Court Opinion

ID: 9691260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:19:27.569654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:07.952231
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice, specially
concurring.
I agree that NDCC § 28-01.1-02 is unconstitutional. My review of the legislative history of § 28-01.1-02 leads me to conclude there is no close correspondence between the statute’s classification and the Legislature’s goals.
Though close correspondence may be “ill-defined,” as Justice Stewart noted in another case on another subject, I know it when I see it. Here, after searching the record I simply do not see it.
Our statute was lifted from Utah (with the changes noted by Chief Justice Erick-stad) before the Utah statute was held unconstitutional by that State’s Supreme Court. On Senator Reiten’s motion, the six-year period of repose contained in Utah’s statute was enlarged in ours to ten years, clearly because of “testimony” that any defect in a product would surface within eight to ten years of its manufacture. *329Minutes, North Dakota Legislative Council, Committee on Products Liability, October 6, 1978, p. 4. Were we applying a rational basis standard of review I would uphold the constitutionality of the statute even though the ten-year period applies indiscriminately to products with useful lives far exceeding ten years. Deference to the Legislature’s reliance on the eight-to-ten-year timeline for defects to surface, would, in my view, sustain the statute.
However, under the intermediate level of scrutiny (which I agree applies to Hanson’s important substantive right), we look “closely” at the correspondence between the statutory classification and legislative goals. Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979). To me that means we exercise independent judgment in evaluating the closeness of the correspondence. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D.1978). I believe, under the heightened scrutiny we employ to evaluate the necessary correspondence, we approach the legislative classification “skeptically, with judgment suspended,” City of Cleburne, supra 105 S.Ct. at 3271, notwithstanding language to the contrary in Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511, 535 (N.D.1982), which I believe actually reflects a traditional rational basis analysis.
Unfortunately, the Legislative Council directed its concern over the constitutionality of NDCC § 28-01.1-02 only to due process considerations. Minutes, N.D.Leg.Council Comm, on Products Liability, January 30, 1978, p. 3. No thought was given to equal protection. Yet, it is clear that the Legislature cannot order action violative of equal protection and it cannot defer to the wishes of some fraction of the body politic if as a consequence of such deference there is a denial of equal protection.
While the goals of the Legislature in enacting this statute were to control rising product liability insurance rates, the interim committee was warned by the State Insurance Commissioner (the most, and probably the only, disinterested person giving testimony) that this bill would not alleviate the problem of increasing premiums because of the lack of information and the resultant uncertainty about insurance industry rate-making methods.
No one, at least no one testifying before the interim legislative committee working on NDCC § 28-01.1-02, was able to present data that established a close correspondence between eliminating claims for relief of persons injured by products after ten years from sale, and controlling the rising premiums for products liability insurance. There was little available data to assess the nature of the problem of rising premiums nationally or in North Dakota. It was suggested by the Insurance Department that if a problem existed in North Dakota, its resolution should be deferred until more information was available at the state level.
If we do not understand the causes of a problem, even conceding that a problem exists, I do not believe that legislation, which destroys the important substantive rights of a class of persons whose misfortune it was to be injured by a product over ten years old satisfies equal protection. There can be no close correspondence between a statutory classification such as we have here and a legislative objective when that objective is grounded on guesswork, frustration, and little more than a wing and a prayer.1 Indeed, the Insurance Department further advised that even if there were knowledge and understanding of why costs were rising, the statute would not alleviate high premiums for North Dakota insureds because:
“Product liability rates are based on countrywide experience (because of statistical credibility), not North Dakota ex*330perience. Even if North Dakota experience were improved by the bill, North Dakota insureds would not see a reduction or tempering in increases in rates. Even if North Dakota experience were improved, that part of a North Dakota insured’s claim experience which is based on suits outside of the state would not be affected by H.B. 1075, and thus would provide no basis for premium reduction.
“If every state had legislation similar to North Dakota’s, premiums would not necessarily be substantially reduced overall. The bill addresses, or attempts to address, only the frequency component of rising claim costs, not the severity component of rising claim costs....” Minutes on H.B. 1075, Senate Industry, Business & Labor Committee (46th Leg. Assembly 1979).
The Legislature recognized it was working in the dark. At the same session it enacted H.B. 1075, it also enacted legislation requiring insurance companies to provide information relevant to rate-making procedures. H.B. 1076 (S.L.1979, ch. 340.) Presumably, that information will provide at least some of the data necessary for reasoned legislation. The Legislature jumped the gun by enacting NDCC § 28-01.1-02 to address a problem before uncovering the sources of that problem. I find no close correspondence justifying the statute’s departure from equal treatment. Nor does the proposition that a Legislature need not cure all ills with one fell swoop, sustain the statute. See Patch v. Sebelius, supra. The problem here is not the Legislature’s attempt to cure one segment of a perceived problem, it is the Legislature’s failure to identify the causes of that problem. The attenuated relationship between the classification and the remedial goal does not, in my view, transcend the harm to the disadvantaged members of the class.
I therefore conclude NDCC § 28-01.1-02(1) violates Art. I, § 21, N.D. Const.
VANDE WALLE, J., concurs.

. Unsuccessful effort was made to elicit information from a member of the Interagency Task Force who could not appear as scheduled. No rescheduling was effected. Minutes, N.D. Leg. Council Comm, on Products Liability, June 2, 1978, p. 2.