Court Opinion

ID: 9927175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:04:20.179907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.436913
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 22–1521

             Submitted October 11, 2023—Filed January 19, 2024

IN RE DETENTION OF STEWART FRANKLIN SCHUMAN,

STATE OF IOWA,
      Appellant,

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, James C. Ellefson,

Judge.

      The State challenges a district court order granting a sexually violent

predator’s request for transitional release. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

GRANTED; WRIT SUSTAINED.
      Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined except Mansfield, J., who filed an opinion concurring in part and

dissenting in part.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines (argued) and Keisha F.

Crestinger, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.

      Michael H. Adams (argued), Local Public Defender, Special Defense Unit,

Des Moines, for appellee.
                                         2

WATERMAN, Justice.
      This case presents questions of whether the district court erred by ordering

the placement of a sexually violent predator in a transitional release program

over the State’s objection and the proper form of appellate review. The State

argues the offender was ineligible for that program without a relapse prevention

plan (RPP) accepted by his treatment provider at the Civil Commitment Unit for

Sexual Offenders (CCUSO) as required by Iowa Code section 229A.8A(2)(d)

(2022). The district court determined that the offender’s plan, approved by the

offender’s expert, satisfied that statutory requirement. The State appealed, and

the offender moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction on the

grounds that there was no final judgment. The State resisted, and in the

alternative, argued that the order could be reviewed through a petition for writ

of certiorari under Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure 6.107 and 6.108. We

submitted the motion to dismiss with the appeal.

      On our review, we determine that a writ of certiorari is the proper form of

appellate review, and we grant the petition. On the merits, for the reasons

explained below, we hold that the district court erred by substituting its

judgment for that of CCUSO’s staff. We agree with the State that this offender
was ineligible for placement in the transitional release program because his

treatment provider at CCUSO had not accepted his proposed RPP. Acceptance

was withheld for a valid reason—the offender’s demotion to a more restrictive

treatment phase after failing polygraph and penile plethysmograph tests. This

offender was not seeking discharge, and courts must give deference to CCUSO’s

internal placement decisions. The district court erred by second-guessing the

CCUSO staff’s placement decision. The offender’s substantive due process claims

fail. We therefore sustain the writ and vacate the district court’s ruling.
                                            3

      I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      Stewart Schuman, now age 69, was civilly committed as a sexually violent

predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A in December 2012. A unanimous jury

determined that Schuman had been convicted of a sexually violent offense and

“suffers from a mental abnormality which makes [him] likely to engage in

predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure

facility.”1 Iowa Code § 229A.2(11) (2012). Schuman has been confined at CCUSO

within the Cherokee Mental Health Institute since 2012.

      A. Schuman’s History of Offending. Schuman had a troubled upbringing

in Louisiana. At age five, Schuman entered foster care. At age 10, Schuman was

placed at a Louisiana state training school where he spent the rest of his teenage

years and where he was sexually abused by staff and older students. He “began

sexually acting out” and sexually abusing his classmates—both boys and girls.

Schuman completed the eleventh grade at the training school. He moved to Iowa

and obtained his GED in 2005 while incarcerated at the Mount Pleasant

Correctional Facility. He has been married twice and has a daughter, a

stepdaughter, and a son.

      Schuman’s criminal record includes two sexual convictions. In 1995, at
age 28, he was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse of his seven-year-old son.

In 2005, at age 38, he was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse of his six-year-

old nephew. Schuman has admitted to other sex offenses that he was not

arrested for but has been inconsistent as to how many. In a 2013 polygraph

interview, Schuman admitted to over one hundred victims. But in 2016, he

admitted to only thirty victims. And in his most recent RPP, Schuman admitted

to only seven victims—his seven-year-old son, his six-year-old nephew, an

      1Schuman    was diagnosed with pedophilic disorder, antisocial personality disorder,
alcohol dependence, polysubstance abuse, and borderline intellectual functioning.
                                               4

eight-year-old   girl    in     1977,   his   nine-year-old    stepsister   in   1981,   an

eleven-year-old girl in the early 1980s, and a thirteen-year-old boy and a

four-year-old girl at times Schuman could not recall.

       B. The CCUSO Program. Schuman has participated in the sex offender

treatment program (SOTP) at CCUSO for a decade. The Iowa Department of

Health and Human Services (HHS) operates CCUSO. Iowa Dep’t of Health &

Hum.      Servs.,       Civil     Commitment        Unit      for   Sexual       Offenders,

https://hhs.iowa.gov/programs/mental-health/find-service/inpatient-

facilities/ccuso [https://perma.cc/SG8M-SJ9E] [hereinafter HHS, CCUSO]. The

legislature established CCUSO through the 1998 Sexually Violent Predators Act

of Iowa, 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1171 (codified at Iowa Code chapter 229A (1999)),

which mirrors other states’ sexually violent predator programs. See In re Det. of

Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 284 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (describing the Act as

“plainly of a kind” with other states’ civil commitment statutes); see also HHS,

CCUSO (“There are twenty (20) states with inpatient treatment programs like

CCUSO.”).

       Chapter 229A was enacted to provide “long-term care and treatment” of a

“small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators.” Iowa Code
§ 229A.1(1), (4) (2022). The legislative findings include the necessity for

commitment procedures “to protect the public, to respect the needs of the victims

of sexually violent offenses, and to encourage full, meaningful participation of

sexually violent predators in treatment programs.” Id. § 229A.1(4). CCUSO

provides a mandatory program for sexual offenders considered likely to reoffend,

with treatment as the program’s main objective. Swanson v. Civ. Commitment

Unit for Sex Offenders, 737 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Iowa 2007). CCUSO staff includes

psychiatric security specialists and therapists who treat the offenders housed
there. See HHS, CCUSO.
                                            5

       “CCUSO developed a ‘Patient Handbook and Orientation Manual’ [that]

provides the rules and policies of CCUSO.” Swanson, 737 N.W.2d at 302. The

handbook explains CCUSO’s “phase system,” which was developed to motivate

offenders to cooperate in their treatment. Id. The treatment program is divided

into   five   phases:     (1) treatment    engagement      and    interfering   factors,

(2) identification of dynamic risk factors and long term vulnerabilities, (3) specific

interventions    for    dynamic   risk    factors   and   long   term   vulnerabilities,

(4) maintenance of change, and (5) transitional release. The phases represent the

offender’s progression through treatment. “Treatment is based on the current

best practice of Risk-Need-Responsivity Model (RNR) . . . .” HHS, CCUSO. A

treatment team determines whether the offender has met the requirements for

the next phase and then refers the offender to the clinical team for a decision.

       Each offender starts at phase one, which is designed to identify

treatment-interfering factors. Phase one is called the “assessment and

observation phase,” when “patients and program staff have an opportunity to

become acquainted and to develop a clear understanding about program

expectations and rules.” Swanson, 737 N.W.2d at 302.

