Court Opinion

ID: 9928767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:04:14.882102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:52.568715
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 220151-U
           NOTICE                                                                        NOTICE
     Decision filed 01/31/24. The
  text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0151                     This order was filed under
  changed or corrected prior to                                                Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
  the filing of a Petition for                                                 not precedent except in the
  Rehearing or the disposition
                                                IN THE                         limited circumstances allowed
  of the same.                                                                 under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Vermilion County.
                                          )
v.                                        )     No. 07-CF-654
                                          )
JEROME JOHNSON,                           )     Honorable
                                          )     Derek J. Girton,
      Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

           JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Vaughan and Justice Barberis concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1         Held: We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the defendant’s second
                 amended postconviction petition where postconviction counsel rendered
                 reasonable assistance of counsel in amending the defendant’s postconviction
                 petition.

¶2         On October 15, 2019, the defendant, Jerome Johnson, filed a pro se petition for relief

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). The

trial court appointed counsel to represent the defendant, and postconviction counsel filed a first

and second amended postconviction petition on the defendant’s behalf. The defendant’s second

amended postconviction petition (second petition) alleged, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial

and appellate counsel.

                                                   1
¶3     The State filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s second petition on March 7, 2022. On

March 11, 2022, the trial court granted the State’s motion and dismissed the defendant’s second

petition at the second stage of the postconviction proceedings. The defendant now appeals the

judgment of the trial court dismissing his second petition raising the sole issue of whether

postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance of counsel. For the following reasons,

we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶4                                    I. BACKGROUND

¶5     On May 15, 2008, the defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual abuse in

violation of section 12-16(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-16(b) (West

2006)), one count of criminal sexual assault in violation of section 12-13(a)(3) of the Code (id.

§ 13(a)(3)), and two counts of indecent solicitation of a child in violation of section 11-6(a) of the

Code (id. § 11-6(a)). At sentencing, the trial court merged the aggravated criminal sexual abuse

conviction into the defendant’s conviction for criminal sexual assault and sentenced the defendant

to consecutive incarceration terms of 30 years for the criminal sexual assault and 5 years each for

the two indecent solicitation of a child convictions. The defendant’s convictions and sentence were

affirmed on appeal, but the matter was remanded for an amended sentencing judgment to reflect

the defendant’s indecent solicitation of a child convictions as Class 3 felonies, rather than Class 2

felonies. People v. Johnson, 387 Ill. App. 3d 1196 (2009) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶6     Subsequent to the defendant’s direct appeal, this matter has undergone three additional

appeals such that we find it efficient to provide the following timeline of the events in this matter:

               March 15, 2013—the defendant filed a pro se petition pursuant to section 2-1401
       of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). On March 18, 2013, the
       defendant filed an amended section 2-1401 petition. The defendant’s amended section 2-

                                                  2
1401 petition alleged, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The State filed a
motion to dismiss the defendant’s amended section 2-1401 petition on July 8, 2014.

        July 15, 2014—the trial court dismissed the defendant’s amended section 2-1401
petition finding that the State had not been properly served; that the initial petition was
untimely; that the claims raised were not supported by the record; that the issues contained
in the amended petition should have been raised on direct appeal; and, that the defendant’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel failed to meet the threshold requirement of
prejudice. The defendant appealed.

         August 11, 2016—the appellate court found that the defendant had been denied a
meaningful opportunity to respond to the State’s motion to dismiss, thus violating the
defendant’s due process rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. People v.
Johnson, 2016 IL App (4th) 140710, ¶¶ 22-25. On remand, the defendant was given 14
days to file a response to the State’s motion to dismiss; however, the defendant failed to
file a response within that time.

         November 29, 2016—the defendant filed a motion to recharacterize his amended
section 2-1401 petition into a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to the Act. On
April 10, 2017, the trial court stated that the matter was currently on appeal and, therefore,
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to address the defendant’s motion to recharacterize his
amended section 2-1401 petition. On May 4, 2017, the defendant sent correspondence to
the trial court stating that the matter was not currently on appeal.

