Court Opinion

ID: 9555287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 16:01:13.509825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:12.325210
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCISCO JAVIER REYES-                          No. 18-70225
CORADO,
                                                  Agency No.
                     Petitioner,                  A098-799-409

    v.
                                                   OPINION
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                     Respondent.

           On Petition for Review of an Order of the
               Board of Immigration Appeals

            Argued and Submitted April 20, 2023
                   Pasadena, California

                     Filed August 11, 2023

    Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Lucy H. Koh, Circuit
        Judges, and Colleen McMahon, * District Judge.

                     Opinion by Judge Koh

*
 The Honorable Colleen McMahon, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2                   REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

                          SUMMARY **

                           Immigration

    The panel granted a petition for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ denial of Francisco Reyes-Corado’s
motion to reopen removal proceedings based on changed
circumstances, and remanded.
    The Board denied reopening based, in part, on Reyes-
Corado’s failure to include a new application for relief, as
required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The government
acknowledged that under Aliyev v. Barr, 971 F.3d 1085 (9th
Cir. 2020), the Board erred to the extent it relied on Reyes-
Corado’s failure to submit a new asylum application for
relief. Here, however, unlike in Aliyev, Reyes-Corado did
not include his original asylum application with his motion
to reopen. Consistent with the plain text of § 1003.2(c)(1)
and various persuasive authorities, the panel held that a
motion to reopen that adds new circumstances to a
previously considered application need not be accompanied
by an application for relief.
    The Board also denied reopening after concluding that
Reyes-Corado did not establish materially changed country
conditions to warrant an exception to the time limitation on
his motion to reopen. Reyes-Corado initially sought asylum
relief based on threats he received from his uncle’s family
members to discourage him from avenging his father’s
murder by his uncle’s family. The Board previously
concluded that personal retribution, rather than a protected

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                  REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                   3

ground, was the central motivation for the threats of
harm. In his motion to reopen, Reyes-Corado presented
evidence of persistent and intensifying threats.
    As an initial matter, the panel explained that the changed
circumstances Reyes-Corado presented were entirely
outside of his control, and thus were properly understood as
changed country conditions, not changed personal
circumstances. The panel also held that these changed
circumstances were material to Reyes-Corado’s claims for
relief because they rebutted the agency’s previous
determination that Reyes-Corado had failed to establish the
requisite nexus between the harm he feared and his
membership in a familial particular social group. The panel
explained that the Board’s previous nexus rationale was
undermined by the fact that the threats, harassment, and
violence persisted despite the lack of any retribution by
Reyes-Corado’s family against his uncle’s family for at least
fourteen years after Reyes-Corado’s father’s murder, and
where multiple additional family members were targeted,
including elderly and young family members who would be
unlikely to carry out any retribution. Thus, the panel held
that the Board abused its discretion in concluding that
Reyes-Corado’s evidence was not qualitatively different
than the evidence at his original hearing.
    The panel also declined to uphold the Board’s
determination that Reyes-Corado failed to establish prima
facie eligibility for relief because Reyes-Corado’s new
evidence likely undermined the Board’s prior nexus finding,
and the Board applied the improperly high “one central
reason” nexus standard to Reyes-Corado’s withholding of
removal claim, rather than the less demanding “a reason”
standard.
4                   REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

    The panel remanded for the Board to reconsider whether
Reyes-Corado established prima facie eligibility for relief
and to otherwise reevaluate the motion to reopen in light of
the principles set forth in the opinion.

