Court Opinion

ID: 9781350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:32:40.8347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:24.980630
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES.
I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority that the family court did not find a jurisdictional defect in wife’s complaint. See Gainey v. Gainey, 382 S.C. 414, 675 S.E.2d 792 (Ct.App.2009). I disagree, however, that either as a matter of pleading or of policy a married couple must be living separate and apart in order to bring an action for separate maintenance and support. I would therefore reverse the family court order to the extent it dismissed the complaint and cancelled the lis pendens.
Although South Carolina did not permit divorce until 1949,6 the equity courts “without any Legislative act, or other authority, began to exercise jurisdiction in case for alimony, Brown v. Brown, 1 Eq. R. 196. A.D. 1785,7 not as in England, as incident to suits for divorce, (for no divorce has ever been allowed in this State,) but as a separate and distinct ground for equitable relief. Julineau v. Julineau, 2 Des. 45 A.D. 1787.”8 Hair v. Hair, 31 S.C.Eq. (10 Rich.Eq.) 163 (S.C.App. *449Eq.1858). Although originally this equitable relief was available only to those who could establish fault that would be grounds for divorce in England, Rhame v. Rhame, 6 S.C.Eq. (1 McCord Eq.) 197 (S.C.App.1826), this requirement was relaxed overtime, leaving the question whether to grant a decree of separate maintenance and support to the court’s broad discretion. Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C. 90, 66 S.E.2d 629 (1951). The equitable authority to grant this relief has devolved upon the family court, but remains a matter of discretion, not bound by statutory requirements.
This State’s long established public policy favors preservation of marriage, and encourages and promotes reconciliation between spouses. Towles v. Towles, 256 S.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 53 (1971). It is “the sundering of the marriage ties” which our public policy seeks to avoid by its strict construction of the grounds for divorce. E.g. Mincey v. Mincey, 224 S.C. 520, 80 S.E.2d 123 (1954) (constructive desertion is ground for divorce only where leaving spouse left because of other spouse’s conduct which amounted to a fault ground for divorce); Nolletti v. Nolletti, 243 S.C. 20, 132 S.E.2d 11 (1963) (spouse must have been deserted for at least a year prior to commencement of divorce action on this ground); Shaw v. Shaw, 256 S.C. 453, 182 S.E.2d 865 (1971) (separation caused by one spouse’s insanity cannot be basis for divorce). Because our public policy requires that courts strictly construe the grounds for divorce, our decisions have been especially concerned with preventing collusive divorces. E.g., Brown v. Brown, supra. Collusiveness is not an issue in a separate maintenance and support action, which does not require a fault ground or a physical separation for at least a year preceding commencement of a divorce action.
The majority takes the State’s public policy strongly favoring marriage over divorce, and applies it to impose new obstacles to those seeking only separate maintenance and support, a non-terminal type of marital litigation which carries with it a greater hope of reconciliation. Moreover, because our public policy encourages reconciliation, I do not understand the majority’s concern with those who commence but then withdraw marital litigation.9
*450The majority relies in part upon the statutory provision that terminates separate maintenance and support awards upon “continual cohabitation.” S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130(B)(5) (Supp.2010). Continual cohabitation is defined as “the supported spouse resides with another person in a romantic relationship for a period of ninety consecutive days.” S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130(B) (Supp.2010) (emphasis supplied). It is not merely living in the same residence which is required, but also a romantic relationship, ordinarily with a third person (though the resumption of cohabitation with a spouse would have the same effect) which provides the statutory basis for ending support. Unlike the majority, as I read § 20-3-130(B)(5), the purpose of separate maintenance and support is to provide the financial means necessary for the parties to be able to live separate and apart, not to require them to already be living in separate residences as a prerequisite to such an action.
I also disagree with the majority’s decision to “borrow” the requirement that parties seeking a divorce based on either desertion or one year’s separation must be separated when the action is commenced, and import it into a separate maintenance and support action as a pleading requirement. I see nothing in our precedents or in our rules 10 which require a person plead separation in her separate maintenance and support complaint. If anything, precedent and legislation suggest11 that no such separation is required. Murray v. Murray, 271 S.C. 62, 244 S.E.2d 538 (1978) (no condonation in separate maintenance and support suit where husband stayed in home with wife); S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130(G) (Family Court may approve alimony or separate maintenance and support agreements “in actions for divorce ... separate maintenance and support actions, or in actions to approve agreement where the parties are living separate and apart”); see also Gainey, swpra (separate maintenance and support decree *451not subject to Rule 60(b), SCRCP relief even though parties resided in same home until day of merits hearing).
In my opinion, public policy does not require parties live in separate residences in order to bring a separate maintenance and support suit. Instead, I would allow such a suit where the parties no longer have a “romantic” relationship. We allow a divorce action to be brought where the parties share a residence, Watson, supra, and have allowed a separate maintenance and support suit under the same circumstances. Murray, supra. Both Watson and Murray recognize the hardship placed on a parent in a custody situation if the parent must leave the home in order to commence marital litigation. In a similar vein, public policy should recognize that financial impossibility may prevent a spouse from establishing a separate residence prior to receiving court-ordered support. We should not deny access to the family court to a party who must, of financial necessity, remain in the marital abode.
I would hold that living separate and apart is not a prerequisite to the bringing of a separate maintenance and support action. I therefore concur in part and dissent in part.
BEATTY, J., concurs.

. Except for the period 1872 to 1878, when divorce on the ground of adultery or willful desertion was permitted by statute. See Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d 330 (1949).

. Reported as Brown v. Brown, 1 S.C.Eq. (1 Des.) 196 (1789).

. Reported as Jelineau v. Jelineau, 2 S.C.Eq. (2 Des.) 45 (1801).

. One need only look at this couples’ history, which includes two prior domestic filings by Wife before she initiated this suit. I do not perceive *450any empirical support for the majority’s belief that requiring physical separation before the filing of a separate and maintenance action will reduce the number of “minor disputes” inundating the family courts.

. See Rule 9, SCRCP, “Pleading Special Matters.”

. I agree with the majority that this case presents a novel question, and find "suggestions,” not binding authority, in our precedents.