Court Opinion

ID: 9838388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 14:00:43.320949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:03.109095
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10220      Document: 52-1       Date Filed: 09/06/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                       In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                     No. 22-10220
                            ____________________

       AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                      Plaintiﬀ-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
       versus
       O.H.M.
       a.k.a. O.H.S., a minor,

                                                       Defendant-Appellee,

       LISA MAHARAJH,
       in her individual capacity,
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                22-10220

       LISA MAHARAJH,
       as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dev-Anand A.
       Maharajh,

                              Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellants.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-01581-WFJ-CPT
                          ____________________

       Before GRANT, TJOFLAT, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Lisa Maharajh appeals the district court’s grant of summary
       judgment in favor of O.H.M. as the beneficiary of a life insurance
       policy. We affirm.
                                       I.
              In 2003, decedent Dev-Anand Maharajh purchased a one-
       million-dollar life insurance policy from American General Life
       Insurance Company. At the inception of the policy, the decedent
       named his then-wife Jennifer as primary beneficiary and any
       children born to that marriage as contingent beneficiaries. In July
       2008, while his divorce from Jennifer was pending, the decedent
       submitted to American General a request to designate his
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       22-10220               Opinion of the Court                         3

       daughter, O.H.M., who was born after the policy was purchased,
       as one hundred percent beneficiary. He additionally named
       Jennifer as trustee for O.H.M. under the Minor Beneficiary Clause.
       The decedent divorced Jennifer in September 2008 and married
       Lisa a year later. In November 2009, the decedent submitted
       another request to modify his beneficiary designations. The 2009
       request listed Lisa as seventy-five percent primary beneficiary and
       O.H.M. as twenty-five percent primary beneficiary. The decedent
       also listed O.H.M. and Lisa’s minor child from a previous
       relationship as fifty percent contingent beneficiaries.
               The following week, American General sent the decedent a
       letter that stated, in part, the following:
              We are unable to complete your request until such
              time as the item(s) below have been resolved:
              • Separate parties should be assigned for primary
                and contingent beneficiary designations.
              • Please provide the relationship of the new
                contingent beneficiary [redacted] to the insured.
              Please complete, sign, and date the enclosed change
              form(s) and return it to our office.
       The letter from American General included a blank copy of the
       form completed by the decedent the previous week and two pages
       of “Instructions and Conditions.” The decedent never responded.
               The decedent died in April 2020, having paid all premiums
       billed for the subject policy up to his death. In the following weeks,
       American General received two “Proof of Death Claimant’s
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       4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10220

       Statements”: one signed by Lisa and the other signed on behalf of
       O.H.M. by Jennifer as parent and legal guardian.
               American General filed a complaint for interpleader relief
       because it was uncertain who was entitled to the death benefit
       under the policy. O.H.M. moved for summary judgment. No facts
       were in dispute; the parties disagreed only as to the legal
       significance of the decedent’s 2009 beneficiary request and
       American General’s subsequent actions. The district court granted
       O.H.M.’s motion and entered judgment in her favor. Lisa appeals.
                                       II.
               We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment
       order, viewing the evidence and all factual inferences in the light
       most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of
       Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). A district court should
       grant summary judgment only when “there is no genuine dispute
       as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
       matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Where reasonable minds
       could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, a
       district court should deny summary judgment. Allen v. Tyson Foods,
       Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).
                                       III.
              The interpretation of a contract, including whether it is
       ambiguous, is a question of law that we review de novo. Reynolds
       v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). “In construing a
       contract, the court should consider its plain language and take care
       not to give the contract any meaning beyond that expressed.
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       22-10220                Opinion of the Court                         5

