Court Opinion

ID: 9368261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 16:01:43.162419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.594515
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-1140   Document: 101     Page: 1   Filed: 02/03/2023

         NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

    TRANSTEX INC., FKA TRANSTEX COMPOSITE
                      INC.,
                    Appellant

                             v.

   KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
   COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
     AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
       PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
                   Intervenor
             ______________________

                        2020-1140
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2018-
 00737.
                  ______________________

                Decided: February 3, 2023
                 ______________________

     JOHN CARACAPPA, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Washing-
 ton, DC, for appellant. Also represented by SCOTT RICHEY,
 JOHN WILLIAM TOTH; ROBERT KAPPERS, Chicago, IL.

    MAI-TRANG DUC DANG, Office of the Solicitor, United
 States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for
Case: 20-1140    Document: 101     Page: 2   Filed: 02/03/2023

 2                                     TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL

 intervenor. Also represented by PETER J. AYERS, THOMAS
 W. KRAUSE, AMY J. NELSON, FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED,
 MARY BETH WALKER.
                 ______________________

     Before PROST 1, SCHALL, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
     Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge PROST.
     Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge SCHALL.
 PROST, Circuit Judge.
      The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) found
 claims 1–9, 19, and 20 of U.S. Patent No. 7,942,471
 (“the ’471 patent”) unpatentable as obvious. WABCO Hold-
 ings Inc. v. Transtex Composites Inc., No. IPR2018-00737,
 Paper 30, 2019 WL 4677106 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 24, 2019)
 (“’471 Final Written Decision”). Patent owner, Transtex,
 Inc. (“Transtex”), appeals. 2 We affirm for the reasons set
 forth below.
                         BACKGROUND
      WABCO Holdings, Inc. and Laydon Composites Ltd.
 (collectively, “WABCO”) petitioned for inter partes review
 of claims 1–9, 19, and 20 of the ’471 patent and claims 1–20
 of U.S. Patent No. 8,449,017 (“the ’017 patent”). The Board
 found all challenged claims of the ’471 patent and claims 1,
 5–11, and 15–19 of the ’017 patent unpatentable as obvious
 in light of Layfield and Rinard. 3 ’471 Final Written Deci-
 sion, 2019 WL 4677106, at *14; WABCO Holdings Inc. v.

     1    Circuit Judge Sharon Prost vacated the position of
 Chief Judge on May 21, 2021.
      2   Transtex was formerly known as Transtex Compo-
 site Inc., so the Board’s final written decision caption re-
 flects that name.
      3   U.S. Patent No. 7,578,541 (“Layfield”); U.S. Patent
 No. 5,280,990 (“Rinard”).
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 TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL                                       3

 Transtex Composites Inc., No. IPR2018-01319, Paper 25, at
 65 (Jan. 10, 2020) (“’017 Final Written Decision”). Transtex
 appealed both Board decisions. Only the ’471 Final Written
 Decision is at issue here, but a brief discussion of the com-
 panion case is warranted given the similarities between
 the challenged claims and the issues raised. 4
                                I
      As Transtex notes, the ’017 and ’471 patents are re-
 lated and have substantially similar specifications. Appel-
 lant’s Br. 1 n.1.         Both patents generally relate to
 aerodynamic trailer skirts. And their specifications ex-
 plain that trailer skirts are used to “reduce the aerody-
 namic air drag and improve fuel efficiency” but are
 typically prone to damage (breaking and bending such that
 they no longer maintain an aerodynamic shape) when they
 encounter foreign objects in the road. ’471 patent col. 1 ll.
 20–45; ’017 patent col. 1 ll. 30–55. Both patents state that
 “[t]here is a need in the art for . . . a resilient skirt assem-
 bly.” ’471 patent col. 1 ll. 47–49; ’017 patent col. 1 ll. 57–59.
 And they describe “a resilient skirt assembly” and “a resil-
 ient strut adapted to secure a skirt panel to a road trailer.”
 ’471 patent col. 2 ll. 3–4, col. 2 ll. 19–20; ’017 patent col. 2
 ll. 5–6, col. 2 ll. 20–21.
     The representative claim at issue in the ’017 patent ap-
 peal was:
     1. A resilient strut adapted to secure an aerody-
     namic skirt to a trailer, the aerodynamic skirt

