Court Opinion

ID: 9712457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:54:17.422866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.337727
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority today holds that a seller of residential real estate has an affirmative duty to disclose a known termite infestation, even where the seller neither attempts to conceal the presence of termites nor realizes the serious consequences which might result from failure to treat the termite presence. Since I view this holding as constituting an extension of the law of this Commonwealth, and since I cannot agree that the facts in the instant case justify such an extension, I must respectfully dissent.
President Judge CERCONE, writing for the majority, holds, first, that, considering the facts of the instant case, it should be the means to establish the principle requiring disclosure of a known termite infestation, and second, that it is unnecessary to establish this principle because Glanski v. Ervine, 269 Pa.Super.Ct. 182, 409 A.2d 425 (1979), already established this legal precedent that is applicable to the instant case. A brief review of prior cases reveals that the instant case can be clearly distinguished from the cases which the majority cites as precedent.
*32I. Pennsylvania Cases
In addition to Glanski v. Ervine, the majority cites Shane v. Hoffman, 227 Pa.Super.Ct. 176, 324 A.2d 532 (1974) and DeJoseph v. Zambelli, 392 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d 644 (1958), to support its holding that the vendors had a duty to inform the purchasers of the termite infestation. These cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
DeJoseph involved a vendor’s fraudulent misrepresentation in response to the purchasers’ question concerning the condition of the house. The vendors had whitewashed the basement and nailed boards over the joists to conceal the serious damage caused by termites. The joists could easily be penetrated by a pointed object, and some disintegrated when touched with a bare hand. Testimony from former tenants revealed that termites had crawled in their food and clothing. The condition was so hazardous that the Township Superintendent of Building Regulations declared that the first floor was unsafe and dangerous for human occupancy.
Presented with this factual situation, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court- affirmed the chancellor’s finding that the vendors had engaged in fraudulent concealment and material misrepresentations. The following was one of the chancellor’s conclusions of law, which the Supreme Court also affirmed: “The doctrine of caveat emptor is inapplicable because defendants committed the frauds of concealment and material misrepresentations and thereby prevented detection of termite damage.” [Emphasis added] 392 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d at 649.1
In Shane v. Hoffman, we held that the vendors were liable to the purchasers who had relied upon the vendors’ fraudulent misrepresentations. In response to the purchasers’ question concerning whether or not the sewer was in good working condition, the real estate agent replied that he knew of no problems. At the closing, the purchasers expressed concern to the vendor about the possibility of improper drainage. In reply, the vendor assured the púrchas*33ers that this was not a problem. Contrary to this assurance, only a month after the purchasers had moved into the property, the sewer backed up, flooding the basement with slime, human excrement, and bathroom tissue. The vendor knew of this condition, which had occurred on numerous occasions, and which had caused a former tenant to vacate the premises. The health hazard created by the backed-up sewer was so serious that the purchasers were required to keep their baby away from the premises for three months until the condition was rectified.
The Shane court held that the real estate agent was liable for his fraudulent reply to the purchasers’ question concerning the condition of the sewer. The agent’s reply was calculated to deceive the purchasers, the court held. The vendor’s liability was based upon principles of agency law since the vendor authorized the agent to discuss all details relating to the property.
As a second basis for the vendor’s liability, the court held that, because of the serious health hazard caused by the defective sewer, the vendor had a duty to inform the purchasers about this defect when they inquired about the drainage system. To support the imposition of this duty upon the vendor, the court cites section 353 of Restatement (Second) of Torts.2
The majority states that the vendor’s liability in Shane was based upon the fact that, “she was a silent seller who breached a duty to disclose. . . . ” The majority then proceeds to quote from the Shane opinion which explained that, in response to a question concerning the drain, the vendor remained silent even though she knew both that a problem existed and that a prior tenant had vacated the premises because of the problem.
Two important distinctions must be made between Shane and the instant case. First, the vendor’s deliberate silence in response to the purchaser’s question in Shane must be distinguished from the silence of the vendors in the instant *34case in which the purchasers did not make any inquiries. Second, the vendor in Shane knew that the drainage problem was a very serious one since a prior tenant had vacated the premises due to the sewer back-up. 227 Pa.Super.Ct. at 185-186, 324 A.2d at 538. Unlike the vendor in Shane, who knew of the serious sewer problem, the vendors in the instant case did not realize that the presence of termites could create a serious problem.3 Considering these crucial distinctions, the principles of law articulated in Shane cannot control our decision in the instant case.
Like DeJoseph and Shane, Borelli v. Barthel, 205 Pa.Super.Ct. 442, 211 A.2d 11 (1965), also involved fraudulent misrepresentations by the vendors, who disguised termite damage with plasterboard and added three floor posts to compensate for termite damage to the joists.
In contrast with the instant case, Borelli, DeJoseph, and Shane involved fraud and/or misrepresentation by the vendor in response to the purchaser’s questions. In the instant case, the purchasers did not inquire about termites, and the vendors made no attempt either to mislead the purchasers or to conceal any damage.
Glanski v. Ervine, 269 Pa.Super.Ct. 182, 409 A.2d 425 (1979), upon which the majority strongly relies, was also an action alleging fraud in the sale of a termite-infested house. In response to the purchaser’s questions concerning the structural soundness of the house, the real estate agent repeatedly denied that any problems existed. In addition, the agent expressly denied that he had ever seen any termites on the premises. Because of a lack of proper lighting, and the placement of furniture to cover termite holes, the purchaser was unable to discover the termite infestation until after the closing. The purchaser then discovered that the house was structurally unsound and unfit for habitation.
On review, we held that the evidence supported verdicts against both the owner and his agent. The agent’s liability was based upon his material misrepresentations concerning *35termites, upon which the purchaser justifiably relied to his detriment. 269 Pa.Super.Ct. at 193, 409 A.2d at 430.
Although the vendor in Glanski neither engaged in nor authorized any misrepresentations, our court held that the vendor had a duty to inform the purchaser about the termites because a seller must disclose conditions that are dangerous to the purchaser. 269 Pa.Super.Ct. at 191, 409 A.2d at 430. To support this principle, Glanski cites Shane v. Hoffman and section 353 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The dangerous conditions in Glanski, which existed at the time of sale, clearly distinguish that case from the instant case. Our court’s opinion related the dangerous conditions that Glanski discovered shortly after the closing:
Closing was held March 6, 1974.3 Shortly thereafter, Glanski set up some lighting in the cellar and found that the beams were infested with termites. On the first floor, he discovered that termites had chewed a hole in the floor; until then, the hole had been covered by a large piece of Ervine’s furniture. Door frames were found to have been eaten away, with only a shell of paint remaining. In short, the house was structurally unsound and unfit for habitation.
