Court Opinion

ID: 9654279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:12:28.888083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:07.543440
License: Public Domain

SPURLOCK, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the judgment of the trial court as to the amount due on the note. The basis for the dissent is that the indebtedness alleged in the plaintiff’s petition cannot be readily calculated solely from the allegations in the petition. Therefore, I would conclude that the demand made is for unliquidated damages.
The pertinent allegations in the petition are as follows:
“The note provides that if the maker defaults in the payment of any installment that has become due, the entire unpaid principal amount of the note shall, at the option of the Plaintiff, become immediately due. Defendant defaulted on said note and Plaintiff elected to mature and accelerate said note after duly notifying Defendant of such acceleration and after the allowance of all just and lawful offsets, payments and credits to Defendant, the balance thereon of $2,339.12 as of October 18, 1977 plus interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from such date, is past due and unpaid and Defendant, though often requested to do so has heretofore failed and refused and still fails and refuses to pay same or any part thereof.”
Attached to the petition and made a part thereof by reference was the note made the basis of this suit. Its pertinent parts are that it was dated March 8, 1977 in the sum of $5,790.00, payable in 42 installments of $169.52 and one installment of $32.38. It further provides “which includes principal and interest on the unpaid balances at the rate of 1 percent per month, both before and after maturity, the installments to be paid monthly” beginning April 20,1977. It also provides for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees as a part of the collection expense.
The judgment awarded the plaintiff $850.00 attorney’s fees.
Tex.R.Civ.P. 241 states that where a judgment by default is rendered against the defendant, if the claim is liquidated and proved by an instrument in writing, the damages shall be assessed by the court. Tex.R.Civ.P. 243 provides that if the action is for an unliquidated demand the court shall hear evidence of damages. The test of whether a demand is liquidated or unliqui-dated is whether the amount of damages *746can be accurately calculated by the court from the instrument in writing and the allegations in the petition. Here the indebtedness alleged is less than the amount appearing on the face of the note. From the general allegation of the petition quoted above it is impossible to calculate the amount of the indebtedness with certainty. There is no allegation of what payments were made, when they were made and the amounts thereof. Further, the dates of default and acceleration are not alleged with specificity.
The allegations in this case are even more general than the allegations in Burrows v. Bowden, 564 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, no writ). There the court held that where the principal balance due on a note could not be calculated solely from the note and the pleadings because the pleadings were conclusory rather than factual, the demand was unliquidated and prevented the court from properly awarding damages upon default.
In Southwestern Fire & Casualty Company v. Larue, 367 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex.1963), a summary judgment case, in a majority opinion the judgment of the trial court granting the summary judgment was affirmed.
The majority affirmed the judgment because the defendant failed to assign a point of error on the grounds that the case should be reversed because the original of the note was not attached to the pleadings or to an affidavit in support of the motion.
In the dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Calvert, he stated: “Thus, if Larue had defaulted in this case, the trial court could not have rendered the judgment it did render absent production in evidence of the note and testimony showing payments and credits supporting the judgment.” He states that Tex.R.Civ.P. 241 applies.
He further stated that: “While all other elements of the plaintiff’s claim are taken as confessed as alleged, the amount of the plaintiff’s damages is not taken as confessed as alleged.” Four justices dissented from the majority opinion.
It should be noted that in the rules governing summary judgments and default judgments there are differences apparent from an examination of the rules.
The trial court could not examine plaintiff’s petition and determine the exact amount of damages. It follows that the petition did not state a liquidated demand and the court therefore could not assess damages under Tex.R.Civ.P. 241.
In this default judgment case liability is confessed. But because an unliquidated demand was made evidence of damages was required for the court to award damages under Tex.R.Civ.P. 243. The same is also true concerning “reasonable attorney’s fees” since no fixed amount of attorney’s fees was provided for in the note.
Because no record was made of the hearing and therefore no statement of facts is available, this case should be affirmed on the issue of liability and reversed and remanded for a trial on the issue of damages which includes the amount due on the note and the assessing of reasonable attorney’s fees.
I agree with the majority that this cause should be reversed and remanded for a new trial on that portion of the judgment which awards attorney’s fees.
I respectfully dissent.