . . . is per se reasonable.”);
see also United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1275 (9th
Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court of the United States agreed,
upholding suspicionless searches of parolees based on the
totality of the circumstances provided they are not “arbitrary,
capricious, or harassing.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843, 856–57 (2006). In the years since Samson, we have
made clear that suspicionless parolee searches that
“compl[y] with the terms of a valid search condition will
usually be deemed reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” United States v. Cervantes, 859 F.3d 1175,
1183 (9th Cir. 2017).
    Our more recent cases have articulated the narrow set of
constraints that apply to law enforcement officers
conducting suspicionless parole searches. First, the officer
conducting the parole search must have probable cause to
believe “that the individual to be searched is on active
parole, and an applicable parole condition authorizes the
search or seizure at issue.” United States v. Estrella, 69
F.4th 958, 972 (9th Cir. 2023). Second, those searches
cannot be “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Reyes, 968 P.2d at 450;
see Cal. Penal Code § 3067(d) (“It is not the intent of the
Legislature to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct
searches for the sole purpose of harassment.”).
   Payne raises two distinct, yet inexorably entwined,
arguments: (1) that the officers on scene during the traffic
12                          USA V. PAYNE

stop used “unreasonable means” to unlock his phone
considering the language of his special search condition;3
and (2) that the search was arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing.
                                  A
    Payne’s unreasonable means argument most closely
implicates the principle, from Estrella, that officers must
have probable cause to believe an individual is on parole and
subject to an applicable parole condition that authorizes the
search at issue. 69 F.4th at 972. Here, the search at issue is
of Payne’s phone, made possible by the forced use of
Payne’s thumb to unlock the device. Payne posits the
question of whether CHP officers complied with the precise
terms of his parole conditions when they searched his cell
phone as a threshold one. In other words, he argues that the
parole search exception to the warrant requirement cannot
apply when officers do not follow the precise terms or
commands of a parole condition. He points to the language
in special parole condition number sixty-four for support,
which compelled Payne to surrender his cell phone to any
law enforcement officer for inspection and “provide [the]
pass key/code to unlock the device.” It further states that
“[f]ailure to comply can result in your arrest pending further
investigation and/or confiscation of any device pending

3
  Invoking Fed. R. Crim. P. 12, the government argues that Payne
forfeited his “unreasonable means” argument because he failed to
squarely present it in his motion to suppress. However, Payne’s
argument centers on the precise language of his parole conditions, which
was presented to and analyzed by the district court during the
suppression hearing. See United States v. Magdirila, 962 F.3d 1152,
1155–57 (9th Cir. 2020). Because Payne’s argument does not rely on
new facts or wholly distinct legal theories, we decline to deem it
forfeited.
                         USA V. PAYNE                        13

investigation.” Relying on the condition’s plain language,
Payne argues that the officers could not use his thumb to
unlock his phone when he refused to provide the numerical
passcode—their only recourse was to confiscate the device
or arrest him pending investigation, as outlined in the special
search condition.
    Textually, Payne’s unreasonable means argument has
certain cogency. The special search condition did not
require Payne to provide a biometric identifier to unlock any
electronic devices in his vicinity and it did include an express
enforcement provision. However, Payne’s argument suffers
from two fatal flaws. First, it ignores the more general,
statutorily mandated search condition included in his—and
every California parolee’s—Notice of Conditions of Parole.
Second, Payne’s proposed approach decouples the analysis
from the “totality of the circumstances” and
“reasonableness” inquiries that form the foundation of our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including in the parolee
search context. See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547
U.S. 398, 403 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118 (2001).
    While Payne’s special search condition addresses
electronic devices specifically, his general search condition,
mandated by California law, states that “any property under
[Payne’s] control are subject to search or seizure by . . . any
other peace officer, at any time of the day or night, with or
without a search warrant, with or without cause.” We have
before held that California’s statutory framework governing
the suspicionless search of parolees authorizes officers to
conduct warrantless searches of parolees’ cell phones. See
Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1275. The language of California’s
general search condition, written into all California parole
notices, is abundantly clear, putting parolees like Payne on
14                      USA V. PAYNE

