Court Opinion

ID: 9537257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:14:53.52864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:17.989459
License: Public Domain

ERWIN, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached in this case, but would base the decision on the *828waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.1 Such a decision can only be reached after a careful analysis of the decisions in the federal courts. It must be determined to what extent the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination and the fifth amendment protections of the federal constitution, as articulated by the federal courts, have been made binding on this court.2
The privilege against self-incrimination is of ancient origin, in genesis being traceable to the abuses of inquisitions by ecclesiastical officials, and later by secular authority, whose purpose was to compel a man to confess to a crime with which he had not been charged. Later, the privilege was expanded to protect an accused from compulsory self-condemnation. Thus, the privilege was originally oriented to the protection of a defendant, actual or prospective.3 However, at an early date the common law afforded the privilege as well to the ordinary witness although he was neither accused nor suspect.4
The dynamic growth of the constitutional privilege reflects that of its common law ancestor so that the privilege, unbounded by historical origin, “has now developed into a broad right of silence, a freedom not to speak — complementing freedom of speech.” 5 The existence of the privilege is not dependent upon the nature of the proceedings; 6 nor does it matter that the likelihood of prosecution is slight so long as its potentiality is real.7 Moreover, the privilege may be properly invoked even though no responsive answer could directly support a conviction; it is enough that an admission might “[furnish] a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution .” 8
The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is a personal privilege. As such it may be waived, for example, by choosing not to remain silent.9 On appeal *829the state argues by testifying at his plea hearing appellant waived his privilege and that the waiver remained in force at the Anthony trial. The almost universal rule is that no waiver of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination continues to a later proceeding by reason of incriminating testimony given in an earlier one.10 The no-waiver rule has found application in numerous contexts: (1) invocation of the privilege during a criminal trial after prior disclosures made (a) to an investigating officer,11 (b) before a grand jury,12 (c) before some type of preliminary hearing,13 (d) during a civil action,14 or (e) during a prior trial of the same criminal charge;15 (2) invocation of the privilege before a grand jury after prior disclosures made to an investigating officer,16 during-*830an earlier trial,17 or at a prior preliminary-hearing-18 or grand jury investigation;19 invocation of the privilege before a legislative committee after prior disclosures made to an investigating officer20 or during a civil action.21
Several -reasons have traditionally been given for this result. To allow the witness to claim the privilege at a distant and separate subsequent proceeding results in no undue advantage or injustice to either party in the latter proceeding. Moreover, circumstances following the first disclosure may give new grounds for apprehension. Finally, repetition of the prior testimony may add to its credibility, negating inadvertence. These traditional rationalia seem to me insufficient to support the no-waiver result.22
While I freely concede that the vast majority of federal decisions noted previously support the assertion that waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination holds only for the hearing in question, it appears the factual circumstances of these cases dictate this result. I have been unable to find a case in which the accused was in fact represented by counsel at the prior judicial proceeding and was actually told of the purpose of his testimony. Further, in only a small minority of cases were the proceedings presided over by a judge familiar with problems in this area.
These cases do not say that there can never be a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, nor does logic support such a conclusion. Obviously, under proper circumstances, with proper understanding, any constitutional right can be waived and this court and the Supreme Court of the United States have alluded to such situations.
In Rutherford v. State,23 this court articulated the doctrine that waiver of a constitutional right could only occur knowingly and intentionally.24 In rejecting the assertion that waiver could occur by silence this court made reference to opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the following language:
The United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938), defined ‘waiver’ as ‘an intention*831al relinquishment or abandonment of a known right of privilege.’ The Supreme Court further stated that every presumption should be indulged against waiver, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 81 L.Ed. 1177, 1180 (1937), and that the Court would not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1103 (1937).25
The case at bar fits the classic pattern of a waiver knowingly and intentionally made:
(1) The witness at the time of entry of the plea of guilty to the crime of burglary was represented by the public defender.
(2) At the time McConkey entered his plea, the district attorney informed the court that McConkey would be called to testify as a witness against his co-defendant, and that the state desired to place him under oath to ascertain the factual background of the burglary.
(3) No objection was made to the statement that he would testify at the trial of his co-defendant by either McConkey or his attorney.
(4) McConkey was then sworn and voluntarily related the factual circumstances of the burglary.
(5) Subsequently, McConkey received a sentence on a plea of guilty to burglary by the same superior court judge under a pre-sentence report which noted his cooperation with the district attorney and his willingness to testify at the trial of' his co-defendant.
I conclude the trial court was correct in holding that McConkey waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to matters previously testified to, and thus was in contempt of court for failing to answer the same question in the trial of his co-defendant.

