Court Opinion

ID: 9471304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:28:40.437349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:20.617759
License: Public Domain

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur with the result the majority reaches and in its holding that a guilty plea which is both voluntarily and knowingly entered should not be set aside.
Thus, with respect to Part IV of the majority opinion, I would make clear that the duty of counsel here was only to assure that the plea of the petitioner was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Notwithstanding any suggestion by the majority to the contrary, counsel was not required to investigate possible defenses, to check for possible weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, to familiarize himself with all the details of the factual background, or to check the latest, citations of relevant cases. I specially concur to express my understanding that there can not be and should not be any check list to be applied with any degree of rigidity in determining the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of counsel. As our cases have held numerous times, the effectiveness of counsel should be judged on a case-by-case basis and it “turns in each case on the totality of the facts in the record.” Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1982). It follows, therefore, as our precedent demonstrates, that the effectiveness of counsel is to be judged differently in a case in which an individual expressly wishes to enter a plea of guilty and waive jury trial from a case in which the defendant wishes to enter a plea of not guilty and to be tried by jury. When the defendant expressly wishes to enter a plea of guilty, the only duty of counsel is to assure that the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered. The precedent of our court demonstrates this principle.
In Doughty v. Beto, 396 F.2d 128 (5th Cir.1968), the facts were quite similar to those presented here. The attorney conferred with the petitioner for only fifteen minutes prior to making the arrangements for a guilty plea and a bargained sentence. In response to the contention that the petitioner had been denied effective assistance of counsel, we stated:
The defense attorney testified, however, that Doughty appeared to be normal, knew what he was doing, was fully informed of his rights, including a jury trial, and agreed to the disposition of the case. Moreover, counsel testified that petitioner promptly admitted the facts which caused his prosecution.... When the proof shows that a defendant is fully informed of his rights, admits his guilt, *1380and is relieved of the likelihood of a life sentence, we cannot condemn the efforts of an attorney as being ineffective.
396 F.2d 130.
In Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213 (5th Cir.1973), we stated:
We do not hold that every appointed counsel representing an accused who desires to plead guilty or whom he advises to plead guilty, must investigate all the facts of the case, explore all possible avenues of defense, etc., to the extent required of appointed counsel representing an accused who pleads not guilty and goes to trial.
476 F.2d at 224.
In Carbo v. United States, 581 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.1978), we reiterated: “When a guilty plea is entered, the only required duty of counsel in rendering reasonably effective assistance is to ascertain if the plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly.” 581 F.2d at 93.
In Jones v. Henderson, 549 F.2d 995 (5th Cir.1977), we extensively discussed the principle that effectiveness of counsel is not to be judged by the same standard in guilty pleas as in not-guilty pleas. In Jones, the petitioners were brought to the courthouse to enter pleas of guilty. Upon their arrival at the courthouse, they were met for the first time by their attorney, who was appointed that morning. The attorney spent only twenty to thirty minutes advising the petitioners of their constitutional rights, the criminal statutes involved and the range of punishment. They admitted to him that they were guilty of the actions with which they were charged. Because the petitioners were anxious to plead guilty, he did not investigate the facts of the case, nor consider evidentiary motions in their behalf, nor familiarize himself with the general facts of the case. In rejecting the contention of ineffective assistance of counsel, we noted:
[I]t is essential to recognize the difference between the duty of counsel to a defendant who enters a guilty plea and the duty to one who goes to trial. The court has frequently held that “the only required duty of counsel under the most liberal construction when a plea of guilty is entered is that counsel . .. should ascertain if the plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly.” [Citations omitted.]
549 F.2d 996-997. Furthermore, we quoted with approval the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, as follows:
It may be argued that a plea of guilty is not understanding^ made when the defendant is unaware of certain technical defenses which might very well make the prosecutor’s job more difficult or even impossible if he were put to his proof. However, we think “understanding^” refers merely to the meaning of the charge, and what acts amount to being guilty of the charge, and the consequences of pleading guilty thereto, rather than to dilatory or evidentiary defenses.
256 F.2d at 710.
Thus, in view of the precedent in our circuit, I would be more reluctant than the majority to hold that the attorney here rendered ineffective assistance to this petitioner. Since this case, however, does not turn on this point, I specially concur simply to demonstrate that the majority opinion appears to hold counsel here to a considerably higher standard than our precedent has applied. This panel, of course, does not and cannot overrule that precedent.