Court Opinion

ID: 9930064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 00:09:22.762894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:58:16.790443
License: Public Domain

02/05/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                                 October 3, 2023 Session

               STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BOBBY MARABLE II

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Gibson County
                       No. 19568 Clayburn L. Peeples, Judge

                             No. W2022-01591-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Bobby Marable II, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury
of aggravated kidnapping involving bodily injury, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault
by strangulation, a Class C felony, for which he is serving an effective thirty-five year
sentence. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-304(a)(4) (2018) (aggravated kidnapping involving bodily
injury), 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2015) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault
involving strangulation or attempted strangulation), -(e)(1)(A)(ii) (classifying aggravated
assault involving strangulation as a Class C felony). On appeal, he contends that: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated kidnapping conviction, (2) the trial court
erred in its jury instructions on aggravated kidnapping, (3) the court erred in allowing the
State to impeach the Defendant with his prior convictions under Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 609, (4) he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of the court’s errors,
and (5) the court erred in classifying him as a Range III, persistent offender for his
aggravated assault conviction. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions and the trial court’s
judgment for aggravated kidnapping, and we remand the case with instructions for the trial
court to correct the Defendant’s aggravated assault judgment to reflect a ten-year sentence
as a Range II, multiple offender.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed,
               Case Remanded for Entry of Corrected Judgment

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
MCMULLEN, P.J., and J. ROSS DYER, J., joined.

Rachele Scott Gibson (on appeal), District Public Defender; Kendal Stivers Jones (on
appeal), Assistant Public Defender – Appellate Division; and Daniel J. Taylor (at trial),
Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bobby Marable II.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Frederick H. Agee, District Attorney General; Scott Kirk, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

       The Defendant’s convictions relate to an incident in the late evening of May 9 and
the early morning of May 10, 2016, in which he went to the victim’s Milan home, choked
her until she was unconscious, and took her while still unconscious to his Humboldt home,
where he choked, spit on, and slapped her. The Defendant would not let the victim leave,
but she escaped after several hours. The Defendant and the victim had been dating for
about one month but had recently stopped seeing each other. Because the relevant events
occurred in two jurisdictions, the present case relates to crimes which occurred within the
jurisdiction of the Twenty-Eighth Judicial District, which includes Milan.

       At the trial, Milan Police Officer Lee Geyra testified that the victim came to the
police department around 9:00 p.m. on May 10, 2016 to report an incident of domestic
violence which began at her home around midnight of the previous evening. He
photographed her injuries. The photographs were received as an exhibit and depict
bruising on the victim’s legs and neck and a red spot on her eye. Officer Geyra noted that
the victim’s voice was raspy. Based upon the victim’s report of a criminal incident, he
obtained an arrest warrant charging the Defendant, whom he identified in the courtroom.

        Officer Geyra identified an aerial photograph of the Defendant’s mobile home
neighborhood, and the photograph was received as an exhibit and showed homes closely
situated to one another. Officer Geyra said that he did not go to the neighborhood to search
for evidence, that he did not search the Defendant’s car, and that no witnesses “c[a]me
forward” to report a kidnapping. Officer Geyra agreed that the victim reported “she had
left the area where the Defendant was” around 7:05 a.m.

       Kristin Newberry testified that she had lived in the Defendant’s neighborhood on
May 10, 2016. She said that a “really anxious and nervous” woman came to her home
between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. on May 10 and that, after speaking with the woman, Ms.
Newberry allowed the woman, whom she recognized from a local business, inside for a
few minutes. Indicating the Defendant in the courtroom, Ms. Newberry said “[t]hat man”
knocked on her door and asked if she had seen “a lady.” She said that the Defendant was
“nervous acting, jittery” and that she recognized the Defendant as her neighbor who lived
“right behind” her. Ms. Newberry said the victim had been behind the front door and out
of the Defendant’s view and that she did not tell the Defendant that the victim was there
because the victim seemed scared. Ms. Newberry said that after the Defendant left, she
drove the victim to the victim’s home in Milan and that they stopped at the victim’s
workplace for the victim to obtain money, which the victim gave to Ms. Newberry.

                                            -2-
        When shown aerial photographs of the Defendant’s and her neighborhood, Ms.
Newberry agreed that the homes were in close proximity and that the Defendant’s home
was “[v]ery close” to the one in which she lived at the time of the incident. She said that
not all of the homes were occupied.

         The victim testified that she and the Defendant were “starting to date” around May
10, 2016. The victim testified that she had been at her home in Milan, Gibson County,
earlier in the day of the incident and that he had been there when she left to visit her mother
and sister. She said that when she returned around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m., the Defendant was
still there. She said her adult son was not home. The victim said the Defendant came from
the home to her car immediately and that she did not have an opportunity to enter the home.
She said that he “snatched [her] up” as soon as she opened her car door and choked her.
She said he thought that she had been out with her “ex” and that he “snatched” her out of
her car as soon as she opened her door and choked her until she was unconscious. She
denied that he asked her for clothing he had left at her home. She denied that she wanted
to “go get into his . . . truck” and that she told him she “wanted to go somewhere and talk.”
The victim said that she did not know how she ended up in the Defendant’s truck and that
when she regained consciousness, she lay on the Defendant’s lap in his truck. She said she
had not gotten into the truck voluntarily and that she did not know how she got inside it.
When asked if the Defendant had asked her to get out of the truck and if she had scuffled
with the Defendant inside the truck, she responded, “I was passed out.”

        The victim testified that after midnight, they arrived at a home in Humboldt which
the Defendant identified as his. She said that when they arrived, the Defendant told her
that if she did not get out of the truck, he would choke her again. She said he “attempted
to choke [her] again,” spit in her face, and slapped her. She said he called her profane and
derogatory names. She said she went into the Defendant’s home, where a woman she had
never seen was present.

        The victim testified that the woman asked the Defendant who the victim was and
why the victim was there, that the Defendant did not answer, that the victim asked the
woman who she was, and that the woman identified herself as the Defendant’s fiancée.
The victim said that when the Defendant stepped outside at a time she did not specify, she
asked the woman who was present if she could help the victim get “out of there.” The
victim said the woman replied that the Defendant “wouldn’t let her.” The victim said she
did not have her cell phone. The victim said that at some point, the woman and the
Defendant went into another room. The victim acknowledged that she did not leave when
they went into the other room. She said the Defendant did not stay in the other room and,
“He kept pacing back and forth.” She acknowledged that she fell asleep for several hours
in the living room and that she had “a beer” earlier in the day.

                                             -3-
       The victim testified that she remained in the Defendant’s home for “[o]ver four
hours” because the Defendant would not let her leave. She said the Defendant and the
woman fell asleep around 4:00 a.m., that the victim fell asleep till about 7:00 a.m., when
she woke after 7:00 a.m. and left the home with her keys, which she had seen the Defendant
place on the kitchen counter. The victim said she went to a nearby house and spoke to a
neighbor, who allowed the victim to come inside.

       The victim testified that while she was in the neighbor’s home, the Defendant came
to the home looking for the victim. The victim said she hid behind the door until the
Defendant left. She said the neighbor readied the neighbor’s children for school and that
the neighbor, the children, and the victim left together in the neighbor’s car. The victim
said she lay in the car seat in order not to be seen. The victim said that after the woman
dropped off the children at school, they went to the victim’s workplace, where the victim
obtained cash to give to the woman for driving the victim home. The victim said that the
woman took her home and that the victim debated whether to alert the authorities, which
she eventually did after being encouraged by others. She acknowledged that she was home
for several hours and that she went to work before going to the police.

        The victim testified that she went directly to the Humboldt Police Department after
work. She later said she went during her meal break around 5:00 p.m. She said she had
gone to report the incident but was told she had to report it to Milan authorities and agreed
it had been within twenty-four hours of the incident. She said she went to the Milan Police
Department and met with Milan Officers Geyra and Alexander. The victim identified
photographs of her injuries, which she described as leg, arm, and neck bruises; a broken
blood vessel in her eye; and scratches on her neck. She acknowledged that she had not
sought medical treatment but said she should have.

       The Defendant testified that he had known the victim for about four weeks in May
2016. He said he sometimes visited in her home and went to her mother’s home on
Mother’s Day and the next day. He claimed that he had stopped seeing the victim at a point
he did not identify and explained that he had been in a relationship with another woman.
He said that two days after Mother’s Day, the victim wanted to resume their relationship
and that the alternative was for her to tell the Defendant’s “old lady” that the Defendant
had been to the victim’s home and had clothing stored there. The Defendant said that he
told the victim, who was at work, that he needed to retrieve his clothing and that, pursuant
to her instructions, he went to her home to get the clothing. The Defendant said that the
victim wanted him to remain at her home to talk to her after she returned from work.

       The Defendant testified that he was coming out of the victim’s home when she
arrived from work. He said the victim’s son was inside the home. The Defendant said he
and the victim went inside to talk in the kitchen. He said that he told her that he did not
want to see her anymore and that he felt bad for the “woman at home.” The Defendant

                                            -4-
testified that when he began leaving, the victim hit the back of his head with a broom
handle. He said that the victim followed him to his truck and that she got inside, insisting
that they talk. He said that he told her to get out of the truck and that she responded by
kicking him. He said the victim put her arms behind the passenger and driver’s seat, sat
on the console, a foot on the dashboard control panel, and a foot on the sunroof. He said
she damaged the dashboard control panel and the sunroof. He said he did not like being
around the victim when she had been drinking because she became violent.

        The Defendant denied choking or strangling the victim before she got into the truck.
He said he did not touch the victim and that the only physical contact they had was when
she kicked him while inside the truck. The Defendant said he told the victim he needed to
get gas and that she was “under the influence . . . from Milan to Humboldt” and that she
fell asleep in the truck. He said he had not forced the victim into his truck and that he did
not “kidnap her in any way from her neighborhood.”

       The Defendant testified that he went to the Humboldt home he shared with his
fiancée, “Queen,” who looked upset when he arrived. The Defendant said he told the
victim to get out of the truck and that he declined her request for permission to sleep in his
truck. He said that he went inside and that the victim entered the home voluntarily about
ten minutes later. He said that he sat on the floor by the door and that Queen and the victim
sat on the couch talking until he and Queen went to bed less than one hour later, leaving
the victim in the living room on the couch. The Defendant said that he did not force the
victim to stay in the home overnight and that he did not restrain her or lock the door to
keep her in the home. He denied taking the victim’s keys.

       The Defendant testified that he did not sleep and that he went to the living room to
see where the victim went after he heard the door open the next morning. He said that he
went to his neighbor’s house and inquired if the victim were there and that the neighbor
said the victim was not present. He said he went home but later went to the victim’s home
to drop off a laptop she had loaned him. He said that before he went to the victim’s home,
he had seen the victim leave with his neighbor. He said he had not tried to stop the victim
and the neighbor when they left.

       The Defendant testified that he had no intent to kidnap the victim or to commit an
aggravated assault of her. He denied choking the victim. When asked if the victim “just
choked herself out,” the Defendant responded, “Either she did or she had some help.” He
acknowledged that he had three prior felony convictions. He agreed that he had been
convicted of sexual battery by an authority figure and was unsure if he had one or two
convictions for violating the sexual offender registry. Documents reflecting the
Defendant’s two convictions for violating the sexual offender registry were received as
exhibits.

                                             -5-
       The trial court took judicial notice of the facts that in 2016, Mother’s Day fell on
Sunday, May 8; that May 9 was a Monday; and that May 10 was a Tuesday. The court
informed the jury of these facts. The Defendant was then asked on redirect to identify the
day on which the victim got into his truck and responded that it had been the day after
Mother’s Day. He denied that he had pulled the victim from his truck and forced her to go
into his house. He said that he told her she could not sleep in his truck and that she “just
came in” the home about ten minutes after he entered the home.

       After receiving the evidence, the jury found the Defendant guilty of the charged
offenses of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault. At the sentencing hearing, the
trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twenty years at 100% for aggravated
kidnapping and fifteen years as a Range III, persistent offender for aggravated assault. The
court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. This appeal followed.

                                             I

                               Sufficiency of the Evidence

        The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated
kidnapping conviction. He argues that the victim’s injuries did not result from a removal
or confinement of her from her property and were, instead, the result of the aggravated
assault that occurred before he kidnapped the victim. The State counters that the evidence
is sufficient. We agree with the State.

        In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521
(Tenn. 2007). The State is “afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all
reasonable inferences” from that evidence. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 521. The appellate
courts do not “reweigh or reevaluate the evidence,” and questions regarding “the credibility
of witnesses [and] the weight and value to be given the evidence . . . are resolved by the
trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); see State v. Sheffield, 676
S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984).

       “A crime may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a
combination of the two.” State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998); see State v.
Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005). “The standard of review ‘is the same whether
the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331
S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn.
2009)).

                                            -6-
       As relevant here, “[a]ggravated kidnapping is false imprisonment . . . committed . .
. [w]here the victim suffers bodily injury[.]” T.C.A. § 39-13-304(a)(4) (2018). “A person
commits the offense of false imprisonment who knowingly removes or confines another
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other’s liberty.” Id. § 39-13-302(a)
(2018). “‘Bodily injury’ includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, and
physical pain or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ,
or mental faculty[.]” Id. § 39-11-106(a)(2) (2014) (subsequently amended).

       The Defendant argues that the injuries the victim suffered from the choking incident
at her home provide the facts for the aggravated assault conviction, which was complete
before the Defendant undertook to kidnap her. The Defendant argues, as well, that the
victim sustained no injuries from the slap and attempted choking which occurred at the
Defendant’s home. Thus, the Defendant theorizes, the “removal and confinement did not
cause [the victim’s] bodily injuries” and cannot support a conviction for aggravated
kidnapping. He acknowledges that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for
kidnapping or false imprisonment, both lesser included offenses of aggravated kidnapping.

