Court Opinion

ID: 9867885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 17:11:19.507218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:18.889702
License: Public Domain

J-A18025-23

                                  2023 PA Super 185

  IN RE: ESTATE OF BERNARD D.                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  RUSH, DECEASED                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: BENJAMIN D. RUSH                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 717 WDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 24, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Orphans’ Court
                     Division at No(s): C-63-OC-2020-911

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.:                        FILED: September 26, 2023

       Benjamin D. Rush (“Benjamin”) appeals from the order,1 entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Orphans’ Court Division,

dismissing his petition seeking the return of a certain piece of real estate to

the Estate of Bernard D. Rush, Deceased. Upon review, we affirm.

       The Orphans’ Court set forth the facts of this matter as follows:

       [Bernard D. Rush (“Decedent”)] died on August 1, 2020. The
       Decedent’s Last Will and Codicil thereto were admitted to probate
       and respondent Barry L. Rush [(“Barry”)] was [granted Letters
       Testamentary thereon].

       Prior to [Decedent’s] death, on September 12, 2019, [Barry], as
       agent under a Power of Attorney [(“POA”)], executed [a] deed on
       the Decedent’s behalf to convey [Decedent’s] home in North
       Strabane Township [(“Property”)], which included [a] professional
____________________________________________

1 This order is appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(3), which provides that

an appeal may be taken as of right from an order of the Orphans’ Court
Division “interpreting a will or a document that forms the basis of a claim
against an estate or trust.”
J-A18025-23

     accounting office [that Decedent shared with Barry] to [Barry] for
     the agreed purchase price of $130,000.00.

     [Benjamin] challenged the propriety of this conveyance in [a]
     petition for citation, alleging that[,] to the extent that the property
     was conveyed for less than its fair market value, the difference
     between the fair market value and the negotiated purchase price
     constituted a gift to [Barry], and that the conveyance of the gift
     exceeded [Barry’s] authority under the [POA].

     The court conducted a hearing on December 9, 2021, and heard
     testimony from [Barry] regarding the circumstances surrounding
     the conveyance in question. [Barry] testified that he worked with
     the Decedent, his father, in the accounting office located within
     the residence, [and] that as Decedent got older, he had moved
     from the residence to an assisted living facility, Presbyterian
     Senior Care. It was the Decedent’s intention to convey the
     property to [Barry] for the continuity of the accounting business
     and to use the proceeds for the expenses of his care in the assisted
     living facility. Included in the Decedent’s Last Will and Testament
     dated June 13, 2017, was a specific bequest to [Barry] of a right
     of first refusal to purchase the property “for its fair market value
     at the time of [Decedent’s] death.” However, subsequent to the
     execution of the Will, the Decedent decided to convey the property
     during his lifetime, since he was no longer living there, and he and
     [Barry] negotiated the purchase price of $130,000.00.

     Attorney Susan Mondik Key[, who at the time of the hearing had
     been practicing law for 32 years,] testified that she had
     represented the Decedent in the transaction in question, and that
     she had previously represented the Decedent in the preparation
     of his estate planning documents, including the [POA] dated June
     5, 2019, by which the Decedent gave [Barry] the authority to act
     on his behalf, including the power “to engage in real property
     transactions.” Attorney Key further testified that she met with the
     Decedent alone at the Presbyterian Senior Care assisted living
     facility with respect to the conveyance in question. The Decedent
     expressed to Attorney Key his desire to convey the property to
     [Barry] for the negotiated purchase price[] and instructed her to
     prepare the deed and other closing documents. Attorney Key
     testified that when she offered to have the Decedent transported
     to the closing, or to have the necessary documents brought to the
     assisted living facility for his execution, the Decedent insisted that
     he preferred to have [Barry] execute all documents necessary for
     the closing as his agent under the [POA].

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      On September 12, 2019, the transaction was completed and the
      property was conveyed to Blue Heron Investments, Inc., a
      company co-owned by respondent, for the agreed purchase price
      of $ 130,000.00.

