Court Opinion

ID: 9462178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:33:47.731225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:26.517378
License: Public Domain

WEBSTER, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in all that has been said in the majority opinion, and were this a direct criminal appeal, I would join without reservation. In my view, however, it is unnecessary for this court to consider on a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion whether there has been full compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. “[C]ollateral relief is not available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements” of a rule of criminal procedure. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429, 82 S.Ct. 468, 472, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). As pointed out in Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 2305, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974), the test under § 2255 is “whether the claimed error of law was ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of jus*861tice,’ and whether ‘[i]t present[s] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.’ ” (Quoting from Hill v. United States, supra, 368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. at 471.) See Houser v. United States, 508 F.2d 509, 512-13 (8th Cir. 1974). Applying that test, a claim that the District Court failed to develop an adequate formal record of the factual basis for accepting the plea does not in and of itself support a collateral attack pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Arias v. United States, 484 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 905, 94 S.Ct. 3195, 41 L.Ed.2d 1153 (1974); Limon-Gonzalez v. United States, 499 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1974).
There are many constitutional rights which may be waived by a voluntary and understanding plea of guilty. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 414 (5th Cir. 1971). Recently enacted amendments to Rule 11 (Public Law 94-64, 89 Stat. 370, 371), effective December 1, 1975, incorporate an extensive litany of rights which must be explained to the defendant by the court at the time of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.1 I would not want this opinion to imply, sub silentio, that noncompliance with any of such provisions can be made the basis of a collateral attack upon the plea, if it was otherwise knowingly and voluntarily entered.

. Rule 11(c), as amended, reads:
(c) Advice to Defendant. — Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further tri^l of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.