Court Opinion

ID: 9897396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:03.051043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:25.977789
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         May 16 2023, 8:38 am

                                                                              CLERK
                                                                          Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                             Court of Appeals
                                                                               and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Paul J. Podlejski                                         Theodore E. Rokita
Anderson, Indiana                                         Attorney General of Indiana
                                                          George P. Sherman
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kristopher M. Wainscott,                                  May 16, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-1817
        v.                                                Interlocutory Appeal from the
                                                          Madison Circuit Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable David A. Happe,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          48C04-2106-F1-1685

                               Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                              Judges Bailey and Brown concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1817 | May 16, 2023                                  Page 1 of 7
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   Police obtained a search warrant for Kristopher Wainscott’s phone based on his

      11-year-old niece’s accusation that Wainscott molested her. After police seized

      Wainscott’s phone—but before they analyzed its contents—the victim partially

      recanted her allegations against Wainscott. Doubting the veracity of the

      recantation, the investigating detective and local prosecutor proceeded with

      analyzing Wainscott’s phone without informing the magistrate who issued the

      warrant of the new development.

[2]   Wainscott moved to suppress all evidence derived from the search warrant,

      arguing that the State’s failure to inform the magistrate of the victim’s

      recantation constituted an omission of material facts that rendered the warrant

      invalid. The trial court denied Wainscott’s motion, and he filed this

      interlocutory appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Because the warrant

      had already been executed by the seizure of the phone, the State had no

      obligation to inform the magistrate of the partial recantation.

      Facts
[3]   In late December 2020, a father reported to police that his daughter (Victim)

      had been molested. When Detective Dave Preston interviewed Victim, she told

      him the incident occurred at a birthday party at her grandmother’s house a few

      months earlier. According to Victim, Wainscott followed her into a bathroom

      and allegedly exposed himself and had sex with her. Victim also expressed

      anxiety that her actions would get Wainscott in trouble.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1817 | May 16, 2023            Page 2 of 7
[4]   Detective Preston applied for a search warrant on January 5, 2023. The warrant

      sought to search Wainscott’s residence for electronic devices capable of storing

      and creating child pornography, as well as images and videos from the subject

      birthday party. A magistrate judge approved the warrant, and law enforcement

      seized Wainscott’s phone from his home two days later.

[5]   On February 1, Wainscott’s attorney informed Detective Preston that Victim

      had recanted the allegations. In response, Detective Preston talked to Victim’s

      mother, who said she had “cornered” Victim, impressing upon her the

      importance of being truthful, warning Victim that the State might “put

      [Wainscott] in prison for 40 years” and “take him away from his family.” Tr.,

      p. 26. In response, Victim said she had fabricated parts of the allegations against

      Wainscott.

[6]   Although Detective Preston did not believe Victim’s recantation, he contacted

      the prosecutor to explain the situation. Agreeing that the recantation seemed

      suspect, the prosecutor recommended against alerting the magistrate judge who

      issued the search warrant and to continue with the scheduled forensic analysis

      of Wainscott’s phone. A month later, law enforcement searched the phone and

      found voyeuristic images of Victim and, in total, 171 images of child

      pornography. The State subsequently filed charges against Wainscott alleging

      child molestation, possession of child pornography, and voyeurism.

[7]   Before his trial, Wainscott moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the

      search warrant. At a hearing on the matter, Wainscott argued that when Victim

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1817 | May 16, 2023          Page 3 of 7
      partially recanted, the warrant was not fully executed because the contents of

      the phone had not yet been analyzed. Therefore, according to Wainscott,

      Detective Preston had a duty to inform the magistrate of the newly discovered

      material fact, and his failure to do so destroyed the warrant’s basis for probable

      cause and rendered it invalid. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and

      Wainscott now brings this interlocutory appeal.

      Discussion and Decision
[8]   We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress “similar to other

      sufficiency issues.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Ind. 2005). “We

      determine whether substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the

      trial court's ruling.” Id. We do not reweigh the evidence and construe

      conflicting evidence towards upholding the trial court’s ruling. Id. However,

      unlike other sufficiency matters, we also consider uncontested evidence that is

      favorable to the defendant. Keeylen v. State, 14 N.E.3d 865, 871 (Ind. Ct. App.

