Court Opinion

ID: 9602654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:58:14.328057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:05.394936
License: Public Domain

PANELLI, J.,
Dissenting.
I.
Although I would like to agree with the majority’s interpretation of Government Code section 13967, subdivision (c),1 I cannot. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion, because I believe that the majority ignores basic principles of statutory construction in order to reach a result it deems more desirable. While the statutory scheme implementing California’s constitutional right of victims of crimes to receive restitution may be incomplete, it is the responsibility of the Legislature to remedy defective legislation, not this court. It is unseemly for this court to achieve the desired result by disregarding express statutory language.
*1078II.
As the majority implicitly recognizes, article I, section 28, subdivision (b) is not a self-executing constitutional provision. (People v. Vega-Hernandez (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1084 [225 Cal.Rptr. 209].) In the absence of implementing legislation, this constitutional right remains inoperative. (Spinney v. Griffith (1893) 98 Cal. 149, 151-152 [32 P. 974] [mechanics’ liens]; Borchers Bros. v. Buckeye Incubator Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 234, 238 [28 Cal.Rptr. 697, 379 P.2d 1] [same]; cf. People v. Vega-Hernandez, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1099 [no support in Constitution for restitution order beyond the scope of the implementing statute].) In a situation where the implementing legislation does not match the breadth of the constitutional provision, our duty is limited to “declaring] the law as we find it.” (Spinney v. Griffith, supra, 98 Cal. at p. 154.) To accomplish this task, we apply the well-recognized rules of statutory construction to the implementing legislation.
In my view, the majority opinion founders on the express definition of “victim” set forth in the statutory scheme. Section 13967, subdivision (c) provides that the trial court sentencing a criminal defendant to prison shall, unless there are “clear and compelling” reasons not to do so, order the defendant to pay full restitution to a “victim,” who “has suffered economic loss as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct. . . .” The term “victim,” for purposes of the article of which section 13967 is a part,2 is in turn expressly defined in pertinent part as “[a] person who sustains injury or death as a direct result of a crime.” (§ 13960, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) The term “injury” is then defined to include “physical or emotional injury, or both.” (§ 13960, subd. (b.) Moreover, “crime” is specifically defined as a “crime or public offense as defined in Section 15 of the Penal Code which results in injury to a resident of this state . . . .” (§ 13960, subd. (c), italics added.) Thus, the statutes as written unambiguously prescribe that, absent physical or emotional injury, the victim of a crime is not a “victim” entitled to restitution for economic loss within the meaning of section 13960, subdivision (c). (Cf. People v. Miller (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 758, 762-763 [265 Cal.Rptr. 77] [Napa Special Investigations Bureau not within the definition of “victim” in § 13960, subd. (a) and thus not a victim entitled to restitution under § 13967, subd. (c)]; People v. Blankenship (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 992, 999-1000 [262 Cal.Rptr. 141] [insurance company not a “victim”]; People v. Williams (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1520, 1523-1524 [255 Cal.Rptr. 778] [same].)
I further observe that the Legislature has demonstrated that it is aware that the definition of “victim” in section 13960, subdivision (a) applies throughout article 1. In drafting section 13960.5, which is also found in article 1, the *1079Legislature specifically provided: “Notwithstanding Section 13960, ‘victim’ shall also include nonresidents of this state who suffer pecuniary losses as a direct result of criminal acts occurring within this state.” (Italics added.) Since the Legislature did not include a similar exception in section 13967, this court should not in the course of interpreting the statute effectively add such language. (Craven v. Crout (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 779, 783 [209 Cal.Rptr. 649] [“Where a statute referring to one subject contains a critical word or phrase, omission of that word or phrase from a similar statute on the same subject generally shows a different legislative intent.”].)
Resort to the statutory language is all that is required to decide the present case. As we have repeatedly recognized, “[t]he statutory language . . . is the best indicator of legislative intent.” (E.g., Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216].) As a corollary, “[i]t is bedrock law that if ‘the law-maker gives us an express definition, we must take it as we find it . . . .’ ” (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 804 [268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934], quoting Bird v. Dennison (1857) 7 Cal. 297, 307; see also People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 468 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697] [statutory definition is “ordinarily binding on the courts”]; Application of Monrovia Evening Post (1926) 199 Cal. 263, 269-270 [248 P. 1017] [statutory definition “binding on the courts”].) Contrary to the majority, I would eschew the use of extrinsic aids and follow these established rules of statutory interpretation to conclude that the express definition of “victim” provided by the Legislature is binding on this court.
