Court Opinion

ID: 9408711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:10:04.419603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.630136
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sherod York,                           :
                                       :
                          Appellant    :
                                       :
             v.                        : No. 626 C.D. 2022
                                       : Argued: June 5, 2023
Abdel Kanan and Walter Jackson         :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                            FILED: July 13, 2023

               Sherod York (York) appeals from the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) that denied York’s motion for post-trial
relief and confirmed the jury’s verdict in favor of Abdel Kanan (Officer Kanan) and
Walter Jackson (Officer Jackson), who were employed as City of Philadelphia police
officers (together, Officers). York brought a civil suit against the Officers alleging
false arrest and malicious prosecution stemming from York’s arrest and prosecution
for three criminal offenses of which he was acquitted. York seeks review of the
legal issue of whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions for malicious
prosecution. York presents two questions for our review, namely, whether the trial
court erred when it instructed the jury that York was required to prove that the
Officers engaged in willful misconduct to prove his malicious prosecution claim,
and whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that York’s malicious
prosecution claim would fail if the Officers had probable cause to arrest him for one
of the three crimes charged. After review of both issues, we affirm.
                 The trial court summarized the background of this case as follows.
York brought a civil suit against the Officers alleging false arrest and malicious
prosecution stemming from his arrest on June 12, 2018, and subsequent prosecution
for unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of the Pennsylvania Uniform
Firearms Act of 1995 (UFA),1 unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia,2 and
violation of a Protection from Abuse (PFA) order.3 Original Record (O.R.) at 991-
1019,4 Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/22, at 1. Regarding his criminal charges, on June
28, 2019, York was acquitted by a jury of the UFA charge, and the remaining charges
were nolle prossed. Trial Court Opinion at 1. For his civil case, trial by jury
commenced on March 28, 2022,5 a verdict for the Officers on the malicious
prosecution claim was entered on March 29, 2022, and the trial court entered a non-
suit on the false arrest claim. Id. York filed a timely motion for a new trial and post-
trial relief, which the trial court denied, after which York timely appealed. Id.
                 The trial court summarized the testimony of Officer Kanan, Officer
Jackson, Detective Matthew Farley (Detective Farley), York, and Carla Stribbling,
York’s fiancée. Officer Kanan testified that he and Officer Jackson responded to a

       1
           Section 6105 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. §6105.

       2
         Section 13 of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of April
14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §780-113.

       3
           Section 6114 of the Protection From Abuse Act, 23 Pa. C.S. §6114.

       4
        Because the Original Record was filed electronically and was not paginated, the page
numbers referenced reflect electronic pagination.

       5
           The trial court mistakenly stated that the civil trial began on March 29, 2022.
                                                   2
call for “a person screaming at 5643 Kingsessing Avenue” in Philadelphia. Trial
Court Opinion at 2. Upon arrival, the Officers entered through the front door, which
was open, and heard a female screaming on the second floor. When they went
upstairs, they heard and saw York arguing with Ramika Williams, the mother of
York’s two children. Ms. Williams’ brother, Bilal Williams, was also upstairs, but
he left when the Officers arrived, indicating “[n]ow you’re here, it’s between them
two, I’m out, I’m leaving, no reason for me here.” Id. Officer Kanan testified that
Mr. Williams had nothing to do with the argument between York and Ms. Williams,
so there was no reason to stop him from leaving. Id.
              Officer Kanan further testified that Ms. Williams told the Officers that
the male (York) had a gun inside of the safe that was on top of the bed, and that York
had a key to the safe on the key chain on his belt. 6 Trial Court Opinion at 2. Officer
Kanan testified that York had his hand on the safe, and York told the Officers that
the key to the safe was the second key on his key ring. Id. at 3. Ms. Williams also
told the Officers that she had a PFA against York, and that he was violating the PFA.
Id. Officer Kanan testified that, at that point, the Officers placed York in handcuffs,
escorted him outside the house, and placed him in the police car for safety reasons,
but he was not under arrest at that point. Id. The Officers opened the safe and
discovered the gun, drug paraphernalia, and $18,409.00 in cash. Id. at 2. The
Officers verified that York was subject to an active PFA, which prohibited him from
being in Ms. Williams’ home and from possessing a firearm.7 Once they confirmed
the valid PFA, the Officers placed York under arrest for the firearm and PFA

       6
       The safe is described as a small, portable safe, similar to a suitcase. See Supplemental
Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 130b.

       7
         The terms of the PFA prohibit York from contacting Ms. Williams, even if she consents
to his contact, and prohibit him from possessing firearms. S.R.R. at 101b-11b.
                                              3
violations. Id. at 3. Officer Kanan also testified that York provided his Pennsylvania
driver’s license with the 5643 Kingsessing Avenue address. Id. at 2.
             Officer Jackson testified that he prepared an incident report, which was
a brief summary of the events, and gave a more detailed statement to Detective
Farley. In addition to confirming the specifics to which Officer Kanan had already
testified, Officer Jackson testified that he believed that Ms. Williams was afraid of
York, because she stated she was afraid that he would kill her, and that, if asked to
testify in court, she would lie and say she never called the police. Trial Court
Opinion at 3. Officer Jackson also testified that York denied the gun was his, and
that “he was holding it for a friend.” Id. at 4.
             Detective Farley testified that he reviewed the paperwork prepared by
the Officers, took statements from the Officers, and prepared the investigation report
for referral to the District Attorney’s Office. Trial Court Opinion at 4. Detective
Farley reviewed the property receipts for the gun, drug paraphernalia, and cash taken
from the safe, which were described as belonging to York. Id. He verified the PFA
between York and Ms. Williams and verified York’s address on Kingsessing Avenue
through the Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Id. at 5. Detective Farley also explained that
arresting officers, like the Officers here, “do not determine whether criminal charges
are brought against a suspect; that is the responsibility of the assigned detective
based upon the information provided by the arresting officers, and then by the
District Attorney’s Office.” Id.
             York testified that he did not reside on Kingsessing Avenue in 2018,
but had moved to Blackwood, New Jersey (NJ), where he was living with his fiancée,
Ms. Stribbling. Trial Court Opinion at 5. York provided a New Jersey state
identification card (not a driver’s license) with a New Jersey address that he got in

                                           4
March or April 2018. Id. York first denied, then admitted, he was aware of the PFA
that prevented him from going to Ms. Williams’ house. Id. York testified that on
the date of the incident, Ms. Williams called him and told him their daughter was
sick, so he went to their house on Kingsessing Avenue. Id. He testified that when
he arrived, the door was open, he went inside, found that his daughter was sleeping,
and that nothing was actually wrong. Id. York believed Ms. Williams used this
story as a ruse to get him to her house to talk about getting back together, and that
started the argument between the two of them. Id. at 6. York testified that Mr.
Williams panicked and rushed out of the room when the police arrived, and that he
and Ms. Williams continued to argue in front of the Officers. Id. York admitted that
the Officers told him he was not under arrest when they initially handcuffed and
removed him from the home, but he also testified he thought that he was under arrest.
Id. York testified that he did not hear Ms. Williams tell the Officers he had a gun in
the safe, and that it was not until later that he found out there was a gun, drug
paraphernalia, and cash in the safe. Id. York denied he owned the contents of the
safe, denied he told the police he lived on Kingsessing Avenue, and denied telling
the police he was holding the gun for a friend. Id.
             York then testified about the conversation he had with his lawyer after
he was acquitted, regarding the return of the cash from the safe. Although York
continued to deny he owned the cash before his arrest, he was informed by his
attorney that he was entitled to have the cash returned to him after being acquitted,
and that his attorney filed a motion for return of property on his behalf. Trial Court
Opinion at 7-11. York testified that “[b]ecause I was--the whole criminal trial was
about everything that was in the safe. And they said everything in the safe was mine
when I told them that it wasn’t. So they basically forced the ownership on me.” Id.

                                          5
at 11. See S.R.R. at 123b-28b. The trial court entered an order memorializing the
agreement between York (also known as Dontae Harris) and the District Attorney’s
Office to return $15,000 to York, with the remaining $3,409 to be forfeited to the
District Attorney’s Office. Id. at 129b. York testified that even though he knew it
did not belong to him, he did not try to return the money, and did not regret taking
it. Trial Court Opinion at 7-10. York was incarcerated for over a year awaiting trial,
and he testified that he developed diabetes while incarcerated due to stress, and he
now panics when he sees police.8 Id. at 11.
                Finally, Ms. Stribbling testified, in relevant part, that York lived with
her and her children in Blackwood, NJ since 2018. Trial Court Opinion at 11. She
confirmed that York told her he was going to Ms. Williams’ house in Philadelphia
on June 18, 2018, to see about his children and that he was arrested. Id. She testified
that she saw the Officers joking around and laughing with each other outside the
courtroom of York’s trial. Id. She testified that she observed changes in York’s
behavior since his incarceration, including difficulty sleeping, the onset of diabetes,
and panicking around police. Id.
                The trial court then discussed York’s claims that the jury instructions
on malicious prosecution were erroneous.9 The trial court reviewed the standard of
review for jury instructions and the doctrine of harmless error. Trial Court Opinion
at 12-13. The trial court then addressed York’s first claim, that the trial court

        8
        York also testified that he had been arrested approximately 20 times and incarcerated over
10 times. Trial Court Opinion at 11 n.7.

        9
         Before the trial court, York raised an additional error regarding the trial court’s denial of
his motion in limine to preclude discussion of the PFA, but York forfeits that issue in his appeal
to this Court. See Appellant’s Brief at 3. Therefore, we will not discuss that issue further. In
addition, York did not seek review of the trial court’s dismissal by non-suit of his false arrest claim.
Therefore, we will not discuss that issue further.
                                                   6
“erroneously instructed the jury that in addition to proving malicious prosecution,
[York] was also required to separately prove that the [O]fficers engaged in willful
misconduct to find the [O]fficers liable.” Id. at 13. The trial court provided the
following jury instructions on this issue:

               You heard mention of the Tort Claims Act. So in the
               Pennsylvania [P]olitical [S]ubdivision Tort Claims Act[10]
               is a piece of legislation, and that governs when a
               municipality or its employees can be held liable for
               damages for injury to a person or property. The Tort
               Claims Act grants a general blanket of immunity to
               municipalities and their employees with certain
               exceptions.

               The Tort Claims Act provides that an employee of a
               municipality, such as a police officer, may be personally
               liable for tortious conduct, but only in limited
               circumstances. An employee may be held liable only
               where his conduct constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual
               malice or willful misconduct.

               Let me define for you what willful misconduct means.
               Willful misconduct entails actual prior knowledge of the
               plaintiff’s [York’s] peril and must be carried out with the
               intention of achieving exactly that wrongful purpose. In
               the context of claims of false arrest and malicious
               prosecution, willful misconduct only exists if the
               [O]fficers deliberately arrested or prosecuted [York]
               knowing that they lacked probable cause to do so. In other
               words [York] must show not only that the [O]fficers
               intended to commit the acts that they are accused of
               carrying out, but also that the [O]fficer[s] understood that
               the actions that they intended to take were unlawful and
               then chose to take those actions anyway. Gross negligence
               or recklessness is not sufficient to prove willful
               misconduct.

       10
          Part of the Judicial Code is commonly referred to as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act (Tort Claims Act), 43 Pa. C.S. §§8541-8564.
                                                 7
Id. at 13-14. See also S.R.R. at 94b-95b.
             The trial court reviewed York’s argument that “willful misconduct” is
synonymous with “intentional tort,” citing King v. Breach, 540 A.2d 976 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1988). York argued if that was the case, then the trial court’s instruction
that a separate finding of willful misconduct was necessary was legal error, placed
an additional burden on York, and unfairly “stacked the deck” against him. Trial
Court Opinion at 14. The Officers responded that under the Tort Claims Act, the
Officers were immune from liability unless York proved they engaged in willful
misconduct, such that a separate instruction on willful misconduct was necessary.
Id. The Officers further responded that any error on this issue would be harmless
because the jury never reached the question of willful misconduct. Because the jury
found the Officers not liable for the tort of malicious prosecution, it never reached,
and did not need to reach, the question of willful misconduct. Id. at 14-15.
             The trial court agreed with the Officers that the willful misconduct
argument was moot, concluding that the jury never reached it because it “did not
find [York] was the subject of malicious prosecution by either of the [Officers].”
Trial Court Opinion at 15. The trial court further concluded that even if the jury had
reached that question, the jury instruction was appropriate under the Tort Claims Act
and Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. 1994). Id. The trial court
reviewed the applicable sections of the Tort Claims Act, especially Sections 8545
and 8548(a) of the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§8545 and 8548(a), that remove
both immunity and indemnity when an officer is judicially determined to have
committed willful misconduct. Id. at 15-16. The trial court then reviewed King, 540
A.2d 976, which equated willful misconduct with intentional tort, determined that
our Supreme Court’s decision in Renk, 641 A.2d at 293, disapproved of that

                                            8
language, and directed that King has no precedential value in police misconduct
cases. Trial Court Opinion at 16-17. The trial court then concluded that the
reasoning in Renk applied here, stating as follows.

             It is conceivable that a jury could find a police officer
             liable for malicious prosecution under circumstances
             which demonstrate that the officer did not deliberately
             institute proceedings against the plaintiff knowing that he
             lacked probable cause to do so. Thus, the finding of
             willful misconduct is necessary to determine whether
             immunity applies.
Id. at 18 (emphasis in original). The trial court further reasoned that the plain
language of Section 8550 of the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §8550, entitled “Willful
Misconduct,” applies to official liability (immunity) generally as well as to
indemnity, “both of which are lost if it is judicially determined that the employee’s
act constituted willful misconduct.” Id. Therefore, the trial court rejected York’s
argument that a separate finding of willful misconduct was not required and
concluded that the jury instruction was properly given. Id.
             The trial court then determined that if the willful misconduct jury
instruction was given in error, any error was harmless because the jury never reached
the question. Trial Court Opinion at 18. The trial court reviewed the verdict slip,
which clearly listed four separate questions. Id. See also S.R.R. at 1b-2b. The jury
answered “no” as to both of the Officers in question number one, indicating that
York did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that either Officer
maliciously prosecuted him. Trial Court Opinion at 18, S.R.R. at 1b. With a “no”
answer for both of the Officers in question one, the verdict sheet directed the jury to
“return to the courtroom without the need of answering the remaining questions,
including question number [three] pertaining to willful misconduct.” Trial Court
Opinion at 19, S.R.R. at 1b. The trial court reasoned that because the jury did not
                                          9
reach the willful misconduct question, York was unable to show that he was
prejudiced by that jury instruction, making any allegations of error harmless, relying
on Boyle v. Independent Lift Truck, Inc., 6 A.3d 492, 496 (Pa. 2010). Trial Court
Opinion at 19.
             The trial court then turned to York’s second claim, that the jury
instruction pertaining to probable cause for malicious prosecution was erroneous
because it

             instructed the jury that if [it] found that the [Officers] had
             probable cause to initiate a prosecution for any one of the
             three crimes for which he was charged (i.e. violation of the
             [PFA] order, unlawful possession of a firearm, or
             possession of drug paraphernalia) then that was sufficient
             to find in favor of the [O]fficers on the malicious
             prosecution claim.
Trial Court Opinion at 19 (emphasis in original). The trial court provided the
following jury instruction on this issue.

             For malicious prosecution, the question for you to decide
             is whether [] the [Officers], possessed probable cause to
             initiate the prosecution against [York] at the time that the
             prosecution was initiated. The prosecution was initiated
             against [York] when he was formally charged with a crime
             by the [D]istrict [A]ttorney’s office. In this case, he was
             charged with a crime on June 13, 2018—he was charged
             with three crimes rather—which was the day after he was
             arrested. For malicious prosecution, you must determine
             if there was probable cause to prosecute [York] for a crime
             at that time. To succeed in a claim for malicious
             prosecution, [York] must show that the [Officers] did not
             have probable cause, as I said, to initiate prosecution for
             any crime. If you find that the [Officers] had probable
             cause to initiate prosecution for any one of the three crimes
             for which he was charged, then you must find in favor of
             the [Officers] on the malicious prosecution claim. So, []
             York was arrested and prosecuted for unlawful possession
             of a firearm, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
                                            10
             contempt for a violation of a [PFA]. I’m going to instruct
             you on the elements of these offenses, and the
             circumstances where probable cause would exist for each
             offense.
Id. at 19-20. See also S.R.R. at 93b-94b. The trial court rejected as “plainly
incorrect” York’s argument that the only crime for which the jury could have found
probable cause existed was violation of the PFA. Id. at 19. The trial court concluded
that there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that probable cause existed to
arrest and prosecute York on all three charges, further noting that the denial to
suppress the evidence at York’s criminal trial constituted a judicial determination
that probable cause existed. Id. at 20.
             The trial court then addressed York’s argument that probable cause to
prosecute him for a minor crime, the PFA violation, did not constitute probable cause
to prosecute him for unrelated, more serious offenses, the UFA and drug charges,
relying on Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 2007). Trial Court Opinion at 21.
The Officers responded that Johnson only applies to a narrow set of circumstances,
not present here. The Officers further responded that York should be judicially
estopped from disavowing ownership of the money in the safe, when he admitted he
was the owner on his verified motion for return of property. The Officers argue that
York’s admission to owning the cash in the safe established probable cause to
believe he owned the safe and its other contents, the gun and drug paraphernalia,
thereby establishing probable cause to prosecute him. Id.
             The trial court established, and the parties agreed, that there is no
Pennsylvania law on the probable cause issue, likely due to the fact that these claims
are generally brought in federal court. Trial Court Opinion at 21. The trial court
acknowledged that although the decisions of the federal district courts and courts of
appeal are not binding on Pennsylvania courts, we often look to these opinions for

