Court Opinion

ID: 9811328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:17:21.907897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:25.590606
License: Public Domain

OPINION
SAM J. DAY, Justice.
I.Introduction
Appellant Roderick Nash appeals from his conviction for aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. In three points, he argues that the trial court erroneously allowed a magistrate to conduct jury selection and that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the verdict. We affirm.
II.Factual Background
On September 13, 2000, Nash knocked on Alexander Garza’s door. Nash and Garza had been friends for about two years. Nash told Garza that he and another friend wanted to talk to Garza about some business, so Garza and Nash went outside where Nash’s companion was sitting in the driver’s seat of a car parked at the curb. Garza got in the car and sat in the passenger seat.
The driver stated that he was “from the old school” and that he wanted to tell Garza something. He then pulled out a small revolver. Garza grabbed the gun, and a struggle ensued. When the man yelled at Nash to hit Garza in the head, Nash pulled Garza out of the car by his waist and neck and threw him to the ground. Nash then “stomped” on Garza’s left ankle, breaking the tibia and fibula.
Garza went to All Saints Hospital and was treated and released. Garza did not have surgery that evening because he did not have the insurance to pay for the procedure. He went to Tarrant County’s John Peter Smith Hospital a week later for surgery. A second surgery was later required because Garza developed an infection. At trial, Garza testified that he had been unable to walk on his foot for over two months. The jury was charged on both assault and aggravated assault.
III.Referral of Jury Selection to Magistrate
In his first point, Nash contends that the trial court erroneously allowed a magistrate to conduct jury selection in violation of section 54.656 of the Texas Government Code. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.656(c) (Vernon 1998) (“A magistrate may not preside over a trial on the merits, whether or not the trial is before a jury.”). This court has twice previously held that in order to challenge the trial court’s referral *537of voir dire to a magistrate, the appellant must have preserved error in the trial court. See Lemasurier v. State, 91 S.W.3d 897, 900 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd); McKinney v. State, 880 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref'd). Although Nash’s attorney objected before voir dire began, the extent of his objection was that “the defendant objects to the magistrate conducting jury selection. He asks that Judge Wilson or another district judge sit in her place to conduct voir dire.” In response, the trial court overruled the motion, stating that “[tjhis case has been referred to [the] magistrate by the district judge just for jury selection only. Anything else?”
To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(a)(1); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 265 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S.Ct. 1466, 143 L.Ed.2d 550 (1999). An objection is sufficient to preserve error for appellate review if the objection communicates to the trial court what the objecting party wants, why the objecting party thinks himself or herself is entitled to relief, and does so in a manner clear enough for the court to understand the objection and request at a time when the court is in a position to do something about it. See Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 504 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref d); see also Anderson v. State, 817 S.W.2d 69, 73 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (stating it is not necessary for counsel to specify the rule under which he is complaining, but only to so frame his objection so that it may be clearly understood by the trial court).
The specific grounds for Nash’s complaint against the magistrate conducting voir dire are not apparent from the context of his objection. While Nash was not necessarily required to state which statute or law he was relying on in support of his objection, he was required to inform the trial court why he believed he was entitled to the ruling requested. Nash provided no basis for why he was entitled to relief. Furthermore, because section 54.656(c) of the government code does not specifically state that a magistrate cannot conduct voir dire, we cannot presume that the magistrate might have been aware of the basis for the objection from the context in which it was made.1 Thus, we hold that the objection failed to preserve error on the complaint made on appeal. We overrule Nash’s first point.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second and third points, Nash argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault because there was no evidence of serious bodily injury. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we *538view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. When performing a legal sufficiency review, we may not sit as a thirteenth juror, re-evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence and, thus, substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1131, 120 S.Ct. 2008, 146 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000).
In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we are to view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Evidence is factually insufficient if it is so wéak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11. Therefore, we must determine whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the verdict or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Id. In performing this review, we are to give due deference to the fact finder’s determinations. Id. at 8-9; Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 136. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder’s. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 12. Consequently, we may find the evidence factually insufficient only where necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9, 12; Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
To make a determination of factual insufficiency, a complete and detailed examination of all the relevant evidence is required. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 12. A proper factual sufficiency review must include a discussion of the most important and relevant evidence that supports the appellant’s complaint on appeal. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).
Serious bodily injury means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon 2003). Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Id. § 1.07(a)(8). Because the penal code provides a different definition for “bodily injury” than for “serious bodily injury,” the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed us in Moore v. State that we must presume that the Texas Legislature intended that there be a meaningful difference- or distinction between the two. 739 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Whether an injury constitutes serious bodily injury must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 352.
