Court Opinion

ID: 9792223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:25:16.683374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:41.209256
License: Public Domain

KEETON, Chief Justice
(dissenting)'.
As the result of an automobile collision in which Grant Hill was killed, appellant was by an information filed .in the District Court, charged with and thereafter found guilty and convicted of involuntary manslaughter, in violation, of Sec. 18-4006, I.C.
Between the city of Burley and the village of Malta, in Cassia County, there is a paved highway, known as U. S. Highway 30 South, extending generally in a northerly and southerly direction. The paved portion of this highway is 24 ft. wide, with shoulders- extending 7 ft. on each side. The bor*37row pit extends further on'the east and west side of the improved portions, sufficient in' width to permit motor vehicles to drive or park on the unimproved parts.
On November 25, 1954, at approximately 11 p. m. deceased was driving a Plymouth car, traveling north on Highway 30 South toward Buhl. Appellant, a farmer by occupation, thirty-two years old, was driving a Cadillac car on said highway, behind the Plymouth car, and going in the same direction.
At the time of the collision, approximately six miles from Malta, a severe dust storm obscured visibility along portions of the highway. Drivers of motor vehicles traveling this highway, preceding, and at the time of the accident, encountered difficulty following the road. Deceased Hill, after he entered the dust storm area, stopped the Plymouth car on the improved part of the road, behind a truck, which the driver had stopped because of lack of visibility, and difficulty in proceeding further along the road. Appellant drove the Cadillac into the dense dust area approximately 150 yards or more from the place where the truck and Plymouth car were parked. All direct testimony is to the effect that on reaching this dust area appellant applied the brakes and decreased the speed of his car; that he proceeded in the right lane of traffic in the direction he was going. Approximately 10 or 20 ft. from where the Plymouth was parked appellant first saw this obstruction in the road and endeavored to stop the Cadillac, but was unable to do so. A collision occurred. The Plymouth car was driven by the impact with the Cadillac car into the truck ahead, parked approximately 10 ft. from the Plymouth, and for reasons not clear, the Plymouth car caught fire. Deceased Hill and passengers accompanying him burned. When the collision occurred, neither car catapaulted, upset or turned over, and the impact was insufficient to show that the Cadillac car driven by appellant was proceeding at an excessive or dangerous rate of speed. Appellant’s testimony as to rate of speed was corroborated by other witnesses who testified that appellant was at the time proceeding at a rate of speed under normal conditions less than the speed prescribed by law. No flares were put out by Hill, the truck driver or others, giving any warning of an obstruction in the road.
After the impact, the truck and the colliding cars were still in the right hand lane of traffic in the direction they were headed. The impact caused the Plymouth car to swerve slightly to the right and the Cadillac slightly to the' left, described by the witnesses as forming a “V”, but both cars were, after the impact, on the improved portion of the road and to the right of the center line of the highway.
In assignments' of error, among others, appellant contends that the verdict of guilty is not supported by and is contrary to the evidence; that the jury should have been advised to acquit appellant.
*38Sec. 18-4006, I.C. defines involuntary manslaughter as follows:
“Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of two kinds:
* * * * * *
“2. Involuntary — in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any unlawful act, other than arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution arid circumspection.”
This definition was amended by Ch. 126 of the 1949 S.L., page 221, by adding thereto the following:
“or in the operation of a motor vehicle in a reckless, careless or negligent manner which produces death; or in the operation of any firearm or deadly weapon in a reckless, careless or negligent manner which produces death.”
In 1953 S.L., ch. 273, Sec. 53, page 495, the Legislature passed the negligent homicide statute which reads as follows:
“(a) When the death of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide. * * * ”.
and by the same Act, Sec. 192, page 551, repealed all acts inconsistent with said chapter.
It thusly appears that where the death of a person ensues as a proximate cause of injury received by the driving of a motor vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, such driver is guilty of negligent homicide. The negligent homicide statute above quoted covers the field formerly embraced in the definition of manslaughter due to the reckless operation of a motor vehicle. While the words used in the two statutes are not identical, they have the same meaning. The term in the manslaughter act “in a reckless, careless and negligent manner” has the same meaning as “reckless disregard of the safety of others” used in the negligent homicide act.
Both statutes above quoted relate to the same subject matter and the prescribed penalty of ten years imprisonment under the manslaughter act is in direct conflict with the penalty to be imposed under the negligent homicide act.
The negligent homicide statute was passed subsequent to the definition of manslaughter contained in Sec. 18-4006, I.C. as amended. The latter statute (negligent homicide statute) being the latest in point of time must control. A later statute prescribing a different punishment for the same offense amends the former statute by implication. State v. Teninty, 70 Idaho 1, 212 P.2d 412; United States v. Stafoff, D.C. *39Mo., 268 F. 417. Further, the provisions of the 1953 Act, Ch. 273, Sec. 192, p. 551, specifically repeal all acts inconsistent with the negligent homicide statute.
Sec. 18-114, I.C. provides:
“In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence.”
Criminal negligence within the statute providing that in every crime there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence does not mean merely the failure to exercise ordinary care or that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under like circumstances, but means gross negligence amounting to a reckless disregard of consequences and of the rights of others. State v. Hintz, 61 Idaho 411, 102 P.2d 639; State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156, State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454, Syl. 12.
In the situation being here considered the appellant, in the operation of the motor vehicle which caused the death of Hill, was not operating it at the time and place of the death of Hill in a grossly negligent manner which amounted to a reckless disregard of consequences or the rights of others, or criminal negligence.
By instruction No. 14, the court instructed the jury that negligent homicide as defined by Sec. 53, Ch. 273, 1953 S.L., was included in the charge of manslaughter as filed. Such is not the law. Conduct which is covered by the negligent homicide statute can. no longer be classified under the common law definition of involuntary manslaughter or the definition contained in Sec. 18-4006, I.C., and conduct in the operation of a motor vehicle which formerly amounted to manslaughter prior to the passage of the negligent homicide statute, that is, causing the death of another in the operation of an automobile, is now covered and included in the definition of negligent homicide. State v. Biddle, 6 Terry 244, 45 Del. 244, 71 A.2d 273.
A reading of the transcript of evidence fails to disclose or warrant the conclusion that appellant at the time Hill was killed was driving the Cadillac car in reckless disregard of the safety of others, or that he was guilty of criminal negligence.
Appellant was confronted with an unforeseen, uncontemplated emergency, which had tragic and most unfortunate consequences. The most that can be said of his conduct is that he was guilty of ordinary negligence. Any other driver on the road might have been placed in a similar situation.
The evidence being insufficient to support a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide, such verdict and judgment of conviction cannot stand and should be set aside. State v. Snyder, 71 Idaho 454, 233 P.2d 802, 33 A.L.R.2d 358; State v. Bates, 63 Idaho 119, 117 P.2d 281; State v. Sullivan, 34 Idaho 68, 199 P. 647, 17 A.L.R. 902.
*40The trial judge instructed the jury that negligent homicide is an included offense covered by the manslaughter statute. . The majority opinion holds that the manslaughter statute so far as it pertains to the operation of a motor vehicle which causes the death of a person has been repealed. Negligent homicide could not be an included lesser offense for a crime shown by the majority opinion not to exist. I am of the opinion that the verdict of guilty was rendered because of the dire and tragic consequences which ensued and not based on any substantial supporting evidence.
The judgment of conviction should be reversed and set aside, and the proceedings dismissed.