Court Opinion

ID: 9468209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:07:58.609115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:45.000205
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree that our previous judgment in this case should be reinstated, but I write separately to illustrate why, in my view, the reasoning in the prior opinion is consistent with Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S.--, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). ^
Although the thrust of the opinion in Scindia is to restrict the shipowners’ liability to longshoremen injured in the midst of stevedoring operations, the case does not proclaim that a vessel may never be found negligent in connection with mishaps suffered by longshoremen. The Supreme Court drafted at least two exceptions to the freshly promulgated policy against holding the shipowner responsible. First, the Court noted that it is “accepted that the vessel may be liable ... if it fails to exercise due care to avoid exposing longshoremen to harm from hazards they may encounter in areas or from equipment under the active control of the vessel during the stevedoring operation.” 101 S.Ct. at 1622. Second, the Court indicated that in some circumstances “positive law or custom” may impose on the shipowner “a duty of supervisory inspection to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of the cargo operations.” 101 S.Ct. at 1624.
Both of these principles are directly applicable to the case at hand. In our initial opinion we held that the shipowner maintained control over the manner in which the gangway was to be secured. 622 F.2d 1168, 1172 (3d Cir. 1980). Relying on testimony by the plaintiff’s expert, which was corroborated by the ship’s captain and second officer, we also affirmed the trial court’s finding that the evidence established a duty on the part of the shipowner to secure, maintain, and watch over the gangway. Id. at 1172. The source of this duty is the custom of “good seamanship” and the tradition of maritime law. The present case therefore comes within the circumstances delineated in Scindia, under which the shipowner may be found liable for injuries to longshoremen occurring during stevedoring operations. The vessel owner did not exercise due care with regard to the gangway area, which remained under the vessel’s active control, see 101 S.Ct. at 1622; and, the custom of admiralty dictates that the shipowner had a continuing duty to watch over and inform itself about hazards involving the gangway and the manner in which it was fastened to the ship, see 101 S.Ct. at 1624. Although this duty to inspect and supervise may be shared with the stevedore by contract, according to the trial testimony the shipowner may not transfer the ultimate responsibility.
The vessel owner argues that Scindia hinged on a distinction between equipment owned by the vessel and items owned by the stevedore. The previously quoted language in the Supreme Court’s opinion, which emphasizes control and duty, rather *530than ownership, is at variance with the shipowner’s interpretation of Scindia. Control over the defective condition remains a crucial factor in imposing liability. This conclusion is consistent with the policy underlying the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court disparaged rules that would “result in holding the shipowner solely liable for conditions that are attributable to the stevedore.” 101 S.Ct. at 1623. This result would come about when the owner has no control over a defective condition. When the owner retains a measure of control, however, a defect cannot fairly be attributed solely to the neglect of the stevedore. In the present case, for example, the jury found that both the stevedore and the owner had some control over the gangway and that both negligently breached their respective duties to monitor the way in which the gangway was attached to the ship.
Because our initial opinion in this matter correctly presaged the role the Supreme Court assigned in Scindia to control by the vessel owner over the area in question and to a customary duty to inspect, it remains viable. I therefore agree that the judgment for Sarauw must be reinstated.