Court Opinion

ID: 9642175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:51:04.055844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:44.051945
License: Public Domain

JONES, Chief Judge
(dissenting in part).
There are times when age-old, time-honored principles of law seem to meet head-on in hopeless conflict.
It is written that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation.
On the other hand it is well recognized that property destroyed in actual battle by either side does not call for compensation. It is held that all property and human rights may -be the victim of battle conditions. If the battle is lost all may be lost.
■Between the application of these two recognized principles is a twilight zone *981the boundaries of which are difficult to determine. The differences are factual rather than fundamental.
In this uncertain zone that cannot be measured by a mathematical yardstick the facts of this case fall.
Were plaintiffs’ permanent installations taken for public use or was the destruction the inevitable result of substantial battle conditions ?
The defendant has seen fit to admit that the vehicles, the gasoline, and movable articles were taken and has paid for them or admitted liability, but insists that the buildings and permanent fixtures fall in a different classification.
In United States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227, 7 S.Ct. 490, 30 L.Ed. 634, Mr. Justice Field gave extended consideration to the question now before this court. That case arose out of the destruction of railroad bridges by Federal armies during the Civil War; the bridges were destroyed to impede the advance of the enemy. Later, again in response to military necessity, the bridges were rebuilt by the United States. The United States sought to charge the railroad for the cost of rebuilding by withholding that amount of money due the railroad for transporting passengers and freight. The railroad sued for the full amount of the transportation charges. The Court decided that it was entitled to recover that amount. Recovery, however, was not based on the Fifth Amendment. The destruction created no cause of action in the railroad; neither •did the rebuilding create a cause of action in the United States; both were dictated by military necessity. Where the parties were left by the fortunes of war, there they were left by the Supreme Court.
At page 239, of 120 U.S., at page 496 of 7 S.Ct: “While the government cannot be charged for injuries to, or destruction of, private property caused by military operations of armies in the field, or measures ■taken for their safety and efficiency, the .converse of the doctrine is equally true, that private parties cannot be charged for works •constructed on their lands by the government to further the operations of its armies.”
The Pacific Railroad opinion was a careful and deliberate attempt to sum up the legal consequences of destruction of private property pursuant to the dictates of military necessity. Mr. Justice Field’s discussion of whether the railroad could have recovered in an action for compensation for the destruction of the bridges was not strictly necessary to disposition of the issue in the case. But it cannot be dismissed as merely gratuitous. As he viewed the case, a proposition and its converse were both involved and both had to be discussed. If not decisive of the issue now before us, his discussion is at least strongly persuasive. It has persuaded me that the demolition of the Pandacan facilities in World War II was, like the destruction of the railroad bridges in the Civil War, a destruction of private property “during war, by the operations of armies in the field, or by measures necessary for their safety and efficiency * * *.” Ibid. If the railroad bridges were not “taken for public use”, then neither were the oil terminal facilties at Pandacan. Admittedly, the question now before us was not as squarely presented in Pacific Railroad as in Grant v. United States, 1 Ct.Cl. 41, 2 Ct.Cl. 551. But the Supreme Court in Pacific Railroad was not unaware of the Grant case. That case as well as Wiggins v. United States, 3 Ct.Cl. 412, had been cited in the railroad’s brief to the Supreme Court. These early Court of Claims cases did not sway the Supreme Court in 1887; 1 do not believe they should sway us now.
The majority has stated: “The Government does not attempt to insure its citizenry against losses due to the ravages of war inflicted by our own or enemy forces in the conduct of a campaign. But when it is determined that a specific person’s property because of its nature or location is so essential to war' effort that it must be taken and put to use for the good of the nation, it is our belief that the public generally should bear the cost of acquisition.” With that statement I agree. It is with its application that I quarrel. I think it has been applied here in a most unrealistic way. *982I think we have here not a case of taking and putting to use of property but rather a case of property destroyed in the conduct of a campaign.
While controls were thrown around the property in question on December 12, 1941, the actual notice of taking was not given until December 28, and it was then made clear that it would be destroyed. At that time the Japanese were at the outskirts of the city of Manila. There was no hope of saving the property. If the city were further defended, the property would undoubtedly be destroyed. If it fell into the hands of the Japanese it would certainly be destroyed before they gave it up. In fact, practically all Manila, residential and otherwise, was destroyed in the process of retaking three years later. Any possible' value to the plaintiffs was gone whichever horn of the dilemma is taken.
The situation was hopeless from a military viewpoint and the army was withdrawn to Corregidor. The property was so near to the battle zone border as to be for all practical purposes within its flaming presence if not actually in it.
The Pandacan installations were demolished almost at the very moment before retreat. The demolition was a defensive action, and an important one. As such, it was inextricably a part of the tragic battle then taking place on the island of Luzon. I do not know how to disassociate that action from the pattern of the battle. I think an appreciation of the realities of the situation requires us to hold that plaintiffs’ properties were destroyed in the course of that battle.
The demolition occurred on December 31, 1941. By January 2, 1942, Manila was under Japanese control. Had the oil terminal facilities fallen intact to the enemy and thereafter been destroyed by United States forces, by bombing, shelling, or other military action, admittedly plaintiffs would have no claim for compensation. Nor would they have a claim for compensation if the enemy had destroyed the property. Of course, had we waited until Manila fell to attempt to destroy the installations, it is not likely that the destruction would have beén as effective. Our forces chose the surer mode and time of destruction. The deliberateness of this choice, the fact that plaintiffs’ properties were singled out for destruction, seems to have influenced the majority’s conclusion that the destruction was a Fifth Amendment taking. I think, however, that it only emphasizes the military nature of the destruction.
This court has been zealous in upholding the force of the eminent domain provision of the Fifth Amendment. We have not been unmindful of the principle that the Amendment is not suspended in time of war, and I do not propose that we should be. However, a scrupulous regard for the Amendment does not require us to ignore the realities ; it does not require us to say that property destroyed by military action was “taken-for public use.” I think that the loss for which compensation is sought here, considered in its context of time and place,, must be regarded in law as what it was in fact — a loss incident to battle, a loss in the words of the majority’s opinion, “inflicted by our own or enemy forces in the conduct, of a campaign.” «
The law is based on reason. It is based’ on human experience. It is the result of ' centuries of effort on the part of the-brightest minds, both legislative and judicial, to secure rules of action that will assure justice in disputes between individuals as well as between citizen and government.
Applying the rule to a very difficult situation we are unable to find within the range of reason any just ground for allowing compensation for the permanent installations. It was one of the darkest periods of World War II. The Japanese-advance at that time seemed irresistible. Shells were bursting in the city. Within, a matter of hours everything would have-been in the hands of the enemy and our outnumbered army captured or destroyed,, had it not been withdrawn to Corregidor. I can reach no other conclusion than that, the destruction was due to battle conditions.
I dissent from the decision that plaintiffs’" properties were taken for public use within, the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
I would allow the Shell 'Company of Philippine Islands, Ltd., to recover the sumt *983of $3,943.20 for products sold and delivered to defendant at Cebu, and which have not been paid for. I would dismiss the other claims of each of the plaintiffs.
WHITAKER, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.