Court Opinion

ID: 9931455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 00:10:13.953439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:42.384884
License: Public Domain

02/08/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                              AT KNOXVILLE
                      Assigned on Briefs October 2, 2023

                                    IN RE LIAM M.

               Appeal from the Probate Court for Cumberland County
                No. 2021PF8166      Amanda Magan Worley, Judge

                             No. E2023-00370-COA-R3-PT

Mother and Father divorced and Mother was given custody of their child. Mother remarried
and eventually she and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights and allow
Stepfather to adopt the child. The trial court found that Father had not visited the child
within four months of the filing of the petition and that termination of Father’s parental
rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Probate Court Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
C.J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

Jeffrey Vires, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Eugene M.

Kevin R. Bryant, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Daniel J. and Heather J.

                                        OPINION

                               PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Heather J. (“Mother”) is divorced from Eugene M. (“Father”). They have one child,
Liam M. Mother is now married to Daniel J. (“Stepfather”). On June 28, 2021, Mother and
Stepfather filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights and for Stepfather to adopt
Liam. Paragraph 16 of the petition alleges the following grounds:

       A) That the Respondent has abandoned the child as defined in Tennessee
       Code Annotated §36-1-102, in that he has willfully and voluntarily failed to
       visit and/or make reasonable payments toward the support of the child for a
       period exceeding the statutory requirement of four (4) consecutive months
       immediately preceding the filing of this Petition.
        B) That the Respondent has failed, without good cause or excuse, to make
        reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the child in accordance
        with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to
        Tennessee Code Annotated §36-5-101;

        C) That the Respondent has failed to seek reasonable visitation with the child,
        and if visitation has been granted, has failed to visit altogether, or has
        engaged in only token visitation as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated
        §36-1-102(1)(C);

        D) That the Respondent has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to
        assume legal and physical custody of the child;

        E) That the Respondent has willfully abandoned the child pursuant to
        Tennessee Code Annotated §36-1-113(g)(1).1

        After a one-day trial on February 1, 2023, the trial court issued its opinion on March
3, 2023. The court determined that clear and convincing evidence proved Father failed to
visit Liam in the four months preceding the filing of the petition. The court ruled that the
ground of failure to pay support failed because the support Father paid, though less than
the full amount, was more than token support. The trial court also ruled that clear and

    1
      The listed grounds are somewhat confusing due to apparent redundancy. Ground (A) of the petition
is abandonment by failure to visit or pay child support for the four months preceding the filing of the
petition. Ground (A) is found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), abandonment as defined in Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i)(a).

    Grounds (B), (C) and (D) are copied from Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(9)(i)-(iii). These grounds
deal with putative fathers. Father, although having suggested in text messages to Mother that he was not
the father, did not deny at trial being Liam’s father and had always been treated as the father. Father is not
a putative father, therefore, we deem Grounds (B), (C) and (D) to be inapplicable. In addition, Mother and
Stepfather abandoned these grounds, which were never specifically brought up at trial. In fact, the word
“putative” does not even appear in the trial transcript or in counsels’ arguments. The trial court’s termination
order also noted that these grounds were not appropriate.

    Ground (E) addresses willful abandonment under Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(1), which
incorporates the definitions of “abandonment” in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-102. Ground (E) is the same as
Ground (A).

     Thus, the petitioners tried only two of the grounds pled in their petition, abandonment by failure to visit
and abandonment by failure to pay support. This is consistent with a comment in trial counsel’s opening
statement, “We pled grounds of abandonment based on willful failure to visit … and also, willful failure to
pay meaningful support. Those are the grounds we intend to rely on.”

                                                     -2-
convincing evidence proved that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in Liam’s
best interest.

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       A parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn.
2010) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921
S.W.2d 170, 174-75 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn.
1994)). This right is not absolute. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. The Tennessee
General Assembly has, by statute, established “‘those situations in which the state’s interest
in the welfare of a child justifies interference with a parent’s constitutional rights by setting
forth grounds on which termination proceedings can be brought.’” In re Jacobe M.J., 434
S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re W.B., IV., Nos. M2004-00999-COA-
R3-PT, M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29,
2005)).

        Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113 establishes the grounds and
proceedings by which parental rights may be terminated. Initially, a petitioner must prove
that at least one termination ground exists. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1); In re Angela
E., 303 S.W.3d at 251. The petitioner must then prove that it is in the child’s best interest
to terminate the parents’ rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2); In re Valentine, 79
S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). “In light of the interests and consequences at stake, parents
are constitutionally entitled to fundamentally fair procedures in termination proceedings.”
In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 522 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 754 (1982)).

       As our Supreme Court has stated:

       Among the constitutionally mandated fundamentally fair procedures is a
       heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence. Santosky, 455
       U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388. This standard minimizes the risk of unnecessary
       or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental parental rights. Id.;
       In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010). Clear and convincing
       evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief or conviction regarding
       the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about
       the correctness of these factual findings.” In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at
       596 (citations omitted). The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard ensures
       that the facts are established as highly probable, rather than as simply more
       probable than not. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App.
       2005); In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Id. Thus, on appeal, we apply the following principles:

                                              -3-
       An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in termination
       proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). In re
       Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246. Under
       Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on the record
       and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless the evidence
       preponderates otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re M.L.P.,
       281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009); In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d
       793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). In light of the heightened burden of proof in
       termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own
       determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as
       supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and
       convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.
       In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. The trial court’s ruling that the
       evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion
       of law, which appellate courts review de novo with no presumption of
       correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting In re Adoption of
       A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all other questions of law in
       parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de novo with
       no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246.

Id. at 523-24.

                                         ANALYSIS

                                      Failure to Visit

        The sole ground the trial court found for terminating Father’s parental rights is
failure to visit Liam in the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. A
parent abandons his or her child when he or she, “for a period of four (4) consecutive
months, [fails] to visit or engage in more than token visitation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
102(1)(E). “Token visitation” means visitation that, “under the circumstances of the
individual case, constitutes nothing more than perfunctory visitation or visitation of such
an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish minimal or
insubstantial contact with the child[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(C). In this case,
the relevant four-month period for determining whether Father abandoned Liam by failing
to visit him is March 28, 2021, through June 27, 2021.

       At the trial, Mother testified that Father had not visited Liam in almost four years.
She testified about an attempted visit in November two years before that failed when Father
began cursing Mother. Liam ran from Father, locked himself in Mother’s car and refused
to go with Father. Mother testified that after that incident Father never called, texted or
went to court seeking visitation. Father admitted that he had not seen Liam for 44 months.

                                            -4-
At another point during the trial, Father disputed that he had not seen Liam since June of
2019, but he had no calendar or diary to support his contention. Father also testified that
he saw Liam at the grocery store once or twice, but Father “didn’t have actual time with
him.”

       On appeal, Father argues that the trial judge “focused only [on] Father’s actions,
minimized Mother’s actions, and ignored the stepfather’s actions.” Father testified that
Mother and Stepfather interfered with Father’s visitation. An interference with visitation
argument is essentially an argument that Father’s failure to visit was not willful. “The
absence of willfulness is an affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-102(1)(I). Therefore, the defense of
absence of willfulness must be pled. TENN. R. CIV. P. 8.03. Father did not plead this
affirmative defense, so the defense of absence of willfulness is waived. See In re Leah T.,
No. M2022-00839-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 4131460, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 22, 2023).

