Court Opinion

ID: 9949307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 14:00:42.096481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:53.908655
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-5007    Document: 010111013120   Date Filed: 03/11/2024     Page: 1
                                                                               FILED
                                                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Tenth Circuit
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                         March 11, 2024
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
                          _________________________________           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                          Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

       Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                        No. 23-5007
  v.                                          (D.C. No. 4:21-CR-00237-GKF-1)
                                                        (N.D. Okla.)
  THOMAS ANTHONY PEARCE, II,
  a/k/a Thomas Anthony Pearce.

           Defendant - Appellant.
                        _________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT
                          _________________________________

 Before MCHUGH, EID, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                 _________________________________

       Thomas Anthony Pearce, II, appeals the denial of his motion to suppress

 evidence obtained from a traffic stop that he claims violated the Fourth

 Amendment. Mr. Pearce argues the stop was not justified at its inception

 because there was no objectively reasonable basis to suspect he was engaged

 in criminal activity. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we discern

 no error in the district court’s suppression ruling and affirm.

       
         This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
 doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be
 cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P.
 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-5007   Document: 010111013120   Date Filed: 03/11/2024   Page: 2

                                       I1

       In the early morning hours of February 8, 2021, Corporal Robert

 Golliday of the Jenks Police Department was working the night shift,

 patrolling the city of Jenks, Oklahoma in his marked police cruiser. At

 around 2:00 a.m., he drove through one of Jenks’s “distance neighborhoods,”

 a residential area somewhat isolated from the rest of the city. R.II.14:18–

 15:7; SR.I.58–59. Corporal Golliday spotted a white Dodge Ram—which

 turned out to be Mr. Pearce’s truck—parked in the driveway of a

 construction site on 131st Street, a main thoroughfare. There were no

 streetlights nearby, and the truck’s headlights were off.

       Corporal Golliday regularly patrolled the area, which was a recent

 target for burglaries, but he had never seen a car parked in that spot before.

 As he passed, Corporal Golliday shined an alley light, a bright light on the

 side of his patrol car, to see if anyone was inside the truck. He saw someone

 moving in the driver’s seat. Corporal Golliday drove on for a few seconds to

 turn his cruiser around at a nearby T-intersection and investigate further.

 By the time Corporal Golliday turned around, the truck was already driving

       1 We derive these facts from the district court’s recitation in its
 memorandum and order on the motion to suppress. Because, as we will
 explain, we consider testimony presented to the district court during its
 evidentiary hearing, United States v. Fonseca, 744 F.3d 674, 680 (10th Cir.
 2014), we rely on the transcript from that hearing as well.

                                        2
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 away, “accelerating down the road at high speed.” SR.I.59. Corporal

 Golliday activated his overhead lights and signaled for the truck to stop.

 The truck eventually pulled over, after bypassing several places to safely

 stop. Corporal Golliday approached the truck and encountered Mr. Pearce

 in the driver’s seat. B.P., later identified as a minor, was seated in the front

 passenger seat.

       Because of information obtained during the stop, Mr. Pearce was

 arrested and then indicted in the Northern District of Oklahoma on various

 child pornography related offenses.2 Before trial, Mr. Pearce moved to

 suppress under the Fourth Amendment “all evidence and material obtained

 directly and indirectly” from the traffic stop. SR.I.20. He argued, as relevant

 here, Officer Golliday lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.3

       2 The government charged Mr. Pearce with Coercion or Enticement of

 a Minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); Production of Child Pornography
 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2251(e); Possession of Child
 Pornography in Indian Country in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(A)
 and 2252(b)(2); and Distribution of Marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
 §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D). SR.III.5–8.
       3 In the district court, Mr. Pearce also urged suppression because the

 detention exceeded its permissible scope. He abandons that argument on
 appeal. Reply Br. at 3 (“[T]he only issue is whether there was reasonable
 suspicion to initiate the stop.”).

                                        3
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       The district court held an evidentiary hearing. Corporal Golliday

 testified about the circumstances of the traffic stop.4 Mr. Pearce called no

 witnesses. The district court denied Mr. Pearce’s suppression motion in a

 written order. The challenged evidence was admitted at Mr. Pearce’s jury

 trial, where he was convicted on all charges.

       This timely appeal followed.

                                       II

       Mr. Pearce contends the district court erroneously denied his motion

 to suppress because Corporal Golliday lacked reasonable suspicion to

 initiate an investigatory stop. The district court rejected this argument and,

 on this record, so do we.

                                       A

       We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress by

 “view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the determination of

 the district court.” United States v. Johnson, 43 F.4th 1100, 1107 (10th Cir.

 2022) (quoting United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir.

 2005)). We accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly

 erroneous. See United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir.

