Court Opinion

ID: 9859780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:37:40.854707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:05:26.773531
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: Although I fully agree with the majority opinion, I write specially because the handling of this case reveals that even experienced trial courts face serious uncertainties when applying section 115 — 10.1 of the Code. This special concurrence will attempt to provide some clarification of that statute. When the State called Washington to testify in defendant’s trial, he claimed not to recall who was with him when he committed the same home invasion for which defendant was then on trial. (Washington had pleaded guilty and the trial court sentenced him a few months earlier for that home invasion.) The State then repeatedly asked Washington whether he was asked certain questions at his sentencing hearing and gave certain answers under oath in response. The trial court overruled defendant’s objections to these questions, and Washington answered that he could not remember. When the State later attempted to present the extrinsic evidence of Washington’s prior inconsistent statements — namely, the transcript of his testimony from his sentencing hearing — defendant objected, in part, on the ground that he had not been given the opportunity to cross-examine Washington when he made the prior statements at the sentencing hearing. The trial court sustained defendant’s objection, although it is not clear from the record whether its ruling was on that particular ground. On appeal, defendant argues that section 115 — 10.1 of the Code: “does not cover the situation present in this case. First, the statute pertains to ‘evidence of a statement made by a witness,’ not to the prosecutor’s reading from the transcript of the witness’ former testimony. Second, the statute only applies when the witness at a trial, hearing[,] or other proceeding has acknowledged under oath the making of the statement. 725 ILCS 5/115 — 10.1(B) [(West 1996)]. That is not this [sic] case here.” Defendant’s arguments both to the trial court and to this court are totally without merit. Laying the foundation for the admission of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence under section 115 — 10.1 of the Code is essentially the same as laying the foundation to impeach a witness with his prior inconsistent statement. In People v. Hallbeck, 227 Ill. App. 3d 59, 62-63, 590 N.E.2d 971, 972-73 (1992), the second district addressed the foundational requirements of section 115 — 10.1 and wrote the following: “A proper foundation must be laid before prior inconsistent statements are allowed into evidence. Part of the necessary foundation is asking the witness whether he made the inconsistent statement. [Citations.] Generally, the questioner must direct the attention of the witness to the time, place, and circumstances of the statement and its substance. [Citation.] The witness must have an opportunity to explain the inconsistency before the introduction of extrinsic evidence of the statement; this requirement prevents unfair surprise and gives the witness an opportunity to explain any inconsistency.” Further, a witness’ prior testimony does not need to directly contradict testimony given at trial to be considered “inconsistent,” as section 115 — 10.1 of the Code uses that term. In People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 87, 538 N.E.2d 481, 488 (1989), quoting United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 608 (7th Cir. 1984), the supreme court held that the term “inconsistent” in section 115 — 10.1 is not limited to direct contradictions but also includes “ ‘evasive answers, *** silence, or changes in position.’ ” Importantly, the Flores court also held that “ ‘where a witness now claims to be unable to recollect [the] matter [at issue], a former affirmation of it should be admitted as a contradiction’ ” under section 115 — 10.1 of the Code. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 87, 538 N.E.2d at 488. In addition, the supreme court has explained that section 115 — 10.1 does not require a minimum number of inconsistencies before a prior statement can be deemed “inconsistent” under that section. The court added that “[i]f the General Assembly had intended such a prerequisite, it could have provided for it in the statute.” People v. Salazar, 126 Ill. 2d 424, 458, 535 N.E.2d 766, 780 (1988). Thus, in the present case, the prosecutor was entirely correct in confronting Washington, when he testified as a State witness, with the prior inconsistent statements he made at his sentencing hearing after he claimed that he could not remember defendant’s involvement in the home invasion at issue. To lay the foundation for extrinsic evidence of what Washington said at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor first had to confront Washington with those portions of his prior testimony that were inconsistent with his testimony at trial. Defendant’s objection at trial — that the State should not be permitted to do so because defendant was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Washington at the time he gave the prior statements — constituted legal nonsense, which the trial court should have summarily rejected.