Court Opinion

ID: 9773481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:47:25.421815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:54.177227
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Judge.
Appellant contends that the charge in the instant case was not as favorable to him as was the charge given in the Punchard case, supra, in that in the Punchard case the jury was told that if they had a reasonable doubt that the accused was the same person who had been convicted under the name of John Cornell in 1928 they should acquit. The primary offense in that case was alleged to have been committed in 1941, and the prior convictions were alleged to have been secured in 1935 and in-1928. An examination of the record in the Punchard case reveals the reason for that charge. There was no question as to proof of identity in the 1935 conviction, but when identifying witnesses were testifying about the 1938 conviction counsel for the appellant had another Negro who looked like the appellant and whose name apparently was John Cornell brought into the courtroom for the purpose of casting a doubt in the mind of the witnesses. Out of an abundance of caution, the trial court gave this charge as to the 1928 conviction only. Such a situation does not exist in the case at bar, and such a charge was not called for.
Appellant contends that the indictment does not allege that each offense was committed after a final conviction in the preceding case. In this we think he is in error. The indictment herein is drawn like the indictments in Clifton v. State, 156 Texas Cr. Rep. 655, 246 S.W. 2d 201, and White v. State, 157 Texas Cr. Rep. 171, 247 S.W. 2d 396; that is, the prior convictions are charged first and then the primary offense is set forth, reciting the matters chronologically rather than in the sequence generally employed. The requisites set forth in those cases are met by the instant indictment.
Appellant complains that the allegation in the indictment describing one of the prior convictions was not sufficient. The allegation was that the appellant had been convicted of the *264“offense of theft over the value of fifty ($50.00) and no/100 dollars, a felony.”
We overrule appellant’s contention in this respect.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.