Court Opinion

ID: 9567789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:57:49.050295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:40.017613
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice,
dissenting:
My disagreement with the majority involves a wide variety of issues. The majority has not only overruled several settled points of law in our jurisdiction, but has done so with only the most meager authority to support its position. The principles it has adopted are clearly outside the mainstream.
I.
On May 28,1987, the defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual assault and two counts of first degree sexual abuse. The defendant was sentenced to serve consecutive sentences of fifteen-to-twenty-five years for each of the two sexual assault convictions with concurrent sentences of one-to-five years for the sexual abuse convictions.
*662The events which led to these convictions allegedly occurred in the fall of 1983. During this period of time, the defendant resided with his wife, his four-year-old twins, a boy and a girl, and an infant son. In December of 1983, the defendant and his wife separated, at which time the defendant ceased living with his family. The divorce was finalized in July of 1984.
Approximately two years later, the ex-wife reported to the authorities that her husband had sexually abused the twins during the fall of 1983. The defendant had visitation rights with the twins during this two-year period, and their relationship appeared to be normal. The twins received therapy and, after several sessions, both of them stated that their father had sexually abused them. There was no physical evidence which supported these allegations. Because I believe the majority has misapplied the law to the facts of this case, I respectfully dissent.
II.
First, the majority’s “lustful disposition” exception to Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence1 will permit admission of evidence of a particular character trait of a defendant accused of a sexual offense in order to show that the defendant acted in accordance with the trait. Nothing could be more directly contrary to the explicit admonition of W.Va.R.Evid. 404(a): “Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.]” The majority tacitly acknowledges the inconsistency of its “exception” and W.Va.R.Evid. 404(a) by its failure to cite or discuss this rule.
In order to establish its “lustful disposition” exception, the majority had to overrule Syllabus Point 8 of State v. Dolin, 176 W.Va. 688, 347 S.E.2d 208 (1986).2 The majority opinion cites four cases from other jurisdictions which it represents as sanctioning a lustful disposition collateral act exception.3 Though four of the United States hardly represent most of the American jurisdictions, the prevalence of the majority’s new view is even less than it asserts. Two of the jurisdictions, Ohio and Wisconsin, have abandoned their ill-conceived lustful disposition exceptions. See State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975); State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis.2d 247, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985). The majority’s position is against sound logic and the overwhelming weight of authority, which holds that collateral acts are inadmissible to show a lustful disposition. Such evidence serves no purpose other than to prove that the defendant acted in conformity with a character trait and is, therefore, guilty of the crime charged. E.g., Johnson v. State, 727 P.2d 1062 (Alaska App.1986); People v. Tassell, 36 Cal.3d 77, 201 Cal.Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1 (1984); Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del.1988); Hearing v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.App.1987), decision quashed on other grounds, 559 So.2d 207 (Fla.1990); Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549 (Ky.1985); People *663v. Major, 407 Mich. 394, 285 N.W.2d 660 (1979); State v. Schumann, 111 N.J. 470, 545 A.2d 168 (1988); State v. Curry, supra; Commonwealth v. Shively, 492 Pa. 411, 424 A.2d 1257 (1981); State v. Burchfield, 664 S.W.2d 284 (Tenn.1984); State v. Harris, 36 Wash.App. 746, 677 P.2d 202 (1984). Cf. Lehiy v. State, 501 N.E.2d 451 (Ind.App.1986), adopted and aff'd, 509 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind.1987) (limiting prior acts showing depraved sexual instinct to acts of sodomy and incest).
We recognized in Dolin that there are occasions when prior sexual acts could be admissible under W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b). We cited State v. Pancake, 170 W.Va. 690, 296 S.E.2d 37 (1982), where we held that prior forcible acts against the victim or other persons known to the victim could be shown to establish the victim’s fear of her attacker. See also State v. Lucas, 178 W.Va. 686, 364 S.E.2d 12 (1987); State v. Miller, 175 W.Va. 616, 336 S.E.2d 910 (1985). Dolin also acknowledged the specific exceptions for admission of character evidence under W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b). Thus, there are several purposes for which evidence of collateral acts involving prior sexual episodes are properly admissible, but none approach the lustful disposition exception adopted by the majority despite its rejection by almost every other jurisdiction.
Another point the majority ignores is the balancing test that has heretofore applied to the admission of W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b) evidence. In Syllabus Points 15 and 16 of State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974), we outlined how to use the balancing test:
“15. In the proper exercise of discretion, the trial court may exclude evidence of collateral crimes and charges if the court finds that its probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will create substantial danger of undue prejudice or confuse the issues or mislead the jury or unfairly surprise a party who has not had reasonable ground to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
“16. In the exercise of discretion to admit or exclude evidence of collateral crimes and charges, the overriding considerations for the trial court are to scrupulously protect the accused in his right to a fair trial while adequately preserving the right of the State to prove evidence which is relevant and legally connected with the charge for which the accused is being tried.”
We have consistently followed Thomas and have recognized that the balancing test is now embodied in W.Va.R.Evid. 403.4 See, e.g., State v. Hanna, 180 W.Va. 598, 378 S.E.2d 640 (1989); State v. Stacy, 179 W.Va. 686, 371 S.E.2d 614 (1988); State v. Johnson, 179 W.Va. 619, 371 S.E.2d 340 (1988); State v. Dolin, supra; State v. Nicholson, 162 W.Va. 750, 252 S.E.2d 894 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 166 W.Va. 153, 273 S.E.2d 346 (1980). Other jurisdictions uniformly agree that before evidence of collateral acts is admissible, its probative value must be weighed against its prejudicial effect to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 893 F.2d 451 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 263, 102 L.Ed.2d 251 (1988); United States v. Conners, 825 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir.1988); Getz v. State, supra; State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957 (1979); State v. Micko, 393 N.W.2d 741 (N.D.1986).
Moreover, as we held in Syllabus Point 3 of Dolin, the trial court should conduct an in camera hearing to determine whether the prejudicial effect of the collateral act evidence outweighs its probative value.5 *664Furthermore, in Syllabus Point 9 of that opinion, we explained that it is customary to give a limiting instruction to the jury that the collateral evidence is not offered to prove guilt of the present crime, but is to be considered exclusively in determining the particular issue on which it is properly offered, e.g., identity, intent, motive, etc.6 The rule that evidence of collateral crimes is not admissible to prove guilt of the crime charged, but rather only to bear on subordinate issues such as system, motive, or intent, is black letter law and is explicitly stated in W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b). See United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Scarborough v. United States, 467 U.S. 1209, 104 S.Ct. 2396, 81 L.Ed.2d 353 (1984); United States v. Bartley, 855 F.2d 547 (8th Cir.1988); State v. Ramirez Enriquez, 153 Ariz. 431, 737 P.2d 407 (App.1987); State v. Walls, 541 A.2d 591 (Del.1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 967, 110 S.Ct. 412, 107 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989); State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 752 P.2d 632 (App.1988); Commonwealth v. Madyun, 17 Mass.App. 965, 458 N.E.2d 745 (1983); State v. Paige, 316 N.C. 630, 343 S.E.2d 848 (1986).
Several courts have suggested that admission of evidence of prior collateral acts of the defendant is best deferred until after the defendant’s case, in order to see whether intent, motive, or identity are actually disputed. See, e.g., United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir.1978). In this case, none of these safeguards were followed, mainly because defendant’s trial counsel neglected to raise an objection to this inflammatory and prejudicial evidence. I will address this failure in Part VI(C).
III.
Also rather astounding to me is the majority’s footnote 24 “limiting” (but for all intents overruling) State v. McCoy, 179 W.Va. 223, 366 S.E.2d 731 (1988).7 In that unanimous two-year-old opinion, we held in Syllabus Point 2 that a qualified expert could opine that the victim of a sexual assault suffered from rape trauma syndrome, “but the expert may not give an opinion, expressly or implicitly, as to whether or not the alleged victim was raped.” 8
In isolation, it is possible to read the majority’s footnote 24 to apply only to a situation where the physician, after making a physical examination of the victim, states that there are physical findings that are consistent with a person having been raped or sexually assaulted. Such a conclusion is entirely permissible. However, this rule would not require the limitation on McCoy.
