Court Opinion

ID: 9620887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:49:08.743954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:55.565584
License: Public Domain

Price, J.
(dissenting): I do not agree that no reversible error was committed in the trial of this case, but will state my views very briefly.
This was not a case where liability was clearly established. The facts concerning the negligence of the parties were very “close.” It seems to me that in such a case the incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial evidence that got before this jury would be more likely to result in prejudice than it otherwise would. Plaintiff’s answer in which he quoted defendant’s counsel as saying that he “represented the insurance company” was entirely uncalled for and was not even responsive to the question asked. I quite agree with defendant that for the court to admonish the jury concerning it would merely have emphasized in their minds the fact that defendant was covered by insurance. The damage had already been done.
The cross-examination of defendant concerning what property she owned and what she had conveyed since the collision was not only improper cross-examination but was clearly outside the issues and highly prejudicial. This was a simple personal injury suit, for actual damages only. The issues concerned the negligence of the parties and the damages sustained. Such line of testimony could have been introduced for one purpose only — to prejudice defendant in the minds of the jury — and in my opinion its prejudicial effect was not cured by the fact it was later stricken and the jury admonished to disregard it. The damage had already been done. That such prejudicial effect can be overcome by the futile gesture of striking from the record and admonishing the jury is unmitigated fiction.
In the light of this whole record, showing the foregoing and a number of other things occurring during the trial, I am unwilling to *393say that the defendant received the fair trial to which every litigant is entitled. I would reverse and grant a new trial.
Thiele and Wedell, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissent.