Court Opinion

ID: 9962073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 16:13:13.065721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:48.279092
License: Public Domain

04/22/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                           AT NASHVILLE
                                 March 5, 2024 Session

               NICOLE MARIE NEUMAN v. PAUL P. PHILLIPS

              Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County
                  No. 20CV-49481J Deanna B. Johnson, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. M2023-00813-COA-R3-CV
                       ___________________________________

This appeal concerns the attempt to register and enforce a foreign decree purporting to
modify the terms of a divorce decree. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the
trial court correctly determined that the foreign decree was void for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Although appellant raised a second issue for review on appeal concerning
attorney’s fees, we conclude appellant is not entitled to any relief on the issue.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
                                  and Remanded

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT
and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined.

Sean R. Aiello, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nicole Marie Neuman.

Paul P. Phillips, Castalian Springs, Tennessee, Pro se.

                                        OPINION

                 BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       This appeal follows an extensive history of litigation between these litigants,
including at least twelve divorce and modification petitions filed in Tennessee, New York,
and Michigan by Nicole Marie Neuman (“Mother”). Of note, a trial judge in Washington
County, Utah (“Utah court”), entered a final decree of divorce on December 9, 2016,
declaring Mother divorced from Paul P. Phillips (“Father”). A supplemental divorce
decree was entered by the Utah court in 2017 (“2017 Divorce Decree”). Among other
provisions, the 2017 Divorce Decree determined the custody arrangement for Mother and
Father’s minor child (“Child”). Both parties thereafter signed an agreement for relocation
(“Relocation Agreement”) allowing Mother and Father to relocate with Child from Utah
to Williamson County, Tennessee, and filed it with the Utah court on March 27, 2019.
However, the Utah court did not attempt to enter the agreement as an order until April 29,
2022.

       Litigation in Tennessee commenced on June 3, 2020, when Mother filed a request
for registration and enforcement of the 2017 Divorce Decree as well as the Relocation
Agreement in the Williamson County Chancery Court (“Tennessee court”). Then, on
September 15, 2020, Mother filed a petition in the Tennessee court for modification of
parenting agreement, seeking to modify the previously entered 2017 Divorce Decree as
well as the Relocation Agreement. As part of her petition, Mother alleged that “[v]enue
and jurisdiction are proper; the parties and child have been residents of Williamson County,
Tennessee for more than six (6) months and this state is the home state of the child.”
Father’s answer to the petition admitted to Mother’s jurisdictional pleading.

       Subsequently, Father filed a motion for civil contempt, to require Mother’s
compliance with the 2017 Divorce Decree, for Child to be enrolled and attend school in
Williamson County, and for Father’s attorney’s fees and court costs. As part of this filing,
Father argued that the Relocation Agreement was not made an order of the Utah court and
therefore did not modify the 2017 Divorce Decree. The matter was heard on March 1,
2022, during which the Tennessee court determined Mother had moved from Tennessee to
Michigan. On March 4, 2022, the Tennessee court entered an order finding that Father had
moved from Williamson County, Tennessee, to Trousdale County, Tennessee, while also
determining that Mother had moved from Williamson County.1 The Tennessee court
ordered Child be enrolled in school in Trousdale County, citing the 2017 Divorce Decree
provision granting Father decision-making authority regarding Child’s education.
Although the Tennessee court maintained that the 2017 Divorce Decree remained the
governing order in this case, the Tennessee court noted that, even under the Relocation
Agreement, Father’s home was to become the primary residence for school purposes if
both parties moved outside Williamson County.

       On March 2, 2022, Mother filed an ex parte motion to enforce the Relocation
Agreement in the Utah court.2 Thereafter, Father filed a motion with the Tennessee court
to conduct a telephone conference with the Utah court pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) to determine which court had
jurisdiction over the child custody case and for attorney’s fees and court costs. On March

        1
           At the time of Father’s initial motion to enroll Child in school in Williamson County, all the
parties still resided in Williamson County. However, by the time the motion was heard, all the parties had
moved from Williamson County, precipitating the Tennessee court’s determination that Child should be
enrolled in school in Trousdale County.
         2
           Although Mother’s motion requested enforcement of the Relocation Agreement rather than a
modification of the child custody determination, the Utah court appears to have treated it as a petition to
modify, because its April 29, 2022, order in response to Mother’s motion operates to modify the terms of
the child custody determination.
                                                   -2-
29, 2022, the respective judges of the Tennessee court and the Utah court conducted their
telephone conference. During the conference, the judge of the Utah court agreed that he
no longer had jurisdiction of the case because neither of the parties nor Child resided in
Utah. Despite its recognition that it no longer had jurisdiction, the Utah court entered an
order on April 29, 2022, providing:

      1. A stipulated “Written Agreement for Relocation,” was filed with this Court
      on March 27, 2019. This stipulated agreement met the requirements to be
      reduced to a Court order but was not done.
      2. Therefore, the “Written Agreement for Relocation,” should have been
      reduced back to an order of the Court back in or around March 29, 2019.
      3. [Father] lodged an objection to reducing the stipulation to an order but was
      overruled.
      4. Jurisdiction should be transferred to Williamson County, Tennessee.