        We reject the Defendant’s argument for two reasons. First, the facts do not support
the Defendant’s contention that the victim had no injuries other than those attendant to the
initial choking. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence demonstrates
that the victim came home to find the Defendant outside her home. He approached her car,
forcibly removed her from it, and choked her to unconsciousness. When she regained
consciousness, she was in the Defendant’s truck. He took her to his home, threatened and
attempted to choke her again, made her go inside his home, and would not let the victim
leave.

        The victim’s injuries, which were documented by photographs and eyewitness
accounts, included bruises on her neck, arms, and legs. She also had a bloodshot eye and
a raspy voice. The Defendant argues, in part, that the victim had no injuries other than
those from the initial choking at the victim’s home. Although the neck bruising and the
bloodshot eye are consistent with choking, the victim also had bruises on her legs and arms.
Bruises constitute bodily injury. Id. The Defendant has not explained how, when the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the arm and leg bruises should
be attributed to choking. The arm and leg bruises constitute bodily injury which is separate
from and in addition to the evidence which formed the basis for the conviction for
aggravated assault via choking. See State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012)
(requiring a jury to determine, after being properly instructed, “whether the removal or
confinement [required for a kidnapping] is, in essence, incidental to the accompanying
felony or, in the alternative, is significant enough, standing alone, to support a conviction”).
The evidence shows, as well, that the Defendant removed the victim from outside her home
and took her against her will to his home, thereby substantially interfering with her liberty.

                                              -7-
        Second, we have considered the Defendant’s argument that the aggravated assault
was a temporally separate event which was completed before the Defendant undertook to
kidnap the victim. The Defendant argues that the language of the aggravated kidnapping
statute requires that bodily injury must result from the removal or confinement. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the Defendant’s
argument must fail. The evidence shows that the Defendant was upset because he thought
the victim, whom he had been seeing romantically and whom had just arrived at her home,
had been with her “ex.” The Defendant approached the victim, pulled her from her car,
and choked her to unconsciousness. When the victim regained consciousness, she was in
the Defendant’s truck, and he took her to his home and made her go inside with threats of
more choking. He sat by the home’s door and paced in the living room, and the victim was
unable to leave until the Defendant eventually went to another room. The evidence
supports a conclusion that the Defendant choked the victim in order to subdue her in
furtherance of his effort to remove her from outside her home and transport her to his home,
where he confined her against her will. As we have stated, the victim suffered bodily injury
in addition to the choking, elevating the offense to aggravated kidnapping. Although the
Defendant argues in his reply brief that the State is foreclosed from basing its argument on
appeal on the bruising on the victim’s arms and legs as constituting the bodily injury for
aggravated kidnapping because the State did not make this argument to the jury, we note
that the jury was the trier of fact and was entitled to consider all of the evidence presented
and make relevant factual findings as to the existence of the elements of the offense. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 521.

      The evidence is sufficient to support the aggravated kidnapping conviction, and the
Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

                                             II

                      Jury Instructions – Aggravated Kidnapping

        The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on modes of
committing aggravated kidnapping which were not alleged in the indictment. The
Defendant acknowledges that the issue was not raised contemporaneously but urges this
court to grant him a new trial as a matter of plain error relief. The State responds that the
issue is waived and that the Defendant cannot establish a basis for plain error relief. We
agree with the State.

       A trial court in a criminal case is required to give “a complete charge of the law
applicable to the facts of the case[.]” State v. Thompson, 519 S.W.2d 789, 792
(Tenn.1975). “[T]he defendant has a right to have every issue of fact raised by the evidence
and material to his defense submitted to the jury upon proper instructions by the judge.”

                                             -8-
Id. The right is constitutional in nature. State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 291
(Tenn. 2002).

       As the State has noted and the Defendant concedes, no objection to the instruction
was raised in the trial court. Plenary review of this issue is waived. See T.R.A.P. 3(e),
36(a); State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. 2005). Relief is foreclosed unless
granted as a matter of plain error. In order for an appellate court to grant plain error relief,

       (a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a
       clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial
       right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused did
       not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is
       “necessary to do substantial justice.”

State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); see State v. Smith, 24
S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000). All five factors must be shown. Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 283.
“[C]omplete consideration of all the factors is not necessary when it is clear from the record
that at least one of the factors cannot be established.” Id. In order for this court to reverse
the judgment of a trial court, the error must be “of such a great magnitude that it probably
changed the outcome of the trial.” Id.; Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 642.

       As relevant here, the indictment charged that the Defendant “did unlawfully and
knowingly remove or confine [the victim] so as to interfere substantially with [her] liberty
and [she] suffered bodily injury, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-304(a)(4).” The trial court
instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:

       For you to find the defendant guilty of [aggravated kidnapping], the State
       must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following
       essential elements:

             (1) That the defendant knowingly removed or confined another person
       unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other’s liberty; and

               That the defendant did so with the intent to inflict serious bodily injury
       or terrorize the alleged victim; or

              That the alleged victim suffered bodily injury; or

            That the defendant possessed or threatened the use of a deadly
       weapon.

