Court Opinion

ID: 9865396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 17:05:02.95516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:41.688712
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/25/23 In re Journee E. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

In re JOURNEE E., a Person                                  B323959
Coming Under the Juvenile                                   (Los Angeles County Super.
Court Law.                                                  Ct. No. 22CCJP02252B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

ANDRIA E.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Pete R. Navarro, Juvenile Court Referee. Dismissed as
moot.
      Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  __________________________

       Andria E. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s
disposition order declaring three-year-old Journee E. a dependent
of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
former subdivision (b)(1),1 and removing her from Mother’s
physical custody under section 361, subdivision (c). Mother’s sole
contention on appeal is that the court and the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice
provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.; ICWA) and related California law. Mother argues
the Department failed to interview the maternal grandmother
and two maternal great-aunts, and the notice sent to the
Seminole Tribe of Florida contained errors that rendered the
notice defective.
       While Mother’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court
ordered the Department to conduct further ICWA inquiry and to
send updated ICWA notices if warranted based on further
information from the additional interviews. Because the court

1     The Legislature amended Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, effective January 1, 2023, in part by revising
subdivision (b)(1) to specify in separate subparagraphs ways in
which a child may come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court due to the failure or inability of the child’s parent or
guardian to adequately supervise or care for the child. Further
undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                2
has now ordered the Department to interview the maternal
relatives, and the Department interviewed the maternal
grandmother and great-aunts, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Investigation, Dependency Petition, and Detention
      On June 6, 2022 the Department received a referral after
Mother went to urgent care and disclosed she had active thoughts
about stabbing herself, hitting pedestrians and other vehicles
with her car, and drowning Journee and her half-sister, six-year-
old Nyla E.2 When Mother was placed on a psychiatric hold and
admitted to the mental health facility, she became verbally and
physically aggressive towards staff. Mother left the facility after
repeatedly kicking and ramming the locked double doors, which
eventually opened.
      On June 10, 2022 the Department filed a petition under
section 300, former subdivision (b)(1), alleging Mother “ha[d] a
history of mental and emotional problems including suicidal and
homicidal ideation, auditory hallucinations, delusional thinking,

2     Mother’s appeal only involves Journee. The juvenile court
found as to Nyla that Texas was the home state and Mother had
violated a Texas family law custody order by leaving Texas with
Nyla. However, the court proceeded with the dependency
proceeding as to Journee because the Texas social services agency
had not filed a dependency proceeding in Texas and there was no
open family law matter as to Journee. The juvenile court found
Jeremy R. was Journee’s alleged father and the Department had
made due diligent efforts to contact him, but his whereabouts
were unknown. Jeremy is not a party to this appeal.

                                3
and aggressive behaviors” that rendered her incapable of
providing regular care of Journee and Nyla. The children were
removed and placed with their maternal great-grandmother,
Jennice W.
       At the June 13, 2022 detention hearing, the juvenile court
detained the children and continued their placement in Jennice’s
home. At the hearing, the court asked Jennice and a maternal
great-aunt (who was not identified) about the family’s Indian
ancestry. Jennice stated she had Indian ancestry but she did not
know the Indian tribe’s name. The maternal great-aunt said the
family’s Indian ancestry was “so far removed,” and she likewise
did not know the tribe’s name. Mother filed a parental
notification of Indian status form, on which she indicated that
“[p]ossibly” the maternal great-grandmother was a member of a
federally recognized tribe, “but details [were] unknown.”