       Phase two is the “core phase.” Id. at 303. The offender “participates in a
minimum one-year curriculum of psycho-educational groups” that “teach

concepts and skills that are fundamental to learning to control sexual impulses.”

Id. Phase two involves the offender recognizing and developing insight into their

offense cycle.

       Phase three is the “advanced phase.” Id. This phase requires the offender

to “work on applying the principles and concepts learned in phase two.” Id. The

offender is required to develop “an individualized treatment plan” and complete

“victim sheets and victim letters.” Id. The offender also develops specific
interventions to control the offender’s dynamic risk factors (DRFs)—which are
                                        6

factors that contribute to the offender’s risk of reoffending. There are several

other requirements for the offender to advance out of phase three: “no ratings

lower than five on the last ninety-day review,” no “major behavioral reports for

the last four months,” and “completion of specific offense polygraphs.” Id.

      Phase four is the “honor phase.” Id. The offender practices interventions

in daily activities. The offender creates an RPP during this phase that outlines

the individual’s DRFs, interventions for the DRFs, and other ways to lower their

risk of reoffending. The offender should learn how to self-identify sexual

tendencies and what factors might lead the offender to reoffend. The offender

must also successfully complete “a polygraph exam regarding recent sexual

fantasies and behaviors.” Id. At the end of phase four, the offender should be

ready for a less restrictive environment with a reduced risk of reoffending. Id.

Progress from phase four to phase five depends upon the individual satisfying

the ten requirements set forth in Iowa Code section 229A.8A(2) and (4). See id.

We quote those requirements in full in our statutory analysis below.

      Phase five is the “transition phase,” also known as the transitional release

program. Id. HHS is authorized to “provide control, care, and treatment, and

supervision of committed persons placed in [the transitional release] program.”
Iowa Code § 229A.8A(1). HHS is also “responsible for establishing and

implementing the rules and directives regarding the . . . restrictions on

confinement and the movement of committed persons, and for assessing the

progress of committed persons in the program.” Id. § 229A.8A(6).

      In phase five, the offender “is gradually given increasing opportunities to

live in less restrictive settings.” Swanson, 737 N.W.2d at 303. Offenders take on

more responsibility for their own care, and CCUSO staff closely monitors them

to determine whether they should be recommended for final release. Phase five
provides the offender with a controlled and monitored introduction into the
                                               7

community outside of confinement at CCUSO. Each public outing must be

approved by CCUSO staff. Outings are closely monitored at first but become less

so as the offender shows reliability.

       The CCUSO program also has treatment levels within each phase. See id.

at 304. Each level provides rewards and privileges for offenders who avoid

behavioral problems and suspensions. See id. Offenders progress through

different levels of each phase to receive more privileges before moving on to the

next phase. Id. Rule violations may result in demotions to a lower level or phase

and loss of privileges. Id.

       C. Schuman’s Progress at CCUSO. After 2012, Schuman gradually

progressed through the treatment program, reaching phase four, level five in

2018. But he plateaued there for about four years. During this time, Schuman

developed several RPPs; none were approved. CCUSO staff subjected Schuman

to at least fifteen polygraphs between 2012 and 2020; he passed fourteen and

failed one. In 2021, Schuman was subjected to two maintenance polygraphs and

two penile plethysmographs (PPGs).2

       The first PPG was administered to Schuman in July 2021. The results were

uninterpretable because Schuman did not meet the minimum threshold of
arousal for any segments. He did show signs of possible response interference

on one segment: “female prepubescent coercive.”

       2A PPG is a procedure that “involves placing a pressure-sensitive device around a man’s

penis, presenting him with an array of sexually stimulating images, and determining his level of
sexual attraction by measuring minute changes in his erectile responses.” United States v.
Rhodes, 552 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jason R. Odeshoo, Of Penology and
Perversity: The Use of Penile Plethysmography on Convicted Child Sex Offenders, 14 Temp. Pol. &
C.R. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2004)). PPGs are “rather routine in adult sexual offender treatment programs.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 562 (9th Cir. 2006)). Experts disagree about
their use and effectiveness. Id. at 626–27.
                                        8

      The second PPG was administered in August 2021. This time Schuman

reached clinical significance on the same segment. There were also signs of

possible response interference on another segment: “male prepubescent

coercive.” The report prepared by the test’s administer stated that “Schuman was

angry during the majority of the test and talked during some of the segments,

which required prompting him to stop.” The report disclosed that Schuman’s age

preference score indicated he was more aroused by images of children than

adults and concluded that he “falls within the high range of risk, indicating he

has a high degree of sexual motivation in committing offense behaviors.”

      A polygraph was administered to Schuman in March 2021. The

polygrapher conducted a pretest interview that asked him three questions:

      1) Since your last test, did you penetrate your anus with your fingers
      for sexual pleasure, 2) Since your last test, did you stick any kind of
      food into your anus, and 3) Since your last test, did you enter your
      anus with any inanimate object?

Schuman answered no to each question. The test results indicated Schuman

had a significant response to question one, so the polygrapher labeled his

response “untruthful.” Schuman failed the polygraph.

      Another polygraph was administered to Schuman in September. The

polygrapher again conducted a pretest interview, this time asking about

masturbation. Schuman answered that he had masturbated using a homemade

dildo, but “didn’t get nothing.” During the polygraph, the polygrapher asked

Schuman another three questions: 1) “Since your last test, other than that one

time that you said, did you masturbate your bare penis?” 2) “Since your last test,

did you masturbate your bare penis while watching any images directly aimed

at minors?” 3) “Since your last test, besides that one time you disclosed, did you

penetrate your anus for any sexual pleasure?” Schuman answered no to each
question. Schuman had a significant response to the first question, and the
                                               9

polygrapher labeled his response “untruthful.” Thus, Schuman also failed this

polygraph. Because of these failed polygraph examinations, CCUSO staff

demoted Schuman from phase four, level five to phase three, level four.

       D. Schuman’s Annual Review Hearing in 2022. On February 21, 2022,

Schuman requested an annual review hearing under Iowa Code section 229A.8.3

Schuman bore the burden of proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that

there is relevant and reliable evidence to rebut the presumption of continued

commitment, which would lead a reasonable person to believe a final hearing

should be held to determine either of the following:” discharge or placement in

transitional release. Id. § 229A.8(5)(e)(1). Schuman submitted a report by

Dr. Luis Rosell to the district court stating that Schuman was suitable for full

discharge and placement in the transitional release program. The annual review

hearing was held telephonically on March 21. Schuman argued that given the

“extremely low burden placed on” him and the report of Dr. Rosell, a final hearing

should be set. The State conceded that Dr. Rosell’s report “does meet

[Schuman’s] burden” to receive a final hearing. That same day, the district court

ordered a final hearing because it found, based on the report from Dr. Rosell and

the State’s concession, Schuman met his burden to set a final hearing. The final
hearing was set for June 30 but was continued to July 6 for good cause.

