Court Opinion

ID: 9691735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 00:00:30.066339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:22.287693
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30585         Document: 00516871664             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/24/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                             FILED
                                      ____________
                                                                                 August 24, 2023
                                       No. 22-30585                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                     Clerk

   Katherine Muslow; Meredith Cunningham,

                                                                   Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                             versus

   Louisiana State University and Agricultural and
   Mechanical College, Board of Supervisors; Thomas
   Skinner, in his individual capacity; Larry Hollier; John
   Harman; Carlton Jones, III, also known as Trey Jones,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:19-CV-11793
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Katherine Muslow and Meredith Cunningham, the plaintiffs-
   appellants, brought numerous gender discrimination and retaliation claims
   against their former employer and some of its employees, the defendants-
   appellees, after their positions were terminated as part of a university-wide

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-30585

   consolidation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
   defendants on all claims, which Muslow and Cunningham appeal. Finding
   that one of Muslow’s and Cunningham’s allegations of retaliation against
   their employer, the university, should have survived, we REVERSE in part
   the district court’s summary judgment. We otherwise AFFIRM the
   judgment of the district court and REMAND the case for further
   proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                         I.
          Plaintiffs-appellants Katherine Muslow and Meredith Cunningham
   (“Plaintiffs”) served the Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center
   in New Orleans (“LSUHSC”) as, respectively, General Counsel from 2002
   to 2019 and part-time staff attorney from 2014 to 2019. LSUHSC houses the
   Louisiana State University system’s schools of medicine, dentistry, and
   public health, among others, and is governed by the Board of Supervisors for
   Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
   (“LSU”). In mid-2019, Plaintiffs’ positions were retired from LSUHSC as
   part of LSU’s consolidation of its legal team, and this employment dispute
   arose shortly thereafter.
          LSU formally began its consolidation of all legal positions outside of
   the LSU Office of General Counsel (“OGC”), including Muslow’s and
   Cunningham’s positions at LSUHSC, with its December 10, 2018 revision
   of Permanent Memorandum-72 (“PM-72”), which provided that
   “University employees with legal degrees, but working outside of the Office
   of General Counsel, are not authorized to provide legal advice to or on behalf
   of [LSU].” However, Muslow was aware of this consolidation as early as
   August 6, 2018, when she received a message discussing the imminent
   integration of LSUHSC legal functions into OGC, of which she made
   Cunningham aware the next day. Thomas Skinner, Vice President of Legal

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   Affairs and General Counsel at OGC, later contacted Muslow on December
   19, again notifying her of the consolidation and outlining the plan to transition
   her position to OGC at the same compensation level she received at
   LSUHSC. Several weeks later, on January 8, 2019, Plaintiffs met with
   Skinner and Carlton “Trey” Jones, III, OGC Deputy General Counsel, to
   discuss the consolidation and their upcoming transfer to OGC.
          On January 18, OGC’s business manager reached out to Muslow and
   Cunningham to facilitate the transfer of their positions to OGC. They were
   informed that, to get set up in LSU’s system, they would “have to go through
   the entire recruiting process, from the job application through collecting all
   of the documents required for new employees.” As part of that process, they
   would have to provide “[a] transcript and completed employment contract”
   “to move forward with processing the Hire transaction.” On January 22,
   Plaintiffs were provided with unexecuted employment contracts for
   signature that listed effectives dates of February 1, 2019. The contracts
   offered Muslow and Cunningham appointments at the same rank they held
   at LSUHSC and the same salary: $227,520 for Muslow and $76,500 for
   Cunningham at 60% part-time employment.
          Muslow and Cunningham submitted the requested job applications
   but did not execute their employment contracts. This was despite multiple
   reminders from OGC’s business manager, including a February 12 message
   to Cunningham—which Cunningham shared with Muslow—that LSU was
   “trying to time the termination and hire transactions so there is not a lapse
   in pay or benefits.” Instead, Muslow emailed Skinner on February 15,
   copying Cunningham, and requested that Plaintiffs’ salaries be revisited
   before they executed the proposed employment contracts. She asked that,
   based on the findings of LSUHSC’s 2017 Unclassified Employee Market
   Study (the “Study”), their salaries should be increased to $375,000 for
   Muslow and to $204,748 (at 80% part-time employment) for Cunningham.

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          The Study had been conducted by LSUHSC in 2017 to evaluate and
   update the pay structure for unclassified positions such as those then held by
   Muslow and Cunningham. As part of the Study, LSUHSC created a job
   worth hierarchy wherein every unclassified position was assigned a relative
   pay grade within the LSUHSC pay grid, which defined the amount of pay an
   employee would receive. Positions were also categorized, based on certain
   characteristics, into “job families”: jobs within each family purportedly
   required “similar knowledge, skills and abilities (competencies).”
          The Study placed the staff attorney position in the “Administrative
   Professional Non-Clinical” job family and the N37 pay grade, corresponding
   to a salary range of $119,736 (minimum), $162,242 (midpoint), and $204,748
   (maximum). As a staff attorney, Cunningham was tasked with providing or
   assisting in the provision of legal counsel to LSUHSC; participating and
   assisting in litigation; reviewing, preparing, and approving contracts;
   assisting in reviewing, drafting, and modifying policies and procedures; and
   assisting in developing training materials and conducting training on legal
   matters. The position required a Juris Doctor degree and membership in, or
   eligibility for admission to, the Louisiana State Bar, as well as five years of
   relevant legal experience. Cunningham’s annualized salary at the time of the
   Study, $127,500, exceeded the N37 pay grade minimum.
          The General Counsel position was placed in the “Leadership” job
   family and the N43 pay grade, corresponding to a salary range of $227,520
   (minimum), $315,116 (midpoint), and $402,711 (maximum). As General
   Counsel, Muslow had several responsibilities, including providing strategic
   support and legal guidance for LSUHSC; acting as advisor on legal matters;
   performing administrative filings; conducting research and analysis of
   current and critical legal issues; and working to ensure organizational
   compliance with federal, state, and local laws and regulations. She was
   required to possess a Juris Doctor degree, a license to practice law in

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   Louisiana, and three years’ experience as a practicing attorney. As part of this
   role, she supervised one part-time attorney, Cunningham. At the time of the
   Study, Muslow earned $182,475, such that her salary did not meet her
   position’s pay grade minimum. To correct this disparity, Muslow’s base pay
   was increased to $227,520, the N43 pay grade minimum, effective July 1,
   2017.
           The Study was not the only support on which Muslow relied in
   making her request that her and Cunningham’s salaries be revisited: she also
   stated in her message to Skinner that such salary adjustments were “overdue
   and necessary to ameliorate an environment at the [LSU]HSC that has not
   seemed historically to view equity as potentially a gendered issue.” Three
   days—and only one business day—later, LSU rescinded both offers pending
   further review because, Muslow and Cunningham were told, “[n]o signed
   copy [of each respective employment contract] has been received and the
   effective date has passed.”
           On March 1, Muslow emailed Skinner and Larry Hollier, LSUHSC’s
   Chancellor, requesting a status update regarding Plaintiffs’ transfers to
   OGC. An hour later, Skinner emailed Hollier, restating OGC’s plan to hire
   two OGC attorney positions to be stationed at LSUHSC and retire existing
   LSUHSC counsel positions and stating that Plaintiffs’ offers were rescinded
   “after neither executed the [employment] contracts.” He also indicated that
   OGC intended to advertise the General Counsel and staff attorney positions,
   for which Muslow and Cunningham could apply and would receive the same
   consideration as any other applicant. Hollier then forwarded Skinner’s email
   to Plaintiffs and added that, “[i]n accordance with revised PM-72,
   [LSUHSC] will retire [its] existing legal positions by June 30, 2019.”
   Muslow replied on March 6, reiterating her and Cunningham’s position and
   seeking confirmation that they were “active candidates” for the OGC
   positions.

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          Several weeks later, Hollier again notified Muslow and Cunningham
   that their positions at LSUHSC would be retired and their employment
   terminated on June 30 and invited them to apply for the new OGC positions.
   Then, on March 26, Muslow filed a complaint with the United States Equal
   Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). She stated her belief
   that she was discriminated against by LSU based on, inter alia, her gender
   and age. In her view, she was “historically underpaid compared to [her] male
   peers” as evidenced by the Study and her offer of transfer to OGC was
   rescinded after she “requested a salary review to bring [her] salary in
   compliance with the data” in the Study. In a supplemental letter to the
   EEOC, signed by Muslow and Cunningham, Plaintiffs indicated that
   Muslow’s original submission was also brought on Cunningham’s behalf.
   The letter also clarified that, as of March 26, “no steps to centralize [LSU’s
   legal] operations ha[d] been taken (e.g., no meetings, plans for workflow,
   consolidation of documents, remote support to our campus, etc.).”
          Plaintiffs never applied for the advertised OGC positions, and
   Muslow told Jones—after he asked if Plaintiffs would nonetheless like to be
   considered for the positions—that, “[u]nless [her] position [was] going to be
   compensated as dictated by the market study done at [LSUHSC], . . . you do
   not have my permission to treat me as an ‘applicant’ for a position I have held
   going on eighteen years now. [Cunningham] concurs.” Cunningham’s at-
   will employment eventually ended on June 30, and Muslow’s employment
   ended on July 15. Following Muslow’s termination, OGC hired Louis
   Colletta as LSUHSC Chief Counsel at an annual salary of $182,500, while
   the staff attorney position was never filled.
          Muslow and Cunningham filed suit in the Eastern District of
   Louisiana on July 22, 2019, against LSU, Hollier, Skinner, and Jon Harman,
   LSUHSC’s Vice Chancellor of Finance and Administration, with Jones later
   added as a defendant in an amended complaint (collectively, “Defendants”).

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   Following motion practice, several claims remained at the summary
   judgment stage: (1) gender discrimination in violation of Title VII against
   LSU; (2) gender discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
   Harman and Hollier; (3) gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Pay
   Act against LSU, Hollier, Harman, and Skinner; (4) retaliation in violation
   of Title VII against LSU; and (5) retaliation in violation of the Equal Pay Act
   against LSU, Hollier, Skinner, and Jones.
          The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all
   counts. On appeal, Muslow and Cunningham argue that the district court
   erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on their various
   gender discrimination and retaliation claims. They also request that the case
   be reassigned on remand because the district court, in their view, improperly
   discredited evidence and expressed disdain for their claims.
                                         II.
          We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
   Watkins v. Tregre, 997 F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir. 2021). We shall affirm “if the
   movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a),
   viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
   drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Watkins, 997 F.3d at
   281. At the same time, “[t]he party opposing summary judgment is required
   to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner
   in which that evidence supports his or her claim.” Diaz v. Kaplan Higher
   Educ., L.L.C., 820 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original)
   (quoting Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)).
                                         III.
          We first consider Plaintiffs’ claims of gender discrimination against
   LSU, Harman, and Hollier under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and then

