Court Opinion

ID: 9957697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 21:00:44.332592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:34.308048
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11717   Document: 67-1     Date Filed: 04/04/2024   Page: 1 of 13

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-11717
                         ____________________

        SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
                                           Plaintiﬀ-Counter Defendant,
        SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS LLC,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        STEPHEN CALABRESE, et al.,

                                         Defendants-Counter Claimants,

        RETROBRANDS USA LLC,
        JEFFREY KAPLAN,
        NEXTEL MOBILE WORLDWIDE INC.,
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                22-11717

                               Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellants.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-60788-JEM
                           ____________________

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Sprint owns trademarks for a “Nextel” word mark when
        used with telecommunication equipment, and a sound mark for
        the Nextel “chirp” noise for use with telecommunication services.
        Stephen Calabrese began selling cell phones under the Nextel name
        and used the chirp sound. After receiving a cease-and-desist letter,
        Calabrese partnered with Jeffrey Kaplan and Retrobrands USA LLC
        to expand sales of his “Nextel” branded devices. Sprint brought a
        successful trademark infringement lawsuit regarding these two
        marks. After a careful review of the record and with the benefit of
        oral argument, we AFFIRM.
                                         I.
              Nextel Communications, Inc. created push-to-talk technol-
        ogy allowing users to press a button, speak, and immediately be
        heard by others in a group. Nextel ﬁrst developed the “Nextel”
        word mark (Reg. No. 1,884,244) and chirp sound mark (Reg. No.
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        22-11717                  Opinion of the Court                         3

        5,047,282) at issue in this case. 1 Nextel merged with Sprint in 2005
        to form “Sprint Nextel.” “Sprint Nextel” became “Sprint” in 2013.
        Sprint merged with T-Mobile in 2020. T-Mobile now owns the
        Nextel word mark and chirp sound mark.
               Nextel’s push-to-talk devices and services have been used by
        ﬁrst responders and other people working in public safety roles.
        These devices used a priority service, which allowed calls to go
        through stadiums or events with congested networks. Rather than
        market to individual consumers, Sprint markets push-to-talk ser-
        vices to business consumers at trade shows.
               In 2016, Calabrese started selling cell phones using the com-
        pany name “Nextel, Inc.” and doing business as “Nextel World-
        wide.” Through an online search for “Nextel” in 2016, Calabrese
        found both the Wikipedia page saying Nextel Communication con-
        tinued as a subsidiary of Sprint and a Sprint webpage oﬀering push-
        to-talk phones under the “Nextel” name. Nonetheless, Calabrese
        appeared at a 2017 trade show selling “Nextel” devices. In re-
        sponse, Sprint sent Calabrese a cease-and-desist letter demanding
        that Calabrese stop using the Nextel name and the domain “nextel-
        worldwide.com.” Calabrese told Sprint he had stopped when, in-
        stead, he had actually partnered with Kaplan to expand.
             Kaplan owns Retrobrands, a company that “revives” iconic
        consumer brands. Kaplan knew that Calabrese had received a

        1 We refer to these as the “Nextel word mark” and “chirp sound mark,” re-

        spectively, throughout this opinion.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-11717

        cease-and-desist letter in which Sprint claimed to own valid and
        subsisting rights in the Nextel word mark. Kaplan’s own research
        indicated that Sprint renewed its rights in the Nextel Mark with the
        United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) in 2015.
        Kaplan also reviewed the following: Sprint’s 2013 statements that it
        would shut down Nextel’s network; Sprint’s ﬁnancial disclosures;
        and records showing the cancellation of some Nextel trademark
        registrations. Kaplan and Calabrese’s companies entered a licens-
        ing agreement to build and later sell a company using “the famous
        and iconic trademark NEXTEL.” Kaplan tried to register both the
        “NEXTEL” name and the Nextel chirp, but the USPTO denied both
        applications due to potential consumer confusion with Sprint’s reg-
        istered trademarks.
               Even without registered marks, Kaplan and Calabrese used
        their Nextel materials to advertise and sell mobile devices and wire-
        less services to the same consumers Sprint targeted. Kaplan and
        Calabrese did not make devices or own a network. They resold
        cheap phones with “NEXTEL” stickers. These phones could not
        access the priority services target customers need. Their advertise-
        ments used phrases like “Nextel is back” and domain names like
        “nextelisback.com.” These sites redirected to “nextelmobileworld-
        wide.com,” which disclosed it was not aﬃliated with Sprint. Under
        the licensing agreement, Kaplan made $40,000 to $50,000. When
        marketing to investors, Kaplan advertised the company as being
        worth $100 million.
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        22-11717                   Opinion of the Court                        5

