Court Opinion

ID: 9381734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 16:08:13.566545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.270292
License: Public Domain

J-S33043-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KASIIM BROOKS                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 333 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 28, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-23-CR-0002553-2019

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                             FILED MARCH 23, 2023

        Kasiim Brooks (“Brooks”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury found him guilty of two counts possession of a controlled

substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”).1         We affirm the convictions but

vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

        The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

              On February 8, 2019[,] at approximately 3:05 a.m., Officer
        Kevin Gamber (Officer Gamber) was issuing parking tickets in the
        area of the 7200 block of Lamport Road in Upper Darby[2] when
        he noticed [Brooks] unconscious in a car parked in a marked fire
        zone. The license plate came back as an Enterprise rental
        car. . . . Officer Gamber attempted to wake [up Brooks].

              Upon [Brooks] waking, he rolled the window down and
        Officer Gamber requested [Brooks] exit the vehicle to ensure that
____________________________________________

1   See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

2Officer Gamber testified, and the trial court found, that the area is known as
a high crime area. See N.T. Suppression, 8/15/19, at 12-13; Trial Court
Opinion, 4/5/22, at 5.
J-S33043-22

       he was okay and to determine if he was intoxicated. During a pat
       down search, Officer Gamber felt [two] cell phones in [Brooks’s]
       pocket [and noticed that Brooks was wearing an expensive
       watch]. . . .

                                         ****

             When Officer Gamber questioned [Brooks] on why he was
       in the area so late at night[, Brooks] responded that he was on
       his way to visit his grandmother and then fell asleep in his car,
       but could not give his grandmother’s home address. Officer
       Gamber questioned [Brooks] in order to determine his level of
       intoxication, if any. Officer Gamber determined that [Brooks] was
       not intoxicated. [Brooks] fully cooperated with Officer Gamber
       during their interaction.

              After backup officers arrived on the scene and [Brooks] was
       identified, Officer Gamber asked for permission to search the
       vehicle, which was granted. The three other officers who arrived
       on the scene did not interact with [Brooks] at this time and none
       of their vehicles had flashing lights. Officer Gamber [searched the
       car] and located 98 baggies of controlled substances[, later
       identified as fentanyl and cocaine,] in the inner compartment area
       of the driver[’s] side door[, and the officer arrested Brooks.3] The
       time between stop and arrest lasted about 10 to 15 minutes.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/22, at 2, 4 (citations to the record omitted).

       Brooks filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the car

asserting that he did not voluntarily consent to the search. The trial court

denied the suppression motion following a hearing, and Brooks proceeded to

____________________________________________

3 At trial, Officer Gamber testified that during his search he saw portions of a
plastic bag protruding from a gap in the “master switch assembly,” the panel
on the driver’s side door with controls for the power windows and locks. See
N.T., 7/23/21, at 35. When the officer lifted the master switch assembly
panel, he discovered the bag containing smaller bags of narcotics. See id.
From the car’s center console, the officer recovered baggies and rubber bands,
along with two bundles of cash totaling $1,080; and from the trunk, the officer
recovered a black duffle bag containing Brooks’s identification, clothes, a list
of phone numbers, and another bundle of cash totaling $1,027. See Trial
Court Opinion, 4/5/22, at 2.

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a jury trial.    The jury found Brooks guilty of PWID (fentanyl) and PWID

(cocaine).      On September 28, 2021, the trial court sentenced Brooks to

consecutive sentences of imprisonment of seventy-two to 114 months4 for

PWID (fentanyl) and thirty to sixty months for PWID (cocaine).      Brooks filed

a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. Brooks timely

appealed, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

    Brooks raises the following issues, which we have reordered for our

review:

       1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the pretrial motion to
          suppress physical evidence?

       2. Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict
          because the evidence failed to establish con[s]tructive
          possession of the unlawful narcotics secreted in the rental
          vehicle?

       3. Whether the court abused its discretion in sentencing [Brooks]
          to an unduly harsh and excessive sentence?

Brooks’s Brief at 10 (reordered).

