Court Opinion

ID: 9891351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 14:04:14.704281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:04.393682
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed October 18, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                      Nos. 3D20-663 & 3D20-1014
                Lower Tribunal Nos. 16-18355 & 18-40723
                          ________________

                         Miami Dade College,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                        Nader + Museu I, LLLP,
                                  Appellee.

    Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jacqueline
Hogan Scola and Carlos Guzman, Judges.

     Mark Migdal & Hayden and Jose M. Ferrer, for appellant.

     David J. Winker, P.A., and David J. Winker, for appellee.

Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and LOBREE, JJ.

     LOBREE, J.

     Miami Dade College (“MDC”) appeals two trial court orders denying its
motions to offset a larger judgment in its favor against Nader + Museu I,

LLLP (“Nader”)’s smaller judgment in another case. As Florida law provides

that offsetting competing judgments is proper when separate judgments

would create an absurd result, we reverse.

                                BACKGROUND

      This proceeding arises from a series of lawsuits between Nader and

MDC relating to a bid protest dispute where Nader contended MDC should

have selected it over three other proposers that responded to a public-private

partnership solicitation for the development of publicly owned property in

Miami. At issue are two of the underlying lawsuits that produced competing

judgments between the parties.

      I.    The First Lawsuit

      In 2016, Nader filed suit against MDC seeking: (1) a declaration that it

was not required to post a bid protest bond; and (2) a temporary injunction

preventing MDC from requiring Nader to post such a bond. In July 2016, the

trial court granted Nader’s request for a temporary injunction. MDC filed a

petition for a writ of prohibition in this Court seeking to prevent the trial court

from entertaining Nader’s complaint. This Court dismissed the petition as

premature and granted Nader’s motion for appellate attorneys’ fees. The

matter was then remanded for the trial court to fix the amount of appellate

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attorneys’ fees.

      II. The Second Lawsuit

      At the time of the first lawsuit, Nader also filed a formal bid protest with

the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) pursuant to section

120.57(3), Florida Statutes. In 2018, the administrative judge in the DOAH

proceeding entered an order awarding MDC its attorneys’ fees and costs

against Nader in the amount of $82,189.50, plus interest. MDC subsequently

filed a petition to enforce that attorneys’ fee award in the trial court after

Nader failed to pay the judgment. The trial court granted the petition and

entered final judgment in MDC’s favor for the full amount of the DOAH award.

That judgment, however, remains unpaid because Nader is insolvent.

      III. MDC’s Efforts to Offset the Judgments

      The remanded appellate attorneys’ fee matter from the first lawsuit

remained pending until 2019. During that time, MDC filed a motion to offset

the forthcoming appellate attorneys’ fee award, asserting the judgment in the

second lawsuit exceed the maximum amount Nader sought as attorneys’

fees. Nader’s previous and then current attorneys’ also filed notices of

attorney charging liens seeking to recover fees for unpaid services against

the impending appellate attorneys’ fee award.

      The trial court held a hearing and subsequently denied MDC’s motion

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to offset, finding it had “no jurisdiction over the judgment” entered in the

second lawsuit. It further awarded Nader $54,710.00 in appellate attorneys’

fees. MDC then filed a motion to offset in the second lawsuit, arguing that

Nader’s appellate attorneys’ fee judgment should be offset from the amount

of the previously entered judgment in its favor. The trial court in the second

lawsuit denied the motion. These consolidated appeals followed.

                          STANDARD OF REVIEW

      This case presents a pure question of law and is reviewed de novo.

See Browning v. Poirier, 165 So. 3d 663, 664 n.2 (Fla. 2015); Cornerstone

SMR, Inc. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 163 So. 3d 565, 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)

(stating that set off “is a pure question of law reviewed de novo, and ‘no

deference is given to the judgment of the lower courts’” (quoting D’Angelo v.

Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003)).

                                  ANALYSIS

      Florida law provides that courts may offset competing judgments when

the entry of separate judgments would create an absurd result. See Angel

Home Health Care, Inc. v. Mederi of Dade Cnty., Inc., 696 So. 2d 487, 488

(Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (reversing and remanding with instructions to set off

judgments where “the two final judgments entered in this case will result in

a great injustice if, as it appears possible, Mederi is insolvent. If this is the

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case, Mederi would be entitled to collect on its judgment of $6,432.00 while

Angel Home would be unable to collect on its greater judgment. Such a

result would be totally absurd.”); Tubbs v. Mechanik Nuccio Hearne &

Wester, P.A., 125 So. 3d 1034, 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (finding “[a] result

allowing Mechanik Nuccio to collect more than $355,000 from the Tubbses

based on a derivative right of Mechanik Nuccio’s client, RC Highlands” totally

absurd where RC Highlands was insolvent and “owed the Tubbses more

than $8,000,000 on the judgment that they held against it”); Lombardo v.

