Court Opinion

ID: 9673822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:18:54.530974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.308272
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
NYE, Justice.
I respectfully dissent.
This is a case of first impression. The specific question concerns the residence requirement of a special judge to try a case in the county probate court.
The facts are undisputed. The regular county judge was disqualified and apparently the interested parties did not agree on the appointment of a proper person to try the case. Whereupon, the Governor appointed Judge Edwards, whose qualifications are not denied, except that he is a non-resident of the county in which the case is to be tried. A quo warranto action was brought by the State of Texas to enforce the substantive law of this state. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Texas holding that the special county judge was disqualified by reason that he was a non-resident of Kenedy County.
There are two constitutional provisions concerning the disqualification of the county Judge. Article V, Sec. 11 of the Texas Constitution provides that if a district judge is disqualified to try a particular case, the parties may by consent appoint a proper person or “ * * * upon their failing to cio so, a competent person may be appointed * * * as may be prescribed by law.” 1 * * * “ * * * This disqualification of judges of inferior tribunals (county judges) shall be remedied and vacancies in their offices filled as may be prescribed by law. * * * ” The same rule applies specifically to county judges in Art. V, Sec. 16 of the Texas Constitution, wherein again the constitutional mandate is, that such person who is to try the case may be appointed "as prescribed by law.” Virtually the same language is used for the appointment of a substitute special county judge.
Article 1932, V.A.C.S., provides that when a county judge is disqualified to act in any probate matter, he shall certify his disqualification to the Governor whereupon the Governor “shall appoint some person to act as special judge in said case, * * This article makes no further reference to the qualifications of a special county judge to be appointed by the Governor other than to be “some person” who shall “act for the regular county judge”, unless you look to the law as set forth otherwise. The Constitution does require that that person be “a proper person” or “a competent person”. Art. V, Sec. 16. It is appellant’s contention that since Art. 1932, V.A.C.S. makes no reference to residency qualifications, then residency is not a requirement for the appointment of a special county judge, “expressio unius est exclusio al-terius”.
*543If no other constitutional provisions or statutory law pertain to the appointment of a special county judge, then such officer of the court would not be required to be a citizen of the United States, a resident of the State of Texas, or a resident of the county in which he was to serve. Art. XVI, Sec. 14, Texas Constitution provides that “All civil officers shall reside within the State; and all district or county officers within their districts or counties, * * * and failure to comply with this condition shall vacate the office so held.” Since the Constitution provides for the appointment of a special judge, and requires that this judge shall be appointed "as prescribed by law”, then normal rules of statutory construction require the reading of Art. XVI, Sec. 14 of the Constitution into every statute providing for the election or appointment of every civil officer of this state. 53 Tex.Jur.2d 170, § 119; Jordan v. Crudgington, 149 Tex. 237, 231 S.W.2d 641. Art. V, Sec. 15 of the Texas Constitution requires that the county judge not only he “some person” (Art. 1932) or “a proper person” or “a competent person” (Art. V, Sec. 16, Texas Constitution), but also one "“who shall be well informed in the law of the State; shall be a conservator of the peace '* * *.” (Art. V, Sec. 14, Texas Constitution).
Art. XVI, Sec. 19 of the Constitution directs the Legislature to set up the qualifications for the grand jurors and petit jurors “as prescribed by law.” The law then prescribes that they be citizens of the United States, the State of Texas and residents of the county. Certainly it would follow that a special county judge should be deemed to have at least the minimum qualifications required of a petit juror or a grand juror. See Art. 2133, V.A.C.S. and Art. 19.09, C.C. P. Our Constitution sets forth residential requirements for persons that are permitted to vote. They too must be citizens of the United States, twenty-one (21) years of age, residents of the state, and they must reside within the county where they offer themselves to vote. Art. VI, Sec. 2, Texas Constitution. Art. VI, Sec. 1 sets forth the classes of persons who are not allowed to vote. Certainly these “persons” would not qualify to be appointed to serve as a civil officer in this state.
The law now prescribes that no person shall be eligible to be appointed to any public office in this State unless he shall be eligible to hold office under the Constitution and the laws of this State and unless he is a citizen of the United States and shall have resided in this State for a period of twelve months and six months in the county. Art. 1.05, Election Code, formerly Art. 2927. The article goes on to provide that these residential requirements shall apply for the office to be filled, unless the Constitution or laws of the United States or the State of Texas prescribed different residential qualifications. See Art. XVI, Sec. 14, supra. It should be noted that Art. 1.05 as now written differs in some respects from the same article at the time of Judge Edwards’ appointment. However, it did require that no person should be eligible to any county office in this State unless he shall be eligible to hold office under the Constitution and that he must be an actual bona fide resident of the county. See Art. XVI, Sec. 14, Texas Constitution. Art. 1932, V.A.C.S. provides for the Governor to make the appointment of the special judge. However, Art. 1.06 of the Election Code states that neither the secretary of the state nor the county judge of this State nor any other authority authorized to issue certificates, shall issue any certificate of appointment to any person appointed to any office in this State who is not eligible to hold such office under the Constitution of this State or under Art. 1.05 cited here above.