The confusion springs from Syllabus Point 7 of the majority opinion which states, rather perplexingly, that “an expert may state an opinion as to whether the child comports with the psychological and behavioral profile of a child sexual abuse victim, and may offer an opinion based on objective findings that the child has been sexually abused.”9 (Emphasis added). I *665cannot reconcile the majority’s statement in footnote 24 that “physical findings” might enable a physician to conclude that sexual abuse had occurred with its shift to the broader phrase “objective findings” in Syllabus Point 7.
In this case, the psychologist, Mr. Trai-nor, did not see the children until two years after the alleged abuse incidents. He made no physical examination of the children and did not state that there were physical findings consistent with sexual abuse. Instead, Mr. Trainor’s testimony about his observation of the children and their behavioral characteristics was quite similar to that condemned in McCoy. He gave his permissible opinion that the children suffered from child abuse syndrome. However, the State went beyond this point and asked Mr. Trainor directly if, in his opinion, the children had been sexually abused; he responded in the affirmative.
In McCoy, the conviction was reversed because the expert indicated that the victim had been raped. Not only does this type of unfounded opinion bolster the credibility of the victim’s testimony, a point that we emphasized in McCoy, but where, as here, the identity of the perpetrator is undisputed, it purports to directly prove the ultimate issue of guilt. Furthermore, because of the expert’s credentials, his opinion carries with it a stamp of scientific legitimacy which obviously will weigh heavily upon the jury.
The majority offers scant authority for its new position. It relies chiefly on State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn.1984), in which the expert was not asked the ultimate question of whether in his opinion the child had been sexually abused. The expert testified only that the child exhibited characteristics consistent with sexual abuse.10 Moreover, in footnote 25, 183 W.Va. at 658, 398 S.E.2d at 140, the majority incorrectly suggests that the Minnesota court sanctioned the prosecutor’s elicitation of the expert’s opinion as to the truthfulness of the victim. This line of questioning was only sanctioned because the defense challenged the victim’s credibility during cross-examination.11
Myers only permitted expert testimony to explain the often erratic and ambivalent conduct of sexually abused children. Significantly, the Myers opinion cites with approval the earlier case of State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn.1982), where the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome was inadmissible because such “testimony furnishes no assistance to jurors, who are as capable as the expert in assessing the credibility of the alleged adult rape victim.” 359 N.W.2d at 610. The Minnesota Supreme Court in Myers simply did not adopt the rule, espoused by the majority, that a psychological expert can opine that a child victim has been physically abused.
The majority also cites State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982); however, this case dealt solely with expert testimony regarding the credibility of the child abuse victim. As in Myers, the Kim court permitted this testimony only after the defendant had attacked the victim’s credibility. The same credibility issue was involved in State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d *6661215 (1983), and State v. Geyman, 224 Mont. 194, 729 P.2d 475 (1986), also cited by the majority. The same cases relied on by the majority were used by the Ohio Court of Appeals in State v. Timperio, 38 Ohio App.3d 156, 528 N.E.2d 594 (1987), which talked about the credibility issue, but failed to discuss the implications of the expert’s opinion that the child had been sexually abused.
Certainly, the majority’s reliance on Kim is misplaced. Indeed, the majority does not attempt any analysis of the credibility issue under the appropriate beginning point, W.Va.R.Evid. 608(a), which limits attacks on credibility “to evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness[.]”12 Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1989), was sharply critical of Kim’s failure to properly analyze Rule 608(a):
“[Rule 608(a)] represents an important policy choice: it prevents trials from being turned into contests between what would amount to modern oath-helpers who would largely usurp the fact-finding function of judge or jury. State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 382, 728 P.2d 248, 252 (1986). The overwhelming majority of courts have expressly or impliedly rejected Kim. We join these courts and hold that rule 608(a)(1) bars admission of an expert’s testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion.” (Footnote omitted).13
It is impossible from the majority’s opinion to state with any degree of accuracy what its view is on this issue. I take some comfort from the last sentence of Syllabus Point 7 that the majority does not sanction an expert expressing an opinion as to the child’s credibility: “Such an expert may not give an opinion as to whether he personally believes the child, nor an opinion as to whether the sexual assault was committed by the defendant, as this would improperly and prejudicially invade the province of the jury.”14 Certainly, as illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court’s careful analysis in *667Rimmasch, the expert should not be able to give an opinion as to the truthfulness of the victim.
Finally, while some courts have permitted a qualified expert to testify that a child victim of sexual abuse displays symptoms of the typical child abuse profile, there is almost universal agreement that the expert is not entitled either to express an opinion as to the truthfulness of the victim or to state, in the absence of physical findings, that the child has been sexually abused.15 The majority’s position is, simply put, wrong.
IV.
Yet another point overlooked by the majority is the threshold question of whether the expert’s testimony with regard to the child abuse syndrome had the necessary degree of scientific reliability to render it admissible. This issue was unfortunately not raised by defense counsel at trial and is part of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that I discuss in Part VI, infra.
The majority instead cites W.Va.R.Evid. 702, which generally permits expert testimony if it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.]”16 We have never interpreted W.Va.R.Evid. 702 as an open door to admit any supposed scientific testimony without some inquiry into its reliability. Before the adoption of W.Va.R.Evid. 702, we formulated two general rules on the admissibility of scientific tests in Syllabus Points 7 and 8 of State v. Clawson, 165 W.Va. 588, 270 S.E.2d 659 (1980):
“7. In order for a scientific test to be initially admissible, there must be general acceptance of the scientific principle which underlies the test.
“8. There are certain scientific tests that have been widely used over a long period of tíme, such that their general acceptance in the scientific community can be judicially noticed.”
Since the adoption of W.Va.R.Evid. 702, we have acknowledged that its adoption may have liberalized the admissibility of scientific tests. See State v. Armstrong, 179 W.Va. 435, 369 S.E.2d 870 (1988); State v. McCoy, 179 W.Va. 223, 366 S.E.2d 731 (1988). Our most recent case, State v. Woodall, 182 W.Va. 15, 385 S.E.2d 253 (1989), sets forth the approach used under W.Va.R.Evid. 702 in Syllabus Points 1 and 2:
“1. Under W.Va.R.Evid., Rule 702, expert testimony concerning generally recognized tests is presumptively admissible and the burden of excluding such testimony is upon the side seeking exclusion. However, when a test is novel or not generally accepted, that circumstance alone meets the threshold requirement of rebutting any presumption of admissibility under Rule 702 and, therefore, with regard to tests that are not generally accepted the burden of proof that the test is reliable remains on the proponent.
“2. When senior appellate courts have concluded that a test is generally accepted by the scientific community, a trial court may take judicial notice of a test’s reliability.”
In the present case, the State made no attempt to demonstrate the reliability of the so-called “child sexual abuse profile.”
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this precise issue in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 400 observing that there was an absence of any “unanimity in the legal community as to the inherent reliability of a child sexual abuse profile to show that abuse has actually occurred with respect to a specific alleged victim.”17 The court in Rimmasch surveyed scientific literature in *668this area and came to these conclusions in reversing the conviction:
“Not only is there a lack of any consensus about the ability of the profile to determine abuse, but the scientific literature raises serious doubts as to the reliability of profile testimony when used for forensic purposes to demonstrate that abuse actually occurred. Scholars acknowledge that no uniformly identifiable psychological profile applies to sexually abused children as a class....
“Suffice it to say, then, that the literature in the area is disparate and contradictory and that child abuse experts have been unable to agree on a universal symptomology of sexual abuse, especially a precise symptomology that is sufficiently reliable to be used confidentially in a forensic setting as a determinant of abuse. See Cerkovnik, The Sexual Abuse of Children: Myths, Research, and Policy Implications, 89 Dick.L.Rev. 691, 705-08 (1985) (compilation of studies on victims of sexual abuse); [Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 Geo.L.J. 429] at 439-48 [(1985)]” 775 P.2d at 401. (Footnote omitted).18
