Court Opinion

ID: 9405839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 15:07:57.40874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:25.097053
License: Public Domain

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                                                   RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2023
                                                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2021-SC-0319-MR

TRACY L. BOYD                                                         APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE
                            NO. 21-CR-00064

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                   AFFIRMING

      A Warren County jury convicted Tracy L. Boyd of one count each of

engaging in organized crime, trafficking in a controlled substance—heroin,

trafficking in a controlled substance—methamphetamine, and being a

persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree. Boyd received a total

enhanced sentence of thirty years in prison. This appeal followed as a matter of

right. See KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b). Having reviewed the record and the

arguments of the parties, we affirm the Warren Circuit Court.

                                I. BACKGROUND

      On November 22, 2019, Joshua Kinkade overdosed on a lethal

combination of fentanyl and methamphetamine. Soon after Kinkade died, an

investigation ensued to trace the source of the drugs that led to his overdose.

Police ultimately concluded that Kinkade had bought the drugs from Stephanie
Silvano. The police set up a controlled buy between Silvano and Kinkade’s

brother, Matthew Kinkade (Matt), who assisted in the investigation. After Matt

contacted Silvano for drugs, Silvano contacted Tracy Boyd and his runner,

Scott Bernauer. Matt then picked Silvano up, and they drove together to meet

Bernauer at Prince Hookah Lounge in Bowling Green. Once there, and after

meeting Bernauer, Silvano told Matt that she had the drugs. Police observed

the interaction and attempted to follow Bernauer as he returned to his

apartment. Bernauer would later testify that Silvano had given Bernauer the

money from Matt in the controlled buy, and Bernauer had taken that money

back to Tracy Boyd. After watching the interaction, police also followed Silvano

and Matt. Police conducted a traffic stop on the pair and took Silvano into

custody.

      Silvano had no drugs on her person when taken into custody. After being

transported to the jail, Silvano claimed that she swallowed the drugs while in

the police cruiser following her arrest. However, after approximately a week in

the hospital following this admission, no drugs were ever recovered. While in

the hospital, Silvano denied selling Kinkade enough heroin to kill him. She did

admit to also having sold from the same batch of heroin to Matt Dobring,

whose body was found by his parents on November 24, two days after

Kinkade’s overdose. Dobring also died from overdose.

      Silvano told police that she had received the drugs in this batch from her

supplier, a black man who drove a white Audi and went by “C” whom she

believed was actually named Tracy. Investigators later discovered that Tracy’s

                                       2
last name was Boyd. Silvano told the police about the apartment in which Boyd

regularly made his drug deals. That apartment belonged to Boyd’s uncle,

Robert Cage. Police officers surveilled the apartment. At some point, two cars

left the apartment complex, one of which was a white Audi. Both cars were

pulled over in traffic stops. Boyd was in the Audi, and Bernauer was in the

other car. Officers alleged that they stopped Boyd because they believed that

his tint was illegal and because they could not clearly see his vehicle’s

temporary tags. Although the tint and tags were both legal, Boyd was taken

into custody on a parole violation warrant. Boyd was cited for possession of

marijuana and for driving without an operator’s license. His phone was

seized. Bernauer was not arrested at that time.

      While in custody, Silvano told police that she had been buying heroin

from Boyd since April or May of 2019, although she later testified that he had

raised her prices after she was arrested in June of that year. The arrest in June

was for trafficking heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine, as well as

possession of marijuana, receiving stolen property—firearm, promoting

contraband, and trafficking heroin inside a facility. According to Silvano’s

testimony, following her arrest, Boyd no longer wanted Silvano around Cage’s

apartment. So, as Silvano testified, Boyd began using Bernauer to run drugs

between himself and Silvano.

      Boyd, Bernauer, and Silvano were all initially indicted as co-defendants.

However, both Bernauer and Silvano received plea deals for their cooperation

in Boyd’s trial. A superseding indictment ultimately led to Boyd being charged

                                        3
with engaging in organized crime, two counts of second-degree manslaughter,

trafficking in a controlled substance—heroin or fentanyl, trafficking in a

controlled substance—methamphetamine, trafficking in a controlled

substance—cocaine, and being a PFO in the first degree.

      As noted above, both Bernauer and Silvano testified at trial. Bernauer

testified at trial that Boyd gave him packages to deliver to Silvano on multiple

occasions. Additionally, the trial court admitted text messages between

Bernauer and Brian Cage, the brother of Robert Cage. Robert’s apartment was

used by Boyd to conduct his drug operation. Bernauer further testified that

Boyd sometimes paid him for his running services in methamphetamine.

Silvano testified that Boyd would sometimes refer customers to her if he was

out of heroin, although Boyd was Silvano’s only heroin supplier. Neither

Silvano nor Bernauer testified that they were part of a criminal organization. In

addition to Silvano and Bernauer, other witnesses also testified that they either

observed Boyd selling drugs or directly purchased drugs from him.

      Following the jury’s deliberations, Boyd was acquitted of both

manslaughter charges as well as the charge of trafficking in a controlled

substance—cocaine. He was found guilty of engaging in organized crime,

trafficking in a controlled substance—heroin, trafficking in a controlled

substance—methamphetamine, and being a PFO in the first degree. Boyd

appealed his conviction to this Court. We discuss further facts as relevant in

our Analysis below.