      [Benjamin] offered no evidence to refute [Barry’s] testimony [] or
      [that] of Attorney Key.      [Benjamin] did not challenge the
      Decedent’s capacity to enter into an agreement with [Barry], and
      did not allege any undue influence. [Benjamin] offered only the
      testimony of Robert J. Owen, a certified real estate appraiser, who
      opined that the property was worth significantly more than the
      agreed purchase price at the time of the conveyance. In support
      of Mr. Owen's testimony, [Benjamin] offered as exhibits the
      appraisal, the common level ratio chart[,] and the Washington
      County assessment for the subject property.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 3-5 (footnotes omitted).

      Following briefing by the parties, the Orphans’ Court entered an order

on May 24, 2022, dismissing Benjamin’s petition.      Benjamin filed a timely

notice of appeal on June 16, 2022.      By order dated June 30, 2022, the

Orphans’ Court ordered Benjamin to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. The order was docketed on July

1, 2022, with a notation that copies were mailed to both counsel on that date.

See Docket Entries, at 3-4.

      Benjamin did not file a Rule 1925(b) statement as ordered. On August

19, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause why his appeal should not be

dismissed for failure to file the court-ordered concise statement. On August

26, 2022, Benjamin filed a response to the rule to show cause in which counsel

stated that “neither the [o]rder, nor notice of the same’s docketing, was ever

received by” counsel.    Response to Rule to Show Cause, 8/26/22, at 1.

Indeed, counsel asserted that he was unaware of the existence of the Rule

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1925(b) order until he received this Court’s rule to show cause.           Counsel

indicated that, at the instruction of Orphans’ Court staff, he filed a motion for

an extension of time, until August 31, 2022, to file the Rule 1925(b)

statement. He also prepared a Rule 1925(b) statement for filing in the event

that the motion was granted.

       On August 26, 2022, the Orphans’ Court judge, the Honorable John F.

DiSalle, personally called counsel’s associate and “indicated [] that [he]

planned to execute [Benjamin’s] proposed order.” Response to Rule to Show

Cause, 9/15/22, at [2]; see also Order, 9/13/22 (“the court personally

informed counsel that the August 26, 2022 [order] had been signed”)

(emphasis added).        Judge DiSalle signed the order on August 26, 2022;

however, the order was not docketed or mailed to counsel until August 30,

2022—one day before the Rule 1925(b) statement was due. 2              See Docket

Entries, at 4.      Counsel claimed that he did not receive the order until

September 6, 2022, on which date he filed a facially untimely Rule 1925(b)

statement. See Response to Rule to Show Cause, 9/15/22, at [3]. In an

attempt to remedy the late filing purportedly caused by counsel’s late receipt

of the mailed order, counsel contacted Judge DiSalle’s chambers and was

advised to submit a ”proposed corrective order to chambers that would

retroactively permit [Benjamin’s] filing of his [Rule] 1925(b) statement on the

day [counsel] received the order” and that Judge DiSalle “would review and
____________________________________________

2 August 26, 2022 was a Friday.        The order was not mailed until the following
Tuesday.

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execute [the order granting an additional extension].”        Id.   Nevertheless,

judicial staff subsequently contacted counsel,

      indicating that [Judge DiSalle] had elected [] not to execute
      [Benjamin’s] proposed [o]rder delivered on September 9, 2022,
      on account of [Judge DiSalle] having personally called [] counsel’s
      offices on August 26, 2022, to indicate his plans to execute [the
      original proposed order extending the time for filing the Rule
      1925(b) statement until August 31, 2022].

Id. at [4]. Consequently, counsel prepared a second motion to extend time,

which Judge DiSalle promptly denied.

      In the interim, on September 8, 2022, this Court issued another rule to

show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed on the basis of waiver for

failure to file the Rule 1925(b) statement by the August 31, 2022 extended

deadline.   In response, counsel recited the above procedural history and

asserted that

      every procedural problem that has arisen in the instant appeal
      has been attributable to problems demonstrably linked to
      failure(s) to follow proper procedure in filing, docketing, and
      mailing of crucial documents by the Court of Common Pleas of
      Washington County, Orphans’ Court[,] and the Washington
      County Register of Wills; and providing appropriate notice
      pursuant to the . . . Local Court Rules so that all interested parties,
      including but not limited to [Benjamin], are afforded the
      appropriate due process rights in complying with . . . appellate
      requirements.

