Court Opinion

ID: 9906867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 16:01:05.263748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:33.850463
License: Public Domain

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2023                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

                 ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                  THE FIRST CIRCUIT

   No. 22–429.      Argued October 4, 2023—Decided December 5, 2023
The Court granted review in this case to consider whether Deborah Lau-
  fer has Article III standing to sue hotels whose websites failed to state
  whether they have accessible rooms for the disabled as required by the
  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, even if Laufer had no thought
  of staying at the hotels, much less booking a room. After a lower court
  sanctioned her lawyer, Laufer voluntarily dismissed her pending suits,
  including her case against Acheson Hotels, LLC, and filed a suggestion
  of mootness in this Court. Though Laufer’s case is moot, the circuit
  split on the issue briefed and argued in this Court is very much alive.
Held: This case is vacated as moot. The Court has the authority to ad-
 dress jurisdictional issues of mootness and standing in any order it
 chooses. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549
 U. S. 422, 431. And while the Court is sensitive to Acheson’s concern
 about litigants manipulating this Court’s jurisdiction, the Court is not
 convinced that Laufer abandoned her case in an effort to evade the
 Court’s review. Pp. 2–3.
50 F. 4th 259, vacated and remanded.

   BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ.,
joined. THOMAS, J., and JACKSON, J., filed opinions concurring in the
judgment.
                        Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 22–429
                                   _________________

    ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. DEBORAH LAUFER
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
             APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                              [December 5, 2023]

   JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
   Deborah Laufer has sued hundreds of hotels whose web-
sites failed to state whether they have rooms accessible to
the disabled. As the sheer number of lawsuits suggests, she
does not focus her efforts on hotels where she has any
thought of staying, much less booking a room. Instead,
Laufer systematically searches the web to find hotels that
fail to provide accessibility information and sues to force
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327, 42 U. S. C. §12101 et seq. Ordi-
narily, the hotels settle her claims and pay her attorney’s
fees. But some have resisted, arguing that Laufer is not
injured by the absence of information about rooms she has
no plans to reserve. Only plaintiffs who allege a concrete
injury have standing to sue in federal court. Laufer, these
hotels have argued, is suing to enforce the law rather than
to remedy her own harms.
   Laufer has singlehandedly generated a circuit split. The
Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that she lacks
standing; the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have
held that she has it. We took this case from the First Cir-
cuit to resolve the split. 50 F. 4th 259 (CA1 2022); 598 U. S.
2               ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                          Opinion of the Court

___ (2023). Though Acheson Hotels, LLC, filed the petition,
Laufer supported the grant.
   After we granted review, the case took an unusual turn.
In July, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland suspended Laufer’s lawyer, Tristan Gillespie,
from the practice of law for defrauding hotels by lying in fee
petitions and during settlement negotiations. See Order in
In re Gillespie, No. 1:21–mc–14 (July 5, 2023), ECF Doc. 14.
It based the suspension on a report finding that Gillespie
demanded $10,000 in attorney’s fees per case even though
he used “boilerplate complaints.” Report and Recommen-
dation in No. 21–mc–14 (June 30, 2023), ECF Doc. 13, pp. 5,
26. In addition, Gillespie funneled six-figure sums to the
father of Laufer’s grandchild for investigatory work that he
never performed, raising the prospect that either Gillespie
or Laufer (or both) got a cut of the money. Id., at 28, 30.
Making matters still worse, the sanctions order against Gil-
lespie also implicated Laufer’s former counsel of record be-
fore this Court, Thomas Bacon. Id., at 30–31.*
   Following these revelations, Laufer voluntarily dis-
missed her pending suits with prejudice, including her com-
plaint against Acheson in the District of Maine. See Notice
of Voluntary Dismissal in No. 2:20–cv–00344 (July 20,
2023), ECF Doc. 45. She then filed a suggestion of mootness
in this Court. At this point, Acheson had already filed its
principal brief on the standing issue, and we deferred a de-
cision on mootness until after oral argument.
   Laufer does not argue that we must dismiss her suit for
mootness. She acknowledges that we can address jurisdic-
tional issues in any order we choose, see Sinochem Int’l Co.
——————
  *On November 14th, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the
suspension order, holding that the district court gave Gillespie insuffi-
cient notice that it might sanction him not only for dishonesty to oppos-
ing counsel, but also for failing to communicate with his clients. In re
Gillespie, No. 23–1819 (CA4 Nov. 14, 2023). Disciplinary proceedings
remain pending in the District Court.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)             3

