Court Opinion

ID: 9691829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:15:33.454081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:26.063837
License: Public Domain

FICKLING, Associate Judge
(dissenting):
The victim of a rape gave the police a statement describing the circumstances surrounding the assault. Four months later the victim was shown a number of photographs of possible suspects, one of whom she thought might be her assailant.
The police submitted an affidavit asserting the above facts to a judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions (now the Superior Court) and requested an order which would direct the petitioner to appear in a lineup. At the hearing below, it was conceded by the Government and was found by the judge that no probable cause existed for the arrest of the petitioner. However, the judge, looking solely at the police affidavit containing the victim’s statement that “the facial features of the photograph were similar to those of the man who assaulted her, but to be sure she would have to see him in person to make a positive identification,” found that there were reasonable grounds to suspect petitioner.
The request for the lineup order was granted conditioned upon the so-called “antiseptic” procedure outlined in the majority’s opinion.
The petitioner moved in this court for a writ of prohibition.
I would grant the writ and, therefore, respectfully dissent from the holding that a judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions1 has the authority to order a suspect in a rape case to appear in a lineup where, concededly, no probable cause exists for the issuance of an arrest warrant against him. The majority states that the authority emanates from two separate though closely related sources: (1) the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,2 and (2) the court’s inherent power.3 I cannot accept either of these grounds as authority for the contemplated order and I will give my reasons in Part I. In Part II I will give my reasons for thinking the order is unconstitutional.
PART I
In Morrow v. District of Columbia, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 417 F.2d 728 (1969), the Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “Section 1651 literally encompass [es] the D.C. Court of Appeals, a court ‘established by Act of Congress.’ ” Unquestionably, this same reasoning applies in the case of the General Sessions Court, which was also created by an Act of Congress.
*219Recognizing that “All Writs” power resides in the General Sessions Court, I now reach the question of whether it can properly he exercised for the purpose of issuing this innovative lineup order. There are two built-in statutory restrictions upon the exercise of this power: (1) it can be used only in aid of a court’s respective jurisdiction, and (2) the purpose for its exercise must be agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
The effect of the first restriction is, to prevent courts from using this statutory power to expand their jurisdiction. As Professor Moore has stated
* * * it is settled that § 1651 does not enlarge a court’s jurisdiction, as established by the Constitution or by statute; the purpose of § 1651 is to effectuate the established jurisdiction.4
Since D.C.Code 1967, § 11-9815 gives the General Sessions Court jurisdiction over arrest warrants generally, the majority appears to conclude that personal jurisdiction over the suspect is not required, nor is jurisdiction over a specific subject matter or, if it is, then potential jurisdiction — i. e., that at some point in the future it might be possible to legally arrest — is sufficient. I would hasten to point out that everyone of us is within this potential jurisdiction.
An examination of Section 11-981 will demonstrate that it confers no jurisdiction in a case such as this and therefore an exercise of Section 1651 power cannot be justified as “in aid of” Section 11-981. Under Section 11-981 a General Sessions judge can issue warrants but only "against persons accused of crimes and offenses Until someone is accused, the judge has no jurisdiction whatsoever to issue a warrant under Section 11-981. Here, admittedly, we have only suspicion; no one has been officially accused of a crime. It may well be that an investigating officer has privately made an accusation to one or more of his colleagues. It is reasonable to assume, however, that Congress meant something more substantial when it used the term “accused.” I believe that, for the purposes of Section 11-981, no one is accused of a crime until a complaint or an affidavit which shows probable cause in compliance with GS Crim.Rule 4(a) 6 is filed against a particular person, or when an indictment is filed. It is my opinion that Rule 4’s provision for summonses is the only potential source of power for this lineup *220order. The rule’s requirement for probable cause is a clear prohibition against the use of a lesser standard.
The majority states that
* * * the [challenged] process issues “in aid of” jurisdiction to issue arrest warrants. Clearly, the challenged process was an exercise of jurisdiction to determine whether specific statutory power should or should not be utilized.
This is an erroneous statement for it seems clear to me that the challenged process was an exercise to attempt to establish probable cause which might then give the judge jurisdiction to issue an arrest warrant. It is hard to imagine a more blatant attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the court, a practice which is explicitly condemned by Section 1651.
Earlier, I pointed out a second restriction on the exercise of the All Writs power: the purpose for its exercise must be agreeable to the usages and principles of law. Since I believe, for reasons stated in Part II of this dissent, that the order violates the Fourth Amendment, this restriction also prevents reliance on Section 1651.
The majority also relies on the inherent power of a court as an alternative basis to support the issuance of the lineup order. It recognizes, however, that, essentially this basis must stand or fall on the same reasoning as the All Writs Statute.
In Morrow v. District of Columbia, supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the inherent “power of a court to issue different types of remedies to effectuate its conceded jurisdiction over some subject matter” and posited this court’s power to issue extraordinary writs, in appropriate cases, thereon.7 I do not dispute this proposition, nor do I deny the existence of a trial court’s inherent power. Yet, as the majority recognizes, this power is limited. “The inherent powers of a court do not increase its jurisdiction; they are limited to such powers as are essential to the existence of the court and necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.” 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 78 at 440 (1965).8 As I stated earlier, this lineup order is an attempt to extend jurisdiction and therefore cannot be based on any inherent power.
