Court Opinion

ID: 9570809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:26:33.400469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:52.705790
License: Public Domain

Bowles, Justice,
dissenting.
As I read the opinion of the majority, I find only one conclusion reached — that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed so that the matter may be referred back to the trial court to hear evidence, and "fully consider” the public policy issue.
Heretofore in Georgia, where the contract is unambiguous, our courts have been able to decide, without the benefit of evidentiary hearings, whether or not a given contract or clause in a given contract violates the public policy of this state. While I do not contend that it is impermissible for a trial judge to hear evidence to aid him in making such a decision, I conclude that the trial judge in this case made his determination based on his experience, common sense, general knowledge prevailing in his community regarding the habits and customs of his people, and prior decisions of our courts touching the question. He was not required by law to hear evidence.
Now, for the first time, we require the trial judge to receive or hear evidence on whether a given contract clause violates public policy. Having done so, he can again use his experience, common sense and general knowledge, and can again consider prior case law in *732making a determination as to whether or not the 90 day contract clause in question violates the public policy of this state. Thus, we are forcing him to do what he did not consider necessary in the first instance, in addition to his customary procedure.
The majority opinion does not specifically overrule Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pratt, 130 Ga. App. 331 (203 SE2d 302), which has heretofore decided the exact question contra to this position. But to support their argument the majority quotes approvingly from two decisions in other states representing the minority view in America and which are without precedent. The majority says, "An insurance limitation forcing such a gruesome choice may be unreasonable and thus may be void as against public policy.” It also castigates "powerful commercial units” and suggests that the policy of insurance offered in this case may have been offered to the insured on an "accept this or get nothing basis.”
The fundamental right of our citizens to legally contract; the fact that the right to contract is paramount public policy of our state and should not be interfered with lightly1; and the fact that our appellate courts have heretofore ruled on the exact question one time, and similar questions many times, are disregarded. Unless there is some compelling reason to do so, we do the citizens of Georgia, the practicing lawyers and the lower courts an injustice when we attempt to overrule precedent without justification. I find no compelling reason, in this case, to deviate from the precedent laid down by this court in earlier cases.
I would affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals without further ado.
I am authorized to state that Justice Jordan joins in this dissent.

 Greenwood Cemetery v. Travelers Ind. Co., 238 Ga. 313 (23 SE2d 910) (1977); Equitable Loan &c. Co. v. Waring, 117 Ga. 599 (1) (44 SE 320) (1903); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Clay, 101 Ga. 331, 332 (28 SE 853) (1897); Kaiser v. Pedrick, 30 Ga. App. 642 (118 SE 790) (1923); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Durden, 9 Ga. App. 797, 800 (72 SE 295) (1911).