Court Opinion

ID: 9963394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 15:01:20.48552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:48.218537
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-1880   Document: 54     Page: 1   Filed: 04/25/2024

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

   UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY
            INDIAN RESERVATION,
                Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2021-1880
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:18-cv-00359-RHH, Senior Judge Robert H.
 Hodges, Jr, Judge Armando O. Bonilla.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: April 25, 2024
                 ______________________

     MICHAEL W. HOLDITCH, Patterson Earnhart Real Bird
 & Wilson LLP, Louisville, CO, argued for plaintiff-appel-
 lant. Also represented by FRANCES C. BASSETT.

     ANDREW MARSHALL BERNIE, Appellate Section, Envi-
 ronment and Natural Resources Division, United States
 Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for de-
 fendant-appellee. Also represented by TODD KIM.
                  ______________________

      Before DYK, REYNA, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
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 2      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

      Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK.
 Opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part filed by
                  Circuit Judge REYNA.
 DYK, Circuit Judge.
     Plaintiff Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray In-
 dian Reservation (“Tribe”) brought suit against the United
 States in the Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) as-
 serting various claims concerning water rights and water-
 related infrastructure. The First Amended Complaint
 (“Complaint”) alleged that the United States breached du-
 ties of trust by mismanaging water rights and mismanag-
 ing water infrastructure held by the United States and
 operated for the Tribe, breached contracts with the Tribe,
 and effected unconstitutional takings of the Tribe’s prop-
 erty. The Claims Court held that the Tribe had not identi-
 fied a trust-creating source of law and dismissed all the
 breach of trust claims, held that one breach of contract
 claim was barred by a 2012 settlement agreement, and
 found the remaining breach of contract and takings claims
 time barred.
      We hold that the Winters doctrine and the 1899 Act do
 not sufficiently establish trust duties to support Indian
 Tucker Act jurisdiction with respect to the Tribe’s claims
 that the United States has a duty to construct new infra-
 structure and secure new water for the Tribe, but that the
 1906 Act imposes trust duties on the United States suffi-
 cient to support a claim at least with respect to manage-
 ment of existing water infrastructure. Thus, as to the trust
 claims, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
 With respect to one breach of contract claim, we affirm in
 part and vacate and remand in part. With respect to the
 takings claims and the other breach of contract claim, we
 affirm the dismissal.
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US        3

                        BACKGROUND
                  I. Historical Background
      The Tribe is a federally recognized and sovereign In-
 dian Tribe that was organized into its present form under
 the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. 25 U.S.C. § 5101 et
 seq. The Tribe occupies the Uintah and Ouray Indian Res-
 ervation (“Reservation”), which encompasses about four
 million acres in the Green River Basin of northeastern
 Utah and lies within the drainage of the Colorado River
 Basin. Approximately half of the Reservation was estab-
 lished by an 1861 Executive Order that was confirmed by
 an Act of Congress instructing the superintendent of In-
 dian affairs for the territory of Utah to “collect and settle
 all or so many of the Indians of said territory as may be
 found practicable in the Uinta valley.” Act of 1864, 38
 Cong. Ch. 77, 13 Stat. 63. The other half was established
 by Congress in 1880. Act of 1880, 46 Cong. Ch. 223, 21
 Stat. 199. Among “[t]he purposes of [the Act of 1880 was]
 to destroy the tribal structure and to change the nomadic
 ways of the Utes by forcibly converting them from a pasto-
 ral to an agricultural people.” United States v. S. Ute Tribe
 or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159, 163 (1971) (citing 10
 Cong. Rec. 2059, 2066 (1880)). Because the Reservation is
 exceptionally arid, year-round water supply depends upon
 water storage infrastructure and irrigation systems to cap-
 ture and distribute winter snowmelt in the rivers running
 through the Reservation. In 1905, the Commissioner of In-
 dian Affairs remarked that the Tribe’s future “depends
 upon a successful irrigation scheme, for without water
 their lands are valueless, and starvation or extermination
 will be their fate.” Complaint at 6 (quoting Rep. of the
 Comm. of Ind. Affs., 1906).
     The history of the relationship between the Tribe and
 the United States with respect to water rights is long and
 complicated. Several events essential to the Tribe’s claims
 here are the following:
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 4        UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

                         The 1899 Act
     •    In 1899, Congress enacted an appropriations stat-
 ute with a provision permitting the Secretary of the Inte-
 rior to grant rights of way on or through the Uintah Indian
 Reservation for the construction and maintenance of dams,
 ditches, and canals, provided that “it shall be the duty of
 the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe such rules and
 regulations as he may deem necessary to secure to the In-
 dians the quantity of water needed for their present and
 prospective wants.” Act of March 1, 1899, 55 Cong. Ch.
 324, 30 Stat. 924, 941 (“1899 Act”). The Tribe maintains
 that this statute created a trust obligation to secure future
 water rights for the Tribe.
     The 1906 Act and the Uintah Indian Irrigation Project
     •    In 1906, Congress enacted another appropriations
 statute that funded the construction of “irrigation systems
 to irrigate the allotted lands of the Uncompahgre, Uintah,
 and White River Utes in Utah.” Act of June 21, 1906, 59
 Cong. Ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 375 (“1906 Act”).
    •    These irrigation works were to be “held and oper-
 ated, and water therefor appropriated under the laws of the
 State of Utah, and the title thereto . . . shall be in the Sec-
 retary of the Interior in trust for the Indians.” Id.
     •   By about 1922, the irrigation system constructed
 pursuant to the 1906 Act, now known as the Uintah Indian
 Irrigation Project (“UIIP”), was essentially completed.
    •    The Tribe alleges that the infrastructure con-
 structed under the 1906 Act today comprises several hun-
 dred miles of waterways and canals. The Tribe maintains
 that the 1906 statute created a trust obligation with re-
 spect to water rights and water infrastructure.
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US        5

                  The Central Utah Project
     •    In 1956 Congress authorized the Central Utah Pro-
 ject, a major infrastructure project to transport water from
 the Colorado River system to lands within Utah.
     •   The initial phase included the Bonneville unit,
 which transports water from the Reservation to the Salt
 Lake City metropolitan region. This initial phase de-
 pended on diverting water subject to the Tribe’s water
 rights, water which was not then being used to irrigate
 lands on the Reservation. The project could not proceed
 without the Tribe’s agreement to delay the use of this wa-
 ter.
                  The 1960 Decker Report
    •    In order to quantify its claims to water rights in
 connection with the proposed Central Utah Project, in 1960
 the Tribe employed E.L. Decker, a former employee of the
 Bureau of Reclamation, to prepare a report surveying pre-
 sent, historic, and future practicably irrigable lands within
 the Reservation (the “Decker Report”).
     •   The Decker Report organized irrigable Reservation
 lands into seven different categories, which included four
 groups particularly relevant to the Tribe’s claims here:
 Group 1, consisting of lands irrigated through the 1906 Act
 infrastructure with federally decreed water rights; Group
 2, consisting of lands irrigated through the 1906 Act infra-
 structure with state-certified water rights; Group 3, con-
 sisting of lands designated as irrigable that were or could
 be served through 1906 Act infrastructure facilities, with
 some lands having a supplemental state-certified water
 right and other lands lacking a water right certificate; and
 Group 5, consisting of certain lands that were found eco-
 nomically feasible to irrigate but not yet irrigated.
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                The 1965 Deferral Agreement
    •     In 1965, after the Decker Report was completed,
 the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), the Bureau of Recla-
 mation, the Central Utah Water Conservancy District (a
 political subdivision of the State of Utah), and the Tribe
 entered into the “1965 Deferral Agreement,” which pro-
 vided that the Bonneville unit “may proceed without objec-
 tion, interference or claim adverse to the water
 requirements for such unit” and that the Tribe would defer
 the use of water designated to irrigate Decker Report
 Group 5 lands until “the ultimate phase of the Central
 Utah project.” J.A. 255–56.
     •   In exchange, the Tribe was granted “full and com-
 plete recognition of the water rights of said tribe, with a
 priority date of 1861 in groups (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) as
 described in the book of claims filed with the State Engi-
 neer, State of Utah, by the Ute Indian Tribe [i.e., as de-
 scribed in the Decker Report], without resort to litigation.”
 J.A. 256.
    •    The 1965 Deferral Agreement also required the
 United States to construct specific additional infrastruc-
 ture units to increase the quantity of water available to the
 Tribe, including the Upalco unit and the Uintah unit,
 which were “to supply said Indian water rights by the 1st
 day of January, 2005,” and “provide storage of the runoff
 waters of the Uintah River and its tributaries.” J.A. 257,
 258.
    •   These additional infrastructure units were never
 constructed. The Tribe alleges that the United States
 breached the 1965 Deferral Agreement.
          The 1967 Midview Exchange Agreement
    •    In 1967, the Tribe, the United States, and an or-
 ganization of secondary water rights users entered into the
 “Midview Exchange Agreement” to exchange particular
 water rights and irrigation facilities.
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US      7

