Court Opinion

ID: 9482737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:59:17.209455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:10.766505
License: Public Domain

BAILEY BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court in this non-jury, diversity case, and, therefore, I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the conclusions of the majority on two controlling issues. The first is the majority’s conclusion that “FDCK had not accepted Martin Marietta’s offer to sell the riverfront property before it knew through Pollitt that the land was no longer available and had been taken off the market.” Majority op. at 623. The second is the majority’s conclusion that FDCK’s “acceptance was conditional and was a counter proposal to Martin Marietta’s unconditional offer to sell the riverfront property.” Majority op. at 626. These conclusions are neither compelled by Kentucky law nor supported by the district court’s factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous.
The majority holds that, because Pollitt candidly admitted that he was aware of the Harmony Landing option contract before he hand delivered FDCK’s acceptance to Gilmour, Martin Marietta’s counteroffer to FDCK was effectively revoked prior to FDCK’s attempted acceptance. It reaches this conclusion by making factual inferences that were not made by the district court and that fail to find support in the record.
An offer is revoked indirectly if “the offeror takes definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed *627contract and the offeree acquires reliable information to that effect.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 43 (1981). Gil-mour’s disclosure provided Pollitt with information that Martin Marietta had entered into only an option contract with Harmony Landing. This information does not constitute definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract with FDCK. Under Kentucky law, an option contract is not a sale of the property, nor even a binding contract to sell, but only a right to exercise a privilege therein defined. See Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Kincaid, 617 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Ky.1981).
FDCK, through Pollitt, did not know what rights the option contract granted to Harmony Landing; it knew only of the option contract’s existence. The option might have been subject to FDCK’s rejection of Martin Marietta’s outstanding counteroffer. “Even a binding contract with a third person may be expressly subject to any rights arising under the outstanding offer.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 43 comment d (1981). If a binding contract with a third person may be subject to any rights arising under an outstanding counteroffer, a fortiori, an option contract with a third person may be subject to any rights under an outstanding counteroffer. The district court’s conclusion that notice of the existence of the option contract with Harmony Landing did not constitute notice of revocation of Martin Marietta’s counteroffer to FDCK is correct. The majority’s reversal of the district court on this issue, based on its unstated inference that FDCK knew that the option to Harmony Landing was unconditional, is neither compelled by Kentucky law1 nor supported by the facts of this case.
I also disagree with the majority’s final conclusion: that FDCK’s acceptance was ineffective because the attachment of the Louisville Board of Realtors form transmogrified the otherwise unequivocal and unconditional acceptance into a mere counteroffer.2 The district court found that “Pol-litt’s acceptance of the counteroffer was unconditional. [The acceptance] says simply ‘the above counteroffer is accepted this 21st day of September, 1988,’ and is signed by Pollitt in his capacity as President of First Development.”
Gilmour testified that, during his September 22 conversation with Pollitt, he asked Pollitt if the terms and conditions in the Louisville Board of Realtors form were intended to be part of the contract. Gilmour testified that Pollitt indicated that they were so intended. The district court, however, did not believe Gilmour’s version of the conversation. Given the district court’s decision to discredit Gilmour’s testimony regarding the attachment of FDCK’s original offer to its acceptance of Martin Marietta’s counteroffer, and the majority’s decision to avoid any credibility assessments, see Majority op. at 621, we are left with the unequivocal acceptance written on the face of Martin Marietta’s counteroffer, the attached copy of the Louisville Board of Realtors form, and Martin Marietta’s bald contention that the inclusion of the Louisville Board of Realtors form was an attempt to vary the terms of the counteroffer. In the light of the district court’s finding and the unequivocal terms of the acceptance, I am unable to conclude that the district court erred.
There are several reasons for FDCK’s attachment of the Louisville Board of Realtors form that are consistent with an acceptance of Martin Marietta’s counteroffer. First, Martin Marietta’s counteroffer to FDCK expressly refers to the Louisville Board of Realtors form, which contains FDCK’s original offer. Next, without ref*628erence to FDCK’s original offer, Martin Marietta’s counteroffer does not adequately describe the property that is the subject of the counteroffer. Additionally, FDCK’s original offer is the only document that reflects the $1,000 good-faith deposit that FDCK had previously delivered to Martin Marietta. Finally, FDCK’s original offer, on the Louisville Board of Realtors form, contained a $300,000 price term that is irreconcilable with the price term in Martin Marietta’s counteroffer. There is, therefore, no way sensibly to construe FDCK’s acceptance of Martin Marietta’s counteroffer as anything but an unconditional acceptance of the counteroffer.
Because FDCK accepted Martin Marietta's counteroffer before Martin Marietta revoked it and because FDCK effectively accepted the counteroffer, I would AFFIRM the decision of the district court and REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this dissent.

. It should be noted that the majority is unable to cite Kentucky case law supporting the conclusion that, as a matter of law, notice of the existence of the option contract with Harmony Landing constituted notice of revocation of the offer.

. Given its previous conclusion that Martin Marietta revoked its offer before FDCK accepted, the majority’s discussion of this issue is unnecessary to its ultimate decision of this case. If, as the majority holds, Martin Marietta effectively revoked before FDCK accepted, then no contract could exist even if the majority agreed that FDCK’s acceptance were unequivocal and unconditional.