Court Opinion

ID: 2965101
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:27.316006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:05.523687
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________
        No. 97-1363

                               AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                RADAMES CARDOZA-RODRIGUEZ, MARTA ELAINE COLL-FIGUEROA,
           ISABEL DE LA PAZ, MARIA D. GARCIA-CACERES, ERNESTO LOPEZ-GARCIA
                  ANA L. MARIN DE RIVERO, CARMEN ANA MARTINEZ-RIVERA
        CARMEN ALICIA MATTOS, GUILLERMO ORTIZ-ROSA, MARGARITA SANTIAGO-NEGRON
                            AND MARGARITA ZEQUEIRA-JULIA,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Ivan A. Ramos,  with whom Ramos &  Ramos-Camara, was on brief  for
            _____________             _____________________
        appellants.
            Terence G.  Connor, with whom  Laura F. Patallo,  Morgan, Lewis  &
            __________________             ________________   ________________
        Bockius  LLP, Carlos  A.  Rodriguez-Vidal,  and  Goldman  Antonetti  &
        ____________  ___________________________        _____________________
        Cordova, were on brief for appellee.
        _______
                                 ____________________

                                   January 7, 1998
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL,   Circuit   Judge.     Defendants-appellants
                      STAHL,   Circuit   Judge.
                               _______________

            Radames Cardoza-Rodriguez  et al., ("employees")  appeal from
                                       __ ___

            the  district court's issuance  of a declaratory  judgment in

            favor  of plaintiff-appellee  American Airlines  ("American")

            enforcing  releases of  age discrimination forms  executed by

            appellants  and  dismissing their counterclaims under the Age

            Discrimination  in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.

               621 et seq. and  Puerto Rico Law 100.  We reverse  in part
                   __ ___

            and   vacate  and  remand   in  part  the   district  court's

            declaration  that  the  releases  at  issue are  enforceable.

            Nonetheless,  we affirm the district court's grant of summary

            judgment  on   the  employees'   counterclaim,  finding   the

            employees' ADEA claims time-barred.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                      Because the  district court issued  the declaratory

            judgment  on  plaintiff's  motion  for  summary judgment,  we

            recite the  facts in a light most favorable to the non moving

            party,  the employees. DeNovellis  v. Shalala, 124  F.3d 298,
                                   __________     _______

            305 (1st Cir. 1997).   

                      On  September  21,  1994, as  part  of  a workforce

            reduction  program,  American  offered  certain  reservation,

            ticket, and cargo agents in the Commonwealth of  Puerto Rico,

            the   opportunity  to  participate   in  a   Voluntary  Early

            Retirement  Program  ("VERP").   The  VERP  provided  for the

                                         -2-
                                          2

            addition  of five  years to  each  employee's actual  age for

            purposes of  calculating  retirements  benefits,  five  years

            additional credited service, cash bridge payments of $400 per

            month until the employee became eligible to receive benefits,

            immediate retirement  medical benefits  and travel  benefits.

            To be eligible to participate in the VERP an  employee had to

            be at the  maximum pay scale in their  job classification and

            at least forty-five years of age.

                      American informed  the employees  of the  program's

            details by  providing  various VERP-related  documents.   The

            introduction to the "Terms and Conditions" booklet describing

            the  program warned  the  employees  to  read  the  materials

            carefully, and  provided a participation deadline of November

            11,  1994,  with  a  seven  day  rescission  period after  an

            election  to  participate.    In  order  to  participate,  an

            employee was required  to sign a "Voluntary  Early Retirement

            Election  Form" attesting that  the decision  was "completely

            voluntary, final and  irrevocable," that he  or she had  been

            given  forty-five days  to make  the  election, and  that all

            rights to reemployment with American were being relinquished.

            The election form also stated that, on an employee's last day

            of work, he  or she  would be  required to  sign a  "Complete

            Release of All Claims," absolving American of all employment-

            related    liability     including,    specifically,     "age

            discrimination claims."

                                         -3-
                                          3

                      The VERP  election form  required each  employee to

            attest  to  having read  the  entire  release form  prior  to

            electing to retire early.   By the terms of the release,  the

            employee agreed  not to  bring any  legal proceeding  against

            American  in any  court, administrative agency,  or tribunal,

            that the employee would forfeit the extra retirement benefits

            if  the employee breached  a material release  term, and also

            provided the  party successfully enforcing the  release costs

            and  attorney's  fees.   The  release  contained  a provision

            stating:  "I  have  had reasonable  and  sufficient  time and

            opportunity   to   consult   with   an   independent    legal

            representative   of  my  own  choosing  before  signing  this

            Complete  Release  of   All  Claims."    Although   the  VERP

            documentation  advised the  employee to  discuss the  program

            with their  families and  to "consult  a financial  advisor,"

            neither  the  release  nor  any  of  the  VERP  documentation

            explicitly advised the employees to consult an attorney prior

            to executing  the release  or electing to  retire.   The only

            mention  of independent  legal advice  was  contained in  the

            release, which was not to be signed until the employee's last

            day of work.  Each employee signed  the release on his or her

            last day of work. 

                      The appellants elected to participate  in the early

            retirement  program on various  dates throughout the election

            period.  The earliest election occurred on  October 11, 1994,

                                         -4-
                                          4

            the latest on December 13, 1994.  The VERP also provided that

            the  employees'  termination   dates  would  depend  on   the

            restructuring process; therefore,  after their election,  the

            employees  continued to  work.   Over  the  next ten  months,

            American  began to terminate them individually.  The earliest

            termination occurred on  December 30, 1994, while  the latest

            did  not  occur  until  September  29,  1995.     After  each

            termination,  American paid  the  VERP's enhanced  retirement

            benefits.  For several months (the  precise period is unclear

            from  the  record),  each  of  the  appellants  accepted  and

            retained these benefits. 

                      On   October  27,  1995,  over  a  year  after  the

            appellants elected to participate in  the VERP, they began to

            file administrative  age discrimination claims with  both the

            Puerto Rico  Anti-Discrimination Unit  ("ADU") and  the Equal

            Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") variously claiming

            that   their  election  to   participate  in  the   VERP  was

            involuntary and that American had discriminated against  them

            on the basis of age.  In general, the complaints alleged that

            certain  management employees  had  led  older  employees  to

            believe that  American planned to move the  operations in the

            reservation  and cargo  departments  to  another location  or

            subcontract  to an  outside company,  placing  their jobs  in

            jeopardy.   However, once  the employees  elected to  retire,

            American asked  them to  train new,  younger replacements  to

                                         -5-
                                          5

            fill their  jobs.   The claimed threatened  job losses  never

            materialized.

                                         -6-
                                          6

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                  Prior Proceedings
                                  Prior Proceedings
                                  _________________

                      On  April 18, 1996,  American Airlines responded to

            the  appellants'  ADU  filings  by  initiating  the   instant

            declaratory judgment action.   See 28 U.S.C.   2201.   In its
                                           ___

            pleadings,  American asked  the district  court  to issue  an

            order declaring the rights and obligations of  the parties in

            connection with the VERP under the Employee Retirement Income

            Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.   1132(a)(3).1  Subsequently,

                                
            ____________________

             1.  Although  neither party has  addressed the issue,  it is
             our  duty  to inquire  sua  sponte into  our  subject matter
             jurisdiction.   In re  Recticel Foam  Corp., 859  F.2d 1000,
                             ___________________________
             1002 (1st  Cir. 1988).   American  brought this  declaratory
             judgment  action under  ERISA, which  provides  for a  civil
             action: 

                      by a .  . . fiduciary  (A) to enjoin  any
                      act or practice which violates the  terms
                      of  the  plan,  or (B)  to  obtain  other
                      appropriate  equitable   relief  (i)   to
                      redress  such   violations  or   (ii)  to
                      enforce any provisions . . . of the terms
                      of the plan. 

