Court Opinion

ID: 9558187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:04:00.658005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:27.591759
License: Public Domain

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:
I concur in the result.
I agree that pointing guns at the boy amounted to the use of excessive force under well-established precedent, so the officers who did so lack qualified immunity.1
Regarding the handcuffs, I would also reverse, but more narrowly.
A reasonable officer could believe that the boy could interfere with legitimate law enforcement in at least two ways. He could leap on the officers or run in front of them as they tried to control his father. Though only eleven, the evidence was that he was between five and six feet tail. Alternatively, he could run around the neighborhood stirring up older youths and adults to interfere. He had already run back toward the house in violation of the officers’s command, “Young man, turn around and put your hands in the air.” His youth might make him less physically dangerous, but more impulsive and energetic than an adult, and he was not a small child. It was not unreasonable for the officers to believe that he might interfere with their legitimate activities.2
*860I would reverse the district court on only one aspect of the use of the handcuffs: lifting the boy to his feet by the handcuffs which were fastened behind him. No law enforcement purpose has been offered to justify that sadistic bit of bullying. Though there is no case holding that pulling an unresisting non-suspect to his feet by handcuffs fastened behind him amounts to the use of excessive force, the cases do establish that the needless and wanton infliction of pain during a search or arrest violates the Constitution.3 The proposition that police may not inflict pain on non-suspects detained during a search, in the absence of any law enforcement reason, should be so obvious to reasonable officers that qualified immunity cannot shield them. A policeman ought to know that he is not constitutionally entitled to hurt people for no reason.4
Though the majority’s holding is not clear, it seems to be that (1) keeping the boy handcuffed for fifteen or twenty minutes after the officers had searched him and found no weapons was excessive, and (2) this is so well established that any reasonable officer ought to know it, so the officers lacked qualified immunity. The opinion appears to hold that even though the boy’s father, for whom the warrant had been issued, had not yet been handcuffed and brought outside, the officers should have removed the handcuffs from his son once they ascertained that the son was not armed.
The majority errs in two respects. First, it was not unconstitutional to keep the boy handcuffed while the warrant was still being executed. We made the same mistake in Mena v. City of Simi Valley,5 and the Supreme Court corrected it in Muehler v. Mena6 Although the small, barefoot woman in Muehler was not herself a threat, the Court held that her “detention in handcuffs for the length of the search” was constitutionally permissible.7 The search in Muehler was not of the woman, but of the residence.
The cases are analogous. Under Mueh-ler, the majority errs in limiting the duration to the search of the boy, as opposed to execution of the search warrant for the home and arrest warrant for the father. The Court rejected our view that the two or three hour duration of the handcuffing in Muehler made it unconstitutional, yet here we hold that, as soon as the officers knew the boy was unarmed they had to take off the handcuffs, even though the search and arrest were still ongoing. The large number of officers who supposedly had their guns pointed at the boy does not justify requiring the officers to remove the handcuffs. The point was to control the boy and prevent him from making trouble, not to shoot him if he did make trouble. As we held in Dawson v. City of Seattle, “Muehler confirms an officer’s authority to detain a building’s occupants during a search so long as the officer conducts the *861detention in a reasonable manner.”8
The majority goes on to deny qualified immunity for keeping the handcuffs on after the boy was found to have no weapons. Such a denial of qualified immunity requires not only that it was unconstitutional to keep him handcuffed until the house was searched and his father was arrested, but also that any reasonable officer should have known that it was unconstitutional.9 This strikes me as bizarre, because no case supports the proposition that keeping an individual handcuffed during a search is unconstitutional except for our decision10 reversed in Muehler.11
We should not reach the Federal Tort Claims Act issues, because Tekle’s brief does not raise them.12 He argues exclusively that the officers violated his constitutional rights, not that they violated his state law rights. In footnote 8, the majority provides a factually mistaken justification for reaching the Federal Tort Claims Act: “there are five pages of argument devoted to the district court’s perceived error in granting summary judgment in favor of the United States on the FTCA claim.” 13 Tekle’s argument at pages 23-24 of his opening brief, cited in the majority opinion at footnote 8, is that federal liability “would have to stem from the actions of its agents,” and the agents committed “clear violations of EPHRAIM’s constitutional rights.” That is a Bivens claim, not a Federal Tort Claims Act claim.14
After setting out the facts and general principles of law on the first fourteen pages of the brief, the appellant argues at pages 15 through 28 that the individual defendants and the United States government violated the constitutional rights of EPHRAIM and qualified immunity does not apply. The remaining two pages of the brief, 28-29, are a conclusion arguing that the plaintiffs due process rights under the Constitution were violated and there is no entitlement to immunity. Appellant does not argue that anyone violated *862state tort law. True, the government argues that it did not violate state tort law, but the appellant is the master of the appeal and chose not to make the argument that the government responded to. There is no reply brief. I am mystified about why we are issuing three different opinions on an issue that appellants chose not to put before us.
