Court Opinion

ID: 9705479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:08:40.439254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:11.751177
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREEN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the decision of the majority to affirm the portion of the judgment of the circuit court dismissing counts I through V of the complaint and to reverse the portion of the judgment dismissing count VIL I cannot agree that counts VI and VIII, based upon violations of Illinois Commerce Commission rules, state a cause of action. Accordingly, I dissent from the decision to reverse the portion of the judgment dismissing those counts. My disagreement with the majority stems from their conclusion that allegations of violations of various safety rules of the Illinois Commerce Commission constitute allegations of negligence on the part of B&O which could be a proximate cause of the collision of the vehicle with the railroad car. The majority correctly sets forth that an injured party cannot recover for a defendant’s violation of a safety rule unless: (1) the violation proximately caused plaintiff’s injury; (2) plaintiff belonged to a class of persons whom the rule was intended to protect from injury; and (3) the kind of injury suffered by plaintiff was the kind of injury which the rule sought to prevent. Logic defies any conclusion that any of the safety rules alleged were enacted with any thought of avoiding collision of motor vehicles with stopped trains or that any violation of these rules could be a proximate cause of any such collision. Requirements as to the level of tracks in relation to the level of the roadway at a crossing or requirements as to the slope of the approaches to a crossing are logically enacted to make the crossing easier upon the vehicle, to prevent the vehicle from becoming struck on the tracks, to enable the driver of the vehicle to cross the tracks more quickly and, in the case of the grade of the approach, to give the driver a better view up and down the tracks before crossing. No indication has been given that the purpose of either of the regulations was to prevent an approaching driver from failing to see an encroaching railroad car because the driver might see light by looking under the car and assume that the crossing was free. Actually, a steeper grade at the crossing would cause the driver to slow down and would aid in the stopping of the vehicle prior to contact with the railroad car. Similarly, requirements as to the width of the crossing or as to the necessity of having a desirable lateral view at the crossing could not have been enacted to deter a collision between an approaching vehicle and a railroad car blocking the crossing. Either a narrow crossing or one with a bad view would tend to slow the driver of the approaching vehicle and tend to make a collision less likely. It is inconceivable that a driver would come up to a crossing on a dark night and, because of an impaired lateral view, fail to slow down and fail to see a vehicle directly ahead. The issues of the rule violations are red herrings. The issues in the case are: (1) whether the B&O was negligent in leaving the railroad car in the crossing under the illumination then present; (2) whether B&O was negligent in starting the train after the collision; and (3) the extent to which an award, if any, should be reduced because of contributory negligence of the driver, if any. The trial court properly dismissed counts VI and VIII. I would affirm that ruling.