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   we consider their corresponding claims against LSU, Harman, Hollier, and
   Jones under the Equal Pay Act.
          Title VII prohibits employers from intentionally discriminating
   against individuals with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
   privileges of employment because of their gender or membership in another
   protected class. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1983 has a wider reach,
   though it similarly prohibits parties acting under color of state law from
   violating federal anti-discrimination laws. See Whiting v. Jackson State Univ.,
   616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980). In this way, Title VII and § 1983 are
   “parallel causes of action” requiring essentially the same inquiry. Lauderdale
   v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 512 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2007). Both require
   that a plaintiff show, as part of her prima facie case, that she was a member
   of a protected class who was paid less than a non-member for work requiring
   “substantially the same responsibility.” Mitchell v. Mills, 895 F.3d 365, 370
   (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522
   (5th Cir. 2008)). Then, pursuant to the burden-shifting framework outlined
   in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the burden shifts
   to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
   actions. Taylor, 554 F.3d at 522. Thereafter, the plaintiff must show that the
   employer’s proffered explanation is pretextual. Id.
          To satisfy her burden at the prima facie stage, a plaintiff must establish
   that her circumstances are “‘nearly identical’ to those of a better-paid
   employee who is not a member of the protected class.” Id. at 523; see also
   Mitchell, 895 F.3d at 370–71. “In making this determination, a variety of
   factors are considered, including job responsibilities, experience, and
   qualifications.” Mitchell, 895 F.3d at 371. These factors need not be identical
   for both the plaintiff and her proffered comparator, however, as such a
   requirement would be “essentially insurmountable”—“it would only be in
   the rarest of circumstances that the situations of two employees would be

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   totally identical.” Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir.
   2009). This inquiry is often reserved for the factfinder, but only when a
   plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to
   conclude that the plaintiff and her proffered comparator are similarly
   situated. Morris v. Town of Indep., 827 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 2016).
   Otherwise, summary judgment is appropriate.
          The district court held that Muslow and Cunningham failed to
   identify proper comparators, i.e., male employees who were paid more for
   sufficiently similar work. Plaintiffs contend that this was in error, pointing to
   several individuals who were employed at LSUHSC at the same time as they
   were, who they believe are comparators. In support of their comparisons,
   Plaintiffs principally rely on the Study to demonstrate that they and their
   purported comparators were similarly situated, as well as limited references
   to the relative job experience or qualifications of specific male employees.
          Muslow and Cunningham argue that, for purposes of Title VII,
   LSUHSC’s Study is “important, if not dispositive.” While the Study is
   instructive, it does not resolve whether Plaintiffs and their proffered
   comparators occupy nearly identical positions. We have previously held as
   much in Brennan v. Victoria Bank and Trust Co., a case concerning an alleged
   pay disparity between male and female bank tellers brought under the equal
   pay provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
   There, the record included the bank’s internal assessment and classification
   of various bank teller positions; nonetheless, we could not determine whether
   pay discrimination was occurring based solely on the bank’s own records.
   Instead, “the controlling factor in equal pay allocations has to be job content,
   not the job description prepared by the employer.” Id. at 899 (emphasis
   added). We reiterated this point more recently in Badgerow v. REJ Properties,
   Inc., where we recognized that it is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that she
   has the same job title as her purported comparator; rather, she must provide

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   “evidence of how her job duties compared to” those of a male employee in
   nearly identical circumstances. 974 F.3d 610, 617 (5th Cir. 2020). Of course,
   a court should not ignore the employer’s rating of jobs, see Victoria Bank, 493
   F.2d at 899, but such classifications are not enough, on their own, to
   demonstrate that another employee is a comparator under Title VII.
           We must also look to the “job responsibilities, experience, and
   qualifications” of Muslow and Cunningham and their proffered
   comparators. 1 Mitchell, 895 F.3d at 371. Muslow puts forward eight
   individuals for consideration, four of whom the Study placed in higher pay
   grades than Muslow. With respect to Edwin Murray, Jimmy Cairo, and
   Demetrius Porche, the employees in lower pay grades than Muslow, she
   provides only a cursory analysis regarding their job responsibilities,
   experience, and qualifications insufficient to create a genuine dispute of
   material fact as to whether their positions are nearly identical to hers.
           Muslow argues that Edwin Murray, LSUHSC’s Vice Chancellor of
   Community and Multicultural Affairs, had two years of experience in his
   position while she had more than fifteen years as General Counsel. But
   Murray’s position required significantly more starting experience than
   Muslow’s—he was required to have 8–10 years of experience in an academic
   or governmental affairs setting and 3–5 years of experience in a senior level
   administrator position, whereas Muslow only needed three years of
   experience as a practicing attorney. She also contends that her position

           _____________________
           1
             Muslow and Cunningham contend that at least some of the position descriptions
   provided by Defendants are “inaccurate, outdated, or otherwise suspect” but fail to
   describe which descriptions are erroneous and in what, if any, ways. By contrast,
   LSUHSC’s compensation manager authenticated the provided descriptions and certified
   that each was in effect at the relevant time. Absent any specific objections by Plaintiffs, we
   find that the position descriptions proffered by Defendants are accurate and rely on them
   for our analysis throughout this section.