                                        4
                                   II. ANALYSIS

      Boyd alleges numerous errors by the trial court and urges this Court to

reverse his conviction. First, he alleges that the trial court erred by dismissing

an entire panel of the venire. Second, he argues that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charges of engaging in

organized crime, trafficking in heroin, and trafficking in methamphetamine.

Third, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial.

Fourth, Boyd asserts that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory

evidence. Fifth, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the information gained from a search of his cell phone. Sixth, he

argues that the trial court erred in admitting text messages that consisted of

hearsay statements. Finally, he urges this Court to reverse his convictions

because of cumulative error. We address each of Boyd’s arguments in turn.

A. Dismissal of Panel of Prospective Jurors

      Boyd’s trial was held in May of 2021 when the courts of this

Commonwealth were engaged in social distancing practices to help prevent the

spread of Covid-19. To achieve appropriate social distancing, the trial court

split Boyd’s jury venire into four panels. The panels were brought into the

courtroom, one at a time, to participate in voir dire. During voir dire of the first

panel, Boyd’s counsel stated, “If there were to be a conviction in this case, the

trial kind of keeps going on. If and only if. And I will tell you, in this case, that

the outcome could put Tracy Boyd in prison for the rest of his life. It’s that

serious.”

                                          5
      The Commonwealth immediately requested a bench conference, and the

trial court advised Boyd’s attorney that he could discuss range of punishment

with the jury. Voir dire then continued with defense counsel asking the

prospective jurors if they could consider the entire range of punishment and

not just “throw the book” at Boyd.

      After the voir dire of the first panel was completed, the Commonwealth

argued and presented caselaw to the trial court that only the penalty range

absent the persistent felony offender enhancement could be discussed with the

jury.1 The Commonwealth asked the trial court to either admonish the venire

panel or to excuse the entire panel. Boyd’s counsel countered that he did not

mention a persistent felony offender sentence but only said that Boyd, who was

fifty-three years old, could go to jail for the rest of his life. The trial court

withheld any ruling at that time in order to read the caselaw provided to it by

the Commonwealth.

      After a break, the trial court explained to the parties that the case law he

was given said that the parties could not tell the jury anything about the

criminal history of the defendant and that they could not ask about PFO

penalties.2 He noted that although Boyd’s counsel’s statement during voir dire

      1 The highest offense level with which Boyd was charged was a class B felony,
carrying a penalty range of ten to twenty years. With the PFO enhancement, this
penalty range would increase to twenty to fifty years or life in prison.
       2 Although the audio from the trial court is difficult to understand, it seems that

the trial court was referencing Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. 2001).

                                            6
to the first panel was factually correct, counsel was not allowed to make such a

statement to the jury.

      Voir dire then proceeded with each of the other three panels of potential

jurors. When discussing the seriousness of the offenses with each of the other

panels, defense counsel did not explain that Boyd could spend the rest of his

life in prison if convicted. Instead, Boyd’s counsel informed the potential jurors

that Boyd could face up to 20 years in prison if convicted of just one of the

offenses and asked if they could consider the entire range of penalties.

      At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial court excused the entire first

panel of the venire over Boyd’s objection. In so doing, the trial court excused

the only African American juror who remained after the court’s other excusals

and strikes for cause.

      To this Court, Boyd argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the

entire first panel of the venire. He argues that his trial counsel’s comments to

the first panel were merely referencing the seriousness of the crimes and the

possibility that a conviction could result in Boyd spending the rest of his

natural life in jail. Boyd further argues that the Commonwealth would have

suffered only minimal prejudice if the trial court had refused to excuse the

entire first panel. He, on the other hand, suffered great prejudice by its excusal

because it resulted in dismissal of the only remaining African American juror

and denied him a jury drawn from all qualified jurors. Finally, Boyd argues

that this error was a structural error which “affect[ed] the framework within

                                         7
which the trial proceed[ed],” and requires reversal. Neder v. United States, 527

U.S. 1, 8 (1999).

      A trial court “has broad discretion in determining whether a jury panel

should be dismissed.” King v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 281, 288 (Ky. 2012)

(quoting Tabor v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Ky. App. 1997)). This

Court will only reverse a trial court’s ruling on this issue if it is a “clear abuse

of discretion.” Id. A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is

“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principals.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).

      In Lawson v. Commonwealth, this Court sought to definitively decide

“how the possible range of penalties should be described to potential jurors

during voir dire examination.” 53 S.W.3d 534, 543 (Ky. 2001). In that case, the

defendant faced charges of second-degree burglary (a Class C felony with a

penalty range of between five and ten years), second-degree arson (a Class B

felony with a penalty range of between ten and twenty years), and first-degree

persistent felony offender (which would have increased the penalty ranges for

each of those offenses to between ten and twenty years and twenty and fifty

years or life, respectively). Id. at 544. During voir dire, defense counsel told the

jury that “[t]he penalty range in this case is five years to life.” Id. at 540. Upon

an objection by the Commonwealth, the trial court instructed the jury to

“disregard the last question by counsel who mentioned that particular range of

penalties.” Id. at 541. The defendant argued on appeal that the trial court

impermissibly limited his voir dire by doing so. Id. at 540.

