Court Opinion

ID: 9950935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 06:05:53.215059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:29.825486
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 14, 2024
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 345852
                                                                     Genesee Circuit Court
DAMARIUS MONTRAIL GREEN,                                             LC No. 17-041898-FC

                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                           ON REMAND

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and JANSEN and BORRELLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        This matter returns to us on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court. People v Green,
___ Mich ___; 997 NW2d 710 (2023) (Green II). Defendant was convicted by jury trial of second-
degree murder, MCL 750.317; armed robbery, MCL 750.529; second-degree arson, MCL 750.73;
fourth-degree arson, MCL 750.75; felon in possession of a firearm (“felon-in-possession”), MCL
750.224f; and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“felony-
firearm”), MCL 750.227b. People v Green, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued May 20, 2021 (Docket No. 345852), p 1, remanded in part and lv den in part, 997
NW2d 710 (2023) (Green I). He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to
concurrent prison terms of 60 to 90 years for second-degree murder and 40 to 60 years each for
armed robbery, arson, and felon-in-possession, to be served consecutively to four concurrent
prison terms of two years each for the felony-firearm convictions. Id.

       Defendant appealed his convictions on several grounds, none of which this Court found
had merit, and his convictions were affirmed. Id. at 1-9. Defendant applied for leave to appeal in
the Michigan Supreme Court, and for the first time raised the argument that his 60-year minimum
sentence for second-degree murder, although within the statutory guidelines, was not
proportionate.1 Defendant’s application was initially held in abeyance pending the decisions in

1
    Defendant does not challenge the sentences he received for his other convictions.

                                                 -1-
People v Posey (Docket No. 162373) and People v Stewart (Docket No. 162497), and once those
cases were decided, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court “for consideration of
whether the defendant’s sentence is proportionate in light of” People v Posey, 512 Mich 317; 1
NW3d 101 (2023) (Posey II), and denied leave to appeal in all other respects. Green II, ___ Mich
at ___. We requested supplemental briefing from the parties limited to this issue. People v Green,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 19, 2024 (Docket No. 345852).2

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       The facts of this case were provided in full in the previous opinion of this Court:

               Defendant’s convictions arise from the death of Michael Stringer and events
       surrounding Stringer’s death. Stringer was last seen alive on the evening of
       December 4, 2016. In the early morning hours of December 5, 2016, a fire was
       reported at a house on West Downey Avenue in Mt. Morris Township, which
       belonged to the mother of codefendant Leonardo Johnson, Jr. The police found
       blood inside and outside the house, but did not find a body. At approximately 5:00
       p.m. that evening, the police found a Chevy Cruze that had been burned and parked
       behind an abandoned house in Flint. The vehicle was towed away and stored at a
       secure impound lot. Later in December 2016, the police received information that
       Stringer had been driving a Chevy Cruze on the night he disappeared. After
       learning that an abandoned Chevy Cruze had been recovered earlier that month, the
       police located the vehicle at the impound lot and then found Stringer’s deceased
       body inside the trunk.

               An autopsy revealed that Stringer died from multiple gunshot wounds. The
       prosecutor’s theory at trial was that Stringer went to Johnson’s mother’s house
       intending to buy marijuana, that defendant and Johnson planned to rob him, and
       that Stringer was shot during the robbery. Afterward, defendant and Johnson
       placed Stringer’s body in the trunk of his car and set the house on fire to cover up
       evidence of the shooting. Defendant and Johnson then went to the home of a mutual
       friend, Johnnisha Williams, where they changed their clothing and defendant
       showered, and then defendant drove Stringer’s car, containing his body, to Flint,
       where it was left and set on fire. After these events, defendant fled the state.

               Defendant and Johnson were tried jointly, before separate juries. Midtrial,
       Johnson entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty of a reduced
       charge of second-degree murder, agreed to a minimum sentence of 22-1/2 years,
       and also agreed to testify truthfully against defendant. At trial, Johnson testified
       that he arranged to meet with Stringer at his mother’s house to sell him marijuana.

2
  We note that “[a] criminal defendant need not take any special steps to preserve the question of
the proportionality of [his or] her sentence.” People v Foster, 319 Mich App 365, 375; 901 NW2d
127 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, “a defendant properly presents the
issue for appeal by providing this Court a copy of the presentence investigation report,” People v
Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 350; 901 NW2d 142 (2017), which defendant has done.

                                                -2-
       Before Stringer arrived, defendant came to the house and the two then decided to
       rob Stringer. When Stringer arrived, Johnson met him outside while defendant
       waited in a bedroom. Johnson brought Stringer into another bedroom and told him
       to wait while Johnson went to the basement to get the marijuana. According to
       Johnson, while he was downstairs, he heard a gunshot. When Johnson returned
       upstairs, he saw that Stringer had been shot in the leg. Johnson claimed that
       defendant then shot Stringer three more times in the face, wrapped his body in some
       blankets, dragged it outside, and placed the body in the trunk of Stringer’s car.
       Defendant then set the house on fire to destroy evidence of the shooting. Johnson
       admitted that the gun used to shoot Stringer belonged to him, but said that he
       allowed defendant to use it to commit the planned robbery.