       E. Schuman’s Final Review Hearing. The final hearing was conducted

by videoconference on July 6. Instead of requesting discharge, Schuman lowered

his sights to seek placement in a transitional release program. The State had the

burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that Schuman was not suitable

       3Each  offender is “entitled to an annual review to determine whether the person’s
circumstances have sufficiently changed to warrant a final hearing for the court to determine if
the committed person should be discharged or is suitable for placement in a transitional release
program.” Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct. (Taft II), 879 NW.2d 634, 635 (Iowa 2016).
                                              10

for that placement. Three witnesses testified: Schuman; the State’s expert,

Dr. Anna Salter; and Schuman’s expert, Dr. Rosell.

       Schuman testified that he had been demoted for about six months due to

his failed polygraphs. Schuman testified that the first polygraph report was

incorrect and that he did not penetrate his anus with his fingers. As to his second

failed polygraph, Schuman claimed that he “made up a story” to tell the

polygrapher in the pretest interview and chose to lie because “if I failed the

polygraph, I was going to lose my Phase [Four] and Level [Five].” Schuman

acknowledged that he is still attracted to boys and girls ages six to fourteen.

       Schuman testified that he had created “four or five relapse prevention

plans,” but did not know if his CCUSO therapist read them and did not hear

anything back about them. Schuman explained that he created a new RPP while

in phase three and submitted it to his therapist, who took no action on the plan.

Schuman explained that he sought transitional release “to get a job” and “build

some money up” before being discharged.

       Dr. Salter, a psychologist, testified regarding her experience evaluating sex

offenders since the early 1980s. She has served as the civil commitment

evaluator for the State since 2004 and has conducted approximately 400
progress evaluations for sex offenders. She has undergone specialized training

in “all the current risk assessment tools,” and has served as a “trainer in scoring

a Static-99.”4

        4Static-99 is an “actuarial risk assessment instrument[]” used to “observe the number of

pre-defined risk factors that an offender demonstrates, and estimate the likelihood that an
offender with a certain number of the pre-defined risk factors will recidivate.” Marcus T.
Boccaccini & Daniel C. Murrie, Field Validity of the Static-99 and MnSOST-R Among Sex Offenders
Evaluated for Civil Commitment as Sexually Violent Predators, 15 Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L. 278, 278–
79 (2009).
                                         11

      Dr. Salter testified that Schuman did not and should not qualify for

transitional release based on his failed polygraphs. She opined that his failures

raise issues about his transparency and honesty—“if you’re willing to lie about

what you’re seeing and thinking and experiencing and feeling and the urges you

have, there isn’t any way to successfully monitor the person.” Dr. Salter

explained why Schuman had been in phase four for four years:

      Well, the closest documentation that I have is the DRF summary by
      the therapist who’s had him for the last two years. Now, since he
      wasn’t promoted for four years, there was a previous therapist for
      two years who also thought that he was not ready for transition.

            And what they have said is that he has not -- even though he
      will admit that he’s a pedophile, he is unable in group to explain
      how he can reduce his pedophilic thoughts. He repeatedly comes
      back to the fact that he can’t get an erection so therefore he’s not
      going to molest children, even though there’s significant numbers of
      child molesters and rapists who cannot get an erection and,
      nonetheless, molest kids.

             They talk about his lack of transparency. They talk about his
      insufficient . . . RPP. This is not just one person. This is two
      therapists in a row and an entire treatment team who feel that he
      did not ever meet the requirements to get his RPP approved . . . . I
      don’t think that the treatment team sort of unfairly refuses to
      approve RPPs when they are solid and comprehensive.

      Next, Dr. Salter addressed why Schuman did not have an approved RPP:

              Now, when I read the records[,] it doesn’t appear to me that
      . . . they think he has sufficient interventions to begin with[,] . . . he
      needs more; but in any case, even if he had sufficient interventions,
      he needs to practice them for a year. Not lying to progress in
      treatment would be a red flag because if . . . you openly state, “I’m
      willing to lie to progress in treatment,” it means that the
      transparency that people need in order to assess your progress just
      isn’t there. They’re going to say what I think you want to hear, and
      that’s a very -- that is not a Phase 4 kind of behavior.

      Dr. Salter then described why it is a good policy for offenders to complete

phase four before getting an RPP approved:
                                         12

      I think you need to develop an adequate number of interventions
      and I think you need to demonstrate that if you have a lapse or you
      have a problem, you’re going to be transparent about it and get help.
      I think you need to demonstrate that you can live the interventions.

            . . . People who refuse to journal, the therapists are completely
      blind about how many urges they’re having, how often they’re having
      them and how they’re handling them, how they’re thinking about
      them, what they’re doing about them.

             And if you combine that kind of blindness with someone who,
      for at least the last two years, never mentions or at least does not
      discuss in any depth their arousal to inflicting pain or their arousal
      to children, then you have someone who is -- in their opinion is not
      appropriate for Phase 4.

      Schuman’s expert, Dr. Rosell, described his experience as a psychologist

in correctional facilities before becoming the director of the SOTP in the Mount

Pleasant Correctional Facility from 1998 to 2002. Since then, he has been

conducting sex offender evaluations “on a regular basis.”

      Dr. Rosell disagreed with Dr. Salter on the significance of Schuman’s failed

polygraphs. Dr. Rosell thought it was more telling that Schuman admitted to

lying, which shows he is “open and honest.” Dr. Rosell also disagreed with

Dr. Salter’s assessment of Schuman’s latest RPP: “I believe it has been

developed. It just hasn’t been accepted. I believe it’s worthy of acceptance. I’m

not privy to the reasons why it hasn’t been accepted but, you know, that seems

to be the sticking point in his progression.” Dr. Rosell added that Schuman’s

RPP has “a nice outline” that lists the factors and the interventions and “goes

through everything as you’re supposed to. And I’ve reviewed many [RPPS], and

this covers all the areas that he needs for the future.” Finally, Dr. Rosell testified

that Schuman should be placed in transitional release.

      The district court entered its ruling on August 17. The district court

ordered Schuman’s placement in the transitional release program. The district
court analyzed all ten requirements for transitional release in section 229A.8A,
                                          13

and it found that the State failed to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt” that

Schuman was “not suitable for placement in a transitional release program.” The

district court gave “no weight to the polygraph results” because the record

showed “nothing about the polygrapher except that the polygrapher is relatively

new” and “reveals nothing about . . . either the polygrapher’s methods or

qualifications.” The district court discredited the PPG results because “the State

has not sought to establish the qualifications of the [PPG] operator or the

reliability of the operator’s methods. . . . [T]his court, acting as the finder of fact,

considers that on this specific record the PPG is of little to no value.”

      The State appealed, arguing that the district court erred by placing

Schuman in the transitional release program. Specifically, the State challenges

the district court’s finding that the RPP requirement has been satisfied.