 2018). “While the existence of reasonable suspicion is a factual

       4 Corporal Golliday also testified about the stop at Mr. Pearce’s trial.

                                        4
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 determination, the ultimate determination of the reasonableness of a search

 or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law reviewed de

 novo.” United States v. Fonseca, 744 F.3d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting

 United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir. 2009)).

                                       B

       The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable

 searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Interactions between police

 and citizens generally fall into one of several categories: “consensual

 encounters, investigative stops, and arrests.” Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d

 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2000). The stop at issue here was an investigative

 detention. “An investigative detention, which is also referred to as a Terry

 stop, is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but unlike

 an arrest, it need not be supported by probable cause.” Id. To satisfy the

 Fourth Amendment, an investigative detention must be “justified at its

 inception,” United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993)

 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)), and “reasonably related in

 scope to the circumstances” prompting the stop, Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. This

 appeal concerns only the first requirement.

       To be “justified at its inception,” an investigative detention must be

 supported by reasonable suspicion—“‘a particularized and objective basis’

 for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273

                                        5
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 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). We

 apply     this   objective   standard       from   “the   perspective        of     [a]

 reasonable officer.” United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 787 (10th Cir.

 2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Quintana-Garcia, 343

 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003)). While not an onerous standard, United

 States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1153 (10th Cir. 2010), reasonable

 suspicion demands “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized

 suspicion or hunch,” United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.

 2005) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Instead, the

 “officer must point to specific, articulable facts.” Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1147.

 Our reasonable suspicion analysis “requires a court to assess the totality of

 the circumstances, not to consider facts in isolation.” United States v.

 Young, --- F.4th --- No. 21-2066, 2023 WL 3608101, at *5 (10th Cir. May 24,

 2023) (citing United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1555 (10th Cir. 1993)

 (“Whether . . . an investigative detention is supported by an objectively

 reasonable suspicion of illegal activity does not depend upon any one factor,

 but on the totality of the circumstances.”)). And “reasonable suspicion may

 exist even if it is more likely than not that the individual is not involved in

 any illegality.” United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir.

 2011) (quoting United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.

 2009)).

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                                       C

       The district court concluded Corporal Golliday reasonably suspected

 Mr. Pearce was involved in criminal activity “based on the time of day, the

 unusual location of the vehicle, reports of crime in the area, and the

 obviously suspicious behavior of driving away from Golliday at a high rate

 of speed.” SR.I.64. The district court made these factual findings:

        Mr. Pearce’s truck was parked “near a construction site in an unlit
         area” at 2:00 a.m. SR.I.58–59.

        Corporal Golliday passed the truck in his marked police car.

        Corporal Golliday had never “seen a vehicle parked in that location
         on his regular patrols through the area.” SR.I.59.

        The truck’s lights were off, but when Corporal Golliday “turned on
         his side alley light” as he drove by, he “observed a person in the
         vehicle.” SR.I.59, 64.

        There was a history of vehicle break ins and construction-site theft
         in the neighborhood.

        After Corporal Golliday passed the truck, Mr. Pearce “fled the area
         at a high rate of speed.” SR.I.64. Based on Corporal Golliday’s
         “training and experience,” he believed Mr. Pearce “was driving
         faster than the posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour.” SR.I.59.

 “Considering the totality of the circumstances,” the district court

 determined Corporal Golliday “had reasonable suspicion to initiate an

 investigative detention.” SR.I.64.

       Mr. Pearce makes three main arguments on appeal. First, he contends

 the district court clearly erred in finding he was speeding. This appears to

                                        7
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 be Mr. Pearce’s only attack on the district court’s factual findings. Second,

 Mr. Pearce challenges the district court’s ultimate conclusion that, under

 the totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion supported the stop.

 Third, Mr. Pearce urges reversal under United States v. Hernandez, 847

 F.3d 1257, 1268 (10th Cir. 2017). As we explain, these arguments are

 unavailing.

                                        1

       Mr. Pearce claims the district court’s finding that he fled from

 Corporal Golliday “at a high rate of speed” is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

 We will reverse a district court’s factual findings on clear-error review only

 if they are “without factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all

 the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

 has been made.” Johnson, 43 F.4th at 1107 (quoting United States v.

 Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 2020)). This standard is not

 satisfied here.

       Corporal Golliday’s testimony at the suppression hearing supports the

 district court’s finding. Corporal Golliday testified he spotted Mr. Pearce’s

 truck, turned his police cruiser around to investigate, and then “observed

 [the truck] leaving the area at a high rate of speed.” R.II.21:20–24. Corporal

 Golliday thought the truck was exceeding the posted speed limit of 45 miles

 per hour. SR.I.59; R.II.22:20–24, 43:2–8. He admitted he did not use a radar

                                        8
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 gun but testified about using his “training and experience” to estimate Mr.

 Pearce’s speed. R.II.43:7–8. The district court credited Corporal Golliday’s

 testimony that Mr. Pearce was speeding, and we see no reason to disturb

 that conclusion.

