Court Opinion

ID: 9868962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:09:26.744347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:58.141198
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing.
The motion asserts that our statement that, “the west line of the Dogie lease is 7600 varas east of the west line of 3 as located from Dod’s monumented S. W. corner of 70 and N. W. corner of 3,” is not supported by the evidence. We have carefully re-examined this matter and adhere to the statement as written.
It is further urged that regardless of inaccuracies in these figures and calculations, our analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Stanolind Case, implicit from these calculations, is “absolutely immaterial.” In this connection it is urged by the state that we were in error in concluding (1) that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Stanolind Case was based upon an adjudication that the southeast corner of 70 is hot farther north than the car spring corner; and (2) that the Supreme Court adopted the work of Dod.
The calculations referred to by appellant are predicated upon the work of Dod and his finding of an excess of 43 varas per section in the nine river sections, 61-69. It is clear to us that the Supreme Court’s decision in the Stanolind Case is predicated upon an adjudication, in so far- as that case is concerned, that the south line of 70 is not farther north than the car spring corner; and also an adoption by the Supreme Court of the method employed by Dod, that is, prorating the excess among the nine river sections. Of course, if Dod’s survey was inaccurate as to the distance between the two points found by him (southeast 70 and southeast 61), this would affect (increase or diminish) the width of each of the involved river sections. As we understand the Stano-lind opinion, the asserted 215-vara vacancy between 101-104 and 34½ is predicated upon the difference between the called east lines of 3+101 and the actual location on the ground of the north line of 34½. In other words, this 2,15 varas exactly coincides with a 43-vara excess in the west lines of the five river surveys, 65-69 (43x5=215). The holding of the Supreme Court that the calls in the east line of 3 for the west lines and corners of the river surveys necessarily adjudicates the south line of No. 3 as beginning at a point 162 varas south of the south line of 65. Consequently, the true location of 65 was determinative of the issue involved in the Stanolind Case. Since this line, however, was not located on the ground and had to be fixed by prorating the excess between the two points found by Dod, the true location of 65 south line necessarily was dependent upon the location of the south lines of both 70 and 61. If the excess between those lines is in fact 43 varas per section, and 70 is located at the car spring corner, then necessarily the south line of 101-104 is coincident with the north line of 34⅝. . If the excess between 70 south and 61 south is greater than 43 *708varas per section, and the car spring corner correctly locates south 70, the south line of 101-104 would fall south of the north line of 34⅛, thus eliminating any vacancy. If, on the other hand, this prorated excess is less than 43 varas per section, then the south line of 101-104 would fall north of the north line of 34½, and a vacancy would be created. It must be held in mind that,the judgment in the Stanolind Case was predicated, not upon a jury finding, but upon a directed verdict, and the Supreme Court necessarily adjudicated the nonexistence of a vacancy between 101-104 and 34½. That the Supreme Cour.t in fact based its decision upon the holding that for the purposes of that case, predicated upon the pleadings of the state, the car spring corner was the true southeast corner of 70, we think clear. However, as stated in our original opinion, it seems to have been the purpose of the Supreme Court to make no adjudication of that corner or of the location as to its northing, other than for the particular purpose of its decision in that case. Disclaimer of the binding effect of its decision upon other litigation was express. For this reason, we made no adjudication as to the position either of the south line or southeast corner of 70, but left such location open as a question of fact. This seems to be the conclusion reached by the Supreme Goitrt, predicated upon the evidence, as distinguished from the pleadings in the Stanolind Casei As stated in our original opinion, the question of vacancy vel non and its extent in so far as this case is concerned depends solely upon the true location of the southeast corner of 70. We made and make no fact finding determinative of that issue.
In a printed argument, in support of the motions of appellants Bryant and Tyler and wife, it is insisted that the action of Stano-lind in applying to purchase the involved land from the state as vacant land and its various acts thereunder constituted ail election between inconsistent rights, thereby creating an estoppel to assert title under the alleged true and inconsistent location of the east line of 104. The following cases, are cited in support of this contention.: Seamans Oil Co. v. Guy, 114 Tex. 42, 262 S.W. 473; Id., 115 Tex. 93, 94, 276 S.W. 424; Clemenger v. Flesher, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W. 304; Bauman v. Jaffray, 6 Tex.Civ.App. 489, 26 S.W. 260; Stine v. Producers’ Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W. 126; Providence Ins. Co. v. Boatner, Tex.Civ.App., 225 S.W. 1115. We have carefully examined these cases. The doctrine announced in these cases seems well grounded in our jurisprudence. It is predicated upon equitable estoppel. That doctrine, however,, we do not regard as applicable to the present case. We believe we have correctly analyzed the transaction in our original opinion. If so, our holding correctly follows.
In an amicus curiae motion filed by attorneys representing clients in other pending cases, objection is made to the portion of our original opinion reading: “The discovery alluded to in the 1931 act we think clearly means the discovery by ‘any person’ to the land commissioner, by means of an application to lease under the 1931 act.”
It is stated that this language is being construed as holding that the party wlm first files his application for purchase in the land office is entitled to priority over one who had made an earlier application for survey but had not filed his application to purchase until later. The quoted language was not intended to so hold, nor do we think it is fairly suscéptible of that construction. The point under, consideration was whether the party who first discovered the existence of a vacancy was entitled to priority regardless of the date of his'application under the 1931 act. The thought embodied in the quotation is that the rights of a party under the act are fixed by means of compliance with the act. An application to purchase is, of course, essential. As prerequisite thereto, a survey is necessary. The applicaton for survey constitutes the first step under the act and no doubt fixes the rights of the applicant in so far as time is concerned. Failure or refusal to follow up the application for survey with such application to purchase would defeat the accrual of any rights under the application for survey. The effect of unreasonable delay or .laches in filing the application to purchase is a question with which we are not here concerned. We think the language of the original opinion, read in the light of the facts presented for adjudication, sufficiently expresses our holding. The question pointed out in the amicus curiae motion was not before us, and consequently not adjudicated.
Except in so far as the original opinion is corrected or modified above, the several motions are overruled.
Corrections made in original opinion, and motions overruled.