Court Opinion

ID: 9616249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:44:42.872588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:56.347227
License: Public Domain

GiveN, Judge,
dissenting:
In my view there is ambiguity in the contract to be interpreted. As applied to the instant case, it appears immaterial whether the ambiguity is patent or latent. In either event the trial court was justified in interpreting the contract in the light of the situation of the parties at the time the agreement was made, the circumstances surrounding them, and any subsequent acts of the parties, relating thereto, throwing light upon their intentions in the making of the contract. Uhl v. Railroad Co., 51 W. Va. 106, 41 S. E. 340. I think the situation of the parties and the material circumstances are fully disclosed by the record. It is not contended, of course, that the terms of a written contract can be varied by extraneous circumstances, but we should keep in mind the wide difference between the varying or changing of the terms of an agreement, and the establishment of the intentions of the parties thereto. Stewart v. Steel Corporation, 100 W. Va. 331, 130 S. E. 447; Watson v. Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 164, 120 S. E. 390; Clayton v. County Court, 58 W. Va. 253, 52 S. E. 103.
Much stress is placed upon the word “any”, used in Subsection (e), as showing that no ambiguity exists in the provision of the contract under consideration, the intention apparently being that “any” must necessarily mean “all”. Of course the word may be made to mean “all” by context. In truth, the meaning of the word “any” usually depends upon context. In 32 C. J. S., Evidence, Section 961, Subsection c, the author states: “The am*662biguities existing in those cases in which the words are all sensible and have a settled meaning but consistently admit of two interpretations according to the subject matter in the contemplation of the parties have been called intermediate.” The primary meaning of the word “any”, as shown by Webster’s International Dictionary, Second Edition, is “one indiscriminately out of a number”. We can not give the word its primary meaning here, however, for the reason that the provision requires that “* * * bills or accounts * * * in an amount not less than the amount of the bills, accounts receivable, hereby assigned or to be assigned unto him, as hereinbefore recited * * *”, be assigned to lessor; therefore, some other of the many meanings of the word “any” must be found. The contract under consideration does not show the aggregate amount of the accounts then owing the lessor, nor are they therein listed. Neither do we find in the record that accounts in the amount of $114,714.85, or any other amount, were ever assigned to appellee. Assuming that all of the accounts making up that sum were assigned to appellee, and that a substantial portion of those accounts was satisfied by payment to appellee, as indicated by the statement of accounts exhibited with the bill, from whence may appellee select accounts aggregating the $114,714.85? From the accounts first created, or from the newer accounts, or can we believe, as has been suggested, that it was intended that appellee return all of the uncollected portion of the accounts making up the $114,714.85, plus all unpaid accounts created during the six year period of operations under the lease, whether that amount be $124,204.83, or several million dollars? The uncertainties pointed out, I believe, clearly show the contract to be ambiguous. The word “any” must be applied to some one of the situations indicated, but to which one?
