Court Opinion

ID: 9917133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 17:07:30.395791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:05.229028
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re C.H., 2024-Ohio-75.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE C.H.                                  :
                                            :               No. 113023
A Minor Child                               :
                                            :
[Appeal by L.H., Mother]                    :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 11, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                                Case No. AD23903514

                                      Appearances:

                 Marc L. Stolarsky Law, LLC, and Marc L. Stolarsky, for
                 appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Zachary J. LaFleur, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

                Appellant L.H. (“Mother”) appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County

Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights and awarding custody of her minor

child, C.H. (d.o.b. 08/04/2017), to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and

Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “agency”). After a thorough review of the law and

applicable facts, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
                       I. Factual and Procedural History

             CCDCFS first became involved in this matter when the facility where

C.H. resides, Sunshine Communities (“Sunshine” or “facility”), contacted the agency

after being unable to get in contact with Mother for the completion of certain

necessary paperwork. C.H. has resided at Sunshine for almost five years, beginning

after he left the hospital following his birth. C.H. is permanently on a ventilator and

tracheostomy tube due to chronic respiratory failure and has a feeding tube. He is

nonverbal and has developmental issues.

             In March 2023, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that C.H. was

neglected and dependent and requested a disposition of permanent custody. The

juvenile court held an adjudicatory hearing after which C.H. was determined to be

neglected and dependent. Mother did not appear at this hearing.1

             A dispositional hearing was held in June 2023, where Mother again did

not appear. The agency presented the testimony of Ronald Parks (“Parks”), a short-

term caseworker assigned to the family; Jennifer Menningen (“Menningen”), a

social worker with Sunshine; and Emily Vandergrift (“Vandergrift”), a registered

nurse with Sunshine, who worked with C.H.

             Parks testified that when he first received the case, he explained to

Mother what paperwork needed to be signed and what she needed to do to return

the paperwork to the facility. He stated that Mother told him that the previous time

      1 Paternity was not established in this case, and thus, this appeal pertains only to

Mother.
that she had not signed the paperwork, which was the year prior, the agency had

completed and returned the paperwork for her.

             Parks testified that the agency filed a case plan in this matter that

included parenting services and required Mother to maintain a relationship with

C.H. and to work with Sunshine. The parenting services were necessary because

Mother had failed to establish a relationship with C.H. and failed to file the necessary

paperwork for the facility. Mother was referred to the Community Collaborative.

Mother was cooperative with the Community Collaborative and received assistance

for her other children.2

             Parks stated that his communication with Mother was “sporadic” and

that it was “very hard” to get in contact with her. He had spoken with her the week

before the dispositional hearing, but prior to that, there had been no contact with

her for months.

             Parks testified that the agency was seeking permanent custody because

communication with Mother had been an ongoing issue and the child needed

someone who was willing to make decisions for him and sign the appropriate

paperwork. He stated that there was still some paperwork that had not been signed

by Mother, including one for schooling, and a medical consent form. Parks stated

that he had conversations with Mother about the outstanding documents, but they

still had not been signed.

      2 At the time of the hearings, Mother had an infant, a nine-year-old, and two

teenage sons, in addition to C.H.
             Menningen testified next and explained her role as a social worker at

Sunshine. She stated that she maintains C.H.’s benefits, including Medicaid and his

supplemental security income, and has been involved with getting annual planning

and school paperwork signed for C.H. She explained that every August, there is a

meeting regarding C.H., after which certain paperwork must be signed. She stated

that the paperwork was signed during the first two years that C.H. was at the facility,

but that it was difficult to get the paperwork signed for the past two years. It is

usually the same paperwork each year, but this year there was also school paperwork

that had to be signed. Mother was also required to submit evidence of her residence

in the form of utility bills or an affidavit from her landlord.

