Court Opinion

ID: 9689244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:26:20.222377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:46.437092
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). I agree with Justice Brickley’s conclusion that leave to appeal was improvidently granted on the question whether MRE 404(a)(3) supersedes the rape-shield statute. I join Justice Archer’s opinion as to part i. Because there is no evidence on this record that law enforcement authorities initiated the visit which was primarily for diagnosis and treatment, MRE 803(4), I also join part m of Justice Archer’s opinion.
Levin, J. The signers of the lead opinion state they agree, for the reasons set forth in part kb) of *147Justice Archer’s opinion, that the exclusion of evidence of complainant’s "sexual history” did not violate Daniel James LaLone’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
The reasons given in part i(B) are that LaLone was able to introduce significant1 and compelling "nonsexual” evidence of the complainant’s bias and motive to fabricate and, alternatively, if there was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2
LaLone’s conviction is reversed on other grounds, as set forth in the lead opinion, and the cause is remanded for a new trial. The Confrontation Clause issue cannot, accordingly, be resolved on the basis of harmless error. If there was error, it should not be repeated at the new trial even if it is thought this error did not warrant a new trial.
While we agree, for the reasons stated in part m of the lead opinion, that LaLone’s conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered, we would hold that the evidence of conflict between LaLone and the complainant concerning her efforts to have sexual relationships with teenage boys is admissible at the new trial because a "reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression”3 of the complainant’s credibility had LaLone’s counsel been permitted to introduce that evidence tending to show her bias and motive to fabricate.
i
Part i(B) discusses Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673; 106 S Ct 1431; 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986), but *148omits reference to the critical language in that opinion establishing a standard recently repeated in Olden v Kentucky, 488 US —, —; 109 S Ct 480; 102 L Ed 2d 513, 520 (1988):
It is plain to us that "[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [the witness’] credibility had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.” Delaware v Van Arsdall, supra, p 680.
In Olden, the Court ruled that the exclusion of evidence of the complainant’s sexual relationship with a man other than the defendant was violative of the defendant’s right of confrontation.
Olden and a codefendant, both of whom are black, were charged with kidnapping, rape, and forcible sodomy. Asserting a defense of consent, Olden sought to introduce evidence that the complainant, a white married woman, was cohabitating with a witness who was black and married to someone other than the complainant. Olden contended that the complainant "concocted the rape story to protect her relationship with [the witness], who would have grown suspicious upon seeing her disembark from [the codefendant’s] car.”4 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision not to admit the evidence. While finding that such evidence was relevant and not barred by Kentucky’s rape-shield law, the court sustained the exclusion of the evidence on the ground that its potential for unfairly prejudicing the jury outweighed its probative value. The United States Supreme Court ruled that "[t]he Kentucky Court of Appeals failed to accord proper *149weight to petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ”5
The substance of what the United States Supreme Court considers to be the "proper weight” to be accorded the right of confrontation is indicated by the Court’s analysis in Olden. Relying almost exclusively on Delaware v Van Arsdall, supra, the Court said:
It is plain to us that "a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [the witness’] credibility had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.” Delaware v Van Arsdall, supra, at 680 ....
While a trial court may, of course, impose reasonable limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness, to take account of such factors as "harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that [would be] repetitive or only marginally relevant,” Delaware v Van Arsdall, supra, at 679, . . . the limitation here was beyond reason. Speculation as to the effect of jurors’ racial biases cannot justify exclusion of cross-examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of [the complainant’s] testimony.[6]
The Court, again relying on Van Arsdall, added that "we find it impossible to conclude 'beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the restriction on petitioner’s right to confrontation was harmless.”7 The Court said that the complainant’s "testimony was central, indeed crucial, to the prosecution’s case.”8
*150II
The complainant in the instant case acknowledged that LaLone, her stepfather, had slapped her face when he accused her of stealing a candy bar and called her a liar. She also acknowledged that she had problems with her parents concerning boyfriends and had been disciplined. She said she wanted to get out of the house because the rules were too strict. She also said she was angry with her father because he "hurt me,” by which she meant the sexual abuse charged against La-Lone.
The excluded evidence was LaLone’s testimony that he had confronted the complainant about telephone calls to teenage boys asking to give blow jobs and if they had rubbers, and that she had admitted the phone calls in front of the whole family. There was a big row. It was then that LaLone learned about the complainant being nude below the waist with a teenage boy, DJ. The complainant told LaLone "to get fucked, that it was her business if she wanted to get laid.” And then he backhanded her.9
Had LaLone been permitted to so testify, the jury might have concluded that the complainant was angry with him, not because he had "hurt” (sexually abused) her or because he had slapped her following an argument concerning an accusation of stealing a candy bar—^-as the complainant asserted—but because he was interfering with her efforts to have sexual relationships with teenage *151boys. Here, as in Olden, the excluded testimony tended to show that the complainant may have fabricated the charge to protect her opportunity to continue or have sexual relationships.
Some persons would not testify falsely, however provoked, while others might testify falsely if provoked in one manner but not in another manner. It was for the jury, not the trial court, to decide whether the evidence that LaLone was interfering with the complainant’s efforts to have sexual relationships with teenage boys motivated her to testify falsely even though the jury may not have been persuaded10 that the "nonsexual” evidence of conflict between LaLone and the complainant motivated her to do so.
Olden and Van Arsdall require examination of the excluded evidence to determine whether, presented with that evidence, a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the complainant’s motive to fabricate charges. Part i(b) focuses rather on the admitted evidence. Even if, as asserted in part i(B), there was significant and compelling nonsexual evidence of the complainant’s bias and motive to fabricate, the Confrontation Clause, as construed in Van Arsdall and Olden, requires the admission of the excluded evidence if a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility had the excluded evidence been admitted.