                                              -9-
The court also instructed the jury:

       Now unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged victim’s
       removal or confinement exceeded that which was necessary to accomplish
       the alleged Aggravated Assault by Strangulation and was not essentially
       incidental to it, you must find the defendant not guilty of Aggravated
       Kidnapping.

See generally White, 362 S.W.3d 559.

       The Defendant argues that the instruction misled the jury because it expanded the
bases upon which the jury might convict him of aggravated kidnapping. He posits that the
jury must have found him guilty of the offense based upon one of the modes of the offense
enumerated in the instruction but not specified in the indictment, given the alleged
deficiency of proof of bodily injury in addition to that relied upon by the State to establish
aggravated assault by strangulation, and that this demonstrates the prejudice he suffered as
a result of the instruction. He argues that the five elements required for plain error relief
have been shown.

       The State counters that the Defendant is not entitled to relief as a matter of plain
error because he cannot demonstrate that consideration of the alleged error is necessary in
order to do substantial justice. See Adkisson, 899 S.W.3d at 641-42. The State argues that
evidence at the trial focused on the victim’s bodily injury and did not include proof that the
Defendant possessed a deadly weapon or that he intended to terrorize the victim. Thus, the
State posits that the jury necessarily convicted the Defendant based upon the victim’s
suffering bodily injury as a result of the kidnapping, the mode of the offense charged in the
indictment.

        In his reply brief, the Defendant argues that the definition of “terrorized” included
in the jury instructions permitted the jury to find the Defendant guilty if the kidnapping
involved the Defendant’s “us[ing] or threaten[ing] violence to intimidate or cause panic.”
See T.P.I.—Crim. 8.02 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). He points to proof
that after the Defendant and the victim arrived outside his home, he slapped her, spit on
her, and threatened to choke her again if she did not go inside.

        Turning to the Adkisson factors, the record clearly establishes what occurred in the
trial court. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42. We will consider the remaining factors.

       The record reflects that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached. See id.;
see also State v. Bowman, 327 S.W.3d 69, 94 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009) (“[W]hen a statute
contains different ways to commit the offense it proscribes, the instruction given to the jury
should be limited to the precise offense alleged in the charging instrument to the exclusion

                                            -10-
of the remaining theories.”) (citing State v. Wayne E. Mitchell, No. 01C01-9209-CR-
00295, 1993 WL 65844, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 1993)).

       Turning to whether a substantial right of the Defendant was adversely affected, we
note that a criminal defendant has a right to a complete and accurate charge of the law.
See, e.g., State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Tenn. 2016); Adkission, 899 S.W.2d at
641-42. This right emanates from the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 6 of the Tennessee
Constitution. Howard, 504 S.W.3d at 270. Because the charge given by the trial court was
inaccurate, a substantial right of the Defendant was adversely affected.

       Notwithstanding the Defendant’s failure to raise this issue in the trial court, the
record does not reflect that he waived it for tactical reasons. See Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at
641-42. This prong of the Adkisson test is met.

        Finally, we consider whether “consideration of the error is ‘necessary to do
substantial justice.’” See id. The jury was instructed both on the mode of aggravated
kidnapping charged in the indictment and on two additional modes that were not charged
in the indictment. As we concluded in section I, the evidence was sufficient to support the
Defendant’s conviction of aggravated kidnapping in which the victim suffered bodily
injury. Relative to the two modes of the offense erroneously included in the jury
instructions, the Defendant notes, first, that the State offered no proof the Defendant
possessed a deadly weapon during the kidnapping. He also argues that the proof of his
intent to terrorize the victim is shown by his assaulting her outside his home during the
kidnapping. We view this argument as strained, at best. The evidence of the Defendant’s
physical assault of the victim outside his home falls short of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that he kidnapped her with the intent to terrorize her. Despite the erroneous
instruction, we cannot conclude that the jury convicted the Defendant of a mode of the
offense for which the Defendant did not receive notice in the indictment. Therefore, we
cannot conclude “the error is so significant that it ‘probably changed the outcome of the
trial.’” See State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 808 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Smith, 24 S.W.3d
at 282-83); State v. Jay W. Edwards, No. E2019-02176-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2554217,
at *17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 18, 2021) (holding that plain error relief was not required
where jury was instructed on modes of the offense both charged and uncharged in the
indictment and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction as to the mode
charged, and distinguishing cases in which only an uncharged mode of the offense was
included in the jury instructions), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2021); cf. State v.
Warren Smith, No. W2019-01882-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 4246798, at *7 (Tenn. Crim.
App. July 28, 2020) (holding that plain error relief was necessary where the jury was not
instructed on the mode of the offense charged in the indictment but was instructed on a
separate mode which was not charged), reh’g denied (Aug. 17, 2020). But see State v.
Michael Smith, No. W2011-01630-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 3702369, at *7-8 (Tenn. Crim.

