Court Opinion

ID: 9809642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:19:27.813682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:17.303811
License: Public Domain

Clark, C. J.,
dissenting in part: There was evidence that II. L. Alderman, division superintendent of the Southern Power Company, made regular trips to this station once a month, and that he knew that the boys were in the habit of swimming at this pool. The witness Burns testified that he had told Alderman not to allow the boys to go in swimming there, as it was dangerous. When the intestate was drowned Howard was for some reason absent from the building, and the intestate was not missed until he returned and, seeing the clothes on the floor, asked whose they were. He then went to the corner and got a pole with an iron hook and, finding the body, fished it out. He testified that the boys had been in the habit of going into this pool for some three years before the intestate was drowned.
If the plaintiffs allegations are correct, the defendants were joint tort-feasors, and at her election she could sue them jointly or severally. Staton v. R. R., 144 N. C., 135. The defendant power company excepted to the refusal of the nonsuit. But the defendant Howard did not make such motion.
It would seem clear that for the defendant Howard to permit a boy of that age to go into the pool 11 feet deep while he absented himself and when there was no precaution to prevent drowning would make out at least a prima facie case against the defendant Howard. The question raised by the motion of the other defendant is as to whether it was liable for the default of its agent in charge of the tank. The size and nature of the tank were as stated. There is evidence that the boys had been permitted to go there .for bathing purposes from three to five years, to the knowledge of the company. Whether or not the 10 cents paid by each went into the treasury of the company or was permitted to be received by Howard in part compensation for his *697services does not appear. But it was a most dangerous instrumentality for boys wbicb tbe power company permitted tbe boys to use upon payment of a small fee and without taking care or oversight to prevent fatalities such as this. There was at least an implied invitation on the part of the power company to go upon the premises, and it is responsible for the loss of life due to its want of care and oversight. Starling v. Cotton Mills, 168 N. C., 229.
In Peking v. McMahon, (Ill.) 27 L. R. A., 206, the Court sustained a verdict and judgment for the death of a child in a pond in a populous city in which the children were in the habit of playing, but which was partially inclosed from the streets, on the ground that such unguarded premises was a dangerous attraction, and the owners were responsible by reason of the implied invitation to children. But here there was an express invitation, and an acceptance of compensation, whether it went to the owner or to its agent in part compensation for his services, and the owner is responsible for the negligence in that there were no safeguards against accident of this kind.
In this case the substation of the power company was situated in a populous neighborhood and it maintained thereon 'a dangerous pond of water within 60 feet of a public street, which was attractive to children, to which place they had been going for nearly five years prior to the death of this boy. The power company is much more liable than if it had merely permitted an _ attractive but dangerous locality to remain at that point without being protected by walls. It had through its custodian and representative permitted children to go there, paying for the privilege, with no sufficient protection against drowning, even if the custodian had been on hand, and in his’ absence there was no protection whatever.
Numerous authorities can be cited to sustain recoveries in cases of this kind, even where there was no invitation, no compensation paid, but merely unguarded premises. Under these circumstances there was ample authority to sustain the liability of the defendant power company.
It was in evidence that the plaintiff’s intestate could not swim. No reasonably careful, prudent man would permit a boy to go into a tank of this kind 11 feet deep with numerous other boys without some protection by boats or floats, or otherwise;' and without the oversight and presence of some man to guard against accident. The boy, who could not swim, clung to the side of the tank, as his body was found close to. where he went in. It seems that the other boys were so engrossed in their sport that they did not know when the plaintiff’s intestate sank. • It was negligence per se, if indeed it was not criminal, for the defendant power company to let the tank be used by the boys without *698supervisión or safeguard, as it bad done for years, and it is responsible for tbe negligence of its agent Howard, even if tbey bad shown, wbicb tbey did not, that be bad been instructed to remain on band to guard against accidents, and render help if needed. Tbe evidence shows that tbe power company was aware that tbe pool was being thus used, and it must, or should, have known that there were no safety appliances nor any method of resuscitation in case of drowning. Tbe boy dropped out of sight beneath 11 feet of water and no one knew it. Tbe defendants bad received bis 10 cents and tbey took no further care or interest. Tbey bad been paid.
