Court Opinion

ID: 9959755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:03:00.535103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:52.295138
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-1354
                 LT Case No. 2021-CF-000253-A
                 _____________________________

MICHAEL L. WAITE,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County.
Joel Fritton, Judge.

Alexei V. Lizanich, of Law Offices of Melisa Militello, Inverness,
and Steven L. Brannock and Sarah B. Roberge, of Brannock
Berman & Seider, Tampa, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L.
Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

                           April 12, 2024

KILBANE, J.

    Michael L. Waite appeals a judgment entered after a nolo
contendere plea to five counts of unlawful interception of oral
communication (a/k/a wiretapping), one count of battery on a law
enforcement officer, and one count of resisting arrest with violence.
Specifically, Waite appeals the denial of several dispositive
motions to dismiss and suppress evidence after reserving his right
to appeal. We reverse the denial of the motion to dismiss the
wiretapping charges. We affirm in all other respects.

                             Facts

    This case stems from a lengthy dispute between Waite and the
Citrus County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”). Since 2018, Waite
quarreled over property boundaries with city employees and CCSO
deputies. For the duration of this dispute, Waite would report
what he believed to be crimes to various state agencies and the
media. As his relationship with the CCSO continued to devolve,
Waite started recording conversations with CCSO deputies.

     In January 2021, Waite called 911 to report what he perceived
to be a trespassing incident involving members of the CCSO.
Waite insisted that he wanted to file a complaint with internal
affairs and that he had an email ready to send. The 911 operator
explained that she would have a supervisor give him a call back as
she could not provide the information he was requesting. Waite
agreed and informed the 911 operator he wanted the call to be
recorded. Later that same day, Sergeant Edward Blair called
Waite back. Waite recorded the three-minute phone conversation
but did not inform Sergeant Blair he was doing so. Waite sent the
audio recording of that call via email to the CCSO records
department and requested an internal investigation.

     In February 2021, Detective Jacob Chenoweth sought to
obtain an arrest warrant based on the recorded conversation
attached to Waite’s email. The State alleged that Waite violated
section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2020), by recording the
conversation with Sergeant Blair without his consent. After
obtaining the warrant, deputies including Captain Ryan Glaze
went to execute it at Waite’s home. An altercation ensued, and it
was alleged that Waite elbowed Captain Glaze in the face.
Incident to the arrest, deputies found an audio recording device
containing three additional recorded conversations with CCSO
deputies.

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     In total, Waite was charged with five counts of wiretapping,
battery on a law enforcement officer, and resisting arrest with
violence. Waite filed several motions to dismiss and suppress
including a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) motion
to dismiss the wiretapping charges.1 Waite conceded that he did
not inform the deputies he was recording the conversations, and
none of the deputies gave their consent to be recorded. However,
Waite argued that the recorded conversations did not fall under
the definition of “oral communication” as defined by section
934.02(2), Florida Statutes, because the deputies did not have an
expectation of privacy.

     The State filed a traverse and demurrer admitting that at all
times during the recorded conversations, the deputies were acting
in their official capacities and added that the deputies were using
office phones and cell phones. However, the State argued that
whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy is an
issue of fact for the jury and therefore the motion to dismiss should
be denied. After a hearing, the trial court agreed with the State
and denied Waite’s motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.

                             Analysis

                      A. Wiretapping Charges

     A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.190(c)(4) is reviewed de novo. Galston v. State, 943
So. 2d 968, 970–71 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing State v. Massey, 873
So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). “It is only when the state cannot
establish even the barest bit of a prima facie case that it should be
prevented from prosecuting.” State v. Heffner, 727 So. 2d 977, 978
(Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (quoting State v. Pentecost, 397 So. 2d 711
(Fla. 5th DCA 1981)). As such, “the motion is somewhat similar to
a motion for summary judgment in a civil case.” State v. Jones,

    1  The fifth count of wiretapping was added at a later point in
time after an additional recorded conversation with a deputy was
uncovered during discovery. On appeal, the State does not contest
that the motion to dismiss and Waite’s reservation of his right to
appeal applied to all five wiretapping charges.

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642 So. 2d 804, 805 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (citing Ellis v. State,
346 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State v. Giesy, 243 So.
2d 635, 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)).

     Under Florida’s wiretapping statute, it is unlawful for any
person to intentionally intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire,
oral, or electronic communication. § 934.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020).
“‘Oral communication’ means any oral communication uttered by
a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation and does not mean any public oral communication
uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.” Id.
§ 934.02(2) (emphasis added). “[F]or an oral conversation to be
protected under section 934.03 the speaker must have an actual
subjective expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition
that the expectation is reasonable.” State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849,
852 (Fla. 1994) (citing State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla.
1985)).

