Court Opinion

ID: 9949830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 18:05:59.049342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:02.488378
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/12/24 P. v. Vanatti CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084336
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF172779B)
                    v.

 LYNDEN VANATTI,                                                                          OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Kenneth C.
Twisselman II, Judge.
         Jill M. Klein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Ian P.
Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                                INTRODUCTION
         On August 3, 2021, a jury convicted defendant Lynden Vanatti of the
premeditated first degree murder of Allen Fagerson (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189,
count 1),1 and found true all enhancements and allegations, including the special
circumstance the murder was intentional and was committed while Vanatti was an active
participant in a gang, and that the murder was carried out in furtherance of the gang
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). Vanatti was also convicted of dissuading a witness, Justin
Becker, from making a report or testifying at trial (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1) & (2), counts 3
and 4).2 Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Vanatti to a term of life without the
possibility of parole, plus an indeterminate term of 57 years to life and a determinate term
of 15 years.
       On appeal, Vanatti contends he is entitled to the benefit of newly enacted
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 333), which amended the language
of section 186.22, and added section 1109 requiring bifurcation, upon a defendant’s
request, of the trial on the gang enhancements and substantive gang offenses from that of
the underlying offenses. Specifically, Vanatti argues the changes made by AB 333
require dismissal of his gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), the substantive gang
offense (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 5), and the gang-murder special circumstance
allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), and that the failure to bifurcate the gang allegations
constituted prejudicial error. The People concede the amendments made to
section 186.22 apply retroactively and that the substantive gang offense (§ 186.22,
subd. (a), count 5) must be dismissed, but argue the changes made by AB 333 do not
apply to the gang-murder special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) because
any change constitutes an unconstitutional amendment to Proposition 21, and that
“[s]ection 1109 applies prospectively only; [but] in any event, [Vanatti] was not
prejudiced by the lack of bifurcation.” During the pendency of this appeal, our Supreme

       1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

       2 As we discuss further below, Vanatti was also convicted and sentenced to
additional offenses and enhancements.

                                              2.
Court held that “applying Assembly Bill 333’s definition of ‘criminal street gang’ to the
gang-murder special circumstance does not unconstitutionally amend
section 190.22(a)(22) [Proposition 21].” (People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561, 580
(Rojas), italics added.)
         Further, Vanatti contends there was insufficient evidence (1) he was an active
participant in the Aryan Brotherhood and (2) the murder was committed to further the
activities of the gang requiring reversal of the gang-murder special circumstance
allegation, the gang enhancements, and the substantive gang conviction. As to
defendant’s substantive gang offense conviction (count 5), the People concede there was
insufficient evidence the murder actually promoted criminal activity by members of the
Aryan Brotherhood gang.
         Finally, Vanatti contends that “substantial evidence does not support a finding [he]
intimidated any witness in violation of section 136.1, requiring reversal of the convictions
of count[s] 3 and 4,” and that his sentences as to counts 3 and 4 are erroneous requiring
him to be resentenced. As to Vanatti’s sentences on counts 3 and 4, the People concede
error.
         We accept the People’s concessions, vacate the sentence, and remand for
resentencing. Further, we conclude the entirety of AB 333 applies retroactively to
Vanatti’s case and, as to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, dismiss the section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1) enhancements, dismiss count 5 (§ 186.22, subdivision (a)), and as to
count 1, dismiss the gang-murder special circumstance allegation pursuant to
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22). On remand, the People are not foreclosed from
retrying Vanatti on the gang enhancements and gang-murder special circumstance

                                              3.
allegation,3 and at resentencing the trial court shall reconsider Vanatti’s sentences as to
counts 3 and 4. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
                             STATEMENT OF THE CASE
       On November 6, 2020, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information
charging Vanatti4 with premeditated first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, count 1)
with the special circumstances he aided and abetted the individual who intentionally
killed Fagerson while lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), that the murder was
intentional and was committed while Vanatti was an active participant in a gang, and the
murder was carried out in furtherance of the gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)); conspiracy to
commit murder (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, count 2);5 dissuading Becker by means of

       3 As we discuss in detail below, because both parties agree there was insufficient
evidence to support the substantive gang offense charge (count 5) under the law in effect
at the time of defendant’s trial, the People are foreclosed from retrying defendant on
count 5 on remand. (See United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 131
(DiFrancesco) (“the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial after a conviction has been
reversed because of insufficiency of the evidence”]; People v. Wetle (2019)
43 Cal.App.5th 375, 388 (Wetle) (concluding that although it was necessary to reverse
based on instructional error, it was also necessary to consider the defendant’s
insufficiency of the evidence claim to determine whether retrial is barred by double
jeopardy principles].)
       4 Vanatti was charged as a co-defendant with Dustin Henthorn, William Leair, Jr.,
and Charles Colwell.
       5 Count 2 alleged the following overt acts in support of the conspiracy:

              “Overt Act No. 1:     On July 20, 2017, Dustin Henthorn went into
       Allen Fagerson’s cell.

       “Overt Act No. 2:    On July 20, 2017, Dustin Henthorn stabbed Allen
       Fagerson.

       “Overt Act No. 3: On July 20, 2017, at least one defendant closed the
       door to cell 118 with Dustin Henthorn and Allen Fagerson inside.

       “Overt Act No. 4: On or before July 20, 2017, at least one defendant told
       Justin Becker not to warn anyone.

                                              4.
force, or by an express or implied threat of force or violence from attending or giving
testimony at a trial or proceeding (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1), count 3); dissuading Becker from
making a report to a correctional officer in furtherance of a conspiracy (§ 136.1,
subd. (c)(2), count 4); active participation in the Aryan Brotherhood gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (a), count 5); and conspiracy to commit an assault with a deadly weapon by a
prisoner (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 4501, subd. (a), count 6).6 As to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, it
was further alleged these offenses were committed for the benefit of the Aryan
Brotherhood gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Finally, as to all offenses, the information
alleged three prior strike offenses (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 4501,

       “Overt Act No. 5: On or before July 20, 2017, at least one defendant told
       Justin Becker not to return to his cell th[r]ough the A-Side line.

       “Overt Act No. 6: On or before July 20, 2017, at least one defendant
       knew about writings made by Allen Fagerson.

       “Overt Act No. 7: On or before July 20, 2017, at least one defendant
       discussed Allen Fagerson’s writings with another inmate.

       “Overt Act No. 8: On or before July 20, 2017, at least one defendant
       discussed Allen Fagerson’s ‘paperwork,’ referring to his criminal history,
       with another inmate.

       “Overt Act No. 9: On or before July 20, 2017, at least one defendant
       discussed the possibility of Albert Rello committing a crime on Allen
       Fagerson.

       “Overt Act No. 10: On or before July 20, 2017, at least one defendant
       possessed the weapon used to stab Allen Fagerson.

       “Overt Act No. 11: On or before July 20, 2017, at least one defendant was
       a porter in Facility B.

       “Overt Act No. 12: On or after July 20, 2017, at leas[t] one defendant
       spoke to Michael Jones about the crime committed on Allen Fagerson.”
       6 The overt acts alleged in count 6 were the same overt acts alleged in count 2.

