Court Opinion

ID: 9925253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 06:06:19.316869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:48.756872
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                     January 18, 2024
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 9:00 a.m.

v                                                                    No. 352569
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
JOHN ANTONIO POOLE,                                                  LC No. 02-000893-02-FC

                 Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RIORDAN, JJ.

LETICA, P.J.

        This case comes before us on remand from our Supreme Court, which directed this Court
to “determine whether defendant is entitled to relief based on [the Supreme Court’s] holding in
People v Parks, [510 Mich 225; 987 NW2d 161 (2022)], that mandatory life-without-parole
sentences imposed on 18-year-old defendants are categorically disproportionate and thus
unconstitutional under Const 1963, art 1, § 16.” People v Poole, 510 Mich 851, 851-852; 977
NW2d 530 (2022). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate defendant’s first-degree
murder sentence and remand for resentencing.

                        I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        In mid-December 2001, defendant was recruited by his uncle and codefendant, Harold
Varner, to murder the victim for $300. Specifically, Varner was having difficulty entering into a
real estate transaction with Delora Lester because she needed additional financing from Varner to
purchase a residential home from him. The victim, Henry Covington, was Lester’s fiancé. Varner
interfered with Lester’s attempt to take possession of the home, and Lester and the victim were
forced to leave the home after someone threw a firebomb through the kitchen window.

       At 5:00 a.m. on December 12, 2001, Varner contacted Amanda Coddington, his property
manager and the mother of his child and asked her to meet him at a gas station. After their meeting,
Varner directed Coddington to an area to meet defendant. Defendant entered Varner’s car first
and then got into Coddington’s car. Coddington was instructed to follow Varner’s car to an area
near where the victim and Lester were staying. Once there, defendant left Coddington’s car,
proceeded into an alley, and headed toward the victim’s home. As Coddington waited, she heard

                                                 -1-
four gunshots. Defendant returned to the car after 15 minutes, holding a .357-caliber gun that he
placed inside a shopping bag on the car’s floor. Coddington asked defendant what happened, but
he instructed her to drive away. Later, defendant told Coddington that he shot “someone,” but did
not identify the victim by name. Varner explained that he had the victim killed because it would
make Lester easier to handle. After the murder, defendant repeatedly asked Varner for more
money. Coddington later discarded the gun in a dumpster.

        At the time of the murder, defendant was 18 years old, but would turn 19 years old within
a month’s time. Following a jury trial, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, 24 to 90 months’ imprisonment for
felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and two years’ imprisonment for possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. When imposing
defendant’s sentence on August 13, 2002, the trial court said:

               As to first degree murder, the law says that Mr. Poole is to serve life without
       parole. And so that’s the sentence that I have no discretion but to give.

               Now, some people would say that that sentence should be for a 30-year-
       older instead of a 19-year-older. Some people would say, it shouldn’t be for a 14-
       year-older, because we have 14-year-olders being tried as adults, and 13-[]year-
       olders. Some would say, well, if you’re 50 and you committed a murder, you
       shouldn’t go for the rest of your life.

               All of those considerations and concerns I imagine at one time were
       considered.[1] But that is the sentence that I must impose and so that is the sentence
       I will impose for Mr. Poole. He will be sentenced to those mandatory sentences
       according to the law.2

       Thereafter, defendant filed two successive motions under MCR 6.502(G) that the trial court
denied. The trial court refused to accept defendant’s third successive motion, and this Court
dismissed defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal. People v Poole, unpublished order
of the Court of Appeals, entered May 1, 2020 (Docket No. 352569). Our Supreme Court
determined that defendant demonstrated a retroactive change in the law, entitling him to file his

1
  We presume the sentencing court was referring to the Legislature that set the penalty for first-
degree murder at life without the possibility of parole. People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 436 &
n 8; 636 NW2d 127 (2001) (“[T]he ultimate authority to provide for penalties for criminal offenses
is constitutionally vested in the Legislature.”). We note that several proposed bills are pending
that would prohibit a court from sentencing an individual under the age of 19 when their crime
was committed to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and would make those
serving such a sentence eligible for parole after serving 10 years. See 2023 SB 119-123 and 2023
HB 4160-4164.
2
 Varner was convicted of second-degree murder, sentenced to 20 to 35 years’ imprisonment, and
was paroled in 2022.

