Court Opinion

ID: 9700653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:40:27.765102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:12.187064
License: Public Domain

Snell, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent from Division II. I think the result is unfortunate and I am disturbed about the practical difficulties and unfair results facing trial judges, trial juries, trial lawyers and litigants as a result of this decision. I fear that confusion will prevail. When a jury is instructed that plaintiff must establish his own negligence, the jurors will, figuratively speaking, recoil in astonishment and say, “If plaintiff was at fault, what is he doing here?” It is true that difficulties of trial judges are occupational hazards. It is also true that “possible confusion in the case” does not “over-weigh the advantage” of sound and expeditious administration of justice. This does not mean, however, that we should create unnecessary confusion. The result in the instant case has the quality of logic developed from respectable authority accurately quoted, but in my opinion the doctrine of contribution should be re-examined so that unnecessary, unrealistic and unfortunate results may be avoided.
An article published in Volume 37 Iowa Law Review, in 1952, on page 553, says: “In order to prevent distortion of indemnity law, not only should the substantive law of the state allow contribution * * * but the procedural law should be such as not to hamstring the beneficial effects of contribution. * * * a defendant who deserves contribution should not be denied that right merely because the plaintiff has not chosen to sue the other negligent tort-feasor, nor because the one seeking contribution has not had a judgment against him but has instead made a reasonable settlement with the injiired person(Emphasis supplied.)
This article dealing primarily with questions of indemnity is cited with approval in Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23, 60 A. L. R.2d 1354, which first recognized in Iowa the “right of equitable contribution” between concurring tortfeasors. While the term “joint tort-feasor” is commonly used to include not only those who are acting jointly but also those who are merely concurring tort-feasors, Best v. Yerkes, supra, carefully distinguishes between an intentional wrong and mere *841negligence. The opinion then proceeds with sound legal reasoning to authorize “equitable • contribution.” If these words mean anything, they mean that there should be equity, fairness and justice in imposing liability. What the Best case really does is to plug the loophole through which a concurring tort-feasor might escape liability. The holding in the instant case opens a new loophole by permitting a defendant in a contribution Case to escape liability by assuming full responsibility for the mishap. That is not in accord with the idea of equitable contribution. To permit escape from civil liability by proving one’s own fault as exclusive is not sound law nor good procedure.
Best v. Yerkes says at page 805 of 247 Iowa: “The right to indemnity, or contribution, presupposes actionable negligence of both parties toward a third party.” These words lead by pure logic to the concluding statement in the instant opinion “that before there can be contribution among tort-feasors, there must be tort-feasors.”
If the result in the instant case is the only result that can be reached in the light of Best v. Yerkes, the rule should be modified, or an exception noted, because as said in that case: “The law, as laws have a tendency to do, has become considerably confused.” (Page 806 of 247 Iowa)
The Henke case, 250 Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168, referred to in the majority opinion, was, as noted,' an extreme case but it does clearly place a duty of good faith action oh an insurance carrier. If in good faith an insurance carrier must settle in order to protect the insured and by doing so is denied a “right of equitable contribution”, a carrier, or in some cases an uninsured defendant, is indeed on the horns of a dilemma.
The opinion in the instant case suggests the possibility of protective measures by assignment or subrogation. Possibly another method might be by the entry and payment of a judgment rather than payment on a stipulation of settlement. Such methods, however, would be vulnerable to attack more serious than we have in the instant case. Under an assignment or subrogation agreement, recovery would not necessarily be limited to “equitable contribution.” The recovery might even yield a profit. The settlement by entry of judgment might be attacked as collusive.
*842I do not think that the basic philosophy supporting Best v. Yerkes or sound jurisprudence requires or supports the conclusion reached in the majority opinion.
In a contribution case neither admission nor proof of absolute liability on the part of one who has settled should be a prerequisite to the essential propositions. Pleading and proof of involvement in the accident, the claim made by the injured party, the hazard faced, and good faith settlement should be sufficient prerequisite. The essential propositions to be established against one from whom contribution is sought should be the same as in a case by the original injured claimant with the prayer for recovery limited to a proportionate share of the amount paid the original claimant. If there is pleading and proof of liability based on negligence, proximate cause, freedom from contributory negligence and damage, the defendant should not be heard to complain because someone else has settled the claim, helped pay the defendant’s liability and reduced his obligation by at least one half. A defense or an objection based on something that might be beneficial and could not possibly be prejudicial is without merit.
In the instant case the plaintiff, faced with substantial claims in a death case, paid $15,000 in settlement. This is not the act of a mere volunteer. It is more realistic to say that it was an act of prudence.
The plaintiff herein should not be penalized, nor should the defendant escape because of plaintiff’s failure to plead and prove his own liability. The plaintiff was in the picture far enough to be entitled to claim contribution.
I would reverse.
Oliver and Larson, JJ., join in this dissent.