Court Opinion

ID: 9949753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 15:18:49.597348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:35.797716
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                            MARCH 12, 2024
                                                      In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                     WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                             DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                            )      No. 39338-1-III
                                                )
                     Respondent,                )
                                                )
   v.                                           )      UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                                )
TIMOTHY LUCIOUS,                                )
                                                )
                     Appellant.                 )

        PENNELL, J. — In 2010, a jury convicted Timothy Lucious of one count of

drive-by shooting and six counts of second degree assault with a deadly weapon. In 2022,

Mr. Lucious filed a motion for postconviction DNA testing of ammunition evidence.

The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

                                    BACKGROUND

        The incident leading to Mr. Lucious’s criminal charges took place in July 2009

when a group of friends went out in Spokane for a birthday celebration. While out at a

bar—and then later at a house party—the friends ran into a woman previously unknown

to them who was confrontational and aggressive. The woman appeared to be an

acquaintance of Mr. Lucious. Eventually, one of the friends arranged to fight the woman

at a local park.
No. 39338-1-III
State v. Lucious

       When the group encountered the woman near the park, she was with several other

people, including Mr. Lucious. The fight began with a physical altercation but things

escalated when the woman wielded a razor blade and later a knife. At some point,

Mr. Lucious pulled out a handgun and waved it around. The friends got back in their

car to leave and Mr. Lucious tapped on the car window with his pistol. Mr. Lucious

asked the car’s occupants if they remembered him. Mr. Lucious also said, “‘Bitch,

I’ll shoot you’” to one of the friends. 2 Rep. of Proc. (Sept. 13, 2010) at 246, State v.

Lucious, No. 29545-1-III.

       The group started to flee, but soon discovered they had left two of their members

behind. As they turned around to retrieve their friends, gunshots rang out. At least one

of the group members was hit by a bullet and the group drove off to a hospital. One of

the friends was critically injured and required eight days of hospitalization.

       Police responded to the hospital and conducted interviews. Several of the group

members were shown a photo array and identified Mr. Lucious as the shooter. Law

enforcement investigated the scene of the shooting and recovered several 9-millimeter

shell casings. They did not find a firearm.

       Mr. Lucious was charged with six counts of attempted first degree murder and

one count of drive-by shooting.

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No. 39338-1-III
State v. Lucious

       At trial, the group members testified against Mr. Lucious. All identified

Mr. Lucious as their assailant with varying degrees of specificity. Some said they

observed him shoot the gun. Others merely testified that they saw Mr. Lucious wielding

the gun. Only one of the group members said they knew Mr. Lucious before the night of

the shooting. The defense impeached group members with evidence of intoxication and

prior false statements.

       The jury convicted Mr. Lucious of one count of drive-by shooting and six counts

of the lesser-included offense of second degree assault with a deadly weapon. He

received a sentence of life in prison as a persistent offender. The convictions were

affirmed on appeal. State v. Lucious, No. 29545-1-III, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App.

May 23, 2013) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/295451.pdf.

       In July 2022, Mr. Lucious filed a motion under RCW 10.73.170 for postconviction

DNA testing of the shell casings. In support of the motion, he submitted a declaration

from Carol Vo, a forensic scientist at the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory.

Ms. Vo declared that she had reviewed the incident report from Mr. Lucious’s case and

determined no prior DNA testing had been performed. According to Ms. Vo, the shell

casings recovered from the crime scene could have yielded DNA evidence pertaining to

the individual who had loaded the ammunition into the gun.

                                             3
No. 39338-1-III
State v. Lucious

       The State opposed Mr. Lucious’s motion. According to the State, even if testing

produced a result favorable to Mr. Lucious, it would merely mean that someone else had

handled the ammunition at some point in time. The State argued such a result would not

reasonably undermine the jury’s verdict.

       The trial court agreed with the State and denied Mr. Lucious’s motion. In a letter

ruling, the court explained:

       . . . [T]he Court is called upon to presume that another individual’s DNA
       would be found on the bullet casings and Mr. Lucious’s DNA would not.
       Mr. Lucious argues that whoever loaded the gun may be the individual
       responsible for firing the gun the night of the street brawl . . . . However,
       this theory is weakened by the fact that a gun can be loaded by one
       individual and fired by another. More compelling, even . . . assuming
       favorable DNA testing for Mr. Lucious, the favorable DNA testing would
       not demonstrate his innocence on a more probable than not basis in light
       of the evidence produced at trial.