In this case, the State made no attempt to establish the reliability of the expert testimony under the Clawson-Woodall standard for admissibility.19
V.
The majority has also mishandled the mother’s hearsay testimony recounting what her son told her. In addressing the mother’s recitation of her son's out-of-court statement, the majority says it “must look at the requirements ... under W.Va. R.Evid. 803(24)” and then quotes the general language of Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Smith, 178 W.Va. 104, 358 S.E.2d 188 (1987).20 From its citation, I think that at *669least the majority agrees that the mother’s recitation of her son’s out-of-court statements was hearsay.
The age-old rule is that a witness’s in-court testimony about an out-of-court statement, if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is hearsay, and is not made admissible merely because the declar-ant testifies and is available for cross-examination. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 200 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, Pelaes v. United States, 479 U.S. 842, 107 S.Ct. 151, 93 L.Ed.2d 92 (1986), quoting from its earlier decision in United States v. Check, 582 F.2d 668, 675 (2d Cir.1978), agreed with this analysis:
“ ‘[T]he federal courts do not recognize any exception to the hearsay rule, or, except in the limited circumstances set forth in Fed.R.Evid. 801(d), any exclusion from the definition of hearsay, which would permit testimony in court relating to the prior out-of-court statements of a witness merely because the witness is available at trial for cross-examination and subject to cross-examination concerning those statements.’ ” 21
See also People v. Davis, 130 Ill.App.3d 41, 85 Ill.Dec. 19, 473 N.E.2d 387 (1984); Daly v. State, 99 Nev. 564, 665 P.2d 798 (1983); State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983).
Furthermore, I believe that any attempt to utilize the hearsay residual exception in W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24) to shoehorn the mother’s testimony into admissibility is unavailing. In Smith, where we discussed this exception and its counterpart, Rule 804(b)(5), we warned “that Rule 803(24) and 804(b)(5) cannot be viewed as an open door to thrust hearsay statements into a trial.” 178 W.Va. at 114, 358 S.E.2d at 198. Our rule is identical to the corresponding federal rule of evidence. The notes of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary as to the intended scope of this residuary exception are telling:
“It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The committee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in Rule 803 and 804(b). The residual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule, including its present exceptions. Such major revisions are best accomplished by legislative action.” Committee on the Judiciary, S.Rep. No. 93-1277, Note to Paragraph (24), 28 U.S.C.A. F.R. Evid. 583 (1975).
E.g., United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755 (D.C.Cir.1979); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3rd Cir.1978).
In this case the out-of-court declarant, the son, was available and did testify. Consequently, there was absolutely no necessity to have the mother testify as to the child’s out-of-court statements. It is true that from a purely technical standpoint, W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24) does not require that *670the out-of-court declarant be unavailable, as does its counterpart in W.Va.R.Evid. 804(b)(5). Nevertheless, several courts that have had occasion to consider this particular point have held that there is an implied requirement of unavailability.
This implication arises from language in W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24) that the proponent of out-of-court statements must demonstrate that the statement “is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts.” Thus, in United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir.1977), the court found that the trial judge erred in admitting an extrajudicial statement of an available witness under Rule 803(24):
“Although the introductory clause of Rule 803 appears to dispense with availability, this condition re-enters the analysis of whether or not to admit statements into evidence under the last subsection of Rule 803 because of the requirement that the proponent use reasonable efforts to procure the most probative evidence on the points sought to be proved. Rule 803(24), thus, has a built-in requirement of necessity. Here there was no necessity to use the statements when the witness was within the courthouse.”
See also Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1053, 103 S.Ct. 1501, 1502, 75 L.Ed.2d 932 (1983); Cummins v. State, 515 So.2d 869 (Miss.1987); Daly v. State, supra; State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985); State v. Velasquez, supra.
The cases cited by the majority for the proposition that courts use the exception to W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24) to permit third parties to testify to child abuse victims’ out-of-court statements are not persuasive. In United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir.1986), State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987), and State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1983), the child victims were found incompetent to testify and, therefore, “unavailable.” W.Va.R.Evid. 804(b)(5) would have come into play in these circumstances. We must also remember that our rules of evidence are written for all cases and must be more narrowly construed in the criminal than in the civil arena. This is because in a criminal case where the victim does not testify, a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause consideration would arise. None of the majority’s cases held that a Confrontation Clause violation had occurred, but none had the benefit of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), which decided that in this type of situation the Confrontation Clause was violated.
United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985) typifies the confusion that can be encountered in addressing this issue. Renville involved testimony of a deputy sheriff who offered the out-of-court statement of the child victim identifying the defendant as the abuser. The victim also testified to this fact at trial. The defendant denied any responsibility for the act. The court, instead of finding that the out-of-court statement was one of identification and thus admissible under W.Va.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C),22 proceeded to discuss only the trustworthiness of the statement under W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24).
Besides confusion, the majority’s opinion demonstrates that the majority fails to understand the extremely limited purpose of the residual hearsay exception. Where the out-of-court declarant is unavailable to testify, but his statement provides a key piece of evidence, it is absolutely crucial to determine whether the strictures of W.Va.R. Evid. 804(b)(5) can be met. Even then, it is gravely doubtful that the Sixth Amendment confrontation question can also be satisfactorily resolved. See Idaho v. Wright, supra.
I cannot conceive that W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24) was designed to provide a means of corroborating the in-court testimony of a witness by permitting third parties to come forward at trial and testify that the witness had told them a similar story in a prior *671out-of-court conversation. Had that been the intent of the rule, it certainly could have been better expressed.
I daresay that if a defendant sought to use this tactic, it would be rejected. This point is aptly illustrated in two Mississippi Supreme Court cases announced within one month of each other. In Clanton v. State, 539 So.2d 1024 (Miss.1989), the court rejected the defendant’s efforts to introduce two out-of-court statements he made to police officers wherein he said that the victim had consented to have sex with him. The court rejected the statements because they were hearsay and were consistent with the defendant’s trial testimony.23 The defendant’s reliance on Rule 803(24) was dismissed almost out of hand. “Clanton overlooks 803(24)(B) which requires that ‘the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can produce through reasonable efforts.’ ” 539 So.2d at 1028.
On the other hand, in Mitchell v. State, 539 So.2d 1366 (Miss.1989), the issue was whether two witnesses to whom the child victim had related her story of abuse could testify as to these statements. The child victim testified at trial. The court concluded that these statements had been admitted under a wrong theory, but suggested that upon a proper analysis they might be admitted under Mississippi’s counterpart to Rule 803(24).24 I find this disparate treatment irrational and disturbing.
Finally, I believe that even if we assume that W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24) is applicable, the evidence in this case does not meet the strictures of the rule. The majority overlooks the Supreme Court’s opinion in Idaho v. Wright, supra, which dealt with Idaho’s counterpart to Rule 803(24). The issue before the Supreme Court involved the Confrontation Clause because the child victim did not testify.25 Her statements about the alleged sexual abuse were related at trial by a pediatrician. The Supreme Court’s analysis bore a striking parallel to the requirements of W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24):
“The crux of the question presented is therefore whether the State, as the proponent of evidence presumptively barred by the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, has carried its burden of proving that the younger daughter’s incriminating statements to Dr. Jambura bore sufficient indicia of reliability to withstand scrutiny under the Clause.” 497 U.S. at —, 110 S.Ct. at 3147, 111 L.Ed.2d at 652-53.
