Court Opinion

ID: 9895354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 20:08:51.744437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:10.597707
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Fonce v. Kabinier, 2023-Ohio-4027.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                TRUMBULL COUNTY

RHONDA J. FONCE,                                  CASE NO. 2022-T-0111
ZONING INSPECTOR
CHAMPION TOWNSHIP,
TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO,                            Civil Appeal from the
                                                  Court of Common Pleas
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,

        - vs -                                    Trial Court No. 2021 CV 00480

CHARLES KABINIER a.k.a.
CHARLES J. KABINIER, et al.,

                 Defendants,

DENNIS M. KABINIER,

                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                               OPINION

                                    Decided: November 6, 2023
                                        Judgment: Affirmed

Mark S. Finamore and Stephen A. Turner, Turner, May & Shepherd, 185 High Street,
N.E., Warren, OH 44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

John H. Chaney, III, Daniel Daniluk, LLC, 1129 Niles Cortland Road, S.E., Warren, OH
44484 (For Defendant-Appellant).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Dennis M. Kabinier, appeals from the judgment of the

Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-

appellee, Rhonda J. Fonce, Zoning Inspector for Champion Township. For the following

reasons, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.
       {¶2}   On May 7, 2021, Fonce filed a Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent

Injunctive Relief against Charles Kabinier and Sylvia Kabinier as well as their son, appellant

Dennis Kabinier. The Complaint alleged that Charles and Sylvia own a residential property

while Dennis “manages [the] property as a residential ‘rental premise,’” was “responsible for

locating a Metal Shipping Container on the premises” and uses and has exclusive control

over this container. Count I alleged that the container violated the Champion Township

Zoning Resolution which states that “Metal Shipping Containers are not permitted in any

districts except industrial.” Count II alleged that using the property in violation of the Zoning

Resolution constituted a public nuisance and that, although asked to remove the container,

the defendants had not done so. The Complaint requested that the defendants be enjoined

from locating and using the container on their property.

       {¶3}   Attached to the Complaint were three copies of documents titled Final Notice

to Comply-Zoning Violation addressed to each of the Kabiniers. They stated: “YOU ARE

HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT YOU ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE CHAMPION TOWNSHIP

ZONING RESOLUTION AS FOLLOWS: Locating a Metal Shipping Container on your

property.” The Notices indicated that the defendants were ordered to remove the shipping

container immediately and that failure to do so would lead to legal action, including the filing

of a criminal complaint or seeking an injunction.

       {¶4}   On October 4, 2021, plaintiff’s counsel filed a Motion for Substitution and

Suggestion of Death, indicating that Charles had died in February 2004 and Sylvia had died

in January 2013. It noted that no probate estate was filed for Charles and an intestate

probate estate was filed for Sylvia but was closed prior to the appointment of a fiduciary. It

moved to substitute the deceased parties with their next of kin and spouses. An amended

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Complaint was filed, adding these parties as defendants as well as a new Count II, alleging

that, even in the absence of the regulation relating to shipping containers, the metal

container, as a structure, could not be located on the property without first applying for a

zoning certificate and, thus, there could be no valid non-conforming use.

       {¶5}   Dennis Kabinier filed an Answer on January 18, 2022.

       {¶6}   On June 10, 2022, Fonce moved for summary judgment. She argued that the

sole legal issue before the court was whether Dennis’ use of the shipping container was

“grandfathered in,” since the container was placed on the property prior to the enactment of

the metal container zoning provision in 2018. She argued that the placement of a container

on the property was not legal prior to 2018 since the Zoning Resolution contained a

requirement to obtain a zoning certificate prior to locating “buildings” on a premises.

Attached to the motion for summary judgment was a copy of zoning regulations including

the provision, effective June 4, 2018, prohibiting metal shipping containers in all districts

which are not industrial and a section titled “Section 19: Zoning Certificate” which states:

“Before constructing, locating, changing the use of, or altering any buildings, including

accessory buildings or changing the use of any premises, application shall be made to the

Champion Zoning Inspector for Zoning Certificate.”

