Court Opinion

ID: 9930351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 18:01:41.140495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:13:58.803846
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USCA11 Case: 22-14288    Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 02/06/2024   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-14288
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        TYLER HARRISON,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        SHERIFF, HOLMES COUNTY FLORIDA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00005-RH-MJF
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                 22-14288

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              This is a disability discrimination case brought under the
        Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). Tyler Harrison, a former employee of
        the Holmes County Sheriff’s Office, alleged that the Sheriff
        constructively discharged him because of his mental health issues.
        The district court granted summary judgment for the Sheriff.
                At bottom, this appeal hinges on whether Harrison’s alleged
        constructive discharge was based (1) solely on Harrison’s mental
        illness; or (2) at least partially on Harrison making misleading
        comments about his relationship with his coworker, and shooting
        himself while intoxicated and on call in a county vehicle. Harrison
        argues that a reasonable jury could find that it was the first
        alternative. We disagree and affirm the district court’s summary
        judgment order.
                                I.    Background
               Harrison began his employment with the Holmes County,
        Florida Sheriff’s Department in 2001 as a correctional officer. He
        eventually became a certified law enforcement officer, achieved
        the rank of lieutenant, and oversaw narcotics investigations. In
        2018, after taking twelve weeks of leave under the Family and
        Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) because of a self-inflicted gunshot
        wound that he suffered while on call in his patrol vehicle, Harrison
        resigned.
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        22-14288                   Opinion of the Court                         3

               Almost four years later, Harrison filed a civil complaint
        against the Holmes County Sheriff, alleging that he was
        constructively discharged on the basis of his actual or perceived
        disability—namely, his mental health issues—in violation of the
        RA. The relevant facts here, construed in the light most favorable
        to Harrison, fall into three buckets: Harrison’s (1) relationship with
        his coworker, Page Fleming, (2) history of mental illness
        culminating in his suicide attempt, and (3) resignation. We discuss
        each in turn.
                      A. Harrison’s Relationship with Page Fleming
               Harrison worked alongside Page Fleming in the narcotics
        division. They worked closely together, and spent time together
        outside of work. One night in the fall of 2017, Harrison and
        Fleming were “hanging out” and “had a few drinks.” “[O]ne thing
        led to another” and they “ha[d] sex.” But according to Fleming,
        they did not engage in an ongoing sexual relationship.
               In October 2017, the Sheriff received a call from Fleming’s
        ex-husband stating that something was going on between Harrison
        and Fleming. Based on the call, the Sheriff directed Harrison’s
        direct supervisor, Major Michael Raley, to inquire into the status of
        Harrison’s and Fleming’s relationship. On October 30, 2017, Raley
        met with both Harrison and Fleming separately; each denied that
        there was anything “going on” between them. 1 But Fleming later

        1 Both Harrison and Fleming claim that their denials were truthful because

        they were not asked specifically if they had sex.
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                    22-14288

        revealed that, before her meeting with Raley, Harrison told
        Fleming not to say anything to Raley about their intimacy. 2
                       B. Harrison’s History with Mental Illness
               Harrison suffers from stress, anxiety, depression, PTSD, and
        alcoholism.     Harrison’s general practitioner, Dr. Contini,
        diagnosed Harrison with depression in February 2017, and
        Harrison took medication for depression and anxiety throughout
        2017. Despite taking medication, Harrison’s depression worsened,
        causing sleep disruption and reducing his ability to concentrate and
        communicate. Harrison then saw Dr. Joy Rabon for two
        counseling sessions. She diagnosed Harrison with generalized
        anxiety disorder. She also stated that Harrison had what she “felt
        like” was alcoholism, depression, and PTSD, but did not make a
        formal diagnosis.
               Harrison’s mental health struggles were not kept secret.
        Harrison told Tate (before he became Sheriff) that he was
        depressed, told Raley that he was seeing a counselor, and told
        Deputy Ryan Segers that he was struggling with depression and
        taking medication.
               In 2017, Sheriff Tate heard rumors that Harrison had been
        drinking a lot and asked Raley to talk to Harrison about it.
        Harrison told Raley that he was struggling with alcoholism.
        Around this same time, Harrison told Fleming he was drinking