Schuman responds that the district court correctly determined that his RPP was

adequate, and that he satisfied the statutory requirements to be placed in the

transitional release program. Alternatively, Schuman argues that his substantive

due process rights would be violated by allowing the State to “veto” his RRP and

limit eligibility for transitional release to those in phase four.

      II. Proper Form of Review.
      Before reaching the merits of the appeal, “we must first determine whether

we have the authority to decide the appeal.” Christiansen v. Iowa Bd. of Educ.

Exam’rs, 831 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Iowa 2013). After the State filed a notice of

appeal, Schuman moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction

on the grounds that there was no final judgment. The State resisted, arguing

that the “[c]ourt has considered direct appeals in other cases in which

transitional release or discharge have been denied or granted following a final

hearing.” Alternatively, the State argues that we could review the district court
                                         14

ruling by a writ of certiorari under Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure 6.107 and

6.108. We ordered Schuman’s motion to dismiss to be submitted with the appeal.

      In its appellate brief, the State argues that the district court’s order placing

Schuman in transitional release following a final hearing was a final

determination by the district court that is directly appealable. But at oral

argument, the State conceded that the district court’s order is not a final decision

because the district court has continuing jurisdiction over the individual until

final discharge.

      Iowa Code section 229A.8 governs the annual review process and requires

an offender to have an examination conducted every year. An annual report must

be submitted to the district court “that committed the person under this

chapter.” Id. § 229A.8(3). The district court determines whether the individual’s

commitment should be continued. Id. § 229A.8(5)(e)(1). Applying a similar

statute, the Washington Supreme Court held that offenders are under the trial

court’s “continuing jurisdiction” until their “unconditioned release,” and there is

no final judgment until nothing is left “for the court to do but execute the

judgment.” In re Det. of Petersen, 980 P.2d 1204, 1213–14 (Wash. 1999) (en banc)

(quoting Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 901 P.2d
1060, 1062 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)); see also Gaal v. Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 01–0321,

2002 WL 31113863, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2002) (en banc) (finding In re

Detention of Peterson persuasive and holding that a ruling denying a final hearing

under Iowa Code section 229A.8 is not a final order subject to direct appeal but

rather is reviewable by a petition for writ of certiorari). We reach the same

conclusion and hold that the district court’s ruling placing Schuman in

transitional release is not a final decision appealable as of right.

      Next, we must decide the proper procedure for review of the district court
ruling. Under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.108, if another form of review
                                         15

is the proper form, then “the case shall not be dismissed, but shall proceed as

though the proper form of review had been requested.” At oral argument, the

State argued—and Schuman’s counsel agreed—that we should treat the appeal

as a petition for writ of certiorari. A petition for writ of certiorari is appropriate

when a party claims the district court “exceeded [its] jurisdiction or otherwise

acted illegally.” Id. r. 6.107(1). We hold certiorari is the proper method to review

the order for transitional release. We consider the State’s notice of appeal as a

petition for a writ of certiorari and grant the petition.

      III. Standard of Review.

      “We review certiorari actions for correction of errors at law.” Taft v. Iowa

Dist. Ct. (Taft II), 879 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct.

(Taft I), 828 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Iowa 2013)). “We examine the court’s jurisdiction

and the legality of its actions, including the proper application of law and

evidentiary support for factual findings.” Id. We review the district court’s

interpretation of chapter 229A for correction of errors at law. In re Det. of

Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 2006).

      “We review constitutional challenges de novo.” Taft II, 879 N.W.2d at 638

(quoting In re Det. of Matlock, 860 N.W.2d 898, 901 (Iowa 2015)).

      [W]e must remember that statutes are cloaked with a presumption
      of constitutionality. The challenger bears a heavy burden, because
      [he] must prove the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Moreover, “the challenger must refute every reasonable basis upon
      which the statute could be found to be constitutional.” Furthermore,
      if the statute is capable of being construed in more than one
      manner, one of which is constitutional, we must adopt that
      construction.

State v. Hess, 983 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Iowa 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting

State v. Aschbrenner, 926 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Iowa 2019)).
                                       16

      IV. Analysis.

      We first address whether the district court erred by construing Iowa Code

section 229A.8A(2)(d) to allow judicial approval of Schuman’s RPP based on its

own judgment and Schuman’s expert but without the approval of Schuman’s

treatment provider. We hold that the district court overstepped its bounds

because Schuman was statutorily ineligible for placement in the transitional

release program without an RPP accepted by his CCUSO treatment provider.

      Next, we address Schuman’s substantive due process claims, and we reject

them. There is no showing in the record that the State acted arbitrarily or in bad

faith by withholding approval of Schuman’s RPP or in demoting him to phase

three. Courts owe deference to the treatment decisions of CCUSO staff. Schuman

was not seeking a discharge, and his limited liberty interest in potential

transitional release on this record does not override the State’s interest in

protecting the public from sexually violent predators.

      A. The District Court Erred by Substituting Its Judgment for the

Treatment Provider Who Never Accepted Schuman’s RPP. The district court

concluded that the State failed to prove Schuman was ineligible for transitional

release. The fighting issue is the statutory requirement that a “detailed relapse
prevention plan has been developed and accepted by the treatment provider.”

Iowa Code § 229A.8A(2)(d) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Schuman’s

treatment provider—the CCUSO staff—never accepted his RPP. The district court

nevertheless deemed this requirement satisfied based on its own determination

and the testimony of Schuman’s expert that Schuman’s RPP “cover[ed] the

necessary areas” and his treatment work was “comprehensive and detailed.” The

State argues that the district court erred in disregarding the statute’s plain

language requiring the treatment provider’s acceptance of the RPP. Schuman
                                        17

counters that we should construe the statute to allow the district court to decide

“whether the plan met the legislative requirements.” We agree with the State.

      1. Overview of transitional release. Section 229A.8 governs transitional

release. This statute establishes “a rebuttable presumption . . . that the

commitment should continue” for the offender. Iowa Code § 229A.8(1). The

offender is entitled to “have a current examination of [the offender’s] mental

abnormality made once every year.” Id. § 229A.8(2). This examination is made in

a report to the district court. Id. § 229A.8(3). The offender then has a right to an

“annual review” for the district court to determine if the offender’s commitment

should continue. Id. At the annual review, the offender may petition for

“discharge or placement in a transitional release program.” Id. § 229A.8(4). The

department must provide the offender with a written notice each year of the

“right to petition the court for discharge or placement in a transitional release

program without authorization from the director.” Id. The offender may request

a hearing for annual review within thirty days of the annual review notice. Id.

§ 229A.8(5)(d).

      At the annual review hearing, the offender carries the burden of proof.

      [The offender must] prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
      there is relevant and reliable evidence to rebut the presumption of
      continued commitment, which would lead a reasonable person to
      believe a final hearing should be held to determine either of the
      following:
            (a) The mental abnormality of the committed person has so
      changed that the person is not likely to engage in predatory acts
      constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged.

