Court Opinion

ID: 9906654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 19:24:19.249499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:19.955485
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued November 28, 2023

                                     In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                             NO. 01-23-00044-CV
                           ———————————
    IN RE UV LOGISTICS, LLC, UV LOGISTICS, LLC D/B/A UNITED
      VISION LOGISTICS, UNITED VISION LOGISTICS F/K/A UV
                    LOGISTICS, LLC, Relators

           Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

                                 OPINION

      Relators, UV Logistics, LLC, UV Logistics, LLC d/b/a United Vision

Logistics, and United Vision Logistics f/k/a UV Logistics, LLC [UV Logistics,

collectively] have filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial

court’s December 16, 2022 order requiring audio and videotape recording of the

independent neuropsychological examinations of four real parties in interest, and
the January 17, 2023 order denying UV Logistics’ motion for reconsideration.1

UV Logistics contends that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the

independent neuropsychological examinations of four real parties to be recorded.2

      We deny the petition.

                                     Background

      This mandamus arises from a personal injury lawsuit filed by real parties in

interest, Joe Medina, as next friend of Lillian Medina, Jeremy Atha, and Keisha

Atha, Individually and as next friend of Keilei Atha, and L.A,3 relating to a

collision between the Medina vehicle and an 18-wheeler carrying a load of pipe.

Real parties alleged that the collision caused injuries to the driver and all four

passengers in real parties’ vehicle. The driver of the truck, Fidel Edel Castillo

Fonseca, who was employed by Layser Trucking, was dispatched on behalf of UV

Logistics, to pick up the pipe and deliver it to the jobsite.

1
      The underlying case is Joe Medina, as Next Friend of L.M.; Jeremy Atha; and
      Keisha Atha, Individually and as next Friend of K.A. and L.A. v. Layser Batista
      Fonseca d/b/a Layser Trucking; Fidel Edel Castillo Fonseca; UV Logistics, LLC;
      UV Logistics, LLC d/b/a United Vision Logistics; United Vision Logistics f/k/a UV
      Logistics, LLC; and Apache Corporation, cause number 2018-89001, pending in
      the 334th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Dawn Rogers
      presiding.
2
      The trial court also ordered relator’s expert to turn over raw evaluation data.
      Relator does not challenge this part of the order.
3
      The four real parties who are the subject of the order for independent
      neuropsychological examinations are Jeremy Atha, Keisha Atha, Keilei Atha, and
      Lillian Medina.
                                            2
      UV Logistics filed a motion to compel an independent neuropsychological

examination of four real parties in interest by UV Logistics’ retained expert, Dr.

Justin O’Rourke, Ph.D. In the motion, UV Logistics asserted that real parties had

been examined by their own experts, Dr. Larry Pollock and Sandra A. Lopez,

LCSW-ACSW and, although UV Logistics had requested examination of real

parties by Dr. O’Rourke, real parties had failed to respond. UV Logistics claimed

entitlement to the independent examination because real parties had placed their

mental condition in controversy by alleging head injuries and other related

conditions. UV Logistics cited to real parties’ depositions to show the injuries they

allegedly sustained in the incident made the basis of the suit. UV Logistics also

stated that real parties’ expert physicians had diagnosed real parties with the

following impairments:

         • Jeremy Atha – cognitive deficits in learning and memory, daily
           headaches, forgetfulness, severe depression and anxiety. Dr. Pollock
           recommended cognitive rehabilitation and psychotherapy,

         • Keilei Atha – cognitive deficits in composite memory, verbal
           memory, visual memory, and reaction time, significant difficulty in
           learning and retaining new information, personality change, emotional
           changes, and significant daily pain. Dr. Pollock recommended
           cognitive rehabilitation for three months and 50 sessions of
           psychotherapy. Ms. Lopez also recommended behavioral health
           services, an outpatient support group, Trauma-Focused Cognitive
           Behavioral Health Therapy and family therapy,

         • Lillian Medina – cognitive deficits in problem solving, reasoning, and
           memory. Dr. Pollock recommended cognitive rehabilitation for three
           months and 50 sessions of psychotherapy, and
                                         3
         • Keisha Atha – cognitive deficits in composite memory, verbal
           memory, composite memory, motor speed, and difficulty following
           precise written instructions, learning and retaining new information,
           time management, verbal fluency, speed of processing information,
           and frustration control.       Dr. Pollock recommended cognitive
           rehabilitation for eight weeks and 50 sessions of psychotherapy.

Real parties opposed the motion.

      The motion was set for a hearing and on October 14, 2022, the trial court

signed an order granting the motion to compel, limiting the duration of each

examination to 1-2 hours for clinical interview and 5-6 hours for standardized

testing. Real parties filed a motion to reconsider and to modify the order to include

certain safeguards, claiming that UV Logistics’ proposed protocols for the

examinations failed to protect their rights and to verify testing was conducted

properly. The safeguards real parties requested were video and audio recording of

the examinations and production of the underlying raw test data. UV Logistics

opposed this modification of the order, asserting that real parties had offered no

grounds supporting the requirement of recording Dr. O’Rourke’s examination.

      During the hearing on the motion, real parties argued that videotaping was

needed to ensure the testing was actually done and to ensure that no one attempted

to circumvent the attorney-client privilege.      In support of their request for

recording, real parties offered the affidavit of Dr. Richard Frederick who stated

that recording of independent medical examinations was needed to protect real

                                         4
parties from deliberate or inadvertent errors and would not violate any ethical or

professional requirements. Real parties also asked the trial court for safeguards

based on real parties’ traumatic brain injuries but offered no evidence concerning

these injuries.

      UV Logistics opposed recording and advised the trial court that case law,

such as In re the Society of Our Lady of the Most Holy Trinity,4 supported UV

Logistics’ argument that real parties had not met their burden of proving the need

for recording of the examinations and that the affidavit of Dr. Frederick did not

provide the type of evidence needed.

      The trial court responded:

      What I find persuasive when I go back through some of the briefing
      from - - it may have been the previous motion - - is some of the
      impairments that the [real parties] are alleged to have. And I
      understand they’re allegations. But it talks about their memory, it
      talks about anxiety, forgetfulness.

      Under ordinary circumstances, again, if we were talking about a
      physical examination or even any other kind of neurological
      examination, we may not have the same concerns because we’d know
      that those particular plaintiffs could run out and go and tell their
      lawyers or get up and say, no, I’m not doing this and call their parent
      on the phone.

      I have concerns these [real parties], though, may or may not – - we
      don’t know - - have the wherewithall to do that. And I think that’s
      again, why I wanted and I am granting the examination. But I do
      believe these safeguards, and I believe under the facts of this case are

4
      622 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburgh 2019, orig. proceeding).
                                         5
      necessary. So I am going to order the medical examination with a
      videographer.

      The trial court orally ruled that the examinations by Dr. O’Rourke would be

videotaped but asked the parties to figure out the logistics and type of facility so

that the audio and visual recording could be as inconspicuous as possible. The trial

court asked for the parties to provide an order within five days.

      UV Logistics then filed two supplemental responses objecting to recording.

Real parties filed a reply to these responses, attaching a draft order for the trial

court, and providing excerpts of Dr. Pollock’s evaluations of the real parties. On

December 16, 2022, the trial court held a “status conference” regarding the parties’

scheduling of the evaluation and the recording logistics. However, the parties had

not reached an agreement and UV Logistics continued to argue that real parties had

not presented proof of special circumstances justifying recording of the

independent examinations. The trial court signed a modified order the same day as

the status conference, December 16, 2022, striking the prior order of October 14,

2022, requiring UV Logistics to provide the location where the neuropsychological

examinations were to be conducted, and ensuring that the location had facilities

permitting “inconspicuous video and audio recording of the examinations.”

Additionally, the trial court ordered UV Logistics to provide the raw data from the

examinations when they produced the expert’s reports.

                                          6
      UV Logistics filed a motion to reconsider the December 16, 2022 order,

arguing again that real parties had not provided sufficient cause to require

recording. On January 17, 2023, the trial court signed an order denying the motion

for reconsideration and UV Logistics filed the petition for writ of mandamus.

                                       Analysis

      Standard of Review

      To establish entitlement to mandamus relief, relators must show both that

the trial court abused its discretion and that they lack an adequate remedy by

appeal. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). A

clear abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is “so arbitrary and

capricious that it amounts to clear error.” In re Bailey-Newell, 439 S.W.3d 428,

431 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding). “With respect to

resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the trial court’s discretion, . . .

the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992). “In other words, under an

abuse of discretion standard, this Court should defer to the trial court’s factual

determinations if they are supported by the evidence.” In re Reedle, No. 05-16-

01483-CV, 2017 WL 944030, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas March 10, 2017, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643

(Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding)).

                                           7
      Less deference is afforded a trial court’s determination of legal principles

that control its ruling. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. A trial court has no

discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts of the

case and thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law will

constitute an abuse of discretion. See id.

      Law Applicable to Independent Mental Examinations

      Requests for mental examinations of opposing parties are governed by Rule

204.1. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 204.1. Under Rule 204.1, “[a] trial court may compel

an examination ‘only for good cause shown’ and ‘when the mental or physical

condition . . . of a party . . . is in controversy.’” In re Sherwin-Williams Co., 668

S.W.3d 368, 370 (Tex. 2023) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 204.1(a)(1)). The “good

cause” requirement balances one party’s right to a fair trial with the other party’s

right to privacy. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex. 2016). To

establish good cause, “the movant must show that (1) the examination is relevant

to the issue in controversy and is likely to lead to relevant evidence, (2) there is a

‘reasonable nexus between the examination and the condition in controversy,’ and

(3) the desired information ‘cannot be obtained by less intrusive means.’”

Sherwin-Williams, 668 S.W.3d at 371 (quoting H.E.B., 492 S.W.3d at 303).