      2014).

[9]   “In deciding whether to issue a search warrant, ‘the task of the issuing

      magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given

      all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that

      contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” Query v.

      State, 745 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

      238 (1983)). Reviewing courts must determine “whether the issuing magistrate

      had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. We

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1817 | May 16, 2023                Page 4 of 7
       “focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence

       support the determination of probable cause.” Id. Significant deference is given

       to the issuing magistrate’s judgment. Id.

       Reverse Franks Claim

[10]   In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court held that when the

       defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the supporting affidavit

       for a search warrant knowingly or intentionally contains a false statement, or

       reflects a “reckless disregard for the truth,” the trial court must hold a hearing.

       438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). If, at the hearing, the court determines that “the

       rest of the affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause, ‘the search

       warrant must be voided’ and any evidence obtained from its fruits excluded.”

       Keeylen, 14 N.E.3d at 872 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 156). A defendant makes

       a ‘reverse’ Franks claim when alleging that the State omitted information

       material to the probable cause analysis. Keeylen, 14 N.E.3d at 872.

[11]   Derivative of its Franks obligations, the State must update the judge that issued

       a warrant of any newly discovered material information between the warrant’s

       issuance and its execution. Query, 745 N.E.2d at 772 (“the magistrate must be

       made aware of any ‘material’ new or correcting information” before the

       warrant’s execution). “Material information” is information which has any

       tendency to “cast doubt on the existence of probable cause.” Id. Essentially, in

       the “situation where the police learned new information after receiving a

       warrant, but before executing the warrant,” the issuing magistrate must be made

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1817 | May 16, 2023                 Page 5 of 7
       aware of the information to ensure probable cause still supports the warrant.

       Ware v. State, 859 N.E.2d 708, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added).

[12]   Wainscott seeks relief under this version of a reverse Franks claim. He argues

       that Victim’s recantation happened before the search warrant had been fully

       executed because the contents of the phone seized through the warrant had not

       yet been analyzed. Assuming that Victim’s recantation is a material fact, this

       would have required the State to inform the magistrate judge of this

       development. But Indiana law contradicts this interpretation of a search

       warrant’s execution. “[A] warrant authorizing a search, testing, or other

       analysis of an item, tangible or intangible, is deemed executed when the item is

       seized by a law enforcement officer.” Ind. Code § 35-33-5-7(f) (2020) (emphasis

       added); see also Brown v. Eaton, 164 N.E.3d 153, 163-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)

       (interpreting and applying Ind. Code § 35-33-5-7(f)). Thus, police fully executed

       the search warrant by seizing Wainscott’s phone. Victim’s partial recantation

       occurred nearly a month after the phone’s seizure and consequently cannot

       affect the search warrant’s validity.

[13]   Besides Victim’s partial recantation, Wainscott also argues that Detective

       Preston’s affidavit supporting the search warrant omitted material information

       about Victim’s credibility. Wainscott alleges that the affidavit “cherry pick[ed]”

       favorable facts and otherwise omitted facts that might have worked against a

       finding of probable cause. Appellant’s Br., p. 15. While Wainscott admits that

       the affidavit described Victim as “worried that things weren’t true” and

       “worried about getting in trouble,” he still contends the affidavit misled the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1817 | May 16, 2023            Page 6 of 7
       magistrate. Exhs., p. 14. We disagree. The affidavit reflects a fair and accurate

       rendition of the events prompting Detective Preston’s request for a search

       warrant and supports a finding of probable cause. Wainscott has not met the

       high bar of proving that the State “engaged in a deliberate falsehood or reckless

       disregard for the truth.” Keeylen, 14 N.E.3d at 877.

[14]   As the State had no duty to inform the magistrate about Victim’s partial

       recantation occurring after execution of the warrant and because probable cause

       otherwise supported the search warrant, we affirm.

       Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1817 | May 16, 2023           Page 7 of 7