                      Opinion of the Court

v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U. S. 422, 431 (2007),
and so have authority to resolve the standing issue. But
mootness is easy and standing is hard, Laufer says. She
urges us to refrain from resolving a difficult question in a
case that is otherwise over.
   Acheson, on the other hand, stresses that the difficult
standing issue is the reason we took this case. Though Lau-
fer’s case is dead, the circuit split is very much alive. This
Court has received briefs and heard oral argument. For ef-
ficiency’s sake, Acheson insists that we should settle the is-
sue now rather than repeating the work later. Moreover,
Acheson warns that if we dismiss this case for mootness,
the standing issue might not come back anytime soon.
While Laufer has disavowed the intention to file any more
ADA tester suits, Tr. of Oral Arg. 70, others will file in the
circuits that sided with her, and hotels will settle, regarding
it as pointless to challenge circuit precedent in this Court.
Why would any hotel take a case this far, Acheson asks, if
the respondent can evade our review by abandoning a claim
rather than risking a loss?
   We are sensitive to Acheson’s concern about litigants ma-
nipulating the jurisdiction of this Court. We are not con-
vinced, however, that Laufer abandoned her case in an ef-
fort to evade our review. She voluntarily dismissed her
pending ADA cases after a lower court sanctioned her law-
yer. She represented to this Court that she will not file any
others. Laufer’s case against Acheson is moot, and we dis-
miss it on that ground. We emphasize, however, that we
might exercise our discretion differently in a future case.
                        *     *     *
  The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit with
instructions to dismiss the case as moot. See United States
v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). JUSTICE
JACKSON objects to this disposition, urging us to instead
4             ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                      Opinion of the Court

leave the First Circuit’s judgment in place. Our Mun-
singwear practice is well settled. See, e.g., United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 584 U. S. 236, 240 (2018) (per curiam);
Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U. S. 92, 93–94
(1979) (per curiam); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County,
299 U. S. 259, 267 (1936) (per curiam); see also S. Shapiro,
K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Su-
preme Court Practice §19.5 (11th ed. 2019). We decline
JUSTICE JACKSON’s invitation to reconsider it.

                                             It is so ordered.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)            1

                    THOMAS
               THOMAS         , J., concurring
                      , J., concurring  in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–429
                          _________________

 ACHESON HOTELS, LLC, PETITIONER v. DEBORAH
                  LAUFER
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
             APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                       [December 5, 2023]

  JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
  Deborah Laufer has filed hundreds of lawsuits against
hotels she has no intention of visiting, claiming that their
websites lack accessibility information mandated by a fed-
eral regulation. At both parties’ request, this Court agreed
to answer a question that has divided the Courts of Ap-
peals: whether plaintiffs like Laufer have standing to bring
these claims. The Court decides not to decide that question
because, after briefing began, Laufer voluntarily dismissed
her claim in the District Court. I would answer this im-
portant and recurring question, which, as all agree, we have
the authority to do. And, I conclude that Laufer lacks
standing.
                               I
   Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation,” such as a hotel. 42 U. S. C.
§§12182(a), 12181(7)(A). Title III defines discrimination to
include “a failure to make reasonable modifications” when
“necessary to afford . . . services . . . or accommodations to
individuals with disabilities.” §12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). To en-
2            ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

               THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

force the ADA’s prohibition on discrimination, Title III cre-
ates a private cause of action that permits “any person who
is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity” to sue for violations. §12188(a)(1). Only injunctive re-
lief and attorney’s fees are available to private litigants.
Ibid.; see also §§12205, 2000a–3(a). The Attorney General,
however, may obtain damages or assess civil penalties.
§12188(b)(2).
   The Department of Justice promulgated a regulation
known as the Reservation Rule to aid in the implementa-
tion of the ADA’s prohibition on discrimination. The rule
requires hotels to “[i]dentify and describe accessible fea-
tures . . . in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals
with disabilities to assess independently whether a given
hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs.” 28
CFR §36.302(e)(1)(ii) (2022). The rule also applies to reser-
vations made “through a third party.” Ibid.
   Laufer, who is wheelchair bound, is a self-described
“tester” of compliance with the Reservation Rule. From her
home in Florida, Laufer scours the internet for hotel web-
sites that do not contain the required accessibility infor-
mation. When she finds a deficient website, she sues the
hotel. She often offers to settle immediately for $10,000 in
attorney’s fees and corrective action. See Report and Rec-
ommendation in In re Gillespie, No. 1:21–mc–14 (D Md.,
June 30, 2023), ECF Doc. 13, p. 5; No. 1:21–mc–14 (July 5,
2023), ECF Doc. 14, p. 1, vacated on other grounds by In re
Gillespie, 2023 WL 7548181 (CA4, Nov. 14, 2023) (per cu-
riam). In the past five years, Laufer has filed over 600 law-
suits against hotels.
   In this case, Laufer visited the website of a bed and
breakfast located in Maine, the Coast Village Inn. She filed
suit against the Coast Village Inn’s owner, Acheson Hotels,
for failing to provide sufficient accessibility information.
She also contended that 13 third-party booking websites,
such as Expedia, failed to provide accessibility information
                 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)           3

               THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

for the Coast Village Inn. Laufer initially alleged that she
was planning to visit the Coast Village Inn as part of a
cross-country trip from Florida to Maine to Colorado. But
she later disclaimed any intent to travel to Maine (or the
Coast Village Inn). 50 F. 4th 259, 267, n. 3 (CA1 2022); see
also Brief for Appellant in No. 21–1410 (CA1), p. 4, n. 1.
   The District Court concluded that Laufer lacked standing
and dismissed her complaint. The First Circuit reversed,
relying primarily on this Court’s holding in Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363 (1982), that a tester had
standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act. When Acheson
Hotels petitioned for certiorari, Laufer agreed. She high-
lighted that the Circuits were split as to her standing and
argued that “clarity from this Court is badly needed.” Brief
in Opposition 1. After we granted certiorari and set the
case for argument, Laufer filed a notice in the District
Court of her voluntary dismissal of her claim with preju-
dice. And, even though Acheson Hotels (and several amici)
had already filed briefs, Laufer requested that we dismiss
this case as moot. We denied her request at that time, but
agreed to consider it at oral argument. The case has been
fully briefed and the Court has heard argument on the mer-
its. Today, however, the majority opts to resolve this case
on mootness. We can—and should—address the question
on which we granted certiorari.
                              II
   I would not dismiss this case as moot. There is no ques-
tion that we have authority to address Laufer’s standing.
Standing and mootness are both jurisdictional doctrines
that flow from Article III. And, there is no mandatory “se-
quencing of jurisdictional issues.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 584 (1999). Indeed, as the majority
and Laufer herself acknowledge, we have the discretion to
determine either “ ‘threshold groun[d] for denying audience
to a case on the merits.’ ” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia
4            ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

               THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U. S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting
Ruhrgas, 526 U. S., at 585); ante, at 2–3; Suggestion of
Mootness 9 (“[T]his Court has discretion to resolve either
issue first”).
   We should address Laufer’s standing, rather than resolve
this case on mootness. As an analytical matter, whether
Laufer had standing the day she filed her suit is logically
antecedent to whether her later actions mooted the case.
More importantly, whether Laufer has standing to bring
her Reservation Rule claims is a recurring question that
only this Court can definitively resolve. As the majority ex-
plains, “Laufer has singlehandedly generated a circuit
split” on her standing. Ante, at 1. And Laufer is far from
the only Reservation Rule tester. See, e.g., Harty v. West
Point Realty, Inc., 28 F. 4th 435 (CA2 2022); Love v. Mar-
riott Ownership Resorts, Inc., No. 20–cv–7523 (ND Cal.,
Mar. 29, 2021); Sarwar v. Om Sai, LLC, No. 2:20–cv–483
(D Me., May 18, 2021). Beyond answering this question for
our colleagues on the Courts of Appeal and District Courts,
we should answer it for Acheson Hotels, which has spent
significant time and resources fully briefing a question that
will now go unanswered.
   What is more, the circumstances strongly suggest strate-
gic behavior on Laufer’s part. After this case was well un-
derway in this Court, Laufer filed a notice with the District
Court voluntarily dismissing her claim with prejudice, os-
tensibly because another court sanctioned one of her attor-
neys for misconduct related to some of Laufer’s ADA cases.
But the attorney in question had nothing to do with the case
before us. Suggestion of Mootness 3 (acknowledging at-
issue attorney “had no involvement in the present case be-
fore this Court”). Laufer’s logic is thus that she dismissed
her claim—and the Court should no longer address whether
she had standing—because an attorney she hired in an en-
tirely different case engaged in misconduct. An unrelated
                     Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)                    5

