Court Opinion

ID: 9911157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 16:13:45.536095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:12.982009
License: Public Domain

THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2023 WY 124

                                                                  OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                         December 19, 2023

KRISTINA EILEEN CROY,

Appellant
(Defendant),

v.                                                                 S-22-0312

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee
(Plaintiff).

                       Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County
                          The Honorable Peter H. Froelicher, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Dion J. Custis of Dion J. Custis, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General;
      Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Jones.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers
are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming
82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in
the permanent volume.
FENN, Justice.

[¶1] Following a jury trial, Kristina Croy was found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. She appeals, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict. She also asserts the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed a juror
prior to deliberations and when it allowed the State to present an extensive rebuttal
argument after making a short initial closing summation. We affirm.

                                         ISSUES

[¶2]   Ms. Croy raises three issues which we rephrase as follows:

              I.    Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
                    verdict?

              II.   Did the district court abuse its discretion when it
                    dismissed a juror for not following instructions?

              III. Did the district court abuse its discretion or otherwise
                   deprive Ms. Croy of a fair trial when it declined her
                   request to restrict how the State split its time between
                   initial closing summation and rebuttal argument?

                                         FACTS

[¶3] Ms. Croy operated a small daycare out of her residence. On September 25, 2019,
an eight-month-old infant, MG, was one of the children in her care. MG’s mother
dropped her off at the daycare at approximately 11:15 a.m. Ms. Croy fed MG and put her
down for a nap. Before putting MG down, Ms. Croy placed her in a sleepsack with a
swaddle attachment. A swaddle attachment is a piece of fabric with Velcro pieces that
“look like butterfly wings on the back when they are stretched open[,]” but when those
“wings” are wrapped around the infant’s torso, they “restrict the movement of the arms,
[and] that sleepsack becomes a swaddle.” Ms. Croy placed MG in the sleepsack with the
wings Velcroed across the infant’s torso, restricting the movement of MG’s arms. Ms.
Croy’s employee left to go to lunch around 12:15 p.m., leaving Ms. Croy alone to
supervise the 12 children who were in her care that day. At 1:20 p.m., Ms. Croy checked
on MG and discovered she was not breathing. She instructed her adult daughter, who
was in the house but not working as a daycare provider, to call 911. The paramedics
arrived shortly thereafter, attempted to resuscitate MG, and transported her to the
hospital. Hospital staff continued resuscitation efforts, but they were ultimately
unsuccessful.

[¶4]   Because MG was a minor whose cause of death was unknown, the Laramie

                                             1
County Coroner was required to conduct an investigation. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-4-
104(a)(i)(H) (LexisNexis 2021) (defining a “coroner’s case” as one where the cause of
death is unknown); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-4-201(b) (LexisNexis 2021) (requiring the
coroner to conduct an investigation whenever she is notified the death is a “coroner’s
case”). The coroner conducted a parallel investigation with the Cheyenne Police
Department.

[¶5] As a result of the investigation, law enforcement officers obtained the following
information from the Department of Family Services’ employee who was responsible for
licensing Ms. Croy’s daycare (daycare licenser). Following MG’s death, at Ms. Croy’s
request, the daycare licenser went to the hospital to be with Ms. Croy. Ms. Croy told the
daycare licenser she put MG down for a nap in the sleepsack with her arms wrapped, and
she could see MG’s “fingers poking out from the bottom.” Ms. Croy demonstrated this
position for the daycare licenser with her arms and wiggled her fingers. The daycare
licenser believed this meant Ms. Croy had swaddled MG. Ms. Croy reported checking on
MG at least twice after putting her down for a nap, and on both occasions, she saw MG
had rolled or turned into a position Ms. Croy did not like. Ms. Croy repositioned MG,
but she did not indicate whether she had changed the swaddle attachment to free MG’s
arms. The final time she checked on MG, Ms. Croy found MG had rolled so she could
not see MG’s face. When Ms. Croy turned MG over, she found the infant was not
breathing.

[¶6] After completing her investigation, the coroner concluded MG died from
positional asphyxia as a result of being improperly swaddled. The State charged Ms.
Croy with involuntary manslaughter. Ms. Croy’s case proceeded to a six-day jury trial.
The jury convicted Ms. Croy of one count of felony involuntary manslaughter. Ms. Croy
was sentenced to five-to-seven years in prison, suspended in lieu of five years of
supervised probation. This appeal timely followed.

