Court Opinion

ID: 9588508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:58.061154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:36.984977
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I have serious reservations with regard to the majority’s resolution of the issue discussed “On Motion for Rehearing.” The prosecutor’s inquiry into appellant Botts’ post-Miranda reactions would appear to be much more extensive than the majority intimates. Likewise, the distinction drawn by the majority between the lack of a verbal response to being arrested and the lack of an emotional response to that event would appear to be tenuous at best. However, notwithstanding my reservations as to the merits, I do not believe that the issue has been preserved for appellate review. Our Supreme Court has held that it is incumbent upon the defendant in a criminal case to object to the State’s elicitation of such testimony as was given in the instant case. See Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496, 504 (246 SE2d 642) (1978). In this case, although there was an objection at the time the testimony was elicited by the State, the objection was not that the inquiry constituted an impermissible infringement upon appellant Botts’ constitutional right to remain silent. That ground was not raised until defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the second day of the trial, long after the testimony had already been admitted. Under these circumstances, the issue has not been preserved for appellate review. “[Tjhere was no objection to the [testimony] that became the subject of the motion for mistrial on the ground that it [was an impermissible comment on] the appellant’s [Fifth Amendment rights] at the time the [testimony] was [allowed] into evidence. ‘(A) mistrial will not lie where evidence is admitted without objection, ([cit.]) and a motion for mistrial not made contemporaneously with the alleged misconduct makes the motion not timely. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” Flynn v. State, 255 Ga. 415, 418-419 (6a) (339 SE2d 259) (1986). Accordingly, although I cannot concur in the majority’s finding of no error, I do not believe that reversal of appellant Botts’ conviction is required.