                                              5.
subd. (a), 246, 459/460, subd. (a)) and three prior serious felony offenses (§ 667,
subd. (a)).
       On August 3, 2021, a jury found Vanatti guilty on all counts and found true all
enhancements and allegations. As to both the alleged prior strikes and the prior serious
felony offenses, the trial court in a bifurcated trial found true that Vanatti suffered these
three prior convictions alleged in the information.
       Subsequently, as to count 1, the trial court sentenced Vanatti to a term of life
without the possibility of parole, plus 15 years for the three prior serious felony offenses
(§ 667, subd. (a)). As to count 3, the trial court sentenced Vanatti to the upper term of
four years, plus 15 years for the three prior serious felony offenses (§ 667, subd. (a)), and
then tripled this term pursuant to section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i), for a total
indeterminate term of 57 years to life, to run consecutive to count 1. As to count 2, the
trial court sentenced Vanatti to a term of 25 years to life, and then tripled this term
pursuant to section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i), for a total indeterminate term of 75
years to life, plus 15 years for the three prior serious felony offenses (§ 667, subd. (a)),
but stayed this sentence pursuant to section 654. As to count 4, the trial court sentenced
Vanatti to the upper term of four years, plus 15 years for the three prior serious felony
offenses (§ 667, subd. (a)), and then tripled this term pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i), for a total indeterminate term of 57 years to life, but stayed this
sentence pursuant to section 654. As to count 5, the trial court sentenced Vanatti to an
indeterminate term of 25 years to life, plus 15 years for the three prior serious felony
offenses (§ 667, subd. (a)), but stayed this sentence pursuant to section 654. Finally, as to
count 6, the trial court sentenced Vanatti to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, plus
a five-year term for the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), but stayed this
sentence pursuant to section 654. The total aggregate sentence imposed was a term of
life without the possibility of parole, plus an indeterminate term of 57 years to life and a
determinate term of 15 years.

                                              6.
                                SUMMARY OF FACTS
I.     The Prosecution Case-in-Chief
       A.     Background of the North Kern State Prison
       Vanatti, Henthorn, Colwell, Leair, and Fagerson were inmates at the North Kern
State Prison in Delano.7 The prison had four security levels, ranging from Level 1
minimum security to Level 4 maximum security. The facility had two sides, “A” and
“B,” and two tiers, and the cell doors were controlled by a central operator. The
underlying murder took place at Facility B, which is a “reception center” where the staff
“determin[ed] what facility w[ould] best suit [the inmate’s] needs as far as security level
and medical issues.” The facility housed general population inmates, which means the
housed inmates “do not have any type of security concerns such as a sensitive need
inmate or a protective custody inmate.”
       The prison was racially segregated between the white, black, and Hispanic
inmates. The white inmates8 were controlled by the Aryan Brotherhood gang, which
imposed a set of rules to be followed by the white inmates. White inmates were required
to “do hits” on individuals not following these rules. Further, any crimes committed for
the benefit of the Aryan Brotherhood had to be approved by the gang or the inmate who
committed the crime would “get hit.” Finally, sex offenders and inmates who kill women
and hurt children were not tolerated in the general population, and these individuals were
usually removed from the general population to a sensitive needs yard.9

       7 Vanatti was also known as “Flea;” Henthorn was also known as “Doc;” Colwell
was also known as “Natural;” and Leair was also known as “Johnny Boy.”
       8 The white inmate population was known as the “Woodpile” or “Peckerwoods.”

       9 The sensitive needs yard was repeatedly referred to throughout the record as
“SNY.”

                                             7.
       B.     Events Prior to the Stabbing
       In July 2017, Vanatti and Henthorn were housed together in cell number 106.
Vanatti introduced himself to other inmates as a member of the Nazi Lowriders gang and
was in charge, alongside Leair, of the white inmates inside the building.
       Fagerson was 57 years old, in poor health, and required the use of a walker. He
was housed with Becker in cell number 118. Fagerson was identified as a “J-cat” – an
individual who was “[a] little slow [and] [s]omeone who takes like psych meds, who just
says things or does weird things that seem a little off compared to how most people in
society would conduct themselves.” He spent most of his free time writing poems for his
granddaughter. These poems involved “[s]omething about a leprechaun and a trail . . . it
was like a little kid story.” Becker thought these poems were “kind of weird.”
       Four days before the murder, Fagerson traded some of his poems for coffee.
These poems eventually ended up in the possession of both Vanatti and Henthorn.
Thereafter, on July 19, 2017, Vanatti and Henthorn called Becker over to sit with them at
a table. Vanatti asked Becker, “ ‘You know what is going to happen to your cellie
tomorrow. Right?’ ” Becker responded, “ ‘What, are you guys going to move him?’ ”
Vanatti replied, “ ‘No. Your cellie is going to die tomorrow.’ ” Becker “was kind of
shocked, and it just made [him] scared.” Vanatti then asked Becker if he was “willing to
do it[,]” and Becker replied, “[N]o, I don’t want to do it. I’m not a killer.” Vanatti then
told Becker, “ ‘It’s okay, I’ve already got a hitter.’ ” Henthorn then told Becker that
Fagerson needed to be killed because “he ha[d] like a 20-year-old [sex] charge.” Vanatti
and Henthorn also told Becker “not to go back to [his] cell and scream for help or yell for
help; that they had the green light[10] and that this was a sanctioned hit; that [Fagerson],

       10 Becker testified a “green light” means “[t]hey have the go-ahead to do it” from
the Aryan Brotherhood.

                                              8.
if [Becker] spooked [Fagerson] for any reason and he left the yard that [he] was going to
be in trouble for it.”
           Later that night, Becker considered reporting this hit to the correctional officers
and took out a piece of paper and “wrote in big bold letters ‘Please help, my life is in
danger.’ . . . ‘I need to be removed out of here ASAP.’ ”11 However, Becker never
showed this piece of paper to the correctional officers, nor did he warn Fagerson about
the hit.
           C.     The Stabbing
           Prior to the murder, Colwell slipped a sharp weapon under Vanatti and Henthorn’s
cell door. Vanatti and Henthorn then took turns sharpening the weapon.
           On July 20, 2017, Becker walked laps in the yard with Henthorn when Henthorn
told him “he was going to go in the cell and lock himself in the cell because he wanted to
make sure that [Becker’s] cellie died; that he was going to get washed up,[12] he knew it,
and he didn’t care.” After Becker completed some laps, Vanatti approached him and
said, “[W]hen the yard was recalled that they wanted [him] to return with the B side line
and to go get in the back of the line of the whites and that when [they] came in the
building that [he] could not go back to [his] cell.” Moreover, Vanatti told him “to sit at a
table in the dayroom and refuse to go back to [his] cell . . . [and he] wasn’t allowed to say
anything about why [he] was refusing but just to refuse.”
           Becker then entered the back of the line as instructed. He then told a correctional
officer next to him, “ ‘Hey, they are going to whack my cellie right now. I am in B-1, in
118’. . . ‘You guys need to send help.’ ” The correctional officer responded, “ ‘There’s
nothing I can do about it. Keep walking.’ ” Becker was frightened. Officers

           11 Officers later found this note in cell number 118. The note read, “[M]y life is in
danger. Please help ASAP.”
           12 Becker testified “washed up” means to get life in prison.

                                                 9.
subsequently placed Becker in handcuffs and transported him to a holding cell until he
could be brought in for questioning. Eventually, Becker told Sergeant T. Yoder “that his
cellmate was going to be murdered.” Thereafter, Sergeant Yoder contacted the control
booth officer to have an officer inspect cell number 118.
       An officer then searched cell number 118 and found Henthorn “standing at the
door, blocking the window view.” Henthorn “didn’t have a shirt on, and he was sweaty
and breathing heavily.” The officer asked Henthorn to move and Henthorn yelled, “ ‘It’s
[general population], motherfucker.’ ” Eventually, the officer “saw Inmate Fagerson
lying on the bottom tier or the bottom bunk face up, unresponsive [¶] [and he] s[aw] an
object sticking out of his chest with blood around it, so [he] immediately hit [his]
alarm.”13
       Officers then placed Henthorn in handcuffs and placed him in a holding cell. At
the holding cell, Henthorn “seemed happy, and he was actually laughing at the time.”
Henthorn told the officers, “I’ll make it easy on you guys. I was caught red-handed
locked in that cell” and also to “make sure to get some [blood] from [his] right pinky nail.
There is a . . . fat ass chunk of [Fagerson’s] blood there.” Further, while Henthorn was
being transported to another facility he told officers, “The women and children are safe
again [¶] [t]he POS is dead.” He further explained:

              “That POS was a pedophile. You know he did some shit back in the
       ‘70s. That motherfucker showed me some kids’ books that he was writing
       that was all about children. I was molested when I was a kid. He fucked
       up by showing me that shit.”
Finally, as it related to the weapon, Henthorn asked the officers, “Did you like the
finishing touches I left on [Fagerson]?”

