Court Opinion

ID: 9856767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:57:20.62983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:34.107514
License: Public Domain

SPEAR, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, but I wish to emphasize the fact that it contains no deviation from the fundamental rule that the burden of proof is upon the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding wherein he alleges he has been deprived of his constitutional rights to assistance of counsel. It is important to note that in his application for writ of habeas corpus appellant alleges that “ * * * John H. Ebersole was denied due process of law by not being given right to have counsel, this right was refused when asked for when requested by the defendet, John H. Ebersole, * * *.”
At the habeas corpus proceeding before Judge Durtschi there was adduced only the testimony of the appellant and the trial judge who presided over the original arraignment, and from the résumé thereof contained in the majority opinion it is clear to me that appellant effectively waived his right to counsel. There is no evidence to sustain appellant’s contention that this right was refused when asked for, or requested by, the defendant. Appellant’s testimony sharply contradicted not only Judge Burton’s testimony but the court records as well. The district' court ob*637viously could apply the usual test of credibility to evaluate the conflicting allegations and evidence. We cannot say that the finding should be rejected as clearly erroneous or question the determination that appellant failed to meet his burden of proving the lack of a knowing or intelligent waiver by a preponderance of the evidence, even in the face of the presumption against such waiver relied upon so heavily in the majority opinion.
The finding of the district court concerning the allegation of the demand for counsel and refusal of the court to grant the same and the finding that in fact appellant did waive his right to counsel in a knowing and intelligent manner is clearly supported by the docket entry recitations as well as by the testimony adduced. Where the district court findings are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence, they will not be disturbed upon appeal. King v. MacDonald, 90 Idaho 272, 410 P.2d 969 (1965); Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179, 397 P.2d 761 (1964); Jain v. Priest, 30 Idaho 273, 164 P. 364 (1917); Haddon v. State, 91 Idaho 460, 424 P.2d 394 (1967).
Therefore these findings of fact and the conclusions of law based thereon should be affirmed.
However, I agree with the majority opinion in effect holding this cause must be returned to Jefferson County for proper arraignment with such proceedings correctly and wholly reported by a court reporter.
While it may be contended that the “oral proceeding” provided for in I.C. § 1-1103 was intended to mean only those proceedings in which sworn testimony was being given in open court, it nevertheless can be construed, as it has by the majority opinion, to include the colloquy between the trial judge and the accused in an arraignment upon a felony charge to enable the trial judge to ascertain whether or not the accused knowingly and intelligently waives his right to the assistance of counsel in the course of such arraignment and subsequent proceedings, if necessary. That such record is requisite appears from the holdings of the various authorities cited in the majority opinion, and I feel these are bolstered by the partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in the recent case of The Application of Gault, 386 U.S. —, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1467, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. In discussing the criteria of the procedural requirements of due process demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, in proceedings against juveniles in juvenile courts, of the three procedural requirements included is
“ * * * and third, the court must maintain a written record, or its equivalent, adequate to permit effective review on appeal or in collateral proceedings.”
Where the proceedings at the original arraignment in the case at hand we re not reported by the court reporter and no minutes thereof were filed with or by the clerk of the court, there is a total lack of written record or its equivalent, and this deficiency must be remedied.
I arrive at this conclusion most reluctantly, because I am convinced from the record produced in the hearing on the writ of habeas corpus that this defendant’s rights were adequately protected; and that, in fact, Judge Burton gave this appellant every possible break, even to placing him on probation after having him treated for thirty days in Idaho Hospital South at Blackfoot. Additionally, it appears this proceeding is merely an exercise in futility on the part of the appellant. Nowhere in these entire proceedings has it in any manner been contended or even intimated that the appellant has any possible defense to the charge to which he plead guilty and for which he was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary.
I concur in reversing the judgment and remanding the cause to the court which tried the habeas corpus proceeding with directions as indicated in the majority opinion.
TAYLOR, C. J., concurs in this concurring opinion.