Court Opinion

ID: 9579804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:46.579706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:46.875753
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. A decision in this case which fails, as I believe the majority does, to clearly understand and conform to the true meaning and purpose of the rule against perpetuities (Code Ann. § 85-707 (a)) is contrary to law. As recently as 1954 in Landrum v. National City Bank of Rome, 210 Ga. 316, 319 (80 SE2d 300), this court wdthout a dissent said: “The purpose of the rule is to prevent the tying up of property for an indefinite period and thus destroying its salability. An interest such as is created under the will here in question, even though it is vested in a class that is subject to open so as to let in persons born during the existence of the preceding estate, just as effectively, ties up property and prevents it being freely sold as if the interests created were contingent. This is true because the estate can not be sold so as to bar the interests of the unborn members of the class. Also, in a case such as the instant one, the possibility is just as great that the interest created will not vest without being subject to being diminished within the time allowed by the rule against perpetuities, and thus tie up property and prevent its being freely sold for a period longer than is deemed desirable by the law as if the interest created were contingent.” (Italics added). We thought the foregoing was sound when we approved it. No reason has been advanced with support by controlling law why it is not still sound. It simply means that any arrangement, irrespective of its form or name whereby property is tied up for *147a period that is or can be longer than that stated in Code Ann. § 85-707(a) is violative of the rule and is void. When thus recognized for its true meaning it is obvious that a judicial or legal fiction of “vesting subject to divesting” in no respect frees an arrangement whereby the ultimate vesting with full power to alienate is or can be postponed for a longer time than the rule allows from being violative of the rule and void.
The will here involved provides that the estate be held, managed, invested, reinvested, and pledged as security by the trustees until the death of testator’s wife and son, and the death or remarriage of any widow the son might have surviving, at which time, the estate to be distributed. There is positively no excuse for failing to see that this encompasses a period of time forbidden by Code Ann. § 85-707(a). Then follow directions as to who may take if others do not, depending upon who is in life at the remote time fixed for distribution. How could the trustee distribute until the distributee is known? How can that be known until the time arrives for such? How could the trustees distribute if the property had vested in others? I agree with counsel that Burton v. Patton, 162 Ga. 610 (134 SE 603), and Dismukes v. Bagley, 165 Ga. 665 (141 SE 902), demand a ruling here that there was no vesting that would avoid the rule against perpetuities, and consequently that rule is offended, and the provision so offending is void.
If resort is had to texts for a full explanation of the rule we believe the soundest expressions to be found in such works is found in Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (4th Ed.), pp. 97, 99, 200, which is cited in the motion for a rehearing. I regret to see my associates ignore this citation without attempting to explain why they reject it.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent.