Court Opinion

ID: 9951405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 22:09:56.762684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:01.686842
License: Public Domain

03/15/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                          Assigned on Briefs January 10, 2024

                JEFFREY JUDKINS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lawrence County
                    No. 36633 Christopher V. Sockwell, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                            No. M2023-00296-CCA-R3-PC
                        ___________________________________

Petitioner, Jeffrey Allen Judkins, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of
counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L.
HOLLOWAY, JR., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

John M. Schweri, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jeffrey Allen Judkins.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Brent Cooper, District Attorney General; and Christi Thompson,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                         OPINION

                          Factual and Procedural Background

Trial

       On the evening of October 18, 2016, Melody Denton was working alone at the Fall
River Market in Lawrenceburg when a man, later identified as Petitioner, entered the store
after dark with a “sawed off” shotgun and wearing a ski mask, gloves, and a dark-colored
“hoodie.” He pointed the gun at her and demanded that she give him the “big bag” of
money located behind the store counter. State v. Judkins, No. M2018-00704-CCA-R3-
CD, 2019 WL 3889733, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
Jan. 15, 2020). Ms. Denton initially believed that she was being pranked, but Petitioner
responded by “jabbing” the gun at her, stating that he had the gun cocked, and demanding
she give the money bag to him. Id. Ms. Denton then gave Petitioner the bag containing
several checks and approximately $300 in cash. Id. He grabbed the bag and ran out of the
store, and Ms. Denton pressed the “panic button” to alert law enforcement. Id. She saw a
white Nissan Frontier exiting the store parking lot with Petitioner chasing after it. Id. Ms.
Denton then locked the store’s front door. Id. Ms. Denton described Petitioner as
“scrawny” and said that he was taller than she, and she was five feet, four inches tall. Id.
She was confident that a man and not a woman committed the robbery. Id.

        Jeffrey Smith, who lived directly behind the Fall River Market, had just arrived
home with his family on the evening of October 18 when he saw a small white truck with
“a camper shell” covering the bed that appeared to be pulling into the driveway behind
him. Id. However, the truck’s driver eventually parked behind the store and turned off the
headlights leaving the parking lights illuminated. Id. Mr. Smith observed that the front
passenger side parking light on the truck was not working. Id. He “found the situation
odd” and remained outside to observe. Id. Mr. Smith saw an individual who he estimated
to be approximately five-feet-eight or nine inches tall and weighing 140 pounds, exit the
passenger side of the truck, slam the door, and walk toward the front of the store. Id. The
truck’s driver then left the store and pulled back out on to Fall River Road. Id. at *2. The
individual emerged from the store, and Mr. Smith shined his flashlight and yelled at the
individual, “asking ‘what the F he was doing over there.’” Id. Mr. Smith saw the
individual, who was carrying something in his hands, run after the truck. Id. Mr. Smith
said that it was dark outside at the time, and the individual was wearing a dark-colored
hoodie with a mask or toboggan covering the individual’s face, so he was unable to see any
facial features. Id. Mr. Smith walked to the store to see if help was needed. Id. He spoke
with Ms. Denton who appeared “fairly upset and rattled.” Id. (quotations omitted).

       The Fall River Market’s bank bag was found by Vergie Nix on the side of Crowder
Road one day after the robbery. Id. Ms. Nix had heard about the robbery and returned the
bag to the store. Id.

       Co-defendant, Ricky Alexander, testified that in October 2016, he lived in an
apartment on Manor Drive in Lawrenceburg and drove a white Nissan Frontier with a
camper shell on it. Id. He and Petitioner had grown up together, and Petitioner was staying
with him at the time because Petitioner had no other place to live. Id. He had also gotten
Petitioner a job with his long-time employer, Buckshot Brannon. Id. Co-defendant
Alexander testified that on October 18, 2016, Petitioner said he wanted to rob the Fall River
Market because he had seen a large bag of money behind the counter a few days earlier.
Id. Petitioner also brought a sawed-off shotgun into the apartment that same evening. Id.
According to Co-defendant Alexander, Petitioner had been talking “off and on” for a few

                                            -2-
days about robbing other places because “he was wanting some money real bad.” Id. Co-
defendant Alexander asserted that although he tried to dissuade Petitioner from robbing the
Fall River Market, he agreed to drive Petitioner there to look at it. Id. Upon arrival, Co-
defendant Alexander pulled his truck in behind the store and turned the headlights off. Id.
He said that Petitioner quickly exited the vehicle and went inside the store. Id. Co-
defendant Alexander was not prepared for Petitioner to actually go inside the store, so Co-
defendant Alexander “backed out from where he was parked, pulled into the parking lot,
and started to drive towards town.” Id. He then saw Petitioner come out of the store and
start running after him in the truck. Id.

