Court Opinion

ID: 4560246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2020-08-26 21:01:55.817186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:16.776093
License: Public Domain

TENNESSEE  BUREAU  OF WORKERS’  COMPENSATION                     
                      WORKERS’  COMPENSATION    APPEALS BOARD                       
                                                                                    
          Katlyn N. McLaurin              )  Docket No. 2017-03-1133                
                                          )                                         
                                                                                    
          v.                              )  State File No. 69883-2017              
                                          )                                         
          AT&T Services, LLC, et al.      )                                         
                                          )                                         
                                          )                                         
          Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )                                       
                                                                                    
          Compensation Claims             )                                         
          Lisa A. Lowe, Judge             )                                         
                                                                                    
                       Affirmed and Remanded—Filed January 31, 2019                 
                                                                                    
          In this second interlocutory appeal, the employer challenges the trial court’s denial of its
          request to compel the employee to submit to a second independent medical examination
                                                                                    
          by a physician of the employer’s choosing. The trial court concluded the employer’s
          request was unreasonable and premature and denied the employer’s motion. The
          employer has appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s
          decision and remand the case.                                             
                                                                                    
          Presiding Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in
          which Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined.          
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
          W. Troy Hart, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, AT&T Services, LLC
                                                                                    
          Timothy Roberto, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Katlyn N. McLaurin
                                                                                    
                            Factual and Procedural Background                       
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
               Katlyn McLaurin (“Employee”) alleged suffering mental injuries as a result of
          being confronted on September 8, 2017, by an armed resident of a house to which she
          had been dispatched by AT&T Services, LLC (“Employer”), for an installation job.
          Employer initially denied the claim but later entered into an agreed order to provide
          reasonable and necessary medical treatment. As a result of a prior expedited hearing and
          interlocutory appeal, Employer was also required to provide past and ongoing temporary
                                                                                    
          disability benefits. See McLaurin v. AT&T Services, LLC, No. 2017-06-1133, 2018 TN
          Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 29, 2018).
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
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               Subsequently, Dr. John Robertson, Employee’s authorized physician, placed
          Employee at maximum medical improvement on August 24, 2018, and assigned a 20%
          permanent partial impairment rating. Employer requested, and Employee agreed to
          attend, an examination with a physician of Employer’s choice. As a result, Employee
          was evaluated by Dr. Michael Fisher on October 25, 2018.                  
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
               Dr. Fisher stated that in his “professional opinion there is no question that her
          present injury is greater than 50% related to the alleged work event.” He credited
          Employee’s assertion that her condition had improved and recommended she be re-
          evaluated in six months to determine whether she had reached maximum medical
          improvement and, if so, the extent of her impairment. Dr. Fisher noted he was “willing to
          see her again, but I will be retiring and hope to be closing my practice by April 1.
                                                                                    
          Because of this, if I were to see her, it would need to be before April 1, 2019.”
                                                                                    
               Within days of Dr. Fisher’s evaluation, Employer filed a motion to compel
          Employee to undergo a second evaluation by a different physician of its choosing,
          asserting such a request was reasonable because Dr. Fisher would be unavailable after
          April 1, 2019, and that a third opinion “would be necessary and helpful to the court.”
          Employee disagreed, arguing Employer was seeking another opinion because it was
                                                                                    
          displeased with Dr. Fisher’s opinion. The trial court denied Employer’s motion, finding
          “[Employer’s] request for an IME with a second physician unreasonable and premature at
          this time.” Employer has appealed.                                        
                                                                                    
                                   Standard of Review                               
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
               The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding whether to
          grant or deny a request for a medical examination pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
          section 50-6-204(d)(1) is abuse of discretion. Perry v. Gap, Inc., No. M2004-02525-WC-
          R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 448, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel May 31, 2006).
          This standard prohibits an appellate court from substituting its judgment for that of the
          trial court, and the appellate court will find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court
          “applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a
                                                                                    
          clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that causes an
          injustice to the complaining party.” Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166,
          176 (Tenn. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton
          Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008)). The abuse of discretion standard
          of review does not immunize a lower court’s decision from meaningful appellate
          scrutiny, however, as discretionary decisions “require a conscientious judgment,
          consistent with the facts, that takes into account the applicable law.” White v. Beeks, 469
                                                                                    
          S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tenn. 2015).                                             
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
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                                       Analysis                                     
                                                                                    
                                         A.                                         
                                                                                    
               As an initial matter, we note that Employer cites Tennessee Code Annotated
                                                                                    
          section 50-6-217(a)(3) (repealed 2017) in support of its position on appeal. Section 50-6-
          217(a)(3) authorized us to reverse or modify a trial court’s decision if the rights of a party
          were prejudiced because the findings of the trial judge were “not supported by evidence
          that is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.” However, as we
          have noted on numerous occasions, this code section was repealed effective May 9, 2017,
          and is no longer applicable.1                                             
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                         B.                                         
                                                                                    
               Turning to the merits of this appeal, Employer argues that because the doctor it
          chose to perform the first evaluation will retire shortly before Employee’s recommended
          six-month follow-up, it is reasonable to compel Employee to undergo another
          examination performed by a different physician now. Thus, according to Employer, the
          trial court erred in (1) “refusing to allow Employer to obtain an independent medical
                                                                                    
          evaluation (IME) regarding diagnosis, degree of impairment, and causation when the
          only impairment rating that has been provided is from the authorized treating physician”;
          and (2) “finding that Employer’s request for an IME was not reasonable at this time.”
          We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either respect.
                                                                                    
