Court Opinion

ID: 9912604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 20:02:29.845927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:25.507397
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 Lattimore v. Department of Social Services CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 YVONNE LATTIMORE,                                                   H050171
                                                                    (Monterey County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Super. Ct. No. 20CV003429)

           v.

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
 SERVICES,

           Defendant and Respondent.

         Yvonne Lattimore, representing herself, appeals from a trial court order denying
her petition for writ of mandate for paramedical and range of motion services. Lattimore
sought services through the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program, overseen by
the California Department of Social Services and administered here by Monterey County
(the County). Lattimore requested a variety of services, including feeding and meal
preparation, hygiene and grooming, dressing, massage, transportation, medicine
administration, and electrical nerve stimulation, for ailments involving her hands, elbows,
shoulders, neck, back, hip, groin, knees, ankles, and feet.
         We understand Lattimore to contend on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion and committed error in making evidentiary rulings and in concluding that she
failed to point to sufficient evidence in the record to support her claims. Lattimore
further asserts the trial court showed bias against her. Lattimore requests that this court
direct the trial court to set aside its order denying her petition and to grant her service
hours.
         For the reasons explained below, we reject Lattimore’s contentions and affirm the
trial court’s order.
                   I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
         Lattimore has received IHSS services since April 16, 2010. The record indicates
that Lattimore challenges the denial of services during two periods (collectively, the
Subject Timeframes): December 18, 2017, to November 6, 2018 (first Subject
Timeframe), and April 10, 2019, to July 17, 2019 (second Subject Timeframe).
         In December 2019, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a decision regarding
(1) the rehearing of an October 2018 ALJ decision covering the first Subject Timeframe,
and (2) the hearing regarding Lattimore’s April 10, 2019 request for IHSS service hours,
covering the second Subject Timeframe (collectively, December 2019 ALJ decision).
Lattimore petitioned the trial court for review of the December 2019 ALJ decision. The
trial court denied the petition, and we review that denial in this appeal.
         To provide context to Lattimore’s arguments in this appeal, we set out many (but
not all) of Lattimore’s requests for IHSS services from the County, the evidence she
submitted, the County’s assessments and responses, and decisions rendered by ALJ’s on
Lattimore’s challenges to the County’s denial of requested services.

         “We recite the essential relevant facts ‘in the manner most favorable to the
         1

judgment, resolving all conflicts and drawing all inferences in favor of respondent.’ ”
(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1233, fn. 2 (Nwosu).) We describe
conflicting evidence only as relevant to Lattimore’s contention that there is sufficient
evidence demonstrating her need for range of motion and paramedical services for the
Subject Timeframes.
                                                   2
       A. Events Prior to December 18, 2017
       In 2016, Lattimore reported to the County that she was receiving daily physical
therapy from Marina Physical Therapy (Marina PT). She submitted to the County an
unsigned letter from Marina PT, dated October 14, 2016, that stated Lattimore had been
going to Marina PT five days per week for the past year for physical therapy on her knee,
hip, neck, back, foot, shoulder, and hands. Lattimore asserted that the letter was unsigned
because “it was going to a third party.” She also stated that Marina PT could not provide
her a list of the times she had used their services “because they had a computer
malfunction and lost all their files prior to September 2016.” When the County called
Marina PT to verify this information, Marina PT stated that no patient used their services
five times per week. Further, Marina PT asserted it had not experienced a computer
malfunction, and Lattimore could have obtained a record of her use of Marina PT
services.
       On April 6, 2017, County employees observed Lattimore at a Walmart store.
Lattimore was pushing a loaded shopping cart without assistance. When Lattimore saw
the County employee, she left the store. Two other County employees were also in the
store and viewed Lattimore walking without assistance or any signs of distress. Two of
the employees saw Lattimore drive away from the store in a silver car.
       On June 5, 2017, Lattimore went to Natividad Medical Center (NMC) for pain in
her feet. She was diagnosed by Dr. A.S.2 as having “Achilles insertion, also calcific
tendinitis bilateral”; “[m]idsubstance Achilles tendinitis/tendinosis bilateral”; “[p]lantar
fasciitis, bilateral”; “[h]ammer digit fifth bilateral with chronic clavus”; and an
“[i]rregularly-shaped pigmented lesion, 6 mm, left fifth toe.” Dr. A.S. prescribed
physical therapy, instructed Lattimore to “wear the proper shoes” and possibly arch