     The question of whether citizens may record telephone
conversations with police officers acting in their official capacities
appears to be an issue of first impression. However, it has
previously been established that there is a First Amendment right
to record police officers conducting their official duties in public.
See Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1147 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA
2018) (“Simply put, the First Amendment protects the act of
photographing, filming, or otherwise recording police officers
conducting their official duties in public.” (quoting Fields v. City of
Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355–56 (3d Cir. 2017))). Additionally,
it has been recognized that meetings taking place in an office
context have “a quasi-public nature,” McDonough v. Fernandez-
Rundle, 862 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Inciarrano,
473 So. 2d at 1274),2 and the constitutional protections of the home

    2 The Florida Constitution recognizes that “[a] public office is
a public trust” and “[t]he people shall have the right to secure and
sustain that trust against abuse.” Art. II, § 8, Fla. Const. Thus,
“the Florida Constitution contemplates that public business is to
be conducted in the ‘sunshine.’” Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs.
v. Edwards, 654 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

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do not extend to an office or place of business. Morningstar v.
State, 428 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. 1982). Moreover, individuals
conducting business over the phone do not enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy on business phone calls where the other
party to the conversation records said conversation, even when
business is conducted from the person’s cell phone at home. See
Avrich v. State, 936 So. 2d 739, 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

     Here, Waite recorded a telephone conversation with Sergeant
Blair. He subsequently emailed the audio recording to the CCSO
to report what he believed to be police misconduct and requested
an internal investigation.3 It was later discovered that Waite had
similarly recorded four other conversations with CCSO deputies.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that any of the
deputies exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy that society
is willing to recognize.

     Importantly, this is based on the record before us as there is
no dispute that all conversations concerned matters of public
business, occurred while the deputies were on duty, and involved
phones utilized for work purposes. As such, Waite did not violate
section 934.03(1)(a) when he recorded the conversations with the
deputies, all of whom were acting in their official capacities at the
time of the recordings, just as if he had the conversations face-to-
face. See Pickett, 236 So. 3d at 1147 n.2; Avrich, 936 So. 2d at 742;
see also McDonough, 862 F.3d at 1320 (explaining that open-
government principles in conjunction with fact that meeting
involved “public employees acting in furtherance of their public
duties” undermined objective expectation of privacy).

     Accordingly, the denial of the rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to
dismiss must be reversed. See Ford v. City of Boynton Beach, 323
So. 3d 215, 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (reversing summary judgment
based on wiretapping statute).4

    3  We in no way suggest the CCSO committed police
misconduct. Rather, this was how Waite perceived the situation.
    4 The State relies on State v. Sells, 582 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1991), for its position that whether officers have a reasonable
expectation of privacy is a question for the jury. However, Sells

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            B. Battery and Resisting with Violence Charges

      Waite further advances that because the wiretapping charges
must be dismissed, so must the charges for battery on a law
enforcement officer and resisting arrest with violence. We
adamantly reject this assertion. Section 776.051(1), Florida
Statutes, “prohibits the use of force to resist either arrest or the
execution of a legal duty by a law enforcement officer unless the
defendant can show that the officer was not acting in good faith.”
King v. State, 120 So. 3d 108, 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (per curiam)
(citing A.W. v. State, 82 So. 3d 1136, 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)); see
also Tillman v. State, 934 So. 2d 1263, 1269 (Fla. 2006), superseded
by statute on other grounds, § 776.051(1), Fla. Stat. (2008)
(explaining that under section 776.051(1) citizens do not have the
“right to resist an illegal arrest with force”). Here, the deputies
were executing an arrest warrant. Waite did not demonstrate a
lack of good faith and should have complied without resorting to
violence.

                           Conclusion

     Because the deputies did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy when they spoke with Waite over the phone in their official
capacities as law enforcement officers regarding public business,
the recordings did not fall within the definition of “oral
communication” in section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (2020), such
that the wiretapping statute, section 934.03(1)(a), applied.
Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the rule 3.190(c)(4) motion to
dismiss the wiretapping charges and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we
affirm.

addresses circumstances where one party suspects that the other
party may be recording. Id. Whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy when he or she suspects the other person is
recording is a question for the jury. See id. That is not the issue
addressed here. Moreover, Sells did not involve a public meeting
or a conversation between police officers and members of the public
regarding public business.

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     AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, REMANDED with
instructions.

EDWARDS, C.J., and MAKAR, J., concur.

                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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