Court Opinion

ID: 9698754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:59:15.902888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:02.757884
License: Public Domain

*84TAMILIA, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
While I concur in the result, I believe the reasoning used by the majority to reach its conclusion goes astray in attempting to resolve the issue. As in the companion case of Matter of Smith, 393 Pa.Super. 39, 573 A.2d 1077 (1990), the majority would interpolate the adult criminal procedures on ineffectiveness of counsel into juvenile cases and would implicate the use of Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are specifically exempted from juvenile proceedings by Pa.R. Crim.P. 1(a)1 and the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 6301 et seq.
In doing so, the majority goes too far. We have held in In Interest of Bonner, 301 Pa.Super. 431, 447 A.2d 1043 (1982), In re Jones, 286 Pa.Super. 574, 429 A.2d 671 (1981), Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa.Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987), and In re Interest of Davis, 377 Pa.Super. 46, 546 A.2d 1149 (1988), that a juvenile has the right to confrontation of witnesses. Since the use of video tape in the juyenile hearing calls into play his right to confrontation of a witness against him, under present law he has been denied a basic right. The doctrine of fundamental fairness, inherent in the broad scope of review available in all children’s proceedings, does not require the application of ineffectiveness doctrine espoused in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967), Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987), Commonwealth v. Petras, 368 Pa.Super. 372, 534 A.2d 483 (1987), and Commonwealth v. Shablin, 362 Pa.Super. 289, 524 A.2d 511 (1987). A fair hearing for a juvenile charged with delinquency requires confrontation of the witnesses against him. Whether raised by an ineffectiveness claim, or simply alleged on appeal, fundamental fairness requires that a new hearing be granted. It is totally unnecessary to *85trigger the broad procedural machinery as to ineffectiveness of counsel to reach that result. See Smith, supra, Tamilia, J., concurring and dissenting. It appears these issues were raised and disposed of heretofore with similar results, without reference to claims of ineffectiveness of counsel whether or not objections were raised during the hearing or upon the filing of post-trial motions. I would clarify the right to allege ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal but would not allow the introduction of the criminal rules and procedures to test the claim. My colleagues on the majority appear to be more trusting of criminal procedures and rules adapted to the adversarial proceedings of the Criminal Court than they are of the Juvenile Act, the Judges and Masters of the Juvenile Court and our own appellate bench in determining whether due process and fundamental fairness tests have been met in the nonadversarial rehabilitative milieu of juvenile proceedings. Any step in the direction to recriminalize juvenile proceedings is a retreat to 19th century doctrines, at a time we are approaching the 21st century. The juvenile justice system in Pennsylvania is working surprisingly well and the deficiencies lie primarily with funding and resources and not with the legal and judicial process. To tamper with it, in the face of legislative and procedural prohibitions, is to destabilize it.
CIRILLO, President Judge, joins.

. It is interesting to note that the majority, in reaching the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel, moves directly to the merits despite the lack of post-trial motions as the issue of ineffectiveness was raised for the first time by new counsel on appal. This proves the lack of necessity to create a rule by judicial fiat permitting post-trial motions when the Juvenile Act and the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require them. See Smith, supra, Tamilia, J., concurring and dissenting.