Court Opinion

ID: 9882512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:57.553718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:05.570814
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Pummell, 2023-Ohio-2721.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               UNION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                         CASE NO. 14-23-05
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

DEVIN COREY PUMMELL,                                     OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court
                            Trial Court No. 22CR0173

                       Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded

                             Date of Decision: August 7, 2023

APPEARANCES:

         Alison Boggs for Appellant

         Raymond Kelly Hamilton for Appellee
Case No. 14-23-05

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Devin Corey Pummell (“Pummell”) brings this

appeal from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Union County finding

Pummell guilty of multiple charges and sentencing him to an aggregate indefinite

prison term of 10 to 14 years. Pummell challenges on appeal 1) the voluntariness

of the guilty plea, 2) the failure of the trial court judge to recuse himself, and 3)

imposition of an indefinite sentence. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment

is reversed.

       {¶2} On August 5, 2022, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Pummell on

the following counts: 1) Aggravated Burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1),

(B), a felony of the first degree; 2) Abduction in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2),

(C), a felony of the third degree; 3) Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), (C), a

misdemeanor of the first degree; 4) Aggravated menacing in violation of R.C.

2903.21(A), (B), a misdemeanor of the first degree; 5) Assault in violation of R.C.

2903.13(A), (C), a misdemeanor of the first degree; and 6) Obstructing Official

Business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), (B), a misdemeanor of the second degree.

Pummell entered pleas of not guilty to each of the counts. On November 10, 2022,

Pummell withdrew his not guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement. The agreement

provided that Count 1 would be amended to Burglary, a felony of the second degree

and Pummell would plead guilty to the amended Count 1 and the remaining five

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Case No. 14-23-05

counts. Doc. 32. Following a dialogue with Pummell regarding the effect of the

plea, the trial court accepted the plea and found Pummell guilty of the charges.

       {¶3} On December 20, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The

trial court then imposed the following sentence: Count 1 – an indefinite prison term

of 8-12 years; Count 2 – 24 months to be served consecutive to Count 1; Count 3 –

180 days in jail to be served concurrent to Counts 1 and 2; Count 4 – 180 days in

jail to be served concurrent to Counts 1 2,and 3; Count 5 – 180 days in jail to be

served concurrent to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4; and Count 6 – 90 days in jail to be served

concurrent to Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The aggregate prison term was 10-14 years.

Pummell appealed from this judgment and on appeal raises the following

assignments of error.

                            First Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred when it accepted [Pummell’s] guilty plea
       when it was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made
       because it was based on representations by the court that the
       court would be lenient in sentencing.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred when it failed to recuse itself, as it was
       evident that the site of the crime became personal to the judge,
       unduly influencing him, and resulting in a bias with the court that
       directly impacted the sentencing, resulting in a violation of
       [Pummell’s] due process rights, creating a sentence that is
       contrary to law.

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Case No. 14-23-05

                            Third Assignment of Error

       The trial court’s imposition of an indefinite sentence pursuant to
       the statutory scheme known as “The Reagan Tokes Law” is
       unconstitutional and must be reversed.

                                Voluntariness of Plea

       {¶4} Pummell alleges in the first assignment of error that his guilty plea was

not voluntarily entered because he was led to believe that the court would be lenient

in sentencing. “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525,

527, 1996-Ohio-179, 660 N.E.2d 450. If a plea is coerced or induced by promises

or threats, the plea is rendered involuntary. State v. Lawson, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-

18-20, 2018-Ohio-4922, ¶ 20. In evaluating the voluntariness of a plea, a reviewing

court must “scrutinize carefully any participation by the trial court in the plea

bargaining process.” State v. Walker, 61 Ohio App.3d 768, 770, 573 N.E.2d 1158

(8th Dist. 1989). The judge’s status as the trier of fact creates a great potential for

coerced guilty pleas if he or she participates in the plea bargaining process. State v.

