Court Opinion

ID: 9571962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:36:51.671783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:15.075156
License: Public Domain

LEVINSON, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusions, except for the specific portions holding (1) plaintiff’s evidence of lost tuition benefits from Davidson College (Davidson) was “overly speculative,” and (2) the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider punitive damages for alienation of affections. Further, because I would reverse the punitive damages award, I make no comment on defendant’s contention it was excessive as a matter of law.
I. PLAINTIFF’S LOST TUITION BENEFITS
I would hold that there is no error in the judgment on compensatory damages. While I agree with the majority’s presentation of the *370relevant case law, I reach a different conclusion upon analysis of the same as applied to the facts of this case.
Plaintiffs testimony regarding his lost income, benefits, and services was supplemented by expert testimony from Dr. Albert Link, Professor of Economics at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro’s Bryan School of Business, on “economic analysis.” Using information specific to plaintiff and Debra, as well as relevant statistical averages, Dr. Link calculated and reduced to present value the cost of, inter alia, plaintiffs lost tuition benefits from Davidson. Plaintiff also admitted into evidence a summary of Dr. Link’s calculations, which utilized a benchmark rate of inflation to calculate the probable cost of Davidson tuition through the period during which plaintiff’s children would likely attend college. Using this table, Dr. Link calculated the total amount that Davidson would have paid for plaintiff’s children’s education. He then reduced that amount to present value, based upon a conservative rate of growth. A comparison of this evidence to that reviewed in our Courts’ decisions regarding damages in wrongful death actions is instructive.
Our appellate Courts have often held that, in the context of wrongful death actions, losses related to a child’s future income are overly speculative if that child was stillborn. DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 431, 358 S.E.2d 489, 494 (1987) (quoting Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 310, 204 A.2d 140, 144 (1964)); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 400, 146 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1966); Fox-Kirk v. Hannon, 142 N.C. App. 267, 272, 542 S.E.2d 346, 351, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 725, 551 S.E.2d 437 (2001). However, this Court, while acknowledging that proof of future damages regarding children “involves a significant degree of speculation,” has allowed young children to recover for loss of earning capacity provided the evidence is sufficient to show that such damages are not unreasonably speculative. Fox-Kirk, 142 N.C. App. at 272, 542 S.E.2d at 351. In particular, it is significant that in Fox-Kirk this Court upheld admission of expert testimony on the probability that a child who was less than three years old at the time of a scarring injury would later attend college, and affirmed recovery for the child’s lost earning capacity. Id. at 273, 542 S.E.2d at 351.
The majority cites the children’s ages and the length of time before they will determine whether to attend college as factors contributing to the speculative nature of plaintiff’s claim. However, in light of precedent declining to hold damages unreasonably speculative where the evidence included the probability a child would have *371attended college but for her injuries before attaining three years of age, see Fox Kirk v. Hannon, id., I cannot agree that evidence of plaintiff’s lost tuition benefits for his children, all of whom were at least three years of age at the time of trial, is overly speculative.1
The majority also concludes plaintiff’s evidence of lost tuition benefits is too speculative because plaintiff did not offer evidence that Davidson’s tuition program would continue to exist in the future. However, the uncontradicted evidence was that Davidson’s tuition benefit program, rather than being a bonus, is guaranteed to all employees who have worked at Davidson for at least three years. The reasonable inference is that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, Davidson’s guaranteed tuition benefit program will exist when plaintiff’s children are college age.
In view of case law and the facts in this case, plaintiffs evidence of lost tuition benefits was properly submitted to the jury. I would affirm the award of compensatory damages in all respects.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS
Secondly, there is error in the judgment on punitive damages. I do not agree with the majority that the evidence of sexual intercourse, without other evidence of aggravating circumstances, is sufficient to allow the submission of punitive damages to the jury in this action for alienation of affections.
This Court recently examined an issue similar to that presented in this case, and stated that, “[e]vidence of ‘sexual relations’ will allow a plaintiff to get to the jury on the issue of punitive damages in a claim for alienation of affections.” Ward v. Beaton, 141 N.C. App. 44, 50, 539 S.E.2d 30, 34 (2000) (emphasis added). However, Ward cited and summarized the following cases in support of this proposition:
Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. [364,] 371, 514 S.E.2d [554,] 560 [(1999)] (finding sufficient aggravating factors where defendant engaged in sexual relations with plaintiff’s husband, publicly dis*372played the affair, welcomed him into her home numerous times, and called plaintiff’s home to determine his whereabouts); Jennings v. Jessen, 103 N.C. App. 739, 744, 407 S.E.2d 264, 267 (1991) (finding sufficient aggravating factors where defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with plaintiffs husband, as well as “cohabited for several weeks with [him] and was audacious enough to call plaintiff’s home in an attempt to discover [his] whereabouts”); Shaw v. Stringer, 101 N.C. App. 513, 517, 400 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1991) (finding sufficient aggravating factors where defendant had sexual intercourse with plaintiff’s wife, ignored plaintiff’s request not to visit the marital home, and laughed when plaintiff’s wife told him that plaintiff knew of the relationship).
Id. Ward also cited the following cases where the evidence was insufficient to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury: Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 431, 102 S.E. 769, 771 (1920) (ordering new trial where plaintiff received punitive damages for alienation of affections in case in which plaintiff did not make out criminal conversation and the court found no aggravating circumstances); Chappell v. Redding, 67 N.C. App. 397, 403, 313 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1984) (finding no evidence of criminal conversation, and reversing and remanding on the issue of punitive damages for alienation of affections because, although “the increasing amounts of time spent with plaintiff’s wife was enough to permit the alienation of affections issue to go to the jury, plaintiff [failed to show] additional circumstances of aggravation to justify the submission of the punitive damages issue”); Heist v. Heist, 46 N.C. App. 521, 527, 265 S.E.2d 434, 438 (1980) (affirming trial court’s refusal to enter judgment on the verdict for plaintiff on the issue of punitive damages where plaintiff’s only evidence of aggravation tended to show that defendant allowed plaintiff’s spouse to repeatedly visit her house even though defendant had knowledge that such visits caused marital discord).
