Court Opinion

ID: 9907142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 19:00:55.280502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:26.844023
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60307     Document: 00516989691        Page: 1   Date Filed: 12/05/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                              FILED
                                                                   December 5, 2023
                                 No. 22-60307                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                              Clerk

   Samuel De Jesus Argueta-Hernandez,

                                                                   Petitioner,

                                      versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                 Respondent.
                  ______________________________

                     Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A094 753 033
                  ______________________________

                   ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING
                     AND REHEARING EN BANC

   Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
         As neither a member of this panel, nor judge in active service,
   requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc, the petitions for
   rehearing en banc are DENIED. Fed. R. App. P. 35 and 5th Cir. R.
   35. The petition for panel rehearing is GRANTED. We withdraw our
   previous opinion and substitute the following:
Case: 22-60307     Document: 00516989691          Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/05/2023

                                   No. 22-60307

          Samuel de Jesus Argueta-Hernandez seeks review of the Board of
   Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his application for withholding of
   removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
   While living in El Salvador, a leader of the infamous gang, MS-13, and other
   gang members targeted and threatened Argueta-Hernandez and his family.
   Despite finding him credible, and despite police reports and evidence
   corroborating the gang’s threats and attempt to kill Argueta-Hernandez’s
   son, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his claims and ordered him
   removed from the United States.
          Although we owe deference to the BIA, that deference is not blind.
   Here, where the BIA misapplied prevailing case law, disregarded crucial
   evidence, and failed to adequately support its decisions, we are compelled to
   grant the petition for review, vacate the immigration court decisions, and
   remand to BIA for further proceedings.
                                     I. Background
         Argueta-Hernandez is a native and citizen of El Salvador who first
   entered the United States without inspection. An IJ ordered his removal to
   El Salvador on March 30, 2007. Argueta-Hernandez reentered the United
   States in 2019 and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
   reinstated his 2007 removal order on September 19, 2019.
         Following his removal, an asylum officer conducted a reasonable fear
   interview of Argueta-Hernandez in June 2021.         During his interview,
   Argueta-Hernandez stated that members of the violent and formidable MS-
   13 gang repeatedly threatened the lives of him and his family, that MS-13
   stalked and surveilled them, that MS-13 caused his son to crash his
   motorcycle when its known assassin followed him, and that four Salvadoran

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   government agencies 1 said his life is in danger, but they cannot protect him.
   The gang threats began in 2018 after Argueta-Hernandez refused to pay rent
   to, or collaborate with them because “he did not want to be complicit with
   their ‘evil doings.’” Argueta-Hernandez testified that he was the President
   of Evangelism at his Christian church and, as time went on, the Salvadoran
   anti-gang unit officials explained that MS-13 is targeting him “because he is
   a Christian.” He also testified that Salvadoran officials detained him for
   three weeks in an anti-gang unit safe house. Furthermore, he could not safely
   relocate in El Salvador “because [MS-13] operates communication networks
   in all neighborhoods and throughout the region.”                       DHS initiated
   withholding-of-removal proceedings because an asylum officer found that
   Argueta-Hernandez was credible and had a reasonable fear of torture in El
   Salvador.
           Subsequently, the IJ determined that Argueta-Hernandez was
   credible, and witnesses corroborated his testimony. The IJ found that
   Argueta-Hernandez’s reports of death threats against him and his family,
   claims that MS-13 targeted him based on his religion, and allegations that
   MS-13 attempted to kill his son were supported by credible testimony, police
   reports,    and     other    evidence.         Importantly,      Argueta-Hernandez
   supplemented the testimonial evidence with United States Department of
   State country conditions reports from the relevant years detailing gang
   threats to religious individuals, and expert analysis placing “the risk of
   torture or death as extremely likely” for Argueta-Hernandez. Nonetheless,
   the IJ concluded that Argueta-Hernandez failed to show that he had suffered
   past persecution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ

           _____________________
           1
              As the IJ found, Argueta-Hernandez sought help from four separate government
   offices: the National Civil Police, the Anti-Gang Unit, the Human Right’s Office, and the
   Prosecutor’s Office.

