Court Opinion

ID: 9713042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:05:41.231496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:15.992941
License: Public Domain

ENGLISH, J, dissenting: I disagree with the majority as to the validity and binding effect of the so-called “settlement” order of November 28, 1960. There is no question but what defendant was incompetent at the time the order was entered, she having been so declared shortly after entry of the divorce decree in 1959. This fact of her incompetency must be borne in mind in considering the authority of the next friend and of the courts in approving the “settlement.” I refer to the agreement reached between plaintiff, his lawyer, defendant’s next friend, and his lawyer as a “so-called ‘settlement’ ” because it did not settle any of the issues which had been presented to the court by the pleadings. It represented, rather, a complete abdication of defendant’s position and, in effect, a withdrawal of defendant’s verified petition — the basic pleading in the case. Defendant’s petition, filed under Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, was the equivalent of a complaint in the proceedings which culminated in approval of the “settlement.” This petition, which was never amended or supplemented, and never set down for hearing, alleged that at all times during the original divorce proceeding, when appearance, answer, stipulation to hear as a default matter, and property settlement agreement were presented on behalf of defendant, petitioner, she was under mental disability; that commencing in January, 1955 defendant demonstrated symptoms of mental disturbance; that this condition became aggravated as time went on, and after consulting psychiatrists she was admitted in December, 1957 to the Psychiatric Institute of Michael Reese Hospital; that after her release from that institution she continued to receive psychiatric treatment on the average of four days per week; that she was readmitted to Michael Reese in January, 1958 where she remained and was treated for psychopathology for four weeks; that during such stay in the hospital her mental derangement had become so acute as to require numerous insulin shock treatments; that after her release on about February 15, 1958 she again continued out-patient psychiatric treatment four times a week during the ensuing months (more than a year) until after the divorce decree was entered; that her mental disability thus prevented her from being guilty of the acts of cruelty alleged in her husband’s complaint to have occurred on April 10 and May 15, 1958; * that during late 1958 and early 1959 defendant twice attempted suicide, and each time was again confined in the Psychiatric Institute for treatment for the time being; that on March 29, 1959 (the divorce decree having been entered in February) she again attempted suicide and was placed in the Psychopathic Ward of Cook County Hospital, following which she was committed by the County Court to a mental institution, and in May 1959 her brother was appointed conservator of her person and estate by the Probate Court. Defendant’s petition further alleged that the facts above recited concerning her mental disability were known to her husband, to his attorney, and to her own attorney at the time of the divorce hearing and when the property settlement agreement was executed; that thereby a fraud was perpetrated on the court, and a “monstrous injustice” was perpetrated upon the petitioner without any fault on her part. The sole prayer of the petition was that the divorce decree be vacated. It did not ask for any modification of the property or alimony provisions of the decree. The petition was verified in its entirety (not on-information and belief, but absolutely) by petitioner’s next friend who was also a physician and her psychiatrist. Plaintiff filed answer to the petition denying most of the facts alleged, stating that defendant did not suffer from psychosis but only from anxiety neurosis and temper tantrums; that the alleged suicide attempts were not genuine; that defendant was only after the money of plaintiff and his father; that defendant had entered Michael Reese Hospital merely for treatment of her “unstable temper and for psychiatric marital-counseling advice”; that she was able to handle her affairs during the period in question; and that her attorney had protected her interests at the divorce hearings.*  The majority point out, with citation of appropriate authorities, that a conservator or next friend has no authority to maintain a divorce aetion on behalf of an incompetent, but does have authority to litigate for his ward to set aside a divorce decree. I agree. The reason for these apparently inconsistent rules is, of course, that they fall on opposite sides of the public policy favoring preservation of marriages. The petition to vacate the divorce decree (filed by leave of eourt) sets forth facts which indubitably demonstrate the perpetration of a “monstrous injustice” to defendant and a fraud upon the court, and, if true, would unquestionably require the court to set aside the divorce decree. In the light of all the circumstances, then, the next friend was clearly acting within the scope of his powers in presenting these facts to the court, and the court was justified in permitting the petition to be filed by the next friend. As a matter of fact, the nature of the circumstances thus called to the attention of the court was such as to require inquiry by the court in its own interest to determine the truth of the allegations charging fraud upon the court itself as well as upon its incompetent ward. The keeper of the sovereign’s conscience could not properly be indifferent under such circumstances; in equity and good conscience it could not properly recognize, as it did, that “a serious controversy existed as to the validity of said decree for divorce,” and then dismiss the matter from conscience, as it did, with an adjustment of money matters, a collateral question of secondary importance only, and one not even mentioned in the pleadings. If there had been a hearing on defendant’s petition, the question of alimony could have been reached by the court only after first deciding against defendant on the issue of her incompetency, as raised by the pleadings. By attempting to modify the alimony provisions of the decree without first conducting a hearing on the questioned validity of the divorce itself, the next friend, counsel, and both courts, in my opinion, so far departed from their obligations to the incompetent as to place the “settlement” beyond the authority of the parties to contract or the courts to approve. The only justification for ignoring the issue of the pleadings, as set forth in the court’s order, was that the controversy over the validity of the decree “would be protracted and expensive to both parties and fraught with difficulties.” Considering the protection, from all persons concerned, to which the incompetent was entitled under the law, I find this lamentably insufficient to sustain the action taken. Alimony rights may or may not he so personal to the incompetent as to be beyond the scope of the next friend’s authority to compromise, as argued strenuously pro and con by the parties in this court. Surely, however, there can be nothing more personal than the incompetent’s right to maintain or restore her marital status. This right, therefore, cannot be waived by anyone on her behalf. (See authorities cited in the majority opinion.) Once having stated a eause of action under the oath of the next friend, with a pleading sufficient to vacate the divorce decree, to ignore it thereafter is, in my opinion, the equivalent of seeking a divorce on behalf of the incompetent, or voluntarily failing to require strict proof in her defense. Either such action would, of course, be outside the powers of a conservator or next friend. And any act which transcends the authority of such a person acquires no validity through approval or ratification by the Probate or any other court. (Nonnast v. Northern Trust Co., 374 Ill 248, 259, 29 NE2d 251.) When all parties are competent, I still have doubts as to the propriety, or even the legality, of achieving property or alimony agreements which result in withholding from the court faets available to one side or the other which might affect proof of the underlying grounds for divorce. The possibility of fraud upon or abuse of the court is always present in this situation. I have no doubt, however, that such a procedure is improper and illegal when one of the parties is under mental disability. I would remand for a hearing on the merits of defendant’s petition to vacate the divorce decree.   The two acts alleged as the grounds for divorce were that defendant threw a china pitcher and cup at her husband, striking him in the shoulder, and on the thigh, causing pain.    This last point is also made by the majority who call attention to the fact that plaintiff had been cross-examined by defendant’s counsel. It is interesting to note that the principal testimony of plaintiff on this cross-examination was to the effect that he would interpose no objection “at any time in the future if Mrs. Newman desires custody and the child’s welfare dictates and she is capable of accepting cdstody.” Does this last clause indicate knowledge by plaintiff of defendant’s mental condition as alleged in her petition? The original divorce property settlement agreement provided that the husband should have custody of the child of the parties, who was then not yet three years old. No reason was stated as to why custody of the child was taken from his mother. Nor did the divorce decree make any finding that the mother was unfit to have custody of her ehild. Do -these facts also indicate knowledge on the part of the husband and both attorneys as to the- mental condition of defendant, in corroboration of the allegations of her petition to vacate ?