Court Opinion

ID: 9394110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 14:04:56.68688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:58.402111
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 5, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-0698-MR

JAMES HARRIS                                                       APPELLANT

                         APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
v.                       HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE
                              ACTION NO. 14-CR-00199-003

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, James Harris, appeals from an Order of the Laurel

Circuit Court denying his RCr1 11.42 motion to vacate his judgment of conviction

following an evidentiary hearing. After our review, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
             The underlying facts are set forth in the direct appeal, Harris v.

Commonwealth, No. 2015-SC-000688-MR, 2016 WL 7665871 (Ky. Dec. 15,

2016), as follows in relevant part:

                   Stephen [a pseudonym for the victim] was five or
             six years old when his mother and stepfather first took
             him to James Harris’s home, where a course of sexual
             conduct would commence during the ensuing four years.

                    ....

                    Harris, [Stephen’s mother, and stepfather] were all
             indicted. [Stephen’s mother and stepfather] were charged
             with multiple counts of human trafficking, in addition to
             first-degree complicity to sodomy. Harris was indicted
             on several counts of first-degree sodomy.

                     At trial, the Commonwealth offered testimony
             from Elvis Proffitt -- an inmate who shared a cell with
             Harris. After Proffitt’s attorney contacted law
             enforcement, Proffitt agreed to wear a wire, and recorded
             a conversation with Harris. In the conversation: Harris
             referred to Stephen by name; he confirmed that [the
             stepfather] would trade Stephen for drugs; that [the
             stepfather] would “shoot them up” and then they
             [Stephen and Harris] “would fuck.” Proffitt admitted at
             trial that he received assistance from the Commonwealth
             in his pending cases for agreeing to help, but denied any
             undue influence in obtaining Harris’s confession.

                    Harris contended at trial that Proffitt had drugged
             him and coerced him into making the incriminating
             statements and continued to deny the allegations levied
             against him. The jury ultimately convicted [Harris] on
             two counts of first-degree sodomy and sentenced him to
             fifty years’ imprisonment.

                                         -2-
Id. at *1-2. Harris appealed and contended that the trial court erred in allowing

testimony about his cross-dressing and by allowing the Commonwealth to

introduce evidence of charges of co-defendants, whose prosecution was severed

from his. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.

                On January 29, 2019, Harris, pro se, filed a motion to vacate his

sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleging ineffectiveness of counsel. The circuit

court2 granted Harris’s request for an evidentiary hearing and appointed counsel.

Appointed counsel subsequently filed a supplemental motion to vacate. On

February 18, 2020, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Defense

trial counsel, Harris’s sister, the DPA3 investigator, and Harris all testified.

           The Circuit Court’s Order Denying Harris’s RCr 11.42 Motion

                By Order entered on August 25, 2021, the circuit court denied

Harris’s motion as follows:

                Movant claims that Hon. Cotha Hudson did not perform
                adequately as counsel. Movant brings forth seven (7)
                arguments as to why he was denied adequate counsel.
                These arguments include: (1) counsel failed to properly
                advise Movant during plea negotiations; (2) counsel
                failed to investigate and present witnesses in support of
                Movant’s defense; (3) counsel failed to attempt to
                neutralize the prejudicial effect of Movant’s cross-

2
  References to the “circuit court” refer to the Laurel Circuit Court when it ruled on Harris’s
RCr 11.42 motion. References to the “trial court” refer to the Laurel Circuit Court prior to the
filing of said motion.

3
    Department of Public Advocacy.

                                               -3-
                 dressing; (4) counsel failed to object to mentioning of
                 severed co-defendants’ charges at trial; and (5) counsel
                 failed to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct
                 during closing arguments; (6) counsel was unprepared for
                 the penalty phase of trial; and (7) the cumulative effect of
                 counsel’s errors rendered Movant’s proceedings
                 fundamentally unfair.

                 The circuit court discussed the applicable law; i.e., that an RCr 11.42

movant has the burden of satisfying the two-pronged Strickland4 standard requiring

that he show that defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective measure

of reasonableness and that counsel’s errors prejudiced the outcome of the trial.

