Court Opinion

ID: 9424447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:11:39.394426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:50.359523
License: Public Domain

*174Mr. Justice Black,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins, dissenting.
Of course I agree that a State may require that applicants and members of the Bar possess the good “character and general fitness requisite for an attorney.” But it must be remembered that the right of a lawyer or Bar applicant to practice his profession is often more valuable to him than his home, however expensive that home may be. Therefore I think that when a State seeks to deny an applicant admission or to disbar a lawyer, it must proceed according to the most exacting demands of due process of law. This must mean at least that the right of a lawyer or Bar applicant to practice cannot be left to the mercies of his prospective or present competitors. When it seeks to deprive a person of the right to practice law, a State must accord him the same rights as when it seeks to deprive him of any other property. Perhaps almost anyone would be stunned if a State sought to take away a man’s house because he failed to prove his loyalty or refused to answer questions about his political beliefs. But it seems to me that New York is attempting to deprive people of the right to practice law for precisely these reasons, and the Court is approving its actions.
Here the Court upholds a New York law which requires that a Bar applicant not be admitted “unless he shall furnish satisfactory proof” that he “believes in the form of the government of the United States and is loyal to such government.” Rule 9406, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. It also approves certain questions about political associations and beliefs which New York requires all applicants to answer. Prom these holdings I dissent.
In my view, the First Amendment absolutely prohibits a State from penalizing a man because of his beliefs. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. *175382, 445 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). Hence a State cannot require that an applicant’s belief in our form of government be established before he can become a lawyer. As Mr. Justice Roberts said in Cantwell v. Connecticut:
“Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,— freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” 310 U. S. 296, 303-304 (1940).
Assuming that a New York statute could constitutionally delegate to a committee of lawyers the power to interrogate applicants for the Bar, the specific questions asked in this case are flatly inconsistent with the First Amendment. Questions 26 (a) and 26 (b) state:
“(a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of any organization or group of persons which, during the period of your membership or association, you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means? - If your answer is in the affirmative, state the facts below.
“(b) [D]id you, during the period of such membership or association, have the specific intent to further the aims of such organization or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof by force, violence or any unlawful means?”
I do not think that a State can, consistently with the First Amendment, exclude an applicant because he has belonged to organizations that advocate violent overthrow of the Government, even if his membership was “knowing” and he shared the organization’s aims. Yates *176v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 339 (1957) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 445 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). The First Amendment was intended to make speech free from government control, even speech which is dangerous and unpopular. And included within the protection of the First Amendment is the right of association; the right to join organizations which themselves advocate ideas. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 527 (1960) (Black, J., and Douglas, J., concurring); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U. S. 17 (1968). It therefore follows for me that governments should not be able to ask questions designed to identify persons who have belonged to certain political organizations and then exclude them from the practice of law.
Question 27 (b) asks: “Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you are, without any mental reservation, loyal to and ready to support the Constitution of the United States?” In my view, this question also invades areas of belief protected by the First Amendment. Here the State seeks to probe an applicant’s state of mind to ascertain whether he is “without any mental reservation, loyal to . . . the Constitution.” But asking about an applicant’s mental attitude toward the Constitution simply probes his beliefs, and these are not the business of the State. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra (Black, J., dissenting); cf. In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 573 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting). For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court below.
Wholly aside from my own views in dissent on what the First Amendment demands, I do not see how today’s decision can be reconciled with other decisions of this Court, to which I shall refer later. The majority seeks *177to avoid this conflict by a process of narrowing construction. It states:
“First, the Rule places upon applicants no burden of proof. Second, 'the form of the government of the United States’ and the 'government’ refer solely to the Constitution, which is all that the oath mentions. Third, ‘belief’ and ‘loyalty’ mean no more than willingness to take the constitutional oath and ability to do so in good faith.” Ante, at 163.
Thus despite the New York law’s command that no applicant shall be admitted “unless he shall furnish satisfactory proof” of his belief and loyalty, the Court holds that this law places on him no burden of proof. The Court seems to assert that this “construction” avoids the problems posed by Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), where we held that taxpayers in order to obtain tax exemptions could not be made to bear the burden of proving that they did not advocate violent overthrow of the Government. We there pointed out that such an allocation of the burden of proof “can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free” because the “man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens.” Id., at 526. .1 do not believe the Court’s narrowing construction here avoids the force of Speiser for in this case the District Court determined, and the appellees do not contend otherwise, that the New York law places on the applicant a burden of “coming forward with some evidence” to satisfy the Committee. 299 F. Supp. 117, 147. In my view, even this shifting of the burden of coming forward is impermissible in light of Speiser v. Randall. The Court held in Speiser that *178the defect in the California procedure was not only that the applicant bore the final burden of persuasion but that “when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State’s general taxing program due process demands that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition.” Id., at 528-529 (emphasis added). Although that case dealt with a tax exemption applicable to veterans, I can see no reason why the First Amendment should offer any less protection to applicants for admission to the Bar. If there is to be any difference at all, I should think a man’s right to practice a profession should be accorded greater protection than his right to a tax exemption.
