Court Opinion

ID: 9891334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 14:00:45.346158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:01.939147
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11236   Document: 55-1    Date Filed: 10/18/2023   Page: 1 of 18

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                               No. 22-11236
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        MARY A. HARRIS,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        MONROE COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY                    BOARD      OF
        TRUSTEES,
        MONROE COUNTY COMMISSION,
        ANN PRIDGEN,
        In her Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        SHANNON POWELL,
        In her Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        JEROME SANDERS,
        In his Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,
        STEVE STACEY,
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11236

        In his Individual and Oﬃcial Capacity,

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00265-CG-N
                           ____________________

        Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               After being terminated from her position at the Monroe
        County library, appellant Mary A. Harris sued the Monroe Coun-
        ty Public Library Board of Trustees (the “Library Board”), four
        individuals who were members of the Library Board (the “board
        members”), and the Monroe County Commission (the “Commis-
        sion”). The district court dismissed Ms. Harris’s claims against the
        Commission and later granted summary judgment to the Library
        Board and the individual board members. After careful considera-
        tion, we affirm.
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        22-11236                   Opinion of the Court                                3

                                               I.
               Ms. Harris, a Black woman, worked at the Monroe County
        library for approximately 35 years. 1 The library’s operations are
        overseen by the Library Board, a non-profit corporation orga-
        nized under Alabama law. See Ala. Code § 11-90-2 (providing that
        the “government and supervision” of free public libraries “shall be
        vested in a library board”). The Library Board consists of five
        members who are selected by the Commission and receive no
        compensation. See id. During the relevant period, three board
        members were White and two were Black.
               The Library Board has the “full power and authority” to
        “[m]anage and control” the operations of the library. Ala. Code
        § 11-90-3(a)(6). Its responsibilities include “engag[ing] . . . employ-
        ees for the day-to-day operation” of the library. Doc. 94-2 at 2. 2
        The library’s employees are “deemed public employees” and are
        “entitled to all benefits and privileges generally afforded public
        employees in the State of Alabama.” Id.
              During her lengthy tenure, Ms. Harris held several differ-
        ent positions at the library. Throughout her employment, Ms.

        1 Given our standard of review at the summary judgment stage, in recount-
        ing the facts of this case, we accept Ms. Harris’s version of disputed facts and
        draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale,
        279 F.3d 1271, 1279 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002).
        2 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                       22-11236

        Harris never signed a written contract for employment with the
        library or the Library Board.
               In 2016, the library’s former director retired, and the Li-
        brary Board appointed Ms. Harris as interim director. Ms. Harris
        applied for the permanent director position. The Library Board
        interviewed three finalists for the position: Ms. Harris; Crystal
        Reynolds, a White woman, and Brenda Taite, a Black woman.
               After interviewing the three finalists, the Library Board
        unanimously agreed that Ms. Reynolds was the most qualified
        candidate and offered her the position. The Library Board notified
        Ms. Harris that she had not been selected. Ms. Reynolds ultimate-
        ly declined the director position, and the Library Board restarted
        the application process. As a result, even though Ms. Harris was
        not selected for the permanent director position, she continued to
        serve as interim director.
               While Ms. Harris continued to serve as interim director,
        issues arose when Steve Stacey, who had recently been appointed
        to the Library Board, organized an event at the library to cele-
        brate Confederate Memorial Day. According to Mr. Stacey, he
        organized the event pursuant to the library’s “policy of hosting a
        program in conjunction with every State-recognized holiday.” 3

        3 It is unclear whether such a policy actually existed. Mr. Stacey believed this
        policy existed because the library held a program in February for Black His-
        tory Month. But Black History Month is not a holiday under Alabama law.
        See Ala. Code § 1-3-8(a). In addition, the record reflects that Mr. Stacey’s
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        22-11236                  Opinion of the Court                              5

