Court Opinion

ID: 9375732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 18:06:45.674791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.201295
License: Public Domain

J-S03007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 JOSEPH VALLERY                           :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1534 EDA 2021

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2020
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0002317-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2023

      Joseph Vallery appeals from his October 15, 2020 judgment of sentence

of five to ten years of incarceration followed by five years of probation which

was imposed after he was convicted of various firearms offenses. We affirm.

      We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the

certified record. At approximately midnight on the evening of October 29,

2017, the victim in this matter, Carlos Morris, and his cousin, Dennis Morris,

left their house on the 100 block of Edgewood Street in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania to walk to a nearby Chinese restaurant. The two men passed

by Appellant and his friend, known only by the name Gooch, who were outside

of Appellant’s home, which was located on the same block of Edgewood Street.

      Upon first encountering one another, the four men exchanged neither

words nor deeds. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/14/22, at 2. When the Morris

cousins returned along the same route a few minutes later, however, an
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altercation erupted between the two groups. See N.T. Trial, 1/29/20, at 48-

49.   What began as a verbal dispute quickly turned physical when Gooch

reached for something behind his back, which prompted Carlos Morris to “flip”

him to the ground.      Id. at 51-52.    At this point, Dennis Morris observed

Appellant wielding a silver handgun that he believed resembled a .9mm pistol.

Id. at 55-56. Dennis Morris watched as Appellant fired the pistol at his cousin

several times.      Carlos Morris ran from the scene.       Id. at 57.     Shortly

thereafter, Appellant got into his car and drove away. Carlos Morris was taken

to Penn Presbyterian Hospital where he was treated for gunshot wounds to his

chin, chest, and arm.

      Thereafter,

      [r]esponding officers located a crime scene comprised of multiple
      .40 caliber fire cartridge casings (“FCCs”), a live .40 caliber bullet,
      and, what would later be determined to be a 9mm or .38 caliber
      projectile. Shortly after police secured the scene, Appellant’s
      uncle, Eugene Rorie, was found by police crossing into the crime
      scene. Rorie was [taken into custody]. At some point, Rorie
      mentioned he had a bag of clothing in his vehicle belonging to
      Appellant, and Rorie consented [to] a search . . . . Police
      recovered the bag which contained clothing with blood stains.
      That clothing was tested by the forensics lab and determined to
      have Appellant’s DNA on them. The blood stains [also] tested
      positive for the victim’s blood. Gunshot reside testing was positive
      for the presence of gunshot reside on multiple articles of clothing,
      including the waistband and inside pockets of the pants.

Id. at 4 (cleaned up). No gun was recovered. Appellant was apprehended

from the basement of his uncle’s home in February 2018 and charged with

attempted murder, aggravated assault, carrying a firearm without a license,

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carrying a firearm on the public streets of Philadelphia, possession of a firearm

by a prohibited person, and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”).

      Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on all charges except for possession

of a firearm by a prohibited person. The trial was held on January 29 and 30,

2020, which was followed by an immediate non-jury trial with respect to the

single outstanding charge. Ultimately, he was found guilty of all the above-

enumerated firearms offenses and not guilty of attempted murder and

aggravated assault. On October 15, 2020, Appellant was sentenced as noted

above. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the weight

of the Commonwealth’s evidence, which was denied by operation of law on

February 26, 2021. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). However, Appellant did

not initially file a notice of appeal.

      On March 31, 2021, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition alleging that

his failure to file a direct appeal was the product of ineffectiveness. The court

agreed and reinstated Appellant’s right to appeal nunc pro tunc, after which

Appellant filed the instant notice of appeal to this Court. Both Appellant and

the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant has presented two issues for our consideration:

      1.    Is the evidence sufficient, as a matter of law, to convict
      [Appellant] of the crimes of possessing a firearm without a license
      and carrying a firearm in Philadelphia as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. §§
      6106 and 6108 of the Crimes Code where the evidence of record
      does not establish that the item allegedly used by [Appellant] had
      a barrel length or overall length which satisfied the definition of
      firearm as that term is defined [at] 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102?

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      2.   Is the verdict of guilty with respect to all charges against
      the weight of the evidence and so contrary to the evidence that it
      shocks one’s sense of justice under the circumstances of this case?

Appellant’s brief at 7.

