Court Opinion

ID: 9883048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:36:02.71803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:19.306827
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Miller
dissenting.
•When these cases were argued before Circuit Judge McCrary and myself at. St. Louis, after due consideration and consultation with him and Judge Treat, of the District Court, I announced certain propositions as the foundations on which the decrees should be rendered. These were afterwards entered in the various circuits-to which the cases properly belonged, and, I believe, in strict accordance with the principles'thus announced.
*30I am still of opinion that those principles are sound,-and I repeat them here as the reasons of my dissent from the judgment of the court now- pronounced in these cases.
■ They met the approval of Judge McCrary when they were submitted to his consideration.. They were filed in the court in the following language :■
1. I am of opinion that what is known as the express business is a branch of the carrying trade that has, by the necessities- of commerce and the usages of thosé engaged in transportation, become known and recognized. ■
. “ That, while it is not possible to give a definition in terms which will embrace all classes of articles usually so carried, and to define it with a precision of words of exclusion, the general character of the business is sufficiently known and recognized to require the court to take notice of it as distinct from the transportation of the large mass of freight, usually carried on steamboats and railroads.
“ That the object of this express business is to carry small and valuable packages rapidly, in such a manner as not to sub: ject them to the danger of .loss and damage, which, to a greater or less degree, attends the transportation of heavy or bulky articles of commerce, as grain, flour, iron, ordinary merchandise, and the like.
“ 2. It has become law and usage, and is one of the necessities of this business, that these packages should be in the immediate charge of -an agent, or messenger of the person or company engaged in it, and to refuse permission to this agent to accompany these packages on steamboats or railroads on which they are carried, and to deny them the right to the control of them while so carried, is destructive of the business and of the rights which the public have to the use of the railroads in this class of transportation.
“3. I am of the opinion that when express matter is so confided to the charge of an agent or messenger, the railroad company is no longer liable to all the obligations of a common carrier, but that when loss or injury occurs, the liability depends upon the exercise of due care, skill and diligence on the part of the railroad company.
*31“ 4. That, under these circumstances, there does not exist on the part of the railroad company the right to open and inspect ■ all packages so carried, especially when they have been duly closed or sealed up by their owners or by the express carrier.
, “ 5. I am of the opinion that it is the duty-of every railroad company to provide such conveyance by special cars, or otherwise, attached to their freight and passenger trains, as .are. required for the safe and proper transportation of. this express matter on their roads, and that the use'of. these facilities should be extended on equal terms to all who are actually and usually engaged in the express business.
“If the number of persons claiming the right to engage in this business at the same time, on the same roacl, should become oppressive, other considerations might prevail; \but until such a state of affairs is shown to be actually, in existence in good' faith, it is unnecessary to consider it.
“ 6. This express matter and the person in charge of it should be carried by the railroad company at fair and reasonable rates ' of compensation; and where the parties concerned cannot agree. upon what that is, it is a question for the courts to decide.
“ 7. I am of. the opinion that a court of equity, in a case properly made out, has the authority to compel' the railroad ■ companies to carry this express matter, and to perform the duties in that respect which I have already indicated, and to make such orders and decrees,, and to enforce them by the. ordinary methods in use necessary to that end.
“ 8. .While I doubt the right of the court to fix in advance the precise rates which the ■ express companies shall pay and the railroad company shall accept, I have no doubt of its right to compel the performance of the service by the railroad company, and after it is rendered, to ascertain the reasonable compensation and compel its payment.
“ 9. To permit the railway company to fix upon a rate of compensation- which is absolute, and insist upon the payment in advance or at the end of every train, would be to enable them to defeat the just rights of the express companies, to destroy their business,' and would be a practical denial of justice. ■
■ “ 10. To avoid this difficulty, I think that the court can as*32sume that' the rates, or other mode of compensation heretofore existing between any such companies, are prima facie, reasonable and just, and-can require the parties to conform to it as the business progresses,, with the right to either party to keep and present an account of the business to the court at stated intervals, and claim an addition to, or rebate from, the amount paid. And to secure the railroad companies in any sum which may be thus found due them, a bond from the express company may be required in advance.
“ 11. When no such arrangement has heretofore been in existence it is competent for the "court to devise some mode of ' compensation to be paid as the business progresses, with like power of final revision on evidence, reference to master, &c.
“ 12. I am of opinion that neither the statutes nor constitutions of Arkansas or Missouri were intended to affect the right asserted in these cases; nor do they present any obstacle to such decrees as may enforce the right of the express companies.”
Three years’ reflection and the renewed and able argument in this court have not changed my belief in the soundness of these principles.
That there may be slight errors in the details of the decrees of the Circuit Courts made to secure just compensation for the services of the railroad companies is possibly true, but I have not discovered them, and the attention of the court has not been given to them in deciding this case; for holding, as it does, that the complainants were entitled to no relief whatever, it became unnecessary to consider the details of the decrees.
I only desire to add one or two observations in regard to matters found in the opinion of this court.
1. The relief sought in these cases is not sought on the ground of usage in the sense that a long course of dealing ■with the public has established a custom in the nature of law. Usage is only relied on as showing that the business itself has forced its way into general recognition as one of such necessity to the •pafelic;-and so distinct and marked in its character, that it is entitled to a consideration different from other modes of transportation.
*332. It is said that the regulation of the duties of carrying by-the. railroads, and of the compensation they shall receive,, is legislative in its character, and not judicial.
As to the duties of the railroad company,- if they .are not, as common carriers, under legal obligation, to carry express matter for any one engaged in that business in the manner appropriate and usual in such business, then there is no case for the relief sought in these bills. But if they are so bound to carry-, then in the absence of any legislative rule fixing their compensation I maintain that that compensation is a judicial question.
It is, then, the ordinary and ever-recurring question on- a quaniitm meruit. The railroad company renders the service which, by the law of its organization, it is bound to render. The express company refuses to pay for this the price' which the railroad company demands, because it believes it to be exorbitant. That it is a judicial question to determine what shall be paid for the service rendered, in the absence of an express contract, seems to me beyond doubt.
That the legislature may, in proper case, fix the rule or rate of compensation, I do not deny. But until this is done the court must decide it, -when it becomes matter of controversy.
The opinion of the court, while showing its growth and importance, places the entire express business of the country wholly at the mercy of the railroad companies, and suggests no means by which they can be compelled to do it. According to the principles there announced, no railroad company, is bound to receive or carry an express messenger or his packages. If they choose to reject him or his packages, they can throw all the business of the country back to the crude condition in which.it was a half century ago, before Harnden established his local express ■between the large Atlantic cities; for, let it be remembered that plaintiffs have never refused to pay the railroad companies reasonable compensation for their seryices, but those companies refuse to carry for them at any price or .under any'circumstances.
\ I am very sure such a proposition as this will not long be acquiesced in by the great commercial interests of the country and by the public, whom both railroad companies and the *34express men are intended to serve. . If other courts should follow ours in this doctrine, the evils to ensue will call for other relief.
' It is in view of amelioration of these great evils that, in dis- ; senting here, I announce the principles which I.earnestly believe ought to control the actions and the rights of these two great ■ public service's. ’