Court Opinion

ID: 9832630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:04:29.091651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:49.771030
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In the first paragraph of the motion for rehearing defendants in error suggest that there is no jurisdiction to pass upon this appeal. This contention has not been heretofore urged and is based upon an Act of the Forty-Sixth Legislature, known as Senate Bill No. 69, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 1883a. It is deemed unnecessary to encumber this opinion by copying the provisions of that Act. Suffice it to say that by its terms it went into effect on the 1st day of January, 1940. Section 1 thereof provides: “No party who participates either in person or by his attorney in the actual trial of the case'in the trial court shall be entitled to review by the Court of Civil Appeals through means of writ of error.”
All parties to this appeal participated in the actual trial of the case in the District Court. Final judgment was rendered herein July 14, 1938. A notice of appeal was given, but same was not perfected. On January 4, 1939 petition for writ of error was filed and thereafter the record was perfected and filed in this Court March 17, 1939.
Article 5, Section 6, of the Constitution, Vernon’s Ann.St. provides: “Said Courts of Civil Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of their respective districts, which shall extend to all civil cases of which the District Courts or County Courts have original or appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law.”
Section 13, Article 1, of the Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”
It appears from the Constitution that the right of appeal from a final judgment is a constitutional right. See Eppstein & Co. v. Holmes & Crain et al., 64 Tex., 560; Pendley v. Berry et al., 95 Tex. 72, 65 S.W. 32; Pratley v. Sherwin-Williams Co. of Texas, Tex.Com.App., 36 S.W.2d 195. This right of appeal cannot be denied by the Legislature, but may be regulated by laws prescribing the manner in which such appeals shall be prosecuted. Edwards v. Morton, 92 Tex. 152, 46 S.W. 792, 793.
Defendants in error seek to sustain their position as to lack of jurisdiction by the cases of Nordyke v. Wright, Tex.Civ.App., 298 S.W. 910, and Plummer et al. v. Van Arsdell, 117 Tex. 200, 299 S.W. 869.
To our mind there is a distinction between those cases and the case at bar. In *797those cases the right of appeal was conferred by Article 2249, R.S.1925, providing that one could appeal from an order granting a new trial. In 1927 that article was amended, Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 2249 and the provision giving the right of appeal from an order granting á motion for a new trial was repealed. The jurisdiction to pass upon a judgment granting a new trial was conferred by the Legislature and was taken away by the Legislature. In the cases last above referred to the right of appeal from a final judgment was not denied. It might have been presumed that, even though the judgment granting the new trial was improper, the same judgment would be entered on another trial. Expense, vexation and delay might be occasioned, but a right guaranteed by the Constitution would not be denied. No real, substantial ultimate right was denied by the repeal of that law.
Steps having been taken sufficient to perfect the constitutional right of. appeal prior to January 1, 1940, it is our opinion that that Act does not operate to divest the jurisdiction vested prior thereto. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Barnes, Tex.Civ.App., 280 S.W. 275; Walker et al. v. Lyles et al., Tex. Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 315; Id., 124 Tex. 38, 72 S.W.2d 1113.
The motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is overruled.
^ The equities of the defendants in error as tirged with great force and clarity in their motion for rehearing and on the original hearing appeal to us with great force. However, we are bound to follow the law as we believe it exists. When a patent is issued based on a survey, the actual footsteps of the surveyor are binding and must be followed. This is true despite the fact that it was the policy of the State at the time.to dispose of this land according to a plat and plan, the plan and plat being in accordance with the use for which the land was then conceived to be reasonably susceptible and to be in accordance with the best interest of the State and purchaser.
The estoppel urged against the State is the patent in question. This patent conveys the land in accordance with the Wads-worth survey. In order to establish this survey questions of fact must be determined, for such facts are not established by clear and uncontroverted evidence.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.