Court Opinion

ID: 9487710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:24:12.236104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:26.420627
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority concludes that the Attorney General has the statutory authority to detain indefinitely an excludable alien who practicably cannot be deported. Because no statute grants such authority, and because I believe that the indefinite detention of an excludable alien violates due process, I dissent.
1. LACK OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
As Judge Noonan pointed out in the decision of the three-judge panel, 21 F.3d 314 (9th Cir.1994), there is no statute that explicitly authorizes the Attorney General to detain indefinitely an excludable alien who practicably cannot be deported. The majority argues that this authority is implicit. Drawing from an amalgam of immigration statutes, the majority cobbles together the semblance of such authority.
But these statutes only authorize the Attorney General to detain excludable aliens for a period. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) allows the detention of aliens who appear to be excludable for “further inquiry.” After such inquiry, the detention under § 1225(b) has served its purpose, and further detention is not authorized. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides for the return of an excludable alien on parole to “the custody from which he was paroled.” The custody from which Barrera was paroled was detention pending deportation, not permanent detention. Finally, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) speaks only to the allocation of the costs of detaining an excludable alien who practicably cannot be deported. Nowhere do these statutes give the Attorney General any license to extend the period of detention into perpetuity.
The fact that Congress failed to pass legislation explicitly limiting the duration of detention of excludable aliens should not be taken as its approval of detention for an indefinite period. In arguing for indefinite detention, the Government relies on Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953). However, Mezei, also an excludable alien, whom no country would accept, had been detained on Ellis Island for two years when the Supreme Court heard his case; afterwards, he was detained for two more years before being released and allowed to enter the United States. I am not aware of any ease that involved the imprisonment for more than eight years of an excludable alien who has not been convicted of any crime.
The majority attempts to re-charaeterize Barrera’s indefinite confinement as “a series of one-year periods of detention followed by an opportunity to plead his case anew.” *1452However, the reality is that the INS can successively deny parole, as it has in Barrera’s case. Practically, Barrera’s detention is indefinite.
Because there is no explicit statutory authority that allows Barrera’s indefinite detention, the majority argues that limiting the time period of the detention of an excludable alien would invite foreign leaders to “compel us to grant physical admission via parole to any aliens he wished by the simple expedient of sending them here and then refusing to take them back.” (Citations omitted.) This argument overlooks the fact that foreign leaders such as Fidel Castro simply could care less whether we imprison or set , free their former imprisoned citizens. The prolonged detention of Mariel Cubans has had no deterrent effect on Castro’s mission to frustrate our foreign policy. In the meantime, individuals such as Barrera have languished in our prisons after having completed their sentence for any previously committed offenses.
2. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROLONGED DETENTION
The majority summarily disposes of Barrera’s constitutional challenge to his confinement by concluding that excludable aliens do not possess any due process rights. The majority cites Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, 73 S.Ct. at 629, for support. However, in Mezei, the Supreme Court explained that the Attorney General may exclude aliens without a hearing when the exclusion is based on confidential information, the disclosure of which may be prejudicial to the public interest. Id. at 210-11, 73 S.Ct. at 628. No such national security concerns are implicated in Barrera’s case.
Moreover, the Supreme Court almost 100 years ago held that excludable aliens have some due process rights. In Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238, 16 S.Ct. 977, 981, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896) the Court held that excludable aliens may not be imprisoned at hard labor without due process of law. More recently, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) the Court clearly stated that “civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” (Emphasis added.)
In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), the Supreme Court held that detention constitutes punishment if the detention appears “excessive” in relation to any alternative purpose. See also Foucha v. Louisiana, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1784, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (even if the initial commitment was permissible, it cannot constitutionally continue after that basis no longér exists). As Judge Noonan reasoned, eight years of imprisonment is excessive for someone who has not committed any federal nor state crimes in that period.
The majority points out that courts have long held that excludable aliens may be detained pending deportation. However, because Barrera practicably cannot be deported, the purported purpose of his detention no longer obtains. The Government does not need to keep Barrera in custody to conduct an “inquiry into [his] true character,” Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235, 16 S.Ct. at 280, while he awaits deportation because there is nowhere for him to go but the United States. In fact, the Government has already surveyed him extensively during his eight years of incarceration. He has been evaluated by psychiatrists at Lompoc and at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital.
These medical evaluations explain the difficulties Barrera encountered while in federal custody. He can be anxious, depressed, and even irritable. While his temperament may require some supervision, Barrera does not deserve to be imprisoned indefinitely.
Thus, the district court’s order requiring Barrera’s release to a halfway house offers the best solution. Judge Noonan aptly summarized the legal and moral basis for the original panel’s decision: “In our society no person may be imprisoned for many years without prospect of termination. The rights of the human person must be vindicated as part of the common good of our society.” I agree, and therefore dissent.