Court Opinion

ID: 9387710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 19:03:03.140562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:15.183464
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/18/23 P. v. Smith CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                               B318663

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                       (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. LA012332-01)
           v.

 DAVID THAYNE SMITH,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles, Richard J. Kirschner, Judge. Affirmed.
         Seymour I. Amster, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Stefanie Yee, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    ________________________
       David Thayne Smith and Daniel Miller were charged in
1993 with the special circumstance murder of Stefan Sweetzer.
Smith was convicted of second degree murder following a trial at
which the People introduced Smith’s statement to a Los Angeles
police detective that he had been at the murder scene with three
other individuals, including Miller, when one of the men (whom
Smith claimed he did not know) shot and killed Sweetzer. (See
People v. Smith (Mar. 13, 1996, B084204) [nonpub. opn.].) Miller
was convicted of first degree murder with a robbery-murder
special-circumstance finding at a separate trial at which Miller
testified it was Smith who shot and killed Sweetzer. (See People
v. Miller (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 522, 525.)
       At the evidentiary hearing in February 2022 to determine
whether to vacate Smith’s conviction for murder pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) (former
section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3)),1 Miller again testified that
Smith was Sweetzer’s actual killer. Based on that testimony and
the record from Smith’s 1993 trial, the superior court denied
Smith’s petition for resentencing, finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that Smith was Sweetzer’s actual killer or had aided and
abetted the murder with an intent to kill. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Smith’s Murder Conviction
       Smith and Miller were jointly charged in an information
filed January 22, 1993 with the murder of Sweetzer (§ 187,

1     Statutory references are to this code.

                                 2
subd. (a)) with special-circumstance allegations the murder was
committed for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)), by lying in
wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), and while Smith and Miller were
engaged in the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). It
was additionally alleged that in the commission of the offense a
principal was armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).)
      Smith moved to sever his trial from Miller’s based on
Miller’s post-arrest statement that directly implicated Smith in
the murder. The motion to sever was granted.
      The jury at Smith’s initial trial was unable to reach a
verdict, and a mistrial was declared.
      According to the evidence at Smith’s second trial,
Sweetzer’s body was discovered on Friday evening, October 16,
1992 at approximately 10:45 p.m. on a dirt road near a
construction site in the Santa Monica Mountains. Shortly before
the body was found, a white van had been seen entering the area
and then speeding away. Responding Los Angeles police officers
found five shell casings around and underneath, and a pager on,
the body, but no wallet or other form of identification on the
victim. It was determined that Sweetzer died from multiple
gunshot wounds: He had been shot five times from behind in the
head, neck and back.
      On the following Monday morning, October 19, 1992, Smith
called the pager found on Sweetzer’s body. A series of discussions
ensued between Smith and police officers during which Smith
identified the victim and explained he and Sweetzer owned a
business installing doors and window frames. According to
Smith, he and Sweetzer had dinner together the preceding
Friday, and Smith dropped Sweetzer off at his apartment around
9:00 p.m. Smith initially told officers he and Sweetzer used a

                                 3
white van in their business to deliver doors and windows and
indicated the van was Sweetzer’s.
       During his conversations with the officers, Smith’s
description of various matters changed. Los Angeles Police
Detective Larry Dolley obtained vehicle registration and
insurance information for a white van owned by Smith. Smith
then said he let Sweetzer and Sweetzer’s roommate use his van
to transport computers, photocopy machines and other types of
office equipment that Sweetzer and the roommate stole and kept
in a storage unit until sold. When Sweetzer and his roommate
split up, Sweetzer persuaded Smith to participate with him in the
burglaries.
       Ultimately Detective Dolley, accompanied by several other
officers, went to Smith’s residence and asked him to step outside
to talk about the contradictions in the statements he had made.
During that conversation Smith said, “I was at the murder scene,
and Dan Smith was with me, Dan Miller was with me, four of us.
There was a guy I didn’t know who had the gun and Stefan had a
gun. It was the guy that I don’t know who shot him, and I don’t
know who he is.” Smith was arrested.
       During the subsequent investigation officers learned that
Smith had rented a storage locker using a false name on
October 18, 1992. Someone named Dan Halsey was also listed as
an owner of the storage unit. On October 19, 1992 two men
unloaded several items from a large white van and stored them
in the unit. When officers accessed the unit they found stolen
office equipment and a file cabinet containing Sweetzer’s wallet
and car keys. Sweetzer’s truck was found parked in the
condominium complex where Smith lived.

                                4
      The jury convicted Smith of second degree murder and
found the firearm allegation true. The court sentenced Smith to
an aggregate state prison term of 16 years to life.2 We affirmed
the judgment on appeal, rejecting Smith’s contentions the trial
court erred in not excluding his statement that he was at the
murder scene as the unlawful product of a custodial interrogation
and there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
second degree murder. (People v. Smith, supra, B084204.)
      2. Smith’s Petition for Resentencing
       On October 23, 2020 Smith, representing himself, filed a
petition for resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95 and
requested the court appoint counsel to represent him in the
resentencing proceedings. Smith checked boxes on the printed
form petition to establish his eligibility for resentencing relief,
including the boxes stating he had been convicted of murder
under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and could not now be convicted of first or
second degree murder because of changes made to sections 188
and 189 effective January 1, 2019. The superior court appointed
counsel to represent Smith.
       Following the People’s response stating they did not oppose
issuance of an order to show cause because Smith could have
been convicted under the natural and probable consequences

2     At his separate trial the jury convicted Miller of first degree
murder and found true the felony-murder special-circumstance
and firearm allegations. The financial gain and lying-in-wait
special-circumstance allegations were found not true. Miller was
sentenced to a state prison term of life without parole. (People v.
Miller, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 524.)

                                  5
doctrine, the court issued an order to show cause, setting the
matter for an evidentiary hearing.
      At the outset of the hearing on February 17, 2022, the court
granted the People’s request to take judicial notice of the record
on Smith’s direct appeal (one volume of the clerk’s transcript,
four volumes of the reporter’s transcript and this court’s
unpublished March 13, 1996 opinion). Smith objected to the
court’s judicial notice of the summary of facts in the appellate
opinion as hearsay, citing recent amendments to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), which provided the admission of evidence at
the hearing is to be governed by the Evidence Code and expressly
provided the court could consider “the procedural history of the
case recited in any prior appellate opinion.” The court responded,
“The court will take judicial notice of the appellate opinion
including the recitation of the facts. . . . This court acts as an
independent fact finder to determine whether the evidence
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner would
be guilty of murder under the amended . . . Penal Code section[s]
188 and 189 and thus ineligible for [re]sentencing. This court has
reviewed the record fully, and this court does find that the
recitation of the facts in the appellate opinion is an accurate
recitation. And that comes from my reading of the transcripts.”
      The People then called Miller as a witness.3 Miller testified
he and Smith met in Seattle in 1992 and Smith invited him to

3      Miller originally declined to answer any questions. After
ruling Miller had no Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to
testify, the court ordered him to answer the People’s questions.
When he again declined, the court found him in contempt of court
and remanded him to custody. Several days later Miller agreed
to testify.

                                6
come to work at Smith and Sweetzer’s door and window
installation company in Burbank. Miller worked with the two
men for about three weeks before Sweetzer’s murder. During
that time Miller learned that Smith and Sweetzer stole tools,
doors and window frames from construction sites for use in their
business and also stole computers and other office equipment
from commercial business parks, which they resold. Smith’s
large white truck was used to transport the stolen goods, which
were stored in a warehouse behind the business’s storefront
before being used or resold. Miller participated in these thefts on
a number of occasions. Miller was aware that Smith kept a pistol
in a locked metal briefcase that he carried with him at all times.
       Miller described the relationship between Smith and
Sweetzer as “tenuous” because Smith suspected Sweetzer was
selling some of the stolen items without giving Smith his share of
the proceeds. The week before the murder, when Miller was at
Sweetzer’s apartment, Sweetzer sold a computer for $1,600.
Smith became very upset when Miller reported this incident to
him, complaining that he was being “ripped off.”
       On the night of the murder Smith told Miller they were
going to have dinner with Sweetzer to discuss things with him
and then go to a construction site where they might have a job
installing door frames. After dinner at Sweetzer’s apartment
Smith suggested visiting the construction site. After Smith drove
the men to the site in his truck, Smith told Miller to watch their
equipment while he spoke to Sweetzer. According to Miller,
“They went walking up that gravel path. And I was just standing
there waiting. Next thing I know I hear a pop. And then it was
followed by three or four more pops.”

