Court Opinion

ID: 9840677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 19:05:15.262736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:59:59.980754
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/19/23 Padilla v. Partners Personnel Management Services CA2/4
           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 TRINIDAD PADILLA,                                                  B318349
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Los Angeles County
        v.                                                          Super. Ct. No.
                                                                    21STCV03616)
 PARTNERS PERSONNEL
 MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David S. Cunningham, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
      Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Craig Nickerson, Darin
R. Webb, Matthew G. Kleiner and Andrea K. Williams for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Mahoney Law Group, Katherine J. Odenbreit and Raleigh
P. Dixon for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        INTRODUCTION

       Trinidad Padilla filed a putative class action against
Partners Personnel-Management Services, LLC (Partners
Personnel), and Vanitas Manufacturers, Inc. dba Cal-Western
Manufacturers (Vanitas), alleging various wage and hour claims
under the Labor Code arising out of his employment. In response,
Partners Personnel moved to compel arbitration, strike the class
claims, and dismiss or stay the litigation based on a document
Padilla signed entitled “Partners Personnel Dispute Arbitration
and Resolution Program” (the arbitration agreement). The trial
court denied the petition on the sole basis that Partners
Personnel failed to meet its burden to show mutual assent
because the arbitration agreement did not define “Company” and
“Employee.”1
       We conclude it is possible to identify the parties to the
agreement (see Civ. Code, § 1558) based on the language of the
arbitration agreement as a whole, the allegations in Padilla’s
complaint, and uncontradicted evidence submitted in support of
Partners Personnel’s petition. We therefore reverse the trial
court’s order denying the petition, and remand the matter to the
trial court for consideration of the issues raised by the parties in
support of and in opposition to the petition, but not reached by
the trial court.

1    Vanitas is not a party to this appeal. According to Partners
Personnel’s petition, Vanitas filed a joinder to the petition.
Vanita’s joinder is not in the record on appeal, however.

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      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       The following facts are undisputed. Partners Personnel, a
staffing company, hired Padilla in 2018. Partners Personnel then
assigned Padilla to work for Vanitas. As part of the hiring process
with Partners Personnel, Padilla signed the Spanish language
version of the arbitration agreement.2
       The arbitration agreement provided, in relevant part:
“[T]he Company and the Employee accept that any and all legally
known disputes, claims or controversies arising out of or relating
to this Agreement, the employment relationship between the
parties, or the termination of the employment relationship, shall
be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the
employment Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association in effect at that time. . . . The arbitration agreement
includes any claim that the Company may have against the
Employee, or that the Employee may have against the Company
or against any of its representatives, officers, employees, agents
or parent, subsidiary or affiliated company, except as set forth
below . . . . This Agreement shall be enforceable under and
subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. and
shall prevail after the termination of the employment
relationship.”
       In 2021, Padilla filed a putative class action complaint
against Partners Personnel and Vanitas for alleged violations of
the Labor Code, including failure to pay all wages, failure to
provide meal and rest periods, failure to pay wages at separation,

2    In support of its petition to compel arbitration, Partners
Personnel also submitted an English language version of the
agreement, prepared by a translator certified by the Judicial
Council of California.

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failure to provide accurate wage statements, and unfair business
practices. In response, Partners Personnel filed a petition to
compel arbitration, strike class claims, and dismiss or stay the
action. In support of its petition, Partners Personnel submitted
the declaration of Julie Danley (an Executive Vice President of
Partners Personnel), and copies of the full arbitration agreement
in Spanish and English. Padilla opposed the petition, arguing in
part that Partners Personnel failed to sufficiently identify the
parties to the arbitration agreement based on its use of the
undefined terms “Company” and “Employee.” Padilla did not
submit his own declaration in support of the opposition.
       Following an initial hearing on the petition, the trial court
continued the hearing to allow both parties to submit
supplemental briefing on the following issues: (1) “[t]he
arbitrations agreement’s failure to define ‘Company’ and
‘Employee’”; (2) “[t]he arbitration agreement’s ‘Connecticut law’
provision”; and (3) “[w]hether the arbitration agreement only
permits [Partners Personnel] to modify the terms and provides
remedies to [Partners Personnel] that are not available to
[Padilla].”
       After reviewing the supplemental briefs and hearing oral
argument, the trial court denied the petition. The trial court
concluded Partners Personnel “fail[ed] to show assent” because
“the arbitration agreement fails to define ‘Company and
‘Employee’[ ].” The court declined to reach the remaining issues
in light of its conclusion.
       Partners Personnel timely appealed the order denying its
petition.

