Court Opinion

ID: 9929488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 19:02:26.886586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:26:28.818683
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/2/24 In re I.A. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 In re I.A. et al., Persons Coming                                 B325800
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                     (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04260A-C)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 V.A.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Temporary Judge. Affirmed.
      Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Father appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and
disposition orders under Welfare and Institutions Code sections
300, subdivisions (b) and (j), and 361, subdivision (c).1
Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) contends that the orders are
supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       As relevant here, mother2 and father have three children:
two daughters, I.A. (born June 2010) and M.A. (born March
2012), and a son, A.A. (born July 2016). Mother and father were
married for 14 years, separating in November 2021. Mother filed
for divorce in August 2022. Our record does not clarify whether
there was an operative custody order in the family law case.
Following the parents’ separation, on certain days father would
pick up all three children from school, take them to his home,
give them lunch, and do homework with them. If the girls did not
want to stay with father, he would take them to mother’s house,
while the son spent most nights with father.
       Between July and October 2022, mother called the police on
three different occasions. In the first two incidents, occurring in
July and August 2022, father was picking up the children, and

      1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

      2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

                                 2
I.A. did not want to go with father.3 I.A. reported that father was
verbally abusive, and had pulled her hair, grabbed her arm, and
pushed her chest. Father pushed I.A. while attempting to take
her cell phone away. Father denied touching I.A. In July, father
left without I.A., taking the two younger children before police
arrived. In August, father got into a verbal argument with
maternal grandfather, and physically touched I.A., either
grabbing her by the arm, leaving a red mark, or pulling her hair
and pushing her in the chest. The following day, mother went to
the local police station to report father’s aggressive behavior,
claiming he is an alcoholic with gambling issues and debt.
Mother played a recording of father’s argument with maternal
grandfather, and showed a photo of I.A.’s arm, with light redness
on it, claiming it was bruising from father grabbing I.A.’s arm the
day before. Both incidents resulted in referrals to the
Department, but they were closed as inconclusive.
       On October 26, 2022, police responded to a call by mother
that I.A. was hiding in the bathroom of a pizza restaurant
because father had struck her. Police found I.A. and M.A. in the
restaurant restroom, crying and begging for help. I.A. had a
bruise on her forearm and said father caused the injury when he
hit her. During a police interview at the restaurant, I.A.
described a separate incident that occurred two days earlier, on
October 24, 2022. After school, I.A. did not want to go to father’s
home, and asked father to take them directly to mother’s house.

      3 We describe the July and August incidents together,
because the Department reports and testimony at the
adjudication hearing do not always clarify when certain actions
occurred. For purposes of our discussion, the exact timing is less
important than the actions reported.

                                 3
Father refused, saying the family would go to his parents’ house
for dinner and do homework. I.A. repeatedly asked to be taken to
mother’s home, and refused to eat dinner at father’s house. An
argument ensued, and father took away I.A.’s cell phone. After
dinner, father drove the girls to mother’s house, but continued
yelling at I.A. While driving, he reached into the back of the car
and slapped her on her thigh twice. He also grabbed her
backpack from the back passenger floor, swinging it and striking
her in the arm with the backpack twice, leaving a bruise on her
arm. Mother photographed the bruise when the girls arrived at
her home. M.A. made a voice recording of father immediately
after the backpack incident, in which father was yelling
obscenities in English and Armenian, yelling that no one in the
car should move or even breathe.
       On October 26, 2022, I.A. again wanted father to take her
directly to mother’s home, but father became enraged and said
they were going to the pizza restaurant for dinner. When I.A.
continued asking to be taken home, he pulled the car over, was
yelling at her and slapped her on the left leg and left forearm in
the restaurant, the girls went to the restroom together, and
called mother from M.A.’s cell phone, and mother called the
police. When police arrived, they found both girls in the
restroom. The girls told officers father was an alcoholic and was
becoming more abusive each day; they were terrified of him and
did not feel safe with him. Father refused to take a sobriety test
or allow the officers to look into his eyes. He was arrested for
misdemeanor child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)) and was
served with an emergency protective order (EPO) regarding all
three children. The EPO provided it would expire on
November 2, 2022. Father posted bail. When his attorney

                                4
ultimately appeared in court, father learned the charges had
been dismissed and no protective orders were in place.