       13 It was later determined Fagerson had been stabbed 75 times in the head, neck,
shoulders, and chest. Fagerson was later pronounced dead. Forensic Pathologist R.
Whitmore testified “[t]he cause of death [was] multiple stab wounds.”

                                            10.
       D.     Vanatti’s Statements
       After the murder, Vanatti and Henthorn were placed in an administrative
segregation unit. Inmate Michael Jones, an affiliate of the Aryan Brotherhood, ran this
unit. Jones testified Vanatti told him all the specifics regarding the plan to murder
Fagerson.
       E.     Gang Evidence
       Officer Farley testified as a gang expert. He testified the Aryan Brotherhood
operates in every prison throughout California and is specific to “[t]he white race.” “The
Aryan Brotherhood basically opposes anybody that isn’t the Aryan Brotherhood . . . [and]
at the end of the day it’s AB and nothing else to them. Anybody else would be either
subservient or enemy.” There are only 20-25 Aryan Brotherhood full members, “[b]ut as
far as affiliates and active participants, it would be in the thousands.” Further, the Nazi
Lowriders (NLR) affiliate with the Aryan Brotherhood. “[T]here are still to this day
former NLR members that are AB members . . . [and] in fact, AB members now, but at
one point they were recruited from the NLR.” Specifically, Officer Farley testified the
NLR does still exist and that “the other loyal [NLR] faction stayed loyal to the Aryan
Brotherhood; therefore, they are still walking the mainline.” The primary activities of the
Aryan Brotherhood are “[m]urder, conspiracy to commit murder, financial crimes, money
laundering, distribution of narcotics, witness intimidation[,] [¶] [a]ssaults with deadly
weapons, battery, battery on peace officers[,] [and] [¶] possession of illegal weapons.”
              1.     Predicate Offenses
       In June 2013, inmate Jason Buckley, an active member of the Aryan Brotherhood,
stabbed inmate Williams while inmates Smith and May punched and kicked Williams.
Inmate Franklin Oden, who ran the white population in the building and was an active
Aryan Brotherhood gang member, directed Buckley, Smith, and May to commit the
assault. Oden was convicted of being an active participant in the gang while conducting

                                             11.
felonious activities, and Buckley was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with a
gang enhancement.
          In January 2014, inmates Michael Ellison, Richard Collins, and Aaron Edwards
stabbed three other inmates during chapel time. Ellison and Collins were convicted of
felony assault with a deadly weapon, whereas Edwards was convicted of misdemeanor
assault with a deadly weapon. Officer Farley testified Ellison, Collins, and Edwards were
active Aryan Brotherhood members at the time of the offense. However, Officer Cope
testified Ellison was not an active member.
          In December 2015, inmates Eric Knudsen and Chad Studebaker assaulted an
inmate while at the yard. Knudsen was convicted of an assault likely to cause great
bodily injury, while Studebaker was convicted of an assault with a deadly weapon. Both
Knudsen and Studebaker were active members of the Aryan Brotherhood gang.
                 2.     Expert Opinion
          Officer Farley testified the Aryan Brotherhood targets sex offenders “to show their
status amongst other races, other gangs, if you will, in the prison” and “[i[f you have been
seen or known or it gets out that one of your leaders or members has a sex crime or you
are allowing that within your ranks, the prison culture in itself will view that organization
as weak and start preying upon . . . if you were labeled weak in prison.” The Aryan
Brotherhood’s prohibition on sex offenders is both a “morality thing” and a “respect
thing.”
          Further, Officer Farley testified to the following:

                 “Based on all the testimony from multiple sources, different sources,
          and the terminology that they are using in their testimony, green lit,
          authorized, approved, and the dynamics of their testimony of how this was
          planned, I would say yes, yes. [Vanatti] was acting on behalf of the Aryan
          Brotherhood.”

                                                12.
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     AB 333
       AB 333 amended the language of section 186.22 to modify the showing necessary
to prove gang offenses and gang enhancements (Stats. 2021, ch. 669, § 3, eff. Jan. 1,
2022), and added section 1109, requiring bifurcation, upon a defendant’s request, of the
trial of gang enhancements and substantive gang offenses from that of the other
underlying offenses. (§ 1109, subds. (a), (b).)
       A.     Sections 186.22 and 190.2, subdivision (a)(22)
       Vanatti contends he is entitled to the benefit of newly amended section 186.22 and
that the gang enhancements, substantive gang offense,14 and gang-murder special
circumstance allegation must be dismissed. The People concede the amendments to
section 186.22 apply retroactively, but disagree the gang-murder special circumstance
must be dismissed because the Legislature could not unconstitutionally amend
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22), created by the voters via Proposition 21. We conclude
Vanatti is entitled to a dismissal of the gang enhancements and the gang-murder special
circumstance allegation. (Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 580.) However, as we discuss in
detail below, we also conclude the People are entitled to retry Vanatti on the gang
enhancements and gang-murder special circumstance allegation, if they so choose.

              1.     The Gang Enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and Substantive
                     Gang Offense (§ 186.22, subd. (a))
       As to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, the jury found true the gang enhancements
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)), and as to count 5, the jury found Vanatti guilty of the substantive
gang offense (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). At the time of Vanatti’s trial, “criminal street gang”
was defined as “any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons,

       14 As noted above, the People concede there is insufficient evidence to support the
substantive gang offense (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 5) and thus count 5 must be
dismissed.

                                             13.
whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one
or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, or (31) to
(33), inclusive of subdivision (e), having a common name or common identifying sign or
symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal gang activity.” (Former § 186.22, subd. (f).) AB 333 revised the
definition of “criminal street gang” to require the members “collectively” (no longer
“individually or collectively”) engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. (§ 186.22,
subd. (f); People v. Clark (Feb. 22, 2024, S275746) ___ Cal.5th ___, ___
[2024 WL 718741, *4] (Clark).)
       Additionally, AB 333 redefined “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” (§ 186.22,
subd. (e)(1)), a necessary requirement for proving the existence of a “criminal street
gang” and thus a “prerequisite to proving the gang crime and the gang enhancement.”
(See § 186.22, subds. (a), (b)(1); People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 816, 823
(Rodriguez).) “ ‘The offenses comprising a pattern of gang activity are referred to as
predicate offenses.’ ” (Id. at p. 822, quoting People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818,
829.) At the time of Vanatti’s trial, “pattern of criminal activity” meant “the commission
of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile
petition for, or conviction of two or more of the following offenses, provided at least one
of these offenses occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those
offenses occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the offenses were
committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons.” (Former § 186.22,
subd. (e).) Under this former definition, the prosecution only had to prove that those
associated with a gang had committed at least two offenses from a list of predicate crimes
on separate occasions within three years of one another. (Former § 186.22, subd. (e); see
People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 665 (Sek).) “[I]t was unnecessary to prove
predicate offenses were gang related.” (Rodriguez, at p. 822; former § 186.22, subd. (e).)