      Whether to grant a motion for an independent mental examination is left to

the trial court’s discretion. See In re Offshore Marine Contractors, Inc., 496

                                             8
S.W.3d 796, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding). But if a

plaintiff has put his neuropsychological condition in controversy through expert

testimony, denying the opposing party their own testing will seriously restrict the

opposing party from discovering facts that might contradict the plaintiff’s expert

witness. See id. at 802–03. “Allowing both parties’ experts to operate on a level

playing field where they both interview [the plaintiffs] and conduct appropriate

testing will allow the jury to consider the basis for their differing opinions.” Id. at

803. However, the trial court retains discretion to place reasonable limits on this

testing by specifying time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the

examination. See id. (citing to TEX. R. CIV. P. 204.1(d)).

      Texas Case Law

      UV Logistics argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a

recording requirement because real parties did not establish special circumstances

or good cause for recording and because recording would impair their expert’s

ability to collect reliable data, would contravene professional standards, rules and

norms, and would threaten the validity of his testing process.           Finally, UV

Logistics argues that the recording requirements denied them the same opportunity

to examine the real parties that real parties’ own expert enjoyed.

      In support of their argument, UV Logistics cites to two Texas cases in which

the courts granted mandamus relief under similar circumstances. See In re the

                                          9
Society of Our Lady of the Most Holy Trinity, 622 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi-Edinburgh 2019, orig. proceeding); In re Redbird Trails Apts., No.

05-20-00284-CV, 2020 WL 3445811, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 24, 2020,

orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

      In Society, the trial court granted relator’s motion to compel an independent

examination by a board-certified forensic psychiatrist but added a handwritten

interlineation stating that the court “will allow for a video recording of the

examination.” 622 S.W.3d at 8. The Society filed a motion for reconsideration

arguing that recording the examination would “significantly impact the results of

the examination.” Id. This motion was supported in part by the affidavit of the

physician who was to examine the plaintiff and he stated that the presence of a

third party or a recording device “creates an atmosphere where the responses of the

examinee are less forthcoming and less representative of the true mental state of

the examinee.” Id. at 8–9. Moreover, the physician stated the recording would

“negatively impact the validity of [his] evaluation and impair [his] ability to

provide to the court the most accurate and true expert analysis and resultant

conclusions.”   Id. at 9.   Finally, the physician stated that recording of his

evaluation would not provide him with equal ability to evaluate the plaintiff under

the same circumstances as that of the plaintiff’s physician. See id. The trial court

held a hearing and denied the Society’s motion to reconsider. See id.

                                        10
       The Society challenged the trial court’s order by filing a petition for writ of

mandamus, arguing that the party seeking recording had the burden to demonstrate

“special conditions” or good cause, that recording would destroy the validity of the

examination, and that in the “battle of the experts,” the Society would be “required

to defend itself on an ‘uneven playing field,’ thereby depriving it of a fair trial.”

Id. at 12.

       Citing to Ornelas v. S. Tire Mart, LLC, 292 F.R.D. 388, 395–97 (S.D. Tex.

2013) and Holland v. U.S., 182 F.R.D. 493, 495 (D.S.C. 1998), the Society court

noted that recording and third-party observation of examinations are disfavored by

most federal courts. 622 S.W.3d at 13. The basis for those courts rejecting

observation and recording is that it introduces “a human or mechanical presence—

whether a lawyer, a stenographer, a tape recorder, or other instrumentality—[that]

changes the nature of the proceeding.” Id. (quoting Ornelas, 292 F.R.D. at 397).

Most federal courts also find that recording affects the results of the examination.

As stated in Romano v. II Morrow, Inc.:

       [A]n observer, a court reporter, or recording device would constitute a
       distraction during the examination and work to diminish the accuracy
       of the process. [An observer could] potentially distract the examining
       [physician] and examinee thereby compromising the results of the
       examination. Moreover, the presence of the observer interjects an
       adversarial, partisan atmosphere into what should be otherwise a
       wholly objective inquiry . . . . The Court finds that the presence of the
       observer would lend a degree of artificiality to the examination that
       would be inconsistent with the applicable professional standard.

                                          11
173 F.R.D. 271, 273–74 (D. Or. 1997). Although Romano discusses an observer,

the federal courts do not distinguish between recording and a third-party observer.

See Holland, 182 F.R.D. at 495.

      The Society court recognized another reason that recording should not be

allowed—it “subverts the purpose of [Rule 204.1], which is to put both the plaintiff

and the defendant on an equal footing regarding the evaluation of the party’s

medical or psychological status.” 622 S.W.3d at 13. In other words, the Society

court held that, where one party has been examined without recording devices, the

other party should be given the same opportunity. See id.; see also Favale v.

Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport, 235 F.R.D. 553, 557 (D. Conn. 2006).

      In Redbird Trails, the Dallas Court of Appeals relied on Society to hold that

it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order videotaping of the

independent examinations. See 2020 WL 3445811, at *4. The Dallas court based

its decision on two findings: (1) the movant’s expert should be allowed the same

opportunity to develop his opinion as the opposing party’s expert and in this case,

real party’s experts were not videotaped, and (2) real party did not provide any

proof of special circumstances or a particularized need requiring videotaping of the

examination.5 See id. at *4 (citing to Society, 622 S.W.3d at 11).

