Court Opinion

ID: 2964567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:27:33.154359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:24.626099
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 96-1052

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 FRANK P. BONGIORNO,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

          No. 96-1560

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 FRANK P. BONGIORNO,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                              _________________________

               Thomas V. Silvia for appellant.
               ________________
               Jeanne  M. Kempthorne  and  Christopher  Alberto,  Assistant
               _____________________       ____________________
          United States Attorneys, with whom Donald K. Stern, United States
                                             _______________
          Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

                              _________________________

                                   February 7, 1997
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  In many respects the history  of
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          this litigation resembles a Greek tragedy, excerpts of which from

          time  to time have  occupied the attention  of no  fewer than ten

          federal  and state  judges across  the nation.    This particular

          passage  revolves  around  the  constitutionality  of  the  Child

          Support  Recovery Act  (CSRA), 18  U.S.C.    228 (1994),  and the

          federal government's authority, if any, to collect restitutionary

          payments ordered under the  CSRA by recourse to the  Federal Debt

          Collection Procedure Act (FDCPA),  28 U.S.C.    3001-3308 (1994).

          The CSRA issue is new  to us and the FDCPA issue has  not, to our

          knowledge, been addressed by any court of appeals.  After sorting

          through  these  and  other  arcana,  we  reject  the  defendant's

          challenge to his criminal conviction and sentence, holding, among

          other  things, that  Congress did  not exceed  the bounds  of its

          constitutional power  in enacting  the CSRA.    Turning to  post-

          conviction  events, we  hold  that the  federal government  lacks

          authority  to proceed against a "deadbeat dad" by using the FDCPA

          as an instrument  for enforcing a restitutionary  order issued in

          connection with an antecedent criminal conviction.

          I.  SETTING THE STAGE
          I.  SETTING THE STAGE

                    In October 1990 a Georgia state court entered  a decree

          ending Sandra  Taylor's marriage to defendant-appellant  Frank P.

          Bongiorno,  granting   Taylor  custody  of  the   couple's  minor

          daughter, and directing  Bongiorno (a  physician specializing  in

          bariatric  surgery)  to pay  $5,000 per  month in  child support.

          Shortly    thereafter,   mother   and    daughter   repaired   to

                                          2

          Massachusetts.  When Bongiorno  subsequently sought to modify the

          child  support award,  Taylor counterclaimed  on the  ground that

          Bongiorno  had failed  to  make the  payments  stipulated in  the

          original  decree.   In  September  1992 the  Georgia  court found

          Bongiorno in contempt  for failing  to pay upward  of $75,000  in

          mandated child support and directed that he be incarcerated until

          he had purged  the contempt.   Bongiorno avoided immurement  only

          because he had accepted  a position in Michigan and  the contempt

          order did not operate extraterritorially.

                    Once in Michigan,  Bongiorno made sporadic payments  of

          child  support despite the fact  that his new  post paid $200,000

          per year.  In March 1993 a Michigan state court domesticated  the

          Georgia support order  and authorized garnishment  of Bongiorno's

          wages  to satisfy  the accumulated  arrearage.   Soon thereafter,

          Bongiorno  quit his  job  and paid  only  $500 a  month  in child

          support from June to December 1993.  In early 1994 Bongiorno went

          to  work for the  State of Michigan.   That May  a Michigan state

          court  issued an order enforcing the Georgia support award to the

          extent of $300 per week.1   Bongiorno failed to satisfy even this

          modest impost.

                    Approximately  one  year  later  the  federal  behemoth

          stirred; the  United States charged Bongiorno  with violating the
                              
          ____________________

               1Differences  in  state  law  explain  this  ceiling.    The
          Michigan court applied Michigan's child support guidelines, Mich.
          Comp.  Laws    552.519  (1988), to  determine  a current  support
          obligation  and  then  added  a  premium to  be  applied  against
          Bongiorno's accumulated arrearages.  Neither the propriety of the
          ceiling nor the Michigan court's treatment of the Georgia court's
          decree is at issue here.

                                          3

          CSRA.     Because   Bongiorno's   minor   daughter  has   resided

          continuously in Massachusetts from  1990 forward (albeit with her

          grandmother  for much  of  that time),  the government  preferred

          charges  in that  district.   Bongiorno  moved unsuccessfully  to

          dismiss  the indictment on the ground that the CSRA represents an

          unconstitutional exercise of  Congress' power under  the Commerce

          Clause.  At an ensuing bench trial, the district court determined

          that Bongiorno had possessed the ability to pay $5,000 monthly in

          the 1992-1993  time frame, but that  he had chosen not  to do so.

          Consequently, the court found Bongiorno guilty of willful failure

          to  pay  child  support  and  sentenced  him  to  five  years  of

          probation.   As  a condition  of probation,  the court  imposed a

          work-release  arrangement,  directing Bongiorno  to  spend up  to

          twelve hours  per day in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for

          the first  year of his  probation.  As  a further condition,  the

          court  ordered  restitution  in the  sum  of  $220,000 (a  figure

          approximating the total arrearage then outstanding).

                    Not  content with its  apparent victory, the government

          commenced  a civil  proceeding  under the  FDCPA  as a  means  of

          enforcing  the  restitutionary  order.    After  some  procedural

          wrangling, the  court granted  the government's motion  to attach

          Bongiorno's wages and disburse the proceeds.

                    Bongiorno filed  timely appeals  in both cases,  and we

          heard the appeals in  tandem.  We now  affirm the conviction  and

          sentence  in the criminal case,  but reverse the  judgment in the

          civil case.

                                          4

          II.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT
          II.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT

                    Bongiorno challenges his conviction principally  on the

          ground that the CSRA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress'

          authority  under  the   Commerce  Clause.    We  review  de  novo

          constitutional challenges to federal statutes.  See United States
                                                          ___ _____________

          v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 471-72 (1st Cir. 1994).
             _______

                            A.  The CSRA and Its Prologue.
                            A.  The CSRA and Its Prologue.
                                _________________________

                    In 1992 Congress focused on the importance of financial

          support from non-custodial  parents as a means  of combatting the

          growing poverty  of single-parent families.   The House Judiciary

          Committee  observed  that  of  $16.3  billion  in  child  support

          payments  due in  1989, only  $11.2 billion  was paid,  leaving a

          shortfall  of  approximately  $5  billion to  be  offset  largely

          through government assistance.   See H.R. Rep. No. 102-771,  at 5
                                           ___

          (1992).   The Committee  concluded that  "the  annual deficit  in

          child support payments remains unacceptably high," especially "in

          interstate  collection  cases, where  enforcement  of  support is

          particularly  difficult."   Id.   To illustrate  this point,  the
                                      ___

          Committee noted  that one-third of all  uncollected child support

          obligations  involved non-custodial  fathers living out  of state

          and that roughly fifty-seven percent of the custodial  parents in

          such situations received  support payments "occasionally,  seldom

          or never."  Id.
                      ___

                    Because   Congress   doubted   the    states'   ability

          efficaciously to enforce support orders beyond their own borders,

          see  id.  at  6  (recognizing that  "interstate  extradition  and
          ___  ___

                                          5

          enforcement in fact remains a tedious, cumbersome and slow method

          of collection"),  it devised a  federal solution hoping  that the

          new  law    the  CSRA    would  prevent delinquent  parents  from

          "mak[ing] a mockery of State law by fleeing across State lines to

          avoid  enforcement  actions by  State  courts  and child  support

          agencies."  138 Cong. Rec. H7324, H7326 (daily ed.  Aug. 4, 1992)

          (statement  of Rep.  Hyde).   In  final  form the  statute  makes

          willful  failure  "to pay  a  past  due  support obligation  with

          respect to a child who resides in another State" a federal crime.

