Court Opinion

ID: 9792643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:32:57.054243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:44.155141
License: Public Domain

LANKFORD, Judge,
dissenting in part; concurring in part.
Although I find much with which to agree in the majority opinion, we part paths on this question: Did the amendment to A.R.S. section 11-506 violate due process by retroactively depriving taxpayers of a vested right?
The constitutional issue requires that we address three questions: (1) Do the taxpayers have a constitutionally protected interest? (2) If so, does the statutory amendment deprive them of that interest? (3) Is the deprivation of the interest fundamentally unfair and thus in violation of due process of law?1 For this court to find a constitutional violation, the answer to all three questions must be “yes.” We will not presume that a statute is unconstitutional, but it must affirmatively appear so. State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6, 648 P.2d 119, 121 (1982).
The threshold question is whether taxpayers have a constitutionally protected right. I agree with the majority that the taxpayers have a property interest in their money. If they lost money because they were erroneously taxed, they may recover their property. Tax statutes in addition to the one at issue here recognize that taxpayers may recover money lost because taxes were erroneously imposed. See A.R.S. §§ 42-178(F), 42-204.-01. This statutorily recognized interest in property is protected by the due process clause. See Smotkin v. Peterson, 73 Ariz. 1, 5, 236 P.2d 743, 745 (1951) (taxpayer’s remedy of action for refund is adequate and does not violate due process); cf. Maricopa County v. Superior Court (First Interstate Bank), 170 Ariz. 248, 823 P.2d 696 (App.1991) (rejecting on other grounds a claim that denial of right to appeal property tax valuation was due process violation).
The next issue is whether the statutory amendment deprives the taxpayers of their property right. This question poses two subsidiary questions: (1) Does the statute erase their property right? (2) Does the statute indirectly deprive the taxpayers of their property right by destroying the remedies which effectuate that right?
The answer to the first question is clearly “no.” The statute challenged here does not *521give the state the power to retain taxpayers’ money extracted by an unlawful tax. The amendment to section 11-506 speaks only to the single remedy —the particular action for refund—provided by that statute; it does not purport to abolish the underlying right to avoid an improper tax. The statute thus does not deprive taxpayers of a property right.
Nor did the Legislature indirectly deny taxpayers’ rights by destroying their remedies. In general, legislation that restricts remedies is not unconstitutional so long as some reasonable remedy remains. 2 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes And Statutory Construction § 41.06, at 377 (Sands 4th ed. rev. 1986). In contrast, legislation that retroactively abolishes a sole remedy, or all remedies, or that so burdens remedies that they become ineffectual, may be unconstitutional. Id. at § 41.09, at 395; Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 692, 711-12 (1960).
Which is true here? Did the amendment unconstitutionally abolish all of the taxpayers’ remedies? Or did it permissibly limit a single remedy among several? On its face, the amendment affected only one remedy, that offered by section 11-506. The amendment did not abolish the remedy but merely limited its scope.
The 1991 legislation is constitutional because the taxpayers have other remedies from improper taxation, as evidenced by the existence of the other remedial statutes left untouched by the 1991 amendment of section 11-506. Indeed, as the majority points out the taxpayers first sought relief under other statutes but were unsuccessful.2
Thus, the statute did not violate due process by stripping away the only remedy for vindicating a property right. Instead, the Legislature merely limited the scope of one remedy, leaving other remedies which—if properly perfected—were well suited for vincheating the taxpayers’ property rights. Cf. Brown Wholesale Elec. v. H.S. Lastar Co., 152 Ariz. 90, 96, 730 P.2d 267, 273 (App.1986) (legislative repeal of particular remedy did not leave plaintiff without a remedy).
Although the conclusion that the statutory amendment did not deprive the taxpayers of their protected right to a refund is enough to affirm the judgment, a consideration of the third question posed by the constitutional issue is valuable because it confirms that result. That question is: Even if it were assumed that the amendment deprived taxpayers of their remedies, is that so fundamentally unfair that it violates due process? Subsumed in this question is the assumption that a right to refund existed prior to the 1991 amendment. If under the prior version of section 11-506 the taxpayers had no right to pursue a refund for an erroneous classification, then the amendment took nothing away from them and consequently cannot be condemned as “retroactive.”
If the statutory amendment were truly retroactive, then it could be argued that it violated due process. See Hall, 149 Ariz. at 140, 717 P.2d at 444 (“[A] right vests ... when it is actually assertable as a legal cause of action or defense or is so substantially relied upon that retroactive divestiture would be manifestly unjust.”). According to the Hall analysis, a right that has been asserted in a judicial action cannot be retroactively denied.
Did the right exist before 1991? The Legislature indicated in the amendment that a right to a refund for an erroneous classification never existed: “The purpose of sections 2 through 5 of this act is curative in nature and is intended to clarify statutory intent and ratify historical administrative interpretation, and does not provide for any change in the law.” A.R.S. § 11-506 (1991), 1991 Ariz. Sess.Laws ch. 303. The 1991 amendment appears to be a negative reaction to Arizona Telco Fed. Credit Union v. Department of Revenue, 158 Ariz. 535, 764 P.2d 20 (App. *5221988), which held that the statute encompassed actions for refunds based on erroneous classifications. The Legislature regarded Telco as an erroneous interpretation of the earlier version of section 11-506 and corrected the mistake by amending the statute.
