Court Opinion

ID: 9451518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:18:49.196183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:46.612117
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I concur in both Chief Judge Hastings’ dissent and Judge Kiley’s dissent. I think, however, that additional -comment is necessary to reemphasize what I conceive to be the erroneous premises upon which the majority opinion rests.
I do not disagree with the majority opinion’s generalities about the laudable role of labor unions in our recent industrial history and the importance of protecting the American workingman from any suggestion of involuntary servitude. These generalities, however, are irrelevant and do not solve the legal question presented. The relevant points cited by the majority in support of its conclusion, and with which I disagree, are: (1) this case involves employees who are involuntary members of the union; (2) the possibility exists that the union might exact crippling and unreasonable fines; and (3) there is no occasion for resorting to legislative history in the application of sections 7 and 8(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act to the facts of this case.
There is no issue in this case concerning compulsory union membership. The issue is whether an employee who has voluntarily applied for and been admitted to full union membership may be subjected to a disciplinary fine for crossing a picket line established by his union. The majority’s reliance upon co*671erced membership is misplaced. Both the Board and the union concede that an employee, even though required by a union security clause to tender uniform initiation fees and periodic dues in order to hold his job, is not subject to internal union discipline if he has either rejected full union membership or resigned from the union.
There is no issue in this case relating to “consecutive fines [which] may run into thousands of dollars.” The facts show that the fines imposed ranged from $20 to $100. This court should not consider hypothetical questions. Reliance upon speculative union conduct and the burdens it might impose upon a recalcitrant member is nét justifiable. Moreover, a member who has been fined and believes that the fine is excessive may contest the fine either in a state court action brought to collect it or in a federal court action claiming a violation of his rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1959).
A literal construction of sections 7 and 8(b) (1) (A) is neither permissible nor dispositive of the issue in this case. It is axiomatic that in interpreting statutes a court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. The words actually chosen are, of course, the strongest measure of the legislative purpose. But words generally have different shades of meaning, and the dominant meaning— the one the legislative body intended— can often be ascertained only by considering the process out of which it evolved. For that reason we should not ignore the legislative history of such significant congressional expressions as sections 7 and 8(b) (1) (A). The briefs and arguments of the parties in this appeal were primarily devoted to the scope of application intended for these provisions by Congress. Refusing to admit that these sections contain words of art whose meaning can only be discerned by consulting their legislative background or failing to recognize that these sections are but amendments to the NLRA and that they should be considered within its contextual framework is inconsistent with proper statutory interpretation. The majority opinion implicitly recognizes this when it refers to the “extensive Congressional debate and study” which assertedly reduced the interpretation of section 8(b) (1) (A) to a simple exercise. The Supreme Court has not found a literal reading of this provision so conclusive. In N. L. R. B. v. Drivers’ Local Union 639, 362 U.S. 274, 80 S.Ct. 706, 4 L.Ed.2d 710 (1960), the Court found it necessary to examine the legislative history of section 8(b) (1) (A) in detail in order to decide whether peaceful picketing by a union is conduct which might “restrain or coerce” employees in the exercise of section 7 rights and therefore falls within the prohibition of section 8(b) (1) (A).
Finally, I am not convinced that a mechanical application of the statutes in question provides an answer to the problem. Employees have the right to engage in concerted activities or to refrain from engaging in such activities. But to read section 7 as saying that an employee who is also a union member may make an independent, ad hoc determination to cross a union-imposed picket line without subjecting himself to reasonable internal union discipline is to say that an employee-member may simultaneously engage in protected activity and refrain from so engaging. If an employee wishes to be free of internal union discipline, there are no legal barriers against the exercise of such choice. But when an employee voluntarily joins a union (an exercise of his section 7 rights) he may not join on his own terms, abiding only by those rules with which he is in personal agreement.1 Similarly, to read the proviso in *672section 8(b) (1) (A) as limiting a union’s internal disciplinary power to expulsion of its members seems to me to be not only an undue restriction of the words “retention of membership” but also an application of the proviso in a way not intended and in a manner which diminishes a power which would exist entirely apart from the proviso. Section 8(b) (1) (A) by its terms is directed at union conduct vis-a-vis employees, not at union conduct vis-á-vis union members.

. In N. L. R. B. v. International Union UAW, 320 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1963), the First Circuit commented on the effect of union membership on an employee’s section 7 right to refrain from concerted activities in the following manner: Under Section 7, absent a collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, the employee has indeed the unfettered right to abstain from indulging in union activity. He need not “form,” “join” or “assist” a labor organization and, again, *672an agreement apart, this inactivity cannot be the source of recriminations. It is by now too clear for citation that this facet of Section 7 was designed to prevent forcing the unwilling worker into a union.
However, we believe that it is quite another thing when the employee eschews his “reluctance” and voluntarily joins a labor organization. At this point, under our view, the employee takes off the protective mantle of Section 7’s “refraining” provision and renders himself amenable to the reasonable internal regulations of the organization with which he chooses to cast his lot.