Court Opinion

ID: 9376476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 19:06:24.478452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:06.971539
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Berry, 2023-Ohio-605.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                          No. 111453
                 v.                              :

LAWRENCE BERRY,                                  :

                 Defendant-Appellant.            :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 2, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-19-638262-A

                                           Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Yasmine Hasan, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Jonathan Sidney, Assistant Public Defender, for
                 appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

                   Defendant-appellant, Lawrence Berry (“Berry”), appeals from his

guilty plea, contending that under the July 1, 1998 amendment of Crim.R. 11, a
defendant must be advised of the aggregate, maximum penalty they may receive as

a result of a plea, rather than the maximum penalty the defendant may receive for

each charge of the plea. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

               In April 2019, Berry was charged in an eight-count indictment.

Counts 1-2 charged him with aggravated vehicular homicide. Counts 3-6 charged

him with aggravated vehicular assault.1 Counts 7-8 charged him with operating a

vehicle under the influence of alcohol.2 The charges arise from a March 2019 car

accident involving Berry, his girlfriend at the time, Janetta Foster (“Foster”), and

Foster’s two minor children at the time, G.P. and M.C. Berry was involved in an

incident with another driver. Berry struck the other driver’s car, causing Berry to

lose control of his own car. Berry crashed through a fence and wrapped around a

utility pole. Berry and Foster were ejected from the car and Foster died shortly

thereafter. G.P. sustained a broken ankle and M.C. sustained a fracture of his femur,

serious back injuries, and memory problems. Berry was driving while under the

influence of alcohol and a suspended license. (Oct. 29, 2019, tr. 412-413).

               The matter proceeded to a jury trial on September 18, 2019. On the

second day of trial, Berry entered into a guilty plea. Berry pled guilty to one count

of aggravated vehicular homicide (Count 1), one count of aggravated vehicular

      1  Each of Counts 1-6 carried a furthermore clause that the offender was driving
under a suspension.
       2 Each of Counts 7-8 carried a furthermore clause that Berry has been previously

convicted or pled guilty to operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
assault (Count 3), as amended to include both G.P. and M.C., and one count of

operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol (Count 7). Counts 2, 4, 5, 6, and

8 were nolled. The court referred Berry to the county probation department for a

presentence investigation and report.

              At the sentencing hearing in October 2019, the trial court sentenced

Berry to ten years in prison on Count 1 (aggravated vehicular homicide), seven years

in prison on Count 3 (aggravated vehicular assault), and 180 days on Count 7

(operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol). The trial court ordered that

Counts 1 and 3 be served consecutively and ordered that Berry pay court costs and a

fine in the sum of $875. The court ordered a lifetime suspension on Berry’s driver’s

license on Count 1, a ten-year suspension on Count 3, and a three-year suspension

on Count 7. The court also ordered six points to be assessed to Berry’s driver’s

license.

              In April 2022, Berry filed a pro se motion for leave to file a delayed

appeal and a pro se motion for appointment of counsel. This court granted Berry’s

motion for leave and appointed the Cuyahoga County Public Defender to represent

Berry on appeal.

              Berry now appeals, raising the following assignment of error for

review:

      Assignment of Error: Whether the trial court failed to comply with
      Crim.R. 11 by failing to determine that [Berry] understood the
      maximum penalty involved in the plea agreement prior to accepting his
      guilty plea.
II. Law and Analysis

              Berry argues that the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11 when

it did not advise him of the maximum, aggregate prison sentence that could be

imposed in the event the court ordered his individual sentences to be served

consecutively. He contends that since the 1998 amendment, appellate courts across

the state have been applying an obsolete version of Crim.R. 11 because the courts

continue to rely on State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988),

which predates the amendment.

   A. State v. Johnson

              In Johnson, the Ohio Supreme Court analyzed the pre-1998

amendment version of Crim.R.11, which provided that before accepting a guilty plea

in a felony case, the trial court must “‘[d]etermin[e] that [the defendant] is making

the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the

maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that [the defendant] is not eligible for

probation.’” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 132-133, quoting Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). The

Johnson Court found that the “[f]ailure to inform a defendant who pleads guilty to

more than one offense that the court may order him to serve any sentences imposed

consecutively, rather than concurrently, is not a violation of Crim. R. 11(C)(2), and

does not render the plea involuntary.” Id. at syllabus.