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                          DISCUSSION

A.    Governing Law and Standard of Review
      The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides arbitration
agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) “‘[E]ven when the [FAA] applies,
[however], interpretation of the arbitration agreement is
governed by state law principles . . . . Under California law,
ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply to arbitration
agreements . . . . “‘The fundamental goal of contractual
interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the
parties . . . .’”’” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153,
177.) With that goal in mind, “[t]he whole of a contract is to be
taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably
practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.” (Civ.
Code, § 1641.)
      “[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and
accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to
arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine
whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its
enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the
existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting
the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v.
Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)
      The issue on appeal is whether Partners Personnel met its
burden to show a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between it
and Padilla. “When, as here, no conflicting extrinsic evidence is
introduced to aid the interpretation of an agreement to arbitrate,
the Court of Appeal reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a

                                 5
petition to compel arbitration.” (California Correctional Peace
Officers Assn. v. State of California (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198,
204.)

B.     Analysis
       Partners Personnel contends it is possible to identify the
parties to the agreement despite the agreement’s failure to define
the terms “Company” and “Employee.” It follows, according to
Partners Personnel, that the trial court erred by finding no valid
arbitration agreement exists between it and Padilla. For the
reasons discussed below, we agree.
       Although the arbitration agreement certainly could have
been clearer by simply defining “Company” and “Employee,”
when reviewing the arbitration agreement as a whole, as we
must (see Civ. Code, § 1641), it is at the very least “possible to
identify” the parties. (See Civ. Code, § 1558 [“It is essential to the
validity of a contract, not only that the parties should exist, but
that it should be possible to identify them”].) The company’s
name is referenced several times in the agreement, beginning
with the title: “Partners Personnel Dispute Arbitration and
Resolution Program[.]” The Partners Personnel logo is also
prominently placed in the top left corner of the first page of the
agreement. Finally, although the first paragraph of the
agreement concerns matters other than arbitration, such as
Padilla’s at will-status, it contains 11 references to “Partners
Personnel.” For example, the fourth sentence states: “I
understand that my employment at Partners Personnel is on an
at-will basis and that I can terminate it at any time, with or
without reason, and with or without notice, either by me or by
Partners Personnel.” (Bold text omitted.) No other company is
referenced in the four-page document.

                                  6
        Moreover, it is undisputed Padilla signed the agreement
the day he was hired by Partners Personnel, and the agreement
was retrieved from Padilla’s personnel file. Thus, under the terms
of the agreement, Padilla “waive[d] [his] right to have any
dispute, claim or controversy . . . decided by a judge or jury in a
court.” (Bolded text and capitalization omitted.) Padilla also
acknowledges he was employed by Partners Personnel, alleging
in his complaint that it should be “deemed an employer” because
Partners Personnel “hired, placed and paid [him].” That Partners
Personnel “does [not] address why it failed to define the term
‘Company’ at any point in the four-page document[,]” as Padilla
argues, has no bearing on the issue before us (i.e., whether it is
possible to identify the parties to the arbitration agreement).
Although defining the terms would have undoubtedly made the
agreement clearer, failing to do so does not render the agreement
unenforceable in every instance based on the standard set forth in
Civil Code section 1558.
        The sole case relied on by both Padilla and the trial court,
Flores v. Nature’s Best Distribution, LLC (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th
1 (Flores), is distinguishable. In Flores, the court noted that
“although not specifically raised by the parties, . . . the
Agreement states it is between ‘employee and Company[ ]’” but
the Agreement “does not define either term.” (Id. at p. 9.) The
court observed that the agreement, therefore, “does not identify
with which entity or entities plaintiff had agreed to submit
‘all legal, equitable and administrative disputes’ to the AAA
for mediation and binding arbitration.” (Ibid.) The court went
on to hold that it “cannot conclude the parties reached
agreement on the matter of submitting any or all of plaintiff’s
claim to . . . arbitration as contemplated by the Agreement”

                                 7
because “[v]iewing the Agreement as a whole [citation], the
Agreement is ambiguous regarding (1) whether the arbitration
provision of the Agreement (not a grievance and arbitration
procedure of a collective bargaining agreement) applied to any or
all of plaintiff’s claims against any or all of defendants in the
instant action and (2) the governing rules and procedures for any
such arbitration.” (Id. at p. 11.) Flores, therefore, does not stand
for the proposition that the parties to a written contract must be
specifically defined in the text to prove the existence of an
agreement. Rather, perhaps because the argument was not
developed by the parties, and/or because the court found the
agreement in Flores was ambiguous in two other respects, the
Flores court did not analyze whether it was “possible to identify”
(Civ. Code, § 1558) the parties to the agreement despite the
undefined terms. As discussed above, because here it is possible
to identify the parties to the arbitration agreement based on the
context (including, most notably, the title of the arbitration
agreement), the trial court erred by denying Partners Personnel’s
petition to compel arbitration on the sole ground that it failed to
define the terms “Company” and “Employee.”

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                          DISPOSITION

       The order is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial
court for consideration of all issues raised by the parties in
support of and in opposition to the petition, but not reached by
the trial court in light of its holding, including the choice-of-law
and modification issues (which the trial court expressly declined
to reach). If the trial court determines a valid arbitration
agreement exists between Partners Personnel and Padilla, then
it must determine whether the claims against Vanitas should
also be arbitrated. Partners Personnel is awarded its costs on
appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                     CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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