                  THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

attorney’s conduct does nothing to change the analysis re-
quired to determine a plaintiff ’s standing. Laufer admits
as much, arguing only that the alleged misconduct “could
distract from the merits of her ADA claims and everything
she has sought to achieve for persons with disabilities like
herself.” Id., at 4. I would not reward Laufer’s transparent
tactic for evading our review. Although the majority leaves
the door open to “exercise [its] discretion differently in a fu-
ture case,” we have needlessly invited litigants to follow
Laufer’s path to manipulate our docket. Ante, at 3. We
should not resolve this case about standing based upon
mootness of Laufer’s own making.1
                              III
   Turning to the question presented, Laufer lacks standing
to bring her ADA claims. Article III of the Constitution ex-
tends the “judicial Power” to all “Cases” and “Controver-
sies.” Standing doctrine serves to “limi[t] the ‘judicial
power’ to ‘ “cases and controversies of the sort traditionally
amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” ’ ”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 343 (2016) (THOMAS,
J., concurring) (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Re-
sources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 774
(2000)). In doing so, standing “preserve[s] separation of
powers by preventing the Judiciary’s entanglement in dis-
putes that are primarily political in nature.” Spokeo, 578
U. S., at 344.
   As I have previously explained, “[t]he mere filing of a
complaint in federal court . . . does not a case (or contro-
versy) make.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___,
___ (2021) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5). Our “ju-
dicial power [does not extend] to every violation of the con-
stitution [or law] which may possibly take place, but to ‘a
case in law or in equity,’ in which a right, under such law,
——————
  1 The majority vacates the opinion below in Laufer’s favor, and rightly

so. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).
6                ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                   THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

is asserted in a Court of justice.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264, 405 (1821). To have standing, a plaintiff must
assert a violation of his rights. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 563 (1992) (“[T]he party seeking re-
view [must] be himself among the injured” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). After all, “[t]he province of the court
is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.” Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803). It is not to address
a plaintiff ’s claim of “only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the . . . laws.” Lujan, 504
U. S., at 573.2
   Laufer lacks standing because her claim does not assert
a violation of a right under the ADA, much less a violation
of her rights. Her claim alleges that Acheson Hotels vio-

——————
   2 The traditional distinction between public and private rights shapes

the contours of the judicial power. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S.
330, 344 (2016) (opinion of THOMAS, J.); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif, 575 U. S. 665, 713 (2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Private rights,
such as the classic rights to life, liberty, and property, were “so called
because they ‘appertain[ed] and belong[ed] to particular men . . . merely
as individuals,’ not ‘to them as members of society [or] standing in vari-
ous relations to each other’—that is, not dependent upon the will of the
government.” Id., at 713 (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 119 (1765)). By contrast, public rights “belon[g] to the
public as a whole.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575
U. S. 138, 171 (2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see also 4 Blackstone, at
5 (1772). And “quasi-private rights, or statutory entitlements, are those
‘ “privileges” ’ or ‘ “franchises” ’ that are bestowed by the government on
individuals.” B&B Hardware, 575 U. S., at 171. We need not classify
Laufer’s legal interests because, regardless of which type of right a plain-
tiff asserts, he must allege “the violation of his private legal right” or his
own injury based on a violation of a public right. Spokeo, 578 U. S., at
344 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (emphasis added); see also A. Woolhandler &
C. Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine? 102 Mich. L. Rev.
689, 723 (2004); C. Nelson, Vested Rights, “Franchises,” and the Separa-
tion of Powers, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1429, 1433, 1437–1438 (2021). For the
reasons provided, Laufer has not alleged a violation of her rights or a
cognizable injury to herself.
                   Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)               7

                THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

lated the ADA by failing to include on its website the acces-
sibility information that the Reservation Rule requires.
Yet, the ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be dis-
criminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the . . . services . . . of any place of public
accommodation.” 42 U. S. C. §12182(a). In other words, the
ADA prohibits only discrimination based on disability—it
does not create a right to information.
    Laufer’s ADA claim is thus different from the tester’s
claim under the Fair Housing Act that the Court addressed
in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363. In con-
trast to the ADA, the Fair Housing Act explicitly prohibits
“represent[ing] to any person because of race . . . that any
dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when
such dwelling is in fact so available.” §3604(d). Accord-
ingly, when Havens Realty told a black tester that no apart-
ments were available but told a white tester that it had va-
cancies, the Court found that the black tester had standing
to sue. The Court explained that the statute created “a le-
gal right to truthful information about available housing.”
Id., at 373. The black tester had been personally denied
that truthful information, so she had standing to bring her
claim. Havens Realty thus has no bearing on Laufer’s
standing as a tester of compliance with the ADA, which pro-
vides no such statutory right to information.
    Laufer points to the Reservation Rule, alleging that it
creates an entitlement to accessibility information. But
even assuming a regulation could—and did—create such a
right, Laufer asserts no violation of her own rights with re-
gard to that information. Laufer does not even harbor
“ ‘some day’ intentions” of traveling to Maine to visit the
Coast Village Inn. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 564. Her lack of
intent to visit the hotel or even book a hotel room elsewhere
in Maine eviscerates any connection to her purported legal
interest in the accessibility information required by the
Reservation Rule. To put it in the “more pedestrian terms”
8             ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

               THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

used by then-Judge Scalia, standing asks “ ‘What’s it to
you?’ ” The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element
of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882
(1983). Acheson Hotels’ failure to provide accessibility in-
formation on its website is nothing to Laufer, because she
disclaimed any intent to visit the hotel.
   Rather than assert a violation of her own rights, Laufer
casts herself in the role of a private attorney general, surf-
ing the web to ensure hotels’ compliance with the Reserva-
tion Rule. Laufer has described herself as “an advocate on
behalf of both [her]self and other similarly situated disa-
bled persons.” App. 17a. She admits that, “[a]s a tester,
[she] visit[s] hotel online reservation services to ascertain
whether they are in compliance with the Americans with
Disabilities Act.” Ibid. As a public official would do, Laufer
even monitors those hotel websites she has found lacking.
She uses “a system” to track each of the hundreds of hotels
she has sued. Id., at 19a. “Once a case is settled, [she]
mark[s] the date . . . when the defendant has agreed to fix
its websites,” and on that date, she “revisit[s]” the website
to ensure the hotel has complied. Id., at 19a–20a.
   Laufer sues “not to enforce specific legal obligations
whose violation works a direct harm” on her, but to force
hotels to comply with the Reservation Rule. Allen v.
Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 761 (1984). “Vindicating the public
interest . . . is the function of Congress and the Chief Exec-
utive,” however, not private plaintiffs. Lujan, 504 U. S., at
576. The President is tasked with the duty to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U. S. Const., Art. II,
§3, and executive branch officials have discretion to choose
whether and how to enforce the law, see Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U. S. 821, 831–832 (1985). Yet, as Judge Newsom has
explained, “[t]esters exercise the sort of proactive enforce-
ment discretion properly reserved to the Executive
Branch,” with none of the corresponding accountability.
Laufer v. Arpan, LLC, 29 F. 4th 1268, 1291 (CA11 2022)
(concurring opinion).
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)            9

               THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

   This case exemplifies the dangers. An official could have
informed Acheson Hotels that its website failed to comply
with the Reservation Rule, and Acheson Hotels could have
updated its website to explain it had no accessible rooms.
Laufer, however, chose to “enforce” each technical violation
of the ADA she could uncover with a lawsuit. Because she
is a private plaintiff, no discretion was required or exer-
cised. And, of course, Laufer has been willing to forgo her
suits if a hotel pays up, even though the ADA provides for
no damages for private litigants. Laufer’s aggressive efforts
to personally impose financial penalties for violations of the
Reservation Rule go far beyond the role that Congress en-
visioned for private plaintiffs under the ADA. Without a
violation of her own rights, Laufer lacks standing to sue ho-
tels under the ADA. Ensuring and monitoring compliance
with the law is a function of a Government official, not a
private person who does not assert a violation of her own
rights.
                               IV
   Standing ensures that courts decide disputes over viola-
tions of a person’s rights, not a defendant’s compliance with
the law in the abstract. Because Laufer has not asserted a
violation of a right owed to her, she has no standing to bring
her Reservation Rule claims. The Court should not have
avoided reaching that conclusion due to Laufer’s eleventh-
hour tactics. I respectfully concur in the judgment because
I would vacate and remand, with instructions to dismiss for
lack of standing.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)             1

                    JACKSON
               JACKSON        , J., concurring
                      , J., concurring  in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–429
                          _________________

 ACHESON HOTELS, LLC, PETITIONER v. DEBORAH
                  LAUFER
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
             APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                       [December 5, 2023]

  JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment.
  I agree with the Court that this case is moot and that it
should be resolved on that basis. But the Court goes fur-
ther, ordering vacatur of the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals under United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S.
36 (1950). See ante, at 3–4. In my view, when mootness
ends an appeal, the question of what to do with the lower
court’s judgment, if anything, raises a separate issue that
must be addressed separately.
                               I
   Mootness and vacatur are distinct concepts. Start with
mootness. The doctrine of mootness stems from Article III
of the Constitution, which permits federal courts to adjudi-
cate only “Cases” and “Controversies.” “Simply stated, a
case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the out-
come.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496 (1969). If
a case becomes moot, “the existence of a case or controversy”
is at an end, and there is therefore no basis for “the exercise
of judicial power.” Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, 306,
n. 3 (1964); see also Chapman v. Doe, 598 U. S. ___, ___
(2023) (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3). Mootness
thus justifies only dismissal. Barring some other justifica-
tion, we can go no further.
2               ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                       JACKSON
                  JACKSON        , J., concurring
                         , J., concurring  in judgment

