Court Opinion

ID: 9695717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:28:05.633295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:01.460103
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
This appeal presents the issue of the scope of our review in a divorce case.
Judge CERCONE, citing Gehris v. Gehris, 233 Pa.Super. 144, 334 A.2d 753 (1975), states that “[i]t is well-settled that in divorce cases, the evidence must be considered de novo at every stage of review; and that review extends to questions of credibility.” Majority opinion at 1297. He then demonstrates by his discussion of the evidence that by this statement of the law he means that our scope of review is entirely uninhibited; thus he pays no attention to the master’s report. Judge HOFFMAN, on the other hand, also citing (and quoting) Gehris, states that where the master is the only one who has heard the witnesses, his decision on credibility is “necessarily dispositive” and “cannot effectively be reviewed,” either by the lower court in the first instance, or on appeal by this court. Dissenting opinion at 1301.
I cannot accept either of these statements of the law. Taking the law as I find it, I nevertheless agree with Judge HOFFMAN (and disagree with Judge CER-CONE) in concluding that a divorce should be granted.
I
The issue of the scope of our review in a divorce case may arise in any of three contexts: where the testimony *247has been heard by a jury; where it has been heard by a judge sitting without a jury; and where it has been heard by a master.
-A-
Where the testimony has been heard by a jury, it is the duty of the court to examine the testimony only to ascertain if there is evidence to support the verdict. Whether the court would have reached the same conclusion if it had been the trier of fact is irrelevant [footnote omitted]. A. Freedman & M. Freedman, Law of Marriage and Divorce in Pennsylvania, vol. 2, § 617, p. 1226 (collectingcases).
-B-
It might seem that the findings of a judge sitting without a jury should be accorded the same weight as a jury’s verdict, and indeed there is a suggestion to this effect in the early cases. See in particular King v. King, 36 Pa.Super. 33, 35 (1908). However, the law is long-settled that this is not so. The leading case is Esenwein v. Esenwein, 312 Pa. 77, 167 A. 350 (1933). There the judge concluded that a divorce should be granted. This court reversed, stating that “the proofs submitted by the libellant do not come up to the required standard.” 105 Pa.Super. 261 at 264, 161 A. 425 at 426. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the libellant challenged the power of this court to examine the evidence de novo. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the challenge, quoting with approval this court’s decision in Fay v. Fay, 27 Pa. Super. 328, 334-5 (1905), which had in turn quoted McClurg’s Appeal, 66 Pa. 366 (1870), where it was said, at 374-75, that the “only exception” to the rule that the testimony will on appeal be examined de novo “is where a fact has been found by a jury trial.”
It does not follow from this insistence upon de novo review that no weight is to be given the judge’s findings. *248Thus in Uhlinger v. Uhlinger, 169 Pa.Super. 574, 576-77, 88 A.2d 423, 424 (1951), this court stated:
As to the various incidents said to constitute indignities to the person, the record discloses irreconcilable conflicts in the testimony at every turn of the page. Judge Kennedy concluded that the credible testimony was adduced by the plaintiff and his witnesses, and this judgment in this particular is entitled to the highest consideration in an appellate court. Bobst v. Bobst, 357 Pa. 441, 54 A.2d 898; Handy v. Handy, 163 Pa.Super. 49, 60 A.2d 415. We recognize, of course, that it is our duty to examine carefully the testimony and base our conclusion on our own independent judgment; yet at the same time we realize that the judge who saw the witnesses, observed their manner, and heard them tes.tify, had a better opportunity to determine their credibility than we, who must rely upon what appears in “cold type”. Tanner v. Tanner, 159 Pa.Super. 637, 49 A.2d 875.
And in Spence v. Spence, 167 Pa.Super. 248, 250-51, 74 A.2d 495, 496-7 (1950), this court stated:
In this conflict of testimony the lower court accepted the testimony of the libellant, corroborated in some, but not in all respects, by that of his brother. Where in a divorce proceeding, as here, credibility is the issue, the conclusion of the hearing judge, as to which of the parties is to be believed, is entitled to respect. Ussler v. Ussler, 158 Pa.Super. 215, 44 A.2d 526; Weber v. Weber, 156 Pa.Super. 6, 39 A.2d 144. In referring to the principle Mr. Justice Linn, in Wick v. Wick, 352 Pa. 25, 42 A.2d 76, said: “Presumably, a trial judge’s opportunity to observe the parties and witnesses during the trial, became the basis of a rule that ‘when witnesses who are competent and equally interested, flatly contradict each other, the conclusion of the judge who heard them, as to which is to be believed, is not to be lightly disturbed.’ Krug v. Krug, 22 Pa.Super. 572, *249573; Koontz v. Koontz, 97 Pa.Super. 70; Dearth v. Dearth, 141 Pa.Super. 344, 15 A.2d 37. In accord with that rule, we have at times resolved doubt in dealing with conflicting testimony, by relying on expressed or implied conclusions of the trial judge.”
