Court Opinion

ID: 9471869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:43:03.402595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:37.065611
License: Public Domain

GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
John E. Demarinis appeals from the Assistant Secretary of Labor’s decision that he is ineligible for Redwood Employee Protection Program (REPP) benefits under Title II of the Redwood National Park Expansion Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-250, §§ 201-13, 92 Stat. 163, 172-82.
Demarinis was employed as a lab technician for over nine years with the Samoa Lumber Mill of the Louisiana-Pacific Corporation. In early November, 1978, the hourly employees went on strike, and Demarinis was temporarily assigned to an eight-hour graveyard shift tending the boiler. During this period he worked overtime to complete his regular duties as a lab technician. On November 8, 1978, he refused to work a twelve-hour graveyard shift tending the boiler, and was discharged from his position as a lab technician. Demarinis testified before the administrative law judge that he *1267did not refuse to work, but rather sought to be reassigned away from the graveyard shift.
The California Employment Development Department (EDD) found Demarinis eligible for both State unemployment compensation benefits and REPP benefits. An administrative law judge affirmed on the grounds that the refusal to work constituted a voluntary leaving with “good cause” as defined in Cal.Unemp.Ins.Code § 1256. De-marinis began collecting his benefits.
Several months later, the EDD changed its eligibility policy and decided that a voluntary leaving with good cause did not constitute a qualifying layoff as defined in the Redwood Act. Demarinis was issued a notice that because he voluntarily left his employment and therefore was not “laid off”, he was not an eligible employee under the Redwood Act. An ALJ and the Secretary affirmed the EDD’s new determination of ineligibility.
This appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation. Title II of the Act, section 213(f), provides that where there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the Act, the Secretary shall adopt the construction which is the most favorable to employees. See Local 3—98, International Woodworkers of America v. Donovan, 713 F.2d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1983). This rule also applies to the interpretation of Redwood Act regulations. David v. Donovan, 698 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.1983).
In this case the Secretary’s own regulations preclude him from reconsidering De-marinis’ eligibility for REPP benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 92.50(c) provides that the EDD may reconsider determinations of eligibility on the same terms and under the same conditions as it may reconsider its own determinations made under California unemployment insurance statutes and regulations.
The California Unemployment Insurance Code, § 1332(a), provides that a determination may be reconsidered within twenty days after mailing or service of the notice of determination. The Secretary clearly has not met this time limit. The Secretary claims that California unemployment insurance regulations permit him to reconsider Demarinis’ claim, citing 22 Cal.Adm.Code §§ 1326-1 through 1326-6. Section 1326-1(b)(4), which describes the “usual procedures” followed in handling a claim, see § 1326-l(b), comes closest to supporting the Secretary. This subsection says that the claimant reports periodically to the EDD for an interview concerning his or her efforts to find work, and states that the interview “is designed’ to discover any potential eligibility issue.” This language at most authorizes the Secretary to redetermine a claimant’s eligibility if the factual situation changes, e.g., if he or she finds another job. It does not authorize him to reconsider eligibility when he changes his interpretation of the applicable law, because the interviews are not designed to discover changes in the law.
The Secretary is bound by his own regulations. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3101, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7:21 (2d ed. 1979). He is not permitted to redetermine whether De-marinis quit or was laid off now that the 20 day period has expired.
In a somewhat similar case we held on equitable grounds that the Secretary was not free to redetermine whether an employee had been laid off before or after the effective date of the Act many months after the state agency had found the worker to be eligible. See Egbert v. Donovan, 720 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.1983).
Construing the statutory scheme as a whole, we hold that the Secretary was time barred from redetermining Demarinis’ eligibility and that the petition must be allowed.
Judgment for Petitioner.