             29 U.S.C.   1132(a)(3).  American seeks a declaration of the
             parties' obligations under the plan in light of the release.
             We need  not confront the  question of whether    1132(a)(3)
             directly authorizes a declaratory  judgment in this context.
             Compare Winstead v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 933 F.2d 576, 578-
             _______ ________    ____________________
             79  (7th Cir.  1991)  (  1132(a)(3)  allows  a fiduciary  to
             obtain  a declaration  regarding its  obligations  under the
             terms  of a plan),  with Gulf Life  Ins. Co. v.  Arnold, 809
                                 ____ ___________________     ______
             F.2d 1520,  1523 (11th  Cir. 1987)  (   1132(a)(3) does  not
             allow an  insurer to obtain  a clarification of its  duty to
             pay  severance programs). In  Franchise Tax Bd.  v. Laborers
                                           _________________     ________
             Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) the Supreme Court stated: 
             ______________

                      Federal  courts   have  regularly   taken
                      original  jurisdiction  over  declaratory
                      judgment   suits   in   which,   if   the

                                         -7-
                                          7

            American  moved under Fed.  R. Civ. P.  67 to have  the court

            approve  the deposit  of future  payments  of the  employees'

            retirement benefits into a court-designated bank account (the

            "court registry").  The court granted that motion, and, since

            May 1996,  American has paid  the monthly payments  due under

            the VERP into an interest-bearing account.

                      The employees  counterclaimed against  American for

            age discrimination under the ADEA, the Older Workers Benefits

            Protection Act ("OWBPA"), 29 U.S.C.   626(f), and 29 L.P.R.A.

               146 et seq., known  colloquially as Puerto Rico "Law 100."
                   __ ___

            Evidently,  once  the  district  court  allowed  American  to

            deposit the  employees' retirement  benefits  into the  court

            registry, a  number of the original employee counterclaimants

            abandoned  their claims.   Of  the  twenty-one employees  who

                                
            ____________________

                      declaratory judgment defendant  brought a
                      coercive  action to  enforce its  rights,
                      that  suit  would necessarily  present  a
                      federal question. 

             Id. at 19; see also  id. at 19 n.19 (discussing jurisdiction
             ___        ___ ____  ___
             in   declaratory    judgment   actions    involving   patent
             infringement);  cf.  Colonial Penn  Group, Inc.  v. Colonial
                             ___  __________________________     ________
             Deposit  Group, 834 F.2d  229, 234 (1st  Cir. 1987) (quoting
             ______________
             Franchise   Tax  Bd.,  463   U.S.  at  19,   and  dismissing
             ____________________
             declaratory judgment action where threatened coercive action
             was based on state law).   Here, the underlying controversy,
             whether characterized as  the employees' right to  sue under
             American's retirement plan,  see 29 U.S.C.    1132(a)(1)(B),
                                          ___
             or as a claim under the ADEA and  OWBPA, clearly  presents a
             wholly  federal question.   As a result,  American's request
             for a declaratory judgment "arises under" 28 U.S.C.   1331. 

                                         -8-
                                          8

            brought  the original counterclaim, only eleven remain in the

            case on appeal.

                      On  July  22,  1996,  American  moved  for  summary

            judgment requesting a declaration that: (1) the employees had

            ratified the release  agreement under both federal  and local

            law; and  (2) the  defendants could  not maintain any  claims

            relating to their early retirement.  American  also moved for

            summary judgment  on  the  employees'  counterclaim  arguing,

            inter  alia,  that the  employees administrative  filings had
            _____  ____

            been untimely.   The court granted American's motion,  and on

            January 27, 1997, issued a declaratory judgment that:

                      (1) Defendants have  ratified the release
                      agreements  entered   into  by   them  in
                      connection with their acceptance of early
                      retirement benefits from American; 

                      (2)  the   release  agreements   preclude
                      defendants   from   raising   any  claims
                      against   American   relating   to  their
                      employment or  retirement, including  the
                      claims for  age discrimination  under the
                      [ADEA, OWBPA, and Puerto Rico Law], 

                      (3)  Defendants  failed   to  file  their
                      claims  of  age discrimination  with  the
                      EEOC    and    Puerto     Rico's    Anti-
                      Discrimination Unit within the applicable
                      limitations period. 

            In  light of  this declaration,  the  district court  granted

            American's motion for summary judgment on the employees' ADEA

            and Law 100 counterclaims.  This appeal followed. 

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                  Standard of Review
                                  Standard of Review
                                  __________________

                                         -9-
                                          9

                      We  "review a  district  court's  grant of  summary

            judgment de novo."  Marrero-Garcia  v. Irizarry, 33 F.3d 117,
                                                 . 
                     _______    ______________     ________

            119 (1st Cir.  1994).  Summary  judgment is appropriate  when

            "the pleadings, depositions,  answers to interrogatories, and

            admissions  on files, together  with the affidavits,  if any,

            show  that there is no genuine  issue as to any material fact

            and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

            of law."   Fed. R. Civ.  P. 56(c).  In reviewing  an award of

            summary judgment, we must scrutinize the  record in the light

            most  amiable to the party opposing the motion, indulging all

            reasonable  inferences in that party's favor.  Griggs-Ryan v.
                                                           ___________

            Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990).  Notwithstanding the
            _____

            liberality of this standard, the nonmovant cannot simply rest

            on unsworn allegations.  Morris  v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto
                                     ______     _________________________

            Rico, 27  F.3d 746,  748 (1st  Cir.  1994).   "[T]o defeat  a
            ____

            properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving

            party  must  establish  a  trial-worthy  issue by  presenting

            'enough competent evidence  to enable a finding  favorable to

            the nonmoving party.'"  LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6
                                    _______    _______________________

            F.3d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Goldman v. First Nat'l
                                                            . 
                                                   _______    ___________

            Bank  of  Boston,  985  F.2d  1113,  1116  (1st  Cir. 1993)).
            ________________

            Finally,  "[a]n  appellate  panel is  not  restricted  to the

            district  court's reasoning but can affirm a summary judgment

            on  any independently sufficient ground."  Mesnick v. General
                                                                . 
                                                       _______    _______

            Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991).
            _________

                                         -10-
                                          10

                                         -11-
                                          11

                                         IV.
                                         IV.
                                         ___

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                      Here, we  are  faced with  two distinct  questions.

            First,  was   the  district  court's   declaration  that  the

            employees' release  operated as a  bar to their ADEA  and Law

            100  claims correct?   Second,  if the  release does  not bar

            their claims, are the employees' claims nonetheless barred as

            a  matter of  law?    We answer  the  first  question in  the

            negative, disagreeing with the district court's determination

            that  the employees' release  bars their  ADEA counterclaims.

            We agree, however,  that the statute of  limitations bars the

            employees' counterclaim.

