Court Opinion

ID: 9351790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-03 19:00:29.112275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:59.666176
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30370        Document: 00516595077            Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/03/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                                                              FILED
                                                                        January 3, 2023
                                      No. 22-30370
                                                                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                    Summary Calendar                          Clerk

   Daphne Weary,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Lumber Liquidators, Incorporated,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 3:19-cv-698

   Before Davis, Smith, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiff-Appellant, Daphne Weary, appeals the district court’s
   summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, Lumber Liquidators,
   Incorporated, dismissing Weary’s claim of racial discrimination in
   employment. We conclude that the district court did not err and AFFIRM.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30370         Document: 00516595077              Page: 2      Date Filed: 01/03/2023

                                          No. 22-30370

                                    I. BACKGROUND
          Lumber Liquidators, Incorporated (“LL”), is a nationwide retailer of
   hard-surface flooring. In January 2017, LL hired Weary, who is African
   American, as an assistant manager at its store in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. At
   that time, Rahman Muhammed was Weary’s supervisor. In June 2017, Seth
   Harper replaced Muhammed.
          On January 20, 2018, Harper gave Weary a “Verbal/Coaching
   Record.” In February 2018, Harper conducted a formal review of Weary’s
   job performance during her first year of employment. His review resulted in
   the issuance of a thirty-day Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”), which
   informed Weary that she was “not currently meeting all of the standards
   expected of a [LL] Assistant Store Manager.” The PIP listed Weary’s
   performance standards “considered deficient and require[ing] immediate
   attention.” As required by the PIP, Harper met with Weary weekly for four
   weeks. On June 12, 2018, LL terminated Weary’s employment because
   Weary “continued with poor performance.” LL did not fill Weary’s position
   after terminating her employment.
          On March 6, 2019, Weary filed a charge of discrimination with the
   Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Louisiana
   Commission on Human Rights. The EEOC subsequently issued Weary a
   right-to-sue letter.       Weary thereafter filed the instant Title VII action
   asserting that LL unlawfully terminated her based on her race.1 Specifically,
   she asserted her termination was based on Haper’s discriminatory animus.
   Weary contended that “Harper referred to her as ‘diva’ in the context of
   claiming that ‘black girls act like divas.’” Weary also alleged that on or
   around May 11, 2018, about a month before her termination, Harper told her

          1
              Weary also asserted an age discrimination claim but later abandoned that claim.

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                                            No. 22-30370

   that “she was better working with ‘black customers’ and that he was better
   working with other races.”
          LL moved for summary judgment arguing that Weary had no direct
   evidence of racial discrimination; that she was unable to establish the fourth
   element of a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the McDonnell
   Douglas2 framework; and that even if she could, LL terminated her for
   legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, which Weary could not show were a
   pretext for racial discrimination. In opposing summary judgment, Weary
   asserted that in addition to the remarks mentioned in her complaint, Harper
   also showed discriminatory animus by referring to “uppity” people shortly
   after Weary’s niece graduated from law school. And stating that “he did not
   associate with that ‘class of people.’” The district court granted summary
   judgment in favor of LL. Weary filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                       II. DISCUSSION
          We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.3
   Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
   genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
   as a matter of law.”4 When a plaintiff does not have direct evidence of
   discriminatory intent, circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent may
   be presented under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.5
   Under that framework, a plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a
   prima facie case of discrimination, which consists of the following elements:
   (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for

          2
              McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
          3
              Ross v. Judson Indep. Sch. Dist., 993 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2021).
          4
              Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
          5
              Ross, 993 F.3d at 321.

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   the position at issue; (3) she suffered a final, adverse employment action; and
   (4) was either replaced by someone outside the protected class or otherwise
   treated less favorably than others similarly situated (i.e., comparator) outside
   the protected class.6 If the plaintiff establishes the four elements of a prima
   facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to provide a
   “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the plaintiff’s termination. If the
   employer meets this burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to
   show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s articulated
   reason is pretext for discrimination.7
          The district court determined that Weary could not establish the
   fourth element of her prima facie case. Specifically, no one replaced Weary
   after her termination; Weary was unable to identify a similarly situated non-
   African American employee who was treated more favorably than she; and
   Harper’s alleged discriminatory comments were not sufficient to carry
   Weary’s burden. Weary argues that she established the fourth element of her
   prima facie case by “other means” when she offered “two sets of three racial
   remarks.” She asserts that the district court erroneously used a “direct
   evidence” standard, instead of a less onerous “indirect evidence” standard,
   in determining that the alleged remarks did not satisfy the fourth element of
   her prima facie case. Weary additionally argues that this same evidence “set
   out facts that also go toward pretext.”
          We need not address the issue whether the district court used the
   proper standard because even assuming Weary satisfied the fourth element
   of her prima facie case, LL met its burden of producing legitimate,
   nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination, and Weary was unable to

          6
              Id.
          7
              See Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 2005).

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   come forward with evidence establishing a genuine dispute that those reasons
   were pretext for discrimination.8
           As noted above, LL asserts that it terminated Weary based on her
   continued poor job performance after placing her on a PIP.                             Weary’s
   termination paperwork cites eight reasons for her termination, seven of
   which detail specific interactions Plaintiff had with customers and
   coworkers.9 This Court has “repeatedly held that a charge of ‘poor work
   performance’ . . . when coupled with specific examples” satisfies an
   employer’s burden of setting forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
   termination.10 Because LL satisfied its burden of production, 11 the burden
   shifted back to Weary to come forward with evidence establishing a genuine
   dispute that LL’s reasons were pretextual.
           Weary argues that LL’s reasons for her termination were pretextual
   by pointing to Harper’s alleged “discriminatory remarks” as well as his
   alleged “ongoing abuse” during the time period between making those
   comments.            She also challenges the veracity of LL’s purported
   nondiscriminatory reasons by noting that “[h]er sales were good” and that

           8
             Although the district court did not rule on the remaining elements of the
   McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, we may affirm summary judgment based on
   any basis supported by the record. Jennings v. Towers Watson, 11 F.4th 335, 343 (5th Cir.
   2021).
           9
              Among the reasons cited by LL for Plaintiff’s termination include her:
   unwillingness “to load” and “listen[] . . . to customers,” inability to remember how to
   “sell” deliveries, and failure to “adapt[] to different customer types,” even after receiving
   coaching from her supervisor.
           10
                Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 231 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations
   omitted).
           11
             Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citation
   omitted) (stating that employer’s “burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can
   involve no credibility assessment.’”).

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                                             No. 22-30370

   her disciplinary record included only one verbal write up for being late from
   lunch. Weary’s arguments are unavailing.
           “Stray remarks with no connection to an employment decision cannot
   create a fact issue regarding discriminatory intent and are insufficient to
   defeat summary judgment.”12 Here, Weary has presented no evidence that
   any of Harper’s alleged comments, made over the course of a year, 13 had any
   connection to her termination. Absent such a connection, this Court has
   consistently held that isolated remarks, such as those at issue here, provide
   insufficient evidence of pretext to defeat summary judgment. 14 Moreover,
   Plaintiff’s assertion that she had a strong performance record at LL is not
   sufficient to create an issue of pretext.15 And aside from conclusively
   asserting that she had a strong performance record, Plaintiff has not come

           12
                Scales v. Slater, 181 F.3d 703, 712 (5th Cir. 1999).
           13
             Plaintiff alleges that Harper made the first remark in June of 2017 and made the
   final remark in May of 2018, the month before she was terminated.
           14
              See, e.g., Scales, 181 F.3d at 712 (noting that plaintiff’s “only evidence of
   discrimination” consisted of her employer’s comment that “she find a ‘black mentor’ and
   statements made in an old newspaper article”and that “[t]he problem with viewing these
   statements as anything more than stray remarks is that there is no evidence that either
   statement was connected to the [employer’s] hiring process”). Notably, even the case
   relied on by Weary, Oldenburg v. University of Texas at Austin, 860 F. App’x 922 (5th Cir.
   2021) (per curiam) (unpublished) held that the plaintiff’s evidence that “members of the
   hiring committee stated her ‘philosophy seems dated’ and referred to her methods as ‘old
   school’ or ‘tried and true’ did not establish pretext. Unpublished opinions issued in or
   after 1996 are “not controlling precedent” except in limited circumstances, but they “may
   be persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006).
           15
             Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Merely
   disputing Appellee’s assessment of h[er] performance will not create an issue of fact . . . at
   the pretext stage.” (citing Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir. 2001))).

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   forward with any evidence that LL’s stated reasons for her termination were
   false.16
              Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Weary failed to come
   forward with evidence establishing a genuine dispute that LL’s legitimate,
   nondiscriminatory reasons were not pretextual. Accordingly, the district
   court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, Lumber
   Liquidators, Incorporated, is AFFIRMED.

              16
               Unlike the plaintiff in Reeves who “made a substantial showing that [his
   employer’s] explanation was false” by offering “evidence that he had properly maintained
   the attendance records,” Weary has presented no evidence that would cast doubt on the
   reasons given by LL for her termination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 144-46 (finding that
   plaintiff presented evidence at trial that cast doubt on his employer’s assertion that plaintiff
   was fired because of his poor work performance and recordkeeping).

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