Court Opinion

ID: 9584258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:46:05.406442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:17.684742
License: Public Domain

SCHUDSON, J.
(dissenting). Following our previous reversal of this case, the trial court, scheduling the evidentiary hearing and considering whether Delgado would be allowed to attend, commented:
I'll put this over, for two weeks, allow you [defense counsel] a chance to talk to your client. . . and tell us ... what your position is with respect to additional testimony, and also I think you need to address whether Mr. Delgado has to be here for that hearing, and I'll tell you that I am trying to do this in a way, if we have to take more testimony from this juror, that makes it as easy for her as possible, and frankly, I don't think she needs to be in a courtroom with the defendant. I don't think it's necessary. I think that adds to the trauma to her, and if it's not legally required, I'm not inclined to do it.
[T]his woman... has paid an exceedingly high price for performing her civic duty at this point, and I want to minimize that as much as possible. So unless it's legally required for Mr. Delgado to be at *34that hearing when we take testimony from that juror, if that's what we have to do, I'm not inclined to have him here.
(Emphasis added.) At the evidentiary hearing that followed more than four months later, the trial court decided to take testimony from the juror in the jury room because that setting "would be a little easier.... I think that would be less intimidating for [the juror]." The trial court began the hearing by addressing her:
[F]irst of all, I want to assure you as best I can that you are not in any trouble in connection with this case. This is not about building any kind of a record or doing anything so that anybody can take any action against you. Okay.
What has occurred in this case is that based on a concern about what occurred during voir dire in reference to information that was given or not given, for reasons that we may get into a little bit this morning, the Court of Appeals felt that there was some question about whether or not Mr. Delgado got — was tried by a fair and impartial and unbiased jury. So the only — the only focus of this hearing and this whole procedure is to determine whether or not Mr. Delgado should get a new trial.
It's not about whether or not anything should happen to you or that you're in any trouble. So as best I can assure you, I want to tell you that you're not in any trouble. There is nothing that's going to occur as a result of this hearing that's going to be focused on you. It's only going to be focused on whether or not we need to provide a different trial for Mr. Delgado.
Although the trial court had indicated that it would "give counsel an opportunity to ask questions after [it had] completed [its] questions," and that it *35"may allow the attorneys some limited opportunity to ask questions," it did not do so. Instead, the trial court examined the juror briefly (the transcript, including the trial court's questions and its reading back of testimony from the previous evidentiary hearing, totals fifteen pages), declined to ask many of defense counsel's submitted questions, denied defense counsel's request to ask "follow-up questions" on a number of subjects covered in the juror's testimony, and declined to ask those questions on counsel's behalf.
After concluding its questioning of the juror, the trial court thanked her and then stated:
I'm sorry for — I do want to say that, having now conducted this hearing, I apologize on behalf of the system that you had to go through this twice. I think we ask an awful lot of citizens, although I think it's an obligation and a responsibility on their part, it[ ] still requires commitment to come down here and participate in a jury trial, and it is a sacrifice, and we understand that, and we appreciate that. But then to have to come back and to go through this kind of process twice I think is — it's asking more than we should of citizen jurors, I think, but I appreciate very much your willingness to come in here and your willingness to answer the questions, and I hope that you can now put all this behind you.
Although in isolation, or in a different legal context, the trial court's efforts to place the juror at ease could very well be commendable, in this case they resulted in an abbreviated hearing that failed to provide a full and fair examination of the juror's possible bias. Indeed, given the trial court's stated intention to make the hearing "as easy for her as possible," and its apology for requiring her to return for the hearing, it is *36difficult to deflect the impression that the trial court's apparent point of view influenced several of its discretionary decisions.
(1) Delgado's presence at the hearing
As the majority explains, a defendant does not have the right to be present at a postconviction eviden-tiary hearing unless it involves a substantial factual issue related to events in which the defendant participated. This does not mean, however, that a defendant's presence is prohibited, or that a defendant's presence would not aid in the development of a full and fair hearing. Even when the subject of a hearing does not involve an event in which the defendant participated, a trial court still has discretion to allow the defendant's presence. Indeed, "a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the proceeding." Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (evaluating whether a defendant has the right to be present at the competency hearing to determine whether a child will be allowed to testify in a sexual abuse case).