       2
        We refer to Lattimore’s doctors by their initials to protect their privacy interests.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
                                                  3
supports, and suggested an operation to repair her fifth toe once she received medical
clearance from Dr. H. for the surgery.
       On December 1, 2017, Lattimore had a surgical procedure at NMC during which
Dr. J.S. released the “[l]eft first extensor compartment” of Lattimore’s left wrist, and
placed a “thumb spica splint” on her left hand, to treat de Quervain syndrome (December
2017 surgery).
       B. Events Precipitating Decisions on Services in First Subject Timeframe:
          December 18, 2017, to November 6, 2018
       On December 18, 2017, two County employees made a home visit to perform an
annual reassessment of Lattimore’s condition and needs (2017 reassessment). At that
time, Lattimore was receiving 283 service hours per month, the maximum allowable
IHSS service hours.
       The County employees observed that, although Lattimore claimed she could not
grip with her hands or feed herself, she was able to pinch and adjust her glasses. When
asked if she could drive, Lattimore responded “ ‘I do not drive’ ” but then, despite
wearing a brace on her left hand, “closed her hands tightly” as if using a steering wheel,
“and stated that she could not do that.” Lattimore also told the County employees that
she could “brush her teeth, write and lift some objects that are not too heavy.” Although
Lattimore “reported Achilles insertion, calc[if]ic tend[in]itis bilateral mid substance,
Achilles tendinitis/tendinosis bilateral, plantar fasciitis, and bilateral hammer digit
chronic clavus,” the County employees saw that Lattimore “was able to get up and down
from the recliner and walk around the apartment with no difficulty.” The County
employees also stated that Lattimore was able to reach diagonally across her body and
reach for objects without apparent discomfort.
       Based on these observations, the County issued a Notice of Action (NOA) dated
December 22, 2017, decreasing Lattimore’s IHSS service hours to 71 hours and 45
minutes per month. The County issued a further NOA dated December 26, 2017,
                                                  4
reducing Lattimore’s IHSS service hours by another 34 hours and 38 minutes per month,
to 37 hours and seven minutes per month. The County explained in the December 26,
2017 NOA that it would not grant Lattimore any hours for either range of motion or
paramedical services until she signed a medical records release allowing the County to
speak directly with her doctors. The County had concerns regarding the authenticity of
the forms they received from Lattimore “based on the advice of [a] state fraud
investigator . . . and Monterey [County] Quality Assurance Supervisor.” Lattimore
subsequently requested a hearing to contest the County’s reduction of her IHSS service
hours.
         Lattimore submitted to the County a paramedical services request form dated
December 27, 2017, allegedly completed and signed by Dr. L.F., which requests daily
paramedical services to “[t]reat scalp, shampoo, condition, blow dry, [and] apply
medication” to address Lattimore’s “[f]olliculitis” for Lattimore’s lifetime (December
2017 paramedical services request form).
         Lattimore submitted to the County seven range of motion request forms dated
December 29, 2017, allegedly completed and signed by Dr. J.S. (December 2017 range of
motion services request forms). These forms requested the following as range of motion
services either indefinitely or for Lattimore’s lifetime: feeding due to Lattimore’s
“tendonitis”; AirCast ice machine treatment for both hands and feet, right knee, and right
elbow to treat “tendonitis, carpal tunnel, DeQuervains Tenosynovitis, plantar fascitis
[sic], Achilles tendonitis, menscus [sic] tear, [and] congenital fusion”; electro-orthostim
(also known as transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation [TENS]) to treat “left and right
shoulder rotator cuff disease”; paraffin hot wax, wrap, heat, hand massage, medication
application, and electro-orthostim to treat “left and right carpal tunnel and DeQuervain’s
Tenosynovitis”; electro-orthostim of both hands, right hip/groin, and right knee to treat
“carpal tunnel syndrome, bursa bursitis, strain and IT band, meniscus tear, [and]
DeQuervain’s”; ice, massage, electro-orthostim, stretching exercise, medication
                                                 5
application, and heat to treat Achilles issues in both feet, bilateral tendonitis, and “plantar
fasciitis bilateral”; and electro-orthostim to treat “lumbar strain, cervical disc disease, and
shoulder impingement bilateral.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
       Lattimore provided the County with a declaration, purportedly signed by Dr. J.S.,
dated March 16, 2018. The declaration stated that Dr. J.S. had personally completed and
signed the IHSS forms, but he did not believe he was required to provide further
verification and was not willing to speak with any County personnel regarding
Lattimore’s medical condition.
       In a decision adopted on April 12, 2018, pursuant to the February 2018 hearing
(April 2018 ALJ decision), the ALJ ordered the County to authorize IHSS service hours
for Lattimore in a variety of service categories, but remanded the claim for range of
motion and paramedical services back to the County for authorization and verification
from Lattimore’s medical provider.
       In response to this order, the County authorized 90 hours and 48 minutes of IHSS
per month (April 2018 NOA). The April 2018 NOA did not authorize the range of
motion and paramedical services Lattimore requested. The County explained that it
would not authorize range of motion or paramedical services hours for Lattimore until the
County received the applicable forms directly from the requesting physician or until such
requesting physician agreed to verify the stated need.
       The County issued another NOA, dated May 24, 2018, increasing Lattimore’s
hours to 97 hours and 17 minutes per month (May 2018 NOA). The May 2018 NOA
stated that the increase was due to an authorization of 1 hour and 30 minutes per week for
paramedical services. The County authorized this increase after it received “verification
from one physician, Dr. [L.F.], for 1:30 hours/week” and a fraud investigator “cleared the
authorization” of the December 2017 paramedical services request form from Dr. L.F.
However, the County noted that, since Lattimore had not signed an authorization for Dr.
J.S. to release Lattimore’s information and records to the County, it could not verify the
                                                  6
information on the December 2017 range of motion services request forms and therefore
could not authorize the requested hours. Instead of signing the release, Lattimore
requested a hearing regarding the May 2018 NOA.
       Dr. J.S. sent the County a letter, dated July 18, 2018, stating that he was “unable to
honor the request to verify Ms. Lattimore’s medical records” because “there is no signed
authorized record release consent form for” Lattimore, and he is “not authorized to
release any medical information to [the County] regarding her care without her written
consent.”
       During the hearing before an ALJ on September 11, 2018, regarding the May 2018
NOA (September 2018 hearing), the County described its reduction of Lattimore’s IHSS
service hours from the pre-2017 reassessment level as “based upon [Lattimore’s]
credibility issues.” The County sought authorization from Lattimore to contact her health
care provider for verification. Lattimore refused to provide authorization, asserting
documents previously submitted were sufficient.
       In a decision adopted October 24, 2018, pursuant to the September 2018 hearing
(October 2018 ALJ decision), the ALJ upheld the May 2018 NOA setting Lattimore’s
IHSS service hours at 97 hours and 17 minutes. The ALJ determined that Lattimore had
not cooperated with the County’s assessment of her need for IHSS services, and the
record contained insufficient evidence that the County received the necessary and
appropriate medical information for paramedical and range of motion services. Lattimore
requested a rehearing of the October 2018 ALJ decision.
       In a letter dated May 10, 2019 (May 2019 letter), the Chief ALJ granted Lattimore
a rehearing of the October 2018 ALJ decision. The Chief ALJ asserted that the “[Manual
of Policies and Procedures] § 30-757.14(g) provides that range of motion exercises may
be authorized in a manner limited to what is prescribed in the regulation,” and there is no
requirement in the regulation that a recipient’s health care provider fill out or sign a form
describing the requested range of motion exercises or that the recipient sign a county
                                                 7
medical release form that allows the county to contact the health provider to provide
verification. The Chief ALJ concluded the County “incorrectly denied [Lattimore] range
of motion services based on her failure to cooperate.”
       C. Events Between Subject Timeframes
              1. January 2019 Notice of Action
       In November 2018, Lattimore sent a letter to the County requesting an increase in
her IHSS service hours due to a change in her medical condition and because she was
unable to use her hands (November 6, 2018 letter). Lattimore attached a photograph of
her hands in casts, and signed her full name in cursive on the letter. Lattimore also
enclosed six range of motion request forms, which were dated November 7, 2018,
purportedly signed by Dr. J.S. (November 7, 2018 range of motion services request
forms). These forms requested range of motion services substantially similar to those
contained in her December 2017 range of motion services request forms. The County
asked Lattimore to sign a release so they could communicate with Dr. J.S. about her
request. Instead of signing the release, Lattimore requested a hearing.
       On November 7, 2018, Lattimore went to NMC to have her wrists examined. The
NMC notes from this visit with Dr. J.S. indicate that Lattimore had seen a different
doctor, Dr. L., who had recommended hand therapy, but the therapy had not yet been
approved (November 7, 2018 Clinic Note). A large section of the November 7, 2018
Clinic Note—where the doctor’s diagnosis and treatment plan typically appear on other
clinic notes from NMC—appears to have been redacted by hand. The nonredacted
portions of the November 7, 2018 Clinic Note do not mention any surgical procedures.
       On December 13, 2018, the County conducted its annual reassessment of
Lattimore’s condition and needs (2018 reassessment). During the 2018 reassessment,
Lattimore refused the County employees access to the bedroom, kitchen, and bathroom

