Court Opinion

ID: 9889609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 20:01:17.847164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:25.975190
License: Public Domain

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                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13892
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        SEAN CHRISTOPHER FINNELL,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cr-80086-RS-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13892

                             ____________________

                                    No. 23-10358
                             Non-Argument Calendar
                             ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                           Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        SEAN CHRISTOPHER FINNELL,

                                                       Defendant-Appellant.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cr-80086-RS-1
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Sean Finnell was convicted of possession of child pornogra-
        phy and sentenced to 160 months in prison, lifetime supervised re-
        lease, and ordered to pay restitution, fines, and a special assessment
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        22-13892              Opinion of the Court                        3

        under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act. He raises three
        challenges to his sentence on appeal. First, he argues that the con-
        ditions placed on his lifetime supervised release are overbroad and
        violate his First Amendment rights. Second, he argues that the res-
        titution award should be vacated because the amount of restitution
        was not determined by a jury and because the district court did not
        disaggregate the victims’ losses. Third, he challenges the imposi-
        tion of a $5,000 special assessment under the JVTA because he says
        he is indigent. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district
        court’s imposition of the conditions on his supervised release and
        restitution award, and we vacate the JVTA special assessment and
        remand the case for further determination by the district court.
                                      I.

                A jury convicted Sean Finnell of possession of child pornog-
        raphy under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The district court sentenced
        him to 160 months in prison and supervised release for life. As a
        condition of his supervised release, the district court prohibited
        Finnell from possessing or using a computer without prior court
        approval and from accessing any sexually explicit materials involv-
        ing adults or children. The district court also ordered him to pay a
        $5,000 special assessment under the JVTA and $106,500 in restitu-
        tion. Finnell objected to the conditions of his supervised release,
        the JVTA assessment, and the restitution award at sentencing. The
        district court rejected each of his arguments. Finnell timely ap-
        pealed.
                                      II.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13892

               We review the imposition of special conditions of super-
        vised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d
        1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003). But if a defendant “fails to clearly state
        the grounds for an objection in the district court . . . he waives the
        objection on appeal” and we review for plain error. Id.
                We review the amount of a district court’s restitution award
        for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309,
        1327 (11th Cir. 2019). We review the legality of a restitution order
        de novo and the underlying factual findings for clear error. United
        States v. Osman, 853 F.3d 1184, 1188 (11th Cir. 2017). And we “re-
        view the district court’s decision that a defendant can afford a spe-
        cial assessment for clear error.” United States v. Doak, 47 F.4th 1340,
        1361 (11th Cir. 2022).
                                       III.

                                       A.

               Finnell first asks us to vacate two conditions the district
        court imposed on his lifetime supervised release: the condition that
        he not use a computer apart from work and the condition that he
        not possess any pornography, including adult pornography.
                When imposing special conditions on supervised release, a
        district court should consider whether each condition: “(1) is rea-
        sonably related to the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors; (2) involves no
        greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to serve
        the purposes of punishment specified in § 3553(a)(2); and (3) is con-
        sistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the
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        22-13892               Opinion of the Court                          5

        Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224,
        1238 (11th Cir. 2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The section 3553
        factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the his-
        tory and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence
        to deter future criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public
        from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2).
        The weight given to each factor is “a matter committed to the
        sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Williams, 526
        F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008). Conditions imposed need not be
        based on the offense of conviction as long as they reasonably relate
        to the section 3553 factors. See United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132,
        1139 (11th Cir. 2009).
                Finnell argues that the first special condition of his super-
        vised release—that he cannot possess or use a computer except for
        employment purposes approved by the district court—is improper
        under the Supreme Court’s decision in Packingham v. North Caro-
        lina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017), because it involves a greater deprivation of
        his liberty than is reasonably necessary. In Packingham, the Su-
        preme Court held that a law that prohibits registered sex offenders
        from accessing social networking websites violates the First
        Amendment. Id. at 108. The government argues that our precedent
        establishes that Packingham does not apply to this type of super-
        vised release condition. We agree with the government.
               We have held that Packingham did not undermine a condi-
        tion of supervised release that prohibits a convicted sex offender
        from using a computer except for work and with the prior
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13892