          18 U.S.C.   228(a).  A "past due support obligation" is an amount

          determined under  a state  court order  that either  has remained

          unpaid for more than one year or is greater than $5,000.  See id.
                                                                    ___ ___

             228(d)(1).   The  law  subjects  violators  to  a  panoply  of

          punishments, including imprisonment, fines, and restitution.  See
                                                                        ___

          id.   228(b) & (c).
          ___

                               B.  The Commerce Clause.
                               B.  The Commerce Clause.
                                   ___________________

                    The Commerce Clause  bestows upon  Congress the  power,

          inter  alia,  to  "regulate Commerce  .  .  .  among the  several
          _____  ____

          States."   U.S. Const., art. I,   8, cl. 3.  The appellant claims

          that the  CSRA   which in  his case has the  effect of regulating

          the nonpayment  of Georgia-imposed child support obligations owed

          by a Michigan resident  to a child domiciled in  Massachusetts2  

          does not fall within the ambit of this constitutional grant.  The

                              
          ____________________

               2Technically, child support is  owed to the custodial parent
          for  the  benefit of  the minor  child.   For  simplicity's sake,
          however,  we choose to reduce the triangle to a straight line and
          treat the obligation as if it were owed directly to the minor.

                                          6

          Supreme Court has identified three general categories of activity

          that  lawfully can be regulated  under the Commerce  Clause:  (1)

          activities  that  involve  use  of  the  channels  of  interstate

          commerce, (2) activities that implicate the  instrumentalities of

          interstate commerce  (including persons or  things in  interstate

          commerce), and  (3) activities  that have a  substantial relation

          to,  or substantially  affect, interstate  commerce.   See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995); Perez v. United
          ______    _____                                   _____    ______

          States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
          ______

                    While the  CSRA is  likely supportable under  more than

          one of these rubrics, we believe that its validity is most easily

          demonstrated  in terms  of the  second class  of activities.   In

          other words, because paying court-ordered child support occurs in

          interstate commerce  when the obligated parent  and the dependent

          child  reside   in  different  states,  the   underlying  support

          obligation is  subject to  regulation under the  Commerce Clause.

          Accord United States v.  Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1003  (10th Cir.
          ______ _____________     _________

          1996)   (holding  that  the   CSRA  regulates   a  "court-ordered

          obligation to  pay money in interstate  commerce"), cert. denied,
                                                              _____ ______

          ___ S. Ct. ___ (1997); United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790
                                 _____________    _______

          (9th  Cir. 1996)  (concluding  that the  support obligation  is a

          "thing"  in  interstate commerce  because it  must  be met  "by a

          payment that will normally move in interstate commerce   by mail,

          by  wire, or by the electronic transfer of funds"); United States
                                                              _____________

          v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir.  1996) (similar to Hampshire),
             ____                                               _________

          cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___ (1997).
          _____ ______

                                          7

                    The appellant employs  various artifices in  attempting

          to  resist  the  force of  this  conclusion.    For starters,  he

          protests  that  the  obligation  to  pay  child  support  is  not

          "commerce" in any meaningful  sense.  That cry is  drowned out by

          the broadcast definitions of  the term used by the  Supreme Court

          from the early days of the Republic, see, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden,
                                               ___  ____  _______    _____

          22 U.S.  (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-96 (1824), as refreshed by more recent

          Supreme Court  jurisprudence, see, e.g., Heart  of Atlanta Motel,
                                        ___  ____  ________________________

          Inc. v. United  States, 379 U.S.  241, 253-58 (1964).   The  term
          ____    ______________

          "commerce" in the Commerce Clause context  is a term of art,  and

          the Court consistently has interpreted it to include transactions

          that might  strike lay persons  as "noncommercial."   See,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          United  States v.  Simpson, 252  U.S. 465,  466  (1920) (defining
          ______________     _______

          commerce  to   include  transporting  whiskey  intended  for  the

          transporter's  personal consumption);  Lottery Case  (Champion v.
                                                 ____________   ________

          Ames), 188 U.S.  321, 354  (1903) (defining  commerce to  include
          ____

          carrying lottery tickets).

                    The appellant is likewise fishing in an empty pond when

          he baldly proclaims  that a support  obligation is an  intangible

          and  therefore not a "thing"  in interstate commerce.   The Court

          has  long   read  the  Commerce  Clause   to  reach  transactions

          concerning  intangibles.   See,  e.g.,  United  States v.  South-
                                     ___   ____   ______________     ______

          Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322  U.S. 533, 549-50 (1944) (holding
          __________________________

          that transactions  may constitute  commerce although they  do not

          "concern the flow  of anything more  tangible than electrons  and

          information"); Pensacola Tel.  Co. v. Western Union Tel.  Co., 96
                         ___________________    _______________________

                                          8

          U.S.  (6  Otto) 1,  11  (1877) (defining  interstate  commerce to

          include   the  transmission   of  intelligence   over  interstate

          telegraph lines).   As the  Court explained in  United States  v.
                                                          _____________

          Shubert,  348 U.S. 222 (1955),  commerce exists where  there is a
          _______

          "continuous  and  indivisible  stream  of  intercourse  among the

          states" involving the  transmission of money  and communications.

          Id. at 226 (quoting South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 541).
          ___                 __________________________

                    This definition fits the economic realities incident to

          child support orders involving a parent in one state and  a child

          in another.  Because compliance with such support orders requires

          the  regular movement  of money  and communications  across state

          lines, such   transactions fall  within the scope  of permissibly

          regulated  intercourse.   See  Hampshire,  95 F.3d  at  1003; see
                                    ___  _________                      ___

          generally Comment, Making Parents  Pay:  Interstate Child Support
          _________          ______________________________________________

          Enforcement  After [Lopez],  144  U. Pa.  L.  Rev. 1469,  1505-11
          __________________________

          (1996).  It  follows inexorably that  Congress lawfully can  pass

          legislation  designed  to   prevent  the   frustration  of   such

          interstate  transactions.   See,  e.g., Allenberg  Cotton Co.  v.
                                      ___   ____  _____________________

          Pittman,  419 U.S.  20,  34  (1974)  (holding that  Congress  can
          _______

          prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce by obviating state

          laws); Heart of Atlanta  Motel, 379 U.S. at 275-76  (holding that
                 _______________________

          Congress has power to remove impediments to interstate commerce).