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   required a Juris Doctor degree, while his did not. However, this only
   underscores how different their roles were. His position required more years
   of work experience and a master’s degree, and he was responsible for
   developing multicultural affairs programs and initiatives, serving as
   LSUHSC’s Risk Management and Security Officer, and overseeing the
   management of the LSU Health Police staff. Muslow directs us to no
   evidence other than the Study to overcome the obvious differences between
   these positions and establish that Murray qualifies as a comparator.
   Regarding the other employees—Jimmy Cairo, then-Dean of the School of
   Allied Health, and Demetrius Porche, Dean of the School of Nursing—
   Muslow similarly points only to the Study, which by itself is insufficient.
   Accordingly, Muslow has failed to establish that these employees are
   appropriate comparators.
         Muslow’s analysis regarding the four male employees occupying
   higher pay grades is similarly perfunctory. By Plaintiffs’ own logic, the
   Study’s pay grade assignments indicate that the positions occupied by these
   male employees require greater knowledge, skills, and abilities. Importantly,
   the evidence also bears this out. Two of the individuals, Henry Gremillion
   and Dean Smith, served as Deans of LSUHSC’s schools and were required
   to have doctoral degrees and at least ten years of experience, with some of
   that time in a managerial position in an academic setting. Muslow’s only
   argument is that Smith was hired more recently than her; however, that is
   insufficient to make them proper comparators considering the significant
   differences between their positions. She also identified Keith Schroth, who
   served as LSUHSC’s Associate Vice Chancellor for Business Development
   and Associate Dean of Fiscal Affairs, as a comparator despite his higher pay
   grade. She contends that his position, unlike hers, required no advanced
   degree, but his position required significantly more experience—eight years,
   at least two of which were in a management capacity—and carried different

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   responsibilities, including overseeing budgeting and contractual relations for
   each of LSUHSC’s six professional schools and creating and negotiating
   business opportunities for LSUHSC. Her argument concerning her last
   purported comparator, John Harman, who was LSUHSC’s Vice Chancellor
   of Administration and Finance, also falls short. Though he was hired more
   recently than her, his position, like many of the others, required significantly
   more experience and came with a host of distinct responsibilities, including
   directing the administrative and financial operations of LSUHSC. The
   district court did not err in finding that these employees’ positions are not
   nearly identical to the position held by Muslow.
          Muslow’s final proffered comparator is her successor, Louis Colletta.
   She contends that he asked for and received a higher salary than she despite
   his lack of experience in an academic or healthcare setting. However,
   Colletta was hired as Chief Counsel of LSUHSC at a salary of $182,500,
   which is substantially less than Muslow’s salary when she left LSUHSC and
   less than she was offered to transition to OGC. While he later became the
   Chief of Staff at LSUHSC, for which he was paid $249,000, that position
   required a different set of qualifications—10 years of administrative
   experience in senior leadership positions—and involved a different set of
   responsibilities—institutional planning and policy development; serving as
   the Chancellor’s primary liaison with LSUHSC, government, and
   community leadership; and overseeing the Chancellor’s organizational units.
   Muslow provides no analysis as to how the Chief of Staff position compares
   to her role as Chief Counsel, and there is no evidence suggesting that it is a
   proper comparator.
          Cunningham offers two purported comparators: Richard Buhler, a
   Senior Contracts Administrative Officer, and Frank Wasser, LSUHSC’s
   Compliance Officer. She argues that her staff attorney position required
   more credentials and more responsibility than Buhler’s, over whom she

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   contends she had oversight, despite being paid less than him. But his position
   required either a Juris Doctor degree and 5 years’ related experience or a
   master’s degree with 8 years’ related experience—similar credentials to
   Cunningham’s with greater prior experience. His position’s responsibilities
   were also significantly different from those of a staff attorney, as he assisted
   in managing the entire contracting process. While one part of his position
   required him to “seek advice from LSUHSC legal counsel as appropriate and
   necessary so there will be no violation of state, or LSUHSC policy or
   procedure,” this does not indicate that Cunningham had oversight of Buhler.
   Rather, it demonstrates the differences between the two positions and their
   varied responsibilities: legal counsel was tasked with staying apprised of state
   law and LSUHSC policy and procedure, while a contracts officer developed,
   managed, and processed contracts on behalf of LSUHSC. Moreover,
   Cunningham’s and Buhler’s positions existed in distinct reporting
   structures: a staff attorney reported to the General Counsel, while a contracts
   officer reported to the Associate Vice Chancellor of Business Development.
   He is not a proper comparator.
          Neither was Wassel’s position nearly identical to that of a LSUHSC
   staff attorney. Though both positions required a Juris Doctor degree,
   Wasser’s position additionally required 8 years of professional-level
   experience at a top law firm, in-house legal department, or university. And
   his responsibilities were significantly different: the Compliance Officer is
   tasked with developing and implementing a compliance plan, serving as the
   employee resource on compliance matters, and liaising with LSU Internal
   Audit, Legislative Auditor, and other oversight entities, among other duties.
   Cunningham held none of these responsibilities.
          Because Muslow and Cunningham have failed to identify any male
   employees who were paid more than them for work requiring substantially
   the same responsibility, they have not established a prima facie case of

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   gender-based wage discrimination. Accordingly, the district court did not err
   in granting summary judgment in favor of LSU, Harman, and Hollier on
   Plaintiffs’ Title VII and section 1983 gender discrimination claims.
          Plaintiffs’ Equal Pay Act gender discrimination claim falls short for
   the same reasons. The Equal Pay Act proscribes pay inequities between
   employees of opposite sexes “for equal work on jobs the performance of
   which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
   under similar working conditions,” except under certain enumerated
   exceptions. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To establish a prima facie case of
   discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must show that “(1) her
   employer is subject to the Act; (2) she performed work in a position requiring
   equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions; and
   (3) she was paid less than the employee of the opposite sex providing the basis
   of comparison.” Badgerow, 974 F.3d at 617 (quoting Chance v. Rice Univ., 984
   F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1993)). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie
   case, “the burden of proof ‘shifts to the employer to show that the
   differential is justified under one of the Act’s four exceptions.’” Plemer v.
   Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Corning Glass
   Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974)).
          For the same reasons that Plaintiffs’ Title VII and section 1983
   discrimination claims fail, so too does their discrimination claim under the
   Equal Pay Act. Here, Muslow and Cunningham rely entirely on the Study to
   establish which employees occupy positions requiring equal skill, effort, and
   responsibility and to argue that they were paid less money than male
   employees with jobs requiring less skill, effort, and responsibility. But the
   Study, without more, is insufficient to establish comparators.
          Moreover, the Equal Pay Act has a “higher threshold” for potential
   comparators than Title VII—“it demands that equal wages reward equal

