Court Opinion

ID: 9600856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:32:09.006959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:55.937578
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
For the reasons that follow, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the appellee’s claims for mandamus and prohibition relief must fail, but I believe that, properly construed, the appellee asserted an appropriate claim for declaratory judgment relief and that the trial court properly granted that relief. Accordingly, I dissent to the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
In substance, the appellee’s complaint alleged that the DeKalb County Magistrate Court, as a whole, has adopted an evidentiary policy that hearsay evidence is illegal evidence and is thus alone an insufficient basis on which to find probable cause and bind a case over to superior court, and the appellee sought relief from uncertainty as to her future obligations under that policy. In construing pleadings, it is a fundamental rule that substance, not nomenclature, *460controls.6 We have also held “that the pleadings are not an end in themselves but only a method to assist in reaching the merits of the case. The courts shall construe the pleadings ‘as to do substantial justice.’ ”7
Because mandamus and prohibition are personal actions against a public officer and not against an office and because the appellee’s complaint asserted a claim against the magistrate court as a whole, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the appellee’s claims for mandamus and prohibition relief cannot stand.8 However, looking to the substance of the appellee’s complaint and construing it to do substantial justice, I believe that the appellee asserted a claim for declaratory judgment relief.
The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is “ ‘to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.’ ”9
The superior court is authorized to enter a declaratory judgment upon petition therefor in cases of actual controversy [under OCGA § 9-4-2 (a)], and “to determine and settle by declaration any justiciable controversy of a civil nature where it appears to the court that the ends of justice require that such should be made for the guidance and protection of the petitioner, and when such a declaration will relieve the petitioner from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to his rights, status, and legal relations.”10
Because the appellee’s complaint showed that she faced uncertainty and insecurity as to her ability to rely on hearsay evidence alone as a basis on which to establish probable cause in order to have a case bound over to an appropriate court, I believe that the appellee properly asserted a claim for declaratory relief.
Moreover, the record shows that the trial court properly found that the magistrate court has a policy that precludes the binding of cases over to the appropriate court based on hearsay evidence alone on the ground that hearsay evidence is always illegal evidence. Such an evidentiary policy is contrary to longstanding evidentiary rules *461that hearsay is legal evidence at a preliminary hearing and is, by itself, a sufficient basis on which to bind a case over to the appropriate superior or state court.11
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declaring the appellants’ evidentiary policy to be invalid. I therefore dissent to the majority opinion.

 State v. Smith, 276 Ga. 14, 14-15 (573 SE2d 64) (2002); Franklyn Gesner Fine Paintings v. Ketcham, 252 Ga. 537, 539 (314 SE2d 903) (1984).

 Block v. Voyager Life Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 162, 163 (303 SE2d 742) (1983) (citations omitted).

 Hall v. Nelson, 282 Ga. 441, 444 (651 SE2d 72) (2007).

 Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 213 (518 SE2d 879) (1999) (quoting OCGA § 9-4-1).

 Baker, 271 Ga. at 213-214 (quoting Calvary &c. Baptist Church v. City of Rome, 208 Ga. 312, 314 (66 SE2d 726) (1951)).

 Gresham, v. Edwards, 281 Ga. 881, 882-883 (644 SE2d 122) (2007); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 120 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54) (1975); 4 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure, § 14.4 (b) (3rd ed. 2007). See also Handley v. Limbaugh, 224 Ga. 408,413 (162 SE2d 400) (1968); Homer v. State, 257 Ga. App. 12, 14 (570 SE2d 94) (2002) (evidence that is admissible under some exception to the rule prohibiting hearsay has probative value).