Court Opinion

ID: 9956079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-31 21:12:32.725052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.028446
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                       OF TEXAS

                                     NO. PD-0700-22

                           MARLON JUNA LALL, Appellant

                                             v.

                                THE STATE OF TEXAS

          ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
                  FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
                          ROCKWALL COUNTY

      Per curiam. Keller, P.J., and Keel, J., concurred.

                                      OPINION

      The State charged Appellant with possession with intent to deliver more than 4 but

less than 200 grams of methamphetamine based in part upon evidence seized after a canine

sniff of Appellant’s vehicle during a traffic stop. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §

481.112(a). Appellant filed a motion to suppress arguing that the police officer lacked
                                                                                   Lall — 2

reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop to conduct the canine sniff of his vehicle.

The trial court denied Appellant’s motion and the case went to trial. A jury found Appellant

guilty and assessed punishment at forty years in prison.

       Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress. In holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop

for the canine sniff, the court of appeals relied in part on the fact that Appellant refused

consent for the officer to search his vehicle even though Appellant was legally entitled to

refuse consent at the time of the request. See Lall v. State, 656 S.W.3d 830, 844 (Tex. App.

– Dallas 2022, pet. granted) (“And while appellant correctly observes that refusal of

consent to search cannot form the sole basis for reasonable suspicion, it can be a factor in

the analysis. Here, appellant’s consent to a search of his person but not the vehicle factors

in the reasonable suspicion analysis.”) (internal citations omitted).      Justice Pedersen

dissented in part on the basis that the majority should not have considered Appellant’s

lawful refusal to consent as any indication of criminal activity for purposes of making a

reasonable suspicion determination. Id. at 848-50 (Pedersen III, J. dissenting).

       Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review asserting two grounds for review.

First, Appellant argues that “[t]he Court of Appeals’s majority erred in viewing Appellant’s

refusal to give consent to search his vehicle as an indicium of criminal activity.” Second,

Appellant argues “[t]he Court of Appeals’s majority erred in holding that Officer Pope had

reasonable suspicion to prolong Appellant’s detention to conduct a canine sniff after the

purpose of the traffic stop had concluded.” We filed and set this case to consider these

arguments. We agree with Appellant on the first ground that the court of appeals erred in
                                                                                   Lall — 3

viewing Appellant’s lawful refusal to give consent to search his vehicle as any indicium of

criminal activity, and we will remand for the court of appeals to consider the second ground

without consideration of Appellant’s refusal to consent.

       In Wade v. State, this Court considered whether a citizen’s lawful refusal to consent

to a search or cooperate with an officer during an otherwise consensual encounter could

support the reasonable suspicion determination necessary for a Terry pat-down search or

investigative detention. Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

In that case, the only evidence giving rise to reasonable suspicion was the defendant’s

refusal to consent to a search of his truck, his extreme nervousness, and his refusal to

answer the officer’s questions about whether he had weapons or contraband. Id. at 669.

We held that neither nervousness nor a refusal to cooperate with law enforcement during a

consensual encounter are sufficient by themselves to constitute reasonable suspicion for a

detention. Id. at 670. Nor could the “action of standing on [one’s] rights” be “the tipping

point in the reasonable suspicion calculus.” Id. at 669. The State seizes on this aspect of

our holding in Wade to suggest that even though a defendant’s actions of standing on his

rights cannot serve as the “tipping point” in a reasonable suspicion determination, it still

may be considered along with other articulable facts. We disagree.

       Wade does not require or encourage consideration of the refusal to consent as a

factor supporting reasonable suspicion. Rather, Wade stands for the proposition that an

otherwise lawful refusal to consent to a search or cooperate with law enforcement cannot,

by itself, establish reasonable suspicion. Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 675 (reasoning that the

officer “needed some objective, factual justification – outside of appellant’s withdrawal of
                                                                                    Lall — 4

consent – to support the detention”). Though we did suggest that a citizen’s refusal to

cooperate with police during a consensual encounter could be a factor in determining

whether an investigative detention was justified, so long as it was not the triggering fact,

that statement is at odds with our conclusion that a refusal to cooperate, by itself, cannot

provide the basis for a detention. Id. at 668. That suggestion is also at odds with the way

we analyzed the issue in Wade. After noting that a lawful refusal to consent could not

provide a basis for detention by itself, we went on to consider the facts outside of Wade’s

refusal to cooperate. Looking only at those facts and not Wade’s choice to stand on his

rights, we concluded that there were no objective indicia of reasonable suspicion sufficient

to justify a detention or frisk. Id. at 675. In other words, Wade’s lawful withdrawal of

consent, by itself, provided no indicium supporting reasonable suspicion and would not, as

a matter of logic, have added anything to the reasonable suspicion calculus. Ultimately,

our observation that the lawful refusal to consent could not be the prominent factor in the

reasonable suspicion calculus was not necessary to our holding and we expressly disavow

it.

       As the dissent observed below, “[t]he people ratified the Bill of Rights to prevent

government abuse. When the assertion of a Fourth Amendment right gives rise to

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the part of the people, it is not a right.” Lall,

656 S.W.3d at 850 (Pedersen III, J. dissenting); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,

437 (1991) (noting that “a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal

level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure”). This view is consistent

with the view of most jurisdictions that lawful refusal to consent may not be considered in
                                                                                      Lall — 5

making a determination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States

v. Skidmore, 894 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir.) (“a law enforcement official cannot consider

[defendant’s] refusal to consent as a factor in the official’s determination of reasonable

suspicion”); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 435 n. 32 (5th Cir. 2001)

(“The mere fact that a person refuses consent to search cannot be used as evidence in

support of reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir.

1997) (“The failure to consent to a search cannot form any part of the basis for reasonable

suspicion.”); Miley v. State, 614 S.E.2d 744, 745 (Ga. 2005) (defendant’s refusal to consent

was “the exercise of a constitutionally protected right available to any person . . . and should

have been disregarded in evaluating the sufficiency of the affidavit to show probable

cause”); Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 708 (Wyo. 2003) (“The failure to consent to a search

cannot form any part of the basis for reasonable suspicion . . . [and] has no place in our

determination.”); State v. Vandenberg, 134 N.M. 566, 578 (2003) (defendants’ refusal to

consent is not a relevant fact to consider in determining whether officer had reasonable

suspicion to support a Terry-frisk).

       The court of appeals should not have considered Appellant’s lawful refusal to

consent to the search of his truck when determining if the facts of this case gave rise to

reasonable suspicion. Instead, the court of appeals should have considered the facts outside

of Appellant’s refusal to determine if those facts gave rise to reasonable suspicion, just as

we did in Wade. Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 675. Because the court of appeals considered

Appellant’s lawful refusal to consent as a factor in its reasonable suspicion analysis, we

need not reach Appellant’s second ground for review. Instead, we vacate the judgment of
                                                                             Lall — 6

the court of appeals and remand the case so that the court of appeals may have an

opportunity to conduct a reasonable suspicion analysis without considering Appellant’s

refusal to consent.

Filed: March 27, 2024

Publish