Court Opinion

ID: 9414733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 16:12:16.838261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:58.329979
License: Public Domain

J-S14025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                    :
                v.                                  :
                                                    :
                                                    :
  COLIN WILLIAM ABBOTT                              :
                                                    :
                       Appellant                    :   No. 857 WDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 30, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-10-CR-0001863-2011

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                            FILED: August 2, 2023

       Appellant, Colin William Abbott, appeals from the post-conviction court’s

order denying his first, timely petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.                Appellant presents seven

issues on review, all of which relate to his claim that trial counsel ineffectively

failed to seek dismissal of all charges due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct

designed to undermine the attorney-client relationship. We affirm.

                                               I.

       In June of 2011, Appellant murdered his father and stepmother, and

attempted to incinerate their corpses. The Commonwealth sought the death

penalty, and the case was set for trial on March 18, 2013. The Commonwealth

eventually offered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of criminal homicide

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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in the third degree, with the caveat that the offer would expire prior to jury

selection.    On February 26, 2013, Appellant accepted.        He waived a pre-

sentence investigation and the parties agreed to have the sentence imposed

the next day.     He received an aggregate sentence of 35 to 80 years of

incarceration.

      On March 11, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea,

claiming that it was not entered voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently, on the

basis that he was originally told he had until March 1, 2013, to accept the deal

but was forced by the trial court to make his decision on February 26, 2013.

He also contended that the sentence date deprived him of the more lenient

“fair and just” standard applicable to attempts to withdraw a plea prior to

sentencing.    See Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1292

(Pa. 2015). The trial court denied relief, finding that Appellant failed to satisfy

the “manifest injustice” standard applicable to post-sentence motions to

withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 383 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (“The standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea after imposition

of sentence is much higher; a showing of prejudice on the order of manifest

injustice is required before withdrawal is properly justified.”) (quotation marks

and citation omitted).

      Appellant appealed, and we affirmed. Commonwealth v. Abbott, No.

708 WDA 2013, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 14, 2013).

We agreed that Appellant failed to establish a manifest injustice. We added

that Appellant’s assertion of manifest injustice was further belied by evidence

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presented at the hearing on the motion to withdraw. The Commonwealth had

presented “nine recorded telephone calls made by Appellant from prison that

the trial court accepted as an exhibit,” wherein “Appellant and his mother

discussed ways to garner publicity and to create judicial ‘chaos’ by filing the

motion to withdraw his plea.” Id. at *7-8.

                                      II.

      Those and other recorded jail calls are significant to Appellant’s PCRA

petition.   Appellant filed a pro se petition on May 27, 2014.       Following

protracted proceedings, an amended petition was filed on February 28, 2020.

In short, the legal claim alleged that the prosecutor assigned to the case,

Assistant District Attorney Ben Simon, committed misconduct by informing

Appellant’s attorney of disparaging comments Appellant made about his

counsel during phone calls. Appellant alleges that this misconduct warranted

dismissal of all charges had trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss. For ease

of discussion, this memorandum will first set forth the testimony adduced at

the evidentiary hearing.

      Appellant gradually became dissatisfied with his privately-retained trial

counsel, Attorney Wendy Williams, beginning with her missing a court hearing

on a motion filed by the Commonwealth. N.T., 7/29/20, at 13, 16. Appellant

was also unhappy that Attorney Williams sent clerical members of her legal

staff to visit him in jail, and that she missed a meeting with police and the

prosecution to review discovery material. Appellant learned of her absence

from the meeting to discuss discovery material when Attorney Kevin Flaherty,

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who was the Chief Public Defender of Butler County and was appointed by the

court to serve as mitigation counsel, arrived to ask if Appellant had heard from

Attorney Williams. When Appellant next spoke to Attorney Williams, she told

him that the meeting date was tentative and had never been finalized. She

told Appellant that ADA Simon was angry at her failure to show and had called

her father in an attempt to find her. Appellant testified that “she thought it

was very inappropriate” that ADA Simon would resort to calling her family

member. Id. at 34.

      Attorney Williams stated that she met with the Commonwealth several

times to look at evidence and “the only meeting that I know that I missed”

was “a meeting to pick discovery up from the district attorney’s office” very

early in the case. Id. at 114. “I did not come when [ADA] Simon felt the day

and time had been appointed for me to appear. I thought it was casual.” Id.

at 115. She stated that ADA Simon “somehow dug my home phone number

of my elderly father up from a ticket I had received from the Butler City Police

about ten years prior.” Id. Her father “was told that I had failed to appear

for a meeting” and he panicked, thinking that the police said she was a missing

person. Attorney Williams “was extremely angry” and she denied ever giving

that phone number to ADA Simon. Id. at 116. ADA Simon “claimed that was

the number I had given him,” but she denied this, saying that she “hadn’t

lived at my father’s home address in over thirty years” and “would have never

given [him] that number[.]” Id. at 115, 116. ADA Simon, who was called by

the Commonwealth as a witness, testified that the missed meeting was to

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review discovery. When Attorney Williams failed to show, ADA Simon “used

the phone numbers that she provided me.” Id. at 197.

      Appellant stated he was “kind of annoyed as well[;] … I pay you all this

money[,] are you going to go there or not[?]” Id. at 35. Appellant was also

upset that Attorney Williams filed a motion to permit Appellant’s mother to

visit the crime scene. “Again, I’m in disbelief. You want my mom to go to the

residence where this incident took place as a, I guess her, investigator, here?”

