Court Opinion

ID: 9953943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 08:11:29.187368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:57.049704
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued March 21, 2024

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00810-CR
                           ———————————
        YOJAN SANTIAGO HERNANDEZ MAGUEYAL, Appellant
                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 239th District Court
                           Brazoria County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 92403-CR

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Yojan Santiago Hernandez Magueyal was found guilty of murder

and sentenced to 53 years’ confinement. Magueyal raises two issues on appeal, that

the statement he made to police should not have been admitted, and that the
remaining evidence was insufficient to convict him of murder. Because any error

admitting the statement was harmless, we affirm.

                                    Background

      In June 2020, Sutton had scheduled a date with M. Reding, who he met on a

website called Secret Benefits. Reding, her boyfriend A. Hinojosa, and Magueyal

planned to rob Sutton during the date. Hinojosa drove them to Sutton’s home where

Reding distracted Sutton by taking drugs with him while Hinojosa and Magueyal

broke in. After entering Sutton’s home, Magueyal shot him in the leg. They tied

Sutton up and stole his truck, his guns, and other items.

      Later, Sutton’s roommate returned home from work and found Sutton lying

against the kitchen wall, bleeding. Sutton’s roommate called 911 and law

enforcement responded and secured the scene. Sutton died from blood loss caused

by the gunshot wound. Investigator H. Goolsby processed the scene, recovering a

.223 shell casing in Sutton’s home. The casing was later determined to have been

fired from Magueyal’s firearm. Goolsby also discovered a box of Spartan shotgun

shells in a bedroom in Sutton’s home, which were also found in Reding’s car and

Magueyal’s bedroom.

      Investigator J. Wolfe obtained a search warrant for Sutton’s phone, which led

him to Reding. A search of Reding’s car uncovered her phone and items from

Sutton’s home. Reding’s phone contained texts between her and Sutton showing that

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she had set up a date with him. There were also photos of Magueyal and Hinojosa

with guns in front of Reding’s car and an Instagram post from Hinojosa about being

“the ones that put that boy on the news,” as well as a picture of Sutton’s truck. There

was also a text that Reding had sent to her sister which had a photo of Sutton’s truck

with the message “Fuck no, he got a truck.” Reding confessed to law enforcement

and testified at trial about the contents of her phone and the details of the robbery

and murder.

      Law enforcement also obtained a search warrant for Magueyal’s home.

During the search, everyone in the home, including Magueyal, was handcuffed. In

Magueyal’s room they found the murder weapon, a jar from Sutton’s home, .223

ammunition, Spartan shotgun shells, and two other firearms.

      During the search, Investigator A. Kerstens approached Magueyal while

Magueyal was handcuffed alongside his family members, and asked if Magueyal

would like to speak with him, to which Magueyal replied, “Yes.” Magueyal was then

interrogated for about 79 minutes in a bedroom with the door closed. Before starting

the interrogation, Investigator Kerstens set up audio recording devices, removed

Magueyal’s handcuffs, told him that he was not under arrest, he was free to leave at

any time, and that “[Magueyal] could go off at any time.” Magueyal confirmed that

he understood and that he knew this was “procedure.” Investigator Kerstens then

confirmed that Magueyal had recently just turned 16 years old and told him that he

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believed “some adults got [Magueyal] into something.” Magueyal confirmed that he

knew Reding and Hinojosa, but said they had a falling out and had not seen them

since July.

      But Investigator Kerstens pushed Magueyal to give him more information,

stating, “you know about [the robbery], I know you know about it.” Magueyal denied

any knowledge of it. Magueyal also denied owning any firearms, but he later

admitted that he bought a silencer from Hinojosa and the murder weapon from

another friend. Magueyal asserted that he had never fired any weapons but had at

times held them during drug deals he did with Hinojosa. Throughout the

interrogation, Magueyal denied any knowledge of the robbery other than that

Hinojosa was trying to sell an engine at some point. But Investigator Kerstens

confronted Magueyal with Reding’s statement that he was with her and Hinojosa

during the robbery and murder. Magueyal explained that it must be because of the

falling out he had with Hinojosa. Near the end of the interrogation, Magueyal stated

that he would let Investigator Kerstens know if he learned any information about

Hinojosa, and the interrogation ended shortly after.

      A search warrant was obtained for Magueyal’s cellphone, and location data

revealed that it was near Sutton’s home on the night of the murder. A video on

Magueyal’s phone had his voice on it and showed several items stolen from Sutton’s

home. There were also photos of the firearms stolen from Sutton’s home, as well as

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the murder weapon, all taken hours after the murder. The day after the murder,

Magueyal and Hinojosa posed for more pictures with the stolen guns.

      A text conversation between Magueyal and Hinojosa showed them discussing

splitting the profits from the robbery. Another text chain from July 2020 showed

Magueyal arguing with Hinojosa over items from the robbery. Magueyal states, “[I]

did the fucken dirt . . . U got more out of it then me” to which Hinojosa responds,

“U ain’t have to do shit . . . It was my lick . . . U said u wanted to pop em not me.”