               According to Johnson, the two then drove to the home of Johnnisha
       Williams where defendant showered and they changed their clothing. At trial,
       Williams corroborated this testimony. Williams also testified that she noticed
       blood on defendant’s shoes when he arrived. Johnson then borrowed Williams’s
       car and followed defendant, who was driving Stringer’s car, to an abandoned house
       in Flint, where they left Stringer’s car and set it on fire. When the police later
       searched Stringer’s car, they found a plastic bag with three sets of clothing. Photos
       recovered from defendant’s and Johnson’s Facebook accounts showed defendant
       wearing distinctive clothing that matched the clothing recovered from Stringer’s
       car. Forensic analysis of a pair of pants recovered from Stringer’s car also revealed
       the presence of DNA that matched defendant’s DNA profile.

               Defendant testified at trial and denied any involvement in the charged
       offenses. He could not remember what he did on December 5, 2016, but denied
       that he was at Johnson’s mother’s house. He remembered going to Williams’s
       house with blood on his shoes and to shower, but claimed it was a different day,
       after he had attended a party. He also stated that he often swapped clothing with
       his friends, including Johnson, so it would not be unusual to find his DNA on
       clothing that Johnson wore.

               After defendant was convicted, Johnson sent a letter to defendant’s counsel,
       advising him that defendant was not involved in this offense and that Johnson
       committed it by himself. Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of this newly
       discovered evidence. After conducting an evidentiary hearing at which Johnson
       and another witness testified, the trial court found that Johnson’s recanting
       testimony was not credible, and accordingly, denied defendant’s motion for a new
       trial. [Green I, unpub op at 1-3.]

                                    II. PROPORTIONALITY

        Defendant now argues that although his sentence for second-degree murder was within the
guidelines range, it was disproportionate and unreasonable because his age is a mitigating factor
that the trial court did not consider, his conviction was based on the testimony of a noncredible
witness—Johnson, and the court failed to justify the sentence it imposed. We disagree.

                                               -3-
       MCL 769.34(10) provides:

                If a minimum sentence is within the appropriate guidelines sentence range,
       the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not remand for resentencing
       absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate information relied
       upon in determining the defendant’s sentence. A party shall not raise on appeal an
       issue challenging the scoring of the sentencing guidelines or challenging the
       accuracy of information relied upon in determining a sentence that is within the
       appropriate guidelines sentence range unless the party has raised the issue at
       sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand
       filed in the court of appeals.

Before Posey II, this Court held that, in light of MCL 769.34(10)—and despite People v Lockridge,
498 Mich 358, 365; 870 NW2d 502 (2015) (rendering the sentencing guidelines advisory rather
than mandatory)—“[w]hen a trial court does not depart from the recommended minimum
sentencing range, the minimum sentence must be affirmed unless there was an error in scoring or
the trial court relied on inaccurate information.” People v Schrauben, 314 Mich App 181, 196 &
n 1; 886 NW2d 173 (2016), overruled in part by Posey II, 512 Mich at 326.

       In Posey II, the Supreme Court considered whether this interpretation renders MCL
769.34(10) unconstitutional, and the lead opinion held that “Lockridge require[d] that the portion
of MCL 769.34(10) requiring affirmation of within-guidelines sentences on appeal be struck as
unconstitutional.” Posey II, 512 Mich at 349 (lead opinion by BOLDEN, J.).3 In People v Posey
(On Remand), ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 345491) (Posey III);
slip op at 2, this Court clarified that the Supreme Court declared the first sentence of MCL
769.34(10) unconstitutional, and that the following principles apply:

       within-guidelines sentences are to be reviewed for reasonableness, that
       reasonableness review requires a determination whether a sentence was
       proportionate, that there is a nonbinding presumption of proportionality, meaning
       that a within-guidelines sentence is not binding on the Court of Appeals, that the
       defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that their within-guidelines sentence
       is unreasonable or disproportionate, and that a within-guidelines sentence may
       indeed be disproportionate or unreasonable. [Quotation marks and citations
       omitted.]

       The Posey III Court also set forth the basic caselaw governing the reasonableness and
proportionality inquiry as follows:

3
 Although no majority consensus was formed by the Supreme Court as to why the first sentence
of MCL 769.34(10) is unconstitutional, the Posey II decision is a plurality decision, at least in part,
and we choose to follow the lead opinion in the interests of judicial economy. See, e.g., People v
Scarborough, 189 Mich App 341, 344; 471 NW2d 567 (1991).

                                                 -4-
              In People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017),
       the Michigan Supreme Court observed:

                       [T]he proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for
               reasonableness is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
               violating the “principle of proportionality” set forth in People v
               Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), “which requires
               sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the
               seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
               offender.”

