Court Opinion

ID: 9892339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:05:00.496114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:17.956820
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/23/23 P. v. Vicente CA4/2

                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079594

 v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. RIF2003251)

 SANTOS VICENTE,                                                          OPINION

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Steven G. Counelis,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and A.

Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorney Generals, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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       A jury found defendant and appellant Santos Vicente guilty of rape and sodomy

of a child under 14 years old and more than seven years younger than defendant (Pen.

Code, § 269, subds. (a)(1) & (a)(3))1; and two counts of a lewd act upon a child under

14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term

of 30 years to life.

       Defendant raises three issues on appeal. First, defendant asserts the trial court

erred by admitting evidence of uncharged conduct. (Evid. Code, § 1108.) Second,

defendant contends the trial court violated his federal right of due process by not

instructing the jury on lesser included offenses. Third, defendant contends that

cumulatively, the foregoing alleged errors created a denial of due process. We affirm.

                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.      BACKGROUND

       The victim has three sisters. Defendant dated Sister-1, who has a child.

Defendant’s relationship with Sister-1 lasted approximately one year. During that time,

defendant transported Sister-1’s child to and from the home where the victim lived with

her family. Defendant’s crimes against the victim occurred in July 2020, when the

victim was 13 years old.

       B.      UNCHARGED CONDUCT

       Sister-2 is approximately 14 years older than the victim, so she was 27 years old

in July 2020. Sister-2 was unmarried and has two children. One day, Sister-2 was

       1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

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alone cleaning the kitchen in the home she shared with the victim. Defendant arrived to

drop off Sister-1’s child. Defendant told Sister-2 that he wanted to touch Sister-2, and

“[h]e tried to get to [her].” Sister-2 “told him that, No, that it wasn’t right.” Sister-2

told defendant to leave, and he eventually apologized and left the house. The prosecutor

asked Sister-2, “How did he try to get to you? What do you mean?” Sister-2 replied, “I

don’t know with what attention [sic] he was coming to. But I felt something bad, and I

told him not to.”

       C.     MOTION

       The People moved in limine to introduce defendant’s conduct with Sister-2

because it demonstrated “a common scheme and plan by the defendant in how he would

groom his girlfriend’s sisters before acting on his sexual desires.” Defense counsel

argued that there were no similarities between the charged offenses and defendant

asking to touch an adult female, i.e., Sister-2. The trial court found the events involving

Sister-2 “provide a high degree of relevance to the intent necessary for the charged

crimes,” and granted the People’s motion.

                                      DISCUSSION

       A.     EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1108

       Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the uncharged

conduct involving Sister-2. We agree but find the error to be harmless.

       When a defendant “is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s

commission of another sexual offense or offenses” may be admitted. (Evid. Code,

§ 1108, subd. (a).) “ ‘Sexual offense’ means a crime under the law of a state or of the

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United States,” such as “[c]ontact, without consent, between any part of the defendant’s

body or an object and the genitals or anus of another person.” (Evid. Code, § 1108,

subd. (d)(1)(C).)

       The uncharged conduct involving Sister-2, as described in this record, was not a

sexual offense. The conduct involved defendant stating his hope to touch an adult,

which is not a crime. Because the uncharged conduct did not involve a sexual offense,

the trial court erred by admitting it. (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).)

       We examine whether the error was harmless. The issue in this case was consent.

Defendant argued that the victim was a willing partner. The People argued that

defendant forced himself upon the victim. The evidence that Sister-2 rejected

defendant, and defendant apologized and left the home, supports a finding that

defendant stops when there is a lack of consent. It demonstrates that defendant

understands “no means no.” Thus, in this case, which was about consent, the evidence

of defendant’s uncharged conduct with Sister-2 was harmless because it was favorable

to defendant on the topic of consent—the sole issue in the case.

       Defendant’s trial counsel used the evidence in his closing argument to the jury:

“[Sister-2] told you that [defendant] approached her and said, I would like to touch you.

Asked, never touched her, never made any attempts to touch her. The conversation was

there. And then [Sister-2] rejected him. And then there was no further action taken on

the part of [defendant], and nothing but apologies, and that was it.