. On the basis of the testimony taken at the time of the original plea of guilty, I must agree with Justice Rabinowitz that the fear of self-incrimination could not be fairly characterized as illusory.

. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed .2d 653 (1964).

. This orientation is reflected in the phrasing of both the federal and the Alaska constitutional provisions guaranteeing the privilege. U.S.Const, amend. V: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” ; Alaska Const, art. 1, § 9: “No person shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to be a witness against himself.”

. For discussions of the historical development of the privilege see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm, of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 58-63, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1598-1601, 12 L.Ed.2d 678, 683-686 (1964) ; DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 144-150 (5th Cir. 1962) ; 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2250 at 267-295 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

. DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 150 (5th Cir. 1962) (footnote omitted). “To apply the privilege narrowly or begrudgingly — to treat it as an historical relic, at most merely to be tolerated— is to ignore its development and purpose.” Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162, 75 S.Ct. 668, 673, 99 L.Ed. 964, 972 (1955).

. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 17, 69 L.Ed.2d 158, 161 (1923).

. United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2nd Cir. 1958) :
We find no justification for limiting the historic protections of the Fifth Amendment by creating an exception to the general rule which would nullify the privilege whenever it appears that the government would not undertake to prosecute. Such a rule would require the trial court, in each case, to assess the practical possibility that prosecution would result from incriminatory answers. Such assessment is impossible to make because it depends on the discretion exercised by [the public prosecutor]. (footnote omitted).
But of. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 366, 37 S.Ct. 621, 622, 61 L.Ed. 1198, 1200 (1917) (fear of prosecution must be more than “a mere imaginary possibility of danger.”)

. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161, 71 S.Ct. 223, 224, 95 L.Ed. 170, 172 (1950).

. Hammonds v. State, 442 P.2d 39, 41 (Alaska 1968).

. 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2276(4) at 470-472 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ; McCormick, Evidence, § 130 at 274 (1954).

. United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 1961) :
[A] prior disclosure to investigating officials cannot constitute a waiver of the privilege witli respect to the same matter in a subsequent legal proceeding. A waiver of the privilege must occur in the same proceeding in which it is sought to be invoked.
See also Jeffries v. United States, 215 F.2d 225, 226, 15 Alaska 83, 87 (9th Cir. 1954); People v. Cassidy, 213 N.Y. 388, 107 N.E. 713, 715 (1915); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 398 Pa. 237, 157 A.2d 207, 210-211 (1960). Contra, Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391, 400 (9th Cir. 1949) (dicta); In re Desaulnier, 276 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Mass.1971) (dicta).

. In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 3953) :
The privilege attaches to the witness in each particular case in which he may bo called on to testify, and whether or not he may claim it is to be determined without reference to what lie said when testifying as a witness on some other trial, or on a former trial of the same case, and without reference to his declarations at some other time or place, (footnote omitted).
See also, United States v. Malone, 111 F.Supp. 37, 39 (N.I).Cal.l953) ; Ex parte Sales, 134 Cal.App. 54, 24 P.2d 916, 919 (1933) ; Duckworth v. Dist. Ct. of Woodbury County, 220 Iowa 1350, 264 N.W. 715, 721 (1936); Apodaca v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 513, 212 P.2d 425, 431 (1949); State v. DeCola, 33 N.J. 335, 164 A.2d 729, 734-735 (1960); Hummell v. Superior Court, 100 R.I. 54, 211 A.2d 272, 274 (1965). Contra, Ellis v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 416 F.2d 791, 800-808 (1969) (Skelly Wright, J., dissenting at 808-809).