                    The CSRA is such a law.  It regulates the nonpayment of

          interstate  child  support obligations.    Because  child support

          orders  that require a parent in one  state to make payments to a

          person in another state are functionally equivalent to interstate

                                          9

          contracts,  see  Sage,  92  F.3d  at  106,  such  obligations are
                      ___  ____

          "things" in  interstate commerce.   Thus,  it is  appropriate for

          Congress   to   enact  legislation   that   will   prevent  their

          nonfulfillment.  On this  basis, the CSRA is a  valid exercise of

          congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  See Hampshire, 95
                                                          ___ _________

          F.3d at 1003-04 (upholding  the constitutionality of the CSRA  on

          the ground that it regulates "what is essentially nonpayment of a

          debt where  the  judgment creditor  and  judgment debtor  are  in

          different states");  Mussari, 95 F.3d  at 790 (reaching  the same
                               _______

          conclusion and observing that a  delinquent parent's "intentional

          refusal to satisfy the debt is as much an obstruction of commerce

          between the states  as any act of extortion  made unlawful by the

          Hobbs  Act");  Sage,   92  F.3d  at  105-06  (reaching  the  same
                         ____

          conclusion and  observing that Congress "surely  has power [under

          the Commerce  Clause] to prevent the frustration of an obligation

          to engage in interstate commerce").

                    The appellant makes  two last-ditch  arguments on  this

          point.  First, he  posits that cases such as  Hampshire, Mussari,
                                                        _________  _______

          and Sage went  awry because they did not recognize  that the CSRA
              ____

          is different from other federal  statutes enacted under the aegis

          of the  Commerce Clause.   The difference,  he says, is  that the

          underlying  payment   obligation      the  child   support  order

          simpliciter   is  a creature of state law.   This circumstance is

          fribbling.    South-Eastern  Underwriters  illustrates  that  the
                        ___________________________

          state-law origins of an  obligation do not preclude  the exercise

          of  congressional power  under the  Commerce  Clause.   The Court

                                          10

          there held, 322 U.S. at 546-47, that a fire insurance transaction

          across state lines constituted commerce among the several states,

          notwithstanding that  the insurance policy itself  was a personal

          contract  subject to state law.  The same principle obtains here:

          although the underlying child support order is a product of state

          law, the  delinquent parent's location vis- -vis  the minor child

          creates interstate nexus  in the  form of an  obligation to  make

          regular  payments  across state  boundaries.    Indeed, the  CSRA

          applies only when the  state-imposed child support order develops
                  ____

          an interstate character, necessitating  the sending of money from

          one state to another by the obligor.  When that occurs, the child

          support  obligation  lies  in  interstate  commerce,  subject  to

          federal  regulation,   and  Congress  may  act   to  prevent  its

          frustration.

                    The appellant's second argument posits that uncollected

          support  payments  have  too  tenuous  an  impact  on  interstate

          commerce  to  justify the  exercise  of  congressional authority.

          This argument  relies heavily on Lopez, a case in which the Court
                                           _____

          struck  down the Gun-Free School  Zones Act (GFSZA),  18 U.S.C.  

          922(q)(1)(A),  which criminalized  the possession of  firearms in

          local school  zones.  Holding  that Congress  exceeded its  power

          under  the Commerce Clause when it enacted the statute, the Court

          reasoned  that gun  possession  in a  local  school zone  is  not

          economic activity of a type that substantially affects interstate

                                          11

          commerce.   See Lopez, 115 S.  Ct. at 1634.   Lopez is inapposite
                      ___ _____                         _____

          here.3  The Lopez majority  considered only the third, "affecting
                      _____

          interstate  commerce,"  branch   of  Commerce  Clause  authority,

          dismissing the first two bases as patently inapplicable.  See id.
                                                                    ___ ___

          at 1630.   Here, however, we  have no occasion to  decide whether

          unpaid child  support substantially affects  interstate commerce;

          we  instead  uphold the  CSRA  under the  second  Commerce Clause

          category   because   it   regulates   things   (namely,   payment

          obligations) in interstate commerce.

                    There is another, more basic reason why Lopez does  not
                                                            _____

          assist the  appellant's cause.   The concerns articulated  by the

          Lopez  Court simply are  not implicated by  the CSRA.   The Lopez
          _____                                                       _____

          Court observed that the GFSZA by its terms had no relation to any

          sort of economic enterprise, and that neither the statute nor its

          legislative  history  contained  express  congressional  findings

          purporting to show the regulated activity's effects on interstate

          commerce.   See id. at 1630-32.  In contrast, the CSRA relates to
                      ___ ___

          economic  transactions, and the  enacting Congress made explicit,

          well-documented findings regarding the economic effect of  unpaid

          child support  upon interstate commerce.   See, e.g.,  supra Part
                                                     ___  ____   _____

          II(A).  In the same vein,  the Lopez Court made much of  the fact
                              
          ____________________

               3To the extent  that the  appellant relies on  a quartet  of
          district court decisions purposing to strike down the CSRA on the
          authority of  Lopez, his reliance is misplaced.  Two of them have
                        _____
          been reversed by  the Ninth  Circuit.  See  Mussari, 95 F.3d  787
                                                 ___  _______
          (reversing  United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Ariz.
                      _____________    _______
          1995), and United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz.
                     _____________    _________
          1995)).  We regard the other two, United States v. Parker, 911 F.
                                            _____________    ______
          Supp.  830 (E.D. Pa. 1995),  and United States  v. Bailey, 902 F.
                                           _____________     ______
          Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995), as infirm.

                                          12

          that  the GFSZA  contained no jurisdictional  element to  forge a

          link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.  See
                                                                        ___

          Lopez,  115 S. Ct.  at 1631.   Such  an element  is conspicuously
          _____

          present  here,  for   the  CSRA  by   its  terms  provides   that

          jurisdiction will attach only  if child support obligations cross

          state lines.  See 18 U.S.C.   228(a); see also H.R. Rep. No. 102-
                        ___                     ___ ____

          771, supra, at 6 (underscoring that Congress designed the statute
               _____

          "to target interstate cases  only").  We have found  the presence

          of  such a jurisdictional element  to be a  powerful argument for

          distinguishing Lopez in other cases, see, e.g., United States  v.
                         _____                 ___  ____  _____________

          DiSanto, 86  F.3d 1238, 1245  (1st Cir. 1996)  (upholding federal
          _______

          arson statute,  18  U.S.C.     844(i)); United  States  v.  Diaz-
                                                  ______________      _____

          Martinez, 71 F.3d 946,  953 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding  a federal
          ________

          firearms possession  statute,  18 U.S.C.     922(k)), and  it  is

          equally potent here.

