Court Opinion

ID: 9660125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:05:58.783406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:15.800489
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, concurring. We often refer to the “safeguards” and “protections” that we say preclude the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 289 Ark. 387, 713 S.W.2d 233 (1986); Clines v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 656 S.W.2d 684 (1983). We reject constitutional challenges to our death-penalty statutes and boast that the statutes are carefully drawn and that they comply with the mandates of the United States Supreme Court by curtailing the jury’s discretion in meting out “this unique penalty,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972)(Stewart, J., concurring), and by permitting “the sentencer to make a principled distinction between those who deserve the death penalty and those who do not.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 776 (1990). The majority opinion in the case at bar may well sap some of the pride we have taken in our laws promoting the orderly narrowing of the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Today we sanction, as we have done before, the admission of victim-impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a death-penalty case. Although I concur in the affirmance of Mr. Lee’s conviction and sentence, I write separately to express my reservations about the use of victim-impact evidence in capital cases because it may frustrate the statutory scheme designed to provide, as it must, “adequate safeguards against the capricious and freakish imposition of the death penalty.” Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 202, 548 S.W.2d 106, 110 (1977). The death-penalty sentencing procedures that we so often have sustained are as follows. The jury in a capital-murder case is required to impose the death penalty if it unanimously returns written findings that: (1) Aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Aggravating circumstances outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all mitigating circumstances found to exist; and (3) Aggravating circumstances justify a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-603 (a) (Repl. 1993). As we have held, this statute means that “[a] jury cannot impose a sentence of death until it specifically finds that all three parts of the statute apply.” Hill v. State, 289 Ark. at 397, 713 S.W.2d at 238. Even if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances exist and outweigh any mitigating circumstances, “it is still free to return a verdict of fife without parole, simply by finding that the aggravating circumstances do not justify a sentence of death.” Id. quoting Clines v. State, supra. Thus, the imposition of the death penalty is not mandatory. Moreover, “the trial judge is not required to impose the death penalty in every case in which the jury verdict prescribes it,” id., and “[w]e have demonstrated our readiness to modify the death sentence where it is imposed capriciously ... or where death is unduly harsh under the circumstances.” Clines v. State, 280 Ark. at 84-85, 656 S.W.2d at 687 (citations omitted). The aggravating circumstances that a jury may consider are strictly limited to the following nine: (1) The capital murder was committed by a person imprisoned as a result of a felony conviction; (2) The capital murder was committed by a person unlawfully at liberty after being sentenced to imprisonment as a result of a felony conviction; (3) The person previously committed another felony, an element of which was the use or threat of violence to another person or the creation of a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person; (4) The person in the commission of the capital murder knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim or caused the death of more than one (1) person in the same criminal episode; (5) The capital murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from custody; (6) The capital murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (7) The capital murder was committed for the purpose of disrupting or hindering the lawful exercise of any government or political function; (8) (A) The capital murder was committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner. (B) For purposes of this subdivision (8), a capital murder is committed in an especially cruel manner when, as part of a course of conduct intended to inflict mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture upon the victim prior to the victim’s death, mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture is inflicted. “Mental anguish” is defined as the victim’s uncertainty as to his ultimate fate. “Serious physical abuse” is defined as physical abuse that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. “Torture” is defined as the infliction of extreme physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the victim’s death. (C) For purposes of this subdivision (8), a capital murder is committed in an especially depraved manner when the person relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion, or shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure in committing the murder; or (9) The capital murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, explosive, or similar device which the person planted, hid, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or mailed or delivered, or caused to be planted, hidden, concealed, mailed, or delivered, and the person knew that his act or acts would create a great risk- of death to human life. § 5-4-604 (Supp. 1995). Although “the jury’s consideration of aggravating circumstances is limited to those enumerated,” the jury’s “consideration of mitigating circumstances is not necessarily so restricted.” Giles v. State, 261 Ark. 413, 420, 549 S.W.2d 479, 483 (1977). The General Assembly has provided that [mjitigating circumstances shall include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) The capital murder was committed while the defendant was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) The capital murder was committed while the defendant was acting under unusual pressures or influences or under the domination of another person; (3) The