         May 17, 2017—the trial court, by docket entry, stated that it had considered the
defendant’s motion to recharacterize his amended section 2-1401 petition as a concession
to the State’s motion to dismiss the defendant’s amended section 2-1401 petition, and
dismissed the defendant’s amended section 2-1401 petition. The trial court then granted
the State 30 days to file a response to the defendant’s motion to recharacterize his amended
section 2-1401 petition to a petition for postconviction relief. On June 16, 2017, the State
filed its response.

         July 20, 2017—the trial court indicated that it had reviewed the original amended
section 2-1401 petition filed on March 18, 2013, and “viewing that pleading as a Petition
for Post conviction Relief the court finds the claims frivolous. In addition the court finds
the claims were not raised in a reasonable time as required by 725 ILCS 122/5-1.” As such,
the trial court denied the defendant’s request to recharacterize his amended section 2-1401
petition as a postconviction petition. The defendant appealed.

        January 3, 2018—the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a late postconviction
petition. The defendant’s motion for leave to file a late postconviction petition argued that
his failure to file a postconviction petition in a timely manner was not due to his own
culpable negligence, but was due to mental health issues, that the defendant had the
equivalent of a sixth-grade education, and that the prison system lost his legal property
which resulted in “years-long mission” to obtain a second copy of this trial record and trial
transcript.

                                          3
               January 11, 2018—the trial court stated that it lacked jurisdiction to address the
       defendant’s motion for leave to file a late postconviction petition as the matter was
       currently on appeal.

                 July 19, 2019—the appellate court dismissed the defendant’s appeal of the trial
       court’s judgment denying the defendant’s motion to recharacterize his amended section 2-
       1401 as a postconviction petition. The appellate court found that it lacked jurisdiction to
       hear the appeal since a trial court’s decision not to recharacterize a pro se pleading as a
       postconviction petition was not, itself, a final, appealable order. People v. Johnson, 2019
       IL App (4th) 170635-U, ¶ 19. The appellate court stated that “[w]ith such a decision, the
       case either proceeds on the pro se petition as it is filed or, as in this case, defendant can
       still file an initial postconviction petition.” Id.

               October 15, 2019—the defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant
       to the Act.

               October 22, 2019—the trial court, by docket entry, dismissed the defendant’s
       petition for postconviction relief stating that it lacked jurisdiction to address the
       defendant’s postconviction petition since the issues raised in the petition were currently on
       appeal. The defendant appealed.

               May 14, 2020—the appellate court found that the trial court’s basis for dismissing
       the defendant’s postconviction petition was improper, reversed the trial court’s judgment,
       and remanded for further stage-two proceedings. People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (4th)
       190852-U, ¶¶ 23, 24.

¶7     The proceedings on remand are the basis for the appeal at bar. As such, we return to the

defendant’s pro se petition for relief pursuant to the Act (pro se petition) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

(West 2018)), filed on October 15, 2019. The defendant’s pro se petition alleged that the trial court

erred when it denied a continuance during trial for the purpose of obtaining new counsel after the

defendant had informed the trial court that he was receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. The

defendant’s pro se petition also alleged that the trial court erred in failing to make any inquiry

regarding the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶8     The defendant’s pro se petition went on to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel

because trial counsel “failed to subject the state[’]s case to any meaningful adversarial testing,”

and “simply went through the motions.” Specifically, the defendant’s pro se petition alleged that

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the defendant had informed his trial counsel of two potential witnesses and that his trial counsel

had failed to contact the witnesses.