                                          11
guidance when facing the same issues. Id. The trial court then reviewed the
prevailing law on this issue in Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 604 (3d
Cir. 2005), that holds “the existence of probable cause as to one charge bars a
plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim entirely.” Trial Court Opinion at 21-22. The
trial court also noted several cases that followed Wright, including Kossler v.
Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 194 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc), that stated, to the extent
Johnson and Wright are in conflict, “‘if one of those two cases must control for
purposes of analyzing the probable cause element, it would be Wright, not Johnson,
that controls.’” Trial Court Opinion at 22, n.11.
             The trial court concluded that York’s reliance on Johnson was
misplaced when Johnson involved a distinguishable set of circumstances where
charges were tacked on after the plaintiff’s arrest, and where the defendant officer
inserted himself into the post-arrest process by lodging additional charges against a
suspect with whom he had a confrontation at the police station. Trial Court Opinion
at 22.   The trial court concluded that the circumstances in Johnson “differ
significantly” from York’s circumstances, where York “was charged with three
crimes at the time of arrest and was prosecuted for the same three crimes,” and that
the three charges “were ‘intertwined’ as contemplated in [Wright].” Id. at 23. The
trial court then concluded that the rule articulated in Wright applied here, namely,
“that probable cause as to one crime, was sufficient to defeat the claim for malicious
prosecution. Here, the jury was free to determine whether probable cause existed
for any one of the crimes charged against [] York, thus, the jury instruction was
correct and a new trial is not warranted.” Id. York then appealed to this Court. He
seeks a new trial based on the trial court’s errors of law in the jury instructions
regarding malicious prosecution.

                                         12
             Review of the relevant legal framework will assist our analysis. Our
Court’s review of jury instructions is limited to determining whether the trial court
committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law controlling the outcome of
the case. Stewart v. Motts, 654 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1995). The Supreme Court has
further provided:

             Error in a charge is sufficient ground for a new trial, if the
             charge as a whole is inadequate or not clear or has a
             tendency to mislead or confuse rather than clarify a
             material issue. Glider v. Com[monweath] Dep[artment] of
             H[ighways], [255 A.2d 542, 547 (Pa. 1969)]. A charge
             will be found adequate unless “the issues are not made
             clear to the jury or the jury was palpably misled by what
             the trial judge said or unless there is an omission in the
             charge which amounts to fundamental error.” Voitasefski
             v. Pittsburgh [Railways] Co., [69 A.2d 370, 373 (Pa.
             1949)]; [a] reviewing court will not grant a new trial on
             the ground of inadequacy of the charge unless there is a
             prejudicial omission of something basic or fundamental.
             Sweeny v. Bonafiglia, [169 A.2d 292, 293 (Pa. 1961)];
             Giorgianni v. DiSanzo, [140 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. 1958)].
             In reviewing a trial court’s charge to the jury, we must not
             take the challenged words or passage out of context of the
             whole of the charge, but must look to the charge in its
             entirety. McCay v. Philadelphia Electric Company, [291
             A.2d 759, 763 (Pa. 1972)].
Stewart, 654 A.2d at 540.
             In addition:

             The proper test is not whether certain portions or isolated
             excerpts taken out of context appear erroneous. We look
             to the charge in its entirety, against the background of the
             evidence in the particular case, to determine whether or
             not error was committed and whether that error was
             prejudicial to the complaining party.

                                          13
James v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 170 A.3d 1156, 1164 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(quoting Krepps v. Snyder, 112 A.3d 1246, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and
internal punctuation omitted)).11
              The elements of malicious prosecution are: (1) the institution of
proceedings against the plaintiff without probable cause and with malice and (2) the
proceedings were terminated in favor of the plaintiff. Alleyne v. Pirrone, 180 A.3d
524, 528 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)(citing Turano v. Hunt, 631 A.2d 822, 825 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1993)).

              “Probable cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion
              supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant that an
              ordinary prudent person in the same situation could
              believe a party is guilty of the offense charged.” La
              Frankie v. Miklich, [618 A.2d 1145, 1148 (Pa. Cmwlth.
              1992)].      Notably a successful case for malicious
              prosecution is both rare and arduous. “Malicious
              prosecution is an action which runs counter to obvious
              policies of law in favor of encouraging proceedings
              against those who are apparently guilty … It never has
              been regarded with any favor by the courts, and it is
              hedged with restrictions which make it very difficult to
              maintain.”      Corrigan v. Cent[ral] Tax Bureau of
              [Pennsylvania], Inc., 828 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. Cmwlth.
              [2003]) (internal quotations omitted) …. “If this were not
              so, it would deter men from approaching the courts of
              justice for relief.” Id.
Alleyne, 180 A.3d at 540.
              Further, the determination of whether the Officers could be found liable
for damages for the intentional tort of malicious prosecution depends on whether
their actions constituted willful misconduct under the Tort Claims Act. Section 8541

       11
          “In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer
persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues.”         Lerch v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
                                             14
of the Tort Claims Act states that, except as otherwise provided, no local agency
shall be liable for damages to person or property for actions of an employee. 42 Pa.
C.S. §8541. Section 8542(b) of the Tort Claims Act provides for nine exceptions to
this immunity, none of which include an exception for intentional torts. 42 Pa. C.S.
§8542(b).    Section 8545 of the Tort Claims Act establishes official liability
generally, stating that an employee of a local agency is liable for civil damages only
to the same extent as his or her employer for acts within his or her official duties,
subject to certain limitations. 42 Pa. C.S. §8545. Section 8547 of the Tort Claims
Act requires the local agency to provide legal assistance to its employees for the
defense of such claims. 42 Pa. C.S. §8547. Section 8548 of the Tort Claims Act
requires the local agency to indemnify its employees against payment of any
judgment on the suit. Lastly, Section 8550 of the Tort Claims Act, entitled “Willful
Misconduct,” states:

