Court Opinion

ID: 9838227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 19:01:29.198987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:59.337057
License: Public Domain

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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10329
                           ____________________

        ELLIS LOUIS MASHBURN, JR.,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
        CORRECTIONS,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-01829-LSC
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                        22-10329

        Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
        WILSON, Circuit Judge:
               Ellis Mashburn, Jr. appeals the district court’s denial of his
        petition for habeas corpus. After reviewing this case’s extensive
        record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
                                       I.      Background
                                                A. Facts
               As with all convictions that result in the ultimate punish-
        ment, the facts underlying this case are heart-wrenching from any
        perspective. In 2006, Mashburn pleaded guilty to, and was subse-
        quently found guilty of, murdering his grandmother and step-
        grandfather. 1 Like the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
        (ACCA), Mashburn v. State, 148 So. 3d 1094, 1103–04 (Ala. Crim.
        App. 2013) (Mashburn I), and the federal district court after it, Mash-
        burn v. Dunn, No. 1:14-cv-01829, 2021 WL 1208868, at *1–2 (N.D.
        Ala. Mar. 31, 2021) (Mashburn II), we recite the facts as they were

        1 Alabama law dictates that when a defendant pleads guilty to a capital offense

        and the State seeks the death penalty, the defendant’s plea is only evidence of
        guilt. See Ala. Code § 13A-5-42 (“A defendant who is indicted for a capital of-
        fense may plead guilty to it, but the state, only in cases where the death penalty
        is to be imposed, must prove the defendant’s guilt of the capital offense be-
        yond a reasonable doubt to a jury. The guilty plea may be considered in de-
        termining whether the state has met that burden of proof.”).
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        22-10329                 Opinion of the Court                              3

        stated in the Alabama trial court’s amended sentencing memoran-
        dum. 2
               1. [Mashburn], while accompanied by at least one
               other individual, went to the home of Henry Owen
               Birmingham, Jr., and Clara Eva Birmingham in the
               late afternoon or early evening hours of October 29,
               200[2]. The apparent reason for the visit was for the
               purpose of the theft of property and perhaps for the
               purpose of confronting Henry Owen Birmingham,
               Jr. In any event, the Birmingham home was invaded
               either by force or by the application of force to an oc-
               cupant after entry by [Mashburn] as proven by trace
               evidence recovered. By testimony presented by a wit-
               ness to whom [Mashburn] had said to have confessed,
               he and his accomplice, Tony Brooks, were armed
               with at least a knife and a hatchet.

               2. The fact that certain items of personal property,
               namely jewelry, of Clara Eva Birmingham were re-
               covered from or were traceable to [Mashburn] after
               the home invasion, the reasonable inference is that
               [Mashburn] went to the Birmingham residence for
               the purpose of obtaining money or things of value.

        2 The ACCA determined that the first sentencing memorandum was not in

        compliance with Alabama Code § 13A-5-47 (requiring trial courts to “enter
        specific written findings concerning the existence or nonexistence” of aggra-
        vating and mitigating circumstances). The ACCA remanded the case back to
        the trial court for more detailed, written fact-finding.
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        4                   Opinion of the Court                22-10329

             3. The bodies of Henry Owen Birmingham, Jr., and
             Clara Eva Birmingham were transported to the
             Cooper Green Hospital forensic autopsy facility
             where they were each subjected to a post-mortem ex-
             amination by Dr. Joseph Embry, State Medical Exam-
             iner. The results of the autopsies were that each vic-
             tim died from multiple stab and sharp instrument
             wounds and blunt-force trauma to the head. Crime
             scene photographs, autopsy photographs and the tes-
             timony of Dr. Embry showed that each victim suf-
             fered repeated wounds from a knife or knife-like in-
             strument, that the wounds were vicious and delivered
             in such a way as to indicate an attack whereby each
             defended themselves and were obviously aware of the
             extent and nature of the attack and their impending
             deaths. The crime scene, too, indicated that both vic-
             tims resisted attack and bore witness to the violence
             associated with their deaths.

             4. Whether either victim was able to appreciate the
             plight and suﬀering of the other or not, the crime
             scene and the autopsy ﬁndings clearly indicate each
             would have been aware of the soon-to-be-fatal assault
             being committed upon them individually.

