Court Opinion

ID: 9352696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 15:01:20.019928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:49.656701
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USCA11 Case: 21-12768    Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 01/09/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-12768
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        ALEXANDER RIVERA,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00567-VMC-AEP-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-12768

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Alexander Rivera dealt heroin and fentanyl. After two of his
        buyers overdosed—one fatally—Rivera was charged with posses-
        sion with intent to distribute fentanyl. Rivera pleaded guilty. The
        district court sentenced Rivera to twenty-four months in prison—
        ten months above the top of his guidelines range—reasoning that
        this sentence was warranted either as an upward departure or an
        upward variance. On appeal, Rivera argues that his sentence was
        procedurally unreasonable. Because we find no clear error in ei-
        ther of the district court’s independently sufficient reasons for Ri-
        vera’s above-guidelines sentence, we affirm.
                           FACTUAL BACKGROUND
                This case started with two overdoses. On September 5,
        2019, M.S. overdosed on fentanyl at a friend’s home. M.S.’s friend,
        J.Z., told responding officers that he discovered M.S. unconscious
        on the bathroom floor. The officers rushed to the bathroom and
        gave M.S. two doses of Narcan. Responding to the treatment, M.S.
        regained consciousness. The officers transported M.S. to the hos-
        pital. Later, the officers found a needle and a clear baggie with a
        white powdery substance in the bathroom where M.S. overdosed.
               At the scene, J.Z. claimed that, while he knew M.S. used var-
        ious drugs, he didn’t know that she used heroin. At the hospital,
        M.S. told the officers a different story. According to M.S., she went
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        21-12768               Opinion of the Court                         3

        to J.Z.’s house earlier that day and, while she was there, J.Z. called
        his drug dealer, “Thrachee.” Shortly after the call, Thrachee
        showed up at the house and met with J.Z. outside. After this meet-
        ing, J.Z. gave M.S. two small baggies of heroin. M.S. then over-
        dosed on that heroin in the bathroom. Officers later determined
        that Thrachee was the defendant, Alexander Rivera.
               A second overdose took place two weeks later. On Septem-
        ber 19, 2019, officers responded to an overdose at a residence.
        When they arrived, first responders were already administering
        emergency aid to J.B., who was unresponsive. J.B.’s mother had
        found him lying on his bedroom floor—not breathing—with a sy-
        ringe in his hand. J.B. didn’t respond to Narcan. Fire and rescue
        transported J.B. to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead.
        The medical examiner listed J.B.’s cause of death as “intoxication
        by fentanyl.”
               During their investigation, officers found a syringe on J.B.’s
        bedroom floor. They also spotted a spoon and a small notepad on
        his dresser. The spoon contained a small baggie with a white pow-
        dery residue in it. The notepad had a phone number for “Thratch.”
        Detectives obtained J.B.’s cell phone and discovered that J.B.’s last
        text message was to Rivera. The text said, “[y]ou round my way
        famo,” which is a common message that users send when looking
        to purchase drugs.
               Using J.B.’s phone, the officers put into place a sting opera-
        tion. They texted Rivera, asking for more of what J.B. had last pur-
        chased. In these messages, the officers referred to the drugs as
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        4                           Opinion of the Court                21-12768

        “fire,” a street term for strong heroin containing fentanyl. Rivera
        agreed to meet the officers in five minutes at a nearby gas station.
        When he did, the officers arrested Rivera. During the arrest, the
        officers searched Rivera and found twenty-eight small baggies in
        his pocket. Lab analysis later confirmed that one of those baggies
        contained 2.8 grams of a heroin and fentanyl mixture.