iii
In Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 311; 94 S Ct *1521105; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974), the defendant’s interest in developing on cross-examination an inference of bias, on the basis of the witness’ "fear or concern of possible jeopardy of his probationary]” status for a juvenile criminal offense, conflicted with Alaska’s interest in protecting the confidentiality of juvenile criminal determinations. There are striking similarities between the analysis in part i(B) and the error of the Alaska Supreme Court in Davis. The United States Supreme Court said in Davis, supra, pp 314-315:
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction, concluding that it did not have to resolve the potential conflict in th[e] case between a defendant’s right to meaningful confrontation with adverse witnesses and the State’s interest in protecting the anonymity of a juvenile offender since "our reading of the trial transcript convinces us that counsel for the defendant was able adequately to question the youth in considerable detail concerning the possibility of bias or motive.” 499 P2d 1025, 1036 ([Alas] 1972). Although the court admitted that [the witness’] denials of any sense of anxiety or apprehension upon the safe’s being found close to his home were possibly self-serving, "the suggestion was nonetheless brought to the attention of the jury, and that body was afforded the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the youth and pass on his credibility.” Ibid. The court concluded that, in light of the indirect references permitted, there was no error.
Since we granted certiorari limited to the question of whether petitioner was denied his right under the Confrontation Clause to adequately cross-examine [the witness], the essential question turns on the correctness of the Alaska court’s evaluation of the "adequacy” of the scope of cross-examination permitted. We disagree with that court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and we reverse. [Emphasis added.]
*153Part i(b) parallels the Alaska Supreme Court’s analysis rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Davis:
[O]n the basis of the defendant’s cross-examination of the complainant, it is clear the defendant was able to introduce compelling nonsexual evidence of the complainant’s bias and motive to fabricate. Therefore, the exclusion of evidence regarding her sexual behavior does not rise to the level of constitutional error.[11]
The Alaska Supreme Court had viewed the admitted evidence in Davis to be "adequate.” part i(b) calls the evidence admitted in this case "significant” and "compelling.” Notwithstanding semantic differences, there is no meaningful distinction between the analysis of the Aláska Supreme Court and that set forth in part i(b). Both proceed on the bases. of their own views concerning how much admitted evidence justifies barring a defendant from presenting other evidence that might persuade a jury of the falsity of a key witness’ testimony.
Part i(B) states that "[u]nlike the defendant in Davis, the trial court’s exclusion of the complainant’s sexual history left the defendant with several avenues to explore the complainant’s bias or motive to fabricate.”12 Defense counsel in Davis explored the witness’ motive to fabricate testimony through the use of avenues other than the excluded evidence. On cross-examination, the witness acknowledged that the property alleged to have been stolen by the defendant was found near the witness’ family home and that the idea had *154crossed his mind that the police might suspect him of the crime.13
Even if the proffered distinction of Davis were accurate, evidence that might have provided a jury with a significantly different impression of a witness’ bias is admissible although there are a number of other "avenues” available to the defendant to explore the complainant’s bias or motive to fabricate.
IV
State courts have held that evidence tending to show the complainant’s bias is admissible although the state has enacted a rape-shield law. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled that Davis required the admission of evidence of a complainant’s prior prosecutions for prostitution, tending to establish a motive to fabricate charges, that the defendant forced the complainant to engage in sexual acts in a parked automobile, related to officers who found the defendant and the complainant naked at the scene, to avoid a further prosecution for prostitution.14 A Pennsylvania appellate court held that Davis required that a defendant be allowed to present evidence of a thirteen-year-old complainant’s alleged sexual relationship with her brother to show that the complainant was motivated to fabricate charges as a means of punishing the defendant’s interference with the complainant’s incestuous relationship and as a means of removing the defendant from the home so that the incestuous relationship could continue.15
In other states, the defendant’s constitutional *155right to confrontation has been held to require, under Davis, admission of evidence tending to show that a ten-year-old complainant had a motive to fabricate charges because the defendant discovered the complainant having sex with third parties and threatened to report what he had seen to the complainant’s parents,16 of evidence tending to show that an underage complainant had a motive to fabricate the charges because she thought she had been impregnated by a third party and was afraid to tell her mother of her sexual activity,17 and of evidence tending to show that a fifteen-year-old complainant fabricated charges to punish the defendant for refusing to consent to her marriage to a twenty-four-year-old fiancé and for threatening to have the fiancé arrested for statutory rape and of evidence that she had on other occasions accused other family members of sexual misconduct in retaliation for threats to have her fiancé arrested.18
Other state court decisions noted in part i(B)19 cite Davis, but were decided without reference to the "significantly different impression” standard stated in Van Arsdall and applied in Olden.
In People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 348; 365 NW2d 120 (1984), this Court recognized that the concerns that prompted enactment of the rape-shield statute must in particular cases be subordinated to a defendant’s right of cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause:
The fact that the Legislature has determined that evidence of sexual conduct is not admissible *156as character evidence to prove consensual conduct or for general impeachment purposes is not however a declaration that evidence of sexual conduct is never admissible. We recognize that in certain limited situations, such evidence may not only be relevant, but its admission may be required to preserve a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. For example, where the defendant proffers evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct for the narrow purpose of showing the complaining witness’ bias, this would almost always be material and should be admitted. . . . Moreover in certain circumstances, evidence of a complainant’s sexual conduct may also be probative of a complainant’s ulterior motive for making a false charge. [Emphasis added.][20]
We would hold that the excluded evidence is admissible at the new trial.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Ante, p 129.

