Court Opinion

ID: 9505696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:14:43.857779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:42.192180
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion overruling the well-established precedent of Porter v. Porter, 526 N.E.2d 219 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), transfer denied.
While the Porter rule may be too sweeping in including as divisible marital property all of what the Court today calls “personal goodwill,” the analysis of the Court of Appeals in Porter convinces me that much of personal goodwill is distinct from future earning capacity. Id. at 223-25 (quoting Marriage of R.M. Lukens, 16 Wash.App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976)). Employing the hypothetical situations used in the Lukens case, I think it beyond debate that the value of the personal goodwill of Dr. Yoon’s practice would be substantially less than that found by the trial court here if he was just beginning his practice or if he was opening a brand new practice in an entirely new geographic location. These differences would be attributable to value in the practice developed during the marriage and should be considered a marital asset. See Porter, 526 N.E.2d at 225 (quoting Lukens, 558 P.2d at 281). That is essentially what Judge Friedlander, writing for the Court of Appeals, held here. Yoon v. Yoon, 687 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). For that reason, I would deny transfer in this case.
DICKSON, J., concurs