Court Opinion

ID: 9634272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:02.10946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:11.498535
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                            No. 04-22-00396-CR

                                     Juan De Los SANTOS-SALAS,
                                               Appellant

                                                       v.

                                           The STATE of Texas,
                                                 Appellee

                     From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2020CR0415
                             Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Beth Watkins, Justice

Sitting:          Irene Rios, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice
                  Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) 1

Delivered and Filed: August 16, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Juan De Los Santos-Salas appeals his conviction on two counts of aggravated sexual

assault of a child. We affirm.

                                                BACKGROUND

           After his daughter, P.S., made a sexual assault outcry against him, Santos-Salas was

charged with two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. A jury found him guilty of both

1
  The Honorable Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) of the Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of
the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
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counts and the trial court sentenced him to 40 years’ confinement, with the sentences running

concurrently. Santos-Salas timely appealed.

                                               ANALYSIS

               Issues 1 and 2—Consolidated Complaints About Witness Testimony

         In his first two issues on appeal, Santos-Salas contends that the trial court erred by allowing

him to be referred to as “the defendant” when P.S. did not identify him in open court and by

allowing expert testimony from the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner without qualifying her as an

expert. The State responds that both arguments were waived because Santos-Salas failed to object

below.

                                            Applicable Law

         Preservation of error is a systematic requirement, and we need not reach a question of

whether the trial court erred unless the complaint has first been preserved for review. TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a); Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). To properly preserve error

for review, a party must have made a specific and timely objection to the trial court until an adverse

ruling was obtained on that objection. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Put differently, the party must

“‘let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly

enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do

something about it[]’” to avoid forfeiting a complaint on appeal. Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459,

464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citation omitted).

                                              Application

                                P.S.’s identification of “the defendant”

         P.S. was the first witness at trial. She testified she was eleven years old and that she knew

the difference between a truth and a lie. She explained that she was in court “[b]ecause of the case

with me and my dad,” and identified her father’s name as “Enrique De Los Santos Salas.” When

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she was asked if she could see her father in the courtroom, she answered “no” although the record

demonstrates Santos-Salas was present. She described feeling “awkward” several times and had

to be asked repeatedly to use her “outside voice,” to speak into the microphone, and to repeat

herself because those present could not hear her. She recounted, in age-appropriate terms, her

father’s digital penetration of her anus and vagina.

        On appeal, Santos-Salas first contends the trial court erred by allowing him to be referred

to as “the defendant” when P.S. did not identify him as such in open court. He relies on Texas

Rules of Evidence 602 and 901 to support this argument. However, at trial Santos-Salas did not

object pursuant to Rule 602, Rule 901, or any other authority regarding P.S.’s failure to identify

him in court. Santos-Salas also argues that P.S. was incompetent to testify pursuant to Rule 601.

Again, however, Santos-Salas did not object to P.S.’s competency as a witness to the trial court.

Had Santos-Salas timely raised either of these objections, the trial court would have been “in the

proper position to do something about” his complaints. Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464. Santos-Salas’s

failure to object deprived the trial court of the ability to address this purported error. See id. We

therefore conclude his first issue on appeal is forfeited. See Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 739

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (stating that with exceptions not applicable here, errors may be forfeited

by appellant’s failure to object at trial).

                                         SANE’s qualifications

        Betty Mercer also testified at trial. She identified herself as a SANE—a Sexual Assault

Nurse Examiner—who had performed approximately 4,000 sexual assault nurse examinations and

had testified in court “[p]robably about 30, 40 times.” She examined P.S. after her outcry and

testified that P.S. reported that her father, who P.S. identified as “Enrique De Los Santos Palomo

Salas,” had been sexually abusing her since she was 5 years old. Mercer testified P.S. reported that

Santos-Salas had put his fingers and penis in her vagina and anus. Mercer testified that the results

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of P.S.’s exam were normal but that this is the result in a majority of child sexual assault

examinations.

       In Santos-Salas’s second complaint on appeal, he contends that Mercer was unqualified to

testify as an expert under Texas Rule of Evidence 702. He particularly argues she was unqualified

to offer an opinion about what the SANE exam showed. However, at trial, Santos-Salas did not

object to Mercer’s qualifications as an expert or to her testimony regarding her findings and

opinion on P.S.’s SANE results. By failing to object, Santos-Salas deprived “the trial judge and

the opposing party an opportunity to correct the error.” Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464. We therefore

conclude his second complaint on appeal is also forfeited. See Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220,

232–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding complaint about witness’s lack of expert qualifications

was waived because no objection was made at trial).