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   explained that “[m]ere verbal threats are generally insufficient to constitute
   persecution.” Furthermore, the IJ ruled that the harm was not because of
   Argueta-Hernandez’s religion, as MS-13 allegedly “never stated that they
   were threatening [him] solely because of his involvement with the Church of
   God.” Instead, the IJ concluded that he was targeted because of “his
   reputation as a good person . . . in the community.”
           With respect to his CAT claim, Argueta-Hernandez provided
   testimony that El Salvador’s prosecutor’s office said there was nothing it
   could do for him except provide a document certifying that he could not stay
   in El Salvador.       Salvadoran police asked Argueta-Hernandez to sign a
   document waiving its liability if MS-13 finds and tortures him. Following his
   three-week detainment by the anti-gang unit, Salvadoran police put Argueta-
   Hernandez in a taxi to the Guatemalan border. Despite finding that the
   officials from each of the Salvadoran agency offices told him there was
   nowhere in El Salvador that “he would be safe,” the IJ ruled that the
   Salvadoran government is willing and able to protect Argueta-Hernandez.
           On September 23, 2021, the IJ ordered Argueta-Hernandez removed
   to El Salvador and denied his applications for withholding of removal and
   deferral of removal under CAT. 8 U.S.C. § 1231; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16.
           Argueta-Hernandez timely appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. The
   BIA affirmed 2 and dismissed Argueta-Hernandez’s appeal on April 27, 2022.
   In denying Argueta-Hernandez’s claims, the BIA explained that he received
   only verbal threats and did not suffer any physical harm. It also found that

           _____________________
           2
            The BIA did not reach the issue of whether Argueta-Hernandez’s proposed social
   groups are cognizable, stating that the putative “lack of past persecution and nexus to a
   protected ground are dispositive in this case.” It considered, however, for purposes of
   CAT, whether “any future harm to [Argueta-Hernandez] would be inflicted by or with the
   consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”

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   “the gang may have had an enhanced interest in exploiting [Argueta-
   Hernandez] because of the privileges he enjoyed as a Christian” but that “is
   insufficient to establish that [his] religion and membership in his proposed
   particular social groups were central reasons that the gang subsequently
   threatened to harm him.” The BIA affirmed, stating that the IJ properly
   found that gang members never told Argueta-Hernandez that he was “not
   allowed to preach or otherwise exercise his religious rights; instead, they
   threatened him for refusing to pay extortion or collaborate with them.”
          For CAT protection, the BIA explained that there was insufficient
   evidence to demonstrate government acquiescence to torture, as Salvadoran
   authorities provided Argueta-Hernandez “with accommodation at an anti-
   gang safe house and helped facilitate his departure from the country.”
   Accordingly, BIA held that this was dispositive and did not consider whether
   the IJ erred in determining that Argueta-Hernandez did not suffer past
   torture.
          Argueta-Hernandez filed a petition for review in this court on May 27,
   2022, which was within 30 days of BIA’s order denying him withholding of
   removal and CAT relief. On July 10, 2023, this panel denied Argueta-
   Hernandez’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland,
   73 F.4th 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2023). In light of recent and prevailing precedent,
   however, we grant the petition for rehearing to address our jurisdiction and
   the merits of Argueta-Hernandez’s claims.
                                     II. Jurisdiction
          Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, we typically review only
   “final orders of removal” when a petition is filed within 30 days of the order.
   Pena Oseguera v. Barr, 936 F.3d 249, 250 (5th Cir. 2019); 8 U.S.C.
   § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1). Here, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction

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   over the petition for review, which was filed within 30 days of BIA’s order
   but several years after the reinstated removal order.
          First, the 30-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional. See Santos-
   Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). In Santos-Zacaria, the Supreme
   Court explained that contrary to our previous interpretation, Stone v. INS,
   514 U.S. 386 (1995) did not establish that the exhaustion requirement in 8
   U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) was jurisdictional in nature. Santos-Zacaria, 598 U.S.
   at 421–22, 428.    Accordingly, we find that judicial review of Argueta-
   Hernandez’s petition is not time barred by § 1252(b)(1).
          Second, we address whether the BIA’s order is deemed final for
   purposes of judicial review. This court has held that an order reinstating a
   prior removal order is itself a final removal order. Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d
   885, 890 (5th Cir. 2014). Additionally, this court has held that reinstatement
   orders are deemed “final” under § 1252(b)(1) “only upon completion of
   reasonable-fear and withholding-of-removal proceedings[.]” Ponce-Osorio v.
   Johnson, 824 F.3d 502, 505–07 (5th Cir. 2016). Since then, however, the
   Supreme Court has held that an IJ’s withholding-only determination is “not
   itself a final order of removal[.]” Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1691
   (2020) (explaining that an order denying CAT relief does not “merge into”
   a preexisting final removal order because it does not “affect the validity of
   the final order”); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2288
   (2021) (“[T]he order of removal is separate from and antecedent to a grant
   of withholding of removal.”).
          This court recently noted that “Nasrallah and Johnson may mean that
   a petitioner who wishes to challenge a reinstatement order in federal court
   must file within 30 days of the reinstatement order—without waiting for
   withholding-only proceedings to conclude.” Ruiz-Perez v. Garland, 49 F.4th
   972, 975–76 (5th Cir. 2022) (noting further that “a panel of this court would