269 Pa.Super.Ct. at 187, 409 A.2d at 427 [footnote omitted].
Unlike Glanski, in the instant case, the presence of termites was not even detected until the purchasers had resided in the house for three (3) years and eight (8) months. Within this factual context, the termite infestation in the instant case did not constitute a condition that was “dangerous to the purchaser.” Accordingly, under the holding in Glanski, the vendors in the instant case did not have a duty voluntarily to disclose the termite infestation.
In Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Fetner, 269 Pa.Super.Ct. 455, 410 A.2d 344 (1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1853, 64 L.Ed.2d 273 (1980), we addressed the issue of whether or not, if neither concealment nor misrepresentations are involved, a vendor has a duty to disclose a title defect to the purchaser. Citing American Metal Fabricators *36Company v. Goldman, 227 Pa.Super.Ct. 284, 323 A.2d 891 (1974), we held that,
[a]n action based upon concealment will not lie, even as between a vendor and vendee, unless there is established an affirmative duty to disclose the existence of a title defect.
269 Pa.Super.Ct. at 462, 410 A.2d at 348. The title defect in Federal Land Bank can be distinguished from the serious danger of physical harm that was involved in Borelli, DeJoseph, Shane, and Glanski. In Borelli, DeJoseph, and Glanski, the damage by the termites was so severe that the houses were unfit for habitation. The basement filled with human excrement in Shane certainly created a very serious health hazard to the occupants. In the instant case, the damage caused by the termites was not even detected by Appellees until they had resided in the house for more than 3V2 years.
The instant case involved neither a risk of immediate serious physical harm nor fraudulent misrepresentations, both of which were present in Borelli, DeJoseph, Shane, and Glanski. Although the vendor in Glanski did not himself engage in fraudulent misrepresentations, the conditions in Glanski were very dangerous and the vendor knew of this danger. In Shane, the vendor, who knew about the serious drainage problem, denied its existence in response to the purchaser’s inquiry. Since the instant case involves distinctions that cannot be reconciled with the respective facts in the aforesaid cases, these cases cannot provide precedent for the instant case. Since the instant case involved neither a risk of immediate serious physical harm nor fraudulent misrepresentations, the principle of law approved by Federal Land Bank should govern the instant case, namely, that, absent an affirmative duty, the vendor need not disclose defects to the purchaser.
II. Facts Not Justification for Imposing Liability
The majority asserts that the facts of the instant case would justify imposing liability upon the vendors if legal precedent establishing such liability did not already exist. I must respectfully disagree.
*37As Judge BROSKY states in his Dissenting Opinion, the facts of the instant case do not justify imposing upon the vendors a duty to disclose. The vendors did not consider the problem to be sufficiently serious to spend $240.00 for extermination. After learning of the infestation, the vendors continued to live in the house for two (2) years; and they testified that they would not have moved if the husband’s employer had not transferred him. The trial court found that the vendors made no attempt to conceal either the existence of the termites or the damage that the termites had caused. Thus, the facts of the instant case reveal that the vendors did not consider the termite infestation to be a serious problem.
The vendors had good reason to believe that the termites had not created a serious problem. Not only did the individuals who inspected the property for the bank fail to discover the termites, but the purchasers did not discover them until they had lived in the house for three (3) years and eight (8) months.
Although the majority interprets these facts to mean that the termite problem could not be discovered by a layman,4 the importance of these facts is that they distinguish the termite infestation in the instant case from the serious and dangerous conditions in DeJoseph v. Zambelli, 392 Pa. 24, 139 A.2d 644 (1958), and Glanski v. Ervine, 269 Pa.Super.Ct. 182, 409 A.2d 425 (1979).
Also, the testimony revealed that the termites could have been detected by Appellees. A licensed exterminator testified that, although an untrained person would not have realized that the grooves in the basement were evidence of *38termites, a layman could detect the termites in the crawl space:
Q Were these [grooves] readily seen?
A I’ll have to answer this way: to a man that is trained, yes; to somebody not trained, no.
Now, in the crawl space that is a little different. I’m talking about the big basement, you’d have to know what you were looking for to find it.
On cross-examination, the witness testified:
Q And you heard the examination she [Mrs. Quashnock] made of the home.
A Right.
Q That type of examination would be very difficult for her to ascertain termites.
A Yes, sir, unless she would see damage in the crawl space. [Emphasis added.]
Although Appellees admitted that they had ample time to inspect the premises, they neither utilized the opportunity to discover the termites in the crawl space, nor did they even inquire about termites.5 Unlike the vendors in DeJoseph, Shane, and Borelli, the vendors in the instant case did not engage in any misrepresentations. The lower court held, as a finding of fact, that the vendors in the instant case did not *39engage in fraud. This case involves the mere failure to reveal when the purchasers neither inquired about termites nor adequately inspected the premises.
CONCLUSION
The instant case presents this court with the difficult issue of where to draw the line between total mandatory disclosure—^volunteering information when no questions have been asked—and a totally arms-length situation. I believe that the degree of severity of the infestation constitutes a reasonable restriction on the seller’s liability. I believe, also, that the period of time that elapsed before the purchaser’s discovery of the termites constitutes another restriction on the seller’s liability. I am unable to conclude that a standard of strict liability is appropriate where, as here, the termite condition was neither serious nor dangerous at the time of sale.
The majority asserts that we need not establish precedent now because Glanski already established the law that is applicable to the instant case. The dangerous conditions in Glanski, together with the fact that the case involved fraudulent concealment, clearly distinguish Glanski from the instant case.
Since Glanski would not impose upon the vendors in the instant case a duty to disclose, I do not believe that the facts of the instant case are such that a duty to volunteer information should be imposed upon the vendors who neither attempted to conceal the presence of termites nor realized the serious consequences of the termites.
Considering the facts of the instant case—particularly, the purchasers’ failure to inquire and to inspect, the length of time until the purchasers discovered the termites, and the vendors’ apparent lack of knowledge that termites could create a serious problem—I would hold that Appellants did not have a duty to disclose the fact that termites were present in their residence.
The majority concedes that a defect must be both serious and dangerous before a duty to disclose arises. Within the *40factual context of this case, I am unable to conclude that either requirement is clearly satisfied. I fear that the interpretation of the applicable law as contained in the majority opinion will result in new parameters of liability not envisioned by the court, which will not be conducive to the smooth and gradual development of our law. If the principle requiring disclosure of a known termite infestation is to be established, I submit that this case is not a proper vehicle for that important step.
I, therefore, would reverse the judgment in favor of the purchasers.
PRICE, CAVANAUGH and POPOVICH, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. The official reporter does not reprint the chancellor’s findings in this case.