       Co-defendant Alexander testified that he saw a man standing in front of the house
located behind the store and that the man yelled “what are ya’ll doing.” Id. Co-defendant
Alexander turned his truck around and picked up Petitioner at “a mechanic place where
they worked on big trucks and stuff.” Id. As they drove back past the Fall River Market,
Co-defendant Alexander saw Ms. Denton standing outside talking to the man from the
house located behind the store. Id.

       Co-defendant Alexander testified that he and Petitioner “almost c[a]me to blows”
as they drove away from the store because of what Petitioner had done. Id. He said that
Petitioner began throwing items out of the vehicle, including the money bag and the ski-
mask Petitioner had been wearing. Id. Co-defendant Alexander said that none of the items
belonged to him but acknowledged that he wore a hat, gloves, and a sweatshirt for work
that he had left in his truck. Id. Co-defendant Alexander received $100 in cash from
Petitioner after the robbery. Id. He admitted that he and Petitioner, knowing that police
would be looking for them and the truck, removed the camper shell and placed it in the
pasture on Mr. Brannon’s property without Mr. Brannon’s knowledge. Id. Co-defendant
Alexander testified that Petitioner left the day after the robbery, and he was unable to
contact Petitioner by phone. Id.

       Detective Zach Ferguson of the Lawrence County Sheriff’s Office investigated the
robbery. Id. at *3. He went to the scene, spoke with witnesses, and obtained video footage
from HLH Express, a trucking company located near the market on Crowder Road. Id.
Detective Ferguson reviewed the video footage with the trucking company’s owner, David
Goolsby. The video showed a white Nissan Frontier with a camper shell stop in front of
the business at approximately 7:45 p.m. “Mr. Goolsby described that, in the video, the
truck pulled towards some pine trees, that someone came [in] ‘from the left’ and got into
the truck, and that the truck then made ‘an abrupt U-turn and sp[u]n out.’” Id. Detective
Ferguson ultimately identified Co-defendant Alexander’s truck from the video footage. Id.
However, the individuals in the truck were not identifiable from the video. Id.

        Police spoke with Co-defendant Alexander on October 28, 2016, and he consented
to a search of his truck. Id. Detective Ferguson noted that the truck’s parking light did not
work, and the truck bed appeared to have had a camper shell that had been removed. Id.

                                            -3-
Co-defendant Alexander initially lied and told police that he had no knowledge of the
robbery. Id. He claimed that his daughter had recently borrowed the vehicle, got into an
accident and left the scene. Id. However, Co-defendant Alexander admitted his role in the
robbery after police began questioning his daughter who was incarcerated. Id. Co-
defendant Alexander gave a written statement on November 2, 2016. Id.

        Co-defendant Alexander told Detective Ferguson that he and Petitioner hid the
camper shell on Mr. Brannon’s property, and Detective Ferguson visited the property and
found it. Id. Detective Ferguson noted that the camper shell had not been there long
“because the grass underneath it was relatively undisturbed.” Id. Co-defendant Alexander
also told Detective Ferguson where Petitioner discarded items along the roadside as they
left the store after the robbery. Id. On November 2, 2016, Detective Ferguson located a
black ski mask, a black glove, and a dark-colored hoodie in a ditch on Skyline Drive. Id.
Later analysis of the items revealed that Petitioner was the primary contributor of DNA
found on the ski mask and glove. Id. The DNA of a “minor contributor” was also found,
but there was insufficient DNA to identify that person. Id. The shotgun used during the
robbery was never recovered. Id.

        Co-defendant Alexander denied that his daughter was with him the night of the
robbery and said that he decided to tell the truth because he and Petitioner were “guilty as
sin.” Id. He also confirmed that “he had an extensive criminal record beginning when he
was a juvenile, including being convicted of armed robbery in 1978.” Id. Co-defendant
Alexander had three additional convictions “from the 1970s to the 1990s.” Id. He also
pled guilty to a vehicle theft “around 2010.” Id. Co-defendant Alexander testified that he
was approximately five feet, ten inches tall. Id. He further explained, “I know when I had
my back surgery, it seemed like I drawed up [sic] and I shriveled up to almost nothing. I
don’t even know if I’m 5’10 anymore. I may not even be 5’9. I’m not really sure.” Id.
He said that he weighed 146 pounds at a recent doctor’s visit. Id. Co-defendant Alexander
testified that he likely “changed [his] appearance” after the robbery, for example, by
trimming his beard. Id.

        Co-defendant Alexander acknowledged that he was later indicted along with
Petitioner for the robbery of the Fall River Market. Id. at *4. He was not arrested until
after he was indicted in March 2017, approximately five months after the robbery occurred.
Id. Co-defendant Alexander testified that he was not promised anything in exchange for
his testimony against Petitioner. Id.

       Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery and received a twenty-two-year
sentence to be served in confinement. Id. On direct appeal, this court affirmed Petitioner’s
conviction. Id. at *7.