               Sprint initiated these proceedings, asserting claims against
        Kaplan, Calabrese, and their companies, Retrobrands USA LLC,
        Nextel, Inc., and Nextel Mobile Worldwide, Inc. (collectively, De-
        fendants) for infringement, unfair competition, false designation of
        origin, dilution, counterfeiting Sprint’s Nextel word and chirp
        sound marks, and cybersquatting. Defendants responded with
        fraud and abandonment aﬃrmative defenses and a counterclaim
        of tortious interference. 2
                At trial, the district court found no evidence to support the
        abandonment of the chirp sound mark and granted judgment as a
        matter of law to Sprint on that defense. The district court left the
        jury to decide whether Sprint abandoned the Nextel word mark.
        The jury returned a verdict for Sprint on all counts—Sprint had not
        abandoned the Nextel word mark; Defendants infringed, counter-
        feited, unfairly competed with, and were likely to dilute the Nextel
        word mark; Defendants committed cybersquatting regarding the
        Nextel word mark; and Defendants infringed, counterfeited, and
        unfairly competed with the chirp sound mark. The jury found $4.5
        million in statutory damages ($2 million for counterfeiting the
        Nextel word mark; $2 million for counterfeiting the chirp sound
        mark; $500,000 for cybersquatting). The jury found an additional
        $5.2 million in disgorgement damages.
             After the jury returned its verdict, the district court entered
        judgment in Sprint’s favor. Sprint ultimately elected statutory

        2 Calabrese is not a party to the appeal.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11717

        damages, which the district court awarded. Separately, the district
        court issued a permanent injunction against Defendants and or-
        dered Defendants to transfer the remaining infringing domain
        names to Sprint and abandon applications to register their marks
        with the USPTO. The district court denied Defendants’ motion for
        stay or, alternatively, motion for extension of time, and Defendants’
        motion to vacate the permanent injunction.
               Kaplan, Nextel Mobile Worldwide, Inc., and Retrobrands
        (collectively Retrobrands) timely appealed.            On appeal,
        Retrobrands argues (1) Sprint lacks standing; (2) Sprint abandoned
        the Nextel word mark and chirp sound mark; (3) the marks were
        insuﬃciently famous for a dilution claim; (4) Sprint did not make a
        timely election of statutory damages; and (5) the district court
        abused its discretion in granting a permanent injunction. We ad-
        dress each argument in turn.
                                         II.
                “Whether a plaintiﬀ has standing to sue is a threshold juris-
        dictional question that we review de novo.” MacPhee v. MiMedx Grp.,
        Inc., 73 F.4th 1220, 1238 (11th Cir. 2023). Standing consists of three
        components: (1) a “concrete and particularized . . . and [] actual or
        imminent” injury; (2) traceability between the injury and the con-
        duct at issue; and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
        U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Here, Sprint holds valid trademarks that
        Retrobrands cannot use, the actions of Retrobrands caused the in-
        fringement harm, and a favorable decision would redress Sprint’s
        alleged harm. This suﬃces for standing. See Royal Palm Props., LLC
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        22-11717                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

        v. Pink Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d 776, 787 n.6 (11th Cir. 2020). Rec-
        ognizing standing, we move to the merits.
                                              III.
                 We review a renewed judgment as a matter of law de novo
        and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
        ing party. Williams v. First Advantage LNS Screening Sols., Inc., 947
        F.3d 735, 744 (11th Cir. 2020). Judgment as a matter of law is only
        appropriate when a plaintiﬀ “presents no legally suﬃcient eviden-
        tiary basis for a reasonable jury to ﬁnd for him on a material ele-
        ment of his cause of action.” Christopher v. Florida, 449 F.3d 1360,
        1364 (11th Cir. 2006). Separately, we review denials of motions for
        new trials for an abuse of discretion. Walter Int’l Prods., Inc. v. Sa-
        linas, 650 F.3d 1402, 1407 (11th Cir. 2011). Our deference is “partic-
        ularly appropriate where a new trial is denied and the jury’s verdict
        is left undisturbed.” Id. (quotations omitted).
               Abandonment is an aﬃrmative defense available against al-
        legations of trademark 3 infringement. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. A mark
        is abandoned “[w]hen its use has been discontinued with intent not
        to resume such use.” Id. A trademark holder must make a “bona
        ﬁde use of a mark.” Id. “Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be