       In his first issue, Brooks challenges the validity of his consent to the

search of the vehicle and claims that the trial court erred in denying his

suppression motion. On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion:

              Our standard of review . . . is whether the record supports
       the trial court’s factual findings and whether the legal conclusions
       drawn therefrom are free from error. Our scope of review is
       limited; we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and
____________________________________________

4As discussed further herein, the Commonwealth concedes that the trial court
imposed an illegal sentence for PWID (fentanyl) because the minimum
exceeded one-half of the maximum term of imprisonment.                  See
Commonwealth’s Brief at 16-17 (discussing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(b)(1)).

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      so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
      uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole.
      Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court,
      we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court
      erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.

Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en

banc) (internal citation omitted).   When examining a ruling on a pretrial

motion to suppress, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence

presented at the suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v. Bush, 166

A.3d 1278, 1281-82 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect private citizens from

unreasonable   searches   and   seizures   by   government    officials.   See

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000).              “A search

conducted without a warrant is deemed to be unreasonable and therefore

constitutionally impermissible, unless an established exception applies. One

such exception is consent, voluntarily given.”     See id. (internal citations

omitted).     The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that a challenged search was constitutional.

See Commonwealth v. McCleary, 193 A.3d 387, 390 (Pa. Super. 2018);

see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H).

      In consent cases, a court’s analysis begins with an examination of the

interaction between the defendant and the police. See Commonwealth v.

Mattis, 252 A.3d 650, 654 (Pa. Super. 2021). If the underlying interaction

between a defendant and a police officer is lawful, then a court analyzes the

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voluntariness of the defendant’s consent, that is, whether the consent “is the

product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice – not the result of

duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne – under the totality

of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855, 862 (Pa.

2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, if an unlawful

seizure precedes the consensual search, the exclusionary rule will require

suppression of evidence unless there is “a sufficient break in the causal

chain[,]” i.e., that the search did not exploit the prior illegality, and the

consent was voluntary. Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889 (internal citation omitted).

In examining the lawfulness of an interaction between police and an individual,

our Supreme Court has stated:

             We have long recognized three types of interactions that
      occur between law enforcement and private citizens. The first is
      a mere encounter, sometimes referred to as a consensual
      encounter, which does not require the officer to have any
      suspicion that the citizen is or has been engaged in criminal
      activity. This interaction also does not compel the citizen to stop
      or respond to the officer. A mere encounter does not constitute a
      seizure, as the citizen is free to choose whether to engage with
      the officer and comply with any requests made or, conversely, to
      ignore the officer and continue on his or her way. The second
      type of interaction, an investigative detention, is a temporary
      detention of a citizen. This interaction constitutes a seizure of a
      person, and to be constitutionally valid police must have a
      reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The third, a
      custodial detention, is the functional equivalent of an arrest and
      must be supported by probable cause. A custodial detention also
      constitutes a seizure.

            No bright lines separate these types of encounters, but the
      United States Supreme Court has established an objective test by
      which courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to
      elevate the interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often

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       referred to as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to
       determine whether, taking into account all of the circumstances
       surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have
       communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty
       to ignore the police presence and go about his business.
       Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
       freedom to walk away, he has seized that person.

See Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199-200 (Pa. 2019)

(internal citations, some quotations, and brackets omitted).

       Additionally, where an officer completes an initial, lawful detention of an

individual and then asks for consent, a court must review all coercive aspects

of the subsequent interaction, including factors such as:

       1) the presence or absence of police excesses; 2) whether there
       was physical contact; 3) whether police directed the citizen's
       movements; 4) police demeanor and manner of expression; 5)
       the location of the interdiction; 6) the content of the questions
       and statements; 7) the existence and character of the initial
       investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness; 8)
       the degree to which the transition between the traffic
       stop/investigative detention and the subsequent encounter can be
       viewed as seamless, . . . thus suggesting to a citizen that his
       movements may remain subject to police restraint; 9) the
       presence of an express admonition to the effect that the citizen-
       subject is free to depart is a potent, objective factor; and 10)
       whether the citizen has been informed that he is not required to
       consent to the search.