             5. Other than [Mashburn’s] plea of guilty, the most
             compelling evidence was the DNA analysis and com-
             parison of crime scene blood with that of [Mashburn]
             and the testimony of a former cellmate of [Mash-
             burn], Michael Wayne Simpson. Four blood traces re-
             covered from the scene, three in the master bedroom
             and one from the wall in the den, matched that of the
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        22-10329              Opinion of the Court                        5

              Defendant, Ellis Mashburn, with a computed popula-
              tion frequency of 1:1.2 quintillion non-related white
              individuals and 1:1.3 quintillion non-related black in-
              dividuals. To strengthen the connection of the trace
              evidence recovered, [Mashburn] was observed to have
              a fresh laceration on his left hand that he stated he
              had himself sewed up after “cutting it on a fence” at
              his residence. Additionally, Michael Wayne Simpson
              testiﬁed that [Mashburn] had confessed to him about
              the killing of his grandmother and step-grandfather
              while accompanied by Tony Brooks. His testimony
              relating what he stated was told to him was con-
              ﬁrmed by various aspects of the crime scene.

                                  B. Procedural History
               Mashburn was convicted on five counts of capital murder,
        including murdering Mr. and Mrs. Birmingham in the course of a
        robbery, Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(2) (Counts 1–2); murdering Mr.
        and Mrs. Birmingham in the course of a burglary, Ala. Code § 13A-
        5-40(a)(4) (Counts 3–4); and murdering two people by one act or
        pursuant to a single scheme or course of conduct, Ala. Code § 13A-
        5-40(a)(10) (Count 5). Mashburn I, 148 So. 3d at 1102. A penalty-
        phase jury unanimously concluded in a special verdict that Mash-
        burn’s crimes “were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel when
        compared to other capital offenses” and voted eleven-to-one to rec-
        ommend a sentence of death—a recommendation that the trial
        court adopted. Mashburn II, 2021 WL 1208868, at *3.
               In its amended sentencing memorandum, the trial court
        identified ten mitigating circumstances that were proven during
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10329

        the proceedings: 1) acceptance of legal responsibility; 2) no signifi-
        cant criminal history; 3) Mashburn’s young age (24) at the time of
        the offenses; 4) “a stormy and dysfunctional family life” and a
        “more probable than not” chance that Mashburn was “the victim
        of psychological and physical abuse and was not properly protected
        by his mother from those intra-family problems”; 5) untreated at-
        tention deficit disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
        that resulted in significant educational and behavioral issues; 6) a
        familial predisposition to mental, social, and substance-abuse issues
        and substance abuse early in life and at or near the time of the
        crime; 7) family reports of a difficult birth that resulted in anoxia at
        the time of delivery (though this circumstance was largely im-
        peached by Alabama “but [was] given appropriate consideration by
        the Court”); 8) mental health issues (like hearing voices) that went
        unaddressed; 9) Mashburn was loved by his family; and 10) “[t]hat
        life without possibility of parole means life without possibility of
        parole.” The trial court also noted that the jury’s verdict—eleven-
        to-one in favor of death—was not unanimous and that “[m]ental
        health experts opined that [Mashburn] had a decreased intellectual
        function likely caused by poly-substance abuse and alleged physical
        trauma,” although the court found that the “trauma was not objec-
        tively demonstrated.”
               The trial court also determined that four aggravating cir-
        cumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the capital
        offenses were committed in the course of a burglary; 2) the capital
        offenses were committed in the course of a robbery; 3) the capital
        offenses were “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared to
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        22-10329                  Opinion of the Court                                7

        other capital offenses”; and 4) Mashburn “intentionally caused the
        death of two or more persons pursuant to one scheme or course of
        conduct.”
                The trial court concluded “that the evidence clearly supports
        the Jury’s verdicts in this case and, in particular, the Jury’s recom-
        mendation of a sentence of death.” The trial court then stated that
        it “is independently of the opinion and finds that the aggravating
        circumstances in this case clearly outweigh the mitigating ones pre-
        sented, that the earlier-imposed sentence of death in this case was
        and is appropriate under Alabama’s guided sentencing scheme and
        that there has been no reason demonstrated that any other sen-
        tence would be warranted.”
              Mashburn’s convictions and sentence were affirmed by the
        ACCA, and both the Supreme Court of Alabama and the Supreme
        Court of the United States denied certiorari. Mashburn v. State, 7
        So. 3d 453 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007), cert. denied October 24, 2008;
        Mashburn v. Alabama, 556 U.S. 1270 (2009) (mem.).
              After exhausting his direct appeals, Mashburn filed a petition
        for postconviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Proce-
        dure 32. 3 See Am. Pet. For Relief from J. Pursuant to Rule 32.1(f)