              When asked about the efforts that Sunshine made to get Mother to

sign the paperwork, Menningen responded that the facility had sent the paperwork

to her multiple times via certified mail. The paperwork was sent with prepaid

envelopes for their return to the facility. Sunshine received the certified card back

that Mother had received it, but the paperwork was not returned to the facility. She

also stated that multiple staff members, including herself, had called Mother and

that she had emailed Mother, all to no avail. Last summer, they involved CCDCFS

to assist with getting the paperwork signed.

              Menningen testified that the same efforts had been made this year –

the paperwork was mailed to Mother via certified mail and staff had called her

multiple times. She acknowledged that they did receive some signed paperwork
once Parks was involved this year, but they still had not received the signed school

paperwork.

             CCDCFS then presented the testimony of Vandergrift, a registered

nurse who had been involved in C.H.’s care. She explained that C.H. is immobile

and cannot speak but has a communication device. She described his daily care as

follows:

      So [C.H.] is vent dependent. He’s on a ventilator 24/7. He requires
      trach[eostomy] care at least twice a day, suctioning throughout the day
      just as needed.

      He has no swallowing ability so he needs oral suctioning as well.

      He’s tube fed 20 hours of the day. He gets medications, treatments like
      aerosol medications through the vent and medications through the G-
      tube about seven times throughout the day.

      And then he gets therapy from our therapy department.

             Vandergrift stated that C.H.’s care plan was formed after going over

his needs and progress each year. She was not aware of Mother ever being involved

in these annual meetings. She stated that Mother had not attended the child’s

medical appointments and when he had been hospitalized, they usually had to leave

messages and wait for her to call them back. She testified that the only interaction

she has had with Mother was in 2020 when Mother called to FaceTime with C.H.

while Vandergrift was in his room.

             When asked what value she saw in doing virtual visits such as the

FaceTime call, Vandergrift stated that Mother “just kinda had the phone open” and
“wasn’t necessarily FaceTiming with him the whole time.” She said different people

were getting on and off the call, and sometimes there was no one on the other end.

              Vandergrift testified that C.H. is able to recognize people that he sees

daily but that he probably would not recognize Mother since he had not seen her

face-to-face in five years.

              Regarding the importance of the unsigned paperwork, Vandergrift

testified that the facility needed to get C.H. into school and that there is a public

school with a “medically fragile unit” that he could attend. He would need an IEP

for the school, which also required Mother to sign papers. Further, if C.H. were to

need hospitalization,3 the hospital might need emergency consent, and it would be

a problem if they were unable to reach Mother.

              Vandergrift stated that she believed that Mother does not fully

understand the depth of C.H.’s needs and the amount of care required each day.

When Mother does call the facility, she asks how C.H. is doing but does not have

specific questions about his health.

              On cross-examination, Vandergrift acknowledged that she does not

work with C.H. on a daily basis and had not observed him for the past year to know

if there had been any more FaceTime visits with Mother. She further conceded that

Sunshine is located approximately two hours from the Cleveland area.

      3 Vandergrift testified that C.H. had been hospitalized only twice within the last

three years, but when he first came to Sunshine, he had been taken to the hospital more
frequently.
                Vandergrift was asked about the visitation restrictions during the

COVID-19 pandemic. She said in late 2020, they began scheduled family visits

outside of the medically fragile unit, which involved the visitors being screened prior

to their visit. She testified that there were no restrictions (outside of the screening)

for visits during the winters of 2020-2021 and 2021-2022.

                Finally, Vandergrift stated that the clothes that C.H. is dressed in each

morning were provided by Sunshine; to her knowledge, Mother had not provided

any clothing.

                The child’s guardian ad litem had provided a written report to the

court and gave her final recommendation at the hearing. She noted that she had not

met Mother and that it had been very difficult to reach her. She emphasized the

need for the facility to be able to reach Mother in an emergency and recommended

that the court grant permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS.

                Following the hearing, the court granted the motion for permanent

custody to CCDCFS and terminated Mother’s parental rights. The trial court made

the following findings:

      The Court finds that following the placement of the child outside the
      child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and
      diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the
      problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home,
      the parent has failed to continuously and repeatedly to substantially
      remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s
      home. Paternity is not established.

