Court Opinion

ID: 9538770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:41:28.626767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:09.279830
License: Public Domain

Petition for Rehearing
Before Brand*, Chief Justice, and Rossman, Lusk, Latourette**, Warner and Tooze, Justices.
BRAND, J.
*332We are confronted by a deplorable situation. On 21 September 1950 tbe petitioner Huffman was sentenced to serve a maximum term of three years. The petition for habeas corpus was not filed until 22 August 1951. The case was put at issue in the circuit court on 17 September 1951. It was not tried until 8 February 1952. The appeal was put at issue in this court on 7 July 1952, five months later. On 13 August this court advanced the case for hearing and heard it on 2 September 1952. For the first time, we are now informed by counsel that the plaintiff was discharged from custody 20 days after the case was argued here, and considerably before this court had completed its study of the varied and profoundly important issues presented. Working thus in the dark, we have expended time and effort in a case which became moot 20 days after we had heard the argument.
The office of habeas corpus is to give to a person, restrained of his liberty, an immediate hearing. OCLA, § 11-413; 39 CJS, Habeas Corpus, § 4, and cases cited. The employment of the Great Writ in this case has resulted in no relief to the prisoner and has uselessly clogged the docket of this court. An opinion upon the merits had been written and published, and a petition for rehearing filed and studied by this court before we were notified that the case had become moot.
 The petition for rehearing is presented by the Attorney General. He “applauds” the views expressed by the court upon the merits, and seeks a rehearing only to a question of procedure. He agrees that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, if no other remedy exists, but now for the first time he suggests that a motion to vacate the judgment in the nature of coram nobis was the only proper procedure in this case. As an *333alternative, lie suggests that there was a remedy under the statutes, authorizing new trials in criminal cases. If the matter were now of any importance to the petitioner Huffman, we would hold that the procedural challenge to the employment of habeas corpus comes too late. We find no evidence that it was presented in the trial court, and it was not urged in this court until after the decision of the case. This case being now moot, the question for our consideration is whether we should pass upon the contentions of the Attorney General because of public interest, not in this case, but in the questions of procedural law which are presented. The discretionary right of this court to pass upon questions of public importance which have become moot is recognized by the authorities. In re Suspension of License by Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 180 Or 495, 177 P2d 406; 3 Am Jur, Appeal and Error, § 733, P 310. There may be further reason for considering the petition because of the fact, as certified by the Attorney General, that the petitioner Huffman, for reasons unknown to us, and in December of 1952, filed a motion in the nature of coram nobis in the Lincoln County circuit court, in which court he was convicted. Under all of the circumstances, we have decided to put at rest the issues presented by the Attorney General in order that the procedural questions may be removed from uncertainty. The petition presents matters which merit consideration and which may also suggest the desirability of remedial legislation.
Only once has the writ of error coram nobis been directly before this court. In State v. Rathie, 101 Or 368, 200 P 790, one who had been convicted of murder in the first degree attempted to sue out a writ of error coram nobis in the circuit court of Umatilla County, *334in which court the defendant had been convicted. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the proceeding and an appeal was taken to this court, where the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. In a brief opinion the court said:
“By Section 1603, Or. L. [now OCLA, § 26-1301], all writs of error and of certiorari are abolished in criminal cases.”
The statute upon which the court expressly relied reads as follows:
“Writs of errors and of certiorari in criminal actions are abolished, and hereafter the only mode of reviewing a judgment or order in a criminal action is that prescribed by this chapter.” OCLA, § 26-1301. (Italics ours.)
The next section of the statute reads as follows:
“The party aggrieved, whether the state or the defendant, may appeal from a judgment in a criminal action in the cases prescribed in this chapter and not otherwise.” OCLA, § 26-1302.
Speaking of OCLA, § 26-1301, the court said:
“This section is plainly fatal to appellants’ contention here, and the order of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.”