In Part III of its opinion the Court holds that New York may demand an answer to Question 27 (b) which asks whether the applicant is loyal to the Constitution “without any mental reservation.”* The majority reasons that an answer to this question may be required because it assists the Committee in assessing “the good faith with which an applicant can take the constitutional oath.” This constitutional oath referred to is simply a pledge that the applicant will “support the Constitution of the United States” and that of New York. I have no doubt whatsoever about the validity of this oath. See Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (SDNY 1967), aff’d per curiam, 390 U. S. 36 (1968). But the issue here is whether New York can conduct an inquisition into an applicant’s beliefs hoping to discredit the sincerity of his oath.
The question requires an applicant to affirm that he holds a certain belief, namely that he is “loyal” “without any mental reservation . . . to . . . the Constitution.” This requirement is a quite different thing from New York’s constitutional oath, which is similar to that *179required of the President and of applicants for admission to the Bar of this Court. The latter are promissory-oaths in which the declarant promises that he will perform certain duties in the future. But Question 27 (b) does not require a promise of future action. It demands that an applicant swear that he holds a certain belief at that very moment, loyalty to the Constitution “without any mental reservation.” Aside from the serious vagueness problems which inhere in an oath that one is “loyal” “without any mental reservation,” cf. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964), this is an attempt to deny admission to the Bar for failure to hold a certain belief. And we have consistently held that the First Amendment forbids a State to impose a sanction or withhold a benefit because of what a man believes. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, ante, p. 1, at 6-7; id., at 9 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra.
The majority’s reasoning that Question 27 (b) may be employed to test an applicant’s sincerity also flatly ignores our unanimous holding in Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116 (1966). There the Georgia House of Representatives excluded duly elected member Julian Bond on the grounds that his statements criticizing the Vietnam war gave “aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States” and showed he did not support the Constitution. Id., at 125. We held that exclusion on these grounds violated Bond’s First Amendment rights. The appellees there argued strenuously that the First Amendment did not deprive them of power to test Bond’s “sincerity.” A three-judge Federal District Court, one judge dissenting, had accepted the appellees’ theory. 251 F. Supp. 333 (1966). But we reversed the court below on the ground that the existence of an oath of office:
“does not authorize a majority of state legislators to test the sincerity with which another duly elected *180legislator can swear to uphold the Constitution. Such a power could be utilized to restrict the right of legislators to dissent from national or state policy or that of a majority of their colleagues under the guise of judging their loyalty to the Constitution.” 385 U. S., at 132.
The majority offers no reason why a “sincerity test” may be applied to New York Bar applicants when it may not be applied to Georgia legislators.
Perhaps the majority considers it relevant that New York has not yet actually excluded a Bar applicant because of his lack of “sincerity” and perhaps would not permit such an exclusion. Certainly the unanimous holding in Bond seems to compel the conclusion that it would not approve denial of admission to the New York Bar because of insincere oath taking. Yet the majority opinion seems to indicate that such exclusion is permissible. And if New York cannot constitutionally use the results of its “sincerity test” to exclude an applicant, what valid state interest can possibly be served by this inquiry into an applicant’s beliefs? Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 6-7; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U. S. 539 (1963).
The only other possible ground I can see for the majority’s failure to follow Bond v. Floyd is that it feels a state legislator’s First Amendment rights are more worthy of protection than those of an applicant to the Bar. If our form of representative government is to function as the Framers of our Federal and State Constitutions intended, the right of legislators to dissent freely is essential. But the framers of the First Amendment intended also that its protection should extend not to some limited groups but to all citizens. Just as a democratic society needs legislators willing and able to criticize national and state policy, so it needs lawyers who will defend unpopular causes and champion unpopular *181clients. As I have pointed out in another case involving requirements for admission to the Bar, society needs men in the legal profession
“like Charles Evans Hughes, Sr., later Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, who stood up for the constitutional rights of socialists to be socialists and public officials despite the threats and clamorous protests of self-proclaimed super patriots — men like Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., and John W. Davis, who, while against everything for which the Communists stood, strongly advised the Congress in 1948 that it would be unconstitutional to pass the law then proposed to outlaw the Communist Party — men like Lord Erskine, James Otis, Clarence Darrow, and the multitude of others who have dared to speak in defense of causes and clients without regard to personal danger to themselves. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, timeserving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In re Anastaplo, 366 U. S. 82, 115-116 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
The Court also holds that New York may require applicants to answer Questions 26 (a) and 26 (b), which inquire about their associational activities and which have been set out in full, supra, at 175. I fail to see how the majority’s approval of these questions can be reconciled with Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, and In re Stolar, ante, p. 23. The majority’s conclusion that these questions do not violate the First Amendment seems to be based on the assumption that the State may punish a man for knowing membership in an organization which advocates violent overthrow of the Government if he specifically intends to bring about such overthrow. On this assumption, the majority ap*182pears to conclude that since such conduct is criminally punishable, the State may inquire about it in order to exclude an individual who has been a member of one of these organizations with the requisite intent.
