Court Opinion

ID: 9648930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:38:40.925962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:06.444535
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice, dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority’s holding that the Appellant’s appeal from the trial court’s finding that a valid common-law marriage existed between the parties is prema*35ture. I would hold the trial court’s holding was a final determination as to the validity of the marriage and was immediately appealable.
The majority’s conclusion rests solely upon the nature of the action which initiated the dispute between the parties as to the existence of a marriage. Citing § 206 of the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. § 206, the majority concedes that a declaration as to the validity of a marriage would be final and reviewable if the action was initially brought as a declaratory judgment action. Nevertheless, the majority disregards the fact that the trial court has entered a declaration as to the validity of the marriage in the instant case because the action originated as one in divorce. Although § 206 permits a party to bring an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of a marriage, the statute does not preclude the issue from being raised in any other proceeding.
The majority’s holding improperly premises the finality and appealability of an order relating to the validity of a marriage upon the nature of the proceeding, rather than its substantive effect. The effect of the trial court’s order in this case is the same which results from one entered in a declaratory judgment action. The relief sought and obtained by the Appellant in the trial court is identical to that requested in a declaratory judgment action — a determination as to the marriage’s validity. The majority would have the Appellant file an action separate from the divorce action originated by the Appellee to insure the finality of the judgment. The duplicative nature and unnecessary expense of such a proceeding are abhorrent to the concept of avoiding piecemeal litigation and increased litigation costs which the majority uses in an attempt to support its holding.
The majority views the trial court’s order as a mere decision as to a particular legal issue without a final resolution of each of the Appellee’s economic claims. But, the very rights and obligations created under the law from which the Appellee seeks to benefit necessarily arise out of and are attendant to the existence of a marital relationship. While the trial court’s finding did not resolve the Appellee’s *36claims for divorce, alimony, and equitable distribution, it finally resolved the Appellant’s contention that no marriage existed. If the Appellant’s challenge would be sustained on appeal, then resolution of the Appellee’s remaining claims would be unnecessary.
It is absurd to burden the Appellant with the expense of defending economic claims arising out of a relationship which may not exist. The policy concerns expressed in Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985) for the social and emotional well-being of the parties are not compelling when the existence of the marriage itself is challenged. Indeed, the prompt disposition of that issue is more critical to the parties' well-being for the existence of a marriage has its own grave legal and social consequences. Fried was based upon the presumption that the individuals are in fact spouses. In the instant case, no such presumption may be made. This is a crucial distinction which dictates a different result. I would not find Fried to be controlling, and note further that the concerns which I expressed in my dissent in that case are exacerbated by the extension of that analysis to the case before us.