Court Opinion

ID: 9534083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:36:43.705386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:28.975564
License: Public Domain

Herd, J.,
concurring and dissenting: I concur with the response of the majority to certified question number one.
I also concur on question number two, agreeing we are bound by the wording of K.S.A. 44-5a01(c), which provides the employer is not liable for compensation if the worker’s disablement occurs more than one year after the last injurious exposure to the hazard. However, I do not agree with the effect of this statute. It effectively denies workers’ compensation coverage to workers who contract latent diseases, such as asbestosis, which do not manifest themselves for a number of years after the exposure. This oversight should be corrected by the legislature.
I disagree with the majority on question number three. The Workers’ Compensation Act was declared constitutional only *516because, in taking away the worker’s common-law remedy, it substituted a remedy for the benefit of the worker by providing liability without fault. See Rajala v. Doresky, 233 Kan. 440, 661 P.2d 1251 (1983). Workers who are victims of asbestosis have lost their common-law remedy without receiving the required substitute remedy under the Act. Therefore, the Act should not be an exclusive remedy in these cases. If the injury complained of is not within the Act’s provisions, the remedy under the Act is not exclusive. Echord v. Rush, 124 Kan. 521, 523, 261 Pac. 820 (1927).
This rule should be applied to carry out the original quid pro quo of the Workers’ Compensation Act. An occupational injury listed under the Act is nonetheless outside its provisions where the Act’s statute of limitations runs before the worker’s disablement.
Finally, the Act is unconstitutional as it applies to victims of asbestosis. Every person is guaranteed a remedy by due course of law for injury to his or her person. Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 18. It is the duty of this court to guard the Kansas Constitution. Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, 340, 757 P.2d 251 (1988). We held in Bell that a statute which placed a cap on recovery for injuries to persons violated the Kansas Constitution. Surely the denial of any remedy for personal injury is a more blatant transgression of the constitution. I would answer certified question number four in the affirmative. The Act is unconstitutional as it applies to victims of asbestosis.