Court Opinion

ID: 9386801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 17:02:42.114799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:01.962766
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/13/23 In re Nicholas G. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 In re NICHOLAS G. et al., Persons                                B319782
 Coming Under the Juvenile Court
 Law.                                                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  18CCJP04900A-C)
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 TIFFANY G. et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed
in part. Conditionally affirmed in part and remanded with
directions.
      Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Tiffany G.
     Caitlin Christian, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Robert H.
     Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                     _____________________
                                                         1
      Tiffany G., the mother of four-year-old Nicholas G., three-
year-old Elizabeth H. and two-year-old Hope H., appeals the
juvenile court’s April 6, 2022 orders denying her petition to
reinstate family reunification services and terminating parental
rights. Tiffany contends the court erred in denying her petition
based on its findings that she had failed to present evidence of
changed circumstances and reinstatement of reunification
services was not in the children’s best interests. She contends
the court erred in terminating parental rights because Nicholas
was not likely to be adopted and the sibling-relationship
exception to termination of parental rights applied. Tiffany also
contends remand is required because the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services and the juvenile
court failed to comply with their duties of inquiry under the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) and related California law. The Department does
not oppose a limited remand for ICWA compliance.
      Robert H., the presumed father of all three children,
appeals the order terminating his parental rights, joining in
Tiffany’s arguments to the extent they benefit him.

1
      The record sometimes refers to Nicholas as Nicholas G. and
other times as Nicholas H. Because the parties identify him as
Nicholas G. in their appellate briefs, we do so as well.

                                2
      We affirm the order denying Tiffany’s petition to reinstate
reunification services. We conditionally affirm the order
terminating parental rights and remand for the Department and
the juvenile court to comply with ICWA and California law.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
     1. The Dependency Petition for Newborn Nicholas and the
        Court’s ICWA Finding
     In October 2018 Tiffany and Robert pleaded no contest to
an amended petition under Welfare and Institutions Code
                            2
section 300, subdivision (b), alleging they each had a long history
of using methamphetamine; both currently used
methamphetamine and other illicit drugs; and Tiffany had used
illicit substances during her recent pregnancy with Nicholas,
resulting in his testing positive for amphetamines at birth, all of
which placed Nicholas at substantial risk of serious physical
harm. The juvenile court declared Nicholas a dependent child of
the court, removed him from parental custody and ordered family
reunification services for Tiffany and Robert, including drug and
alcohol programs for both parents with random weekly drug
testing. Visitation was to be monitored.
        Tiffany and Robert completed ICWA-020 Parental
Notification of Indian Status forms in advance of the initial
detention hearing in August 2019, checking the boxes indicating
they had no Indian ancestry as far as they knew. Based on
Tiffany’s and Robert’s denials of any Indian ancestry, the court
stated it had no reason to believe Nicholas was an Indian child
and found ICWA did not apply. In its September 6, 2018

2
      Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stated.

                                 3
jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department stated Tiffany
and Robert had told the social worker during a post-detention
interview that Nicholas had no Indian ancestry; he was a
“Caucasian” child. Neither the Department nor the court made
any further ICWA inquiries as to Nicholas.
      2. Nicholas’s Six-month Review Hearing
      At the six-month review hearing on June 2019 (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)), the court found a substantial risk to Nicholas’s
physical safety if he were returned to his parents’ custody. The
court found Robert’s progress in his case plan minimal at best
and terminated his family reunification services. The court found
Tiffany in partial compliance and continued her services.
       3. Newborn Elizabeth’s Detention, a New Dependency
          Petition and the Court’s ICWA Finding
       In August 2019 Tiffany gave birth to Elizabeth. Both
Tiffany and Elizabeth had positive toxicology screenings for
amphetamines at Elizabeth’s birth. Elizabeth was immediately
detained, and the Department filed a section 300 petition for her.
       In September 2019 the court sustained an amended
section 300, subdivision (b), petition, finding Tiffany had a long
history of substance abuse; Tiffany used illicit substances while
pregnant with Elizabeth; Robert was a daily user of
methamphetamine and cocaine; and both parents’ substance
abuse and failure to protect placed Elizabeth at substantial risk
of serious physical harm. The court declared Elizabeth a
dependent child of the court and removed her from parental
custody. The court granted Tiffany family reunification services,
again requiring her to complete a drug program and participate
in random weekly drug testing, and denied Robert family
reunification services pursuant to section 361.5,

