Court Opinion

ID: 9561003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:00:59.019538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:28.403531
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
1. In my view, the State has failed to present sufficient grounds to warrant reversal of the trial court’s order quashing the indictment. As the majority opinion points out, the motion to quash was apparently premised upon the question of the DOT officers’ authority to make the initial stop of appellee’s automobile, but no evidence was presented to show what actually occurred at that time and no facts were stipulated. OCGA § 32-6-29 (a) (12) empowers DOT to appoint enforcement officers who, in addition to their powers to enforce specific licensing and fuel tax registration requirements, shall have the power to “protect any life or property when the circumstances demand action.” However, the State failed to show that appellee was engaged in a statutory activity concerning which the DOT officers had any specified powers to make arrest, nor did it submit any proof that the officers were acting to protect any life or property. Further, as recognized by the majority, there was no evidence to show whether a citizen’s arrest was made pursuant to OCGA § 17-4-60 or if the DOT officers observed a criminal offense taking place. If a criminal offense *362was committed, it must be shown that a “reasonable articulable ground” existed to make a warrantless arrest, and each case depends on its own facts. See State v. Hodges, 184 Ga. App. 21 (360 SE2d 903) (1987); Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853 (1) (363 SE2d 63) (1987).
“ ‘The [S]tate has the burden of proving the lawfulness of [appel-lee’s] warrantless arrest. [Cits.]’ ” Smith v. State, 188 Ga. App. 574, 575 (373 SE2d 800) (1988). “ ‘We will not presume error from a silent record. [The State had] the burden of showing error affirmatively by the record and this burden [was] not discharged by recitations in the brief. [Cits.]’ ” Williams v. State, 188 Ga. App. 496 (3) (373 SE2d 281) (1988). Accord In re Holly, 188 Ga. App. 202 (372 SE2d 479) (1988).
2. I am also concerned with the majority’s overruling of the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to quash the indictment on the ground that such motions must be in writing. The transcript of a pretrial hearing which is before us on appeal reveals that defense counsel sought permission at the outset to file a written motion to quash the indictment accompanied by a brief. After hearing arguments of counsel in regard to the merits of this motion, i.e., the DOT officers’ authority to stop appellee’s car, the trial court agreed to allow both parties to submit briefs contending what the facts were, which the court would accept as true “for the purpose of this motion.” The prosecutor made no objection to this ruling. Defense counsel submitted a memorandum of law in support of appellee’s motion to quash, with two supplemental additions, but the record does not show that the State filed anything in response.
The order appealed from by the State recites as follows: “Defendant having filed a motion to quash indictment and the Court having considered the briefs of law and all other matters properly of record in said case, . . . said Indictment is hereby dismissed.” The State likewise raised no objection to the form or content of this order; on appeal it argues only that the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find that the DOT enforcement officers were acting in the performance of their statutory duties and authorized to stop appellee when they encountered him driving in a reckless and dangerous manner that threatened the safety of persons and property. Thus it is clear that insofar as the form of the motion to quash is concerned, the State “acquiesced in the ruling of the trial court and placed no objection to the procedure adopted. The failure to make timely and specific objection at trial may be treated as waiver. [Cits.]” Riley v. State, 180 Ga. App. 409, 411 (349 SE2d 274) (1986). Accord In the Interest of J. L. Y., 184 Ga. App. 254 (3) (361 SE2d 246) (1987).
The issue of whether the motion to quash was required to be ir writing was first raised and considered sua sponte by the majority as a basis for reversing the order granting it. I cannot agree that this *363court can properly transform a possible error that has been waived into a ground for reversal. “ ‘The duty of the appellate court is to correct errors alleged to have been made in the trial court. . . .’ [Cits.]” Tandy Corp. v. McCrimmon, 183 Ga. App. 744, 747 (360 SE2d 70) (1987).
Decided June 30, 1989
Rehearing denied July 17, 1989
Harry D. Dixon, Jr., District Attorney, Margaret M. Edwards, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
C. Deen Strickland, for appellee.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.