The defendant argues that State v. Rathie does not deny the existence of a remedy in the nature of coram nobis in this state. He asserts that, although the application was denominated a petition for writ of error coram nobis, it was actually a petition for a retrial for newly discovered evidence. The record shows, however, that the petition was filed more than eight months after judgment of conviction and the right to file a motion for a new trial had long since expired. The proceeding was a petition for a writ of error coram nobis or it was nothing, and there is *335nothing to indicate that the decision of the court would have been any different if, instead of denominating the petition as one for writ of error coram nobis, it had been denominated a motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis. The decision of this court in State v. Rathie was not based upon any insufficiency of the facts pleaded. On the contrary, the decision is a clear construction of statute, which declares that hereafter the only mode of reviewing a judgment or order in a criminal action is that prescribed by chapter 13 of Title 26 (OCLA, §§ 26-1301 to 26-1332 inclusive.) The chapter in question constitutes a code complete within itself, and the provisions of the civil code in reference to appeals do not apply to criminal actions. State v. Berger, 51 Or 166, 94 P 181; State v. Stone, 178 Or 268, 166 P2d 980, and cases there cited. The point of the case is that, by statute, the field has been preempted by a code which establishes exclusive procedure for the review of judgments and criminal cases.
From the case of Boyd v. Smyth, 200 Iowa 687, 205 NW 522, 43 ALR 1381, we quote the following:
“In a later Ohio case, State v. Hayslip, 90 Ohio St. 199, 107 N.E. 335, the court said:
“ ‘We find that in Ohio the common-law writs and pleas are designated and defined by statute just as crimes are designated and defined by statute. The writs of coram nobis and coram vobis, which are invoked in behalf of the defendants in error, are no part of the criminal jurisprudence of the state of Ohio.’
“Following this line of logic, it is to be noted by an inspection of our Code that it is a complete Criminal Code in itself, making provision for various pleas; also for motions for new trial, in arrest of judgment, and giving the defendant the right of appeal. Under our practice, when a crimi*336nal case is appealed, the duty of the Supreme Court is to review the errors, if any, in the record. In effect, under the Iowa practice the appeal in a criminal case has the same force and effect as does a writ of error in the courts where the same is used. It follows that, the Legislature having provided a complete Criminal Code, and not having provided for any writ of error coram nobis, such writ- is not available under the practice in this state.
“In Coppock v. Reed, 189 Iowa 581, 178 N.W. 382, 10 A.L.R. 1407, an action in equity was brought to expunge and correct a record in a criminal case that had been tried several years before, in which Coppock was the defendant. In the discussion of that case this court said:
“ ‘Certainly, this may not be done through the writ of error coram nobis; for that does not lie, even if available in this state, to correct an issue of fact which has been adjudicated, nor for an alleged false testimony at the trial; * * * nor for newly discovered evidence’—citing authority.
“However, we are not disposed to dig into the musty archives of the past to resurrect and revivify ancient and worn out writs that have long since been discarded and forgotten.”
The principle thus announced in the cases cited is as applicable to a motion in the nature of coram nobis as to the ancient writ itself. This was made clear by the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Harper, 220 Iowa 515, 258 NW 886. In that case an appeal was taken from the refusal of the court to entertain a motion for a new trial after the expiration of the term of court at which sentence had been pronounced. The motion was designated a “ ‘motion in arrest of judgment and for new trial and for writ of error coram nobis or other review.’ ” The court said:
“In so far as the motion may be treated as an application for writ of error eoram nobis or other *337review, it could not be entertained because this court has held that our code of criminal procedure is complete in itself and that common law proceedings not embraced in the code are not available, and has especially held that the writ of error coram nobis has been abolished. * * *”
In Michigan a similar rule was announced in Dewey v. Otsego Circuit Judge, 250 Mich 377, 230 NW 180. The question related to the duty of a court to grant a writ of error coram vobis. The court cited Boyd v. Smyth, supra, and said:
“The common-law writ of error coram vobis has never obtained in this State, having been rendered obsolete by statutory methods of correcting error. * * *
“To direct the circuit judge to make review ‘in the nature of a writ of error coram vobis,’ would award plaintiff review in the nature of a motion for a new trial long after right to make such a motion has been lost by delay.”
