Court Opinion

ID: 9543102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:42:11.47362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:39.859201
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County denying a petition to terminate spousal support. We reverse.
*521Thomas McKeown (husband) and Robin McKeown (wife) were married in 1980 and separated in 1987. There were no children born of the marriage. Divorce proceedings commenced in 1987. Wife sought spousal support while the divorce was pending. Subsequently, the trial court ordered husband to pay spousal support to wife. The spousal support order was modified on February 6, 1990. The modification required husband to pay his wife $100.00 per week for spousal support, to maintain his wife’s medical insurance, and to pay the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on both residences the parties owned.
On September 6, 1990, the trial court entered a final decree in divorce, divorcing the parties from the bonds of matrimony and distributing the property under an order of equitable distribution. Husband appealed the equitable distribution order.
Pending resolution of the appeal, husband petitioned the trial court to terminate his spousal support payments effective the date of the divorce decree. The trial court denied husband’s petition to terminate spousal support stating:
AND NOW this 13th day of May, 1991, upon consideration of the rationale of the Superior Court expressed in Ritter v. Ritter, 359 Pa.Super. 12, 518 A.2d 319 (1986) that “spousal support and alimony pendente lite are indistinguishable in the context of the divorce action” and the holding of the Court in Ponthus v. Ponthus, 70 Pa.Super. 39 (1918) and it appearing that the Defendant has not complied with the prior Order of this Court for equitable distribution and has not sought a supersedeas of said Order, the Petition of Defendant Thomas G. McKeown for termination of spousal support and the Rule heretofore issued thereon are dismissed.
Thereupon, husband filed this timely appeal. Husband now presents one issue for our consideration: did the trial court err in refusing to terminate the order of spousal support as of the date of the parties’ divorce?
In reviewing spousal support orders, this court may not disturb the decision of the trial court unless there has been *522a clear abuse of discretion. Remick v. Remick, 310 Pa.Super. 23, 456 A.2d 163 (1983). An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in judgment. Discretion is abused only when the law is misapplied or overridden or the judgment exércised is manifestly unreasonable. Lesko v. Lesko, 392 Pa.Super. 240, 242, 572 A.2d 780, 782 (1990) (citations omitted).
Husband claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition to terminate spousal support because the duty to provide spousal support ceases when the marriage is dissolved. In support of its denial of the petition to terminate spousal support at the time of the divorce decree, the trial court correctly quoted Ritter, supra. The Ritter court stated, “(s)pousal support and alimony pendente lite are indistinguishable in the context of a divorce action.” 359 Pa.Super. at 16, 518 A.2d at 321 (1986). However, a year later in Levine v. Levine, 360 Pa.Super. 297, 520 A.2d 466 (1987), this court explained:
Ritter, however, is limited to the procedural issue of the appealability of an order for spousal support where the wife requested either spousal support or alimony pendente lite in her answer to the husband’s divorce complaint for support or alimony pendente lite, (citations omitted.)
Levine, 360 Pa.Super. at 302, 520 A.2d at 468. The present case is an appeal from an order dismissing the exceptions of both parties to a master’s report and ordering husband to pay spousal support. Thus, this case is distinguishable from Ritter.
The trial court also cites Ponthus v. Ponthus, 70 Pa.Super. 39 (1918), which has lost its relevance due to the enactment of the Divorce Code of 1980.1 Prior to the Divorce Code, the divorce decree itself was appealed. The Divorce Code now allows parties to agree to the entry of a no-fault divorce. Generally, in a bifurcated divorce, it is not the divorce itself which is contested, but the economic issues.
*523A dependent spouse may receive both spousal support and alimony pendente lite. Although both awards are temporary in nature, spousal support and alimony pendente lite are separate and distinct creations of the law. Krakovsky v. Krakovsky, 400 Pa.Super. 260, 583 A.2d 485 (1990). Spousal support provides living expenses for a dependent spouse prior to the resolution of the divorce. Levine, supra; Fexa v. Fexa, 396 Pa.Super. 481, 578 A.2d 1314 (1990). The duty to pay spousal support stems from the marital relationship itself and terminates upon the dissolution of the marriage. Levine, supra; Fexa, supra. On the other hand, alimony pendente lite is awarded for the period between the entry of the divorce decree and the distribution of the marital property. The purpose of alimony pendente lite is to preserve economic equality between the parties pending the resolution of equitable division, thereby allowing the dependent spouse to maintain or defend the divorce action. Krakovsky, supra.
Upon entry of a divorce decree, a trial court may convert a spousal support order into an alimony pendente lite order. Because a conversion from spousal support to alimony pendente lite is not merely a formal change but a substantive alteration, it is not automatic and the party seeking alimony pendente lite must specifically apply for it. Krakovsky, supra; Levine, supra. When a party applies for alimony pendente lite, the trial court must determine whether or not a spouse is entitled to this type of award. In making its determination, the trial court must understand that the circumstances of the parties are subject to change throughout the dissolution of the marriage and the accompanying property division and, therefore, take this into consideration. Levine, supra.
Here, wife did not apply for alimony pendente lite and, therefore, the trial court never had the opportunity to consider whether there were any changes in the parties’ circumstances. Thus, the trial court never made the requisite determination as to whether wife was entitled to alimony pendente lite. Levine, supra. Accordingly, we find that *524the trial court misapplied the law and thereby abused its discretion when it ordered husband to pay spousal support after termination of the marriage. Lesko, supra; Remick, supra. Wife failed to apply to have the award of spousal support converted into alimony pendente lite. The parties are now divorced and husband’s obligation to provide spousal support is terminated. We, therefore, reverse the trial court order denying husband’s petition to terminate spousal support.
Order reversed.
DEL SOLE, J., files a dissenting opinion.

. Act of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63, No. 26, 23 P.S. § 101 et seq. (repealed); Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1240, No. 206, 23 Pa.C.S. § 3101 et seq.