If any further demonstration of uncertainties rendering the contract ambiguous were necessary, I would simply refer to the fact that not more than two members of this Court can arrive at the same conclusion with reference thereto. I am not unmindful of the rule sometimes *663applied, to the effect that the use of a common word in a peculiar sense does not make a contract ambiguous. See In Re Milliette's Estate, 206 N. Y. S. 342; Kraner v. Halsey, 82 Cal. 209, 22 P. 11371 We have more, in the instant case, than the use of the word “any”. What is the subject matter of “any”? Is it the $114,204.83, the $124,204.83, the $223,429.74, or the $99,224.91, plus some part of one or the other of such sums. In 3 C. J. S., Ambiguity, the author, speaking of latent ambiguities, says that: “The term has been said to imply either, on the one hand, a concealment of the real meaning or intention of the writer which does not appear on the face of the words used, until these words are brought in contact with collateral facts or until the facts are shown, or, on the other hand, a clear expression of the party’s intention, and the existence of a doubt not as to the intention, but as to the object to which the intention applies, and, in the latter case, the necessity of extrinsic evidence to identify the object. The term has accordingly been defined as an ambiguity raised by evidence, or that arises from the proof of facts aliunde, one which arises not upon the words of the instrument, as looked at in themselves, but upon those words when applied to the object or subject which they describe, or one which does not appear on the face of the language used or the instrument being considered, or when the words apply equally to two or more different subjects or things, as where the language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or evidence aliunde, creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings. The term has been held to be an equivalent of ‘equivocation,’ and has been distinguished from ‘error,’ ‘mistake,’ and ‘patent ambiguity’.” The contract being ambiguous, a court would be justified in considering what equities or inequities would result to the parties under any interpretation of the contract, in an effort to arrive at the intention of the parties. “Where possible, a reasonable and equitable construction will be given a contract; but harsh and unreasonable terms may not be ignored or changed by the *664court contrary to the clear meaning of the language used and the intent of the parties.” 17 C. J. S., Contracts, Section 319. See Engineering Co. v. County Court, 92 W. Va. 368, 115 S. E. 462; Seward v. Hardware Co., 161 Va. 610, 171 S. E. 650.
“Unless intention of parties to contract is manifest by language employed, subject-matter, and surrounding circumstances, that construction should be given which is consistent with the right of the case.” Telephone Co. v. Telephone Co., 142 Va. 529, 129 S. E. 389. The trial court merely applied these principles in its effort to determine the true meaning and intent of the language contained in Subsection (e) of Section 12 of the contract. In so doing, that court did not necessarily forget the principles relating to interpretation of contracts, and disposed of the matter entirely upon equitable principles. So viewing the question, I can not say that his interpretation is wrong. At least not more than two members of this Court can agree that he erred as to any principle of law. In addition to having the parties before him, in being permitted to consider the situation of the parties and the circumstances surrounding them, resultant equities and inequities that would possibly arise under any interpretation of the contract, as above indicated, he could look to each and all of the provisions of the contract. From these provisions he would find that the parties contracted with reference to furniture and other personal property in the hospital, with reference to taxes and other assessments, with reference to repairs to the hospital building, with reference to alterations of that building, with reference to insurance, with reference to inventories, from all of which he would certainly discover that the intention of the parties as to such matters was that, upon the termination of the lease, the parties be placed in as nearly the same position as they were at the beginning of the lease. Could this not be considered in determining their intentions with reference to the accounts receivable and the accounts' payable? The result reached by the trial court as to the accounts receivable and the accounts pay*665able was to the same practical effect as the results reached by the parties in the contract as to such other matters.
I do not think that we should make a fetish of the word “any” and rely on it as solving the. problem presented by this record. Nor should we give literal meaning to a group of ambiguous words which would result in inequitable or unconscionable disposition of this controversy. I think it is better to arrive at a fair and equitable result upon the theory that the parties to the lease here considered did not intend to take from each other any right or rights which in all fairness belong to the other. I think that the Circuit Court of Mingo County has given effect to the intention of the parties as nearly as could be done, in the circumstances disclosed by this record.
It will be noticed that the syllabus prepared by Judge Fox, and concurred in by Judges Haymond and Riley, remands the case for “consideration” only. Therefore, I presume there can be no further development of the case as it relates to interpretation of the contract. “Consideration” alone may be given it by the trial court. Not more than two members of this Court are able to agree upon any proposition of law or fact which should be considered again by the trial court. I have been unable to find any precedent or reason for reversal of the decree of the trial court in such circumstances. The record shows that the trial court fully and carefully considered every phase of the matter involved. His views were clearly expressed in a written opinion. The judgment entered is in accord with those views. Inasmuch as not more than two members of this Court can say that the trial court erred as to any principle of law, I would affirm that judgment. This Court should not expect the trial court to discover some mystic formula for solving a problem that we are unable to solve.
Being of the views indicated, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to say that Judge Lovins concurs in the views expressed herein.