Court Opinion

ID: 9910995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 01:00:38.291025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:24.658252
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40758          Document: 00517005786               Page: 1      Date Filed: 12/18/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                       ____________                                          FILED
                                                                                      December 18, 2023
                                        No. 22-40758
                                       ____________                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                             Clerk
   Barney Donalson, Jr.,

                                                                        Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                               versus

   Erin McLeaish,

                                                 Defendant—Appellee.
                       ______________________________

                       Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the Eastern District of Texas
                                 USDC No. 6:22-CV-13
                       ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
           On January 14, 2020, Barney Joe Donalson, Jr. was arrested at the Van
   Zandt County Courthouse in Canton, Texas following his outburst in the
   Courthouse hallway. Two years later, Donalson sued Deputy Erin McLeaish,
   alleging that she violated his constitutional rights during the arrest.1 The case

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
          1
            Donalson also named Steve Deville as a defendant, but he later dismissed claims
   against Deville.
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   was referred to a magistrate judge who recommended granting summary
   judgment in favor of Deputy McLeaish. The district court adopted the
   magistrate’s report and agreed. Donalson appealed.
           We find that Donalson failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of
   material fact as to his § 1983 claims and that Deputy McLeaish is entitled to
   summary judgment as a matter of law. The district court’s ruling is
   AFFIRMED.
                                              I.
                                              A.
           Appellant Joe Donalson is a pastor at the New Beginnings Fellowship
   Church (NB), located in Houston, Texas. In 2017, NB purchased a property
   in Canton, Texas to use as an emergency shelter for hurricane victims or as a
   “multipurpose house of worship with a sanctuary and housing for homeless
   persons.” However, NB quickly encountered problems with the Canton mu-
   nicipal government who quickly filed suit in the 294th Judicial District of
   Texas seeking to enjoin NB from occupying the premises without complying
   with the relevant health and safety codes. On January 14, 2020, the court
   granted the injunction and ordered that NB, and Donalson personally, vacate
   the premises.2
           The same day the injunction was issued, Donalson went to the Van
   Zandt courthouse to try and stay the order. While Donalson spoke with the

           _____________________
           2
             The court also ordered that all personal property be removed from the property,
   proscribed habituation on the property, prohibited NB and Donalson from performing
   work on the property until they acquired the requisite City permits, and mandated that a
   third-party inspection be performed once the party was vacated. The court authorized the
   City of Canton Police Department to monitor and enter the premises, ordered the City to
   disconnect water service to the property, and required prior written authorization before
   reconnecting water.

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   Court Coordinator, Deputy Erin McLeaish approached the pair and re-
   quested that Donalson lower his voice because court was in session. After
   Donalson explained that he sought an emergency stay and that he “was
   told . . . not [to] leave this courthouse until I have a ruling on it,” McLeaish
   directed Donalson to sit in a chair several feet away.
          Several minutes later, a second officer—Deputy Rule—approached
   Donalson while he sat down. Donalson explained to Rule that he sought an
   emergency stay, and McLeaish said the presiding judge on the case was not
   in the courthouse that day. In a slightly raised voice, Donalson disputed
   McLeaish’s explanation and requested to speak with another judge. In re-
   sponse, Rule advised Donalson that he “better calm it down because I will
   take you out of here.”
          Then, Donalson picked up his cell phone from his lap, raised both
   hands, and began to hit himself in the head with his hands and phone. He
   yelled an expletive, began to writhe in his chair, and rocked himself back and
   forth which caused his head to connect with the wall behind him. McLeaish
   approached Donalson with her hands outstretched towards his arms but low-
   ered, seemingly attempting to stop him from hitting himself. At this point,
   Donalson may have tried to bite McLeaish. Rule approached Donalson from
   his other side and similarly tried to hold down his arms.
          Donalson continued to flail his arms and legs, resist the deputies, and
   eventually slid off his chair and threw himself to the ground.3 McLeaish
   moved to the ground and tried to restrain Donalson by placing her right knee
   onto Donalson’s back or side as she grabbed his left arm and brought it behind
          _____________________
          3
            When Donalson launched himself forward, his momentum caused his chair to
   move and trip Deputy Rule. Rule fell onto Donalson’s back and Donalson can be heard
   crying and saying “ow.” Rule quickly composed herself and moved off Donalson’s back.
   Footage shows that the fall caused Donalson to begin bleeding from his face.

