Court Opinion

ID: 9955760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 14:15:02.029653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:20.199186
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                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2022-CA-0454-MR

DEQONTAY L. DUNNAWAY                                          APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE JOHN DAVID SIMCOE, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 19-CR-00123

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                        APPELLEE

                                  OPINION
                                 AFFIRMING

                                ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, GOODWINE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: DeQontay L. Dunnaway, pro se, appeals the Hardin Circuit

Court’s March 25, 2022, Order denying him Kentucky Rules of Criminal

Procedure (RCr) 11.42 relief. We affirm.
                                  BACKGROUND

             In September of 2019, following a jury trial in the Hardin Circuit

Court, Dunnaway was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first

degree, first offense, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree

(PFO1). He was sentenced to twenty-years’ imprisonment and filed a matter of

right appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court. His conviction was affirmed by a

Memorandum Opinion of the Supreme Court rendered January 21, 2021. Therein,

the Supreme Court summarized the pertinent facts as follows:

                    On January 27, 2019, Kentucky State Police
             Trooper John Adams effected a traffic stop on a vehicle
             operated by Dunnaway for speeding and improper lane
             usage. Trooper Adams detected the smell of burnt
             marijuana as he approached the vehicle. Dunnaway was
             asked to exit the vehicle and accompany Trooper Adams
             to his cruiser. Upon questioning, Trooper Adams learned
             Dunnaway did not have a valid operator’s license and the
             vehicle had been rented by Dunnaway’s passenger, Adria
             Shouse, two days earlier. Dunnaway refused Trooper
             Adams’ request to search the vehicle.

                    While Trooper Adams and Dunnaway were sitting
             in the cruiser, Trooper Richard Ellis arrived on scene and
             approached the vehicle to speak with Shouse. Trooper
             Ellis smelled burnt marijuana and noticed an open
             alcoholic beverage container in the vehicle. Shouse
             denied smoking marijuana and refused a request to
             search the vehicle.

                   Dunnaway and Shouse gave inconsistent stories
             about their travels. Dunnaway was evasive in answering
             some of the Troopers’ questions and he became nervous
             and agitated when pressed about marijuana usage. Based

                                          -2-
            on their observations and belief contraband was in the
            vehicle, the Troopers executed a warrantless search and
            located a black bag behind the driver’s seat. Within the
            black bag was a sealed bag containing approximately 220
            grams of cocaine and another bag containing 499 pills
            which appeared to be ecstasy and several of which tested
            positive for methamphetamine. Dunnaway and Shouse
            were both arrested and Dunnaway admitted the drugs
            belonged to him.

                   Dunnaway was indicted for trafficking in a
            controlled substance (cocaine), first degree, second or
            subsequent offense, trafficking in a controlled substance
            (ecstasy, greater than ten dosage units), second degree,
            second or subsequent offense, and PFO I. Dunnaway
            filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized,
            asserting the warrantless search of the rented vehicle was
            improper and did not fall within an exception to the
            warrant requirement and further, that the roadside
            detention was improperly extended beyond the time
            necessary to issue the appropriate traffic citations.
            Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. A
            subsequent motion to set aside or vacate the order
            denying suppression was likewise denied.

                   ....

                   During trial, the Commonwealth dismissed the
            trafficking charge related to ecstasy and the second or
            subsequent offense portion of the other trafficking
            charge. The jury found Dunnaway guilty of the
            remaining counts and recommended a sentence of twenty
            years’ imprisonment. He was subsequently sentenced in
            conformity with the jury’s recommendation[.]

Dunnaway v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-SC-0730-MR, 2021 WL 234773 at *1-2

(Ky. Jan. 21, 2021).

                                       -3-
              On January 18, 2022, Dunnaway filed a timely RCr 11.42 motion,

arguing1 he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial

counsel had failed to: (1) challenge the length of his traffic stop by Troopers Ellis

and Adams; and (2) communicate his acceptance of a plea offer from the

Commonwealth prior to the offer’s deadline. The circuit court denied his motion

without granting him an evidentiary hearing. Additional facts will be discussed in

the course of our analysis. This appeal follows.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              Every defendant is entitled to reasonably effective, but not necessarily

errorless, counsel. Fegley v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Ky. App.

2011). In evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must

show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense as articulated in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This standard applies equally

when defendants allege they declined a plea offer in favor of going to trial, based

on counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Osborne v. Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 860,

864 (Ky. App. 1998).

1
  In his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion, DeQontay Dunnaway also
argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that certain items the troopers
testified were found in his vehicle (a cigarillo and a container of alcohol) should have been
collected and preserved as evidence. The circuit court rejected this argument, and Dunnaway has
abandoned it on appeal.

                                             -4-
              Under Strickland, the movant must first prove his counsel’s

performance was deficient by demonstrating counsel’s representation “fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness” such that “counsel was not functioning as

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment[.]” Commonwealth v. Tamme,

83 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ky. 2002). Second, the movant must prove counsel’s

“deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Our

review proceeds accordingly.