                                                8
she claimed to use, and “refused to answer most questions.”3 The County employees
observed that Lattimore’s casts were very clean and did not show signs of use. The
County employees also noted that Lattimore was able to easily stand up and sit down.
Although Lattimore claimed that “she could not use her hands at all” and “signed all
documents with an X,” timesheets the County received from Lattimore for pay periods
covering October 1, 2018 through November 30, 2018, bore a signature and date that
resembled Lattimore’s signature and handwriting style in other documents.
       The County issued a NOA dated January 15, 2019, reducing Lattimore’s IHSS
service hours (January 2019 NOA). Lattimore requested a hearing to contest this
reduction in hours.
       During the March 26, 2019 hearing regarding the January 2019 NOA (March 2019
hearing), the ALJ observed that Lattimore was not wearing any casts or wraps and
appeared to be able to fully use and manipulate her hands and fingers.
       In a decision adopted June 3, 2019, regarding the January 2019 NOA pursuant to
the March 2019 hearing (June 3, 2019 ALJ decision), the ALJ determined that Lattimore
had no need for IHSS services and ordered the County to discontinue them. The ALJ
based his decision on Lattimore’s ability to sign the October 1, 2018 to November 30,
2018 timesheets despite claiming to be unable to write, that Lattimore’s wrappings did
not appear dirty even though, allegedly, she had been wearing them for four to six weeks
prior to the 2018 reassessment,4 and that, “during the course of the hearing [Lattimore],

       3
          Lattimore resided in her brother’s house at the time of the 2018 reassessment.
On April 17, 2019, Lattimore’s care provider informed the County that Lattimore’s
brother had evicted her. The County stated that “[p]ublic criminal records reveal that
[Lattimore]’s brother, who lives at the last physical address [she] provided, filed a
restraining order against [her] on April 3, 2019.” Lattimore did not inform the County of
her change in residence and did not respond to the County’s requests that she verify her
address.
        4
          The ALJ observed: “Had the claimant been wearing these casts and wraps on
her arms for the 4 to 6 weeks prior to the December 13, 2018, assessment they would not

                                                9
who appeared at the hearing with neither casts nor wrappings, had full use of both
hands.”
         The County terminated Lattimore’s IHSS services effective July 1, 2019, in
accordance with the June 3, 2019 ALJ decision.
               2. February 2019 Notice of Action
         On February 26, 2019, Lattimore was arrested and charged in federal court with
three counts of wire fraud, three counts of mail fraud, and two counts of supplemental
security income fraud after “an active, years long fraud investigation” of Lattimore
relating to her receipt and deposit of IHSS paychecks intended for her care provider.
That day, the “[Department of Health Care Services] Investigator” informed the County
that Lattimore was not wearing casts when she was arrested. Based on that information,
the County issued a further NOA, again reducing Lattimore’s IHSS service hours
(February 2019 NOA). Lattimore requested a hearing to contest this further reduction in
hours.
         On March 6, 2019, two County employees separately encountered Lattimore at a
food bank and reported that she had no casts on her hands or arms and appeared to be
walking without any trouble and without any assistive devices. One of the employees
observed Lattimore driving a gold vehicle, and no one else was in the car.
         On March 8, 2019, Lattimore went to NMC for bilateral de Quervain and exterior
tenosynovitis (March 2019 clinic visit). In the notes from this visit (March 2019 Clinic
Note), Dr. J.S. states that Lattimore should continue to wear thumb spica splints, and sets
forth the history of her use of the splints, including their placement on November 7, 2018,
removal on February 14, 2019, and planned replacement on April 10, 2019, during which
time, per Dr. L.’s recommendation, Lattimore is to wear the splints “at night.” Most of

be so clean or white. Instead, they appeared to have the appearance of casts and
wrappings that had been recently applied (i.e.[,] the day of the assessment). It was also
noted during the hearing that these casts were of the removable type.”
                                                10
the copies in the record of the March 2019 Clinic Note have been redacted by hand to
remove Dr. L.’s recommendation.
       During the April 23, 2019 hearing regarding the February 2019 NOA (April 2019
hearing), Lattimore presented the redacted November 7, 2018 Clinic Note, a photograph
of Lattimore with casts on her hands that was included with the November 6, 2018 letter,
and the November 7, 2018 range of motion services request forms enclosed with the
November 6, 2018 letter. Lattimore testified at the hearing that “Dr. JS put the casts on
her arms on November 7, 2018,” and “he signed the range of motion forms dated
November 7, 2018.” Lattimore did not explain a number of discrepancies in her evidence
or why some of the information she submitted appeared to be redacted, nor did she
provide information regarding the redacted content.
       In a decision adopted June 4, 2019 regarding the February 2019 NOA pursuant to
the April 2019 hearing, the ALJ sustained the County’s authorization of IHSS service
hours in the February 2019 NOA. In support of the County’s decision to reduce her
IHSS service hours, the ALJ cited to inconsistencies in the record, including Lattimore’s
ability to sign her full name despite asserting that she is unable to use both hands, and her
refusal to answer questions regarding the redacted content in the November 7, 2018
Clinic Note.
       D. Decisions on Services During Second Subject Timeframe: April 10, 2019, to
          July 17, 2019
       On April 10, 2019, Lattimore went to NMC and requested bilateral thumb spica
splints, which Dr. J.S. placed (April 2019 clinic visit). That day, Lattimore requested the
maximum IHSS service hours of 283 per month, alleging a change in her circumstances,
stating that she could not use her hands. Lattimore signed “her full signature in cursive”
on the letter. The County requested Lattimore sign an authorization so that the County
could speak with Lattimore’s doctor and review her medical records. Instead of signing
the requested form, Lattimore requested a hearing.
                                                 11
      On June 10, 2019, Lattimore requested a hearing with respect to the County’s
response to her April 10, 2019 request for 283 IHSS service hours per month.
      On July 17, 2019, an ALJ presided over the concurrent rehearing regarding the
October 2018 ALJ decision—covering Lattimore’s request for IHSS service hours for the
December 18, 2017 to November 6, 2018 period—and hearing regarding Lattimore’s
April 10, 2019 request for the maximum IHSS service hours for the April 10, through
July 17, 2019 timeframe based on Lattimore’s alleged change in circumstances
(collectively, the July 2019 hearing).5 During this hearing, Lattimore demonstrated that
she had “unrestricted movement” of her fingers, was able to open and close her hands,
and pick up objects. The ALJ noted that, during the hearing, Lattimore’s casts looked
similar to the ones shown in a photo Lattimore dated April 10, 2019, did not have any
odor, and appeared “very clean” despite having been worn, allegedly, “24 hours a day
since May 2019.”
      In the December 2019 ALJ decision following the July 2019 hearing, the ALJ
found, in weighing the evidence in the administrative record, that Lattimore’s “verbal,
written and physical actions” lacked credibility. The ALJ cited to the observations of
County employees, including that of other ALJ’s; Lattimore’s demonstrated ability to
perform tasks Lattimore alleged she could not accomplish; Lattimore’s alteration of
medical records and submission of “conflicting medical evidence,” and Lattimore’s
appearance in public without casts or wraps around her hands and with apparent full use
of both hands. As a result, the ALJ upheld the October 2018 ALJ decision sustaining the
May 2018 NOA setting Lattimore’s IHSS service hours at 97 hours and 17 minutes and