        Doc. 94-3 at 3. See Ala. Code § 1-3-8(a), (b)(3) (designating the
        fourth Monday in April as Confederate Memorial Day and a state
        holiday).
                For Confederate Memorial Day, Mr. Stacey, a former
        commander of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, 4 planned two
        presentations at the library. For the first presentation, he deliv-
        ered a lecture entitled “History of Units Raised in Monroe County
        with a Discussion of Units [F]ormed in Neighboring Counties
        with Men from Monroe.” Doc. 100-2. In the second presentation,
        Frank Pierce, a commander with the Sons of Confederate Veter-
        ans, delivered a lecture entitled “CSA Cavalry Equipment & Arms
        with Discussion of 7th Alabama Calvary in Forrest’s Command.”
        Id. Mr. Pierce’s presentation was about Confederate troops under
        the command of Nathan Bedford Forrest, who later served as the
        first grand wizard of the Ku Klux Klan. Mr. Stacey served as mod-
        erator for Mr. Pierce’s presentation.
               According to Mr. Stacey, these presentations were about
        “matters of historical significance in Monroe County pertaining to
        the Civil War” but did not relate to “slavery . . . or race whatso-
        ever.” Doc. 94-3 at 3. Although Mr. Stacey denied that the event

        event was the first time that the library hosted an event related to Confeder-
        ate Memorial Day.
        4 The Sons of the Confederate Veterans is an organization for “descendants
        of men who served in the Confederate Army.” Doc. 100-1 at 2. In the organi-
        zation, a commander is the equivalent of a chapter president.
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                      22-11236

        was intended to celebrate the Confederacy, flyers promoting the
        event stated that its purpose was to “[c]elebrate.” Doc. 100-2. The
        flyers also promised, “[w]e will assist you in learning the unit your
        ancestor served [in] and the battles he fought.” Id.
               Given that the library was hosting an event that appeared
        to celebrate the Confederacy, was intended for those whose fami-
        ly members had fought for the Confederacy (that is, Monroe
        County’s White community), and included a presentation focus-
        ing on the leadership of a man who also served as the first grand
        wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, it is perhaps unsurprising that some
        Black community members in Monroe County voiced concerns
        about the event. Mr. Stacey nevertheless proceeded with the
        event and refused to speak with these community members
        about their concerns.
               Seventy people attended the Confederate Memorial Day
        event. According to Ms. Harris, approximately 50 of the attendees
        were men and 20 were women. 5 Nearly all of the attendees were
        White; other than Ms. Harris, there were only two Black at-
        tendees. Ms. Harris saw attendees come to the event “with Con-
        federate flags.” Doc. 94-4 at 78.
              Ms. Harris attended Mr. Pierce’s presentation for about 10
        to 15 minutes. A few minutes before the presentation began, a
        male attendee called Ms. Harris “the N word.” Id. at 71–72. Alt-

        5 According to Mr. Stacey, only seven of the attendees were men.
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        22-11236                 Opinion of the Court                                 7

        hough Ms. Harris did not observe anything “inappropriate” dur-
        ing the presentation, she left because she became “uncomforta-
        ble” and was worried about what was going to transpire. Id. at
        68–69. She was “very upset” after the program, particularly be-
        cause of the legacy of slavery and Monroe County’s history of rac-
        ism. 6 Id. at 73.
               After the event, Ms. Harris filed a charge of discrimination
        with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
        (“EEOC”), alleging that she has been discriminated against be-
        cause of her race. 7 In her charge, Ms. Harris recounted that she
        had not been selected for the director position. She also discussed
        the library event, which she said “celebrate[d] the Confederate
        Flag” and was attended by over 70 participants who were “known
        Ku Klux Klan affiliates.” Id. at 93. Ms. Harris also asserted that she
        had been retaliated against for complaining about racial discrimi-
        nation. The EEOC ultimately closed its file on the charge because
        the Library Board employed fewer than 15 employees and thus
        was not covered by Title VII. 8 See Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach,

        6 The record reflects that at least 18 lynchings occurred in Monroe County.
        7 Ms. Taite, the other Black finalist for the director position, also filed a

        charge with the EEOC.
        8 Congress has authorized the EEOC to investigate charges that employers

        engaged in unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII or certain other
        federal employment statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Title VII); see also
        29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C.
        § 12117 (Americans with Disabilities Act). Congress has not authorized the
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11236

