Court Opinion

ID: 9733263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:00:25.524294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:40.016021
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). With my colleagues’ determination to consider a court rule to guarantee defendants’ right to be personally present at every stage of the trial where their substantial rights may be affected, including in-chambers conferences with the judge, I am in full concurrence.
However, I respectfully differ with my colleagues’ finding that the defendant in this case was not deprived of constitutional due process. I believe he was and would have reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for resentencing.
In People v Medcoff, 344 Mich 108; 73 NW2d 537 *534(1955), this Court found that defendant’s absence during an examination by the trial court into possible misconduct by jurors constituted reversible error.1 The right of the defendant "to be present at all stages of the trial where his substantial rights might be affected” was found to be as fundamental as the right to trial by an impartial jury.2 The Court recognized that under Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97; 54 S Ct 330; 78 L Ed 674 (1934), the Due Process Clause provides defendants
"the right to be personally present at every stage of the trial where their substantial rights may be affected by the proceedings and where their presence relates to the fullness of their opportunity to defend against the charge.”3
Although the examination of the jurors at issue in Medcoff occurred during the trial, the Court observed that
"when considering what is the 'trial’ for purposes of this question [defendant’s right to be present] we can exclude formal and preliminary matters or matters occurring after the hearing on the merits or rendition of the verdict, as well as other matters.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Relying on this dictum,4 the prosecutor maintains *535that a defendant’s right to be personally present ends with the trial, and thus that the , right to be present depends on the chronological stage of the proceeding rather than on the substantive nature of the inquiry.
A right as fundamental as the right to be personally present is not subject to such formalistic confinement.
A proper analysis of when a defendant has the right to be present should depend on the character of the proceeding and whether the reasons supporting a defendant’s right to be present at trial are equally applicable to that proceeding. Of particular concern are whether substantial interests of the defendant may be affected, and whether the defendant’s presence bears a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to affect the reliability or fairness of the judicial process being exerted upon him.
Levin, J., concurred with Williams, J.

 One part of Medcoff’s holding, that prejudice is conclusively presumed to have resulted from defendant’s absence, was rejected in People v Morgan, 400 Mich 527, 536; 255 NW2d 603 (1977), in favor of the standard of "any reasonable possibility of prejudice”.

 Medcoff, supra.

 Medcoff, supra, p 115. See also Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 819, fn 15; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975):
"It is now accepted * * * that an accused has a right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings, Snyder v Massachusetts * *

 The prosecution also relies on People v Ormsby, 48 Mich 494; 12 *535NW 671 (1882), and People v Boyd, 49 Mich App 388; 212 NW2d 333 (1973). Ormsby held that a defendant has no right to be present when the court hears a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, analogizing that proceeding to review hy an appellate court. The nature of the inquiry in Ormsby, i.e., an analysis of the legal sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, is factually distinguishable from the present case where new evidence was received and evaluated to reach the initial determination of the proper sentence. Boyd involved a pretrial suppression hearing and, rather than supporting the prosecutor’s position, apparently concluded that the defendant had the right to be present. Boyd’s further conclusion that the right was waivable was conditioned upon a finding of no prejudice from the defendant’s absence, a finding that cannot be made on this record.