Court Opinion

ID: 9765050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:49:06.794137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:43.380981
License: Public Domain

OPINION

REID, Chief Justice.
This ease presents for review the construction of the residuary clause of the last will and testament of General Ogle, who died a resident of Sevier County in March 1984. The trial court construed the will to devise to his widow a life estate in real property. The Court of Appeals reversed. The judgment of the trial court is found to be correct.
The facts in this case are not disputed.1 The will provided for payment of debts and funeral expenses and then provided in pertinent part:
I hereby leave, bequeath and devise the remainder of my estate, including real property and personal or mixed property, to my wife, Loretta Sutton Ogle, for her lifetime and at her death the remainder, if any at that time, to be divided equally among my three (3) children, Bobby Ogle, Bonnie Ogle Reagan and Betty Jo Ogle. Said children to share and share alike. (Emphasis added).
At the time of his death, the testator was married to plaintiff Loretta Ogle. After the testator’s death, she executed a warranty deed purporting to convey a fee simple interest in the residence, which had been owned by the testator at the time of his death, to plaintiff Fred Loveday, Loretta Ogle’s son by a prior marriage. Ogle and Loveday then instituted this declaratory judgment proceeding, T.C.A. § 29-14-101 et seq., against the other persons named in the will, Bobby Ogle, Betty Jo Ogle, and Bonnie Ogle Reagan, who are the children of the testator by a prior marriage, seeking a declaration that Ogle *669had acquired under the will a life estate in the real property coupled with an unlimited power of disposition, whereby Ogle could convey the property in fee simple. Defendants answered, admitting that the will gave the widow a life estate, but denying that she obtained the right to convey the fee, and prayed that the warranty deed from Ogle to Loveday be set aside.
The trial court found in favor of the remainder beneficiaries, declaring that the widow took a life estate only. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the deed transferred to Loveday a fee simple interest in the residence.
T.C.A. § 66-1-106 provides in pertinent part:
When the unlimited power of disposition, qualified or unqualified, ... is given expressly, in any written instrument, to the owner of any particular estate for life or years, ... such estate is changed into a fee absolute as to right of disposition,....
Pursuant to this statute, the owner of a life estate with an unlimited power of disposition can convey the fee simple estate, and, thus, defeat the interest of remaindermen. Hall v. Hall, 604 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn.1980); Hobbs v. Wilson, 614 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn. 1980). If the power of disposition is not exercised by the life tenant and if the property is not sold for debts dining the continuance of the life estate, the property will pass to the remainder beneficiaries upon the death of the life tenant. Redman v. Evans, 184 Tenn. 404, 199 S.W.2d 115, 116-17 (1947). This Court, in Hobbs, swpra, summarized these principles of law as follows:
Under the common law of this state, a devise of a life estate coupled with an absolute power of disposition created a fee simple estate in the [life tenant] which effectively defeated the rights of a remain-derman, whether the power of disposition was exercised or not. (Citations omitted). The application of this rule of law often defeated the basic intent of the testator that the remainderman share in that part of the estate not disposed of by the life tenant (Citation omitted). To correct this situation, the legislature passed T.C.A. § [66-1-106]....
The effect of this statute is to convert a life estate in real property, coupled with the full power to dispose of the property, into a fee simple absolute as to the right of disposition, while saving the rights of a remainderman in property when the power of disposition is not executed.
Hobbs, 614 S.W.2d at 330.
The determinative issue, therefore, is whether Ogle was expressly given an unlimited power of disposition. In making this determination, several cases are instructive. In Redman v. Evans, 184 Tenn. 404, 199 S.W.2d 115 (1947), the testatrix devised the residue of her estate to her nephew “to handle as he sees fit during his lifetime and the balance to go to his daughters_” Redman, 199 S.W.2d at 116. The Court found that this language was sufficient to give the life tenant, the nephew, the unlimited power of disposition. Id. at 117-19. Similarly, in Jones v. Jones, 225 Tenn. 12, 462 S.W.2d 872 (1971), the testator devised all of his property to his wife “to do as she sees fit during her life.” As in Redman, the Court in Jones found that the wife, as the life tenant, had the right to convey the property in fee simple absolute because the phrase “ ‘to do with as she sees fit’ meant just that and when she ‘saw fit’ to sell ... she was carrying out the wishes of the testator and was abiding by the provisions of the will.” Jones, 462 S.W.2d at 874. See also Miller v. Gratz, 3 Tenn.App. 498, 507 (Tenn.App.1926) (observing that a life tenant obtains the unqualified right to dispose of property by the use of phrases such as “to do with at pleasure”, “to do with at discretion”, or “to use and enjoy at pleasure”). Likewise, in Hobbs v. Wilson, supra, ‘ the testator devised real property to his wife “for life and, having full confidence in her judgment and discretion, I authorize her to use so much of the corpus thereof as she shall find necessary for comfort and maintenance, she being the sole judge of her needs ... and at her death, whatever remains indisposed of, if any, I will and devise the same in fee simple to my twelve nieces and nephews. ...” This language was also found to have expressly granted the wife the unlimited power to dispose of the property in fee simple. Hobbs, 614 S.W.2d at 330. Finally, *670in Skovron v. Third National Bank in Nashville, 509 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn.App.1973), the testator devised his property to his wife “to have and to hold for and during the full term of her natural life, with right to use and employ, all of said property ... for her use and benefit ... and upon her death, such of said property as may remain, shall go to and become the property of my brother....” Skovron, 509 S.W.2d at 499. The Court of Appeals in Skovron found that this language evidenced an intent by the testator to give his widow a life estate only. Id. at 507-508.
After reviewing the foregoing case law, the trial court in the present case found as follows:
The Court is persuaded in this case that the testator has not complied with the provisions of the statute, such as to grant to the widow the power of disposition.... [T]he Court is constrained to find that the testator did not expressly give the power of disposition to the widow. This is distinguished from those cases that the Court has been referred to and the Court read, wherein there are other wordings, such as, that she may do with it as she sees fit or words to that effect. We don’t have that here. ⅝ * * And the statute says, that this power must be given expressly. The Court must find and does find that this power of disposition is not expressly given by this provision of the will.
This Court is in agreement with the conclusion reached by the trial court. The testator devised the property to his wife “for her lifetime and at her death the remainder, 'if any at that time, to be divided equally” among his children. This language does not give the widow the unlimited power of disposition, qualified or unqualified. T.C.A. § 66-1-106 requires that the power of disposition be “expressly given.” The most expansive meaning that can be given the words “if any at that time” falls far short of an expressed grant required by the statute. The testator devised a life estate to his widow and a vested remainder to his named children. Therefore, Ogle did not have the power to convey a fee simple estate in the property in question.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court reinstated.
Costs are assessed against plaintiffs.
O’BRIEN, ANDERSON and BIRCH, JJ., concur.
DROWOTA, J., dissents.

. In reviewing this case, the Court has taken note of counsels’ failure to comply with Tenn.R.App.P. 28(g) requiring citations to the record. There is not a single reference to the record in the briefs filed in this case. Counsel are reminded that compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure is not optional.