Court Opinion

ID: 9479294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:13:39.283381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:55.842181
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
Free seeks to overturn the results of the bench trial conducted by Magistrate Frazier based on a single argument: that “the District Court erred by giving considerable weight to the evidence and testimony presented by the Government, but very little to mine.” Thus, in essence, Free asks this court to reweigh the credibility of witnesses whose testimony the magistrate saw and heard. As the Supreme Court has *1537stressed, however, a trial court’s credibility determinations are entitled to considerable deference, except in those rare situations where the testimony the district court credits is internally inconsistent or otherwise implausible. See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 108 S.Ct. 1771, 1777-80, 100 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Free makes no allegation that the testimony of the government’s witnesses was incredible. Therefore, Free has failed to present any non-frivolous argument on appeal, and his petition to proceed in forma pauperis should be denied. I believe that this is a sufficient basis for ruling on Free’s appeal; I therefore concur in the judgment.
I can see potential merit in relegating “small” tort claims to an administrative remedy, provided this can be done without unfairly disadvantaging the claimants. Unfortunately, I do not know enough about the subject to join in advocating such a program at this time, but I believe some related points should be noted with respect both to the majority opinion and to Judge Coffey’s concurrence. First, whatever the merit of a general floor under tort claims, it is doubtful that the suggested limitations should be imposed exclusively on prisoners; the restrictions, if any, should be general. To classify prisoners separately with respect to procedures for securing specified categories of statutory and constitutional rights is a slippery slope. Judge Coffey in his concurring opinion cites a number of areas other than tort claims where prisoners have filed frivolous claims and I assume his “screening” process could extend broadly across the area of prisoner complaints. Again what Judge Coffey suggests seems to me to be another halfway house on the road to cutting off normal routes of access by prisoners to the courts. Only a few years ago it was a matter of some pride in our federal justice system that it was open to prisoners with personal or property grievances as much as, for example, to insurance companies with in-terpleaders or large manufacturers be-seiged with product complaints.1
I am certainly as aware as anyone of the problems created by frivolous litigation— including the broad category of such cases emanating from prisons. But we do have *1538ways of coping with the problem which do not discriminate against prisoners. As Judge Coffey himself notes by quoting from Neitzke v. Williams, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989), 28 U.S.C. section 1915 (which is, after all, the statute directly involved in this motion to proceed in forma pauperis) itself provides a powerful weapon to the federal courts to dismiss cases which are clearly frivolous. Dismissals under section 1915(d) can be made sua sponte, without the necessity of extended proceedings, and in fact without even requiring the defendant to appear and defend the action. Moreover, if Mr. Free really intends to abuse the process with a multitude of law suits, he may simply be enjoined from filing more suits without special permission as have been many others both inside and outside prisons. See, e.g., In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir.1988); Lysiak v. Commissioner, 816 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.1987) (per curiam); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc);, Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 23-25 (2d Cir.1986).
Finally, prisoners’ property claims, though tenuous and of slight apparent significance to those of us outside the walls, no doubt loom larger in the context of a lifetime at Marion. Today, while interest in prisoners apparently continues its steady decline, we should be vigilant not to engage in wholesale or indiscriminate disparagement of their grievances.

. Prisoner claims are hardly the only area where there are good arguments for some limitation of the federal courts’ jurisdiction. Diversity of citizenship cases, for example, account for almost twice as many new filings in the district courts as prisoner petitions. Between June 30, 1986 and June 30, 1987, 67,071 new diversity cases were filed in the district court, compared with 37,316 prisoner suits. Of the diversity cases, there were 32,840 private contract actions (including 6,685 insurance claims); 27,769 personal injury suits (12,485 of which were products liability actions, 6,686 of these asbestos cases); 4,072 real property actions (including 3,001 foreclosure suits); and 2,329 personal property damage claims. Between September 30, 1987 and the same date in 1988 a similar relationship exists: 69,062 diversity filings as compared with 39,732 prisoner petitions. The diversity filings for that year break down as follows: 32,236 contract claims (including 6,962 insurance actions); 30,342 personal injury suits (14,697 products liability cases, 9,824 of the latter asbestos-related); 4,007 real property actions (2,971 foreclosures); and 2,394 personal property damage claims. By reciting these statistics I do not intend to transform the present appeal into a legislative hearing, nor do I intend to minimize the burden federal courts face due to the large number of prisoner petitions being filed. I merely want to suggest that in any reordering of priorities involving the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Congress must take note that it is not only the prisoner who is contributing to the caseload. In addition, it is important that prisoner claims raise issues of federal law which are particularly appropriate for disposition by federal courts. This is not true of diversity litigation (although I think there are other cogent reasons for not taking a meat-axe approach to this jurisdiction).
As Judge Coffey notes, Congress has recently increased the amount in controversy required to support federal diversity jurisdiction, in an effort to curtail the number of diversity cases filed. However, despite Judge Coffey’s contrary view, the suggestion of the majority in the present case is in a crucial respect different from the approach Congress took in the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act. Congress did not seek to target a specific group of litigants (such as tort plaintiffs, or mortgage and finance companies) to bear the brunt of its "streamlining” effort. Instead, Congress adopted a "status-neutral” approach to the problem. In the present case, by contrast, the majority seeks to exclude a particular class of litigants from federal court specifically because of their disfavored status as state and federal prisoners. It is this aspect of the majority’s proposal which I find disquieting.