Court Opinion

ID: 9580638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:07:04.325534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:25.152959
License: Public Domain

SCHWAB, C. J.,
specially concurring.
It can be inferred from the majority opinion that if government undertakes to legislate for the public good by enacting licensing laws, building and safety codes and the like, it will be liable in many cases for injury resulting from government’s failure to achieve 100 percent success in enforcing that legislation. Such *1100legislation and enforcement of that legislation are inextricably bound together by the singleness of the goal — the achievement of public good. I would resolve the issue in this case by reaching the question of immunity under the Tort Claims Act. If the decision to legislate in the public good is discretionary, and thus beyond the power of the courts to mandate through the device of making government liable in tort for failure to do so, it should be beyond the power of the courts to mandate enforcement of public-good legislation by making government liable for failing to do so. To put it another way, government is immune from tort liability except to the extent it elects not to be. Albeit in a manner difficult to interpret, Oregon has stated the extent to which it has waived governmental immunity in the Tort Claims Act. In Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or 485, 475 P2d 78, 45 ALR3d 857 (1970), the Supreme Court, dealing with the question of discretionary (therefore immunity) versus ministerial (therefore liability), stated:
"The most decisive factor but one most difficult to articulate is that it is essential for efficient government that certain decisions of the executive or legislative branches of the government should not be reviewed by a court or jury. The reason behind such factor is that the bases for the legislative or executive decision can cover the whole spectrum of the ingredients for governmental decisions such as the availability of funds, public acceptance, order of priority, etc.” 256 Or at 506.
In Jones v. ChehalemPark & Rec. Dist., 28 Or App 711, 716, 560 P2d 686, Sup Ct review denied (1977), we concluded that "* * * matters requiring substantial expenditures of public funds and the weighing of significant public priorities * * * [are] wholly within the discretion of the public body to decide.”
As the majority recognizes, the great weight of authority in the United States is that the failure to enforce licensing and regulatory legislation does not create liability on the part of government to individuals injured as the result of the failure of third parties to comply with such legislation. These holdings are *1101commonly cast not in terms of immunity based upon the discretionary-versus-ministerial test, but in terms of duty only to the public at large and not to a particular member of the public. My difficulty with these cases is not with their logic, but with their terminology. Their rationale, where it is expressed, is just as logical as Smith v. Cooper, supra — in fact, it is essentially identical.
In Stigler v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill2d 20, 268 NE2d 26 (1971), an action was filed on behalf of a child against the city alleging that the child was injured by ingesting lead paint that had flaked off a wall in a housing project. The plaintiff contended that this happened because the city had failed to enforce its housing code. The trial court dismissed the case on motion and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the ordinance did not give rise to any special duty to the plaintiff or to any person different from the public at large. In so doing, the court said:
"* * * If the failure of the city to enforce this ordinance should render it liable for injuries sustained thereby, the tremendous exposure to liability would certainly dissuade the city from enacting ordinances designed for the protection and welfare of the general public, and thereby the general public would lose the benefit of salutory legislative enactments.” 48 I112d at 24-25.
In Gerneth v. City of Detroit, 465 F2d 784 (6th Cir 1972), the City of Detroit was sued for failure to properly enforce an ordinance prohibiting convicted felons from obtaining a private patrolman license. The city had issued a license to such a patrolman, failing to note that he had previously been convicted of the felony of "careless use of firearms.” The plaintiff was shot by this patrolman and claimed the city was liable for failure to properly enforce the licensing provision in the ordinance. The trial judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that the undertaking by the city to license private patrolmen did not create any duty to private persons, the violation of which would justify *1102an action for damages for the failure to perform the duty properly. On appeal the court concluded that the city was not liable for improper enforcement of the licensing ordinance, stating:
"It appears to this Court that the imposition of a duty to one in the position of plaintiff * * * and a resulting liability for damages for breach of such duty would impose an undue burden upon municipal corporations, and might in fact substantially interfere with the licensing and investigatory functions of such municipal corporations. It appears to us that as a matter of public policy, absent a statement to the contrary by the legislature or the highest court of jurisdiction involved, the imposition of liability for damages for breach of such a claimed duty would be inappropriate under the circumstances of a case such as this. There is no basis for a conclusion that the Detroit City Council, in enacting the ordinance in question (paraphrasing the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo) [in Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 NY 160, 159 NE 896, 62 ALR 1199 (1928)], 'intended to assume an obligation of indefinite extension to every member of the public . . . and the crushing burden which such an obligation might impose.’ ” 465 F2d at 787.
I would hold that here the City of Eugene is immune from liability under the Tort Claims Act for the reason that the decision by government as to whether it will provide complete or haphazard or no enforcement at all of licensing and regulatory legislation is discretionary in the context of tort liability.