     4   In the ’017 Final Written Decision, the Board also
 found that WABCO had not shown that claims 2–4, 12–14,
 and 20 of the ’017 patent, which claimed resilient struts of
 a particular shape, were unpatentable as obvious. WABCO
 cross-appealed, and we affirmed the Board’s determination
 on those claims. No shape-specific limitations are at issue
 here, so we don’t discuss that aspect of the related case.
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 4                                      TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL

     being adapted to be substantially longitudinally
     mounted to the trailer,
     the aerodynamic skirt comprising a skirt panel in-
     cluding a front portion and a rear portion, the front
     portion being adapted to be mounted toward a for-
     ward portion of the trailer and the rear portion be-
     ing adapted to be mounted toward a rear portion of
     the trailer in a configuration reducing air drag
     about the trailer, the skirt panel being adapted to
     move away from the configuration reducing air
     drag about the trailer when contacting a foreign ob-
     ject and to recover the configuration reducing air
     drag about the trailer thereafter,
     the resilient strut being adapted to sustain an elas-
     tic deformation when a load is applied to the resili-
     ent strut when the skirt panel moves away from the
     configuration reducing air drag about the trailer
     and to self-recover the resilient strut original shape
     when the load is removed, the resilient strut includ-
     ing a longitudinal shape variation adapted to
     change a mechanical strength of the resilient strut
     and influence a stiffness of the resilient strut.
 Transtex Inc. v. Laydon Composites Ltd., 848 F. App’x 901,
 903 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Transtex I”) (emphasis in original)
 (quoting ’017 patent claim 1).
     In Transtex I, Transtex challenged the Board’s conclu-
 sions related to the resilient strut limitation. Specifically,
 it argued that the Board’s motivation-to-combine and rea-
 sonable-expectation-of-success findings were erroneous.
 We rejected both arguments and affirmed the Board’s ob-
 viousness determination. 5 We concluded that the Board’s

     5   The discordant timing of our decisions here and in
 Transtex I is a product of the two Final Written Decisions’
 differing temporal relationships with Arthrex. We rejected
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 TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL                                  5

 motivation-to-combine finding “was more than an imper-
 missible conclusory assertion” and that it was supported by
 substantial evidence in the form of Mr. Tres’s expert testi-
 mony. Transtex I, 848 F. App’x at 907. As for reasonable
 expectation of success, we found that “Mr. Tres’s declara-
 tions confirm that the expectation of success here is rea-
 sonable in view of the teachings of Layfield and Rinard”
 and that the Board’s decision had adequately set out the
 reasons for its conclusion. Id. at 908.
     This appeal is also centered on the Board’s conclusions
 about a resilient strut limitation. The representative claim
 of the ’471 patent at issue here is:

 Transtex’s Appointments Clause challenge in the ’017 pa-
 tent appeal because the Board’s decision issued after our
 then-binding decision in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew,
 Inc., 941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Transtex I, 848 F.
 App’x at 905 n.3. The ’471 Final Written Decision issued
 before our Arthrex decision, so this case was initially re-
 manded for proceedings consistent with that decision. Or-
 der (Feb. 5, 2021), ECF No. 64. After the Supreme Court’s
 decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970
 (2021), the mandate was recalled, and the case was re-
 manded for the limited purpose of seeking Director review.
 Order (Dec. 30, 2021), ECF No. 82. WABCO withdrew
 from the appeal before Director review was denied. Order
 (Feb. 18, 2022) ECF No. 85. When the appeal was rein-
 stated, supplemental briefing was ordered and the United
 States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) was permit-
 ted to respond to all issues raised in Transtex’s appeal
 (prior to WABCO’s withdrawal the PTO’s brief had ad-
 dressed only the Appointments Clause issue). Order (July
 26, 2022), ECF No. 93. Transtex is no longer pursuing an
 Appointments Clause challenge. Appellant’s Supp. Reply
 Br. 2 n.3.
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 6                                      TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL

     1. An aerodynamic skirt adapted to be substan-
     tially longitudinally mounted to a trailer, the aero-
     dynamic skirt comprising:
         (a) a skirt panel including a front portion and a
         rear portion, the front portion being adapted to
         be mounted toward a forward portion of the
         trailer and the rear portion being adapted to be
         mounted toward a rear portion of the trailer in
         an aerodynamic configuration of the skirt, the
         front portion having a front height and the rear
         portion having a rear height, the front height
         being shorter than the rear height, the skirt
         panel being adapted to move away from the
         aerodynamic configuration of the skirt when
         contacting a foreign object and to recover to the
         aerodynamic configuration of the skirt thereaf-
         ter,
         (b) the skirt panel being resiliently secured to
         the trailer with a plurality of resilient struts,
         each resilient strut comprising
             (i) an intermediate portion;
             (ii) a trailer connecting portion at a first
             end thereof; and
             (iii) a skirt connecting portion at a second
             end thereof,
             (iv) the resilient strut being adapted to sus-
             tain an elastic deformation when a load is
             applied thereon when the skirt panel moves
             away from the aerodynamic configuration
             of the skirt both proximally toward a center
             of the trailer and distally away from the
             center of the trailer, and to self-recover an
             original shape when the skirt panel returns
             to the aerodynamic configuration of the
             skirt when the load is removed.
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 TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL                                      7

 ’471 patent claim 1 (emphasis added).
     The limitations at issue in both appeals are similar.
 Both struts are adapted to sustain an elastic deformation—
 the only difference is whether they can do so when the skirt
 panel moves away from its configuration in general (the
 ’017 patent’s resilient strut limitation) or when it moves
 away from its configuration bidirectionally (towards the
 center and away from it) (the ’471 patent’s resilient strut
 limitation).
     The similarities between appeals don’t end there. As
 in Transtex I, Transtex argues that the Board’s motivation-
 to-combine and reasonable-expectation-of-success findings
 related to the resilient strut limitation were erroneous here
 as well. And those are the only aspects of the Board’s deci-
 sion that Transtex challenges.
                                II
      In the ’471 Final Written Decision, the Board first dis-
 cussed WABCO’s anticipation ground. It found that Lay-
 field taught all limitations of the representative claim
 aside from the resilient strut limitation. ’471 Final Written
 Decision, 2019 WL 4677106, at *5–6. For the resilient
 struts, the Board concluded that Layfield did not expressly
 teach a flexible strut or expressly “discuss the desirability
 of strut flexibility.” Id. at *6. Further, in the context of its
 inherency analysis, the Board concluded that struts made
 of the materials disclosed in Layfield without any consid-
 eration of their construction (including the strut’s thick-
 ness) would not necessarily sustain the elastic deformation
 the claims require. Id. at *7. Transtex does not challenge
 these aspects of the Board’s decision.
     Having already concluded that Layfield taught the
 other elements, the Board addressed the combination of Ri-
 nard and Layfield only as it related to the resilient strut
 limitation. The Board rejected Transtex’s arguments on
 lack of motivation to combine and absence of reasonable
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 8                                     TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL

 expectation of success and concluded that “[WABCO] ha[d]
 demonstrated sufficiently that one of ordinary skill in the
 art would have had reason with rational underpinning to
 combine the teachings of Rinard and Layfield in the man-
 ner proposed by [WABCO] with a reasonable expectation of
 success.” Id. at *13. Transtex timely appealed. We have
 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
                         DISCUSSION
      “We review the Board’s ultimate obviousness determi-
 nation de novo and underlying factual findings for substan-
 tial evidence.” Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1349
 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Board’s findings on reasonable expec-
 tation of success and motivation to combine are factual.
 See Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc.,
 876 F.3d 1350, 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “A finding is
 supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind
 might accept the evidence as adequate to support the find-
 ing.” Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Child.’s Grp.,
 LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Even where the
 record could support two conclusions, substantial evidence
 supports either finding. In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1329
 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
     Transtex argues, as it did in Transtex I, that the
 Board’s findings on motivation to combine and reasonable
 expectation of success were erroneous. We address each
 challenge in turn.
                               I
     Transtex argues that substantial evidence does not
 support the Board’s motivation-to-combine finding because
 the testimony offered by WABCO’s expert, Mr. Tres, was
 too conclusory to support it. Appellant’s Br. 29–31.
 Transtex also contends that the Board did not adequately
 explain the basis for its motivation conclusion in any event.
 Appellant’s Br. 32–33. This is essentially the same argu-
 ment—about the Board’s finding regarding the same pieces
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 TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL                                     9

