Court Opinion

ID: 9424521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:11:49.924619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:50.765780
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
Less than four years ago this Court held that
“the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.” Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U. S. 253, 268 (1967).
The holding was clear. Congress could not, until today, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment enact a *837law stripping an American of his citizenship which he has never voluntarily renounced or given up. Now this Court, by a vote of five to four through a simple change in its composition, overrules that decision.
The Court today holds that Congress can indeed rob a citizen of his citizenship just so long as five members of this Court can satisfy themselves that the congressional action was not “unreasonable, arbitrary,” ante, at 831; “misplaced or arbitrary,” ante, at 832; or “irrational or arbitrary or unfair,” ante, at 833. My first comment is that not one of these “tests” appears in the Constitution. Moreover, it seems a little strange to find such “tests” as these announced in an opinion which condemns the earlier decisions it overrules for their resort to cliches, which it describes as “too handy and too easy, and, like most clichés, can be misleading.” Ante, at 835. That description precisely fits those words and clauses which the majority uses, but which the Constitution does not.
The Constitution, written for the ages, cannot rise and fall with this Court’s passing notions of what is “fair,” or “reasonable,” or “arbitrary.” The Fourteenth Amendment commands:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
Speaking of this very language, the Court held in Afroyim that no American can be deprived of his citizenship without his assent. Today, the Court overrules that holding. This precious Fourteenth Amendment American citizenship should not be blown around by every passing political wind that changes the composition of this Court. I dissent.
Bellei became an American citizen under the terms of *838§ 1993 of the Revised Statutes, as amended,1 and he has neither renounced his American citizenship nor voluntarily assented to any governmental act terminating it. He has never given any indication of wanting to expatriate himself but, rather, has consistently maintained that he wants to keep his American citizenship. In my view, the decision in Afroyim, therefore, requires the Court to hold here that Bellei has been unconstitutionally deprived by § 301 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19522 of his right to be an American citizen. Since § 301 (b) does not take into account in any way whether the citizen intends or desires to relinquish his citizenship, that section is inevitably inconsistent with the constitutional principles declared in Afroyim.
The Court today holds that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to Bellei. The Court first notes that Afroyim was essentially a case construing the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Citizenship Clause declares that: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States . . . ,” the Court reasons that the protections against involuntary expatriation declared in Afroyim do not protect all American citizens, but only those “born or naturalized in the United States.” Afroyim, the argument runs, was naturalized in this country so he was protected by the Citizenship Clause, but Bellei, since he acquired his American citizenship at birth in Italy as a foreign-born child of an American citizen, was neither born nor naturalized in the United States and, hence, falls outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees declared in Afroyim. One could hardly call this a generous reading of the *839great purposes the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to bring about.
While conceding that Bellei is an American citizen, the majority states: “He simply is not a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen.” Therefore, the majority reasons, the congressional revocation of his citizenship is not barred by the Constitution. I cannot accept the Court’s conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizenship of some Americans and not others.
Indeed, the concept of a hierarchy of citizenship, suggested by the majority opinion, was flatly rejected in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163 (1964): “We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive.” Id., at 165. The Court there held that Congress could not deprive Mrs. Schneider of her citizenship, which she, like Mr. Bellei in the present case, acquired derivatively through her citizen mother. Consequently, the majority in its rush to overrule Afroyim, must also, in effect, overrule Schneider as well.
Under the view adopted by the majority today, all children born to Americans while abroad would be excluded from the protections of the Citizenship Clause and would instead be relegated to the permanent status of second-class citizenship, subject to revocation at the will of Congress. The Court rejected such narrow, restrictive, and super-technical interpretations of the Citizenship Clause when it held in Afroyim that that Clause “was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation . . . .” 387 U. S., at 268.
Afroyim’s broad interpretation of the scope of the Citizenship Clause finds ample support in the language and history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bellei was not “born ... in the United States,” but he was, constitutionally speaking, “naturalized in the United States.” Although those Americans who acquire their citizenship *840under statutes conferring citizenship on the foreign-born children of citizens are not popularly thought of as naturalized citizens, the use of the word “naturalize” in this way has a considerable constitutional history. Congress is empowered by the Constitution to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” Art. I, § 8. Anyone acquiring citizenship solely under the exercise of this power is, constitutionally speaking, a naturalized citizen. The first congressional exercise of this power, entitled “An Act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” was passed in 1790 at the Second Session of the First Congress. It provided in part:
“And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States.” 1 Stat. 103, 104.
This provision is the earliest form of the statute under which Bellei acquired his citizenship. Its enactment as part of a “Rule of Naturalization” shows, I think, that the First Congress conceived of this and most likely all other purely statutory grants of citizenship as forms or varieties of naturalization. However, the clearest expression of the idea that Bellei and others similarly situated should for constitutional purposes be considered as naturalized citizens is to be found in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898):
“The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution . . . contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere *841fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory; or by authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts.” 169 U. S., at 702-703.