Department Investigation and Petition

       I.A. reported to the social worker that she used M.A.’s
phone in the restaurant restroom to call mother because she was
afraid of father, who was yelling at her and hits her often. Both
girls said they were afraid of father because he was too
aggressive with them, they do not feel safe with him driving, and
they believe he is an alcoholic. Mother reported father has been
drinking for six to eight years, but his alcoholism has been worse
since their separation about a year ago. They had a family law
hearing scheduled for November 2, 2022.
       Father denied hitting any of his children or anyone else,
and denied cursing or using damaging words while speaking with
the children. He stated he would yell if they were being
disrespectful.
       On October 28, 2022, the Department filed a dependency
petition, alleging counts under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)
and (j), based on father’s physical abuse of I.A. (counts a-1, b-1,
and j-1) and Milana (counts a-2, b-2, and j-2), and father’s alcohol
abuse (count b-3). At the initial hearing on November 14, 2022,
the court denied mother’s request for a temporary restraining
order, and ordered the children to be released to mother, with
father having monitored visits. The court further provided that
father could attend the girls’ sporting events with a monitor, but
that he would step down from coaching the teams. Both parents
were ordered not to discuss the case with the children or speak
negatively about the other parent to the children.

                                 5
Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing

      The jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place over two
days in December 2022, and the court heard testimony from I.A.,
M.A., and father. After argument and a short break, the court
announced it would sustain an amended b-1 count and dismiss
all remaining counts of the dependency petition. As amended,
the count read: “On prior occasions, . . . [father] used
inappropriate physical means to remove [IA.’s] phone from her
grasp and pushed [M.A.] and engaged in aggressive tactics to
make them comply with the father’s wishes. Such inappropriate
physical actions and aggressions made [I.A.] and [M.A.] fear their
father and caused them some pain and endangers their physical
health and safety and places them and their sibling [A.A.] at risk
of physical harm.” The court ordered the Department to arrange
child and family team meetings for paternal and maternal family
members, so all family members would be aware of the order to
refrain from making negative comments about either parent.
The court ordered monitored visits for father, recognizing that
the girls may not be ready to visit with him, and so they could
decline or have the visit end early if they wished. The court
ordered the children removed from father’s custody under section
361, subdivision (c), placing them with mother.

                          DISCUSSION

      Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support
the court’s exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions
(b) and (j). He argues that there was insufficient evidence of

                                 6
serious physical harm. He also argues that even if we were to
find sufficient evidence that he physically disciplined the
children, his actions fell within his right to reasonably discipline
his children, and his actions did not establish that the children
were at substantial risk of serious physical harm at the time of
the jurisdictional hearing. Finally, father challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s removal order.
Father has not demonstrated that there was insufficient evidence
to support the court’s orders.

Jurisdiction: Relevant Law and Standard of Review

      Pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile
court may exercise jurisdiction over a child if it finds “[t]he child
has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] [t]he
failure or inability of [his or her] parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the child[.]” Under section 300,
subdivision (j), the court may exercise jurisdiction over a child
upon finding “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected,
as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a
substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as
defined in those subdivisions.”
      If parents’ actions fall within the scope of their right to
reasonably discipline their children, those actions may not serve
as the basis of dependency jurisdiction under section 300. (In re
D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 640 [acknowledging “exception
to dependency jurisdiction for reasonable discipline,” which
“applies across the board to all of section 300’s jurisdictional
grounds”].) For this “ ‘parental disciplinary privilege’ ” to apply,

                                   7
however, three elements must be satisfied: (1) the parent acted
with “ ‘a genuine disciplinary motive;’ ” (2) the discipline was
necessary (i.e., warranted by the circumstances); and (3) the
amount of punishment was reasonable and not excessive. (In re
D.M., supra, at p. 641; Gonzalez v. Santa Clara County Dept. of
Social Services (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 72, 91 [“a successful
assertion of the parental disciplinary privilege requires three
elements: (1) a genuine disciplinary motive; (2) a reasonable
occasion for discipline; and (3) a disciplinary measure reasonable
in kind and degree”]
       We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional orders for
substantial evidence. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987,
992 (Yolanda L.).) Under this standard, “we view the record in
the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations,
drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support
the juvenile court’s findings and orders.” (Ibid.) “We do not
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.]” (In re Dakota H. (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 (Dakota H.).)
       “Substantial evidence must be of ponderable legal
significance. It is not synonymous with ‘any’ evidence.
[Citation.] The evidence must be reasonable in nature, credible,
and of solid value. [Citation.]” (Dakota H., supra, 132
Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) “The appellant has the burden of showing
there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support
the finding or order. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “ ‘. . . “The ultimate test
is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in
question in light of the whole record.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(Yolanda L., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.)