¶9      On May 14, 2020, the trial court appointed counsel to represent the defendant. On March

4, 2022, postconviction counsel filed a first amended petition for postconviction relief (first

amended petition) on behalf of the defendant. The first amended petition alleged that the

defendant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in that trial counsel: (1) failed

to conduct any meaningful trial preparation and only met with the defendant one time prior to trial;

(2) failed to show or discuss discovery with the defendant; (3) failed to contact two potential

witnesses; (4) waived formal reading of the charges at the preliminary hearing, but failed to explain

the charges and penalties to the defendant; and, (5) never discussed a plea agreement which the

defendant believes was offered by the State. The defendant’s first amended petition also alleged

that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a Krankel 1 hearing when the defendant stated during

the trial that “I don’t want him as my attorney, your Honor. I got a feeling I’m not being represented

properly.” Along with the first amended petition, postconviction counsel filed a certificate of

compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). The State filed a motion

to dismiss the defendant’s amended petition2 on March 7, 2022.

¶ 10    The defendant filed a motion for leave to file a second petition on March 9, 2022. The

defendant’s second petition repeated the allegations set forth in the first amended petition and

added an allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. According to the defendant’s

second petition, appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to allege ineffective assistance of trial

        1
        Inquiries regarding a defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel held pursuant
to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), are commonly referred to as Krankel hearings.
        2
       The State incorrectly titled its motion to dismiss as a motion to dismiss the defendant’s second
amended petition, and later acknowledged the error, but did not amend the motion to correct the error.

                                                   5
counsel as an issue within the defendant’s direct appeal of his convictions and sentence. Attached

to the defendant’s second petition was a portion of the trial court’s preliminary hearing transcript,

the affidavit of the defendant, and a portion of the defendant’s trial transcript.

¶ 11    The State filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s second petition on March 11, 2022, and

the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss the same day. At the hearing,

the State did not object to the filing of the second petition, and the trial court allowed “the filing

of the second petition today.”3 The trial court also noted that the State had filed a motion to dismiss

the second petition, instanter, that incorporated “most of the argument from their motion [to

dismiss] that was filed on March 7th.”

¶ 12    The trial court heard arguments from both parties, and after arguments, in open court, the

trial court held that the defendant’s issues regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the

trial judge’s failure to conduct a Krankel hearing were waived for not having been raised on direct

appeal. The trial court went on to state as follows:

                “But, again, all those issues are then reraised in Count III regarding ineffective

        assistance of Appellate counsel.

                I’d also I guess sort of point out that much of the allegations are on a failure to

        communicate with defense counsel who I will point out at this time has passed away and

        is unable at any point to refute whether or not these conversations took place or not, but for

        the purpose of today’s hearing anyway we’re going to assume the allegations made by [the

        defendant] are true and correct.”

        3
         The defendant’s second petition, attached to his motion for leave to file a second amended petition,
and the defendant’s affidavit contained as an exhibit to the second petition were not signed by the defendant.
At the hearing, postconviction counsel indicated that, “we couldn’t get it back and forth in time,” but that
the defendant had signed both and that postconviction counsel would file the executed petition and affidavit.
However, the record does not contain any subsequent filing of the second petition nor an executed copy of
the defendant’s affidavit in support of the second petition.
                                                      6
¶ 13    The trial court then went on to address each of the allegations of ineffective assistance of

counsel contained in the defendant’s second petition under the two-prong test set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The trial court found that, even when taking the

defendant’s allegations as true and correct, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the outcome

of the trial would have been different if trial counsel had consulted with the defendant more or had

reviewed the discovery with the defendant. With regard to trial counsel’s failure to contact the two

potential witnesses, the trial court noted that there were no affidavits attached to the second petition

indicating what the witnesses would have testified to or how their testimony would have

contradicted the complaining witnesses. As such, the trial court stated that there was no means to

determine whether the potential witnesses’ testimony may have altered the outcome of the trial.

¶ 14    The trial court went on to state that there was nothing attached to the second petition, or

contained in the record, that would indicate that a plea offer was made by the State other than the

defendant’s belief that an offer may have been made. Since there was no proof of a plea offer, the

trial court stated that it could not then find that such an offer would have changed the outcome of

the defendant’s case.