Perhaps the greatest fault in the majority’s reasoning on this aspect of the case is the belief that the phrase in Morrow, “conceded jurisdiction over some subject matter,” is satisfied by the fact that in some situations a General Sessions Court judge has jurisdiction to issue an arrest warrant. The employment of such a broad concept of subject matter jurisdiction, while completely ignoring personal jurisdiction, is totally unjustified. Such a vast extension of the judicial power is frightening. In the sense used here, judges have jurisdiction over an innumerable list of subjects. Can a domestic relations judge, who has jurisdiction over divorce actions, order a married man, suspected by his wife of adultery, to file a sworn admission or denial of such conduct, even though no divorce action or related case has been filed? Since the judge has “conceded jurisdiction” over divorce cases, might we say he has inherent power to do this or, alternatively, that it is “in aid of” his jurisdiction since it might simplify a future divorce action if one is brought? Is such an order so different from saying that a judge can order a rape suspect to stand in a lineup since in the future this might enable him to issue an arrest warrant if one is asked for? In my opinion, inherent powers cannot come into play here until there is some specific subject matter actually before the trial court, independent of any alleged inherent power.
*221Bestowing power on judges9 to issue this type of lineup order, despite its “antiseptic” nature, can have grave consequences such as the return of the condemned investigatory arrest. Gatlin v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 326 F.2d 666 (1963). Unlike the practices in some foreign countries and under other forms of government, generally courts in the United States are not investigatory agencies. Rather, the judicial function calls for neutrality and detachment.10 Normally, our courts do not lend their authority to an investigation until probable cause has been established. Rather than aid its establishment, the court’s function is to judge whether that standard has been met. Police, aided by grand juries and prosecutors, serve as the investigatory arm of the government. If we wish to alter this relationship — assuming for the moment that we constitutionally can — by calling upon the courts to aid a police investigation by helping to establish probable cause, then the legislature should initiate this change.
PART II
Finding that the instant “lineup order” exceeded the scope of legitimate judicial power, I would normally be disposed to merely state that the writ of prohibition should issue; there would be no need to reach the constitutional question. Courts should refrain from deciding constitutional issues when not necessary for the disposition of the case.11
This principle points up an additional problem I have with the majority’s opinion. Despite the fact that it finds these orders improper, great effort is expended justifying the issuance of this type of order in a future case. Clearly, even under the majority’s view of the case, the constitutional issue need not be reached,12 nor should be reached.13
Since I am writing in dissent, however, I am not so restricted. Not only do I feel free to question the constitutional underpinnings of this ruling but, rather, I am compelled to do so.
The majority holds that forcing a citizen to come to a police station against his will and, further, compelling him to stand on display in an “antiseptic” lineup under threat of imprisonment for contempt of court is not an arrest. Rather, it states this is merely a “lesser intrusion upon liberty” and can be supported by an “articulable suspicion”; since it is not an arrest, probable cause to arrest need not be shown. After employing a balancing test, the majority holds that, in some cases, *222such an intrusion upon liberty can coexist with the Fourth Amendment.14
The Fourth Amendment is made up of two clauses: the reasonableness and the Warrant clauses. It states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.15
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court allowed a limited search for weapons, which admittedly involved a seizure, despite the fact that probable cause, in the traditional sense, was absent. The Court pointed out that it was dealing with swift, on-the-spot police action
* * * which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. [Id. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879.]
The Court seemed to indicate that the Warrant clause did not apply and therefore the existence of probable cause was not involved,16 however, here a form of warrant is contemplated and, consequently, the Warrant clause must be considered.
. The overriding standard of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness;17 when applicable, however, the effect of the Warrant clause is that seizures upon less than probable cause are unreasonable per se. No further inquiry into reasonableness is necessary. The Terry decision coupled with dicta from Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), has left the effect of the Fourth Amendment requirement for probable cause unclear. Several alternative conclusions may be drawn.18
One possible conclusion is that in all cases probable cause must be shown. However, it is a completely flexible standard varying with all the circumstances of a case. This' concept, variable probable cause, stems from the dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Unlike our present concept where we focus on only one issue— is there probable cause to believe the person is guilty of a crime — 19 this test would call for the examination of a variety of factors such as: the gravity of the crime; whether the police are concerned mainly with detention rather than prevention; the seriousness of the intrusion necessitated by the type of detention em*223ployed. For instance, where a crime as serious as murder is involved and the police are only seeking a 10-minute detention for the purpose of taking fingerprints, a magistrate might be justified in issuing a warrant though the quantum of evidence was sufficient to show only probable cause to suspect, rather than probable cause to believe, guilt. Moreover, if the victim happened to be a police officer shot down in the course of duty, this same quantum of evidence might justify more lengthy detention or even the issuance of a search warrant. In essence, probable cause becomes one of a number of factors balanced in a test to determine the overriding standard of reasonableness. Search, frisk, arrest, or detention — variable probable cause applies to all.
