Court Opinion

ID: 9521992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:16:28.472026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:10.224918
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 19. concurring. I fully concur in the opinion for the court. I add only my view that Condition M should be modified to avoid the interpretation issues that have plagued its enforcement. Condition M has become part of the standard form probation conditions imposed in every case. It is, however, not required by statute, see 28 V.S.A. § 205(c)(1), nor on the list specifically authorized by statute, id. § 252(b). Thus, its use is entirely within the control of the judiciary.
¶ 20. As the cases discussed in the majority opinion demonstrate, the application and interpretation of Condition M have been challenged primarily in cases where the probation officer has alleged that the probationer engaged in “threatening behavior,” but the “behavior” involved has been primarily or exclusively speech. On the one hand, the prosecution argues that speech is behavior and, on the other, the defendant argues it is not. The cases have tried to find a middle ground between these positions, and the results are not always predictable.
*238¶ 21. It is clear to me that the need is for better language that anticipates the interpretation difficulties and defines more specifically the coverage of the condition. If we are to have judiciary-created standard probation conditions, imposed in every case, we must take more seriously our obligation to improve and correct them where our enforcement experience shows that improvement or correction is needed. Language clarification is a better course of action than regular appeals raising variations of the same question that do not lead to a comprehensive solution.
¶ 22. Wouldn’t it be nice if this were the last decision of this Court on the meaning of Condition M because Condition M is amended to eliminate the interpretation questions?
¶ 23. I am authorized to state that Judge Kupersmith joins this concurrence.