¶ 15    The trial court next addressed the Krankel issue, stating that the trial judge did not err in

failing to conduct a Krankel hearing during the defendant’s trial since the trial had to be completed

in order to allege ineffective assistance of counsel. Based on the above findings, the trial court

stated as follows:

                “I don’t find that based on what is before the Court there is any evidence that would

        meet the second prong of the Strickland test. Therefore, I will grant the State’s Motion to

        Dismiss.”

                                                   7
¶ 16   The defendant now appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing his second petition.

On appeal, the defendant argues that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance of

counsel when he failed to adequately amend the defendant’s pro se petition and attach evidentiary

support regarding the two potential witnesses. The defendant also argues that postconviction

counsel rendered unreasonable assistance of counsel when he failed to amend the second petition

to address culpable negligence.

¶ 17                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18   The Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) provides a remedy to a criminal defendant

who’s federal or state constitutional rights were substantially violated in his or her original trial or

sentencing hearing. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 455 (2002). A postconviction

proceeding is not an appeal from an underlying judgment, but rather a collateral attack on the

judgment. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 328 (2009). As a collateral proceeding, a postconviction

proceeding allows inquiry only into constitutional issues that were not and could not have been

adjudicated in an appeal of the underlying judgment. Id.

¶ 19   The Act provides a three-stage process for the adjudication of postconviction petitions.

People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23. At the first stage, the trial court independently assesses

the defendant’s petition, and if the court determines that the petition is “frivolous” or “patently

without merit,” the court can summarily dismiss it. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018); People

v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001). To survive the first stage, “a petition need only present

the gist of a constitutional claim.” People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996).

¶ 20   If a petition is not dismissed at the first stage, it advances to the second stage where an

indigent petitioner can obtain appointed counsel and the State can move to dismiss it. 725 ILCS

5/122-2.1(b), 122-4, 122-5 (West 2018); Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245-46. At the second stage, the

                                                   8
trial court is “foreclosed from engaging in any fact-finding because all well-pleaded facts not

rebutted by the record are to be taken as true.” People v. Phyfiher, 361 Ill. App. 3d 881, 884 (2005).

At the second stage, if the defendant makes a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the

petition advances to the third stage where the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS

5/122-6 (West 2018); Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246.

¶ 21   In this matter, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the

defendant’s second petition at the second stage. We review de novo a trial court’s dismissal of a

postconviction petition at the second stage. People v. Velasco, 2018 IL App (1st) 161683, ¶ 91.

¶ 22   As stated above, counsel may be appointed at the second stage where a defendant is

indigent (725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2018)), and the right to counsel in postconviction proceedings

is derived from statute rather than the Constitution. People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364 (1990).

Thus, postconviction petitioners have no constitutional right to counsel, effective or otherwise, and

are guaranteed only the level of assistance which the statute provides. People v. Custer, 2019 IL

123339, ¶ 30. That level of assistance has been defined by our supreme court to mean a

“reasonable” level of assistance and a “reasonable” standard is significantly lower than the one

mandated at trial by our state and federal constitutions. Id. One aspect of “reasonable” assistance

is compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule (eff. July 1, 2017). People v. Carter, 223 Ill. App.

3d 957, 961 (1992).

¶ 23   Rule 651(c) imposes three duties on appointed postconviction counsel. People v. Perkins,

229 Ill. 2d 34, 42 (2007). Pursuant to the rule, postconviction counsel must show that he or she

(1) consulted with the petitioner to ascertain his or her contentions of constitutional deprivations,

(2) examined the record of the trial proceedings, and (3) made any amendments to the filed pro se

petition necessary to adequately present the petitioner’s contentions. Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July

                                                  9
1, 2017). The purpose of the rule is to ensure that postconviction counsel shapes the defendant’s

claims into a proper legal form and presents them to the court. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 44.

¶ 24    There are two ways in which appointed counsel may comply with Rule 651(c). Counsel

may file a certificate indicating that the requirements of the rule were complied with or the record

as a whole may demonstrate that counsel complied with the provisions of Rule 651(c). People v.

Richmond, 188 Ill. 2d 376, 380 (1999). Substantial compliance with Rule 651(c) is sufficient.