Id. (emphasis in original). On November 2, 2022, this Court issued a per

curiam order discharging the rules to show cause, subject to review by the

merits panel. See Order, 11/2/22.

      Benjamin raises the following claims for our review:

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      1. Did the [Orphans’ Court] err in finding that Barry [] acted
      legally pursuant to the [terms of Decedent’s POA and will], and
      should instead have found that Barry [] exceeded the scope of the
      [POA] when he made a de facto gift to himself of $85,000.00 when
      he transferred the [Property]?

      2. Did the [Orphans’ Court] err in finding, based only on the
      testimony of counsel for the Decedent and the drafter of the
      [POA], that “the POA document in question expressly provides this
      authority [to engage in real property transactions] as well,”
      because the [Orphans’ Court] was clearly erroneous in its failure
      to consider the four[ ]corners of the [POA] document itself, in
      which the Decedent clearly and positively indicated by marking his
      desire to restrict Barry [] to limited gifting powers only?

      3. Did the [Orphans’ Court] err in failing to find that Barry[’s]
      usage of his limited gifting power under the [POA] to transfer the
      [Property] was an instance of clear self-dealing, as the value of
      the [P]roperty changing hands (and consequent net value
      accruing to Barry []) was well beyond the scope of the $15,000.00
      gift limit established in the [POA]?

Brief of Appellant, at 4-5.

      Prior to reaching the merits of Benjamin’s appeal, we must determine

whether he has waived his claims on appeal for failure to timely file his Rule

1925(b) statement.      Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b)

provides that a judge entering an order giving rise to a notice of appeal “may

enter an order directing the appellant to file of record in the trial court and

serve on the judge a concise statement of the errors complained of on

appeal[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The rule also states that “[i]ssues not included

in the [s]tatement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this

paragraph     (b)(4)   are    waived.”         Pa.R.A.P.   1925(b)(4)(vii).   In

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998), our Supreme Court held

that “from this date forward, in order to preserve their claims for appellate

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review, [a]ppellants must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file

a [Rule 1925(b) statement].      Any issues not raised in a [Rule] 1925(b)

statement will be deemed waived.”        Lord, 719 A.2d at 309; see also

Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (stating any

issues not raised in Rule 1925(b) statement are deemed waived). This Court

has held that “[o]ur Supreme Court intended the holding in Lord to operate

as a bright-line rule, such that ‘failure to comply with the minimal

requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of the issues

raised.’” Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88

A.3d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted). However,

“[u]pon application of the appellant and for good cause shown, the judge may

enlarge the time period initially specified or permit an amended or

supplemental [s]tatement to be filed.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2)(i).

      As set forth above, counsel asserts that he never received the court’s

Rule 1925(b) order, although the docket reflects that the order was mailed to

both counsel on July 1, 2022. See Pa.R.O.C.P. 4.6 (requiring clerk of courts

to provide written notice of court orders to counsel of record or unrepresented

party and shall note on docket date when notice given). Generally, “a party’s

failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement will [not] be excused based merely

upon bald allegations that the party did not receive a [Rule] 1925(b) order.”

Commonwealth v. Hess, 810 A.2d 1249, 1255 n.9 (Pa. 2002) (citation

omitted). In Hess, the appellant asserted that he had not received the trial

court’s Rule 1925(b) order.    In support of his claim, he provided multiple

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affidavits—including one from the prosecuting District Attorney—asserting the

absence of such an order from the records and noted that the trial court’s

docket entries did not indicate the date and manner by which he had been

served with the order, in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 114. The Court concluded

that Hess had not been served with the order, and therefore that waiver was

inappropriate. Conversely, here, the docket clearly indicates that copies of

the Rule 1925(b) order were mailed to counsel on July 1, 2022, and Benjamin

has provided no affidavit of either his or opposing counsel certifying that the

order was not received.

