Court Opinion

ID: 9942455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 01:12:18.740231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:06.951054
License: Public Domain

02/20/2024
                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                              AT KNOXVILLE
                               Assigned on Briefs January 2, 2024

                                         IN RE MACEE M.

                     Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County
                      No. 202463-1      John F. Weaver, Chancellor
                         ___________________________________

                                 No. E2023-00985-COA-R3-PT
                            ___________________________________

The father and stepmother of Macee M. filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental
rights on three grounds. The trial court found that one ground had been proven,
abandonment for failure to support, and that termination of the mother’s parental rights
was in Macee’s best interest. Based on these findings, the mother’s parental rights were
terminated. The mother appeals. We affirm the termination of her parental rights.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J. STEVEN
STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.

Jennifer L. Chadwell, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the appellant, Elisa M. W.1

Theodore Kern, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Shannon and Thomas L.

                                                OPINION

                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Thomas L. (“Father”) and Elisa M. W. (“Mother”) are the natural parents of Macee
M., born in June of 2012. Father and Mother were never married. However, the Circuit
Court for Hamilton County, Tennessee entered a parentage order in November of 2015
establishing Father’s parentage.

        1
          This court has a policy of protecting the identity of children by initializing the last names of the
children, parents, close relatives, and pre-adoptive parents and by not providing the child’s exact birth date.
       On January 30, 2019, Father filed a petition for custody in the Hamilton County
Juvenile Court. Soon after, as the trial court explained, “the decline in the Mother’s parental
status began to accelerate.” On September 20, 2019, the juvenile court adjudged the child
dependent and neglected and granted legal custody to Father.

       Almost two years later, on May 13, 2021, Father and his wife, Shannon L.,
(collectively “Petitioners”) filed a petition for termination of parental rights and adoption
against Mother in the Knox County Chancery Court. The petition alleged three grounds for
termination of Mother’s parental rights: (1) abandonment due to failure to pay support,
Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); (2) persistence of
conditions which led to removal of the child from Mother’s care, Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3); and (3) failure to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and
willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for
the child, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14).

        On June 16, 2021, Mother filed a pro se answer to the petition. The case was tried
over four days throughout several months, specifically, on July 26, 2022, September 20,
2022, November 3, 2022, and January 12, 2023. On the first day of trial, Mother, through
counsel, filed an amended answer; however, the initial answer and first amended answer
did not include the affirmative defense of lack of willfulness to the claim of abandonment
for failure to support. Then, on September 13, 2022, Mother filed a motion to amend her
answer to include the affirmative defense to the abandonment claim. After hearing
arguments on the motion during the second day of trial, the trial court granted the motion
and a second amended answer was filed. After two additional days of trial, the court took
the matter under advisement.

       On June 8, 2023, the trial court issued a written memorandum opinion and judgment
and termination of parental rights in which it found that Petitioners had proven by clear
and convincing evidence the ground of abandonment for failure to provide support for
Macee and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Macee’s best interest. Based
on these findings the court granted the petition and terminated Mother’s parental rights.

        This appeal followed.

                                                 ISSUES

       The sole issue presented by Mother is whether the trial court erred in finding that
Petitioners proved the ground of abandonment for failure to support.2

        For their part, Petitioners raise two issues:
        2
          Although Mother only raises this one issue, this court has an affirmative duty to also consider
whether termination of her parental rights is in Macee’s best interest. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d
507, 525 (Tenn. 2016).
                                                   -2-
       1. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to terminate the parental rights of
          [Mother] based on failure to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and
          willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
          responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and
          physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or
          psychological welfare of the child.

       2. Whether the Trial Court correctly determined that termination of [Mother’s]
          parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their
children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling,
92 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tenn. 2002). “[T]his right is not absolute and parental rights may be
terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence justifying such termination under the
applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).

