Court Opinion

ID: 9638127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:34:08.479011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:04.011598
License: Public Domain

RUTLEDGE, Associate Justice.
I concur in the result. The circumstance which justifies the exercise of jurisdiction here and, in my opinion, distinguishes this case from Curley v. Curley, *421941, 74 App.D.C. 163, 120 F.2d 730, 732, is the fact that, as this record discloses, it may be difficult if not impossible for appellee to maintain a suit for maintenance elsewhere.1- Within the period of their matrimonial troubles appellant has resided at various times in Virginia, the District of Columbia and Maryland, and has claimed both residence and legal domicil in Arkansas. Since that claim has been rejected, the location of his domicil in any of the jurisdictions where he has resided might be very difficult for appellee to establish in another suit brought in any of them. She therefore has no convenient forum for securing the service of process on a domiciliary basis. Without that she might be unable to secure personal service in Virginia, her own and the last matrimonial domicil, and other jurisdictions might apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens applied in the Curley case,2 even though service were secured by catching appellant on the run. To decline jurisdiction here and commit appellee to suit elsewhere might therefore be to put her upon a merry-go-round of litigation in other jurisdictions, with no certainty that any of them could or would exercise jurisdiction in her behalf. But for this difficulty, I should think the second marriage on the faith of the Arkansas divorce would constitute a strong reason, additional to those stated in the Curley case, for declining to exercise jurisdiction in this one.3 The second wife is not a party to this suit, and while her rights are not and cannot be adjudicated, they also cannot but be affected seriously, if only indirectly in the legal sense. If another convenient forum were available, therefore, in my opinion exercise of jurisdiction ought to be declined, in accordance with the ruling in Curley v. Curley, supra. This, in order to avoid the necessity of declaring, without adjudicating, that the second marriage is void and doing so in a proceeding to which the second wife is not a party. It is doubtful whether any but a domiciliary jurisdiction of at least one of the parties should undertake to do this in any case. But since appellant’s domicil has been so beclouded, the present circumstances justify a nondomiciliary jurisdiction in granting relief, if any could do so. I therefore concur in the decision which my brethren have reached.

 Cf. notes 2 and 3 infra.

 As I understand the Curley case, there were two independent grounds of decision, namely, that in the circumstances (1) comity might be and ought to be extended to the Florida decree; (2) that exercise of jurisdiction should be declined in application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
For recent application and discussion of the doctrine, see Universal Adjustment Corporation v. Midland Bank, 1933, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152, 87 A.L.R. 1407, and authorities cited and discussed; Note (1933) 87 A.L.R. 1425; Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum (1935) 29 Ill. L.Rev. 867.

 The opinion in Curley v. Curley does not purport to make an inclusive enumeration of factors or circumstances indicating that exercise of jurisdiction should be declined. Those mentioned are illustrative. Undue hardship to the defendant in allowing the suit to be maintained and absence of special hardship to the plaintiff in remitting him to a more appropriate forum are taken into account. Universal Adjustment Corporation v. Midland Bank, 1933, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152, 158, 87 A.L.R. 1407. Apropos the situation in the present case is the statement: “For the plea of forum non cenveniens to succeed, it is necessary to show that some other court in a civilized country has jurisdiction.” ' Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum (1935) 29 Ill.L.Rev. 867, 883, citing authorities.