            1.  Is the Release Enforceable?
            _______________________________

                      American  presents two  alternative arguments  that

            the  release the  employees signed  is  enforceable: (1)  the

            release complied with  the OWBPA, 29 U.S.C.    626(f) or, (2)

            if the  release is  invalid under the  OWBPA, by  refusing to

            return the  enhanced retirement benefits  they received under

            the VERP, the  employees ratified the release.   We disagree.

            We find that the employees'  release of their ADEA claims did

            not comply with the OWBPA and that the ratification  doctrine

                                         -12-
                                          12

            does not apply  to invalid ADEA waivers.2   We consider their
                                                    2

            arguments in turn. 

                                
            ____________________

            2.  We emphasize that  our holding is limited to  releases of
            ADEA  claims that  are invalid  under the OWBPA.   We  do not
            decide  or express  any  opinion  on  whether  the  employees
            validly released their non-ADEA claims. See infra part IV.2. 
                                                    ___ _____

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      a. Compliance with the OWBPA
                      ____________________________

                      Although  the  district court  did  not  reach this

            issue,  American  contends  that we  can  affirm  the court's

            declaration  because the  releases  the employees  signed are

            valid under the OWBPA.  We disagree.

                      For  an  employee's  waiver of  ADEA  rights  to be

            enforceable, it must be "knowing and voluntary."   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            Long v. Sears Roebuck & Company, 105 F.3d 1529, 1534 (3d Cir.
            ____    _______________________

            1996).   Prior to  the enactment of  the OWBPA,  courts split

            over how to determine whether  a waiver of rights was knowing

            and  voluntary.     Some  courts   used  "ordinary   contract

            principles" such as fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or lack of

            consideration,  see O'Shea  v. Commercial  Credit  Corp., 930
                                         . 
                            ___ ______     _________________________

            F.2d  358, 362  (4th  Cir.),  cert. denied,  112  S. Ct.  177
                                          _____ ______

            (1991); Shaheen v. B.F. Goodrich  Co., 873 F.2d 105, 107 (6th
                             . 
                    _______    __________________

            Cir. 1989); Moore  v. McGraw Edison Co., 804  F.2d 1026, 1033
                        _____     _________________

            (8th  Cir.  1986),  while others  formulated  a  "totality of

            circumstances"  test,  see  Bormann  v. AT&T  Communications,
                                   ___  _______     _____________________

            Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 924
            ____                               _____ ______

            (1989); Coventry v.  U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d  514, 518 (3d
                    ________     _______________

            Cir. 1988).   To  resolve  this split,  Congress enacted  the

            OWBPA,  29  U.S.C.     626(f),  which  amended  the  ADEA  by

            mandating  that a  waiver  of  ADEA  claims  contain  certain

            minimum  information to constitute  a "knowing and voluntary"

            waiver: 

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      (1)  The  release must  be  written in  a
                      manner calculated to be understood by the
                      employee  signing  the  release,  or  the
                      average     individual    eligible     to
                      participate;

                      (2)  the release must  specifically refer
                      to claims arising under the ADEA;

                      (3)  the  release  must  not  purport  to
                      encompass claims that may arise after the
                      date of signing;

                      (4)  the     employer     must    provide
                      consideration for the ADEA claim above
                      and beyond that to which the employee
                      would otherwise already be entitled; 

                      (5)  the  employee  must  be  advised  in
                      writing to consult with an attorney prior
                                                          _____
                      to executing the agreement;
                      __________________________

                      (6)  the employee must be  given at least
                      45  days  to  consider  signing  if   the
                      incentive is offered to a group; 

                      (7)  the release must  allow the employee
                      to  rescind the  agreement  up to  7 days
                      after signing; and 

                      (8)  if   the  release   is  offered   in
                      connection with an exit incentive or 
                      group termination  program, the  employer
                      must provide information  relating to the
                      job titles and ages of those eligible for
                      the   program,   and   the  corresponding
                      information relating to  employees in the
                      same job titles who were not eligible for
                      the program.

            See 29 U.S.C.   626(f)(1)(A)-(H) (emphasis added).
            ___
             
                      The  OWBPA also explicitly places the burden on the

            party asserting the validity of a waiver to  demonstrate that

            the waiver was "knowing and voluntary."  See Id.   626(f)(3);
                                                     ___ ___

            Raczak v.  Ameritech  Corp., 103  F.3d 1257,  1261 (6th  Cir.
            ______     ________________

                                         -15-
                                          15

            1997).    To  prevail  on  a  motion  for  summary  judgment,

            therefore, American needed  to demonstrate that there  was no

            genuine  issue  of  material  fact  as  to  whether  the VERP

            complied with each  of the section 626(f)  requirements.  See
                                                                      ___

            Griffin v.  Kraft General Foods,  Inc., 62  F.3d 368,  371-72
            _______     __________________________

            (11th Cir. 1995). 

                      Surprisingly,  the  VERP documents  comprising  the

            agreement  did  not  specifically  advise  the  employees  to

            consult with an attorney prior to executing the release.  See
                                                                      ___

            29  U.S.C.       626(f)(1)(E).3     Although  each   employee

            acknowledged  on the  VERP  election  form  having  read  the

            release before making his or her election, the only reference

            to  consulting legal counsel  appears in the  release itself,

            which was not to be executed until the employee actually left

            work a number of months later.  When the employees elected to

            retire, however, they promised to  sign the release on  their

            termination date as a  condition of receiving benefits.   The

            release  states only: "I  have had reasonable  and sufficient

            time and  opportunity to  consult with  an independent  legal

                                
            ____________________

            3.   On  appeal, American argues  that the  VERP informed the
            employees that: 

               [E]ach employee should obtain  whatever advice he or she
               required including consultation with  personal attorneys
               or advisors  and should make  an informed  and voluntary
               choice whether to participate in the plan. 

            Although American  cites to  documentation to  support   this
            contention,  nowhere except  in  the release  does the  cited
            material mention private legal counsel. 

                                         -16-
                                          16

            representative  of  my  own   choosing  before  signing  this

            Complete Release of All Claims."   The VERP Agreement itself,

            although  it advised employees  to consult financial  and tax

            advisors,    to   seek    advice    from   local    personnel

            representatives,  and to  attend  retirement seminars,4  said

            nothing  about seeking  independent  legal  advice  prior  to

            making  the election to  retire and  agreeing to  execute the

            release as the statute dictates.

                      Given  the  burden  OWBPA  places on  employers  to

            demonstrate   their    agreements   contain    the   required

            information,  the  reference  contained  in  the  release  is

            insufficient to satisfy    626(f)(1)(E).   "Congress's intent

            in enacting   626  was to compel employers to provide data so

            that  an  employee  considering  waiving  ADEA  rights  could

            assess,  with the assistance of  counsel, the viability of an
                     _______________________________

            ADEA claim."  Raczak, 103  F.3d at 1259 (emphasis  supplied).
                          ______

            For this purpose, section 626(f)(1)(E) provides that a waiver

            is  not knowing  and  voluntary  unless  "the  individual  is

            advised in  writing  to consult  with  an attorney  prior  to

            executing the agreement."  To advise is to "caution," "warn,"

            or  "recommend."  See Webster's Third New World International
                              ___ _______________________________________

            Dictionary 32 (1986).   This statutory requirement  could not
            __________

            be more clear, nor its  purpose more central to the statutory

                                
            ____________________

            4.      It also  advised  divorced  employees to  consult  an
                                      ________
            attorney regarding the effects of certain payment options.