            (b) The committed person is suitable for placement in a
      transitional release program pursuant to section 229A.8A.

Id. § 229A.8(5)(e)(1). The court must set a final hearing if the court determines
the offender met his or her burden under paragraph (a) or (b), or both. Id.
                                         18

§ 229A.8(5)(e)(2)(a). At the final hearing, the state bears the burden to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that either the individual’s “mental abnormality

remains such that the person is likely to engage in predatory acts that constitute

sexually violent offenses if discharged” or the individual “is not suitable for

placement in a transitional release program pursuant to section 229A.8A.” Id.

§ 229A.8(6)(d).

      Section 229A.8A governs the requirements for transitional release. The

statute provides ten requirements that all must be met to qualify for transitional

release:

             2. A committed person is suitable for placement in the
      transitional release program if the court finds that all of the following
      apply:

            a. The committed person’s mental abnormality is no longer
      such that the person is a high risk to reoffend.

             b. The committed person has achieved and demonstrated
      significant insights into the person’s sex offending cycle.

           c. The committed person has accepted responsibility for past
      behavior and understands the impact sexually violent crimes have
      upon a victim.

            d. A detailed relapse prevention plan has been developed and
      accepted by the treatment provider which is appropriate for the
      committed person’s mental abnormality and sex offending history.

          e. No major discipline reports have been issued for the
      committed person for a period of six months.

           f. The committed person is not likely to escape or attempt to
      escape custody pursuant to section 229A.5B.

            g. The committed person is not likely to engage in predatory
      acts constituting sexually violent offenses while in the program.

            h. The placement is in the best interest of the committed
      person.

            i. The committed person has demonstrated a willingness to
      agree to and abide by all rules of the program.
                                             19

                ....

             4. A committed person who refuses to register as a sex
       offender is not eligible for placement in a transitional release
       program.

Id. § 229A.8A(2), (4) (emphasis added). Only paragraph (d) is contested here.

       Several of the eligibility requirements in section 229A.8A(2) involve

relatively     open-ended     fact-finding   by   the   district   court.   For   example,

section 229A.8A(2)(a) requires the district court to determine whether “[t]he

committed person’s mental abnormality is no longer such that the person is a

high   risk     to     reoffend.”   Id.   § 229A.8A(2)(a).    Other    requirements     in

section 229A.8A(2), however, only require the court to answer questions of

historical fact. For example, subsection (2)(e) requires the court to determine

whether “[n]o major discipline reports have been issued for the committed person

for a period of six months.” Id. § 229A.8A(2)(e); see also Taft I, 828 N.W.2d at

321–22 (affirming denial of transitional release due to major disciplinary

violations).

       2. Analysis of Iowa Code section 229A.8A(2)(d). Under its plain language,

an offender is ineligible for transitional release without an RPP accepted by the

treatment provider. Id. § 229A.8A(2)(d). Whether the offender’s treatment

provider accepted the RPP is a historical fact. It either happened or it did not.

The record in this case is clear: No treatment provider accepted Schuman’s RPP.

Schuman nevertheless argues the district court could approve the RPP through

its own judicial determination. The State argues the statute requires acceptance

of the RPP by the treatment provider, without which Schuman is not “suitable for

placement in the transitional release program.” The State further argues that the

district court lacks statutory authority to approve an RPP that the treatment

provider never accepted. We agree with the State.
                                        20

      The legislature specifically granted the “treatment provider” the sole

authority to accept the RPP. Iowa Code § 229A.8A(2)(d). The legislature did not

define “treatment provider” in chapter 229A, but both parties acknowledge that

the treatment provider is Schuman’s current therapist at CCUSO. Schuman’s

RPP includes a space for his therapist to sign and approve it. Our own contextual

analysis   confirms   that   the   “treatment    provider”   is   within   CCUSO.

Section 229A.7(7) provides the “control, care, and treatment” of an offender must

be “provided at a facility operated by the department of [health and] human

services.” Id. § 229A.7(7). It also requires an offender under the “control, care,

and treatment by the department” to be “kept in a secure facility . . . under the

supervision of the department.” Id. That facility, where Schuman has been

confined, is CCUSO. The staff there sign off on whether individual offenders

receive “increasing opportunities to live in less restrictive settings.” Swanson,

737 N.W.2d at 303. And specifically, it is the treatment provider who decides

whether the RPP is “appropriate for the committed person’s mental abnormality

and sex offending history.” See Iowa Code § 229A.8A(2)(d). As the State observes,

this makes good policy sense because the CCUSO therapist providing ongoing

treatment knows the offender best.
      Schuman argues that “[t]he legislature surely did not intend to prohibit

judicial examination of the issue or give the treatment program veto power over

the district court.” He argues that we “can uphold the intent of the legislature by

reading the statute to require the district court to hear evidence about the relapse

prevention plan and make decisions concerning the completeness and

appropriateness as well as the circumstances of the plan as did the district court

in this case.” We disagree. The plain meaning of section 229A.8A(2)(d) authorizes

“the treatment provider” alone to accept the RPP, not the court or an outside
expert retained by the offender’s counsel. Iowa Code § 229A.8A(2)(d). “When a
                                         21

proposed interpretation of a statute would require the court to ‘read something

into the law that is not apparent from the words chosen by the legislature,’ the

court will reject it.” State v. Childs, 898 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Iowa 2017) (quoting

State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 730 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Iowa 2007)).

      Relying on inapposite cases involving statutes unrelated to chapter 229A,

our colleague’s partial dissent would read into section 229A.8A(2)(d) an implied

requirement that the treatment provider “consider” the RPP and presumably

either accept or reject it “by the time of the final hearing.” We decline to read that

timing requirement into the statute. CCUSO chose not to consider Schuman’s

RPP because it determined he was ineligible for transitional release after his

demotion to phase three, a decision which we will address in turn.

      Taft I is instructive on the interplay between CCUSO and the courts. In

Taft I, we determined the “plain language of section 229A.8A(2)(e) disqualifies

from transitional release any committed person who has received any major

disciplinary report during the previous six months.” Taft I, 828 N.W.2d at 322.

We rejected the argument that the district court could override that requirement

based on the testimony of the offender’s expert who discounted the significance

of those disciplinary violations. Id. We reach the same conclusion here. The plain
language of section 229A.8A(2)(d) disqualifies Schuman from transitional release

when he lacks an RPP approved by his CCUSO treatment provider, regardless of

the approval of his retained outside expert.

      We hold that Schuman was ineligible for transitional release because his

RPP was never accepted by his treatment provider at CCUSO. The district court

erred by ruling Schuman satisfied the RPP requirement.

