Court Opinion

ID: 9672458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:55:27.763975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:16.337499
License: Public Domain

DOGGETT, Justice,
dissenting.
Having previously announced a stay of execution,1 the majority now grants a full judicial pardon for what the trial court found to be a capital offense. Observing first-hand the conduct of the parties in this *173case, after multiple hearings, and after reviewing a lengthy report by a special master appointed to hear discovery matters, the trial judge determined that:
• “Remington’s conduct throughout this proceeding has been flagrant bad faith and its counsel has engaged in a callous abuse of the discovery process.”
• “Remington’s counsel B. Lee Ware acted in bad faith during the discovery process and has engaged in a callous abuse of the discovery process.”
• “The bad faith conduct of Remington and its counsel in the conduct of the discovery process and the trial of this cause resulted in denial of a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of the litigants.”
• “Remington’s conduct and the conduct of its counsel B. Lee Ware throughout this proceeding in the hindrance of the discovery process justified a presumption that its claims and defenses lack merit.”
The actions of Remington and its counsel, in the opinion of the trial judge, warranted an order striking Remington’s pleadings, granting a default judgment against it, prohibiting it from seeking contribution, indemnity or offset, and barring mitigating evidence on punitive damages. Rather than according deference to this trial judge by upholding the death penalty sanctions imposed, the majority grants Remington a full pardon for its bad faith conduct.
In a similar sanctioning of Chrysler Corporation, a trial judge in Nueces County issued findings chronicling repeated falsehoods to the court, violations of court orders and obstructions and delay of the discovery process, and concluded that:
• “Chrysler’s long standing and flagrant discovery conduct in this case can only be described as a wilful failure to comply with its responsibilities of discovery under our state’s Rules of Civil Procedure and orders of this court. Such a callous disregard for its responsibilities therein will not be tolerated by this Court.”
• “Chrysler’s lengthy and continuous obstruction of Plaintiffs’ discovery efforts clearly justifies the presumption ... that Chrysler believes its defenses to Plaintiffs’ allegations lack merit.”
Again, the majority intervened, overturning the trial court’s efforts to curb extreme and offensive discovery abuse. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1992, orig. proceeding).2
The word “sanction” has two distinct and opposite meanings. A sanction can be a punishment designed to encourage compliance with the law, or it can indicate approval or ratification of conduct.3 By repeatedly overturning the sanctions imposed by trial judges to punish abuse of the discovery process, the majority has chosen to sanction — or ratify — the underlying bad faith conduct. In disarming trial courts by denying them an effective mechanism to ensure compliance with discovery rules, the majority second-guesses trial judges by retrying sanctions in this court and consequently condones and encourages discovery abuse and delay.
In granting today’s pardon, the majority ignores Remington’s long history of discovery abuse, and the many procedures followed by the trial court prior to ordering severe sanctions for conduct it found to be callous and in bad faith. The underlying litigation concerns whether a defect in the Remington Model 700 rifle caused injury to David Craig in November 1985 by discharging without the trigger being pulled.4 Pretrial discovery took place over a fourteen-month period and was at times hotly disputed, requiring the appointment of a special master. Determining that “Remington has acted in bad faith and has abused the discovery process” by failing to produce documents as required by the court’s order *174and agreement of counsel, the trial court on February 9 ordered Remington to pay $25,000 as a monetary sanction. Remington was further directed, as an “additional sanction,” to pay the master’s fees and expenses. Mandating compliance with the production order and agreement no later than a date set by the master, the order warned that “any future abuse of the discovery process” or any failure to comply with any order of the trial court or special master would result in the imposition of death penalty sanctions. Following continued alleged discovery abuse, a two-day hearing was held before the special master on Craig’s motion to strike Remington’s pleadings in May 1989. Both parties presented evidence and examined witnesses as to discovery procedures; no sanctions were, however, imposed at that time.
The case proceeded to trial in February 1990 before a jury, which determined that, although Remington had failed to warn of the rifle’s potential for misfiring, such failure did not cause Craig’s injuries. Craig requested a new trial and sought further sanctions for Remington’s discovery abuses. A hearing was held on both motions; at the court’s request, the special master filed a report concerning the conduct of Remington and its counsel during pretrial discovery. That report condemned the conduct of Remington and its counsel for obstructing the discovery process by failing to cooperate, by engaging in delaying tactics and by making a misrepresentation to the special master.
The trial judge granted a new trial. In a separate order on March 21, 1990, he struck Remington’s pleadings, rendered a default judgment, prohibited Remington from conducting further discovery and from offering evidence to contest liability, and denied Remington contribution, indemnity or offset based on the comparative responsibility of any other party for the injuries. Although declining to review this sanctions order, we previously directed its reconsideration by the trial court in light of TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell. Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell, 820 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
