Court Opinion

ID: 9910155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 21:00:52.549686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:15.542664
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-2092

        SEA “B” MINING COMPANY, c/o HealthSmart Casualty Claims Solutions,

                            Petitioner,

                     v.

        THOMAS  E.  MARTIN; DIRECTOR,  OFFICE OF   WORKERS’
        COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
        LABOR,

                            Respondents.

        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. (21-0166 BLA)

        Submitted: November 8, 2023                                 Decided: December 13, 2023

        Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Timothy W. Gresham, PENN, STUART & ESKRIDGE, Abingdon,
        Virginia, for Petitioner. Brad A. Austin, WOLFE WILLIAMS & REYNOLDS, Norton,
        Virginia, for Respondent.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Sea “B” Mining Co. (“Employer”) petitions this court for review of the Benefits

        Review Board’s (“BRB”) order affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)

        decision granting Thomas E. Martin’s subsequent claim for benefits under the Black Lung

        Benefits Act (the “Act”), 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 to 944. Employer argues that the ALJ’s

        decision to credit the opinions of Dr. J. Randolph Forehand over the opinions of Drs.

        Jeffrey Sargent and Roger McSharry was neither supported by substantial evidence nor

        adequately explained. We deny the petition for review.

               Our review of an ALJ decision that the BRB has affirmed is “highly deferential.”

        W. Va. CWP Fund v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 880 F.3d 691, 697

        (4th Cir. 2018). We review the legal conclusions of the BRB and ALJ de novo, considering

        whether those conclusions “are rational and consistent with applicable law.” Id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted); see Edd Potter Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp.

        Programs, 39 F.4th 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2022). With respect to factual findings, our review

        is limited to considering “whether substantial evidence supports the factual findings of the

        ALJ.” Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Stallard, 876 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means

        such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

        conclusion.” Sea “B” Mining Co. v. Addison, 831 F.3d 244, 252 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “To determine whether this standard has been met, we consider

        whether all of the relevant evidence has been analyzed and whether the ALJ has sufficiently

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        explained his rationale in crediting certain evidence.” Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling, 783

        F.3d 498, 504 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “We are not at liberty to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ but rather must

        defer to the ALJ’s evaluation of the proper weight to accord the evidence, including

        conflicting medical opinions.” Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Cochran, 718 F.3d 319, 322

        (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, an ALJ remains obliged to

        conduct “an appropriate analysis of the evidence to support his conclusion.” Milburn

        Colliery Co. v. Hicks, 138 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998). “[E]ven if legitimate reasons

        exist for rejecting or crediting certain evidence, the ALJ cannot do so for no reason or for

        the wrong reason.” Addison, 831 F.3d at 252-53 (cleaned up). The ALJ also is required

        “to adequately explain why he credited certain evidence and discredited other evidence.”

        Hicks, 138 F.3d at 532. While this requirement “is not intended to be a mandate for

        administrative verbosity,” the reviewing court must be able to “discern what the ALJ did

        and why he did it.”      Piney Mountain Coal Co. v. Mays, 176 F.3d 753, 762 n.10

        (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               To establish entitlement to black lung benefits, a claimant must prove that (1) he

        has pneumoconiosis; (2) it arose from his coal mine employment; (3) he has a totally

        disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment; and (4) his pneumoconiosis substantially

        contributes to his disabling impairment.         20 C.F.R. §§ 718.202, 718.203, 718.204,

        725.202(d); see Stallard, 876 F.3d at 667. Under the Act, “pneumoconiosis” is defined as

        “a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary

        impairments, arising out of coal mine employment,” and includes both “clinical” and

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        “legal” pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a). “‘Clinical pneumoconiosis’ consists of

        those diseases recognized by the medical community as pneumoconiosis,” which are

        “characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of particulate matter in the

        lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust exposure

        in coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(1). “‘Legal pneumoconiosis’ includes

        any chronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine

        employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2). “[A]rising out of coal mine employment” means

        “significantly related to, or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine

        employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(b).

               Employer argues that the ALJ erred in affording weight to Forehand’s opinion,

        asserting that Forehand’s opinion is neither well reasoned nor well documented because it

        was formed with the belief that Martin’s coal mine employment spanned 15 years, failed

        to take into account Martin’s smoking history, and assumed that coal dust exposure

        substantially contributed to Martin’s disability. Having reviewed the record, we conclude

        that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reliance on Forehand’s opinion and that the

        ALJ adequately explained why he credited Forehand. Contrary to Employer’s assertions,

        Forehand attributed to Martin a lengthy smoking history and specifically explained that the

        additive effects of coal dust and cigarettes meant both factors substantially contributed to

        his respiratory impairment. Further, in crediting Forehand’s opinion, the ALJ explained

        that the opinion was supported by the underlying documentation, supported to some extent

        by the opinions of Drs. Michael Green and Elie Nader, and buttressed by the cross-

        examination testimony of one of Employer’s doctors. The ALJ also accounted for the four-

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        year discrepancy between the employment history Forehand relied on and the history as

        found, explaining that the discrepancy did not significantly undermine the credibility of

        Forehand’s reasoned, well-documented opinion. See Harman Mining Co. v. Dir., Off. of

        Workers’ Comp. Programs, 678 F.3d 305, 311 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding four-year

        difference between the lengths of coal mine employment relied on by a doctor and the ALJ

        was “relatively insignificant” and did not “compel rejection” of the doctor’s conclusion).

               Relatedly, Employer contends that the ALJ should have credited the opinions of

        McSharry and Sargent.      Again, the ALJ’s decision to discredit those opinions was

        supported by substantial evidence. As the ALJ observed, those doctors’ assumption that

        Martin’s smoking history was the sole cause of his obstructive disorder was inadequately

        explained, and it contradicted the scientific premises underlying the black lung regulations.

        Because the ALJ’s determinations were rational, explained, and supported by substantial

        evidence, we decline Employer’s invitation to substitute our weighing of the conflicting

        opinions for that of the ALJ. ∗ See Cochran, 718 F.3d at 322.

               Accordingly, we deny Employer’s petition for review. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                               PETITION DENIED

               ∗
                Because we conclude that the ALJ did not err in crediting Forehand’s findings of
        legal pneumoconiosis and disability causation, we do not reach Employer’s remaining
        arguments regarding whether the ALJ erred in also finding clinical pneumoconiosis.

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