5
      Relators assert that neuropsychological examinations present different concerns
      that a physical or medical examination and in support of that argument, they cite
      In re Genesis Marine, LLC, No. 01-22-00028-CV, 2022 WL 2919935 (Tex.
                                          12
      The Society case is well-reasoned and we will follow it

      Although the two Texas cases determined that recording of an independent

examination should not occur absent a showing of special circumstances or a

particularized need, real parties contend that these cases are unsound and urge this

Court not to follow them. Because Society is the initial case with detailed analysis

of the issue, real parties focus on Society, arguing that it is based on “select federal

district court opinions,” which real parties appear to contend are wrongly decided

as they conflate the presence of third parties at independent examinations with

inconspicuous recording. Real parties also dispute the Society statement that the

majority of federal courts reject recording. Real parties state: “While there is

certainly a dispute among federal trial courts across the country—as one would

expect given that these are inherently discretionary issues to be decided on a case-

by-case basis—declaring any sort of majority rule or presumption based on these

cases is careless.”6

      App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 26, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). In that
      case, relators sought mandamus relief to require the trial court to permit the audio
      recording of an independent medical examination. Id. at *1. Because this case
      does not state why the petition was denied, it lends no support for relators’
      argument.
6
      In rejecting the majority federal rule cited by Society, real parties cite
      Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Overstreet, 103 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Ky. 2003)
      and Boswell v. Schultz, 175 P.3d 390, 395–96 (Okla. 2007). Both cases merely
      note that not all federal courts agree on whether recording of independent
      examinations should be allowed.

                                           13
      In reviewing federal cases addressing the recording of independent

examinations, there are some that permit recording under exceptional

circumstances. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Sequoyah Trading & Transp., 273 F.R.D.

662, 664 (D. Kan. 2011) (holding that special circumstances supported recording

when party had long history of mental illness that could prevent his

communication with counsel); Di Bari v. Incaica Cia Armadora, S.A., 126 F.R.D

12, 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (permitting stenographer at psychiatric exam where

plaintiff was not fluent in English and would have trouble communicating with his

attorney). But recording of independent examinations is the exception, not the

rule, and most federal courts addressing this question reject recording of an

independent examination. See, e.g., Holland, 182 F.R.D. at 495 (“However, the

majority of federal courts have rejected the notion that a third party should be

allowed, even indirectly through a recording device, to observe a Rule 357

examination.”); Jackson v. Harris Cnty, Tex., No. H-17-3885, 2019 WL 2544058,

at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 20, 2019) (“Courts generally disfavor third-party attendance

or videotaping of mental examinations.”).

7
      Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 permits a court to order a party whose mental
      or physical condition is in controversy to submit to a physical or mental
      examination but the order may be made only on motion for good cause and the
      order must specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the
      examination as well as the examinee. See FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a). This rule is quite
      similar to Rule 204.1, which also permits a trial court to order a party to submit to
      an examination only when the mental or physical condition of a party is in
      controversy and for good cause shown. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 204.1(a),(c).
                                           14
     In cases like Holland and Tomlin v. Holecek, federal courts have identified a

variety of concerns with allowing recording of an independent examination. The

presence of a third party adds a “degree of artificiality to the interview technique

which would be inconsistent with applicable professional standards” and would be

at odds with the Rule 35 purpose to provide a level playing field, which means that

“the party requesting the examination should be free from oversight by the

opposing party.” Holland, 182 F.R.D. at 495. The court added that both the

plaintiff’s and the defendant’s experts were bound by the same principles of

professional integrity and methodologies of their discipline.       See id. at 496.

Finally, the court agreed with Tomlin v. Holecek, 150 F.R.D. 628 (D. Minn. 1993),

in which the court “refused to promote ‘the infusion of the adversary process into

the . . . examining room,’” because the presence of a videographer could influence

the examinee, “even unconsciously, to exaggerate or diminish his reactions” to the

physical examination or fail to respond in a forthright manner. Holland, 182

F.R.D. at 496 (citing and quoting Tomlin, `150 F.R.D. at 631–34). The Holland

court further stated that a videotape “would give Plaintiffs an evidentiary tool

unavailable to Defendant, who has not been privy to physical examinations made

of [plaintiff] by either his treating physicians or any experts he may have retained”

and this further undermines the purpose of Rule 35. Holland, 182 F.R.D. at 496.