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   need to conclude that Nasrallah and Johnson unequivocally overruled prior
   precedent before applying new jurisdictional rules to our review of
   reinstatement orders”). The court in Ruiz-Perez declined to reach whether
   Nasrallah and Johnson overruled Ponce-Osorio, but that issue is now squarely
   before this panel. We address it in a similar fashion as our sister circuits. 3
           Neither Nasrallah nor Johnson overrules this court’s precedent. In
   Nasrallah, the “narrow question before” the Supreme Court concerned the
   scope of review for a CAT protection claim. 140 S. Ct. at 1688. Nasrallah
   did not address jurisdiction or reinstatement proceedings, and it declined to
   consider arguments regarding its impact on statutory withholding orders. Id.
   at 1694 (“That question is not presented in this case, and we therefore leave
   its resolution for another day.”). While Nasrallah held that an order denying
   CAT relief is not “final,” we may still review such an order “together with
   final orders of removal.” Id. at 1690.
           Furthermore, Johnson concerned the finality of removal orders for
   purposes of detention under § 1231, not for judicial review under § 1252. 141
   S. Ct. at 2280. The Court distinguished the language used in the detention
   statute (§ 1231) from that used in the statute governing judicial review of
   removal orders (§ 1252); it declined to address the interpretation of the
   latter. Id. at 2285 n.6 (“We express no view on whether the lower courts are
   correct in their interpretation of § 1252, which uses different language than
   § 1231 and relates to judicial review of removal orders rather than
   detention.”).

           _____________________
           3
            See Kolov v. Garland, 78 F.4th 911, 919 (6th Cir. 2023); Arostegui-Maldonado v.
   Garland, 75 F.4th 1132, 1140–43 (10th Cir. 2023); Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1039,
   1048–55 (9th Cir. 2023); see also Carmen Amanda Barrios Duenas v. Att’y Gen., No. 22-
   3024, 2023 WL 6442601, at *3–4 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (unpublished).

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           We may consider the IJ’s reinstatement order removing Argueta-
   Hernandez to El Salvador, as affirmed by the BIA, because Nasrallah and
   Johnson comport with our earlier precedent. See Ponce-Osorio, 824 F.3d
   at 505–07. On rehearing, both parties agree with this logic. 4 “[F]or a
   Supreme Court decision to change our Circuit’s law, it ‘must be more than
   merely illuminating with respect to the case before [the court]’ and must
   ‘unequivocally’ overrule prior precedent.” Tech. Automation Servs. Corp. v.
   Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal citations
   omitted). It cannot be the case that a petitioner may only seek review before
   reinstatement of a removal order, and without a full administrative record. A
   decision to the contrary could have disastrous consequences on the
   immigration and judicial systems. 5
           Therefore, this court has jurisdiction to consider Argueta-
   Hernandez’s timely petition for review regarding withholding of removal and
   protection under the CAT.

           _____________________
           4
             Argueta-Hernandez separately raises a third basis for jurisdiction: the IJ’s order
   reinstating his removal specified that the “decision is final unless an appeal is filed with the
   Board of Immigration Appeals within 30 calendar days of the date of the mailing of this
   written decision.” Because Argueta-Hernandez filed an appeal with the BIA, his argument
   that the decision is final based on the aforementioned language alone is not persuasive.
           5
             If that was our reality, it would be “immensely resource intensive” as numerous
   noncitizens would file premature petitions for review. For example, “[i]t would lead to an
   increase in filings, as petitioners would inevitably have to file a petition for review to
   preserve the possibility of judicial review, even when unsure if they would need to, or even
   choose to, challenge the decision in the future[,]” which in turn “would require our court
   to dedicate resources to tracking and closing moot or abandoned petitions” and “to
   establish a system of holding petitions for review in abeyance for years at a time.” Alonso-
   Juarez, 80 F.4th at 1053.

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                                 III. Standard of Review
          We typically review the BIA’s decision and may consider the IJ’s
   decision when it has influenced the BIA’s determinations. Gomez-Palacios v.
   Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft,
   303 F.3d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2002)). We accept “administrative findings” as
   “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
   conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Garland v. Ming Dai,
   141 S. Ct. 1669, 1681 (2021). This court reviews factual findings of the BIA
   for substantial evidence, and questions of law de novo, giving considerable
   deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the legislative scheme it is entrusted
   to administer. Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2007); Nasrallah
   140 S. Ct. at 1692. Under the substantial evidence standard, we may not
   reverse a factual finding unless the evidence “compels” such a reversal—
   i.e., the evidence must be “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
   conclude against it.” Reyes-Hoyes v. Garland, No. 20-60133, 2023 WL
   3075064, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2023) (per curiam) (citing Wang v. Holder,
   569 F.3d 531, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2009)). It is the petitioner’s burden to
   demonstrate that the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Zhao, 404
   F.3d at 306. We may only affirm the BIA based on its stated rationale.
   Vazquez v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 862, 870 (5th Cir. 2018).
                              IV. Withholding of Removal
          Argueta-Hernandez argues that the BIA’s ruling is legally erroneous
   because it required a showing of physical harm to establish persecution, and
   it disregarded death threats and MS-13’s attempt to kill his son. He also
   argues that the BIA did not meaningfully consider his religious and liberty
   deprivations, psychological harm, and cumulative harm. In addition, he
   argues that the BIA’s nexus ruling is erroneous because it considered neither
   evidence of mixed motives nor one of his proposed particular social groups,

