Court Opinion

ID: 9964507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:00:40.438639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:33.808905
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12493     Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 04/30/2024   Page: 1 of 5

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 23-12493
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       MARK KNOX,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       JOHNNY HARDWICK,
       Judge, Ala. 15th Circuit Court,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00075-WKW-JTA
USCA11 Case: 23-12493         Document: 30-1         Date Filed: 04/30/2024         Page: 2 of 5

       2                          Opinion of the Court                       23-12493

                               ____________________

       Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Mark Knox, proceeding pro se, appeals following the district
       court’s dismissal of his complaint against Johnny Hardwick, a
       Montgomery County, Alabama, Circuit Court Judge. In the com-
       plaint, Knox alleged that Judge Hardwick had violated his civil
       rights in state court when the judge purportedly would not let him
       speak and directed a bailiff to detain him during proceedings in-
       volving medical malpractice claims Knox had brought against a
       hospital. The district court dismissed Knox’s federal complaint on
       two grounds: (1) it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine; and
       (2) Judge Hardwick was entitled to judicial immunity. On appeal,
       Knox argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint
       as barred by judicial immunity. After thorough review, we affirm.
              We review de novo whether an official is entitled to judicial
       immunity. Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001).
       Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss
       an action by a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis if it is frivolous
       or malicious or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
       immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).

       1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

       413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
       (1983).
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       23-12493                Opinion of the Court                          3

               We liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants, but we
       will not “serve as de facto counsel” or “rewrite an otherwise defi-
       cient pleading.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–
       69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). An appellant abandons
       any argument not briefed on appeal, made in passing, or raised
       briefly without supporting arguments or authority. Access Now,
       Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004); Sapuppo
       v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). To
       obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on multi-
       ple, independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that
       every stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect.
       Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
              Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from dam-
       ages for their acts taken while acting in their judicial capacity unless
       they acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bolin v. Story,
       225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). Thus, a
       judge enjoys immunity for judicial acts even if he made a mistake,
       acted maliciously, or exceeded his authority. McCullough v. Finley,
       907 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that even “a judicial
       officer who was allegedly motivated to further a conspiracy enjoys
       absolute judicial immunity”). Further, a judge acts in “clear ab-
       sence of all jurisdiction” only if he lacked subject-matter jurisdic-
       tion. Id. at 1332 (quotations omitted).
             In this appeal, Knox argues that the district court erred in
       dismissing his complaint as barred by judicial immunity. Notably,
       however, the district court dismissed Knox’s complaint on two
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12493

       independent grounds – one was that Judge Hardwick was entitled
       to judicial immunity, and the other was that the Rooker-Feldman
       doctrine barred his claims, since the appropriate course for Knox’s
       challenge to Judge Hardwick’s rulings or conduct in the state court
       litigation should have been to seek relief by pursuing an appeal in
       that case to the appropriate state court. But Knox failed to chal-
       lenge the district court’s conclusion that his complaint was barred
       by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, so he has not challenged every
       stated ground for the judgment against him. As a result, he has
       abandoned his claim on appeal and the judgment is due to be af-
       firmed on this basis. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
              But, in any event, even if we were to address the argument
       Knox raises on appeal -- concerning judicial immunity -- we are un-
       persuaded. The district court did not err in dismissing Knox’s com-
       plaint as barred by judicial immunity because, assuming the allega-
       tions in the complaint to be true, Judge Hardwick would have been
       acting within his judicial capacity when he ordered the bailiff to
       detain Knox during proceedings in the judge’s courtroom. Bolin,
       225 F.3d at 1239. Indeed, under Alabama law, “[e]very court” has
       the “power . . . [t]o preserve and enforce order in its immediate
       presence . . . as is necessary to prevent interruption, disturbance or
       hindrance to its proceedings” and “[t]o control, in furtherance of
       justice, the conduct of its officers and all other persons connected
       with a judicial proceeding before it[.]” Ala. Code § 12-1-7(1),(4).
       Thus, even if Judge Hardwick had acted maliciously or exceeded
       his judicial authority when he was attempting to maintain court-
       room decorum during Knox’s case, he was entitled to judicial
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       23-12493               Opinion of the Court                        5

       immunity, so long as he was not acting in the clear absence of all
       jurisdiction. McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1331; Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239.
       Knox has made no allegation to this effect. Accordingly, we also
       affirm the district court’s dismissal of Knox’s complaint on judicial
       immunity grounds.
             AFFIRMED.