Court Opinion

ID: 9713875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:24:38.889772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:21.176254
License: Public Domain

MACK, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
Sometimes, in the practice of criminal law, bizarre factual circumstances make it very difficult to apply settled legal principles. In this murder case, I am left with the disquieting thought that we are in no *435position to conclude that the trial court’s curtailment of the cross-examination of a pivotal government witness about his own juvenile adjudication for murder did not result in a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.
Here, we have no problem with legal principles thanks to Tabron I & II. See Tabron v. United States, 410 A.2d 209 (D.C.1979) (Tabron I), appeal after remand, 444 A.2d 942 (D.C.1982) (Tabron II). We can agree, for example, that the government’s failure to disclose (or the trial court’s refusal to permit cross-examination of) the juvenile criminal records of witnesses for impeachment purposes, may or may not require a reversal of a defendant’s conviction. In making such determination, we consider such factors as whether the juvenile record is sought to show bias or merely general credibility, the extent of the curtailment of cross-examination, and any motive of the witness to curry favor (even by lying) with the government in order to avoid prosecution for the same crime. See Tabron I, supra, 410 A.2d at 212-13; Tabron II, supra, 444 A.2d at 943-44. We know, moreover, that in order to justify a harmless error ruling, it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that either (1) the defendant would have been convicted without the curtailment, or (2) the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness’s testimony. See Tabron II, supra, 444 A.2d at 944 (quoting Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 856 (D.C.1978)). I repeat that these are separate tests.
As to the facts, we know, that in the year 1992, a young teenager (Jesse Moore) was shot to death. Appellant Walls was arrested for this murder in 1994. He was tried in 1995 and again in 1996. Both trials resulted in hung juries. This instant appeal is from a conviction obtained in 1997.
While awaiting jury selection in this 1997 trial, a conscientious court (who had presided at one of the previous trials) consulted counsel as to their respective positions with respect to matters which conceivably might prejudice jurors and, thus, the outcome of this third trial. The court refused the prosecutor’s request for a voir dire question as to whether a juror might have “strong feelings” about the fact that a government witness (i.e., Micah Bryan, who was then incarcerated in Maryland) had made a deal with prosecutors in this case. The court also adhered to its ruling in the previous trial that Micah Bryan’s earlier juvenile murder conviction could not be used for impeachment purposes.
As the trial proceeded, the government relied upon the testimony of Micah Bryan. Bryan, a one-time close Mend of Walls, testified that on the night of the murder, he had arrived on the scene with Walls and that Walls had concealed a gun in his pants. He testified that Walls was the killer of Moore. He admitted that he did not tell the law enforcement officers this on the night of the murder. He admitted that he identified Walls as the killer only after he himself had been convicted of drug and possessory crimes in Maryland and was seeking a reduction in sentence.1
On this record, arguably, I find it difficult to conclude, in this appeal (by Walls from a conviction of murder) that the error in curtailing the cross-examination of Bryan (the key witness against Walls), *436about his own adjudication for murder, was not one of constitutional magnitude. From a purely commonsensical viewpoint, I would think that the “outcome of trial” test of Tabron II, 444 A.2d at 944, for harmless error would be impossible to apply here where previous trials involving the same key witness had ended in mistrials.2
Turning, therefore, to the second test for harmless error under Tabron II, 444 A.2d at 944, it is clear that the restricted line of inquiry concerning Bryan’s adjudication for murder would have weakened the impact of his testimony. On the night when young Jesse Moore was murdered, this witness was no stranger to murder; he had killed as a youngster. At the time, he was still under court supervision for his juvenile murder conviction. He arrived on the murder scene with Walls shortly before the shots rang out; he was the only witness in a position to see who actually fired the gun. Indeed, he was, by all accounts, a key witness. Had the jury known of this witness’ juvenile adjudication for murder, it is reasonable to assume that it would have put the whole case in a “different light.”3 As a single error, this curtailment, when considered along with the fact that Bryan was no stranger to lying and had every motive to curry favor with the respective jurisdictions of this area, would undermine confidence in the verdict.
I respectfully dissent.

. The government also called one Ramon Cherry as a witness. Cherry was fourteen years old at the time of the murder and twenty-one years old at the time of this third trial and, like Biyan, had existing felony and other charges pending in Maryland. He testified that he did not identify Walls as the killer on the fatal night because he "wanted to get some revenge.” He wanted to kill Walls himself.

. Moreover, if we embrace an "outcome of trial” test, the "strategy” of trial counsel — not to call Andrew Morris — at this third trial could conceivably have resulted in a Sixth Amendment violation. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777 (D.C.1990). I disagree with the majority that the potential effect of Morris’ testimony on the credibility of Bryan and Cherry would have been of minimal value to Walls and, thus, was a "wise tactical deci.sion.”

. As the Supreme Court has stated in the context of Brady violations, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), a constitutional error is demonstrated by "showing that the [undisclosed] favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The curtailed inquiry into Biyan’s juvenile murder conviction, though not a Brady violation as in Kyles, nonetheless put this case in such a "different light” as to amount to constitutional error.