Court Opinion

ID: 9581146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:12:02.246205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:44.154971
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
Since I believe that the majority has ignored several persuasive authorities from other states and binding Georgia precedent that mandates that the plaintiff here be treated as an invitee and not a mere licensee, I must respectfully dissent.
Viewed most favorably to Howard, the evidence reveals that Howard accompanied her adult daughter to a local radio station *470pursuant to an invitation to the daughter to be interviewed at the station in connection with the daughter’s campaign for a city council position. The two women sat in the radio station’s lounge for some time and spoke with a radio station employee. This lounge area was the area designated for radio station guests and was not part of the off-limit or interior part of the station. Howard pointed out to her daughter a “Watch Your Step” sign in the front of the lounge and told her that apparently something was wrong with the passageway back to the studio and to be careful. Howard was injured as she moved over an unseen step-down in the lounge floor near a desk.
The majority erroneously concludes that, under the above circumstances, Howard was a mere licensee and therefore could not hold Gram liable for her injuries absent evidence that Gram wilfully or wantonly injured her. However, a more careful analysis reveals that Howard was an invitee and that Gram therefore owed her a higher level of duty.
An invitee is someone whom a landowner (by express or implied invitation) induces or leads to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose. OCGA § 51-3-1. A licensee is a person who is neither a customer, a servant, nor a trespasser, who does not stand in any contractual relation with the landowner, and who is permitted (expressly or impliedly) to go on the premises merely for his own interests, convenience, or gratification. OCGA § 51-3-2 (a). Thus,
[t]o determine whether a person is an invitee or a mere licensee, the nature of his relation or contact with the owner or occupier of the premises must be determined. The test is whether the injured person at the time of the injury had present business relations with the owner of the premises which would render his presence of mutual aid to both, or whether his presence on the premises was for his own convenience.
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Restaura, Inc. v. Singleton, 216 Ga. App. 887 (1) (456 SE2d 219) (1995).
Based on this standard, we have at times held that persons who are merely accompanying an invitee are on the premises for their own interests, convenience, or gratification and are therefore licensees. Restaura, supra, 216 Ga. App. at 887-888 (1); Venable v. Langford, 116 Ga. App. 257, 258-259 (2) (157 SE2d 34) (1967). Since the facts are undisputed that Howard had no present business relations with Gram but was simply accompanying her adult daughter to the scheduled interview, these cases would indicate that Howard was a licensee.
Nevertheless, a more recent case has held otherwise. Last year in Pye v. Reagin, 262 Ga. App. 490 (586 SE2d 5) (2003), we considered *471the status of a woman accompanying her friend to the doctor’s office. We held that the landowner owed to this woman the duties owed to an invitee, and we used this standard to determine the merits of the case. Id. at 491.
The conflict in this area of law gives us cause to consider the matter anew. In today’s society, it has become expected and known that friends and family often accompany invitees to places of business. Aparent will take his child to school; a friend will accompany an elderly patient to the doctor’s office; a neighbor will go to the store to assist a neighbor in deciding what to buy or simply to provide companionship; a spouse will drive the other spouse to the hospital and stay there to provide moral support; a family member may accompany an invited guest to a radio station lounge area that is open to the public.
Landowners who invite persons to their premises are certainly aware of this common occurrence and in fact deem this in their best business interests since without such companions invitees might well not come as often to the premises and provide the benefits to the landowner. In other words, the presence of the companion encourages the invitee to accept the invitation to come to the premises, which benefits the landowner. Cf. Etheridge Motors v. Haynie, 103 Ga. App. 676, 680 (3) (120 SE2d 317) (1961) (one who accompanies invitee/friend to business to inspect repair work occupies position of invitee). Other jurisdictions have made similar analyses. See Crane v. Smith, 144 P2d 356, 361 (Cal. 1943); Farrier v. Levin, 176 Cal. App.2d 791, 796 (1959); Nave v. Hixenbaugh, 304 P2d 482, 488 (Kan. 1956); Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. Duvelius, 173 NE 737, 740 (Ohio 1930). Indeed, as an FCC-regulated entity that has a duty to serve the public good and has a lounge area that is open for public use, the radio station here should have been keenly aware of the circumstances that would give rise to Howard being placed in the position of an invitee when she accompanied her daughter to an interview that was requested by the station.
The majority’s contention that our recent and binding authority of Pye v. Reagin, supra, does not dictate a necessary expansion of the invitee doctrine is unpersuasive. The fact that the injured party in Pye was a person who accompanied an invitee to a doctor’s office, and was still treated as an invitee for purposes of the analysis in the opinion, is a central proposition for which that case stands. The plaintiff in Pye ultimately did not prevail on her claim, because, as an invitee, she was unable to show that the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard that allegedly caused her injury. See Pye, supra, 262 Ga. App. at 491-492. The plaintiffs status as an invitee who accompanied a friend to a place of business in Pye spurred the *472critical area of analysis in that case, which analysis now dictates the proper decision in the present case.
Decided July 13, 2004
Nicola M. Bajalia, for appellant.
Alexander & Vann, William C. Sanders, for appellee.
Thus, those who accompany invitees are themselves implicit invitees and should therefore be entitled to the same standard of care that a landowner owes invitees. Those cases holding otherwise should be overruled. See Restaura, supra, 216 Ga. App. at 887-888 (1); Venable, supra, 116 Ga. App. at 258-259 (2).
Since Howard was an invitee, Gram could be liable to her for injuries caused by Gram’s failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping its premises and approaches safe. OCGA § 51-3-1. Failing to warn Howard of a hazard on the premises known to Gram could form the basis for finding a breach of Gram’s duty to her. See Berson v. American Golf Corp., 265 Ga. App. 772 (595 SE2d 622) (2004). Here the hazard on Gram’s premises was a level change (a “step-down”) in the floor of the lobby of the premises. The entire floor of the lobby, both the upper level and the lower level, was covered in the same solid-colored carpeting. No color change differentiated or emphasized the change in the floor level. Although there was a warning sign present (“Watch Your Step”), its placement did not clearly warn of the danger present in the lobby, as the sign was near the front and side of the lobby on the side where there was a hallway going back to the studio where it could allow a jury to decide that such sign warned visitors that the hazard lay in the hallway region as opposed to right in the middle of the lobby (the conclusion reached by Howard when she saw the sign). The two EMTs who came to Howard’s aid did not see the step-down and both tripped over the level change. Indeed, two Gram employees who knew of the level change both, on occasion, had stumbled over the level change. Thus, as the evidence was anything but plain and palpable as to the landowner’s negligence, summary judgment was inappropriate. See Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748 (2) (b) (493 SE2d 403) (1997) (the negligence of the defendant is generally not susceptible of summary adjudication; “summary judgment is granted only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed”).
I am authorized to state that Judge Barnes and Judge Phipps join in this dissent.