 Id.

 Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 680; 106 S Ct 1431; 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986).

 Olden, supra, 488 US —; 102 L Ed 2d 518.

 Id., 102 L Ed 2d 519.

 Id., 102 L Ed 2d 520.

 Id., 102 L Ed 2d 521.

 Id., 102 L Ed 2d 520.
Part i(b) recognizes the centrality of the complainant’s testimony in this case, yet concludes that "matters brought out on cross-examination” render any possible error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
*150Once it is conceded, even for the sake of argument, that there was constitutional error, it should be recognized that the error cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the reason stated in part i(b): "[T]he significance of complainant’s testimony to the people’s case is readily apparent. . . . [T]he complainant’s credibility was essential to the trier of fact’s eventual verdict.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 A more complete recital of the "sexual history” evidence that was excluded may be found, ante, pp 119-121.

 Because of the erroneous admission of the psychologist’s testimony which requires a new trial, it is unclear whether the nonsexual evidence of conflict, untainted by the inadmissible evidence, might have been sufficient to persuade the jury that the complainant testified falsely.

 Ante, p 131.

 Ante, p 130.

 Davis, supra, pp 312-313.

 Commonwealth v Joyce, 382 Mass 222; 415 NE2d 181 (1981).

 Commonwealth v Black, 337 Pa Super 548; 487 A2d 396 (1985).

 State v Jalo, 27 Or App 845; 557 P2d 1359 (1976).

 State v DeLawder, 28 Md App 212; 344 A2d 446 (1975).

 Woods v State, 657 P2d 180 (Okla Crim App, 1983). See also State v Howard, 121 NH 53; 426 A2d 457 (1981); State v Vonesh, 135 Wis 2d 477; 401 NW2d 170 (1986).

 Ante, p 131, n 22.

 The rule which I would abstract from these cases is that, irrespective of its prejudicial impact on the state’s interests, a defendant is constitutionally entitled to cross-examine the prosecutrix about prior sexual conduct with third persons if the witness’s responses, when considered with other evidence in the case, might be sufficient to raise in the mind of a juror a reasonable doubt as to whether the intercourse was consensual. [People v Patterson, 79 Mich App 393, 409; 262 NW2d 835 (1977) (Cavanagh, J., concurring).]