Commonwealth v. Moyer, 954 A.2d 659, 665 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)

(internal citations and quotations omitted);5 accord Commonwealth v.

Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 906-07 (Pa. 2000).

____________________________________________

5 The above factors may overlap when considering whether a seizure occurred
and whether an individual voluntarily consented to a search, because both
issues require a consideration of the objective circumstances surrounding an
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       On appeal, Brooks does not dispute that Officer Gamber had reasonable

basis to order him out of the car, frisk him, and determine whether he was

intoxicated. See Brooks’s Brief at 19-20. However, Brooks argues that once

the officer determined he was sober, the purpose of the initial detention was

complete, and he should have been allowed to leave. See id. at 20. The

continuing interaction with Officer Gamber, along with the arrival of the three

backup officers, Brooks asserts, amounted to an unlawful detention that

coerced his consent.       See id.      Brooks concludes that he was entitled to

suppression of the evidence found in the car, because “[c]onsent is not

voluntary where the suspect is surrounded by police and subject to accusatory

questioning.” See id. at 20.

       The trial court explained its denial of Brooks’s suppression motion noting

that Officer Gamber had reasonable suspicion to believe that Brooks “was

involved in nefarious activities” when the officer frisked Brooks. Trial Court

Opinion, 4/5/22, at 5. However, the court concluded that Brooks “was free to

leave the scene” when Officer Gamber later requested consent to search the

car. See id.

       We disagree with the trial court’s “free to leave” analysis.       At the

suppression hearing, Officer Gamber testified that he woke Brooks up by

banging on the car window for approximately one minute, and then asked

____________________________________________

interaction between a police officer and the individual giving consent. See
Commonwealth v. Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citing Strickler, 757 A.2d at 901-02).

                                           -7-
J-S33043-22

Brooks to exit the vehicle. Brooks complied, and the officer frisked him. See

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/15/19, at 12-13. After the frisk, Officer Gamber

began asking Brooks why he was in the area and Brooks replied that he was

visiting his grandmother. See id. at 13. The officer and Brooks then had an

exchange about the location of his grandmother’s home. Brooks was unable

to give the officer “a straight answer as to where it was or what he was doing

in the area.”      Id. at 13-14.       During these discussions, Officer Gamber

concluded that Brooks was not intoxicated. See id. at 20. Approximately five

minutes after Officer Gamber began interacting with Brooks, three backup

officers arrived in marked patrol cars. See id. at 14, 24. Officer Gamber

“identified”6 Brooks when the backup officers arrived and then asked him for

verbal consent to search the vehicle. Id. at 14. Officer Gamber testified that

when he requested Brooks’s consent to the search the car, Brooks was free to

leave; however, he did not expressly say so. See id. at 23-24.

       Following our review of the record, we conclude that when Officer

Gamber requested consent to a search the interaction constituted a seizure

not a mere encounter. Brooks was clearly detained when the officer ordered

____________________________________________

6  The Commonwealth elicited no testimony about how Officer Gamber
identified Brooks, and at no point during the suppression hearing did Officer
Gamber state that he requested or obtained any paperwork or identification
cards from Brooks.

                                           -8-
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him out of the car and frisked him.7 The Commonwealth failed to adduce any

evidence about when, during his continuing interactions with Brooks, Officer

Gamber concluded that Brooks was not impaired. Moreover, there was no

meaningful break or “endpoint” that separated the initial detention of Brooks

from the officer’s continued questioning of Brooks. See Freeman, 757 A.2d

at 906-07. The transitions from the frisk to the point at which Officer Gamber

believed Brooks was free to leave were relatively quick and seamless, such

that a reasonable person would not have felt “free to leave,” ignore Officer

Gamber’s questions, or simply disregard the request for a consensual search.