                                    DISCUSSION

   I. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict?

[¶7] The standard of review we apply to sufficiency of the evidence claims is well
established:

             This Court examines the evidence in the light most favorable
             to the State. We accept all evidence favorable to the State as
             true and give the State’s evidence every favorable inference
             which can reasonably and fairly be drawn from it. We also
             disregard any evidence favorable to the appellant that
             conflicts with the State’s evidence.

                                           2
Martens v. State, 2023 WY 93, ¶ 16, 535 P.3d. 891, 897 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Thompson
v. State, 2018 WY 3, ¶ 14, 408 P.3d 756, 761 (Wyo. 2018)). “[W]e do not consider
whether or not the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
but instead whether or not the evidence could reasonably support such a finding by the
factfinder. We will not reweigh the evidence nor will we re-examine the credibility of
witnesses.” Id., 535 P.3d at 896 (quoting Thompson, ¶ 14, 408 P.3d at 760). We defer to
the jury and assume they believed the evidence adverse to Ms. Croy because they found
her guilty. Id. (quoting Thompson, ¶ 14, 408 P.3d at 760).

[¶8] Ms. Croy argues there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict in this case
because the State’s expert based her opinion regarding MG’s cause of death on double
hearsay. Ms. Croy asserts a finding of positional asphyxia was necessary for a conviction
in this case, and without the expert’s testimony, the jury was left to speculate about MG’s
cause of death. The State argues this evidence was received without a limiting
instruction and could be used for any purpose. The State also asserts the jury received
other significant evidence surrounding the cause of death, including from Ms. Croy’s
own expert, all of which supports a finding MG died from positional asphyxia.

[¶9] The State’s expert, Dr. Kelly Lear, based her opinion in part on statements Ms.
Croy made to the daycare licenser following the incident, including that MG had been
swaddled in a sleepsack and Ms. Croy found MG with her face obscured. Dr. Lear
testified this information was “part of the key history” she needed to form her opinion
that MG did not have the ability to breathe because her face was obstructed by something
in the environment.

[¶10] Although Dr. Lear relied on hearsay, her opinion was admissible. We have
recognized the Wyoming Rules of Evidence (W.R.E.) expressly allow an expert to use
hearsay when forming an opinion, if other experts in that field would rely on similar
evidence. See Hayes v. State, 935 P.2d 700, 703–04 (Wyo. 1997) (citing W.R.E. 703;
McGinn v. State, 928 P.2d 1157, 1162–63 (Wyo. 1996); LP v. Natrona Cnty. Dep’t of
Pub. Assistance and Soc. Servs., 679 P.2d 976, 1004 (Wyo. 1984)). In this case, Dr. Lear
testified forensic pathologists often rely on statements from friends, family members, and
others who witnessed the events when attempting to determine the cause of death. The
record establishes contract pathologists, like the one who performed the autopsy in this
case, must rely on information from the coroners, who in turn receive that information
from a variety of sources. Thus, experts in the field of forensic pathology typically rely
on the type of hearsay utilized by Dr. Lear when forming their opinions. Further, during
the trial, Ms. Croy did not make a hearsay objection to Dr. Lear’s testimony or to the
admission of her report.1 “‘If evidence comes in without objection the jury may use it for

1
  We note Ms. Croy filed a pretrial motion to strike her report and preclude Dr. Lear from testifying at
trial. However, the district court denied the motion, finding Dr. Lear’s testimony satisfied the two-part

                                                   3
any legitimate purpose,’ and we may rely on it in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction.” Deephouse v. State, 2023 WY 37, ¶ 16, 527 P.3d
1261, 1265 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Neidlinger v. State, 2021 WY 39, ¶¶ 31–32, 482 P.3d
337, 346–47 (Wyo. 2021)). Dr. Lear’s testimony was substantive evidence the jury could
consider when reaching its verdict.