                                            3
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   his back. Two other officers joined the scuffle to assist Rule and McLeaish,
   and the four officers struggled to handcuff Donalson. During the struggle,
   McLeaish continued to straddle Donalson’s legs to hold him down.
          After   approximately     thirty       seconds,   McLeaish   successfully
   handcuffed Donalson and called for an ambulance. McLeaish remained on
   top of Donalson while she put on rubber gloves, secured his handcuffs, and
   patted him down. Once another officer arrived to interview Donalson,
   McLeaish left the scene. Although Donalson was injured during the
   interaction, he refused medical treatment.
          Donalson was taken to a local hospital for a mental evaluation. The
   hospital determined Donalson did not require medical treatment and
   released him into the custody of the sheriff’s department, and he was
   transferred to jail. Over the next several months, Donalson claims that he
   experienced headaches, back pain, and abdominal pain from the incident.
   Medical records indicate Donalson was eventually diagnosed with
   headaches, “postconcussion syndrome,” spinal nerve damage, and
   gastrointestinal hemorrhage.
                                         B.
          Two years later, Donalson sued Deputy McLeaish under
   42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
   rights. Donalson claimed that McLeaish violated his Fourth Amendment
   rights when she unlawfully detained him by “limit[ing] his movement by
   ordering him down a hallway and to sit in a chair,” and by using excessive
   force to “slam Donalson on the floor and [cause] serious injury by putting
   her knee in the small of his back twisting [sic].”
          After the case was referred to a magistrate judge, McLeaish moved for
   summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and provided three ex-
   hibits in support of her motion. Exhibit A is the temporary restraining order

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   issued on January 14, 2020, enjoining NB, Donalson, and Covenant Commu-
   nity of New Beginnings Fellowship/Canton from occupying the aforemen-
   tioned property in Canton, Texas. Exhibit B contains McLeaish’s affidavit,
   an affidavit of probable cause and an order to detain Donalson, and also in-
   corporates three videos provided to the court: (1) Exhibit B.3, labeled “Dep-
   uty McLeaish Body Camera Video (1 of 2)”; (2) Exhibit B.4, labeled “Dep-
   uty McLeaish Body Camera Video (2 of 2)”; and (3) Exhibit B.5, labeled
   “Van Zandt County Courthouse Video.” Exhibit C is an affidavit by
   Waynette Barker, the District Court Administrator of Van Zandt County.
           The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant
   McLeaish’s motion for summary judgment on both claims. As to Donalson’s
   unlawful detention claim, the magistrate judge concluded McLeaish did not
   violate Donalson’s constitutional rights by “limit[ing] his movement by
   ordering him down a hallway and to sit in a chair.” Regarding the excessive
   force claim, the magistrate judge found that McLeaish’s use of force was not
   excessive because Donalson presented an objective risk of harm to himself
   and the nearby officers by “weaponiz[ing] his cell phone” which justified
   using force to restrain him. Once Donalson was on the ground, the magistrate
   judge concluded that McLeaish used appropriate force considering
   Donalson’s “initial struggle,” the length of time McLeaish kept her knee on
   his back, and the time it took to handcuff Donalson and perform a pat down.
   Ultimately, the magistrate judge concluded that McLeaish acted as a
   reasonable officer under the circumstances and did not use excessive force.4
   The district court agreed and granted McLeaish’s motion for summary

           _____________________
           4
             The magistrate judge further found that Donalson failed to provide evidence that
   McLeaish violated a clearly established right because Donalson provided inapposite case
   law to support his claim.