                                 7
        Miller testified the “pops” sounded like gunshots. When he
looked around, Miller saw Sweetzer on the ground and Smith
holding a gun. Smith called for Miller to help him by going
through Sweetzer’s pockets. Miller found a set of keys that he
gave to Smith.
        Smith and Miller then left the murder scene, with Smith
driving fast according to Miller. They went directly to Sweetzer’s
apartment, which they entered using the keys Miller had taken
from Sweetzer’s body. Inside the apartment Smith looked for the
money he believed Sweetzer had been withholding from him.
Smith found the $1,600 from the computer sale and told Miller he
believed a key on Sweetzer’s keychain was to a post office box
where additional funds had been stored. The two men spent the
night at Sweetzer’s apartment because Smith, promising to pay
Miller for his assistance, wanted help the next day moving stolen
goods stored in the business’s warehouse to a storage unit in
Orange County.
        The following day Smith and Miller rented a storage unit in
Huntington Beach using false names, loaded stolen equipment,
as well as Sweetzer’s filing cabinet, into Smith’s truck and moved
it all into the storage unit.
        Miller also testified that, after Smith called Sweetzer’s
pager and was asked to come to the police station, Smith told
Miller that in any discussion with law enforcement Miller should
say there was a third person with them at the construction site
named Richard, an associate of Sweetzer’s, who was the person
that shot Sweetzer.
        Miller was at Smith’s house when Detective Dolley
questioned and then arrested Smith. Miller was also arrested at
that time and told the officers, as Smith had directed, that

                                 8
Richard had shot Sweetzer. Miller subsequently told the police
that Smith was the shooter.
       On cross-examination Miller acknowledged he had filed his
own petition for resentencing and knew if he was the actual killer
he would not be entitled to resentencing relief. Miller admitted
he had prior felony convictions for drug trafficking and had
carried a firearm when committing those offenses. Miller also
admitted he tried to flee when the police came to Smith’s home.
Miller was not unduly concerned about spending the night at
Sweetzer’s apartment with someone who had just committed
murder because Smith had discarded the gun before they went to
the apartment and Smith had no motive to try to kill him.
       After Miller’s testimony the court admitted into evidence
both Miller’s post-arrest statement and the testimony from his
trial in which he identified Smith as the individual who shot
Sweetzer. Then, following argument by counsel, the court briefly
summarized the evidence, stated Miller was “very credible” and
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith was the actual killer
and ineligible for resentencing. The court further found beyond a
reasonable doubt, if Smith was not the actual killer, he aided and
abetted the murder with the intent to kill. In addition, the court
explained it had done an analysis under People v. Banks (2015)
61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 and
that, based on those cases, it found Smith was a major
participant (presumably in the robbery of Sweetzer) who acted
with reckless disregard for human life.
       Smith filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                9
                         DISCUSSION
      1. Accomplice Liability for Murder and Section 1172.6
       Under the ameliorative changes to the law relating to
accomplice liability for murder effected by Senate Bill No. 1437
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), malice must be proved to convict a
principal of murder except under the narrowed felony-murder
rule set forth in section 189, subdivision (e), and may not be
imputed based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3)), thereby eliminating the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843). The
amended felony-murder provision requires the People to prove
specific facts relating to the defendant’s individual culpability:
The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although
not the actual killer, the defendant, with the intent to kill,
assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or
the defendant was a major participant in an underlying felony
listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, “as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2,” the felony-murder special-circumstance provision
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708.)
       Section 1172.6 authorizes an individual convicted of felony
murder or murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to vacate
the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he
or she could not now be convicted of murder because of these

                                10
changes to the law relating to accomplice liability for murder.4 If
the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing he or she
falls within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to
relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
       At that hearing to determine whether the petitioner is
entitled to relief, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The court may consider evidence
“previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony. The
petitioner and the prosecutor may also offer new or additional
evidence. (Ibid.) The superior court’s decision to deny the
petition after an evidentiary hearing, if the proper standard and
burden of proof were applied, is reviewed for substantial
evidence. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951;
People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 985; People v.
Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 113.)
     2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
        Finding That Smith Was the Actual Killer and Ineligible
        for Resentencing Relief
     Miller’s testimony that Smith employed a ruse to drive
Sweetzer to an isolated area and then shot and killed him

4     Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) extended
these modifications to attempted murder and voluntary
manslaughter.