                                             14.
       The amended statute made several changes to this definition and limited the type
of predicate offenses sufficient to prove the gang enhancement and gang offense. “First,
the predicate offenses now must have been committed by two or more ‘members’ of the
gang (as opposed to any person). [Citation.] Second, the predicate offenses must be
proven to have ‘commonly benefited a criminal street gang.’ [Citation.] Third, the last
predicate offense must have occurred within three years of the date of the currently
charged offense. [Citation.] Fourth, the list of qualifying predicate offenses has been
reduced. [Citation.] And fifth, the currently charged offense no longer counts as a
predicate offense.” (People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 477-478 (E.H.), italics in
original); § 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (e)(2).) As our Supreme Court recently stated in Clark:

               “The Legislature’s reference to collective engagement thus calls for
       an inquiry not just into how the predicate offenses benefited the gang, but
       also how the gang works together as a gang. It calls for a showing of a
       connection, or nexus, between an offense committed by one or more gang
       members and the organization as a whole. [¶] This organizational nexus
       may be shown by evidence linking the predicate offenses to the gang’s
       organizational structure, meaning its manner of governance; its primary
       activities; or its common goals and principles.” (Clark, supra,
       ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2024 WL 718741, *9], italics omitted.)
Finally, the new element that the predicate offenses “commonly benefited a criminal
street gang” requires “the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).) A new subdivision (g) was also added specifying that
“[e]xamples of a common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but are not
limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang
rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.”
(§ 186.22, subd. (g).)
              2.     The Gang-Murder Special Circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22))
       Further, as to count 1, the jury found true the gang-murder special circumstance
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22) was enacted as a part of

                                             15.
Proposition 21, an initiative measure adopted by the electorate in the March 2000 primary
election. (People v. Shabazz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 55, 65.) Section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(22), makes first degree murder a capital crime if “[t]he defendant
intentionally killed the victim while the defendant was an active participant in a criminal
street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was carried
out to further the activities of the criminal street gang.” (Italics added.)
       Prior to Rojas, the Court of Appeal was divided as to whether AB 333
unconstitutionally amended Proposition 21. (See, e.g., People v. Lee (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 232, 245, review granted Oct. 19, 2022, S275449 [AB 333 did not
unconstitutionally amend Proposition 21]; People v. Rojas (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 542,
553-558, review granted Oct. 19, 2022, S275835 [AB 333 did unconstitutionally amend
Proposition 21].) During the pendency of this appeal, our Supreme Court resolved this
dispute and held that “applying Assembly Bill 333’s definition of ‘criminal street gang’
to the gang-murder special circumstance does not unconstitutionally amend
section 190.22(a)(22) [Proposition 21].” (Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 580.) Therefore,
we reject the People’s argument AB 333 unconstitutionally amended Proposition 21.
Further, because the jury instructions provided in this case omitted elements added by
AB 333, we must decide whether this error was harmless.
              3.      Prejudicial Error
       Although the People concede AB 333 applies retroactively to Vanatti’s case, the
People argue prejudice cannot be established because “substantial evidence support[s]
[both] the gang[-murder] special circumstance allegation and [the] gang
enhancements[.]”
       As it relates to prejudice, the Fourth District, Division 2 in E.H., stated the
following:

              “Because Assembly Bill 333 essentially adds new elements to the
       substantive offense and enhancements in section 186.22—for example, by

                                              16.
       requiring proof that gang members ‘collectively engage’ in a pattern of
       criminal gang activity, that the predicate offenses were committed by gang
       members, that the predicate offenses benefitted the gang, and that the
       predicate and underlying offenses provided more than a reputational benefit
       to the gang—we agree with our colleagues in the Second District that the
       prejudice standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
       18, 24 (Chapman) applies. [Citations.] Under that standard, the absence of
       instruction on the amended version of section 186.22 requires reversal
       unless ‘it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
       contribute to th[e] jury’s verdict.’ ” (E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
       p. 479.)
       In order to prove harmless error under the Chapman standard, it is not enough to
show that substantial or strong evidence existed to support a conviction under the correct
instructions. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Sullivan v. Louisiana
(1993) 508 U.S. 275, “the question . . . is not what effect the constitutional error might
generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon
the guilty verdict in the case at hand . . . The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the
error.” (Id. at p. 279, italics in original.)
       Courts have found harmless error under this standard where the missing element
from an instruction was uncontested or proven as a matter of law. For example, in
People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, the trial court omitted the elements of robbery
from the jury instructions, but the court held the error was harmless because the only
contested issue at trial was the defendant’s identity. (Id. at p. 832.) “Defendant knew
what the elements of robbery were, and he had the opportunity to present any evidence he
wished on the subject. ‘[W]here a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt
that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such
that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction
is properly found to be harmless.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Neder v. United States (1999)
527 U.S. 1, 17.) Similarly in People v. Vinson (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1190, this court

                                                17.
affirmed a defendant’s petty theft conviction with a prior theft conviction even though the
law had changed after trial to require proof of three prior convictions, rather than one.
(Id. at p. 1200.) The defendant conceded he had suffered two prior convictions and his
attorney stipulated at trial to a third conviction. Therefore, there was no dispute as to
whether the new element in the law was proved. (Ibid.)
        Here, we cannot conclude the jury instructions were harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. First, the 2013 predicate offense is the only offense that potentially
satisfies newly amended section 186.22 because there was “evidence of a direct order
from the gang to commit specific crimes.” (Clark, supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___
[2024 WL 718741, *9]; see e.g. People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 958 [the murder
would have been agreed on at a meeting called by the gang’s “ ‘ “shot caller” ’ ”]; In re
Masters (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1054, 1063 [a certain attack “would normally have been
ordered only by the highest echelon of a gang’s leadership”].) However, as to the other
two predicate offenses, although the People proved the individuals were active members
of the Aryan Brotherhood gang at the time of their offenses and were actively
participating in the gang at that time, the People did not prove the predicate offenses
commonly benefited the Aryan Brotherhood gang. (See Clark, supra, ___ Cal.5th at
p. ___ [2024 WL 718741, *9]; § 186.22, subd. (e)(1) [“ ‘[P]attern of criminal gang
activity’ [requires] . . . two or more of the following offenses”].) Second, the People’s
gang expert testified about several ways in which a crime could benefit a criminal street
gang, but one of those benefits was reputational. When asked whether a murder could
“keep control or keep power,” i.e. enhance their reputation, the expert answered, “They
do what’s called overkill . . . they are going to make it . . . a blood bath.” This is to instill
“[i]ntimidation, fear” and to ensure the “other inmates or other races . . . out on the
yard . . . see what these people do to their own people, [and] are not going to mess with
them.” In closing arguments, the People argued that the murder benefitted the gang as a
whole because “when they come together and they commit a murder and they kill

                                               18.
someone who violates the core values of the gang, it is unreasonable to think they did not
intend to commit this with the gang in mind.” Although evidence of benefits to the gang
beyond reputational benefit was introduced, we cannot rule out the possibility the jury
relied on the reputational benefit to the gang as its basis for finding the gang
enhancements, substantive gang offense, and gang-murder special circumstance
allegation true. Therefore, the instructional error was not harmless under the Chapman
standard. Accordingly, we dismiss the gang enhancement allegations (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)), as alleged in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and the gang-murder special
circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), as alleged in count 1.
       B.     Section 1109
       Vanatti further contends that newly enacted section 1109 should apply
retroactively to his case and thus, “[g]iven the retroactive application of section 1109, the
trial court’s failure to bifurcate the gang allegations [in] counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, and the
substantive gang charge alleged in count 5, at the request of the defense, violated the
express mandate of section 1109 and constituted legal error.” The People contend
“[s]ection 1109 applies prospectively only[, but] in any event, [Vanatti] was not
prejudiced by the lack of bifurcation.”
       As we explain below, the trial court’s failure to bifurcate pursuant to section 1109
was harmless because there is no basis to conclude bifurcation would have affected the
outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we need not consider both the issue of whether
section 1109 applies retroactively15 and the merits of Vanatti’s bifurcation motion.
              1.      Applicable Law
       “Pursuant to section 1109, subdivision (a), upon a defendant’s request, a case in
which a gang enhancement is charged under section 186.22, subdivision (b) or (d) must

       15 The issue of whether section 1109 applies retroactively to cases that are not yet
final is currently under review by our Supreme Court in People v. Burgos (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 550, review granted July 13, 2022, S274743.