 of prior art—that Transtex advanced in Transtex I.
 Transtex I, 848 F. App’x at 906. We do not find it persua-
 sive here either.
      The Board sufficiently explained its reasons for finding
 a motivation to combine Layfield with Rinard’s resilient
 support elements. Before the Board specifically discussed
 the resilient strut limitation, it had already concluded that
 “Layfield explicitly teaches flexibility of the skirt panel.”
 ’471 Final Written Decision, 2019 WL 4677106, at *5. And
 it had described Rinard as “explain[ing] that [its] air
 scoops, including vertical support elements 76, can be
 made ‘from a resilient material’ . . . allow[ing] the air scoop
 ‘to resume its illustrated configuration upon removal of
 contact’ with another structure, such as a loading dock.”
 Id. at *4 (citing Rinard col. 10 ll. 43–50). Ultimately, the
 Board concluded that “[WABCO] ha[d] shown that one of
 skill in the art would have had a reason with rational un-
 derpinning to look to other similar types of trailer compo-
 nents that are also flexible to make further improvements
 to Layfield’s design.” Id. at *12. In doing so, the Board also
 explained why it was rejecting Transtex’s arguments: be-
 cause they either sought to explain why Rinard’s support
 elements alone did not teach the resilient strut instead of
 addressing the combination or were based on the previ-
 ously rejected contention that Layfield did not teach a flex-
 ible skirt panel.
     Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion.
 Mr. Tres testified that a person of ordinary skill in the art
 (“POSA”) would have been “motivated to implement Ri-
 nard’s teachings concerning the resilient arcuate element
 72 and support elements 76 in the Layfield trailer fairings
 to provide a skirt panel that recovers its aerodynamic con-
 figuration after moving away from that position when con-
 tacting a foreign object and struts that are ‘resilient’ as
 recited in the challenged claims of the ’471 patent.”
 J.A. 1374 ¶ 148. And this conclusion has a sufficient basis.
 For example, Mr. Tres based his opinion on the fact that
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  10                                    TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL

  “Rinard and Layfield are both concerned with providing
  flexible fairing components that can be elastically de-
  formed” and that a POSA would have recognized that Lay-
  field’s resilient skirt would benefit from a resilient strut.
  J.A. 1374 ¶ 145–46.
      In sum, the Board’s motivation-to-combine finding was
  not erroneous: it is supported by substantial evidence. The
  dissent agrees with this conclusion and would not disturb
  the Board’s motivation-to-combine finding on appeal ei-
  ther.
                               II
      As for reasonable expectation of success, Transtex ar-
  gues that the Board improperly shifted the burden by re-
  quiring that Transtex show no reasonable expectation of
  success. Appellant’s Br. 36–38. Additionally, Transtex ar-
  gues that the Board’s conclusion is erroneous because the
  Board never explained how the proposed combination
  would work. Id. at 39–41. Neither argument is persua-
  sive. 6
      First, the Board did not improperly shift the burden to
  Transtex. The Board simply noted that one of Transtex’s
  reasonable-expectation-of-success arguments only ad-
  dressed whether Rinard’s resilient components alone
  would move away from the trailer without addressing why
  the combination was subject to the same argument.
  ’471 Final Written Decision, 2019 WL 4677106, at *11.
     Second, the Board explained its reasons for finding rea-
  sonable expectation of success. And substantial evidence
  supports that finding. This is where our conclusions and

       6  Because we reject Transtex’s arguments, we do not
  need to address the PTO’s contention that Transtex is col-
  laterally estopped from advancing them based on our deci-
  sion in Transtex I.
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  TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL                                  11

