Court Opinion

ID: 9598406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:08:34.942923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:41.541870
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting in part. I concur in the opinion and judgment except that I dissent from the ruling in division 1 and the reversal of the ruling there treated.
If the contract sued on was within the statute of frauds it appeared on the face of the record and was subject to demurrer and not a plea. Since the plea contending that the action here brought was barred by the statute did not set up1 another and different contract which would have been barred by the statute, the demurrer to the plea was properly sustained.
Paragraph 21 of the answer alleges: “Further answering said petition, and by way of special plea, the defendant avers that the alleged cause of action in the plaintiff’s petition rests upon an agreement in parol; that said alleged agreement could not be performed within one year; and that, therefore, said cause of action is barred by the statute of frauds.” This paragraph of the answer in truth and in fact is a demurrer for the reason that it does not admit the execution of the parol contract set forth in the petition and, as stated above, it is not good as a plea of the statute of frauds for the reason that it does not set up a different state of facts from that alleged in the petition upon which to base the contention that it is barred by said statute. Even under the theory enunciated in Mendel v. Miller & Sons, 134 Ga. 610 (68 S. E. 430), namely, that if the defendant by his answer admits the agreement, but pleads and insists on the benefit of the statute, he will be entitled to it notwithstanding such admission, the defendant does not bring himself within the rule announced in the Mendel case for the reason that he does not admit the parol agreement.