      The parent(s) has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the
      child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the
      child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness
      to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.

      ***

      The parent(s) has abandoned the child.

      ***

      Upon considering the interaction and interrelationship of the child
      with the child’s parents, siblings; the special needs of the child; the
      custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in
      temporary custody of a public children services agency or private child
      placing agency under one or more separate orders of disposition for
      twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period; the
      child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether
      that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent
      custody; and the report of the Guardian ad Litem; the Court finds by
      clear and convincing evidence that a grant of permanent custody is in
      the best interests of the child and the child cannot be placed with
      one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time and should not be
      placed with either parent.

      ***

      The Court finds that the child’s continued residence in or return to the
      home of mother, [L.H.], will be contrary to the child’s best interest.

      ***

      (Emphasis sic.)

              Mother then filed the instant appeal, raising one assignment of error

for our review:

      The court’s decision was an abuse of discretion and against the
      manifest weight of the evidence because the trial court erred in
      determining that mother failed to support, visit, and communicate with
      the child during the worldwide COVID pandemic.
                               II. Law and Analysis

               The right to raise one’s own child is “‘an essential and basic civil

right.’” In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, quoting In

re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997); see also In re Murray, 52

Ohio St.3d 155, 156, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990), quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (a parent has a “‘fundamental liberty

interest’ in the care, custody, and management” of his or her child). However, this

right is not absolute. It is “‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which

is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037,

86 N.E.3d 1012, at ¶ 29, quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391

N.E.2d 1034 (1979).

              Because termination of parental rights is “‘the family law equivalent

of the death penalty in a criminal case,’” In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546,

2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, quoting In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368,

776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14, it is “an alternative of last resort.” In re Gill, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 79640, 2002-Ohio-3242, ¶ 21. It is, however, “sanctioned when

necessary for the welfare of a child.” In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and

101694, 2015-Ohio-1028, ¶ 7, citing In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619, 624, 645

N.E.2d 812 (9th Dist.1994). “‘All children have the right, if possible, to parenting

from either natural or adoptive parents which provides support, care, discipline,

protection and motivation.’” In re J.B. at ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio

App.3d 88, 102, 696 N.E.2d 1090 (8th Dist.1996).
              In her sole assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court’s

decision to grant permanent custody of C.H. to the agency was an abuse of discretion

and against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Mother asserts that

the trial court erred in finding that she had abandoned C.H.

              While Mother argues in part that the juvenile court’s decision

constituted an abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court of Ohio has recently held that

this is not the appropriate standard of review.

      [T]he proper appellate standards of review to apply in cases involving
      a juvenile court’s decision under R.C. 2151.414 to award permanent
      custody of a child and to terminate parental rights are the sufficiency-
      of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, as
      appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments presented by
      the parties.

In re Z.C., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 18. Thus, we will disregard Mother’s

abuse of discretion argument and review this matter solely under the manifest-

weight-of-the-evidence standard.

               “When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses,

and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Z.C. at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v.

Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20.

              Before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights and grant

permanent custody of a child to CCDCFS, it must satisfy the two-prong test set forth
in R.C. 2151.414. First, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence

that one of the following conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e)

exists:

          (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
          temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
          private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
          consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the
          temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
          private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
          consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1)
          of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the
          temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the
          child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a
          reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

          (b) The child is abandoned.

          (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who
          are able to take permanent custody.

          (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
          children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve
          or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child
          has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
          services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more
          months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in
          division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
          previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another
          state.

          (e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents
          from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated
          an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions
          by any court in this state or another state.

                 In the instant matter, the juvenile court determined that the child had

been abandoned by Mother. Under R.C. 2151.011(C), “a child shall be presumed

abandoned when the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with
the child for more than ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume

contact with the child after that period of ninety days.”