        2 It violates the Sheriff’s office policy to “make any false or misleading
        statements or misrepresent facts under any circumstances.”
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        22-14288                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        more and that he was seeing a doctor about his depression and
        sadness. Fleming even accompanied Harrison to his first
        counseling session with Dr. Rabon. Fleming also reported to Raley
        that Harrison was depressed and that Raley needed to call Harrison
        to check on him.
               Harrison’s mental health issues came to a head on January
        1, 2018. Fleming received a call from Harrison in the early
        afternoon. Harrison, who was working on call, was “crying really,
        really bad” and was incomprehensible. Fleming kept him on the
        phone until she could get to him. When she arrived on the scene,
        Harrison was sitting in the driver’s seat of his unmarked police
        truck with a revolver in his hand. She could tell that Harrison was
        drunk. 3 Fleming then saw Harrison point the gun at himself and
        heard a gunshot. Harrison had shot himself under his chin. 4
        Fleming administered first aid until first responders arrived on the
        scene. Harrison was hospitalized and later discharged on January
        3, 2018.
               On January 22, 2018, Harrison received FMLA leave for the
        injuries he sustained from the shooting. He received twelve weeks

        3 It violates office policy to bring alcohol into any county vehicle, to use

        alcohol while on duty, and to use alcohol while armed.
        4 Harrison initially claimed the shooting was accidental. However, in his reply

        brief, Harrison concedes that “the record makes clear that the shooting was
        anything but accidental, and the situation was reported immediately as an
        attempted suicide.” Given the surrounding circumstances, we find, for
        summary judgment purposes, that the shooting was a suicide attempt.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14288

        of leave, dated back to January 2, 2018. The medical notes stated
        that Harrison had “acute stress disorder” and “will be following
        with a mental health disorder.”
                              C. Harrison’s Resignation
               Sometime during Harrison’s FMLA leave, Raley told
        Harrison that if he did not resign, the Sheriff would investigate “the
        shooting” and “the [Fleming] thing” to support terminating him.
        However, he was told that after one year, he could return. On
        April 2, 2018, the day Harrison was set to return from FMLA leave,
        he received a Notice of Internal Investigation which stated that he
        would be investigated for allegedly violating several of the office’s
        policies, including “Unbecoming Conduct,” “Use of Intoxicants,”
        and “Testimonies and Truthfulness.” Harrison resigned the same
        day. Despite being told that he could return after a year, Harrison
        was never hired back by the Sheriff’s Office.
               In support of his claim for discriminatory constructive
        discharge and disparate treatment, Harrison pointed to several
        comparators who he claimed engaged in similar misconduct but
        were treated differently. First, Investigator Ken Tate took FMLA
        leave for over four months to recover from heart surgery, was
        reportedly drinking on duty, and allegedly sexually harassed
        Fleming. Yet, Tate was not investigated or asked to resign.
        Second, Patrol Officer Zack Neitsch, while off duty, caused a car
        accident resulting in a death but was not forced to resign or
        threatened with termination. And third, Greg Gordon “was
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        22-14288                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

        contributing alcohol to an 18-year-old girl and sleeping with her”
        but was not fired.
               The Sheriff denied that Harrison was constructively
        discharged, and stated that Harrison violated office policies by
        making misleading comments about his relationship with his
        coworker, and by shooting himself while intoxicated in a county
        vehicle. Accordingly, the Sheriff maintained that Harrison could
        not make out a prima facie case of discrimination and moved for
        summary judgment.
               The district court held a hearing and orally granted the
        Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. Applying the McDonnell
        Douglas 5 framework, the district court first found that Harrison was
        not disabled within the meaning of the RA because there was no
        evidence that Harrison was diagnosed with alcoholism or that his
        depression was a permanent condition that substantially impaired
        a major life activity. 6 But even assuming the presence of a
        disability, the court found that Harrison was not constructively
        discharged solely by reason of his alleged disability as required
        under the RA. Instead, the court found Harrison was discharged

