Court Opinion

ID: 9584412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:47:53.670535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:44.252884
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe Bass Custom Landscapes, Inc. was entitled to summary judgment based on Cunard’s assumption of the risk of walking across an ice-covered parking lot, I respectfully dissent.
In addition to the facts stated in the majority opinion, the following facts are important.
The record shows that Cunard was, and still is, employed as a teller coordinator at a bank in Forsyth. When Cunard arrived for work on January 5, 1999, she noticed a “lot of ice” on the bank’s grounds, which looked like a “winter wonderland.” After parking in her usual spot in the lower parking lot, Cunard saw ice on the asphalt as soon as she exited her car. She surmised that the bank’s sprinkler system, which is maintained by Bass, must have come on during the night and that the water must have frozen.
Cunard walked across the icy, slippery parking lot to a sidewalk, which also was covered with ice. According to Cunard, ice was everywhere and was impossible to avoid. At the end of the sidewalk, Cunard climbed ten steps to a driveway which led to the bank’s entrance. At the top of the steps, Cunard saw Elaine Colbert, a bank teller, walking to the drive-up window. Cunard and Colbert talked briefly about the ice and how “everybody had to be careful.” Colbert then slipped and fell on the ice. Another employee arriving for work helped Colbert into the building.
Once inside, Cunard told, the bank’s senior manager, Keith Crusan, that Colbert was injured. Crusan and another manager were “discussing that the sprinkler system had gone off overnight and had frozen.” Cunard then checked on Colbert, whose leg was swelling and bleeding slightly. Cunard and other bank employees told Colbert that she “might want to get it checked out.” Colbert testified that she “didn’t feel like it was anything, but better safe than sorry.” Cunard *624testified that she did not believe Colbert faced an emergency situation requiring immediate attention.
According to Cunard, Crusan told her to take Colbert to the hospital. She asked Crusan if he wanted her to do it then, and he said yes. Cunard admitted that she knew it was dangerous to return to her car across the ice, but she did not protest or question Crusan’s instruction to take Colbert to the hospital, and she never hinted or suggested that she did not want to comply.
. Cunard returned to her car along the same path she had taken into the bank. As she was descending the steps to the lower parking lot, she slipped and fell, injuring her neck and back.
The affirmative defense of assumption of the risk precludes recovery when the evidénce shows that the plaintiff, without coercion of circumstances, freely chose a course of action with full knowledge of its danger. Jekyll Island State Park Auth. v. Machurick, 250 Ga. App. 700 (1) (552 SE2d 94) (2001). The defendant is entitled to summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s assumption of the risk if plain, palpable, and undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff (1) had actual knowledge of the danger and (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with the danger, yet (3) voluntarily exposed herself to those risks. Id. at 700-701.
Cunard does not deny that she knew about the ice and understood and appreciated the danger of traversing it. She argues, however, that Bass cannot establish the third element of its assumption of the risk defense because there is a factual dispute as to whether she was coerced into facing the risk.
Cunard relies on a series of cases in which this Court recognized that the circumstances of a person’s employment can constitute coercion sufficient to defeat an assumption of the risk defense. In Kitchens v. Winter Co. Builders, 161 Ga. App. 701 (289 SE2d 807) (1982), a construction worker sued a general contractor for personal injuries he incurred when he fell from a slippery ladder at the job site. The contractor sought summary judgment on the basis of assumption of the risk. This Court held that summary judgment was not appropriate, even though the worker knew the ladder was dangerous, because “[t]here was no safer alternative” to ascending the ladder and “there was an emergency whereby . . . the need for haste to repair collapsing forms required immediate action without allowance for a process of weighing risks and benefits on the part of the plaintiff.” Id. at 703 (1).
In York v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 217 Ga. App. 839 (459 SE2d 470) (1995), a worker whose employer had told him to deliver a load of fish to Winn-Dixie “immediately” found that the loading dock was seven to ten feet higher than the bed of his truck. The worker complained to the warehouse supervisor, who said, “I don’t want to talk to you. Just *625get the damn fish off the truck and leave.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. The supervisor, also said that there was no other place to unload the fish. While unloading the fish, the worker was injured, and he sued Winn-Dixie and another defendant. We held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on their assumption of the risk defense because there was a jury question whether “the circumstances presented a practical choice” to the worker. Id. at 840.
