Court Opinion

ID: 9352534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:21.783262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:40.822209
License: Public Domain

J-A27031-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MICHAEL L. STRUNK                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 160 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 1, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-22-CR-0000106-2020

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                            FILED: JANUARY 6, 2023

        Appellant, Michael L. Strunk, appeals from the aggregate judgment of

sentence of 17 years to 35 years’ incarceration imposed by the Court of

Common Pleas of Dauphin County following his conviction by a jury of two

counts of sexual assault, one count of aggravated indecent assault, three

counts of indecent assault, one count of unlawful contact with a minor, and

one count of corruption of minors.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

        Appellant was charged with the above offenses for committing three

separate assaults on a girl who was 16 and 17 years old at the time (Victim).

Appellant, who was Victim’s mother’s paramour, was living with Victim and

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3124.1, 3125(1), 3126(a)(1), 6318(a), and 6301(a)(1)(ii),
respectively.
J-A27031-22

Victim’s mother at the time. The charges were tried to a jury from July 22 to

23, 2021.

      At trial, Victim testified that in February 2019, approximately a week

before her 17th birthday, Appellant fondled her breast under her shirt, pulled

down her pants and underwear, and had sexual intercourse with her when she

had fallen asleep on the living room couch after she got home from work. N.T.

Trial, 7/22/21, at 55-64. Victim woke up when Appellant was fondling her

breast, but said nothing to Appellant during this attack and pretended to be

asleep. Id. at 61. Victim testified that slightly more than a month later, on

April 3, 2019, when she was medicated after having her wisdom teeth and

other teeth removed, Appellant fondled her breast, pulled down her pants,

and repeatedly put his fingers in her vagina.      Id. at 65-71, 109.    Victim

testified that she was crying and tried to scream and fight him off but that she

couldn’t because of the effects of the pain medication that she was on and

because her mouth was full of gauze. Id. at 69-71. Victim testified that a

few days after this second assault, Appellant came into her bedroom after she

had gone to bed, took her pajama pants off, and inserted his penis in her

vagina. Id. at 71-76, 112. Victim testified that she pretended to be asleep

and that the assault stopped when her mother walked into the bedroom and

got angry at Appellant and Appellant left the room with her mother. Id. at 76-

78, 117-19. Victim testified that she did not want the assaults reported to the

police because she was afraid that she and her mother would become

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homeless and she did not want to have to testify.       Id. at 78-79.    Victim

testified that the assaults were not reported to the police and instead, she and

her mother installed a lock on Victim’s bedroom door, and that after the lock

was installed, Victim woke up on several occasions to the sound of Appellant

trying to pick the lock. Id. at 79-80. Victim testified that she had herself

committed for psychiatric treatment shortly after the third assault because

she was suicidal. Id. at 80, 91-92. Several months later, Victim spoke about

being assaulted to an adult who had taken care of her in the past when Victim’s

mother was in drug treatment and that adult reported that Victim had been

sexually assaulted. Id. at 27-29, 96-97.

      Victim’s mother testified that she walked into Victim’s bedroom and

found Appellant naked from the waist down in bed with Victim, who was also

naked from the waist down. N.T. Trial, 7/22/21, at 146-48. Victim’s mother

testified that Victim appeared to be asleep.     Id. at 148.   Victim’s mother

testified that she had smoked PCP that night and was ashamed and afraid and

that she did not make Appellant leave the house or call the police. Id. at 145,

148-51, 169-73.    A Children and Youth Services worker testified that she

spoke to Appellant in October 2019 after the sexual abuse report was received

and that Appellant denied that he had any sexual contact with Victim. Id. at

182-85. A police detective who interviewed Appellant twice testified that in

an October 2019 interview, Appellant denied that he had any sexual contact

with Victim. N.T. Trial, 7/23/21, at 209-10. The detective testified that after

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Appellant was arrested in November 2019, he asked to speak to her again and

after being given Miranda2 warnings, Appellant gave a videotaped statement.

Id. at 211-13. In that videotaped statement, which was played to the jury,

Appellant admitted sexual contact with Victim, but claimed that he mistook

Victim for Victim’s mother in the first assault and that the second and third

incidents were consensual.        Id. at 212-14, 218, 227, 242-43. Appellant did

not testify or call any witnesses in his defense. Id. at 235-39.

        On July 23, 2021, the jury convicted Appellant of all of the above

charges. N.T. Trial, 7/23/21, at 296-98. Following the verdict, the trial court

directed that the probation department prepare a pre-sentence investigation

report and ordered that Appellant be assessed by the Sexual Offenders

Assessment Board (SOAB) to determine if he should be classified as a Sexually

Violent Predator (SVP) under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification

Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10, et seq. N.T. Trial, 7/23/21, at 300; Trial

Court Order, 7/26/21.

