Court Opinion

ID: 9948790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:12:55.744939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:50.876421
License: Public Domain

03/07/2024
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                             AT KNOXVILLE
                                     February 13, 2024 Session

TRICAP CROSS CREEK ASSOCIATES LLC v. GABRIEL CORZO, ET AL.

                    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County
                         No. 22C1189     Kyle E. Hedrick, Judge

                                  No. E2023-00635-COA-R3-CV

This appeal concerns a landlord/tenant dispute. Tricap Cross Creek Associates, LLC
(“Plaintiff”), the landlord, filed a detainer action against Gabriel Corzo (“Defendant”), the
tenant, in the General Sessions Court for Hamilton County. Judgment was entered for
Plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”).
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Defendant
appeals, arguing that genuine issues of material fact exist.1 Plaintiff asks, pursuant to the
lease, for an award of attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. As Defendant never
responded to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed material facts, he failed to show a genuine
issue of material fact existed. We affirm. On remand, the Trial Court is to determine and
award to Plaintiff its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal.

    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed;
                                    Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R.
FRIERSON, II, and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.

Gabriel Corzo, Pro Se.

Vincent Jackson, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tricap Cross Creek Associates,
LLC.

1
 Plaintiff opted not to participate in oral argument, instead relying solely on its brief. Defendant appeared
and argued.
                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION2

                                              Background

      In October 2022, Plaintiff filed a detainer action against Defendant in the General
Sessions Court for Hamilton County. Plaintiff sought possession of the premises at issue,
unpaid rent, and attorney’s fees and costs.3 In November 2022, judgment was entered by
agreement of the parties in Plaintiff’s favor for possession and $6,043.27 in damages.

        Defendant appealed to the Trial Court. In February 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion
for summary judgment supported by a statement of undisputed material facts. Also
included among Plaintiff’s filings was the sworn affidavit of Angela Woody, Plaintiff’s
leasing agent. Plaintiff relied on the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act at Tenn.
Code Ann. § 66-28-101, et. seq., and Defendant’s alleged breach of the parties’ lease
agreement through non-payment. Plaintiff’s motion was set to be heard in March.
Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff’s motion by the time the March hearing date arrived.
The Trial Court, sua sponte, moved the hearing to April to afford the pro se Defendant
more time to respond. The hearing was reset to April 10th, 2023 at 8:00 a.m. When April
10th arrived, Defendant did not show up on time for the hearing. Plaintiff’s counsel was
present. The Trial Court waited 30 minutes to give Defendant more time to show up before
proceeding. Eventually, after Defendant still had not shown up, the Trial Court ruled in
Plaintiff’s favor. Defendant only showed up after the hearing. Defendant also failed to
timely or properly respond to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Defendant did file
some assorted documents, but only after the Trial Court had ruled. Additionally, the
documents still did not constitute a response to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed material
facts.

       In May 2023, the Trial Court entered its final judgment. In its final judgment, the
Trial Court stated as relevant:

                This matter is an appeal of an Order of unlawful detainer from the
          Hamilton County General Sessions Court dated November 10, 2022. That
          Order reflects that it was granted based upon “Agreement of Parties.” A

2
  Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides: “This Court, with the concurrence of all judges
participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum
opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum
opinion it shall be designated ‘MEMORANDUM OPINION,’ shall not be published, and shall not be cited
or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.”
3
    Monica Guardado was originally named as a defendant as well. She later was dismissed voluntarily.
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      timely appeal was filed with this Court. On February 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed
      the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. A hearing was set for March 20,
      2023 by way of a Notice of Hearing filed March 6, 2023. The motion was
      called at the Court’s docket for hearing on March 20, 2023. Both Plaintiff
      and Defendant Gabriel Corzo were present for the hearing. The Court noted
      that Mr. Corzo was pro se and, of greater significance, had filed no response
      to the motion. The Court, sua sponte, refused to hear the motion on this date.
      The Court explained to Mr. Corzo that Rule 56 required a response including
      a response to the Statement of Material Facts. The Court explained that these
      responses must be filed prior to any hearing. The Court then reset the hearing
      for 8:00 a.m. on April 10. The Court explained to both parties that it had a
      jury trial that would be ongoing that date so a special time of 8:00 a.m. was
      used. The Clerk entered the 8:00 a.m. time on the rule docket.

             On April 10 at 8:00 a.m., Plaintiff’s counsel was present – Mr. Corzo
      was not. The Court waited until 8:30 a.m. to hear the matter to give
      additional time for Mr. Corzo to appear. Mr. Corzo was still not present.
      The Court conducted the hearing at 8:30 a.m. The Court noted the time for
      the hearing, that no response had been filed prior to the hearing, and that Mr.
      Corzo had never called or emailed requesting additional time. After
      accepting all the material statements as being true, and after reviewing the
      record as a whole, the Court granted the summary judgment. Later that
      morning, Mr. Corzo appeared and brought with him certain documents.
      None of those documents filed was a response to Plaintiff’s Statement of
      Undisputed Material Facts. The Court notes here that, even had Mr. Corzo
      been timely, the summary judgment still had no timely response such that all
      statements of material fact were deemed admitted.

