Court Opinion

ID: 9417213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:06:39.367182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:37.862334
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Clifford
and Mr. .Justice .Bradley, concurring in the judgment, delivered the following opinions.: —
Mr.- Justice Clifford.
Commercial law is a system of jurisprudence acknowledged by all maritime nations,- and upon no subject is it of ipore importance that there should be, as far ás practicable, uniformity of decision throughout the world.
Bills of exchange and promissory notes are commercial paper in the strictest sense, and as such must ever be regarded as favored instruments, as well on account Of their, negotiable quality, as their universal convenience in mercantile affairs; Everywhere the rule is that they may be transferred by indorsement, or when indorsed in blank or made payable to bearer they are transferable by mere delivery. International regulations ■ encourage their use as a safe and convenient medium for the settlement of balances among mercantile men *33of different nations, and any course of judicial decision calculated to restrain or impede their full and unembarrassed circulation for the purposes of .foreign or domestic trade would be contrary to the soundest principles of public policy. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 364.
Sufficient appears to ■ show that the corporation plaintiff became' the holder of the note de -ribed in the declaration, and that,, payment being refused, it instituted.the present action of assumpsit to recover, the amount. Service having been made, the defendant appeared and set up several- defences, which are fully exhibited in its answer filed in the case. ' Certain proceedings followed, which it is not necessary to notice, as -the parties by consent waived a jury and submitted the cause to the Circuit Court upon an agreed statement of facts. Hearing was- had, and the Circuit Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of the note - and costs of suit, and the defendant sued out the present writ of error'.'
Eight errors are assigned, but it will not be necessary to give the several assignments a ■ separate examination, as the questions presented .do not properly involve more than three material propositions 1. That the cause of action is barred by a former recovery in an action by the plaintiff against the indorsers of the note. 2. That the plaintiff, inasmuch as it holds the note as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, is not a bona fide holder of the same within the meaning of the commercial rule which shuts out proof of equities between the antecedent parties to the instrument. 3. That by the law of the State the plaintiff, in view of the facts exhibited in the agreed statement, is not entitled to the benefit of that rule, and that the law of the State in that regard furnishes in such a case the rule of decision in the Federal courts.
Special findings were made by the Circuit Court, from which-it appears that the defendant was the maker of the note, and that it was payable to. the order of it’s treasurer, by whom it was indorsed in blank, and that it was also indorsed by the firm of Palmer & Company, consisting of the president and financial agent of the corporation defendant.
■ Ego ugh appears to show that the note was made and indorsed for the sole purpose of raising money for the use of *34the defendant, nothing having -been paid to either of the indorsers for 'their indorsement. When duly executed and indorsed in blank, the defendant placed the note with dthers in the hands of a firm of note-brokers for sale to raise money for its use. Prior to that, .the same note-brokers had frequently borrowed ■ money from the corporation plaintiff; but they did not keep any account with the bank, and had no other transactions, with the same than those set forth in the findings of the court.
Twelve call-loans at seven per cent interest were, made at different times by the ..plaintiff to the note-brokers on collaterals, as specifically enumerated, and described in the findings, each of which was separate and had no reference to any other, and 'it appears that each was made upon a separate lpt of collaterals. Two of those loans, to wit, the one for $36,000, and the last one, which is for $10,000, will be the subject of special .comment in disposing of the case.
Before the brokers applied for the loan of $36,000, it appears that they had paid all their previous loans obtained from the plaintiff, and that they procured the loan upon .collaterals, among which was the note for $36,000 described in the findings. Other banks or capitalists made loans do tnese brokers, taking collaterals as security, and the plaintiff three weeks later loaned them $10,000 more, taking as security the four notes mentioned in the findings.
Adequate collaterals were at that time held by the plaintiff ■for each of those loans, but it appears that the promisors of one of the collaterals given for the last loan, within eleven days after the money was advanced, failed in . business and became notoriously bankrupt, and that knowledge of that fact reached the plaintiff. Prior to that, it was known that the brokers who negotiated the loans were insolvent, -and the' findings show that they, at the request of the plaintiff, executed and delivered to-it the instrument exhibited in the transcript, in which they agreed that all securities, bonds, stocks, or other property deposited by them with the plaintiff might be held by it, and be deemed security for all their indebtedness to the plaintiff, as more fully set forth in the findings.
Certain advances were made by.the brokers to the;d.efend*35ant, by reason of which the latter became indebted to them in the sum of §600,“ and it appears that the defendant tendered that sum both to the brokers and the plaintiff, and demanded .the return of note in suit.
Payment in full of the large note '-was obtained by the plaintiff out of the'collaterals originally deposited .with it for that purpose, and it appears'that the moneys collected from those collaterals exceeded the amount of that loan by the sum of §2,403.61, so that the entire balance 'remaining due on the last loan was §5,906.99.
Process to enforce'.payment was first sued out against, the indorsers, and in that action the plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum o’f §600, which sum, with the costs of suit, was duly pa-id ; and it appears that the balance due, deducting the collections from the collaterals and the judgment against the indorsers, is §5,136.68, for which, with, interest and costs, the judgment was entered in .the Circuit Cpurt.
Judgments rendered in courts of competent jurisdiction are conclusive between the parties and privies until the same- are reversed or in some manner set aside and annfilled.
When a fact has once been tried and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, it cannot be again .contested ■ between the same parties or their privies in -the same or any other court, if -it appear that the same matter was directly involved in the pleadings' and that the merits of the cause were decided in.' the first case.
Parties' and privies in such a case are bound, by the estoppel, ■but the holder of a negotiable bill of exchange or promissory • note may pursue his remedy, against the indorsers as well as the immediate promissory party. Consequently, as stated by Mr. Bigelow, an indorsee of a bill of exchange or promissory note may sue all the prior parties concurrently or successively at his election, subject to .the' condition that he is entitled to but one satisfaction. Bigelow, Estoppel (2d ed.), 55; Bishop v. Haywood, 4 T. R. 478; Britten v. Webb, 2 Barn. & Cress. 483; Windham v. Wither, 1 Stra. 515; Burgess v. Merrill, 4 Taunt. 468; Farwell v. Hilliard, 3 N. H. 318; Porter v. Ingraham, 10 Mass. 88.
Authorities to show that the holder in such a case is not *36estopped to sue the maker because he has recovered judgment against the indorser are numerous and decisive. Russell & Erwin Manuf. Co. v. Carpenter, 5 Hun (N. Y.), 162; Story, Promissory Notes (7th ed.), sect. 401; Pritchard v. Hitchcock, 6 Man. & G. 151, 201.
Suppose that is so, then it is insisted by the defendant that the plaintiff is not a bona-fide holder for value in the usual course of business within the meaning of the commercial law.
Questions of fact are set at rest'by tlie findings, from which it appears that the note is payable to the treasurer of the defendant or order, by whom it was indorsed in blank as well as by the firm, ■ consisting of the president and financial agent of the company; that it was placed by the maker' in the hands of the brokers for sale to raise money for the use of the maker, and that the plaintiff loaned the full amount of the note to the agents of the defendant and took the note indorsed in blank as collateral security for the loan before maturity. None of these matters are disputed, and it is equally and undeniably true that the whole of the money loaned went into the hands of the defendant, in pursuance of the arrangement it made with its own agents.
Neither fraud nor mistake is alleged or even suggested in respect to any one of tjiese matters, from which it follows, as a .necessary legal conclusion, that the plaintiff became the actual holder of the note in good faith before ’ maturity by delivery from the agents of the defendant, and that it as such assumed .the responsibility to demand payment of the maker when the note fell due, and, if not paid, to give the required notice of nonpayment to the indorsers.
Beyond, all question, the findings show that the plaintiff in good faith became a party to the note described in the declaration before maturity, and that as such holder it was bound to adopt proper measures to fix the liability of the indorsers, and that if it had failed to demand payment of the maker, or to give the required notice to the indorsers, it would have become liable to the party from whom it received the noté for whatever loss ensued from such neglect. Such a holder of a foreign bill of exchange, if not paid at maturity, must see that it is duly protested; and for the same reason the holder of an inland *37bill or negotiable promissory note must see to it that proper steps are taken, in case of non-payment by the acceptor or maker, to fix the liability of parties to the instrument who would otherwise be discharged.
Securities of a negotiable character may be transferred'by indorsement made at the time they are delivered, or if indorsed in blank or made payable to bearer, they may be transferred by mere delivery without any new indorsement. In either case, t"he holder, other things being equal, acquires full title to the instrument, the correct commercial rule being that whoever lawfully and in good faith becomes the holder of a valid negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note before maturity, by direct indorsement or by delivery when indorsed in blank or made payable to bearer, assumes the responsibility, if not paid when it falls due, of entering protest or of making demand and giving notice of non-payment as the case may require; and. that in all cases of such a transfer the holder, whether he paid cash for the note or made new advances to the transferrer, or accepted it in substitution of prior collaterals surrendered, or received it in payment of property sold or of antecedent indebtedness, or as collateral security of a pre-existing debt or-any pecuniary liability for the pledgor, is a holder for value ,in the usual course of business within the meaning of the commercial law, and is unaffected by any equities between the antecedent parties, provided he took it in .good faith and without notice of anything to impeach the title of the person from' whom it was received.
Authorities everywhere agree at the present time that a bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument for a valuable consideration, without notice of anything which impeaches its validity, if he takes it under an indorsement made before maturity, holds the title unaffected by any equities between-the antecedent parties, even though as between them it may be without any legal validity. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 15.
Instruments of the' kind are commercial paper in the strictest sense, and must ever be regai-ded as favored securities, on account of their universal convenience in mercantile transactions and the settled rule is that transferees of the same hold the instrument clothed with the presumption that it was nego*38tiated for value, in the usual course of business, at the time of its execution, and without notice of any equities between the antecedent parties to the instrument. Collins v. Gilbert, 94 U. S. 753.
Possession of such an instrument before maturity, if indorsed in blank or payable to bearer, is prima facie evidence that the ■ holder is. the owner and lawful possessor of the same; and nothing short- of proof that he had knowledge, at the time he took it, .of the facts which impeach the title as between the antecedent parties, not even gross negligence, if unattended1 with mala fides, is sufficient to overcome the effect of that evidence, or to• invalidate the.title of the holder supported by that presumption. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 365; Bank v. Leighton, 2 Exch. Rep. 61; Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 545, 550; Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 247, 249.
•Apply that rule in- an. action by the transferee against the maker, of a negotiable note indorsed in blank, or payable to bearer, and it-is clear that he has nothing'to do in the opening of his case except to prove the signatures to" the instrument and introduce the same in evidence, as the instrument goes to the-jury clbtiled with the presumption that'the plaintiff became the holder of the same for value at its'date in the usual course of lousiness, without notice of anything to impeach his title. Pettee v. Pfout, 3 Gray (Mass.), 502; Way v. Richardson, id. 412.
Clothed as the 'instrument is with the described presumption, the plaintiff is not bound to give any' evidence to show that he gave value for the same until the other party has clearly proved that the consideration was illegal, or that the instrument was fraudulent in1 its inception, or that it had been lost or stolen before it came to the possession of the holder. Fitch v. Jones, 5 El. & Bl. 238; Smith v. Braine, 16 Ad. & E. n. s. 242; Hall v. Featherstone, 3 H. & N. 282.
Cases arise where the supposed-defect or the infirmity of the title‘appears on the face of the instrument j and where that is so, .the question whether the party who took it had notice or not -is in general a question of construction; and must be determined by the court as matter of law'. Andrews v. Pond, *3913 Pet. 65; Fowler v. Brantley, 14 id. 318; Brown v. Davis, 3 T. R. 86.
