Court Opinion

ID: 9900511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 23:01:45.244163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:07.006636
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                Before
                     HACKEL, KISOR, and BLOSSER
                       Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                     v.

                        Daniel K. CHEGE
                   Corporal (E-4), U.S. Marine Corps
                               Appellant

                             No. 202200079

                        _________________________

                         Decided: 13 October 2023

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                              Military Judge:
                               Derek Poteet

 Sentence adjudged 8 December 2021 by a general court-martial con-
 vened at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, consisting of
 officer and enlisted members. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: re-
 duction to E-1, confinement for two years, forfeiture of all pay and al-
 lowances, and a dishonorable discharge.

                             For Appellant:
             Lieutenant Christopher B. Dempsey, JAGC, USN

                              For Appellee:
               Lieutenant Colonel James A. Burkart, USMC
                Lieutenant Gregory A. Rustico, JAGC, USN
                 United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                              Opinion of the Court

   Senior Judge HACKEL delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
   Senior Judge KISOR and Judge BLOSSER joined.

                            _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                            _________________________

HACKEL, Senior Judge:
    A panel of officer and enlisted members convicted Appellant, contrary to
his pleas, of two specifications of sexual assault in violation of Article 120, Uni-
form Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 1 for penetrating the vulva of Lance Cor-
poral [LCpl] Jane 2 with his penis and his hand without her consent.
    Appellant asserts seven assignments of error [AOEs]: (1) the military judge
abused his discretion by excluding evidence that the victim made a false accu-
sation of sexual assault against another Marine after reporting the allegation
against Appellant; (2) the military judge abused his discretion by denying the
Defense requests for production, continuance, and abatement based on newly
discovered evidence that the victim had tampered with a defense witness; (3)
the military judge erred by preventing the Defense from arguing that the vic-
tim tampered with a defense witness; (4) the military judge erred by not in-
structing the members on a mistake of fact defense; (5) the aforementioned
cumulative errors denied Appellant a fair trial; (6) the evidence is not legally
and factually sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction; and (7) Appellant’s
trial defense counsel was ineffective for not seeking credit for time Appellant
spent in civilian pretrial confinement. 3 We find no prejudicial error and affirm.

   1 10 U.S.C. § 920.

   2 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and counsel,

are pseudonyms.
   3 On 15 May 2023, Appellant filed a motion for expedited review of his seventh

AOE. Appellant asserted, and the Government conceded, that Appellant was entitled
to two days of pretrial confinement credit for time spent in civilian custody. On 16 May
2023, this Court ordered that Appellant be credited with two days of confinement credit
and that the United States certify that its order had been complied with. On 31 May
2023, the United States certified that Appellant received two days of pretrial confine-
ment credit and was released from confinement on 27 May 2023. As Appellant has

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                  United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                               Opinion of the Court

                                I. BACKGROUND

    Appellant became familiar with LCpl Jane in May of 2019 after she first
arrived at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, where Appellant
served as her supervisor. This was her first duty station. Appellant and LCpl
Jane began to socialize, occasionally getting food and spending time together
outside of work. Between May and June 2019, LCpl Jane and Appellant kissed
on four occasions. On 4 July 2019, LCpl Jane and Appellant attended a party
at a fellow Marine’s home in San Diego where they both consumed alcohol.
LCpl Jane testified that this was the second time she had consumed more than
one drink in a party setting. LCpl Jane recalled feeling “slightly tipsy” but “not
really drunk.” 4
    LCpl Jane testified that during the party, she and Appellant did not inter-
act, kiss, or flirt with each other. She recalled that, at one point during a group
conversation, Appellant leaned forward to speak to another person and put his
hand on LCpl Jane’s thigh. She testified that this made her feel uncomfortable.
That night, LCpl Jane decided to sleep at the house where the party had taken
place. She slept on one side of an L-shaped sofa and Appellant slept on the
other side. In addition to LCpl Jane and Appellant, there were two other people
asleep in the same room. LCpl Jane testified that she slept wearing a t-shirt,
jean shorts, and underwear.
    LCpl Jane testified that after she had lain down and closed her eyes to
sleep, she heard Appellant whisper her name and begin to shake her. She did
not respond to Appellant and testified that she believed Appellant would “leave
[her] alone” if she continued to ignore him. 5 Appellant moved LCpl Jane’s
shorts and underwear to the side and then penetrated her vagina with his fin-
gers. LCpl Jane testified that she continued to pretend to be asleep and that
she “disconnected from the situation. [She] froze.” 6 Appellant then removed his
fingers and repositioned LCpl Jane to her side, moving her midsection closer
to the edge of the couch before getting behind her and penetrating her vagina
with his penis. LCpl Jane testified she continued to not react and still felt “fro-
zen.” 7 After some time—characterized by LCpl Jane as “not long”—Appellant

already received confinement credit, his seventh AOE has been resolved and is, there-
fore, moot. See United States v. Dedolph, No. 202100150, 2022 CCA LEXIS 658, at *30
(N-M Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2022).
   4 R. at 696.

   5 R. at 701.

   6 R. at 702.

   7 R. at 704.

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                   United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                                Opinion of the Court

left the room and went into the kitchen. He then returned to the sofa, posi-
tioned himself behind LCpl Jane, and penetrated her vagina with his fingers
again. LCpl Jane testified at this point that she still felt frozen and had not
reacted or indicated that she was awake. Appellant then penetrated her vagina
with his penis for a second time. LCpl Jane testified that Appellant then pulled
her onto his lap and tried to kiss her. LCpl Jane stated that she did not kiss
him back or react and kept her body limp. Appellant then put her back on her
side of the couch and went to sleep.
    At trial, LCpl Jane testified that she did not consent to any of Appellant’s
sexual acts. She explained that she did not try to get help from the other people
sleeping in the room because she knew they were asleep and unaware of what
was happening. She also stated that she felt “completely dead . . . [she] wasn’t
feeling anything or thinking anything.” 8 LCpl Jane did not recall speaking
with Appellant the next morning.
    The following month, in August 2019, LCpl Jane engaged in consensual sex
with Appellant after consuming alcohol with him in his barracks room. During
trial, LCpl Jane explained that having sex with Appellant “gave [her] . . . a
sense of empowerment” 9 and “control of [her] own feelings.” 10 She also testified
that having sex at that time “allowed [her] to feel the feelings that [she’d] been
suppressing” 11 since the incident in July 2019. Afterwards, she felt “aw-
ful…[l]ike really, really upset.” 12 She got dressed, left Appellant’s barracks
room, and called her friend, Corporal [Cpl] Golf. Understanding that LCpl Jane
was upset, Cpl Golf drove to meet her outside of the barracks building and
spoke with her. He testified that LCpl Jane stated Appellant had just sexually
assaulted her. At trial, Cpl Golf distinguished her description of the August
sexual encounter with the subject of the instant court-martial, which occurred
in July. LCpl Jane provided conflicting testimony, stating that that she did not
tell Cpl Golf that the sex with Appellant in August was an assault or noncon-
sensual, and that Cpl Golf was confused or misremembered their discussion.