People v. Richardson, 382 Ill. App. 3d 248, 257 (2008).

¶ 25    A rebuttable presumption that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance exists

where the certificate has been filed. People v. Profit, 2012 IL (1st) 101307, ¶ 19. The defendant

bears the burden to overcome this presumption by demonstrating that his or her counsel failed to

substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 651(c). Id. Where postconviction counsel has

failed to fulfill the duties required of Rule 651(c), our supreme court has held that remand is

required regardless of whether the claims raised in the petition had merit. People v. Suarez, 224

Ill. 2d 37, 47 (2007).

¶ 26    In the present case, the defendant’s postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate

on March 4, 2022. Thus, there is a rebuttable presumption that postconviction counsel provided

reasonable assistance and it is the defendant’s burden to overcome this presumption.

¶ 27    The defendant argues that he has rebutted the presumption of substantial compliance with

Rule 651(c) because the record demonstrates that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable

assistance by failing to shape the defendant’s claims into proper legal form, by failing to provide

evidentiary support on the defendant’s claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel

concerning the two witnesses, and by failing to argue that the defendant was not culpably negligent

for filing a late petition.

                                                10
¶ 28   According to the defendant’s argument, postconviction counsel pleaded non-specific,

conclusory allegations regarding the two witnesses, and failed to explain the significance of their

testimony or how their testimony was material to the defendant’s defense. The defendant also

argues that postconviction counsel failed to include affidavits from the two witnesses or explain

why the affidavits were not included as required by section 122-2 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-2

(West 2018). The defendant argues that the allegations regarding the witnesses may have been

enough to state the gist of constitutional claim, but were insufficient to make a substantial showing

as required at second-stage proceedings as evidenced by the trial court’s noting that “there’s no

affidavits attached telling us what their testimony would have been and *** there’s no way to

know that, in fact, having called those individuals may have changed the outcome of the case.”

¶ 29   As previously stated, the purpose of Rule 651(c) is to ensure that postconviction counsel

shapes the defendant’s claims into proper legal form and present those claims to the court. Perkins,

229 Ill. 2d at 44. Proper presentation of a petitioner’s substantive claims necessarily includes

attempting to overcome procedural bars, such as timeliness and forfeiture. Id. In this matter,

postconviction counsel amended the defendant’s pro se petition twice. A comparison of the pro se

petition and the second petition demonstrates that postconviction counsel took the allegations

contained in the pro se petition and placed them in the proper legal form, which included the

addition of specific dates, specific locations, and details that were not contained in the pro se

petition. The second petition also alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which

prevented the procedural bar of forfeiture of the defendant’s claims for failing to raise the issues

on direct appeal.

¶ 30   The second petition also set forth when, where, and how the defendant had provided his

trial counsel with the names and contact information of the two potential witnesses. It then set

                                                 11
forth how the witnesses’ testimony may have contradicted other witnesses at trial. Specifically,

with regard to one witness, the allegation in the second petition stated as follows:

       “[Witness] was called by the State to testify and Petitioner/Defendant contends that had

       trial counsel interviewed and call as a witness [potential witness][,] she would testify that

       what [witness] testified to was different from what [witness] told [potential witness],

       specifically, that Petitioner/Defendant did not do what he was charged with.”

¶ 31   The defendant cites to People v. Patterson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120359, in support of his

argument that the allegations were non-specific or conclusory. At issue in Patterson, however, was

the allegation in the postconviction petition that trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest

during the trial. Id. ¶ 10. The Patterson court affirmed the dismissal of the defendant’s

postconviction petition at the second stage, finding that the defendant had failed to allege any

specific defects in trial counsel’s performance and had not provided affidavits or citations to the

record showing specific instances of defective performance. Id. ¶ 20.