        3 In both his Rule 32 petition and his subsequent federal habeas petition, Mash-

        burn raised a number of claims, covering both the guilt and penalty phases of
        his trial. All of these claims were dismissed by the ACCA and the district court
        for various reasons. See Mashburn I, 148 So. 3d at 1162; Mashburn II, 2021 WL
        1208868, at *41. The review that follows, however, is limited to the issues
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10329

        of the Ala. Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 32 Petition), Mash-
        burn v. State, 148 So. 3d 1094 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) (No. CR-11-
        0321). In his petition to the state circuit court, Mashburn alleged
        that his penalty-phase counsel were constitutionally ineffective, in
        violation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Specifi-
        cally, Mashburn first argued that his counsel were ineffective for
        failing to present evidence that he was under the influence of drugs
        (methamphetamine and prescription drugs) and was without sleep
        for numerous days at the time of the crimes. See Rule 32 Petition,
        ¶ 224. Mashburn claimed that counsel should have presented this
        information along with evidence about how drug use and sleep
        deprivation would have affected his mental state during the com-
        mission of the crimes. Id. ¶ 226. Second, Mashburn pointed out
        that Dr. Thomas Sachy, a clinical neuropsychiatrist, testified that
        Mashburn had “some form of bipolar disorder.” Id. ¶ 255. Mash-
        burn argued that his counsel were ineffective for not pushing fur-
        ther and offering medical evidence about how this disorder could
        have caused involuntary and combative behavior on the night of
        the murders. Id. ¶ 258.
               Mashburn requested discovery, but a little over a week later,
        Alabama filed a motion requesting that the circuit court withhold
        ruling on Mashburn’s request because his claims were due to be

        delineated in the certificate of appealability. See Freeman v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t
        of Corr., 46 F.4th 1193, 1215 (11th Cir. 2022).
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        22-10329                   Opinion of the Court                                 9

        dismissed. Mashburn I, 148 So. 3d at 1104. The circuit court agreed
        with Alabama and summarily dismissed Mashburn’s petition. Id. 4
                The ACCA affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 1162. As we will
        detail more below, the ACCA determined that Mashburn failed to
        plead his claims with sufficient specificity to satisfy Alabama Rules
        of Criminal Procedure 32.3 5 and 32.6(b). 6 Id. at 1153, 1158–59. For
        both claims, the ACCA took particular issue with Mashburn’s fail-
        ure to 1) identify an expert or lay person who would have testified
        had they been solicited, and 2) describe what the testimony of those
        individuals would have been. Id. at 1158–59; see also Windsor v.
        State, 89 So. 3d 805, 813–14 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (concluding that
        summary dismissal was appropriate where the defendant did not,
        in part, “specifically identify any experts counsel could have called
        and did not set forth specifically what their testimony would have

        4 For reasons unknown, the parties were not notified about the summary dis-

        missal for around a year, which under Alabama Rules, would ordinarily bar an
        appeal. Mashburn II, 2021 WL 1208868, at *4; Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c). Once
        Mashburn was finally informed, and without opposition from Alabama, he
        filed a petition seeking an out-of-time appeal under Alabama Rule of Criminal
        Procedure 32.1(f). Mashburn II, 2021 WL 1208868, at *4. The ACCA granted
        the petition.
        5 Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.3 states that “[t]he petitioner shall

        have the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence
        the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief.”
        6 Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6 states that “[e]ach claim in the pe-

        tition must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon which
        relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds.
        A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been violated and mere con-
        clusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings.”
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10329

        been”). The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Mashburn’s peti-
        tion for a writ of certiorari. Mashburn II, 2021 WL 1208868, at *4.
                Mashburn next took his claims to federal court by filing a
        petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254. See id. at *1. The
        district court made rather quick work of Mashburn’s claims. First,
        the district court found that Mashburn “alleged many claims in his
        habeas petition without citing case authority, discussing record ev-
        idence, or replying to Respondents’ contentions about dismissal.”
        Id. at *11. Interestingly, the district court couched its decision
        about Mashburn’s pleadings in the language of abandonment by
        holding that “[c]onsistent with his silence, Mashburn has abandoned
        those portions of his petition or waived the right to pursue them as
        habeas claims.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Tharpe v. Humphrey,
        No. 5:10-cv-433, 2014 WL 897412, at *3 n.4 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 6.,
        2014), aff’d sub nom. Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.
        2016)).
               As an alternative to its abandonment holding, the district
        court held that Mashburn’s petition was too “conclusory” to show
        why the ACCA’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unrea-
        sonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court prece-
        dent” or was “based on unreasonable factual findings” as required
        by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28
        U.S.C. § 2254(d). Id. 7 Thus, the district court dismissed Mashburn’s

