Court Opinion

ID: 2689742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-08-01 20:22:14.035321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:56:51.139393
License: Public Domain

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL V. FOWERBAUGH.

     [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), ___ Ohio

St.3d ___.]

When an attorney engages in a course of conduct that violates DR 1-

              102(A)(4), the attorney will be actually suspended from

              the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.

Attorneys at law -- Misconduct -- Misleading or lying to a client

     concerning a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer by a client --When

     an attorney engages in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,

     or misrepresentation, the attorney will be actually suspended from

     the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.

     (No. 95-394 -- Submitted September 13, 1995 -- Decided

December 12, 1995.)

     On Certified Report by the Board of Commissioners on

Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 94-25.

     Relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint with

the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the

Supreme Court (“board”), charging respondent, Albert E.

Fowerbaugh of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0001535,

with violating DR 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without
preparation adequate in the circumstances), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting

an entrusted legal matter), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and 1-

102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects upon his

fitness to practice law). Respondent stipulated to all charged

disciplinary violations, as well as many of the allegations in the

complaint. The matter was heard by a panel of the board on January

13, 1995.

      The stipulations and testimony before the hearing panel

establish that in April 1992, Patricia Veale, a resident of Florida,

retained respondent to represent her in obtaining a parentage and

child support order for her minor child. Beginning in May 1992,

respondent conducted negotiations with the attorney for the putative

father concerning a settlement on these issues. By July 1993, Veale

had become concerned with respondent’s representation after

numerous telephone calls to respondent were made without

response. Moreover, respondent had ignored Veale’s requests to

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have the putative father pay the cost of the blood test used in

determining paternity.

      Apparently in an attempt to placate his client, respondent

misrepresented to Veale that he was proceeding with a paternity

action in Summit County Juvenile Court. In late September 1993,

Veale repeatedly inquired as to the status of her case and requested

copies of court documents that would confirm to her that respondent

had actually filed the paternity action. On September 28, 1993,

Veale received what appeared to be a copy of a complaint filed in

Summit County Juvenile Court. Actually, the document was a fake.

      Respondent testified that shortly after misrepresenting to Veale

about the filing of the case, he attempted to file the complaint with

the juvenile court. The court refused to accept the complaint for filing

as the case should have been filed with the Child Support

Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”). However, the CSEA would not

accept the complaint because of Veale’s non-resident status. In an

effort to stall his client’s inquiries, respondent created a false

document by superimposing an official time stamp from another

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document onto the rejected complaint, adding a fictitious case

number, and “assigning” an actual Summit County judge to the

action. Respondent then faxed the fabricated document to his client.

      After receiving the fraudulent “complaint”, Veale called the

Summit County Juvenile Court to determine if a complaint had been

filed. The clerk informed her that the court was not issuing numbers

in the range of the case number appearing on the “complaint”.

      Respondent perpetuated his dishonest conduct by falsely

indicating to Veale that a hearing on her paternity action had been

scheduled for November 4, 1993. Continuing to mislead his client,

respondent called Veale in late October 1993 to confirm the fictitious

hearing date. Still suspicious, Veale nonetheless purchased an

airline ticket in anticipation of attending the hearing. Further

deceiving his client, respondent prepared and sent to Veale what

appeared to be an official request for production of documents.

      Shortly before the fictitious hearing date, respondent falsely

represented to Veale that the November 4 court date, which had

never been scheduled, had been canceled due to a scheduling error

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by the court. After this final blatant misrepresentation, respondent

sent a letter to Veale terminating the attorney-client relationship and

returning the retainer fee. Nowhere in the letter did respondent

acknowledge his failure to file the action with the juvenile court or his

subsequent pattern of misrepresentation to her.

      The hearing panel found that despite the testimony of the

complaining witness and respondent’s stipulations that he had

violated all the Disciplinary Rules charged in the complaint, the

evidence supported only a violation of DR 6-101(A)(2) for “handling”

a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances and

a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) for engaging in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

      In recommending a public reprimand for this misconduct, the

hearing panel considered that respondent did not create financial

hardship or pecuniary loss to Veale, that Veale was receiving $450

per month which respondent had negotiated, that he had practiced

for thirty years with no history of disciplinary violations, and that he

had been candid with the panel. The panel also considered that

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respondent had been suffering personal problems and upheaval in

his office, both of which have since been corrected. The board

adopted the panel’s findings and recommended that respondent

receive a public reprimand.

                         -----------------------------

      Geoffrey Stern, Disciplinary Counsel, and Alvin E. Mathews,

Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

      Albert E. Fowerbaugh, pro se.

                         -----------------------------

      MOYER, C.J. This disciplinary case presents the court with an

opportunity to provide guidance to certified grievance committees

and the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline in all

cases where an attorney engages in a pattern of conduct of

misleading or lying to a client concerning a legal matter entrusted to

the lawyer by the client. DR 1-102(A)(4) is straight forward and

unambiguous. It states that a “lawyer shall not *** [e]ngage in

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”

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     In discipline cases where an attorney has deceived a client, we

have imposed a varying range of sanctions. In Disciplinary Counsel

v. Gwyn (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 8, 640 N.E.2d 1141, we publicly

reprimanded an attorney for violating DR 6-101(A)(3) and 1-

102(A)(4). In Gwyn, the respondent told his client that he had filed a

lawsuit when in fact he had not filed the suit. The misrepresentations

continued for two years. The respondent even fabricated pleadings

falsely indicating that the case had been filed and dismissed. During

that time, however, the respondent made other efforts to resolve the

matter, including research into the legal issues involved in the case

and attempts at discovery. Because of respondent’s forthright

testimony and numerous character witnesses, the court adopted the

board’s recommendation that respondent receive only a public

reprimand. Gwyn, 71 Ohio St.3d at 10, 640 N.E.2d at 1142.