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   and it improperly relied on dissimilar case law.            In response, the
   government’s arguments mostly mirror the BIA and IJ’s decisions.
                                    A. Past Persecution
          To obtain a grant of withholding of removal, an applicant must
   establish a clear probability that his life or freedom will be threatened in the
   country of removal because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in
   a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); INS
   v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984). The applicant must demonstrate that
   the statutorily protected characteristic was or will be “at least one central
   reason” for the persecution he claims. Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341,
   344 (BIA 2010); see Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2019);
   Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 864. The statutorily protected ground cannot
   be “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for
   harm.” Shaikh, 588 F.3d at 864 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
          In addition, to find persecution, “[t]he harm or suffering need not be
   physical, but may take other forms, such as the deliberate imposition of
   severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing,
   employment or other essentials of life.” Abdel-Masieh v. U.S. I.N.S., 73 F.3d
   579, 583 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted); see Tamara-Gomez v.
   Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2006); Morales Lopez v. Garland,
   852 F. App’x 758, 772–73 (5th Cir. 2021). “Examples of persecution” can
   include “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so
   severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Morales v. Sessions,
   860 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fei Mei Cheng v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,
   623 F.3d 175, 192 (3d Cir. 2010)). Moreover, threats of violence against
   family members can support a finding of persecution so long as they are
   coupled with threats made directly to the petitioner. See, e.g., Tamara-
   Gomez, 447 F.3d at 349 (concluding that the record compelled a finding of

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   persecution where it included, among other things, “threats of violence and
   acts of vandalism” against the asylum applicant’s family); Abdel-Masieh, 73
   F.3d at 583 (concluding that the suffering or harm necessary to a finding of
   persecution can include “deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment
   or other essentials of life” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
          Other circuits have similarly held that physical harm is not required
   for persecution. See, e.g., Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 952 F.3d 101, 111 (3d
   Cir. 2020) (“[T]he IJ and BIA erred . . . in conditioning a finding of past
   persecution based on verbal threats on a showing of physical violence to
   Petitioner.”); Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615, 629 (4th Cir. 2021) (en
   banc) (“Upon remand, the BIA should bear in mind that the harm need not
   be physical.”); Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 793 (6th Cir. 2020)
   (explaining that “physical abuse is not an absolute prerequisite to a finding of
   persecution” (quoting Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir.
   2010))).
          Furthermore, to show a well-founded fear of persecution, the
   applicant “must show that a reasonable person in the same circumstances
   would fear persecution if deported.” Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d
   511, 518 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Jukic v. INS, 40 F.3d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1994)).
   “The subjective fear of future persecution must be objectively reasonable.”
   Id. (citing Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1997)). A “reasonable
   degree” can mean a ten percent chance. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
   421, 446 (1987).
                                    1. Severity of Harm
          The BIA determined that the harm Argueta-Hernandez “suffered—
   including approximately five phone threats, surveillance, and an incident
   where a gang hitman followed his son—is not severe enough to rise to the
   level of persecution.” Focusing on the lack of physical harm to Argueta-

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   Hernandez, the BIA stated that he “received only verbal threats and did not
   suffer any physical harm.” In doing so, the BIA also categorizes MS-13’s
   hitman attempt on Argueta-Hernandez’s son as non-threatening. Argueta-
   Hernandez contends that by effectively requiring physical injury to establish
   past persecution, the BIA and IJ erred.
          We agree. Threats of death and other serious harms constitute
   persecution when they are objectively credible. Zhu, 493 F.3d at 598–99.
   Here, the IJ found, and the BIA affirmed, that the Salvadoran authorities
   deemed MS-13’s threats as credible and imminent. Moreover, because the
   asylum officer and immigration courts deemed Argueta-Hernandez credible,
   and evidence corroborated his testimony that he repeatedly received death
   threats from MS-13, he has presented crucial factors for establishing
   persecution. See, e.g., Tamara-Gomez, 447 F.3d at 348–49; Portillo Flores, 3
   F.4th at 635.
          In its analysis of the death threats, the BIA relied on Morales v.
   Sessions, 860 F.3d at 816, for the proposition that “persecution generally
   ‘requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or
   intimidation.’” But in Morales, there was only one “isolated, verbal threat of
   future violence” coupled with testimony from a non-credible source of a
   second threat. 860 F.3d at 816–17. Here, by contrast, there were not just a
   “few isolated incidents of verbal harassment,” but rather several sustained
   credible death threats by MS-13 against Argueta-Hernandez and his family—
   threats so credible that numerous Salvadoran officials told Argueta-
   Hernandez to flee the country.
          The BIA also cited Arif v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 2007),
   for the proposition that “persecution is an extreme concept that does not
   include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” While it is
   true that not all “offensive” treatment qualifies as persecution—name-

