Court Opinion

ID: 9660179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:07:10.518677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:13.520359
License: Public Domain

George K. Cracraft, Judge, dissenting. I am in full accord with the opinion of the majority that specific criminal intent, which is an essential element of the crime of burglary, cannot be presumed from a mere showing of an unexplained illegal entry of an occupiable structure. The burden is on the State to prove every element of the offense charged and cannot, without violating constitutional requirements of due process, shift to the accused the burden of explaining his illegal entry. Our Supreme Court expressly so held in Norton v. State, 271 Ark. 451, 609 S.W.2d 1 (1980). My point of departure is at the majority’s conclusion that in reaching its verdict the jury was required to rely on speculation, surmise or prohibited presumption. It is my opinion that there was evidence from which the jury could properly infer the requisite intent and that it was not error for the trial court to submit that issue to it. Criminal intent or purpose, a fact which cannot in the nature of things be positively known to others, is difficult if not impossible to prove by direct evidence. It is, however, an inference of fact that a jury may draw from other facts and circumstances which are shown by direct evidence. Barksdale v. State, 262 Ark. 271, 555 S.W.2d 948 (1977). This principle was reaffirmed in the recent opinion of Johnson & Carroll v. State, 276 Ark. 56, 632 S.W.2d 416 (1982), in which our Supreme Court stated that, in determining whether criminal intent existed, the jury is allowed to draw on their common knowledge and experience in reaching a verdict from other facts directly proved. In France v. State, 68 Ark. 529, 60 S.W. 236 (1900) the court stated that flight to avoid arrest may be evidence of guilt and, while standing alone might not be strong enough to sustain a conviction, may be one of a series of facts and circumstances from which guilt may be inferred. The weight to be given it is a matter for the jury to determine. Here there was evidence not only of an illegal entry by the appellant but it was shown that the house was fully furnished and contained items of value, including a radio playing at the time on high volume which made the appellant’s movements in the house difficult to detect. There was also evidence that appellant was aware that a young female resided there. When his presence within the dwelling was discovered by a lawful occupant he fled. I am of the opinion that when all of the facts and circumstances are considered along with his flight from the scene there was sufficient evidence upon which the issue of his intent might be submitted to the jury. In Norton v. State, supra, the Supreme Court made the same distinction I would make here. There the court said: We are not unmindful that our decision in Grays v. State, 264 Ark. 564, 572 S.W.2d 847 (1978), may suggest that the specific intent requirement of burglary may be presumed from the unexplained illegal entry of an occupiable structure. In Grays, however, the defendant fled, eluding the police officers, when his presence was discovered in the occupiable structure. We have consistently suggested that the flight of an accused to avoid arrest is evidence of his felonious intent. See, e.g., France v. State, 68 Ark. 529, 60S.W. 256(1900), Smith v. State, 218 Ark. 725, 238 S.W.2d 649 (1951), Russell & Davis v. State, 262 Ark. 447, 559 S.W.2d 7 (1977). Notwithstanding our holding in Grays, however, we find no evidence here other than appellant’s illegal entry to sustain a conclusion that appellant’s entry was for the purpose of committing an imprisonable offense. While this is a case in which the jury might have found that his illegal entry was without criminal intent, I am unwilling to hold that this was not a question for the jury to determine or that it could not do so without resort to speculation, surmise or constitutionally prohibited presumptions flowing merely from proof of the illegal entry. I am authorized to state that Judge Corbin shares these views. We respectfully dissent.