Pursuant to these findings, the Utah court entered the Relocation Agreement as an order
and purported to transfer jurisdiction to Tennessee (“2022 Relocation Order”).

       On May 6, 2022, Mother filed a notice of filing order for registration and
enforcement of the 2022 Relocation Order in the Tennessee court. Thereafter, Mother filed
a motion for the court to declare that the 2022 Relocation Order is the governing order in
this case. On May 12, 2022, Father filed his response opposing Mother’s request, as well
as a petition for criminal contempt against her.

       On May 16, 2023, Mother filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit, stating that she was
“providing notice of voluntary nonsuit of her claim for modification of permanent
parenting plan and child support” but that, “[w]ith this dismissal, [the] claims for
registration of foreign order and enforcement of permanent parenting plan remain.”

       Following a two-day hearing, the Tennessee court entered an order finding that
Father failed to meet his burden of proof for all counts of criminal contempt and that the
2022 Relocation Order was null and void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In support
of voiding the 2022 Relocation Order, the Tennessee court reasoned that the Utah court
lost jurisdiction when Mother filed her petition to modify in the Tennessee court on
September 15, 2020, observing that it was undisputed Mother, Father, and Child all lived
in Tennessee at the moment of filing. (TR Id.) The court highlighted several other moments
in the course of litigation where it was clear that neither Mother, Father, nor Child had
resided in Utah since at least six months prior to Mother filing her petition to modify on
September 15, 2020. (TR Id.) This appeal followed.

                                           -3-
                                  ISSUES PRESENTED

       Upon reviewing the raised issues in Mother’s brief, the dispositive issues in this
appeal may be restated as follows:

   I.       Whether the Tennessee court erred in ruling the 2022 Relocation Order is null
            and void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the Utah court.

   II.      Whether the Tennessee court erred in declining to award Mother her attorney’s
            fees.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “Review of a trial court’s determinations on issues of law, such as the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction and statutory construction, is de novo, without any presumption
of correctness.” Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2013). If a party challenges a
foreign court’s order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, “[t]his amounts to a collateral
attack.” Moorcroft v. Stuart, No. M2013-02295-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 413094, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015). Although we do not normally permit a collateral attack, it
is permissible when the order in question is void. Id. An order is void when the issuing
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the complainant. Id. Moreover, Tennessee law
specifically permits a party to contest the registration and enforcement of a foreign decree
by demonstrating that the “issuing court did not have jurisdiction[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. §
36-6-229(d)(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-232(d)(1)(A).

                                      DISCUSSION

         Relocation Agreement

        Before turning to the merits of the case before us, we find it appropriate to briefly
discuss the purpose and history of the UCCJEA as it applies to the issues presented here.
As a predecessor to the UCCJEA, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”)
was “[p]romulgated in 1968 in an effort ‘to bring order out of the chaos that once marked
interstate custody disputes when the courts of different states claimed authority to issue
contradictory custody orders.’” Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 544 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2006) (quoting Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Fla. 1990)). Although every
state legislature enacted a version of this act by 1986, differences in the language and
construction of each state’s version of the UCCJA undermined its ultimate goal of
providing uniformity and reducing conflict between various jurisdictions. Id. In an effort
“to sweep away the enormous body of conflicting decisions that had accreted over the past
thirty years under the UCCJA[,]” the UCCJEA was introduced across the country to
streamline “the language and structure of the underlying uniform statute.” Id. In light of
this context, we conclude that our analysis of Utah’s version of the UCCJEA may be aided
                                             -4-
by Tennessee’s version of the UCCJEA as it has “substantially the same language . . . and
both are derived from the same Model act.” Moorcroft, 2015 WL 413094, at *6; see Matter
of Adoption of B.H., 474 P.3d 981, 986-87 (Utah 2020) (stating that the UCCJEA was
intended to be uniform among all the states).