   8 R. at 705.

   9 R. at 779.

   10 R. at 784.

   11 R. at 779.

   12 R. at 779.

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                 United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                              Opinion of the Court

    LCpl Jane reported the sexual assault to law enforcement in February
2020. As part of law enforcement’s investigation, LCpl Jane conducted a pre-
text phone call with Appellant. During the call, LCpl Jane confronted Appel-
lant about having sex with her while she was asleep in July 2019. Appellant
stated that he “didn’t have any self-control in that moment.” 13 Appellant also
stated that he “barely” penetrated her vagina with his penis. 14 Appellant
acknowledged that he “did what he did knowing” that LCpl Jane did not con-
sent. He concluded that the “fault is on me . . . if I could take it back, I would
because there’s no way I should have done that.” 15
    Nearly one month later, law enforcement interviewed Appellant about the
alleged sexual assault. When given an opportunity to tell his side of the story,
Appellant made a number of additional incriminating statements. He admitted
that he tried to “wake her up,” and “talk to her;” 16 that he “forced [him]self
upon her in a way that – you know, [he] was trying to have sex with her;” 17 and
that he put his hand inside her shorts and was “feeling her vagina with [his]
hand.” 18 Appellant stated that during the encounter LCpl Jane was “not re-
sponding.” 19 He also recalled “trying to penetrate” her vagina with his penis
though he could not recall whether it happened. 20 He further stated that he
tried to hold her to “show some remorse.” 21 Appellant admitted “I remember
one point just coming to and just realizing, ‘My gosh. What am I doing? This is
heinous. This is disgusting.’” 22
    Additional facts, including facts related to events during Appellant’s court-
martial, necessary to resolve specific assignments of error are included in the
discussion, infra.

   13 Pros. Ex. 4 at 9.

   14 Pros. Ex. 4 at 11.

   15 Pros. Ex. 4 at 9.

   16 Pros. Ex. 5 at 13.

   17 Pros. Ex. 5 at 10.

   18 Pros. Ex. 5 at 13.

   19 Pros. Ex. 5 at 13; 16-17.

   20 Pros. Ex. 5 at 12, 17.

   21 Pros. Ex. 5 at 21.

   22 Pros. Ex. 5 at 10.

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                United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                             Opinion of the Court

                                   II. DISCUSSION

A. The Military Judge did not Abuse his Discretion by Excluding Evi-
dence that LCpl Jane made a False Allegation of Sexual Assault
   In a pretrial Article 39(a) session, trial defense counsel moved to admit ev-
idence that LCpl Jane had previously made a false sexual assault allegation.
The military judge denied the motion.

   1. Standard of Review and the Law
    We review a military judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence, includ-
ing putting limitations on the scope of cross-examination, for an abuse of dis-
cretion. 23 An abuse of discretion occurs when (1) the ruling is predicated on
findings of fact clearly unsupported by the evidence; (2) the military judge used
incorrect legal principles; (3) the military judge applied correct legal principles
to the facts in a way that is clearly unreasonable; or (4) the military judge failed
to consider important facts. 24 This standard is highly deferential and recog-
nizes that a judge has a range of choices available and will not be reversed so
long as the decision falls within that range. 25 Indeed, the “challenged action
must be arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.” 26
    Military Rule of Evidence [Mil R. Evid.] 412 provides that evidence of a
victim’s sexual behavior is generally inadmissible. Rule 412(b)(3) creates an
exception to that general provision for evidence “the exclusion of which would
violate the accused’s constitutional rights.” 27 Contemplated within Mil. R.
Evid. 412(b)(3) is an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation via
cross-examination. 28 To establish that exclusion of certain evidence would vio-
late the constitutional rights of an accused, the accused bears the burden of
demonstrating “that the evidence is relevant, material, and favorable to his
defense, and thus . . . is necessary.” 29 “The term ‘favorable’ is synonymous with

   23 United States v. McElhaney, 54 M.J. 120, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2000).

   24 See United States v. Commisso, 76 M.J. 315, 321 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

   25 United States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 187 (C.A.A.F. 2004).

   26 McElhaney, 54 M.J. at 130.

   27 Mil. R. Evid. 412(b)(3).

   28 United States v. Erikson, 76 M.J. 231, 235 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

   29 United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 445, 448 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

                                          6
                    United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                                 Opinion of the Court

‘vital.’” 30 If evidence is determined to meet the criteria of Mil. R. Evid.
412(b)(3), the military judge must then conduct a Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing
test to determine whether the evidence regarding the alleged victim’s sexual
behavior outweighs the risk of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, mislead-
ing the members, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumu-
lative evidence.” 31 When offering evidence of a false allegation of sexual assault
under Mil. R. Evid. 412(b)(3), an accused bears the burden of demonstrating
that the false allegation was, in fact, both false and an allegation. 32
    In Erikson, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces [CAAF] examined
whether the military judge erred in excluding evidence that the victim had
previously made a false accusation of sexual contact against another Soldier.
There, the defense made a pretrial motion to admit evidence that a prior accu-
sation of sexual assault made by the victim in that case was false. The defense
argued that the false accusation provided evidence of the victim’s modus op-
erandi and “how she accuses other men of assaulting her even when untrue.” 33
The military judge convened an Article 39(a), UCMJ, session where he heard
evidence, including: (1) a summary court-martial acquittal; (2) a denial by the
accused Soldier; (3) testimony from an individual who was present at the time
the assault was alleged and denied seeing an assault, and; (4) testimony from
the victim denying that the prior accusation was false. 34 The CAAF deter-
mined:
       The military judge was in the best position to determine the
       credibility of these witnesses, and there is no evidence before
       this Court to suggest that his conclusion that [the victim] was
       more credible than the prior accused was clearly erroneous.…the
       military judge was correct in concluding that the summary
       court-martial acquittal …was not dispositive of the falsity of the
       allegation. Second, he was correct in concluding that the denial
       by the prior accused was no more persuasive here than in McEl-
       haney. And third, the military judge did not abuse his discretion