See Moyer, 954 A.2d at 665, 669.               Thus, the trial court erred when it

determined that Brooks was “free to leave” when Officer Gamber asked for his

consent, and we conclude that Brooks was subject to an investigative

detention when the officer asked for his consent. See id.

       We next consider whether the seizure was lawful. Because Brooks does

not assert that his interactions with Officer Gamber and the three backup

officers escalated to a functional equivalent of arrest, see Brooks’s Brief at 19

(arguing that Officer Gamber “unlawfully detained” Brooks), we assess

whether there was reasonable suspicion to support an investigative detention

when Brooks consented to the search.

____________________________________________

7 The trial court and the parties do not dispute that Officer Gamber had
detained Brooks during this phase of the interaction. See Trial Court Opinion,
4/5/22, at 5.

                                           -9-
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      In assessing whether a detaining officer has reasonable suspicion to

conduct an investigative detention, we employ the following standard:

             Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to
      articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
      reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him
      reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal
      activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in
      that activity. Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing
      court must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts
      available to the officer at the moment of intrusion warrant a
      [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken
      was appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 306 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable cause

necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest and depends on the information

possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of the

circumstances.    See Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa.

2010). The totality of the circumstances test requires consideration of all

information obtained by an officer during a lawful interaction.          See In

Interest of A.A., 195 A.3d 896, 910 (Pa. 2018) (holding that information

learned during a valid traffic stop may be considered to determine whether an

officer had a lawful basis to initiate a second detention after the traffic stop),

abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa.

2021).

      Brooks, as noted above, argues that any basis for prolonging the initial

detention or initiating a subsequent detention had dissipated and that “the

power to detain [him] and the vehicle was exhausted” when Officer Gamber

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determined he was not intoxicated.       Brooks’s Brief at 20.    Brooks baldly

asserts that “[a] perceived expensive watch, two cell phones, whether in a

high crime area or not, fall far short on the reasonable suspicion required to

warrant” extending or initiating a new investigative detention. See id. at 19-

20.

      The record here shows that Officer Gamber found Brooks sleeping in a

running rental car that was parked in a fire zone.       See N.T. Suppression

Hearing, 8/15/19, at 7-8. After waking Brooks, frisking him, and feeling two

cellphones in Brooks’s pocket, Officer Gamber asked why Brooks was in the

area. See id. at 12-13. While Brooks indicated he was going to visit his

grandmother, he was not able to give his grandmother’s address or point out

her home.    See id. at 13-14.     During this interaction, the officer noticed

Brooks was wearing an expensive watch. See id. at 12. At the suppression

hearing, the officer summarized his suspicions as follows:

      His story didn’t add up. It didn’t make sense what he was doing
      in the area. He wasn’t -- gave me -- able to . . . give me a straight
      answer to where his grandmother lived. I thought it was odd that
      he would visit a grandparent or someone of that age at 3:00 in
      the morning. It was a high crime area. He had multiple cell
      phones on his person. He had a very expensive watch. It was a
      rental car. All these details lead me to believe that he wasn’t
      being truthful with me and there was something more to what was
      going on than he was leading on.

N.T., Suppression Hearing, 8/15/19, at 16-17. Officer Gamber testified that

he only identified Brooks after the three backup officers arrived. See id. at

14.

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      Following our review, we conclude that Brooks’s argument that Officer

Gamber lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him after determining he was

not intoxicated merits no relief. Brooks’s attempt to limit the scope of the

investigative detention and the facts obtained by Officer Gamber is too

narrow. Having come upon Brooks asleep in a running car, illegally parked in

a fire zone at 3:00 a.m. in a high crime area, Officer Gamber had an

objectively reasonable basis to briefly detain and question Brooks to confirm

his identity, determine why he was in the area and his possible travels, in

addition to his possible level of intoxication. Moreover, when assessing the

totality of the circumstances, this Court will not separate out the information

obtained during a lawful interaction when determining reasonable suspicion

continued to exist to continue or re-initiate an investigative detention. See

In Interest of A.A., 195 A.3d at 910. Thus, Brooks’s argument contravenes

the proper application of the totality of the circumstances test and fails to

demonstrate that Officer Gamber lacked reasonable suspicion to briefly detain

and question him about the reasons for his sleeping in his car.