The majority relies heavily on Ward in support of its conclusion that sexual intercourse, in and of itself, is sufficient to submit the issue of punitive damages to a jury.2 However, this was not the essen*373tial holding in Ward, and to the extent Ward can be interpreted to support that proposition it is obiter dicta. See State v. Hickey, 317 N.C. 457, 465, 346 S.E.2d 646, 652 (1986) (holding obiter dicta is not binding authority).
Although Ward includes the statement that evidence of sexual intercourse will allow submission of the issue of punitive damages, neither the cases upon which Ward relies nor the facts at issue in Ward support the majority’s conclusion. In addition to evidence of sexual intercourse, Ward found:
[T]here was evidence of other aggravating circumstances. Specifically, after forming a sexual relationship with plaintiff’s husband, the defendant accompanied him when he returned his children to the custody of plaintiff. On a later date, the defendant appeared unannounced at the front door of the marital home, asking plaintiff if they could be friends. Again, about a week later, defendant arrived in the driveway of the marital home while plaintiff’s husband was visiting his children, blowing the car horn for plaintiff’s husband. The plaintiff walked outside and recognized the defendant, who subsequently drove away without Mr. Ward. We find this evidence of additional circumstances of aggravation sufficient to warrant submission of the punitive damages issue to the jury on plaintiff’s claim for alienation of affections.
Ward, 141 N.C. App. at 51, 539 S.E.2d at 35 (emphasis added).
In Ward, as in all of the cases to which it cites in support of its proposition that sexual intercourse will allow submission of the issue of punitive damages to a jury, there was evidence of additional aggravating factors which supported submission of the issue to a jury. Moreover, none of the cases cited by Ward hold, as the majority does, that sexual intercourse, in and of itself, is sufficient to allow submission of punitive damages to a jury in an alienation of affections claim.
In Ward, defendant repeatedly harassed plaintiff at her home and flaunted her relationship with plaintiff’s husband. Id. In Hutelmyer, defendant publicly displayed her affair with plaintiff’s husband and called plaintiff’s home to determine his whereabouts. Hutelmyer, 133 N.C. App. at 371, 514 S.E.2d at 560. In Jennings, defendant cohabited for several weeks with plaintiff’s husband and called plaintiff’s home in an attempt to discover her husband’s whereabouts. Jennings, 103 *374N.C. App. at 744, 407 S.E.2d at 267. In Shaw, defendant ignored plaintiffs request not to visit the marital home and laughed when plaintiff’s wife told him that plaintiff knew of the relationship. Shaw, 101 N.C. App. at 517, 400 S.E.2d at 103.
Contrary to both the plaintiff’s contention and the majority holding, prior case law does not validate the conclusion that evidence of sexual intercourse, standing alone, is sufficient to submit the issue of punitive damages to a jury. Although there may be a correlation between cases involving sexual intercourse and those where the issue of punitive damages is submitted to the jury, relevant case law does not support the conclusion reached by the majority. Application of the majority’s interpretation of Ward to the instant case would lead to overreaching results and a wholesale disfigurement of the foundation upon which damage awards in claims for alienation of affections are based.
In light of the criteria requiring “willful, wanton, aggravated or malicious conduct” beyond that necessary to satisfy the elements of the tort itself, Ward, 141 N.C. App. at 50, 539 S.E.2d at 35, the gravamen of the standard for an award of punitive damages in an alienation of affections claim is not the mere commission or omission of certain acts, such as sexual intercourse. Rather, it is the display and manifestation of defendant’s actions to the plaintiff or others, in a way that tends to exacerbate plaintiff’s loss. See Chapell, 67 N.C. App. at 403, 313 S.E.2d at 243 (holding “there must be some evidence of circumstances of aggravation in addition to the malice implied by law from the conduct of defendant in alienating the affections between the spouses which was necessary to sustain a recovery of compensatory damages”).
Additionally, plaintiff argues there was evidence of other facts, apart from the evidence of sexual intercourse, that constitute malicious, willful, or wanton conduct sufficient to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. In his brief and at oral argument, plaintiff argues email communications, letters, and phone calls to Debra were sufficient evidence of aggravating circumstances. Plaintiff also points to the trial court’s judicial review of the punitive damages award pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1D-50 (2001):
(a) That the defendant knew the sexual affair between himself and Debbie Oddo Presser was wrong, and pursued said affair, and the sexual conduct involved, anyway;
*375(b) That the defendant intentionally pursued this sexual affair after Debbie Oddo Presser tried to terminate the relationship;
(c) That at the time of his conduct, the defendant knew that the plaintiff was married;
(d) That, at the time of the affair, the defendant pursued secret sexual meetings with Debbie Oddo Presser which he went to . substantial measures to hide both from the plaintiff and from his wife;
(e) That the criminal conversations and alienation of affections committed by the defendant resulted in the absolute divorce of the plaintiff and Debbie Oddo Presser; and
(f) That at the time of his conduct, the defendant himself was married and he separated from his wife soon after his sexual affair with Debbie Oddo Presser began.
The trial court’s review shows that defendant did not display or manifest to plaintiff or others his communication with Debra. Defendant’s actions are merely dimensions of the malice ascribed to the underlying tort of alienation of affections and would be inherent in most claims of alienation of affections. Thus, defendant’s actions are insufficient evidence of aggravating factors to allow the issue of punitive damages to be submitted to a jury.3 To hold otherwise renders meaningless the long held standard allowing punitive damages only where defendant’s actions evince circumstances of aggravation in addition to the malice implied by law from the tort itself. See Chapell, 67 N.C. App. at 403, 313 S.E.2d at 243.
In the case sub judice, unlike previous cases allowing punitive damages, there is no evidence of malicious, willful, or wanton conduct beyond that inherent in the underlying tort. Defendant did not flaunt or make known his contact with Debra. There is no record evidence that prior to separation defendant manifested his relationship *376with Debra or made known his feelings to anyone other than Debra. In essence, plaintiffs claim rests on the evidence of sexual intercourse occurring on one or two occasions, approximately two weeks before the parties separated.4
I would hold the evidence of sexual intercourse, in and of itself, was insufficient to allow the submission of punitive damages to the jury in the claim for alienation of affections. Because the verdict sheet combined the issues of punitive damages for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages for criminal conversation.

