Court Opinion

ID: 9742166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:07:53.528438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:29.017892
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: Contrary to my colleagues, I believe that section 2 of Article XI of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XI, § 2) does authorize Dr. Glisson to bring this action to enforce the provisions of the Illinois Endangered Species Protection Act (520 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 1998)). A proper analysis of section 2 should begin with the long-recognized principle that the meaning of any given constitutional provision depends on the common understanding of the citizens who, by ratifying the Constitution, “gave it life.” Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 492 (1984). To assess that understanding, we must give effect to the plain language of the Constitution, for it is the language itself which provides the best evidence of what the drafters intended to convey to the citizens for ratification. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 181 Ill. 2d 65, 77 (1998). The plain language of section 2 states that “[e]ach person has the right to a healthful environment” and that “[e]ach person may enforce this right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. XI, § 2. Nothing in this language suggests in any way that the right to bring an action to enforce the right to a healthful environment is restricted to cases of environmental pollution. That being so, we have no authority to create such a limitation ourselves. Our construction of section 2 is guided by the same principles applicable to the construction of statutes (Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 134 (1993)), and those principles dictate that where the language used is clear and unambiguous, we must give it effect as written, without reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express (Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996)). My colleagues’ resort to legislative history is inappropriate. Justice Miller explained the principle clearly some years ago. He wrote that where the language of a constitutional provision is clear, “we should have no occasion to consult the convention debates of th[at] provision [ ]. The same rules of construction applicable to statutes apply as well to the constitution [citations], and a basic rule of statutory construction forbids a court to canvass legislative history for evidence of legislative intent if the meaning of a provision can be determined from its text.” Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d at 134. Altering a watercourse in a way that will eradicate species of threatened or endangered wildlife clearly has obvious and important implications for the healthfulness of the environment. To dismiss those implications, as my colleagues do, is to ignore the substantial and well-documented importance of biodiversity to human welfare. The brief filed by amici curiae includes a passage from Raymond Dasman’s work, Wildlife and America (Council on Environmental Quality 1978), which makes a compelling point regarding the importance of species preservation: “[M]edical science now makes use of species once considered worthless — that might easily have been allowed to become extinct on the grounds that they were ‘good for nothing.’ The present use of Penicillium mold (antibiotics), Rhesus Monkeys (blood groups), sea urchins (embryology), cinchona bushes (quinine), Xenopus toads (pregnancy tests), Strychnos vines (curare), foxgloves (digitalis), and Rauwolfia (hypertension), could not have been predicted (except perhaps by practitioners of folk medicine, who were familiar with the curative properties of many of these species). Similar contributions are made by wild species to agricultural production, to pest control, and to the development of new domestic varieties. Each species is a storehouse of irreplaceable genetic material whose loss we cannot afford.” We protect threatened and endangered species because, in so doing, we protect ourselves and the welfare of the Illinoisans who will inherit this land when we are gone. It is our obligation and it is an obligation I believe that most Illinoisans believed they were assuming when they ratified section 2 of article XI of our Constitution. Under any fair reading, that provision cannot be confined to industrial pollution. To suggest, as my colleagues do, that the only environmental threats implicated by our Constitution are those that emanate from a smoke stack, drain pipe or car exhaust ignores wisdom, science and the plain language of the law. Under section 2 of article XI, “every person” has the right to bring an enforcement action. Whether Dr. Glisson has a personal stake in the outcome is therefore legally irrelevant. I note, however, that his concern over the fate of the least brook lamprey and Indiana crawfish is more than just abstract or theoretical. He lives in the immediate area of the proposed dam project and has included allegations in his complaint demonstrating the adverse effects the project will have on him personally. Under these circumstances, his interest in the matter is certainly adequate “to assure sufficient sharpness in defining the issues so that the court may be aided in deciding the case.” Kluk v. Lang, 125 Ill. 2d 306, 315 (1988). That, in the end, is the whole purpose of the standing requirement. Kluk, 125 Ill. 2d at 315. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that section 2 of article XI authorizes private citizens to bring suit to enforce the requirements of the Illinois Endangered Species Protection Act and that Dr. Glisson has standing to initiate such a proceeding. I therefore dissent.