notice that their person, home, phone, and other belongings
may be searched at any time without cause or a warrant. This
“clear and unambiguous search condition” serves to
“significantly diminish[] [parolees’] reasonable expectation
of privacy.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 852. Thus, under the
general search condition of Payne’s parole, he did not have
an “expectation of privacy that society would recognize as
legitimate” in the contents of his cell phone. Id. The
question then becomes whether the inclusion of the special
search condition in any way alters that reality.
    In applying Supreme Court precedent governing
warrantless parolee and probationer searches, we have
acknowledged that officers are generally required to conduct
these searches pursuant to valid search conditions. In United
States v. Caseres, we held that warrantless parole searches
do not withstand scrutiny when officers are unaware that
§ 3067, or a similar parole search statute or condition,
applies. 533 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008). Caseres drew
on well-founded concerns that officers could seek to use
broad parole search conditions—discovered to apply only
after a warrantless search took place—to retroactively justify
their actions. See id.; Samson, 547 U.S. at 856 n.5 (“[A]n
officer would not act reasonably in conducting a
suspicionless search absent knowledge that the person
stopped for the search is a parolee.”); Moreno v. Baca, 431
F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[P]olice officers cannot
retroactively justify a suspicionless search and arrest on the
basis of an after-the-fact discovery of . . . a parole
condition.”); Fitzgerald v. City of Los Angeles, 485 F. Supp.
2d 1137, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“[A]dvance knowledge of
a parolee’s status is critical to the constitutionality of a
suspicionless search of a parolee.”). These cases, on which
Caseres relied, did not hold that officers must have
                        USA V. PAYNE                       15

knowledge of the exact language of a parole condition.
Rather, they focused on whether the searching officers had
knowledge of a parolee’s status.
    In Estrella, we refined the prior knowledge language
from Caseres to mean that an officer must have both:
(1) “probable cause to believe that an individual is on active
parole before conducting a suspicionless search,” and
(2) probable cause to believe that “an applicable parole
condition authorizes the search . . . at issue.” 69 F.4th at
971–72. We opted for this standard, in lieu of an “actual
knowledge” standard, on the basis that the Fourth
Amendment “calls for reasonable determinations, and does
not demand certainty.” Id. at 968 (citing Hill v. California,
401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)).
    Our decisions in Caseres and Estrella do not support
Payne’s proposition that the officers were compelled to
follow the special search condition to the letter or that the
special search condition served to override the general
search condition. Instead, they support the government’s
position that the general search condition authorized the
search of Payne’s cell phone. If we were to accept Payne’s
proposition, it would impose an impractical burden on
officers in the field to study a parolee’s specific parole
conditions before conducting the investigations they deem
necessary based on the circumstances with which they are
confronted. See Estrella, 69 F.4th at 968 (noting that
officers cannot be expected to possess “‘up-to-the-minute’
information of a parolee’s status before proceeding with a
routine compliance check”).
   Here, having confirmed Payne’s California parole status
with the Riverside County Sheriff’s dispatch, Officer
Coddington was on notice of Payne’s general search
16                      USA V. PAYNE

condition, which subjected all “property under [Payne’s]
control” to “search or seizure . . . at any time of the day or
night, with or without a search warrant, with or without
cause.” As a California officer, dealing with a California
parolee, he reasonably believed that §§ 3067(b)(3) and
2511(b)(4) authorized him to search Payne, his vehicle, and
his belongings, including his cell phone. The search was
thus independently justified under Payne’s general search
condition.
    That Payne was also subject to a special electronic
device search condition, of which Officer Coddington was
also aware, does not place the search of Payne’s cell phone
outside of the realm of reasonableness, even considering the
way Officer Coddington accessed its contents. In Delrio, the
California Court of Appeal considered the interplay between
California’s mandatory search conditions and other various
special conditions to which a parolee may be subjected. See
People v. Delrio, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 304–09 (Ct. App.
2020). There, the court found that special conditions of
California parole, like special condition sixty-four in
Payne’s case, “do not appear intended to set restrictions on
the searches and seizures authorized by Penal Code section
3067, subdivision (b)(3), or to elevate a parolee’s
expectations of privacy.” Id. at 308. Instead, the court saw
the terms as interposing additional penalties for possible
parole violations. Id. (“When such special conditions are
selected, the parolee’s failure to adhere may give rise to
parole violation charges . . . .”). We agree.
   As Payne would have it, CHP officers’ only recourse for
Payne’s refusal to provide his numerical passcode would
have been the two options textually set forth in his special
parole condition: “arrest pending further investigation
and/or confiscation of any device pending investigation.”
                        USA V. PAYNE                        17

Payne argues that any officer conduct outside of those
measures would be per se unreasonable. But so drastically
limiting the range of permissible officer conduct based on
whether a parolee is subject to a special search condition
would lead to bizarre results. Nor do parole search
conditions have the strict textual force that Payne suggests
they should. See People v. Schmitz, 288 P.3d 1259, 1273
(Cal. 2012) (noting that the scope of a parole search is not
“strictly tied to the literal wording of the notification given
to the parolee upon release”); Delrio, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
309 (“[T]he officers who performed the parole search of
defendant were not required to first ascertain and parse the
language of the [parole] form”).
    Law enforcement officers in the field can proceed with a
search under a parolee’s general search condition, assuming
that search is reasonable.        After all, the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation defines
special conditions of parole as “rules imposed in addition to
the general conditions of parole,” not in place of those
general conditions. Parole Conditions, Cal. Dep’t of Corrs.
&       Rehab.,       https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/parole/parole-
conditions/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2024) (emphasis added).
These special conditions are imposed based on a parolee’s
particular offense and criminal history—i.e., aggravating
factors—and are designed as a further means by which the
department can “discourage criminal behavior.” Id. It
would thus make little sense to hold that Payne’s special
search condition materially raised his expectation of
privacy, providing him with a way to shield the contents of
his phone from officer inspection by refusing to provide his
passcode.
   At best, the special condition of Payne’s parole created
some minimal ambiguity concerning the reach of his parole
18                      USA V. PAYNE

conditions in the aggregate. In reviewing suspicionless
searches of parolees, the Supreme Court of the United States,
the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court of California have
often analyzed parole conditions, their clarity, and officers’
knowledge of their express terms as factors to consider in a
comprehensive reasonableness analysis. For example, in
Samson, the Supreme Court of the United States found the
clear expression of a parole search condition as “salient,” but
still examined the search under the “totality of the
circumstances.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 852; see also Knights,
534 U.S. at 118; Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1275; People v.
Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 506–07 (Cal. 2003). This totality of
the circumstances approach is sound, especially considering
that a parole search is an exception to the warrant
requirement, well-situated in broader Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
873 (1987). With that approach in mind, we assess “on the
one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
    Payne’s parole status alone subjected him to a
significantly diminished expectation of privacy.        See
Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1275. With respect to his cell phone,
Payne signed and acknowledged multiple explicit parole
search conditions that required him to surrender any device
in his vicinity for search without cause. To the extent that
Payne’s special search condition created an ambiguity over
how far his general search condition could sweep, that
ambiguity may have marginally increased Payne’s
expectation of privacy in his cell phone. But any increase
based on these facts is de minimis. Payne knew he was on
                        USA V. PAYNE                       19

parole. He knew that, based on his parole conditions, all his
belongings could be searched at any time, including the
contents of his cell phone. Officer Coddington’s use of
means not specifically contemplated by Payne’s special
search condition to access a device over which Payne had no
significant privacy interest does not appear to have been
unreasonable.
    The reasonableness of the search is compounded when
Payne’s diminished privacy interest is weighed against the
government’s interest in supervising parolees. “[A] State’s
interests in reducing recidivism and thereby promoting
reintegration and positive citizenship among probationers
and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that would not
otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.”
Samson, 547 U.S. at 853. The Supreme Court has described
this government interest as “overwhelming” based on
parolees increased propensity “to commit future criminal
offenses.” Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole
v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998)). Here, the State’s already
significant interest was even greater based on Officer
Coddington’s knowledge of Payne’s assault with a deadly
weapon charge, Payne’s extreme nervousness during the
traffic stop, and Payne’s possession of over $1,000 in cash.
    Accordingly, we hold that the inclusion of Payne’s
special search condition did not vitiate the force of his
statutorily mandated general search condition, which
independently authorized the search at issue in this case.
Moreover, we hold that any ambiguity created by the
inclusion of the special condition, when factored into the
totality of the circumstances, did not increase Payne’s
expectation of privacy in his cell phone to render the search
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
20                       USA V. PAYNE