       On December 28, 2020, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
alleging that the trial court improperly denied his motion for new trial because the State

                                           -4-
failed to disclose “favorable information-evidence” in violation of Brady v. Maryland; that
the trial court erred by “limiting defense’s cross-examination of responding officer
regarding statements made to him by the alleged victim, where those statements were
inconsistent with the victim’s written statement to police and ultimately his trial
testimony”; and numerous grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.1 Counsel was
appointed, but the record on appeal does not contain an amended petition for post-
conviction relief.

Post-Conviction Hearing

       Trial counsel testified that he had been practicing law for twenty-five years and had
handled more than 500 and “maybe more” than 1,000 criminal cases. He had been
appointed to represent Petitioner in general sessions court. Petitioner was in custody at the
time and was held without bond because he was on either state probation or community
corrections at the time of the offenses in this case. Trial counsel had previously represented
Petitioner in other matters, and they “had a good talking relationship.”

       Trial counsel estimated that he met with Petitioner in this case approximately five
times before trial. He “would have” obtained a recording of the preliminary hearing but
did not recall if he played the recording for Petitioner. Trial counsel did not recall talking
to Mr. Smith before trial but remembered that Mr. Smith believed a woman had been
involved in the robbery because the person who got out of the truck was about the same
size as Mr. Smith’s wife. Trial counsel assumed that the person Mr. Smith described was
Petitioner.

       Trial counsel agreed that Co-defendant Alexander originally told police that he did
not have anything to do with the robbery. When the police confronted him with evidence
that his truck may have been seen at the time of the robbery, he said that he loaned the
truck to his daughter. However, when police began focusing on Co-defendant Alexander’s
daughter, he wanted to “come clean and tell the truth.” He also admitted to changing his
appearance and that of the truck. Trial counsel agreed that Co-defendant Alexander was
the only person who identified Petitioner. He further agreed that Co-defendant Alexander
told police about the black ski mask, black glove, and the Fall River Market bank bag which
contained checks, being thrown out of the truck window after the robbery. Trial counsel
noted that there was “other corroborating circumstantial evidence which tended to
incriminate [Petitioner].”

       Trial counsel was aware through discovery that Co-defendant Alexander was going
to testify at trial. He cross-examined Co-defendant Alexander concerning his prior
convictions, including armed robbery. Trial counsel did not recall if he obtained certified
copies of the prior convictions, but at trial, Co-defendant Alexander admitted the armed

  1
      We will address only those issues raised on appeal.

                                                    -5-
robbery conviction and “possibly other convictions.” When asked if having the certified
copies of Co-defendant Alexander’s convictions would have helped “cast a doubt” on
Petitioner’s involvement in the robbery, trial counsel replied: “It would have impeached
him. Like I said, I impeached him through his own admission. So I guess the question is
would it have impeached him more, made it more apparent to the jury. I mean possibly.”
However, trial counsel asserted that Co-defendant Alexander’s convictions “were in
evidence already” through Co-defendant Alexander’s own testimony.

       Trial counsel agreed that DNA was a key piece of evidence produced by the State.
He did not recall if the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) laboratory report
concerning the DNA evidence was admitted as an exhibit at trial. However, he knew that
the black glove and ski mask were entered “[b]ecause they brought that into court and it
was in a bag, and they put plastic gloves on, or vinyl gloves, to retrieve those items.” Trial
counsel agreed that the TBI report should have been entered as an exhibit,2 but the TBI
forensic scientist could testify “about that work he did[.]” He noted that he did not receive
the report in initial discovery but received it sometime later. Post-conviction counsel
pointed out that although Detective Ferguson’s initials indicated that he sealed the evidence
bag containing the commingled items consisting of the black glove, ski mask, and DNA
swabs sent to the TBI for DNA testing, it was actually sealed by Detective Jackie Heard.
However, trial counsel testified that he did not remember having a “serious concern about
the chain of custody.”

       Trial counsel testified that Petitioner’s DNA profile was found on the black glove
and ski mask that were sent to the TBI, and there was one additional unknown profile. The
DNA profiles were submitted to the state Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”)
database for comparison, but he did not request that the profiles be compared to the national
CODIS database or any additional “larger, more global” databases. The TBI lab report
noted that the “partial DNA profile is not eligible for addition to the national database.”
Additionally, trial counsel did not ask for Co-defendant Alexander or his daughter to
provide a DNA sample for testing. He agreed that it may have been “appropriate” to obtain
the samples based on any inconsistencies in Co-defendant Alexander’s testimony, but he
did not know for certain. Trial counsel testified:

        You’re looking at what a jury is going to think. Let’s say it was [Co-
        defendant] Alexander’s DNA, we found out that it was his, I mean, I don’t
        know - - I kind of assumed it was [Co-defendant] Alexander’s because [Co-
        defendant] Alexander testified that he kept those kind of items in and around
        his truck for work: gloves, hats, things like that.