A remedy by motion in the nature of coram nobis is available in the state of New York where it was held that the court has inherent power which the legislature can neither curtail nor abolish and which authorizes a court “to correct its own record or to set aside an order or judgment which was induced by fraud or procured in violation of a constitutional right of a party.” People v. Gersewitz, 294 NY 163, 61 NE2d 427. However, the question decided in that case was whether an appeal would lie from an order denying the motion in the nature of coram nobis. It was held that there was no constitutional right to an appeal and since the legislature had provided none, no such right existed. The court said:
“ ‘It has repeatedly been held that the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of this state in crimi*338nal eases is purely statutory; and, of course, such jurisdiction can never be assumed, unless a statute can be found which expressly sanctions its exercise.’ ”
The matter was said to be in the hands of the legislature. See People ex rel Sedlak v. Foster, 299 NY 291, 86 NE2d 752, 59 NYS2d 477. Subsequently a right of appeal in New York was provided by statute. See Matter of Bojinoff v. People, 299 NY 145, 85 NE2d 909; McKinney’s Consol Laws of NY Ann, § 517, and 1947 amendment, 1952 Cumulative Pocket Part, § 517. See also People v. Adamson, 33 Cal2d 286, 201 P2d 537. If we had followed the New York theory on inherent power, it would have availed the petitioner in this case nothing, for Oregon has provided no right of appeal from any such order. "We find no statute authorizing an appeal from an order on motion made after the time for such motion has expired and not appearing in a judgment roll. OCLA, § 26-1304. This absence of any right of appeal confirms our view that a motion in the nature of coram nobis, if it is available ever or at all, should not be declared to be the sole remedy for the vindication of constitutional right to the exclusion of the ancient writ of habeas corpus. The New York court in People v. Gersewitz, supra, recognized that “Habeas Corpus proceedings are the traditional remedy” in such cases.
Other considerations support our conclusion that habeas corpus was a proper remedy in the pending case. The only relief which can be granted under a petition for a writ of error eoram nobis is the setting aside of judgment and the granting of a new trial. The modern substitute by motion is in the nature of an application for new trial. As we have said, the Oregon legislature has provided a complete criminal code *339covering the right of appeal and the right to a new trial. The provisions of chapters 7 and 8 of Title 5 OCLA have been incorporated in the criminal code by reference. OCLA, § 26-1001. The incorporated portion of the civil code expressly limits the time within which a motion for a new trial may be made, as well as the time within which a new trial may be granted upon the court’s own motion. OCLA, §5-803 and OCLA, § 5-806. This court has held in a criminal case that a motion for a new trial must be filed within the time prescribed. State v. Hecker, 109 Or 520, 221 P 808. We would be' reluctant to adopt as a general rule that one who has been convicted in violation of constitutional rights is without remedy merely because of his failure to act within 30 days. No such limitation has ever been imposed upon the employment of the writ of habeas corpus, yet, that identical result was reached in the leading case of People v. Reid, 195 Cal 249, 232 P 457, 460, when the relief sought was in the nature of coram nobis. The court said:
“Appellant concedes that the provision of a statutory remedy impliedly displaces the common-law remedy to the extent that the former is available, but argues that where the statutory remedy is unavailable by reason of the statute of limitations applicable thereto, that the common-law remedy should then be applied. He argues that because the defendant did not discover the facts here relied upon until too late to present them in support of Ms motion for new trial, the statutory remedy should be deemed ‘unavailable,’ and the common-law remedy should therefore be resorted to. He cites no authority which supports this conclusion and we are convinced that it is not sound. Where the Legislature has provided a statutory remedy which supplants in whole or in part a corresponding common-law remedy, and has appended *340thereto a statute of limitations different from that which governs the common-law remedy, there is presented the situation of a conflict between the common law and the statute, in which case the latter must prevail. To hold in such case that after the expiration of the statutory limit the common-law remedy could still be availed of would be to hold in effect that in case of conflict between the two the common law prevails over the statute. * * *”
The ancient writ of error coram nobis was a common-law device designed to bring before a trial court a judgement previously rendered by it for the purpose of review or modification on account of some error of fact and not of law affecting the validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which was not brought into issue at the trial. 24 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1606, p 143.
