Court Opinion

ID: 9940880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 17:00:56.59435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:59.789588
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11086    Document: 20-1      Date Filed: 02/15/2024   Page: 1 of 17

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11086
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        LILLIE M. MIDDLEBROOKS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        EQUIFAX, INC.,
        EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                       23-11086

                          D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01825-SCJ
                              ____________________

        Before: WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Lillie Middlebrooks, proceeding pro se, appeals from the dis-
        trict court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor of
        Equifax, Inc. (“EFX”) and Equifax Information Services, LLC
        (“EIS”) (collectively, “Equifax”) and denying her Federal Rule of
        Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to vacate the district court’s order
        placing unredacted documents filed by Equifax under seal and or-
        dering Equifax to file reacted copies of the documents. She also
        challenges the district court’s denial of her motions for sanctions
        against Equifax for Equifax’s failure to timely identify witnesses
        and file initial disclosures. After careful review, we affirm.
                                               I.
              Middlebrooks is a consumer. In 2018, she disputed two ac-
        counts on her Equifax credit report and sought to obtain a home
        mortgage. This case arises out of these events. 1

        1 Because we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor

        of Equifax, we recount the facts in evidence in the light most favorable to Mid-
        dlebrooks, the nonmovant. See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253,
        1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010). We note where facts are disputed.
               Much of the evidence we describe here comes from a declaration by
        Equifax’s Litigation Support Manager, Celestine Gobin. Middlebrooks argues
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        23-11086                   Opinion of the Court                                3

                EFX, a holding company, owns EIS and uses it as a store-
        house of consumer credit information. Together, they comprise
        Equifax, which has three functions relevant here. First, Equifax col-
        lects and stores consumer credit information. Equifax collects
        credit information from “data furnishers”—entities that report con-
        sumer credit information. Doc. 122-1 at 6. 2 Data furnishers are sub-
        ject to a due diligence process, must certify that they will abide by
        the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), and must sign an agree-
        ment with Equifax in which they agree to provide accurate data,
        update data regularly, and have a process for verifying information.
        EIS stores the data Equifax collects from data furnishers.
               Second, Equifax responds to requests for a consumer’s credit
        information. Equifax provides “consumer disclosures” in response
        to requests by consumers. And it provides “consumer reports,” or
        “credit reports,” in response to requests by third parties, such as a
        credit grantor. These reports and disclosures summarize the con-
        sumer’s credit history. Doc. 122-1 at 5.
              Third, Equifax investigates consumer disputes about credit
        information. A consumer may contact Equifax to dispute infor-
        mation reported on her consumer report or disclosure. When
        Equifax receives a dispute, EIS makes an electronic record of it and
        any of Equifax’s subsequent actions relating to it. Equifax

        in this appeal that the district court erred in considering this declaration. For
        the reasons set forth in Part III, we reject Middlebrooks’s challenge to the
        court’s consideration of this evidence.
        2 “Doc.” numbers are the district court’s docket entries.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11086

        investigates the dispute, including by reviewing information and
        documents the consumer supplies and, if necessary, by asking the
        data furnisher to investigate and advise as to whether the infor-
        mation it has provided is accurate. If upon investigation Equifax
        learns that a consumer’s credit information needs to be changed,
        Equifax changes it. Regardless of whether it changes a consumer’s
        information upon the conclusion of its investigation, Equifax noti-
        fies the consumer of the results of the investigation.
                Middlebrooks sent a letter to Equifax disputing two collec-
        tion accounts from data furnisher Fair Collections & Outsourcing
        (“FCO”) that were being collected on behalf of a creditor, Lasalle
        Investment Management. Middlebrooks stated that two FCO col-
        lection accounts, one for $1,000 and one for $189, were not hers
        and were fraudulently placed in her consumer credit information
        file, as she had never entered into a contract with Lasalle. Middle-
        brooks did not include any documentation like a police report to
        support her fraud allegation.
               Equifax opened a case for investigation based on Middle-
        brooks’s letter, notified FCO of the dispute, and sent FCO Auto-
        mated Consumer Dispute Verification (“ACDV”) forms requesting
        investigations into each account. FCO returned the ACDV forms
        with its investigation results, advising that the $1,000 debt should
        be deleted from Middlebrooks’s file but that the $198 debt be-
        longed to Middlebrooks and was reported accurately. On both
        forms, FCO listed its “Responder” as “Cristina Manalo.” Doc. 122-
        1 at 18, 20. FCO provided Equifax with the consumer information
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        23-11086               Opinion of the Court                         5