       “To terminate parental rights, a court must determine that clear and convincing
evidence proves not only that statutory grounds exist but also that termination is in the
child’s best interest.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-113(c)). “Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm
belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or
substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re Bernard T., 319
S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010) (citation omitted). “The clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard ensures that the facts are established as highly probable, rather than as simply
more probable than not.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522.

       In an appeal, “this [c]ourt is required ‘to review thoroughly the trial court’s findings
as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in the child’s best
interests.’” In re Connor B., 603 S.W.3d 773, 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting In re
Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525). In doing so, we must “determine whether the trial
court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006).
Stated another way, we must make our “own determination as to whether the facts, either
as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to
clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.” In
re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524.

      The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record with a
presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. Tenn.

                                             -3-
R. App. P. 13(d). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo with no presumption
of correctness. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524.

                                             ANALYSIS

                     I.      ABANDONMENT FOR FAILURE TO SUPPORT

      The trial court found that Petitioners had proven one ground for termination of
Mother’s parental rights, that Mother had abandoned Macee by failing to support her
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §36-1-113(g)(1) in that she had made no voluntary
payments during the four-month statutory time period.3 Mother contends this was error.

        A parent’s rights may be terminated upon a showing of clear and convincing
evidence of abandonment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1), (g)(1). Petitioners contend
that Mother abandoned Macee by failing to financially support her under the statutory
definition, which reads in pertinent part:

       (1)(A) For purposes of terminating the parental or guardian rights of a parent
       or parents or a guardian or guardians of a child to that child in order to make
       that child available for adoption, “abandonment” means that:

               (i) For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately
               preceding the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any
               amended petition to terminate the parental rights of the parent
               or parents . . . of the child who is the subject of the petition for
               termination of parental rights or adoption, that the parent or
               parents . . . have failed to support or have failed to make
               reasonable payments toward the support of the child[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A) (2020). Failure to support is further defined as the
failure to provide monetary support or more than token payments for the statutory period,
and the ability to make only small payments is not a defense to failure to make any
payments. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(D).

        This court applies the versions of the parental termination statutes in effect on the
date the petition was filed. In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017)
(holding “that the version of the statute in effect at the time of the petition’s filing controls
this action”). While the statute previously required the party seeking termination to prove
that the failure to support was willful, see In re Mattie L., 618 S.W.3d 335, 345–46 (Tenn.

       3
         The petition was filed on May 13, 2021; therefore, the determinative period for abandonment is
from January 13, 2021, through May 12, 2021.

                                                 -4-
2021), an absence of willfulness is now an affirmative defense that must be established by
the parent.4 The statute in effect when this petition was filed on May 13, 2021, provides in
pertinent part:

        (I) For purposes of this subdivision (1), it shall be a defense to abandonment
        for failure to visit or failure to support that a parent or guardian’s failure to
        visit or support was not willful. The parent or guardian shall bear the burden
        of proof that the failure to visit or support was not willful. Such defense must
        be established by a preponderance of evidence. The absence of willfulness is
        an affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
        Procedure.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I) (2020).

       “Failure to support is willful when a parent is aware of the duty to support and has
the ability but makes no attempt to provide support and has no justifiable excuse for failure
to do so.” In re Mattie L., 618 S.W.3d at 345. See also In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838,
863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

        Failure to visit or support a child is “willful” when a person is aware of his
        or her duty to visit or support, has the capacity to do so, makes no attempt to
        do so, and has no justifiable excuse for not doing so. . . . Failure to visit or to
        support is not excused by another person’s conduct unless the conduct
        actually prevents the person with the obligation from performing his or her
        duty . . . or amounts to a significant restraint of or interference with the
        parent’s efforts to support or develop a relationship with the child.

In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 864 (citations and footnotes omitted).

        Mother relies on the fact that a child support payment of $6,361.00 was made on
April 5, 2021, which was within the relevant four-month period. Additionally, she notes,
that after this payment was made, Mother’s total child support arrearage was only $498.00.
However, she admits that she made no other payments of financial support during the
relevant four-month period.