                                 11
because Sweetzer had failed to fairly share the proceeds of their
joint criminal enterprise, if properly admitted and considered by
the superior court, constituted substantial evidence to support
the court’s finding that Smith was Sweetzer’s actual killer. (See,
e.g., People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [“unless the
testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable,
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
conviction”]; People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 963 [same].)
Smith challenges the superior court’s reliance on Miller’s
testimony, arguing there was no evidence corroborating the
testimony of Miller, an accomplice to the crime, tending to
connect Smith to the murder and, in any event, Miller was not a
credible witness. Smith also contends the superior court
improperly took judicial notice of the factual summary in this
court’s opinion affirming his conviction on direct appeal,
requiring a reversal and a new evidentiary hearing. None of
these arguments has merit.
         a. Miller’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated
       “Section 1111 provides in part: ‘A conviction can not be had
upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by
such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not
sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the
circumstances thereof.’ The requirement that accomplice
testimony be corroborated is an ‘“exception[]” to the substantial
evidence’ rule. [Citation.] It is based on the Legislature’s
determination that ‘“because of the reliability questions posed
by”’ accomplice testimony, such testimony ‘“by itself is
insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction.”’. . . [¶]
Thus, for the jury to rely on an accomplice’s testimony about the

                                12
circumstances of an offense, it must find evidence that, ‘“without
aid from the accomplice’s testimony, tend[s] to connect the
defendant with the crime.”’ [Citations.] ‘The entire conduct of
the parties, their relationship, acts, and conduct may be taken
into consideration by the trier of fact in determining the
sufficiency of the corroboration.’ [Citations.] The evidence ‘need
not independently establish the identity of the victim’s assailant’
[citation], nor corroborate every fact to which the accomplice
testifies [citation] and ‘“may be circumstantial or slight and
entitled to little consideration when standing alone.”’” (People v.
Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 32.)
       As Smith argues, and the People concede, Miller was
unquestionably Smith’s accomplice; and his testimony, therefore,
required corroboration—evidence reasonably tending to connect
Smith to the commission of the murder. The evidence before the
superior court from Smith’s trial, where Miller did not testify, did
just that. As discussed, Smith admitted to Detective Dolley he
was present at the murder scene. And the record from Smith’s
trial established that Smith’s van was used in the murder; Smith,
using a false name,5 rented a storage unit three days after the
murder where he moved thousands of items of stolen property
from the warehouse at the business he owned jointly with
Sweetzer, as well as items of Sweetzer’s personal property; and

5       As the superior court pointed out when reviewing the
evidence before denying Smith’s petition for resentencing, the
fictitious name he used was “David Thayne,” his first and middle
names, and the combination to the lock was the date Smith
graduated from high school: “Not particularly clever, but
nevertheless what in fact happened and was established by the
evidence.”

                                 13
Sweetzer’s car was found parked near Smith’s condominium
complex. The People amply satisfied the corroboration
requirement of section 1111. (See People v. Brown (2003)
31 Cal.4th 518, 556 [“[c]orroborating evidence may be slight, may
be entirely circumstantial, and need not be sufficient to establish
every element of the charged offense,” internal quotation marks
omitted].)
         b. The superior court properly assessed Miller’s
            credibility
       Smith’s counsel did his best to undermine Miller’s
credibility, pointing out his prior criminal record and ownership
of a firearm, his attempt to escape when officers came to question
and then arrest Smith, and his motive to lie to enhance the
possibility of success on his own section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing. Those facts, whether considered separately or in
combination, did not make Miller’s testimony—and, in particular,
his assertion it was Smith who shot Sweetzer—inherently
improbable, even if they do raise questions about Miller’s
description of his own role in the events.6 Accordingly, the