Were we to reach the Federal Tort Claims Act issues, I agree with Judge Fisher that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not expose federal law enforcement officers to liability when they are acting within the confines of the special law enforcement privileges conferred upon them by other statutes. However, I disagree with Judge Fisher’s conclusion that Tekle’s FTCA claim for false arrest presents genuine issues of material fact.
*863APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
P»8«<s)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. Ri
Cases. Hi
Codes. iy
Statutes..... iv
Court Rules. v
I. INTRODUCTION. 2
A. NATURE OF THE CASE.. 2
B. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND APPEALABILITY 3
C. ISSUES PRESENTED.. 4
D. FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 4
E. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 8
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, AND SHOULD HAVE DENIED THIS MOTION IN THE FACE OF THE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT AND EVIDENCE SUBMITTED. 13
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 13
B. TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT AND EVIDENCE ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE... 15
1. The Individual Defendant» Violated FHjwitaV Appellant EPHRAIM’S Constitutionsl Rights And Are Not Immune From The Consequences Of Their Actions.... 15
a) Placing a Gun to Plaintiffs Head. 16
b) Methods of Detaining Plaintiff During Execution of Arrest of His Father and of Search Warrant Violates Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment Right». 21
i
*864c) Tima Defendants Must be HaW Accountable for their Vtotation* of PMnUfr* Constitutional Righto.. 22
III THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES, AND SHOULD HAVE DENIED THIS MOTION IN THE FACE OF THE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT ANO EVIDENCE SUBMITTED. 23
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 23
B. TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT AND EVIDENCE ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE. 26
1. The UNITED STATES' Aponte Violated Plaint*/ Appellant EPHRAIM'* Constitutional Rights And The UNITED STATES Is Not Immune From The Consequences Of Their Actions.. 25
a) Placing a Gun to Plaintiffs Head. 26
b) Methods of Detaining Plaintiff During Execution of Arrest of Hi* Father arid of Search Warrant Violates Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment Rights. 26
o) The UNITED STATES Must be Held Accountable for the Violations of Plaintiffs Constitutions) Rights by Vtarr Agents... 27
IV CONCLUSION. 28
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH F.RC.P. 32(a)(7). 30
*865stial have juródictton of appeals from aR fin*! decmortM of the district courts of the United Stats* . . . .* As Mated in his Notice of Appeal, timely filed on Oecembar 24. 2003 pursuant to Rule 4<t>) of the Ftrfgai Buht-of Aaofta ftpoadurt. PfeuntWf EPHRAIM appeals from bom of those summary judgments, which disposed of Plaintiffs claims herein. [CT-804-805.]
C. ISSUES PRESENTED.
1) Whether tha district court abused is dtscredon in granting the Summary Judgment Motion cf Defendants GARO TQROBSlAN. KEITH BODEN. CHARLES McCALMONT. THOMAS JANKOWSKI, DAVID HAWKES, a« individuals end Special Agents of the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, no agency of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
2) Whethor the district court abused its dwcretfon in granting the Summary Judgment Motion of Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
D. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
On Match 23, 1898, federal agents served search and arrest warrants at the residence erf EPHRAIM'S parents, Salomon and Uty Tekle, located at 19673 Los Alien» Street, Chahworth, California. Solomon and Lily Takie were suspected of narcotics and income tax-related offenees. [CT-694.]
Prior to the operation, the IRS prepared a plan for execution of the warrants and determined that three children resided in the residence, none of
4
*866the law. No officer of the law may sat that taw at defiance with impunity. All officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it" United States v. Lee (1882) 106 U.S. 196, 220.
In the face of «te overwhelming evidence presented to the district court proving the despicable and unnecessarily brutal treatment of this minar Plaintiff. K granted the eummary Judgment end found that *... the force treed to detain Plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances’ [CT-79S], releasing these Defendants from accountable for thairunoonecionable actions.
Plaintiff EPHRAIM respectfuBy submits that the district court abusad its discretion in this ruing, and requests that this Honorable Court reverse the granting of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and order the district court to place this case in tine for Trial
IU. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION fli gRAKUNff SUMMARY JUDGMENT POR THE UNITED STATES. AND SHOULD HAVE DENIED THIS MOTION IN THE FACE OF THE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT AMP EVIDENCE SUBMITTED.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
In its Order Granting the UNITED STATES’ Motion for Summary Judgment the district court dearly abused its discretion by finding that the "OefencJant United States’ liability is derivative of the InctividuN Defendants'
23
*867liability. . . . Since no lame of triable fact exists as to the reasonableness of PtaintifPa detention during the «Mention of the search warrant at his home, Plaintiffs assault and battary, and false arrest chums must fail.... Likewise, PlaintjfTs cfaim for intentional Infliction of emotional distraes must tail because the Individual Defendants’ did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct* CT-790. line 19 to page 797, Une 10.]
As this Honorable Court it we* aware, any liability placad upon the UNITED STATES in a tort chum would have to stem from the actions of Us agents. Accordingly, the district court based its decision In granting the UNITED STATES* Motion for Summary Judgment solely upon its finding that the unconscionable acta of the individual Defendants wore "reasonable under the circumstances.'
RaintifT/Appellant EPHRAIM submits that he met his burden of proof by establishing triable Issues of fact against the UNITED STATES, by providing evidence of the dear violations of EPHRAIM’S constitutional rights committed by the aoents of ft» UNITED STATES, as presented to toe district court In his Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Fact fa Opposition to the UNITED STATES’ Motion for Summary Judgment [CT-596MS03],