        3 Under the Lanham Act, “trademark” refers to “any word, name, symbol, or

        device, or any combination thereof [] (1) used by a person, or (2) which a per-
        son has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the
        principal register established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or
        her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
        source of the goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11717

        prima facie evidence of abandonment.” Id. If a defendant can
        show a prima facie case of abandonment, the burden of production
        shifts to the plaintiﬀ, but the burden of persuasion remains with
        the defendant. Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc.,
        304 F.3d 1167, 1176–77 (11th Cir. 2002). Abandonment is a factual
        question. Id. at 1174. “[W]e require strict proof ” to ﬁnd abandon-
        ment. Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984).
               The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act prohibits
        registering or using domain names when at the time of registra-
        tion, the domain name is “identical or confusingly similar to” a
        mark at issue and the person creating the cybersquatting domain
        name “has a bad faith intent to proﬁt from that mark.”
        15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
               Under de novo review and our strict standard for ﬁnding
        abandonment, Sprint did not abandon either mark at issue, which
        also supports the jury ﬁnding for Sprint on its cybersquatting claim.
                Retrobrands repeatedly emphasizes the variety of Nextel
        marks Sprint abandoned or cancelled. These do not matter be-
        cause abandonment is speciﬁc to a mark and its particular use.
        Here, the Nextel word mark at issue does not require a speciﬁc font
        or stylization, and its registration relates to use with telecommuni-
        cation equipment. Similarly, the chirp sound mark relates to
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        22-11717                  Opinion of the Court                               9

        telecommunication services. We only review the use of these two
        marks related to telecommunications equipment and services. 4
                 Sprint’s testimonial and physical evidence suﬃce to show
        continuous use of both marks during the relevant three years. At
        trial, a former Sprint executive testiﬁed that Sprint continued to use
        the Nextel word mark on packaging when selling the Sonim Strike
        XP from 2013 to 2018. Sprint also introduced a Sonim Strike XP
        package from 2013 featuring the Nextel word mark. Sprint’s wit-
        nesses testiﬁed that they continued to use the chirp sound mark in
        their devices and in promotional presentations. Calabrese started
        using his Nextel mark in 2016 and appeared at the same 2017
        tradeshow where Sprint used its Nextel word mark. Without three
        years of nonuse, Sprint did not abandon either mark. Absent a
        prima facie case, the remaining evidence does not support aban-
        donment by Sprint.
               Further, without abandonment, Retrobrands lacks a good
        faith defense for its cybersquatting claim. The cease-and-desist let-
        ter, independent internet searches showing Nextel products on
        Sprint’s website, and the USPTO’s decision not to grant Kaplan a

        4 Retrobrands submitted a motion to take judicial notice of Related USPTO

        Nextel Records: (1) USPTO TESS search dated May 2, 2023, listing 82 entries
        of Nextel marks as abandoned or dead; (2) USPTO webpage for a Nextel Black
        and Gold logo listed as dead; (3) USPTO webpage for a “Nextel Direct Con-
        nect Mark” listed as dead; and (4) USPTO webpage for “Sprint Together with
        Nextel Mark” listed as dead. We deny Retrobrands’ motion to take judicial
        notice of these records because they each relate to marks that are not at issue
        in this appeal.
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        22-11717

        trademark because his marks were confusingly similar to Sprint’s
        marks all combine to support ﬁnding Retrobrands lacked good
        faith.
               The jury found that Sprint had not abandoned the word
        mark or the sound mark and found in Sprint’s favor on the cyber-
        squatting claim. We decline to disturb the jury’s verdict given our
        ﬁnding that there was suﬃcient evidence to support such a verdict.5
                                               IV.
                We review Lanham Act damage awards for an abuse of dis-
        cretion. Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1988)
        (per curiam). The Lanham Act outlines speciﬁc statutory damages
        for using counterfeit marks—either between $1,000 and $200,000
        per counterfeit mark or up to $2 million per counterfeit mark when
        its use was willful. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). Cybersquatting in violation
        of § 1125(d)(1) can carry statutory damages of between $1,000 and
        $100,000 per domain name, “as the court considers just.” Id. at
        § 1117(d). Both provisions allow plaintiﬀs to elect damages “at any