      5
       During the July 2019 hearing, Lattimore also claimed that the discontinuation of
her IHSS services pursuant to the June 3, 2019 ALJ decision was “incorrect.” Lattimore
informed the ALJ that she “requested a hearing” on the termination of her IHSS, so the
ALJ noted that that issue would “be addressed on a different day with a different judge.”
The ALJ subsequently denied Lattimore’s claim contesting the discontinuation of her
IHSS. That decision is not within the scope of this appeal.
                                               12
denied Lattimore’s April 10, 2019 request for additional IHSS service hours due to
insufficient credible evidence to support Lattimore’s claims for the requested services.
       E. Proceedings on Petition for Writ of Mandate
       Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, Lattimore petitioned for a
writ of administrative mandate challenging the December 2019 ALJ decision to the
extent it upheld the October 2018 ALJ decision and denied Lattimore’s April 10, 2019
request for additional IHSS service hours.6
       During the hearing on April 1, 2022 (April 2022 hearing), the trial court asked
Lattimore to point to factual evidence (specifically, medical records) in the record that
demonstrated Lattimore was entitled to the requested paramedical and range of motion
services for the Subject Timeframes. Lattimore relied primarily on the Chief ALJ’s May
2019 letter granting her request for a rehearing of the October 2018 ALJ decision, rather
than to medical records documenting her need for services.
       Upon further prompting from the trial court, Lattimore identified specific pages
from the administrative record for the trial court to review as evidence demonstrating her
need for the claimed services.
       Many of the documents identified by Lattimore are copies of correspondence
between Lattimore and the County and copies of County forms, including the
paramedical and range of motion request forms purportedly signed by Drs. L.F. and J.S.,
and copies of photos of Lattimore wearing casts or wraps on her hands and arms. Sixteen

       6
        Lattimore’s petition for writ of mandate and her appeal briefs request range of
motion and paramedical services either through the “[p]resent date” or through
“December 21, 2020.” However, the December 2019 ALJ decision, the subject of
Lattimore’s petition for writ of mandate, covered only the Subject Timeframes.
Moreover, the trial court confirmed with Lattimore that the only claims and periods at
issue were those discussed during the October 24, 2018 ALJ decision and the additional
IHSS service hours request Lattimore made on April 10, 2019. We therefore limit our
review to Lattimore’s request for paramedical and range of motion services during the
Subject Timeframes. Any requested services for the periods after the Subject
Timeframes are outside the scope of this appeal.
                                                13
of the identified pages of the administrative record are “Clinic Notes,” the first of three
pages of an “Outpatient Neurology Follow-Up Note,” and one “Operative Report” from
NMC, which cover the June 2017 clinic visit, the November 2017 clinic visit (discussed
post (pt. II.B.2.)), the December 2017 surgery, the March 2019 clinic visit, the April 2019
clinic visit (all except the November 2017 clinic visit discussed ante (pt. I.A.–I.D.), and a
redacted list of medications.
        After independent review of the administrative record, including the documents
identified by Lattimore, the trial court found Lattimore failed to meet her burden of
demonstrating need for the requested IHSS service hours for the Subject Timeframes,
denied her petition pursuant to an order dated June 23, 2022, and entered judgment
against her. This appeal followed.
                                       II. DISCUSSION
        In her appeal of the trial court’s order denying her petition, Lattimore contends the
court erred in (1) concluding that Lattimore did not identify evidence in the record
supporting her claims that she was entitled to paramedical and range of motion services;
and (2) denying her the opportunity to argue her case at the hearing, not allowing her
witness to testify, and deferring to the December 2019 ALJ decision.
        A. In-Home Supportive Services
        The IHSS program is governed by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 12300 et
seq.7 “The purpose of the legislation is to give the aged, blind and disabled the
‘assistance and services which will encourage them to make greater efforts to achieve
self-care and self-maintenance, whenever feasible, and to enlarge their opportunities for
independence.’ (§ 12002.) IHSS is specifically ‘designed to avoid institutionalization of
incapacitated persons.’ ” (Reilly v. Marin Housing Authority (2020) 10 Cal.5th 583,
588.)