   Vacatur is a different animal entirely. Vacatur is a rem-
edy that erases a judgment that has already been rendered.
Here, the Court invokes a so-called Munsingwear vacatur,
see ante, at 3–4, a species of vacatur that we have some-
times applied to judgments in civil cases that have “become
moot while on [their] way here or pending our decision on
the merits,” 340 U. S., at 39.
   The precise origins of vacatur, both as a general matter
and in its Munsingwear form, are uncertain. In fact, some
have described the power of a court to vacate a judgment as
“shrouded in ancient lore and mystery.” Advisory Commit-
tee’s Note on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b), 28 U. S. C. App.,
p. 289.1 It seems plausible that our authority to vacate a
lower court’s judgment under Munsingwear arises from our
“supervisory appellate power” to “make such disposition of
the case as justice requires.” Walling v. James V. Reuter,
Inc., 321 U. S. 671, 676 (1944); see also U. S. Bancorp Mort-
gage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 21–22
(1994). All agree, however, that vacatur extends from the
historical practice of equity, which for centuries has pro-
vided courts with the power “to protect all rights and do jus-
tice to all concerned.” Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 805,
807 (1870). The Munsingwear remedy, like its vacatur kin,
developed from “this equitable tradition.” Bancorp, 513
U. S., at 26.
   As an equitable remedy, vacatur “is not granted as a mat-
ter of course.” Salazar v. Buono, 559 U. S. 700, 714 (2010).
Instead, precisely “[b]ecause [vacatur] is rooted in equity,
the decision whether to vacate turns on ‘the conditions and
——————
  1 We have sometimes invoked 28 U. S. C. §2106 as the source of our

vacatur authority after mootness arises, see, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563
U. S. 692, 712 (2011), but that statute provides only that we may “direct
the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.”
§2106. And, of course, that statutory provision cannot confer jurisdiction
in excess of Article III, from which the limitation of mootness derives.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)            3

                    JACKSON
               JACKSON        , J., concurring
                      , J., concurring  in judgment

circumstances of the particular case.’ ” Azar v. Garza, 584
U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (quoting
United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-
Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U. S. 466, 478 (1916)). Per histori-
cal tradition, a court that is asked to exercise its equitable
authority to vacate a lower court’s judgment must deter-
mine, in essence, whether it is “most consonant to justice”
for the judgment to “remain undisturbed” or be vacated.
South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold
Mining Co., 145 U. S. 300, 301–302 (1892) (emphasis de-
leted).
                              II
   Because mootness and vacatur involve different legal
analyses, see Part I, supra, I think courts should address
them separately. Moreover, at least in theory if not in prac-
tice, vacatur does not—and cannot—automatically follow
from mootness.
   For one thing, automatic vacatur plainly flouts the re-
quirement of an individualized, circumstance-driven fair-
ness evaluation, which, as I have explained, is the hallmark
of an equitable remedy. “The essence of equity jurisdiction
has been the power . . . to do equity and to mould each de-
cree to the necessities of the particular case.” Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944). Vacatur is an “extraor-
dinary” exercise of an appellate court’s “equitable” author-
ity. Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26. As such, it simply cannot be
a one-size-fits-all solution.
   Second, and perhaps even more fundamentally, auto-
matic vacatur is flatly inconsistent with our common-law
tradition of case-by-case adjudication, which “assumes that
judicial decisions are valuable and should not be cast aside
lightly.” Chapman, 598 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3). Our
legal system rests not only on the holdings of this Court,
but also on the reasoned decisions of duly authorized lower
court judges. Jurists presiding over cases at every level
4             ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                    JACKSON
               JACKSON        , J., concurring
                      , J., concurring  in judgment