                               C.  The Tenth Amendment.
                               C.  The Tenth Amendment.
                                   ___________________

                    Bongiorno next claims that  the CSRA violates the Tenth

          Amendment (and, in the bargain, tramples principles of federalism

          and comity).   This claim hinges on his contention  that the CSRA

          falls  beyond Congress'  competence because it  concerns domestic

          relations (an area traditionally within the states' domain).   We

          reject the claim out of hand.

                    The Tenth Amendment declares that "powers not delegated

          to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to

          the  States, are reserved to  the States respectively,  or to the

          people."   U.S. Const. amend. X.  The amendment is not applicable

                                          13

          to situations in which  Congress properly exercises its authority

          under an enumerated constitutional power.  See New York v. United
                                                     ___ ________    ______

          States,  505 U.S. 144, 156  (1992).  Inasmuch  as Congress passed
          ______

          the CSRA pursuant  to the  valid exercise of  such an  enumerated

          power  (the power  to regulate  interstate commerce),  that tenet

          governs here.   Accord Hampshire,  95 F.3d at  1004; Mussari,  95
                          ______ _________                     _______

          F.3d at 791.

                    What is  more, a  Tenth Amendment attack  on a  federal

          statute  cannot  succeed  without  three ingredients:    (1)  the

          statute must regulate the "States as States," (2) it must concern

          attributes of state  sovereignty, and (3)  it must  be of such  a

          nature that compliance with it would impair a state's ability "to

          structure   integral   operations   in   areas   of   traditional

          governmental  functions."   Hodel  v. Virginia  Surface Mining  &
                                      _____     ___________________________

          Reclam.  Ass'n,  Inc.,  452  U.S. 264,  287-88  (1981)  (internal
          _____________________

          citations and quotation  marks omitted).   The  CSRA passes  this

          test  with flying colors.  It  does not interfere with state law.

          To the  contrary, the  CSRA comes  into play only  after a  state

          court issues a  child support order, and it does  not authorize a

          federal court to revise the  underlying decree.  Because Congress

          succeeded  in drafting the CSRA "to  strengthen, not to supplant,

          State enforcement efforts," 138 Cong. Rec. at H7326 (statement of

          Rep. Hyde), the law withstands Tenth Amendment scrutiny.

                    In this  wise, the appellant's analogy  to the domestic

          relations exception to the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction

          is  bootless.   The CSRA  contemplates criminal  prosecutions (in

                                          14

          which federal jurisdiction runs nationwide, see 18 U.S.C.    3231
                                                      ___

          (1994);  see also DiSanto, 86  F.3d at 1246),  not civil actions;
                   ___ ____ _______

          and,  insofar as civil analogues might  be helpful, the existence

          of the CSRA itself  by analogy supplies an independent  basis for

          federal jurisdiction because CSRA cases are cases "arising under"

          a federal  statute, and thus  more evocative of 28  U.S.C.   1331

          than of 28 U.S.C.   1332.

                    This leaves  only federalism and comity.   However, the

          appellant's emphasis  on these aspirational doctrines  cannot tip

          the  balance.    While  federalism  and  comity  are  matters  of

          legitimate concern,  they are not  grounds upon which  courts may

          declare federal statutes unconstitutional.

                        D.  Additional Constitutional Claims.
                        D.  Additional Constitutional Claims.
                            ________________________________

                    On  appeal, Bongiorno  asserts a  gallimaufry of  other

          constitutional  challenges  to  his  conviction,  invoking  among

          others, the  Due Process  and Equal Protection  Clauses, and  the

          Sixth  and  Eighth  Amendments.   Because  these  challenges  are

          procedurally defaulted, we dispose of them without ado.

                    Here, procedural default has  two faces.  The appellant

          failed to raise these  miscellaneous constitutional arguments  in

          the nisi  prius court  and matters  not squarely presented  below

          generally cannot be  advanced on  appeal.  See  United States  v.
                                                     ___  _____________

          Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Slade,
          ______                                    _____________    _____

          980  F.2d 27,  30  (1st Cir.  1992).   This  raise-or-waive  rule

          applies  full bore to constitutional claims.  See Daigle v. Maine
                                                        ___ ______    _____

                                          15

          Med. Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 688 (1st Cir. 1994).
          _______________

                    To make  a bad situation worse,  the appellant's briefs

          in this court advance  these alleged constitutional violations in

          vague and cryptic  terms.  Appellate judges are not clairvoyants,

          and it is surpassingly difficult for  us to make something out of

          nothing.  Cf. William Shakespeare, King Lear act 1, sc. 4 (1605).
                    ___                      _________

          We  have steadfastly deemed waived  issues raised on  appeal in a

          perfunctory  manner, not accompanied  by developed argumentation,

          see, e.g., Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 990 (1st  Cir.), cert.
          ___  ____  ________    _____                                _____

          denied,  116 S. Ct. 515  (1995); Ruiz v.  Gonzalez Caraballo, 929
          ______                           ____     __________________

          F.2d 31, 34  n.3 (1st Cir. 1991);  United States v. Zannino,  895
                                             _____________    _______

          F.2d 1, 17 (1st  Cir.), cert. denied,  494 U.S. 1082 (1990),  and
                                  _____ ______

          this  case  does  not  warrant  an  exception  to  that  salutary

          practice.    "It  is not  enough  merely  to  mention a  possible

          argument  in the  most  skeletal way,  leaving  the court  to  do

          counsel's work . . . ."  Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17.
                                   _______

                    For  these  reasons,  we  hold that  appellant's  other

          constitutional arguments   none of which appear at first blush to

          possess discernible merit   are procedurally defaulted.4

          III.  THE LEGALITY OF THE SENTENCE
          III.  THE LEGALITY OF THE SENTENCE

                    The   appellant   contends   that   the   "intermittent

          confinement" condition of his  probation exceeds the maximum term

          of imprisonment authorized by the statute of conviction.  Because
                              
          ____________________

               4We  have considered  all  the  points,  constitutional  and
          nonconstitutional, to which the appellant alludes  in challenging
          his  conviction.   None  have the  potential  to justify  relief.
          Those  that  we  have  not  specifically  identified  are  either
          unpreserved, or unworthy of discussion, or both.

                                          16

          Bongiorno did not raise this contention in the district court, we

          review it  only for plain error.  See United States v. Olano, 507
                                            ___ _____________    _____

          U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993); Taylor, 54 F.3d at 972.
                                   ______

                    Bongiorno is a  first offender who, under the CSRA, can

          be  imprisoned for  no more  than six  months.   See 18  U.S.C.  
                                                           ___

          228(b)(1).  Nevertheless, a sentencing court can impose probation

          for up  to five years, see  18 U.S.C.   3561(a)  & (c)(2) (1994),
                                 ___

          and, as a condition of probation, the court in its discretion may

          require a defendant  to "remain in  the custody of the  Bureau of

          Prisons  during nights,  weekends,  or other  intervals of  time,

          totaling  no more  than the  lesser of  one year  or the  term of

          imprisonment authorized for the offense, during the first year of

          the  term  of  probation."    18  U.S.C.     3563(b)(11)  (1994).