                                         -17-
                                          17

            scheme  at issue, especially  in light of  Congress's concern

            with  discrimination in  the suspect  context  of group  exit

            programs.5

                      American argues that the waiver form complied  with

            the OWBPA because there is no dispute that the employees were

            fully  aware that only  persons in their  classifications who

            were  over the age  of 45 and  at the highest  pay rates were

                                
            ____________________

            5.  The legislative history of the OWBPA states: 

                In  the  context   of  ADEA  waivers,  the   Committee
                recognizes    a   fundamental    distinction   between
                individually   tailored   separation  agreements   and
                employer programs targeted at groups of employees.
                                         . . .
                During  the  past  decade,  in  particular,  employers
                faced with  the  need to  reduce  workforce size  have
                resorted   to   standardized  programs   designed   to
                effectuate  quick  and  wholesale  reductions.     The
                trademark  of involuntary  termination  programs is  a
                standardized formula  or package of employee  benefits
                that  is available  to more  than one  employee.   The
                trademark  of  voluntary   reduction  programs   is  a
                standardized formula  or package of benefits  designed
                to   induce  employees   voluntarily  to  sever  their
                employment.  In  both cases, the terms of the programs
                generally  are not subject  to negotiation between the
                parties.   In  addition, employees  affected by  those
                programs  have  little or  no  basis  to suspect  that
                action  is  being  taken  based  on  their  individual
                characteristics.    Indeed,  the   employer  generally
                advises them  that the termination  is not  a function
                of   their    individual   status.      Under    these
                                                        ______________
                circumstances,  the need  for adequate information and
                ______________________________________________________
                access  to   advice  before  waivers  are   signed  is
                ______________________________________________________
                especially acute. 
                _________________

            S.  Rep.  No.  101-263,  at  32  (1990),  reprinted  in  1990
                                                      _____________
            U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1537-38 (emphasis added). 

             

                                         -18-
                                          18

            eligible, that they were releasing age claims in exchange for

            enhanced benefits, and  that they were provided  with all the

            advice the statute required.  We disagree.  The fact that the

            employees may have known they were waiving rights in exchange

            for enhanced  retirement benefits  does  not satisfy  section

            626(f)(1)(E).   We read section  626(f)(1)(E) to mean what it

            says: employers must  advise employees in writing  to consult

            an attorney prior to executing  a release of ADEA claims. The

            failure to advise the employees to  consult with counsel goes

            to the  heart of  the statute's purpose.6   Because  American

            failed to directly advise their employees to consult a lawyer

            before making the election, we rule, as a matter of law, that

                                
            ____________________

            6.  In  light of the OWBPA's imprecise terms, some violations
            may be  so technical as  to be de  minimis, and thus  may not
            invalidate an  otherwise valid  release of  ADEA claims.  See
                                                                      ___
            Raczak,  103 F.2d at  1260. American's failure  adequately to
            ______
            advise  the employees  to  obtain  counsel is  in  no way  de
            minimis.     
                         

                                         -19-
                                          19

            American failed to meet its burden under the OWBPA.7  See  29
                                                                  ___

            U.S.C.   626(f)(1).

                      b. Ratification of the Employees' ADEA Waiver
                      _____________________________________________

                      As we have said, the  district court did not decide

            whether the  release complied with  OWBPA.   Rather, it  held

            that  the  employees'   acceptance  of  enhanced   retirement

            benefits, as well as their opposition to the court's order to

            deposit  the  disputed  retirement  funds  into  the  court's

            registry pending the outcome of  this litigation, constituted

            a  ratification  of  the  original  release  agreement.    We

            disagree.

                      In the  past,  we  have  applied  the  ratification

            doctrine  to  enforce  an otherwise  invalid  release  on the

            ground that "'[a] contract or release, the execution of which

            is induced by  duress, is voidable, not void,  and the person

                                
            ____________________

            7.   As the employees point out, the waiver is also deficient
            in  another manner.   The waiver broadly  prohibits employees
            from  maintaining   "any  legal  proceedings  of  any  nature
            whatsoever  against American  et  al.  before  any  court  or
                                          __  __
            administrative  agency" and  requires  them  to "direct  that
            agency or court  to withdraw from or dismiss  the matter with
            prejudice"  if  the  agency  assumes  jurisdiction  on  their
            behalf.  Section  626(f)(4), however, states: "No  waiver may
            be used to justify interfering with the protected right of an
            employee to file a charge or participate  in an investigation
            or proceeding conducted by the Commission."  Cf. E.E.O.C.  v.
                                                         ___ ________
            Astra U.S.A., Inc., 94 F.3d  738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[A]ny
            __________________
            agreement  that  materially   interferes  with  communication
            between an employee and the Commission sows the seeds of harm
            to the public interest"); E.E.O.C. v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d
                                      ________    _____________
            1085,  1089-90  (5th  Cir.  1987)(holding pre-OWBPA  that  an
            employee cannot  waive the  right to file  a charge  with the
            EEOC). 
                    

                                         -20-
                                          20

            claiming duress must  act promptly to repudiate  the contract

            or release or he will be  deemed to have waived his right  to

            do so.'"  In re Boston Shipyard Corp., 886 F.2d 451, 455 (1st
                      ___________________________

            Cir. 1989) (quoting Di Rose  v. PK Management Corp., 691 F.2d
                                _______     ___________________

            628,  633-34  (2d  Cir.  1982)).    The  related  tender-back

            doctrine  requires a party seeking  to avoid a contract based

            on  duress to first  return any consideration  received.  See
                                                                      ___

            Deren  v. Digital  Equipment Corp.,  61 F.3d  1, 1  (1st Cir.
            _____     ________________________

            1995).  American asserts that the employees' retention of the

            enhanced benefits received from the VERP ratified the invalid

            waiver.  The retention of benefits is relevant, however, only

            if  the  ratification  and  tender-back  doctrines  apply  to

            waivers of ADEA claims after the adoption of the OWBPA.

                      The circuits are split on whether the acceptance of

            benefits  ratifies  an  otherwise   invalid  waiver  of  ADEA

            claims.8    A   majority,  both  before  and   after  OWBPA's

            enactment,  have held that  neither ratification  nor tender-

            back is  appropriate when  employees have  signed an  invalid

            ADEA waiver.   See  Howlett v. Holiday  Inns, Inc.,  120 F.3d
                           ___  _______    ___________________

            598,  601-03  (6th  Cir. 1997)  (post-OWBPA);  Long  v. Sears
                                                           ____     _____

            Roebuck  & Co.,  105 F.3d  1529, 1533  (3d Cir.  1997) (post-
            ______________

            OWBPA); Oberg  v. Allied  Van Lines, Inc.,  11 F.3d  679 (7th
                    _____     _______________________

                                
            ____________________

            8.  This issue has been argued before the Supreme Court and a
            decision   is  currently   pending.  See   Oubre   v.  Energy
                                                 ___   _____       ______
            Operations, Inc., 1996  WL 28508 (E.D. La.),  aff'd, 102 F.3d
            ________________                              _____
            551 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1466 (1997)). 
                                 _____ _______

                                         -21-
                                          21

            Cir.  1993) (post-OWBPA), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1108 (1994);
                                      ____________

            Forbus  v. Sears,  Roebuck &  Co., 958  F.2d 1036  (11th Cir.
            ______     ______________________