[¶11] The jury also heard other evidence pertaining to MG’s cause of death. Two
witnesses testified Ms. Croy swaddled MG before putting her down for a nap that day.
The jury watched a video, recorded by a camera located in the daycare, that showed Ms.
Croy carrying MG into the kitchen with the infant’s arms still wrapped in the swaddle.
Ms. Croy removed the sleepsack as she attempted to perform CPR. The jury learned
DFS regulations prohibit swaddling an infant without a doctor’s note, and even with a
doctor’s note, an infant cannot be swaddled once she is able to roll independently.
Multiple witnesses testified swaddling an infant who can roll poses a danger of
asphyxiation because the baby may suffocate if she rolls over with her arms restricted and
cannot roll herself back over. The daycare licenser trained Ms. Croy in safe sleep
practices, and Ms. Croy knew she should not be swaddling an infant who could roll. The
sleepsack itself contained warnings that it should not be used on an infant who could roll
independently. The State presented evidence MG was able to roll independently. Ms.
Croy told the daycare licenser she had checked on MG at least twice and found her rolled
or turned in a position she did not like and repositioned her. The daycare licenser
testified Ms. Croy “used a motion, like a turning motion with both her hands to show that
she moved [MG] back over . . .” on those occasions. The last time she checked on MG,
Ms. Croy could not see MG’s face, so she “turned her over” and that was when she
discovered MG was not breathing. Even Ms. Croy’s expert agreed it was “very
conceivable” MG’s death was caused by positional asphyxia.

[¶12] To convict Ms. Croy of involuntary manslaughter, the State had to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt she involuntarily, but recklessly, killed MG without malice. Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2021). “Recklessly” is defined as:

               A person acts recklessly when [s]he consciously disregards a
               substantial and unjustifiable risk that the harm [s]he is
               accused of causing will occur, and the harm results. The risk
               shall be of such nature and degree that disregarding it
               constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that
               a reasonable person would observe in the situation[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(ix) (LexisNexis 2021). The State presented sufficient

test for expert testimony established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S 579, 113
S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 469 (1993). Ms. Croy did not appeal that ruling.

                                                  4
evidence for the jury to conclude swaddling MG posed a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of death, Ms. Croy understood that risk and consciously disregarded it, resulting in MG’s
death. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict.

   II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it dismissed a juror for not
        following instructions?

[¶13] Almost immediately after the jury retired to consider its verdict, a juror identified
as Juror No. 1 informed the bailiff that Juror DN had approached him in the parking
garage the previous Friday evening and said something like: “I don’t think the State has
made its case.” The district court reported this incident to the parties and stated:

          Obviously that’s not in compliance with the rules that I’ve told
          them throughout the proceedings and not supposed to make up
          your minds until the case is finally given to you. So what I’d like
          to do at this point is bring [DN] in. He’s been separated in a
          different room. And ask him if that’s accurate and see what he
          says. And I think probably regardless of what he says, I will still
          excuse him.

The district court indicated it would be improper to allow DN to continue serving after
Juror No. 1 came forward to report the incident.

[¶14] The district court brought DN into the courtroom, and he confirmed he had spoken
to the other juror: “I said I’m still open about it, but I don’t know where I’m standing
kind of a thing, yeah.” He also confirmed he said something “similar” to he did not think
the State had made its case. The district court then admonished DN, saying “that is not
really in keeping with our rules that you’re not to make up your mind until the case is
finally submitted to you, I’m going to excuse you at this point.” Ms. Croy objected to the
dismissal of DN because he indicated he could still keep an open mind. The district court
excused DN over Ms. Croy’s objection, finding there was sufficient evidence to excuse
him because he had made up his mind to some extent, even though the court “repeatedly
told the jurors throughout these proceedings to keep an open mind.” In addition, the
district court was concerned by the fact that Juror No. 1 felt the incident was important
enough to leave the jury room and report it to the bailiff. DN was replaced by the first
alternate.

[¶15] Ms. Croy alleges the district court abused its discretion when it discharged juror
DN despite being informed the juror could keep an open mind. Ms. Croy asks us to
apply the same standard to this case that we do to dismissing prospective jurors during
voir dire. She claims that whenever a juror has formed or stated an opinion, the ultimate
question should be whether that juror can set aside that opinion. The State contends the
court properly dismissed the juror for violating the court’s rules.