    •    As part of the exchange, title to “the Midview Dam
 and Reservoir, Duchesne Diversion Dam, Duchesne Feeder
 Canal, and Midview Lateral together with all facilities and
 property appurtenant thereto” (hereinafter the “Midview
 Property”) was to be transferred to BIA to “become part of
 the project works of the Uintah Project,” and BIA was to
 “operate and maintain” the same “as part of the Uintah
 Project [UIIP].” J.A. 263.
     •   The Tribe contends that because the Uintah Pro-
 ject (UIIP) infrastructure was to be held in trust for the
 Tribe pursuant to the 1906 Act, the Midview Property was
 also meant to be held in trust, but that the United States
 has not transferred the property to BIA and is “using water
 from the Midview Reservoir to irrigate lands other than
 those designated for irrigation under the Midview Ex-
 change” in violation of the agreement. Complaint at 35. It
 alleges that the United States failed to comply with the
 agreement in other respects as well.
   The Central Utah Project Completion Act (“CUPCA”)
                        of 1992
    •    In 1990, the United States, the State of Utah, and
 the Tribe attempted to negotiate a “Revised Ute Water
 Compact,” which was intended to quantify the Tribe’s wa-
 ter rights. 1 Congress ratified the 1990 Revised Ute Water
 Compact, subject to ratification by the State of Utah and
 the Tribe. The Tribe never ratified the 1990 Revised Ute
 Water Compact.
    •  In 1992, Congress passed the Central Utah Project
 Completion Act (“CUPCA”), Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat.
 4600.

    1    The State of Utah and the Tribe had agreed to an
 earlier 1980 compact, but the United States Congress did
 not ratify it.
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     •   Title V of CUPCA, which concerned “Ute Indian
 Rights Settlement,” noted that there were “unresolved
 Tribal claims arising out of [the 1965 Deferral Agree-
 ment],” that “construction of the Upalco and Uintah Units
 [required by the 1965 Deferral Agreement] has not been
 undertaken,” and that “there is no present intent to pro-
 ceed with Ultimate Phase construction.” Id. § 501(a)(2)–
 (3). One of the purposes of Title V was to “put the Tribe in
 the same economic position it would have enjoyed had the
 features contemplated by the [1965 Deferral Agreement]
 been constructed.” Id. § 501(b)(3). The House Committee
 Report further stated that the “purpose of Title V is to au-
 thorize the [Tribe] to quantify by compact its reserved wa-
 ter rights vis-a-vis the State of Utah and to settle long-
 outstanding claims against the United States arising out of
 the construction of the Central Utah Project.” H.R. Rep.
 No. 102-114, pt. 1, at 69 (1991).
    •    CUPCA provided for economic benefits to the
 Tribe, which have totaled several hundred million dollars
 to date. One provision, section 502(a), provided that “the
 Tribe shall receive from the United States 26 percent of the
 annual Bonneville Unit municipal and industrial capital
 repayment obligation . . . which represents a portion of the
 Tribe’s water rights that were to be supplied by storage
 from the Central Utah Project, but will not be supplied be-
 cause the Upalco and Uintah units are not to be con-
 structed.” The Tribe currently receives approximately
 $2 million per year under this provision.
    •    In addition, sections 504, 505, and 506 provided
 $198.5 million for economic development, farming opera-
 tions, and improvements to existing reservoirs, streams,
 and municipal water facilities.
    •    Receipt of these funds was conditioned on a
 “waiver” of “any and all claims relating to [the Tribe’s] wa-
 ter rights covered under the [1965 Deferral Agreement].”
 CUPCA § 507(b). The purpose of this section was to
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US         9

 accomplish “a waiver of all historical claims which the tribe
 may have, including all claims arising out of the [1965 De-
 ferral Agreement].” H.R. Rep. No. 102-114, pt. 1, at 127.
 But the waiver did not include, “and indeed preserved . . .
 rights which the Tribe may have under the Ute Indian
 Compact and under Title V itself.” Id. at 127–28. Section
 507 is ambiguous as to whether the waiver of contractual
 claims was imposed on the Tribe—unilaterally eliminating
 the contractual rights by statute—or whether the claims
 would be waived only if the Tribe accepted the settlement
 funds and agreed to the revised compact. See CUPCA
 §§ 503(a); 507.
     •   In its complaint, the Tribe alleges that the latter
 construction is correct, that the Tribe has not yet received
 the full amount of funds provided by these sections of
 CUPCA, and that the proposed 1990 Revised Ute Water
 Compact was never ratified. Therefore, the Tribe alleges,
 there was no effective settlement or waiver of the Tribe’s
 claims under the 1965 Deferral Agreement.
                The 2012 Settlement Agreement
     •    In 2006, the Tribe filed a lawsuit at the Claims
 Court concerning the United States’ alleged breach of trust
 in its management of CUPCA funds. This lawsuit was set-
 tled in 2012. In exchange for $125 million, the Tribe agreed
 to waive:
     [A]ny and all claims, causes of action, obligations,
     and/or liabilities of any kind or nature whatsoever,
     known or unknown, regardless of legal theory, for
     any damages or any equitable or specific relief, that
     are based on harms or violations occurring before
     the date of the execution of this Settlement Agree-
     ment by both Parties and that relate to the United
     States’ management or accounting of Plaintiff’s
     trust funds or Plaintiff’s non-monetary trust assets
     or resources.
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 10       UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

 J.A. 273 (emphasis added). The waiver contained an ex-
 ception for claims based on the Tribe’s “water rights,
 whether adjudicated or unadjudicated; [the Tribe’s] au-
 thority to use and protect such water rights; and [the
 Tribe’s] claims for damages for loss of water resources al-
 legedly caused by [the United States’] failure to establish,
 acquire, enforce or protect such water rights.” J.A. 277.
                   II. The Present Lawsuit
     The Tribe filed the present case on March 7, 2018, seek-
 ing damages for breaches of trust, breaches of contract, and
 unconstitutional takings. 2 After the Tribe amended its

      2   The next day, the Tribe also filed a case in the
 United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
 Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. United
 States Dep’t of Interior, 18-cv-547, ECF 1 (D.D.C. March 8,
 2018). The complaint in that case raised similar allega-
 tions concerning the United States’ fiduciary duties (in-
 cluding based on the 1899 and 1906 Acts), the 1965
 Deferral Agreement, and the Midview Exchange Agree-
 ment, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.,
 ECF 57, at 68–82. Following the government’s motion to
 dismiss, the district court determined that neither the 1899
 nor the 1906 Act created enforceable trust duties and that
 the claims related to both the Midview Exchange Agree-
 ment and the 1965 Deferral Agreement were time barred.
 560 F. Supp. 3d 247, 258, 261–63 (D.D.C. 2021). This deci-
 sion was dated September 15, 2021. The remaining claims
 were transferred to the District of Utah. Id. at 268.
      In the District of Utah, the court granted the Tribe
 leave to amend its complaint. No. 21-cv-573, 2023 WL
 6276594, at *2 (D. Utah Sept. 26, 2023). Following another
 motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed most claims
 with prejudice, agreeing with the District Court for the Dis-
 trict of Columbia that the Tribe failed to establish common-
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US        11

 initial complaint, the United States moved to dismiss un-
 der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).
                   A. Breach of Trust Claims
     The complaint pled several breach of trust claims, al-
 leging that the “United States holds legal title as trustee to
 the Tribe’s trust lands, waters, water works, and trust
 funds relating to these assets.” Complaint at 2. The com-
 plaint presented two basic theories of the United States’
 trust duties. First, the Tribe alleged that the United States
 has a duty to procure new water for the Tribe, including by
 constructing new water storage infrastructure. The Tribe
 primarily based this theory on the “Winters doctrine,” un-
 der which the “Federal Government’s reservation of land
 for an Indian tribe also implicitly reserves the right to use
 needed water from various sources,” Arizona v. Navajo Na-
 tion, 599 U.S. 555, 561 (2023) (citing Winters v. United
 States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908)), and on the 1899 Act. 3
 Second, the Tribe alleged that the United States has failed
 to maintain the 1906 Act irrigation infrastructure and to
 preserve related water rights, which are held in trust by
 the United States for the benefit of the Tribe pursuant to
 the 1906 Act.

