Court Opinion

ID: 9461339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:11:47.35014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:00.451396
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
This appeal asks us to interpret the Act of August 4, 1947, ch. 458, 61 Stat. 731. Concededly, the Act is no model of clarity. Whether it requires the appropriate Oklahoma county court, acting in an exclusive delegated statutory capacity,1 to divine the grantor’s “consent,” or whether it requires that court to determine whether the conveyance was for adequate consideration and thus not a product of overreaching, is unclear. And neither the legislative history nor the case law, sparse as it is, provides much assistance. Nevertheless, whether such doubt be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor or not, I cannot conclude that it is necessary to the preservation of plaintiff’s rights that her motion for a preliminary injunction be granted. If, under the Act, the grantor’s objection — made for whatever reason, or for no reason, and made at any time — is sufficient cause to require the Oklahoma court to refuse to approve the conveyance, then the plaintiff’s remedy in that court is complete and no reason for the preliminary injunction appears. If, on the other hand, the Act requires that the Oklahoma court investigate the objective equities of the conveyance — rather than the subjective state of mind of the grantor — , then, again, no reason appears for the preliminary injunction, for no irreparable *526injury could result lest we hold that such injury could occur from the performance by the Oklahoma court of its duties under the Act. That I am unwilling to do, and I must therefore respectfully dissent.

. The Act of August 4, 1947, ch. 458, § 1(b), 61 Stat. 732, provides, in part, that “[proceedings for approval of conveyances by restricted heirs or devisees under this section shall not be removable to the Federal court