       {¶7}   Also attached were copies of citizen complaints made giving rise to the

investigation of the Kabinier property. A copy of a May 2, 2018 letter titled “Violation” sent

to Charles Kabinier was also attached, which requested removal of items on the property,

including vehicles, trash, and the metal container. An affidavit signed by Fonce alleged that

all allegations raised in the Complaint were true.

       {¶8}   Dennis filed a motion for summary judgment on June 30, 2022. He argued

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
that he did not have an ownership interest in the subject property and was not responsible

for zoning violations. He argued that the existence of the “storage shed/building” on the

property was a nonconforming use since the Zoning Resolution permitted single dwellings

“and buildings accessory thereto.” Finally, he alleged that he did not receive notice of the

violations. In an attached affidavit, he swore that he did not own the property, the “storage

shed/building” was “located upon” the property in 2011 and it was utilized as part of the

estate for multiple years. In reply to Fonce’s motion, he argued that the shed was not proven

to be a “structure or building” as defined in the Zoning Resolutions and, thus, no zoning

certificate was required for a valid non-conforming use.

       {¶9}   On November 1, 2022, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry granting

summary judgment in favor of Fonce. It found that the placement of the shipping container

on the property was not a nonconforming use since it was not permitted by the applicable

zoning ordinance, as there was no zoning certificate issued for the container. It rejected

Kabinier’s argument that he could not be sued since he was not the owner of the property,

finding a suit can be brought against the person in possession of the property. It also found

no due process violation. It denied Kabinier’s motion, granted Fonce’s motion and entered

judgment permanently restraining Kabinier from locating and using a metal shipping

container on the property.

       {¶10} Kabinier timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error:

       {¶11} “[1.] Whether the trial court erred, and abused its discretion, in failing to find

in favor of Appellant, where Appellee failed to assert its claim(s) against the real parties in

interest.

       {¶12} “[2.] Whether trial court erred, and abused its discretion, in failing to find in

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
favor of Appellant, where the storage shed/building on the real estate was a valid

non-conforming use permitted by Appellee.

       {¶13} “[3.] Whether trial court erred, and abused its discretion, in failing to find in

favor of Appellant, where Appellant was entitled to due process and notice, but did not

receive same from Appellee in this case and throughout this process.”

       {¶14} Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and * * * the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” i.e.,

when “reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to

the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled

to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” Civ.R.

56(C). An appellate court reviews the granting of a motion for summary judgment de

novo. Fradette v. Gold, 157 Ohio St.3d 13, 2019-Ohio-1959, 131 N.E.3d 12, ¶ 6. “A de

novo review requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of the evidence

before the trial court without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Peer v. Sayers, 11th

Dist. Trumbull No. 2011-T-0014, 2011-Ohio-5439, ¶ 27.

       {¶15} In his first assignment of error, Kabinier argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by failing to grant summary judgment in his favor where he was not a real party in

interest in the litigation and the claims could not be prosecuted against him. Fonce contends

that because Kabinier was in possession of the property, he was a proper party.

       {¶16} An abuse of discretion standard has been applied to claims that a trial court

improperly recognized a party to the proceedings pursuant to Civ.R. 17(A) and Civ.R. 25(C).

Midwest Business Capital v. RFS Pyramid Mgt., LLC, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2011-T-0030,

2011-Ohio-6214, ¶ 18-25.

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
       {¶17} Civ.R. 17(A) sets forth that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of

the real party in interest.” (Emphasis added.) It further discusses dismissal of the action in

the absence of a real party in interest after time has been allowed for joinder or substitution

of such party (“ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action

has been commenced in the name of the real party in interest”). Civ.R. 17(A) does not

address suits brought against a party. Case law relating to this rule resolves this issue in

relation to the party bringing a claim rather than the defendant against whom a matter has

been filed. See City Natl. Bank v. Gides, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-030, 2017-Ohio-7962,

¶ 20 (“a real party in interest is an individual who has suffered an injury in a matter”);

Progressive Macedonia, LLC v. Shepherd, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-792, 2021-Ohio-

792, ¶ 59 (“if a claim is asserted by one who is not the real party in interest, then the party

lacks standing to prosecute the action”). Kabinier does not cite authority applying this rule

to defendants to an action.

       {¶18} Kabinier also cites Civ.R. 25, which provides a procedure and timeline for

substituting the proper party for a deceased party. Similarly, he cites R.C. 2117.06(A), which

sets forth the procedure to be followed by creditors seeking to litigate claims against an

estate. These arguments all relate to whether a claim can be maintained against the

deceased. However, at the time of the initial filing of the complaint in this matter, Dennis

was listed as a separate defendant and the action was brought against him personally in

addition to his parents. This was before the plaintiff realized both parents were deceased

and filed the suggestion of death. An action can be maintained separately against Dennis

and not as a representative of the deceased parties for the reasons further described below.

The validity of the lawsuit against his deceased parents and any representatives of his

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
parents is irrelevant to whether the claims against him individually were valid.

       {¶19} Nonetheless, even considering the application of R.C. 2117.06 here, we do

not find it precluded the Township, and Fonce as Zoning Inspector, from seeking an

injunction for a zoning violation. R.C. 2117.06(A) provides: “All creditors having claims

against an estate, including claims arising out of contract, out of tort, on cognovit notes, or

on judgments, whether due or not due, secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliquidated,

shall present their claims” to the executor, the probate court, or the distributees of the estate,

depending upon the circumstances. R.C. 2117.06(B) requires that “all claims shall be

presented within six months after the death of the decedent.” “Creditor” for the purposes of

R.C. 2117.06 has been “broadly defined by the Ohio Supreme Court,” and includes “‘all

persons having rights in action against the decedent.’” Harshbarger v. Moody, 3d Dist.

Logan No. 8-09-13, 2010-Ohio-103, ¶ 20; Embassy Healthcare v. Bell, 155 Ohio St.3d 430,

2018-Ohio-4912, 122 N.E.3d 117, ¶ 28 (citation omitted).

       {¶20} Kabinier has not provided authority that demonstrates a township, as

represented by the zoning inspector, is a “creditor” or “person” having a right to bring a claim

against the decedents. A township is not “invested with the general powers of a corporation,”

it has “no inherent power,” and it has “only those powers expressly authorized or necessarily

implied from the expressed grant of statutory power.” In re Petition for Incorporation of the

Village of Holiday City, 70 Ohio St.3d 365, 369, 639 N.E.2d 42 (1994); State ex rel. Butler

Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of County Commrs., 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

22664, 2008-Ohio-6542, ¶ 15. See Yorkavitz v. Bd. of Twp. Trustees of Columbia Twp.,

166 Ohio St. 349, 351, 142 N.E.2d 655 (1957) (“[w]hatever police or zoning power townships

of Ohio have is that delegated by the General Assembly, and it follows that such power is

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
limited to that which is expressly delegated to them by statute”). Kabinier does not provide

authority supporting a conclusion that a township, which has limited authority and is not a

corporation or legal person, is authorized to bring a claim as a creditor or in some manner

initiate estate proceedings to bring such claim. R.C. 2117.06(A) provides methods for a

creditor to raise claims either after the appointment of an executor or after the final account

or certificate of termination has been filed. Here, it appears no executor was appointed and

there was no final account or certificate of termination. While Kabinier contends that it was

up to the township to “procure the appointment of an administrator of decedent’s estate,” he

again does not support his argument with citation to case law that the township was able or

required to do so.

       {¶21} Significantly, we observe that R.C. 2117.06 has been recognized as having

the purpose to “promote the early and final settlement of estates” and allow for “distribution

to be made of the residuum among those entitled.” Pierce v. Johnson, 136 Ohio St. 95, 99,

23 N.E.2d 993 (1939). Here, there was no financial encumbrance or inability to distribute

the assets of the estate in the absence of a creditor claim brought by the township, as the

township merely sought removal of a container on the property. Those interests implicated

by creditors in estate proceedings vary from the interest of a zoning inspector and township

to ensure compliance with zoning laws that affect the community as a whole, rather than

impact the distribution of property to distributees free of encumbrances or claims. Again,