“While the writ is recognized as an existing common-law remedy in some jurisdictions, it is almost obsolete, and in other jurisdictions has been abolished by statute or superseded by statutory remedies, at least as to so much of its former scope as is comprehended in and covered by the statutory remedies, and hence is not available under the practice in some states; but the same purpose is attained now in some of these jurisdictions by filing a motion to set aside the judgment, or a statutory petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, although in appropriate circumstances the common-law writ may still properly issue. Statutes abolishing the common-law writ and authorizing correction of errors in fact, correctable by such writ, on motion or petition, do not abolish the essentials of the proceeding under such writ * * 24 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1606, p 144. And see 31 Am Jur, Judgments, § 798-812.
Iowa, Michigan and Oregon are listed in the notes to the text as states in which the remedy is not avail*341able. Where the procedure by motion is recognized, the scope of the remedy is determined by the decisions under the common-law writ.
When the writ coram nobis came into general use there was no remedy by appeal or motion for new trial. People v. Reid, supra. However, some of the states which have enacted complete criminal codes similar to OCLA, § 26-1301 et seq., have also continued to recognize the availability of common-law relief by motion in the nature of coram nobis, with confusion and uncertainty as the result. In other jurisdictions, post-conviction statutes have been passed which take the place of all proceedings in the nature of coram nobis and which eliminate much of the uncertainty as to the scope of that remedy. Illinois Revised Statutes, 1947 (State Bar Association Edition), ch 110, § 196, p 2539; Jones Illinois Statutes Annotated, 1934-1949, Cumulative Supplement, §§ 37.835-37.841, inclusive. Under the federal practice a post-conviction procedure in the nature of coram nobis is now authorized by statute. It is available when sentence has been imposed in violation of constitutional right, but applies only to convictions in federal courts. USCA, Title 28, § 2255.
The common-law writ, in its original form, was one of narrow scope, as compared to habeas corpus, and where statutory procedure by motion has been substituted for the writ, the scope of relief is still subject to many of the limitations which controlled the ancient writ. The common-law remedy was adopted in Nebraska by statute, insofar as that remedy was not inconsistent with constitution or statutory provisions. The writ was therefore held available in that jurisdiction. Swanson v. State, 148 Neb 155, 26 NW2d 595. *342But, it was also held that the writ was not available where the code provides a remedy. Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb 84, 261 NW 339, and the narrow restrictions which existed at common law were still recognized under the modern procedure in Nebraska. In Hawk v. State, 151 Neb 717, 39 NW2d 561, the court said:
“Where the facts alleged are known to the applicant before or during the progress of the trial, or could have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the writ must be denied.”
The same requirement of reasonable diligence as a prerequisite for relief in the nature of coram nobis is generally recognized in the modern procedure analogous to the old writ. Alexander v. State, 20 Wyo 241, 123 P 68; Dobbs v. State, 63 Kan 321, 65 P 658; People v. James, 99 Cal App2d 476, 222 P2d 117. The James case, supra, resembled the one at bar in many respects. The court cited many authorities to the effect that the remedy by motion is one of narrow scope, available only when no other remedy exists, and when the petitioner could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have discovered the alleged violation of his constitutional rights at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ. The court held that the applicant was precluded from asserting the irregularity of procedures, by his failure to move to quash the information pursuant to the authority of statute. See 31 Am Jur, Judgments, § 806; People v. Reid, supra. In People v. Ingles, 97 Cal App2d 867, 218 P2d 987, the court observed that habeas corpus has been held available in situations where the defendant was not given the opportunity to have the advice of counsel, and did not waive such right.