                                            5
[¶16] We review a district court’s decision on whether to dismiss a juror for an abuse of
discretion. See Castellanos v. State, 2016 WY 11, ¶ 102, 366 P.3d 1279, 1306 (Wyo.
2016) (quoting Carothers v. State, 2008 WY 58, ¶ 4, 185 P.3d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2008))
(discussing the standard of review for dismissing a juror during voir dire); Benjamin v.
State, 2011 WY 147, ¶¶ 25–35, 264 P.3d 1, 9–10 (Wyo. 2011) (discussing the standard of
review to apply to a district court’s denial of a motion to remove of a juror made during
trial). Generally, a court abuses its discretion if it discharges a juror “without factual
support, or for a legally irrelevant reason.” United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1302
(11th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Register, 182 F.3d 820, 840 (11th Cir. 1999)).

[¶17] Rule 23(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure (LexisNexis 2021)
(W.R.Cr.P.) allows a court to excuse a juror “for any just cause after trial commences.”
Our rule is similar to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. “[W]e can
look to federal precedent interpreting similar rules as persuasive authority.” Adams v.
State, 2023 WY 85, ¶ 21, 534 P.3d 469, 476 (Wyo. 2023) (citing Pena v. State, 2013 WY
4, ¶ 48, 294 P.3d 13, 22–23 (Wyo. 2013)). While we have not expressly addressed this
issue, federal courts recognize “just cause” exists to dismiss a juror who “refuses to apply
the law or to follow the court’s instructions.” Abbell, 271 F.3d at 1302 (citing United
States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448, 451–52 (11th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v.
Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 631–34 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of a juror for
refusing to follow instructions and for lack of candor).

[¶18] In this case, DN admittedly violated the district court’s instructions by discussing
the case with another juror prior to deliberations. “It is not proper for jurors to discuss a
case between themselves when they are not functioning as a jury.” 89 C.J.S. Trial § 948
(Aug. 2023 Update). In addition, “[p]rejudging a case is serious misconduct by a juror
. . . .” 89 C.J.S. Trial § 942 (Aug. 2023 Update). DN’s comments violated the district
court’s instruction not to prejudge the case, even though he later claimed he was “still
open about it.” DN failed to comply with the district court’s instructions, giving the
district court just cause to remove him. The district court had factual support and a
legally relevant reason to dismiss DN. It did not abuse its discretion when it removed
him and replaced him with an alternate.2

2
  We also note Ms. Croy made no attempt to show she was prejudiced by DN’s removal. We have held
only prejudicial errors require reversal. See, e.g., Berry v. State, 2023 WY 75, ¶ 31, 533 P.3d 474, 483–84
(Wyo. 2023) (quoting Thompson v. State, 2021 WY 84, ¶ 28, 491 P.3d 1033, 1042 (Wyo. 2021))
(“Prejudicial error requires reversal, while harmless error does not.”); West v. State, 2013 WY 128, ¶ 21,
311 P.3d 157, 163 (Wyo. 2013) (citing State v. Spears, 300 P.2d 551, 557 (Wyo. 1956); Daniel v. State,
2003 WY 132, ¶ 15, 78 P.3d 205, 212 (Wyo. 2003)) (“[I]n order to warrant reversal of a conviction, error
must be prejudicial. Even when a constitutional error is involved, reversal is not required if we conclude
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

                                                    6
    III. Did the district court abuse its discretion or otherwise deprive Ms. Croy of a
         fair trial when it declined her request to restrict how the State split its time
         between initial closing summation and rebuttal argument?

[¶19] At the end of the jury instruction conference, Ms. Croy asked the district court if it
was going to impose a time limit on closing arguments. The district court stated 45
minutes was usually sufficient, but it would not stop counsel if they needed more time.
Ms. Croy then asked the district court that any time limit be “split accordingly with the
State’s main argument and rebuttal. Just to prevent the State taking more time in rebuttal
than the main argument.” The State argued it would be inappropriate to place such a
limit on the State’s rebuttal argument because rebuttal “is to address the points made by
the defendant[,]” and the amount of time needed for rebuttal depended on what the
defense said. After referring to its case management order, the district court indicated the
State had been allotted 45 minutes for closing argument, and the State could split that
time between its main closing and rebuttal argument in whatever way it chose.

[¶20] The State’s initial closing summation was limited and short. It spans just three
pages of the transcript. The State thanked the jurors for their time, asked them to apply
the jury instructions they had been given, and asked them to weigh the credibility of the
witnesses when reaching their verdict. The defense gave a detailed closing argument
challenging certain aspects of the case. The State’s rebuttal argument was much longer
than its initial closing summation. It spans 15 pages of the transcript. In its rebuttal
argument, the State responded to the arguments made in the defense’s closing argument.
The defense did not ask for surrebuttal.