Id.   Appellant’s mother was not permitted to view the crime scene, but

Attorney Williams was allowed to visit.    According to Appellant, she asked

Appellant to pay for a new videorecorder so she could record her visit.

However, “[w]hen she went to the crime scene with this videorecorder that

we bought, she never took it out of the box. She never charged the battery.

The entire purchase of it and use of it was a complete waste of money.” Id.

at 47. Appellant spoke to his mother about this in “[n]ot very nice” language.

Id. at 48. Appellant then learned in November of 2012 that Attorney Williams

asked his mother for $500 for gas money. Appellant “went through the roof”

and refused to pay. Id. at 49. Again, Appellant spoke about all of this on the

phone to his mother.

      The tenor of these comments was eventually conveyed to Attorney

Williams. Appellant stated that on October 4, 2012, Attorney Williams visited

the jail following another meeting to review discovery. “Apparently[,] when

she got to the police station[,] … [ADA] Simon told her that my mother hated

her, and he was referencing the motion filed to tour the crime scene. I vividly

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remember her saying his words were[,] ‘why are you going to bat for [his

mother]? She hates you. You should hear the things they’re saying about

you over the prison phone.’” Id. at 40-41.

      Appellant also made disparaging remarks about ADA Simon, prompted

by a visit from Attorney Flaherty. Appellant stated that, sometime in early

November, he called his girlfriend to discuss her attending a New York Yankees

game. The next day, Attorney Flaherty visited and asked specific details about

that conversation, warning him that the Commonwealth was “still listening”

and to “be careful what you say.” Id. at 53. Appellant, believing that ADA

Simon was listening to Appellant’s calls every evening, asked Attorney

Flaherty, “is he gay? This man [is] obsessed with me[.]” Id. at 54. Attorney

Flaherty said “No, he’s not gay. He has a girlfriend and [he] explained where

she worked.” Id. Appellant then made a phone call to his mother, relating

the details of ADA Simon’s personal life and where his girlfriend worked.

Attorney Flaherty returned to the jail a few days later, angry at Appellant for

sharing that information on the phone. Appellant was also told by Attorney

Flaherty that, during a Butler County Christmas party, another assistant

district attorney told Attorney Flaherty to “stay away from [ADA Simon]. He’s

ticked off at you for sharing personal information with [Appellant].” Id. at 60.

      As trial preparations continued through the end of 2012 and into early

2013, Appellant received the plea offer. He and both attorneys discussed it.

Attorney Williams was “supportive of [his] position” to reject the plea, whereas

Attorney Flaherty recommended he take it.       Id. at 66.   Attorney Flaherty

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“ended up storming out of the room. I started criticizing his performance as

an attorney.” Id. That evening, Appellant again disparaged his attorneys in

a conversation with his mother.

     That phone call led to an urgent request by Attorney Williams. According

to Appellant, “around February 13th, 14th, 2013, I had gotten a call down to

the guard’s desk[. H]e said your attorney needs you to call her right away.”

Id. at 67-68. Attorney Williams testified why she was desperate to contact

Appellant:

     So, that would have been February of 2013[,] when we were
     moving towards trial, moving towards working out a plea, like a
     runaway train. Things were getting quite heated, and I received
     a call very late in the day from [ADA] Simon of an emergent nature
     insisting I come down to Butler, come up to Butler immediately
     that day, that evening. That … some recordings that were calls
     form the jail of [Appellant]’s … were so explosive and important
     that I had to hear them immediately.

                                    ***

     I mean, I thought [Appellant] had confessed or said something in
     the calls with his mother. The way it was put to me[,] it would
     kind of blow the case out of the water and of a very emergent
     nature, and I was quite upset because I couldn’t get down here so
     I called [Attorney Flaherty], and it was very late in the day. It
     was like four o’clock.

                                    ***

     I told him he’s got to get over there to [ADA Simon]’s office. I
     mean, it wasn’t a thing where it was you’ll send it to me and I will
     listen to it. That February eighth weekend … my whole job was to
     get ready for trial … and [ADA] Simon felt the need to call me to
     tell me to get down there to listen to the thing[,] I was quite
     concerned.

Id. at 126-27.

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      The timing of this event is significant, and Appellant, Attorney Williams,

and Attorney Flaherty all testified that this incident occurred before the plea.

Attorney Flaherty recalled that Attorney Williams asked him to visit ADA

Simon’s office to review phone calls. He did not remember the exact date,

but he believed it was close to trial “because [Attorney Williams] was

aggressively preparing for trial. She was afraid again that something might

have been said on those tapes.” Id. ADA Simon “did allow me to listen to

the tapes, and I don’t think he was present making comments or anything[,

he] just allowed me to listen to them, and I was satisfied that there was

nothing inculpatory or exculpatory [in] nature on those tapes.” Id. He did

not take a copy of the tapes and described the comments as Appellant “saying

things about [Attorney Williams] and probably saying things about myself[,]

… just the usual stuff you expect. Someone’s on trial for their life[,] they get

frustrated ... with [their] representation.” Id. at 176.

      Returning to Attorney Williams’ account, she spoke to Attorney Flaherty

that evening, explaining that he “was quite angry.         … The nature of the

recordings were basically [Appellant] and his mother talking about me, my

child, my personal life, whatever, and [Attorney Flaherty]…. Not of evidentiary

or case-related nature other than just derogatory, you know, inflammatory

type comments, but it had no, there was no confession which is what I had

feared.” Id. at 128. Her “impression was [ADA] Simon wanted me to listen

to the calls. [Attorney Flaherty] kind of stood in between that and said you’re

not going to listen them[,] you don’t need to listen to them.” Id. at 136. In

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the interest of having a complete file, she requested a copy of the calls from

Attorney Flaherty after her withdrawal from the case. Attorney Flaherty “said

‘I don’t have it and you’re not getting it.’” Id. at 137 (quotation marks added).