   30 Erikson, 76 M.J. at 235.

   31 Mil. R. Evid. 403.

   32 See Erikson, 76 M.J. at 235-36 (citing McElhaney, 54 M.J. at 127, 130).

   33 Erikson, 76 M.J. at 233.

   34 Id. at 236.

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                    United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                                 Opinion of the Court

       in finding that [the victim] was more credible than the witnesses
       who testified on behalf of the defense. 35
Ultimately, the CAAF determined that it was not error to exclude the
evidence at trial. 36

   2. Additional Facts
    At Appellant’s court-martial, the Defense moved to admit several pieces of
evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 412, including that LCpl Jane “made a false sex-
ual assault allegation against another Marine.” 37 In its motion, the Defense
stated that while it was “still investigating and attempting to gather evidence
on this issue . . . it will seek to introduce evidence that [LCpl Jane] made a
false accusation against another person—namely, Sergeant [[Sgt] Mike].” 38
The military judge held an Article 39(a) session and heard testimony from LCpl
Jane and Corporal [Cpl] Foxtrot. Cpl Foxtrot testified about a conversation he
had in November or December 2020 with LCpl Jane. Cpl Foxtrot was in a ro-
mantic relationship with LCpl Jane during the time when this conversation
occurred. He testified that LCpl Jane had told him that she had had sex with
Sgt Mike: “I can’t remember what she said verbatim, but she did…describe it
as nonconsensual. She said that she had no ability—she didn’t—she wasn’t
able to say, ‘No.’” 39 Cpl Foxtrot admitted that he could not “remember exactly
what was said.” 40
   The military judge also questioned Cpl Foxtrot. When asked whether his
memory of this conversation with LCpl Jane was “a clear memory or not a clear
memory,” Cpl Foxtrot replied, “Well, I do remember specifically she—[LCpl
Jane] told me it was nonconsensual, and [Sgt Mike] told me that it was con-
sensual.” 41

   35 Id. at 235.

   36 Id. at 236.

   37 App. Ex. XI at 1.

   38 App. Ex. XI at 13.

   39 R. at 208.

   40 R. at 209.

   41 R. at 211-12.

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                   United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                                Opinion of the Court

   In contrast, LCpl Jane testified that the encounter with Sgt Mike in 2020
was consensual and that she did not ever tell anyone that it was a nonconsen-
sual encounter. 42 She testified that Cpl Foxtrot’s recollection was incorrect:
       I told him that it wasn’t something that I had wanted, and what
       I had meant by that was, when it happened, it wasn’t, like,
       planned. It wasn’t something that I was thinking about. It was
       something that just happened. I wasn’t telling him that we had
       – or that, for me, it was nonconsensual. 43
    In his findings, the military judge explained that this evidence was “highly
distinguishable” from the charged offense. 44 If offered at trial, the military
judge found that it would likely be distracting, noting both that this incident
took place “a year and a half after the charged incident,” and that it would
“require a trial within a trial . . . it would require the members to make a de-
termination between two witnesses.” 45 To that end, the military judge identi-
fied, based on his observations of the testimony, that the discrepancy in testi-
mony could simply be the result of a misunderstanding, noting that both wit-
nesses “could very well be testifying sincerely as to what they believe happened
during that conversation.” The military judge also found that counsel may wish
to explore Cpl Foxtrot’s motivation in testifying “to the extent that [Cpl Fox-
trot]’s relationship with [LCpl Jane] apparently is not ongoing,” which would
be distracting. 46
   Conducting an analysis under Mil. R. Evid. 403, the military judge ex-
pressed concern over the relative probative value of the evidence. He concluded
that this evidence required “a trial within a trial” 47 and that this type of evi-
dence “appears to the Court to be squarely the type of evidence that [Mil. R.
Evid.] 412 is...intended...to exclude.” 48 The military judge excluded the evi-
dence regarding LCpl Jane’s sexual encounter with Sgt Mike.

   42 R. at 223.

   43 R. at 225.

   44 R. at 276.

   45 R. at 277.

   46 R. at 278.

   47 R. at 277.

   48 R. at 278.

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                 United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                              Opinion of the Court

   3. Analysis
     We find that the military judge did not abuse his discretion. As a prelimi-
nary matter, Appellant “was required to establish the falsity” of LCpl Jane’s
purported subsequent sexual assault allegation for it to be potentially admis-
sible under Mil. R. Evid. 412. 49 The military judge carefully considered testi-
mony of LCpl Jane and Cpl Foxtrot at an Article 39(a), UCMJ, session and
placed his findings orally on the record. The evidence of falsity presented by
Appellant was relatively weak, consisting only of Cpl Foxtrot’s testimony about
his conversation with LCpl Jane wherein he remembered her saying the sexual
encounter with Sgt Mike was nonconsensual. In contrast, Cpl Foxtrot also tes-
tified that Sgt Mike told him the encounter with LCpl Jane was consensual.
LCpl Jane agreed with Sgt Mike that their encounter was consensual and tes-
tified she did not make an allegation of sexual assault in her conversation with
Cpl Foxtrot. On this evidence, the military judge found “based on the Court’s
evaluation of [LCpl Jane] and [Cpl Foxtrot’s] tone and [LCpl Janes] demeanor
and comportment during her testimony . . . that both [Cpl Foxtrot] and [LCpl
Jane] could very well be testifying sincerely as to what they believe happened
during that conversation, and what was said during that conversation.” As the
person best suited to make assessments about witness credibility, the military
judge is entitled to deference absent clearly erroneous factual determinations.
Like in Erickson, there is no evidence before this Court to suggest the military
judge’s finding was clearly erroneous. 50
    It is clear from our review that, having found the proffered “false allega-
tion” lacked credibility, the military judge then properly determined that per-
mitting the Defense to present this theory would waste time and create sub-
stantial risk of confusing the members. The proof offered in Appellant’s case
seems particularly weak when compared with the facts in Erikson, where to
prove falsity the defense offered “(1) a summary court-martial acquittal; (2) the
prior accused’s testimony denying the assault; (3) the testimony of a person
who was present in the room at the time of the alleged incident and who denied
seeing any sexual assault occurred.” 51 It is clear that the CAAF recognized, as
do we, that the military judge’s determination at the trial level respecting the
credibility of testimony and the impact of evidence on a trial under the Mil. R.
Evid. 403 framework is entitled to great deference. Despite Appellant’s take on

   49 Erikson, 76 M.J. at 236.

   50 Id.

   51 Erikson, 76 M.J. at 236.

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                United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                             Opinion of the Court

the evidence, an abuse of discretion requires more than a mere difference of
opinion. 52
    The military judge did not exhibit an erroneous view of the law, nor was
his decision “arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.” 53
We therefore decline Appellant’s invitation to disturb the military judge’s rul-
ing.

