Court Opinion

ID: 9854837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:14:57.098577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:28.290220
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree that the judgment below must be reversed, but I would reverse the judgment on the basis of the rule recently laid down by this court in Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199 (203 SE2d 445) (1976).
This appeal is from a judgment on the pleadings rendered in the trial court in favor of the defendant-appellee. The appellant here brought the action below in the superior court to set aside a judgment of the court of ordinary that had awarded a year’s support to a widow and had divested appellant of his remainder interest in the property awarded to the widow.
Appellant’s father died on August 25, 1973; the will *168named his widow, the testator’s second wife and stepmother of the appellant, executrix of the estate; the widow was left a life estate in all of the testator’s property with remainder over to the appellant; after the testator’s funeral the appellant returned.to his home in Asheville, North Carolina; on September 7, 1973, letters testamentary were issued to the widow; on September 11, 1973, the widow instituted a year’s support proceeding and gave notice thereof by publication; the year’s support judgment was entered on November 5, 1973, and appellant alleged that he had no actual notice of the proceedings or the judgment; the widow thereafter died; and the appellee here is her son by a previous marriage, the executor of her estate, and the sole beneficiary under her probated will.
Appellant filed his complaint on September 18,1975, and also filed a notice of lis pendens against the realty that he contends that he was divested of by virtue of the year’s support judgment.
The appellee filed responsive pleadings and moved for judgment on the pleadings.
The trial judge conducted a hearing, did not receive evidence but heard argument of counsel only, and then granted appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The hearing was transcribed, and the trial judge concluded it with this statement: "Well, I am going to sustain the motion, I don’t think you are entitled to attack, I believe there is enough shown to show that she only did what she was entitled to have done under the law to do, and it may be harsh, but it’s her right, that will make it simple, you can take it up and test the constitutionality of these issues, I don’t believe that they are imposing so far as this particular case is concerned. I don’t believe they are, you can prepare an order on it, Mr. Gamer (appellee’s attorney).” The judgment was entered November 24, 1975.
Appellant’s fourth enumerated error is that the trial judge erred in holding that the year’s support proceeding is not unconstitutional "in the instant case.”
I conclude that the instant case is controlled by the recent decision of this court rendered in Allan v. Allan, supra, even though we specifically gave prospective *169application to the rule there set forth. Allan was argued October 14, 1975, decided January 28, 1976, and rehearing was denied February 11, 1976. The "constructive service issue” was pending in the trial court in the instant case during this time span; the judgment in the instant case was rendered November 24,1975; and the instant case was docketed in this court on January 16, 1976, prior to the decision rendered in Allan.
Under these circumstances, I would hold that the Allan rule is equally applicable in this case, and that appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings should not have been sustained.