Court Opinion

ID: 9845346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:19:40.790907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.062297
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
*392In dissenting to the majority opinion herein, I believe the following should be the opinion of the Court.
Upon a jury verdict returned June 30, 1948, by which defendant was found guilty of murder of the first degree, penalty was fixed at death; after motion for a new trial was overruled, sentence was pronounced, fixing the date of execution as the week beginning January 8 and ending January 15, 1949. Execution having been stayed, this writ of error assigned to the judgment is before us by the plaintiff in error, to whom I will refer as the defendant.
By an information filed January 30, 1948 by the District Attorney, the defendant was charged with the felonious killing of his wife on January 27, 1948 in the City and County of Denver. On arraignment, February 10, 1948, the defendant, after counsel was assigned, entered the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time, since, and now. It was ordered that defendant be committed to the psychopathic ward at the Colorado General Hospital for observation for a period not to exceed thirty days. The record shows that on May 10, 1948 defendant, by his attorney, withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and entered a plea of not guilty. Trial was had in due course, resulting in the verdict heretofore mentioned; motion for new trial was overruled, after which counsel then caused the record here presented to be prepared and filed in this court within the time allowed therefor. After lodging the record here, counsel failed to further prosecute this writ of error, and upon petition of the Attorney General, this court requested the trial court to assign new counsel for the defendant. There was a compliance with this request and present counsel accepted the onerous assignment, took the record as he found it, and we must notice his able presentation as it is now before us.
In reviewing this capital case, we are confronted with the unpleasant duty of not yielding to, or being controlled by, natural human sympathy, but to examine the *393entire record “in favor of life” and to.be certain, as far as certainty can exist in any such case, that defendant had, or will now have, all of the safeguards humanely provided by the law of the land, as well as that available through the inherent power of this court dictated in good conscience. To this end I set out salient parts of the record made from the testimony and rulings of the court.
The defendant, approximately thirty-one years of age, married the deceased January 29, 1940; deceased was twenty-nine years old at the time of her death; they lived about five years on a farm near Brighton, Colorado, and moved to 3763 Williams street, Denver, in 1945. They had four children, namely, Robert, John Frank, Richard, and Paula Jean. The oldest, Robert, was born October 18, 1940 and was at the time of the trial over seven years of age. In June, 1947, defendant commenced serving a sentencé in the state penitentiary on a charge of fourth degree arson, and was released therefrom on January 26, 1948 at about 9: 00 o’clock A. M. On that day, he started to his home.
Robert Berger, the oldest child, after a preliminary examination by the court out of the presence of the jury, was permitted to testify over the objection of defendant’s counsel. According to his testimony,, the defendant reached home shortly after dinner when deceased, was washing dishes. Robert testified that he and his sister had already gone to bed in a small bedroom provided with twin beds and a small child’s bed; that defendant threw some money on the floor for the children; took a drink out of a bottle that he had in his pocket and then placed the bottle on the dresser; that he heard his mother and father arguing about the father’s drinking; that defendant said “he could get a better wife than she. was.” Robert slept with a brother in the twin bed close by a twin bed occupied by defendant and the deceased.. In answer to a leading question (as I will later point out) Robert testified that he saw his father choke his mother; *394that they were jumping up and down on the bed; that the hands of the clock were straight up and down apparently indicating 12:30 o’clock at night. All of the testimony in the case indicated that the lights were off in the room. Robert further testified that the defendant got up and walked around; poured some whiskey on deceased’s face and then wiped it off; that deceased lay still and said nothing; that defendant got dressed, walked back and forth in the house, into the kitchen for a while and then undressed and came back to bed and got in bed with Robert for a while; that at about daylight, defendant aroused the children and told them he was going to- see their Grandpa Berger at Brighton; he further testified that the children dressed themselves and helped each get dressed; that during all of this time deceased said nothing and was lying the same way on the bed; that there was blood on her face; and that defendant tried “to make believe she was alive.” It was a very cold morning and they went out to get on the bus; defendant carried the youngest child, Paula Jean, and the three other children walked .along; that the bus did not come; the younger children began to cry and defendant and the children returned home; then defendant left; the two older boys went into the house and found deceased lying on the bed with blood on her face and one of them, Frank, went outside and told Mr. Hanauer, a passerby, to call the police. Hanauer testified that he went down into the next block and placed a call to the police department. Dr. Angelo Lapi, medical examiner for the City and County of Denver, responded to the call and took charge of the body and later that day performed an autopsy and found that death was caused by asphyxia due to strangulation and was not superinduced or from natural causes; the time of death was fixed as between 11:00 o’clock P. M. on January 26 and 3:00 o’clock A. M. January 27. Several police officers promptly arrived at the scene. Defendant was arrested about 11:00 o’clock A. M. on that day near 47th and Williams street. The *395suit coat he was wearing bore blood stains, which were later analyzed by Dr. Frances McConnell, clinical pathologist, as being made by the same type “O” blood as that of deceased.
