Court Opinion

ID: 9963116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 17:00:50.580543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.180803
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SEMONE THOMPSON,                                DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                          DA-0714-21-0112-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: April 23, 2024
  AFFAIRS,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Donald Boyte , Bernice, Oklahoma, for the appellant.

      Jamelda W. Burton-Domino and April Garrett , Houston, Texas, for the
        agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained her removal under the authority of the Department of Veterans Affairs
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (VA Accountability
Act), Pub. L. No. 115-41, § 202(a), 131 Stat 862, 869-73 (2017) (codified

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

at 38 U.S.C. § 714). For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the appeal to the
Dallas Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand
Order.

                                 BACKGROUND
         The appellant was employed as a GS-12 Social Worker with the Veterans
Health Administration in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10
at 224.    On December 10, 2020, the deciding official sustained by substantial
evidence two specifications under the charge of failure to follow instructions, and
two specifications under the charge of inappropriate conduct. Id. at 23, 148. He
removed the appellant from Federal service effective December 15, 2020.          Id.
at 23. The appellant filed a Board appeal of her removal, and after holding a
hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision, sustaining one
specification of the failure to follow instructions charge and one specification of
the inappropriate conduct charge. IAF, Tab 73, Initial Decision (ID) at 13-17.
Specifically, under the failure to follow instructions charge, the administrative
judge sustained the first specification, which stated that the appellant failed to
notify her supervisor or the Program Support Assistant of any Return to Clinic
Orders despite being directed to do so. ID at 13-15. She did not sustain the
second specification, which alleged that the appellant failed to follow instructions
when she used a specific conference code for her spirituality group, finding that
the agency failed to establish that she acted contrary to valid supervisory
instructions.    ID at 15.    Regarding the inappropriate conduct charge, the
administrative judge did not sustain the first specification, which alleged that the
appellant engaged in inappropriate conduct by emailing a request for production
of documents to her supervisor and a Registered Nurse as part of her Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission case. ID at 16. She sustained the second
specification, finding that the agency had established that the appellant engaged
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in inappropriate conduct when she requested a change of “ownership” of group
conference calls to herself. ID at 16-17. Thus, because the administrative judge
sustained one of the two specifications under each charge, she concluded that the
agency had established the two charges by substantial evidence. ID at 15, 17.
      Then, acknowledging the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) in Sayers v. Department of Veterans Affairs ,
954 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding that § 714 requires the Board to
review for substantial evidence the entirety of the agency’s removal decision,
including the penalty), the administrative judge found that the agency proved by
substantial evidence that removal was supported. ID at 17. After finding that the
appellant did not prove her affirmative defenses of retaliation for prior equal
employment opportunity (EEO) activity, discrimination based on age, race,
national origin, or religion, a disparate impact claim based on race, a failure to
accommodate religion claim, whistleblower reprisal, violation of her due process
rights, and harmful error, the administrative judge affirmed the agency’s action.
ID at 18-37.
      The appellant filed a petition for review contesting, among other things, the
administrative judge’s findings that the charges were supported by substantial
evidence. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 11 at 5-22. The agency responded
in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review, 2 PFR File, Tab 14, and the
appellant filed a reply to the agency’s response, PFR File, Tab 15.

2
  In its response, the agency requested that we dismiss the appellant’s petition for
review as untimely. PFR File, Tab 14 at 6. The appellant’s petition for review was due
on October 12, 2021, PFR File, Tab 10, and the appellant, who resides in the Central
Time Zone, filed her petition for review at 12:01 a.m. Central Time on October 13,
2021, PFR File, Tab 11. Pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g), we find that the appellant
established that there is good cause for waiving the 1-minute filing delay, as she
explained under penalty of perjury that she experienced technical difficulties with the
Board’s e-Appeal system which resulted in the delay. PFR File, Tab 13 at 4-5.
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                                   ANALYSIS
Remand is required to address whether the agency’s error in sustaining the
removal based on substantial evidence harmed the appellant.
      As noted, the deciding official sustained the action based on his conclusion
that there was substantial evidence to do so. IAF, Tab 10 at 23. After the initial
decision in this case was issued, the Federal Circuit decided Rodriguez v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 8 F.4th 1290, 1296-1301 (Fed. Cir. 2021), in
which it determined that the agency erred by applying a substantial evidence
burden of proof to its internal review of a disciplinary action under 38 U.S.C.
§ 714. The court found that substantial evidence is the standard of review to be
applied by the Board, not the agency, and that an agency’s deciding official must
“determine” whether “the performance or misconduct . . . warrants” the action at
issue, using a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. Id. at 1298-1301.
      The Federal Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez applies to all pending cases,
regardless of when the events at issue took place.     See Lee v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16 (recognizing that a new precedential
Federal Circuit decision applied to all cases pending with the Board).        The
administrative judge and the parties did not have the benefit of Rodriguez, and
therefore were unable to address its impact on this appeal. We therefore remand
this case for adjudication of whether the agency’s apparent error in applying the
substantial evidence standard of proof was harmful. See Semenov v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 16, ¶ 23 (finding it appropriate to apply the
harmful error standard from 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2) to actions taken under
38 U.S.C. § 714).