B. The Military Judge did not Abuse his Discretion by Denying the De-
fense Requests for Production, Continuance, and Abatement Related
to Allegations of Witness Tampering
   At trial, LCpl Jane allegedly tampered with a witness. The military judge
denied trial defense counsel’s requests for production of evidence, continuance,
and abatement related to the alleged tampering. Before this Court, Appellant
argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the military judge to deny the
Defense request for production of “Snapchat communications” and to deny the
Defense requests for continuance and abatement. 54

   1. Standard of Review and the Law
    We review a military judge’s decision on production of evidence for an abuse
of discretion. 55 Similarly, a military judge’s ruling on whether to grant an
abatement or continuance are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 56 As dis-
cussed above, this is a highly deferential standard that recognizes an abuse of
discretion only where: (1) the ruling is predicated on findings of fact clearly
unsupported by the evidence; (2) the military judge used incorrect legal prin-
ciples; (3) the military judge applied correct legal principles to the facts in a
way that is clearly unreasonable; or (4) the military judge failed to consider
important facts. 57

   52 See, e.g., United States v. Black, 82 M.J. 447, 453 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

   53 Black, 82 M.J. at 453.

   54 Appellant Brief at 48.

   55 United States v. Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 239, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2004).

   56 United States v. Simmermacher, 74 M.J. 196, 199 (C.A.A.F. 2015).

   57 See Commisso, 76 M.J. at 321.

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                United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                             Opinion of the Court

    With regard to the production of evidence at the trial level, parties are “en-
titled to the production of evidence which is relevant and necessary.” 58 Evi-
dence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable,
and that fact is one of consequence in determining the action. 59 Relevant evi-
dence is necessary when it is “not cumulative and when it would contribute to
a party’s presentation of the case in some positive way on a matter in issue.” 60
Movants must also demonstrate that the evidence requested actually exists. 61
    With regard to a request for a continuance, a military judge “should, upon
a showing of reasonable cause, grant a continuance to any party for as long
and as often as is just.” 62 Our superior court identified several non-dispositive
factors to assess whether a continuance was appropriate in a given case, in-
cluding: surprise, the nature of any evidence involved, the timeliness of the
request, the length of continuance, prejudice to the opponent, whether the mov-
ing party received prior continuances, whether the moving party was acting in
good faith, the use of reasonable diligence by the moving party, any possible
impact on the verdict, and prior notice. 63
   With regard to abatement, we examine the strictures of Rule for Courts-
Martial [R.C.M.] 703(e)(2), which provides that parties are not entitled to evi-
dence which has been “destroyed, lost, or otherwise not subject to compulsory
process.” 64 The rule establishes three criteria for relief as an exception to that
general principle:
       [I]f [(1)] such evidence is of such central importance to an issue
       that it is essential to a fair trial, and [(2)] if there is no adequate
       substitute for such evidence, the military judge shall grant a con-
       tinuance or other relief in order to attempt to produce the evi-

   58 Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 703(e).

   59 Mil. R. Evid. 401.

   60 R.C.M. 703(e) Discussion.

   61 See United States vs. Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 239, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2004).

   62 R.C.M. 906(b)(1).

   63 See United States v. Miller, 47 M.J. 352, 358 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

   64 R.C.M. 703(e)(2).

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                    United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                                 Opinion of the Court

       dence or shall abate the proceedings, unless [(3)] the unavaila-
       bility of the evidence is the fault of or could have been prevented
       by the requesting party. 65
Abatement is an appropriate remedy only if each of the three criteria has been
satisfied. 66 The CAAF has noted that military judges have “broad discretion”
in determining whether an adequate substitute under factor (2) is available. 67

   2. Additional Facts
    During his court-martial, Appellant alleged that LCpl Jane tampered with
the testimony of LCpl Hotel, who was LCpl Jane’s close friend. Notes from a
July 2021 pretrial interview with trial defense counsel indicated LCpl Hotel
would testify that LCpl Jane told him that she would get a ride from Appellant
the morning after the sexual assault. 68 LCpl Hotel did not review the interview
notes for accuracy. On the eve of trial, trial defense counsel again interviewed
LCpl Hotel, who denied stating that LCpl Jane discussed getting a ride with
Appellant.
    Appellant had planned to call LCpl Hotel to testify regarding the morning
immediately following the sexual assault, but Appellant claimed that LCpl Ho-
tel had changed his story after having conversations with LCpl Jane against
the military judge’s orders. These conversations, which took place between
July and December 2021, formed the basis for Appellant’s motion for a dismis-
sal with prejudice. During a subsequent interview with Appellant’s counsel the
day before trial, LCpl Hotel stated that he did not remember any conversations
regarding LCpl Jane getting a ride with Appellant. 69
    On the second day of trial, shortly after the members were impaneled, LCpl
Hotel testified during an Article 39(a) session that he did not believe that LCpl
Jane ever told him that she was going to get a ride with Appellant. He ex-
plained that any reference he might have made to LCpl Jane getting a ride
from Appellant was a hypothetical explanation for how she got home following
the assault. 70 He testified that he did not discuss his testimony with LCpl Jane
nor did they discuss him altering his testimony.