      Appellant’s first claim for relief implicates the sufficiency of the

Commonwealth’s evidence with respect to Appellant’s convictions pursuant to

18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(1) (“[A]ny person who carries a firearm concealed on

or about his person . . . without a valid and lawfully issued license under this

chapter commits a felony of the third degree.”) and 6108 (“No person shall

carry a firearm . . . at any time upon the public streets or upon any public

property   in   [Philadelphia.]”).     Specifically,   Appellant   asserts   the

Commonwealth did not adduce sufficient evidence that he was in possession

of a “firearm” as defined under the Uniform Firearms Act (“UFA”).            See

Appellant’s brief at 23-30 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102).

      We bear the following basic legal principles in mind:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, we may not weigh the
      evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be

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       considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
       credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
       is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 282 A.3d 1161, 1171 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned

up).    As noted above, Appellant’s arguments concern the definition of

“firearm” under the UFA, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “Any

pistol or revolver with a barrel length less than 15 inches, . . . or any pistol,

revolver, rifle, or shotgun with an overall length of less than 26 inches.” 18

Pa.C.S. § 6102. Our precedent confirms that proof that a particular weapon

meets the barrel length definitions noted above is an essential element of both

§ 6106 and § 6108. See Commonwealth v. Todd, 384 A.2d 1215, 1217

(Pa. 1978), superseded by statute on separate grounds, Commonwealth v.

Gillespie, 821 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. Ray, 751

A.2d 233, 235-36 (Pa.Super. 2000).

       Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to adduce any evidence that

the weapon wielded by Appellant on the night in question fell within the length

restrictions set by § 6102. See Appellant’s brief at 21. However, it is well-

established that the Commonwealth may establish the length of a particular

weapon     by   purely   circumstantial   evidence   in   this    context.   See

Commonwealth v. Rozplochi, 561              A.2d 25, 31          (Pa.Super. 1989)

(concluding that there was sufficient evidence to establish the length of a

firearm’s barrel from testimony and estimations of size provided by an

eyewitness, irrespective of whether the gun was entered into evidence);

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Commonwealth v. Jennings, 427 A.2d 231, 235 (Pa.Super. 1981) (holding

jury is permitted to “infer” the length of a weapon by first-hand observation).

      Instantly, the gun Appellant possessed on the night in question was

never recovered by the Commonwealth. However, Dennis Morris testified at

numerous points during Appellant’s trial that he observed Appellant in

possession of a “[s]ilver .9mm” pistol.    N.T. Trial, 1/29/20, at 55, 71, 77.

Thereafter, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Officer Daniel Cha,

who was stipulated by the parties to be “an expert in ballistics and firearms

identification.”   N.T. Trial, 1/30/20, at 10-11.   As part of his testimony,

Officer Cha brought a standard .9mm pistol and provided the jury with an

extended opportunity to “get a full look at the size of the [type of] gun” that

Appellant was alleged to have possessed on the night in question. Id. at 20-

21. Thus, the jury had an opportunity to estimate the overall size of the at-

issue firearm by observation. See Rozplochi, supra at 31; Jennings, supra

at 235. This Court has also previously credited expert testimony to establish

barrel length in this context. See Ray, supra at 236 (holding that evidence

was sufficient where “the expert in the instant case was able to identify both

the type of gun used and its barrel length”).

      Furthermore, additional circumstantial inferences also provide support

for the conclusion that Appellant possessed a firearm with a barrel length less

than fifteen inches. Dennis Morris testified that Appellant was able to hold

and discharge the at-issue firearm with one hand. See N.T. Trial, 1/29/20, at

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53. Moreover, he affirmed that the firearm was a “pistol.” Id. at 56. Finally,

no of-record evidence suggested that the barrel of Appellant’s weapon was

exceptionally long. This Court has found such circumstances to be persuasive

on this specific issue.1       See Commonwealth v. King, 251 A.3d 1266

(Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision at 4-5) (holding testimony

“[King] was holding the firearm with one hand seemingly waving it around,

coupled with [the] characterization of the firearm as a ‘pistol,’ and absent any

evidence of an exceptionally long barrel length,” permitted the factfinder to

infer that the “firearm’s barrel length met the definition set forth in Section

6102”); see also Rozplochi, supra at 31 (same).

       Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

we conclude that there was sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence for

the jury to conclude that the at-issue weapon fell within the length parameters

of § 6102. No relief is due on Appellant’s first claim.

       Appellant has also challenged the weight of the Commonwealth’s

evidence. We note that “a true weight of the evidence challenge concedes

that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which

evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742,

____________________________________________

1  The gunshot residue evidence in this case also supports an inference that
Appellant kept his firearm secreted in and around the waist of his pants, which
this Court has also found persuasive on the issue of barrel length pursuant to
the UFA. See Commonwealth v. Biggs, 248 A.3d 455 (Pa.Super. 2021)
(non-precedential decision at 5).

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758 (Pa. Super. 2014). In order to prevail in such an argument, the defendant

must demonstrate that the of-record evidence is “so tenuous, vague and

uncertain   that   the   verdict   shocks   the   conscience    of   the   court.”

Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003). Thus,

“[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the

testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a

different conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 464 (Pa.

2019). Rather, a new trial should be awarded only where the fact-finder's

verdict was “so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice[.]”

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013). Thus,

      A weight challenge is sui generis. Such a claim is not premised
      upon trial court error or some discrete and correctable event at
      trial, but instead ripens only after, and because of, the [fact-
      finder's] ultimate verdict in the case. As a result, a claim asserting
      that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence rests
      within the trial court's discretion. We review the trial court's
      exercise of discretion in ruling on the claim, and not whether the
      verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court is
      required to consider whether [its] verdict is so contrary to the
      evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a
      new trial is imperative.

Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 531 (Pa. 2022) (cleaned up).

      Appellant asserts that his convictions are “impermissibly based upon

conjecture and surmise” and that the Commonwealth’s evidence establishes

“no more than a mere possibility of guilt.” Appellant’s brief at 22. The trial

court responded to these allegations, as follows:

      There was ample evidence presented to find [Appellant] guilty of
      the aforementioned charges. Dennis Morris testified that he

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      witnessed [Appellant] firing a firearm, and was uncertain as to the
      type, but finally concluded it was a [.]9mm semi-automatic. That
      testimony was corroborated by law enforcement. [An officer
      testified] that he found two FCCs, one live bullet, and one bullet
      projectile at the scene. [Another officer testified] he recovered
      the FCCs, bullet and bullet projectile and placed them on a
      property receipt. Officer Cha testified that the FCCs were .40
      caliber Smith & Wesson ammunition as was the live bullet and that
      the bullet projectile was most likely a .9mm or .38 caliber bullet.
      [One of the Commonwealth’s experts] testified that the clothing
      recovered from the scene contained [Appellant’s] DNA. Finally,
      [another expert] testified that the clothing contained gunshot
      residue in the waistband and inside pockets of the pants.

      [The] Commonwealth elicited enough direct and circumstantial
      evidence that [Appellant], a prohibited felon, possessed a firearm,
      an instrument of crime, on the public streets of Philadelphia
      without a license.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/14/22, at 11-12. Thus, the trial court denied Appellant’s

post-sentence motion “because it understood that its role was to award a new

trial only if” the verdict was “truly shocking to the judicial conscience.” Id. at

9-10. Ultimately, the trial court found no such misfeasance here. Id. at 12.

      We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reasoning and

justification.     Aside from painstakingly reciting the evidence at trial,

Appellant’s      argument      on   this   point   is   focused     entirely   upon   mere

inconsistencies     in   the    Commonwealth’s          evidence,    i.e.,   differences   in

Dennis Morris’s statements to police compared with his testimony at trial, or

the presence of additional DNA signatures on the clothes seized by police.

See Appellant’s brief at 41-44.            Such factual quibbling will not support a

weight of the evidence claim. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d

621, 630 (Pa. 1995) (“[A] witness’s credibility is solely for the [factfinder] to

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determine.”). Moreover, the jury was informed of these alleged discrepancies

and it was fully within their ken to make credibility determinations with respect

to any conflicting evidence. It is practically axiomatic that “[i]t is not for this

Court to overturn the credibility determinations of the fact-finder[.]”

Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 320 (Pa.Super. 2006). The

verdict here did not shock the conscience of the trial court, and we find no

basis to overturn that conclusion.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/28/2023

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