Court Opinion

ID: 9561347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:08:03.94732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:44.818038
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice.
Kimjon Ingram, Cassandra Hefflin, Geneva Haith and Christopher Wolfe were jointly charged with two counts of murder, two counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, arson in the first degree and possession of an explosive device stemming from the July 1994 fire-bombing deaths of two young children and injury to their mother. Following the joint indictment, the State filed notices of intent pursuant to OCGA §§ 17-10-16 and 17-10-30.1 to seek imprisonment for life without parole 1 but did not give notice of an intent to seek the death *325penalty. 2 Appellees filed pre-trial motions contesting the State’s election to seek life without parole when notification of intent to seek the death penalty had not been issued and the death penalty was not being sought as an alternative sentence. The trial court granted appellees’ motions. We granted interlocutory review and affirm the trial court’s order that a sentence of life without parole is an alternative sentence to a sentence of death, dependent upon the State also seeking the death penalty.
The State contends that the trial court erred in granting appellees’ motions, focusing solely on OCGA § 17-10-16 (a) as authority for a sentence of life without parole independent of the State seeking the death penalty. To resolve this matter we must look to the intent of the Legislature in enacting Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654 (hereinafter “the Act”). OCGA § 1-3-1 (a).
It is well established that the intent of the Legislature in adopting any part of an act “must be obtained from a consideration of the Act as a whole. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 661 (238 SE2d 361) (1977). See also Ellis v. Johnson, 263 Ga. 514 (1) (435 SE2d 923) (1993).
[Statutes are not to be construed in a vacuum, but in relation to other statutes of which they are a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter are to be construed together, and harmonized wherever possible.
East West Express v. Collins, 264 Ga. 774, 775 (449 SE2d 599) (1994).
In the Act, the Legislature amended two Code sections by inserting “life without parole” as a third sentencing option,3 and created four new Code sections within Chapter 10 of Title 17.4 It is apparent from a review of these statutes that they represent a coherent statutory plan whereby death penalty provisions are and must be utilized in order to implement the life without parole sentencing option. In pertinent part the four new Code sections provide as follows: OCGA § 17-10-16 (a) sets forth that a person convicted of an offense committed after May 1, 1993, for which the death penalty may be *326imposed “may be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life without parole, or life imprisonment as provided in Article 2 of this chapter.”5 (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-10-30.1 (a) provides that a sentence of life without parole applies to murder cases in which the court or the jury finds one or more statutory aggravating circumstances.6 OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (a) creates three threshold requirements for imposition of a sentence of life without parole by a jury: (a) the defendant must be convicted of murder;7 (b) the jury must include a finding of one statutory aggravating circumstance; and (c) the jury must affirmatively recommend life without parole.8 Pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-32.1, defendants who enter a guilty plea after indictment for an offense for which the death penalty or life without parole may be imposed, may be sentenced to life imprisonment, id. at (a); however, where the State has filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty and a statutory aggravating circumstance exists, the judge may sentence a defendant to death or life without parole. Id. at (b).
We conclude from a consideration of the Act as a whole that the Legislature intended the sentence of life without parole be considered and imposed only when seeking the death penalty. This conclusion is further reinforced by Section 9 of the Act, which expressly provides that “[n]o person shall be sentenced to life without parole unless such person could have received the death penalty under the laws of this state . . . .” The unavoidable result of the legislative enactment is to bar the State from seeking life without parole unless the State has filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
By enacting Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, the Legislature enhanced the sentencing scheme for offenses for which the death penalty could be imposed by adding a third sentencing option of life without parole for punishment in capital murder cases. Although it is true, as asserted by the State, that life without parole is limited to cases where the defendant is convicted of murder, that limitation is consistent with the statutory scheme to provide a third sentencing option in capital murder cases, where no alternative before existed between life with the possibility of parole or death. While permitting the State to seek a sentence of life without parole outside the context of a death pen*327alty case may allow, as the State asserts, for a logical alternative in aggravated murder cases where factors exist that militate against seeking the death penalty, that matter is best raised before the Legislature.
Because the sentence of imprisonment for life without parole is inapplicable in this case, the trial court correctly refused to allow the State to seek impermissibly a sentence of life without parole without also seeking the death penalty. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting appellees’ motions.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Carley, J., who dissents.

 “[LJife without parole” means that the defendant shall be incarcerated for the remainder of his or her natural life and shall not be eligible for parole unless such *325person is subsequently adjudicated to be innocent of the offense for which he or she was sentenced.
OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d) (1). See also OCGA § 17-10-16 (b).

 Uniform Superior Court Rule 34, Unified Appeal Rule II (A) (1) provides that the prosecuting attorney must file with the clerk of the superior court a written notice of an intention to seek the death penalty.

 Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, §§ 1 and 2, amending OCGA §§ 17-10-1 and 17-10-2.

 Ga. L. 1993, p. 1643, §§ 3, 4, 5 and 6 created OCGA §§ 17-10-16; 17-10-30.1; 17-10-31.1 and 17-10-32.1. These latter three statutes are all codified in the death penalty article.

 Article 2, captioned “Death Penalty Generally,” applies only in death penalty cases and sets forth the procedure for imposition of the death penalty.

 It is only in cases where the State seeks the death penalty that juries are required to find the statutory aggravating circumstances pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-30 (b).

 It follows that OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (a) excludes other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized. See OCGA § 17-10-30 (a) and (b).

 In the instance where the jury finds at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, but fails to reach a unanimous verdict as to the sentence, the judge is authorized to dismiss the jury and at his option, impose sentence of either life imprisonment or life without parole; the judge has no authority to impose a sentence of death. OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (c).