                                         15
      Federal courts considering this issued have found that psychological

examinations raise special concerns. See, e.g., Tomlin, 150 F.R.D. at 631–32. In

deciding whether to permit recording of the examination of a security guard who

was assaulted and suffered severe injuries and psychological harm, the court noted

that no one had claimed that the examiner was unqualified “either because of her

professional qualifications or her professional integrity.” Id. at 631. Instead, the

complaint was that the physician would conduct a “2-hour interview which

[would] unnecessarily [expose] him to the unfettered inquiry of an ‘agent’ of the

Defendants, whose sole function will be to disparage the value of his case.” Id. In

reviewing other federal and state cases on the question, the court observed that the

great weight of federal decisions favored exclusion of a third-party observer and

the state cases were “driven by perceived local customs or the provisions of a State

statute.” Id. Like in Holland, the Tomlin court also held that recording the

examination would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of Rule 35 and

justified its holding on three grounds: (1) requiring a recording “would potentiate

toward invalidating [the examiner’s] evaluatory technique”; (2) Rule 35 is an

attempt to level the playing field between the parties in their efforts to appraise the

plaintiff’s psychological condition; and (3) to require recording of a Rule 35

examination would “foster a greater degree of advocacy in the conduct of such

examinations than is, already, unavoidably present.” Id. at 631–34. Therefore, the

                                          16
court ordered the psychological examination to go forward without any restrictions

such as recording. See id. at 634.

     Because the federal courts consider the presence of a recording device to be

an indirect form of a third-party presence, though less intrusive, most of these

courts reject recording, and particularly of psychological examinations, based on

the risk of invalidating the evaluator’s technique given that psychological

examinations “necessitate an unimpeded, one-on-one exchange between the doctor

and the patient.” Tomlin, 150 F.R.D. at 631–32; see also Schlenker v. G-and-R

Integration Servs, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-237, 2021 WL 6805706, at *3, 6 (D. N. D.

Oct. 4, 2021) (considering position statements of professional organizations such

as The National Academy of Neuropsychology, the American Academy of Clinical

Neuropsychology and the American College of Professional Neuropsychology that

oppose third-party observers or recording, and ultimately finding “special

circumstances sufficient to warrant recording of [doctor’s] examination of

[plaintiff]”).

     The federal courts also interpret Rule 35, which is similar to Texas Rule of

Civil Procedure 204.1, as “a forthright attempt to provide a ‘level playing field’

between the parties in their respective efforts to appraise the Plaintiff’s

psychological state.” Tomlin, 150 F.R.D. at 632. As in our case, the Tomlin

plaintiff objected to permitting defendant’s “hired gun” to have an “unfettered

                                       17
opportunity to question [plaintiff] for two hours.” Id. But the court stated that its

decision was guided by the clear intent of the rule rather than “misapprehensions

about its potential for misuse.” Id. The court found that permitting the defense

expert an unfettered, two-hour examination was “no greater than the liberality

extended to the Plaintiff’s consultants . . . .” Id. at 633. In addressing plaintiff’s

argument that permitting the presence of plaintiff’s attorney or the recording of the

defense expert’s examination would assist plaintiff’s counsel in questioning the

defense expert, the court determined that this “would be endorsing, if not

promoting, the infusion of the adversary process into the psychologist’s examining

room to an extent which is, in our considered judgment, inconsistent with the just,

speedy and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes, and with the dictates of Rule

35.” Id. at 634.

      Finally, our survey of relevant cases demonstrates that some state courts do

permit recording of independent examinations. See, e.g., DiFiore v. Pezic, 296

A.3d 425, 435, 437 (N.J. 2023) (holding that, based on state rule 4:19, trial court

determines on case-by-case basis what conditions to place on defense examination,

including who may attend and if it may be recorded, and if defendant objects,

defendant should move for protective order to prevent recording or third-party

observation), see also Boswell v. Schultz, 175 P.3d 390, 398–99 (Ok. 2007) (stating

that Oklahoma statute authorizes examinee to bring third-party representative and

                                         18
case law has previously permitted audio recording; also asserting that independent

examinations are made with litigation in mind and, because defendant had not

shown reason to limit recording to audio recording, medical examination could be

videotaped).8

      Real parties contend, as some courts have decided, that recording of an

independent medical examination is merely a condition of the examination that

trial courts have discretion to impose and that modern technology permits

recording to be unobtrusive or inconspicuous and thus, any concerns about

interference with the examination are unfounded. See, e.g., J.H. v. Sch. Town of

Munster, 38 F. Supp. 3d 986, 989 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (observing that “in its

discretion, a court may permit the presence of a recording device at the Rule 35

examination”).    The federal courts that do permit recording find concerns

“overblown or misplaced” as to recording causing a distraction, inhibiting candid

communication, or failing to put defendant and plaintiff on an equal footing.

Brewer v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 4:21-CV-241-MLB, 2023 WL 1529382, at *1–2

(N.D. Ga. Feb. 3, 2023). The Brewer court explained that “[m]odern audio-

8
      The Boswell court sets out the relatively few states with statutes that, as of 2007,
      specifically permit an external presence in the examination either by third-party
      presence or audio or video recording. See 175 P.3d at 390 n. 21 (Ok. 2007). The
      court also sets out the large number of states, including Texas, with more general
      statutes or rules, some of which permit recording. Id. at 397 n. 23–24. According
      to the review of the states in this case (in 2007), there is not a majority of states
      that uphold recording of examinations.
                                           19
recording devices are small, unobtrusive, quiet, and . . . often forgotten after the

first few minutes of a proceeding.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing

Underwood v. Fitzgerald, 229 F.R.D. 548, 550 (M.D. Tenn. 2005), in which the

court permitted audio recording as long as recording device was small, quiet, and

unobtrusive). But the Texas cases considering this issue have not followed this

minority view.