. Moreover, defendant’s argument on appeal that the tuition benefits are overly speculative is primarily grounded not on the question whether these children will attend college, but rather on evidence suggesting plaintiff might not continue working at Davidson for reasons unrelated to defendant’s conduct: (1) plaintiff’s DWI conviction; (2) the lack of success of Davidson’s wrestling team while plaintiff was its coach; and (3) the impact of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (2001) (prohibiting gender discrimination in educational programs or activities receiving federal funding) on Davidson’s decision to continue its wrestling program.

. The only other case authority the majority cites for its conclusion is Scott v. Kiker, 59 N.C. App. 458, 297 S.E.2d 142 (1982). Although Scott involves a claim for alienation of affections, it neither discusses nor holds anything relevant to the issue for which it is cited by the majority. Rather, the issue in Scott deals with spousal privilege and sheds no light on the evidence necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages for alienation of affections.

. Although N.C.G.S. § 1D-35 (2001) sets forth the factors a jury may consider in determining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded, the first inquiry under G.S. § 1D-15 is whether, due to defendant’s fraudulent, malicious, willful, or wanton conduct, sufficient evidence of aggravation exists to entitle plaintiff to punitive damages. Therefore, although G.S. § ID-35 includes concealment as a factor in determining the amount of punitive damages, its inclusion is not determinative of whether there is aggravation pursuant to G.S. § 1D-15 (standards for recovery of punitive damages). Furthermore, I note that in many garden variety civil tort actions, the evidence may suggest feature(s) described in G.S. § ID-35. This does not mean, of course, that every one of these tortfeasors is necessarily subject to punitive damages.

. There is some evidence that defendant and Debra engaged in sexual intercourse once after plaintiff and Debra separated, but before they divorced. However, plaintiff may not recover damages for post-separation conduct. Pharr v. Beck, 147 N.C. App. 268, 273, 554 S.E.2d 851, 855 (2001) (in an action for alienation of affections, spouse may not recover damages for post-separation conduct).