                                              19.
be tried in separate phases. Section 1109, subdivision (b) provides that ‘[i]f a defendant
is charged with a violation of subdivision (a) of Section 186.22, this count shall be tried
separately from all other counts that do not otherwise require gang evidence as an
element of the crime. This charge may be tried in the same proceeding with an allegation
of an enhancement under subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22.’ ” (People v. Ramos
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1129 (Ramos).)
       Section 1109 was added because:

              “(e) California courts have long recognized how prejudicial gang
       evidence is. [Citation.] Studies suggest that allowing a jury to hear the
       kind of evidence that supports a gang enhancement before it has decided
       whether the defendant is guilty or not may lead to wrongful convictions.
       [Citations.] The mere specter of gang enhancements pressures defendants
       to accept unfavorable plea deals rather than risk a trial filled with
       prejudicial evidence and a substantially longer sentence.

              “(f) Bifurcation of trials where gang evidence is alleged can help
       reduce its harmful and prejudicial impact.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 669, § 2,
       subds. (e), (f).)
       Vanatti’s right to bifurcation under section 1109 is purely statutory. (Ramos,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1131-1133 [concluding section 1109 error was harmless
under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson)].) “ ‘Typically, a defendant
who has established error under state law must demonstrate there is a reasonable
probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more
favorable result.’ ” (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 553.)
       In People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169 (Tran), our Supreme Court held the
failure to bifurcate pursuant to section 1109 is not structural error. (Id. at pp. 1208-1210.)
The court also rejected the defendant’s argument the Chapman standard for federal
constitutional error applies, reasoning the admission of gang evidence in that case was
not prejudicial that it rendered the trial “ ‘fundamentally unfair.’ ” (Id. at p. 1209.)

                                              20.
Instead, it evaluated the trial court’s failure to bifurcate under the Watson standard. (Id.
at pp. 1209-1210.)
              2.     Harmless Error
       In assessing prejudice under Watson, “an appellate court may consider ‘whether
the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence
supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable
probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’ ” (People v.
Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 870, italics omitted.)
       Here, Vanatti “contends that in this case, the gang evidence had little relevance to
any of the substantive offenses – namely, the charged murder, conspiracy to commit
murder and assault, and dissuading a witness” and this evidence “is exactly the type of
evidence that on its own created a substantial danger of inflaming the jury’s passions by
simply identifying [him] with such a group.” We disagree. First, the evidence of
Vanatti’s guilt was overwhelming. Vanatti and Henthorn were housed together and
Vanatti was in charge of the white inmates inside the building. Fagerson’s poems ended
up in the possession of both Vanatti and Henthorn, and Vanatti told Becker, “ ‘You know
what is going to happen to your cellie tomorrow. Right? [¶] Your cellie is going to die
tomorrow.’ ” Vanatti and Henthorn then told Becker to not go back to his cell and
scream for help, and that if Fagerson was “spooked . . . for any reason . . . [Becker] was
going to be in trouble for it.” Subsequently, on the day of the stabbing, Vanatti
approached Becker at the yard and laid out the plain for what Becker needed to do going
forward. Inmate Jones also testified Vanatti told him about the plan to murder Fagerson.
Finally, prior to the stabbing, both Vanatti and Henthorn took turns sharpening the
murder weapon. The evidence was clear that once Vanatti received the “green light,” it
was up to him to plan and orchestrate the attack on Fagerson.
       Second, evidence regarding Vanatti’s Aryan Brotherhood gang membership was
highly relevant for identity, motive, or intent under Evidence Code section 1101,

                                             21.
subdivision (b). It was relevant for the jury to hear that Aryan Brotherhood gang
members target sex offenders “to show their status amongst other races, other gangs, if
you will, in the prison” and that the prohibition on sex offenders is based on the Aryan
Brotherhood’s sense of morality. Further, any potential prejudice from the gang evidence
was mitigated when the trial court provided the jury with a limiting instruction regarding
its consideration of the gang evidence, which we presume it followed. (People v.
Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 414 [“We presume that jurors understand and follow the
court’s instructions”].)
       Accordingly, we conclude Vanatti was not prejudiced by the failure to bifurcate
the gang enhancements, gang offense, and gang-murder special circumstance allegations.
(See People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051 [“Any evidence admitted solely
to prove the gang enhancement was not so minimally probative on the charged offense,
and so inflammatory in comparison, that it threatened to sway the jury to convict
regardless of defendants’ actual guilt.”].) Therefore, we affirm Vanatti’s conviction in its
entirety. (See E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 480 [failure to bifurcate was harmless
under Watson standard in light of “ ‘overwhelming’ ” evidence in support of the robbery
convictions, stating “[e]ven if section 1109 applied retroactively to this case – an issue
we need not and do not decide here – E.H. cannot show it is ‘reasonably probable’ he
would have obtained a more favorable result if his trial had been bifurcated”].)

II.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Gang-Murder Special Circumstance
       Allegation and the Gang Enhancements.
       Vanatti further argues there is insufficient evidence to support the gang findings
necessary for the gang-murder special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22))
and gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). While we are vacating the gang findings
under AB 333, we must still address this claim to determine whether the gang-murder
special circumstance allegation and gang enhancements may be retried on remand. (See
DiFrancesco, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 131; Wetle, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 388.) As we

                                             22.
explain below, we conclude these remaining gang findings were supported by substantial
evidence under the law in effect at the time of Vanatti’s trial.
       A.     Applicable Law
       “In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support an
enhancement, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence – that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value – from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We presume every fact in
support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the
evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] ‘A reviewing court neither
reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’ ” (People v. Albillar (2010)
51 Cal.4th 47, 59-60 (Albillar).)
       “There are two ‘prongs’ to the gang enhancement under section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1). [Citation.] The first prong requires that the prosecution prove the
underlying felony was ‘gang related.’ [Citations.] The second prong ‘requires that a
defendant commit the gang-related felony “with the specific intent to promote, further, or
assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.” ’ ” (People v. Weddington (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 468, 484, fn. omitted (Weddington); former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
        Similarly, “[s]ection 190.2, subdivision (a)(22), by its express terms contains
three basic elements: (1) the defendant must intentionally kill the victim; (2) while an
active participant in a criminal street gang; [and] (3) in order to further the activities of
the gang.” (People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 612.) The language of
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22) “substantially parallels the language of section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1), which authorizes a sentencing enhancement for felonies ‘committed
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with