                           COUNSEL

David A. Schlesinger (argued), Kai Medeiros, and Paulina
Reyes, Jacobs & Schlesinger LLP, San Diego, California, for
Petitioner.
Enitan O. Otunla (argued), Trial Attorney; Bernard A.
Joseph, Senior Litigation Counsel; Joseph H. Hunt,
Assistant Attorney General; Office of Immigration
Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of
Justice; Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

                           OPINION

KOH, Circuit Judge:

    Francisco Reyes-Corado (“Reyes-Corado”), a native and
citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying Reyes-
Corado’s motion to reopen. We grant the petition for review
and remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.1

1
  Reyes-Corado has filed a separate petition for review of the BIA’s
denial of a subsequent motion to reopen. We address Reyes-Corado’s
petition for review in Case No. 21-149 separately.
                 REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                  5

  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Reyes-Corado entered the United States in 2000. During
proceedings before an immigration judge (“IJ”) in 2005 and
2006, Reyes-Corado sought asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”) based on strife within his extended family
during and after the Guatemalan Civil War.
    During that war, Reyes-Corado’s father, Noe Reyes, and
his paternal uncle, Simon Reyes, fought on opposite sides.
Noe Reyes belonged to Comisariados del Ejército, an
auxiliary group affiliated with the Guatemalan military, and
acted as an informant to the military. Simon Reyes fought
on the guerrillas’ side. Simon killed his nephew—the son of
the sister of Simon and Noe—in 1990. Then, in the early
1990s, Simon disappeared and Simon’s son was murdered.
Simon’s family believed the Comisariados kidnapped
Simon and blamed Noe for Simon’s disappearance.
    The Guatemalan Civil War formally ended in 1996. In
2003, a few years after Reyes-Corado’s arrival in the United
States, Simon’s sons shot and killed Reyes-Corado’s father,
Noe, in his home. Reyes-Corado presented evidence of his
father’s murder to the IJ. Reyes-Corado’s application for
relief was also based on threats that had been made against
him personally since his father’s murder. Letters from
Reyes-Corado’s mother, grandmother, and aunt described
vivid threats from Simon’s sons that Reyes-Corado would
meet the same fate as his father. Reyes-Corado testified
repeatedly before the IJ that Simon’s sons would try to kill
Reyes-Corado “as a precaution” to prevent him from
avenging his father’s death.
   The IJ granted asylum, finding that the death threats
against Reyes-Corado constituted past persecution. The
6                    REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

BIA reversed the IJ’s decision. The BIA concluded that
Reyes-Corado, who left Guatemala in 2000, before his
father’s murder in 2003 and the subsequent threats, did not
experience any harm rising to the level of persecution before
leaving Guatemala and thus did not experience past
persecution. The BIA further found that Reyes-Corado did
not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of a protected ground because “[a]lthough [Reyes-
Corado’s] father was murdered by relatives because of an
intra-family dispute dating back to the civil war, and [Reyes-
Corado] was threatened by the same relatives, it d[id] not
appear that [Reyes-Corado] was threatened simply because
he was a member of his father’s family.” The BIA thus
vacated the IJ’s grant of asylum. 2
    Reyes-Corado sought reconsideration of this decision.3
In denying reconsideration, the BIA expanded upon its prior
nexus finding:
        There is . . . insufficient indication that
        [Reyes-Corado] was threatened and would be
        targeted for harm primarily due to his family
        membership, as [Reyes-Corado] himself
        testified that the sons of his missing uncle
        threatened him because “they surely believe

2
  The BIA remanded for the IJ to consider Reyes-Corado’s eligibility for
the other forms of relief he sought. On remand, the IJ denied Reyes-
Corado’s applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection.
3
 Reyes-Corado also appealed the denial of withholding of removal and
CAT protection. The BIA found that, having failed to meet the lower
burden of proof for asylum, Reyes-Corado was not eligible for
withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that
Reyes-Corado had not made the requisite showing of government
acquiescence for CAT relief.
                   REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                     7

        that [Reyes-Corado] would want to kill
        them” for murdering his father. The record
        establishes that personal retribution, not any
        protected ground, was the central motivation
        for the threats of harm against [Reyes-
        Corado] lodged by his cousins.