In Baird v. State Bar of Arizona and In re Stolar, we hold today that States may not require an applicant to the Bar to answer the question “have you been a member of any organization that advocates overthrow of the government by force?” Ohio recognized in Stolar that it could not exclude an applicant unless he had knowledge of the organization’s aims at the time of his membership. However, it argued that its question was appropriate because it was merely a prelude to determining whether petitioner was a “knowing” member. We rejected that argument, and held that the First Amendment barred Ohio from demanding an answer to that question which required an applicant to supply information about political activities protected by the First Amendment. In re Stolar, supra, at 30, and see id., at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Here the majority seems to concede that New York could not possibly exclude an applicant unless he had been a member of an organization advocating forcible overthrow, he knew of these aims, and he had a specific intent to help bring them about. Ante, at 165-166. Since even on the majority’s theory New York cannot exclude an applicant unless all these requirements are met, why is the State permitted to ask Question 26 (a) which makes no reference to “specific intent”? In Baird and Stolar five members of the Court agreed that questions asked by Bar admissions committees were invalid because they inquired about activities protected by the First Amendment. Why then is the same result not required here?
It may be argued, of course, that Question 26 is sufficiently specific under the majority’s standard because parts (a) and (b) taken together do include a “specific *183intent” requirement. But the Court’s holding permits the knowledge and specific intent elements of Question 26 to be split into two parts. This allows the State to force an applicant to supply information about his associations, which, even under the majority’s rationale, are protected by the First Amendment.
But even if Questions 26 (a) and 26 (b) were combined into one question, this would not satisfy the standards set by the Court in United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967), and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969). Robel involved a section of the Subversive Activities Control Act barring members of “communist-action” organizations from defense employment. The section was struck down for overbreadth because it sought “to bar employment both for association which may be proscribed and for association which may not be proscribed consistently with First Amendment rights.” 389 U. S., at 266. Thus the statute was found defective because it purported to bar persons on account of membership without regard to whether they had been knowing members and had an intent to overthrow the Government. In that case we held the Federal Government could not bar a man from private employment in defense facilities unless he had engaged in conduct which could be criminally proscribed. We recognized that banning a man from employment is a form of civil punishment which must meet the requirements of the First Amendment. Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967). And in Brandenburg v. Ohio, supra, a unanimous Court made clear that association with a group to advocate violence cannot be punished consistently with the First Amendment. In Brandenburg we struck down an Ohio statute which purported to make criminal the act of associating with an assembly to advocate violence to achieve political reform. The Court held that advocacy of violence or the joining with others to do so could not be proscribed “ex*184cept where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Id., at 447. Clearly the New York questions are not nearly so narrowly drawn. New York seeks to inquire about membership in organizations advising or teaching violent overthrow, for the purpose of excluding persons who knowingly belong to such organizations with the requisite intent. See Brief for Appellees 14-15. However, it does not specify that the organization’s advocacy must have been “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and “likely to . . . produce such action.” Thus, for their failure to meet the Brandenburg requirements, the New York questions are overbroad. After our decision in Robel, it should make no difference that New York threatens to exclude people from their chosen livelihood rather than to put them in jail.
Perhaps the majority fails to recognize the force of Robel and Brandenburg because Bar applicants seek to become members of a profession very important to the welfare of society; in the majority’s words, a profession “dedicated to the peaceful and reasoned settlement of disputes between men, and between a man and his government.” Ante, at 166. Unfortunately, there is some support in our past decisions for the proposition that lawyers are such a special group that they should not enjoy the full measure of constitutional rights accorded other citizens. See, e. g., Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117 (1961), where this Court held that a New York lawyer could be disbarred solely for relying on his privilege against self-incrimination and refusing to answer certain questions in a state investigation of professional misconduct. But I had thought that any such theory was clearly repudiated by our decision in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511 (1967), which expressly overruled Cohen. In Spevack we held that New York could not disbar an *185attorney for taking the Fifth Amendment in a disciplinary proceeding, and we stated:
“Like the school teacher in Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551, and the policemen in Garrity v. New Jersey [385 U. S. 493] lawyers also enjoy first-class citizenship.” 385 U. S., at 516.
I add only a few words, speaking as a member of the Bar. Quite obviously, its members should be men of high character and ability so that the Bar can fulfill the enormous responsibilities that face it. At the same time, its members and those who aspire to membership should not be disciplined or denied admission without full and unquestioned due process of law and protection of all their constitutional rights. Discipline or denial of admission should only take place after notice and hearing before an unquestionably impartial tribunal. I must repeat once again that consistently with due process of law, applicants for a profession cannot be turned over to the whim of their prospective competitors to determine their right to practice. I think the District Court did magnificent service in stripping the New York Bar of much of its unbridled power over the admission of new members. My only regret is that it did not strip it further.
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the Court.

The question is set out in full, ante, at 165.