        166 F.3d 1332, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that Title VII’s
        prohibitions on discrimination apply to employers with 15 or
        more employees).
               A local newspaper reported on Ms. Harris’s allegation that
        Ku Klux Klan affiliates had attended the library’s Confederate
        Memorial Day event. Several community members complained
        to the Library Board about this allegation. Community member
        Loretta McKenzie wrote that she was “highly offended” and “ex-
        tremely upset” by the “unjust accusation” that “70 known mem-
        bers of the KKK attended” the event. Doc. 94-3 at 29. She accused
        Ms. Harris of having a “racist agenda” and demanded that Ms.
        Harris be “dismissed immediately.” Id. Others threatened to sue
        over the allegation.
              After receiving these complaints, the Library Board re-
        quested a meeting with Ms. Harris. Ms. Harris briefly attended
        the meeting but then left the meeting and would not return.
               After Ms. Harris refused to rejoin the meeting, Library
        Board member Ann Pridgen recommended that Ms. Harris be
        terminated “due to defamation of character concerning the allega-
        tions that 70 citizens that attended a program at the library were
        members of the KKK.” Doc. 100-5. The four members of the
        board who were present at the meeting (Mr. Stacey, Ms. Pridgen,

        EEOC to investigate charges that employers violated the Fourteenth
        Amendment.
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        22-11236              Opinion of the Court                        9

        Shannon Powell, and Jerome Sanders) voted to terminate Ms.
        Harris’s employment.
                Following the vote, the Library Board delivered to Ms.
        Harris a letter terminating her employment. The letter stated that
        the Library Board was “shocked” by the allegation that Ku Klux
        Klan affiliates had attended the Confederate Memorial Day event.
        Doc. 94-3 at 31. It asserted that this allegation was false because
        “[w]omen cannot be members of the KKK” and most of the at-
        tendees at the Confederate Memorial Day event were women. 9
        Id. The Library Board wrote that Ms. Harris’s conduct left it with
        “no choice” but to terminate her employment effective immedi-
        ately. Id.
               Ms. Harris filed this lawsuit, bringing claims under
        42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Library Board, the four individual
        board members who voted for her termination, and the Commis-
        sion. First, she alleged that the defendants violated her right to
        due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating
        her without holding a pre-termination hearing. Second, she
        claimed that they violated her right to equal protection under the
        Fourteenth Amendment by terminating her based on her race.
        Third, she asserted that they violated her right to equal protection

        9 Library Board members knew from “past experience” that women could
        not be members of the Ku Klux Klan. Doc. 100-3 at 5.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-11236

        under the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating her in retalia-
        tion for her filing an EEOC charge. 10
               The Commission filed a motion to dismiss. The district
        court concluded that Ms. Harris failed to state a claim for relief
        against the Commission because “beyond the fact that [the
        Commission] appointed the [board members], [she] has failed to
        allege any facts . . . indicating how [the Commission] was in-
        volved in the events underlying her claims.” Doc. 45 at 13. Ac-
        cordingly, the district court granted the Commission’s motion
        and dismissed the claims against it.
               After the parties completed discovery, the Library Board
        and the four board members filed motions for summary judg-
        ment. The district court granted the motions. First, the district
        court found that there was no due process violation because the
        undisputed evidence showed that Ms. Harris was an at-will em-
        ployee who had no property interest in her continued employ-
        ment. The district court also ruled, in the alternative, that there
        was no due process violation because the undisputed facts

        10 Ms. Harris also alleged that the defendants violated her right to equal pro-
        tection by failing to promote her to director because of her race. In addition,
        she brought a claim for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
        Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The district court granted summary
        judgment on these claims. Because Ms. Harris does not argue on appeal that
        the district court erred in granting summary judgment on either claim, we
        discuss them no further.
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        22-11236               Opinion of the Court                        11

        showed that Ms. Harris was given an opportunity to be heard pri-
        or to her termination.
               Second, the district court considered the equal protection
        claim alleging that Ms. Harris was terminated because of her race.
        Ms. Harris argued that she had come forward with sufficient cir-
        cumstantial evidence to allow a factfinder to infer that she was
        terminated because of her race. The district court disagreed, con-
        cluding that the evidence did not support an inference that Ms.
        Harris was terminated because of her race.
                Third, the district court turned to the claim that the Library
        Board and the board members engaged in retaliatory conduct that
        violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
        Because binding precedent made clear that there was no viable
        claim for retaliation under the Equal Protection Clause, the dis-
        trict court granted summary judgment on this claim as well.
               This is Ms. Harris’s appeal.
                                         II.
                We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
        judgment, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable infer-
        ences in favor of the nonmoving party. Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s
        Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). Sum-
        mary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that
        there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
        is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                 22-11236

