Court Opinion

ID: 9367350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 16:09:37.711747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:59.474390
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Parrish v. Beeler, 2023-Ohio-247.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:               NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN                  )

KRIS M. and DENISE R. PARISH                         C.A. No.      21CA011810

        Appellants

        v.                                           APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                     ENTERED IN THE
VIVIAN J. BEELER                                     COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                     COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
        Appellee                                     CASE No.   20CV200501

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: January 30, 2023

        TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}     Kris and Denise Parrish appeal a judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common

Pleas that granted summary judgment to Vivian Beeler on their property damage claim. For the

following reasons, this Court affirms.

                                                I.

        {¶2}     Ms. Beeler sold a house to the Parrishes. The Parrishes allege that, sometime

between the signing of the purchase agreement and closing, Ms. Beeler removed fixtures from the

house, damaged its walls, and ruined the house’s custom paintjob. The Parrishes sued Ms. Beeler,

asserting damage to real property, trespass to real property, fraud, and conspiracy. After Ms.

Beeler moved for summary judgment, the Parrishes conceded partial summary judgment on their

trespass, fraud, and conspiracy claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to Ms. Beeler

on the damage to real property claim, concluding that the Parrishes could not maintain their tort

action because the parties had a contract involving the house. The court also concluded that the
                                                  2

Parrishes had not established that Ms. Beeler owed a legal duty to them that was imposed by law

because of their relationship and had not pointed to any evidence that would support a claim for

damage outside of the contract. The Parrishes have appealed, assigning two errors.

                                                 II.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT HOME PURCHASERS
       COULD NOT MAINTAIN A TORT ACTION AGAINST THE HOME SELLER
       IN LIGHT OF THE EXISTENCE OF A FULLY-EXECUTED PURCHASE
       AGREEMENT FOR THE HOME.

       {¶3}    In their first assignment of error, the Parrishes argue that the trial court incorrectly

concluded that they could not maintain a tort action against Ms. Beeler because of the contract for

the sale of the property. We do not agree.

       {¶4}    Appellate review of an award of summary judgment is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56

when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the

nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse

to the nonmoving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), citing Civ.R.

56(C). A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must

resolve any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356,

358–359 (1992). A trial court does not have the liberty to choose among reasonable inferences in

the context of summary judgment, and all competing inferences and questions of credibility must

be resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor. Perez v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 35 Ohio

St.3d 215, 218 (1988).
                                                 3

       {¶5}    The Parrishes acknowledge that this Court has held that the existence of a contract

generally excludes the opportunity to present the same case as a tort claim. Textron Fin. Corp. v.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Ohio App.3d 137, 151 (9th Dist.1996) (“A tort claim based upon

the same actions as those upon which a claim of contract breach is based will exist independently

of the contract action only if the breaching party also breaches a duty owed separately from that

created by the contract, that is, a duty owed even if no contract existed.”). They argue that they

could not have presented a contract claim in this case, however, because it would have been

prohibited by the doctrine of merger. According to the Parrishes, when a deed is delivered and

accepted without qualification, a cause of action upon the underlying contract cannot exist. Their

only remedy for the destruction Ms. Beeler caused, therefore, was their tort claim for damage to

property. They also argue that the contract does not discuss whether the items at issue in this case

were fixtures, so a breach of contract claim would not have resolved whether Ms. Beeler’s conduct

was permissible, even if the doctrine of merger did not apply.

       {¶6}     In her motion for summary judgment, Ms. Beeler argued that she did not owe a

duty to the Parrishes outside of the contract and that they, therefore, could not recover against her

in tort. In the Parrishes’ opposition brief, they responded to that argument by asserting that they

became equitable owners of the house after signing the contract. They argued that, as equitable

owners of the house, they had a cause of action against anyone who caused damage to the house,

including Ms. Beeler. They also argued it would not make sense if Ms. Beeler could be immune

from a property damage claim just because she was the seller of the house.

       {¶7}    The Parrishes did not argue in their opposition brief that they were not permitted to

bring a contract claim against Ms. Beeler because of the doctrine of merger. This Court will not

consider a defense to a motion for summary judgment that is argued for the first time on appeal.
                                                4

City of Akron v. Harris, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25993, 2012-Ohio-1713, ¶ 4, citing Morgan v.

Village of Silver Lake, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25148, 2010-Ohio-3581, ¶ 11. Accordingly, we will

not address the Parrishes’ merger argument. For the same reason, the Parrishes have also forfeited

their argument that they should be allowed to pursue a property damage claim because a breach of

contract claim would not resolve whether the items in controversy were fixtures. Id.

       {¶8}    The Parrishes have not forfeited their argument that Ms. Beeler owed them the same

duty as any individual not to damage a house of which they had become an equitable owner.

Unlike other individuals, however, Ms. Beeler was the legal owner of the house at the time that

she removed the items from it. Whether something had to remain in the house at the time of

closing was governed by the parties’ contract, which had a specific provision addressing the issue.

The purchase agreement also contained a provision addressing Ms. Beeler’s responsibility to the

Parrishes if any damage occurred to the house before the title transfer. The Parrishes have not

pointed to any injury that they suffered that was outside of the scope of the purchase agreement.

       {¶9}    Upon review of the record, we conclude that the Parrishes have not established that

they could maintain a property damage claim against Ms. Beeler that was independent of the

contractual relationship between them. The Parrishes’ first assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE HOME
       PURCHASERS FAILED IN RESPONSE TO HOME SELLER’S SUMMARY
       JUDGMENT MOTION TO BRING FORTH ANY EVIDENCE TENDING TO
       SHOW THAT THE HOME SELLER OWED THEM A LEGAL DUTY OUTSIDE
       THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, SO THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
       APPROPRIATE.

       {¶10} In their second assignment of error, the Parrishes argue that the trial court

incorrectly concluded that they had not presented any evidence that established that Ms. Beeler

owed them a legal duty outside the purchase agreement. The substance of their brief, however,
                                                 5

does not focus on this issue. Instead, the Parrishes concentrate on whether the items that Ms. Beeler

removed from the house before closing were fixtures under the analysis set out by the Ohio

Supreme Court in Masheter v. Boehm, 37 Ohio St.2d 68 (1974). The Parrishes refer back to their

first assignment of error in addressing whether Ms. Beeler owed them a duty outside of the

purchase agreement. The Parrishes also argue that they established the extent of the harm they

suffered in their response to Ms. Beeler’s motion for summary judgment.

       {¶11} The trial court did not reach the issue of whether the items Ms. Beeler removed

from the house before closing were fixtures because it determined that the Parrishes could not

bring a property damage claim against her because of the existence of the purchase agreement.

The arguments that the Parrishes have made under their second assignment of error do not establish

that there was a genuine issue whether Ms. Beeler owed them a legal duty outside of the existence

of that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that the Parrishes have not demonstrated that the

trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment to Ms. Beeler. The Parrishes’ second assignment

of error is overruled.

                                                III.

       {¶12} The Parrishes’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
                                                 6

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellants.

                                                     THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
                                                     FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

EDWARD F. HERMAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellants.

JOSEPH P. DUNSON, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.

JAY C. MARCIE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.