       Mr. Pearce says we uphold stops based on speeding only when there

 is “more information in addition to the [officer’s] estimate.” Opening Br. at

 14 (citing United States v. King, 209 F. App’x 760, 762 (10th Cir. 2006)

 (noting officer’s use of a radar gun to measure a suspect’s speed)). As an

 initial matter, the district court found Corporal Golliday “did not stop [Mr.

 Pearce] solely to investigate a speeding violation.” SR.I.64. Instead,

 Corporal Golliday relied “on a range of factors,” including the late hour, the

 truck’s proximity to a construction site, and the truck’s speed as it left the

 area to support the stop. SR.I.63–64. But even still, we have never

 suggested an officer’s visual estimation of speed categorically cannot

 support a traffic stop at its inception. Rather, “[i]t’s long been the case that

 an officer’s visual estimation can supply probable cause to support a traffic

 stop for speeding in appropriate circumstances.” United States v. Ludwig,

 641 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir. 2011).5

       5 We note the government does not argue Corporal Golliday’s visual

 estimation of Mr. Pearce’s speed established probable cause for the stop.

                                        9
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        Perhaps recognizing this principle, Mr. Pearce argues it was not

  appropriate in this case to rely on Corporal Golliday’s visual estimation. Mr.

  Pearce explains Corporal Golliday assessed his speed at night, in an area

  without streetlights, and when Corporal Golliday was himself “accelerating

  to catch up to Mr. Pearce.” Reply Br. at 8–9. These facts do not render the

  district court’s finding clearly erroneous. Even if we could say “there are

  two permissible views of the evidence” presented to the district court, “the

  factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United

  States v. Pikyavit, 527 F.3d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson

  v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). And in any event, Mr. Pearce

  fled from law enforcement.6 Defense counsel conceded at oral argument he

  did “not specifically challenge[]” the district court’s finding of flight as

  The government simply contends Mr. Pearce’s speed was part of the totality
  of the circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion.
        6 Mr. Pearce seems to contend it is significant he did not engage in

  “headlong” flight, meaning he did not “flee an approaching officer.” Reply
  Br. at 9. Mr. Pearce cites no authority defining flight so narrowly, and we
  are aware of none. The Supreme Court has recognized “unprovoked flight
  upon noticing the police” is “evasive behavior” relevant to the reasonable
  suspicion analysis. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (emphasis
  added); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 59 (2018)
  (explaining suspects’ “scattering and hiding” after noticing police could be
  factored into the totality of the circumstances).

                                        10
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  clearly erroneous.7 Oral Arg. 11:37–12:04.

                                        2

        Mr. Pearce next argues the totality of the circumstances does not

  support the district court’s reasonable suspicion determination. We are not

  persuaded.

        At the outset, we observe Mr. Pearce seems to proceed from an

  incorrect point of departure for the Fourth Amendment analysis.

  Reasonable suspicion “is based on the totality of the circumstances” and not

  on “each of an officer’s observations in isolation.” United States v. Garcia,

  751 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Rice, 483

  F.3d 1079, 1083 (10th Cir. 2007)); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9 (“Any one of these

  factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent

  with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to

  reasonable suspicion.”). Mr. Pearce contests the significance of several facts

        7 Even if preserved, a clear-error challenge to the district court’s
  finding of flight would fail. When Corporal Golliday first saw Mr. Pearce’s
  truck, it was parked with its lights off. As the government highlighted at
  oral argument, Corporal Golliday wanted to investigate further but it took
  him “four to six seconds” to turn around. Oral Arg. 20:20–20:46. In that
  time, Mr. Pearce started to drive away “at a high rate of speed.” R.II.21:20–
  24. No other cars were on the road, and Corporal Golliday was aware of
  nothing else that could have provoked Mr. Pearce’s departure. R.II.23:8–16.
  From that, Corporal Golliday testified he believed Mr. Pearce “was trying
  to get away from the police.” R.II.22:25–23:7. Under the circumstances, we
  cannot say the finding Mr. Pearce fled from law enforcement lacks factual
  support in the record.

                                        11
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  found by the district court, contending these should not factor into the

  Fourth Amendment analysis because an innocent explanation attends to

  each.

          For example, Mr. Pearce posits, even at 2:00 a.m., a person could “just

  as likely [have been] parked in the [construction site] driveway to protect

  the property” rather than vandalize it. Opening Br. at 16. When it comes to

  the reports of break-ins and theft in the area, Mr. Pearce counters an

  “individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing

  alone, is not enough to support a reasonable particularized suspicion that

  the person is committing a crime.” Opening Br. at 13. Mr. Pearce minimizes

  the significance of his driving away from Corporal Golliday, explaining an

  “individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business” when

  approached by law enforcement without reasonable suspicion or probable

  cause. Reply Br. at 9 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125

  (2000)).8

          8 As a general principle, we do not disagree. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125

  (holding “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal
  level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.” (quoting
  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991))). But the district court found
  Mr. Pearce fled, that factual finding is unchallenged, and “[f]light, by its
  very nature, is not ‘going about one’s business;’ in fact, it is just the
  opposite.” Id.

