Court Opinion

ID: 9742328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:10:55.092618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:31.144811
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority analysis of the issues except for Comer’s contention that she was entitled to an instruction on the lesser offense of criminal recklessness. IC 35-42-2-2.
I believe she was for the reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Johnson v. State (1981) Ind.App., 426 N.E.2d 91 (1981).
IC 35-42-2-2(b) defining criminal recklessness speaks in terms of causing serious bodily injury. Since IC 35-41-1-2 defines that phrase to include bodily injury that causes death, it appears to me that statutory overlap exists which should require the giving of a properly tendered instruction. Furthermore, I do not agree that the burden should have been upon Comer to tender a definition of serious bodily injury.
In Humes v. State (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 379 the Supreme Court decided that the terms “knowingly or intentionally” contained in the definition of criminal recklessness should be ignored in favor of a legislative intent to establish an offense based upon recklessness.
That result does not, however, control the present appeal since the principal offense with which Comer was charged was, also, a reckless conduct offense.
The instruction should have been given and Comer is entitled to a new trial as a consequence of the error.
I would, therefore, reverse and remand.