                               B
    In addition to his unreasonable means argument, Payne
claims that the search of his cell phone violated California’s
prohibition against arbitrary, capricious, or harassing parole
searches.     Suspicionless parole searches that violate
California’s prohibition against arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing searches are constitutionally unreasonable.
Cervantes, 859 F.3d at 1183. This prohibition, however, is
“decidedly narrow” and only applies to situations where, for
example, a search “is based merely on a whim or caprice or
when there is no reasonable claim of a legitimate law
enforcement purpose.” Estrella, 69 F.4th at 972 (quoting
People v. Cervantes, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 471 (Ct. App.
2002), as modified (Dec. 23, 2002)).
    Payne argues that “[o]nce the officers found nothing
illegal on [his] person or in his vehicle, that should have been
the end of the matter,” but he does not cite to any authority
suggesting that an officer’s failure to abandon their
investigation under these circumstances rises to the level of
a violation of the arbitrary, capricious, or harassing standard.
Instead, he cites cases involving the automobile exception
for the proposition that officers had no reason to search the
contents of Payne’s phone for evidence of his window tint
violation. Those cases, however, are inapposite because
officers must have probable cause to conduct a search under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Parole
searches, on the other hand, require no such probable cause
determination as to the place or thing being searched.
   Finally, Payne claims that the officers’ search of his
photos, videos, and maps ran afoul of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Riley v. California, which held that officers could
not search the contents of an individual’s cell phone as
                             USA V. PAYNE                               21

incident to their arrest. 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). However,
we clearly rejected the argument that Riley applies to parole
searches of a cell phone in Johnson. 875 F.3d at 1273–75.
We therefore decline to extend Riley’s reasoning to the facts
of this case.
    The CHP officers who legitimately stopped Payne did so
based on their independent suspicion that Payne had violated
California’s Vehicle Code. They proceeded with their
investigation logically and appropriately after learning
Payne was a California parolee and observing his behavior.
Having failed to present any evidence that the CHP officers
who stopped Payne and eventually searched his cell phone
demonstrated any “arbitrary or oppressive conduct,” Reyes,
968 P.2d at 451 (citations omitted), we hold that the search
of Payne’s cell phone was reasonable. 4
                                   III
    Next, we consider Payne’s argument that CHP officers
violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when they compelled him to unlock his cell
phone using his fingerprint. Again, we review the district
court’s denial of Payne’s motion to suppress de novo, and its
factual findings for clear error. Sullivan, 797 F.3d at 632–
33.
    Ratified in 1791, the Fifth Amendment provides that
“[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. While

4
  To the extent that determination required the court to apply facts to law
in a way that was “essentially factual,” we discern no clear error in the
court’s conclusion. United States v. Franklin, 18 F.4th 1105, 1115 (9th
Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1259–60
(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
22                      USA V. PAYNE

the precise scope of the privilege has, and continues to be,
subject to great debate, what has emerged is a three-prong
analysis, with each prong representing a standalone inquiry.
For a criminal defendant to benefit from the Fifth
Amendment privilege, there must be a “communication” at
issue that is: (1) compelled; (2) incriminating; and
(3) testimonial. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev.,
Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). The government
all but concedes that Payne has established the compelled
and incriminating prongs of the analysis, so we address them
only briefly.
    The district court implicitly found that CHP officers
compelled Payne to use his thumb to open the device, despite
Officer Coddington’s attestation that Payne reluctantly
opened the device on his own. For the purposes of this
appeal, the government has accepted Payne’s version of
events. Payne averred that, after he refused to give officers
his passcode, one of them “grabbed [his] thumb and
unlocked the phone.” This transpired while Payne was
handcuffed and in the back of a patrol vehicle. Compulsion
is present for Fifth Amendment purposes when,
“considering the totality of the circumstances, the free will
of the witness was overborne.” United States v. Anderson,
79 F.3d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977)). Based on Payne’s
version of events, the use of his thumb to unlock his phone
was compelled. He was physically restrained, in the back of
a squad car, and had already refused to provide officers with
the passcode to unlock the phone. Based on this resistance,
CHP officers took matters into their own hands, physically
selecting one of Payne’s thumbs to unlock the device.
    The use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his device was also
“incriminating.” This prong of the Fifth Amendment
                        USA V. PAYNE                        23

analysis has been interpreted to encompass “any disclosures
which the witness reasonably believes could be used in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used.” Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
445 (1972). Here, Payne could have reasonably concluded
that giving up his thumbprint, and thereby access to the vast
trove of personal information contained on his cell phone,
would lead to evidence that could be used against him in a
criminal prosecution. Indeed, that is exactly what happened.
    The more difficult question is whether the compelled use
of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone was testimonial. To
date, neither the Supreme Court nor any of our sister circuits
have addressed whether the compelled use of a biometric to
unlock an electronic device is testimonial. Testimonial
communications are those that, “explicitly or implicitly,
relate a factual assertion or disclose information.” Doe v.
United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988). Of course, there
are no explicit communications on this record. Payne said
nothing when CHP officers used his thumb to unlock his
phone. His Fifth Amendment claim thus rests entirely on
whether the use of his thumb implicitly related certain facts
to officers such that he can avail himself of the privilege
against self-incrimination. This argument implicates two
lines of Supreme Court precedent: the physical trait cases
and the act of production doctrine.
    Compelled physical acts—i.e., those that require an
individual to serve as a “donor”—are not testimonial. The
physical trait cases have addressed circumstances where an
individual is compelled to: don a particular piece of clothing,
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910); stand in
a lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223 (1967);
provide a handwriting or voice exemplar, Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967) (handwriting
24                       USA V. PAYNE

