Court Opinion

ID: 9759070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:02:40.694362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:58.924221
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I am unable to agree with my colleagues that reversal is warranted in this case. In my view, the trial judge’s finding that Juror No. 477 could be impartial was not clearly erroneous, and the judge did not abuse her broad discretion in declining to disqualify this prospective juror for cause. I am also satisfied that the judge committed no error, and certainly no reversible error, in overruling an objection to a very brief portion of defense counsel’s closing argument. I would affirm the judgment.
I.
The question whether a prospective juror who has been challenged for cause will be able to perform her duties impartially is one of fact, and the trial judge’s determination must therefore be accorded great deference on appeal. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-38, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984).1 A finding of impartiality may be overturned only for “manifest error.” Id. at 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)) (quotation marks omitted); accord, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878); Harris v. United States, 606 A.2d 763, 764 (D.C.1992); Rease v. United States, 403 A.2d 322, 326 (D.C.1979) (per curiam). The burden of showing partiality rests squarely upon the challenger. Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 325. Moreover, as my colleagues recognize, “the trial court has broad discretion in conducting voir dire [,] and its rulings will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion and substantial prejudice to the [appellant].” Maj. op. at 1005 (citations and ellipsis omitted). “The determination of a potential juror’s impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge.” Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 325 (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, Juror No. 477 was not “manifestly” biased, and, in my opinion, the majority’s reversal of the trial judge’s decision cannot be reconciled with our deferential standard of review as described above.
The record reflects that Juror No. 477 spoke openly, and with apparent candor, during her interrogation on voir dire. She volunteered that, in her opinion, “the tort system might benefit from an overhaul.” 2 She also disclosed that she had read The Death of Common Sense, a book that Ms. Lewis’ attorney regarded as unduly critical of tort and personal injury plaintiffs. These disclosures may not have made No. 477 appear to be an ideal juror from Ms. Lewis’ perspective, but they were not grounds for automatic disqualification. Any possible partiality suggested by the prospective juror’s responses was not at all “manifest,” as the cases require. At most, *1010the inference that someone with Juror No. 477’s views would not be fair to the plaintiff was hypothetical — -a possibility, perhaps, but hardly a certainty. That is not enough to permit appellate second-guessing. As the Supreme Court explained in Reynolds, supra,
if hypothetical only, the partiality is not so manifest as to necessarily set the juror aside. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Burr’s Trial (1 Burr’s Trial, 416), states the rule to be that “light impressions, which may fairly be presumed to yield to the testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of the testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep impressions which close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him.”
98 U.S. at 155; see also Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 826. Juror No. 477’s comments might perhaps have suggested some philosophical leanings which could operate to the advantage of the defense, although even that possibility was hardly obvious or manifest. Under the authorities cited, there was no ground for reversal.
The trial judge recognized that Juror No. 477’s responses did warrant further inquiry regarding the woman’s ability to be fair to both parties. The judge therefore followed up by propounding several more specific questions. In response, the prospective juror stated, inter alia, that she could “certainly serve and, I think, be an impartial, fair judge of the events and so forth.”3 Asked whether she would treat the plaintiffs witnesses differently because they were plaintiffs witnesses, she responded “No, I don’t think so.” Satisfied with these assurances, the judge rejected the plaintiffs challenge for cause and explained her reasons for doing so:
Clearly, I was concerned when [Juror No. 477] described what she seemed to feel as a negative experience in her being involved in a lawsuit against the school she chaired the board at.
When I distinguished significantly between that kind of case and this kind, she seemed to understand that there really wasn’t much of an overlap in her own — between the nature of these claims.