      B. The District Court Erred by Overriding CCUSO’s Decision to

Demote Schuman to Phase Three. The district court found that Schuman was
demoted from phase four to phase three “as a result of failing two maintenance
                                                22

polygraphs, one in March of 2021 and the other in September of 2021.” The

district court determined that “the fact that Schuman was reduced to Phase

[Three] and RPPS are not accepted until Phase [Four]” was not a “sufficient

reason” to reject Schuman’s RPP, and “there was no reliable reason for the

reduction to Phase [Three].” Contrary to the partial dissent, the district court

does not get to override CCUSO’s demotion decision and then unilaterally deem

the RPP requirement satisfied because it found Schuman’s expert more credible

than the State’s.5 We hold that the district court erred by substituting its

judgment for CCUSO’s internal placement decision.

       The legislature granted CCUSO broad authority to operate its treatment

and transitional release programs. Section 229A.7(7) requires CCUSO to provide

the “control, care, and treatment” of the offenders; and the treatment and care

must be “provided at a facility operated by the department.” Iowa Code

§ 229A.7(7). The legislature requires CCUSO to “establish a transitional release

program and provide control, care, and treatment, and supervision of committed

persons placed in such a program.” Id. § 229A.8A(1). And the legislature

empowered CCUSO to “establish[] and implement[] the rules and directives

regarding the location of the transitional release program, staffing needs,
restrictions on confinement and the movement of committed persons, and for

assessing the progress of committed persons in the program.” Id. § 229A.8A(6).

       The legislature codified the purpose of CCUSO’s treatment program: “The

procedures regarding sexually violent predators should reflect legitimate public

          5The partial dissent relies on substantial evidence review of the district court’s findings

under the eligibility requirements for transitional release under Iowa Code section 229A.8A(2)(a)–
(c), (g)–(h). But the fighting issue is paragraph (d), the requirement for approval of the RPP by the
treatment provider. No substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that
paragraph (d) was satisfied. Indeed, it is undisputed that the treatment provider did not approve
Schuman’s RPP.
                                        23

safety concerns, while providing treatment services designed to benefit sexually

violent predators who are civilly committed” and “encourage full, meaningful

participation” of offenders in the treatment program. Id. § 229A.1(4). The

legislature granted CCUSO substantial discretion to determine the treatment

provided to the offenders and to assess the treatment progress of offenders.

Judicial review is limited. See Swanson, 737 N.W.2d at 307 (holding a sexually

violent predator could not challenge CCUSO’s placement decision as an

“aggrieved person” under Iowa Code chapter 17A and concluding his failure to

progress “is not an adverse action, but an integral part of the treatment under a

cognitive-behavioral model”); see also In re Saiz, 492 P.3d 484, 491–92 (Kan. Ct.

App. 2021) (requiring the district court to “give due regard to the judgment of

mental health professionals about the appropriate treatment methods,” and

reversing the order that released the sexually violent predator).

      We have already recognized that correctional officials may rely on a failed

polygraph examination as a factor influencing the decision to remove an inmate

from a sex offender treatment program. Reilly v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 490,

498–99 (Iowa 2010) (“[P]olygraph examinations serve a rehabilitative purpose

within treatment.”). We approvingly noted “the use of polygraphs in sex offender
treatment programs,” including CCUSO. Id. (collecting cases); see also Swanson,

737 N.W.2d at 303 (discussing the use of polygraphs in the SOTP at CCUSO).

And Schuman admittedly lied during his polygraph interview to improve his

chances of progressing. As the State’s expert, Dr. Salter, testified, lying during a

polygraph examination is a red flag that supports Schuman’s demotion to the

more restrictive phase three. That demotion was “based on . . . the professional

judgment of those treating him within the CCUSO program.” Taft II, 879 N.W.2d

at 639.
                                        24

      Courts should give CCUSO’s internal placement decisions a “wide berth.”

Off. of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Edwards, 825 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 2012)

(quoting Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Grossheim, 498 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa

1993)). “There is a ‘presumption of regularity that attaches to the decisions of

administrative agencies’ that protects them against inquiry into how they reach

their decisions based upon mere suspicion.” Id. at 21 (quoting Martin Marietta

Materials, Inc. v. Dallas County, 675 N.W.2d 544, 554 (Iowa 2004)). This

presumption can be overcome by a “strong showing of bad faith or improper

behavior.” Id. (quoting Martin Marietta Materials, 675 N.W.2d at 554). Schuman

made no such showing. The district court erred by overruling CCUSO’s decision

to demote Schuman to phase three.

      C. Schuman’s Substantive Due Process Claims Fail. Schuman argues

that requiring “treatment provider approval of a relapse prevention plan amounts

to a ‘veto’ of the district court’s exercise of discretion, authority, and options,”

and thereby violates his substantive due process rights under both the United

States and Iowa Constitutions. Shuman further argues that CCUSO’s policy

“that provides that the relapse prevention plan won’t be considered until Phase

[Four], likewise violates [his] right to due process.” The State responds that
Schuman has no substantive due process right to “placement in a different phase

of treatment,” as opposed to discharge. We agree with the State that CCUSO’s

denial of transitional release did not violate Schuman’s substantive due process

rights.

      1. Substantive   due    process   requirements.   “We    have   ‘traditionally

considered the federal and state due process provisions to be equal in scope,

import, and purpose.’ ” Matlock, 860 N.W.2d at 903 (quoting Garren, 620 N.W.2d
                                               25

at 284).6 Schuman “does not offer or suggest a framework under the Iowa

Constitution different from that under the United States Constitution.” Id.

Accordingly, we apply the same analysis to his state and federal claims. Id.

       “[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear

some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.”

Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d at 289 (alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Indiana,

406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). Substantive due process prohibits the State from

“engaging in arbitrary or wrongful act[s] ‘regardless of the fairness of the

procedures used to implement them.’ ” Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 284 (quoting

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). “A person’s interest in freedom

from bodily restraint is ‘at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process

Clause from arbitrary governmental actions.’ ” Id. (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana,

504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).

       When confronted with an offender’s challenges to treatment decisions,

courts “must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified

professional.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982). Judges and juries

are not “better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such

decisions.” Id. at 322–23. A treatment decision, “if made by a professional, is
presumptively valid.” Id. at 323 (footnote omitted). We will question its

constitutionality only when the professional’s decision is such “a substantial

departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on

such a judgment.” Id. “We are not required, nor is it appropriate for us to specify

       6The  Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Iowa Constitution provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 9.
                                         26

which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.”

Swanson, 737 N.W.2d at 309. We are only required “to make certain that

professional judgment was in fact exercised.” Id.

      In In re Detention of Garren, we rejected the offender’s claim that he had a

“substantive due process right to the least restrictive setting.” 620 N.W.2d at

285. Rather, “substantive due process demands, at the most, that there be a

reasonable fit between the governmental purpose and the means chosen to

advance that purpose.” Id. (quoting In re B.B., 516 N.W.2d 874, 879 (Iowa 1994)).

We concluded that “there is a reasonable fit here between the State’s purpose of

protecting society from persons who have been determined to be likely to reoffend

if not placed in a secure facility and their placement in such a facility.” Id.

      2. Substantive due process as applied to Schuman. Schuman seeks only

transitional release—a less restrictive level of treatment—not discharge or

supervised release where he would reside outside CCUSO in the community.

Discharge is an “unconditional discharge from the sexually violent predator

program.” Iowa Code § 229A.2(4). Discharge is allowed when the offender “no

longer suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to

engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged.” Id.
§ 229A.8(1). Supervised release is allowed when the offender still “suffers from a

mental abnormality and it is in the best interest of the community to order

release with supervision before the committed person is discharged.” Id.

§ 229A.9A(1)(b). By contrast, the transitional release program allows outings into

the community while the offender still remains housed at CCUSO’s facility. See

In re Det. of Anderson, 895 N.W.2d 131, 143 (Iowa 2017).

      We reiterate that offenders have no fundamental right to the “least

restrictive placement.” Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 285; see also Washington v.
Bergen (In re Det. of Bergen), 195 P.3d 529, 533–34 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)
                                         27

(rejecting a sexually violent predator’s substantive due process claim for

conditional release into the community as the least restrictive alternative). As

Dr. Salter testified, CCUSO staff made a reasoned professional judgment to

demote Schuman to phase three and to deny him transitional release without a

RPP approved by his therapist who knows him best. Deference is owed to those

professional judgments. See Romeo, 457 U.S. at 322. The statute that authorized

CCUSO’s placement decision is “presumed constitutional, and ‘[t]he challenger

bears a heavy burden [to] prove the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ ” Taft II, 879 N.W.2d at 638 (first alteration in original) (quoting State v.

Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa 2002)). Schuman has made no

such showing. His substantive due process claims fail.

      V. Disposition.

      For these reasons, we sustain the writ and vacate the district court’s

ruling.

      PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI GRANTED; WRIT SUSTAINED.
      All justices concur except Mansfield, J., who files an opinion concurring

in part and dissenting in part.
                                        28

                                             #22–1521, In re Detention of Schuman

MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
      I concur in part and dissent in part. I join the majority’s conclusion that

certiorari is the proper method of reviewing this case. I also agree with the

majority that the district court erred in substituting its own evaluation of Stewart

Schuman’s relapse prevention plan (RPP) for an evaluation by the treatment

provider. However, I find the State’s conduct problematic in this case, and I

would remand for further proceedings on Schuman’s request for transitional

release.

      Schuman’s litany of sex offenses with young children might suggest that

he is a poor candidate for any type of release. Nonetheless, Schuman completed

his prison sentences over a decade ago. He has been civilly confined at the Civil

Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (CCUSO) since then without the

predicate of a criminal conviction. Because of the significant liberty interest at

stake, the law requires that Schuman be afforded an annual examination and

review. See Iowa Code § 229A.8(2) (2022). Concerning that annual review, the

law further provides,

      The court shall consider all evidence presented by both parties at
      the annual review. The burden is on the committed person to prove
      by a preponderance of the evidence that there is relevant and reliable
      evidence to rebut the presumption of continued commitment, which
      would lead a reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be
      held to determine either of the following:

            (a) The mental abnormality of the committed person has so
      changed that the person is not likely to engage in predatory acts
      constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged.

            (b) The committed person is suitable for placement in a
      transitional release program pursuant to section 229A.8A.

Id. § 229A.8(5)(e)(1).
                                         29

      On March 21, 2022, the district court held a brief annual review hearing.

There, it determined that Schuman should proceed to a final hearing on whether

he should be granted discharge or transitional release. As the court explained,

            The Respondent has submitted the report of Dr. Luis Rosell,
      Psy.D. in which Dr. Rosell opines that the Respondent is suitable for
      placement in the Transitional Release Program or to be Discharged.
      The State agrees that this showing satisfies the burden imposed
      upon the Respondent pursuant to Iowa Code section 229A.8(5)(e)(1),
      and the Court agrees.

      Approximately three and a half months later, on July 6, the final hearing

took place. At the hearing, three witnesses testified: Schuman, psychologist

Dr. Anna Salter for the State, and psychologist Dr. Luis Rosell for Schuman.

      Schuman made clear at the final hearing that he was not interested in

discharge and only interested in transitional release. Under transitional release,

Schuman would continue to be housed at CCUSO but would have opportunities

to leave the facility temporarily. Schuman explained why he desired this

alternative:

      I want to build some money up. I want to get a job so I can build
      some money up so I can get me a place to stay. All I got in the bank
      is a thousand dollars, and I’d like to have more than a thousand
      dollars to get out in the street.

As the district court put it, “Schuman has specifically disclaimed any request for

discharge.”

      The statute governing transitional release, Iowa Code § 229A.8A, provides,

             2. A committed person is suitable for placement in the
      transitional release program if the court finds that all of the following
      apply:

            a. The committed person’s mental abnormality is no longer
      such that the person is a high risk to reoffend.

             b. The committed person has achieved and demonstrated
      significant insights into the person’s sex offending cycle.
                                        30

           c. The committed person has accepted responsibility for past
      behavior and understands the impact sexually violent crimes have
      upon a victim.

            d. A detailed relapse prevention plan has been developed and
      accepted by the treatment provider which is appropriate for the
      committed person’s mental abnormality and sex offending history.

          e. No major discipline reports have been issued for the
      committed person for a period of six months.

           f. The committed person is not likely to escape or attempt to
      escape custody pursuant to section 229A.5B.

            g. The committed person is not likely to engage in predatory
      acts constituting sexually violent offenses while in the program.

            h. The placement is in the best interest of the committed
      person.

            i. The committed person has demonstrated a willingness to
      agree to and abide by all rules of the program.

Id. § 229A.8A(2).

      There was consensus at the final hearing that Schuman met three of these

requirements: (e), (f), and (i). The disagreement between Dr. Salter and Dr. Rosell

centered on the other criteria. This disagreement played out in the weight that

the psychologists placed on Schuman’s polygraphs and penile plethysmographs

(PPGs) and on the Static-99R risk assessment tool. Dr. Salter took the position

that the Static-99R underestimated Schuman’s true risk of reoffending and did

not use it. Dr. Rosell relied on it.

      There was also testimony concerning paragraph (d), which requires that

“[a] detailed relapse prevention plan has been developed and accepted by the

treatment provider which is appropriate for the committed person’s mental

abnormality and sex offending history.” Id. § 229A.8A(2)(d). CCUSO is divided

into five “phases,” with phase five being transitional release and phase four the

phase just short of transitional release. Schuman had spent several years in
phase four until being demoted in 2021 to phase three because of two failed
                                          31

polygraphs. While in phase four, Schuman submitted several RPPs, but none

were approved. When he was demoted to phase three, Schuman again submitted

an RPP. The evidence was undisputed that this RPP was not even considered

because CCUSO’s policy is not to consider RPPs unless the individual is in phase

four. Yet Dr. Rosell testified favorably on this RPP and deemed it “worthy of

acceptance”:

            Q. Number four, a detailed relapse prevention plan has been
      developed and accepted by the treatment provider as appropriate for
      the committed person’s abnormality and sex offending history. What
      is your opinion on that, Doctor?

