Court Opinion

ID: 9593826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:25:11.134829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:31.787190
License: Public Domain

APODACA, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the majority’s determination that: (1) the phrase “six months” as used in SCRA 1986, 7-506(B) (Repl.Pamp. 1988), means six calendar months, as opposed to six thirty-day months; and (2) the day on which the complaint was filed should not be included in computing the six-month period. I disagree, however, with the holding that defendant’s request for continuance somehow operated as a “partial” waiver, a term used by the majority. I also disagree with the determination that the thirty-five day delay resulting from defendant’s continuance request should not be included, as a matter of law, in computing the six-month period. In my opinion, this decision was solely a matter for the trial court to consider, pursuant to the express provisions of the rule. In this regard, it should be noted that abuse of discretion is not presently an issue in this appeal. I would therefore remand the case to the trial court for a determination of whether defendant was responsible for the trial not commencing within the six-month period. I should note that the majority and I have taken divergent views on disposition of this appeal primarily, I believe, because we have each taken a different approach in formulating the issue. The majority correctly observes that defendant's continuance request, as well as the order granting the continuance, expressly stated that defendant waived “the six-month rule.” However, as the majority concedes, the state never raised the issue of waiver in the trial court and thus, that particular issue was not preserved on appeal. Although the majority acknowledges that point (at least as to an absolute or total waiver), it concludes nonetheless that the express language of both the request and the order had the effect of a “partial” waiver. Having so concluded, the majority then apparently proceeds, incorrectly, in my view, to equate waiver with the exception language of the rule (referred to in this dissent as the exception provision): “unless, after a hearing, the judge finds that the defendant was responsible for the failure of the court to commence trial.” Referring to this phrase, the majority states: “We construe this language as allowing a limited waiver of the six-month trial requirement.” Earlier in the opinion, the majority stated that “defendant does not dispute that his motion for continuance included an express consent to a limited waiver.” The majority thus appears to be mixing inappropriately the concept of waiver with the exception provision. In my judgment, the concept of waiver, as discussed in the majority’s opinion, and the specific provisions of the rule, are separate and distinct and should not be confused or intertwined. They stem from different concepts. I agree that enforcement or operation of the rule, since it creates a right in a defendant, may be waived, much as a defendant is said to have waived a constitutional right, including the right to a speedy trial. But, because we are dealing with two different concepts, I believe that once it has been determined that the state failed to preserve the issue of waiver, that should be the end of that particular inquiry. Yet, although the majority holds that the state did not preserve the issue, it resurrects it in discussing the interpretation or construction to be given to the rule. The majority also states that the order granting the continuance “expressly noted that the defendant waived the six month rule____ Defendant has not expressly challenged this finding of waiver contained in the order.” I submit that the notation referred to was not a finding of fact entered by the trial court. Besides, it was not incumbent on defendant to expressly or affirmatively challenge this “finding of waiver.” - Instead, it was the responsibility of the state to argue and preserve the issue. It failed to do so. As the majority points out, the burden of proof to establish waiver rests on the state. See State v. Boeglin, 100 N.M. 127, 666 P.2d 1274 (Ct.App.1983). The issue was never argued by the state in the trial court, much less preserved on appeal. A determination that the state failed to preserve the issue of waiver, however, does not end the inquiry on appeal, for the exception provision of the rule remains. While the initial inquiry was whether defendant waived operation or enforcement of the rule (and the state failed to preserve this issue), the inquiry now becomes: was defendant responsible for the trial not commencing within the six-month period? This second inquiry should be considered on its own; it has absolutely nothing to do with waiver. The express language of the rule demands it. The majority also properly concludes that the subject rule vests the trial court with discretion in considering the various factors resulting in trial delay and in weighing these factors in deciding whether the six-month period has been exceeded. I propose that this discretion is precisely involved in the trial court’s determination of whether a particular defendant is responsible for failure of the trial to commence within the required period. The unequivocal language of the exception provision gives the trial court this discretion. Having determined that the subject rule vests the trial court with this discretion, including the discretion to properly exclude from the six-month time requirement those periods of delay attributable to defendant, the majority then determines, as a matter of law, that the thirty-five day period (the time between the trial date for which defendant obtained a continuance and the date the trial was next scheduled to commence) is attributable to defendant and should therefore not be included in calculating the six-month period. I submit that with the one hand, the majority “giveth” discretion to the trial court; with the other, it “taketh” such discretion away. The following summary of the trial court proceedings may be of some assistance in explaining my rendition of what a proper disposition of this appeal would be. The metropolitan court entered a finding that defendant was not responsible for the trial not commencing within “180 days.” It made this finding based on two false assumptions: first, by using in the computation a thirty-day month rather than a calendar month; second, by including the date on which the complaint was filed. The complaint was filed on May 15. Trial was initially scheduled to commence approximately three months later, on August 11. It was for this trial setting that defendant requested a continuance, and as a result, a new trial was scheduled on September 15, about one month later. Query: What was the result or consequence of defendant’s request for continuance being granted? The answer, I believe, is that it had the effect of postponing the trial date for only about a month, still some two months before the expiration of the six-month period. The trial setting was then rescheduled repeatedly for many reasons not attributable to defendant. I submit the trial court could find that it was these later delays, not defendant, that were responsible for the six-month period being exceeded. Is a reviewing court able to conclude from these facts alone that defendant was responsible for the trial not commencing within the six-month period? I contend we cannot on the facts of this appeal; at least, not without infringing on the trial court’s function. On the other hand, under these specific facts, the trial court could reasonably determine that defendant was not responsible for the trial not commencing within the required time. In this connection, I believe the majority is reading language into the rule that simply is not there; the rule does not “speak” of a defendant being partially responsible for any portion of the delay. Instead, I believe the language should be strictly construed in favor of defendant. Besides, the express language permits the trial court, not this court, to determine the only issue that is before us on appeal: whether defendant was responsible for the trial not commencing within the six-month period. To interpret or construe the rule to permit this court to do otherwise is to invade the discretionary province of the trial court, for it has not been permitted to use its discretion in determining defendant’s responsibility under the rule. As a result, abuse of discretion is not an issue before us. In the opinion’s final paragraph, the majority states that the trial setting “was within six months from the date of the filing of the charges against defendant.” (Emphasis added.) In so concluding, the majority mischaracterizes what actually occurred. This conclusion, to me, evidences the mistaken premise on which the majority’s determination rests. According to my calculations, the period from May 15 (date complaint was filed) to December 15 (date trial commenced) is a period of seven months, clearly beyond six months. The language of the rule states plainly what procedure is to be followed in the event trial has not commenced within six months, namely, a determination by the trial court, after a hearing, that defendant was or was not responsible for the trial not commencing within the allotted time. Stated differently, once it has been determined that trial has not commenced within the required time, this determination then triggers the trial court’s task of determining defendant’s responsibility, if any, for the delay. For these reasons, I believe the proper disposition of this appeal would be to remand the case to the trial court, with instructions that it enter findings and conclusions with respect to the only issue before us: whether defendant was responsible for the trial not commencing within the allotted time. The trial court previously entered such a finding, but in so doing, improperly calculated the time period under two erroneous assumptions. I believe the trial court should be given an opportunity to discretionarily make this determination under the current guidelines noted by the majority.