Court Opinion

ID: 9926753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 17:03:45.912699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:59.672017
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              Jan 25 2024, 8:56 am

                                                                                  CLERK
                                                                              Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                 Court of Appeals
                                                                                   and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
James A.L. Buddenbaum                                      Lonnie D. Johnson
Courtney L. Abshire                                        Justin K. Schwemmer
Parr Richey Frandsen Patterson Kruse,                      Clendening Johnson & Bohrer,
LLP                                                        P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Bloomington, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Frame Station, Inc. d/b/a                                  January 25, 2024
Framemakers,                                               Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Plaintiff,                        23A-CT-1426
       v.                                                  Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
                                                           Court
The Foundry at 304, LLC, Foundry
WPR                                                        The Honorable Geoffrey J.
Orrego, LLC and Foundry WPR                                Bradley, Judge
Elmore, LLC,                                               Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           53C01-2004-CT-751
Appellees/Cross-Appellant-Defendants.

                                  Opinion by Judge Riley
                              Judges Crone and Mathias concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024                            Page 1 of 17
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Plaintiff, Frame Station, Inc. d/b/a Framemakers

      (Framemakers), appeals the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions

      thereon with respect to Framemakers’ right of use of its express easement across

      the property of Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Defendant, The Foundry at 304,

      LLC, Foundry WPR Orrego, LLC, and Foundry WPR Elmore, LLC

      (collectively, Foundry).

[2]   We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

      ISSUE
[3]   Framemakers presents one issue on appeal, while the Foundry presents one

      issue on cross-appeal. We consolidate both issues and restate these as the

      following single issue: Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the

      Foundry did not interfere with Framemakers’ easement during the development

      and construction of the Foundry’s real estate project.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   Framemakers, founded by Ulgis Augenbergs (Augenbergs) and a former

      business partner in 1976, is a private corporation that operates a retail custom

      picture frame store at 314 West Kirkwood Avenue in Bloomington, Indiana. In

      addition, Framemakers also operates a wholesale business in the same location,

      known as ‘Prime Chops’, that sells custom framing to other retail frame stores,

      mostly in central Indiana. Framemakers’ retail store relies almost entirely on

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 2 of 17
      walk-in retail customers for its business, and many customers will make several

      trips to the store to custom frame their artwork.

[5]   The Foundry at 304, LLC is an Indiana limited liability company created to

      own and develop a multi-family and commercial real estate project (Project) on

      property located at 304 West Kirkwood Avenue, directly east of Framemakers’

      retail business. Foundry WPR Orrego, LLC and Foundry WPR Elmore, LLC

      own the commercial space on the first floor of the Project.

[6]   Framemakers’ current location at 314 West Kirkwood Avenue, identified as

      Lot 154 of the City of Bloomington, is leased from Augenbergs and his spouse,

      and provides Framemakers with a parking lot directly behind and to the north

      of the building, along the alley between Kirkwood Avenue and Sixth Street.

      Lot 154 is accessed from Sixth Street via an easement originally granted by the

      First National Bank of Bloomington to Alma J. Henry (Framemakers’

      predecessor in interest) as the grantee and recorded on April 29, 1974

      (Easement). The specifically delineated Easement provides, in pertinent part:

              THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH, that the undersigned,
              FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BLOOMINGTON, hereinafter
              called GRANTOR, for and in consideration of the sum of One
              Dollar ($1.00) and other good and valuable considerations, not
              herein expressed, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
              does hereby quit claim, convey and grant to ALMA J. HENRY,
              of Monroe County, Indiana, hereinafter called GRANTEE, a
              non-exclusive easement and right of way for ingress and egress
              over and across the following described lands, to-wit:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 3 of 17
        A part of the In-Lot 198 in the City of Bloomington, Indiana,
        described as follows:

        An easement for ingress and egress over the following described
        tract: Beginning at a point 16.50 feet East of the Northwest
        corner of the said In-Lot 198 said point being on the South line of
        Sixth Street, thence South for a distance of 99.52 feet, thence
        S35ºW for a distance of 40.69 feet, thence South for a distance of
        3.78 feet, thence East for a distance of 12.0 feet to the Northwest
        corner of In-Lot 155, thence N 35ºE for a distance of 40.69 feet,
        thence North for a distance of 103.30 feet to the South line of
        Sixth Street, thence West over and along the said South line of
        Sixth Street for a distance of 12.00 feet to the place of beginning.
        Containing 1727 square feet, more or less.

