Court Opinion

ID: 9484225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:44:27.169017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:05.704238
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I do not agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that Loftus’s acceptance of $5,000.0.0 violated the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and' accordingly dissent.
I believe that the outcome of this case turns on one issue: whether Loftus obtained the $5,000.00 in exchange for the performance ' or nonperformance of his official acts as a County Commissioner. In a Hobbs Act prosecution of a public official, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the public official obtained a payment from another in exchange for performance or nonperformance of his or her official duties. United States v. O’Keefe, 825 F.2d 314, 319 *800(11th Cir.1987); United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir.1980). Receipt of such a payment is prohibited under the Hobbs Act only if the government can establish the existence of a quid pro quo, in other words, that the payment “is made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.” McCormick v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 1816, 114 L.Ed.2d 307, (1991). Therefore, in order to establish a Hobbs Act violation, “the government need only show that [Loftus] has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” Evans v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 1889, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992).
In the present case the government showed that Loftus had accepted a payment to which he was not entitled but failed to show that the payment was made in return for his official acts, that is as a county commissioner. The FBI agents acting as partners in the Lerner Project wanted to rezone the land in question from residential to commercial use. The rezoning of land was strictly a function of the City Council and the City Planning and Zoning Commission. There was no evidence presented at trial that Lof-tus, a County Commissioner, had either the power to effect the desired rezoning or that the Lerner partners believed that he had such ability.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that Loftus took, or had ever taken in the past, any action which had influenced the City Council or the Planning and Zoning Commission to act or refrain from action in other matters. On the contrary, the Mayor of Bellevue testified that she had several meetings with Loftus which were attended by several current and past Council members. The Mayor testified that the land in question was discussed at these meetings but that Loftus never approached her or the City Council members concerning the rezoning of such land.
In United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir.1978), this court was confronted with the same question at issue here. The defendant in Rabbitt was convicted of violating the Hobbs Act by accepting a commission fee from an architectural firm he had recommended to the State officials involved in awarding such contracts. In reversing the Hobbs Act conviction, this court determined that the evidence did not show that the defendant possessed, the apparent power to award the state contract. Id. at 1028.
In Rabbitt, this court further concluded that the architectural firm knew that the defendant could not award the state contract, but could at most recommend them to state officials as qualified architects. Id. Thus, this court held that, absent evidence that any state architectural contract had been awarded-to that firm as a result of the defendant’s influence or that the firm reasonably believed that the defendant’s introduction alone was enough to secure state architectural work, the government had failed to prove the firm entertained a reasonable belief that the defendant possessed effective control over the award of architectural contracts to establish extortion “under color of official right” in violation of the Hobbs Act. Id. at 1027-28.
The majority opinion distinguishes Rabbitt from the present case on the ground that the defendant in Rabbitt did not promise to use his official position to influence the persons granting the contracts, but only promised to introduce the architectural firm to influential persons. However, the majority’s argument misses the mark. Under the holding in Rab-bitt, it is irrelevant to a Hobbs violation analysis whether the official involved promised to use his or her official position to influence governmental decision or whether the official merely promised to introduce the party seeking favorable treatment to the government officials making the ultimate decisions; either way the official is still acting in an official capacity.
The focus in Rabbitt was whether “the extorted party possesses a reasonable belief in the official’s power [to bring about the desired result].” Rabbitt, 583 F.2d at 1027; see also United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 394 (1st Cir.1976); United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 643 (3rd Cir.1975); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 1562, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975). As *801stated above, the government produced no evidence that Loftus had the power to effect the rezoning or that the Lerner partners reasonably believed that he had such influence or authority.
After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, I cannot agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding Loftus guilty of extortion under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act. I respectfully dissent.