Court Opinion

ID: 9719501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:54:41.414439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:07.915347
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly granted Lyons’s motion to dismiss and its blurring of the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. Lyons filed his motion to dismiss based upon Ind. Trial Rule 12(b)(1), i.e., lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Appellant’s Appendix at 12-25) The Rogerses responded by arguing that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Lyons. (Appellant’s Appendix at 37-46) The trial court granted the motion to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction but did not specify whether subject matter or personal jurisdiction was lacking.
On appeal, the Rogerses again argue that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Lyons, while Lyons argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the administration of the trust or personal jurisdiction. The majority addresses only subject matter jurisdiction. The majority places much emphasis on the will’s reference to “Robert Lyons, of Alexandria, Virginia” in asserting that the action should be heard in Virginia. However, I do not believe that the will’s reference to “Robert Lyons, of Alexandria, Virginia” evinces an intent that the trust be administered in Virginia. Rather, I believe it is necessary to address both subject matter and personal jurisdiction and the relevant statutory authority.
*952“Indiana trial courts possess two kinds of ‘jurisdiction.’ ” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind.2006). “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs.” Id. “Personal jurisdiction requires that appropriate process be effected over the parties.” Id. In K.S., the Indiana Supreme Court held that “[ojther phrases recently common to Indiana practice, like ‘jurisdiction over a particular case,’ confuse actual jurisdiction with legal error, and we will be better off ceasing such characterizations.” Id.
First, although they do not fit within the category of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, Ind.Code § 30-4-6-2 and Ind.Code § 30-4-6-4 are relevant here.2 Ind.Code § 30-4-6-2 provides: “The court will have continuing jurisdiction to supervise the administration of the trust only if the settlor expressly directs in the terms of the trust that the court is to have that jurisdiction.” Similarly, Ind.Code § 30-4-6-4 provides:
Except as provided in section 7 of this chapter and IC 30-4-7, unless the terms of the trust expressly direct that the court is to have continuing jurisdiction over the administration of the trust:
(1) a trustee need not docket a trust in the records of the court nor may the court require a trust to be docketed; and
(2) with respect to a decedent’s estate docketed for the purpose of probate or administration, which either establishes a trust or makes a devise to another trust, the court shall have no continuing jurisdiction over the administration of the trust after any distribution from the estate is paid or delivered to the trustee.
The testamentary trust here did not expressly direct that the Marion County probate court would have continuing jurisdiction over the trust. (Appellant’s Appendix at 29-36) Consequently, the Marion County probate court could not assert “continuing jurisdiction” simply because the trust was established here.3 However, this is not to say that the parties could not bring an action related to the trust in the Marion County probate court. Rather, the action “could be brought in any court having appropriate civil jurisdiction.” 7 Henry’s Indiana Probate Law and Practice § 39.14 (2008). An analysis of subject matter and personal jurisdiction is, thus, necessary.
As for subject matter jurisdiction, Ind. Code § 30-4-6-1 provides that “jurisdiction in this state for all matters arising under this article [the Trust Code] shall be with the court exercising probate jurisdiction.” The Marion County probate court has the power to hear and determine trust eases and, thus, had subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. See, e.g., K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 542 (“A juvenile court indeed has exclusive jurisdiction over a proceeding alleging a child to be a delinquent child.”); 7 Henry’s Indiana Probate Law and PractiCe § 39.14 (2008) (“The Code places jurisdiction of trust[s] solely in the court exercising probate jurisdiction”).
*953Finally, as for personal jurisdiction, Ind. Trial Rule 4.4(A) reduces analysis of personal jurisdiction to the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Federal Due Process Clause. LinkAmerica Corp. v. Albert, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Ind.2006). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that before a state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). “If the defendant’s contacts with the state are so ‘continuous and systematic’ that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into the courts of that state for any matter, then the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction, even in causes of action unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.” Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)).
If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are not “continuous and systematic,” specific jurisdiction may be asserted if the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 & n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404). Specific jurisdiction requires that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state so that the defendant reasonably anticipates being haled into court there. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). A single contact with the forum state may be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over a defendant, if it creates a “substantial connection” with the forum state and the suit is related to that connection. Id. (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957)). A defendant cannot be haled into a jurisdiction “solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528).
