Court Opinion

ID: 9420744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:55:51.01691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:26.911516
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Minton,
with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas join,
dissenting.
I do not see how this case is solved by telling the National Labor Relations Board that since some “management functions” clauses are valid (which the Board freely admits), respondent was not guilty of an unfair labor practice in this case. The record is replete with evidence that respondent insisted on a clause which would classify the control over certain conditions of employment as a management prerogative, and that the insistence took the form of a refusal to reach a settlement unless the Union accepted the clause.1 The Court of *411Appeals agreed that respondent was “steadfast” in this demand. Therefore, this case is one where the employer came into the bargaining room with a demand that certain topics upon which it had a duty to bargain were to be removed from the agenda — that was the price the Union had to pay to gain a contract. There is all the difference between the hypothetical “management functions” clauses envisioned by the majority and this “management functions” clause as there is between waiver and coercion. No one suggests that an employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice when it proposes that it be given unilateral control over certain working conditions and the union accepts the proposal in return for various other benefits. But where, as here, the employer tells the union that the only way to obtain a contract as to wages is to agree not to bargain about certain other work*412ing conditions, the employer has refused to bargain about those other working conditions. There is more than a semantic difference between a proposal that the union waive certain rights and a demand that the union give up those rights as a condition precedent to enjoying other rights.2
I need not and do not take issue with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that there was no absence of good faith. Where there is a refusal to bargain, the Act does not require an inquiry as to whether that refusal was in good faith or bad faith.3 The duty to bargain about certain subjects is made absolute by the Act.4 The majority seems to suggest that an employer could be found guilty of bad faith if it used a “management functions” clause to close off bargaining about all topics of discussion. Whether the employer closes off all bargaining or, as in this case, only a certain area of bargaining, he has refused to bargain as to whatever he has closed off, and any discussion of his good faith is pointless.
That portion of § 8 (d) of the Act which declares that an employer need not agree to a proposal or make concessions does not dispose of this case. Certainly the Board lacks power to compel concessions as to the substantive terms of labor agreements. But the Board in this case was seeking to compel the employer to bargain about subjects properly within the scope of collective *413bargaining.5 That the employer has such a duty to bargain and that the Board is empowered to enforce the duty is clear.
An employer may not stake out an area which' is a proper subject for bargaining and say, “As to this we will not bargain.” To do so is a plain refusal to bargain in violation of § 8 (a) (5) of the Act. If employees’ bargaining rights can be cut away so easily, they are indeed illusory. I would reverse.

 A member of respondent’s negotiating committee stated that the committee “had given considerable thought to the character of prerogative that, in our opinion, the Company was entitled to main*411tain for its management, as well as considerable thought to the character of safeguard which would make the retention of such prerogatives ... of value and worth to the Company, and invulnerable to attack. . . . [W]e orally stated to the Union that that was going to be the position of the Company . . . .” (R. II, p. 32.)
A Union negotiator testified as follows:
“Q. Now, as I understand your testimony, you have said that Company said you would have to agree ....
“A. It was the condition of a contract.
“Q. Now, how often, if it was more than once, did the Company state that or something similar to that . . . did they only say it once or did they state it more than once?
“A. I can’t testify as to the number of times. I will say they said it several times.
“A. To get a contract, an agreement must be reached and must be made by the Union to include Article II-A as the Company’s prerogative clause.” (R. Ill, pp. 60-61.)
The same Company negotiator told the Union that the clause in question was the “meat of the contract” and that if the Union accepted it a contract could be obtained in “short order.” (R. Ill, p. 60.)

 There is similarly a difference between a union voluntarily disbanding, and the employer insisting that it disband as a condition of granting a wage increase. Cf. McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board, 116 F. 2d 748.

 The only exception is that an employer in good faith can challenge the majority status of the bargaining representative and request proof that it does in fact have such status. Cf. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. Labor Board, 87 U. S. App. D. C. 360, 369, 185 F. 2d 732, 741.

 J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332; H. J. Heinz Co. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 514, 525.

 National Licorice Co. v. Labor Board, 309 U. S. 350, 360; Inland Steel Co. v. Labor Board, 170 F. 2d 247, 252; Labor Board v. Bachelder, 120 F. 2d 574, 577.