Court Opinion

ID: 6470801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-26 14:15:42.325351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:53:48.193610
License: Public Domain

OMAN, Chief Justice, dissenting. I feel compelled to dissent from the majority opinion in this case, because I cannot agree that the facts support a finding of custody in Kilpatrick with the permission of Rodriquez, the named insured. The facts are that Kilpatrick did cosign a note with his son-in-law, Rodriquez, and this note was given as evidence of and to secure payment of at least a part of the purchase price of the automobile. Rodriquez left the automobile parked at the apartment he and his wife occupied, and not with Kilpatrick. As shown by the majority opinion, Kilpatrick did not know that Rodriquez had left until he had visited the apartment. It was then he found the automobile parked there. Kilpatrick did nothing to assert control over the vehicle. He had no key thereto and could not drive it away. He made no effort to otherwise remove the vehicle to his place or any other place for safekeeping, and he took no measures to exercise control over or to secure the safekeeping of the vehicle. He went back to the apartment about a week later and found the vehicle still sitting there. Again he did nothing to exercise control over or to secure the safekeeping of the vehicle. On his third visit, which was five or six days later, the vehicle had disappeared. It is true he testified he took custody of the automobile, but I can find no action on his part which would in any way so indicate. Surely the taking of custody of property under the circumstances here present requires more than the mere formation of an intent. There was not the slightest effort to exercise control over or to effect safekeeping of the vehicle. Kilpatrick saw it sitting there and left it sitting there with nothing more, except his claimed intent to take custody. - Likewise, I cannot agree that Rodriquez gave permission to Kilpatrick to take custody. Rodriquez obviously took the key to the vehicle with him — or at least he did not offer- or give it to Kilpatrick — and he left the vehicle at his apartment without knowledge on the part of Kilpatrick that he, Rodriquez, had left and was leaving the vehicle parked at the apartment. The majority rely upon implied consent. They do so on the ground that Rodriquez did not object. To what could he object? The most Kilpatrick had done was to see the vehicle parked at Rodriquez’ apartment on two occasions and, according to him, had decided to take custody. There is nothing to even suggest that Rodriquez knew Kilpatrick had seen the vehicle so parked on the two occasions or had formed the intent to take custody. Even if Rodriquez had known, what was there to which he could object or which would even suggest the need for objection? The fact that Kilpatrick had cosigned the note, cannot, in my opinion, in any way be construed as implying permission on the part of Rodriquez for Kilpatrick to take custody of the automobile. Rodriquez did absolutely nothing from which his consent to give custody of the automobile to Kilpatrick could be implied. The terms “custody” and “permission” must be given their ordinary meaning, because they are not ambiguous terms and are not used ambiguously in the policy of insurance. King v. Travelers Insurance Company, 84 N.M. 550, 505 P.2d 1226 (1973). For the plain and ordinary meaning of custody, see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 559 (3d ed. 1961). For the plain and ordinary meaning of permission, see Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1683 (3d ed. 1961). Because I can find no custody, and certainly no custody with permission, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.