        7 See also id. at *41 (“With the exception of one procedurally-defaulted ineffec-

        tiveness allegation, the substance of Mashburn’s Rule 32 and § 2254 assertions
        are the same. Akin to the ACCA’s assessment of Mashburn’s exhausted Rule
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        22-10329                   Opinion of the Court                                 11

        claims “as abandoned or unproven on habeas review.” Id. And,
        finding that Mashburn had failed to make a viable federal habeas
        claim, the district court also denied Mashburn’s requests for an ev-
        identiary hearing and a certificate of appealability (COA). Id. at
        *40–42. 8
                Mashburn filed a motion to alter or amend judgment under
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which the district court de-
        nied. In its order, the district court first defended its abandonment
        holding. Then, responding to Mashburn’s request that it address
        his claims on the merits, the district court maintained that it had
        already made an “alternative merits-based holding that [Mashburn]
        failed to prove a right to relief under AEDPA on those allegations
        adjudicated in state court.” The district court explained that the
        “thrust of this holding is that despite the attachment of AEDPA def-
        erence to those allegations which the state courts rejected substan-
        tively, Mashburn sought habeas relief without asserting anything
        to satisfy his stringent adjudicated burden or resist a § 2254 dismis-
        sal in reply.” After further analysis, the district court again denied
        Mashburn’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and a COA.

        32 allegations, this Court finds that Mashburn’s § 2254 allegations, even ac-
        cepted as true, lack the requisite factual and legal specificity to substantiate an
        entitlement to habeas relief.”).
        8 A COA permits a plaintiff to appeal a final order of a district court in a habeas

        corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). “A [COA] may issue under para-
        graph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of
        a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2).
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                         22-10329

              Mashburn then filed a motion for a COA with this court,
        which we granted. In the COA, we identified three issues:
                   (1) Whether Mashburn’s trial counsel provided inef-
                   fective assistance, pursuant to Strickland v. Washington,
                   466 U.S. 668 (1984), in the penalty phase of his trial by
                   failing to present evidence regarding his state of mind
                   at the time of the crimes;

                   (2) Whether Mashburn’s trial counsel provided inef-
                   fective assistance, pursuant to Strickland, 466 U.S. at
                   668, in the penalty phase of his trial by failing to pre-
                   sent medical evidence regarding his bipolar disorder
                   diagnosis; and

                   (3) Whether Mashburn was entitled to an evidentiary
                   hearing in the district court.

             II.      Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: COA Issues 1 and 2
                                                A. Law
               “We review de novo a district court’s denial of habeas relief
        on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, which presents a
        mixed question of law and fact.” Pye v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic
        Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 1034 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). 9

        9 Although Mashburn has filed two (nearly identical) petitions as part of his

        postconviction efforts—his state Rule 32 petition and his federal § 2254 habeas
        petition—our review focuses on the adequacy of the former. Frazier v. Bou-
        chard, 661 F.3d 519, 527–28 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.
        170, 181 (2011) (“We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the
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        22-10329                 Opinion of the Court                             13

                To establish counsel was constitutionally ineffective under
        Strickland, a petitioner must show that 1) his counsel’s performance
        was deficient, and 2) the deficient performance was prejudicial.
        Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
               To prove deficiency, a petitioner must demonstrate that “in
        light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of
        counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent
        assistance.” Id. at 690; see also Perkins v. United States, 73 F.4th 866,
        879 (11th Cir. 2023) (stating a petitioner “must establish that no
        competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel
        did take”). This is an objective assessment, and we start from a
        presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable. Strickland,
        466 U.S. at 690.
                To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show “there is a
        reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
        the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,
        466 U.S. at 694. Here, “the question is whether there is a reasona-
        ble probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including
        [this] court, to the extent [we] independently reweigh[] the evi-
        dence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
        mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695; see also
        Gavin v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 40 F.4th 1247, 1263 (11th Cir.
        2022). So, to determine the reasonable probability of a different
        result, we must “consider ‘the totality of the available mitigation