B.     The Jurisdiction and Disposition Report and Hearings
       According to the jurisdiction and disposition report, the
social worker attempted to interview Mother on July 6, 2022, but
Mother “refused to provide any historical family information.”
The social worker also interviewed Jennice regarding the
maternal family’s Indian ancestry. Jennice denied that she,
Jenikque M. (maternal grandmother), Mother, Nyla, or Journee
was a registered member of a federally recognized Indian tribe or
had lived on a tribal reservation. But Jennice believed her family
was descended from the Seminole Tribe in Florida “based on
family stories, photographs, observations of ancestral relatives’
facial characteristics, physical traits-appearances and forefather
regional history.” Jennice provided information regarding her
birthdate and birthplace (Carson, California); the maternal great-

                                4
great-grandmother Mattie W.’s birthdate, birthplace (Springfield,
Florida), and place of death (Inglewood, California); maternal
great-great-grandfather Leo W.’s birthdate; and maternal great-
great-great-grandmother Lula H.’s birthdate and birthplace
(Springfield, Florida). Jennice explained the family was
descended from the Seminole Tribe through Mattie’s mother,
Lula, but Jennice had no evidence that either Mattie or Lula was
registered with a federally recognized Indian tribe or lived on a
tribal reservation.
       At the August 3, 2022 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile
court sustained the amended allegations under section 300,
former subdivision (b)(1), that Mother’s mental and emotional
problems rendered her incapable of providing regular care for
Journee. At the Department’s request, the court continued the
disposition hearing to September 20 for ICWA compliance. The
court ordered the Department to re-interview Jennice and to
interview other maternal relatives regarding their Indian
ancestry, and to provide ICWA notice to the Seminole Tribe of
Florida.
       On September 8, 2022 the social worker sent an ICWA
notice of the disposition hearing to Mother, the Seminole Nation
of Oklahoma, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Secretary of
the Interior. The ICWA notice stated Journee “may be eligible
for membership” in the “Seminole Nation of Oklahoma.” The
notice provided information on Journee’s birthdate and
birthplace (Harris County, Texas); Mother’s former and current
address, birthdate and birthplace (Carson, California); Jeremy’s
birthdate; Jenikque’s birthdate, birthplace (California), and state
of residency (Washington); maternal grandfather Andre E.’s date

                                 5
and place of death (California); Jennice’s current address,
birthdate, and birthplace (Carson, California); and maternal
great-grandfather John M.’s birthdate, birthplace (Pennsylvania),
and state of residency (California). No information was provided
as to Jeremy’s parents or grandparents. On the forms, some
information was crossed out and corrected, including to change
the name of the tribe from “does not apply” to “Seminole”; to
change Mother’s birthplace from “unknown” to Carson,
California; and as to some relatives, to change “unknown” to
“does not apply.” (Capitalization omitted.)
       Attached to the ICWA notice was a one-page summary of
the information provided by Jennice, including the maternal
great-great-grandmother Mattie’s birthdate, birthplace
(Springfield, Florida), and burial place (Inglewood, California)
and the maternal great-great-great-grandmother Lula’s
birthdate, birthplace (Springfield, Florida), and burial place
(Panorama City, Florida). In a September 22, 2022 letter, the
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma responded that the tribe checked
its enrollment “based on the information exactly as provided by
you,” and Journee, the parents, and the grandparents were not
enrolled members. (Boldface omitted.)3
      The Department’s last minute information for the court
provided an update on its ICWA inquiry. The social worker re-
interviewed Jennice on September 7; Jennice had no additional
information on her family’s Indian ancestry. Jennice reported

3     We grant the Department’s July 26, 2023 motion for
judicial notice of the letter from the Seminole Nation of
Oklahoma. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, sub. (a).)

                                6
maternal great-grandfather John M. did not have any Indian
ancestry. The social worker had previously interviewed Jenikque
(the maternal grandmother), who stated she was not registered
with any Indian tribe and had not lived or attended school on a
tribal reservation. Jenikque indicated Jennice was the family
historian and had more information regarding the family’s Indian
ancestry than she did. Mother did not have contact information
for Jeremy or his relatives. Jeremy’s whereabouts remained
unknown.
       At the September 20, 2022 disposition hearing, the juvenile
court declared Journee a dependent of the court and removed her
from Mother’s physical custody. The court ordered Mother to
submit to weekly random and on-demand drug and alcohol
testing, a psychological assessment, and a psychiatric evaluation.
The court also ordered Mother to participate in mental health
counseling and individual counseling and to take all prescribed
psychotropic medication. The court granted Mother monitored
visits with Journee for a minimum of two times per week for two
hours each visit. The court did not make an ICWA finding at the
hearing.
      Mother timely appealed on September 28, 2022.
C.     Postjudgment Evidence
       On September 28, 2022 the social worker sent an IWCA
notice to the Seminole Tribe of Florida, which was received by the
tribe.4 In an October 7, 2022 letter, the Seminole Tribe of Florida