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   work.” Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542,
   546 (5th Cir. 2001). In other words, an employee who fails to qualify as a
   comparator under Title VII in a case of gender-based wage discrimination
   also fails to qualify as a comparator under the Equal Pay Act. Accordingly,
   the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of LSU,
   Harman, Hollier, and Jones on Plaintiffs’ Equal Pay Act discrimination
   claim.
                                          IV.
            We next consider Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims under Title VII against
   LSU and under the Equal Pay Act against LSU, Hollier, Skinner, and Jones,
   which allege that Muslow and Cunningham suffered from retaliation in
   response to their salary-review requests and filing of EEOC charges.
            We analyze retaliation claims brought under either Title VII or the
   Equal Pay Act using the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
   framework. Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, Inc., 984 F.3d 460, 469 (5th Cir. 2021).
   “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must ‘demonstrate
   that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action
   occurred; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the
   adverse employment action.’” Id. (quoting Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Tex.,
   L.L.C., 753 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2014)). The defendant must then provide
   a “legitimate, non-retaliatory reason” for the employment action. Id. at 470.
   If the defendant does so, the burden then falls to the employee to show that
   the employer’s stated reason is a pretext for unlawful retaliation. Gorman,
   753 F.3d at 171. “Under this framework, the employee’s ultimate burden is
   to prove that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but
   for the protected conduct.” Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23 F.4th
   422, 437 (5th Cir. 2022).

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                                            No. 22-30585

                                      1. Prima Facie Case
            Muslow and Cunningham present two allegations of retaliation: first,
   that they received letters notifying them of their positions’ terminations only
   a few days after filing EEOC charges; and second, that their employment
   contracts with OGC were rescinded, and they were eventually terminated,
   after they raised gender-pay equity concerns to Skinner via email. 2
            Plaintiffs’ first allegation—that they were first notified of their
   termination shortly after filing EEOC charges on March 26, 2019—is not
   supported by the evidence. On March 1, 2019, Hollier emailed Skinner,
   copying Muslow and Cunningham, and stated: “In accordance with revised
   PM-72, [LSUHSC] will retire our existing legal positions by June 30, 2019.”
   The record reflects that Plaintiffs had actual notice of this message, as
   Muslow responded to it five days later on behalf of herself and Muslow.
   Thus, Muslow and Cunningham were notified that their LSUHSC positions
   would be terminated long before they filed EEOC charges; as such, there is
   no causal link between their alleged protected activity and the adverse
   employment action, and Plaintiffs have not presented a prima facie case of
   retaliation with respect to this allegation.
            Plaintiffs’ allegation relating to the salary-review request finds more
   support in the record. At this stage, Defendants’ sole argument is that
   Muslow’s request was not a protected activity because it was unreasonable

            _____________________
            2
               Muslow and Cunningham briefly discuss a third allegation; namely, that they
   never received their requested pay increase. However, they provide no explanation
   regarding this alleged prima facie case of retaliation, nor do they appear to have raised it
   before the district court. Accordingly, we consider the argument forfeited and do not
   address it here. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party
   forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first instance in the district court . . . or by
   failing to adequately brief the argument on appeal.”).

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                                    No. 22-30585

   for Plaintiffs to believe that they were experiencing gender-based wage
   discrimination.
          To qualify as a protected activity, “the employee’s conduct must have
   ‘opposed’ the employer’s practice and that opposed practice must have been
   unlawful.” Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir.
   2021). “Importantly, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the practice was
   actually unlawful for his opposition to be a protected activity; rather, it is
   enough that the plaintiff reasonably believed the practice was unlawful.” Id. at
   1210. We hold that Plaintiffs’ belief that LSUHSC unlawfully discriminated
   against them because of their gender was reasonable. In Muslow’s February
   15, 2019 email to Skinner, she laid out the reasons she believed LSUHSC,
   and LSU by extension, was unlawfully discriminating against them:
          The adjustments sought are not only equitable on their face
          given the 2017 study, but are also overdue and necessary to
          ameliorate an environment at the [LSU]HSC that has not
          seemed historically to view equity as potentially a gendered
          issue. By way of example: With my move to the OGC, there
          will be but one woman who directly reports to the chancellor
          and, like me, her salary has lagged far behind her male peers.
          Also like me, her salary was adjusted only to the bare salary
          minimum indicated in the 2017 equity study and she's not
          received an adjustment since.
   That we conclude that Defendants did not discriminate against Plaintiffs
   does not negate their reasonable belief, based on these facts, that they
   received discriminatory wages on account of their gender. Moreover,
   although the district court was unable to locate it, the record reflects that
   Skinner understood Muslow’s email to raise gender-pay equity concerns.
   Regarding Muslow’s email, he stated at his deposition: “Did I read the letter
   as indicating that she had a problem with gender disparity in pay at Health
   Science Center New Orleans? Yes, that’s what I took from that letter,” and

