Court Opinion

ID: 9497943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:04:16.898655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:31.265655
License: Public Domain

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 604, provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2)” that an alien’s application for asylum is untimely.1 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (emphasis added). Because the majority’s reading of the statute impermissibly narrows the plain meaning of “any determination” to exclude some determinations, I respectfully dissent from its assuming jurisdiction and reviewing petitioner Viktor Sagaydak’s claim that his asylum application is not time-barred.
Here, the IJ found “that the male respondent is ineligible for asylum since he ... did not apply for asylum until ... more than one year after his arrival.” (Citing § 1158(a)(2)(B) and 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2).) Because the IJ also mistakenly “believed that the one-year deadline was absolute and not subject to any exception,” Maj. op. at 1040, he did not go on expressly to rule on Viktor’s contention that the extraordinary circumstances exception of § 1158(a)(2)(D) applied to his case. On this basis, the majority holds “that the IJ failed to make ‘any determination,’ even though the extraordinary circumstances issue was raised by Viktor’s attorney,” and concludes, therefore, “that § 1158(a)(3) does not apply to this case.” Maj. op. at 1040. It holds that the IJ’s failure expressly to address the extraordinary circumstances tolling provision was a *1046failure to make any determination under § 1158(a)(2); therefore, that review is not barred. I disagree.
We have already held that in deciding whether § 1158(a)(3) applies, “we need only determine whether the IJ acted under section 1158(a)(2).” Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir.2001). And in this case, it is clear that the IJ did so act. The only requirement is that the IJ act under § 1158(a)(2); not that he act under every, or any particular, subdivision of § 1158(a)(2). Here, the IJ expressly determined that Viktor was “ineligible for asylum” under the one-year bar of § 1158(a)(2)(B). That he was mistaken in his application of § 1158(a)(2), in believing that no tolling was available, does not mean that he did not act under § 1158(a)(2) in holding that Viktor’s petition was barred by the one-year provision.
In effect, the majority is reviewing the merits of the IJ’s time-bar ruling. It holds, in substance, that the IJ erred in his determination that no tolling was available and remands on that issue and directs the agency to make a redetermination of that issue. I agree with the majority that “[n]either the statute nor the regulation is ambiguous, and neither could be interpreted any other way than including an extraordinary-circumstances exception. The IJ erred as a matter of law....” Maj. op. at 1041. But the fact that the IJ “erred as a matter' of law” in applying the one-year time-bar means that he made an erroneous determination, not that he did not make “any determination” at all. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part II of the majority opinion.
I do, however, fully concur in Part III of the majority opinion, and in the remainder of the opinion insofar as it pertains to Nataliya Sagaydak’s claim for asylum and to the Sagaydaks’ claims, for withholding of removal.

. There are two elements to the timeliness requirement. First, there is the requirement that an asylum application be filed within one year of the alien's arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). There is also a "changed circumstances” and "extraordinary circumstances” exception which permits tolling the one-year period. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).