        5 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

        6 For Rehabilitation Act purposes, a “disability” is “a physical or mental

        impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” See 29
        U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (cross-referencing 42 U.S.C. § 12102). “[M]ajor life activities
        include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
        seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
        breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
        working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
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        8                          Opinion of the Court               22-14288

        because he had committed actionable misconduct. Harrison and
        Fleming had been in a relationship of some sort and Harrison had
        admitted to telling Fleming not to tell the Sheriff about their
        relationship. The district court also found that Harrison had been
        drunk on call in a county vehicle, which constituted fireable
        misconduct even if his actions were caused by a mental health
        disability. The district court also distinguished the comparators
        from Harrison. Finally, the district court explained that Harrison
        failed to show that the Sheriff’s reasons were pretext for
        discrimination based on a disability. Thus, the court granted
        summary judgment for the Sheriff. Harrison appealed.
                             II.      Standard of Review
               We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo. Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327,
        1333 (11th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is proper if there is no
        genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
        to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “A genuine issue of material
        fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
        nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its
        favor.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)
        (en banc) (quotations omitted). All submitted evidence is viewed
        in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Owens, 52
        F.4th at 1333.
                                    III.   Discussion
               On appeal, Harrison argues that the district court erred in
        finding that he had (1) not established a prima facie case of disability
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        22-14288                Opinion of the Court                           9

        discrimination under the RA; and (2) not shown that the Sheriff’s
        stated reasons for Harrison’s constructive discharge were
        pretextual. After review, we affirm the district court.
               The RA prohibits federally funded programs from
        discriminating against qualified individuals with a disability.
        29 U.S.C. § 794(a). RA and Americans with Disabilities Act
        (“ADA”) claims are analyzed under the same legal framework.
        Owens, 52 F.4th at 1333–34. “[T]hus, cases involving the ADA are
        precedent for those involving the [RA].” Id. at 1334 (alterations in
        original) (quoting Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.
        2005)). A plaintiff can survive summary judgment by either (1)
        alleging direct discrimination; (2) satisfying the McDonnell Douglas
        burden-shifting framework; or (3) demonstrating a convincing
        mosaic of circumstantial evidence warranting an inference of
        intentional discrimination. Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d
        1213, 1220 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (“Lewis I”); Center v. Sec’y,
        Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 895 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2018). Because
        Harrison has not alleged direct discrimination, he must either (1)
        satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, or (2)
        show a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence warranting
        an inference of intentional discrimination.
               A prima facie case under the RA requires that the plaintiff
        show he (1) has a disability or is perceived as having such a
        disability; (2) is qualified for the job; and (3) suffered an adverse
        employment action as a result of the disability. Center, 895 F.3d at
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        10                          Opinion of the Court                        22-14288

        1303. 7 The plaintiff must prove that the adverse employment
        action was “solely by reason of” his disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a);
        see also Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6
        (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “plaintiffs claiming intentional
        discrimination under the RA must show that they were
        discriminated against ‘solely by reason of [their] disability,’ [while]
        the ADA requires only the lesser ‘but for’ standard of causation”
        (internal citation omitted)). 8 Thus, a plaintiff suing under the RA
        cannot prevail if the employer based the adverse employment
        action partially on disability and partially on other factors. Ellis v.
        England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005). Under McDonnell
        Douglas, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability
        discrimination, and the employer articulates a legitimate,
        nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, the plaintiff must then
        show that the stated reason was pretext for discrimination. Center,
        895 F.3d at 1303. The burden of persuasion remains on the
        employee throughout. Id.

        7 A voluntary resignation is not an adverse action, but a resignation is not

        voluntary if it was a constructive discharge forced by an employer’s duress or
        misrepresentation of a material fact. Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560,
        1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1995).
        8 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (RA provision providing that “[n]o otherwise

        qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
        disability, . . . be subjected to discrimination . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 42
        U.S.C. § 12132 (ADA provision for public employers providing that “no
        qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, . . . be
        subjected to discrimination . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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        22-14288               Opinion of the Court                         11

