Court Opinion

ID: 9473757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:38:39.931539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:42.924467
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
A partial dissent is drawn from me because I am unable to accept a literal statutory construction so at odds with the evident Congressional intent that it simply cannot be the law. Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892).1
The question is simple. The prior sentence called for one unparolable term of 12 years, for having been engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, followed by a spate of concurrent 5 year sentences, all of which were subject to parole. The 5 year sentences were all vacated on the grounds that the crimes underlying them were lesser included offenses. On remand the district judge imposed a 17 year sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 848. That sentence properly cannot stand. However, I part company with the majority as to how the district judge may resentence. I am unable to accept the majority’s flat assumption that none of the sentence properly can be subject to parole in light of 21 U.S.C. § 848(c):
In the case of any sentence imposed under this section, imposition or execution of such sentence shall not be suspended, probation shall not be granted____
I disagree with the conclusion that the maximum permissible sentence is 13 years eight months (12 years plus 20 months which mark the time which would have to elapse in any event before eligibility for parole could arise). I reach my conclusion by considering what the prohibition of parole for those convicted of committing a continuing criminal enterprise must have meant. By the inclusion of § 848(c), Congress simply intended to increase, not to reduce, the time a convicted criminal should stay in prison.
The majority agrees that a sentence, if permitted by statute, of 17 years, the last 5 of which are to be subject to parole, would here have been proper, i.e. wholly constitutional. Descending to the statutory level, in my view, despite 21 U.S.C. § 848(c), such a sentence is not forbidden. Congress did not intend to mandate, in a situation like the present one, release on parole in no more than 13 years eight months. It did mean to make the criminal eligible for parole in 13 years eight months, but to keep *1072him incarcerated for the full 17 years if he misbehaved in such a fashion as to render him ineligible for parole.
The language of 12 U.S.C. § 848(a) contemplates imprisonment up to life. When a district judge in his discretion hits upon a combination of sentences for offenses subsequently determined, because all but one were lesser included offenses, to be subject to one punishment only, Congress did not, when it forbade parole, mean to improve things for the criminal by insisting on release on parole as soon as the earliest date for parole eligibility is reached, even in case of someone disqualified by unseemly behavior from parole.
Consequently, I would find implicit in 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) an addendum, reading something like this:
“unless, and only to the extent, parole is mandated by constitutional considerations.”
Therefore, in my view, the final paragraph of the opinion should read:
For the foregoing reasons, Count Nine is REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. The sentence should not exceed seventeen years, the last five years of which shall be subject to parole.
Of course, that would necessitate some, though not extensive, modification of the foregoing reasons set forth in the majority opinion. With much of what the majority has written I find myself in agreement. It is only the 3 years and 4 months between 13 years eight months and 17 years which seem to me improperly treated. The district judge should be able to include them in a sentence, so long as everything over 12 years is subject to parole.

. "All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in
their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.”
To a criticism that my interpretation stands the statute on its head, it should be observed that literal speech and intended meaning are not, in every case identical. Here one must keep the language intact by standing the meaning on its head, or do the reverse. Either way the statute is, in a sense "turned on its head.” In making a choice, I prefer to preserve meaning rather than an expression at clear odds with intent.