Court Opinion

ID: 9839690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 19:04:12.248831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:01.698891
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 In re L.J. CA4/2
See Dissenting Opinion
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re L.J., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                           E080296

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.No. J287021)

 v.                                                                      OPINION

 S.M.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Vincent Uberti and Elena S. Min, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for

Defendant and Appellant.

         Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and David Guardado, Deputy County Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                                   I. INTRODUCTION

       Defendant and appellant S.M. (Mother) appeals from the December 1, 2022 orders

terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child, L.J. (born in October 2020), and

selecting adoption as L.J.’s permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1 Mother

raises two claims of error in this appeal. First, Mother claims plaintiff and respondent

San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) violated Mother’s due

process rights by “cancel[ing]” Mother’s visits with L.J. without a court order for nearly

six months (between June 2 and October 25, 2022) before the December 1, 2022 section

366.26 hearing. Mother claims her inability to visit L.J. during this period prevented her

from developing a beneficial relationship with L.J. and, on that basis, from avoiding the

termination of her parental rights by showing that the parental-benefit exception to

adoption applied to her relationship with L.J. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

       We conclude that Mother forfeited her due process claim by failing to raise it in

the juvenile court. Alternatively, we agree with CFS that any error CFS made in

cancelling Mother’s visits was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Given L.J.’s young

age and the entire record, including Mother’s record of cancelling visits and not engaging

with L.J. during visits before June 2, 2022, there is no reasonable possibility Mother

could have forged a beneficial relationship with L.J., such that the loss of the relationship

through the termination of Mother’s parental rights would have harmed L.J. more than

       1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                              2
adoption would have benefited L.J. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631, 634,

640.)

        Second, Mother claims CFS failed to discharge its duty of inquiry under sections

224.2, subdivisions (a), (b) and (c), by asking L.J.’s father D.J., and L.J.’s paternal and

maternal extended family members, whether L.J. may be an “Indian child” under the

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We conclude there

was no ICWA inquiry error. Thus, we affirm the section 366.26 orders.

                              II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

A. L.J.’s Detention, the Protective Custody Warrant, and Section 300 Petition

        L.J. came to the attention of CFS shortly after L.J. was born in October 2020. L.J.

had no health concerns, but Mother tested positive for controlled substances during her

pregnancy with L.J. Mother had five older children and was receiving reunification

services for four of those children in open dependency cases in San Bernardino County.

When L.J. was two days old, CFS took L.J. into protective custody pursuant to a

protective custody warrant (§ 340, subd. (b)(2)) and placed L.J. in temporary foster care.

        Shortly thereafter, CFS filed a petition alleging L.J. was at risk because Mother

had anger management and mental health issues, including bipolar disorder and anxiety

disorder; Mother had engaged in domestic violence in the presence of her older children;

and Mother lived an unsafe and unstable lifestyle. (§ 300, subd. (b).) L.J.’s four older

siblings were removed from Mother due to similar concerns. (§ 300, subd. (j).) The

identity and whereabouts of L.J.’s father was unknown; thus, the ability of L.J.’s father to

provide for L.J. could not be assessed. (§ 300, subd. g).)

                                              3
B. The Detention Hearing; Mother Denies Native American Ancestry

       At the detention hearing on October 21, 2020, Mother was present and denied any

Native American ancestry. On the same day, Mother signed “Parent: Family Find and

ICWA Inquiry” and “Parental Notification of Indian Status” forms, indicating it was

unknown whether Mother had or may have Native American ancestry, and Mother had

no Native American ancestry as far as she knew. In earlier proceedings for her older

children, Mother denied Native American ancestry.

       At the October 21, 2020 detention hearing, Mother identified D.J. as L.J.’s father,

the same father as J.J. and N.J., two of Mother’s older children. D.J. was not present.

Mother was granted visitation for L.J., once weekly for two hours or twice weekly for

one hour, to be supervised by CFS or its delegate. On November 2, the court terminated

Mother’s and D.J.’s services in the other cases, including in the cases for J.J. and N.J., but

the court granted Mother six additional months of services under the permanent plans for

her four older children.

