Court Opinion

ID: 9818504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 05:50:18.91404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:25.155572
License: Public Domain

BAILEY C. MOSELEY, Justice,
concurring and dissenting opinion.
Edna Lopez and her children who were the subject of this suit first came to the attention of the judicial system April 6, 2009, when an original petition was filed by the Child Protective Services division of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (CPS). At that time, Francisco Lopez16 was generically identified (with two others) as “the father of the child,” with the observation that his address was not known. An amended petition filed two days later alleged Francisco to be the father of the male child born March 25, 1996, and the female child born November 19, 1999; again, it was alleged that Francisco’s whereabouts were unknown. An attorney ad litem was appointed for Francisco and the alleged father of another of the children; that attorney ad litem duly filed a response on Francisco’s behalf. A family service plan, which made *26no mention of Francisco, was filed May 29 and identified the goal of the plan to be family reunification. Francisco was served by certified mail July 27, 2009. In a “Permanency Plan and Permanency Progress Report” filed by CPS December 15, 2009, Francisco is mentioned as the father of the two children mentioned previously with the notation that he cannot return to the United States for ten years due to unnamed criminal activity while in this country, but would continue to participate in monthly conference calls with the children. Each subsequent progress report repeats the same information about Francisco verbatim. There is no indication that any home study of Francisco’s home was conducted or that he was permitted to participate in any plan dictated by the trial court or CPS at any time, except for the monthly telephone calls previously noted.
Once CPS has been appointed managing conservator of a child, Texas Family Code Section 263.401 contains very precise and explicit time limits on the judicial involvement with the child. Specifically, it prescribes that “on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator, the court shall dismiss the suit” with the proviso that one 180-day extension of that one-year period can be made if the “court finds that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing con-servatorship of the department and that continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.401 (West 2008).
Here, the first order appointing CPS as temporary managing conservator of the children was entered April 9, 2009. The entry of this order thus would have dictated the first deadline of the first Monday after April 9, 2010, for final determination, absent an extension. Even with the 180-day extension that was granted, CPS and the trial court were forced to take the fork in the road of either terminating the parental rights or dismissing the case very shortly after the date set for hearing. Everyone was operating under the statutory gun.
The trial court terminated Francisco’s parental rights, finding that he had: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (3) failed to support the children in accordance with Francisco’s ability during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition; and (4) constructively abandoned the children who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of CPS or an authorized agency for not less than six months, and (a) CPS or an authorized agency had made reasonable efforts to return the children to Francisco; (b) Francisco had not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the children, and (c) Francisco demonstrated an inability to provide the children with a safe environment.
We must remember that a court may order termination of the parent-child relationship only if the court finds the allegations to be true by clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001 (West Supp.2010). The standard “clear and convincing” evidence is defined as “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be estab*27lished.” Spangler v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 962 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, no pet.).
The majority only addresses the finding that Francisco had engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. The majority correctly points out that this conduct cannot be considered an isolated act but, rather, a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct. For this, the majority relies upon Francisco’s rather foggy description of what the majority calls an “inappropriate relationship” with a person whom Francisco described as being underage. The evidence upon which this rests is the following exchange during the trial. On direct examination of Francisco,17 the following exchange occurred:
Q. Okay. Now, you got in trouble in Wisconsin, right?
A. Yes. Correct.
Q. You were having — your girlfriend was underage?
A. Yes. Correct.
That is the sole source for the assumption that Francisco engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a child. One must infer that there was an inappropriate relationship and simple inferences not based on clear and convincing evidence will not support such a finding. One could just as easily infer that he had a young female friend to whom he had given a beer and was convicted of that offense — a much less serious offense. At any rate, Francisco’s other testimony was that he had been placed on some kind of probation for whatever offense he committed, but he failed to live up to the terms of his probation and moved to Texas. After he had lived in Texas, he (rather naively) went to Dallas to apply for legal residency status; when the prior criminal offense was discovered, he was deported. Of course, whatever conduct Francisco perpetrated in Wisconsin occurred before he even met Edna. One must calculate, then, that since the elder of the two children Francisco sired by Edna was over fifteen years old at the time of trial, the incident for which he was convicted had taken place not less than sixteen years before the time the order terminating his parental rights was entered.
The commission of a very unclear offense (the gravity of which is unproven) and his failure to live out the terms of a probated sentence over a decade and a half before is hardly clear and convincing evidence that Francisco engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of his children — children who were not even yet thought about, much less conceived. There is no clear and convincing evidence here.
As to the other findings by the trial court upon which the termination was based, there appears to be absolutely no evidence at all to support them.
When one considers the finding that Francisco knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children, Francisco’s testimony that he believed the children to have been in perfectly acceptable surroundings and that Edna had not abused drugs or alcohol when they were together is not controverted. Francisco testified that his father saw the children on many occasions and made no such report of mistreatment, neglect, or maltreatment to him. Conversely, Francisco said that he thought (erroneously, it turns *28out) that Edna was a good mother to the children. Erroneous information about children who are hundreds of miles away does not constitute knowing conduct.
As to the finding that Francisco failed to support the children in accord with his ability during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition, the evidence is once again uncontroverted that Francisco elicited the aid of his father (who apparently made regular trips in the area in which the children were located) in delivering things to his children. He would then reimburse his father by giving his mother funds in Mexican currency. Francisco only made $400.00 per month, but asked if he needed to get a second job to send more money than he had in the past. There is a simple lack of any evidence that Francisco was not supporting his children in accord with his ability to pay; except for the testimony he provided as to his income, there is no other evidence of ability (or inability) to pay.
There is simply no evidence at all that the requirements of Section 161.001(a)(N) of the Texas Family Code have been satisfied. To commence, although there is ample evidence that CPS had been appointed temporary managing conservator of the children, there is simply no evidence at all that Francisco constructively abandoned the children, that CPS had made reasonable efforts to return the children to Francisco, or that there was any evidence that he had demonstrated an inability to provide the children with a safe environment, each of which is required to be proven. There was no home study of Francisco’s situation and there was no attempt to return the children to him in the record. Francisco testified that he spoke to the children on the telephone on a regular basis, but was constrained from visiting them personally because he had been deported.
It is obvious that Francisco’s role in this trial was that of the forgotten man. Perhaps if the State had truly considered his role as the father of the children, it could have obtained copies of the Wisconsin papers to affirmatively show what crime Francisco had committed there. It chose not to do that. Was it a heinous crime? Who knows? Perhaps if CPS had considered the importance rightly placed on the value of the parent and child relationship between Francisco and his children, its agents would have seen to the commission of a home study of Francisco’s home. It did not. Perhaps if some request for support was made by CPS to Francisco during the time that the children were under CPS conservancy, he would have provided what he could afford. There is no evidence that this took place.
I would affirm the termination of the parent and child relationship as to Edna, but I would reverse the termination as it pertains to Francisco.

.To distinguish Francisco Lopez from Edna Lopez, the mother of all of the children, reference to these people will henceforth be made by their first names only.

. Francisco appeared during the trial only for his testimony by telephone through an interpreter. He was unable to attend the trial because of his deportation to Mexico.