        On December 1, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on whether

Appellant should be classified as an SVP and to sentence Appellant. At this

hearing, the trial court heard testimony from the SOAB evaluator who

assessed Appellant.       N.T. SVP & Sentencing Hearing at 5-21.       No other

witnesses testified on the issue of whether Appellant should be classified as

____________________________________________

2   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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an SVP. Id. at 21. Following the SOAB evaluator’s testimony, the trial court

found that Appellant was an SVP. Id. at 21-22. The trial court then imposed

consecutive sentences of 5 to 10 years’ incarceration for each of the sexual

assault and aggravated indecent assault convictions, a concurrent sentence of

5 to 10 years’ incarceration for the unlawful contact with a minor conviction,

and a consecutive sentence 2 to 5 years’ incarceration for corruption of

minors, resulting on an aggregate sentence of 17 years to 35 years’

incarceration. Id. at 36-41; Sentencing Order.3

       Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion in which he sought a new

trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence

and moved for modification of his sentence on the ground that the imposition

of consecutive sentences was excessive and unreasonable.        Post-Sentence

Motion at 2-3. By order entered December 30, 2021, the trial court denied

Appellant’s post-sentence motion in its entirety. Trial Court Order, 12/30/21.

This timely appeal followed.

       Appellant presents the following four issues for our review:

       I. Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict Mr. Strunk of
       unlawful contact with a minor, where the complainant testified
       that the sole verbal contact was in the first incident after any
       criminal offense was completed?

____________________________________________

3The trial court imposed no sentence for the three indecent assault convictions
on the grounds that those charges merged with the sexual assault and
aggravated indecent assault convictions. N.T. SVP & Sentencing Hearing at
37-39; Sentencing Order at 1-2.

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       II. Whether the evidence at trial shocks the consci[ence] where
       the evidence produced clearly showed a mother finding her
       daughter in an alleged sexual assault and her daughter did not cry
       out for help, speak to her afterw[a]rds to characterize it as an
       assault, nor were the police called.

       III. Whether the evidence failed to sufficiently show, by clear and
       convincing evidence, that M[r]. Strunk should be an SVP where
       the sole deciding factor appeared to be his number of offenses
       with the same victim.

       IV. Whether the aggregate sentence of 17.54-35 years was clearly
       unreasonable, so manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse
       of discretion and inconsistent with the protection of the public,
       gravity of offenses, and defendant's rehabilitative needs?

Appellant’s Brief at 11-12 (suggested answers omitted). None of these issues

merits relief.

       Appellant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict

him of unlawful contact with a minor because there was no evidence that he

communicated with Victim to accomplish any of the sexual assaults.           Our

standard of review in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-

settled:

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
       to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
       a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
       the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
       addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
       the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
       innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
       resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
____________________________________________

4 Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, as explained above, his aggregate
minimum sentence is 17 years’ incarceration, not 171/2 years’ incarceration.

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      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

      The Crimes Code provides that a person commits the crime of unlawful

contact with a minor

      if he is intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement
      officer acting in the performance of his duties who has assumed
      the identity of a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an activity
      prohibited under any of the following, and either the person
      initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this
      Commonwealth:

      (1)   Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to
            sexual offenses).

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a). The statute defines the contact required as an element

of this offense as:

      Direct or indirect contact or communication by any means,
      method or device, including contact or communication in person
      or through an agent or agency, through any print medium, the
      mails, a common carrier or communication common carrier, any
      electronic communication system and any telecommunications,
      wire, computer or radio communications device or system.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(c).

      The element of contact requires proof that the defendant engaged in

some verbal or nonverbal communication with the minor for purposes of

sexual contact beyond physically approaching the minor and the physical

contact of the sexual act itself. Commonwealth v. Davis, 225 A.3d 582,

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587 (Pa. Super. 2019); Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79-81

(Pa. Super. 2015).

      Even though the statute is titled “unlawful contact with a minor,”
      it is best understood as “unlawful communication with a minor.”
      By its plain terms, the statute prohibits the act of communicating
      with a minor for enumerated sexual purposes.

Commonwealth v. Rose, 960 A.2d 149, 152-53 (Pa. Super. 2008).

      This element of communication is sufficiently proven to support an

unlawful contact with a minor conviction where there is evidence that the

defendant engaged in nonverbal communication with the minor to bring about

the sexual contact or evidence that he engaged in physical contact with the

minor separate from the sex crime itself to facilitate the sex crime.

Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 80-81 (not responding to minor’s knock on door so

that she would enter and find him naked constituted nonverbal communication

sufficient   to   support   unlawful    contact   with   minor    conviction);

Commonwealth v. Velez, 51 A.3d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 2012) (evidence

that minor was naked from the waist down and had her knees up was sufficient

to prove verbal or nonverbal communication to cause minor to be in that

position and state of undress); Commonwealth v. Copeland, No. 2452 EDA

2021, at 6-9 (Pa. Super. August 31, 2022) (unpublished memorandum)

(defendant’s positioning minor on her stomach and removing her clothes was

sufficient communication to support unlawful contact with minor conviction).

Evidence that the defendant came to the minor and engaged in sexual contact,

however, is insufficient by itself to support an unlawful contact with a minor

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conviction.   Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 80 (vacating unlawful contact with a

minor conviction as to minor who testified only that defendant came into her

room and touched her breasts and rear end without saying anything);

Commonwealth v. Letham, No. 1259 WDA 2020, at 5-7 (Pa. Super. January

13, 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (vacating unlawful contact with a

minor conviction where evidence with respect to assault on that minor was

that defendant came into a room where she was standing and grabbed her

breasts without saying anything).

      Appellant is correct that there was no evidence that Appellant verbally

communicated anything to Victim or gave her nonverbal signals to bring about

the sexual contact.   Victim did not recall Appellant saying anything to her

before or during any of the assaults and did not testify that he said anything

sexual or related to the assaults during the intervening weeks and days

between the assaults. N.T. Trial, 7/22/21, at 60-64, 66, 70, 105-07, 109, 114-

17.   Victim testified that immediately after the first assault, Appellant

whispered something in her ear and that she could not remember what he

said, but that it was not a threat or a request that she not tell her mother.

Id. at 64, 106.

      Victim, however, testified that Appellant removed or pulled down her

clothing in order to commit the sexual assaults and aggravated indecent

assault.   Id. at 60-62, 68-69, 75-76, 117. That evidence that Appellant

engaged in physical contact with Victim beyond the assaults themselves to

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facilitate his sexual contact with Victim is sufficient to prove the element of

communication. Velez, 51 A.3d at 267; Copeland, No. 2452 EDA 2021, at

6-9. Because communication is the only element of unlawful contact with a

minor that Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove and

Appellant’s acts of removing or pulling down Victim’s clothing to facilitate his

assaults were sufficient to satisfy that element, Appellant’s claim of

insufficiency of the evidence fails.

      Appellant’s contention that he is entitled to a new trial on weight of the

evidence grounds is also without merit. A new trial may be granted on the

ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence only where the

evidence at trial was so weak or the verdict was so contrary to the evidence

that the verdict shocks the trial court’s sense of justice. Commonwealth v.

Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017); Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249

A.3d 257, 269-70 (Pa. Super. 2021); Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 758. Review of

the denial of a weight of the evidence motion for a new trial is limited to

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that

the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v.

Clemons,     200   A.3d   441,   463-64     (Pa.   2019);   Commonwealth     v.

Delmonico, 251 A.3d 829, 837 (Pa. Super. 2021).              “One of the least

assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s

conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence.”

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Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 758 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049

(Pa. 2013)) (brackets omitted).

      Appellant’s only argument that the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence is that the testimony of Victim and her mother was not credible

because they did not make Appellant leave the home or report the crimes to

the police. The trial court did not discuss the evidence at trial in its order

denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion and did not issue any other opinion.

Trial Court Order, 12/30/21; Trial Court Order, 1/25/22. It is clear, however,

that the trial court concluded that the verdict did not shock its sense of justice,

as it specifically rejected Appellant’s claim that he was entitled to new trial,

which was based on the claim that the testimony against him was incredible,

Trial Court Order, 12/30/21; Post-Sentence Motion at 2-3, and its statements

at sentencing show that it found Victim’s testimony credible.         N.T. SVP &

Sentencing Hearing at 33-35. This conclusion of the trial court that the verdict

was not against the weight of the evidence was not an abuse of discretion.

The fact that a sexual assault victim remains in contact with her attacker after

the assaults and does not immediately report the crime does not require a

jury to find the victim’s testimony incredible or require a conclusion a verdict

based on the victim’s testimony is shocking or against the weight of the

evidence.   Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 809 (Pa. Super.

2017).

