Court Opinion

ID: 9756812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:01:34.592783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:30.034546
License: Public Domain

Prescott, J.,
concurred.
I agree that the appeal in this case properly raises the question whether the provision of the Statute, Code (1951), Art. 2B, sec. 166 (d) (3), is directory or mandatory, and I also agree that it is mandatory insofar as it calls for an “automatic affirmance * * * unless the time has been extended by the court for good cause shown.” I do not agree that the court has no further jurisdiction in the matter after the judgment is entered.
Rule 1, of the Rules of Practice and Procedure, under VI, *567“Revisory Power of Courts Over Final Judgments, Orders and Decrees”, provides: “For a period of thirty (30) days after the entry of any judgment, order or decree, final in its nature, or thereafter pursuant to motion filed within such period, the Court shall have the same revisory power and control over such judgment, order or decree as it had during the term at which it was entered under the practice heretofore existing. After the expiration of such period the Court shall have the same revisory power and control over such judgment, order or decree as it had after the expiration of the term at which it was entered under the practice heretofore existing.” Rule 2 declares that Rule 1 supersedes certain specified statutory provisions of the general and local laws, “and any other statutes and rules of court to the extent inconsistent with this rule.” These rules were adopted, of course, pursuant to the powers conferred or recognized in the Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 18A. We pointed out in Tiller v. Elfenbein, 205 Md. 14, 21, that the rule is based on a sound policy. I see no reason to restrict its application so as to exclude cases where the legislature confers a “special statutory jurisdiction on the courts”. The legislature can allow or decline to allow an appeal in any case. It has allowed an appeal from the Board in this type of case, and there is no contention that it was not timely, or that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it, as in the cases cited. True, the legislature called for “automatic affirmance” under certain conditions. It did not say that thereafter the court would have no jurisdictional power to reopen. I think the matter is procedural in its nature and not jurisdictional. Being procedural, it is within the power of this Court, by rule, to modify or change an existing statute. The rule is in terms applicable to “any judgment.”
The difficulty in the instant case is that the record was received in the trial court on January 27, and since there was no seasonable extension of time the judgment was ripe for entry on February 26. The appellants filed no motion to strike within thirty days from that date, or indeed at any time, and the motion for “automatic affirmance” filed by the appellants on March 22 can hardly be considered a motion to *568reopen within the meaning of the rule. Nor can the court’s order of April 20 be deemed an exercise of its revisory power. There is no showing that grounds existed, such as fraud, surprise or mistake, for reopening the judgment after the lapse of thirty days from February 26. It is apparent that the court erroneously relied upon the directory character of the statutory provision. For these reasons I concur in the result. I think, however, that it is unfortunate, and unnecessary to a decision of the case, that the decision be rested on a lack of jurisdiction in the trial court to reopen the judgment in a proper case. I think this question should have been left open.
Judge Prescott authorizes me to say that he agrees with the views here expressed.