        7
            Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
                                                   14
       The California Department of Social Services (CDSS) oversees the program and
has promulgated regulations to assist in its implementation, which appear in its Manual of
Policies and Procedures (MPP). (See State Dept. Social Services, Manual of Policies and
Procedures; Norasingh v. Lightbourne (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 740, 744 (Norasingh).)
The IHSS program “provides assistance to those eligible aged, blind and disabled
individuals who are unable to remain safely in their own homes without this assistance.”
(MPP, § 30-700.1.) Services and program benefits are administered by the applicable
county (here Monterey) under the supervision of CDSS. (Norasingh, at pp. 744–745.)
The county “process[es] applications for IHSS, determine[s] the individual’s eligibility
and needs, and authorize[s] services.” (Basden v. Wagner (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 929,
934 (Basden).)
       Relevant here, the county may authorize (1) paramedical services, which are
supportive services “persons could provide for themselves but for their functional
limitations,” and “include the administration of medications, puncturing the skin or
inserting a medical device into a body orifice, activities requiring sterile procedures, or
other activities requiring judgment based on training given by a licensed health care
professional” (§ 12300.1; see also § 12300, subd. (b)); and (2) personal care services such
as range of motion services that are comprised of (a) exercises “to restore mobility
restricted because of injury, disuse or disease,” and/or (b) maintenance exercises “to
maintain function, improve gait, maintain strength, or endurance,” “to maintain range of
motion in paralyzed extremities,” or to provide “assistive walking.” (MPP, § 30-
757.14(g); § 12300, subd. (c)(6).)
       Prior to authorizing services, the county must receive “a certification from a
licensed health care professional” that declares the recipient “is unable to perform some
activities of daily living independently,” and that without such services to assist with
daily living activities, the “recipient is at risk of placement in out-of-home care.”
(§ 12309.1, subd. (a), (a)(2).) Prior to the initial authorization of IHSS services, the
                                                 15
county performs needs assessments. It annually reassesses IHSS recipients thereafter.
(MPP, § 30-761.21; § 12301.1, subd. (b).)
       The county also reassesses a recipient’s need for services when the recipient
notifies it of a change in circumstances necessitating an adjustment in service hours or
when “there is other pertinent information which indicates a change in circumstances
affecting the recipient’s need for” IHSS. (MPP, § 30-761.219; § 12301.1, subd. (d).)
The county categorizes the recipient’s abilities, function, and dependence on assistance
on a scale of one to five. (MPP, §§ 30-756.1, 30-756.2.) A recipient is categorized at a
level five in one or more applicable service categories if the county determines that the
recipient “cannot perform the function, with or without human assistance.” (§ 12309,
subd. (d)(5); MPP § 30-756.15.)
       The county’s social services staff determines “the need for services based on all of
the following: [¶] [] The recipient’s physical/mental condition, or living/social situation.
[¶] (a) These conditions and situations shall be determined following a face-to-face
contact with the recipient, if necessary. [¶] [(b)] The recipient’s statement of need. [¶]
[(c)] The available medical information. [¶] [(d)] Other information social service staff
consider necessary and appropriate to assess the recipient’s needs.” (MPP, § 30-761.26.)
In general, eligible IHSS recipients may not receive more than 195 hours of IHSS per
month. (§ 12303.4, subd. (a).) However, “[s]everely impaired [IHSS] recipients” may
receive up to 283 hours of IHSS per month. (Basden, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 934;
§ 12303.4, subd. (b).)
       The statute governing the IHSS program grants the CDSS and the county authority
to investigate, detect, and prevent “fraud in the provision or receipt of in-home supportive
services” (§ 12305.82, subd. (a)), “to take appropriate administrative action relating to
suspected fraud in the provision or receipt of in-home supportive services, and to refer
suspected criminal offenses to appropriate law enforcement agencies for prosecution.”
(Id., subd. (b).) The statute defines “ ‘[f]raud’ ” as “the intentional deception or
                                                 16
misrepresentation made by a person with the knowledge that the deception could result in
some unauthorized benefit to himself or herself or some other person. Fraud also
includes any act that constitutes fraud under applicable federal or state law.” (§ 12305.8,
subd. (a).)
       To facilitate the county’s compliance with the regulations and statute, the recipient
is responsible for, among other things, completing and making available to the county all
documents required by the county to determine the recipient’s eligibility and need for
services. (MPP, § 30-760.1.) The recipient’s obligations include “[c]ooperating with
county fraud detection and prevention and quality assurance activities including case
reviews and home visits,” “[r]eporting all known facts which are material to [the
recipient’s] eligibility and level of need,” and “[r]eporting within [10] calendar days of
the occurrence, any change in any of these facts.” (Ibid.)
       The recipient must “cooperate to the best of his/her ability in the securing of
medical verification which evaluates the following: [¶] [(a)] His/her present condition.
[¶] [(b)] His/her ability to remain safely in his/her own home without IHSS services. [¶]
[(c)] His/her need for either medical or nonmedical out-of-home care placement if IHSS
were not provided. [¶] [(d)] The level of out-of-home care necessary if IHSS were not
provided.” (MPP, § 30-763.11.) Under the regulations, the recipient’s “failure to
cooperate as required in [s]ection 30-763.11 shall result in denial or termination of
IHSS.” (Id., § 30-763.12.)
       B. Analysis
       A decision denying public assistance impacts fundamental vested rights. (Frink v.
Prod (1982) 31 Cal.3d 166, 177.) In reviewing a decision impacting fundamental vested
rights, a trial court exercises independent judgment, “reconsider[ing] the evidence
presented at the administrative hearing and mak[ing] its own independent findings of
fact.” (Ruth v. Kizer (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 (Ruth).) When exercising its
independent judgment, a trial court must afford “ ‘ “a strong presumption
                                                17
of . . . correctness” ’ to administrative findings,” and the party challenging the
administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative
findings are “ ‘ “contrary to the weight of the evidence.” ’ ” (Fukuda v. City of Angels
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817 (Fukuda), citing Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 139.)
       In reviewing such decisions, the appellate court examines the entire record,
including the administrative record, to determine whether substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s findings. (Worthington v. Davi (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 263, 277
(Worthington); Calderon v. Anderson (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 607, 613.) “ ‘Substantial
evidence’ is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. [Citation.] It is sufficient ‘ “if any reasonable trier of fact could have
considered it reasonable, credible and of solid value.” ’ ” (San Diego Unified School
Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1142
(San Diego USD).)
       The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence (Norasingh, supra, 229
Cal.App.4th at p. 753), but, rather, “resolve[s] all conflicts and indulge[s] all reasonable
inferences in favor of the party who prevailed in the trial court.” (Worthington, supra,
208 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.) “ ‘If there is substantial evidence, the judgment must be
affirmed. [Citation.] We do not reweigh the evidence. Our inquiry “begins and ends
with the determination as to whether there is substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact.” ’ ” (San Diego USD, supra, 214
Cal.App.4th at p. 1142.) “If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence
that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences,
might have reached a contrary conclusion.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d
870, 874, italics omitted.)
       We review the interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations de novo,
(K.I. v. Wagner (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1419 (K.I.)), and “ ‘reverse the judgment