C. Jurisdiction and Disposition

       In November 2020, CFS reported that, in the proceedings for the older children in

November 2019, D.J. said he was unsure whether he had Native American ancestry. In

April 2020, D.J.’s sister (L.J.’s paternal aunt) said, “ ‘I don’t think so, no,’ ” when CFS

asked her whether she was aware of any Native American ancestry in D.J.’s family. In

September 2020, L.J.’s maternal grandmother said “her family” had no Native American

ancestry. In November 2020, Mother was unemployed, living with the maternal

grandmother, and had no permanent home for herself and her children. D.J. did not

                                              4
participate in his court-ordered case plan for J.J. and N.J. and, in November 2020, CFS

was unable to reach D.J. by phone.

       On November 12, 2020, Mother was present at the jurisdiction and disposition

hearing for L.J. D.J. was not present. The court sustained amended allegations of the

petition, declared L.J. a dependent, and ordered L.J. removed from parental custody.

Mother was granted reunification services and unsupervised, weekly, four-hour visits

with L.J. The court bypassed services for D.J., finding D.J. was a mere biological father

of L.J. and that it was not in L.J.’s best interest to offer D.J. services. (§ 361.5, subd.

(b)(10).) The court found that ICWA did not apply to L.J. L.J. remained in foster care.

D. The Six-month Review (May 2021)

       At the six-month review hearing on May 12, 2021, the court extended Mother’s

services for L.J. to the 18-month, statutory time limit in April 2022 (§ 366.21, subd. (h)),

and continued Mother’s weekly, four-hour, unsupervised visits with L.J. Mother’s

unsupervised visits with L.J. were being held currently with Mother’s visits with

Mother’s older children, including J.J. and N.J.

       In May 2021, CFS reported that Mother’s anger management skills had “improved

a great deal,” but Mother still had “work to do.” CFS identified Mother’s anger as “the

safety threat that still needs to be addressed.” In particular, Mother had difficulty

controlling her anger with CFS staff and with caregivers. At a December 21, 2020 visit,

Mother “berat[ed]” J.J.’s caregiver for not handing J.J. to Mother before the caregiver

had checked in J.J. at the CFS office, even though Mother had been “previously advised”

that the caregivers were to check the children in before handing them to Mother. Mother

                                               5
also brought D.J. to the December 21 visit even though D.J. was not supposed to be there.

In an April 1, 2021 visit, Mother yelled at the daughter of J.J.’s caregiver, claiming the

daughter had threatened Mother.

E. The 12-month Review (March 2022)

       The 12-month review hearing was originally scheduled for November 9, 2021, but

it was set contested and ultimately held on March 21, 2022. In November 2021, CFS was

seeking to terminate Mother’s services and set a section 366.26 hearing for L.J. In July

2021, L.J. was moved to the foster home where J.J. and N.J. had been living, which later

became L.J.’s prospective adoptive home. Also in July 2021, Mother’s visits, which

were still unsupervised, were moved from CFS’s office to a restaurant. Through

Mother’s older children, CFS learned that Mother was allowing D.J. to attend Mother’s

visits at the restaurant. Mother initially denied that D.J. was attending visits.

       In November 2021, CFS reported that Mother had not been taking full advantage

of her visitation time with L.J. On more than two occasions, Mother asked L.J.’s

caretaker to pick up L.J. early from the visit, claiming L.J. had a fever, but L.J.’s

temperature was normal after the visit. More recently, Mother had been cancelling her

visits 60 to 90 minutes before the visits were to begin. During a visit on

February 28, 2022, Mother allowed D.J. to speak with J.J. on the phone, even though

Mother had been advised not to allow D.J. access to the children.

       CFS also reported that Mother was not benefiting from her services. In addition to

Mother’s anger management issues, CFS was concerned about Mother’s “unspecified

relationship/contact” with D.J. and her history of allowing D.J. unauthorized access to the

                                              6
children, given the parents’ history of domestic violence. CFS considered D.J. a “safety

threat” because he had not participated in services to address his domestic violence, anger

management, and substance abuse issues.

       D.J. first appeared in the proceedings for L.J. at the 12-month review hearing on

March 21, 2022. In response to the court’s questions, D.J. said he was unsure whether he

had Native American ancestry, but he did not believe and no one had ever told him that

he had any Native American ancestry. D.J. denied that he or any of his family members

were members of or were enrolled in any tribe; he had no family members who were

born, lived, or died on a reservation; and none of his living relatives had ever told him he

was a descendant of a member of a tribe. Based on this inquiry, the court found “no

reason to know or believe” L.J. was an Indian child. (§ 224.2.) On March 21, D.J.

completed “family find” and “parental notification” forms consistent with his statements

at the March 21 hearing.

       Due to the late timing of the March 21, 2022 12-month review hearing, at the

hearing, the parties stipulated and the court ordered Mother’s services continued to the

April 13, 2022, 18-month review hearing. But on March 21, the court reduced the

duration of Mother’s weekly visits from four hours to two hours and changed the visits

from unsupervised to supervised by CFS. The court authorized D.J. to have monthly,

two-hour supervised visits with L.J., separately from Mother.

F. The 18-month Review (April 2022)

       At the 18-month review hearing on April 13, 2022 (§ 366.22), the court placed

further restrictions on both parents’ visits, including no cell phone use and no bringing

                                             7
snacks for the children. CFS again recommended that the court terminate Mother’s

services and set a section 366.26 hearing for L.J. The court continued the hearing to June

2 and combined it with the June 2 section 366.26 hearing for Mother’s four older

children, including J.J. and N.J.

       In April 2022, CFS reported that Mother paid very little attention to L.J. during

visits, and L.J. “w[a]nders around the visitation room entertaining herself.” At the June 2

hearings, L.J.’s caregiver, who began supervising Mother’s visits with L.J. in July 2021,

explained that L.J. was “like an infant” in July 2021, so Mother would just “put [L.J.] in a

[car seat]” and not be “very interactive” with L.J, but Mother was “very active” with J.J.

and N.J. By February or March 2022, L.J. spoke “like she is [a two-year old].” At that

time, Mother was “a little” more interactive with L.J., but Mother’s “focus” was “really

on” J.J. and N.J. When L.J. needed something during visits, L.J. would “go to the

caregiver” instead of Mother. L.J. was “thriving and blossoming” in her caregiver’s

home with J.J. and N.J., and the caregiver was willing to adopt L.J.

       CFS also reported that Mother still had not benefited from her services. CFS

opined that L.J. would be unsafe if returned to Mother given Mother’s unresolved anger

management and domestic violence issues, L.J.’s “vulnerability” to “resource conditions”

in the home Mother shared with the maternal grandmother, and the maternal

grandmother’s “past CFS history and child endangerment charges.” During an April 26

visit, Mother brought chocolate for the children despite the April 13 order not to bring

any snacks for the children. On May 5, Mother cancelled her visit for the day, claiming

her ride had a flat tire.

                                             8
        At the June 2, 2022 hearings, Mother presented evidence that she had blocked

D.J.’s calls to her phone and had obtained a temporary restraining order against D.J. on

May 23. The court found that Mother had completed her services but there was “still no

benefit or protection.” The court terminated Mother’s services, set a section 366.26

hearing for L.J., and reduced the frequency of Mother’s weekly, supervised, two-hour

visits to twice monthly. In the other dependency cases, the court terminated parental

rights to three of Mother’s four older children, including J.J. and N.J. On June 14, the

court granted Mother’s request for a permanent restraining order against D.J., for one

year, through June 14, 2023. As of September 26, 2022, Mother had been unable to serve

the permanent order on D.J.

G. The Section 366.26 Hearing (September 29, 2022)

        In its section 366.26 report, filed on September 19, 2022, CFS recommended that

the court terminate parental rights to L.J. and select adoption as L.J.’s permanent plan.

The section 366.26 hearing was set contested and was continued from September 29 to

December 1, 2022. The September 19 report noted L.J. had made “great strides” in her

development with her caregivers, who were now her prospective adoptive parents. L.J.

had “a large vocabulary for her age” and spoke “in long sentences.” The prospective

adoptive parents were in the process of adopting J.J. and N.J., and L.J. was bonded to

them.

        In the September 19, 2022 report, CFS wrote that L.J. had had only one visit with

Mother during the post-June 2 reporting period, namely, a supervised video call “on

July 18, 2020.” The 2020 date appears to be a typo; the video call must have occurred on

                                             9
July 18, 2022. In another part of the report, CFS wrote L.J. “ha[d] not had contact or

visits with the birth parents or extended relatives,” but CFS appears to have meant that

there had been no in person visits since June 2, 2022.

       On September 26, 2022, Mother filed a section 388 petition asking the court to

reinstate her reunification services for L.J. Mother argued there were changed

circumstances because she had ended her “domestic violence relationship” with D.J. by

obtaining the temporary restraining order on May 23. Mother argued it would be in L.J.’s

best interest to reinstate Mother’s services because Mother and L.J. were “closely

bonded” and shared “a close relationship.”

       In her petition, Mother did not address her visitation with L.J. But in court on

September 29, 2022, Mother’s counsel told the court that Mother had been “constantly

contacting the department, her former worker, attempting to get visits with [L.J.] and has

constantly been rebuffed every time.” Mother’s counsel asked the court to order CFS to

“follow up” with Mother so Mother could visit L.J. The court ordered county counsel to

make sure “they [(the social worker and CFS staff)] understand there is still a visitation

order.” Counsel for D.J. told the court that D.J. had been having “the same problem”—

contacting CFS about visiting his children and no one would return his calls. The court

encouraged the parents’ counsel to address their concerns through meetings or e-mails

with CFS.

       In an interim review report, filed on November 30, 2022, CFS asked the court to

deny Mother’s section 388 petition. In a November 29 interview, Mother told CFS that

she had not been in a relationship with D.J. since June 2020. Mother was living with the

                                             10
maternal grandmother and was seven months’ pregnant with a child who was not D.J.’s

child. Mother did not know the identity of the father of her current child, saying she

“went on a depression swing and did a bunch of stuff.” After her new child was born,

Mother planned to get a job, even though she had scoliosis, arthritis, and a learning

disability that caused her to “have a hard time getting a job.” Mother planned to move

out of state. She said, “I’m not staying in California so you can rip my baby away from

me like you guys did with my other kids and me kill myself for it.”

       Regarding Mother’s visits, the November 30, 2022 report repeated the statement

in the September 19 report, that Mother had a “supervised video call” with L.J., “on July

18, 2020 for about 20 minutes.” Again, the correct date appears to have been July 18,

2022. In addition, on October 25, 2022, Mother began having in person, supervised

visits with L.J., twice monthly, on the first and third Tuesday of every month, for two

hours at a CFS office. In the November 30 report, CFS did not explain why, apart from

the July 18 video call, Mother did not visit L.J. between June 2 and October 25. But CFS

argued that Mother did not have a bond with L.J. “due to Mother not visiting” L.J. “for

over 6 months until recently, as stated” in the report.

       At the December 1, 2022 section 366.26 hearing, the court denied Mother’s

section 388 petition, after concluding the petition did not make a prima facie showing of

changed circumstances or that L.J.’s best interests would be served by granting Mother

additional reunification services. Next, the court proceeded to the section 366.26 hearing

and accepted CFS’s reports into evidence.

                                             11
       Mother testified she had been visiting L.J. “through last week or the week before

that,” but claimed CFS had “cancelled all” of her visits since her parental rights to J.J.

and N.J. were terminated on June 2, 2022. During the recent visits, L.J. “smiled at” and

“walked to” Mother, Mother and L.J. played with stuffed animals, and L.J. would sit on

Mother’s lap and would hug Mother. When asked what L.J. called Mother, Mother said

L.J. “doesn’t really talk.” L.J. did not react emotionally at the beginnings or the ends of

her visits with Mother.

       Mother’s counsel argued that the parental-benefit exception to adoption applied

based on Mother’s bond with L.J. Thus, Mother’s counsel asked the court to place L.J. in

a long-term guardianship rather than select adoption as L.J.’s permanent plan and

terminate parental rights to L.J. The court found that the parental-benefit exception did

not apply, selected adoption as L.J.’s permanent plan, and terminated parental rights to

L.J. Mother timely appealed.

                                     III. DISCUSSION

A. Mother Forfeited Her Due Process Claim, and Any Error in Cancelling Mother’s

Visits Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

       Mother claims CFS violated her due process rights by “cancelling ” her visits with

L.J. after June 2, 2022—the date the court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her

older children, terminated Mother’s reunification services for L.J., and reduced the

frequency of Mother’s two-hour, CFS-supervised visits with L.J. from weekly to

bimonthly. Mother claims CFS “ ‘rebuffed’ ” Mother’s “constant” attempts to schedule

visits with L.J. after June 2 and did not allow Mother to resume her visits with L.J. until

                                             12
shortly before the December 1 section 366.26 hearing. Mother claims the cancelled visits

prevented Mother from showing she had a parental bond with L.J. and from avoiding the

termination of Mother’s parental rights, by showing that the parental-benefit exception to

the preference for adoption and termination of parental rights applied to her relationship

with L.J. (§ 366.16, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

       We conclude Mother forfeited her due process claim because she did not raise it in

the juvenile court before or at the time of the section 366.26 hearing. Alternatively, we

conclude that any CFS error in denying Mother visitation with L.J. after June 2, 2022 was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Any cancelled visits between June 2. and October

25, when the record shows Mother resumed visiting L.J., could not have affected the

court’s ruling that the parental-benefit exception did not apply.

       1. Legal Principles

       “The federal and state Constitutions guarantee that no state shall deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993)

5 Cal.4th 295, 306-307.) Although “due process” guarantees apply to dependency

proceedings, the concept of due process cannot be precisely defined. (In re Dakota H.

(2005) 132 CalApp.4th 212, 222.) In determining the process that is due in a particular

case, the court evaluates three elements: the private interests at stake, the government’s

interest, and the risk the procedures used will lead to an erroneous decision. (Lassiter v.

Dep’t of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18, 27; In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351,

359.) “The private interest at stake in a dependency proceeding is enormous. A parent’s

interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children is a

                                             13
fundamental civil right. Children, too, have a compelling independent interest in

belonging to their natural family. [Citation.] In addition, each child has a compelling

interest to live free from abuse and neglect in a stable, permanent, placement with an

emotionally committed caregiver. [Citation.] The government’s interest in a child’s

welfare is [also] significant. ‘[T]he welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a

state has not only a right, but a duty, to protect.’ ” (In re Dakota H., at p. 223.)

       In dependency proceedings, courts balance the competing interests of parents,

children, and the government. Until reunification services are terminated and the section

366.26 hearing is set, “the parents’ interest in reunification is given precedence over a

child’s need for stability and permanency.” (In re Julia U. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 532,

543.) But after reunification services are terminated and the section 366.26 hearing is set,

the focus of the dependency proceedings shifts from the parents’ interest in reunification

to the child’s interest in permanency and stability. (In re Dakota H., supra,

132 Cal.App.4th at p. 223; In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309.) After

reunification services are terminated, a parent still has a due process right to visitation

unless the court finds the parent’s visits would be detrimental to the child. (In re Hunter

S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504; § 366.21. subd. (h).) “Meaningful visitation is

pivotal to the parent-child relationship, even after reunification services are terminated.”

(Hunter S., at p. 1504; see In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 49.)

       Our Supreme Court has held that the statutory procedures used for termination of

parental rights satisfy due process requirements only because of the demanding

requirements and multiple safeguards built into the procedures. (Cynthia D. v. Superior

                                              14
Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 256; In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 307-308; In re

Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) “If a parent is denied those safeguards

through no fault of her own, her due process rights are compromised.” (In re Hunter S.,

at p. 1504.) Likewise, the erroneous denial of parent-child visitation, after reunification

services are terminated, “compromises a parent’s due process rights to litigate and

establish” the parental-benefit exception to the adoption preference. (In re Valerie A.

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1007.) “Courts have long recognized that . . . a lack of

visitation may ‘virtually assure[] the erosion (and termination) of any meaningful

relationship’ between mother and child.” (In re Hunter S. at p. 1504.)

       The parental-benefit exception applies if, “[t]he court finds a compelling reason

for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” because “the parents

have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit

from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) To establish the

exception, a parent must prove three elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

“(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which

would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be

detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631; In re Valerie A.,

supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007 [noting preponderance of evidence standard of proof].)

       In enacting the parental-benefit exception, the Legislature “provided a means by

which even a parent to whose custody a child cannot currently be returned has a final

chance to avoid termination of parental rights if she can show she has maintained regular

contact and visitation with her child, and the child would benefit from continuing the

                                             15
relationship. Obviously, the only way a parent has any hope of satisfying this statutory

exception is if she maintains regular contact with her child. . . . [F]or the parent deprived

of visitation, ‘it is a forgone conclusion that [she] is not going to be able to establish the

exception or have any meaningful chance to avoid the termination of parental rights.’ ”

(In re Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1504-1505.)

       2. Mother Forfeited Her Due Process Claim

       Under the forfeiture doctrine, an appellate court will ordinarily decline to exercise

its discretion to consider a party’s challenge to a juvenile court’s ruling if the party failed

to object to the ruling in the juvenile court. (In re L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 728, 737-

738.) The purpose of the forfeiture doctrine is to encourage parties to bring errors to the

attention of the juvenile court so the errors may be corrected. (In re S.B. (2004)

32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 221-222 [The

forfeiture doctrine “is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the

conclusion of the proceedings.”].)

       Here, the record does not show that Mother attempted to correct CFS’s alleged

cancellation of her visits with L.J. by asking CFS to allow Mother to make up her

cancelled visits or by asking the court to order CFS to allow Mother to make up her

cancelled visits. For this reason, Mother has forfeited her due process claim.

       On September 29, 2022, counsel for the parties appeared in court for the section

366.26 hearing, and the hearing was continued to December 1, 2022. On September 29,

Mother’s counsel told the court that Mother had been unable to visit L.J. since June 2,

2022, because CFS had “constantly . . . rebuffed” Mother’s attempts to arrange visits with

                                              16
L.J. after the court terminated Mother’s reunification services for L.J. (and Mother’s

parental rights to her older children) on June 2, 2022. Counsel for D.J. said D.J. had been

having “the same problem;” no one at CFS would return D.J.’s calls about visiting his

children. Mother’s counsel asked the court to order CFS to “follow up” with Mother so

Mother could visit L.J. The court ordered county counsel to make sure “they [CFS staff]

understand there is still a visitation order.” The court also encouraged the parents’

counsel to address any concerns the parents had with CFS through meetings with CFS or

emails to CFS.

       The record does not show, however, that Mother or her counsel ever raised the

matter of Mother’s cancelled visits with CFS or the court, at any time after September 29,

2022, including at the December 1, section 366. 26 hearing. After September 29, neither

Mother nor her counsel asked CFS or the court to allow Mother to make up any of

Mother’s cancelled visits, or to continue the section 366.26 hearing to allow Mother to

make up the visits. Moreover, at the December 1 section 366.26 hearing, Mother did not

claim, as she does now, that CFS violated her due process rights, or prevented her from

establishing the parental-benefit exception, by canceling her visits after June 2.

       At the December 1, 2022 hearing, Mother testified that CFS had “cancelled all” of

Mother’s visits since June 2, and Mother had only recently been able to visit L.J. Shortly

before the hearing, CFS reported Mother began visiting L.J. every first and third Tuesday

of the month beginning on October 25. Thus, Mother visited L.J. on October 25, and

twice in November, before the December 1 hearing. But on December 1, Mother did not

testify, and Mother’s counsel did not argue, that any of Mother’s cancelled visits had any

                                             17
impact on Mother’s ability to prove the parental-benefit exception. Rather, Mother and

her counsel were completely silent on the due process issue. Mother and her counsel

attempted to prove the parental-benefit exception based on Mother’s relationship with

L.J. at the time of the December 1 hearing, without claiming CFS violated Mother’s due

process rights and prevented Mother from forging a beneficial relationship with L.J. by

cancelling Mother’s visits with L.J. after June 2.

       By remaining silent on her due process claim in the juvenile court, Mother has

forfeited the claim for appeal. (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 221-222.)

Had Mother raised the due process claim at or before the December 1 hearing, the court

could have remedied the alleged due process violations by allowing Mother to make up

her cancelled visits with L.J. and by continuing the section 366.26 hearing, if necessary,

to allow Mother to make up her cancelled visits. Mother’s September 29 complaint and

December 1 testimony about the cancelled visits, without arguing the cancellations

violated Mother’s due process rights and prevented her from establishing the parental-

benefit exception, was insufficient to preserve the due process claim for appeal.

       3. Any CFS Error in Cancelling Mother’s Visitation Was Harmless

       CFS claims any error it made in “cancelling” Mothers visits with L.J. after

June 2, 2022 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.

       Due process violations in dependency proceedings are subject to harmless error

analysis under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. (In re L.J. (2023)

89 Cal.App.5th 741, 754; In re J.S. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1080-1081.) That is, an

order claimed to be affected by a due process violation must be reversed unless the record

                                             18
shows there is no reasonable possibility the violation contributed to the order. (See

generally Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)

       Based on the entire record, we discern no reasonable possibility that any alleged

“cancellation” by CFS of Mother’s bimonthly visits with L.J., after June 2 until

October 25, 2022, affected the juvenile court’s determination, on December 1, 2022, that

the parental-benefit exception did not apply. As noted, a parent must prove three

elements to establish the exception: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a

relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the

termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C., supra,

11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)

       The court found that Mother failed to prove all three elements. Regarding the

second and third elements, the court found Mother did not show she had a beneficial

relationship with L.J., such that the loss of that relationship would have harmed L.J. “to

an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.” (In re

Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 634.) We discern no reasonable possibility that

Mother could have made this showing, even if Mother could have had nine additional,

two-hour visits with L.J. between June 2 and October 25, 2022.

       Mother did not have a strong bond with L.J. prior to June 2, 2022. Mother did not

consistently visit L.J. early in the proceedings, when Mother was allowed unsupervised,

weekly, four-hour visits with L.J. In November 2021, CFS reported that Mother had

cancelled several visits and had ended at least two visits early. Mother also showed little

interest in L.J. during her subsequent, supervised visits with L.J. From July 2021, when

                                             19
L.J. was nine months old, through April 2022, when L.J. was 18 months old, Mother did

not engage with L.J. during visits. Instead, Mother focused on J.J. and N.J., and allowed

L.J. to wander “around the visitation room entertaining herself.” L.J. would go to her

caregiver, who was supervising the visits, if L.J. needed anything during the visits.

Additionally, L.J. was just over two years old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing on

December 1. At that time, L.J. was closely bonded with her prospective adoptive parents,

with whom she had been living since she was nine months old in July 2021.

       At the section 366.26 hearing on December 1, 2022, Mother testified that Mother

and L.J. had a loving relationship. During her most recent visits with L.J. (in October

and November 2022), L.J. sat on Mother’ lap. and showed affection by hugging Mother

and holding Mother’s hand. But L.J. was never sad or upset when the visits ended.

Based on the entire record, including L.J.’s young age, her attachment to her prospective

adoptive parents, and her strong interest in the stability and permanency that a new,

adoptive home could provide her, there is no reasonable possibility that Mother, with

only nine additional visits with L.J. between June 2 and October 25, 2022, could have

forged a beneficial relationship with L.J., such that the loss of that relationship would

have harmed L.J. more than the loss of a new adoptive home. (In re Caden C., supra,

11 Cal.5th at p. 634.)

B. There Was No ICWA Inquiry Error Concerning D.F. or Extended Family Members

       Mother claims CFS erroneously failed to ask D.J.’s and L.J.’s extended family

members whether L.J. is or may be an Indian child for purposes of determining whether

ICWA applied to the proceedings for L.J. We find no ICWA inquiry error.

                                             20
       1. Sufficient Inquiry Was Made of D.J.

       To implement ICWA, the county welfare department and the juvenile court have a

duty to determine whether a dependency case involves an Indian child. “The duty to

inquire consists of two phases—the duty of initial inquiry and the duty of further

inquiry.” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 671, 678.) This case does not involve

the duty of further inquiry, which arises only if the court or the department has “reason to

believe that an Indian child is involved.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)

       “Federal regulations require state courts to ask each participant ‘at the

commencement’ of a child custody proceeding ‘whether the participant knows or has

reason to know that the child is an Indian child.’ (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2022).)” (Ricky

R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 678-679.) Similarly, “[s]tate law requires the court to

pursue an inquiry ‘[a]t the first appearance in court of each party’ by asking ‘each

participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to know

that the child is an Indian child.’ (§224.2, subd. (c).)” (Ricky R., at p. 679.) In addition,

the court and department have “an affirmative and continuing duty” to inquire whether a

child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)

       Mother claims “CFS did not make any inquires of [D.J.] during this case; CFS

simply reproduced its undated inquiry of [D.J.] from a prior CFS case.” Mother is

incorrect. The court made sufficient inquiries of D.J. when D.J. first appeared in the

proceedings for L.J. at the 12-month review hearing on March 21, 2022. (§ 224.2, subd.

(c).) In response to the court’s questions at the hearing, D.J. said he did not believe, and

no one had ever told him, that he had any Native American ancestry, and neither he nor

                                             21
any of his living relatives were members of an Indian tribe. Father also completed

“family find” and “parental notification” forms, consistent with his responses to the

court’s inquiry.

       2. The Duty To Interview Extended Family Members Never Arose

       Section 224.2, subdivision (b) provides: “If a child is placed into the temporary

custody of a county welfare department pursuant to Section 306 . . . , the county welfare

department . . . has a duty to inquire whether that child is an Indian child. Inquiry

includes, but is not limited to, asking . . . extended family members . . . whether the child

is, or may be, an Indian child . . . .”

       There is a split of authority in this court on the question of whether the duty to

inquire of extended family members under section 224.2, subdivision (b), applies (1) only

when a child is taken in temporary custody under section 306, or (2) applies in every

case, regardless of whether the child is taken into “temporary custody” without a warrant

under section 306 or is taken into “protective custody” pursuant to a warrant under

section 340. In three decisions, several panels of this court have adopted the first view.

(In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500-501, 503-504 (Robert F.), review

granted July 26, 2023, S279743, following In re Adrian L. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 342,

357-370 (conc. opn. of Kelley, J.); In re Ja.O. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 672, 677-678

(Ja.O.), review granted July 26, 2023, S280572; and In re Andres R. (2023) (Aug. 23,

2023, E079972)___Cal.App.5th___[2023 Cal.App.Lexis 638] (Andres R.).) In a fourth

decision, another panel of this court disagreed with Robert F. and concluded, “there is

only one duty of initial inquiry, and that duty encompasses available extended family

                                             22
members no matter how the child is initially removed from the home.” (In re Delila D.

(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, 962 (Delila D.), petn. for review filed Aug. 22, 2023,

S281447.)

       Mother argues that Delila D. was correctly decided and that Robert F., Ja.O., and

Andres R. are based on a misinterpretation of section 224.2 as a whole and its legislative

history. Mother claims that, under Delila D., DPSS failed to interview J.L.’s extended

family members, including the paternal grandmother who was “present at one, if not

more, of Mother’s visits” and other paternal and maternal extended family who were

“referenced” by Mother and D.J. Mother further argues that the failure to inquire of these

extended family members was prejudicial because any of the extended family members

may have had “readily obtainable information tending to shed meaningful light” on

whether L.J. is an Indian child. (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739.)

       Pending a contrary decision by our Supreme Court, we agree with the reasoning of

Robert F., Ja.O., and Andres R., and disagree with the reasoning of Delila D. Thus, we

conclude that DPSS’s obligation to interview L.J.’s extended family members about

L.J.’s possible status as an Indian child, under section 244.2, subdivision (b), was never

triggered, or never arose, given that L.J. was taken into protective custody pursuant to a

protective custody warrant. (Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 500-501; § 340.)

       Furthermore, CFS did not have a duty to interview extended family members

under section 224.2, subdivisions (a) or (c), given that, throughout the proceedings, there

was never any indication that L.J. is or could be an Indian child. As Robert F. explained,

section 224.2, subdivisions (a) and (c) “describe the duty of inquiry that arises in every

                                             23
dependency case. But the plain language of those subdivisions does not require the

county welfare department or the court to question extended family members as part of

the initial inquiry in every case. And although case-specific circumstances may require

the department to interview extended family members under one of those subdivisions,

Mother has not identified any such circumstances here. For instance, if the parents deny

any Indian ancestry, but a family member later contacts the social worker and volunteers

that the family has Indian ancestry, then the department cannot ignore that claim. It has a

duty to follow up on the information as part of its ‘affirmative and continuing duty to

inquire.’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) Similarly, if a parent states that they do not know whether

they have Indian ancestry and directs the social worker to ask a particular relative who

would know, then the department must follow up with that relative as part of its

affirmative and continuing duty of inquiry. It cannot ignore the information. Nothing

similar occurred in this case.” (Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 504.)

                                   IV. DISPOSITION

       The December 1, 2022 orders are affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                               FIELDS
                                                                                           J.
I concur:

CODRINGTON
          Acting P. J.

                                            24
[In re L.J., E080296]

      RAPHAEL, J., Dissenting.

      I respectfully dissent. I would apply rule 5.481(a)(1) of the California Rules of

Court and In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, which require inquiry of readily

available extended family as to whether a child is Indian in every dependency matter

where a child is removed from the parents. Instead, the majority follows caselaw that

“disapprove[s]” that rule of court (In re Andres R. (August 23, 2023, E079972) [2023

Cal.App. Lexis 638, *1]) insofar as it requires inquiry of extended family where the child

is removed by warrant, rather than without a warrant. Such a distinction does not make

sense and is not what the Legislature intended. (See also In re Jerry R. (September 11,

2023, F085850) [2023 Cal.App. Lexis 697] [following In re Delila D.]; In re V.C.

(September 6, 2023, A166527) [2023 Cal.App. Lexis 687] [following In re Delila D.].)

                                                              RAPHAEL
                                                                                          J.

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