        permission of the district court. In United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d
        971 (11th Cir. 2020), we distinguished Packingham from that condi-
        tion of supervised release for three reasons. First, we reasoned that,
        although the law in Packingham restricted sex offenders beyond the
        completion of their sentence, Bobal’s restriction did not extend be-
        yond his supervised release term. Id. at 977. Second, we noted that
        the law in Packingham applied to all registered sex offenders, not
        just those who used a computer or other electronic means to com-
        mit their offenses, and thus the law was not sufficiently narrowly
        tailored. But because Bobal’s use of an electronic device was at the
        core of his offense—communicating with a minor via text mes-
        sage—the prohibition on his use of a computer prevented him
        from repeating that offense. Id. Finally, unlike the law in Packing-
        ham, Bobal’s restriction allowed him to obtain court permission to
        use a computer for his employment, and Bobal could seek a modi-
        fication of his release for other reasons. Id. Thus, we held that
        Bobal’s conditions on his supervised release were distinguishable
        from Packingham and did not violate the First Amendment.
               Finnell argues that his sentence is distinguishable from Bobal
        for three reasons: (1) we reviewed Bobal’s sentence for plain error,
        (2) Finnell never communicated with minors, and (3) Bobal was
        permitted to later move to modify the conditions of his supervised
        release, while Finnell claims our decision in United States v. Cordero,
        7 F.4th 1058, 1070 (11th Cir. 2021) does not allow him to seek a
        modification. We address each argument in turn.
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        22-13892               Opinion of the Court                         7

               We ordinarily review conditions of supervised release for
        abuse of discretion, but we review for plain error when the defend-
        ant fails to properly state his objection in the district court. See
        United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1087. The parties disagree about
        whether Finnell properly stated his objection to the conditions of
        his supervised release in the district court, and therefore about
        what standard of review should apply. But we do not think it mat-
        ters because his challenge fails either way.
                If we review the district court’s imposition of the conditions
        on Finnell’s supervised release for plain error, our holding in Bobal
        directly applies and forecloses his arguments. And if we review the
        issue for abuse of discretion, our precedent after Bobal also fore-
        closes his arguments. Indeed, after we decided Bobal, we reviewed
        a similar computer restriction imposed on a 30-year term of super-
        vised release for abuse of discretion and upheld that condition. See
        United States v. Coglianese, 34 F.4th 1002, 1010 (11th Cir. 2022). We
        noted that “[w]e have uniformly upheld similar restrictions, so long
        as the defendant . . . has the ability to seek permission from the
        probation office to use a computer and/or access the internet for
        specified purposes.” Id. Finnell may seek permission from the dis-
        trict court to use a computer for employment purposes, and as the
        district court noted at sentencing, may move to modify the condi-
        tions of his supervised release when he is released from prison.
        Thus, we reject Finnell’s argument that Bobal is inapposite because
        we applied the plain error standard of review.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-13892

                We also reject Finnell’s attempt to distinguish Bobal on the
        grounds that he accessed and saved thousands of images of child
        pornography on the internet and did not communicate with the
        minors directly like the defendant in Bobal. The district court found
        that Finnell was “a clear and present danger to children all across
        the world.” It found that Finnell lacked both remorse for his crimes
        and recognition of the seriousness of his offense. Indeed, Finnell
        stated at sentencing that he believed minors have the right to ex-
        press themselves through child pornography and that the images
        he possessed were of minors freely expressing themselves. He also
        stated that he failed to see the criminality in his actions and the
        need for any punishment.
               The sentencing guidelines recommend a condition limiting
        the use of a computer when a defendant used a computer to com-
        mit a sex offense like Finnell did here. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(B).
        The district court considered the section 3553 factors and all the
        evidence before it and concluded that the sentence was appropri-
        ate. Based on all the evidence, we do not believe the district court
        abused its discretion or committed plain error by imposing this
        condition of supervised release on Finnell.
                We also reject Finnell’s argument that our decision in
        Cordero holds that he is not allowed to seek a modification of his
        supervised release. 7 F.4th 1058. We agree with the government
        that Cordero only held that a defendant cannot contest the legality
        or constitutionality of his supervised release via a motion to mod-
        ify. Id. at 1070. We did not hold that a defendant may no longer
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        22-13892               Opinion of the Court                          9

        move to modify the restrictions on his supervised release. Rather,
        the district court made clear at sentencing that Finnell may do just
        that when he gets out of prison. Thus, we reject this argument as
        well.
               We now turn to Finnell’s challenge to the condition of his
        supervised release that he may not access sexually explicit material
        depicting minors or adults. He argues that this condition is over-
        broad and unjustified as it pertains to adult pornography and there-
        fore violates his First Amendment rights. The parties again dispute
        whether we should review this condition for plain error or abuse
        of discretion. We again conclude that the district court did not err
        under either standard of review.
               The government says this condition was appropriate be-
        cause Finnell’s lack of remorse shows that he cannot distinguish
        between legal and illegal pornography—i.e., that all pornography
        should be legal and that he saw nothing wrong with what he did.
        We agree. Although Finnell’s conviction was for child pornogra-
        phy, Finnell demonstrated that he could not or would not distin-
        guish between child pornography and adult pornography and
        showed a complete lack of remorse for his crimes. For these rea-
        sons and the reasons stated above, we hold that the district court
        was well within its discretion to order a total prohibition on all sex-
        ually explicit material to defer Finnell’s future criminal conduct and
        to protect the public.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13892

                                       B.

               Finnell next argues that we should vacate the district court’s
        restitution award because (1) the jury made no findings about the
        victims’ losses or the number of victims, and (2) the district court
        did not disaggregate the victims’ losses. We reject both arguments.
               The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 requires district
        courts to order restitution for covered offenses, including Finnell’s
        conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259. The district court may not decline
        to award restitution because a defendant is indigent. Id. §
        2259(b)(4)(B)(i). The district court must “determine the full
        amount of the victim’s losses that were incurred or are reasonably
        projected to be incurred by the victim” and “order restitution in an
        amount that reflects the defendant’s relative role in the causal pro-
        cess that underlies the victim’s losses, but which is no less than
        $3,000.” Id. § 2259(b)(2)(A)-(B).
               Finnell first argues that Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny
        establish that a court may not award restitution absent a jury find-
        ing without violating the Sixth Amendment. In Apprendi, the Su-
        preme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
        any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre-
        scribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
        proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). We
        then held that Apprendi does not apply to restitution orders.
        Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006). Fin-
        nell argues that the Supreme Court abrogated Dohrmann in South-
        ern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012), which applied
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        22-13892               Opinion of the Court                         11

        Apprendi to criminal fines. The Court held that it has “never distin-
        guished one form of punishment from another” in stating Ap-
        prendi’s rule, and that “our decisions broadly prohibit judicial fact-
        finding that increases maximum criminal ‘sentences,’ ‘penalties,’ or
        ‘punishments.’” Id. at 350. Finnell argues this holding extends to
        criminal restitution.
                We disagree. Nothing in Southern Union leads us to conclude
        that it abrogated our holding in Dohrmann such that Apprendi and
        its progeny apply to restitution orders. The Court in Southern Union
        specifically explained that there could not “be an Apprendi violation
        where no maximum is prescribed.” 567 U.S. at 353. Our analysis in
        Dohrmann turned on the absence of a maximum award in the resti-
        tution statute, and there is similarly no maximum here. 44 F.3d at
        1281. And since Southern Union, several of our sister circuits have
        declined to extend Apprendi to restitution. See United States v. Vega-
        Martinez, 949 F.3d 43, 54 (1st Cir. 2020); United States v. Sawyer, 825
        F.3d 287, 297 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Thunderhawk, 799 F.3d
        1203, 1209 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Bengis, 783 F.3d 407, 412–
        13 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Rosbottom, 763 F.3d 408, 420 (5th
        Cir. 2014); United States v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146, 1148–51 (9th Cir.
        2013); United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216–18 (7th Cir.
        2012); United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012). We
        thus conclude that the district court was not required to submit the
        question about the victims’ losses to the jury.
               Finnell separately argues that the restitution award violates
        the Sixth Amendment under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13892

        (2013) because a jury did not determine the number of victims of
        Finnell’s crimes. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court extended Apprendi
        to mandatory minimums so that facts triggering mandatory mini-
        mums must be found by a jury. Id. at 103. Finnell argues the district
        court violated his Sixth Amendment right because a jury did not
        identify each victim of his crimes and therefore did not determine
        the statutory mandatory minimum he would owe in restitution.
        But that argument must fail for the same reason his first argument
        does: Apprendi does not apply to restitution orders, and nothing in
        our precedent or the Supreme Court’s precedent has abrogated our
        holdings. See Dohrmann, 442 F.3d 1279.
                Finnell’s second argument regarding the district court’s res-
        titution order is that the district court erred in the amount of resti-
        tution it awarded because it did not disaggregate the losses. That
        is, Finnell says the district court was required to separate the vic-
        tims’ losses caused by Finnell’s possession of the images and the
        losses caused by the initial abuse. But we have held that “a district
        court is not required to determine, calculate, or disaggregate the
        specific amount of loss caused by the original abuser-creator or dis-
        tributor of child pornography before it can decide the amount of
        the victim’s losses caused by the later defendant who possesses and
        views the images.” United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1333
        (11th Cir. 2019). The district court made an appropriate finding of
        Finnell’s restitution based on the evidence before it. Thus, we re-
        ject this argument.
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        22-13892               Opinion of the Court                         13

                                       C.

                Finnell’s last argument is that we should vacate the district
        court’s imposition of a $5,000 special assessment under the JVTA
        because he is indigent. The JVTA provides that the district court
        should impose this assessment “on any non-indigent person” con-
        victed of certain offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a)(3). Finnell argues that
        there was sufficient evidence that he was indigent because a mag-
        istrate judge previously found him indigent, and the probation of-
        ficer reported he could not pay the JVTA assessment because he
        had $100 in his checking account, no income or assets, and $7,000
        in credit card debt. He notes that the district court determined that
        he could not pay a fine yet still imposed the JVTA assessment. He
        also argues that the district court gave no explanation for finding
        him non-indigent and imposing the JVTA assessment after he ob-
        jected to it on the grounds of indigency.
               The government says the district court did not err because
        indigency can be based on future earnings and because it did not
        know Finnell’s financial status because he declined a presentence
        interview and did not sign the release forms to permit the proba-
        tion officer to verify his financial information. The government
        also argues that Finnell failed to sufficiently raise the issue at sen-
        tencing.
               We agree with Finnell that the district court gave no expla-
        nation for its imposition of the JVTA assessment in light of Finnell’s
        objections on the basis of indigency. After the government asked
        the district court to impose the JVTA assessment, the district court
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13892

        determined that Finnell could not pay a fine, but immediately im-
        posed the JVTA assessment. Finnell later asked the district court to
        clarify whether it was imposing the assessment and the court said
        that it was. Finnell cited the statute, pointed out that it only applies
        to non-indigent persons, stated that he is indigent and has no ability
        to pay the assessment, and argued that the court should not order
        the JVTA assessment. The district court provided no other reason-
        ing for imposing the assessment.
               It is true that other circuits have held that indigency for pur-
        poses of the JVTA assessment can be determined based on future
        potential earnings. See, e.g., United States v. Rosario, 7 F.4th 65, 70
        (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Norton, 48 F.4th 124, 133–34 (3d Cir.
        2022). It is also true that the record may support a finding that Fin-
        nell may be able to pay the JVTA assessment when he gets out of
        prison. But the district court failed to explain its reasoning for im-
        posing the JVTA assessment in light of Finnell’s objection and evi-
        dence on the record that Finnell might be indigent.
               In the context of fines imposed under the sentencing guide-
        lines, we have held that “when the record provides no guidance as
        to the court’s reason(s) for imposing a fine, we must remand the
        case so that the necessary factual findings can be made.” United
        States v. Hernandez, 160 F.3d 661, 666 (11th Cir. 1998); see also
        U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). The same is true in the context of the JVTA
        assessment. The district court must provide some reason on the
        record for imposing the JVTA assessment when the defendant has
        presented evidence of indigency and has objected to the
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        22-13892               Opinion of the Court                       15

        assessment. Because the district court failed to do so, we vacate its
        ruling and remand for the district court to make the necessary fac-
        tual findings.
                                       IV.

            For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM IN PART AND
        VACATE AND REMAND IN PART.