                                                -2-
third motion for relief from judgment. People v Poole, 510 Mich 851; 977 NW2d 530 (2023).
Our Supreme Court vacated our order dismissing defendant’s delayed application for leave to
appeal under MCR 6.502(G) and remanded the matter to this Court, directing that the merits of
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment be addressed in light of People v Parks, 510 Mich
225; 987 NW2d 161 (2022).3 Poole, 510 Mich at 851-852.

               II. LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE AND AGE OF THE OFFENDER

        In Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), the United
States Supreme Court concluded that the punishment of life without parole for juveniles
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, stating:

               The two 14-year-old offenders in these cases were convicted of murder and
       sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In neither case did
       the sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment.
       State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would
       have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature
       of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole)
       more appropriate. Such a scheme prevents those meting out punishment from
       considering a juvenile’s “lessened culpability” and greater “capacity for change,”
       Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 68, 74; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010), and
       runs afoul of our cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants
       facing the most serious penalties. We therefore hold that mandatory life without
       parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
       Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”

After the Miller decision, the question arose whether its holding applied retroactively to juvenile
offenders who had final convictions and sentences at the time Miller was decided. The opportunity
to address this issue arose in Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US 190, 193-194; 136 S Ct 718; 193
L Ed 2d 599 (2016). In Montgomery, the petitioner was 17 years old in 1963, when he killed a
deputy sheriff in Louisiana. The petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but
his conviction was reversed when it was determined that public prejudice deprived him of a fair
trial. On retrial, the petitioner was again found guilty but “without capital punishment.” Under
Louisiana law, the petitioner was automatically sentenced to life without parole upon the jury’s
verdict and was not given the opportunity to present mitigation evidence to justify a less severe
sentence. At the time of his filing seeking relief, the petitioner was 69 years old and had spent
nearly his entire life in prison. Id. at 194.

       The Montgomery Court noted that, in Miller, it was determined that mandatory life without
parole for juvenile offenders that committed homicide violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 195. The failure to consider youth and its
accompanying circumstances to the harshest prison sentence of life without parole posed a risk of

3
  Despite concluding that defendant was entitled to file his successive motion for relief from
judgment, our Supreme Court did not remand the matter to the trial court for acceptance of the
motion and direct the trial court to render a decision on the motion.

                                                -3-
disproportionate punishment. And, therefore, sentencing courts were now required to consider the
juvenile’s diminished capacity and heightened ability to change before sentencing him to life or to
die in prison. Despite the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Montgomery Court
noted that a trial court was not foreclosed from sentencing a juvenile defendant to life without
parole. But, “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children,
those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 195 quoting Miller, 567 US at 479-
480.

        Following the decision in Miller, the petitioner sought collateral review of his sentence,
and the Louisiana state courts concluded that Miller did “not have retroactive effect in cases on
state collateral review.” Montgomery, 577 US at 196-197. The Montgomery Court granted
certiorari to address whether the Miller Court adopted a new substantive rule that applied
retroactively on collateral review for defendants sentenced as juveniles to die in prison. Id. at 197.
The Montgomery Court addressed retroactivity, stating:

               Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Teague v Lane, 489 US 288; 109 S
       Ct 1060; 103 L Ed 2d 334 (1989), set forth a framework for retroactivity in cases
       on federal collateral review. Under Teague, a new constitutional rule of criminal
       procedure does not apply, as a general matter, to convictions that were final when
       the new rule was announced. Teague recognized, however, two categories of rules
       that are not subject to its general retroactivity bar. First, courts must give
       retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law. Substantive rules
       include “rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct,” as well
       as “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants
       because of their status or offense.” Penry v Lynaugh, 492 US 302, 330; 109 S Ct
       2934; 106 L Ed 2d 256 (1989); see also Teague, supra, at 307; 109 S Ct 1060[; 103
       L Ed 2d 334]. Although Teague describes new substantive rules as an exception to
       the bar on retroactive application of procedural rules, this Court has recognized that
       substantive rules “are more accurately characterized as . . . not subject to the bar.”
       Schriro v Summerlin, 542 US 348, 352, n 4; 124 S Ct 2519; 159 L Ed 2d 442 (2004).
       Second, courts must give retroactive effect to new “ ‘ “watershed rules of criminal
       procedure” implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
       proceeding.’ ” Id., at 352; 124 S Ct 2519[; 159 L Ed 2d 442]; see also Teague, 489
       US[] at 312-313; 109 S Ct 1060[; 103 L Ed 2d 334]. [Montgomery, 577 US at 198.]