The Court in Wong Kim Ark thus stated a broad and comprehensive definition of naturalization. As shown in Wong Kim Ark, naturalization when used in its constitutional sense is a generic term describing and including within its meaning all those modes of acquiring American citizenship other than birth in this country. All means of obtaining American citizenship which are dependent upon a congressional enactment are forms of naturalization. This inclusive definition has been adopted in several opinions of this Court besides United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra. Thus in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 167 (1875), the Court said: “Additions might always be made to the citizenship of the United States in two ways: first, by birth, and second, by naturalization. . . . [N]ew citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization.” And in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884), the Court took the position that the Fourteenth Amendment
“contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. . . . Per*842sons not . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired.” 112 U. S., at 101-102.
Moreover, this concept of naturalization is the only one permitted by this Court’s consistent adoption of the view that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to supply a comprehensive definition of American citizenship. In an opinion written shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Court stated that one of the primary purposes of the Citizenship Clause was “to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States, and also citizenship of a State.” Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 73 (1873). In his study, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Professor Flack similarly concluded that the Citizenship Clause “put beyond doubt and cavil in the original law, who were citizens of the United States.” H. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 89 (1908). And in Afroyim both majority and dissenting Justices appear to have agreed on the basic proposition that the scope of the Citizenship Clause, whatever its effect, did reach all citizens. The opinion of the Court in Afroyim described the Citizenship Clause as “calculated completely to control the status of citizenship.” 387 U. S., at 262. And the dissenting Justices agreed with this proposition to the extent of holding that the Citizenship Clause was a “declaration of the classes of individuals to whom citizenship initially attaches.” Id., at 292.
The majority opinion appears at times to rely on the argument that Bellei, while he concededly might *843have been a naturalized citizen, was not naturalized “in the United States.” This interpretation obviously imposes a limitation on the scope of the Citizenship Clause which is inconsistent with the conclusion expressed above that the Fourteenth Amendment provides a comprehensive definition of American citizenship, for the majority’s view would exclude from the protection of that Clause all those who acquired American citizenship while abroad. I cannot accept the narrow and extraordinarily technical reading of the Fourteenth Amendment employed by the Court today. If, for example, Congress should decide to vest the authority to naturalize aliens in American embassy officials abroad rather than having the ceremony performed in this country, I have no doubt that those so naturalized would be just as fully protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as are those who go through our present naturalization procedures. Rather than the technical reading adopted by the majority, it is my view that the word “in” as it appears in the phrase “in the United States” was surely meant to be understood in two somewhat different senses: one can become a citizen of this country by being born within it or by being naturalized into it. This interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the Citizenship Clause. That clause was added in the Senate rather late in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, and as originally introduced its reference was to all those “born in the United States or naturalized by the laws thereof.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768. (Emphasis added.) The final version of the Citizenship Clause was undoubtedly intended to have this same scope. See Flack, supra, at 88-89.
The majority takes the position that Bellei, although admittedly a citizen of this country, was not entitled to the protections of the Citizenship Clause. I would not depart from the holding in Afroyim that every American *844citizen has Fourteenth Amendment citizenship. Bellei, as a naturalized American, is entitled to all the rights and privileges of American citizenship, including the right to keep his citizenship until he voluntarily renounces or relinquishes it.
The Court today puts aside the Fourteenth Amendment as a standard by which to measure congressional action with respect to citizenship, and substitutes in its place the majority’s own vague notions of “fairness.” The majority takes a new step with the recurring theme that the test of constitutionality is the Court’s own view of what is “fair, reasonable, and right.” Despite the concession that Bellei was admittedly an American citizen, and despite the holding in Afroyim that the Fourteenth Amendment has put citizenship, once conferred, beyond the power of Congress to revoke, the majority today upholds the revocation of Bellei’s citizenship on the ground that the congressional action was not “irrational or arbitrary or unfair.” The majority applies the “shock-the-conscience” test to uphold, rather than strike, a federal statute. It is a dangerous concept of constitutional law that allows the majority to conclude that, because it cannot say the statute is “irrational or arbitrary or unfair,” the statute must be constitutional.
Of course the Court’s construction of the Constitution is not a “strict” one. On the contrary, it proceeds on the premise that a majority of this Court can change the Constitution day by day, month by month, and year by year, according to its shifting notions of what is fair, reasonable, and right. There was little need for the founders to draft a written constitution if this Court can say it is only binding when a majority finds it fair, reasonable, and right to make it so. That is the loosest construction that could be employed. It is true that England has moved along very well in the world without a written constitution. But with complete familiarity *845with the English experience, our ancestors determined to draft a written constitution which the members of this Court are sworn to obey. While I remain on the Court I shall continue to oppose the power of judges, appointed by changing administrations, to change the Constitution from time to time according to their notions of what is “fair” and “reasonable.” I would decide this case not by my views of what is “arbitrary,” or what is “fair,” but rather by what the Constitution commands.
I dissent.

 Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the Act of May 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 797.

 8 U.S. C. §1401 (b).