Court Opinion

ID: 9750406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:56:57.909222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:09.363690
License: Public Domain

BLACKWELL, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that a defendant who commits a housebreaking while carrying a loaded handgun is not guilty under Article 27, § 36B(d) of “use” of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. I disagree and respectfully dissent.
While the defendant admits he carried a fully loaded and operational .38 caliber colt revolver during the housebreaking, the majority notes that the defendant did not actively employ this gun in the sense of force or intimidation; therefore, he did not “use” the gun as the legislature contemplated in § 36B(d). Instead, the majority holds that such action constitutes the lesser crime of § 36B(b), which makes it illegal to “wear, carry, or transport any handgun”, unrelated to any other criminal activity or use.
This conclusion is incorrect in light of the mandate of 36B(d), which penalizes “any person who shall use a handgun ... capable of being concealed on the person in the commission of any felony or any crime of violence as defined in § 441.” There is no ambiguity in the word “use.” If a defendant knowingly carries a handgun during the commission of a felony or a violent crime, it is unimportant whether he holds it in his hand, points it in someone’s face, or carries it in his pocket, belt or holster. The defendant is effectively using the handgun to accomplish his purpose, namely a felony or crime of violence itemized in § 441. By contrast, if a defendant unlawfully possesses a handgun without committing a felony or violent crime, the defendant is guilty of the lesser crime under § 36B(b). The majority’s holding blunts the statute’s purpose by allowing defendants who knowingly carry handguns during the com*546mission of a crime to escape the stricter punishment of § 36B(d) simply based on the chance that they are not confronted.
Federal law concurs with this interpretation of the word “use.” In affirming the conviction of a defendant for use of a firearm to commit a felony, the Ninth Circuit definitively held that:
[t]he fact that [the defendant] never had an opportunity to brandish or discharge his gun does not mean that he did not ‘use’ it. [The defendant] attempted to rob a bank and possession of a loaded gun was an integral part of the attempt. [The defendant] ‘used’ his gun, much as he used the gloves and ski mask. These items increased the likelihood of success; without them he probably would not have sallied forth.
United States v. Moore, 580 F.2d 360, 362 (9th Cir.1978) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1976)), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. United States, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S.Ct. 463, 58 L.Ed.2d 430 (1978). See also United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 842-43 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1270-71 (9th Cir.1981).
The trier of fact in the instant case correctly concluded that the defendant used the handgun to accomplish his purpose. I would affirm the conviction.
MURPHY, C.J., has authorized me to say that he joins in this dissenting opinion.