Court Opinion

ID: 9472092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:49:10.403213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:44.473902
License: Public Domain

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because the majority’s interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) effectively obviates the role, mandated by rule 4(e), of the Kentucky state long-arm statute in this case, I must respectfully dissent.
The majority recognizes that, “[i]t is clear ... that Rule 4, Fed.R.Civ.P., affects personal jurisdiction of district courts by placing territorial limits on their process” where, as here, Congress has neglected to promulgate statutory provisions for service of process concomitant with federally created substantive rights. As a consequence of Congressional inaction in this Jones Act cause, rule 4(e) directs that the federal court’s personal jurisdiction be referenced to appropriate relevant forum state statutes. On its face, rule 4(e) offers no support for the majority’s conclusion that “... a federal district court considering a case that arises under federal law is not subject to precisely the same due process limitations which restrict its reach in diversity cases”. The majority ignores the direct command of rule 4(e) which specifically mandates that the federal court limit service of its process to the “circumstances” and “manner” prescribed by the forum state’s long-arm statute by inappropriately framing the confronted issue here on ap*1273peal as “... whether the district court’s assertion of jurisdiction unfairly burdened I & M with the requirement of litigating in an inconvenient forum”. In the case at bar, the relevant Kentucky long-arm statute limits service of process on non-residents to claims arising from the non-resident’s transaction of business within its geographic boundaries.
Here the record evidences that the asserted cause of action accrued from the out cf state negligence of a non-Kentucky defendant which proximately caused injury outside of the state of Kentucky to a plaintiff who was not and never had been a resident of that state.
Accordingly, from the facts of this case, it is apparent that personal jurisdiction could not have been invoked pursuant to Kentucky’s long-arm statute. I would therefore vacate the judgment of the court below and remand the case for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.