Court Opinion

ID: 9757201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:24:35.177501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:36.020878
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Eagen :
I agree with the majority that when Mercier voiced his constitutional right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel during the police questioning, that all police interrogation should have ceased. I also agree the police acted contrary to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), by then confronting Mercier with Leroy WasMngton’s accusatory statement. I further agree the burden was on the Commonwealth to affirmatively establish Mercier later voluntarily decided to waive his right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. But, at this point the majority and I part company.
Despite Ms original insistence on his right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel, it is my view Mercier had the right to change his mind and to then proceed to waive these rights if he did so voluntarily. This Court so held in Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A. 2d 361 (1970). I further believe *217this is what happened in this case, and that the waiver was effective and valid. In order to more clearly understand my position on this point, certain facts established by the record, but unmentioned in the majority opinion, need to be set forth.
At the time involved Mercier was twenty years of age and was of average intelligence. Upon being confronted with Washington’s statement, Mercier said nothing incriminating, but asked to converse privately with his mother and aunt. Permission was granted and the three conferred privately for approximately twenty minutes. Upon emerging from this conference and without anything further being said by the police, Mercier asked to be given a polygraph test. He was then again administered a full set of Miranda warnings, said he understood, but still desired the test. In response to the question, if he wanted a lawyer to be present he stated: “No, I asked the other detective for one, but I changed my mind. I want to tell you what happened without having a lawyer with me.” At this point, Mercier was allowed to again speak privately with his mother and aunt. At the conclusion of this second conference, which consumed at least ten minutes, the requested test proceeded. At the conclusion of the test, Mercier was warned of his Miranda rights for the third time and shortly thereafter gave the statement which the majority say was erroneously admitted in evidence at trial.
It should be noted Mercier came voluntarily to the police; that he said nothing incriminating when confronted with Washington’s statement; that this occurred some time later, and only after he had conferred privately for at least thirty minutes with members of his immediate family, and only after the completion of a polygraph test which he himself requested. It should also be noted there was no extensive period of questioning, no incommunicado incarceration, and no physical abuse, and it is undisputed Mercier was fully aware *218of Ms rigMs. On these facts the waiver was certainly voluntary or at least it may not be ruled involuntary as a matter of law. Cf. Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 445 Pa. 1, 281 A. 2d 852 (1971).
The majority say that once Mercier asserted his constitutional rights, any subsequent waiver thereof to be effective “must have been initiated by Mm.” But, isn’t this what occurred?
After the police confronted Mercier with WasMngton’s statement, the interrogation did stop. The police said nothing further at this point. It was Mercier who initiated the subsequent events by requesting the polygraph test. But say the majority, even if tMs is so, having once asserted his constitutional rights there could not be a subsequent “knowing and intelligent waiver” unless a lawyer were present to assist in this decision. In my view, tMs is an unwarranted and improper extension of Mvra/nda. In fact, no court, witMn my knowledge, has ever previously ruled that a twenty-year-old individual of average intelligence must have the assistance of a lawyer before he may effectively waive his right to have one.
I dissent.
Mr. CMef Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Pomeroy join in tMs opinion.