Court Opinion

ID: 9696793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:58:52.747175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:37.824676
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court and join Judge Steadman’s opinion. The jury apparently found that although plaintiff Breezevale, through its officers and employees, fabricated offer letters and related documents in an attempt to deceive *641the court and to defraud Firestone, the plaintiff would probably have prevailed at trial in its suit against Firestone notwithstanding the forgeries and associated false testimony. To be sure, the fabrication of evidence could logically have infected Breezevale’s case against Firestone in its entirety,1 and I agree with the trial judge that the plaintiffs chicanery would almost certainly have been exposed anyway even if Breezevale had found a way to postpone Ms. Paul’s deposition. Nevertheless, GDC has not demonstrated that the award of damages to Breezevale was unreasonable, for the fabricated documents related solely to a single discrete part of the Firestone litigation, and the jury did not find them decisive even as to that part. Accordingly, although I agree with the trial judge’s unfavorable assessment of Breezevale’s conduct, I join Judge Steadman in concluding that Breezevale’s case against GDC does not fail as a matter of law for lack of proof of the requisite causal link between GDC’s negligence and Breezevale’s damages. I write separately, however, to emphasize that nothing in the court’s opinion should be read as countenancing the kind of litigation tactics revealed by this record, or as limiting the authority of the trial judge to sanction Breezevale’s misconduct in conformity with correct legal principles.
“Our adversary system depends on a most jealous safeguarding of truth and candor.” Jones v. Clinton, 36 F.Cupp.2d 1118, 1131 (E.D.Ark.1999) (quoting United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir.1993)). Lying to the court, or engaging in related deceptive practices, is “serious business.” Medrano-Quiroz v. United States, 705 A.2d 642, 653 (D.C.1997). “We [have] join[ed] Justice Kennedy in his rejection of the notion that one who violates his testimonial oath is no worse than the student who claims the dog ate his homework.” Coumaris v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd., 660 A.2d 896, 901 (D.C.1995) (quoting ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 325-26, 114 S.Ct. 835, 127 L.Ed.2d 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Unfortunately, deception in judicial proceedings is not as unusual as it ought to be. In the centuries that have elapsed since Adam took that first bite of the apple in the Garden of Eden, a great many people, some of them powerful and famous, have been found to have lied under oath or to have otherwise done their best to conceal the truth and to subvert judicial proceedings. “Judges, lawyers and experts on the court system worry that perjury is being committed with greater frequency and impunity than ever before.” Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, 81 A.B.A. J. 68 (1995); see also Lisa C. Harris, Note, Perjury Defeats Justice, 42 Wayne L.Rev. 1755 (1996). A cynical observer who has seen it all might conclude that this sort of thing “goes with the territory” and that judges should not get too excited about it. Indeed, in one matrimonial controversy, this court referred, either infelieitously or ironically, to “a tolerable amount of perjury.” Coles v. Coles, 204 A.2d 330, 331-32 (D.C.1964). But when fabrication of evidence or similar fraud has been discovered and exposed, the consequences ought to be severe enough to inhibit repetition. This case presents an unusually tawdry example of fraudulent litigation practices, and the judge did not and does not lack the authority to do something about it.
*642Three years after having settled with Firestone for $100,000 (rather than for the $3,500,000 offered by that defendant before Ms. Paul disclosed the forgeries), Breezevale brought this suit against GDC. Breezevale continued to insist that Ms. Paul was lying and that the offer letters and spreadsheets were genuine. Breeze-vale executives so testified under oath, but neither the jury nor the judge believed them. On the verdict form, the jury was asked:
Do you find that [GDC] has established that forgeries occurred and, if so, that one or more Breezevale executives participated in such forgeries?
The jury answered: ‘Tes.” Subsequently, in awarding GDC sanctions against Breezevale, the trial judge wrote that he had
focused on the evidence directly relevant to the core question presented by the case: Did Breezevale forge offer letters in February of 1991 and thereupon litigate in bad faith? The [cjourt has no difficulty in concluding the evidence clearly and convincingly compels an affirmative answer to the question.
Joseph Abou Jaoude, with the knowledge of Charles Awit and approval of Habib Habib, undertook in February 1991 to boost Breezevale’s case against Firestone by creating a false 1987 record of business activity on Firestone’s behalf. Once the fraud was disclosed and Breezevale’s case against Firestone destroyed, Breezevale executives, rather than accept the outcome, chose to sue their lawyers for legal malpractice, asserting the documents at issue were genuine, yet knowing them to be false.
It is difficult to envision a clearer case of bad faith litigation. Not only did Breezevale make Gibson Dunn lawyers unwitting accomplices in its attempted fraud on Firestone when it created the forged documents and delivered them for discovery, but it then sought to punish Gibson Dunn for [Breezevale’s] own misconduct. The cost to Gibson Dunn has been enormous. The cost to this [c]ourt and to the citizens of the District of Columbia, although obviously not as great, is also considerable. While the city may not be able to recoup, Gibson Dunn can.
These findings by the judge find overwhelming support in the record,2 and they must ultimately inform the court’s exercise of discretion in the imposition of sanctions. I think it important to emphasize that, as the trial judge pointed out, the issue as to which Breezevale presented fabricated evidence was “the core question presented by the [malpractice] case.” Even if we assume, in light of the jury’s verdict, that Breezevale’s action against GDC was “not in itself brought in bad faith,” see Synanon Found., Inc. v. Bernstein, 517 A.2d 28, 38 (D.C.1986) (Synanon II), it is significant that Breezevale’s key allegation in the malpractice case was untrue and known by Breezevale to be untrue. The testimony offered in support of that allegation was likewise false. The final disposition of this case should reflect this underlying reality.3