      Having considered the Texas cases, as well as cases from other jurisdictions,

we find Society to be well-reasoned and we reject real parties’ contention that it is

“unsound.” The federal cases cited by Society primarily rely on Federal Rule 35,

which is quite similar in language to our Rule 204.1, in that it permits one party to

compel another party to submit to a physical or mental examination. Compare

TEX. R. CIV. P. 204.1(a) with FED. R. CIV. P. 35. Both require the motion to state

good cause for the examination and both require the trial court to specify the time,

manner, place, conditions, and scope of the examination. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

204.1(c)-(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 204.1 is to balance the

movant’s right to a fair trial with the opposing party’s right to privacy. See H.E.B.,

492 S.W.3d at 303. The stated purpose of Federal Rule 35 is “to preserve the equal

footing of the parties to evaluate the plaintiff’s [physical or mental condition] . . . .”

Diaz v. Con-Way Truckload, Inc., 279 F.R.D. 412, 419 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Although Federal Rule 35 and our Rule 204.1 are not

                                           20
identical in language, both rules have the same purpose—to permit the movant the

right to obtain medical or psychological evidence it may use to oppose the other

party’s evidence, and this preserves an equal playing field for the parties while

balancing both parties’ rights.

      Moreover, Society sets out a reasonable rule for determining whether

recording an independent examination should be permitted. As in most federal

cases addressing this issue, the Society court stated that recording should not be

permitted unless the movant establishes special circumstances or a particularized

need for recording. See Society, 622 S.W.3d at 17. The Society court also noted

the problems with recording such an examination without advising the party:

“Videotaping Doe during a psychological examination performed for the purposes

of litigation, without disclosing to her that the examination would be recorded, or

the possibility and likelihood that the videotape would be viewed by third parties,

presents fundamental problems pertaining to consent [and] privacy” and might not

“comport with the rules of ethics and fiduciary responsibilities imbedded in the

attorney-client relationship and the ethical and professional obligations of the

examiner.” Id. We will follow this requirement that a movant for the recording of

an independent psychological examination provide evidence, including specific

facts of special circumstances or a particularized need for the recording of the

examination. See id.

                                        21
      UV Logistics has not established an abuse of discretion

      According to Society, a party requesting recording must “show special

circumstances or a particularized need, unique to her situation, supported by

specific facts, that provide good cause for allowing the examination to be

videotaped.” See id. at 17. The kinds of special circumstances that might support

recording include “where the examinee is a minor, does not speak the relevant

language, or suffers from a disability that might impair his or her ability to

communicate to counsel what occurs during the examination, or where evidence

otherwise suggests that recording would be advisable.” Id. at 14; see Schaeffer,

273 F.R.D. at 664 (special circumstances supported recording when party had long

history of mental illness that could prevent his communication with counsel);

Greenhorn v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 649, 653–54 (D. Kan. 2003)

(recording upheld where examiner had been previously disqualified for abusive

behavior); Di Bari, 126 F.R.D. at 14 (permitting stenographer at psychiatric exam

where plaintiff was not fluent in English and would have trouble communicating

with his attorney); Maldonado v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,, No. 09-1187-EFM, 2011

WL 841432, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 8, 2011) (permitting recording because party had

third-grade education and was non-English speaker with impaired memory and

cognitive abilities which impaired ability to communicate with counsel); T.B. ex

rel. G.B. v. Chico Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV S-07-0926-GEB-CMK, 2009 WL

                                       22
837468, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2009) (permitting recording of examination of

autistic child on examiner’s request because “with traumatized children, a child’s

facial expressions, body language, movements and behavioral enactments

communicate medically significant information which can be captured on

videotape” and there was “no indication in this case that the unobtrusive use of a

video camera will make the examination of plaintiff adversarial.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

      Good cause for recording an examination “is not established by the

inherently adversarial nature of the examination, the fact that the examining

physician was selected or paid for by opposing counsel, the theoretical potential for

misconduct during the examination, the desire to obtain an accurate, dispute-free

version of what was said, or the fear that the examination would become a de facto

deposition.” Society, 622 S.W.3d at 15 (citing Hertenstein v. Kimberly Home

Health Care, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 620, 629–31 (D. Kan 1999)).

      Real parties initially provided no evidence meeting the “special

circumstances” test. Real parties initially sought recording of the examination

based on the following reasons:      (1) the testing would give an agent of UV

Logistics virtually unbridled access to the real parties; (2) there was no disclosure

of what tests would be used; (3) the testing would not be supervised by the real

parties’ attorneys or a representative; (4) there would be no way to verify the

                                         23
    testing was conducted properly; and (5) the real parties had traumatic brain

    injuries. Real parties further claimed that testing without their attorney present was

    “a dangerous and intrusive circumvention of their rights and the attorney/client

    privilege.” None of these arguments constituted proof of special circumstances

    unique to the individuals that supported recording of the neuropsychological

    examinations.