When questioned at police headquarters, defendant stated that on his way from Canon City by bus, he purchased a pint of liquor at Colorado Springs and had some drinks and sandwiches at Palmer Lake; that he arrived home early in the evening; that he retired with deceased about midnight; that at about 4:00 o’clock he decided to take the children to Brighton; that with deceased’s help, he dressed the children and he left with them, but when no bus came along and the baby started to cry, he returned home with the children and the deceased was not at home when he returned; that he left and bought a pint of whiskey and went to Ward’s Hotel, where he overheard some police officers inquiring about a man dressed like him, so he removed a leather jacket and a pair of trousers that he was wearing over another pair; he then went out to catch a ride to Brighton, but was arrested by the police. •
The People introduced testimony relating to prior threats and mistreatment of deceased. The defendant did not testify, but introduced evidence showing numerous prior arrests of the defendant; acts of violence by defendant toward the deceased and others; and his dissolute and profligate ways; he also introduced evidence showing a back injury received in 1946 and his commitment to the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital for observation on two occasions.
I will detail but little of the circumstantial evidence, which, from my examination of the record and considered as a whole, unmistakably points to the guilt of the defendant. Of course, however convincing this circumstantial evidence might be, if not supported by direct evidence, the death penalty cannot be imposed. My difficulty stems from parts of the testimony of Robert Berger, inconsistent in many details, but direct in part, *396and said to be sufficiently direct to support the infliction of the death penalty. Due to the graveness of the situation, and not moved by any maudlin sympathy for the defendant, we should conscientiously consider this testimony, how it was obtained, how it was treated by the court, and the lack of caution to the jury in considering this possibly controlling part of the evidence. My care in the study of this important phase of the case is not pursued with the thought of a reversal of the jury’s finding of guilt, but as it is appropriate to the question of the penalty of death or life imprisonment, which, by statute, rests in the jury’s hands under proper instruction from the court. The part of the testimony of Robert Berger, the seven-year old witness, that is most direct and devastating to the defendant was his statement that he saw his father choke his mother. There is such a lack of continuity in other parts of his testimony that there is danger concealed in its consideration if used to inflict a death penalty. My search and study of the record does not reveal that the above statement of the child witness was voluntary. It came in response to a positive, leading question twice propounded to him before the answer, and, as shown by the record in the examination by the district attorney, as follows:
“Q. Did you say, Robert, your dad choked your mother, did you say that?
“Mr. Wettengel: He didn’t say that. I object to that.
“Mr. Danks: My understanding he did say that at one point.
“The Court: The form of the question is objectionable. Objection sustained as to that. Proceed with your inquiry.”
Then later in the examination, the district attorney, out of a clear sky again propounded the following question:
“Q. Bobby, did you tell the Court and Jury, did you tell us, Bobby, your dad choked your mother?
“Mr. Wettengel: I ask that the record be consulted. *397It is not only an attempt to suggest and supply the answer, but he is trying to make the child say something he did not say. I challenge the record.
“The Court: He may ask whether this was true. I don’t think the question in its present form is proper, whether he stated that, he may ask now whether that happened, not what he testified to. You may ask.
“Mr. Hanks: Bobby, did you see your dad choke your mother? A. Yes.
“Q. How did he choke your mother, what did he do? A. By his hands. Q. Where did he put his hands? A. Around her neck. Q. Did you see that, Bobby? A. Yes.”
According to his other testimony, this was while the lights were off in the room. I am not unmindful of the rule permitting more or less leading questions to an infant, and that some latitude is indulged in that regard; however, this rule must be followed with caution and limitations where a death penalty is in the offing. It-must be noted, and to me it is important, that this question was twice propounded, or in other words the answer was put into the mouth of the child before the answer. The seriousness of the effect of this statement will not permit me to say that it was voluntary and came from the lips of the child wholly uninfluenced by what had been said in his presence by the district attorney. In a measure, this statement was partially refuted by the medical examiner as to the possible details of how the strangulation took place. It might have been a sufficient variance to have caused the jury to largely discount the testimony of the child and rely more, or entirely on the circumstantial evidence. At this point I say that no instruction on circumstantial evidence was given to the jury, and I hold that for discussion later in this opinion.
