Court Opinion

ID: 9556999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 13:04:01.553738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:51.031694
License: Public Domain

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 official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: August 21, 2023

            S23A0710. BELTRAN-GONZALES v. THE STATE.

        COLVIN, Justice.

        Appellant Ricardo Beltran-Gonzales appeals his conviction for

malice murder in connection with a stabbing at Hays State Prison,

which resulted in the death of fellow inmate Nathaniel Reynolds.1

        1The stabbing occurred on January 18, 2013. On July 8, 2013, a
Chattooga County grand jury charged Appellant with malice murder, felony
murder, and aggravated assault. Leonardo Ramos Rodrigues, whose case is
not part of this appeal, was separately charged with the same crimes. On
September 26, 2013, the State filed a notice of joint trial seeking to try
Appellant together with Rodrigues. A joint jury trial was held from February
24 to 26, 2014. The jury found Appellant and Rodrigues guilty on all counts,
and the court sentenced them both to serve life in prison for malice murder.
The court merged Appellant’s aggravated-assault and felony-murder charges
into his malice murder charge for sentencing purposes, but the felony-murder
charge was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263
Ga. 369, 371-372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Appellant filed a motion for new
trial on February 27, 2014, which he amended through new counsel on
December 2, 2016. Following a hearing, the court issued a written order
summarily denying the motion on October 2, 2018. Defense counsel did not
timely file a direct appeal. On March 16, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se habeas
petition, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a
notice of appeal. On February 2, 2023, the habeas court granted Appellant
On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in recharging the jury on malice murder without also

recharging the jury on Appellant’s defenses. Appellant also argues

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State

jointly trying Appellant with another inmate, Leonardo Ramos

Rodrigues, who was separately charged with committing the same

fatal stabbing.       For the reasons explained below, we affirm

Appellant’s conviction.

      1. The trial evidence showed the following. In September

2012, Reynolds and Rodrigues were inmates at Hays State Prison.

The men, both of whom were assigned to the “C building” dormitory,

had an altercation on September 6. As a result of the fight, Reynolds

was taken out of the general population and segregated in the

Special Management Unit (“SMU”). While Reynolds was in the

SMU, Appellant arrived at Hays State Prison as a prisoner.

relief in the form of an out-of-time direct appeal. Pursuant to the habeas
court’s order, Appellant filed a notice of appeal in his criminal case directed to
this Court. The appeal was docketed to this Court’s April 2023 term and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                        2
Eventually, Reynolds asked to be returned to the general

population, and his request was granted in January 2013.

     On January 18, 2013, Officers Nicholas Souther and Stefan

Hoglund transported Reynolds from the SMU back to C building.

When they arrived at C building, the officers exchanged paperwork

with Officer Christopher Magness, who was the C building floor

officer. Officer Andrew Liden, who was stationed in C building’s

control room, then saw Appellant “run past the dorm or the control

room door with a sharp piece of metal in his hand” and “stab inmate

Reynolds,” before the men moved out of his line of sight. Meanwhile,

Officers Souther, Hoglund, and Magness heard a commotion nearby.

The officers testified that they turned to see Appellant and

Rodrigues stabbing Reynolds with “prison made knives” made out of

“sharpened pieces of metal,” known as “prison shank[s].” Appellant,

who had one prison shank, and Rodrigues, who had two prison

shanks, cornered Reynolds and “t[ook] turns stabbing him” as

Reynolds “tr[ied] to swat his hands to avoid the blades.” Officer

Daniel Keena, who was stationed at D building ran to the scene and

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likewise witnessed the stabbing.

     The officers radioed the code for an inmate fight with weapons.

Shortly thereafter, Correctional Emergency Response Team Officer

Matthew Kennedy ran to the scene, witnessing the stabbing in the

process. He then yelled at Appellant and Rodrigues to stop and get

down on the ground. Appellant laid down his weapon and put his

hands over his head, but Rodrigues refused to comply with the

instructions until Officer Kennedy administered pepper spray.

     While officers secured the men, Reynolds collapsed on the

ground. Reynolds died soon after. The State’s medical examiner

testified that Reynolds had ten incised wounds and seven stab

wounds and had died from “[s]harp force trauma of the chest,” which

had “pierced the heart.”

     Rodrigues, who was a native Spanish speaker, testified in his

own defense through an interpreter at trial. His testimony included

a description of the incident that resulted in Reynolds being sent to

the SMU. Rodrigues testified that he and others were watching a

soap opera in Spanish when Reynolds approached the television and

                                   4
changed the channel. An argument ensued. According to Rodrigues,

he eventually left the room and went outside, but Reynolds followed

him out and stabbed him in the back.

     Rodrigues also admitted that he had killed Reynolds, but he

claimed that he had acted in self-defense. Rodrigues testified that,

after eating at the cafeteria, he returned to C building and found

Reynolds standing outside. According to Rodrigues, he feared for

his life because he knew Reynolds had previously threatened to

“finish [Rodrigues] off,” and, after the men made eye contact,

Reynolds started “coming towards” Rodrigues while “put[ting] his

hand in [his pants]” in an apparent attempt to retrieve a weapon.

Rodrigues testified that he “didn’t give [Reynolds] time” to pull out

a weapon and instead “went toward” Reynolds, attacking Reynolds

with two shanks. When asked about Appellant’s involvement in

Reynolds’s killing, Rodrigues said, “The guilty one of [Reynolds’s]

murder is myself. [Appellant has] got nothing to do with this.”

Rodrigues further testified that he had not been friends with

Appellant, that Appellant “wasn’t even [at the prison] when

                                 5
[Rodrigues and Reynolds] first had the problem,” and that Rodrigues

had acted alone in stabbing Reynolds.

     Although opening statements and closing arguments were not

transcribed, testimony at the motion-for-new-trial hearing revealed

that Appellant’s defense at trial was that he was mistakenly

identified as a perpetrator of the stabbing. 2          The jury rejected

Appellant’s defense and found him guilty of the charges

     2. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion

when, in response to a jury question about the law of malice murder,

the court recharged the jury on malice murder without also

recharging the jury on Appellant’s defenses. We disagree.

     At trial, the court instructed the jury on the State’s burden to

prove the identity of a defendant as the perpetrator of the alleged

crime, the elements of malice murder, and the law regarding mutual

combat and self-defense. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a

     2    Although the court charged the jury on mutual combat and
justification, those defenses were not included in Appellant’s written request
for jury charges and the record does not suggest that Appellant argued those
defenses.
                                      6
note to the court stating, “We would like for you to read the law on

malice murder again.” The court proposed to counsel that it would

“simply read the one definition,” and Rodrigues asked the court to

also recharge the jury on “the affirmative defenses.”     The court

responded that it would ask the jurors if they wanted a recharge on

other instructions and that the court would reread the instructions

on “mutual combat” and the “affirmative defenses” if the jurors

wanted more. The court then recharged the jury on malice murder

and asked, “Does that answer your question or are there other

portions of the charge that you would like for me to read as well?”

The jury foreperson responded, “No, ma’am, that does it.” The court

then stated, “Now, let me just caution you, don’t take this away from

the rest of the charge[.] [T]he Court’s charge should be taken as a

whole. Everything I charged you in the original charge is equally as

important.”   After the jury returned to deliberations, Rodrigues

objected to the court’s failure to recharge the jurors on “the

defenses[,] . . . since we requested that,” and Appellant joined the

objection.

                                 7
     “A trial court has a duty to recharge the jury on issues for which

the jury requests a recharge.” Flood v. State, 311 Ga. 800, 806 (2)

(b) (860 SE2d 731) (2021). “[O]ur case law contains no general

mandate requiring trial courts, when responding to a jury’s request

for a recharge on a particular issue, to also recharge on all principles

asserted in connection with that issue.” Dozier v. State, 306 Ga. 29,

32-33 (3) (829 SE2d 131) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Rather, when the jury does not request additional instructions, “the

need, breadth, and formation of additional jury instructions are left

to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Barnes v. State, 305 Ga.

18, 23 (3) (823 SE2d 302) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted)).