                 Said easement is for the use and benefit of the lands now
                 owned by the GRANTEE, and described as follows, to-
                 wit:

                 In Lot One Hundred Fifty-Four (154) in the City of
                 Bloomington, Indiana and shall run to and for the use and
                 benefit of the above-described lands.

                 It shall be the obligation of the GRANTOR to establish,
                 construct and maintain the easement granted herein and
                 GRANTOR hereby agrees that at all times during any
                 construction on the premises of GRANTOR, adjacent to
                 the present North and South alley, ingress and egress
                 through the alley as now established, running north and
                 south between Fifth and Sixth Streets, a portion of which
                 is East of the lands of the Grantee, or the easement
                 granted herein, there shall be no unobstructed use thereof

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024          Page 4 of 17
                        for ingress and egress from Fifth Street to Sixth Street in
                        the City of Bloomington, Indiana. 1

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 28-29).

[7]   On February 9, 2000, Bank One, N.A. conveyed Lot 155, Lot 156, Lot 197,

      and Lot 198 to Elmore Y Orrego, LLC, which, in turn, on January 13, 2016,

      conveyed the Lots by special warranty deed to the Foundry. Both deeds are

      “subject to any and all easements, agreements, and any other encumbrances or

      restrictions of record.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 29-30).

[8]   The Easement, which the Foundry is aware of, runs across Lot 198 in favor of

      Lot 154 and was created when the alley, which originally ran from Kirkwood

      Avenue to Sixth Street, was partially vacated from the northeast corner of

      Framemakers’ Lot 154 north to Sixth Street to make way for the Bank One

      drive-through lanes. The alley from the north edge of Framemakers’ Lot 154,

      which runs south to Kirkwood Avenue, remained in place. The Easement from

      Sixth Street runs south (parallel to the vacated alley) where it terminates at

      approximately the northeast corner of Framemakers’ Lot 154 and where the

      alley begins and runs to Kirkwood Avenue, providing continuous access from

      Sixth Street to Kirkwood Avenue.

      1
        The remainder of the Easement involved a now-extinguished right of first refusal to purchase and is not
      relevant to the dispute in this Cause.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024                             Page 5 of 17
[9]   At some point in 2013 and 2014, the Foundry commenced the design and

      development of the Project, which was to occupy Lots 155, 156, 197, and 198.

      In 2016, the Foundry contracted with Onyx and East, LLC (Onyx) to construct

      the new commercial building. Pursuant to the terms of the contract entered

      into by the Foundry and Onyx, Onyx was responsible for supervision and

      direction of the Project and was mandated to confine the work to areas

      permitted by applicable laws, statutes, ordinances, codes, rules, and regulations.

      Beginning in June 2017, a large crane was placed in the Easement area,

      blocking access between Sixth Street and the Framemakers’ property. For the

      remainder of 2017, the evidence reflected the continuous obstruction of the

      Easement area by the ongoing construction on the Project. The obstructions

      were as simple as leaving a fence in the Easement or as severe as leaving

      construction materials and equipment unattended in the Easement, completely

      blocking its access. Over the period of time running from the middle of 2017,

      when the portable crane was installed in the Easement, through 2019, the

      Easement was continuously occupied by construction vehicles or materials.

      Tire marks on the Framemakers’ parking lot show that the Easement, alley, and

      parking lot were used as part of the construction site on a frequent basis.

      Despite being aware of the construction’s interference with Framemakers’

      Easement, at no point did the Foundry place any signage, issue written

      instructions, or take any other affirmative action to protect Framemakers’ rights

      to the ingress and egress on the Easement.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 6 of 17
[10]   On April 30, 2020, Framemakers filed its Complaint against the Foundry,

       which it amended on May 5, 2020, seeking to address the interference and

       obstruction of the Easement by requesting an injunction to preserve and protect

       easement rights, an injunction to prohibit blocking the alley, damages for

       trespass to its property, and damages to the business of Framemakers.

       Framemakers did not pursue the injunctive relief and, after parties waived trial

       by jury, the case was tried before the bench on January 11-12, 2023, on the

       issues of interference, trespass, and damages to Framemakers’ business.

[11]   On June 1, 2023, the trial court entered forty-three findings of fact and thirty-

       two conclusions thereon, issuing a judgment in favor of the Foundry. In

       interpreting the Easement, the trial court found that “neither party has alleged

       that the language of the Easement is ambiguous, and the [c]ourt finds that there

       is no ambiguity in the grant of the Easement.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38).

