Court Opinion

ID: 9570651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:24:57.928752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:35.255168
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(dissenting). On May 1, 1956, while in the employ of defendant W. E. Wood Company, Robert Lee Young suffered á compensable injury for which he received weekly compensation payments until September 6, 1957. On that day the workmen’s Compensation department entered the following redemption order:
“The agreement to redeem the employer’s entire liability for an injury sustained by the plaintiff on '5-1-56 by a single payment in lieu of weekly payments having been considered by a hearing referee of the workmen’s compensation department and it appearing that said agreement should be: approved ;
“Therefore, it is ordered that said agreement to redeem the employer’s entire liability eor weekly payments herein by the payment of $15,000 be: approved; ‘ ,. ( .. . . ....
*193“It is further ordered that said sum he paid as follows:
$2,500 directly to Carl Z. Millen, attorney(s) for plaintiff for all legal services rendered; in7 cluding all expenses in connection therewith;
$..... directly to ............................. for medical expenses (specify type or none)
$12,500 directly to the plaintiff, being the balance;
“It is further ordered that defendant (s) shall also complete the payment of weekly compensation of $34 per week until September 6, 1957;
“It is further ordered that defendant shall pay the cost of the transcript of the hearing herein.” (Emphasis added.)
The agreement to redeem liability, referred to in the redemption order, was signed by defendants and Robert Lee Young’s then guardian on August 8, 1957, and reads as follows:
“Robert L. Young was an employee of W. E. Wood Co. and on or about 5-1-56 he received an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and that as a result of such injury weekly payments have been made to (him) by the employer for not less than 6 months, and that: On 5-1-56 plaintiff sustained a fractured skull while working for defendant. Compensation has been paid to him at the rate of $34 per week, over that time. Plaintiff has been adjudged a mentally incompetent person and it is now the decision of the plaintiff through his legal guardian, Betty H. Crooks, to settle any claim which he may have against defendant pursuant to an order of the probate court in order to invest the proceeds in a home and income producing property which can be used for the plaintiff’s support.
“(In the above space state fully the following facts: total amount of compensation paid to date, the present disability of the employee, the reasons *194for desiring a redemption of liability, and the amount agreed to be paid upon approval of this agreement by the department.)
“Wherefore, it is agreed between the parties that the department may enter an order in this cause providing that the sum of $15,000 shall be forthwith paid by the employer to Betty H. Crooks, guardian of Robert L. Young, M. I. and that upon such payment the liability of the employer for the payment of compensation for said injury shall be redeemed in accordance with the first part of section 22 of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act.” 
The agreement just quoted and the briefs filed on this appeal indicate that the parties agree that the redemption order was entered pursuant to the first clause of section 22 of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act. The opinion filed by the appeal board confirms that this is its view. Section 22 read in its entirety as follows, the clause relied upon as authority for the redemption order being italicized:
“Sec 22. Whenever any weekly payment has been continued for not less than 6 months, the liability therefor may be redeemed by the payment of a lump sum by agreement of the parties, subject to the approval of the compensation commission, and said compensation commission may at any time direct in any case, if special circumstances be found which in its judgment require the same, that the deferred payments due under this act be commuted on the present worth thereof at 5 per cent per annum to 1 or more lump sum payments, and that such payments shall be made by the employer or the insurance company carrying such risk, or commissioner of insurance, as the ease may be.” CL 1948, § 412.22 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.172).
*195Tbe instant dispute arose when plaintiff, successor guardian of Robert Lee Young, filed in April, 1960, an application for hearing and adjustment of claim, seeking, inter alia, payments for medical and hospital treatment of his ward. Plaintiff alleged that the workmen’s compensation department had no authority, under section 22, to permit defendant to redeem its liability for medical services made necessary for plaintiff because of his injury. I agree.
The language of the statute is clear, and provides that with regard to any “weekly payment,” “liability therefor may be redeemed by the payment of a lump sum”.2 Thus, section 22 by express terms is authority only for redemption of weekly compensation payments.3 Medical payments are not weekly payments4 and, therefore, there is no statutory au*196tbority for their redemption.5
At least one of the briefs amicus filed in this case, on behalf of a group of workmen’s compensation insurers, candidly admits that to permit redemption *197of medical benefits under section 22 this Court •would bave to construe the statutory language to mean other than that which it explicitly provides:
