Court Opinion

ID: 9844099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:57:42.014262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:27.898090
License: Public Domain

LANDAU, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the "writ of continuing garnishment that Miller served on Zidell was not effective. I do not agree with the majority’s reasoning in two respects.
My first disagreement is with the majority’s conclusion that certain language in ORS 29.401 may be ignored as a mere “clerical error.” The majority reaches that conclusion in response to the dissent’s argument that the disputed language supports its reading of the statute. ORS 29.401 provides, in relevant part:
“In addition to garnishment proceedings otherwise available under ORS * * * 29.401 to 29.415, a person for whom a writ of garnishment may be issued under ORS 29.137 may *738obtain a writ of continuing garnishment against any garnish ee who is an employer of the defendant. To the extent that the earnings [owed by the defendant] are not exempt from garnishment, the garnishment shall be a lien and continuing levy against earnings owed by the garnishee to the defendant at the time of service * * *.”
The catch is that the “garnishment proceedings otherwise available under ORS * * * 29.401 to 29.415” are proceedings for obtaining a writ of continuing garnishment. Thus, the statute contains a meaningless reference to itself: In addition to the proceedings for obtaining a writ of continuing garnishment, a person may obtain a writ of continuing garnishment.
According to the dissent, the provision that one may obtain a continuing writ of garnishment “in addition to” garnishment proceedings “otherwise available” under ORS 29.401 to ORS 29.415, which is the writ of continuing garnishment statute,
“indicates that a continuing writ, described in ORS 29.401 to ORS 29.415, may be used to garnish more than just earnings owed by an employer to an employee.”
133 Or App at 744. In other words, because the statute authorizes the issuance of a writ of continuing garnishment to garnish “earnings,” and then, “in addition to” that, goes on to authorize the issuance of a writ of continuing garnishment, the dissent concludes that the writ of continuing garnishment procedure must allow garnishment of something more than the garnishment of earnings. In my view, that is a reading of the statute only Lewis Carroll would love. To maintain it, the dissent is required to assert that the same statutory language means two different things at the same time.
The majority concedes that the statutory cross-reference to itself “could well effect a substantive change in the continuing writ provisions,” as the dissent argues. 133 Or App at 750. The majority avoids that effect, however, by deeming the cross-reference a “clerical error.” Id. I would neither grant the dissent that concession nor attempt to avoid it by means of clerical error.
We may ignore clerical errors that have been introduced into legislation by legislative counsel and not actually *739enacted by the legislature. See, e.g., State v. Lermeny, 213 Or 574, 580, 326 P2d 768 (1958); Mitchell v. Board of Education, 64 Or App 565, 568, 669 P2d 356, rev den 296 Or 120 (1983). That is not, however, what we confront in this case, in which the so-called “clerical error” was voted on and enacted by the legislature.
I am aware that, in one case, Justice Linde suggested that we may ignore the misnumbering of a section, and insert additional statutory section references, if that comports with our understanding of the legislature’s intentions, based on the legislative history of the enactment. Bush v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 295 Or 619, 622, 669 P2d 324 (1983). Still, I have a difficult time squaring that decision with our statutory duty:
“[T]o ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted * *
ORS 174.010. Indeed, the notion that we are free—on the basis of our reading of the tea leaves of legislative history—to rewrite the language of statutes that the legislature has enacted raises in my mind serious questions concerning the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches.
Rather than rely on the device of clerical error, I would confront the statutory problem head on: The language that the legislature enacted is a redundancy. I am well aware of the countless cases that recite the hoary maxim that we are loath to conclude that the legislature enacted language that has no meaning. The fact remains that sometimes the legislature does that. We are permitted to deem language meaningless if “no other reasonable conclusion is available.” 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 299 Or 344, 358, 703 P2d 207 (1985). This is such a case. The disputed language in ORS 29.401 should be ignored because it is capable of no reasonable construction, not because it is a clerical mistake.
My second disagreement with the majority concerns its determination that the writ Miller served on Zidell is ineffective. In my view, the matter may be resolved in a straightforward fashion: The writ of continuing garnishment *740applies only to “earnings,” which the statute clearly treats as synonymous with “wages.” This case does not involve the garnishment of “wages.” Therefore, the writ was ineffective.