The majority justifies the use of legislative history as an interpretive aid on the ground that to apply the statutory language as written would lead an absurd result, i.e., the conclusion that the Legislature “knowingly disregarded” the constitutional mandate of article I, section 28, subdivision (b) to enact legislation directing the trial courts to order defendants found guilty of criminal acts to pay restitution to all victims of crimes. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1072.) I disagree with the majority’s conclusion.
The maxim that a statute should be construed to avoid absurd results is not implicated in this case. The nature of a constitutional provision that is not self-executing undermines the majority’s reasoning. The fact that our state Constitution recognizes an expansive right to restitution does not mean that to date the Legislature has provided a statutory remedy coextensive with the constitutional mandate or that the statutes implementing a less expansive remedy are rendered absurd because they are not comprehensive. Moreover, we are not compelled to attribute the fact that comprehensive legislation has not been enacted to any desire by the Legislature to ignore or avoid its responsibilities. Failure to provide for direct restitution from imprisoned *1080defendants to their victims who have suffered solely economic damages may simply be the product of legislative oversight. (Cf. People v. Downing (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 667, 672 [220 Cal.Rptr. 225] [statutes failed to fully implement constitutional mandate to provide for restitution].) In my view, the majority is not warranted in invoking the maxim of “absurdity” to justify ignoring explicit statutory language, even if it does so to achieve what it perceives to be a superior result. Instead, the unambiguous statutory language chosen by the Legislature should be given effect.
Because the definition of “victim” provided by the Legislature is clear and unambiguous, there is simply no need to resort to extrinsic aids to interpretation as the majority does. (E.g., Delaney v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785, 804.) However, I observe that, even if a review of legislative history was appropriate, it would not alter my views. The legislative history is silent regarding how “victim” should be defined for purposes of section 13967, subdivision (c). As the majority correctly observes, the legislative history sheds no light on the decision to place the statutory language that became section 13967, subdivision (c) in article 1. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1074, fn. 6.) The Legislature, however, is presumed to have been aware of existing laws, including section 13960, which expressly provides that its definitions are applicable throughout article 1. (See In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890, fn. 11 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].)
Moreover, the fact that the addition of subdivision (c) to section 13967 was a response to the decision in People v. Downing, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 667, does not lead to a contrary conclusion. In Downing, the court held restitution could not be ordered when a defendant was sentenced to prison and commented that the restitution fund was of no assistance to victims of property offenses. While Downing was an impetus to the legislation considered here, the legislative history supports the conclusion that the Legislature was primarily concerned with remedying the anomaly that restitution orders could be entered against paroled defendants, but not imprisoned defendants. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen Bill No. 2404, 4 Stats. 1986 (Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 557; Sen. Rules Com., Floor Analysis, Sen. Bill No. 2404 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 21, 1986; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Bill Dig., Sen. Bill No. 2404 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Bill Dig., Sen. Bill No. 2404 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.); Letter from Attorney General to Hon. Bill Lockyer (Apr. 9, 1986).)
The Legislative history is inconclusive at best and should not defeat the clear definition of “victim” applicable throughout article 1, including section 13967, subdivision (c). (See Delaney v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 804.)
*1081III.
Because the Legislature has provided an express and unambiguous definition of “victim” in section 13960, subdivision (a) that is applicable to section 13967, subdivision (c), I conclude that, in order to be eligible to receive direct restitution for economic damages caused by an imprisoned criminal defendant, the victim of the crime must have suffered physical or emotional injury. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Mosk, J., concurred.

All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.

Both section 13960 and 13967 appear in title 2, division 3, part 4, chapter 5, article 1 of the Government Code (article 1).