Court Opinion

ID: 9955089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 17:01:34.45931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:15.838871
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 27 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE ROBERTO MENDOZA,                           No. 21-1062
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A208-411-662
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

JOSE ROBERTO MENDOZA,                           No. 22-1821
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A208-411-662
 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
                            Submitted October 20, 2023**
                                 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: IKUTA, BADE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

      Jose Roberto Mendoza, a native and citizen of Peru, petitions for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing his appeal of an

Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying his application for withholding of removal and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Mendoza also petitions

for review of the BIA’s subsequent denial of his motion to reopen. We dismiss in

part for lack of jurisdiction and deny in part.

      1.   We lack jurisdiction to review factual challenges to the denial of

Mendoza’s application for withholding of removal and the denial of his motion to

reopen. Under the “criminal alien bar,” we lack “jurisdiction to review any final

order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed

a [covered] criminal offense.” Coria v. Garland, No. 22-970, 2024 WL 1164863, at

*1 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)). To determine

whether the criminal alien bar applies, we “first determine whether the denial of

relief raised in a petition for review is part of the final order of removal or merges

with it.” Id. at *14 (citing Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 581–82 (2020)). We

      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

                                          2                                 22-1821
then ask whether “the petitioner is removable based on a conviction covered by

§ 1252(a)(2)(C).” Id. If so, “then we lack jurisdiction to review factual challenges

to the final order of removal and may only review constitutional claims or questions

of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D).” Id.

      We conclude that § 1252(a)(2)(C) bars our review. First, Mendoza challenges

orders that “merge into the final order of removal” under § 1252(a)(2)(C). See

Coria, 2024 WL 1164863 at *6 (“[A] motion to remand, which is analogous to a

motion to reopen, merges with the final order of removal for purposes of

§ 1252(a)(2)(C).”); id. at *7 n.3 (“[W]ithholding of removal fall[s] within the final

order of removal and [is] subject to § 1252(a)(2)(C).”); see also Nasrallah, 590 U.S.

at 582.

      Second, Mendoza is “removable by reason of having committed a criminal

offense covered in section 1182(a)(2).” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Mendoza does

not contest that he was convicted of a covered controlled substance offense. Instead,

he argues that he is “no longer ‘indisputably’ removable” because a California state

court granted his motion to vacate his drug conviction. But no such argument was

presented to the BIA, and Mendoza offers no evidence to support his assertions. Nor

does he explain how the alleged vacatur of his conviction would affect his

removability.

      With the exception of his due process claim, which we address next,

                                        3                                  22-1821
Mendoza’s challenges to the denial of withholding of removal and reopening relate

to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and are factual in nature. We lack

jurisdiction to consider those factual challenges to the final order of removal under

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). See Coria, 2024 WL 1164863 at *2 (holding that the

Ninth Circuit’s “on the merits” exception to § 1252(a)(2)(C) is no longer good law

after Nasrallah).

      2. We have jurisdiction to review Mendoza’s due process claim under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) because it involves a pure question of law. To succeed on

his due process claim, Mendoza must show that “(1) the proceeding was so

fundamentally unfair that [he] was prevented from reasonably presenting his case,

and (2) [he] demonstrates prejudice, which means that the outcome of the proceeding

may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Ibarra–Flores v. Gonzales, 439

F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

We review this question de novo. Id. at 620.

      Mendoza has not shown that his immigration proceedings were “so

fundamentally unfair” that he was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.

Id. Mendoza alleges that he struggled to understand English, that he had difficulty

hearing the proceedings, and that the IJ was biased. But the IJ offered a Spanish

interpreter, which Mendoza declined.        Moreover, the IJ offered numerous

continuances and opportunities for Mendoza to meet with his counsel, and also made

                                        4                                  22-1821
efforts to ensure that Mendoza understood the questioning.         Finally, the IJ’s

comments about the numerous continuances he had granted to Mendoza do not

establish bias.

      3. The criminal alien bar at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) does not preclude our

review of Mendoza’s factual challenges to the denial of CAT relief, which is not part

of the order of removal. See Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at 587; Andrade v. Garland, 94

F.4th 904, 914 (9th Cir. 2024). We review the denial of CAT relief for substantial

evidence. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021). “Under

this standard, we must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence compels

a contrary conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.

2019). Because the BIA cited Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (B.I.A.

1994), in addition to providing its own review of the evidence and law, we review

both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 891 (9th

Cir. 2020).

      To succeed on his CAT claim, Mendoza must show that “he is more likely

than not to be tortured” if removed to Peru. Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland, 49

F.4th 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2022). The IJ denied CAT relief after finding that

Mendoza was not credible.1 The record does not compel a contrary conclusion.

1
 The BIA concluded that Mendoza waived his CAT claim because he did not
meaningfully challenge it before the BIA. In this court, the government does not

                                        5                                  22-1821
Based on material inconsistencies, omissions, and the “evolving” nature of

Mendoza’s testimony, the agency reasonably determined that the evidence supported

an adverse credibility finding. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 750 (9th

Cir. 2022) (“[E]ven minor inconsistencies that have a bearing on a petitioner’s

veracity may constitute the basis for an adverse credibility determination.”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). And even if Mendoza could resolve the

inconsistencies about his entering the United States, the IJ’s adverse credibility

finding would still stand because the totality of the record supports that finding. See

Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (“There is no bright-

line rule under which some number of inconsistencies requires sustaining or

rejecting an adverse credibility determination—our review will always require

assessing the totality of the circumstances.”). Absent his credible testimony, the

remaining evidence in the record does not enable Mendoza to meet his burden under

CAT.

       DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.2

raise the waiver issue, and instead argues that substantial evidence supports the
agency’s adverse credibility determination. Because any failure to exhaust before
the BIA is not jurisdictional, see Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 413
(2023), we resolve the CAT claim on the merits.
2
  The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate. The
motions for a stay of removal are otherwise denied.

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