Court Opinion

ID: 9689189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:23:55.588685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:32.933119
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion and believe that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to a prison term of forty to sixty years. When the gravity of the offense and defendant’s previous contacts with the criminal justice system are considered, the sentence violates the proportionality standard set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Consequently, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for resentencing.
i
The majority disregards the Milboum standard and establishes a new standard of review for the sentencing of habitual offenders:
*328[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion in giving a sentence within the statutory limits established by the Legislature when an habitual offender’s underlying felony, in the context of his previous felonies, evidences that the defendant has an inability to conform his conduct to the laws of society. [Ante at 326.]
The majority provides no rationale for not using the Milbourn proportionality standard.
I dissent because I believe that the Milbourn standard should be applied to the sentencing of habitual offenders. Milboum intended that the sentencing guidelines be a starting point in determining whether a nonhabitual sentence is disproportionate. It also anticipated that its proportionality standard would apply to crimes not covered by the guidelines, such as those of habitual offenders. Id. at 661, n 29. Consequently, it has been interpreted to intend that “review of an habitual offender sentence is limited to considering whether the sentence violates the principle of proportionality set forth in [Milbourn]." People v Gatewood (On Remand), 216 Mich App 559, 560; 550 NW2d 265 (1996).
The justifications for the standard that is laid out in Milbourn apply as forcefully to habitual offenders as to nonhabitual offenders. In adopting the standard of proportionality, the Milbourn Court considered the factors used by the Legislature in formulating sentences. It reasoned that the Legislature weighed both the severity and nature of the offense and the background of the offender in setting the appropriate sentence for a crime. It then determined that a sentence imposed by a trial judge was an abuse of discretion if it was not “proportionate” in light of the offense and the offender.
*329Before Milbourn, an appellate court would find an abuse of discretion only if the sentence “shock[ed] the conscience.” People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 550; 339 NW2d 440 (1983). The Milbourn Court noted that appellate courts extend great deference to the sentencing judge when making abuse of discretion determinations. If an abuse of discretion standard is narrowly construed, appellate review may avoid altogether the consideration of disparity between the sentence under review and others given for the same offense. Id. at 647. Consequently, the Court reasoned that a proportionality standard provides a more objective review of a trial judge’s exercise of sentencing discretion than the “shock the conscience” standard.
Another justification for the proportionality standard was that it checks judicial prejudices, including racial, gender and social discriminations, that sometimes arise in the sentencing process. Id. at 646.1 The standard accomplishes more than fostering uniform sentences among similarly situated offenders. Id. at 645-646. It protects the criminal justice system from the biases associated with differing philosophies and protects against over-sentencing. Id. at 645-646, 653.
The majority’s rule in the instant case appears to disregard the Milbourn Court’s concerns. In setting a different standard for sentence review for habitual offenders, it risks taking a step backwards. Sentencing judges’ differing personal backgrounds, experiences, and viewpoints will surely give rise to disparate sentences among habitual offenders as they did among nonhabitual offenders before Milbourn. Id. at *330645. The fact that no sentencing guidelines exist for habitual offenders leaves the sentencing judge without a valuable gauge to measure the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. Therefore, optimum appellate review of habitual offender sentences requires the objectiveness of a proportionality standard at least as much as, if not more than, sentences subject to the guidelines.
The Legislature has created a sentencing commission to develop sentencing guidelines. MCL 769!32-769.34- MSA 28.1097(3.2)-28.1097(3.4). These guidelines will supersede the current sentencing guidelines for first-time offenders. MCL 769.34(1); MSA 28.1097(3.4)(1). They will also establish separate sentence ranges for habitual . offenders. MCL 769.33(e)(vii); MSA 28.1097(3.3)(e)(vii). Thus, the Legislature intends that sentencing guidelines will one day be used in habitual offender sentencing. In the interim, habitual offenders should have the benefit of objective sentence review. The proportionality standard articulated in Milbourn should apply.
n
In reviewing the habitual offender sentence using the Milbourn proportionality standard, it was appropriate- for the Court of Appeals to consider Hansford’s background and the nature of his offense. Milbourn at 650. It noted:
Defendant does, to be sure, have an extensive record and a poor history of community supervision. Moreover, his stealing from his hospitalized mother is particularly offensive. [Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 11, 1995 (Docket No. 165364), slip op at 2.]