                                                 18
of the [trial] court only if it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law.’ ” (Worthington,
supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)
       “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–
609, citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Lattimore’s status as a
self-represented litigant does not exempt her from the rules of appellate procedure or
relieve her burden on appeal. (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1246–1247.)
       “Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the positions
taken” (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862), and a
party who claims the trial court erred may not “rest on the bare assertion of error but must
present argument and legal authority on each point raised.” (Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp.
(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645, 649.) We are not required to search the record for error
ourselves (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246), and “[w]e are not bound to
develop appellants’ arguments for them.” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) When an appellant asserts a point on appeal “ ‘but fails to
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority,’ ” this court may treat the
point as forfeited. (Nelson, at p. 862; see also Nisei Farmers League v. Labor &
Workforce Development Agency (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 997, 1018.)
              1. IHSS Recipients’ Obligation to Cooperate with CDSS
       Lattimore cites no legal authority supporting her claim that the trial court erred
when it determined that Lattimore failed to identify evidence in the record supporting her
claims for paramedical and range of motion services during the Subject Timeframes.8

       8
       The sole case Lattimore cites in her briefing on this point, Ruth, supra, 8
Cal.App.4th at page 385, does not assist her. The court in Ruth overturned the trial

                                                 19
Accordingly, Lattimore has forfeited this contention on appeal. Furthermore, we do not
agree with Lattimore that the trial erred on this point.
       In terms of specific evidence in the record supporting her claim, Lattimore relies
heavily on the May 2019 letter from the Chief ALJ, both in the present appeal and in the
trial court and administrative proceedings that followed the issuance of that letter. Her
reliance on the May 2019 letter is misplaced.
       The May 2019 letter does not substantiate Lattimore’s claim that she required
paramedical and range of motion services during the Subject Timeframes. It does not
diagnose or assess Lattimore’s alleged medical conditions, discuss any medical records or
other documents she submitted, or state that she is entitled to paramedical and range of
motion services. The letter sets forth the Chief ALJ’s interpretation of the procedural
requirements in the MPP. Indeed, during the July 2019 hearing, the ALJ explained, and
Lattimore acknowledged, that the inclusion of the phrase “ ‘based upon her failure to
cooperate’ ” means that the Chief ALJ was not instructing the CDSS to grant the
requested hours, only that the denial of those hours was incorrect if based solely on
Lattimore’s failure to cooperate.
       In fact, the MPP does require IHSS recipients to cooperate with the county’s
assessment process. Pursuant to section 30-763.11 of the MPP, an IHSS recipient is
required “to cooperate to the best of his/her ability in the securing of medical verification
which evaluates the following: [¶] [(a)] His/her present condition. [¶] [(b)] His/her
ability to remain safely in his/her own home without IHSS services. [¶] [(c)] His/her
need for either medical or nonmedical out-of-home care placement if IHSS were not

court’s decision on the grounds that the Medi-Cal recipients failed to present the requisite
documentation to support their requests for the equipment at issue. (Id. at p. 390.) As
discussed post (pt. II.B.2.), Lattimore’s appeal faces a similar issue here.
                                                 20
provided. [¶] [(d)] The level of out-of-home care necessary if IHSS were not provided.”9
(MPP, § 30-763.11, italics added.) Moreover, the MPP clearly states that a recipient’s
“failure to cooperate as required in [s]ection 30-763.11 shall result in denial or
termination of IHSS.” (Id., § 30-763.12, italics added.)
       “The interpretation of a regulation, like the interpretation of a statute, is, of course,
a question of law” and “the ultimate resolution of such legal questions rests with the
courts.” (Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 310.) While an
administrative agency’s interpretation, including that of ALJ’s supporting the
administrative agency, of its governing regulations “is entitled to ‘great weight and
deference’ ” (Norasingh, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 753), this “principle of deference
is not without limit; it does not permit the agency to disregard the regulation’s plain
language.” (Motion Picture Studio Teachers & Welfare Workers v. Millan (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195.) An agency’s construction of its own regulation no longer
controls if “it is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the plain language of the
regulation.” (Ibid.)
       The MPP’s language clearly requires IHSS recipients to cooperate with the
county, and just as clearly sets forth denial or termination of IHSS as the consequence of
an IHSS recipient’s failure to cooperate.
              2. Evidence of Need for Paramedical and Range of Motion Services
       Even apart from Lattimore’s refusal to cooperate with the County’s assessments
and investigation, the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that Lattimore did not elicit “any evidence in the record that indicates that the
       9
         Reading sections 30-761.26 and 30-760.1 of the MPP together, a recipient must
complete and make available to the County all documents the County “consider[s]
necessary and appropriate to assess the recipient’s” eligibility and need for IHSS. (MPP,
§§ 30-761.26, 30-760.1.) Given the County’s well-documented and well-substantiated
concerns regarding Lattimore’s credibility and the authenticity of her documents, it was
reasonable for the County to require Lattimore to sign releases so the County could speak
directly with Lattimore’s doctors to better assess and to verify Lattimore’s claims.
                                                  21
weight of the evidence demonstrates that [she] was entitled to the range of motion and
paramedical services hours she sought from the County.” We agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that Lattimore failed to meet her burden of proving that the December 2019
ALJ decision was “contrary to the weight of the evidence.”
       While many of the medical documents in the record are duplicates, we can
summarize the unique medical records as follows: (1) an NMC Clinic Note describing
the June 2017 clinic visit regarding Lattimore’s feet; (2) the first (out of three) pages of
an NMC Outpatient Neurology Follow-Up Note for the November 2017 clinic visit that
lists Lattimore’s vital signs, but not the reason for or outcome of the visit; (3) an NMC
Operative Report describing the December 2017 surgery; (4) a heavily redacted
November 7, 2018 Clinic Note discussing Lattimore’s wrists and hand therapy; (5) the
March 2019 Clinic Note regarding Lattimore’s “bilateral de Quervain” and discussing
removal, placement, and nighttime wear of thumb spica splints; and (6) an NMC Clinic
Note describing the April 2019 clinic visit during which Lattimore requested bilateral
thumb spica splints.10
       Lattimore claimed to have “undergone six major surgeries,” including “surgery on
her arms on November 7, 2018,” and submitted “thousands of pages” of medical records