      Nevertheless, assuming the veracity of counsel’s statements in his

filings in both the Orphans’ Court and this Court, counsel’s failure may

arguably have been excusable in light of the fact that the Orphans’ Court’s

order denying Benjamin relief contained the reasoning underlying the court’s

decision.   It is within a trial court’s discretion to order the filing of a Rule

1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (“If the judge entering the order

giving rise to the notice of appeal [] desires clarification of the errors

complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order directing the appellant

to file” a Rule 1925(b) statement.) (emphasis added). Given that the Orphans’

Court had already authored an opinion setting forth its rationale, it may have

been reasonable for counsel to assume that no Rule 1925(b) order would be

forthcoming. However, counsel’s subsequent failure to comply simply cannot

be overlooked.

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      Despite having been personally advised by Judge DiSalle that the order

granting an extension to file the Rule 1925(b) statement had been signed on

August 26, 2022, see Order, 9/13/22 (stating “the court personally informed

counsel that the August 26, 2022 [order] had been signed”), counsel

nonetheless failed to take any steps to determine when and if the order had

been filed, or to simply file the already-prepared Rule 1925(b) statement.

Although the order was not filed of record until August 30, 2022—one day

before the Rule 1925(b) statement was due—counsel made no effort to

monitor the court’s docket, or to inquire with judicial chambers, and instead

waited—for a full six days after the extension had expired—for the order

to arrive in the mail. Notably, counsel argued, in his second motion to extend

time, that Benjamin

      was placed at the mercy of the U.S. Postal Service’s standard
      mailing system, which:

         i. [i]s not represented to deliver parcels in less than 24
         hours; [and]

         ii. [h]as received bipartisan legislative attention for negative
         impacts its deliveries’ timeliness have suffered in the wake
         of the Covid-19 pandemic[.]

Motion to Extend Time, 9/12/22, at ¶ 25(d) (footnote omitted). Counsel’s

acknowledged awareness of the well-documented and widely publicized issues

surrounding the postal service’s recent lack of efficiency renders inexcusable

his failure to take any affirmative action whatsoever to ensure his client’s

compliance with an order that Judge DiSalle personally advised him on

August 26, 2022 had been signed that same day.

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       We also find disingenuous counsel’s assertion that he waited for the

extension order to arrive in the mail before filing the Rule 1925(b) statement

because “it would be outrageous” for a party to file an untimely document

with any court without the court first having filed an order permitting him to

do so.       Response to Rule to Show Cause, 9/15/22, at [3] (emphasis in

original).    Indeed, on September 6, 2022, counsel did just that, filing his

client’s Rule 1925(b) statement after the expiration of the initial extension of

time, but six days before he filed the second motion for an extension on

September 12, 2022. Had counsel simply filed the concise statement as soon

as Judge DiSalle advised him that he had granted the extension, his client’s

claims would have been preserved. As it stands, we are constrained to agree

with the Orphans’ Court that Benjamin has waived all of his claims on appeal

for failure to timely file his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement.3

       Moreover, even if we were to address the merits of Benjamin’s appeal,

he would be entitled to no relief. Our standard of review of the findings of an

Orphans’ Court is deferential.

       When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans’ Court, this
       Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error
____________________________________________

3 We acknowledge that the manner in which Judge DiSalle and his staff
addressed counsel’s requests for extension—particularly the ex parte
telephone call—are somewhat unorthodox, and we would caution the court to
refrain from ex parte communications with litigants or their counsel. It is also
apparent that there are issues with the filing, docketing, and mailing of
documents by the Washington County Register of Wills that require
addressing. Nevertheless, we decline to find that a breakdown in court’s
operations occurred, as it was ultimately counsel’s own inaction that resulted
in the waiver of his client’s claims on appeal.

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     and the court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence.
     Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines
     the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will not reverse
     its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that discretion.

     However, we are not constrained to give the same deference to
     any resulting legal conclusions.

In re Fiedler, 132 A.3d 1010, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc).

