Court Opinion

ID: 9670374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:19:38.163255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:04.142210
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority that as a general proposition "the police [lack] the authority to make a binding promise of immunity or not to prosecute.”1 Absent evidence that the police were authorized by the prosecutor to make such a promise, a police officer’s promise of immunity or not to prosecute cannot be enforced.
In the instant case, no evidence was offered that the police officer who entered into the agreement not to prosecute was expressly authorized or clothed with apparent authority2 to do so by the prosecutor. There being no evidence that the officer who entered into the agreement was authorized to do so, I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
While the police exercise, as a practical matter, a charging discretion in deciding whether to make an arrest, issue a citation, or seek a warrant,3 the ultimate charging discretion is confided solely to *459the prosecuting attorney and the Attorney General.4 A police officer’s decision not to arrest, cite, or seek an arrest warrant may thus be countermanded by the prosecutor to whom the charging discretion is confided.
Federal courts have enforced "non-plea agreement” promises of nonprosecution or other concessions made by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration or of the Federal Bureau of Investigation5 without evidence that a United States Attorney or the Attorney General has delegated to them authority to make such a promise. It may be that federal courts in effect take judicial notice of a working relationship between agents of the dea, the fbi, and United States Attorneys, under the *460aegis of the Department of Justice, and that the relationship is such that no evidence of express or apparent authority or delegation is or should be required. This Court would not, however, be justified in taking judicial notice that there is such a relationship between state police officers and the Oakland County Prosecutor.
A different question might be presented if evidence were to be adduced that by words or conduct the prosecutor had clothed state police officers working in the area of narcotics enforcement with the authority to make promises of nonprosecution to offenders in exchange for evidence, cooperation, or other assistance.

 Ante, pp 452.

 See 1 Restatement Agency, 2d, §§ 8 and 27.

 See LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect Into Custody (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1965), p 63.

 See Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect With a Crime (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1969), p 151. American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-3.9, pp 3-53 ff.

 United States v Carrillo, 709 F2d 35 (CA 9, 1983) (indictment dismissed where the defendant cooperated with dea agents in return for a promise not to prosecute); United States v Rodman, 519 F2d 1058 (CA 1, 1975) (the court dismissed indictment where Securities and Exchange Commission agents failed to perform their agreement to "strongly recommend” to the United States Attorney not to prosecute the defendant in return for his cooperation); In re Doe, 410 F Supp 1163 (ED Mich, 1976) (the court enforced a narcotics agent’s oral promise that the defendant would not be subject to questioning; the defendant made this agreement through an fbi agent in exchange for turning over five hundred grams of cocaine); United States v Wolf, 601 F Supp 435 (ND Ill, 1984) (the court suppressed evidence given by the defendant to Canadian tax authorities where they promised not to give it to the Internal Revenue Service and the latter had participated in challenged conduct); United States v Pascal, 496 F Supp 313 (ND Ill, 1979) (the court dismissed an indictment, enforcing a dea agent’s oral agreement to recommend to the United States Attorney that defendant not be indicted in return for his cooperation). Cf. United States v Barrett, 390 F Supp 1022, 1024 (D SC, 1975) (sentence reduction was denied on the ground that the defendant failed to meet the burden of proving that government agents promised him "special consideration” in exchange for full cooperation — the court said that "[t]here can be no distinction between promises made by prosecutors in the Attorney General’s office and promises made by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration.”)
Cf. United States v Carter, 454 F2d 426 (CA 4, 1972), and United States v Sanderson, 498 F Supp 273 (MD Fla, 1980), enforcing promises made by United States Attorneys.