             In any action against a local agency or employee thereof
             for damages on account of an injury caused by the act of
             the employee in which it is judicially determined that the
             act of the employee caused the injury and that such act
             constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful
             misconduct, the provisions of sections 8545 (relating to
             official liability generally), 8546 (relating to the defense
             of official immunity), 8548 (relating to indemnity) and
             8549 (relating to limitation on damages) shall not apply.
43 Pa. C.S. §8550 (emphasis added).
             As to the first issue, York reiterates the arguments he made before the
trial court, arguing that a separate willful misconduct jury instruction was erroneous,
and unfairly stacked the deck against York. York not only objects to the jury
instruction on malicious prosecution and willful misconduct set forth above, but also

                                          15
to the following instructions that preceded those set forth above. A few paragraphs
earlier, the trial court instructed that

               [i]n this case, [York] has the burden of proving the
               following things: Number one, that the [Officers’]
               conduct constituted malicious prosecution. Number two,
               the [Officers’] conduct constituted willful misconduct.
               Number three, the [Officers’] conduct was a factual cause
               in bringing about the harm to [York]. [York] also has the
               burden of proving the extent of damages caused by the
               [Officers’] malicious prosecution if you find so.
S.R.R. at 93b; Appellant’s Brief at 13.
               York argues that these two parts of the trial court’s instructions unfairly
increase York’s burden of proof. York further argues that the trial court erred when
it applied Section 8550 of the Tort Claims Act to both immunity from liability and
to indemnity, when Renk, 641 A.2d 289, addressed only indemnity. York further
cites to our Court’s decision in Cruz v. Police Officers MaDonna, Peachey, and
McCue (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1748 C.D. 2015, filed January 27, 2017), attached to his
brief, arguing that the Court has applied willful misconduct in Section 8550 of the
Tort Claims Act to the question of indemnity, but not to liability.12 The Officers’
response on this issue repeats their arguments to the trial court, and emphasizes that
the plain language of Section 8550 and the willful misconduct provision applies to
both liability in Section 8545 and indemnity in Section 8548. The Officers further
respond that York misstates the Tort Claims Act analysis, and that neither Renk nor
Cruz support his argument.
               In Renk, our Supreme Court considered the case of a City of Pittsburgh
police officer who was found liable for the torts of assault, battery, and false

       12
         See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (“As used in this rule, ‘non-precedential decision’ refers to . . . an
unreported memorandum opinion of the Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008. []
Non-precedential decisions . . . may be cited for their persuasive value.”).
                                                16
imprisonment for injuries to an individual during an arrest, and who had a judgment
of $7,648.08 entered against him. Renk, 641 A.2d at 291. The police officer sought
indemnification from the City of Pittsburgh for the amount of the judgment, and the
Supreme Court considered whether “a determination of liability for tortious conduct
is the equivalent of a judicial determination of willful misconduct sufficient to
preclude indemnification for the payment of a judgment entered in the action.” Id.
at 292. The Supreme Court analyzed the Tort Claims Act and the Commonwealth
Court’s decision in King, 540 A.2d at 981, especially the statement that “willful
misconduct is synonymous with intentional tort.” The Supreme Court concluded
that the quoted statement from King did not apply to police misconduct cases,
stating, “[t]his equation has no validity in the context of a lawsuit based on police
conduct, however. The King decision, which did not involve police conduct, is of
no precedential value.” Renk, 540 A.2d at 293.
             The Supreme Court held that

             [i]t is conceivable that a jury could find a police officer
             liable for those torts [assault and battery, and false
             imprisonment] under circumstances which demonstrate
             that the officer did not intentionally use unnecessary and
             excessive force, or did not deliberately arrest a person
             knowing that he lacked probable cause to do so.
Renk, 641 A.2d at 293-94. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court,
and held that the jury verdict alone was insufficient to establish the officer’s willful
misconduct, the City of Pittsburgh failed to establish the officer’s acts were willful
misconduct, and the City of Pittsburgh would be required to indemnify the officer
for the amount of the judgment. Id. at 294.
             In Cruz, our Court considered the case of a City of Philadelphia police
officer who was found liable for the intentional torts of assault, battery, and false

