Court Opinion

ID: 9662833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:19:23.926462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:42.973732
License: Public Domain

VANMETER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Here, the Cabinet’s brief and the majority opinion begin with the premise that because the case was transferred from the Jefferson Circuit Court to the Scott Circuit Court, the Jefferson Circuit Court lost subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. However, in fact both the circuit courts possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter. See Privett v. Clendenin, 52 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Ky.2001) (stating that “[sjubject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to determine ‘this kind of case’ as opposed to ‘this case[,]’ ” citing Duncan v. O’Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Ky.1970)). While the record is clear that venue of the matter was transferred to the Scott Circuit Court, nothing prevented the parties from choosing to waive venue and return to the Jefferson Circuit Court, as happened here.
According to J.T.G., he originally agreed to take the child only after the Cabinet agreed in court to provide kinship care2 assistance with child care expenses. Unfortunately, the record contains no written agreement or order for the payment of such funds. Meanwhile, in June 2005, J.T.G. and C.S. were named as the child’s permanent custodians, and the case was transferred to the Scott Circuit Court for any further proceedings.
The Cabinet thereafter provided kinship care assistance for several years. When *42the Cabinet ceased paying for child care, J.T.G. was advised by a Cabinet representative that he should seek an order from the Jefferson Circuit Court directing the Cabinet to resume providing assistance. J.T.G. followed the advice and filed his motion in that court. Significantly, the Cabinet does not argue that it lacked notice of the motion or failed to appear at the hearing. However, the Cabinet failed to raise any issues at that time regarding venue. On September 11, 2008, the Jefferson Circuit Court entered an order directing the Cabinet to provide kinship care assistance. No appeal was taken and the order became final in October 2008.
In November 2008, J.T.G. sought enforcement of the order by the Scott Circuit Court. The Scott Circuit Court ordered enforcement of the order and this appeal followed.
Contrary to the Cabinet’s arguments, this matter does not turn on whether the Jefferson Circuit Court had jurisdiction. Clearly, the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this type of case. While the Cabinet could have challenged the Jefferson Circuit Court’s exercise of venue, it did not do so. In other words, the issue of venue was waived. As noted by the Kentucky Supreme Court, venue, unlike jurisdiction, “may be conferred by waiver[.]” Fritsch v. Caudill, 146 S.W.3d 926, 927 (Ky.2004) (citing James v. Holt, 244 S.W.2d 159 (Ky.1951)). The court further noted in Fritsch that “while the concept of venue is important, it does not reach the fundamental level of jurisdiction, a concept whereby the authority of the court to act is at issue.” 146 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Duncan v. O’Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626 (Ky.1970)). Because the Cabinet failed to object timely to the Jefferson Circuit Court’s exercise of venue, it implicitly agreed to that court’s determination of the issue brought in J.T.G.’s motion, i.e., whether an agreement existed concerning the payment of certain child care expenses. Issues of jurisdiction and venue therefore did not prevent the Jefferson Circuit Court from entering its order, and the Cabinet’s claim that the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order was void ab initio must fail.
Next, the Cabinet claims that the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order was unconstitutional on its face as being in violation of KRS 610.010(12), which specifically excludes from trial court jurisdiction those matters which involve the Cabinet’s efforts to place, care for or treat children. However, a careful reading of the statute shows that it applies only to children who are “committed to or in the custody of the cabinet[.]” The child herein was neither committed to nor in the custody of the Cabinet during the time in issue, and the record is clear that J.T.G. is the child’s permanent custodian. The statute therefore is not applicable to the court’s efforts to enforce the order directing the Cabinet to pay child care costs.
Finally, regardless of whether the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order was the “law of the case,” certainly the Scott Circuit Court was obligated to enforce the final order issued by that court. No error occurred.
The Scott Circuit Court’s order should be affirmed.

. Kinship care is established by KRS 605.120(5), which provides that "[t]o the extent funds are available, the cabinet may establish a program for kinship care that provides a more permanent placement with a qualified relative for a child that would otherwise be placed in foster care due to abuse, neglect, or death of both parents.” Further, a "kinship caregiver who is dissatisfied with an action or inaction on the part of the cabinet relating to financial assistance under the Kinship Care Program shall have rights to a hearing pursuant to 921 KAR 2:055.” 922 KAR 1:130, Section 19(2). Certainly, neither party has raised the administrative procedure, and to that extent, its consideration has been waived.