Court Opinion

ID: 9474561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:01:31.53833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:10.825718
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While the Court acknowledges that, in order to establish liability in restitution, the civil law normally requires a benefit received of some sort as well as a loss sustained, the Court nevertheless holds that “it is unmistakable from the tenor of these statutes ... that Congress did not intend the term ‘restitution’ as used in the [Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982] to be so construed.” The Court cites the fact that the statute allows compensation for *770the victim’s “medical expenses, lost income, or funeral expenses" as authority for its interpretation of the statute. The Court reads into the statute a broad tort concept of compensation for damages rather than applying a restitutionary concept.
I would hold that in ordering “restitution” under the statute, the sentencing court is limited by general concepts of restitution as previously developed in equity and in common law, rather than tort principles of compensation.
In the instant case, as the District Court noted, the defendant himself actually acquired approximately $16,000 worth of stolen checks and parceled them out to his co-conspirators for cashing. The conspiratorial group received the money. The defendant was the leader of the group, and the others were acting as agents of the enterprise. Under these circumstances, the District Court was correct in concluding that general principles of restitution would allow the proceeds of the checks received by the defendant’s enterprise to be considered as benefits received by him. Cf. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 71 S.Ct. 680, 95 L.Ed. 927 (1951) (benefits obtained by agents of trustee at expense of trust estate are attributable to trustee); G. Palmer, The Law of Restitution § 2.11 at 141-42 (1978). The case fits within established principles of restitution, and there is no need to use broader tort concepts.
The fact that the statute allows compensation for the victim’s medical and other similar expenses does not mean that such damages may be awarded when they do not fit within general principles of restitution. Congress consistently used the word “restitution” throughout the statute. The members of the Judiciary Committees of both houses of Congress, as well as their staffs, are lawyers trained in the common law tradition. They understood, in my opinion, that the word “restitution” has a historical meaning different from tort, and I would maintain this distinction when interpreting the statute.