Court Opinion

ID: 9709798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:55:00.01128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:51.591897
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in parí). I agree with much of the majority’s analysis and expressly concur with parts I, n, in, iv, v, and vn. However, I would hold that Judge Hocking is not guilty of any judicial misconduct and would dismiss this case.
I agree with the majority that Judge Hocking is not guilty of any judicial misconduct with respect to the People v Hensick, Livingston Circuit Court, File No. 91-6537-FC, sentencing proceeding. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion with respect to Judge Hocking’s conduct during the McPherson v McPherson, Eaton Circuit Court, File No. 82-409-DM, proceeding. After listening to the audiotape of the hear*28ing, it becomes clear from the exchange with Ms. Sharp that Judge Hocking had read her motion before taking the bench. As the majority notes, “Judge Hocking quickly informed Ms. Sharp that he perceived the motion before the court as simply a- disguised second motion for rehearing.” Ante at 20. I disagree with the majority’s interpretation that Judge Hocking “instigated a confrontational exchange with Ms. Sharp . . . .” Id. at 23. Instead of answering Judge Hocking’s question about what was “new” in this motion, Ms. Sharp continued to argue the merits. It was after her refusal to answer his question by continuing to argue the merits that Judge Hocking denied her motion. At that point, I find that Ms. Sharp’s behavior became “shockingly” unprofessional.
Ideally, a judge should not instigate or engage in confrontational behavior or react to such behavior — no matter how provoked. Yet, every attorney who regularly appears before the judges of our state — judges who are forced to operate with limited resources and under great pressure from the docket — will immediately recognize that outbursts like Judge Hocking’s are far from infrequent. Most judges wrestle with their self-control, and all hear motions they are predisposed against and antagonistic toward. I join the majority in wishing we could populate our courtrooms with judges devoid of temper and full of angelic patience. But if such perfect creatures exist, their planetary origin is truly unknown.
This practical observation means the Court either says today what it does not mean, or will not do tomorrow what it says today. Inevitably, the interpretation of today’s new standard pressed on Judge Hocking will never be applied so stringently again. If it were, our docket would be clogged with similar cases. Judge Hocking will have been censured under a standard designed uniquely for him, a result so contrary to our role as judges that perhaps this holding itself is prejudi*29cial to the administration of justice, although not clearly so.
Despite our lofty expectations, some judges from time to time will stumble. From the record before me, I see evidence that Judge Hocking lost his temper only once at one attorney who was herself discourteous and contemptuous. If Judge Hocking regularly behaved this way, routinely raising his voice at advocates and closing his mind to their arguments, the administration of justice would indeed be in jeopardy. This isolated incident, although cause for concern, poses no such threat. The majority properly dismisses the allegation of misconduct during the Hensick proceedings because of its isolated nature. I would urge the same reasoning be applied to place the incident with Ms. Sharp in its proper perspective.
Judges play a central role in our system of justice and therefore are appropriately held to exceptionally high standards of conduct. I would emphasize that Judge HocMng’s behavior should not be excused. Judges should struggle to maintain their temperament and view the cases before them unobscured by passion. When violations of this standard are drastic or repeated, we should not hesitate to censure them. But, we do the judiciary a disservice when we condemn human failings as judicial misconduct.
An isolated incident of rudeness should be identified, privately reprimanded, and hopefully prevented from recurring. Such an incident is not, however, “clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice,” MCR 9.205(C)(4), and should not be the subject of any suspension from the state’s highest court.
Therefore, I would reject the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commission.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.