Court Opinion

ID: 9795853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:40:08.342351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:38:00.495698
License: Public Domain

STEBNER, District Judge,
Retired, dissenting.
[¶ 27] I respectfully dissent. In United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587, 592 n. 6, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001), the Supreme Court stated:
We do not decide whether the probation condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy ... that a search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The terms of the probation condition permit such a search, but we need not address the constitutionality of a suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Although I agree with the majority that this unaddressed question is before us today, I disagree with the conclusions the majority draws from Knights. See majority opinion, ¶¶ 19-21. Indeed, the Supreme Court also stated:
We hold that the balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s house. The degree of individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of when there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest reasonable. Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term “probable cause,” a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable. Those interests warrant a lesser than probable-cause standard here.
Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 592-93 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court’s references to a lesser standard and its repeated notation that the search in Knights was supported by reasonable suspicion leads me to conclude that although probable cause is not required, some quantum of individualized suspicion is nevertheless still necessary. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22, 122 S.Ct. at 592-93.
[¶ 28] Additionally, I would mention that I agree with Justice Voigt that McAuliffe’s conduct did not constitute interference with a peace officer. However, I do not agree that the officers would have eventually found the drugs on his person. The officers did not have a warrant or probable cause to search McAuliffe. Instead, they were relying on the probation condition which required McAuliffe to consent to the search. Thus, when he refused to consent to the search, the officers should have initiated the process for revoking MeAuliffe’s probation by informing the attorney for the state of the facts that establish a probation violation as provided by W.R.Cr.P. 39.