Court Opinion

ID: 9919408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:05:51.710549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.614692
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3772-21

PAUL SCHORR,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE PLANNING BOARD OF
THE CITY OF TRENTON and
AJAX HOLDING II, LLC,

     Defendants-Respondents,
___________________________

                   Submitted December 5, 2023 – Decided January 18, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-0546-22.

                   Paul Schorr, appellant pro se.

                   McGill & Hall LLC, attorneys for respondent The
                   Planning Board of the City of Trenton (George D.
                   McGill, of counsel and on the brief).

                   Sills Cummis & Gross, PC, attorneys for respondents
                   Ajax Holding II, LLC (Mark Evan Duckstein, of
                   counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Paul Schorr (Schorr) appeals from the June 27, 2022 order dismissing, as

untimely, his challenge of the Planning Board of the City of Trenton's (Board)

approval of Ajax Holdings II, LLC, project (Ajax or Ajax Project). We affirm.

                                        I.

      We glean the facts and procedural history from the motion records. On

April 14, 2021, Ajax filed an application with the Board for variances and final

and preliminary site plan approvals.

      On August 12, 2021, the Board held a public meeting. Before considering

Ajax's application, the Board considered the application of another developer,

Vista. Ajax and Vista had the same principals and were represented by the same

attorney, but their applications were separate.

      After Vista's presentation but before the Board's vote the following

interaction transpired on the record:

            [Board Member]: . . . there[ is] some question in some
            of the correspondence about right to salvage material
            from the building before it comes down? Is that a
            consideration of yours . . . ?

            [Vista]: Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. Do you want any
            bannisters . . . ?

            [Board Member]: I might just want that iron fence from
            in front of the building.

                                                                          A-3772-21
                                        2
             [Vista]: Well, it[ is] all yours. . . . We[ will] be happy
             to work with historic preservation. . . .

             [Board Attorney]: Okay, we[ will] add that condition.

             [Board Member]: Thank you.

             [Board Chairperson]: Coordinate through either the
             Historic Commission or the Landmarks folks with that?

             [Vista]: Sure.

Thereafter, the Board considered Ajax's application; hearing testimony on

behalf of Ajax, public comment, and objection from Schorr. The Board voted

to approve the application. On October 28, 2021, the Board adopted a resolution

granting Ajax's application.     On November 3, 2021, the Times of Trenton

published notice of the Board's resolution granting Ajax's application.

      On November 12, 2021, nine days after the Board's notice of publication

of the Ajax resolution, Schorr filed a "Complaint In Lieu of Prerogative Writs

and for Other Relief" (Initial Complaint) against the Board, Ajax, and Vista.

The Initial Complaint alleged the Board's approval was arbitrary, capricious and

unreasonable and the Board member's request for the historic fence created a

conflict of interest. Schorr sought reversal of the approvals and a remand "in

view of the potential conflict of interest."

                                                                          A-3772-21
                                         3
      In response to the Initial Complaint, Ajax filed a motion to dismiss

arguing, in part, Schorr, "c[ould ]not challenge two distinct and unrelated project

approvals in a single action." Schorr opposed that part of the motion arguing

"that both matters 'involve common questions of law,' and it is in the interest of

judicial economy to consider the projects together."

      On January 25, 2022, the motion judge heard the parties' oral arguments

and, in a written opinion, found "[Schorr's] [c]omplaint improperly join[ed]

legal challenges to two separate and distinct claims." He found joinder was not

required under Rule 4:28-1, nor permitted under Rule 4:29-1. The motion judge

noted Schorr "remain[ed] free to bring an action against each project separately[

and he was] not pass[ing] judgment on the merits of . . . [the] [c]omplaint." The

motion judge entered an order dismissing Schorr's Initial Complaint without

prejudice.1

1
   Schorr's Notice of Appeal does not include the January 25, 2022 order of
dismissal. "Therefore th[e] order[ is] not within the scope of his appeal, and we
will not address [it]." 30 River Court East Urban Renewal Co. v. Capograsso,
383 N.J. Super. 470, 474 (App. Div. 2006) (citing R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(i); Fusco v. Bd.
of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 460-62 (App. Div. 2002)). However,
we note that Rule 4:30 provides "[m]isjoinder of parties is not ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by the court order on
motion by any party or its own motion. Any claim against a party may be
reserved or severed and proceeded with separately by court order."

