Court Opinion

ID: 9622257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:14:32.094964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:15.244037
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Justice,
dissenting.
In the case at bar, strict adherence to the Rules of Civil Procedure leads to a result that is both absurd and manifestly unjust. Under the authority of Civil Rule 94,1 I would relax the rules and affirm the judgment below.2

. "These rules are designed to facilitate business and advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any case where it shall be manifest to the court that a strict adherence to them will work injustice.” Rule 94, Alaska R.Civ.P.

. For purposes of this discussion, I accept the majority’s premise that Civil Rule 16.1(g) and Rule 41(e) conflict. Such conflict, however, is more imagined than real.
Rule 41(e) allows the dismissal of cases not prosecuted for one year. Rule 16.1(g) provides a mechanism whereby fast track cases can be dismissed for want of prosecution faster than other cases: after only 270 days plus 60, provided there is compliance with the procedural requirements of Rule 16.1(g). Nothing in Rule 16.1(g), however, suggests that these added requirements apply to every dismissal of fast track cases.
The time honored rule of construction in cases such as this is to read the rules in question so that their provisions do not conflict, if it is reasonably possible to do so. See, e.g., Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602, 604 (Alaska 1967). Thus read, Rule 16.1(g) provides an expedited means of disposing of dormant fast track cases, if certain procedures are followed; Rule 41(e) allows those same cases to remain dormant longer, but permits them to be dismissed after one full year of dormancy, without the procedural protections provided by the other rule.