Court Opinion

ID: 9957104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 17:11:39.960047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.256370
License: Public Domain

J-A25008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SHAWN LEE WARNER                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 274 WDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-07-CR-0000307-2020

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                 FILED: APRIL 3, 2024

       Shawn Lee Warner appeals from the order denying his motion to dismiss

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.1 We reverse and dismiss the complaint with

prejudice.

       By way of background, Appellant was charged by criminal information

on January 14, 2020, following a domestic violence incident in late September

2019. After several delays, including some during the COVID-19 pandemic,

Appellant was scheduled for trial on August 2, 2021. Since over 365 days had

elapsed, Appellant filed a Rule 600 motion to dismiss. The court held hearings

on March 7, 2022, and June 9, 2022. For reasons detailed infra, the trial court

denied Appellant’s motion. The court thereafter amended the order to permit
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This Court granted Appellant’s petition for permission to appeal pursuant to

42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b).
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interlocutory appeal to this Court and this timely appeal followed.2 Appellant

presents the following issues for our consideration:

       1.)    Whether the trial court’s decision ought to be reversed
              where this Honorable Court’s decision in Commonwealth
              v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743 (Pa.Super. 2022), is inapplicable to
              the instant matter in so much as the record contains no
              information that the Commonwealth relied on the COVID-19
              orders regarding Rule 600 when it failed to exercise due
              diligence in prosecuting [Appellant’s] criminal matter.

       2.)    Whether      this  Honorable    Court’s    decision    in
              Commonwealth v. Carl applies to the instant matter in so
              much as the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence
              throughout the pendency of this matter, as required by
              Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2021),
              regardless of the orders entered by the state and local
              courts as to COVID-19 and Rule 600.

Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up).

       Our standard of review for Rule 600 claims is well-settled:

       In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial
       court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
       Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
       facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
       and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
       error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
       overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly
       unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will,
       as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

       The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record
       of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the trial
       court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most
       favorable to the prevailing party.

____________________________________________

2 In lieu of an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court refers us

to the certified record. No Rule 1925(b) statement was ordered or filed.

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      Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is
      not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. Rule
      600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of
      the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society.
      In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has
      been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to
      effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those
      guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the
      administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate
      the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed
      through no fault of the Commonwealth.

      So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
      Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial
      rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a manner
      consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. In
      considering these matters, courts must carefully factor into the
      ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual
      accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law
      enforcement as well.

Carl, 276 A.3d at 748 (cleaned up).

      Turning to the statute, Rule 600 provides that a trial must commence

within 365 days from the date the complaint is filed.          See Pa.R.Crim.P.

600(A)(2)(a). When, as here, a defendant elects to proceed to trial instead

of entering a plea, the trial will commence on the day the court calls the case

to trial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(1). Importantly, not all time between the

filing of the complaint and calling the case to trial counts towards the 365

days. See Carl, 276 A.3d at 749. Subsection (C) sets forth the method of

computation thusly:

      (1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage
      of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
      Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be
      included in the computation of the time within which trial must
      commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
      computation.

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            ....

      (3)(a) When a judge or issuing authority grants or denies a
      continuance:

            (i) the issuing authority shall record the identity of the party
            requesting the continuance and the reasons for granting or
            denying the continuance; and

            (ii) the judge shall record the identity of the party requesting
            the continuance and the reasons for granting or denying the
            continuance. The judge also shall record to which party the
            period of delay caused by the continuance shall be
            attributed, and whether the time will be included in or
            excluded from the computation of the time within which trial
            must commence in accordance with this rule.

      (b) The determination of the judge or issuing authority is subject
      to review as provided in paragraph (D)(3).

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C).     Finally, subsection (D) provides the remedy for a

violation of Rule 600’s prompt-trial requirements:

      When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time
      periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the
      defendant’s attorney . . . may file a written motion requesting that
      the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this
      rule has been violated. . . . The judge shall conduct a hearing on
      the motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D).

      We have explained that the interplay of these subsections results in a

three-step process for calculating whether a defendant has been brought to

trial promptly:

      First, Rule 600(A) provides the mechanical run date. Second, we
      determine whether any excludable time exists pursuant to Rule
      600(C). We add the amount of excludable time, if any, to the
      mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date.

