Court Opinion

ID: 9577248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:33:22.21855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:13.335105
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: The bombardment of this court with a 252-page record on appeal, most of which was designated by the appellees, and the confusion created by an attempt to summarize the evidence in the opinion, tend to obscure the simplicity of the facts and the issues presented. I cannot agree with the court’s decision in several particulars.
Title to the one-half section of real estate in question passed under the will of W. H. Armstrong, duly admitted to probate in the probate court of Douglas County, Kansas. Final settlement under the will was made in March, 1919. The will devised a life estate to Leland O. Armstrong with a remainder in fee to his children, the appellants herein. The life estate of Leland O. Armstrong was subject to a prior life estate devised by W. H. Armstrong to Anna M. Armstrong, the testator’s wife and the grandmother of Leland O. Armstrong. Anna died in April, 1919, thereby terminating her interest in the real estate.
The instruments by which the appellees acquired their easements for right-of-way purposes were executed by Leland O. Armstrong and his wife, who were in possession of the real estate when the instruments were executed.
The instruments by which these rights-of-way were granted to the appellees may be described as “quit-claim” in form. That is, they did not warrant the title of Leland O. Armstrong and his wife or undertake to defend the appellees should the grant be questioned in any way.
The claim of adverse possession herein asserted by the appellees is against the remaindermen, the appellants.
Long before the turn of the century the Kansas Supreme Court held that as against the devisees of an estate in remainder the possession of the estate by the life tenant, or by persons to whom the life estate has been conveyed, does not start any statute of limitations or prescription to running during the lifetime of the devisee of the life estate. (Peck v. Ayres, 79 Kan. 457, 100 Pac. 283; and Dewey v. McLain, 7 Kan. 126.)
The court relies on Clark v. Butler Rural Electrification Ass’n, 177 Kan. 344, 279 P. 2d 240, for the proposition that the two-year *315statute of limitations, concerning the erection of electric transmission or distribution lines on property by a cooperative in Kansas, commenced to run against a remainderman while the life tenant was still in possession. There the life tenant owned the fee simple title when she executed a perpetual easement. She later conveyed to her son reserving a life estate. Furthermore, the court was there impressed with the specific statute in favor of cooperatives barring actions against them “after the expiration of a period of two years of continuous maintenance of such lines.” The life tenant contended the statute (G. S. 1949, 17-4627) should be construed as beginning to run against him only at the time his estate became possessory, but the court said:
“. . . We are cited to and know of no authorities warranting the sustaining of his position under our statute and the confronting facts and circumstances.” (p. 346.)
In Clark the court was not confronted with the adverse possession statute, and the authorities heretofore cited on adverse possession (Peck v. Ayres, supra, and Dewey v. McLain, supra) were cited to die court in the briefs filed in the Clark case but were rejected as being immaterial to the decision. These cases on adverse possession have never been overruled. They are the law of Kansas today.
On the facts in this case Leland O. Armstrong, tire life tenant, and the appellees are in privity. In other words, the appellees can assert no right to the ownership of their rights-of-way based on the adverse possession statute (K. S. A. 60-503) under a “belief of ownership” as long as the life estate of Leland O. Armstrong in the real estate continues to exist.
In this connection it was said in Dewey v. McLain, supra:
“. . . Entering into possession then as the claimant of a life estate, his possession was not adverse to, but consistent with and in subordination to the rights of the reversioner. Will such a possession set a statute of limitations to running? Ordinarily not. In the case of Kirk v. Smith, 9 Wheaton 241, Marshall, C. J., says one of the rules applicable to limitation laws ‘which has been recognized in the courts of England, and in all others where the rules established in those courts have been adopted, is, that possession, to give title, must be adversary — the word, indeed, is not to be found in the statutes, but the plainest dictates of common justice require that it should be employed.’ ‘It would shock that sense of right which must be felt equally by legislators and judges, if a possession which was permissive, and entirely consistent with the title of another, should silently bar that title. Several cases have been decided in this court in which the principle seems to have been considered as generally acknowledged, and in the State of Pennsylvania particularly it has been expressly recognized. To allow a different construction would be to make a *316statute of limitations a statute for the encouragement of fraud — a statute to enable one man to steal the title of another by professing to hold under it. No latos admit of such a construction.’” (pp. 131, 132.) (Emphasis added.)
