Court Opinion

ID: 9854353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:06:15.450712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:02.324401
License: Public Domain

JON E WILCOX, J.
¶ 40. (concurring). I write separately to restate some basic rules of subrogation in order to address the court of appeals' concern over the application of the made-whole doctrine in this case. Further, I wish to state that in my view, the only reason *278the plaintiffs in this wrongful death action are allowed to defeat Travco's right of subrogation is because Travco stipulated that the plaintiffs were not made whole and Wis. Stat. § 895.04 (2001-02)1 allows the plaintiffs to assert and satisfy certain claims in which Travco has a subrogated interest that properly belong to the estate and could have been recovered as part of a survival action.
¶ 41. Subrogation occurs when a subrogee "steps into the shoes of the subrogor to the extent it has made payment as a result of [an] actionable event." Wilmont v. Racine County, 136 Wis. 2d 57, 63, 400 N.W.2d 917 (1987)(emphasis added). Thus, "[playment is the sine qua non for subrogation." Muchow v. Goding, 198 Wis. 2d 609, 626, 544 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1995). Without payment by one party on behalf of another, no subro-gation relationship exists between the two and no subrogation rights arise. Id.2 If a subrogation relationship exits, the subrogee does not possess an independent claim against the tortfeasor (whose injury of the subrogor necessitated payment); rather, it owns part of the liability of the tortfeasor separate from that part owned by the subrogor. Wilmont, 136 Wis. 2d at 63-64.
¶ 42. As the subrogee and subrogor each own part of the claim against a tortfeasor, they often are forced to compete for a limited pool of money. When this occurs, the made-whole doctrine establishes an equitable rule of priority that prevents the subrogee from asserting its *279right of subrogation until its subrogor has been made whole for all damages suffered. Paulson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 WI 99, ¶¶ 21-26, 263 Wis. 2d 520, 649 N.W.2d 645. Thus, "the subrogee has no right to share in the fund recovered from the tort-feasor until the subrogor is made whole." Garrity v. Rural Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 547, 253 N.W.2d 512 (1977). Where there is a settlement between the tortfeasor and the subrogor, the subrogor may request a hearing in which the circuit court determines whether the subrogor has been made whole by the settlement amount. Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 278-79, 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982).
¶ 43. In order to foster settlements, allow injured parties to settle on their own terms, and ensure that subrogees participate in a Rimes hearing, this court approved the use of a settlement agreement whereby the tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff and the plaintiff grants the tortfeasor a full release and further agrees to indemnify the tortfeasor for any claim made by its subrogee. Schulte v. Frazin, 176 Wis. 2d 622, 633-35, 500 N.W.2d 305 (1993). Such an agreement calls for application of the made-whole doctrine because it "indirectly creates the prospect that the insurer will be competing with its own insured." Id. at 633-34.
¶ 44. I wish to emphasize that the Schulte settlement procedure is a means of ensuring application of the made-whole doctrine, which itself limits preexisting subrogation rights. Neither Schulte nor the made-whole doctrine as set forth in Garrity and Rimes create subrogation rights in the first instance. As such, their application is dependent upon the existence of a subrogation relationship between two parties, which, in turn, is dependent upon one party indemnifying the other for a loss. That is, the made-whole doctrine *280applies only where a subrogee and subrogor compete for a limited pool of money. Paulson, 263 Wis. 2d 520, ¶¶ 23-28.
¶ 45. I reiterate these basic tenets of the law of subrogation in response to the court of appeals' concern that operation of the made-whole rule in this case could result in a single plaintiff being able to extinguish the rights of other plaintiffs or insurers in a multi-plaintiff action against a common tortfeasor. See majority op., ¶ 10. Such a result should never occur under a proper application of established subrogation principles.