In this case, from its first comments to its final apology, the trial court focused on the comfort of the juror. It never considered whether Delgado's "presence would contribute to the fairness of the proceeding." Had the trial court focused more clearly on the juror's possible bias, it might well have perceived the importance of Delgado's presence. After all, the juror's credibility was at issue and, indeed, because of her failure to respond accurately during voir dire and her. failure to provide a plausible explanation for that failure (not to mention her disclosure of the concealed information to convince a holdout juror), her credibility *37was at least doubly suspect. Thus, even though the subject of the juror's testimony did not involve events in which Delgado had been directly involved, his presence could have motivated important testimony.1
Thus, although the majority is correct in concluding that Delgado did not have the statutory right to be at the hearing, the majority is incorrect in failing to fully apply the very legal principle it additionally cites: "whether to permit the defendant to be present at the postconviction hearing is within the trial court's discretion." Majority op. at 23. The majority addresses only whether Delgado had "any personal knowledge of either [the juror's] history [as a sexual-assault victim] or whether the juror was biased against him." Majority op. at 24. Of course, he did not. But the majority fails to consider, just as the trial court failed to consider, whether Delgado's presence would "contribute to the fairness of the proceeding" and, if so, whether that contribution would be outweighed by any unfairness his presence might produce.
*38Despite the fact that this was a hearing to examine the juror's possible bias, and despite the fact that the juror's credibility was at issue, the trial court focused on the comfort of the juror to the exclusion of the consideration of whether Delgado's "presence would contribute to the fairness of the proceeding." Thus, the trial court failed to exercise lawful discretion.
(2) Counsel's questioning of the juror
Citing After Hour Welding, Inc. v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734, 743, 324 N.W.2d 686, 691 (1982), the majority states, "Neither the defendant nor his or her lawyer is permitted to question the juror directly." Majority op. at 25. That, however, is not quite what After Hour Welding says. The supreme court wrote:
[Tjhe trial court should examine the juror under oath only as to the circumstances under which the statements were made and not as to what effect they had, if made, on himself as a juror or on the other jurors. The judge must then determine whether he is convinced by clear and satisfactory evidence the statements were made and determine as a matter of law the probable effect of them upon a hypothetical average jury.
The judge should conduct the examination of jurors called, but the attorneys may submit questions to the judge they wish asked.
After Hour Welding, 108 Wis. 2d at 742-43, 324 N.W.2d at 691-92. In After Hour Welding, the supreme court was discussing, the procedure a trial court should employ at a hearing to determine whether, under Rule 906.06(2), Stats., "extraneous prejudicial information *39was improperly brought to the jury's attention," id. at 738, 324 N.W.2d at 689, not whether a juror was biased.2 Further, the issue in After Hour Welding was not whether the trial court or counsel should conduct *40the questioning. Thus, After Hour Welding does not stand for the remarkable proposition that, in a hearing to examine a juror's possible bias, a trial court may never exercise discretion to allow counsel to question the juror.
I certainly can conceive of circumstances in which a trial judge, properly exercising discretion, would conclude that he or she should pose all of counsels' and the court's questions. Yet I cannot conceive of any circumstance in which a trial judge, as a matter of law, should be prohibited from exercising discretion to allow counsel to question a juror whose possible bias is at issue. In this case, although twice indicating that counsel likely would be allowed to question the juror, the trial court ultimately denied defense counsel the chance to do so. The record reflects no explanation for the trial court's change of heart. The record reflects no exercise of discretion. The record overall, however, suggests that the trial court's preclusion of questioning by defense counsel was in keeping with its intention to make the hearing "as easy for [the juror] as possible." This, once again, apparently blurred the trial court's focus on "the fairness of the proceeding." Therefore, I conclude that the trial court also failed to exercise lawful discretion in deciding whether counsel would be allowed to question the juror.
(3) Counsel's additional and follow-up questions
Regardless of whether counsel or the court posed the questions, the majority concludes that "Delgado is partially correct, however, when he asserts that the *41trial court erroneously limited the scope of its inquiry." Majority op. at 25.1 agree. I do not agree, however, that the omission of the defense questions was "de minimis." Majority op. at 30.
Although I do have some disagreement with the majority's assessment of which additional questions should have been permitted, rather than parsing out the questions and debating their relevance to juror bias, I think it is far more important to consider all the questions and the overwhelming impression gained from the entire hearing. The conclusion, I think, is inescapable: as conducted by the trial court, the hearing did nothing more than provide the juror the opportunity to declare her fairness. Indeed, true to its stated intention, the trial court did make the hearing "as easy for her as possible.”
Thus, whether the trial court should have posed counsel's additional and follow-up questions or permitted counsel to do so, the failure of anyone to ask those questions (and perhaps others that could have logically followed) allowed a juror of dubious credibility to declare her fairness without the slightest concern that, in the trial court's reassuring prefatory words, she was "in any trouble." With the juror's answers unchallenged and her credibility untested, the transcript provides the questions and answers to which one could point in order to proclaim that the juror was unbiased. The record as a whole, however, allows only for the conclusion that a meaningful hearing never took place.
