Court Opinion

ID: 9910440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 17:08:52.238831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:56.307359
License: Public Domain

J-S44011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TIMOTHY DOCKERY                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2983 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 17, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0742101-1989

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED DECEMBER 15, 2023

       Appellant, Timothy Dockery, appeals pro se from the order entered on

October 17, 2022, which dismissed his sixth petition filed under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

       This Court summarized the factual and procedural history of the case

leading up to the dismissal of Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition:

         On May 19, 1988, Appellant and his brother, Laverne
         Dockery, entered a Philadelphia residence armed with
         automatic weapons. The Dockery brothers shot and killed
         Gregory Tutt, Hassan Uqdah, James Saunders, and Dawn
         Gross.

         [On February 6, 1991, a jury found Appellant guilty of four
         counts of second-degree murder and one count each of
         burglary, conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of
         crime.] The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
         term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S44011-23

       On June 2, 1992, this Court affirmed the judgment of
       sentence. Commonwealth v. Dockery, 613 A.2d 1259 (Pa.
       Super. 1992) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not
       file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.

       On May 19, 1994, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition.
       Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition. On
       May 23, 1996, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's first
       PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing. This Court
       affirmed the dismissal and our Supreme Court denied
       allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Dockery, 701
       A.2d 776 (Pa. Super. 1997) (unpublished memorandum),
       appeal denied, 723 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1998). . . .

       On March 8, 1999, Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA
       petition. On March 24, 1999, the PCRA court dismissed
       Appellant's second PCRA petition as untimely. This Court
       affirmed the dismissal. See Commonwealth v. Dockery,
       803     A.2d  790    (Pa.  Super.   2002)    (unpublished
       memorandum). . . .

       On May 20, 2008, Appellant filed his third pro se PCRA
       petition. On May 12, 2009, the PCRA court dismissed the
       petition as untimely.   Appellant did not appeal that
       determination.

       On December 15, 2014, Appellant filed [] his fourth, pro se[,]
       PCRA petition. . . . On September 3, 2015, the PCRA court
       dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing[. This
       Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order on January 6, 2017,
       and, on August 1, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
       denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.
       Commonwealth v. Dockery, 160 A.3d 245 (Pa. Super.
       2017), appeal denied, 169 A.3d 1076 (Pa. 2017).

Commonwealth v. Dockery, 160 A.3d 245 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished

memorandum), appeal denied, 169 A.3d 1076 (Pa. 2017).

     Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition was filed on January 8, 2018 and

dismissed on August 13, 2018. Although Appellant filed a timely notice of

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appeal from that order, Appellant later discontinued his appeal.         See

Appellant’s Praecipe to Discontinue, 11/28/18, at 1.

     Appellant filed the current PCRA petition – his sixth – on April 1, 2019.

As the PCRA court explained:

        [After filing his sixth petition pro se, Appellant] retained
        Attorney Cheryl J. Sturm, Esq.[,] who filed a counseled
        amended [sixth] PCRA petition on March 2, 2021. In the
        counseled amended petition, [Appellant] raised two claims:
        (1) [Appellant’s] constitutional rights were violated because
        the Commonwealth did not disclose the full scope of
        [co-defendant Timothy Quattlebaum’s (“Co-Defendant
        Quattlebaum”)] cooperation agreement – namely, that he
        would serve only six years in prison rather than the [ten] to
        20 year sentence alluded to during trial; and (2) Appellant’s
        constitutional rights were violated because only hearsay
        testimony was presented at the preliminary hearing.

        In the counseled amended petition, [Appellant] claims that
        the petition is timely because the claims: (1) are premised
        upon the newly discovered recantation evidence set forth in
        the 2016 [affidavit sworn by Co-Defendant Quattlebaum];
        and, (2) governmental interference resulted in [Appellant]
        not discovering the basis of these claims. Seven weeks []
        after filing the amended petition, Attorney Sturm filed a
        [petition] for leave to withdraw as counsel. Attorney Sturm
        and [Appellant] (filing pro se) both supplemented the
        [petition] to withdraw. On July 28, 2021, [the PCRA] court
        granted Attorney Sturm leave to withdraw and appointed
        James Lloyd, Esq. [(“Attorney Lloyd”)], [as] counsel to
        represent [Appellant] with respect to the current PCRA
        proceedings.

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 12.

     On March 24, 2022, however, Attorney Lloyd filed a petition to withdraw

as counsel and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.

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Super. 1988) (en banc). On September 27, 2022, the PCRA court granted

counsel leave to withdraw and issued Appellant notice that it intended to

dismiss his petition in 20 days without holding a hearing. See PCRA Court

Order, 9/27/22, at 1-3; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). The PCRA court finally

dismissed Appellant’s petition on October 17, 2022.         PCRA Court Order,

10/17/22, at 1. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from this order. We

now affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s untimely, serial PCRA petition.

      “As a general proposition, we review a denial of PCRA relief to determine

whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and free

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 830 (Pa. 2014).

      Before this Court may address the substance of Appellant’s claims, we

must first determine if this petition is timely.

        [The PCRA requires] a petitioner to file any PCRA petition
        within one year of the date the judgment of sentence
        becomes final. A judgment of sentence becomes final at the
        conclusion of direct review . . . or at the expiration of time
        for seeking review.

                                       ...

        However, an untimely petition may be received when the
        petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the
        three limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set
        forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), are met.
        A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed
        within [one year] of the date the claim could first have been
        presented. In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the
        PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, the petitioner must plead
        and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised
        within the [one-year] timeframe.