   2
     The record from the direct appeal shows that the report was in fact entered as Exhibit #6 at trial. See
Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 147 n.4 (Tenn. 2010) (noting that an appellate court may take judicial
notice of its own records).

                                                   -6-
       But he couldn’t - - if I remember right, he couldn’t - - he didn’t know whether
       those were gloves or a cap that had belonged to him, and - - but he testified
       that [Petitioner] definitely had them on the night in question and that he threw
       them out the window[.]

On cross-examination, trial counsel acknowledged that Co-defendant Alexander could
have “theoretically” given a DNA sample as a result of his prior felony convictions that
would have been included in the CODIS database.

       Trial counsel acknowledged that Petitioner had been living with Co-defendant
Alexander and that Co-defendant Alexander had access to the items, and his DNA or his
daughter’s DNA could have been on them. Trial counsel further agreed this would have
“lined up” with Mr. Smith’s testimony that he originally thought that he saw a man and a
woman arguing outside of the store and that it could have been Co-defendant Alexander
and his daughter who committed the robbery. However, trial counsel testified: “I mean,
there are some problems with that, I mean, in that the store clerk testified that it was
definitely a male subject that robbed her” because trial counsel recalled “pressing her on
that. But she was confident that it was a male who came in the store.” Trial counsel
acknowledged that there was a discrepancy as to what color hoodie the robbery suspect
was wearing. He noted that one witness testified that the hoodie was white, but the one
that was recovered was dark-colored. Co-defendant Alexander told police where to find
the items that were recovered after the robbery.

       When asked how he prepared for Petitioner’s case, trial counsel testified that he
requested and received discovery and then reviewed it with Petitioner and “gave him a
copy of the paper discovery for him to have in his jail cell.” He also reviewed the
surveillance video of the white truck, visited the Fall River Market to inspect the crime
scene, and spoke with Ms. Denton and two of the officers involved in the case. Trial
counsel thought that he spoke to Co-defendant Alexander without his attorney present
because there were no charges pending against him at the time, but he could not recall for
certain. He also drove around the area of the robbery so that he would be “familiar with
the road and the layout of the curves, the hills, the houses along the way and stuff,” and
from the road he “inspected the trucking company where the video footage was shot.” Trial
counsel further testified that in preparation for a trial, he typically prints out the indictment
and relevant statutes, reviews the rules of evidence at issue, and obtains a copy of the jury
pool, which he also provides to a defendant to see if they know anyone on the list. Trial
counsel testified that the defense strategy was to attack Co-defendant Alexander’s
credibility and argue that Co-defendant Alexander committed the robbery and was using
Petitioner as a “scapegoat.”

       Trial counsel testified that Petitioner did not wish to testify at trial because he had
an extensive criminal record that could be used to impeach his testimony. He noted that
Petitioner had “ten separate dates that he received felony convictions, but some of them

                                              -7-
were multiple felonies.” Therefore, Petitioner was either a persistent or a career offender.
Trial counsel said that Petitioner did not provide him with any names for an alibi witness.
Trial counsel testified that his standard practice is to inform his clients that it is their sole
decision to testify, and a Momon3 hearing was conducted in this case.

        Trial counsel did not recall if the judge commented at the preliminary hearing that
Co-defendant Alexander’s story did not match the other testimony presented. Trial counsel
said that he reviewed the hearing prior to trial, but did not remember the comment because
he may have skipped over it because the court’s comments would not have been
“particularly important” to him as a defense attorney, and it “wouldn’t have influenced
[him] one way or the other.” He said: “So, from a defense standpoint, I would be listening
to that preliminary hearing to hear what the witnesses were going to testify to - - [ ]so that
I can be ready to cross-examine them, or to examine them if they’re my witnesses in court.”
Generally, he would take notes of what the witnesses said at the hearing to compare it with
their trial testimony.

        Petitioner testified that he requested that trial counsel provide him with a transcript
of the preliminary hearing, but Petitioner never received it. He said that the trial court
commented that Co-defendant Alexander’s testimony at the preliminary hearing did not
match. Petitioner wanted to show that Co-defendant Alexander had “changed his story two
or three times during the preliminary [hearing]. At trial his story was different from the
preliminary [hearing].” Petitioner agreed that the hoodie found by police on Skyline Drive
belonged to him and that it had been in Co-defendant Alexander’s truck because they
worked together. He also noted that he wore gloves and a ski mask or toboggan at work
because it was cold at the time. He said that it was possible that at some point, he had worn
the black ski mask recovered in this case. Petitioner agreed that one witness said that the
hoodie that the suspect wore at the time of the robbery was white, and another witness said
that it was a dark color.

