Court Opinion

ID: 9470735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:14:40.425171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:05.028791
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that a wholly competent, nonindigent petitioner seeking section 2255 or similar post-conviction relief can intentionally delay attempts to secure counsel until the court orders an evidentiary hearing on his petition. Here attorney Petrella, who represented the Alfords so capably on this appeal, had been contacted by them at some unspecified time before the district court had ordered a hearing. Apparently, Petrel-la was willing to take the case, but it was decided not to actually retain him until the district court ruled whether to have an evi-dentiary hearing on the petition. When on June 1,1982 George Alford was finally able to tell Petrella that the trial court had indeed ordered such a hearing and had set it for June 9, Petrella needed a two-week continuance to get ready. Had he been retained when first contacted, entered his appearance, and done minimal preparation, he doubtless would have received notice of the setting by May 20 (when George Alford did) and would have been ready for trial on June 9.* Because Petrella’s retention was *426intentionally delayed, the Alfords have had to undergo the expense of his services on appeal, and the taxpayers have had to foot the bill for an unnecessary trial as well.
*424While the public has an interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice, and the trial court in the management and control of its own docket, these interests must be weighed in relation to the petitioner’s need for a fair hearing.9 In the present case, no articulated or presently advanced reason supports the denial of a brief continuance to enable the Alfords to be represented by their attorney at an evi-dentiary hearing instead of being forced to conduct the trial pro se as lay persons. On the other hand, many reasons weigh in favor of concluding that their request for a brief continuance was not unreasonable and was reasonably necessary to assure a fair trial of their contentions.
These include: (a) the Alfords’ ability to find, retain, and confer with counsel was considerably constrained by their incarceration (in separate facilities making concerted efforts and decisions more difficult)—this exacerbated by both being moved, pursuant to court ordered writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, preparatory to the hearing, a holiday weekend and poor prison mail service; (b) the period of time between the court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing and its scheduled date was brief (only three weeks); (c) the Alfords had no counsel at any time during the course of their petition; (d) the Alfords made efforts to obtain counsel as soon as they received notice of the court’s decision to hold a hearing; (e) the Alfords promptly advised the court of their need and desire for a continuance of the hearing date; (f) the continuance was unopposed by the United States Attorney; (g) the continuance was for a short two-week period, and (h) was for the legitimate purpose of permitting counsel adequate time to prepare; (i) no previous continuances had been sought or granted in the case; (j) the case was one in which a lawyer’s skills were likely to be crucial—the case was, though narrow, a difficult one to prove even if wholly meritorious (turning on the adverse examination of experienced criminal trial attorneys, and attempting to corroborate the Alfords’ allegations with the testimony of witnesses with little direct knowledge of the whole picture, in particular, the Greenville law-firm’s secretary, the relatives, the letter recipients, and the cellmates, to show by circumstantial evidence and inference that promises or predictions of leniency were made to the Alfords by the Greenville lawyers prior to the pleas which could have formed a part of the bargain); (k) there was no indication that the delay sought was in any sense a dilatory tactic; (l) although perhaps hypothetically possible, in the real world it was pragmatically impossible for the Alfords from behind prison walls to find and retain another attorney to prepare for the hearing scheduled for hearing and actually held on June 9th, after their timely prospectively retained lawyer was forced to withdraw on June 2 for lack of time to prepare adequately when the district court denied his unopposed request for a continuance for two weeks; and (m) *425the Alfords were not themselves attorneys, and were possessed of no particular training or abilities likely to render them able advocates in their own behalf.
*426It will not do to say that Petrella’s services might not have been needed, because the district court might have disposed of the petition without an evidentiary hearing. It is rare indeed that such petitions are granted without an evidentiary hearing, and if they are it will usually be because of the very sort of legal error that counsel is so much more likely than a lay person to be able to discover and articulate to the court. On the other hand, it is obvious that had there been a denial of the petition without an evidentiary hearing, Petrella would have been retained to appeal such a denial, just as he was retained for the present appeal.
The early retention of counsel for post-conviction relief proceedings should be encouraged. Counsel, we may assume, will advise the prospective petitioner of the futility of filing or pursuing petitions or grounds wholly lacking in merit, and at the same time will render it more likely that valid complaints are brought to the attention of the courts in a clear and understandable manner. The early presence of counsel will doubtless even cause an occasional petition to be properly granted without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing, and will likely prevent a greater number of others from being wrongfully denied without such a hearing. Moreover, even if there is to be an evidentiary hearing, the earlier counsel has come into the case, the less likelihood there is of wasted motion, delayed focusing on the real issues to be resolved, and unnecessary continuances.
The advantages of having counsel present in the early stages of post-conviction proceedings are also applicable to indigent petitioners, though counsel is usually not appointed for them until a hearing is ordered. The difference, of course, is that in such cases the cost of counsel is borne by the public, or the bar, and does not serve as an economic incentive to the petitioner to screen out frivolous petitions or claims. There is no reason to remove such incentive, or place such costs on the public, for nonin-digent petitioners. Further, the more sophisticated legal “screening,” which the indigent nonlawyer petitioner would in any event be unable to effectively do pro se, is done by the court system, law clerks, magistrates, and judges. But there is no reason for these officials to do this service, at public expense, for those who can afford counsel.
In sum, for those who can afford counsel, if they seriously believe that theirs is a case worth taking to federal court, then they should realize that it is necessarily also one worth retaining counsel for, to advise them whether or in what respects the case has arguable merit or chance of success and, if it does, to file it for them and pursue it to a proper conclusion.
On this single occasion, there is certainly no lasting significant harm in allowing the Alfords a third bite at the apple.** My main concern is with the general rule laid down by the majority, that a competent, financially able petitioner for post-conviction relief can intentionally delay retaining counsel until an evidentiary hearing on the petition is ordered. Though even this is not a rule of overriding significance, it never*427theless is, in my view, unfortunate as unnecessarily and unwisely adding to the long-term load of an already so heavily burdened federal judicial system.