Finally, in Styles v. Mobil Oil Corp., 218 Ga. App. 48 (459 SE2d 578) (1995), a construction worker sued for injuries he sustained after falling from an icy steel beam. The defendant claimed that the worker assumed the risk of walking on the beam. The worker, however, testified that he discussed the danger with his supervisor, who said, “I cannot tell you to go up there, but we’ll get somebody who can.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 49 (1). The worker interpreted the supervisor’s comment as a threat to walk on the beam or be fired. The worker also testified that he knew of other employees who had been fired for “being a little too safe.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. Under these circumstances, this Court correctly held that there was a factual dispute whether the worker exercised a free choice to walk on the beam, unrestricted by coercion or intimidation.
Cunard asserts that she was coerced into traversing the ice outside the bank a second time because her supervisor directed her to take Colbert to the hospital. She submitted an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment averring that she “did not feel comfortable in challenging [Crusan’s] order to go get my car” and that she was concerned that her “employment with the bank would be jeopardized” if she did not do so.
Cunard’s subsequent deposition testimony, however, paints a different picture:
Q. At the time were you afraid if you did not take [Colbert] that [Crusan] would fire you?
A. He was my direct supervisor and he told me I needed to take her, so I did.
Q. Were you afraid that he would fire you if you did not také her?
A. I am not sure how to answer that.
Q. And I don’t know how to make that question any moré straightforward.
A. When he directly told me I needed to take her and he was my supervisor — I mean, that’s my job performance.
Q. Were you afraid that he would fire you if you did not take her and proffered a legitimate excuse for your reason not to take her?
*626A. Just that it was my job performance. I don’t know that if I had the thought, if I don’t, I am going to get fired.
Q. And I understand that when . . . [Crusan] said to you that you need to take [Colbert] to the hospital, you actually never had a thought in your mind that if I don’t do it, I am going to get fired; that thought never crossed your mind, did it?
A. I just thought he was telling me to do it, so I did.
Q. And the thought that if you didn’t do it, he would fire you or take some adverse employment action against you never entered your mind, did it?
A. No, I don’t believe so.
In addition, Cunard testified that she was not afraid of Crusan, that he was open to suggestions as a manager, that she had made suggestions to him in the past, that their working relationship was good, and that he had never threatened to take any adverse employment action against her. In fact, Crusan had promoted Cunard from teller to teller coordinator about six months before the morning in question. Finally, Cunard admitted that nothing prevented her that morning from telling Crusan that she was afraid of going back out on the ice.
Despite the majority’s attempt to demonstrate otherwise, there is a clear conflict between Cunard’s statement in her affidavit that she felt her employment with the bank would be jeopardized if she did not obey Crusan’s command and her deposition testimony that she never thought he would take adverse employment action against her if she did not comply. Because Cunard has failed to explain this conflict, it must be resolved against her by “eliminating] the favorable portions of the contradictory testimony.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Wright v. JDN Structured Finance, 239 Ga. App. 685, 686 (1) (522 SE2d 4) (1999).
Eliminating Cunard’s favorable affidavit testimony removes any evidence of coercion by her supervisor. Cunard argues that her deposition testimony that she thought taking Colbert to the hospital was part of her “job performance” shows that she felt coerced. Without more, however, Cunard’s unelaborated reference to “job performance” does not establish that she believed her job would be negatively affected by refusing or questioning her supervisor’s request. And any such inference collapses in light of her deposition testimony that she did not believe her supervisor would take adverse employment action against her if she refused his request.
*627Decided November 7, 2002
Reconsideration denied November 27, 2002
Jones, Cork & Miller, W. Kerry Howell, for appellant.
McKenney, Jordan & Carey, John D. Carey, for appellee.
Even if Cunard did subjectively believe that her job would be jeopardized if she did not go back across the ice, no objective facts support this belief. There is no evidence here, as there was in Styles, supra at 48, that Crusan ever directly or indirectly threatened Cunard’s job if she did not comply. Nor was there any evidence, as there was in York, supra at 839, that Cunard pointed out the danger to her supervisor but was met with hostility. Rather, the evidence here shows that Cunard enjoyed a good working relationship with Crusan and was not afraid to voice concerns to him.
Finally, unlike in Kitchens, supra at 701, there is no evidence that Cunard was coerced by an emergency situation that required immediate action. Instead, the evidence showed that a co-worker had suffered a minor injury and was not in acute distress. Thus, Cunard had the opportunity to assess alternatives that were safer than going back across the icy path to her car.
Because the undisputed facts do not show that Cunard was coerced into assuming the risk of traversing the ice, I believe that the trial court erred by denying summary judgment to Bass.