   65 Id.

   66 Simmermacher, 74 M.J. at 201 n.5.

   67 Id. at 202.

   68 App. Ex. XLIX at 2.

   69 App. Ex. L.

   70 R. at 586-87.

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                 United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                              Opinion of the Court

   LCpl Hotel stated that between July and December 2021 he had told LCpl
Jane that he was going to be a witness, but he denied providing any details to
her. Otherwise, he claimed that they did not discuss the details of the court-
martial, aside from LCpl Jane’s feelings of stress and anxiety over the legal
proceedings.
   Another Marine, LCpl Lima, witnessed a conversation between LCpl Hotel
and LCpl Jane when LCpl Lima and LCpl Jane dropped off some food for LCpl
Hotel the day before trial. LCpl Lima testified at the Article 39(a) session that
while he did witness LCpl Hotel and LCpl Jane speaking privately, they had
only exchanged greetings and bid each other a good night.
    LCpl Jane was present in the courtroom during LCpl Lima’s testimony.
After hearing the Defense make a request for her communications with LCpl
Hotel, LCpl Jane used her phone to block and then unblock LCpl Hotel on
Snapchat, which resulted in their conversation history being deleted from her
cell phone. Separately, after the conclusion of the Article 39(a) session, LCpl
Lima recanted his testimony in an interview with the Defense and admitted
that LCpl Jane had actually discussed the case with LCpl Hotel. LCpl Lima
stated that he had heard enough details of the case to know that their conver-
sation was about the case. LCpl Lima stated that both LCpl Jane and LCpl
Hotel apologized for getting LCpl Lima involved in the case.
    When LCpl Hotel and LCpl Lima were recalled to provide further testi-
mony in light of these revelations, they both invoked their right to remain si-
lent. 71 The Defense requested a grant of testimonial immunity for both wit-
nesses to further develop the facts relating to the conversation at issue. The
Defense requested that the proceedings be abated until the trial court received
an answer on the immunity question from the convening authority. The mili-
tary judge denied the Defense motion for abatement pending the resolution of
the immunity request. The convening authority denied the request on 6 De-
cember 2021. 72 The military judge later denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss,
finding that Appellant failed to carry his burden.
   While this litigation was on-going, Appellant initially requested discovery
of digital “communications between [LCpl Jane], [LCpl Hotel], and [LCpl

71 R. At 668, 999. Although LCpl Hotel invoked his right to remain silent after being

informed that there was an allegation that he gave false testimony. The military judge
ruled that Appellant could still call LCpl Hotel to testify about the sexual assault itself.
Appellant did not recall LCpl Hotel. R. at 1031-32.
    72 See App. Ex. LXV.

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                   United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                                Opinion of the Court

Lima],” arguing that there was some circumstantial evidence that there had
been witness tampering. 73 Following the Defense interview with LCpl Lima
whereby he recanted his earlier testimony, Appellant clarified the discovery
request: “we would like discovery on all of their conversations. We’re going to
send a preservation request to Snapchat . . . my inference is that there is a lot
of information that will be found in their communications about this case.” 74
   The Government contested the motion, arguing that the Defense presented
no evidence of what “occurred in the Snapchats,” focusing on the court’s ad-
monition to the witnesses “to not discuss the facts of the case.” 75 Further, the
Government argued that issuing a warrant to Snapchat would necessitate a
continuance of potentially months, given the proximity to the winter holidays.
No evidence was offered by either party regarding whether—and to what ex-
tent—Snapchat would still possess the evidence being sought.
    The military judge suggested that LCpl Jane allow her Victims’ Legal
Counsel [VLC] to search her phone for any pertinent messages. In response,
the Defense requested a continuance and an abatement until “we have that
immunity, where they can take the stand, and until we have that discovery.” 76
Further, the Defense argued that a review of LCpl Jane’s phone would be in-
sufficient as Snapchat messages were frequently deleted. Further, he clarified
that his discovery request was for “everything, including text messages, social
media messages, messages through Facebook messenger, Instagram, and
Snapchat.” 77
    The military judge partially granted Appellant’s discovery request to the
extent discovery would involve LCpl Jane and her VLC searching her phone
for pertinent electronic messages sent during the relevant timeframe with ei-
ther LCpl Hotel or LCpl Lima. The military judge also stated that he would
allow Appellant “robust impeachment” of LCpl Jane. 78 The following day, the
Defense became aware that LCpl Jane had blocked LCpl Hotel on Snapchat.
Later that day, the Defense informed the military judge that it had also become
aware of a text message from LCpl Jane to LCpl Hotel sent the previous day

   73 R. at 618.

   74 R. at 655-56.

   75 R. at 676 (emphasis added).

   76 R. at 679.

   77 R. at 680.

   78 R. at 683.

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                   United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                                Opinion of the Court

that stated, “I had to block you on Snapchat . . . but I added you back.” 79 The
Defense proffered that such a course of action had the effect of deleting the
conversation history within the Snapchat application.
     Pointing to the deletion of Snapchat conversation history as evidence of “an
attempt to cover her tracks,” trial defense counsel then argued that the De-
fense would need the previously requested discovery to adequately impeach
LCpl Jane. 80 The military judge denied that motion and stated that “the right
to robust cross-examination is going to include cross-examining regarding the
text message that you mentioned stating, ‘I had to block you on Snapchat but
I added you back.’” 81 The military judge also found that there were ample
grounds for impeachment to discuss LCpl Jane’s conversations with LCpl Ho-
tel.
     The Defense successfully impeached LCpl Jane on these issues. During her
testimony, she stated that it was “a lie” when LCpl Hotel testified that they
did not talk about the court-martial when she and LCpl Lima brought him
food. 82 She also offered that it was “a lie” when LCpl Hotel stated that he and
LCpl Jane never discussed specific details of the court-martial. 83 While LCpl
Jane admitted that her conversations with LCpl Hotel were a violation of the
military judge’s order, she maintained that their conversation was limited to a
discussion of a third-party who she was unsure was a witness. She also denied
asking LCpl Hotel or LCpl Lima to alter their testimony. LCpl Jane admitted
that she blocked and unblocked LCpl Hotel, but claimed that the resulting de-
letion of their conversation history was unintentional. 84
    Additionally, the Defense inquired about whether LCpl Jane knew that
LCpl Hotel would purportedly testify that she told him that she would be get-
ting a ride with Appellant the morning after the sexual assault. LCpl Jane
maintained that she did not know any aspects of LCpl Hotel’s testimony. LCpl
Jane denied asking LCpl Hotel to change his testimony. After the Defense
rested its case, Appellant requested a ruling on the request for an abatement
of the proceedings for discovery of evidence that would tend to prove the alle-
gations of witness tampering. The military judge denied that request.

   79 R. at 685.

   80 R. at 686.

   81 R. at 687.

   82 R. at 1053.

   83 R. at 1053.

   84 R. at 1054-55.

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                   United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                                Opinion of the Court

   3. Analysis
   As the moving party, Appellant bore the burden to show, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the Snapchat messages between LCpl Jane and LCpl
Hotel existed and, if so, that they were both relevant and necessary. As a
threshold matter, we find that Appellant failed to carry his burden. We recog-
nize that LCpl Jane’s actions during court would have resulted in Snapchat
messages between her and LCpl Hotel being deleted, had any existed at the
time. However, Appellant was unable to establish the relevance of any such
messages. At an earlier point in the litigation, the military judge inquired
about the nature of LCpl Hotel’s communications with LCpl Jane:
       MJ:                Okay. And you indicated that you messaged at
                          least once per day with [LCpl Jane], but some
                          days you talked for an hour or two per day –
       LCpl Hotel:        Yes.
       MJ:                 – is that telephone conversation or is it texting
                          for an hour or two?
       LCpl Hotel:        I would say both. Sometimes we message – we
                          usually text – is our main way of communi-
                          cating. 85
This interaction is the only one presented on the record that clearly establishes
indicia of the means of communication used between LCpl Jane and LCpl Ho-
tel. It is unclear what precisely texting means in this context—whether it be
SMS text messages or messages sent through a social media application like
Snapchat. Due to the discovery directed by the military judge, the evidence
established that LCpl Jane sent a text message to LCpl Hotel stating words to
the effect of, “‘I had to block you on Snapchat but I added you back.’” 86 This
text message is itself probative of the fact that LCpl Jane and LCpl Hotel com-
municate via text messages. It is also probative of the fact that LCpl Hotel and
LCpl Jane may have communicated on Snapchat, though the nature of those
communications—whether they be photos or videos or written messages—is
unclear.
   Finally, the Defense questioned LCpl Jane about the purported deletion:

   85 R. at 580-81.

   86 R. at 687.

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                United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                             Opinion of the Court

       Defense Counsel:       So, . . . that last question, by blocking him,
                              it deleted the conversation history?
       [LCpl Jane]:           Yes. And again, I was unaware that it
                              would delete the history. 87
From this interaction, it is clear that the action taken by LCpl Jane deleted the
conversation history between her and Appellant. However, it is unclear
whether that conversation history contained photos, videos, or written mes-
sages. More importantly, it is also unclear whether the conversation history
was pertinent to Appellant’s court-martial. And trial defense counsel asked
LCpl Jane no questions to resolve this ambiguity.
    To borrow from trial defense counsel’s own statements, it appears from the
record that the existence, relevance, and necessity of text messages was merely
an “inference” made by the Defense that there was “a lot of information that
will be found in their communications about this case.” 88 Further, trial defense
counsel failed to present evidence that any of the messages, if they existed,
sought in the discovery request would be found on Snapchat servers. Conse-
quently, Appellant did not show that the purported communications were rel-
evant and necessary and should have been produced through compulsory pro-
cess. We therefore hold that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying Appellant's motion to compel production.
    With regard to Appellant’s request for a continuance and abatement, we
likewise find that the military judge did not abuse his discretion. A military
judge “should, upon a showing of reasonable cause, grant a continuance to any
party for as long and as often as is just.” 89 Abatement is appropriate where the
lost evidence is of central importance to a fair trial, no adequate substitute
exists, and the unavailability of the evidence was not the fault of the requesting
party. 90 Military judges have “broad discretion” in the determination of
whether adequate substitutes exist. 91 Here, we find that the military judge’s
ruling provided an adequate alternative to an extended discovery process.
    As a preliminary matter, we note that the Defense requested the messages
for the purpose of impeachment. Insofar as the purported messages are of
claimed central importance to a fair trial, the significance of the messages

   87 R. at 1054-55.

   88 See R. at 655-56.

   89 R.C.M. 906(b)(1).

   90 See R.C.M. 703(e)(2).

   91 Simmermacher, 74 M.J. at 201 n.5.

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                United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                             Opinion of the Court

would be rooted in their impeachment value. Here, the military judge allowed
for limited discovery of the contents of LCpl Jane’s phone and allowed the De-
fense robust cross-examination of LCpl Jane on the matter. Indeed, LCpl Jane
admitted through cross-examination before the members that she talked to
LCpl Hotel about the trial in violation of the military judge’s order and that
her actions deleted conversation history with LCpl Hotel.
    Not only did the Appellant fail to make the required showing that the evi-
dence necessitating the requested delay existed, but the military judge also
provided an adequate substitute for the processes requested by Appellant. The
military judge developed a clear record and did not fail to consider any im-
portant facts. The military judge’s ruling was not based on findings of fact
clearly unsupported by the evidence, nor was the military judge’s application
of legal principles incorrect or unreasonable. 92 We find that the military judge
did not abuse his discretion in denying the Defense requests for continuance
and abatement. Even assuming that the military judge erred by not granting
the requests for continuance and abatement, we find that no error caused ma-
terial prejudice to the substantial rights of Appellant.

C. The Military Judge did not Abuse his Discretion by Preventing Ap-
pellant from Arguing that LCpl Jane Tampered with a Witness’s Tes-
timony

   1. Standard of Review and the Law
    Rulings regarding closing argument are reviewed for an abuse of discre-
tion. 93 The Supreme Court has recognized that a judge in a criminal case “must
be and is given great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting the scope
of closing.” 94 Military judges are afforded deference over what arguments to
allow in closing argument because of their responsibility to exercise “reasona-
ble control of the proceedings.” 95 The CAAF has held that “[c]losing arguments

   92 See Commisso, 76 M.J. at 321.

   93 United States v. Bess, 75 M.J. 70, 75 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

   94 United States v. Payne, No. 200501454, 2009 CCA LEXIS 107, at *11 (N-M Ct.

Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).
   95 R.C.M. 801(a)(3).