                                        III.
                Ms. Harris argues on appeal that the district court erred in
        granting summary judgment to the Library Board and the board
        members on her claims that (1) her right to due process under the
        Fourteenth Amendment was violated because she was denied
        procedural due process when she was terminated, (2) she was de-
        nied equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
        when she was terminated because of her race, and (3) she was de-
        nied equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
        when she was terminated in retaliation for complaining about ra-
        cial discrimination. We consider each issue in turn.
                                        A.
               We begin with the claim that the Library Board and the in-
        dividual board members violated Ms. Harris’s due process rights
        by terminating her employment without an adequate pre-
        termination hearing. To establish a procedural due process viola-
        tion, Ms. Harris had to show that she (1) had a property interest
        that she was deprived of by state action and (2) received insuffi-
        cient process concerning that deprivation. Ross v. Clayton Cnty.,
        173 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1999). We focus here on the re-
        quirement that Ms. Harris show that she was deprived of a prop-
        erty interest.
              Ms. Harris argues that she had a property interest in her
        continued employment. To have a property right in continued
        employment under Alabama law, “the crucial question is whether
        the employment is terminable ‘at will’ or whether the employer’s
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        22-11236              Opinion of the Court                       13

        discretion to discharge the employee is somehow fettered.” Green
        v. City of Hamilton, Hous. Auth., 937 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir.
        1991). An employer’s discretion to discharge a public employee is
        restricted when a “state law or local ordinance in any way limits
        the power of the appointing body to dismiss [the] employee.”
        Ross, 173 F.3d at 1307 (internal quotation marks omitted). An em-
        ployer’s discretion to terminate a public employee also may be
        limited if it agreed in a contract that the employee could be dis-
        missed for certain reasons only. See Green, 937 F.2d at 1564. But if
        the employment is “at will,” meaning the employer’s discretion to
        discharge is unfettered, the public employee does not have a
        property interest in continued employment and is “not entitled to
        procedural due process in connection with her termination.” Ad-
        ams v. Bainbridge–Decatur Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 888 F.2d 1356, 1366
        (11th Cir. 1989).
               We conclude that Ms. Harris was an at-will employee. She
        has not identified, and we have not found, any Alabama law or
        local ordinance that limited the Library Board’s authority to dis-
        charge her. And she has come not forward with evidence of any
        contract that limited the Library Board’s discretion to terminate
        her for any reason. Because Ms. Harris was an at-will employee,
        she did not have a property interest in her continued employment
        and was not entitled to procedural due process in connection with
        her termination. See id.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11236

                                         B.
               We next turn to the claim that the Library Board and the
        individual board members violated Ms. Harris’s right to equal
        protection by terminating her because of her race.
               “[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires government enti-
        ties to treat similarly situated people alike.” Campbell v. Rainbow
        City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006). It “prohibits race . . .
        discrimination in public employment.” Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware,
        906 F.3d 1302, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018). An employment discrimina-
        tion claim against a state actor for a violation of the Equal Protec-
        tion Clause is “subject to the same standards of proof and use[s]
        the same analytical framework as discrimination claims brought
        under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C.
        § 1981.” Id. at 1312 n.6. Among other things, the employee “must
        establish the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Id. at 1312.
                A plaintiff may use either direct evidence or circumstantial
        evidence to establish intent. Id. “Direct evidence is evidence that,
        if believed, proves the existence of discriminatory intent without
        inference or presumption.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911,
        921 (11th Cir. 2018) (alterations adopted) (emphasis added) (inter-
        nal quotation marks omitted). “In contrast, circumstantial evi-
        dence only suggests, but does not prove, a discriminatory mo-
        tive.” Id. at 921–922 (internal quotation marks omitted). When a
        plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, she may establish that
        the defendant acted with a discriminatory intent by relying on the
        burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
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        22-11236                  Opinion of the Court                             15

        Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), or by presenting a “convincing mosaic
        of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer inten-
        tional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Smith v. Lockheed-
        Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal
        quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).
                We have previously addressed what types of statements
        qualify as direct evidence. “Only the most blatant remarks, whose
        intent could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis
        of some impermissible factor[,] constitute direct evidence of dis-
        crimination.” Fernandez v. Trees, Inc., 961 F.3d 1148, 1156 (11th
        Cir. 2020 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
        An example of direct evidence would be a manager saying, “Fire
        Earley—he is too old.” Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d
        1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
        also Jefferson, 891 F.3d at 922 (treating manager’s statement that
        plaintiff was not hired because company “wanted a Korean in that
        position” as direct evidence (internal quotation marks omit-
        ted)). 11