I believe it is far too late in the day to argue that this theory applies to arrests or full criminal searches. Such a result would call for a reversal of our jurisprudence surrounding this area of the law. Courts have developed the standard of probable cause to believe and, until it is met, any arrest is legally unreasonable. If the type of detention employed, however, does not involve an arrest or a full criminal search, we are faced with a different question.
There is another possible conclusion, in the wake of Terry, in regard to the status of probable cause. With this alternative the existing standard calling for probable cause to believe is observed where an arrest or full criminal • search is involved; when that standard is not met, the conduct is unreasonable per se. However, the existence of a detention involving something less than an arrest is recognized. Since a “seizure” is involved, the Fourth Amendment applies,20 however, the reasonableness standard and the Warrant clause’s requirement for probable cause may be satisfied and the seizure sanctioned, despite a failure to meet the traditional probable cause to believe test. It is only when these lesser detentions are involved that variable probable cause comes into play and suspicion becomes legitimate.
It appears that the majority adopts this latter alternative.21 Under this test the crucial question is whether there is an arrest.22 If there is, then we must look for traditional probable cause.
The majority holds that the intrusion upon libérty brought about by the proposed lineup order is less than a formal arrest. As intrusions which are considered less than arrests, it refers to Terry situations and also states that “[o]ne may reasonably be stopped and asked questions by the police or requested to furnish identification,” citing United States v. Lee, D.C.App., 271 A.2d 566 (1970). If by “stop” the majority means to forcefully detain for any purpose other than a search for weapons', we are then in an area specifically left unanswered by Terry;23 The Lee case involved a voluntary stop upon being asked for identification and the opinion plainly leaves Terry’s unanswered question open. See United States v. Lee, supra at 567 24
When discussing police power to forcefully detain citizens on the street for investigation, we are in a controversial *224and largely unchartered area.25 There can be no doubt but that the police have the right to ask someone to stop and answer questions despite a lack of probable cause. Remington, The Law Relating to “On the Street” Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. of Crim.L.C. & P.S. 386 (1960). This is not an arrest. Bailey v. United States, supra, 128 U.S.App.D.C. at 364, 389 F.2d at 315. Where the police are acting on intuitive suspicion or a mere hunch, however, it is established that they have no power in the face of a citizen’s refusal to halt or answer their questions. Green v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 23, 24, 259 F.2d 180, 181 (1958).
Whether one accepts the validity of a brief on-the-street detention for interrogation,26 it is clear that it can only be upheld if it can be distinguished from an arrest for, if there is an arrest, then traditional probable cause is necessary. When it is realized that in Kelley v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 298 F.2d 310 (1961), the court found an arrest when a suspect was ordered to leave a restaurant to answer a few questions, it should be clear that there is very little room to maneuver short of arrest. In the instant case it is conceded that we have a detention in fact. There can be no doubt but that the police, the suspect, and any reasonable man innocent of a crime would consider this a detention. Whether they would consider it an arrest depends on their definition of that term. Terry v. Ohio, supra 392 U.S. at 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, indicates that not every detention is an arrest. Despite the fact that detention and arrest may not be synonymous, to assert that the detention contemplated by the lineup order is not an arrest is to participate in semantic nonsense. It would appear that, at the least, two factors must be present before a distinction from an arrest could be justified: (1) the time involved must be tremely brief, and (2) it must involve oñly a stop rather an affirmative command to move somewhere else.27 Within these narrow confines, it is conceivable that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard might be satisfied.28
The step from a brief stop to a trip to the station house and forced stint in a lineup is a giant step backward to the age of investigatory arrests.29 To contend *225that this is not a formal arrest renders the term “arrest” meaningless. To contend that a citizen can be ordered to a police station against his will and then further ordered to stand on a stage and be viewed, again against his will, and not be under arrest is beyond reason. What does it matter that the lineup is “antiseptic” ? The fact that no official record will be kept and therefore the citizen will, hopefully, be spared some public humiliation is irrelevant.30 I recognize that this is less an “intrusion upon liberty” than placing a man in jail for a few days, yet, nonetheless, both are arrests.
Professor LaFave, a champion of the variable probable cause doctrine, would old this contemplated lineup beyond the permissible limits of the Fourth Amendment. He has stated:
A full lineup — attended by the victims, witnesses, the suspected offender, and his attorney — which displays several other persons bearing some resemblance to the suspect can hardly be arranged within time limits that would pass muster for a temporary seizure. If any attempt is to be made to identify the suspect as the offender or to clear him, it must be done by other means.31
The fact that a judge or a magistrate authorizes a violation of the Fourth Amendment does not make that violation legitimate. Courts are likewise bound by the amendment. See Aguilar v. Texas, supra note 10.
I read Davis v. Mississippi, supra, as a significant roadblock to this lineup order. Dicta in that case suggests that in some limited situation it might be permissible to take a suspect’s fingerprints despite a lack of probable cause.32 The Court stressed the scientific reliability of that evidence plus the relatively slight intrusion upon personal security. This technique was expressly distinguished from eyewitness identification. It is not that lineups are less scientific than fingerprints; rather, they are not scientific at all. Perhaps a more significant distinction between the two processes is the character of the detention. Fingerprints can be taken anywhere in a matter of minutes. Lineups, however, necessarily involve more time; also, the suspect must be ordered to move rather than merely stop.33
In conclusion I wish to stress that I share the majority’s concern for “the desperate situation regarding urban safety and lawlessness.” Yet, if this nation is to remain free, it is necessary for the judiciary to maintain a perspective and at all times to act in a constitutional manner.