In response to the argument that the Teague decision had no bearing on state collateral review, the

Montgomery Court rejected the assertion that its constitutional commands were not binding on
state courts, stating:

               The Court now holds that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law
       controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review
       courts to give retroactive effect to that rule. Teague’s conclusion establishing the
       retroactivity of new substantive rules is best understood as resting upon
       constitutional premises. That constitutional command is, like all federal law,

                                                 -4-
       binding on state courts. This holding is limited to Teague’s first exception for
       substantive rules; the constitutional status of Teague’s exception for watershed
       rules of procedure need not be addressed here.

               This Court’s precedents addressing the nature of substantive rules, their
       differences from procedural rules, and their history of retroactive application
       establish that the Constitution requires substantive rules to have retroactive effect
       regardless of when a conviction became final.

                                               * * *

       It follows, as a general principle, that a court has no authority to leave in place a
       conviction or sentence that violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the
       conviction or sentence became final before the rule was announced. [Montgomery,
       577 US at 200, 203 (emphasis added).]

Accordingly, substantive rules are those that forbid criminal punishment of certain primary
conduct as well as those that prohibit “a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants
because of their status or offense.” Montgomery, 577 US at 200-201 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Substantive rules, then, set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain
criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.” Id. at 201. When
a state enforces a penalty barred by the Constitution, the resulting sentence is unlawful. Id.
Accordingly, new substantive rules are applied retroactively. Id. at 202.

       The Montgomery Court further determined that the Miller decision applied to collateral
review and did not implicate a state’s interest in finality of convictions and sentences, even if it
did contain a procedural component when addressing the offender’s youth and attendant
circumstances. Id. at 204, 209-210. Ultimately, the Montgomery Court stated:

               The Court now holds that Miller announced a substantive rule of
       constitutional law. The conclusion that Miller states a substantive rule comports
       with the principles that informed Teague. Teague sought to balance the important
       goals of finality and comity with the liberty interests of those imprisoned pursuant
       to rules later deemed unconstitutional. Miller’s conclusion that the sentence of life
       without parole is disproportionate for the vast majority of juvenile offenders raises
       a grave risk that many are being held in violation of the Constitution.

                Giving Miller retroactive effect, moreover, does not require States to
       relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender
       received mandatory life without parole. A State may remedy a Miller violation by
       permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by
       resentencing them. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §6-10-301(c) (2013) (juvenile
       homicide offenders eligible for parole after 25 years). Allowing those offenders to
       be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only
       transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a
       disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

                                                 -5-
               Extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders does not impose an
       onerous burden on the States, nor does it disturb the finality of state convictions.
       Those prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life
       sentences. The opportunity for release will be afforded to those who demonstrate
       the truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous
       crimes are capable of change. [Id. at 212.]

        Although the Montgomery decision addressed juveniles under the age of 18, defendants on
the cusp of that age sought relief from sentences of life imprisonment. Indeed, in Parks, 510 Mich
at 232-233, the defendant was 18 years old when he was involved in a shooting. Specifically, the
defendant and his cousin were in a vehicle having a discussion in low voices. The defendant
handed his cousin a gun, and the two men entered a store. The defendant remained in the store
while his cousin left and went into the parking lot. The victim was shot while sitting in his car in
that parking lot. Witnesses heard the gunshots and saw the cousin flee the parking lot. The
prosecutor did not assert that the defendant shot the victim. Rather, the charge of first-degree
premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), against the defendant was premised on an aiding and
abetting theory. Ultimately, a jury convicted the defendant of first-degree premeditated murder,
carrying a concealed pistol, MCL 750.227(2), and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. Pertinent to
this appeal, the defendant was sentenced to life without parole for the first-degree murder
conviction. Id. at 233. On appeal, this Court rejected defendant’s challenge to his sentence as
cruel and unusual. However, our Supreme Court concluded that, although the sentence did not
violate the Eighth Amendment, it violated the broader protections prohibiting cruel or unusual
punishment in Michigan’s Constitution:

               [I]n light of current federal precedent, we find no support in the Eighth
       Amendment for extending Miller’s protections under the Eighth Amendment
       beyond the bright line originally set[.] But the fact that the United States Supreme
       Court has decided to draw the line at 17 [year olds] does not preclude us from
       drawing a different line pursuant to the broader protections provided by the
       Michigan Constitution. It is only logical that Michigan’s “cruel or unusual”
       language is broader than the Eighth Amendment floor. And the Supreme Court, in
       fact, recently indicated that states have a wide latitude in providing greater Miller
       protections. . . .