Decided cases of .the highest authority support that proposition, but it is a very, different matter when it is proposed to impeach the title of the holder by proof of facts and circumstances outside of the instrument itself, as he is then to be affected, if at all, by wrhat has occurred between other parties. For his own acts he is plainly responsible, but he may well claim exemption from any consequences flowing from the acts of others, unless it be first clearly shown that he had knowledge of such facts and circumstances at the time he became the holder of the instrument. Actual knowledge of such'facts and circumstances must be'proved to defeat the title of the holder; and the question whether he had such knowledge or not is a question of fact for the jury, and, like other questions of scienter, must be submitted to their determination.
Indorsers of negotiable securities enjoyed, the protection1 of that rule for ages before any successful attempt was made to annex to it any qualification, unless it appeared that the consideration was illegal,-.or that the instrument was fraudulént in its inception, or that it had been lost or stolen before it came to the possession of the holder. Hinton's Case, 2 Show. 235; Anonymous, 1 Salk. 126; Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452; Grant v. Vaughan, 3 id. 1516; Peacock v. Rhodes, 2 Doug. 633; Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56.
Throughout the whole period - covered by those decisions it was universally understood that the title of the bona fide holder was unaffected by any equities between the antecedent parties; but it was subsequently decided that if the indorser of' the instrument had no valid title to the samé, and that such facts and circumstances were known to the indorsee, at the time of the transfer, as would have caused a person of ordinary prudence to suspect that the indorser had no right to transfer the instrument or to use the same for his own benefit, then the holder, as against the acceptor or maker, is not entitled to. recover. Gill v. Cubitt, 3 Barn. & Cress. 466.
For a brief period that rule- was followed, but it was never ..satisfactory, and at the end of twelve years was distinctly overruled in the tribunal- where it was first promulgated. *40Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870; Arbouin v. Anderson, 1 Ad. & E. n. s. 498.
We must hold, said Lord Denman, in the ease last cited, that the owner of a bill of exchange is entitled to recover upon it if he has come by it honestly, and that that1 fact is implied prima facie by possession, and that, to meet the inference so raised, fraud, felony, or some such matter must be proved.
Abundant authority to support the proposition that the case which for a period relaxed that rule has been overruled for more than half a century is found in the reported cases already cited, and Mr. Chitty says that the old rule of law, that the holder of a negotiable security transferable by delivery can give a title, which he himself does not possess, to a person taking the same bona fide for value, is by those decisions again re-established in its fullest extent. Chitty, Bills (13th ed.), 257; Worcester County Bank v. Dorchester & Milton Bank, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 491. Conclusive support to that conclusion is found in decisions not previously .cited and in the text-writers of the highest authority. Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22 How. 96; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110.
Nothing short of fraud, not even gross negligence, says Mr. Justice Story, if unattended with mala.fides on the part of the taker of the instrument, will invalidate his title so- as to prevent him from recoveiing the amount. Story, Promissory Notes (7th ed.), sect. 382. Every person, says the same learned author, is treated in the sense of the rule as a bona fide holder for value, not only who has advanced money or other value for it, but who has received it in payment'of a precedent debt, or has a lien on it, or has taken it-as collateral security for a precedent debt, or for future as well as for past advances. Story on Bills (4th ed.), sect. 192.
During the period the modified rule referred to was recognized as good law in the courts of the country where it was first promulgated, it must be admitted -that the courts of several of the States in our own- country accepted the same rule, and that the pernicious effects resulting from those examples are still to be seen in some of the more recent -State decisions. Attempt was made at one time to maintain that the holder of a negotiable security, if he received it as payment of a precedent *41debt, could not be regarded as a bona fide holder for value in the usual course of business, even though he took it without notice of any defect in the title of the transferrer, or of any equities between the antecedent parties; but that erroneous rule of decision is abandoned and overruled. Bank of St. Albans v. Gilliland, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 311; Small v. Smith, 1 Den. (N. Y.) 583, 586; Edwards, Bills and Notes (2d ed.), 322.
Reported cases also show that'it-was decided during that period in the courts of the samé State that if ajparty in good faith took a negotiable security of a holder without due inquiry, or with knowledge of such facts and circumstances as would put a prudent man upon inquiry in-making purchases of personal property, he would not acquire a good title to the instrument, if it appeared that equities existed between the antecedent parties, and that vigilant inquiry would have enabled the taker to have ascertained the true character of those equities; but .the appellate tribunal of the State has exploded that legal heresy as applied to negotiable securities, and has in that respect adopted the true commercial rule as administered in the courts of Westminster Hall. Pringle v. Phillips, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 157; Welch v. Sage, 47 N. Y. 143, 147.
Prior to the decision in the case- of Gill v. Cubitt, the rule was that nothing short of proof of knowledge of the facts and circumstances constituting the equities between the antecedent parties would enable the maker to defend the suit of the holder; but the court in that case decided that the transferee could-not recover if the circumstances under which the transfer took place were such as would naturally have excited the suspicion of a prudent and careful man. State court decisions in many cases followed that erroneous theory; but the case itself has been authoritatively overrüled in £he tribunal where it had its origin, and the old rule as re-established by the later adjudications has been in repeated instances adopted by this court and by the highest courts of the State where the present controversy arose. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 364; Seybel v. National Currency Bank, 54 N. Y. 288, 295; Dutchess Insurance Co. v. Hachfield, 73 id. 226.
Much progress, it will be seen from the preceding observations,, has been made within the last thirty years in-securing *42uniformity of decision in. respect to mercantile controversies between tbe Federal, and State courts, and tbe courts of this country and those of the parent country, from which most of our commercial rules and usages are derived; Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29.
