Court Opinion

ID: 9881910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 17:01:14.417546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.155766
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            OCT 4 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    21-10351

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:18-cr-00302-JAD-NJK-2
 v.

RICHARD FRED DITTMER III,                       MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Nevada
                   Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted October 2, 2023**
                               Las Vegas, Nevada

Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,***
District Judge.

      Richard Dittmer, III, pled guilty to one count of receipt of child

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (b), and one count of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
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attempted sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and

(e). Despite waiving his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, Dittmer now

argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion by allowing his mother to

speak at his sentencing hearing over his objections, and (2) clearly erred by

imposing four supervised release conditions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we dismiss the appeal.

       “We review de novo whether an appellant has waived his right to appeal

pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement.” United States v. Wells, 29 F.4th 580,

583 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). “Although we typically review de novo whether

a challenged supervised release condition illegally exceeds the permissible

statutory penalty or violates the Constitution, we review for plain error when a

party fails to raise its illegality argument to the district court,” as Dittmer failed to

do here. United States v. Nishida, 53 F.4th 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned

up).

       1.    “We lack jurisdiction to entertain appeals where there was a valid and

enforceable waiver of the right to appeal.” United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d

1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v.

Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). A waiver is valid

and enforceable “when (1) its language clearly and unambiguously encompasses

the defendant’s right to appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) it was knowingly and

                                            2
voluntarily made.” United States v. Hollins, 70 F.4th 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 2023)

(citation omitted).

      Here, Dittmer’s appellate waiver is valid and enforceable. Dittmer does not

dispute that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate waiver, nor does

the record suggest anything to the contrary. The appellate waiver also clearly

encompasses Dittmer’s right to challenge the admission of his mother’s statement

at sentencing and his supervised release conditions by barring challenges to “the

manner in which the district court determined [his] sentence” and “any other aspect

of the sentence.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; Wells, 29 F.4th at 584 (holding that “any

aspect” of a sentence includes supervised release conditions).

      2.     Even if an appellate waiver is valid and enforceable, it does not apply

if the sentence violates the law. See United States v. Mendez-Gonzalez, 697 F.3d

1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2012). We find that this exception does not apply to

Dittmer’s non-constitutional claims regarding the district court’s decision to admit

his mother’s testimony over defense counsel’s objections1 and to impose certain

1
  Dittmer attempts to frame his claim regarding his mother’s testimony as a
constitutional challenge by arguing that the district court violated his right to
counsel by controlling his mitigation strategy at sentencing. However, the
ineffective assistance of counsel cases that Dittmer cites are inapposite, and the
district court had broad discretion to consider the information presented by his
mother, subject to certain due process limitations that are not at issue in this
case. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3661; see also United States v. Franklin, 18 F.4th
1105, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2021).
                                         3
supervised release conditions. See Wells, 29 F.4th at 585, 589 (holding that the

exception does not apply to arguments that a sentence is overbroad or violates 18

U.S.C. §§ 3583 or 3553). Accordingly, Dittmer’s appeal on those grounds is

waived under the plea agreement.

      To determine whether the exception applies to his constitutional challenges,

we must first address the merits. See Nishida, 53 F.4th at 1149 (“When a

defendant with an otherwise valid appeal waiver challenges the legality of her

sentence, the claim as to waiver rises and falls with the claim on the merits.”

(cleaned up)). Dittmer raises three constitutional challenges to his supervised

release conditions: (1) that Special Condition #12 (place restriction) is

unconstitutionally vague because it fails to specify a distance he must maintain

from places primarily used by children; (2) that Special Condition #14

(pornography ban) infringes his First Amendment rights by limiting legal

possession of sexually explicit material involving adults; and (3) that Special

Condition #16 (polygraph testing) violates his Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination. We find all three arguments meritless under plain error review. See

United States v. Gibson, 998 F.3d 415, 419-20 (9th Cir. 2021) (approving a nearly

identical place restriction with no distance specification); United States v. Daniels,

541 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding a pornography ban against a similar

First Amendment challenge); see id. at 925 (holding that “polygraph testing as a

                                          4
condition of supervised release does not infringe on a defendant’s Fifth

Amendment rights”). Because the “unlawful sentence” exception does not apply

to Dittmer’s constitutional claims, those claims are also waived. We therefore

dismiss Dittmer’s appeal.

      DISMISSED.

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