Court Opinion

ID: 9856804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:58:22.88563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:39.315908
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the judgment and the respective rulings in the several divisions of the majority opinion indicated.
1. I dissent from the ruling in Division 2 of the majority opinion because the State attempted to put the defendant’s character in issue by proving a motive for the defendant’s conduct in his dealings with the two men who were allegedly shot at and a third man, the attempted motive being that the defendant was soliciting business for his wife and another woman, both of whom were prostitutes, and that extorting money from the three men was the defendant’s purpose. There is not one shred of evidence of any kind which would authorize a finding that the defendant was soliciting business for the two women.
2. I dissent from the ruling in Division 7 of the opinion. I think that the jury would have been authorized to find the defendant guilty of pointing a pistol at another, on the two counts, and the court should have so charged, as requested. Jenkins v. State, 92 Ga. 470, supra.
If I am correct in my understanding of the case of Jenkins v. State, supra, the reasoning of the majority is erroneous. My understanding of the ruling in that case is that the jury was not required to find the defendant guilty of shooting at another, even though the evidence authorized that finding, and that the jury could find a verdict of pointing a weapon at another. If I am *706correct, by refusing to permit the jury to bring in a verdict of pointing a weapon at another by not giving the principle in charge, the court deprived the defendant of a substantial constitutional right. The majority reasons that the error of the court is harmless by reason of the fact that the evidence demands a verdict of guilty of shooting at another. I think the majority goes too far. I think it would be going too far even if the law were contrary to what I think it is with reference to a finding of pointing a weapon at another. I have never seen such treatment of a defendant’s statement, even considering it as unambiguous. But I think that it is ambiguous and that the jury could have found that even though the defendant stated that he “shot at” the two parties he did not mean to say that he aimed directly at them because he specifically denied that he shot with the intent to hit the two men. The majority is depriving a jury of the duty to construe the defendant’s testimony. That’s a jury’s job, not ours, in such a case as this. The following statement from a Mississippi case supports my theory that the defendant could have meant that he shot in “the general direction of” the two men, and not that he was pleading guilty to the charges. The court said: “We cannot see that the words ‘at and towards’ have the effect of narrowing the charge in the declaration of liability, as contended. These words have somewhat indefinite meaning. In the Century Dictionary ‘at’ is described as ‘a preposition of extremely various use.’ It is therein said that, according to its context, it is equivalent to ‘near, about under, over, toward.’ The same dictionary defines ‘toward’ as meaning ‘in the direction of.’ Anderson’s Law Dictionary says the word ‘at’ ‘is somewhat indefinite.’ A statute of Indiana made the pointing of a firearm ‘at or toward any other person’ an offense. In the case of Lange v. State, 95 Ind. 114, it was held that the pointing of a gun at the door of a dwelling wherein [was] the person threatened was a sufficient proof that the gun was pointed ‘at or toward.’ The court said: ‘The word “toward” is of very comprehensive signification, for it means, “in the direction of.” ’ The general significance of these words is controlled by the context. This is so in the case at bar. The charge against the sheriff is his failure in his official duties, con*707sisting of his improper use and discharge of a firearm. It is admitted that he fired his pistol and that the ball therefrom struck and killed Johnston. The ball went out of the muzzle of the weapon and went into the head of the unfortunate youth. The ball was going in the direction of its victim when it struck. The sheriff, when asked by his own counsel on direct examination, ‘Did you shoot at him?’ answered, ‘Yes.’ He evidently understood ‘at’ to mean in the general direction of.” State v. Cunningham, 107 Miss. 140, 150 (65 S 115, 51 LRA (NS) 1179).