Court Opinion

ID: 9892117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 17:04:11.310367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:48.905001
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/20/23 P. v. Zamora CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B326059

     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. TA118561)
                   v.

EDWIN ZAMORA,

     Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.

     James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Herbert S. Tetef and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                        **********
       Defendant and appellant Edwin Zamora appeals from the
denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95). Former section 1170.95 was
renumbered and recodified as section 1172.6 with no change in
the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we refer to
former section 1170.95 only by its new designation (§ 1172.6).
       We affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Defendant, along with three accomplices, was convicted by
a jury of two counts of attempted murder arising from two
separate gang-related attacks, on one victim by stabbing, and on
the other by shooting. As to count 1 (the shooting incident), the
jury found true the allegation the attempted murder was
committed willfully, deliberately and with premeditation. Gang,
deadly weapon and great bodily injury allegations were also
found true. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of
43 years to life. (People v. Virto (Oct. 21, 2016, B243201)
[nonpub. opn.].)
       Defendant, who was 17 at the time the crimes were
committed, filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court
following this court’s initial decision in 2015 affirming his
conviction. The Supreme Court granted review and deferred
further consideration pending its resolution of a juvenile
sentencing issue in another case. After issuance of its decision in
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283–284, the Supreme
Court transferred the case to us with directions to vacate our
original decision and reconsider the cause in light of Franklin.
After doing so, we again affirmed defendant’s conviction, as well
as the convictions of his codefendants. (People v. Virto, supra,
B243201.)

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        Following the passage of Senate Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) and Senate Bill 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), defendant
filed, in propria persona, a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. Defendant alleged he was convicted of attempted
murder under a theory of felony murder, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or another theory in which malice
was imputed to him, and that he could no longer be convicted
under the amended murder statutes. He sought appointment of
counsel.
        The petition was assigned to the Honorable Laura Walton,
the judge who had presided over defendant’s 2012 trial. The
court found the petition was facially sufficient and appointed
defendant counsel. The court set an “order to show cause re:
prima facie basis” for March 11, 2022. The People filed
opposition, and defendant, through appointed counsel, filed a
reply. The People also filed a supplemental opposition with a
copy of the 2012 trial transcript of the court instructing the jury.
        After several continuances, the hearing was held on
November 22, 2022. Defendant waived his right to be personally
present and was represented by counsel. The court said it had
reviewed the parties’ briefs and entertained argument from
counsel. The court denied defendant’s petition and concluded no
evidentiary hearing was necessary because defendant was
convicted under a direct aiding and abetting theory that
remained valid under current law. The court explained that no
theory of imputed malice was presented to the jury which, based
on the jury instructions given, necessarily found defendant acted
with intent to kill.
        This appeal followed. We granted defendant’s motion to
augment the record with the appellate record from defendant’s
direct appeal in People v. Virto, supra, B243201.

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                            DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the trial court improperly failed to
conduct an evidentiary hearing after scheduling an order to show
cause and the People failed to present substantial evidence of his
guilt as a direct aider and abettor under current law. Defendant
also contends remand for an evidentiary hearing is warranted
because the jury instructions were ambiguous and allowed the
jury to convict him of attempted murder on a theory of implied or
imputed malice.
       We reject all of defendant’s contentions and conclude the
record of conviction conclusively establishes defendant’s
ineligibility for sentencing relief and therefore affirm the trial
court’s denial of his petition. (People v. Ervin (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101 [appellate court reviews de novo the
denial of a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage].)
1.     There Were No Procedural Irregularities.
       Defendant faults the trial court for declining to conduct an
evidentiary hearing “even after issuance of an OSC” and of
improperly relying on its own recollection of the trial instead of
requiring the People to present admissible evidence that
demonstrated his guilt as an aider and abettor under current
law.
       The court complied with the requirements of
section 1172.6, subdivision (c) which states, in relevant part, that
“[a]fter the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings,
the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to
relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.”
       Here, the court, after receiving defendant’s petition, found
it to be facially valid and appointed him counsel as he requested.

