Court Opinion

ID: 9576783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:28:26.808242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:47.722235
License: Public Domain

Carrico, J.,
dissenting:
I dissent. I would affirm the conviction of the defendant.
The majority opinion reverses the conviction of the defendant because of an alleged threat by Chief Peach to prosecute members of the defendant’s family if he did not confess. Such reversal, the majority says, is dictated because of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 83 S. Ct. 1336, 10 L. ed. 2d 513.
I do not interpret the Haynes case as requiring the action here taken by the majority. In that case, the sole point relied upon by Haynes to void his confession was that he was told by the police that he would have to cooperate and sign a confession before he could telephone his wife to secure a lawyer for him. On that single point, the police officers, in their testimony, failed to contradict Haynes.
The Supreme Court held that the inability of the police officers to contradict Haynes on the sole factual issue involved in the case left his account of his interrogation “testimonially undisputed.” The court ruled that the “confession was obtained in an atmosphere of substantial coercion and inducement created by statements and actions of state authorities.” 10 L. ed. 2d, at p. 520.
Tn the case before us, the situation is quite different from that *156existing in the Haynes case. Haynes, from the time of his arrest until his conviction, never denied his guilt. Here, although the prose-cutrix positively identified the defendant as her assailant and although he originally confessed to the crime, he denied his guilt on the witness stand. And on every material point in the case, save the Peach incident, the defendant, unlike Haynes, was contradicted by direct testimony.
The trial judge,, sitting without a jury, had the authority and the obligation to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The judge saw the defendant and heard him testify. That the judge concluded that the defendant lied in his testimony is obvious from the record.
The trial judge, in his oral opinion, said of the defendant’s testimony relating to the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession that he found it unworthy of belief. The judge, commenting upon the defendant’s testimony that he had not read the twenty-seven confessions signed by him, said, “that’s a little incredible.” The judge, noting that the defendant had produced witnesses who testified that they would believe the defendant under oath, said, “I’m afraid I can’t go along with that.”
It is true that no one directly contradicted the defendant’s testimony as to the conversation with Chief Peach. But the trial judge was entitled to conclude that the defendant, having testified untruthfully as to every other material point in the case, also lied about the conversation with Chief Peach.
The defendant, himself, could not even tell a straight story about his conversation with Chief Peach. He first said that Chief Peach told him that his parents would be prosecuted if he did not confess. Later in his testimony, he said that his mother, father, wife and brother were all included in the Chief’s threat.
The insincerity of the defendant’s testimony leaps out from the printed pages of the record before us, just as the falsity of his story appeared obvious to the trial judge. The fallaciousness of the defendant’s statements, together with the testimony of the police officers, justified the trial court in concluding that no threat was made to the defendant by Chief Peach. I cannot, therefore, agree with the decision of the majority to reverse the judgment of the trial court because of such alleged threat.
Nor do I agree with the views expressed in the'concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Spratley. I note his admonition that it is our duty *157to adopt the rulings of the United States Supreme Court, notwithstanding our disagreement with the reasoning or principles upon which such rulings are based.
My quarrel with the views expressed in the concurring opinion stem not from any disagreement with the rulings of the United States Supreme Court, but from the fact that the concurring opinion goes beyond what those rulings require.
It is true that in the Escobedo case, the United States Supreme Court said “that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory — when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession — our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.” [Emphasis added.]
What were the circumstances there, in Escobedo? The accused was represented by a lawyer. When the police undertook to interrogate Escobedo, he asked to consult with his lawyer. That request was refused. Escobedo’s lawyer, at that very moment, was at police headquarters asking to see his client. That request was also refused. The confession that resulted from the ensuing interrogation was held to be inadmissible — not a surprising result under the circumstances.
But those circumstances do not exist in this case. As the majority finds, Hammer had not engaged counsel and he made no request to call or consult with counsel. He was advised of his right to remain silent. The evidence shows that Hammer was asked if he wished to make a telephone call, but made none. Before the confessions were secured, the municipal judge advised Hammer that the charges against him were serious and that he was entitled to a continuance so that he might make whatever arrangements he thought necessary for trial. The judge also advised Hammer “with relation to an attorney.”
The views of the United States Supreme Court are in such a transitory state in the field of criminal law, particularly with regard to confessions, that I am opposed to extending the loose language of the Escobedo opinion to any set of circumstances beyond those existing in the Escobedo case, until required so to do. It may well be, though hardly foreseeable, that even that court someday will reconsider, retrench and restore a semblance of order to the enforcement of the criminal law.
This court needs to apologize to no one for its zeal in protecting the rights of those accused of crime. But we should not be over*158zealous, we ought not disturb established principles and, above all, we must not, without sufficient reason, add to the confusion which others have created in the field of criminal law.
For the views herein expressed, I cannot add my vote to the reversal of the conviction of an admittedly guilty felon.