Court Opinion

ID: 9737690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:32:18.866832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.741013
License: Public Domain

GOOD, J. pro tem.*
I dissent.
The majority opinion appears to be predicated upon only a limited portion of respondent’s testimony and ignores or rejects admissions and other evidence, direct and inferential, that fixes the distance between véhicles at 160 to 180 feet rather than 90 feet and that contradicts her testimony of an immediate stop within 10 feet upon observing the plaintiff’s position of peril. The rejected evidence as to distance lies in respondent’s testimony that she first observed the boy and knew he was in danger as she went into the curve from Black-wood and that he was then at the McCleary driveway. Later she said he was just coming off the upper level portion of Hadden, which would be a considerably greater distance. The McCleary driveway was 75 to 80 feet above the point of impact *245which in turn was 39 feet above a tangent projected by the traffic officer from the opposite side of the Blackwood curve. A tangent from the near side would add another 40 feet to Hadden. The descriptions of the course of the two roads and the photographic exhibits show that Blackwood and Hadden form a continuous curve and that forward visibility would be constant from any point on the first half of the curve. This distance of uninterrupted visibility for a driver entering Hadden was paced by Mr. Fambrini at 180 feet. These factors in evidence, corroborated by the photographs, would well support a jury finding that instead of 90 feet respondent had between 160 to 180 feet of observation of plaintiff upon first discovering his position of peril.
Further her testimony as to an immediate stop within 10 feet (with the boy continuing to coast some 80 feet into her stopped automobile) is contradicted by her admissions to the traffic officer at the scene that she was just “barely moving” or had stopped or “almost” stopped at the time of impact. If the jury found the distance to be either 160 feet or more on her testimony or 180 feet on the Fambrini testimony and further found that she was almost stopped it could have drawn the rather compelling inference that respondent did not come to an immediate stop upon first observing the inattentive cyclist but continued ahead for 90 to 100 feet straddling the center of the road by two or three feet (her stopped position) and then made the last instant kind of panic stop that, as she said, stalled her motor. The traffic officer also testified that the bicycle hit respondent’s car at its left head-lamp, thus placing the boy 1% feet on his own side of the road. Because of this and the fact that 8 feet of black-top plus a shoulder of unspecified width was clear and unoccupied at her right it cannot be said as a matter of law that a swerve of even 2 or 3 feet to respondent’s side of the road was not available to her and, in the exercise of due care, was not required in order to avoid impact. I do not consider it “mere speculation” to assume that if vehicles have even three or four feet of space between them they do not ordinarily collide.
The majority seems to concede that there was substantial evidence of the first two elements of the Brandelius formula but relies on the testimony of the 90-foot distance and immediate stop to hold that there was no substantial evidence to-support the third element. The ignored evidentiary factors above mentioned were at least of sufficient substance to require a jury determination of whether or not the facts required by *246the third element, including time and space, were present at the time and place of the accident in question. Confessing to no great sympathy for erratic young cyclists it is nevertheless the law that they are just as deserving of the right to a jury determination of the facts as any plaintiff in any recorded ease wherein the last clear chance doctrine has provided an exception to the consequences of the law of contributory negligence. I would therefore reverse the judgment.
Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 20, 1960. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.