Where a life tenant or his assigns are in possession of the real property, there is no presumption that the holding by the assigns of a life tenant was under a claim adverse to the remaindermen during the existence of the life estate. (Thompson v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 203 Cal. 578, 265 Pac. 220.) The presumption is that they intend to hold only during the life estate, unless some actual notice is brought forth to the remaindermen that a greater estate is claimed adversely. (See Hays v. Lemoine, 156 Ala. 465, 47 So. 97; Mills v. Pennington, 213 Ark. 43, 209 S. W. 2d 281; and Cessna v. Carroll, 178 Kan. 650, 290 P. 2d 803.) To hold to the contrary would be to impute bad faith to the assigns of the life tenant and knowledge thereof to the remaindermen. (Thompson v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., supra.) On the facts in the instant case the “quitclaim” grants to the appellees have no greater significance than a quit-claim deed to real property, which signifies that the grantee acquires no greater interest than the grantor had to convey or assign. The recording of the right-of-way grants by the appellees, which the court seems to emphasize, does not alter the situation. Nowhere in the findings or conclusions made by the trial court is there, any indication when the holding of the easement under the adverse possession statute by the appellees commenced to run against the remaindermen.
On the facts here presented the remaindermen can not be, held accountable for failing to bring an action authorized under K¡ S. A. 58-2523., There is no indication in the record that the. grant of a right-of-way to-each of the appellees herein, or the use of the right-of-way by .them, constituted waste or that, it was a trespass< causing injury to the■ remaindermen’s interest in the real estate. The appellants’ claim in this action is founded upon the right to possession. (When the life tenant executed a five-year lease on the land in question to Ward Shull on November 30, 1961, for a golf course, the lease to commence March 1, 1962, with a provision for renewal, the appellants brought this action against the life tenant, the appellees and others within the fifteen-year period for posséssion of the land as remaindermen, on the ground that Leland O. Armstrong violated one of the conditions imposed upon his life, estate.) The appellants are denied specific relief for possession of the real estate free of the easements and are relegated to compensation for ’damn *317ages against the appellees only by reason of the public convenience and necessity (the appellees having power of eminent domain). The appellants had no right of action, which depended upon the right of possession, until they were entitled to the possession of the real estate. This does not give the appellees the right to antedate the termination of the life estate with an assertion of trespass or waste. (Thompson v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., supra.) There being no evidence of trespass or waste to the remaindermen’s interest, it must be assumed by the mere assertion, as it was by the court in relying upon K. S. A. 58-2523.
The opinion written for the court purports to arbitrarily ignore the foregoing law. The court seems to say, in effect, that the appellees were claiming adversely to the remaindermen under a “belief of ownership” long before the life estate terminated. If this is over-presumptuous in construing the court’s opinion, it must be said the court is making a dual approach, the second being that the life estate of Leland O. Armstrong terminated more than 15 years prior to the appellants’ action.
The second approach of the court is indicated by its approval of the shotgun finding made by the trial court as to when the adverse holding, by the appellees began to run against the appellants. The detailed recital of the facts with emphasis on the forfeiture provisions in' the will likewise embraces the veiled assumption that the life estate terminated more than 15 years prior to the filing of the appellants’ action oh the theory the life tenant violated conditions imposed upon his life estate. (This point was urged by the appellees in their brief, as a ground for upholding the trial court.)
This point merits consideration for it is likewise erroneous, in my opinion. The provision in the will of W. H. Armstrong setting up the life éstate in Leland O. Armstrong is quoted in the court’s opinion and need not bé repeated. The provision quoted indicates the life estate in Leland O. Armstrong is subject to termination upon ¡the happening of certain conditions. The provisions here material read:
“If . . . Leland O. Armstrong, shall at any time, or in any way make, execute' or deliver any deed, mortgage, lease, equipment or any instrument ’in 'writing purporting or attempting to grant, convey, sell, mortgage or otherwise alienate said real estate, except to lease or rent the same for a period of itot more than three years at any one time, or if he should suffer or allow the taxes or assessment levied on said real estate to be in arrears more than two years, or if the said life estate in said real estate shall be sold to satisfy *318the judgments of any court rendered against him, then and in such an event . . . the life estate . . . shall cease, determine and be forfeited. . . . ” (Emphasis added.)
