Court Opinion

ID: 9778858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:23:42.167924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:13.080260
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin, joined by Justice Brewster,
dissenting.
I find myself unable to agree with the majority opinion that the deed in question furnishes a key, or data, whereby the land sought to be conveyed may be identified.
The majority opinion says "there is no Denver Resurvey No. 2,” and in another portion of the opinion it is stated that-“upon an examination of the records it is disclosed that there is no Denver Resurvey No. 2.” There is only one “Denver Resurvey” found in the records. Therefore, the designation of a Denver Resurvey “No. 2” is false. To determine in what survey the land is located we must eliminate from the description the word and figure “No. 2.” It is only by thus eliminating the false description “No. 2” that we can ever put the property in the existing “Denver Resurvey.” With this false description eliminated, we find our description placing the land in “Block One Hundred Seventy-five (175, in Denver Resurvey.” There is a block “175” in the Denver Resurvey, but the grantor in this instrument did not own lots 10, 11 and 12 therein; therefore, this deed could convey no title to such lots.
It is argued in the majority opinion that by “Block 175, Den*545ver Resurvey” is meant Block 175 of the original townsite of Galveston, Texas. The answer is that the only key, or data, given by the deed to locate Block 175 is that such block is located in the Denver Resurvey. The instrument nowhere says that by “Block 175” is meant only a block by such number in the original townsite of Galveston. According to the description in the deed, it could as well be contended that the “Block 175” referred to any or all additions or subdivisions in the town of Galveston where in a block “No. 175” is found as that the deed refers only to the original townsite for the location of this particular block. This construction would leave to the whim of the particular party seeking to locate the land the designation of the addition in which “Block 175” can be located. The deed only refers to “Block 175 Denver Resurvey” and there is not one word, sign, key, data, or means given in the deed whereby “Block 175” can be located at any place except in Denver Resurvey. To put such block at any other place is the pure figment of imagination and speculation of every person reading the deed. One person would put Block 175 in one addition; another person in a second addition and a third person in a third and entitrely different addition, and each would have as much logic to support his location as will support the location in the original townsite of Galveston, Texas. The deed just does not contain any key whereby the original addition can be selected for the location, over every other addition to the City of Galveston save the Denver Resurvey. To locate the lots in “Block 175 Denver Resurvey” is fatal to petitioners’ contention. If “No. 2” should be transposed to read “In No. 2 Denver Resurvey” or a comma supplied so as to read “Denver Resurvey, No. 2,” we are still confronted with the further designation in the description “Block 175.” So that to distinguish it then from Block 175 in Denver Resurvey, we must interpolate or add to the description the word “original,” all of which the authorities cited above seem to forbid.
The rule to be applied in cases where a part of a description is false is set out in very plain words in the case of Reserve Petroleum Co. v. Harp, 1950, 148 Texas 448, 226 S.W. 2d 839, 841, as follows:
“The case is one for the application of the rule that the part of a description that is false will be disregarded or rejected as surplusage and the deed will be sustained as valid if, after the rejection of what is false, the remaining words of the description are sufficient to identify the land with certainty. Arambula v. Sullivan, 80 Texas 615, 619-620, 16 S.W. 436; Cartwright v. Trueblood, 90 Texas 535, 538-539, 39 S.W. 930; Maupin v. *546Chaney, 139 Texas 426, 431, 163 S.W. 2d 380; Vaughn v. Continental Royalty Company, 5 Cir., 116 F. 2d 72. * * *”
In the case at bar I have demonstrated that when the false description “No. 2” is eliminated, the description left does not identify the land sued for.
It has often been said that the contract must “furnish within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty.” Wilson v. Fisher, 114 Texas 53, 188 S.W. 2d 150, 152; Broaddus v. Grout, 152 Texas 398, 258 S.W. 2d 308; Tidwell v. Cheshier, 153 Texas 194, 265 S.W. 2d 568; Small v. Morris, 152 Texas 192, 255 S.W. 2d 174; Stekoll Petroleum Co. v. Hamilton, 152 Texas 182, 255 S.W. 2d 187. This description does not furnish any key or reference to any other writing whereby the land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty. The property described by the deed simply does not exist.
In Dahlberg v. Holden, 150 Texas 179, 238 S.W. 2d 699, we quoted with approval the doctrine expressed in 13 C. J., Contracts, Section 496, p. 535; 17 C. J. S., Contracts, See. 308. “While the courts should avoid, if possible, holding a contract void on the ground of uncertainty, they have no right to interpolate or to eliminate terms of material legal consequence in order to uphold it. * * *” The language must be construed as written. The Court ha& no right to alter it by interpolation or substitution.
I agree with the majority view of the Court of Civil Appeals that the description is insufficient under the Statute of Frauds, and therefore I would affirm the judgment of that Court.
Opinion delivered June 1, 1955.
Rehearing overruled July 6, 1955.