Court Opinion

ID: 9676048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:13:23.917938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:43.106948
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in issue n-B that the trial court did not err in refusing to receive the testimony of a clinical psychologist concerning defendant’s capacity to waive knowingly and intelligently his Miranda1 rights.
As noted by the majority, whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary and whether an otherwise voluntary waiver is knowing and intelligent are *557separate questions. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1; 551 NW2d 355 (1996); People v Garwood, 205 Mich App 553, 555-556; 517 NW2d 843 (1994). While the voluntariness prong is determined solely by examining police conduct, a statement made pursuant to police questioning may be suppressed in the absence of police coercion if the defendant was incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his constitutional rights. Garwood, supra. Here, the trial court failed to distinguish between the voluntary prong and the knowing and intelligent prong of the waiver analysis and, consequently, erred in refusing to permit defendant’s expert to testify regarding defendant’s mental capacity to waive knowingly and intelligently his Miranda rights at the time of his police interrogation. Because of its misinterpretation of the relevant law, the trial court did not have the opportunity to consider the testimony of defendant’s expert in determining whether defendant’s confession was voluntary. Hence, the proper remedy is to remand this matter to the trial court for continuation of the Walker hearing relative to whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Garwood, supra at 559.
I concur with the remainder of the majority opinion.

 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).