Court Opinion

ID: 9565958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:30:46.68614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:18.087633
License: Public Domain

*597McMurray, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Defendants Green and Payne, along with a third defendant (Chitwood) were indicted for the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault and mutiny (in a penal institution). The defendants were jointly tried. Defendant Chitwood was convicted of all three counts. See Chitwood v. State, 170 Ga. App. 599, supra. Defendants Green and Payne were acquitted of the armed robbery count but convicted of the offenses of aggravated assault and mutiny (in a penal institution). Following the denial of the defendants’ motions for new trial as amended, they appeal.
Defendants first enumerate error in that the trial court did not grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the general charge of aggravated assault when the elements of the crime are the same as the specific crime of mutiny (in a penal institution).
I agree with the majority in Division 1 that the trial court’s denial of this motion was not error. However, the defendants contend the trial court erred in not granting their motion to require the state to elect either the aggravated assault or the mutiny charge because the elements were the same and the exact same evidence was used to prove both crimes. Defendants’ argument is that the two convictions merged both in law and in fact and since they merged judgment should be entered only as to one count, and, as between the two counts, the mutiny count should take precedence over aggravated assault since it is a more specific legislative classification of the prohibited conduct. The majority has adopted this view and has ordered that the aggravated assault conviction be vacated. To this I cannot agree.
At the very outset the state by brief agrees with some of the defendants’ argument and concedes that the two crimes (aggravated assault and mutiny) factually merged, the mutiny count being the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Both counts resulted from a single attack upon a prison guard in which these defendants Green and Payne aided and abetted the defendant Chitwood to club the guard senseless with a metal table leg, thus the single assaulting act supports conviction of and sentence for only one crime. See Dotson v. State, 160 Ga. App. 898, 899 (3) (288 SE2d 608). The state contends that upon remand the trial court should be instructed to discharge the conviction for mutiny which merges with the conviction of the greater offense of aggravated assault. I agree to this view.
The defendants, however, argue that under State v. Edwards, 236 Ga. 104 (222 SE2d 385), the state could not prosecute under a general statute (aggravated assault upon a peace officer) wherein the legislature had created a specific statute covering the exact offense, in this instance, a specific crime delineated as mutiny (in a penal institution). The elements are the same in that the crime of aggravated as*598sault as here was with a deadly weapon upon the guard, a peace officer. The assault also was a specific crime charged, allegedly committed while the defendants were confined in a penal institution (mutiny). State v. Edwards, 236 Ga. 104, supra, was one in which the state was prosecuting the defendant for involuntary manslaughter even though the General Assembly had created the offense of homicide by vehicle. In that case demurrers were sustained, and the state appealed (a constitutional attack being involved). The Supreme Court reversed the trial court in holding the statute unconstitutional (homicide by vehicle) but held that the trial court “properly reached the conclusion that the defendant could not be tried for the offense of involuntary manslaughter” and reversed the quashing of the entire indictment.
Defense counsel also cites Johnson v. State, 130 Ga. App. 134 (202 SE2d 525), wherein it was held that a defendant could not be tried for motor vehicle theft and theft by taking because both crimes arose out of the same transaction. Therein this court pointed out at page 137 (2) (b) that motor vehicle theft differs from theft of any property by prohibiting a designated kind of conduct so that the conviction of motor vehicle theft would bar conviction under the general statute with reference to theft generally. At page 138 (Div. 3) direction was given to set aside the theft conviction (theft of the motor vehicle) as being barred by conviction and sentence for theft by taking, both crimes having arisen out of the same transaction.
However, we are faced here with whether or not mutiny is a lesser included offense than that of aggravated assault or whether or not the general charge of aggravated assault merged with the specific charge of mutiny. See OCGA § 16-1-6 defining an included crime as that “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the [greater] crime charged,” or the lesser included crime differs from the greater crime (aggravated assault) “only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.” The mutiny statute here, OCGA § 16-10-54, refers to a person in lawful custody in any penal institution “who assails, opposes, or resists an officer of the law or of such penal institution . . . with intent to cause serious bodily injury,” and provides for a less serious punishment than that for aggravated assault. It is quite clear that under the facts of the case sub judice the offense of mutiny was a lesser included offense than that of aggravated assault. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the general crime of aggravated assault even though the elements of the crime are the same as the lesser included offense of mutiny. I therefore cannot agree with the majority that the *599greater crime of aggravated assault merged in the lesser crime of mutiny.
I therefore respectfully dissent.