Court Opinion

ID: 9467235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:42:29.724064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:14.592745
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part):
Judge Meskill’s majority opinion persuasively argues that the evidence against appellant, exclusive of informant Budal’s testimony, is strong enough to preclude reversal, despite the destruction of the Budal tapes by the DEA. And it is true that neither those tapes nor Budal’s testimony in any way related to appellant’s conviction under Count Two. But the Count Three and, accordingly, the Count One conviction were based on that testimony.
The Boston DEA tapes were Rule 16-Jencks Act material which the government had an obligation to make available to the defense. See United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319, 1327 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821, 97 S.Ct. 69, 50 L.Ed.2d 82 (1976); Fed.R.Crim.P. 16; Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. As we said in United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446, 449 (2d Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 928, 99 S.Ct. 314, 58 L.Ed.2d 321 (1978):
*1026While we have decided that the special circumstances of the instant case militate against reversal on this ground, we will look with an exceedingly jaundiced eye upon future efforts to justify nonproduction of a Rule 16 or Jencks Act “statement” by reference to “department policy” or “established practice” or anything of the like. There simply is no longer any excuse for official ignorance regarding the mandate of the law. Where, as here, destruction is deliberate, sanctions will normally follow, irrespective of the perpetrator’s motivation, unless the Government can bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that no prejudice resulted to the defendant.
Although Bufalino came down after the order to destroy the tapes was signed, the tapes were not actually destroyed until some months later. The government argues that the later act was “ministerial” only. We do not know, however, what transpired during the five-month interval between the signing of the order to destroy the tapes and their destruction. “Standard practice” is not a defense under Bufalino, 576 F.2d at 449. Furthermore, the Boston DEA office had already been warned of the rule in Bufalino by United States v. Pollock, 417 F.Supp. 1332 (D.Mass.1976) (destruction of Rule 16-Jencks Act evidence in ongoing case led to dismissal). The government also argues that the tapes were inculpatory. But how can we tell? In any event, appellant may well have been prevented from fully exercising his right to cross-examine Budal and his right of confrontation generally.
The problem here is that the Boston DEA agent who ordered destruction of the tapes was aware that there was an ongoing drug investigation involving appellant in the Eastern District of New York; in fact, before the destruction of the Boston tapes, appellant had been indicted for other drug transactions. It is at the very least difficult to understand, in light of the admissibility of similar acts evidence, why it would occur to Boston to destroy these tapes. Be this as it may, the tapes were deliberately destroyed. And the fact that the actual destruction occurred some months after Bu-falino was decided was apparently not known by the trial judge.
I well recall Judge Frank’s admonition, in a case involving injection of prejudice into prosecutorial argument, that if appellate courts do not approve of a practice, but nevertheless affirm in each given case, “ ‘[t]he deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such occasions are purely ceremonial,’ ” United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting opinion).
I would not reverse, but I would remand Counts One and Three for a hearing on whether the agents acted in good faith or whether prejudice could be eliminated by a new trial without Budal’s testimony. I join the majority in affirming Count Two. Appellants’ other arguments do not persuade me and on those points as well I join the majority.