        Petitioner did not deny that his DNA was on the black glove and black ski mask
sent to the TBI; however, he complained that the items were commingled in the same
evidence bag with the DNA swabs taken from him by Captain Adam Brewer of the
Lawrence County Sheriff’s Office ten months after the robbery occurred. He also wrote to
the “TBI lab” to ask how they had received the items in the evidence bag. Petitioner
pointed out that the TBI scientist testified that there was a second person’s DNA on the
items, and the jury asked if “anybody else was tested for DNA.” Petitioner claimed that
prior to trial, he never saw the TBI lab report concerning the DNA results even though he
had requested it from trial counsel. He said that he first saw the report at the post-
conviction hearing and noted that it was not made an exhibit at trial. He noted that the TBI
scientist compared Petitioner’s DNA “to the in-house database or something like that[,]”

   3
    Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999) (establishing the standard of knowledge a defendant
must demonstrate to waive their constitutional right to testify).

                                              -8-
and “he had no hits” until he compared it to Petitioner’s DNA sample that was taken by
Captain Brewer at the county jail. Petitioner testified that he was on community corrections
at the time of the offenses in this case, and had been on community corrections since 1995.
He had previously provided a DNA sample when he was originally placed on community
corrections. He asked trial counsel why the DNA of Co-defendant Alexander and his
daughter had not been tested because Co-defendant Alexander had originally said that his
daughter had the truck on the night of the robbery.

       Petitioner testified that he wrote trial counsel numerous letters from the jail and
prison but Petitioner did not keep copies of them. When asked if there were any witnesses
that he wanted trial counsel to talk with, Petitioner only shrugged his shoulders. He said
that he and trial counsel discussed his decision about testifying on the day of trial.
Petitioner testified:

       Well, it was just, you know, he said that the State was going to try to impeach
       me, you know, and since I had prior felonies, which was another thing - - he
       sat here and said I had ten felonies i[n] just one case, one charge.

       Burglary, theft, and vandalism is all one charge but they’ve got three different
       cases for it and made it three different felonies, Your Honor.

Petitioner asserted that all of the charges stemmed from “one incident” with the same
offense date. He agreed that his prior criminal record was the reason that he did not testify
at trial, and he was told that he was a career offender. Petitioner admitted he was advised
that it was his sole decision about whether to testify.

         On cross-examination, Petitioner agreed that trial counsel had Co-defendant
Alexander’s prior statements and “probably” cross-examined him about any discrepancies
at trial. He further agreed that the hoodie found after the robbery belonged to him, and it
was packaged separately from the glove, ski mask, and DNA samples, and sent to the TBI
for testing. Petitioner acknowledged that the glove and ski mask could have possibly been
his and contained his DNA. However, he asserted that the items were found ten miles from
the crime scene and could have been placed there by Co-defendant Alexander. Petitioner
was unable to say how he was prejudiced by having the glove, ski mask, and DNA samples
commingled in the same envelope or how the items were contaminated.

                                          Analysis

       In his brief, Petitioner sets out four issues on appeal claiming that trial counsel was
ineffective by 1) failing to conduct a prompt and adequate pre-trial investigation; 2) failing
to adequately prepare for trial and present a defense; 3) failing to request that DNA of other
potential suspects found during the investigation be submitted to CODIS for potential
matches to exonerate or exculpate Petitioner; and 4) that the cumulative effect of the errors

                                            -9-
entitles him to relief. Under each subheading, Petitioner raises multiple issues, some of
which are duplicated. We have identified eight issues of ineffective counsel raised and will
address them accordingly: trial counsel 1) failed to review with Petitioner the court’s
comments at the preliminary hearing concerning Co-defendant Alexander’s inconsistent
statements; 2) failed to have the partial DNA profile of a second unknown individual
submitted to a “larger database to attempt to identify whose DNA it was” and have the
DNA of other suspects tested; 3) failed to challenge the chain of custody of the DNA
evidence “when one officer packaged it and another one signed for it”; 4) failed to discuss
until the day of trial whether Petitioner would testify; 5) failed to meet with Petitioner a
sufficient number of times by meeting with him only five times before trial; 6) failed to
interview Mr. Smith and Ms. Denton before trial to find out what their testimony would
be; 7) failed to submit certified copies of Co-defendant Alexander’s prior convictions for
impeachment purposes; and 8) that cumulative error entitles him to relief. The State
responds that Petitioner has waived five of his claims, that he has not demonstrated that
trial counsel rendered deficient performance as to any of his claims, including those that
are waived, and that he has not shown any prejudice.

                                          I. Waiver

        Initially, we point out that Petitioner did not make any closing arguments at the post-
conviction hearing concerning his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, as
reflected in the record, Petitioner requested to submit his arguments in a “letter” to the post-
conviction court. The court approved that process and gave the State ten days to respond
to the arguments set out in the letter. Neither Petitioner’s letter nor the State’s response is
included in the record on appeal. “It is the burden of the appellant to prepare a record on
appeal that presents a complete and accurate account of what transpired in the trial court
with respect to the issue on appeal.” Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 172 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1997) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 24 (b)). Thus, we do not know what issues Petitioner
argued in support of his post-conviction petition.