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      Appellant’s remaining two issues, his challenges to his SVP designation

and sentence, likewise are not grounds for relief.      A defendant may be

determined to be an SVP if he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense

and, following an assessment by an SOAB evaluator, the Commonwealth

proves by clear and convincing evidence at an SVP hearing that the defendant

suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him

likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.12,

9799.24; Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super.

2015). All five of the offenses of which Appellant was convicted are defined

by SORNA as sexually violent offenses on which an SVP determination can be

based. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.12, 9799.14(b)(6), (8), (c)(5), (d)(5), (7).

      To prove the element of mental abnormality or personality disorder, “the

evidence must show that the defendant suffers from a congenital or acquired

condition that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a

manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts

to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other

persons.” Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189-90 (quoting Commonwealth v.

Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034 (Pa. Super. 2013)). In addition, it must be shown

that the defendant’s conduct was predatory. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190.

Predatory conduct is defined as an “act directed at a stranger or at a person

with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or

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promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.”

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.12.

      In performing an SVP assessment, the evaluator must consider all of the

following 15 factors:

      (1) Facts of the current offense, including:

            (i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.

            (ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means necessary
            to achieve the offense.

            (iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.

            (iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.

            (v) Age of the victim.

            (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual
            cruelty by the individual during the commission of the crime.

            (vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

      (2) Prior offense history, including:

            (i) The individual’s prior criminal record.

            (ii) Whether the individual completed any prior sentences.

            (iii) Whether the individual          participated   in    available
            programs for sexual offenders.

      (3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

            (i) Age.

            (ii) Use of illegal drugs.

            (iii) Any mental      illness, mental disability      or    mental
            abnormality.

            (iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to              the
            individual’s conduct.

      (4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender assessment
      field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of reoffense.

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42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b); see also Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190.             An

expert testifying in support of an SVP designation must opine on whether the

defendant has a propensity to reoffend, but the risk of reoffending is only a

factor that the expert must consider in making the SVP assessment, not a

separate requirement for SVP designation. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support an SVP designation,

this Court may not reweigh the factors that are relevant to whether the

defendant is an SVP and must limit its review to whether the factors on which

the SVP determination is based are supported by sufficient evidence.

Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 220-25 (Pa. 2006).

      The trial court’s SVP determination here was based on the testimony of

the SOAB evaluator, who was the only witness at the SVP hearing. The SOAB

evaluator testified that he considered all of the 15 factors and opined that the

nature of the sexual conduct (penetrative assaults), Victim’s mental capacity

at the time of the assaults (that she was asleep or on pain medications),

Appellant’s criminal history (consisting of non-sexual assaults, drug crimes

and other non-sexual offenses), Appellant’s drug use, the fact that he

committed multiple assaults on Victim, his age, Victim’s age, and the family

relationship supported the conclusion that Appellant suffered from antisocial

personality disorder, engaged in predatory behavior, and had a propensity to

commit sex crimes. N.T. SVP & Sentencing Hearing at 7-12, 16-21. The SOAB

evaluator opined based on these factors that Appellant met the criteria to be

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classified as an SVP. Id. at 13-14. This testimony is sufficient to support the

trial court’s determination that Appellant was an SVP. Commonwealth v.

Lippincott, 208 A.3d 143 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc), relied on by Appellant

does not hold that such evidence is insufficient. Rather, this Court vacated

the defendant’s SVP designation in Lippincott on the ground that the trial

court applied the wrong burden of proof (an issue on which it was itself

subsequently overruled by Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972 (Pa.

2020)), not on insufficiency of the evidence. 208 A.3d at 154.

      Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support an SVP

designation because there were not multiple victims and that repeated sexual

abuse of a single victim cannot support an SVP determination. That, however,

is not the law. Contrary to Appellant’s contention, a defendant may properly

be found to be an SVP where his only sex crimes are against a single victim.

Stephens, 74 A.3d at 1035-36, 1039-42 (affirming SVP designation of

defendant who committed numerous acts of indecent assault and aggravated

indecent assault on a single child victim over a two-year period);

Commonwealth v. Pagan, No. 781 MDA 2020, at 4-8 (Pa. Super. December

10, 2020) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming SVP designation of

defendant whose only sex crime was multiple indecent assaults against the

same child).

      Appellant’s final issue is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. Challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are not

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appealable as of right and may be considered only where the following

requirements are satisfied: 1) the appellant has preserved the issue in the

trial court at sentencing or in a motion for reconsideration or modification of

sentence; 2) the appellant has included in his brief a concise statement of the

reasons for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of his sentence in

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), and 3) the challenge to the sentence raises

a substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the

Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 295-96

(Pa. Super. 2011).

       Appellant has satisfied these three requirements.     Appellant filed a

timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration of his sentence in which he

argued that the aggregate sentence that the trial court imposed was excessive

and unreasonable and has included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief.

Post-Sentence Motion at 3; Appellant’s Brief at 24-28.     Appellant has also

raised a substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the

Sentencing Code. A substantial question exists where the appellant advances

a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were inconsistent

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or were contrary to the

fundamental norms of the sentencing process.             Commonwealth v.

DiClaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2019); Antidormi, 84 A.3d at

759.    Appellant asserts that his aggregate sentence of 17 to 35 years’

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incarceration, due to imposition of consecutive sentences, is excessive and

that the trial court considered only the seriousness of the crimes and not his

mitigating evidence or rehabilitative needs.    A claim that a sentence was

excessive coupled with claim that trial court did not consider defendant’s

rehabilitative needs presents a substantial question.     Commonwealth v.

Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc).

      Appellant’s challenge to his sentence, however, fails on the merits. Our

review of this issue is governed by the following standards:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770 (quoting Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d

1244 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

      The record here shows that the trial court had reviewed and considered

a pre-sentence investigation report before imposing sentence on Appellant.

N.T. SVP & Sentencing Hearing at 33. Appellant concedes that the sentences

that the trial court imposed were within the standard range of the sentencing

guidelines. Appellant’s Brief at 46. Where the trial court has reviewed a pre-

sentence investigation report prior to sentencing the defendant, this Court

presumes that the trial court was aware of and weighed the relevant

information regarding the defendant’s character and mitigating factors.

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Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 471 (Pa. Super. 2018);

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa. Super. 2013);

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010). This Court

therefore will not consider a standard range sentence imposed with the benefit

of a pre-sentence investigation report excessive or an abuse of the trial court’s

sentencing discretion. Radecki, 180 A.3d at 471; Corley, 31 A.3d at 298;

Moury, 992 A.2d at 171.

      The fact that the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for four of

Appellant’s five crimes does not change this. A trial court has discretion to

impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for crimes committed

in the same course of criminal conduct and imposition of consecutive

sentences can be found to be unreasonable in only the most extreme

circumstances. Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1212 (Pa. Super.

2021); Radecki, 180 A.3d at 469-70; Moury, 992 A.2d at 171-72.

      Here, Appellant committed three separate assaults on Victim days and

weeks apart.    Appellant is not entitled to a “volume discount” for those

separate crimes. Brown, 249 A.3d at 1216; Radecki, 180 A.3d at 470-71;

Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 772. While his aggregate sentence is lengthy, it is not

of the extreme length that rises to the level of an abuse of discretion.

Compare Brown, 249 A.3d at 1209-10, 1216-17 (sentence of 16 to 32 years

for three firearms convictions was not abuse of discretion); Caldwell, 117

A.3d at 767, 770-72 (sentence of 31 to 62 years for aggravated assault,

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robbery, theft, and firearms convictions was not abuse of discretion);

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1267-68, 1274-78 (Pa. Super.

2013) (aggregate sentence of 40 years, 7 months to 81 years and 2 months

incarceration for 2 burglary convictions and over 30 convictions for receiving

stolen property and other non-violent crimes was within trial court’s

discretion); with Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 138-39,

146-50 (Pa. Super. 2011) (maximum sentence of 80 or 90 years for a single

episode of sexual assaults and robbery, a second robbery, and multiple

burglaries and thefts was abuse of discretion); Commonwealth v. Dodge,

957 A.2d 1198, 1199, 1201-02 (Pa. Super. 2008) (sentence of 581/2 to 124

years’ incarceration for 2 burglary convictions and over 30 convictions for

receiving stolen property and other non-violent crimes was abuse of

discretion); Commonwealth v. Whitman, 880 A.2d 1250, 1251-52, 1254

(Pa. Super. 2005), rev’d on other issue, 918 A.2d 111 (Pa. 2007) (sentence

of 39 to 78 years’ incarceration for multiple nonviolent burglaries and other

property crimes was abuse of discretion); Commonwealth v. Bauer, 604

A.2d 1098, 1101-02 (Pa. Super. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 618 A.2d

396 (Pa. 1993) (sentence of 27½ to 55 years’ incarceration for multiple drug

sales was abuse of discretion); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 510 A.2d 760,

761, 763-64 (Pa. Super. 1986) (sentence of 30 to 60 years’ incarceration for

multiple robberies was abuse of discretion).

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J-A27031-22

     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that all of the issues raised by

Appellant in this appeal lack merit. We therefore affirm Appellant’s judgment

of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023

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