  the dissent’s part ways. The dissent would reverse on this
  ground, concluding that no explanation by the Board would
  be sufficient in any event because the record lacks substan-
  tial evidence of reasonable expectation of success. We, on
  the other hand, conclude, as we did in Transtex I, that Mr.
  Tres’s declarations in view of Layfield and Rinard provided
  a sufficient and proper basis for the Board’s conclusion.
       “[T]he expectation of success need only be reasonable,
  not absolute.” See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d
  1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007). So the Board did not need to
  conclude that a POSA would be certain that the strut would
  sustain an elastic deformation; it just needed to conclude
  that it would have been reasonable for a POSA to expect
  that result. The Board explained that it agreed with
  WABCO’s argument, supported by expert testimony, that
  “Rinard provides an obvious solution to the problem of aer-
  odynamic fairings mounted to trailers encountering exter-
  nal objects that can damage the aerodynamic performance
  of the fairing, and that applying this solution to the Lay-
  field struts would yield the predictable result of allowing
  the Layfield struts 58 to absorb greater impacts without
  having to be repaired or replaced.” ’471 Final Written De-
  cision, 2019 WL 4677106, at *11 (cleaned up). That was
  sufficient.
       Substantial evidence supported that conclusion. Ri-
  nard’s resilient vertical support elements, Layfield’s struts
  and flexible skirt panel, and Mr. Tres’s testimony that re-
  lies on both references and his background knowledge in
  mechanics and plastics all provided substantial evidence
  for the Board’s finding. And because there are factual and
  rational underpinnings to support Mr. Tres’s opinions, the
  Board was within its discretion to rely on them to reach its
  conclusion. See Acoustic Tech., Inc. v. Itron Networked
  Sols., Inc., 949 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
     Additionally, this is a situation where the evidence of
  motivation to combine—evidence that everyone agrees
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  12                                    TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL

  meets the substantial-evidence threshold—and the evi-
  dence of reasonable expectation of success significantly
  overlap. Likewise, the Board’s discussion of both issues
  overlapped. Mr. Tres’s declaration provided that a POSA
  would have “recognized the benefit” of the combination so
  that the struts “may deform either inwardly or outwardly.”
  J.A. 1374 ¶ 147; see also J.A. 1373 ¶ 145 (“Rinard and Lay-
  field are both concerned with providing flexible fairing
  components that can be elastically deformed . . . .”). And
  the Board found a motivation to look to flexible trailer com-
  ponents specifically. ’471 Final Written Decision, 2019 WL
  4677106, at *12. Thus, it was reasonable for the Board to
  look to this same evidence and conclude that a POSA would
  have reasonably expected the resiliency benefit that moti-
  vated him to combine the references in the first instance.
      The dissent would conclude that, notwithstanding that
  substantial evidence supports a POSA’s motivation to com-
  bine the references specifically because they were flexi-
  ble—the correct conclusion, everyone agrees—nonetheless,
  it does not support a POSA’s reasonable expectation that
  the resulting combination would be flexible. This record,
  devoid of any indication that this is an unpredictable art,
  does not support this distinction. “[D]emonstrat[ing] a mo-
  tivation to combine references does not necessarily imply
  that the challenger has also met its burden of showing a
  reasonable expectation of success in achieving a claimed
  method of treatment.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. Int’l
  GmbH, 8 F.4th 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (emphasis
  added). But in some instances, a POSA will be motivated
  to combine familiar elements for the same reasons she
  would expect them to yield predictable results. This is one
  such instance.
      Finally, the slight differences between the claim limi-
  tation at issue here and the claim limitation at issue in our
  previous decision do not support the dissent’s inconsistent
  outcome. In Transtex I we concluded that “Mr. Tres’s dec-
  larations confirm that the expectation of success here is
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  TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL                                   13

  reasonable in view of the teachings of Layfield and Rinard.”
  848 F. App’x at 908. In contrast, here the dissent would
  rest its reversal on its conclusion that a comparable decla-
  ration was too conclusory for the Board to have properly
  relied on it. Because both declarations are sufficient, there
  is no basis to reach a different conclusion here than we did
  in Transtex I.
                             CONCLUSION
      We have considered Transtex’s other arguments and
  find them unpersuasive. Since substantial evidence sup-
  ports the Board’s motivation-to-combine and reasonable-
  expectation-of-success findings, we affirm the Board’s de-
  termination that claims 1–9, 19, and 20 of the ’471 patent
  are unpatentable as obvious.
                             AFFIRMED
                               COSTS
  No costs.
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          NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                    ______________________

    TRANSTEX INC., FKA TRANSTEX COMPOSITE
                      INC.,
                    Appellant

                               v.

   KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
   COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
     AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
       PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
                   Intervenor
             ______________________

                          2020-1140
                    ______________________

      Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
  Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2018-
  00737.
                   ______________________

  SCHALL, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
      The majority affirms the Board’s obviousness determi-
  nation. It does so because it concludes that substantial ev-
  idence supports the Board’s findings with respect to
  motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of suc-
  cess. While I agree with the majority on the first point, for
  the reasons stated below, I part company with it on the sec-
  ond point.
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  2                                      TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL

      The challenged claims of the ’471 patent, unlike the
  claims of the ’017 patent at issue in Transtex I, require that
  the resilient strut of the trailer skirt be “adapted to sustain
  an elastic deformation when a load is applied thereon when
  the skirt panel moves away from the aerodynamic configu-
  ration of the skirt both proximally toward a center of the
  trailer and distally away from the center of the trailer” and
  then “self-recover.” ’471 patent, Reexam. Cert. col. 1 ll. 25–
  52 (emphases added). 1 In my view, the Board did not ex-
  plain how the combination of Layfield and Rinard would
  have reasonably been expected to achieve this claimed fea-
  ture. Nor do I see anything in Mr. Tres’s testimony that
  provides substantial evidence that would support such a
  finding. Mr. Tres’s opinions regarding reasonable likeli-
  hood of success merely paraphrase the claim language
  and/or depend on WABCO’s argument that Layfield alone
  teaches a resilient strut, which argument the Board ex-
  pressly rejected. See J.A. 1374, ¶ 147; J.A. 1374–75, ¶ 149;
  J.A. 1381, ¶ 164; TQ Delta, LLC v. CISCO Sys., Inc., 942
  F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Conclusory expert testi-
  mony does not qualify as substantial evidence.”). The most
  pertinent testimony of Mr. Tres states:
      In my opinion, a skilled artisan would have recog-
      nized the benefit of constructing the Layfield struts
      58 from a “resilient material” as taught by Rinard
      so that the Layfield struts 58 may deform either in-
      wardly or outwardly in response to a load being ap-
      plied against them, such as, when encountering an

      1    The requirement that the resilient strut permit
  movement of the skirt panel “both proximally toward a cen-
  ter of the trailer and distally away from the center of the
  trailer” was added during ex parte reexamination proceed-
  ings of the ’471 patent. It was the addition of this claim
  language that led the examiner to conclude that the claims
  were patentable over the prior art of record, which included
  Layfield and Rinard. J.A. 1189–90.
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  TRANSTEX INC.   v. VIDAL                                     3

      external structure like a loading dock and to return
      to their original position supporting the panels in
      an aerodynamic configuration once the load caused
      by the contact with external structure is removed.
  J.A. 1374 ¶ 147. This testimony, provided in connection
  with motivation to combine, supports that one of skill in
  the art would have appreciated that a Layfield strut, if
  made from Rinard’s resilient material, would have the abil-
  ity to collapse and recover. See also J.A. 1372–74, ¶¶ 143–
  46; J.A. 1374, ¶ 148; J.A. 1375, ¶ 150. I do not believe, how-
  ever, that this testimony constitutes substantial evidence
  that one of skill in the art would have had a reasonable
  likelihood of success in combining Layfield and Rinard to
  achieve a strut that would be adapted to permit movement
  of a trailer skirt “distally away from the center of the
  trailer” and then “self-recover.”
       Thus, and because I would reject the Director’s argu-
  ment that Transtex is collaterally estopped from pursuing
  its appeal in view of Transtex I, I would conclude that the
  Board committed reversible error in finding that a skilled
  artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success
  in achieving the claimed invention. 2 I therefore respect-
  fully dissent.

      2    Collateral estoppel is not limited to situations
  where patent claims are identical but instead “requires
  that the issues of patentability be identical.” Google LLC v.
  Hammond Dev. Int’l, Inc., 54 F.4th 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
  2022) (concluding that collateral estoppel applied where
  identical issues of patentability were presented). Where,
  as here, there are differences between the unadjudicated
  patent claims and adjudicated patent claims that materi-
  ally alter the question of invalidity, collateral estoppel does
  not apply. See id.; see also Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps
  South, LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013).