Court Opinion

ID: 9758986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:58:52.995264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:57.777499
License: Public Domain

GRAY, Justice,
dissenting.
Once again, the majority decides an appeal based on an issue not raised or briefed by the appellant or rebutted by the State. The issue Gerron presented:
The trial court erred in failing instruct the jury, as requested, concerning the appellant’s alleged failure to maintain a single lane.
The issue decided by the majority:
Gerron was entitled to a jury instruction because any stop outside a police officer’s jurisdiction for a suspected but unobserved DWI offense was investigatory and therefore illegal.
Appellant’s counsel raised an issue about the officer’s jurisdiction with the trial court *573in a motion for directed verdict. It was denied. Counsel specifically declined to question on appeal the correctness of the court’s decision to deny the directed verdict. We should not do it for him.
Even if the issue decided by the majority was raised by Gerron, I believe Articles 14.01 and 14.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are broad enough to allow for reasonable suspicion to be developed while in the officer’s geographical jurisdiction. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. arts 14.01 & 14.03(d) (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2001); see also Romo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). This is especially true for DWI offenses. I did not, and still do not, agree with this Court’s previous decision in Yeager and its discussions of a police officer’s extra-jurisdictional authority. Yeager v. State, 23 S.W.3d 566 (Tex.App.—Waco 2000, no pet.). I do not now agree with the majority’s application of Yeager in this case.
With these comments, I respectfully dissent.