       Additionally, although post-conviction counsel asserted at the post-conviction
hearing that he amended Petitioner’s original petition “with the court[,]” the record on
appeal does not contain an amended post-conviction petition. The post-conviction court’s
order denying relief also noted that there was an amended petition. However, in its
response to the post-conviction petition, the State noted that “the State has not been made
aware of any amended petition being filed [by] [Petitioner’s] attorney, . . . . The State
responds to [Petitioner’s] original petition[.]” Because there is no amended petition in the
record, the only way this court may respond to any issues not formally raised in the original
post-conviction petition is “if the issue was argued at the post-conviction hearing and
decided by the post-conviction court without objection.” Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d
450, 458 (Tenn. 2020). Otherwise, the issue is waived. Id. at 457; see also Tenn. R. App.
P. 36(a) (issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived).

                                             - 10 -
        We agree with the State that Petitioner has waived the following claims: that trial
counsel failed to discuss until the day of trial whether Petitioner would testify; failed to
meet with Petitioner a sufficient number of times by meeting with him only five times
before trial; and failed to interview Mr. Smith and Ms. Denton before trial to find out what
their testimony would be. These specific claims were not raised in the original post-
conviction petition or addressed in the post-conviction court’s order denying post-
conviction relief. It is not known whether these issues were argued in the “letter” to the
post-conviction court because as previously stated, the letter was not included in the record
on appeal. Therefore, the claims are waived. See Holland, 610 S.W.3d at 458. Waiver
notwithstanding, there was limited testimony presented at the post-conviction hearing
concerning these claims, and they would fail on the merits because under a de novo review,
Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s performance was deficient or prejudicial.
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on those issues.

       Petitioner further contends on appeal that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s
errors deprived him of a fair trial and that he should be granted a new trial. However, we
agree with the State that this issue is likewise waived because it was not raised in the
original post-conviction petition, nor was it addressed at the post-conviction hearing or in
the post-conviction court’s order denying relief. See id. In any event, we conclude there
were no errors committed by trial counsel, and as a result, no cumulative error exists.
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.

                          II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

        The right to the effective assistance of counsel is safeguarded by both the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Tennessee; therefore, it is
cognizable under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. U.S. Const. amend VI; Tenn. Const. art.
I, § 9; T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (“Relief under this part shall be granted when the conviction or
sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the
Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.”). A petitioner alleging
the ineffective assistance of counsel “shall have the burden of proving the allegations of
fact by clear and convincing evidence.” T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f); Dellinger v. State, 279
S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn. 2009). Whether a petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of trial
or appellate counsel, he bears the burden of showing that (1) counsel’s performance was
deficient and (2) the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984); Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990). Failure to satisfy either
prong is sufficient to deny relief. Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004);
Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 316 (Tenn. 2007) (“[I]f this Court determines that either
prong is not met, we may forego consideration of the other prong.”).

       A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and
fact. Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 867 (Tenn. 2008) (citing Finch, 226 S.W.3d at 315).
Thus, an appellate court is bound by the factual findings of the post-conviction court unless

                                           - 11 -
the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings; but the post-conviction
court’s application of law to those factual findings is reviewed de novo with no
presumption of correctness. Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn. 2009) (citing
Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 293); State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 450,457-58 (Tenn. 2001)).

             A. Failure to Review the Court’s Comments from the Preliminary Hearing

        Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered deficient performance because he did
not “personally listen to and review the [p]reliminary [h]earing with [Petitioner] which
would have fostered an understanding of [Petitioner’s] theory and validated it by hearing
the Judge[’s] comment on the record that [Co-defendant] Alexander wasn’t being truthful
at the [p]reliminary hearing.” The State argues that this issue is waived because it was not
raised in the original post-conviction petition, argued to the post-conviction court, or
addressed by the post-conviction court.4 We conclude that although not addressed by the
post-conviction court, this issue was sufficiently raised for our consideration in the pro se
post-conviction petition and during the post-conviction hearing.5

       Concerning this claim, trial counsel did not recall if the judge at the preliminary
hearing commented that Co-defendant Alexander’s testimony did not match the other
testimony presented at the hearing. Trial counsel testified that he reviewed the preliminary
hearing prior to trial, but he may have skipped the comment because the judge’s comments
would not have been “particularly important” to him as a defense attorney, and it “wouldn’t
have influenced [him] one way or the other.” Trial counsel further asserted that “from a
defense standpoint, I would be listening to that preliminary hearing to hear what the
witnesses were going to testify to - - . . . so that I can be ready to cross-examine them, or
to examine them if they’re my witnesses in court.” He said that he generally took notes of
the witnesses’ testimony at the hearing to compare it with their trial testimony.

       Petitioner has failed to include a transcript or recording of the preliminary hearing
in the record, either on direct appeal or in his post-conviction proceeding. We cannot
discern what comments were made by the preliminary hearing judge or whether they would
have affected Petitioner’s case. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish his factual
allegations concerning this claim by clear and convincing evidence. Likewise, he cannot
demonstrate any prejudice by trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance. Petitioner is
not entitled to relief on this issue.

