Court Opinion

ID: 9637186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:00:04.025801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:54.306356
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join the court’s opinion but write separately to place this decision in its broader context.
Our caselaw development as to supervised probation in reciprocal discipline cases has not been entirely consistent. In at least one reciprocal discipline case, this court imposed the discipline ordered by the other jurisdiction, including supervision by a “probation monitor” for four years after completion of a one-year suspension. See In re Chadwick, 585 A.2d 798, modified, 591 A.2d 837 (D.C.1991). The monitoring, however, was limited to that conducted in California, where the respondent had his practice. See id., 585 A.2d at 801.
In contrast, in another reciprocal discipline case where Florida had imposed both a ninety-one day suspension and a two-year probation period for charging clearly excessive attorney’s fees, this court ordered the same suspension but did not, in addition, require the two-year probation as reciprocal discipline in the District of Columbia. See In re Richardson, 602 A.2d 179 (D.C.1992). The Board had taken the view that probation would be inappropriate because there was no evidence that the attorney had a practice or health-related problem that called for monitoring. See id. at 186.
I agree that, given our required deference to the recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility, see ante at 927-928, this is not a case in which supervised probation should be required in addition to suspension and reinstatement upon a showing of fitness. Because we regularly do require supervised probation in certain kinds of cases, however, I believe it is important to show that the present case does not fall within the scope of those cases where we commonly have done so.
Typically, this court has ordered a period of supervised probation only in cases where the attorney’s prior misconduct has been “attributable to extraordinary circumstances, such as a physical, mental, or emotional crisis or illness which had abated since the time of the violation.” In re Tinsley, 582 A.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C.1990).1 Compare In re Larsen, 589 A.2d 400 (D.C.1991) (staying execution of disbarment and ordering three years of supervised probation, where misconduct was attributable to manic depressive disorder) and In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627 (D.C.1989) (ordering four-month suspension, with execution of last two months stayed on condition of attorney’s compliance with conditions of two years of supervised probation, where misconduct was attributable to chronic depression) and In re Reid, 540 A.2d 754 (D.C.1988) (staying execution of disbarment and ordering supervised probation, where misconduct was attributable to alcoholism) *929and In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987) (same) with Tinsley, 582 A.2d at 1195-96 (refusing to order supervised probation as alternative discipline, absent evidence that attorney met illness and other Board criteria). In the present case, there is no direct evidence of health or behavior problems that would be ameliorated by a period of supervised practice.
I support the policy of the Board and this court justifying supervised probation — including requirements to report regularly to sobriety monitors, to practice monitors, and to financial monitors — for attorneys who have committed disciplinary violations and are recovering from addictions and other illnesses that have substantially contributed to their infractions. See, e.g., Peek, 565 A.2d at 634 (chronic depression); Kersey, 520 A.2d at 328 (alcoholism). Moreover, it seems to me that some of these probationary requirements would also be desirable in certain cases in which attorneys do not suffer from addictions or other illnesses. I have reviewed cases from time to time in which attorneys have committed infractions of a kind indicating (at least to me) a need not only for a showing of rehabilitation and fitness pursuant to In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C.1985), but also for a period of supervision by financial and/or practice monitors before these attorneys are allowed to have, once again, an unfettered right to represent clients. D.C.Bar R. XI § 3(a)(7) (probation) is clearly broad enough to permit such an expanded probation system.
I can understand the practical problem of a lack of resources for monitoring, but that is a problem that the District of Columbia Bar, with its strong tradition of volunteerism in the public interest, could easily help solve. As for probation-monitoring in reciprocal discipline cases when a lawyer practices primarily in another jurisdiction, I believe there is much to be said — consistent with the theory underlying reciprocal discipline — for deferring to the judgment of disciplinary authorities in that other jurisdiction and thus for ordering conforming probation as a condition of reinstatement, to be monitored by the disciplinary authorities there. See Chadwick. In that way, a probation violation elsewhere, resulting in an immediate suspension, could serve as a basis for more easily reimposing a corresponding sanction here, in the public interest. As indicated above, however, I am satisfied with the Board’s recommendation that no probation in addition to the suspension and other requirements for reinstatement should be imposed here.

. The Board on Professional Responsibility has announced three additional criteria for supervised probation: "(1) that the offense not be of a serious nature, (2) that the attorney not have a substantial record of prior discipline, [and] (3) that the attorney demonstrate a repentant attitude." Tinsley, 582 A.2d at 1195.