       When the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed
       to mean ‘just what the language therein implies and nothing
       more.’” O’Brien v. McMahon, 44 So. 3d 1273, 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
       App. 2010) (quoting Walker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 758 So. 2d
       1161, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted)). The
       parties agree that Florida law applies to this dispute.
              Under Florida law, an insured’s right to change the
       beneﬁciary of a life insurance policy depends on the terms of the
       policy. McDaniel v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins., 722 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla.
       Dist. Ct. App. 1998). The insured must strictly comply with the
       terms of the policy to eﬀectuate a change in the beneﬁciary. Id.
       The doctrine of strict compliance exists to protect the insurer, and
       only the insurer may waive it. Miller v. Gulf Life Ins., 12 So. 2d 127,
       130 (Fla. 1942).
              Lisa argues that the decedent’s 2009 beneﬁciary request
       controls because the decedent strictly complied with the terms of
       his policy governing changes of beneﬁciary. The relevant policy
       provision provided:
              While this policy is in force the owner may change
              the beneﬁciary or ownership by written notice to us.
              When we record the change, it will take eﬀect as of
              the date the owner signed the notice, subject to any
              payment we make or other action we take before
              recording.
              Florida law requires that we read the phrase “subject to any
       payment we make or other action we take before recording” “as
       creating some objectively reasonable standard.” See O’Brien, 44 So.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10220

       3d at 1278–79 (interpreting the similar phrase “Your request must
       be in writing and in a form that meets our needs”). In other words,
       any such “other action” must be “objectively reasonable.” This
       reading allows the insurer to protect itself from liability when faced
       with a defective beneﬁciary request. Cf. id. (“If a policy holder
       submitted a beneﬁciary change form that named ‘John Smith of
       New York’ as a new beneﬁciary, it would not be feasible for [the
       insurer] to act on the request without additional identifying
       information.”). In such cases, strict compliance with the policy
       may require the insured to respond appropriately in curing any
       defects.
              We agree with the district court that American General’s
       actions upon receiving the decedent’s defective beneficiary request
       were objectively reasonable. The insurer provided the decedent
       with written notice that identified (a) how the beneficiary request
       was defective and (b) how to resolve the defects. It even provided
       him with the necessary form along with instructions for filling it
       out. Because the decedent neither responded to the notice nor
       inquired as to the status of his filing in the ten years that followed,
       we conclude that the decedent did not strictly comply with the
       terms of the policy.
             Lisa raises several unavailing arguments in support of her
       appeal. First, she argues that “[o]nly the insurance policy”—not
       the instructions contained in American General’s notice to the
       decedent—“sets forth the terms with which the owner/insured
       must strictly comply in order to change a beneficiary.” But the
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       22-10220               Opinion of the Court                        7

       policy allowed American General to take “other action[s] . . .
       before recording” the beneficiary change, such as requiring the
       decedent to cure a defective request.
              Second, Lisa argues that the “‘other action we take’ clause is
       so broad and ambiguous[] that it should be construed against
       American General and in favor of the insured.” This clause is
       analogous to the one at issue in O’Brien, where the insurer required
       a change request to “be in writing and in a form that meets our
       needs.” O’Brien, 44 So. 3d at 1278. In reading this phrase “as
       creating some objectively reasonable standard,” the O’Brien court
       determined that this provision “plainly requires that a beneficiary
       request contain enough information to allow [the insurer] to act on
       the request.” Id. at 1279. We agree with the district court that,
       under the standard set in O’Brien, the “other action” clause—
       however broad it may be—clearly and unambiguously allowed
       American General to take objectively reasonable actions before
       recording the decedent’s defective request.
               Finally, Lisa argues that “[n]othing in the policy precludes
       American General from recording” the decedent’s “beneficiary
       change request now, which would make it effective as of the date
       signed.” We disagree. The policy plainly requires that only its
       “owner” may change the beneficiary. Neither Lisa nor anyone else
       is entitled—after the owner’s death—to change the beneficiary.
                                  *     *      *
             The decedent filed a defective request to add Lisa as a
       beneficiary on his policy, and American General’s actions in
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       8                    Opinion of the Court               22-10220

       response were objectively reasonable. Because the decedent failed
       to strictly comply with the terms of his policy, we AFFIRM the
       district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of O.H.M.