 law trust obligations on the federal government and that
 claims related to the 1965 Deferral Agreement and the
 Midview Exchange Agreement were time barred. Id. at *5,
 *11, *17, *24. The Tribe was permitted to re-plead two
 claims related to a 2019 contract between the Bureau of
 Reclamation and the State of Utah. Id. at *19, *24. That
 case is still pending in the District of Utah.
     3    The “various sources” implicated by the Winters
 doctrine include “groundwater, rivers, streams, lakes, and
 springs—that arise on, border, cross, underlie, or are en-
 compassed within the reservation.” Arizona v. Navajo Na-
 tion, 599 U.S. at 561 (citing Winters, 207 U.S. at 576–77).
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 12       UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

      The Claims Court dismissed all seventeen of the breach
 of trust claims, holding that neither the 1899 Act nor the
 1906 Act expressly created specific trust duties and that
 the Claims Court therefore lacked jurisdiction under the
 Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505. 4 Ute Indian Tribe of
 Unitah and Ouray Indian Reservation v. United States, No.
 18-359 L, 2021 WL 1602876, at *4–5, *9 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12,
 2021) (“Decision”).
             B. 1965 Deferral Agreement Claims
     The Tribe also pled two claims related to the 1965 De-
 ferral Agreement. First, the Tribe alleged in claim 14 that
 the United States breached the agreement by failing to
 “implement systems and facilities for the development of
 all Tribal Reserved Water Rights.” Complaint at 76–77.
 The Claims Court held that this claim was time barred be-
 cause CUPCA made clear in 1992 that the infrastructure
 would not be completed. Second, in the alternative and as-
 suming that the breach of contract claims were extin-
 guished, the Tribe alleged in claim 15 that CUPCA effected
 an unconstitutional taking of the Tribe’s 1965 Deferral
 Agreement contractual rights because CUPCA purported
 to extinguish the Tribe’s contract rights without just com-
 pensation. The Claims Court also found this claim to be
 time barred because the alleged taking was a discrete
 event—the enactment of CUPCA—and therefore “the Tribe
 had knowledge of the facts forming the basis of its claim in
 1992.” Decision, at *8.

      4  The breach of trust claims are claims 1–9, 12, 13,
 16–20, and parts of claim 21. The Tribe also relied on var-
 ious other treaties and statutes as creating a trust obliga-
 tion. We do not read the language of those provisions to
 create a specific trust obligation. Nor do we see any signif-
 icance in the supposed judicial admissions by the United
 States in prior litigation.
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US       13

          C. Midview Exchange Agreement Claims
      The Tribe pled two claims related to the Midview Ex-
 change Agreement. First, the Tribe alleged in claim 11
 that the United States breached the agreement by “failing
 to effectuate a transfer of the Midview Property in trust for
 the benefit of the UIIP” and operate it for the Tribe’s bene-
 fit, which has resulted in damages because the United
 States diverts water from the Midview Property to irrigate
 other lands, reducing the amount of stored water available
 to the Tribe. Complaint at 73.
     The Claims Court held that this claim was barred by
 the 2012 settlement agreement, which “waived and re-
 leased the United States from claims, known and un-
 known, for ‘improper[ ] or inappropriate[ ]’ transfer of non-
 monetary trust assets or resources and ‘fail[ure] to under-
 take prudent transactions for the sale, lease, use, or dis-
 posal of [the Tribe]’s non-monetary trust assets or
 resources.’” Decision, at *8 (alterations in original) (quot-
 ing J.A. 275). Second, the Tribe alleged that the United
 States physically took tribal property without just compen-
 sation through the Midview Exchange because the Tribe
 was compelled to give up “a portion of the Tribe’s senior-
 priority Winters Reserved Water Rights” in exchange for
 “state-based water rights, with a priority date inferior to
 the Tribe’s Winters Reserved Rights.” Complaint at 72.
 The Claims Court found this claim to be time barred be-
 cause “the source of the claim is the execution of the
 [Midview Exchange] Agreement,” which occurred in 1967.
 Decision, at *8.
                 D. Claims Court Judgment
     The Claims Court entered judgment on February 16,
 2021, dismissing all of the Tribe’s claims. The Tribe timely
 appeals.      We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(3).
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 14      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

                          DISCUSSION
     We review de novo dismissals by the Claims Court for
 lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Trusted Integration, Inc.
 v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and
 dismissals for failure to state a claim, Bd. of Supervisors of
 Issaquena Cnty., Mississippi v. United States, 84 F.4th
 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2023). We generally presume that
 the facts alleged in the complaint are true and draw all rea-
 sonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Reynolds v.
 Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir.
 1988); Issaquena, 84 F.4th at 1364. We “may also look to
 matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim,
 items subject to judicial notice, and matters of public rec-
 ord.” A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d
 1142, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks, al-
 terations, and citation omitted).
     Generally, we do not address issues not presented to
 the trial court or not pressed on appeal. See In re Google
 Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
 “An issue that is merely alluded to and not developed as an
 argument in a party’s brief is deemed” forfeited. Rodriguez
 v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 8 F.4th 1290, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
 2021). We will exercise our discretion to review forfeited
 issues when, among other reasons, “there is a change in the
 jurisprudence of the reviewing court or the Supreme Court
 after consideration of the case by the lower court” or an is-
 sue was not presented to the court we are reviewing but
 nonetheless “an issue is properly before the court.” Golden
 Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., 527 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed.
 Cir. 2008) (quoting Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1356
 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
                I. The Breach of Trust Claims
       We first address the Tribe’s breach of trust claims.
 While the United States has a “general trust relationship
 . . . [with] the Indian people,” to establish jurisdiction over
 a breach of trust claim under the Indian Tucker Act a Tribe
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US         15

 first “must identify a substantive source of law that estab-
 lishes specific fiduciary or other duties.” United States v.
 Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003) (“Navajo I”) (in-
 ternal quotation omitted). “[T]he analysis must train on
 specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regu-
 latory prescriptions.” Id. If the Tribe identifies such a stat-
 ute at step one of the Navajo I analysis, at the second step
 “the court must then determine whether the relevant
 source of substantive law ‘can fairly be interpreted as man-
 dating compensation for damages sustained as a result of
 a breach of the duties [the governing law] impose[s].’” Id.
 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Mitchell,
 463 U.S. 206, 219 (1983) (“Mitchell II”)).
     The Claims Court dismissed all of the Tribe’s breach of
 trust claims because the Tribe failed at step one to “estab-
 lish that the United States has a specific trust obligation to
 ensure adequate water delivery or storage on the Tribe’s
 Reservation.” Decision, at *6. The Tribe’s breach of trust
 claims fit into two broad categories. We consider each of
 these categories in turn.
                               A
      In the first category of claims, the Tribe alleged that
 the United States has duties in trust to secure new water
 for the Tribe, including by constructing new water storage
 infrastructure. According to the Tribe, the Winters doc-
 trine and the 1899 Act impose upon the United States a
 “fiduciary duty to [] secure the amount [of] water to satisfy
 the Tribe’s present and prospective wants.” Complaint at
 8. The Tribe also argues that the United States has “a
 money-mandating fiduciary duty to provide storage facili-
 ties and other infrastructure necessary . . . to prevent un-
 necessary loss or waste of Tribal water.” Complaint at 60.
 We agree with the Claims Court that Winters and the 1899
 Act do not impose these trust duties and conclude that the
 Claims Court properly dismissed these claims.
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 16      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

