Court Opinion

ID: 9549826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:25:23.272378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:57.455102
License: Public Domain

Pekelis, J.
(concurring)—I concur in the result, but disagree with the majority's conclusion that the Preston court applied "latent" to the term "dangerous" instead of to the term "condition." The problem is in determining what the statutory term "condition" should encompass. The definition of latent, that is, " 'a condition not readily apparent to the recreational user", Preston, 48 Wn. App. at 892 (quoting Morgan v. United States, 709 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1983)), implicates the injury causing aspects of a "thing" and not simply the "thing" itself. This is particularly true in circumstances such as those in Preston where the question was whether the defect of a child's plaything was readily apparent. It would have been far too limiting to equate the merry-go-round's internal mechanism with the "condition" and conclude that simply because it was visible, the condition was not latent. In short, I have absolutely no quarrel with the Preston court's application of the term "latent."
Nevertheless, under either interpretation of "latent," the majority's holding is the correct one. Here, whether the "condition" is considered to be the tracks themselves or *612their injury causing aspect, the condition was clearly not latent.
Review denied at 113 Wn.2d 1020 (1989).