Court Opinion

ID: 9791088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:05:12.521244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:33.932240
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Justice
(dissenting).
It is my strong conviction that three distinct legal concepts are directly involved in determining the true meaning of the statutes applicable to the situation in this case. The first is the concept of commutation of an award to a lump sum, as urged by petitioner, Special Indemnity Fund. In this connection it is to be noted that the last paragraph of 85 O.S.1961 § 172, states as follows:
“Provided, that whenever an injured person receives an award in excess of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00), payable out of the Special Indemnity Fund, said injured employee, for good cause shown, in cases of extreme hardship, may have said award commuted to a lump sum payment by *826permission of a majority of the members of the State Industrial Court, said lump sum payment not to exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the total award payable by the Special Indemnity Fund. All other awards payable out of the Special Indemnity Fund shall be paid in periodical installments and without commutation thereof to a lump sum.”
We are particularly concerned with the meaning of the last sentence of the quoted paragraph.
It is as follows: “All other awards payable out of the Special Indemnity Fund shall be paid in periodical installments and without commutation thereof to a lump sum”.
It is conceded that if the Legislature had provided by a separate section or sub-section that all awards except certain described ones payable out of the Special Indemnity Fund shottld be paid only in periodical installments, it would then be arguable that it meant and meant only what it apparently had said.
However, it is to be particularly noted here that the subject provision appeared at the tail-end of a paragraph which itself was a specific proviso referring to commutation of awards under the circumstances indicated in the statute in situations only where awards exceeding $7500.00 have been made.
In such a case, “said injured employee, for good cause shown, in cases of extreme hardship, may have said award commuted to a lump sum judgment.”
It is to be further emphasized in this connection that the last part of the sentence in question specifically stated “arid without commutation thereof to a lump sum”.
It is my thought that in writing the sentence with which we are here concerned, the Legislature was thinking particularly and specifically and only of situations where claimants, because of hardship, would be seeking the commutation of awards and intended that the State Industrial Court should order the commutation to a lump sum in instances only where the award exceeded $7500.00 and then only to the extent of not to exceed 25% thereof and that in other situations where commutation should be sought awards from the Special Indemnity Fund should “be paid in periodical installments and without commutation thereof to a lump sum.”
In 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 244, pages-238, 239, is the following language:
“* * * (I)t is a general principle of interpretation that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The rule applies even though there are no negative words excluding' the things not mentioned * * * ”
In the case of St. Louis-San Francisco-Ry. Co. v. McIntosh, 103 Okl. 246, 229 P. 1064, 1067, we said:
“ * * * (U)nless an act of the Legislature is so drawn as to clearly convey the idea that the levy provided for shall be in addition to the limitations provided in section 9692, it shall' be construed to come within the terms and conditions of said section, and, as-suggested by appellant, the familiar rule in the construction of the statute,. ‘Expressio unius est exclusio alterius/' is applicable. 25 R.C.L. 981, announces-the rule as follows:
“ ‘It is a general principle of interpretation that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing; expressio unius est exclusio al-terius. The affirmative description of the cases in which the jurisdiction may be exercised implies a negative on the exercise of such power in other cases. 5}i ⅜ ⅝ Í
“In the case of Ex parte Ballew, 201 P. 525, the Court of Criminal Appeals said:
“ ‘Applying the rule of statutory construction, “Expressio unius est exclusio-alterius,” the affirmative description and enumeration of the acts constituting contempt implies a negative as to the *827•exercise of such power in other cases not enumerated.’ ”
In 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 249, pages T244, 245 and 246, is the following language:
“ * * * (I) n accordance with what is commonly known as the rule of ejus-dem generis, where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and •construed as, restricted by the particular designation and as including only things or persons of the same kind, •class, character, or nature as those ■specifically enumerated. The general 'words are deemed to have been used, not to the wide extent which they might bear if standing alone, but as related to words of more definite and particular meaning with which they are associated. * * * ”
This Court in the case of Walton v. Donnelly, 83 Okl. 233, 201 P. 367, 369, 370, said:
“In an endeavor to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers, there are certain cardinal rules of construction to be used as an aid in guiding the •court in arriving at the intention of the framers of the charter. One of these rules as announced in 25 R.C.L. p. 996, is as follows:
“ ‘General words in a statute must receive a general construction, unless there is something in it to restrain them, but in accordance with what is commonly known as the rule of ejusdem generis, where, in a statute, general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation, and to include only things or persons ■of the same kind, class, or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose.’
“This court in applying the rule of ejusdem generis in the case of Board of County Commissioners v. Grimes, 75 Okl. 219, 182 Pac. 897, in the body of the opinion, stated as follows:
“ ‘General words do not explain or amplify particular terms preceding them, but are themselves restricted and explained by the particular terms.’
“The same rule was announced and applied in the case of Wolf v. Blackwell Oil Co., 77 Okl. 82 [81], 186 Pac. 484.”
I do not believe we may properly say the Legislature by section 172 intended that in every instance than those specifically therein provided for an award could absolutely not be made except it be payable in periodical installments.
A second concept with which we are concerned in determining the measure of its responsibility and the time for fulfilling same by the Special Indemnity Fund is that of acceleration of payment.
85 O.S.1961, §§ 41 and 42, so far as applicable, are as follows:
“ * * * Failure for ten days to pay any final award or any portion thereof as ordered, shall immediately entitle the beneficiary to an order finding the respondent and/or insurance carrier to be in default and all unpaid portions, including future periodical installments unpaid, shall thereupon become due and may be immediately enforced as provided by Section 13366 of this Chapter”. 85 O.S.1961 § 41.
“If payment of compensation or an installment thereof due under the terms of an award, except in case of appeals from an award, be not made within ten days after the same is due by the employer or insurance carrier liable therefor, the Commission may order a certified copy of the award to be filed in the office of the Court Clerk of any County, which award whether accumulative or lump sum shall be en*828tered on the Judgment Docket of the District Court, and shall have the same force and he subject to the same law as judgments of the District Court. * * * ” 85 O.S.1961, § 42.
In Pruitt v. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co., Okl., 361 P.2d 494, 496, is the following language:
“The quoted enactments [85 O.S. 1961 §§ 41, 42], we have held, effect on employer’s default an automatic acceleration in maturity of future periodical installments adjudged against the employer in a final accumulative award of the State Industrial Court. By force of law such unaccrued installments are commuted to a lump sum so that the entire unsatisfied obligation becomes due at once.”
In the case of Excise Board of Grady County v. Griggs, 192 Okl. 636, 138 P.2d 829, 831, in referring to the automatic acceleration clause in sections 41 and 42, supra, we said:
“ * * * It was by operation of law and not by order of the State Industrial Commission that all unpaid portions of the award became due and subject to enforcement.”
In Pruitt v. Mid-Continent, supra, we further said:
“These provisions [85 O.S.1961 §§ 41, 42] facilitate expeditious enforcement of delinquent accumulative awards and enable the beneficiary-workman to compel satisfaction of the aggregate unpaid compensation adjudged in his favor. He can thereby avoid the cumbersome method of resorting to successive proceedings for the collection of individual installments as the same accrue and become due. Excise Board of Grady County v. Griggs, 192 Okl. 636, 138 P.2d 829; Rucks-Brandt Const. Corporation v. Silver, 194 Okl. 324, 151 P.2d 399. See, also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Richter, 182 Okl. 446, 73 P.2d 307.”
In Special Indemnity Fund v. Davidson, 196 Okl. 118, 162 P.2d 1016, 1017, 1018, we stated:
“Said 1943 Act was not amendatory to the Workmen’s Compensation Law but was merely supplementary thereto. Special Indemnity Fund v. Farmer, [195 Okl. 262] 156 P.2d 815. It did not create any new benefits or enlarge the right to compensation or increase the amount thereof. It merely shifted the burden of paying the additional permanent disability from the employer or his insurance carrier to the Special Indemnity Fund. * * * ”
In stating that the burden of paying additional compensation resulting from previous physical impairment of the claimant has been shifted from the employer or his insurance carrier to the Special Indemnity Fund, this Court, in effect, placed the Special Indemnity Fund in the same position as any other insurance carrier. Other insurance carriers defaulting in payments on an award are subject to having the unpaid balance accelerated and thereby due and payable in a lump sum.
By the act creating the Special Indemnity Fund (85 O.S.1961 § 171 et seq.,) the Legislature intended that the Special Indemnity Fund be required to step into the shoes of employer and insurer and take over their burdens and be amenable to the rules governing their conduct.
The burden of paying was shifted. See Special Indemnity Fund v. Davidson, 196 Okl. 118, 162 P.2d 1016, and Special Indemnity Fund v. Horne, Okl., 276 P.2d 240. The Special Indemnity Fund should pay in accordance with requirements of sections 41 and 42, supra.
A third concept, to my mind, not applicable in this case, but in whose tentacles I fear we find ourselves indirectly embroiled is the doctrine of pari materia. Statutes which relate to the same thing or which have a common purpose are said to be in pari materia. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 366, pp. 801, 802 and State ex rel. v. Phillips Petroleum, infra.
*829As stated in the text of 82 C.J.S., to which reference has just been made, “On the other hand, statutes are not in pari materia which do not relate to the same subject and which have no common purpose and scope; and, although an act may incidentally refer to the same subject as another act, it is not in pari materia if its scope and aim are distinct and unconnected. * * *"
To my mind the subject sentence quoted from section 172 and the applicable provisions from sections 41 and 42 are somewhat related in that each refers to the payment of awards to injured workmen as required by provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, but on the other hand, are wholly divorced in tenor and thought because the former applies to commutation of awards or parts thereof to lump sums and the applicable portions of the latter sections apply only to acceleration of payment of awards, when those obligated to make the payments neglect or refuse to timely discharge their obligations.
Section 172, supra, does not purport to deal with the situation of a respondent defaulting in the payment to an injured workman of the periodical installments of an award. As we have noted above, the language “All other awards payable out of the Special Indemnity Fund shall be paid in periodical installments and without commutation thereof to a lump sum” appearing in section 172, supra, refers, as does all the other language in the last paragraph of such section, to applications by claimants to “lump sum” awards that is, have a portion thereof paid in a lump sum, for good cause shown because of their immediate need for the money.
There is no language in section 172 in any way referring to acceleration of an award when the insurance carrier is in default in paying the periodical installments of that award. To hold that section 172 applies to instances of default by insurance carriers is to read into such section language and meaning the Legislature did not see fit to specifically place therein.
In an instance of hardship, respondents have no control over commutation of an award, and that is the circumstance the Legislature sought to control by the enactment in 1953 of the last paragraph of section 172 quoted hereinabove.
By the way of contrast, in 85 O.S.1961 §§ 41 and 42, the Legislature dealt with an entirely different matter. In such sections the Legislature was concerned with failure of respondents to promptly make payments on awards to injured workmen. It thereby provided additional methods of enforcing payment of an award.
In the event respondents are in default in paying an award, payment thereof may be accelerated without the claimant being required to show hardship.
In an instance arising under these sections, respondents have full control in that payment of an award will not be accelerated unless respondents are in default. A respondent can keep from being in default by simply making payments on an award when they are due.
If the views herein expressed do not prevail, the Special Indemnity Fund can refuse to promptly make payments on an award to an injured workman. Under such circumstances the only recourse open to the claimant is to file successive applications with the State Industrial Court to require the Special Indemnity Fund to bring its payments up to date.
The Special Indemnity Fund is granted privileges not extended to other insurance carriers. Under previous holdings of this Court all other insurance carriers defaulting in paying periodical installments of an award are subject to having the balance accelerated. In Excise Board of Grady County v. Griggs, supra, at page 831 of the Pacific Second Reporter, we stated:
“ * * * It was caused by failure of defendant to pay the amount due. The finding of the State Industrial Commission that defendant was in default made applicable the statute under *830which the entire amount of the award became due. * * * ”
The Special Indemnity Fund refers us -to no statutory enactment or holding by this ■Court specifically exempting it from the operation of the automatic acceleration ■clause in 85 O.S.1961 §§ 41 and 42. Nor •have we in our research found any such ■exemption.