       After a thorough examination of the record, we agree that the trial court’s decision
to terminate Father’s parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

                                        Best Interest

        When examining the best interest of the child in the termination of parental rights
context, we are directed by statute to consider the nonexclusive factors found in Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1). The statute lists factors that the court “shall consider,” In re Angela
E., 303 S.W.3d at 251, but a court is not required to find that each of the enumerated factors
exists before concluding that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a parent’s
rights. In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Similarly, the statute
does not call for a mechanical determination regarding each of the factors, but rather the
relevancy and weight of each factor will be unique to each case. In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d
490, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Consequently, in certain circumstances, the consideration
of one factor may be determinative. Id. (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2005)). However, this does not relieve a court of its duty to consider each factor
and, even in cases where one factor is outcome determinative, the court must consider all
factors and relevant proof that a party offers. In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 682
(Tenn. 2017).

       The facts considered in the best interest analysis must be proven by “‘a
preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.’” Id. at 681 (quoting
In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tenn. 2015)). “‘After making the underlying factual
findings, the trial court should then consider the combined weight of those facts to
determine whether they amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the
child’s best interest[s].’” Id. (quoting In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555).

                                            -5-
        The trial court considered all the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1) and
considered several factors most relevant. The court found that Liam’s need for stability and
continuity would not be affected by the termination of Father’s parental rights.2 The court
also found that Father had “consistently been inconsistent with child support.”3 Another
important trial court finding was that “there is not a secure and healthy parental attachment
between the child and [Father]. [Father] fails to visit, call, attend school functions and
attend extracurricular activities.”4 Father has “disdain for his ex-wife and new husband . .
. , sees himself as the victim, and takes no personal responsibility for his relationship with
Liam….”5 Moreover, the court noted that Father had not visited Liam in at least 44
months.6 The court heard and credited “the testimony of both [Mother and Stepfather] in
that the child has a close relationship with [Stepfather].”7 As for relationships with persons
other than caregivers8, the court observed that Father maintained that his two older sons
had a good relationship with Liam, yet Father also texted Mother that “Just so you know,
Easton and Westin changed their numbers just in case y’all had them. They don’t want
nothing to do with him [Liam] until he learns to quit believing your lies…” The court found
the relationship Liam had with his half-brothers not to be significant.9

    2
      This finding relates to the factor in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(A): “The effect a termination
of parental rights will have on the child’s critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout
the child’s minority.”
    3
     This finding relates to the factor in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(C): “Whether the parent has
demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety
needs.”
    4
      This finding relates to the factor in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(D): “Whether the parent and
child have a secure and healthy parental attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation
that the parent can create such attachment.”
    5
        This finding also relates to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(D).
    6
      This finding relates to the factor in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(E): “Whether the parent has
maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child and used the visitation or other contact to
cultivate a positive relationship with the child.”
    7
      This finding relates to the factor in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(H): “Whether the child has
created a healthy parental attachment with another person or persons in the absence of the parent.”
    8
      “Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons other than parents and
caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and the likely impact of various available outcomes on
these relationships and the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage,” is the factor in Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(I).

    9
       Two factors the court considered relevant are not as strong as those discussed above. The factor found
in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113 (i)(1)(F) is “Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home.” The
trial court believed that the incident when Father cursed at Mother and Liam ran from Father and locked
himself in Mother’s car shows that Liam is fearful of Father. This conclusion may be true, but the evidence
                                                    -6-
        The trial court’s findings related to these statutory factors are solidly grounded in
the testimony of the parties. We affirm the trial court in concluding that it has been proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Father’s parental rights is in
Liam’s best interest.

                                                CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against
the appellant, Eugene M., for which execution may issue if necessary.

                                                                     /s/ Andy D. Bennett
                                                                     ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

in the record is not sufficient to establish that this is the case. It is equally possible that Liam did not like
Father’s behavior and showed his disgust by running from Father. The other factor that the court found
important is listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (i)(1)(S), “Whether the parent has consistently provided
more than token financial support for the child.” As previously noted, the court observed that Father had
“consistently been inconsistent with child support.” But earlier in the opinion, the court found that it did
“not believe that the relevant time period shows that the payments were only token payments.” Taking a
longer view, the court was not persuaded that Father had made more that token payments in the past.

                                                     -7-