Concede all that, and still it is insisted by the defendant that the plaintiff took the note merely as a collateral security for a pre-existing debt, without any, present consideration at the time of the transfer, and that’ a party who tabes a negotiable security under such circumstances cannot be regarded as acquiring i¿ in the usual course of business, and consequently that he takes it subject to prior equities. Many decisions- of the courts of tjie State concur that" if there is a present consideration at the time of the transfer, independent.of the previous indebtedness, a party acquiring a' negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note before maturity as a collateral security for a pre-existing:, debt, without knowledge of the facts which impeach the title as between the antecedent parties, thereby becomes a holder in the usual course of business, and that his title is complete,, so that it will not be affected by any prior equities between other parties, at least to the extent óf the debt for which it'-is so held. White v. Springfield Bank, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 222; New York Marbled Iron Works v. Smith, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 362.
When commercial paper is pledged by the apparent owner before it matures as collateral security for advances, the pledgee ifi good faith is entitled-to. hold it for the amount of snch advances', though it turns out afterwards that the papty making the pledge was a mere agent for the true owner, and that the transaction was ,a breach of duty to the principal. Belmont Branch Bank v. Hoge, 35 N. Y. 65; Murray v. Beckwith, 81 Ill. 43.
Where full-value is paid by the pledgee, and the transfer is made before maturity, without notice 'of any prior equities between the antecedent parties, the title of the holder of the security is not' subject to be defeated, by proof that he might have obtained such notice by the exercise of active vigilance. Cash advances or the sale of goods or other property will constitute a good consideration for the'transfer; nor is such a pay*43■ment or sale indispensable,'as it is equally well settled that the-actual discharge of a precedent debt, or the surrender of prior collaterals, or a binding agreement to give time for the payment of a debt then due, will have the same effect. Elting v. Vanderlyn, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 237; Morton v. Burn, 7 Ad. & E. 19; Jennison v. Stafford, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 168; Baker v. Walker, 14 Mee. & W. 465; Walton v. Mascall, 13 id. 452; Wheeler v. Slocum, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 62; Kearslake v. Morgan, 5 T. R. 513.
Examples given by Mr. Justice Story show that the receiving a note as security for a debt, or forbearance to sue a present claim or debt, or an exchange of securities,. or becoming a surety, or doing any other act at the request or for the benefit of the maker or indorser, will constitute a sufficient consideration for. a note as well as the payment of money, or the making of- advances, or giving' credit, or the -discharge of a present debt, or the performance of work or labor at the request of the party. Story, Promissory Notes (7th ed.),'sect. 186.
Differences of opinion, however, still exist where the transfer is made as a collateral security for a pre-existing debt, without any other consideration than what flows from the nature of-the contract at the time the instrument is delivered, and such as may ba inferred from the- relation of debtor and creditor in! respect to the pre-existing"debt.
Further argument to show that where negotiable .paper is .received in payment and extinguishment of a pre-existing.-debt ■the holder is.entitled to protection is quite unnecessary, as the ..authorities in support of the proposition, even in this country, are quite too numerous for citation. Townsley v. Gramrall 2 Pet. 170, 182; Parsons, Bills and Notes, 221.
Nor is it necessary to add anything to prove that the title of the holder is good if he took the note outright for goods or other property sold and delivered to the t^ansfer-rer bf the note at-'the time the transfer was made. All this is admitted, or if not admitted is so fully established hylauthority as not-to re-' -quire any further argument in its support'. Substantial uniformity of judicial opinion exists (both in this country and in England to that extent, but there is «-still stnne diversity of decision in this country upon the question whether the .same *44conclusion will follow where the negotiable security is transferred ar collateral security, without any other consideration than the delay of payment incident to the transaction and what flows from the relation of debtor- and creditor in respect to the existing debt and 'the obligation which the transferee assumes by the reception of the negotiable instrument before maturity. Standard decisions of the State courts are referred to by the defendant where it is held that the title of the holder under such circumstances is not good. Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 54, 59; Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 637, 644; Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 93, 95.
Sixty years have elapsed since the commercial rule adopted and enforced .by that series of decisions was first promulgated, and yet it does not and never has commanded the slightest countenance from any court sitting in Westminster Hall. Earnest differences of opinion existed in that country among judicial-men in respect to the. extent of the protection which the commercial law afforded to a Iona fide holder of a negotiable security against the equities between the antecedent parties, but there is no authentic evidence that any substantial diversity of opinion ever arose in- thé courts of that country touching the question under consideration.
Partners engaged in business being -in want of available means, the senior member gave his note to a bank to enable the firm to overdraw their account, and the junior member gave his note to the maker of the first note for half the amount. In the course of subsequent transactions the payee of thé last note indorsed it to his creditors as collateral security for a preexisting debt. Payment of the note being refused, the holders sued the maker, who made defence that the plaintiffs were not bona fide holders; but the court held otherwise, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, separate opinions being given by all the justices.of the court. Heywood v. Watson, 1 M. & P. 268; s. c. 4 Bing. 496.
Consideration was given for the note in the case of Percival v. Brampton (2 C., M. & R. 180), but the court unanimously held, that, if the note had been transferred merely as a collateral security for a previous debt, the plaintiffs might properly be ¿escribed as holders for a valuable consideration.
*45Holders of a negotiable security transferred before maturity as a collateral security for a pre-existing débt become parties to the instrument to such an extent that they assume the responsibility of making demand and giving the required notice to fix the liability of the indorser; and it is held that where a creditor received such a security from the debtor and failed to make seasonable demand of payment, that his laches as between himself and his debtor were equivalent to the payment of the collateral. Peacock v. Purcell, 14 C. B. n. s. 728; Taylor v. Williams, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 44.
Proof of fraud may defeat the right of the holder in such a ease, but where there is no such proof the settled rule in England is that a party taking a negotiable instrument as a collateral security takes it for a sufficient consideration and is entitled to recover. Poirier v. Morris, 22 Law J. Rep. n. s. Q. B. 313; s. c. 2 El. & Bl. 89, 104.