After a November 29, 1991 hearing, the trial court reaffirmed its previous imposition of sanctions. The order, signed December 7, referenced repeated violations of court orders, including discovery orders, the court’s earlier determination of Remington’s bad faith and abuse of the discovery process, its previous sanctions and warning, the master’s findings and the conduct of Remington’s counsel, as well as hearings and filings throughout the pen-dency of the case. The trial court concluded, under TransAmerican, that there was a direct relationship between Remington’s offensive conduct and the sanction imposed; that lesser sanctions had proved ineffective and that severe sanctions were justified; that the conduct of Remington and its counsel justified a presumption that its defenses lack merit; and that the bad faith conduct of Remington and its counsel during discovery had resulted in a denial of a fair hearing to the litigants. The trial court’s order set forth findings of misconduct by Remington and its counsel, including numerous violations of prior orders as to discovery, several misrepresentations to the court, interjection of frivolous and un-meritorious objections to discovery, and obstruction of the discovery process in the manner in which documents were provided for the special master to review. The trial court found that both Remington and its counsel had acted in bad faith and had abused the discovery process. These are the findings that the majority now effectively overturns.
A well-defined pattern is now in place demonstrating the majority’s determination to meddle with those trial courts that possess the fortitude to utilize penalties against those who thwart the objective of the discovery process — the search for truth. I joined the consensus effort in this court in TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding), recognizing that appellate review is sometimes required when trial courts misuse their potent sanctions powers. Yet because the trial judge who has witnessed first-hand the conduct of the parties is clearly in the best position to *175assess the level of bad faith involved as well as the most appropriate means of punishment, reasonable discretion must be accorded, particularly in making factual determinations. Affording no deference, the majority has now clearly converted the broad constraints expressed in Trans-American into routine de novo review of sanctions.
The majority opinion in Chrysler correctly set forth the scope of the inquiry under TransAmerican:
Two factors mark the bounds of the trial court’s discretion in order for sanctions to be just: first, a direct relationship between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed must exist; and second, the sanction imposed must not be excessive. In other words, “the punishment should fit the crime.” [TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917.]
A permissible sanction should, therefore, be no more severe than required to satisfy legitimate purposes. This means that a court must consider relatively less stringent sanctions first to determine whether lesser sanctions will fully promote compliance, deterrence, and discourage further abuse. Id.
841 S.W.2d at 849. In performing this review, there is a tension between according proper deference to the trial court’s factual determinations and ensuring that no abuse of discretion has been committed. While free to examine the entire record to ensure compliance with TransAmerican, this court should not undertake independent factfinding. We do not examine specific instances of conduct one by one, but look at the proceedings as a whole to determine the propriety of the sanctions imposed. While we stated in Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding), that “[t]he judicial system cannot afford immediate review of every discovery sanction,” neither can it afford to engage in de novo review of every case involving severe sanctions.
This, however, is precisely the approach that the majority has begun regularly to employ. Examining the most minute details of the record in Chrysler, quoting remarks from the bench, discussing at length particular discovery disputes — then resolving all facts in Chrysler’s favor, five judges in Austin chose to become substitute factfinders. The majority overturned sanctions imposed by a trial judge who made extensive factual findings as to Chrysler’s bad faith conduct and who had appropriately examined each of the considerations dictated by TransAmerican. These findings were rejected in a single sentence:
Nor do we find any evidence in the record of flagrant bad faith or counsel’s callous disregard for the obligations of discovery.
841 S.W.2d at 850. This method of review violates the long observed restriction on this court’s ability in an original proceeding to resolve disputed facts.5
For Remington, the majority’s approach is slightly different. First, most of the trial court’s findings are disregarded on technical grounds. Then the remainder, as in Chrysler, are separately analyzed and found not to warrant severe sanctions.
Remington’s bad faith abuse of the discovery process, the majority determines, cannot serve as the basis for sanctions because Craig waived his right to complain: “the failure to obtain a pretrial ruling on discovery disputes that exist before commencement of trial constitutes a waiver of any claim for sanctions based on that conduct.” Majority Opinion at 170. As justification for this new and unprecedented rule, the majority relies on misleading scholarship and materials outside the record. The opinion cites one case and one commentary, neither of which addresses sanctions and both of which are concerned exclusively with the need to obtain a ruling on special *176exceptions prior to trial.6 The waiver theory is then buttressed with the declaration that:
We hold that Craig waived any objections to these matters when he certified to the trial court that his pleadings were in order and that discovery was complete.
Id. at 170. Nothing in the record indicates that Craig made any such certification. Unfortunately, the concept that an appellate court’s review is strictly limited to the record is once again being ignored by the majority. See Speer v. Presbyterian Children’s Home and Service Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.1993) (avoiding merits of employment discrimination claim by declaring cause moot based entirely upon alleged post-trial developments for which no record of any kind was offered).
