Court Opinion

ID: 9717369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:02:31.746874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:52.881176
License: Public Domain

J ohn B. Robbins, Judge, dissenting. It should be an extraordinary circumstance to require a defendant to be shackled with leg chains throughout a trial and in full view of his jury. However, I agree with the majority that such a situation existed during Steward’s trial. The trial court was of the opinion that Steward posed a serious risk to the safety of the jury and court personnel, and there was ample evidence to support such an opinion. Steward had been diagnosed by Dr. Charles H. Mallory and Dr. Kenneth Dowless, forensic staff psychologists with the Arkansas State Hospital, as suffering schizophrenia, paranoid type, continuous, and the majority opinion summarizes some of the bizarre behavior of Steward within recent years. Consequently, on this issue I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm. It is with the second issue that I disagree with today’s decision. Steward contends that the court erred in refusing to suspend the trial proceeding to ascertain whether he was competent to stand trial. For the following reasons I agree with Steward’s contention. Steward’s jury trial was conducted on August 2, 2004. At this time other charges were pending against him. More than one year earlier, on June 17, 2003, the trial court ordered a mental evaluation prior to trial on one of these other charges. Dr. William Cochran, a licensed psychologist with the North Arkansas Human Services System, conducted an evaluation in which he found that Steward was delusional with paranoid ideation and concluded with an opinion that Steward was not competent to stand trial. Consequently, all criminal prosecutions against Steward were suspended and he was committed to the custody of the Director of the Department of Human Services for inpatient detention, care and treatment until restoration of fitness to proceed. On February 17, 2004, a report pertaining to Steward was filed with the trial court from Dr. Charles Mallory and Dr. Kenneth Dowless. The report was based upon Steward’s court, police and psychological history, and interviews with Steward held on September 23, 2003, and January 23, 2004. Two significant points relevant to this appeal were presented in this report. First, Dr. Mallory expressed his opinion that at the time of the alleged criminal offenses, due to mental disease, Steward lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Secondly, Dr. Mallory opined that Steward was now competent to proceed to trial and “it is unlikely that his mental condition will deteriorate due to the stress of awaiting trial or the stress of trial itself, as long as he can be maintained on his current regimen of medications.” Following receipt of this report, which was also signed by Dr. Kenneth Dowless, a hearing was held on June 21, 2004. The hearing is significant, not so much as to what was decided, but what was not. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court stated: [T]he Court rules that the defendant does not fit under the McNaughton rule at the time of the event, that it is a fact question, will be a fact question for the jury. Clearly, because of the court’s reference to the McNaughton rule, the issue was whether Steward lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the alleged criminal conduct. The court did not address Steward’s competency to proceed to trial. Although no ruling had been made regarding Steward’s fitness to proceed since summer of2003 when the court found him not competent to proceed to trial, a jury trial was held on August 2, 2004. Three times during the trial Steward’s attorney brought to the attention of the trial judge that Steward indicated that he was having continuing conversations with “Gunny,” Steward’s gunnery sergeant, apparently from when Steward was serving in active duty with the United States Marines. These three colloquies include the following statements: First colloquy — Defense Counsel: Judge, my client tells me, I just talked to him, he’s hearing voices and I bring that to the Court’s attention because I think I’m duty bound to do it. I’m not sure what I’m asking other than to advise the Court. But because we had this issue, I think the law requires me to advise the Court and the Court makes a determination that he needs some clarification that he talk to one of the doctors, one of them is here. The Court: Well, I’ve done that once. Second colloquy —■ Defense Counsel: Judge, again for purposes of the record, on each session when we break or anything, I always try to talk to Mr. Steward and I did in this instance talk to Mr. Steward to see if I’m confident about his mental state, and just to bring to the Court’s attention again that he continues to say that he’s having conversations with Gunny and in particular last night about him having the right to be tried in a military Court. The Court: All right, the Court will make a record that he is not shackled but he has leg chains on and the reason is that the prior actions of the