She “wasn’t willing to fight him on it.          I thought he had thrown it out or

destroyed it, and he said he never actually physically got it from [ADA]

Simon.” Id. In general, Attorney Williams “felt [ADA] Simon was trying to

push the case to trial and get in between my relationship with [Appellant] to

do that and … obviously in a death penalty case[,] my job is to keep him from

being on death row.” Id. at 139. She testified that she was provided several

sets of phone calls during discovery but “there was nothing on any of it about

personal [sic], about me that I recall. It was all case related.” Id. at 140.

       Attorney Williams was angry but continued to prepare for trial.        She

testified that around February 21, 2013, Appellant “was asking for a

misconduct motion, some type of prosecutorial misconduct motion to be filed

to have [ADA Simon] removed from the case….” Id. at 130. Attorney Williams

testified that she considered filing the motion and “had talked to [Attorney

Flaherty] about it” but she felt “it would be counterproductive in my preparing

for trial[.] … [Attorney Flaherty] felt that if we filed that[,] and it was granted

and [ADA Simon] was removed[,] that possibly … another experienced trial

lawyer would try the case ….”1 Id. The defense team decided against the
____________________________________________

1 Cases suggest that the removal of the prosecutor and/or that office may be

an appropriate remedy where the prosecutor has demonstrated an actual
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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motion because “frankly the defense team felt that [ADA] Simon was too

personally involved in the case and his animosity against [Appellant] was

showing[. W]e were better off with him being on the case because he was a

little bit off his game….” Id.

       ADA     Simon      testified   that     Attorneys   Williams   and   Flaherty

misremembered the timeframe.              ADA Simon agreed that he did call the

attorneys about “an emergent situation saying you need to listen to these,”

but stated that the subject matter was the phone calls previously referenced

in our direct appeal memorandum, i.e., calls where Appellant indicated to his

mother that the motion to withdraw his plea was a sham. Id. at 208. He

“intended to introduce these at the post-sentence plea withdrawal” and,

according to ADA Simon, “I did get a hold of Attorney Flaherty, and he did

come to my office and listen to those calls.” Id. at 209. He explained that

those calls did contain disparaging comments:

       So there were nine phone calls[,] or eight or nine phone calls[,] …
       at this time, and [Attorney] Flaherty did hear all of those
       derogatory comments.         Some were sexual in nature about
       [Attorney] Williams sleeping with the [j]udge. Bad mouthing
       [Attorney] Flaherty. Things like that. That was my recollection of
       what was on that tape. It was not pleasant some of those
       things[,] but then [Appellant] discusses with his mother[,] ‘let’s
       see what kind of chaos we can create by filing this motion. This
       could help you with a book deal.’ Or whatever. And that was the
       real [sic] in my position[,] I was going to present that at the plea
       hearing to show his true motive as to why he was trying to pull

____________________________________________

impropriety. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 460 A.2d 747, 749 (Pa.
1983).

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      his plea[,] not because of a manifest injustice or any other valid
      claim.

Id. at 209-10 (quotation marks added).

      ADA Simon testified that he did make comments about Appellant’s

mother not liking Attorney Williams. The Commonwealth objected to having

Appellant’s mother visit the crime scene, and he spoke about the issue with

Attorney Williams. He stated that Attorney Williams “started to go on a rant

… about me listening to telephone calls. Her words were ‘and on another note

how dare you listen to calls between a mother and her son’….” Id. at 201

(quotation marks added).    ADA Simon responded, “Because he wont stop

talking[,] he keeps giving me good information … [Appellant’s mother] does

not like you anyway. I did say that.” Id.

      The conflicting accounts concerning these phone calls are the gravamen

of Appellant’s PCRA claim, as he argues that ADA Simon’s actions were

designed to interfere with the attorney-client relationship and warranted

dismissal of all charges. We briefly address some other issues that bear on

this claim.   Attorney Williams testified to an encounter with ADA Simon

regarding her motion to have Attorney Flaherty appointed.       According to

Attorney Williams, ADA Simon attended a public hearing before the county

commissioners where “one commissioner [is] known to be a troublemaker and

a big fiscal, you know, watchdog person, and ... it disturbed me [ADA] Simon

went to that public hearing and objected and made an issue for [Attorney]

Flaherty’s office that the county should not fund [Appellant]’s death

defense[.]” Id. at 125.

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      Attorney Williams said that she confronted ADA Simon, and he “replied

that he had attended the meeting as a private citizen which is his right … but

I thought it was a conflict.” Id. ADA Simon disputed this. “I didn’t [attend].

I never did that. I’d like to see the minutes from any meeting where that is

even alleged.   It’s not my place.     It would be our county solicitor who

challenges whether the public defender’s office represents or can be appointed

to represent somebody. I don’t recall ever doing that.” Id. at 203.

