Court Opinion

ID: 9740097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:27:50.9082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.217225
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring.
The case at bar is a different one than Miller v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 454, 417 N.E.2d 339, upon which the dissent relies. In Miller, the trial court admitted evidence of two convictions for which Miller had not even been sentenced yet on the day of his habitual offender trial, These were not merely "out of sequence." They were not admissible on any grounds.
By contrast, Richards' three convictions were all admissible. One was an offense from the mid-1970s. Two others were later offenses whose dates intertwined such that they were not by themselves "two prior unrelated felonies." However, either of them could combine with the first conviction to establish the necessary predicates for an habitual finding. These last two convictions were, in effect, alternative proofs offered by the progecution. A jury properly instructed on the definition of "two prior unrelated felonies" is perfectly able to determine from this evidence whether the State has met its burden of proof. The issue on appeal is simply whether the evidence favorable to the judgment is adequate to support it.
PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., join in this concurrence.