Court Opinion

ID: 9662671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:14:59.640449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:41.207306
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
It is true that what the majority opinion extracts from the 20 odd pages of voir dire examination of venirewoman Rogers, appears in the record. That its significance is to establish the State’s entitlement to a challenge for cause on the ground of bias,1 however, is unlikely. For after Rogers gave the excerpted response, it was fully explained to her by defense counsel that jurors in Texas do not “vote for” the death penalty, but instead, are to answer special questions according to the trial judge’s instructions, by applying the evidence adduced. The effect of her answers were even explained in detail to Rogers by the trial judge. She nevertheless insisted several times thereafter that she would follow the judge’s instructions, including answer the questions based on the evidence;2 the ultimate question and answer which preceded her exclusion were:
“Q: Mrs. Rogers, being a conscientious citizen of our county, you would, if chosen as a juror in this case or any case follow the judge’s instructions, and you would answer any questions that the judge gives you from the evidence that you heard in the courtroom, wouldn’t you?
A: I certainly would.”
Similarly, venirewoman Swanger — after hearing it explained that the jury’s function is to answer questions that the judge asks about the evidence, “then the Judge, based upon those answers, imposes the sentence” —concluded her voir dire as follows:
“Q: If seated as a juror in this case, and the Judge tells you from the evidence, answer these questions, would you follow the Judge’s instructions?
A: If seated, I would have to, wouldn’t I?
Q: Right. And so would you?
A: If seated, I would.”
From the majority’s continuing application of the dictates of Witherspoon v. Illinois,3 as a “ground of exclusion” in direct contravention of Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), I must disassociate myself. See my dissenting opinion in May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), vacated and remanded, 454 U.S. 959, 102 S.Ct. 497, 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981).
I dissent.
TEAGUE, J., joins.

. Presumably, the basis for the exclusion upheld is bias, see Article 35.16(b)(3), V.A.C.C.P., but the majority opinion does not identify it.

. Though she admitted that she might be “affected” by the knowledge of effects of her answers. .

. 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968).