              The Johnson Court reasoned that neither the United States

Constitution nor the Ohio Constitution requires a trial court to inform a defendant

during his plea hearing of the maximum total of the sentences he faces or that the
sentences can be imposed consecutively. Id. at 133. Regarding Crim.R. 11, the Court

considered the text of the rule itself and stated:

      A review of [Crim. R. 11(C)] indicates that it requires the trial court to
      explain before it accepts “the plea,” “the nature of the charge and of the
      maximum penalty involved.” (Emphasis added.) Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a).
      Upon its face the rule speaks in the singular. The term “the charge”
      indicates a single and individual criminal charge. So, too, does “the
      plea” refer to “a plea” which the court “shall not accept” until the
      dictates of the rule have been observed. Consequently, the term “the
      maximum penalty” which is required to be explained is also to be
      understood as referring to a single penalty. In the context of “the plea”
      to “the charge,” the reasonable interpretation of the text is that “the
      maximum penalty” is for the single crime for which “the plea” is
      offered. It would seem to be beyond a reasonable interpretation to
      suggest that the rule refers cumulatively to the total of all sentences
      received for all charges which a criminal defendant may answer in a
      single proceeding.

Id. at 133. The Court concluded that because the trial court in Johnson explained to

the defendant the individual maximum sentences possible, his guilty plea was

proper. Id.

   B. The July 1998 Amendment to Crim.R. 11

               The language relied upon by the Johnson Court to justify its holding,

however, has been slightly amended. As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in State v.

Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 15, “Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a) has been amended since Johnson so that a single plea can now apply to

multiple charges, see 83 Ohio St.3d xciii, cix (effective July 1, 1998).” The relevant

portion of Crim.R. 11 now provides that a trial court shall not accept a guilty plea in

a felony case without first
      [d]etermining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
      understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
      penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
      for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at
      the sentencing hearing.

(Emphasis added.) Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).

   C. Maximum Penalty and Crim.R. 11 post-Johnson and the July 1998
      Amendment

               Based on the analysis in Johnson, Berry contends that because the

prior version of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) governed singular pleas to singular charges, its

reference to “the maximum penalty” necessarily referred to the singular penalty

associated with a singular plea to a singular charge. Berry’s argument, however, is

not new.

               In Bishop, the Ohio Supreme Court began its plurality analysis by

noting that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) was amended since Johnson was decided. Id. at ¶

15. The Bishop Court, however, did not articulate whether, or to what extent, the

amendment of the rule (from “charge” to “charges”) impacted its longstanding

holding in Johnson. Instead, the Court distinguished Johnson based upon the fact

that the defendant’s felony sentence and the 12-month sentence attributable to his

postrelease control violation were intertwined and were required to be served

consecutively under R.C. 2929.141(A)(1). Id. at ¶ 17. Because a prison sentence

imposed for a postrelease control violation must be served consecutively to prison

sentences for new felony offenses that gave rise to the violation, the court found that

the phrase “maximum penalty involved” in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) includes the
postrelease control violation sentence. Id. Consequently, the Court found that the

defendant must be notified of the fact that the sentences are required to be imposed

consecutively at the time of the plea hearing on the new felony offense in order to

satisfy Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). Id. at ¶ 21.

               Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Bishop discusses the effect of

the amendment by noting that

       Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) has been amended to require the trial court to
       ensure that the accused understands the nature of the “charges” and
       the maximum penalty involved. However, we amended the rule in
       1998 — almost a decade after we decided Johnson — “in light of
       changes in terminology used in the criminal law of Ohio effective July
       1, 1996,” by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136 (“S.B. 2”),
       and the staff comment to the amendment does not indicate that making
       the word “charge” plural was intended to be a substantive change. 83
       Ohio St.3d xciii, cxi. We do not make significant revisions to our
       procedural rules cryptically, and we have never held that our holding
       in Johnson has been abrogated by the amended rule.

Id. at ¶ 47.