       Looking at the plain and ordinary meaning of the language, the trial court

       noted that “the intention of the Easement grant was that Framemakers would

       have unobstructed access for ingress and egress even when the grantor, the

       servient estate, had construction happening on its premises.” (Appellant’s App.

       Vol. II, p. 38). The court concluded that, based on the evidence before it, it was

       “clear that Onyx, and parties they employed, continuously and pervasively

       obstructed Framemakers’ Easement rights, either partially or in whole, in

       violation of the Easement grant.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). On the

       issue of trespass, the trial court found the Foundry not liable for the actions of

       their contractors and that there was no evidence that the Foundry trespassed on

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024       Page 7 of 17
       Framemakers’ property. With respect to the damages, the trial court concluded

       that the Foundry’s contractor was solely responsible for obstruction and

       interference with the Easement and that the Foundry was not liable for the

       contractors’ actions.

[12]   Framemakers now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Standard of Review

[13]   Where the trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions thereon sua sponte,

       “the findings control our review and the judgment only as to the issues those

       specific findings cover. Where there are no specific findings, a general

       judgment standard applies and we may affirm on any legal theory supported by

       the evidence adduced at trial.” Estate of Henry v. Woods, 77 N.E.3d 1200, 1204

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We apply a two-tier standard of review to the sua sponte

       findings and conclusions. Id. First, we determine whether the evidence

       supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment.

       Id. We will set aside findings and conclusions only if they are clearly

       erroneous, that is, when the record contains no facts or inferences supporting

       them. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves

       us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Barkwill v. Cornelia H.

       Barkwill Revocable Trust, 902 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In

       conducting our review, we consider only the evidence favorable to the

       judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Estate of Henry, 77

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024       Page 8 of 17
       N.E.3d at 1204. We do not reweigh the evidence, nor do we assess witness

       credibility. Id.

       II. Interference with Easement

[14]   Framemakers contends that because the Easement grants Framemakers a non-

       possessory interest across the property of the Foundry and prohibits the

       Foundry from interfering with Framemakers’ use of the Easement, the trial

       court erred when it applied a negligence standard to a real estate easement

       dispute and concluded that the Foundry defeated the interest by allowing its

       contractors to interfere with Framemakers’ use of the Easement.

[15]   As our supreme court has stated: “An easement is the right to use another’s

       land for a specified purpose. An easement appurtenant benefits adjoining land;

       an easement in gross benefits a specific individual. The land benefited by an

       easement is the dominant estate; the land burdened by an easement is the

       servient estate.” Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d 987, 990 (Ind.

       2018). And where—as here—an easement was “voluntarily created by a

       written instrument to serve a specified purpose,” the easement is known as an

       express easement. Easement, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). When

       examining the scope of easement rights in Indiana, we “hold[ ] the parties to

       the agreement they—or their predecessors in interest—made when they

       negotiated their easement or acquired their property concerning the easement.”

       DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d at 995; cf. Successor in Interest, Black’s Law Dictionary

       (11th ed. 2019) (noting a successor in interest “retains the same rights as the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024       Page 9 of 17
       original owner, with no change in substance”). In this way, Indiana common

       law “promotes certainty,” ensuring “property interests and corresponding

       property values remain stable and predictable.” DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d at 995.

[16]   It is well-established that easements are limited to the purpose for which they

       are granted. McCauley v. Harris, 928 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The

       owner of an easement, known as the dominant estate, possesses all rights

       necessarily incident to the enjoyment of the easement. Id. The dominant estate

       holder may make repairs, improvements, or alterations that are reasonably

       necessary to make the grant of the easement effectual. Id. The owner of the

       property over which the easement passes, known as the servient estate, may use

       his property in any manner and for any purpose consistent with the enjoyment

       of the easement, and the dominant estate cannot interfere with the use. Id. “All

       rights necessarily incident to the enjoyment of the easement are possessed by

       the owner of the dominant estate, and it is the duty of the servient owner to

       permit the dominant owner to enjoy his easement without interference.” Id.

       The servient owner “may not so use his land as to obstruct the easement or

       interfere with the enjoyment thereof by the owner of the dominant estate.” Id.

       Moreover, the owner of the dominant estate cannot subject the servient estate

       to extra burdens, any more than the holder of the servient estate can materially

       impair or unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement. Id.