                                4
subdivision (b)(10). The court ordered monitored visitation for
both parents.
      As to ICWA, Tiffany and Robert supplied ICWA-020 forms
at Elizabeth’s August 2019 detention hearing again indicating
they had no Indian ancestry as far as they knew. Based on those
forms, the court found ICWA did not apply. Although maternal
great-aunt Ronalda S. and maternal great-uncle Jesse S. were
present at Elizabeth’s detention hearing, they were not asked
about her Indian ancestry.
      4. The 12-month Review Hearing for Nicholas; the
         Six-month Review Hearing for Elizabeth
      At the March 2020 12-month review hearing for Nicholas
(§ 366.21, subd. (f)) and the six-month review hearing for
Elizabeth, the court found Tiffany’s progress with her case plan
insubstantial. Still, the court continued Tiffany’s family
reunification services for both children.
      5. Hope’s Detention at Birth, the Filing of a New
          Dependency Petition and ICWA Findings
      In August 2020 Tiffany gave birth to Hope and both tested
positive for amphetamines. Hope was immediately detained.
The court found, based on Robert’s and Tiffany’s new ICWA-020
forms again denying knowledge of Indian ancestry, that ICWA
did not apply.
      The Department filed a new section 300 petition in August
2020 as to Hope, alleging Tiffany’s use of illicit drugs during her
pregnancy with Hope, her and Robert’s continued substance
abuse and failure to protect their children placed Hope at
substantial risk of serious physical harm (§ 300, subds. (b), (j).).

                                  5
       6. The Court’s Orders Terminating Tiffany’s Family
          Reunification Services and Setting the Selection and
          Implementation Hearing for Nicholas and Elizabeth
       In October 2020 the court held the 12-month review
hearing for Elizabeth and the 18-month review hearing for
Nicholas (§ 366.22). Citing Tiffany’s failure to participate
consistently in a drug treatment program and her continuing
substance abuse, the court terminated Tiffany’s family
reunification services with Nicholas and Elizabeth and set a
selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26
for both children for February 21, 2021.
      7. The Court’s Jurisdiction Findings and Disposition Order
         Concerning Hope and the Order Setting the Selection
         and Implementation Hearing for Hope
      The court sustained the new petition as to Hope at the
December 2020 jurisdiction hearing (§ 300, subds. (b), (j)). At a
March 2021 disposition hearing the court declared Hope a
dependent child of the court and removed her from parental
custody. The court denied Tiffany and Robert family
reunification services pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(10), (11), (13), and set a selection and
implementation hearing for Hope for June 24, 2021. That
hearing, along with the selection and implementation hearings
for Nicholas and Elizabeth, was continued several times.
       8. Tiffany’s Section 388 Petition To Reinstate Her Family
          Reunification Services After Giving Birth to Jacob
       In November 2021 Tiffany filed a section 388 petition
seeking reinstatement of her reunification services. Tiffany’s
petition alleged she had enrolled in a residential drug treatment
center in August 2021 and shortly thereafter gave birth to

                                6
Jacob H. The Department allowed Jacob to reside with her at the
drug treatment facility due to her significant progress in the
                    3
treatment program. Tiffany submitted evidence of 16 clean drug
tests and consistent participation in a 12-step program and
counseling.
       Tiffany’s petition acknowledged Nicholas had been residing
in Arizona with Ronalda since his placement with her in
December 2019; the court had ordered an evaluation under the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for the
potential placement of Elizabeth and Hope with Ronalda’s
granddaughter Kristie L. and the ICPC had recently been
approved. However, Tiffany urged the court not to place
Elizabeth and Hope in Arizona but to allow them to remain in
California, if not in her custody, then at least with an order
reinstating her family reunification services.
       9. The April 2022 Hearing on Tiffany’s Section 388 Petition
          and the Selection and Implementation Hearing for All
          Three Children
       The hearing on Tiffany’s section 388 petition and the
selection and implementation hearing for all three children was
held on April 6, 2022. By that time Elizabeth and Hope had been
placed with Kristie; Nicholas remained placed with Ronalda. All
three children were thriving in their placements. Kristie wished
to adopt Elizabeth and Hope. Ronalda wished to adopt Nicholas.
       In support of her petition Tiffany testified that by August
2021 she had finally realized she needed to break her addictive
patterns and address her drug addiction for good. She enrolled in
the Didi Hirsch residential drug treatment program where she

