Court Opinion

ID: 9945322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:10:44.278185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.471748
License: Public Domain

J-S20028-22

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
               v.                        :
                                         :
                                         :
 JAMES THOMAS SMITH                      :
                                         :
                     Appellant           :   No. 747 WDA 2021

                Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 9, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County
                  Criminal Division at CP-03-CR-0000532-2016

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                      FILED: February 27, 2024

     James Thomas Smith (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his

first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.      Following remand for the appointment of new

counsel for Appellant, the matter is before us for review.     After careful

consideration, we affirm.

                                    FACTS

     This Court previously summarized the facts underlying Appellant’s

convictions:

     Appellant and the victim had a three-year romantic relationship
     that was fraught with Appellant’s manipulative and controlling
     behavior, including erratic temper tantrums and threats of
     violence toward the victim and her children. The relationship
     ended in 2012, and in 2013, the victim obtained a Protection from
     Abuse Order (“PFA”), which was effective from August 2013
     through August 2016. The PFA prohibited Appellant from having
J-S20028-22

       any contact with the victim, her children, and her parents; it also
       excluded Appellant from the victim’s residence. Despite the PFA,
       Appellant continued to contact the victim, and made multiple
       threats to the victim and her children.

       On June 24, 2016, Appellant saw the victim with another man at
       an ice cream store, and confronted her, stating “I told you what
       would happen if I ever saw you with anyone, and this is not done.
       I promise you tonight this will be done. I promise you that it will
       be over.” N.T. Trial, 10/11/17, at 55. Throughout that evening,
       Appellant sent the victim numerous text messages and
       voicemails. Appellant also parked his car approximately one half
       mile from the victim’s house, and sat in the woods watching her
       house all evening.

       At approximately 3:00 AM on June 25, 2016, Appellant broke into
       the victim’s home using a pipe wrench. He then entered her
       bedroom, and locked the bedroom door. The victim went to the
       bathroom at one point with her cell phone and texted the
       neighbors for help. When she returned to the bedroom, Appellant
       raped her. After several hours, Appellant took the victim’s cell
       phone, told her to lie if anyone asked why her door frame was
       broken, and forced her to drive him to his car.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 220 A.3d 641, 917 WDA 2018 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(unpublished memorandum at 1) (footnote omitted).

                                PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On October 13, 2017, a jury convicted Appellant of rape, involuntary

deviate sexual intercourse, burglary, aggravated indecent assault, criminal

trespass, criminal mischief, and kidnapping.1 On December 19, 2017, the trial

court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 18 to 36 years in prison. On July

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(2), 3123(a)(2),            3502(a)(1),   3125(a)(3),
3503(a)(ii), 3304(a)(5), and 2901(a)(2).

                                           -2-
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9, 2019, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence.         Smith, supra.

Appellant did not seek review with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

       On July 8, 2020, Karissa Murphy, Esquire, filed a PCRA petition on

Appellant’s behalf.2 In the petition, Appellant claimed ineffective assistance

of trial counsel: Blaine Jones, Esquire, and Nicole Nino, Esquire.3 The PCRA

court held an evidentiary hearing on January 29, 2021. Appellant testified

and presented testimony from Attorney Jones, Attorney Nino, Linda Smith

(Appellant’s mother), and Danny Libengood (Appellant’s cousin).             The

Commonwealth did not call additional witnesses. At the close of evidence and

at the request of Attorney Murphy, the PCRA court ordered the parties to

submit post-hearing briefs. On June 9, 2021, the PCRA court entered an order

and memorandum denying relief.

       Attorney Murphy timely filed a notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf,

and successfully petitioned to withdraw from her representation of Appellant.

This Court ultimately remanded to the PCRA court for the appointment of new

counsel.    Commonwealth v. Smith, 283 A.3d 382, 747 WDA 2021 (Pa.

____________________________________________

2 The trial court docket incorrectly indicates that trial counsel, Blaine Jones,

Esquire, filed the PCRA petition. The docket correctly indicates Attorney
Murphy entered her appearance for Appellant 12 days later, on July 20, 2020.

3 Attorney Nino worked with Attorney Jones at Blaine Jones Law, LLC.
                                                                See
PCRA Court Memorandum, 6/9/21, at 4. On August 4, 2017, both counsel
entered their appearance on Appellant’s behalf. Id.

                                           -3-
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Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum at 8).           We directed appointed

counsel to file a new Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement.

      Relevant to this appeal, on August 29, 2022, Zachary Gelacek, Esquire,

entered his appearance on behalf of Appellant. After numerous extensions,

Attorney Gelacek filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement on March 27,

2023, challenging the PCRA court’s ruling on Appellant’s ineffective assistance

of trial counsel claims. The PCRA court filed a supplemental opinion on April

3, 2023.

      On October 23, 2023, this Court ordered the appointment of new PCRA

counsel for Appellant. The PCRA court complied, appointing Lisa C. Peluso,

Esquire, to represent Appellant in this appeal. Attorney Peluso has filed an

appellate brief on behalf of Appellant; the Commonwealth has filed a

responsive brief. The matter is now properly before us for review.

      Appellant presents the following issues:

      I.    Whether the trial court erred in denying the PCRA petition
            and finding trial counsel was not ineffective where
            Appellant’s trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for
            trial?

      II.   Whether the trial court erred in denying the PCRA petition
            where trial counsel was ineffective for their unprofessional
            conduct and in failing to protect Appellant’s interests?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (capitalization modified).

      In reviewing an order denying a PCRA petition, our standard of review

“is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported

by   the    evidence   of   record    and   whether   it   is   free   of   legal

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error.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super.

2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).       “The PCRA court’s

credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this

Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa.

2014) (citation omitted).

      Appellant’s issues assert the ineffective assistance of counsel.       We

presume counsel to be effective:

      To establish ineffectiveness, a petitioner must plead and prove the
      underlying claim has arguable merit, counsel’s actions lacked any
      reasonable basis, and counsel’s actions prejudiced the
      petitioner. Counsel’s actions will not be found to have lacked a
      reasonable basis unless the petitioner establishes that an
      alternative not chosen by counsel offered a potential for success
      substantially greater than the course actually pursued. Prejudice
      means that, absent counsel’s conduct, there is a reasonable
      probability the outcome of the proceedings would have been
      different.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

      Appellant first claims trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not

interviewing and securing witnesses for trial.        Appellant’s Brief at 15.

Appellant explains that Attorney Jones was supposed to represent him at trial.

Id. at 11. However, one month prior to trial, he was informed that Attorney

Nino would represent him.       Id.   Appellant states, although he provided

Attorney Nino with Appellant’s list of requested witnesses, she failed to contact

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them. Id.     Rather, only Smith contacted these witnesses.          Id.   Appellant

further asserts Attorney Nino met with him just once prior to trial. Id.

      “The amount of time an attorney spends consulting with [her] client

before trial is not, by itself, a legitimate basis for inferring the total extent of

counsel’s pretrial     preparation,   much    less the    adequacy of counsel’s

preparation.”    Commonwealth v. Harvey, 812 A.2d 1190, 1196-97 (Pa.

2002).     With this in mind, we review the evidence presented at the PCRA

evidentiary hearing.

      Attorney Nino testified that she had prepared for Appellant’s trial with

Attorney Jones. N.T., 1/29/21, at 25-26. Attorney Nino stated,

      [Appellant and Attorney Nino] spoke a lot on the phone. I have a
      lot of messages, a lot of emails, a lot of all that, but I do know
      [Appellant] came in before trial, probably the month before trial
      at least, for hours. I don’t know exactly how many days, though,
      but I know that we prepped his case together.

      ….

      … The month prior to trial was when [Appellant] came in. You
      know, we have a lot of cases. … I don’t tend to prep jury trials or
      even nonjury trials … physically prep them [,] … talk about direct
      examination, those sorts of things, until about a month before.

             I felt like if I try to prep witnesses and stuff like that too far
      ahead of time, then that’s not sufficient for them to testify at trial.
      So that’s my point, [Appellant] came in – the last time I remember
      he came in for hours was within a month before trial in my
      recollection. That’s my recollection.

      ….

