Court Opinion

ID: 9850683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:01:31.244477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:41.584702
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority relies on Georgia cases which either are distinguishable or should be reevaluated in the light of recent precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States, I dissent to Division 2 and to the reversal of the judgment of conviction which resulted in a sentence of life plus twenty years for malice murder, aggravated assault and attempted arson.
Citing Kirkland v. State, 274 Ga. 778, 780 (2) (560 SE2d 6) (2002) and Bradham v. State, 243 Ga. 638, 639 (3) (256 SE2d 331) (1979), the majority states that “this Court has recognized that causing a defendant to unnecessarily use a peremptory strike on a juror [who] should have been excused for cause is per se harmful error. [Cits.]” (Maj. op. p. 166.) However, Kirkland v. State, supra at 780 (2), actually held that defense counsel’s failure to challenge a prospective juror for cause prejudiced the defendant since it resulted in “the seating of disqualified jurors. . . .” Thus, Kirkland “was tried before a biased jury” and was deprived of his federal constitutional right “to be tried by an impartial jury.” Kirkland v. State, supra. Under those “extreme circumstances, prejudice is implied and counsel’s error is harmful per se. . . .” Kirkland v. State, supra. In this case, however, the allegedly disqualified juror whom the trial court excused for cause and whom Fortson’s trial attorney peremptorily challenged *169was obviously never seated. The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected
the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. We have long recognized that peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension. [Cits.] ... So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated. [Cits.]
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 81, 88 (108 SC 2273, 101 LE2d 80) (1988).
In dicta, Kirkland v. State, supra at 779 (2), also cites Bradham, a 4-3 decision, for the proposition that “ £[w]hen a defendant in a felony trial has to exhaust his peremptory strikes to excuse a juror who should have been excused for cause the error is harmful.’ [Cit.]” After Ross, however, most jurisdictions which “considered the issue either rejected [this] automatic reversal rule or reaffirmed their . . . prior opinions that the curative use of a peremptory challenge was not reversible error, absent prejudice to the defendant. [Cits.]” State v. Hickman, 68 P3d 418, 420 (II) (B) (Ariz. 2003). Then in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U. S. 304, 317 (III) (120 SC 774, 145 LE2d 792) (2000), the Supreme Court answered “the question left open in Ross” and held that “a defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges pursuant to [Fed. Rule Grim. Proc.] 24 (b) is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause.” OCGA § 15-12-165, like Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 (b), provides only that the parties to a criminal case may peremptorily challenge a certain number of jurors. Thus, under either federal or state law, the use of a peremptory challenge, in an attempt to insure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury, even if due to an error of the trial court or of counsel, simply does not constitute the deprivation or loss of the challenge. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, supra at 315-316 (III); State v. Fire, 34 P3d 1218, 1224 (Wash. 2001). If the defendant “is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right.” United States v. Martinez-Salazar, supra at 307. Since Martinez-Salazar, several additional state supreme courts have adopted the rule “that the curative use of a peremptory challenge violates neither a constitutional right, nor a rule-based or statute-based right.” State v. Hickman, supra at 421-422 (II) (C). See also Green v. Maynard, 564 SE2d 83, 86 (S.C. 2002). As some of those courts have pointed out, the automatic reversal rule of Bradham does not level the playing field, *170but tilts it in favor of the defendant. State v. Hickman, supra at 426 (III) (C); State v. Lindell, 629 NW2d 223, 248-249 (V) (D) (Wise. 2001).
The majority quotes the rationale oí Bradham as follows: “[I]t is well established in Georgia that peremptory strikes are invaluable. Bradham v. State, [supra] at 639 [(3)].” (Maj. op. p. 166.) However, acknowledgment of the role of the peremptory challenge in reinforcing a defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury does not preclude recognition that such challenges are auxiliary. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, supra at 311 (II). This principle was perhaps best articulated by the author of the majority opinion in the instant case:
The exercise of peremptory strikes has long been recognized as a procedure created to assist litigants in obtaining a fair and impartial jury and not an independent substantive right. The substantive right involved is the right to an impartial jury and peremptory strikes are merely one possible procedure that can be used to obtain such a jury. [Cits.]
Barner v. State, 263 Ga. 365, 367 (4) (434 SE2d 484) (1993).
