Court Opinion

ID: 9376974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 16:01:16.226737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.826814
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-6021     Document: 010110821794       Date Filed: 03/06/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                        PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         March 6, 2023
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 22-6021

  BRANDON ROSS WILLIAMS,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Oklahoma
                           (D.C. No. 5:20-CR-00211-PRW-1)
                        _________________________________

 Laura Deskin, Research and Writing Specialist, (and Jeffrey M. Byers, Federal Public
 Defender, on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.

 Danielle Connolly, Assistant United States Attorney, (and Robert J. Troester, United
 States Attorney, on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, KELLY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 KELLY, Circuit Judge.
                          _________________________________

       Defendant Brandon Ross Williams pled guilty to being a felon in possession of

 a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment.

 On appeal, he challenges his lengthy sentence as an improper application of the

 Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). He asserts that his two prior Arkansas drug
Appellate Case: 22-6021    Document: 010110821794        Date Filed: 03/06/2023      Page: 2

 convictions are not categorically “serious drug offenses” under 18 U.S.C.

 § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) because his state convictions could have applied to hemp, and

 hemp was no longer a federally controlled substance at the time of his federal

 sentencing. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)

 and we affirm.

       Ultimately, this case is all about timing. Specifically, in the context of

 assessing whether a prior state drug conviction qualifies as a predicate “serious drug

 offense” under the ACCA, we must resolve the proper time of comparison to

 determine whether state and federal drug laws are a categorical match. There are two

 possible approaches: (1) comparing the state drug schedules in effect at the time of

 Mr. Williams’ prior convictions and the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of

 his federal sentencing (“time of federal sentencing comparison”); and (2) comparing

 the state drug schedules in effect at the time of Mr. Williams’ prior convictions and

 the federal drug schedules in effect at the time he committed the instant federal

 offense (“time of federal offense comparison”). See United States v. Gregory

 Williams, 48 F.4th 1125, 1133 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2022)

       For the reasons discussed below, we adopt the time of federal offense

 comparison. Since there was a categorical match between Arkansas’ definition of

 marijuana at the time of Mr. Williams’ prior convictions and the federal definition at

 the time he committed his federal offense, the district court properly applied the

 ACCA enhancement.

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                                      Background

       On May 2, 2018, a Dewey County Sheriff’s Deputy initiated a traffic stop of

 Mr. Williams’ car after observing two traffic violations. 2 R. 9. Mr. Williams

 appeared under the influence, and an inventory search of the car revealed a loaded

 Glock 27 pistol and a loaded Glock magazine. Id.

       On August 18, 2020, Mr. Williams was indicted for being a felon in possession

 of a firearm on or about May 3, 2018. 1 R. 11–12. On November 4, 2021, Mr.

 Williams pled guilty to the indictment and acknowledged he potentially faced a

 minimum 15-year sentence pursuant to the ACCA. Id. 53–65. 1

       The presentence investigation report (PSR) classified Mr. Williams as an

 armed career criminal and thus subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C.

 § 924(e). To trigger the ACCA’s application, the PSR identified three prior Arkansas

 convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense: (1) a 2001 conviction for

 delivery of marijuana; (2) a 2003 conviction for residential burglary; and (3) a 2003

 conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. 2 R. 10, 13–15. The

 enhancement increased the statutory range on his § 922(g) conviction from 0–10

 years’ imprisonment to 15 years to life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

       As for the Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR calculated Mr. Williams’ initial

 base offense level as 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2k2.1(a)(4)(A). The ACCA designation

       1
         Mr. Williams initially pled guilty on January 28, 2021, but withdrew his plea
 upon learning he was subject to the ACCA enhancement. He nonetheless reentered a
 guilty plea later.
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 increased the offense level to 33 under § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B). Three levels were then

 subtracted for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a)–(b). At an offense level

 of 30 with a criminal history category of IV, the guidelines range was 135 to 168

 months’ imprisonment. However, the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum

 increased the guidelines range to 180 months’ imprisonment.