               In other words, we may draw our own line, and we do so today.

                                              * * *

               Although we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s
       interpretation of the Eighth Amendment when interpreting our constitutional
       prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment, we find Miller and Montgomery
       persuasive to the extent they held that juveniles are constitutionally different from
       adults for purposes of imposing a life-without-parole sentence and, for the reasons
       stated in this opinion, adopt that general proposition under the Michigan
       Constitution. However, we part ways with the United States Supreme Court’s
       jurisprudence to the extent the Court drew the line for defining the class of

                                                -6-
       defendants that are entitled to individualized sentencing to those under the age of
       18. [Parks, 510 Mich at 247-248.]

       After examining scientific analysis of brain development, the Parks majority determined
that extending constitutional protections against cruel or unusual punishment to 18-year-old
defendants did not interfere with the role of the Legislature and the separation of powers:

               In order to determine whether our Constitution compels additional
       considerations when sentencing 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree
       murder to mandatory life without parole, we apply the [People v] Lorentzen[, 387
       Mich 167; 194 NW2d 827 (1972)] test, as reaffirmed in [People v] Bullock[, 440
       Mich 15; 485 NW2d 866 (1992)]. The Lorentzen test is used to determine whether
       a punishment is disproportionate and thus “cruel or unusual.” We reiterate that this
       four-factor test requires us to consider: (1) the severity of the sentence relative to
       the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for other
       offenses; (3) sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and
       (4) the goal of rehabilitation, which is a criterion specifically “rooted in Michigan’s
       legal traditions . . . .” Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34.

               We hold that this test, overall, compels the conclusion that mandatorily
       subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without first considering the
       attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment and thus a
       disproportionate sentence that constitutes “cruel or unusual punishment” under
       Const 1963, art 1, § 16. While the Legislature has authorized such sentences, we
       are duty-bound to enforce the state Constitution through application of the
       Lorentzen test to reflect “the deeper, more profound judgment of the people
       reflected in the constitution . . . .” Bullock, 440 Mich at 40-41. That judgment
       compels an individualized sentencing process before condemning 18-year-olds to
       die behind prison walls.

               While the dissent believes that the punishment rendered in this case is a
       statutory decision that is only within the purview of the Legislature, we note that
       the interpretation of Const 1963, art 1, § 16 governs our decision. We are duty-
       bound to interpret the Constitution, no matter the outcome. Contrary to what the
       dissent argues, determining whether the Legislature’s chosen sentence runs afoul
       of our Constitution’s protections is well within the purview of this Court and does
       not violate any separation-of-power principles. We cannot shirk our duty and defer
       to the Legislature’s choice of punishment when its choice is offensive to our
       Constitution. See Bullock, 440 Mich at 41 (“The very purpose of a constitution is
       to subject the passing judgments of temporary legislative or political majorities to
       the deeper, more profound judgment of the people reflected in the [C]onstitution,
       the enforcement of which is entrusted to our judgment.”). [Parks, 510 Mich at 254-
       256.]

                                                -7-
The Parks defendant, who committed his offense as an 18-year-old, was deemed entitled to relief
of his unconstitutional sentence, see MCL 769.25.4 In his appeal to our Supreme Court, this
defendant similarly committed his offense when an 18-year-old, but exhausted his appeals before
Parks was decided. Thus, defendant seeks collateral relief through MCR 6.508 despite filing two
prior successive motions for relief from judgment.