       In the instant case, we have been asked to review if the Tennessee court erred in
holding that the 2022 Relocation Order entered by the Utah court was void for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Our analysis begins with Utah’s statute concerning its
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child custody matters:

       (1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204, a court of this state
       that has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 78B-13-
       201 or 78B-13-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the
       determination until:

           (a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and one
           parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant
           connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer
           available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and
           personal relationships; or

           (b) a court of this state or a court of another state determines that neither
           the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently resides
           in this state.

       (2) A court of this state that has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this
       section may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the court determines that it
       is an inconvenient forum under Section 78B-13-207.

       (3) A court of this state that has made a child custody determination and does
       not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify
       that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination
       under Section 78B-13-201.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-202 (emphasis added). Under this provision, we highlight that
a Utah court, or a court of another state, may extinguish Utah’s exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction upon a determination that both parents and child have left Utah. See Staats,
206 S.W.3d at 548-50. Although Utah does not incorporate the official comments under
the UCCJEA,3 our parallel statute does, offering helpful guidance in this matter:

       3
         Tennessee adopted and incorporated the UCCJEA’s official comments into its own version of the
UCCJEA. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-204. Although Utah did not formally pass similar legislation adopting
and incorporating the official comments, the Court of Appeals of Utah has cited to the UCCJEA official
                                                -5-
        Continuing jurisdiction is lost when the child, the child’s parents, and any
        person acting as a parent no longer reside in the original decree state.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-217 cmt. 2 (paralleling UCCJEA § 202 cmt. 2).

       Upon our review of the record, it is clear that Mother, Father, and Child left Utah
and moved to Tennessee several years prior to the Utah court entering the 2022 Relocation
Order. Moreover, when Mother filed her petition to amend the child custody agreement on
September 15, 2020, she stated that all parties had moved from Utah to Tennessee and that
jurisdiction was proper in Tennessee. Husband’s response to Mother’s petition admitted
the very same.

        In addition to Mother’s and Father’s initial pleadings, the Tennessee court indicated
it was clear all parties had moved from Utah. On February 24, 2022, Father was served
with a petition to enroll the 2017 Divorce Decree in Michigan. In that specific petition,
Mother alleged she then lived in Michigan. During a hearing on March 1, 2022, the
Tennessee court determined that Mother had moved to Michigan from Williamson County,
Tennessee. On March 4, 2022, the Tennessee court entered an order permitting Father to
enroll Child in school in Trousdale County, Tennessee, because he and Child had relocated
there from Williamson County, Tennessee.

         Moreover, the Tennessee court’s final order and memorandum reflected that, during
a UCCJEA conference held between the Tennessee court and Utah court on March 28,
2022, “[the judge of the Utah court] stated he no longer had jurisdiction over these matters
and these parties, because neither party nor the child had lived in Utah for some time.” Of
course, the Utah court itself ultimately recognized that Tennessee should be exercising
jurisdiction in this matter but inexplicably and inconsistently, in the same order, took action
with respect to the parties and Child. In sum, the record demonstrates that, prior to the Utah
court’s entry of the Relocation Agreement as an order, there was no dispute among the
parties or either jurisdiction that Mother, Father, and Child had not resided in Utah for
several years.4 As a result, the Utah court had lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 78B-13-202(1)(b) of the Utah Code Annotated. See Staats, 206 S.W.3d
at 548-49 (determining that the foreign state’s exclusive, continuing jurisdiction terminated
at the time a petition to modify was filed in Tennessee because no party had lived in foreign
state for over eleven months); see also Roper v. Roper, 594 S.W.3d 211, 224-25 (Ky. Ct.

comments before in support of its analysis, and incidentally, we observe from one Utah decision that the
specific comment under the UCCJEA cited by that court is the same we reference in this Opinion. In re
Z.Z., 310 P.3d 772, 777 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (citing to UCCJEA § 202 cmt. 2 (1997)).
         4
           As such, it is of course clear from the record that neither of the parents nor Child lived in Utah
when Mother filed her March 2, 2022, request with the Utah court for that court to enforce the Relocation
Agreement, which had, at the time, yet to be entered as an order.

                                                   -6-
App. 2019), modified (Jan. 18, 2020) (concluding that its own court lacked modification
jurisdiction because all parties had moved away from Kentucky); Joshua A. v. Shaquanda
T., 200 N.Y.S.3d 347, 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023) (affirming that the family court lacked
jurisdiction because none of the parties lived in New York at the time the petition to modify
was filed and none of the parties disputed that fact); Weliver v. Ortiz, 291 A.3d 427, 435-
38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2023) (concluding that the trial court erred by asserting jurisdiction over
a child custody modification where all parties pled that they no longer lived in
Pennsylvania).

