Court Opinion

ID: 9461213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:08:47.16424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:56.682866
License: Public Domain

WEIS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
The issue posed in the previous opinion by this panel was a narrow one. In a situation where the United States Attorney volunteered legal information on the punitive portions of the perjury statute to an uncounseled witness, did fundamental fairness require that he also advise the witness of a favorable recantation provision of the act? United States v. Lardieri, 497 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1974).
There was no necessity to decide the broader question which has been urged by the government’s petition for rehearing and pervades the majority opinion— that is, whether there is a statutory duty to make a disclosure to every grand jury witness under all circumstances. Though an argument might be made to that effect, the thrust of precedent in this Circuit is to the contrary. United States v. DiMichele, 375 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1967).1 Our original opinion went no farther than to say that if the United States Attorney chooses to advise a witness on the applicable law of perjury, the factual circumstances may be such that, in the interest of fairness, the prosecutor should disclose the favorable as well as the unfavorable aspects of the statute..
That opinion was based on the concepts of fundamental fairness and our supervisory authority over grand jury activity. For these propositions we need not look for express statutory direction. Our judicial obligation requires us to assure ourselves that proceedings before bodies over which the courts have control are conducted with evenhanded concern for both sides, not allowing one to gain an unseemly advantage over the other. Fundamental fairness is essential to the effective functioning of the adversary process which is at the heart of the common law system.
As the majority recognizes, there has been much debate in recent years over the desirability of retaining the grand jury as an institution. The charge has been made all too frequently that the grand jury is simply a tool of the prosecutor and, therefore, should be abolished. Not enough attention has been focused on one of the fundamental functions of the grand jury — that is, to protect the citizen from the rigors of an unjustified prosecution for a serious crime by shielding him from arbitrary governmental action. The screening process of the grand jury is a significant constitutional protection which should remain viable and effective. The courts must be alert to prevent its erosion.
There should be no doubt that the courts do possess the authority to supervise grand jury activity. In Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960), it was said:
“The grand jury is an arm of the court and its in camera proceedings constitute ‘a judicial inquiry.’ ”
Earlier, in Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327, 60 S.Ct. 540, 542, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940), the Court wrote:
“ • . . The Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process. It must initiate prosecution for the most important federal crimes. It does so under general instructions from the court to which it is *326attached and to which, from time to time, it reports its findings. The proceeding before a grand jury constitutes ‘a judicial inquiry’, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66, 26 S.Ct. 370, 375, 50 L.Ed. 652, of the most ancient lineage.”
In re Schofield, 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973), was an assertion of supervisory power and an indication of our continuing concern with the problem of grand jury proceedings. In United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1974), we emphasized the importance of the screening role.
The grand jury function is best served by extending fair treatment' to those who appear before it. Questioning before that body must often be probing and insistent, but physical compulsion on a witness, for example, could not be sanctioned. And, just as vigoro.us cross-examination in a trial is permissible, but is always subject to control by the presiding judge, so should interrogation of a witness before a grand jury be subject to supervision of the court. Failure to extend the protection of the court to a witness is as detrimental in one situation as the other. I do not believe, therefore, that it is necessary to find specific statutory direction to reach the result we did in our prior opinion. What is involved is not an assessment of the wording of the statute but, rather, its administration — a function traditionally entrusted to the courts. In this respect, Section 1623 does not differ from other criminal statutes.
It is of some significance that this statute is aimed at false statements made before or ancillary to a court or grand jury. While the law is designed to make it easier to secure convictions, it is balanced by giving a witness the opportunity to clear himself, if need be, by recantation. The purpose is to make Section 1623 a more effective device for obtaining the truth in proceedings before courts and grand juries. It may have been assumed that, in those two forums, reasoned judgments would be utilized to make the most effective use of the combination of compulsion by punishment and inducement by recantation to discover the truth. It bears repeating that it is the discovery of truth, not the successful prosecution of perjury, which is the ultimate objective of this statute. Our original ruling gave no license to lie before a grand jury and would not hinder the prosecution in its quest for truth.
There is no need at this point to answer spéculation as to whether the defendant would have recanted or that he understood the prosecutor as having granted him that privilege. These are factual matters which should be decided upon remand after a full development of the pertinent circumstances. The district court, after such a proceeding, would be in a far better position than we to decide those matters.
The discussion of the New York statute and cases decided under it is not really helpful for a determination of the question that is presented here. The circumstances are different, and I am not persuaded that, if confronted with the same situation as we have been here, the New York courts would decide in the same fashion as the majority does.
I believe our prior opinion represented only a small step forward, but its reversal is a large step backward. I dissent.

. That case held that there is no duty to warn a grand jury witness of his right to invoke the Fifth Amendment. For a criticism of the doctrine and a discussion of grand jury proceedings in general, see The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 Duke L.J. 97.