Another' limitation upon the scope of the remedy in the nature of coram nobis is found in the rule that *343the writ or equivalent motion is never granted to relieve from circumstances arising subsequent to the judgment. Collins v. State, 66 Kan 201, 71 P 251; 31 Am Jur, Judgments, § 3804. This rule alone would render coram nobis unavailable in the pending case because one of the issues related to the alleged unconstitutional deprivation of the right to appeal from the judgment. Again, the authorities are in conflict as to whether there is any time limit upon the right to proceed in this manner against the judgment. People v Richetti, 302 NY 290, 97 NE2d 908; People v. James, supra; 24 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1606c (3), p 153. The authorities are also in disagreement as to whether coram nobis would lie after affirmance on appeal. People v. Reid, supra, and Smith v. Buchanan, 291 Ky 44, 163 SW 5 (contra.)
The coexistence of a complete code of appellate procedure, with the remedy in the nature of coram nobis, and with the constitutional remedy of habeas corpus, has produced uncertainty among the members of the bar, and extreme difficulty in the courts, in their attempt to determine when relief in the nature of coram nobis is available and when it is not. In any event, it is clear that the adoption of the codes has resulted in a drastic narrowing in the scope of relief by motion in the nature of coram nobis. There is much with which we agree in a recent opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas. We quote:
“We need not say here that under no circumstances is the writ longer available under our procedure. But we are not now aware of a situation where adequate remedies are not provided by our comprehensive codes of civil and criminal procedure—by motions for new trial, on any of the many grounds enumerated in the statutes (Gr.S. *3441935,60-3001; 62-1603); for arrest of judgment (G.S. 1935, 62-1605, 62-1606); by petition for rehearing on account of newly discovered grounds for new trial (G.S. 1935, 60-3005); by proceedings to vacate or modify judgments (G.S. 1935, 60-3007); for vacation of void judgments (G.S. 1935, 60-3009); for appellate review (G.S. 1935, 60-3302 et seq.; 62-1701 et seq.); and in addition the relief afforded in habeas corpus proceedings (G.S. 1935, 60-2201 et seq. * * *” State v. Miller, 161 Kan 210, 166 P2d 680.
An apt illustration of the confusion which has arisen with reference to the proper procedure may be found in People v. Rothrock, 14 Cal2d 34, 92 P2d 634. In that ease defendant had been convicted of several crimes. Being reasonably uncertain as to his remedy he filed motions for writ of coram nobis, writ of audita querela, writ of habeas corpus, writ of certiorari, recall of remittitur, revocation and annulment of judgment, and “for further relief.” We should avoid the anomalous situation which arises when, in the same jurisdiction, similar relief is given under coram nobis and under habeas corpus, yet where it is held that relief in the nature of coram nobis is available only when there is no other remedy and that relief in habeas corpus is also available only when there is no other remedy, a situation which exists in a neighboring state. We conclude that the suggested remedy in the nature of eoram nobis would not have been adequate, and was not available to plaintiff, and in any event, that habeas corpus was the appropriate procedure. State v. Turpin, 255 Wis 358, 38 NW2d 495.
It is suggested that both before and after our decision in State v. Rathie, supra, 101 Or 368, 200 P 790, this court has recognized the propriety of a motion in the nature of coram nobis. Reliance is placed upon *345State v. Lillie, 172 Or 194, 139 P2d 576; State v. Donahue, 75 Or 409, 144 P 755, 147 P 548; and State v. Fiester, 32 Or 254, 50 P 561. It should be unnecessary for this court to point out the distinction between the cases last cited and the case at bar. In all three of the cases cited the court entered an order nunc pro tunc to correct or amplify the record so as to make it show the truth as to what was actually done in open court. In State v. Lillie, supra, we held that the error which was corrected by the nunc pro tunc order was merely clerical or ministerial. We cited State v. Lillie with approval in our original opinion in the pending case, and said, “if the judicial record does not correctly state what occurred in court, the proper remedy is by motion to correct the record. ’ ’ In the case at bar, the attempt was not merely to correct clerical error concerning events in open court, but was to invalidate the proceedings in court by evidence concerning events before and after the court proceedings were had. In none of the three cases did the court have before it a claim of violation of constitutional right supported by evidence of conduct outside of court and tending to invalidate but not to contradict the judicial record.