      The recent Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Nav-
 ajo Nation dealt directly with these issues. There, the Nav-
 ajo Nation alleged that the treaty establishing the Navajo
 Reservation created affirmative duties to supply water un-
 der the Winters doctrine. 599 U.S. at 558–59. The Su-
 preme Court noted that the Winters doctrine, without a
 duty-imposing treaty, statute, or regulation, does not “re-
 quire the United States to take affirmative steps to secure
 water for [Indian] Tribe[s].” 599 U.S. at 569–70. “[T]he
 treaty said nothing about any affirmative duty for the
 United States to secure water,” id. at 565, and “contained
 no ‘rights-creating or duty-imposing’ language.” Id. at 564
 (quoting Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 506). Because the United
 States “owes judicially enforceable duties to a tribe ‘only to
 the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities,’” the
 Supreme Court found that Navajo Nation could not sustain
 its breach of trust claim. Id. at 564 (quoting United States
 v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 177 (2011)).
     Here, the Tribe primarily argues that the 1899 Act pro-
 vides the rights-creating duties found necessary in the
 Navajo I case. The 1899 Act appropriated funds “for the
 purpose of paying the current and contingent expenses of
 the Indian Department.” 30 Stat. 924. It further provided:
      That the Secretary of the Interior be . . . authorized,
      in his discretion, to grant rights of way for the con-
      struction and maintenance of dams, ditches, and
      canals, on or through the Uintah Indian Reserva-
      tion in Utah, for the purpose of diverting and ap-
      propriating the waters of the streams in said
      reservation for useful purposes:
      Provided, That all such grants shall be subject at
      all times to the paramount rights of the Indians on
      said reservation to so much of said waters as may
      have been appropriated, or may hereafter be appro-
      priated or needed by them for agricultural and do-
      mestic purposes; and it shall be the duty of the
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US         17

     Secretary of the Interior to prescribe such rules and
     regulations as he may deem necessary to secure to
     the Indians the quantity of water needed for their
     present and prospective wants, and to otherwise
     protect the rights and interests of the Indians and
     the Indian service.
 Id. at 941.
     In other words, the 1899 Act allowed the Secretary to
 authorize rights of way for construction of facilities to di-
 vert water away from the Reservation, but in doing so the
 Secretary could not interfere with the Tribe’s “paramount
 rights” to water. This is essentially an acknowledgment of
 a Winters obligation—the Secretary could not permit con-
 struction that would interfere with the Tribe’s right to ap-
 propriate water from the streams of the reservation for
 domestic or agricultural purposes. Although the Secretary
 had a “duty . . . to prescribe such rules and regulations as
 he may deem necessary to secure to the Indians the quan-
 tity of water needed,” this language falls short of creating
 a trust duty with respect to particular property. Id. The
 Secretary’s duty is to establish rules and regulations. The
 United States has not “expressly accept[ed]” a duty to se-
 cure new water for the Tribe by construction of new infra-
 structure or other means. Navajo Nation, 599 U.S. at 564.
      The complaint never alleges that the Secretary
 breached a fiduciary duty by failing to establish the regu-
 lations contemplated by the 1899 Act. And this duty to pre-
 scribe regulations is explicitly subject to the Secretary’s
 discretion—he must only prescribe such regulations “as he
 may deem necessary”—which further demonstrates that
 the 1899 Act does not create a mandatory duty. 30 Stat. at
 941. Finally, the language referring to a duty “to otherwise
 protect the rights and interests of the Indians and the In-
 dian service” is not specific enough to create trust duties.
 Id.; see Hopi Tribe v. United States, 782 F.3d 622, 667 (Fed.
 Cir. 2015) (“[A] statute or regulation that recites a general
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 18       UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

 trust relationship between the United States and the In-
 dian People is not enough to establish any particular trust
 duty.”). The 1899 Act does not contain any “in trust” lan-
 guage, nor does it establish a corpus of particular assets or
 any duties with respect to them. It simply recognizes a
 prevailing Winters obligation not to interfere with the
 Tribe’s existing rights and to prescribe regulations as may
 be “deem[ed] necessary” by the Secretary to protect them,
 which is not sufficient to create a trust obligation. 30 Stat.
 at 941.
     Claims 2, 3, 4, 16, 17, and 18 are all premised on a pur-
 ported duty of the United States to construct new infra-
 structure or affirmatively secure new water for the Tribe.
 The 1899 Act neither expressly nor implicitly imposes such
 duties on the United States. Therefore, we affirm the
 Claims Court’s dismissal of claims 2, 3, 4, 16, 17, and 18 for
 lack of jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act.
                                B
      We reach a different conclusion as to the second cate-
 gory of the Tribe’s breach of trust claims, at least as to wa-
 ter infrastructure. 5 In the second category, the Tribe
 alleges that the United States has mismanaged particular
 infrastructure and specific water rights previously appro-
 priated to the Tribe and held in trust for the Tribe’s benefit.
 The Tribe relies on the 1906 Act as a duty-creating source
 of law. The 1906 Act appropriated funds:
      For constructing irrigation systems to irrigate the
      allotted lands of the Uncompahgre, Uintah, and
      White River Utes in Utah . . . the cost of said entire

      5  Whether the Tribe may also prevail on a claim that
 a trust relationship was created with respect to water
 rights by the 1906 Act is a question we do not decide but
 remand to the Claims Court, as we explain later in this
 opinion.
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     work to be reimbursed from the proceeds of the sale
     of the lands within the former Uintah Reservation:
     Provided, That such irrigation systems shall be
     constructed and completed and held and operated,
     and water therefor appropriated under the laws of
     the State of Utah, and the title thereto until other-
     wise provided by law shall be in the Secretary of
     the Interior in trust for the Indians, and he may
     sue and be sued in matters relating thereto:
     And provided further, That the ditches and canals
     of such irrigation systems may be used, extended,
     or enlarged for the purpose of conveying water by
     any person, association, or corporation under and
     upon compliance with the provisions of the laws of
     the State of Utah:
     And provided further, That when said irrigation
     systems are in successful operation the cost of op-
     erating same shall be equitably apportioned upon
     the lands irrigated, and, when the Indians have be-
     come self-supporting, to the annual charge shall be
     added an amount sufficient to pay back into the
     Treasury the cost of the work done, in their behalf,
     within thirty years, suitable deduction being made
     for the amounts received from disposal of the lands
     within the former Uintah Reservation.
 34 Stat. at 375.
                               1
     As to water-related infrastructure, the Tribe alleged
 that the irrigation systems constructed under the 1906 Act
 (today known as the UIIP) comprise at least several hun-
 dred miles of waterways and canals designed to irrigate
 88,000 acres of land. The Tribe alleged that the United
 States had allowed the infrastructure to fall into “a grave
 state of disrepair” resulting in only 61,000 acres of land re-
 ceiving water as of 2016. Complaint at 24.
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 20      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

     The United States argues that the language in the
 1906 Act merely declares a limited trust without specific,
 enforceable duties, relying on United States v. Mitchell, 445
 U.S. 535 (1980) (“Mitchell I”). In Mitchell I, plaintiffs
 sought damages “for alleged mismanagement of forests lo-
 cated on lands allotted to Indians under [the Indian Gen-
 eral Allotment Act of 1887].” 445 U.S. at 536. The statute
 at issue there was apparently silent as to timber manage-
 ment, but provided:
      [T]he United States does and will hold the land
      thus allotted, for the period of twenty-five years, in
      trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to
      whom such allotment shall have been made . . . .
 Id. at 541 (quoting 24 Stat. 389, as amended, 25 U.S.C.
 § 348). The Supreme Court explained that the statute
 “does not unambiguously provide that the United States
 has undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities as to the
 management of allotted lands,” id. at 542, and noted that
 other sections of the statute established that “the [Indian]
 allottee, and not the United States, was to manage the
 land,” id. at 543; see also 24 Stat. 388 (“[A]ll allotments set
 apart under the provisions of this act shall be selected by
 the Indians . . . in such manner as to embrace the improve-
 ments of the Indians making the selection.”). Thus, the “in
 trust” language “created only a limited trust relationship
 . . . that does not impose any duty upon the Government to
 manage timber resources.” Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 542.
     By contrast, several years later in Mitchell II the Court
 considered statutes and regulations requiring the Secre-
 tary of the Interior to “manag[e] the Indian forests so as to
 obtain the greatest revenue for the Indians consistent with
 a proper protection and improvement of the forests,” to
 “manage Indian forest resources on the principle of sus-
 tained-yield management,” and to “preserv[e] Indian forest
 lands in a perpetually productive state.” Mitchell II, 463
 U.S. at 220–21 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US         21