            Given that the Court, sua sponte, granted an extension to file the
      appropriate documents, explained the necessary filings to the Defendant
      Corzo, and based upon the record as a whole, the Court finds there is no
      material question of fact and that summary judgment should be granted.

Defendant timely appealed to this Court.

                                       Discussion

       In his brief, Defendant does not state an issue, as such, but says that “[t]here are
genuine issue[s] of material fact disputing the Pla[i]ntiff’s case.” Meanwhile, Plaintiff
raises an issue of whether it should be awarded its attorney’s fees and costs incurred on

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appeal. We are mindful that Defendant is proceeding pro se. With regard to pro se litigants,
this Court has stated:

              Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and
       equal treatment by the courts. Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222,
       227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Paehler v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, Inc., 971
       S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The courts should take into account
       that many pro se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the
       judicial system. Irvin v. City of Clarksville, 767 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. Ct.
       App. 1988). However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary
       between fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s
       adversary. Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying
       with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are
       expected to observe. Edmundson v. Pratt, 945 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn. Ct.
       App. 1996); Kaylor v. Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728, 733 n. 4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
       1995).

Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 62-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

       Defendant failed to include a statement of issues in his brief. Under Rule 27(a)(4)
of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendant was required to include in his
brief among other things “[a] statement of the issues presented for review[.]” Similarly,
“[r]eview generally will extend only to those issues presented for review.” Tenn. R. App.
P. 13(b). While we are mindful of Defendant’s pro se status, leaving out a statement of
issues is a major omission. A statement of issues is important because it alerts opposing
parties, and also this Court, to exactly what the appellant is arguing the lower court got
wrong.

        However, even overlooking the lack of a statement of issues, Defendant’s basic
argument—that genuine issues of material fact exist in this case—is without merit.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against Defendant. That implicates Rule 56
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. A party moving for summary judgment must
show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Plaintiff’s motion was
supported by a statement of undisputed material facts. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 requires the
non-moving party to respond to the moving party’s statement of facts in this manner:

       Any party opposing the motion for summary judgment must, not later than
       five days before the hearing, serve and file a response to each fact set forth
       by the movant either (i) agreeing that the fact is undisputed, (ii) agreeing that
       the fact is undisputed for purposes of ruling on the motion for summary
                                              -4-
       judgment only, or (iii) demonstrating that the fact is disputed. Each disputed
       fact must be supported by specific citation to the record. Such response shall
       be filed with the papers in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

In addition, “[w]hether the nonmoving party is a plaintiff or a defendant—and whether or
not the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial on the challenged claim or
defense—at the summary judgment stage, ‘[t]he nonmoving party must demonstrate the
existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in
favor of the nonmoving party.’” TWB Architects, Inc. v. The Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d
879, 889 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477
S.W.3d 235, 265 (Tenn. 2015)). Our standard of review on a motion for summary
judgment is de novo without a presumption of correctness, meaning we make a fresh
determination on whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 were met. Rye, 477
S.W.3d at 250.

       We have previously determined that a trial court may consider statements of fact
admitted when a non-moving party fails to respond to the moving party’s statement of
material facts. Cardiac Anesthesia Servs., PLLC v. Jones, 385 S.W.3d 530, 539-40 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2012) (citing Holland v. City of Memphis, 125 S.W.3d 425, 428-29 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2003)). In Holland, we stated that “the material facts set forth in the statement [of
material facts] of the moving party may be deemed admitted in the absence of a statement
controverting them by the opposing party.” Holland, 125 S.W.3d at 428. Furthermore, in
Simmons v. Harris, No. M2000-00227-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1586451, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Oct. 25, 2000), perm. app. denied Apr. 16, 2001, we determined that a non-moving
party’s noncompliance with Rule 56.03 by failing to respond to the moving party’s
statement of material facts can result in the trial court failing to consider the non-moving
party’s factual contentions, and the statement of facts by the moving party being deemed
admitted.

       In the present case, Defendant never filed a response to Plaintiff’s statement of
undisputed material facts. Thus, the Trial Court was justified in deeming Plaintiff’s facts
admitted. With only Plaintiff’s facts to go on, there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Under the admitted facts, Defendant breached the lease agreement by failing to pay what
he owed. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We affirm the grant
of summary judgment to Plaintiff. We observe further that Defendant did not show up for
the summary judgment hearing even though, according to the Trial Court’s order, the Trial
Court personally told him what time the hearing would start. However, even if Defendant
had shown up to the hearing on time, his failure to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03
meant he still would have lost.

                                             -5-
       Turning to Plaintiff’s separate issue, we consider whether Plaintiff should be
awarded its attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. Paragraph 33 of the parties’ lease
agreement provides: “In the event we incur attorney’s fees in enforcing this Lease Contract
against you or any occupants or guests, you must pay our reasonable attorneys’ fees and
other litigation costs.” In light of this provision, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. On remand, the Trial Court is to
determine and award to Plaintiff its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal.

                                        Conclusion

       The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the Trial
Court for collection of the costs below and further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion. The costs on appeal are assessed against the Appellant, Gabriel Corzo, and his
surety, if any.

                                          ______________________________________
                                          D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

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