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   calling, for example, is not persecution, see Matter of V-F-D-, 23 I&N Dec.
   859, 863–64 (BIA 2006)—it is equally true that repeated credible death
   threats do constitute persecution. See Tamara-Gomez, 447 F.3d at 349.
          Moreover, Arif is distinguishable. There, the petitioner “d[id] not
   state an independent ground for withholding of removal, relying instead on
   her husband’s proffered persecution and insisting that she is a derivative
   beneficiary of the application filed by her husband.” 509 F.3d at 681. There
   was no discussion of harm—physical or otherwise. See Portillo Flores, 3 F.4th
   at 627 (“[W]e do not condition a finding of past persecution on whether the
   victim required medical attention or even on whether the victim was
   physically harmed at all. Nor do we reduce our persecution analysis to a
   checklist or measure the severity of an injury in stitches.” (quoting Blanco v.
   Att’y Gen., 967 F.3d 304, 311 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations marks
   omitted))).
          Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales is instructive. Tamara-Gomez and his
   family received repeated phone calls threatening him and his family, and
   when they moved to another house, the threatening phone calls resumed
   “within weeks.” Tamara-Gomez, 447 F.3d at 346. When “a bicycle bomb
   exploded in Tamara-Gomez’s new neighborhood, killing five (none of the
   victims were members of Tamara-Gomez’s family)[,]” him and his family
   fled to the United States. Id. Nonetheless, the IJ determined that Tamara-
   Gomez did not establish past persecution, and “found the ‘bomb incident’
   to be ‘a random act of violence all too common in Colombia and unrelated to
   the respondent or his wife.’” Id. at 348 n.6.         This court disagreed,
   concluding: “[c]onsidered in isolation the bike bomb may in fact have been a
   ‘random act of violence.’ Yet, in the light of the other occurrences it is not
   unreasonable to believe that the bomb was targeted at Tamara-Gomez and/or
   his family.” Id. at 348 n.7.

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          Similarly, here MS-13 persistently threatened Argueta-Hernandez,
   and when he stopped answering his phone, the gang sent a man to his home
   to convey the gang’s threats. Argueta-Hernandez had received a call from
   the MS-13 gang leader threatening to kill his family members shortly before
   an assassin and another gang member followed his son and attempted to kill
   him. Then, a gang member called Argueta-Hernandez and confirmed that
   they had tried (and would continue trying) to kill his son. As in Tamara-
   Gomez, the BIA “discarded all evidence of persecution” even though it did
   not dispute the IJ’s finding that Argueta-Hernandez is “credible and
   accept[ed] his account of the facts.” Id. at 348 (internal quotation marks
   omitted).
          Moreover, Argueta-Hernandez contends that the BIA improperly
   asserted that a persecutor must specifically reference his victim’s religious
   practices for the latter to suffer harm. We agree with Argueta-Hernandez
   that such finding is legally and factually unsupported. And to the extent that
   the BIA conflates the severity of harm and nexus analyses, it “committed
   legal error by requiring that [he] prove” motive to establish persecution.
   Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 192 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that where the
   record and findings show a pattern of persecution based on Christianity in a
   country, “[p]etitioners were not required to show that they would be singled
   out for persecution upon return”). Based on the cumulative evidence before
   the BIA and IJ, Argueta-Hernandez has sufficiently shown a severity of harm
   for past persecution.    Where the court has “evidence of regular and
   methodical targeting,” it “[has] not hesitated to find persecution.” See
   Gjetani v. Barr, 968 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Tamara-Gomez, 447
   F.3d 343).
          As Argueta-Hernandez suffered past persecution in El Salvador, a
   regulatory presumption arises that he would face future persecution if he
   returned to El Salvador. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(I); Zhu, 493 F.3d at 599.

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   This presumption may be rebutted, but only if the government can prove by
   a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there has been a fundamental change
   of conditions that removes the threat to the applicant, or (2) the applicant
   could avoid the threat by relocating to another part of the country. Zhu, 493
   F.3d at 596–97. Because the government has not suggested that there has
   been a fundamental change in conditions or that Argueta-Hernandez can
   relocate within El Salvador, there is an indication that he will face future
   persecution.
                                         2. Nexus
          Argueta-Hernandez argues that BIA wrongly asserts that he must
   show MS-13 sought to harm him in order to overcome a protected
   characteristic. He also argues that BIA treated the nexus requirement as an
   either-or proposition, in which MS-13 either acted for one reason or another,
   but not both. Separately, Argueta-Hernandez contends that the BIA and IJ
   failed to consider one of the proposed particular social groups.
          Withholding of removal requires an applicant showing a threat to his
   or her life or freedom “because of” race, religion, nationality, membership
   in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
   The applicant must demonstrate that one of those five enumerated
   characteristics “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting
   the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Because “the
   nexus requirement is not an ‘either-or’ proposition,” a court must consider
   the existence of multiple motives for the persecutor’s actions when such
   evidence exists. Ontunez-Tursios, 303 F.3d at 349; see also Rivas-Martinez v.
   I.N.S., 997 F.2d 1143, 1148 (5th Cir. 1993) (remanding to BIA for
   consideration of mixed motives). “[A]lthough a statutorily protected ground
   need not be the only reason for harm, it cannot be incidental, tangential,
   superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.” Cabrera v. Sessions,