                                     Issue 3—Admitted Letter

       In his third issue on appeal, Santos-Salas complains that the trial court erred by admitting

into evidence a letter P.S. wrote to her father but did not send. However, the record shows that the

trial court did not admit the letter into evidence—Santos-Salas objected to the letter pursuant to

Rule 403 and 404(b) and the trial court sustained his objections. The letter was not admitted as an

exhibit and the jury received no evidence about the letter or its contents. Because Santos-Salas

received the relief he requested from the trial court, we conclude there is no error for us to review.

We overrule his third issue.

                                 Issue 4—Sufficiency of Evidence

                               Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       In his final issue on appeal, Santos-Salas contends that the evidence was legally insufficient

to support his conviction. On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any trier of fact would be

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rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under a legal

sufficiency review, we are “not to become a thirteenth juror” but “to ensure that the evidence

presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.”

Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury is the sole judge of the

witnesses’ credibility and weight of the evidence and can believe all, some, or none of it. Ramsey

v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If there is any inconsistency between

testimony, it is within the jury’s province to resolve the conflict. Martinez v. State, 524 S.W.3d

344, 349 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. ref’d).

       Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative in establishing guilt, and

circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt so long as the conclusion was

not based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d

763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The jury is permitted to draw any reasonable inferences so long

as each inference is supported by the record and “if the record supports contradictory reasonable

inferences,” it is presumed the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict. Metcalf v. State,

597 S.W.3d 847, 855–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

                                            Application

       To convict Santos-Salas, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of P.S. by any

means. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i). In sexual abuse cases, the testimony of the

child victim alone is sufficient to support the conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.07(a), (b)(1). “Child victims of sexual crimes are afforded great latitude when testifying and

they are not expected to testify with the same clarity and ability as is expected of a mature and

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capable adult.” Hiatt v. State, 319 S.W.3d 115, 121 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. ref’d)

(citing Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

          Here, P.S. testified that for nearly a year, when her mother was at work, Santos-Salas would

touch her “middle part” and “butt” under her clothing, sometimes putting his finger and penis

inside her vagina and anus. She described the discomfort she felt when Santos-Salas would put his

finger and penis inside her vagina and anus, and described the fear she felt about seeking help

sooner.

          The jury also heard from Santos-Salas’s wife, Nohemi Palomo Hernandez, who testified

that her husband’s name is “Juan Enrique De Los Santos Salas.” She explained that she and Santos-

Salas are P.S.’s parents. She testified that in the early hours of September 23, 2019, she walked in

on Santos-Salas and P.S., who was then 8 years old, laying together under a blanket on the living

room couch. P.S. screamed and ran to Hernandez crying for help, telling her mother “that her dad

was touching her,” “[t]hat he would touch her vagina” and “that he had his part inside her.”

Hernandez took P.S. to the hospital where the San Antonio Police Department was informed of

the incident.

          In addition, the jury heard from Mercer, who testified that P.S. reported that her father had

put his fingers and penis inside her vagina and anus since she was 5 years old. Mercer also testified

that P.S.’s SANE examination was normal but that this is a consistent result for a majority of sexual

assault examinations of children. The jury also heard from the SAPD officer who was dispatched

to the medical clinic where P.S. was treated, gathered information from P.S., Hernandez, and

Mercer, and then prepared a report for the subsequent SAPD investigators. Then, the jury heard

from the SAPD officer who searched Santos-Salas’s residence and the SAPD detective who

investigated the allegations against Santos-Salas. Finally, the jury heard from two of Santos-

Salas’s co-workers, who agreed that Santos-Salas was very involved in his children’s lives and

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characterized him as “a good person” and “a hard working person, worker, very respectful and

responsible.” Neither, however, had seen Santos-Salas interact with his children.

       While there was no physical evidence presented, none is required “when, as in this case,

the complainant provides ample testimony to establish that a sexual assault occurred.” Bargas v.

State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 888 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Garcia v.

State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). Any inconsistency between the witnesses’

testimony was for the jury to resolve and it is presumed any conflict was resolved in favor of the

verdict. Martinez, 524 S.W.3d at 349; Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855–56. We therefore hold the

evidence indicates the jury was rationally justified in finding Santos-Salas guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                 Beth Watkins, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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