Court Opinion

ID: 9442965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:05:38.831135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:18.517358
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I agree that the convictions should be affirmed but I am unable to agree with the reasoning of my brethren in two respects.
First, the majority relies upon our decision in Villaroman v. United States, 1930, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 240, 184 F.2d 261, 262-263 to preclude consideration of appellants’ contention that the court’s charge to the jury erroneously applied the presumption arising from recent possession of stolen property and sudden acquisition of wealth. I do not think Villaroman requires such a conclusion. That case was decided on grounds which made it unnecessary to consider the effect of Rule 30 upon the other errors urged on appeal. I think the proper construction of the rule1 is that suggested by Judge Fahy in his discussion of Villaroman in Montgomery v. Virginia Stage Lines, 89 U.S.App.D.C. -, 191 F.2d 770.2 He intimated there that if specific objections are made at the time the trial court refuses to grant a requested instruction, it is unnecessary to repeat those objections after the charge has been given and before the jury retires. I think such a reading of the rule is less formalistic than that suggested by way of dictum in Villaroman and yet satisfactorily serves the objective of the rule by calling errors to the trial judge’s attention at a time when he may remedy them. Cf. Harlem Taxicab Ass’n v. Nemesh, 89 U.S.App.D.C. -, 191 F.2d 459. Since appellant here did object after his requested instruction had been refused, I think we may consider his assignment of error.
Upon such consideration, I think the presumption referred to above was not erroneously applied. The charge, viewed in its entirety, properly confined the presumption to items which might be specifically identified upon the basis of evidence in the record. As to matter which could not be so identified, the rule in the charge was, substantially correct.
*476The second point on' which -I differ- from the. majority has -to do-with appellants’ contention that they were .prejudiced.- by the prosecuting attorney’s argument to the jury, quoted at pages 3^4 of the majority opinion [191 F.2d 474]. I think the. remarks complained of -were improper and that their -effect was not vitiated by the court’s statement to appellants’ counsel that he might reply to it in his argument.' Nor can their effect upon the jury be minimized merely because they .were made in the heat of. argument. The. jury should' have -been specifically admonished to ignore them. Although the court did not do that, it did say, during-the argument and in the presence of the jury, in response to defense counsel’s objection: “I don’t .think there is any evidence to show that you, Mr. Johnson, or anybody else tampered with the coin.” (Transcript, p. 1318) That.statement ¡served substantially the same purpose as would have been served by a dirpct admonition to the jury. I think-it sufficiently, though not ideally, cured an error which would otherwise have required reversal.

 Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., reads in, pertinent part: “No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.”

. Directly involved in that case was Civil Rule 51, 28 U.S.C.A., the relevant part of which is identical with Criminal Rule 30.