Court Opinion

ID: 9634652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:19:14.916937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:03.473132
License: Public Domain

GAULTNEY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the convictions. I respectfully dissent to the reversal of the punishment; I would affirm the judgments in their entirety.
The majority holds that the trial court erred in overruling defendant’s objection that his prior convictions were “irrelevant.” I would hold instead that appellant’s “relevancy” objection below is a general objection which does not preserve error on appeal; furthermore, his general “relevancy” objection at trial does not comport with his appellate complaint. An objection that evidence is “irrelevant” is a *97general objection. See Henderson v. State, 617 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Miranda v. State, 813 S.W.2d 724, 742 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, pet. refd) (“A general objection of ‘relevancy’ or of ‘hearsay1 presents] nothing for review.”). That is particularly true in the punishment phase in view of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ statement that a determination of what is relevant in the punishment phase “should be a question of what is helpful to the jury in determining the appropriate sentence in a particular case.” Mendiola v. State, 21 S.W.3d 282, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (quoting Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)) (emphasis in Mendiola ). The Court’s description of “relevancy” demonstrates that the objection “irrelevant” is wide-ranging and covers a barnyard of specific issues.
It is axiomatic, based upon case law and rules of evidence and appellate procedure, that an objection must be specific to preserve error. See Martinez v. State, 22 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a). A specific objection is required for two reasons; first the trial judge must be informed of the basis for the objection to afford the court an opportunity to rule on the issue; and secondly, a specific objection provides opposing counsel an opportunity to satisfy the objection by offering additional evidence or removing the basis for the objection. See Martinez, 22 S.W.3d at 507 (Further, an appellate court errs in reversing a judgment on a ground that was not preserved by a specific objection.). Here, appellant did not tell the trial court that he objected to the State’s failure to offer sufficient proof that the prior convictions were actually his convictions, as opposed to someone with the same name who lived in the same county. Had he made that specific objection, the State would have been given an opportunity to satisfy that objection. The trial court would also have been sufficiently informed of the basis for the objection so that the court could have excluded the evidence if the State failed to satisfy the specific objection. See Darby v. State, 922 S.W.2d 614, 619 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. refd). Aleman’s relevancy objection at the punishment phase to the admission of the certified judgments setting forth his prior convictions did not apprise the trial court of the specific complaint he raises on appeal — -that the State did not offer sufficient proof he was the same man as the one named in the certified judgments.
Given the broad scope of what is “relevant” evidence in the punishment phase, I would hold that appellant’s general “irrelevant” objection was tantamount to no objection and, moreover, did not comport with the issue raised on appeal.1 I would affirm the judgments of the trial court.

. In closing argument defendant’s attorney argued that her client had "never been convicted of any felony offenses other than driving while intoxicated.” The convictions at issue here were the DWI convictions. She also argued that he was currently on probation and that when the jury reviewed the DWI conviction they would see "that one of the conditions of his probation is that he commit no new offenses against the laws of this [S]tate[.]” She argued that if the jury was “concerned that this might happen again,” they would "know that if he did commit a new offense in this regard that would be a violation of his community supervision.” If these were not her client’s convictions, as an officer of the court she certainly would not have made this assurance to the jury, would *98she? What if the jury had relied on her assurance?
Because I believe the error asserted here was not preserved at trial, I need not address whether this affirmative use and adoption of his DWI convictions in closing argument constituted a waiver of his relevance objection or instead a permissible attempt to explain the evidence.