As against the remedy of coram nobis, we find a wealth of authority to the effect that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy in cases of this nature. We quote from People v. Adamson, 34 Cal2d 320, 210 P2d 13, a recent en banc decision of the Supreme Court of California:
“With expansion of the function of habeas corpus in this state, an application for that writ has become the proper remedy to attack collaterally a judgment of conviction which has been obtained in violation of fundamental constitutional rights. Thus, the appropriate writ to secure relief from a *346judgment of conviction obtained by the use of false testimony known by the prosecution to be false is not coram nobis but habeas corpus (in re Lindley, supra, page 725 of 29 Cal.2d, page 928 of 177 P.2d; see People v. Mooney (1918), 178 Cal. 525, 174 P. 325; Mooney v. Holohan (1934), 294 U.S. 103, 113, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406; In re Mooney (1937), 10 Cal.2d 1, 73 P.2d 554), although coram nobis has been used for this purpose (see People v. Kirk (1946), 76 Cal.App.2d 496, 498, 173 P.2d 367). And habeas corpus, not a non-statutory motion to vacate the judgment (in the nature of a petition for coram nobis), is the proper proceeding to raise the question of systematic, discriminatory exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury which indicted defendant, a Negro. (See People v. Montgomery (1942), 51 Cal.App.2d 444, 125 P.2d 108.) Habeas corpus can be used to advance the contention of denial of the right to counsel, at least where no other remedy is available. (See in re Egan (1944), 24 Cal.2d 323, 337, 149 P.2d 693, 701 [‘It may be assumed that a petitioner would be entitled to release on habeas corpus if he could show that deprivation of counsel resulted in an unfair trial or in substance in no trial at all’]; In re Jingles (1946), 27 Cal.2d 496, 498, 165 P.2d 12 [proceeds directly to consideration of the merits of the contention, without discussing whether the writ is a proper remedy]; In re Tedford (1948), 31 Cal.2d 693, 192 P.2d 3 [same]; In re McCoy (1948), 32 Cal.2d 73, 194 P.2d 531 [habeas corpus is available where petitioner has no other adequate remedy]; * *
Petitioner v. O’Leary, 325 Mass 179, 89 NE2d 769; Ex parte Dooley, Tex Cr App (1952), 246 SW 2d 631; Ex parte McCune, Tex Cr. App (1952), 246 SW2d 171; Ex parte Peaker, 82 Okl Cr 360, 170 P2d 264; Ex parte Wallace, 24 Cal2d 933, 152 P2d 1; Ex parte Pennington, 71 Okl Cr 263, 110 P2d 923; Horner v. *347Webb, 19 Wash2d 51, 141 P2d 151; In re Davis, 78 Okl Cr 444, 150 P2d 367; People v. Montgomery, 51 Cal App2d 444, 125 P2d 108; Ex parte Wilkerson, 72 Okl Cr 301, 115 P2d 923; Ex parte Stinnett, 71 Okl Cr 184, 110 P2d 310; Ex parte Massey, Tex Cr App (1952), 249 SW2d 599.
In onr original opinion we intimated that one who had been convicted in violation of his constitutional rights would be entitled to his discharge. The Attorney General construes our statement as meaning that further prosecution would be impossible, no matter how guilty a defendant had been. No such construction of our opinion is warranted. Habeas corpus functions only to discharge from illegal confinement. What rights the state may have after such discharge is a question which is not before us. But see OCLA, § 11-418; Ex parte Wilkerson, supra; and In re Stevens, 81 Okl Cr 65, 160 P2d 415.
It is also contended in the petition for rehearing that even if a motion in the nature of coram nobis is not available, the plaintiff had an adequate remedy under the statutory motion for new trial. We have already indicated that the right to move for a new trial within 30 days of conviction would not, in this case, constitute an adequate remedy.