                                           -11-
App. July 12, 2013) (granting relief as a matter of plain error where the trial court included
in the jury instructions modes of the offense both charged and uncharged in the indictment).

        Because the Defendant has not established that all five of the Adkisson factors exist,
he is not entitled to plain error relief based upon the trial court’s erroneous jury instructions.

                                               III

                           Impeachment with Prior Convictions

        The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach
the Defendant with his prior convictions under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609. He argues
that the probative value of impeachment with his prior convictions for sexual battery by an
authority figure and multiple violations of the sex offender registry law did not outweigh
their unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues. The State responds that the
Defendant waived consideration of the issue by failing to raise it in the motion for a new
trial and that, in any event, he is not entitled to relief as a matter of plain error. The
Defendant responds that he is entitled to plain error relief. We agree with the State that the
issue was waived and that the Defendant has not established that he is entitled to plain error
relief.

       Before the Defendant began his case-in-chief, defense counsel requested a hearing
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609 regarding the State’s ability to impeach the
Defendant with the prior convictions. The defense argued that the prejudice from evidence
of the sexual offender registry violation convictions outweighed their probative value
because the present case “involves alleged accusations of violence against a lady.” The
State argued that the prior conviction offenses were not similar because the present case
did not involve allegations of a sexual offense. The trial court ruled that the State could
impeach the Defendant with the sexual battery by an authority figure conviction and with
two of the violating the sexual offender registry convictions.

       Thereafter, the Defendant acknowledged on direct examination that he had “three
prior felony convictions,” and on cross-examination, the State inquired about the
Defendant’s recollection regarding the specific conviction offenses. Although the
Defendant claimed to remember only one conviction for violating the sexual offender
registry, he stated that the conviction arose after he failed “to report to them that [he] was
working at a job.” In its final instructions, the court told the jury that their consideration
of the prior convictions was limited to the convictions’ effect on the Defendant’s
credibility.

       Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609 permits the use of previous convictions to impeach
a witness’s credibility so long as the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment of

                                              -12-
more than one year or the crime involved dishonesty or false statements. Tenn. R. Evid.
609(a)(2). Impeachment evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 609(a) “is limited to the fact
of a former conviction and that the crime was committed.” State v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d
33, 35 (Tenn. 1999). Previous convictions cannot be admitted as evidence to show a
defendant’s propensity to commit the charged offense, regardless of whether witness
credibility is a central issue at a trial. See Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). In determining the
admissibility of a defendant’s previous conviction pursuant to Rule 609, a trial court must
make findings relative to whether the conviction’s probative value on the Defendant’s
credibility outweighs the unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues raised during
the trial. State v. Thompson, 36 S.W.3d 102, 109 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000); see State v.
Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 674 (Tenn. 1999). Therefore, a trial court “must analyze the
relevance the impeaching conviction has to the issue of credibility,” “explain [the
relevance] on the record,” and “assess the similarity between the crime on trial and the
crime underlying the impeaching conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see State v. Waller, 118 S.W.3d 368 (Tenn. 2003); Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee
Law of Evidence § 6.09[10][c] (6th ed. 2011). “If the court makes a final determination
that such proof is admissible for impeachment purposes, the accused need not actually
testify at the trial to later challenge the propriety of the determination.” Tenn. R. Evid.
609(a)(3).

       Relative to credibility, violent crimes “might reflect on the moral character of a
witness and therefore are not without probative value on credibility.” Cohen, § 6.09[10][c];
see State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (stating “felonies of a
violent nature reflect on the moral character of a witness . . . [, and] this evidence is not
usually without probative value”). However, “the link between [violent] crime and
truthfulness is, at best, weak and the potential prejudice is significant.” Cohen, §
6.09[10][c]; see State v. Barnard, 899 S.W.2d 617, 621-23 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Long
v. State, 607 S.W.2d 482, 485-86 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (stating crimes involving
assaultive conduct might result from causes that have “little or no direct bearing on honesty
or veracity”).

        As the State correctly notes, the Defendant did not raise the Rule 609 issue in the
motion for a new trial. See T.R.A.P. 3(e). Plenary review is waived, and our consideration
is limited to one for plain error. Id.; Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42.

        Turning to the Adkission factors, we conclude that the record clearly establishes
what occurred in the trial court and that the record does not reflect that the issue was waived
for tactical reasons. See Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42.

