Court Opinion

ID: 9691034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:03:21.922587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:09.445632
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM P. POWERS, Circuit Judge.
Robbery: sentence, ten years imprisonment.
I
Bobby James Staggs was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced to a term of ten years by the Circuit Court of Limestone County. Staggs’ motion for a new trial was denied, and he appeals.
II
The defendant was driving an automobile which was stopped by Deputies Cleatus Craig and Norman Looney of the Limestone County Sheriff’s Department at approximately 2:00 o’clock in the morning. Deputy Looney asked the defendant to step out for a check of his driver’s license.
The passenger in the defendant’s vehicle placed a gun in Craig’s back and instructed him to remove his gun. The passenger then instructed Looney to come around the car. As Looney made a move for his gun Staggs said “don’t do that or he will kill him.” Staggs placed his right hand in his right front pocket which appeared to contain a small caliber pistol which' he then pointed at the deputy. Staggs then forced the deputy to return his driver’s license to him, and the passenger took the deputies’ guns and forced the deputies down an embankment. The passenger left the scene in the patrol car, and Staggs left the scene in his automobile with Looney’s pistol.
Testimony was offered and received over the objection of defendant concerning an attempt by him to bribe a witness. A witness also testified that defendant admitted having in his possession the property taken.
Ill
Defendant contends on this appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
Robbery at common law has been defined as the felonious taking of money or goods of value from the person of another or in his presence against his will by violence or by putting him in fear. The evidence shows that the defendant was driving the automobile in which both he and the passenger were riding, that he made the statement during the course of the crime, “Don’t do that or he will kill him,” that he drove the automobile away from the crime leaving the deputies, that he had his hands on what appeared to be a gun and pointed it at the deputy during the course of the crime. The defendant admitted that he had the property taken in his possession or control.
Title 14, § 14. Code of 1940 provides as follows:
“The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, between principals in the first and second degree, *205in cases of felony, is abolished; and all persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid or abet in its commission, though not present, must hereafter be indicted, tried, and punished as principals, as in the case of misdemeanors.”
 It has been repeatedly held that any word or act contributing to the commission of a felony, intended and calculated to incite or encourage its accomplishment, whether the one so contributing is present or not, brings the accused, under such circumstances, within the influence of T. 14, § 14. McMahan v. State, 168 Ala. 70, 53 So. 89; Davis v. State, 36 Ala.App. 573, 62 So.2d 224.
The defendant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence that the accused attempted to bribe a witness. This contention is without foundation. A party’s attempt to suppress evidence is admissible against him. Liles v. State, 30 Ala. 24; Whatley v. State, 209 Ala. 5, 96 So. 605; Woodard v. State, 253 Ala. 259, 44 So.2d 241.
The defendant further argues that the trial court erred in the refusal to give the following requested charge:
“4. The court charges the jury that an indictment for robbery also embraces the charge of larceny.”
A defendant is entitled to a charge on lesser offenses included in the indictment if there is any reasonable theory from the evidence which would support the position. Stovall v. State, 34 Ala.App. 610, 42 So.2d 636, cert. den. 252 Ala. 670, 42 So.2d 639. However, it is not error, and a conviction for robbery should not be reversed for refusal of the trial court to charge on larceny unless there was a reasonable theory from the evidence which would not support a robbery conviction but would support conviction for larceny. In this case the evidence could only establish the crime of robbery, and the refusal of the trial court to charge on larceny as requested was not error. Kelley v. State, 235 Ala. 5, 176 So. 807, reversing 27 Ala. App. 584, 176 So. 806; Brooks v. State, 36 Ala.App. 310, 55 So.2d 366.
The defendant’s other claims of error relate to alleged prejudicial argument of counsel which are also without merit and are not supported by the record in that the objections of defendant which were overruled did not sufficiently specify the state- ’ ments of the State’s counsel.
IV
We have considered the entire record in this case, and from this examination we conclude that error is not made to appear.
The foregoing opinion was prepared by Hon. WILLIAM P. POWERS, Circuit Judge, temporarily on duty on the Court pursuant to subsection (4) of § 38, T. 13, Code 1940, as amended; the Court has adopted his opinion as its own.
The judgment below is hereby
Affirmed.
All the Judges concur.