Court Opinion

ID: 9472988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:16:42.586054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:16.004743
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part,
While I agree with a substantial part of what the court holds today, I am unable to *954agree that the district court properly waived the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies for those class members who alleged disabling pain but did not pursue timely appeals after denial of their claims. The court today considerably exceeds the limits of the waiver doctrine as set down in Mental Health Association v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983). Several factors present in Mental Health are not present in this case, the most notable being that the claimants in Mental Health, because of their condition, were often incapable of understanding or effectively using their appeal rights. Id. at 970. Given the extensive public discussion of the Social Security situation in this circuit from late November 1983 through July 16, 1984, I find it hard to believe that persons truly threatened with such irreparable harm as hypothesized by the court would not have sought administrative review of the denials of their benefits.
In addition, in Mental Health there was a finding by the district court that an improper presumption was being applied; thus, we held, additional agency proceedings would not result in further clarification of agency policy and immediate court review would not “interfere prematurely with agency procedures.” Id. at 970-71. Here, while there have been many misapplications of the pain standard, the July 17, 1984, stipulation concerning the standard in such cases does not demonstrate the existence of an erroneous policy or procedure. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (8th Cir.1984). There is less reason to believe that blanket court intervention is necessary and I would defer to normal agency procedures, including the Secretary’s decisions on when waiver of exhaustion is appropriate.
The extension of Mental Health to the facts of this case is contrary to the principles laid down in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901 n. 11, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (waiver of exhaustion requires the existence of a challenge entirely collateral to the substantive claim of entitlement plus a colorable claim of irreparable harm). Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the opinion dealing with the waiver of exhaustion, commencing on page 15 of the court’s opinion. I would not allow those seeking administrative review to continue in this litigation.