Court Opinion

ID: 9631632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:45:15.504368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:39.623620
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Chief Justice,
concurring.
The court upholds today the nisi prius ruling that the parties to this appeal had not entered into a common-law marital relationship.1 Although I accede to the court’s judgment and concur in its pronouncement, I write separately to correct the faulty exposition of common-law marriage that crept into some of our extant jurisprudence. The significance of cohabitation2 in the context of a common-law marriage has suffered from several decades of irreconcilably discordant jurisprudence.3 This case presents an opportunity to reinfuse the body of our unwritten law4 with the ancient lore that regards cohabitation as not essential to achieving matrimonial status by common-law marriage.
Common-law marriage has roots as far back as the 12th Century canon law.5 Under the rules introduced by Pope Alexander III,6 marriage could be contracted by consent alone — sans ecclesiastical ceremony, parental consent, or physical consummation — if the consent was “in the words of the present tense.”7 Under Oklahoma law, first pronounced in 1905, the same rule applies — a common-law marriage is contracted by per verba de praesenti.8 If a man and woman declare that they take each other as husband and wife, at the moment of their mutual consent, they are married.9 Early case law recognizes that the vital point of inquiry into the *116existence of a non-ceremonial marriage focuses on whether there was mutual consent of both parties to a •present or immediate assumption of the marital bond. Repute and mutual holding out as husband and wife are merely evidentiary of the antecedent consent’s reality.10 Cohabitation is probative of a voluntary relationship which may be marital in character if mutual consent is otherwise found to have been present. Cohabitation alone is insufficient as proof of consent per verba de praesenti.11
Scattered cases that regard cohabitation as a prerequisite for a consensual non-ceremonial marriage12 are clearly irreconcilable with the earlier correct exposition of common-law marriage.13 The distorted gloss of latter years may stem from judicial misidentification of a probative fact with an element of marriage itself. The erroneous view may also have been influenced by excessive judicial fear that a status so important could be created so informally. The erroneous impression that physical consummation is essential to matrimony without ceremony may have contributed to the confusion.14
Cohabitation is not a necessary element of a common-law marriage. It cannot validate a bond that falls short of the legal mark because of want of mutual consent. Consensus, non concubitus, facit matri-monium.15
I would today overrule the distortions scattered throughout our case law and excise from its corpus references to cohabitation as a prerequisite for a common-law marriage.16 All opinions in conflict with *117Reaves17 should be regarded as an incorrect exposition of the ancient canonical doctrine still effective in Oklahoma today as part of our common law.18

. A "common-law marriage” is more properly called a “pre-Tridentine canonical consensual marriage." Ancient canon law, which consisted of the decrees of the various popes was the basis of matrimonial law in England. Before the Council of Trent (Trident in Latin) in 1563 canon law required no ceremony or religious sacrament for a valid marriage. The canon and civil laws administered in the ecclesiastical courts of England were brought from England to this side of the Atlantic and have been received as a part of Oklahoma law. Reaves v. Reaves, 15 Okl. 240, 82 P. 490, 494 (1905).

. Cohabitation means living together. Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, 520 (2nd Ed. 1959). It may include but is not synonymous with sexual relations.

. Compare the cases infra note 10 with those infra note 16.

. The unwritten law — earlier known by its Latin designation of lex non scripta regni Angliae — is the non-statutory law of the kingdom of England and Wales, also called the common law, which originated from custom and judicial decisions. McCormack v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., Okl., 613 P.2d 737, 740 (1980).

. See supra note 1. For a discussion of the canonical theory of marriage, see 2 F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, The History of English Law, 368-379 (Cambridge 1968).

. Canonists before Pope Alexander III considered marriage effected by the physical union of man and woman in carnal copulation. Since there could also be copulation without marriage, they decided a mental element was also necessary. They held that the marriage began by agreement but became complete and indissoluble once the agreement was sealed by a physical union. This view was replaced by the later canon law that did away with the physical consummation requirement. See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 391 (2d Ed.1979).

. Such a bond was indissoluble and even before consummation would be upheld in preference to a subsequent church marriage with a different spouse. See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 546 (3rd Ed.1990).

. Per verba de praesenti means literally “by words in the present tense.” Black's Law Dictionary, 1031 (5th Ed.1987). In canon law this medieval Latin phrase means “words that make mutual consent immediately effective.”

. Marriage was, of course, a church sacrament, but the church accepted the civil law doctrine that marriage was in one aspect a contract, created by mutual consent. See M. Radin, *116Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History, 504-505 (West 1936).