       Petitioners counter arguing that Mother made no “voluntary” support payments
during the relevant period, the only child support payment was the income tax intercept
received on April 5, 2021, and that an involuntary income tax intercept is not considered

        4
         Prior to 2018, the statute defined abandonment as a showing that the parent “willfully failed to
support or . . . willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) (effective July 1, 2016, to June 30, 2018); see In re Preston H., No. M2022-
00786-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 6793215, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2023).

                                                  -5-
as a child support payment for purposes of determining abandonment. The trial court
agreed, finding:

       The Mother’s only payment of support for the child during the period of four
       months immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of the
       Mother’s parental rights was by tax refund intercept on April 5, 2021 in the
       amount of $6361. However, a payment of child support via an intercept by
       the Internal Revenue Service does not constitute a voluntary payment of child
       support by the Mother during the statutory four-month period. See In re
       Bryce F., No. E2014-01380-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 7403826, at *13 (Tenn.
       Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2014); In re Kadean T., No. M2013-02684-COA-R3-PT,
       2014 WL 5511984, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2014); and In re Ima D.,
       No. M2021-00022-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 5441832, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App.
       Nov. 22, 2021). This payment is the only factual matter of defense raised in
       the Mother’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the claim
       that the Mother had “abandoned” the child by her failure to pay support for
       the four continuous months prior to the filing of the petition.

(Citations to the record omitted.)

       As the trial court correctly noted, we considered the import of a tax intercept in
several cases, including in In re Kadean T., No. M2013-02684-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL
5511984 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2014), In re Lavanie L., No. E2008-02622-COA-R3-PT,
2009 WL 3231091 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009), and In re Alyssa Y., No. E2012-02274-
COA-R3-PT, 2013 WL 3103592, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2013). As is the case
here, with the exception of a tax intercept, the parent in Kadean T. provided no support
during the four-month period.

       But for the $838 tax intercept which was received during the relevant period,
       it is uncontroverted that Mother provided no support during the four-month
       period. The trial court found that the tax intercept did not qualify as a support
       payment by Mother; because it was not a voluntary payment of child support.
       Mother contends this was error, however, she cites no authority that supports
       her position and we have identified authority that supports the trial court’s
       ruling.

       In In re Lavanie L., No. E2008-02622-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 3231091
       (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009), the mother made a similar argument; she
       contended that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) does not require that child
       support payments be made willfully or voluntarily. Id. at *6 (emphasis
       added). It was her contention all that mattered was that support was received
       during the relevant period, and “as long as a payment is made, it does not

                                             -6-
       matter how that payment was made, nor does it matter whether it was made
       willingly.” Id. We found the assertion without merit, stating:

              As far as this court is concerned, she did willfully fail to make
              her child support payments. As a result, the State had to resort
              to other measures and intercept her income tax return to recoup
              those payments. Furthermore, her failure to pay child support
              is particularly disturbing because she had a tax refund for the
              State to intercept, showing that she had earnings from which
              she could have paid support. Due to her willful failure to make
              appropriate child support payments for a period of four months
              preceding the filing of the Petition for Termination, we affirm
              the trial court’s ruling that Mother was in violation of Tenn.
              Code Ann. § 36 -1-113(g)(1).

       Id.

       The above rationale was followed in In re Alyssa Y., No. E2012-02274-COA-
       R3-PT, 2013 WL 3103592, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2013), in which
       we stated:

              The fact that Mother’s tax refund was intercepted and applied
              to her child support obligation is not relevant. In re Lavanie L.,
              No. E2008-02622-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 3231091, at *6
              (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009). As this Court noted in Lavanie,
              the interception of a tax refund does not constitute a voluntary
              payment of child support. Id.

       Id.; see also In re Adoption of Alexander M.S.F., 2013 WL 4677886, at *5
       (holding a tax intercept is “irrelevant to the issue of willful failure to support”
       and does not constitute a voluntary payment of support).

       Based on the foregoing authority, the trial court correctly concluded that the
       tax intercept would not be considered in determining whether Mother failed
       to support her child during the relevant period.

