Court Opinion

ID: 9694190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:28:15.968602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:57.237587
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
Christianson, J.
Plaintiff has petitioned for a rehearing. The first sentence in the petition for rehearing reads as follows: “In the opinion rendered by this court in the above entitled proceeding, the court assumed that the basis -for the suit brought by the plaintiff no longer exists and therefore remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the main action.” Plaintiff is in error. This court did not remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the main action.
The appeal was from an order continuing a temporary injunction and the opinion rendered by this court was limited to the order from which the appeal had been taken. The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status-quo of the subject matter of the suit and protect the rights of the plaintiff “pending final determination of the case upon the merits.” Burton v. Walker et al., 13 ND 149, 100 NW 257; Giliman et al. v. Talley et al., 140 Ia 718, 119 NW 144; Van Horn v. City of Des Moines et al., 192 Ia 1313, 186 NW 193; State v. Wadhams Oil Co., 149 Wis 58, 134 NW 1121, 40 LRA NS 607; NDRC 1943, Secs. 32-0602, 32-0603.
The former opinion on this appeal did not make or purport to make any determination of the merits of plaintiff’s cause of action nor did it “carry any implication of a determination of any question affecting the merits.” It was “not an adjudication on the merits, and is not conclusive of any question affecting the merits in subsequent proceedings in the suit or another suit involving the same cause of action.” Roller v. Murray, 71 W Va 161, 76 SE 172, LRA1915F 984, Ann Cas 1914B 1139; Beech v. U. S. Fidelity & G. Co., 54 Idaho 255, 30 Pac2d 1079, 92 ALR 264. “It is well recognized,” said the Supreme Court of Wisconsin (State v. Wadhams Oil Co., supra), *285“that such orders (temporary injunctions) have been used and employed to maintain the status 'quo of the rights of parties, and thus protect persons against irreparable injuries in the law. Its legal object is to preserve a person’s property or rights in controversy, until a final adjudication is reached upon the merits of-the controversy; but it does not, in a legal sense, conclude the rights of the parties.”
The opinion rendered in this case relates to the appeal from the temporary injunction and to that alone. No determination is made of the merits of the main action, and the issues in- such action remain undetermined. See Giliman et al. v. Talley et al., supra; State v. Wadhams Oil Co., supra; Roller v. Murray, supra. See, also State ex rel. Lemke v. District Court, 49 ND 27, 45, 186 NW 381, 388. In the concluding paragraph of the opinion we say: “It is therefore ordered that the case be remanded to the district court with directions to dissolve the temporary injunctional order from which the appeal was taken and dismiss the proceedings instituted by the order to show cause.”
In the opinion reference Is made to statements made by respondent’s counsel on the oral argument, relating to the then status of the watercourse and to steps taken by the defendant to remove the obstruction which the plaintiff claimed prevented the free flowage of water therein. With respect to such statements it is said in the petition for rehearing that it is the distinct recollection of plaintiff’s' counsel “that at the time of the argument of the appeal, it was stated to the court that the plaintiff had advised his attorney that a culvert had been constructed on the highway during the summer or fall of 1949 after the issuance of the temporary restraining order herein, and that as a result of the construction of said culvert, the shallow waters of so-called Puller’s Lake had been drained from the lands of the plaintiff.” That “it was not the intention of the undersigned to convey the impression to the court that the culvert installed was adequate to permit the free flowage of the water in the drain at all times.” That “the adequacy of the culvert to permit free flowage at all times could not and was not admitted by the plaintiff, because the plaintiff had not had an *286opportunity to observe the adequacy or inadequacy of the drainage provided for by the culvert except as to the drainage of the shallow waters in the lake. The troublesome problem of spring-runoffs and the drainage of water resulting from heavy rains are as yet still undetermined.” In the petition for rehearing- it is also said: “As of the time of the hearing- of the appeal before this court, one fact was determined and admitted: — The water on the lands of the plaintiff as of last summer and fall was drained off.” But “whether or not the culvert will handle the full drainage resulting from spring- runoffs and rains is another entirely different question.”