Language similar to that emphasized by the court in its opinion in a will granting a life estate with conditional limitations was described in Conger v. Conger, 208 Kan. 823, 494 P. 2d 1081 (not cited by the court). There the court distinguished between a condition subsequent and a conditional limitation. In the opinion the court said:
“The real distinction, however, between a condition subsequent and a conditional limitation is that in the former the estate is voidable upon the election of the person in whose favor the condition is imposed, while in the latter the estate is void upon the occurrence of the event that would terminate the estate. . . .” (p.829.)
The distinction between the will in the Conger case and in the provisions of the will presently before the court is the nature of the conditions imposed. It must be emphasized that when W. H. Armstrong' executed his will in 1915 there was a right-of-way for a gas pipeline across the half section of real estate in question, which he and his wife, Anna, had granted to the predecessors (assignors) of Cities Service Gas Company. In construing the material provision of the will here in question imposing the conditional limitation it is apparent W. H. Armstrong was restricting the limitation of the life estate to a conveyance of the one-half section of real estate by the life tenant or an alienation otherwise accomplished.
The term “alienation” has been defined as a voluntary and complete transfer of the property and possession from one to another, and any transfer of real estate, short of conveyance of title, is not an alienation of the estate. No matter in what form the sale may be, unless title is conveyed to the purchaser, the estate is not “alienated.” (Masters v. Madison County Mutual Insurance Co., 11 N. Y. 624; Hiles v. Benton, 111 Neb. 557, 196 N. W. 903; Blank v. Browne, 217 A. D. 624, 216 N. Y. S. 664; and Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Dunnington, 118 Okla. 231, 247 Pac. 353.)
The granting of a right-of-way to the appellees herein was not an alienation of the real estate herein within the meaning of the terms used in the will of W. H. Armstrong. Certainly, the granting of a right-of-way by the life tenant to the appellees, under threat of condemnation by the appellees (who had the power of eminent domain and, on the record presented, used against other landowners *319in the vicinity to complete their acquisition of a right-of-way) could not be construed as an alienation of the real estate by the life tenant within the meaning of the provisions of the will.
The exception to the provisions regarding alienation in the will, authorizing the life tenant to lease or rent the real estate for a period of not more than three years at any one time, is likewise a condition that must be fulfilled to prevent the termination of the life estate in Leland O. Armstrong. The court’s opinion suggests the granting of a meter and regulator lease in August, 1946, for the purpose of metering and regulating gas tapped from the gas pipeline installed pursuant to the right-of-way granted to Cities Service Gas Company, for a period of ten years with renewal privileges from year to year at a rental of $10 per year, was sufficient to arbitrarily hold that the life estate terminated in 1946 when the meter and regulator least was given. In my opinion this is utter nonsense. The will devised to Leland O. Armstrong a half section of real estate for his life. Surely, the granting of a lease for the installation of a meter and regulator on a few feet of ground within the confines of the half section to accommodate Cities Service Gas Company in its use of the gas pipeline installed on the right-of-way was not within the contemplation of the testator sufficient to cause a forefeiture of the life estate. The testator was speaking of a lease or rental of the entire half section, if not a substantial portion thereof, for a period of time longer than three years.
Forfeitures are not favored under the law, as they are considered harsh exactions, odious and to be avoided where possible. (37 C. J. S. Forfeitures, §5, p. 10.) Forfeitures are not looked upon with favor by the courts, and one who seeks to enforce a forfeiture must himself be free from blame. (Storm v. Barbara Oil Co., 177 Kan. 589, 282 P. 2d 417.) Under these circumstances Cities Service Gas Company is in no position to assert the meter and regulator lease to accomplish a forfeiture of the fife estate, as it attempts to do in its brief.
At this juncture, it should be noted, the Cities Service Gas Company paid a $10 rental per year to Leland O. Armstrong for this meter and regulator lease from the time it was granted until this action Was commenced. It seems to me this is an absolute admission binding upon Cities Service Gas Company in derogation of its asserted claim to a prescriptive easement based on a “belief of ownership” against the remaindermen. It recognizes Leland O. *320Armstrong, with whom it is in privity, as the owner of the servient estate.
