Court Opinion

ID: 9943225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 21:03:57.906901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:37.200198
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 P. v. Monroy CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B325666
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. PA085567)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County)

v.

JOSEPH WAYNE MONROY,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       Joseph Wayne Monroy was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a))1 He appeals an order
denying his section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. The order
was made at the prima facie stage of the proceedings.
       We affirm. The record of conviction shows that appellant is
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief because he was the actual
killer. Furthermore, at the prima facie hearing appellant’s
counsel conceded that the petition was without merit.

         1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                    Appellant’s Plea and Sentence
       Appellant was charged with murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).)
Pursuant to a plea bargain, in January 2018 he pleaded no
contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted a firearm-use
enhancement (§ 12022.5). He was sentenced to prison for an
aggregate term of 21 years: the upper term of 11 years for
voluntary manslaughter plus the upper term of 10 years for the
firearm-use enhancement.
                       Relevant Facts Based on
                 Transcript of Preliminary Hearing
       At the preliminary hearing the following testimony was
presented:
       Wilmar Gonzalez (Wilmar) testified that appellant had shot
Wilmar’s brother, Rudy Gonzalez (Rudy), during an argument
between appellant and both brothers. Appellant “just started
shooting.” Wilmar turned around and ran away. After the
shooting Wilmar heard appellant do “some wicked laugh” and
say, “‘ha, ha, ha, ha. That’s what you get.’”
       A police officer testified that Wilmar said he heard two
shots. After the second shot, Wilmar said he heard appellant say,
“‘My shit jammed.’”
       Juan Gonzalez (Juan), a bystander, testified that he had
seen two persons (Wilmar and Rudy) confront appellant. The two
persons ran away. Appellant fired a gun at one of the persons.
He “heard two shots.”
       Margarito Posadas was with Juan Gonzalez. Posadas also
testified at the preliminary hearing. Posadas told a police officer
that he had seen appellant remove a handgun from his pants
pocket. Appellant “chased the victim . . . into [a] walkway.” At
that point, Posadas heard the second of two gunshots.

                                2
       Rudy’s cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the
chest. He did not sustain any other gunshot wounds. The
petition mentioned nothing about whether appellant was the
actual killer.
                         Counsel’s Concession
       When appellant initially appeared with counsel before the
trial court on the section 1172.6 petition, the court stated: “I
know this case. I remember it. The defendant was the actual
killer. He is the only defendant involved. [¶] There is no basis
for the [petition] that I can see, but I’m going to set it for [a prima
facie] hearing . . . .” Appellant’s counsel did not deny that his
client was the actual killer.
       At the beginning of the prima facie hearing, appellant’s
counsel conceded that the section 1172.6 petition was without
merit. Counsel said, “I would submit on the issue of changing the
nature of the charge [i.e., the section 1172.6 petition to vacate the
manslaughter conviction and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts][.] I believe that there’s no legal basis for that; however,
we would ask that the court would consider in its discretion
striking any of the enhancements that have been admitted.”
(Italics added.)
       In his reply brief appellant asserts, “To the extent this
Court . . . agrees with respondent that trial counsel’s remarks
amounted to a concession that the petition is meritless, appellant
has been deprived of his right to the effective assistance of
counsel.” We disagree. It is reasonable to infer that counsel
knew appellant was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief because he
was the actual killer.
       In any event, “‘there is no constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction

                                  3
proceedings,” such as the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6
proceeding. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 226
(Delgadillo); see also id., at p. 227 [“there is no federal
constitutional right to counsel under subdivision (c) [the prima
facie stage] of section 1172.6, and the right to counsel at that
point in the proceedings is purely statutory”].)
          Appellant Failed to Make a Prima Facie Showing
       “[T]he court may appropriately deny a [section 1172.6]
petition at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52.) “We independently review a trial court’s
determination on whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing.” (Ibid.)
       Section 1172.6 “relief is unavailable if the [petitioner]
was . . . the actual killer . . . .” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 710; see also Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233
[“Delgadillo is not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6”
because “the record here makes clear that Delgadillo was the
actual killer and the only participant in the killing”].)
       The preliminary hearing transcript shows that appellant
was “the actual killer and the only participant in the killing.”
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.) Without the assistance
or encouragement of any other person, appellant fired the bullet
that caused Rudy’s death. Moreover, appellant admitted an
allegation that he had personally used a firearm. Based on the
testimony at the preliminary hearing, only one person – the
actual killer – used a firearm. (See People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 743 [“a finding that a defendant personally used
a firearm does not in itself prove a defendant is the actual killer