      … I do know that [Appellant] requested that I be the attorney. I
      was not planning – even though I was prepping the case the whole
      time with [Attorney Jones] …, it was not my intention to be lead

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      counsel on that case, because I did not prep it as if I was trying it
      before September. The other attorneys worked on it. I was not
      a part of it before [Appellant] had requested that I be the one.

            We had a bunch of conversations about former sex cases
      that I had and … he told me at least, that he would like me[,]
      being the female partner[,] to be the one to try the case. I believe
      that was early September.

            I believe there is an email to that effect shortly after him
      and I discussed it, and then that’s when I became lead counsel
      and that’s when we started meeting in person a lot more and
      prepping for trial.

Id. at 28-29.

      The PCRA court rejected Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim based on

Attorney Nino’s lack of trial preparation:

      Attorney Nino testified that she typically does not prepare for jury
      trials far in advance so that the case is fresh in the minds of her
      clients and witnesses. N.T., 1/29/21, at 28. She further testified
      that 1) other attorneys at her firm had worked on [Appellant’s]
      case prior to her becoming lead counsel, 2) she spoke with
      [Appellant] extensively on the telephone, 3) she prepared for trial
      without [Appellant] being present, and 4) less preparation for trial
      was necessary because [Appellant], by his own choice, was not
      going to testify. N.T., 1/29/21, at 26-30….

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/9/21, at 8-9. The PCRA court found “that Attorney

Nino’s trial preparation was neither unreasonable nor lacking in diligence.”

Id. The PCRA court’s finding is supported in the record, see N.T., 1/29/21,

at 26-30 (wherein Attorney Nino described her trial preparation), and we

discern   no    abuse   of   the   court’s   discretion   in   rejecting   Appellant’s

ineffectiveness claim based upon counsel’s lack of preparation.            See PCRA

Court Opinion, 6/9/21, at 8-9; see also Harvey, 812 A.2d at 1196-97.

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      In conjunction with Appellant’s claim regarding Attorney Nino’s lack of

preparation, he asserts Attorney Nino was ineffective for not calling Danny

Libengood (Libengood) as a fact witness. Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant

claims Libengood would have testified Appellant and the victim had an ongoing

relationship, “even sneaking around during the pendency of a Protection From

Abuse Order that was filed against [Appellant].” Id. Appellant claims this

evidence would have been critical to his defense of consent. Id.

      Appellant acknowledges Attorneys Jones and Nino testified they did not

recall a list of witnesses. Id. Nevertheless, Appellant argues they rendered

ineffective assistance by presenting no witnesses on his behalf. Id. According

to Appellant, there is no reasonable basis for his counsel’s failure, asserting

“[t]he outcome of the trial would likely have been different had [Attorney]

Nino investigated and interviewed witnesses[,] as the evidence presented was

basically just that of” the victim and Appellant. Id. Appellant contends that

testimony regarding the victim’s actions, before and after the rape, were

critical to his defense. Id. at 17.

      To establish that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a potential

witness, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate:

      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
      the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
      for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
      witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
      trial.

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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 536 (Pa. 2009) (citation

omitted).     To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner “must show how the

uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial under the

circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1109

(Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). “Thus, counsel will not be found ineffective for

failing to call a witness unless the petitioner can show that the witness’s

testimony would have been helpful to the defense.” Id. (citation omitted).

Further, the failure to call a witness “is not per se ineffective assistance of

counsel[,]     for   such   decision    usually    involves   matters   of   trial

strategy.”    Id. (citation omitted).   “Where counsel has made a strategic

decision after a thorough investigation of law and facts, it is virtually

unchallengeable[.]” Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 735 (Pa.

2000).

      At the PCRA hearing, Libengood testified that he has known Appellant

for “[f]orty some years.” N.T., 1/29/21, at 120. Libengood confirmed he was

available and willing to testify on Appellant’s behalf. Id. at 121. He stated

Appellant’s attorneys never contacted him about testifying on Appellant’s

behalf. Id.

      On     cross-examination,    Libengood      acknowledged   Appellant   had

discussed with him “[b]its and pieces” of the underlying incident. Id. at 122.

Libengood stated he would have testified Appellant has “been a good person

all his life. In trouble a couple times.” Id. at 123. Although Libengood stated

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he would testify as to Appellant’s propensity for nonviolence, he admitted he

was aware Appellant had broken into the victim’s home through the back door.