The legislative branch surely has the power to tell the judicial branch that judges have misconstrued a statute and extended it beyond its intended reach.3 As a consequence, curative statutes such as this one are generally regarded as not violative of due process. Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 Tex.L.Rev. 425, 468 (1982); see, e.g., Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 556 A.2d 145, 150 (1989); Rudewicz v. Gagne, 22 Conn.App. 285, 582 A.2d 468, 465 (1990); Hoben v. City of Minneapolis, 324 N.W.2d 161,163 (Minn.1982) (interpreting statutes as retroactive); see also Graham v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782 F.Supp. 74, 76 (N.D.Ill.1992) (“In cases where Congress is correcting Supreme Court interpretations of a statute rather than creating new rights, the statute is frequently interpreted retroactively absent evidence of intent to the contrary.”). Such amendments do not take away rights because they merely clarify the original statute rather than change its substance.
In short, the Arizona Legislature’s amendment indicates that the original version of section 11-506 did not give the taxpayers the right to recover a refund for a tax based on an erroneous classification. Our Supreme Court in State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 269, 693 P.2d 921, 924 (1985) wrote: “It is ... clear ... that ‘[a]n amendment which, in effect, construes and clarifies a prior statute will be accepted as the legislative declaration of the original act.’ ” (quoting City of Mesa v. Killingsworth, 96 Ariz. 290, 297, 394 P.2d 410, 414 (1964)).
For a court to insist that the State must provide a refund when the Legislature has declared that there is no such remedy and never has been such a remedy is to offer the taxpayers a windfall because if the original legislative intent had been honored by the courts, no “right” would have ever arisen. See Hochman, 73 Hakv.L.Rev. at 705. The 1991 clarifying amendment stated what the original legislation intended and did not change the status quo ante. The amendment thus did not retroactively abolish any rights.
However, not every statutory amendment that has retroactive effect is curative. I agree with the majority that a legislature may not shield substantive retroactive changes in the law by labeling them “curative.” (Slip Opinion at 16). Nevertheless, the majority’s response to this problem is far too sweeping. Its solution is to declare all avowedly curative statutes unconstitutional. This is not the law. Moreover, it concludes that the Legislature falsely or incorrectly characterized its own amendment as curative. This conclusion is not only unsupported by the record, it is wholly inconsistent with our longstanding recognition of a presumption of constitutional validity.
The courts have far less drastic means than this by which we can protect constitutional rights. Courts can and do distinguish between proper amendments and those that run afoul of the due process clause. For example, Congress obliterated an estimated $5 billion in employee claims in the late 1940’s when it passed a statute4 negating U.S. Supreme Court interpretations5 of the Fair Labor Standards Act that had given rise to the claims. See Hochman, 73 Harv.L.Rev. at 721-22; Ray H. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw.U.L.Rev. 540, 554-56 (1957). Every one *523of the circuit court decisions, and numerous district court and state court decisions, upheld the statute. Greenblatt, 51 Nw. U.L.Rev. at 555, n. 65. See also, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 33 S.Ct. 428, 57 L.Ed. 773 (1913) (distinguishing between the permissible abolition of all remedies against the government and impermissible repudiation of the underlying governmental obligation).
The considerations that indicate to courts whether an amendment is truly curative include, for example, whether the amendment closely follows a judicial opinion interpreting the statute or a controversy about the statute’s meaning, or instead alters a longstanding judicial or administrative interpretation. See State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 269, 271, 693 P.2d 921, 924, 926 (1985); State v. Barnett, 142 Ariz. 592, 596, 691 P.2d 683, 687 (1984); O’Malley Lumber Co. v. Riley, 126 Ariz. 167, 169, 613 P.2d 629, 632 (App.1980) (O’Connor, J.); Darak v. Darak, 556 A.2d at 150; Hoben v. City of Minneapolis, 324 N.W.2d at 163. The former is the case here—the Legislature acted to correct our mistake in Telco—which strongly suggests that the amendment is curative.
We also may consider whether the Legislature provided explicit guidance about the nature of the amendment. In this case, our Legislature has told us as directly as possible that its amendment is curative. To hold otherwise, as the majority does, is to find that the Legislature attempted to deceive us. Implicit, too, is the majority’s acceptance of the original statute as unambiguous. I cannot agree on either count. Even without the Legislature’s statement of purpose, “a subsequent legislative change in the language of a particular statute ... is a strong indication of the Legislature’s original intent [citations omitted]____ [Because] [t]his modification occurred shortly after the original version of [the statute] was enacted ... [it] is to us a clarification in order to reflect the intent of the original enactment ...” State v. Barnett, 142 Ariz. at 596, 691 P.2d at 687.
Finally, the Legislature indicated that its amendment restored a prior administrative interpretation. The majority fails to cite any evidence contrary to this legislative finding, which in my view is entitled to deference. See Lancaster v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 143 Ariz. 451, 458, 694 P.2d 281, 288 (App.1984) (“Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction, especially where such a declaration coincides with and thus confirms the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution.”).