          Invoking  this  discretionary  power, the  trial  court sentenced

          Bongiorno to five years of probation, on condition that he remain

          in  custody  for twelve  hours per  day  during the  first twelve

          months of the probationary  term.  Judge Keeton reasoned  that if

          "the defendant [were]  in the  custody of the  Bureau of  Prisons

          twelve hours during  each night, that total time in  a year would

          be  six months"  and  therefore would  not  exceed the  statutory

          maximum.

                    On  appeal     the  district court  having  stayed  the

          operation of  the intermittent confinement condition    Bongiorno

          faults the  judge's reasoning.  He bases his argument principally

          on  the "Schedule  of  Substitute Punishments"  contained in  the

                                          17

          federal sentencing  guidelines.5  But, the  sentencing guidelines

          do not affect this case; a first offense for a willful failure to

          pay  child  support  is  a  Class  B  misdemeanor  to  which  the

          guidelines do not apply.  See U.S.S.G.  2J1.1, comment. (n.2).6
                                    ___

                    Moving beyond the guidelines, the  appellant's position

          is  also  unsound because  it rests  on  an interpretation  of 18

          U.S.C.   3563(b)(11)  that offends a  bedrock maxim of  statutory

          construction:  all words and clauses in a statute are intended to

          have meaning and  ought to be  given effect.   See United  States
                                                         ___ ______________

          Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508  U.S. 491, 504 n.6 (1993);  United
          _________________    ____                                  ______

          States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc.,  758 F.2d 741, 751-52 (1st  Cir. 1985).
          ______    ______________

          To consider  only the  period of time  (one year)  for which  the

          court imposed the  condition of probation would ignore the number

          of  hours  the  appellant  actually will  be  confined  and would

          thereby render  the statutory allusion  to the importance  of the

                              
          ____________________

               5The provision states in pertinent part:

                    One day of intermittent confinement in prison
                    or jail for one  day of imprisonment (each 24
                    hours of  confinement is credited  as one day
                    of   intermittent    confinement,   provided,
                    however, that one  day shall be  credited for
                                  _______________________________
                    any calendar day  during which the  defendant
                    _____________________________________________
                    is  employed in  the  community and  confined
                    _____________________________________________
                    during all remaining hours); . . . .
                    __________________________

          U.S.S.G.  5C1.1(e)(1) (Nov. 1995) (emphasis supplied).

               6We note  in passing that, even if  the guidelines attached,
          the  intermittent  confinement which  the district  court crafted
          probably  would not  qualify for  full-day credit  under U.S.S.G.
           5C1.1(e)(1) because, while the  order requires confinement up to
          twelve hours per day,  it neither fixes a definite  work schedule
          nor  otherwise requires  confinement  for "all  remaining  hours"
          apart from time spent at work.

                                          18

          total  number of hours ("totaling no more than") meaningless.  We

          will  not  lightly  encroach upon  congressional  prerogative  by

          reading  words out of a  statute, see United  States v. Victoria-
                                            ___ ______________    _________

          Peguero,  920 F.2d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
          _______                                    _____ ______

          932  (1991),  and there  is  no  warrant  for  doing so  in  this

          instance.7

                    In all events,  the appellant did  not raise the  point

          below,  and we  discern no  plain error.   The  appellant himself

          concedes that straight imprisonment for  six months would be more

          onerous  than intermittent confinement for one year.  At the same

          time, the  lower  court's work-release  arrangement advances  the

          CSRA's primary objective of encouraging child support payments by

          affording  the   appellant  an   opportunity   to  practice   his

          profession.    Given  these  verities,  it  is evident  that  the

          sentencing order works no injustice.  It follows that the alleged

          interpretive  error cannot amount to plain error.  See Olano, 507
                                                             ___ _____

          U.S. at 732; Taylor, 54 F.3d at 973.
                       ______

          IV.  THE GRASP OF THE FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE ACT
          IV.  THE GRASP OF THE FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE ACT

                    We turn now to the appeal in the civil case.  That case

          began  when the  United States  invoked the  FDCPA and  sought to

                              
          ____________________

               7The  appellant also  asseverates  that  the district  court
          failed  to  satisfy  the  statutory  stricture  that  requires  a
          district  court,  among  other   things,  to  impose  a  sentence
          sufficient but not greater than necessary to reflect the severity
          of  the offense, promote respect for the law, and afford adequate
          deterrence.  See  18 U.S.C.   3553(a)(1)-(2).   This asseveration
                       ___
          is  meritless.   The sentence  artfully balances  the appellant's
          persistent  disregard  of  child   support  obligations  and  the
          desirability  of deterrence against his need for liberty if he is
          to earn the money to which his minor daughter is entitled.

                                          19

          compel Bongiorno to pay the arrearage owed as back child support.

          The government assumed  that since Bongiorno had  been ordered to

          make restitution of this sum as part of the punishment imposed in

          the  criminal case,  it had  access to  the FDCPA  as a  means of

          collecting the debt.  The district court honored the government's

          assumption  and granted  a  writ  of  garnishment.    On  appeal,

          Bongiorno maintains that the  court should have defenestrated the

          civil action because  a restitution order issued pursuant  to the

          CSRA is not a "debt" within the meaning of the FDCPA.  We agree.

                                    A.  The FDCPA.
                                    A.  The FDCPA.
                                        _________

                    Congress  enacted the  FDCPA  as Chapter  XXXVI of  the

          Crime Control Act  of 1990, Pub. L. No.  101-647, 104 Stat. 4933,

          effective May 29, 1991, thus creating a framework under which the

          United  States might more  efficiently collect debts  owed to it.

          The framework includes procedures that the government can utilize

          to recover on, or secure, such debts, and to that extent relieves

          the  federal sovereign's  need to  rely on  a patchwork  of state

          laws.  See H.R. Rep.  No. 101-736, at 23-25 (1990),  reprinted in
                 ___                                           _________ __

          1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6631-33; see also Selbe v. United States,
                                           ___ ____ _____    _____________

          912 F. Supp. 202, 205 (W.D. Va. 1995).

                    Congress passed the FDCPA with an end game in mind:  to

          "lessen[]  the effect of delinquent  debts on the massive federal

          budget  deficit now  undermining the  economic well-being  of the

          Nation."   H.R. Rep. No. 101-736, supra, at 23, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
                                            _____

          at 6631.  Consistent  with this goal, Congress  "defined [`debt']

          broadly  to include amounts owing to the United States on account

                                          20

          of a  direct loan  or loan insured  or guaranteed  by the  United

          States  as  well  as  other amounts  originally  due  the  United

          States."   Id. at 28, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6636.  Notwithstanding
                     ___

          this breadth  of  definition, Congress  restricted the  statute's

          grasp  to those obligations owing to the federal government.  See
                                                                        ___