In holding that defense counsel’s unnecessary use of a peremptory challenge on a disqualified juror in a felony trial is harmful per se where such challenges are exhausted, Bradham, supra at 639 (3), relied solely on the very different principle that the unnecessary peremptory strike is harmless per se where the defendant did not have to exhaust his peremptory challenges in order to strike the disqualified juror. See Foster v. State, 240 Ga. 858, 859 (2) (242 SE2d 600) (1978). That principle was subsequently abandoned in Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 464, 465 (2) (339 SE2d 712) (1986), which “held that ‘(t)he defendant’s use of his peremptory strikes will ... no longer play a role in our evaluation of the harm caused by the refusal to strike an unqualified juror.’ [Cit.]” Wallace v. State, 275 Ga. 879, 881 (3) (572 SE2d 579) (2002) (Fletcher, C. J.). Accordingly, the mere exhaustion or waste of peremptory strikes should not dictate that a given action regarding a disqualified juror is either invariably harmless or necessarily harmful. Instead, the focus under current Georgia law should be on whether any unqualified juror was seated as the ultimate result of errors with respect to jurors challenged for cause. See Kirkland v. State, supra at 780 (2). The trial court’s ruling did not “result in the seating of any juror who should have been dismissed for cause. . . . [T]hat circumstance would require reversal. [Cits.]” United States v. Martinez-Salazar, supra at 316 (III). In my opinion, therefore, Bradham, supra at 640 (3), should not have disapproved this Court’s previous holding that a defendant who uses his peremptory strikes to remove disqualified jurors does not meet his burden of *171affirmatively showing reversible error where he does not complain about the inclusion of any other jurors. Kemp v. State, 226 Ga. 506, 507 (2) (175 SE2d 869) (1970). See also Patterson v. State, 239 Ga. 409, 411 (1) (238 SE2d 2) (1977). Accordingly, Bradham and those cases which have followed it should be overruled, including the following: McKinney v. State, 254 Ga. 503 (330 SE2d 884) (1985); Hutcheson v. State, 246 Ga. 13, 14 (2) (268 SE2d 643) (1980); Parisie v. State, 178 Ga. App. 857, 859 (2) (344 SE2d 727) (1986).
The requirement that a defendant show prejudice beyond the exhaustion or waste of peremptory strikes is consistent with harmless error review.
[M]ost trial error, and even most constitutional error, is reviewed for harmless error. . . . “Virtually any error, under particular circumstances, can be harmless.” [Cit.] ... If important constitutional errors are subject to harmless error review, then, logically, a trial court’s erroneous denial of a challenge for cause and the defendant’s subsequent use of a peremptory challenge to cure that error should be subject to harmless error review. ... A defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge to cure a trial court’s erroneous denial of a challenge for cause is an error in the trial process, and not an error affecting the framework of how a trial proceeds.
State v. Hickman, supra at 424-425 (III) (C) & in. 7. If a trial court’s error in causing the needless use of a peremptory strike is not inevitably harmful, then defense counsel’s deficient conduct in the same regard is not necessarily prejudicial. One disturbing element of Bradham “is that it requires a new trial in cases where the trial was nearly perfect and the verdict is unquestionably sound.” State v. Lindell, supra at 249 (V) (D). See also State v. Hickman, supra at 422 (II) (C). Given the reality that trial courts rule on challenges for cause, and attorneys exercise peremptory strikes, by the minute, often deciding between shades of gray on the spot and under pressure, “it seems incongruous that a defendant should receive a new trial simply because the trial judge [or defense counsel] made a mistake that had no impact on the reliability of the jury’s verdict.” State v. Hickman, supra at 425 (III) (C). See also United States v. Martinez-Salazar, supra at 316 (III). Where, as here, the attorney for an accused “wastes” a peremptory strike on a juror already excused for cause, that circumstance does not, in and of itself, create a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s actions, the result of the proceeding would have been different. White v. State, 939 SW2d 887, 900 (II) (O) (Mo. 1997); Robinson v. State, 1998 WL 380634 (Tex. App.Beaumont) (not designated for publication, but may be cited pursu*172ant to Rule 47.7 of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure). Because Fortson has failed to demonstrate such a probability, as she has not shown that any disqualified juror was ever seated, her conviction should not be reversed on the basis of her trial attorney’s mistaken use of a peremptory strike.
Decided October 6, 2003.
Cook, Noell, Tolley, Bates & Michael, Edward D. Tolley, Ronald E. Houser, for appellant.
Robert W. Lavender, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jason C. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears joins in this dissent.