               Justice Fischer’s dissent also addressed the effect of the amendment

to Crim.R. 11, stating that

       [w]hile we did interpret a prior version of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) in
       Johnson, the plain language of the rule still demonstrates that “Crim.R.
       11 applies only to the entry and acceptance of the plea,” Johnson at 134,
       and that “the reasonable interpretation of the text is that ‘the maximum
       penalty’ is for the single crime [now “crimes”] for which ‘the plea’ is
       offered” (emphasis added.), Id. at 133. In Johnson, * * * [t]he court
       reviewed the plain language of former Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and
       determined that “the maximum penalty involved” means the penalty
       for the “crime” for which “the plea” was offered, not that “the maximum
       penalty involved” means any and all possible future consequences of
       the plea.

       A plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt of the
       offense or offenses to which the plea is entered. Crim.R. 11(B)(1). * * *
      Thus, a guilty plea is entered to a charged offense, and “the maximum
      penalty involved” is the maximum penalty for that offense to which the
      defendant pleads guilty and not additional or collateral possible
      punishments that are an indirect consequence of the guilty plea.

Id. at ¶ 73-74.

                  Because the plurality in Bishop did not expressly overrule Johnson

and for the reasons articulated in the dissents, we find that the change from “charge”

to “charges” under the 1998 amendment to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) did not disturb

Johnson’s holding. As we noted in State v. Nave, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107032,

2019-Ohio-1123, while the plurality in Bishop distinguished Johnson, it did not

overrule Johnson when it had an opportunity to do so. Id. at ¶ 11.

                  Our continued application of the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in

Johnson is consistent with prior decisions from this court as well as other Ohio

appellate courts. In Nave, we acknowledged that

      [t]his court has followed Johnson on numerous occasions and
      concluded that Crim.R.11(C)(2)(a) does not require a trial court to
      advise a defendant of the potential for discretionary consecutive
      sentencing. State v. Vinson, 2016-Ohio-7604, 73 N.E.3d 1025, ¶ 24
      (8th Dist.), citing, among others, State v. Dansby-East, 2016-Ohio-
      202, 57 N.E.3d 450, ¶ 16-17 (8th Dist.), and State v. Dotson, 8th Dist.
      Cuyahoga No. 101911, 2015-Ohio-2392, ¶ 12. In State v. Norman, 8th
      Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91302, 2009-Ohio-4044, this court found that
      where a trial court is required to impose a sentence consecutively, the
      failure to advise the defendant of that fact constituted a failure to
      substantially explain the maximum penalty. Id. at ¶ 13. See also State
      v. Abernathy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107123, 2018-Ohio-4414, ¶ 4.
      However, where the decision to impose consecutive sentences arises
      purely from the trial court’s discretion under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), such
      an advisement is not required. See Johnson at the syllabus; Vinson at
      ¶ 24-26.
Id. at ¶ 10. See also State v. Cobbledick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108959, 2020-Ohio-

4744, ¶ 6, discretionary appeal not allowed, 164 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2021-Ohio-3336,

173 N.E.3d 1238, (“Under Ohio law, there is no requirement for the trial court to

advise of the possibility that each individual sentence may be imposed consecutively,

such that a plea can be considered as involuntary in the absence of such an

advisement.”); State v. Poage, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110577, 2022-Ohio-467, ¶ 13

(“[A] trial court is not required ‘“to advise a defendant of the cumulative total of all

prison terms for all the offenses at the time of the guilty plea.’”” Id., quoting State

v. Gooden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109643, 2021-Ohio-1192, ¶ 20); State v. Novoa,

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 19 MA 0073, 2021-Ohio-3585, ¶ 22 (recognizing that “many

appellate jurisdictions, including this Court, have continued to follow Johnson”);

State v. Willard, 2021-Ohio-2552, 175 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 69 (11th Dist.) (“This court and

others have recognized the court’s distinction in Bishop and have continued to apply

Johnson.”); State v. Gabel, 6th Dist. Sandusky Nos. S-14-038, S-14-042, S-14-043,

and S-14-045, 2015-Ohio-2803, ¶ 13-14, citing State v. Millhoan, 6th Dist. Lucas

Nos. L-10-1328, L-10-1329, 2011-Ohio-4741; State v. Mack, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.