. Overend v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 131 Cal. 280, 63 P. 372, 374 (1900); People v. Lawrence, 168 Cal.App.2d 510, 336 P.2d 189, 193 (1959); In re Mark, 146 Mich. 714, 110 N.W. 61, 62 (1906); Hutchins v. State, 212 Miss. 145, 54 So.2d 210, 212 (1951). Cf. Samuel v. People, 164 Ill. 379, 45 N.E. 728, 729 (1896) (affidavit initiating prosecution); Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 420 (1899) (same). Contra, Crum v. Brock, 136 Miss. 858, 101 So. 704, 705 (1924), criticized in Comment, 38 Harv.L.Rev. 1122 (1925).

. Ex Parte Berman, 105 Cal.App. 37, 287 P. 125, 127 (1930) (no waiver by answering interrogatories in separate civil action). But cf. Loraitis v. Kukulka, 1 Ill.2d 533, 116 N.E.2d 329, 331-332 (1953) (civil action held to be one proceeding so that sworn pleading constitutes waiver of privilege at trial); Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 107 N.E. 2d 696, 700 (1952) (same as to deposition).

. George R.R. and Banking Co. v. Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27 S.E. 794, 800-801 (1896) :
The second trial is a de novo investigation before another jury, whose duty it is to consider the case in the light only of the evidence adduced at that hearing, and to allow the witness to assert his privilege would result in no undue advantage or injustice to either party to the cause.
See also United States v. Wilcox, 450 F.2d 1131, 1141-1142 (5th Cir. 1971); Woodward v. State, 21 Ala.App. 417, 109 So. 119, 121 (1926) ; Mallin v. Mallin, 227 Ga. 833, 183 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1971); State v. Rawls, 252 Or. 556, 451 P.2d 127, 128-129 (1969); Emery v. State, 101 Wis. 627, 78 N.W. 145, 152 (1899). Cf. Commonwealth v. Phoenix Hotel Co., 157 Ky. 180, 162 S.W. 823, 826 (1914) (closely related trials).

. United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139-140 (2nd Cir. 1958); Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 1956).

. United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1951).

. Cullen v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. (24 Grat.) 624, 637 (1873) (the first reported case dealing with the question of waiver by prior testimony) :
The question before us is not what the witness may have said elsewhere; but whether, when it is apparent that a disclosure from him may tend to crimi-nate him, he shall now, in a pending trial, be compelled to make that disclosure, although he claims his constitutional right of refusal. We do not see that his statements elsewhere have anything to do with the question.

. United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 140 (2nd Cir. 1958); Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 605 (5th Cir. 1956); State v. DeCola, 33 N.J. 335, 164 A.2d 729, 731-733 (1960). Contra, United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2nd Cir. 1942) (two different grand jury appearances regards as part of same proceeding); Loubriel v. United States, 9 F.2d 807, 808 (2nd Cir. 1926) (same); State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 117 A.2d 499, 504-505 (1955) (same).

. Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 1952).

. Poretto v. United States, 196 F.2d 392, 394 (5th Cir. 1952).

. The weakness of the rationalia usually advanced to support the no-waiver result has generated considerable criticism. Dean McCormick, for example, states that the rule “protects chiefly the person accused of crime, and gives very little protection to the witness.” McCormick, Evidence § 130 at 274 (1954). See also Houghton, Requiring Witnesses to Repeat Themselves, 47 Tex.L.Rev. 266 (1969) ; Comment, Whether Witness’ Prior Voluntary Testimony Constitutes Waiver of Privilege of Self-Incrimination in Second Trial of Same Case, 73 Dickinson L.Rev. 80 (1968).

. 486 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1971).

. Id. 949.

. Id. 949-950.