Court Opinion

ID: 9544267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:53:42.950896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:31.964986
License: Public Domain

*499O’Connor, J.
(dissenting in part). I dissent from the court’s disposition of the possession with intent to distribute charges. There is neither prejudice nor substantial threat of prejudice to the defendant that cannot be remedied by measures short of dismissal. In light of society’s “substantial interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and bringing the guilty to justice,” Commonwealth v. King, 400 Mass. 283, 290 (1987), indictments and complaints should not be dismissed unless dismissal is required to cure prejudice or the substantial threat of it. I would reverse the dismissal of all the charges against the defendant.
The court gives two reasons for its conclusion that the judge correctly dismissed the possession with intent to distribute charges. The first of these is that the defendant’s statement that the money found in his house belonged to someone else “made the prosecution privy to a probable defense strategy,” ante at 496, thus granting the prosecution an unfair trial advantage. The second reason is that the statement concerning the ownership of the bag “could toughen the Commonwealth’s bargaining posture and strengthen unfairly its case regarding charges carrying substantial penalties,” ante at 497.
I agree with the court that whether or not the money found in the defendant’s house belonged to him would bear significantly on the issue of the defendant’s guilt of possession with intent to distribute. However, it does not follow that the defendant’s statement to his lawyer that the money was not his, made known to the police, advanced the Commonwealth’s case in the slightest degree. The defendant was caught with $31,000 cash and drugs in a bag together with other drugs in his home. Faced with this fact, the defendant at trial could either attempt an explanation, consistent with innocence, of why his $31,000 Was in the bag, or he could deny that the $31,000 was his. A prosecutor with less than even minimal experience would surely have anticipated and been ready for both defenses. The interception of the defendant’s statement exposed no secret strategy. Practically speaking, it conferred no advantage on the Commonwealth.
*500The court’s expressed concern about possible consequences to the defendant in plea bargaining negotiations is equally unfounded. The prosecution’s “knowledge of a possible third party offender” is said to possibly “toughen the Commonwealth’s bargaining posture and strengthen unfairly its case . . ante at 497. The way in which the defendant’s exculpatory statement might enable the prosecution to toughen its bargaining posture is neither apparent nor explained by the court. The police found over $31,000 and drugs in the defendant’s home. In such circumstances, the possibility of third party involvement was manifest. The defendant’s statement divulged no clues not already obvious. It conferred no plea bargaining advantage on the prosecution.
The District Court judge expressed concern about the availability of the recorded statement to assist the prosecutor’s impeachment of the defendant should he testify. There is a simple remedy for that perceived problem, and it falls far short of dismissing the complaints. As the court said in Commonwealth v. Hine, 393 Mass. 564, 573 (1984), judicial responses should be limited to truly remedial measures. The proper judicial response to the judge’s concern is an order prohibiting the prosecution from using the tape to impeach the defendant or for any other purpose.
The judge concluded that Sergeant Lamb’s future testimony has been tainted by his private viewing of the tape. An appropriate suppression order, not the dismissal of complaints, is the correct remedy. With the suppression of tainted evidence, the defendant’s right “to obtain a fair trial after, and in light of, the impropriety,” Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 312-313 (1984), would be assured.
The court does not purport to base its affirmance of the dismissal of the complaints charging possession with intent to distribute on the egregiousness of the police misconduct alone. Instead, the court concludes, contrary to my view, that the police misconduct prejudiced or substantially threatened to prejudice the defendant, and that, therefore, the complaints were properly dismissed. Nevertheless, the court’s opinion contains dicta suggesting that egregious prosecutorial miscon*501duct may sometimes necessitate dismissal even in the absence of prejudice. Ante at 498. I disagree.
In Commonwealth v. King, 400 Mass. 283, 292 (1987), the court said, “It may be that, in the absence of prejudice or substantial threat of prejudice, an indictment should never be dismissed.” It is my view, consistent with that observation in King, that dismissal in the absence of prejudice is never an appropriate remedy. Dismissal in the absence of prejudice ignores the fact that “judicial responses should be limited to truly remedial, and not punitive, measures . . . .” Commonwealth v. Hine, supra at 573. A dismissal of criminal charges not needed to remedy prejudice cannot properly be termed “remedial.” Furthermore, the enhanced deterrence provided by such a rule compared to a rule based on prejudice is minimal, see Commonwealth v. King, supra at 292 n.4. Most importantly, such minimal deterrence does not justify dismissal of charges when balanced against the strong public interest in prosecuting suspects and punishing the guilty. Id. at 290.
The standard under art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights should conform to that enunciated by a unanimous Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981), under the Sixth Amendment: “Our approach has thus been to identify and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial .... More particularly, absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate . . . .”
There are other remedies for police misconduct that do not “needlessly frustrate law enforcement and the public interests in that sphere,” such as civil remedies and internal police discipline. Commonwealth v. Hine, supra at 573. I respectfully dissent from the court’s disposition of the possession with intent to distribute charges.