      Our final consideration in assessing the trial court’s suppression ruling

is whether Brooks’s consent was voluntary. See Valdivia, 195 A.3d at 862.

Although we have concluded that Brooks was subject to an investigatory

detention, we agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth established

that his consent was not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied,

under the totality of the circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Cartagena,

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63 A.3d 294, 301 (Pa. Super. 2013) (noting that a suppression court’s legal

conclusion are not binding on this Court and that this Court may affirm on any

ground). The record shows that Officer Gamber and the three backup officers

were at the scene in full uniform when Officer Gamber requested Brooks’s

consent to search the car. However, none of the officers had activated their

emergency lights.    See N.T. Suppression, 8/15/19, at 14-16.         The three

backup officers also remained behind Brooks’s car at a distance of about five

to six feet. See id. at 16. None of the backup officers interacted with Brooks

or had positioned themselves, or their vehicles, to block or physically control

Brooks’s movements.      See id. at 28-29.       Officer Gamber testified that

throughout the investigative detention of Brooks, their interactions were

cordial. See id. at 16. Officer Gamber testified that after the frisk, he did not

physically touch or control Brooks’s movements or restrain him in any manner.

See id. at 15-16, 24. Although the officer and Brooks were standing face to

face, at no time did Officer Gamber draw his firearm or threaten Brooks. See

id. at 16. According to Officer Gamber, Brooks did not hesitate in giving his

consent and affirmatively stated that the officer could “search the vehicle.”

Id.

      Based on this record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that

Brooks’s consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. See

Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/22, at 6. Brooks’s general assertion that his consent

was invalidated by the nature of his interactions with Officer Gamber and the

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mere presence of three other officers alone fails to convince this Court that

the overall nature of a lawful detention was so coercive that his will was

overborne.8 Rather, there was ample support for the court to conclude that

Brooks’s consent was the product of a free and unconstrained choice. Thus,

we affirm the order denying Brooks’s suppression motion.

       In his next issue, Brooks claims that the evidence was insufficient to

prove his possession of the contraband recovered from the car. Our standard

of reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is as follows:

              We assess the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
       therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner. We
       must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the
       fact-finder to have found every element of the crime beyond a
       reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
       the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
       factfinder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
       established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
       possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
       may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
       and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
____________________________________________

8 Brooks also emphasizes that Officer Gamber did not advise him that he was
free to leave and did not obtain a written consent to search. While such factors
may weigh heavily, Pennsylvania law does not regard any one factor to be
dispositive when considering the nature of interaction or the voluntariness of
consent. Cf. Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427, 433 (Pa. 1999)
(emphasizing that although knowledge of the right to refuse a search is a
factor, a court’s focus must be on the totality of the circumstances). We add
that this Court has determined that a consent to a search was voluntary under
circumstances that could be considered more coercive than those present
here. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Benitez, 218 A.3d 460, 483 (Pa. Super.
2016) (affirming the trial court’s finding that consent was voluntary despite
the presence of multiple police officers); Commonwealth v. Rosas, 875 A.2d
341, 345, 349-50 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that Rosa’s consent was
voluntary despite the presence of two state troopers and Rosa being in
handcuffs following a traffic stop).

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      be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered.

Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 740-41 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(internal citation omitted), appeal denied, 279 A.3d 508 (Pa. 2022)

      A conviction for PWID requires the Commonwealth to prove that the

defendant “knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance

without being properly registered to do so, with the intent to manufacture,

distribute, or deliver it.” Commonwealth v. Dix, 207 A.3d 383, 390 (Pa.

