Court Opinion

ID: 9595604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:42:04.694155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:29.131732
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
OGATA, J.,
WITH WHOM KOBAYASHI, J., JOINS
The Board of Regents adopted Appendix A (as it read at the time material to this action)1 sometime in 1969, the same year that President Cleveland first came to the University. Appendix A outlines specific procedures which culminate in the granting or refusal of tenure “by the Board of Regents” [Sections 1(c) and 2] and labels the decision as “The Regents’ decision” [Sections 3 and 9]. Section 13 of Appendix A states that the Faculty Personnel Committee “will forward everything to the President, who recommends appropriate action *698to the Board of Regents.” Section 12 states that “The President . . . will forward these recommendations to the Board of Regents for action.” President Cleveland’s testimony on cross-examination indicates that he believes that the “practices ’ ’ he follows are different than what appears in Appendix A. The trial court concluded that Section 12 required the President to forward to the Board of Regents, for its independent review, the recommendations made at the various levels of administration. I find no error in that conclusion and disagree with the majority on that point. Compare, Silverman v. University of Colorado, 541 P.2d 93, 97 (Ct. App. 1975).
In their cross-appeal, the Defendants contend that Appendix A fails to define what “action” the Board of Regents is to take, despite the language contained therein that “the Regents’ decision” is to “grant or refuse to grant tenure” [Sections 1(c), 2, 3 and 9]. In view of this alleged omission, they further urge us to find that, according proper weight to the prior and allegedly uninterrupted practice of non-review by the Board, the decision to refuse to grant tenure was in fact delegated to the President in this case because the Board of Regents did not act at all. Of course, the inaction by the Board is readily explained by the trial court’s finding, which appears from the record to be undisputed, that in 1971 the President made no recommendations to the Board of Regents- concerning Plaintiff’s application and did not forward the recommendations made at other University levels of administration to the Board of Regents for action.
The Defendants’ legal contention is that under Article IX, Section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution and under HRS§§ 26-11, 304-3, 304-11, the Board of Regents has the right and authority to delegate to the President of the University the decision to deny tenure. I have no quarrel with this proposition of law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bourgeois v. Board of Sup’rs., 205 La. 177, 17 So. 2d 25 (1944); Cathcart v. Anderson, 10 Wash. App. 429, 517 P.2d 980 (Ct. App. 1974); Papadopoulis v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education, 14 Ore. App. 130, 511 P.2d 854 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974); Sheppard v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 378 F. Supp. 4 (D.C. W. Va. 1974), *699affirmed, 516 F.2d 826 (1975); Stebbins v. Weaver, 396 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Wis. 1975). And, despite Defendants’ representations in their brief to the contrary, the trial court made no ruling that the Board lacked the power to so delegate its authority. Defendants ask us, however, to leap from the proposition that the Board is legally empowered to delegate the decision to deny tenure to the conclusion that it must have been delegated in this case because the President of the University is the executive officer of the Board.
But what effect are we to give the policy formally adopted by the Board of Regents,2 reduced to writing,3 and published as Appendix A to the Faculty Handbook?4 The parties have agreed from the inception of this action that Appendix A governs the granting and awarding or the denial of tenure to Plaintiff. The trial court so concluded. To accept the Defendants’ contention is to hold that, despite the stipulation and the language used in Appendix A, Appendix A has no legal effect where the executive officer of the Board of Regents ignores it. While the nature of Appendix A need not be *700decided in this case, I cannot reduce it to the insignificance required by Defendants’ contentions. Moreover, assuming arguendo as the majority does that Appendix A was incorporated into Plaintiff’s contract, the President’s action in assuming the authority to deny tenure could not modify the contract without Plaintiff’s consent. In continuing her employment for the requisite number of years, she became entitled to be considered for tenure in accordance with Appendix A.
The majority opinion finds from its review of the parol evidence in the record the fact that the Board of Regents delegated to the President the decision to deny tenure. However, the trial court found that the decision to deny tenure was not in fact delegated. In this case, the trial proceeded in large part on the theory that President Cleveland’s failure to forward certain recommendations to the Board of Regents for the granting or refusal of tenure constituted the breach of a duty owed to Plaintiff. Defendants’ primary defense was that the duty was not breached because the Board in fact performed by delegating to the President the authority to deny tenure. After rejecting Defendants’ proposed finding of fact that the President was “[ajcting for the Board of Regents,” the trial court made the finding that President Cleveland was only “\p~\urporting to act for the Board of Regents.” (Emphasis added.)
The federal practice is that findings of fact made by the trial court pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 52(a) are to be construed liberally in support of a judgment or order, even if the findings are not as specific or detailed as might be desired. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 956 (1949); Carr v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited, 200 F.2d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1952); Travelers Insurance Company v. Dunn, 228 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir. 1956); Zimmerman v. Montour Railroad Company, Inc., 296 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 828 (1962); Blumenthal v. United States, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962); Wells-Benz, Inc. v. United States, 333 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1964); Manning v. Jones, 349 F.2d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1965). See also Elam v. United States, 250 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1958). This rule *701is not in conflict with this court’s decisions in affirming the trial court’s judgment where “the record is so clear that the court does not need the aid of the findings”, Mayer v. Alexander and Baldwin, 56 Haw. 195, 532, P.2d 1007 (1975); Lalakea v. Baker, 43 Haw. 321 (1959), or in remanding for the entry of findings of fact where the basis of the trial court’s decision is unclear. Upchurch v. State, 51 Haw. 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969). The test drawn from these cases is whether the findings of fact actually made afford the reviewing court a clear understanding of the ground for the trial court’s decision in light of the record.