(4) Defendant's request to call additional jurors as witnesses
The majority correctly explains that, in this case, because our prior reversal recognized that the juror had not responded accurately on voir dire, no testi*42mony from other jurors was necessary to determine whether the juror failed to reveal potentially prejudicial information. Majority op. at 31-32. The majority, however, leaps from that undisputed proposition to the unconnected conclusion that Delgado was properly precluded from calling other jurors to testify regarding the juror's comments. The leap is neither legal nor logical.
What the juror said to other jurors during deliberations may be critical to a court's evaluation of the juror's credibility and possible bias. To restrict a hearing to the juror's account of his or her comments during deliberations — to preclude testimony from the only eleven people who could counter the juror's account — is to preempt a fair evaluation of credibility and bias.
Because the trial court did not conduct or permit counsel to conduct a meaningful examination of the juror and, therefore, because it is impossible to know what the juror might have testified in a full and fair hearing, it is impossible to say whether additional jurors would have been necessary. It is clear, however, that in order to evaluate the juror's credibility and determine her possible bias, testimony from other jurors might prove to be relevant. Therefore, on remand, I would instruct the trial court to defer the decision of whether to allow additional jurors to testify until the completion of a meaningful examination of the juror whose credibility and bias are at issue. If, at that point, it is clear that the determinations of credibility and possible bias may turn on the juror's account of what she said during deliberations, other jurors should be permitted to testify.
(5) Conclusion
By the time this sexual assault case came before the trial court for its second postconviction evidentiary *43hearing, the record established that the juror had failed to answer important voir dire questions accurately, . and had failed to provide a plausible explanation for that failure. The record also established that, during deliberations, the juror confronted a holdout juror with an argument for conviction based on the revelation of her own sexual assault victimization — the very information she had concealed during voir dire. Although it remains possible that, despite these facts, a trial court could conclude that the juror was unbiased, such a conclusion cannot be reached based on the record of this hearing.
Quite obviously, the trial court failed to exercise discretion as one would when determining what procedures a fact-finder should employ in order to undertake the careful and perhaps uncomfortable evaluation of the credibility of a juror — particularly a juror who has given considerable reason for concern about her credibility. Instead, the trial court carried out the analysis seeking to make the hearing "as easy for her as possible." The trial court accomplished that goal; that goal, however, was not the purpose of the hearing we ordered.
We remanded this case for a meaningful hearing to determine the juror's possible bias. That hearing has yet to take place. Therefore, I would remand again and require the trial court not only to be considerate of the juror and all other witnesses who may testify, but also to exercise discretion in fashioning procedures to assure "the fairness of the proceeding." In determining whether Delgado should be present, and in selecting both the questions and questioners, I would require the trial court to exercise discretion with full concentration on "the fairness of the proceeding," not on the often incompatible concern for making the hearing "as easy *44for [the juror] as possible." Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 As the Supreme Court has emphasized:
The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it. A witness "may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts. He can now understand what sort of human being that man is." It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person "to his face" than "behind his back." In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly.
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (citation omitted). Although in Coy the Supreme Court was considering the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, its commonsense assessment of how a person-to-person meeting may motivate truthfulness also is instructive in considering whether such person-to-person "presence would contribute to the fairness of the proceeding."

 The distinction, I think, is significant. After all, at a hearing on whether extraneous prejudicial information came to the jury, the juror-witnesses would not be on the "hot seat" (with the possible exception of a juror who may have been the source of such information). The jurors' credibility would rarely be at issue and cross-examining questions rarely would be needed to uncover the truth. By contrast, however, in a hearing on juror bias, the juror necessarily occupies the "hot seat," credibility often is at issue, and cross-examining questions may be crucial.
Factually, After Hour Welding, Inc. v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734, 324 N.W.2d 686 (1982), is somewhat difficult to analyze because, in a sense, it presents a mixed situation — that is, it is a case in which the extraneous information was introduced by jurors who may have been biased. Analytically, therefore, the following two hypothetical situations may be more helpful in clarifying the "hot seat" distinction I am attempting to draw:
(1) Twelve unbiased jurors are deliberating. A bailiff walks in and tells them, "Incidentally, I think you should know that the defendant has numerous prior convictions for the same kind of crime." The twelve jurors remain unbiased, but the fairness of the verdict has been destroyed by the introduction of extraneous information. At the postconviction motion hearing, the jurors will be witnesses, but the only witness on the "hot seat" will be the bailiff.
(2) Eleven unbiased jurors are deliberating. What they do not realize, however, is that the twelfth juror is the brother of the victim. Although he never discloses that to the other eleven, and although no extraneous information ever comes to them, the fairness of the verdict has been destroyed by juror bias. At the postconviction motion hearing, only the twelfth juror will occupy the "hot seat," and rightfully so.
The "hot seat" status of the jurors in these two hypothetical situations is significantly different. The procedures productive of a fair postconviction hearing in each may be very different as *40well. Thus, the After Hour Welding standard of the first hypothetical simply does not satisfy the needs of the second.