Court Opinion

ID: 992325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:50:17.47098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:24.367215
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD DICKERSON,
Petitioner,

v.

STEVENS SHIPPING & TERMINAL
                                                                        No. 96-2521
COMPANY; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR,
Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Benefits Review Board.
(95-899)

Submitted: May 15, 1997

Decided: June 4, 1997

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

E. Paul Gibson, Allison A. Stover, RIESEN LAW FIRM, L.L.P.,
North Charleston, South Carolina, for Petitioner. Stephen E. Darling,
SINKLER & BOYD, P.A., Charleston, South Carolina, for Respon-
dents.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Richard Dickerson appeals the decision of the Benefits Review
Board (Board) affirming the administrative law judge's (ALJ) award
of permanent partial disability benefits under the Longshore and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act (Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (West
1994 & Supp. 1997).* The only issue in this appeal is whether sub-
stantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Dickerson's injury
is to his left arm, and thus covered by the "schedule" found at section
908(c)(1) of the Act. Dickerson maintains that the ALJ erred by fail-
ing to find that he injured his left shoulder, even though his functional
limitations are to his arm. If Dickerson's injury is to his shoulder, his
benefits are properly calculated outside the schedule, under section
908(c)(21) of the Act.

Although Dickerson contends that his testimony that he injured his
shoulder rather than his arm is unrebutted, the ALJ rationally con-
cluded that the medical evidence of record supports the conclusion
that he injured his arm. Dickerson reported to Dr. Graham, his treat-
ing physician, that he injured his arm. Dr. Graham's examination
revealed only injury to the upper left arm, and he emphasized in his
report that the injury and impairment both involved only the arm. Dr.
Price, who also examined Dickerson, expressed a corroborative opin-
ion.

The reports of Drs. Schimenti and Hogan were more ambiguous.
Each noted Dickerson's reports of injury to both his shoulder and his
arm, but diagnosed impairment of the arm only. In discounting these
reports, the ALJ acknowledged that he could award benefits under
_________________________________________________________________
*The Board issued no opinion in this case. Its affirmed the ALJ's deci-
sion automatically pursuant to section 921 of the Act when it did not
issue a decision within one year of the filing of Dickerson's appeal.

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section 908(c)(21) where the injury occurred to a body part not cov-
ered by the schedule but manifested itself in a part covered by the
schedule. See Andrews v. Jeffboat, 23 BRBS 169, 173 (1990). He also
recognized, however, that evidence of physical harm was relevant to
the determination of the location of the injury. Moreover, he properly
accorded greatest weight to the opinion of Dickerson's treating physi-
cian, based on his greater familiarity with the claimant and the fact
that he examined Dickerson closer to the time of his accidents.

In short, while the record contains conflicting evidence regarding
the location of Dickerson's injury, substantial evidence supports the
credibility determinations and inferences made by the ALJ in this
case. See See v. Washington Met. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375,
380 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing standard of review). Accordingly, the
decision of the Board is affirmed. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED

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