A number of lay witnesses, who were intimately acquainted with the defendant, testified that over a period of years the defendant acted queer, was not all there, and in their opinion was not sane. This mental condition *398was shown to be aggravated by excessive drinking on the part of the defendant which had continued for a long time prior to his plea of guilty to the charge of arson, which occurred under strange and peculiar circumstances-and for which he served a short term in the penitentiary. It is definitely established by the evidence that defendant had been twice sent to the psychopathic ward of the Colorado General Hospital for observation. The last of these two occasions was in May of 1947. When the defendant was directed to be sent to the psychopathic hospital for observation by the County Court of Adams county, a report and letter was sent by the psychopathic hospital to- the county court in the matter. At the time Dr. Cotter Hirschberg was testifying on behalf of the People herein as a psychiatrist, and in charge of the psychiatric ward when defendant was committed by the court to the ward for observation in the present case, counsel for defendant interrogated him concerning the matter of the records of the hospital on the previous occasion in May, 1947, just mentioned, and sought to identify the exhibits and the offer was rejected. The exhibit offered is marked Defendant’s Exhibit #2 and is as follows:
“University of Colorado School of Medicine and Hospitals
4200 East Ninth Avenue Denver 7, Colorado
“May 23, 1947
“Colorado Psychopathic Hospital
“Honorable R. Boyd Garrison Adams County Judge Brighton, Colo.
In re: John Berger
“Your Honor:
“The above named patient was admitted to this hospital 5-13-47 on a complaint from Adams County. The patient was previously in this hospital in 1944 at which time the final diagnosis was chronic alcoholism. Patient was *399taken from this hospital by his family against the advice of the hospital physicians.
“During his present hospitalization, he has been very difficult to handle. He is uncooperative, has become belligerent and has attempted to escape from the hospital. We feel that he will not benefit by treatment in this hospital and that he will only get into more difficulty if released. We therefore have no other alternative but to recommend that he be placed before a lunacy commission and transferred to the State Hospital at Pueblo.
“Sincerely yours,
“Ewald W. Busse
“Ewald W. Busse, M. D.
Senior Resident”
“ewb;bm”
This is a copy of the other offered exhibit which was the original. For surrebuttal, counsel for defendant called Dr. Ewald W. Busse, who was in charge of the psychopathic ward at the time of the commitment in May, 1947, and claiming surprise at the doctor’s testimony, attempted to cross-examine him on the variance between his testimony and the exhibit, and upon objection, counsel was denied the privilege of further examining the witness. It appears that the matter upon which counsel desired to examine the witness was that in his testimony he fixed the condition of defendant as an alcoholic, while the offered exhibit, over the witness’s signature, discloses that the witness recommended that defendant be placed before a lunacy commission and transferred to the State Hospital at Pueblo. I believe the ruling of the trial court in rejecting the exhibits, as well as the refusal of surrebuttal testimony in a capital case on the question of the mental condition to be considered in fixing the penalty, was serious error. According to the case of Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P. (2d) 1109-12, the defendant, even though he had not relied upon a plea of insanity, was “ * * * entitled to introduce evidence of insanity, or mental derangement short of in*400sanity, for the purpose, not of an acquittal, but of reducing the grade of the crime from murder of the first degree to murder of the second degree * * * ” and further in the opinion, it is said, “ * * * In determining whether the penalty shall be death or life imprisonment, the jury act in the exercise of a sound discretion. It is conceivable that the mental condition of a defendant at the time of the homicide may be such as to induce a jury in the exercise of their discretion, to fix the lesser penalty * *
It would be at the risk of great harm to exclude any evidence bearing upon the mental condition of the defendant, such as is unmistakably shown by the tendered exhibit, in May of 1947, as not being material as to his possible mental condition in January, 1948. This could easily have been the controlling feature of all the evidence in the minds of one or more jurors, or the entire jury, when it came to the question of considering the penalty to be inflicted.
In considering the matter of the guilt or the innocence of the defendant, I believe that it was the duty of the court, by proper instruction, to caution the jury concerning the testimony of Robert Berger, the seven-year old witness, not permitted to testify under the statutes except in sound discretion of the trial court after examination, especially in capital cases. This witness does not fall within the general class of adult witnesses whose credibility is to be determined by the jury under the guidance of the general stock instruction as to the credibility of witnesses. To so caution the jury does not come within the ban of emphasis by the court of the testimony of any particular witness, but due to the immaturity of the witness, it is only a guess on the part of the trial court as to the competence. This would in nowise lessen the effect of the testimony of the witness if the jury was directed to consider the age of the witness and the likelihood of imaginative impressions formed around and about an unusual and an extraordinary event. This cau*401tion would permit the jury, from its observation of the witness, to determine for itself the credibility, which, in the last analysis, is just as important as the discretion of the judge in permitting the witness to testify. This requirement is doubly important for consideration in fixing the penalty. The presumption against the capacity of a child seven years old to commit a crime is very strong and the same reason should apply to the possible effect of a child’s testimony in a capital case. The fixing of the penalty was a vital phase of this case, and in following the general rule, we should hold that it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to instruct the jury on every essential question and phase of the case suggested by the evidence and the circumstances connected with the trial. This suggested guidance by the court could easily have been the difference between life imprisonment or death as the punishment.
