Court Opinion

ID: 9777380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:08:59.205722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:33.246245
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice
(concurring).
In remanding this case to this Court the Supreme Court agreed with appellant that in evaluating and overruling appellants’ motion for an extension of time for filing a statement of facts we used “an erroneous rule of law.” The Supreme Court further stated, “The court of civil appeals has determined the issue of good cause under an erroneous rule of law.” 430 S.W.2d 483.
The rule of law which we applied in overruling appellants’ motion is reflected by the following quotation from our opinion:
“Our holding simply is that waiting twenty-three or twenty-four days before ordering a statement of facts is not acting promptly within the above rule and that unless it be shown that had the statement of facts been ordered promptly it still could not have been prepared within the time allowed good cause within Rule 386, T.R.C.P., as construed in Matlock v. Matlock, 151 Tex. 308, 249 S.W.2d 587, is not shown. There the Court emphasized that under the Rule appellant must show ‘good cause why he could not file’ (italics ours) the record timely, and further stated that Courts of Civil Appeals have hut little discretion in determining whether to permit the late filing of a transcript.” Tex.Civ.App., 421 S.W.2d 921 (Italics added).
The Supreme Court in reversing us had this to say about Matlock:
“Nothing said in this opinion is intended to detract from our decision in Matlock or from our opinion as it dealt with the fact situation in that case. But our statement in Matlock that the fact situation before it ‘left the Court of Civil Appeals with but little discretion in determining whether or not to permit the late filing of a transcript’ should not be interpreted as meaning that courts of civil appeals have little or no discretion to permit the late filing of transcripts and statements of facts in other situations.”
I submit that it was not the “fact situation” in Matlock which prompted the Court there to hold that the Courts of Civil *154Appeals were left “with but little discretion” in determining whether to permit the late filing of a record. It was Rule 386, as there interpreted, which left us with but little discretion. Under the facts of Mat-lock we had no discretion.
The following quotation from Matlock demonstrates the validity of this comment:
“When, under authority of the Legislature, this court adopted rules of civil procedure it brought forward in Rule 386 amended Article 1839 without any change material here. It preserved the exact language of the statute as amended in 1933 and 1939, which provided that the motion must show ‘good cause * * * why said transcript and statement of facts could not be so filed.’ The rule cannot, therefore, be treated as one adopted by the court for its convenience or for the more orderly submission of causes, which the court might feel at liberty to waive for any cause deemed by it to be sufficient. To the contrary, the rule carries forward an unambiguous statute declaring the public policy of the State on a question of importance in the administration of justice. When the Legislature in 1931 materially reduced the time for filing the transcript, it declared in the emergency clause that the crowded condition of the dockets of the courts ‘demands that the laws governing the practice and procedure therein be so amended as to expedite and simplify the business of the Courts as soon as possible.’ The same language appears in the emergency clause of the Act of 1933, indicating that by granting additional time within which to file a motion for permission to file a transcript after the sixty-day period, the Legislature intended to restrict the meaning of ‘good cause’ to cases in which the appellant could not file the transcript within the sixty-day period. Obviously, that restriction left the Court of Civil Appeals with but little discretion in determining whether or not to permit the late filing of a transcript.” 151 Tex. 308, 249 S.W.2d 587.
Cases from other Courts of Civil Appeals which expressly hold that, under Matlock, it is the rule that leaves the Courts of Civil Appeals with but little discretion in these matters are: State v. Camper, 261 S.W.2d 465, Dallas, (1953) writ ref.; Jaye v. Texas Consolidated Oils, 287 S.W.2d 688, Dallas (1956) n. w. h.; Couch v. City of Richardson, 313 S.W.2d 949, Dallas (1958) writ ref. n. r. e.; Consolidated Casualty Insurance Co. v. Wade, 373 S.W.2d 841, Corpus Christi (1963) writ dismissed; Williams v. Williams, 392 S.W.2d 539, Tyler (1965) n. w. h. To the same effect is 4 Tex.Tur.2d, Appeal and Error — Civil—Sec. 564, p. 88.
In Wigley v. Taylor, 393 S.W.2d 170, Tex.Sup. (1965) cited in both prior opinions herein, the Court had an excellent opportunity to disavow Matlock, but the case was not mentioned.
In Douglas v. Wheeler, 306 S.W.2d 956 (1957) this Court denied appellant an extension of time within which to file a statement of facts under circumstances similar to but more appealing than those presented here, the Court stating the rule to be applied in this language:
“Even though the trial court is vested with ‘broad discretion’ in determining what is good cause for the late filing of a statement of facts in that court, State v. Camper, supra, in Matlock v. Matlock, 151 Tex. 308, 249 S.W.2d 587, it is said that the meaning of good cause for failure to timely file the transcript in the Court of Civil Appeals is restricted to cases in which the transcript could not be filed within the sixty day period and that the Court of Civil Appeals is left ‘with but little discretion in determining whether or not to permit the late filing of a transcript.’ ”
A writ of error was applied for in that case but the Supreme Court did not grant the writ and remand the case to this Court *155on the ground that we had used an erroneous rule of law, rather the Supreme Court approved the decision of this Court in refusing the writ because it found no reversible error.
I am delighted that the Supreme Court has modified the harsh rule of Matlock. I regret only that litigants, such as Douglas, have been deprived of their right of review of adverse judgments because of a breakdown in communications between the Supreme Court and the Courts of Civil Appeals.
I concur in the action of this Court in granting appellants’ motion for an extension of time within which to file a statement of facts.