3
      Jacob is not a subject of this appeal.

                                 7
gave birth to Jacob. She recently completed the program with
clean drug tests throughout her stay. Tiffany supported this
claim with a letter from her drug treatment counselor, who also
related to the court that Tiffany had exhibited a desire to stay
sober, set boundaries, hold herself accountable and care for
Jacob.
       Tiffany explained she was living with Jacob in a sober-
living home and hoped to find a new place where she could reside
with all her children. She stated she was no longer in a
relationship with Robert, although she saw him regularly so that
he could visit with Jacob and they could have joint virtual visits
with Nicholas, Elizabeth and Hope. Tiffany acknowledged she
had left her first sober-living home suddenly, and without notice
to anyone, to live with a relative after finding mold in her room.
After speaking with a social worker and realizing her mistake,
she found a new sober-living facility in February 2022 where she
and Jacob were currently residing. Tiffany testified she was
eight-months sober and continued to have clean weekly drug
tests in her sober-living facility. Tiffany sought custody of her
children or, at the very least, reinstatement of family
reunification services with Nicholas, Elizabeth and Hope so that
they could be a family.
       Tiffany also supplied a letter from Laurence Blanchard, a
senior pastor and counselor affiliated with her sober-living home.
Pastor Blanchard attributed Tiffany’s drug abuse to her
significant childhood traumas and her misguided effort to numb
her pain. However, Pastor Blanchard continued, with the loss of
custody of Elizabeth and Hope and the birth of Jacob (Pastor
Blanchard did not mention Nicholas), Tiffany realized she needed
to change her life. Assisted by her drug program, her sober-living

                                8
facility and local church, Tiffany had forged a new drug-free path.
Pastor Blanchard was convinced that Tiffany “has put herself on
the road to permanent sobriety and that she has demonstrated
the commitment and willpower to remain on that road.”
       Tiffany submitted similar letters from her sponsor at her
sober-living facility and from Elizabeth and Hope’s former foster
parent (a relative) emphasizing Tiffany’s recent sobriety, good
care of Jacob and commitment to remaining sober and reuniting
with all her children.
       The children’s counsel and the Department urged the court
to deny Tiffany’s section 388 petition, asserting Tiffany presented
“changing circumstances,” not “changed circumstances.” They
reminded the court Tiffany had used methamphetamine since she
was a teenager and during all four of her pregnancies; she had
begun treatment several times in the past while her three older
children were under court supervision, only to return to using
methamphetamine; and she recently abruptly left one sober-
living facility without notifying the Department. Although
Tiffany acknowledged suffering from depression, she had taken
herself off her medication without medical supervision and was
not in counseling other than services she received in her sober-
living home. Most importantly, they argued, her recent eight-
month sobriety in a structured sober-living environment was too
recent and too tenuous to risk upsetting the stability the children
had gained in relative placements with their prospective adoptive
parents. None of the children had ever lived with Tiffany; all
three had developed a parental bond with their prospective
adoptive parents; and Ronalda and Kristie had stated they
planned to ensure all three children would remain in each other’s
lives.

                                 9
       The court denied Tiffany’s section 388 petition, finding her
recent sobriety signified “changing, but not changed”
circumstances. The court also found reinstatement of family
reunification services was not in the best interests of Nicholas,
Elizabeth or Hope. In addition, observing Robert had not
addressed his drug issues at all, the court expressed its concern
that Tiffany’s unwillingness to eliminate Robert from her life
until he addressed his own drug addiction placed Tiffany’s own
fragile sobriety at risk.
       Proceeding directly to the selection and implementation
hearing, the court terminated Tiffany’s and Robert’s parental
rights over all three children, finding no exception to termination
applied. As to the sibling-bond exception that Tiffany raised, the
court responded that the children’s prospective adoptive parents,
who were also relatives, articulated a desire to maintain a family
bond among Elizabeth, Hope and Nicholas. In any event, the
court found, “[A]ny risk of loss of ongoing contact with the
children and their siblings [wa]s outweighed by the long-term
benefit to the children from the permanency and stability of
adoption.”
                            DISCUSSION
       1. Section 388 and Standard of Review
       Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court
orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change
of circumstance and demonstrates modification of the previous
order is in the child’s best interest. (In re Jasmon O. (1994)
8 Cal.4th 398, 415; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317;
In re Alayah J. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478; see In re
Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 447 [“‘[s]ection 388 provides the
“escape mechanism” that . . . must be built into the process to