          28U.S.C.  3002(3), (15).8 Thislimitation didnot ariseby accident:

                         The definition of  `debt' was  carefully
                    written to  make clear that the  act will not
                    apply  to obligations  which began  as purely
                    private  loan or  contract obligations.   For
                    example, if  one of our constituents  goes to
                    his neighborhood bank or thrift and takes out
                    a business or personal loan, that transaction
                    is  between him and the bank or thrift. . . .
                    This is true even if the bank or thrift later
                    fails   and  is   taken   over   by   Federal
                    regulators.  If  the Federal Government seeks
                              
          ____________________

               8The FDCPA defines "debt" as:

                    (A)  an amount  that is  owing to  the United
                    States on  account of a direct  loan, or loan
                    insured or guaranteed, by the  United States;
                    or
                    (B)  an amount  that is  owing to  the United
                    States  on  account of  a  fee,  duty, lease,
                    rent,  service,  sale  of  real  or  personal
                    property,   overpayment,  fine,   assessment,
                    penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax,
                    bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery
                    of a  cost incurred by the  United States, or
                    other  source of  indebtedness to  the United
                    States, but that is not owing under the terms
                    of a contract originally entered into by only
                    persons other than the United States; . . . .

          28  U.S.C.    3002(3).   In  this  connection it  defines "United
          States" as:

                    (A) a Federal corporation;
                    (B) an agency, department, commission, board,
                    or other entity of the United States; or
                    (C) an instrumentality of the United States.

          28 U.S.C.   3002(15).

                                          21

                    to recover these loan or contract obligations
                    .  .  . it  is not  eligible  to use  the new
                    procedures in this act.

          136 Cong. Rec.  H13288 (daily  ed. Oct. 27,  1990) (statement  of

          Rep. Brooks).

                    Mimicking the way in which Congress chose to define the

          statute's  terms, courts  have tended  to draw  the line  between

          included  and excluded  debts depending  on whether  a particular

          debt is  owed to the United  States in the sense  that the debt's

          proceeds, if  collected, will inure directly  to the government's

          benefit (in contrast to benefitting a third party).  Thus, a fine

            which is payable to the government and which, when paid, swells

          the  public fisc    is  a debt  for purposes of  the FDCPA.   See
                                                                        ___

          United  States  v. Coluccio,  51 F.3d  337,  339 (2d  Cir. 1995);
          ______________     ________

          United  States v. Coluccio, 19  F.3d 1115, 1116  (6th Cir. 1994).
          ______________    ________

          Similarly,  federal  tax indebtedness     which  is owed  to  the

          government  and  which,  when  collected,  is  deposited  in  the

          Treasury   is  a debt for purposes of the FDCPA.   See Markham v.
                                                             ___ _______

          Fay, 74  F.3d 1347, 1354 (1st Cir. 1996).  A promissory note held
          ___

          by the Small Business Administration   the proceeds of which will

          enrich the government's  coffers when  payment is  effected    is

          also a  debt for  FDCPA purposes.   See  United States  v. Golden
                                              ___  _____________     ______

          Elevator,  Inc., 868  F.  Supp. 1063,  1066-67  (C.D. Ill.  1994)
          _______________

          (dictum).  By like token, cleanup expenses in environmental cases

            which  are owed by statute  to the government, see  42 U.S.C.  
                                                           ___

          9607(a)(4)(A)  (1994), and which are used  to reimburse or defray

          monies  actually  expended by  it     are  considered  debts  for

                                          22

          purposes of the FDCPA.   See United  States v. Dickerson, 790  F.
                                   ___ ______________    _________

          Supp.  1583, 1584-85  (M.D.  Ga. 1992).    This approach  squares

          neatly with the statute  and its legislative history.   The types

          and kinds of debts  enumerated in section 3002(3)    for example,

          "a direct loan," an "insured or guaranteed" loan, an amount owing

          as an  unpaid "fee" or  "duty"   seem to  contemplate payments in

          which  the  government  has  a  direct   pecuniary  stake.    The

          legislative  history sounds much the  same theme.   See H.R. Rep.
                                                              ___

          No. 101-736, supra, at 23, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6631.
                       _____

                             B.  The Status of the Debt.
                             B.  The Status of the Debt.
                                 ______________________

                    Mindful  of the statutory  definitions, the legislative

          history,  and the way in which courts have approached the problem

          of determining which debts are within the FDCPA's grasp and which

          are not, we conclude that inclusion necessitates an inquiry aimed

          at determining to whom the debt  is owed and to whose benefit the

          proceeds of the  debt will inure  when it is  paid.  At the  very

          least, a debt cannot qualify if both parts of  this inquiry point

          toward  exclusion:  a debt cannot be eligible for inclusion under

          the FDCPA  if the United States  is neither the formal  owner nor

          the direct beneficiary of it.  In all events, the debt must clear

          an additional  hurdle:  it must  be one that, in  the parlance of

          the  statute, "is  not  owing  under  the  terms  of  a  contract

          originally  entered into by  only persons  other than  the United

          States."  28 U.S.C.   3002(3).9
                              
          ____________________

               9In passing  the FDCPA, Congress  evinced a clear  intent to
          exclude  private transactions     debts created  under (and  thus
          governed by) state law, and to which the United States was not an

                                          23

                    To be sure,  the district court  made no such  inquiry,

          but instead  allowed the government's  application for a  writ of

          garnishment  in a  margin  order after  striking the  appellant's

          pleadings.  Before us, however, the government has not raised any

          procedural objections or technical defenses.  Rather, it concedes

          that  it can  employ  the FDCPA  only  if the  restitution  order

          constitutes  a debt  within  the  meaning  of  the  FDCPA.    See
                                                                        ___

          Appellee's Brief at 9.  The  parties have briefed and argued this

          issue  on the  merits without  reservation, and  it is  therefore

          within our  proper province to determine  whether the restitution

          order  that the  government  seeks to  enforce  comes within  the

          penumbra of the FDCPA.

                    The  government's affirmative  answer to  this question

          leans  heavily on  the majority  opinion in  NLRB v.  E.D.P. Med.
                                                       ____     ___________

          Computer Sys.,  Inc., 6 F.3d 951  (2d Cir. 1993).   In that case,
          ____________________

          the Second Circuit considered whether a  backpay award decreed by

          the National  Labor Relations  Board (NLRB) to  remedy an  unfair

          labor practice constituted a debt to the United States within the

          purview of the  FDCPA.  The  panel divided over  the issue.   The

          majority started by holding that the award was a debt due  to the

          federal  government since it had been imposed on the defendant by

          a federal agency:
                              
          ____________________

          original party   from the grasp of the  FDCPA.  See H.R. Rep. No.
                                                          ___
          101-736, supra, at 23,  1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6631.  In this vein,
                   _____
          a main proponent of the bill emphasized that to warrant inclusion
          the  transaction underlying  the debt  must be  one in  which the
          government was  a direct, original  participant.   See 136  Cong.
                                                             ___
          Rec. H13288, supra.  The final version of the FDCPA codifies this
                       _____
          legislative intent.