       Mr. Williams objected to the ACCA designation arguing the 2001 and 2003

 Arkansas drug convictions do not qualify as “serious drug offenses” and thus cannot

 serve as valid predicate offenses under the ACCA. He argued they do not qualify

 because the Arkansas drug schedule in effect at the time of his state convictions is

 categorically overbroad in that it criminalized more substances than did the federal

 Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in effect at the time of his federal sentencing in

 2022. Specifically, Arkansas included hemp in its definition of marijuana at the time

 of Mr. Williams’ state convictions, see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-101 (2001), id.

 (2002), while the federal CSA has exempted hemp from its definition of marijuana

 since December 20, 2018. See Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No.

 115-334, § 12619, 132 Stat. 4490, 5018; 18 U.S.C. § 802(16) (“The term ‘marihuana’

 does not include . . . hemp.”). Without the ACCA designation, Mr. Williams total

 offense level would be 17 with a Guidelines range of 37–46 months’ imprisonment.

 2 R. 33.

       The district court overruled the objection. Relying on United States v.

 Traywicks, 827 F. App’x 889 (10th Cir. 2020), the district court found that since

 there was a categorical match between the federal and state drug schedules at the

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 time of the prior state convictions, the convictions qualify as predicate offenses under

 the ACCA. 3 R. 68–69. Thus, on January 25, 2022, the district court sentenced Mr.

 Williams to 180 months’ imprisonment. Id. 89.

                                        Discussion

       As noted, Mr. Williams argues that the ACCA enhancement is improper

 because his two prior Arkansas drug convictions are categorically broader than the

 ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” in effect at the time of his federal

 sentencing. After Mr. Williams was sentenced, this court held that “a defendant’s

 prior state conviction is not categorically a ‘serious drug offense’ under the ACCA if

 the prior offense included substances not federally controlled at the time of the

 instant federal offense.” Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1138. However, we left open

 “whether the district court looks to the federal definition at the time of the

 commission of the instant federal offense or at the time of sentencing thereon.” Id. at

 1133 n.3. It was unnecessary to decide that issue because the federal definition of

 marijuana excluded hemp at both times. Id.

       That is not the case here. Both parties agree that the application of the ACCA

 enhancement turns on whether the Arkansas offense is overbroad. Here, there is a

 categorical match under the time of federal offense comparison such that application

 of the ACCA is proper, as both the Arkansas state drug schedules in effect in 2001

 and 2003 and the federal drug schedules in effect on May 3, 2018 when Mr. Williams

 committed his federal offense, included hemp. See Aplt. Br. at 14; Aplee. Br. at 16.

 There is a categorical mismatch under the time of federal sentencing comparison, as

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 the federal drug schedules excluded hemp pursuant to the 2018 Farm Bill at the time

 of Mr. Williams’ sentencing on January 25, 2022.

       The two parties disagree only on which version of the federal drug schedules

 we must look to in determining categorical overbreadth. The government urges we

 look at the federal drug schedules in effect when Mr. Williams committed his

 underlying federal offense. Mr. Williams contends we must look at the federal drug

 schedules in effect when he was sentenced.

    A. The ACCA

       The ACCA imposes a sentence enhancement for being a felon in possession of

 a firearm for any person who has “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony

 or a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Relevant here, the statutory

 definition of “serious drug offense” includes “an offense under State law, involving

 manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a

 controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the [CSA] (21 U.S.C. 802)), for

 which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”

 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). In turn, 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) states a “controlled substance” is “a

 drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or

 V of part B of this subchapter [21 U.S.C §§ 811–14].” We now must determine

 whether Mr. Williams’ prior state drug convictions qualify as serious drug offenses.

    B. Whether Mr. Williams was properly subjected to an enhanced sentence
       under the ACCA

       We review de novo whether a prior state conviction qualifies as an ACCA

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 predicate offense. Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1137. To determine whether a

 prior state drug conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense, we employ the

 categorical approach. See United States v. Cantu, 964 F.3d 924, 926–27 (10th Cir.

 2020). “Under the categorical approach, a state drug offense that includes non-

 federally controlled substances is overbroad and thus not categorically a ‘serious

 drug offense.’” Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1137.

    1. In employing the categorical approach, circuit courts have employed different
       approaches to resolve the embedded timing issue

       In employing the categorical approach, the circuits have taken a variety of

 approaches regarding which version of drug schedules apply. Only one other circuit

 has addressed the precise issue presented here. Instead, the circuit debates have

 largely concerned whether a court should compare state and federal law as it existed

 at the time of the prior state conviction (time of prior state conviction comparison) or

 compare past state law with some version of current federal law.

       As noted, this court adopted the time of federal offense comparison, albeit

 leaving open the specific issue we must answer. Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1133

 & n.3. We relied in part on holdings of the First and Ninth Circuits that courts must

 look to the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of federal sentencing to

 determine whether a prior conviction is a “controlled substance offense” within the

 meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Abdulaziz, 998 F.3d

 519, 531 (1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Bautista, 989 F.3d 698, 703 (9th Cir. 2021).

 Those cases of course addressed this timing question in the context of the Guidelines

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 and not the ACCA — an important distinction. Such a distinction is important as

 those circuits found the term “controlled substance” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) to be

 limited to substances listed in the federal CSA, Bautista, 989 F.3d at 702; Abdulaziz,

 998 F.3d at 529, whereas this court has found that the meaning of “controlled

 substance” in the Guidelines is not so limited. United States v. Jones, 15 F.4th 1288,

 1294 (10th Cir. 2021). Moreover, those cases were deciding whether to employ a

 time of federal sentencing or time of prior state conviction comparison. A time of

 federal offense comparison was never considered.

       In the ACCA context, the Fourth Circuit held courts must compare federal law

 in effect at the time of federal sentencing with the state law in effect at the time of

 state sentencing for the prior convictions. See United States v. Hope, 28 F.4th 487,

 504–05 (4th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Fourth Circuit adopted the time of federal

 sentencing comparison. The court based its decision on the fact that “the Sentencing

 Guidelines require that a district court use the manual that is ‘in effect on the date

 that the defendant is sentenced . . . .’” Id. at 505 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11). While

 it appears adopting the time of federal sentencing comparison as opposed to the time

 of federal offense comparison would have been outcome determinative (like Mr.

 Williams, the defendant in Hope committed his crime prior to the 2018 Farm Bill but

 was sentenced afterward, and argued overbreadth based on the 2018 Farm Bill’s

 exclusion of hemp) the Fourth Circuit also presented its resolution as a dispute

 between whether to employ the time of federal sentencing comparison or time of

 prior state conviction comparison. Id. at 492–93, 504–05.

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       Next, the Eighth Circuit held that under the ACCA, “the categorical approach

 requires comparison of the state drug schedule at the time of the prior state offense to

 the federal schedule at the time of the federal offense.” United States v. Perez, 46

 F.4th 691, 700 (8th Cir. 2022). Thus, the Eighth Circuit adopted the time of federal

 offense comparison. However, it appears the court was not required to decide

 whether to consult federal law at the time of the federal offense or federal

 sentencing. 2 Instead, it was confronted with whether to use the federal definition at

 the time of the prior state conviction or a more current definition. Id. at 699–700.

 The court in Perez rooted its decision in due process and fair notice considerations

 stating that consulting the federal drug schedule in force at the time of the federal

 offense ensures that a defendant has notice of whether his prior convictions could

 affect the penalty he faces for the underlying federal offense. Id. Interestingly, Perez

 employed a different comparative approach under the Guidelines, holding that

 “whether a prior state conviction is a controlled substance offense for Guidelines

 purposes is based on the law at the time of conviction, without reference to current

       2
         This understanding of Perez is reinforced by some imprecise language in the
 court’s holding. After deciding the relevant timeframe is the “time of the federal
 offense,” the Eighth Circuit went on to state that “[w]hether a previous state
 conviction is a serious drug offense only becomes salient at the time of sentencing . .
 . . Therefore, the federal law in effect at the time of the federal sentencing is the
 relevant definition for ACCA purposes.” Id. While Perez sends mixed signals
 concerning the timing issue, it unequivocally applied the relevant drug definition at
 the time of the federal offense—2019—even though the defendant was sentenced in
 2021, and thus employed the time of federal offense comparison. Id. at 696–97, 699–
 700.
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  state law.” 3 Id. at 703 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit like our circuit has

  found that the term “controlled substance,” is not limited to those substances listed in

  the federal CSA. Id. at 702.

