Court Opinion

ID: 9550100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:29:27.193011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:50.529764
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J,
I dissent.
Mr. Belli’s flamboyant life style has no doubt offended many a lawyer and judge. But while the facts before us may affront our sense of professional dignity, they fail to support suspension of petitioner from the practice of law for willfully soliciting professional employment.
The majority first determines that the conduct of the lecture agent in distributing publicity pamphlets, soliciting lecture engagements and arranging radio and TV appearances does not constitute an acceptable basis for discipline because it is not principally or primarily directed toward the solicitation of clients.
Then, however, the majority decides that the conduct of the same agent, acting pursuant to the same contract in sending a press release announcing the 20th anniversary dinner of the Belli lecture series, is improper because, while “primarily directed at generating seminar publicity,” it contains language “primarily directed at soliciting law business in the sense that such solicitation could have been anticipated as the language’s primary, probable function.” The troublesome language apparently refers to Mr. Belli’s purported clients paying him tribute at his testimonial dinner in Denver.
Finally, the majority decides that the conduct of the same lecture agent in announcing “Melvin Belli is onto unabridged Glenfiddich Scotch,” while not initially imputable to Mr. Belli, became chargeable to him when he failed to stop the final ad on his return from Africa. Just how a New York whiskey endorsement might enhance a California law practice goes unexplained. Reliance on Palmquist v. State Bar, 43 Cal.2d 428 [274 P.2d 640], is misplaced—the case assists Mr. Belli.
The facts of this case—forcing the majority to concede that “there remain only two bases for disciplining petitioner and that these consist of vicarious behavior in which petitioner took no active role,”—hardly support the willful violations charged in the first paragraph of the majority’s lengthy opinion. Worse, the opinion casts grave doubt on the propriety of any com*843mercial or testimonial use of a lawyer’s name, absent clear constitutional protection.
I would dismiss the proceedings.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied March 27, 1974. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.