                                       ANALYSIS

              On appeal, Dunnaway argues the circuit court erred in rejecting both

of his claims of ineffective assistance set forth above without first giving him the

benefit of an evidentiary hearing. However, it is only when the Commonwealth’s

answer to an RCr 11.42 motion “raises a material issue of fact that cannot be

determined on the face of the record [that] the court shall grant a prompt

hearing[.]” RCr 11.42(5). With that in mind, the circuit court committed no error

with respect to Dunnaway’s first argument. We quote and adopt the circuit court’s

analysis as set forth in its final order:

              Dunnaway’s first claim is that his attorney failed to
              challenge the length of his detention in a motion to
              suppress. This claim is not factually correct as his
              counsel did in fact, in a motion to suppress, request the
              Court to examine the length of time he was detained on
              the underlying traffic offenses. The facts heard at the
              suppression indicated that Trooper Adams was actively
              attempting to get Dunnaway’s operator’s license

                                            -5-
              information when Trooper Ellis approached the vehicle
              and smelled the odor of burnt marijuana. Roughly five
              minutes elapsed from the stop to Trooper Ellis’s arrival
              and approach of the vehicle. There is no ineffective
              assistance of counsel when an attorney brings a motion
              but does not prevail in that motion. The Court found
              there was no extension of the traffic stop in its order
              entered on August 22, 2019.

March 25, 2022, Order, Record at 234.

              We also agree with the circuit court’s determination that Dunnaway

was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding his second argument as

pertains to his counsel’s alleged failure to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer

made prior to trial. Some additional background is necessary to address this

agreement. The Commonwealth made a plea offer to Dunnaway on Thursday,

September 5, 2019, with an acceptance deadline of Friday, September 6, 2019, at 1

p.m.2 This offer, had it been accepted, would have resulted in a more favorable

outcome for Dunnaway; namely, in exchange for his unconditional guilty plea, it

would have permitted him a sentence of twenty-years’ imprisonment with a

possibility of parole after serving 20 percent of his sentence. Dunnaway’s counsel

2
  On page 13 of Dunnaway’s brief on appeal, he argues his trial counsel was also ineffective “by
not alerting defendant of a deadline in the first place.” Dunnaway provides no citation to where
in the record he raised this argument below. Moreover, Dunnaway did not raise this argument in
his RCr 11.42 motion. Accordingly, we are not at liberty to address it. When the grounds of the
argument are “different from those asserted in the court below, [they] are not properly preserved
for appellate review.” Daugherty v. Commonwealth, 572 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1978) (citations
omitted). “Our jurisprudence will not permit an appellant to feed one kettle of fish to the trial
judge and another to the appellate court.” Owens v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Ky. App.
2017) (footnote omitted).

                                              -6-
related the offer to him, but no plea agreement was ultimately formed because

Dunnaway, by and through his counsel, did not timely accept the Commonwealth’s

offer.

                The dispositive issue for this appeal is whether the record

conclusively demonstrates Dunnaway failed to unequivocally instruct his counsel

to accept the Commonwealth’s offer prior to when it expired. To that point,

Dunnaway alleged in his RCr 11.42 motion that he had instructed his attorney to

respond to the Commonwealth’s plea offer: (1) by agreeing to it, provided the

offer also permitted him a thirty-day, pre-incarceration “furlough;” or, in the event

no furlough would be permitted, (2) by timely accepting the Commonwealth’s

offer.3

3
    The relevant allegation set forth in Dunnaway’s RCr 11.42 motion was:

                In the final week before trial the Hardin County Commonwealth
                Attorney offered [Dunnaway] 20-year sentence with 20% parole
                eligibility under the subsequent offender standard. When offer was
                presented to [Dunnaway], he accepted the offer with a counter
                offer asking the court for a “Furlough” to get his affairs in order
                before turning himself in. He then alerted his attorney that if the
                “Furlough” was not accepted then he would still accept the offer.

                        Counsel after presenting this information to his client
                contacted the Commonwealth Attorney about said counter and the
                Commonwealth denied the counter. Counsel then contacts
                [Dunnaway] in which time [Dunnaway] tells counsel I still accept
                the offer. Counsel failed to meet the deadline set by the
                Commonwealth and attempted to complete the deal after the
                deadline in which case the Commonwealth denied the attempt.

