Court Opinion

ID: 9883640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:04:37.775959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:16.664972
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Judge,
concurring.
Appellant, Bobbie Gainer Grant, was charged by information with the misdemean- or of evading arrest. Tex. Penal Code § 38.04.1 Appellant never objected to the in*26formation nor did he file a motion to quash. At trial, Officer Lawson testified and identified himself as “Lieutenant Craig Lawson.” Other officers testified at trial and referred to him as “Lieutenant Lawson;” attorneys for the State and for appellant addressed him as “Officer Lawson” and continually referred to him as “Officer Lawson.” The jury charge referred to him as “Officer Lawson.” Because I believe there was a variance between the name of the complainant, Lawson, as stated in the information, and his true name, but that said variance was not fatal, I concur with the opinion of the Court.
At trial appellant moved for a directed verdict. Appellant argued in his motion there was a fatal variance between the State’s evidence and the allegations in the charging instrument because
the State charges in its information, that defendant did flee from a peace officer identified as “Officer Lawson.” The evidence introduced by the State establishes “Officer” is not the State witness’ Christian name but is nothing more than an appellation which describes or characterizes the person named in the information as the peace office whom defendant has been accused of evading.
The trial court denied appellant’s motion, and the jury found appellant guilty as charged in the information. Appellant’s punishment was assessed at 180 days confinement in the county jail and a fine of $300, probated for one year.
In his appeal before the court of appeals, appellant renewed his contention the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State alleged but failed to prove, the complainant’s first name was “Officer.” The Court of Appeals reversed appellant’s conviction and entered an order of acquittal, in a published opinion. Grant v. State, 944 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, 1997) (Stover, J., dissenting).
The court of appeals, citing Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 21.07, held that the use of the complaining witness’ correct surname only is insufficient under the statute [article 21.07].2 It also rejected the State’s contention that identifying the complaining witness by his correct last name with an identifying title, i.e., “Officer,” is sufficient to comply with article 21.07, citing Stewart v. State, 31 Tex.Crim. 153, 19 S.W. 908 (1892) and Johnson v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 457, 140 S.W. 337, 339 (1911). The court of appeals, finding no evidence in the record Lieutenant Craig Lawson was commonly known as “Officer Lawson,” further held there was no issue of any variance as to the complainant’s name for the jury to resolve guided by proper instructions. See Blankenship v. State, 785 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Therefore, the court of appeals concluded there was a fatal variance between the complainant’s name stated in the information and evidence of his name introduced at trial.
We granted the State’s petition-for discretionary review to consider the sole ground for review raised therein:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to prove the complainant’s given name was “Officer.”
I note initially that article 1.14(b) provides:
If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or in any post-conviction proceeding.
Since the enactment of article 1.14 in 1985, this Court has construed its provisions strictly. We have held, however, that article 1.14 does not apply to a charging instrument that does not qualify as such because it fails to *27charge a “person” with an “offense.” Cook v. State, 902 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (indictment failed to charge a named person with an offense); Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (written instrument is an indictment or information under the Constitution if it accuses someone of a crime \yith enough clarity and sufficiency to identify the penal statute under which the State intends to prosecute, even if the instrument is otherwise defective) Duron, at 550-51, citing Cook, supra, at 483 (Maloney, J., concurring).
The above cases hold that the article 1.14(b) requirement to raise an objection to defects in a charging instrument before trial applies to all defects except those that are of constitutional magnitude under Texas Constitution, Article I, Section 10 and Article V, Section 12. Such defects must be of a magnitude to disqualify a charging instrument as being such under our constitution.
Turning to the present case, there is no doubt that the charging instrument meets constitutional standards: it names a person (appellant) and charges him specifically with an offense (evading arrest) described in the penal code. Appellant does not claim the charging instrument fails to contain information sufficient to enable him to prepare his defense. Assuming, arguendo, the information is defective for failing to identify the complainant by his proper first name, appellant’s failure to object to such defect prior to commencement of trial forecloses him from raising it on appeal.
Furthermore, the variance between complainant’s name as stated in the information and his true name is not the “fatal” variance contemplated by article 21.07. First, there is no doubt that “Officer Lawson” and “Lieutenant Craig Lawson” are the same person. There was no evidence at trial that either the State or appellant were surprised or misled as to the complainant’s identity; appellant fails to show the variance prejudiced him in any way. See Stevens v. State, 891 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Blankenship v. State, supra, at 159-160. To find that, under these facts and circumstances, article 21.07 mandates reversal of appellant’s conviction and sentence would be an absurd result not intended by the legislature. See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).3
With these comments, I concur with the opinion of the Court.

. The relevant part of the information read:
[T]hen and there unlawfully and intentionally flee from Officer Lawson, a peace officer who Bobbie *26Grant knew to be a peace officer, who was lawfully attempting to arrest or detain Bobbie Grant.

. Article 21.07 provides:
In alleging the name of the defendant, or of any other person necessary to be stated in the indictment, it shall be sufficient to state one or more of the initials of the Christian name and the surname. When a person is known by two or more names, it shall be sufficient to state either name. When the name of the person is unknown to the grand jury, that fact shall be stated, and if it be the accused, a reasonably accurate description of him shall be given in the indictment.

. A different result might occur where the evidence at trial clearly establishes the complainant was a different person than that named in the indictment. Assuming the article 1.14 requirement of timely objecting to such a variance is not applicable, defendant may well be entitled to reversal of his conviction on appeal due to legal and factual insufficiency of the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).