                                   4
[citation], [but] the facts of a particular case may support only
that conclusion”].)
       Appellant contends that, at the prima facie stage, a
petitioner’s allegations that he or she meets the criteria for relief
cannot be refuted by relying on the preliminary hearing
transcript. Appellant argues that his “properly completed
petition for resentencing is all that was required to fulfill his
burden at the prima facie showing phase of these proceedings.”
       “Courts of Appeal are split on the import of the preliminary
hearing transcript in determining whether a petitioner has made
a prima facie case for resentencing under section 1170.95.”
(People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 989 (Flores).) The
issue is pending before our Supreme Court in People v. Patton
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted June, 28, 2023,
S279670. (See the 6/30/2023 Supreme Court News Release for
Patton, #23-129 [“This case presents the following issue: Did the
trial court engage in impermissible judicial factfinding by relying
on the preliminary hearing transcript to deny defendant’s Penal
Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage? (See People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 [(Lewis)].)”].)
       The preliminary hearing transcript is part of the record of
conviction. (People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150,
1159; Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 989, fn. 11.) “The record
of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless. This is consistent with the statute’s overall purpose: to
ensure that murder [or manslaughter] culpability is
commensurate with a person’s actions, while also ensuring that
clearly meritless petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of

                                 5
a single-step prima facie review process.” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.)
       “Although evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing
establishes, at most, only that ‘there is “sufficient cause” to
believe defendant guilty of a public offense’ [citation], that
limitation does not necessarily preclude the trial court from
allowing such evidence to ‘inform the trial court's prima facie
inquiry under section [1172.6]’ to determine whether the petition
is ‘clearly meritless’ (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971). Nothing
in Lewis supports the proposition that the preliminary hearing
transcript may ‘inform the trial court's prima facie inquiry’ only
when the [petitioner] has stipulated to the transcript as the
factual basis for his plea.” (People v. Pickett (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 982, 993, review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643.)
       Our Supreme Court has commented favorably upon the
reliability of evidence presented at a preliminary hearing: “We
conclude the [preliminary hearing] transcript was part of the
record of the prior conviction, whether that term is used
technically, as equivalent to the record on appeal [citation], or
more narrowly, as referring only to those record documents
reliably reflecting the facts of the offense for which the defendant
was convicted. The transcript falls within even the narrower
definition because the procedural protections afforded the
defendant during a preliminary hearing tend to ensure the
reliability of such evidence. Those protections include the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the requirement
those witnesses testify under oath, coupled with the accuracy
afforded by the court reporter’s verbatim reporting of the
proceedings.” (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223.)

                                 6
       Accordingly, we conclude that where, as here, the
petitioner’s conviction was based on a guilty or no contest plea so
there is no trial transcript, a court can consider the preliminary
hearing transcript at the prima facie stage. The preliminary
hearing transcript unequivocally establishes that appellant was
the actual killer. He is therefore ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law. Although appellant did not admit that
he was the actual killer, his counsel justifiably conceded in open
court that there was “no legal basis” for the petition.
       In these circumstances, the trial court did not err in
summarily denying the petition at the prima facie stage. The
petition was “clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
971.) It would be a waste of judicial resources to reverse and
remand the matter for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary
hearing. We reject appellant’s claim that “[t]he superior court’s
dismissal of the petition without . . . allowing appellant to present
evidence at a hearing . . . violated appellant’s procedural due
process rights.” “It is fundamental that courts do not engage in
futile acts.” (In re Pratt (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 795, 880.)
                              Disposition
       The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                                  YEGAN, J.
We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                                 7
                    David W. Stuart, Judge

             Superior Court County of Los Angeles

               ______________________________

     Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.