Court Opinion

ID: 9695025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:04:30.232181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:07.688306
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(dissenting).
I disagree with division I of the majority opinion, accordingly, I dissent. I would hold that the matter of liability insurance to cover officers for punitive damage awards is not a subject of mandatory bargaining.
In our previous construction of Iowa Code section 20.9, we found legislative intent to adopt a restrictive and narrow approach to interpreting the subjects listed in this section when considering whether mandatory bargaining applied to them. Charles City Community Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 275 N.W.2d 766, 772-73 (Iowa 1979); City of Fort Dodge v. Iowa PERB, 275 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1979). We have employed a two-step analysis for determining whether a proposal falls within the scope of mandatory bargaining: (1) it must come within the meaning of one of the subjects listed in section 20.9; and (2) there must be no legal prohibition against bargaining on the particular topic. Charles City Educ. Ass’n v. PERB, 291 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 1980).
The majority opinion did not apply a restrictive approach. It incorrectly utilized the “reasonable expectation” doctrine, a principle applicable to insurance policy interpretation rather than statutory construction.
Our task should be to determine whether the legislature intended mandatory bargaining for insurance for punitive damage awards. At first blush, the unrestrietive term “insurance” might appear to cover any type of insurance that an employer might secure for the benefit of an employee. Reason tells us, however, that the legislature did riot intend to cover all possible kinds of insurance available to an employee. For example, I do not believe the legislature intended that insurance coverage that protects an employee from the loss of his home or personal property would be subject to mandatory bargaining. While the statute in question speaks to “insurance,” we have often concluded that the manifest intent of the legislature prevails over the literal import of the words *838used. In re N.H., 383 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Iowa 1986).
In ascertaining that intent, we consider the object sought to be accomplished along with the evils sought to be remedied. We will seek a reasonable interpretation which will best affect the purpose of the statute and avoid absurd results.
Id. (citations omitted).
I recognize that an award of punitive damages against an employee may arise from activities performed during working hours, a situation related to employment and different from the loss of personal property used in my earlier example. Punitive damages are awarded for willful and wanton misconduct and are justified because they serve as punishment to the wrongdoer and as a deterrent to others. Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 1983). In Briner, we held that a private employer is only responsible for punitive damages for the acts of an employee when the employer authorized the acts or when an employee is acting in a managerial capacity. Id. at 867. At the time Iowa cost of insurance for punitive damages would be destroyed if we were to determine punitive damage insurance was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
I would hold the legislature never intended to include coverage for employee punitive damages under the topic of “insurance” in section 20.9. Consequently, I would reverse the district court’s judgment in this respect.
McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS and SNELL, JJ., join this dissent.