Court Opinion

ID: 9729228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:29:35.15297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:56.193925
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority in affirming the entry of summary judgment with respect to counts I and II by reason of the mootness of the issues raised and in its refusal to consider the matter under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Similarly, I concur with the majority in its decision to return this matter to the trial court to consider the appropriateness of attorney fees for the plaintiff. I dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that the City is complying with section 9(b) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9(b) (West 1996)) in its maintenance of a “central” file for FOIA denials. The City admits that it does not maintain a “single central office file that is open to the public and indexed according to the type of exemption asserted” and that it took a significant passage of time before plaintiff received a response to his requests. The majority cites section 9(b), relating to the maintenance of a “single central office,” but asserts that this requirement is modified by the provision of section 2(a) of the Act, which defines a “public body” as “any legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of the State, state universities and colleges, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees, or commissions of this State, and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited to committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or in part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue.” 5 ILCS 140/2(a) (West 1996). The majority takes care to emphasize the statement that defines a “public body” as “cities *** and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing” (5 ILCS 140/2(a) (West 1996)). 304 Ill. App. 3d at 784. The majority then provides the usual and customary command that in any statutory construction we look to the plain language employed by the legislature in crafting the statute. Apparently, we need not look to the plain language of section 9(b), which commands that there be a “single central office file” maintained by public bodies (5 ILCS 140/9 (b) (West 1996)). Further, the majority ignores the rule of statutory construction that requires us to give preference to a specific statutory limitation or duty over a general statutory prescription. E.g., People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 379 (1992) (“[i]t is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that where there exists a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision, either in the same or another act, which both relate to the same subject, the specific provision controls and should be applied”); see also McDunn v. Williams, 156 Ill. 2d 288, 309 (1993); Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195-96 (1992). The majority suggests that each individual department is a subsidiary body of the City and, accordingly, is a public body within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, may maintain section 9(b) records. It cites Board of Regents of the Regency University System v. Reynard, 292 Ill. App. 3d 968 (1997), for this proposition (304 Ill. App. 3d at 784), even though both the facts and holding in Regents fall far short of the mark. The issue there was whether the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 1994)) and the FOIA applied to an advisory council created by the Academic Senate of Illinois State University, which was one of five universities governed by the Board of Regents of the Regency University System. The court held that such an entity was a public body and required application of both of these “sunshine laws.” The court did not address the issue of the maintenance of a “single central office file” for denials of FOIA requests. The majority misreads my dissent. 304 Ill. App. 3d at 785.1 do not take issue with its interpretation of the term “public body” and believe that the various subdivisions of the City can indeed be “public bodies” within the meaning of section 2 of the Act. The several cases cited by the majority merely define a “public body” but do not touch upon a definition of “single central office file.” None of the cited cases touch upon the interaction between section 9(b) and section 2 of the Act. Furthermore, none of the cases cited consider the meaning or effect of the word “central.”2  “A statute capable of two interpretations should be given that which is reasonable and which will not produce absurd, unjust, unreasonable or inconvenient results that the legislature could not have intended.” Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1993). Moreover, the doctrine of in pari materia “provides that, where two statutory provisions address the same subject matter, an interpretation which gives effect to both provisions must be adopted.” Johnson v. St. Therese Medical Center, 296 Ill. App. 3d 341, 348 (1998). Under the majority’s view, the “Senior Citizens Sewer Service Charge Exemptions,” a subsidiary body of the Department of Sewers, which is a subsidiary body of the City of Chicago, is a subsidiary public body able to maintain its own central file of denials of FOIA requests. Plaintiff notes that there are 25 distinct agencies or departments that the City acknowledges maintain a “single central office file.” Many of these agencies or departments have agencies within their jurisdiction which, under the majority’s definition, could be subsidiaries capable of maintaining their individual “single central office file.” Additionally, there are at least 18 other departments or agencies of the City that are worthy of maintaining a “single central office file” with reference to FOIA denials.3  In setting forth the foundations of statutory construction, the majority failed to give effect to the notion that the legislature is presumed not to create legislation that has an absurd result. Moreover, the majority has failed to consider the guiding principles the Act set out in section 1: “Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of government, it is declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who represent them as public officials and public employees consistent with the terms of this Act. Such access is necessary to enable the people to fulfill their duties of discussing public issues fully and freely, making informed political judgments and monitoring government to ensure that it is being conducted in the public interest.” 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 1996). I cannot conceive that the framers of this critical piece of legislation, which seeks to open the processes of government to the public, would have imagined that a citizen seeking to determine the denial policy of an Illinois city might be required to file 50 or more FOIA requests. Therefore, I would remand this matter to the trial court to allow the court to consider the issues raised in count III and thereafter fashion an injunctive remedy to comply with the goals and purpose of the Freedom of Information Act.  In People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 83 Ill. 2d 191 (1980), the court found that a gathering of several aldermen could be subject to the Open Meetings Act. In Copley Press, Inc. v. Administrative Office of the Courts, 271 Ill. App. 3d 548 (1995), the court found that agencies which perform judicial functions are not subject to the disclosure requirements of the FOIA. In Hopf v. Topcorp, Inc., 256 Ill. App. 3d 887 (1993), the court found that corporations are not public bodies subject to the FOIA where the corporations do not constitute legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of the government. In Rockford Newspapers, Inc. v. Northern Illinois Council on Alcoholism & Drug Dependence, 64 Ill. App. 3d 94 (1978), the court found that a private corporation that received governmental funding was not a “subsidiary body” within the meaning of the Open Meetings Act. In DeHarder Investment Corp. v. Indiana Housing Finance Authority, 909 F. Supp. 606 (S.D. Ind. 1995), the federal district court found that Indiana Housing Finance Authority was not a federal “agency” as the term is used in the federal FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1994)) and, thus, was not subject to the federal FOIA.   According to documents produced by the City in the trial court, there are 25 City Departments that maintain various types of FOIA denials. These include (1) the Department on Aging; (2) the Department of Animal Care and Control; (3) the Department of Buildings; (4) the Office of Cable Communications; (5) the Department of Consumer Services; (6) the Department of Environment; (7) the Board of Ethics; (8) the Department of Finance; (9) the Chicago Fire Department; (10) the Department of Fleet Management; (11) the Department on Housing; (12) the Commission on Human Relations; (13) the Department of Human Services; (14) the Office of the Inspector General; (15) the Department of Law; (16) the Department of Public Health; (17) the Mayor’s Office of Special Events; (18) the Municipal Reference Library; (19) the Department of Personnel; (20) the Department of Planning and Development; (21) the Department of Streets and Sanitation; (22) the Department of Sewers; (23) the Department of Transportation; (24) the Department of Water; and (25) the Department of Zoning. Additionally, within the 25 enumerated agencies, there are at least 82 subdivisions. There are at least 18 other City departments with offices and published telephone listings, which the City did not include on its list and which, under the majority’s view, could maintain FOIA denials. These include (1) the Chicago Department of Aviation; (2) the Chicago Office of Management and Budget; (3) the Chicago city clerk; (4) the Chicago city treasurer; (5) the Department of Cultural Affairs; (6) the Mayor’s Office for People with Disabilities; (7) the Economic Development Commission; (8) the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners; (9) the Mayor’s Office of Employment and Training; (10) the Department of General Services; (11) the Chicago Housing Authority; (12) the Mayor’s Office of Inquiry and Information; (13) the License Appeal Commission; (14) the Office of the Mayor; (15) the Chicago Police Department; (16) the Department of Purchase, Contracts and Supplies; (17) the Department of Revenue; and (18) the Board of Zoning Appeals. See Ameritech, City/County/State/United States Government Guide, Chicago White Pages, at 12-14 (February 1998).