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   890 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Sealed Petitioner v. Sealed
   Respondent, 829 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2016)); see Sealed Petitioner, 829 F.3d
   at 383 (“[P]ersecutors may have legitimate reasons for their actions, but an
   additional central reason for their actions is persecution on account of a
   protected category.”); see Berhe v. Barr, 837 F. App’x 255, 258 (5th Cir.
   2020)(remanding to the BIA for further consideration). To satisfy this nexus
   requirement, an applicant need only present “‘some particularized
   connection between the feared persecution’” and the protected
   characteristic. Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 138 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting
   Faddoul v. I.N.S., 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994)).
          The BIA and IJ stated that the threats, which included extortion and
   death, were not motivated by Argueta-Hernandez’s religion or membership
   in a protected social group, “but rather by criminal intent, personal
   vendettas, or monetary gain, which do not establish the required nexus.” By
   characterizing MS-13’s threats against Argueta-Hernandez and his family as
   solely extortion, BIA disregards that he needed only to present “‘some
   particularized connection between the feared persecution’” and the
   protected ground in which his application for relief relies. Id. at 138.
   Contrary to the BIA’s analysis, nothing requires Argueta-Hernandez to show
   that MS-13 explicitly said “he was not allowed to preach or otherwise
   exercise his religious rights.” See, e.g., In Re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 489
   (BIA 1996) (“An asylum applicant is not obliged to show conclusively why
   persecution has occurred or may occur. Such a rigorous standard would
   largely render nugatory the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Cardoza-
   Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).”).
          Furthermore, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s finding that MS-13 targeted
   Argueta-Hernandez “for extortion and collaboration because of his
   successful business, contacts, and reputation in his town,” but these
   circumstances are not mutually exclusive. For example, in Rivas-Martinez,

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   this court held that the BIA incorrectly applied an “either-or” analysis when
   the petitioner provided political and non-political reasons for refusing to help
   her alleged persecutors in El Salvador. 997 F.2d at 1145, 1147–48 (remanding
   to the BIA because it relied solely on the non-political reasons, rather than
   political reasons, to deny the petitioner relief). Although the petitioner in
   Rivas-Martinez offered a non-political excuse, it was error for the BIA to
   categorically prevent her from showing political persecution through other
   evidence. Id. at 1147; see Ontunez-Tursios, 303 F.3d at 349; Berhe, 837 F.
   App’x at 257–59. Here, the IJ and BIA similarly suggested that MS-13
   targeted Argueta-Hernandez for economic gain “instead” of religious
   reasons despite evidence to the contrary. Although MS-13’s initial threats
   followed Argueta-Hernandez’s refusal to pay rent to and collaborate with
   MS-13, he claims that more threats were made in the subsequent years that
   were motivated by his religion and status in the Christian church. For
   example, Argueta-Hernandez was repeatedly told that his status as an
   Evangelical Christian leader was the reason he was targeted by MS-13.
   According to Argueta-Hernandez’s testimony, the leader of the gang said the
   following: “This is why we are doing this to you because you are Christian
   and you are good with God and that is why we looked for you.” Moreover,
   reports indicated that gang threats to religious individuals are prevalent, and
   “the risk of torture or death as extremely likely for [Argueta-Hernandez].”
   Finally, as the IJ acknowledged, it was only after Argueta-Hernandez became
   President of Evangelism that the gang began targeting him. The IJ found this
   information to be credible and corroborated but denied Argueta-
   Hernandez’s claims.
          While it is possible that Argueta-Hernandez’s alleged persecutors
   were motivated by “his reputation as a good person and businessman in the

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   community,” this does not necessarily disprove nexus. 6                        Community
   members, police officers, and MS-13 considered Argueta-Hernandez a good
   person because he was a well-known religious leader who was “not doing bad
   things.” Even if his good reputation was entirely distinct from his religious
   practice, the words and actions of his persecutors could demonstrate that his
   religion was still one central reason for his persecution. If we allow BIA’s
   analysis to stand as-is, we run the risk that anything can be recharacterized as
   “incidental” or “tangential” under the BIA’s logic.
           Finally, Argueta-Hernandez contends that the IJ failed to consider one
   of his proposed social groups (“Salvadoran informants against gang
   members”). The BIA acknowledged the IJ’s error, then made the same
   mistake by stating that it was irrelevant, as the “central reason” for the
   gang’s harm was extortion. The BIA commits reversible error by failing to
   adequately consider whether an applicant belongs to an alleged social group
   and whether he had a well-founded fear of persecution. Cabrera, 890 F.3d at
   163 (“[W]e must remand for the agency to comply with its established
   responsibility.” (internal citations omitted)).