. Now the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Writs.
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

. The eavesdropping eases, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), and Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S.Ct 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966), are cited by the majority as examples of exercise of judicial power without reference to a specific authorizing statute. However, I would point out that strict requirements for probable cause were insisted upon and, though the authority for the court orders was not specifically discussed, I assume and expect the Supreme Court also assumed that Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 was sufficient authority since searches were involved.

. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 54,10 [2], at 64 (2d ed. 1966).

. Section 11-981. Power of judges to issue warrants returnable to Criminal Division ; record.
Each judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions may, at any time, including Sundays and legal holidays, on complaint under oath or actual view, issue warrants returnable to the criminal division of the court against persons accused of crimes and offenses committed in the District of Columbia. In every such case, he shall make a record of his proceedings in a book to be kept for that purpose. The warrants shall be issued free of charge.
After February 1, 1971, judges of the Superior Court have the power to issue specific types of warrants under the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 111 (§ 11-941). This power is “[s]ubject to title 23” and specifically § 23-561.

.Rule 4. Warrant or Summons Upon Complaint
(a) Issuance.
If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the comjilaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense lias been committed and that the defendant lias committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it. Upon the request of .the attorney for the government a summons instead of a warrant shall issue. More than one warrant or summons may issue on the same complaint. If a defendant fails to appear in response to the summons, a warrant shall issue, unless the attorney for the government requests the issuance of another summons.

. The court also discussed ancillary jurisdiction. For the distinction, see Morrow v. District of Columbia, supra, 135 U.S.App.D.C. at 164 n. 10, 417 F.2d at 732 n. 10.

. Inherent powers are also discussed at 1 J. Moore, supra note 4, ¶ 0.60 [6],

. I presume that the majority does not pretend that mere magistrates have such power. There has been no discussion of the inherent power of a magistrate, nor any assertion that Section 1651 extends to magistrates.

. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).

. Even the Supreme Court has a duty to avoid decision on presented constitutional questions “unless essential to proper disposition of a case.” Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581, 78 S.Ct. 433, 435, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958). Surely we have a duty to show even greater restraint and to observe the fundamental judicial doctrine that unnecessary constitutional questions should be avoided. Sohm v. Fowler, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 382, 385, 365 F.2d 915, 918 (1966).
“[N]o matter how much [the parties] may favor the settlement of an important question of constitutional law, broad considerations of the appropriate exercise of judicial power prevent such determinations unless actually compelled by the litigation before the Court.” Barr v. Matteo, 355 U.S. 171, 172, 78 S.Ct. 204, 205, 2 L.Ed.2d 179 (1957) ; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 110, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948); Heed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17, 27 (4th Cir. 1961).

. In this case the court reversed the ordered lineup because of an inadequate record. Hence, the constitutionality of such a lineup order is not an issue “essential to proper disposition of [the] case.”

. When faced with a similar issue as that before us, the Supreme Court in Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S.Ct. 291, 24 L.Ed.2d 299 (1969), refused to decide the serious constitutional question in the absence of a complete and proper record.

. Whether one agrees that this is an arrest, there can be no question but that there is a seizure of the person which is governed by the Fourth Amendment.

. U.S.Const. amend. IV.

. The Court stated:
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether “probable cause” existed to justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case. [392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, at 1879.]

. Wyman v. James. 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) ; Terry v. Ohio, supra at 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) ; United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.1970) (border search).

. I refer to these because they are interpretations which would come closest to supporting the majority’s result. I am not saying that these are the only interpretations possible. . Terry was not meant to be definitive. As one commentator has put it
this was the Court’s first foray into this particular thicket and it is thus understandable that it made a conscious effort to leave sufficient room for later movement in almost any direction.
UaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters;' and Beyond, 67 Mich.L.Rev. 40, 46 (1968) (hereinafter cited as LaFave).

. Brinegar v. United States, supra; GS Crim.Rule 4. See also GS Crim.Rule 41.

. 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

. The majority states that a “formal arrest” is not involved and therefore traditional probable cause is not necessary.
Since it is apparent to me that the contemplated lineup order cannot be justified even under the standards of this test, I need not here indicate my approval or disapproval.

. The majority uses the term “formal” arrest. I am not exactly sure what is meant by this. Surely it could not mean to set up a distinction based upon wheeler the police choose to bring someone to a station for formal booking. Observance of these formal procedures generally has nothing to do with the time of an arrest.

. 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879.
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative “seizure” upon less than probable cause for purposes of “detention” and/or interrogation.

. Anything in Lee that indicates that the police have a right to detain for investigation is pure dicta.

. Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 365 n. 10, 389 F.2d 305, 316 n. 10 (1967) (Leventhal, J., concurring). In his opinion, written before Terry, Judge Leventhal finds nothing wrong with stopping citizens to clear up suspicious circumstances but indicates his uncertainty of the effect of a refusal to stand still and answer questions. “[I]t may be that there is just no way of holding someone who reacts that way to police questioning.”

. See Yam Sang Kwai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 411 F.2d 683 (1969) (both McGowan, J., concurring and Wright, J., dissenting).

. But see Price v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 119 A.2d 718 (1956), where this court ruled that a restraint of a person’s full liberty for even a short period of time is an arrest. (Emphasis added.)

. The Uniform Arrest Act § 2 (see Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va.L. Rev. 315, 344 (1942)), would purportedly allow a detention on less than probable cause for up to 2 hours. Delaware adopted this Act, however, it has been interpreted as requiring probable cause for any detention. DeSalvatore v. State, 2 Storey 550, 163 A.2d 244 (Sup.Ct.Del.1960) ; United States v. Thompson, 292 F.Supp. 757 (D.Del.1968).
The A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 2.02 (Tent.Draft No. 1, 1966) authorizes a detention of only 20 minutes upon less than probable cause. The reason for this shorter time is that the drafters felt that the objectives of any pre-arrest detention should be limited to securing and verifying identification and asking for cooperation. For these purposes, 20 minutes should be more than adequate. See Commentary at 98-99.

.See Report and Recommendations of the Commissioners’ Committee on Police Arrests for Investigation (1962). It is interesting that only 10 years ago the police were urging that the only way they could control crime was if they could bring suspects into the station on less than prob*225able cause. In line with this, thousands of “investigatory arrests” occurred. This practice was condemned and its discontinuance demanded.
These investigatory arrests were, of course, illegal. Gatlin v. United States, supra.

. Is not the use of Mr. Wise’s name in this very case a potential source of public humiliation?

. LaFave, supra note 18, at 117.

. In this regard we cannot take too lightly the Court’s statement that:
We have no occasion in this case, however, to determine whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable cause to arrest. [394 U.S. at 728, 89 S.Ct. at 1398]
It is conceivable that the Court will determine that such procedures are not possible. Such a result would be compelled for instance if Terry is limited to situations involving a certain “rubric of police conduct” historically and practically beyond the scope of the Warrant clause. See n. 16 supra and accompanying text. We would not then have to look to the concept of variable probable cause to explain the rationale of Terry.

.Fingerprints and palm prints as well as hair samples could easily be obtained in the suspect’s own home or even on the street without major inconvenience. If desired, privacy could be obtained and undue public attraction avoided. The whole procedure could be completed in less than a few minutes and a trip to the police station is hardly necessary.