exemplar); Wade, 388 U.S. at 222–23 (1967) (voice
exemplar); submit to fingerprinting, Wade, 388 U.S. at 223;
or have their blood drawn for DUI testing, Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). Each case reached the
same conclusion: not testimonial. In Schmerber, for
example, the Court recognized that history and lower court
precedent made clear that the privilege against self-
incrimination was designed to ward off “situations in which
the State seeks to . . . obtain[] the evidence against an
accused through the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from his own mouth.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because the “[p]etitioner’s
testimonial capacities were in no way implicated” and his
“participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results
of the test,” the Court held that the compelled blood draw
was not testimonial under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 765.
    On its face, the use of Payne’s thumb to unlock his phone
appears no different from a blood draw or fingerprinting at
booking. These actions do not involve the testimonial
capacities of the accused and instead only compel an
individual to provide law enforcement with access to an
immutable physical characteristic. See Wade, 388 U.S. at
222–23. The next step of the investigation depends on the
“independent labor of [the state’s] officers.” Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (quoting Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581–82 (1961)). But Payne
maintains that the use of his thumb to unlock his phone is
fundamentally different from the compelled acts in past
physical trait cases, including the fingerprinting discussed in
Schmerber and Wade. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764;
Wade, 388 U.S. at 223. According to Payne, this is because
of what the compelled use of his biometric implicitly
                              USA V. PAYNE                               25

communicated. He looks to the act of production doctrine
for support.
    Under the act of production doctrine, a purely physical
act may nonetheless be testimonial because of what it
communicates “wholly aside from the contents” of the thing
produced. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
Although act of production cases have dealt exclusively with
responses to document subpoenas, their reasoning applies to
other situations. 5 The Supreme Court has reasoned that
producing a trove of documents in response to a subpoena
may implicitly communicate “the existence of the papers
demanded and their possession or control by the
[individual],” as well as the individual’s “belief that the
papers are those described in the subpoena.” Id. (citing
Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)).
    The act of production doctrine’s triggering point
becomes clearer upon close reading of the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Doe, 487 U.S. 201, and United States v.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000). In Doe, the government
compelled an individual to “sign 12 forms consenting to
disclosure of any bank records respectively relating to 12
foreign bank accounts over which the Government knew or
suspected that Doe had control.” 487 U.S. at 203. However,
the consent forms did not force Doe to himself collect and

5
   The government suggests the doctrine only applies to subpoena
responses, arguing that there is “no basis to extend that doctrine to the
act of biometric unlock.” We are not so sure. The Supreme Court has
stated in its act of production jurisprudence that “[t]he difficult question
whether a compelled communication is testimonial for purposes of
applying the Fifth Amendment often depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.” Doe, 487 U.S. at 214–15; see also
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (noting questions of whether “tacit averments”
are testimonial “do not lend themselves to categorical answers”).
26                         USA V. PAYNE

turn over any documents. The Court held that this was not a
testimonial production, reasoning that the signing of the
forms related no information about existence, control, or
authenticity of the records that the bank could ultimately be
forced to produce. Id. at 215–16. For these reasons, the
consent forms were more akin to producing “a handwriting
sample or voice exemplar” because the act was not
“compelled to obtain ‘any knowledge [the suspect] might
have.’” Id. at 217 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 222). 6 The
forms only provided the government with “access to a
potential source of evidence,” but locating the evidence itself
required “the independent labor of its officers.” Id. at 215
(internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added).
    Hubbell, on the other hand, involved a “subpoena duces
tecum calling for the production of 11 categories of
documents.” Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 31. The suspect
eventually “produced 13,120 pages of documents and
records and responded to a series of questions that
established that those were all of the documents in his
custody or control that were responsive to the commands in
the subpoena.” Id. The Court held that this act of production
was of a fundamentally different kind than that at issue in
Doe because it was “unquestionably necessary for
respondent to make extensive use of ‘the contents of his own
mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive
to the requests in the subpoena.” Id. at 43. The “assembly
of those documents was like telling an inquisitor the

