Court Opinion

ID: 9656504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:49:38.422498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.823046
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with that part of the majority opinion holding that the conduct of the operators of motor vehicles prior to a collision, the location and speed of such vehicles, and the physical facts existing at the scene of an accident, constitute a transaction within the meaning of the dead man’s statute.
The word transaction as used in the dead man’s statute means a personal transaction with the deceased, as this court has heretofore indicated. See, Harnett v. Holdrege, 5 Neb. (Unoff.) 114, 97 N. W. 443; Fitch v. Martin, 74 Neb. 538, 104 N. W. 1072; In re Estate of Baker, 144 Neb. 797, 14 N. W. 2d 585, 155 A. L. R. 950; In re Estate of House, 145 Neb. 866, 18 N. W. 2d 500, 159 A. L. R. 401. It means a transaction in which each is an active participant; a mutual transaction between the deceased and the surviving party. It does not prohibit the survivor from describing an event or physical situation, or the movement or actions of a deceased person, quite independent and apart, and in no way connected with, or prompted or influenced by reason of, the conduct of the party testifying. Thus construed, the dead man’s statute does not bar the testimony of the survivor as to his observation and description of the physical situation, and the movements and actions of the participants at the time of the accident.
*393While there is a division of authority on the subject, I am of the opinion that the following cases support the better rule: Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 Md. 304, 121 A. 2d 218; Seligman v. Hammond, 205 Wis. 199, 236 N. W. 115; Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis. 249, 248 N. W. 155; McCarthy v. Woolston, 210 App. Div. 152, 205 N. Y. S. 507; Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 102 S. W. 2d 552; In re Estate of Talty, 232 Iowa 280, 5 N. W. 2d 584, 144 A. L. R 859; Krause v. Emmons, 29 Del. 104, 97 A. 238; U. S. A. C. Transport v. Corley (Ga.), 202 F. 2d 8; Kilmer v. Gustason (Fla.), 211 F. 2d 781. Independent acts ' have never heretofore been held to be within the dead man’s statute by this court. See, Larson v. Swingley, 105 Neb. 116, 179 N. W. 303; Bosteder v. Duling, 115 Neb. 557, 213 N. W. 809.
The majority places a broad and unlimited meaning on the word transaction. The dead man’s statute, section 25-1202, R. R. S. 1943, is an exception to the general statute, section 25-1201, R. R. S. 1943, stating who is competent to testify as a witness. The exception ought to be strictly construed. It ought not to be given the broadest definition that can be found. Statutes which have the effect of limiting the evidence in a judicial hearing to something less than all the available evi- ' dence should be most narrowly construed. This, for the reason that justice will not ordinarily prevail where only a part of the available evidence affords the only support for the judgment rendered.
Chappell, J., concurs in this dissent.