               Here, even assuming that Harrison is (1) disabled,
        (2) qualified for the job, and (3) suffered an adverse employment
        action, the adverse action was not based solely on a disability. See
        29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable
        to Harrison, he was constructively discharged, at least in part (if not
        entirely), based on misconduct unrelated to his disability. By
        Harrison’s own account, the Sheriff stated that he would
        investigate “the shooting” and “the [Fleming] thing” to support
        terminating Harrison. And the official notice of investigation
        stated that Harrison would be investigated for “Unbecoming
        Conduct,” “Use of Intoxicants,” and “Testimonies and
        Truthfulness.” Because the dishonest statements about his
        relationship with Fleming are clearly unrelated to any alleged
        disability, his alleged constructive discharge was based at least
        partially on factors other than his disability. Thus, he cannot
        establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the RA. See Ellis,
        432 F.3d at 1326.
                Even the conduct that Harrison argues was tied to his
        disability—being drunk and armed while on call in a county
        vehicle—is a fireable offense irrespective of whether his disability
        involved depression and alcoholism. See Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch.
        Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1217 (11th Cir. 2021). In Todd, the plaintiff
        teacher threatened to kill herself and her child, took “an excessive
        amount of Xanax while at school,” and threatened to harm school
        administrators. Id. We held that, even though the teacher’s threats
        likely stemmed from her depressive disorder, the defendant school
        district was not required by the RA to countenance dangerous
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-14288

        misconduct just because it was caused by a disability. Id. The same
        holds true here. Harrison was intoxicated while on call behind the
        wheel of his patrol car, and discharged a firearm in the presence of
        two individuals. This conduct endangered himself, other officers,
        and members of the community. And there is no evidence that the
        alleged constructive discharge was based on Harrison having a
        disability, rather than the dangerous conduct that his disability may
        have caused.
               Finally, none of the comparators Harrison presented is
        similar enough to establish disparate treatment. “[A] plaintiff must
        show that [he] and [his] comparators are ‘similarly situated in all
        material respects.’” Lewis, 918 F.3d 1213. Ordinarily, a similarly
        situated employee will have (1) engaged in the same basic conduct
        or misconduct as the plaintiff; (2) been subject to the same
        employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff; (3) been
        under the same supervisor as the plaintiff; and (4) have the same
        employment or disciplinary history as the plaintiff. Id. at 1227. Ken
        Tate was accused of sexual harassment and drinking on the job
        (which he denied); Neitsch caused a deadly car accident while off
        duty; and Gordon was accused by a criminal defendant of
        providing alcohol to and sleeping with an 18-year-old. None of
        these comparators both made misleading comments about a sexual
        relationship with a coworker and drunkenly shot themselves while
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        22-14288                   Opinion of the Court                                13

        on call in a county car. Thus, Harrison fails to make out a prima
        facie case of disability discrimination. 9
                                     IV.     Conclusion
               Because Harrison failed to make out essential elements of
        his prima facie case 10 of disability discrimination under the RA, the

        9 We need not venture any further with the McDonnell Douglas test to resolve

        Harrison’s claim, because his failure to make out a prima facie case “reflects a
        failure of the overall evidence.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939,
        945 (11th Cir. 2023). “Under McDonnell Douglas, the failure to establish a prima
        facie case is fatal only where it reflects a failure to put forward enough
        evidence for a jury to find for the plaintiff on the ultimate question of
        discrimination.” Id. at 947. For example, “the plaintiff’s failure to produce a
        comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case,” but,“[a] plaintiff
        who fails to prove that she was a member of a protected class . . . or that she
        suffered an adverse employment action, will be unable to prove that she was
        unlawfully discriminated against.” Id. at 946.
        Here, not only has Harrison failed to produce a comparator, but he has also
        failed to show that he was fired solely because of a disability—a necessary
        element of his ultimate claim. Thus, because Harrison’s failure to make out a
        prima facie case “reflects a failure of the overall evidence,” we need not
        consider his argument that the Sheriff’s proffered reasons for his constructive
        discharge were pretextual. Id. at 945–47.
        10 While not addressed by the district court, Harrison made passing reference

        below and on appeal to an alternative “convincing mosaic” framework for
        showing employment discrimination. Under such a framework, “we look
        beyond the prima facie case to consider all relevant evidence in the record to
        decide the ultimate question of intentional discrimination.” Tynes, 88 F.4th at
        947. But regardless of whether we apply the McDonnell Douglas test or the
        convincing mosaic framework, Harrison must still point to enough evidence
        for a reasonable factfinder to infer that he was fired solely because of a
        disability. For the reasons discussed above, Harrison has failed to do so.
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        14                  Opinion of the Court             22-14288

        district court did not err in granting the Sheriff’s summary
        judgment motion.
              AFFIRMED.