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       If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply the
       due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600(D). As we have
       explained, Rule 600 encompasses a wide variety of circumstances
       under which a period of delay was outside the control of the
       Commonwealth and not the result of the Commonwealth’s lack of
       diligence. Any such period of delay results in an extension of the
       run date. Addition of any Rule 600 extensions to the adjusted run
       date produces the final Rule 600 run date. If the Commonwealth
       does not bring the defendant to trial on or before the final run
       date, the trial court must dismiss the charges.

Carl, 276 A.3d at 749. It is the Commonwealth that bears the burden of

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that it behaved with due

diligence throughout the criminal proceedings. Id. at 748.

       Additionally, considering the procedural history of this case, our recent

jurisprudence concerning the excludability of delays resulting from an

emergency judicial order entered during the COVID-19 pandemic is

particularly apt. In that vein, both the Commonwealth and Appellant rely on

our decision in Carl to support their positions, though they come to

diametrically opposed conclusions.

       In Carl, we analyzed a specific judicial emergency order,3 which, by its

plain language, suspended Rule 600 calculations for the duration of the

declared emergency. Id. at 750. We found the language “unambiguously

suspended in criminal cases all rule-based, ‘prompt trial’ time computations

for the duration of the Declaration’s effective period, and nothing in the

____________________________________________

3 The operative language of the order in Carl directed that “[d]uring the
emergency, the following shall apply: . . . (3) Suspend statewide rules
pertaining to the rule-based right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial.”
Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 747 (Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting York
County Declaration of Judicial Emergency, 5/28/20).

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subsequent paragraph of the Declaration placed qualifications or limitations

on this absolute, temporary suspension.” Id. at 751. As such, we determined

that the court in Carl erred in conducting a due diligence analysis before

excluding the time. Id.

      However, our holding in Carl only applies to emergency orders

unambiguously suspending Rule 600. For all other emergency orders, we find

guidance from our High Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Harth, 252

A.3d 600 (Pa. 2021).      In Harth, the Court clarified that “requiring the

Commonwealth to demonstrate that it acted with due diligence before a trial

court excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of judicial

delay comports with the language of Rule 600(C)(1) and its commentary, the

purpose behind the rule, and our prior jurisprudence[.]” Id. at 617 (cleaned

up). Therefore:

      in ruling on a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss, a trial court
      must first determine whether the Commonwealth has met its
      obligation to act with due diligence throughout the life of the case;
      if the Commonwealth meets its burden of proving due diligence,
      only then may the trial court rely upon its own congested calendar
      or other scheduling problems as justification for denying the
      defendant’s motion.

Id. at 618.

      This Court recently summarized how “Harth and Carl frame the inquiry

for the effect of emergency orders on Rule 600[:]”

      If an order unambiguously suspends Rule 600 without
      qualification, then the period of the suspension is added to the run
      date without considering the Commonwealth’s diligence. Carl,
      276 A.3d at 751. Alternatively, if an order characterizes a delay

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       as a court postponement, then that period is only excluded if
       the trial court determines after a hearing that the
       Commonwealth exercised due diligence through the life of
       the case. Harth, 252 A.3d at 618.

Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 719 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up,

emphasis added), appeal granted in part, 305 A.3d 541 (Pa. 2023).4

       Of particular issue in Lear were local emergency orders that did not

unambiguously suspend Rule 600, but instead declared that the delays “shall

be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time

under Rule 600(C).” Id. at 720 (cleaned up). We held that “[f]or such judicial

delay to be excluded from the Rule 600(C) computation, the trial court must

find that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence. Because the trial court

did not afford the Commonwealth the opportunity to prove its diligence, we

remand[ed] for a hearing under Rule 600(D).” Id. (cleaned up).

       With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts of this case. Notably,

in arguing that the Commonwealth failed to exercise diligence, Appellant’s

____________________________________________

4Specifically, our High Court has granted allocatur to answer the following
question:

       Whether a court must assess the Commonwealth's due diligence
       during a worldwide pandemic for purposes of Rule 600 before it
       excludes delay attributable to a local judicial emergency during
       which the president judge cancelled and suspended all trials,
       suspended Rule 600 and otherwise excluded judicial delay caused
       by the judicial emergency, and implemented strict procedures to
       protect the public?

Commonwealth v. Lear, 305 A.3d 541 (Pa. 2023).

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counsel asserted that after receiving initial discovery, counsel had contacted

the District Attorney’s Office by phone three times between June and July of

2020, leaving voicemails and receiving no return phone calls. Counsel also

sent two letters, one in July 2020 and a second in October 2020, again with

with no reply. Discouraged by the lack of response, counsel stopped trying to

reach out to the Commonwealth. See Memorandum of Law in Support of the

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 600, 3/28/22, at unnumbered 2; N.T.

