Court Opinion

ID: 9901590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 06:05:49.628807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:35.576593
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      November 21, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                     No. 362794
                                                                      Wayne Circuit Court
QUINTIN WASHINGTON,                                                   LC No. 18-006241-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and CAMERON and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In 2018, following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit
murder, MCL 750.83, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, felon in possession of
ammunition, MCL 750.224f(6), and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, second offense, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-
offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 20 years to 20 years and one
day for the assault conviction, and two to five years for each felon-in-possession conviction, to be
served consecutively to a five-year term of imprisonment for one count of felony-firearm.1

        Defendant appealed his convictions. We affirmed his convictions, but remanded for
resentencing because the trial court used an incorrect sentencing guidelines range.2 On remand,
the trial court resentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent prison
terms of 15 to 20 years for the assault conviction, and two to five years for each felon-in-possession
conviction, to be served consecutively to a five-year term of imprisonment for one count of felony-
firearm. Following his resentencing on remand, and after defendant filed a claim of appeal from

1
  Although the jury convicted defendant of three counts of felony-firearm, the trial court stated at
defendant’s sentencing that it was “collapsing those three into one” and the judgment of sentence
stated that two of the felony-firearm counts “are vacated.”
2
 People v Washington, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 30,
2020 (Docket No. 347440), lv den 508 Mich 952 (2021).

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the judgment issued on resentencing, defendant moved to correct an invalid sentence and to vacate
his convictions, which the trial court denied. Defendant appeals by right following his
resentencing, but he does not challenge his sentences. Instead, he challenges the trial court’s denial
of his postappeal motion to vacate his convictions. But we do not have jurisdiction to consider
this issue and thus we affirm.

                                    I. FACTUAL OVERVIEW

       In defendant’s prior appeal, we summarized the underlying facts as follows:

       Defendant’s convictions arise from the nonfatal shooting of Tavion McKnight in a
       Detroit neighborhood on the afternoon of March 21, 2018. The principal issue at
       trial was defendant’s identity as the shooter. The prosecution presented evidence
       that, shortly before McKnight was shot, he and defendant had both left a
       neighborhood convenience store. Defendant walked out of the store with Marvin
       Esmond, who knew defendant from the neighborhood and happened to see
       defendant in the store. Surveillance video from a nearby business, which was
       admitted and played at trial, captured defendant and Esmond walking on Whittier
       Street, and captured McKnight leaving the store, crossing Whittier, and cutting
       between two buildings. Esmond testified that as they were walking, defendant
       turned and ran across Whittier, and the video showed defendant walking away from
       Esmond, running across the street and along the length of one of the buildings that
       McKnight walked between, and then disappearing from view. Approximately one
       minute after defendant left Esmond, Esmond heard 8 to 10 gunshots; the video
       captured Esmond looking back, and Edmond testified that he looked back because
       he heard the gunshots. McKnight then ran back toward the store and collapsed in
       the middle of Whittier, having been shot once in the buttocks. McKnight testified
       that the shooter had pointed a gun at him and he ran; no one else was in the area at
       the time. McKnight was unable to identify defendant as the shooter or provide a
       description of the shooter, including whether the shooter was male or female, but
       he testified that the shooter was wearing a black jacket and a black hood. In
       contrast, Esmond positively identified defendant as the person who ran across the
       street, but testified that defendant was wearing a blue and yellow Wolverines jacket.
       At trial, the defense argued that defendant, who was wearing a blue and yellow
       jacket, was misidentified as the shooter, who McKnight described as wearing all
       black, and that the surveillance video only showed defendant “running across the
       street and disappearing behind the building.” [People v Washington, unpublished
       per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 30, 2020 (Docket No.
       347440), pp 1-2.]

        In defendant’s prior appeal, he argued that (1) the verdict was against the great weight of
the evidence, (2) the trial court committed various errors that violated his right to due process, (3)
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during trial and at sentencing, (4) the cumulative
effect of the alleged errors required reversal, and (5) he was entitled to be resentenced. We rejected
all of defendant’s challenges to the validity of his convictions, but plaintiff conceded, and we
agreed, that defendant was entitled to be resentenced because the trial court did not use the correct

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sentencing guidelines range. Id. at 10. Accordingly, we affirmed defendant’s convictions, but
remanded for resentencing. Id. at 12.

        Following resentencing on remand, defendant appealed by right from the judgment of
sentence on resentencing. Thereafter, defendant moved to correct an invalid sentence and to vacate
his convictions. Relying on our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v Peeler, 509 Mich
381, 395; 984 NW2d 80 (2022), defendant argued that his convictions were invalid because he
was indicted by a one-man grand jury and did not receive a preliminary examination before being
brought to trial.3 The trial court denied defendant’s motion, reasoning that his case was
distinguishable from Peeler because defendant had a trial and was found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury and thus he was not prejudiced by the failure to hold a preliminary
examination.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

      Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate his convictions
where he was indicted by a one-man grand jury and did not receive a preliminary examination.
We do not have jurisdiction to consider this issue.

        “[W]here an appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of
right in a criminal case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from
the decision on remand.” People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481; 522 NW2d
880 (1994). “[T]he scope of the second appeal is limited by the scope of the remand.” People v
Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435-436; 231 NW2d 649 (1975). Following a resentencing, our jurisdiction
is limited to issues arising from the resentencing itself. See MCR 7.203(A)(1) (“An appeal from
an order described in MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii)-(v) is limited to the portion of the order with respect to
which there is an appeal of right.”), MCR 7.202(6)(b)(iii) (“a sentence imposed following the
granting of a motion for resentencing”), and MCR 7.202(6)(b)(iv) (“a sentence imposed, or order
entered, by the trial court following a remand from an appellate court in a prior appeal of right”).
See also People v Gauntlett, 152 Mich App 397, 400; 394 NW2d 437 (1986) (“An appeal from a
resentencing is limited to the resentencing proceeding.”).

       In defendant’s earlier appeal from his convictions and original sentencing, we remanded
the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of resentencing.4 Defendant was resentenced,

3
  In Peeler, the defendants were indicted by a one-man grand jury and the trial court denied the
defendants’ pretrial motions to remand for preliminary examinations. Peeler, 509 Mich at 386.
After the defendants filed interlocutory applications for leave to appeal, our Supreme Court
reversed and remanded. The Court held:

         MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4 authorize a judge to investigate, subpoena witnesses,
         and issue arrest warrants. But they do not authorize the judge to issue indictments.
         And if a criminal process begins with a one-man grand jury, the accused is entitled
         to a preliminary examination before being brought to trial. [Id. at 400.]
4
    Washington, unpub op at 12.

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and he filed his appeal by right from the judgment issued on resentencing. In the present appeal,
defendant does not challenge the sentences imposed on resentencing. Rather, he attacks the trial
court’s March 2023 order denying his postjudgment motion to correct an invalid sentence and
vacate his convictions. Despite the label attached to the motion, the motion did not seek to correct
any sentence, but instead only challenged the validity of defendant’s convictions on the basis of
an issue related to the initiation of charges. Because the scope of this appeal is limited by the
scope of the remand, and defendant’s attack on the validity of his convictions is beyond the scope
of the remand, it is not properly before us. See Jones, 394 Mich at 435-436 (indicating that an
appeal from a resentencing is limited to the resentencing proceedings). We also lack jurisdiction
to consider defendant’s challenge to the March 10, 2023 order because it was entered after
defendant filed his claim of appeal. See MCR 7.203(A)(1).

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                             /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                             /s/ Sima G. Patel

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