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        The    Supreme     Court   has   forbidden    precisely    “this      sort   of

  divide-and-conquer analysis.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. Regardless of what

  we might make of any singular fact, the proper focus of the district court’s

  inquiry, and ours, is the totality of the circumstances. Looking to the

  totality we have no trouble concluding, as did the district court based on its

  thorough factual findings, that “specific, articulable facts,” Simpson, 609

  F.3d at 1147, taken together, provided a “particularized and objective basis”

  to suspect Mr. Pearce of criminal activity, Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting

  Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18).9 Mr. Pearce has not meaningfully argued

  otherwise.

                                         3

        Finally, Mr. Pearce urges reversal under United States v. Hernandez,

  where we affirmed the district court’s suppression ruling following an

  investigative stop. 847 F.3d 1257 at 1268. According to Mr. Pearce, the facts

  in Hernandez are analogous to those presented here, and we should find his

  stop, like the one in Hernandez, was based only on “inchoate suspicions and

        9  The district court suggested Corporal Golliday had reasonable
  suspicion to stop Mr. Pearce even without considering his flight. SR.I.64
  (“These facts alone would have merited further investigation and Golliday
  would have been permitted to approach the vehicle to conduct a limited
  investigation even if defendant had not driven away.”). We find Mr. Pearce’s
  flight significant in our de novo reasonable-suspicion analysis and factor it
  into the totality of the circumstances.

                                         13
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  unparticularized hunches.” Reply Br. at 6 (quoting Hernandez, 847 F.3d at

  1270). We disagree because Hernandez is distinguishable.

        In Hernandez, police stopped the defendant in the early evening as he

  walked outside the fenced perimeter of a construction site near an

  intersection in downtown Denver. Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1260–61. The

  defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the stop,

  arguing the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. Id. The government

  responded the officers had reasonable suspicion because:

        (1) Mr. Hernandez was walking next to a construction site which
        had been the previous target of construction material thefts; (2) he
        was walking in a “high crime” area (with regard to theft, gang
        activity, and drug dealing); (3) he was not using the sidewalk
        located on the other side of the street; and (4) he was wearing all
        black clothing and carrying two backpacks.
  Id. at 1268. The district court rejected the government’s arguments and

  granted the defendant’s motion. Id. at 1261. The panel likewise found these

  justifications insufficient and affirmed. Id. at 1270.

        True, Mr. Pearce and Mr. Hernandez were both stopped near

  construction sites that had a recent history of theft known to law

  enforcement. But Mr. Hernandez walked on public property outside a

  construction site fence, id. at 1260, while Mr. Pearce admits he was parked

  on a partially built driveway within a construction site. Opening Br. at 20;

  R.II.16:5–17:8. Mr. Hernandez was walking near an urban intersection before

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  8:00 p.m., Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1261, while Mr. Pearce was sitting in his

  parked truck in a remote neighborhood at 2:00 a.m., SR.I.59, 64; R.II.14:16–

  15:2. And unlike Mr. Pearce, Mr. Hernandez did not flee when he saw police.

  Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1261 (explaining officers drove next to Mr.

  Hernandez as they spoke to him, and when they asked him to stop, he

  complied).10 Thus, on the record before us, we are not persuaded to reverse

  under Hernandez.

        10 Mr. Pearce relies on several other cases, but none advance his cause.

  Reid v. Georgia is factually distinguishable. 448 U.S. 438, 440–41 (1980)
  (finding no reasonable suspicion where a suspect arrived on a flight from a
  location known to be a source of cocaine, the flight arrived early in the morning,
  the suspect had limited luggage, and the suspect and his companion appeared
  to “conceal the fact that they were traveling together.”). So is United States v.
  Davis. 94 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding no reasonable suspicion
  where government “fail[ed] to show any specific factual basis for suspecting”
  the defendant of a “particular crime” based on the defendant walking in a high
  crime area with his hands in his pockets and defendant’s choice to continue
  “walking in the same direction and same manner” after officers instructed him
  to stop (emphasis omitted)). United States v. Salazar seems to undermine Mr.
  Pearce’s position. 609 F.3d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding potentially
  innocuous conduct, like pulling into a closed business next to an unoccupied
  commercial vehicle, supported reasonable suspicion in the totality of the
  circumstances after the suspect attempted to evade officers).

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                                       III

        We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Pearce’s motion to

  suppress.

                                         ENTERED FOR THE COURT

                                         Veronica S. Rossman
                                         Circuit Judge

                                        16