Court Opinion

ID: 9948257
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Date Created: 2024-03-06 18:09:34.940458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:22.637203
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This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40834

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT ALTON JONES a/k/a
ROBERT A. JONES,

      Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY
Daniel A. Bryant, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Erica Schiff, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1}    Defendant Robert Alton Jones appeals his conviction of aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-2(A) (1963). On appeal,
Defendant argues the district court committed plain error by admitting lapel camera
video of Victim’s statements to police. Defendant claims that the video contained
hearsay, irrelevant, unduly prejudicial information, and inadmissible character evidence
that the district court should have excluded regardless of defense counsel’s failure to
object. We reverse and remand because the admission of this video “constituted an
injustice that creates grave doubts concerning the validity of the verdict.” State v.
Antonio M., 2023-NMSC-022, ¶ 17, 536 P.3d 487 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).1

BACKGROUND

{2}    A grand jury indictment charged Defendant with one count of aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, contrary to Section 30-3-2(A), and one count of resisting,
evading or obstructing an officer (arrest), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1(B)
(1981). During the State’s opening statement, the State told the jury that its first witness,
Sergeant Brawley, would testify that Victim said Defendant “pointed his .44 Magnum
gun at her.” The State continued, “[t]hat was after [Defendant] was drinking that
particular day and pointed the gun at himself and said, “I’m going to shoot myself, and
more or less, if I go, you go.”

{3}    The State called Sergeant Brawley, who testified that after responding to a
domestic dispute he observed Victim standing by a vehicle in the driveway, “visibly
shaken.” Sergeant Brawley testified that he was wearing a lapel camera that day; that
he had reviewed the lapel camera recording before trial; and that it was a true and
accurate depiction of what he had witnessed. With no objection from defense counsel,
the district court admitted the lapel recording as an exhibit. The State then published
nearly twenty minutes of the unedited lapel recording.

{4}     In the recording, Victim stated that she and her son drove to Los Angeles to visit
with another son who happened to be on parole. Victim told Sergeant Brawley that she
told Defendant she would return on Monday, which she did. Victim stated that when she
returned home from the trip nothing had been done around the house and Defendant
did not realize it was Monday. Victim stated that Defendant had been yelling and
screaming at her all day and that Defendant was drinking “Joose”2 which she threw in
the sink because he always has alcohol around the house. With regard to the conviction
in this case, Victim stated that while she was outside speaking with a dispatcher,
Defendant pointed his .44 magnum at the middle of her forehead, before taking his gun
to his throat and saying, “if you call the cops, it’s the end of me,” and that she had seen
Defendant with a gun earlier in the day. Victim also said she would not stay in the house
to have the gun pointed at her forehead again when she knows that it is loaded all the
time.

{5}    Victim additionally made several statements about Defendant’s past behavior
unrelated to the charges in this case, (1) on a prior occasion Victim had to call the police
because Defendant had broken her cell phone by throwing it on the floor; (2) Defendant

1Defendant also argues (1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting improper bolstering
testimony; (2) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) Defendant suffered cumulative
error. We decline to address these arguments because we reverse on other grounds.
2Victim described “Joose” as a 14 percent alcohol by volume drink that contains a warning label.
previously took Victim’s gun and shot it into the floor right next to her head; (3)
Defendant berates Victim all of the time and calls her stupid, and then uses the excuse
that he had brain surgery; (4) at one point Victim went broke and lost her house as a
result of Defendant drinking a thirty-pack a day; (5) Victim is really afraid of Defendant
because of “that incident with the guns and shooting it in the floor and putting the big
gun to [her] forehead”; and (6) that Defendant told Victim “every time, . . . you’re around
your queer kid, . . . you get like this.”

{6}    The State called Victim as its second witness. The trial occurred more than two
years after the incident, and by that time, Victim was suffering from Stage 4 lung cancer
and undergoing significant treatment. Victim testified that she had lived with Defendant
for approximately fifteen years and mentioned that the two of them had been in a
romantic relationship that ended five years prior. Victim stated that Defendant had been
by her side since her diagnosis, would take her to and from her medical appointments,
and had encouraged her to receive chemotherapy and radiation treatment. In response
to the State’s questioning, Victim affirmed that she would not want anything “bad” to
happen to Defendant.

{7}    When asked about what happened on the day leading to the charges in the case,
Victim said that after she was diagnosed with cancer, she blocked out everything bad
that had happened to her. The State then asked Victim if watching the lapel recording
would help refresh her recollection about the events of that day—Victim did not think the
video would refresh her memory, but agreed to “give it a try.” The State noted that the
video had already been admitted into evidence and told Victim that she would be
questioned based on the footage she would see. Victim identified herself as the person
portrayed in the recording. The State replayed a portion of the recording that depicted
Victim saying that Defendant had broken her phone on a prior occasion, and confirming
to Sergeant Brawley that Defendant had pointed a gun at her that day. Victim claimed
she did not remember making that statement, but she did not think she would lie to
police. Instead, Victim stated that when she gets upset, she “tend[s] to expound on
things.” The State pressed Victim to see whether she had lied to police on the day of the
alleged assault, and she replied that she did not know and did not remember what had
happened. Victim said that the recording “look[ed] like a movie to [her], it’s like it’s
surreal.”