                                               -7-
             The circuit court disagreed that resolving and rejecting these

allegations required an evidentiary hearing, basing its holding upon what the

Commonwealth, Dunnaway, and Dunnaway’s attorney (Peale) related about their

plea negotiations during the final pretrial hearing on September 9, 2019, the only

occasion when the plea negotiations were discussed on the record. The circuit

court explained there was no “meeting of the minds” between the parties because,

in its view, Dunnaway had only authorized his counsel to respond to the

Commonwealth by “accepting” its offer but adding two conditions: (1) the

aforementioned furlough; and (2) the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress evidence from trial. The circuit court held that the addition of

these conditions converted Dunnaway’s response to the Commonwealth into a

counteroffer, which does not qualify as an acceptance under principles of contract

law. See, e.g., Casner v. Oldham, 279 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Ky. 1955) (“An

acceptance must correspond to the offer at every point and conclude the

agreement.”).

             We will summarize what transpired at the September 9, 2019, hearing

prior to trial. There, Attorney Peale first broached the subject of the

Commonwealth’s plea offer by agreeing it had expired, and that “part of the reason

Memorandum in Support of RCr 11.42 Motion, Record at 200-01.

                                          -8-
there’s been these sticking points as far as having an agreement [was] because

[Dunnaway] wants a conditional plea preserving his right to appeal the pretrial

motions and rulings, and that’s not part of what the Commonwealth’s position is.”

(Emphasis added.) Peale then made a novel request of the circuit court to allow

Dunnaway to accept the Commonwealth’s expired offer, and to also allow

Dunnaway to enter a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the

pretrial motions and rulings. Dunnaway sat next to Peale during the hearing and

did not correct Peale – or the record – when Peale made these representations. The

circuit court rejected this request from the bench, explaining that because

Dunnaway had never entered any agreement with the Commonwealth permitting

those options, Dunnaway’s only recourse – assuming he still wished to plead guilty

– would be an unconditional open plea with no guarantees regarding the length of

the resulting sentence.

             Subsequently, Peale told the trial court that he needed to speak with

Dunnaway about a few matters, and the trial court took a brief recess. Upon

returning to the courtroom, Dunnaway addressed the court, insisting he “agreed to

the 20;” that “the only objection [he] had was to get a furlough;” and that “even if

[he] hadn’t got the furlough, [he] would’ve still accepted the 20.” Peale similarly

indicated Dunnaway had “instructed” him prior to the deadline “that the 20 would

be what he would be receptive to,” and that Dunnaway indicated that “again” when

                                         -9-
Peale spoke with him after the deadline had expired. Peale stated he believed what

he had related to the Commonwealth on behalf of Dunnaway prior to 1 p.m. on

Friday qualified as a “timely” “acceptance of the 20.” Peale stated that when he

contacted the Commonwealth at or about 5 p.m. on Friday, he did so merely to

“reiterate that Mr. Dunnaway would take the 20.” Further clarifying Dunnaway’s

position, Peale stated:

             It was still my understanding that the 20 was on the table,
             that the 20 was accepted by the defendant, and that we
             could ask the court, um, regarding the conditional plea
             and regarding the furlough subsequent to that. But that
             was, that was my understanding, that the 20 was still on
             the table.

September 9, 2019, Hearing, Video Record 9:05:53-9:53:20.

             Based on the hearing record, Dunnaway’s statement that he instructed

his attorney that he wanted to take the Commonwealth’s offer, or that he was

willing to accept “the 20,” meant something other than pure acquiescence. Rather,

his apparent desire – even days after the Commonwealth’s offer of an

unconditional plea had expired – was to make a timely (albeit piecemeal)

acceptance of the sentence the Commonwealth was offering, but to reserve settling

two other terms of his conviction for later agreement or the trial court’s resolution:

(1) his requested furlough; and (2) his request for a conditional guilty plea.

             Even if we were to grant Dunnaway the benefit of the doubt that his

request for a furlough was immaterial to whether he accepted the Commonwealth’s

                                         -10-
offer, the record conclusively refutes the proposition that Dunnaway instructed

Peale to agree to an unconditional guilty plea before the offer expired or at any

time thereafter. Indeed, in his brief before this Court, Dunnaway does not argue he

instructed his attorney to accept the Commonwealth’s proffer of an unconditional

guilty plea. Nor does he address the circuit court’s conclusion, as set forth in its

order denying his RCr 11.42 motion, that his failure to agree on that term – an

essential term – precluded his effective acceptance of the Commonwealth’s offer.

In short, Dunnaway’s failure to reach a plea agreement with the Commonwealth

was not because his attorney was ineffective in conveying his response to the

Commonwealth. Rather, as Dunnaway readily admits in his motion below, the

response was a “counter-offer” not an acceptance of the plea as offered by the

Commonwealth. Memorandum in Support of RCr 11.42 Motion, Record at 200-

01. Under these circumstances, counsel was not ineffective.

                                   CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Hardin Circuit Court’s

March 25, 2022, Order denying Dunnaway RCr 11.42 relief.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -11-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:             BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

DeQontay L. Dunnaway, pro se     Daniel Cameron
Burgin, Kentucky                 Attorney General of Kentucky

                                 Kristin L. Conder
                                 Assistant Attorney General
                                 Frankfort, Kentucky

                               -12-