Court Opinion

ID: 9906231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 15:03:28.906102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:12.467573
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                          SECOND DISTRICT

                FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

                               Petitioner,

                                    v.

                   JULIANNE M. HOLT, Public Defender,

                              Respondent.

                              No. 2D23-729

                           November 29, 2023

Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough
County, Samantha Lee Ward, Judge.

Charles T. Martin, Jr., Assistant General Counsel, Daniel A. Johnson,
Deputy General Counsel, and Lance Eric Neff, General Counsel,
Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, and Rocky W. Brancato, Assistant
Public Defender, Tampa, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

      The Department of Corrections petitions for a writ of quo warranto
to preclude the Thirteenth Circuit Public Defender's representation of
Nathaniel O'Neal in a pending civil restitution lien proceeding. We grant
the petition.
                                      I.
      O'Neal is serving a life sentence for first-degree murder. This court
affirmed his conviction and sentence. O'Neal v. State, 244 So. 3d 215
(Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (table decision).
      In September 2022, the department filed in the circuit court a
motion to impose a civil restitution lien pursuant to section 960.293,
Florida Statutes (2022). The court thereafter granted the public
defender's motion to be appointed as O'Neal's counsel in the matter.
      The public defender opposed imposition of the lien, arguing that
the department would enforce it by garnishing O'Neal's inmate trust
account. Such a garnishment would make O'Neal's punishment less
bearable because he would be unable to make purchases from the
canteen. The motion also alleged that the department is selectively
seeking civil restitution liens as a form of punishment. The public
defender maintained that in this case the department is seeking a lien in
retaliation against O'Neal for filing a federal civil rights action against the
department and to offset any potential judgment arising from that action.
      The department moved to vacate the public defender's
appointment, asserting that proceedings to impose a restitution lien are
civil in nature, for which O'Neal is not entitled to representation by the
public defender.
      The circuit court observed that the public defender has raised
substantial claims on behalf of O'Neal and that the assistance of counsel
is essential to a fair and thorough presentation of those claims. It denied
the department's motion, relying on Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363
(Fla. 1979), and Graham v. Vann, 394 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
The court, citing Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(b)(2), further
reasoned that the civil restitution proceeding was adversarial in nature

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because it arose from the criminal action against O'Neal. Finally, the
court posited that appointment of the public defender is authorized
under section 27.51(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes (2023), because the civil
restitution proceedings are ancillary to a state criminal charge.
                                   II.
      We issued an order to show cause why the department's petition
should not be dismissed for lack of standing. Having considered the
parties' arguments on that question, we discharge the order to show
cause.
      "In quo warranto proceedings seeking the enforcement of a public
right the people are the real party to the action and the person bringing
suit 'need not show that he has any real or personal interest in it.' "
Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989) (footnote
omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Pooser v. Wester, 170 So. 736, 737 (Fla.
1936)). "[A]ctions in the nature of quo warranto to question the authority
for the exercise of rights, privileges[,] and powers derived from the state
can be brought by any person." Macnamara v. Kissimmee River Valley
Sportsmans' Ass'n, 648 So. 2d 155, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (second
alteration in original). In this case, the public right is to have the public
defender perform her duties in a constitutional manner. See Martinez,
545 So. 2d at 1339 n.3.
      Here, the secretary of the department, as a citizen and taxpayer,
has standing to petition for quo warranto, regardless of whether he or the
department is affected by the public defender's actions. See Thompson v.
DeSantis, 301 So. 3d 180, 184 (Fla. 2020).
                                    III.
      Turning to the merits of the petition, we note that quo warranto
may be employed to challenge a public defender's representation of a
party on the basis that the public defender is without legal authority to

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undertake the representation. See State v. Grate, 252 So. 3d 351, 352
(Fla. 5th DCA 2018); see also State, Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v.
Schreiber, 561 So. 2d 1236, 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The public
defender's authority to undertake representation of any party emanates
from section 27.51, which prescribes public defenders' duties.
      That statute "generally provides that public defenders shall
represent indigents who have been charged or arrested for a variety of
criminal offenses that could result in imprisonment and in a limited
number of civil proceedings that threaten their liberty interests, as well
as in all indigent criminal direct appeals." Grate, 252 So. 3d at 353; see
also State ex rel. Smith v. Jorandby, 498 So. 2d 948, 950 (Fla. 1986)
(reasoning that section 27.51 "permits representation by a public
defender only in circumstances entailing prosecution by the state
threatening an indigent's liberty interest"). Further, the public defender's
duties under chapter 27 include representing an indigent defendant who
seeks to collaterally attack a judgment and sentence, but only when due
process mandates the appointment of counsel. See Russo v. Akers, 724
So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 1998); see also § 924.051(9), Fla. Stat. (2022)
("Funds, resources, or employees of this state or its political subdivisions
may not be used, directly or indirectly, in appellate or collateral
proceedings unless the use is constitutionally or statutorily mandated.").
      Pertinent here, section 960.293(2) provides that "[u]pon conviction,
a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for
damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional
costs."1 The State may seek these damages in a civil action or as a

