Court Opinion

ID: 9460898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:02:13.341826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:49.260362
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur in Judge Feinberg’s excellent opinion, except for Part III.
The essential facts with respect to the nature and extent of the inordinate delays resulting from Connecticut’s archaic appellate procedure in the processing and disposition of criminal appeals are not in dispute. See Ralls v. Manson, 375 F.Supp. 1271 (D.Conn.1974), reversed on other grounds, 503 F.2d 491 (2nd Cir. July 5, 1974).1
Rather than remand this case to Judge Clarie for confirmation of the delays that prevailed at the time of Roberson’s appeal, I would, on the basis of the record before us, decide now whether he was entitled as a matter of due process to have his appeals processed and heard within a shorter period of time than that permitted by Connecticut’s procedure. That issue is not easily resolved. Although a defendant, subject to certain conditions, is constitutionally entitled to a speedy trial in accordance with the Sixth Amendment, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), denial of a speedy appeal may not amount to a denial of due process. Cf. United States v. Massino, 432 F.2d 324 (2nd Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022, 91 S.Ct. 586, 27 L.Ed.2d 633 (1971) with Way v. Crouse, 421 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1970).2 Some of the reasons advanced in favor of a speedy trial (e. g. the express terms of the Sixth Amendment, the presumption of innocence, the risk of loss of evidence) are not persuasive in determining whether the Constitution requires an appeal to be heard within a prescribed period of time, or indeed, at all. Repeatedly the Supreme Court has stated “that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. See, e. g., McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-688 [14 S.Ct. 913, 914-915, 38 L.Ed. 867].” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 L.Ed. *311891 (1956). See also Monger v. Florida, 405 U.S. 958, 959, 92 S.Ct. 1163, 31 L.Ed.2d 236 (1972) (Douglas dissenting, joined by Brennan and Stewart).
The question here is whether, once having accorded Roberson a right of appeal, Connecticut was required by the Due Process Clause to process it promptly. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). I think we can and should resolve that issue on the records made available to us by the parties, rather than, by remanding, ourselves compound the delay that is the focus of Roberson’s attack.

. Upon oral argument counsel acknowledged the acceptability of statistics that had been presented to Judge Blumenfeld in Ralls, where he stated (375 F.Supp. at p. 1280)
“While the appellate procedures theoretically provide for a final determination of a direct appeal within approximately six months, the procedure apparently works very differently in practice. The petitioner has submitted statistical tables representing the timetable of review of the seventy criminal appeals decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court between November 4, 1970, and December 18, 1973. The tables are not controverted or challenged by the state. The data indicate that during the three years covered by the tables, no criminal appeal taken by a defendant has received final determination by the Connecticut Supreme Court in less than thirteen months after a notice of appeal was filed. Moreover, less than ten percent of the criminal appeals by defendants decided during the three-year period were decided in less than eighteen months. Slightly more than half the appeals were decided in eighteen to thirty months, and almost forty percent of the appeals were pending more than thirty months before final decision. The average length of time for a criminal appeal by a defendant was approximately thirty months.”

. Nor does the fact that state appellate delay may excuse exhaustion of remedies upon an application for habeas corpus relief, United States ex rel. Graham v. Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463 (2nd Cir. 1972), bear any relevance to the possible unconstitutionality of the delay itself.