The BIA also found that Reyes-Corado failed to satisfy his
burden to show that he could not reasonably avoid harm by
relocating to another part of Guatemala. This court denied
Reyes-Corado’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision.
Reyes-Corado v. Holder, 584 F. App’x 322 (9th Cir. 2014).
    In 2017, Reyes-Corado moved to reopen removal
proceedings. He argued that the motion was timely because
circumstances had changed in Guatemala and, based on
those changes, he could show prima facie eligibility for relief
from removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Specifically,
as described in detail in Section II, he argued that Simon’s
sons’ threats against Reyes-Corado and his family had
persisted and intensified, materially affecting Reyes-
Corado’s eligibility for relief.
    The BIA denied reopening, and Reyes-Corado timely
petitioned for review of that decision.
                STANDARDS OF REVIEW
     The BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for
abuse of discretion, and this court “defer[s] to the BIA’s
exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally,
or contrary to law.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986
(9th Cir. 2010). Within that rubric, the court reviews the
BIA’s determination of purely legal questions de novo and
its factual findings for substantial evidence. Id.
8                 REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

    “Motions to reopen are disfavored due to the ‘strong
public interest in bringing litigation to a close.’” Hernandez-
Ortiz v. Garland, 32 F.4th 794, 800 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir.
2010) (per curiam)). At the same time, however, we have
emphasized that judicial review of motions to reopen serves
as an important “safety valve” in the asylum process,
ensuring that the BIA “‘considers new information’ bearing
on applicants’ need for and right to relief.” Salim v. Lynch,
831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Pilica v.
Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 948 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 242 (2010).
                       DISCUSSION
                              I.
    The BIA’s first stated reason for denying the motion to
reopen was that Reyes-Corado had not “submitted a new
asylum application.” The BIA cited 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1),
which provides in relevant part:
       A motion to reopen proceedings shall state
       the new facts that will be proven at a hearing
       to be held if the motion is granted and shall
       be supported by affidavits or other
       evidentiary material. A motion to reopen
       proceedings for the purpose of submitting an
       application for relief must be accompanied
       by the appropriate application for relief and
       all supporting documentation.

    In Aliyev v. Barr, 971 F.3d 1085, 1086 (9th Cir. 2020),
we held that “[t]he plain and unambiguous text of
§ 1003.2(c)(1) does not require [a petitioner seeking to
reopen a prior asylum application based on changed
                  REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                    9

conditions] to attach a new application for relief to a motion
to reopen.” As the government acknowledged at oral
argument, Aliyev thus makes clear that the BIA erred to the
extent it relied on Reyes-Corado’s failure to submit a new
asylum application.
    Here, however, unlike in Aliyev, Reyes-Corado did not
include his original asylum application with his motion to
reopen. See id. at 1086–87. The question here, which was
not before the Aliyev court, is whether a petitioner’s failure
to attach any application for relief is an appropriate basis on
which to deny a motion to reopen.
    We have long read 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) to
contemplate two kinds of motions to reopen: those raising
changed circumstances affecting a previously raised claim,
and those “for the purpose of submitting an application for
relief.” See, e.g., Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057,
1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A motion to reopen is based on
factual grounds, and seeks a fresh determination based on
newly discovered evidence or a change in the applicant’s
circumstances since the time of the hearing. A petitioner
may also move to reopen for the purpose of submitting a new
application for relief, provided such motion is accompanied
by the proper application for relief . . . .” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Cheneau
v. Garland, 997 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Etemadi
v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1013, 1027 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that
“[t]he unambiguous language of § 1003.2(c)(1) describes
two kinds of motions to reopen,” making “a clear distinction
between a motion to reopen proceedings and a motion to
reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an
10                   REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