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that Rule 803(24) is not “a firmly rooted hearsay exception ... [that] satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded long-standing judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements.” 497 U.S. at —, 110 S.Ct. at 3147, 111 L.Ed.2d at 653. (Citations omitted). The Supreme Court went on to determine that the State must show “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 497 U.S. at —, 110 S.Ct. at 3147, 111 L.Ed.2d at 655. “ ‘The circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness on which the various specific exceptions to the hearsay *672rule are based are those that existed at the time the statement was made and do not include those that may be added by using hindsight.’ ” 497 U.S. at —, 110 S.Ct. at 3149, 111 L.Ed.2d at 655, quoting Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir.1979).
Following this point, the Supreme Court in Wright took pains to point out that the “evidence ... must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.” 497 U.S. at —, 110 S.Ct. at 3150, 111 L.Ed.2d at 657. (Citations omitted). The majority’s rejection in Idaho v. Wright of consideration of corroborating evidence to enhance the reliability of the out-of-court statement sparked the dissent. The majority made this unequivocal statement:
“In short, the use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement’s ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ would permit admission of á presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial_” 497 U.S. at —, 110 S.Ct. at 3150, 111 L.Ed.2d at 657.
Because the hearsay exception embodied in W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24) has no historical guarantee of trustworthiness, it is presumptively unreliable. In order to overcome this presumption, before a statement will be admitted under W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24), it must meet the strict test of Wright.
Another problem with the mother’s recitation of the son’s story is that no one attempted to elicit any coherent statement of what the child said to her. According to the mother’s trial testimony, in October, 1984, she noticed her son, who was then five years of age, “constantly bouncing on the floor, at times I’d catch him ridin’ the chair arms, and, I just knew it wasn’t natural.”
She spoke about the behavior to a neighbor, who agreed to baby-sit her two other children. While giving her son a bath, the mother then asked why he was bouncing up and down, and he told her that “daddy told me to do it, it feels good.” She then inquired if daddy had said or done anything else. The mother testified that the child stated he could not tell her. She asked if he could tell the neighbor, “Aunt Kika.” According to the mother, the child’s response was, “well, daddy didn’t say I couldn’t tell nobody except you, mommy[.]” The mother then asked “Aunt Kika” to come into the room, and, according to the mother, the child then disclosed the sexual abuse incident.26
If the analysis begins as suggested in Wright, that “the Supreme Court of Idaho properly focused on the presumptive unreliability of the out-of-court statements[,]” 497 U.S. at —, 110 S.Ct. at 3152, 111 L.Ed.2d at 659, then there is little to lend any reliability to the declarant’s statement. The statement was not made soon after the event. It was not spontaneous or even made in a volunteered sense, because it came about as a result of interrogation by the mother. The Supreme Court in Wright placed special emphasis on this latter point by stating that “we note that it is possible that ‘[i]f there is evidence of prior interrogation, prompting, or manipulation by adults, spontaneity may be an inaccurate indicator of trustworthiness.’ ” 497 U.S. at —, 110 S.Ct. at 3152, 111 L.Ed. at 659-60, quoting State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 201, 735 P.2d 801, 811 (1987).
I am convinced that there is no evidence to compel the conclusion that the child’s statement to the mother had the “particularized guarantee of trustworthiness” necessary to admit it under Rule 803(24) as circumscribed by the Confrontation *673Clause.27 This guarantee of trustworthiness is set out as the primary factor in Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Smith, supra, which outlines the requirement for admissibility under Rule 803(24): “First and most important is the trustworthiness of the statement which must be equivalent to the trustworthiness underlying the specific exceptions to the hearsay rule.”
VI.
In its rush to throw a blanket of approval over the hearsay testimony of the psychologist, Mr. Trainor, the majority misunderstands the purpose of W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4), involving statements made to a physician for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. The two-part test set out in Syllabus Point 5 of the majority opinion misconceives the requirements of the rule.28 The initial language of W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4) is “[sjtatements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment[.]”29
As this language indicates by the disjunctive “or,” there are two alternate grounds for permitting testimony by a physician of statements made to him by patients. A patient’s statement to a treating physician as to present and past mental and physical conditions, including causative factors, have always been admitted, because the patient has a selfish interest to speak truthfully in order to receive appropriate treatment. This “self interest” guarantees the trustworthiness of the out-of-court statements. See generally E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 292 (3d ed. 1984); Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 778 (1971 & Supp.1990). We recognized this exception in Syllabus Point 8 of Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W.Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959).30
Prior to the adoption of W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4), courts consistently held that statements made by the patient to a nontreating physician who examined the patient for purposes of trial testimony were not admissible. See generally E. Cleary, supra at § 293. We adhered to this view in Syllabus Point 9 of Sutherland.31
The adoption of Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) and its accompanying committee note explanation has resulted in a broadening of this hearsay exception to include statements made to a physician consulted for the purpose of diagnosis when no treatment is anticipated by the declarant.32 See gener*674ally, R. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements For the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C.L. Rev. 257 (1986). I think the majority has failed to grasp the separate, alternative grounds available under W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4). This failure stems from its reliance on Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir.1988). Morgan followed the two-part test set out in United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985), which joins the alternative grounds for admissibility to make a combined two-part test,33 in which the physician may occupy both roles, i.e., as a treating physician and as one who also gives a diagnosis.
Aside from the majority’s incorrect legal analysis, I doubt from my reading of Mr. Trainor’s rambling account of his contact with the children that he was a treating physician. The State did not attempt to establish a foundation that he was a treating physician by showing what treatment he actually rendered. Likewise, the State did not attempt to isolate what statements the children actually made to him.
Mr. Trainor’s testimony suggests that on his first contact with the case, the sexual abuse story was told to him by the mother. He then began to work with the children, particularly the son who was not able to talk about the abuse.34 Certainly, the mother’s statements given to Mr. Trainor about what her son had told her do not qualify as a patient’s statement under W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4). I cannot help but conclude that Mr. Trainor began his “treatment” with his “diagnosis” a foregone conclusion.
Other courts have expressed concern that where very young children are involved whose testimonial competence is questionable, and no physical findings of abuse are involved, the physician’s testimony as to statements supposedly made by the children may not be admissible. At their young age, children can lack the maturity to appreciate the link between their statements and the treatment. Cassidy v. State, 74 Md.App. 1, 536 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988). Colorado courts have required the State to demonstrate in camera that very young children understand the obligation to provide the doctor with accurate information in order for the statements to be admissible under its counterpart to W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4). See Olden v. People, 732 P.2d 1132 (Colo.1986); W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo.1984).
Mr. Trainor was never specifically directed to define his role or to separate what the children actually told him from what their mother said that she had been told. Further confusion arose when he discussed general characteristics of the child abuse syndrome without explaining whether they were present in the case at hand. I discussed the foundation deficiency of his opinion in Part III, supra. Defense counsel made no pertinent objections on any of these points.
*675VII.
A.
The majority brushes aside the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the record is replete with incidents where counsel not only failed to object to evidentiary matters, but also to substantive issues that might well have produced a different result at trial or on this appeal. In addition, counsel questioned witnesses in such a faulty manner as to award the prosecution an erroneous and unwarranted advantage. I find it impossible to conclude that counsel’s error can be washed away under the rubric of strategy and tactics.
