Court Opinion

ID: 9661454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:39:31.440548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:28.751680
License: Public Domain

McGILL, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with that portion of the majority opinion and judgment which in effect holds that paragraph eight of the “Property Settlement Agreement” evidences an enforceable contract by which appellant agreed to pay to appellee the sums therein specified for support of the children, regardless of change in conditions or any change that the court should make with reference to the support of the children, as specified in such paragraph.
Manifestly the parties could not enter into an enforceable' contract which would in any way impair o» curtail the power and authority of the court to alter or change the provision for support contained in the decree of divorce. Such power is specifically conferred on the court by Art. 4639a, R.C.S. The majority opinion by construing this paragraph as an enforceable contract whereby appellant agreed to pay to appellee the sums therein specified for the support of the children unduly emphasizes the language “First party agrees that he will pay” and entirely ignores the language “that he will not contest a provision in the decree to be entered in said suit requiring that he pay to Second Party the sum of Five Hundred Doílárs ($500.00') per month”, etc. That the parties did not so construe this paragraph of the agreement is borne out by the fact that appellant sought to have the amount‘provided in the divorce decree decreased, and that the ap-pellee in paragraph fourteen of her first amended original reply sought to have such monthly payments increased to the sum of $1,000 per month. In my opinion the correct construction of this paragraph is that the parties, in order to avoid the necessity of proof as to the amount that should be provided in the decree for support of the children, were merely agreeing that the stipulated amounts in paragraph eight should be inserted in the decree. This construction is borne out by paragraph one of the agreement quoted in the majority opinion whereby it is stated that the parties do mutually agree that the stipulated amounts may be made a part of said decree. Since the court by Art. 4639a, R.C.S. retained continuing jurisdiction to alter or change the amounts provided for support of the children, as held in Lakey v.. McCarroll, cited by the majority, it seems to me that paragraph eight evidences nothing more than a ‘consent by the parties that such amounts might be inserted in the decree, and did not evidence any enforceable contract that should be binding on either party, regardless of future conditions and circumstances.
In my opinion the judgment should be reformed so as to eliminate the paragraph of which appellant complains, and to clear*250ly indicate that when, appellant has complied with the order of the court changing such amounts specified in the decree of divorce he has fulfilled his obligation and is not liable for any additional amounts. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from this portion of the opinion and judgment.