Her personal opinion, her reading in the area, I’m satisfied with her description of her ability to be impartial and fair is a reasonable one. I don’t see a big overlap with her personal case and this one. I don’t think that we have a basis other than speculation in which to strike her for cause.
Obviously, the trial judge’s ruling on the plaintiffs challenge to this prospective juror turned primarily on her assessment of the woman’s responses. Juror No. 477 stated, under oath, that she could be an impartial and fair judge of the facts. If this statement was true, then there was no basis for a challenge for cause. In the final analysis, it was the judge’s responsibility to decide whether, given the entire record, the prospective juror’s assurance was believable. See Patton, supra, 467 U.S. at 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885. The judge did her duty, inquired further, and considered all of the prospective juror’s answers. In the end, the judge credited Juror No. 477’s “description of her ability to be impartial and fair.” This, as I have noted, *1011was a finding of fact. Under the applicable standard of review, such a finding is insulated from assertive appellate second-guessing unless it is manifestly erroneous. Patton, supra, 467 U.S. at 1031, 104 S.Ct. 2885; cf. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1997).
Although my colleagues in the majority do not phrase their ruling in this way, their decision, when assessed under the “manifest error” standard of review, amounts to a holding that the trial judge erred by believing, rather than disbelieving, Juror No. 477’s representations under oath. It is there that they and I part company. Over several pages of transcript, the judge and the prospective juror participated in a thoughtful dialogue. The judge had the obvious advantage of being able to look the woman in the eye, to observe her demeanor and mannerisms, and to consider her tone and emphasis in responding to questions. See Rease, supra, 403 A.2d at 325 (emphasizing the importance of the trial judge’s ability to assess a prospective juror’s demeanor). By marked contrast, we, as an appellate court, have access only to the transcript — to the whole transcript, to be sure, but to nothing but the transcript. “The best and most accurate record is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the fruit before it was dried.” Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1215 (D.C.1999) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1949) (Jerome Frank, J.)) (quoting Ulman, The Judge Takes The Stand 267 (1933)). Where, as in this case, the merits of the plaintiffs challenge for cause turn almost entirely on the prospective juror’s demeanor and credibility, an appellate court, in my view, may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge.
Judge Reid points out, and I agree, that “[pjeople do not readily admit to bias.” Maj. op. at 1005 (citation omitted). This is a fundamental fact of life with which any experienced judge is undoubtedly familiar. A prospective juror’s representation that she can and will be fair therefore is not, and cannot be, binding on the trial judge. The judge must use his or her own judgment and worldly wisdom to determine whether or not the prospective juror is being truthful, or whether the juror has biases of which he or she may not be aware. But we do not have the slightest reason to believe that the experienced judge in this case was unable to appreciate the reluctance on many people’s part to acknowledge them own prejudices. The fact that the judge believed this prospective juror, after receiving her responses during voir dire, does not suggest that the judge would automatically credit every self-serving declaration that might be presented to her by someone the judge regarded as less trustworthy. Indeed, the judge sustained the plaintiffs challenge for cause against another prospective juror — a former law clerk to a Superior Court Judge — on a record which, at least on paper, would have justified the woman’s retention on the jury.4
I agree with the majority that the trial judge plays an important role in detecting bias on the part of potential jurors. Maj. op. at 1005 (citation omitted). I likewise have no quarrel with my colleagues’ view that
voir dire ... to be meaningful, must uncover more than the jurors’ bottom *1012line conclusions [to broad questions], which do not in themselves reveal automatically disqualifying biases as to their ability fairly and accurately to decide the case, and indeed, which do not elucidate the bases for those conclusions.
Id. (citation omitted, ellipsis and alteration in original). But in this case, there was a specific dialogue between the prospective juror and the judge. At the conclusion of this exchange, Ms. Lewis’ attorney did not propose any additional questions to be propounded to the prospective juror, nor did he seek leave to interrogate Juror No. 477 himself. Instead, he asked the judge, on the basis of the record as it then stood, to disqualify No. 477 for cause. Having failed to suggest, in the trial court, further voir dire questions focused upon Juror No. 477’s qualifications,5 Ms. Lewis cannot now be heard to complain, for the first time on appeal, that no further interrogation of this prospective juror was conducted. See, e.g., In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 477-78 & n. 11 (D.C.1996).