Tbe defendant urges that it was error for the court to refuse tbe following prayer for instruction: “If you find from tbe evidence that when tbe Southern Power Company inclosed tbe pool, through one of its servants, Moser, it directed Edwards to cease to use tbe pool as a bathing pool, and thereafter it was done secretly, in a secret manner, as far as tbe Southern Power Company was concerned, and unknown to tbe Southern Power Company or any of its officers, and purposely concealed from the' Southern Power Company, then I charge you that tbe Southern Power Company would not in any wise be responsible for tbe death of tbe plaintiff’s intestate.” This instruction eliminated tbe implied authority wbicb is recognzed by tbe law and undertook to confine tbe jury to tbe evidence offered to show that tbe power company authorized tbe defendant Howard to use tbe pool upon its premises as alleged in tbe complaint.
This is contrary to tbe well settled and necessary principles of law that- when a dangerous agency of this kind, located on one of tbe principal streets- of tbe town, is openly and notoriously used, as is shown by tbe fact that a large number of boys habitually went there, tbe responsibility is necessarily upon tbe owner of tbe property, who put it in tbe power of Howard tó use it, and by no oversight or supervision took care to ascertain and prevent it. Tbe mere fact, if true, that tbe company forbade Edwards thus to use it is no excuse or exoneration. Howard was in sole charge of tbe property, and so far as it was concerned be.was tbe alter ego of tbe corporation." It confided tbe building to bis charge and during tbe long period that it was used as a dangerous instrumentality it took no care to see that its orders were executed, if it gave such orders. This was tbe negligence of tbe company. It sent a man there once a month, and with proper supervision be should have known, if be did not, what tbe whole town knew, that this dangerous instrumentality was habitually used as a bathing pool. If this supervisor did not ascertain that fact, bis negligence was tbe negligence of tbe company.
*699This is not the case where a single act of an employee is done against the orders of the company. Here there was a long course of dealing by a man who was in sole charge of the property, and the company was negligent in not seeing that its orders were obeyed, if they were given. It was negligent in that its supervisor who visited the property once a month did not discover that its other subordinate was. using the property in a manner dangerous to the safety of the children in the community. If the corporation is not responsible for the long continued misconduct of the servant in sole charge of the property, and if, further, it is not responsible for the neglect of its supervisor in visiting the property to discover and suppress the notorious disobedience of its orders, then all that is necessary to protect a corporation is to give orders not to do a certain act and leave them to be disobeyed, thus putting the responsibility upon the irresponsible servant and exempting the owner of the property which caused the injury or death. The company cannot obtain immunity by merely giving orders. It must see that they are obeyed. A railroad company instructs its engineers to run on a certain schedule. If they disobey these instructions the company is responsible for any collision that may occur, though the act was done against its orders. Its responsibility to the public is not negatived because its servants disobeyed its orders. In this case Howard was in charge of the building in which this dangerous pool was situated. He was acting within the scope of his' employment while in control of the building under his charge, and none the less so because he disobeyed the instructions given him in regard thereto. The supervisor visited the building once; a month, and his negligence in not ascertaining the disobedience of orders by Howard, if there were such orders, is none the less the negligence of the company, for in the scope of his employment he was negligent in not ascertaining and stopping the misuse of the building, which was a matter of public notoriety.
Any other doctrine would deprive the public of protection against the dangerous use of railroad engines, pools, or other dangerous agencies by the simple fact that the employee in charge had been told not to use it in a certain manner, though he is left to disobey these orders notoriously for a long period of time, causing such injuries as the wrongful death of the boy on this occasion. These principles are elementary, and, if not maintained, the public would be at the mercy of powerful instrumentalities of danger left in the unsupervised control of subordinates, if it can be shown they were told to be careful.
T concur in affirming the judgment as to Howard, and in sustaining the refusal to nonsuit in favor of the Southern Power Company, and the ruling as to the measure of damages, but dissent as to granting a new trial to the Southern Power Company.