Accord: Partleton v. Partleton, 169 Pa.Super. 485, 82 A. 2d 684 (1951).
In Gehris v. Gehris, supra, Judge HOFFMAN cites Uhlinger, Spence, and Partleton, for the proposition that
if the ultimate decision rests on a statement asserted by one party and denied by the other, where there is no corroborative evidence, demeanor on the stand is necessarily dispositive of the issue and is the kind of evidence that cannot effectively be reviewed by an appellate court.
233 Pa.Super. at 148,334 A.2d at 755.
Although I join Gehris (Judge Van der Voort, joined by Judge Price, dissented), I now acknowledge that it goes beyond the law; neither the cases cited (as the above quotations from them show), nor any other cases I have found, warrant the expressions “necessarily dispositive” and “cannot effectively be reviewed.” A more accurate statement of the law is that quoted by this court in Spence v. Spence, supra:
“When witnesses who are competent and equally interested, flatly contradict each other, the conclusion of the judge who heard them, as to which is to be believed, is not to be lightly disturbed.”
Having said so much, I wish to note my disagreement with the law. To me, the formulation “not to be lightly disturbed” is so ambiguous as to be useless. Plainly, it substantially undercuts “de novo review.” Equally plainly, no one can tell how substantially. Worse than being useless, however, the formulation opens the way for this court to grant or deny a divorce arbitrarily, that is to say, without any standard that can be articulated so that the parties to the action will understand why they *250have won or lost. If the lower court’s order is disturbed, who can say whether it has been “lightly” done? And with such a standard, who can predict how an appeal will be decided?
The problem raised by these questions is similar to that formerly encountered by the courts in attempting to define what error was “fundamental.” That attempt has been abandoned. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 223 Pa.Super. 245, 297 A.2d 826, aff'd, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1972); Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). So should the courts abandon the attempt to insist upon a review that while “de novo”, does not “lightly disturb” the lower court’s findings.
When a case has been tried before a judge sitting without a jury, there should be no distinction so far as appellate review is concerned between a divorce case and any other kind of case. The general rule is:
On appeal, after findings made by a judge without a jury, the function of the appellate court is to determine whether the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial judge, approved by the court en banc, are sufficiently supported by the evidence. In so far as the finding of the court is not supported by the evidence, it will not be permitted to stand. The case will be disposed of as if the facts had been found by a jury. The evidence and proper inferences therefrom favorable to the finding must be taken as true and all unfavorable to it must be rejected.
6 Standard Pa. Practice 30 (footnotes, citing cases, omitted).
We apply this rule in deciding whether the trial judge’s findings that a woman was, or was not, raped should be upheld; I see no reason why we should not apply it in deciding whether his finding that a woman did, or did not, commit indignities should be upheld.
This opinion of mine, however, is not the law; I express it only in the hope that it may someday become *251the law. In the meantime, Esenwein v. Esenwein, supra, holds that on appeal a divorce case, unless it was heard by a jury, is to be reviewed differently from any other kind of case. Until Esenwein is overruled, we are bound by it; and not only has Esenwein not been overruled, it has relatively recently been cited with approval. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 428 Pa. 118, 121, 236 A.2d 785, 787 (1968).
-C-
The law on the effect to be given a master’s findings, when the master is the only one who has heard the testimony, is likewise settled, albeit, in my view, also unsatisfactorily.
The leading cases are Middleton v. Middleton, 187 Pa. 612, 41 A. 291 (1898), and Nacrelli v. Nacrelli, 288 Pa. 1, 136 A. 228 (1927). In Middleton the lower court approved the master’s report, which recommended that a divorce be granted. Reversing, the Supreme Court said:
Whether the marital contract shall be severed is the gravest of questions, not alone to the parties, but to the state, for the social structure rests upon it. It never was intended that judicial function should in any material degree be relinquished by conducting the proceedings before a master in his office, or that weighty judicial responsibility should be evaded by shifting it over to a member of the bar. We feel sure, a careful perusal of the statutes, will convince any one of the correctness of these observations. The ability, learning and conscience of the court must be called into exercise before there can be a dissolution of this contract. While the witnesses may be examined, and their testimony reduced to writing by the examiner, the court must, before decree, be satisfied by its own knowledge of the testimony that the averments of the libel have been proved by full and competent evidence. It is not sufficient that they have been proved to the *252satisfaction of the examiner by witnesses that the court neither saw nor heard.