application for relief”), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn,
36 F.4th 1238 (9th Cir. 2022). 4
    Consistent with the plain text of § 1003.2(c)(1) and
various persuasive authorities, we hold that the first type of
motion to reopen—one, like Reyes-Corado’s, that adds new
circumstances to a previously considered application—need
not be accompanied by an application for relief. Accord
Liang Wang v. Whitaker, 743 F. App’x 867, 868 (9th Cir.
2018) (“Where, as here, the petitioner does not seek a new
form of relief but rather review of a previously submitted
application available to the BIA, the original application
need not be attached.”); Tanusantoso v. Barr, 962 F.3d 694,
700–01 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[T]he language ‘for the purpose of
submitting an application for relief’ must be given effect; a
motion to reopen for the purpose of submitting an
application for relief has to be a particular kind of motion to
reopen, with particular procedural requirements.” (quoting 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1))); Etemadi, 12 F.4th at 1028 (“There
are two kinds of motions to reopen, and those that are ‘for
the purpose of submitting an application for relief’ require
an attachment of the ‘appropriate application.’ The other
kind does not.” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1))).
   Requiring Reyes-Corado to attach a previously
submitted application would be a needless formality. Cf.
Abassi v. INS, 305 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that a pro se movant’s “failure to staple” a

4
  Etemadi reached the same result we reach today. Although the opinion
was withdrawn upon the grant of panel rehearing and is thus not binding,
we find its reasoning persuasive. Cf., e.g., Johnson v. Rancho Santiago
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Although we
are not bound by our vacated decision in Lockyer, we find its reasoning
persuasive . . . .”).
                  REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                    11

country profile that was “easily available to the BIA” to a
motion to reopen that referred to that profile did not “excuse
the BIA from an obligation to consider” the profile). Indeed,
the BIA was clearly aware of Reyes-Corado’s original
application because it cited the 2005 asylum application in
its order denying reopening.
                              II.
    The BIA also concluded that Reyes-Corado’s motion to
reopen did not show changed circumstances in Guatemala
and was thus time-barred. Ordinarily, a motion to reopen
must be filed within ninety days of a final administrative
order of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no time
limit, however, for a motion “based on changed
circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the
country to which deportation has been ordered, if such
evidence is material and was not available and could not
have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”
Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
    With his 2017 motion to reopen, Reyes-Corado
submitted a declaration detailing Simon’s sons’ actions and
threats against Reyes-Corado’s immediate family in
Guatemala that had occurred after (or that Reyes-Corado
discovered after) the 2006 IJ hearing. The facts alleged in
the declaration must be accepted as true for purposes of
ruling on the motion to reopen. Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d
210, 213 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting “the rule that requires the
[BIA] to accept as true facts alleged in petitioner’s affidavits
in support of reopening”). Such facts show that Simon’s
sons continued, even fourteen years after Noe’s death, to
make death threats against Reyes-Corado. As explained in
more detail below, the declaration also shows an escalating
campaign of threats, harassment, and physical violence
12                REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

against Reyes-Corado’s family in Guatemala, including
children and Reyes-Corado’s elderly mother.
    The BIA concluded that this evidence did not satisfy
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)’s changed circumstances exception.
According to the BIA, “the additional evidence attached to
[Reyes-Corado’s] motion does not demonstrate worsening
country conditions or circumstances material to [Reyes-
Corado’s] claim” because it “describes ongoing, intra-family
animosity that predated the [IJ’s] hearing” and “continues
through to the present time.” Thus, the BIA found Reyes-
Corado’s fear of harm “a continuation of conditions
presented to the [IJ]” at the prior hearing. This was an abuse
of discretion.
    As an initial matter, the “intra-family” nature of the
purported changed circumstances does not, as the
government contends, take this case outside 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). “‘[A] self-induced change in personal
circumstance[,]’ such as a child’s birth in the United States[,]
does not suffice for changed country circumstances
purposes.” Kaur v. Garland, 2 F.4th 823, 830 (9th Cir.
2021) (quoting He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th
Cir. 2007)); see also Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205,
1209–10 (9th Cir. 2021). However, “changed circumstances
[that] occur in the country of nationality or the country to
which removal is ordered, and are entirely outside the
petitioner’s control,” may constitute changed country
circumstances “even if they are personal, painful, or life-
altering.” Kaur, 2 F.4th at 831; accord Lin Xing Jiang v.
Holder, 639 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A changed
circumstance need not reach the level of a broad social or
political change in a country; a personal or local change
might suffice.”).
                   REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                      13

