Court Opinion

ID: 9775993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:15:36.124165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:40.730311
License: Public Domain

ODOM, Judge.
I concur in the dismissal of this appeal. Because the sentence was untimely pronounced, this Court is without jurisdiction. Although the majority decline to expressly acknowledge that lack of jurisdiction is the cause for dismissal, the fact of dismissal in this case necessarily implies a lack of jurisdiction because no lesser defect would support our action.
The Constitution of Texas mandates this Court’s appellate jurisdiction:
“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of the State in all criminal eases of whatever grade, with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.” Art. 5, Sec. 5, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Const.
The Legislature, acting pursuant to the power granted by this provision, has created a statutory right of appeal in Art. 44.02, V.A.C.C.P., which provides:
“A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter prescribed.”
Only jurisdictional defects can defeat a defendant’s right to have his appeal heard by this Court. In Chumbley v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 491, 132 S.W.2d 417 (1939) it is written: ,
“Every person who takes an appeal from a conviction of the county or district court over which this court has been given jurisdiction is legally entitled to have his cause reviewed.”
In Young v. State, 172 S.W.2d 500 (Tex.Cr.App.1943), the Court stated:
“The right of appeal, where authorized, is a valuable right and should be denied only where the express mandate of law so provides.”
The majority opinion, by a careful choice of words, has dismissed this appeal without expressly acknowledging our lack of jurisdiction:
“The sentencing having been improperly and untimely pronounced without the timely filed motion for new trial having been overruled by action of the court or by operation of law and at a time when the motion had not been withdrawn, the sentence is voidable and the appeal must be dismissed. See Ex parte Shields, 550 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Cr.App., Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing, May 18, 1977).”
The fact of dismissal, however, necessarily means we are without jurisdiction, because to dismiss this case if we did have jurisdiction would be a violation of this Court’s constitutional mandate to hear all appeals where our jurisdiction is invoked (unless subsequently waived) and would be a denial of appellant’s statutory right to have his appeal heard today, and of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws.
*169The exercise of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is not a matter of discretion.1 The absence of discretion in this matter, and the constitutional powers, duties, and rights involved in the determination of whether dismissal will be ordered, further underscore the finding of lack of jurisdiction upon which the dismissal of this appeal necessarily rests.
If the majority dispute this conclusion, let them inform the citizens of Texas and our bench and bar on what grounds this Court may refuse to hear this appeal in the face of jurisdiction to hear it. Their failure to do so, and the very disposition of this case, acknowledge the validity of the dissent in Ex parte Shields, supra, on motion for rehearing, and the unanimous majority in that case on original submission. The majority in Shields on rehearing, however, declined even to address the issue before the Court in that case, although that issue was stated quite plainly by the petitioner therein, as set out in the dissenting opinion on rehearing. If this Court had the power to hear Shields’ original appeal, as assumed by the majority on rehearing in that case, then the Court has the power to hear appellant’s appeal in this case. That we do not hear it shows we may not hear it. The dismissal of this case, therefore, is either on jurisdictional grounds or is in flagrant disregard of this Court’s constitutional mandate and appellant’s rights. The presumption should be that this Court today acts in accordance with its constitutional duties and, therefore, that it today orders this dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.
On this basis, I concur in the dismissal.

. Chumbley v. State, and Young v. State, both supra. Contrast our discretionary jurisdiction in original habeas corpus matters, as discussed in Ex parte Norvell, Tex.Cr.App., 528 S.W.2d 129, 130.