               In a post-Miranda interview, 1 Rivera admitted that he sold
        cocaine but denied selling heroin. Following the arrest, officers
        also interviewed J.Z., M.S.’s friend. J.Z. admitted that he pur-
        chased heroin from “T” on the day that M.S. overdosed but—con-
        trary what M.S. told police—denied giving her any heroin. J.Z. said
        that he’d purchased heroin from T thirty to forty times and that he
        expected that the heroin he purchased from him contained fenta-
        nyl. Officers showed J.Z. a photo of Rivera and J.Z. confirmed that
        Rivera was T.
                                 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               A federal grand jury indicted Rivera for knowingly and in-
        tentionally possessing with intent to distribute a substance contain-
        ing fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. sections 841(a)(1) and
        (b)(1)(C). Rivera pleaded guilty.
              At his sentencing, the district court calculated Rivera’s advi-
        sory guidelines range. While Rivera’s criminal history spanned
        over a dozen incidents—including drug convictions—only two

        1
            See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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        21-12768               Opinion of the Court                        5

        offenses were scored, totaling three criminal history points. As a
        result, Rivera fell into a criminal history category of II. His base
        offense level was twelve but was lowered by two points for ac-
        ceptance of responsibility. With a total offense level of ten and a
        criminal history category of II, Rivera’s guidelines range was eight
        to fourteen months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised re-
        lease.
                The presentence investigation report identified two possible
        grounds for an upward departure under sections 5K2.1 and 5K2.2
        of the sentencing guidelines: (1) that Rivera had “sold an individual
        an unknown quantity of a heroin/fentanyl mixture” and the “indi-
        vidual subsequently died after he overdosed on fentanyl”; or (2)
        that Rivera had “sold an individual an unknown quantity of a her-
        oin/fentanyl mixture” and the “individual’s friend subsequently
        overdosed on heroin/fentanyl and had to be hospitalized.” The
        report also suggested that the overdoses could justify an upward
        variance under 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a)(1).
               At the sentencing hearing, the government said that it was
        not seeking an upward departure or variance because it didn’t think
        it could meet its burden of proving causation by a preponderance
        of the evidence. Instead, the government asked for “a sentence at
        the high end of the applicable guidelines.”
                The district court, noting that it was not bound by the gov-
        ernment’s recommendation, concluded that two independently
        sufficient grounds supported an above-guidelines sentence. First,
        the district court found that an upward departure was warranted
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-12768

        under sections 5K2.1 and 5K2.2. As to M.S., the district court noted
        that the presentence investigation report suggested that “M.S. in-
        formed law enforcement that she overdosed on the heroin that J.Z.
        received from [Rivera], shortly after [Rivera] delivered the heroin
        to J.Z.” J.Z. also “acknowledged that he purchased heroin from
        Rivera approximately [thirty] to [forty] times and he expects it to
        contain fentanyl.” As to J.B., the district court observed that the
        police found a “spoon and small notepad” in J.B.’s room and that
        the notepad contained Rivera’s phone number. And J.B.’s “last
        message” was a text to Rivera “looking to purchase drugs.” The
        district court found that there was “enough circumstantial evi-
        dence there for an upward [departure]” and that the departure
        would be “so minute that it really [wouldn’t] capture what this man
        . . . more likely than not did.”
                Second, the district court offered “an alternative basis” for
        its above-guidelines sentence: “the strength and potency of the
        drugs and insufficiency of the guidelines to capture that, as well as
        the defendant’s repeated delivery of drugs.” On these grounds, the
        district court sentenced Rivera to three years’ imprisonment fol-
        lowed by three years of supervised release. Rivera timely appealed.
                            STANDARD OF REVIEW
                “We review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or
        significantly outside the guidelines range—under a deferential
        abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Henry, 1 F.4th
        1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Where, as here, a defend-
        ant challenges his sentence as procedurally unreasonable, we must
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        21-12768                Opinion of the Court                         7