           _____________________
           6
              The BIA stated that “[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that the applicant’s religion
   and membership in his proposed particular social groups are potential reasons for the
   gang’s enhanced interest in extorting and collaborating with the applicant, the
   applicant has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that the gang harmed or will
   harm him in order to overcome a protected characteristic.” It is not clear whether the BIA
   intended to invoke a mixed-motive analysis here, but if so, the BIA should have identified
   how substantial evidence regarding religious persecution may be whittled to an “enhanced
   interest in extorting and collaborating.” The facts in this case could suggest otherwise. For
   example, a gang could choose to extort an individual based on the perceived social, political,
   or economic benefits that a religious individual may have. And when, as here, a religious
   individual refuses to assist that gang because of his beliefs, the BIA and IJ should consider
   that as substantial and critical evidence supporting the petitioner’s claim. See, e.g., Rivas-
   Martinez, 997 F.2d at 1145, 1147–48. It is improper, however, to broadly exclude asylum
   applicants who resist an alleged persecutor, and who are also persecuted for several reasons
   including, but not limited to, extortion.

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           As a result, we vacate and remand the BIA’s decision on the past
   persecution and nexus analysis for lack of substantial evidence and analysis
   to support it. On remand, the BIA should consider that the harm need not
   be physical. It should also recognize that death threats need not be made
   directly to the petitioner, and in this case, both the petitioner and his family
   were threatened. Further, the BIA should acknowledge that extortion may,
   in certain circumstances, not destroy a petitioner’s claim where other facts
   establish nexus. The BIA should bear in mind that persecutors may have
   multiple motives, and those motives are not necessarily directly disclosed to
   the petitioner but can be shown through evidence (i.e., credible testimony,
   police reports). The facts may demonstrate that religious persecution and
   extortion coexist. On remand, the BIA should clarify its analysis in light of
   the aforementioned issues and authority.
                                V. Convention Against Torture
           Argueta-Hernandez argues that the BIA, affirming the IJ, disregarded
   evidence that would support granting protection under CAT. The IJ and BIA
   concluded that Argueta-Hernandez failed to show the El Salvadoran
   government was unable or unwilling to protect him. 7 The BIA held that the
   evidence did not show that a Salvadoran public official or other person acting
   in an official capacity “would turn a blind eye [to Argueta-Hernandez’s]
   future torture by gang members” because authorities provided him with
   “accommodation at an anti-gang safe house and helped facilitate his

           _____________________
           7
            In the context of CAT, the BIA considers whether the Salvadoran government is
   unwilling or unable to protect Argueta-Hernandez. Its analysis flows from the IJ’s decision
   subpart entitled “Inflicted by Government or Organization Government is Unwilling or
   Unable to Protect Respondent from.” The BIA declined to reach the issue of past torture.
   Thus, to the extent BIA considers the Salvadoran government’s actions, we address it in
   turn.

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   departure from the country[.]” Argueta-Hernandez argues that such holding
   is legally and factually unsupported.
          We agree. A petitioner is eligible for CAT relief if he can “establish
   that it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to the
   proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The regulations
   define “torture” to include “any act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is
   intentionally inflicted on a person” by or with the acquiescence of a public
   official for informational, punitive, coercive, or discriminatory purposes. Id.
   § 1208.18(a)(1); see Arulnanthy v. Garland, 17 F.4th 586, 597–98 (5th Cir.
   2021). A public official acquiesces to torture when he or she has prior
   “awareness of such activity and thereafter breach[es] his or her legal
   responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.”             8 C.F.R. §
   1208.18(a)(7) (“Such awareness requires a finding of either actual knowledge
   or willful blindness.”). An applicant may satisfy his burden of proving
   acquiescence by demonstrating “a government’s willful blindness of
   torturous activity.” Iruegas-Valdez v. Yates, 846 F.3d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (quoting Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 2010)).
          The CAT imposes specific requirements on IJs and the BIA. Though
   past torture is not enough for CAT relief, the immigration courts must
   consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture” when
   deciding whether future torture is more likely than not.              8 C.F.R.
   § 1208.16(c)(3)(i); see Arulnanthy, 17 F.4th at 597–98. They must also
   consider “[e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights
   within the country of removal” and any “[o]ther relevant information
   regarding conditions in the country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)
   (listing other required considerations).
          Our precedent imposes its own requirement: CAT claims are
   “distinct from asylum and withholding-of-removal claims and should receive