Additionally, today’s action improperly amends by judicial opinion an explicit procedural rule. See Alvarado v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex.1992) (“Nor should we revise [Rule 215] by opinion.”). In delineating the type of conduct that can serve as a basis for sanctions, Rule 215 authorizes no restriction on the timing of their imposition. While requiring that punishable conduct occur during pretrial discovery, the rule in no way mandates that the sanctions be levied prior to trial commencement.
Nor is waiver, real or imagined, relevant in determining whether Remington should be punished for its bad faith conduct. Nothing in our procedural rules requires that sanctions be in response to the motion of a party. Under Rule 215.2 and 215.3, “the court [may] impose sanctions sua sponte, even if no motion is filed.” Report of Texas Supreme Court Task Force on Sanctions at 21 (1993). How then can the conduct of the victimized party disempower the court from imposing sanctions that it finds so overwhelmingly deserved?
Having handily eliminated most of the trial court’s findings, the majority then proceeds to divide and conquer those remaining beginning with the conduct of Remington’s counsel at trial. Even if misconduct at trial is beyond the scope of Rule 215, a trial judge should certainly be entitled to consider what occurred at trial in evaluating the extent and effect of pretrial abuse. Two findings addressed to Remington’s trial conduct are clearly viewed by the trial court as revealing a failure to comply with pretrial discovery orders.7 Although the majority recognizes that not all discovery abuse is apparent at the very moment of occurrence, and may, under some circumstances, be revealed only by events during or after the trial, Majority Opinion at 170,8 it nonetheless painfully retries Remington’s trial conduct and finds it wanting under TransAmerican.
Upon close study, however, the majority opinion reveals that the issues of bad faith or abuse of the discovery process are irrelevant to whether sanctions may be levied against a party. Rather than focusing on the litany of abuses recorded by the trial judge, the majority instead weighs the ultimate issues of liability in the underlying litigation:
This record, as evidenced by the jury’s verdict [attributing causative liability to Debbie James and not Remington], rebuts rather than supports such an inference [that Remington’s claims or defenses lack merit].
*177Id. at 171. No matter how egregious Remington’s conduct, the majority concludes, ultimate sanctions would be unwarranted. Employing precisely the same tactic in Chrysler, the majority noted the fact that a drunk driver was one proximate cause of the accident and concluded that: •
In fact, the record conclusively refutes any such suggestion [that Chrysler’s claims or defenses lack merit].
841 S.W.2d at 850 & n. 12.
This approach distorts beyond recognition the statement in TransAmerican that “Discovery sanctions cannot be used to adjudicate the merits of a party’s claims unless a party’s hindrance of the discovery process justifies a presumption that its claims or defenses lack merit.” 811 S.W.2d at 918. Under TransAmerican, the sole inquiry is the conduct of the sanctioned party during discovery, and whether that conduct is so obstructive to the judicial process that a party should not be entitled to proceed. The fact that a valid defense may or may not exist is not a factor to be considered. Otherwise, a party like Remington or Chrysler, that may only be partially liable for an accident, could never be subjected to severe sanctions no matter how callous the pretrial abuse. It is particularly unfair to vindicate Remington on the basis of a jury verdict that may very well have been directly affected by the discovery abuse and bad faith found by the trial court.
Today’s decision has far-reaching effects. In the Texas judiciary, numerous practical considerations discourage imposition of harsh sanctions — it is always easier to say “go work it out,” to dissuade counsel from bringing heated discovery battles that are difficult to sort out before the busy trial judge. In the unusual situation where the trial court takes an interest in such a struggle, follows TransAmerican, and finally says “Enough!,” the majority has now imposed another disincentive. The trial judge who does nothing about discovery abuse or at most offers a slight slap on the wrist need never fear review here. Doing too little to ensure that the search for the truth is meaningful will not justify involvement by this majority. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.1992, orig. proceeding) (making it more difficult to obtain timely review of decisions denying discovery). But if the trial court orders a meaningful sanction, a full de novo trial in this court is guaranteed. In overturning sanctions in cases such as this one in which the trial court has found highly egregious conduct, the majority ensures that trial judges will be further discouraged from taking the time and trouble to punish bad faith behavior.
The findings made by the trial court here establish a continued disregard for both its orders and the discovery process sufficient to support a presumption that Remington’s defenses lack merit. Lesser sanctions were imposed and were ineffective to curb the abuse. Under these circumstances and having reviewed the entire record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing severe sanctions. Remington’s request for mandamus relief should be denied.
GAMMAGE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. This proceeding concerns conduct that occurred in 1989, was reflected in a lengthy jury trial in February 1990 and was thereafter the subject of a March 21, 1990 sanctions order. The manufacturer first sought mandamus review of the sanctions order in April 1990, was denied relief in the court of appeals but granted an immediate stay the day it sought mandamus here in June 1990. Not until June 1991 was this matter finally decided by instructing the trial court to reconsider its order. Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell, 820 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding) (per curiam). After the trial judge reaffirmed the imposition of sanctions, Remington again sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals overruled Remington’s request on April 23, 1992. The following day it received another immediate stay from this court, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted in February 1993, three years after the first trial.