        11 Ms. Harris says that in Wright v. Southland Corporation, we adopted a dif-
        ferent standard for determining when a statement qualifies as direct evidence
        and recognized that direct evidence may require the hearer “to make at least
        one inference to connect the dots between the comment and the protected
        personal characteristic.” Appellant’s Br. at 18 (citing Wright, 187 F.3d 1287,
        1295–98 (11th Cir. 1999)). Ms. Harris’s reliance on Judge Tjoflat’s opinion in
        Wright is misplaced. Neither of the other two members of the panel joined
        the opinion; they concurred in the result only. See 187 F.3d at 1306 (Cox, J.,
        concurring in result only); id. (Hull, J., concurring in result only). What is
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                      22-11236

                On appeal, Ms. Harris argues that she introduced “direct
        evidence of discrimination.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. We disagree.
        She has identified no statement that, if believed, shows “without
        inference or presumption” that she was terminated because of her
        race. Jefferson, 891 F.3d at 921.
                Because Ms. Harris did not introduce any direct evidence
        of discrimination, the district court correctly analyzed her race-
        discrimination as one based on circumstantial evidence. Although
        Ms. Harris argued in the district court that she introduced suffi-
        cient circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment un-
        der a convincing mosaic theory, she does not raise any argument
        on appeal challenging the district court’s conclusion that she
        failed to establish a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence.
        Accordingly, she has forfeited any challenge to the district court’s
        determination that she failed to introduce circumstantial evidence
        of discrimination. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873
        (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
                                              C.
              We now consider Ms. Harris’s claim that the Library Board
        and the individual board members violated her right to equal pro-

        more, both before and after Wright, we have defined direct evidence as “evi-
        dence, which if believed proves existence of fact in issue without interference
        or presumption.” See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th
        Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); Jefferson, 891 F.3d at 921
        (same).
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        22-11236               Opinion of the Court                       17

        tection when they terminated her in retaliation for her complaints
        about race discrimination. This claim fails because we have rec-
        ognized that the Equal Protection Clause does not establish a
        general right to be free from retaliation for making complaints of
        discrimination. See Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th
        Cir. 1997) (holding that a retaliation claim “simply does not impli-
        cate the Equal Protection Clause”).
                Ms. Harris does not dispute that in Watkins we held there is
        no right to be free from retaliation under the Equal Protection
        Clause. But she says that Watkins is no longer good law after the
        Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Educa-
        tion, 544 U.S. 167 (2005). We disagree.
                Under our prior-panel-precedent rule, we are bound by
        Watkins unless it has been “overruled or undermined to the point
        of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en
        banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
        An “intervening decision of the Supreme Court can overrule the
        decision of a prior panel” only when the Supreme Court’s deci-
        sion is “clearly on point.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
               The Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson did not overrule
        or abrogate our decision in Watkins. In Jackson, the Supreme
        Court considered whether the private right of action implied by
        Title IX, which prohibits discrimination in any education program
        receiving federal funding, encompassed claims of retaliation.
        544 U.S. at 171. After considering the broad statutory language in
        Title IX as well as the fact that Title IX was enacted after the Su-
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11236

        preme Court had construed other statutes prohibiting discrimina-
        tion to cover retaliation claims, the Court held that Title IX’s pri-
        vate right of action encompassed retaliation. Id. at 173–77. Be-
        cause nothing in Jackson addressed the Equal Protection Clause,
        we cannot say that Jackson was so clearly on point that it over-
        ruled Watkins. See Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352; see also Wilcox v. Lyons,
        970 F.3d 452, 463 (4th Cir. 2020) (“We do not read the Court’s de-
        cision in Jackson to suggest that . . . the Constitution’s aged guar-
        antee of equal protection . . . necessarily incorporates a right to be
        free from retaliation for reporting discrimination.”).
                                         IV.
               Ms. Harris understandably found the events at the library
        immensely disturbing and frightening. But it is not our role in this
        case to rule on the propriety of the defendants’ behavior. Instead,
        we must apply the law to the claims before us. For the reasons set
        forth above, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
              AFFIRMED.