In the complaint it is alleged that the plaintiff is the owner of a section of land in Steele County which is described in the complaint. According to the plaintiff’s complaint the origin and nature of the obstruction in the watercourse of which plaintiff complains was as follows: “That all on about the year 1935, the above named defendant constructed a public highway along- the North section line of said section, and said highway runs in an East and West direction. That said highway was so constructed as to cross natural drainway and -watercourse as above described, and was constructed so as to block and obstruct the natural and free drainage of water in said watercourse and drainway, and particularly the free and natural drainage of water in watercourse and drainway as the same flows across the said plaintiff’s land above described. That said highway above described was .so constructed by said defendant as herein set forth, and said highway is still being- maintained and so located by said defendant. That as a result of the construction of said highway . . . and by reason of its continued maintenance by the said defendant” the water flowing in said watercourse “has been caused to be dammed and blocked by said highway” and to overflow the natural banks of the watercourse and flood portions of plaintiff’s land.
In respondent’s brief on this appeal it is said:
“It is the contention of plaintiff and respondent that the only purpose of the action is to eliminate an obstruction of a watercourse lying on the defendant’s land, said watercourse being-maintained by the defendant. This obstruction is in the form *287of a public highway constructed along the north boundary of the plaintiff’s land, which said highway does not have installed therein adequate drainage facilities in the form of culverts. Obviously, under the circumstances, the obstruction can be removed by the mere installation of culverts so as to provide for the proper drainage of the water in the watercourse. This does not necessitate the complete elimination of the highway or the highway improvement. As a matter of fact on the last page of appellant’s brief, the information is given to this court that such adequate drainage has been provided for in the form of culverts without the complete elimination of the highway or the highway improvement.”
The order that was issued in this case was not merely prohibitory, it was also mandatory. It restrained and enjoined the defendant county, its officers, servants, agents, and employees, until the further order of the court, from in' any way obstructing the natural and free flowage of water in the watercourse and further provided that any obstruction now constructed and maintained by the defendant Steele County, its. officers, servants, agents, and.employees, be forthwith, removed, from said watercourse and drain.
We have this situation, therefore, as shown by the complaint and the statements in respondent’s brief and petition for rehearing. The obstruction in the watercourse which the plaintiff sought to have the defendant county enjoined from maintaining and compelled to remove consisted of a public highway constructed by the defendant county on or about "1935. “The-obstruction could be removed by the mere installation of culverts so as to provide for the proper drainage of water in the-watercourse.” “During the summer or fall of 1939 after the issuance of the temporary restraining order herein” the defendant county constructed a culvert; “that as a result of the construction of said culvert the shallow waters of so-called Fuller’s Lake had been drained from the lands of the plaintiff,”" and that “as of the time of the hearing of the appeal before this, court, one fact was determined and admitted: — The water on the lands of the plaintiff as of last summer and fall was drained, off.” These facts and circumstances are wholly in accord with. *288the conclusion reached in the opinion rendered in this case that the defendant has complied with the order appealed from and that the conditions alleged to exist and requiring the issuance of a temporary injunction have ceased to be and the appeal'has ■become moot; that there is no reasonable likelihood that-there will be any further act on the part of the defendant county to obstruct the watercourse during the pendency of the action, Rosenthal et al. v. Shepherd Broadcasting Service, Inc., 299 Mass 286, 12 NE2d 819, 114 ALR 1502, and that in view of. the conditions and circumstances of the case the appeal should not be dismissed but the case should be remanded to the trial court with directions to dissolve the temporary injunction and dismiss the proceedings instituted by the order to show cause.
As has been pointed out, we are concerned alone with.the temporary injunction, and what was said in the opinion rendered in this case and what has been said in this opinión relate only to the temporary injunction. The main action is not before us and we express no opinion with respect to the merits of such action or any question that may be involved upon the trial and determination thereof. Rehearing denied.
Nuessle, C. J., Morris, Burke and G-rimson, JJ., concur.