6
  Justice Stevens dissented from the majority opinion in Doe but
introduced an analogy that was central to his majority opinion in
Hubbell. He wrote that a defendant “may in some cases be forced to
surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents, but
I do not believe he can be compelled to reveal the combination to his
wall safe.” Doe, 487 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
                        USA V. PAYNE                       27

combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender
the key to a strongbox.” Id. (citing Doe, 487 U.S. at 210
n.9). Thus, the dividing line between Doe and Hubbell
centers on the mental process involved in a compelled act,
and an inquiry into whether that act implicitly communicates
the existence, control, or authenticity of potential evidence.
     District courts applying Doe and Hubbell have arrived at
different conclusions on the biometric unlock question.
Payne relies heavily on a Northern District of California case
that held forced biometric unlocks violate the Fifth
Amendment. In re Residence in Oakland, Cal., 354 F. Supp.
3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019) [hereinafter Oakland]. There, a
magistrate judge determined the act of production doctrine
applied for two primary reasons. First, because compelling
an individual to unlock a device with a biometric identifier
is the functional equivalent of compelling that person to turn
over their alphanumeric passcode, an act that is generally
accepted to be protected by the Fifth Amendment because it
requires an individual to divulge the contents of his mind.
Id. at 1015–16 (“[I]f a person cannot be compelled to
provide a passcode because it is a testimonial
communication, a person cannot be compelled to provide
one’s finger, thumb, iris, face, or other biometric feature to
unlock that same device.”). Second, because the act
instantly concedes “that the phone was in the possession and
control of the suspect, and authenticates ownership or access
to the phone and all of its digital contents.” Id. at 1016.
Other district courts have come to similar conclusions. See,
e.g., United States v. Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187–
88 (D. Nev. 2020); In re Single-Family Home & Attached
Garage, No. 17 M 85, 2017 WL 4563870, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 21, 2017).
28                          USA V. PAYNE

     Still other district courts have come to the opposite
result. Addressing the Oakland court’s reasoning, these
cases assert that whether a passcode and a fingerprint unlock
are functional equivalents is an observation with no legal
significance to the Fifth Amendment analysis. See In re
Search Warrant No. 5165, 470 F. Supp. 3d 715, 734 (E.D.
Ky. 2020) (“The Court stands by the unambiguous
distinction in both the law and common sense between
something intangibly held in the most sacred of places—
one’s own mind—and an immutable physical
characteristic.”). Moreover, responding to the argument that
“if the device unlocks, then the incriminating inference is
that the person had possession or control of the device,”
these courts note that such a line of analysis improperly
conflates the incrimination prong with the testimonial prong.
See In re Search Warrant Application for [redacted text],
279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 805 (N.D. Ill. 2017). They ultimately
conclude that biometric unlock cases are no different than
other physical trait cases, like subjecting an individual to
fingerprinting or drawing a person’s blood, because the acts
at issue “do not themselves communicate anything.” Id. 7
    In Payne’s case, the Fifth Amendment question
stemming from the compelled use of his thumb to unlock his
phone bears striking resemblance to Justice Steven’s key vs.
combination analogy. While providing law enforcement
officers with a combination to a safe or passcode to a phone
would require an individual to divulge the “contents of his

7
  State courts are equally split on the issue. Compare, e.g., State v.
Pittman, 479 P.3d 1028, 1040–43 (Or. 2021) (unlocking phone using
biometrics is testimonial), with State v. Diamond, 905 N.W.2d 870, 874–
78 (Minn. 2018) (unlocking phone using biometrics is not testimonial);
People v. Ramirez, 316 Cal. Rptr. 3d 520, 544–50 (Ct. App. 2023)
(same).
                        USA V. PAYNE                        29