      Magueyal, who was a juvenile at the time of the murder, was certified to stand

trial as an adult and charged with Sutton’s murder. At trial, Magueyal moved to

suppress his statement to Investigator Kerstens, but the trial court denied his motion.

No fingerprints or DNA matching Magueyal’s was found at Sutton’s home or

Reding’s car, the murder weapon was not tested, and Magueyal did not testify at

trial. The jury found Magueyal guilty and sentenced him to 53 years’ confinement.

                                Motion to Suppress

A.    Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of

discretion under a bifurcated standard. See Wexler v. State, 625 S.W.3d 162, 167

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Roquemore v. State, 11 S.W.3d 395, 398 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2000) (op. on reh’g) (“[i]ssues concerning a juvenile’s

confession, although raised in a criminal forum, are controlled by the Family

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Code.”). When the police obtain a confession from a juvenile before a magistrate

has read him his rights, an appellate court evaluates whether the juvenile was in

custody by (1) examining the factual circumstances surrounding the interrogation,

and (2) making a legal determination about whether a reasonable person would have

felt free to terminate the encounter and leave. See In re J.J., 651 S.W.3d 385, 389

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (en banc) (citing State v. Saenz,

411 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). An appellate court gives almost total

deference to the trial court’s assessments of historical fact and conclusions that turn

on credibility, but we review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not

turn on credibility, such as the legal determination of whether the juvenile was in

custody when he confessed. Id. at 389–90.

      Because the trial court denied the motion to suppress without any findings of

fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling and assume the

trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling if those findings are

supported by the record. Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167. We will uphold the trial court’s

ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable

to the case. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

B.    Harm Analysis

      Assuming, without deciding, the trial court erred when it admitted Magueyal’s

statement, we review the alleged error for harm. In a criminal case, the erroneous

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denial of a motion to suppress a statement taken in violation of Miranda1 is

constitutional error subject to review under the standard in Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 44.2(a). See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Under Rule 44.2(a), “[i]f the

appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional error that is subject to

harmless error review, the court of appeals must reverse a judgment of conviction or

punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did

not contribute to the conviction or punishment.” Id.

         The emphasis of the harm analysis is not whether the evidence supported the

verdict. Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Instead, the

question is the likelihood that the constitutional error was actually a contributing

factor in the jury’s deliberations in arriving at that verdict.” Id. In determining this,

we may consider (1) whether the statement was cumulative of other evidence, (2)

the importance of the statement to the State’s case, (3) the probable weight a juror

would place upon the statement, (4) the existence of evidence corroborating or

contradicting the statement on material points, and (5) the overall strength of the

State’s case. See id.; Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 777–78 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003). After considering these factors, the reviewing court must be able to declare,

beyond a reasonable doubt, “that the error did not contribute to the conviction”

before it can affirm it. Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690–91.

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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      The State offered testimony from a co-conspirator, as well as incriminating

photos, texts, cell phone location data, video, and physical evidence:

         • Reding testified that she knew Magueyal through his friendship with
           Hinojosa;

         • Reding testified that Magueyal participated in the robbery and murder;

         • Reding testified that Magueyal shot Sutton with a large firearm;

         • A photo of Magueyal and Hinojosa with guns in front of Reding’s car;

         • An Instagram post from Hinojosa including the photo of Magueyal and
           Hinojosa posing with guns in front of Reding’s car with the caption
           “[w]e the ones that put that boy on the news . . . .”;

         • A .223 shell casing found in Sutton’s home determined to have been
           fired from Magueyal’s .300 blackout.

         • A box of Spartan shotgun shells in Sutton’s home, some of which were
           also found in Reding’s vehicle and Magueyal’s room;

         • The murder weapon was found in Magueyal’s bedroom;

         • An empty jar from Sutton’s home was found in Magueyal’s bedroom;

         • .223 ammunition was found in Magueyal’s bedroom;

         • Magueyal’s cellphone location data revealed he was near Sutton’s
           home on the night of the murder;

         • Magueyal’s cellphone contained a video that had his voice on it and
           showed several items stolen from Sutton’s home;

         • Magueyal’s cellphone contained photos of stolen firearms from
           Sutton’s home and of Magueyal and Hinojosa posing with them;

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           • Magueyal’s cellphone contained photos of the murder weapon taken
             shortly after the murder;

           • Text messages between Magueyal and Hinojosa discussing stolen items
             from Sutton’s home and splitting the profits from the robbery;

           • Text messages between Magueyal and Hinojosa arguing over items
             from the robbery including a text from Magueyal to Hinojosa stating,
             “I did the fucken dirt . . . U got more out of it then me.”

      Magueyal’s statement to law enforcement denied his involvement and

confirmed information obtained from his phone:

           • Magueyal knew Reding and Hinojosa;

           • Magueyal denied having seen Reding or Hinojosa since July;

           • Magueyal denied involvement in the robbery;

           • Magueyal denied having ever shot a firearm; and

           • Magueyal admitted owning the murder weapon.

      1.      Whether the statement was cumulative

      Magueyal’s statement contained little cumulative evidence. This is in part

because his statement contains little information relevant to the robbery and murder.

Much of the interrogation is spent discussing dog ownership, working, hunting, and

gun ownership generally. Magueyal’s statement also included denials that Magueyal

took part in the robbery and murder, that he knew Reding and Hinojosa, and that he

owned the murder weapon. Magueyal’s statement about his relationship with Reding

and Hinojosa was cumulative evidence because it went toward establishing a

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relationship between the three robbers, which Reding also testified to. As for

ownership of the firearm, while not cumulative, it is merely circumstantial evidence

that Magueyal participated in the murder. The ownership of the murder weapon ties

Magueyal to the murder no more than his possession of it does. And his possession

was established through law enforcement’s search of his bedroom, not through his

statement.

      2.     The importance of the statement to the State’s case and strength
             of the case

      The State presented overwhelming evidence outside of Magueyal’s statement.

Reding’s testimony implicated Magueyal as an active participant in the robbery and

as the shooter. Magueyal’s cellphone location data put him near the location of the

murder when the robbery and murder occurred. Magueyal’s cellphone also

contained photos of him posing with items stolen from Sutton’s home and photos of

the murder weapon. It also had text messages from Magueyal to Hinojosa discussing

the robbery, arguing over how to split the stolen items, and Magueyal’s admission

that he “did the fucken dirt.” The search of Magueyal’s bedroom also uncovered the

murder weapon and multiple stolen items from Sutton’s home. Additionally, the

State’s closing arguments only referred to Magueyal’s interrogation once, stating,

“He lied to you about having guns . . . . He eventually admitted to having [the]

murder weapon . . . . before the offense had occurred.” Magueyal’s statement was

unimportant to the State’s case because the State relied heavily on other evidence

                                        10
and did not emphasize the statement. Compare Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 694 (nearly

entire jury argument constituted intensive debate between the parties about

corroboration of defendant’s improperly admitted statement), with Heath v. State,

No. 01-19-00794-CR, 2021 WL 4095243, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Sept. 9, 2021, pet. ref’d) (any error was harmless, in part, because challenged

cellphone report was not emphasized by State, State did not ask witnesses about the

contents of it, and it was not a critical piece of evidence connecting defendant to

crime).

      3.     The probable weight a juror would place on the statement

      The statement likely held little weight with the jury. Magueyal did not confess.

He never admitted any involvement in the robbery or murder. Throughout the

interrogation, Magueyal was consistent. Even when Investigator Kerstens

confronted him and told him that others had implicated him, he denied involvement.

While the jury did request to review his statement during its determination of guilt,

the only unique information in the statement was that Magueyal admitted owning

the murder weapon. But ownership of the murder weapon does not directly show

that Magueyal committed the murder. Moreover, there was other more significant

circumstantial evidence supporting the verdict, such as Reding testifying that

Magueyal was the shooter, and photos on Magueyal’s cellphone of stolen items from

Sutton’s home and of the murder weapon.

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      And most importantly, there was evidence of Magueyal arguing with Hinojosa

over the profits from the crime where Magueyal stated, “I did the fucken dirt . . . U

got more out of it then me” and Hinojosa responded, “U ain’t have to do shit . . . It

was my lick . . . U said u wanted to pop em not me.” Because of the significant

amount of other inculpatory evidence, the statement likely held little to no weight

with the jury on a material issue. See Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 777 (error is harmless

unless reasonable likelihood it materially affected jury’s deliberations).

      4.     The existence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the
             statement

      First, Magueyal’s ownership of the murder weapon was corroborated by

photos and where the weapon was found. Second, Magueyal’s relationship with

Reding and Hinojosa was corroborated by Reding’s testimony and Magueyal’s text

messages. Finally, Magueyal’s denial of being in contact with Reding and Hinojosa

and his denial of involvement in the robbery and murder were contradicted by

Reding’s testimony, Magueyal’s text messages, and Sutton’s stolen items recovered

from Magueyal’s home.

      To reach its verdict, the jury must have disbelieved Magueyal’s denials to

Investigator Kerstens and given more weight to the other evidence implicating

Magueyal. See Foyt v. State, 602 S.W.3d 23, 45 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2020, pet. ref’d) (“although appellant’s falsehoods tend to incriminate him,” error in

admitting statements was harmless given other evidence); Watson v. State, No. 01-

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21-00281-CR, 2023 WL 4239869, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 29,

2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (admission of statement

was harmless error where jury disbelieved appellant’s denial of involvement in

murder); but see Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)

(falsehoods can be probative of guilt). Considering the evidence, the statement’s lack

of importance to the State’s case, and the likely weight a jury would place on the

statement favor our conclusion that any error in denying the motion to suppress was

harmless because admitting Magueyal’s statement did not affect the integrity of the

trial. See Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 782; see Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690 (reviewing court

must be satisfied to level of confidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that error did not

contribute to conviction to conclude that error was harmless).

      We overrule Magueyal’s first issue. Accordingly, we need not address his

remaining argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Sarah Beth Landau
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas-Molloy.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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