II.
The majority also holds that a new trial is required because the trial judge overruled an objection by Ms. Lewis’ attorney to a very brief portion of defense counsel’s closing argument by Mr. Voss’ attorney. According to my colleagues, the comments to which objection was made constituted an improper “claims-minded plaintiff’ argument. In my opinion, the relevant portion of counsel’s closing was based on evidence that had been received without objection, and the argument was not improper. Even assuming, arguendo, that the objection should have been sustained, reversal is not warranted.
During her cross-examination by counsel for Mr. Voss, Ms. Lewis was asked about two prior accidents in which she had been involved. She acknowledged that she had made a claim following each of these events, that her attorney in the present case had represented her in each, and that in one instance, she had been evaluated by the physician who testified on her behalf against Mr. Voss. Ms. Lewis’ attorney did not object to this cross-examination,6 and the evidence became a part of the record.
During her closing argument, Mr. Voss’ attorney referred briefly to the injuries suffered by Ms. Lewis in her previous accident. Counsel then continued as follows:
Ms. Lewis believes and claims that all her problems are related to this one incident despite the fact that she had significant preexisting arthritis in the knee, in other parts of her body and other problems.
The cyst, the osteo — tricompartmental osteoarthritis. And the doctors agree those are not all related, but despite that everything now is related to this one incident.
She’s made several claims before in the past. That’s part of the evidence to *1013consider. Does she have an interest or motive — .
(Emphasis added.) Before defense counsel could finish the last sentence and identify the alleged “interest or motive,” Ms. Lewis’ attorney objected, complaining at the bench that the foregoing constituted an improper “claims-minded plaintiff’ argument.
The only objection made by the plaintiff on “elaims-mindedness” grounds was to the two brief sentences plus seven words that I have italicized above. The judge pointed out that the evidence had been received without objection, and she ruled that counsel’s argument to that point therefore had not been out of order. The judge added, however, that the defense did not “have a foundation laid that suggests that credibility is at issue because of prior claims.”7 On this limited record, the majority apparently concludes that the closing argument made by Mr. Voss’ counsel warrants reversal of the judgment.
I turn first to the merits of the plaintiffs objection. The majority relies on general statements in two decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.8 Maj. op. at 1007. But ten years after the earlier of these Second Circuit cases, and seven years after the later one, this court reiterated that
the courts of the District of Columbia are notably liberal in receiving evidence of claim-mindedness and allowing the jury to assess its weight. Decisions binding on us firmly indicate the relevance of such evidence to assessing the truth of the witness’ present allegations.
Murphy v. Bonanno, 66B A.2d 505, 510 (D.C.1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).9
In Murphy, supra, this court relied on, and cited with approval, Mintz v. Premier Cab Ass’n, supra note 9. 663 A.2d at 510. Mintz involved a scenario similar to the one now before us. In that case, the plaintiff, a passenger in a taxi, sued the taxicab company for injuries sustained in a collision between two cabs. On cross-examination, the plaintiff was interrogated regarding claims that she had made following her involvement in two prior accidents. In closing argument, counsel for the defendant challenged the plaintiffs credibility upon the ground that she was “claims-minded.” Mintz, 75 U.S.App. D.C. at 389, 127 F.2d at 745. There was no evidence that the plaintiffs earlier claims were fa*1014bricated or false. The trial judge nevertheless permitted the defense argument. Thereafter, in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Edgerton, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment favorable to the defendant:
This type of evidence, like many other types, may create prejudice but is believed to be worth more than it costs.10
This case is within the principle. Negligent injury is not unusual, but it is unusual for one person, not engaged in hazardous activities, to suffer it repeatedly within a short period and at the hands of different persons. The court’s rulings were therefore right. That all three of appellant’s stories may have been true affects the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. It was for the jury to decide from all the evidence, and from its observation of appellant on the stand, whether she was merely unlucky or was “claim-minded.”