In the case of Special Indemnity Fund v. Duff, 200 Okl. 57, 191 P.2d 584, 587, ihis Court stated:
“ * * * Special Indemnity Fund contends that the Commission was without authority to revive the award as •against it. We think the revivor was ■proper. 85 O.S.1941 § 41. The Fund •concedes that an award may properly 'be revived against the employer under said section, Schmidt et al. v. Moncrief et al., 194 Okl. 377, 151 P. 2d 920, but contends that such section has no application to an award made ■against it. It is asserted that the Special Indemnity Fund Act is a com■plete act in and of itself and that it •contains no specific provision which would authorize a revivor of an award against it. It is argued that the provision of the Act to the effect that an ■injured employee shall receive compen■sation on the basis of his combined ■disabilities as is now provided by the laws of this state refer only to the method of computation of compensation as provided by 85 O.S.1941 § .22; that it does not indicate any intent upon the part of the legislature •that awards entered against it should be governed by the revivor provision ■of said Section 41.
* * * * * *
“When the legislature declared that a ‘physically impaired person’ should receive compensation on the basis of liis combined disabilities as is now provided by the laws of this state and that a designated portion thereof should he assessed against the employer and its insurance carrier and the balance should be paid out of the Special Indemnity Fund it did not intend to limit the application of existing laws merely to the computation of compensation but it evidently intended to make available all laws then in force to secure the full payment thereof including Section 41, supra.”
In the case of Special Indemnity Fund v. Horne, Okl., 276 P.2d 240, we stated that the allowing of interest on awards from the date ordered paid by the State Industrial Court until the date • of satisfaction thereof as provided by 85 O.S. 1961 § 42 was an additional method of enforcing an award. In that case at page 242 of the Pacific Second Reporter is the following language:
“In Hickman v. Gumerson, 190 Okl. 514, 125 P.2d 765, we held that section 42, supra, is an additional method of enforcing an award”.
As we have noted previously herein, the acceleration of an award as a result of the default in payment thereof is another method of enforcing an award.
In the Plome case, supra, we held that the Special Indemnity Fund was subject to the additional method of enforcing an order entailing the payment of interest as provided by section 42, supra. In that case at page 242 of the Pacific Second Reporter, we said:
“Finally it is argued that the Special Indemnity Fund Act is not an amendment of the Workmen’s Compensation Law but is a full and complete remedy afforded under the Special Indemnity Fund Act and since there is no provision for awards to draw interest any award against the Special Indemnity Fund for interest would be illegal. We do not agree. * * *
“The statute provides that an award shall be made against Special Indemnity Fund and since by statutory provision awards draw interest an award for the collection of interest against Special Indemnity Fund is not only *831within the province of the Workmen’s Compensation Law but does not conflict with any provision creating the Special Indemnity Fund”.
By analogy if awards against the Special Indemnity Fund can be enforced by requiring the payment of interest and may be revived, it would follow that awards against it also may be enforced by acceleration of future periodical installments in a final accumulative award. Especially is this true in the absence of any legislative pronouncement prohibiting such acceleration against the Special Indemnity Fund.
I do not consider the cases of Special Indemnity Fund v. Hull, Okl., 369 P.2d 162 and Special Indemnity Fund v. Hobbs, 196 Okl. 318, 164 P.2d 980 applicable to the factual situation herein presented inasmuch as acceleration due to default was not involved or discussed in either of such cases.
In my opinion there is quite definitely a distinction between the commutation of an award resulting from an application therefor by a claimant and the acceleration of an award resulting from default of the insurance carrier in paying an award.
Both result in the lump sum payment of certain unpaid installments of an award, but the basis and procedure for granting each and the number of installments required to be paid are entirely different. They serve completely different purposes. By not defaulting in the payment of an award the insurance carrier can prevent an acceleration but it cannot prevent the commutation of a portion of an award to a lump sum because of hardship provided the claimant makes the required showing.
It appears to me that we have here a situation to which certain language from the case of Board of County Commissioners of Creek County v. Alexander State Treasurer, 58 Okl. 128, 159 P. 311, quoted in State ex rel. Marland, Governor v. Phillips Petroleum Co. et al., 189 Okl. 629, 118 P.2d 621, 625, is applicable. The Court said:
“ * * * When it is apparent that a strict interpretation of a particular statute, construed alone, would defeat the intention of the Legislature as shown by other legislative enactments, which relate to the same subject, and which have been enacted in pursuance of, and according to a general purpose in accomplishing a particular result, such construction should not be adopted * * *»
I respectfully dissent.