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                                     No. 22-30585

   that he “took it to mean . . . that there was a—potentially a pay disparity
   between males and females at [LSU]HSC.” As the district court recognized,
   such testimony “seem[s] to corroborate that Plaintiffs’ belief was objectively
   reasonable.” Taken together, this evidence satisfies Plaintiffs’ burden at the
   summary judgment stage to show that their salary-review request was a
   protected activity.
          Defendants do not contest that the other elements of a prima facie
   case have been satisfied for Plaintiffs’ salary-review-request allegation. We
   hold that Muslow and Cunningham have identified two adverse employment
   actions related to this allegation—the rescission of their employment
   contracts, and their eventual termination—and provided evidence linking
   such actions to their salary-review request. Accordingly, we find that
   Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to this
   allegation.
                      2. Legitimate Non-Retaliatory Reason
          Defendants offer several non-retaliatory reasons for the employment
   actions taken against Muslow and Cunningham sufficient to satisfy their
   summary judgment burden: LSUHSC positions were retired in favor of OGC
   positions; Plaintiffs did not execute their OGC employment contracts;
   Plaintiffs did not apply for the new OGC postings despite multiple
   invitations; and Muslow advised Jones that he did not have permission to
   treat her or Cunningham as OGC applicants. We agree with the district court
   that these are legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for rescinding Plaintiffs’
   employment contracts and terminating their positions, which Muslow and
   Cunningham do not dispute. Thus, we must consider whether Plaintiffs have
   offered sufficient evidence of pretext.

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                                     No. 22-30585

                                     3. Pretext
          At this stage, Plaintiffs must establish that Defendants’ asserted
   reasons for rescinding their employment contracts and terminating their
   positions are pretext for the real, retaliatory purpose. Septimus v. Univ. of
   Hous., 399 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, a plaintiff must provide
   substantial evidence that, but for her protected activity, she would not have
   been subject to the adverse employment action. Id.; Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores
   E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2020). “Even if a plaintiff’s protected
   conduct is a substantial element in a defendant’s adverse employment action,
   no liability for unlawful retaliation arises if the employee would have faced
   that discipline even without the protected conduct.” Wantou, 23 F.4th at
   437.
          Muslow and Cunningham have not met this burden with respect to
   their termination from LSUHSC. The evidence establishes that Plaintiffs
   were aware of the plan to consolidate all legal services within OGC by
   December 2018. While they were told at that time that the transition would
   be administrative, Muslow and Cunningham do not dispute that they were
   required to go through the entire recruiting process, which included the
   submission of a “completed employment contract” before OGC could
   effectuate their hiring. As the district court recognized, Plaintiffs’ “failure
   to execute the tendered employment contracts with OGC or to apply for the
   new OGC positions – despite being prompted and invited to do so multiple
   times – cemented their termination.” Thus, it was inevitable that their
   positions would be terminated, and the salary-review request was not the but-
   for cause of their termination.
          However, Muslow and Cunningham have provided substantial
   evidence regarding that their employment contracts at OGC would not have
   been rescinded but for the request for their salaries to be reviewed because of

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                                          No. 22-30585

   gender-pay equity concerns. Upon review, it appears that the district court—
   and Defendants on appeal—treated the rescission of Plaintiffs’ employment
   contracts and their later termination as a single adverse employment action
   and thus did not separately consider whether the salary-review request was
   the but-for cause of the contract recission. But these are their own adverse
   employment actions and must be considered separately.
           Defendants offer only one non-retaliatory reason that Plaintiffs’
   employment contracts were rescinded: they were not executed by February
   1, the effective appointment dates listed on the contracts. 3 Muslow and
   Cunningham offer substantial evidence that there was no deadline for
   executing the contracts. Notably, OGC continued to request that Plaintiffs
   execute the allegedly expired contracts after February 1, which calls into
   question Defendants’ reason for rescinding the contracts. Moreover, Skinner
   explained at his deposition that the employment contracts were rescinded
   because he was “taken aback” by Plaintiffs’ salary-review request. Given his
   admission that their request raising gender-pay equity concerns regarding the
   OGC salaries was the reason the contracts were rescinded, we hold that
   Muslow and Cunningham have presented evidence sufficient to overcome
   summary judgment on this allegation of retaliation.
                           4. Individual-Defendant Liability
           Lastly, Hollier, Skinner, and Jones contend that they are not
   “employers” for purposes of the Equal Pay Act and thus cannot be held liable
   for Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim. 4 Under the Equal Pay Act, an employee or

           _____________________
           3
             Their other proffered reasons relate only to Plaintiffs’ eventual termination, not
   the recission of Plaintiffs’ contracts.
           4
            LSU does not dispute that it was Plaintiffs’ employer for purposes of the Equal
   Pay Act and Title VII claims brought against it.

                                               20
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                                      No. 22-30585

   former employee may seek legal or equitable relief for retaliation only against
   an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). We rely on the “economic reality test”
   when determining a party’s status as an employer, under which we evaluate
   “whether the alleged employer: (1) possessed the power to hire and fire the
   employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or
   conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment,
   and (4) maintained employment records.” Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445,
   448 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gray v. Powers, 673 F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir.
   2012)). A plaintiff need not establish each element for us to find that a party
   was her employer, but she must, at the very least, establish that at least one
   of the factors is present. Gray, 673 F.3d at 357.
          As an initial matter, Muslow and Cunningham do not allege that
   Hollier was involved in the recission of their employment contracts, which is
   the only alleged retaliatory action that we hold survives summary judgment.
   Accordingly, it was proper for the district court to grant summary judgment
   in favor of Hollier on Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim.
          That leaves Skinner and Jones, both of whom worked at OGC—and
   not LSUHSC—when Plaintiffs’ employment contracts were rescinded.
   Muslow and Cunningham argue that Skinner had the power to “hire, fire,
   and control their work, particularly in early 2019 as they transitioned to the
   OGC.” However, the transition to OGC, which would have given Skinner
   many of the powers considered by our test, never took place. Plaintiffs were
   still employed by LSUHSC when they were eventually terminated, and it was
   LSUHSC that ultimately fired them. Moreover, Muslow and Cunningham
   stated in their EEOC charge that, by the end of March, “no steps to
   centralize [LSU’s legal] operations ha[d] been taken (e.g., no meetings, plans
   for workflow, consolidation of documents, remote support to [LSUHSC’s]
   campus, etc.).” In short, by Plaintiffs’ own admission, Skinner lacked the
   power to control their work. Accordingly, we hold that Skinner was not

