Court Opinion

ID: 9721896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:11:58.586471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:29.127390
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority in this case. While I find no fault with the legal propositions relied upon by the majority in its opinion, I do not view the evidence as does the majority. In my view, the record clearly establishes that the appellant was *592not only urged to perform creative work outside of the classroom but was required to do so. The testimony reflects that the appellant’s immediate supervisor, Professor Dan Howard, who was chairman of the department of art, discussed with Rowan what would be required in the way of creative design. He was informed by Professor Howard that he must do as much creative work as time would possibly allow and make all and any attempts to exhibit his work. As noted by the majority, the appellee considered this so significant that it paid the cost of shipping the artwork to its place of exhibition. The evidence is without dispute that appellant was advised that faculty members were expected to put in somewhere in the area of 70 hours a week, including 18 to 21 contact hours, with the remaining hours devoted to creative research, advising, and committee assignments. Appellant testified that in his conversation with Professor Howard he was advised that creative activity and scholarly research was an integral, imperative part of his duty and a condition of his employment. The dean of the college acknowledged that he considered the doing of professional work at home a part of appellant’s job as a member of the faculty.
It may be true that under certain circumstances work performed by a college professor at home may be unrelated to his employment and, therefore, not covered by the workmen’s compensation act; however, in this case, the employer did not deny that appellant was expected to perform this work, including the work done at home. Had the employer denied this fact, the majority opinion might be correct. But here both the employer and the employee testified that the work being performed at the time of the injury was considered by the employer as part of the employee’s duties. It is difficult to see how we can find, as a matter of law, that the work was not a part of the employee’s duties. The majority appears to give little credence to the requirement of a college professor to either *593“publish or perish.” That view, in my judgment, ignores the reality of the matter. Had the university wished to maintain control over the safety of the studio facilities used by the faculty, it could have easily provided the appellant with adequate facilities and instructed him not to perform the required work at home. Quite to the contrary, it not only failed to provide him with adequate facilities but encouraged him to use his home facilities in lieu of those which were not otherwise adequately provided by the university. Many types of employment are of such nature that they are not performed solely within identifiable premises controlled and operated by the employer. It occurs to me that our decision in this case today, under the facts presented, does violence to our oft-stated rule that the workmen’s compensation act is to be construed liberally so that its beneficent purposes may not be thwarted by technical refinement of interpretation. See Haler v. Gering Bean Co., 163 Neb. 748, 81 N.W.2d 152 (1957); Franzen v. Blakley, 155 Neb. 621, 52 N.W.2d 833 (1952). Under the facts in this case, I would have found that the injury arose out of and in the course of the appellant’s employment and was compensable.
White, J., joins in this dissent.