                                                                             A-3772-21
                                        4
        On March 24, 2022, Schorr filed a New Complaint against the Board and

Ajax.

        On May 24, 2022, Ajax filed a motion to dismiss the New Complaint as

untimely under Rule 4:69-6(a). Ajax contended "Schorr failed to take any action

towards re-filing his claims against Ajax until he initiated this action . . . a period

of [fifty-seven] days from the entry of the [motion judge]'s dismissal order."

Moreover, "[e]ven if the period of time during which the [Initial] Complaint was

pending . . . is ignored, [sixty-six] days expired between the publication of notice

and filing of the [New] Complaint."

        Schorr opposed the motion arguing, in part: (1) Ajax's calculation of the

days for filing was "arbitrary," because as of the motion judge's January 25,

2022 order, the forty-five-day time period had elapsed; and (2) the Board failed

to "submit[] any papers in response" to the Initial or New Complaints.

        The motion judge heard the parties' oral arguments on June 25, 2022. On

June 27, he authored another written opinion. The motion judge found Schorr's:

              complaint . . . violat[ed] . . . Rule 4:69-6(a). On
              November 3, 2021, . . . Ajax's application for land use
              approvals was publicly noticed in the Times of Trenton.
              . . . On November 12, 202[1], nine days after public
              notice, [Schorr] filed his [I]nitial [C]omplaint . . . . This
              [c]ourt dismissed the same on January 25, 2022. The
              [c]ourt does not factor the pendency of the initial
              complaint into is calculations. Once this [c]ourt

                                                                                A-3772-21
                                           5
            dismissed [the Initial Complaint, Schorr] retained
            thirty-six days in which he could timely file a complaint
            against [d]efendants. [Schorr filed the New Complaint]
            on March 25, 2022, fifty-seven days after his [I]nitial
            [C]omplaint was dismissed and twenty-one days
            beyond the forty-five-day deadline.

The motion judge explained the dismissal of the Initial Complaint "was not an

invitation for [Schorr] to take an extended period of time," and despite

"maintain[ing] thirty-six days to file []his action . . . [Schorr] failed to do so."

Finding "Rule 4:69-6 exists to provide 'stability and finality to public actions[]'

[and] 'to give an essential measure of repose to actions taken against public

bodies[,]'" (citations omitted), the motion judge dismissed the New Complaint

with prejudice because it was untimely.

      The motion judge "dismiss[ed] the [New C]omplaint in its entirety,

notwithstanding the failure of the [Board] to file a responsive pleading." The

judge reasoned

            [a] filing out of time is out of time as to all [d]efendants
            and to leave the [New C]omplaint open against the
            public body [Board], or to permit the entry of default
            against it, would merely require the . . . Board to seek
            to vacate default and then file a successful motion to
            dismiss the [New C]omplaint. That is not a wise use of
            judicial or public resources.

      Here, Schorr argues the motion judge erred: (1) "in determining that [he]

did not comply with Rule 4:69-6 when the action commenced on November 12,

                                                                              A-3772-21
                                         6
2021, nine . . . days after the notice of decision published on November 3, 2021";

(2) "in dismissing the conflict of interest . . . after sworn statements by [a] board

member, 'I might just want that iron fence from in front of the building' and by

[Vista], 'Well it[ is] yours'"; and (3) "by dismissing the request to permit the

entry of default against the . . . Board after stating on the record that they had

not filed responsive pleadings."         We conclude Schorr's arguments are

unavailing.

                                         II.

      This appeal presents issues regarding the application of Rule 4:69-6.

"Appellate review of the meaning of the New Jersey Court Rules is de novo."

State v. Dickerson, 232 N.J. 2, 17 (2018).

                                         A.