Remand is required to address the agency’s penalty determination.
      In Connor v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 8 F.4th 1319, 1325-26 (Fed.
Cir. 2021), issued after the initial decision in this case, the Federal Circuit
determined that the Board must consider and apply the factors set forth in
Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), in its review
                                                                                 5

of an agency’s penalty selection under the VA Accountability Act. The court
held that, although the Act precludes the Board from mitigating the agency’s
chosen penalty, “[i]t does not alter the penalty review with respect to the Douglas
factors,” and that, while the Board cannot mitigate the penalty, “if the Board
determines that the [agency] failed to consider the Douglas factors or that the
chosen penalty is unreasonable, the Board must remand to the [agency] for a
redetermination of the penalty.” Connor, 8 F.4th at 1326-27 (citing Brenner v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 990 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (explaining
that “if the [Board] concludes that the [agency’s] removal decision is unsupported
by substantial evidence, the [Board] should remand to the [agency] for further
proceedings”)).    As we found with the Rodriguez case, the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Connor applies to all pending cases, regardless of when the events at
issue took place. See Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16.
      Here, in reviewing the agency’s penalty, the administrative judge did not
cite to Douglas, and except in summarizing the deciding official’s testimony, did
not mention the factors set forth by the Board in Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. ID
at 17. In the deciding official’s decision letter upholding the proposed removal,
he did not reference Douglas, but he alluded to Douglas factors when discussing
the penalty, including the nature of the appellant’s job responsibilities, her
previous discipline, and her lack of rehabilitative potential. IAF, Tab 10 at 23.
Thus, the record is unclear as to whether the agency considered the Douglas
factors in making the decision to remove the appellant.      For that reason, and
because the administrative judge and the parties did not have the benefit of
Connor, and therefore were unable to address its impact on this appeal, remand is
required for this issue as well.

Instructions for the administrative judge on remand.
      On remand, the administrative judge should provide the parties with an
opportunity to present evidence and argument addressing whether the deciding
official’s use of the substantial evidence standard constituted harmful error and
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whether the agency properly considered the Douglas factors. 3 The administrative
judge should hold a supplemental hearing, if requested by the appellant, to
address these two issues. The administrative judge should then issue a new initial
decision fully addressing the issues in this appeal.        The administrative judge
should also address the appellant’s affirmative defenses of discrimination and
EEO retaliation in accordance with the Board’s decision in Pridgen v. Office of
Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31. To the extent that it is appropriate, the
administrative judge may adopt her original findings on the merits of the charges,
nexus, and the appellant’s remaining affirmative defenses, but if any of the
evidence and argument developed on remand causes the administrative judge to
reassess her previous findings, she should explain that in her remand initial
decision. See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589
(1980) (explaining that an initial decision must identify all material issues of fact
and law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the
administrative judge’s conclusions of law and her legal reasoning, as well as the
authorities on which that reasoning rests).

3
  In considering the penalty, the administrative judge should be mindful that when all of
the agency’s charges are sustained, but some of the underlying specifications are not
sustained, the agency’s penalty determination is entitled to deference and should only
be reviewed to determine whether it is within the parameters of reasonableness in light
of the sustained misconduct. Payne v. U.S. Postal Service, 72 M.S.P.R. 646, 650-51
(1996). Thus, in reviewing the penalty, the administrative judge should determine
whether the agency proved by substantial evidence that it properly applied the Douglas
factors and whether the agency’s penalty selection was reasonable and, if not, she
should remand the appellant’s removal to the agency for a new decision on the
appropriate penalty. See Connor, 8 F.4th at 1326; Sayers, 954 F.3d at 1376, 1379
(identifying the Board’s scope of review of the penalty in an action taken under the VA
Accountability Act as substantial evidence).
                                                                                 7

                                    ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Dallas
Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.