. It has always been understood — the inference, indeed, is one of the simplest in human experience — that a party’s falsehood or other fraud in the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or spoliation, and all similar conduct is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the case’s lack of truth and merit. The inference thus does not necessarily apply to any specific fact in the cause, but operates, indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his cause.
Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 783-84 (D.C.1991) (emphasis in original) (quoting II J. Wigmore, Evidence § 278, at 133 (Chadbourn ed.1979)).

. In his 23-page opinion, the judge explicated, persuasively and in meticulous detail, why he, like the jury, credited Ms. Paul’s account and disbelieved the denials by Breezevale’s executives. I therefore believe that it is now unnecessary for the trial court to revisit this issue on remand. See maj. op., ante, at n. 17 (citing authority for partial new trials). To retry the question whether the documents were forged would be to add to these proceedings further costs which, as the judge noted with a measure of understatement, the District "may not be able to recoup.”

. As an alternative basis for affirmance, GDC seeks to invoke the principle that ”[n]o court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action on an immoral or illegal act.” Hunter v. Wheate, 53 App. D.C. 206, 208, 289 F. 604, 606 (1923) (quoting Higgins v. *643McCrea, 116 U.S. 671, 686, 6 S.Ct. 557, 29 L.Ed. 764 (1886) (quoting Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowper 341, 343, 98 Eng. Reports Reprint 1120, 1121)); sea also Horjales v. Loeb, 291 So.2d 92, 93 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974) (“One who engages in a fraudulent scheme loses all right to the prosecution of a lawsuit.”). The doctrine of Hunter and like cases has been applied in actions for legal malpractice. See, e.g., Carmel v. Clapp & Eisenberg, P.C., 960 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 1992) ("the appellant’s own fraud may bar his legal malpractice claim in connection with transactions complained of”); Mettes v. Quinn, 89 Ill.App.3d 77, 44 Ill.Dec. 427, 411 N.E.2d 549, 551-52 (1980) (dismissing action against attorney who allegedly rendered negligent advice, where this advice led to setting aside of favorable settlement agreement which had been induced by client’s misrepresentations). GDC’s reliance on these authorities is not implausible, for the central allegation of Breezevale’s malpractice suit has been found by both judge and jury to be false.
Having ruled in GDC’s favor on other grounds, the trial judge did not reach the issue whether dismissal was appropriate on the grounds that Breezevale had founded its action on its own illegal or immoral conduct. Although this court is free to affirm a judgment on grounds not relied upon by the trial judge, see, e.g., In re O.L., 584 A.2d 1230, 1232 n. 6 (D.C.1990), I do not believe that it would be appropriate to do so in this case. The jury found that Breezevale had some legitimate claims, and “the court must scrupulously avoid penalizing a party for a legitimate exercise of the right of access to the courts.” Synanon II, supra, 517 A.2d at 37; see also Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 214 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 3-4, 663 F.2d 178, 180-81 (1980) (per curiam). The weighing of the relevant considerations would have required the trial judge to exercise his discretion, and in this case the judge has not yet had occasion to do so, so affirmance would be premature. Moreover, in general, the principle of Hunter has been applied in situations in which the plaintiff’s recovery depended entirely on his fraudulent conduct, so that he could not recover without invoking the fruits of his own fraud. The jury’s verdict in this case recognizes the validity of some of Breezevale's claims and thus suggests that dismissal on Hunter grounds would not be warranted.