Byrd, 63 Ohio St.2d 288, 293, 407 N.E.2d 1384 (1980). Comments made by a trial

judge in the plea bargaining process must be carefully scrutinized to see if they

affected the voluntariness of the defendant’s guilty plea. Id. An appellate court must

determine whether the statements of the judge “could have led the defendant to

believe he could not get a fair trial, including a fair sentence after the trial” to

determine if the voluntariness of the plea was undermined. Lawson, supra.

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Case No. 14-23-05

          {¶5} Here, the change of plea occurred during the final pretrial. Before

Pummell and the State had a discussion about a plea, the trial court made the

following statements.1

          The other thing that you need to know is is, [sic] if you enter a plea of
          guilty, that you are likely, likely I said, to be sent to prison for a period
          of time. In the event of a guilty plea where you’re taking
          responsibility for your actions on the night in question, you can count
          on the fact that your sentence is going to be on the lower end of the
          scale as opposed to the higher end of the scale. And, if you’re also
          required to enter a plea to the Abduction, it’s likely that the Court
          would impose a concurrent sentence and not a consecutive sentence.

          At the end of a trial, if you choose not to take – and it’s your choice –
          at the end of the trial, if you were to be found guilty, you could count
          on the penalties being more severe than what I’ve told you.

    Plea Hearing Tr. 7. The trial court then recessed to allow Pummell and the State to

discuss a possible plea. When the hearing resumed, the State indicated that a plea

agreement had been reached. Pursuant to the agreement, Count 1 of the indictment

was amended to burglary, a second degree felony and a lesser included offense of

aggravated burglary. Pummell agreed to enter a plea of guilty to the amended Count

1 and all of the remaining counts.

          {¶6} Pummell argues that his plea was coerced when he was promised a

lower sentence if he entered a plea, but a harsher sentence if he was convicted after

a trial. The State argues that since the trial court’s statements were made before

1
 From the record it appears the change in plea occurred very late in the day on the Thursday prior to a three-
day weekend with the court needing to know whether to cancel the jury that was summoned to appear the
following Monday.

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Case No. 14-23-05

Pummell requested the amended charge, the trial court was not involved in the plea

negotiations. This Court has previously held that statements made by a trial court

before the State and the Defense negotiate a plea can still be participation in the plea

negotiation. State v. Howard, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-09-16, 2010-Ohio-4828.

       {¶7} In Howard, the State rested its case and defense counsel indicated that

Howard wished to testify against the advice of counsel. The trial court held a

discussion with Howard about how he should take a plea deal in order to get a

shorter sentence. The trial court then ordered a recess to allow the State and the

defense to have time to discuss a potential plea agreement. After the recess, Howard

changed his plea to one of guilty. On appeal Howard claimed that his plea was not

voluntarily entered because of the statements by the trial court before the

negotiation. This Court held that the trial court had participated in the plea

bargaining process by making the statements and the statements rendered the plea

involuntary. Based upon this, this Court reversed the judgment and remanded the

matter for a new trial.

       {¶8} Like the matter in Howard, the trial court here did not officially

participate in the plea bargaining process. However, the trial court did make

statements telling Pummell that he would receive a lower sentence if he entered a

guilty plea than if he went to trial. The trial court guaranteed that the sentence would

be at the lower end of the sentencing range if Pummell entered a plea, threatened a

harsher sentence if Pummell was convicted after a trial, and then took a recess to

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Case No. 14-23-05

allow the parties time to discuss. The trial court specifically stated “at the end of

the trial, if you were to be found guilty, you could count on the penalties being more

severe than what I’ve told you.” This statement is the equivalent of the trial court

making a threat that there will be additional punishment if the defendant did not

reach a plea agreement and was found guilty after trial, thus rendering the plea

involuntary. Machibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962).

The first assignment of error is sustained.

       {¶9} Having sustained the first assignment of error regarding the withdrawal

of the guilty plea, the remaining assignments of error are rendered moot. Pursuant

to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c), this Court will not rule on them at this time.

       {¶10} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant, the judgment of the

Court of Common Pleas of Union County is reversed and the matter is remanded to

the trial court for further proceedings.

                                                            Judgment Reversed and
                                                                 Cause Remanded

MILLER, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls

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