Court Opinion

ID: 9847904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:09:32.487428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:45.547454
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Chief Justice,
concurring.
In State v. DeVoe, 560 P.2d 12, 15-17 (Alaska 1977), I first addressed the question of a defendant’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination in the situation where the state seeks both probation or parole revocation and a separate criminal conviction for the same conduct. I agree with the majority that the competing constitutional values at issue here call for adoption of an exclusionary rule, under our supervisory powers, rendering any self-incriminating statements made in a parole or probation revocation hearing as well as their fruits inadmissible in any subsequent criminal proceeding. However, this does not, to my mind, completely resolve the difficult dilemma that the probationer or parolee still faces, even with a grant of such immunity.
The probationer or parolee when confronted with a revocation hearing prior to a criminal trial still must weigh several factors in deciding whether to testify. Not to testify may mean that parole or probation will be revoked because no response had been made to the state’s evidence. The commentary to the ABA standards on probation point out the greater difficulty in defending such an action:
The relative informality of a probation revocation proceeding, as compared to the trial of an original criminal charge, underlines the danger. Relaxation of rules of admissibility of evidence, the absence of a jury, a lesser burden of proof — factors such as these can lead to an abuse of the proceedings by basing revocation upon a new criminal charge when the offense could not be proved in an ordinary criminal trial.
ABA Standards relating to Probation, § 5.3, at 63 (Approved draft 1970). To testify and put forth a full defense, if successful, may still be a hollow victory. For while the parolee or probationer may be successful in persuading the parole board or the court that parole or probation should not be revoked, the prosecution has most likely been given a fairly comprehensive presentation of the parolee or probationer’s defense. At the criminal trial, the prosecution will thus be better prepared because the revocation proceeding was held prior to the trial on the underlying criminal conduct. Part of the rationale for the constitutional right against self-incrimination is that the state must bear the entire burden of proof of guilt in a criminal case and the state cannot require the defendant to contribute to that proof through his own testimony. The initial view of the accused’s defense at a revocation hearing may inappropriately lessen the state’s burden of proof at trial at the expense of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. Thus, I agree with the position of the California Supreme Court in People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 406, 533 P.2d 1024, 1046 (Cal.1975), that the preferable solution in these circumstances is to postpone the holding of the revocation proceeding until after the outcome of the criminal prosecution. As I noted in my concurrence in DeVoe:
Consideration of such factors led the American Bar Association to recommend that:
*1000A revocation proceeding based solely upon commission of another crime ordinarily should not be initiated prior to the disposition of that charge. However, upon a showing of probable cause that another crime has been committed by the probationer, the probation court should have discretionary authority to detain the probationer without bail pending a determination of the new criminal charge.
This position has been adopted by the American Law Institute and, at least arguably, by several state legislatures.
560 P.2d at 16 (footnotes omitted).
The majority opinion states that “the state’s interest in initiating prompt revocation proceedings upon the occurrence of a criminal offense cannot be ignored.” The ABA Standard suggests if there is concern that the parolee or probationer will not appear or will commit further criminal activity, the court should detain the defendant without bail until the trial. In Alaska, this is not possible since there is a constitutional right to bail when criminal charges are pending under Alaska Constitution, art. I, sec. 11. Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1974).1 Although bail cannot be denied, if there is evidence suggesting nonappearance or that the parolee or probationer poses a danger to the community, the court can take these factors into consideration in fixing the amount of bail or terms of a conditional release.2 Id. at 1397. I believe that this option adequately protects the state’s interests without imposing undue burdens on the parolee or probationer’s constitutional rights.
Further, in McGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1232-33 (Alaska 1975), we noted in the context of prison disciplinary hearings that:
The Division of Corrections’ regulations pertaining to major infractions involving conduct constituting felonies provide for referral to the local district attorney, together with a request that he advise the institution within five working days whether prosecution will be undertaken. If the district attorney informs the institution that prosecution will be undertaken and the case goes to trial, there will be no further disciplinary action taken by the institution against the offender for the particular conduct.
I am of the view that either the parole board, Department of Health and Social Services, or the legislature should consider adopting a similar regulation or statute providing that the parole or probation officer seeking revocation based on conduct constituting a crime must refer the matter to the district attorney to consider the bringing of criminal charges. If the district attorney, within stated time constraints, informs the parole or probation officer that he will not seek criminal charges, then the officer can proceed with the revocation proceeding. If the district attorney does plan on bringing criminal charges, the parole or probation officer must suspend any revocation pro*1001ceedings until after the outcome of the criminal prosecution.
I believe that such a procedure will adequately protect the parolee or probationer’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination while offering the state adequate measures to deal with criminal conduct committed by parolees or probationers.
BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ., dissent on the basis that the superior court’s order of immunity unambiguously and completely protected petitioner’s privilege against self-incrimination.

. In Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389, 1398 (Alaska 1974), the court concluded that the right to bail did not extend to situations in which there is not a criminal proceeding but only a probation revocation proceeding. However, the court noted that, even in those cases, denial of bail is ill advised:
While we hold that appellant Max Ray Martin was neither entitled to bail under the Alaska Constitution or the Alaska Bail Act, we suggest bail should be withheld pending revocation proceedings only in unusual cases. Trial judges have wide latitude in imposing suitable conditions for prehearing release, other than the denial of bail. The denial of bail may constitute a needless disruption of the probation process negating the program’s objectives of rehabilitation and eventual integration into society. Furthermore, the recent expansion in the area of probationer’s rights by the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), suggests the granting of bail.

. In People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 406, 533 P.2d 1024, 1046 (1975) (citations omitted), the court similarly noted:
Where pretrial custody is required of one accused of crime, the state has available to it procedures for requiring bail or otherwise restraining conduct which would render unnecessary immediate resort to the machinery of probation revocation in those instances where the accused happens to be a probationer.