Court Opinion

ID: 9497158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:44:45.537816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:02.083373
License: Public Domain

PROST, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority concludes that sov*1141ereign immunity is not waived based on its finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c)(2) is subject to two plausible readings. In my view, however, there is only one plausible reading of the statutory language at issue. It is the reading that maintains that “interest shall be allowed on all final judgments against the United States in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, at the rate provided in [§ 1961(a)] and as provided in [§ 1961(b) ].” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c)(2) (emphasis added).
I
The majority errs in reading § 1961(c)(2) as providing a second “plausible” reading for at least four reasons. First, as the majority notes in its discussion of the appellants’ arguments, “all” means “all.” There is no language in the statute that limits “all” to a specific subset of cases or that creates ambiguity where none exists.
Second, the majority also attempts to trace a path through § 1961(b) that would create ambiguity in § 1961(c)(2). But § 1961(b) merely discusses how interest is to be calculated — not whether it is available at all. The § 1961(b) method of computation is to be used “except as provided in section 2516(b) [of title 28] and section 1304(b) of title 31.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(b) (emphasis added). And here, “except” means “except.” The majority’s second “plausible” reading of the statute effectively requires amending “except as provided in” to read “subject to.” It is simply not in our power to amend the text of Congressional statutes in such a way.
Third, the majority’s reading of § 1961(c)(2) as having a second “plausible” meaning renders significant portions of the statute superfluous. This violates a central canon of statutory construction. See Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 877, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (courts should have “a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has said, “[i]t is ... not our job to find reasons for what Congress has plainly done; and it is our job to avoid rendering what Congress has plainly done ... devoid of reason and effect.” Greah-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217-18, 122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002) (emphasis in the original).
Fourth, and finally, the majority is incorrect when it implies that the literal reading of § 1961(c)(2) cannot be given effect because it is supported by “nary a word” of legislative history. Clear statutes need not be supported by legislative history in order to be given effect. To deny a clear statute its force based on the absence of legislative history would be an example of the tail wagging the dog.
II
The majority also rests its conclusion that there is no sovereign immunity waiver on the alternative ground that 31 U.S.C. § 1304 does not provide an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity.1 But it is highly doubtful that a separate statute can trump a clear waiver of sovereign immunity in another statute. In any event, the government has neither raised it as an independent basis for a judgment against the Oil Companies nor argued it before this court. Moreover, there is conflicting case law on whether or not § 1304 can serve as an additional barrier to recovery of post-judgment interest when it conflicts with another more specific statute. In this *1142case, therefore, § 1304 by itself does not appear to me sufficient to create ambiguity regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c)(2).
For the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. See Part III.B.4 of the majority opinion.