C-140054, 2015-Ohio-1430, ¶ 25; State v. Roberts, 9th Dist. Medina No. 19CA0004-

M, 2019-Ohio-4393, ¶ 6; State v. Ellis, 5th Dist. Coshocton Nos. 2019CA0014,

2019CA0015, 2020-Ohio-1130, ¶ 10; State v. Whitman, 2021-Ohio-4510, 182

N.E.3d 506 (6th Dist.) (Discussing the effects of Johnson, Bishop, and the 1998

amendment to Crim.R. 11, and finding that “the change from ‘charge’ to ‘charges’

under the 1998 amendment to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) did not disturb the holding in
Johnson.” Id. at ¶ 28.). Continuing the application of prior decisions from our court,

we now address Berry’s plea.

   D. The Colloquy

              In the instant case, Berry entered into a guilty plea following two days

of trial. With regard to the maximum penalty, the trial court advised Berry:

      [COURT]: Do you understand the offenses to which you are pleading
      guilty?

      Sir, you would be pleading guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide.
      That’s a felony of the first degree. It is possibly punishable from three
      to eleven years in one-year increments. It carries with it a maximum
      discretionary fine of $20,000.          Post-release control would be
      mandatory and it would be for a period of five years. There would be
      no reduction.

      Do you understand that?

      [BERRY]: Yes. Yes.

      [COURT]: There is a presumption for prison. Do you understand?

      [BERRY]: Yes.

      [COURT]: Additionally, you would be pleading guilty to aggravated
      vehicular assault. That’s a felony of the second degree. It is possibly
      punishable from two to eight years in one-year increments. It carries
      with it a maximum discretionary fine of $15,000.

      Do you understand that?

      [BERRY]: Yes.

      [COURT]: And, lastly, sir, you will be pleading guilty to driving while
      under the influence. That’s a misdemeanor of the first degree. It is
      possibly punishable from 20 days in jail or ten days in jail, up to six
      months.

      Do you understand that?

      [BERRY]: Yes.
[COURT]: There’s a possible discretionary fine of $525 to $1,625.

Do you understand that?

[BERRY]: Yes.

[COURT]: Alcohol, drug assessment, and treatment is mandatory.

Do you understand?

[BERRY]: Yes.

[COURT]: There’s a driver’s license suspension from one to seven
years.

Do you understand that?

[BERRY]: Yes.

[COURT]: [T]here are some other class suspensions I need to review
with you which would make this inoperable.

Do you understand?

[BERRY]: Yes.

[COURT]: Because on the aggravated vehicular homicide, you would
have a Class 1 driver’s license suspension.

Do you understand?

[BERRY]: Yes.

[COURT]: And on the aggravated vehicular assault, you would have a
Class 3 driver’s license suspension.

Do you understand that?

[BERRY]: Yes.

[COURT]: Okay. A Class 1 driver’s license suspension * * * would be a
suspension of your driver’s license for the rest of your life; and a Class
3, which would be applicable to the aggravated vehicular assault, would
be from two to ten years.

Do you understand?
[BERRY]: Yes.

[COURT]: And then, of course, you would have the other one, the DWI,
which would have been from one to seven. * * * [A]gain, that doesn’t
really play in it, but you need to know what your rights are with
reference to it, okay?

[BERRY]: Uh-huh.

[COURT]: Okay. Sir, upon your release from prison, the Ohio Parole
Board would impose a period of post-release control of five years.
There would be no reduction. They may impose conditions and
sanctions. Should you decide to commit an act that causes you to be
found in violation of your post-release control, you can be remanded to
an Ohio penal institution for an additional 50 percent of your original
sentence.

Do you understand?

[BERRY]: Yes.

[COURT]: All of these cases do carry with it a disability, which would
prohibit you from being able to obtain a valid carry conceal weapon
certification in the future.

Do you understand that?

[BERRY]: Yes.

***

[COURT]: And just quickly, I’m going to go over what’s been said on
the record, okay? You tell me if there’s anything different.