        it relied upon to conclude that the $198 collection account was
        valid, and Equifax, as part of its investigation, confirmed that the
        information FCO provided matched information it had collected
        on Middlebrooks. Equifax then informed Middlebrooks that it had
        deleted the $1,000 debt but not the $198 debt.
               Middlebrooks then filed a complaint alleging that Equifax vi-
        olated the FCRA’s requirements that a credit reporting agency fol-
        low reasonable procedures (1) “to assure maximum possible accu-
        racy of the information” about a consumer in her credit report, 15
        U.S.C. § 1681e, and, (2) when a consumer initiates a dispute as to
        the accuracy of information, “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation
        to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate,” id.
        § 1681i(a)(1)(A). The complaint alleged that Middlebrooks sought
        a home mortgage from three lenders and that Equifax provided
        each lender a credit report with the $198 delinquent and unpaid
        collection account, an amount resulting in a lower credit score than
        should have been reported. As a result of this incorrect credit score,
        the complaint alleged, Middlebrooks received unfavorable mort-
        gage interest rates and borrowing limits. The complaint also al-
        leged that Middlebrooks again disputed the $198 account in 2020
        and that Equifax deleted the charge from her credit file.
               This case thereafter “followed a frustrating path,” Doc. 142
        at 4, and we recount only the events relevant to this appeal. Dis-
        covery began, closed, was reopened, and then closed again. Even-
        tually, with Equifax’s motion for summary judgment pending,
        Middlebrooks moved for sanctions against Equifax. Middlebrooks
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11086

        asserted that Equifax failed to timely provide initial disclosures as
        required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) and also failed
        to produce any documents in discovery, thereby depriving her of
        the opportunity to prepare an effective defense to the summary
        judgment motion. Specifically, Middlebrooks argued that Equifax
        failed to provide initial disclosures until after the close of discovery
        and in so doing failed to identify a key witness, Equifax’s Litigation
        Support Manager Celestina Gobin. Middlebrooks asked the district
        court to strike Gobin’s declaration, several paragraphs in Equifax’s
        statement of material facts, and documents supporting the motion
        for summary judgment, including the ACDV forms.
                Equifax admitted that it had failed to provide initial disclo-
        sures until after the close of discovery. But, it argued, the oversight
        was inadvertent, and, in any event, it had identified Gobin as a po-
        tential witness in interrogatory responses provided before the close
        of discovery. Thus, Equifax argued, Middlebrooks was on notice
        that Gobin was likely to have discoverable information. Equifax
        stated that it was willing to withdraw its pending motion for sum-
        mary judgment and refile it after Middlebrooks was afforded an op-
        portunity to conduct additional discovery.
                A magistrate judge concluded that Equifax’s failure to make
        initial disclosures by the deadline was not “substantially justified”
        but “at least arguably harmless.” Doc. 96 at 6. The judge further
        noted that Equifax had offered to withdraw its pending motion for
        summary judgment and reopen discovery for Middlebrooks. This
        remedy, the judge found, “would substantially eliminate any
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        23-11086                 Opinion of the Court                              7

        prejudice” Middlebrooks suffered. Id. Thus, the judge ordered that
        Equifax’s pending motion for summary judgment be withdrawn,
        that discovery be reopened “for the sole purpose of allowing [Mid-
        dlebrooks] the opportunity to depose any witnesses listed in
        Equifax’s belatedly provided initial disclosures,” and otherwise de-
        nied Middlebrooks’s motions. Id. at 8. Over Middlebrooks’s objec-
        tions, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s order.
               At the close of the reopened discovery period (during which
        time Middlebrooks did not depose Gobin), Equifax again moved
        for summary judgment. As relevant to this appeal, Equifax argued
        that both of Middlebrooks’s FCRA claims could succeed only if she
        had put forth evidence that her credit report contained an inaccu-
        racy, and she had offered only conclusory allegations to that effect.
        Equifax attached to its motion several unredacted, unsealed docu-
        ments that contained personal identifying information, including
        Middlebrooks’s full social security number and date of birth. Upon
        a motion by Middlebrooks, the magistrate judge ordered the of-
        fending documents sealed and further ordered Equifax to file re-
        dacted versions of the documents in compliance with the court’s
        relevant standing order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2.
               Middlebrooks moved for relief from the magistrate judge’s
        order under Rule 60(b), arguing that the judge had erred in permit-
        ting Equifax to file (and rely upon) redacted and sealed documents. 3

        3 Middlebrooks moved for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), which permits a

        district court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                       23-11086