[¶21] Ms. Croy asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State
to “make an opening argument as its rebuttal.” She asserts this was a violation of
W.R.Cr.P. Rule 29.1 because by waiving initial closing summation, the prosecutor also
waived rebuttal argument.3 She claims she had no way of responding to the State’s
lengthy rebuttal argument, which resulted in denial of a fair trial. The State contends Ms.
Croy has not cited any legal authority demonstrating the trial court abused its discretion
through its time management order. The State further asserts Ms. Croy cannot
demonstrate there was any improper content in its rebuttal argument, that the way it
structured its argument violated a clear and unequivocal rule, or she was harmed by any
alleged error.

[¶22] “A trial court’s decision to place time restrictions on closing arguments is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Sanchez v. State, 2006 WY 116, ¶ 31,

3
  W.R.Cr.P. 29.1. states: “After the evidence has been presented and the judge has instructed the jury on
the law closing argument shall be permitted. The prosecution shall open the argument. The defense shall
be permitted to reply. The prosecution shall then be permitted to reply in rebuttal.”

                                                   7
142 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Wyo. 2006) (citing Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.
Ct. 2550, 2555, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1975); Cole v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir.
1991)). “Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions
drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously.” Id.
(quoting Penner v. State, 2003 WY 143, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 2003)).

[¶23] Contrary to Ms. Croy’s argument, although the State gave a limited and short
initial closing summation, the State did not entirely waive its initial opening summation.
Therefore, no W.R.Cr.P. 29.1 violation occurred when the State gave a short opening
summation and lengthy rebuttal argument. However, we must determine whether Ms.
Croy was deprived of a fair trial when the district court declined her request to place
restrictions on the manner in which the State could divide its allotted time.

[¶24] Trial courts are afforded discretion in controlling their courtrooms, including
closing arguments in criminal cases:

               The presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in
               controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing
               summations. He may limit counsel to a reasonable time and
               may terminate argument when continuation would be
               repetitive or redundant. He may ensure that argument does
               not stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair
               and orderly conduct of the trial. In all these respects he must
               have broad discretion.

Sanchez, ¶ 33, 142 P.3d at 1143 (quoting Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S. Ct. at 2554)
(emphasis removed). The technique of reserving the bulk of the State’s closing argument
for rebuttal has been characterized by other jurisdictions as “sandbagging.” See, e.g.,
Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997, 1001 (Del. 1982). The issue of sandbagging is one of first
impression for this Court.4

4
 At least one state has found sandbagging may constitute prosecutorial misconduct. People v. Robinson,
31 Cal. App. 4th 494, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding prosecutor committed misconduct by giving a
perfunctory opening argument “designed to preclude effective defense reply” and then giving a rebuttal
argument that was ten times longer and “immune from defense reply”); Odom v. Miller, No. LA CV 12–
04141–VBF–SS, 2014 WL 4384651, at *5 (D. C.D. Cal. Sept. 3. 2014) (“a prosecutor commits
misconduct if he ‘sandbags’ the defense by giving a perfunctory initial closing argument followed by a
lengthy rebuttal”). Ms. Croy did not frame her claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct, so we will not
address this issue as such. Woods v. State, 2017 WY 111, ¶ 18, 401 P.3d 962, 969 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting
Snyder v. State, 2015 WY 91, ¶ 15 n.1, 353 P.3d 693, 695 n.1 (Wyo.2015)) (“This ‘Court will not frame
the issues for the litigants and will not consider issues not raised by them and not supported by cogent
argument and authoritative citation.’”).

                                                   8
[¶25] We have frequently discussed the significance of providing a defendant with a
constitutionally fair trial and protecting a defendant’s fundamental right to present a
defense. See, e.g., Munoz v. State, 2013 WY 94, ¶¶ 16–18, 307 P.3d 829, 834 (Wyo.
2013) (collecting cases). “Closing argument is ‘an aspect of a fair trial which is implicit
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by which the States are
bound.’” Bailey, 440 A.2d at 1003 (citing Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 204–05 (Del.
Supr. 1980)). “The purpose of closing argument is to allow counsel to offer ways of
viewing the significance of the evidence.” Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 24, 63 P.3d
875, 884 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 145 (Wyo. 1981)).
However, we place limits on prosecutors’ closing arguments designed to ensure the
fairness of the trial and prevent compromise of the judicial system. Id., 63 P.3d at 884–
85.