       Regarding the remaining factors, the record reflects that the trial court found that
the prior convictions and the conduct alleged in the present case were not substantially
similar. The court applied an incorrect standard, finding “that the probative value is not

                                             -13-
substantially outweighed by any prejudicial value.” Essentially, this is the balancing test
for Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. To repeat, the balancing test for Rule 609 requires
that the probative value of the evidence on the Defendant’s credibility outweigh the unfair
prejudicial effect on the substantive issues. See Thompson, 36 S.W.3d at 109 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2000); see also Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 674.

        Notwithstanding the court’s misapplication of the law, the record does not reflect
that the trial court violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law in admitting the evidence
pursuant to Rule 609. As the trial court correctly noted, the prior convictions and the crimes
on trial were not similar in nature, limiting concerns about the unfair prejudicial effect of
the evidence of the prior convictions on the substantive issues. The court instructed the
jury that its use of the evidence of the prior convictions was limited to issues involving the
Defendant’s credibility. A jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions. See, e.g.,
State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 293 (Tenn. 2014). We also cannot conclude that a
substantial right of the Defendant’s was adversely affected or that consideration of the error
is necessary to do substantial justice. See Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42; Dorman O’Neal
Elmore, Jr. v. State, No. E2005-02263-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 2482949, at *3 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2006) (“Rarely will plain error review extend to an evidentiary
issue.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2006).

        The Defendant has not established that plain error relief is required. He is not
entitled to relief on this basis.

                                              IV

                                     Cumulative Error

       The Defendant contends that he should receive a new trial due to the prejudice
accruing from the cumulative effect of the trial court’s jury instructions on aggravated
kidnapping and the evidentiary ruling on the prior convictions. The State responds that
cumulative error relief is not required. We agree with the State.

        The cumulative error doctrine requires relief when “multiple errors [are] committed
in the trial proceedings, each of which in isolation constitutes mere harmless error, but
which when aggregated, have a cumulative effect on the proceedings so great as to require
reversal in order to preserve a defendant's right to a fair trial.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d
1, 76-77 (Tenn. 2010) (internal citations omitted); see State v. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1, 79
(Tenn. 2010) (“‘[T]he combination of multiple errors may necessitate . . . reversal . . . even
if individual errors do not require relief.’”) (quoting State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 789
(Tenn. 1998)).

                                             -14-
       We have determined that no plain error exists as to either of the individual issues.
Upon consideration of the issues in question, we conclude that cumulative error relief is
not appropriate. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

                                             V

                                       Sentencing

       Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in classifying him as a
Range III, persistent offender for his aggravated assault conviction and that he should be
resentenced as a Range II offender. He argues that the State failed to prove that a prior
Georgia conviction qualified as a felony under Tennessee law and that without inclusion
of this conviction as a prior felony conviction, he qualified only as a Range II offender.
The State agrees that the court erred in imposing a Range III sentence and proposes that
this court impose a Range II, ten-year sentence. The Defendant responds that this court
should not resentence him to ten years and should, instead, remand the case to the trial
court for resentencing. We conclude that the parties are correct that the Defendant should
have been sentenced as a Range II offender, and we modify his aggravated assault sentence
length to ten years, the maximum Range II sentence for the offense.

A.     Range Classification

        The State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Enhanced Punishment which listed four
Tennessee felony convictions: Class D felony evading arrest, Class C felony sexual battery
by an authority figure, and two counts of Class E felony violating the sexual offender
registry. The presentence report, which was received at the sentencing hearing, listed four
Tennessee felony convictions and numerous additional misdemeanor convictions from
Tennessee and Georgia. Documents memorializing the Defendant’s February 6, 1997
guilty plea in Georgia for the offense of cruelty to children was received as an exhibit at
the hearing. A sentencing document included in the exhibit reflected that the Defendant
pleaded guilty and agreed to a three-year split confinement sentence, consisting of 180 days
in jail and the balance on probation.

       The State took the position at the sentencing hearing that the Defendant was a Range
II offender for the aggravated kidnapping conviction and a Range III offender for the
aggravated assault conviction. Relative to the Range III sentencing, the State relied upon
the four Tennessee felonies and the Georgia cruelty to children conviction. The trial court
asked defense counsel, “[D]o you agree with those ranges?” Defense counsel responded,
“Yes, sir.” The court proceeded to sentence the Defendant to twenty years at 100% for
aggravated kidnapping and to fifteen years as a Range III, persistent offender. The court
ordered that the sentences be served consecutively.

                                           -15-
       The Sentencing Reform Act defines Range II and Range III offenders as follows:

       (a) A multiple offender is a defendant who has received:

       (1) A minimum of two (2) but not more than four (4) prior felony convictions
           within the conviction class, a higher class, or within the next two (2)
           lower felony classes, where applicable; or

       (2) One (1) Class A prior felony conviction if the defendant’s conviction
       offense is a Class A or B felony.

T.C.A. § 40-35-106(A)(1)-(2) (2019) (subsequently amended).

       (a) A persistent offender is a defendant who has received:

       (1) Any combination of five (5) or more prior felony convictions within the
           conviction class or higher or within the next two (2) lower felony classes,
           where applicable; or

       (2) At least two (2) Class A or any combination of three (3) Class A or Class
           B felony convictions if the defendant's conviction offense is a Class A or
           B felony.

Id. § 40-35-107(a)(1)-(2) (2019) (subsequently amended). The State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant qualifies for enhanced range sentencing. Id. §§ 40-35-
106(c), -107(c).

       Despite the statutory requirement that the range classification be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, the State did not offer proof beyond the presentence report and the
Georgia documents, and the Defendant agreed to the sentencing range proposed by the
State. Against this backdrop, the trial court did not make specific findings related to the
proof of the Defendant’s range classifications for the respective offenses. In its brief, the
State says, “Though the State relied on a Georgia conviction to establish the necessary fifth
predicate felony [for Range III sentencing], that offense does not constitute a felony in
Tennessee.” Thus, we conclude that the State concedes it cannot establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Georgia offense is a felony which could be relied upon as a
predicate felony for Range III sentencing.

       The record reflects that the Defendant has four felony convictions that are “within
the conviction class, a higher class, or within the next two (2) lower felony classes” of his
Class C felony conviction for aggravated assault. See id. § 40-35-106(a)(1). He is a Range

                                            -16-
II offender. The trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range III offender for aggravated
assault, and the judgment must be corrected to reflect the correct range classification.

B.     Length of Aggravated Assault Sentence

        Because the Defendant was erroneously sentenced as a Range III offender, the trial
court utilized the wrong sentencing range in determining the length of the Defendant’s
sentence. See id. § 39-13-102(e)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2015) (subsequently amended)
(classifying aggravated assault involving strangulation as a Class C felony). Compare id.
§ 40-35-112(b)(3) (2019) (six-to-ten-year sentencing range for Range II offenders
convicted of a Class C felony) with id. § 40-35-112(c)(3) (ten-to-fifteen-year sentencing
range for Range III offenders convicted of a Class C felony). Thus, the length of his
sentence must be reconsidered.

       An appellate court is authorized to “[a]ffirm, reduce, vacate or set aside the sentence
imposed.” Id. § 40-35-401(c)(2) (2019). The Defendant does not contend that the trial
court erred in its application of enhancement factors or that it failed to apply mitigating
factors. Likewise, he does not quibble with the imposition of consecutive sentences. Thus,
the only issue to be resolved is the appropriate length of the Range II aggravated assault
conviction.

       A trial court must consider any evidence received at the trial and sentencing hearing,
the presentence report, the principles of sentencing, counsel’s arguments as to sentencing
alternatives, the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct, any mitigating or
statutory enhancement factors, statistical information provided by the Administrative
Office of the Courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee, any
statement that the defendant made on his own behalf, the potential for rehabilitation or
treatment, and the result of the validated risk and needs assessment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-103
(2019), -210 (2019); State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Moss, 727
S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tenn. 1986); State v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987));
see T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (2019).

        The record reflects that the trial court considered the relevant factors. It considered
the statutory enhancement and mitigating factors and made appropriate findings based
upon the evidence before it, after which the judge stated, “I’m having a hard time figuring
out why the maximum sentence wouldn’t apply in these cases, given the circumstances.”
The court then imposed the maximum sentence for each conviction. Based upon the court’s
determination that the Defendant should receive maximum sentences, we modify the length
of the Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction to the Range II maximum of ten years.
We acknowledge the Defendant’s argument that this court should remand the case for a
determination regarding the length of the aggravated assault sentence, but the record is
sufficient for this court to determine that the trial court’s intent was for the Defendant to

                                             -17-
receive a maximum sentence. Remand for further consideration of the sentence is neither
necessary nor would further the interests of judicial economy. See T.C.A. § 40-35-
401(c)(2).

       Finally, we note that the Defendant has not challenged the imposition of consecutive
sentencing and has conceded to this court that he qualified as “an offender whose record
of criminal activity is extensive.” See id. § 40-35-115(b)(2) (2019 (subsequently amended)
(permitting consecutive sentencing on this basis). The many prior convictions listed in the
presentence report, which span several pages, bear out this concession.

      The Defendant’s convictions are affirmed. The sentence for aggravated assault is
modified to ten years in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender, to be served
consecutively to the sentence for aggravated kidnapping.

                                            _____________________________________
                                             ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE

                                           -18-