         Next, the Third Circuit explicitly parted ways with the Fourth Circuit’s

  decision in Hope and held “that courts must look to the federal law in effect when the

  defendant committed the federal offense.” United States v. Brown, 47 F.4th 147, 153

  (3d Cir. 2022). Most importantly, the Third Circuit appears to be the only circuit

  presented with the precise issue this court faces — whether to adopt the time of

  federal offense comparison or the time of federal sentencing comparison. Cf. Hope,

  28 F.4th at 504–05 (discussing why it employed a time of federal sentencing

  comparison as opposed to a time of prior state conviction comparison).

         The Third Circuit’s decision to adopt the federal offense approach was guided

  in part by the federal saving statute, which provides that the “repeal of any statute

  shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability

  incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide.” 1

  U.S.C. § 109. Under the saving statute, “penalties are ‘incurred’ under the older

  statute when an offender becomes subject to them, i.e., commits the underlying

         3
           On the same day that Perez was issued, the Sixth Circuit, in the context of the
  Guidelines’ career offender enhancement — U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) — and to determine
  the meaning of “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 adopted a
  time of prior state conviction comparison and held courts must consult “the drug
  schedules in place at the time of the prior conviction” not the drug schedules in place
  at the time of instant federal sentencing. United States v. Clark, 46 F.4th 404, 408
  (6th Cir. 2022).
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  conduct that makes the offender liable.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 272

  (2012). The Third Circuit determined that the 2018 Farm Bill effected a repeal

  within the meaning of the saving statute given that it changed the definition of

  marijuana and thereby indirectly affected federal penalties associated with prior

  serious drug offenses. Brown, 47 F.4th at 151. Moreover, since the defendant

  committed the offense prior to the effective date of the 2018 Farm Bill, the defendant

  incurred his penalties at that time, when there was still a categorical match for

  purposes of the ACCA. Id. at 151–52. Lastly, the court determined the 2018 Farm

  Bill did not make the new definition of marijuana retroactive and therefore did not

  disturb application of the federal saving statute. Id. at 152–53.

        The Third Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey,

  which addressed a similar timing issue. 567 U.S. 260. In Dorsey, the Court

  considered whether lighter sentencing penalties for crack cocaine introduced by the

  Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 should apply to offenders who committed their offense

  prior to the Act’s passage. 567 U.S. at 264. There, the Court found pre-Act

  offenders were entitled to the lesser penalties because the Act incorporated a

  background sentencing principle embodied in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

  that courts apply the Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing. Id. at 275. In

  contrast, the Third Circuit found that nothing in the 2018 Farm Bill implies

  retroactive application of newer versions of the federal drug schedule nor does it

  direct courts to look to the background sentencing principle embodied in the

  Sentencing Reform Act. Brown, 47 F.4th at 152.

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        Additionally, in reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit noted that applying

  the time of federal offense comparison best comports with fair notice principles as it

  allows a defendant to know whether his prior convictions constitute serious drug

  offenses when he commits the underlying federal offense. Id. at 153. Moreover, it

  reasoned that applying federal law at the time of federal sentencing would lead to

  significant and arbitrary sentencing disparities. Id. While the court acknowledged

  all line-drawing creates some degree of arbitrariness, it concluded that any resulting

  disparity ought to be rooted in a defendant’s voluntary conduct, as opposed to when

  that defendant is sentenced, which can be affected by countless considerations

  beyond the defendant’s control. 4 Id. Thus, the defendant in Brown was properly

  subjected to the ACCA’s enhanced penalties because there was a categorical match

  between the federal and state definition of marijuana at the time he committed his

  federal offense even though there was a subsequent mismatch caused by the 2018

  Farm Bill when he was sentenced. Id. at 150–53.

