Court Opinion

ID: 9575542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:14:41.072635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:21.812920
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice
(concurring specially/concurring in result).
I concur with the majority holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on the lesser offense and in upholding the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.
However, I merely concur in the result of that portion of the majority opinion dealing with the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial because of the State’s alleged use of a peremptory challenge to strike a perspective juror who is a member of the Indian race. I cannot join the majority on this issue, since I am unclear as to the meaning of the statements that “[a] defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the venire solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case” and “[o]nce the defendant makes the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the State to explain the racial exclusion.” Citing Bat-son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
The majority opinion does not explain how a defendant must make a prima facie showing “in his case”, nor, for that matter, does it indicate what constitutes a “requisite showing.” Absolutely no guidance is given to either the bench or bar of this state.
It is settled law, and not disputed by the State, that the State’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges is subject to the broad commands of the equal protection clause. The burden rests upon the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination. Batson, supra; Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519, 23 S.Ct. 402, 47 L.Ed. 572 (1903). His burden is met by a prima facie showing, on the record, of purposeful discrimination. The burden then shifts to the State to demonstrate that “permissible racial neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.” Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536, 542 (1972).
From a practical standpoint, the defendant must raise the issue immediately upon the State’s exercise of the claimed discriminatory peremptory challenge. It is the trial court’s responsibility to conduct an in-camera hearing on the issue. The mere fact that the person disqualified is of the same race does not, in and of itself, establish a prima facie case. See Batson, supra. Upon a prima facie showing, the State must establish to the satisfaction of the trial court the absence of purposeful discrimination. Id. The trial court should consider all relevant circumstances, including a pattern of strikes against jurors of certain categories, the prosecutor's questions or statements during voir dire, together with any inferences which may be appropriately drawn therefrom. Id.
In this case, even though there was no transcript of the voir dire examination, an *827adequate, albeit minimal, record was made to demonstrate that the trial court gave meaningful consideration to appellant’s objections. In making its rulings, the trial court determined that there was a marriage relationship between the prospective juror and the defendant, which, although not sufficient to warrant excuse for cause, provided sufficient meritorious reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge. This holding was certainly proper.
I am authorized to state that Justice MORGAN joins in this concurring specially/concurring in result.