Court Opinion

ID: 9396247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 21:04:27.209885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.481315
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN RE ASBESTOS LITIGATION                §
                                         §
HENNESSY INDUSTRIES, LLC                 §   No. 144, 2023
and its Predecessor-in-Interest,         §
AAMCO Tools, Inc.,                       §   Court Below—Superior Court
                                         §   of the State of Delaware
       Defendant Below,                  §
       Appellant,                        §   C.A. No. N19C-01-100
                                         §
       v.                                §
                                         §
LISA ESTRADA, individually and           §
as Fiduciary for the Estate of           §
DONALD JORDONEK, deceased,               §
                                         §
       Plaintiff Below,                  §
       Appellee.                         §

                          Submitted: April 28, 2023
                          Decided:   May 19, 2023

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

                                      ORDER

      After consideration of the notice of appeal from an interlocutory order and the

documents attached thereto, it appears to the Court that:

      (1)    The appellant, Hennessy Industries, LLC, has petitioned this Court,

under Supreme Court Rule 42, to accept an appeal from the Superior Court’s March

28, 2023 oral ruling denying Hennessy’s motion for summary judgment and the

court’s opinion dated April 11, 2023, denying Hennessy’s motion for reargument.

The plaintiff-appellee in this asbestos litigation alleges that Donald Jordonek
contracted and died from mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure during his

career as an automotive mechanic.           Hennessy is the successor-in-interest to

AMMCO Tools, Inc., which manufactured brake lathes and grinders with which

Jordonek worked while employed at the Goodyear Tire Service Center in Maple

Heights, Ohio, from 1972 to 1999. The AMMCO equipment that Jordonek used did

not contain asbestos, but the plaintiff-appellee asserts that AMMCO designed and

sold a machine the function of which was to grind asbestos-containing brake linings,

and that such use released asbestos dust.

      (2)    Hennessy moved for summary judgment. Among other arguments,

Hennessy contended that under Ohio law it could not be held liable for injuries

caused by asbestos-containing products that it did not manufacture or supply. In

response, the plaintiff-appellee asserted several theories under which Hennessy

could be held liable under Ohio law, including that Hennessy owed a duty to warn

users about the danger of asbestos exposure from the use of its products. The

Superior Court denied Hennessy’s motion for summary judgment as to the duty-to-

warn claim in a bench ruling on March 28, 2023. Hennessy moved for reargument;

the Superior Court denied the motion in a written opinion on April 11, 2023. The

court stated that, “[l]ike a number of other jurisdictions, Ohio follows the general

rule that a manufacturer does not have a duty to warn of adjacent parts supplied by

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a third party, the so-called bare metal defense.”1 But, noting that “there are well

recognized exceptions to this rule,”2 the court concluded that an Ohio court would

recognize an exception to the rule in the circumstances of this case. Specifically, the

Superior Court held that an Ohio court would recognize a duty to warn where a

manufacturer of non-asbestos-containing products intended those products to be

used with another product for an activity that “inevitably created a hazardous

situation.”3

       (3)     The Superior Court denied Hennessy’s application for certification of

an interlocutory appeal.4 The court held that it had decided a substantial issue of

material importance, but determined that appellate review before final judgment is

not warranted.5 Turning to the considerations set forth in Rule 42(b)(iii), the court

rejected Hennessy’s argument that Rule 42(b)(iii)(A) supported certification. The

court acknowledged that the question presented was one of first impression, but

determined that, because it “is not a question of Delaware law, but a question of

1
  Estrada v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 2023 WL 2903403, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2023).
2
  Id.
3
   Id. at *5; see also id. (“The factual requirements that must be established to trigger [this]
exception are: (1) the manufacturer’s product is necessarily used in conjunction with another
product; and (2) the danger results from the two products together.”).
4
  Estrada v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 2023 WL 3093554 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2023).
5
  Id. at *1. See DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(i) (“No interlocutory appeal will be certified by the trial
court or accepted by this court unless the order of the trial court decides a substantial issue of
material importance that merits appellate review before a final judgment.”).

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Ohio law,” it is less pressing to resolve on an interlocutory basis.6 The court also

rejected Hennessy’s argument that interlocutory review might terminate the

litigation,7 observing that the litigation will continue as to at least one other

defendant, regardless of whether it continues against Hennessy.8 Finally, the court

rejected Hennessy’s argument that interlocutory review is warranted based on

considerations of justice or judicial economy because a decision in Hennessy’s favor

would save the expense of a trial,9 reasoning that “[t]his scenario exists in every case,

and in this Court’s view is not a sufficient reason under factor (H) to grant

Hennessy’s application.”10 Finally, the court determined that none of the other Rule

42(b)(iii) considerations supported certification and found “no benefit to

certification that could outweigh the costs of piecemeal litigation.”11

       (4)    We agree that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.

Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of this

Court.12 In the exercise of its discretion and giving great weight to the trial court’s

view, this Court has concluded that the application for interlocutory review does not

meet the strict standards for certification under Supreme Court Rule 42(b).

6
  Estrada, 2023 WL 3093554, at *2 (emphasis omitted).
7
  DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(G).
8
  Estrada, 2023 WL 3093554, at *2.
9
  DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(H).
10
   Estrada, 2023 WL 3093554, at *2.
11
   Id.
12
   DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(d)(v).

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Exceptional circumstances that would merit interlocutory review of the Superior

Court’s decision do not exist in this case,13 and the potential benefits of interlocutory

review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by

an interlocutory appeal.14 Interlocutory review would not promote the efficient

conclusion of the case, which has been pending for more than four years and which

would continue regardless of the outcome of an interlocutory appeal.

          NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the interlocutory appeal is

REFUSED.

                                         BY THE COURT:

                                         /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
                                              Chief Justice

13
     Id. R. 42(b)(ii).
14
     Id. R. 42(b)(iii).

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