Court Opinion

ID: 9631997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:58:23.635335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:53.692383
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice
(dissenting):
I agree with the majority that the administrative law judge plainly erred in excluding evidence in reliance on the hearsay rule. We have held explicitly that a strict application of the rules of evidence is inappropriate in such hearings. E.g., Gardner v. Edward Gardner Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 693 P.2d 678, 681-82 (Utah 1984). I also think the testimony excluded was relevant to the issues put before him. However, I cannot conclude that the erroneous exclusion of the evidence was harmful.
There was ample evidence before the administrative law judge to support his ruling that plaintiff had failed to show a causal connection between the accident and the lung problems. See, e.g., Higgins v. Indus*1335trial Commission, 700 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 1985); Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986). It is not for this Court to redetermine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. E.g., Staker v. Industrial Commission, 61 Utah 11, 16, 209 P. 880, 882 (1922). Given the decision of the administrative law judge on the conflicting evidence, I cannot say that had the erroneously excluded evidence been admitted, it would have raised a substantial likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the claimant. Mattingly v. Charnes, 700 P.2d 927, 929 (Colo.App.1985) (administrative agency’s decision will not be reversed unless substantial rights of the party are prejudiced); In re Certificate of Need Application, 234 Kan. 802, 805-06, 676 P.2d 107, 110 (1984) (administrative agency’s error which does not prejudice substantial rights of the party will not be reversed); see also Gardner v. Edward Gardner Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 693 P.2d at 682 (administrative law judge’s exclusion of testimony justified remand when the judge effectively precluded plaintiff from meeting the evidence against him); cf. State v. Hackford, 56 Utah Adv.Rep. 9, 11 n. 1 (April 22, 1987); see State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-21 (Utah 1987) (standard of review defined); Utah R.Evid. 103; Utah R.Civ.P. 61; Utah R.Crim.P. 30; Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30 (1982). Therefore, I would affirm on the causation issue.1
As for the majority’s holding that the proceedings before the administrative law judge were conducted in a manner that made them so unfair as to deny the claimant due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, I dissent. Certainly, the administrative law judge erred in excluding the hearsay evidence. To my knowledge, erroneous rulings alone are not sufficient to show the bias or prejudice required to disqualify a judge. State ex rel. Miller v. Richardson, 229 Kan. 234, 238, 623 P.2d 1317, 1322 (1981) (construing state statutory law); see Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3, § C.
In the present action, the administrative law judge did more than rule erroneously. He also displayed impatience with the claimant’s witnesses and did not manifest the temperate neutrality that I would hope is the general rule in trial courts and administrative tribunals. However, I cannot agree that his divergence from good practice was so extreme or affected the proceedings so profoundly that we can say that the claimant was denied due process under the state constitution.
The majority cites Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985), as authority for the proposition that “[fjairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility of unfairness.” This general hortatory statement is correct. However, it does not assist in deciding the present case. In Anderson, we held that principles of fairness required that an administrative law judge be disqualified from a case when he or she previously had appeared as an attorney for one side. The statute we applied in reaching this conclusion does not require any showing of actual prejudice, but mandates automatic disqualification when a judge has acted as an attorney for either party in the action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1(3) (1977). We saw no reason why this statutory requirement should not be extended under the banner of due process to administrative law judges.
That ruling has no application in the present action. Moreover, there is no state statute, rule, or provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct that condemns what occurred here. The closest provision is that which requires that judges must disqualify themselves when they are actually biased or prejudiced against a party or an attorney. See Utah R.Civ.P. 63(b). Due process most certainly requires that a similar rule apply in an administrative setting. See, e.g., Vali Convalescent & Care Institution v. Industrial Commission, 649 P.2d 33, 36-37 (Utah 1982). However, the present facts do not rise to that level. *1336Here, the administrative law judge did not act as patiently or courteously to the litigants as he should have acted. See Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 8, § A(3). His conduct, however, did not display disqualifiable bias or prejudice or deny the claimant due process. See State v. Logan, 286 Kan. 79, 86-88, 689 P.2d 778, 784-85 (1984); Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Committee, 300 Or. 415, 427-29, 712 P.2d 87, 95-97 (1985).
I think the majority should be cautious lest the grounds that are used today to overturn this proceeding in the name of fairness become a standard attack upon administrative or judicial rulings whenever some basis can be found in the record for arguing that the judge’s behavior was less than ideal on any given day.
HALL, C.J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.

. Apparently the majority agrees that the evi-dentiary ruling alone does not warrant reversal, since it reaches for the constitutional argument as a foundation for overturning the result below.