Court Opinion

ID: 9775478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:00:31.444081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:26.937726
License: Public Domain

GILBERTO HINOJOSA, Justice,
dissenting.
The trial court found the City’s regulations and burdens on the land so severe that a taking occurred. The jury found the City’s actions were arbitrary and unreasonable. Yet, the majority reverses and renders. It holds that the City’s actions constituted a valid exercise of “police power.” I respectfully dissent because I believe the primary issue involved in this case was a question of fact, and the jury found this question in favor of the plaintiff.
The distinctions drawn in inverse condemnation cases have variously been described as: illusory, “a sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog,” and “a crazy quilt pattern.” City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex.1978). However, the law is clear that unreasonable interferences with a landowners’ right to use property are considered “takings,” and are subject to an inverse condemnation action. DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 108-09 (Tex.1965); San Antonio River Authority v. Garrett Brothers, 528 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1975, writ *65ref'd n.r.e.). The law also provides a recovery if a governmental authority unreasonably uses its regulatory power to burden land when its motivation is to benefit itself. Teague, 570 S.W.2d at 391.
I recognize that the question of whether a taking has occurred is a question of law for the court. Woodson Lumber v. City of College Station, 752 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988). However, if the issue is whether the governmental entity is attempting to unreasonably burden the land with the intent to benefit itself, I believe a question of fact for the jury is presented on the questions of unreasonableness and intent.1 Cf. Guidry, 801 S.W.2d 142, 147 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no writ) (a question of fact is presented if a landowner sues for losses caused by unreasonable delay in construction); Woodson, 752 S.W.2d at 748 (a question of fact is presented if City’s actions are arbitrary and capricious). Questions of intent are clearly within the province of the fact-finder. Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex.1986). Because the evidence supported these findings, and the jury found the City’s actions unreasonable, I would affirm.2
I believe a taking occurred because the City unreasonably used its zoning pow;ers to forbid the primary and intended use of the property for the City’s present and future benefit. The evidence showed that the City was attempting to maintain aesthetics and to keep “options” open for future land use. The means the City used were to place one condition after another in front of Pena before it would permit him to operate the salvage yard. The somewhat unorthodox means used by the City to accomplish its goals was direct evidence of unreasonableness, and sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to find an improper motive. Cf. Spoljaric, 708 S.W.2d at 435 (slight circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fraudulent intent). Based on this evidence, I believe the jury was entitled to conclude that the City was motivated by a desire to benefit itself by keeping a profitable business from starting on land it might later need to acquire, and a desire to stop the operation of Pena’s “eyesore” business — all without paying the landowner.
Unlike the majority, I find this case indistinguishable from Teague. In that case, the City of Austin used its permit power to effectively stop development of property owned by Teague. The City’s goal was to preserve a “scenic easement” on Teague’s land. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the City’s denial of permits was a burden so severe that it was a taking and therefore Teague should be compensated.
The evidence in this case showed that the City of Pharr used its regulatory powers to keep appellee from developing and operating his auto salvage yard. One motivation was to keep this alleged eyesore from operating along the main road from the City to Reynosa, Mexico. I do not find this significantly different from Teague where the City of Austin used its regulatory power to acquire a “scenic easement” along Interre-gional Highway 35. Moreover, just like in Teague, the burden of City’s regulations fell only upon the shoulders of the landowner, while the benefit fell into the collective lap of the general public. I would hold that there was sufficient evidence to establish that this type of restriction and the manner in which it was carried out was unreasonable.
The majority distinguishes Teague on the grounds that the City of Austin’s actions caused Teague to lose all use of the land, and in this case appellee lost only one use of the land. However, Tex. Const, art. I § 17 provides recovery if a party’s land is taken or damaged. See Teague, 570 S.W.2d at 393. The evidence showed that after the City’s actions, the land’s value reverted to that for pasture. The jury found that it was worth $350,000 as a salvage yard. After the City’s regulation, it was worth only $65,000. The land has, in *66my opinion, been damaged by the City’s acts.
I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.

. The Teague Court did not reach this question because the City did not contest the issue of intent.

. In other words, I would deem a finding that the City attempted to benefit itself. Tex.R.Civ.P. 279.