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                United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                             Opinion of the Court

by counsel are limited ‘to evidence in the record and to such fair inferences as
may be drawn therefrom.’” 96

   2. Additional Pertinent Facts
    Prior to closing arguments, trial defense counsel indicated in an Article
39(a) session that he wished to refer to LCpl Jane’s interactions with LCpl Ho-
tel as “witness tampering” during his closing argument. 97 The Government ob-
jected. Appellant argued that witness tampering was a reasonable inference
given the deletion of the Snapchat messages and LCpl Jane’s violation of the
military judge’s order. The military judge found that while inappropriate con-
versations in violation of his instructions had taken place, there was no direct
evidence of witness tampering. The military judge ruled that Appellant could
raise the specter of witness tampering by allowing Appellant to “assert that
there was a witness who was tainted.” 98 Appellant could also pose the question
about whether “witness tampering” occurred “as long as there [was] a very
clear question mark at the end of that sentence,” but could not “assert [witness
tampering] as a conclusion.” 99
    During closing argument, the Defense was allowed to posit to the members
questions regarding why LCpl Jane would delete her messages, why LCpl Jane
would speak to a defense witness in violation of the military judge’s instruc-
tions, and asked the members to consider “what she is trying to hide.” 100 The
Defense also argued that because of LCpl Jane’s “knowing violation,” the mem-
bers did not get to hear from LCpl Hotel. 101 The Defense suggested to the mem-
bers that these actions were the result of LCpl Jane believing that the accusa-
tions against Appellant were not true.

   96 United States v. Robles-Ramos, 47 M.J. 474, 476-77 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (quoting

United States v. White, 36 M.J. 306, 308 (C.M.A. 1993)).
   97 R. at 1103-04.

   98 R. at 1107-08.

   99 R. at 1108.

   100 R. at 1161-62.

   101 R. at 1162.

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                 United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                              Opinion of the Court

   3. Analysis
    Accused have a constitutional right to present argument through counsel
before deliberation on findings at a court-martial. 102 Closing arguments may
include comment regarding “testimony, conduct, motives, interests, and biases
of witnesses to the extent supported by the evidence.” 103 However, this right is
not absolute. A military judge may place appropriate limits on closing argu-
ment so long as their actions “prevent unnecessary waste of time,” “promote
the ascertainment of truth,” and “avoid undue interference with the parties’
presentations or the appearance of partiality.” 104 “The parties are entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to properly present and support their contentions on
any relevant matter.” 105
    In this case, the military judge permitted defense counsel to raise the issue
of witness tampering by inference only – allowing defense counsel to suggest
that tampering may have occurred so long as there was a clear “question mark”
at the end of the inference. The military judge’s decision was predicated on his
finding that, while his order was violated by inappropriate conversations, the
Defense presented no direct evidence that witness tampering occurred. Based
on our review of the record, we find this decision was supported by the record.
And we do not find that that military judge erred by his decision to limit the
Defense to make arguments supported by “evidence in the record and … such
fair inferences as may be drawn therefrom.’” 106 Under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, considering the leeway provided to the Defense in cross-examina-
tion and closing argument, the military judge’s actions were not an abuse of
his discretion.

D. The Military Judge Did Not Err by Failing to Provide an Instruc-
tion on Mistake of Fact as to Consent

   1. Standard of Review and the Law
    Whether a military judge properly instructed a panel is an issue of law that
this Court reviews de novo. A military judge must provide instruction on any

   102 See R.C.M. 919(a).

   103 R.C.M. 919 discussion.

   104 R.C.M. 801(a)(3) discussion.

   105 R.C.M. 801(a)(3) discussion.

   106 Robles-Ramos, 47 M.J. at 476-77 (quoting United States v. White, 36 M.J. 306,

308 (C.M.A. 1993)).

                                        21
                  United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                               Opinion of the Court

affirmative or “special” defenses that are “in issue” in a case. 107 A matter is put
into issue when “some evidence, without regard to its source or credibility, has
been admitted upon which members might rely if they choose.” 108 This is a
relatively low standard, which does not require that the evidence raising an
issue be compelling, 109 and “any doubt about whether an instruction should be
given should be resolved in favor of the accused.” 110
    Mistake of fact as to consent is an affirmative defense to the offense of sex-
ual assault without consent—the offense of which Appellant was ultimately
convicted. The affirmative defense relieves an accused of criminal liability if
the accused who, “as a result of ignorance or mistake,” held “an incorrect belief
of the true circumstances such that, if the circumstances were as the accused
believed them, the accused would not be guilty of the offense.” 111 The offense
of sexual assault without consent is a general intent offense. As this Court
identified in Norton, where an appellant was convicted of a general intent
crime, the mistake of fact “must have existed in the mind of the accused and
must have been reasonable under all of the circumstances.” 112 Reasonableness
under all of the circumstances requires that “some evidence must show that
Appellant’s mistake of fact was not only reasonable, but that Appellant did in
fact honestly infer consent based on the circumstances.” 113 The second element
is not self-proving. Indeed, our superior court has found that evidence can exist
to meet the first prong of objective reasonableness, but that same evidence does
not necessarily offer insight into an appellant’s subjective inferences related to
consent. 114

    2. Analysis
   During an Article 39(a) session held before the military judge provided find-
ings instructions to the members, the military judge heard argument on the

    107 R.C.M. 916.

    108 R.C.M. 920(e) discussion.

    109 United States v. Barnes, 39 M.J. 230, 232 (C.A.A.F. 1994) (citation and internal

quotation omitted).
    110 United States v. Hibbard, 58 M.J. 71, 73 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

    111 R.C.M. 916(j)(1).

    112 United States v. Norton, No. 202000046, 2021 CCA LEXIS 375, at *8 (N-M Ct.

Crim. App. July 29, 2021) (citing R.C.M. 916(j)(1)).
    113 Norton, 2021 CCA LEXIS 375, at *8 (citing United States v. Jones, 49 M.J. 85,

91 (C.A.A.F. 1998)) (cleaned up).
    114 See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 41 M.J. 435, 438 (C.A.A.F. 1995).

