Court Opinion

ID: 9843015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:24:31.786702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:25.431153
License: Public Domain

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with much of the majority’s thoughtful and well considered opinion. In my judgment, however, the majority underestimates the cumulative effect of the Government’s actions. When viewed in totality, I believe that the Government’s inclusion of the culpability rankings in the pre-sentence report constituted a breach of the plea agreement. I must therefore respectfully dissent.
*641I agree with the majority that the United States Attorney’s Office plays an important role in the preparation of complete and accurate pre-sentence reports. I also agree in general that neither the inclusion in the report of a Government’s version of the facts nor a culpability ranking necessarily constitutes a recommendation as to sentence. Plea agreements differ, however, as do the extent and importance of the Government’s contributions to pre-sentence reports. The important interests served by the prosecution’s participation in the process, and even the Government’s duty to provide information to the probation office, simply cannot justify upholding a sentence if the defendant reasonably interpreted the plea agreement to forbid the Government from contributing to the pre-sentence report in a particular fashion. See United States v. Cook, 668 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir.1982).
As the majority correctly points out, “[e]ach plea agreement must be analyzed on what the parties themselves agreed on.... The court cannot condone the Government accomplishing through indirect means what it promised not to do directly where the facts so demonstrate.” Maj. op. at 638 n. 1. In my view, this is a case where the Government accomplished indirectly through its contribution to the pre-sentence report precisely what it agreed not to do, i.e., convey the message to the court that Stemm should be sent to prison.
The record and the arguments presented to us make clear that the Government knew at the time of the plea agreement the role it would play in preparing the pre-sen-tence report. Stemm, however, was unaware that the Government intended to rank the defendants as to their culpability. Several factors indicate that Stemm’s misunderstanding did in fact exist and was not unreasonable: (1) different districts prepare pre-sentence reports in different ways; (2) Stemm submitted an affidavit asserting that even a former U.S. Attorney in Kansas did not know about the Government’s practice of ranking defendants; and (3) Stemm immediately objected when he became aware of the message the Government had indirectly conveyed to the court.
Where the parties have radically different views about the role the Government will play in sentencing under a particular plea agreement, this court has stated that “we look to what the defendant reasonably understood when he entered his guilty plea.” United States v. Greenwood, 812 F.2d 632, 635 (10th Cir.1987). The plea agreement in this case went much further than simply stating that the Government would make no sentence recommendation. It specifically prohibited the Government from making any recommendation as to any aspect of sentence whatsoever. It also listed a number of particular factors, prefaced by the qualifier “including”, that the Government promised not to address. The phrasing of the agreement suggests that the Government was limited in ways not specifically set out in the agreement. The Government also agreed not to oppose probation. A defendant entering such an agreement could reasonably believe that the Government was thereby promising not to take any stand on incarceration. In particular, under this agreement a defendant could reasonably believe that the Government had agreed not to convey its impression to the court directly or indirectly that defendant deserved harsher punishment than other defendants. To conclude otherwise would contradict our reasoning in Greenwood that a “plea agreement is not an appropriate context for the Government to resort to a rigidly literal approach in the construction of language.” Id. To me, the prosecution’s statement that Stemm was highly culpable is tantamount to a statement that he deserves punishment as opposed to probation.
The majority does not directly say that Stemm’s interpretation of the agreement was unreasonable. It does so indirectly, however, by relying on United States v. Michaelson, 552 F.2d 472, 475 (2d Cir.1977) (finding “frivolous” defendant’s argument that Government participation in the pre-sentence report breached plea agreement). The instant case, however, is distinguishable. In Michaelson, the Government agreed to make no sentence recommenda-*642tíon, and the defendant objected to the Government’s furnishing the probation office “with information the Government had as to the part each defendant played in the criminal scheme.” Id. Stemm has admitted that if the Government had merely promised to make no sentence recommendation and had simply given its information to the probation office, he would have no meritorious claim of breach. The Government, however, did considerably more here.
As I discussed above, this plea agreement is not fairly characterized as a standard “no recommendation” agreement. More importantly, however, the Government prepared a detailed statement of the facts that it knew would appear in the pre-sentence report, and it preceded the. statement by ranking defendants in order of the Government’s view of their culpability in the described scheme. The Government placed Stemm at the top of this list. By itself, I do not believe that the Government’s submission of its version of the crime constituted a breach of the plea agreement. In my opinion, however, the combination of the Government’s direct contribution of a highly incriminating statement of the facts and the ranking of Stemm as the most culpable defendant constituted an indirect recommendation that Stemm be sentenced to a prison term and that his sentence be more severe than the other defendants. It most certainly was tantamount to a recommendation that Stemm was not an appropriate candidate for probation.
I would vacate the sentence and remand with instructions to permit Stemm to withdraw his plea or to be resentenced by another judge based upon a pre-sentence report prepared in conformity with the plea agreement.