capital murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, intoxication, or drug abuse; (4) The youth of the defendant at the time of the commission of the capital murder; (5) The capital murder was committed by another person and the defendant was an accomplice and his participation relatively minor; (6) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-605 (Repl. 1993). See Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 38, 852 S.W.2d 772, 779 (1993) (stating “the defense must be allowed during the sentencing phase to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence the defense proffers concerning the character or history of the offender or the circumstances of the offense”)(citations omitted)(emphasis added). The statutory provisions are quoted at length to demonstrate exactly what the jury is permitted to consider in determining whether to impose the death sentence. The statutes prescribe a tidy formula. In determining whether the death penalty is justified, the jury must consider only whether the evidence has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) one or more of the enumerated aggravating circumstances exist in the case at hand; (2) the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances; and (3) the aggravating circumstances justify the imposition of the death penalty. When the jury is requested to impose the death penalty in a capital case, its sole task during the penalty phase is to evaluate the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and make certain findings with respect to that evidence. Nothing more, and nothing less, may figure into the equation according to § 5-4-603(a). Therefore, as our cases have intimated, the Trial Court should allow into evidence during the sentencing phase of a death-penalty case only that which is relevant to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances alleged by the parties. See Hendrickson v. State, 285 Ark. 462, 466, 688 S.W.2d 295, 298 (1985)(stat-ing “the evidence offered must be probative of some issue to be properly considered in the penalty phase”). Where the State seeks the death penalty, the only issue that is “properly considered” by the sentencing-phase jury is whether aggravating circumstances exist, whether they justify the imposition of the death penalty, and whether they outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Thus, the evidence presented to the jury during the sentencing phase of a death-penalty case should be relevant to these issues. This is the regime that we have found to be constitutionally sound. As we have held, a sentencing structure — such as the one created by Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-4-603 (a) to 5-4-605 and their predecessors — that permits the jury to impose the death penalty after considering evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and making certain findings with respect to that evidence “provides adequate guidelines, so limiting and directing the exercise of the jury’s discretion that an arbitrary, capricious, wanton or freakish exercise of that discretion is improbable.” Collins v. State, 261 Ark. at 203, 548 S.W.2d at 111. This particular procedure, we have found, passes constitutional muster because it “genuinely narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and . . . reasonably justifies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988), quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). According to our cases, it is entirely appropriate for the jury to perform the function of narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants at the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial. See Johnson v. State, 308 Ark. 7, 823 S.W.2d 800 (1992). My concern is that the admission of victim-impact evidence in capital sentencing proceedings pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl. 1993) may, without appropriate limitations, make undesirable and unintended changes in the accepted method by which juries in Arkansas have determined whether the “unique penalty” of death is justified in a given case. As noted, § 5-4-603 (a) mandates that the jury’s decision to impose the death penalty rest solely upon a careful evaluation of the evidence, if any, establishing aggravating and mitigating circumstances as they are defined by §§ 5-4-604 and 5-4-605. The evidence that a jury receives should be relevant to the existence, or non-existence, of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Despite the logic of this position, and despite the clear mandate of § 5-4-603(a), § 5-4-602(4) permits, without restriction, the admission of victim-impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a death-penalty case. Section 5-4-602(4) provides as follows: In determining sentence, evidence may be presented to the jury as to any matters relating to aggravating circumstances enumerated in § 5-4-604, any mitigating circumstances, or any other matter relevant to punishment, including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence, provided that the defendant and the state are accorded an opportunity to rebut such evidence. Evidence as to any mitigating circumstances may be presented by either the state or the defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters, but mitigation evidence must be relevant to the issue of punishment, including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime, and the defendant’s character, background, history, and mental and physical condition as set forth in § 5-4-605. The admissibility of evidence relevant to the aggravating circumstances set forth in § 5-4-604 shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence in trials of criminal matters. Any evidence admitted at the trial relevant to punishment may be considered by the jury without the necessity of reintroducing it at the sentencing proceeding. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument respecting sentencing. The state shall open the argument. The defendant shall be permitted to reply. The state shall then be permitted to reply in rebuttal. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl. 19,93) (emphasis added). The jury’s ability to perform its duty under § 5-4-603 (a) could be undermined by the admission of victim-impact evidence pursuant to § 5-4-602(4). Section 5-4-603(a) requires the jury to consider only evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. In the sentencing phase of a death-penalty case, therefore, the jury, in performing the “narrowing function” described above, should be allowed to consider only that evidence that tends to establish the existence, or nonexistence, of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Instead, the jury in the penalty phase is permitted by § 602(4) to consider as well any victim-impact evidence that is merely “relevant to punishment.” The danger posed by this language is that it coüld be construed as permitting the introduction of victim-impact evidence that, while “relevant to punishment” in the abstract, has absolutely no bearing on the only question that the jury is supposed to consider in a death-penalty case — that is, whether imposition of the death penalty is justified under § 5-4-603(a) in light of the evidence concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If victim-impact evidence is irrelevant to this determination, then its admission in the sentencing phase would unquestionably interfere with the jury’s ability to perform its narrowing function under § 603(a). The jury clearly should not be permitted to receive evidence that has no tendency to make the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances “more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ark. R. Evid. 401. Moreover, there is no question that §§ 603(a), 604, and 605 do not permit the jury to rely on victim-impact evidence in determining whether aggravating circumstances exist, whether they justify the imposition of the death penalty, and whether they outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, § 602(4), in providing for the admission of victim-impact evidence, did not create a “new” aggravating circumstance that could justify imposition of the death penalty under § 603(a). We said as much in Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 109, 907 S.W.2d 677, 689 (1995), and it is also evident that the fact that a murder had a certain “impact” on the victim or the victim’s survivors could not, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s death-penalty jurisprudence, constitute a valid aggravating circumstance because it would not “genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty” or “reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Zant v. Stephens, supra. Every murder results in a deleterious impact on the victim or the victim’s survivors, and thus evidence establishing such an impact could not permit the jury to perform its narrowing function. To be admissible in a capital sentencing procedure, victim-impact evidence must be direcdy relevant to an aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Although § 5-4-602(4) provides that victim-impact evidence may be presented if it is “relevant to punishment,” that language, at least in the context of a death-penalty case, should be read in conjunction with § 5-4-603(a), which requires the jury to consider only evidence bearing on aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether to impose the death penalty. A relevancy-based limitation on the use of victim-impact evidence is not prohibited by the language of § 5-4-602(4). In fact, unless these statutes are interpreted as imposing this limitation, the statutes will have the absurd result of permitting the admission of evidence that can have no effect on the jury’s decision to impose the death penalty. In a death-penalty case, victim-impact evidence should not be admitted if it will distract the jury from completing the task assigned to it by § 603(a). Evidence that is irrelevant to an aggravating or mitigating circumstance would do just that. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution imposes no per se bar to the introduction of victim-impact evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding. In the Payne case the Court held that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. at 827. The Court reasoned that victim-impact evidence “is simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities,” and that such evidence could reasonably assist the jury in “assessing] meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthiness.” Id. at 825. See generally K. Elizabeth Whitehead, Mourning Becomes Electric: Payne v. Tennessee’s Allowance of Victim Impact Statements During Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 45 Arjec. L. Rev. 531 (1992). Although it is difficult to think of victim-impact evidence that might add to any of the statutory mitigating factors, perhaps such evidence could relate to one of the statutory aggravating factors, although it is hard to imagine how unless it would be admissible regardless as direct evidence of one of the statutory aggravating factors. Given the manner in which we have attempted to satisfy the constitutional requirement of narrowing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, however, we should not allow victim-impact evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding unless it is directly relevant to the elements of mitigation and aggravation specified in the statutes. See, e.g., Lambert v. State, 1996 WL 744864 (to be reported at 675 N.E.2d 1060,_ (Ind. 1996)) (holding that, “in death penalty cases, the only admissible victim impact testimony is that testimony which is relevant to a statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstance”). See also Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 1994). In the case at bar, I have serious doubts whether the victim-impact evidence presented to the jury was relevant to any of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances raised by the parties. Mr. Lee did not, however, seek to exclude that evidence on the basis of relevancy. Likewise, on appeal, Mr. Lee raises no relevancy-based argument. He simply argues that the victim-impact statute violates due process and that we should reconsider our previous holdings affirming the validity of § 5-4-602(4). I agree that suppression of the victim-impact evidence in this case was not required on the basis of the arguments presented to the Trial Court and to this Court on appeal, and I therefore concur in the result reached by the majority.