In re Kadean T., 2014 WL 5511984, at *6–7.

       We acknowledge Mother’s argument that an income tax intercept is akin to a child
support wage assignment for which a parent is credited as providing support; however, she
provides no authority to support her contention on this point. As Petitioners note in their
argument, “a wage assignment is an administrative method of streamlining collection of
current child support obligations. An income tax intercept is a collection of a past due debt

                                              -7-
following a judgment of arrears against the obligor.” Thus, we find Mother’s contention
on this issue unpersuasive.

       Mother also contends that she did not willfully fail to pay support because she lacked
the income to provide any support. While she claimed to be unable to work due to physical
and mental health issues, both she and her husband testified that she worked for her
husband’s lawn care business in 2020 and 2021 for which she was compensated. Further,
there would have been no funds to intercept had she not earned taxable income. More
importantly, Mother failed to establish that she was unable to work during the relevant
four-month period and her testimony concerning her inability to work is not only
inconsistent, but it is contradicted by her own testimony and that of her husband. This is
significant because, as noted earlier, an absence of willfulness is now an affirmative
defense that must be established by the parent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I); see
also In re Preston H., 2023 WL 6793215, at *12. Specifically, the statute provides:

          (I) For purposes of this subdivision (1), it shall be a defense to abandonment
          for failure to visit or failure to support that a parent or guardian’s failure to
          visit or support was not willful. The parent or guardian shall bear the
          burden of proof that the failure to visit or support was not willful. Such
          defense must be established by a preponderance of evidence. The absence
          of willfulness is an affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the
          Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I) (2020) (emphasis added). And Mother failed to prove
by a preponderance of evidence that her failure to support Macee was not willful.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Petitioners proved
the ground of abandonment by failing to pay support during the relevant four-month period.

    II.       FAILURE TO MANIFEST AN ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO ASSUME CUSTODY

       Petitioners contend that the trial court erred by failing to find that Mother failed to
manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody or financial
responsibility of Macee pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14). We
disagree.

          The statute defines this ground as when

          A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and
          willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
          responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and
          physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or
          psychological welfare of the child[.]

                                                -8-
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14).

       This ground requires that the petitioner prove two elements by clear and convincing
evidence. First, the petitioner must prove that the parent failed to manifest “an ability and
willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of
the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Second, the petitioner must prove that
placing the child in the parent’s “legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial
harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
113(g)(14). Both elements must be satisfied for this ground to be established. In re Neveah
M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674 (Tenn. 2020).

       As for the first element, our Supreme Court has explained that the petitioner must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “has failed to manifest either ability
or willingness.” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 677. If either is proven, then the first
element is satisfied. Id.

       With regard to the second element, the court has not identified a set list of
circumstances that would constitute substantial harm because of the varied forms of
conduct in which substantial harm can arise. However, this court has stated that “substantial
harm” would indicate two things. “First, it connotes a real hazard or danger that is not
minor, trivial, or insignificant. Second, it indicates that the harm must be more than a
theoretical possibility.” In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL
3058280, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018) (quoting Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 732
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)).

       In its analysis of this issue, the trial court found:

       The evidence is clear and convincing, as discussed above, that the Mother
       has not demonstrated a willingness to personally assume financial
       responsibility for the child. However, this Court otherwise disagrees with the
       Co-Petitioners that the evidence is clear and convincing that the Mother has
       failed to show an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and
       physical custody of the child.

       The trial court’s analysis of this issue continued with the finding that Mother

       has not been permitted to have coparenting time with the child since
       December 19, 2019. Also, as of the Juvenile Court Magistrate’s findings and
       recommendations of February 12, 2020, the Mother has not been permitted
       to have any real-time contact with the child, with her contact being limited
       to “written communications by letter or email to said child but no
       photographs.”

