Court Opinion

ID: 9589834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:49:18.789796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:20.625929
License: Public Domain

Hawes, Justice,
dissenting. The original opinion circulated in this case merely affirmed the Court of Appeals opinion (123 Ga. App. 812) as correct. In my original dissent, I felt, and so stated, that the opinion and judgment, by agreeing with the Court of Appeals, was no more than a *714holding that the certiorari was improvidently granted. I reasoned .that such a holding was repugnant to the legal questions raised by the certiorari. That opinion was recalled. In my original dissent, I did not raise any question as to the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts over this case. After the original opinion was withdrawn, the court propounded three questions to the attorneys on both sides as follows:
1. Does the State court have jurisdiction of this case, or are the questions in issue covered by the National Labor Relations Act and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board?
2. Assuming that adjudication of the issue of whether the employee was guilty of insubordination and subject to dismissal from his job is within the jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B., is the question of whether he is entitled to a pension a question for decision by the N. L. R. B., or by the courts of this State, or, expressed another way,
3. Does the collective bargaining agreement entered into by Atlantic Steel Company and the Union, who represented this employee, control only as to the question of dismissal of the employee, or does it also control as to the contract between the company and the employee as to payment of pension?
Only the attorney for Atlantic Steel Company responded. He approached each question separately, and, I thought, answered them convincingly and should have brought about a different result and finding from the last opinion reached. The attorney for Atlantic Steel Company relied on a number of authorities; for example, he relied on and cited in his brief with explanations: Dowd Box Company v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, supra; Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 supra; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 344, supra. However, the court, in its second opinion, has misconstrued and misinterpreted these decisions to the detriment of his client, Atlantic Steel Company.
These cases deal with "unfair labor practices” and were brought in the proper jurisdiction. My position, as far as *715jurisdiction is concerned, in this case, is plain and simply that the pension agreement in question is a collective bargaining agreement signed by the same officers as those who signed the collective bargaining contract between the company and the union relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment. Both the pension agreement and the collective bargaining contract were witnessed and approved by the same members of the bargaining committee, Local No. 2401. The pension agreement incorporates, by specific reference thereto, the terms of the collective bargaining contract. The pension agreement and bargaining contract, though separate documents, are considered by management and labor who negotiated both as a "package deal,” and, being a "package deal,” must be and are always construed together. Disputes arising between an employer and an employee over the right to receive pensions are grievances, subject if necessary to be arbitrated as part of the conditions of employment and the subject matter for collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. "The statute [National Labor Relations Act] requiring an employer to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees in respect to rates of pay, wages and conditions of employment includes retirement and pension plans.” (Emphasis supplied) See Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 170 F2d 247; also Allied Chemical &c. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. (decided 12-8-71).
I take the further position that, in the absence of clear language in the pension or bargaining agreement, making provisions for pension rights of employees discharged for cause, such discharged employee forfeits any right he might have had at the point of discharge, subject, of course, to the arbitration proceedings wherein the validity of the discharge is questioned. I find no such language in either the pension agreement or the collective bargaining contract. In the case before us, the discharge was questioned and upheld in arbitration proceedings. The law clearly pre-empts the jurisdiction of the courts after arbitration, except in cases *716of fraud, bad faith or collusion. Hildreth v. Union News Co., 315 F2d 548. It is presumed that all of Kitchens’ rights were adjudicated in the arbitration proceeding, and the decision therein is final and binding. If they were not, it was incumbent upon Kitchens to exhaust his grievances in the proper forum. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650, supra. My position with respect to the jurisdictional question is fortified by the fact that I do not find, nor have the parties cited to this court, any Georgia case dealing with disputes as to rights arising under collective bargaining agreements that has been decided since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act.
However, assuming for the sake of argument, but not agreeing, that the Georgia courts have jurisdiction, under both Georgia and Federal law, the rights of the plaintiff in this case were properly adjudicated in the trial court. In order to be eligible for a pension under the pension plan, an employee must have had 15 years’ service with the defendant and have reached the age of 60 years. The plaintiff, as set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, had worked for the defendant 22 years. An issue of fact as to plaintiff’s correct age was raised by the evidence, but the trial court in the judgment appealed from did not reach that question but decided "in favor of the defendant on the issue of law, namely, that the plaintiff was not an employee and was not thereby eligible to apply for a pension.” In so holding, I think the trial court was correct.
