Court Opinion

ID: 9831666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:16:29.421245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:36.845966
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In their motion for rehearing defendants in error insist most earnestly that we have overlooked essential factors of the case and have not given due weight to the authorities cited. The propositions urged were considered carefully and the authorities examined with equal care before our original opinion was handed down. However, in recognition of the importance of the principles involved and in deference to the zeal and seriousness of counsel for defendants in error, we have re-examined with extreme care the authorities cited by them as well as other authorities, and to meet the criticism that defendants in error’s contentions were treated lightly, we further elaborate our views as to the authorities:
Defendants in error seem to rely most strongly upon People v. Beach, 49 Colo. 516, 113 P. 513, 37 L.R.A.,N.S., 873. In that case the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed a decision of the trial court sustaining a general demurrer to a complaint against a sheriff and the surety upon his bond. However, the state of facts there presented by the pleading was quite different from that with which we are now confronted. There the pleading, which attempted to allege a cause of action in favor of a prisoner who was injured by the *573negligent dropping by a deputy sheriff of a loaded revolver which had been taken from the prisoner’s person, failed to allege facts showing that the prisoner had been lawfully arrested, or that the deputy sheriff had a lawful right to search the prisoner and seize the revolver. The effect of the decision is that mere conclusions of the pleader, which are not statements of fact, were not sufficient as against general demurrer, which is not the Texas rule. Walters v. Great Nat. Life Ins. Co., Tex. Com.App., 124 S.W.2d 850, and cases there cited. The court was careful to say that it must not be understood as holding that for an unlawful act, or one in excess of the officer’s legitimate authority, a surety on an official bond may not be held liable for resulting damages when the act is done by the deputy by virtue of or under color of his office. In State ex rel. Hamilton et al. v. May et al., 177 Mo.App. 717, 160 S.W. 1030, cited by defendant in error, it was said that no recovery could be had because it was not charged that the act done was unlawful. The court said that though it should be granted that the act was grossly negligent, it was impossible to hold that it was done contrary to law and that in doing it the officer could be said not to have discharged the duties of his office according to law. He left a door open while executing process, as a result of which an infant boy then in the building, contracted pneumonia from which he thereafter died. The court quoted with approval an expression of the Maryland Court to the effect that there was no clause in the bond to cover an abuse or usurpation of power — no negative words that he (the officer) could commit no wrong by color of his office nor do anything not authorized by law. The distinction between the cases is readily seen. In Clement v. Dunn, 114 Cal.App. 60, 299 P. 545, it was held that a deputy driving to a place where he was to perform an official act was not then engaged in its performance, and therefore the sheriff could not be held liable for damages occasioned by the deputy’s negligent driving. Usrey v. Yarnell, 181 Ark. 804, 27 S.W.2d 988 and Humphrey v. Ownby, Mo.App., 104 S.W.2d 398, are to the same effect; while in Williams v. Priddy, 188 Ark. 137, 64 S.W.2d 553, the statement of facts is so meager that we are unable to determine whether or not the deputy ■ was performing a duty devolving upon the sheriff at the time his car collided with that of the injured person, though it is fairly inferable that such was the case.
In contrast to the last cited case is the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Hanratty v. Godfrey, 44 Ohio App. 360, 184 N.E. 842, holding that the negligence of a deputy sheriff in operating an automobile belonging to the county and under control of the sheriff when conveying prisoners to the penitentiary is official misconduct for which a sheriff is liable. This case cites Rischer v. Mehan, 11 Ohio Cir.Ct.Rep. 403, to the effect that the real question is, was the particular act complained of unlawful and done while engaged in and in connection with the performance of an official duty? Cited also is United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Samuels, 116 Ohio St. 586, 157 N.E. 325, 53 A.L.R. 36, holding that where in the discharge of an official duty an officer fails to take that precaution or exercise that care which a due regard for others requires and the result is injury, the officer’s conduct constitutes a misfeasance.
However, argue the defendants in error, the evidence cited by the Court in‘ the former opinion is not sufficient to carry the issue to the jury. In addition to what has been stated, we call attention to the following facts shown by the record: Turk’s car was equipped with a siren and with a red spot-light on the front — privileges accorded law enforcement officers but not permitted ordinary automobile drivers. Sec. 9, Article 827a, Penal Code, Vernon’s. The record shows that former deputy sheriff Minor described Hoenke’s condition and conduct at the time of the alleged arrest in the following language: “The man was bleeding from his head, blood all over him and he was staggering and in an incoherent condition, he could not answer questions at all. I saw he. was going to fall and I steadied him and laid him over to the side of the road and tried to get him to lie down, but I could not do anything with him. Then I carried him to Turk’s car and put him in the back seat of Turk’s car.”
We think the evidence is sufficient to carry to the jury the issue of whether or not Hoenke was under arrest for being drunk in a public place at the time of the collision with plaintiff’s car. If at that time Hoenke was a prisoner by *574virtue of a lawful arrest, the sheriff owed him the duty of using due care in transporting him to his lawful destination. If he unlawfully violated that duty and as a result of this breach plaintiff and his son were injured, the sheriff and the surety upon his bond were liable, provided the act also transgressed a duty owing plaintiff and his son and they were not guilty of contributory negligence. For, if such were the facts, the injury was occasioned by the act of the deputy sheriff in performing an official duty in a negligent manner.
We adhere to our conclusion that the testimony of Johnnie Hoenke was admissible when he testified that the defendant sheriff at the hospital in which the brother of the witness was being cared for told witness that he had arrested his brother for being drunk, since sheriff West was a defendant, was primarily liable if there were liability, and if an arrest had in fact been made the prisoner had not been released but was still in the custody of the sheriff and the statement was explanatory of the custody and contemporaneous with it. See Thornell v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., Tex.Com.App., 249 S.W. 203; Brite v. Atascosa County, Tex.Civ.App., 247 S.W. 878; Lasater v. Purcell Mill & Elevator Co., 22 Tex.Civ.App. 33, 54 S.W. 425; Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Krone, 177 Ark. 953, 9 S.W.2d 33, 60 A.L.R. 1493; and cases cited in Note 2b, 60 A.L.R. 1500.
In arriving at the conclusion that the evidence in the record requires submission to the jury of issues as to the liability of the sheriff and his surety we have not considered the evidence of Walter Kneupper as to the statement made by Houston Minor. It was not contemporaneous with the custody of Hoenke and was not admissible as original testimony. Nor have we considered the testimony of the same witness as to West’s statement to him that he had been told the boys were drunk. We think this latter statement in the form that it was received was not admissible.
After thorough study of the authorities cited and many others and careful consideration of the arguments urged in behalf of defendants in error, we are of the opinion that the motion for rehearing should be overruled, and it is so ordered.