       At trial, evidence was admitted that Mr. Lucious was seen holding a firearm
       by six different witnesses, with five of the witnesses identifying him as the
       shooter. Even though eye-witness testimony may not be too reliable, the
       testimony is bolstered in this case due to the number of witnesses who saw
       Mr. Lucious with a gun. More importantly, it would be improper for the
       Court to assume the role of the jury and reweigh the credibility of the eye-
       witness testimony. Credibility determinations of each witness are left to the
       trier of fact as they are able to observe each witness while subject to direct
       examination and cross-examination.

       . . . [T]he presumptively favorable DNA results would not demonstrate Mr.
       Lucious’s innocence on a more probable than not basis.

                                              4
No. 39338-1-III
State v. Lucious

Clerk’s Papers at 332. The trial court’s written order incorporated the letter ruling.

Mr. Lucious timely appeals.

                                        ANALYSIS

       Under RCW 10.73.170, an individual incarcerated for a felony offense may file

a postconviction motion requesting DNA testing of evidence. The statute imposes

procedural 1 and substantive 2 requirements. The procedural components are fairly

“lenient,” but the substantive requirement is “onerous.” State v. Riofta, 166 Wn.2d

358, 367, 209 P.3d 467 (2009). We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for

postconviction DNA testing for abuse of discretion. State v. Thompson, 173 Wn.2d

865, 870, 271 P.3d 204 (2012).

       The only contested issue in this case is the substantive component of the statute.

This provision requires the applicant to show a “likelihood that the DNA evidence would

demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis.” RCW 10.73.170(3). Well-

established rules govern whether an applicant has satisfied the substantive component.

In considering a request for postconviction DNA testing, a court must afford the movant

the presumption that further testing will indicate the absence of the defendant’s DNA and

       1
           See RCW 10.73.170(2).
       2
           See RCW 10.73.170(3).

                                              5
No. 39338-1-III
State v. Lucious

the presence of some other person’s DNA. Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 370. 3 The court must

assess whether an exculpatory result would so offset the remaining inculpatory evidence

that innocence becomes not merely possible, but probable. See id. at 369 (“[C]ourts must

consider . . . the impact that an exculpatory DNA test could have in light of [the

remaining] evidence.”).

       Applying the foregoing standards, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding Mr. Lucious did not meet the substantive requirement for postconviction

DNA testing. The most favorable outcome of testing for Mr. Lucious would be a result

revealing the DNA of one or more other persons on the shell casings to the exclusion of

Mr. Lucious. But this best-case scenario would not tend to show probable innocence.

Loading a gun and firing a gun are two distinct and separate acts that necessarily take

place at different points in time. The fact that Mr. Lucious might not have loaded the

gun does not tend to show he was not the shooter. 4 Furthermore, given the context of the

       3
          This standard does not mandate further inferences beyond the presumption of an
exculpatory test result. See State v. Braa, 2 Wn. App. 2d 510, 521, 410 P.3d 1176 (2018)
(“[N]either our Supreme Court nor this [appellate] court has held that a petitioner is
entitled to additional inferences in [their] favor beyond the assumption of a favorable
DNA test result.”).
        4
          Mr. Lucious is not entitled to a presumption that the source of any DNA on the
ammunition is the person who loaded the firearm. Nevertheless, even giving Mr. Lucious
the benefit of that reasoning, he has not satisfied the substantive requirement for DNA
testing.

                                             6
No. 39338-1-III
State v. Lucious

State’s inculpatory evidence, a DNA result favorable to Mr. Lucious would be of

little value. Numerous witnesses identified Mr. Lucious as the shooter. While the

eyewitnesses’ testimony was not unimpeachable, DNA evidence suggesting Mr. Lucious

may not have loaded the firearm would not have contradicted the testimony in any way.

No witness ever claimed they saw Mr. Lucious load the gun. Nor would an exculpatory

DNA test have augmented any areas of impeachment.

       The trial court acted well within its discretion in denying Mr. Lucious’s motion

for postconviction DNA testing. We therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling.

                                    CONCLUSION

       The order denying Mr. Lucious’s motion for postconviction DNA testing is

affirmed.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in

the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

                                          _________________________________
                                          Pennell, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________            _________________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.                   Staab, J.

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