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   judgment. Donalson filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district
   court denied.
           On appeal, Donalson argues the district court erred by considering
   inadmissible and unreliable evidence and that the record does not support
   McLeaish’s entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. We
   disagree.
                                                 II.
           The magistrate judge determined that the video evidence from
   McLeaish’s body-worn camera and from a hallway camera inside the
   courthouse offered “uncontested facts” refuting Donalson’s account of the
   event. Because “nothing in the record indicates that [McLeaish’s] knee was
   placed on [Donalson’s] back in an aggressive manner or that it was placed for
   a reason other than to ensure both [Donalson’s] and the officers’ safety while
   assisting with restraining [Donalson],” the magistrate concluded that
   Donalson failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to the
   reasonableness of McLeaish’s use of force and recommended the district
   court grant McLeaish’s motion. Without commenting on the footage, the
   district court adopted the recommendation.
           Donalson now argues the district court erred by considering
   McLeaish’s videos for three reasons. First, Donalson argues the footage is
   not competent summary judgment evidence because it was unauthenticated.
   Although McLeaish did not authenticate the videos before the magistrate
   judge, summary judgment evidence need not be in an admissible form so long
   as it is capable of being presented in an admissible form at trial.5 This
           _____________________
           5
             Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b)(2) (“A party may object that the material cited to support
   or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.”); Lee
   v. Offshore Logistical & Transp., L.L.C., 859 F.3d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (July 5,
   2017) (citing 11 Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil ¶ 56.91 (2017)); Allen v. Hays,

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   approach “allows the court to consider the evidence that would likely be
   admitted at trial—as summary judgment is trying to determine if the
   evidence admitted at trial would allow a jury to find in favor of the
   nonmovant—without imposing” the burdens of trial at an earlier procedural
   stage.6 Because McLeaish could have authenticated the videos at trial by
   providing an affidavit of their authenticity, Donalson’s argument has no
   merit.
            Second, Donalson claims McLeaish destroyed or altered the videos
   and fraudulently “passed off” her exhibits as the “true and correct copy of
   the Van Zandt surveillance videos of the incident.” In support of this
   assertion, Donalson claims McLeaish’s body-worn camera footage was
   “altered into two separate files, with missing material content both before, in
   the middle, and after.” He further argues that Exhibit B.5, the hallway
   recording, shows signs of “intentional concealment of material information”
   and objects that this recording was not the same as the “full 33-minute long
   video that was publicly released without audio.”7
            The Court disagrees. Fraud upon the court is a serious accusation, and
   Donalson has provided no evidence that the exhibits were improperly

            _____________________
   812 F. App’x 185, 193 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The attached documents, moreover, were properly
   before the court on summary judgment, despite their not being authenticated, because
   admissible evidence may be submitted in an inadmissible form at the summary judgment
   stage.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted); Maurer v. Indep. Town, 870 F.3d 380,
   384 (5th Cir. 2017) (“At the summary judgment stage, evidence need not be authenticated
   or otherwise presented in an admissible form.”) (citation omitted).
            6
                Maurer, 870 F.3d at 384.
            7
             Because McLeaish failed to provide the “full” video, Donalson also argues that
   she “failed to make a complete disclosure” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
   26(a)(1). There is no evidence that McLeaish excluded Exhibit B.5 from her initial
   disclosures, and Donalson did not object to her disclosures in his Response to her motion
   for summary judgment.