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                                     No. 22-30585

   Plaintiffs’ employer for purposes of the Equal Pay Act and the district court
   properly granted summary judgment in his favor on Plaintiffs’ retaliation
   claim.
            Only Jones remains. Muslow and Cunningham argue only that “[h]e
   participated in decisions about their OGC transition and the later drafting of
   their termination letters, which were sent after they filed EEOC charges,”
   and thus had control over them. These facts are insufficient to transform
   Jones into Plaintiffs’ employer. Muslow and Cunningham do not allege that
   he had any decision-making power relating to their OGC transition, and his
   being one of several voices contributing to a decision—ultimately made by
   another individual—to terminate Plaintiffs does not transform him into an
   employer. Moreover, Jones’ participation in the drafting of Plaintiffs’
   termination letters (and it is not clear that he participated, as Plaintiffs rely
   solely on Hollier’s testimony that Jones may have provided input) does not
   establish that he had control over Muslow and Cunningham. Reviewing
   employment and termination letters is a regular part of legal counsel’s
   responsibilities, and this does not transform legal counsel into the employer
   of every person whose termination letter he or she reviews. Like Skinner, we
   hold that Jones was not Plaintiffs’ employer and summary judgment in his
   favor was proper.
            Accordingly, the district court erred only by granting summary
   judgment in favor of LSU on Plaintiffs’ Title VII and Equal Pay Act
   retaliation claims relating to Plaintiffs’ salary-review request and the
   subsequent revocation of their employment contracts.
                                          V.
            Muslow and Cunningham request that, on remand, we reassign the
   case because the district court improperly discredited their evidence and
   “expressed disdain” for their claims. Our power of reassignment “‘is an

                                          22
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                                       No. 22-30585

   extraordinary one’ and ‘is rarely invoked.’” Miller v. Sam Hous. State Univ.,
   986 F.3d 880, 892 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307,
   1333 (5th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiffs have provided no persuasive reason why we
   should invoke this extraordinary power, and we decline to do so.
                                   *        *         *
          For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district
   court in favor of LSU on Plaintiffs’ Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims
   alleging that LSU retaliated against Muslow and Cunningham by revoking
   their employment contracts following their salary-review request, and
   otherwise AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. We REMAND the
   case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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                                     No. 22-30585

   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
          I respectfully dissent, but only in regard to retaliation. As to that issue,
   plaintiffs have transmuted baseless speculation about LSU’s motive in re-
   scinding their employment contracts into a “genuine” and “material” fac-
   tual dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Instead, we should affirm the
   summary judgment in full. I otherwise concur in the thorough and impres-
   sive opinion.
          The majority systemically—and correctly—recognizes plaintiffs’ fail-
   ure to carry their evidentiary burden on almost every claim. But its culling
   wrongly spares one stalk: plaintiffs’ retaliation claim. The theory is that LSU
   rescinded plaintiffs’ employment contracts effecting their transfer to the
   Office of the General Counsel (“OGC”) because they had sent an e-mail
   requesting a salary increase and raising the issue of gendered pay disparity.
   The LSU employee primarily responsible for the rescission was Thomas
   Skinner, Vice President of Legal Affairs and General Counsel.

          To survive summary judgment on retaliation, plaintiffs must establish
   a prima facie case. Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, Inc., 984 F.3d 460, 469 (5th Cir.
   2021). If they succeed, LSU must offer a “legitimate, non-retaliatory rea-
   son” for the action. Id. at 470 (citing Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Tex., L.L.C.,
   753 F.3d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 2014)). The burden then shifts back to plaintiffs
   to show that the reason was pretextual. Gorman, 753 F.3d at 171.
          I do not dispute that plaintiffs have made out their prima facie case.
   But the majority’s well-intentioned treatment of LSU’s proffered non-
   retaliatory reasons is unduly constrained and overlooks swathes of the record.
   It identifies “several” reasons proffered by LSU for the contract rescissions,
   including that plaintiffs’ “positions were retired in favor of OGC positions;
   [p]laintiffs did not execute their OGC employment contracts; [p]laintiffs did
   not apply for the new OGC postings despite multiple invitations; and Mus-

