Court Opinion

ID: 9543572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:46:41.541815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:37.438753
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(concurring in part and concurring in the result in part):
Judge Billings and I agree that the conviction appealed from should be affirmed. However, while we concur in section II of the opinion, we do not join in section I. Concerning the pretext doctrine, we instead adhere to the views we recently expressed in State v. Lopez, 181 Utah Adv.Rep. 41, 1992 WL 41598 (Utah App.1992).
Applying the Lopez analysis to the facts of this case, it is clear that officers Smith and Jones did not ticket defendant as a pretext while acting on an unconstitutional motivation. See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-78 (Utah App.1988), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Officer Smith testified that he began writing jaywalking tickets in October of 1990, after witnessing an incident in which a jaywalker almost caused a vehicular accident in the 900 block of South State Street.1 Further, the record shows that, in the two- to three-month period between his observation of the near accident and his stop of defendant, Smith had written approximately one dozen jaywalking tickets. These facts demonstrate that Officer Smith’s stop of defendant was prompted by a desire to reduce jaywalking in the area; it was not a pretext to pursue some hunch the officers had about defendant.
“Although the pretext question does not turn on the arresting officer’s subjective motivation, a trial court may consider the officer’s testimony as to why the officer stopped the car and whether such stop is consistent with his usual practice.” Lopez, 181 Utah Adv.Rep. at 45. In a case such as the instant one, where a police officer’s actions are consistent with a legitimate course of conduct adopted after specific observations or experiences have brought valid concerns to the officer’s attention, we believe the officer’s uncontroverted subjective motivation should be afforded particular significance. An objectively reasonable police officer who has not witnessed the potential dangers of jaywalking firsthand may be less likely to stop individuals for the offense than an objectively reasonable officer who has recently observed a traffic accident caused by a jaywalker, and who has thereafter embarked upon a consistent course of jaywalker-nabbing.
In the instant case, Officer Smith’s stop of defendant was consistent with a coursé of conduct Smith had pursued ever since witnessing a jaywalker almost cause a traffic accident in the recent past at approxi*282mately the same place. Given the understandably sensitizing effect of such an experience, the demonstrated effect the experience did in fact have on Officer Smith’s treatment of jaywalkers, and the lack of any evidence offered by defendant to counter the objectively reasonable nature of Officer Smith’s conduct, it is clear on the record before us that Officer Smith’s actions were not pretextual. Accordingly, while we disagree with Judge Russon’s refusal to apply Sierra to the facts of this case, we agree defendant’s conviction should be affirmed. We hold that Officer Smith’s actions were constitutional under Sierra as clarified by Lopez.
BILLINGS, J., concurs.

. At the time of defendant's stop, Officer Jones was working as a trainee under Officer Smith's supervision. Given the subordinate position trainees occupy vis-a-vis training officers, it should be assumed that Officer Jones’s motivation in ticketing defendant was simply that of a trainee following the lead of an instructor. Accordingly, in determining whether a violation of the pretext doctrine occurred, we concentrate only on Officer Smith’s motivation in stopping defendant.