Because the amendment has every indication of being truly curative, it is not unconstitutionally retroactive. That alone is enough to uphold the statute, but there is another reason for upholding it. Even if the legislation were a retroactive change in the substantive law, and even if it deprived taxpayers of a right to a refund, we must still consider whether the statute is fundamentally unfair and therefore must be stricken as unconstitutional.
The determination of fundamental fairness is the most difficult part of the analysis. There is no formula, no bright line beyond which a retroactive statute is unconstitutional. However, even a retroactive statute is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). Moreover, the many decisions upholding retroactive legislation reveal that a statute does not violate due process merely because it is retroactive.
There are two potential methods of due process analysis. The first is the familiar rational basis test, a lenient standard of review which merely asks whether the legislature had a rational reason for its enactment. E.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. at 18-19, 96 S.Ct. at 2894 (retroactive liability of coal mine operators for disability to miners attributed to pneumoconiosis); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 728-30, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2717-18, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984). Here, the 1991 amendment has a rational basis either in the administrative benefits of limiting the avenues of relief or in correcting the misimpression that section 11-506 provided a refund for erroneous classifications. In fact, the Legislature has expressly stated that its amendment comported with historical admin*524istrative interpretation, a fact entitled to great weight. See 2 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 41.11, at 411 (Sands 4th ed. rev. 1986); Hochman, 73 Harv.L.Rev. at 704-06. “The [Supreme] Court’s favorable treatment of curative statutes is probably explained by the strong public interest in the smooth functioning of government. It is necessary that the legislature should be able to cure inadvertent defects in statutes or their administration by making what has been aptly called ‘small repairs.’ ” Hochman, 73 Harv.L.Rev. at 705.
The other method of due process scrutiny balances the government’s interests against the individual’s interest, with a particular emphasis on the fairness of the government’s treatment of the individual. See generally Hochman, 73 Harv.L.Rev. at 694-96. This includes consideration of the individual’s reliance on the prior state of the law. Id. at 696. Even when an individual does rely on prior law, however, the statute is not necessarily invalid. See generally Munzer, 61 Tex. L.Rev. 425 (discussing expectations theory). In particular, the pendency of a lawsuit, or even the existence of a judgment, does not invariably create such a reliance that the statute is inescapably invalid.6 It is difficult to see, for example, how the taxpayers’ use of their property would have been different simply because their property was subjected to a less favorable tax treatment in a single year out of many. “Moreover, some statutes can achieve their purpose only if applied to pending litigation. Examples of such legislation are curative statutes ... eliminating the windfall which occasionally results from an unexpected judicial decision.” Hochman, 73 Harv.L.Rev. at 718. Some reliance is not fatal because even “[a] prospective statute may equally defeat reasonable expectations____” Id. at 693. Finally, it is settled that there is no right to be free from a tax. Retroactive taxation has been sustained almost uniformly against due process challenges. Id. at 706. Even when an already collected tax has been declared invalid, the government may severely limit recovery of a refund. See Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 349-53, 57 S.Ct. 816, 822-24, 81 L.Ed. 1143 (1937) (statute permissibly placed burden on taxpayer of proving it absorbed tax and had not shifted tax burden to others).
In this case, colorable arguments can be made on both sides of the proposition that the statute is invalid. If the record reflected that the taxpayers had foregone their other remedies in reliance on the availability of section 11-506, the amendment would at least appear to be less fair. But that is not what the record reveals. Instead, the taxpayers availed themselves of other avenues of relief but failed because of their own procedural missteps and turned to section 11-506 only as a last effort. At least under these circumstances, the Legislature has not treated these taxpayers so unfairly that the legislation violates due process of law.
Instead of focusing on the due process question of fundamental fairness, the majority emphasizes its belief that the section 11-506 refund procedure was a “vested right.” The vested right characterization is not ana*525lytical, but represents only a conclusion: due process would be violated if retroactivity were allowed. See Slawson, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 216; Hochman, 73 Harv.L.Rev. at 696; Greenblatt, 51 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 561; Gregory J. DeMars, Retrospectivity and Retroactivity of Civil Legislation Reconsidered, 10 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 253, 268 (1983); see also 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 670, p. 653 (1979) (citing cases at nn. 62, 63) (criticizing the “vested right” and “substantive or procedural” characterizations by courts). In other words, a statute is unconstitutional if the right affected has “vested.” In my opinion, such a label should not substitute for accepted methods of due process scrutiny.
A right created by statute, however, may not be “vested” and thus may not be protected from legislative action. See Brown Wholesale Elec. v. H.S. Lastar Co., 152 Ariz. 90, 95, 730 P.2d 267, 272 (App.1986). Thus, even if the majority’s “vested right” analysis is accepted, it does not necessarily render the amendment invalid if the taxpayers’ “right” was created by statute. See Maricopa County v. Superior Court (First Interstate Bank), 170 Ariz. 248, 252, 823 P.2d 696, 700 (App.1991) (right to appeal from property classification exists only by force of statute).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which reverses the tax court’s decision.

