Court Opinion

ID: 9405487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 18:00:46.861258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:23.926359
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                                                                          JUN 28 2023
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS LOPEZ-PALOMARES,                           No. 21-236
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A205-712-421
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted June 7, 2023**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, HAMILTON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.***

      Petitioner Luis Lopez-Palomares, a citizen of Mexico, challenges the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal from the

Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States Circuit Judge for
the Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

      Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them

here except as necessary to provide context. We review legal questions de novo

and factual determinations for substantial evidence. Tomczyk v. Garland, 25

F.4th 638, 643 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (citing Ixcot v. Holder, 646 F.3d 1202,

1206 (9th Cir. 2011)). Because the BIA affirmed the decision of the IJ and

incorporated portions of the IJ’s decision, “we treat the incorporated parts of the

IJ’s decision as the BIA’s.” Maie v. Garland, 7 F.4th 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2021).

      1. Assuming Petitioner did not waive his challenge to the BIA’s finding

that he failed to establish a causal nexus between a protected ground and the

persecution he fears, substantial evidence supports that finding. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (requiring asylum applicants to show that a protected ground

is “at least one central reason” for persecution); id. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (requiring

withholding applicants to show that a protected ground is “a reason” for

persecution). Petitioner fears persecution on account of membership in the

particular social group of his family. He testified that one of his brothers was

severely beaten and another brother was kidnapped by unknown perpetrators in

their hometown of Leon, and he believes that the perpetrators of those attacks

will harm him if he returns to Mexico. However, the record does not compel

the conclusion that Petitioner would be targeted based on his association with

his brothers.

      2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that

                                        2                                    21-236
Petitioner has not established that he is more likely than not to be tortured by or

with the acquiescence of the Mexican government if removed. See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.16(c)(1)–(2), 1208.18(a)(1). Petitioner argues that his testimony and

country reports show widespread organized crime and corruption in the

Mexican government. But “generalized evidence of violence and crime in

Mexico is not particular to Petitioner[] and is insufficient to meet th[e]

standard” for CAT relief. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152

(9th Cir. 2010); see also Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir.

2008) (requiring applicants for CAT relief to show a “particularized threat of

torture” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 936

(9th Cir. 2004))).

      PETITION DENIED.

                                        3                                    21-236