have a duty “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). That mootness can sometimes
leave parties unable to appeal does not bear on the contin-
ued validity of those lower court opinions in any respect.
   We do not consider a court’s judgment to be any less bind-
ing on the parties simply because there is not an appeal;
appeal or not, lower court rulings are still law. And it is not
as if a decision rendered by a lower court is less than final,
or is not perfected, unless and until it receives the impri-
matur of this Court. Indeed, many lower court determina-
tions are not even appealable as a matter of law. See, e.g.,
28 U. S. C. §1447(d) (providing that, with limited excep-
tions, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or other-
wise”); cf. §1292(a) (authorizing appeals of only certain
kinds of interlocutory orders). Our legal system regards
those decisions as pronouncements of law nevertheless.
   In other words, even if a party cannot appeal, or opts not
to do so, lower court judgments are binding and presump-
tively valid. And the lack of an appeal, on its own, does not
suffice to rebut that presumption. Any suggestion to the
contrary misunderstands the scope of the authority that all
federal judges have pursuant to Article III, and disrespects
the time and talent of the jurists who have previously un-
dertaken to assess the merits of the matter.
   Nor is the validity of a lower court’s judgment cast into
doubt as a result of the case’s subsequent mootness. We do
not erase past precedents just because those cases cease to
be live, litigated matters. Every federal case fades to black
at some point, yet in our common-law system of case-by-
case adjudication, the rulings that Article III judges have
issued in those cases remain good law. “[T]here is no par-
ticular reason to assume that a decision, later mooted, is
any less valid as precedent than any other opinion of a
court.” Mahoney v. Babbitt, 113 F. 3d 219, 222 (CADC
1997).
                      Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)                     5

                       JACKSON
                  JACKSON        , J., concurring
                         , J., concurring  in judgment

                               III
                                A
   Why, then, does the possibility of nullifying a lower
court’s judgment by ordering Munsingwear vacatur exist?
I submit that it serves a specific, equitable function: to ad-
dress any unjust circumstances or unfairness that might
stem from the inability to appeal a particular lower court
decision, notwithstanding its presumptive validity. And
just as in Munsingwear itself, “the party seeking relief from
the status quo of the appellate judgment” bears the burden
of establishing “equitable entitlement to [this] extraordi-
nary remedy.” Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26.2
   Thus, in my view, sound vacatur arguments must be
rooted in fairness. Likewise, I believe that a court’s Mun-
singwear determination should involve a particularized as-
sessment of whether “the conditions and circumstances of
the particular case” warrant vacatur of the lower court’s
judgment. Garza, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
   It is, of course, impossible to catalog all of the potential
circumstances that might justify vacatur of a lower court’s
judgment on fairness grounds, so I will not attempt to do so
here. As a general matter, I believe that a party who claims
equitable entitlement to vacatur must explain what harm—
other than having to accept the law as the lower court
stated it—flows from the inability to appeal the lower court
decision. The procedural history of Munsingwear provides
——————
   2 In United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950), the Fed-

eral Government, as plaintiff, had brought both an injunctive claim and
a damages claim; it lost the injunctive claim first and was unable to ap-
peal that lower court determination because of intervening mootness.
Id., at 37. The unappealable lower court judgment with respect to the
injunctive claim then precluded the Government from litigating the mer-
its of its damages claim. Ibid. This Court noted that a vacatur request
had been available to the Government to avert this unfairness, but that
the Government had “slept on its rights” in failing to seek that particular
remedy. Id., at 40–41.
6               ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                       JACKSON
                  JACKSON        , J., concurring
                         , J., concurring  in judgment

one example of the kind of harm that might warrant vaca-
tur. See n. 2, supra. Another stems from the fact that
courts “must also take account of the public interest” when
making a vacatur determination, Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26,
which raises broader fairness concerns—such as “the or-
derly operation of the federal judicial system,” id., at 27.
For that reason, I think that the Court’s “sensitiv[ity] to
Acheson’s concern about litigants manipulating this Court’s
jurisdiction,” ante, at 3, could be a relevant vacatur consid-
eration, and is likewise reflected in our prior observation
that it would be “strange” to “permit a plaintiff to obtain a
favorable judgment, take voluntary action that moots the
dispute, and then retain the benefit of the judgment.”
Garza, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation
marks omitted).3
  It suffices for now to say that “[f]lexibility rather than ri-
gidity has distinguished” a court’s equitable power and the
potential reasons for exercising it. Hecht, 321 U. S., at 329.
Still, it bears repeating that the reason for a vacatur rem-
edy must be more than “mere disagreement with the deci-
sion that one seeks to have vacated.” Chapman, 598 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 3). Every lower court loser would, of
course, prefer that the lower court’s opinion not exist. But
in each and every case in our adversarial justice system,
one side loses—and generally must accept that outcome.
  To me, such first principles about the nature of the vaca-
tur remedy, the design of our common-law system, and the
scope of appellate authority best inform how this Court, and
other Courts of Appeals, should proceed when addressing a
——————
  3 The Court has accepted respondent’s claim that she voluntarily dis-

missed her suit for legitimate reasons, see ante, at 3, and to be clear, I
concur with that conclusion. My only point is that any perception that
mootness has been procured tactically, based on its timing (here, the
mootness occurred after we granted review, oral argument was sched-
uled, and briefing had begun) or otherwise, would be relevant to deter-
mining whether the equitable vacatur remedy is warranted.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)              7