        The proper relief, she argued, would have been for the exhibits to
        be “completely stricken” from the court’s docket. Doc. 129 at 2.
        She also argued that “the district court was mandated to destroy
        and expunge” the documents. Id. at 16. The magistrate judge de-
        nied Middlebrooks’s motion, reasoning that because courts have
        authority to order documents to be sealed or redacted either by
        motion or sua sponte, the court did not err in ordering the exhibits
        sealed or filed redacted.
               The magistrate judge also issued a report and recommenda-
        tion (“R&R”) recommending that Equifax’s motion for summary
        judgment be granted. The judge concluded that despite Middle-
        brooks’s many protestations about Equifax’s litigation strategy,
        “she offers no evidence that there was an inaccuracy in her report.”
        Doc. 131 at 9.
                Middlebrooks objected to both orders. The district court,
        however, adopted the R&R, granted summary judgment in favor
        of Equifax, and denied Middlebrooks’s Rule 60(b) motion. As to the
        summary judgment motion, the district court agreed with the mag-
        istrate judge that Middlebrooks “did not provide the Court with
        any evidence showing that the Credit Report was inaccurate so as
        to create a material dispute of fact.” Doc. 142 at 29. Because both
        of Middlebrooks’s claims could succeed only upon a finding that
        Equifax’s report contained factually inaccurate information, the

        because of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ.
        P. 60(b)(1).
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        23-11086                Opinion of the Court                          9

        court concluded that she could not as a matter of law succeed on
        either claim.
                The district court concluded that Middlebrooks’s Rule 60(b)
        motion was due to be denied. The court explained that sealing and
        ordering redaction of the offending documents remedied Middle-
        brooks’s harm and that “there is no additional benefit in destroying
        or expunging these documents.” Id. at 33. Plus, the court explained,
        destroying documents “is inconsistent with the common-law right
        of access to judicial proceedings.” Id. at 34. Finally, the court con-
        cluded that the magistrate judge, “pursuant to his inherent author-
        ity to control his docket, could sua sponte seal documents” and did
        not clearly err in ordering other documents filed redacted. Id.
               Middlebrooks has appealed, challenging the district court’s
        refusal to exclude Gobin’s declaration and related documents, de-
        nial of Rule 60(b) relief, and grant of summary judgment in favor
        of Equifax.
                                          II.
               We review a district court’s decision on whether and how to
        sanction a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) for
        an abuse of discretion. Hearn v. McKay, 603 F.3d 897, 903 (11th Cir.
        2010). We also review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) mo-
        tion for an abuse of discretion. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Nat’l Urological
        Grp., Inc., 80 F.4th 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2023). This standard gives
        the district court a “range of choice[,] so long as that choice does
        not constitute a clear error of judgment.” Fuentes v. Classica Cruise
        Operator Ltd, Inc., 32 F.4th 1311, 1321 (11th Cir. 2022) (alteration and
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                    23-11086

        internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, a district court
        has broad, yet not unbridled, discretion in deciding whether to im-
        pose evidentiary sanctions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
        “A district court abuses its discretion only when it misapplies the
        law or bases its decision on ﬁndings of fact that are clearly errone-
        ous.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292,
        1313 (11th Cir. 2011).
                We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
        de novo. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir.
        2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if, construing the evi-
        dence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the movant
        shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the mo-
        vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 1263–64. The
        party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibil-
        ity of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and
        identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
        interrogatories, and admissions on ﬁle, together with the aﬃdavits,
        if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
        of material fact.” Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292
        (11th Cir. 2012) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
        “The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to rebut that
        showing by producing aﬃdavits or other relevant and admissible
        evidence beyond the pleadings.” Id. (internal quotation marks
        omitted). A plaintiﬀ must point to “speciﬁc facts in the record that
        could lead a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd in his favor.” Beard v. Banks,
        548 U.S. 521, 535 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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        23-11086                    Opinion of the Court                                 11

                                               III.
               Middlebrooks mounts three challenges on appeal. First, she
        argues that because Equifax failed to timely disclose Gobin as a wit-
        ness as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district
        court should have excluded from the record Gobin’s declaration
        and exhibits like the ACDV form attached to it when the court con-
        sidered Equifax’s motion for summary judgment. Second, Middle-
        brooks challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment
        in favor of Equifax, arguing that she did not bear the burden to
        prove that her credit report contained an inaccuracy. 4 Third, she
        challenges the district court’s denial of her Rule 60(b) motion, ar-
        guing that Equifax had attempted a “trial by ambush” and so it