                                           24
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                                           No. 22-30585

   low advised [the Deputy General Counsel] that he did not have permission
   to treat her or Cunningham as OGC applicants.”
           The majority proceeds to note that the district court’s analysis on the
   retaliation claim was imprecise because it treated both the rescission of plain-
   tiffs’ contracts and their eventual termination as a single adverse employ-
   ment action. The district court therefore jumbled the (potentially different)
   non-retaliatory reasons for each of the two employment actions. LSU makes
   the same mistake on appeal.
           Fair enough. But that confusion was understandable, given that plain-
   tiffs lumped their theories of adverse employment action together. The
   majority correctly disentangles the arguments about each of the employment
   actions but construes LSU’s arguments too narrowly in light of the failure of
   all the parties to keep their analysis perfectly neat. After all, the university
   also contended that the salary demands themselves—rather than any allega-
   tion of pay disparity—provoked the contract rescission, pointing to Skinner’s
   testimony about the salary-request e-mail. 1
           The record unequivocally corroborates that explanation. Skinner’s
   deposition testimony—all sworn, none controverted—decisively answers
   the question of why plaintiffs’ contracts were rescinded: The requested
   salary increases were unreasonable and logistically impossible (or nearly so).
   Describing the request in his deposition, Skinner said,
           But what became clear in that e-mail is that [Muslow’s] salary
           expectations, or at least what she felt she should be entitled to,
           were significantly higher than what we had offered. And what
           _____________________
           1
               Even if we were inclined to impose the strictest requirements on LSU to present
   all of its arguments perfectly clearly in its appellate briefing, affirmance would still be war-
   ranted: “We are free to uphold the district court’s judgment on any basis that is supported
   by the record.” Zuspann v. Brown, 60 F.3d 1156, 1160 (5th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases).

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                                    No. 22-30585

         we had offered was significantly higher than the range that our
         HR department in Baton Rouge had said would be appropriate
         for the position.
                 ....
                . . . I was willing to [increase her salary] in order to ease
         the transition . . . . When Ms. Muslow came back and said
         [$]370[,000] or whatever the number was, I—literally, it
         stopped me in my tracks because this was not a minor differ-
         ence in compensation. . . . This was a—this was over 50
         percent higher than the salary that we had offered.
                 ....
                . . . Paying the chief counsel in New Orleans $370,000,
         when that individual is a Baton Rouge employee, would have
         made that individual maybe the second-highest-paid employee
         on the Baton Rouge campus next to President Alexander.
                . . . This was, “Hey, I need to see what’s out there and
         understand, if we can get somebody who is at least equally
         competent in the range that our folks are saying is supposed to
         be the range, then I’m not going to pay somebody $370,000 or
         $350,000.”
   Those statements are in exact accordance with Skinner’s e-mail to the Chan-
   cellor of the Health Sciences Center explaining the situation: “On Feb-
   ruary 15, 2019, Ms. Muslow e[-]mailed me demanding significant salary
   increases for the new [attorney] positions, far in excess of the amounts
   authorized for the positions by LSU HR[].”
         The explanation offered by Skinner is patently non-retaliatory. Mus-
   low requested a salary increase from $227,500 to $375,000—a 64.8% in-
   crease. Likewise, Cunningham requested an increase from $127,500 to
   $204,748 (both annualized)—a 60.5% increase—in addition to a bump from
   0.60 full-time equivalent to 0.80 full-time equivalent. The salary requests

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                                         No. 22-30585

   were not just substantively significant: They far exceeded the authorized
   compensation for the positions and would have “completely skew[ed] and
   destroy[ed] [LSU’s] compensation structure in Baton Rouge.” As for Mus-
   low’s request, Skinner thought the gap was “insurmountable without some
   empirical evidence or proof of what it would take to hire a chief counsel in
   New Orleans or, for that matter, a chief counsel in Shreveport,” only under-
   scoring the point. 2
           The discussion should end there. Skinner did not believe that a chief
   counsel—man or woman—was entitled to the salary Muslow requested.
   Indeed, her male successor, Louis Colletta, earned $182,500 when he
   started—over $40,000 less than what Muslow was making at the end of her
   tenure. Identical reasoning applies to Cunningham, given Skinner’s testi-
   mony and e-mail to the Chancellor (although her position is currently
   vacant).
           The majority stresses that Skinner understood plaintiffs’ e-mail to
   include an allegation of gender disparity in pay. That’s not in dispute, but
   it’s also irrelevant: The e-mail also contained a request for significant salary
   increases. Moreover, the part of the e-mail requesting salary bumps iden-
   tified both male and female comparators, and only the final few paragraphs
   of the e-mail mentioned anything about gender at all. The majority appears
   to find it inconceivable that Skinner could have been aware of both facets of
   the e-mail but have been motivated by only one of them. His deposition tes-
   timony eliminates any such doubts.
           Taken at face value, the majority’s reasoning unintentionally allows

           _____________________
           2
              Skinner did not even take Muslow and Cunningham out of the running for the
   new positions. They could still apply; he just was not going to agree to the huge increases
   without first determining whether the local labor market justified them.

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                                     No. 22-30585

   any plaintiff to make absurd demands of her employer, gesture toward Title
   VII or the Equal Pay Act at the end of the request, and then survive summary
   judgment if the employer (reasonably) rejects the demands. The problems
   with that approach are clear even in this case. Skinner was pellucid on the
   basis for the rescissions: The requested salary increases were unreasonable
   and logistically nonviable. There is not a whiff of any retaliatory motive in
   the record. Nor do plaintiffs offer even a scintilla of evidence contradicting
   Skinner’s claims or demonstrating that they were pretextual. In fact, they
   don’t even mention them at all.
          “[N]o liability for unlawful retaliation arises if the employee would
   have faced that [action] even without the protected conduct.” Wantou v.
   Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422, 437 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Long
   v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 305 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002)). The question is
   whether LSU would have rescinded the contracts if plaintiffs had merely
   ended their e-mail before mentioning gender pay disparities at the end. The
   answer is clear from the record: Yes.
          Plaintiffs therefore failed to establish a genuine dispute as to any mate-
   rial fact on their retaliation claims. Because defendants are entitled to judg-
   ment as a matter of law under our circuit’s burden-shifting framework, the
   summary judgment should be affirmed across the board.

                                          28