Court Opinion

ID: 9668277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:08:20.594322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:44.303115
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On December 10, 1998, we issued an opinion dismissing appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction based upon appellant’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing. We deny rehearing, but we issue this opinion as a supplement to our previous opinion. Our judgment of December 10, 1998, remains unchanged.
Appellant claims we erred by not reaching the merits. He relies on Brown v. State, 943 S.W.2d 35, 42 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), and Wyatt v. State 951 S.W.2d 144, 146-47 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd). He asserts that the Wyatt court considered “the identical claim” advanced by appellant. We disagree.
In Brown, the court initially deferred adjudication and then adjudicated guilt and imposed a 60-year prison term. 943 S.W.2d at 36. In Wyatt, the court initially deferred adjudication and then adjudicated guilt and imposed a 30-year prison term. 951 S.W.2d at 145-46. In both Brown and Wyatt, as in the present case, the defendants appealed the voluntariness of their initial plea. However, unlike in the present case, the defendants in Brown and Wyatt appealed from their adjudication of guilt. In the present case, appellant appeals not from his adjudication of guilt; instead, he appeals from a subsequent revocation of “ordinary” proba*328tion, i.e., “community supervision,” where his sentence had been suspended after being adjudicated guilty.
A defendant may appeal the imposition of deferred adjudication when it is imposed. Brown, 943 S.W.2d at 42. This is not such a case. A defendant may appeal from a judgment adjudicating guilt after a previously deferred adjudication. Id. at 36, n. 2. This is not such a case. Appellant did not appeal at either time. Instead, he accepted his initial deferred adjudication and also his adjudication and suspended sentence of regular probation without appealing at either time, and now, after having his “regular” probation revoked, he seeks to appeal the voluntariness of his initial plea that resulted in deferred adjudication. Because of the significant difference in appellant’s procedural posture from the defendants in Brown and Wyatt, we conclude those eases are not controlling.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is denied.