             A. I believe it has been developed. It just hasn’t been accepted.
      I believe it’s worthy of acceptance. I’m not privy to the reasons why
      it hasn’t been accepted but, you know, that seems to be the sticking
      point in his progression.

      For reasons that it explained in detail, the district court generally found

Dr. Rosell’s testimony more persuasive. It discounted the polygraph and the PPG

results. Therefore, the district court concluded that criteria (a), (b), (c), (g), and

(h) had been met. Those are the criteria that the majority characterizes as

“open-ended.”

      The district court’s findings on criteria (a), (b), (c), (g), and (h) are supported
by substantial evidence. This means they are binding on us. See Spitz v. Iowa

Dist. Ct., 881 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Iowa 2016). Notably, on certiorari review, we

must accept the district court’s factual findings when they are supported by

substantial evidence. See id. (“We find error when the district court’s finding of

facts are not supported by substantial evidence . . . .”). Although the majority

quotes Dr. Salter at great length, and quotes Dr. Rosell only briefly, it was Dr.

Rosell whom the district court found more credible. Notably, the State does not

appeal these findings.
                                        32

      This leaves us only with criterion (d), the requirement that the offender

have an accepted RPP. Here the district court found:

      A detailed relapse prevention plan has been developed and accepted
      by the treatment provider which is appropriate for the committed
      person’s mental abnormality and sex offending history. Dr. Salter
      relies simply on the fact that Schuman was reduced to Phase [Three]
      and RPPs are not accepted until Phase [Four]. If that was a sufficient
      reason, the concept of judicial review would be defeated and this
      trial would have been a waste of time. The court is convinced that
      there was no reliable reason for the reduction to Phase [Three].

      The majority agrees with none of this reasoning; I agree with some of it. If

the State and the majority are correct, the trial was indeed “a waste of time.” The

State consented to a final hearing, which meant that Schuman had rebutted the

presumption of continued confinement and presented enough for a reasonable

person to conclude a final hearing should be held on whether the offender is

suitable for transitional release. But transitional release requires an accepted

RPP, and three and half months later the treatment provider hadn’t even looked

at Schuman’s RPP. That can’t be the end of the story.

      For one thing, we interpret statutes like section 229A.8A(2)(d) so they

make sense, not nonsense. See Iowa Code § 4.4(3) (“In enacting a statute, it is

presumed that . . . [a] just and reasonable result is intended.”). In my view, an
implied term of section 229A.8A(2)(d)’s requirement that the RPP be accepted by

the time of the final hearing is a requirement that it be considered. See Lewis v.

Jaeger, 818 N.W.2d 165, 185 (Iowa 2012) (“[A]lthough a statute employing broad

terms is obviously more susceptible to being applied in an arbitrary or

discriminatory fashion than one containing detailed language, an ordinance may

be narrowed through an implied term of objective reasonableness.”); State v.

Abrahamson, 696 N.W.2d 589, 592 (Iowa 2005) (holding that a statute providing
that the court “shall approve” a claim for room and board reimbursement
                                        33

submitted by a sheriff or county allowed the district court to exercise judgment

over that claim and not simply “rubber-stamp” it); Iowa C.R. Comm’n v. Deere &

Co., 482 N.W.2d 386, 389 (Iowa 1992) (holding that an agency could not

“circumvent [a] statute” establishing a thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial

review of no-probable-cause determinations by adopting a rule allowing the

agency   to   reopen   a   case   at   any   time).   The   majority   justifies   the

section 229A.8A(2)(d) requirement by observing that the CCUSO treatment

provider, who must accept the plan, “knows the offender best.” But this only

works when the treatment provider actually looks at the plan.

      Second, I believe the majority’s analogy to Taft v. Iowa District Court is off

the mark. See 828 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 2013). In Taft, the offender had incurred

six major disciplinary reports within the relevant time period. Id. at 322. In

support of the offender’s quest for a final hearing, the offender’s expert

discounted those reports as “not based on allegations of sexual misconduct.” Id.

This opinion, we held, could not override the “plain language of section

229A.8A(2)(e) [that] disqualifies from transitional release any committed person

who has received any major disciplinary report during the previous six months.”

Id. Therefore, the offender was not entitled to a final hearing. Id. at 323.
      This case is different. Section 228A.8A(2)(d) is unlike section 228A.8A(2)(e)

in the extent to which the condition is under the control of CCUSO, rather than

the offender. There was no suggestion in Taft that the offender had received the

disciplinary reports because of something he couldn’t do anything about—like

CCUSO’s refusal even to consider Schuman’s RPP. See id. at 311 (providing that

Taft was cited for “lying to staff,” “inciting disruptiveness,” “disrespecting the

CCUSO staff,” and a “boundary violation”). Furthermore, the offender in Taft was

appealing the court’s denial of a final hearing, whereas here Schuman was
granted a final hearing. Id. at 312. Under Taft, the grant of a final hearing meant
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that the offender “more likely than not generated a fact question” on the

transitional release issues. Id. at 318. Yet now, the majority concludes Schuman

was never actually a candidate for transitional release. If so, why did the State

agree to the final hearing?

      Third, the majority engages in a bit of sleight of hand. It uses Dr. Salter’s

opinions and the failed polygraphs to justify Schuman’s demotion to phase three,

which in turn provides the majority’s justification for CCUSO’s not even having

considered Schuman’s RPP. But this approach doesn’t give adequate weight to

the district court’s factual findings. The district court didn’t accept Dr. Salter’s

opinions; it found those of Dr. Rosell more credible. In short, the majority

reanalyzes the district court’s findings on criteria (a), (b), (c), (g), and (h) to

demonstrate that the State didn’t act arbitrarily with respect to criterion (d). The

substantial-evidence rule prohibits the majority from taking this path.

      Having said this, I do not agree that the district court itself should have

decided the suitability of the RPP on this record. I would remand to give the State

an opportunity to supplement the record with testimony from the CCUSO

treatment provider on the appropriateness of Schuman’s plan. If the CCUSO

treatment provider has a nonarbitrary reason for not accepting the plan, then I
would hold that Schuman is not entitled to transitional release. If the State

declines this opportunity to supplement the record, or the treatment provider

cannot articulate a reasonable basis for refusing to accept the plan, then

Schuman would enter transitional release. Usually, we don’t allow do-overs, but

in this case Schuman has less of a liberty interest than usual because he is not

seeking outright release, which he recognizes he is not ready for. Schuman does

have a legitimate interest in not being subjected to arbitrary government

conduct.