. I joined Justices Mauzy and Gammage in dissenting in that case; Justice Gonzalez noted his dissent on rehearing. 841 S.W.2d at 853.

. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2008-009 (1976).'

.Similar claims regarding the Model 700 are at issue in the underlying litigation in Chapa v. Garcia, 848 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.1992, orig. proceeding), and Remington v. Canales, 837 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.1992, orig. proceeding).

. Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 24 (Tex.1992, orig. proceeding); Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex.1991, orig. proceeding); Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex.1990, orig. proceeding). See also Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex.1992, orig. proceeding) ("With respect to resolution of factual issues ... the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).

. Olney Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Farmers Mkt., Inc., 764 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1989, writ denied) ("The record exhibiting the lack of evidence of filing of the exceptions and showing an affirmative announcement of 'ready' without requesting a ruling constitutes a waiver of any possible error by Appellant.”); 3 Roy W. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 17:9 (1992) (section entitled “Special Exceptions").

. The findings, set out in a footnote in the majority opinion, included the trial court’s determination that Remington offered materials at trial that it had not produced in discovery and had misrepresented to the court had in fact been produced, and that Remington failed to disclose the scope of proposed testimony of a expert witness. Majority, Opinion at 169-170 n. 4.

.The standard for determining which conduct has been waived by announcing ready for trial is left unclear. Is the standard whether one should have known of the discovery abuse or is it actual knowledge?