Court Opinion

ID: 9637163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:59:29.724794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:54.072428
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Justice,
dissenting.
Since I am unable to agree that the striking similarities between the murders of Karen Stubbs and Andrea Thomas are no more than coincidental, I dissent.
I readily recognize that the admission of evidence of the accused’s prior criminal activity is “so highly prejudicial in its effect upon the jury as to be equalled only by an actual confession in its impact.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 515 Pa. 473, 476, 530 A.2d 83, 85 (1987) citing Commonwealth v. Spruill, 480 Pa. 601, 606, 391 A.2d 1048, 1050 (1978). Only under special circumstances is evidence of prior crimes admissible. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 515 Pa. at 477, 530 A.2d at *13185 citing McCormick, Evidence, § 190 (1972 2d ed.); see also Commonwealth v. Morris, 493 Pa. 164, 175, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (1981) (discussing special circumstances exception in the context of joinder of criminal actions).
Admission of evidence of a prior crime is permissible when used for the purpose of identifying the perpetrator. This narrow exception only applies when both the prior crime and the present offense share such distinct similarities that, “one would naturally conclude that both crimes were perpetrated by the same individual.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 515 Pa. at 477, 530 A.2d at 85. “There must be such a high correlation in the details of the crimes that proof that the defendant committed one makes it very unlikely that anyone else but the defendant committed the others.” Id. at 478, 530 A.2d at 86 quoting Commonwealth v. Shively, 492 Pa. 411, 414, 424 A.2d 1257, 1259 (1981). More is needed than commission of two crimes of the same class, rather the method of commission must be so unusual so as to constitute a signature. Compare Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 532 A.2d 385 (1987) (finding factual similarities sufficient for admission of evidence of prior crimes demonstrating identity and common scheme) with Commonwealth v. Bryant and Commonwealth v. Shively (both cases finding insufficient factual similarities to justify application of exception).
The trial court in the case sub judice determined that the factual similarities between the two murders were so striking that the evidence of the prior crime was relevant to identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the instant offense.1 The admission or suppression of evidence is a decision vested in the trial court, and that decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. 318, 521 A.2d 1 (1987).
*132My review of the record in the instant case reveals there was ample evidence to support the trial court’s admission of appellant’s prior offense as a signature crime. An examination of appellant’s selection, interaction, stabbing, and vaginal traumatization of the victim; the method of murder; and appellant’s calculated concealment of the crime reveals that appellant has replicated his handiwork.
On August 2, 1980, appellant murdered Karen Stubbs. The victim was a 15 year old, black female, student and resident at Pine Forge Academy in Berks County. Appellant, although not a student, also lived in the dorm, and knew the victim. Appellant claimed that he accidentally strangled the victim after she flirted with him, and then prevented his efforts to leave the dorm room. The victim was found nude, stabbed, hit in the back of the head, and vaginally traumatized. Appellant claimed that he stabbed the victim with a paint scraper in an attempt to perform a tracheotomy.
The only forensic evidence linking appellant to the crime scene was fibers of his clothing found under the victim’s fingernails. This is explained by the fact that appellant went to great lengths to conceal his identity. Appellant placed the victim’s clothes in a sink full of water, and wiped off her arms and all items he touched. He disposed of the paper towels he used to wipe off all of his fingerprints and threw the paint scraper in a nearby river. He stated that he got the idea to cover up the murder from a Colombo movie where a man accidentally killed a lady and then tried to make it look like a robbery. (N.T. 8/6/90 at 117).
The victim in the present case, Andrea Thomas was murdered on June 4, 1989. Thomas was a 14 year old, black female and a student at Pine Forge Academy at the time of her death. Appellant, who was Ms. Thomas’ uncle, knew the victim. Appellant admitted to being in the decedent’s Montgomery County home the morning of the murder. The victim was found virtually nude, stabbed, hit in the back of the head, and vaginally traumatized. The cause of death was strangulation by ligature. In addition, evidence was presented that on *133the morning of the murder, the decedent was flirting and wrestling with appellant. Despite appellant’s admitted wrestling with the victim the morning of the murder, the only forensic evidence linking appellant to the crime scene was his fingerprint on the inside surface of a trash bag. Appellant stated that he immediately washed his pants after leaving the victim that morning. The house was ransacked giving the appearance that a robbery had occurred.
The cumulative and distinctive similarities between the victims selected; the interaction with each victim prior to death; the method of murder; the fact that each victim was stabbed with an unusual weapon, struck in the back of the head, and vaginally traumatized; and the calculated concealment of the crime provide a correlation between the two crimes that goes far beyond the natural similarities shared by all classes of homicides.