        record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the mer-
        its.”)).
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                       22-10329

        evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in
        the habeas proceeding’—and ‘reweigh it against the evidence in ag-
        gravation.’” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (per curiam)
        (alteration adopted) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397–
        98 (2000)). The Supreme Court defines “reasonable probability” as
        “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”
        of the proceeding. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This “requires a ‘sub-
        stantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Pin-
        holster, 563 U.S. at 189 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
        112 (2011)).
               On its own, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an
        easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). But our
        review here is subject to an AEDPA filter. AEDPA only permits a
        federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to a
        claim “adjudicated on the merits” in a state court if that adjudica-
        tion “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an un-
        reasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
        mined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.
        § 2254(d)(1), or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unrea-
        sonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre-
        sented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). 10

        10 The state court dismissed Mashburn’s petition for noncompliance with Ala-

        bama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(b). We have held that “state court
        summary dismissals of . . . constitutional claims under Rule 32.6(b) [are] adju-
        dications on the merits, and are therefore . . . subject to review under
        AEDPA.” Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 808 (11th Cir. 2011).
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        22-10329               Opinion of the Court                        15

                Relevant here, “[t]o meet the ‘unreasonable application’
        standard, ‘a prisoner must show far more than that the state court’s
        decision was merely wrong or even clear error.’” Pye, 50 F.4th at
        1034 (quoting Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 523 (2020) (per cu-
        riam)). Instead, “a state prisoner must show that the state court’s
        ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking
        in justification that there was an error well understood and com-
        prehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
        disagreement.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419–20 (2014) (quot-
        ing Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103).
                “Applying AEDPA to Strickland’s prejudice standard, we
        must decide whether the state court’s conclusion that [counsel’s]
        performance at the sentencing phase . . . didn’t prejudice him—
        that there was no ‘substantial likelihood’ of a different result—was
        ‘so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond any possibility for
        fairminded disagreement.’” Pye, 50 F.4th at 1041–42 (quoting Shinn,
        141 S. Ct. at 523–24). We apply this framework below.
                                   B. Mashburn’s Claims
               Mashburn first argues that his counsel were deficient during
        the penalty phase of his trial because, despite knowing Mashburn
        was 1) high on methamphetamine and prescription drugs and 2)
        without sleep for four to five days at the time of the crimes, they
        “failed to seek aid from a medical expert to investigate the potential
        effects both lack of sleep and abuse of prescription drugs would
        have on one’s ability to control one’s actions and think clearly.” See
        Rule 32 Petition, ¶ 224, 226. Without citation, Mashburn opines
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                     22-10329

        that “[l]ack of sleep joined with the use of prescription drugs is
        likely to have an effect on one’s behavior and mental state.” Id.
        ¶ 225. 11 Finally, Mashburn suggests that evidence of his intoxica-
        tion could have been used to disprove the existence of the mental
        state required for the prosecution’s aggravating factors of robbery
        and burglary, and “may have influenced the jury in their consider-
        ation of the prosecution’s other aggravating factors.” Id. ¶ 227.
               Second, Mashburn claims that his penalty-phase counsel
        performed deficiently by failing to present evidence to support tes-
        timony about his bipolar disorder. As described earlier, Mashburn
        notes that a clinical neuropsychiatrist, Dr. Thomas Sachy, “testified
        that Mr. Mashburn has some form of bipolar disorder as well as
        brain damage leading to a behavior disorder.” Id. ¶ 255. Mashburn
        adds the following allegations:
               [Trial counsel] did not present evidence that bolstered
               Dr. Sachy’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder in Mr. Mash-
               burn. They did not explain the relationship of Mr.
               Mashburn’s psychiatric disease to his crime. Children
               with bipolar disorder, the disease Dr. Sachy diagnosed
               Mr. Mashburn as suﬀering from, are known to hear
               voices, as Mr. Mashburn has throughout his life. Chil-
               dren with bipolar disorder often begin abusing sub-
               stances at an early age to cope with their psychiatric
               symptoms as Mr. Mashburn did. Bipolar disorder also

        11 As the ACCA noted, Mashburn did not identify the names of any medical

        experts who would have testified at his trial had they been contacted, nor did
        he supply evidence of what information experts might have provided.
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        22-10329                 Opinion of the Court                             17

                causes impulsivity and episodic extreme dyscontrol,
                which can lead to unpredictable, involuntary com-
                bative behavior.