              Testimony at the hearing reflected that Mother had not visited C.H. in

person since he had come to Sunshine. Mother argues that the COVID-19 pandemic

impeded her ability to visit C.H. and asserts that she maintained contact with C.H.

through video visits.

              Mother’s argument that the pandemic prevented her from visiting

C.H. in person lacks merit. It is undisputed that the pandemic did not begin until

March 2020, and yet Mother had not visited C.H. for over two years prior to that.

Moreover, while there may have been some initial restrictions on visits, Vandergrift

testified that in late 2020, family members were permitted to visit after undergoing

a screening. Nevertheless, Mother still did not make any attempt to visit C.H. in

person. Mother places significant emphasis on her FaceTime visits, but there was

no evidence presented as to the frequency of the calls — Parks characterized them

as “a few” visits. Moreover, in the call that Vandergrift described, it does not sound

like Mother was present throughout the virtual visit.

              In her brief, Mother argues that this court has previously noted that

the COVID-19 pandemic affected visitation between children and parents. Mother

is correct that this court has acknowledged the impact of the pandemic on visitation;

however, in those cases and in the present case, the pandemic could not be blamed

as the sole reason for a lack of visitation. See In re M.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

111145, 2022-Ohio-1680, ¶ 32 (“This court recognizes the [COVID]-19 pandemic
may have impacted Mother’s ability to visit M.H., but in 2020 she saw M.H. only

once on a FaceTime call.”); In re S.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110016 and 110017,

2021-Ohio-1091, ¶ 34 (“We recognize the impediments the [COVID]-19 restrictions

interjected in this case. But those restrictions were not imposed until 15 months into

the case.”). Similarly, here, Mother has not visited the child in the entire time that

he has been at Sunshine — a time period that extends far beyond the months when

the pandemic would have precluded visitation.

              We therefore find that the trial court’s determination that Mother

abandoned C.H. was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

              Once the first prong is met, the juvenile court must find by clear and

convincing evidence that granting permanent custody to the agency is in the best

interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “Clear and convincing evidence” is that

measure or degree of proof that “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm

belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161

Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus; In re M.S., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101693 and 101694, 2015-Ohio-1028, at ¶ 8. “‘Where the proof

required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to

determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the

requisite degree of proof.’” Z.C. at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71,

74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990), citing Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio St. 1, 12 N.E. 526 (1887),

paragraph two of the syllabus.
              In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held pursuant

to R.C. 2151.414(A)(1), the juvenile court must consider all relevant factors,

including, but not limited to, the following:

      (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
      parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
      providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

      (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
      the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
      child;

      (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
      been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
      agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
      a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;

      (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
      whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
      permanent custody to the agency;

      (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
      apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

              A juvenile court is required to consider each relevant factor under R.C.

2151.414(D)(1) in making a determination regarding permanent custody, but

“[t]here is not one element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to

the statute.” In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532,

¶ 56. This court has previously stated that only one of these enumerated factors

needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody. In re Moore, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76942, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3958 (Aug. 31, 2000), citing In

re Shaeffer Children, 85 Ohio App.3d 683, 621 N.E.2d 426 (3d Dist.1993). Further,
the Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require

a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). Consideration is all the statute requires.” In re A.M.,

166 Ohio St.3d 127, 2020-Ohio-5102, 184 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 31.

              Appellant does not specifically argue that the trial court erred in

finding that permanent custody was in C.H.’s best interest but merely states that a

lack of visitation is only one factor the court should consider in determining the best

interest of the child. Here, the juvenile court set forth all of the factors that it

considered when assessing C.H.’s best interests, and the findings made by the court

were all supported by clear and convincing evidence.

              Mother’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

                                  III. Conclusion

              After thoroughly reviewing the entire record, we find that the juvenile

court’s judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and affirm the

award of permanent custody of C.H. to CCDCFS.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

                                            _
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR