Court Opinion

ID: 9674037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:22:11.966727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:47.764837
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(dissenting).
This case goes to the heart of the plea bargaining process, questioning the reasons for its very existence. It demonstrates how a common malfunction of the process results in further delays of criminal justice administration, strained relations between bench and bar, and manifest injustice to criminal defendants.
The facts surrounding these guilty pleas are amply set forth in the majority opinion. They present an all too familiar scenario. Accepting the testimony most favorable to the State, it is seen that the defendants changed their pleas to guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation of probated sentences. Although they were admonished at the time by the trial court that he was not bound to accept the prosecutor’s recommendations, and were in all probability so informed beforehand, they quite reasonably expected to receive probated sentences. They would never have changed their pleas if they had thought for a moment that they would wind up in the penitentiary. However, the trial judge rejected the terms of the plea bargain, as was his prerogative. It is a fact, however, that this prerogative is never exercised by many judges, and only rarely by the rest, for the obvious reason that it defeats the whole purpose of the plea bargaining system.
That the plea bargaining process is an indispensable element of our criminal justice system there can no longer be any doubt. See, e. g., Guster v. State, 522 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (concurring opinion); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). The bedrock assumption of the process was stated by the Supreme Court in Santobello as follows:
“. . . when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Id., at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
When a defendant does not obtain the sentence he bargained for, even though the prosecutor made the recommendation agreed to, there has been in a very real sense a failure of consideration flowing to the defendant.
Consider briefly the consequences of affirming convictions such as these. Defense lawyers are going to be much more hesitant to enter plea bargains with the prosecutor’s office — especially in Hays County — if the judge is simply going to ignore them. This should necessitate trials in at least some cases which would otherwise be settled by negotiated pleas.
“An accused will be reluctant to engage in negotiations or to enter into a plea agreement if he cannot withdraw his plea of guilty when he does not obtain the expected concessions he was promised.” State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146, 151-52 (1968).
Other aspects of the delay in criminal justice administration caused by the judge’s rejection of the plea bargain can be foreseen in the lengthy wrangling over motions to withdraw the guilty plea and in motions for new trial, as in this case, and in appeals such as this.
Moreover, rejection of plea bargains can only lead to strained relations between the bench and bar. Although this case involved uncharacteristic cooperation between de*77fense counsel, the prosecutor’s office, and law enforcement officials, the record reveals lack of communication and distrust where the trial judge is concerned. When a judge lends no more credence to a plea bargain than was exhibited in the instant case, he is going to disappoint not only the defense bar, but the prosecutor’s office as well.
Consider also the cost in respect for the system that cases such as this engender.
“It is important for all segments of our society to believe that our court systems dispense justice. This includes the criminals themselves as well as the law abiding citizens and especially those criminals who have cooperated fully in police investigations.” Dube v. State, 257 Ind. 398, 275 N.E.2d 7 (Ind.1971).
To that group of criminals might be added those who uphold their end of the bargain and plead guilty. The disillusionment with the criminal justice system already festering in our jails and prisons cannot help but be exacerbated by cases such as those of Gibson and Reeves. And it is not likely that the general public will more readily perceive the justness of such results.
The denial of motions to withdraw guilty pleas in such cases also results in manifest injustice to the defendant. His guilty plea usually waives numerous rights, including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses and the right to assert whatever defenses he thinks he has. What is the consideration for these concessions if the court rejects the bargain and the plea is irrevocable?
“More important, we believe, if withdrawal is refused upon proof of an un-kept and unfulfilled plea agreement, defendant has been in effect deprived of his right to a jury trial and the benefit of the presumption of innocence — constitutional safeguards guaranteed to every accused without regard to the probability of his guilt or the truthfulness of any pretrial admissions or confessions.” State v. Wolske, supra at 151.
What can be more unfair than the procedure countenanced by the majority, whereby a defendant must uphold his end of the bargain, to his irrevocable prejudice, before the court decides whether or not the prosecution’s side of the bargain will be upheld?
There has been a growing recognition by other jurisdictions of the problems discussed above. A variety of safeguards surrounding guilty pleas have been adopted, but the one I would urge today is simply this: when the trial judge rejects a plea bargain, the defendant, upon timely request, should have the right to withdraw his guilty plea.
There is admittedly no statutory or case authority in Texas for this rule. In fact, the rule urged would have the effect of overruling express authority to the contrary. Williams v. State, 487 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The cases of Trevino v. State, 519 S.W.2d 864 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), Galvan v. State, 525 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and Cruz v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 530 S.W.2d 817 (this day decided) to the same effect are distinguishable. In none of those cases was there a timely request to withdraw the guilty plea before imposition of sentence.1 It should also be noted that *78Texas subscribes to a liberal policy touching withdrawal of guilty pleas. Garcia v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 9, 237 S.W. 279 (1922).
Perhaps concerned about injustices in the area of voluntary guilty pleas, the 64th Legislature recently amended the applicable statute, Art. 26.13, V.A.C.C.P., by adding among other things the following required admonishment prior to acceptance of such pleas:
“(2) the fact that any recommendation of the prosecuting attorney as to punishment is not binding on.the court.”
This action codified the recommendations of some cases as to “the better practice”. Trevino v. State, 519 S.W.2d 864, 868 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Galvan v. State, 525 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). It is nevertheless clear that the statutes do not contemplate the rule urged today. It should be noted, however, that such a rule would not rob the trial judge of his discretion to accept or reject a guilty plea. This discretion is essential if the trial judge is to prevent oppressive or unfair bargains and to protect the public interest. The rule would merely permit an accused to opt for the uncertainties of trial by changing his plea to not guilty when confronted with a trial judge unwilling to accept the prosecutor’s recommendation.
It is neither necessary nor appropriate to defer to the Legislature for fashioning this rule. The Legislature wisely left “delusive hope of probation” out of Art. 26.13 as a factor which might invalidate a guilty plea. See also Valdez v. State, 507 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). The Legislature is not blind to the fact that most negotiated guilty pleas are based on some sort of hope of probation. Under the strict language of Art. 26.13, a guilty plea can be accepted even if it is based on a hope of probation which turns out to be delusive. All the rule urged today would do would be to permit the accused to withdraw his guilty plea, upon timely request, if that hope turns out to be delusive. No modification of Art. 26.13 is necessary. Moreover, the amended Art. 26.13 now only requires that a guilty plea be free and voluntary, dropping the proscriptions against fear, persuasion, promises, and delusive hopes of pardon. The way is opened for spreading the terms of plea bargains upon the record, as my Brother Odom has prudently recommended in Cruz, supra.
It remains to consider where other jurisdictions stand on this matter. Following the lead of the third2 and eighth3 circuits, Congress has finally adopted the long awaited amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11(e)(4), effective December 1, 1975 provides as follows:
“Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.” (Emphasis added)
It thus appears that the entire federal system now subscribes to the rule urged today. A majority of the states confronting the issue also permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea if the judge rejects the plea bargain.4 Many of those states rejecting *79the rule have done so only after lengthy discussions and over dissenting opinions.5 Thus, the trend is in the direction of the rule urged here.
Support for the rule can also be found in the proposed revisions to the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft, 1968), Sec. 2.1(a)(ii)(5)6 and the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (Proposed Official Draft, 1975), Secs. 350.5(4) and 350.6.7
The time is right for Texas to join the growing number of jurisdictions permitting withdrawal of guilty pleas, upon timely request, when the trial court rejects a plea bargain. Only after having been given such an opportunity after the trial judge rejects the plea bargain can a defendant’s plea be characterized as voluntary. Accordingly, I would adopt the rule discussed above and reverse these convictions. The causes should be remanded and the appellants given a chance to change their pleas.
DOUGLAS, J., not participating.

. Since sentences are not usually probated until after a pre-sentence report has been filed and the time for filing motion for new trial has expired, the sentencing hearing is often the first indication a defendant has that probation will be denied. At this time, good faith would require that the trial judge indicate his dissatisfaction with the prosecutor’s recommendation, thereby allowing a timely motion to withdraw the guilty plea before imposition of sentence. It is noted that Trevino, Galvan and Cruz were all sentenced by the same trial judge, who did not afford them this advance warning of his intentions.
See also the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft, 1968), Sec. 3.3(b); The American Law Institute’s Model Code of Pre-Ar-raignment Procedure (Proposed Official Draft, 1975), Sec. 350.5(4), and Rule 11(e), Fed.Rules of Crim.Proc., eff. Dec. 1, 1975, containing similar recommendations.

. United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1972).

. United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den., 416 U.S. 907, 94 S.Ct. 1613, 40 L.Ed.2d 112 (1974).

. Connecticut — Quintana v. Robinson, 31 Conn.Sup. 22, 319 A.2d 515 (1973).
Florida — Davis v. State, 308 So .2d 27 (Fla.1975).
Georgia — Burkette v. State, 131 Ga.App. 177, 205 S.E.2d 496 (1974).
Illinois — Ill.Sup.Ct. Rule 402(d)(2) (1970); Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110A, Sec. 402(d)(2).
Indiana — Watson v. State, 300 N.E.2d 354 (Ind.1973).
*79Iowa — State v. Fisher, 223 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 1974).
Minnesota — State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146, 152 (1968).
New Hampshire — State v. Farris, 320 A.2d 642, 644 (N.H.1974) recommended as “prudent”.
New Jersey — State v. Nuss, 131 N.J.Super. 502, 330 A.2d 610 (A.D.1974).
Pennsylvania — Rule 319, Pa.Rules of Crim.Proc.; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 335 A.2d 777 (Pa.Super.1975).

. California — People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 (1970).
Massachusetts — Commonwealth v. Stanton, 317 N.E.2d 487 (Mass.App.Ct.1974).
Michigan — People v. Rogers, 55 Mich.App. 491, 223 N.W.2d 20 (1974).
Missouri — Huffman v. State, 499 S.W.2d 565 (Mo.Ct.App.1973).
New Mexico — State v. Ramos, 85 N.M. 438, 512 P.2d 1274 (N.M.Ct.App.1973).
New York — People v. Selikott, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784 (N.Y. Ct.App.1974), cert, den., 419 U.S. 1122, 95 S.Ct. 806, 42 L.Ed.2d 822 (1975).
Texas — Williams v. State, supra.
Wisconsin — State v. McKnight, 65 Wis.2d 582, 223 N.W.2d 550 (1974).

. 2.1 Plea withdrawal.
(a) The court should allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal, proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.

(ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever the defendant proves that:
(5) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement concurred in by the court, and he did not affirm his plea after being advised that the court no longer concurred and being called upon to either affirm or withdraw his plea.

.Section 350.5. Additional Action to be Taken by the Court Where There is Plea Agreement

(4) Ruling on the Plea. Before accepting a plea pursuant to a plea agreement, the court shall advise the parties whether it approves the agreement and will dispose of the case in accordance therewith. If the court determines to disapprove the agreement and not to dispose of the case in accordance therewith, it shall so inform the parties, not accept the defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and advise the defendant personally that he is not bound.

Section 350.6. Sentencing Following Plea
If, at the time of sentencing, the court for any reason determines to impose a sentence more severe than that provided for in a plea agreement between the parties, the court shall inform the defendant of that fact and shall inform the defendant that the court will entertain a motion to withdraw the plea. The court after pronouncing the sentence of a defendant who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere shall inquire of the defendant personally whether the sentence pronounced violates any agreement or understanding the defendant had with respect to the sentence. If the court determines that the sentence pronounced is inconsistent with an agreement, or that it differs from the defendant’s understanding in such a way that it would be unjust to permit the defendant’s plea to stand, it shall vacate the plea.