                                              -9-
        Based on our review of the trial court’s additional analysis, it is readily apparent
that the trial court was troubled by the fact that the magistrate in juvenile court allowed
Mother’s access to and communications with Macee to be controlled and blocked by the
therapist who had been hired by Petitioners.5 The trial court was also troubled by the fact
that Mother’s access was also controlled by Macee, who was a mere child at the time. As
the trial court noted in its final order:

        As discussed above, on April 28, 2021, the Juvenile Court Magistrate
        provided that the “[t]he mother’s coparenting time is at the discretion of
        the child and the child’s therapist” and that there would be “[n]o further
        reviews.” As stated by the Co-Petitioners in their proposed findings and
        conclusions, the Mother’s “path to reestablish her relationship with [the
        child] has been to work with Dr. Juliet Thomas, [the child’s] therapist.” [See
        Petitioners’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, filed
        December 15, 2022, p.6]. However, the therapist was retained by the Co-
        Petitioners and compensated by them. The child is in the custody and
        control of the Co-Petitioners and is, to say the obvious, a child. Moreover,
        although no copy of the petition was filed as an exhibit, the Mother testified
        that she had a petition pending in the Hamilton County Juvenile Court for
        visitation and contact with the child when the Co-Petitioners commenced this
        parental termination action. That petition demonstrates the Mother’s
        persistence in attempting to regain a relationship with her child.

        The evidence in the record does not preponderate against these findings.
Furthermore, considering the above facts, as well as others in the record, we agree with the
trial court’s conclusion that the evidence fails to clearly and convincingly establish this
ground. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that Petitioners have not
proven this ground.

                                   III.     BEST INTEREST FACTORS

       Because we have, however, determined that the ground of abandonment by failure
to provide support has been established upon which to terminate Mother’s parental rights,
our focus shifts to whether it is in Macee’s best interest that Mother’s rights be terminated.6
In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 877.

        5
         Additionally, in its discussion of the best interest factors, the trial court noted in pertinent part:
“While the Court is concerned with the role and authority given to the therapist in the dependency
and neglect proceedings, this Court found the therapist to be a competent and credible witness. See
generally Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d 834, 838–39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing unlawful
delegation of judicial authority to non-judge).” (Emphasis added).
        6
            Mother did not challenge the trial court’s finding that it was in Macee’s best interest that Mother’s
                                                      - 10 -
       “When a parent has been found to be unfit by establishment of at least one statutory
ground for termination of parental rights, as here, the interests of parent and child diverge,
and the focus shifts to what is in the child’s best interest.” In re Jude M., 619 S.W.3d 224,
244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020). As such, the courts must review each factor “from the child’s,
rather than the parent’s perspective.” In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681 (Tenn.
2017).

       Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
for courts to consider in determining whether termination is in a child’s best interest.7
“These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party to the termination
proceedings is free to offer proof of any other factor relevant to the best interest analysis.”
In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d at 681–82.

       The trial court conducted a thorough analysis of the relevant factors, which we
discuss below.

       Regarding statutory factor (A), the trial court concluded that termination of
Mother’s parental rights was necessary for Macee’s stability and continuity of placement.
Specifically, the court found that:

        The child does not trust the Mother and is conscious of the Mother’s not
        being normal. The child wants to be adopted by Shannon [L.], her stepmother
        and the co-petitioner in this matter. Attempts to continue interaction between
        the Mother and the child have been problematic. According to the child’s
        therapist, the denial of this petition would be traumatic to the child.
        Conversely, the Mother produced Christmas cards from the child expressive
        of the child’s love for her Mother. However, the child has subsequently
        started a new life and is thriving without interference or distraction from her
        Mother. The child’s therapist testified that the child’s emotional health
        improved with the restricting and elimination of contact with her Mother.

       Having reviewed the record, we have determined that the evidence preponderates
in favor of these findings.

parental rights be terminated. Nevertheless, this court has an affirmative duty to consider whether
termination of her parental rights is in Macee’s best interest. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525.
Accordingly, we shall conduct the requisite analysis of the best interest factors.
        7
          The statute was amended in 2021, prior to the commencement of this action, and the trial court
correctly identified and considered the factors set forth in the amended version of Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (2021).
                                                  - 11 -
       As to statutory factor (B), the court found that “changing the child’s current
environment and the denial of this petition, as stated above, would be traumatic for the
child.” The evidence preponderates in favor of this finding.