        “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
        error, such as . . . selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
        facts.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009)
        (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “Clear error
        review is deferential, and we will not disturb a district court’s find-
        ings unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
        mistake has been committed.” United States v. Monzo, 852 F.3d
        1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). We afford this deference
        because district courts—given their “superior position to find
        facts”—have an “institutional advantage” in making sentencing de-
        terminations. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51–52 (cleaned up).
                                   DISCUSSION
               Rivera argues that the district court clearly erred as to both
        the departure and the variance. As to the departure, Rivera says
        there was “no factual support” that Rivera caused the overdoses.
        As to the variance, Rivera claims there was “no evidence” that the
        drugs he sold were unusually potent. We disagree.
                              The Upward Departure
                “There is a basis for enhancement pursuant to sections 5K2.1
        and 5K2.2 where death or physical injury is a result of the crime.”
        United States v. Sweeting, 933 F.2d 962, 966 (11th Cir. 1991); see
        also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1 (“If death resulted, the court may increase the
        sentence above the authorized guideline range.”); id. § 5K2.2 (“If
        significant physical injury resulted, the court may increase the sen-
        tence above the authorized guideline range.”). The party seeking
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 21-12768

        a departure bears “the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
        the evidence, that [it is] entitled to the departure.” United States v.
        Stuart, 384 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States
        v. Onofre-Segarra, 126 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 1997)).
               The district court did not clearly err in finding that M.S. and
        J.B. overdosed on the drugs Rivera sold them. As the district court
        pointed out, M.S. told the officers at the hospital that J.Z. gave her
        two baggies of heroin after J.Z. returned from buying heroin from
        Rivera just outside the house. M.S. said that she overdosed on that
        heroin in the bathroom. Similarly, J.B.’s last text message—sent
        hours before his death—was to Rivera, seeking drugs. And J.B.
        died of a fentanyl overdose. Rivera later showed up at a gas sta-
        tion—in response to the officers’ text from J.B.’s phone—with 2.8
        grams of fentanyl. On these facts, we are left with no “definite and
        firm conviction” that the district court erred in concluding that Ri-
        vera caused the overdoses. Monzo, 852 F.3d at 1345.
              Against this, Rivera advances three arguments—all uncon-
        vincing.
                First, Rivera contends that the government didn’t “prove
        the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence”
        because “it conceded it cannot prove that [Rivera’s] actions re-
        sulted in death or great bodily harm.” Rivera is wrong. As an initial
        matter, the district court was not bound by the government’s sen-
        tencing recommendation. See United States v. Plasencia, 886 F.3d
        1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming a sentence even where the
        district court “appl[ied] the enhancement sua sponte”); see also
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        21-12768                Opinion of the Court                          9

        United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirm-
        ing a sentence in which the district court rejected the government’s
        low-end recommendation and sentenced the defendant to almost
        ten years over the advisory guidelines range). Indeed, while some
        sections of the guidelines require the government to move for a
        departure, see, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (“Upon motion of the govern-
        ment . . . .”), the guideline provisions in our case do not. And in
        reaching its own sentencing decision, the district court was free to
        rely—as it did—on undisputed statements in the presentence inves-
        tigation report. See United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248, 1255
        (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the “district court’s factual findings for
        purposes of sentencing may be based on . . . undisputed statements
        in the [presentence investigation report]”). In short, there was no
        procedural error in the district court’s decision to reject the gov-
        ernment’s recommendation based on the presentence investiga-
        tion report.
               Second, Rivera points to gaps in the evidence that (he says)
        cut against the district court’s finding that the drugs he sold caused
        M.S. and J.B. to overdose. So, for example, he says that “[t]here
        was no evidence [Rivera] was J.B.’s only supplier, nor that the
        drugs taken by J.B. preceding his death were the drugs provided by
        [Rivera].” But the district court was not required to rule out every
        possible cause of J.B.’s death. See United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d
        1298, 1317 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A factual finding cannot be clearly er-
        roneous when the factfinder is choosing between two permissible
        views of evidence.”). Instead, the law allows the district court to
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  21-12768