First, the record discloses that the two child victims were permitted to testify by way of a closed-circuit television. The child witness was placed in the judge’s office with a television camera. The defendant, attorneys, judge, and jury were in the courtroom where they could view the television screen and hear the questions and the child’s answers. They could not be seen by the child witness. For some unexplained reason, in the judge’s office with the witness was a state trooper who, according to the record, had participated in the investigation. This entire arrangement was by agreement between the prosecutor and defense counsel.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. As the United States Supreme Court explained in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1934, 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 496 (1970): “Our own decisions seem to have recognized at an early date that it is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.”
In Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), the Supreme Court found the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated when the trial court permitted the sexually abused child witness to be screened from the defendant while testifying, even though the witness could be observed by the jury. We followed Coy’s dictates in Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Murray, 180 W.Va. 41, 375 S.E.2d 405 (1988):
“Under Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. [1012], 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), and State ex rel. Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647, 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975), the right to confrontation assured by the Sixth Amendment and W.Va. Const, art. Ill, § 14 is violated where a witness testifies at trial and the defendant is denied the opportunity to confront the witness face-to-face.”
We acknowledged in Murray the Supreme Court’s caveat in Coy that “[w]e leave for another day, however, the question whether any exceptions exist. Whatever they may be, they would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an important public policy.” State v. Murray, 180 W.Va. at 48 n. 3, 375 S.E.2d at 412 n. 3, quoting 487 U.S. at 1021, 108 S.Ct. at 2803, 101 L.Ed.2d at 867.
This issue is weighty and difficult. In any event, by failing to raise a Sixth Amendment right of confrontation objection, counsel made a grievous mistake. I recognize that, after this case was tried, the United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that in certain instances live television testimony is permissible at trial by a child who is a victim of sexual abuse. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). However, Craig does not grant a blanket approval of this technique. In order to invoke the procedure, the Supreme Court decided that it must be shown that an important state interest could be furthered: “We likewise conclude today that a State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.” 497 U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 3167, 111 L.Ed.2d at 683. The Supreme Court went on in Craig to spell out in some detail how a requisite finding should be made:
“The requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one: *676the trial court must hear evidence and determine whether use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify.... The trial court must also find that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant.... Finally, the trial court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimus, i.e., more than ‘mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify,’ Wildermuth [v. State], 310 Md. [496], 524, 530 A.2d [275] at 289 [ (1987) ]; see also State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 511-512, 57 P. 542, 543-544 (1899).” 497 U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 3169, 111 L.Ed.2d at 685. (Citations omitted).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court took pains to emphasize that the procedures used must ensure
“the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to rigorous adversarial testing and thereby preserving] the essence of effective confrontation. Because there is no dispute that the child witnesses in this case testified under oath, were subject to full cross-examination, and were able to be observed by the judge, jury, and defendant as they testified, we conclude that, to the extent that a proper finding of necessity has been made, the admission of such testimony would be consonant with the Confrontation Clause.” 497 U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 3170, 111 L.Ed.2d at 686.
In the present case, no objection was made to the testimony by closed-circuit television, and there is no record of whether the initial requisite finding could be met. In Craig, there was expert testimony regarding the particular trauma that the child witnesses would have experienced if forced to confront the defendant face to face.
A further critical point is embedded in this case which was not present in Craig. Here, the child witness was in the room with an adult who was one of the State’s investigating officers. I do not believe that any court would sanction this type of procedure. With the officer not on camera, the potential for him to influence the child witness by head nodding or other signals without detection by the court or jury is available. In short, I do not believe that the procedure used in this case comports with Craig, and I believe that a violation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation has occurred.
B.
I have previously addressed the admissibility of the expert’s testimony in Part IV, supra. Counsel made no objection to the reliability of the expert’s so-called tests that led to his child abuse profile. As a consequence, the State was never required to prove this threshold issue. Moreover, no objection was made to Mr. Trainor’s conclusion that the children had been the victims of sexual abuse even though there were no physical findings of abuse. These omissions clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of trial counsel’s representation.
C.
As I discussed in Part II, defense counsel made no attempt to preclude the prosecution from offering evidence of collateral crimes under W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b). Counsel did not request an in camera hearing to determine if the prejudicial effect of this testimony outweighed the probative value under W.Va.R.Evid. 403 and as required by State v. Dolin, supra. Finally, counsel did not request a cautionary or limiting instruction to the jury that such collateral crimes could not be considered as evidence of guilt. Counsel was totally ineffective in this regard, and there can be no doubt that the defendant was severely prejudiced.
D.
Defense counsel’s ill-conceived questioning of witnesses, coupled with the failure to object to the prosecutor’s questions, led to devastating results for the defendant.
First, the defendant’s ex-wife testified that the defendant had made telephone calls to sex clubs. She was not present when the telephone calls were made and *677did not hear the conversations. Defense counsel made no objection.
The ex-wife also testified that the defendant had masturbated in front of his son. She did not witness these events, but testified that she had been informed of them by her son approximately two years after-wards. Again, counsel did not object, although it was clear from the very beginning of the ex-wife’s testimony that she was going to relate not what she observed, but what was related to her by her son.
Defense counsel’s cross-examination of the defendant’s ex-wife, who was the State’s key witness, and who was hostile towards the defendant, led to some disastrous consequences. Despite defense counsel’s failure to object to the direct testimony about the defendant’s calls to sex clubs, there was no linkage of these calls to the children until defense counsel asked this question and received the following answer:
“Q So, that there doesn’t appear to be any connection between these phone calls and any abuse of the children, isn’t that correct?
“A That’s not true, because my children said that their father made them listen to these phone calls.”
In a bizarre attempt to impeach the ex-wife’s credibility, defense counsel unaccountably brought into evidence another collateral act of the defendant which involved sex with a dog. Not only was this statement hearsay, but the ex-wife managed to expand on the statement to include the defendant’s threat to the son.35
Further unenlightened cross-examination of the ex-wife by defense counsel brought to the jury’s attention that the defendant had pulled out his vasectomy stitches because he had been “playing with himself.”36 Even with defense counsel’s absence of objections, the State had not tried to introduce these acts on direct examination of the defendant’s ex-wife.
*678Finally, when defense counsel asked the ex-wife whether she and the defendant had a normal sex life, she responded: “I thought it was normal up until the end, towards the end.” On redirect, the prosecutor made several more pulverizing points based on defense counsel's “opening the door” about the defendant’s normal sex life. The prosecutor was able to have the ex-wife describe the defendant’s inability to have an orgasm without masturbating. The ex-wife also described the defendant's practice of leaning against the washing machine and masturbating when it was in the spin cycle.
I cannot help but believe that all of this bizarre sexual information would cast the defendant as a monstrous sexual pervert who, in the eyes of the jury, was easily capable of accomplishing the sexual abuse of his children. For defense counsel to bring this information to the attention of the jury by direct and explicit questions defies any logic. In the words of Syllabus Point 21 of State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974), “no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted in the defense of an accused.” 37
I am at a loss to account for the majority’s glossing over of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Conclusion