        As to statutory factor (C), whether Mother had met the child’s needs, the court made
the following findings:

       [T]he Mother financially abandoned the child during the period of four (4)
       continuous months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to
       terminate her parental rights. The child-support records indicate that the
       Mother has never made any direct payments of support when not subject to
       a wage assignment. The Mother did not pay support for the child as ordered
       by the Juvenile Court. The Mother did not pay her share of the child’s
       medical expenses. Also, aside from the child’s material needs, according to
       the testimony of the child’s therapist, the Mother failed to conform or correct
       her behavior so that she could have a stable relationship with the child.

       Having reviewed the record, we have determined that the evidence preponderates
in favor of these findings.

        As to statutory factor (D), the court found, based on the therapist’s testimony, that
Macee “currently has no attachment to her Mother and that a mother-child relationship
between the child and the Mother is not foreseeable.” The evidence preponderates in favor
of this finding.

       As to statutory factor (E), regarding Mother’s regular visitation to cultivate a
positive relationship, the trial court found:

       [T]he child’s therapist testified that the Mother did not use contact with the
       child in a positive way. The Juvenile Court progressively restricted or
       eliminated the Mother’s parenting time and communication with the child to
       no parenting time except at the discretion of the therapist and the child and
       to no communication except such as might be initiated by the child. Even
       when the Mother had face-to-face parenting time and telephone
       communication available to her, she did not take full advantage of the
       contact. Likewise, the Mother did not take full advantage of written
       communication with the child.

       Having reviewed the record, we have determined that the evidence preponderates
in favor of these findings.

      As to statutory factor (F), “[w]hether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s
home,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(F), the court found:

                                           - 12 -
         [T]he child witnessed violence between the Mother and her husband in their
         home. The therapist opined that the presence of the Mother’s husband would
         cause traumatic stress to the child because of the physical violence and
         arguments that the child witnessed between the Mother and her husband. The
         child had reported to the therapist that the child had witnessed her Mother’s
         husband hitting her.

         The evidence preponderates in favor of these findings.

       As to statutory factor (G), the court found that “the Mother’s husband would trigger
or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or posttraumatic symptoms. Also, as stated
above, the child witnessed her Mother’s husband hitting her.” The evidence supports these
findings.

        As to statutory factor (H), the court found that Macee “is attached not only to her
Father but to her stepmother and her step siblings. She stated to the therapist that she wants
her stepmother to be her mother. She calls her stepmother ‘mom.’” The evidence supports
these findings.

       The trial court found that statutory factor (I) was not significant for this case, and
we agree. It also found that there was “scant evidence” relevant to statutory factor (J), other
than that “Mother continues to struggle with mental health issues.” Again, we agree.

         As to statutory factor (K), the court made the following findings:

         [T]here is little or no evidence as to the Mother’s taking advantage of
         available programs, services, or community resources to assist in making a
         lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions. The Mother did,
         however, testify that she has taken parenting classes and that she is compliant
         with her mental health treatment and medications and that she and her
         husband attend marriage counseling. There was no corroborating evidence,
         however, that the Mother has her mental health issues under control.

       Having reviewed the record, we have determined that the evidence preponderates
in favor of these findings.

         The court found that statutory factor (L) was not applicable to this case, and we
agree.

       As to statutory factor (M), the court found: “Mother has not demonstrated a sense
of urgency in seeking custody of the child or addressing the circumstances, conduct, or

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conditions that began with the Hamilton County Circuit Court in limiting her coparenting
time to supervised visitation.” The evidence preponderates in favor of these findings.