R.C. 519.24 exists to allow the township to pursue such matters. Nonetheless, it is worth

noting that Kabinier claims the estate has not been distributed and he does not have

ownership of the property, so it may be questioned how the failure to bring a claim in probate

court would impact him as the defendant in this action. We observe, however, that title to

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
real property vests immediately upon death in the heirs. See Winters Natl. Bank & Trust

Co., v. Riffe, 2 Ohio St.2d 72, 76, 206 N.E.2d 212 (1965), citing Barlow v. Winters Natl. Bank

& Trust Co., 145 Ohio St. 270, 278, 61 N.E. 2d 603 (1945). Further, for the reasons

addressed below, a claim was properly brought against him as present possessor of the

property, which implicates a separate interest than those raised in estate proceedings.

       {¶22} R.C. 519.24, under which the present proceedings were brought, provides: “In

case any building is * * * located, erected, constructed, * * *, or used or any land is * * * used

in violation of sections 519.01 to 519.99, inclusive, of the Revised Code, or of any regulation

or provision adopted by any board of township trustees under such sections, * * * the

township zoning inspector * * * may institute injunction, mandamus, abatement, or any other

appropriate action or proceeding to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove such unlawful location,

erection, construction, * * * or use.” It does not set forth a particular party who must be sued

but references prevention or abatement of the violation. Kabinier does not cite to authority

that the person in present possession of the property, although not the owner, cannot be

subject to an action against the property.

       {¶23} It has been held that the “present possessor” of a property is an appropriate

defendant in a suit brought to enjoin zoning violations. River Bend Farm Dev. Co. v. Cellular

One, 11th Dist. Portage No. 95-P-0076, 1996 WL 210783, *2 (Mar. 8., 1996); Monus v. Day,

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 35, 2011-Ohio-3170, ¶ 41. A person in possession of land

has been defined as one who “is in occupancy of land with intent to control it.” Hensley v.

New Albany Co. Ohio Gen. Partnership, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APE02-189, 1997 WL

798776, *6 (Dec. 31, 1997), citing Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 157 (1965).

There is no factual dispute that Dennis Kabinier is presently residing at the property. He

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
stated in his affidavit that, upon the death of his father in 2004, he “was asked to move into

and did move into the [subject] real estate with Sylvia.” Although he maintains that he does

not have an ownership interest in the real estate or rental agreement for the use and

occupancy of the property, he does not deny that he continues to reside there. The record

establishes that he is the occupant of the property and has been responsible for its care for

a number of years. The failure to pursue probate proceedings or otherwise resolve the title

to the property after his parents’ death does not absolve him of the responsibility to comply

with zoning regulations as the “present possessor.” See River Bend at *2.

       {¶24} Kabinier cites Thomas v. Bldg. Dept. of Barberton, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25628,

2011-Ohio-4493, in support of the proposition that “a future or speculative interest is not

sufficient to confer standing.” Thomas related to a party’s standing to bring an appeal of the

Building Department’s order of condemnation. The court noted that the issue of standing in

an administrative appeal must be demonstrated since appeals are “not allowed for the

purposes of settling abstract questions but only to correct errors injuriously affecting the

appellant.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 7. The interest here is different as the action filed by

the plaintiff was filed to enforce an existing zoning violation, not to address a question in the

abstract. The issue is not one of standing, i.e., whether Kabinier had an interest in the

property. Rather, it is whether a person in possession of a property is responsible for

complying with zoning regulations. The law allows for an injunction to be sought to prohibit

or abate improper use of a property and, for the reasons outlined above, the suit could be

brought against Kabinier, regardless of whether he is the owner. See Bohach v. Advery, 7th

Dist. Mahoning No. 00 CA 265, 2002-Ohio-3202, ¶ 20 (finding that the person in possession

of the property, rather than the owner, was impacted by zoning regulations).

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
       {¶25} The first assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶26} In his second assignment of error, Kabinier argues that Fonce failed to

demonstrate a violation of the zoning regulations since the use of the shipping container on

the property was permissible at the time the container was placed there.

       {¶27} There is no question that Section 5, Subsection 21 of the Champion Township

Zoning Resolution provides that “Metal Shipping Containers are not permitted in any districts

except industrial.” There is no dispute that there was a metal shipping container on the

Kabinier property. However, this regulation was not enacted until 2018, well after the

container was placed on the property, a fact which Fonce concedes.

