Court Opinion

ID: 9621375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:56:58.431396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:03.254746
License: Public Domain

HEARN, Judge
(concurring):
This case has a protracted procedural history, having already been before this Court twice, and now a third time in this en banc rehearing. While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I feel compelled to express my concern that this decision be limited to its unique facts, and further, to accept the dissent’s invitation to point specifically to those facts. Therefore, I separately concur.
In this case, the County placed both Wade and Pierce in the ultimate “catch-22.” Wade initially proceeded against Pierce individually without knowledge that he was possibly acting within the scope of his official duties at the time of the accident. By the time Wade discovered that Pierce might *529have been acting in the scope of his employment with the County, the County had already asserted the opposite position in a workers’ compensation claim filed by Pierce. Because the County denied Pierce was acting in the course and scope of his employment, Pierce realized that he faced substantial individual liability in Wade’s civil suit. It was incumbent upon him, as well as his liability insurer, to attempt to reach an amicable disposition. Moreover, it is the policy of the courts of this state to foster settlements. Subsequent to execution of the covenant, the County altered its position, claiming that if Pierce was acting within the scope of official duties, it was entitled to the protection of the Tort Claims Act, specifically, the bar of further claims against a governmental entity after a settlement or judgment under the Act.
The dissent would place Pierce in the unenviable position of having to gamble on liability exposure. If the jury found he was not acting in his official duties at the time of the accident and awarded substantial damages to Wade, Pierce and his insurance carrier would be exposed to a judgment which they otherwise could have avoided by a reasonable settlement. Pierce and his insurance carrier are placed in a worse position than an ordinary tortfeasor simply by virtue of Pierce’s employment with the County. Moreover, there is absolutely no suggestion that Wade was attempting a double recovery in this case. At oral argument, Wade’s counsel conceded that any recovery against the County would be offset by his settlement with Pierce. Cast against these peculiar facts, the majority correctly holds that Wade’s actions did not constitute a settlement “under the Act.”
The County’s ultimate liability in this case is still very much in question. A jury will have to determine the issue of Pierce’s status at the time of the accident. I do not believe, however, that Wade should be denied the right to proceed against the County because of his prior covenant not to execute against Pierce. I agree with the majority that the covenant did not constitute a settlement under the Act since at that time whether Pierce was acting within the scope of his official duties was in serious dispute because of the position taken by the County.
CURETON and STILWELL, JJ., concur.