       10
          Lattimore attached to her opening brief partial copies of medical records dated
November 8, 2019, and onward, two signed paramedical services request forms from July
2022, and a single page purportedly from the decision regarding her challenge to the
discontinuation of her IHSS discussed ante (fn. 6). Pursuant to California Rules of Court,
the record on appeal is “[a] record of the written documents from the [trial] court
proceedings,” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(a)(1)) the administrative record, (id., rule
8.120(a)(2)) and the reporter’s transcript of the hearing before the trial court. (Id., rule
8.120(b).) An appellant’s brief may only address matters in the record. (Id., rule
8.204(a)(2)(C), (d).) The general rule of appellate review is that the reviewing court
examines the correctness of a judgment or order based upon the record before the trial
court for consideration. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) Documents not
before the trial court cannot be included as part of the record on appeal and thus must be
disregarded as beyond the scope of appellate review.” (Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1307.) We therefore will not consider Lattimore’s
arguments that rely on such documents.
                                                 22
to the County and to the ALJ’s presiding over her requested hearings and rehearings.
However, as the trial court observed, the administrative record does not evidence any of
these alleged additional surgeries during the Subject Timeframes, nor does it show a
voluminous production of medical records. The only record of an operation in the record
documents Lattimore’s December 2017 surgery, while the clinic notes in the record
discuss only physical therapy and other nonsurgical and surgical recommendations.
       The medical documents in the record are insufficient to support Lattimore’s claims
for the range of motion and paramedical services she asserts she needed during the first
Subject Timeframe. They do not show evidence of the folliculitis that allegedly
necessitates the services described in the December 2017 paramedical services request
form. Nor do the medical records in the record show evidence of the rotator cuff disease,
carpal tunnel, bursa bursitis, strain or IT band issues, lumbar strain, cervical disc disease,
or shoulder impingement that allegedly necessitate the variety of services documented in
the December 2017 range of motion services request forms.
       The June 5, 2017 clinic note indicates that Lattimore is “recuperating from a
patellar tendon and right medial meniscus repair,” but none of the other medical records
indicate any new meniscus injury thereafter, even though a meniscus tear is listed six
months later as one of Lattimore’s medical conditions in a December 2017 range of
motion services request form. None of the medical records include information that
would indicate that any of the medical conditions documented in the medical records and
claimed in the December 2017 paramedical services request forms, such as DeQuervain’s
Tenosynovitis, Achilles issues, and plantar fasciitis, are so severe as to suggest they will
be with Lattimore for her “lifetime,” the duration for which Dr. J.S. indicated Lattimore
would require the requested services.
       The medical documentation in the record is likewise insufficient to support
Lattimore’s claims that she should be ranked a level five and granted 283 IHSS service
hours, the maximum allowable under the statute and the MPP, for the second Subject
                                                 23
Timeframe. “The determination whether the individual is entitled to the higher benefit
level requires a factually intensive evaluation of the assistance needed for numerous
specified daily living tasks.” (K.I., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416.) The only medical
record that falls within the April to July 2019 timeframe does not indicate a disability or
reduction in function such that Lattimore would be unable to perform the functions, with
or without human assistance, that the statute and MPP require in order to rank an IHSS
recipient as a “five.” Nor does it suggest such severe impairment as to require the receipt
of the maximum allowable number of IHSS service hours. (Basden, supra, 181
Cal.App.4th at p. 934.) Indeed, other medical records, particularly the March 2019 Clinic
Note just a month before Lattimore’s April 10, 2019 request, indicate that the thumb
spica splints needed to be worn only at night, that they can and may be removed and, in
fact, were removed for a two-month period.
       Lattimore did not point the trial court or this court to any additional medical
records, nor does the record reveal any documents that would support her claim that her
medical condition during the Subject Timeframes necessitates the authorization of the
requested range of motion and paramedical services.
       In addition, observations of Lattimore’s own conduct during reassessments and
hearings during the Subject Timeframes likewise cast doubt on the existence and extent
of Lattimore’s documented medical conditions during the Subject Timeframes. During
the 2017 reassessment, Lattimore was able to grip her hands tightly, use her hands to
reach up to adjust her glasses and take them on and off, get up and walk around without
difficulty, and reach and lean diagonally across her body without any apparent
discomfort. Lattimore attested to her ability to “brush her teeth, write and lift some
objects that are not too heavy.” Lattimore demonstrated her ability to brush her teeth and
confirmed her ability to write to an ALJ during the February 2018 hearing. As the ALJ
for the February 2018 hearing noted, “it was unclear why [Lattimore] is able to brush her

                                                24
teeth, but not able to feed herself or wipe herself,” and “as [she] is able to write and brush
[her] teeth, she should be able to perform most of the feeding tasks.”
       Lattimore testified, “before November 7, 2018,” she used “removable handguards
that attached by Velcro and could be taken on and off by pulling the Velcro straps” to
support her thumb. According to the County employees’ observations during the 2017
reassessment, Lattimore wore this brace only on her left hand, which is consistent with
the NMC Operative Report describing the December 2017 surgery. Lattimore did not
have casts or splints on her hands during the period from December 16, 2017, to
November 7, 2018, and the County sought to discuss with Lattimore’s doctor why she
was unable to perform some of the treatments listed in the paramedical and range of
motion forms herself. But Lattimore and Dr. J.S. stymied the County’s efforts to speak to
him regarding her medical conditions.
       During the July 2019 hearing, County employees and the ALJ observed Lattimore
manipulating paperwork on her own, waving her fingers, picking up a water bottle,
picking up a coffee cup using four of her fingers, and moving objects around. The ALJ
for the July 2019 hearing observed, Lattimore “demonstrated how she had unrestricted
movement of all four fingers, demonstrated they opened and closed to her palm, and how
she could pick up a water bottle by using both hands, rather than gripping it with one
hand because the cast interfered with closing the hand around the circumference of the
water bottle.” The record contains no explanation by Lattimore of the inconsistencies
between her stated inabilities and her observed abilities.
       Furthermore, the County granted Lattimore two hours per week of IHSS service
hours for feeding, and two hours and 20 minutes per week of IHSS service hours for
bathing, oral hygiene, and grooming. The record contains no explanation why Lattimore
requires additional feeding services beyond those already granted, and how any such
services would be considered range of motion services, as opposed to feeding services as
set forth in the statute. (§ 12300, subd. (c)(7).) Under the applicable regulations, range
                                                 25
of motion services are limited to exercises that are intended to restore mobility or
maintenance exercises intended to retain mobility (MPP, § 30-757.14(g)), which would
not include feeding. Nor has Lattimore explained or identified any evidence in her
briefing why she requires additional shampooing, conditioning, and blow drying services
beyond those granted in the “[b]athing, oral hygiene, and grooming” category of IHSS,
and how those services would require the training and judgment of a medical professional
such that they would rightfully fall under the paramedical category of supportive services
as opposed to the personal care services category. (§ 12300, subd. (c)(2).) In addition,
Lattimore does not present any evidence undermining the County’s position (and the
finding in the December 2019 ALJ decision) that electro-orthostim services, including the
use of a TENS unit, are “not compensable” under the range of motion category of
services. Use of the TENS unit to provide electro-orthostim services is a pain relief
treatment (which is not compensable), rather than restoration or retention of mobility.
       We decide the trial court did not err in concluding that the record does not support
Lattimore’s claims for paramedical and range of motion services. Lattimore has failed to
meet her burden of showing that the trial court’s decision was contrary to the weight of
the evidence in the record.
       Although it is not necessary to our conclusion, we observe that the record contains
considerable evidence of Lattimore’s history of providing fraudulent or redacted
documents to the County. For example, in addition to providing falsified Marina PT
records to the County, Lattimore refused to answer the County’s and the ALJ’s questions
regarding the content of the redacted portions of other medical records, including with
respect to the redacted November 7, 2018 and March 2019 Clinic Notes. Lattimore’s
alteration of her medical records removed information that could help the County assess
her needs, including, with respect to the March 2019 Clinic Note, information that