       {¶28} R.C. 519.19 provides that “[t]he lawful use of any dwelling, building, or

structure and of any land or premises, as existing and lawful at the time of enactment of a

zoning resolution or amendment thereto, may be continued, although such use does not

conform with such resolution or amendment” unless it is voluntarily discontinued. The

Champion Township Zoning Resolution, Section 6(1), also provide that a non-conforming

use “may be continued, except that, if it is voluntarily discontinued for one (1) year or more,

it shall then be deemed abandoned * * *.” “A use of property must be lawful at the time the

use was established in order to qualify as a nonconforming use. Therefore, a use not

permitted by the applicable zoning ordinance when the use was established does not

constitute a nonconforming use.” Pschesang v. Terrace Park, 5 Ohio St.3d 47, 448 N.E.2d

1164 (1983), syllabus. Further, “[n]onconforming uses are not favorites of the law.” Janson

v. Beninato, 11th Dist. Ashtabula Nos. 2015-A-0039 and 2015-A-0040, 2016-Ohio-2796, ¶

24. The issue, then, is whether there was a nonconforming use for the property and whether

it was properly demonstrated. “Civil actions pursuant to R.C. 519.24 require proof by clear

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and convincing evidence.” Bd. of Mantua Twp. Trustees v. Kukral, 11th Dist. Portage No.

2021-P-0093, 2022-Ohio-1721, ¶ 35. While the party seeking to demonstrate that a certain

use of land is prohibited has the burden to demonstrate that claim, a party claiming the right

to use that property due to a nonconforming use carries the burden to establish such a use.

Petti v. Richmond Heights, 5 Ohio St.3d 129, 131, fn. 1, 449 N.E.2d 768 (1983).

       {¶29} As an initial matter, it is noteworthy that Kabinier’s argument as to the

nonconforming use in this matter changed somewhat over the course of the proceedings.

In his motion for summary judgment, he emphasized that the Zoning Resolutions in effect

“when the storage shed/building” was located on the property allowed single family dwellings

and “buildings accessory thereto,” implying that the container was an accessory building.

(Emphasis sic.) In his response to Fonce’s motion for summary judgment, which asserted

that a zoning certificate was required to have a building placed on one’s property, he then

contended that the shipping container was not a building and plaintiff failed to establish that

it was.   Kabinier himself has been somewhat inconsistent in whether he believes the

container on his property should be considered a building.

       {¶30} The Champion Township Zoning Resolution, Section 4, provides that “[t]he

following uses, and no other, shall be deemed class ‘R’ uses and permitted in all ‘R’ Districts:

(1) Single and two family dwellings, and buildings accessory thereto.” It also includes

various other uses not pertinent here.       It has been held that where a zoning code is

permissive, i.e., lists all of the uses permitted and prevents all others, other uses need not

be specifically prohibited. State ex rel. Bailey v. Madison, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-284,

2012-Ohio-4950, ¶ 10. In an effort to exhibit compliance with the listed uses, Kabinier initially

emphasized that the Resolution made lawful “buildings accessory thereto.” According to

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Champion Township Zoning Resolution, Section 19: “Before constructing, locating,

changing the use of, or altering any buildings, including accessory buildings or changing the

use of any premises, application shall be made to the Champion Township Zoning Inspector

for a Zoning Certificate.” While Kabinier now argues that the container was not a building

for the purposes of avoiding the requirement to obtain a zoning certificate, he does not

identify what other use permitted under the code applies.

       {¶31} Nonetheless, presuming that having a container on the property was a lawful

use in the absence of a finding that it was a building, and, thus, unlawful only due to the

failure to get a zoning certificate, Kabinier’s arguments still fail. We find that Kabinier failed

to demonstrate that the container did not meet the definition of a building under the Zoning

Resolution. Section 30 of the Resolution defines a structure or building as “anything erected,

constructed or reconstructed on a foundation, posts, piles, blocks, skids, sills or support,

whether such foundation, posts, piles, blocks, skids, sills or other support is or is not

permanently located in, or attached to, the soil.”

