Court Opinion

ID: 6969450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-24 01:59:43.508058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:09.458453
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Wilkin delivered the opinion of the court: The chief ground urged by appellant for a reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court is the falsity of the answer to one of the questions appearing in the medical examination of the insured. On the back of the application made by appellee, in what purports to be the medical examination of the insured, this question and answer appear: “Q. — How many brothers dead? Ans.— None.” The medical examination is certified- to by the medical examiner, as follows: “I certify that I have, this 7th day of October, 1895, made a personal examination of tb,e above named person, (Richard Wagner,) and that the above answers are in my own handwriting, and that the signature of the applicant or person examined was written in my presence. M. J. McKenna, M.D.” Preceding the medical examiner’s certificate, and immediately at the end of the series of questions and answers referred to in the certificate,"of which the quoted question is one, appears the following language, to which is affixed the signature of Richard Wagner, the insured: “I hereby declare and warrant that the answers to the above questions, and the statements made in the application on the other side hereof, are true, and were written by me or by my proper agent, and that said answers and statements, together with this warranty, shall form the basis of any contract of insurance that may be entered into between me and the Globe Mutual Insurance Association, and that if a contract of insurance is issued it shall not be binding on the company unless, upon its date and delivery, I shall be in sound health.” On the front side of the sheet, on the back of which is the medical examination and statement signed, as above, by the insured, is the application by appellee for the policy, and over her signature appears the following: “I hereby make application for the policy described above, and as an inducement to the association to issue a policy, and as a consideration therefor, make the agreement as to agency, and all other agreements and warranties contained in the medical examination, as fully as if I had signed the same.” It appears from the evidence that a brother of the insured died in London, England, more than four years prior to the date of the application for insurance'in this case, but there is no evidence tending to show that the insured ever knew of his brother’s death. Appellant asserts, however, that, whether he knew of it or not, the statement that none of his brothers were dead is a warranty, and being untrue, avoids the policy. Appellee contends that the statement, though false, is not a warranty, but a mere representation, which, unless material, would not avoid the policy. In the absence of explicit, unequivocal stipulations requiring such an interpretation, it should not be inferred that the insured or the appellee took a life policy with the distinct uiiderstanding that it should be void if any statements made in the medical examination should be false, whether the insured was conscious of the falsity thereof or not. (Moulor v. American Life Ins. Co. 111 U. S. 335.) Whether or not the deceased knew of the death of his brother at the time of the application for insurance was a question for the jury, and no evidence of such knowledge appears in the record. To hold that, as a precedent to any binding contract, he should guarantee absolutely that none of his brothers were dead would be unreasonable, in the absence of a more explicit stipulation than here appears. It not infrequently happens that a man loses trace of all or a part of his relations, and to hold him to absolutely guarantee that they were living, in order that he might obtain insurance, would sometimes be to require an impossibility, and would be almost absurd. What is said in Moulor v. American Life Ins. Co. supra, is peculiarly applicable to the case at bar. In that case the insured made a false statement as to his having had certain diseases, and “warranted that the above are fair and true answers.” The court say: “The entire argument in behalf of the company proceeds upon a too literal interpretation of those clauses in the policy and application which declare the contract null and void if the answers of the insured to the questions propounded to him were in any respect untrue. What was meant by ‘true’ and ‘untrue’ answers? In one sense, that only is true which is conformable to the actual state of things. In that sense a statement is untrue which does not express things exactly as they are, but in another, and broader sense, the word ‘true’ is often used as a synonym of honest; sincere; not fraudulent. Looking at all the clauses in the application, in connection with the policy, it is reasonably clear — certainly the contrary cannot be confidently asserted — that what the company required of the applicant as a condition precedent to .any binding contract was, that he would observe the utmost good faith towards it, and make full, direct and honest answers to all questions, without evasion or fraud, and without suppression, misrepresentation or concealment of facts with which the company ought to be made acquainted; and that by so doing, and only by so doing", would he be deemed to have made fair and true answers.” In that case the untrue statements were held to be representations, and not warranties, and we think, on the same reasoning", the answer here in question should be so held, and in the absence of proof by the company of fraud or intentional misstatement on the part of the insured the policy was not rendered invalid merely because the answer proved to be false. We are satisfied the court below committed no reversible error, and the judgment of that court will, be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.