The Attorney General suggests one consideration of serious import. We think, however, that it relates to a matter of legislative policy. He points out that the use of habeas corpus, under our present statute, OCLA, § 11-442, may impose heavy burdens upon the circuit court of Marion County, in which county the penitentiary is located. If the flood of petitions for habeas corpus, (90 per cent of which have been found *348to be unwarranted or fraudulent), should engulf the courts of Oregon, as has happened elsewhere, there would be some merit to this point. It is also true that extreme inconvenience may arise in securing in Marion County, the attendance, when necessary, of the officials of the convicting court. If the problem becomes sufficiently serious, the remedy lies with the legislature, either to amend the venue statute, or to enact a post-conviction statute, clearly defining the respective areas of habeas corpus, and of the suggested new procedure. Much of the difficulty suggested by counsel may be removed by a statutory provision such as that found in the federal laws providing that:
“On the hearing of an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment the certificate of the judge who presided at the trial resulting in the judgment, setting forth the facts occurring at the trial, shall be admissible in evidence. Copies of the certificate shall be filed with the court in which the application is pending and in the court in which the trial took place.” 28 USCA, § 2245, p 319.
“On application for a writ of habeas corpus,, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits, are admitted any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants, or to file answering affidavits.” 28 TJSCA, § 2246. See also Illinois Post-conviction Statute, cited supra.
Counsel argues that “Legislation can not help” the situation because, forsooth, the legislature “has forbidden the use of habeas corpus in these cases by plain words.” We know of no impediment to a legislative enlargement to the scope of habeas corpus if that should be necessary. However, our original opinion *349has, we hope, made it crystal clear that habeas corpus was an appropriate remedy in the pending case.
Unless, and until, remedial legislation becomes necessary and is enacted, we are firmly of the opinion that we should not put shackles on the one writ which stands as the great guarantee to all men of justice under law. As said in Price v. Johnston, 334 US 266, 92 L ed 1356, “The writ of habeas corpus should be left sufficiently elastic so that a court may in the exercise of its proper jurisdiction, deal effectively with any and all forms of illegal restraint.” Again it is said, “It must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.” Bowen v. Johnston, 306 US 19, 83 L ed 455. We must also shape our procedural apparatus so as to comply with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in Young v. Ragen, 337 US 235, 93 L ed 1333, where it is said:
“We recognize the difficulties with which the Illinois Supreme Court is faced in adapting available state procedures to the requirement that prisoners be given some clearly defined method by which they may raise claims of denial of federal rights. Nevertheless, that requirement must be met. * * *”
We venture one concluding suggestion. Habeas corpus has become the prevailing means by which the federal courts have inquired into the constitutional validity of criminal proceedings in state courts. The federal judges have been plagued by constant and almost endless litigation involving claims and counter claims as to what is the proper procedure in the respective states. The federal courts must, under their rules, determine, in cases coming before them, *350whether the petitioner for habeas corpus has exhausted his state remedy. The books are full of cases suggesting the existence of a judicial game of battledore and shuttlecock, wherein claimants, over long periods of years, are tossed from state to federal, and back to state, and again to federal courts, in the protracted attempt to determine by what procedure relief should be given, assuming that it is merited. That the situation could become intolerable is illustrated by a study of the cases which originated in Illinois and have gone thence to federal courts. See also United States v. Snyder, 183 F2d 742.
These considerations suggest that, at least, in the absence of any legislation, this state should assimilate its procedure in these cases, as nearly as may be, to that of the federal courts, who, from time to time review our decisions, and that we should declare what is the proper state remedy. In Darr v. Burford, 339 US 200, 94 L ed 761, the United States Supreme Court said:
“The writ of habeas corpus commands general recognition as the essential remedy to safeguard a citizen against imprisonment by State or Nation in violation of his constitutional rights. * * *”
In harmony with this declaration, we hold that habeas corpus was the proper remedy in the case which was presented to us, and that there was no other adequate remedy. We hold further, that convicted persons should exhaust their remedies in the nature of an appeal and by motion for a new trial before resorting to habeas corpus, whenever on the facts of the case, either of those procedures would provide an adequate remedy.
The motion for rehearing is denied and the action is dismissed.