Court Opinion

ID: 9717113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:58:26.575865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.318220
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. I would affirm both the trial court and court of appeals’ decision in this case. The issue before our court is whether the trial judge was clearly wrong when he determined that Candis Young was not entitled to all the medical expenses she incurred when being treated by Dr. Roberts, a chiropractor, for nine months after being attacked by Maria Barbera.1 Young avered that she incurred $7,135 in medical expenses billed by Dr. Roberts, but after the hearing to determine damages, the trial judge awarded only $4,500 for her medical expenses. Dr. Roberts did not testify at the hearing on damages; only Young did. She said that Barbera confronted her, “jumped on top of me, started punching me and pulling my hair, swinging me around [when] I got my foot up, pushed her off me, and ran away.” Young continued, “[Barbera] actually pulled some of my hair out, scratched my face and left some bloody spots on my head.” Young further said that on the day after the incident, she could hardly move her head in either direction, nor could she easily move her back or neck to drive. At the hearing, Young stated she was fully recovered. Young told the trial judge that she never went to the emergency room to see a medical doctor, nor had she received any medication. Asked by the trial judge whether her parents’ insurance company paid on the bill, Young said the insurance company paid a thousand dollars or a little over. On re-direct examination, Young could not recall Dr. Roberts saying that Young didn’t have to pay the remainder of his bill if she did not win this civil lawsuit. On these facts, it is hardly surprising — and certainly not clearly erroneous — that the trial judge concluded that nine months of chiropractic treatment was unreasonable. A party seeking to recover medical expenses in a personal-injury case has the burden of proving both the reasonableness and the necessity of those expenses. See Volunteer Transport, Inc. v. House, 357 Ark. 95, 162 S.W.3d 456 (2004). Moreover, our law is well settled that the reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses are questions of fact to be decided by a jury, or, as here, by a judge sitting as the trier of fact. See Roy v. Atkins, 276 Ark. 586, 637 S.W.2d 598 (1982); Blissett v. Frisby, 249 Ark. 235, 458 S.W.2d 735 (1970). The law is also established that a trial judge, as fact-finder, is the sole evaluator of credibility and is free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of any witness, Schweck v. Burris, 330 Ark. 780, 957 S.W.2d 702 (1997). And it has long been the rule that testimony of a party to an action, who is interested in the result, will not be regarded as undisputed as determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Eggleston v. Ellis, 291 Ark. 317, 724 S.W.2d 462 (1987). Turning to the testimony presented by Young at the trial court hearing, she did refer to Dr. Roberts’s bill, which reflects his treatment of Young and a total of $7,135; however, the mere fact that a plaintiff has incurred medical expenses and the defendant has admitted liability does not automatically translate into a damage award equivalent to those expenses. See Depew v. Jackson, 330 Ark. 733, 957 S.W.2d 177 (1997). In listening to Young and studying Dr. Roberts’s bill, the trial judge expressed some doubts regarding whether Dr. Roberts overbilled. After all, the evidence suggested that Young’s parents’ insurance paid $1,000 or more of Roberts’s charges, and Young testified that she “did not recall” whether Dr. Roberts said that Young did not have to pay the remainder if she did not win this lawsuit. The judge also questioned whether the length of the treatment had been warranted, commenting that he had seen a lot of personal injury cases involving chiropractic care, but had “almost never” seen one where the treatment for a sore neck lasted for nine months. Obviously, the judge harbored doubts as to both Young’s recollections bearing on the amount already paid to Dr. Roberts by her parents’ insurance company and whether any further payment would be required if she lost this case, and the reasonableness of the extent of the treatment. Rather than reducing the entire amount of medical expenses to $1,000, the judge awarded Young $4,500, which appears reasonable under the circumstances. In addition to the above, I disagree with the majority’s application of Ponder v. Cartmell, 301 Ark. 409, 784 S.W.2d 758 (1990). Young relied on Ponder for its statement that, “so long as an individual has used reasonable care in selecting a physician, she is entitled to recover from the wrongdoer to the full extent of her injury, even though the physician fails to use the remedy or method most approved in similar cases or adopt the best means of cure.” Ponder, 301 Ark. at 412. I find that this statement stands in sharp contrast to two important principles announced by this court: first, the reasonableness of medical expenses is a question for the factfinder, see Blissett v. Frisby, 249 Ark. 235, 458 S.W.2d 735 (1970); and second, the mere fact that a plaintiff has incurred medical expenses and the defendant has admitted liability does not automatically mean that the plaintiff is entitled to a damage award equal to those expenses. Depew v. Jackson, 330 Ark. at 740. Arkansas law is clear that a default judgment establishes liability but not the extent of damages. Volunteer Transport, Inc. v. House, 357 Ark. 95, 162 S.W.3d 456 (2004) (emphasis added); Jean-Pierre v. Plantation Homes, Inc., 350 Ark. 569, 89 S.W.3d 337 (2002). In this state, a hearing is required after default in order to establish damages, and the plaintiff must introduce evidence to support damages. Volunteer Transport, supra; Byrd v. Dark, 322 Ark. 640, 911 S.W.2d 572 (1995). However, if Ponder is to be literally interpreted to mean that a plaintiff can simply introduce a billing statement to definitively establish her medical damages, then there would be no purpose in holding a hearing on damages once liability had been established; in addition, a plaintiff would not be required to prove both the reasonableness and the necessity of her treatments, so long as she had a doctor’s bill in hand. This is not what our case law says, and for that reason, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusions.   Barbera and Young had been friends, but apparently a dispute as to whether Young stole Barbera’s brother’s Play Station led to this fight.