Court Opinion

ID: 9368743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 20:09:31.365284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.569927
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12656    Document: 4-1    Date Filed: 02/06/2023   Page: 1 of 14

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12656
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       ROBERT M. SILLS,
                                                  Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       FCI TALLADEGA WARDEN,

                                                 Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01685-LSC-SGC
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12656

       Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Robert Sills, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the district
       court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition, which
       sought an order directing the warden of his institution to give “fair
       treatment” to his request for placement in home confinement un-
       der the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
       (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. 281, 516
       (2020). The district court found that it lacked the authority to order
       his placement in home confinement, and that Sills could not state
       a procedural-due-process claim because he lacked a constitution-
       ally protected liberty interest in his place of confinement. After
       careful review, we affirm.
                                         I.
               Sills is a prisoner serving two consecutive 120-month sen-
       tences for federal drug crimes. In May 2021, he submitted an ad-
       ministrative request at his place of confinement, a minimum-secu-
       rity prison camp at FCI Talladega, seeking placement in home con-
       finement under the CARES Act. The acting warden denied the re-
       quest in a June 2021 response, and the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
       denied Sills’s appeal in November 2021, concurring with the acting
       warden’s rationale.
             According to the warden’s response, Sills’s request was re-
       viewed under the BOP’s guidelines for home confinement under
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       22-12656                Opinion of the Court                         3

       the CARES Act. Sills was a “47 year old male” who had a “[l]ow
       [r]isk [l]evel of recidivating” under the PATTERN risk assessment.
       He was assigned “Medical Care Level 2,” which was “considered
       stable, chronic care,” and he had no “underlying medical condi-
       tions considered to place [him] at higher risk for severe illness from
       COVID-19.” The record reflects that Sills has a medical history of
       asthma, headaches, allergies, and chronic ear infections. The act-
       ing warden’s response continued that Sills had a “[s]erious history
       of [v]iolence,” citing police records relating to a 1990 conviction for
       unlawful possession of a firearm, which indicated that Sills had pos-
       sessed a loaded firearm while “banging on the door” of a residence
       and “yelling threats” with three other individuals. For those rea-
       sons, Sills’s request was denied.
              In December 2021, Sills filed the instant habeas corpus peti-
       tion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He claimed that the warden violated
       his due-process right to “fair treatment” by failing to follow the
       governing criteria for home confinement under the CARES Act.
       He relied on an April 2021 BOP memorandum outlining the factors
       relevant to determining whether “inmates are suitable for home
       confinement under the CARES Act.” As relief on his § 2241 mo-
       tion, Sills did not expressly ask to be placed in home confinement.
       Rather, he sought an order directing the warden to give “fair treat-
       ment” to his request based on the April 2021 guidance.
              After soliciting further briefing from Sills, a magistrate judge
       issued a report and recommendation that Sills’s § 2241 petition be
       denied. The magistrate judge first found that Sills’s claim, while
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12656

       styled as a procedural-due-process claim, was really a challenge to
       the substance of the BOP’s decision, which was not subject to judi-
       cial review. The magistrate judge further found that any proce-
       dural-due-process claim failed because Sills did not have a constitu-
       tionally protected liberty interest in his place of confinement.
              Sills filed objections, making clear that his “core and only
       claim is that the respondent has failed to abide by the BOP’s own
       promulgated procedures in denying his request for CARES Act
       home confinement.” He cited district-court decisions permitting
       habeas challenges based in part on the April 2021 guidance.
             The district court overruled Sills’s objections without fur-
       ther comment, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
       and denied the § 2241 petition. This appeal followed.
                                        II.
               We review the denial of a § 2241 petition de novo. Bowers
       v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir. 2011). Any underlying fac-
       tual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. In conducting our
       review, we give a generous reading to Sills’s pro se filings. See Tim-
       son v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). In addition, we
       must “look behind the label” of his claim and determine whether it
       is cognizable under other frameworks. United States v. Jordan, 915
       F.2d 622, 624–25 (11th Cir. 1990).
              Section 2241 permits district courts to grant habeas relief for
       petitioners held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
       or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal
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       22-12656               Opinion of the Court                        5