In the present case the special county judge has all the power and authority of a regular judge and should be required to have all the qualifications of a regular judge. He is paid the same salary by the county commissioners and at the same rate as the regular county judge. Markwell v. Galveston County, 186 S.W.2d 273, Tex.Civ. *544App., err. ref.; Art. 1932, V.A.C.S. Bylaw he is required to take the oath of office and to execute a bond. Art. 1928, V.A.C.S.; Porter v. State, 48 Tex.Cr.R. 125, 86 S.W. 767 (1905). Yet Art. 1932, V.A.C.S. and Art. V, Secs. 11 and 15 of the State Constitution are silent on the matter of a bond. His term of office continues during the time the disqualified county judge remains in office or until the case is concluded or unless it is removed by a proper proceeding. He is a constitutional officer and should be required to meet all of the constitutional requirements of that office and of the laws of this state. It has been held that the county judge under the Constitution is a county officer. State ex rel. Peden v. Valentine, 198 S.W. 1006, Tex.Civ.App. (1917) error refused; Wells v. Arledge, 259 S.W. 991, Tex.Civ.App. (1924). See also Wolnitzek et al. v. Lewis et al., 162 S.W. 963, Tex.Civ.App. (1913). It is true that he is not a "county office holder”, but nevertheless he does hold a civil office vesting in him a portion of the sovereign powers of the State of Texas. If appellant’s theory that the special judge appointed by the Governor is to be only “some person”, as set forth in Art. 1932, V.A.C.S., then it would not be necessary for that person to be a resident of the State of Texas nor .even a citizen of the United States. This would be unthinkable. Yet when we look for the particular requirement of our laws that that “some person” be a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Texas, we also find without exception, that the law provides that he also be a resident in the county which he serves. As a civil office holder, he should be required to reside in the county where he serves, because he represents the people who reside in the unit in which he serves. Whitmarsh v. Buckley, Tex.Civ.App., 324 S.W.2d 298. He should be close to the people and available for service. I know of no law that would permit a county civil office holder or special county judge to be appointed or elected who would not be required to be a citizen of the United States, a citizen of Texas, and a resident of his county.
Unless the special county judge be considered a county officer there would be no statutory authority for his removal from office. See Art. V, Sec. 24. See also Art. I, Sec. 4; Art. Ill, Sec. 6. 7, 18, 19, 20, 23; Art. XV, Sec. 4; Art. XVI, Sec. 2, 4, and 5. If we ignore the provisions of the Constitution to say that they do not apply because Art. 1932, V.A.C.S. is all inclusive and does not list its terms as to the qualifications or disqualifications for holding the office of special county judge, we would in effect state that the Legislature by statute was attempting to overrule the applicable provisions of our Constitution. Without giving effect to Art. XVI, Sec. 14 requiring that civil officers be residents of this State and residents of the county in which they serve, I would hold that Art. 1932, V.A.C.S. would be unconstitutional.
Appellant cites Honse v. Ford, Tev.Civ.App., 258 S.W. 527, no writ history; Campbell v. McFadden, 9 Tex.Civ.App. 379, 31 S.W. 436, writ refused (1895), and Hagler v. State, 116 Tex.Cr.R. 552, 31 S.W.2d 653. These cases involve the residential requirements of two district judges and a justice of the Court of Civil Appeals. They are distinguishable. First of all, the residential qualifications of the judges in the three above cited cases were raised by collateral attack and not by direct attack. (2) They were all de facto judges, the same as I would hold as to the qualifications of Judge Edwards if his qualifications were questioned similarly on a collateral attack. (3) They were all state officers and not county officers. (4) The Constitution provides for district judges to freely exchange districts, Art. V, Sec. 11, Texas Constitution. There is no provision in the Constitution or the statutes that permit the exchange of benches for county judges. (5) These cases were decided prior to Art. 1.05, which was formerly Art. 2927 R.S., which did not specify that district officers must reside in their district.
Since the special county judge in probate is not a state or district officer, he must be a county officer and must reside in the *545county. If he is a civil officer, he must also reside in the county. If he is not a county officer or civil officer, appellants have failed to tell this honorable Court what type of an officer, a special county judge in probate is. His status as a civil officer and as a county officer would be hard to deny.
In case of a disqualified county judge, the Legislature did not create a special probate court or a special judge to serve such court with special residential requirements. I do not believe that it was the intent of the Legislature under Art. 1932, supra, to permit a special county judge to be a non-resident. Numerous opinions issued by the office of the Attorney General over many years have been consistent in holding that the residential requirements of civil officers comply with the laws of our state and of our Constitution.
In the case of Jordan v. Crudgington, 149 Tex. 237, 231 S.W.2d 641 (1950), the Supreme Court of Texas in reviewing a law setting up a new court and a new judge to serve that court, struck down parts of the statute as being unconstitutional. They held that the judge of that court was not a state officer but a county officer and although the law did not provide anywhere, as to the judge’s residential requirements the court held that the judge of that court was a county officer. It was immaterial, the court said, that the Legislature failed to require that the judge be a resident of the county because such residential matters are “ * * * regulated both by our Constitution and our statutes. The judge of the court created by this Act is a county officer. Article XVI, Section 14, of the Constitution makes it mandatory that all county officers reside within their counties, and Article 2927, R.S. {now Art. 1.05 Election Code, “eligibility") provides that a county officer must be an actual bona fide citizen of the county for more than six months prior to his election. Those provisions will be read into the law.1’
Although Art. 1932, V.A.C.S. does not require the special judge to be a resident of the county in which he is required to serve, the Constitution and other laws do make this a requirement. I further believe that the Supreme Court in Jordan v. Crudging-ton, supra, requires that the constitutional and statutory provisions of our laws as to residency, will be read into this law.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Emphases throughout are supplied.