Court Opinion

ID: 9569237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:11:42.620249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:50:46.398128
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge.
Appellee-employee suffered a back injury which arose out of and in the course of her employment with appellant-employer. As a result of this back injury, appellee began receiving workers’ compensation income and medical benefits from appellant. However, when a bill for alcohol detoxification treatment which had been provided to appellee was submitted for payment as an authorized medical expense, appellant refused to pay it. Appellee then filed a claim with the State Board of Workers’ Compensation, wherein she asserted that her alcohol dependency and her need for detoxification had been the direct result of the pain and depression which had accompanied the compensable injury to her back. The administrative law judge (ALJ) made a finding that appellee’s alcohol detoxification had resulted from her job-related injury and appellant was ordered to pay for those services. Upon its de novo review, the Full Board made the ALJ’s award its own. On appellant’s appeal to the superior court, the award of the Full Board was affirmed. Appellant’s application for a discretionary appeal to this court from the superior court’s affirmance of the Full Board’s award was granted.
OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) sets forth the controlling statutory definition of a compensable “ ‘injury’ or ‘personal injury’ ” for purposes of workers’ compensation. By its terms, that statute contains not only a general definition of what constitutes a compensable “injury” or “personal injury,” but it also specifies certain circumstances or conditions wherein a finding of a compensable “injury” or “personal injury” will not be authorized. OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) mandates an absolute prohibition against a finding of a compensable “injury” or “personal injury” under certain circumstances: “ ‘Injury’ and ‘personal injury’ shall not include injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed *573against an employee for reasons personal to such employee. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The statuté also provides for a conditional prohibition as to certain specified diseases: “ ‘Injury’ and ‘personal injury’ shall not . . . include heart disease, heart attack, the failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis unless it is shown by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence that any of such conditions were attributable to the performance of the usual work of employment.” (Emphasis supplied.) In 1973, OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) was amended to add the following: “Alcoholism or disabilities attributable thereto shall not be deemed to be ‘injury’ or ‘personal injury’ by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Drug addiction or disabilities resulting therefrom shall not be deemed to be ‘injury’ or ‘personal injury’ by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment except when such addiction was caused by the use of drugs or medicines prescribed for the treatment of the initial injury by an authorized physician.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear that the legislative intent of this 1973 amendment is to extend the absolute prohibition against a finding of a compensability as an “injury” or “personal injury” to cases of alcoholism and to extend the conditional prohibition against such a finding to certain cases of drug addiction. Accordingly, the issue for resolution is what effect this absolute statutory prohibition as to alcoholism has in this case.
Appellee urged and the superior court found that OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) is applicable only as to the initial “injury” or “personal injury” upon which an employee ultimately premises his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Thus, under this interpretation given to OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) by the superior court, it is only the employee who has asserted alcoholism as his initial work-related injury who would be barred from recovering benefits as attributable thereto. It is undisputed that appellee’s initial injury was not alcoholism but was a compensable accidental “injury” to her back and the evidence would authorize the finding that her alcoholism arose from the pain and depression caused by her compensable back injury. The superior court found that the costs of treating appellee for that alcoholism are, therefore, recoverable as an element of the medical benefits to which her back injury would entitle her.
If OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) constitutes a bar to the recovery of benefits only where alcoholism is the initial injury, then the 1973 amendment of that statute was superfluous. Prior to 1973, our workers’ compensation law already contained an explicit prohibition on the recovery of benefits by an employee whose initial job-related injury was the proximate result of his intoxication. See OCGA § 34-9-17; Castleberry v. U. S. Fid. &c. Co., 126 Ga. App. 425 (190 SE2d 831) (1972). Moreover, if the intent of the 1973 amendment had merely been to provide *574for the non-compensability of alcoholism only as an initial “injury,” the legislature would presumably have expressed that intent in language similar to that which it contemporaneously employed as to the issue of drug addiction. The 1973 amendment specifies that subsequent addiction which is caused by the use of drugs or medicines prescribed by an authorized physician for the initial injury is to be deemed a compensable “injury” or “personal injury.” Thus, if appellee’s addiction were attributable to such prescribed drugs or medicines, there is no doubt that the cost of her detoxification would be compensable pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-1 (4). However, the legislature did not similarly specify in the 1973 amendment that subsequent alcoholism, if attributable to the initial injury, is to be deemed compensable. To the contrary, the legislature stated, without condition or limitation, that alcoholism “shall not be deemed” to be a compensable “injury” or “personal injury.” Thus, the interpretation given by the superior court to the 1973 amendment to OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) would be contrary to at least two rules of statutory construction. That construction would render the effect of the 1973 amendment entirely superfluous as to the issue of alcohol, notwithstanding the rule of statutory construction that “ ‘[a] legislative body should always be presumed to mean something by the passage of an act.’ ” Humthlett v. Reeves, 211 Ga. 210, 219 (2) (85 SE2d 25) (1954). The construction utilized by the superior court would also ignore the contemporaneous language of the entire statutory provision, notwithstanding the rule that “[i]n the construction of a statute the legislative intent must be determined from a consideration of it as a whole. [Cit.] The construction of language and words used in one part of the statute must be in the light of the legislative intent as found in the statute as a whole. [Cit.]” Williams v. Bear’s Den, Inc., 214 Ga. 240, 242 (104 SE2d 230) (1958).
When the applicable rules of statutory construction are applied, it is clear that the legislative intent of the 1973 enactment was to address the compensability of claims involving addiction and to preclude a recovery for any and all claims for compensation based upon alcoholism and to authorize the recovery of claims for compensation based upon drug addiction under limited circumstances. Nothing that is relied upon by appellee compels a contrary result. Having been reversed by the Supreme Court, this court’s decision in Bullington v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co., 122 Ga. App. 842 (178 SE2d 901) (1970), rev’d 227 Ga. 485 (181 SE2d 495) (1971) has no precedential value. In fact, a strong argument could be made that the 1973 amendment to OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) envinces the General Assembly’s intent that, as to the compensability of claims based upon alcoholism, the existing statutory workers’ compensation law of this State never again be subject to the judicial construction reached in Bullington. Although the workers’ *575compensation law is to be liberally construed in favor of the claimant, this court has no authority to ignore the clear language of a statute and to allow the recovery of compensation benefits where the legislature has specified that it shall be denied. If compensation for alcoholism, whether it be in the form of income or medical benefits, is to be authorized in this State, it is for the legislature to amend OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) and not for this court to ignore that provision. The superior court erred in affirming the erroneous award of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation.

Judgment reversed.

Birdsong, C. J., Sognier, Pope and Beasley, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., concurs and also concurs specially. McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., and Benham, J., dissent.