Court Opinion

ID: 3587894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:37:21.267468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:56.702724
License: Public Domain

[EDITORS' NOTE:  THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 42 
[EDITORS' NOTE:  THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 43 
Upon these facts this appeal should succeed. The plaintiffs were in actual possession of the property when the defendant, against their will, forcibly seized, removed and sold it. This was enough without any other evidence of title to maintain the action (Stowell v. Otis, 71 N.Y. 36), except against the true owner, or one connecting himself in some way with the true owner. The general denial does not avail the defendant, for justification is not admissible under it. The only defense is in the affirmative answer, which sets up that the property seized belonged to Shoemaker, or Levi Allen as his assignee. So far as this answer merely shows title out of the plaintiffs, it is of no consequence. If the title was in fact in Allen, the defendant does not connect himself with it. He must, therefore, rely on showing title in Shoemaker, against whose property only he has execution. This he does not do. On the contrary the answer asserts that Allen, as assignee of the goods, etc., of Shoemaker, is a necessary party to the action, but no steps appear to have been taken to bring him in, in accordance with this averment. The referee in substance finds that on the 20th of July, 1880, and before the judgment against him was obtained, Shoemaker executed *Page 46 
a general assignment of all his property, including that in question, to Allen for the benefit of his creditors, and by necessary implication also finds that on that day he delivered possession of it to his assignee, for he says Shoemaker continued in possession until he executed the assignment. The assignee is not a party to the suit, and the defendant's justification fails because he shows that the title is in Allen, against whom he has no claim. It is conceded that if the judgment creditor were seeking to secure the avails of the mortgaged property by proceedings in the nature of a creditor's bill, and did not attack the assignment as well as the mortgage, then it would not be entitled to relief, because a judgment setting aside the incumbrance by mortgage would not afford the bank any relief, as the property or the avails of it would belong to the assignee, and so it was held by us in Spring v. Short (90 N.Y. 538). The form of the action is immaterial where the same facts appear. Here they do. The respondent argues that showing title in Allen will not enable the plaintiffs to sustain the action without that title has been transferred to them. Doubtless that is so. They did not need to show it. Possession was enough, prima facie, to sustain the action, but it does appear, however, that possession was taken by Allen's permission. Besides, as the goods when seized by the defendant were in the actual possession of the plaintiffs, the burden was upon the defendant either to prove title in Shoemaker, or to connect himself with Allen's title, and show that the taking was by his authority, or by virtue of process or right acquired through legal proceedings against him. (Merritt v. Lyon, 3 Barb. 110; Demick v. Chapman, 11 Johns. 132; Hurd v. West, 7 Cow. 752.) Neither of these things were accomplished. No invalidity is found as to the assignment, nor any unwillingness on the part of the assignee to perform his duty under it. He stands, not a mere representative of the debtor, but of the rights of creditors, and may impeach the assignor's conveyances, although the debtor could not do so. (Laws of 1858, chap. 314.) So also as the title to the property passed to Allen by the assignment, he could doubtless, as the *Page 47 
defendant's counsel says, maintain his action in trover. He could do so because he was the general owner. But so also could the plaintiffs, because their possession was, upon the findings of the referee, by the permission of the assignee. They had thus a special property, or interest in the articles, and a recovery by either would be a bar to an action by the other. But it is enough to defeat the justification set up in this action that at the time the defendant levied, the judgment and execution debtor had no right or interest in the property, it having passed from him by the prior assignment to Allen; and as this was before judgment, so of course it was before execution issued, and the goods were neither actually nor constructively bound by it. (2 R.S. 365, § 13; Code, § 1405.) It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider other questions raised by the appellants, or anticipate how they may stand upon another trial.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
All concur, except FINCH, J., dissenting, ANDREWS, J., not voting, and MILLER, J., absent.
Judgment reversed.