“So the question is, whether the words ‘weekly payment’ are to be construed literally, as not includ*198ing medical benefits, so that the liablity ‘therefore’ which can be redeemed does not include such benefits. * * *
“In other words, is the redemption statute to be construed to mean that ‘whenever any weekly payment has been continued for not less than six months, the liability [for such weekly payments] may be redeemed.’
“Or is it to be construed to mean that ‘whenever any weekly payment has been continued for not less than six months, the liability [under this act] may be redeemed.’ ”
Despite the lack of ambiguity in the legislature’s language, it nonetheless is argued that an approved redemption agreement under section 22 ends an employer’s entire liability, including liability for medical services. Thus, Mr. Justice Kelly cites Catina v. Hudson Motor Car Co. (1935), 272 Mich 377, and Marks v. Otis Elevator Co. (1936), 276 Mich 75, both of which contain language to the effect that an approved redemption agreement terminates any further liability on the part of the employer. This was quite true at the time of those decisions, for then an employer was required to furnish medical services for no more than 90 days,6 while a redemption agreement could not be entered into until at least six months after the injury. Thus, when Catina and Marks were decided, an approved redemption agreement did end all liability with regard to payments which would otherwise have come due after the redemption date. Such is not the case now, when an employer may be required to furnish medical services for the rest of an employee’s life. CLS 1961, § 412.4, as amended by PA 1965, No 44 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 17.154). Nor has such *199been the ease since 1943, when the legislature first provided that an employer might be required to furnish medical services to an injured employee for a period extending beyond six months from the date of his injury. PA 1943, No 245.
Since 1943, the workmen’s compensation department has continued to regard redemption agreements as absolving an employer not only from liability for further weekly payments, but also from liability for further medical payments. It is argued that this extended administrative implementation of section 22 requires that we approve the statutory interpretation upon which that implementation has been founded. This is a case where an administrative agency has acted contrary to unambiguous statutory language. It is our duty to uphold the law, and its continued violation by an agency of the State does not seem to me to mandate our departure from this course. See People v. Holbrook (1964), 373 Mich 94, where the Court was not so moved by a considerable history of administrative disregard of explicit statutory commands as to give an unlawful practice its imprimature.
It is argued that because the department submitted its Rule 9 (1959 AACS, § R 408.39) to the legislature,7 and the legislature took no action with regard to such rule, the legislature in effect silently amended section 22 to permit redemption of liability for medical benefits even while leaving unchanged the language which limits redemption to weekly benefits. Rule 9 reads:
“Any agreement to redeem the liability of the insurer or self-insured employer must be submitted *200on form R.E.D. The agreement must be accompanied by a report from a licensed physician approved by the employee giving in detail the findings of a recent examination.”
Presumably, in defendants’ view, the legislature should have inferred from the requirement that there be a medical examination of the employee in connection with an agreement to redeem, that the agreement might therefore terminate the employer’s liability for medical benefits. But the legislature might also have assumed that the requirement of a medical examination was to determine precisely questions such as the nature of a specific loss, or whether disability is partial, total, or total and permanent, all of which have a bearing on the benefits to which an employee is entitled, and all of which would, therefore, be of legitimate concern to the department in determining whether a redemption agreement should be approved. This State views with disfavor any attempt to alter or amend statutes by implication, see 1963 Const, art 4, § 25 and its predecessors. Yet here we are being asked to say that unambiguous legislative language, namely, that redemption agreements may cover only weekly compensation payments, has been impliedly amended, without change in the language, not by a subsequent legislative act but by a legislative failure to act in the face of the ambiguous language of the department’s Rule 9. If we were to concede this, no longer would the legislature be the sole repository of legislative power.
It is argued also that unless a redemption agreement ended liability for medical services as well as for weekly compensation, no employer ever would consent to such an agreement. However that may be, it is not relevant to the case now before us. The legislature provided for redemption of weekly com*201pensation payments; medical services are not such payments; therefore, there is no statutory authorization for redemption of liability for medical services. As the appeal board preached, but did not practice, in this ease of Wehmeier, “We believe that we have no moral or legal right to adjust the statute so as to make it fit the case.”
The award should be reversed and the case remanded. Costs to plaintiff.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Adams, J., concurred with Souris, J.

