Court Opinion

ID: 9836773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:01.088749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:20.549818
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge
(concurring in part and in the result and dissenting in part):
In my view, the majority errs by deciding this case under Article 75(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 875. This case is controlled by Article 57(a), not Article 75(a). By its terms, Article 75(a) applies to situations where the “executed part of a court-martial sentence” was set aside or disapproved. Article 75(a) is silent regarding cases where only the convening authority’s action, but not the sentence, was set aside or disapproved. While it is true that setting aside a sentence always has the effect of setting aside the convening authority’s action, setting aside the convening authority’s action does not set aside the sentence. In appellant’s case, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not set aside the sentence; it set aside the convening authority’s action. Unpub. op. at 2. Thus, in my opinion, Article 75(a) is inapplicable to appellant’s case.
The granted issue is whether, under the version of Article 57(a) in effect at the time, *392the forfeitures should have been applied to appellant’s pay beginning on the date of the first convening authority’s action on September 6, 1996, or on the date of the second convening authority’s action on August 13, 1998. In United States v. Foecking, 22 USC-MA 46, 46 CMR 46 (1972), this Court held that when the convening authority’s first action is not “lawful,” the forfeitures are not effective until there is a legally correct action by the convening authority approving the sentence. However, in Keys v. Cole, 31 MJ 228, 231 (CMA 1990), this Court held that forfeitures were effective on the date of the convening authority’s action, even if the findings and sentence were set aside on appellate review because of a trial error, because “the forfeitures, when effected, were proper under color of law.” See also Dock v. United States, 46 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (Fed.Cir.1995).
Keys and Foecking are not inconsistent, but they are factually different. Keys involved a reversal for a trial error — improper denial of a continuance. Foecking addresses the situation where — as in this ease — the convening authority’s’ action itself was defective. In such a situation, the Foecking rationale would compel the conclusion that the sentence was not lawfully ordered executed until the second convening authority’s action on August 13,1998.
The question remains whether the Foecking interpretation of Article 57(a) is inconsistent with the intent of Congress. I agree with the majority that Foecking construed Article 57(a) in a manner inconsistent with the legislative purpose expressed in Article 75(a), and I join in the decision to overrule Foecking. I also agree that our decision to overrule Foecking is prospective and not applicable to appellant’s case. See United States v. Allbery, 44 MJ 226 (1996).
Finally, I join the majority’s conclusion that, while appellant is entitled to the benefit of Foecking, he is not entitled to any relief from this Court. Even if appellant had provided documentation to support his claim for back pay, this court lacks fact-finding authority. Jurisdiction to compute and order restoration of any back pay owed appellant rests with the United States Court of Federal Claims, not this Court. See United States v. Allen, 33 MJ 209, 215-16 (CMA 1991); Keys, 31 M J at 234.