4     We grant the Department’s July 26, 2023 motion for
judicial notice of the certified mail receipt indicating notice to the

                                  7
stated the tribe had “researched the ICWA notice.” The Seminole
Tribe wrote, “Journee [E.] is not an enrolled member of the
Seminole Tribe and is not eligible for enrollment within the
Seminole Tribe based on the information provided and
researched by the Tribe.”
       On June 13, 2023 the juvenile court issued an order stating
the Department “has interviewed the maternal grandmother
(Jenikque [M.]) and maternal great-grandmother (Jennice [W.])
extensively about the family’s Native American ancestry. DCFS
provided on Judicial Council form ICWA-030 notice to the
Seminole Nation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Secretary of the
Interior that included the information provided by the maternal
grandmother and maternal great-grandmother. [¶] DCFS shall
interview/attempt to interview any other available relatives,
including the maternal great-aunts (Katherine [W.] and Denise
[W.]) to ascertain if they have additional information regarding
the family’s Native American ancestry other than that provided
by the maternal grandmother and great-grandmother. [¶] If,
and only if, further information is derived from the additional
interviews, DCFS shall send updated notices to the relevant
tribe(s) and agencies.”
       According to the Department’s September 5, 2023 last
minute information for the court, on August 25, 2023 the social

Seminole Tribe of Florida was sent on September 28, 2022.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) The Department’s
request does not include the ICWA notice that was sent to the
tribe. We also grant the Department’s motion for judicial notice
of the October 7, 2022 letter from the Seminole Tribe of Florida to
the Department.

                                 8
worker interviewed Katherine and Denise to elicit any additional
ICWA information. The report states “[b]oth responded that they
had no further information to provide [other] than what was
already provided to the Department and the Court.”5 ~(9/7/23
RJN Ex. 1)~

                          DISCUSSION

A.     ICWA Inquiry and Notice Requirements
       ICWA and California law require in dependency
proceedings that where the court knows or has reason to know an
Indian child is involved, notice must be given to the relevant
tribes. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3, subd. (a); In re Isaiah W.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 5; In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309,
317 (Rylei S.); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(c)(1).) The notice
requirement is at the heart of ICWA because it “enables a tribe to
determine whether the child is an Indian child and, if so, whether
to intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.” (In
re Isaiah W., at p. 5; accord, In re Antonio R. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 421, 428 (Antonio R.).)
       The juvenile court and the Department “have an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for
whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed,
is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah

5     On June 21, 2023 we granted the Department’s motion for
judicial notice of the June 13 order. We also grant the
Department’s September 7, 2023 motion for judicial notice of the
September 5 last minute information for the court. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

                                 9
W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 9; In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70,
77 (J.C.).) The duty to inquire begins with initial contact
(§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child
protective agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals
whether the child may be an Indian child. (Rylei S., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 316; J.C., at p. 77; In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 437.)
      Section 224.2, subdivision (b), imposes on the Department a
duty to inquire whether a child in the Department’s temporary
custody is an Indian child, which “[i]nquiry includes, but is not
limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child . . . .” (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1) [the Department “must ask . . .
extended family members . . . whether the child is or may be an
Indian child”].) “The duty to develop information concerning
whether a child is an Indian child rests with the court and the
Department, not the parents or members of the parents’
families.” (Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 430; see In re
K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706 [“The juvenile court’s duty to
inquire . . . is independent of any obligation on the part of the
parents of the dependent child.”].) As we have repeatedly held,
“Where the Department fails to discharge its initial duty of
inquiry under ICWA and related California law, and the juvenile
court finds ICWA does not apply notwithstanding the lack of an
adequate inquiry, the error is in most circumstances . . .
prejudicial and reversible.” (Antonio R., at p. 435; accord, J.C.,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 80-81.)

                                10
       In addition, section 224.2, subdivision (e), imposes a duty of
further inquiry if the juvenile court or the Department “has
reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding,
but does not have sufficient information to determine that there
is reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” “Further
inquiry includes, but is not limited to,” interviewing “extended
family members,” contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and
contacting “the tribe or tribes and any other person that may
reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s
membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.” (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.481(a)(4) [if the social worker “knows or has reason
to know or believe that an Indian child is or may be involved,”
further inquiry must be conducted as soon as practicable by
interviewing “‘extended family members,’” and contacting the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, “the tribes, and any other person who
reasonably can be expected to have information regarding the
child’s status or eligibility”].)

B.     The Juvenile Court’s Order Requiring the Department To
       Interview the Maternal Relatives Moots Mother’s Appeal
       Mother contends the Department failed to comply with
ICWA because the social worker did not interview the maternal
grandmother (Jenikque) and two maternal great-aunts,
Katherine and Denise. Contrary to Mother’s contention, the
social worker interviewed Jenikque regarding the maternal
family’s Indian ancestry. Jenikque reported Jennice was the
family’s historian and had more information about the family’s
Indian ancestry than she did.
       However, the Department concedes the record does not
reflect whether, at the time of Mother’s appeal, Katherine and

                                 11
Denise were interviewed regarding the family’s Indian ancestry.
Although the juvenile court briefly questioned a maternal great-
aunt at the detention hearing, the great-aunt is not identified in
the record. The social worker interviewed Katherine and Denise
regarding the allegations in the dependency petition, but he did
not ask them about the family’s Indian ancestry. Under
section 224.2, subdivision (b), the Department had an obligation
to inquire of extended family members (and others with an
interest in the child) as to Journee’s possible Indian ancestry.6

6      We recognize that under ICWA the term “extended family
member” is defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s
tribe, or absent law or custom, as “a person who has reached the
age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt
or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece
or nephew, first or second cousin or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(2); see § 224.1, subd. (c) [“As used in connection with an
Indian child custody proceeding, the terms ‘extended family
member’ and ‘parent’ shall be defined as provided in Section 1903
of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act.”].) The Department does
not, however, contend there was no duty to interview Katherine
and Denise. Further, the duty of inquiry under section 224.2,
subdivision (b), includes “but is not limited to” extended family
members, and it also includes “others who have an interest in the
child.” And the duty of further inquiry under section 224.2,
subdivision (c)(2), likewise states the duty “is not limited to”
contacting extended family members, as well as any person “that
may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the
child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.” It is
reasonable to expect the maternal great-aunts would have had
information regarding Journee’s possible Indian ancestry given
Mother’s statement on the parental notification of Indian status
form that possibly the maternal great-grandmother (Jennice) was

                                12
(See Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 318; J.C., supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 77; Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
p. 431.) The Department failed to satisfy its duty of inquiry
under sections 224.2, subdivisions (b) and (e). There is also no
evidence the Department had informal contact with the Seminole
Tribe of Florida as required by section 224.2, subdivision
(e)(2)(C). (Rylei S., at pp. 319-320 [Department was required to
make informal contact with tribe under section 224.2, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)]; In re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 744 [child
protective service agencies “do[] not discharge their duty of
further inquiry until they make a ‘meaningful effort’ to locate and
interview extended family members and to contact [the Bureau of
Indian Affairs] and the tribes”].)
       Mother contends the failure of the Department to interview
the maternal great-aunts requires reversal of the disposition
order. However, as discussed, on June 13, 2023, while Mother’s
appeal was pending, the juvenile court ordered the Department
to interview Katherine and Denise and “any other available
relatives,” and to send updated ICWA notices to the relevant
tribes if the additional interviews yielded further information.
Further, on August 25, 2023 the social worker interviewed
Katherine and Denise to elicit additional information on whether
Journee was an Indian child, and Katherine and Denise indicated
they did not have any additional information.
       The Department urges us to find Mother’s appeal is now
moot under In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 and In re Baby Girl

a member of the Seminole Tribe, and the fact the great-aunts
were Jennice’s siblings.

                                13
M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635.7 We agree with the Department
that Mother’s appeal is now moot.
      The Supreme Court in In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
page 276 clarified the mootness doctrine: “A court is tasked with
the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment which
can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case
before it.”’ [Citation.] A case becomes moot when events
‘“render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in
favor of plaintiff, to grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.”’
[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be
met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being

7      The Department argues in the alternative that Mother’s
appeal is not ripe under J.J. v. Superior Court (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 447, 461 because the juvenile court has not yet
made a finding whether ICWA applies. In J.J., the mother
petitioned for extraordinary relief after the juvenile court denied
family reunification services and set a permanency planning
hearing under section 366.26. (Id. at p. 450.) The Court of
Appeal granted the writ petition and remanded for “the juvenile
court to set a hearing and modify its dispositional orders,
providing mother with appropriate reunification services.” (Id. at
pp. 461-462.) However, the court found the mother’s ICWA claim
was not ripe for review “because the juvenile court made no final
ICWA ruling at or before the challenged dispositional hearing as
to whether the ICWA applied to the proceedings.” (Id. at p. 461.)
We do not reach the Department’s ripeness argument because we
dismiss the appeal as moot.

                                  14
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” The court specified
that the mootness doctrine applies in the dependency context.
(Ibid.)
       The parents in In re D.P. challenged on appeal the
jurisdiction finding that their infant child was at substantial risk
of suffering serious physical harm, but while their appeal was
pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction without
issuing any orders that continued to impact the parents. (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 272.) The Supreme Court found the
impacts of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding, including the
stigma from the jurisdiction finding, were too speculative, and
therefore, the parents’ challenge was moot. (Id. at p. 282.)
       The D.P. court explained that “relief is effective when it
‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or
legal status.’ [Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for
effective relief, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she
has suffered from a change in legal status. Although a
jurisdictional finding that a parent engaged in abuse or neglect of
a child is generally stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is
insufficient to sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired
with some effect on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of
being redressed by a favorable court decision.” (In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) The court provided as examples of non-
moot challenges to jurisdiction findings cases in which a
jurisdiction finding affects parental custody rights, limits a
parent’s contact with his or her child, or results in a disposition
order that continues to adversely affect a parent. (Id. at pp. 277-
278.)

                                 15
        The court emphasized, however, that “[e]ven when a case
is moot, courts may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach
the merits of the dispute.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 282.) Reviewing courts will generally exercise their discretion
when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is
likely to recur, when there may be a recurrence of the controversy
between the parties, or when a material question remains for the
court to determine. (Ibid.) The D.P. court also identified
additional factors reviewing courts may evaluate when
considering whether to exercise their discretion to decide a moot
case, including whether a challenged jurisdiction finding could
impact current or future dependency proceedings, and the nature
of the allegations against the parent (with more egregious
findings showing a parent’s greater interest in challenging the
findings). (Id. at pp. 285-286.) In addition, courts may consider
why the appeal became moot: for example, principles of fairness
may favor discretionary review of cases rendered moot “by the
prompt compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (Id. at p. 286.)
       Because the juvenile court has ordered the Department to
interview the maternal great-aunts and to update the ICWA
notices with any new information, and the Department
interviewed the maternal great-aunts, we cannot provide any
effective relief by ordering the juvenile court to take the action it
has already taken (or order the Department to conduct interviews
it has already conducted). As Division Five of this district
observed in In re Baby Girl M., supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pages
638 to 639, in finding the father’s appeal of the jurisdiction
findings and disposition order based on an inadequate ICWA
inquiry was moot, “[A]ll we could order in resolving this appeal is

                                 16
that the Department and juvenile court fulfill their inquiry and
notice obligations under ICWA and related California law.
Because that is what the Department is already doing, and
because we are not in a position to micromanage that process in
this appeal (detailing, for instance, all those who must be
interviewed, what they must be asked, and what must be
included in any notice to tribes that is required), there is no
effective relief we can now provide.” Although the juvenile court
has not yet considered the adequacy of the Department’s
additional inquiry or made an ICWA finding in light of the
additional interviews, it is the role of the juvenile court in the
first instance to ensure the Department complies with the court’s
orders and to make the appropriate findings under ICWA.8

8      Mother also contends the ICWA notices contain errors
because some information was crossed out and handwritten
interlineations were added to the notices. Mother argues the
record is unclear as to whether the social worker or the juvenile
court made the handwritten corrections to the notices. We note
the social worker re-interviewed Jennice on September 7, 2022
and sent the ICWA notices on September 8. As the Department
argues, it is reasonable to infer the social worker made the
handwritten corrections (providing additional information) after
re-interviewing Jennice, before sending the ICWA notices by
mail. Moreover, there is no evidence the juvenile court made any
corrections to the ICWA notice. More concerning is that the
ICWA notice was sent initially to the wrong Indian tribe. The
certified mail receipt shows the ICWA notice was sent on
September 8, 2022 to the Seminole Nation in Oklahoma, and not
the Seminole Tribe of Florida. However, the social worker
remedied this error by sending the ICWA notice to the Seminole
Tribe of Florida on September 28, 2022. The Seminole Tribe of

                                17
       Mother fails to explain why the June 13, 2023 order and
the Department’s subsequent interviews of Katherine and Denise
do not render her appeal moot. Although she did not file a reply
brief, she addressed the Department’s mootness argument in her
opposition to the Department’s July 26, 2023 motion for judicial
notice. Mother requests we take judicial notice of her appeal in
case number B328354 (Journee II) of the juvenile court’s
November 28, 2022 finding ICWA did not apply and its March 20,
2023 order at the six-month review hearing (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)(1)) denying her request to return Journee to her care, as
well as the mootness argument made in her opening brief in that
case. However, in Journee II, Mother raised the same arguments
she asserts in her opening brief in this appeal: that the ICWA
notice contained cross-outs and handwritten changes and the
Department failed to interview the maternal great-aunts. Her
opening brief in Journee II did not address whether the juvenile
court’s June 13 order rendered her appeal moot. Moreover, if the
court determines the Department has complied with the June 13
order and makes a finding whether ICWA applies, the concerns
raised by Mother in this appeal and Journee II will be addressed.
Finally, Mother fails to articulate any reason why we should
exercise our discretion to consider her moot appeal, especially
given that she will have another opportunity to argue mootness
in Journee II. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.)

Florida acknowledged receipt of the notice in its October 7, 2022
letter.

                                18
      We therefore dismiss Mother’s appeal as moot.9

                         DISPOSITION

      The appeal is dismissed as moot.

                                          FEUER, J.
We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

9      The Department notes in urging us not to reverse or
remand for ICWA compliance that Mother could have achieved
ICWA compliance by simply notifying the Department of her
concerns, and that as soon as the Department learned of the
ICWA error, it raised the issue with the juvenile court. We agree
that it would have been more efficient for Mother to have raised
her concerns with the Department (and even more efficient for
the Department to have fully complied with its obligations in the
first place), but in any event, dismissal of Mother’s appeal
operates as an affirmance of the disposition orders. (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285; In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398,
413.)

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