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   modified; he offers mere “speculative allegations.”8 That McLeaish’s body
   camera footage was divided into two recordings does not mean the recordings
   were inaccurate or their quality was compromised. Further, aside from the
   conclusory allegation that the footage is “missing material content,”
   Donalson does not explain what the “material content” is or how it affects
   the case at hand. Moreover, the hallway footage captures the entirety of the
   encounter, from McLeaish’s initial meeting with Donalson to when he is
   escorted out of the building. This footage renders any deficiencies in the
   body-worn camera recordings immaterial.
          Finally, Donalson’s critique of the hallway recording is likewise
   unpersuasive. Exhibit B.5 is a 33-minute recording from a hallway camera
   inside the courthouse. Because of its vantage point, the recording captured
   the whole encounter. However, Donalson claims that Exhibit B.5 is not the
   same recording as the “full” video released by the County and that the
   provided video indicated “intentional concealment of material information.”
   Donalson provided a YouTube link to the “full” video, which he asserts
   shows the scene from a “different angle” and reflects McLeaish using her
   knee to restrain Donalson.
          The Court has reviewed Donalson’s referenced video and finds that
   it is the same recording McLeaish provided as Exhibit B.5. The recordings
   contain the same content, are recorded from the same vantage point, and
   both bear the indicator “Camera 05.” Donalson’s argument that McLeaish
   concealed material by not providing “full” video is baseless.9

          _____________________
          8
              See Skiba v. Jacobs Ent., Inc., 587 F. App’x 136, 139 (5th Cir. 2014).
          9
            For the same reason, Donalson’s accusations provide no basis to remand for
   another evidentiary hearing nor to supplement the appellate record.

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                                                  III.
            Donalson also contends that the record did not support the district
   court’s grant of summary judgment because there is a genuine dispute as to
   whether McLeaish used excessive force. This Court reviews a district court’s
   grant of summary judgment de novo and disagrees with Donalson.10
                                                   A.
            42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability for the “deprivation of any rights,
   privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” caused by
   any person acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
   or usage, of any State.”11 To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must
   establish: (1) a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
   United States, and (2) that was committed by a person acting under color of
   state law.12 Donalson claims McLeaish violated his Fourth and Fourteenth
   Amendment rights to be free from unlawful detention and excessive use of
   force.
            The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
   seizures.13 A “seizure” occurs when, “taking into account all of the
   circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have
   communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the
   police presence and go about his business.’”14 Seizures are unlawful if,

            _____________________
            10
                 Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 405 (5th Cir. 2021).
            11
                 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
            12
              Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 826 F.3d 272, 277–78 (5th Cir. 2016), as revised
   (June 16, 2016).
            13
                 U.S. Const., amend. IV.
            14
             Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 (2003) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
   437 (1991)); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).

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   depending on the circumstances, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or
   probable cause to detain the individual.15
           Any claim “that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—
   deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure
   of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
   reasonableness standard.”16 To establish a Fourth Amendment violation
   based on an officer’s use of excessive force, the plaintiff must show: (1) an
   injury; (2) “which resulted from the use of force that was clearly excessive to
   the need;” (3) “the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable.”17
           At summary judgment, the movant must show that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
   a matter of law.18 The Court reviews all facts in the light most favorable to
   the nonmoving party.19 However, when a public official asserts the qualified
   immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the
   official violated a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the right was
   “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.20 Under this
   burden shifting regime, the public official asserting qualified immunity does

           _____________________
           15
            See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (justifying on-the-street stops based
   on reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot); Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 746 (5th Cir. 2023)
   (“An arrest is unlawful if the officer did not have probable cause.”).
           16
                Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
           17
             Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rockwell v. Brown,
   664 F.3d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 2011)).
           18
                Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
           19
                First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 555 F.3d 177, 181 (5th Cir. 2009).
           20
              Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
   Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992)).

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   not bear the initial burden of showing “an absence of genuine disputes of
   material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.”21
           This Court will review the evidence in light most favorable to
   Donalson and will draw all reasonable inferences in his favor, but Donalson
   still bears the burden of pointing to “specific evidence” in the record that
   demonstrates a genuine dispute of material fact as to a constitutional injury
   that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.22 Moreover,
   “when there is video evidence in the record, courts are not bound to accept
   the nonmovant’s version of the facts if it is contradicted by the video.”23
   However, when video evidence is ambiguous or incomplete, “a court should
   not discount the nonmoving party’s story unless the video evidence provides
   so much clarity that a reasonable jury could not believe his account.”24
                                                 B.
           The district court granted McLeaish’s motion for summary judgment
   on Donalson’s unlawful seizure and excessive force claims. In his briefing
   before the Court, Donalson does not appeal the district court’s dismissal of
   his unlawful seizure claim.25 Thus, only the excessive force claim is before us.

           _____________________
           21
                Id.
           22
                Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016).
           23
              Crane v. City of Arlington, Tex., 50 F.4th 453, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied
   Arlington, TX v. Crane, No. 22-1151, 2023 WL 7117014 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2023).
           24
                Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 2018).
           25
              Despite noting that “this case also presents the issue of whether Donalson was
   subjected to a false arrest when [O]fficer McLeaish directed him to sit by himself in a chair
   in the Van Zandt County Courthouse hallway,” Donalson did not brief this issue. This
   Court will not address issues not raised in the initial appellate brief. See Reagan Nat’l
   Advert. Of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin, 64 F.4th 287, 291 (5th Cir. 2023) (“Ordinarily,
   ‘[a]n appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal.’”)
   (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994)).

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           Donalson bears the burden of pointing to “specific evidence” of:
   (1) his injury; (2) “which resulted from the use of force that was clearly
   excessive to the need;” and (3) “the excessiveness of which was objectively
   unreasonable.”26 As evidence of his injury, Donalson directs this Court to his
   records, which reflect diagnoses ranging from headache and trauma to acute
   lower GI bleeding. He also points to the video evidence, which he describes
   as “portray[ing] a prone Donalson lying under McLeaish and several other
   officers lying in a pool of blood.”
           It is indisputable that Donalson was injured during the scuffle at the
   courthouse. As Donalson points out, his injuries are apparent from the videos
   that show pools of blood underneath Donalson’s head and significant blood
   on his face. But as McLeaish notes, Donalson “caused injury to himself”
   when he hit himself in the head with his cell phone, “thrashed” around in his
   chair, and propelled himself onto the ground. The footage underscores
   McLeaish’s account: Donalson hit himself in the head repeatedly and
   forcefully rocked back forward and backward in his chair, seemingly hitting
   his head against the wall. Furthermore, the footage shows that it was
   Donalson, not McLeaish or Rule, who pulled himself to the floor. When he
   hit the ground, Donalson injured his face, which is captured clearly by the
   hallway camera.
           Next, Donalson contends that his more serious injuries, i.e., the spinal
   and intestinal injuries, occurred once he was on the ground when McLeaish
   “lifted one of her knees and struck Donalson in the back injuring his spine
   and small intestine.” Donalson claims he was not resisting when McLeaish

           _____________________
           26
                Orr, 844 F.3d at 490; Ramirez, 716 F.3d at 377 (quoting Rockwell, 664 F.3d at
   991).

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   delivered her “knee strike assault,” and that the video footage “removes any
   doubts” as to the force used.
           Even accepting that Donalson sustained serious injuries, we cannot
   say that McLeaish used excessive force. “Excessive force claims are
   necessarily fact-intensive; whether the force used is ‘excessive’ or
   ‘unreasonable’ depends on ‘the facts and circumstances of each particular
   case.’”27 Whether an officer acted reasonably is a totality of the
   circumstances assessment, but relevant factors include “the severity of the
   crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
   of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
   attempting to evade arrest by flight.”28
           Although Donalson had committed no crime, we agree with the
   district court that he posed a threat to himself and others when he
   “weaponized” his phone.29 Donalson posed a threat to his own safety as soon
   as he began hitting himself in the head with a hard object, thrashing his body
   in the chair, and hitting his head against the wall. Donalson did not merely
   “tap[] his forehead” with the phone; audio from McLeaish’s body camera
   captured the sound of Donalson’s phone hitting his head five times before

           _____________________
           27
             Scott v. City of Mandeville, 69 F.4th 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Deville v.
   Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)).
           28
                Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986).
           29
               We further note that given Donalson’s behavior—including his physical
   movements and yells—the deputies could have reasonably believed he presented a
   substantial risk of harm to himself and, as such, were legally authorized to detain Donalson
   at that point. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 573.001 (authorizing a peace
   officer, without a warrant, to take a person into custody if the officer has reason to believe
   and does believe “the person is a person with mental illness,” “because of that mental
   illness there is a substantial risk of serious harm to the person or to others unless the person
   is immediately restrained,” and “believes that there is not sufficient time to obtain a
   warrant before taking the person into custody”).

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   McLeaish approached him. The same clip reflects Donalson moving his head
   backwards and connecting with the wall.
           Furthermore, Donalson’s actions threatened the deputies’ safety.
   When McLeaish attempted to hold his arm down, Donalson appeared to have
   tried to bite her. He continued to wave his phone and arms violently, and in
   doing so, brought his fist close to Rule’s head as she tried to restrain him.
   When he launched himself out of his chair, Donalson brought Rule down with
   him.30 Because Donalson presented an objective risk of harm to himself and
   the deputies, McLeaish had cause to temporarily restrain him.31
           The footage also indicates that McLeaish used minimal force when
   restraining Donalson. While Donalson was flailing in the chair, McLeaish
   approached him with her arms lowered; she limited her physical contact at
   first to his arms and wrists. Only when Donalson moved to the ground did
   McLeaish exert more force by using her right knee to hold Donalson down
   while she attempted to bring his left arm behind his back.32 Once Donalson
   was handcuffed, McLeaish remained on Donalson’s back for approximately
   one more minute while she put on rubber gloves, adjusted Donalson’s
   handcuffs, and performed a pat down. Once McLeaish completed her frisk,
   she stood up, thus removing any weight from Donalson.

           _____________________
           30
             Contrary to Donalson’s assertion that “Deputy McLeaish and several other law
   enforcement officers pulled Donalson out of the chair onto the floor and piled on top of
   him,” the video shows that neither Deputy McLeaish nor Deputy Rule pulled him towards
   the ground. To the contrary, Donalson pulled Rule down.
           31
                See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 573.001.
           32
             Although the audio records Donalson stating “I’m not resisting,” the video
   shows Deputies Rule and McLeaish, as well as two other officers who came to support
   them, struggling to clasp the handcuffs.

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          In sum, less than three minutes passed between the moment when
   Donalson threw himself onto the ground and when Deputy McLeaish
   stopped exerting force. During this time, the body-worn camera and hallway
   recordings show that McLeaish placed her knee on Donalson’s back for
   approximately two and a half minutes. Although minutes may feel longer in
   the moment, McLeaish did not exert any more force than was needed to
   secure Donalson’s handcuffs, don rubber gloves, and perform a pat down.
          Finally, although the footage shows McLeaish used her knee to
   restrain Donalson, it does not support Donalson’s contention that she “twice
   lifted one of her knees and struck Donalson in the back injuring his spine and
   small intestine.” In fact, the footage contradicts his claims. Thus, even
   viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Donalson, his allegations are
   refuted by the video evidence such that no reasonable jury could believe his
   account.
          Donalson bore the burden of demonstrating McLeaish’s use of force
   was “clearly excessive.” He has not done so.
                                        IV.
          Law enforcement officers must use no more force than is necessary to
   restrain individuals. The video evidence conclusively supports this Court’s
   conclusions that Donalson presented a threat to himself and Deputies
   McLeaish and Rule, McLeaish exerted a reasonable amount of force to
   restrain Donalson, and she ceased doing so as soon as Donalson was secured.
   Under these circumstances, McLeaish is entitled to qualified immunity.
          Accordingly, the district court’s ruling is AFFIRMED.

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