Hearing, 6/9/22, at 5-9. Additionally, the deputy court administrator testified

that the Commonwealth did not ask to have the matter listed for trial. See

N.T. Hearing, 6/9/22, at 23-24.

        We note that the Commonwealth did not file a memorandum of record

in response to the Rule 600 motion, though it purportedly submitted an

untimely memorandum, which does not appear in the certified record. Despite

being directed to “be prepared to address its due diligence at all phases of this

case during the hearing currently scheduled for June 9, 2022[,]” the

Commonwealth offered no testimony or argument to demonstrate that it was

aware of Appellant’s case, had been tracking the relevant Rule 600 date, or

had requested for the case to be listed. See Supplemental Order, 5/25/22,

at 9.     Rather, the Commonwealth relied upon the administrative and

emergency orders, and stated that it was trial ready as of May 2021, because

that was when the case was first listed for trial. See N.T. Hearing, 6/9/22, at

30.

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      In computing the excludable time, the trial court made the following

findings of fact and conclusions of law:

      1. The criminal complaint in this matter was filed on January 14,
      2020.

      2. On March 16, 2020, the Honorable President Judge Elizabeth A.
      Doyle issued a court order explicitly suspending Rule 600 due to
      the COVID-19 pandemic until June 15, 2020.

      3. The time period from January 14, 2020, through March 15,
      2020 amounts to sixty-two days of delay which this court finds to
      be attributable to the Commonwealth.

      4. The time period from March 16, 2020, through June 15, 2020,
      amounts to a period of ninety-two days of delay which this court
      finds to be attributable to the court due to its explicit suspension
      of Rule 600.

      5. From June 16, 2020, to November 24, 2020, there was
      additional delay in this matter. There was no judicial suspension
      of Rule 600 during this time period. We find that this time period
      amounts to one-hundred and sixty-two days of delay which is
      attributable to the Commonwealth.

      6. On November 25, 2020, President Judge Doyle issued an
      additional administrative court order again explicitly suspending
      Rule 600. This judicial suspension of Rule 600 lasted until
      February 23, 2021. We calculate this time period to amount to
      ninety-one days attributable to the court.

      7. On March 15, 2021, President Judge Doyle issued an order
      administratively moving all cases involving non-incarcerated
      defendants that were not praeciped to be heard at the March 22,
      2021 trial list review to the trial list review on May 24, 2021.

      8. Judge Doyle’s March 15, 2021 Order states, “Any delay of
      time between the expiration of the suspension of Rule 600
      on February 23, 2021, and trial list review on May 24, 2021
      shall be attributed as ‘time delay attributable to the court’
      and shall not be attributable against any defendant for
      purposes of Rule 600(C)(2).        Any motion for remedy
      pursuant to Rule 600(D)(1) or (2) shall be reviewed by this

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      court in light of the previous administrative orders and this
      order.”    (See docket of 2021 MD 49 & Commonwealth's
      Memorandum of Law, Attachment “J”).

      9. This court finds that the time period from February 24, 2021 to
      May 24, 2021 amounts to ninety days of delay which must be
      attributed to the court due to Judge Doyle’s March 15, 2021 order.

            ....

      11. [Appellant’s] case was again administratively moved from the
      May 24, 2021 trial list review date to the August 2, 2021 trial list
      review date.

Supplemental Order, 5/25/22, at 3-6 (cleaned up, emphasis added).

      Of those delays, the court found that 224 days were attributable to the

Commonwealth, from January 14, 2020 to March 15, 2020, and from June 16,

2020, to November 24, 2020. Id. at 6. Saliently, the court found several

delays attributable to the court and excluded those periods from its calculation

without considering the Commonwealth’s due diligence: (1) from March 16,

2020, to June 15, 2020, and from November 25, 2020, to February 23, 2021,

due to explicit suspensions of Rule 600, (2) from February 24, 2021, to May

24, 2021, based on the March 15, 2021 order, and (3) from May 25, 2021, to

August 2, 2021, because Appellant’s case was administratively moved. Id.

