Court Opinion

ID: 9726380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:47:01.067601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.664235
License: Public Domain

*186WHITE, P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
I find that I am unable to agree with the result reached by my colleagues; my view is that the Agricultural Labor Relations Board’s (hereafter Board) order is entitled to enforcement. There is no argument but that Labor Code section 1160.8 is a legislative command that all are bound to obey in our review of the Board’s set aside petitions. The findings of the Board are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. (See maj. opn., ante, p. 181.) Our Supreme Court decided in Tex-Cal Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 346 [156 Cal.Rptr. 1, 595 P.2d 579], that the legislative mandate embodied in section 1160.8 passes constitutional (California) muster. Manifestly if the standard for judicial review of Board decisions is “substantial evidence,” review utilizing the standard “independent judgment” as to the weight of the evidence is prohibited.
The majority’s erudite opinion illustrates that the distinction between the respective standards of review when practically applied become illusory if not nonexistent. Particularly is this apparently the case when, as herein, in applying the “substantial evidence” standard seemingly undue emphasis is placed on the admonition “[t]he ALRB’s decision must be grounded on a reasonable interpretation of the facts.” (See maj. opn., ante, p. 185.)
Of course, not to be overlooked is the fact that reasonable justices often differ as to what constitutes substantial evidence. In this case, my colleagues evaluate the record in salient part as follows: “Here, we have an isolated statement made by a low level supervisor, which statement was apparently not made by prearrangement but was an off-the-cuff statement made during an employee discussion of the pros and cons of unionization.” (See maj. opn., ante, p. 185.)
If the view projected by the majority is the only reasonable interpretation of the'record evidence, I would readily agree that bare minimum standards protecting the employer’s constitutional right to freely communicate in labor union elections and disputes would dictate the result they reach as sound and reasonable in equity and law.
But in my review of the record, I find the requisite evidentiary support for the Board’s finding and order. I find the Board’s evaluation of *187Supervisor Flores’ statements and their effect in the context of the labor dispute at Merrill Farms to be reasonable.
The administrative law officer (ALO) found Flores’ statements in fact threatened the employees “with the loss of their places to live” and “the losing of their jobs” “if they voted for the union.” Further, the ALO found that Flores’ threatening statements put the workers in “fear” of retaliation if they continued to be amenable to the union and thereby adversely affected the union efforts. The Board, of course, adopted the ALO’s findings.
In my view, the Board’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Witness Macias testified that when the workers returned to their living quarters that night everyone discussed what Flores had earlier stated during lunch time. He testified to the effect that after the statement, worker support for the union waned. Also, it was Macias’ opinion that the workers were “scared” as to what would happen to them if their camp closed. His cross-examination revealed that while before the incident no one refused the union leaflets, afterwards they would not talk to him and would not take leaflets from him. Witness Rasa’s testimony essentially corroborated that of Macias. He testified that the workers were surprised and “taken aback,” after which the workers would no longer accept the offer of union buttons.
The ALO and subsequently the Board found that Flores intended his statements as threats in order to restrain, coerce and intimidate the employees in the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. (Lab. Code, § 1153, subd. (a).) State of mind or intent is most often a matter of proof by circumstantial evidence. Rasa testified that he reacted to Flores’ statement that the union meant closing the camp by saying the company would be bankrupt “because what would they do with their fields?” It was then, according to Rasa, that Flores made his raising cows and planting feed grasses statement. I have no difficulty in finding legally sufficient evidentiary support for the Board’s findings as regards intent. It certainly negates and precludes a finding of being “off-the-cuff,” in my view.
Rasa’s version has added significance. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. (1969) 395 U.S. 575 [23 L.Ed.2d 547, 89 S.Ct. 1918], discusses in detail the delicate balance between the employer’s protected free speech right to communicate with his employees and the employees’ equal *188right to associate freely. In light of the fact that the record herein is devoid of any evidence even suggesting that Flores’ statement was a prediction of ‘“demonstrable “economic consequences’”” (see Gissel, supra, at p. 619 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 581]), I find the Board’s finding of threats intended to “restrain,” “coerce,” and “intimidate” valid, i.e., supported by substantial evidence.
The fact that Flores’ statement was “isolated” would not seem to make it any less an unfair labor practice, if in fact, it contains a “‘threat of reprisal or force, or promise of benefit.” (Lab. Code, § 1155, italics added.)
“Threats of reprisal,” having the effect of instilling “fear,” were factual questions herein answered by the Board, supported by substantial evidence and the Board’s expert appraisal of the entire labor relations setting presented. In Abatti Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 317, 327 [165 Cal.Rptr. 887], Presiding Justice Brown ( Gerald) points out that “charges of coercive threats. . .of employees present especially difficult considerations of competing interests.” I concur in his view that “[w]e may not substitute our judgment for that of the Board in its area of special expertise, the assessment of the weight of circumstantial evidence in context.” (At p. 333.) Abatti Farms, Inc. is similar to the instant case in that therein a sister (office employee) of the employer’s made statements to the employees linking a possible union victory to loss of jobs without supporting facts showing economic necessity. In my view because we make full use of the Board’s expertise and sensitivity to the effects of speech in the labor union election context as contemplated by the Act (Tex-Cal Land Management Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 24 Cal.3d 335, 345; Abatti Farms, Inc, supra, at p. 327, quoting NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., supra, 395 U.S. 575, 617-618 [23 L.Ed.2d 547, 580]), we are not thereby abdicating our responsibility to review the Board’s decision for reasonableness and fairness. (See Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 490 [95 L.Ed. 456, 468-469, 71 S.Ct. 456].) In this case, neither the time nor isolation of the statement renders the Board’s decision unreasonable. The fact that the “high level executives of Merrill Farms were [not] aware of the statement” (maj. opn., ante, p. 185) would not seem to render the Board’s decision unfair unless it can be said the basic doctrine of respondeat superior is basically unfair or unreasonable. I assume these *189considerations were properly considered by the Board in fashioning the remedial order.
I would find that the Board’s order is entitled to enforcement.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 9, 1981. White, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petition of real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 13, 1981. Bird, C. J., did not participate therein. Taylor, J.,* participated therein. Newman, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.