Court Opinion

ID: 9641473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:32:45.351729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:37.679820
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The influence of a judge is such that once a jury has heard the judge’s previous ruling on a crucial matter, it cannot be said that no juror was influenced. The. prejudicial effect of the trial judge’s statement could not be *7rectified by his subsequent proper instructions concerning the function of the jury in assessing the evidence. The error cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978).
In order to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial, the trial judge must be careful to remain absolutely impartial, and he or she must not usurp the function of the jury as the ultimate fact finder. Commonwealth v. Jones, 452 Pa. 569, 308 A.2d 598 (1973); Commonwealth v. Archambault, 448 Pa. 90, 290 A.2d 72 (1972); Commonwealth v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 123 A. 486 (1924). The United States Supreme Court in Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350, 354 (1946), stated:
“ ‘The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight,’ . . . and jurors are ever watchful of the words that fall from him. Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge’s last word is apt to be the decisive word.”
It is vital that the trial judge avoid comments which would be taken as indicating the court’s opinion on the question of guilt or innocence. Commonwealth v. Crawford, 452 Pa. 326, 305 A.2d 893 (1973). ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, § 5.6(a) at 68 (Approved Draft, 1972).
The concern repeatedly expressed by this Court in connection with statements made by the trial judge is born from the practical realization of the influence a judge is capable of exerting over a jury by virtue of his exalted position. In Commonwealth v. Archambault, we stated:
“An expression by the judge that in his opinion the accused is guilty leaves an indelible imprint on the minds of the jury. The jury is undoubtedly going to attribute to the judge, because of his experience in criminal cases, special expertise in determining guilt or innocence.”
448 Pa. at 95, 290 A.2d at 75.
*8Although the judge’s expression was not an expression of his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, it was a comment going to a crucial matter, namely the voluntariness of certain statements to the police. The trial judge did not express an opinion as to guilt but he did infer that he had already ruled the statements to be voluntary. In actuality the trial judge’s ruling on voluntariness was only a ruling on the admissability of the evidence and not a determination as a fact finder of a final matter.
I am cognizant of the fact that in evaluating the correctness of instructions to the jury, the charge must be read and considered as a whole. Commonwealth v. Lesher, 473 Pa. 141, 373 A.2d 1088 (1977). Yet, in a case such as this one, where the judge has revealed his own ruling, later statements to the jury telling them that they are the sole fact finders do not diminish the impact of the judge’s prior statements. Unquestionably, after hearing the judge’s previous finding of voluntariness, it cannot be said that no juror was influenced and there was no error.
The majority also finds no error in the admission into evidence of two photographs. These photographs depicted the blood splattered body of a male lying on the floor surrounded by pools of blood. Not only were his hand and hair caked with blood but blood soaked towels were also visible. The pictures were no less than gory. Although there has been some disagreement in this Court as to the admissibility of photographs of corpses, even under the majority rule established in Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 459 Pa. 511, 329 A.2d 844 (1974) these photographs were not “of such essential evidentiary value that their need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.” Since the pictures showed only a body on the floor they could not have aided or provided the jury “with an overall view of the scene of the crime.” I can see no value in admitting them to “corroborate the testimony of the medical pathologist.” I am confident the jury would *9have believed the victim was indeed dead without being subjected to these inflammatory pictures.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.