Court Opinion

ID: 9730071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:00:17.789643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:03.906790
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
Plaintiffs motion for directed verdict came at an inappropriate time. The general rule is that such a motion be made:
(1) after the opening statement of adverse counsel, if by such statement it is clearly shown no cause of action exists or that the cause of action is undeniable;
(2) at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent; or (3) at the close of all the evidence.
5A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice 1150.04 (2d ed. 1981) (footnotes omitted). As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has stated, “[Njeither in the rules nor in the ease law is there any basis for rendering a directed verdict against a defendant before he has had a chance to present evidence.” Gonzalez v. Le Concorde Campagnie D’Assurances, 601 F.2d 606, 608 (1st Cir.1979). We held as much in Habeck v. Sampson, 87 S.D. 73, 202 N.W.2d 868 (1972).
Even if plaintiffs motion had been made at the close of defendant’s evidence, it should not have been granted. When faced with a motion for directed verdict, a trial court must accept the evidence which is most favorable to the nonmoving party and indulge all legitimate inference in his favor that can fairly be drawn therefrom. Budahl v. Gordon and David Assocs., 323 N.W.2d 853 (S.D.1982). If there is sufficient evidence to allow reasonable minds to differ, a directed verdict is inappropriate. Cox v. Brookings Int’l Life Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 299 (S.D.1983). Although a verdict is appropriately directed when there is no question for the trier of fact, it is seldom that the party having the burden of proving a proposition establishes such proposition as a matter of law. Ziebarth v. Schnieders, 342 N.W.2d 234 (S.D.1984), and eases cited therein. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, § 2535 (1971).
In First National Bank of Jacksonville v. Bragdon, 84 S.D. 89, 167 N.W.2d 381 (1969), this court recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235 (S.D.1979), we adhered to the Bragdon holding. See also Gross v. United States, 723 F.2d 609 (8th Cir.1983); Gross v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 1085 (D.S.D.1981). As recognized in Bragdon and Behrens, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is based upon intentional, unreasonable conduct that the defendant knows would be likely to result in emotional distress. In essence, the Bragdon-Behrens rule is similar to that set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1):
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
Under the Restatement rule a plaintiff who has alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress must prove four elements:
(1) outrageous conduct by defendant; (2) defendant’s intentional causing, or reckless disregard of probability of causing emotional distress; (3) plaintiff suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s conduct.
Powell v. Khodari-Intergreen Co., 334 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Iowa 1983); see also Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1984); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1976); Amsden v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972). See generally Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Colum.L.Rev. 42 (1982); Note, Minnesota’s “New Tort”: Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress, 10 Minn.L.Rev. 349 (1984).
*658Comment (h) to The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 provides:
It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.
See also Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir.1982); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
Defendant contends that his evidence could have controverted the existence of the required intent. Plaintiff had been employed by the city of Vermillion as its finance officer from 1980 until she was terminated from this position in January of 1982. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against the city and certain of its officials for injuries she allegedly suffered due to the termination. See Ruple v. Weinaug, 328 N.W.2d 857 (S.D.1983). See also Ruple v. City of Vermillion, S.D., 714 F.2d 860 (8th Cir.1983). Defendant’s wife was employed as a secretary to the city manager during the time that plaintiff served as finance officer. Defendant’s evidence at trial consisted of testimony from his wife and other city employees, including the city manager, regarding the tension that existed at the city offices prior to plaintiff’s being terminated and the apparent ill will that plaintiff had manifested towards defendant’s wife. Defendant testified that he had made the telephone calls for the purpose of venting his anger and frustration over the difficulties his wife had encountered in working with plaintiff. He contends that the jury should have been allowed to consider this evidence on the. question of his intent.
Although defendant had pleaded guilty to two charges of having violated SDCL 49-31-31, when civil litigation involves occurrences which gave rise to a criminal charge to which the defendant pleaded guilty the guilty plea is not conclusive as to civil liability and may be explained. Berlin v. Berens, 76 S.D. 429, 80 N.W.2d 79 (1957).
Hard as it is to generate any enthusiasm for defendant’s position, I would hold that the jury should have been permitted to determine whether his conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to warrant a recovery by plaintiff. Regrettably, standards of speech and social discourse have become so debased that that which once was heard only in the locker room and in the barracks has become commonplace — if indeed not de rigueur in certain circles. Speech that we judges find to be grossly offensive may seem less than outrageous to a jury composed of individuals daily exposed to the suffocating verbal crudities epidemic in a society in which so many have apparently lost the ability to express themselves in other than the most graphic of terms. See Epstein, “Sex and Euphemism,” Commentary, April 1984.
I would hold that reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant’s conduct, when viewed in the light of his explanation of the background events that he claims prompted him to make the calls, warranted the imposition of liability under the tests set forth in the Restatement rule. Accordingly, the trial court should have permitted the jury to decide this issue.