187 Pa. at 615, 41 A. at 291.
Likewise, in Nacrelli the lower court approved the master’s report, which recommended that a divorce be granted. On appeal to the Supreme Court it was argued that Middleton was distinguishable. At the time Middleton was decided, there was no statutory authority for the master to do anything except take and return the testimony; at the time Nacrelli was argued, the master was authorized to take the testimony and to return it, “together with a report of the proceedings before him and his opinion of the case, to the court.” Act of March 10, 1899, P.L. 8, replaced by subsequent acts. The Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that these statutory changes added weight to the master’s findings. Said the Court:
These statutes do not change or attempt to change the duty of an appellate court to examine the testimony in divorce cases. President Judge ORLADY, speaking for the court in Breene v. Breene, 76 Pa.Super. 568, 570, says: “We are obliged by the statute of May 5, 1899, P.L. 250, section 7, conferring our jurisdiction [as theretofore exercised by the Supreme Court], to examine for ourselves the testimony in cases of this character, and to determine therefrom, independent of the findings of an examiner, or even in the court below, whether in truth and in fact a legal cause of divorce has been made out. Ever since the passage of this act, it has been held incumbent upon this court, on an appeal from a decree of divorce, except where there has been an issue and jury impanelled, to review the testimony and adjudge whether it sustains the complaint of the libellant.” Prior to 1899 the trial court appointed examiners, sometimes called masters, to take testimony in divorce cases, and return the same to the court, but the statutory right to make a report and ex*253press an opinion of the case seems to have originated in that statute. Such opinion is merely advisory and in no sense relieves the trial court of its duty to fully examine the testimony and decide upon the merits of the case. Sturgeon’s Pennsylvania Law and Procedure in Divorce (2d ed.) page 391. Such decision in each divorce case should be founded on the court’s personal examination of the testimony and in every contested case should be accompanied by a discussion of the evidence and a finding of the necessary facts and legal conclusions.
288 Pa. at 5-6, 136 A. at 229.
This characterization of the master’s findings as “merely advisory” has not always been followed. Where the case turns on credibility, it has been said that the master’s findings are “entitled to the fullest consideration.” See, e. g., Smith v. Smith, 157 Pa.Super. 582, 583-85, 43 A.2d 371, 372 (1945) (extended discussion). Sometimes the two standards are combined. For example, in Vautier v. Vautier, 138 Pa.Super. 366, 367, 11 A. 2d 207, 208 (1939), this court said:
We have repeatedly held that the report of the master is advisory only, and that it is our duty to examine the testimony carefully and make our independent finding. A report of a master, who has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the parties and their witnesses, is, nevertheless, to be given fullest consideration : Lyons v. Lyons, 116 Pa.Super. 385, 176 A. 792.
And see Freedman, supra, vol. 2, § 654 n. 20-22 (collecting cases).
These principles, despite their frequent reiteration, are attended in their application with great difficulty, which may be traced to the fact that Middleton v. Middleton, supra, and the many cases deriving from it, are built on a logical fallacy. In Middleton, as has been noted, it was said that “[i]t is not sufficient that [the allegations of desertion] have been proven to the satisfaction of the ex*254aminer by witnesses that the court neither saw nor heard.” (Emphasis added.) 187 Pa. at 615, 41 A. at 291. This may be granted. However, neither can it be sufficient for the allegations to have been proved to the satisfaction of the court by witnesses it neither saw nor heard. It is absurd to suppose that a judge can by himself, i. e., “de novo,” make a sound decision in a case that turns on credibility, when the judge has not heard the witnesses.
Nor is the absurdity lessened by the reference in Middleton to the State’s interest in the marital contract. The State’s interest is not to preserve the marital contract willy nilly; it is to preserve the contract if there is no legal cause to sever it. This interest cannot be served by the rule announced in Middleton. A judge who decides questions of credibility without having heard the witnesses is very likely to make a mistake. Sometimes his mistake will result in preserving a marital contract that should be severed; other times it will result in severing a marital contract that should be preserved.
As I understand Judge HOFFMAN’S opinion, he would escape the absurdity of Middleton by holding that a master’s findings on credibility are “necessarily dispositive” and “cannot effectively be reviewed.” However, I simply find no authority for this proposition. I recognize that he relies upon his opinion in Gehris v. Gehris, supra, but as I have stated above, in my view Gehris itself goes beyond the decided law.
