Court Opinion

ID: 9701894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:42:34.850333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:30.506303
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). The accused in this case testified in his own behalf. Thereafter the court charged the jury in part as follows: “In weighing the testimony that . . . [the defendant] has given you, you should apply the same principles by which the testimony of other witnesses are tested, and that necessarily involves a consideration of any interest that he might have in the case. You will consider the importance to him of the outcome of this trial and his motive on that account for perhaps telling the truth. An accused person having once taken the witness stand . . . must have his testimony measured in the same way as any other witness, including, however, his interest in the verdict which you will render.” (Emphasis added.)
The defendant took exception to that charge claiming that it was clearly prejudicial and had the effect of totally diminishing his defense in the eyes of the jury. In my view, the use of this often-repeated charge unduly singles out the defendant’s *339testimony and improperly comments on his motives and interest in the outcome of the verdict without similarly commenting on the possible motives and interests of the complaining witnesses.
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty; Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471, 81 S. Ct. 1587, 6 L. Ed. 2d 963; Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453,15 S. Ct. 394, 39 L. Ed. 481; and if he does not testify, no comment can be made upon his failure to do so. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106. The charge in this case placed a premium on the defendant’s decision to testify. It had the effect of relegating his claim of innocence to a less credible testimonial category than that of the complaining witnesses. By creating such a circumstance, the charge undermines the presumption of innocence by attributing a motive to the defendant that can only attach if he is indeed guilty as charged.
Even under the notions of the 1894 decision, Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301,15 S. Ct. 610, 39 L. Ed. 709, cited by the majority, the United States Supreme Court recognized (p. 305) that a court may not arbitrarily single out a defendant’s testimony and said (p. 310): “The import of . . . [the authorities cited in the Reagan decision] is that the court is not at liberty to charge the jury directly or indirectly that the defendant is to be disbelieved because he is a defendant, for that would practically take away the benefit which the law grants when it gives him the privilege of being a witness.” (Emphasis added.) This state’s “traditional” charge to the jury, which denigrates the weight to be accorded an accused’s testimony, has that unfortunate and prejudicial result.
*340“[T]he accused’s right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal is the very foundation of due process. ‘. . . Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man ... to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.’ Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543, 85 S. Ct. 1628,14 L. Ed. 2d 543.” Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 546, 363 A.2d 49. To single out the defendant for exercising his right to testify is equally as repugnant as commenting on the exercise of his right to remain silent.
The better rule is to limit the charge to a general statement of the elements by which all witnesses’ testimony should be weighed: not to single out the defendant’s testimony as less trustworthy than that of other witnesses. See State v. Jonas, 169 Conn. 566, 578-80, 363 A.2d 1378 (Bogdanski, J., concurring and dissenting); see also, e.g., United States v. Brown, 453 F.2d 101, 107 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978, 92 S. Ct. 1205, 31 L. Ed. 2d 253; Garvin v. State, 255 Ind. 215, 217-22, 263 N.E.2d 371; State v. Bester, 167 N.W.2d 705, 706-10 (Iowa); Bryson v. State, 291 So. 2d 693, 694—95 (Miss.); Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 265-67,165 So. 2d 345; State v. Finkelstein, 269 Mo. 612, 618-22, 191 S.W. 1002; Graves v. State, 82 Nev. 137, 138-42, 413 P.2d 503; State v. Bruyere, 110 R. I. 426, 430, 293 A.2d 311; Stewart v. State, 484 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tenn. Crim. App.); and cases cited at 85 A.L.R. 523, 577.
I would, therefore, find error, set aside the judgment and order a new trial.