{8}     The State then replayed another portion of the video where Victim said she did
not want to be in the house with Defendant after he had pointed the gun at her
forehead, and where he allegedly said, “I go, you go,” as he pointed the gun at himself
and then at her. In response, Victim said she did not remember making those
statements to Sergeant Brawley, but that she thought she was distraught at the time
because she was having trouble breathing—not because Defendant had pointed a gun
at her. Victim then said that she did not think Defendant would ever hurt her.

{9}    Later during Victim’s testimony, she stated that she remembered she had just
returned from a great trip with her sons that day, but that was all she could recall. The
State asked if the trip included one of Victim’s sons that Defendant “called a bad name
for somebody who is gay.” When Victim appeared puzzled, the State asked to play
another portion of the recording, which defense counsel objected to on relevance
grounds. The district court overruled the objection. The State then replayed a clip from
the recording where Victim stated that Defendant had called her son a “queer kid.”
Victim did not recall Defendant calling her son a bad name.

{10} The State asked Victim if she’d heard of selective memory, and she had, but
stated she did not believe she had a selective memory. The State continued to highlight
Victim’s memory issues by asking her why she remembered some details from the
incident and not others. The State concluded the direct examination by reiterating that
Defendant was caring for Victim and that she did not want anything bad to happen to
him.

{11} In closing, the State continued to emphasize the distinction between what the
jury saw in the lapel recording and what Victim testified to before them. The State
encouraged the jury to rely on the recording to understand what happened on the day of
the alleged assault. For instance, the final statement the prosecutor made to the jury
was, “Today we saw selective memory-loss, selective amnesia. But what really
happened that particular day, folks, there is no question. [Victim] is now the actress of
the year. What you see in [the lapel recording] is true, that’s what happened . . . . What
you heard [Victim] say today is not true[, right]? She said nothing happened, but we
know something happened.” The jury convicted Defendant of aggravated assault and
acquitted him of resisting arrest. Defendant appealed.

DISCUSSION

{12} Defendant contends the admission and playing of the lapel recording was error.
Generally, “[w]e review the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion
standard and will not reverse in the absence of a clear abuse.” State v. Sarracino, 1998-
NMSC-022, ¶ 20, 125 N.M. 511, 964 P.2d 72. However, Defendant did not object to the
admission of the lapel recording and as such we review its admission for plain error.3
See State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 46, 345 P.3d 1056; see also Rule 11-103(E)
NMRA (permitting a court to “take notice of a plain error affecting a substantial right,
even if the claim of error was not properly preserved”). To find plain error, the Court
“must be convinced that admission of the challenged evidence constituted an injustice
that creates grave doubts concerning the validity of the verdict.” Antonio M., 2023-
NMSC-022, ¶ 17 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In
determining whether plain error has occurred, we “examine the alleged errors in the

3Defendant initially argues the admission of the lapel recording violated his right to confront witnesses.
“Under the Confrontation Clause, out-of-court testimonial hearsay is barred unless the witness is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.” State v. Cabezuela,
2011-NMSC-041, ¶ 49, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705 (text only) (citation omitted). The State responds that
the Victim ultimately testified at trial, thereby affording Defendant the opportunity to confront her. We
decline to address this argument further because we resolve the admission of the recording as an
evidentiary issue rather than as a confrontation issue. See Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 28, 267
P.3d 806 (observing that courts should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds and avoid
reaching unnecessary constitutional issues).
context of the testimony as a whole.” Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 46 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We apply the plain error rule “sparingly as an
exception to a preservation rule designed to encourage efficiency and fairness.” State v.
Garcia, 2019-NMCA-056, ¶ 10, 450 P.3d 418.

{13} Defendant argues that the video recording was inadmissible hearsay.4 See Rule
11-801(C) NMRA. The parties do not deny that the lapel recording contained hearsay.
Rather, the State argues that the recording was admissible as a recorded recollection
under Rule 11-803(5) NMRA. Rule 11-803(5) states that a recorded recollection is “[a]
record that”

                (a)     is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot
                        recall well enough to testify fully and accurately,

                (b)     was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was
                        fresh in the witness’s memory, and

                (c)     accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge.

        If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as
        an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.

{14} The State argues that Victim provided a foundation for the admission of the
recording as a recorded recollection because she testified that she could not recall the
alleged assault, acknowledged that the video was taken shortly after she called the
police, and that she had never lied to the police. According to the State, “the statement
would accurately reflect her knowledge of the incident at the time.”

{15} However, the district court admitted the video recording during Sergeant
Brawley’s testimony, rather than Victim’s. As such, the State did not lay a foundation for
the admission of Victim’s hearsay statements contained in the video recording under
Rule 11-803(5) at the time of its admission. Moreover, as stated above, evidence of
recorded recollection admitted under Rule 11-803(5) allows a party to read the evidence
into the record and may be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.
Here the State did not read any of Victim’s statements into the record, but instead
published the lapel recording to the jury and entered it into evidence.