                                III. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

        This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an
abuse of discretion. People v Owens, 338 Mich App 101, 113; 979 NW2d 345 (2021). An abuse
of discretion occurs when the trial court makes an error of law or when its decision falls outside
the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Id. But, the trial court’s fact findings supporting
its decision on the motion for relief from judgment are reviewed for clear error. People v Kasben,
324 Mich App 1, 7; 919 NW2d 463 (2018). The defendant must demonstrate the right to relief.
MCR 6.508(D).5

       In relevant part, MCR 6.508(D) provides:

              The defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to the relief
       requested. The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion

                                              * * *

              (3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could
       have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion
       under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates

              (a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior
       motion, and

4
  MCL 769.25 governs the process for examining the sentences of juvenile offenders affected by
the Miller decision and possible resentencing. See MCL 769.25a(2). The Parks Court vacated
Parks’s sentence for first-degree murder and remanded for resentencing in accord with
MCL 769.25.
5
  Our Supreme Court opted to remand the case to this Court despite determining that defendant
satisfied MCR 6.502(G). When deciding a motion for relief from judgment, MCR 6.508, the trial
court makes factual findings and an ultimate ruling on the motion. This Court does not find facts
but merely serves as an error correcting court. See Bean v Directions Unlimited, Inc, 462 Mich
24, 34 n 12; 609 NW2d 567 (2000) (“The Court of Appeals role is not to ‘find’ facts. . . .”); People
v Blevins, 314 Mich App 339, 352 n 5; 886 NW2d 456 (2016) (“The Court of Appeals is an error-
correcting court. . . .”). We agree with the dissent that the appropriate disposition would have been
a remand to the trial court to accept the third motion for relief from judgment and to address the
merits of the motion. Therefore, our discussion of MCR 6.508(D) is limited to address the
application of the Parks decision in the context of collateral review.

                                                -8-
                 (b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for
       relief. . . .

Relevant to this appeal, “actual prejudice” means that, “in the case of a challenge to the sentence,
the sentence is invalid.” MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv).6

        We conclude that defendant satisfied the “good cause” and “actual prejudice” requirements
for purposes of MCR 6.508(D)(3). Defendant has good cause for failing to raise the issue in his
claim of appeal or initial motions for relief from judgment. Defendant committed the murder in
2001, and the United States Supreme Court did not determine that life without parole sentences as
applied to juveniles under the age of 18 was cruel and unusual punishment until 2012. Thus,
defendant should not be penalized for failing to raise the issue in his original appellate challenge
or earlier successive motions for relief from judgment. See People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 384-
385 n 8; 535 NW2d 496 (1995) (Prejudice may be caused by external factors including whether a
legal basis for a claim was then available to counsel.).

        Court authority over a defendant typically ends when a valid sentence is pronounced.
People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96; 559 NW2d 299 (1997). But a court may correct an invalid
sentence. Id. “A sentence is invalid when it is beyond statutory limits, when it is based upon
constitutionally impermissible grounds, improper assumptions of guilt, a misconception of law, or
when it conforms to local sentencing policy rather than individualized facts.” Id. A sentence
premised on inaccurate information also may be deemed invalid. Id. In this case, defendant
contends that his sentence is invalid because it is premised on constitutionally impermissible
grounds; his sentence violates the prohibition on cruel and/or unusual punishment. Consequently,
defendant established that he will suffer actual prejudice if his sentence violates this prohibition.

        The Parks Court employed a four-factor test to assess whether a punishment is
disproportionate and thus “cruel or unusual.” This test requires the court to consider: (1) the
severity of the sentence relative to the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the same
jurisdiction for other offenses; (3) sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense;
and (4) the goal of rehabilitation, which is a criterion specifically “rooted in Michigan’s legal
traditions . . . .” Parks, 510 Mich at 254-255, citing Bullock, 440 Mich at 33-34. The Parks Court
further determined that “mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without
first considering the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment and thus a
disproportionate sentence that constitutes ‘cruel or unusual punishment’ under Const 1963, art 1,
§ 16.” Parks, 510 Mich at 255.

6
  The “good cause” and “actual prejudice” factors are not relevant until the trial court determines
that a successive motion is within one of the exceptions of MCR 6.502(G)(2). People v Swain,
288 Mich App 609, 632-633; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). Our Supreme Court determined that defendant
had “met the requirements necessary to file a successive motion for relief from judgment pursuant
to MCR 6.502(G)(2).” Poole, 510 Mich at 851. See People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 310-311;
987 NW2d 85 (2022) (A defendant’s claim need not fall squarely within a retroactive change in
the law, but need only serve as a “foundation” or “base” to overcome the procedural bar of
MCR 6.502(G)(2).)