                                                26
indicated that the thumb spica splints need only be worn at night and were removable.11
The trial court could reasonably infer from the language redacted the rationale for the
redaction, that Lattimore was trying to hide the truth of her condition to obtain the
requested services.
       Lattimore also heavily redacted the November 7, 2018 Clinic Note, obscuring the
portion of the Clinic Note that would typically indicate the doctor’s diagnosis and
treatment plan for the patient, for a visit to NMC that occurred on the same day she
claims she had another surgical procedure on her hands. These fragmentary excerpts do
not allow for an accurate evaluation of Lattimore’s medical condition or comparison with
her claimed need for paramedical and range of motion services. Relatedly, Lattimore did
not explain to the ALJ’s, the trial court, or this court, how she was able to sign her full
signature to a letter requesting IHSS services on November 6, 2018, despite claiming in
that same letter that she was “unable to use both hands” and attaching to it a photo of her
hands in casts. Nor did she explain how she included the range of motion request forms
purportedly signed and dated November 7, 2018, by Dr. J.S. with the November 6 letter.
       We decide the trial court did not err in concluding Lattimore failed to carry her
burden of demonstrating evidence in the record sufficient to support her claim for the
requested paramedical and range of motion services during the Subject Timeframes.
              3. Fair Trial Claims
       Lattimore asserts that the trial court committed procedural error by exhibiting bias
in not allowing Lattimore to present her case, by not allowing her to present a witness
introduced for the first time at the trial court hearing, and by deferring to the December
2019 ALJ decision. Although Lattimore references pages in the reporter’s transcript to

       11
         Although Lattimore alleged at the April 2022 hearing that her care provider
mistakenly redacted this language, rather than language regarding a different medical
condition, that the same language is redacted in multiple ways over multiple copies
strongly suggests that the redaction was intentional rather than accidental.
                                                 27
support her claim of procedural errors, she does not develop the points with citation to
legal authority or argument. Accordingly, Lattimore has forfeited these contentions on
appeal. In any event, our review of the record does not support her claims of error.
       With respect to Lattimore’s assertion that the trial court denied her “the complete
chance to tell and prove” her case, the reporter’s transcript pages she cites do not support
her claim. To the contrary, at the hearing Lattimore was able to describe the paramedical
and range of motion forms she submitted, and the trial court prompted Lattimore to
identify any medical records that would support the claims for the requested services.
The trial court provided Lattimore with multiple opportunities to elicit such records and
allowed Lattimore extra time in the hearing to gather her documents. The trial court told
Lattimore that it would “go back and take a look” and “go through the entire record, but
pay particularly close attention to the pages” Lattimore identified. There is no evidence
in the portions of the record Lattimore cites on appeal that the trial court did not afford
her “the complete chance to tell and prove” her case.
       Nor do the pages Lattimore cites indicate any bias on the part of the trial court.
When alleging bias, a party must allege concrete facts that demonstrate the trial court was
biased. (Shakin v. Board of Medical Examiners (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 102, 117;
Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 781, 792.) Although
Lattimore cites to the entirety of the reporter’s transcript in support of her claim of bias,
she does not point to any specific statements in support of her claim, and we have not
identified any.
       In addition, the trial court did not err in not allowing Lattimore’s care provider to
testify at the hearing. As to this assertion of error, Lattimore makes only a blanket
statement, without any citation to authority. Moreover, as Lattimore herself
acknowledged in her petition for writ of mandate, Code of Civil Procedure section
1094.5, subdivision (e) only permits the admission of “extra-record evidence” that “in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced” at the administrative
                                                  28
hearing. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (e).) A party “ ‘may not complain of the
absence of a witness unless [the party] had made a showing of due diligence to obtain the
attendance of the witness.’ ” (Nick v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1993) 12
Cal.App.4th 1407, 1417.)
        Lattimore does not establish that she made such a showing. Further, she does not
acknowledge that, in response to CDSS’s objection to the introduction of Lattimore’s
care provider as a witness and the trial court sustaining the objection, she conceded the
point and told the trial court it was “fine.” Lattimore therefore forfeited her right to
challenge the matter on appeal. (Sperber v. Robinson (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 736, 742–
743.)
        Finally, the reporter’s transcript page Lattimore references in support of her claim
that the trial court erred by “defer[ring]” to the December 2019 ALJ decision only
contains CDSS’s argument regarding Lattimore’s lack of cooperation, and the trial court
giving Lattimore the opportunity to respond to that contention. It does not include any
intimation that the trial court did not exercise independent judgment.
        Nevertheless, as discussed ante (pt. II.B.), even when exercising its independent
judgment, a trial court can and should accord a “strong presumption of correctness” to the
findings in the administrative decision it reviews. (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 817.)
“Independent judgment review ‘ “does not mean that the preliminary work performed by
the administrative board in sifting the evidence and in making its findings is wasted
effort. . . . [I]n weighing the evidence the courts can and should be assisted by the
findings of the board.” ’ ” (San Diego USD, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141, quoting
Fukuda, at p. 812.) The trial court did not err to the extent it deferred to the December
2019 ALJ decision.
                                    III. DISPOSITION
        The judgement is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
                                                 29
                                  ______________________________________
                                             Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H050171
Lattimore v. Dept. of Social Services