      1 Such damages are liquidated.   For a life or capital felony, the
offender is liable for $250,000. § 960.293(2)(a). Otherwise, an offender

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counterclaim in any civil action. § 960.297(1). However, the court of
conviction also retains jurisdiction to impose a civil restitution lien for
the "duration of the sentence or up to [five] years from release from
incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later." § 960.292(2);
Wilson v. State, 957 So. 2d 683, 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
      Proceedings to impose civil restitution liens pursuant to section
960.293 are civil in nature. See Goad v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 845 So. 2d
880, 884–85 (Fla. 2003); Welsh v. State, 47 So. 3d 332, 332 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2010); Doctor v. State, 679 So. 2d 76, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996);
Rosero v. State, 668 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The fact
that the court of conviction has jurisdiction to impose the lien does not
render the proceedings criminal. Rather, the criminal court's authority
to impose the civil restitution lien reflects the legislature's intention to
create an accelerated method of imposing a civil restitution judgment.
See Rosero, 668 So. 2d at 1115.
      The public defender is not authorized to represent O'Neal in this
civil restitution lien proceeding because it is civil in nature and does not
implicate O'Neal's liberty interests. Further, defending against the
department's efforts to obtain a civil restitution lien under section
960.293(2) does not invoke the due process concerns that justify the
appointment of counsel in postconviction relief proceedings.
      The authorities relied on by the circuit court do not authorize
appointment of public defenders in civil restitution lien proceedings.
Graham addressed the right to counsel in state and federal collateral
relief proceedings for death row inmates. 372 So. 2d at 1365. The test

is liable for $50 per day based on the length of the sentence imposed.
§ 960.293(2)(b).

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announced in Graham has been applied to determine when a defendant
is entitled to counsel in postconviction relief proceedings generally. See
Russo, 724 So. 2d at 1152; Rowe v. State, 777 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Fla.
2d DCA 2001). The civil restitution proceedings at issue in this case are
civil in nature and do not involve any sort of collateral attack on O'Neal's
judgment and sentence.
      In Vann, the First District affirmed the public defender's
representation of inmates in a habeas proceeding challenging the
conditions of their incarceration. 394 So. 2d at 180. The inmates
alleged they were being denied basic constitutional rights due to the
"violent conditions in the prison, inadequate staff training, overcrowded
conditions and physical plant deficiencies." Id. at 179. No such liberty
interests are at stake here.
      We acknowledge the circuit court's authority to appoint counsel
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(b)(2), which
provides:
      Counsel may be provided to indigent persons in all
      proceedings arising from the initiation of a criminal action
      against a defendant, including postconviction proceedings
      and appeals therefrom, extradition proceedings, mental
      competency proceedings, and other proceedings that are
      adversary in nature, regardless of the designation of the court
      in which they occur or the classification of the proceedings as
      civil or criminal.

But the general authority to appoint counsel is not the same as the
authority to appoint the public defender. See, e.g., Yacucci v. Hershey,
549 So. 2d 782, 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (reversing the appointment of
the public defender's office in a dependency proceeding, holding that rule
3.111(b)(2) "however does not give any indication that said counsel can
be the public defender's office").

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     Finally, the public defender is not authorized to represent O'Neal
because civil restitution proceedings are not "ancillary to a state charge"
under section 27.51(1)(b)4, which provides:
     The public defender shall represent, without additional
     compensation, any person determined to be indigent under s.
     27.52 and . . . [u]nder arrest for, or charged with . . . [a]
     violation of a special law or county or municipal ordinance
     ancillary to a state charge, or if not ancillary to a state charge,
     only if the public defender contracts with the county or
     municipality to provide representation pursuant to ss. 27.54
     and 125.69.
Because this civil restitution lien proceeding is not founded on a violation
of a special law or county or municipal ordinance, the public defender's
appointment is not authorized by section 27.51(1)(b)4.
     Accordingly, we grant the department's petition. The public
defender may not represent O'Neal in the subject civil restitution lien
proceeding.
     Petition granted.

NORTHCUTT, VILLANTI, and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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