. Due process is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article 2, § 4 of the Arizona Constitution. For present purposes, the due process protections of these provisions will be treated as substantively equivalent.
The majority opinion relies heavily on Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc., 149 Ariz. 130, 717 P.2d 434 (1986). However, that decision was based not on due process but on Ariz. Const. Art. 18, § 5, which preserves the defense of contributory negligence for jury decision. Obviously, that provision is not implicated here and differs greatly from the due process clause.

. It was the failure of the taxpayers prior attempts to challenge the tax assessment and to obtain a refund that transformed their action under section 11-506 into their last remaining hope. The record before us indicates that section 11-506 was their "sole” remedy only in the sense that it was the last remaining remedy after the taxpayers either abandoned or failed to properly pursue their other remedies. Notably, the majority does not suggest that the 1991 legislative amendment abolished the sole remedy available to taxpayers for an unlawful tax.

. The majority opinion expresses doubt that one legislature may declare the intent of another. (Slip Opinion at 15). If courts can interpret legislation, then why cannot the body which enacted the legislation also do so? The majority ignores that legislative intent is a collective, institutional intent that does not vary with the membership of the legislature.

. The Portal to Portal Act, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (1947).

. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local 123, 321 U.S. 590, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161, 65 S.Ct. 1063, 89 L.Ed. 1534 (1945); Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946).

. W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CalX.Rev. 216, 249-50 (1960). E.g., Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 116-17, 72 S.Ct. 581, 584, 96 L.Ed. 786 (1952) (Congress may withdraw court jurisdiction over pending employee actions for compensation); Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 67 S.Ct. 1140, 91 L.Ed. 1368 (1947) (state court judgments entitling landlords to evict tenants enjoined under Emergency Price Control Act). "The [Supreme] Court appears to have given little or no weight to the fact that the right affected by retroactive legislation has on occasion been asserted in litigation pending at the time of the enactment.” Hochman, 73 Harv.L.Rev. at 717.
Prior Arizona decisions are not to the contrary. The cases cited in Hall, 149 Ariz. at 140-41, 717 P.2d at 444-45, involve statutory interpretation, not due process. See Allen v. Fisher, 118 Ariz. 95, 574 P.2d 1314 (App.1977); Gulf Homes, Inc. v. Gonzales, 139 Ariz. 1, 676 P.2d 635 (App. 1983). It is one thing for a court to determine whether the legislature intended a statute to be retroactive; it is a larger step for a court to determine that retroactivity renders a statute unconstitutional. Moreover, Allen expressly recognizes that changes in procedure or remedies may be applied retroactively to pending proceedings unless the statute impairs "vested rights.” 118 Ariz. at 96, 574 P.2d at 1315. See also Singer, supra at § 41.09, p. 396 ("[C]hanges in statute law which pertain only to procedure are generally held to apply to pending cases.”).