Court Opinion

ID: 9929518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 21:00:58.689261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:43:13.240889
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                  File Name: 24a0053n.06

                                       Case No. 23-5494

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
                                 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                              Feb 02, 2024
                                                                            KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
                                                        )
 MICHAELJAMES TAYLOR WOOD,
                                                        )
           Plaintiff-Appellant,                         )    ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                        )    UNITED STATES DISTRICT
 v.                                                     )    COURT FOR THE EASTERN
                                                        )    DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,                       )
           Defendant-Appellee.                          )                           OPINION
                                                        )
                                                        )

Before: SILER, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

       NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Michaeljames Wood received disability benefits as a

child. When he turned eighteen, the Social Security Administration (SSA) reexamined his case

and found he was not disabled. Wood may have been eligible to keep receiving benefits because

he participated in a vocational rehabilitation program.       But Wood failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies, so we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of his case.

                                               I.

       As a child, Wood received supplemental security disability benefits under Title XVI of the

Social Security Act of 1935. Wood turned eighteen on December 31, 2015. Because Wood turned

eighteen, SSA reexamined his eligibility for disability benefits. In March 2016, Wood submitted

an adult disability report. If Wood was participating in vocational rehabilitation, he might have

had a claim for continued benefits, known as § 301 benefits.1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(6). But in

       1
        See Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 301, 94 Stat.
441, 449–50 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1383).
No. 23-5494, Wood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

that March report, Wood said he was not participating in a vocational rehabilitation program.2 SSA

concluded in a July 2016 letter that Wood was not disabled under the disability rules for adults.

       Wood asked SSA to reconsider that decision. He again denied participation in vocational

rehabilitation in a disability report dated August 2016. After a hearing, SSA again determined that

Wood was not disabled in March 2018. The hearing officer’s report said that Wood was not

receiving any vocational rehabilitation.

       Next, Wood requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The hearing

request form did not mention vocational rehabilitation or any claim to § 301 benefits and only

claimed that Wood was still disabled. Wood attended the hearing pro se on October 11, 2018, and

August 29, 2019. At the hearing, Wood presented some evidence of vocational rehabilitation, but

he never explicitly asked the ALJ to continue his benefits based on that vocational rehabilitation.

The ALJ issued a written decision in January 2020 that listed Wood’s disability status as the only

issue for review. The ALJ found Wood was not disabled.3

       Wood asked the Appeals Council to review the ALJ’s decision based on his participation

in “an appropriate program of vocational rehabilitation services.” A.R. 210. Wood’s point seemed

to be that participation would entitle him to § 301 benefits. The Appeals Council denied Wood’s

request for review on September 29, 2020. The denial included the following paragraph:

       2
         Wood’s mother may have completed this report and others like it for Wood. But we still
speak of Wood filling out forms and filing documents that others may have submitted on his behalf.
       3
          Wood moved to alter or amend the ALJ’s decision on February 28, 2020, arguing that he
should receive § 301 benefits. The motion claimed that the ALJ had jurisdiction to reopen and
revise its decision “[b]ecause the claimant has not requested Review by the Appeals Council.”
A.R. 506. The ALJ expressed willingness to reopen the case. But on March 25, 2020, Wood did
petition the Appeals Council for review. Wood suggested that the Appeals Council should remand
the case to the ALJ in a letter dated August 7, 2020. But the Appeals Council denied review
instead.
                                                 2
No. 23-5494, Wood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

               You were advised in the Notice for Continuing Disability Review issued on
       January 20, 2016, that your benefits may continue if you were taking part in certain
       vocational rehabilitation or similar programs, and that you should inform the local
       Social Security office about any program you were taking part in when you
       provided needed information during and after the Continuing Disability Review.
       Determination of eligibility for Section 301 benefits is made separately from a
       determination of medical cessation (POMS DI 14510.003 and 14510.035). Any
       questions about your enrollment and participation in vocational rehabilitation or
       your eligibility for continued benefits under Section 301 should be directed to your
       local Social Security office.