defendant, how strong he is, and unresponsive he is, I’m afraid to get him around the jury but I have kept his leg chains on. Third colloquy — Defense Counsel: I make my record again that as I indicated to the Court on several occasions during the course of this trial, Mr. Steward has indicated and without giving privileged information that he is still communicating with his gunnery sergeant, and I think thus calls into question his competency to stand trial in this matter; that, I think the rule of law is clear that at any point in time that the court becomes aware or that the competency of the defendant to proceed to trial is brought into question that the court has an obligation to make a finding with regards to whether or not there needs to be any additional evaluation on the subject. The Court: The objection is overruled. It is not clear as to when “that once” occurred, which the trial court mentioned during the first colloquy. At this point, Steward had been examined and reports had been made twice. The first was in June 2003 and resulted in the trial court finding Steward not competent to proceed to trial. The second examination and report was the one dated February 17, 2004, which was the subject of the June 2004 hearing and concluded with the trial court holding that Steward’s mental capacity at the time of the alleged offense would be a factual issue for the jury. No ruling was pronounced at that hearing pertaining to Steward’s competence or fitness to proceed to trial. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-305 (a)(1) (Repl. 2005) provides in pertinent part: The supreme court has defined the test of competency to stand trial as “whether a defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him.” (emphasis added) Haynes v. State, 346 Ark. 388, 392, 58 S.W.3d 336, 339 (2001); and see Thessing v. State, 365 Ark. 384, 230 S.W.3d 526 (2006). Granted, here the trial court had complied with this mandate more than a year before Steward was eventually tried. That suspension resulted in a determination that Steward was not competent to proceed to trial. Steward was committed to the state hospital for treatment. He was placed on a regimen of medication and by January 2004 he had improved to a level that staff psychologists opined that he was competent to be tried, provided he continued to “be maintained on his current regimen of medications.” [T]he court shall immediately suspend any further proceedings in a prosecution if: (D) There is reason to doubt the defendant’s fitness to proceed. As noted by the majority, an evaluation once performed pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-305 does not ordinarily require a second opinion, and our supreme court has held that further evaluation is discretionary with the trial court. See Dyer v. State, 343 Ark. 422, 36 S.W.3d 724 (2001); Dirickson v. State, 329 Ark. 572, 953 S.W.2d 55 (1997). While an evaluation based upon interviews with a defendant within the past few days or perhaps few weeks might shed light on whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to assist his counsel in his defense, it is indefensible to consider an evaluation based on interviews more than six months earlier as relevant for this purpose under the circumstances of this case. I submit that the trial court should have suspended the trial, at least until Steward could be examined, when it was brought to the court’s attention that Steward was hearing voices, especially when Steward stated that he would testify because Gunny was telling him to do so.1 Clearly, Steward’s delusion of hearing instructions from “Gunny” directing him to act contrary to his attorney’s recommendations interfered with his ability to consult with his lawyer. The six-month lapse of time since Steward was last evaluated by a psychologist, the fact that the opinion of the psychologists who performed that evaluation conditioned Steward’s competency on maintenance of his medicinal regimen, and the delusions of Gunny’s directions during trial should have triggered application of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-305 and its requirement for an evaluation. This is not an instance of doctor shopping that the supreme court discouraged in Dirickson, supra, or a case where there was no history of mental illness as in Dyer, supra. The trial was so far removed from the previous evaluation that the issue of competency to proceed and a mental evaluation should not be considered discretionary, but rather mandatory pursuant to section 5-2-305. However, even if discretionary, the trial court either failed to exercise his discretion, or if exercised, abused that discretion by failing to have Steward evaluated. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings, including a current competency evaluation before a new trial.   The prosecution attempted to cross-examine Steward following his direct examination. Steward would only respond by stating his name, military rank and serial number. The fact that the State did not object and/or seek contempt sanctions at this juncture is some indication of the State’s opinion of Steward’s competency.