Court Opinion

ID: 9633668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:56:15.593285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:39.603439
License: Public Domain

GREENWOOD, Judge
(concurring
and dissenting):
I must respectfully disagree with the majority on the issue of standing. I believe that defendant met his burden of proof and, therefore, had standing to contest the legal sufficiency of the search of the car. As stated in the majority opinion, the fourth amendment offers protection against unreasonable searches and seizures to those who have a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the invaded place. Rafeas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 428, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). In Rakas, an officer stopped a vehicle which he believed was the getaway car for an armed robbery. A search of the vehicle revealed rifle shells in the glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat. At the motion to suppress hearing, defendants did not assert a possessory or proprietary interest in the car, the rifle or the shells. The Court held that because defendants asserted no property or posses-*200sory interest in the automobile or the property searched, they were not entitled to challenge the search of the glove compartment or areas under the seat of the vehicle.
In four recent Utah cases, the Utah Supreme Court has found no standing where the defendant failed to show evidence of ownership or possession of the area or property searched. In State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978), the Court found defendant lacked standing to object to the search of a stolen vehicle. See also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App.1987) (defendant had standing to challenge the search of a vehicle in which he claimed ownership where one of the critical facts to be established at trial was whether the car was stolen). Lack of standing to question the search of an automobile was again found in State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984), where defendant did not own the automobile or attache case seized and did not show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects searched. Similarly, in State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1987), defendant had no standing to challenge the search of his mother’s trailer where he failed to provide evidence that he shared ownership, use, possession or an expectation of privacy in the trailer. Most recently, in State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987), the Court found no standing where “[defendant presented no testimony that he had driven the car with the permission of the owner or under circumstances that would imply permissive use. Absent claimed right to possession, he could not assert any expectation of privacy in the items seized....”
Analyzing this case in light of these principles, I am persuaded that defendant had standing to challenge the search of the car. At the motion to suppress hearing defendant called the arresting officer as a witness. The officer testified that when he stopped the vehicle defendant was driving and had the keys to the ignition and trunk. After having defendant sign a written consent to a search of the car, the officer asked defendant to first open the trunk. Defendant complied. In the trunk the officer saw defendant’s personal belongings and the “metal compartment.” The officer also testified that defendants were on a two week vacation traveling from California to New York and that he understood Rafael Villa was using the car with his brother’s permission. Finally, the officer testified that he had checked and determined that the car was not reported stolen.
The facts of this case differ substantially from those in Rakas, Purcell, Valdez, Ia-cono and Constantino, in that defendant, in this case, asserted a possessory interest in both the car and his personal belongings in the passenger compartment and trunk. Also, in contrast to Rakas, defendant in the present case was more than a passenger in the vehicle. He was driving the car and had the keys to the ignition and trunk in his possession. He had complete dominion and control over the area searched and could exclude all others. Although defendant did not testify that he had the owner’s permission to use the car, the officer did testify that it was his understanding that the passenger, Rafael Villa, had his brother’s permission to use the car. At least one court has held that the driver of a car had standing to challenge the search of that car where the owner gave the passenger permission to drive the car and where the driver had the keys to the car and could exclude all others, except the owner and the passenger, from the car. State v. Sanders, 5 Kan.App.2d 189, 614 P.2d 998 (1980). In Sanders, the court stated
While appellant in the instant case was not the owner of the automobile, it has never been alleged that the lady friend of appellant lacked proper permission to drive the same, or that she lacked the requisite ability to allow the appellant to drive the car. Appellant, thus, was more than a mere passenger. He possessed the keys to the car and was driving the same. While it is probable that the lady who allowed appellant to drive could have revoked permission to do so, and while unquestionably the owner of the car could have deprived appellant of his possession thereof, it is not contended that they had done so at the time of appellant’s apprehension. We conclude, that, at least insofar as the criminal law *201is concerned, the appellant stood in the place of the owner, and was entitled to the same expectation of privacy as would have extended to the owner at such time and place.
Id., 614 P.2d at 1003.
Permission from Rafael Villa for defendant to drive the car, combined with the facts that defendant had his personal belongings in the car and trunk, was traveling in the car on an extended vacation and had the keys to the car and trunk, demonstrate that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched.
The majority opinion’s reliance on State v. Boutot, 325 A.2d 34 (Me.1974), for the principle that an officer’s state of mind should not determine standing, is unpersuasive. First, the case predates Rakas, and does not, therefore, focus on the “legitimate expectation of privacy” standard. Second, in this case the officer’s testimony went to objective facts, such as who was driving, what was said at the time of the stop, and the identity of the owner. None of the evidence suggesting that defendant had lawful possession of the car was refuted by the state. Third, in Boutot, the car was known to be stolen and defendant presented no evidence of a proprietary or possessory interest in the vehicle. Id. at 37.
I do not mean to imply that every passenger in a car has standing to object to a seárch of the car, and agree with Rakas that areas of a car such as the trunk “are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply [does] not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49, 99 S.Ct. at 433 (second emphasis added). However, defendant in this case was not just an ordinary passenger getting a ride from the car’s owner. He had permission to use the car for an extended period of time, placed his personal possessions in the car, was able to lawfully exclude others from the car, and had, as a result, a subjective legitimate expectation of privacy in the car and its contents. As such, he had standing to protest the search of the entire car, not just his personal possessions, as would the owner of the car. I believe that the majority’s finding that defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy cannot extend beyond his personal property is not supported by the cases cited, each of which involves a defendant found to have no standing to object to a search of any part of the vehicle or its contents.
I would find that defendant had standing to contest the search and seizure and remand for a determination of whether the search and seizure was lawful.
I concur with the remainder of the majority opinion.