Id. at 1. Wood does not claim to have ever contacted his local Social Security office as directed.

       Instead, Wood filed a complaint on November 21, 2020, that asked the district court to

reinstate his benefits based on his participation in vocational rehabilitation. SSA moved for

summary judgment and to dismiss, and the district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation in full, dismissed the case on March 28, 2023.                 The report and

recommendation found that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether Wood was entitled to

§ 301 benefits because SSA had not made a final decision on the issue. R.31, R&R, p. 9, PageID

1169. In the alternative, the magistrate judge found remand unnecessary because Wood had an

available remedy—“pursuing his claim for Section 301 benefits through his local Social Security

office.” Id. at 8–9, PageID 1168–69.

       Wood timely appealed on May 26, 2023. We review the district court’s finding that it

lacked jurisdiction de novo. Cathedral Rock of N. Coll. Hill, Inc. v. Shalala, 223 F.3d 354, 358

(6th Cir. 2000).

                                                II.

       Wood relies on 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to establish jurisdiction. Section 405(g) permits review

of “any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which [the

plaintiff] was a party,” and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) provides that determinations under Title XVI

can also be reviewed “as provided in section 405(g).” Wood has not obtained any agency decision,
                                                 3
No. 23-5494, Wood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

let alone a final decision, on the issue of § 301 benefits. Only the Appeals Council formally

addressed the issue, and it told Wood that “[a]ny questions about your enrollment and participation

in vocational rehabilitation or your eligibility for continued benefits under Section 301 should be

directed to your local Social Security office.”

       Exhaustion “contains two separate elements: first, a jurisdictional requirement that claims

be presented to the agency, and second, a waivable requirement that the administrative remedies

prescribed by the Secretary be exhausted.” Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1773 (2019)

(cleaned up). Arguably, the non-waivable “jurisdictional” bar does not apply here: Wood

presented evidence of vocational rehabilitation before the ALJ, he asked the ALJ to alter or amend

her decision based on the § 301 issue, and he also raised the issue before the Appeals Council.

       Regardless, Wood did not exhaust all available administrative remedies. When SSA offers

additional process, the claimant must also exhaust those avenues of possible relief. See Willis v.

Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 1991). In Willis, the Appeals Council decided on remand

from the district court that a determination on “the income and resource provisions of the Act” was

needed. Id. at 392–93. So SSA essentially restarted its review process, providing an initial

decision and notifying Willis that she could request reconsideration. See id. at 397. Willis instead

moved for contempt or mandamus. Id. at 394. But we concluded that she failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies. Id. at 397. We said that “once the Secretary had established that further

administrative relief was available, Willis was required to pursue that course of action before

proceeding to federal court.” Id. at 398.

       Like Willis, Wood had access to further administrative relief, so he had to pursue that relief

before resorting to federal court. SSA decides and reviews § 301 determinations separately from

the question of whether a disability exists. So when the Appeals Council denied Wood’s request

                                                  4
No. 23-5494, Wood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

for review in September 2020, it claimed that Wood had been advised in 2016 that he should

“inform the local Social Security office” about any vocational rehabilitation program he had been

utilizing. A.R. 1. And the Appeals Council reiterated, “Any questions about your enrollment and

participation in vocational rehabilitation or your eligibility for continued benefits under Section

301 should be directed to your local Social Security office.” Id. By not following the Appeals

Council’s directions, Wood failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.4

        The non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement can be waived. But Wood does not argue

that waiver or an exception to exhaustion applies. The district court correctly dismissed Wood’s

case for lack of jurisdiction.

                                                III.

        For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment below.

        4
         Wood also argues that the ALJ failed to develop the record, but only in relation to whether
the administrative record has sufficient evidence about his claim for § 301 benefits. So we do not
address that argument.
                                                 5