Court Opinion

ID: 9456009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:39:47.013044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:49.414735
License: Public Domain

EDENFIELD, District Judge
(dissenting) :
Judge Tuttle has written an analytical and exhaustive opinion. After some research and much deliberation, however, I must dissent. In short, considering the state of this record, the business background of each of these parties, and the subject matter of this contract, I think there should be a trial; and, like Judge Tuttle, I base this conclusion on the language of the contract itself. I might feel differently if the subject matter of the contract were something other than a computer or if the background of the parties was different. But these parties were businessmen. A contract between businessmen, whether clear or ambiguous, should be construed on the basis of its own facts, in the light of sound business practice, with business sense and with the understanding and interpretation of businessmen or intelligent men of affairs. (17A C.J.S. Contracts § 294c, pp. 37-38.) The contention of Honeywell, adopted by the majority, is that it was to do little more than to furnish certain naked pieces of equipment. It did imply that the machine would run, since it was to furnish maintenance, but its contention is that it did not promise that it would accomplish any result whatsoever or even print a single line. Like the Mona Lisa of the ballad, its computer, as far as guaranteed results were concerned, was just a cold and lovely work of art. I simply cannot conceive of two capable businessmen negotiating for the sale or lease of a computer except on the basis of what it would do. Ultimately this is what Honeywell was selling and this is what Lovable thought it would get. I would examine the contract accordingly.
Against this background the “Addendum” to this contract, though admittedly not very explicit, nevertheless takes on a meaning to me quite different from that which the majority opinion would give it. It says to me, very clearly, that by the contract both parties understood and expected that the machine would at least accomplish something. For example, in subparagraph (b) of the Addendum Honeywell agrees to furnish a systems analyst to assist Lovable “in the design and implementation of a system whereby the equipment specified shall overate satisfactorily for use as *678described below.” The use. described below is stated in subsection (f) to be “time-keeping, accounting for accounts receivable and payroll, statistical computation, order writing, and billing.”
Again in subparagraph (f) Honeywell agrees that in the event it is determined that the equipment “will not handle the reasonable needs of Lessee” the contract may be cancelled.
From these words of the contract itself, it is clear to me that at least one of the parties thought it was bargaining for at least some results and that this was known to the other party. Con-cededly, the question is a close one but to my mind these circumstances exude at least enough “ambiguity” to permit parol evidence and to allow a jury to consider the applicability of Ga.Code Ann. § 20-703 to the effect that:
“The intention of the parties may differ among themselves. In such case, the meaning placed on the contract by one party, and known to be thus understood by the other party, at the time, shall be held as the true meaning.”
This is not to suggest that the plaintiff would or should recover on trial. Its delay in asserting its claim suggests that the whole suit may have been an afterthought; or it may be barred from recovery by failing to give notice of default as required by section 9.2 of the contract. Indeed the evidence may show that plaintiff itself was a computer expert and that it was warned that results were not guaranteed. I only suggest that the agreement is sufficiently ambiguous to entitle the plaintiff to a trial and an opportunity to present its evidence instead of being unceremoniously dumped out of court on motion.