Haige, 971 So. 2d 1037, 1038–39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (noting that setting off

separate fees and costs order in favor of tenant against judgment for unpaid

rent in favor of landlord would be proper).

      Nader contends this case is distinguishable from prior precedent

because the judgments here did not arise from a single proceeding or unit of

litigation. According to Nader, parties are prohibited from seeking to offset

competing judgments from separate lawsuits. We find this contention is

without merit, as this Court has previously offset competing judgments from

separate lawsuits. See Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc., 212 So. 3d 431,

448 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (reversing order that denied motion to set off

competing judgments from separate cases when allowing two judgments to

stand would give one party “the power to wipe out [the other party’s] million-

                                      5
dollar judgment” against them).

      Nader further argues the trial courts’ orders should be affirmed

because the attorneys’ charging liens have priority over MDC’s right to offset.

Florida law, however, provides that “[t]he right of set-off prevails in general

cases, so as to interfere with the solicitor’s lien upon the debt recovered.”

Carter v. Bennett, 6 Fla. 214, 217 (1855). Further, the attorneys’ charging

liens attached to the judgment in the first lawsuit, which was entered after

the judgment in the second lawsuit. Nichols v. Kroelinger, 46 So. 2d 722,

724 (Fla. 1950) (“At common law the attorney’s charging lien attached to the

judgment, rather than to the cause of action.”). “[A] pre-existing judgment is

superior to a charging lien on a later acquired judgment.” In re Diplomat

Elec., Inc., 499 F.2d 342, 349 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974). Therefore, the attorney’s

charging liens do not have priority because the judgment in MDC’s favor is

superior.

      As an alternative, Nader asserts the trial court’s decision should be

affirmed in the second lawsuit because collateral estoppel barred MDC from

filing its setoff motion there.1 “[C]ollateral estoppel, also known as issue

1
  Nader also argues the trial court’s order in the second lawsuit must be
affirmed pursuant to Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d
1150 (Fla. 1979), because MDC failed to provide a transcript of the hearing
on that motion. We find this argument meritless as the issue presented here
is a pure question of law and the absence of a transcript is not fatal to our

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preclusion, applies where: (1) the identical issues were presented in a prior

proceeding; (2) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in

the prior proceeding; (3) the issues in the prior litigation were a critical and

necessary part of the prior determination; (4) the parties in the two

proceedings were identical; and (5) the issues were actually litigated in the

prior proceeding.” Pearce v. Sandler, 219 So. 3d 961, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA

2017) (quoting Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004)). For the

bar of collateral estoppel to apply, the matter had to be “fully litigated and

determined in a contest which result[ed] in a final decision of a court of

competent jurisdiction.” Zimmerman v. State, Off. of Ins. Regulation, 944

So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting GLA & Assocs., Inc. v. City

of Boca Raton, 855 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)); see also Pleasure

v. State, 931 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“For the bar of collateral

estoppel to apply, the prior decision must have been on the merits.”).

      Here, we find collateral estoppel did not apply because the matter was

review. See Rollet v. de Bizemont, 159 So. 3d 351, 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
(“Where the hearing at issue is non-evidentiary and consists only of legal
argument, the failure to provide a transcript is not necessarily fatal to
appellate review.”); Ronbeck Constr. Co. v. Savanna Club Corp., 592 So. 2d
344, 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (“The rule of Applegate v. Barnett Bank of
Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979), applies only where the trial court’s
decision turns on its resolution of contested facts. Here the trial court faced
a pure legal question.”).

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not fully litigated or determined in the first lawsuit as the trial court’s decision

was not merits based. “A judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a

declaration of the law as to the respective rights and duties of the parties

based upon the ultimate facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence and

upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical,

or dilatory objections or contentions.” J. Schnarr & Co. v. Virginia-Carolina

Chem. Corp., 159 So. 39, 42 (Fla. 1934).            An order finding a “lack of

jurisdiction is not [a determination] on the merits.” Neapolitan Enters., LLC

v. City of Naples, 185 So. 3d 585, 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

      The trial court in the first lawsuit did not declare the rights or duties of

Nader or MDC based on the ultimate facts—rather, the trial court simply

concluded it did not have jurisdiction over the judgment in the second lawsuit.

Thus, MDC was not barred by collateral estoppel from filing its motion to

offset in the second lawsuit because there was no “‘clear-cut former

adjudication’ on the merits.” Suniland Assocs., Ltd. v. Wilbenka, Inc., 656

So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (quoting Dep’t of Health & Rehab.

Servs. v. LaPlante, 470 So. 2d 832, 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)).

                                 CONCLUSION

      Accordingly, we find that the trial courts erred in failing to grant the

motions to offset as allowing the separate judgments to stand would create

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an absurd result—namely, one where Nader would collect on its judgment

and receive a windfall benefit while MDC would be left unable to collect on

its greater judgment due to Nader’s insolvency.

     Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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