By classifying K. S. A. 60-503 as a statute of limitations the court justifies its application retroactively to a claim “under a belief of ownership,” which is an entirely new concept under the adverse possession statute. In this respect amendment of the adverse possession statute, as it now appears in the new code of civil procedure, effective January 1, 1964, changes the substantive rights of the parties.
For example, prior to January 1, 1964, the appellees in this case were required to hold possession knowingly adverse and in open hostility to the owner of the property. They were required to hold the possession of the property in this manner for a period of fifteen years before their possession ripened into title. By admission the appellees at no time claimed title to their easements knowingly adverse or in open hostility to the remaindermen in this case. They candidly admit their claim to a prescriptive easement is based upon a “belief of ownership.” Now, if “a belief of ownership” was insufficient prior to January 1, 1964, how can it be said the appellees have claimed adversely for a period of fifteen years under the present statute? (K.S. A. 60-503.)
To approach the question from another angle, it may be said on the date of each of the remaindermen’s birth each acquired a vested interest as remainderman in the half section of real property in question. Thus, anything that affected his right to the property affected a vested right. As of December 31, 1963, the appellants’ vested right was not affected in any way by adverse possession, on the facts in this case. If the statute is given retroactive application, the one-year period of limitation imposed by the legislature on actions commenced under 60-503, supra, would be sufficient to divest the remaindermen of their interest in the real estate on a “belief of ownership.” In my opinion title cannot ripen by adverse possession founded upon a “belief of ownership” under 60-503 until January 1, 1979. To hold otherwise would violate the Constitution of the State of Kansas and the Constitution of the United States in that it would deprive the appellants of their property without due process of law and without just compensation. (State, ex rel., v. Public Service Comm., 135 Kan. 491, 500, 11 P. 2d 999.)
The Kansas Supreme Court has held that a statute will not be given retroactive application unless the statute clearly indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to do so. (State, ex rel., v. *321Public Service Comm., supra.) If the statute is given retroactive application and destroys or impairs vested property rights it is unconstitutional. (Davis, Administrator v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 206 Kan. 40, 476 P. 2d 635; Lyon v. Wilson, 201 Kan. 768, 433 P. 2d 314; Johnson v. Warren, 192 Kan. 310, 387 P. 2d 213; and see Eaton v. Doe, 172 Kan. 643, 654, 243 P. 2d 236.)
Statutes of limitation are presumed to be prospective and not retrospective in their operation in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, and the presumption is against an intent on the part of the legislature to make a statute retroactive. To give a statute retrospective operation the intention of the legislature that it shall so operate must be unequivocally expressed. (Serrault v. Price, 125 Kan. 548, 265 Pac. 63; State v. Brown, 146 Kan. 525, 73 P. 2d 19; and Siefkin v. Siefkin, 150 Kan. 396, 92 P. 2d 1005.)
But, 60-503, supra, is not a mere statute of limitations. It is more. This is apparent from the court’s opinion when it cites substantial authority for the proposition that a modem adverse possession statute has a twofold purpose. First, to cut off the right to bring an action; and second, vest the disseisor with title. The court also cites authority for the proposition that the doctrine of adverse possession is a ripening of certain types of possession into title by the lapse of time.
Our court has held where an act is more than a mere statute of limitations it will have prospective application only. (Serrault v. Price, supra, and see State v. Brown, supra.) Where a statute operates retrospectively to effect divesting of vested property rights in real property it is unconstitutional and void. (Davis, Administrator v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 206 Kan. 40, 476 P. 2d 635.)
In Gard, Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, Annotated, Sec. 60-503, the author sets forth the intention of the draftsmen of the new code provision in the “Advisory Committee Notes” as follows:
“It will be noted that this section changes the common law principles of adverse possession as pronounced by the Kansas Supreme Court. The purpose is to eliminate disputes, particularly, as to boundary lines which have been treated as correct over a long period of years.”
The author’s commentary is set forth in the court’s opinion and indicates the change in the statute was designed for boundary line disputes. In these situations notice imparted by the recording Acts does not affect the parties, because resort to the record would not *322show where the boundary between two tracts of land is actually situated with respect to the true boundary line.
While a syllabus prepared by the court would be helpful to inform the reader the basis of its holding, ostensibly, among other things, the court holds that under K. S. A. 60-503 any person who has been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of real property (or an easement of right-of-way, as here) under a good faith belief of ownership, which must be reasonable under all the facts and circumstances, for a period of fifteen (15) years acquires title by adverse possession. Furthermore, the rule is absolute in that nothing whatever on record regarding the real property is sufficient to impart constructive notice to the disseisor so long as he has no actual notice of infirmities in his grantor’s title. (This case is complicated by the fact that the disseisors are corporations, discussed infra).
It seems to me the court’s position on constructive notice imparted by the recording of title instruments amounts to this: These public utilities (appellees) with a competent legal staff at their disposal are not bound by the constructive notice which record title imparts, but the minor remaindermen, whose vested rights to the property were on record long before the granting of the easements, are bound by the notice which the subsequent recording of the easements imparts, even though the remaindermen were minors when the easements were granted and recorded. The remainder-men are held to be bound by constructive notice thát each of the utilities was claiming a “perpetual easement.” The remaindermen’s stipulation that they knew the utility lines were on the real property is not tantamount to knowledge on their part that the utilities were claiming a perpetaual easement. They had a right to assume, absent actual knowledge to the contrary, that the utilities were holding their easements in privity with their grantor and consistent with his limited estate.
On the facts in this case the utilities should be held to constructive notice that Leland O. Armstrong had only a life estate. Conceding the law to be as stated in the court’s opinion regarding constructive notice of defects in title where one claims by adverse possession, it has no application to the facts in this case. Here the utilities when they acquired their easements were dealing directly with the person in possession of the half section of land in which they were interested. This person was Leland O. Armstrong, the life tenant. One who acquires an interest in real property is bound to take *323notice of the rights of the person in possession of the property. Now, the only instrument showing Leland O. Armstrong to have any rights in the real property whatever was the will of W. H. Armstrong, duly admitted to probate and on record in the probate court of Douglas County. Had the utilities exercised any diligence whatever, they would have found that the party in possession had only a life estate. There was no defect in the chain of title. The limited right of Leland O. Armstrong to the property was in the very instrument by which he claimed title and possession.
The remaindermen herein were minors throughout the entire period of time Leland O. Armstrong and the utilities were dealing with each other regarding the easements in question. Richard A. Armstrong was born December 5, 1926, and became of legal age and attained his rights of majority on December 5,1947; and Betty J. Grisham was born December 7, 1931, and became of legal age and attained her rights of majority on December 7,1952.
Commencing in 1929 and extending through August, 1946, the life tenant granted Cities Service Gas Company two pipeline right-of-way easements and a meter and regulator lease through the property in question. In 1944 the life tenant granted an easement to Kansas Electric Power Company (later merged into KP&L) for the construction of an electrical transmission line over the property.
The court charges these minor remaindermen with notice that the easements were “perpetual and in no way limited.”
It seems to me the law which the court’s opinion announces is topsy-turvy. K. S. A. 60-503, as construed by the court, encourages fraud. It is a statute which enables one man to steal the title of another by professing to hold under it. It confers privileged rules of law upon those least entitled to it.
The legislature had no intention whatever of abrogating the law of this state regarding constructive notice imparted by the recording of instruments affecting real estate titles when it enacted the new code of civil procedure, of which K. S. A. 60-503 is a part.
My concern with the court’s decision is the impact it will have as a precedent, and the disrupting influence it will have on established institutions in our economic society which rely upon the stability of real estate titles by reason of the obligation the law imposes upon persons to take notice of matters on record concerning real estate.
Here we are dealing with “belief of ownership” which is a subjective consideration, a state of mind of the possessory claimant, *324and not intent. For example, the utilities in this case to have a good faith “belief of ownership” had to be diligent in their negligence — their failure to examine the record and take notice of the instrument by which Leland O. Armstrong claimed possession and title. The trial court found the utilities had no actual notice of the limited estate.
Actually, on the facts in this case, the court’s decision does not foster good faith. It encourages fraud. Of what culpable acts are the remaindermen guilty to justify the taking of their vested remainder?
The court in its opinion says there is evidence to support the trial court’s findings. On the record presented the sufficiency of the findings may be questioned in one vital area — good faith in the belief of ownership by the utilities. The trial court simply found the utilities were in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the easements under a belief of ownership.
