Court Opinion

ID: 9675578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:58:08.852678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:35.676006
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I concur in Justice Levin’s opinion to the extent that it finds the building exception to governmental immunity applicable, Pichette v Manis-tique Public Schools, 403 Mich 268, 285; 269 NW2d 143 (1978), and the appropriate test under that exception to be the one set forth in Bush v Oscoda *82Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 731; 275 NW2d 268 (1979). Therefore, I agree to reinstatement of Count III of plaintiffs complaint.
I also concur in Justice Levin’s finding that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity applies to Count IV of plaintiffs complaint and therefore that count should be reinstated.
Additionally, I concur in reinstatement of Count V of plaintiffs complaint charging the city and hospital with negligence. While I personally would not favor reinstatement and, in fact, signed the dissent of Justice Ryan in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183, 202; 273 NW2d 413 (1978), four Justices of this Court, in two opinions in Parker, did find that a city which owns and operates a general hospital may not claim governmental immunity.
As to Count I, I concur in the result advanced in Justice Levin’s opinion but I would add a caveat. Count I is captioned "Intentional Infliction of Injury.” The opinion, citing McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65; 247 NW2d 521 (1976), states that "a majority of the Court agreed that an intentional tort was not in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function”. The statement is not incorrect as explaining the ultimate holding under the facts of McCann, but I do not read McCann as authority for the broad proposition that intended conduct which harms another is never protected by governmental immunity. A tort is a civil wrong and conduct which is wrong within one setting can be permissible within another. For example, a police officer may not intentionally strike a citizen peacefully walking down the street, but his duty may require the police officer to intentionally strike another citizen to prevent him from murdering a third peaceful citizen. Further, McCann *83clearly sets limits that the conduct must be without and not within the scope of the exercise and discharge of a governmental function. As stated in my sole opinion in McCann, it is the ultra vires activities of public employees which are not protected by the doctrine of governmental immunity.
While Count I is not well pleaded with respect to McCann, because I find that ultra vires conduct may be possibly proven, within the inartful language, I concur with Justice Levin that it was erroneously dismissed.
Finally, I must dissent to reinstatement of Count II. That count is captioned "Negligence”, and pleads negligent conduct occurring within the jail. Maintaining a jail is a governmental function and negligent discharge of a governmental function is not excepted from governmental immunity.
Therefore, I would reinstate plaintiff’s Counts I, III, IV and V, and remand for trial.