There is a strong presumption that counsel was effective and that the challenged

conduct may be sound trial strategy. The circuit court then addressed each of

Harris’s claims as follows:

      1. Failure to properly advise during plea negotiations

                 The circuit court found Attorney Hudson’s testimony to be credible

and concluded that she acted competently in advising Harris of the plea offer.5

      2. Failure to investigate and present witnesses in defense

                 The circuit court found no deficiency in Attorney Hudson’s

investigating and calling witnesses in Harris’s defense. The court explained that it

is duty of a lawyer to promptly investigate the circumstances of a case and attempt

4
    Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

5
    Harris appears to have abandoned this issue on appeal.

                                                 -4-
to find relevant facts, citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387, 125 S. Ct. 2456,

2466, 162 L. Ed. 2d 360 (2005). The circuit court noted that the DPA had assigned

an investigator to assist defense counsel with the case. The circuit court found that

Attorney Hudson investigated the victim’s siblings and determined that they were

of no assistance. It also found that Attorney Hudson considered calling the co-

defendants. However, their case was still pending, and their attorney advised that

if called as witnesses, they would invoke the privilege not to testify. She also

interviewed Harris’s brother, who offered no helpful information and made it clear

that he wanted no part of the trial. The court concluded that Attorney Hudson

performed her essential functions and acted reasonably.

   3. Failure to neutralize prejudicial effect of movant’s cross-dressing

             Harris alleged four separate instances where Attorney Hudson was

ineffective by failing to neutralize any prejudicial effect of his cross-dressing:

             a. Voir Dire: Harris claimed that Attorney Hudson did not adequately

or effectively question the panel during voir dire. The circuit court explained that

Attorney Hudson had advised the jury that the Commonwealth would introduce

evidence that Harris was a cross-dresser. She then asked if that would cause a

juror to decide that Harris was guilty -- even if the Commonwealth failed to prove

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. None of the jurors raised a hand in response. At

the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Hudson testified that she did not go into further

                                          -5-
detail because she thought it would only emphasize the issue and inflame the jury

against Harris. The circuit court concluded that the record and testimony at the

hearing showed that Attorney Hudson “consciously and intentionally considered

how to address the cross-dressing issue . . . [and] fulfilled her duty by asking the

question referred to above, and her decision to delve no further into the matter was

sound trial strategy.”

                b. Failure to object to improper testimony: Harris claimed that he

was unduly prejudiced when Attorney Hudson failed to object to Detective Allen’s

testimony regarding Harris’s cross-dressing and failed to preserve the issue for

appeal. The circuit court concluded that this claim lacked merit. Attorney Hudson

had preserved the issue in a pretrial motion in limine, which the trial court denied.

The issue was raised on direct appeal, and the Supreme Court determined that the

evidence was admissible under KRE6 404(b)(1) to establish Harris’s identity; i.e.,

the victim remembered that the man who assaulted him was wearing a sundress.

The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court committed no error in allowing

the testimony and affirmed. Consequently, the circuit court determined Attorney

Hudson did not act deficiently by failing to object to it.

                c. Failure to retain a mental health expert: Harris claimed that

Attorney Hudson should have retained a mental health expert in order to discredit

6
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                          -6-
any theory that cross-dressing was related to pedophilia. The circuit court

explained that the issue “was unsupported by sufficient details to enable . . . the

court to properly address it[,]” and it was not raised by Harris at the evidentiary

hearing.

              d. Failure to request a limiting instruction: Harris claimed that

Attorney Hudson was ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction on the

cross-dressing testimony. The circuit court disagreed and concluded that defense

counsel’s “strategy throughout the trial was to avoid inflaming the jury with a lot

of discussion about [Harris’s] cross-dressing. Therefore, it is reasonable that she

would not want the issue to be brought up again in the form of an instruction.”

4. Failure to object to mention of charges of severed co-defendants

              Harris’s cellmate, Elvis Proffitt, testified against Harris at trial.

Proffitt had worn a wire to obtain Harris’s confession, which was played for the

jury. During Proffitt’s testimony, he referenced the charges against the severed co-

defendants.7 Attorney Hudson did not object to this testimony at trial. On direct

appeal, the Supreme Court had reviewed the admissibility of the testimony under

the palpable error standard and concluded that any error was harmless.8 The circuit

7
 As the Commonwealth notes, Harris was charged in the same indictment as the victim’s mother
and stepfather, but his case was severed from that of his co-defendants.
8
 The Supreme Court explained it was “certain” that the alleged error would not have affected the
outcome below. There was ample testimony at Harris’s trial that in exchange for narcotics, the
co-defendants drugged their son “so Harris could forcibly have his way with him. . . . We are

                                              -7-
court agreed “that the statement did not prejudice Mr. Harris,” concluding that the

prejudice prong of Strickland was not satisfied.