Securities of the kind were deposited by the defendant with the plaintiffs as collaterals for a pre-existing debt, among which was the check in controversy, and it appeared that the defendants having failed to pay the debt the plaintiffs brought an action on the check, the defence being the want of consideration and that the plaintiffs were not holders for value; but the Court of Exchequer ruled otherwise, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, from which the defendant appealed to the Exchequer Chamber. Both parties were fully heard in the appellate tribunal, and the court decided that the title of a creditor to a negotiable security transferred to him on account of a pre-existing debt, if received Iona fide, without notice of any infirmity in the title of the debtor, is indefeasible, whether the instrument is payable at a future time or on demand. Currie v. Misa, Law Rep. 10 Ex. 153.
Questions of various kinds, it seems, were discussed in the subordinate court; but the statement of the justice who gave the opinion of the court in the appellate tribunal is, that the argument was addressed almost entirely to the question whether an existing debt formed of itself a sufficient consideration for a negotiable security payable on demand, so as to constitute the creditor to whom'it was paid a holder for value; and the court, 'Justice Lush giving the opinion, decided that question in the *46affirmative." Efis reasons for the conclusion are cogent and satisfactory, and in the course . of the opinión he remarked that “ it was not disputed on the argument, nor could it be, that if instead of a check the security had been a bill or note, payable at a subsequent date,.however short, the plaintiffs’ title would have been unimpeachable; ”• to.which he also added, that the proposition had been' established by many authorities, both-in that country and in the American courts.
Ntf attempt was- made to controvert that proposition as applied to bills or notes payable at a future day; but the defendant insisted that inasmuch- as .the check was payable on demand the rule did not apply,.as there was no consideration, because-it could notj be implied that there was any agreement for delay. •Suffice it to say in that regard that the court decided that the supposed distinction “ had no foundation either in principle or upon authority,” and proceeded to remark that it does not' follow that thejegal element of consideration is entirely absent, where the security is payable immediately.
Forbearance is doubtless a good consideration for the trans-: fer of such an instrument; but á, valuable consideration in the sense of the law, as the court remarked in that case, may consist either in.- some right, interest, .profit, or benefit accruing .to. .'the one party, or some extension of time of payment, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the-other.
. Call-loans- may be regarded as payable on demand, and, inasmuch as the collateral in' this case was payable'at a future-day, the implication' -is not an unreasonable one that the, arrangement operated as an injury to the holder.and as a benefit to-the debtor and pledgor. Such a reason may doubtless have weight; but it is by no means certain that it is the 'true foundation of the title of' the holder, as other authorities hold that' a negotiable security-transferred for such a purpose is in some-sense a conditional payment of the debt, the condition being that the debt revives if the security is not realized. Belshaw v. Bush, 11 C. B. 191-205; Griffiths v. Owen, 18 Mee. & W. 58, 64.
Still not satisfied; the'defendant in the case (Currie v. Misa) appealed' from the judgment of affirmance rendered in the *47Exchequer Chamber to the House of Lords. Much instruction is derived in respect to the issue between the parties by referring to the propositions maintained by the counsel of the appellant, of which the following are the most important: 1.' That there was a total failure of consideration, inasmuch as the defendant 'Misa never received any- value for his’ draft except the. four bills which were dishonored. 2. That the check in question was not a bill of exchange, nor a promissory note, nor an order for the payment of money on demand. 3. That the existence .of a past debt is not a sufficient consideration for the transfer of the check.
Enough is reported of the arguments .for the appellant to show that nothing was left undone by his counsel in their power to do. to 'sustain those propositions'; but the learned judges overruled them all, and affirmed the judgment rendered in the two lower • courts. In giving the ■ principal opinion, Lord Chelmsford said that he entertained no doubt that, as between the defendant and the depositor of the check, there was a sufficient consideration, and that the bankers were holders for value, and he proceeded to remark that the counsel of the appellant admit that if the judges are of that opinion it will dispose of the case. All the judges concurred that the holders were holders' for value, and the result was the same as in the court of original jurisdiction. Misa v. Currie, 1 App. Cas. 554, 563.
Corresponding views are held in th'e Queen’s Bench, in the Court of Appeals, and in the High Court of Chancery. Where a party by. means of a false pretence, or-condition which he does not fulfil, procures another party to give him a note or acceptance in' favor of a third person, to whom he pays it and who receives it Iona fide for value, the Queen’s Bench decided that the giver remains liable to pay the same, because his acceptance or transfer of the same imports value prima facie, and he can only relieve himself from his promise to pay the holder by showing that he is not a holder for value, or that he received the instrument in bad faith, or with notice of its infirmity. Watson v. Russell, 3 B. & S. 34, 40.
Two of the justices‘concurred in that proposition without any qualification, and the Chief Justice'also concurred in the *48same to the extent of the debt of the holder it was pledged to secure, which is the sqme rule-that Shaw, C. J., with the concurrence of all his associates, adopted nearly twenty years earlier.- Chicopee Bank v. Chapin, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 40.
Commercial securities, when transferred to discharge a preexisting debt, it is admitted, give the holder a good title which will shut out- prior equities; and the Court of Appeals in a recent case decided that there was no difference in that regard between past and present consideration to be found in the books, and held that the transfer of a bill of lading for a valuable consideration to a bona fide transferee defeats the right of stoppage in transitu of the unpaid vendor of the goods, ■although the consideration was past and not given at the time the bill of lading was delivered to the transferee by the lawful holder. Leask v. Scott, 2 Q. B. D. 376, 380.