            1992)  (holding,  pre-OWBPA,  that  the  ADEA  displaced  the

            tender-back  doctrine); cf.  Raczak  v. Ameritech  Corp., 103
                                    ___  ______     ________________

            F.3d  1257, 1260 (6th Cir. 1997)(affirming without a majority

            rationale the  district court's refusal to apply ratification

            doctrine to an invalid ADEA waiver).  In addition, a district

            court in this  circuit has sided with the  majority view. See
                                                                      ___

            Soliman v.  Digital Equip. Corp.,  869 F. Supp. 65  (D. Mass.
            _______     ___________________

            1994).   The  Fourth and  Fifth  Circuits and  some  district

            courts, however, have held that a waiver that does not comply

            with  the  OWBPA  is  voidable,  rather  than  void;  thus, a

            plaintiff  who  retains   retirement  benefits  ratifies  the

            invalid waiver.  See Blistein  v. St. John's College, 74 F.3d
                             ___ ________     __________________

            1459, 1466 (4th Cir. 1996);  Blakeney v. Lomas Info. Sys., 65
                                         ________    ________________

            F.3d 482,  484 (5th Cir.  1995); see  also Hodge v.  New York
                                             ___  ____ _____     ________

            College   of  Podiatric  Medicine,  940  F.  Supp.  579,  582
            _________________________________

            (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Bilton  v. Monsanto Co.,  947 F. Supp.  1344
                             ______     ____________

            (E.D. Mo. 1996).    The    arguments    for    and    against

            incorporating the ratification and tender-back doctrines into

            the ADEA have been thoroughly reviewed in these cases, and we

            will not repeat their analysis fully.  

                      The decisions  in favor  of ratification  primarily

            argue  that, because Congress  used "the terms  'knowing' and

            'voluntary,' which parallel the common-law concepts of fraud,

                                         -22-
                                          22

            duress,  and  mistake,  it  is  apparent  that  Congress  was

            defining only those  circumstances in which a  contract would

            be voidable, not when it  would be void."  Blistein, 74  F.3d
                                                       ________

            at  1466.  A voidable contract can, of course, be ratified by

            subsequent conduct.  See id.   Accordingly, in the absence of
                                 ___ ___

            any language  in the  statute indicating  that a waiver  that

            contravenes the OWBPA cannot be ratified, the common-law rule

            still operates. See Wamsley  v. Champlin Ref. & Chems.  Inc.,
                            ___ _______     ____________________________

            11 F.3d 534, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1993).

                      The  majority view rests  on two primary arguments:

            (1) the plain  language of OWBPA and  its legislative history

            indicate that Congress  did not intend ratification  to apply

            to releases that are invalid  under OWBPA, see Long, 105 F.3d
                                                       ___ ____

            at  1537; and (2) the OWBPA  displaced the common-law tender-

            back doctrine under  Hogue v. Southern Ry. Co.,  390 U.S. 516
                                 _____    ________________

            (1968).   We reject the view adopted by the  Fourth and Fifth

            Circuits and adopt  the majority position.  At  common law, a

            waiver of rights was  simply a contract, subject  to defenses

            like duress  or mistake.   When Congress  enacted the  OWBPA,

            however,  it specifically  rejected  using ordinary  contract

            principles to govern the validity of ADEA waivers.  Long, 105
                                                                ____

            F.3d at  1539 (reviewing  legislative history);  see also  S.
                                                             ___ ____

            Rep. No.  101-293, see supra  note 4, at 32  (disapproving of
                               ___ _____

            the approach adopted in Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co.,
                                    _________    _______________________

            809 F.2d 539  (8th Cir. 1987)).  Instead,  Congress enacted a

                                         -23-
                                          23

            "floor" of specific procedures an employer must follow before

            an employee's waiver is effective.   See S. Rep. No. 101-293,
                                                 ___

            supra  note  4, at  32  (noting that  the  OWBPA "establishes
            _____

            specified minimum requirements that must be satisfied  before

            a  court may  proceed  to  determine  factually  whether  the

            execution of a waiver was 'knowing and voluntary'").  Section

            626(f)(1) states a clear rule: an individual  "may not waive"

            an ADEA claim unless  the waiver is "knowing and  voluntary."

            And a waiver is not knowing and voluntary unless the employer

            complies with the eight OWBPA requirements.  See id.
                                                         ___ ___

                      Incorporating the  ratification doctrine  into this

            statutory  scheme would  emasculate the  Act.   "Through  the

            OWBPA Congress  sought to  insure that  employees faced  with

            deciding whether  to sign an  ADEA waiver and forego  an ADEA

            claim be provided  with sufficient information to  allow them

            to evaluate  the merits of  that claim."   Long, 105  F.3d at
                                                       ____

            1542.  The ratification doctrine  rests on a fiction that the

            retention  of  benefits by  the  injured party  forges  a new

            contract once  the fraud has  been discovered.  Id.  at 1539.
                                                            ___

            An employee, however, "could no  more assent to the waiver of

            his ADEA claim after having signed the defective release than
                           _____

            he could at  the time of signing  it."  Howlett, 120  F.3d at
                     ____________                   _______

            601 (emphasis in original).  To allow the simple retention of

            benefits  to validate a  noncomplying waiver would  mean that

                                         -24-
                                          24

            OWBPA applied to the first contract, but not to the fictional

            second contract.  See Long, 105 F.3d at 1540.  
                              ___ ____

                      When, as here, an employer fails in the simple task

            of advising  its employees  to consult  an attorney  prior to

            electing to  retire, the  employee is more  likely to  face a

            critical   decision   without  the   knowledgeable   guidance

            necessary to assess whether he or she is possibly a victim of

            age  discrimination.     If  the  ratification   doctrine  is

            incorporated  into  this  scheme,  an employer  could  obtain

            waivers  without advising the employee to consult an attorney

            and then put  the employee to the difficult  choice of giving

            up essential benefits in order  to protect his or her rights.

            The very  problem that Congress  enacted the OWBPA  to remedy

            could  thus   resurface,  albeit   through  the   back  door.

            Therefore, incorporating the  ratification doctrine into  the

            OWBPA could act to undermine the incentives  for employers to

            follow  OWBPA's  procedures  and  deter  the  prosecution  of

            meritorious claims.  Cf. Hogue  v. Southern Ry. Co., 390 U.S.
                                 ___ _____     ________________

            516 (1968) (holding  that the Federal Employer  Liability Act

            displaced the common-law tender-back requirement).9

                                
            ____________________

            9.  American relies on Deren v. Digital Equip. Corp., 61 F.3d
                                   _____    ____________________
            1   (1st  Cir.  1995)  in  contending  that  ratification  is
            appropriate unless Congress  indicates a clear intent  to the
            contrary.  Such  reliance is misplaced.  In  Deren, the court
                                                         _____
            held  that an employee's waiver of  ERISA claims was ratified
            by  his retention of  benefits for three  and one-half years.
            Unlike the  ADEA waivers  here, however,  the validity of  an
            ERISA  waiver is governed  by federal  common-law principles,
            see Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability  Plan, 70 F.3d
            ___ _____    _______________________________________

                                         -25-
                                          25

                      The  conflict between  common-law ratification  and

            the statutory scheme at issue here is particularly stark when

            an  employer  seeks to  induce  an employee  to  accept early

            retirement.  Here, the employees voluntarily agreed to retire

            in exchange  for enhanced  benefits  without which,  American

            assures us, they would have remained on the job at American's

            highest pay scale.  Courts applying the ratification doctrine

            to  ADEA claims  have  stated  that  the  employees  must  be

            required  to restore  the status  quo  by tendering-back  the

            benefits  they  received  for  waiving  their  claims.    See
                                                                      ___

            Blakeney,  65  F.3d  at  485.    This  position  is  arguably
            ________

            plausible in the context of a unilateral termination when  an

            employee receives  severance benefits  an employer would  not

            have paid but for the  release.  See, e.g., Wamsley, 11  F.3d
                                             ____ ____  _______

            at 72.   In  the context of  a voluntary  retirement program,

            however,  tendering  back  the  benefits  received  does  not

            restore the status quo.