                                          24

                         It is precisely  because the Board  acts
                    in  the public's  interest  and not  those of
                    private  individuals  that persuades  us that
                    the backpay award sought  by the Board may be
                    considered a debt to the  United States under
                    the FDCPA.   The Board serves as more  than a
                    mere  conduit when it  initiates an action to
                    collect a backpay award.

          Id.  at 955.  Having  stated this proposition,  the majority then
          ___

          skimmed over  the beneficial ownership aspect,  gave great weight

          to the fact that without federal intervention the award could not

          be  collected,10 and ruled that the FDCPA  applied.  See id.  The
                                                               ___ ___

          dissenting  opinion stressed that  the backpay award could not be

          considered a debt  owed to the United States within  the ambit of

          the  FDCPA because any money collected  by the NLRB would flow to

          the  pockets of the  victimized employees and  would not directly

          benefit the government.  See id. at 958 (Walker, J., dissenting).
                                   ___ ___

                    Passing the obvious distinction between E.D.P. and this
                                                            ______

          case   E.D.P.  is readily distinguishable because  there the NLRB
                 ______

          was  the  only entity  empowered by  law  to enforce  the backpay

          award, see supra note 10, whereas here the debt is enforceable by
                 ___ _____

          the parties  to  whom the  money, when  collected, actually  will

          flow11   we believe  that Judge Walker's dissent provides  better
                              
          ____________________

               10The  NLRB imposed  the  backpay award  under the  National
          Labor Relations Act.  See  29 U.S.C.    151-169 (1994).   In such
                                ___
          circumstances,  the NLRB is the  only entity empowered  by law to
          enforce  the   award.     See  Amalgamated  Utility   Workers  v.
                                    ___  ______________________________
          Consolidated   Edison   Co.,   309  U.S.   261,   264-70   (1940)
          ___________________________
          (interpreting 29 U.S.C.   160(a)).

               11The appellant's  ex-wife and minor daughter have available
          mechanisms to enforce the CSRA restitution order, see 18 U.S.C.  
                                                            ___
          3663(h)  (1994) (providing that an order of restitution in a CSRA
          case may  be enforced either by the United States or "by a victim
          named  in the  order"),  as  well  as  the  child  support  order

                                          25

          guidance for us than does the majority opinion.  While there  may

          be a somewhat stronger  argument for regarding a debt as owing to

          the  United States if the  federal government is  the only entity

          able  to recover it (the E.D.P. scenario), the decision to extend
                                   ______

          the FDCPA to such a situation is a decision properly reserved for

          the  legislative  branch.    Because  the  statute,  as  written,

          contains  no  language  suggesting  that  all  debts  subject  to

          exclusive federal  enforcement are  included within the  grasp of

          the FDCPA,  we find the position taken  by the E.D.P. majority to
                                                         ______

          be unsatisfactory.

                    The  force of  Judge  Walker's opinion  is  but one  of

          several factors that influence our judgment.  The  most important

          factor is the language and purpose of the statute itself.  Nearly

          as  telling is a mature  but still viable  precedent.  Forty-five

          years  ago, the  Supreme  Court  wrestled  with  a  very  similar

          question  under the Bankruptcy Act.   See Nathanson  v. NLRB, 344
                                                ___ _________     ____

          U.S. 25 (1952).   The  statutory scheme that  the Court  pondered

          used  a concept  of    public debt  that  bears a  strong  family

          resemblance to the  concept that  fuels the FDCPA.   It  provided

          that, with exceptions  not relevant here,  "debts owing to .  . .

          the United  States"  would  "have  priority, in  advance  of  the

          payment of dividends  to creditors."   11 U.S.C.    104(a)  (West

          Supp.  1952) (repealed 1978).   The  precise question  before the

          Nathanson Court was whether  an NLRB award for backpay was a debt
          _________

          owing  to the United States  (and, thus, entitled  to priority in
                              
          ____________________

          underlying it.

                                          26

          bankruptcy).  The Court  acknowledged that the NLRB was  an agent

          of  the  United  States and  a  creditor  (being  the only  party

          entitled to enforce the claim), but stated that it did not follow

          that the debt was  owing to the United States  within the meaning

          of the Bankruptcy Act.   344 U.S. at 27.  Priority  in bankruptcy

          was intended "to secure an adequate revenue to sustain the public

          burthens and  discharge the public debts,"  yet granting priority

          in  this  instance would  not  further  those  goals because  the

          beneficiaries  of the claim were  private persons.   Id. at 27-28
                                                               ___

          (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  On this  basis,

          the Court concluded  that the  debt was  not owed  to the  United

          States  in the relevant sense  and therefore was  not entitled to

          the statutory priority.  See id. at 28.
                                   ___ ___

                    Nathanson bears a close affinity to this case.  For one
                    _________

          thing, the language of the FDCPA parallels that of the bankruptcy

          provision  discussed  in  Nathanson.    For  another  thing,  the
                                    _________

          legislative  purpose underlying  the  FDCPA is  analogous to  the

          legislative purpose  distilled by the Nathanson  Court.  Congress
                                                _________

          enacted  the FDCPA to relieve  the strain on  the federal deficit

          created  by persistent  nonpayment of  debts owed  to the  United

          States.     See  H.R.  Rep.  No.  101-736,  supra,  at  23,  1990
                      ___                             _____

          U.S.C.C.A.N.  at 6631.   This  mirrors the  congressional concern

          that drove the bankruptcy  priority provision which the Nathanson
                                                                  _________

          Court was called upon  to construe.  See  Nathanson, 344 U.S.  at
                                               ___  _________

          27-28.    Accordingly,  in  both  the FDCPA  and  the  bankruptcy

          milieux, the  statutory mechanism does not  serve the legislative

                                          27

          purpose  except  when  it operates  in  regard  to  a debt  whose

          recovery will  directly augment  the public  coffers.   Since the

          dynamic in  this  case tracks  the dynamic  that was  at work  in

          Nathanson   the relation  of the government's beneficial interest
          _________

          in  the debt  to the  statutory scheme  is very  much the  same  

          Nathanson's ratio decidendi controls our deliberations.
          _________   _____ _________

                    The force  of this conclusion is  not dissipated merely

          because the  government secured the restitutionary  order.  After

          all, Nathanson instructs us to look beyond such formalities.  See
               _________                                                ___

          id. at 28  (explaining that a  court must refuse  to treat as  an
          ___

          included  debt "a claim which the United States is collecting for

          the benefit of  a private party").  In  this case, the government

          is not the holder  of the debt in  any legally cognizable  sense,

          and it seeks to collect restitution not to its own behoof but for

          the benefit of a  private party (Bongiorno's daughter).   Because

          the  order  of  restitution here     like  the  backpay award  in

          Nathanson    involves no direct pecuniary interest of the federal
          _________

          sovereign, it does not create  a debt owing to the  United States

          within the meaning of the FDCPA.

                    The  government  also tries  to  dodge  this bullet  by

          touting its  indirect interest  in the award.   It tells  us that
                       ________

          public  assistance substitutes for most  of the $5 billion annual

          shortfall  in  unpaid child  support, and  that  there is  thus a

          demonstrable public  interest in enforcing  restitutionary orders

          issued  in CSRA cases.  We  agree that this is  an area of public

          concern, but  that is beside the  point.  A similar  sort of "for

                                          28

          the general good"  argument was  made to, and  dismissed by,  the

          Nathanson  Court.   See  id.  (rejecting  the argument  that  the
          _________           ___  ___

          government's  abiding   interest  in  eliminating   unfair  labor

          practices warranted stretching the statute to secure a preference

          in payment for backpay  awards).  The sockdolager, of  course, is

          that  Bongiorno's daughter is not  on the welfare  rolls.  Hence,

          the government has failed  to show any direct  pecuniary interest

          of a kind  that would render this debt collectible  by the United

          States under the FDCPA.

                    The government has  one last  shot in its  sling:   the

          FDCPA  specifically mentions "restitution"  among the  classes of

          included  debt, see 28 U.S.C.   3002(3)(B) (quoted supra note 8),
                          ___                                _____

          and  the  government posits  that we  need  not look  beyond this

          label.   The argument  will not wash.   The FDCPA  does not state

          that every order  of restitution,  no more than  every "rent"  or
               _____

          every  type of  "reimbursement,"  constitutes  an included  debt.

          Rather,   the   text  limits   the  statute's   applicability  to

          restitution  that implicates  a  "source of  indebtedness to  the
                                                                    _______

          United States."  Id. (emphasis supplied).
          _____________    ___

                    This   added  language  reintroduces   the  concept  of

          benefit.    Some  restitutionary  orders create  debts  that  owe

          beneficially  to the federal government  and thus fall within the

          purview of the FDCPA.   A prototypical  case is United States  v.
                                                          _____________

          Gelb,  783  F.  Supp.   748  (E.D.N.Y.  1991).    Gelb   involved
          ____                                              ____

          restitution under the RICO statute.   Since that statute declares

          that a convicted person  must "forfeit to the United  States" any

                                          29

          ill-gotten  gains, see  18 U.S.C.    1963(a) (1994),  the federal
                             ___

          government is the direct beneficiary of the restitution order and

          the order thus creates a  debt collectible under the FDCPA.   See
                                                                        ___

          Gelb, 783  F. Supp.  at 752.    But other  types of  restitution,
          ____

          which,  when  paid,  will  not  increase  public  revenues  (say,

          restitution  to an  individual victim  of a  crime), do  not come

          within the statutory encincture.   In short, we cannot  isolate a

          single word     "restitution"    and  conclude that  every  order

          bearing that label automatically  falls within the FDCPA's grasp.

          The  federal   government  may  collect  under   the  FDCPA  only

          restitution that is  "owing to the United  States."  28 U.S.C.   

          3002(3).

                    We  end where  we began.   Because  restitution ordered

          under  the  CSRA  is  not  owed  to  the   United  States  in  an

          economically meaningful sense, the  government cannot utilize the

          FDCPA  as a vehicle for collecting such  awards.  On this view of

          the case, we do not  reach the question of whether the  debt must

          be considered  as private in  character (and thus  ineligible for

          inclusion  under the FDCPA on  that basis) because  a state court

          order created  the underlying child support  obligation, and both

          the obligor and obligee are private parties.12
                              
          ____________________

               12We note in passing that a cogent argument can  be made for
          the proposition that  what started as a debt  owed by one private
          party (Bongiorno)  to another (Taylor, on behalf  of the couple's
          daughter) remains so in  its collection, and that the  peripheral
          involvement  of  the  federal  government  does  not  change  the
          obligation's  inherently private character.   Indeed, the belated
          federal entry into this situation bears a striking resemblance to
          the  "failed  thrift"  example   that  Chairman  Brooks  used  to
          illustrate  a debt that would be excluded from the FDCPA's grasp.
                                           ________

                                          30

                    Because  the government  sued  under  an  inappropriate

          statute, we must reverse the judgment in the civil case.  This is

          not to say, however, that the appellant can thumb his nose at the

          restitution  order.  Payment of restitution is a condition of his

          probation,  and  the  government   has  adequate  remedies  if  a

          convicted defendant  flouts a condition of probation.  See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          18 U.S.C.    3663(g), 3583(e) (1994).   The government, moreover,

          can attempt to collect  the restitution order by resort  to other

          civil  remedies, see  28  U.S.C.    3003(b)  (providing that  the
                           ___

          United  States retains  its authority under  laws other  than the

          FDCPA to collect debts owed to the  government); see also Fed. R.
                                                           ___ ____

          Civ.  P. 64 &  69; see generally  Custer v. McCutcheon,  283 U.S.
                             ___ _________  ______    __________

          514, 516-19  (1931)  (discussing  application  of  various  state

          statutes  to  executions on  judgments  recovered  by the  United

          States),  and,  as  mentioned earlier,  Bongiorno's  ex-wife  and

          daughter have  ample recourse, see supra  note 11.  But  to allow
                                         ___ _____

          the federal government  to proceed  under the FDCPA  for no  more

          persuasive reason than that collecting the debt serves the public

          interest  would cavalierly  consign Nathanson  to the  scrap heap
                                              _________

          and, in the bargain, expand the FDCPA's scope without limitation.

          We are not at liberty to chart so free-wheeling a course.

          V.  EPILOGUE
          V.  EPILOGUE

                    We  need go no  further.   To recapitulate,  we discern

          neither  a constitutional flaw in the fabric of the Child Support

          Recovery  Act   nor  any  other  reversible   error  marring  the
                              
          ____________________

          See 136 Cong. Rec. H13288 (quoted supra p. 21).
          ___                               _____

                                          31

          appellant's  conviction and  sentence.   We therefore  affirm the

          judgment in the criminal case.  The civil case, however, yields a

          diametrically opposite outcome.   Because the federal  government

          does  not have a direct  pecuniary interest in  the avails of the

          restitutionary order, we hold that the  order is not a debt owing

          to  the United  States subject  to collection under  the FDCPA.13

          The government's  ancillary civil action ought  therefore to have

          been dismissed.

          Affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The cases are remanded to
          Affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The cases are remanded to
          _____________________________________   _________________________

          the district  court for further proceedings  consistent with this
          the district  court for further proceedings  consistent with this
          _________________________________________________________________

          opinion.  No costs.
          opinion.  No costs.
          _______   ________

                              
          ____________________

               13Given this  holding, we  need not address  the appellant's
          claim that the district court improperly struck his pleadings for
          failure  to comply with local rules governing appearances by out-
          of-state counsel.

                                          32