5. Failure to object to alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument

               Next, the circuit court addressed issues which Harris raised regarding

the Commonwealth’s closing argument: that a PowerPoint presentation listed a

wrong charge on one of the slides; that the word “Guilty” appeared next to the

charges; and that the Commonwealth had made the statement, “What this

defendant did to him is one of the worst things I’ve heard in my life.” Harris

claimed that Attorney Hudson should have objected to the PowerPoint and the

statement.

               The court noted that it had instructed the jury at the beginning of trial

that opening and closing statements are not and shall not be considered as

evidence. The circuit court explained that the PowerPoint slides were merely

visual aids, that they were not admitted into evidence, and that the Commonwealth

informed the jury that a wrong charge was listed on the presentation. The court

concluded that “[n]othing in the PowerPoint in any way affected the outcome of

the proceeding.” Although, the court found the Commonwealth’s statement more

concerning, it noted that it was isolated and that the jury had been instructed not to

confident that [Proffitt’s] testimony in no way undermined the integrity or fairness of Harris’s
trial.” Harris, 2016 WL 7665871, at *4.

                                                -8-
consider closing arguments as evidence. The court concluded that Harris had

failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland because he failed to demonstrate

that the outcome of the trial would have been different if Attorney Hudson had

objected.

6. Failure to prepare for the penalty phase of trial

             Harris also argued that defense counsel was unprepared for the

penalty phase of trial and should have done more to find and call witnesses. The

circuit court concluded that Attorney Hudson acted adequately in preparing for the

penalty phase. Attorney Hudson testified at the evidentiary hearing that Harris’s

school records could not be located due to their age. There were no Social

Security records because Harris was not a recipient. She had considered calling

Harris’s mother, but she was too ill. Attorney Hudson had already spoken to

Harris’s brother, and it would have been futile to call him. She wanted to call

Harris’s ex-wife, but she could not locate her. Attorney Hudson also considered

calling a jail worker, but she decided against it because drugs were present in

Harris’s cell. She did not want the jury to believe that the drugs were Harris’s.

The circuit court concluded that Attorney Hudson “was simply unable to locate or

produce any evidence or testimony that would have assisted [Harris] in the penalty

phase. Further, it cannot be ignored that the crimes [Harris] committed were

                                         -9-
abhorrent, so it was not at all unreasonable for the jury to recommend the

maximum penalty.”

7. Cumulative error

      The circuit concluded that there was no cumulative error.

                                    This Appeal

            On August 31, 2021, Harris filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court.

            We evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims
            under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
            466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984),
            adopted by this Court in Gall v. Commonwealth, 702
            S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985). Under the Strickland framework,
            an appellant must first show that counsel’s performance
            was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct.
            2052. A “deficient performance” contains errors “so
            serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
            guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.
            Second, the appellant must show that counsel’s deficient
            performance prejudiced his defense at trial. Id. “This
            requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as
            to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
            is reliable.” Id. An appellant must satisfy both elements
            of the Strickland test in order to merit relief. Id.

                    When faced with an ineffective assistance of
            counsel claim in an RCr 11.42 appeal, a reviewing court
            first presumes that counsel’s performance was
            reasonable. Commonwealth v. Bussell, 226 S.W.3d 96,
            103 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Haight v. Commonwealth, 41
            S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001) overruled on other grounds
            by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.
            2009)). We must analyze counsel’s overall performance
            and the totality of circumstances therein in order to
            determine if the challenged conduct can overcome the
            strong presumption that counsel’s performance was

                                        -10-
              reasonable. Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 441-42. In addition,
              the trial court’s factual findings and determinations of
              witness credibility are granted deference by the
              reviewing court. Id. Finally, we apply the de novo
              standard when reviewing counsel’s performance under
              Strickland. Bussell, 226 S.W.3d at 100.

Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Ky. 2016).

                            Harris’s Arguments on Appeal9

                 I.     Failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct

              Harris first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument -- specifically to the

PowerPoint presentation with the incorrect charge and the statement that what

Harris did to the victim “was one of the worst things I’ve heard in my life.” The

circuit court concluded that Harris had failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of

Strickland because he failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the trial would

have been different had Attorney Hudson objected. We agree. As the

Commonwealth notes, the evidence against Harris was overwhelming. The victim

testified against Harris -- as did Harris’s cellmate, and Harris’s taped confession

was played for the jury.