      As to statutory factor (N), the court noted that the juvenile court ruled that Macee
was dependent and neglected while in Mother’s custody. The court further found:

        The evidence establishes that the Mother’s husband engaged in physical
        abuse toward the Mother and that the child witnessed the abuse. The Co-
        Petitioners testified that the Mother’s home was untidy and unsanitary. While
        the Mother disputed that testimony, this Court finds the Co-Petitioners’
        testimony to be more credible. The Father also testified that the child had
        extensive dental problems and was lacking in dental care. However, the
        Father and the Mother enjoyed equal coparenting time and no explanation
        was provided as to why the Father had not obtained dental care for the child
        earlier.

       Having reviewed the record, we have determined that the evidence preponderates
in favor of these findings.

      As to statutory factor (O), the trial court found that the evidence was insufficient to
determine whether Mother ever provided safe and stable care for Macee. We agree.

       As to statutory factor (Q),8 the court found that Mother has not demonstrated that
she has the ability and commitment to create and maintain a suitable home that meets
Macee’s needs. To the contrary, the court found “Mother does not understand the child’s
basic and specific needs necessary for the child to thrive.” The evidence preponderates in
favor of this finding.

       As to statutory factor (R), regarding the health and safety of Mother’s home
environment, the court found that the evidence was insufficient to make a finding, and we
agree.

        As to statutory factor (S), the court found, “Mother has not consistently provided
more than token financial support for the child.” The evidence preponderates in favor of
this finding.

        As to statutory factor (T), the trial court made the following finding:

        8
          Statutory factor (P) concerns whether the parent has demonstrated “an understanding of the basic
and specific needs required for the child to thrive.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(P). The trial court made
no written finding concerning factor (P). Nevertheless, other findings made by the trial court relate to this
subject, which findings are noted elsewhere.
                                                   - 14 -
       Mother testified that she has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and that
       she currently takes medication for depression. In prior court hearings, the
       Mother testified that she had been misdiagnosed with bipolar disorder but
       had been diagnosed with attention deficient/hyperactivity disorder, bulimia
       nervosa, and depression. The Mother testified that she could not remember
       the name of her current counselor. The Mother has a history of not complying
       with medical directives such as driving an automobile when she was not
       medically cleared to do so due to seizures resulting in a major single car crash
       in January 2020. Again, as set forth above, the Mother does not understand
       the child’s basic and specific needs for the child to thrive.

       Having reviewed the record, we have determined that the evidence preponderates
in favor of these findings.

       In summation of its best interest analysis, the trial court found as follows:

       None of the above statutory factors exist to disfavor termination of the
       Mother’s parental rights or to indicate that termination of her parental rights
       is not in the child’s best interest. On the other hand, the “combined weight”
       of the Court’s factual findings above “amounts to clear and convincing
       evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Riley B., [No.
       E2022-00684-COA-R3-PT,] 2023 WL 3477216 at *9 [(Tenn. Ct. App. May
       16, 2023)].

       Thus, based on the combined effect of these and other findings of fact, the trial court
concluded that Petitioners had proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the
best interest of Macee for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated.

        “Facts considered in the best interests analysis must be proven by ‘a preponderance
of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.’” In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d at
681 (citations omitted). Having reviewed the record and the trial court’s findings, we have
determined that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s best interest
findings.

       Having made this determination, we must now consider the combined weight of
these facts to determine whether they amount to clear and convincing evidence that
termination is in the child’s best interests. Id.; see also In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533,
555–56 (Tenn. 2015). Having done so, we find, as the trial court did, that the combined
weight of these facts proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s
parental rights is in the best interest of Macee.

       Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s
parental rights is in Macee’s best interest.

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        Having affirmed the trial court’s determination that grounds have been proven and
that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child, we affirm
the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

                                     IN CONCLUSION

       Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that a ground for termination
of Mother’s parental rights was proven and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is
in the best interest of Macee. Accordingly, we also affirm the termination of Mother’s
parental rights. Costs of appeal are assessed against the appellant, Elisa M. W.

                                                    ________________________________
                                                    FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.

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