   4
      The only comment considered by the post-conviction court was one allegedly made by the trial court
that there was doubt that Petitioner was involved in the robbery. The post-conviction court found that this
comment was made at trial “during a jury-out conference regarding jury charges and lesser-included
offenses.” The post-conviction court did not address comments made by the judge at the preliminary
hearing.
   5
     The post-conviction petition incorrectly refers to the recording of the Grand Jury testimony rather than
the preliminary hearing testimony.

                                                   - 12 -
       B. Failure to Have the Partial DNA Submitted to a Larger Database and Test the
                                      DNA of Other Suspects

       Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to
request that the partial DNA profile from an unknown individual, obtained from the black
glove sent to the TBI laboratory, be submitted to a larger DNA database such as the national
FBI CODIS database rather than the state CODIS database administered by the TBI.
Petitioner further asserts that trial counsel should have requested that both Co-defendant
Alexander and Co-defendant Alexander’s daughter submit to DNA testing. Petitioner
claims that running a “larger global search” on the unknown partial DNA profile “could
have identified the other profile as [Co-defendant] Alexander’s daughter which would have
exonerated [Petitioner] and also matched the story of Jeff Smith, the only other witness to
the incident who thought it was a man and woman who were arguing outside before the
robbery took place.”

       Concerning this claim, the post-conviction court found:

       Petitioner also claims that [trial counsel] did not request DNA samples to be
       run through the FBI CODIS data base and/or a larger national base to identify
       unknown profiles. The TBI testified at trial that the secondary sample
       obtained was inconclusive to produce a profile for further submission.
       Further, as argued by the prosecution in its reply, the Petitioner’s DNA was
       the primary contributor, and the Petitioner claimed the items as his. Thus,
       this argument is without merit.

        The record does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings. Trial
counsel acknowledged at the post-conviction hearing that while it might have been
“appropriate” to obtain Co-defendant Alexander’s or Co-defendant Alexander’s daughter’s
DNA sample, he did not know for certain. He further testified that he “kind of assumed”
the partial DNA profile found on the black glove and ski mask was that of Co-defendant
Alexander because he testified at trial that he “kept those kind of items in and around his
truck for work[.]” Trial counsel further acknowledged that because Petitioner had been
living with Co-defendant Alexander at the time of the robbery, the DNA of Co-defendant
Alexander or his daughter could have been on those items. He agreed that this theory
would have “lined up” with Mr. Smith’s testimony that he originally thought that he saw a
man and a woman arguing outside the Fall River Market and that it could have been Co-
defendant Alexander or Co-defendant Alexander’s daughter who committed the robbery.
However, trial counsel testified: “I mean, there are some problems with that, I mean, in
that the store clerk testified that it was definitely a male subject that robbed her” because
trial counsel recalled “pressing her on that. But she was confident that it was a male who
came in the store.”

                                           - 13 -
       Moreover, the TBI forensic scientist who testified at trial said that he was unable to
determine the identity of the minor DNA contributor to the partial profile and that his
“interpretation” of the minor contributor was “deemed to be inconclusive.” Therefore, he
could not determine how many contributors there were to the sample, and he could neither
include nor exclude anyone from being the minor contributor.

        In considering whether the second DNA profile found on the black glove should
have been submitted for testing again, the post-conviction court noted that “the second
profile found on the glove was inconclusive and that no viable sample could be obtained
from which to make any comparison.” Even if the TBI forensic scientist had been given
Co-defendant Alexander’s or Co-defendant Alexander’s daughter’s DNA samples, the
DNA samples from the two items were inadequate to match with anyone, including known
individuals. Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to submit the partial DNA profile to a larger
database or to obtain DNA samples from Co-defendant Alexander or Co-defendant
Alexander’s daughter was not unreasonable, and he did not render deficient performance.
Additionally, Petitioner has not shown any prejudice. The TBI lab report specifically states
that the “partial DNA profile is not eligible for addition to the national database.” Petitioner
did not present any further proof at the post-conviction hearing about any other larger or
global DNA databases that would have yielded any different results. Also, the fact remains
that Petitioner was the major contributor to the DNA found on the black glove and ski
mask. Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

               C. Failure to Challenge the Chain of Custody of the DNA Evidence

       Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “question” the
“chain of custody dilemma” because Detective Ferguson placed the black glove and ski
mask into a paper bag, but Detective Jackie Heard was the one who actually sealed it.

       Concerning this issue, the post-conviction court found:

       The Petitioner argues that there was a chain of custody issue with regards to
       the evidence sent to the TBI lab as Officer Jackie Heard packaged the
       evidence, but it was Officer Zac[h] Ferguson who sent it off to the TBI lab.
       Jackie Heard did not testify as to the chain of custody and authenticity of the
       chain. Petitioner’s argument misstates Tennessee law, as all links in the
       chain of custody not need to be proven, so long as the evidence presented
       establishes that the evidence is credible. Clearly, the jury concluded that the
       chain was sufficient and, thus, this issue is without merit.