          Although real parties offered the affidavit of Richard Frederick, Ph.D., his

    affidavit only offered general statements concerning his disagreement with

    allowing a defense expert “unfettered access to the Plaintiffs”9 without recording.

    Dr. Frederick was not a physician who had examined real parties in this case and

    so his affidavit provided no special circumstances unique to the real parties

9
       During the hearing held on October 26, 2022, real parties’ counsel stated:

                 We’re going to send some folks that have traumatic brain
                 injury, have depression, they’ve had a lot of problems since
                 they got hit by the 18-wheeler; and the last thing we need to
                 do is have somebody, a defense-hired expert, circumvent the
                 attorney-client privilege, start asking all kinds of questions
                 about things, and then give us a global report without us
                 knowing exactly what took place. And that’s why we
                 submitted evidence in this case. And I know there’s cases
                 that talk about videotaping and if you’re going to videotape,
                 you need to bring evidence. We brought evidence.

                 We brought evidence of Dr. Richard Frederick, and Dr.
                 Frederick points out things by having watched on videotape
                 some of the flawed testing that takes place and if we don’t
                 monitor it, there’s going to be problems.

                                              24
supporting recording of the examinations. Instead, Dr. Frederick merely opined in

favor of recording examinations and asserting that recording is “commonly used”

and a “common practice” and that it does not “disrupt the testing process, when

modern equipment is used.” These general concerns and opinions do not provide

evidence of special circumstances or a particularized need, unique to each of the

four real parties, that required recording of the neuropsychological examinations.

      In contrast, UV Logistics offered the affidavit from their neuropsychologist,

Dr. Justin O’Rourke, who asserted:

      [N]europsychological practice standards dictate that it is not
      permissible to allow video/audio recording, third party observation, or
      monitoring of clinical or forensic evaluations. I respectfully decline
      the request from Plaintiffs’ counsel to record, videotape, or observe
      the neuropsychological evaluation for the following legal, scientific,
      and ethical reasons:

   a. Allowing third party observation, monitoring, or recording would
      violate neuropsychological practice standards and the standards put
      forth by my professional board, the American Academy of Clinical
      Neuropsychology/American Board of Clinical Neuropsychology
      (hereafter referred to as AACN). Dr. Frederick erroneously states in
      his affidavit that “The field of neuropsychology has now abandoned
      the argument that video cameras negatively affect test performance.”

      ....

      However, Dr. Frederick does not cite the 2021 consensus statement
      from NAN [National Academy of Neuropsychology] and AACN that
      directly addresses third party observation recording . . . . [providing
      that third party observation in person or recorded] remains a potential
      threat to the validity and reliability of evaluation results, and violates
      test security guidelines, ethical principles and standards of conduct in
      the field.
                                         25
   b. The presence of a third-party observer (including recording
   devices) would constitute a non-standard administration of the tests
   and compromise the validity of the cognitive and psychological test
   results. Neuropsychological and psychological tests are standardized
   measure that are not developed in the presence of a third-party
   observer. If a third-party observer or recording device is present, then
   results from non-standard test procedures would be compared to
   normative data based on the standard test administration . . . and
   would limit the conclusions that could be drawn from the data.
   Indeed, it appears that Dr. Frederick and Plaintiffs’ counsel are trying
   to compel an invalid and non-standard exam, especially when Dr.
   Frederick states in his affidavit that neuropsychologists who
   videorecord evaluations are obligated to “report that the assessment
   was conducted in a non-standard way (which is exactly what Dr.
   O’Rourke should do when he records his entire assessment).”

c. Third-party observation compromises the scientific integrity of test
   results and increases the risk of producing inaccurate information for
   the plaintiff, counsel, and court. Multiple peer reviewed scientific
   articles have been published on the effect of third-party observers
   (including recording devices) on the validity and reliability of
   neuropsychological/psychological tests.

   ....

   d. The Plaintiffs have completed prior cognitive evaluations in this
   case, and none of them included video/audio recording or third party
   observation as part of the exams.

   ....

   e. Dr. Frederick creates a strawman argument when he states that
   neuropsychologists are concerned about the effect of third party
   observation and video/audio recording on test results, but then they
   contradict themselves when they do not show the same concern about
   the effects of litigation or an examination by an “opposing” expert
   that Plaintiffs presumably distrust. . . . .—The effect of litigation is
   known and present in clinical exams . . . and [c]ompetent
   neuropsychologists aim to minimize sources of error and non-standard
                                     26
      test administration in their exams, which means excluding third party
      observers and video/audio recordings regardless of the context (i.e.,
      clinical or forensic).

      f. Allowing third party observation or recording violates professional
      ethics codes, practice standards, and the Act and Rules of the Texas
      State Board of Examiners of Psychologists (TSBEP).

