Court Opinion

ID: 9786177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:50:02.767224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:42.222281
License: Public Domain

Judge Pro Tem COPSEY,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision in section (II)(A) and join in the majority’s decision in section (II)(B). The majority holds in section (II)(A) that I.C. § 12-120(4) is the exclusive provision governing attorney fee awards in personal injury actions and that it authorizes recovery only for prevailing plaintiffs. I would affirm the district court and hold that I.C. § 12-120(1) mandates attorney fee awards to prevailing defendants in personal injury actions where the amount alleged is less than $25,000. I would further hold that I.C. § 12-120(4) only amends the conditions a plaintiff must meet in such personal injury cases in order to be awarded fees.
As Justice Walters wrote in his law journal article with respect to I.C. § 12-120(1), “[t]he scope of this statute is substantial. First of all it applies to ‘any action,’ without limitation, where the amount pleaded is $25,000 or less.” Hon. Jesse R. Walters, Jr., A Primer for Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, 38 Idaho L.Rev. 1, 25 (2001) (emphasis added). Unlike other attorney fee statutes, the award of attorney fees under this statute is mandatory. Id. at 26. Furthermore, this statute places certain procedural conditions on plaintiffs which must be met before a prevailing plaintiff may recover attorney fees.1 Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has held I.C. § 12-120(1) also mandates attorney fees be awarded to defendants who prevail in such actions. Id. at 25 (citing Loftus v. Snake River Sch. Dist., 130 Idaho 426, 942 P.2d 550 (1997)).
In 1996, the Idaho legislature added subsection (4) to I.C. § 12-120, and amended I.C. § 12-120(1) to reflect its addition.2 The majority reads the language in I.C. § 12-120(1) “[ejxcept as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section ...” as meaning that subsection (4) provides the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees in personal injury actions, and that by adding subsection (4), the legislature affirmatively eliminated the right of a prevailing defendant in a personal injury action to be awarded attorney fees.3 To reach their conclusion, the majority finds that the term “claimant” as used in I.C. § 12-120(4) is ambiguous making the legislature’s intention unclear’.
The majority then examines the original language in the bill introduced in 1996 and follows its changes in committee. That bill originally read as follows: “... there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party ... a reasonable amount ... as attorney’s fees.” The term “prevailing party” was changed to “claimant” in a subsequent markup. The majority finds this bare act during the committee mark-up suggests the legislature intended to preclude a prevailing defendant from recovering attorney fees, changing the existing law. However, there is no legislative history indicating why this change was made, and there is no direct evidence that the legislature intended to radically depart from the prior rule allowing a prevailing *700defendant be awarded attorney fees in such personal injury cases.4
Unlike the majority, I would hold that when read together, I.C. §§ 12-120(1) and 12-120(4) are clear and unambiguous.5 The two sections can be read together to mean that in personal injury cases, the plaintiff cannot recover attorney fees unless he submits a proof of claim as more fully described in subsection (4) without changing a prevailing defendant’s right to attorney fees. I would find that subsection (4) only addresses the conditions under which a plaintiff may recover and does not affect a defendant who prevails in a personal injury case where the amount alleged is less than $25,000.
While clearly subsection (4) changes the conditions a plaintiff must satisfy in order to be awarded attorney fees in a personal injury action, the prevailing defendant’s right to attorney fees are covered by I.C. § 12-120(1). This construction is consistent with the previous state of the law and would explain why subsection (4) does not refer to “prevailing party.” “It is assumed that when the legislature enacts or amends a statute it has full knowledge of the existing judicial decisions and case law of the state.” George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990). Furthermore, “[t]he legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles of law unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language employed admits of no other reasonable construction.” Id. Thus, without a clear indication that the legislature intended to eliminate a prevailing defendant’s right to fees, I would construe the statute as only changing a plaintiffs responsibilities.
A statute is ambiguous only where reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its meaning. State v. Browning, 123 Idaho 748, 750, 852 P.2d 500, 502 (Ct.App.1993). “[Ajmbiguity is not established merely because different possible interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case . then all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered ambiguous.” Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 (1992). In construing a statute, the court “will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions.” Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 428, 849 P.2d 98, 101 (1993) (citing Messenger, 118 Idaho at 539-40, 797 P.2d at 1387-88). A statute is to be construed as a whole without separating one provision from another. Messenger, 118 Idaho at 539, 797 P.2d at 1387.
Thus, viewing the statute as a whole, I would hold that the statute is clear and unambiguous and that there is no reason to resort to the rules of statutory construction. I would further hold that a prevailing defendant in a personal injury action for less than $25,000 is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(1).
On the other hand, if the majority is correct and subsection (4) provides the exclusive means for recovering attorney fees in personal injury actions where the amount alleged is less than $25,000, I would find that *701this subsection does not exclude prevailing defendants from recovering attorney fees.
As the majority holds, resolving this issue centers on the word “claimant” and its meaning. However, unlike the majority, I think this word is clear and unambiguous and would rely on its ordinary meaning. In statutory construction “[ujnless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when construing a statute.” Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990). Thus, I first would consider the ordinary dictionary definition of “claimant.”
According to Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.2003), a “claimant is one that asserts a right” or according to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.2000) it is “[a] party that makes a claim.” Therefore, given the subject matter of the statute, a claimant, as used in this subsection, is the person claiming the attorney fees. If the legislature intended to eliminate attorney fees for prevailing defendants by enacting this subsection, the legislature could have simply said so, which it did not. The legislature could have inserted the word, plaintiff, for the original word, prevailing party, making the subsection read as follows: “... there shall be taxed and allowed to the plaintiff ... a reasonable amount ... as attorney’s fees.” This would have clearly changed the prior rule and created no confusion. The legislature did not do this.
Without any direct evidence, the majority presumes the legislature intended to radically depart from the previous state of the law on attorney fees and affirmatively intended to eliminate attorney fees for prevailing defendants in personal injury cases. However, there is no plainly expressed declaration to preclude prevailing defendants from recovering fees, and under Idaho case law, the legislature should be presumed to not intend to overturn long established principles of law absent such plain declaration. Messenger, 118 Idaho at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388.6 Furthermore, if the majority is correct that “claimant” is ambiguous, then by definition subsection (4) is capable of more than one construction, suggesting the presumption announced in Messenger was not overcome. Id.
In addition, when a statute is capable of more than one construction, the court may consider the consequences of a proposed interpretation. See Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 177, 560 P.2d 497, 499 (1977). When choosing between alternative constructions of a statute, courts should presume that the statute was not enacted to work a hardship or to effect an oppressive result. Id. Constructions that would cause a statute to produce “unnecessarily harsh consequences are to be avoided and any ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of a reasonable operation of the law.” Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 691, 604 P.2d 51, 55 (1979). The majority considered the consequences and concludes that the amendment’s consequences promote settlement.
However, contrary to the majority’s opinion, eliminating a prevailing defendant’s right to recover attorney fees in a small personal injury case will not encourage settlement. An unreasonable plaintiff would have no real incentive to accept a reasonable settlement offer, knowing that there was no risk of attorney fees being imposed. The plaintiffs only downside would be the potential loss of an affirmative award of fees to himself.
Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s decision to award attorney fees to defendants who prevail in personal injury actions where the amount claimed is less than $25,000.