. For an eloquent history of the common-law marriage and an explanation of how the concept came to be adopted in Oklahoma, see Reaves, supra note 1. For our early jurisprudence that correctly defines the elements of consensual non-ceremonial marriage, see also Allen v. Smith, 177 Okl. 605, 61 P.2d 564 (Syllabus 2) (1936); Richard v. Richard, 172 Okl. 397, 45 P.2d 101 (Syllabus 2) (1935); Gustin v. Carshall, 156 Okl. 173, 10 P.2d 250 (Syllabus 5) (1932); Tiuna v. Willmott, 162 Okl 42, 19 P.2d 145 (Syllabus 1) (1933); Fisher v. Fisher, 116 Okl. 129, 243 P. 730 (1926); Mudd v. Perry, 108 Okl. 168, 235 P. 479, 482 (1925); Horrigan v. Gibson, 87 Okl. 1, 206 P. 219, 221 (1922).

. See supra note 8 for the definition of per verba de praesenti.

. The court distinguishes today cases that consider cohabitation an essential element, e.g., Rath, infra note 16 at 1013, from those that consider cohabitation or assumption of marital duties essential for a common-law marriage, e.g., Greenwood, infra note 16 at 342. A recent case requires "exclusive relationship, proved by cohabitation” for a common-law marriage. Matter of Estate of Stinchcomb, infra note 16 at 29. In my view cases that require cohabitation and open assumption of marital duties are no different from those which require cohabitation or open assumption of marital duties or some other unnecessary element. All of those cases fail to recognize that cohabitation is merely probative of a voluntary relationship which may be marital in character if mutual consent is otherwise found to have been present.

. Compare the cases supra note 10 with those infra note 16.

. See Reaves, supra note 1 for the correct exposition of common-law marriage.

. Consent, and not cohabitation, constitutes marriage. Black’s Law Dictionary, 276 (5th Ed. 1979).

. Following is a non-exhaustive list of Oklahoma cases that appear to consider cohabitation an essential element of a common-law marriage:
Matter of Estate of Stinchcomb, Okl., 674 P.2d 26, 29 (1983);
Rath v. Maness, Okl., 470 P.2d 1011, 1013 (1970);
Daniels v. Mohon, Okl., 350 P.2d 932, 935 (1960);
D.P. Greenwood Trucking Co. v. State Industrial Com'n, Okl., 271 P.2d 339, 342 (1954); Maxfield v. Maxfield, Okl., 258 P.2d 915, 921 (Syllabus 2) (1953);
Quinton v. Webb, 207 Okl. 133, 248 P.2d 586, 589 (1952);
Ridgeway v. Logan, 205 Okl. 603, 239 P.2d 778, 782 (1952);
In re Blackhawk's Estate, 195 Okl. 390, 158 P.2d 168 (Syllabus 1) (1945);
Aurand v. Aurand, 195 Okl. 643, 161 P.2d 857 (1945);
Vann v. Vann, 186 Okl. 42, 96 P.2d 76, 77 (1939);
In re Graham's Estate, 169 Okl. 568, 37 P.2d 964 (1934);
Baker v. Jack, 112 Okl. 142, 241 P. 478, 480 (1925);
Bothwell v. Way, 44 Okl. 555, 145 P. 350, 351 (1915);
Estate of Phifer, 629 P.2d 808, 809 (Okl.App.1981);
*117Estate of Bouse, 583 P.2d 514, 517 (Okl.App.1978);
Dowell v. Welch, 574 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Okl.App.1978);
Matter of Estate of Rogers, 569 P.2d 536, 539 (Okl.App.1977).
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma may want to take note of the following cases that appear to consider cohabitation an essential element of a common-law marriage:
Blake v. State, 765 P.2d 1224, 1225 (Okl.Cr.1988);
Marshall v. State, 537 P.2d 423 (Okl.Cr.1975);
Fulbright v. State, 508 P.2d 688, 693 (Okl.Cr.1973);
Vaughn v. State, 489 P.2d 507 (Okl.Cr.1971);
McKee v. State, 452 P.2d 169, 172 (Okl.Cr.1969);
Wheaton v. State, 85 Okl.Cr. 132, 185 P.2d 931 (1947);
Chapman v. State, 84 Okl.Cr. 41, 178 P.2d 638, 640 (1947).

. Reaves, supra note 1.

. The provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 2 are:
“The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma; but the rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof, shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any general statute of Oklahoma; but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their object.” [Emphasis mine.]