       prisoner may use § 2241 “to challenge the execution of his sen-
       tence, such as the deprivation of good-time credits or parole deter-
       minations.” McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc.,
       851 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
              We start with some background about the BOP, home con-
       finement, and the CARES Act. As part of its expansive authority to
       manage federal prisons, the BOP has the power to “designate the
       place of the prisoner’s imprisonment” and to transfer “a prisoner
       from one penal or correctional facility to another.” 18 U.S.C.
       § 3621(b). “[A] designation of a place of imprisonment under
       [§ 3621(b)] is not reviewable by any court.” Id.; see McKune v. Lile,
       536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“[T]he decision where to house inmates is at
       the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”).
             In addition, the BOP may place a prisoner in “prerelease cus-
       tody,” including home confinement, to facilitate reentry into the
       community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2). Ordinarily, the length of
       home confinement is limited to no more than six months. Id.
              But, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the CARES Act
       permits the BOP to “lengthen the maximum amount of time” for
       which home confinement is authorized under § 3624(c)(2), as the
       BOP deems appropriate, during the national emergency. CARES
       Act, § 12003(b)(2), 134 Stat. at 516. Neither § 3624(c)(2) nor the
       CARES Act provides the judiciary any authority to grant an inmate
       home confinement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2); CARES Act,
       § 12003(b)(2).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12656

               After passage of the CARES Act, the Attorney General di-
       rected the BOP to prioritize granting home confinement as a tool
       to combat the dangers posed by COVID-19 in federal prisons, un-
       locking the BOP’s expanded powers. In a memorandum dated
       March 26, 2020, the Attorney General outlined a “non-exhaustive
       list of discretionary factors” to consider under the “totality of the
       circumstances.” These factors included the age and vulnerability
       of the inmate to COVID-19, the security level of the institution, the
       inmate’s conduct in prison, the inmate’s risk score under PAT-
       TERN (risk assessment for recidivism and violence), whether the
       inmate had a reentry plan, and the danger the inmate posed to the
       community.
              Just over a year later, on April 13, 2021, the BOP adopted
       updated guidance listing the criteria for institutions to use when
       assessing suitability for home confinement. An inmate was suita-
       ble for home confinement, according to the April 13 guidance
       memo, if he had the following: (a) a “verifiable release plan”; (b) no
       current or prior offense that was “violent, a sex offense, or terror-
       ism-related”; (c) no current detainer; (d) a low or minimum secu-
       rity placement; (e) a low or minimum PATTERN recidivism risk
       score; (f) no violent or gang-related activity while incarcerated; and
       (g) served 50% or more of his sentence (or at least 25% if less than
       18 months of the sentence remain). The April 13 memo also di-
       rected “review[]” of the inmate’s recent prison disciplinary history
       and of “the COVID-19 vulnerability of the inmate, in accordance
       with CDC guidelines.”
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       22-12656               Opinion of the Court                        7

                                       III.
              We conclude that the district court properly denied Sills’s
       § 2241 petition. As Sills concedes, the court lacked the authority to
       order his placement in home confinement. See United States v.
       Houck, 2 F.4th 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Saun-
       ders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021). And he has alleged noth-
       ing that would make his custody in violation of the Constitution or
       laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
              Sills maintains that the warden and the BOP failed to follow
       the BOP’s own promulgated criteria in the April 13 guidance
       memo when denying his request for CARES Act home confine-
       ment. He states that courts have found this argument to be “an
       actionable habeas claim,” which he compares to a challenge to the
       denial of parole. Sills asserts that he was denied due process in re-
       lation to the denial of his request for home confinement, claiming
       that he had a liberty interest in “fair treatment” based on a former
       regulation that was codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541.12.
              To state a procedural-due-process claim, a petitioner must
       show he was deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty inter-
       est without due process of law. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225,
       1232 (11th Cir. 2003). An inmate is entitled to procedural-due-pro-
       cess protections only if he has such a “protected liberty interest.”
       Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2016).
       In general, liberty interests for prisoners are “limited to freedom
       from restraint” which imposes “atypical and significant hardship on
       the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                        22-12656

       Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 482, 483–84 (1995). There is no liberty
       interest in “conditional[] release before the expiration of a valid sen-
       tence,” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex,
       442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), or in a particular place of confinement more
       generally, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 228–29 (1976).
              Sills does not dispute that he lacks a protected liberty interest
       in home confinement. See, e.g., Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232; Green-
       holtz, 442 U.S. at 7. So he was not entitled to due-process-protec-
       tions in relation to that decision.
              Still, though, Sills argues that he has a liberty interest in “fair
       treatment” on his request for placement in home confinement, cit-
       ing 28 C.F.R. § 541.12 and case law regarding parole decisions. See,
       e.g., Wilson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 193 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1999)
       (“[T]he Parole Commission must follow its own regulations,
       which have the force of law.”). Section 541.12 does not appear to
       be a current regulation and cannot be read to create a protected
       entitlement, in any event. 1 But we agree that case law regarding

       1 Section 541.12 appears to have stated that “[inmates] have the right to expect
       that as a human being [they] will be treated respectfully, impartially and fairly
       by all personnel.” Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
       28 C.F.R. § 541.12 (1989)). But Barden did not hold that this regulation created
       a protected liberty interest. See id. Nor does this regulation meet Sandin’s
       standard for protected liberty interests. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 482,
       483–84 (1995). Plus, Sills’s interpretation of § 541.12, even if valid, would sub-
       ject a wide array of prison-management decisions to judicial review, in contra-
       vention of Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
       215, 225 (1976) (rejecting a view of due process that “would subject to judicial
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       22-12656                 Opinion of the Court                             9

       discretionary parole decisions offers useful guidance in the absence
       of more on-point precedent. We briefly summarize the relevant
       law before turning to the facts here.
                                           A.
               As a general rule, unless there is a liberty interest in parole,
       a defendant does not have a “constitutional right to procedural due
       process protections” in parole determinations. O’Kelley v. Snow,
       53 F.3d 319, 322 (11th Cir. 1995); see Slocum v. Ga. St. Bd. of Par-
       dons & Paroles, 678 F.2d 940, 941–42 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Unless there
       is a liberty interest in parole, the procedures followed in making
       the parole determination are not required to comport with stand-
       ards of fundamental fairness.”). We have specifically rejected a
       due-process challenge based on an alleged entitlement to fair pa-
       role consideration. See Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941–42.
               But our precedent does not wholly foreclose judicial review
       of discretionary parole decisions. In Monroe v. Thigpen, for exam-
       ple, we recognized a due-process right not to be treated “arbitrarily
       and capriciously,” even in the absence of a liberty interest in parole.
       932 F.2d 1437, 1441–42 (11th Cir. 1991). A parole board violates
       this right if it engages in “flagrant or unauthorized action,” such as
       admittedly relying on false information beyond its statutory au-
       thority. Id. But cf. Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 489 (11th Cir.
       1982) (no flagrant or unauthorized action where the parole board’s

       review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been
       the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts”).
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                    22-12656

        decision was “within the powers established by the statutes”). But
        even so, Monroe did not adopt a broader “due process right to be
        fairly considered for parole.” See Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1440–42.
                Nevertheless, even in “the absence of a constitutional
        claim,” a federal prisoner challenging “the decision of the board or
        the process by which that decision was reached” can obtain relief
        by showing that the board’s actions were “so unlawful as to make
        his custody in violation of the laws of the United States.” Brown v.
        Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing 28 U.S.C.
        § 2241(c)) 2; see also Bowers v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir.
        2011) (“Our review is limited to whether the [parole board] acted
        unlawfully such that Bowers is in custody in violation of the Con-
        stitution or laws . . . of the United States.” (cleaned up)). But “[a]
        departure by the board [from its own rules] does not necessarily
        make [a prisoner’s] custody illegal.” Brown, 528 F.2d at 1055. We
        will not reverse a decision of the board “unless it involves flagrant,
        unwarranted, or unauthorized action.” Bowers, 651 F.3d at 1291.
                                             B.
               We have not previously addressed the scope of judicial re-
        view over the denial of home confinement under the CARES Act.
        For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the
        denial of home confinement is reviewable to the same extent as the

