Court Opinion

ID: 9743935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:50:43.735796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:45.853577
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Hoffman, C. J.
I dissent from the majority opinion. We are here concerned with a question of first impression in Indiana — whether a father may maintain a wrongful death action for the stillbirth of a once-viable fetus, such stillbirth resulting from defendant’s negligence.
The majority opinion first turns to a learned discussion of the development of authority from other jurisdictions, prop*499erly recognizing the division of that authority to be at least partially due to the statutory peculiarities of the various jurisdictions. The majority opinion points out that twenty-four jurisdictions have spoken on whether to allow, or not allow, the father’s cause of action for wrongful death. The views of these jurisdictions are readily divisible into a numerical majority and minority. Yet, even among the majority of jurisdictions that allow such cause of action, there are numerous and varying points of view. In light of this division of authority, this court, making the first pronouncement of this issue in this jurisdiction, must aim its discern point-blank at the most rational and equitable resolution of this issue under Indiana statutes and case law.
The majority opinion points out that unborn children are accorded certain property and inheritance rights. Where the child is conceived at the time of the decedent’s death, it is considered in being as of the time of conception. However, in Indiana, as well as other jurisdictions, this right is conditioned on the fact that the child be born alive. In Swain v. Bowers (1927), 91 Ind. App. 307, at 316, 158 N. E. 598, at 601, (transfer denied), this court held:
“It is a well-established rule of law that an infant is in being from the time of conception for the purpose of taking any estate which is for its benefit, whether by devise or under the statute of descent, provided it be born alive, and after such a period of foetal [fetal] existence that its continuance in life might be reasonably expected.” (Citing authorities.)
In view of the condition that the infant “be born alive” and so far matured in its fetal existence as to be capable of living, after-born child statutes and pretermitted heir statutes lend little, if any, support for the proposition that unborn fetus is a “child.”
Indiana statutes expressly distinguish between death and stillbirth. IC 1971,16-1-17-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 35-1901 (Burns 1969) provides, “[t]he person in charge of interment shall *500file a certificate of death or of stillbirth with the local health officer * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, IC 1971, 16-1-17-7, Ind. Ann. Stat. §35-1907 (Burns 1969), provides, “[u]pon receipt of a properly executed certificate of death or of a stillbirth * * * a local health officer * * * shall issue a permit for the disposal of the body.” (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously, these statutes intend that a stillbirth and death be treated in the same manner as to recordation and disposal of the body. The statutes, however, do not say, nor are they meant to say, that a death of a once-living human being is equivalent to a stillbirth.
It is true that a stillbirth is, in substance, a “dead body.” It is also true that a fetus conceived in the mother’s womb is, after the passage of time, capable of being separated from the mother’s body and carrying on life on its own. The perplexing question, however, is whether a wrongful death action may be maintained by the wife’s husband for the death of the yet-unborn “child.”
If such a cause of action is held to exist, it must exist under IC 1971, 34-1-1-8, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-217 (Burns 1967), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Action for injury or death of child. — A father, or in case of his death, or desertion of his family, or imprisonment, the mother, or in case of divorce the person to whom custody of the child was awarded, may maintain an action for the injury or death of a child; * *
Prior Indiana decisions construing this statute have held that actions for wrongful death of a child and actions for wrongful death of adults are separate and distinct and the statutory provisions relating to each should be independently construed.
Louisville, New Albany and Chicago R’y. Co. v. Goodykoontz, Guardian (1889), 119 Ind. 111, 21 N. E. 472; Hahn, et al. v. Moore (1956), 127 Ind. App. 149, 133 N. E. 2d 900, (transfer denied); Mayhew v. Burns (1885), 103 Ind. 328, 2 N. E. 793.
*501The action of the father for the wrongful death of a child is based solely on the loss of the father’s property right in the fruits of the child’s services.
Thompson v. Town of Fort Branch (1931), 204 Ind. 152, 178 N. E. 440, 82 A. L. R. 1413; Hahn, et al. v. Moore, supra.
Where the “child” is unborn, this property right is not only infinitely speculative but, in fact, non-existent, vesting only with the birth of a living, self-sustaining child.
This jurisdiction has long held that in an action to recover for the death of his child, the father’s measure of damages is the pecuniary value of the services the child would have rendered until he reached majority, less the cost of his support and maintenance.
Hahn, et al. v. Moore, supra; Thompson v. Town of Fort Branch, supra; Siebeking, et al. v. Ford, Admx., etc. (1958), 128 Ind. App. 475, 148 N. E. 2d 194 (transfer denied).
At first blush, this measure of damages seems outmoded even when applied to the death of a living child. The time has long since past that families depended on their childrens’ labors to help provide their means of life. Now the costs of schooling, clothes, medical and dental care, housing, food and last, but not least, college tuitions and expenses far outweigh the child’s contribution to the family income. Be that as it may, this writer does not propose to invade the legislative realm of changing this long-standing policy. It will here suffice to say that if this measure of damages is applied to the death of an unborn “child” the result would rest on no more than mere supposition. When the infant is still encased within its mother’s womb mortal man is incapable of knowing if the “child” will survive the ordeal of birth, not to mention the impossibility of trying to assign a pecuniary value to the services the child might have provided had he been born alive.
In Schulty v. Stecy (D. C., N. D. Ind. 1967), 11 Ind. Dec. *502198, Judge Beamer directly addressed the issue with which we are here concerned as follows:
“Although there are strong reasons for allowing recovery by an infant who receives prenatal injuries but is subsequently born alive, it does not necessarily follow that an action should be had for the stillbirth of a child.
“Indiana provides a special action for the death of a child. The statute provides: ‘A father . . . may maintain an action for the injury or death of a child . . . .’ Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann., Sec. 2-217. This recovery is limited to medical expenses for the care of the child and loss of income which the parents could have received during the child’s minority, less the cost of support and maintenance during that period. [Citing authorities.]
“In the case of a stillborn child there are no medical expenses of the child besides those of a mother. The value of the child’s services less the cost of support during his minority is so speculative as to be beyond determination. This court therefore believes that Indiana courts would not allow recovery for the stillbirth of a child.
“This will not necessarily preclude all recovery for the loss of the child. The Restatement of Torts, Section 869 states, ‘(I)n an action by the mother for a tort which has caused her physical harm, damages can be included for the pain, suffering and mental distress caused by the death of the child before birth or immediately afterwards.’ ”
Where an infant, having received prenatal injuries, is subsequently born alive, it may recover for those injuries through its guardian or next friend. Recovery is had by the person to whom the damage accrued. Where a minor child is killed, recovery of the father’s lost property right is accorded by statute. Yet, to allow an expectant father to recover for the death of a stillborn “child” is to open the courtroom doors to boundless uncertainty of damages and the impossibility of determining when the “child” becomes viable for on this point even medical experts disagree.
The mother’s pain and suffering and other actual injuries are recoverable in the mother’s personal injury action against the tortfeasor. The hospital and doctor care, incidental medi*503cal expenses, loss of consortium, the infant’s funeral expenses and other damages actually incurred are recoverable in the husband’s action for damages. Thus, in accordance with general principles of equity the husband and wife have been made whole as to the damages actually suffered.
For the foregoing reasons I believe that equity demands that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
NOTE. — Reported in 277 N. E. 2d 20.