     We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to

recharge the jury only on malice murder. Appellant argues that “the

trial court maybe should have recharged the jury on the affirmative

defenses [in addition to recharging the jury on malice murder], so as

to not leave an erroneous impression in the minds of the jury.” But

the court directly responded to the jury’s specific request that the

court reread the malice-murder instruction, fulfilling its duty to

                                   8
recharge the jury at the jury’s request. See Flood, 311 Ga. at 806 (2)

(b). See also Barnes, 305 Ga. at 23 (3) (“[I]t was within the court’s

discretion whether to recharge the jury in full or only upon the point

or points requested by the jury.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

In addition, the court took steps to ensure that the recharge would

not cause confusion or leave an erroneous impression in the minds

of the jurors. Specifically, the court confirmed that the recharge

answered the jury’s question and that the jury did not want the court

to repeat any additional instructions. The court also directed the

jury to consider the court’s instructions as a whole and not to put

undue emphasis on the recharge. Accordingly, this claim fails. See

Dozier, 306 Ga. at 33 (3) (no abuse of discretion where the court

“recharged the jury on party to the crime,” the court “followed up by

asking the jury if the recharge had helped,” and there was “no

indication that . . . the trial court put undue emphasis on the party

to a crime theory, . . . that the jury was confused after the recharge[,]

or that the recharge left the jury with an erroneous impression of

the law” (citation and punctuation omitted)). See also Barnes, 305

                                   9
Ga. at 22-23 (3) (no abuse of discretion in recharging the jury only

on malice murder, even where the court did not “ask[ ] the jury if its

question [about what malice murder was] had been sufficiently

answered,” because “nothing indicate[d] that the jury was confused

after the recharge or that the recharge left the jury with an

erroneous impression of the law”).

     3. Appellant also argues that trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective for failing to object to the State trying Appellant jointly

with Rodrigues. We are unpersuaded that trial counsel performed

in a constitutionally deficient manner.

     Before trial, the State filed a notice of joint trial, seeking to try

Appellant and Rodrigues together, even though the men had been

indicted separately. Defense counsel did not object, and the case

proceeded to trial.

     As described above, the trial evidence showed that Rodrigues

and Reynolds had a prior altercation on September 6, 2012, which

resulted in Reynolds being segregated in the SMU until the day of

his death on January 18, 2013. The court instructed the jury that

                                   10
this evidence could be considered only for the purpose of assessing

“the state of feeling between the defendant and the alleged victim

and the reasonableness of the alleged fears by the defendant

Rodrigues.”

     In addition, the State introduced trial evidence, under OCGA §

24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”), that Rodrigues had pleaded guilty to

involuntary manslaughter after stabbing a man in the chest in 2008.

Before the State introduced the Rule 404 (b) evidence, the court

instructed the jury that the evidence could “be considered only to the

extent that it may show the intent that the State is required to prove

in the crimes charged against Mr. Rodrigues in this case presently

on trial” and not “for any other purpose.” The court gave a similar

instruction again at the conclusion of the case.

     In his motion for new trial, Appellant claimed that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to object to the joint trial of Appellant and

Rodrigues because the evidence that Rodrigues had a prior difficulty

with Reynolds and had previously stabbed someone prejudiced

Appellant’s defense. Trial counsel was asked at the motion-for-new-

                                   11
trial hearing whether he thought the evidence regarding Rodrigues’s

prior conviction created a “possibility” that the jury could hold

Appellant “guilt[y] by association” and whether he had ever thought

he should sever the trials.       To both questions, trial counsel

responded, “No.” Trial counsel explained that he “wanted the jury

to actually hear about Mr. Rodrigues’[s] conviction” because it was

“very clear that [the conviction] just involved Mr. Rodrigues, not

[Appellant],” and he “thought it was important . . . that the jury be

able to compare [Appellant and Rodrigues] side by side,” so the

jurors could see that Rodrigues “ha[d] this history of violence” while

Appellant “d[id] not.” Trial counsel further testified that he believed

this contrast between the defendants supported the defense theory,

which was that Appellant “was [not] actually involved in this killing”

committed by Rodrigues and had been mistakenly identified as a

perpetrator when correctional officers, who were “dealing with a . . .

large group of inmates, . . . plucked [Appellant] from the ground.”

The trial court summarily denied Appellant’s motion for new trial.