 The redemption order is equally clear: “it. is ordered that said agreement to redeem the employer’s entire liability for weelcly payments herein by payment of $15,000 be: approved;”. (Emphasis added.)

 It might be well to note that the second clause of section 22, dealing with commutation of “deferred payments” is authority, as is the first clause, only for the redemption of weekly compensation payments. The distinction between the two clauses is that while under the first, the consent of both employer and employee must be obtained, under the second there is no need for the employer’s consent to an order of the department, sought by an employee, that deferred payments be commuted to one or more lump sum payments. McMullen v. Gavette Construction Co. (1919), 207 Mich 586. And see Anderson v. Clark Equipment Co. (1936), 278 Mich 492, 497: “We have heretofore held that the line of demarcation between the two procedures is whether the settlement is made by approved agreement or by award on petition, [citing cases]”; Grycan v. Ford Motor Co. (1939), 291 Mich 241, 248: “Proceedings for the redemption of weekly payments, for their commutation under special cireumstanees, for the creation of a trust fund, or for the purchase of an annuity, are all subject to the approval of the department of labor and industry.” (Emphasis added.) And see, currently, CL 1948, § 412.22, as amended by PA .1965, No 44 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 17.172).

 The statutory section dealing with provision of medical services read thusly: “The employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, to an employee who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, reasonable medical, surgical and hospital seivices and medicines or other attendance or treatment recognized by the laws of this State as legal, when they are needed, for the first 6 months after the injury and thereafter for such additional 6 *196month periods as the commission may in its discretion order. Such additional 6 month periods shall be granted only upon written request of the employee to the commission for each period and after the employer or his insurer has been given an opportunity to file objections thereto and to be heard thereon. The employer shall also sujjply to such injured employee dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eye glasses, hearing apparatus and such other appliances as may be necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of the injury. If the employer shall fail, neglect or refuse so to do such employee shall be reimbursed for the reasonable expense incurred by or on his behalf in providing the same, by an award of the commission.” CLS 1961, § 412.4 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev §17.154). See, currently, CLS 1961, §412.4, as amended by PA 1965, No 44 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp §§ 17.154, 17.154[1]). That such “services and medicines * * * attendance or treatment” are not the “weekly payments”, referred to in section 22 as redeemable, is obvious.

 Since there exists no statutory authority for redemption of an employer’s liability to provide medical benefits, the consideration, in Mr. Justice Kelly’s opinion and in briefs filed in this case, of the intention of the parties with regard to such redemption, namely, that all parties intended that liability for medical services be redeemed, is irrelevant. The issue having been raised by Justice Kelly, it may be well to note that the record in this case of Wehmeier does not persuasively support a finding that the parties intended that liability for medical services be redeemed.
(1) It is said that because the settlement for $15,000 exceeded by some $2,850 the present worth of the employer’s exposure to liability, it follows that the employer must have intended that liability for future medieal services be redeemed also, else it would never have agreed to such “excessive” payment. But this is based upon the assumption of the employer that as of the date of redemption, September 6, 1957, it had at most a liability for 431 more weeks of payment at $34 per week. As a matter of fact, however, Mr. Young had been adjudged mentally incompetent by the Wayne county probate court on August 1, 1956. Thus there was a strong likelihood that Mr. Young would have been found by the department to be totally and permanently disabled, in whieh case defendant’s liability for weekly payments instead of extending for only 431 -weeks, could have extended for the rest of the life of this employee who was 38 years old at the time of his injury in 1956. CLS 1961, §§ 412.9, 412.10 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev §§ 17.159, 17.160). Redemption of medical payments aside, defendant employer got a bargain.
(2) At the redemption hearing held on August 12, 1957, the then guardian of Mr. Young was not present. The attorney representing the guardian was present, as were Mr. Young and his alleged wife (see Young v. Wehmeier [1963], 369 Mich 110; In re Young Estate [1965], 376 Mich 106)) the latter of whom was also represented by the guardian’s attorney. The brief discussion concerning the scope *197of the proposed redemption centered on the rights of the alleged wife:
"Mr. Jones: Mrs. Young, you appreciate, I assume, that presuming this settlement receives the approval of the commission, and the money is paid to Mrs. Crooks as guardian, that should something unforeseen happen to your husband as a result of this injury that he has received, that any benefits that you might also have had under the compensation law are also wiped out by this settlement: you understand that?
"A. Yes, I understand that.
“Mr. Jones: You know you wouldn’t be entitled to any benefits as his widow in the event this settlement is approved, any benefit by the week?
"A. You mean probate court?
"Mr. Jones: No, the weekly benefit that he is—strike that.
“Under the compensation law, should something happen to your husband and he should die, you, as a widow, would be entitled to weekly benefits for a period of time, providing you could establish that the death was a result of the injuries received. Now, by doing it this way and getting this lump sum, if anything should happen to your husband, that closes out any rights you may have there also; do you understand that?
“The Referee: Any rights to compensation.
"Mr. Jones: Any rights to compensation.
"A. Oh, I understand that.”
There is no intimation in the hearing record that it was intended that liability for medieal services be redeemed.
(3) The referee who handled the redemption in 1957 also heard the later application for provision of medieal services to Mr. Young and held, in April, 1961, that “the redemption order entered herein on September 6, 1957 (sic) had no affect (sie) on defendants (sic) liability to provide medieal care under section 4 of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act.” Thus the official who was present at the hearing which resulted in the redemption order concluded that the order did not absolve defendants from liability to provide medieal services for Mr. Young.
(4) Finally, how can it be argued persuasively that the parties intended to redeem any conceivable liability of defendants to plaintiff when the redemption order itself said, in language as free of ambiguity as any I have seen, that what was being approved by the order was an agreement to redeem the employer’s “entire liability for weekly payments”. Had the parties intended that liability for medieal services was also to be redeemed (which services, in defendant’s view, are one of the most economically significant liabilities to which employers are exposed under the act), one would expeet that they would have sought explicit recognition of this fact in the redemption order. They did not.

 Originally medieal services were required to be furnished for three weeks; by the time of the Catina and Maries Cases this requirement had been extended to 90 days. PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10; PA 1919, No 64.

 See CLS 1961, §§ 24.78b, 24.78e (Stat Ann 1961 Kev §§3.560 [14b], 3.560[14e]),