Court Opinion

ID: 9389796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 15:00:56.674189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.728517
License: Public Domain

21-1194
     Drew v. City of New York

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                       SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1                 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 3   New York, on the 26th day of April, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               GUIDO CALABRESI,
 7               MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8               EUNICE C. LEE,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   _____________________________________
11
12   Keith Drew,
13
14                              Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16                    v.
17
18   City of New York, Unknown Employee,                                          21-1194
19   Unknown Supervisor,
20
21                     Defendants-Appellees.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                          RAYMOND D. MOSS (Karen R. King, Daniel
25                                                     P. Gordon, Sloane Lewis, on the brief),
26                                                     Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello
27                                                     P.C., New York, N.Y.
28
29   FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                         PHILIP W. YOUNG (Richard Dearing, Devin
30                                                     Slack, on the brief), for Sylvia O. Hinds-
31                                                     Radix, Corporation Counsel of the City of
32                                                     New York, New York, N.Y.
 1            Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

 2   New York (Carter, J.).

 3            UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 4   DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED AND REMANDED.

 5            Keith Drew, proceeding pro se below, sued the City of New York (“the City”) and two

 6   unknown defendants, alleging that the City’s handling of his inmate account while he was in

 7   custody violated his constitutional rights. After the deadline for amending the pleadings passed

8    and discovery closed, Drew moved to amend his complaint to add named parties in place of the

 9   unknown defendants. The magistrate judge denied Drew’s motion as untimely because he did

10   not show good cause. The district court then granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.

11   See Drew v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-011709, 2021 WL 1226413, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,

12   2021).    Drew appealed and was appointed counsel by a panel of this Court.        On appeal, Drew

13   argues that the district court (1) applied the wrong standard to his procedural due process claim,

14   (2) abused its discretion by failing to construe his complaint as alleging state-law claims for

15   conversion and negligence, and (3) abused its discretion by denying Drew leave to amend to add

16   unnamed parties and then dismissing his claims against those parties. We assume the parties’

17   familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

18   I.       Procedural Due Process Claim

19            The parties agree that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to Drew’s

20   procedural due process claim. “[I]n evaluating what process satisfies the Due Process Clause,

21   the Supreme Court has distinguished between (a) claims based on established state procedures and

                                                      2
 1   (b) claims based on random, unauthorized acts by state employees.”           Rivera-Powell v. N.Y.C. Bd.

 2   of Elections, 470 F.3d 458, 465 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When the

 3   state conduct in question is random and unauthorized, the state satisfies procedural due process

 4   requirements so long as it provides [a] meaningful post-deprivation remedy.             In contrast, when

 5   the deprivation is pursuant to an established state procedure . . . the availability of post-deprivation

 6   procedures will not, ipso facto, satisfy due process.”      Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In

 7   instances of deprivation pursuant to established state procedures, the court determines the process

 8   due by balancing the three factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Rivera-

 9   Powell, 470 F.3d at 466. Those factors are: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the

10   official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures

11   used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the

12   Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

13   that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”        Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

14          Drew alleged that “[a]ll deprivations . . . occurred in accordance with official custom and

15   policy of” the New York City Department of Correction.            App’x at A25. But the district court

16   applied the standard for “random, unauthorized acts” and concluded that the availability of post-

17   deprivation remedies satisfied due process.         See Drew, 2021 WL 1226413, at *6.            This was

18   error. We thus vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for consideration of Drew’s

19   procedural due process claim under the Mathews factors and Drew’s important interest in his

20   inmate account. 1

            1
                The district court also erroneously stated that all claims “arising out of transactions occurring

                                                          3
 1   II.     State-Law Conversion and Negligence Claims

 2           Drew argues that the district court should have construed his complaint to allege conversion

 3   and negligence claims under state law.        We agree.     “It is well established that the submissions

 4   of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that

 5   they suggest.”    Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal

 6   quotation marks omitted).       Under New York law, a “conversion takes place when someone,

 7   intentionally and without authority, assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging

 8   to someone else, interfering with that person’s right of possession.”            Colavito v. N.Y. Organ

 9   Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 49–50 (2006) (citation omitted). Drew’s complaint made

10   numerous allegations that the City “confiscated or forfeited Plaintiff [sic] personal property,

11   without adequate process, statutory authority, or legitimate penological objective in violation of

12   Due Process.”      App’x at A16.       Drew’s complaint also alleged negligence.           See id. at A22

13   (alleging that the City “has been reckless and negligent in forfeiting [his] monetary assets”).

14   Indeed, the City’s answer referenced “state-law claims.”                   Id. at A66.        Under these

15   circumstances, the district court should have considered Drew’s state-law claims. 2                      See

16   Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475 (vacating and remanding dismissal of a pro se complaint when “the

     before November 8, 2016 are barred” by Drew’s settlement agreement with the City. Drew, 2021 WL
     1226413, at *5. The parties agree that the agreement bars only claims that accrued on or before November
     8, 2016.
             2
                The City argues on appeal that Drew was not entitled to any pro se solicitude because of the
     number of cases he has litigated. The City waived this argument below. See App’x at A322 (“[T]he
     court must read the pro se party’s supporting papers liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest
     arguments they suggest.” (alterations adopted and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States
     v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2017) (“It is well settled that arguments not presented to the district
     court are considered waived or forfeited and generally will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”
     (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted)).

                                                          4
 1   language in [the plaintiff’s] submissions is broad enough to cover the . . . theory” of the claim

 2   (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2008)

 3   (vacating dismissal of pro se complaint for insufficient pleading when the complaint “gives [the

 4   defendant] notice of [the plaintiff’s] claim and the grounds upon which it rests [] is sufficient to

 5   satisfy Rule 8(a)”). The City’s argument that Drew failed to enumerate state-law claims in the

 6   caption of his complaint is meritless. See Quinones v. City of Binghamton, 997 F.3d 461, 469

 7   (2d Cir. 2021) (rejecting the argument that a district court may limit a pro se complaint when the

 8   plaintiff “fail[s] to enumerate [the claim] as a separate cause of action”).

 9   III.     Denial of Leave to Amend

10            Finally, Drew argues that “the district court abused its discretion in denying Drew’s motion

11   for leave to amend his complaint.” Supp. Br. at 37–38. We agree that Drew should have been

12   granted leave to amend. “[D]istrict judges should, as a general matter, liberally permit pro se

13   litigants to amend their pleadings.” Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 826 F.3d 631, 633 (2d Cir.

14   2016); see also Dluhos v. Floating & Abandoned Vessel, Known as New York, 162 F.3d 63, 69 (2d

15   Cir. 1998) (suggesting that “a pro se litigant in particular should be afforded every reasonable

16   opportunity to demonstrate that he has a valid claim” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

17            We have considered all of the parties’ remaining arguments and find them to be without

18   merit.   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case

19   is REMANDED for further proceedings.

20                                                  FOR THE COURT:
21                                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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