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See Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4-5 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(quotation marks and some citations omitted).

      We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on June 2, 1992 and

Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Dockery, 613 A.2d 1259 (Pa. Super.

1992) (unpublished memorandum). Thus, Appellant’s judgment of sentence

became final at the end of the day on July 2, 1992. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P.

903(a). Since the PCRA requires that a petition be filed “within one year of

the date the judgment becomes final,” Appellant had until July 2, 1993 to file

a timely PCRA petition.      See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).         Therefore,

Appellant’s current petition, which was filed on April 1, 2019, is patently

untimely and the burden thus fell upon Appellant to plead and prove that one

of the enumerated exceptions to the one-year time-bar applied to his case.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284,

1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to properly invoke a statutory exception to the

one-year time-bar, the PCRA demands that the petitioner properly plead and

prove all required elements of the relied-upon exception).

      Appellant purports to invoke the “newly discovered facts” and

“governmental interference” exceptions to the time-bar.       These statutory

exceptions provide:

        (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
        subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date
        the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and
        the petitioner proves that:

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            (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
            of interference by government officials with the
            presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
            or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws
            of the United States;

            (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
            unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
            ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]

                                      ...

        (2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph
        (1) shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could
        have been presented.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

      To successfully invoke the governmental interference exception, a

“petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously raise the

[underlying] claim was the result of interference by government officials, and

the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008).

      Regarding the newly discovered evidence exception, our Supreme Court

has explained:

        subsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components, which must be
        alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner must establish
        that: 1) “the facts upon which the claim was predicated were
        unknown” and (2) “could not have been ascertained by the
        exercise      of     due      diligence.”    42    Pa.C.S.A.
        § 9545(b)(1)(ii)(emphasis added). If the petitioner alleges
        and proves these two components, then the PCRA court has
        jurisdiction over the claim under this subsection.

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Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis

omitted).

      Further, to properly invoke either exception, the petitioner is statutorily

required to file his petition “within one year of the date the claim could have

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). As our Supreme Court explained,

to satisfy this “one year requirement,” a petitioner must “plead and prove that

the information on which he relies could not have been obtained earlier,

despite the exercise of due diligence.” See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959

A.2d 306, 310-311 (Pa. 2008); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94,

98 (Pa. 2001).    Moreover, because the “one year requirement” of section

9545(b)(2) is a statutory mandate, the requirement is “strictly enforced.” See

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      The PCRA court ably explained why Appellant’s claims are time-barred:

        [Appellant’s claims are] premised upon unknown benefits
        granted to [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum] in exchange for
        [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum’s] trial testimony[.            These
        claims were] arguably not discovered by [Appellant] until he
        received [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum’s] affidavit (dated
        March 18, 2016) until sometime in 2016. One key portion of
        this new fact – namely, that [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum]
        only served six years in prison for his conviction for four
        murders – was apparently known to [Appellant] in 2005
        according to his third pro se PCRA petition. However,
        [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum’s] affidavit indisputably contains
        additional exculpatory information as it includes a recantation
        of his trial testimony and the motive for providing false
        testimony against [Appellant] at trial. Indeed, in the 2016
        affidavit, [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum] admits that he leveled
        false allegations against [Appellant] in order to secure a
        secret deal with the district attorney to avoid a lengthy prison

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        sentence for other crimes in a separate indictment pending
        against him for an “auto theft ring” he was involved in.
        [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum] further explained that the lies
        aided him in exacting revenge against [Appellant] and his
        co-defendant/brother because [Appellant] refused to bail
        [Co-Defendant     Quattlebaum]      out    of  county    jail.
        [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum] admits that he harbored further
        animosity against the Dockerys because [Appellant’s]
        co-defendant/brother had an affair with [Co-Defendant
        Quattlebaum’s] wife. This infidelity was especially offensive
        to [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum] because Laverne Dockery
        was cheating on [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum’s] sister by
        engaging in the affair at the time of the murders. . . .

        Appellant received [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum’s] affidavit –
        and thus new facts – while the appeal of the order dismissing
        his fourth PCRA petition was pending. In his petition for leave
        to file a second or subsequent [petition] in federal court,
        [Appellant] averred that he “discovered the new evidence
        contained in [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum’s] affidavit on
        March 18, 2016.” The appeal was finally resolved on August
        1, 2017, when the Supreme Court denied allocator. Thus, on
        August 2, 2017, there were no appeals pending in this matter
        . . . for the first time since September 30, 2015 – i.e., before
        [Appellant] received [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum’s] affidavit.
        ...

        Accordingly, [Appellant’s] first opportunity to raise a PCRA
        claim as a result of the discovery of the new information in
        [Co-Defendant Quattlebaum’s] affidavit – which [Appellant]
        claims was withheld from him as a result of governmental
        interference – was on August 2, 2017. . . . [Appellant] did
        not file the [current PCRA petition] until April 1, 2019.
        Accordingly, the petition does not fall within the timeliness
        exception provided in [Section] 9545(b)(i) or (ii).

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 19-21.

      We agree with the PCRA court’s able analysis and conclude that, since

Appellant failed to plead a valid exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, Appellant's

petition is time-barred and our “courts are without jurisdiction to offer

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[Appellant] any form of relief.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516,

523 (Pa. Super. 2011).     We thus affirm the PCRA court's order, which

dismissed Appellant's sixth PCRA petition without a hearing.

     Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 12/15/2023

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