Court Opinion

ID: 9543977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:03.662163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:37.286000
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting).
A domicile, once acquired, is retained until supplanted by acquisition of a new one. Edmundson v. Miley Trailer Co., 211 N.W.2d 269, 270-271 (Iowa 1973). In Edmundson we approved the following quote from 25 Am.Jur.2d, Domicile, § 24, p. 19:
“The requisite element of intent to change one’s domicile necessarily includes an intention to abandon the former domicile, and to do so permanently. There must be both an absence of an intent to return and an intent to remain in the place chosen as the new domicile. To effect a change of domicile, there must be the intent to exchange the prior domicile for another. If a person establishes a new dwelling place, but never abandons the intention of returning to the old dwelling place as his only home, the domicile remains at the old dwelling place." (Emphasis in Edmundson.)
The majority concedes our review is not de novo and that the finding of the trial court is binding on us if it is supported by substantial evidence. Morris v. Morris, 197 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa 1972).
I think Christina’s testimony is substantial evidence, sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling. The majority seems to hold that the Canadian Immigration Identification Record destroys Christina’s testimony of her subjective intention. But under our *714scope of review it seems to me that her testimony persists. She may well have retained a subjective intent that her sojourn in Canada would be tentative and revocable. Her desperate desire to preserve the marriage could explain her willingness to sign the required papers and move to Canada without the necessary intent that the move was to be permanent.
It is not enough for us to disagree with the determination of the trial court. It is for us only to determine whether, on the record, the trial court could find as it did.
I would affirm.