                                          17
imprisonment for injuries to an individual during an arrest, and who had a judgment
of $33,700 entered against him. Cruz, slip op. at 1. After the verdict was returned,
the trial court then charged the jury with determining whether the officer had
committed willful misconduct in bringing about the harm to the arrestee, and the
jury found that the officer did not. Id., slip op. at 2. The officer sought and was
denied post-trial relief, after which he appealed, arguing that, as a matter of law, he
could not be liable for the intentional torts alleged when the jury found that he did
not commit willful misconduct. Id. The Court reviewed the Tort Claims Act and
Renk, and determined that

             [b]ased upon our review of the record in its entirety, we
             conclude that the jury determined that while [the officer]
             intentionally struck and detained Cruz [the arrestee], he
             subjectively felt that he could do so under these
             circumstances. The jury, as trier of fact, was free to draw
             the conclusion that [the officer’s] actions, regardless of his
             subjective belief, were not justifiable in the instant matter.
             One can have an honest belief that his actions are justified.
             It is, however, within the jury’s province to find that such
             actions were not justified, despite the actor’s belief to the
             contrary. In such situations, under Renk, the trier of fact
             can find the officer not immune, but nevertheless not so
             unjustified in his subjective belief as to lose his right to
             indemnification.
Cruz, slip op. at 7.
             As to the second issue here, whether the trial court erred in its jury
instructions on probable cause and malicious prosecution, we agree with the trial
court and the parties that we must be guided by the decisions of the federal district
courts and appeals courts when there is no Pennsylvania law on this point. On this
issue, York again argues that we should be guided by Johnson and not Wright, and

                                          18
the Officers respond that the general rule in Wright should apply when Johnson was
decided on specific facts not present here.
             In Wright, 409 F.3d at 596, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
considered an arrestee who was charged with burglary, theft, criminal mischief, and
criminal trespass, whose charges were eventually dismissed, and who then brought
a civil rights action for false arrest and malicious prosecution against the arresting
officers. The Court analyzed whether the officers had probable cause to arrest the
individual for criminal trespass, and concluded that they did, based on the
information available at the time of her arrest. Id. at 603. The Court held that “[e]ven
though our discussion of probable cause was limited to the criminal trespass claim,
it disposes of her malicious prosecution claims with respect to all of the charges
brought against her, including the burglary.” Id. at 604.
             In Johnson, 477 F.3d at 76, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
considered a parolee who was arrested on various charges stemming from an
altercation between the parolee and his parole agent in the parole office, whose
charges were eventually dismissed, and who then brought a civil rights action for
false arrest and malicious prosecution. On the issue of probable cause and malicious
prosecution, the Court acknowledged that the holding in Wright remained good law,
but it was troubled by a broad application of Wright to situations where officers
would be insulated from liability in all cases where they had probable cause for an
arrest on only one charge. Id. at 83. The Court was concerned that officers could
tack on more serious, unfounded charges which lacked probable cause, because there
was probable cause to arrest on one charge. Id. at 84. The Court stated

             [t]his result seems unprincipled to us as there is a
             distinction on the one hand between a simultaneous arrest
             on multiple charges where, in a sense the significance of

                                          19
             the charges for which there was not probable cause for
             arrest is limited as the plaintiff in the ensuing civil action
             could have been lawfully arrested and thus seized on at
             least one charge and, on the other hand, prosecution for
             multiple charges where the additional charges for which
             probable cause is absent almost surely will place an
             additional burden on the defendant.
Id.
             The Court found specific facts that distinguished it from Wright,
namely, that the parole agent continued to be involved in the matter after the
parolee’s arrest, the parole agent advised the local police that parolee had threatened
him, and he wanted the parolee to be prosecuted, was agitated over their
confrontation in the waiting room and was alleged to have misrepresented the events
that took place in the waiting room. Johnson, 477 F.3d at 84. The Court further
observed that unlike in Wright, where the “circumstances leading to the arrest and
prosecution were totally intertwined,” the parole agent’s actions in Johnson were
“bifurcated in the sense that the agents first arrested [the parolee] and then, after the
arrest, [the parole agent] took steps by supplying information to the [the local police]
that led to [the parolee’s] prosecution.” Id. at 82 n.9. The Court then concluded