        2This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to
        October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
        1981) (en banc).
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        22-12656                    Opinion of the Court                                11

        denial of parole to a federal prisoner. 3 But Sills has alleged nothing
        to suggest his custody by the warden violates the Constitution or
        laws of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c); cf. Bowers, 651
        F.3d at 1291; Brown, 528 F.2d at 1054–55.
               According to Sills, the BOP failed to follow its own guide-
        lines by denying home confinement based on findings that he had
        a serious history of violence and did not have a medical condition
        placing him at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19. He
        asserts that his prior convictions did not include violence and that
        he has asthma, which the CDC indicates can make severe illness
        from COVID-19 more likely “if it’s moderate to severe.” See Peo-
        ple with Certain Medical Conditions, Centers for Disease Control
        and      Prevention,       https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
        ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medical-condi-
        tions.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2023).
              Given the broad range of discretion vested in the BOP, Sills
        cannot show the BOP’s conduct was “flagrant” or “unauthorized”

        3 Sills has not briefed this issue, and the warden has not filed a brief at all. It
        does not appear that Sills is asking for a different standard than the parole
        cases, nor is there an obvious reason to apply a different standard, since the
        two situations are broadly comparable. To the extent material differences ex-
        ist, they would work against Sills. Notably, § 3625 expressly exempts the
        BOP’s prisoner-placement and prerelease-custody decisions, including home
        confinement, from judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act
        (APA), see 18 U.S.C. § 3625, while the federal parole board appears to be sub-
        ject to the APA at least in part, cf. Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1053–54
        (5th Cir. 1976) (discussing the APA in relation to the federal parole board).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12656

        such that his custody is unlawful. He does not dispute that the BOP
        could consider his criminal history and medical conditions as part
        of assessing his suitability for home confinement under the totality
        of the circumstances. And nothing in the April 13 guidance mem-
        orandum prohibited the warden from looking at the underlying
        facts of a prior conviction. To extent the warden departed from
        the BOP guidance, such a departure does not necessarily make
        Sills’s custody illegal. Cf. Brown, 528 F.2d at 1055 (“A departure by
        the board does not necessarily make his custody illegal.”). After all,
        he is serving a valid sentence, and home confinement is committed
        to the BOP’s discretion. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 (“There is
        no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be con-
        ditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”).
               Nor has Sills shown that the warden relied on false infor-
        mation, as in Monroe. See 932 F.2d at 1441–42. He does not deny
        the warden’s description of the police records, which reflect that he
        engaged in intimidating and threatening behavior while armed.
        Plus, CDC guidance indicates that the severity of asthma deter-
        mines whether it increases the risk of severe illness from COVID-
        19, and the warden apparently found that Sills’s asthma was not
        severe enough to qualify under CDC guidelines. Nothing in the
        record contradicts that assessment. The question whether these
        factors warranted the denial of home confinement is not before us.
        Our review is, at best, much narrower. And we see nothing before
        us to support a conclusion that the denial of home confinement in
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        22-12656                Opinion of the Court                        13

        Sills’s case exceeded the BOP’s authority or rendered Sills’s custody
        illegal. Cf. Bowers, 651 F.3d at 1291; Brown, 528 F.2d at 1055.
               The cases Sills cites are not binding and do not warrant a
        different outcome. Sills refers to case law from the Third Circuit
        permitting judicial review of certain discretionary decisions of the
        BOP. See Coburn v. Spaulding, No. 3:20-cv-01389, 2021 WL
        3026851, *4 (M.D. Penn. June 15, 2021) (“Although the Court can-
        not review Coburn’s challenge to the BOP’s decision under the
        CARES Act, the Court may assess ‘whether the BOP abused its dis-
        cretion.’”); see also Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 434 (3d Cir.
        2012) (reviewing a placement decision under § 3621(b) for
        “whether the BOP abused its discretion”). Under this case law, the
        BOP abuses its discretion if it fails to recognize and exercise the
        discretion available to it to decide a prisoner’s claim for relief. See
        Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 481, 483 (3d Cir. 1990) (remand-
        ing for the BOP to give “fair treatment” to a prisoner’s request,
        where the BOP had mistakenly found it lacked the authority to
        grant relief).
                In this case, though, the BOP considered Sills’s request and
        exercised its broad authority under § 3624(c)(2) and the CARES Act
        to deny home confinement after discussing many of the factors
        listed in the April 13 guidance memo. It did not fail to recognize
        its authority or deny the request on nondiscretionary grounds. So
        Barden does not support remand here. And even under Barden,
        the petitioner still must establish a “serious potential for a
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12656

        miscarriage of justice” warranting habeas relief. See id. at 479. Sills
        has made no such showing here.
                For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Sills’s § 2241 peti-
        tion.
                AFFIRMED.