The same principle applies as to the failure of the court in this case to give an instruction on circumstantial evidence. The direct evidence in this case was obtained, as we have seen, by leading questions and is uncorroborated except by circumstantial evidence. The jury could easily have been more influenced by the circumstantial evidence than by the direct evidence so elicited. The throbbing question before us is not as to what part of the evidence satisfied the jury as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but what part thereof influenced them in fixing the penalty. The quantum of the testimony relied upon by the state was circumstantial, but no instruction was given the jury at all that the law. provides, in substance, that the death penalty cannot be imposed on circumstantial evidence only. By the failure to give an instruction on circumstantial evidence, it was the equivalent of the court saying that “the testimony before you is direct.”
As to the matter of determining the punishment, the only instruction touching on that phase is instruction No. 19 which contains the following: “ * '* * unless your *402verdict should be guilty of murder in the first degree, in which event, in accordance with these instructions, you will fix the punishment at either life imprisonment or death.” My reading of the instructions discloses no other reference to the possible penalty, and nothing in the way of guidance or a rule to follow in making the distinction between the two penalties. There should have been an instruction to the effect that the jury should consider all of the evidence, including any mitigating circumstances, and also consider any evidence of mental derangement in determining the penalty, in the event their verdict was guilty of murder of the first degree.
I could unduly lengthen this opinion by further discussion of these vital questions, but I am confident that sufficient has been herein pointed out to show that to uphold the imposition of the death penalty by the jury in its unguided deliberations is dangerous, if permitted to stand, as a precedent in such cases. The whole record is sufficiently satisfying to sustain the verdict of guilty of murder, but not to warrant the infliction of the death penalty. We therefore are confronted with further disposition of the case. Consequently, we should consider our power to modify the judgment, which I believe to be inherent when true justice so requires. To hold otherwise would be an impairment of the underlying and most salutary power with which this tribunal has confidently been entrusted by the people for the final and ultimate administration of justice. The distinct function of the administration has been vouchsafed to the judicial department, separate and free from encroachment by other departments of the government. It has been wisely provided that upon the failure or exhaustion of the judicial power, then executive clemency may be sought. First being conscious of our responsibility, we should measure up to the full, and not shift the burden to the executive department.
A modification of the judgment before us, from the *403death penalty to that of life imprisonment, would not be an invasion of the pardoning power. The exercise of control over inferior tribunals and their judgments is in no way related to the powers of clemency invested in the executive department. The act is judicial and not executive.
It is for the legislative department to define what may be offenses against the person, property, or the public, and set a general standard for punishment. No one would dare contend that the legislature could anticipate all of the circumstances surrounding the commission of crime, and fix an inflexible standard for punishment. Considering in full the realities of life and the varied and complex relationships of people in life’s intercourse, I must finally say that this function of the legislature is a general, and not an inflexible, standard.
We do not hesitate to affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment, or orders, of a trial judge and I do not find any logical reason to hold that the verdict of a jury has any more potency than the finding of a trial judge. Our power to set aside and reverse a judgment based upon a jury verdict is not questioned. The grant of this extreme power surely includes the lesser power, that of modification of a judgment when justice requires, as shown by the entire record of a case.
No limitation of the power to modify the judgment before us is'to be found in the Constitution or the statutes of this state. The jury is not a body separate and apart from the court. It is a part of the court and a part of a combination of a judge and jury which constitutes the court. Our action in controlling the judgments of the inferior courts, embraces the power to modify. Our right to exist and to function as a court must ultimately rest upon our power to dispense fundamental justice. Modifying this judgment would be an act and an award of what we should determine to be justice. In our form of government, justice is imperative.
I have hereinbefore indicated that the errors men*404tioned were not sufficient to justify a reversal of the judgment based upon the verdict of guilt, and also have indicated that the entire record of so-called direct testimony, and circumstantial evidence points unmistakably to the guilt of the defendant. A reversal and remanding of this cause for a new trial after this lapsed period from the date of the offense could, in several ways, result in a defeat of ultimate justice. However, I am not satisfied that the jury, after its determination of guilt, was wholly unaffected by nonguidance and possible prejudice in their deliberations on fixing the penalty. On this question a reasonable doubt exists, and any benefit arising therefrom belongs to defendant. Therefore, in the exercise of our full judicial power, I am of the opinion that we should order that the verdict and judgment herein be modified, and that the penalty imposed be that of imprisonment for life.