Court Opinion

ID: 9749413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:42:29.4063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:43.033231
License: Public Domain

BYER, Judge,
dissenting.
I would reverse the judgment of contempt against the Pennsylvania Public School Employes’ Retirement System (Retirement System), because the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
With certain exceptions not applicable to this case, the General Assembly has vested this court with exclusive original jurisdiction of actions against the Commonwealth and its agencies. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a). The February 7, *2631989 order with respect to which the appellant was found in contempt is in the nature of an injunction. Clearly, the courts of common pleas do not have jurisdiction to entertain injunction actions against the Commonwealth or its agencies; such actions can be filed only in this court.
The majority holds that the trial court had jurisdiction because the February 7, 1989 order was an attachment under Pa.R.C.P. 1920.43(c), and the exclusive jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a) should not be construed as extending to ancillary remedies in cases in which the Commonwealth or its agencies have only an incidental involvement.
I find it unnecessary to determine whether the majority is correct that our exclusive jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a) does not encompass attachment execution in actions where the Commonwealth or one of its agencies is merely a garnishee. That is because the record clearly shows that there was no such attachment in this case.
The February 7, 1989 order is in the nature of an injunction. It purports to enjoin the Retirement System. However, it was entered on the basis of a petition in which the plaintiff requested relief only against her husband. The plaintiff did not serve the petition on the Retirement System before presenting it to the court.
Our Supreme Court has provided in Pa.R.C.P. 1920.43(c) that where the trial court in a divorce action orders the attachment of property “in the possession of a garnishee, the practice and procedure shall conform as nearly may be to Rules 3111 to 3113 and Rules 3142 to 3145 governing attachment execution.” The record in this case shows there was absolutely no compliance with Pa.R.C.P. 3111-3113 or 3142-3145. Indeed, at a minimum, Pa.R.C.P. 3111(a) mandates that the attachment “shall be served by the sheriff upon the garnishee” in the same manner as original process. The record demonstrates that the sheriff did not serve the so-called “attachment” in this case.
The Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that service of the writ of attachment on the garnishee by the sheriff is *264required before the garnishee is subject to the injunction encompassed within the attachment. See Pa.R.C.P. 3111(c). If this truly were an attachment proceeding, the absence of proper service by the sheriff would preclude the contempt action against the garnishee.
We would not tolerate such a departure from the required manner of service under the Rules of Civil Procedure if we were dealing merely with the service of a writ of summons or complaint on an agency of the Commonwealth. Therefore, it seems only reasonable that we should require strict compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure where the service of an alleged “attachment” is the predicate for holding an agency of the Commonwealth in contempt.
There was no attachment in this case. Plaintiff simply made no effort to comply with the rules applicable to an attachment execution. Instead, this case involves only an ex parte injunction against the Retirement System in an action in which the Retirement System was not named as a party. If the Retirement System had been named as a party to an injunction action, the trial court clearly would have been without jurisdiction. I believe the trial court likewise lacked subject matter jurisdiction here, so I respectfully dissent.