Court Opinion

ID: 9491077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:03:08.593351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:29.763641
License: Public Domain

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
When Judge Winter wrote the majority opinion for affirmance, reported at 65 F.3d 240, I concurred because I believed he was right. I still believe that he was. I write briefly to explain why. The salient facts may be succinctly stated.
In 1993, the Nassau County Police Department and the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms were conducting a joint investigation of Kaye’s illegal trafficking in narcotics and firearms. In the process of this investigation, Kaye sold both marijuana and illegal firearms to an undercover Nassau County detective. The State authorities arrested Kaye for selling marijuana; the federal authorities arrested him for illegal possession of firearms.
In exchange for reduced sentences, Kaye agreed to cooperate with both State and federal authorities in the identification and conviction of other wrongdoers. His efforts on behalf of the State authorities proved fruitful. His efforts on behalf of the federal authorities were insubstantial and unproductive.
Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provide:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
In Judge Winter’s original opinion, he said: The plain language of the section encompasses all law enforcement authorities whatever governmental unit they represent, and nothing in the Commentary even remotely suggests that the all-inclusive language was not deliberate. Therefore, a motion by the government under Section 5K1.1 is necessary before a court may depart from the Guidelines based on assistance to state or local, as well as federal, authorities.
In Judge Winter’s revised opinion, he says: Upon reconsideration, I now believe that the term “offense” in Section 5K1.1 is properly interpreted to refer only to federal offenses and that Section 5K1.1 addresses assistance only to federal authorities.
In his original opinion, Judge Winter cited United States v. Love, 985 F.2d 732, 734 (3d Cir.1993) and United States v. Emery, 34 F.3d 911, 912 (9th Cir.1994), as persuasive, albeit not compelling, precedent. I too found them persuasive when I concurred. In Love, the Court said:
There is no indication in the language of § 5K1.1 or in the accompanying commentary that the Commission meant to limit “assistance to authorities” to assistance to federal authorities. The provision is entitled “Substantial Assistance to Authorities,” and describes the assistance as “substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. There is no suggestion that the offense need be a federal offense or that the investigators need be federal authorities. The application notes and background commentary, like the provision itself, refer only to “assistance to authorities.” If the Commission had intended to limit the provision to assistance to federal authorities it doubtless would have done so.
The Emery Court continued in the same vein:
*90The fact that Emery assisted state, not federal, authorities does not alter our conclusion that section 5K1.1 provides the sole authority for a downward departure in recognition of a defendant’s assistance to authorities. As the Third Circuit persuasively reasoned in Love, there is no indication in the guidelines or elsewhere that application of section 5K1.1 is limited to assistance to federal authorities in the investigation of federal crimes. Id. Federal courts regularly have applied section 5K1.1 to instances in which a defendant has assisted state and local authorities. See id., and cases cited therein.
These decisions which have not been overturned do not stand isolated and alone. See, e.g., United States v. Egan, 966 F.2d 328, 330 n. 1 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1069, 113 S.Ct. 1021, 122 L.Ed.2d 167 (1993); United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 943, 112 S.Ct. 382, 116 L.Ed.2d 333 (1991); United States v. Hill, 911 F.2d 129, 131 (8th Cir.1990), vacated on other grounds, 501 U.S. 1226, 111 S.Ct. 2845, 115 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1991). However, Judge Winter now has changed his mind and holds that section 5K1.1 does not apply to assistance rendered to local law enforcement agencies. Supra, at 87. I respectfully disagree.
Section 944(n) of Title 28, U.S.C. provides: The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.
The purpose of these enactments is clear—the encouraging of defendants’ cooperation. See United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046, 110 S.Ct. 845, 107 L.Ed.2d 839 (1990); United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246, 249 (7th Cir.1990) I cannot believe that either Congress or the Commission intended to encourage cooperation only with federal authorities. The obligation of every citizen to report wrong-doing to authorities is centuries old. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1362, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980); United States v. Ramirez-Cifuentes, 682 F.2d 337, 346-47 (2d Cir.1982) (Lumbard, J., concurring) (“The duty of every good citizen is, when called upon, to give all information in his power to the proper officers of the law as to persons connected with crime____”) (quoting Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App. 13, 98 Pac. 43, 44 (1908)); United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 385 (10th Cir.1986). The Guidelines specifically recognized this obligation in the following “Background” to section 5K1.1: “A defendant’s assistance to authorities in the investigation of criminal activities has been recognized in practice and by statute as a mitigating sentencing factor.”
The Guidelines are not as parochial as my colleagues suggest. For example, Guideline Section 4A1.2 sets forth sentences to be counted and excluded in computing all defendants’ Criminal History, and subdivision (c) of that section blankets the field of offenses without separating federal from state. See, e.g., Lewis, supra, at 249-50.
Assuming there is ambiguity in the foregoing provisions, we should follow the well-established doctrine that “ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 121, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2202, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). A defendant who has cooperated with State authorities in the hope that this would bring him some favorable sentencing treatment should not have his hopes dashed by a niggardly interpretation of section 5K1.1. I am not as certain as are my colleagues that such an unhappy situation would constitute “an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described” within the meaning of section 5K2.0. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992).
I therefore dissent.