own mind,” turning over a key to a safe or a thumb to unlock
a phone requires no such mental process. Hubbell, 530 U.S.
at 43. To say that a passcode and a biometric are equivalents
and thus cannot receive different treatment under the law is
a syllogistic fallacy. The logic goes: biometrics are the
equivalent of or a substitute for a passcode and passcodes are
protected under the Fifth Amendment, so, biometrics are
also protected under the Fifth Amendment. The flaw lies in
the fact that the Supreme Court has framed the question
around whether a particular action requires a defendant to
divulge the contents of his mind, not whether two actions
yield the same result. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43. The
functional equivalent argument attempts to make an end run
around this central piece of the Fifth Amendment inquiry.
When Officer Coddington used Payne’s thumb to unlock his
phone—which he could have accomplished even if Payne
had been unconscious—he did not intrude on the contents of
Payne’s mind.
    While we find the fact that there was no “cognitive
exertion” on Payne’s part most determinative, In re Search
of [redacted] Washington, D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 538
(D.D.C. 2018), the relative level of existence, control, and
authentication established through a biometric unlock
compared to a comprehensive response to a subpoena is also
instructive. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43. Payne concedes
that “the use of biometrics to open an electronic device is
akin to providing a physical key to a safe,” but argues it is
nonetheless a testimonial act because it “simultaneously
confirm[s] ownership and authentication of its contents.”
However, Payne was never compelled to acknowledge the
existence of any incriminating information. He merely had
to provide access to a source of potential information, just as
was the case in Doe and Schmerber. See Doe, 487 U.S. at
30                      USA V. PAYNE

215; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765. The officers were left to
identify any incriminating evidence through their own
investigation. This is decidedly unlike Hubbell, where the
subpoena respondent was implicitly conceding the
“existence, authenticity, and custody” of specific documents
that prosecutors could use in building its case against the
respondent. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41–42.
    One can imagine how Payne’s case might alternatively
fit more neatly in the Hubbell framework. For example, had
officers somehow compelled Payne to cull through the
information in his phone and produce any photos or videos
that demonstrated his participation in fentanyl trafficking,
there may have been a testimonial act of production.
Turning over those photos or videos would implicitly
concede that Payne had such videos, that they depicted what
the officers were looking for, and that they related to his
specific activities. Obviously, that is not the case here.
     The Supreme Court has also observed that implicit
authentication is the “prevailing justification” for extending
Fifth Amendment protection to acts of documentary
production because responding to a subpoena may be akin to
requiring a suspect to “implicitly testif[y] that the evidence
he brings forth is in fact the evidence demanded.” Fisher,
425 U.S. at 412 n.12 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 346 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)). But “[t]he fact that an individual is able to
unlock a phone with a physical characteristic does not
automatically make each individual set of data, such as
photos, videos . . . immediately authentic.” In re Search
Warrant Application for the Cellular Telephone in United
States v. Barrera, 415 F. Supp. 3d 832, 841 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
Authentication is not established in the same way here
compared to a response to a subpoena where the respondent
                        USA V. PAYNE                      31

is essentially stating the “item is what the proponent claims
it is.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)). Phones like
Payne’s “can often be programmed to use multiple
individuals’ biometrics.” In re Search Warrant No. 5165,
470 F. Supp. 3d at 733. While the fact that Payne’s thumb
unlocked the phone proved to be incriminating, it alone
certainly did not serve to authenticate all the phone’s
contents.
    To the extent Payne relies on the Oakland court’s
attempt to distinguish biometric unlocks from “requiring a
suspect to submit to fingerprinting” because it immediately
results in access to more physical evidence and “there is no
comparison . . . required to confirm a positive match,” this
line of analysis conflates what is incriminating with what is
testimonial. Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1016; see Doe, 487
U.S. at 210 (“[C]ertain acts, though incriminating, are not
within the privilege.”). All physical trait cases have dealt
with compelled acts eventually leading to incriminating
evidence that can be used in a suspect’s prosecution. See In
re Search Warrant Application for [redacted text], 279 F.
Supp. 3d at 805 (noting the “distinction—between whether
an act is testimonial versus whether the act is
incriminating—explains why physical characteristics, like
fingerprints, blood samples, handwriting, and so on are not
protected by the privilege even though they often are highly
incriminating”). The compelled use of an individual’s
thumb to unlock a device shares many of the same
incriminating inferences as comparing a suspect’s
thumbprint to a thumbprint lifted from a murder weapon.
The time it takes to make the connection, or the amount of
incriminating information that flows from the
nontestimonial act, is of little consequence.
32                          USA V. PAYNE

