Court Opinion

ID: 9759736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:26:20.119038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:04.362871
License: Public Domain

HEDGES, Justice,
concurring.
I concur "with the majority’s holding, that the doctrine of after-acquired evidence applies to limit damages. I agree that appellant raised a fact issue concerning whether *239she knew that her criminal conviction was in fact a criminal conviction. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that there are fact questions regarding (1) whether ap-pellee would have hired appellant had she disclosed her prior criminal conviction in her employment application; and (2) whether ap-pellee would have fired appellant had it discovered her prior conviction after she was hired.1
In her affidavit, Clauter swore that appellant would not have been hired had she disclosed her felony conviction in her employment application or had appellee known of the conviction, and that appellee would have immediately terminated appellant had it learned that she had falsified information about her criminal conviction in her employment application. Appellant argues that this affidavit is improper summary judgment evidence because Clauter’s statements (1) are conclusory and self-serving and (2) lack credibility because nothing in the affidavit indicates how she knew that appellant would be fired upon discovery of the prior conviction. Conclusory
An oft-repeated objection to summary judgment evidence, as well as to evidence in other contexts, is that it is conclusory. There is much confusion about what this objection means. It does not mean that logical conclusions based on stated underlying facts are improper. That type of conclusion is proper in both lay and expert testimony. What is objectionable is testimony that is nothing more than legal conclusion. Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex.1984). To allow such testimony is to invade the province of the fact finder, which is the sole arbiter of what used to be known as “ultimate issues,” or issues that by their legal consequences control the disposition of the case. Such legal conclusions involve, for example, statements that proper notice was given, Beta Supply v. G.E.A. Power Cooling Sys., 748 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied), and statements that an indebtedness was renewed and extended, Mercer v. Daoran Corp., 676 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex.1984). They are inadmissible because they do not inform the jury about the underlying facts. Rather, such opinions “amount to little more than the witness choosing sides on the ease outcome.” Mowbray v. State, 788 S.W.2d 658, 668 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd).
Ms. Clauter’s statements are not legal conclusions; they are merely statements of her company’s employment policy gleaned from her position as appellee’s head of personnel. I believe that this evidence is not the sort of conclusion condemned by the courts, but is rather a statement of fact evidencing appel-lee’s corporate intention in personnel practices. I would hold that because it is entirely fact based, it is entirely proper.
Self-Serving
I am frequently at a loss to understand what this objection means in the context of a summary judgment affidavit. This objection goes to the weight of the evidence as evaluated by the fact finder. Because we review summary judgment evidence on a legal sufficiency standard, whether the movant has established its contention as a matter of law, the weight of the evidence is an inappropriate consideration unless it descends to that infamous nether region, a “mere scintilla.” Clearly, in this case, an objection that the testimony is “self-serving” is not meaningful.
If this objection is a criticism of the affi-ant’s status as an interested witness, then it can be coherently addressed. The affidavit of an interested witness can support a summary judgment “if the evidence is clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradiction and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
I would hold that Ms. Clauter’s affidavit meets all these criteria. The majority states that her testimony cannot be easily controverted. To the contrary, testimony of this sort is easily controverted by historical and statistical data establishing that an employer’s conduct belies its representations.
*240The majority states that Ms. Clauter’s testimony is contradicted by the fact that although appellee had appellant sign a document giving permission to verify her criminal history, no verification was ever conducted. I believe that this conclusion is unwarranted. The connection between appellant’s deceit in her employment application and appellee’s failure to actively investigate her record notwithstanding her representations is far too tenuous to infer a contradiction to Ms. Clau-ter’s statement.
No Personal Knowledge
Finally, appellant argues that the affidavit is not credible because there are no predicate facts establishing how Ms. Clauter knew whereof she spoke. This contention is really a challenge to the affiant’s basis of her testimony. To be legally valid, an affidavit must demonstrate on its face that the affiant possesses personal knowledge of the facts stated therein. Humphreys v. Caldwell, 888 S.W.2d 469, 470-71 (Tex.1994).
Ms. Clauter states that her affidavit is made on personal knowledge, and she supports that assertion with fact. She acquired personal knowledge concerning the personnel policy by virtue of her service as appellee’s personnel director since December, 1988. To hold that her affidavit does not establish her personal knowledge on its face would effectively mean that no employee could ever execute an affidavit on behalf of its company. I can conceive of no clearer expression of personal knowledge than in Ms. Clauter’s affidavit.
Conclusion
To hold that Ms. Clauter’s affidavit raises fact issues about whether appellee would have hired or subsequently terminated appellant had it known of her criminal conviction means that no defendant can ever obtain a summary judgment in this type of case. How else can an employer express its employment policy if we refuse to credit its uncontradicted statement by a representative with personal knowledge? I would hold that there are no fact issues raised by Ms. Clau-ter’s affidavit.

. I agree that here is a fact issue concerning whether appellant knew that her prior criminal conviction was in fact a criminal conviction, which relates to whether she deliberately falsified the information in her employment application.