      After the hearing concluded, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file

proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a proposed order, with the

Commonwealth having thirty days to respond.         Appellant instead filed a

motion to amend the PCRA petition and requested a second evidentiary

hearing.   Appellant argued that, based on ADA Simon’s testimony, he had

demonstrated an “extreme animus, unrelated to his duties and responsibilities

as the prosecutor of this case, towards [Appellant], [Appellant]’s mother, and

[Appellant]’s trial attorney. … [ADA] Simon deliberately sought to prevent

[Appellant] from having [c]ourt-appointed mitigation counsel and sought to

interfere with the attorney-client relationship between [Appellant] and his

counsel.” Motion to Amend, 10/25/21, at ¶¶ 1-2. This allegation pertained

to Attorney Williams’ testimony that ADA Simon attended a meeting about

Appellant’s eligibility for court-appointed counsel. Appellant argued that ADA

Simon tried “to interfere with [Appellant]’s right to counsel as protected by

the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions.”     Id. at ¶ 3.   He added that the

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hearing testimony established “that [Appellant] was denied assistance of

counsel in his attempts to request to withdraw his plea.” Id. at ¶ 4.

      Appellant then filed his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,

which included several matters that bore no relation to the amended petition.

Appellant designated “claim one” as an allegation that post-sentence counsel

Attorney Flaherty as well as direct appeal counsel ineffectively failed to advise

Appellant of his right to counsel during post-sentence motions. The claim was

centered on the fact that Appellant filed his motion to withdraw pro se, and

his attorneys did not assist him or file a motion on his behalf.         Appellant

claimed that “the entire post[-]sentence, pro se process was a legal nullity”

and that our Superior Court memorandum was likewise a legal nullity.

Memorandum of Law, 3/24/22, at 6-7.

      Next, Appellant designated “claim two” as comprising two subclaims,

“claim two(a) and claim two(b),” both of which concerned his plea. Id. at 9.

His first subclaim was that ADA Simon “committed overreaching during the

pretrial stages” and that neither of his attorneys “understood the law as it

pertained to prosecutorial overreaching. Counsel[] failed to provide adequate

advice and failed to raise a claim of pretrial overreaching, as well as a violation

of [Appellant]’s constitutional rights to a fair trial.” Id. Subclaim two was

that the plea was unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently entered

because counsel failed to inform him that he would have to pay the costs of

prosecution. Id.

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      Appellant listed “claim three” as an illegal sentencing claim. Specifically,

he complained that the sentencing order stated that Appellant must pay costs

but did not list the specific costs to be paid.

      “Claim four” was that ADA Simon committed prosecutorial overreach

during the PCRA proceedings. The basis for this claim was that ADA Simon

lied during his testimony.

                                       III.

      The PCRA court issued an opinion on June 30, 2022. The court first

denied the motion to amend the PCRA petition. The court determined that

amendment was unnecessary as the claims that Appellant sought to add to

the amended petition were either waived, as they could have been raised on

direct appeal, or meritless in any event. Regarding the claims of overreach

during the PCRA process, the court concluded that even if ADA Simon did

overreach, that is “irrelevant to the trial and plea proceedings, which occurred

over six years before the hearing on the PCRA [petition].” PCRA Court Opinion

(“PCO”), 6/30/22, at 10.

      Addressing the claim that his attorneys should have sought dismissal

due to prosecutorial misconduct, the PCRA court concluded that Attorney

Williams had a reasonable strategic basis “in failing to report the perceived

prosecutorial overreach.” Id. at 12 (citing testimony by Attorney Williams

that ADA Simon was “off his game” and a motion would simply result in a

more experienced prosecutor trying the case). The PCRA court also concluded

that Appellant failed to establish prejudice, as “some other ADA would be

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appointed to try the case, or the Office of Attorney General would try the

case.” Id. Thus, dismissal was not a possibility.

     Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and, as ordered by court, a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The

PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion, adopting its June 30, 2022 opinion

and responding to additional allegations in the concise statement as

warranted. Appellant now presents seven issues for our review, which we

have re-ordered for ease of disposition:

     [1]. Did the [c]ourt abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law
     by denying … Appellant the opportunity to amend his petition
     although the [c]ourt considered the issues of merit raised?

     [2]. Did the [c]ourt abuse its discretion in failing to grant …
     Appellant the opportunity to conduct a second evidentiary hearing
     to enable … Appellant the opportunity to fully develop the record
     on the issues raised in the amended petition?

     [3]. Did the [c]ourt abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law
     when it claimed all of the issues raised in the amended petition,
     as well as the issues raised in the supplemental petition, were
     without merit without conducting a requested evidentiary
     hearing?

     [4]. Did the [c]ourt err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion
     when it stated Appellant was afforded and had counsel during the
     entire post[-]sentence stage[?]

     [5]. Did the [c]ourt err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion
     by stating that post[-]trial misconduct is irrelevant to the issue
     [o]f pretrial misconduct?

     [6]. Did the [c]ourt err on its limited finding of facts as the record
     contradicts the limited findings made by the [c]ourt and are not
     supported by the record?

     [7]. Did the [c]ourt abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law
     when it applied the wrong standard of review as it pertains to
     prosecutorial misconduct?

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Appellant’s Brief at 16.

                                       IV.

      Our standard of review is well-settled:

      When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, an appellate court
      must determine whether the PCRA court’s order “is supported by
      the record and free of legal error.” Generally, a reviewing court
      is bound by a PCRA court’s credibility determinations and its fact-
      finding, so long as those conclusions are supported by the record.
      However, with regard to a court’s legal conclusions, appellate
      courts apply a de novo standard.

      To be entitled to relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish,
      by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or
      sentence resulted from one or more of the errors enumerated in
      42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2), and that his claims have not been
      previously litigated or waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544. … An issue is
      waived if the appellant “could have raised it but failed to do so
      before trial, at trial, … on appeal or in a prior state postconviction
      proceeding.” Id. § 9544(b).

