Court Opinion

ID: 9569022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:09:46.414776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:36.248836
License: Public Domain

Judge MITCHELL
dissenting.
I would hold that the trial court correctly interpreted paragraph 6 of the plaintiff’s motion, quoted in full in the majority opinion, as alleging no change of circumstances other than an increase in the defendant’s income. The majority relies upon the last clause of that paragraph which alleges that the defendant’s weekly payments for the support of the plaintiff as required by the consent judgment of 17 November 1969 are “totally inadequate under the current circumstances.” When the paragraph is read in its entirety, however, it is apparent that the language relied upon by the majority relates back to the remainder of the paragraph which, in my view, alleges that the “current circumstances” have been brought about solely by virtue of an increase in the defendant’s income. The plaintiff does not allege, nor did she allege in 1969, that the payments by the defendant were not adequate when agreed upon to support her in the manner to which she had become accustomed during the marriage. Instead she relies solely upon her allegation of increase in the defendant’s earnings. Although I have found no North Carolina case directly in point, I would hold that payments for the support of a dependent former spouse, without regard to whether they are designated as “alimony,” may not be modified solely by virtue of improvements in the financial status of the supporting spouse. Arnold v. Arnold, 332 Ill. App. 586, 76 N.E. 2d 335, 18 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1947).
Additionally, in Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E. 2d 240 (1964), Justice Sharp (now Chief Justice), spoke for a unanimous Supreme Court of North Carolina and held that:
[A]n agreement for the division of property rights and an order for the payment of alimony may be included as separable provisions in a consent judgment. In such event the division of property would be beyond the power of the court to change, but the order for future installments of *480alimony would be subject to modification in a proper case. Briggs v. Briggs, 178 Or. 193, 165 P. 2d 772, 166 A.L.R. 666. However, if the support provision and the division of property constitute a reciprocal consideration so that the entire agreement would be destroyed by a modification of the support provision, they are not separable and may not be changed without the consent of both parties. 2 A Nelson on Divorce and Alimony (2d Ed. Rev.) § 17.03; Annot., 166 A.L.R. 693-701.
262 N.C. at 70, 136 S.E. 2d at 243.
Here, the original judgment of 17 November 1969 states on its face that the parties have consented and agreed that the judgment is just and agreeable with respect to them and that the judgment is determinative “of their respective rights and obligations.” The trial court’s judgment of 18 November 1969 granting the defendant an absolute divorce is made a part of the record on appeal and its terms and date of entry indicate that it was consented to by the plaintiff as consideration for the consent of the defendant to the judgment of the previous day. Where, as here, the consent judgment establishing support for the dependent spouse is consented to as consideration for other consent judgments or agreements also a part of such final settlement and states specifically that the purpose of the parties is to reach a final settlement of their rights and duties, I would hold such facts to constitute conclusive evidence that an integrated and not a separable agreement was intended and entered. See DiMarco v. DiMarco, 60 Cal. 2d 387, 385 P. 2d 2, 33 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1963). To permit the trial court now to modify the provisions of this agreement would destroy the whole, as it was based upon the reciprocal considerations flowing between the defendant and the plaintiff at the time of their divorce. In my view, this would violate the teaching of Briggs that, where such an “entire agreement” will be destroyed by modification, it is not separable and may not be changed without the consent of the parties. Nor do I find the fact that the reciprocal considerations here are contained in two judgments dealing with divorce, property settlement and support, rather than a single judgment containing reciprocal provisions for a division of property and for support, sufficient ground upon which to declare the agreement of the parties separable.
*481I fear the holding of the majority will encourage dependent spouses to enter agreements and consent to judgments which adequately provide for their needs in the manner to which they are accustomed at the time of their divorce, then forever review the fortunes of their former spouses with an eye toward achieving a windfall profit solely by virtue of the improvement of those fortunes. The supporting former spouses, having reached fair and just settlements of such matters and gone on to achieve success, at times with the help and encouragement of a new spouse and family, will never know with any certainty which fruits of their labor they may call their own. I do not find this result desirable and, for reasons previously set forth in this dissent, I would hold that such is not required by law.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority and would affirm the order of the district court dismissing the plaintiff’s motion in the cause.