      Alternatively, the Utah court could have had jurisdiction to enter the Relocation
Agreement as an order “if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under Section
78B-13-201.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-202(3). Section 78B-13-201 of the Utah Code
Annotated accords jurisdiction if

       (a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement
       of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before
       the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state
       but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;

       (b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection (1)(a),
       or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction
       on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under Section
       78B-13-207 or 78B-13-208; and

          (i) the child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or
          a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state
          other than mere physical presence; and
          (ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s
          care, protection, training, and personal relationships;

       (c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (1)(a) or (b) have declined
       to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more
       appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under Section 78B-
       13-207 or 78B-13-208; or

       (d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c).

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-201(1). Here, the record does not support a finding of
jurisdiction for the Utah court with respect to these bases. Per the pleadings of both parents
stating that Child had lived in Williamson County for over six months, Tennessee had
become the home state of Child by the time Mother filed her petition to modify on
September 15, 2020. Moreover, Tennessee did not decline jurisdiction in this matter, and
as we already noted, during the UCCJEA telephone conference between the respective
                                              -7-
judges of the Tennessee court and the Utah court, the judge of the Utah court agreed that
he no longer had jurisdiction of the case because neither of the parties nor Child resided in
Utah. Therefore, the Utah court lacked jurisdiction to modify the custody order pursuant
to section 78B-13-201 of the Utah Code Annotated.

       Because the Utah court had already lost its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and
did not have jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination at the time of the 2022
Relocation Order’s entry, the Tennessee court was correct in concluding that the Utah
court’s 2022 Relocation Order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, we
highlight that our conclusion herein parallels the Utah court’s own acknowledgements,
which it made in the UCCJEA conference and again in the 2022 Relocation Order, that
Tennessee, not Utah, has jurisdiction over the instant child custody case.

        Attorney’s Fees

        In her brief, Mother argues she is entitled to attorney’s fees in relation to her attempt
at enforcing the 2022 Relocation Order, as well as in relation to her defense of Father’s
criminal contempt petition. As to the specific matter of attorney’s fees concerning the
litigation surrounding the 2022 Relocation Order, Mother provides no citations whatsoever
to the record. Beyond that, though, we observe that the statute she claims authorizes her
to recover attorney’s fees expressly limits recovery to the “prevailing party[.]” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-5-103(c). Of course, in light of our disposition herein, Mother is not a prevailing
party with respect to her attempt to register and enforce the 2022 Relocation Order. She is
thus not entitled to any attorney’s fees concerning that issue.5

        As for Mother’s request for fees on the criminal contempt matter, this section of
argument only contains a single citation to the record, albeit through an “Id.” reference that
ostensibly relates back to a record citation from a prior section of argument. In any event,
the citation itself is simply offered as support for the notion that Father failed to prove
Mother was in contempt. There is no actual citation concerning a denial of attorney’s fees
in relation to the contempt matter, and Mother’s brief fails to indicate where, if at all, she
requested attorney’s fees regarding her defense of the contempt petition. Moreover, it is
unclear from the record transmitted to us on appeal whether she actually ever requested
fees in relation to the contempt matter. Regardless, we note that a request for attorney’s
fees associated with the defense of a criminal contempt petition may be granted at the trial
court’s discretion. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). Here, Mother’s brief simply relies
upon the fact that she successfully prevailed against Father’s allegations of criminal

        5
          In connection with our discussion, we observe that Mother has also requested attorney’s fees in
association with the litigation of this appeal. However, Mother failed to include this request in her statement
of issues. As we have previously stated, requests for attorney’s fees that are not raised in the statement of
issues are not properly before this Court. See Mathes v. N.J. Ford & Sons Funeral Home, Inc., 680 S.W.3d
208, 213-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023); see also Gibson v. Bikas, 556 S.W.3d 796, 810 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
Therefore, we conclude the issue of appellate attorney’s fees has been waived.
                                                    -8-
contempt. Assuming arguendo she had actually requested an award of attorney’s fees in
relation to the contempt matter, which again, is not clear from this record, Mother does not
attempt to explain how the Tennessee court’s failure to award her attorney’s fees would
constitute an abuse of discretion. She offers no argument concerning the matter but simply
states in a conclusory manner that she “should be entitled to an award.” In light of these
omissions, we conclude that Mother has waived her argument on appeal concerning
attorney’s fees associated with her criminal contempt defense.

                                     CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Tennessee court’s refusal to register and
enforce the 2022 Relocation Order and conclude that Mother is not entitled to any relief
concerning her raised issue pertaining to attorney’s fees.

                                                      s/ Arnold B. Goldin
                                                    ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE

                                           -9-