                                10
allow the court to consider new information’”]; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.570(e).) “‘“The petitioner has the burden of showing
by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence
or a change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed
modification would be in the best interests of the child.”
[Citation.] “[T]he change in circumstances must be substantial.”’”
(In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1122-1123; accord,
In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.)
       When, as here, a section 388 petition is filed after family
reunification services have been terminated, the juvenile court’s
overriding concern is the child’s best interests. (In re
Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) The parent’s interests
in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer
paramount; and the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability. (Ibid.; In re Malick T., supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123; In re Jacob P. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
819, 828.) Nonetheless, a parent may rebut the presumption that
continued care is in the best interest of the child after
termination of reunification services by showing that
circumstances have changed and would warrant further
reunification services. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th
295, 310.)
       “[B]est interests is a complex idea” that requires
consideration of a variety of factors. (In re Kimberly F. (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530; see In re Jacob P., supra,
157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 832-833.) In determining whether a
section 388 petitioner has made the requisite showing, the
juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural
history of the case, including factors such as the seriousness of
the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem

                                11
was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal,
the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the
change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made
sooner. (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616; In re
Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446-447; In re Justice P.
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-189.)
       If the juvenile court has ruled the parent failed to carry his
or her initial burden to demonstrate new evidence or changed
circumstances, the first step of the analysis, the question for the
reviewing court is whether that finding is erroneous as a matter
of law. (See In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1194
[“where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial,
‘the question for the reviewing court [becomes] “‘whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of
law’”’”]; In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1156
[same].) We review the court’s best-interest finding for abuse of
discretion and may disturb the exercise of that discretion only in
the rare case when the court has made an arbitrary or irrational
determination. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-
319; In re I.B. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 133, 153.) We do not inquire
whether substantial evidence would have supported a different
order, nor do we reweigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the juvenile court. (In re Stephanie M., at
pp. 318-319.)
       2. The Court Did Not Err in Denying Tiffany’s Section 388
           Petition Seeking Reinstatement of Reunification Services
       Tiffany contends, and we agree, the court misapprehended
Tiffany’s initial burden when it found Tiffany had presented
“changing” but not “changed” circumstances. Section 388,
subdivision (a)(1), authorizes a parent to seek a modification of a
court order “upon grounds of change of circumstance or new

                                 12
evidence[.]” Tiffany presented new and substantial evidence of a
change of circumstance—her eight-month sobriety following
completion of a residential drug treatment program and her
relocation to a sober-living residence with Jacob. The court’s
emphasis on the recent, and still-tenuous, nature of Tiffany’s
sobriety was properly directed to the second prong of the
section 388 analysis—whether a new order reinstating
reunification services with Nicholas, Elizabeth and Hope was in
the children’s best interests. (See generally In re Ernesto R.
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 221; In re J.C. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.)
       As to that second prong, the court did not abuse its
discretion in determining reinstatement of reunification services
would not be in any of the children’s best interests. Although
Tiffany presented glowing reports of her recent sobriety, which
the court credited, the court also emphasized Tiffany’s long-
standing drug addiction and the very recent nature of her
rehabilitation and expressed concern over her ability to maintain
it outside the structured environment of her sober-living facility,
especially when Robert, who had not addressed his drug
addiction, remained a constant presence in her life. The court
also observed that Nicholas, Elizabeth and Hope were each
detained at birth, had never lived with Tiffany and had no
meaningful relationship with her. In contrast, all three were
thriving in the care of their prospective adoptive parents with
whom they shared a parental bond. Considering all the
circumstances, the court found that jeopardizing the children’s
stability by reinstating family reunification in the hope that
Tiffany’s recent sobriety would continue was not in any of the