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The parties then submitted briefs and the court scheduled a
hearing to determine whether defendant had made a prima facie
showing. The minute order described the hearing as “an order to
show cause re: prima facie basis.”
       The November 22, 2022 hearing was held so the court could
assess defendant’s prima facie showing—it was not an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). At the hearing, the court acknowledged it had
reviewed the parties’ written briefs, which included the People’s
submission of the instructions to the jury during the 2012 trial.
The court acknowledged its role as the trial judge and explained
its recollection, consistent with the jury instructions, that the
jury had not been instructed on any theory of imputed malice and
the prosecutor had proceeded solely on a theory of direct aiding
and abetting. The court said the jury could only have found
defendant guilty of attempted murder by finding he had acted
with intent to kill. On that basis, the court denied defendant’s
request for an evidentiary hearing.
       The trial court’s role at the prima facie stage is limited.
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) Nevertheless, Lewis
held that the trial court’s review may include consideration of the
record of conviction from which a finding of ineligibility may be
made as a matter of law. “ ‘[I]f the record, including the court’s
own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in
the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.; accord, People
v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 [court may deny a
petition at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law].)

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2.      The Jury Instructions and Verdict Support the Trial
        Court’s Denial of Defendant’s Petition.
        The Legislature, in passing Senate Bill 1437, amended
Penal Code sections 188 and 189 “ ‘to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’ ” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708.)
        Defendant is not entitled to sentencing relief because the
jury instructions and verdict demonstrate that he was convicted
under a theory that remains valid under current law as amended
by Senate Bill 1437, i.e., direct aiding and abetting with the
intent to kill.
        Defendant concedes the People proceeded only on a theory
of direct aiding and abetting, and that the jury was not instructed
with felony murder, the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or any other theory that rests liability on imputed
malice. He says however, citing People v. Langi (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), that the jury instructions were
ambiguous and allowed the jury to convict him as an aider and
abettor without necessarily finding the requisite level of malice
now required under the amended murder statutes. The
contention is without merit.
        Langi has no applicability here. Langi concluded that “the
standard aiding-and-abetting instructions are ill suited to the
crime of second degree murder” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 982, italics added) and a killing by one who acted with a
conscious disregard for life. Langi said that if a trial court uses
the standard instruction without modifying it to fit the specifics
of second degree murder, “the instruction creates an ambiguity
under which the jury may find the defendant guilty of aiding and

                                 6
abetting second degree murder without finding that he personally
acted with malice.” (Ibid.) Langi says nothing about the
instruction being infirm for premeditated attempted murder.
       The jury here was told that it “must separately consider the
evidence as it applies to each defendant. You must decide each
charge for each defendant separately.” (CALCRIM No. 203.)
       Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted
premeditated murder. He and his three accomplices were found
guilty on both counts.
       The jury was instructed that to find defendant guilty of
attempted murder, “the People had to prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step toward
killing another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant intended
to kill that person.” (CALCRIM No. 600, italics added.)
        The jury was instructed with the principles of direct aiding
and abetting liability, including that: “To prove that the
defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that
crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator
committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or
during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to
aid and abet the perpetrator committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶]
4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” (CALCRIM No. 401.)
       The jury was told that “[s]omeone aids and abets a crime if
he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or
she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate,
promote, encourage or instigate the perpetrators’ commission of
that crime.” (CALCRIM No. 401.)
       CALCRIM No. 601 told the jury that if they found
defendant guilty of attempted murder, then it would have to

                                 7
decide the additional allegation of whether the attempted murder
was premeditated. The instruction explains, in relevant part,
that the “defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill when he
acted. The defendant deliberated if he carefully weighed the
considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant premeditated if he
decided to kill before acting.” (Ibid.) The premeditation
allegation was found true as to count 1.
       The jury instructions and verdict unequivocally
demonstrate defendant was found guilty of participating in both
attempted murders with the intent to kill and not on any theory
of implied or imputed malice. Defendant is therefore ineligible,
as a matter of law, for sentencing relief under section 1172.6 and
the trial court did not err in so finding and declining to conduct
an evidentiary hearing.
       To the extent defendant appears to reargue there was
insufficient evidence presented at his 2012 trial to establish his
guilt as an aider and abettor (an issue already rejected in
defendant’s direct appeal), that issue is not before us.
                           DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant and appellant Edwin
Zamora’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                              GRIMES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                  STRATTON, P. J.         WILEY, J.

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