        4 Middlebrooks also argues that the district court erred in treating EFX and EIS

        as one entity for purposes of determining whether either, or both, was a credit
        reporting agency and therefore subject to the FCRA. Middlebrooks misses the
        point. It is true that EFX maintained in the district court that it was not a credit
        reporting agency, and that Middlebrooks disputed that fact. But it is also true,
        as the magistrate judge noted, that Equifax—that is, both EFX and EIS—would
        be entitled to summary judgment even if EFX was a credit reporting agency
        because Middlebrooks failed to present any evidence showing that her credit
        report contained an inaccuracy. In other words, even construing the disputed
        fact regarding EFX’s status as a credit reporting agency in the light most favor-
        able to Middlebrooks, Middlebrooks could not prevail. Because, as we explain
        above, we agree that Middlebrooks offered no evidence of an inaccuracy, we
        can make the same assumption in Middlebrooks’s favor regarding EFX’s status
        as a credit reporting agency.
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                       23-11086

        should have been subject to greater sanctions. Appellant’s Br. at 53.
        As we explain below, we reject Middlebrooks’s arguments. 5
                Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires a party to dis-
        close via initial disclosures any individual likely to have discovera-
        ble information that the party may use to support its claims or de-
        fenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (requir-
        ing parties to supplement incomplete disclosures in a timely man-
        ner). The district court, by adopting the magistrate judge’s order,
        found Equifax in violation of Rule 26. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
        dure 37 gives a district court “discretion to decide how to respond
        to a litigant’s failure to make a required disclosure under Rule 26.”
        Taylor v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 940 F.3d 582, 593 (11th Cir. 2019).
        Specifically, Rule 37 provides that “[i]f a party fails to provide infor-
        mation or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e),” the
        district court may exclude that information or witness “unless the
        failure was substantially justified or is harmless,” or, “instead of this
        sanction, . . . may impose other appropriate sanctions.” Fed. R. Civ.
        P. 37(c)(1), (c)(1)(C).

        5 Middlebrooks advances several additional arguments on appeal, including

        that the district court erroneously found that she had failed to alert the court
        to Equifax’s discovery violations; that 45 days was insufficient time for her to
        prepare to depose Gobin; that she would not have been able to depose Gobin
        effectively because Equifax allegedly did not produce her complete credit file
        or a complete copy of its FCRA compliance practices; that Gobin’s declaration
        was inadmissible for summary-judgment purposes because her signature was
        typed, not handwritten; and that Equifax waived any argument that its proce-
        dures were reasonable. We have carefully considered these arguments and
        find no merit in them.
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        23-11086               Opinion of the Court                        13

               Here, the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in
        fashioning a sanction lesser than exclusion. See Fuentes, 32 F.4th at
        1321. Even assuming Equifax’s failure to timely disclose Gobin as a
        witness was neither substantially justified nor harmless, the court
        rendered it harmless by reopening the discovery period so that
        Middlebrooks could depose Gobin. That Middlebrooks did not de-
        pose Gobin during that period does not render the remedy to the
        violation meaningless.
               Middlebrooks argues that Equifax’s violation of the district
        court’s scheduling order (failing to timely disclose Gobin as a wit-
        ness) was not good cause for the court’s modiﬁcation of the sched-
        uling order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modiﬁed
        only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”). Good cause or
        not, modiﬁcation of the scheduling order was within the district
        court’s inherent authority. Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016)
        (explaining that a district court possesses “inherent powers that are
        governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
        vested in courts to manage their own aﬀairs so as to achieve the
        orderly and expeditious disposition of cases” (internal quotation
        marks omitted)). Indeed, nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
        cedure or our case law prohibited the district court from remedy-
        ing a party’s harm from an opposing party’s violation of a schedul-
        ing order by modifying the scheduling order to give the harmed
        party (and the harmed party alone) more time to conduct discov-
        ery. Even looking at the district court’s decision to reopen discovery
        for Middlebrooks through the lens of Rule 16(b)’s good-cause re-
        quirement, it is easy to see that Equifax’s discovery violation
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11086