      "The immediate issue before us is whether [Schorr] filed a timely action

in lieu of prerogative writs[, Rule 4:69-6,] challenging the validity" of the

Board's approval of the Ajax Project. In re Ordinance 2354-12 of W. Orange,

223 N.J. 589, 596 (2015). Rule 4:69-6(b)(3) provides:

              [n]o action in lieu of prerogative writs shall be
              commenced . . . to review a determination of a planning
              board . . . after [forty-five] days from publication of a
              notice once in the official newspaper of the
              municipality or a newspaper of general circulation in
              the municipality . . . .

                                                                               A-3772-21
                                         7
      Schorr argues that he complied with the Rule because he "commenced [an

action] within nine days after publication of the notice of decision." In effect,

he avers the timely filing of his Initial Complaint satisfied the Rule's timing

requirement, and, thereafter, he was free to file the New Complaint regardless

of the timeframe required by the Rule. We disagree.

      The Rule is "designed to give an essential measure of repose to actions

taken against public bodies." Tri-State Ship Repair & Dry Dock Co. v. City of

Perth Amboy, 349 N.J. Super. 418, 423 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Washington

Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adj. v. Washington Twp. Planning Bd., 217 N.J. Super.

215, 225 (App. Div. 1987)).

      The Initial Complaint was timely filed, nine days after public notice of the

Ajax project. However, the Initial Complaint was dismissed on January 27,

2022. Thereafter, allowing for the tolling of the time between the date of filing

of the Initial Complaint and the date of dismissal, Schorr had thirty-six days

remaining to file the New Complaint. He failed to do so.

      We conclude Schorr's delayed filing violated Rule 4:69-6(b)(3).           To

conclude otherwise would frustrate the design of the Rule, "to give an essential

measure of repose to actions taken against public bodies." Tri-State Ship, 349

N.J. Super. at 423. Therefore, his complaint is barred.

                                                                            A-3772-21
                                        8
                                        B.

      Schorr argues the Board member's question regarding the salvage of iron

fencing rises to the level of a conflict of interest. This argument is misguided.

      A claim alleging a conflict of interest on the part of a board member is an

important public interest that may warrant enlargement under Rule 4:69-6(c).

See Haggerty v. Red Bank Borough, 385 N.J. Super. 501, 511 (App. Div. 2006).

However, Schorr explains that he "raises the issue of a [c]onflict of [i]nterest[,]

not to ask for an enlargement[ of the forty-five-day period under Rule 4:69-

6(c)], but to seek reversal of the [Board's] decision."

      Therefore, Schorr's conflict of interest argument goes to the merits of the

Board's approval. In challenging the merits Schorr must comply with Rule 4:69-

6(a)(3). Since we conclude Schorr failed to comply with Rule 4:69-6(a)(3), his

conflict of interest argument is barred. See Matter of Borough of Englewood

Cliffs, 473 N.J. Super. 189, 205 (App. Div. 2022) (holding the Borough was

time barred by Rule 4:69-6 from asserting a conflict of interest in challenging

its own action in approving settlements).

                                        C.

                                                                             A-3772-21
                                         9
      Schorr argues the motion judge erred in "dismissing the request to permit

the entry of default against the . . . Board after stating on the record that they

had not filed responsive pleadings." We disagree.

      Our conclusion that Schorr's New Complaint was filed untimely applies

equally to Ajax and the Board. We agree with the motion judge that to allow a

futile entry of default would be a waste of judicial and public resources.

      Rule 1:1-2 provides:

            The rules . . . shall be construed to secure a just
            determination, simplicity in procedure, fairness in
            administration and the elimination of unjustifiable
            expense and delay. . . . [A]ny rule may be relaxed or
            dispensed with by the court in which the action is
            pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice.
            In the absence of rule, the court may proceed in any
            manner compatible with these purposes and, in civil
            cases, consistent with case management/trial
            management guidelines set forth in Appendix XX of
            these rules.

      Here, Schorr was provided with a full and complete opportunity to argue

the merits of the timeliness of his filing. Therefore, we conclude the dismissal

as to all defendants, including the Board, was appropriate.

      Affirmed.

                                                                             A-3772-21
                                       10