                      For instance,  American does not  contend that  the

            employees  should, as a  precondition to suing,  refuse their

            retirement benefits  and seek  reinstatement.  American  does

            not,  in  other  words, contemplate  the  restoration  of the

            status quo.   Rather, American wants to  use the ratification

            doctrine to  retain the  economic benefit  of the  employees'

                                
            ____________________

            173,  178 (1st  Cir. 1995),  rather  than a  detailed set  of
            statutory  procedures.  Therefore, Deren does not require the
                                               _____
            incorporation of the ratification doctrine into the OWBPA.

                                         -26-
                                          26

            decisions  to retire early -- a decision obtained by American

            in  violation of the OWBPA.  As  the Forbus court noted, this
                                                 ______

            result could  "encourage egregious  behavior on  the part  of

            employers in forcing certain employees into early  retirement

            for the economic benefit of the company."  958 F.2d at 1041.

                      We therefore join the majority of courts which have

            considered  the   issue  and  conclude  that   an  employee's

            retention of benefits does not act to ratify a waiver of ADEA

            claims  that fails  to comply  with  the OWBPA.10   Thus,  we

            reverse the  district  court's declaration  that the  release

            precludes defendants  from raising age  discrimination claims

            under the ADEA.

                                
            ____________________

            10.   Our holding  is limited  only to  waivers that  violate
            OWBPA's requirements.  Whether the  ratification and  tender-
            back doctrines apply to a waiver that complies with the OWBPA
            but is not  "knowing and voluntary"  for a different  reason,
            see Reid v.  IBM Corp., 1997 WL 357969, at *4 (S.D.N.Y 1997),
            ___ ____     _________
            is a separate question, one we need not reach today. 

                                         -27-
                                          27

            2. Ratification of the Employees' Law 100 Waivers
            _________________________________________________

                      Our rejection of  the ratification doctrine in  the

            ADEA  context has implications  for whether, as  the district

            court s judgment declares, the release bars non-ADEA  claims.

            Though cursory mention  of state law was made  in the summary

            judgment motions,  both parties  centered their arguments  on

            the question of whether the  release, as a whole, was subject

            to  the ratification doctrine  under federal and  Puerto Rico

            law.  The district court opinion is unclear as to whether the

            release,  despite  the  employees'  invalid  waiver  of  ADEA

            claims,  nonetheless  would  bar their  Puerto  Rico  Law 100

            claims,  as  well  as  any  other  claims  relating  to their

            employment.  In reaching a conclusion that it does, the court

            merely  stated: "The  result  is the  same under  Puerto Rico

            law."  

                      In  Long,  the  Third  Circuit,   facing  the  same
                          ____

            problem, explained:  

                      [T]he district court rested  its grant of
                      summary judgment as to  all claims on its
                      finding that the  release as a  whole was
                      voidable and had been ratified . . . . 
                      Our holding,  confined as  it is to  ADEA
                      releases  invalid under  OWBPA, does  not
                      automatically dispose of the remainder of
                      [the employee's]  claims as might  be the
                      case if we had rested our decision on the
                      void/voidable distinction.

            105  F.3d at  1544-45.   To ensure  that  the parties  had an

            adequate opportunity to  litigate this issue, the  Long court
                                                               ____

            vacated the district court's entry of summary judgment on the

                                         -28-
                                          28

            non-ADEA  claims and remanded for further consideration.  Id.
                                                                      ___

            at 1545.   We  think the same  prudent approach  is warranted

            here.   While we  express no opinion on  the issue, we vacate

            the district court's  declaration that the release  bars non-

            ADEA claims and  remand that issue for  further consideration

            consistent with  our opinion.11  Cf. Eagle-Picher Industries,
                                             ___ ________________________

            Inc. v.  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,  829 F.2d 227,  246 (1st Cir.
            ____     ____________________

            1987)  (vacating language in final judgment and remanding for

            further consideration).

                                          V.
                                          V.
                                          __

                  Monetary Benefits Deposited in the Court Registry
                  Monetary Benefits Deposited in the Court Registry
                  _________________________________________________

                      In May 1996, the district court ordered the deposit

            of  the   employees' retirement  benefits  into an  interest-

            bearing account pursuant to Fed.  R. Civ. P. 67.  During  the

                                
            ____________________

            11.   As already  noted, we affirm  the court's dismissal  of
            ADEA  and Law  100  claims  because they  are  barred by  the
            statute  of  limitations.    See  infra.     The  statute  of
                                         ___  _____
            limitations does not,  however, provide an independent  basis
            for affirming the district court's declaratory judgment.  The
            district  court s declaratory judgment  had three  parts: (1)
            that the release was ratified, (2) that the release precludes
            all employment   related claims (including ADEA  claims), and
            ___
            (3) that the  employees  age discrimination claims  are time-
            barred.   On appeal, we  must determine if the  trial court's
            declaratory judgment, a final ruling  that is res judicata in
            any  future litigation concerning this release, is correct in
            all respects.   See  10A Charles A.  Wright, et  al., Federal
                            ___                                   _______
            Practice  and  Procedure,        2771  (1983)("A  declaratory
            ________________________
            judgment is  binding on the  parties before the court  and is
            res  judicata in  subsequent proceedings  as  to the  matters
            declared. . . .").   The statute of limitations  is  relevant
            only to the  third part of the district   court s declaratory
            judgment.   Therefore, we  must reach the  ratification issue
            despite the fact  that the employees  counterclaim  is barred
            by the limitations period.

                                         -29-
                                          29

            pendency  of this action, these funds have been accumulating.

            The question  remains as  to their  proper disposition.   The

            record  reflects that  American choose  not  to address  this

            issue  on summary  judgment and  neither party  raises it  on

            appeal.   Therefore, we do  not reach  this issue.   We note,

            however, that  these funds  are due  to the employees  unless

            there exists  a basis for their retention.  We leave this for

            the  district court  to  determine  on  remand  in  a  manner

            consistent with this opinion. 

                                         VI.
                                         VI.
                                         ___

                               Statutes of Limitations
                               Statutes of Limitations
                               _______________________

                      The   district  court   granted  American   summary

            judgment  on  the  ground  that  the  applicable  limitations

            periods  barred  all  of the  employees'  counterclaims.   We

            affirm as  to the  federal claims,  although we clarify  that

            four of the employees' Law 100  claims were not barred by the

            statute of limitations. 

            1. The ADEA Claims
            __________________

                      In  "deferral states"  (states  which have  enacted

            employment  discrimination   laws)  such   as  Puerto   Rico,

            employees must file charges of unlawful age discrimination in

            employment with the  EEOC within 300 days  "after the alleged

            unlawful  practice occurred."  29 U.S.C.    626(d).  American

            contends  that the employees filed  their claims with the ADU

            and the  EEOC outside the  300-day time limit imposed  by the

                                         -30-
                                          30

            ADEA.  We agree.    To  determine   the  timeliness   of  the

            employee's complaint, we must specifically  identify when the

            unlawful  practice that the employees claim violated the ADEA

            occurred.  See Lorance v. A.T. & T. Techs., 490 U.S. 900, 904
                       ___ _______    ________________

            (1989).   The gravamen of  the employees'  complaint is  that

            American misled them into believing that they were faced with

            an impossible choice:  retire with enhanced benefits  or face

            termination  when   American   eliminated   the   cargo   and

            reservations  operations  in  San Juan.    In  Vega v.  Kodak
                                                           ____     _____

            Caribbean Ltd., 3 F.3d 476 (1st Cir. 1993), we explained that
            ______________

            such a "take it or leave it" choice that discriminates on the

            basis of age is unlawful.

                      To transform an offer of early retirement
                      into   a   constructive    discharge,   a
                      plaintiff must  show that  the offer  was
                      nothing more  than a charade,  that is, a
                      subterfuge   disguising   the  employer's
                      desire to  purge the  plaintiff from  the
                      ranks  because  of  his age.  .  .  . [A]
                      plaintiff who has  accepted an employer's
                      offer  to retire can be said to have been
                      constructively discharged when  the offer
                      presented was, at  rock bottom, a  choice
                      between early retirement with benefits or
                      discharge without benefits . . . . 

            Id. at 480  (citations and internal quotations  omitted).  If
            ___

            the VERP was  a charade, then American  discriminated against

            the employees by providing them  no choice but to participate

            in   an  early  retirement  program  offered  only  to  older

            employees.     As  the   alleged  discriminatory   act,  this

            constructive discharge triggered the limitations period.  See
                                                                      ___

                                         -31-
                                          31

            Young v. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Servs. Research, 828 F.2d 235,
            _____    _____________________________________

            238 (4th Cir. 1987); cf. Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107
                                 ___ ______    _____________________

            F.3d 568,  573 (8th  Cir. 1997) (applying  rule in  Title VII

            case).    It follows  that,  at  the latest,  the  applicable

            statutes  began to run when each  employee accepted the VERP.

            All the employees accepted the  VERP more than 300 days prior

            to  filing  their  administrative  claims.12  Therefore,  the

            employees claims are time-barred.

                      The  employees'  arguments  to   the  contrary  are

            flawed.  The  employees first argue that the  statute did not
                                
            ____________________

            12.  The  defendants/employees have  provided a  table titled
            "Summary of  Relevant Dates"  that set  forth the  applicable
            election  and filing  dates for  calculating the  limitations
            periods.   American has  not disputed  the accuracy  of these
            dates. 

                                      VERP         ADU        Days 
                                      VERP         ADU        Days 
                    Employee        Accepted      Filing    Post VERP
                    Employee        Accepted      Filing    Post VERP

               Cardoza-Rodriguez    10/18/94     10/29/95      376
               Coll-Figueroa        10/28/94     10/27/95      364

               De La Paz            10/11/94     10/27/95      381

               Garcia-Caceres       10/12/94     11/15/95      399
               De Rivero            10/14/94     10/27/95      378

               Martinez-Rivera      12/12/94     10/27/95      318

               Mattos                11/3/94     10/27/95      356
               Ortiz-Rosa           10/18/94     11/15/95      393

               Santiago-Negron      10/21/94     10/30/95      374

               Zequiera-Julia       12/13/94     10/27/95      317

               Lopez-Garcia         11/10/94     11/15/95      370

                                         -32-
                                          32

            start to run until they actually left American's employ after

            electing to  retire early.   This argument is meritless.   In

            Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980) the
            ______________________    _____

            Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's Title VII claim accrued

            when  the employee  was  denied tenure  due  to alleged  race

            discrimination,  not  when  his  actual  employment  contract

            expired one year later.   Because the allegedly unlawful  act

            was  the denial  of tenure,  the termination date  itself was

            merely the "inevitable  consequence" of prior  discrimination

            and thus did  not trigger the statute of limitations.  Id. at
                                                                   ___

            257-58.  Here,  the employees' job termination  was similarly

            the inevitable result of their decision to participate in the

            VERP.

                      The  employees' contend  that their  discrimination

            claims did not accrue until younger workers actually replaced

            them.    This  argument  fails  because  a  prima  facie  age

            discrimination claim does not necessarily require replacement

            by a younger worker.  See Sanchez  v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37
                                  ___ _______     ___________________

            F.3d 712, 719  n.7 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing  cases).  Instead,

            when  an  employer  implements  a  reduction-in-force,   "the

            [employee] may demonstrate  either that the employer  did not

            treat age neutrally or that  younger persons were retained in

            the  same position."    Hildalgo  v.  Overseas  Condado  Ins.
                                    ________      _______________________

            Agencies,  Inc., 120 F.3d  328, 333 (1st  Cir. 1997)(internal
            _______________

            quotations omitted).  We have stated categorically:

                                         -33-
                                          33

                      "[W]hen  an employee  knows  that he  has
                      been  hurt  and   also  knows  that   his
                      employer has inflicted the injury, it  is
                      fair  to   begin  the   countdown  toward
                      repose.  And the plaintiff need  not know
                      all the  facts that support his  claim in
                      order for countdown to commence."  
             
            Morris, 27 F.3d  at 750. When the employees  signed the VERP,
            ______

            they knew that the program was offered only to employees over

            forty-five  years of  age.   And it  was then,  the employees

            allege, that American presented them with a "take it or leave

            it"  choice between early  retirement and losing  their jobs.

            As a  result,  by  the  time  the  employees  were  allegedly

            pressured   into  accepting   early   retirement,  they   had

            sufficient information to  bring their discrimination  claim.

            See id.
            ___ ___

                      In this case, the limitations period commenced when

            the  employees elected  to participate  in the  VERP.   Thus,

            unless there exists a basis for equitable modification of the

            limitations period, all the employees' ADEA claims are barred

            as a matter of law.

            2. Equitable Estoppel and Tolling
            _________________________________

                      The  employees   contend  that  the   doctrines  of

            equitable estoppel  and equitable  tolling should  save their

            claims.13  We reject the application of these doctrines here.

                                
            ____________________

            13.  The   ADEA  filing  period  is  akin  to  a  statute  of
            limitations and thus, subject to equitable modification.  See
                                                                      ___
            Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Federal Bank,  979 F.2d 890, 895 (1st
            ______________    __________________
            Cir. 1992).

                                         -34-
                                          34

                      Equitable estoppel  is invoked when an  employee is

            aware  of his ADEA rights, but does  not make a timely filing

            due  to his reasonable  reliance on his  employer's deceptive

            conduct.  Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746,
                      ____    ____________________________

            752 (1st  Cir. 1988).   The employees  have failed  to allege

            such conduct  here.   Rather, they  have simply parroted  the

            same  events that gave  rise to their  underlying claim: that

            American misled them as to the reason for the VERP.  There is

            no  evidence  that  American caused  the  employees  to delay

            bringing their lawsuit, or otherwise "lulled the plaintiff[s]

            into  believing  that it  was  not  necessary for  [them]  to

            commence  litigation."  Dillman v. Combustion Eng., Inc., 784
                                    _______    _____________________

            F.2d 57, 60 (2d  Cir. 1986).  Thus, equitable estoppel is not

            warranted.  