    The events that Reyes-Corado contends constitute
changed circumstances occurred in Guatemala and were
“entirely outside [Reyes-Corado’s] control; [he] did not
volitionally change or affect them.” Kaur, 2 F.4th at 831.
Therefore, such events are properly understood as changed
country conditions, not changed personal circumstances, for
purposes of ruling on a motion to reopen. See id. at 830–31
(petitioner’s “husband’s death in India and the ensuing
threats from her in-laws” constituted “more than a personal
change in circumstances”).
    Thus, the question before us is whether Reyes-Corado’s
new evidence shows a change that is material to his claim
for relief. 5 We have addressed that question by asking
whether the new evidence is “‘qualitatively different’ from
the evidence presented at the previous hearing.” Najmabadi,
597 F.3d at 987. “The critical question is not whether the
allegations bear some connection to a prior application, but
rather whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that
a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim
for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.” Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.
2004). Under this standard, a change in circumstances need
not be “dramatic,” especially where, as here, conditions were
already severe at the time of the original proceedings. See
Joseph v. Holder, 579 F.3d 827, 833 (7th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting “dramatic change” standard).
   The government does not contend that there has been no
change in circumstances in Guatemala. Since the 2006 IJ
hearing, Simon’s sons started making death threats against

5
  The government does not dispute that the evidence “could not have
been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
14                 REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

other members of Reyes-Corado’s immediate family.
Simon’s sons also started physically harming these other
family members. The actions alleged in the declaration
attached to Reyes-Corado’s motion to reopen include the
following:

     •   On December 24, 2007, Simon’s sons shot
         Reyes-Corado’s family’s house during the
         family’s Christmas celebration.       Reyes-
         Corado’s niece “narrowly escaped” being hit
         by a bullet that came through the wall.
     •   On February 14, 2009, Simon’s sons
         threatened Reyes-Corado’s mother and
         sisters, telling them that if they did not
         provide Reyes-Corado’s address in the
         United States, Simon’s sons would kill
         Reyes-Corado’s mother and sisters the way
         they killed Reyes-Corado’s father.
     •   In 2010, one of Simon’s sons began killing
         Reyes-Corado’s mother’s hogs with guns and
         poisoning her chickens.
     •   Also in 2010, one of Reyes-Corado’s sisters
         overheard Simon’s sons talking about how
         they had a “radio” that let them listen in on
         Reyes-Corado’s family’s phone calls and
         how they wanted to find out where in the
         United States Reyes-Corado was.
     •   In March 2011, Simon’s sons started showing
         up regularly at Reyes-Corado’s sister Rosa’s
         new house, showing their guns and laughing.
              REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                15

•   On January 10, 2013, one of Simon’s sons
    showed up at Reyes-Corado’s sister Alma’s
    house, hit her on the shoulder, and threatened
    to kill her and her children.
•   On July 14, 2016, one of Simon’s sons
    approached Rosa’s husband, Rildo (Reyes-
    Corado’s brother-in-law) on Reyes-Corado’s
    family’s property with a gun in hand, then
    threatened to kill Rildo and pushed him to the
    ground, hurting his back.
•   In October 2015, Simon’s sons shot at the
    family home, threatened Reyes-Corado’s
    mother, and shouted insults at the family.
    Reyes-Corado’s mother had a nervous
    breakdown as a result and was hospitalized
    overnight.
•   In November 2016, Simon’s sons shot at the
    family home again and threatened to kill
    Reyes-Corado’s mother and family.
•   On December 31, 2016, Simon’s sons left
    Reyes-Corado’s family a note reading, “You
    are going to die, dogs.”
•   On February 14, 2017, Simon’s sons left
    Reyes-Corado’s family a note reading, “We
    already killed the first one, Paco is next.”
    Paco is Reyes-Corado’s nickname.
•   On May 8, 2017, an unknown boy
    approached Rosa in town and told her that
    Simon’s son was near. Simon’s son then shot
    into the air.
16                REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

     •   On May 10, 2017, Simon’s sons insulted
         Reyes-Corado’s mother at a Mother’s Day
         celebration and told her they would leave a
         surprise for her at the cemetery. The next
         day, Rosa visited the cemetery and found
         Noe’s tomb destroyed.
     •   Later in May 2017, Reyes-Corado’s brother-
         in-law Rildo was hospitalized for three days
         after eating a banana from his banana crop.
         Simon’s sons had poisoned Rildo and his
         wife Rosa’s banana crops.