9
 Harris raises eight arguments on appeal. In his Statement of Points and Authorities, Harris
numbered the Standard of Review on Appeal as Argument “I” and his first actual argument as
“II.” We address Harris’s arguments in the order presented and have renumbered them
accordingly.

                                             -11-
 II.   Failure to investigate, prepare for, and present any mitigating evidence
                          during the penalty phase of the trial

             Next, Harris argues that defense counsel was ineffective because she

failed to call any witnesses or to present any mitigating evidence on Harris’s behalf

during the penalty phase of the trial. As amply set forth above, the circuit court

detailed Attorney Hudson’s efforts to locate records as well as her efforts at

searching for and investigating witnesses.

             However, Harris submits that his sister, who testified at the

evidentiary hearing, would have been able to testify about Harris’s life and his

dedication to their mother. He claimed that his employer could have testified

about his work ethic. Harris omits the fact that his sister also testified that she

knew about his cross-dressing and that she suspected his involvement with drugs --

issues which defense counsel strategically wanted to avoid. Moreover, Harris did

not know if his employer was aware of his cross-dressing.

             The circuit court carefully analyzed these contentions and concluded

that counsel acted in an adequate manner. It noted that she was “simply unable to

locate or produce any evidence or testimony that would have assisted [Harris] in

the penalty phase.”

             We have reviewed the recorded proceeding of the evidentiary hearing.

The trial court’s factual findings have a substantial evidentiary foundation.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the circuit court that

                                          -12-
Attorney Hudson’s performance was not deficient. We wholly agree as well that it

cannot “be ignored that the crimes [Harris] committed were abhorrent, so it was

not at all unreasonable for the jury to recommend the maximum penalty.”

III.   Failure to neutralize prejudicial effect of Harris’s cross-dressing

             Harris again raises four instances where he contends Attorney Hudson

was deficient. With respect to voir dire and the failure to request a limiting

instruction, we agree with the circuit court that both were matters of sound trial

strategy: that defense counsel did not want to inflame the jury by having a lot of

discussion about cross-dressing. “Trial strategy will not be second guessed in an

RCr 11.42 proceeding.” Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 473 (Ky.

2003), overruled on other grounds by Leonard, 279 S.W.3d 151.

             Harris contends that he was prejudiced by Attorney Hudson’s failure

to object to Detective Allen’s testimony regarding cross-dressing. However, on

direct appeal, our Supreme Court clearly determined that the evidence was

admissible. “An RCr 11.42 motion is limited to the issues that were not and could

not be raised on direct appeal.” Teague v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.3d 630, 633

(Ky. App. 2014). We agree with the circuit court that this argument lacks merit

and that defense counsel was not deficient in failing to object.

                                         -13-
                 Harris’s argument in regard to the fourth instance -- the failure to

retain a mental health expert -- is completely undeveloped. Therefore, we decline

to address it.

                       IV.    Failure to conduct adequate voir dire

                 Harris argues that Attorney Hudson did not adequately elicit

information to determine which -- if any -- members of the panel had biases that

would render them incapable of being impartial. The trial court did not

specifically address this issue in its August 25, 2021, Order. RCr 11.42(6)

provides in relevant part that:

                 At the conclusion of the hearing or hearings, the court
                 shall make findings determinative of the material issues
                 of fact and enter a final order accordingly. . . . A final
                 order shall not be reversed or remanded because of the
                 failure of the court to make a finding of fact on an issue
                 essential to the order unless such failure is brought to the
                 attention of the court by a written request for a finding
                 on that issue or by a motion pursuant to Civil Rule
                 52.02.

(Emphasis added.)

                 Harris did not file a post-judgment request for additional findings.

Thus, the issue is not properly before us.

                 It is fundamental that a party who asserts a claim must
                 prove that claim to the satisfaction of the trier of fact, and
                 on failure of the fact-finder to rule on the contention, the
                 pleading party must seek a ruling from the trial court by
                 means of a request for additional findings of fact.

                                             -14-
Vinson v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465, 471 (Ky. 2004).

     V. Failure to object to mention of the severed co-defendants’ charges

             Harris contends that counsel was deficient in failing to object to Elvis

Proffitt’s testimony referencing the severed co-defendants’ charges. As noted

above, the Supreme Court reviewed Proffitt’s testimony on direct appeal under the

palpable error standard and concluded that any error was harmless. Harris is

correct that “a failure to prevail on a palpable error claim does not obviate a proper

ineffective assistance claim.” Leonard, 279 S.W.3d at 158 (quoting Martin v.

Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006)). However, the circuit court did not

hold that the decision in Harris’s direct appeal constituted a procedural bar on this

issue. Rather, the circuit court determined that Harris had failed to satisfy the

prejudice prong of Strickland. On appeal, Harris contends that “[c]ounsel’s failure

to object was deficient, and this deficiency prejudiced [Harris]. Absent this

deficiency, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome either at trial or

on appeal.” The argument is conclusory at best. Strickland requires

“demonstrable prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 S.W.3d 843, 846 (Ky.

2014). In light of the overwhelming evidence against him, we agree with the

circuit court that Harris failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland on this

issue.

                                         -15-
 VI. Failure to investigate and present witnesses to support Harris’s defense

            Harris contends that there were witnesses who should have been

called or at least interviewed for the defense. Among them was the jail employee

to whom Harris reported finding drugs in his jail cell. Harris selectively quotes

from Attorney Hudson’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing and contends that

she should have called him. However, on cross-examination, Attorney Hudson

clarified that the drug thing “goes both ways.” At the time of trial, it was her

strategy not to get involved in a drug issue: “that would make the jury think oh if

he’s a drug user, and he cross-dresses, of course he sodomizes little boys.” The

trial court found that Attorney Hudson “had considered calling a worker from the

jail . . . . However, she decided that this would not be a good course of action as

there were drugs present in Harrris’ [sic] cell and she not want the jury to believe

they were his and make assumptions about his character.”

            Harris also contends that his sister also could have testified during the

guilt phase about her observations because she lived on the property and could see

Harris’s dwelling from her residence. As the Commonwealth notes, the sister’s

testimony -- as brought out on cross-examination -- would “likely have been more

harmful that helpful” and would have bolstered the victim’s testimony. The sister

admitted seeing the victim’s “parents” visiting with Harris -- during which time

                                        -16-
the victim’s younger siblings were locked outside unsupervised. However, she

did not see the victim and had no knowledge of what had gone on behind closed

doors.

            At the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Hudson testified that Harris’s

brother did not want to testify and that he did not have any relevant information.

Furthermore, she noted that the brother had recently been released from federal

prison and had state charges. His drug use would have been an issue as well. The

circuit court found that Attorney Hudson had interviewed Harris’s brother, who

offered no helpful information and who made it clear that he wanted no part of the

trial.

            Harris also contends that two of his cellmates wrote letters on Harris’s

behalf. Harris submits that “[a]t trial, they would have testified that [Harris] and

Elvis [Proffitt] were in the medical cell together, and that when [Harris] returned

to his cell from medical, he was shaken up and terrified of Elvis.” Appellant’s

brief contains no citation to the record to support this contention. Neither cellmate

testified at the evidentiary hearing.

            Harris also raises an issue regarding the failure to call the victim’s

younger siblings as witnesses. Attorney Hudson testified that she met with the

younger siblings, that they had never been in the room where “this” occurred, and

that “it” had never happened to them. They had no relevant information or

                                        -17-
personal knowledge. The circuit court found that Attorney Hudson had

investigated the victim’s siblings and determined that they were of no assistance.

             Harris wraps up this argument by stating, “But for counsel’s failure to

investigate, interview, and subpoena relevant witnesses, there would have been a

different outcome in [Harris’s] case.”

             The trial court’s findings have a substantial evidentiary foundation,

and we defer to them. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree

with the trial court that Attorney Hudson performed her essential functions and

acted reasonably. We further conclude that Harris has failed to satisfy the

prejudice prong of Strickland on this issue.

 VII. Failure to establish and maintain a positive attorney client relationship

             The circuit court did not address this issue. Thus, it is not properly

before us for the same reasons discussed above. RCr 11.42(6). Vinson, supra.

                              VIII. Cumulative error

             We are not persuaded of any cumulative error. As our Supreme Court

stated in Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010), “we have

declined to hold that the absence of prejudice plus the absence of prejudice

somehow adds up to prejudice.”

             We affirm the thorough and well reasoned Order of the Laurel Circuit

Court.

                                         -18-
          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:              BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jacquelyn “Jaye” Bryant-Hayes     Daniel Cameron
Lagrange, Kentucky                Attorney General of Kentucky

                                  Stephanie L. McKeehan
                                  Assistant Attorney General
                                  Frankfort, Kentucky

                                -19-