Id. Appellant presented no further testimony from other potential witnesses.

      The PCRA court rejected Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness based upon

the failure to present potential witnesses:

      [Appellant] argues that all of the potential witnesses he
      presumably would have called to testify on his behalf would have
      bolstered his allegations that the sex between he and [the victim]
      was consensual, that they had an ongoing relationship prior to the
      incident, and that [the victim’s] testimony was not credible.
      However, as is evident from the trial testimony, the nature of
      [Appellant’s] relationship with [the victim] was explored
      thoroughly at trial, particularly by Attorney Nino in a vigorous
      cross-examination. [Appellant’s] own testimony and the text
      messages between him and [the victim] clearly established the
      history between the two, which was not materially in dispute.
      Because the testimony of the additional witnesses would have
      been cumulative, any failure of Attorney Nino to contact those
      individuals and secure their testimony was reasonable and, in any
      event, resulted in no prejudice to [Appellant].               See
      Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1134 (Pa. 2008);
      N.T., 1/29/21, at 33-34.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/9/21, at 10. The PCRA court’s reasoning is supported

in the record, and its legal conclusion is sound.      See id.; see also N.T.,

1/29/21, at 123 (wherein Libengood acknowledged Appellant had been in

trouble “a couple times” and had broken into the victim’s home). Accordingly,

Appellant’s claim based on trial counsel’s failure to present Libengood’s

testimony merits no relief. See id. As Appellant offered no other potential

witness’s testimony, he is not entitled to relief as to counsel’s failure to secure

additional fact witnesses. See Johnson, 966 A.2d at 536.

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      In his second issue, Appellant argues the PCRA court improperly denied

his ineffectiveness claim based on trial counsel’s failure to present character

witnesses.    Appellant’s Brief at 17.        In particular, Appellant identifies

Libengood and Smith as potential character witnesses. Id. Appellant argues

“no reasonable basis exists for either [Attorney] Jones or [Attorney] Nino to

fail to interview the potential character witnesses.” Id. at 18. According to

Appellant, he provided the names of several witnesses who would testify

regarding his reputation in the community. Id. Appellant points out he had

no criminal record. Id. Appellant directs our attention to this Court’s holding

in Commonwealth v. Weiss, 606 A.2d 439 (Pa. 1992). Appellant’s Brief at

18. According to Appellant, under similar circumstances, our Supreme Court

in Weiss concluded that the defendant’s trial counsel had no reasonable basis

for not presenting character witnesses, “where counsel performed a limited

investigation into the quantity and/or quality of character witnesses and

counsel had unreasonable prejudice towards familial witnesses.” Id.

      Appellant   claims   this   Court   granted   relief   in   a   similar   case,

Commonwealth v. Hull, 982 A.2d 1020 (Pa. Super. 2009). Appellant’s Brief

at 19. According to Appellant, in Hull, this Court “found it was not reasonable

for trial counsel to not present any character witnesses where the defendant

had no prior criminal record and, as here, it was defendant’s word against that

of the victim.” Id.

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     Appellant disputes Attorney Nino’s testimony that she had discussed

character witnesses with Appellant, and he provided only his mother’s name

as a potential witness. Id. Appellant claims he provided Attorney Nino with

a list of character witnesses, which included Libengood. Id. Appellant states

his mother and Libengood both testified at the PCRA hearing that they were

available and willing to testify, and were familiar with Appellant’s character

and reputation in the community. Id.

     “Failure to present available character witnesses may constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 785 A.2d 998,

1000 (Pa. Super. 2001). A defendant may introduce evidence of his character

traits that are relevant to a crime charged. See Pa.R.E. 404(a). Pennsylvania

Rule of Evidence 608 addresses the admissibility of character evidence:

     (a) Reputation Evidence. A witness’s credibility may be attacked
     or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for
     having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. But evidence
     of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s
     character for truthfulness has been attacked. Opinion testimony
     about the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is
     not admissible.