                                  8
Evidentiary Support for Jurisdictional Findings

       In challenging the evidentiary support for the court’s
jurisdictional finding, father focuses on the court’s determination
that he used inappropriate physical means to take I.A.’s phone
from her, pushed M.A., and engaged in aggressive tactics that
placed the children at risk of harm. He points out inconsistencies
in the children’s statements, and highlights mother’s efforts to
limit father’s custody and visitation rights through the family law
proceeding.
       While there may have been inconsistent or conflicting
evidence, the evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction when
viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s decision.
       The Department’s reports and the children’s testimony at
the adjudication hearing described specific incidents where father
pushed I.A. in the chest and pulled her hair after she said she did
not want to go with father. Father repeatedly denied hitting his
children, but there is ample evidence to the contrary, and we
leave questions of credibility to the juvenile court. M.A. testified
that father did not used to act so aggressively, but started hitting
after parents separated. During his testimony at the
adjudication hearing, father admitted that he would yell when
the children, particularly I.A., were being disrespectful. He also
admitted asking mother for assistance when I.A. was being
difficult, noting that mother mocked him, rather than helped
him. In light of all of the testimony, and father’s continued
insistence that he did not hit his children at all, it was reasonable
for the court to infer that, absent court intervention, there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding that that father’s conduct
in response to I.A.’s defiant attitude had placed I.A. at risk of

                                 9
serious physical harm and would escalate, placing all three
children at risk of serious physical harm.
       Recognizing the state of the record and our general
deference to jurisdictional findings supported by substantial
evidence, father also argues his actions constituted reasonable
parental discipline. We are not convinced by father’s argument,
because the court could reasonably infer that father’s aggressive
attitude and physical actions—and the pain and fear they
triggered in his daughters—were neither genuinely disciplinary
nor warranted by the circumstances.
       In D.M., the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over the
children based in part on its finding that, by spanking them with
a sandal, mother engaged in inappropriate discipline amounting
to physical abuse. (In re D.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 638.)
The D.M. court reversed the jurisdictional finding pertaining to
the mother’s physical abuse, reasoning the juvenile court
improperly relied on a “blanket rule” that “treats the implement
of punishment (a sandal rather than a hand) as dispositive,” and
therefore applied the wrong legal standard by failing to “consider
the genuineness, necessity, or reasonableness of mother's use of
spanking as a disciplinary measure[.]” (Id. at pp. 642–643.) The
D.M. court remanded the case so the juvenile court could apply
the three-part test described above to ascertain whether the
mother’s actions fell within the parental disciplinary privilege.
(Id. at p. 643.)
       Here, in contrast to the parent in D.M., father denied
hitting his children, and testified that he disciplined I.A. by
taking away things she liked, such as her cell phone or basketball
games. Father acknowledged only that he would yell at I.A. if
she spoke disrespectfully, and the court acknowledged that

                               10
handling disrespect from a pre-teen poses a parental challenge.
However, nothing in the court’s statements or the sustained
jurisdictional finding supports that the court viewed father’s
physical acts as having a genuine disciplinary motive. To the
contrary, there is ample evidence to support the court’s
determination that father’s actions stemmed not from an
intention to discipline the older sister, but rather from anger and
frustration.
      On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude
father’s actions, considered in the context of a heated custody
battle and a defiant oldest daughter intent on spending as little
time with father as possible, were not genuinely disciplinary.
Because successful assertion of the parental disciplinary privilege
requires satisfaction of all three elements of the applicable test
(Gonzalez, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 91), the court did not err
in sustaining the amended allegation. Accordingly, there is
substantial evidence to support the court’s determination that
the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical
harm absent court involvement.