Certain bankers pressed their debtors for better security, .and the debtors., having promised to comply with.the request, hypothecated merchandise-for the purpose,'evidenced.by warehouse .certificates, which the debtors agreed to ■ deliver as. soon as they could be procured from the warehouse. They, the debtors, procured the warrants,'but.refused to deliver the same, when- the plaintiffs ’ instituted the present suit, to which the respondents demurred, insisting that the existence of the debt is no sufficient consideration for such an agreement. Among, other things, the respondents contended that the allegations of the bill did not exhibit a transaction where the complainants promised to abstain from ■ suing their demand for any certain time;' but the Vice-Chancellor held that the bankers did in •effect give, arid that the respondents did receive, the benefit of some degree of forbearance and benefit that they would not have obtained if they had not made the agreement, and the demurrer was accordingly overruled. Alliance Bank v. Broom & Co., 2 Drew. & Sm. 289.
■ Without more, these authorities are sufficient to show that there is but one voice upon the subject in the courts of the parent country, and that they, speak to the point with a degree of unanimity and uniformity well .calculated to excite admiration and to inspire confidence that the- rule of decision is both correct and just. ."Not only every court, but every *49judge of every oourt,'in that country concurs in the proposition, that the holder of such a negotiable security- before maturity, as collateral to a pre-existing debt without notice of any prior equities; is a bona fide holder for value in the usual course of business, and that his title to the instrument is good, and wholly unaffected by any such prior equities between the antecedent parties.. Text-writers everywhere adopt the same rule, and recogijize and commend it as the correct and true rule of decision. . -
So, if a bill or note b,e indorsed as a collateral security, says Chittv, that is an adequate consideration to enable the party to sue thereon, though he advanced ho new credit-on the bill or note at the time; and he lays down the same rule as to the receipt of a bill or note in payment of a pre-existing debt. Chitty, Bills (13th ed'.), 74.
In the ordinary course of things, says Mr. Justice Story, the holder is presumed to be the prima facie holder of such a security for value, and he is not -bound to' give evidence that he •gave any value for it, until the other party establishes the want or failure ,or illegality of the consideration, or that the bill had been lost or stolen before it came -to the possession of the holder. It may then be incumbent- on' him to show, that-he has given value for it, because.he ought not, under such circumstances, to be placed in a better situation than the antecedent parties through whom he obtained the instrument. Story, Bills (4th ed.), sect. 193; Story, Notes (7th ed.), sects. 195, 196.
A creditor, says Byles, may agree to take a bill as collateral security for a debt already due, without affecting his present, right to sue for the debt; but, if a creditor elects so to do, he becomes the.trustee to that extent of the debtor, and is'bound to perform the duties of a holder, in respect to presentment and notice of dishonor, and, if he fail to dó'so, the parties'only liable conditionally are discharged, as no one but the actual, holder can perform those duties. Byles, Bills (5th Am. ed.), 369; Peacock v. Purcell, 32 L. J. 256; s. c. 14 C. B. n. s. 728.
- Litigated qases often arise where there is a present consideration given for the transfer;. and- Mr. Daniel regards it as *50agreed that the holder • of the collateral -security, in all such cases, is a bona fide holder lor value, if he took the security without notice of any equities between the antecedent parties, or if there was any agreement, express or implied, to. give time of payment of the debt to:tke debtor ; but he admits that, where neither of these conditions exists in the case, the- question is one of more difficulty. Those two propositions he supports by sound reasons and convincing suggestions, and then proceeds to examine the argument for and against the proposition, that the same conclusion should be reached even where there is no new consideration other than what arises from the relation of debtor and creditor, nor any express agreement to extend the time of payment. His view is, that the issue in such a case must turn upon the question whether there' is any implied suspension of the prior debt until the collateral becomes due, and that an .implied agreement is as binding as one expressed in terms, of which it is supposed no one entertains the least doubt.
Different' examples are put by the author, and the proper presumption in each supposed case is stated; but he finally comes to the conclusion that, inasmuch as- the holder in such a case becomes a party to the collateral security, and that he thereby assumes the burden as such holder of fixing the liability of the indorser, he is properly, to be regarded as a holder for value, if he took the-collateral in good faith and without notice of any equities between the antecedent parties. 1 Daniel, Negotiable Securities (2d ed.), sects. 827-830; Blanchard v. Stevens, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 162, 167; Maitland v. Citizens' National Bank of Baltimore, 40 Md. 540, 564.
Three of the theories involved in the controversy are presented by Mr. Parsons for caréful examination; 1. Where negotiable paper is received in payment of an antecedent debt; but further discussion of that topic is unnecessary, as it is conceded in this case that the title of the holder in such a case is as good as if the contents were paid in cash. 2. .Where it is received as collateral security for a pre-existing debt. 3. Where it is received as collateral security'for a debt-contracted at the ■date of the transfer.
Two objections, as the author states, are usually taken to each of the last two theories: 1. That, as no new consideration *51is paid by the bolder, he .is not .injured by the impeachment of his title. 2. That such a transfer as is supposed in either of the last two cases is not One made in the usual course of business.-
Transfers of negotiable securities, for the purpose supposed, are seldoni made, except in the execution of some agreement or understanding, by which the transferrer is to be benefited ; as by delay or forbearance or further credit, or the giving up of other collaterals, or the substitution of one collateral for another, or the promise to forego the means of obtaining other indemnity or security.
Few cases, it is presumed, arise where the interest of,’ the debtor is not consulted; so _ that; if the rule should be confined to the oases falling within the abstract theory of such a defence, the question would cease to be of much importance, nor would> it often-be true that', if the title of the . holder should be impeached, he would be left in as good condition as, he was befofe." 1 Parsons, Bills and Notes, 219.
Debtors are often benefited by-delay, but creditors are usually sufferers. Transactions of the kind, .it is said, are not to be regarded as transfers made in the usual course of business; but the court is unable to adopt that conclusion, as the statement of the learned author is believed to be correct, that a large part of the use that is made of negotiable paper is as a means of borrowing money or .of securing debts previously contracted.-^.
