Court Opinion

ID: 9675883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:08:43.610372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:57.904245
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant has filed a short but vigorous motion for rehearing which, in view of the importance of the question raised, requires further discussion. The motion particularly attacks our holding that, “It is not necessary for a subscription agreement to be in writing in order to be enforcible.” It is asserted that we have held directly contrary to the decision of the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in Wasson v. Clarendon College & University Training School, 131 S.W. 852, wherein it appears that suit was filed upon a written agreement to pay $200 to the financial agent of Clarendon College. This obligation would become due and payable under the contract “when fifty thousand dollars is subscribed in Donley County, limited to one year from date.” It appeared that a women’s organization, known as the College Circle, had verbally pledged $1,000 to the college fund. The Court held that the word, “subscribed,” as used by the parties to the written contract should be literally construed as meaning a commitment actually signed by the party making the same. Under this definition, the Court held that the $1,000 which the College Circle had orally agreed to contribute could not be considered as “subscribed” within the contractual meaning, so as to constitute a part of the $50,000, mentioned in the agreement. There is language in the opinion which may be construed as indicating that the college could not recover against the College Circle because its promise to contribute was not in writing. As the case was not one between the college and the circle, such language is strictly obiter dicta.
The word “subscription” has at least another meaning in addition to that adopted in Wasson v. Clarendon College & University Training School. In Rutenbeck v. Hohn, 143 Iowa 13, 121 N.W. 698, 700, it was said that:
“While the strict definition of the word ‘subscribe’ or ‘subscription’ involves the idea of a written signature, yet by common usage it is often employed to include an agreement, written or oral, to give or pay some amount to a designated purpose, more usually, perhaps, to some purpose for the promotion of which numerous persons are uniting their means and their efforts. An actual taking of stock has been held to be equivalent to a subscription. Barron v. Burrill, 86 Me. 66, 29 A. 939. ‘Subscribe’ has been defined as equivalent to ‘agree to pay.’ ”
There is probably a conflict in the holdings of the two cases mentioned. Dissimilar definitions of the word “subscribed,” were followed and this circumstance has been pointed out, or at least alluded to by the text writers. 39 Tex.Jur. 817, 60 C.J. 953, note 15; 83 C.J.S., Subscriptions, § 2. But the fact that the word “subscribed” may have different meanings and courts have adopted various definitions thereof in construing contracts wherein the word is used, should not confuse the issue here.
The substantive rule of law applicable to this case is that when one makes a promise to contribute money for a specified objective and such promise is relied upon and the purpose of the pledge is carried out, the party making the promise may be held liable thereon. The theory supporting the recovery is one of contract and not of gift. It was incumbent upon appellee to make out a cause of action in contract, recognized as legally enforcible, but it did not have the burden of proving a written signature of the person sought to be held, simply because under one dictionary definition of the term “subscrip*110tion,” the element of a written signature is involved.
Because of compelling reasons of public policy recognized by the Legislature, there are certain contracts which may not be established' by parol. See Statute of Frauds, Articles 3995 ,.and 3995a, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Stats. Likewise, because of public policy considerations, the Legislature has .'provided' that claims against specified parties may not be established by the, parol testimony of designated classes of persons. See the dead' man’s statute, Article 3716, Vernon’s ‘Ann.Tex.Stats.
.In the present case,‘Mrs. Rawls was .not rendered an incompetent witness by.virtue of a-statutory'enactment. •• Neither is there a statute which provides that the agreement to which she testified could only be. proved by an instrument in writing: To so hold would. be to write another provision into the' statute of frauds by judicial fiat. '
There seems to be no common law requirement that an agreement or promise such as the one here involved be in Writing. Bullock v. Falmouth & Chipman Hall Turnpike Road Co., 85 Ky. 184, 3 S.W. 129; Colfax Hotel Co. v. Lyon, 69 Iowa 683, 29 N.W. 780; Mills v. Friedman, 111 Misc. 253, 181 N.Y.S. 285, and authorities therein cited.
We- are not unmindful- of appellant’s 'argument that the recognition of oral •agreements' such- as 'that here' involved might lead to frauds or attempted frauds. HoWévet,- as We see it, the adoption of an exclusionary rule of evidence, based purely upon* public policy Considerations, such as that suggested -here, is a matter properly within the sphere of the legislative branch of government. "
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled. We also overrule appellant’s motion to certify questions to the Supreme Court. If our holdings in this case be contrary to those of the Austin Court in Wasson v. Clarendon College & University Training School, Tex.Civ.App., 131 .S.W. 852, as asserted by appellant; íhé. Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the case by writ of error. Articles 1728 and 1821, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Stats., as amended, Acts 1953, 53d Leg, p. 1026. See also, Rule 475, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which remains in effect until January 1, 1955.
Motion overruled.