Court Opinion

ID: 9832248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:45:27.931892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:44.767417
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
On original submission we held that appellant’s count for damages, wherein he alleged ownership in Mrs. Davis, the contract to sell the property, and breach of that contract, was bad on general demurrer. The general demurrer was sustained on the ground that appellant’s petition on this count stated a cause of action for nominal damages only. Against this holding the following proposition is advanced on this rehearing;
“A petition which sets out a legal cause of action for breach of contract entitles the plaintiff to at least nominal damages which carries court costs and for that reason is good against a general demurrer.”
In support of this proposition the following authorities are cited: Campbell v. McFadden (Tex. Civ. App.) 31 S. W. 436; Davis v. Railway Company, 91 Tex. 505, 44 S. W. 822; Miller v. Moore (Tex. Civ. App.) 111 S. W. 751; Senter v. Brooks Supply Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 278 S. W. 334; Chapman v. Wither-spoon (Tex. Civ. App.) 192 S. W. 281; Ara v. Rutland (Tex. Com. App.) 215 S. W. 445; Railway Company v. Jenkins (Tex. Civ. App.) 89 S. W. 1106. After a careful examination of all these authorities, we do not believe they are in point. In all of them plaintiff’s petition stated a cause of action for compensatory damages within the jurisdiction of the trial court. That plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages only was a conclusion from the facts in issue and not from a construction of the petition.
In the case before us it appears upon the face of appellant’s petition that he has an action' fo,r nominal damages and no more. In other words, the face of his petition discloses that he has no substantial right in the cause of action declared. That he places his damages at a sum within the jurisdiction of the district court does not aid the legal conclusion flowing from the facts pleaded. We recognize the general rule to *447be “the amount of the controversy is the amount claimed in the plaintiff’s petition” (Tarbox & Brown v. Kennon, 3 Tex. 8), and that the trial court has jurisdiction of such amount unless by affirmative pleading the jurisdiction is challenged by a proper plea. But in the cases announcing this rule, the amount claimed in the petition legally flows from the facts pleaded as constituting the cause of action. In the case before us the damages claimed on the facts pleaded by plaintiff cannot be recovered, as a matter of law. His statement that by the acts pleaded he was damaged in the sum claimed is only a conclusion of the pleader, which, on the face of the petition, has no support in law. Judge Townes, in his Texas Pleading, p. 530, says:
“A general demurrer is a suggestion to the court that the facts stated in the pleading demurred to, if true, do not entitle the plaintiff to any relief from the court.” *
It is the doctrine of our courts that jurisdictional questions can be raised by a general demurrer. Piedmont, etc., Ins. Co. v. Bay, 50 Tex. 511. In point on this case, Judge Townes’ proposition should be stated as follows:
“A general demurrer is a suggestion to the court that the facts stated in the pleadings demurred to, if true, do not entitle the plaintiff to any relief from the court within its jurisdiction.”
No one would contend that the district court has jurisdiction of an action where the prayer is for only nominal damages, and that is the effect of plaintiff’s petition here. In King v. Watson, 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 285, the suit was for $350 for breach of contract. The county court sustained a general demurrer against the petition. In sustaining that ruling, Judge Willson said:
“The petition showed a good cause of action for nominal damages. Wherever the breach of an agreement, or the invasion of a right, is established, the law infers some damage, and even if none be proved, will award a nominal or trifling sum. Sedgw. on Dam. 47; Wood & Mayne on Dam. § 6; 1 Greenl. on Ev. § 254; Hope v. Alley, 9 Tex. 395; Moore v. Anderson, 30 Tex. 224. But notwithstanding the appellant in this -case was entitled to recover nominal damages under the allegations in his petition, the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the suit because the other damages claimed, being such as were not recoverable, could not be considered in determining the amount in controversy in the suit, and the nominal damages did not confer jurisdiction upon the court. Hibbard v. Telegraph Co., 33 Wis. 558 [14 Am. Rep. 775]; Jones v. King, 33 Wis. 422; Laubenheimer v. Mann, 19 Wis. 519; Hudspeth v. Allen, 26 Ind. 165.”
In support of his proposition, Judge Will-son cites a decision from the Supreme Court of Indiana. In Reid v. Johnson, 132 Ind. 416, 31 N. E. 1107, by the Supreme Court of that state, plaintiff prayed for damages in the sum of $500. A general demurrer was sustained. In discussing this demurrer it was said:
“When the averments of a pleading are such as to authorize the recovery of nominal damages, and no more, and do not in any way involve the establishment or vindication of any substantial right, it is not available error to sustain a demurrer to it.”
See, also, Ferguson Seed Farms v. McMillan (Tex. Civ. App.) 296 S. W. 902.
We believe appellant’s proposition should be overruled.
We have given the most careful consideration to the other propositions advanced, and, finding them without merit, the motion for rehearing is in all things overruled.