      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA
      petitioner must satisfy the performance and prejudice test set
      forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
      Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This Court has recast
      the two-part Strickland standard into a three-part test by
      dividing the performance element into two distinct components.
      To prove that counsel was ineffective, the petitioner must
      demonstrate: (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit;
      (2) that no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure
      to act; and (3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of
      counsel’s error. To prove that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a
      reasonable basis, a petitioner must prove that “an alternative not
      chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than
      the course actually pursued.”

Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633–34 (Pa. 2022).

      Additionally, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred by not granting

him leave to amend his PCRA petition. Amendments to a PCRA petition “shall

be freely allowed to achieve substantial justice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A). This

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“liberal standard for amendment is essential because criminal defendants may

have just one opportunity to pursue collateral relief in state court.”

Commonwealth v. Crispell, 193 A.3d 919, 930 (Pa. 2018) (citation

omitted).
                                      A.

      Reordered issues one through five all share the common complaint that

the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s request to amend his PCRA

petition after the evidentiary hearing. As detailed supra, Appellant’s motion

to amend his PCRA petition and the accompanying proposed findings of fact

and law raised several claims that were not advanced in the original petition,

and which did not relate to the evidentiary hearing.      Presently, Appellant

abandons all but one of those claims in lieu of a complaint that the PCRA court

erred in denying his request to hold a second evidentiary hearing focused on

ADA Simon’s conduct during the PCRA proceedings. Appellant claims that “the

issue is now two-fold, one, [ADA] Simon did seek to interfere with Appellant’s

right to counsel[.] Two, [ADA] Simon was lying about his interactions with

the Solicitor, to cover up his actions.” Appellant’s Brief at 64. As to claims

one through three (including claim two comprising two subclaims), Appellant

argues that, “[a]lthough the [c]ourt held Appellant was not permitted to

amend[,] … the PCRA [c]ourt implicitly permitted Appellant to amend his

petition by considering the issues….” Id. at 66. Appellant submits that, as a

result, “the claims raised in Appellant’s supplemental amended petition were

preserved for appeal.” Id.

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      The fact that the PCRA court explicitly denied amendment belies the

argument that the court “implicitly” permitted amendment. See PCO at 10

(“[Appellant]’s Motion to Amend the PCRA Petition is denied.”) (emphasis in

original). The PCRA court simply decided, in the exercise of its discretion, that

amendment was not warranted because all the claims were waived and/or

meritless. Appellant does not explain why the PCRA court’s conclusions in that

regard were erroneous.       The brief contains no discussion whatsoever

addressing the PCRA court’s conclusions that the other PCRA claims he wished

to include were meritless, waived, or both. While amendment shall be liberally

permitted, amendments are not self-executing. “[B]efore a petitioner may

amend a PCRA petition, a petitioner must seek and obtain leave to amend

because amendments to a PCRA petition are not ‘self-authorizing.’”

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 92 A.3d 708, 730 (Pa. 2014) (citation

omitted). The PCRA court explicitly denied amendment, and Appellant cannot

establish an abuse of discretion merely by stating amendment should have

been permitted. He has therefore failed to develop an adequate argument

challenging the PCRA court’s decision and his appellate claims are waived for

that reason.   Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 377 (Pa. 2023)

(“Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with

citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.        It is not the

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obligation of an appellate court to formulate [an] appellant’s arguments for

him.”) (citation omitted).2

       Appellant’s reordered fifth issue stands on a different footing, as that

claim pertains to “claim four” of the motion to amend and is focused on

Attorney Williams’ belief that ADA Simon attempted to have court-appointed

penalty counsel removed.         Appellant avers that the PCRA court abused its

discretion in declining to permit further development of his claim, as he had

no basis to pursue it prior to Attorney Williams’ testimony.

____________________________________________

2 Even if not waived, we would conclude that the PCRA court did not abuse its

discretion in denying amendment. First, Appellant’s argument that he was
denied post-sentence counsel when the court entertained his pro se motion to
withdraw his nolo contendere plea could have been raised on direct appeal.
Hence, it is waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). Appellant would have to raise
this claim through a layered ineffectiveness claim, which he failed to
adequately plead and prove. Moreover, he was not entirely denied counsel as
Attorney Flaherty assisted in litigating his pro se motion.

      Second, he waived his claim that his plea was unknowingly tendered
due to ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to inform him
that he was required to pay the costs of prosecution. Appellant called Attorney
Williams at the first evidentiary hearing and no testimony was taken regarding
the plea.

      Finally, the claim that Appellant received an illegal sentence is not
subject to waiver. However, we agree with the PCRA court that this issue is
meritless. Appellant argued that the fact the sentencing order referenced the
costs but did not specifically itemize the costs made his sentence illegal. While
not bound by the Commonwealth Court’s decisions, we “see no impediment
to the clerk’s performing that ministerial duty, if … the imposition of costs
generally has been authorized by the trial judge.”              Richardson v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 991 A.2d 394, 397 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
Appellant has failed to develop an argument that a sentence becomes illegal
by virtue of another governmental entity calculating the specific costs.

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      One may question why this topic would not have come up prior to the

evidentiary hearing. In any event, we find no abuse of discretion. The thrust

of Appellant’s desire to hold a second evidentiary hearing was to offer

additional evidence concerning Attorney Williams’ claim that ADA Simon

questioned Appellant’s entitlement to court-appointed counsel. We note that

the Commonwealth filed an objection to Appellant’s first motion to amend due

to, inter alia, noncompliance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1)(i), which states, in

pertinent part, that the petition “shall include a certification … stating the

witness’s … substance of testimony….” On February 2, 2022, the PCRA court

granted Appellant 30 days “to amend the PCRA Petition in order to comply

substantially to the filing requirements under Pa.R.Crim.P. 902.”       Order,

2/3/22 (single page). Appellant then filed a second motion to amend, which

was substantively identical to the former motion and included additional

certifications. Appellant included a copy of a response from the Open Records

Officer for the Butler County District Attorney’s Office. The letter indicates

that Appellant requested copies of all correspondence between ADA Simon

and then-County Solicitor Julie Graham. The response stated that that there

was no written correspondence but indicated that there “was a verbal

conversation.”   Exhibit to Motion to Amend, 2/22/22.      Appellant’s motion

stated that Appellant left two messages for Ms. Graham but she did not reply.

      It is unclear what the “verbal conversation” entailed. But even if we

were to assume that the conversation was relevant to his claim of interference

with the attorney-client relationship, the PCRA court did not abuse its

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discretion. Ms. Graham did not respond to Appellant’s requests, and he thus

failed to include any kind of indication as to what, if anything, she could add.

Appellant apparently did not pursue any other kind of recourse, such as a

subpoena or a court order.      The PCRA court therefore did not abuse its

discretion in determining that a hearing was not warranted, as it would

amount to a fishing expedition.

       In the alternative, even if the response from the Open Records Officer

and Ms. Graham’s failure to respond warranted some further evidentiary

development before the PCRA court, we would find that Appellant has failed

to establish any kind of prejudice.    Even if we accept that Appellant could

establish that Attorney Williams’ accusation was correct, Appellant makes no

attempt to explain how ADA Simon’s testimony at the PCRA hearing could

support a cognizable claim under the PCRA. Appellant merely insists that ADA

Simon lied at the PCRA hearing. We fail to see how that would support a claim

under the PCRA, as ADA Simon’s conduct at the PCRA hearing could not have

any bearing on what occurred prior to Appellant’s plea.      “A court may not

summarily dismiss a PCRA petition, however, when the facts alleged in the

petition, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief.” Commonwealth v.

Barbosa, 819 A.2d 81, 85 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). Conversely, a court may summarily dismiss a petition, or

in this case deny a hearing, when the facts alleged would not entitle Appellant

to relief.

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      At most, establishing that ADA Simon did attend the hearing would

undermine his credibility concerning the testimony surrounding several of

these events. But, as explained infra, we accept — for purposes of this appeal

— that ADA Simon did engage in conduct that would arguably warrant

disqualification from the case had Attorney Williams sought that relief.

                                      B.

      We now address Appellant’s final two issues, both of which concern the

claim raised in his original amended PCRA petition: that his counsel

ineffectively failed to seek dismissal due to prosecutorial misconduct.

Beginning with the first of these issues, Appellant submits that the PCRA court

erred in its limited findings of fact. We agree that the PCRA court’s findings

are limited, and it did not make any explicit findings of credibility or fact.

Specifically, Appellant takes issue with the PCRA court’s reference to a CD

included as part of the record in this PCRA proceeding. The PCRA court opinion

states: “A hearing … was held on July 29, 2020.        The following day, the

Commonwealth filed a Motion for Release of Evidence in the form of a CD,

which was granted on July 31, 2020. That CD contained the audio of the

phone calls at issue.” PCO at 2 (emphasis added). Appellant argues that

this finding is not supported by the record.

      We agree.    As set forth in detail supra, ADA Simon testified that he

called Appellant’s attorneys concerning recorded jail calls.         However,

Appellant, Attorney Flaherty, and Attorney Williams all stated that this phone

call must have occurred prior to the entry of the nolo contendere plea.

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Attorney Williams was adamant that she attempted to contact Appellant due

to a concern that he had confessed or made some other type of damaging

statement, which would seriously impact her trial preparation.         Attorney

Flaherty’s testimony was substantially the same regarding the timing. ADA

Simon disagreed with all three witnesses.

      The CD that is the subject of the Commonwealth’s motion references

“nine recorded phone calls,” which would be the nine phone calls referenced

in our direct appeal decision regarding Appellant’s motive for filing his motion

to withdraw the plea. Those calls were all made after the entry of Appellant’s

plea. Appellant’s PCRA argument clearly pertained to the other phone calls,

which precipitated Attorney Williams’ urgent phone call to the prison and

Attorney Flaherty’s visit to ADA Simon’s office.

      To the extent the PCRA court’s ruling could be interpreted as an indirect

finding that ADA Simon’s testimony was credible, that conclusion cannot be

reconciled with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Attorney Williams had a

reasonable strategic basis for declining to seek disqualification.   The PCRA

court opinion states that “counsel had a valid reason for the failure to report

the alleged overreach.” PCO at 7. The PCRA court easily could have said that

there was no arguable merit to a claim of disqualification on the grounds that

ADA Simon did nothing to even plausibly support such a motion. Thus, we

agree that the calls “at issue” are not those nine recorded phone calls.

      We therefore resolve the first issue by accepting arguendo that ADA

Simon’s conduct may have supported a meritorious motion to disqualify.

                                     - 23 -
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Commonwealth’s Brief at 8 (“Even assuming arguendo that some degree of

misconduct may be deemed to have taken place[,]… [Appellant] has still failed

to make out a valid claim for PCRA relief.”). Accordingly, we can now address

whether the PCRA erred as a matter of law when it denied this claim.

      Initially, we agree with Appellant that the PCRA court’s analysis does

not address Appellant’s claim. “[T]he proper standard of review … as it relates

to misconduct would be to dismiss the case, not reassign the case to another

prosecutor.” Appellant’s Brief at 59. He maintains that a motion to dismiss

would have succeeded based on ADA Simon’s conduct.             We agree with

Appellant that his attorneys could not have a reasonable strategic basis for

declining to file a motion to dismiss if that motion were clearly meritorious.

For instance, suppose a defendant enters a guilty plea but the attorney

overlooks a motion to suppress that is clearly meritorious and would result in

suppression of all evidence.     The fact that the guilty plea was otherwise

favorable would not preclude relief. Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.

365, 382 n.7 (1986) (observing that defense attorneys would not “sandbag”

meritorious claims by deliberately failing to raise them in hopes of prevailing

on collateral review; “No reasonable lawyer would forgo competent litigation

of meritorious, possibly decisive claims….”).       This dynamic is further

demonstrated by Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), a case analyzing a

claim that counsel ineffectively advised accepting a guilty plea by supplying

incorrect advice on parole eligibility:

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       In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely
       resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-
       assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For
       example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to
       investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the
       determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by
       causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on
       the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led
       counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This
       assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction
       whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of
       a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to
       advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the
       crime charged, the resolution of the “prejudice” inquiry will
       depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would
       have succeeded at trial.

Id. at 59.

       Analogously, here, the alleged error is that counsel failed to recognize a

clearly meritorious motion to dismiss.3 Thus, we agree that the PCRA court

erred by concluding that Attorney Williams had a reasonable strategic basis

for not pursuing a motion to dismiss. We would agree that Attorney Williams’

decision was designed to effectuate Appellant’s interests if the only

consideration was whether to not file the motion (and proceed with ADA Simon

as the prosecutor) or file the motion (and potentially risk the assignment of a

____________________________________________

3 Our analysis is different from Hill with respect to the prejudice inquiry. In
Hill, the petitioner claimed that he would have proceeded to trial in lieu of
accepting a plea had he been correctly advised on parole eligibility. While
Appellant did ultimately accept a plea, as framed, his options were not limited
to either pursuing a motion to dismiss, accepting the plea, or proceeding to
trial. There is no indication that the Commonwealth conditioned the plea
bargain on not filing any such motions, and we express no opinion on whether
the Commonwealth could do so. For our purposes, the prejudice component
will be established if a motion to dismiss is clearly meritorious.

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more experienced prosecutor).       Those options do not address Appellant’s

contention that Attorney Williams should have sought complete dismissal.

      For the following reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s conclusion that

Attorney   Williams   was    not   ineffective   on   a   different   legal   basis.

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 595 (Pa. Super. 2021) (noting

that “this Court may affirm a PCRA court’s order on any legal basis”). We

agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant has failed to establish that the

law supports a motion for dismissal under these circumstances.                 See

Drummond, supra at 645-46 (concluding that assertion that counsel should

have objected to a jury instruction’s hypothetical concerning reasonable doubt

had arguable merit but concluding that “counsel was under no reasonable

obligation to raise a challenge to the instruction, as any such objection would

have lacked a then-existing legal foundation”). As the Commonwealth notes,

“[Appellant] cites no authority, however, and the Commonwealth is aware of

none, that stands for the proposition that double jeopardy principles could

compel preemptive dismissal of a case on the basis of alleged overt

prosecutorial overreach prior to the attachment of even a single incident of

legal jeopardy.”   Commonwealth’s Brief at 11.        We agree, and we reject

Appellant’s argument that caselaw clearly supports a motion for dismissal

under these circumstances.

      Appellant must establish that his claim for dismissal is so strong that no

competent attorney would have failed to file it. See Premo v. Moore, 562

U.S. 115, 124 (2011) (explaining that the merits of the motion must be so

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clear that “no competent attorney would think a motion to suppress would

have failed”).   We thus assess the legal arguments Appellant develops in

support of his claim. Appellant maintains that “the instant case was indeed

subject to dismissal with double jeopardy protections.” Appellant’s Brief at

48. He largely relies on Commonwealth v. Anderson, 38 A.3d 828 (Pa.

Super. 2011) (en banc), wherein this Court affirmed an order dismissing a

case on double jeopardy grounds due to pretrial prosecutorial misconduct, and

Commonwealth v. Byrd, 209 A.3d 351 (Pa. Super. 2019), where this Court

upheld the trial court’s decision to bar retrial where the prosecutor spoke to a

potential defense character witness and discussed information learned from

jail recordings. We conclude that neither case supports a motion for dismissal

for an alleged attempt to interfere with the attorney-client relationship.

      In Anderson, Anderson’s jury trial convictions were reversed due to

prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, but Anderson was not

granted discharge on double jeopardy grounds due to that misconduct.

Anderson, 38 A.3d at 831. Instead, the matter was then relisted for retrial.

The case involved underage witnesses and Anderson raised an issue

concerning their competency. During the retrial phase of the case, Anderson

alleged that the prosecutor had inappropriately coached the witnesses in the

past, and the trial court issued an order barring the prosecutor from

interviewing the witnesses ahead of the competency hearing unless a

psychologist was present and certain records were kept. At the competency

hearing, a witness gave answers indicating that the prosecutor had met with

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the witness in violation of the court’s conditions. The trial court determined

that the prosecutor’s “actions constituted an overall pattern of misconduct

designed to violate [Anderson]’s right to a fair trial[.]”     Id. at 839.    The

Commonwealth appealed and we affirmed, holding that “the prosecutor

intentionally acted to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a

fair trial.”    Id. at 840.   The closing paragraph again concluded that the

“prosecutor committed intentional misconduct to deny [Anderson] a fair

retrial.” Id.

       Parts of Anderson support Appellant’s claim. We authorized dismissal

on double jeopardy grounds based on prosecutorial misconduct occurring

before the trial itself. As the four dissenting judges opined, an unfair trial

could not have occurred since the second trial had not yet commenced. See

id. at 843 (Olson, J., dissenting) (“That the misconduct at issue here took

place and was discovered pretrial is significant—[Anderson] was not subjected

to an unfair trial as his new trial had yet to occur.”). In rejecting this theory,

Anderson supports Appellant as the two are arguably in the same position:

like Anderson, he cites prosecutorial misconduct occurring pretrial.

       Nevertheless, at the end of the day, Anderson involved a case in which

the defendant had formerly proceeded to a trial at which jeopardy attached.

Seeking dismissal on double jeopardy grounds definitionally requires that the

defendant have been placed in jeopardy.        As the Commonwealth correctly

observes, jeopardy had not attached at the time Appellant claims that

Attorney Williams should have filed a motion seeking dismissal on double

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jeopardy grounds.     “In Pennsylvania, jeopardy does not attach and the

constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy has no application until a

defendant stands before a tribunal where guilt or innocence will be

determined.” Commonwealth v. Vargas, 947 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super.

2008) (citation omitted).

      This distinction is, in our view, dispositive.       “The constitutional

prohibition against ‘double jeopardy’ was designed to protect an individual

from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than

once for an alleged offense.” Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187

(1957). “The underlying idea … is that the State with all its resources and

power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an

individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,

expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety

and insecurity….” Id. Thus, once a defendant is placed in jeopardy, the trial

should result in a decision by the fact-finder, whatever the result may be. See

Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673–74 (1982) (referencing “the

defendant’s valued right to complete his trial before the first jury”).

Appellant’s argument overlooks the fact that he had not proceeded to trial.

As there is no second trial to bar here, Appellant has no viable double jeopardy

claim supporting dismissal. The same is true of Byrd, where the trial court

barred retrial when “on the evening of the third day of the trial[, the

prosecutor] contacted … a potential character witness for [the defendant].”

Byrd, 209 A.3d at 354.

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      Appellant is correct that our Supreme Court has held that our

constitution offers greater protections in this arena. See Commonwealth v.

Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992) (holding that our constitution’s double

jeopardy provision “prohibits retrial of a defendant not only when prosecutorial

misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial,

but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to

prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial”). But, again,

the expanded protections all address whether retrial is barred.             See

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 231 A.3d 807, 826 (Pa. 2020) (“It is

established that the jeopardy prohibition is not primarily intended to penalize

prosecutorial error, but to protect citizens from the embarrassment, expense

and ordeal of a second trial….”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Appellant was simply never subject to a trial or any attachment of jeopardy

at the point at which the motion, in his view, should have been filed. Even if

we assume there is arguable merit to his claim that a motion to dismiss in

these circumstances had some prospect of success, the foregoing analysis

demonstrates that the claim was clearly not a guaranteed winner. For Sixth

Amendment purposes, that is the relevant inquiry. Hendrix v. Palmer, 893

F.3d 906, 922 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he failure to file a meritorious suppression

motion does not constitute per se ineffectiveness.       For such a failure to

constitute deficient performance, the meritorious nature of the motion must

be so plain that no competent attorney would think a motion to suppress

would have failed.”) (cleaned up). Counsel has no obligation to file motions

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that “would have lacked a then-existing legal foundation.”        Drummond,

supra at 646.

       Finally, we add that the double jeopardy precedents do not encompass

Appellant’s claim in one other respect: the claim in Anderson involved

misconduct designed to deny a fair trial through the subversion of the truth-

determining process. Appellant thus faces an additional hurdle, as nothing in

Attorney Williams’ testimony establishes that her relationship with Appellant

was actually undermined by ADA Simon’s conduct, and Attorney Williams

would be required to immediately inform the trial judge if some external

influence prevented her from fulfilling her professional responsibilities to her

client. Relatedly, Appellant does not establish that ADA Simon’s actions were

specifically intended to undermine the attorney-client relationship or that his

conduct was so reckless that it was substantially likely that his relationship

with his attorneys would be undermined. The only conclusion that the record

supports is that Attorney Williams had enough to present a motion to

disqualify ADA Simon from participation. All other impediments aside, that is

a far cry from a finding that ADA Simon engaged in such severe misconduct

that society’s interest in prosecuting crime should not be weighed against the

alleged misconduct.4

____________________________________________

4 Our research indicates that claims for dismissal based on the attorney-client

relationship tend to be analyzed as a violation of the Sixth Amendment.
United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1986) (“To establish a
[S]ixth [A]mendment violation, a criminal defendant must show two things:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       We therefore conclude that Attorney Williams had no obligation to raise

a claim that the law did not, and does not, support. We therefore affirm the

denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition.

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/2/2023

____________________________________________

first, that the government knowingly intruded into the attorney-client
relationship; and second, that the intrusion demonstrably prejudiced the
defendant.”). Courts take varying approaches to whether and when a showing
of prejudice is required, to say nothing of whether dismissal is an appropriate
remedy. See generally Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th
Cir. 1995). We express no opinion on the validity of any of these points, but
merely highlight them to further demonstrate that Appellant’s claim is not
clearly meritorious.

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