That the matter may be resolved in that manner is borne out by the language of the statute. Although the writ of continuing garnishment statutes do not define “earnings,” they do provide a form that “shall be” followed when serving the writ upon a garnishee employer. ORS 29.415 states, in part,
“This section establishes a form for a writ of continuing garnishment described in ORS 29.401 to 29.415 and issued by an attorney as described in ORS 29.137 and 29.139. A writ of continuing garnishment issued by an attorney shall be in substantially the following form:”
The statute then describes the obligations of the garnishee as follows:
“YOU MUST ANSWER THIS WRIT BY COMPLETING AND FILING A CERTIFICATE OF GARNISHEE WHETHER OR NOT YOU OWE ANY WAGES TO THE DEBTOR.
“IF YOU FAIL * * * TO DELIVER THE WAGES WHEN REQUIRED TO DO SO, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO COURT PROCEEDINGS * * *.”
ORS 29.415. (Emphasis supplied.) The statute also requires that a garnishee be advised that,
“This writ garnishes only wages you owe to the Debtor as of the date you received this writ, including debts that existed but were not yet due when you received this writ and wages that accrue on or before 90 days after the date this writ is issued.
“ * * * *
“[I]f you cannot tell from the writ whether you owe any wages to the Debtor, the writ does not garnish anything * *
ORS 29.415. (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, the garnishee must certify that at the time of the delivery of the writ, the garnishee,
“had in my possession, control or custody only the following wages due or to become due * *
*741ORS 29.415. (Emphasis supplied.) Presumably, the legislature would not direct attorneys and clerks of the court to advise garnishees that the “writ garnishes only wages,” if it actually intended that a writ of continuing garnishment reach something other than “wages.” The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the legislature’s own description of the effect of ORS 29.401 is that a writ of continuing garnishment may only be used as a levy against “wages.”
The term “wages” generally connotes some sort of payment on a regular basis, pursuant to an established rate per specified period of time. Webster’s, for example, defines the term as follows:
“a pledge or payment of usu. monetary renumeration by an employer esp. for labor or services usu. according to contract and on an hourly, daily, or piecework basis * * * [and] applies chiefly to an amount paid daily or weekly * * *.”
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2568 (unabridged ed 1993). (Emphasis supplied.)
Wages are not involved in this case. Zidell does not owe West payment on an hourly, daily, weekly or piecework basis. To the contrary, Zidell was obligated to pay West pursuant to a purchase order, under which West was to provide hired workers, supply materials and equipment and acquire insurance coverage, all for the painting of Zidell’s barge. When the work on the barge was completed, Zidell was to pay West a predetermined sum of money in order to cover the costs of West’s labor and materials. West was not paid according to the length of time required to complete the project. Rather, West was paid according to the cost of the project, plus some amount representing profit. Zidell did not owe West “wages.” Consequently, Miller’s writ of continuing garnishment did not operate as a levy against the money Zidell owed West under the terms of the purchase order. In my view, that ends the matter.
The majority goes on to discuss several additional issues, I think unnecessarily. The majority, for example, relies on ORS 23.175(3) to support its position that the reference to “earnings” in ORS 29.401 does not cover the money Zidell owed West in this case. 133 Or App at 736-37. *742The definition of “earnings” in ORS 23.175(3), however, applies only to the term “[a]s used in this section [ORS 23.175] and ORS 23.185.” ORS 23.175. Whatever “earnings” may mean for the purposes of those statutes, the fact remains that, for the purposes of ORS 29.401, the legislature has manifested its intention to use the term in the narrow sense of “wages” only.
The majority also takes on the dissent’s reading on legislative history in disputing the legislature’s intended definition of the term “wages.” I think that is unnecessary as well. Whatever the legislative history might show cannot alter the fact that the legislature unambiguously referred to the term “earnings” in ORS 29.401 to mean “wages” only. I do not advocate mindless adherence to the artificial constraints imposed upon v. by PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Nevertheless, when the language at issue is not capable of the construction that is being asserted, no amount of legislative history is sufficient to alter that fact. In my view, the dissent’s proposed construction does unreasonable violence to the statutory language, and, to me, that should be the long and the short of the discussion.
Finally, the majority contests the dissent’s argument that the writ of continuing garnishment is not limited to the service of “employers” in the “typical employer-employee” relationship and may also apply to cases in which an independent contractor has been retained. At least for the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to resolve that issue. If the contract between Zidell and West does not provide for the payment of “wages,” the writ of continuing garnishment is ineffective regardless of how the contractual relationship is characterized or the statutory term “employer” is defined.
Edmonds and Armstrong, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.