Super. 2019); see also 35 P.S. § 780–113(a)(30).          Possession may be

established by the defendant’s actual or constructive possession of a

controlled substance.    See Bowens, 265 A.3d at 741.            To establish

constructive possession, the evidence must show a nexus between the

defendant and the item sufficient to infer that he had the power and intent to

exercise dominion and control over it. See id. “Dominion and control means

the defendant had the ability to reduce the item to actual possession

immediately, or was otherwise able to govern its use or disposition as if in

physical possession.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

      Brooks asserts that the Commonwealth failed to establish possession

because he was not in actual possession of the “narcotics that were secreted

inside of the rental vehicle” and the evidence failed to establish constructive

possession. Brooks’s Brief at 29. He argues that the trial evidence established

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that he was fully cooperative with the police, which is “more consistent with

innocence rather than guilt” because it “belies common sense that a person

who knowingly was in possession of contraband would freely and willingly give

consent” for a search. Id. at 30.

      Following our review, we discern no merit to Brooks’s argument. The

trial record established that Brooks was the sole occupant of a rental car and

fell asleep in the driver’s seat with the car still running.    See N.T. Trial,

7/23/21, at 29-30. The drugs, while hidden, were located underneath the

master switch assembly on the armrest located on the driver’s side door. See

id. at 34-35. The master switch assembly was already loose and portions of

the plastic bag containing the drugs was visible. See id. at 34-36. Moreover,

as noted by the trial court other evidence linked Brooks to the car and the

trafficking of drugs, including the presence paraphernalia consistent with

packaging drugs, as well as large amounts of cash and a customer list located

in a duffel bag that also contained Brooks’s identification card. See Trial Court

Opinion, 4/5/22, at 9; see also N.T. Trial, 7/23/21, at 38-39, 55, 122, 124.

Thus, there was ample circumstantial evidence proving Brooks’s constructive

possession of the drugs found in the driver’s side arm rest.            Brooks’s

arguments that no guilty person would have cooperated with the police or

consented to a search of the vehicle go to the weight rather than sufficiency

of the evidence. Thus, Brooks’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

fails. See Dix, 207 A.3d at 390.

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     Brooks’s third issue challenges the discretionary aspects of the trial

court’s sentence.   Before addressing this issue, however, we consider the

Commonwealth’s suggestion that the trial court’s imposition of an illegal

sentence renders this issue moot. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 16-17.

     This Court may address the legality of a sentence sua sponte and

remand the matter to the trial court even in the absence of the preservation

of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 986 A.2d 1241, 1244 n.3

(Pa. Super. 2009).     Where the trial court imposes a sentence of total

confinement under the Sentencing Code, the court must state a maximum

sentence and a minimum sentence, which specifies the date on which the

defendant, once jailed, is eligible for parole.   See Commonwealth v.

Basinger, 982 A.2d 121, 127 (Pa. Super. 2009).        The Sentencing Code

mandates that the minimum sentence imposed “shall not exceed one-half of

the maximum sentence imposed.”       42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(b)(1).    Absent a

contrary provision of law, the failure to comply with section 9756(b)(1) goes

to the legality of the sentence. See Mitchell, 986 A.2d at 1244.

     In the case sub judice, the trial court imposed a minimum sentence of

seventy-two months of imprisonment for PWID (fentanyl), and a maximum

sentence of 114 months. Because the minimum sentence is more than one-

half of the maximum and no contrary provision of law applied, that sentence

violates section 9756(b)(1) and must be vacated. See Mitchell, 986 A.2d at

1244. Furthermore, because the trial court imposed consecutive sentences,

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our decision affects the overall sentencing scheme. Therefore, we vacate the

judgment of sentence and remand this matter for resentencing. Because we

vacate and remand due to the illegal sentence, we decline to address Brooks’s

discretionary aspect of the sentence claim. See Commonwealth v. Conley,

--- A.3d ---, ---, 2022 WL 17098985, at *7 & n.15 (Pa. Super. 2022).

      In sum, we affirm Brooks’s convictions for PWID, but vacate the

judgment of sentence and remand this matter for resentencing.

      Judgment of sentence vacated.           Case remanded for resentencing.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

      Judge King joins in this decision.

      Judge Kunselman concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/23/2023

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