Bills and instruments of the’ kind, indorsed in blank or payable to bearer, when transferred to an innocent holder create the same liability as if indorsed at the time of the transfer. Where a party executed such a note to take up a prior note, and his agent delivered it to a third person as collateral security for his own pre-éxisting debt, Shaw,, C. J.,‘ held that the holder took a good title as against the maker to the extent of his debt, but that he could not recover any more than the amount of his pre-existing debt. Stoddard v. Kimball, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 469.
Adjudged cases, almost without number,, decide that, where the pre-existing debt is discharged,, the title of the innocent holder is beyond question; but frequent attempt is made "to show that there is a distinction between taking such a note in *52payment of a pre-existing debt and taking it as a collateral security for sueb a payment. One whose debt is due, says Redfield, C. J., must pay it, or become a bankrupt in the commercial sense. If, instead of money, he gives a bill or note, either on time or at sight, whether this is payment in form or is given as collateral to his debt, he gains time, and is saved from the disgrace and ruin consequent upon stopping payment. Viewed as'it may be, the debtor' in either case derives the benefit of an implied' understanding that the creditor will not immediately press for payment, unless the new sécurity proves unproductive, and, if it does, that the creditor may.pursue any other proper remedy. Difference in form between payment and collateral security, it-was admitted, existed; but the court unanimously held that there was no difference in principle, provided the indorsement was unqualified, so as to impose upon the holder the obligation to conform to the law merchant in enforcing payment. Atkinson v. Brooks, 26 Vt. 569, 576.
Other State decisions, too numerous for citation, hold that a party "taking -a negotiable note in payment of, or as a collateral security for, a precedent debt, is a bona fide holder for a valuable consideration, and that he is entitled to the same protection as a holder who receives the same in payment for goods delivered at the time of the transfer, or one who pays cash for the instrument when it is delivered. Allaire v. Hartshorne, 21 N. J. L. 665; Hamilton v. Vought, 84 id. 187, 191; Culver v. Benedict, 13 Gray (Mass.), 7, 10; Johnson v. Way, 27 Ohio St. 374, 379; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388; Gwynn v. Lee, 9 Gill (Md.), 138.
Even suppose that the title of the plaintiffs is good under the rule of the commercial law, as understood and administered in the’Federal courts, still it is insisted by the defendants that the State courts have adopted a different .rule in such a case, and that the State rule of decision is the one applicable in the case before, the court. Both parties are citizens of the same State; and it must: be admitted that if the State rule is applicable in the case, then the ruling of the Circuit Court is erroneous. Various arguments were advanced in support of the proposition, but the one most pressed is that derived from the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act, which provides that the laws of *53the several States, except where'.the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise reqúire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, fin cases where, they apply. 1 Stat. 92.
State laws furnish rules of decision in trials at common law in the Federal courts, in cases where they apply, which leaves it plainly to be understood that those laws do not apply in all cases, and it was early decided that they do not apply to the process and practice of the Federal courts. Wyman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1.
In cases depending on the statutes of a State, and more especially in those representing titles to land, the court adopts the construction of the State, where that construction is settled and can bé ascertained. Polk's Lessee v. Wendell, 9 Cranch, 87, 98.
Where any rule of real property has been settled in the State courts, the same rule will be applied by this court that would be applied by them. Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 162.
Controversies often arise where this court will refuse to adopt a decision of th'e State court, as in the-construction of a will, unless it'appears that the decision has become, by acquiescéncé, a rule of property in the State. Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464, 476.
Three decisions from the State courts show that the rule of decision adopted by the courts of the State at that period ■ support the views of the defendants, and we regret to say that-the-tendency of some of the later, decisions in the same tribunals are in the same direction. Atlantic National Bank of New York v. Franklin, 55 N. Y. 235.
Such being the fact, it becomes necessary to decide the question whether the decisions of a State'court compel this court to apply to the facts of the case a rule of decision, believed to be -in direct conflict with the rule of commercial law. Nearly forty years have elapsed since this question was first presented to this court for decision. Doubts were then entertained whether the State rule was absolutely settled; but, for the purposes of the decision, that point was unconditionally ad*54mitted. Then as now the chief argument in support of the proposition was that the question was controlled by the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act, to which the court responded,-in the first place, by denying that the word “laws,” used in the section, included the decisions of the local tribunals within the scope of its meaning. In the ordinary meaning of language, said Mr. Justice Story, it will'hardly be contended that the decisions of the courts constitute laws, adding that, at most, they are only evidence of what the law is, and are not of themselves laws. They are often re-examined, reversed, and qualified by the courts themselves, whenever they are' found to be either defective or ill-founded or.otherwise incorrect.
His views were that the laws of a State are more usually understood to be the rules and enactments of the legislature, or long established local customs having the force of laws. None, it is believed, can dissent-from that view, and we have the authority of that opinion for saying that', in all cases prior to that time,.the court had uniformly supposed that the section, when properly interpreted, was limited in its application to State laws.strictly local, and'the construction thereof by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a. permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intra-territorial in their nature and character; that the court had never supposed that the section applied, or was designed to apply, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, nor to questions of general commercial law
These views were enforced, by many other illustrations, and the court decided — every member of the court but one concurring — that the section, upon its true intendment and construction; is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages, and that it does not extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect of which are. to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 18.
Judicial view's of a corresponding character were expressed by Lord Mansfield, as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, nearly a century earlier, when he said that the maritime law is not-the *55law of a particular country, but' tbe general law of nations. Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 882.
Mr. Justice Story referred to that case, in support of the decision of the court, and quoted the celebrated maxim of Cicero, which, liberally interpreted, is to the effect that maritime law is not one thing in one Mm try and another thing in a different country, nor one thing to-day and another to-morrow, but that, in all times and nations, it is immutable and imperishable. Translation by Yonge -(London, 1858), 360.
