Court Opinion

ID: 9796783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:04:52.278376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:37.304801
License: Public Domain

Elliot, J.,
dissenting. I dissent. As did the majority, I gamer guidance from Mitchell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 271 Kan. 684, 24 P.3d 711 (2001).
The Mitchell court held that a rejection of the excess UM coverage in 1984 controlled an accident occurring in policy year 1991. See Mitchell, 271 Kan. at 688. Mitchell was controlled by the 1981 amendment of K.S.A. 40-284(c) which provided that unless the named insured requested higher uninsured motorist coverage than required by law, the higher coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a “ ‘renewal policy where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to the insured by the same insurer.’ ” (Emphasis added.) 271 Kan. at 691 (quoting L. 1981, ch. 191, sec. 1).
The present case involves the 1986 amendment to the statute which added the “any subsequent policy issued by the same insurer,” including, but not limited to, supplemental, renewal, reinstated, transferred, or substitute policies language. L. 1986, ch. 173, sec. 1.
The Mitchell court discussed the 1986 amendment even though it was not directly involved in the case. The court observed that an argument could be made that the change in 1986 was an “expansion” of the statute because it is presumed when the legislature changes language in a statute, it intends to change the meaning. Mitchell, 271 Kan. at 696-97.
The Mitchell court rejected this argument, favoring instead a ruling that the 1986 amendment “merely worked a clarification” of the 1981 amendment emphasizing the replacement aspects of the policies. Mitchell, 271 Kan. at 697.
*765In ruling the 1984 rejection of the higher UM coverage controlled the 1991 accident scenario, the Mitchell court on numerous occasions emphasized the continuous relationship between insured and insurer. “Continual coverage existed between UPS and Liberty over an extended period of time.” 271 Kan. at 696. “[Requiring further rejections within that existing relationship would run counter to the legislative intent to simplify the rejection process.” 271 Kan. at 695.
In Mitchell, the uncontroverted facts established that UPS dealt exclusively with Liberty over an extended period of time for more than 20 years. 271 Kan. at 696.
Simply stated, the Mitchell court’s ruling relies heavily, if not exclusively, on the long-term, unbroken relationship between insured and insurer. The Mitchell court even remarked about problems created in situations where coverage lapsed or where the terms of coverage markedly changed. 271 Kan. at 695.
Given this, I am not able to ascribe to the legislature an intent that a rejection of high-end uninsured/underinsured coverage once given controls for all time, even after a break in the relationship between insured and insurer.
This brings us to the facts t)f the present case. St. Paul covered Kansas City, Kansas, in 1996,1997, and 1998. In 1998, Kansas City, Kansas, and Wyandotte County merged to form the Unified Government, and in 1999, St. Paul covered the Unified Government.
But in 2000, 2001, and 2002, the Unified Government went elsewhere for its insurance coverage. In 2003, the Unified Government returned to St. Paul for coverage. One could argue that the Unified Government had only a 1-year prior relationship with St. Paul.
How did the parties treat the Unified Government’s return to St. Paul’s bosom in 2003?
St. Paul booked the policy as new business. To me, “new business” does not evoke images of a prior or significant relationship.
And St. Paul certainly acted as if it thought it needed a new rejection form — because it demanded one. The Unified Govern*766ment certainly acted as if it needed to provide a new rejection— because it attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to provide one.
Given all this, I would affirm.