Court Opinion

ID: 9552896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:19:00.445993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:18.937954
License: Public Domain

BERMAN, Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur in the opinion written by Judge Coyte but I add some thoughts of my own in support of that opinion.
The dissent relies upon Hatfield v. Barnes, 115 Colo. 30, 168 P.2d 552 (1946), in support of the proposition that a finding of good faith is a finding of fact which this court may not disturb. And, so it was in Hatfield, but only because in that action “[pjlaintiffs . .. were required, under the pertinent federal statute and regulations, not only to establish that possession was sought for immediate use and occupancy as a dwelling for themselves, but also that it was sought in ‘good faith.’ ”
Here, neither the zoning ordinances nor case law permit good faith to be a defense in the action brought by these plaintiffs, even though it might well be a defense if the action had been brought by the city against the defendants Williamson and Skrbina. Nor for that matter does the evidence support the trial court’s finding that defendants acted in “good faith.” Certainly, ignorance of the zoning law was no excuse for the Williamsons nor for Skrbina *228who, in the trial court’s words, relied upon some “unspecified zoning ordinance governing parking.”