Court Opinion

ID: 9819018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:17:59.968242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:35:07.311708
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I would affirm the appellate court’s judgment. For the reasons stated by the appellate court, I agree that section 143.15 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143.15 (West 1994)) requires an insurance company to provide at least 10 days’ actual notice before cancelling a policy for nonpayment of the premium. I also agree that there is a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment, with respect to when the 10-day notice period expired here and when the accident actually took place. I will not repeat the appellate court’s well-reasoned construction of the Insurance Code’s precancellation notice requirements. The court’s opinion has been published (277 Ill. App. 3d 627) and is available for review by anyone interested in learning more about it. What does warrant additional comment, however, is my colleagues’ reliance on recent changes in the Insurance Code to support their conclusion that the appellate court’s interpretation of the law is incorrect. There is no question that subsequent amendments to a statute may be an appropriate source for discerning legislative intent. People v. Bratcher, 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543 (1976). Where a statute is ambiguous and the legislature amends it soon after a controversy has arisen as to its meaning, the amendment may be regarded as a legislative interpretation of the original law rather than as an attempt to change the law. Church v. State of Illinois, 164 Ill. 2d 153, 163 (1995); see Hyatt Corp. v. Sweet, 230 Ill. App. 3d 423, 433 (1992). The problem with applying these principles here is that the amendments were made in response to the very case which is now before us for review years after the original legislation was enacted. Rather than reflect the legislature’s intent with respect to the original law, the quoted statements from the house floor show nothing more than that certain current members of the General Assembly are unhappy with the appellate court’s disposition of this litigation and want it changed. By giving weight to the remarks of these legislators, the majority has helped them achieve that objective. In effect, the court has facilitated a legislative override of the appellate court’s judgment. While not suggesting that anything untoward took place in this particular case, I note that the potential for abuse is substantial. The majority’s approach creates a significant danger that litigants with substantial resources or the support of lobbying groups may be able to prevail on the legislature to alter the law while a case is pending on review in order to help them escape the consequences of adverse judgments. Not only is this a subversion of the judicial process, it also raises grave separation of powers concerns under article II, section 1, of this state’s constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1). The separation of powers principles contained in article II, section 1, of the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1) prohibit the legislative branch of government from exercising powers belonging to the judiciary. The General Assembly has the right to draft legislation and to amend statutes if it believes that a judicial interpretation of a law is at odds with its intent. Our court has expressly held, however, that the legislature may not, by amendment, attempt to attribute to the original statute, at the time of a reviewing court’s opinion, a meaning different from that declared in the opinion. This court has regarded such efforts as an attempt by the legislature to specify how we should apply the law to the particular case that is before us on review, and we have condemned the attempts as unconstitutional. In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190, 203-05 (1982). In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190 (1982), remains the law in this state (see In re Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill. 2d 468, 497 (1995)) and should be followed here. The intervening amendment, and the floor debates on that amendment, should not be taken into account in reviewing the appellate court’s construction of section 143.15 of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143.15 (West 1994)). For this reason, and the reasons given by the appellate court in its opinion, I respectfully dissent.