Court Opinion

ID: 9960593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 17:00:49.211186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:39.274117
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 16 2024
                                                                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

SOPHIE RIDER,                                      No. 22-56075

                   Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:22-cv-02913-SB-AFM

     v.
                                                   MEMORANDUM*
JEANNIE FULLER; JENNIFER FULLER;
BERNARD ANDERSON; ERIN
BARDALES, AKA Erin Sooper, AKA Erin
Valarde; DOES, 1 to 5, inclusive,

                   Defendants-Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Central District of California
                    Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

                                Submitted April 16, 2024**

Before: BENNETT, BADE, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

          Plaintiff-Appellant Sophie Rider appeals from the district court’s dismissal

of her complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see United States ex rel.

Hartpence v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (en

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
  The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
banc), we affirm.

      Rider’s operative second amended complaint asserts claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, slander, “false allegations” (alleging, in substance,

trespass and theft), and false imprisonment. Named as Defendants, in one or more

of these claims, are Rider’s next-door neighbor, Jeannie Fuller (who the complaint

alleges is now a retired officer with the Torrance Police Department), as well as

Fuller’s daughter and two other Torrance police officers. Rider’s sole asserted

basis for invoking federal court jurisdiction is that one or more of these claims

states a cause of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

      In dismissing Rider’s previous complaints with leave to amend, the district

court explained that § 1983 does not provide a remedy for state law torts and that

Rider would have to adequately plead sufficient facts to support a non-frivolous

claim under § 1983. In particular, the court noted that the complaint failed to plead

sufficient facts establishing either the state-action element of a § 1983 claim or any

basis for concluding that Rider’s claims based on long-ago conduct were not

barred by the statute of limitations. After affording Rider two opportunities to cure

these deficiencies, the district court held that Rider’s effort to assert a § 1983 claim

was so wholly insubstantial and frivolous that it did not even suffice to give rise to

federal jurisdiction. See Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45–46 (2015) (citing

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946)).

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      We agree with the district court that Rider’s effort to invoke § 1983 is

“wholly insubstantial and frivolous” and therefore fails to provide any basis for

federal question jurisdiction. See Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–83. Nearly all of the

conduct alleged in the complaint involves private disputes between Rider and

Fuller, including disputes in state court concerning a restraining order that Fuller

obtained, and sought to have extended, against Rider. The complaint fails to plead

any facts that would support a non-frivolous claim that Fuller took the alleged

actions under color of state law, as required to state a § 1983 claim. See Schucker

v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Invoking state legal

procedures does not constitute ‘joint participation’ or ‘conspiracy’ with state

officials sufficient to satisfy section 1983’s state action requirement.”). Although

the complaint also alleges that Fuller conspired with the Defendant police officers

to have Rider taken into civil custody on false pretenses, that alleged conduct

occurred in 2014 and there is no non-frivolous basis for concluding that Rider’s

reliance on such a theory raises a valid § 1983 claim. See Maldonado v. Harris,

370 F.3d 945, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that § 1983 claims are governed by

“the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state,” which in

California is two years (citing CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 335.1)). Finally, although the

complaint alleges that, at some unspecified time, Fuller called the police, who then

drove by Rider’s house “slowly with intimidating stares,” any contention that such

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conduct, without more, is actionable under § 1983 is wholly frivolous.

      Because Rider’s effort to shoehorn her state law claims into the framework

of § 1983 was wholly insubstantial and frivolous, the district court properly

concluded that her complaint failed to invoke the district court’s federal question

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And because Rider and her next-door

neighbor were obviously not of diverse citizenship, there was no basis for diversity

jurisdiction. The court therefore properly dismissed this action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

      AFFIRMED.

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