Court Opinion

ID: 9578792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:48:29.377528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:27.205538
License: Public Domain

Judge Greene
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I disagree only with that part of the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees, granted under a provision in the separation agreement. Public policy may very well favor allowing contractual provisions for indemnification of attorneys’ fees. See Stuart M. Speiser, Attorneys’ Fees, ch. 15 §§ 15:3-15:8 (1973 & Supp. 1993) (discussing competing public policy arguments for and against allowing such provisions). Nonetheless, our Supreme Court has spoken directly to this issue and restated the well-established rule in North Carolina that “[e]ven in the face of a carefully drafted contractual provision indemnifying a party for such attorneys’ fees as may be necessitated by a successful action on the contract itself, our courts have consistently refused to sustain such an award absent statutory *256authority therefor.” Stillwell Enters., Inc. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 289, 266 S.E.2d 812, 814-15 (1980). In the face of this unequivocal holding of our Supreme Court, this Court in Edwards, without any citation to Stillwell, upheld an award for attorneys’ fees granted pursuant to a separation agreement even though there was no statutory authorization for such an award. Edwards v. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. 706, 403 S.E.2d 530, disc. rev. denied, 329 N.C. 787, 408 S.E.2d 518 (1991). In addition, this Court in Carter, without any attempt to apply or inteipret Stillwell, approved parties’ contracting for the payment of attorneys’ fees. Carter v. Foster, 103 N.C. App. 110, 404 S.E.2d 484 (1991). I am aware that panels of this Court are bound by prior decisions of this Court, In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989), but I do not believe that this rule applies when the prior decisions of this Court do not apply or purport to interpret a previous Supreme Court opinion clearly requiring a contrary result. In this event, this Court has “the responsibility to follow [Supreme Court] decisions ‘until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court’.” Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 118, 431 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1993).1 This principle is supported by federal cases, including County of Monroe, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 690 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1982), which is cited by our Supreme Court in Civil Penalty.
In Monroe County, the Eleventh Circuit recognizes that the general rule is “a three-judge panel may not disregard precedent set by a prior panel absent an intervening Supreme Court decision or en banc circuit decision.” Id. at 1363. When, however, a decision set by a prior panel does not apply or purport to interpret an earlier controlling Supreme Court decision, the general rule does not apply because a panel is “without power to disregard” an earlier controlling Supreme Court decision. Id.; Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1981).
Accordingly, because Edwards and Carter did not apply or purport to interpret Stillwell and because Stillwell is unambiguous in its holding and remains the law of this State, this Court is bound to follow Stillwell, not Edwards or Carter. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s enforcement of the attorneys’ fees provision in the parties’ separation agreement.

. The fact that our Supreme Court denied discretionary review in the Edwards case does not mean that our Supreme Court “has determined that the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct.” Peaseley v. Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 592, 194 S.E.2d 133, 139 (1973).