       {¶32} Kabinier argues that the container does not meet this definition for a few

reasons. First, he contends, without further analysis of the meaning of these terms, that the

container was already built and was not erected or constructed. “Erected” has been defined

not only as “to put up by the fitting together of materials,” but also to “fix in an upright position”

or to “set up, establish.”       Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/erected#dictionary-entry-2 (accessed October 31, 2023). From the

facts presented by the parties, there is nothing to refute a conclusion that the container was

fixed in an upright position or “established” on the property. While it may not have been

“constructed” by being assembled on the property, the fact that the definition provided

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several terms to define a structure indicates they have different meanings. See State v.

Herbert, 49 Ohio St.2d 88, 113, 358 N.E.2d 1090 (1976) (“the use of different language [in

statutes] gives rise to a presumption that different meanings were intended”). Kabinier did

not present any evidence relating to how the structure was placed on the property.

       {¶33} As to the second requirement, a building must be located on foundation, posts,

piles, blocks, skids, sills or support, whether they are attached to the ground or not. Although

Kabinier argues that Fonce failed to demonstrate, through evidence or photographs, that the

container was placed on such materials, as addressed above, the burden is on the party

seeking to utilize the non-conforming use to establish lawful use. Petti 5 Ohio St.3d at 131,

fn. 1, 449 N.E.2d 768. Here, the record is devoid of evidence as to whether the container

was placed on a foundation, posts, or the other methods described. While Kabinier claims

in his brief that it was not, he did not provide evidence or attest to this fact in his affidavit

upon summary judgment.         As the Ohio Supreme Court held in Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v.

Morgan, 116 Ohio St.3d 461, 2008-Ohio-87, 880 N.E.2d 88, a plaintiff moving for summary

judgment “does not bear the initial burden of addressing the nonmoving party’s affirmative

defenses.” Id. at syllabus. “Rather, a non-moving party has the burden to submit evidence

as to its own affirmative defenses.” Wickham v. Wickham, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 15 CAE

07 0057, 2015-Ohio-4136, ¶ 36, citing Todd at ¶ 14-18. “The landowner claiming the

defense of a valid, nonconforming use must * * * prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the use existed on the effective date of the zoning change, and furthermore, that the

use was legal at that time.” Wooster v. Entertainment One, Inc., 158 Ohio App.3d 161,

2004-Ohio-3846, 814 N.E.2d 521, ¶ 48 (9th Dist.); Swan Creek Twp. v. Wylie & Sons

Landscaping, 168 Ohio App.3d 206, 2006-Ohio-584, 859 N.E.2d 566, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.) (“[t]he

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
party seeking to take advantage of a nonconforming use must demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the use was lawful”).

       {¶34} Fonce met her initial burden of demonstrating that there was a metal shipping

container on the property, both through Fonce’s averment that the shipping container was

located on the property and Kabinier’s agreement that a container had been located on the

property, and that this violated the Zoning Resolution in place prohibiting such use. Kabinier

did not present evidence to support his contention that the container was a lawful use at the

time it was placed on the property and failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

this claim, thereby failing to meet the burden placed on the landowner. See Stumpff v.

Riverside Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28589, 2020-Ohio-4328, ¶ 21

(where the record was “ambiguous” as to whether parcels were used as an automobile

salvage yard before the enacted zoning ordinance, the defendant failed to meet his burden

to prove the nonconforming use by a preponderance of the evidence); Martin v. Cleveland,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 75405, 2000 WL 426546, * 5 (Apr. 20, 2000) (defendant failed to

meet his burden of showing that the use of his property was lawful as he did not present

evidence demonstrating whether the property had been enclosed by a wall of sufficient size

for the purposes of storing wrecked vehicles).

       {¶35} Further, we observe that the Zoning Resolution separately defines an

“Accessory Building or “Structure” as a building with “one or more enclosed sides or a roof

located on the same lot and of a nature customarily incidental and subordinate to the primary

use, structure, building, or dwelling located on the lot.” Provided this definition applies to the

present circumstances, Kabinier also failed to present evidence that the container did not

meet this definition. As noted above, such structure would also be subject to the requirement

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
to obtain a zoning certificate.