I conclude on a rather elegiac note. Perhaps I have read more into the majority’s opinion than was meant; perhaps it did not intend to stand the law in this area on its head. I trust that our circuit judges and counsel will approach this area with a cautionary balanced view of the law as it exists elsewhere, as I hope it will exist here, and as I have attempted to outline.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice NEELY joins me in this dissent.

. W.Va.R.Evid. 404(b) provides:
“Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. — Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

. Syllabus Point 8 of Dolin states:
"To the extent that State v. Beacraft, 126 W.Va. 895, 30 S.E.2d 541 (1944), State v. Lohm, 97 W.Va. 652, 125 S.E. 758 (1924), and State v. Driver, 88 W.Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921), allow collateral sexual offenses to be admitted into evidence to show an improper or lustful disposition toward the victim, they are overruled."

.In note 15, 183 W.Va. at 651, 398 S.E.2d at 133, the majority states:
"Jurisdictions have termed such uses in different manners but still have permitted this evidence to show an accused's 'emotional propensity for sexual aberration,’ 'lewd disposition,’ ‘propensity to act out his sexual desires with young girls,’ or 'moral disposition and perversity.’ See State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. 377, 379, 430 P.2d 139, 141 (1967); State v. Maestas, 224 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Iowa 1974); State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis.2d 647, 648, 247 N.W.2d 696, 703 (1976); State v. Shively, 172 Ohio St. 128, 131, 174 N.E.2d 104, 107 (1961).”

. W.Va.R.Evid. 403 states:
“Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or,, needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

. Syllabus Point 3 of Dolin states:
"Before a trial court can determine that evidence of collateral crimes is admissible under one of the exceptions, an in camera hearing is necessary to allow a trial court to carefully consider the admissibility of collat*664eral crime evidence and to properly balance the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect."

. Syllabus Point 9 of Dolin provides:
“It is customary to give the jury a limiting instruction with regard to its consideration of a collateral crime. This instruction generally provides that the evidence of a collateral crime is not to be considered as proof of the defendant’s guilt on the present charge, but may be considered in deciding whether a given issue or element relevant to the present charge has been proven. When a defendant requests this limiting instruction, it must be given.”

. Footnote 24 of the majority’s opinion, 183 W.Va. at 658, 398 S.E.2d at 140, states: “We clarify this holding in that McCoy is limited to the facts of that case. Hence, a physician can testify that in his or her opinion, based on physical findings, a particular victim was raped.”

. The full text of Syllabus Point 2 of McCoy states:
"Qualified expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome is relevant and admissible in a prosecution for rape where the defense is consent. The expert may testify that the alleged victim exhibits behavior consistent with rape trauma syndrome, but the expert may not give an opinion, expressly or implicitly, as to whether or not the alleged victim was raped.”

. The complete text of Syllabus Point 7 is:
"Expert psychological testimony is permissible in cases involving incidents of child sexual *665abuse and an expert may state an opinion as to whether the child comports with the psychological and behavioral profile of a child sexual abuse victim, and may offer an opinion based on objective findings that the child has been sexually abused. Such an expert may not give an opinion as to whether he personally believes the child, nor an opinion as to whether the sexual assault was committed by the defendant, as these would improperly and prejudicially invade the province of the jury.”

. Syllabus Point 4 of Myers demonstrates this point:
"It is within the trial court's discretion to admit qualified expert testimony describing the psychological and emotional characteristics typically observed in sexually abused children and those observed in the complainant and giving other background data providing a relevant insight into the conduct and demean- or of the child complainant which the jury could not otherwise bring to its evaluation of her credibility.”

. In Syllabus Point 5 of Myers the Minnesota court stated: "Defendant opened the door to opinion testimony regarding the truthfulness of complainant’s allegations by eliciting the opinion of complainant’s mother about the truthfulness of her daughter’s allegations.”

. The full text of W.Va.R.Evid. 608(a) is:
“Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness, (a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. — The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.”

. In note 2 of Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 392, the Utah Supreme Court listed jurisdictions which have rejected Kim’s credibility rule:
"E.g., United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 341 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir.1985); State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 382-86, 728 P.2d 248, 252-56 (1986); Johnson v. State, 292 Ark. 632, 639-40, 732 S.W.2d 817, 819-21 (1987); People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1098-99, 215 Cal.Rptr. 45, 49-50 (1985); Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 341 (Colo.1986); Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 275 (Del.1987); Kruse v. State, 483 So.2d 1383, 1387-88 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986); Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind.1987); State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 1986); Commonwealth v. Carter, 9 Mass.App. 680, 681-82, 403 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (1980), aff'd, 383 Mass. 873, 417 N.E.2d 438 (1981); People v. Walker, 150 Mich.App. 597, 389 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1985); State v. Jackson, 239 Kan. 463, 470, 721 P.2d 232, 238 (1986); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. 1984); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 239 (Mo.1984); In re J.W.K., [223 Mont. 1] 724 P.2d 164, 166 (1986); Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 734 P.2d 705, 709 (1987); People v. Reid, 123 Misc.2d 1084, 1087, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1984); State v. Staples, 120 N.H. 278, 281-82, 415 A.2d 320, 322 (1980); State v. Heath, 316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E.2d 565 (1986); State v. Milbradt, 305 Or. 621, 628-29, 756 P.2d 620, 624 (1988); Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (1986); State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321, 326 (R.I.1981); State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash.App. 652, 656-57, 694 P.2d 1117, 1121 (1985); State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis.2d 92, 96-97, 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (1984); Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 1987); see United States v. Earley, 505 F.Supp. 117 (S.D.Iowa 1981); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1156-57 (Me.1988); State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795, 803-04, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 240, 93 L.Ed.2d 165 (1986); State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D.1985); see also Feeney, Expert Psychological Testimony on Credibility Issues, 115 Mil.L.Rev. 121, 134-35 (1987) (discussing same prohibition in military courts)."

.For the full text of Syllabus Point 7, see note 9, supra.

. See cases cited in note 13, supra.

. The complete text of W.Va.R.Evid. 702 states:
"Testimony by Experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”

.The Rimmasch court cited the following authorities for this statement:
"Compare State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338-39 (1982) (admitting); Kruse v. State, 483 So.2d 1383, 1385-86 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) (admitting); ... People v. Roscoe, *668168 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1098-1101, 215 Cal.Rptr. 45, 49-50 (1985) (excluding): State v. Hudnall, 293 S.C. 97, 100, 359 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (1987) (excluding); People v. Pullins, 145 Mich.App. 414, 420-21, 378 N.W.2d 502, 505 (1985) (excluding); see State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240-42 (Mo.1984) (rape trauma syndrome evidence inadmissible to prove rape occurred); [J. Myers, Child Witness Law and Practice ] § 4.16; Comment, Syndrome Testimony in Child Abuse Prosecutions: The Wave of the Future?, 8 St. Louis U.Pub.L.Rev. 207, 218 (1989); Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in Cases Involving the Sexual Misuse of a Child, 42 U-Miami L.Rev. 1033, 1048-50 (1988); McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 Or.L.Rev. 19, 41 (1987)." 775 P.2d at 400.

.In footnote 10 of Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 401, these authorities were given:
"The views of a number of these scholars are set out at length in McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 77 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 1, 18-24 (1986) [hereinafter McCord, 77 J.Crim.L. & Criminology]; Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 Geo.LJ. 429, 440-43 (1985) [hereinafter Georgetown Note]; and in J. Myers, Child Witness Law and Practice § 4.15, at 151-52 & n. 107 (1987) [hereinafter Myers]. See also Golding, [Mental Health Professionals and the Courts: The Ethics of Expertise ], [_Int’l J.L. Psychiatry note 6, at 32 n. 8 [(1989)] ('Currently, absent certain strong physical signs (e.g. presence of venereal disease or blatant vaginal or anal trauma), there are no scientifically acceptable scientific data on "sexual abuse profiles” based upon psychological data.’)”

. In both Clawson and Woodall, we emphasized that even where the reliability of the test is generally recognized, it must also be shown that the test was conducted in a proper manner by a qualified expert. See Syllabus Point 3, State v. Woodall, supra; State v. Clawson, 165 W.Va. at 620, 270 S.E.2d at 677-78.

. Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Smith states:
"The language of Rule 804(b)(5) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and its counterpart in Rule 803(24) requires that five general factors must be met in order for hearsay evidence to be admissible under the rules. First and most important is the trustworthiness of the statement, which must be equivalent to the trustworthiness underlying the specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. Second, the statement must be offered to prove a material fact. Third, the statement must be shown to be more probative on the issue for which it is offered than any other evidence the proponent can reasonably procure. Fourth, admission of the statement must comport with the general purpose of the rules of *669evidence and the interest of justice. Fifth, adequate notice of the statement must be afforded the other party to provide that party a fair opportunity to meet the evidence."

