Court Opinion

ID: 9747502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:18:34.464513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.170768
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
There can be no quarrel with the majority’s general statement of the law: If appellant was, as the majority contends, a mere gratuitous licensee with respect to his use of the loft, the decedent landlord owed him no duty to inspect the ladder leading to it. Kopp v. R. S. Noonan, Inc., 385 Pa. 460, 123 A. 2d 429 (1956).
If, however, appellant’s oral lease did include a portion of the loft, the landlord did owe such a duty. Pratt v. Scott Enterprises, Inc., 421 Pa. 46, 218 A. 2d 795 (1966). Upon this record it was for the jury to have chosen between these two hypotheses concerning appellant’s status, and for this reason I must dissent.
While the construction of a lease is ordinarily a question of law for the court alone, Lott v. Guiden, 205 Pa. Superior Ct. 519, 211 A. 2d 72 (1965), the resolution of questions as to the existence and terms of an ambiguous oral lease is within the province of the jury. Folsom v. Cook & Co., 115 Pa. 539, 9 Atl. 93 (1887); Leedom-Worall Co. v. Wick, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 243 (1913). The trial court is of course always free to withdraw a question of fact from the jury’s consideration and decide it itself when the evidence so dictates, but withdrawal of the question of the terms of the contested oral lease was not warranted here.
As the majority recites, appellant entered into an oral lease with Mary Luksa in September of 1965 for the use of a stall, tack room and pasture for a monthly rental of $15. Later in the same month appellant received permission to store his tack in the loft in order to avoid an argument with another tenant concerning *131use of the tack room. In October, after that other tenant had departed and the original reason for appellant’s use of the loft had ceased, appellant requested and was granted the continued use of the loft for the purpose of storing hay. Another tenant was extended the same privilege. Finally, in March of the following year appellant was injured while attempting to climb the ladder to the loft.
The majority apparently reasons that the loft could not have been included in appellant’s leasehold because unsupported by any consideration. In so holding, however, it overlooks long settled principles of property law. A parol lease which does not fix the term of the lease but which reserves rent at a specified rate per month will, without more, create a tenancy from month to month. Hollis v. Burns, 100 Pa. 206 (1882). Furthermore, the continuance of a tenant in possession into a new term is deemed a new and separate agreement requiring no additional consideration. Supplee v, Timothy, 124 Pa. 375, 16 Atl. 864 (1889). Thus, in September of 1965, during the original term of the lease, there was indeed no consideration for appellant’s use of the loft. He was at that time but a licensee “privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the posessor’s consent.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §330 (1965). However, it is possible, and the jury could have so found, that the continued permission to use the loft in the following months was intended by the parties as a renegotiation and expansion of the original lease. To be sure, Mary Luksa received no additional rental, but consideration could certainly be inferred from appellant’s willingness to rent from her in the subsequent months leading up to and including the month in which the accident occurred.
Oncfe it is accepted that the jury might reasonably have found the loft to be within appellant’s lease, there *132remains no other justification for the trial court’s compulsory nonsuit. There was sufficient evidence that a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the dangerous condition of the ladder and that appellant did not voluntarily assume the risk of its use.
Appellant’s case is far from overwhelming. Nevertheless, a jury issue was presented, and he deserved the chance of obtaining a favorable verdict or at least having the jury reject his claim.