 These statutes and regulations, the Supreme Court held,
 sufficiently “establish[ed] a fiduciary relationship and de-
 fine[d] the contours of the United States’ fiduciary respon-
 sibilities” to support Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction. Id. at
 224.
     More recently, in United States v. White Mountain
 Apache Tribe, the Supreme Court considered the applica-
 tion of Mitchell I and Mitchell II to another statute similar
 to the 1906 Act at issue here. 537 U.S. 465 (2003). In White
 Mountain Apache, the statute provided that the “‘former
 Fort Apache Military Reservation’ would be ‘held by the
 United States in trust for the White Mountain Apache
 Tribe, subject to the right of the Secretary of the Interior to
 use any part of the land and improvements for administra-
 tive or school purposes.’” Id. at 469 (quoting Pub. L. 86–
 392, 74 Stat. 8). The White Mountain Apache Tribe sought
 damages for the United States’ failure to maintain the
 trust property. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the stat-
 utory language expressly defined a fiduciary relationship
 and that the United States enjoyed occupation of the trust
 property, which was sufficient for Indian Tucker Act juris-
 diction even though the statute did not “expressly subject
 the Government to duties of management and conserva-
 tion.” Id. at 474–75.
     The United States’ position here—that the 1906 Act es-
 tablishes only a bare trust with respect to water infrastruc-
 ture—is inconsistent with both the text of the 1906 statute
 and the Supreme Court’s decision in White Mountain
 Apache. The statute here expressly describes particular
 property—the UIIP irrigation system—and there is ex-
 press fiduciary language with an identified beneficiary—
 the property is to be held “in trust for the Indians.” 34 Stat.
 375. Moreover, the “held and operated” language pre-
 scribes specific duties. Id. By identifying a corpus, a trus-
 tee, a beneficiary, an intent to create a trust relationship,
 and duties with respect to the property, the 1906 Act bears
 the “hallmarks of a more conventional fiduciary
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 22       UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

 relationship.” White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 473.
 Thus, like the statute at issue in White Mountain Apache,
 the 1906 Act “goes beyond a bare trust and permits a fair
 inference that the Government is subject to duties as a
 trustee” to protect and preserve the property. Id. at 474–
 75.
      The 1906 Act, by its plain text, establishes that the
 United States accepted a duty to “h[o]ld and operate[]” the
 described irrigation systems “in trust for the Indians.” 34
 Stat. 375. The Tribe also pled a breach of this duty, namely
 that the United States has allowed the 1906 Act infrastruc-
 ture to fall into “a grave state of disrepair.” Complaint at
 24. These allegations are sufficient to clear the first step
 of the jurisdictional analysis in Navajo I with respect to the
 failure to maintain water infrastructure. The Tribe has
 identified “a substantive source of law that establishes spe-
 cific fiduciary or other duties,” and that the complaint suf-
 ficiently “allege[d] that the Government has failed
 faithfully to perform those duties,” as required for Indian
 Tucker Act jurisdiction. Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 506. 6

      6   The United States argued on appeal that it does not
 exercise “exclusive authority to use and occupy th[e] prop-
 erty,” contending that the lack of exclusive control distin-
 guishes White Mountain Apache. Oral Arg. at 27:00–28:25.
 The Tribe’s complaint alleged that the United States,
 through the BIA, exercises “pervasive and comprehensive
 control of the UIIP,” including through assessing operation
 fees, performing maintenance and rehabilitation, regulat-
 ing project structures, and executing carriage agreements
 with other water users. Complaint at 22–25. The United
 States did not challenge any of the factual allegations re-
 lating to the trial court’s jurisdiction. At this stage of the
 proceedings, we must take the well-pled factual allegations
 of the operative complaint as true. Reynolds, 846 F.2d at
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US        23

     We next turn to the second step of the Navajo I juris-
 dictional analysis, “whether the relevant source of substan-
 tive law ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating
 compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach
 of the duties.’” 537 U.S. at 506 (quoting Mitchell II, 463
 U.S. at 219). “This ‘fair interpretation’ rule demands a
 showing demonstrably lower than the standard for the ini-
 tial waiver of sovereign immunity.” White Mountain
 Apache, 537 U.S. at 472. A statute need only “be reasona-
 bly amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of re-
 covery in damages . . . a fair inference will do.” Id. at 473.
 In addition, “[a]t the second step of the jurisdictional anal-
 ysis . . . common-law trust principles come into play.” Hopi
 Tribe, 782 F.3d at 668.
     We again find White Mountain Apache instructive.
 There, as here, “the fact that the property occupied by the
 United States is expressly subject to a trust supports a fair
 inference that an obligation to preserve the property im-
 provements was incumbent on the United States as trus-
 tee” because “a fiduciary actually administering trust
 property may not allow it to fall into ruin on his watch.”
 White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. at 475 (citing, inter alia,
 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 176 (1957)); see also Re-
 statement (Third) of Trusts § 76 (2007). Here, as in White
 Mountain Apache, “it naturally follows that the Govern-
 ment should be liable in damages for the breach of its fidu-
 ciary duties.” 537 U.S. at 476 (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S.
 at 226). We find that the duties prescribed by the 1906 Act
 can be fairly interpreted as money-mandating, and, there-
 fore, that the second element of the Navajo I jurisdictional
 analysis is satisfied as to the water infrastructure claims.

 747. Therefore, given that the complaint alleged exclusive
 control, we do not decide whether such a showing of exclu-
 sive control is required by White Mountain Apache as ar-
 gued by the United States.
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 24      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

     The United States argues that the 1906 Act cannot cre-
 ate trust duties because the Department of Interior’s “man-
 date” is “to manage the Project for the benefit of both
 Indians and non-Indians,” which is “incompatible with the
 notion that it imposes enforceable fiduciary duties owed
 specifically to Plaintiff.” Appellee’s Br. 21. The 1906 Act
 contains no such mandate. While the “ditches and canals
 of such irrigation systems may be used, extended, or en-
 larged for the purpose of conveying water by any person,
 association, or corporation,” 34 Stat. 375, this does not, as
 the United States contends, require the Secretary to con-
 sider the benefits to those non-trustee users.
     Moreover, allowing the United States to use the infra-
 structure for the benefit of non-Indians is not inconsistent
 with the existence of a trust obligation. The Supreme
 Court’s decision in Jicarilla is instructive. There, the
 Court considered whether the United States, acting as a
 trustee, could assert attorney-client privilege and withhold
 communications from an Indian Tribe beneficiary.
 Jicarilla, 564 U.S. at 165–66. The common law’s fiduciary
 exception barred any such claim of attorney-client privi-
 lege, but the Supreme Court held that the United States
 could choose to structure the trust relationship to avoid
 such a principle, noting that the United States “is not a pri-
 vate trustee,” and Congress may choose “to structure the
 Indian trust relationship in different ways.” Id. at 173,
 178. Likewise, the trust obligations created by the 1906
 Act’s express duties to hold and operate the infrastructure
 for the Tribe’s benefit are not defeated by a provision al-
 lowing the Secretary to provide for third-party use. We
 hold that claims 1 (to the extent it concerns maintenance
 of 1906 Act infrastructure and not further construction), 5,
 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 19, 20, and 21 (to the extent it concerns
 operation of 1906 Act infrastructure but not in other re-
 spects), plead a breach of trust premised on the alleged fail-
 ure of the United States to maintain and operate the 1906
 Act infrastructure for the benefit of the Tribe. Because the
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US        25