     To establish that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective,

                                  12
an appellant must “prove both deficient performance by counsel and

resulting prejudice.” Evans v. State, 315 Ga. 607, 611 (2) (b) (884

SE2d 334) (2023) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). To prove that trial counsel

was deficient, an appellant “must demonstrate that his attorney

performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering

all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional

norms.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884 SE2d 346)

(2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).       There is “a strong

presumption that counsel’s representation was within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Monroe v. State, 315

Ga. 767, 781 (6) (884 SE2d 906) (2023) (citation and punctuation

omitted). Overcoming that presumption requires an appellant to

show “that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer

did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Evans, 315

Ga. at 611 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted).       Further,

“[w]hether to seek severance is a matter of trial strategy, and in the

absence of evidence to the contrary, counsel’s decisions are

                                 13
presumed to be strategic and thus insufficient to support an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233,

241 (2) (c) (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted).

Where an appellant fails to show deficient performance, this Court

need not examine whether the appellant has established prejudice.

See Monroe, 315 Ga. at 781 (6).

     Here, Appellant has not shown that trial counsel performed

deficiently in failing to object to the joint trial of Appellant and

Rodrigues.   As trial counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial

hearing, he strategically acquiesced in the joint trial of Appellant

and Rodrigues, believing that a joint trial would benefit Appellant’s

mistaken-identification defense. Trial counsel reasoned that trying

the men together would allow the jury to hear that Rodrigues had

previously stabbed a man to death, and that such evidence

supported an inference that Rodrigues, rather than Appellant, was

the likely perpetrator of Reynolds’s stabbing. Although trial counsel

was not asked at the motion-for-new-trial hearing how the evidence

regarding Rodrigues’s prior difficulty with Reynolds impacted his

                                  14
trial strategy, that evidence similarly supported the defense theory,

showing that Rodrigues had a motive to stab Reynolds, while

Appellant did not.

     Appellant contends that it would have been “more beneficial”

to sever the cases if trial counsel wanted the jury to distinguish

between Appellant and Rodrigues.       But “[t]he fact that present

counsel would pursue a different strategy does not render trial

counsel’s strategy unreasonable.” Walker v. State, 294 Ga. 752, 757

(2) (e) (755 SE2d 790) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Further, although Appellant also asserts that the jury likely used

the evidence of Rodrigues’s prior difficulty and prior conviction

against Appellant, the record does not support Appellant’s

contention. There was no evidence presented at trial suggesting

that Appellant was involved in the prior altercation between

Rodrigues and Reynolds, which occurred before Appellant arrived at

the prison. Further, as trial counsel testified at the motion-for-new-

trial hearing, it was “very clear” from the trial evidence that

Appellant was not involved in the stabbing that resulted in

                                 15
Rodrigues’s prior conviction. Moreover, the trial court instructed

the jury that evidence pertaining to Rodrigues’s prior difficulty and

prior conviction could be used only against Rodrigues. See Charles

v. State, 315 Ga. 651, 660 (4) (884 SE2d 363) (2023) (“[T]he jury is

presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court absent clear

evidence to the contrary.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

     Under the circumstances, we cannot say that trial counsel’s

strategy of allowing the two defendants to be tried together to

support an inference that only Rodrigues was responsible for the

crime was objectively unreasonable, such that no attorney would

have pursued it. See Slaton v. State, 303 Ga. 651, 654 (3) (b) (814

SE2d 344) (2018) (holding that trial counsel did not make a “patently

unreasonable” decision not to move for a severance on the ground

that evidence would be admitted that was only admissible against

the co-defendant because that evidence “generally supported

appellant’s defense that [the co-defendant was the one who had]

committed the murder” (citations and punctuation omitted)); Gomez

v. State, 301 Ga. 445, 466 (12) (b) (801 SE2d 847) (2017) (holding

                                 16
that it “was not a patently unreasonable trial strategy” not to “seek

to sever [the defendant’s] trial” on the ground that some inculpatory

evidence about the co-defendant was only admissible against the co-

defendant, where trial counsel “believed that the more bad things

that came out about [the co-defendant], regardless of the source[,]

were good for [the defendant].” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

This claim therefore fails.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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