Court Opinion

ID: 9699023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:07:18.694782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:45.691272
License: Public Domain

T. Q-. Kavanagh, J.
(dissenting). Plaintiff sought mandamus to compel defendant to accord him the status of tenure and to employ him as a tenure teacher.1 ’The matter is here on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the summary judgment of the trial court denying the relief requested.
The plaintiff teacher was employed as a probationary teacher by the defendant board, had served two years without written notice that his work was unsatisfactory, and then was notified he would not be employed for the ensuing year.
Defendant concedes that for the purpose of determining the questions involved here, the plaintiff’s work must be deemed satisfactory during the probationary period.
This case, if not controlled by the letter, is certainly controlled by the spirit of Wilson v. Flint Board of Education (1960), 361 Mich 691. In Wilson the defendant board had “adopted a policy of requiring three years probation for all new teachers in the Flint school system” (at 694) and had not furnished the plaintiff teacher with written notification as to the quality of her work, whether it was satisfactory or otherwise. We held that while the board might grant a third year of probation for the benefit of the teacher, it could not require it, and that the failure to give written notice as to whether or not the work was satisfactory during the statutorily provided two-year probationary period was conclusive evidence that the work was satisfactory.
“The result of the above” we said, “is that the teacher has satisfactorily completed the probation*689ary period, is entitled to the status of tenure, and may not be dismissed save for reasonable and just cause, and then only in compliance with the provisions of tbe act.” (At 696.) (Emphasis added.)
Under the clear intendment of Wilson the plaintiff here is entitled to the status of tenure.
The school board argues that the last sentence of Art II, § 32 “Any probationary teacher or teacher not on continuing contract shall be employed for the ensuing year unless notified at least 60 days before the close of the school year that his services will be discontinued” permits a local board to terminate the services of a satisfactory teacher as well as an unsatisfactory teacher.
The notice of discontinuance is not related to satisfactory or unsatisfactory work they argue, and hence the board’s decision to dismiss the probationary teacher can be as capricious as may please the board.3
The purpose of the teachers’ tenure act was spelled out in Rehberg v. Board of Education of Melvindale, Ecorse Township School District No. 11, Wayne County (1951), 330 Mich 541, and the cases cited therein, as well as in Wilson, supra.
The whole thrust of the act is to limit the local boards’ power in its employment of teachers. “Its purpose is to maintain an adequate and competent teaching staff, free from political and personal arbitrary interference.” Ehret v. Kulpmont Borough School District (1939), 333 Pa 518 (5 A2d 188) cited in Rehberg, supra, at 545.
*690“It promotes good order and the welfare of the state and the school system by preventing removal of capable and experienced teachers at the personal whims of changing office holders.” State, ex rel. Anderson, v. Brand (1938), 214 Ind 347 (5 NE2d 531, 110 ALE 778), cited in Rehberg, supra, at 545.
“In State, ex rel. Wood, v. Board of Education of City of St. Louis (1947), 357 Mo 147 (206 SW2d 566, 567) it is stated that the purpose of the act is to protect and improve state education by retaining in their positions teachers who are qualified and capable, and who have demonstrated their fitness, and to prevent the dismissal of such teachers without just cause.” Rehberg, supra, at 545.
In Wilson, supra, noting that the tenure act was intended to reduce turnover in the teachers’ profession, we quoted the following comment in 37 Mich L Eev 430-432 (1939):
“The large turnover in the profession was due in part to certain practices which were widespread throughout the country; among them may be noted discharge (1) because of political reasons, (2) because of nonresidence in the community, (3) in order to make places for friends and relatives of board members or influential citizens, (4) in order to break down resistance to reactionary school policies, and (5) in order to effect economies either by diminishing the number of teachers and increasing the amount of work assigned to those retained, or by creating vacancies to be filled by lower salaried, inexperienced employees. Of these practices the first was exceedingly influential in the growth of the tenure movement, some of the more notorious cases of political dismissal challenging the attention of the public to the injury to professional morale and efficiency resulting from the misuse of the control vested in the administrative agencies. The remedy for such abuses was sought in legislation designed to strip the school boards of their autocratic power *691and to prescribe for them rules of administrative action which would ensure a greater degree of security to their employees.”
The interpretation of the act which the school board here advocates is contrary to the spirit and letter of the law.
The above cases, cited for the policies underlying the act, admittedly apply to the tenure period but their spirit pervades the probationary period as well.
We are not saying that the board lacks any discretion to retain or not to retain a probationary teacher. The probationary period is just that — a period of proof. We are saying that the intent of the entire act was to eliminate capricious and arbitrary employment policies of local school boards. This includes the probationary as well as the tenure period of employment.
The act was not myopically drafted. It recognized both the need for a erial period and its concomitant danger — the potential abuse by the board of their discretion.
The act spells out that probation is a period of trial. Its satisfactory completion requires that a teacher who completes nis probation must be hired. At this point the board’s discretion has been removed, and thereafter, cause must be shown for a teacher’s removal.
There is good reason for this. It prevents using satisfactory reports to lull teachers into two-year stays (at lower salaries) when there is a known likelihood that they will not be retained.
Such a system allows the teacher no chance at self-improvement or self-correction. He has no notice of his failure to measure up to the standards of the board. If he does not accidentally change— *692for the lack of any reported deficiency gives him no direction—he will be discharged. Discharge (or failure to rehire) is a blemish that can permanently scar his record and effectively limit any chance he has to be rehired as a teacher in this state. Since there is little or no reciprocity for teachers between states, such damage to his teaching credentials in his chosen profession may indeed destroy his career. Therefore it is incumbent on the boards to follow both the letter and spirit of the law.
All parts of an act should be read together to harmonize the meaning and give effect to the act as a whole.
Art II of the act provides for a probationary period and all of the other Articles deal with teachers who satisfactorily completed that period and achieved the status of “continuing tenure.”
Art III, § 1  provides in part that “after the satisfactory completion of the probationary period a teacher shall be employed continuously by the controlling board under which the probationary period has been completed, and shall not be dismissed or demoted except as specified in this act.” (Emphasis added.)
The only fair reading of this section is that upon “satisfactory completion of the probationary period” the teacher is entitled to be given tenure by that board.
“Shall be employed by the controlling board” takes it out of the board’s hands to decide whether or not to accord tenure. 5
*693Even if we disagree with the wisdom of such regulation of teachers’ employment, the legislature by this act has given them an enforceable legal right. Mandamus should issue as prayed.
T. M. Kavanagh and Adams, JJ., concurred with T. GL Kavanagh, J.

 According to the provisions of the Michigan teachers’ tenure act (MCLA § 38.71 et seq. [Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 15.1971 et seq.]).

 MCLA § 38.83 (Stat Aim 1968 Rev § 15.1983).

 The board here did not permit employment of the plaintiff teacher beyond the two year probationary period, hence had not accorded him such tenure as would entitle him to appeal to the tenure commission. This suit is for mandamus compelling the board to do so. The “refusal to employ” is thus distinguished from a dismissal, and under the circumstances of this ease, is properly one for the court’s decision.

 It is worth repeating that this does not mean that a teacher can never be discharged. It means that if a teacher is not given any notice that his work is unsatisfactory and he completes the probationary period then he is entitled to be shown cause before he can be released from employment.