Court Opinion

ID: 9845189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:16:25.921219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:53.999576
License: Public Domain

POSHEIM, Chief Justice.
Glenn Smith (appellant) was convicted on two counts of third degree burglary and two counts of grand theft. We affirm.
The Coast-to-Coast store in Martin, South Dakota was broken into on the morning of February 9, 1982. Entry was made through a heat duct on the roof of the building. Footprints in fresh snow led from the roof of the store to a two-family dwelling. The upstairs of the building was occupied by a family and the basement by appellant. The house has a common entryway leading to both apartments. After following the footprints to the residence at Dorothy Street, one of the officers maintained surveillance while the other went to secure a search warrant.
Although the address of the house under surveillance was 407 Dorothy Street, the search warrant listed it as 401 Dorothy Street. Deputy Rolfe’s affidavit for the search warrant consistently referred to the residence as 401 Dorothy Street.* He testified the mistake occurred because the house number, as affixed to the garage, looked like a 1 rather than a 7.
The application and affidavit in support of the search warrant otherwise accurately described the general location of the house and the names of the residents. Reference to houses by the names of the occupants is common in Martin, a rural community of about 1,000 people. Actually, numbering houses was a recent innovation.
Armed with the search warrant, the officers entered the residence at 407 Dorothy Street and proceeded to the basement apartment. They knocked twice on the door to the apartment. Upon receiving no response, they forcibly entered the apartment by kicking open the door. They found some of the items known to be missing from the Coast-to-Coast store in appellant’s bedroom. Appellant was in the apartment at the time and was arrested. No entry or search of the upper apartment occurred.
Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The trial court ruled the search warrant was valid. Reversible error is claimed because the search warrant failed to state the correct street address and the apartment to be searched.
Article VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution provides that “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.” See also U.S. Const. amend. IV. These safeguards should be given a reasonable interpretation. State v. Wellner, 318 N.W.2d 324 (S.D.1982).
Consequently, searches conducted on warrants bearing incorrect addresses have not been condemned outright. A search warrant issued for 260 27th Avenue rather than 262 27th Avenue was upheld where the officer discovered that 260 27th Avenue did not exist and reasoned that the informant had misread 262 as 260 because an accumulation of dirt, running paint, and corrosion around the house numbers ob*508scured the last digit. State v. Rood, 18 Wash.App. 740, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977).
Rood listed
three general sources of information that may be considered in determining whether the premises to be searched are sufficiently identified, absent a correct street address, to enable the officers to locate them with certainty. Those are: (1) other physical descriptions of the premises contained in the warrant or affidavit, State v. Trasvina, [16 Wash.App. 519, 557 P.2d 368 (1976) ]; (2) information concerning the location of the premises based upon the officer’s personal knowledge of the location of the premises or its occupants, State v. Davis [165 Wash. 652, 5 P.2d 1035 (1931)]; State v. Andrich, 135 Wash. 609, 238 P. 638 (1925); and (3) the personal observations of the officer or officers at the time the warrant is executed. This latter source is recognized in Steele v. United States, [267 U.S. 498, 45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925) ], with its pronouncement that the description suffices if the officer can “with reasonable effort” ascertain and identify the place intended.
Id. at 1328. We approve use of such sources of information to validate an otherwise incorrect search warrant. See also United States v. Prout, 526 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.1976); United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650 (3rd Cir.1975).
The facts in this case support all three sources expressed in Rood. The information in the affidavit set forth the location and description of the dwelling and the names of its occupants. The evidence shows that local residents and particularly law enforcement officers knew where everyone lived in the community. This personal knowledge on the part of the officers permitted them to ascertain the intended premises with certainty solely on the basis of the search warrant and supporting affidavit. Additionally, the personal observations of the investigating officers who discovered footprints leading through the snow from the crime scene to the door of the residence and the continued presence of one officer at the residence while the other obtained the search warrant safeguarded against entering the wrong place. The search warrant therefore does not fail for particularity.
In State v. Kaseman, 273 N.W.2d 716 (S.D.1978), we addressed the question whether “particularly” modifies the word “warrant” or the word “affidavit” in Article VI, § 11 of our state constitution. We there held that search warrants must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized and affidavits supporting those search warrants need not particularly describe the place, person, or thing but must contain a showing of probable cause. Here we have the converse situation of an inaccurate warrant supported by a detailed affidavit. We now confirm that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, but that requirement is satisfied if the circumstances surrounding the execution of the warrant are such that the officer can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched. See Steele v. United States, supra.
Appellant also contends that the search warrant was inadequate because it did not designate the apartment to be searched. We disagree. A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the objects of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Consequently, where probable cause exists which supports the issuance of a warrant for an entire building, the warrant is valid. State v. Ellis, 263 S.C. 12, 207 S.E.2d 408 (1974); Annot. 11 A.L.R.3d 1330, § 7 (1967). The trail of footprints that led from the Coast-to-Coast Store to the common entry of the residence at 407 Dorothy placed the entire residence under suspicion.
We do not mean to say, of course, that one search warrant may be used in all *509cases to justify the search of all living units in a multiple-residence structure, for in most situations probable cause would not exist for such a blanket authorization and thus the warrant would not pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., United States v. Votteller, 544 F.2d 1355 (6th Cir.1976); United States v. Gusan, 549 F.2d 15 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Higgins, 428 F.2d 232 (7th Cir.1970); United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.1955). When considered in the light of the totality of the circumstances, however, we do not view the warrant in the instant case as being beyond the pale of particularity. There were only two living units within the structure located at 407 Dorothy Street. There apparently was no separate entry dedicated to each apartment. The probable cause to believe that the fruits of the break-in were in the structure was overwhelming. The possible intrusion upon the privacy of the occupants of both units was thus reasonable within any fair interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. In a word, we must draw a distinction between the warrant in the instant case and one that would purport to authorize a search of all units in a large apartment complex based upon tracks leading to the front door of the complex. That distinction made, the ghost of seriatim kick-ins is laid.
Finally, appellant argues that the court should have given South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction 2-14-6 in place of instruction 1-12-2. South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction 2-14-6 addresses the effect of intoxication on the ability to form intent. The trial court was warranted in refusing the instruction, for there is no evidence in the record which suggests that defendant was under the influence of alcohol when he committed the crime. There was some evidence indicating that appellant had been drinking excessively during the recent past. There was no evidence, however, pointing to intoxication on the night of the crime. A trial court need not instruct on matters that find no support in the evidence. State v. Chamley, 310 N.W.2d 153 (S.D.1981).
Affirmed.
WOLLMAN, DUNN and MORGAN, JJ., concur.
HENDERSON, J., dissents.

 The affidavit stated in part:
We followed the footprints north along the footpath. The footprints left the footpath in an easterly direction near the residence at 401 Dorothy Street and were followed to the residence at 401 Dorothy Street. The footprints appeared to enter the front porch door at 401 Dorothy Street. The upstairs of 401 Dorothy is believed to be occupied by the James Hinek family and the basement by Glen [sic] Smith and one of the sons of Olive Burke.