Court Opinion

ID: 9769941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:08:52.280459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:09.342714
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
WOODLEY, Judge.
In his motion for rehearing, appellant complains of our disposition of his Bill of Exception No. 2, which bill is addressed to the question of the admissibility of the testimony of the witness Raymond McGraw as given on a former trial and reproduced upon the theory that the witness had subsequently removed beyond the limits of the state.
The testimony so reproduced was given by the witness at a former trial of this case on August 4, 1949, and the witness was cross-examined by appellant’s counsel.
Appellant says that the evidence shows only a temporary absence of the witness from the state, and insists that the effect of our holding in the original opinion is that such an absence is a sufficient predicate for reproduction of the testimony of the absent witness under the statute (Arts. 749-750, C.C.P.).
It is true that in August, 1949, the witness testified that he resided in Blooming Grove, Texas. But the evidence given on *390the trial in January, 1950, by the brother of the witness, as quoted in our original opinion, was that the witness left Texas about three months before the trial and went to Louisiana where he worked; that he left Louisiana 6 or 8 weeks before the trial and went to Ohio from which state a letter was mailed to the brother and received by him a month before the trial, and another letter from the same place was received by the witness’ mother the day before the trial. The brother testified: “He was living in Willington, Ohio, at that time. That is the same place he sent the letter to my mother from that she got yesterday.”
Whether a witness has “removed from the State” as that term is used in the statutes depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
The proof, showing that the witness had been absent from this state for some three months and that he was “living” in Ohio, was sufficient as a predicate for the reproduction of the witness’ testimony on a former trial. It is not required that the state establish that the witness is permanently gone beyond the limits of the state and that he never intends to return. A mere temporary absence such as absence on a business or pleasure trip of a temporary nature, however, is insufficient.
Upon further consideration, we withdraw the statement in our original opinion to the effect that the holding in Smith v. State, 142 Tex. Cr. R. 349, 152 S.W. 2d 751, was overruled by the later cases of Conn v. State, 143 Tex. Cr. R. 367, 158 S.W. 2d 503, and Norton v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. R. 294, 186 S.W. 2d 347.
Though the strictness of the rule regarding proof of the removal of a witness from the state as a predicate for the reproduction of his testimony given at a former trial appears to have been somewhat relaxed in the Conn and Norton cases, this court has adhered to the rule stated in Brent v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 544, 232 S.W. 845, and quoted in Norton v. State, supra, to the effect that where the proof shows that the witness is temporarily absent from the state, as on a journey which in the ordinary course of things will be ended by return, the predicate is insufficient, but when the residence of the witness is shown as outside the state, and his return is indefinite, the prior testimony may be received.
*391Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion approved by the court.