                    JACKSON
               JACKSON        , J., concurring
                      , J., concurring  in judgment

Munsingwear motion. Mindful that vacatur of a lower
court’s judgment is an extraordinary equitable remedy de-
signed to ensure fairness, and fully cognizant of the danger
of uprooting presumptively valid legal precedents—contri-
butions to the common law that belong to all who are gov-
erned by the rule of law in our constitutional system, not
just the parties in the particular case—we should carefully
evaluate the purported need for vacatur, in terms of the
harms it would avert. And in the absence of any demon-
strated harm-related justification for vacating a lower
court’s opinion, we should conclude that “[t]he ‘public inter-
est’ . . . is generally better served by leaving appellate judg-
ments intact.” Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U. S. 87, 98 (2009)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
                               B
   All that said, I am aware that a party who is deprived of
the opportunity to appeal due to mootness (like Acheson)
might feel that loss acutely. It might even experience the
thwarting of its chance to obtain a reversal on appeal as a
grave injustice, on par with any other fairness-based justi-
fication for vacatur of the lower court’s ruling. I also recog-
nize that this Court has previously expressed sympathy for
that view. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. 692, 713
(2011) (suggesting that the inability to challenge “a legally
consequential decision” warrants vacatur). But I disagree.
There is nothing inherently inequitable about not being
able to pursue an appeal.
   To reiterate the basic bottom line: The lack of jurisdiction
that prevents an appeal and the set of circumstances that
relate to whether the lower court’s judgment should be per-
mitted to stand are entirely distinct. The lower court issued
its ruling while the case was alive. And so rendered, that
ruling is precedent—“presumptively correct and valuable to
the legal community as a whole.” Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26.
The observation that “what is done is done” is thus the
8               ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                       JACKSON
                  JACKSON        , J., concurring
                         , J., concurring  in judgment

starting point for assessing any response to mootness be-
yond mere dismissal of the appeal.
   It is true that the losing party would ordinarily have the
right to challenge a lower court’s decision by pursuing an
appeal. But that right is not absolute or inviolate. Wanted
appeals sometimes cannot proceed for a host of reasons,4
and in such instances, the losing party is normally stuck
with the outcome that the lower court announced after its
consideration of the matter in dispute. We do not consider
the proposers of unrequited requests for appellate review to
have been unjustly wronged.
   To be sure, in the instant case, there is another wrinkle:
We not only granted Acheson’s petition for certiorari, but
we also heard oral argument related to the merits of its
claim that the lower court’s judgment was erroneous. Thus,
Acheson had a better opportunity than most to achieve the
requested reversal of the Court of Appeals’ unfavorable de-
cision. But this Court’s demonstrated interest in reviewing
Acheson’s challenge to respondent’s moot legal action does
not add anything to the fairness equation. Now that its ap-
peal has been mooted, Acheson is in no different position
than the multitude of other litigants who suffered defeat in
the Courts of Appeals and will not get a review of their case
on the merits from this Court. To sustain a request for va-
catur, Acheson needs to rely on something more than its
own abject disappointment.
                         *    *     *
  The parties in this case have not provided any equitable
basis for vacatur of the Court of Appeals’ judgment, nor has
the majority described any, beyond its reference to the
Court’s past practices and a citation to Munsingwear. See
——————
  4 Our Court might decide not to grant a would-be petitioner’s request

for certiorari, for example. Or, even after granting review, we might dis-
miss the petition after determining that certiorari was improvidently
granted.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)              9

                    JACKSON
               JACKSON        , J., concurring
                      , J., concurring  in judgment

ante, at 3–4. For the reasons explained above, I would or-
dinarily not agree to the imposition of a vacatur remedy
that was not fully discussed, much less established. But I
recognize that this Court’s vacatur ruling is consistent with
our “established practice” of vacating the judgment of the
Court of Appeals below “when mootness occurs through . . .
the unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower
court.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S.
43, 70–71 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Garza, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3); supra, at 6, and
n. 3. I concur in the judgment on the basis of that prece-
dent, despite my own views of this practice, because re-
spondent’s voluntary dismissal is the sort of “unilateral ac-
tion” that we have previously deemed adequate for vacatur.