                                13
children’s best interests. That finding, amply supported by the
record, was well within the court’s discretion.
      3. The Court Did Not Err in Terminating Parental Rights
       The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is “to
provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent children.
(§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th
1063, 1076 [the selection and implementation hearing “‘is
designed to protect children’s ‘compelling rights . . . to have a
placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the
caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child’””].)
The question at the hearing is not “‘whether the child should be
returned to the parent, an issue already decided in the negative
with the permanent plan of return to the parent having been
rejected,’” but “‘whether the child is adoptable and what the
alternative permanency plan should be.’” (In re Christopher L.,
at p. 1076; accord, In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630-631.)
       The legislative preference at this critical stage is for
adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 630; In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) If
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely
the child will be adopted within a reasonable time and none of
the six statutory exceptions to termination and placement for
adoption contained in section 366.26 applies, the court must
terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Caden C., at p. 630.)
             a. The court properly found Nicholas was likely to be
                 adopted within a reasonable time
       Tiffany contends there was no substantial evidence
Nicholas was likely to be adopted (see In re J.W. (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 263, 267 [we review the court’s adoptability

                                14
findings by clear and convincing evidence for substantial
evidence]), emphasizing that, at the time of the selection and
implementation hearing, Nicholas had begun exhibiting certain
behavioral symptoms and was scheduled to be evaluated for
autism spectrum disorder.
       Contrary to Tiffany’s suggestion, that Nicholas may be
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder does not make him
unlikely to be adopted. (See In re J.W., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 268-269 [“Very few children in the dependency system are
without problems. To deny [a child] the chance to permanently
become a member of a family that loves him and that he loves,
simply because he has special needs, would derail the entire
concept of permanent planning”].) Moreover, Ronalda, well
aware of Nicholas’s behavioral challenges, has never identified
them as an obstacle to adoption or wavered from her desire and
commitment to adopt him. That alone is substantial evidence to
support adoptability. (See In re Mary C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
793, 803-804 [that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed
interest in adopting the child is, alone, substantial evidence that
a child is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time]; In re
Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650 [“[u]sually, the
fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in
adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical
condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child
are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor”].)
       Tiffany’s related claim that Ronalda was disqualified from
obtaining ICPC foster care approval for adoption, leaving
Nicholas unlikely to be adopted by her, is also without merit.
Even if we credited Tiffany’s questionable argument that
Ronalda’s ability to adopt had some relevance to the question of

                                15
Nicholas’s adoptability (see In re Sarah M., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1650 [the issue of adoptability focuses on the child, not the
prospective adoptive parent; “a prospective adoptive parent’s
willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be
adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective
adoptive parent or by some other family”]), a careful reading of
the record shows no such legal impediment to Ronalda’s adoption
of Nicholas. Although the Department expressed some early
concern whether Ronalda was required to obtain ICPC foster care
approval in Arizona to adopt Nicholas and recommended (and
Ronalda agreed to) legal guardianship as a back-up alternative,
the Department clarified on March 21, 2022, in advance of the
selection and implementation hearing, that Ronalda needed only
to obtain ICPC approval for adoption by a relative caregiver, for
which she indisputably qualified. Ronalda could begin the ICPC
approval process once parental rights had been terminated.
Tiffany has not demonstrated any error in the court’s
adoptability findings.
             b. The court did not err in finding Tiffany had not
                established the sibling-relationship exception
       As discussed, at the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts
from family reunification to selection and implementation of a
permanent plan for the child. If adoption is likely, the court must
terminate parental rights and free the child for adoption barring
applicability one of six statutory exceptions to termination
enumerated in section 366.26. (In re Christopher L., supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 1076; see In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at
p. 53 [“court must order adoption and its necessary consequence,
termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified
circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that

                                 16
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the
child”]; see also In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630-631
[“if the parent shows that termination would be detrimental to
the child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the
court should decline to terminate parental rights and select
another permanent plan”].) The statutory exceptions are
applicable only in “exceptional circumstances”; adoption remains
the norm. (Id. at p. 631 [“‘[t]he statutory exceptions merely
permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to
choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption’”];
In re Celine R., at p. 53 [same]; see In re Matthew C. (1993)
6 Cal.4th 386, 392 [when a child is adoptable and the court finds
that declining to apply one of the statutory exceptions would not
cause detriment to the child, the decision to terminate parental
rights is relatively automatic].)
       The sibling-relationship exception to termination of
parental rights and placement for adoption applies when the
juvenile court concludes there would be “substantial interference
with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the
nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited
to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home,
whether the child shared significant common experiences or has
existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether
ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s
long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal
permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
       “The purpose of the sibling exception is to preserve long-
standing sibling relationships that serve as ‘anchors for
dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.’” (In re
Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 781; accord, In re

