Court Opinion

ID: 9838505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:08:34.667595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:36.648444
License: Public Domain

J-S28034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MAURICE BAILEY                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 989 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 4, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0014654-1993

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                     FILED: September 6, 2023

       Appellant, Maurice Bailey, appeals pro se from the order entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which denied his first timely

petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9541-46, without an evidentiary hearing. After a careful review, we affirm

the PCRA court’s order in all respects except that we vacate and remand for a

proper determination of credit for time served.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On September

24, 1994, a jury convicted Appellant of stabbing and beating his pregnant,

fifteen-year-old girlfriend to death. Appellant was also fifteen years old at the

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S28034-23

time of the offense. The trial court has aptly summarized the evidence from

the jury trial as follows:

             [K.G.]…and [Appellant]…were involved in a romantic
      relationship. As a result of this relationship, [K.G.] became
      pregnant.
            [K.G.] and [Appellant] agreed to meet on November 6,
      1994, in the afternoon hours in the Elliott section of the City of
      Pittsburgh. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss [K.G.’s]
      pregnancy and how the couple were to respond to the situation.
            [Appellant] and [K.G.] were initially seen talking in an area
      adjacent to the park. They were later seen walking into the park
      in that same area. The time that [Appellant] and [K.G.] were seen
      walking into the park was shortly before 3:00 [p.m.] on November
      6, 1994.
            At approximately 4:42 p.m., officers from the City of
      Pittsburgh received a report to respond to an area near this park
      by the Thaddeus Stevens School. The officers found the victim,
      [K.G.], lying in an alcove and covered with blood. The police
      discovered several footprints leading away from the scene of the
      victim in blood. Footprints were also visible on the victim’s jeans
      and a wound was evident in her neck. It was ultimately
      determined that [K.G.] had received multiple stab wounds to the
      neck, one of which was fatal. Other physical evidence was also
      gathered at the scene by the City of Pittsburgh Police.
            Investigation by the City of Pittsburgh Police led them to
      discover that [Appellant] was to meet with [K.G.] on the afternoon
      of her death. A description of the person accompanying the
      deceased as she entered the park fit [Appellant]. A search
      warrant was subsequently obtained, resulting in the discovery of
      clothing that had been worn by [Appellant] that appeared to
      contain blood. [Appellant] was arrested and admitted to having
      stabbed and killed [K.G.]. Physical evidence later confirmed that
      the blood found on [Appellant’s] clothing was consistent with that
      of [K.G.] and inconsistent with that of [Appellant].            An
      examination of the deceased’s body indicated that in addition to
      receiving ten superficial and one fatal stab wound, the deceased
      also had abrasions about her face and head.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/10/95, at 1-3.

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       The jury convicted Appellant on the sole count of first-degree murder,

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a), and on April 10, 1995, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to life in prison without parole.      This Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence on May 17, 1996. See Commonwealth v. Bailey, 679

A.2d 842 (Pa.Super. 1996) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not file

a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.

       Thereafter, on July 9, 2012, Appellant filed a serial PCRA petition, in

which he argued his sentence was illegal pursuant to the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455

(2012).1 After filing several amended PCRA petitions, Appellant filed a motion

for resentencing pursuant to Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 136

____________________________________________

1 The Miller Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under

the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. The
Court also held that a trial court is not foreclosed from imposing a sentence
of life imprisonment without parole on a juvenile; however, before doing so,
the court is required to “take into account how children are different, and how
those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in
prison.” Id. at 480.
       In response to Miller, in October of 2012, the Pennsylvania legislature
enacted 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1. The statute provides that juvenile offenders
convicted of first-degree or second-degree murder must receive a mandatory
minimum sentence. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a), (c). However, the statute
applies only to those “convicted after June 24, 2012.” Id.

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S.Ct. 718 (2016).2 On April 28, 2016, the Commonwealth filed an answer to

Appellant’s motion agreeing to resentencing.

