Court Opinion

ID: 9963138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 17:01:46.430246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.357130
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 24 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FREEDOM CHRISTOPHER AUS                         No.    23-15412
PFAENDLER,
                                                D.C. No. 4:20-cv-00188-JCH
                Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

SAHUARITA, TOWN OF; JOHN
GEORGE; JOSEPH A. RIVERA; JESS
VILLANUEVA; SHANNON COLLIER;
SAMUEL ALMODOVA,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                John Charles Hinderaker, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 4, 2024
                               Phoenix, Arizona

Before: CLIFTON, BYBEE, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

      Freedom Christopher Austin Pfaendler appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment on his civil rights claims against the Town of

Sahuarita and the individual police officers who arrested him, brought under

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona state law. The district court granted summary

judgment to Defendants on Pfaendler’s false arrest, malicious prosecution, and

illegal search claims, finding that the officers’ actions were constitutionally valid

or protected by qualified immunity.

      We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. O’Doan v. Sanford, 991

F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2021). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we affirm.

      1.     To sustain a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution under

§ 1983 or Arizona law, a plaintiff must show the absence of probable cause.

Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2015); Slade v. City of

Phoenix, 541 P.2d 550, 552-53 (Ariz. 1975). “To determine whether an officer had

probable cause for an arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and

then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an

objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56-57 (2018) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). “Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within

the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to

believe that a crime has been committed.” Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d

1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009).

      Pfaendler first asserts that the district court failed to properly apply the

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summary judgment standard in its probable cause analysis. But he fails to identify

any disputed issue of material fact, as the factual disputes he identifies are (1) not

“over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), (2) belied by video evidence in the record, see

Hernandez v. Town of Gilbert, 989 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 2021), or (3) disputes

that would require us to “draw unreasonable inferences from circumstantial

evidence,” McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).

      “In the absence of material factual disputes, the objective reasonableness of

a police officer's conduct is a pure question of law.” O’Doan, 991 F.3d at 1035

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The undisputed facts were more

than sufficient for a reasonable officer to conclude that Pfaendler had violated

Arizona’s trespassing law, which requires in relevant part that a person

“[k]nowingly enter[] or remain[] unlawfully on any real property after a reasonable

request to leave by . . . the owner or any other person having lawful control over

such property . . . .” A.R.S. § 13-1502(A)(1).1 Officers had uncontradicted

information that the store manager, a “person having lawful control over [the]

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       Though Pfaendler was ultimately charged with disorderly conduct, “an arrest
is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the
offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 54 n.2. We limit
our discussion to trespass, as that analysis is sufficient to resolve this case.

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property,” had made one or more “reasonable request[s] to leave.” Pfaendler, still

in the store when officers arrived, appeared to be “remaining unlawfully.”

      Pfaendler counters that officers “failed to meaningfully account

for . . . exculpatory evidence” suggesting that he had not knowingly refused a

request to leave. Specifically, he contends that he never heard the manager’s

requests to leave. But “[t]he mere existence of some evidence that could suggest [a

valid defense] does not negate probable cause.” Yousefian, 779 F.3d at 1014. All

that is required is “a ‘fair probability’ that the person knew” their conduct was

unlawful. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994). It was not

unreasonable for officers to conclude that under the totality of the circumstances –

which included not only Pfaendler’s innocent explanation, but also the manager’s

countervailing statements, 911 calls relating that Pfaendler was ignoring requests

to leave, and officers’ own observations of and interactions with Pfaendler – there

was a fair probability that Pfaendler knew he had been asked to leave and yet

remained. Cf. O’Doan, 991 F.3d at 1041 (“If arresting officers had to accept at face

value claims of potential lack of mens rea, as here, many arrests for unlawful

conduct would likely be called into question . . . .”).

      2.     Pfaendler also contends that a material factual dispute remains over

whether the decision to arrest was based on his “contempt of cop,” i.e., his

“invocation of his right to remain silent or his failure to be sufficiently deferential

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to officers.” We will not ordinarily scrutinize an officer’s actual motivations for an

otherwise valid arrest. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)

(“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth

Amendment analysis.”). Where, as here, the objective facts provide probable cause

to arrest, the arresting officers’ subjective intent is irrelevant. See Nieves v.

Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1724-25 (2019).

       3.    Pfaendler urges reversal of the dismissal of his federal illegal search

claim, as well as the reinstatement of his claims for equitable relief. Because these

arguments are predicated on the absence of probable cause for his arrest, they must

also fail.

       AFFIRMED.

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