¶ 32   Here, however, postconviction counsel identified specific witnesses, gave detailed

information regarding when trial counsel was informed of the witnesses, and stated how the

witnesses’ testimony may have contradicted other witnesses at trial. Further, attached to the second

petition was a copy of a portion of the defendant’s preliminary hearing, the affidavit of the

defendant, and a copy of a portion of the trial transcript in support of the allegations. Therefore,

we do not find that the allegations within the second petition were non-specific or conclusory such

that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance in amending the pro se petition.

¶ 33   The defendant also argues that, although the second petition was attached to the affidavit

of the defendant, postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance of counsel by failing to

obtain and attach the affidavits of the two witnesses. In People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 241

                                                 12
(1993), our supreme court has stated that “a trial court ruling upon a motion to dismiss a post-

conviction petition which is not supported by affidavits or other documents may reasonably

presume that post-conviction counsel made a concerted effort to obtain affidavits in support of the

post-conviction claims, but was unable to do so,” unless this presumption is contradicted by the

record. In this matter, the defendant fails to cite to any portion of the record that would contradict

the presumption that postconviction counsel made a concrete effort to obtain the affidavits of the

two witnesses but was unable to do so. Since the defendant fails to refute the presumption, we

cannot find that postconviction rendered unreasonable assistance of counsel in failing to obtain

and attach the affidavits of the two potential witnesses.

¶ 34    Next, the defendant argues that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance

of counsel when he failed to amend the second petition to assert that the untimely filing of the

petition was not due to the defendant’s culpable negligence. This argument is without merit. The

record demonstrates that the defendant’s second petition was not dismissed as untimely. Although

the trial court heard arguments from the parties regarding the timeliness of the defendant’s petition,

the trial court made no findings, either orally or in writing, that it had found the defendant’s petition

to be untimely. Because the trial court made no finding regarding the timing of the defendant’s

petition, we find no deficiency or unreasonableness in postconviction counsel’s representation on

this issue. See People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶¶ 50-51 (finding no deficiency in postconviction

counsel’s representation where the trial court had not dismissed the petition as untimely).

¶ 35    Finally, the defendant argues that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance

of counsel by failing to plead and argue prejudice as required under the second prong of Strickland

concerning the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Although the defendant argues that

                                                   13
postconviction counsel failed to plead prejudice, our review of the second petition demonstrates

that it contained the following allegation within the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim:

       “The acts/or omissions of counsel prejudiced the Petitioner/Defendant and failed to rise to

       the level of reasonableness as required by Strickland v. Washington, 46[6] U.S. 668

       (1984).”

¶ 36   Further, at the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss, postconviction counsel argued that

trial counsel’s failure to meet with the defendant and discuss the pending criminal charges,

including the discovery tendered by the State, resulted in the defendant never having an

opportunity to view the State’s case against him and prohibited the defendant an opportunity to

provide trial counsel with an alibi and/or participation in his defense. As such, postconviction

counsel argued as follows:

               “Judge, I think—I think there was prejudice to [the defendant] and I believe the

       outcome of his trial would have been different had trial counsel met with him and

       conducted even a minimal investigation based on a review with [the defendant] of the case

       against him.”

¶ 37   The defendant does not state what additional prejudicial factor postconviction counsel

should have pleaded or argued. Postconviction counsel included an allegation of prejudice within

the second petition and argued that the significance of trial counsel’s omissions resulted in

prejudice since the outcome of the trial may have been different had the defendant been given an

opportunity to participate in his defense. Therefore, we do not find that postconviction counsel

rendered unreasonable assistance of counsel.

¶ 38   Based on the above, we find that the defendant has not overcome the presumption that

postconviction counsel rendered reasonable assistance of counsel. Postconviction counsel

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amended the defendant’s pro se petition to the proper legal form to present it to the court and to

protect the defendant’s claims from procedural bars. Further, we can find no deficiency in

postconviction counsel’s representation where the trial court did not dismiss the second petition as

untimely. We therefore find that postconviction counsel rendered reasonable assistance of counsel

and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 39                                 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 40   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court of Vermilion County

dismissing the defendant’s second petition for postconviction relief.

¶ 41   Affirmed.

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