       On October 23, 2017, after a lengthy hearing, the trial court resentenced

Appellant to thirty-five years to life in prison. Appellant did not file a post-

sentence motion; however, he filed an appeal to this Court from his new

judgment of sentence.         On appeal, Appellant challenged the discretionary

aspects of his sentence.3 Concluding Appellant had waived his discretionary

sentencing claims pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) by failing to file a post-

sentence motion and/or raising the claims during the sentencing proceedings,

this Court affirmed the October 23, 2017, judgment of sentence. See

Commonwealth v. Bailey, 219 A.3d 235 (Pa.Super. filed 6/14/19)

(unpublished memorandum).             Appellant filed a petition for allowance of

appeal, which our Supreme Court denied on December 23, 2019. Appellant

did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme

Court.

       On August 20, 2020, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition, and

on October 7, 2021, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant.

____________________________________________

2 Montgomery held that Miller constituted a new substantive rule that courts

must apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.

3 Specifically, Appellant contended   his new sentence was unreasonable and
excessive, the trial court failed to place sufficient reasons on the record to
justify the sentence, the trial court did not consider his rehabilitative needs,
and the trial court focused solely on the seriousness of the offense.

                                           -4-
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On November 9, 2021, counsel filed a petition to withdraw as counsel, along

with a Turner/Finley4 “no-merit letter.” On June 24, 2022, the PCRA court

entered an order granting counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel, as well

as providing Appellant with notice of its intention to dismiss the PCRA petition

without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did

not file a response to the PCRA court’s notice. By order filed on August 4,

2022, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition.

       This timely, pro se appeal followed. The PCRA court directed Appellant

to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Appellant timely complied, and the PCRA

court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 18, 2023.

       On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of

Questions Presented” (verbatim):

       I.     Did the trial court err when it admitted Commonwealth’s
              evidence on Appellant’s Nation of Islam (NOI) religious
              beliefs at 10/23/2017 resentencing hearing?
       II.    Did the trial court err when it considered Commonwealth’s
              evidence on Appellant’s Nation of Islam (NOI) religious
              belief against Appellant’s request for 25-year minimum
              sentence?
       III.   Did Commonwealth violated [sic] Appellant’s [sic] process
              rights when it suppressed Brady material?
       IV.    Did Commonwealth violated [sic] Appellant’s [sic] process
              rights when it presented Napue evidence at 10/23/2017
              resentencing hearing?
____________________________________________

4 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
Counsel certified that, on November 9, 2021, he sent to Appellant via first-
class mail a copy of the petition to withdraw and no-merit letter.

                                           -5-
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       V.     Did the trial court err in its breakdown in the judicial process
              when Appellant received 6/24/2022 notice of intention to
              dismiss on 7/18/22 4 days after the 20-day response
              deadline?[5]
       VI.    Did the trial court err [sic] it’s [sic] miscalculation of
              Appellant’s time credit after it ruled Appellant was entitled
              to any time served for this case at 10/23/2017 resentencing
              hearing?

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers

omitted) (footnote added).6

       Preliminarily, we note that our standard of review for an order denying

PCRA relief is limited to whether the record supports the PCRA court’s

determination,      and    whether     that    decision   is   free   of   legal   error.

Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 597 Pa. 648, 952 A.2d 640, 652 (2008). “We

must accord great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and such

findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the record.”

Commonwealth v. Scassera, 965 A.2d 247, 249 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation

omitted).

____________________________________________

5 Appellant suggests in his “Statement of Questions Presented” that he
received the PCRA court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intention to dismiss
on “July 18, 2022, 4 days after the 20-day response deadline[.]” Appellant’s
Brief at 8. However, in the argument portion of his brief, as discussed infra,
Appellant admits the prison mail scanning system reveals he received the
notice on July 11, 2022, which was prior to the 20-day deadline. See
Appellant’s Brief at 26.

6 We have renumbered Appellant’s issues for the ease of discussion.

                                           -6-
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       In his first and second issues, Appellant claims that, in resentencing

Appellant on October 23, 2017, the trial court violated his due process rights

by admitting a document into evidence, which allegedly detailed Appellant’s

beliefs and practices in the Nation of Islam religion.7       Further, Appellant

contends the trial court erred in considering the evidence of Appellant’s

religious beliefs in resentencing Appellant.