        Id. ¶ 258. 12
                Alluding to the amended sentencing memorandum, Mash-
        burn highlights the trial court’s finding that “[m]ental health ex-
        perts opined that [Mashburn] had a decreased intellectual function
        likely caused by poly-substance abuse and physical trauma, which
        trauma was not objectively demonstrated.” While the trial court
        recognized that Mashburn’s counsel presented evidence in support
        of this mitigating factor, it did not find the factor to be proven be-
        yond a reasonable doubt. Mashburn contends that more evidence
        about the effects of bipolar disorder would have strengthened this
        factor’s influence.
                                          C. Discussion
              We start by addressing Alabama’s contention that Mashburn
        waived any challenge to the district court’s initial holding that he
        abandoned the claims listed in the COA. 13 Alabama argues that

        12 Again, beyond referencing Dr. Sachy’s diagnosis and making claims about

        the effects of bipolar disorder, Mashburn did not provide the names of any
        experts who would have testified had they been contacted by his counsel, nor
        did he file additional evidence of what the expert testimony would have been.
        13 See Question from Judge Wilson at Oral Argument at 32:17, Mashburn v.

        Alabama, (No. 22-10329) (argued July 26, 2023), https://www.ca11.uscourts.g
        ov/oral-argument-recordings (“[Mashburn] abandoned the abandonment ar-
        gument?”).
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10329

        Mashburn did not sufficiently address this issue in his opening brief,
        and indeed, Mashburn’s entire argument on the issue is confined
        to a single footnote. In that footnote, Mashburn contends that be-
        cause the district court ultimately addressed the merits of his claims
        in response to his motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule
        59(e), the abandonment issue is moot. As Alabama rightly points
        out, this court has held that “[w]hen an appellant fails to challenge
        properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court
        based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge
        of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be af-
        firmed.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th
        Cir. 2014). Passing references without argumentation or citation
        to authority are insufficient. Id. at 681. However, because 1) “our
        abandonment rule is prudential, not jurisdictional,” United States v.
        Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc); 2) the district
        court’s classification of pleadings in an initial habeas petition as
        “abandoned” is an oddity, see McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856
        (1994) (explaining that “[f]ederal courts are authorized to dismiss
        summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its
        face” (emphasis added)); and 3) “we may affirm on any ground sup-
        ported by the record,” Carey v. Dep’t of Corr., 57 F.4th 985, 989 (11th
        Cir. 2023), we decline to resolve the case on this basis.
               Instead, we conclude the ACCA’s determination that Mash-
        burn’s Rule 32 petition failed to sufficiently plead facts that establish
        prejudice was not “contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application of,
        clearly established federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because
        the facts pleaded in the Rule 32 petition are insufficient to establish
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        22-10329                 Opinion of the Court                            19

        prejudice under the Strickland-AEDPA framework, we affirm the
        denial of habeas relief. See Carey, 57 F.4th at 989 (“Because a peti-
        tioner must prove both deficient performance and prejudice, a
        court need not address one element if it determines that the peti-
        tioner has failed to prove the other.”).
                “In deciding whether this ruling by the state court denying
        post-conviction relief ultimately was reasonable, we conduct the
        prejudice inquiry by evaluating the totality of the available mitiga-
        tion evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence ad-
        duced in the habeas proceeding—and reweighing it against the ev-
        idence in aggravation.” Frazier, 661 F.3d at 532 (alterations
        adopted) (quoting Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 701 (11th Cir. 2002)).
        Even accepting the allegations in Mashburn’s habeas petition as
        true, this analysis leads us to the conclusion that neither his claim
        regarding his mental state at the time of the crime nor his claim
        regarding his bipolar disorder—whether considered separately or
        together—is sufficient to overcome AEDPA deference and estab-
        lish prejudice. That is, we find that “there is [not] a reasonable
        probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an ap-
        pellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs evidence—
        would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigat-
        ing circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
        695. 14

        14 In Alabama, at least ten members of the jury must agree to sentence a de-

        fendant to death. Ala. Code § 13A-5-46(f). Mashburn was sentenced to death
        by a vote of eleven to one. So, prejudice here requires “a reasonable
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        20                        Opinion of the Court                      22-10329

                Looking first at the mitigating circumstances, Mashburn
        claims that his trial counsel “lacked the requisite familiarity with
        the case to present a coherent theory of mitigation and deprived
        the judge and jury of critical mitigating evidence[.]” Pet’r Br. 21.
        Mashburn cites to cases in which we held that counsel’s failure to
        present mitigating evidence was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant
        habeas relief. We find those cases distinguishable from this one. In
        those cases, we reached our conclusion because counsel either
        failed to present any important mitigating evidence at trial or pre-
        sented only a sliver of significant evidence. See DeBruce v. Comm’r,
        Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 758 F.3d 1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing
        that “the sentencing jury heard nothing of the daily beatings that
        DeBruce suffered as a child at the hands of his older sister, his re-
        sistance to joining gangs despite their assaults and intimidation, the
        pervasive violence in his neighborhood that caused him to witness
        the stabbing of a neighbor and his brother being shot, his one or
        more suicide attempts, DeBruce’s efforts to nurse his sister while
        she recovered from an incapacitating stroke, DeBruce’s alcoholic
        and disengaged father, or his struggles in school and his low-aver-
        age intelligence”); Cooper v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 646 F.3d 1328, 1355
        (11th Cir. 2011) (lamenting that “[w]hile the jury heard a small
        sliver of his volatile upbringing, the jury heard nothing of Cooper’s
        life of horrific abuse rendered by both his father and brother, his

        probability” that at least two other jurors “would have struck a different bal-
        ance” regarding Mashburn’s “moral culpability.” Andrus v. Texas, 140 S. Ct.
        1875, 1886 (2020) (per curiam).
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        22-10329               Opinion of the Court                         21

        use of drugs and alcohol beginning at age 11 to escape his family
        and the abuse, his abandonment by his mother for short stretches
        of time, his seventh-grade education and learning deficits, and his
        depression”); Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2011)
        (explaining that new evidence would have revealed that the peti-
        tioner suffered “from organic brain damage, bipolar disorder, an
        epileptic or seizure disorder, and borderline mental retardation”;
        endured regular abuse from his parents, including beatings with ra-
        zor strops and belts; grew up in poverty due to his father’s gam-
        bling addiction; and lived with a mother who “suffered from clini-
        cal depression, suicidal ideations, rage blackouts, and urges to phys-
        ically hurt her children”—all of which would lead to “increased im-
        pulsivity,” “decreased sound judgment,” and conduct that is “not
        entirely volitional”); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1067 (11th
        Cir. 2002) (holding that the petitioner was entitled to habeas corpus
        relief because of “counsel’s failure to investigate, obtain, or present
        any evidence of mitigating circumstances to the sentencing jury”).
               Here, the state trial court acknowledged that Mashburn’s
        counsel presented evidence for twelve mitigating factors and that
        ten mitigating factors were proven. Unlike the cases referenced
        above, Mashburn’s argument is not that he was prejudiced by his
        counsel’s failure to produce any evidence, but that he was preju-
        diced by his counsel’s failure to produce even more evidence. How-
        ever, counsel is not “required to present all mitigation evidence.”
        Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
        banc).
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        22                        Opinion of the Court                     22-10329

               And, in our view, the ACCA did not unreasonably err in con-
        cluding that Mashburn did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate
        that it is reasonably probable—or substantially likely, Pinholster,
        563 U.S. at 189—that the information he believes should have been
        introduced would have tipped the aggravation-mitigation scale in
        his favor. For example, regarding Mashburn’s claim that counsel
        should have marshaled evidence about his state of mind at the time
        of the crimes, “we have repeatedly stressed that evidence of intox-
        ication or alcoholism is a double-edged sword that itself could
        harm a petitioner’s case.” Brooks v. Comm’r, Ala Dep’t of Corr., 719
        F.3d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 2013).
                And, considering Mashburn’s claim that counsel should
        have presented more expert testimony of the potential deleterious
        effects of bipolar disorder, such as the link between bipolar disorder
        and childhood substance abuse, 15 the record reflects that the jury
        did hear evidence that Mashburn started huffing paint and gasoline
        at eleven years old to deal with the voices he heard, and by thirteen
        he started drinking wine and taking his parents’ prescription pain
        medication to subdue his psychiatric ailments. The trial judge

        15 We note once more that the jury in fact heard Dr. Sachy testify that he be-

        lieved Mashburn had “some form of bipolar disorder.” Rule 32 Petition, ¶ 255.
        Mashburn argues that the jury should have heard more testimony about how
        “[c]hildren with bipolar disorder often begin abusing substances at an early
        age to cope with their psychiatric symptoms as Mr. Mashburn did” and how
        bipolar disorder “also causes impulsivity and episodic extreme dyscontrol,
        which can lead to unpredictable, involuntary combative behavior.” Rule 32
        Petition, ¶ 258.
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        22-10329                  Opinion of the Court                              23

        credited this testimony and noted that Mashburn’s history of sub-
        stance abuse and mental health issues were mitigating factors. We
        cannot say that every fair-minded jurist would believe that more
        details about the effects of bipolar disorder on Mashburn’s life, in-
        cluding during his childhood, would create a substantial likelihood
        of a different sentence. Cf. Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1234–35 (concluding
        that a different result was reasonably probable when there was new
        evidence of bipolar disorder—the diagnosis itself, rather than testi-
        mony about its effects—along with new evidence about organic
        brain damage, epileptic or seizure disorder, borderline intellectual
        disability, violent child abuse, poverty, and the cumulative effects
        of those factors). 16
               Our conclusion is bolstered by the strength of the aggravat-
        ing circumstances identified by the trial court. When there is “sub-
        stantial evidence of aggravating circumstances” it can be “more

        16 As Mashburn points out, in Orme v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida held

        that the balance of mitigating and aggravating factors may have been altered
        if counsel had presented evidence about the petitioner’s bipolar disorder,
        which would have bolstered his intoxication defense. 896 So. 2d 725, 732, 736
        (Fla. 2005) (per curiam). However, apart from arising outside of Alabama, at
        least two points distinguish Orme from Mashburn’s case. First, in Orme, it ap-
        pears counsel did not present any evidence about the petitioner’s bipolar diag-
        nosis. Id. at 733. Here, the jury heard Dr. Sachy’s testimony that Mashburn
        had “some form of bipolar disorder,” Rule 32 Petition, ¶ 255—they just did
        not learn more information about the disorder’s symptoms. Second—and per-
        haps more importantly—Orme was decided by the Supreme Court of Florida,
        which did not owe AEDPA deference to another court. Here, on the other
        hand, we are duty-bound to respect the decision of the ACCA unless it was
        objectively unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                22-10329

        difficult to establish prejudice under Strickland.” Holsey v. Warden,
        Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); see also
        Sochor v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 685 F.3d 1016, 1030 (11th Cir. 2012).
        Here, the trial court concluded that Alabama proved four aggravat-
        ing circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. One of which—that
        the offenses were “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel compared
        to other capital offenses”—was unanimously agreed upon by a jury
        after hearing ample evidence about the gruesome deaths of two
        elderly victims.
               In sum, Mashburn’s counsel presented enough evidence for
        the trial court to determine that twelve mitigating circumstances
        had been invoked and ten had been proven. Despite this, an Ala-
        bama jury concluded in an eleven-to-one vote that the aggravating
        factors outweighed their mitigating counterparts such that Mash-
        burn’s sentence was appropriate. While Mashburn argues that
        more evidence about his bipolar diagnosis and state of mind should
        have been presented, this additional evidence—even if true—is of
        debatable strength and would only constitute a fraction of the total
        mitigating evidence that the jury would have considered. Thus,
        tethered to the highly deferential standards of review imposed by
        AEDPA and Strickland, we cannot say the ACCA unreasonably
        erred in determining that Mashburn failed to sufficiently plead facts
        that would establish prejudice under Strickland. Because the
        ACCA’s conclusion was not “contrary to,” or “an unreasonable ap-
        plication of, clearly established Federal law” we cannot grant Mash-
        burn the habeas relief that he seeks.
                             III.   Evidentiary Hearing
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        22-10329                Opinion of the Court                          25

                Because we conclude that the claims in Mashburn’s Rule 32
        petition, even if true, are insufficient to overcome AEDPA defer-
        ence and establish prejudice under Strickland, the district court did
        not abuse its discretion by foregoing an evidentiary hearing. See
        Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 477 (2007) (noting that we review
        a district court’s decision deny a habeas petitioner’s request for an
        evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion); see also id. at 474 (“In
        deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court
        must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to
        prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle
        the applicant to federal habeas relief.”); Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Di-
        agnostic Prison, 975 F.3d 1145, 1163 (11th Cir. 2020) (similar).
                                    IV.    Conclusion
              For the reasons above, we affirm the district court’s denial
        of Mashburn’s habeas claims.
               AFFIRMED.