Id., 75 U.S.App. D.C. at 390, 127 F.2d at 745.11
In light of these authorities, it cannot fairly be said that the challenged portion of defense counsel’s closing argument was contrary to District of Columbia law. A careful reading of what Mr. Voss’ attorney actually said (as distinguished from what opposing counsel obviously apprehended that she might say) reveals that the “claims-minded plaintiff’ theme, if it emerged at all, was implicit rather than explicit — counsel asked rhetorically whether the plaintiff had an “interest” or “motive.” Murphy, supra, and Mintz, supra note 9, as well as other decisions surveyed in Murphy, would have permitted a far more direct articulation of the theory than defense counsel ever attempted.
I should think that if my colleagues share Justice Ginsburg’s discomfort with Mintz and with Mintz’s District of Columbia progeny, see note 9, supra, then our court should address the problem directly, en banc. In the meantime, however, we are required to follow binding precedent. Even if one were to construe the holding in Mintz as inconsistent with the later decision in Roundtree, supra note 11, which it is not, Mintz would control. “Where a division of this court fails to adhere to earlier controlling authority, we are required to follow the earlier decision rather than the later one.” Thomas v. *1015United States, 731 A.2d 415, 420 n. 6 (D.C.1999).
But even if the plaintiffs objection to the defendant’s closing argument had been well-taken — and, for the reasons that I have stated, I am convinced that it was not — reversal would still be unwarranted. The jury, as I have noted, was well aware that Ms. Lewis had made two prior accident claims, that her attorney was involved in both of them, and that the doctor who testified on her behalf at the trial in this case had been consulted in one of the two. This testimony was admitted without objection. Counsel for Ms. Lewis never moved to strike this evidence, nor did he request a limiting instruction regarding the purpose for which the jury could consider it. During the trial, the only objection made by Ms. Lewis’ attorney regarding the issue now under discussion was to the two short completed sentences and one short incomplete sentence in defense counsel’s closing that are quoted and italicized on page 1012, supra. It takes quite a stretch to construe these twenty-four words12 as a “elaims-minded plaintiff’ argument. But even if counsel’s remarks are so interpreted, the probability that an attorney’s very cryptic comment (about facts well-known to the jury) appreciably affected the result of a three-day trial is surely somewhere between negligible and nil.
III.
In a civil case, as in a criminal prosecution,
[t]he reversal of a [judgment] entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, [counsel], and the [parties] to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place; [parties or witnesses] may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences. The “passage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible.” These [and other] societal costs of reversal and retrial are an acceptable and often necessary consequence when an error in the first proceeding has deprived a [party] of a fair determination of the [merits]. But the balance of interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial.
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (phrases in brackets inserted to replace criminal case terminology; internal citations omitted). In my opinion, Ms. Lewis received a fair trial, and there is simply no sufficient basis in law for a reversal that will entail so much cost in time and treasure to so many people.
I am prepared to assume that this trial was not perfect, for perfection in any human endeavor “is a rare commodity.” Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1228 (D.C.1992) (en banc). But any retrial will probably be even less perfect. The accident in this case occurred on September 25, 1995. The new trial is unlikely to take place less than six years after the fact. By then, the memories of the witnesses may well have eroded considerably. For reasons that I have explained, I differ with my colleagues significantly with respect to the doctrinal principles applicable to this case. But looking at the case realistically, the practical consequences of this reversal strike me as most unfortunate.
In conclusion, I suggest that en banc review may be appropriate of
*10161. the contrast between the majority’s approach and what I consider to be the well-established standard of review applicable to a judge’s denial of a challenge of a prospective juror for cause; and
2. the status in this jurisdiction of the “claims-minded plaintiff’ doctrine, in light of the rule of M.A.P. v. Ryan.
In the meantime, I respectfully dissent.