        The record does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings. At
trial, Detective Ferguson testified that he collected the evidence, placed it in a paper bag,
and sent it to the TBI lab for testing. He said that the bag had his name and the date on it,
and “[w]e tape it up and initial on the seams.” Detective Ferguson agreed that the back of

                                             - 14 -
the bag contained his initials as the person who sealed the evidence. However, he pointed
out that Detective “Jackie Heard is actually - - was one of the investigators assisting me.
He actually sealed the bag.” At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he
did not recall having a “serious concern about the chain of custody” based on this
information.

        We conclude that trial counsel did not render deficient performance by failing to
object to the chain of custody concerning the black glove and ski mask. Petitioner failed
to introduce any evidence at the post-conviction hearing to demonstrate that even if trial
counsel had challenged the chain of custody as to those items, such a challenge would have
been successful. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish either deficient
performance or prejudice resulting from any alleged deficiency in trial counsel’s
performance. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

            D. Failure to Submit Certified Copies of Co-defendant Alexander’s Prior
                             Convictions for Impeachment Purposes

        Finally, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “run a
criminal background check and obtain [c]ertified [c]opies of all of [Co-defendant]
Alexander’s prior convictions for [a]rmed [r]obbery and exposing these heinous crimes of
moral turpitude to the jury” because the “very crime on trial is the one that the [S]tate’s
star witness ‘The Co-Defendant’ has on his record[, and it] is important to let the jury see
[c]ertified copies of these convictions in writing and trial counsel admitted as much at the
[p]ost[-][c]onviction [r]elief [h]earing.”

       Concerning this claim, the post-conviction court found:

       As to [trial counsel] not introducing certified copies of [Co-defendant]
       Alexander’s prior convictions for robbery and other violent crimes to
       impeach [Co-defendant] Alexander, a review of the record indicates that [Co-
       defendant] Alexander underwent thorough cross-examination by [trial
       counsel] and that [Co-defendant] Alexander’s prior convictions were
       admitted under testimony. The information regarding [Co-defendant]
       Alexander’s prior convictions were discussed and thoroughly questioned by
       [trial counsel] and, although the printed copies of the convictions were not
       submitted to the [c]ourt for proof, proof of his prior convictions was put into
       evidence through [Co-defendant] Alexander’s testimony. Thus, there is no
       merit to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel here.

       Again, the record does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s
findings. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he was aware through
discovery that Co-defendant Alexander was going to testify at trial. He was aware of Co-
defendant Alexander’s criminal record and cross-examined him at trial about his prior

                                           - 15 -
convictions that included armed robbery. While trial counsel did not recall if he obtained
certified copies of the convictions, Co-defendant Alexander admitted to the convictions at
trial. When asked if having certified copies of the convictions would have helped to “cast
doubt” on Petitioner’s involvement in the robbery, trial counsel replied: “It would have
impeached him. Like I said, I impeached him through his own admission. So I guess the
question is would it have impeached him more, made it more apparent to the jury. I mean
possibly.” However, trial counsel reiterated that Co-defendant Alexander’s convictions
“were in evidence already.”

        We conclude that trial counsel has not rendered deficient performance as to this
claim. Co-defendant Alexander admitted at trial that he had an “extensive criminal record
beginning when he was a juvenile,” that included an armed robbery conviction in 1978.
He further admitted that he had been “incarcerated on three separate occasions from the
1970s to the 1990s[,]” and he “pled guilty to vehicle theft around 2010.” Judkins, 2019
WL 3889733, at *3. Co-defendant Alexander further admitted that he had been indicted
as an accomplice for the robbery in this case. Id. at *4. Moreover, as pointed out by the
State, the trial transcript reflects that trial counsel told Co-defendant Alexander that he had
a “half-inch stack of [Co-defendant Alexander’s] criminal record” with him at trial. Trial
counsel further indicated that he would have introduced the certified copies had Co-
defendant Alexander disputed them.

       We conclude that trial counsel’s decision not to introduce the certified copies of Co-
defendant Alexander’s convictions, since he admitted to them during cross-examination,
was a strategic one that was made with adequate information as a result of trial preparation
and will not be second-guessed by this court. Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 12 (Tenn.
1982); Tolliver v. State, 629 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). Trial counsel’s
performance concerning this issue was not deficient nor has Petitioner shown that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Petitioner presented absolutely nothing at the post-
conviction hearing, including copies of the certified convictions or any other circumstances
surrounding these convictions, that should have been presented to the jury or that would
have affected the outcome of his trial. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

                                         Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

                                               ____________________________________
                                               JILL BARTEE AYERS, JUDGE

                                            - 16 -