        supplied good cause for a remedy. At bottom, Middlebrooks quib-
        bles with the remedy the district court chose. But because the dis-
        trict court’s sanction was squarely within its broad range of
        choices, we will not second guess it. Fuentes, 32 F.4th at 1321.
               Middlebrooks further argues that the Gobin declaration
        should have been excluded because it relied upon the ACDV
        forms, and the “Responder” listed on those forms, Manalo, was
        never disclosed to Middlebrooks as a witness. For the same reason,
        she similarly argues that the ACDV forms should have been ex-
        cluded. As the district court explained, Manalo was not a witness,
        and so Equifax was not required to disclose her under Rule 26. See
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amend-
        ment (“A party is no[t] . . . obligated to disclose witnesses or docu-
        ments, whether favorable or unfavorable, that it does not intend to
        use.”). Rather, Manalo merely prepared business documents upon
        which Gobin relied. And since Middlebrooks had an opportunity
        to depose Gobin, she had the opportunity to question Gobin’s reli-
        ance on those documents. We also note, as did the district court,
        that Middlebrooks received a copy of the ACDV forms well before
        the close of discovery, so she cannot argue that Equifax failed to
        disclose the documents themselves.
              Given that the district court permissibly declined to exclude
        the Gobin declaration and ACDV forms, we consider those docu-
        ments in reviewing the district court’s summary judgment order.
        The FCRA provides that a credit reporting agency preparing a con-
        sumer report must follow reasonable procedures to assure the
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        23-11086               Opinion of the Court                         15

        maximum possible accuracy of the information relating to the per-
        son about whom the report relates. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Further,
        if a consumer disputes the completeness or accuracy of any infor-
        mation contained in her file and she notifies the credit reporting
        agency of the dispute, the agency must “conduct a reasonable rein-
        vestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inac-
        curate.” Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). To establish a violation of either of
        these FCRA provisions, the consumer must present evidence tend-
        ing to show that the agency prepared a report containing inaccu-
        rate information. Losch v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 995 F.3d 937,
        944 (11th Cir. 2021) (setting forth the elements of a prima facie vi-
        olation of § 1681e); Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d
        1151, 1160 (11th Cir. 1991) (setting forth the elements of a claim
        under § 1681i), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in
        Santos v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC., 90 F.4th 1144, 1156
        (11th Cir. 2024).
               We agree with the district court that, in response to
        Equifax’s evidence that the $198 collection amount indeed be-
        longed to Middlebrooks, Middlebrooks offered no evidence that
        this was inaccurate. Although Middlebrooks alleged in her com-
        plaint that Equifax deleted the $198 collection account a couple of
        years after she disputed it and the $1,000 account, she offered no
        evidence to support this allegation. And our case law refutes Mid-
        dlebrooks’s argument that she was not required to offer any evi-
        dence to show an inaccuracy. An inaccuracy on her credit report is
        an essential element of both of Middlebrooks’s claims. 15 U.S.C.
        §§ 1681e(b), 1681i(a)(1)(A). Equifax bore its initial burden to show
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        16                         Opinion of the Court                         23-11086

        that the report was accurate. At that point, the burden shifted to
        Middlebrooks to offer some evidence to refute Equifax’s evidence.
        Jones, 683 F.3d at 1292; Beard, 548 U.S. at 535. This she did not do.
        Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment in
        Equifax’s favor. 6
               Lastly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
        ing Middlebrooks’s Rule 60(b) request to vacate the order sealing
        Equifax’s unredacted ﬁlings and ordering Equifax to ﬁle redacted
        versions of the documents. Middlebrooks argues that the district
        court’s order permitting Equifax to ﬁle documents containing her
        personal identifying information under seal and with redactions
        constituted a “trial by ambush,” Appellant’s Br. at 53, but she fails
        to explain how she was ambushed by the court’s order. Middle-
        brooks knew the content of the ﬁlings when Equifax ﬁled its mo-
        tion for summary judgment. The court was within its authority to
        order the oﬀending documents sealed and redacted. See Perez-

        6 For the first time in her reply brief, Middlebrooks argues that Equifax cannot

        assert that she failed to show an inaccuracy in her credit report because
        Equifax allegedly did not produce her credit file in discovery. She also argues
        that the accuracy of the credit report is an “affirmative defense” that Equifax
        waived. Reply Br. at 16. We will not consider arguments raised for the first
        time in a reply brief. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 682–
        83 (11th Cir. 2014); see Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (explaining that our rule applies even to a brief filed by a pro se litigant). Even
        if we were to consider these arguments, however, we would reject them. The
        record shows that Middlebrooks was in possession of her credit file in June
        2018, before she filed suit and long before the close of discovery. And, as we
        set forth above, the existence of an inaccuracy is an element for stating a claim
        under the FCRA, not an affirmative defense.
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        23-11086                Opinion of the Court                          17

        Guerrero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 717 F.3d 1224, 1235 (11th Cir. 2013). Thus,
        Middlebrooks has failed to show any abuse of the district court’s
        discretion.
                                                   7
               For the above reasons, we aﬃrm.
               AFFIRMED.

        7 Middlebrooks’s “Motion to Transfer Appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of

        Appeals” is DENIED. The appeal is properly in this Court because Middle-
        brooks filed her action in the Northern District of Georgia.