Court Opinion

ID: 9526073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:11:32.931433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:20.002006
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, P.J.,
concurring.
I concur, but would summarily affirm the trial court's division of marital property since our review of the exercise of discretion in such cases is meaningless. Iu rejecting the proposition that our dissolution statute requires a 50-50 division of marital property as a starting point, our supreme court has reinstated the pre-Luedke situation in which a trial court's range of choice is virtually limitless and our review little more than pretense. See Luedke v. Luedke (1985) Ind. 487 N.E.2d 133, vacating 476 N.E.2d 853.
IND.CODE 31-1-11.5-11(b) directs a trial court to divide marital property in a "just and reasonable" manner after considering the factors listed in paragraphs (1) to (5), but does not specify the weight to be given each factor or define a range of choice. The determination of what is "just and reasonable" is thus left completely to the discretion of the trial court. Consequently, the distribution of assets varies from court to court depending on the predisposition or whim of a particular trial judge. Moreover, the lack of specific directives together with the difficulty of determining what is a "just" distribution greatly increases the temptation of the trial *367judge to rely on non-statutory factors. At worst, property is distributed according to who was "good" or "bad", notions of no-fault divorcee temporarily having been set aside.
The prospect of appellate review has offered no respite from this situation. As long as it appears the trial court "considered" the statutory factors, an appellate court is hard pressed to find an abuse of discretion. This effective denial of appellate review seriously impacts the many displaced homemakers appearing in our courts who leave the marriage with few marketable skills and, since the demise of alimony, must depend on the property distribution for their financial well-being.
In the midst of this morass, Judge Miller suggested that I.C. 81-1-11.5-11(b)(1) should be interpreted as creating a rebut-table presumption that an even division of marital property between a homemaker and wage earner is equitable. 476 N.E.2d at 864-65. This 50-50 starting point would not only have given trial courts a point from which to begin the consideration of statutory factors, but also would have provided a basis for real appellate review of the trial court's distribution.
With the vacation of Lwedke, our supreme court has ignored the profound consequences of property distributions to dissolution litigants and restored a situation in which the financial well-being of these parties is left to the good graces of a particular trial judge whose decision is difficult, if not impossible, to overturn on appeal.