[¶26] In Bailey, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized a trial court has discretion to
govern the scope of the State’s rebuttal argument, but that discretion is not so broad as to
permit a trial judge “to oversee a blow to a defendant’s right to a fair trial via the State’s
sandbagging.” Id. at 1003. In Bailey, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that while
each case must be decided on “its own peculiar facts,” there are certain factors that
should be considered when determining whether a case should be reversed due to a
prosecutor’s use of sandbagging in rebuttal argument:

              whether a fair statement of the State’s position has been made
              in some manner in its opening argument; whether any waiver
              has been made by the defendant, either by his counsel’s own
              argument or by the failure to object properly and to preserve
              the point; and, lastly, a determination of the question of
              prejudice in view of all the circumstances.

440 A.2d at 1002 (quoting State v. Peterson, 423 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Mo. 1968)). Courts
are more likely to reverse due to sandbagging if a prosecutor “exceed[s] the scope of its
rebuttal by delving into matter purposely left untouched by defense counsel in his
summation.” Id. at 1003; see also People v. Rios, B293392, 2020 WL 241936, at *4 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020) (finding no reversible error when prosecutor’s rebuttal argument
was “a fair response to the theory raised by defense counsel during his closing
argument”).

[¶27] We agree with the approach taken in Bailey and find every case must be evaluated
on its particular facts. We have repeatedly recognized that “[b]efore we hold that an error
has affected an accused’s substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a conviction, we
must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the
absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused.” Black v.
State, 2017 WY 135, ¶ 13, 405 P.3d 1045, 1050 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting McGinn v. State,
2015 WY 140, ¶ 13, 361 P.3d 295, 299 (Wyo. 2015)). The factors set forth in Bailey are

                                              9
helpful to our resolution of this issue. In this case, there was no “fair statement” of the
State’s position in its initial closing argument. The State made no comment on any of the
evidence. In fact, the State did not even ask the jury to return a guilty verdict. This
factor could weigh in favor of finding the district court abused its discretion by allowing
the State to present a lengthy rebuttal argument.

[¶28] Turning to the second factor, although Ms. Croy raised the issue of how the State
could divide its closing argument at the jury instruction conference, she did not object to
the sufficiency of the State’s summation at the conclusion of the State’s initial closing
argument. Nor did she make any objections that the State’s rebuttal argument addressed
matters outside of those she raised in her own closing argument. Ms. Croy only objected
once during the State’s rebuttal argument, claiming the State was mischaracterizing the
evidence about how Ms. Croy repositioned MG. The district court instructed the jury to
rely on its memory of the evidence and not the attorneys’ arguments. Finally, Ms. Croy
did not ask for surrebuttal. This factor weighs in favor of finding the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to make its rebuttal argument.

[¶29] Lastly, with respect to prejudice, Ms. Croy has not pointed to any inappropriate
content in the State’s rebuttal argument. She has not demonstrated any way in which the
State’s argument exceeded the scope of the defense’s closing “by delving into matter
purposely left untouched by defense counsel in his summation.” Bailey, 440 A.2d at
1003. Similarly, Ms. Croy “has not pointed to a specific argument that [s]he passed-up in
reliance on the State’s closing summation[,]” nor has she “demonstrated how [she] was
prejudiced by [her] failure to make a particular argument.” State v. Miller, No.
9605003827, 1999 WL 167837, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 1999). She has not shown
there is a reasonable probability the verdict might have been more favorable to her if the
prosecutor had not been allowed to make a lengthy rebuttal argument. See Black, 2017
WY 135, ¶ 13, 405 P.3d at 1050 (quoting McGinn, 2015 WY 140, ¶ 13, 361 P.3d at 299).

[¶30] Based on the particular facts of this case, we cannot find the district court abused
its discretion or deprived Ms. Croy of a fair trial when it declined her request to impose
restrictions on how the State split its time between closing summation and rebuttal
argument.

                                      CONCLUSION

[¶31] The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The district court did
not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a juror for failure to follow its instructions.
Based on the facts of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion or deny Ms.
Croy a fair trial when it declined her request to impose restrictions on how the State split
its time between closing summation and rebuttal argument. Affirmed.

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