      As in Carl, the judicial emergency orders entered during the pendency

of Appellant’s case unequivocally suspended Rule 600 for portions of the delay

of his trial. See In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d

1281 (Pa. filed Mar. 16 2021) (per curiam) (bestowing upon president judges

in each judicial district “the authority to suspend the operation of [Rule] 600”

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(capitalization altered)); Blair County Supplemental and New Order, 5/29/20,

at 4 (mandating that Rule 600(C) remain “suspended through June 15,

2020”); Blair County Modified Administrative Order, 1/7/21, at 2 (ordering, in

light of the ongoing pandemic and increased spread of COVID-19, that Rule

600 be “suspended from November 25, 2020 through February 23, 2021”).

Applying our holding in Carl, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded

the delay resulting from these orders, from March 16, 2020, to June 15, 2020,

and from November 25, 2020, to February 23, 2021. See Carl, 276 A.3d at

751.

       However, contrary to the assumption by the trial court and the

Commonwealth, Carl does not apply to administrative orders continuing case

conferences, such as the March 15, 2021 order. Indeed, that order expressly

disavowed suspension of Rule 600 calculations, indicating instead that any

delay should be attributable to the court and should not be attributable to a

defendant under Rule 600(C)(2). See Order, 3/15/21 (“Any delay of time

between the expiration of the suspension of Rule 600 on February 23, 2021

and Trial List Review on May 24, 2021 shall be attributed as ‘Time Delay

Attributable to the Court’ and shall not be attributable against any Defendant

for purposes of Rule 600(C)(2).”).

       Accordingly, the delay caused by the March 15, 2021 order and the May

2021 administrative move are governed by Harth and Lear, and could only

be excluded if the Commonwealth acted with due diligence “throughout the

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life of the case.” Harth, 252 A.3d at 618. Thus, insofar as the trial court

relieved the Commonwealth of the necessity of proving due diligence as to

those periods, it erred.

      Generally, we would remand for the trial court to conduct a due diligence

analysis. However, remand is not necessary in this case. Although the court

did not consider the Commonwealth’s diligence in excluding the pertinent time

periods, the court explicitly advised the Commonwealth that it had to prove

diligence at the June 9, 2022 Rule 600 hearing and, following that hearing,

the court determined that the Commonwealth had not acted diligently in

prosecuting Appellant’s case. Specifically, it held that “it does not appear that

the Commonwealth exercised any due diligence in calculating when

[Appellant’s] case should be called for trial.” Order, 7/6/22, at 7. Indeed, the

court found that Appellant’s case had been “overlooked, and only after a Rule

600 issue was raised by the defense did the Commonwealth rely upon Judge

Doyle’s Rule 600 suspension orders.” Id.

      The court’s conclusions are supported by the certified record, as detailed

supra, since the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence or argument

that it acted diligently, and indeed did not even act diligently in responding to

Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. Therefore, applying the court’s finding that the

Commonwealth failed to act with due diligence throughout the life of the case,

we conclude that pursuant to Harth, the time from February 24, 2021, to

August 2, 2021, was not excludable for purposes of Rule 600.

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      With these corrections in mind, we determine whether the court

nonetheless properly denied Appellant’s motion, or if Rule 600 was violated

and the complaint must be dismissed. Since the criminal complaint was filed

on January 14, 2020, Appellant’s mechanical run date was January 13, 2021.

The court determined that the ensuing sixty-two days from the filing of the

complaint were attributable to the Commonwealth. However, upon review of

the certified record, we observe that Appellant obtained a continuance of his

preliminary hearing from January 21, 2020, to February 4, 2020, and

therefore, fourteen of those days should be excluded from the Rule 600

calculation.   Accounting for this exclusion, Appellant’s adjusted run date

became January 27, 2021. Pursuant to the emergency orders unambiguously

suspending Rule 600, we exclude 183 days, from March 16, 2020, through

June 15, 2020, and from November 25, 2020, through February 23, 2021,

resulting in an adjusted run date of July 29, 2021. No periods of time after

the emergency orders were excludable. Accordingly, since Appellant’s trial

did not take place by that date, his Rule 600 speedy trials rights were violated,

and the trial court erred in not granting Appellant’s motion and dismissing the

complaint.

      Based on the foregoing, we are compelled to reverse the order denying

Appellant’s Rule 600 motion and we dismiss the complaint with prejudice. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D).

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      Order reversed.    Complaint dismissed with prejudice.   Jurisdiction

relinquished.

      Judge Kunselman joins this Memorandum.

      Judge Colins files a Concurring Statement.

FILED: 4/3/2024

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