Court Opinion

ID: 9712243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:49:56.451631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.036775
License: Public Domain

Heher, J.
(concurring). Under the doctrine of res judicata, the judgment entered in the Law Division of the Superior Court on July 19, 1951 is conclusive of the rights of the parties and their privies in the matters of law and fact at issue, not only such matters actually litigated and determined, but also those properly determinable in the action. Hudson Transit Corporation v. Antonucci, 137 N. J. L. 704 (E. & A. 1948). So much is conceded. There was no appeal from the judgment. Public policy and the private rights of the litigants ordain that there be an end to litigation. Were it not for this principle, litigation would be endless. And it would seem to be axiomatic that there would be no occasion for a declaration of the rights of the parties under this judgment by means of the Declaratory Judgments Act, N. J. S. 2A:16-50 et seq., if the remedy sought were the enforcement by foreclosure or otherwise of the liens established by the judgment, for a plenary suit to that end would provide full relief, and a mere declaration of rights under the statute now invoked, to be followed by executorial process in another action in a court where an adequate remedy could be had, would constitute the piecemeal method of litigating private rights that is alien to the genius and spirit of our constitutional judicial procedure.
But the plaintiff insurers are not seeking the satisfaction of their right of subrogation by foreclosure of their liens and sale of the lands to which they have attached, but rather the protection of their right thus established by the judgment until the rendering of what is due becomes a practical measure.
The pier property is encumbered by a first mortgage of $68,000, covering other premises as well, held by the Provident *26Mutual Life Insurance Company; second and third mortgages aggregating $73,500, also embracing other premises, and then comes the indenture of trust mortgage of $601,000, securing a ten-year bond issue. The bonds have been in continuous default both as to principal and interest since April 1, 1939; all the interest charges on the prior mortgages have been paid, and there are no tax arrears. Apparently, all parties have adopted a waiting policy in the hope that time would bring the economic rehabilitation that would provide for the bonds a security that has long been nonexistent in fact, or largely so. Foreclosure now would not serve the purposes of the plaintiff insurers. But they have an interest in the res to be shielded meanwhile; and a declaratory judgment to that end would serve the traditional concept of that process, “to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations.” N. J. S. 2A :16-51.
It is time enough to deal with other and different circumstances as and when the occasion arises. Can it be that one may invoke the declaratory judgment process to adjudicate the right, intending forthwith to bring another action in another court for execution of the judgment? That would make a fetish of the declaratory proceeding. It would be violative of the well-settled principle of one legal proceeding for the enforcement of an accrued cause of action. The avoidance of unnecessary multiple actions is basic to our new procedural process; indeed, it had recognition under the old constitutional system. The Declaratory Judgments Act makes no provision for the execution of judgments entered under its provisions, save that “Further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted whenever necessary or proper, by application to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief.” N. J. S. 2A :16-60.
The act can operate only within the framework of the Constitution. For example, the prerogative writ jurisdiction vested in the old Supreme Court, as the successor of the King’s Bench, by the 1844 Constitution was thus put beyond legislative impairment. State v. Court of Common Pleas. 1 *27N. J. 14 (1949); State, Duford, Prosecutor v. Decue, 31 N. J. L. 302 (Sup. Ct. 1860); Traphagen v. Township of West Hoboken, 39 N. J. L. 232 (Sup. Ct. 1877); Green v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 42 N. J. L. 118 (Sup. Ct. 1880). The Supreme Court was the “sole depositary” of the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, and quo warranto; the “distinguishing feature of the King’s Bench was the authority which it alone exercised by means of the writs of certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto,” and the 1844 Constitution “was framed to perpetuate in our Supreme Court the same ample and exclusive power * * Flanagan v. Treasurer of City of Plainfield, 44 N. J. L. 118 (Sup. Ct. 1882). Eor instance, the title to an office was triable only by a writ in the nature of quo warranto. Finnegan v. Miller, 132 N. J. L. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Duncan v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of City of Paterson, 131 N. J. L. 443 (Sup. Ct. 1944). And at common law the remedy for dissolution of a corporation is by quo warranto. In re Collins-Doan Co., 3 N. J. 382 (1949).
But there is no occasion to go on. It suffices to say that the declaratory judgment was designed to enlarge the early common-law conception of the judicial process as a means of remedying an actual violation of personal or private rights; and that, ordinarily, there is no occasion for invoking the measure where there is a wholly adequate remedy in the usual course of a plenary suit for the prosecution of a cause of action that has reached the stage of enforcement, and such is the relief sought. In re Cryan’s Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 A. 675 (Sup. Ct. 1930), 71 A. L. R. 1417; De Charette v. St. Matthews Bank Trust Co., 214 Ky. 400, 283 S. W. 410 (App. Ct. 1926), 50 A. L. R. 34; Travelers’ Insurance Co. v. Greenough, 88 N. H. 391, 190 A. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1937), 109 A. L. R. 1096; State ex rel. Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Terte, 345 Mo. 95, 131 S. W. 2d 587 (Sup. Ct. 1939), 124 A. L. R. 1331; Brindley v. Meara, 209 Ind. 144, 198 N. E. 301 (Sup. Ct. 1935), 101 A. L. R. 682. The act is not contrived to provide a substitute for other regular actions. Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, *28229 N. W. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1930), 68 A. L. R. 105. See 142 A. L. R. 11, as to the federal act; also 87 A. L. R. 1211, 1220; 172 A. L. R. 848. The basic purpose of a declaratory-action is a timely determination and protection of the right to avert the risk of delay pending action in the normal course that is conditioned upon the accrual of an enforceable cause of action, and the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits. There may be danger of loss before maturity of the cause of action; and delay by the adversary party in bringing action may have prejudicial consequences. In a word, the question would seem to be whether the declaratory proceeding will serve the interests of essential justice in the circumstances of the particular case; and the case for such relief here meets that test. Such seems to be the current of authority, a consideration of prime importance in assessing a statute intended to achieve uniformity in the law. Our rule, R. R. 4:92A, does not have a different significance.
Por these reasons, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment.
Heher, J., concurring in result.
For affirmance—Ohief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan—6.
For reversal—None.