The government has agreed that you will plead guilty to aggravated
vehicular homicide. That’s a felony of the first degree. They’ve agreed
that you will plead guilty to aggravated vehicular assault. That’s a
felony of the second degree. They’ve agreed that you will plead guilty
to driving while under the influence. That’s a misdemeanor of the first
degree. The aggravated vehicular homicide is subject to a license
suspension, a Class 1 license suspension, which would be for life. The
Class 3 aggravated vehicular assault case is a suspension of two to ten,
and the DWI is one to seven.

Now, is there anything else?
      [BERRY]: No.

      [COURT]: How do you1 plead, sir, guilty or not guilty?

      [BERRY]: Guilty.

      [COURT]: And are you, in fact, guilty, sir?

      [BERRY]: Yes.

      [COURT]: Let the record reflect the Court finds [Berry] has knowingly
      and voluntarily entered his plea with a full understanding of his
      constitutional and trial rights.

      Counselors, are you satisfied that Rule 11 has been complied with?

      [STATE]: Yes, Your Honor.

      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.

      [COURT]: Therefore, sir, the Court will accept your plea of guilt.

(Sept. 20, 2019, tr. 401-407.)

               “The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11 is to convey certain

information to a defendant so that they can make a voluntary and intelligent

decision regarding whether to plead guilty.” Poage, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110577,

2022-Ohio-467 at ¶ 9, citing State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423

N.E.2d 115 (1981). When the trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights

outlined in Crim.R. 11 that a defendant waives by pleading guilty, “we presume that

the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is

required.” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶

14, citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St. 3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶

31, and State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 62,

syllabus. “But when a trial court fails to fully cover other ‘nonconstitutional’ aspects
of the plea colloquy, [such as the maximum penalty,] a defendant must affirmatively

show prejudice to invalidate a plea.” Id., citing Veney at ¶ 17.

               The Dangler Court clarified that when a defendant attempts to

invalidate his plea, reviewing courts should engage in the following inquiry: “(1) has

the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has

not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a

defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of

prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” Id. at ¶ 17.

               Based on the plea colloquy above, we find that trial court complied

with Crim.R. 11(C) and advised Berry of the maximum penalty involved. The trial

court clearly advised Berry of the maximum potential sentence for each count,

including the potential fines and license suspensions, as well as the weapons

forfeiture. The court then repeated the plea agreement and asked both the state and

defense counsel if they were satisfied with the plea. “While it may be a best practice

for a court to inform a defendant of the total of all potential sentences [the

defendant] may receive, it is not a requirement for a court to comply with Crim.R.

11(C).” Poage at ¶ 13. The trial court is not required “‘to advise a defendant of the

cumulative total of all prison terms for all the offenses at the time of the guilty plea.’”

Gooden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Wojtowicz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 104384, 2017-Ohio-1359, ¶ 12, citing State v. Vinson, 2016-Ohio-7604, 73

N.E.3d 1025, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). Because the trial court clearly informed Berry of the
maximum potential penalties he faced for each offense to which he plead guilty, the

court complied with Crim.R. 11.

               Having answered the first question in the affirmative, we then look to

the third question, and Berry can prevail only by establishing that he would not have

pled guilty but for the trial court’s failure to advise him of his aggregate, maximum

sentence. There is nothing in the record indicating that Berry would not have pled

guilty had the trial court informed him of the maximum aggregate of the sentences

he faced. In addition, none of the offenses to which Berry pled guilty carry a

mandatory, consecutive sentence. Consequently, the trial court was not required to

inform Berry of the maximum, aggregate sentence. Accordingly, Berry has not

established prejudice and he is not entitled to have his guilty plea vacated for a

failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C). Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765,

164 N.E.3d 286, at ¶ 24.

               Therefore, the sole assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

               The change from “charge” to “charges” under the 1998 amendment to

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) did not disturb the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson.

Our continued application of Johnson is consistent with prior decisions from this

court as well as other Ohio appellate courts. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) does not require a

trial court to advise a defendant of the maximum, aggregate of all prison terms for

all the offenses at the time of the guilty plea for discretionary, consecutive sentences.

Here, because the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences was
discretionary, the trial court was not required to inform Berry of the aggregate,

maximum penalty and the trial court’s failure to provide such information was not

a violation of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).

               Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to

the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR