Court Opinion

ID: 9834294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:28:05.496002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:13.626791
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[7] The appellants ably and with much earnestness insist that the case was not properly disposed of by the opinion of this court on January 4, 1913. In view of the motion for rehearing, we deem it necessary to state the grounds of defense set up by the appellants in their answer upon which the case went to trial. The answer of O. P. Miller; E. W. H. Miller, H. J. C. Reed, and Frank B. Baxter consisted of a general denial, a' plea that the money furnished to Reed by appellee was under an agreement that appellee'should live in the house with said Reed, etc. A plea that the money so furnished was not in fact the money of appellee, and also that she knew where the house was in the fall of 1908, but in no way disaffirmed the location of the house until March 10, 1911, when suit was brought, and that she failed to use diligence in bringing said action, and also pleaded the two-year statute of limitation in bar of her action. The appellants nowhere alleged *344that they had a superior lien or equities to that set up by appellee, or what their equities were in the land, when or from whom they purchased it, or what or how they paid for the same. They did not ask the court to adjust any equitie's between the parties.
The testimony shows that Reed bought the land in question in 1908, and that appellee bought her quarter in June, ¡1908. Reed sold his quarter in April, 1911, including the improvements. It appears that one David Pausch held this land as trustee for the Royal Land Company, of which C. P. Miller was the president. He testified Reed purchased this land from the Royal Land Company, and could not say whether he got deed 'or not. He had heard Reed did not build the house with his money, and it was intimated that his motber-in-law was furnishing the money. At the time he got the land from Baxter, Reed was in possession of it. C. P. Miller testified that Reed purchased the land from the Royal Land Company, like any one else under a contract. .“That was the way we made those sales.” The evidence is sufficient to support the court’s finding that Reed had purchased the' land and gone into possession of it under such contract. The parties made the following agreement, which is part of the record in this case: “It is agreed that the northeast quarter of section 15, block 3, of the Capitol Syndicate subdivision in Dal-lam county, Texas, was patented by the state of Texas to Abner Taylor, and that Abner Taylor conveyed same by warranty deed to the trustees of the Capitol' Freehold Land & Investment Company, and by the trustees of said 'Company it was conveyed by warranty deed to P. A. Baxter on the 26th day of March, 1908, deed filed for record on the 10th day of April, 1908, in Dallam county, Texas, and P. A. Baxter conveyed the same by warranty deed to David Pausch on the 1st day of January, 1909, which deed was filed for record on the 7th day of May, 1909, and that David Pausch conveyed the property by warranty deed 'to E. W. H. Miller on the 6th day of January, 1911, which deed was filed of record in Dallam county, Texas, on the 21st day of January, 1911, and that -E. W. H. Miller conveyed the same by warranty deed to William Starch on the 7th day of November, 1911, which deed was filed for record in Dallam county, Texas, on the 27th day of. December, 1911.” There is nothing shown by the pleadings or the testimony as to the amount Reed-' agreed to pay for the land or its value. E. W. H. Miller does not show what he paid for the land or how he paid for it. We hold that appellants in this case should have filed their answer in the nature of a cross-bill, setting up the superiority of their equities, if there were such, to appellee’s lien, and should have asked that the court compel the adjustment of the equitable claims of the respective-parties. In the absence of such a plea or facts establishing the amount which Reed might have owed on the land and the amount paid by E. W. I-I. Miller for the land from the Royal Land Company, or from Pausch, the court could do' no more than he did — that is, establish appellee’s lien against the land. The appellants were brought into the suit for the purpose of adjusting their equities if they had any, and, having set up none in themselves, they sought only to defeat appellee’s lien. If we understand the authorities cited by appellants, they are to the effect above stated. King v. Brown, 80 Tex. 276, 16 S. W. 39; Morrow v. Morgan, 48 Tex. 304; Silliman v. Gammage, 55 Tex. 365.
Appellants cite a great number of authorities in cases of trespass to try title, wherein it is said the rule is that the party claiming title under a junior lien before he can recover must tender to the one holding title under the prior lien the amount due or paid. See Pierce v. Moreman, 84 Tex. 596, 20 S. W. 821. In the instant case the record nowhere charges appellee with knovrfedge of the appellants’ equities at the time of the suit. She brought appellants into the suit, simply alleging they claimed some interest in the land. Was she required to ascertain what the claims were before she brought her suit and to allege them? It occurs to us, if appellants had any equities, they should have set them up so the court could have properly adjusted same by its decree. In this case E. W. H. Miller, who appears to have purchased the land, does not allege that the debt of Reed to the Royal Land Company passed by the deed of Reed, or was assigned to him when he purchased the land. His right may be on the warranty so far as this record shows. He does not allege a subrogation, which, as we understand, he should have done. Boone v. Miller, 86 Tex. 74, 23 S. W. 574; McCammant v. Roberts, 87 Tex. 241, 27 S. W. 86; Perkins v. Sterne, 23 Tex. 563, 76 Am. Dec. 72.
If the appellant Miller, or the other appellants, sought to be subrogated to the lien retained by the vendor of Reed, then -the appellants should have plainly alleged the facts which gave the right of subrogation, and should have asked for such relief in a cross-petition. Crow v. Fiddler, 3 Tex. Civ. App, 576, 23 S. W. 17; Wilkin v. Owens, 102 Tex. 197, 114 S. W. 104, 132 Am. St. Rep. 867; 37 Cyc. 309.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.