Accordingly, EPHRAIM requests that this Honorable Court take judicial notice of Section it, A. Standard of Review, above, and submits that toe authorities cited therein as to the individual Defendants are identical to his case in point against the UNITED STATES.
24
*868B. TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT AND EVIDENCE ARE PRESENT IN TIBS CASE.
i- 31» UNITED 3IAIEaLAfltctt.ytei«td BEHtVMM't CflnittfathMiil..Bl8hll...AfflLJrht. -UNITES STATES ft-NaUmmunt Frflnilttt-Caftftgm*ft»-Qf Ihtfr Acttoni-
Clearly, the evidence provided to the district court [see Plaintiffs' Statement of Qenuin» Issue» of Material Feet CT*686403) proves mat the conduct of the «aunts of the UNITED STATES in their treatment ctf this 11-year-otd boy durinQ the arrest of his hither, was unreasonable and in dear violation of his Constitutional rights.
As stated above, the UNITED STATES «halt not be shielded in qualified immunity from liability for civil damages when tha conduct of its agents violates dearly established or constitutional rights of which a reasonable parson would have known. Behrens v. Palletier. supra, at 299. Tha taw governing the officials* conduct was dearly established and. under that law, reasonable officers ooukt not have believed that their conduct was tawful. Katz v. United States, supra, at 967.
The contours of the right at issue in this case were sufficiently dear at the time of the conduct of the agents of the UNITED STATES on March 23, 1998, in that EPHRAIM, an 11-year-old boy, had a right to be free from excessive force, custodial detention, and threat of death by the placement of a *869gun to bit heed, and the UNITED STATES must be held responsible for the unlawful conduct of its agonfo.
*86825
*869») Ptartimi fiHnfr PUnffTi
As was statsd above, and presented to the district court in Plaintiffs Statement of Genuine Issue* of Material Fact {CT-596-603I. a gun was hew to EPHRAfM's bead, end weapons worn pointed at Wm throughout his detention by tbe agents of tita UNITED STATES.
EPHRAIM hereby refers this Honorable Court to hfs argument end authorities presented above, and submits that the dear contours of foe tew governing the pointing of guns at suspects (atfoough this minor child was cat a suspect) put reasonable officers on notice that unreasonably pointing their guns at the heed or an innooent n-year*afd boy would violate his constitutions! rights.
Under those circumstances, it waa inappropriate for the district court to decide Otis casa as a matter of law, and the caae must go to a jury to decide whether the UNITED STATES' agents’ conduct was reasonable.
b) Mfttoflt gf.Qrtatown Ptaíntiff Pudra JUrartfon at Amhrtaf mAEathfo-and. cf ftareh WafrantYlsbttii PtotoSfff famiti AnwndmwrtRiabte-
It beers repeating that these agents at the UNITED STATES did not simply "detain* Plaintiff while executing foe arrest of his father and search warrants, but rather held Plaintiff in handcuffs for an extended period *870of time, held a gun to Plaintiff» head, brandished firearms in Plaintiffs direction, tifted Plaintiff by the handcuff chains from behind his beck, had Plaintiff sit on the curb in his bare feat, had Plaintiff sit on a stoat in his bare feet, inauted Plaintiffs parents' place of origin, and spat upon Plaintiffs shoe*. [CT-596-603.] The*» acts, perpetrated upon this 11-yaar-okt boy during custodial detention, obviously violated his Constitutional rights, and placed direct liability on tha UNITED STATES for tha actions of its agents,
*86926
*870EPHRAIM again retara this Honorable Court to tha authorities cited above, and submits that the malarial facts presented to the district court raised serious "additional concerns* about tha treatment of this young boy during his detention by these UNITED STATES «gents, as their actions were unreasonable and excessive under (hese circumstances. [CT-6M-603.] These concents must be addressed at Trial.
«) Bf WHITED STATES Mtftlw, HttM ArawaUato iter «ha Vtolattena of Plaintiffs Constitutional aaMiJnfttwffAflim»-
As undteputabiy shown to tha district court in Plaintiffs Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Fact (CT-596>603), these UNITED STATES agenta ctoeriy viola tod Plaintiffs constitutional rights. Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court take judicial notice of the cese of Bevins v. Six Unknown Named Apante of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. supra, as cited above.
27
*871In the face of the overwhetminQ evidence presented to the district court previno the despicable treatment of this minor Plaintiff. H granted the summary judgment end found diet die «genie of die UNITED STATES *... did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct* (CT>797], relessmg the UNITED STATES of accountability foe the unccnsrionsble actions of its agsms.
Ptaintiff EPHRAIM reapectfutiy submits that the district court abused its discretion In this rating, and requests that this Honorable Court reverse the granting of the UNITED STATES’ Motion fix Summary Judgment and order the dlatrict court to place this case in line for Trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Court is called upon to review both law and Met and to drew rite line as to what le and te not reasonable behavior. Government actions which “offend the canons of decency and fairness* violate the due process protection of the Constitution. Rochin v. California(1952) 342 U.S. 165, 169.
The claims of eN of the Defendants of entittemem to immunity from Piaintrifa daime depend on whether the trier of facts accepts Defendants' versions of the facts or Plaintiffs. The dispute is dearly genuine and me facts are material, indeed, cantnti to the due process daim.
Plaintiff beleves that reasonable jurors wiB find by «preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in this matter. Therefore, based on the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully requested that this Honorable Court of Appeals reverse the summary judgments erroneously entered In favor of 1) the *872Individual Defendants and 2) Defendant UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, as issues offset remain to bring this case to Trial,
*87128
*872Dated: April 16,2004.
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29