In their designation of additional portions of the record both Cities Service Gas Company and the Kansas Power and Light Company designated “Exhibit W — Release” to be incorporated in the record on appeal. This exhibit is a release for all crop and property damages arising from the construction of a “110 KV Line through my property . . .” [typed in blank space of form release], covering the real property here in litigation. The release recites that in consideration of the sum of “seventy-five dollars” [handwritten in blank space], the receipt of which is acknowledged, “I (we) Anna M. Armstrong [typed in blank space] L. O. Armstrong of Douglas County” [handwritten in blank space] (Emphasis added) unconditionally release “The L. E. Myers Co., and the Kansas Electric Power Co.” [typed in blank space on form release]. The release was signed by L. O. Armstrong and dated the 21st day of July, 1944.
This release was unquestionably prepared by the Kansas Electric Power Company or its agents and presented for signature with the blank spaces completed with the typed information above indicated. Where did the Kansas Electric Power Company or its agents get the name: “Anna M. Armstrong”? The court says in its opinion the release contained “the typed name ‘Anna M. Armstrong’ — which fact remains unexplained in the record.”
In July, 1944, Anna M. Armstrong had been dead over 25 years.
Under these circumstances there is only one source from which the name “Anna M. Armstrong” could have been acquired by the *325utility dealing with the real property in question — from the will of W. H. Armstrong on record in the Probate Court of Douglas County. This very instrument disclosed that not only Anna M. Armstrong, but also Leland O. Armstrong, owned only a life estate in the real property in question.
Corporations of necessity must deal through persons who are their agents. They are charged with the acts and deeds of their agents, and also are charged with the knowledge which their agents possess. Under these circumstances “Exhibit W” places in the record a written admission by the Kansas Electric Power Company (later merged into KP&L) that it had knowledge of the instrument on record disclosing the limited estate of Leland O. Armstrong. Good faith under a belief of ownership? I think not. Under these facts and circumstances the Kansas Power and Light Company must be charged with knowledge of the true facts regarding the limited estate of Leland O. Armstrong with whom it was dealing, and it could not assert a belief of ownership in good faith. Otherwise, if the knowledge of its agents cannot be imputed to a corporate entity, no one could ever successfully challenge a corporation’s claim of good faith under a belief of ownership.
The trial court did not find the utilities (appellees'herein) were in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the easements in question under a good faith belief of ownership. The trial court was content to adopt the utilities’ positions that they relied upon employed agents to acquire the easements and do the work; and that none of the utilities’ officers or attorneys were aware of the limited estate of Leland O. Armstrong as indicated by the many exhibits the utilities introduced showing their activities with the easements and financing of structures and transmission lines placed thereon.
These utilities may eventually find they have won the battle but lost the war, unless the legislature comes to their rescue. They are not on a one-way street in acquiring prescriptive rights by adverse possession under the new concept — belief of ownership.
An analogous situation is found in Potter v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 201 Kan. 528, 441 P. 2d 802. There it was held the utility was not required to stand the expense of lowering its pipeline on the right-of-way acquired to accommodate the leveling and grading of farm land for irrigation purposes. As a result of the Totter decision utilities now find they are required to pay dearly for ease*326ments acquired through, condemnation, where the juries are instructed in accordance with the law of the Potter case.
Under tire new concept of adverse possession authorized by K. S. A. 60-503, as now construed by the court, utilities will be required to exercise the utmost diligence to avoid losing their easements to landowners who hold their land under a good faith belief of ownership free of the encumbrance of an easement. A pipeline, for example, buried for many years, where farming operations are conducted over the line, becomes lost to all except those who actually know of its existence or are charged with constructive notice by the recording of the easement. But under the new concept in adverse possession, “belief of ownership”, constructive notice imparted by the recording of the easement is no longer a defense to adverse possession. That which is on record is immaterial where one in open, exclusive and continuous possession claims title under a good faith belief of ownership for fifteen years. Once the easement is lost the utility in all probability will be required to resort to its powers of eminent domain to acquire the easement. It will then be confronted with inflation, changed circumstances and such decisions as Potter and Spears v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 203 Kan. 520, 455 P. 2d 496, in a condemnation proceeding.
Any landowner, and there are many, can be just as diligent in his negligence to establish good faith under a “belief of ownership” as a utility.
It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
Fatzer, C. J. and Prager, J., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.