      When the trial court held a hearing on October 26, 2022 on real parties’

motion to modify the original order to permit recording of Dr. O’Rourke’s

evaluations and when the trial court orally granted that motion, the trial court had

before it no proof of special circumstances, but only had arguments of counsel and

speculation about the need for recording. Speculation about special circumstances

is not the proof required to show special circumstances justifying audio and video

recording. See Society, 622 S.W.3d at 13–14.

     However, further proof was presented to the trial court after the October 26

hearing. In their reply to UV Logistics’ responses opposing the October 26 oral

ruling, real parties for the first time provided some medical record excerpts

concerning the impairments of the four real parties.       Although these are not

complete reports by Dr. Pollock, they include the summaries and conclusions for

his evaluations of each real party and the excerpts include the signature of Dr.

Pollock.

     Exhibit G to real parties’ reply is an excerpt from a report of an evaluation by

Dr. Pollock of Jeremy Atha finding that he had cognitive impairments, anxiety,

                                         27
forgetfulness, depression, and “significant neuropsychological impairments” with

deficits in rote verbal learning and memory, making it difficult for him to recall

specifics of information heard when the information is unrelated.

     Exhibit H is an excerpt of an October 2021 evaluation by Dr. Pollock of

Keisha Atha revealing “significant neuropsychological impairments” with deficits

in “complex attention and processing speed (speed of auditory information

processing), executive functioning (verbal fluency) . . . [and] cognitive dysfunction

. . . forgetfulness, and increased depression and anxiety.”

     Exhibit I is an excerpt of a neuropsychological evaluation by Dr. Pollock of

Keilei Atha revealing “Major Neurocognitive Disorder” and “significant

neuropsychological impairments” including deficits in “complex attention and

processing speed (speed of visual tracking, numerical reasoning, visual motor

speed, and speed of auditory information processing), executive functioning

(verbal fluency), learning and memory (rote verbal learning and memory and

visual recognition memory), and language (receptive language and verbal

fluency).”   Dr. Pollock further concluded that Keilei’s complex attention and

processing-speed deficits make it difficult for her to process verbal and visual

information, and short-term memory problems make it difficult for her to recall

specifics of information she had heard if it is unrelated.

                                          28
     Exhibit J is an excerpt from the neuropsychological evaluation performed by

Dr. Pollock on Lillian Medina in which Dr. Pollock determined that Medina had

ongoing visual impairments, “significant neuropsychological impairments”

including deficits in “complex attention and processing speed (speed of visual

tracking and speed of auditory information processing), learning and memory (rote

verbal learning and memory and logical verbal memory), as well as language

(sentence repetition and oral spelling).”

     To determine if this evidence meets the test set out in Society, it must “show

special circumstances or a particularized need, unique to [real parties’] situation,

supported by specific facts, that provide good cause for allowing the examination

to be videotaped.” Society, 622 S.W.3d at 17. Although the medical records

include many similar issues shared by all of the real parties, such as anxiety,

depression, and forgetfulness, the records also present neuropsychological issues,

unique to each real party, that affect their ability to process information, remember

information, and therefore, likely will affect their ability to communicate with their

attorneys about the testing. See id. at 14 (asserting that courts have found special

circumstances when evidence shows plaintiff suffers from impairment preventing

ability to communicate with counsel what happened during examination). Based

on the evidence of unique deficits in each of the real parties’ verbal memory,

processing speeds, and attention, the trial court could have concluded that real

                                            29
parties had presented sufficient proof of special circumstances unique to each real

party that supported recording of the evaluations by Dr. O’Rourke.

      Although this evidence was presented after the trial court had orally ruled to

permit recording of the examinations, it was presented to the trial court before it

signed the December 16, 2022 order.10 Thus, as detailed above, the trial court had

adequate proof of special circumstances showing that each of the real parties had

cognitive deficits that could likely affect their ability to communicate about the

testing with their counsel.

      In the mandamus context, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the

trial court as it concerns “factual issues or matters committed to the trial court’s

discretion.” Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839; In re Wyatt Field Svc. Co., 454 S.W.3d

145, 152 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding). We cannot

substitute our opinion for that of the trial court even if we would reach a different

conclusion. See Hollander v. Capon, 853 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). Because the trial court could have concluded that

real parties presented sufficient proof of special circumstances or a particularized

10
      Relators do not challenge or brief in this Court the scope of the record considered
      by the trial court when it signed the December 16, 2022 order and the January 17,
      2023 order. See Guerinot v. Wetherell, No. 01-12-00194-CV, 2013 WL 2456741,
      at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 6, 2013, no pet.). As a result, we also
      do not address it. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 454 (Tex. 2011)
      (declining to address potential ground for mandamus relief not briefed to the
      Court).
                                          30
need, unique to each real party, UV Logistics has not established that the trial court

abused its discretion.

      Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We lift the stay of

all trial court proceedings granted on February 2, 2023. Any pending motions are

dismissed as moot.

                                              Richard Hightower
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

                                         31