. See Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir.2002).

. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“The 'reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a *860reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”).

. See, e.g., Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that forcibly throwing a woman to the ground and twisting her arms while handcuffing her amounted to excessive force because it was unnecessary).

. See, e.g., Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir.2002).

. Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir.2003) rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 354 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.2004) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).

. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005).

. Id. at 95, 125 S.Ct. 1465.

. Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1066 (9th Cir.2006).

. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (holding that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity in performing their discretionary functions unless their actions "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”).

. Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir.2003).

. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005).

. Kim v. Kang, 154 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir.1998) ("[W]e will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in appellant’s opening brief.”).

. Judge Tashima and I have been unable to agree on whether the appellant’s brief fairly raises the FTCA theory. I have attached as an appendix to this dissent a statement of issues and the five pages of argument that Judge Tashima thinks raise the claim, and that I think do not raise the claim. There is a point to the doctrine that a claim not raised in the appellant’s brief is waived, and the point is not just to simplify an appellate court’s work. Rather, there is a fairness problem, perhaps a due process problem, if an appellee loses an appeal on a theory that came from a judge’s chambers rather than an appellant's brief.

.Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (waiving sovereign immunity "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred ”) (emphasis added), with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (holding that claim for damages may be allowed where agents of the United States violated individual’s constitutional rights).