     In his opinion dated January 30, 2023, Judge DiSalle set forth his sound

reasoning as follows:

     Based on its assessment of the testimony and determination of
     the credibility of the witnesses, the [court] found that [the] real
     estate transaction in question was not a gift made by [Barry] to
     himself, but the execution of the Decedent’s desire to sell the real
     estate to [Barry] for an agreed price, using the authority of the
     [POA]. Decedent gave express instructions to his attorney to
     complete the transaction in this manner and there was no
     evidence offered by [Benjamin] to the contrary. . . .

     [Benjamin’s] case is based on his attempt to characterize the
     transaction as a gift made by [Barry] to himself, to the extent that
     the appraised value of the property exceeded the actual
     consideration. [Benjamin] admitted that, had the Decedent opted
     to sign the deed himself, instead of utilizing the convenience of
     having [Barry] execute the documents on his behalf, he could
     raise no issue with the transaction. The court did not find
     [Benjamin’s] argument compelling. There was no evidence that
     this real estate transaction was [a] gift or a partial gift, or that the
     Decedent intended the conveyance to be a gift to [Barry].
     [Benjamin’s] entire claim is based on the disparity of the fair
     market value of the real estate and the actual consideration paid
     for the conveyance, as agreed by the Decedent and [Barry].
     [Benjamin] did not challenge the Decedent’s capacity to enter into
     the transaction, or his intent and willingness to sell the real estate
     to [Barry], for the agreed purchase price of $130,000.00. The
     fact that the Decedent chose to facilitate the transaction through
     the authority conferred upon his agent, who was also the grantee,
     did not convert the transaction from a bona fide sale into a gift.

     Section 5603(i) of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciary [(“PEF”)]
     Code expressly confers upon a duly appointed agent the “power

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     to ‘engage in real property transactions’” and to “acquire or
     dispose of real property (including the principal’s residence) or any
     interest therein.” The [POA] document in question expressly
     provides this authority as well. The testimony was clear and
     uncontroverted that the Decedent [] instructed Attorney Key to
     complete the transaction [] via the authority vested in his agent
     under the [POA], and that [Barry] agreed to use his authority as
     agent as instructed.

        “Agency is a relationship whereby the principal manifests
        assent that another person (the agent) will act on the
        principal’s behalf subject to the principal's control, and the
        agent agrees to do so.”

        The basic elements of agency are the manifestation by the
        principal that the agent shall act for him, the agent’s
        acceptance of the undertaking[,] and the understanding of
        the parties that the principal is to be in control of the
        undertaking.

     Traver v. Reliant Senior Gore Holdings, Inc., 228 A.3d 230,
     286 (Pa. Super. 2020)[.]

     Based on the testimony and the court’s assessment of credibility,
     the [court] found that [Barry] was not making a discretionary gift
     to himself under the POA, but rather, was following the express
     instructions of the Decedent by executing all of the documents as
     the Decedent’s duly appointed agent, in order to complete the real
     estate transaction. The Decedent maintained control of the
     transaction, entered into an agreement for the purchase price for
     his property, and gave instructions to his [a]ttorney and [Barry],
     as his agent, for the consummation of the closing, as testified to
     by Attorney Key. That the Decedent did not personally attend the
     closing or execute the documents is of no moment. The [PEF]
     Code specifically provides that an agent charged with the power
     to engage in real property transactions includes the authority to
     “exercise all powers with respect to real property that the
     principal could if present.”          [20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5603(i)(6)
     (emphasis added by Orphans’ Court).] Based on the factual
     findings of the [court] and the law of principal and agent, there is
     no merit to appellant’s claim for relief.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/30/23, at 6-8 (footnotes omitted).

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      Here, the Orphans’ Court’s findings of fact are all supported in the

record, and we can discern no error of law or abuse of discretion, where

Decedent’s capacity to enter into the transaction was unchallenged and Barry

utilized the POA merely as a matter of convenience at the express direction of

Decedent. Accordingly, we would, in the alternative, affirm on the basis of

Judge DiSalle’s opinion.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/26/2023

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