Court Opinion

ID: 9734802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:46:35.695507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:51.395508
License: Public Domain

J. T. Kallman, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The facts clearly show the elements of an attempt in this case. There was a specific intent to commit unarmed robbery. There were overt acts that went beyond mere preparation. The clerk was getting the money out of the cash register for the defendant at his command. The attempted unarmed robbery had been completed.
The question then arises that if the attempt has been accomplished, why did the defendant suddenly discontinue the efforts necessary to complete the criminal act. We have before us a record, and that is all we can rely on. This record reflects a number of reasons why the criminal act may have been terminated:
1) The defendant’s statements that he wouldn’t do it to her this time because you’re good-looking.1
2) As defendant made this statement a woman came in and directed defendant out of the store.
3) There were other people in the store while defendant was there and the record does not reveal the effect this may have had on defendant’s choosing to discontinue the crime.
The statute, MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287, as quoted in the majority opinion, reads in part: "but shall fail in the perpetration, or * * (Emphasis added.)
One notes here that the statute is in the disjunctive. Granted, the defendant was not intercepted or prevented from completing the crime. However, under the statute he clearly failed in the perpetration of the crime, whatever the reason. The statute does not say that if a defendant voluntarily discon*289tinues the criminal act the attempt fails. Nor does it say if a defendant involuntarily discontinues the criminal act the attempt succeeds. Where the statute, as here, says that when a defendant shall fail in the perpetration of a crime, that is enough to convict for an attempt. The statute is clear and unambiguous, clearly permitting, under the facts in this case, a conviction for an attempt.
In People v Stephens, 84 Mich App 250, 255; 269 NW2d 552 (1978) Judge Beasley stated: "I would agree with the trial court that it was legally too late for defendant Stephens to abandon his criminal intent”.
That is the situation in this case. The defendant had progressed too far into the crime to assert now the defense of voluntary abandonment. This was even recognized by the defendant when he told Stanchfield (unrebutted testimony): "You could only get me on attempted anyway”.
I would affirm the conviction and sentence.

 But note he said that next time he’d do it even if she were there. The criminal intent had not been abandoned.