 1906 Act sufficiently sets forth a source of law to establish
 these duties at the pleading stage, we vacate the Claims
 Court’s dismissal of these infrastructure claims and re-
 mand.
       Relatedly, the Tribe contends that the United States
 has a trust obligation not to allow use of the infrastructure
 by third parties without the Tribe’s approval and sufficient
 compensation to the Tribe. The Tribe alleged that the
 United States had mismanaged the infrastructure by en-
 tering “informal agreements allowing non-Indian irriga-
 tion companies and other non-Indian irrigators to utilize
 . . . [the] infrastructure for their own benefit.” Complaint
 at 37. The Tribe has not presented further argument on
 this point, nor did the Claims Court address it in any de-
 tail. At this stage of the proceeding, we think it premature
 to address the question of whether allowing third-party use
 is a breach of the United States’ fiduciary duties (except to
 the extent that we hold that such third-party use is not in-
 consistent with the obligation to protect and preserve the
 property).
                               2
      We finally address the Tribe’s breach of trust claims
 concerning water rights based on the 1906 Act. Although
 we have concluded that the 1906 Act can fairly be read as
 creating a trust relationship obligating the United States
 to protect and preserve the water infrastructure, the Tribe
 contends that the United States’ trust duties include a gen-
 eral obligation to protect and preserve water rights. The
 language of the 1906 Act is less than clear on this point,
 but the Tribe alleges here, inter alia, that the United States
 violated this duty by effecting “transfers of the Tribe’s wa-
 ter rights . . . from Indian lands to non-Indian lands under
 the UIIP and from Indian lands on the Reservation to non-
 Indian lands outside of the UIIP.” Complaint at 30. Spe-
 cifically, the Tribe alleged that the Decker Report—which
 the Tribe commissioned in 1960 to quantify its claims to
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 26     UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

 water rights, and upon which the Tribe relied to define its
 claims here—identified three groups of lands served by
 1906 Act facilities with recognized appurtenant water
 rights (Groups 1, 2, and 3). Claim 7 of the Complaint al-
 leged that transfers of these water rights by the govern-
 ment were improper. The Tribe also alleged in claim 9 that
 the United States’ execution of the Midview Exchange
 Agreement somehow constituted mismanagement of the
 Tribe’s water rights. Similarly, the Tribe alleged in claim
 19 that the transfer of Decker Report Group 2 water rights
 to the Duchesne Townsite, which was accomplished
 through an act of Congress, Pub. L. No. 106-370 (2000),
 breached the United States’ trust obligations under the
 1906 Act. Claims 9 and 19 asserted that damages are owed
 because the United States failed to ensure that the Tribe
 received access to replacement water and adequate com-
 pensation for the transfers.
      The Claims Court did not specifically address these
 claims, likely because the government did not present the
 issue to the court separately from the Winters arguments.
 Nor do the parties brief these issues on appeal in any de-
 tail, focusing instead on the infrastructure issue. Nonethe-
 less, other breach of trust claims relating to the 1906 Act
 will go forward in the Claims Court, and we believe “injus-
 tice might otherwise result” were we not to remand for an
 opportunity for the Claims Court to consider these claims.
 Forshey, 284 F.3d at 1353 (quoting Hormel v. Helvering,
 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)). We also perceive a predicate,
 jurisdictional issue which has received little attention from
 the parties—whether claims 7, 9, or 19 as for water rights
 would survive the time bar, since the transfers at issue oc-
 curred in the 1940s, in the year 1967, and in the year 2001,
 respectively.
      The Tribe also contends that the United States under
 the 1906 Act had an obligation to secure additional water
 for the Tribe. For the same reasons that we found no such
 trust obligation in the 1899 Act, we find no such obligation
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US          27

 in the 1906 Act. The Tribe also contends that the United
 States had a trust obligation to expand the 1906 Act infra-
 structure at the government’s expense. While the 1906 Act
 obligated the United States to “construct[] and complete[]”
 the “irrigation systems,” we do not read the 1906 Act as
 imposing any such obligation on the government as trus-
 tee. 34 Stat. at 375. Even under the common law of trusts,
 there is no duty to expand the trust corpus at the trustee’s
 own expense. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 88
 cmt. a (2007) (recognizing a right of reimbursement for ex-
 penses properly incurred). The 1906 Act does not itself cre-
 ate a trust duty to construct the full scope of the project
 initially contemplated in the statute. See Hopi Tribe, 782
 F.3d at 669 (declining to find that holding reserved water
 rights in trust implicitly imposes a duty to provide water
 infrastructure). Rather, under the 1906 Act it is the title
 to the facilities actually built that shall be held in trust. To
 the extent claim 1 or any others plead for relief from the
 United States’ failure as trustee to construct the full scope
 of the project initially contemplated, the 1906 Act does not
 support Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction.
     We note that the Tribe relies on a provision allowing
 the Secretary to “sue and be sued in matters relating” to
 the 1906 Act. 34 Stat. at 375. We do not read that provi-
 sion as itself creating a cause of action for breach of trust.
          II. The 1965 Deferral Agreement Claims
                                A
     We turn next to the Tribe’s claims that the United
 States has breached the 1965 Deferral Agreement. First,
 in claim 14, the Tribe alleged “the United States has bla-
 tantly foregone any effort to satisfy Tribal Reserved Water
 Rights as promised in the 1965 Deferral Agreement”
 through the construction of promised infrastructure. Com-
 plaint at 76. The 1965 Deferral Agreement provides:
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 28      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

      If the ultimate phase of the Central Utah project is
      not completed sufficiently to supply said Indian
      water rights by the 1st day of January, 2005, equi-
      table adjustment will be made in accordance with
      said reserved and perfected water rights of the
      tribe to permit the immediate Indian use of the wa-
      ter so reserved. It is agreed that the first day of
      January, 2005, shall be mutually considered as the
      maximum date of deferment and that all phases of
      the Central Utah project will in good faith be dili-
      gently pursued to satisfy all Indian water rights at
      the earliest possible date.
 J.A. 257 (emphasis omitted). The Claims Court dismissed
 claim 14 as time barred because “the Tribe knew as early
 as 1980 that the Uintah and Ute Indian Units contem-
 plated by the 1965 Deferral Agreement would not be con-
 structed.” Decision, at *9. On appeal, the Tribe contends
 that the 1965 Deferral Agreement gave a commencement
 date of January 1, 2005, for projects to supply Indian water
 rights, which allows for completion within a reasonable
 amount of time, and that construction of irrigation and
 storage projects has been ongoing to the present day. We
 disagree with the Tribe’s reading of the 1965 Deferral
 Agreement.
     On its face, the agreement provides that the project
 must be “completed sufficiently to supply said Indian water
 rights by the 1st day of January, 2005,” or else “equitable
 adjustment will be made.” J.A. 257 (emphasis added).
 Thus, on the facts alleged in the complaint, January 1,
 2005, is the latest date on which the construction-related
 aspects of the claim accrued; the equitable adjustment lan-
 guage cannot be read to support that construction would
 begin in 2005. We agree with the Claims Court’s dismissal
 of the construction-related aspects of claim 14 under 28
 U.S.C. § 2501. We have no occasion to determine what ob-
 ligations would be imposed on the United States with re-
 spect to the “equitable adjustment” language since the
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US          29