       {¶36} Kabinier also argues that Fonce failed to demonstrate the date on which

Section 30 of the Zoning Resolution became effective. A review of the Champion Township

Zoning Resolution reveals that when provisions are added, the date of the change is

denoted. While each individual definition in Section 30 (“Definitions”) does not state the date

of enactment, there is nothing to indicate that they were not in place at the times in dispute

here. Nonetheless, for the reasons demonstrated above, the burden is on Kabinier to

demonstrate a nonconforming use, to which the definition of the building is relevant. He did

not present an alternate version of the Zoning Resolution nor other facts to support his

contention that there was a nonconforming use.

       {¶37} The second assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶38} In his third assignment of error, Kabinier argues that “to insure compliance with

due process requirements, the Zoning Resolutions of Champion Township * * * require that

notice be given regarding all alleged zoning violations.” He contends that notices were sent

to Charles and/or Sylvia Kabinier on May 2 and December 6, 2018, but not to him and that

the December notice only mentioned the violation of locating a shipping container on the

property, not the failure to obtain a zoning permit. He alleges that the amended complaint

brought up, for the first time, the zoning permit issue.

       {¶39} The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 16, of the Ohio Constitution, require that parties receive

notice of judicial proceedings and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.          Ohio Valley

Radiology Assocs. Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp. Assn., 28 Ohio St.3d 118, 125, 502 N.E.2d 599

(1986). “‘[A]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding *

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Case No. 2022-T-0111
* * is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties

of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’’’

(Citation omitted.) PHH Mtge. Corp. v. Prater, 133 Ohio St.3d 91, 2012-Ohio-3931, 975

N.E.2d 1008, ¶ 9. “[D]ue process is a flexible concept demanding more, or less, depending

upon particular factual circumstances.” In re Foreclosure of Liens for Delinquent Taxes, 62

Ohio St.2d 333, 337, 405 N.E.2d 1030 (1980).

       {¶40} Kabinier alleged that only Charles and Sylvia received notices relating to

violations, although Fonce attached to her motion for summary judgment copies of a letter

addressed to Dennis. Presuming that Dennis Kabinier did not receive a notice, we still find

no due process violation. Although Kabinier argues that the Champion Township Zoning

Resolution requires notice of alleged zoning violations, he provides no reference to any

provision or section that contains such a requirement. References to notice in the Resolution

relate to hearings before the Board of Zoning Appeals, on zoning amendments and special

use   permits    for   adult   entertainment     businesses,     and   to   the   construction    of

telecommunications towers. The Enforcement Section of the Zoning Resolution, Section

21, provides that where there is a zoning violation, an action for injunction or other

appropriate proceedings may be taken and prosecution may occur under Chapter 519 of the

Revised Code. It does not reference notice to be given prior to instituting such proceedings.

       {¶41} R.C. 519.24, under which the present matter was brought, allows for the

bringing of a suit for injunction if a building is erected or land is used in violation of the zoning

regulations. It does not reference a notice of violation requirement. It has been held that,

where a notice of a zoning violation was not sent to a defendant, since she was served with

the complaint and had the opportunity to defend the case in court, there was adequate notice

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and no due process violation. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Nimer, 2012-Ohio-5431,

982 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). There is no question that Kabinier was able to respond to

the complaint and present his arguments through the summary judgment proceedings.

      {¶42} To the extent Kabinier takes issue with the fact that the original complaint did

not address the failure to obtain a zoning certificate to place the metal container on the

property, we do not find this violated his due process rights. Amending the complaint did

not deprive Kabinier of notice as he was permitted to respond to the amended complaint

and the additional allegation, filed an answer on January 18, 2022, and subsequently filed a

motion for summary judgment and a response to Fonce’s competing request for summary

judgment. Further, this new count alleged the same violation that was contained in the

original complaint and final notice, improperly having a storage container on the property,

but merely provided justification as to why this was not a nonconforming use.

      {¶43} The third assignment of error is without merit.

      {¶44} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of

Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of Fonce, is affirmed. Costs to be

taxed against the appellant.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.

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