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                United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                             Opinion of the Court

Defense’s proposed mistake of fact instruction. The Government, relying on
this Court’s decision in Norton, argued that there was no evidence that, at the
time of the offense, Appellant was under a mistaken belief that LCpl Jane con-
sented. The Government argued that it was not enough to put mistake of fact
in issue that LCpl Jane and Appellant had kissed on previous occasions. The
Defense argued that, unlike in Norton where the victim and the appellant had
previously dated and then ended their relationship, here the preexisting rela-
tionship was on-going. Therefore, there was some evidence of consent. Defense
counsel argued:
       There exists [evidence] that…those acts…were consensual. And
       so, to not allow the mistake of fact instruction would be to as-
       sume that in that moment, [Appellant] believed that consensual
       acts were actually unconsensual, and that he did not mistake
       that they were consensual…It seems to be a paradox that is…es-
       sentially creating a criminal mens rea in a situation where there
       is not actually a crime committed because of the consent instruc-
       tion. 115
    The military judge reasoned that, “as a first initial matter, there is no evi-
dence before the Court as to the subjective state of mind of the accused at the
time of the offense suggesting that he was under the impression that he be-
lieved that [LCpl Jane] was consenting.” 116 After reviewing this Court’s deci-
sion in Norton, the military judge denied the request for a mistake of fact in-
struction.
    We find that the military judge’s denial of the instruction was proper. This
case is similar to both Norton and United States v. Jones, where the evidence
provided “no insight as to whether the appellant honestly believed the victim
was consenting.” 117 Here, not only is the record devoid of any evidence or testi-
mony sufficient to raise the issue that Appellant may have actually held the
requisite honest and subjective belief, but the evidence tends to support the
opposite conclusion. Appellant’s statements on the matter are found in the re-
cording of his pretext phone conversation with LCpl Jane and subsequent in-
terview with law enforcement, neither of which weigh in favor of the mistake
of fact instruction. We do not find any evidence that Appellant indicated he

   115 R. at 1097.

   116 R. at 1096,

   117 Norton, 2021 CCA LEXIS 375, at *9 (citations and internal quotation omitted).

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                  United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                               Opinion of the Court

held a subjective mistaken belief as to consent contained in either conversa-
tion. In fact, Appellant made statements which indicated he believed that LCpl
Jane was unable to consent to sexual activity because she was asleep.
    Even if we were to assume that some evidence existed to put the mistake
of fact defense in issue, we are convinced that any instructional error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “A constitutional error is harmless if it is
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the de-
fendant guilty absent the error.” 118 After careful review of the record and the
evidence presented at trial, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that,
had the mistake of fact instruction been given, the members would have
reached the same outcome.

E. Cumulative Error

   1. Standard of Review and the Law
    We review claims of cumulative error de novo. 119 Under the doctrine of cu-
mulative error, the existence of errors—none of which merit reversal individu-
ally—in combination merit the disapproval of a finding or sentence. 120 Errors
asserted that are without merit are, plainly, insufficient to invoke the doc-
trine. 121 Reversal under the cumulative error doctrine is the remedy only when
a court determines that the cumulative errors denied an appellant a fair
trial. 122 “[A]ppellate courts are far less likely to find cumulative error where
the record contains overwhelming evidence of a defendant’s guilt.” 123

   2. Analysis
    The doctrine of cumulative error allows this Court to reverse a conviction
even if errors do not merit reversal individually. 124 After careful review, we
find no errors occurred in this case that are prejudicial, either alone or in the

   118 United States v. McDonald, 57 M.J. 18, 20 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

   119 United States v. Pope, 69 M.J. 328, 335 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

   120 See Pope, 69 M.J. at 335.

   121 See United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1, 61 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

   122   Pope, 69 M.J. at 335.
   123 United States v. Flores, 69 M.J. 366, 373 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

   124 United States v. Dominguez, 81 M.J. 800, 822-23 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2021)

(citing United States v. Banks 36 M.J. 150 (C.A.A.F. 1992)).

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                 United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                              Opinion of the Court

aggregate. Appellant received a fair trial. This assignment of error is therefore
without merit. 125

F. Legal and Factual Sufficiency

   1. Standard of Review and the Law
    Appellant argues that the evidence presented at his court-martial is legally
and factually insufficient to support his convictions. We review questions of
legal and factual sufficiency de novo. 126 To determine legal sufficiency, we ex-
amine whether, “considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a reasonable fact-finder could have found all the essential ele-
ments beyond a reasonable doubt.” 127 In conducting this analysis, we must
“draw every reasonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the
prosecution.” 128
    In evaluating factual sufficiency, we determine whether, after weighing the
evidence in the record of trial and making allowances for not having observed
the witnesses, we are convinced of the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 129 In conducting this unique appellate function, we take “a fresh, impar-
tial look at the evidence,” applying “neither a presumption of innocence nor a
presumption of guilt” to “make [our] own independent determination as to
whether the evidence constitutes proof of each required element beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.” 130 Proof beyond a “[r]easonable doubt, however, does not mean
the evidence must be free from conflict.” 131

   2. Analysis
   To prove the first specification of sexual assault, the Government had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Appellant committed a sexual act
upon LCpl Jane by penetrating her vulva with his penis and (2) Appellant did

   125 See United States v. Tapp, 83 M.J. 600, 624 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2023).

   126 Article 66(c), UCMJ; United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F.

2002).
   127 United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1987).

   128 United States v. Guttierrez, 74 M.J. 61, 65 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (cleaned up).

   129 Turner, 25 M.J. at 325.

   130 Washington, 57 M.J. at 399.

   131 United States v. Rankin, 63 M.J. 552, 557 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2006).

                                          25
               United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                            Opinion of the Court

so without the consent of LCpl Jane. 132 To prove the second Specification of
sexual assault, the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) Appellant committed a sexual act upon LCpl Jane by penetrating her vulva
with his hand and (2) Appellant did so without the consent of LCpl Jane. 133
    The evidence of Appellant’s guilt in this case—including LCpl Jane’s testi-
mony, admissions made by Appellant during his pretext phone conversation
with LCpl Jane, and the admissions made by Appellant to law enforcement—
is overwhelming. Appellant made several admissions, all of which were corrob-
orated by LCpl Jane’s testimony, including: that he penetrated her vagina with
his penis, that he acted while believing that LCpl Jane could not consent, that
he tried to wake LCpl Jane before he penetrated her vulva, that he felt her
vagina with his hand, and that LCpl Jane was not responding during this time.
    Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,
we conclude that a reasonable fact-finder could have found all the essential
elements of both Specifications of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The
evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction. Regarding factual suffi-
ciency, after weighing the evidence before us and making allowances for not
having personally observed the trial, we are similarly convinced of Appellant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is thus factually sufficient to
support the conviction.

   132 Article 120, UCMJ.

   133 Article 120, UCMJ.

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               United States v. Chege, NMCCA No. 202200079
                            Opinion of the Court

                                 III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and
that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights oc-
curred. 134
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                  FOR THE COURT:

                                  MARK K. JAMISON
                                  Clerk of Court

   134 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

                                       27