    These incidents, according to Reyes-Corado’s affidavit,
are “just a few of the many that have affected [his] family,”
who receive threats on a “weekly to bi-monthly basis.”
Moreover, Simon’s sons are “constantly” asking where
Reyes-Corado is.
    These changes are material to Reyes-Corado’s claims for
relief because they “rebut[] the [agency’s] finding ‘that
provided the basis’ for denying relief” previously. Darby v.
Att’y Gen., 1 F.4th 151, 160 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Khan v.
Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 497 (3d Cir. 2012)). During the
2006 IJ hearing, Reyes-Corado repeatedly testified that he
feared harm from Simon’s sons because they would try to
prevent Reyes-Corado from seeking retribution for his
father’s death. On the basis of this testimony, the BIA found
that Reyes-Corado failed to establish the requisite nexus
between the harm he feared and his membership in the
familial particular social group. The BIA’s denial of relief
was premised on this nexus finding.
    The fact that the threats, harassment, and violence
persisted for at least fourteen years after Noe was murdered
                     REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                         17

in 2003 without retaliation from Reyes-Corado’s family
undermines this rationale. See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988
F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that “sweeping
retaliation towards a family unit over time can demonstrate
a kind of animus distinct from ‘purely personal retribution’”
and can “demonstrate nexus if . . . persecutors ‘specifically
sought out the “particular social group” of [petitioner’s]
family’” (quoting Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 910 (9th
Cir. 2018))). So, too, does the fact that the evidence of death
threats before the IJ consisted solely of threats against
Reyes-Corado, 6 while the new evidence shows death threats
(coupled with poisoning and physical violence) against
multiple other members of Reyes-Corado’s family in
Guatemala. 7 This includes Reyes-Corado’s elderly mother
and his young nieces and nephews. As Reyes-Corado points
out, the fact that Simon’s sons have terrorized and threatened
Reyes-Corado’s elderly mother, even though it is unlikely
Simon’s sons fear retribution from her, further indicates that
the feared persecution is on account of family membership
rather than the agency’s earlier reasoning about a preemptive
response to retribution.

6
  It is true that the evidence before the IJ also included Noe’s murder.
But to focus on the murder as an indication that country circumstances
have not worsened misapprehends the question. The question is not
whether the actions have gotten more serious or violent in the abstract.
It is whether the actions have made it so that Reyes-Corado “now has a
well-founded fear of persecution” on account of a protected ground. See
Malty, 381 F.3d at 945.
7
  Further, the new evidence undermines the BIA’s internal relocation
finding, which was upheld by the Ninth Circuit. Reyes-Corado, 584 F.
App’x at 325. The new evidence shows that since the IJ hearing,
Simon’s sons had begun trying to find out where Reyes-Corado lived in
the United States, including by listening in on Reyes-Corado’s family’s
phone calls with Reyes-Corado.
18                REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

    This court’s decision in Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d
977 (9th Cir. 2005), is instructive in this respect. In Bhasin,
the petitioner had testified at the IJ hearing that her two sons
had gone missing and that Bhasin herself had been
kidnapped, beaten, detained, and told that “her whole family
would be eliminated.” Id. at 985. However, the agency
“originally denied relief” because it found that the
persecutors were “not motivated by [Bhasin’s] membership
in a [familial] social group, but rather by a desire to locate
[Bhasin’s son], or as a means of retribution against [Bhasin’s
son].” Id. In support of this finding, the BIA noted that
“other close members of [Bhasin’s] family are living in India
without difficulty.” Id. In her motion to reopen, however,
Bhasin presented evidence about other relatives’
disappearances that “completely undermined this rationale
for concluding that the [nexus] requirement had not been
satisfied.” Id. “[B]ecause of th[e] direct relationship
between the [BIA’s] justification for its initial denial and
Bhasin’s newly presented evidence,” we found it
“perplex[ing]” that the BIA concluded that the evidence
presented in the motion to reopen was “not highly
probative.” Id. at 986. Accordingly, we concluded that the
BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.
Id. at 989.
    The motion to reopen in Bhasin was filed within ninety
days of the final administrative decision, so the question was
not whether Bhasin’s motion showed “changed
circumstances” within the meaning of 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). See 423 F.3d at 982. Nevertheless, the
question the Bhasin court addressed—whether “the new
evidence, when considered together with the evidence
presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie
eligibility for the relief sought,” id. at 984—is clearly
                    REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                         19