[17]   The Foundry, when taking ownership of Lot 198, had actual and constructive

       knowledge of the existence of the Easement and the rights granted to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024    Page 10 of 17
       Framemakers under the Easement. In interpreting the unambiguous language

       of the Easement, the trial court unequivocally concluded that

               the Easement unambiguously grant[s] Framemakers a ‘non-
               exclusive easement and right of way for ingress and egress’ over a
               specifically described portion of Lot 198, but it also explicitly
               provides that ‘there shall be no unobstructed use [of the
               [E]asement] for ingress and egress from Fifth Street to Sixth
               Street’ ‘during any construction on the premises of GRANTOR.’
               The plain and ordinary language of the Easement demonstrates
               that the intention of the Easement grant was that Framemakers
               would have unobstructed access for ingress and egress even when
               the grantor, the servient estate, had construction happening on its
               premises.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). Finding, based on the evidence before it, that

       Framemakers’ Easement rights had been obstructed during the construction of

       the Project, the trial court, instead of concluding that the Foundry had

       interfered with Framemakers’ Easement rights, applied a negligence standard

       and determined that “Onyx [as the Foundry’s contractor], and parties they

       employed, continuously and pervasively obstructed Framemakers’ Easement

       rights, either partially or in whole, in violation of the Easement grant.”

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38.).

[18]   In its conclusion that Onyx was in violation of Framemakers’ Easement rights,

       the trial court applied the general rule that “a principal is not bound by the acts

       of his agent unless they are performed within the scope of authority actually

       and ostensibly conferred upon him,” citing as authority Cincinnati H. & I.R. Co.

       v. Carper, 13 N.E. 122, 124 (Ind. 1887), as well as the rule that “courts have

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024       Page 11 of 17
       recognized that an independent contractor may create liability for his principal

       in certain circumstances,” citing Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 978

       (Ind. 1998). (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 39). The trial court continued to

       analyze this Cause pursuant to negligence principles and concluded that no

       exceptions to these rules applied and that Onyx, and not the Foundry as its

       principal, was responsible for the obstruction of and interference with the

       Easement.

[19]   The trial court conflated the property law principles at play in the Easement

       rights determination between Framemakers and the Foundry with the

       negligence principles between the Foundry, as owner of the Project, and Onyx,

       as its contractor. Onyx is not a party to the Easement, and Framemakers is not

       a party to the construction contract entered into between the Foundry and

       Onyx. This case involves a written easement document where Framemakers

       has asserted that the servient estate owner interfered with and obstructed

       Framemakers’ enjoyment of its rights under the Easement. The Easement was

       entered into between Framemakers and the Foundry, and the Foundry is liable

       for violating Framemakers’ rights under the Easement.

[20]   The only legal construction under which Framemakers could pursue Onyx for

       interfering with its Easement is by being in privity with the Foundry in its

       construction contract with Onyx. Generally, only parties to a contract or those

       in privity with the parties have rights under the contract. OEC Diasonics, Inc. v.

       Major, 674 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). However, “one not a party

       to an agreement may nonetheless enforce it by demonstrating that the parties

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 12 of 17
       intended to protect him under the agreement by the imposition of a duty in his

       favor.” Id. To be enforceable, it must clearly appear that it was the purpose or

       a purpose of the contract to impose an obligation on one of the contracting

       parties in favor of the third party. Id. It is not enough that performance of the

       contract would be of benefit to the third party. Id. It must appear that it was

       the intention of one of the parties to require performance of some part of it in

       favor of such third party and for his benefit, and that the other party to the

       agreement intended to assume the obligation thus imposed. Id. The intent of

       the contracting parties to bestow rights upon a third party “must affirmatively

       appear from the language of the instrument when properly interpreted and

       construed.” Freigy v. Gargaro Co., 60 N.E.2d 288, 291 (1945).

[21]   The construction agreement between the Foundry and Onyx does not indicate

       that the parties affirmatively placed a duty on Onyx to keep the Easement free

       of any obstructions. Rather, the boilerplate contractual language merely directs

       Onyx to confine the work to areas permitted by applicable laws, statutes,

       ordinances, codes, rules, and regulations, and specifically mentions that the

       “[a]greement is made solely and specifically between and for the benefit of the

       parties hereto, [], and no other person, individual, corporation or entity,

       whatsoever, shall have any rights, interests or claims hereunder or be entitled to

       any benefits under or on account of this [a]greement[.]” (Exh. Vol. VII, p. 60).

[22]   Furthermore, every case cited by the trial court—and the Foundry—in support

       of its decision involved the negligent actions of contractors in relation to

       personal injury claims by third parties and not the intentional interference with

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024      Page 13 of 17
       easement rights between the parties to that easement which are rooted in a

       contract. See, e.g., Becker v. Kreilein, 770 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ind. 2002) (“Indiana

       recognizes five exceptions to the general rule of non-liability of a principal for

       an independent contractor’s negligence[.]”); Gwinn v. Harry J. Kloeppel & Assoc.