                                  17
Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 437.) “‘To show a substantial
interference with a sibling relationship the parent [or sibling
granted standing] must show the existence of a significant sibling
relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the
child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but
would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the
relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on
termination, there is no substantial interference with that
relationship.’” (In re Elizabeth M., at p. 781; accord, In re L.Y.L.
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952.)
       If the court finds a significant sibling relationship exists
and would be upended by terminating parental rights and
adoption, then the court must “balance the beneficial interest of
the child in maintaining the sibling relationship, which might
leave the child in a tenuous guardianship or foster home
placement, against the sense of security and belonging adoption
and a new home would confer.” (In re L.Y.L., supra,
101 Cal.App.4th at p. 951; accord, In re Elizabeth M., supra,
19 Cal.App.5th at p. 781; In re D.M. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
283, 293.)
       The parent has the burden of proving the statutory
exception applies. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th p. 625; In re
Elizabeth M., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 781.) The court’s
decision a parent has not carried this burden may be based on
either or both of two component determinations—whether a
beneficial sibling relationship exists and whether the existence of
that relationship constitutes “a compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child.”
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); see In Elizabeth M., at pp. 781-782.)

                                 18
       We review the juvenile court’s finding the parent has not
established the existence of the requisite beneficial relationship
under the substantial evidence standard. (See In re Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) When the juvenile court
concludes the benefit to the child derived from preserving the
sibling relationship is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
benefit achieved by the permanency of adoption, we review that
determination for abuse of discretion. (See Id. at p. 640; In re
Elizabeth M., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 782.)
       Implicitly acknowledging none of the children shared a
sibling bond with Jacob, Tiffany contends there was a beneficial
sibling relationship between Nicholas, on the one hand, and his
sisters, on the other hand, that would be disrupted to their
detriment by the termination of parental rights. Although
Nicholas had never lived with his sisters, Tiffany maintains they
saw each other and Nicholas had even referred to Hope as “his
baby.” Tiffany contends the court ignored this evidence when it
found no sibling bond existed and failed to reach the question
whether adoption would be detrimental to the sibling
relationship.
       Although Nicholas and his sisters apparently enjoyed each
other’s company, there was little, if any, evidence of an actual
sibling bond between Nicholas, one the one hand, and either of
his sisters, on the other, let alone evidence that it would be
detrimental to any of them to sever that relationship. Even if
there were a sibling bond, the court found Ronalda’s and Kristie’s
own familial relationship, together with their express
commitment to ensuring the children remained in each other
lives, made it unlikely that termination of parental rights would
interfere with the siblings’ relationship. (See In re D.O. (2016)

                                19
247 Cal.App.4th 166, 176 [juvenile court properly considered
caregiver’s assurance of future sibling visits when determining
sibling-relationship exception did not apply]; see also In re
Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 55 [“[w]hen appropriate, court
can encourage the adoptive parents to agree to visits among the
siblings”].)
       And, even if Tiffany could establish a beneficial sibling
relationship between Nicholas and his sisters that would be
disrupted by termination of parental rights, the court found any
benefit from preserving that relationship was substantially
outweighed by the benefits of the permanency and stability each
of the children would gain from adoption, the very finding Tiffany
asserts the court did not make. That finding was well within the
court’s discretion. Simply stated, Tiffany has not demonstrated
hers was the “exceptional case” where the stability and
permanency of adoption is outweighed by the benefits of
preserving the sibling relationship. (In re Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 631; see generally In re Daisy D. (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 287, 293 [“[t]he author of the legislation adding
the sibling relationship exception anticipated that ‘use of the new
exception “will likely be rare,’’ meaning ‘that the child’s
relationship with his or her siblings would rarely be sufficiently
strong to outweigh the benefits of adoption’”].)
   4. Remand Is Necessary for Compliance with ICWA Inquiry
      Requirements
      ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.101 et seq. (2023)) set minimal procedural protections for
state courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing
them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re Y.W. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551.) The statute authorizes states to