. By its terms, section 353 is limited to a vendor’s liability for physical harm caused by the undisclosed condition.

. See our discussion of the facts on pages 135 - 136, infra.

. The majority argues that the lower court’s finding of fact should not be overturned on review. I agree. The problem is that the lower court’s statement, that the termites would not have been ascertained by an untrained purchaser, is not a finding of fact but merely a statement of the judge’s opinion in his memorandum opinion issued after exceptions were argued. The lower court did not even refer to this alleged “fact” in its opinion to support its decision following trial. Thus, rather than a finding of fact, the statement in question appears to be a mere afterthought of the lower court to support its denial of exceptions regarding the vendors’ duty to disclose.

. The majority argues, first, that an inexperienced person would not have discovered the termites in the crawl space, and second, that a reasonable inspection would not include the crawl space because of its dimensions. I must disagree. As discussed above, the exterminator testified that a layman would have recognized the presence of termites in the crawl space. More significantly, when the Quashnocks pulled boards from the crawl space, they immediately saw the grooves and recognized that a problem existed. If they had inspected the crawl space before they purchased the house, they could have recognized the problem then.
In response to the majority’s assertions about the dimensions of the crawl space, we note that, although Mr. Frost had never entered the crawl space, both the exterminator, called by the vendors, and a specialist, called by the purchasers to estimate the damage, had, in fact, entered it. Thus, the dimensions of the crawl space would not have prevented the purchasers from inspecting it. Mrs. Quashnock testified, however, that she had never even gone into the “back area” of the basement when she inspected the house. Surely this was not a “reasonable inspection” within this factual context.