Principally, Defendants urge upon us the conclusory statements repetitively made by President Cleveland at the trial as establishing the fact that the Board of Regents actually delegated to him the authority to deny tenure. A reasonable interpretation of the trial court’s finding, however, is that the trial court rejected the evidence urged upon us.
The record is silent on what procedures were required by the 1964 Faculty Handbook for consideration of application of tenure.5 President Cleveland testified that prior to his term of office which began sometime in 1969, the Board of Regents refrained from considering all recommendations for tenure — either positive or negative. Doctor Potter, a faculty member who as former associate dean for Academic Development edited the 1969 Faculty Handbook, testified that in 1970 he had advised President Cleveland that it was his opinion (which remained unchanged at trial) that the President was required by Appendix A, then recently adopted, to take both positive and negative recommendations to the Regents for their action and that in 1970, still within President Cleveland’s first year, he had accompanied the President when the President presented to the Board of Regents the recommendations for granting and refusing tenure. President Cleveland testified that it was at his own suggestion, however, that the Board of Regents changed its prior practice so that it began to consider positive recommendations for tenure *702but continued to refrain from considering negative decisions. The record shows that beginning in 1971, the year material to this case, President Cleveland assumed the responsibility of deciding who would be denied tenure. At the 1974 trial, Doctor Potter admitted he knew President Cleveland has been following this practice since 1971. Dean Contois also testified that he knew of this unwritten practice without specifying when it had started. The majority infers from this history that the Board of Regents must have affirmatively delegated to the President the authority to deny tenure. But there is no evidence showing that the Board took any such affirmative action in derogation of its adopted written policy. To the contrary, in 1973 the Board negated any such inference by readopting Appendix A without making any change in its written provisions which reserve to the Board the decision to grant or refuse to grant tenure.
In my opinion, in light of the factual issues raised at trial, the trial court’s failure to enter an explicit finding that the President was in fact acting for the Board as proposed by Defendants, coupled with the entry of its above-quoted finding of fact and its judgment against Defendants, is tantamount to a finding that the authority to deny tenure was not delegated to the President. This is the only logical and reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the record. Even if a different inference could be made, that would not be reason to set aside the trial court’s finding. H.R.C.P. Rule 52(a); Viveiros v. State, 54 Haw. 611, 513 P.2d 487 (1973); Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585, pp. 732-733.
Having considered that the Defendants’ cross-appeal does not merit reversal of the trial court, I turn now to Plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred because, while it found that Appendix A governed the granting and awarding or denial of tenure, it refused to enforce what Doctor Potter called the “tenure by inadvertence” clause in Section 2 of Appendix A. Self-executing provisions like Section 2 have been enforced in other states. See, e.g., Papadopoulis v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education, 14 Ore. App. 130, 511 P.2d 854 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974); Pima *703College v. Sinclair, 17 Ariz. App. 213, 496 P.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1972). Compare cases where the granting of tenure depended upon an affirmative act: King v. Board of Regents, Claremont Junior College, 541 P.2d 836 (Okla. 1975); Sheppard v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 378 F. Supp. 4 (D.C. W. Va. 1974), affirmed, 516 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1975). See also 3A Corbin on Contracts, § 684, pp. 230-231.
Plaintiff claims the fact that Dean Contois notified her prior to the automatic tenure date that her tenure application would be denied and the fact that several university agencies recommended that tenure be denied in her case are irrelevant. These facts would be equities against granting an equitable remedy such as specific performance of an employment contract. See Dobbs, Handbook of the Law of Remedies 929 (1973); Hanbury, Modern Equity 46-47 (9th ed. 1969). In order to put the injured party in as good a position as he would have had if performance had been rendered as promised, some courts have held that an award of damages is the appropriate remedy. Bruno v. Detroit Institute of Technology, 51 Mich. App. 593, 215 N.W.2d 745 (1974); cf. Papadopoulis v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education, 14 Ore. App. 130, 511 P.2d 854 (1973), cert. denied 417 U.S. 919 (1974); Zimmerman v. Minot State College, 198 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 1972).
But the concept of tenure is a property interest or right created by Appendix A which is cognizable at law. I am convinced from the weight accorded to tenure by the parties and my review of the case law, including Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), that tenure is a unique right. Since the notice sent by Dean Contois was ineffective to toll Appendix A’s automatic tenure provision, cf. Papadopoulis v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education, supra, 511 P. 2d at 875, I would hold that Plaintiff has acquired the right to continued renewal of her contract in accordance with the provisions of Appendix A. Compare, Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Pima College v. Sinclair, 17 Ariz. App. 213, 496 P.2d 639 (1972). Therefore, I would remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an order which conformed to my opinion.

 There was testimony that there had been a 1964 Faculty Handbook, but the record does not show what was contained in that Handbook, the parties having agreed at trial that the 1964 version was irrelevant to this action. There was also testimony that an updated version of the 1969 Faculty Handbook was adopted by the Board of Regents in 1973. The 1973 version of Appendix A is identical to the 1969 version. Nothing in the 1973 version of Appendix A mentions the alleged delegation of authority to deny tenure to the President of the University.

 See Article IX, Section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution and HRS § 26-11.

 Appendix A begins: “The University of Hawaii subscribes to the A.A.U.P.’s 1940 Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure . . . .”
The A.A.U.P. Statement states:
“Academic Tenure * * * *
(1) The precise terms and conditions of every appointment should be stated in writing and be in the possession of both institution and teacher before the appointment is consummated.”
Academic Freedom and Tenure, 1940 Statement of Principles and Interpretive Comments, 56 AAUP Bulletin 323,324 (1970). See also Interpretive Comment 6, id. at p. 326.
In speaking about the above-quoted principle the following comment has been made:
“Good practice requires that the institution (department, college, or university) define ... its procedures for reaching decisions on these matters. The 1940 Statement of Principles prescribes that ‘The precise terms and conditions ... be stated in writing . . . .’ Committee A also believes that fairness to the faculty member prescribes that he be informed, early in his appointment, of the substantive and procedural standards which will be followed in determining whether or not his appointment will be renewed or tenure will be granted.”
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Procedural Standards on the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, 56 AAUP Bulletin 21,22 (1970).

 Id.

 See footnote 1,supra. Doctor Potter testified that the “tenure by inadvertence” clause in Section 2 of Appendix A was the unwritten practice at the University prior to the 1969 adoption of Appendix A.