        do exactly what it did: to look at the evidence before it—including
        all the circumstantial evidence—and conclude that Rivera more
        likely than not caused the death. Cf. United States v. Overstreet,
        713 F.3d 627, 637 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming an above-guidelines
        sentence based on “circumstantial evidence”).
               Third, Rivera argues that our unpublished decision in
        United States v. Arroyo-Jaimes, 608 F. App’x 843 (11th Cir. 2015)
        supports reversal here. It doesn’t. In that case, we remanded a case
        for resentencing where the district court relied on the govern-
        ment’s “assertion” at sentencing that the defendant had previously
        possessed more than “200 grams of methamphetamine and drug
        paraphernalia.” Id. at 849. Although the presentence investigation
        report included that the defendant was arrested for trafficking
        methamphetamine, it included no facts from which the court could
        find that the defendant in fact trafficked the drugs. Id. This case is
        different. Here, the district court didn’t, as in Arroyo-Jaimes,
        simply rely on an arrest record and the government’s assertions to
        find guilt. Instead, the district court relied on the presentence in-
        vestigation report’s detailed—and undisputed—facts in finding that
        M.S. and J.B. overdosed on Rivera’s fentanyl. Arroyo-Jaimes is
        therefore inapposite here.
                               The Upward Variance
                A court may impose a variance because “the case at hand
        falls outside the ‘heartland’ to which the [c]ommission intends in-
        dividual [g]uidelines to apply,” “the [g]uidelines sentence itself fails
        properly to reflect [section] 3553(a) considerations,” or “perhaps
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        21-12768               Opinion of the Court                       11

        because the case warrants a different sentence regardless.” Rita v.
        United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). As with a departure, a
        court’s variance may be procedurally unreasonable if the court “se-
        lect[ed] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.” United States
        v. Coglianese, 34 F.4th 1002 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.
        at 51). “And in all cases, the appealing party bears the burden of
        showing that the district court’s sentence is unreasonable in light
        of the record and the [section] 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
        Harris, 964 F.3d 986, 988 (11th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
                Rivera hasn’t met that burden here. The district court found
        that the “the strength and potency of the drugs and insufficiency of
        the guidelines to capture that, as well as the defendant’s repeated
        delivery of drugs,” justified an upward variance. None of these
        findings are clearly erroneous. There is nothing improper about
        the district court recognizing the “strength and potency” of fenta-
        nyl. In fact, Rivera’s counsel referred to the drug as “devastating”
        at sentencing. And the district court was entitled to rely on its ex-
        perience in discussing the dangers of fentanyl. See United States v.
        Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009) (“There is no require-
        ment that sentencing judges confine their considerations to empir-
        ical studies and ignore what they have learned from similar cases
        over the years. Indeed, one of the reasons district courts are given
        such wide latitude in sentencing is their experience in handling
        criminal cases.”). Nor was there any error in the district court’s
        finding on Rivera’s “repeated delivery of drugs.” That’s because
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12768

        Rivera himself admitted to dealing cocaine, and J.Z. told officers
        that he had purchased heroin from Rivera thirty to forty times.
               In response, Rivera argues only that there was “no evidence
        from which the district court [could] conclude that the heroin/fen-
        tanyl was of a strength/potency not contemplated by the guide-
        lines” because the guidelines “would have been promulgated with
        the average strength/potency of heroin/fentanyl” in mind. Ri-
        vera’s point, in other words, was that the government did not
        prove that his fentanyl was stronger than the fentanyl considered
        by the guidelines. Rivera misconstrues the district court’s ruling.
        The district court didn’t find that Rivera’s fentanyl was particularly
        potent. It said that, in its view, fentanyl in general is particularly
        potent and dangerous, and it stated its position that the guidelines
        don’t adequately account for this fact. “The Supreme Court has
        held that variances from the advisory guidelines range can some-
        times be based on the sentencing judge’s disagreement with
        whether a guideline properly reflects the [section] 3553(a) factors.”
        United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.
        2015). Rivera hasn’t contended that the district court erred in mak-
        ing that sort of a judgment here.
              AFFIRMED.