 Tribe has not at this point coherently alleged a breach of
 this obligation. Even if 2005 were not the latest date for
 construction, we think that the Claims Court was correct
 in its conclusion that, as early as 1980, the Tribe knew that
 the construction was not going to occur and that the claim
 accrued decades ago. Therefore, we affirm the Claims
 Court’s determination that claim 14 is time barred.
                                B
      While the Tribe’s primary theory is that the 1965 De-
 ferral Agreement claims survived the 1992 CUPCA stat-
 ute, 7 claim 15 pled in the alternative that, if section 507 of
 CUPCA extinguished the Tribe’s property interest in “con-
 tractual rights and legal claims arising under the 1965 De-
 ferral Agreement,” then CUPCA constituted a taking.
 Complaint at 77. The Tribe contends that the compensa-
 tion provided by CUPCA included both the funds and pro-
 jects defined in Title V (titled “Ute Indian Rights
 Settlement”) and also the funds and projects defined in Ti-
 tle II, Section 203 (titled “Uinta Basin Replacement Pro-
 ject”), and that this did not constitute adequate
 compensation for the taking of the defined contract rights.
 The Claims Court dismissed claim 15 as time barred be-
 cause the compensation scheme in CUPCA was fixed in
 1992. Decision, at *8. The Tribe argues that the stabiliza-
 tion doctrine saves the claim because “the Tribe was enti-
 tled to [defer filing suit until it could] first see whether the
 United States would fulfill its promise to mitigate the im-
 pacts of the purported ‘waiver’ of the 1965 Deferral Agree-
 ment through the construction of the Uintah Basin
 Replacement Projects.” Appellant’s Br. 47. The Tribe al-
 leged that these projects are ongoing through the present

     7  This theory only has relevance with respect to the
 non-construction claims based on the 1965 Deferral Agree-
 ment because we have held that the construction claims
 are time barred.
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 30      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

 day. We assume, without deciding, that the stabilization
 doctrine applies here, in the context of a regulatory taking.
 However, even on this assumption, we agree with the
 Claims Court.
      Our cases have “‘soundly rejected’ the notion ‘that the
 filing of a lawsuit can be postponed until the full extent of
 the damage is known.’” San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United
 States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Bol-
 ing v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
 Rather, stabilization occurs when “the permanent nature
 of the taking is evident and the extent of the damage is
 reasonably foreseeable.” Boling, 220 F.3d at 1371. In a
 case involving a statute, “it is fundamental jurisprudence
 that the [a]ct’s objective meaning and effect were fixed
 when the [a]ct was adopted.” Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C.
 v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
 Here, the effect of the Uinta Basin Replacement Project
 provision in Title II of CUPCA was apparent as of CUPCA’s
 adoption in 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 203(a)–(b). Sec-
 tion 203 provided that the projects were discretionary and
 contingent on feasibility and environmental studies. The
 Tribe’s theory is that what the government constructed un-
 der these discretionary provisions turned out to be insuffi-
 cient compensation. That is not adequate to invoke the
 stabilization doctrine (assuming it applies); the Tribe could
 have argued in 1992 that the discretionary nature of the
 projects rendered them inadequate compensation. There-
 fore, we affirm the Claims Court’s determination that
 claim 15 is time barred.
      III. The 1967 Midview Exchange Agreement Claims
                              A
     In addition to the breach claim with respect to the 1965
 Deferral Agreement, the Tribe also alleged a second breach
 of contract, claim 11, concerning the 1967 Midview Ex-
 change Agreement, which provided that the Midview Prop-
 erty (i.e., water infrastructure covered by the agreement)
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US        31

 would be “transfer[red] to Indian Affairs” and “become part
 of the project works of the Uintah Project.” J.A. 263. Claim
 11 alleged that the United States breached the Midview
 Exchange Agreement by “failing to effectuate a transfer of
 the Midview Property in trust for the benefit of the UIIP,”
 which the Tribe further characterized as a failure to “com-
 plete[] the underlying paperwork to formally transfer the
 Midview Property from [the Bureau of Reclamation] to
 BIA.” Complaint at 34, 73. While stated as a breach of
 contract claim, the claimed damages are alleged to be those
 that would be received on a breach of trust theory if the
 property had been transferred to the trust. 8
     The Claims Court held that claim 11, insofar as it con-
 cerns water infrastructure, is barred by the 2012 settle-
 ment agreement because it “relate[s] to the United States’
 management or accounting of . . . Plaintiff’s non-monetary
 trust assets or resources.” J.A. 273; see Decision, at *8.
     On appeal, the Tribe argues that claim 11 does not im-
 plicate the 2012 settlement agreement in this respect be-
 cause the Midview Property never became a trust asset.
 We reject the Tribe’s theory. We read the settlement agree-
 ment as covering both assets that were in trust and assets
 that should have been transferred in trust. To the extent
 that claim 11 concerned infrastructure, we think that a
 claim that such infrastructure was mismanaged is a claim
 that “relate[s] to the United States’ management” of that
 purported trust asset (i.e., a non-monetary trust asset), and
 claims “based on harms or violations occurring before the
 date of the execution of [the 2012] Settlement Agreement,”

     8   Claim 8 directly alleged a breach of trust with re-
 spect to the Midview Property. It is unclear whether this
 claim has independent significance given the breach of con-
 tract theory, and also unclear whether a breach of trust
 claim can be stated for failure to transfer assets into trust.
 We leave these issues to be addressed on remand.
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 32      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

 which was March 8, 2012, are barred. J.A. 273. We affirm
 the dismissal of claim 11 insofar as it concerned infrastruc-
 ture.
     The Tribe also alleged that it received particular water
 rights under the Midview Exchange Agreement, and that
 the federal government has improperly diverted water
 owned by the Tribe to other users in violation of the agree-
 ment. The 2012 agreement expressly excluded from waiver
 claims concerning:
      Plaintiff’s water rights, whether adjudicated or un-
      adjudicated; Plaintiff’s authority to use and protect
      such water rights; and Plaintiff’s claims for dam-
      ages for loss of water resources allegedly caused by
      Defendants’ failure to establish, acquire, enforce or
      protect such water rights.
 J.A. 277. The question of whether the Midview Exchange
 includes water rights was not a focus of the parties or the
 court below. Given the explicit exceptions in the 2012 set-
 tlement that the Claims Court relied upon, three questions
 remain: (1) whether there are water rights under the
 Midview Exchange Agreement, (2) whether the complaint
 adequately pled a breach of contract with respect to water
 rights, and (3) whether the exception in the 2012 settle-
 ment applies. We vacate the Claims Court’s dismissal of
 claim 11 and remand for consideration of these issues.
                               B
     Claim 10 alleged that the Midview Exchange Agree-
 ment in other respects constituted a “per se physical tak-
 ing” because the Tribe was deprived of a portion of its
 “senior-priority” water rights, which were originally
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US          33

 recognized in a 1923 District of Utah decree. 9 Complaint
 at 72. While the exchange agreement provided for a trans-
 fer of those rights, the Tribe alleged it received inadequate
 compensation in the form of “state-based water rights, with
 a priority date inferior to the Tribe’s Winters Reserved
 Rights and with the prospect of forfeiture through non-
 use.” Id. The Tribe’s theory appears to be that the property
 the Tribe received in the exchange was inadequate, and
 therefore the Tribe did not receive just compensation for
 the property given up in the exchange. The Claims Court
 found that claim 10 is barred by the statute of limitations
 because “the source of the claim is the execution of the
 [Midview Exchange] Agreement,” and thus any takings
 claim accrued in 1967. Decision, at *8.
      On appeal, the Tribe contends that the stabilization
 doctrine saves the claim because “subsequent acts and
 omissions by the United States [have] gradually increased
 the disparities between the value of the senior-priority wa-
 ter rights . . . and what the Tribe received in exchange,” in-
 cluding the United States “(1) failing to transfer the
 Midview Property into trust for the Tribe” and “(2) clas-
 sif[ying] [] Indian lands that would otherwise receive irri-
 gation water from Duchesne River pursuant to the
 Midview Exchange as temporarily or permanently non-as-
 sessable [i.e., not eligible to receive irrigation water], with-
 out fulfilling its responsibility to render such lands
 assessable again.” Appellant’s Br. at 41–42. We disagree
 with the Tribe that these allegations were improperly dis-
 missed.
     Unlike the takings claim with respect to the 1965 De-
 ferral Agreement, the claim with respect to the Midview

     9   The Tribe cited United States v. Cedarview Irriga-
 tion Co., No. 4427 (D. Utah 1923) and United States v. Dry
 Gulch Irrigation Co., No. 4418 (D. Utah 1923) as the cases
 resulting in this decree.
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 34        UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

 Exchange Agreement does not rest on alleged legislative
 abrogation of preexisting contract claims. Rather, the
 claim is that the bargained-for consideration either was not
 provided or had less value than was anticipated. We do not
 see how inadequacy of a bargained-for exchange, whether
 a party is dissatisfied at the time of the bargain or after-
 wards, could result in a taking. “We have held that when
 the government itself breaches a contract, a party must
 seek compensation from the government in contract rather
 than under a takings claim.” Piszel v. United States, 833
 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Hughes Commc’ns
 Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed.
 Cir. 2001)). Although we have vacated the Claims Court’s
 dismissal of the Tribe’s breach of contract claim concerning
 the Midview Exchange Agreement, this breach allegation
 cannot sustain the Tribe’s takings claim, which was
 properly dismissed.
      Finally, the Tribe alleges that a taking occurred be-
 cause the Midview Exchange Agreement violated 25 U.S.C.
 § 177, the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. 10 The Tribe’s the-
 ory on this point appears to be that there was a taking be-
 cause the BIA transferred away the Tribe’s federally-
 decreed water rights illegally. Even assuming, without de-
 ciding, that a violation of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act
 could give rise to a claim for money damages, a violation of
 the Indian Non-Intercourse Act cannot be the basis of a
 takings claim. Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d
 1355, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]o the extent that the plain-
 tiff claims it is entitled to prevail because the agency acted
 in violation of statute or regulation, Del-Rio does not give

      10 “No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of
 lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian na-
 tion or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or
 equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
 entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US          35

 the plaintiff a right to litigate that issue in a takings action
 rather than in the congressionally mandated administra-
 tive review proceeding.” (discussing Del-Rio Drilling Pro-
 grams, Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
 1998))).
     Accordingly, we affirm the Claims Court’s dismissal of
 claim 10.
            IV. Alternative Grounds for Dismissal
     The United States argues that this court should con-
 sider specific alternative grounds to affirm the dismissal of
 any claims for which we vacate the Claims Court’s decision.
 For example, the United States contends that most of the
 surviving breach of trust claims are time barred, and that
 several of them are barred by the 2012 settlement agree-
 ment. While it is true that “we may affirm a judgment of
 the trial court on any ground supported by the record, . . .
 [t]he decision whether to do so . . . lies within our discre-
 tion.” El-Sheikh v. United States, 177 F.3d 1321, 1326
 (Fed. Cir. 1999). We do not reach these alternative grounds
 on appeal.
     The United States also argues that all remaining
 claims should be barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500, which pro-
 vides that the Claims Court “shall not have jurisdiction of
 any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff . . . has
 pending in any other court any suit or process against the
 United States” or its agents. As the United States acknowl-
 edges, we held in Resource Investments, Inc. v. United
 States that “the § 1500 bar operates ‘only when the suit
 shall have been commenced in the other court before the
 claim was filed in [the Claims Court].’” 785 F.3d 660, 669
 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Tecon
 Eng’rs, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 943, 949 (Ct. Cl.
 1965)). Because the Claims Court action was filed before
 the District of Columbia action, see supra n.2, under our
 precedent section 1500 does not apply.
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 36      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

                           V. Remand
     On remand, the Claims Court may order the Tribe to
 replead the surviving claims for purposes of clarity and
 may consider the United States’ alternative grounds for
 dismissal. The court also urges the parties to consider com-
 prehensive settlement of the remaining claims in light of
 what appears to be costly and protracted future litigation.
                           CONCLUSION
     We affirm the Claims Courts’ dismissal of claims 2, 3,
 4, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18. We affirm in part and vacate
 in part the dismissal of claims 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 19,
 20, and 21, and remand for further proceedings consistent
 with this opinion.
  AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED
                  IN PART
                              COSTS
 Costs to neither party.
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    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                   ______________________

   UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY
            INDIAN RESERVATION,
                Plaintiff-Appellant

                               v.

                     UNITED STATES,
                     Defendant-Appellee
                   ______________________

                         2021-1880
                   ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:18-cv-00359-RHH, Senior Judge Robert H.
 Hodges, Jr, Judge Armando O. Bonilla.
                 ______________________

 REYNA, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-part and dissenting-
 in-part.
      I am pleased to join my colleagues for most of the ma-
 jority opinion. But I depart that union in part because I
 believe the 1899 Act is a duty-imposing source of law suffi-
 cient to support Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction over the
 Tribe’s breach of trust claims.
     The 1899 Act is about tribal water. Act of March 1,
 1899, 55 Cong. Ch. 324, 30 Stat. 924, 941. It gives the Sec-
 retary the discretion to grant rights of way to others for
 construction and maintenance of water infrastructure, sub-
 ject to the paramount rights of the Tribe. Id. And it ex-
 pressly places on the Secretary a “duty . . . to prescribe such
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 2       UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

 rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to secure
 to the Indians the quantity of water needed for their pre-
 sent and prospective wants, and to otherwise protect the
 rights and interests of the Indians[.]” 1 Id.
     This case is unlike the treaty at issue in Arizona v.
 Navajo Nation, 599 U.S. 555 (2023) because, here, the 1899
 Act imposes actionable fiduciary duties on the government.

     1   The majority ascribes specific fiduciary duties to
 particular sources of law and, in turn, to particular claims
 in the Tribe’s first amended complaint. As a result, the
 majority leaves unaddressed important aspects of the acts.
 For example, the majority characterizes the 1899 Act as re-
 lating solely to “duties in trust to secure new water for the
 Tribe, including by constructing new water storage infra-
 structure.” Maj. Op. 15 (emphasis added). As a result, the
 majority considers the 1899 Act as isolated to new infra-
 structure and not about access to existing water. Each act
 should be individually interpreted and considered based on
 its language. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
 (1917) (“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute
 must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in
 which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole
 function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
 terms.”). The Court of Federal Claims did not engage in an
 analysis separating the Tribe’s causes of action and ascrib-
 ing alleged fiduciary duties between the 1899 and 1906
 Acts, and I fault the majority’s decision to do so. As con-
 cerns the Tribe’s breach of trust claims, I concur only in the
 majority’s conclusion that the 1906 Act creates actionable
 trust duties requiring vacatur and remand. I do not join
 the manner in which the majority allocates alleged fiduci-
 ary duties between the 1899 and 1906 Acts, nor its peculiar
 assignment of the Tribe’s breach of trust causes of action
 between the two acts.
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 UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US        3

 Although the Navajo Nation treaty set aside a reservation
 for the Navajo and thus implicitly created reserved water
 rights for the Tribe, it did not create “a duty on the United
 States to take affirmative steps to secure water for the
 Tribe.” Id. at 566. In comparison, the 1899 Act expressly
 relates to water. In granting the Secretary discretionary
 authority over building and maintaining water infrastruc-
 ture, it expressly places on the Secretary a “duty . . . to
 prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem
 necessary to secure to the Indians the quantity of water
 needed for their present and prospective wants.” 30 Stat.
 at 941 (emphasis added).
     With such express language provided, there was no
 need for the 1899 Act to explicitly refer to water and water
 infrastructure as being held “in trust” for it to create ac-
 tionable fiduciary duties. Nor does it matter that the 1899
 Act permits the Secretary to choose rules and regulations
 “as he may deem necessary.” Id. The specific rules and
 regulations created may be up to the Secretary, but there
 is nothing permissive in the 1899 Act about the Secretary’s
 ultimate duty to prescribe sufficient rules and regulations
 to secure for the Tribe “the quantity of water needed for
 their present and prospective wants.” Id. I am at a loss as
 to how the language of the 1899 Act can be understood to
 mean that the Secretary has the discretion to not secure
 water to the Tribe.
     The majority decision regarding the 1899 Act is an-
 other in a drip line of cases eroding promises that the
 United States clearly and objectively made to tribal na-
 tions. Those promises were from one sovereign state to an-
 other, couched in legal terms with all the trappings of
 legality. See Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629,
 667–68 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Tribes are not pri-
 vate organizations within state boundaries. Their reserva-
 tions are not glorified private campgrounds. Tribes are
 sovereigns.”). The plain language of the 1899 Act creates
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 4      UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN v. US

 fiduciary obligations on the Secretary that are objectively
 clear and unambiguous. I thus respectfully dissent in part.