             [t]herefore, unlike the conduct of the defendants in Wright,
             [the parole agent’s] involvement in both the arrest and the
             initiation of criminal proceedings against [the parolee] was
             more extensive, and lasted beyond the issuing of an
             affidavit of probable cause for his arrest and the arrest
             itself. In the circumstances, for both the legal and factual
             reasons we have set forth, we will not apply Wright to this
             case and thereby insulate [the parole agent] from liability
             for the alleged fraudulent fabrication of baseless charges
             against [the parolee].
Id. at 84.
             As the trial court noted, the Courts in the Third Circuit have generally
looked to Wright when analyzing the probable cause element of a malicious
                                           20
prosecution claim. See e.g., McIntosh v. Crist, No. 13-103, 2015 WL 418982, at *6
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2015); Kinsler v City of Philadelphia, No. 13-6412, 2015 WL
3970899, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2015) (collecting cases); Laphan v. Haines, No.
14-4063, 2016 WL 627246, at *5 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2016); Blair v. City of
Pittsburgh, 711 Fed.App’x 98 (3d Cir. 2017). Further, the en banc Third Circuit has
stated, to the extent that Johnson and Wright are in conflict, “if one of those two
cases must control for purposes of analyzing the probable cause element, it would
be Wright, not Johnson that controls.” Kossler, 564 F.3d at 194 n.8.
              As to the first issue, we must reject York’s argument that the separate
jury instructions on tort liability and willful misconduct were in error, when the plain
language of the Tort Claims Act, Renk, and Cruz do not support his contentions.
Section 8550 of the Tort Claims Act provides that when a judicial determination of
willful misconduct is made, the official liability provisions in Section 8545 and the
indemnity provisions in Section 8548 “shall not apply.” Thus, if willful misconduct
is judicially determined, the officer shall not be able to claim official immunity in
Section 8545 or indemnity from his public employer in Section 8548(a).
              The Supreme Court’s holding in Renk explains why the question of tort
liability and willful misconduct must be posed and answered separately, when the
Court articulated a scenario in which an officer could be found liable for an
intentional tort, but still retain his right to official immunity or indemnification if the
trier of fact found him not to have committed willful misconduct. Renk, 641 A.2d
at 293-94. A similar situation occurred in Cruz, and our Court affirmed the verdict
below that found the officer liable for an intentional tort, but still entitled to
indemnification after a finding of no willful misconduct. Cruz, slip op. at 7.
Although those cases addressed the interplay between an intentional tort and willful

                                            21
misconduct in the context of indemnity, they do not serve to limit the analysis to
indemnity only, when the plain language of Section 8550 applies to both immunity
and indemnity.
             York’s appeal does not call into question the indemnity issue, because
here, unlike in Renk or Cruz, the Officers were found not liable for the tort of
malicious prosecution, no judgment was entered against them, and they had no need
to seek indemnification from the City of Philadelphia. York’s argument on this issue
is misplaced, because he attempts to draw a distinction between immunity and
indemnity for willful misconduct purposes, when the Tort Claims Act does not
support this distinction.
             Upon review of the jury instructions on malicious prosecution and
willful misconduct, as a whole, we discern no error of law by the trial court. We
may not, as York suggests, take “certain portions or isolated excerpts out of context,”
but must “look to the charge in its entirety.” James, 170 A.3d at 1164. As such, we
find no error in these jury instructions when they “clearly and accurately explain[]
the relevant law.” Id.
             We further agree with the trial court that if we discerned any error in
the willful misconduct instructions, and we did not, any such error was harmless,
because the jury never reached the question. The record, including the verdict slip,
is clear that the jury first decided that York failed to prove the Officers maliciously
prosecuted him, did not deliberate further, and did not reach the willful misconduct
question or any of the other questions.            See S.R.R. at 1b-2b.         “[O]ur
Commonwealth’s long-standing caselaw holds that allegations of error are harmless
where the jury is not required to deliberate over the issue out of which the alleged
error arises in order to reach its verdict.” Boyle, 6 A.3d at 496.

                                          22
             As to the second issue, we are not persuaded that the facts of York’s
arrest or prosecution are aligned with those in Johnson, or that the trial court erred
in its jury instructions on malicious prosecution and probable cause. York failed to
present facts that would distinguish it from the prevailing standard in Wright. Unlike
the conduct of the parole agent in Johnson, the three charges against York stemmed
from a single incident, where he was arrested on one day and charged the next day
with the same three crimes. In this case there were no allegations that the Officers
fabricated information or involved themselves beyond York’s arrest to influence the
prosecution. The Officers and Detective Farley testified that it was the responsibility
of the detective and the District Attorney to make the decision to initiate prosecution,
not the Officers. The facts presented here demonstrate that York’s arrest and
prosecution were intertwined, and the Officers did not initiate prosecution against
York, such that the trial court correctly applied the prevailing standard in Wright.
Because we find no error in the jury instructions on probable cause, we need not
address the Officers’ argument that York should be estopped from challenging
probable cause based on his acceptance of cash found in the safe.
             Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

                                        MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

                                          23
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sherod York,                        :
                                    :
                       Appellant    :
                                    :
           v.                       : No. 626 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Abdel Kanan and Walter Jackson      :

                                   ORDER

           AND NOW, this 13th day of July, 2023, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dated May 6, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

                                    __________________________________
                                    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge