Court Opinion

ID: 9716454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:40:03.107431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:45.716420
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Wright, J.:
I respectfully dissent. The defendant would not have to elect either (1) to testify that he was not operating the car at the time of the collision, or (2) remain silent. His position might, and probably would, be that his car was not involved in the collision at all. I particularly question what I consider to be the fundamentally erroneous statement in the majority opinion that, if the defendant chose to testify, “the burden would have shifted back to the Commonwealth to prove Avho Avas the operator”. The burden is upon the CommonAvealth throughout the entire trial to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that burden never shifts from the CommonAvealth. The only effect of Section 1209 of the Vehicle Code, assuming *318that it applies in this case, is to make “the registration plate displayed” prima facie evidence.
It is my view that Judge Taxis used good sound common sense in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction. I would affirm upon the following excerpt from his well considered opinion:
“A jury could not without conjecture or surmise reach the conclusion that (1) Bolger’s car was the vehicle involved in the accident on October 2, 1955, and (2) that Bolger was the driver of that car without entertaining a reasonable doubt as to one or both of these essential factors. A single piece of chrome is the only substantial link establishing any connection between Bolger’s car and the accident and this piece of chrome was not discovered until three days after the accident occurred. Bolger’s car was damaged on both sides, indicating that the vehicle had been involved in at least one accident other than the alleged occasion on October 2, 1955; and the possibility cannot be overlooked that the piece of chrome might well have been torn from the defendant’s car on this other occasion. Furthermore, at a still later undetermined date, several additional pieces of chrome were found at the scene of the accident. Some of these pieces of chrome appeared to fit, others did not. The non-fitting pieces of chrome clearly did not come from either Bodnar’s or the defendant’s car, giving rise to the possibility that the culprit in this case was the driver of the vehicle shorn of these non-fitting pieces of chrome, and not the defendant. Added to this thin skein of evidence is the sole fact that the damaged car is registered in the name of the defendant. Note also that the registration number of defendant’s car was not obtained by Bodnar at the scene of the accident, but at a much *319later date, giving rise to tbe serious question whether the presumption of owner-operation of Section 1209 of tbe Motor Vehicle Code has any application in this case.
“It is apparent that a conviction based on these sketchy facts could only be the result of conjecture, suspicion and surmise. Standing against the presumption of innocence the circumstances proved were not sufficient to exclude reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Should the case have gone to a jury and a conviction resulted, we would have been compelled to set the verdict aside as not being supported by the evidence”.
Gunther, J., joins in this dissent.