¶ 46. Assume plaintiff A settles with a tortfeasor and further agrees to indemnify that tortfeasor against claims brought by plaintiffs B and C or their insurers. Unless plaintiffs B or C or their insurers have paid part of the loss suffered by plaintiff A, there is no subrogation relationship between the parties. That is, unless some other party has indemnified plaintiff A, there is no relation of subrogee and subrogor and no subrogation rights exist. If there is no subrogation relationship in the first instance, then the made-whole doctrine has no relevance. In the absence of inter-plaintiff indemnification, each plaintiff possesses a separate independent claim against the tortfeasor. In contrast, the made-whole doctrine applies where two parties each own part of a single claim by virtue of a subrogation relationship and are forced to compete for limited funds. See Paulson, 263 Wis. 2d 520, ¶¶ 23-28. While a Schulte settlement forces a subrogee and subrogor to compete for limited funds, it does not create the subrogation relationship between the two.
¶ 47. Thus, the fact that multiple plaintiffs may compete for limited funds when pursuing a common tortfeasor does not trigger application of the made-whole doctrine unless they each own part of the other's *281claims. Where multiple plaintiffs each possess independent claims against a common tortfeasor and there is no subrogation relationship between them in the first instance, a Schulte settlement does not create subrogation rights and the made-whole doctrine has no application.
¶ 48. However, the result of the majority opinion is perfectly consistent with these basic subrogation principles. Here, Travco paid sums of money under its insurance policy for Dayle's funeral expenses, medical expenses, and damage.to her wrecked car. Majority op., ¶ 3. As these items of damages were incurred between the time of the tortious act and Dayle's death, they properly belong to the estate and could be asserted as part of a survival action under Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1). Weiss v. Regent Props. Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 233, 346 N.W.2d 766 (1984).3
¶ 49. As such, there is no doubt that Travco obtained a subrogation right in claims belonging to the estate to the extent it made payment to or on behalf of the estate. However, the estate did not bring a survival action in this case; rather, the plaintiffs brought an action for wrongful death, claiming the above damages as well as losses stemming from the deprivation of society and companionship of their mother under § 895.04. Had the estate instead brought a cause of action, Travco's subrogation rights would certainly be contingent upon the estate being made whole for its damages.
¶ 50. While a "wrongful death action is separate and distinct from the survival action[,]" id., Wis. Stat. *282§ 895.04(5) allows those bringing a claim for wrongful death to recover medical and funeral expenses. Further, Wis. Stat. § 895.04(6) allows a wrongful death plaintiff to "waive and satisfy the estate's cause of action" as part of a settlement agreement. Thus, § 895.04 allows the plaintiffs to essentially stand as proxies for the decedent's estate by allowing them to assert and control claims that properly belong to the estate.
¶ 51. As noted, a subrogated interest is not an independent claim, but instead represents part ownership of the subrogor's claim against the tortfeasor. Because of its payments to or on behalf of the estate, Travco owns part of the claims that the plaintiffs are able to assert and control by virtue of § 895.04. In essence, as a result of § 895.04, Travco has the same relationship with the plaintiffs (to the extent they are able to assert and satisfy claims belonging to the estate) as it would with the decedent's estate, had the estate sought recovery.
¶ 52. Thus, Travco's subrogated interest in claims belonging to the estate is rightly subject to the plaintiffs being made whole, vis-á-vis the claims they assert on behalf of the estate, the same as it would be had the estate itself asserted these claims. As Travco stipulated that the plaintiffs were not made whole, the made-whole doctrine appropriately limits its subrogation rights. Likewdse, because the plaintiffs are able to assert and satisfy claims that properly belong to the estate, use of the Schulte settlement procedure is just as appropriate here as it would be had the estate brought a cause of action and executed the same type of agreement.
¶ 53. I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK joins this opinion.

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted.

 See also Rimes v. State Farm Mat. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 Wis. 2d 263, 271 316 N.W.2d 348 (1982) (" 'The primary reason for the adoption of subrogation is the principle of indemnity.'") (quoting Denenberg, Subrogation Recovery: Who is Made Whole, FIC Quarterly, Winter 1979 at 185-86).

 See also J. Ric Gass et al., 2 The Law of Damages in Wisconsin: Wrongful Death § 16.7, at 12 (Russell M. Ware ed., 3d ed. 2003) ("Medical, hospital, and funeral expenses are properly items of damages for the estate.").