    Accordingly, we hold that the compelled use of Payne’s
thumb to unlock his phone (which he had already identified
for the officers) required no cognitive exertion, placing it
firmly in the same category as a blood draw or fingerprint
taken at booking. The act itself merely provided CHP with
access to a source of potential information, much like the
consent directive in Doe. The considerations regarding
existence, control, and authentication that were present in
Hubbell are absent or, at a minimum, significantly less
compelling in this case. Accordingly, under the current
binding Supreme Court framework, the use of Payne’s
thumb to unlock his phone was not a testimonial act and the
Fifth Amendment does not apply. 8
    We would be remiss not to mention that Fifth
Amendment questions like this one are highly fact dependent
and the line between what is testimonial and what is not is
particularly fine. Our opinion should not be read to extend
to all instances where a biometric is used to unlock an
electronic device. Indeed, the outcome on the testimonial
prong may have been different had Officer Coddington
required Payne to independently select the finger that he
placed on the phone. See In re Search Warrant Application
for [redacted text], 279 F. Supp. 3d at 804 (discussing how

8
  Payne argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley supports a
different result because there the Court recognized that modern
technological advances like the use of smart phones may require
reexamination of certain privacy principles. 573 U.S. at 403. But Riley
analyzed cell phone searches under the Fourth Amendment, which calls
for a reasonableness analysis. See In re Search Warrant Application for
[redacted text], 279 F. Supp. 3d at 806. The Fifth Amendment demands
no such reasonableness inquiry. The narrow question before us is
whether the compelled use of Payne’s thumb is testimonial. Existing
Supreme Court precedent provides the necessary tools to answer that
question.
                        USA V. PAYNE                        33

a suspect would be required to engage in some thought
process if the government compels them to “decide which
finger (or fingers) to apply” to a sensor). And if that were
the case, we may have had to grapple with the so-called
foregone conclusion doctrine. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
We mention these possibilities not to opine on the right result
in those future cases, but only to demonstrate the complex
nature of the inquiry.
                              IV
    Having determined that the search of Payne’s cell phone
did not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, Payne’s
argument that the evidence seized from El Cortez Way must
be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree” fails.
    Next, Payne contends that the pre-warrant search of the
house on El Cortez Way independently violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. The government offers three possible
reasons why either the pre-warrant search was legal, or the
constitutionality of the pre-warrant search is immaterial to
the outcome of this case. First, it claims the search was valid
pursuant to Payne’s parole conditions. Second, it claims that
the search warrant CHP officers eventually obtained was
valid notwithstanding the constitutionality of the pre-
warrant search. Third, it claims that even if the search
warrant was invalid, the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies. We agree with the government’s
second argument and, thus, do not address its first or third.
    We review the district court’s denial of Payne’s motion
to suppress de novo and can affirm on any basis the record
supports. United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir.
2005).
34                      USA V. PAYNE

    When a search warrant application includes “illegally
obtained information,” a reviewing court must determine
whether the warrant was supported by probable cause after
“properly purg[ing] the affidavit of the offending facts.”
United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, the district court held that “when you eliminate the
facts uncovered during the sweep, the warrant contained
probable cause.” In his reply brief, Payne expressly
conceded that he “agrees with the government . . . that the
information from his phone likely would have been
sufficient for probable cause even without the information
garnered during the illegal protective sweep.” We agree.
    Assuming without deciding that the pre-warrant sweep
of El Cortez Way violated Payne’s Fourth Amendment
rights, whether the warrant CHP officers obtained was
supported by probable cause —i.e., a “probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity”—depends on the
facts included in the warrant application that CHP officers
knew before the sweep. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. 48, 57 (2018). These included: (1) Payne was
extremely nervous, sweating profusely, and fumbling for his
documents when he was initially pulled over; (2) Payne
confirmed that he was on parole; (3) a search of Payne’s cell
phone showed a video depicting a large amount of cash, a
money-counting machine, and several bags of what officers
suspected to be fentanyl; (4) a separate video from Payne’s
phone showed the outside of the home on El Cortez Way;
(5) the map application on Payne’s phone showed a pin to a
parked vehicle outside a residence on El Cortez Way; and
(6) upon driving to the location on El Cortez Way, Officer
Coddington observed a silver BMW, confirmed it was
registered to Payne, and was able to unlock the vehicle using
the key seized from Payne’s person.
                        USA V. PAYNE                        35

    As Payne acknowledges in his reply brief, these facts go
well beyond establishing probable cause to believe that a
search of the house would uncover evidence of criminal drug
possession and trafficking. Thus, the search warrant was
valid even after excising the facts included in the application
from the pre-warrant protective sweep. The district court
rightfully denied Payne’s motion to suppress.
                       CONCLUSION
   We AFFIRM the denial of Payne’s motion to suppress.