Court Opinion

ID: 9481545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:22:25.112863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:23.487012
License: Public Domain

McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I concede that the statutory scheme embodied in 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a) is not a paragon of clarity. That said, I nonetheless believe that when viewed through the prism of the congressional purpose behind the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (“the Act”), 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1988), the majority’s interpretation is inappropriate. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Section 952(a) of the Act defines the crime. The entry of controlled substances onto American soil causes the harm and *1002furnishes the jurisdictional basis for punishment of the offender. Section 952(a) makes no mention of a specific intent. Section 960(a) penalizes those who violate section 952; but by adding a specific mens rea requirement, section 960(a) limits the universe of individuals who may be punished, thereby protecting the innocent traveller who unwittingly brings a controlled substance into the United States.
Section 960(a) provides that a defendant violates section 952 when he “knowingly or intentionally imports” a controlled substance. The majority reads this as if it read, “knowingly or intentionally imports into the United States ...,” and it does this by interpreting the verb “import” to imply “into the United States,” which, of course, is its clear meaning in section 952. The point, however, is that the phrase “into the United States” does not appear in section 960(a), and the adverbs “knowingly or intentionally” appearing in section 960(a) modify only the verb “import.”
To make the adverbial phrase modify the missing words “into the United States” the majority holds that the very word “import” must, in context, imply “into the United States.” It is here that I part company with the majority, on both semantic and policy grounds.
As a matter of statutory construction, the majority’s interpretation ignores the express definition of the term “import”, which requires only a “bringing in or introduction of [the controlled substance] into any area_” 21 U.S.C. § 951(a)(1) (emphasis added). It also distorts the statutory scheme of Title 21 by effectively reading the phrase “into the United States” out of section 952(a). See Moskal v. United States, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 461, 466, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) (each word or phrase of a statute should be given meaning).
As I interpret sections 952(a) and 960(a), the phrase, “into the United States,” appearing in section 952(a) is for jurisdictional purposes only, i.e., the physical situs of the crime must be in the United States. The crime, therefore, is committed when an individual, with the criminal intent described in section 960(a), introduces a controlled substance “into any area,” and that “area” happens to be the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 271 (1st Cir.1987). On numerous occasions, this court, as well as our sister circuits, has found that similar statutory language, which is necessary to define a federal crime, is jurisdictional only, and does not constitute any part of the mens rea of the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Eisenberg, 596 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir.) (under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, knowledge that securities transported in interstate commerce not necessary), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843, 100 S.Ct. 85, 62 L.Ed.2d 56 (1979); United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir.1975) (under 18 U.S.C. § 659, “knowledge of interstate or foreign character of the goods” not required), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074, 96 S.Ct. 858, 47 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976); see also United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1427 (7th Cir.) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 448, 83 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984).
I agree with the majority that the dispos-itive question here is whether Congress intended to legislate to the fullest extent of its power. Did Congress intend to use all means at its disposal to thwart drug trafficking? If so, then the “into the United States” language should be interpreted only as the required jurisdictional nexus. On the other hand, if Congress intended to limit the scope of the legislation to those who actually intended to cause harm in the United States, the easiest way to accomplish this would have been to include, as an element of the crime, knowledge or intent that the controlled substance reach the United States. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 1260 n. 9, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (“[t]he question ... is not whether the requirement is jurisdictional, but whether it is jurisdictional only”).
