Court Opinion

ID: 9757857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:01:49.368374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:45.020721
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Wright, J.:
This appellant should not be permitted to play fast and loose with the trial court. On Wednesday, Octo*536ber 26, 1966, she was convicted on two charges of armed robbery. On Friday, October 28, 1966, she appeared with her trial counsel who informed the court that he had discussed with appellant the rights afforded her and that she did not desire to file post-conviction motions. ’’The Court: Is that correct, Miss Blum? The Defendant: Yes, Sir”. Appellant then took the stand and gave testimony in mitigation of her offenses, following which concurrent sentences were imposed. Contrary to the intimation in the majority opinion, the record (pp. 217a-220a) clearly discloses that the trial judge did not insist upon sentencing immediately after the verdicts,1 nor was appellant “compelled” to decide concerning the filing of post-trial motions prior to the expiration of the four-day period.
On Monday, November 1, 1966, appellant's present counsel filed a motion for a new trial. The trial judge thereafter conducted an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the mandate of Commonwealth v. Grillo, 208 Pa. Superior Ct. 444, 222 A. 2d 427, and found as a fact that appellant had intelligently waived her right to file post-conviction motions. This finding is fully supported by the testimony.
The majority is effecting a drastic and unwarranted change in criminal procedure in this Commonwealth. The law has been well settled that post-conviction motions must be made prior to sentence: Commonwealth v. Whiting, 205 Pa. Superior Ct. 92, 208 A. 2d 1. Are sentences imposed within four days of verdict to be henceforth invalid, regardless of the defendant's representations to the court. May a defendant hereafter demand to be sentenced immediately following verdict *537and then evaluate the sentence imposed and, if dissatisfied, subsequently file post-conviction motions. I vigorously dissent from the order of remand, and would affirm the judgments below.
Ervin, P. J., and Watkins, J., join in this opinion.

 “. . . because you certainly have tbe right to consider whether or not there would be good bases and grounds for filing a motion for a new trial, arrest of judgment, and such other motions as you may wish to make”.