If the defendant has contacts with the forum state sufficient for general or specific jurisdiction, due process requires that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is reasonable. Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528). The assertion of personal jurisdiction will rarely be found unreasonable if “minimum contacts” are found. Id. Reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a defendant is determined by balancing five factors:
(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenience and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Id. at 968 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528). These considerations come into play only if the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to assert personal jurisdiction. Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)).
First American Bank of Virginia v. Reilly, 563 N.E.2d 142 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), is instructive on this issue. In Reilly, Robert Anderson, who resided in Virginia, executed a will that created a trust through which his residuary estate would *954pass. 563 N.E.2d at 143. The will named First American Bank (“Bank”) as trustee. Id, Anderson died a resident of Indiana, and the will was probated in Indiana. Id. The Bank declined appointment as executor and did not appear or participate as a party in the probate proceedings. Id. at 143-144. The co-administratrix transferred the residuary estate to the Bank in Virginia. Id. at 143.
Reilly, the beneficiary, resided in New Jersey. Id. at 144. Later, Reilly filed a petition in Indiana seeking to declare the trust null and void, and the Bank filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and the doctrine of forum non-conve-niens, which the trial court denied. Id.
On appeal, we held that “a nonresident trustee may not be called upon to defend in this or any other state unless it has had the litigation related ‘minimal contacts’ with the state that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over it.” Id. (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238-39, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). The Bank transacted no business in Indiana, had no offices in Indiana, and did not appear or acquiesce in an exercise of jurisdiction during the probate proceedings. Id. at 144-145. The trust assets were not held or administered in this state, and the trust document itself was not created in Indiana. Id. at 145. “The Bank’s agreement to act as trustee, without a showing of any pre-existing involvement or a continuing connection with the state such as administrative oversight of the trust simply [did] not evince the kind of deliberate contact required of First American.” Id. (footnote omitted). Further, personal jurisdiction was not established by the fact that Anderson died in Indiana, leaving assets that eventually passed into the trust. Id. We noted that “[a]t the time the Indiana probate court had jurisdiction over Mr. Anderson’s estate, it did not have personal jurisdiction over [the Bank], Title did not vest in [the Bank] as trustee until the trust estate was delivered to it in Virginia....” Id. at 145-146. We concluded that the Bank did not have “the sufficient minimum contacts necessary for an exercise of in personam jurisdiction.” Id. at 145.
Here, Alford’s will, which created the trust, was probated in Indiana at Lyons’s request. Lyons was the personal representative and was named as trustee in the will. Lyons is a resident of Virginia and has administered the trust in Virginia. All of the trust’s records are maintained in Virginia, and the trust files tax returns in Virginia. The beneficiaries of the trust reside in Indiana.
While Lyons’s payments to the Indiana beneficiaries and the Indiana third-party service providers are insufficient to establish the necessary minimum contacts, I conclude that his actions of admitting Alford’s will to probate and serving as personal representative are sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in Indiana.4 Unlike in First American Bank, Lyons appeared and acquiesced in the exercise of personal jurisdiction during the probate *955proceedings. As a result of his activities, Lyons should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Indiana. I thus conclude that the Marion County probate court had personal jurisdiction over Lyons. Having concluded that the probate court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction, I disagree with the majority and would hold that the court erred by granting Lyons’s motion to dismiss.

. These statutes fall within what was formerly described as jurisdiction over the particular case. See Packard v. Shoopman, 852 N.E.2d 927, 929-930 (Ind.2006) (observing that " 'jurisdiction over the particular case’ is something of a misnomer and refers to failure to meet procedural requirements but does not constitute a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction in the sense that the court cannot hear cases of the same general class”).

. The majority also cites to Ind.Code § 30-4-6-3. However, that statute concerns venue, not jurisdiction.

. Courts have held that payments made to an Indiana beneficiary by a foreign trustee do not establish the necessary minimum contacts. See, e.g., Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252, 78 S.Ct. at 1239 (holding that trust income payments made by trustee to settlor in Florida did not confer personal jurisdiction); Rose v. Firstar Bank, 819 A.2d 1247, 1252 (R.I.2003) (holding that the bank trustee’s periodic mailings of trust-account statements and checks to the beneficiaries together with occasional telephone calls did not establish personal jurisdiction in home state of beneficiaries); see also Saler v. Irick, 800 N.E.2d 960, 972 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (holding that the Indiana courts did not have in rem jurisdiction over annuities even though the decedent received income from the annuities in Indiana).