                                              23.
the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang
members . . . .’ ” (People v. Carr (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 475, 488 (Carr).)
       Further, “[i]t has long been settled that expert testimony regarding whether a crime
was gang related is admissible . . . [because] [s]uch matters are sufficiently beyond
common experience that expert testimony would assist the jury.” (People v. Vang (2011)
52 Cal.4th 1038, 1049, fn. 5 (Vang).) “ ‘Expert opinion that particular criminal conduct
benefited a gang’ . . . can be sufficient to support [both the gang enhancement under]
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)” (id. at p. 1048), and the gang-murder special
circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). (Carr, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 488-490.)
       Experts may be asked questions that coincide with the ultimate issue in a case
(Evid. Code, § 805; People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1227), but they cannot
offer an opinion on whether a defendant is guilty because “the trier of fact is as
competent as the witness to weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of
guilt.” (People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 47; see People v. Coffman and
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 77.) Although the traditional method of eliciting opinion
testimony from an expert witness is a hypothetical question based closely on the evidence
of the case being tried (Vang, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1046), an expert may also provide
an opinion based on other witnesses’ testimony presenting no factual conflicts or
contradictions (In re Collin’s Estate (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 702, 712-715.)
       B.       Analysis
       Specifically, Vanatti argues there was insufficient evidence that: (1) he was an
active participant in the Aryan Brotherhood at the time of the murder and (2) that he
specifically intended to promote and assist in the criminal activities of the Aryan
Brotherhood. As to both claims, we disagree.
       First, substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s finding Vanatti was an
active participant in the Aryan Brotherhood at the time of the murder. Vanatti identified

                                             24.
himself as an NLR gang member and took an active leadership role in the gang.
Although there were only 20-25 full members of the Aryan Brotherhood, gang expert
Officer Farley testified the NLR existed at the time of the murder and the NLR affiliated
with the Aryan Brotherhood. At the time of the murder, Aryan Brotherhood “affiliates
and active participants . . . would be in the thousands.” Specifically, “the other loyal
[NLR] faction stayed loyal to the Aryan Brotherhood . . . [and] they are still walking the
mainline.” Therefore, Vanatti’s NLR membership established his association with the
Aryan Brotherhood.
       Further, Vanatti was in charge, alongside Leair, of the white inmates inside the
building and was therefore responsible for enforcing the rules set by the Aryan
Brotherhood. This leadership role was evidenced by the fact he himself received the
“green light” from the Aryan Brotherhood for the “sanctioned hit” of Fagerson.
Accordingly, a reasonable jury could have found Vanatti was an active NLR gang
member who acted in a leadership role for the Aryan Brotherhood.
       Nonetheless, Vanatti argues that “[i]t was undisputed [he] was not a validated
member of the Aryan Brotherhood” and that the white inmates were required to follow
the rules imposed by the Aryan Brotherhood “regardless of loyalty to the [gang], or suffer
violent retribution.” Although there was evidence Vanatti was a member of the Aryan
Brotherhood, active gang membership is not required to support a true finding as to both
the gang-murder special circumstance and the gang enhancements. (See § 190.2,
subd. (a)(22); People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 698 [holding that pursuant to
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), “gang membership is not an element of the gang
enhancement”].) Therefore, the issue is not whether Vanatti was a member of the Aryan
Brotherhood, but rather whether he actively participated in or committed the crimes for
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. Evidence
regarding the Aryan Brotherhood was relevant to establish these issues irrespective of
Vanatti’s membership.

                                             25.
       Additionally, as noted above, Vanatti took an active leadership role in the Aryan
Brotherhood. Officer Farley testified about the difference between a white inmate who
simply followed the Aryan Brotherhood’s rules16 and an inmate who actively participated
in the gang. Vanatti not only followed the rules of the gang, but rather took a position of
power within the gang when he assumed control over the white inmates inside the
building. He then orchestrated the plan to murder Fagerson by obtaining permission from
the gang to commit the crime, and then subsequently recruited Henthorn to be the actual
stabber. Accordingly, Vanatti was an active participant in the Aryan Brotherhood. (See
People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1130 [“[A]ctive participation in a criminal
street gang . . . [requires] participation that is more than nominal or passive”].)
       Secondly, substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s finding Vanatti intended
to promote, further, or assist in the criminal conduct of the Aryan Brotherhood. As to the
first prong, there was substantial evidence the underlying felony was “gang related.”
(Weddington, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 484.) To be gang related, “[t]he offense may
be committed (1) for the benefit of a gang; (2) at the direction of a gang; or (3) in
association with a gang.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) Here, Fagerson’s killing benefited the
Aryan Brotherhood because targeting sex offenders establishes the gang’s “status
amongst other races, other gangs . . . in the prison” and it was both a “morality thing” and
“respect thing.” Further, as noted above, this killing was done at the direction of and
association with the Aryan Brotherhood because Vanatti was required to obtain the
“green light” from the gang before orchestrating the attack.
       The second prong requires a defendant to commit the underlying felony “with the
specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.”
(Former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) Intent for the second prong “ ‘is rarely susceptible of

       16 A white inmate who only follows the rules of the Aryan Brotherhood was
referred to as a “programmer[].”

                                             26.
direct proof and usually must be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding
the offense.’ ” (People v. Rios (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 542, 567-568.) As noted above,
Vanatti told Becker that Fagerson’s murder was sanctioned by the Aryan Brotherhood
Regardless, whether or not the Aryan Brotherhood in fact gave Vanatti the “green light”
to murder Fagerson is irrelevant. All that matters for intent is that Vanatti himself
believed the Aryan Brotherhood sanctioned the murder.
       Nonetheless, Vanatti argues the murder was not gang related because (1) Henthorn
had a personal reason for killing Fagerson and (2) the Aryan Brotherhood had “in fact
ordered no stabbings during th[e] time” of the murder. Both of these inferences are
reasonable from the record. With that being said, “we must accept the reasonable
inferences supporting the verdict over any inferences (even if reasonable) proffered by
defendant.” (People v. Shamblin (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 15; see also People v. Rundle
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 137, overruled on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009)
45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22. [holding that if there is substantial evidence supporting the
verdict, it is insufficient for a defendant to cite to “various items of evidence in
isolation . . . arguing each could be viewed as pointing to his innocence of the charge
rather than his guilt . . . [e]ven if defendant’s premise is correct . . .”].)
       Therefore, we conclude substantial evidence supports both the gang-murder
special circumstance and gang enhancements under the law in effect at the time of
Vanatti’s trial. “ ‘Because we do not reverse based on the insufficiency of the evidence
required to prove a violation of the statute as it read at the time of trial, the double
jeopardy clause of the Constitution will not bar a retrial. [Citations.] “ ‘Where, as here,
evidence is not introduced at trial because the law at that time would have rendered it
irrelevant, the remand to prove that element is proper and the reviewing court does not
treat the issue as one of sufficiency of the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at
p. 669.) Accordingly, apart from the substantive gang offense (§ 186.22, subd. (a),
count 5), our decision does not bar the prosecution from retrying Vanatti on the gang-

                                                27.
murder special circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) and the gang enhancements
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) on remand.
III.   Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdicts as to Counts 3 and 4.
       Vanatti further contends “substantial evidence does not support a finding [he]
intimidated any witness in violation of section 136.1, requiring reversal of the convictions
on count[s] 3 and 4.”
       A.     Additional Factual Background
       Vanatti was convicted of preventing and or dissuading a witness, Becker, in
violation of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) (counts 3 & 4) and of doing so by threat
and/or force (§ 136.1, subdivision (c)(1)).
       As to counts 3 and 4, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 2622, which
instructed the jury as follows:

              “The defendant is charged in Counts three and four with intimidating
       a witness in violation of Penal Code section 136.1(b)(1).

       “To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
       that:

       “1.    The defendant tried to prevent or tried to discourage Justin Becker
       from making a report that he or someone else was a victim of a crime to a
       correctional officer.

       “2.    Justin Becker was a witness and/or crime victim;

       “AND

       “3.    The defendant knew he was trying to prevent or trying to discourage
       Justin Becker from making a report that he or someone else was a victim of
       a crime to a correctional officer and intended to do so.

