Court Opinion

ID: 9517463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:17:51.18736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:54.288458
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE APPLETON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority in this case. Without going so far as to find the stopped-train rule to be an anachronism as the Tenth Circuit colorfully did in Hurst, 958 F.2d 1002, I do not find the rule as most recently enunciated by our supreme court in Dunn, 127 Ill. 2d 350, 537 N.E.2d 738, supports the judgment entered on the pleadings here. It is clear that Dunn left open the door to a plaintiff who could establish “special circumstances” that could support a duty on the part of a railroad to provide warnings beyond the mere presence of the train. I agree that plaintiff here alleged as special circumstances factors that Dunn specifically found not to qualify as such, i.e., darkness, vehicular traffic, a lack of lighting, and the grade of the crossing. I would find, however, that plaintiff alleged one other situational fact, which in my mind constitutes a special circumstance: that the railway cars blocking the road onto which plaintiffs decedent crashed his vehicle were not standard sized railroad cars but were rather flat or “lowboy” cars that may have presented oncoming traffic no profile that would be observable by one approaching the intersection who is driving with due and proper regard for his safety. This is not to say that the involvement of such cars automatically creates liability for the railroad. I would suggest that more needs to be known about them, e.g., their exact dimension, color, whether any reflective markings were present, et cetera. I conclude, however, plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the nature of the cars to establish the potential of a special circumstance sufficient to avoid judgment on the pleadings.