Court Opinion

ID: 9739312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:12:02.09005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.489142
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HALL, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In applying the Mathews factors, I believe the due process clause of the federal constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XI\( §1) requires a trial court in a termination proceeding to hold a competency hearing for a parent where the parent’s attorney requests such a hearing or, in the absence of such a request, the behavior of the parent suggests to the court that a competency hearing should be held. See In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557, 566, 613 A.2d 780, 785 (1992). In either situation, the standard the trial court should be guided by is whether the record before the court contains specific factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment. In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. at 566, 613 A.2d at 785, citing State v. Lloyd, 199 Conn. 359, 365, 507 A.2d 992, 995 (1986). In this case, the majority maintains that postponing a termination proceeding until a competency hearing is completed or until a parent’s competency is restored would delay a child’s interest in finding a permanent home and undermine the State’s parens patriae interest in protecting the child’s welfare. This argument is too broad to comport with due process and fundamental fairness because in certain cases a parent’s competency may be restored within a relatively short period of time. Holding a competency hearing would give the parties an opportunity to present evidence concerning the likelihood that the parent could be restored to competency within a reasonable time. In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. at 564, 613 A.2d at 784. The trial court would then be in a position to determine the most appropriate and beneficial course of action. The majority also contends that a competency hearing would impose an increased fiscal cost and administrative burden on the State. I do not believe that the administrative costs of holding a competency hearing are prohibitive when balanced against a parent’s fundamental right to the care, companionship, custody, and management of his or her child. The United States Supreme Court has determined that a parent’s interest in retaining custody of his or her child outweighs the State’s interest in avoiding the comparatively minimal costs of a fitness hearing. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 562 n.9, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1215 n.9 (1972). The majority finally contends that where a parent is represented by counsel, the absence of a fitness hearing offers little or no risk of an erroneous deprivation of parental rights. I disagree. A mentally incompetent parent who is unable to understand the nature of a termination proceeding or assist his or her attorney in presenting the case could be at a severe disadvantage. A mentally incompetent parent may be unable to supply an attorney with sufficient information to rebut evidence offered by the State, which, although superficially damaging, could be refuted by a competent parent or a witness whose availability would be made known by a competent parent. See In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. at 563, 613 A.2d at 784. In addition, a mentally incompetent parent’s ability to offer affirmative proof of the existence or prospect of an ongoing parent-child relationship might be significantly compromised. See In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. at 563, 613 A.2d at 784. A mentally incompetent parent might also be unable to assist his or her attorney in establishing tactical and substantive goals at a termination proceeding. See In re Alexander V. 223 Conn. at 563, 613 A.2d at 784. In sum, there is a substantial risk that a mentally incompetent parent, who is unable to understand the nature of a termination proceeding or assist his or her attorney in presenting the case, might suffer an erroneous deprivation of parental rights even where the parent is represented by counsel.