It seems clear to me that Congress resolved to exert all means at its disposal to combat drug trafficking. The House Report accompanying the Act states that the “legislation [was] designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing *1003menace of drug abuse in the United States ... (2) through providing more effective means for law enforcement aspects of drug abuse prevention and control-” H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4566, 4567. In preparing this House Report, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives quoted at length from a report by the Prettyman Commission, a presidential commission appointed to study narcotics and drug abuse. First among the Prettyman Commission’s three-point general philosophy was the following: “The illegal traffic in drugs should be attacked with the full power of the Federal Government. The price for participation in this traffic should be prohibitive. It should be made too dangerous to be attractive.” Id. at 4575 (quoting Report of President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse (1963)); see also United States v. Palella, 846 F.2d 977, 980 (5th Cir.) (the Act represents “a comprehensive scheme designed to suppress and, hopefully, ultimately terminate the illegal distribution of drugs from whatever source, foreign or domestic”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S.Ct. 162, 102 L.Ed.2d 133 (1988); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir.1980) (the Act represents a congressional effort “to eradicate all illegal drug trafficking”).
Evidence of Congress’ expansive purpose can also be gleaned from the sheer breadth of several other provisions in the Act, particularly section 959. 21 U.S.C. § 959. That section — concededly not at issue here — clearly proscribes acts of manufacture and distribution of controlled substances anywhere. Certainly legislation with such sweeping extraterritorial consequences evinces a congressional intent to approach the high-water mark of its authority to prevent illicit drug trading. Additionally, it is not without significance that section 959 clearly and categorically requires knowledge or intent that the controlled substances enter the United States, suggesting that when it intended that a defendant had to know the destination of the controlled substance, Congress knew how to communicate that idea.
The majority questions why, if Congress intended the reading that I envision, it did not add to either section 952 or 960(a) an Olympian statement similar to that in, for example, section 959(c).1 I cannot, of course, speak for the congressional mindset. One answer, however, is that no further statement was needed because the phrase “into the United States” had already been inserted into section 952 to provide the jurisdictional basis for proscribing importation. Further, the majority agrees that sections 952 and 960(a) apply to extraterritorial acts; the question is whether those acts must be accompanied by an intent to cause harm in the United States. Thus, simply mimicking the words of section 959(c) in either section 952 or 960(a) would not have served any clear congressional purpose.
It is also noteworthy that American treaty obligations require the United States to cooperate with other signatories in suppressing international drug trafficking. See Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. 6298 (ratified by U.S. in 1967). Congress has expressed its intent to fulfill these obligations. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(7); see also United States v. Muench, 694 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir.1982) (“Congress has expressly declared that the drug laws are in part intended to meet the United States’ duties under [its] treaties”), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908, 103 S.Ct. 1881, 76 L.Ed.2d 811 (1983).
This impressive body of evidence satisfies me that Congress intended to use all methods at its disposal to eradicate drug abuse in the United States. Such pervasive and persuasive evidence of congressional purpose resolves the ambiguity in the statutory scheme. Additionally, it serves to trump an application of the rule of lenity. The Supreme Court has noted that when legislative history indicates a broad congressional purpose, statutory language that might otherwise be ambiguous should *1004be interpreted in line with that purpose; and, in those cases, the rule of lenity will not provide a safe harbor from criminal liability. See Moskal, 111 S.Ct. at 465-68; McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 655-58, 102 S.Ct. 1332, 1339-41, 71 L.Ed.2d 522 (1982).
Common sense dictates that in order to fulfill this congressional purpose of full-scale drug interdiction, the source must be attacked. Congress, therefore, attacked those engaged in international drug trafficking with all the authority it could muster. Its purpose was to close all loopholes available to those engaged in this illicit trade; and, a careful examination of the statutory scheme at issue indicates that none presently exist.
By making it necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew that the controlled substance was to enter the United States, what the majority opinion does is not merely to recognize a lacuna in the law, but to create an unnecessary obstacle to the enforcement of the drug laws. In certain cases involving the key players in drug conspiracies, prosecutors will be able to surmount this hurdle by successfully employing the majority’s proposed conscious-avoidance charge. The beneficiaries of the majority’s opinion, however, will be those individuals who are on the periphery of importation schemes. Couriers and the like will easily be able to create a reasonable doubt as to both their knowledge of the destination of a controlled substance and their conscious-avoidance of such knowledge. Lest there be any question, couriers and other peripheral participants, on the whole, play an essential role in the proliferation of drugs in this country. Their role in drug trafficking should never be underestimated.
In sum, I am unable to agree with the majority’s reading of the statutory scheme in question because it is semantically unsound and is at cross-purposes with clear congressional efforts to enhance drug interdiction. Accordingly, I dissent.

. Section 959(c) provides: "This section [959] is intended to reach acts of manufacture and distribution outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 21 U.S.C. § 959(c).