       Initially, we note that, aside from bald assertions of error, Appellant has

not developed these issues in his brief. That is, aside from alleging a certain

document was entered into evidence, and the trial court allegedly considered

the document, Appellant has not developed the issues on appeal. Notably, he

has cited no relevant authority in support of his issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119.

       Further, to the extent these issues relate to the trial court’s admission

of evidence during the resentencing hearing8 and/or a discretionary aspect of

____________________________________________

7 Appellant specifically challenges the admission of Commonwealth Exhibit 4,

which was a document from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
outlining the fact Appellant was a security threat due to Appellant’s self-
admitted gang-related activity. As the PCRA court noted, Appellant was
“investigated [for being] the leader of a new security threat group at SCI-
Pittsburgh known as the original men of honor. Men of honor were having
conflicts with white supremacists [at] SCI-Pittsburgh.” PCRA Court Opinion,
filed 1/18/23, at 5.

8 “During a sentencing proceeding, due process allows a court to consider any

information, even if it would not be admissible under the evidentiary rules,
provided that the evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability, the court makes
explicit findings of fact as to credibility, and the defendant has an opportunity
to rebut the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Eldred, 207 A.3d 404, 408
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -7-
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Appellant’s new sentence, the issues are waived since Appellant could have

raised the issues previously.9        See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b) (“[A]n issue is

waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at

trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction

proceeding.”).

       Moreover, to the extent Appellant suggests that, upon resentencing him,

the trial court was “vindictive” towards Appellant’s religious beliefs and had

no authority to impose a harsh sentence to “punish” Appellant for his religious

beliefs in violation of his constitutional rights, assuming, arguendo, this

presents a legality of sentencing claim,10 we find no merit.                 See

Commonwealth v. Prinkey, ___ Pa. __, 277 A.3d 554 (2022) (holding that,

where sentencing court’s authority to act has been infringed upon, the

sentence is illegal for issue preservation purposes, and legality of sentencing

claims are cognizable under the PCRA).

____________________________________________

(Pa.Super. 2019) (citations omitted) (quotation marks and quotation
omitted). This Court has recognized that, since due process applies, “a
defendant has [the] right to dispute evidence at sentencing.” Id.
9 Appellant has not presented this issue in terms of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

10 We note that issues relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of

law. See Prinkey, supra. Our standard of review over questions involving
the legality of a sentence is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary. Id.

                                           -8-
J-S28034-23

       In addressing this issue, the PCRA judge, who also was the resentencing

judge, specifically indicated: “[Appellant’s] religious beliefs and practices in

the Nation of Islam were not discussed or reviewed at the [sentencing]

hearing.     The Court did not consider [Appellant’s] religious beliefs in

sentencing [Appellant].” PCRA Court Opinion, filed 1/18/23, at 5.

       After reviewing the record, we find no error.            See Prinkey, supra

(setting forth the scope and standard of review for legality of sentencing

claims). Simply put, aside from Appellant’s bald assertion that the PCRA court

was “vindictive” towards Appellant’s religion and illegally imposed a harsh

sentence to punish him for his religious beliefs without the authority to do so,

there is no evidence supporting his assertion. In fact, the PCRA judge, who

resentenced Appellant, specifically indicated he did not consider Appellant’s

religious beliefs in imposing sentence. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief

on his first or second issues.

       In his third issue, Appellant contends the Commonwealth committed a

Brady11 violation by failing to turn over Appellant’s prison records prior to the

resentencing     hearing    on    October      23,   2017.   Appellant   contends   the

____________________________________________

11 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 831194 (1963). “Under Brady, the

prosecution must turn over evidence within its possession that is exculpatory
to either the guilt or the punishment of the defendant.” Commonwealth v.
Morales, 549 Pa. 400, 701 A.2d 516, 522 (1997) (citations omitted).