       “As used here, witness means someone or a person the defendant
       reasonably believed to be someone:

       “Who knowns about the existence or nonexistence of facts relating to a
       crime;

                                              28.
       “A person is a victim if there is reason to believe that a federal or state
       crime is being or has been committed or attempted against him.

       “It is not a defense that the defendant was not successful in preventing or
       discouraging the witness and/or crime victim.

       “It is not a defense that no one was actually physically injured or otherwise
       intimidated.” (Italics in original.)
Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2623, which is as
follows:

              “If you find the defendant guilty of intimidating a witness, you must
       then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegations that
       the defendant acted maliciously and acted in furtherance of a conspiracy or
       used or threatened to use force.

       “To prove these allegations, the People must prove that:

       “1.    The defendant acted maliciously;

       “AND

       “2.    The defendant acted with the intent to assist in a conspiracy to
       intimidate a witness; or

       “3.     The defendant used force or threatened, either directly or indirectly,
       to use force or violence on the person or property of a witness or a victim.

       “Special instruction number one explains when someone is acting in a
       conspiracy to intimidate a witness. You must apply that instruction when
       you decide whether the People have proved this additional allegation.

       “A person acts maliciously when he unlawfully intends to annoy, harm, or
       injure someone else in any way, or intends to interfere in any way with the
       orderly administration of justice.

       “The People have the burden of proving this allegation beyond a reasonable
       doubt. If the People have not met this burden for any allegation, you must
       find that the allegation has not been proved.” (Italics in original.)
Finally, the trial court instructed the jury with a special instruction as follows:

                                              29.
        “I have explained that a defendant may be guilty of a crime if he
either commits the crime or aids and abets the crime. He may also be guilty
if []he is a member of a conspiracy.

“Defendants are charged in Count 4 with conspiracy to intimidate a
witness, in violation of Penal Code section 136.1(c)(2).

“To prove that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that:

“1.   The defendant intended to agree and did agree with one or more
Defendants/co-conspirators (Dustin Henthorn and/or [Vanatti] and/or
Charles Colwell) to commit the crime of intimidat[ing] a witness.

“2.    At the time of the agreement, the defendant and one or more of the
other alleged members of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them
would commit the crime of intimidiat[ing] a witness.

“3.     One of the defendants and/or co-conspirators committed at least one
of the following alleged overt acts to accomplish the intimidation of a
witness: 1) Defendant Henthorn spoke to Justin Becker, 2) [Vanatti] spoke
to Justin Becker, 3) At least one Defendant told Justin Becker not to warn
anyone, 4) At least one defendant told Justin Becker not to inform Allen
Fagerson, 5) At least one defendant told Justin Becker that Allen Fagerson
was going to be killed.

“AND

“4.    At least one of these overt acts was committed in California.

“To decide whether a defendant committed these overt acts, consider all of
the evidence presented about the acts.

“To decide whether a defendant and one or more of the other alleged
members of the conspiracy intended to commit the intimidation of a
witness, please refer to the separate instructions that I have given you on
that crime.

“The People must prove that the members of the alleged conspiracy had an
agreement and intent to commit the intimidation of a witness. The People
do not have to prove that any of the members of the alleged conspiracy
actually met or came to a detailed or formal agreement to commit that
crime. An agreement may be inferred from conduct if you conclude that
members of the alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to
commit the crime.

                                     30.
       “An overt act is an act by one or more of the members of the conspiracy
       that is done to help accomplish the agreed upon crime. The overt act must
       happen after the defendant has agreed to commit the crime. The overt act
       must be more than the act of agreeing or planning to commit the crime, but
       it does not have to be a criminal act itself.

       “You must all agree that at least one alleged overt act was committed in
       California by at least one alleged member of the conspiracy, but you do not
       have to all agree on which specific overt act or acts were committed or who
       committed the overt act or acts.

       “You must make a separate decision as to whether each defendant was a
       member of the alleged conspiracy.

       “Someone who merely accompanies or associates with members of a
       conspiracy but who does not intend to commit the crime is not a member of
       the conspiracy.

       “Evidence that a person did an act or made a statement that helped
       accomplish the goal of the conspiracy is not enough, by itself, to prove that
       the person was a member of the conspiracy.” (Italics in original.)
       B.     Applicable Law
       In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction, “ ‘the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence – that is, evidence
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value – such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Hillhouse
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496.)
       Section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) provides in part: “Except as provided in
subdivision (c), every person who attempts to prevent or dissuade another person who has
been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a crime from doing any of the following is
guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by a imprisonment in county jail for not
more than one year or in the state prison: [¶] (1) Making any report of that victimization
to any peace officer or state or local law enforcement officer or probation or parole or
correctional officer or prosecuting agency or to any judge.” (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1).)

                                             31.
       Section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1), which defines the aggravated form of the crime
and subjects the perpetrator to higher penalties, provides in relevant part: “Every person
doing any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (b) knowingly and maliciously under
any one or more of the following circumstances, is guilty of a felony punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years under any of the following
circumstances: [¶] (1) Where the act is accompanied by force or by an express or implied
threat or force or violence, upon a witness or victim or any third person or the property of
any victim, witness, or any third person [¶] [or] (2) Where the act is in furtherance of a
conspiracy.” (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1), (2).)
       C.     Analysis
       Vanatti argues “the plain language of the statute criminalizes trying to prevent or
dissuade another person ‘who has been the victim of a crime or who is witness to a
crime’ from making any report ‘of that victimization’ to a correctional officer[,]” and
thus, section 136.1 does not apply because “[t]he statements made to Becker did not refer
to ‘a crime;’ rather, they referred to an assault or murder that had not yet happened.”
(Italics omitted.) Vanatti further argues “substantial evidence does not support a finding
[he] intended to prevent or dissuade Becker from reporting a crime to a correctional
officer.” As to both arguments, we disagree.

              1.     Section 136.1, Subdivision (c)(1) Applies to Both Completed and
                     Ongoing Crimes
       Vanatti relies heavily on People v. Reyes (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 972 (Reyes) in
support of his first contention. In Reyes, the defendant was a deputy public defender who
represented Olivas in the underlying matters. (Id. at p. 976.) In one of these matters, the
trial court placed Olivas on probation and issued a protective order requiring him to stay
100 yards away from his mother, and to stay away from her home. (Id. at pp. 976-977.)
Olivas was also “ ‘prohibited from having any “personal, electronic, telephonic, or

                                             32.
written contact” with [his mother], and prohibited from having contact with [her]
“through a third party, except an attorney of record.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 977.)
       Subsequently, the district attorney charged the defendant with violating two
witness tampering statutes, including dissuading a victim or witness from reporting a
crime under section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1). (Reyes, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975,
979-980.) These charges were based on a preliminary hearing where, after issuance of
the protective order described above, defendant contacted Olivas’s mother, identified
himself as “ ‘[Olivas’s ] district attorney,’ ” and told her that Olivas was going to be
released that day, and if he was near or at her home, she should not call the police but
instead should call the defendant. (Id. at pp. 977-978, 981.)
       The preliminary hearing evidence was focused on an alleged attempt by the
defendant to dissuade Olivas’s mother from reporting a potential future crime (i.e. a
possible future violation of the protective order by Olivas). (Reyes, supra,
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 984, fn. 7.) Although the prosecution also presented a theory the
statute applied because of Olivas’s ongoing abuse of his mother (id., at p. 984), the trial
court granted the defendant’s motion to set aside the information pursuant to section 995
and agreed with his position “the language of [section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1)] requires
that the defendant attempt to dissuade the reporting of a past crime.” (Reyes, at p. 980,
italics added.)
       On appeal, the First District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
the section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) charge. (Reyes, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975,
981, 989.) The Court of Appeal summarized the issue as follows: “[W]hether
section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), should be construed to apply only to dissuasion of
reports about completed crimes, as [the defendant] contends (and the superior court
ruled), or should be construed more broadly to encompass future crimes as well, as the
People contend (and the magistrate ruled).” (Id. at pp. 982-983.) After considering the
parties’ arguments, the Court of Appeal applied the “rule of lenity as a tool of last resort”