     In Toledo Bar Assn. v. Dzienny (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 173, 648

N.E.2d 499, the respondent failed to file a medical malpractice

lawsuit before the statute of limitations expired. Converting an act of

malpractice into a violation of the Code of Professional

                                   7
Responsibility, respondent concealed his malpractice and continually

misled his clients regarding the status of the lawsuit. The Board of

Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found that the

respondent had violated both the DR 6-102(A) and 1-102(A)(4), and

recommended a six-month suspension that should be stayed. In

rejecting respondent’s plea for a public reprimand the court adopted

the board’s recommendation, stating that “[i]n light of the significant

and lengthy deception of his clients, the respondent’s argument that

he deserves the lightest punishment possible under the rules is

without merit.” Dzienny, 72 Ohio St.3d at 175, 648 N.E.2d at 501,

(Moyer, C.J., dissenting to the stay of the suspension).

      More recently we moved closer to the rule we announce today.

In Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Speros (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 101, 104,

652 N.E.2d 681, 683, we stated that “[d]ishonesty toward a client,

whose interests are the attorney’s duty to protect, is reprehensible.

And, as we continue to see such violations of DR 1-102(A)(4), we

recognize that this misconduct may hereafter require more severe

                                    8
discipline than we have previously imposed.” Respondent was

suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for six months.

      We express our growing concern with the increase in the

discipline matters referred to us by the Board of Commissioners on

Grievances and Discipline in which members of the bar of Ohio have

deceived their clients or a court. A lawyer who engages in a material

misrepresentation to a court or a pattern of dishonesty with a client

violates at a minimum, the lawyer’s oath of office that he or she will

not “knowingly employ or countenance any *** deception, falsehood

or fraud.” Gov. Bar R.I(8)(A). Such conduct strikes at the very core

of a lawyer’s relationship with the court and with the client. Respect

for our profession is diminished with every deceitful act of a lawyer.

We cannot expect citizens to trust that lawyers are honest if we have

not yet sanctioned those who are not. Therefore, recognizing that

the sanctions that we have imposed heretofore against lawyers who

have violated DR 1-102(A)(4) are apparently not causing some

lawyers to understand the importance of being honest with courts

and clients, we announce a rule that will be applied to this case and

                                   9
future cases. When an attorney engages in a course of conduct

resulting in a finding that the attorney has violated DR 1-102(A)(4),

the attorney will be actually suspended from the practice of law for an

appropriate period of time.

      In the instant case, respondent engaged in a continuing course

of deceit and misrepresentation designed to cover up his inaction on

an entrusted legal matter. After lying to his client about proceeding

with the case, respondent fabricated documents to perpetuate the

fraud until he finally withdrew from the case. Respondent argues that

his cover-up was merely an effort to stall his client’s inquiries, and

that his reliance on misinformation that he received from the juvenile

court necessitated the deception. We find these arguments to be

spurious. Rather than accepting personal responsibility for his

actions, respondent attempts to justify his conduct. Furthermore,

respondent’s protracted deception would not have been uncovered if

his client had not taken it upon herself to verify her own attorney’s

actions.

                                    10
      While we are cognizant of the pressures and demands, both

professional and personal, that attorneys may face, this court “cannot

permit attorneys who lie either to their clients or to the court to

continue practicing law without interruption.” Disciplinary Counsel v.

Greene (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 13, ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___.

Therefore, we hold that when an attorney engages in a course of

conduct that violates DR 1-102(A)(4), the attorney will be actually

suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.

      In spite of respondent’s stipulation that he violated DR 6-

101(A)(2), 6-101(A)(3), 1-102(A)(4), and 1-102(A)(6), the hearing

panel and the board dismissed both the 6-101(A)(3) and 1-102(A)(6)

charges because they believed these charges had not been proven

by clear and convincing evidence. We defer to the board and will not

disturb that finding. However, we remind the board that an attorney’s

conduct may constitute neglect when the attorney fails “‘to advance a

client matter for which he has been retained. Neglect is different

from negligence and usually requires a pattern of disregarding

                                    11
obligations or repeated omissions by an attorney.’ [Citation omitted].”

Dzienny, 72 Ohio St.3d at 176, 648 N.E.2d at 502.

      For the foregoing reasons, we order that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio for six

months. Costs taxed to respondent.

                                                      Judgment accordingly.

      WRIGHT, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur.

      DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in judgment only.

      PFEIFER, J., dissents and would suspend respondent for six

months, stayed.

      Alice Robie Resnick, J., concurring in judgment. For the reasons set

forth in my dissenting opinion in Disciplinary Counsel v. Greene (1995), 74

Ohio St.3d 13, ___ N.E.2d ___, I concur in judgment only. It is the

responsibility of this court to give guidance as to what conduct constitutes a

violation of the Disciplinary Rules. It is not the province of this court to use

syllabus law to mandate a particular sanction once a violation has been

found. The sanction in each individual’s case should be determined based

upon the unique facts and circumstances of that case.

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DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

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