Disposition order: Relevant Law and Standard of Review

      Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides for the removal of a
dependent child from the physical custody of the parent “with
whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated” if
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or
would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the
minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means
by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without

                                11
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical
custody.” Subdivision (d) contains similar provisions with respect
to removal from a parent with whom the child did not reside.
(§ 361, subd. (d) [removal requires finding of substantial danger,
as in subd. (c)(1), for the parent to live with the child rather than
for the child to return home].) “[B]oth subdivision (c) and
subdivision (d) impose the same factfinding requirements and
heightened clear and convincing burden of proof for removal.” (In
re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 720 [any error in removal
order under section 361, subdivision (c), rather than subdivision
(d) was harmless].)
       “ ‘On appeal from a dispositional order removing a child
from a parent we apply the substantial evidence standard of
review, keeping in mind that the trial court was required to make
its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing
evidence.’ ([In re] Ashly F. [(2014)] 225 Cal.App.4th [803,] 809;
see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005 [‘when
presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence,
the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole,
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by
this standard of proof’].) ‘ “ ‘ The ultimate test is whether it is
reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in
light of the whole record.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520–521.)

                                 12
Evidentiary Support for Disposition Order

      The Department argues that the factual record here does
not support that the children were living with father at the time
the dependency petition was filed; accordingly, the Department
contends that the removal order at issue could not have been
made under section 361, subdivision (c), and that the clear and
convincing evidence standard does not apply. We need not
resolve any conflict about the evidence regarding whether the
children were living with father, however, because section 361
authorizes the court to remove a child from parental custody
regardless of whether the child resides with the parent or not, so
long as there is clear and convincing evidence that there would be
a substantial danger for the parent to live with the child. (See
section 361, subds. (c) and (d).)
      Applying the heightened standard on appeal for review of a
finding that a juvenile court must make by clear and convincing
evidence, we find that the same substantial evidence outlined
above, considering the record as a whole, provides adequate
support for the court’s removal order.

                               13
                   DISPOSITION

The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                        MOOR, J.
I concur:

            RUBIN, P. J.

                           14
In re I.A. et al.
B325800

BAKER, J., Dissenting

       I respectfully dissent. The grounds on which the juvenile
court took jurisdiction over the children in this case do not satisfy
the threshold for jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300.1 As I shall briefly explain, the juvenile court’s
own findings establish this is so. I accordingly believe the
majority errs by speculating about what the juvenile court could
have concluded or inferred—but did not actually conclude or
infer.
       The juvenile court dismissed the dependency petition’s
section 300, subdivision (a) count alleging Father inflicted serious
physical harm nonaccidentally on the children (or presented a
substantial risk of inflicting such harm). The juvenile court also
specifically found the children’s testimony that Father hit I.A.
with a backpack while driving was not credible. But the juvenile
court determined it would assert jurisdiction by sustaining its
own self-styled allegation that Father “used inappropriate
physical means to remove [I.A.’s] phone from her grasp and
pushed [M.A.] and engaged in aggressive tactics to make them
comply with [F]ather’s wishes.”

1
      Statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
       The problem, however, is that the juvenile court never
decided whether Father’s actions described in the allegations the
court crafted to make a risk of serious physical harm finding
(even while dismissing the allegation that Father inflicted such
harm nonaccidentally) were justified as reasonable parental
discipline. (See generally § 300 [“It is the intent of the
Legislature that this section not . . . prohibit the use of
reasonable methods of parental discipline[ ] or prescribe a
particular method of parenting”]; In re D.M. 242 Cal.App.4th 634,
640.) And that is not because the court was not alerted to the
issue: both the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services and Father argued at the jurisdiction hearing
that, given the evidence, the court needed to make a finding
about whether Father took the actions he did in service of
reasonable parental discipline. The court, however, never did.
       In some circumstances, reviewing courts can imply findings
that were not made. On this record, there are two reasons why
we should not and, indeed, cannot. First, as already discussed,
the juvenile court dismissed the section 300, subdivision (a) count
and found not credible the only evidence about “aggressive
tactics” that might present a substantial risk of serious physical
harm and yet be difficult to attribute to reasonable parental
discipline (the backpack striking). Second, such an implied
finding is directly contrary to an express finding the juvenile
court did make. When articulating its ruling on the record, the
court left no doubt about the real reason why it was assuming
jurisdiction: “[I] think that the nastiness and the vile feelings of
the parents’ separation are dripping onto the children. And
that’s the primary reason why I’m asserting jurisdiction in this
case.”

                                 2
      Because we do not defer to lower court findings that were
never made, and because the record is clear that the juvenile
court asserted jurisdiction for reasons that are insufficient under
the only subdivisions of section 300 pled and sustained in the
dependency petition, I would reverse.

                            BAKER, J.

                                 3