                      Equitable tolling is appropriate when the plaintiff

            demonstrates "excusable  ignorance" of his  statutory rights.

            Kale, 861  F.2d at  752.  Equitable  tolling does  not apply,
            ____

            however, if an  employee is actually or  constructively aware

            of his or  her ADEA  rights.  Id.  at 753.   An employee  has
                                          ___

            actual knowledge of  his rights if  he "learns or is  told of

            his ADEA rights,  even if he becomes only  generally aware of

            the  fact there is  a statute outlawing  age discrimination."

            Id.
            ___

                      In  this  case,  each  employee  signed   the  VERP

            election  form, which contained a paragraph attesting that he

                                         -35-
                                          35

            or  she had read  the release.   The release stated  that the

            employees were releasing American from any age discrimination

            claims he or she may have had.   Therefore, the employees had

            actual  knowledge of  their ADEA  rights.   In addition,  the

            employees have alleged here that, shortly after inducing them

            to sign the  VERP, American went on a  "recruitment frenzy of

            new  reservation   agents"  and  announced  that   the  cargo

            department  would remain  in Puerto  Rico despite  American's

            earlier  claims.   In  light of  these facts,  the employees'

            claim  that their "excusable"  ignorance caused them  to wait

            far  longer  than   300  days  to  pursue   their  claims  is

            untenable.14   See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare  Corp., 920 F.2d
                           ___ ____    ________________________

            446, 452 (7th Cir. 1990)  (holding that equitable tolling was

            not warranted when the employee discovered, three weeks after

            receiving  notice of his termination, that a younger employee

            would replace him). 

            3. The Puerto Rico Law 100 Claims  
            _________________________________

                      The employees contend that their Law 100 claims are

            not barred by the statute of limitations.  In pertinent part,

                                
            ____________________

            14.    The employees  allude  to  the  theory  of  continuing
            violations, which applies when a plaintiff alleges repetitive
            instances of discrimination perpetuated over time. See Havens
                                                               ___ ______
            Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982); United Air
            ____________    _______                            __________
            Lines,  Inc.  v.  Evans,  431  U.S. 553,  558  (1977).    The
            ____________      _____
            employees  have,  however,  failed  properly  to  allege  any
            factual basis for finding an act of discrimination within the
            limitations  period.  This claim  therefore fails as a matter
            of law.
              

                                         -36-
                                          36

            Law 100 forbids  adverse employment actions based on  any one

            of  several  protected characteristics,  including age.   See
                                                                      ___

            P.R.  Laws Ann. tit.  29,   146  (1985); Sanchez,  37 F.2d at
                                                     _______

            723.   Under substantive  Puerto Rico law  generally, actions

            for civil  liability based on  fault commence "from  the time

            the aggrieved person  had knowledge thereof."  P.R. Laws Ann.

            tit. 31,    5298  (1991); Rodriguez v.  Nazario De  Ferrer et
                                      _________     _____________________

            al., 121 P.R. Dec. 347,  P.R. Offic. Trans. No. CE-86-417, at
            ___

            9 (P.R. 1988).  

                      In Olmo v. Young &  Rubicam of P.R., Inc., 110 P.R.
                         ____    ______________________________

            Dec. 740 (P.R.  1981), the Supreme Court of  Puerto Rico held

            that the one  year statute of limitations in  Article 1868 of

            the  Puerto Rico Civil Code applied to  Law 100 claims.  Like

            ADEA claims, a cause of action under Law  100 accrues when an

            employee becomes  aware of  his injury  through receipt of  a

            termination  notice.15  See Rodriguez, P.R. Offic. Trans. No.
                                    ___ _________

                                
            ____________________

            15.  The  employees  cite  Sanchez v.  A.E.E.,  97  J.T.S. 45
                                       _______     ______
            (1997)  for the proposition  that the statute  of limitations
            under  Law  100 begins  to  run from  the  last  day that  an
            employee  was  employed.    American  contests  this reading,
            asserting that the  case dealt with a hostile  and persistent
            sexual harassment  work  atmosphere,  was  issued  without  a
            formal  opinion, and  thus, has  no precedential  value.   We
            direct the employees' attention to  U.S. Ct. of App. 1st Cir.
            Rule 30.7, 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1997): 

                Whenever an  opinion of the  Supreme Court  of Puerto
                Rico  is  cited in  a brief  and oral  argument which
                does not appear  in the bound  volumes in English, an
                official,   certified   or   stipulated   translation
                thereof  with three conformed copies  shall be filed.

                                         -37-
                                          37

            CE-86-417, at  9; see  also Montalban v.  Puerto Rico  Marine
                              ___  ____ _________     ___________________

            Management,  Inc., 774 F. Supp. 76, 77 (D.P.R. 1991)(applying
            _________________

            Puerto  Rico  law).     Therefore,  in   the  context  of   a

            constructive  discharge,  the  date  the  employee  elects to

            retire triggers  the Law 100  limitation period.  All  of the

            employees' claims, with the exception of four discussed below

            (Coll-Figuera, Martinez-Rivera, Mattos,  and Zequiera-Julia),

            are thus barred by statute of limitations as a matter of law.

                      The  remaining four employees'  Law 100  claims are

            not time-barred; they fail on the merits  as a matter of law.

            To survive summary judgment, an employee must submit at least

            some evidence  upon which  a jury  could properly  proceed to

            find an  employer  guilty  of  age discrimination.    See  De
                                                                  ___  __

            Arteaga v. Pall Ultrafine Filtration Corp., 862 F.2d 940, 941
            _______    _______________________________

            (1st  Cir. 1988)  (affirming  summary  judgment  on  Law  100

            complaint  for lack  of  evidence).    With  respect  to  the

            remaining  four  employees,  the  record  is  devoid  of  any
                                                                      ___

            competent  evidence demonstrating  that they were  victims of

            age  discrimination.     These  four  employees  have  failed

            individually to  submit even sworn affidavits  attesting that

            they suffered  age discrimination.   Rather,  they appear  to

            rely wholly  on the  general allegations  contained in  their

                                
            ____________________

            The  employees have  not  complied with  this rule.  Thus, we
            decline their  invitation to find  that the  Supreme Court of
            Puerto Rico has overruled Rodriguez.  
                                      _________

                                         -38-
                                          38

            complaint and the affidavits of their fellow employees.  Such

            evidence cannot withstand a motion for summary judgment.  See
                                                                      ___

            Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also  Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822 (an
                                                    ,
                                   ___ ____  _______

            appellate panel  can affirm on  any independently  sufficient

            ground).

                                        VIII.
                                        VIII.
                                        _____

                      In conclusion,  we hold  that the  release violated

            the OWBPA  and that the employees' retention of benefits does

            not act to  ratify a waiver  that failed to  comply with  the

            OWBPA.   We therefore  reverse that portion  of the  district

            court's judgment  declaring that the  employees' retention of

            benefits  ratified  the release  of  their ADEA  claims.   We

            vacate and remand  to the district court  to further consider

            the issue  of whether the  release bars non-ADEA claims.   We

            affirm the district  court's entry of summary judgment on the

            employees' counterclaims. 

                      Affirmed in  part;  reversed in  part; vacated  and
                      ___________________________________________________

            remanded in part.  No costs.
            _________________

                                         -39-
                                          39