Court Opinion

ID: 9466516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:18:22.567381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:46.926106
License: Public Domain

FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion seems to concede that Mrs. Harbaugh was denied a separate credit account (and, by implication, that Mr. Harbaugh was issued an unrequested card) but finds no violation of the Act, holding that the Act does not specifically require the bank to establish an individual account for Mrs. Harbaugh since she applied using the name “Mrs. John Harbaugh.” But it was not Mrs, Harbaugh who created the difficulties she encountered — it was the bank’s computers, some of which, at least, have not been programmed to identify Mr. John Doe and Mrs. John Doe as two different persons. Thus an application from Mrs. Doe (or Mrs. Harbaugh) causes a credit card to be issued in the husband’s name only. The statutory requirements are clear— there is no exception for good faith computer programming deficiencies. It is the bank’s obligation to comply with the law, making whatever adjustments in its application forms or computer programs necessary to meet the requirements of the statute.1
Aside from what seems to me to be a fairly straightforward example of a denial of credit, there are several aspects of this case that particularly intrigue me.
First, as the majority opinion notes, there were at least two alternative choices available to the bank when Mrs. Harbaugh’s application was received even given the claimed inflexibility of the bank’s computers. The bank could have established an account in the name of Helen Harbaugh (which it had learned was her name) or it could have written to her explaining the problem and asking for instructions. The bank, however, did neithér. Instead it established an account in the name of “John Harbaugh.” The majority seems to hold that the latter course of action was more in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the Act than either of the first two would have been. I strongly disagree.
Second, although the bank asserts that its practice of deleting courtesy titles “is in accordance with the aims of the equal credit opportunity laws to ensure that the credit granting process is ‘neutral as to sex’ ” (appellee’s brief, p. 14) the bank does use courtesy titles in some of its dealing with cus*1175tomers and indeed used courtesy titles in its dealings with the Harbaughs. The application which Mr. Harbaugh received in the mail had the name “Mr. John Harbaugh” already typed in. Mrs. Harbaugh crossed out “Mr.” and typed in “Mrs.”, signing the application the same way. When the bank (now omitting the courtesy title) could not obtain verification that “John Harbaugh” was employed by the Chicago Board of Education it wrote a letter not to “John Harbaugh” but to “Mrs. John Harbaugh” to inform her of its inability to verify her employment. Obviously at least some of the bank’s computers (or perhaps some of its employees) are trained to use courtesy titles and the bank apparently considers it appropriate to use them in some instances.
The third point that intrigues me is the suggestion that a married woman’s designation of herself as, for example, “Mrs. John Doe” is so extraordinary that a credit lending institution cannot reasonably be expected to process a credit application from someone who refers to herself in that fashion. There are over sixty million married or widowed women in this country who Emily Post and Amy Vanderbilt still insist are properly addressed only as “Mrs.” followed by their husband’s names.2 The strictures of etiquette are more relaxed today than they were forty years ago when the Harbaughs were married, but the older usage is not so archaic that a credit lending institution can simply ignore its existence.
Finally, I note that the majority is affirming on a ground not relied on by the district court and, indeed, not argued by the bank on appeal. As the majority opinion notes, the bank’s argument both in the district court and here has been that Mrs. Harbaugh was not denied credit because the Master Charge cards sent to the Harbaugh home with the name John P. Harbaugh on them were her cards, issued in her name (albeit without her courtesy title) and for her use. The district court, granting summary judgment to the bank, accepted this argument but also held that it would have been a violation of the Act if the bank had issued a card to “Helen Harbaugh” because one section of Regulation B (12 C.F.R. § 202.7(b)) requires creditors to use the surname (birth-given, spouse’s or combined) of the applicant’s choice. The bank prudently chose not to defend that aspect of the district court order and the majority has now, I believe with equal wisdom, rejected the only other ground on which the district court judgment rested.3 The majority nonetheless affirms the judgment.4
The statutory requirements are clear. Mrs. Harbaugh was denied credit in violation of those requirements. The bank should not be permitted to hide the violation behind its choice of computer formats. I would reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for entry of judgment in favor of the Harbaughs.

. I would not reach the question of what sort of adjustments might be required. I note, however. that this entire lawsuit could have undoubtedly been avoided if the bank’s application forms included a note that courtesy titles are not used on charge cards and suggesting, therefore, that applicants be certain that the first and last names on the application are the names desired on the account. Instead, as noted further, the bank sends out partially completed application forms which include the courtesy titles of the potential applicants.

. Amy Vanderbilt describes the use of “Mrs.” followed by a woman’s given name instead of her husband’s name as an “insult” to proper social nomenclature and an “indignity.” Amy Vanderbilt, Amy Vanderbilt’s Etiquette (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972, pp. 42, 544). Etiquette authorities would also insist, of course, that it is normally improper for a woman to use “Mrs.” in her signature (as Mrs. Harbaugh did). There are exceptions, however. To quote Emily Post
“The only times when a woman actually uses ‘Mrs.’ in her signature are in a hotel register, on a business telegram, on a charge account, or in a letter ordering a purchase from a store. And then it must be ‘Mrs. John Smith.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Emily Post, Emily Post’s Etiquette, 12th revised edition by Elizabeth L. Post (New York: Funk & Wagnails, 1969).

. It is, of course, irrelevant that Mrs. Harbaugh had the right to use the cards issued in her husband’s name. That right arose only out of her marital status. The Act gives married women the right to obtain their own credit, independent of their marital status.

. Unless, of course, one accepts the proposition that John P. Harbaugh is the name of Helen Harbaugh, and the cards issued to John P. Harbaugh are therefore her cards, it necessarily follows that Mr. Harbaugh correctly claimed he had received an unsolicited card.