{16} To the extent the State argues that it refreshed Victim’s recollection during her
testimony, we observe that by that time the recording had already been admitted into
evidence. We are unaware of any way in which a witness could lay a foundation to
admit evidence after it has already been published to the jury. Contrary to the State’s

4Defendant also contests the State’s use of lapel video from the following day when Defendant was
arrested. However, as the State points out, the State used this recording to prove Defendant had resisted
arrest. We decline to address the use of this recording because Defendant was ultimately acquitted of
resisting arrest. Defendant has failed to demonstrate why the use of that video called into question “the
validity of the verdict” under the plain error standard. See Antonio M., 2023-NMSC-022, ¶ 17.
argument, Victim’s statements in the lapel recording were not admitted in accordance
with the requirements of Rule 11-803(5).

{17} Beyond the fact that the video recording contained inadmissible hearsay,
Defendant further argues in part that portions of the recording provided the jury with
unfairly prejudicial evidence in violation of Rule 11-403 NMRA, as well as inadmissible
character evidence under Rule 11-404(B) NMRA. In response, the State asserts that
“[t]he evidence was not inherently inadmissible under Rule 11-404(B),” and notes Rule
11-404(B) provides numerous exceptions that allow for the admission of “evidence of a
crime, wrong, or other act.” However, the State makes no argument about which of
those exceptions might apply to Victim’s statements here. Rather, the State contends
that the evidence did not contain inadmissible character evidence because Victim’s
statements were “long” and “rambling,” as indicated by her references to a trip she took
with her sons, her son’s sexual orientation, one of her son’s status on parole,
Defendant’s tendency to drink, a time when Defendant broke her phone, and a time
when Defendant shot a hole in the floor of her home, which the State alleges was
closely entwined with the crime Defendant was charged with here. The State finally
asserts that the jury “did not act solely on emotion about Defendant being a bad
person,” because it acquitted him of resisting arrest.

{18} For the reasons we explain below, we conclude the statements in the video—
which included alleged instances of prior acts of aggression towards Victim and her
property, alleged alcohol abuse, and other unsavory personality traits—unfairly
prejudiced Defendant because they illustrated for the jury that Defendant was a bad
person prone to violence and alcohol abuse, and were used to show he acted in
accordance with those character traits. See Rule 11-403 (allowing for the exclusion of
relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”); Rule 11-
404(B)(1) (prohibiting “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act” if used “to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character”).

{19} This evidence made it appear to the jury that Defendant had a propensity for
substance abuse and violence and that on the day at issue in this case, he was acting
in accordance with his propensity to be violent towards Victim. See State v. Gallegos,
2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 21, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828 (“The nearly universal view is that
other-acts evidence, although logically relevant to show that the defendant committed
the crime by acting consistently with his or her past conduct, is inadmissible because
the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of
guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment—creates a
prejudicial effect.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Kerby, 2005-
NMCA-106, ¶ 25, 138 N.M. 232, 118 P.3d 740 (“In the case of evidence of other
uncharged bad acts, unfair prejudice refers to the risk that the jury . . . will draw
unfavorable inferences about the defendant’s propensity for criminal conduct from
evidence of non[]charged bad acts.”). We do not approve of the use of such evidence.
See State v. Ashley, 1997-NMSC-049, ¶ 16, 124 N.M. 1, 946 P.2d 205 (“It is not proper
to make the defendant appear to be an evil person before the jury.” (alteration, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

{20} Furthermore, it is clear that the State could have shown the jury only the relevant
portions of the lapel recording—it only used pertinent snippets of the footage to contrast
Victim’s testimony on the stand with her statements to Sergeant Brawley on the day of
the alleged assault. Instead, the State made the video the centerpiece of its case. For
example, in the State’s closing statement, the prosecutor insisted at least ten times that
the jury should refer to the lapel recording if they had any doubts about what happened
between Defendant and Victim. Because the prosecution relied so heavily on an
improperly admitted recording, which consisted of numerous unduly prejudicial hearsay
statements, we conclude that the evidence played a material role in the jury’s decision
to convict. As such, the evidence seriously affected the fairness of the trial and creates
grave doubts concerning the validity of the verdict. State v. Leyba, 2012-NMSC-037, ¶¶
27, 37, 289 P.3d 1215 (reversing a verdict in part because of the admission of hearsay
statements regarding the defendant’s prior act of violence towards the victim in her
diary); State v. Barraza, 1990-NMCA-026, ¶18, 110 N.M 45, 791 P.2d 79 (noting that in
determining whether there has been plain error, “we must examine the alleged errors in
the context of the testimony as a whole.” As such, we have grave doubts about the
validity of this verdict. See Antonio M., 2023-NMSC-022, ¶ 17.

CONCLUSION

{21} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

{22}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

WE CONCUR:

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge

MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
retired, Sitting by designation