        Lastly, we note that the Eleventh Circuit initially adopted the time of federal

  offense comparison as well. See United States v. Jackson, 36 F.4th 1294, 1297 (11th

  Cir. 2022) superseded, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022). Much like Perez and Brown,

  its decision was grounded in the fact “that due-process fair-notice considerations

        4
          The Third Circuit offered the hypothetical of two defendants violating the
  same law on the same date in 2016 in identical fashion with identical prior
  convictions. Id. at 153. However, if one pleaded earlier and was sentenced in 2017,
  that defendant would be subject to the ACCA whereas the defendant who was
  sentenced after the 2018 Farm Bill would receive a lighter sentence. Id.
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  require us” to adopt the time of federal offense comparison. Id. However, the

  Eleventh Circuit reversed course and adopted the time of prior state conviction

  comparison holding that approach was required by the Supreme Court’s decision in

  McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011). See Jackson, 55 F.4th at 855. Thus,

  in employing the categorical approach the court compared the state drug schedules to

  the federal drug schedules as they existed at the time of the prior state conviction. Id.

  at 856. It is worth noting that this court explicitly rejected the contention that

  McNeill controls which version of federal law courts must consult because McNeill

  “was discussing a subsequent change in the prior offense of conviction—and not the

  federal definition to which it is compared.” Gregory Williams, 48 F.4th at 1142–43.

        For those keeping count, in the ACCA context that makes two circuits

  adopting the time of federal offense comparison, see Brown, 47 F.4th at 153; Perez,

  46 F.4th at 700; one circuit adopting the time of federal sentencing comparison, see

  Hope, 28 F.4th at 504–05; and one circuit adopting time of prior state conviction

  comparison—after originally adopting the time of federal offense comparison, see

  Jackson, 55 F.4th at 855. As for determining whether prior convictions can serve as

  predicate “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines, see U.S.S.G.

  § 4B1.2, every circuit that limits the definition of “controlled substance” to the

  federal definition as embodied in the CSA has adopted the time of federal sentencing

  comparison. See Abdulaziz, 998 F.3d at 531; Bautista, 989 F.3d at 703. By contrast,

  in circuits that do not define “controlled substance” by reference to the CSA, every

  circuit to reach the timing question has held that a court only consults the law at the

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  time of the prior state conviction, not current federal or state law. See Clark, 46

  F.4th at 408; Perez, 46 F.4th at 703. Though the cases on the timing issue are not

  entirely uniform, we think that the correct approach is to employ the time of federal

  offense comparison.

     2. The parties’ contentions

          Mr. Williams argues the time of federal sentencing comparison is correct

  because the “text, history, and purpose of the ACCA all point toward comparing the

  state drug schedules at the time of state conviction to current CSA drug schedules.”

  Aplt. Br. at 15. Mr. Williams contends that because the text reflects an

  understanding that the drug schedules may change, one must apply current federal

  law as opposed to older versions. Id. at 17. For support, he points out that the term

  “controlled substance” is defined as “a drug or other substance, or immediate

  precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter.” Id. at

  15 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 802(6)). In turn, Part B of the relevant subchapter states that

  in addition to these initial five schedules, “[t]he schedules established by this section

  shall be updated and republished on a semiannual basis.” Id. at 15–16 (citing 21

  U.S.C. § 812(a)). Moreover, Mr. Williams argues that Congress was aware of the

  background principle that we apply the sentencing laws in place on the date of

  sentencing when crafting § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Id. at 18 (citing Dorsey, 567 U.S. at

  275).

          In addition, he urges this court to follow the Fourth Circuit’s lead in Hope. As

  discussed, Hope relied on the fact that the Guidelines require courts to use the

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  manual in effect on the date of sentencing. 5 Lastly, to the extent there is ambiguity,

  Mr. Williams urges this court to apply the rule of lenity and decide the timing issue

  in his favor. Aplt. Br. at 22–23.

        In response, the government argues that the federal saving statute resolves the

  question in its favor. Aplee. Br. at 13–17. It argues Mr. Williams incurred his

  ACCA penalty on the date he committed his offense. See Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 272.