        5 On appeal, Retrobrands also argued that the district court erred by denying

        its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding dilution.
        Retrobrands argued that Sprint did not present sufficient evidence that its
        marks were famous enough or had sufficient recognition for a successful dilu-
        tion claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). It may not be that the marks at issue are
        sufficiently famous for a dilution claim. But the statutory damages Sprint re-
        ceived only relate to its counterfeiting and cybersquatting claims. As the fol-
        lowing subsections explain, neither the monetary nor injunctive relief Sprint
        received requires finding in its favor on the dilution claim. Therefore, the dis-
        trict court’s error in allowing the jury to return a verdict on the dilution claim
        was harmless.
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        22-11717                Opinion of the Court                          11

        time before ﬁnal judgment is rendered by the trial court.” Id. at
        § 1117(c), (d).
                Sprint’s complaint requested both statutory and actual dam-
        ages. The jury calculated awards for several categories, which in-
        cluded the maximum amounts for each statutory award: $2 million
        for counterfeiting the Nextel word mark; $2 million for counterfeit-
        ing the chirp sound mark; and $500,000 for cybersquatting. Sprint
        elected the $4.5 million of statutory damages rather than $5.2 mil-
        lion in actual damages before the district court had ruled on its mo-
        tion for a permanent injunction. Sprint’s election occurred before
        the ultimate ﬁnal judgment. The district court did not abuse its
        discretion in awarding the statutory damages calculated by the jury.
                                           V.
               We review the granting of a permanent injunction for an
        abuse of discretion. Angel Flight of Ga., Inc. v. Angel Flight Am., Inc.,
        522 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. 2008). To receive a permanent in-
        junction, a plaintiﬀ must show:
               (1) it has suﬀered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies
               available at law, such as monetary damages, are inad-
               equate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering
               the balance of hardships between the plaintiﬀ and de-
               fendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the
               public interest would not be disserved by a perma-
               nent injunction.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11717

        Id. A plaintiﬀ seeking a permanent injunction is “entitled to a re-
        buttable presumption of irreparable harm upon a ﬁnding of a vio-
        lation identiﬁed in this subsection.” 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).
                As a threshold matter, Retrobrands argues that the district
        court lacked jurisdiction to enter a permanent injunction. Gener-
        ally, a district court no longer has jurisdiction over a case once a
        party enters a notice of appeal. In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1328
        (11th Cir. 2007). After a party ﬁles a notice of appeal, a district
        court retains jurisdiction over things that could help the appellate
        court exercise its jurisdiction. Id. Filing a premature notice of ap-
        peal does not strip the district court of this jurisdiction. See Gris
        v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam).
        Retrobrands decided to ﬁle the notice of appeal one day after ﬁling
        a motion for reconsideration of the judgment. Filing both motions
        meant the district court did not yet have an opportunity to rule on
        the motion for reconsideration, which made Retrobrands’ ﬁrst no-
        tice of appeal premature.
              Ultimately, the district court properly entered a permanent
        injunction. Because Retrobrands violated the Lanham Act, Sprint
        was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm. The
        circumstances satisfy the remaining prongs for granting a perma-
        nent injunction. Remedies at law are inadequate to address the
        harm of confusion that would arise without the injunction. Given
        the ﬁnding of infringement and counterfeit, the balancing of inter-
        ests weighs heavily in Sprint’s favor. Finally, entering a permanent
        injunction beneﬁts the public interest by preventing confusion
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        22-11717              Opinion of the Court                     13

        among ﬁrst responder consumers of push-to-talk devices.
        Retrobrands’ phones lack the priority service that ﬁrst responders
        associate with “Nextel” products. The district court did not abuse
        its discretion by entering a permanent injunction.
              AFFIRMED.