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   separate analytical attention.” Arulnanthy, 17 F.4th at 598 (quoting Santos-
   Alvarado v. Barr, 967 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2020)); see also Efe v. Ashcroft,
   293 F.3d 899, 907 (5th Cir. 2002) (cautioning against “overreliance on an
   adverse credibility ruling” in the CAT context).
           After Argueta-Hernandez reported MS-13’s attempt to kill his son,
   four governmental agencies in El Salvador told him that they cannot protect
   him or his family. As the IJ acknowledged, “[t]he officials from each office
   all told [Argueta-Hernandez] that there was nowhere in El Salvador where
   he would be safe.” 8 We find, however, that no “reasonable adjudicator could
   have found as the agency did.” See Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. at 1678; see also
   Portillo Flores, 3 F.4th at 635 (holding that “[p]urported Salvadoran efforts to
   combat gang violence and corruption in general do not excuse the agency’s
   failure to support its decision with the proper legal and factual analysis of
   Petitioner’s specific circumstances”). In ruling that Argueta-Hernandez had
   not established government acquiescence, the BIA and IJ failed to take the
   facts into consideration.
           The BIA improperly determined that temporarily placing Argueta-
   Hernandez in a safehouse and “facilitating” his departure was evidence of a
   willingness to protect him from MS-13. According to Argueta-Hernandez’s
   testimony, the prosecutor’s office confirmed that there was “not much” it
   “could do” for him, except have him sign a document certifying that he

           _____________________
           8
               A Salvadoran police sergeant pulled up his file and saw the report Argueta-
   Hernandez made against the gang, and repeatedly told him that he “cannot be here in this
   country” and that he was “cooked.” The Office of Human Rights stated that there was
   not much they could do because gang members were always watching hi” and MS-13 was
   “everywhere.” The Anti-Gang Unit said that “if [he] didn’t want to show up dead in a
   gutter . . . [he] could not be in El Salvador.” A representative from El Salvador’s District
   Attorney’s office also said that he cannot live in El Salvador: “Gang members are in every
   part of the country and wherever [he goes] they will find [him].”

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   “could not stay in El Salvador.” And the BIA and IJ’s reliance on the fact
   that the anti-gang unit put Argueta-Hernandez in a taxi to Guatemala does
   not negate that he is no longer safe or protected in El Salvador. In affirming
   the IJ, the BIA concluded that it is insufficient for CAT that the Salvadoran
   government acknowledged MS-13 “will kill” Argueta-Hernandez if he stays
   in El Salvador and should sign a liability waiver if he remains in El Salvador.
   In doing so, the BIA failed to consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility
   of future torture.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i); Arulnanthy, 17 F.4th
   at 597–98. 9
           The BIA and IJ’s analysis are also legally unsupported. In denying
   Argueta-Hernandez’s claims, the agencies cite Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794
   F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2015) and Martinez Manzanares v. Barr, 925 F.3d 222 (5th
   Cir. 2019). In Ramirez-Mejia, the petitioner “alleged that officials advised
   her to leave the country” after she received gang threats, but “she did not
   allege that the officials expressed any intent to acquiesce in her torture if she
   did not leave.” 794 F.3d at 494 (explaining that police “insisted that she file
   a report against” a gang member that threatened her).                      Likewise, the
   petitioner in Martinez Manzanares argued that “the Honduran government
   was ‘willfully blind’ to his persecution,” but admitted that “he never
   reported [his attacker’s] threats to the police,” and did not allege that he
   “asked the mayor to have the police investigate the incident—much less that
   the mayor refused.” 925 F.3d at 228.

           _____________________
           9
            “[A] failure to mention ‘key evidence’ like this raises too great a concern that the
   BIA did not adequately consider the evidence before it.” Emmanuel-Tata v. Garland, 2022
   WL 126982, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2022) (unpublished) (“We therefore reverse the BIA’s
   decision. We need not further consider the BIA’s factual determinations” (citing 8 C.F.R.
   § 1208.16(c)(3); Arulnanthy, 17 F.4th at 598; Abdel-Masieh, 73 F.3d 579 at 585)).

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          Here, by contrast, the Salvadoran government stated multiple times
   that MS-13 “will kill” Argueta-Hernandez if he returns to El Salvador, and
   its efforts to obtain a waiver could show that if he returns, it will not prevent
   that outcome.        And despite finding this information credible and
   corroborated, the IJ denied Argueta-Hernandez’s claims without appropriate
   legal analysis.
          Therefore, we vacate BIA’s decision on Argueta-Hernandez’s CAT
   claim and remand for further analysis. The IJ and BIA underexplained their
   assessment of his argument and disregarded evidence of his CAT claim.
                                      VI. Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the petition for review,
   REVERSE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for proceedings consistent
   with this opinion.

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