The majority reaches to other jurisdictions to provide examples of cases where the evidence was insufficient to satisfy this limited exception. See People v. Golochowicz, 413 Mich. 298, 319 N.W.2d 518 (1982); Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 Va.App. 241, 337 S.E.2d 897 (1985).2 The facts in neither of these cases have the quantity nor quality of similarities present in the instant case. Further, the precise holding in Goloehowicz was that the admission of the prior crime evidence was error,
not because we find an abuse of discretion in the determination that the two crimes were of the requisite similarity and bore the requisite distinctive “signature” of a single actor, but because we are persuaded that the evidence of the uncharged homicide was so unfairly prejudicial when weighed against its limited and tenuous probative worth that, in its admission, the defendant was denied a fair trial.
413 Mich. 298, 323, 319 N.W.2d 518, 526 (emphasis added).
The majority, in a further attempt to buttress its case, has created a dissimilarity between the Stubbs and Hawkins mur*134ders.3 The majority states:
The instant murder was not unique and .differed from the 1981 murder because the victim here died of strangulation by ligature. The dissimilarities in the murders lead to the conclusion that the 1981 murder was accidental (as Appellant testified) and the instant murder was intentional. The fact that the 1981 Stubbs murder was accidental is further buttressed by the fact that Appellant tried to use a paint scraper to perform a tracheotomy on the victim, and he pled guilty to homicide of the third degree. On the other hand, the puncture wounds on Thomas had nothing to [do] with an attempt to restore life. Moreover, the ligature marks on Thomas’ neck indicate intentional murder. Thus, the Commonwealth offered third degree murder in one case and sought to prove first degree murder in the other. Clearly, the Commonwealth recognized that the murders were different just as a paint scraper and a fork are unusual and unique, and they were employed in such different ways so as not to indicate that the same person necessarily committed the murders.
(Majority at 553).
The fact that, unlike Karen Stubbs, Andrea Thomas was strangled by ligature is a relevant dissimilarity. Likewise, the fact that Karen Stubbs was stabbed in the neck, and Andrea Thomas was stabbed in the back is relevant in considering the admissibility of the prior crime.
However, the majority’s conclusion that Karen Stubbs was accidentally murdered, or that the stab wounds she suffered were caused by appellant in an attempt to restore life is not sound. The majority’s accidental murder theory is premised on nothing more than appellant’s unbelievable, unsupportable, and never before accepted assertions that the stab wounds were caused by an attempted tracheotomy following an accidental strangulation. Further, there is no basis for construing *135Hawkins’ prior plea to murder in the third degree as evidence that the Commonwealth somehow recognized the Stubbs murder was accidental.4 The majority is speculating as to why the Commonwealth offered a plea bargain.
Appellant argues that the connection between the two murders is weakened by the fact that the two crimes were committed nine years apart in different counties. In considering the issue of remoteness, we have held that the length of time between crimes is, “but another factor to be considered in determining if the prior crime tends to show that the same person committed both crimes.” Commonwealth v. Shively 492 Pa. at 416, 424 A.2d at 1259 (1981). First, the length of time decreases in significance considering that appellant spent six of the nine intervening years incarcerated. Second, when measured against all the similarities, the gap between murders does not alter the logical connection between the two crimes. In addition, the fact that the first murder occurred in Berks County while the second occurred in Montgomery County reflects the appellant’s change in residence, and not a change in his modus operandi.
Finally, I would not require the Commonwealth to present “evidence ... of serial killings or a sophisticated profile that applies to Appellant.” (Majority at 553). This is simply not a prerequisite to admitting evidence of prior crimes. Accordingly, I would find the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the prior Stubbs murder.
I dissent.
NIX, C.J., and CAPPY, J., join this dissent.

. Before receiving the evidence of a prior crime, the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence was only admissible for a very limited purpose. (N.T. 8/6/90 at 91-92). When giving its charge, the trial court again instructed the jury on the precise purpose it was to consider the evidence of the prior murder. (N.T. 8/14/90 at 116-118). I hasten to add that even with cautionaiy instructions, the admission of a prior crime still could be reversible error if a significant correlation between the prior crime and instant offense was lacking.

. The Supreme Court of Virginia in Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (1990) disapproved of language contained in Sutphin v. Commonwealth, that would "require that evidence of the other crimes may not be admitted unless they are virtual carbon copies of the case on trial." Spencer at 89-90, 393 S.E.2d at 616.

. Once having found the similarities insufficient to support the admission of this limited prior crimes exception, the court is not required to examine any dissimilarities. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 515 Pa. at 479, 530 A.2d at 86.

. Indeed, Hawkins was charged with first degree murder.