. We have the same provisions in our Rule 801(d) which provides that certain out-of-court statements are not hearsay. W.Va.R.Evid. 801(d) provides:
"(d) Statements Which are not Hearsay. — A statement is not hearsay if—
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. — The de-clarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. — The statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."

. For the full text of W.Va.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(C), see note 21, supra.

.The court reasoned in Clanton, 539 So.2d at 1028, as follows:
“These statements were hearsay. Ordinarily, under prerules decisions, they would have been inadmissible even if Clanton had testified, as an attempt to bolster his testimony. ... This has been carried over into the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Rule 613 recognizes that prior inconsistent statements may be used for impeachment purposes, but prior consistent statements cannot be used to bolster a witness.... And, when a witness testifies, prior consistent statements are likewise inadmissible, except in rare and special circumstances, none of which are present here.” (Citations omitted.)

. The Court's remarks in Mitchell were: "[On remand], it will be incumbent upon the trial judge from the court proceeding before him to first determine and find that the hearsay testimony is not otherwise admissible under M.R.E. 803, but could qualify under 803(24).” 539 So.2d at 1371. (Citations omitted).

. From a technical standpoint, the trial court's finding that the child victim was incapable of testifying rendered the witness unavailable. In these circumstances, W.Va.R.Evid. 804(b)(5) would come into play. Both this rule and W.Va.R.Evid. 803(24), however, are identical as to the criteria that have to be met.

. The child's story, as related by the mother, was:
“[H]e opened up and said daddy had put his georgie in his butt and it hurt, and daddy had put his finger in his butt and it hurt, daddy had played with my georgie, meaning [E.L.j's georgie, until daddy’s georgie peed white, I’m tryin to get on a five year level to see if there was any, maybe oral sex, so I asked him, well [E.L.], did at any time did daddy put his mouth on your georgie, and he said but mommy, I told him not to with that brown stuff in his mouth, well, Ed used snuff, and he cried, at this point, I lost it, my only concern at that time was my God, my son needs help.”

. Part of the problem with admitting such statements from adults is that their testimony about what the child victim told them is usually much more elaborate them the victim is able to actually testify about. This is demonstrated by the record in this case where both children answered most of the questions with either yes or no.

. Syllabus Point 5 of the majority opinion states:
"The two-part test set for admitting hearsay statements pursuant to W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4) is (1) the declarant’s motive in making the statements must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment, and (2) the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied upon by a physician in treatment or diagnosis."

. The full text of W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4) is:
"The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
******
“(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or adas. inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”

. Syllabus Point 8 of Sutherland states:
“It is a well recognized exception to the hearsay rule that a doctor who examines a patient for the purpose of treatment may testify as to his medical conclusions, which may be based on the history given to him by the patient with regard to subjective symptoms.”

. Syllabus Point 9 of Sutherland states:
"Where an examination by a doctor is not made within the doctor-patient relationship for the purpose of treatment but made solely for the purpose of using the doctor as a witness, the exception to the hearsay rule, that a doctor who examines a patient for purpose of treatment may testify as to his medical conclusions based on the history given to him by the patient with regard to subjective symptoms, disappears.”

. The Advisory Committee notes to Fed.R.Evid. 803(4) state in material part:
"Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not within its guar*674antee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify. While these statements were not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the basis of his opinion, including statements of this kind. The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries. The rule accordingly rejects the limitation. This position is consistent with the provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which expert testimony is based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in the field.”

. The courts’ confusion in this area is discussed in R. Mosteller, supra at 274 n. 68:
“The error committed here of joining the two requirements is a relatively common one with courts, arising typically from the same mistake in two highly influential opinions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 [101 S.Ct. 1709, 68 L.Ed.2d 203] (1981), and United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985). See, e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 949-50 (4th Cir.1988).”

. Mr. Trainor’s testimony was:
"[I]nitially, I, when, when we had a, when I had my first contact with the case, much of the story had been told to a, to a family friend and it was repeated to me by, by Mrs. [L.]. When we first got started, [E.L.] had a great deal of trouble talking about it, one thing that commonly happens in sexual abuse cases is after a disclosure, there is a suppression phase[.]”

. The questioning was as follows:
"Q ... you made another, other statements to the officer in the course of the investigation, do you want to maintain now that everything you said in that report is accurate and true?
“A Yes, I haven’t lied to nobody.
"Q Would you recall making a statement with respect to a dog?
"A Yes, I did.
"Q Uh-huh is that statement true?
"A I didn’t see it, that’s what my son told me.
"Q Wait a minute, you told the officer and I quote, ‘she also indicated that he had sex with the poodle terrier in front of [E.L.] at some point in time,’ is that statement true or false?
"A I stated that [E.L.] had told me that his daddy had let the dog, which was a poodle, her name was Mitzi, ride his georgie, and if he told mommy he would let the dog eat [E.L.]’s georgie off, I did not see that myself.
"Q Uh-huh, how old was this dog?
"A Maybe a year and a half, two years old.
"Q Uh-huh, how big is it?
“A I haven’t seen it, he’s got it.
"Q Well, he had it when you lived in the house together, didn’t you?
"A Oh, yeah, at that time, she was about this long, maybe stood about that high, (at this time, the witness showed the approximate length and height of the dog by showing with her hands).
"Q What sex was the dog?
"A Female.
"Q You sit there and you, you relay this statement that you, it’s physically impossible for that to happen, isn’t it?
“A I don’t know, I wasn’t there, I was just tellin you what my son told me.”

. The exchange from the record is as follows:
"Q [I]n the course of your discussions with Mr. Trainor, as in your discussions with the police officer, you made a number of statements regarding your, your husband’s sexual behavior, and at one point, you stated that he pulled vasectomy stitches.
"A I had company that came from the Auxiliary ... there visiting me and the children, we were sitting there talking and Ed hollered to ask if I could come in the bathroom with him, and when I did, he showed me where the stitches had been pulled loose, what am I supposed to do, I said I guess you’ll have to go back up to the emergency room, you’ve pulled 'em loose, so he did, I think [a neighbor] went and got him and brought him home, and he said that Dr. Khurana had prescribed a couple prescriptions so that there wouldn't be any infections, and I made the comment that it’s not gonna do a world of good if you didn’t have handcuffs on the bottom of the prescription because it came from playing with himself.”
"Q Now, are you going to maintain that that was the truth as seen by your own eyes?
"A I’ve seen him sit and pat the front of his pants more times than I would even want to try to estimate the amounts of time.”

. The full text of Syllabus Point 21 of Thomas states:
“Where a counsel’s performance, attacked as ineffective, arises from occurrences involving strategy, tactics and arguable courses of action, his conduct will be deemed effectively assistive of his client’s interests, unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted in the defense of an accused.”