Commercial law, says Bouvier, is a phrase employed tos denote the branch of the law which relates to the rights of property and the relations of persons engaged in commerce. Persons engaged in commercial adventures, wherever they may have their domicile, have business relations throughout the civilized world, from which it results that commercial law is less local and more international than any other system of law, except the law of nations.
Codes, laws, and ordinances, of. other States, says a learned writer, whether ancient or modern, are received by the courts with great respect, not as containing any authority in themselves, but as evidence of the general law merchant. Wbiere these are contradicted by judicial decisions, they cease to have any value in the jurisdiction where the law is decided to be the other way. Levi (2d ed.), 2.
Authoritative support to the proposition, that the decisions of the State courts do not control in such a case, is also derived from other decisions of this court, in which every member of the court concurred. Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Insurance Co., 16 Pet. 495, 511.
Insurance against fire in that case was effected by a mortgagor, and one of the questions was as to the amount the insured was entitled to recover. Reported cases from the State reports wére referred to as furnishing the rule, of decision. Responsive to that argument, Mr. Justice. Story remarked, among other things, that the question presented was a question of general commercial law, involving the construction of an insurance contract, which is by no means local in-its character, or regulated by any local policy or customs; that the decisions of the State tribunals are entitled to great respect, but that *56they cannot conclude the judgment of this court in such a case; and that this court is bound to interpret the instrument according to its own opinion of its true intent and objects.
Equally decisive views have often been expressed by this court in other cases, of which one, deserves special notice. Preliminary to the point decided, the court very properly ad-' mitted that the Federal courts will pay due .regard to the laws of the States and their construction by the State tribunals; but the court decided, Mr. Justice Harlan giving the opinion, that this court is not bound by the decisions of the State courts in determining a question of general commercial law; that such is the established doctrine of the court, so frequently announced as not to require any extended citation of authorities in its support. Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239; Amis v. Smith, 16 Pet. 303, 314; Conkling’s Treatise (5th. ed.), 140.
Argument to show that the decisions of this court referred to contradict the decisions of the State court upon the matter in decision is quite unnecessary, as that'is admitted. Nor is it-correct to suppose that the leading case, contradicting the views of the State court, is unsupported to its full extent' by other decisions of this court. • Instead of that, the doctrines of that case were directly and fully reaffirmed in the following case, decided more than twelve years later. Watson v. Tarpley, 18 How. 517.
State legislation, as shown in that case, had prescribed regulations in' respect to the protest of bills of exchange, and notice of their dishonor repugnant to the'requirements of the law merchant; and this court held that the State regulations were not operative, and that the payee or indorsee of the bill, in spite of the State law, might enforce his rights in the Federal court, as defined and recognized by the decisións of this court. Reference was there made to the sentiments expressed by Lord Mansfield, that the maritime law was not- the law of one country only, but of the commercial world ; and -the court decided that the • commercial law was not circumscribed .within any local limits, and that citizens resorting to the Federal tribunals for the ascertainment of their rights' might well claim the benefit of the rules of the general commercial law. Six of the *57justices of tlie court, including the Chief Justice, held the same views in the still later case, to which special reference is made. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343, 371.
Collaterals, previously held in that case, had been surrendered' when the new arrangement was made, and the evidence showed an agreement for forbearance; and the court, in order to prevent a dissent, rested the case, so far as respected the question of consideration, upon; those special facts; but it is deemed proper to state that two-thirds of the court entirely approved of the views of Mr. Justice Story, as expressed in Swift v. Tyson, and in his valuable works upon bills of exchange and promissory notes. Confirmation of the proposition that his views in that decision are correct is also derived from a note appended to the text of the third volume of Kent’s Commentaries, by the distinguished author, in which he says that he is inclined to concur in that' decision as the plainer and better doctrine. 8 Kent, Com. (12th ed.) 81; Cooley, Const. Lim. (4th ed.) 18.
State decisions, in respect to titles to real estate and transfers of property, usually furnish the rule of decision in the Federal courts, by virtue of the . before-mentioned provision of the Judiciary Act; but the established practice is, that it does not apply,' except in matters of a strictly local character; that is to say, to the positive statutes of the States and the interpretations of the same by their own tribunals, including rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as real property, and that it does not extend to questions of general commercial law, from which it'follows that where any controversy arises as to the liability of a party to a bill of exchange, promissory note, or other negotiable paper, in one of the Federal courts, which is not determined by the positive words of. a State statute,' or its meaning as construed. by the State courts, the Federal courts will apply to its solution the general principles of the law merchant, regardless of any local decision. 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst.. (2d ed.) sect. 10.
Transactions of a commercial character éxtend throughout the civilized world,' and it is well known that they are chiefly conducted through the medium of bills of exchange and other negotiable instruments. Uniformity of decision is a matter of *58great- public convenience and universal necessity, acknowledged by-all commercial'nations. Should this court adopt a principle of decision which when carried into effect would establish as many different rules for the determination of commercial controversies as there are States in the Union, it would justly be considered a public calamity, as' it must necessarily depreciate our negotiable securities in all the foreign markets of the world where our merchants have commercial transactions.
. Stable and immutable rules are necessary to give confidence to those who receive such securities in the .usual course of business, when indorsed ill' blank, or made payable to bearer, so that if such a bill or note is made without consideration, or be lost or stolen, and afterwards be negotiated for value to one having no knowledge of such facts, in the usual course of businéss, his title shall be good, and he shall be entitled to collect the amount.
Uniformity of decision in such cases is highly desirable, and these observations are sufficient- to show that nothing is wanting to accomplish that great object but the concurrence of a few more of the State courts, of which _none are more to be desired than the courts of New York and Pennsylvania. It is hoped that they will concur at no distant day.
For these reasons the conclusion is that the judgment should be affirmed.