Court Opinion

ID: 9671320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:34:35.427717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.294463
License: Public Domain

*730Gillespie, J.
In Mahaffey v. First National Bank, 231 Miss. 798, 97 So. 2d 756, we held that the liability of a father to support his child does not survive his death in the absence of a contract imposing such liability. The case now before us involves a contract between the husband and wife prior to divorce, and which was approved by decree of the court. The contract provided for the payment to the wife for the support of two minor children a stated sum monthly with the provision that “The payments herein obligated to be made shall cease as to each child when she attains her twenty-first birthday, or marries, or dies. ’ ’ The question is whether the quoted terms of the contract, along with the other provisions, impose liability upon the husband’s estate to continue such support payments after his death.
The material facts were stipulated by the parties and are not in controversy. W. Jack Lewis and Bess Lassi-ter Lewis were married on October 31, 1934. There was born of the marriage two children, namely, Katherine Ann Lewis, and Marguerette Gibson Lewis.
W. Jack Lewis and his wife, Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis, separated sometime prior to January 29, 1950. On July 29, 1950, Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis filed her petition in the Chancery Court against W. Jack Lewis, praying that the defendant be required to provide a reasonable sum each month for the support of herself and children. The defendant filed his answer and supplemental answer to said petition. When the matter was reached for trial, the parties appeared before the court and announced that they had agreed upon a settlement and submitted to the court an executed copy of the following agreement:
“THIS CONTRACT AND AGREEMENT is entered into on this the 9th day of June, 1951.
*731“MES. BESS LASSITEE LEWIS AND W. JACK LEWIS are married, one to the other, and lived together as husband and wife for a number of years.
“There were born to the parties two children, Katherine Ann Lewis, age fifteen years, and Margnerette Gibson Lewis, age six years. The parties are now living separate and apart and it is apparent to them that they cannot again live and co-habit as man and wife.
“In order to avoid litigation, and in order to definitely fix the status and financial responsibility of the parties as to one another and as to the children aforesaid, and, in consideration of the agreements and covenants herein .set forth, the parties agree as follows:
“Other than as stated herein, the parties have no financial claim as to the other and all obligations as to each other not provided for herein are given up and relinquished.
“W. Jack Lewis, hereinafter sometimes referred to as party of the first part, agrees, binds, and obligates himself to pay to Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis, hereinafter sometimes referred to as party of the second part, the sum of SIXTY-TWO & 50/100 DOLLAES ($62.50) each month for the care, maintenance, support and upkeep of Katherine Ann Lewis, and SIXTY-TWO 50/100 DOL-LAES ($62.50) each month for the care, upkeep, maintenance, and support of Marguerette Gibson Lewis. The payments herein obligated to be made shall cease as to each child as and when she attains her twenty-first birthday, or marries, or dies. Payment for each child shall be made only so long as she is under the supervision of her mother and no payment shall be made for a child who is not living under her said mother’s supervision, or, while she is living* with her father for a continuous period of 30 days. Payments are to be made on the first day of each month, with the first payment to be made on the first day of July, 1951.
“Party of the first part shall have, and is hereby accorded, the right to have the custody of the named child*732ren either together or one at a time, a minimum of two days each week and shall so have their custody for a thirty day period each year, said period to be during the scholastic vacation period.
“The custody of said children by party of the first part shall not he at such time as will interfere with their regular school attendance or regular church service and Sunday School attendance on Sundays.
“Party of the second part shall not keep the said children away from Meridian for more than thirty (30) days at the time without court order after notice to party of the first part, and never permanently.
“Party of the first part agrees that for the period of the Sixty-two and 50/100 dollar payments above provided for, he will pay reasonable medical hills for necessary medical treatment of the said children, it being agreed that the doctor who shall treat them shall be mutually agreeable to the parties hereto.
“Party of the first part shall, and binds himself to, deed to the named children, as tenants in common, a one-half interest in and to the home occupied by party of the second part described as follows: (Description omitted)
“Until Marguerette Gibson Lewis reaches her twenty-first birthday, party of the first part shall pay one-half of the ad valorem taxes and insurance on said property and so long as party of the second part lives in the said house and remains unmarried to anyone other than party of the first part, and so long as she holds the legal title to a one-half interest in the described property, party of the first part shall pay the other one-half interest of the said taxes and insurance premiums on said property.
“The one-half interest in the described property to be deeded to the children aforesaid shall not be sold until Marguerette Gibson Lewis reaches her twenty-first birthday and party of the second part binds herself that she will not sell the one-half interest in the *733property she holds until Marguerette Gibson Lewis reaches her twenty-first birthday.
“Death or marriage of either of the children shall relieve party of the first part as to any payments herein obligated to be paid for the benefit of such of said child or children who may die or marry.
“Party of the first part agrees that he will make, or cause to be made, at his own expense reasonable repairs to the residence now on the described property and keep the same in reasonably habitable condition until Mar-guerette Gibson Lewis reaches her twenty-first birthday, but, it is understood he is not obligated to make any structural changes in said residence, and for said period no structural changes shall be made to the said residence.
“Should the residence on the described premises be destroyed by fire or windstorm, the insurance carried on the said residence shall be used in the reconstruction of another residence thereon.
“Neither of the parties hereto obligates himself or herself as regards a divorce and the matter of divorce is left entirely within the discretion of the parties. Should party of the second part be divorced from party of the first part, and marry someone else, then party of the first part’s obligation as to the one-half interest in the real property herein described owned by party of the second part shall immediately cease as to her said one-half interest.”