  Moreover, just as the Third Circuit found, it argues the 2018 Farm Bill constitutes a

  repeal within the meaning of the saving statute as it excluded hemp from the

  definition of marijuana and thereby indirectly affected federal penalties for marijuana

  convictions. See id. (discussing that a repeal occurs when a new statute decreases the

  penalties under the older statute). Moreover, it argues, as the Third Circuit found, the

  2018 Farm Bill did not express an intent to apply retroactively 6 and, as such, Mr.

  Williams properly incurred the enhanced ACCA penalties because he committed his

  underlying offense while hemp was still included in the federal definition of

  marijuana.

        Mr. Williams counters that reliance on the federal saving statute is inapposite.

  Aplt. Reply Br. at 2–6. According to Mr. Williams, the relevant sentencing statute is

        5
           In fact, Hope directly quoted Bautista, a Guidelines case, which stated “it
  would be illogical to conclude that federal sentencing law attaches ‘culpability and
  dangerousness’ to an act that, at the time of sentencing, Congress has concluded is
  not culpable and dangerous. Hope, 28 F.4th at 505 (quoting Bautista, 989 F.3d at
  703) (emphasis in original). According to the Fourth Circuit, such a view would
  nullify Congress’ ability to revise the criminal code. Id.
         6
           Mr. Williams concedes the bill’s new definition of marijuana is not
  retroactive. Aplt. Reply Br. at 3.
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  18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and that statute has not been changed by any act of Congress.

  Moreover, the 2018 Farm Bill did not repeal penalties for marijuana convictions but

  merely modified the definition of marijuana to exclude hemp. Thus, the saving

  statute is simply not in play here and it cannot tell us which federal drug schedule to

  consult in conducting our categorical analysis. Id. at 3. Instead, according to Mr.

  Williams and as the Fourth Circuit found in Hope, background sentencing principles,

  utilized in Guidelines cases, require us to consult the federal drug schedule in effect

  at the date of sentencing.

     3. Analysis
        Mr. Williams’ first contention — that the “text, history, and purposes of the

  ACCA” dictates that we adopt time of federal sentencing comparison — is

  unavailing. To be sure, the ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” does

  reference a schedule that is subject to change. However, that simply does not address

  which version of that changing drug schedule a court must consult in conducting its

  categorical analysis. He provides no other textual, historical, or purpose-based

  arguments.

        In addition, Mr. Williams’ reliance on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Hope is

  unpersuasive. Hope relied on Guidelines cases such as Bautista 7 and the Guidelines

  directive that courts use the manual in effect on the date of sentencing, neither of

        7
           Indeed Hope mistakenly asserts that Bautista concerned a similar timing
  issue in the ACCA context. Id. at 505 n.15. The case did not concern the ACCA but
  rather whether a prior conviction was for a “controlled substance offense” under
  § 4B1.2(b) of the Guidelines. Bautista, 989 F.3d at 701.
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  which applies here. 28 F.4th at 505. As the Third Circuit rightly pointed out, this is

  not a Guidelines case, but rather a case involving the ACCA, which omits a similar

  directive requiring courts to use the law in effect at the time of sentencing. Brown,

  47 F.4th at 153–54. Accordingly, Mr. Williams’ argument concerning background

  sentencing principles embodied in the Guidelines does not overcome the due process

  and fair notice considerations that ultimately carry the day as discussed below. To be

  sure, the cases that have employed the time of federal sentencing comparison for

  purposes of the Guidelines could be persuasive and favor Mr. Williams’ position.

  However, Bautista and Abdulaziz are distinctly unpersuasive given that unlike the

  Tenth Circuit, the First and Ninth Circuits limit the term “controlled substance” in

  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) to substances listed in the federal CSA, Bautista, 989 F.3d at

  702; Abdulaziz, 998 F.3d at 529. As for the circuits that have reached this issue but

  do not so limit the term “controlled substance” like the Tenth Circuit does, see Jones,

  15 F.4th at 1294, they have employed a time of prior state conviction comparison.

  See Clark, 46 F.4th at 408; Perez, 46 F.4th at 703. In total, looking to these out-of-

  circuit cases discussing the timing issue under the Guidelines provides little

  meaningful guidance. Thus, we decline to follow Hope, which expressly relied on

  those cases.

        In rejecting Mr. Williams’ argument, we instead adopt the time of federal

  offense comparison as due process and fair notice considerations mandate such an

  approach. It is vital that when a defendant commits a federal offense, that defendant

  is aware of the penalties he faces and the nature of his prior convictions should he

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  have any. See United States v. Johnson, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). Leaving a

  defendant in limbo until he is sentenced violates this notice requirement. As Judge

  Hartz noted, applying the federal schedules in effect at the time of the federal offense

  best comports with fundamental notions of due process. See Cantu, 964 F.3d at 936–

  37 (Hartz, J., concurring). This court in Gregory Williams embraced this rationale

  when it chose the time of federal offense as the appropriate reference point. See 48

  F.4th at 1142. So too did the Third and Eighth Circuits. See Brown, 47 F.4th at 153

  (“[T]his rule gives a defendant notice not only that his conduct violated federal law,

  but also of his potential minimum and maximum penalty for his violation and

  whether his prior felony convictions could affect those penalties.” (internal quotation

  omitted)); Perez, 46 F.4th at 699.

         In addition, this approach minimizes potential disparities in sentencing. Under

  Mr. Williams’ desired approach, two individuals who violate § 922(g) in identical

  respects with identical prior convictions could receive different sentences simply

  because they might be sentenced at different times. See Brown, 47 F.4th at 153.

  Sentencing dates are affected by a variety of factors including plea negotiations,

  health concerns, and court schedules. In fact, several years may pass between the

  commission of an offense and sentencing. See e.g., United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d

  930, 933–34 (10th Cir. 2012) (indicating over six years passed between the

  defendant’s commission of his offenses and sentencing thereon).

         In light of this troubling potential for disparity, the Third Circuit reasoned,

  “[i]f penalties are to differ because of an arbitrarily selected date, it seems fairer that

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  the severity of the penalty depend upon the voluntary act of a defendant in choosing

  the date of his criminal conduct than upon the date of sentencing.” Brown, 47 F.4th

  at 153 (quoting United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 2010)). Of

  course, we recognize disparities could result from the time of federal offense

  comparison. However, the approach we adopt makes those disparities less arbitrary

  as it ties them to a defendant’s voluntary act. Moreover, it avoids another

  problematic aspect inherent in the time of federal sentencing comparison. That

  approach could incentivize delay (in hopes of a change in the law creating or

  eliminating a categorical mismatch) to the defendant’s or government’s advantage.

        As for the government’s federal saving statute argument and Mr. Williams’

  dispute of its applicability, we note that Congress did not change the ACCA — the

  underlying sentencing statute at issue here. Moreover, the 2018 Farm Bill simply

  excluded hemp from its definition of a controlled substance, it did not repeal

  penalties for marijuana convictions. What it did do is de-criminalize hemp. The

  government argues the 2018 Farm Bill set off a chain of events that indirectly

  affected penalties under the ACCA and as such implicated a statutory change of the

  ACCA. Given the more direct approach of our disposition, we need not resolve this

  contention.

        Lastly, the rule of lenity does not rescue Mr. Williams’ argument. “[T]he rule

  of lenity applies when a court employs all of the traditional tools of statutory

  interpretation and, after doing so, concludes that the statute still remains grievously

  ambiguous, meaning that the court can make no more than a guess as to what the

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  statute means.” Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 789 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,

  concurring). First, we are not in a position where we must merely guess which is the

  correct approach. Instead, we exhaust our tools of statutory interpretation by looking

  to our own circuit decisions in Cantu and Gregory Williams. In addition, the basis of

  our decision is rooted in due process and avoiding arbitrary sentencing discrepancies.

  Second, not a single circuit court when confronted with these timing issues has

  resorted to the rule of lenity. While that does not prevent us from becoming the first

  circuit to do so, it demonstrates that our normal tools of interpretation are sufficient,

  and that the statute is not so “grievously ambiguous.” Also, not employing it here

  comports with the Court’s admonition that “the rule of lenity rarely comes into play.”

  Shular, 140 S. Ct. at 788.

        Because there was a categorical match between Arkansas’ definition of

  marijuana at the time of Mr. Williams’ two prior drug convictions and the federal

  definition at the time he committed the underlying 922(g) offense, the district court

  properly applied the ACCA’s enhanced penalties.

        AFFIRMED.

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