 Petrella candidly admitted as much on oral argument. Wholly apart from any such admission, the record shows that George Alford’s petition (seven typed legal-size pages, well written and replete with citation and discussion of authorities) was filed in October 1981. George Alford, an obviously sophisticated, educated, and intelligent individual, had by that time presumably decided that he had a good-faith, serious claim for post-conviction relief which he wished to then pursue in court. Assuming (as the majority does, at least arguen-*426do) that Alford was then financially able to retain a lawyer for this purpose, as he had been able to do at his trial, was able to do on June 1, 1982, and was able to do on this appeal, there were over seven months during which this, and the lawyer’s preparation, could have been accomplished. I also observe that at the time of their arrest in March 1981, Mr. Alford was, in the words of the district court, in possession of “a large sum of money” and some marihuana, and Mrs. Alford had a pistol on her person; their car contained “a quantity of cocaine and a number of firearms.”

. “What is a reasonable delay necessarily depends on all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Some of the factors to be considered in the balance include: the length of the requested delay; whether other continuances have been requested and granted; the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; whether the defendant has other competent counsel prepared to try the case, including the consideration of whether other counsel was retained as lead or associate counsel; whether denying the continuance will result in an identifiable prejudice to defendant’s case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial nature; the complexity of the case; and other relevant factors which may appear in the context of any particular case.”
Linton v. Perini, supra, 656 F.2d at 210 (quoting United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C.Cir,1978)) (reversing convictions for failure to give short continuance for retained counsel’s adequate preparation for trial).

 In my opinion, the district court, which obviously gave a most careful, thorough, and fair consideration to all the Alfords’ claims, could have properly found that they had ample time and opportunity to retain counsel sufficiently in advance of the hearing so that a continuance should not have been necessary, and accordingly did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. As this is the only issue reached by the majority, there is no occasion for this dissent to discuss any other.