Court Opinion

ID: 9960917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 16:04:01.505325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:05.794452
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                         Opinion filed April 17, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-2231
                        Lower Tribunal No. 22-5357
                           ________________

                           Cameron Jenkins,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                               Euclid, L.C.,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria de
Jesus Santovenia, Judge.

     Cameron Jenkins, P.A., and Cameron Jenkins, for appellant.

      Armstrong Teasdale LLP, and Glen H. Waldman and Marlos J. Weiss,
for appellee.

Before EMAS, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Appellant Cameron Jenkins, a former tenant of appellee, Euclid, L.C.,

appeals the trial court’s final judgment of eviction, entered at the conclusion

of a bench trial. 1 Jenkins raises numerous claims on appeal, but we find

none are meritorious. Upon our review, the trial court’s final judgment is

supported by competent substantial evidence, and Jenkins has failed to

demonstrate any reversible error by the trial court. Verneret v. Foreclosure

Advisors, LLC, 45 So. 3d 889, 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“Findings of fact by

a trial judge in a nonjury proceeding will not be set aside on review unless

totally unsupported by competent and substantial evidence.”) (citing Laufer

v. Norma Fashions, Inc., 418 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)).

      Affirmed.

1
  Initially, Jenkins filed a multi-count complaint against Euclid in circuit court,
and Euclid filed a single-count eviction action in county court. Jenkins moved
to transfer Euclid’s county court action to circuit court, and to consolidate the
two suits, a request which was granted. The trial court subsequently severed
the eviction count from the remainder of the action, thereby allowing it to
proceed more expeditiously, see § 51.011, Fla. Stat. (2022) (Summary
Procedure) and § 83.59(2), Fla. Stat. (2022) (Right of Action for
Possession); Camena Invs. & Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Cross, 791 So. 2d 595,
596-597 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“The summary procedure statutes envision an
expedited process to determine the right to possession promptly without the
necessity of deciding all other issues between the parties”), and we find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s action. Jenkins’ claims remained
pending in the trial court at the time he filed the notice of appeal in the instant
cause.

                                        2