relevant to whether circumstances have changed sufficiently
such that a petitioner who previously did not have a
legitimate claim for asylum or other relief now does, see
Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (articulating the “critical question” in
evaluating changed circumstances under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)). 8
    The government emphasizes that Reyes-Corado “fears
the same mistreatment” he feared during the original
proceedings. However, our case law makes clear that this is
not disqualifying, so long as the new circumstances take that
fear across the threshold for a well-founded fear of future
persecution or otherwise materially affect the petitioner’s
entitlement to relief. See, e.g., Malty, 381 F.3d at 945–46;
Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017);
see also, e.g., Cabas v. Barr, 928 F.3d 177, 181–82 (1st Cir.
2019). Reyes-Corado’s new evidence is capable of doing
just that. The new evidence not only shows that Reyes-
Corado’s fear of persecution has become more serious and
more real; it also shows that the agency’s prior nexus
finding—that any feared harm would be retribution-based—
was not borne out.
    The BIA thus abused its discretion in determining that
Reyes-Corado had not provided qualitatively different
evidence.
                                 III.
   The BIA also suggested, as a third and final reason for
denying reopening, that Reyes-Corado had not shown prima

8
  Indeed, other changed circumstances cases have relied on Bhasin in
evaluating the required showing under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). See,
e.g., Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990; Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198,
1204–05 (9th Cir. 2017).
20                REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND

facie eligibility for the underlying relief. We decline to
uphold the BIA’s decision on that ground. Indeed, the
government does not argue that this ground suffices to deny
the petition for review.
    The BIA limited its discussion of prima facie eligibility
for relief to nexus, concluding that, “[a]s previously
determined, personal retribution appears to be the central
motivation for the harm, not a protected ground.” However,
as discussed above, Reyes-Corado’s new evidence likely
undermines the prior nexus finding.
    Further, the BIA applied an improperly high nexus
standard. For withholding of removal, an applicant must
show that a protected ground would be “a reason” for the
persecution, a “less demanding standard” than the “one
central reason” standard for asylum. Barajas-Romero v.
Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017). The government
acknowledges that notwithstanding the BIA’s citation to
Barajas-Romero, the BIA applied the higher “one central
reason” standard, rather than the correct “a reason” standard,
to Reyes-Corado’s withholding claim. See Garcia, 988 F.3d
at 1147 (“[A]lthough the BIA decision cited . . . our Barajas-
Romero decision, which distinguished between the ‘one
central reason’ and ‘a reason’ standards, the BIA’s analysis
is inconsistent with any serious consideration of the
difference.”).
                      *       *       *
    At this stage, Reyes-Corado was not required to
“conclusively establish” his entitlement to relief. Salim, 831
F.3d at 1139 (quoting Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777, 785
(9th Cir. 2003)). “A party demonstrates prima facie
eligibility for relief ‘where the evidence reveals a reasonable
likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have
                  REYES-CORADO V. GARLAND                 21

been satisfied.’” Kaur, 2 F.4th at 833 (quoting Salim, 831
F.3d at 1139). We remand for the BIA to reconsider whether
Reyes-Corado established prima facie eligibility for relief
and otherwise reevaluate the motion to reopen in light of the
principles set forth in this opinion.
   PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED.