Court Opinion

ID: 9849249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:36:54.335333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:09.519541
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(dissenting). Conceding the correctness of the Chief Justice’s opinion under the interpretation accorded the statute thus far, I still am impelled to address myself to one phase of that *113interpretation which I "believe has been uniformly incorrect. In order so to do I must advert to the amendment to the statute made by Act No 155, PA 19521 Prior to the adoption of this amendment, an employee injured under circumstances which would give rise to a cause of action in his behalf against a negligent third party, but which was also compensable under the Michigan workmen’s compensation act, was required to elect which remedy to pursue. "Utilization of one excluded the other. The amendment provided in part:
“The acceptance of compensation benefits or the taking of proceedings to enforce compensation payments shall not act as an election of remedies, but such injured employee * * * may also proceed to enforce the liability of such third party for damages in accordance with the provisions of this section.”
Concerning the enforcement of that liability, the act recites:
“If the injured employee or his dependents or personal representative does not commence such action within 1 year after the occurrence of the personal injury, then the employer or its compensation insurance carrier may, within the period of time for the commencement of actions prescribed by statute, enforce the liability of such other person in the name of that person. Not less than 30 days before the commencement of suit by any party under this section, such party shall notify, by registered mail at their last known address, the workmen’s compensation commission, the injured employee, or in the event of his death, his known dependents, or personal representative or his known next of kin, his employer and the workmen’s compensation insurance carrier. Any party in interest shall have a right to join in said suit.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*114This section has been construed since its enactment as permissive only. This is to say, the service of the notice had no particular binding legal effect. Thus construed, what I believe to have been the legislative intent is read out of the statute. It seems to me the words “shall notify” imports some action on the part of the party notified. The only logical action I can conceive is that the party notified must join in the action or waive his right to share in the recovery. Except for this I see no reason for the requirement of notice.
I am well aware that I am vulnerable to the criticism that this issue was not raised on appeal. Certainly under the settled case law it was not an issue. I write this brief opinion to express my view not of what the law is but what I think it ought to be.
I cannot forbear this additional observation. If the legislative intent in amending the act was to give the injured employee an additional basis for recovery, the credit of the recovery against compensation “paid or to be paid” as it has been construed thus far defeats that recovery. The real effect is to constitute the injured workman a collection agency for the employer or insurer. This may have been the legislative intent but I don’t think so. I find the statute in its present form, as judicially construed, totally unworkable and self-defeating. This is particularly true because the workmen’s compensation department seems not to be empowered to make a finding of a specific money-amount for permanent partial disability. For however long an injured employee draws any amount of compensation, his tort recovery is payable first as reimbursement. I cannot believe this is what the legislature intended. If it did, it certainly did not give the negligently injured party an additional basis for recovery. I am hopeful that if I am completely in error judi*115dally in my position, my expression of that position may avoid legislative acquiescence.
The comparable provision of the Wisconsin workmen’s compensation act provides that after the expense of recovery (a euphemism for attorney’s fees) the first third of the recovery goes to the injured employee absolutely. Thereafter the recovery is credited to the employer, or his insurer, to the extent of compensation payments made and those payments required to be paid in the future, and the balance over, if any, to the injured employee. Until the “payments to be made” can be ascertained with certainty the employee is constituted a trustee for the duration of the period compensation payments are made to him, with the insurer or employer the beneficiary of the trust.
I repeat that I cannot believe this is what our legislature intended. If it did, I am hopeful that it will review the wording of the statute.
As to decision in this case, I would hold that the failure of the employer and insurer to join in the action after notice constituted a waiver of their right to any part of the employee’s recovery.
Kellt, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

CLS 1961, §413.15 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev §17.189).