               With regard to Employer’s first argument, Employer appears to be overlooking a
                                                                                    
          crucial point: it was allowed to obtain an independent medical evaluation. That is
          precisely what Dr. Fisher provided. While Employer may have been dissatisfied with Dr.
                                                                                    
          1 See Travis v. Carter Express, Inc., No. 2018-03-0237, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 67, at *6
          n.1 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Dec. 21, 2018); Miller v. Logan’s Roadhouse, Inc., No. 2018-06-
          0225, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 59, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov. 15, 2018);
          Bullard v. Facilities Performance Grp., No. 2017-08-1053, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 37, at
          *5 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 7, 2018); Ledford v. Mid Georgia Courier, Inc., No. 2017-01-
          0740, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 28, at *4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. June 4, 2018);
          Duignan v. Stowers Machinery Corp., No. 2017-03-0080, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 25, at
          *8-9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 29, 2018); Ogden v. McMinnville Tool & Die, Inc., No.
          2016-05-1093, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 14, at *9-10 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd.
          May 7, 2018); Edwards v. Fred’s Pharmacy, No. 2017-06-0526, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS
          9, at *5-6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 14, 2018); Bowlin v. Servall, LLC, No. 2017-07-0224,
          2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *6-7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2018);
          Thompson v. Comcast Corp., No. 2017-05-0639, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *12-13
          (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 30, 2018); Baker v. Electrolux, No. 2017-06-0070, 2017 TN Wrk.
          Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 65, at *5-6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 20, 2017); Butler v. AAA
          Cooper Transportation, No. 2016-07-0459, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 54, at *5-6 (Tenn.
          Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 12, 2017); Glasgow v. 31-W Insulation Co., Inc., No. 2017-05-0225,
          2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 51, at *11-12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 6, 2017).
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          Fisher’s opinion, Employer was not prevented from obtaining such an opinion. What
          Employer seeks here, and what it essentially argues the law protects, is a third opinion.
          Employer relies on Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1) (2018), which
          states that the “injured employee must submit to examination by the employer’s
          physician at all reasonable times if requested to do so by the employer.” As we have
                                                                                    
          pointed out before, the “rule has developed that ‘physical examinations requested
          pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(1) generally should be
          granted.’” King v. Big Binder Express, LLC, No. 2016-07-0378, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp.
          App. Bd. LEXIS 92, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Dec. 7, 2016) (quoting
          Perry, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 448, at *7). However, we have also observed that “an
          employer’s right to an examination of an employee pursuant to section 50-6-204(d)(1) by
          a physician of the employer’s choosing is not without limits.” Id.        
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
               In order to compel an employee to submit to an examination by a physician of the
          employer’s choice, “the employer’s request [must] be made at a ‘reasonable
          time[]’ and ‘be reasonable, as a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances.’” Id. at
          *11 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[r]easonableness in ‘each case must be determined
          upon all the particular facts of that particular case.’” Id. “The statute does not require
          repeated examinations be conducted because the employer is displeased with the results.”
                                                                                    
          Cross v. Norrod Builders, Inc., No. M2005-00743-WC-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 855,
          at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Apr. 11, 2006); see also Perry, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS
          448 (affirming the trial court’s conclusion that, where the employee had been seen by one
          of the employer’s physicians, she was not required to see another).       
                                                                                    
               In this case, the trial court concluded Employer’s request was unreasonable, and
                                                                                    
          we find no abuse of discretion in that finding. Employer, after learning Employee had
          been placed at maximum medical improvement with an impairment rating, requested an
          examination by a physician of its choice. Employee agreed, and she was seen by Dr.
          Fisher. Employer, upon receiving that physician’s report, then sought to obtain another
          opinion, which the trial court found was unreasonable.                    
                                                                                    
               Employer argues that, because Dr. Fisher is planning to retire, it is necessary for
                                                                                    
          another physician to examine Employee since Dr. Fisher will be unavailable for
          Employee’s follow-up appointment. However, Dr. Fisher did not state he would be
          unavailable. Rather, he stated that if he was going to see her, it would need to be before
          he retired. While that date is approximately one month sooner than the recommended
          follow-up date, Dr. Fisher indicated his willingness to see Employee again. And while
          Dr. Fisher indicated his intent to retire, he may decide to continue practicing, a point not
          lost on the trial judge who noted Employer’s request was premature. Moreover,
                                                                                    
          Employer has reasonable opportunities to depose Dr. Fisher or obtain his expert opinions
          in another admissible form, and there is no indication in this record it cannot do so either
          before or after his planned retirement date.                              
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
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               Given the circumstances presented, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its
          discretion. Employer has not established that its desire for a successive opinion is
          reasonable at this time. After six months have elapsed, if Employee cannot see Dr. Fisher
          and does not wish to attend an examination with another physician, Employer may ask
          the trial court to revisit the issue.                                     
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                      Conclusion                                    
                                                                                    
               For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
          in denying Employer’s request for another opinion. Accordingly, the trial court’s
          decision is affirmed, and the case is remanded.                           
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
                                                                                    
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