Plaintiff was discharged on November 13, 1967, on the grounds of "insubordination.” At the time of his discharge, he was a member of the "bargaining unit” as defined in the collective bargaining agreement and, by virtue of his being a member thereof, his rights vis-a-vis the employer were to be determined in accordance with the procedures set forth in that contract. The union filed a grievance complaint against the employer on account of the plaintiff’s discharge and this was carried to arbitration, the final stage of the 4-step grievance procedure as set forth in the contract. The arbitrator’s award denied the complaint, holding that *717the employer did not violate the labor agreement in discharging Mr. Kitchens. That award was rendered on April 11, 1968. Plaintiff acquiesced in that decision and did not formally present to the employer his claim for a pension until January 28, 1969, more than. 14W months after his discharge and more than 9 th months after the final award of the arbitrator.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals and the majority of this court utterly ignore the basic and fundamental principle that whatever rights the plaintiff in this case has, insofar as his relations with his employer, or former employer, are concerned, are controlled by the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the company and the union, as his sole and exclusive bargaining agent, and the assertion of such rights is governed by applicable rules of substantive Federal law. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238 (82 SC 1318, 8 LE2d 462); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 344, supra.
The legality of the discharge of Mr. Kitchens having been upheld by the arbitrator, he was no longer an employee and he had no rights under the pension agreement. This is so because Sec. 1 (d) of the 1966 Pension Agreement defines "Employee” as "A person who is an active, full-time employee of the company within said bargaining unit”; and, Sec. 1 (e) defines "Pensioner” as "An employee who shall be eligible for and entitled to a pension under the provisions of the pension plan.” It will thus be seen that at the time Mr. Kitchens applied for a pension he was neither an employee nor a pensioner, since he had been discharged and his discharge was upheld by the arbitrator. See Smith v. Board of Trustees for Relief &c. 173 Ga. 437 (160 SE 395), and Carlton v. West, 174 Ga. 394 (163 SE 176), the only Georgia cases on this point. Therefore, he was not eligible to receive a pension, regardless of what his age might have been, and it is immaterial that he may have tried to inject into the case an issue as to his age. See Reeves v. Tarvisian, 351 F2d 889; Piper v. Meco, Inc., 412 F2d 752, where the U. S. Court of Appeals (1st Circuit) held, in effect, that *718a terminated employee was not entitled to recover under a pension plan where the employee had submitted the question of the propriety of his termination to arbitration and where the board of arbitration had ruled that the employee had been terminated for cause. See, also, United Steel Workers v. Enterprise Wheel &c. Corp., 363 U. S. 593 (80 SC 1358, 4 LE2d 1424).
The Court of Appeals injects into the case for the first time issues respecting forfeiture. A forfeiture is not involved in this case. The pension agreement was a mere gratuity to the employees. The company paid the entire cost of the pension, the employees making no contribution whatsoever to the fund, and the administration of the pension fund under the terms of the agreement is vested solely in the employer. The plaintiff, therefore, acquired no vested interest in the pension and had nothing which he could forfeit. Smith v. Board of Trustees for Relief &c., supra; Carlton v. West, supra; Hooten v. Holcomb, 177 Ga. 561 (170 SE 803).
On motion for rehearing, the applicant in certiorari called the court’s attention to the fact that the majority had cited no Georgia law in support of its position, while he had cited four Georgia cases in point, being the same cases cited immediately above herein. With that observation before it, the majority again recalled its opinion to add: "We decline to follow the cases of [citing the four cases] which are not full-bench decisions.” With these added words, the majority has shown its disregard for the stability of the law and established precedents so sorely needed in these times. How confusing it must be to the Bar for these established precedents to be thus lightly brushed aside.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the opinion and judgment of this court. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and would affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Almand concurs in this dissent.