Court Opinion

ID: 9662690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:15:37.390338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:41.398952
License: Public Domain

*249JON E WILCOX, J.
¶ 68. (concurring). I agree with the court's reasoning and conclusions. I write separately only to address the dissent's assertion that this court's decision in Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768, recognizing parental rights as fundamental and acknowledging the severity of termination proceedings, is somehow incompatible with the court's finding of jurisdiction in this case. I believe the principles in Evelyn C.R. and other cases like it are compatible with this case. For the policy reasons relating to the State's and the child's interests discussed by the court in ¶¶ 37-39, cases such as the one before us present a situation where application of the recognized status exception to minimum contacts doctrine makes sense.
¶ 69. In Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶ 21, 26, 36, this court found that a circuit court erred when it entered a default judgment on the issue of abandonment in a proceeding for termination of parental rights without first fulfilling its duty to take evidence sufficient to support a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother had abandoned the child. However, we then concluded that the error was harmless because the circuit court remedied the situation by taking appropriate evidence before terminating the parent's rights. Id., ¶¶ 33-36. In finding that the circuit court erred, this court acknowledged that parental rights are fundamental. Id., ¶ 20. We also noted that termination proceedings are of a "severe nature," and due process requires that there be proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is appropriate, before parental rights may be terminated. Id., ¶ 21.
¶ 70. Nonetheless, acknowledging that a right is fundamental does not mean it is absolute and need never give way when other interests are at stake. The *250issue in the present case is jurisdiction, whether a Wisconsin court has jurisdiction to go forward with a termination proceeding at all. Although parental rights are fundamental and the effects of termination severe, the jurisdiction issue also involves other important interests, specifically those of the child and the State, that must be considered in the equation. The dissent argues that consideration of the "fundamental nature and importance of parental rights" is lacking in the majority opinion. Dissent, ¶ 76. However, I submit that the recognition of parental rights as fundamental should not be determinative on whether the status exception to personal jurisdiction is applicable. As one court recently explained:
The fact that parental rights have been designated "fundamental liberty interest[s]," Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982), does not alter our analysis. Cases dealing with status often involve a fundamental liberty interest. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has allowed courts to exercise jurisdiction in such cases where standards of fairness are not violated.
D.A. v. State, 2002 UT 127, ¶ 31, 63 P.3d 607. As this court discussed in its opinion, we have determined that these standards of fairness have been met in the present case. See majority op., ¶¶ 47-64. The nonresident parent was given ample notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the balance of the Asahi factors — which examine the interests of the parent, the child, and the State — tips in favor of jurisdiction. Id.
¶ 71. We note in this decision that if the circuit court has no jurisdiction in cases such as this, the result is often a child caught in "jurisdictional limbo." Majority op., ¶ 15. This is a significant concern, one that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act *251(UCCJA) was enacted specifically to address. Majority op., ¶ 29. I agree with the court's conclusion that the UCCJA allows Wisconsin to take jurisdiction in this case under the status exception. I also agree that sufficient due process protections were provided to the non-resident parent. In circumstances such as these, where the issue is jurisdiction and the conflict is between parental rights and the State's interest in protecting the child's best interests, it is appropriate to apply the UCCJA.
¶ 72. Evelyn C.R. did not hold that default judgment in termination cases could not occur at all. It simply held that a court must take sufficient evidence before entering such a judgment. See Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 36. The present case allows an alternative basis for jurisdiction, but only where sufficient due process protections are in place. As the majority notes, whether the basis for jurisdiction over a person is minimum contacts or some other means, the applicable due process standard is the same. Majority op., ¶ 24. Today's holding is consistent with our recognition of the importance of parental rights, but it provides a balance such that jurisdiction is allowed where the balance of interests at stake indicates that the child's interests in getting a court determination and the State's interest in protecting the child's interests are in danger.
¶ 73. The unique set of circumstances involved in a case such as Thomas J.R.'s allows Wisconsin to take jurisdiction under the status exception to personal jurisdiction. This determination is in no way intended to minimalize the importance of parental rights. The status exception has been a long-accepted exception to personal jurisdiction and provides an alternative means of jurisdiction under very limited circumstances. I therefore see no conflict between this court's recogni*252tion of a fundamental right and its decision to allow jurisdiction under the limited circumstances presented here.