                                           -9-
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Commonwealth gained an “unfair advantage” by using his prison records

without releasing them to Appellant prior to the resentencing hearing.12

       Initially, we note Appellant has not developed this issue in his brief.

Notably, aside from citing generally to Brady, he has cited no relevant

authority in support of his issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119.

       Further, the record is clear Appellant could have raised this issue

previously. Thus, it is waived on this basis. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b) (“[A]n

issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before

trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction

proceeding.”); Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1, 79 A.3d 595 (2013)

(holding Brady issue is waived for PCRA purposes if the issue could have been

raised previously on direct appeal but the petitioner failed to do so).

       In his fourth issue, Appellant contends the prosecutor violated the

dictates of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (1959),13 by

eliciting false testimony from Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Agent

____________________________________________

12Appellant has not asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
connection with his alleged Brady violation.

13 In Napue, the witness, who had been serving a 199-year sentence for the

same murder for which the petitioner had been on trial, falsely testified that
the prosecutor did not offer the witness a reduction in sentence in exchange
for the witness’ testimony. Napue, 360 U.S. at 265. There, the United States
Supreme Court determined that the failure of a prosecutor to correct the
testimony of the witness, which he knew to be false, denied the petitioner due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. Id. at 265, 271.

                                          - 10 -
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Michael Glenn14 during the October 23, 2017, resentencing hearing. Appellant

contends Agent Glenn gave false testimony indicating Appellant was a

member of a gang, which is known as the original men of honor, and the

Commonwealth knew the testimony was false. Appellant contends that, since

the Commonwealth did not “correct” Agent Glenn’s false testimony during the

resentencing hearing, the Commonwealth violated his due process rights.15

       We dispose of Appellant’s claim by noting Appellant could have raised

the claim previously. Thus, it is waived on this basis.16 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9544(b) (“[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed

to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior

state postconviction proceeding.”).

       In his fifth issue, Appellant contends that, although the PCRA court filed

its Pa.R.Crim.P 907 notice of its intention to dismiss on June 24, 2022, the

prison mail system reveals Appellant did not receive the notice until July 11,

2022, which was just four days prior to the twenty-day deadline.            See

Appellant’s Brief at 26 (prison system “scanned Appellant’s non privileged

____________________________________________

14 Agent Glenn explained he works in the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections Special Investigations and Intelligence Division.

15 Appellant presented no ineffective assistance of counsel claim in connection

with his Napue challenge.

16 In any event, contrary to Appellant’s bald assertion, as the PCRA court
indicated, there is no evidence Agent Glenn presented false testimony during
the resentencing hearing, and his testimony was consistent with prison
records. PCRA Court Opinion, filed 1/18/23, at 5-6.

                                          - 11 -
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mail, tracked Notice’s arrival on 7/11/2022, at 5:33 a.m.”).             Appellant

contends this constituted a breakdown in the PCRA court’s operations.

      Assuming, arguendo, Appellant is correct, we conclude Appellant has

not demonstrated he was prejudiced. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion in his

brief, the docket entries and record reveal Appellant took no action, including

responding or seeking an extension of time to respond after he received the

notice. Moreover, the PCRA court did not dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition

until August 4, 2022, more than twenty days after Appellant received the Rule

907 notice. See Commonwealth v. Vo, 235 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa.Super. 2020)

(indicating “service of any notice of dismissal, whether in the form of a Rule

907 notice by the court, or a Turner/Finley no-merit letter, must occur at

least twenty days prior to an official dismissal order”) (quotation marks and

quotation omitted)). Further, Appellant has not indicated what issues or

argument he desired to present in response to the Rule 907 notice. Thus, we

conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

      In his final issue, Appellant claims that, upon resentencing him on

October 23, 2017, the trial court erred in failing to award him full credit for all

time served. Pointing to the written sentencing order, he specifically notes

the trial court erred in failing to award credit for time served from the date of

Appellant’s arrest (November 7, 1993) to March 16, 1994 (the date which the

trial court set as the commencement for credit for time served).

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       “[A] challenge to the trial court’s failure to award credit for time spent

in custody prior to sentencing involves the legality of sentence and is

cognizable under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Menezes, 871 A.2d 204,

207 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Our standard of review over such

questions is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary. Id.

       Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code, governing how a trial court applies

credit for time served, states, in pertinent part:

       Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be
       given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of
       the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as
       a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit
       shall include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during
       trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1).         “The principle underlying Section 9760 is that a

defendant should be given credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing

for a particular offense.”17 Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 595

(Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

       Here, at the conclusion of the resentencing hearing on October 23,

2017, the trial court verbally directed that Appellant “shall receive credit for

any time served attributable to this case.” N.T., 10/23/17, at 172.

Nevertheless, in its written sentencing order, the trial court set forth specific

____________________________________________

17The dictates of Section 9760 apply to resentencing cases as well. See
Commonwealth v. Ligon, 206 A.3d 1196 (Pa.Super. 2019) (recognizing that
when a defendant is resentenced pursuant to Montgomery the defendant is
entitled to credit for time served).

                                          - 13 -
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time periods for which Appellant would solely receive credit for time served.

Specifically, the trial court indicated Appellant would receive credit from

3/16/94 to 4/11/95 (392 days), as well as from 4/10/95 to 10/23/17 (8233

days). Trial Court Order, filed 10/23/17.

       Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to award him credit for

time served from November 7, 1993, when he was arrested, to March 16,

1994, the date upon which the sentencing order indicated the award of credit

for time served commenced.18

       We agree with Appellant that there are irregularities with the trial court’s

October 23, 2017, sentencing order regarding Appellant’s entitlement to credit

for time served.      As Appellant avers, the certified record reveals he was

arrested on November 7, 1993, and the sentencing order does not provide

credit for time served from November 7, 1993, to March 16, 1994.19

____________________________________________

18 In Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing order, and not the statements

a trial court makes about a defendant’s sentence, is determinative of the
court’s   sentencing    intentions  and   the   sentence   imposed.    See
Commonwealth v. Green, 335 A.2d 392, 392 (Pa.Super. 1975) (en banc).
Our Supreme Court has held that the “signed sentencing order, if legal,
controls over oral statements of the sentencing judge not incorporated into
the signed judgment of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Isabell, 503 Pa. 2,
12, 467 A.2d 1287, 1292 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
       In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth recognizes the written
sentencing order controls and concedes there are inaccuracies in the
sentencing order.

19 We note the record does not definitively reveal whether Appellant was in

custody during this time; however, as discussed infra, bail was set on March
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       However, the certified record further reveals that bail was set in this

matter on March 25, 1994, and on that same date, Appellant, through a third-

party bondsman, posted $40,000.00 for bail. There is no indication from the

record that Appellant’s bail was revoked prior to his conviction (September

24, 1994) or original sentencing (April 10, 1995).20         Consequently, we

question whether the trial court properly awarded credit for time served from

March 25, 1994 (bail posted) to April 10, 1995 (original sentencing).

Additionally, we note the trial court indicated in its October 23, 2017, order

that the “start date” for the computation of credit for time served is March 16,

1994; however, there is nothing in the certified record that suggests

Appellant’s custody began on March 16, 1994, for purposes of applying

Section 9760.

       Based on the aforementioned, to ensure that Appellant receives the

proper credit to which he is entitled, we vacate that portion of the PCRA court’s

order denying Appellant’s claim pertaining to credit for time served in

connection with this matter and remand for the trial court to determine

properly Appellant’s credit for time served. We affirm the PCRA court order

denying Appellant relief in all other respects.

____________________________________________

25, 1994, which suggests Appellant was in custody during some or all of the
time period after his November 7, 1993, arrest.

20 We are unable to determine from the record whether Appellant was taken

back into custody after the jury’s verdict, at the time of sentencing, or some
other time.

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      Order affirmed, in part. Order vacated and remanded, in part.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2023

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