6      Smith’s argument that the jury at Miller’s trial rejected his
testimony identifying Smith as the actual killer is misplaced.
Miller’s jury found not true the two special-circumstance
allegations—financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)) and lying in
wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15))—that required the jury to find Miller
was the actual killer or an accomplice acting with intent to kill
(see § 190.2, subd. (c)), and necessarily found him guilty of
special-circumstance murder as a major participant in the
robbery of Sweetzer who acted with reckless indifference to
human life (see § 190.2, subd. (d)), suggesting it believed Smith
was the actual killer but that Miller did not innocently wait by
the van while Smith shot Sweetzer.

                                 14
question whether to believe the witness was for the superior
court as the finder of fact, not for us as the reviewing court.
(See, e.g., People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 378 [“‘[a]
reviewing court neither reweighs [the] evidence nor reevaluates a
witness’s credibility’”]; People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th
838, 890 [same].)
         c. Judicial notice of the factual summary from our
            opinion on direct appeal was not prejudicial error
      Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), as amended effective
January 1, 2022, provides at the evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court
“may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in
any prior appellate opinion.” Cases interpreting that language
have reasoned it precludes the superior court from considering a
prior appellate opinion’s statement of facts at the evidentiary
hearing. (See, e.g., People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
292 [the “specificity” of the language in subdivision (d)(3)
“indicates the Legislature has decided trial judges should not rely
on the factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions
when a section [1172.6] petition reaches the stage of a full-
fledged evidentiary hearing”]; see also People v. Cooper (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 393, 400, fn. 9 [the 2022 amendment to
subdivision (d)(3) “prevents a trial court from relying on facts
recited in an appellate opinion to rule on a petition under
section [1172.6]”].)

      Similarly misplaced is Smith’s suggestion that Miller would
not have agreed to spend the night at Sweetzer’s apartment with
Smith if Smith had just murdered Sweetzer. Both men agreed to
spend the night together following the murder, indicating, for
whatever reason, neither feared the other.

                                15
       Without conceding the factual summary from an opinion
deciding a petitioner’s direct appeal is inadmissible at a
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), evidentiary hearing, the
Attorney General argues taking judicial notice of that summary
here did not constitute prejudicial error. (See People v. Myles
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 706 [reversal is not required for
evidentiary error at a hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), unless it is reasonably probable petitioner
would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the evidence
been excluded]; see generally People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19,
29 [“the Watson test for harmless error applies” to the denial of a
right that “is purely a creature of state statutory law”].) We
agree.
       Although the superior court took judicial notice of the
factual summary from People v. Smith, supra, B08204, nothing in
the record supports Smith’s claim on appeal (made without
citation to the record) that the court “stated it was considering
the facts in the appellate opinion.” To the contrary, in overruling
Smith’s objection, the court explained it understood its role as
independent fact finder was to determine whether the evidence
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith would be
guilty of murder under amended sections 188 and 189 and
emphasized it had read the transcripts of the trial to make that
determination. The further statement that the factual recitation
in the appellate opinion was accurate does not indicate the court
relied on our opinion rather than the testimony in the underlying
transcripts to find Smith was guilty of murder under current law.
(See People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 292-293 [it
is petitioner’s burden on appeal to identify any portion of the
appellate opinion the superior court relied on, rather than

                                16
information in the trial transcripts submitted for the court’s
decision].)
       In addition, Smith does not dispute the superior court’s
assessment that the factual recitation in the appellate opinion
was accurate, nor does he identify any information in that
opinion that was not also contained in the trial transcripts.
Accordingly, even if inadmissible, because the statement of facts
was merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence, any
consideration of it by the trial court was necessarily harmless.
(See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1016 [because
evidence challenged as inadmissible hearsay was cumulative, any
error in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt];
People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1257-1258 [any error in
admission of photographs cumulative to other evidence that was
detailed and essentially uncontested was harmless]; see
also People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 232.)
                        DISPOSITION
     The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                     PERLUSS, P. J.
     We concur:

           SEGAL, J.

           FEUER, J.

                               17