Court Opinion

ID: 9789971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:44:43.076405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.502233
License: Public Domain

On Denial of Petition for Rehearing.
*253SMITH, Justice.
Appellants in their petition for rehearing, again urging application of the last clear chance doctrine, stress certain testimony of respondent railroad engineer, to the effect that the train had approached to about 20 to 25 feet of the railroad crossing before he acted to avoid the pending accident, upon receiving warning from respondent railroad fireman to “big hole” the engine, i. e., place the brakes in emergency position.
We again refer to the fireman’s testimony, that it was not until the Ralph automobile was at the “Y” of Highways Nos. 93 and 74, about 340 feet south of the railroad crossing, that there appeared to the fireman to be any cause for concern, when the automobile, without slackening its speed, continued its northerly course on Highway No. 93 toward the crossing.
We again point out that the time elements were short for stopping either the train or the automobile. The train consisting of nine cars was approximately 400 feet in length and when stopped, according to the engineer, “the rear end of the train was 400 feet across the crossing,” (pointed to in the petition for rehearing). The Ralph automobile, continuing its course toward the crossing, was traveling at a speed of not less than 55 miles per hour.
Here, the train was traveling at the rate of speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour or 44 to 51 feet a second, and the automobile at the rate of speed of not less than 73 feet a second. Additionally it is a well known fact that the reaction of an individual to a stimulus involves a time factor, — in this-case the reactions of both the fireman and the engineer.
The time involved was three seconds at the most from the time the fireman observed the Ralph car continuing north toward the crossing, when he hollered to the engineer to place the brakes in emergenc}^ position, to the time when the engineer reacted.
Again we point out, in order that the last clear chance doctrine have application, “the last clear chance must be a clear one.” Laidlaw v. Barker, 78 Idaho 67, 75, 297 P.2d 287, 291. Here, if there was a last chance, we are unable to discern it to have been a clear one.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
TAYLOR, C. J., and KNUDSON and McQUADE, JJ., concur.