                                20
provide “‘a higher standard of protection’” to Indian children,
their families and their tribes than the rights provided under
ICWA. (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287-288;
see 25 U.S.C. § 1921.) In addition to significantly limiting state
court actions concerning out-of-family placements for Indian
children (see In re T.G., at pp. 287-288), ICWA permits an Indian
child’s tribe to intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise
jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding (see 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(c); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8).
       To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in
dependency proceedings as guaranteed by ICWA and related
state law (see In re Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 5), an
investigation of a child’s possible Indian ancestry must be
undertaken and, where appropriate, notice provided to interested
tribes. (See § 224.2, subd. (a) [imposing on the court and child
protective services agencies “an affirmative and continuing duty
to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child”].)
The duty to inquire “begins with the initial contact” (§ 224.2,
subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective
services agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether
the child may be an Indian child. (In re Rylei S. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316; § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).)
       Section 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the child protective
agency to ask “the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the
child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (See In re
T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 290; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(1).) If the court or child protective agency “has

                                 21
reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding,
but does not have sufficient information to determine that there
is reason to know that the child is an Indian child,” the court and
the Department “shall make further inquiry regarding the
possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as
soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(4).) If the further inquiry “results in a reason to
know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice
requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3
[notice under ICWA “shall be provided” if the court, social
worker, or probation officer “has reason to know . . . that an
Indian child is involved”].)
       “‘The duty to develop information concerning whether a
child is an Indian child rests with the court and the Department,
not the parents or members of the parents’ families.’” (In re
Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 317; accord, In re Antonio R.
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 430; In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 742 [“the agency has a duty to gather
information by conducting an initial inquiry, where the other
party—here the parent . . . has no similar obligation”].)
       Here, after Tiffany and Robert both stated they had no
Indian ancestry, the Department made no further inquiries to
any known extended family member despite having the contact
                                4
information for several of them. Moreover, in finding ICWA did

4
      Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.1,
subdivision (c), provides “extended family member” is defined as
provided in ICWA. ICWA defines “extended family member,” if
not separately defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s

                                22
not apply to the children, the court relied entirely on the parents’
responses and made no further ICWA inquiries—not to maternal
great-aunt and great-uncle Ronalda or Jesse, who were present
at Elizabeth’s detention hearing (the initial contact), or to the
Department to ensure it complied with its ICWA obligations. As
                                                                5
the Department implicitly concedes, much more was required.

tribe, as “a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who
is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
      The Department’s reports indicate the Department had
contact information for maternal grandmother Dianna, maternal
grandfather Bryant G., maternal uncle Donald G., paternal
grandmother Lillian R., paternal cousins Bill B. and Joe P.,
paternal aunt Cheyenne E. and paternal cousin June L.
5
       In not opposing a remand for ICWA compliance, the
Department implicitly recognizes not only that error occurred,
but also this division’s treatment of ICWA inquiry error. (See,
e.g., In re Antonio R. supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 436 [“[I]n
determining whether the failure to make an adequate initial
inquiry is prejudicial, we ask whether the information in the
hands of the extended family members is likely to be meaningful
in determining whether the child is an Indian child, not whether
the information is likely to show the child is in fact an Indian
child. In most circumstances, the information in the possession
of extended relatives is likely to be meaningful in determining
whether the child is an Indian child—regardless of whether the
information ultimately shows the child is or is not an Indian
child”].) The question concerning the standard of prejudice under
which to evaluate ICWA inquiry error is currently pending in the
Supreme Court. (See In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769,
review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.)

                                 23
                         DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s April 6, 2022 order denying Tiffany’s
section 388 petition is affirmed. The juvenile court’s April 6,
2022 order terminating Tiffany and Robert’s parental rights is
conditionally affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile
court for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of
ICWA and related California law, including for the Department
to make all reasonable efforts to identify and thereafter interview
all extended family members, not just those who have previously
been identified, as well as others who have an interest in any of
the children, regarding the children’s possible Indian ancestry
and to submit a report of its interviews or efforts to conduct the
interviews to the juvenile court, and for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

                                     PERLUSS, P. J.
      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.

            FEUER, J.

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