     (b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except as provided in Rule 609
     (relating to evidence of conviction of crime),

         (1) the character of a witness for truthfulness may not be
         attacked or supported by cross-examination or extrinsic
         evidence concerning specific instances of the witness’ conduct;
         however,

         (2) in the discretion of the court, the credibility of a witness
         who testifies as to the reputation of another witness for
         truthfulness or untruthfulness may be attacked by cross-
         examination concerning specific instances of conduct (not

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         including arrests) of the other witness, if they are probative of
         truthfulness or untruthfulness; but extrinsic evidence thereof
         is not admissible.

Pa.R.E. 608.

      In a rape case, admissible evidence of the defendant’s relevant

character traits may include evidence of traits such as “non-violence or

peaceableness, quietness, good moral character, chastity, and disposition to

observe good order.” Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 454 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “[I]n a case where there are only two direct

witnesses involved, credibility of the witnesses is of paramount importance,

and   character   evidence    is   critical   to   the   jury’s   determination   of

credibility.” Harris, 785 A.2d at 1000.

      At the PCRA hearing, Smith testified that, at the last hearing before trial,

Attorney Jones indicated he would not be available on the scheduled trial date.

N.T., 1/29/21, at 107. Smith confirmed Attorney Jones’s representation that

someone from his office would appear at trial.           Id.   According to Smith,

Attorney Nino met with Appellant only one week prior to trial. Id. Smith

testified she had not discussed testifying as a character witness with

Appellant. Id. at 108. According to Smith, she was willing and available to

testify and, in fact, attended the trial. Id. Smith stated Attorney Nino never

asked Smith to testify. Id. at 109.

      On cross-examination, Smith confirmed she was present at a meeting

between Attorney Nino and Appellant, where they discussed character

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evidence. Id. at 113. Smith stated, “There were some names mentioned …

that … would be able to testify or would know the story behind everything,

basically.” Id. According to Smith, those names were provided to Attorney

Nino.     Id.   Smith identified Libengood, Jason Zimmerman, and Richard

Klingensmith as potential witnesses. Id. at 114.

        Attorney Nino testified regarding her discussions with Appellant about

potential character witnesses:

        [Attorney Nino:] … I asked him about character witnesses. The
        only one he could provide to me was his mother, and we discussed
        whether we should call mom or not call mom. As you are aware,
        character goes to veracity and peacefulness in the community.
        It’s not her knowing him, but it’s the reputation. I will say, I even
        talked to mom about it. Mom did not feel super comfortable.

        ….

              … I do recall specifically talking to [Appellant’s] mother even
        during the trial about her being a character witness. Even in the
        hallway we discussed it, because again that’s the only one that he
        put forward. He didn’t have a lot of support.

              Quite frankly, the more that we had talked, I had learned of
        things that could have been difficult for a character witness even
        to be cross-examined on. I know he was a zero prior record score,
        but he had an ex-wife and kids and whatnot that were not willing
        to – you know, his mother is the only one he could come up with.

              We talked about putting mom up versus maybe putting up
        like a preacher or somebody in the community and he did not
        provide me with anyone other than his mother. And then at that,
        it was a discussion in my recollection that we both made about
        mom not being a good character witness.

        ….

              It wasn’t even just my conclusion. It was something I
        discuss with all clients, because I obviously leave that up to them.

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     [Appellant] broke into the [victim’s] house, which in itself is not a
     nonviolent activity, and so I was concerned that mom might be
     questioned about that in particular. [Appellant] and I talked about
     her being nervous to testify or to say anything, really. … I have
     multiple text messages from her. She is just a nervous person
     about the trial, about everything, and he in my recollection didn’t
     want to drag her into the quote/unquote trial is basically where he
     was.

           And we talked about, too, how people feel about when …
     your mother is the one that takes the stand to be your character
     witness. … I’m not so sure how strong that makes an impression
     on a jury in my personal opinion, but we talked about the ups and
     downs of it, and he just decided that he didn’t want to call mom.
     And that’s my recollection.

           I don’t recall if he said anybody else and then we decided
     against them. I can’t recall that. … I know we definitely discussed
     character witnesses, and I know I discussed it with mom in the
     courthouse specifically, too.

Id. at 30-32.

     The PCRA court resolved the conflicts in testimony:

            Attorney Nino testified, the [c]ourt believes credibly, that
     she believed that [Appellant] was not going to testify at trial,
     chiefly because he did not dispute that he had broken into [the
     victim’s] home just prior to the sexual incident giving rise to his
     charges and convictions. See N.T., 1/29/21, at 26-27; Pa.R.E[.],
     608(b)(2). The [c]ourt finds [Appellant’s] testimony that the
     burglary was not discussed with him to be not credible. Attorney
     Nino indicated to the jury in her opening statement, before
     [Appellant] appeared for trial later that day, that he would not be
     testifying. N.T., 10/11/17, at 39:7-11. Although [Appellant]
     ultimately did testify at trial, there is no evidence that the
     Commonwealth introduced or attempted to introduce evidence of
     [Appellant’s] reputation for dishonesty. Thus, even assuming that
     [Appellant] had provided a list of character witnesses to Attorney
     Jones or Attorney Nino, their testimony would have been
     irrelevant and inadmissible under Pa.R.E[.] 608(a).

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/9/21, at 13.

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     The PCRA court further opined,

     [u]nder [Pa.R.E.] 404(a)(2)(A), the only pertinent trait that any
     character witnesses would be able to address would be
     [Appellant’s] reputation in the community for law-abiding, non-
     violent behavior. Attorney Nino testified that the only character
     witness presented to her by [Appellant] was his mother. She
     testified that she ultimately decided not to call any character
     witnesses because [Appellant’s] Mother was not comfortable
     testifying and because of the potential incidents of violent
     behavior in [Appellant’s] past that could be brought up to rebut
     the character testimony. See N.T., 1/20/21, at 30-32. Although
     [Appellant’s] mother testified at the PCRA hearing that she would
     have testified on [Appellant’s] behalf, nowhere did she indicate
     that she would have testified to his character in the community
     for law-abiding, non-violent behavior. N.T., 1/29/21, at 108-109.

            Moreover, even assuming that [Appellant] presented a list
     of potential character witnesses to Attorney Jones and Attorney
     Nino, only one of these potential witness, Danny Libengood,
     testified at the PCRA hearing. Mr. Libengood, [Appellant’s] cousin,
     indicated that he would have testified to the relationship between
     [Appellant] and the alleged victim, together with [Appellant’s]
     propensity for nonviolence. Mr. Libengood admitted to not
     having much knowledge of [Appellant’s] reputation for
     nonviolence in the community. N.T., 1/29/21, at 119-124.
     See Commonwealth v. Van Horn, 797 A.2d 983, 987-88 (Pa.
     2002) (proffered character witnesses’ potential testimony
     regarding their own experience with the defendant and their
     perceived relationship between the defendant and the alleged
     victim not valid character testimony about the defendant’s
     reputation in the community). It also was not contested in the
     record that [Appellant] broke in to the alleged victim’s home and
     broke the doorframe of the entrance. Because cross-examination
     of character witnesses is not limited to prior convictions, the
     attorney for the Commonwealth no doubt would have cross[-
     ]examined Libengood and any other character witness regarding
     the incident, discrediting their testimony to [Appellant’s]
     reputation for nonviolence. Attorney Nino’s decision to not call
     [Appellant’s] mother or any other character witnesses therefore
     was not based on oversight or false assumptions, but rather on a
     reasonable conclusion that the value of any such testimony would
     be outweighed by damaging impeachment of those witnesses’

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          testimony. [Appellant] has failed to establish either that this claim
          has arguable merit or that it prejudiced him.

Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added). Thus, the PCRA court found Attorney Nino,

in fact, discussed character witnesses with Appellant and made a strategic

decision regarding the value of potential character testimony. “Where counsel

has made a strategic decision after a thorough investigation of law and facts,

it is virtually unchallengeable[.]” Basemore, 744 A.2d at 735.

          On review, the PCRA court’s findings are supported in the record and we

discern no error or abuse of discretion. See PCRA Court Opinion, 6/9/21, at

13-15. Moreover, we cannot and will not disturb the PCRA court’s credibility

determinations. See Commonwealth v. Hand, 252 A.3d 1159, 1165 (Pa.

Super. 2021) (“the PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported

by the record, are binding on this Court[.]”). Appellant’s claim warrants no

relief.

          Order affirmed.

DATE: 02/27/2024

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