Thereupon the court entered its decree dated June 9, 1951, finding that the said settlement agreement was reasonable and proper and approving the same and adopting the same as its decree. Later the said Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis filed suit against her husband, W. Jack Lewis, for a divorce. The said W. Jack Lewis made no appearance to the suit and under date of November 17, 1952, the court rendered a decree granting unto the said Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis an absolute divorce from the defendant, W. Jack Lewis. There was *734written into the decree the following: “An agreement between the parties touching support and custody of children by decree entered, no order is entered or made here. ’ ’
On the 26th day of February, 1953, W. Jack Lewis and Miss Bettye Keyes were married. W. Jack Lewis died on August 30, 1958, at which time he was living with his wife, Mrs. Bettye Keyes Lewis.
On August 5, 1955, Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis filed a petition praying that the aforesaid settlement .agreement be modified as to the custody of said children to the extent that the provision therein granting W. Jack Lewis the right to the custody of said children for a 30-day period each year be eliminated therefrom, and the court decreed accordingly on August 23, 1955.
W. Jack Lewis complied with the provisions of the aforesaid settlement agreement in all respects to the date of his death except as to the payment of ad valorem taxes on the home for the year 1958, which taxes were paid by the said Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis. The admin-istratrix of the estate of W. Jack Lewis declined to make the payments provided for in said settlement agreement accruing subsequent to the date of the death of the said W. Jack Lewis. On April 18, 1959, Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis, individually, and as guardian of Marguerette Gibson Lewis, a minor, and as the mother and next friend of said minor, filed two petitions in the matter of the estate of W. Jack Lewis, deceased, seeking an order requiring the administratrix to pay the ad valorem taxes and insurance premiums and monthly payments for the support and maintenance of said children accruing subsequent to the death of W. Jack Lewis, deceased. The grounds of the petition were that the obligations of the said W. Jack Lewis in said settlement agreement survived his death. It was the position of the administra-trix that the obligations of the said W. Jack Lewis in the aforesaid settlement agreement terminated upon his death.
*735This was the issue as presented for the determination of the court. Claims on behalf of the children for sums accruing subsequent to the death of said W. Jack Lewis were duly and properly probated.
On proper petition presented to the court, the court fixed the amount of one year’s support for the widow and the minor, Marguerette Gibson Lewis, in the sum of $2400 to be paid to the widow, Mrs. Bettye K. Lewis, and the sum of $1200 to be paid for the use and benefit of the minor, Marguerette Gibson Lewis, pursuant to Section 561 of the Mississippi Code of 1942.
After a full hearing on the petitions to require the administratrix of the estate of W. Jack Lewis, deceased, to pay the ad valorem taxes and insurance premiums and monthly allowances for the support of the children, the court entered its decree denying the prayer of said petitions and dismissing the same. At the time of the final hearing, the minor, Marguerette Gibson Lewis, was under the age of 21 years and was unmarried, and was living with her mother, Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis, and was under the supervision of her mother. At said time, Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis was unmarried and had remained unmarried since the time of her divorce from the said W. Jack Lewis. At said time also, the said Mrs. Bess Lassiter Lewis held the legal title to one-half interest in the property described in the settlement agreement and her two children, Katherine Ann Lewis, and Marguerette Gibson Lewis, held title to the remaining undivided one-half interest in said property. Katherine Ann Lewis was unmarried and became 21 years of age on May 15, 1957. From the decree dismissing the aforesaid petitions, the petitioners prosecute this appeal.
While Mahaffey was the first judicial announcement in this State of the rule that the liability of the father to support his child does not survive his death in the absence of a contract imposing* such liability, it can probably be safely assumed that such rule has generally *736been recognized by the bench and bar throughout the years. After considering the cases from other jurisdictions and the contrariety of opinion prevailing elsewhere, the Court, in Mahaffey, said: “We think the better rule is that the liability of the father to support his child does not survive his death in the absence of a contract or agreement imposing such liability.”
If there is an obligation to continue payments after death of W. Jack Lewis it must be in accordance with the express provisions of the contract or manifested by fair implication, considering the contract by its four corners together with the circumstances of the parties. Since the contract does not refer to the death of W. Jack Lewis or to his executor or administrator, it seems clear that there is no express obligation that the payments survive his death.
In determining whether the contract manifests such obligation by fair implication it must be considered that when the contract was made the separate support and maintenance suit had been filed and W. Jack Lewis had answered. The contract in question was executed on June 9, 1951, and the same day a decree was entered disposing of that litigation and approving the contract. The contract recited that it was entered into “to avoid litigation. ’ ’ This was litigation in which the court could not require the payment of child support after death of the defendant, W. Jack Lewis. While the contract provided that the child support payments should cease as to each child if she (a) attains 21 years of age, or (b) marries, or (c) dies, or (d) fails to live with her mother, these provisions are mere limitations on the obligation to pay child support and in our opinion it cannot be said that such provisions manifest any intent to impose an obligation that the payments survive the death of W. Jack Lewis. To the contrary, the contract contains several provisions indicating that it was made in contemplation of W. Jack Lewis being alive during its per-*737forruance rather than being made with his death being within the contemplation of the parties.
 In our opinion the provisions of the contract do not purport to extend the payments for child support subsequent to the death of W. Jack Lewis. Since the law does not impose any such liability we think it can he imposed only when the contract affirmatively does so either by express terms of fair implication.
We think the chancellor correctly decided the issue and that his decree should be affirmed.
Affirmed.
McGehee, C.J., and Lee', Kyle and McElroy, JJ., concur.