       Inc., 9 N.E.3d 687, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“The long standing general rule is

       that a principal is not liable for the negligence of a general contractor.”) These

       cases and principles have no application in determining the rights of the parties

       to the Easement. While these cited cases may provide guidance on the relative

       responsibilities of parties to a personal injury case, they do not provide guidance

       to the determination of the relative rights of parties to an express easement.

[23]   The Foundry cites to Gray v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 624 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1993), as standing for the proposition that one who hires an independent

       contractor is also not liable for the contractor’s torts, not just negligence. While

       it is true that the Gray case involved a nuisance claim and not a negligence

       claim, the court held that the principal could not escape liability for a nuisance

       claim related to PCB contamination by hiring an independent contractor whose

       work by nature would lead to a nuisance. Id. at 54. Likewise here, the

       Foundry hired Onyx to construct a building, and the very nature of Onyx’s

       work resulted in the interference and obstruction of the Easement.

[24]   In its cross-appeal, the Foundry posits that the trial court erred in its

       interpretation of the unambiguous language of the Easement. See Burkett v. Am.

       Family Ins. Group, 737 N.E.2d 447, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“An ambiguity

       does not exist merely because the parties proffer differing interpretations of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024        Page 14 of 17
[contract] language.”). Focusing on the language in the Easement that “there

shall be no unobstructed use [of the Easement] for ingress and egress from Fifth

Street to Sixth Street” “during any construction on the premises of

GRANTOR,” the Foundry asserts that the trial court’s interpretation that

Framemakers should have unobstructed access for ingress and egress even

when the Foundry had construction on its premises, would render the word

“no” ineffective and meaningless. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). If the

Easement was truly meant to give Framemakers unobstructed access during the

construction on Foundry’s property, the Foundry contends that the Easement

should have read, ‘there shall be unobstructed use for ingress and egress . . .

during any construction.’ We disagree. “When construing an instrument

granting an easement, the trial court must ascertain and give effect to the

intention of the parties, which is determined by proper construction of the

language of the instrument from an examination of all parts thereof.”

McCauley, 928 N.E.2d at 314. In this light, “[p]articular words and phrases

cannot be read alone, as the parties’ intention must be gleaned from the

instruction as a whole.” Id. Here, the Easement runs across Lot 198, as the

servient estate, for the benefit of Lot 154, the dominant estate, and provides for

a “non-exclusive easement and right of way for ingress and egress over and

across [] Lot 198.” (Appellant’s App. Vol II, p. 68). The Easement further

obligates the Foundry, as the grantor, to agree “that at all times during any

construction on the premises of GRANTOR, [], there shall be no unobstructed

use thereof for ingress and egress [].” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 68). A

reading of all material parts of the Easement leads to the reasonable
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024     Page 15 of 17
       construction that the parties intended for Framemakers, as grantee and owner

       of Lot 154, to have unobstructed ingress and egress. While the placement of

       the word “no” is confusing, the intent of the parties “must be gleaned from the

       instrument as a whole.” McCauley, 928 N.E.2d at 314. Accepting the

       Foundry’s interpretation would render all the preceding language of the

       Easement meaningless in favor of the puzzlingly placed word “no.” We find

       that the Easement’s unambiguous language demonstrates that Framemakers

       would enjoy unobstructed access, even when the Foundry had ongoing

       construction on the premises.

[25]   Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in insulating the Foundry

       from liability under the Easement by applying negligence principles. Instead,

       Framemakers’ and the Foundry’s respective rights and obligations derive from

       the express Easement, which, by its unambiguous language, granted

       Framemakers unobstructed access for ingress and egress even when the

       Foundry, as the owner of the servient estate, had construction occurring on Lot

       198. Based on the evidence before it and undisputed by the parties, the trial

       court concluded that Framemakers’ Easement rights had been “continuously

       and pervasively obstructed [], either partially or in whole, in violation of the

       Easement grant.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 38). Therefore, we conclude

       that the Foundry interfered with Framemakers’ Easement rights by obstructing

       Framemakers’ access. We remand to the trial court for the determination of

       damages, if any.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024      Page 16 of 17
       CONCLUSION
[26]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred by concluding that the

       Foundry did not interfere with Framemakers’ Easement during the

       development and construction of the Foundry’s Project.

[27]   Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

       Crone, J. and Mathias, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1426 | January 25, 2024   Page 17 of 17