Court Opinion

ID: 9529609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:52:29.551493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:51.496033
License: Public Domain

OP ALA, Justice,
dissenting in part — - SIMMS, J., joins this writing insofar as it calls for a response from Liberty Bank & Trust Company before the appeal’s dismissal is effected.
Holding that the order from which Michael Paul Rogalin [Rogalin] seeks corrective relief *840is unappealable by law, the court dismisses his appeal as premature. The court reaches its decision without affording Liberty Bank & Trust Company of Oklahoma City, N.A. [Liberty or mortgagee] — the appellee — an opportunity to respond to Rogalin’s petition for rehearing. While I agree that Rogalin’s cause may not be advanced for review because a related counterclaim stands undecided below,1 I would call for a response from Liberty (who did not seek rehearing) before dismissing this appeal.
I would liken our action to sapping Liberty’s judgment of its previously accepted and perceived finality. While Liberty previously had sought to dismiss Rogalin’s appeal for want of a “final appealable order”, its appellate paperwork neither concedes nor addresses any infirmity in its preappeal foreclosure sale. Today’s dismissal directly condemns as prematurely entered — in advance of judgment in the case — the trial court’s confirmation of Liberty’s sale of the mortgaged premises,2 leaving Rogalin’s equity of redemption unextinguished and placing the purchaser’s sale-derived title at risk.3 Our dismissal is hence the functional equivalent of a confirmation order’s vacation.4
Because this dismissal affects Liberty’s substantial property interest and reduces its perceived nisi prius victory by foreclosure decree to the insecure status of a mere mid-litigation judicial action in the ease, which is not yet executable,5 due process dictates that Liberty be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present its position on the issue, if any it have.6

. Because Rogalin’s counterclaim is related to the same transaction or occurrence as Liberty’s foreclosure claim — i.e., to Rogalin's obligations under the terms of the notes and mortgage — the order entered in favor of Liberty, which resolves only a part of the claims between the parties, is one of a class not certifiable for immediate appeal under the terms of 12 O.S.Supp.1993 § 994. DeLuca v. Mountain States Financial Resources Corp., Okl., 827 P.2d 171. See also the Bar Committee Comments to 12 O.S.Supp.1990 § 1006 — the earlier version of § 994.

. FDIC v. Tidwell, Okl., 820 P.2d 1338, 1342 (1991).

. Sooner Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Okl. Central Credit Union, Okl., 790 P.2d 526, 531 (1990).

. Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84-85, 108 S.Ct. 896, 899, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1190, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).

. Tidwell, supra note 2 at 1342.

. Oklahoma’s Constitution Art. 2, § 7 states:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
Extant jurisprudence teaches that an opportunity to be heard is an essential element of due process. Crussel v. Kirk, Okl., 894 P.2d 1116, 1121 (1995); Cate v. Archon Oil Co., Inc., Okl., 695 P.2d 1352, 1355 (1985); York v. Halley, Okl., 534 P.2d 363, 364 (1975); Shaw v. Swank, Okl., 416 P.2d 928, 931 (1966); Kiespert v. Jenkins, Okl., 324 P.2d 283 (1958); Greco v. Foster, Okl., 268 P.2d 215, 219 (1954).
In accord with this principle is Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2711, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983), where the Court held that "since a mortgagee clearly has a legally protected property interest, [it] is entitled to notice reasonably calculated to apprise” it of the action. The purpose of this notice is to "apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). [Emphasis mine.]