                                          8
      In Lawson, we sought to “strike a balance which maximizes the

fundamental fairness of the proceeding by weighing the importance of selecting

a fair and impartial jury against the fairness concerns implicated by”

overloading the jury with information about “the possibility of convictions for

lesser-included offenses, . . . the possibility of PFO-enhancement, and . . . the

operation of concurrent and consecutive sentencing.” Id. at 544, 543. To best

strike this balance, we held that “voir dire should examine jurors’ ability to

consider only the penalty ranges for the individual indicted offenses without

PFO enhancement.” Id. at 544. We went on to explain that “where a party or

the trial court wishes to voir dire the jury panel regarding its ability to consider

the full range of penalties for each indicted offense, the questioner should

define the penalty range in terms of the possible minimum and maximum

sentences for each class of offense.” Id. Parties should not refer to the penalty

range with a PFO enhancement.

      We reaffirmed this holding in Jacobsen v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.3d

600 (Ky. 2012). In that case, we explained that “[t]rying to account for all of

[the sentencing] possibilities . . . unduly complicated the trial court’s task,

risked misleading the jury about its role and about what was truly at stake in

the case, and risked disclosing, implicitly, the defendant’s prior criminal

record.” Id. at 608. We explained that the Lawson court weighed those risks

“against the need to give the potential jurors some sentencing information” in

order to “meaningfully assess[]” “their ability to consider the full range of

                                         9
penalties.” Id. Although we acknowledged that the Lawson rule was not perfect,

we reaffirmed its application. Id.

      The facts of the case at bar are distinguishable from those in Lawson.

Boyd’s counsel did not explicitly inform the jury of the potential penalty range

as Lawson’s counsel did. Instead, she merely stated that “the outcome could

put Tracy Boyd in prison the rest of his life.” That statement is ambiguous

regarding whether defense counsel was referencing an actual sentence of life in

prison (which would violate our rule in Lawson) or merely the practical effect of

a conviction and lengthy prison sentence on a fifty-three-year-old man during a

global pandemic. Because of that ambiguity, we cannot definitely say that

Boyd’s counsel violated our rule in Lawson.

      We now turn to whether the trial court’s excusal of the entire first panel

of the venire was a clear abuse of discretion. We hold that it was not for the

following reasons. First, we acknowledge that the trial court’s remedy may have

been extreme. The court could have used other measures to cure any potential

prejudice, even though it believed that the jury likely was not prejudiced. The

trial court could have admonished the jury about the correct penalty range or

required defense counsel to clarify her statement to refer to Boyd’s natural life,

given his age and the penalty range. However, we also understand the trial

court likely desired to exercise an abundance of caution in ensuring a fair jury

was seated.

      It is not this Court’s place to second guess the trial court’s use of its

discretion in a case such as this one, especially because the court withheld

                                        10
making a decision until voir dire was completed. By that time, the trial court

had seen the reactions of the jurors in each of the venire panels to the

questions of counsel. The court also would have seen any difference in those

reactions between the members of the different panels, based on the different

questions asked and statements made. The trial judge was in the best position

to observe and consider any effect Boyd’s counsel’s statement may have had on

the members of the first venire panel. See Hayes v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d

93, 100 (Ky. 2010) (“[T]he trial court is in the best position to evaluate a juror’s

demeanor . . . during voir dire.”) (citations omitted). Given all of this and our

deferential standard of review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

excusing the entire first venire panel.

B. Directed Verdict

      Boyd next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a

directed verdict on the charges of engaging in organized crime, first-degree

trafficking in heroin, and first-degree trafficking in methamphetamine. Our

directed verdict standard was described in Commonwealth v. Benham:

      On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair
      and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
      Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
      juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
      guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purposes of
      ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
      evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
      questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
      testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
      under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
      a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed
      verdict of acquittal.

                                          11
816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). “So long as the Commonwealth produces

more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the charges, a defendant's

motion for directed verdict should be denied.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 617

S.W.3d 321, 324 (Ky. 2020). With these standards in mind, we address each of

the charged crimes in turn.

1. Engaging in Organized Crime

      Boyd argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a

directed verdict on the charge of engaging in organized crime. Kentucky

Revised Statute (KRS) 506.120 outlaws engaging in organized crime. As

relevant to Boyd’s case, KRS 506.120 states as follows:

      (1) A person, with the purpose to establish or maintain a criminal
      syndicate or to facilitate any of its activities, shall not do any of the
      following:
      ....
             (e) Commit, or conspire or attempt to commit, or act as an
             accomplice in the commission of, any offense of a type in
             which a criminal syndicate engages on a continuing basis;
      ....
      (3) As used in this section “criminal syndicate” means three (3) or
      more persons . . . collaborating to promote or engage in any of the
      criminal acts provided in subsection (4)(a) to (f) of this section on a
      continuing basis.

      (4) As used in this section, “criminal gang syndicate” means three
      (3) or more persons acting as a part of or members of a criminal
      gang and collaborating to promote or engage in any of the following
      on a continuing basis:
      ....
             (e) Illegal trafficking in controlled substances as prohibited
             by KRS Chapter 218A.

In this case, the Commonwealth alleged that the three members of the criminal

syndicate were Boyd, Silvano, and Bernauer.

                                         12
      Boyd argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence

that Boyd, Silvano, and Bernauer collaborated in trafficking in controlled

substances on an ongoing basis. Specifically, he notes that neither Bernauer

nor Silvano were charged with engaging in organized crime. He also notes that

both Silvano and Bernauer denied being a part of any criminal organization

during their trial testimony. They both also denied viewing Boyd as their boss

or employer. Finally, he points out that Silvano testified that she sold drugs to

enable her own drug addiction, not to further Boyd’s business, and that she

had different sources for the drugs that she sold. Boyd relies on Parker v.

Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 647 (Ky. 2009), and Edmonds v. Commonwealth,

906 S.W.2d 343 (Ky. 1995), to support his position, arguing that the facts of

his case are more like those in Parker than in Edmonds.

      In Parker v. Commonwealth, Parker argued that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of criminal syndication

(a prior version of the current engaging in organized crime charge). 291 S.W.3d

at 675. In that case, one of the co-conspirators testified that each of the

members of the gang at issue “did their own thing” when selling drugs. Id. at

676. Further, only three individuals were named as co-conspirators to the

trafficking offense (when the statute required five), and the trafficking offense

only involved a one-time drug deal, “not a continuing collaboration to sell

narcotics.” Id. We held, “It is simply beyond question that one incident

involving only three individuals is not sufficient to prove the existence of an

ongoing collaboration involving at least five individuals.” Id. at 677.

                                        13
      By contrast, in Edmonds v. Commonwealth, Edmonds lived in a residence

with the head of the “First Family,” an organization consisting of at least eight

people, including Edmonds. 906 S.W.2d at 347, 345. Both the manufacture

and sale of crack cocaine were being conducted at that residence. Id. at 345,

347. Edmonds was also present in an apartment where a search warrant was

executed, resulting in the seizure of cocaine, crack cocaine, marijuana, and

other evidence of drug trafficking. Id. at 345. Edmonds also went to New York

to purchase cocaine and frequently rented cars that were driven as part of the

criminal syndicate. Id. at 347. Based on the totality of the evidence, we

explained “that Edmonds either established, maintained or facilitated drug

trafficking activities in which the ‘First Family’ engaged on a continuing basis.

The members of the family numbered at least five as required by” the statute in

effect at the time. Id.

      We disagree with Boyd’s contention that the facts of his case are more

like Parker than Edmonds. At Boyd’s trial, evidence was admitted showing that

Silvano sold heroin that Boyd provided to her. Silvano testified that, although

she sold other types of drugs provided to her by other people, Boyd was her

sole supplier of heroin. Boyd also gave her advice on how to best operate her

drug business, including that she should make her customers wait for her and

always travel during rush hour. Silvano further testified that if Boyd did not

have any heroin, he would direct his customers to her. There were also text

messages admitted into evidence between Silvano and another man where the

man referenced Boyd telling him to call Silvano to get drugs while Boyd was

                                        14
out of town. Silvano also testified that she traveled with Boyd to Ohio to

procure drugs. Finally, Silvano testified that after she was arrested for

trafficking in drugs and released from jail, Boyd directed her to go through

Bernauer to receive drugs from Boyd.

      Bernauer, in turn, testified that he began running simple errands for

Boyd, but eventually began delivering packages to Silvano. He testified that

Boyd would give him a package, and Bernauer would then deliver it to Silvano.

He testified that this occurred between five and ten times. Bernauer further

testified that when Boyd was out of town, Bernauer would conduct

transactions for Boyd, including receiving the money and providing the

customer with pre-weighed drugs. Sometimes Boyd would pay Bernauer with

methamphetamine. Bernauer also testified that he took the money he received

from Silvano during the controlled buy with Matthew Kinkade back to Boyd.

Additionally, text messages were admitted in which Boyd directed people to go

to Bernauer to pick up drugs. Finally, there were numerous text messages and

phone calls between Boyd, Silvano, and Bernauer, including from the day of

the controlled buy, admitted into evidence.

      The two elements of the engaging in organized crime statute that Boyd

appears to allege were not satisfied are the collaboration element and the

continuing basis element. Regarding the collaboration element, this Court has

previously explained, “[C]ollaboration in the statute means simply collaborating

in the scheme, and it is not necessary for the Commonwealth to show that

each participant collaborating in the scheme collaborated with or even was

                                        15
aware of the collaboration of the other participants.” Commonwealth v. Phillips,

655 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Ky. 1983). In this case, Boyd, Silvano, and Bernauer certainly

were all aware of their respective roles in the operation. Silvano relied on Boyd

to supply her with heroin to sell, and Bernauer acted as a middleman between

Boyd and Silvano. Further, although neither Silvano nor Bernauer admitted to

being part of an organization, such recognition or intent is not relevant when

assessing the practical operations of the organization. See Commonwealth v.

Jones, 497 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Ky. 2016) (“[I]t is immaterial to our analysis

whether Jones subjectively knew he was forming a criminal syndicate.”). Based

on the totality of the evidence admitted, the Commonwealth presented

sufficient evidence of the collaboration element of the charge of engaging in

organized crime.

      We now turn to the continuing basis element. In order to prove the

activity occurred on a continuing basis, “[t]he Commonwealth is not held to

proving any specific number of incidents or any elements of time, but must

show by the proof what the jury could infer from the evidence as intent to

collaborate on a continuing basis.” Parker, 291 S.W.3d at 675 (quoting Phillips,

655 S.W.2d at 9). In this case, the Commonwealth presented evidence of

multiple instances of drug trafficking over a period of several months between

Boyd, Silvano, and Bernauer. This was sufficient to establish the continuing

basis element of the engaging in organized crime charge.

      Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Boyd’s motion for a

directed verdict on the engaging in organized crime charge. The Commonwealth

                                       16
presented more than a scintilla of evidence and presented sufficient evidence

that a reasonable jury could find Boyd guilty of that crime.

2. Trafficking in Heroin

      Boyd next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a

directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in heroin. Boyd notes that he was

never found in possession of heroin and argues that the “only evidence to

establish [he] was involved in any drug activity was self-serving testimony from

other drug users and their text messages.” He then spends the majority of his

analysis attacking the credibility of the witnesses who testified against him.

      Under KRS 218A.1412(1)(d), a person is guilty of trafficking in heroin

“when he or she knowingly and unlawfully traffics in . . . [a]ny quantity of

heroin.” “Traffic,” in turn, “means to manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell,

transfer, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a

controlled substance.” KRS 218A.010(56).

      In this case, Silvano testified that she repeatedly received heroin from

Boyd and then sold it to her customers. Although he claimed that he didn’t

know anything about heroin, Bernauer testified that he distributed packages

for Boyd. Specifically, Bernauer testified that on the day of the controlled buy,

he provided the package to Silvano, which Silvano testified contained heroin.

Finally, Mi.G. and Ma.G.3 both testified that they purchased heroin from Boyd.

      3   We use initials to protect the privacy of the witnesses.

                                             17
      It is solely the jury’s role to determine if it believes the witnesses

presented. See Eversole v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 209, 220 (Ky. 2020)

(“[A] jury is free to believe the testimony of one witness over the testimony of

others.” (citing Minter v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Ky. 2013))).

Given their finding of guilt on the trafficking in heroin charge, the jury must

have believed at least some of the testimony presented to it from Silvano,

Bernauer, Mi.G., and Ma.G., as was its prerogative.

      Finally, Boyd argues that because he was not found in possession of

heroin or methamphetamine, the Commonwealth did not present corroborating

physical evidence, and his motion for a directed verdict should have been

granted. He cites to no case that requires this level of proof, and his argument

is unavailing. Our Court has held that a “[c]onviction can be premised on

circumstantial evidence of such nature that, based on the whole case, it would

not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Rogers v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 303, 311 (Ky. 2010). The

Commonwealth’s case against Boyd was built on more than circumstantial

evidence, as multiple witnesses directly testified that they obtained heroin from

Boyd. Given this evidence, and viewing the evidence as a whole, it was not

clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Boyd guilty of trafficking in heroin.

Thus, the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a directed verdict.

3. Trafficking in Methamphetamine

      Boyd next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a

directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in methamphetamine. He again

                                         18
argues that because he was never found in possession of methamphetamine

and because the Commonwealth relied on the testimony of witnesses who Boyd

asserts were not credible, the trial court should have granted his motion for a

directed verdict.

      Under KRS 218A.1412(1)(e), a person is guilty of trafficking in

methamphetamine “when he or she knowingly and unlawfully traffics in . . .

[a]ny quantity of” methamphetamine. “Traffic,” in turn, “means to manufacture,

distribute, dispense, sell, transfer, or possess with intent to manufacture,

distribute, dispense, or sell a controlled substance.” KRS 218A.010(56).

      In this case, Silvano testified that she bought a personal use amount of

methamphetamine from Boyd on at least one occasion. Bernauer testified that

Boyd sometimes gave him methamphetamine as payment. Bernauer also

testified that he saw methamphetamine at the apartment from which Boyd sold

drugs and described how the methamphetamine was packaged. He also

testified that Boyd would leave methamphetamine in the apartment and that

Bernauer would give it to Boyd’s customers and receive the monetary payment.

Finally, multiple text messages were admitted into evidence from Boyd and

Bernauer referencing methamphetamine transactions.

      As previously explained, the jury was at liberty to believe whichever

witnesses it saw fit to believe. See Eversole, 600 S.W.3d at 220 (citing Minter,

415 S.W.3d at 618). It was also free to draw inferences from circumstantial

evidence presented to it. See Rogers, 315 S.W.3d at 311. This Court cannot

make credibility determinations on a review of a denial of a motion for directed

                                        19
verdict. See Benham, 816 S.W.2d 187. Given all of the evidence presented, it

was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Boyd guilty of trafficking in

methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a

directed verdict.

C. Motion for a Mistrial

      Boyd next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a

mistrial after Silvano testified that Boyd went to a court hearing in Ohio.

During Silvano’s testimony, the Commonwealth asked her if she knew where

Boyd obtained his drugs. She testified that one time she went with him to Ohio

to get drugs but that she was not with him the entire time. She explained that

for a period of time, she stayed in their hotel room while Boyd went to court.

Specifically, she stated, “He was supposed to have had a court hearing, and so

I stayed in the hotel room, when he went to, well when he was at court, and I

worked on his laundry.” Boyd immediately objected and requested a mistrial.

The trial court denied his motion for a mistrial and instead gave the jury the

following admonition:

      Ladies and gentlemen, there was a mention of a court date. That
      testimony is to be stricken and have no bearing whatsoever in any
      deliberation. I am directing you. Whether or not there was a court
      date or was not a court date is not relevant to this case at all.

This Court has

      long held that an admonition is usually sufficient to cure an
      erroneous admission of evidence, and there is a presumption that
      the jury will heed such an admonition. A trial court only declares a
      mistrial if a harmful event is of such magnitude that a litigant
      would be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect
      could be removed in no other way. Stated differently, the court
      must find a manifest, urgent, or real necessity for a mistrial. The
                                        20
      trial court has broad discretion in determining when such a
      necessity exists because the trial judge is “best situated
      intelligently to make such a decision.” The trial court's decision to
      deny a motion for a mistrial should not be disturbed absent an
      abuse of discretion.

Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 17 (Ky. 2005) (citations omitted).

A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is “arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principals.” English, 993

S.W.2d at 945 (citations omitted).

      In this case, Silvano’s reference to a court date in Ohio was fleeting. No

information was given to the jury about the reason Boyd had to go to court,

including whether the case was civil or criminal and whether he was a witness

or a party. In light of the presumption that the jury followed the trial court’s

admonition to disregard the evidence, the evidence was not so prejudicial that

it denied Boyd a fair and impartial trial. Therefore, we cannot hold that the trial

court abused its discretion in denying Boyd’s motion for a mistrial.

D. Exculpatory Evidence

      Boyd next argues that the Commonwealth committed a Brady violation

by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence and that the trial court failed to

provide him with an appropriate remedy. 4 On the second day of testimony,

Detective Rick Bessette testified that he first received information about Silvano

while investigating a manslaughter in Allen County, Kentucky.5 Towards the

end of trial, Detective Jason Lanham testified that he first heard Silvano’s

      4   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
      5   Warren County and Allen County border each other.

                                          21
name from detectives who were investigating the murder of Alyssa Rodriguez in

Allen County. He further testified that the detectives who were investigating

that crime were tracking down leads when they spoke to several drug addicts

who identified their heroin supplier as Silvano. That information was given to

Detective Lanham, who began surveilling Silvano. Eventually, that surveillance

led to a search warrant and, ultimately, to Silvano’s arrest in June 2019.

      After this testimony was elicited from Detective Lanham, Boyd’s counsel

requested a bench conference. Boyd’s counsel explained to the trial court that

he had never heard that Silvano’s name first came up in a manslaughter

investigation before Detective Bessette’s testimony at the beginning of the trial.

He argued that he had no way of knowing it was actually a murder

investigation and did not know the victim’s name until Detective Lanham had

just testified to it. He further alleged that based on his Google search, Silvano

was on surveillance video going into Rodriguez’s house.6 The Commonwealth

insisted that Silvano was not a murder suspect but instead that her name

came up as someone selling heroin.

      The trial court then questioned Detective Lanham outside the presence of

the jury and allowed Boyd to do the same. During this questioning, Detective

Lanham testified that Rodriguez’s murder had a marijuana nexus. He further

explained that during the course of the investigation into Rodriguez’s death,

detectives were led to “an addict house.” The people at this house told the

      6 Boyd argues to this Court that he could have used this information to further

impeach Silvano’s credibility had he known about it before she testified.

                                         22
detectives that the source of their heroin supply was Silvano. This was not the

house where the murder took place, and Silvano was never a suspect in the

homicide.

      Boyd then moved for the entirety of Silvano’s testimony to be stricken

from the record because the information about the death investigation was not

turned over to him before the trial. The trial court overruled that motion. Boyd

then moved for the trial court to prohibit Detective Lanham from testifying any

further, and the trial court denied that motion as well.

      The Commonwealth then continued its direct examination of Detective

Lanham. Following the direct examination, Boyd cross-examined Detective

Lanham. During this cross-examination, Boyd sought to connect Silvano more

directly to the murder of Rodriguez but was unsuccessful. Boyd even showed a

surveillance video of the murder scene and asked Detective Lanham if the

woman shown in the video “match[ed] the build and description” of Silvano.

Detective Lanham told the jury that, in his opinion, the woman in the video did

not look like Silvano. He also testified that he never asked Silvano if it was her

in the video.

      Boyd argues that by failing to disclose that Silvano’s name initially came

to the attention of police during a murder investigation, the Commonwealth

violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the United States

Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence

                                        23
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad

faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. This Court has made clear, however, that

      “Brady only applies to ‘the discovery, after trial, of information
      which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the
      defense.”’ Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 410 (Ky.
      2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427
      U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)).
      Consequently, when such information is disclosed at trial and the
      defense actively cross-examines on it, there is no Brady violation.
      Nunley v. Commonwealth, 393 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Ky. 2013).

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 471 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Ky. 2015). In this case, the

information about which Boyd complains came to his attention during his trial.

He was able to, and did, actively cross-examine Detective Lanham about the

murder investigation and Silvano’s connection to it. This Court knows of no

reason, and Boyd did not cite to any reason, why Boyd could not have also

recalled Silvano to the witness stand to question her about her connection to

the murder investigation and its impact on her tesimony. Accordingly, the

Commonwealth did not commit a Brady violation by failing to disclose evidence

that police first learned of Stephanie Silvano when investigating the murder of

Rodriguez, and the trial court did not err in denying Boyd’s motions to strike

the testimony of Silvano and prohibit further testimony from Detective

Lanham.

E. Cell Phone Suppression

      Boyd next argues that the information collected from his cell phone

should be suppressed because it was fruit of the poisonous tree of an illegal

traffic stop. To the trial court, he also argued that the stop was pretextual, that

                                        24
the seizure of his phone was illegal, and that there was an unreasonable delay

between the time police seized his phone and when they searched his phone.

However, he appears to have abandoned these additional claims on appeal.

      “The standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on a suppression motion

is two-fold. We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error, and deem

conclusive the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial

evidence.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Ky. 2011) (footnote

omitted). “Substantial evidence” means “evidence that when taken alone or

in light of all evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in

the minds of reasonable men.” Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 420

(Ky. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted). “[W]hen the findings of fact are

supported by substantial evidence, we review the court’s application of the law

to those facts de novo.” Bond v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Ky.

2015) (citation omitted). When doing so, “we take care ‘to give due weight to

inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement

officers.’” Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).

      In this case, the trial court described the facts leading to the traffic stop

of Boyd as follows:

      On November 22, 2019, the police received a call that two
      individuals had overdosed and was [sic] not breathing. One of
      those individuals, Joshua Kinkade, was pronounced dead a few
      hours later. During the investigation into the overdose death of Mr.
      Kinkade, detectives stopped and seized the phones of Stephanie
      Silvano, Scott Bernauer, and, ultimately, Defendant Tracy Boyd.
      Stephanie Silvano informed the police that she obtained Heroin
      from “C,” who they believed to be Tracy Boyd. She advised the
      officers that she had purchased Heroin from C at her apartment
      and that C drove a white Audi. As part of their investigation, some
                                        25
      officers watched her apartment and were looking for C. The
      detectives observed a white Audi driven by a man who fit Silvano’s
      description of C. The vehicle was stopped for having, what officers
      believed to be, an illegal tint and a temporary tag that was “hard to
      read.” Both the tint and tag were legal. . . . During the stop, officers
      learned that he had an E-Warrant and placed Mr. Boyd under
      arrest for a parole violation. Then, they asked for and seized his
      phone.

Boyd does not allege that any of the trial court’s factual findings were

erroneous. Thus, we deem them conclusive. See Williams, 364 S.W.3d at 68.

       To this Court, Boyd argues that his arrest and the seizure of his cell

phone and ultimate search of that phone were illegal because the police did not

have reasonable suspicion to stop him on the night in question. The trial court

disagreed. Instead, the trial court determined,

      [T]here was nothing illegal about Mr. Boyd’s tint or tag, but a
      homicide investigation including the statements of Silvano
      regarding his description and his vehicle as well as the appearance
      of an illegal tint, when combined with the totality of the other
      evidence available to the detectives, created a reasonable,
      articulable suspicion to support the conduct of an investigatory
      stop.

We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo, and we reach the same

conclusion. The officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Boyd.

      The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” However, “[a] police

officer may constitutionally conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer

has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Bauder

v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 588, 590–91 (Ky. 2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion requires “at least a minimal level of
                                        26
objective justification for making the stop” and is more than an

“unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Id. at 591 (citations and quotation

marks omitted). We have explained,

      Accordingly, the stop of an automobile and the resulting detention
      of the driver are unreasonable, under the Fourth Amendment,
      absent a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver is
      unlicensed, or that the automobile is not registered, or that either
      the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for
      violation of the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99
      S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). The court must consider the
      totality of the circumstances in determining whether a police
      officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that
      a person stopped may be involved in criminal activity. United
      States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d
      621 (1981).

Id.

      In this case, the police had information that a man named “C,” who

drove a white Audi and lived in a particular apartment, had sold drugs to

Silvano. Silvano in turn had sold those drugs to two people who had died of a

drug overdose. The police then observed a white Audi leaving the apartment

complex identified by Silvano. This information was sufficient to establish a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver of the white Audi was involved

in criminal activity.

      Further, the police officer who made the stop testified that he believed

the Audi’s window tint was too dark and that he could not see the temporary

license plate. The trial court found the officer’s testimony regarding his belief

that the window tint was illegal to be credible. On this basis alone, even if it

was pretextual, the police officer had a legal basis to stop the car. See Wilson v.

                                        27
Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001) (“[A]n officer who has probable

cause to believe a civil traffic violation has occurred may stop a vehicle

regardless of his or her subjective motivation in doing so.”) (citing United States

v. Akram, 165 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 1999); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.

806 (1996)). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the

results of Boyd’s cell phone search as fruit of the poisonous tree of an

unconstitutional traffic stop.

F. Text Messages

      Boyd next argues that the trial court erred in admitting text messages

between Bernauer and Brian Cage, Boyd’s uncle. He argues that the text

messages contained hearsay and that his inability to cross-examine Brian Cage

violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Boyd objected to the

admission of the text messages at trial. The trial court overruled his objection,

finding that the text messages were not offered for the truth of the matter

asserted but instead were offered to show Bernauer’s reaction and what he did

with the information he received from the text messages.

      The standard of review on evidentiary issues is abuse of discretion. Clark

v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007); Commonwealth v. English,

993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether

the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported

by sound legal principles.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d

575, 581 (Ky. 2000) (citing English, 993 S.W.2d at 945).

                                        28
      The text messages at issue are as follows, with the ellipses signifying a

change in date.

Brian Cage (BC): Is nephew still there my boy on his way

Scott Bernauer (SB): He is7

...

BC: Did y’all ever get good

SB: Not yet

BC: Still Nothing?

SB: Nope. What you trying to do?

BC: 3 basketball balls8

...

BC: U got any?

SB: Nope. We’re still all out

BC: Did anything ever happen

SB: I’m good now.9

BC: Nephew there

SB: No

...

BC: Are you good?

      7 After reading this text message to the jury, Bernauer explained that “nephew”
was a reference to Boyd.
      Bernauer then explained that “basketball” meant 8 balls, or 3.5 grams, of
      8

methamphetamine.
      9   Bernauer explained that “I’m good now” meant that he had some drugs.

                                          29
SB: I am

...

BC: Is everything Kool?

BC: Be there in 5 minutes

SB: He said he’s in [sic] his way10

...

BC: My guy on the way atleast [sic] we can play ball

BC: Kool?

SB: I don’t have that much of my own gotta call nephew and see if I can get it.

It’s here though.

BC: Ok.

SB: You get yours yet?

BC: I’ll have your 11.00 dollars when I come that way

SB: Cool. I’m good now to11

...

BC: U up

SB: Yep.

BC: Is nephew there

SB: I don’t know. He’s on the war path of killing me.

BC: Why?

      10   Bernauer clarified that he was referring to Boyd in this text message.
       11 Bernauer explained that in this string of text messages he and Cage were

talking about methamphetamine.

                                            30
BC: What happened

BC: U rather not say?

SB: He insists that I picked up some money if [sic] his that he lost last night in

the parking lot.12

BC: O wow why did it have to be you

BC: It could have been anybody

SB: Because I was the only one standing lookout at the time. So none of the

crack heads that came by could have done it.

BC: I needed a ride is why I was asking but I’ll call a cab I had a job to go to

last night

BC: How much was it

SB: Job?? You?? Miracles do happen.

BC: Lol

BC: Yea

SB: 3 or 4 hundred he said.

      Pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 802, “[h]earsay is not

admissible except as provided by these rules or by rules of the Supreme Court

of Kentucky.” “Hearsay” is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted.” KRE 801(c). This Court has held that “whether a

question contains an assertion, and thereby is a statement that could be

      12 Bernauer clarified that he was talking about the parking lot at the apartment

complex where he was living.

                                          31
subject to the hearsay rule, depends on the content of the question and the

circumstances surrounding its utterance.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 384

S.W.3d 117, 128 (Ky. 2012).

      In this case, very little context was provided regarding the text messages

between Bernauer and Brian Cage. Many of the text messages were questions.

Most of those questions did not rise to the level of an assertion such that they

fell within the hearsay rule. Some of the questions, however, arguably were

assertions. Further, some of Brian Cage’s text messages likely were not offered

for their truth, but instead were offered to show Bernauer’s reaction or

response to the message, as found by the trial court. Without additional

context, however, it is difficult to determine. Of all of Brian Cage’s text

messages, one was most likely to contain inadmissible hearsay: “3 basketball

balls.” Bernauer clarified in his testimony that “basketballs” referred to “8

balls” of methamphetamine, or 3.5 grams of methamphetamine. This is a clear

reference to drug activity and the most relevant of the text messages.

      We need not definitely determine whether any of these text messages

were admitted in error, however. Even if they were, such an error would be

harmless. This Court will deem an error in the admission of evidence harmless

“if we can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially

swayed by the error.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 595 (Ky.

2010). In this case, the jury heard evidence from multiple witnesses that Boyd

provided drugs to Silvano, Bernauer, and others. It further heard that Silvano

sold the heroin that Boyd provided to her, and that Boyd sometimes even

                                         32
referred his own customers to Silvano. The jury also heard that Bernauer ran

errands for Boyd, including delivering packages and accepting money in

exchange, and that Bernauer was often paid for these errands in

methamphetamine. It also heard that Bernauer acted as a middleman between

Boyd and Silvano after Silvano was arrested for trafficking. Given all of this and

the minimal relevance and prejudice of the text messages, “we can say with fair

assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by” any error that

may have occurred in the admission of the text messages. Id.

G. Cumulative Error

      Finally, Boyd argues his conviction should be reversed due to

cumulative error. Under the cumulative error doctrine, “multiple errors,

although harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative

effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313

S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). “Where, as in this case, however, none of the

errors individually raised any real question of prejudice, we have declined to

hold that the absence of prejudice plus the absence of prejudice somehow adds

up to prejudice.” Id. (citing Furnish v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 34 (Ky.

2002)). In this case, the only potential error we have identified is the admission

of Brian Cage’s text messages. That potential error alone did not render Boyd’s

trial fundamentally unfair, and there are no other errors to accumulate.

Accordingly, we hold there was no cumulative error in this case.

                                        33
                                III. CONCLUSION

     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Warren Circuit

Court.

     All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Kayla Danielle Deatherage
Molly Mattingly
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett
Assistant Attorney General

                                      34