                                             33.
and concluded that if defendant’s “conduct on this record is a crime under section 136.1,
subdivision (b)(1), the [trial] court correctly pointed out, ‘we need the Legislature to tell
us.’ ” (Id. at pp. 989-990.)
       Two years later, this same court, in reference to Reyes, rejected defendant’s
argument that a violation of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) requires that a witness be
prevented from reporting a completed crime, not an “ ‘ongoing’ ” crime. (People v.
Sherman (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 402, 413 (Sherman).) The Sherman court analyzed the
statute and concluded that it “does not uniformly use the past tense to describe the
underlying crime the reporting of which the defendant must have sought to prevent” and
“the applicable definition of ‘ “[v]ictim” ’ does not limit its coverage to a person who was
victimized in the past[;] [citation] [i]nstead, it includes a person ‘with respect to whom
there is reason to believe that any crime . . . is being or has been perpetrated or attempted
to be perpetrated.’ ” (Id. at p. 416, italics added.) Accordingly, “Reyes does not support
[the defendant’s] argument that section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) cannot apply to an
attempt to prevent a victim from calling the police during an ongoing crime such as an
assault.” (Id. at p. 413.)
       Here, we find the Sherman analysis persuasive. Although Fagerson was not yet
murdered when Vanatti dissuaded Becker from intervening, the conspiracy to attack and
murder Fagerson had already begun. At the point at which Vanatti attempted to dissuade
Becker from reporting, Vanatti had already received the “green light” for the “sanctioned
hit” of Fagerson. Therefore, the conspiracy to murder was “ongoing” at the time Vanatti
told Becker not to tip off Fagerson. (See Sherman, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 413.)
       Furthermore, Vanatti was convicted of violating section 136.1, subdivision (c)(2),
which enhances the sentence for witness dissuasion when “the act is in furtherance of a
conspiracy.” It is clear the Legislature intended not only to criminalize the act of
dissuading a witness from reporting an ongoing conspiracy, but also to punish this type of
act more harshly than that of simple witness dissuasion. This is not the type of case

                                             34.
where “ ‘defendant allegedly sought to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime that had
not yet occurred[,]’ ” (Reyes, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 987), but rather is one in which
a conspiracy was already in full effect. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the
jury’s verdict that Vanatti attempted to dissuade Becker from reporting an ongoing,
active conspiracy to commit murder.

              2.     Vanatti’s Statement to Becker Sufficiently Encompassed a Threat
                     of Retaliation if Becker Reported the Ongoing Crime to
                     Correctional Officers
       Vanatti further argues that “nothing from [his] directive supports a logical
conclusion [he] intended to dissuade Becker from reporting the impending assault to a
correctional officer,” but rather “[t]he directive was not to spook Fagerson – in other
words – not to give Fagerson a reason to ask for help, as made clear by Becker’s
testimony.” (Italics omitted.) However, Vanatti told Becker “not to go back to [his] cell
and scream . . . or yell for help” and that if Fagerson was “spooked . . . for any reason and
he left the yard that [he] was going to be in trouble for it.” Becker testified the only way
for an inmate to leave the yard was to “fill out a . . . form and ask for help or medical
form or he could go up to the cop and ask for help.” It was reasonable for the jury to
infer that Vanatti was threatening Becker not to tell a correctional officer about the plan
to murder Fagerson, which in turn would have resulted in Fagerson being safely removed
from the yard. Accordingly, a threat not to “spook” Fagerson encompassed a warning not
to do anything to draw the correctional officer’s attention to the plot to murder Fagerson.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict as to counts 3 and 4.
IV.    Vanatti’s Sentences on Counts 3 and 4 Were Incorrectly Calculated.
       Lastly, Vanatti contends the trial court incorrectly calculated his sentences as to
counts 3 and 4, and “[b]ecause the error affected multiple counts, the matter should be
remanded for resentencing.” The People concede error and agree Vanatti is entitled to be
resentenced. Our conclusion as to the applicability of AB 333 renders this argument

                                             35.
moot because he is already entitled to a full resentencing. (See People v. Valenzuela
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all
prior resentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”]; People v. Buycks (2018) 5
Cal.5th 857, 893 [“ ‘the full resentencing rule’ ”].) However, in anticipation of Vanatti’s
resentencing, we call to the trial court’s attention to an error in the original sentence.
        “The three options for calculating the minimum term of the life sentence (the
‘minimum indeterminate term’ or simply the ‘minimum term’) are set out in section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(A). ‘Option 1’ calculates the minimum term by tripling the term that
would otherwise apply to the offense. [Citation.] The minimum term in ‘Option 2’ is
25 years to life. [Citation.] And ‘Option 3,’ sometimes referred to as the ‘traditional
sentencing’ option, calculates the minimum term using normal determinate and
indeterminate sentencing procedures, including enhancements. Under Option 3, the
minimum term is ‘[t]he term determined by the court pursuant to [s]ection 1170 for the
underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under Chapter 4.5
(commencing with [s]ection 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any period prescribed by
Section 190 or 3046.’ ” (People v. Flores (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 368, 379-380 (Flores).)
       “While the minimum terms under Options 1 and 3 will vary from case to case,
Option 2 ‘essentially acts as a default to ensure that the defendant’s indeterminate term
will always be a minimum of 25 years.’ [Citation.] Option 1 triples the term for the
offense, and doesn’t include enhancements, whereas Option 3 does include enhancements
but doesn’t multiply the base term for the offense by any number. [Citation.] As such,
Option 1 will usually be the greatest ‘when the current crime is particularly serious, and
thus carries a significant sentence,’ and Option 3 will generally yield the greatest
minimum term ‘when the defendant has an extensive criminal recidivist history, and
hence there are numerous applicable enhancements.’ ” (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at
p. 380, quoting People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 552-553, italics omitted.)

                                              36.
       Here, as to count 3, the trial court imposed the upper term of four years, plus
15 years for the three prior serious felony offenses (§ 667, subd. (a)), and then tripled this
result under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i), for a total indeterminate term of
57 years to life. As to count 4, the trial court imposed this same sentence, but stayed it
pursuant to section 654. These sentences were improperly calculated because section
667, subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i) “triples the term for the offense, [but] doesn’t include
enhancements.” (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 380, italics added.) This rule
applies to the five-year serious felony priors pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a).
(People v. Williams (2004) 34 Cal.4th 397, 404-405 [section 667, subdivision (a) priors
are enhancements].) The correct sentence under Option 1 is the four-year term tripled to
12 years. Accordingly, the longest of the three possible terms pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(A) is 25 years. If applicable, the trial court may address this issue at
Vanatti’s resentencing.
                                      DISPOSITION
       Vanatti’s sentence is vacated and this matter is remanded for resentencing
consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 333, we dismiss the gang
enhancement allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), as alleged in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6; the
substantive gang offense (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 5); and the gang-murder special
circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), as alleged in count 1. Although the People
are foreclosed from retrying Vanatti on the substantive gang offense (count 5), the People
are not foreclosed from retrying Vanatti on the gang-murder special circumstance
allegation and gang enhancements. Thereafter, the trial court is directed to file an

                                             37.
amended and corrected abstract of judgment and transmit copies thereof to the
appropriate authorities. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                            SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

                                            38.