Court Opinion

ID: 9667501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:47:29.96912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:14.392656
License: Public Domain

Bashara, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority misapprehends the issue involved in this appeal. The question is not whether the "Auto Accident Notice” was ineffective to give written notice because it may have *536been completed by the agent and not by the plaintiff. Those were not the facts alleged by either side.
Plaintiff indicated that over the period he was receiving treatment for his injury, he had informed defendant’s agent, Mr. Sutton, of his condition on several occasions. He stated that Sutton advised him to see a lawyer as early as three months after the accident. Plaintiff sought the advice of counsel several times during the year. Plaintiff admits, however, that he did not submit written notice of . the injury to defendant or its agents.
In a deposition, Mr. Sutton stated that he did not learn plaintiff had been personally injured in the accident until over a year later. He denied having received any medical bills during that year. When he learned of the personal injury claim, it was promptly submitted in writing to defendant. However, liability was denied because no written notice was provided within one year of the accident, as required by MCL 500.3145(1); MSA 24.13145(1). No personal protection insurance benefits were paid.
For the purposes of the summary judgment motion, the trial court assumed that plaintiff had given oral notice of his injuries to Mr. Sutton on the day of the accident. However, the court ruled the notice was not written, thereby rendering it insufficient. Therefore, the real issue is whether oral notice of personal injury is sufficient to override the statutory mandate.
MCL 500.3145(1); MSA 24.13145(1) is controlling. It provides:
"(1) An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury *537unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more that 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced. The notice of injury required by this subsection may be given to the insurer or any of its authorized agents by a person claiming to be entitled to benefits therefor, or by someone in his behalf. The notice shall give the name and address of the claimant and indicate in ordinary language the name of the person injured and the time, place and nature of his injury.”
The purpose of the above statute was explicitly stated by this Court in Davis v Farmers Ins Group, 86 Mich App 45, 48; 272 NW2d 334 (1978):
"In the case at bar, the language of the statute was intended as a limitation on actions for personal benefits arising under the no-fault act, with a mechanism for extending the one-year period upon filing of notice within the year. There is no requirement that plaintiff file notice in order to be able to take advantage of the full statutory period. That he is entitled to in any case. Notice simply gives him the benefit of an additional year’s grace.”
Since plaintiff admittedly did not file the present action within one year of the accident, he must show that he filed the requisite notice in order to gain the additional year grace period. Therefore, the issue is whether the oral notice purportedly given to defendant constitutes sufficient compliance with the statute in order to invoke the grace period provision.
*538In Keller v Losinski, 92 Mich App 468; 285 NW2d 334 (1979), the same issue was addressed, although in a different scenario. The essential facts are the same, however; the plaintiff gave oral notice to the insurer but failed to commence suit or submit written notice within one year of the accident. This Court held that the trial court erred in denying the insurer’s motion for accelerated judgment, GCR 1963, 116.1:
"League General received no written notice of plaintiffs injury within a year of the accident and though the accident occurred on March 22, 1975, no attempt was made to bring League General into this action until April 20, 1977. Claims based on an obligation of League General to pay personal protection insurance benefits for plaintiffs injury are therefore barred by the time limitations established by the no-fault statute. MCL 500.3145(1); MSA 24.13145(1).” Id., 472.
Based upon Keller, I would hold the trial court’s conclusion that oral notice is not sufficient to toll the one-year statute of limitations is not clearly erroneous. Loranger v Citizens Mutual Ins Co, 100 Mich App 681; 300 NW2d 369 (1980).
I agree with the majority that a motion for accelerated judgment is the proper form. However, I concur in the reasoning of the trial court and would affirm its judgment.