Court Opinion

ID: 9597580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:00:34.62234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:38.685668
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
dissenting.
In November, 1974, in Friedman v. Friedman, 233 Ga. 254 (210 SE2d 754) (1974), this court held that a divorce could be granted before trial on motion for judgment on the pleadings and that the issue of permanent alimony could be tried later. Prior to that time the issues of divorce and permanent alimony almost universally were decided at the same time. Thus the problem which has arisen here could not have arisen' before and without Friedman v. Friedman, supra.
We are now called upon to decide what happens to a wife’s right to alimony when, after a pre-trial divorce, she remarries before the alimony trial. We have not heretofore decided this issue as it usually is the husband who remarries before the alimony trial.
A wife can recover in a divorce case in two ways: (1) permanent alimony, and (2) property division. McLane v. McLane, 224 Ga. 748 (164 SE2d 821) (1968); Code §§ 30-201, 30-209.
(1) Permanent alimony may be recovered in (a) periodic payments or (b) lump sum. Eastland v. Candler, 226 Ga. 588 (176 SE2d 89) (1970). Lump sum permanent alimony may be ordered paid in money or property (real or personal). For example, the household furnishings may be awarded to the wife as alimony.
(2) In order for there to be a property division, the wife (or husband) must show that title is or should be in the party claiming the property. McLane v. McLane, supra. Although there could be a property division of a sum of cash (e.g., a bank account), see Holloway v. Holloway, 233 Ga. 631 (212 SE2d 809) (1975), a property division more often occurs as to tangible property. McLane v. McLane, supra. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a property division of tangible *425property or a lump sum alimony award of property. See Holloway v. Holloway; supra; Crawford v. Schelver, 226 Ga. 105 (172 SE2d 686) (1970).
In the case before us, the majority hold that where the divorce decree is entered before trial and the wife remarries before permanent alimony is awarded, there can still be a property division but there can be no permanent alimony, not even a lump sum property payment.
The tragic result of the majority decision is that the husband will be able to prevent the remarried wife from keeping the clothes on her back unless she can show title to her garments. Even if she can show title, we should not put such a weapon in the hands of her husband and we should not burden trial courts with the necessity of hearing evidence as to the title to every stick of furniture in the house. We should hold that after a wife’s remarriage, although the trial court cannot enter a meaningful periodic alimony award, it can still enter a lump sum alimony award.
The majority cite Code § 30-209 for the proposition that the obligation for permanent alimony ceases upon the wife’s remarriage. That provision, first enacted in 1966, Ga. L. 1966, p. 160, did not foresee this court’s Friedman decision. That provision did, however, end with "unless otherwise provided in the decree.” I would find that the trial court’s reservation, in the pre-trial divorce decree, of jurisdiction to enter a later alimony award preserved the court’s jurisdiction to do what it said notwithstanding the wife’s remarriage (i.e., the reservation of jurisdiction constituted an "otherwise provided in the decree”). This would enable the wife to keep her unmentionables as alimony without having to prove in court her title to each and every one of them.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Nichols and Justice Hall join in this dissent.