In examining the definition of “serious bodily injury,” the Moore court explained that “protracted” means extended, lengthened, prolonged, or continued. Id. The injury in the case before us did not create a substantial risk of death or cause death or serious permanent disfigurement. Thus, for Nash’s conviction of aggravated *539assault to stand, the record must reflect legally sufficient evidence of protracted loss or protracted impairment of the use of a bodily member or organ, as required by the statute. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02. The relevant issue is the disfiguring and impairing quality of the bodily injury as it was inflicted, not after the effects have been ameliorated or exacerbated by other actions such as medical treatment. Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980), overruled on other grounds, Hedicke v. State, 779 S.W.2d 837 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
Although the State offered no expert medical testimony of causation, degree of loss or impairment of the function of the anide, or prognosis, Garza testified without objection regarding his injuries and prognosis, the subsequent infection at the operation site and his additional surgery, and his physical disability and missed work. Garza testified that after the stomping attack, he could not stand or walk and that both bones in his lower leg had been broken. At the hospital, he was told that he would need surgery and that it would take six months to a year for his leg to completely heal. During surgery, a plate, a rod, and some pins were implanted in his ankle. While recovering from surgery, Garza could not put weight on his left foot because it was too painful. Eight weeks after surgery, Garza had been told that although the bone had healed, his doctors had discovered that his ankle had become infected. As a result, a second surgery was performed, and the plate was removed. After the second surgery, Garza again had to wear a cast and could only walk with crutches.
Two and a half months after the accident, Garza returned to work, but had to use crutches to walk. Garza testified that he now wears a walking boot so that he will not limp. He still wears the boot because “I don’t do enough therapy or I haven’t gone to enough therapy or done the right things for it to heal, I would imagine.” On cross examination, Garza stated that he was not in a position to say how long “the injury is going to be” because he is not a doctor and that he could not give a medical diagnosis regarding the injuries to his ankle or testify as to what the doctors did to him.
The State also introduced X-rays without objection from which Garza pointed out the fractures, the subsequent surgery, and the location of metal plates. Medical records from Garza’s emergency room visit to All Saints Hospital were admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit Two. His injury was described in the record as “a nondisplaced distal fibular fracture. There is a minimally displaced medial malleolar fracture. Ankle mortise appeal’s intact. There is a joint effusion.” Severity of pain at the time was described as moderate. The records show that Garza’s leg was splinted, he was given crutches and a drug prescription for pain, and he was sent home. Although the written instructions from the hospital did not schedule specific follow-up visits, Garza was instructed to “FOLLOW-UP WITH [HIS] DOCTOR IN 2-3 DAYS.” The instructions also stated that “[t]he typical broken bone requires only protection and sufficient time for healing.... The length of time depends on the location and type of fracture, and on the age of the patient. The treatment plan the physician has outlined for you is customized to your fracture and health condition.” Garza did not return to All Saints for further treatment or surgery because he did not have insurance to cover the expense. He had surgery a week later at Tarrant County’s John Peter Smith Hospital.
Garza’s fiancée, Dorinda McCoy, testified that she went with Garza to St. Jo*540seph’s Hospital for the initial treatment.2 He was taken in an ambulance, and she followed in her car. The emergency room personnel dressed Garza’s ankle ■ with a half-cast and wrapped it. McCoy testified that “[tjhey said if he didn’t get surgery within the next two days, it would start healing on its own and they will have to rebreak it.” The record contains no evidence of who “they” are. Garza had surgery at least a week later. McCoy testified that after the first surgery, Garza’s ankle became infected and a second surgery was required.
The injury to Garza’s ankle was not shown to have created a substantial risk of death or serious permanent disfigurement. The evidence shows, however, that Garza could not walk or stand after the attack; he had at least one surgery after the attack because of the injuries he sustained in the attack; he had a plate, a rod, and some pins implanted in his ankle during the first surgery; he could not put weight on his left foot after his first surgery; another surgery was necessary because an infection developed; after his second surgery, he had to have a cast put on and use crutches to walk for an unspecified length of time; he could not return to work for two and a half months and had to use crutches to walk when he returned to work; and he currently uses a boot to walk because of a limp. Applying the proper standard of review, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to demonstrate a protracted loss or impairment of a bodily member; thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to show serious bodily injury. Furthermore, we do not believe the evidence is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence. Consequently, we overrule Nash’s second and third points.
V. Conclusion
Having overruled Nash’s points on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
LIVINGSTON, J. filed a concurring opinion.
DAUPHINOT, J. filed a dissenting opinion.
CAYCE, C.J.; GARDNER and WALKER, JJ. concur in result only.

. Several courts of appeals have determined that “trial on the merits” commences after voir dire is completed. See, e.g., Thornton v. State, 957 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997) (stating trial is considered to commence when jeopardy attaches — when jury is impaneled — because it is at that point that the defendant is “put to trial before the trier of facts”), aff'd, 986 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Carpenter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997) (holding trial "commences” at the same point that jeopardy attaches), aff'd, 979 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Hinojosa v. State, 875 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.) (holding trial on the merits under code of criminal procedure commences at the time that the jury is impaneled and sworn, i.e., at the same time that jeopardy attaches).

. Although Garza testified that he went to All Saints first, McCoy testified that she thinks he went to St. Joseph's first, but she was "not positive.”