                                                 -9-
        As stated in Montgomery, “a court has no authority to leave in place a conviction or
sentence that violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the conviction or sentence became
final before the rule was announced.” Montgomery, 577 US at 203. Substantive rules “set forth
categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether
beyond the State’s power to impose.” Id. at 201. When a state enforces a penalty barred by the
Constitution, the resulting sentence is unlawful. Id. New substantive rules are applied
retroactively. Id. at 202. Because the Parks Court extended the protections of juvenile defendants
from a cruel or unusual punishment of mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole to 18-year-olds, this substantive rule determination, prohibiting a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants without consideration of the mitigating factors of youth must
be applied retroactively even upon collateral review.

                                  IV. STATE RETROACTIVITY

        On appeal, defendant argued that a state retroactivity analysis is not required, but, even if
it was, Parks applied retroactively. The prosecution did not respond directly to defendant’s first
argument in its briefing.7 Instead, it urged this Court to adopt the federal test announced in Teague,

7
  Before remanding this matter to this Court, our Supreme Court heard oral argument on
defendant’s application for leave to appeal. At that time, JUSTICE CAVANAGH asked defense
counsel, “If we agree that [defendant] is allowed to file a successive motion and that offenders
who are 18 . . . have a right to a Miller hearing, do we still have to determine whether or not our
extension of Miller to [juveniles who are] 18 applies retroactively under Michigan law? I mean
do we have that here to be able to decide or does that need to go back?” Defense counsel responded
that she would welcome the opportunity to brief the issue; however, she alternatively proposed
that the Supreme Court could explicitly determine that its decision applied retroactively as it had
in Bullock.
        In Bullock, the Supreme Court struck down life without parole sentences for two
defendants convicted of possession of over 650 grams of cocaine as being cruel or unusual under
the state Constitution. Bullock, 440 Mich at 27-42. The defendants’ challenges to their sentences
arose during their initial appeal. In addition to invalidating the defendants’ sentences, the Court
further held: “[O]ur decision today necessarily invalidates the sentences of all defendants currently
incarcerated under the same penalty, and for committing the same offense, as the defendants at
bar.” Id. at 42.
       On appeal, defendant contends that the same is true here, adding that our Supreme Court
adhered to this principle in People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301; 987 NW2d 85 (2022). In Stovall, the
defendant was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for two separate second-degree
murder convictions committed in 1991 when he was a juvenile. Id. at 308. The defendant filed a
successive motion for relief from judgment in 2017, after Miller and Montgomery were decided,
challenging his sentence of life with the possibility of parole as “cruel and/or unusual under the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan
Constitution.” Id. at 312. The Court easily dispensed with the defendant’s Eighth Amendment
challenge quoting from Montgomery: “ ‘A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting
juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.’ ”

                                                -10-
to reject the Montgomery majority’s analysis that Miller applied retroactively, and to follow the
reasoning of the Montgomery dissenters to conclude that Parks did not apply retroactively.8
During oral argument, this Court raised the question of the applicability, if any, of People v Carp,
496 Mich 440; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), cert gtd and opinion vacated sub nom on other grounds
Carp v Michigan, 577 US 1186; 136 S Ct 1355; 194 L Ed 2d 339 (2016).9 In Carp, which was
decided before Montgomery, our Supreme Court determined that Miller did not satisfy the test for
retroactivity under federal or state law. Carp, 496 Mich at 451. In so holding, the Carp Court
determined that the rule adopted in Miller was procedural. Id. at 484-485. But, as the Montgomery

Stovall, 510 Mich at 313, quoting Montgomery, 577 US at 212. Analyzing the question under the
Michigan Constitution, however, the Court ruled that the defendant’s life-with-the-possibility-of-
parole sentence was cruel or unusual. Id. at 307, 313-322. Stated otherwise, our Supreme Court
afforded sentencing relief on state constitutional grounds to a defendant who challenged his
sentence on collateral review based on Miller and Montgomery.
        We recognize that Parks was issued on the same day as Stovall. In Parks, our Supreme
Court explained that “automatic condemnation to die in prison at 18 is beyond severity—it is
cruelty” given the defendant’s brain development. Parks, 510 Mich at 258. In its conclusion, the
Court observed:
       [M]andatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder
       to a sentence of life without parole violates the principle of proportionality derived
       from the Michigan Constitution, Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 176-181[]; Bullock, 440
       Mich. at 33-34[], and thus constitutes unconstitutionally cruel punishment under
       Const 1963, art 1, § 16. This renders Parks’s automatic sentence of life without
       parole unconstitutional. Parks and other 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-
       degree murder are entitled to the full protections of MCL 769.25 and our caselaw,
       as opposed to the automatic sentencing scheme in MCL 750.316(1). [Parks, 510
       Mich at 268.]
This last sentence may be interpreted to apply to defendants, who like Parks were on direct review;
however, it may also be read as similar to the broad language in Bullock, albeit not as explicit.
Moreover, as a matter of logic, we question whether the State could continue to impose a sentence
that a court has determined is cruel or unusual on a prisoner simply because the time to directly
challenge their sentence has passed. Regardless of the inferences of the Parks decision and the
questionable clarity of the remand order in our case, we will address the retroactivity argument.
8
 A state may have a different retroactivity rule for state constitutional decisions and may even
have a retroactivity rule more favorable for defendants for new federal constitutional rules than
does the United States Supreme Court. Danforth v Minnesota, 552 US 264; 128 S Ct 1029; 169 L
Ed 2d 859 (2008).
9
  After oral argument, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing Carp’s viability. Defendant
contended that Carp lacked any precedential value. The prosecution asserted that Carp’s state-
law retroactivity analysis controlled the outcome here.

                                               -11-
Court subsequently determined, Miller’s rule was substantive and applied retroactively to cases on
collateral review.

        Our Supreme Court derived our state’s retroactivity analysis from Linkletter v Walker, 381
US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965).10 People v Hampton, 385 Mich 669, 674; 197
NW2d 404 (1971). The Court identified the following “key factors” to determine whether a
judicial decision applies retroactively under state law: “(1) [t]he purpose of the new rule; (2) the
general reliance on the old rule; and (3) [t]he effect on the administration of justice.” The Court
subsequently recognized that Linkletter discussed retroactivity as it pertained to “the use of
evidence or on a particular mode of trial” and that “[t]hose procedural rights and methods of
conducting trials . . . do not encompass all of the rights found in the first eight Amendments.”
People v Gay, 407 Mich 681, 705-706; 289 NW2d 651 (1980). Consequently, “when faced with
a retroactivity question,” the Court recognized that an analytical distinction has evolved.” Id. at
706.

       When considering procedural rules governing trial conduct, the Linkletter-
       Hampton criteria play a predominant role. However, when non-procedural or
       substantive rights of a fundamental nature are affected, they are normally to be
       accorded retrospective application. The Linkletter-Hampton considerations may be
       addressed, but only in the rare instance will they have determinative effect. [Gay,
       407 Mich at 706.]

        The holding in Parks, as in Miller, is substantive, not procedural. Therefore, Carp’s
analysis of retroactivity, constructed upon the faulty premise that Miller’s rule was a procedural
rule, does not control the outcome here. Indeed, in Stovall, our Supreme Court afforded relief to
a defendant, who on collateral review, sought to extend Miller’s principles on state constitutional
grounds.

       Our state prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment protects criminal defendant
“against barbaric and inhumane punishments.” Id. at 243. As explained in Parks, the purpose of
the Miller/Montgomery requirements is to ensure individualized sentencing in order to avoid
imposition of an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual sentence of mandatory life without parole
sentence. Therefore, the attributes of youth that defendant shares with juvenile defendants must
be considered by the sentencing court. Parks, 510 Mich at 266-267. Restoring discretion to the
sentencing judge to consider the Miller factors “ensure[s] that life-without-parole sentences are

10
  “Linkletter was subsequently disavowed as the federal standard for retroactivity in Griffith v
Kentucky, 479 US 314; 107 S Ct 708; 93 L Ed 2d 649 (1987)[.]” People v Barnes, 502 Mich 265,
273 n 5; 917 NW2d 577 (2018).

                                               -12-
imposed only in cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s age.” Jones v
Mississippi, 593 US ; 141 S Ct 1307, 1318; 209 L Ed 2d 390 (2021).11

        Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s sentence of mandatory life without the possibility of
parole for first-degree murder and remand for proceedings consistent with MCL 769.25. We do
not retain jurisdiction.

                                                            /s/ Anica Letica
                                                            /s/ Stephen L. Borrello

11
   Although there was reliance on the mandatory life-without-parole sentences on 18-year-olds
convicted of first-degree murder, the impact on the administration of justice should be short-lived
given the limited class of defendants that will have to be resentenced after consideration of the
Miller factors.

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