. Under I.C. § 12-120(1), in order for the plaintiff to receive an award for attorney fees, the statute requires that the plaintiff must have made a written demand on the defendant at least ten days before the commencement of the action. Additionally, if the defendant tenders an amount equal to ninety-five per cent of the ultimate judgment, attorney fees cannot be awarded to the plaintiff. I.C. § 12-120(4) changes these conditions.

. While the legislature made certain other changes, only the changes to I.C. § 12-120(1) and the addition of subsection (4) are relevant here.

.Gillihan also argues that dicta in Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 476, 36 P.3d 218, 228 (2001) supports treating Idaho Code § 12-120(4) as the sole subsection applying to personal injury actions. In Great Plains, the Idaho Supreme Court stated "[tjhe phrase '[ejxcept as provided in subsections (3) and (4)’ means: if it is not a ... personal injury (4), I.C. § 12-120(1) applies." Great Plains, 136 Idaho at 476, 36 P.3d at 228. However, where the Supreme Court was not called upon to decide, and did not decide, whether subsection (4) provided the exclusive means for obtaining attorney fees in a personal injury action, the court is not bound by its observation.

. While Gillihan presented an affidavit from the bill's sponsor, this affidavit is nothing more than post-enactment "history," and should not be considered. See e.g. Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 129 (2003); Salem-Keizer Ass'n of Classified Employees v. Salem-Keizer School Dist. 247, 186 Or.App. 19, 61 P.3d 970 (2003). The motive or purpose of the drafters of a statute is not relevant to its construction, absent reason to conclude that the body which adopted the statute was aware of that purpose and believed the language of the proposal would accomplish it. Robert L. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.4th 894, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951 (2003).

. "[W]here the language of the statute is unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction.” Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 415, 849 P.2d 83, 88 (1993). When called upon to interpret a statute, the court begins with an examination of its literal words. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare ex rel. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776, 779, 890 P.2d 727, 730 (1995). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory construction. State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 405 (1997).

. "The legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles of law unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language employed admits of no other reasonable construction." Messenger, 118 Idaho at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388 (citing Doolittle v. Morley, 77 Idaho 366, 292 P.2d 476 (1956)).