Any doubt in this regard is removed by this court’s decision in Langeland v. Langeland, 108 Pa.Super. 375, 164 A. 816 (1933). There the lower court held just what Judge HOFFMAN says we should hold here. In its opinion the lower court said:
Being unwilling to reverse the findings of the master, who met the witnesses, observed them while giving testimony and gave careful consideration to all the testimony as his report shows, when the determination *255depends upon the credibility of the witnesses, we feel it our duty to confirm his report.
Id. at 378, 164 A. at 817.
This court unanimously reversed, saying: “This language, we think, indicates a misapprehension upon the part of the court below of its duty in divorce cases, as defined in Nacrelli v. Nacrelli, supra." Id. To be sure, we might overrule Langeland, except that it is based upon Nacrelli, by which we are bound. Moreover, it has relatively recently been cited with approval. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, supra, 428 Pa. at 121, 236 A.2d at 787.
In these circumstances, the only escape that I see from the absurdity of Middleton is to concentrate upon the injunction in the later cases, that where the issue is credibility, the master’s findings are “entitled to the fullest consideration.” See, e. g., Smith v. Smith, supra. I do not suggest that this is an easy solution. One cannot accomplish a “de novo” review while at the same time giving the master’s findings “the fullest consideration.” Our law would be healthier if the insistence upon a “de novo” review were abandoned. Also, in a given case there may be different opinions as to what “fullest consideration” means. For example: In Rankin v. Rankin, 181 Pa.Super. 414, 124 A.2d 639 (1956), this court was unanimous in setting aside a master’s findings; but in Faszczewski v. Faszczewski, 182 Pa.Super. 295, 126 A.2d 773 (1956), and Shank v. Shank, 130 Pa.Super. 122, 196 A. 570 (1938), the court divided, five to two in Faszczewski, and four to three in Shank, the dissenting judges arguing in both cases that the majority had in fact not given the fullest consideration to the master’s findings. However, difficult cases will always engender differences of opinion. If we do not take Ale novo” too literally, and if we make an earnest effort to give the master’s findings on credibility “the fullest consideration,” I think that at least in most cases we shall not *256miss the mark by much. If in a given case we conclude to reject the master’s findings, we should explain in detail the basis of our rejection. Thereby we shall avoid, at least as much as possible, the danger of making an arbitrary decision.
II
It remains to apply the law, as I have found it to be, to the facts of the present case.
I cannot join Judge CERCONE’s opinion because it seems to me he has failed to follow the injunction that where the issue is credibility, the master’s findings are “entitled to the fullest consideration.” He gives the findings no consideration at all: they are hardly mentioned, much less analyzed. This is in striking contrast to the treatment of the master’s findings in Shank v. Shank, supra. There the majority opinion rejected the master’s findings, but explained in detail the basis of its rejection. Judge HOFFMAN’S opinion demonstrates, at least to me, that when the master’s findings are given consideration, they prove persuasive. They are full and internally consistent, and they record facts by no means improbable. Accordingly, to accept the findings is not in my judgment inconsistent with our responsibility to make a de novo review.
There is a second difficulty I have with Judge CER-CONE’s opinion. In reviewing the record, he has in my judgment applied an incorrect legal standard. Thus he states that to rule in favor of appellant, “we would have to draw from the credible evidence” “[t]he inference of ‘settled hate and estrangement.’ ” Majority opinion at 1299. I submit that this is not so. In a concurring opinion in Steinke v. Steinke, 238 Pa.Super. 74, 86, 357 A.2d 674, 680 (1975), I pointed out that it is not necessary to prove settled hate and estrangement:
[T]he “essential feature of a charge of indignities”, Phipps v. Phipps [368 Pa. 291, 81 A.2d 523 (1951)], is *257a “course of conduct” that will depend “largely upon the circumstances of each case” but that in every case must be “inconsistent with the position and relation as a spouse,” McKrell v. McKrell [352 Pa. 173, 42 A.2d 609 (1945)], and render the condition of the injured and innocent spouse “intolerable” and his or her life “burdensome”, Act of May 2, 1929 [P.L. 1237, § 10, as amended by the Act of Mar. 19, 1943, P.L. 21, § 1], 23 P.S. § 10.
This test, as the master’s findings amply show, has been met.
The order of the lower court should be reversed and the record remanded with instructions to enter an order divorcing appellant from appellee.