. As Justice Powell stated for the Court in Patton, supra, the question whether a potential juror can serve impartially
is not one of mixed law and fact. Rather it is plainly one of historical fact: did a juror swear that he could set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the evidence, and should the juror’s protestation of impartiality have been believed.
467 U.S. at 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885 (citation omitted).

. No. 477 based this opinion on her experiences in a case in which a school district with which she had been connected had been sued.

. Juror No. 477 added that "the events would have to be pretty straight forward in order for me to — I’m not going to give someone the benefit of the doubt just based on — .” The judge explained that the plaintiff had the burden of proof and "[s]o we won’t be asking you to give her the benefit of the doubt.” Juror No. 477 responded: "Right.”

. This occurrence illustrates the problem with appellate intervention in cases in which the pros and cons of a challenge for cause are evenly balanced. In the present case, application of a non-deferential standard of review might entitle each party to reversal on the basis of the judge's ruling on a challenge for cause if the jury’s verdict ultimately went against that party!

. Earlier, as the majority points out, counsel for Ms. Lewis did ask that certain additional questions be posed to the entire venire on voir dire. This was quite different, however, from proposing specific follow-up questions to be propounded to this particular juror on the basis of her prior answers. In any event, we have held that a trial court has broad discretion in conducting voir dire, and the judge was not required to pose questions in the precise language proposed by Ms. Lewis’ attorney where, as here, the judge's own inquiries to the prospective jurors addressed the issues sought to be explored by counsel. See Cordero v. United States, 456 A.2d 837, 841 (D.C.1983).

. Counsel later explained to the court that he believed the evidence to be admissible because his client had suffered injury to her neck in one of the earlier cases as well as in the accident that precipitated the present case.

. Following the judge’s ruling, Mr. Voss’ attorney reminded the jury that Ms. Lewis “was treated by the same doctor as to one of those injuries,” and she invited the jurors to consider the doctor’s credibility. There was no further objection.

. Outley v. New York, 837 F.2d 587, 592 (2d Cir.1988); Raysor v. Port Auth., 768 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.1985).

. The Murphy case was decided one month and fourteen days before the accident that precipitated the present litigation. The liberality of the courts of this jurisdiction with respect to evidence of claim-mindedness, to which we referred in Murphy, supra, has also been explicitly noted in a leading commentary:
The courts in the District of Columbia go to the other extreme. They have said that whenever there have been other claims, it is up to the jury to decide whether the claimant is “unlucky or claim-minded." Mintz v. Premier Cab Association, [75 U.S.App. D.C. 389, 390,] 127 F.2d 744, 745 (1942) (cross-examination of plaintiff about two prior personal injury claims); Manes v. Dowling, 375 A.2d 221, 223 (D.C.1977) (evidence of four subsequent personal injury claims admissible even though only one was of another parking lot accident); Evans v. Greyhound Corp., 200 A.2d 194, 196 (D.C.1964) (proper to cross-examine plaintiff suing for a fall while a passenger aboard a bus about two previous settled claims).
McCormick on Evidence § 196 at 580 n. 10 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d. ed. 1984) (format of citations altered).

. The statement in Mintz, 75 U.S.App. D.C. at 390, 127 F.2d at 745, that "[t]his type of evidence ... is believed to be worth more than it costs,” is directly contrary to the views of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Raysor, supra note 8, 768 F.2d at 40. See Maj. op. at 1007. The court there stated that "litigiousness may have some slight probative value, but that value is outweighed by the substantial danger of jury bias against the chronic litigant.” Raysor, supra note 8, 768 F.2d at 40. The majority relies heavily on Raysor, but Mintz constitutes controlling authority, see note 11, infra, while Raysor does not.

. Mintz was decided more than twenty eight years before February 1, 1971, and its holding is therefore binding on this court. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). In Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 325-26 (D.C.1990), a divided panel of this court declined to follow dictum in Mintz which appeared to approve the cross-examination of a complaining witness in a sexual assault case regarding other unrelated sexual assault charges that the witness had made on previous occasions against various other men. But the division of this court that decided Roundtree was not empowered to, and did not purport to, overrule the holding of Mintz with respect to the relevance of a plaintiffs claim-mindedness in civil litigation. Cf. Hemphill v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 299 U.S.App. D.C. 184, 185-86, 982 F.2d 572, 573-74 (1993) (per curiam) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing Mintz as a decision "of a certain age”). Murphy, supra, in which the claims-minded plaintiff theory was declared to be alive and well, at least in civil cases, was decided after both Roundtree and Hemphill.

. If "she’s” and "that’s” are each considered to be one word, rather than two, then the challenged portion of the argument consists of only twenty-two words.