                “An appropriate sentence should give consideration to the reformation of
       the offender, the protection of society, the discipline of the offender, and the
       deterrence of others from committing the same offense.” People v Boykin, 510
       Mich 171, 183; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). With respect to sentencing and the
       guidelines, the key test is not whether a sentence departs from or adheres to the
       guidelines range. Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 472. The key test is whether the
       sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter. Id. In regard to
       proportionality, the Milbourn Court “observed that the Legislature has determined
       to visit the stiffest punishment against persons who have demonstrated an
       unwillingness to obey the law after prior encounters with the criminal justice
       system.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 668. “The premise of our system of criminal
       justice is that, everything else being equal, the more egregious the offense, and the
       more recidivist the criminal, the greater the punishment.” People v Babcock, 469
       Mich 247, 263; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). [Posey III, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op
       at 2-3.]

        We now must consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant
to 60 to 90 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder in light of Posey II. According to the
presentence investigation report, defendant’s prior record variable score was 75 points, placing
him in Level F, and his offense variable score was 115, placing him in Level III. The sentencing
guidelines range was therefore calculated at 365 to 1200 months’ imprisonment (or approximately
30 to 100 years). His minimum sentence of 60 years (720 months) therefore fell within the
guidelines range, approximately in the middle.

         At sentencing, the trial court began its pronouncement of defendant’s sentence by stating
that he was 22 years old at that time (in September 2018). Defendant was 20 years old at the time
of the crime in 2016. Defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, and the trial court
noted his juvenile record as well as the fact that he had absconded from a federal parole program
at the time these crimes were committed. The court noted that he was unemployed, unmarried,
obtained his general education diploma, and had no history of substance abuse. The court then
noted the heinous nature of this crime, defendant having lured the victim to the residence for a
drug deal, shot the victim while he begged for his life, set the house on fire to destroy evidence,
and then hid the body in the trunk of a car. The court then rendered its’ sentence for second-degree
murder of 60 to 90 years’ imprisonment.

                                                -5-
        Defendant first argues that his age was a mitigating factor that was not adequately
considered at sentencing. Defendant cites Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 489; 132 S Ct 2455;
183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), which held that sentencing individuals to mandatory life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for crimes committed before age 18 violated the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. See also Jones v Mississippi, 593 US 98, 114;
141 S Ct 1307; 209 L Ed 2d 390 (2021) (explaining that, “[f]aced with a convicted murderer who
was under 18 at the time of the offense and with defense arguments focused on the defendant’s
youth, it would be all but impossible for a sentencer to avoid considering that mitigating factor.”)
(emphasis added). Michigan has followed the trend in mitigating the harshest sentences for youth.
See generally Boykin, 510 Mich at 178 (holding that trial courts must consider youth as a
mitigating factor when sentencing juveniles specifically to a term-of-years sentence under MCL
769.25 or MCL 769.25a, the statutes enacted in response to Miller, but need not articulate on the
record how a defendant’s youth affected that decision). However, defendant was not 18 years old
or younger at the time he committed these crimes in 2016. He was 20 years old, and admits in his
supplemental brief that he was legally an adult, and that Miller drew the age boundary at 18.
Defendant relies on studies indicating that the qualities of youth extend past age 18 and into the
early twenties that has not yet been adopted by caselaw. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by not considering youth as a mitigating factor when sentencing defendant because he
was over 18 years old at the time of the crime.

         Next, defendant argues that his sentence for second-degree murder is not proportionate
because his co-defendant, Johnson, submitted a statement posttrial indicating defendant did not
take part in the murder, which the trial court did not consider at sentencing. Based on Johnson’s
statement, defendant moved for a new trial, an evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court
denied defendant’s motion because Johnson’s recanting testimony was not credible. Green I,
unpub op at 1-2. This issue was addressed in this Court’s previous opinion, wherein we upheld
the trial court’s finding and denial of defendant’s motion. Id. at 5-8. As Johnson’s statement was
not made until after sentencing, it would not have been available at defendant’s original sentencing
hearing, and the trial court could not have abused its discretion in failing to consider it. Moreover,
as it seems that the argument now raised sounds in the merits of the trial court’s decision, which
was already addressed on appeal, see id., or the sufficiency of the evidence, and this remand is
limited to the issue of sentencing, Green II, ___ Mich at ___, we need not address it further.

        Lastly, defendant argues the trial court failed to adequately justify defendant’s sentence.
As noted above, the trial court acknowledged defendant’s age, his criminal history, his
employment and education history, and the particular facts of the crime. Defendant was a fourth-
offense habitual offender, and he had violated federal parole at the time he committed these crimes.
As stated above, the Legislature intended the stiffest punishments against people who demonstrate
an unwillingness to obey the law after previous encounters with the criminal justice system, and
“everything else being equal, the more egregious the offense, and the more recidivist the criminal,
the greater the punishment.” Posey III, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3 (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Thus, the reasoning provided by the trial court was sufficient to establish that
defendant’s sentence was proportionate to the offense and the offender. Defendant has not met his
burden to prove that his within-guidelines sentence was disproportionate or unreasonable, and the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant for second-degree murder.

                                                 -6-
Affirmed.

                  /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                  /s/ Stephen L. Borrello

            -7-