Court Opinion

ID: 9732583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:26:57.603931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:01.247226
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY, specially concurring: While I concur with the result reached in the majority opinion, my reasons for reaching that result differ in some respects. Both the majority and dissenting opinions provide sound reasoning in support of their respective positions. The majority notes, correctly I believe, that Bray I dealt only with the applicability of section 19(n) to that case and did not consider whether section 19(n) overruled Proctor. Accordingly, the petitioner is not attempting to circumvent our decision in Bray I. Further, as the majority points out, Proctor and its progeny show that in some instances the Workers’ Compensation Act is not the exclusive remedy for recovery by an injured employee. The majority opinion effectively reasons that statutes which relate to the same subject should be construed harmoniously where possible, and that a repeal of a statute by implication will not be found unless the intent of the legislature to do so is clear. Thus, according to the majority, the enactment of section 19(n) implied no repeal of prior law, and section 2 — 1303 interest should continue to be available for section 19(g) judgments, as set forth in Proctor. The dissenters reason that the legislature meant to overrule Proctor by enacting section 19(n). This view, which leads to the conclusion that no interest is available here, is in keeping with the Act’s statement that it is the sole measure of responsibility of any employer. I would also note that at the time of its enactment, section 19(n)’s 6% interest provision matched the 6% interest provided by the Interest Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 74, par. 3.) Section 19(n) was subsequently amended several times to expand its coverage and provide an interest percentage based on prevailing interest rates. These latter facts tend to show a legislative intent to make the Act all-inclusive. Faced with equally persuasive, opposing interpretations of section 19(n), we must turn to the principles we have established for selecting the proper interpretation. One such principle is that the Workers’ Compensation Act is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives. (Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Com. (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913.) The fundamental purpose of the Act is to provide employees and their dependents prompt, sure and definite compensation, together with a quick and efficient remedy for injuries or death suffered in the course of employment. (General American Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Com. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 359, 454 N.E.2d 643.) In accordance with this objective, section 19(g) of the Act permits the entry of a speedy judgment in cases where there has been a refusal to pay. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.19(g); Kuhl v. Industrial Com. (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 519, 498 N.E.2d 240. In the instant case, the majority interpretation liberally construes the Act to accomplish the Act’s objective of providing employees with quick and efficient compensation for injuries. Interest accruing on awards ensures that employers have nothing to gain by delaying payment without cause. Interest payments also further the Act’s objective of prompt compensation by ensuring that the employee begins benefit-ting from the award upon the arbitrator’s or Industrial Commission’s decision, even if the employee does not actually receive payment until later. Lastly, the majority’s interpretation puts some muscle behind section 19(g)’s objectives of speedy judgment and payment. The dissent’s interpretation, on the other hand, creates two classes of injured employees. Under that interpretation, those who receive an award under section 19(e) and are thus potentially covered by the interest provision of section 19(n) are accorded the full benefit of the Act’s goal of providing them with prompt compensation for their injuries. Those who receive an award under section 19(h); as did the instant petitioner, are relegated to a lower class in which the employer, not threatened by accruing interest, is induced to take appeals and delay in order to control the money awarded for as long as possible. I can find nothing in the Act or elsewhere from which to conclude that the legislature intended such a result. Given the ambiguity of section 19(n) in relation to Proctor, I believe we have no choice but to liberally construe the Act in favor of the employee. For this reason, I join in the majority’s determination that the circuit court properly awarded section 2 — 1303 interest to the petitioner.