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       “That—I would assert to you that it’s indicative that [defendant] understands

boundaries. And if someone tells him no, if someone tells you I’m not interested in

you, if someone tells you, I don’t want to do anything with you, he understands those

boundaries and he respects them and he doesn’t pursue it any further. [¶] That is

circumstantial evidence that everything that [the victim] is telling you is called into

question. Because if she’s saying no, no, don’t touch me, don’t do all these things,

[defendant] wouldn’t have done those things.”

       In sum, the evidence involving Sister-2 was helpful to defendant because it

tended to demonstrate that defendant would not have acted without consent.

Accordingly, the trial court’s error in admitting the evidence was harmless. (See Cal.

Const., art. VI, § 13 [“miscarriage of justice” needed for reversal]; People v. Nguyen

(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1120 [applying the “reasonably probable” harmless error

standard].)

       B.     DUE PROCESS

              1.     PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The People charged defendant with: aggravated sexual assault of a child, in the

form of rape (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)) (Count 1); aggravated sexual assault of a child, in the

form of sodomy (§ 269, subd. (a)(3)) (Count 2); and two counts of a lewd act upon a

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child (§ 288, subd. (a)) (Counts 3 & 4) as lesser included offenses of Counts 1 and 2.

The trial court denied defendant’s request for a statutory rape instruction.2

       Defendant’s theory of the case was that the 13-year-old victim consented. In

closing argument to the jury, defendant’s trial counsel argued, “Count 3 and Count 4,

288(a), if you notice there is no issue in regards to whether consent was rendered. It’s

not an element. It’s not something you can consider. It doesn’t matter. When you have

sex with somebody who’s under 14 and you have the elements that are present in Count

3 and Count 4, that means that a crime was committed. [¶] Count 1 and Count 2, the

critical issue here [is consent].” Defense counsel continued, “And it wasn’t rape. And

it wasn’t sodomy. But there was sex. There’s no issue there. You’re not here to

determine that. It happened. [¶] So hold [defendant] accountable for what he did do

wrong, what he is responsible for, which is Count 3 and Count 4.”

              2.     ANALYSIS

       Defendant contends the trial court violated his right of due process because

defendant’s theory of the case was that the victim consented to intercourse and sodomy,

and, by omitting instructions for statutory rape (§ 261.5, subd. (a)) and sodomy with a

minor (§ 286, subd. (b)(1)), the trial court only instructed the jury on the People’s theory

of the case. Defendant asserts, “[T]he trial court unfairly forced the jurors to either

accept the prosecutor’s theory of the case, or to acquit [defendant].”

       2 “[S]tatutory rape is a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual
assault/forcible rape under the statutory elements test.” (People v. Vasquez (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 107, 113.)

                                             6
       A defendant’s due process “right to present a defense ‘would be empty if it did

not entail the further right to an instruction that allowed the jury to consider the

defense.’ ” (Bradley v. Duncan (2002 9th Cir.) 315 F.3d 1091, 1099.) Lack of consent

is not an element of a lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). (People v. Soto (2011)

51 Cal.4th 229, 238.) When instructing the jury on the offense of a lewd act upon a

child (§ 288, subd. (a)), the trial court informed the jury, “It is not a defense that the

child may have consented to the act.” (CALCRIM No. 1110.)

       Lack of consent is an element of aggravated sexual assault of a child. (§§ 261,

subd. (a)(2) [“against a person’s will”]; 286, subd. (c)(2)(A) [same] & 269, subds. (a)(1)

& (a)(3).) When instructing the jury on aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269,

subds. (a)(1) & (a)(3)), the trial court informed the jury that a victim’s lack of consent is

an element of the offense. (CALCRIM Nos. 1000 & 1030.) Further, the trial court

explained, “The defendant is not guilty of [aggravated sexual assault of a child] if he

actually and reasonably believed that the other person consented to the act.”

       The trial court provided the jury with instructions regarding consent. If the jury

believed that the victim consented, then it could have acquitted defendant on the charges

of aggravated sexual assault of a child (Counts 1 & 2) and convicted him only of lewd

acts upon a child (Counts 3 & 4). Accordingly, defendant’s right of due process was not

violated because the jury received instructions relevant to the defense of consent.

       C.     CUMULATIVE EFFECT

       Defendant contends that when the foregoing alleged errors are considered

together, their combined effect caused a denial of due process. We found a single error;

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therefore, there are not errors to cumulate. (See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th

543, 606 [rejecting cumulative prejudice contention].)

                                       DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                     MILLER
                                                                                         J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                      Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
                                  J.

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