Court Opinion

ID: 9486619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:54:29.646638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:50.143638
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Today the majority takes the ill-advised step of extending the “relevant conduct” law *720of this circuit, previously applicable only in drug cases, to cases in which a defendant has been convicted solely of firearms offenses. Because I cannot find any sound justification for the court’s initial decisions in this area, I cannot support today’s expansion. Accordingly, I dissent.
In today’s opinion, the court allows Defendant Partington to be sentenced for conduct with which he has not been charged. While this is not an uncommon occurrence in the realm of drug offenses, this court has not to date applied this circuit’s relevant conduct case law to an offense exclusively involving firearms. In support of today’s expansion the majority asserts that “[t]he court discerns no pertinent distinctions between the possession of illegal drugs and the possession of firearms for purposes of applying the sentencing guidelines.” However, I continue to believe that our previous treatment of the relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines is unjustified and should not now be used to increase the sentences of defendants in firearms cases. As I noted in my concurring opinion in United States v. Wilson, 954 F.2d 374, 378 (1992), “[i]t is my position ... that this court jumped the tracks on this issue as long ago as the [United States u] Sailes decision, and has since been hurtling in a direction in which it should never have gone.”
The basis for my disagreement with this court’s relevant conduct precedent, and thus with the result reached in the instant case, has been addressed at length in both my concurrence in Wilson and in Chief Judge Merritt’s dissent in United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1329-33 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1094, 111 S.Ct. 980, 112 L.Ed.2d 1065 (1991). However, I believe that it is my duty to once again assert my position in light of this court’s continued adherence to an error of great magnitude.
Congressional authorization of the Sentencing Commission’s power is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998. Section 994(i)(l)(A) authorizes the Commission to “insure that the guidelines promulgated ... reflect ... the appropriateness of imposing an incremental penalty for each offense in a case in which a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses committed in the same course of conduct.” Thus, the Commission is authorized only to allow incremental punishment for crimes of which the defendant has been convicted. The Commission has no authority to allow uncharged conduct to result in enhanced sentences. Yet in spite of § 994(Z )(l)(A)’s obvious limitation on the Commission’s authority, this court has repeatedly affirmed sentences reflecting uncharged conduct.
In addition to being unauthorized, the inclusion of uncharged conduct in a defendant’s base offense level is counterproductive to the goal of judicial economy, for as the benefits of “copping a plea” are eroded by the addition of unpredictable amounts of uncharged conduct, more and more defendants will choose to take their chances with trial. Furthermore, the court’s acceptance of uncharged conduct in a defendant’s base offense level encourages dishonesty. Defendants, aware of the increased punishment to which they may be exposed, will decline to “come clean” with pre-sentence investigators and probation officers.
More troubling still, the inclusion of uncharged conduct in a defendant’s base offense level encourages prosecutors to try a defendant on those charges upon which a conviction is most easily secured. Even if a prosecutor is unable to prove a defendant’s culpability for uncharged crimes, under the prevailing law of this circuit, the prosecutor may be secure in the belief that the defendant will nevertheless be punished for the uncharged behavior. I cannot condone this inevitable consequence of the circuit’s current law, for if the prosecution’s objective is to see that a defendant is punished for particular conduct, it should be required to present a case that will achieve this result. To allow anything less enables the prosecution to achieve through the “back door” what it could not achieve through direct proof at trial. This is neither a just result, nor one that the courts should encourage.
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that this circuit’s approach to relevant conduct has merit, the majority nevertheless misapplies its own misbegotten “related conduct” doctrine in the instant case. The facts of this case do not support the inclusion at sentenc*721ing of Partington’s possession of the sawed-off rifle.
Defendant Partington was convicted of the unlicensed sale of firearms. Thus, to be included as relevant conduct at sentencing, Partington’s possession of the sawed-off rifle must have been a part of the same course of conduct as his firearm sales. United States v. Smith, 887 F.2d 104, 106 (6th Cir.1989). Contrary to the majority’s position, I find that the facts of this ease do not support that conclusion.
It is undisputed that the unlicensed sale of firearms did not involve the sale of sawed-off weapons. As the government acknowledged in its sentencing memorandum: “[wjhile the government believes that any firearm held for sale should be included in the calculation of the proper guideline range, the evidence does not clearly support the proposition that the sawed-off rifle was held for sale.” J.A. at 30. Compared with the charged offense the asserted relevant conduct involved a different type of weapon (sawed-off weapons rather than standard firearms); different conduct on Partington’s part (simple possession of a firearm rather than the active sale of weapons); and different people (only Partington was involved in the possession while others were involved in the sale). See United States v. Lewis, 987 F.2d 1349, 1356 (8th Cir.1993). In light of these undisputed facts, even if I were to apply the majority’s “relevant conduct” doctrine, I could not find, as the majority does, that Partington’s possession of the sawed-off rifle was a part of the same course of conduct as his unlicensed sale of firearms.
Because I firmly believe that the majority opinion today marks an unfortunate expansion of this circuit’s relevant conduct law and because the majority misapplies its own doctrine, I dissent.