*331I agree that defendant exhibits a continuing disregard for the criminal justice system and a low probability of speedy rehabilitation. His persistent criminality, even during parole or probation, clearly warrants the conclusion that he is as yet unable or unwilling to abide by the rules of the criminal justice system.
On the other hand, Hansford’s crimes were nonviolent: larceny, receiving stolen property, and a misdemeanor fleeing and eluding offense. The court sentenced him to probation for three of his offenses. He received a fine of $185 or nineteen days for a fourth. His longest sentence was three to seven years. In addition, defendant’s criminal acts have not “escalated from nonviolent robberies into dangerous weapon assaults against police officers.” People v Cervantes, 448 Mich 620, 628; 532 NW2d 831 (1995). Should he have no further opportunities to live outside the prison system? A forty-year minimum term for a thirty-four-year-old is a life sentence.
Defendant’s sentence must also.be proportionate to his underlying offense. Milbourn at 650. By way of comparison, in People v Odendahl, 200 Mich App 539, 541; 505 NW2d 16 (1993), the Court of Appeals held that a ten- to fifteen-year sentence for being a fourth habitual offender was not disproportionate under the circumstances. Odendahl had been convicted of felonious assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Id. at 540. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
First, the evidence indicates that defendant argued with and choked the victim. After the victim fled from him, defendant chased her and then shot her three times at close range. Defendant sought aid for the victim following the *332shooting, but only after returning the rifle. Further, he asked the victim not to report him to the authorities. Second, defendant has an extensive criminal history, including four previous felonies and five misdemeanors. Some of these offenses involved assault crimes. [Id. at 541.]
Hansford was convicted of entering an occupied dwelling without the owner’s permission and receiving stolen property over $100. He pleaded guilty of being a fourth habitual offender. Unlike Odendahl’s underlying violent offenses, Hansford’s offenses are nonviolent. Yet, remarkably, Hansford’s minimum sentence is thirty years greater than Odendahl’s. As the Court noted in Milbourn:
“Unjustified disparities promote disrespect for the criminal justice system and resentment among prisoners, thus impairing their morale and motivation for rehabilitation.”
[Id. at 645.]
In light of these factors, I conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to forty to sixty years.
The majority provides too few reasons for its conclusion that this extreme sentence is not an abuse of discretion. It mentions defendant’s extensive record of thievery, that he stole from the home of his hospitalized mother, and his “inability to conform his conduct to the laws of society.”
The majority notes that the sentence is within the statutory maximum, life or a lesser term, for a fourth habitual offender. The implication is that any sentence within statutory limits would be acceptable. However, the maximum punishment under MCL 769.12(1); MSA 28.1084(1) applies to nonviolent as well as violent habitual fourth offenders. Defendant’s *333crimes are not among the worst offenses covered by the applicable habitual offender statute. MCL 769.12(1); MSA 28.1084(1). Defendant’s forty- to sixty-year sentence makes his offenses appear far greater than they are, and thus, leaves little room “ ‘to operate’ from the least to the most serious situations” as contemplated by Milbourn. People v Merriweather, 447 Mich 799, 806; 527 NW2d 460 (1994).
The majority invites the same “over sentencing” that the Milboum Court criticized when it wrote:
Just as the routine award of high grades demeans academic value, the routine imposition of maximum sentences would send a garbled message of society’s views on the relative blameworthiness of various commissions of a given crime to the public as well as to the ultimate consumer of judicial sentencing behavior — the convicted offender. [Id. at 645-646.]
It sends an undesirable message to both the defendant and to society.
in
Milboum established the standard of sentence review in Michigan: proportionality. I see no need for a new and different standard for habitual offenders. When applied to the sentence in this case, the standard reveals the sentence as disproportionate. It should not stand. Consequently, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for resentencing.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 Citing Nagel, Structuring sentencing discretion: The new federal sentencing guidelines, 80 J Crim L & Criminology 883-884 (1990).