Court Opinion

ID: 9626367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:09:44.133639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:46.786402
License: Public Domain

BIGGS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that the trial court, on the facts of this case, was not required to conduct a more extensive inquiry before allowing defendant to proceed pro se.
It is well settled that a defendant has a constitutional right to waive counsel and proceed pro se. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). However, our Supreme Court has held that before allowing a defendant to waive in-court representation, the following constitutional and statutory standards must be met: (1) a defendant must “clearly and unequivocally” express a desire to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se; and (2) the trial court must satisfy itself that the defendant’s waiver was made “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581, 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107, 132 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1995). Neither of these requirements has been satisfied in the case sub judice.
*92As the majority correctly points out, defendant signed a waiver of counsel form on 11 December 2000. Though the waiver form explicitly instructs that the defendant check only one of two boxes to indicate (1) his desire to waive assigned counsel or; (2) his desire to waive all counsel and appear on his own behalf, the defendant checked both boxes. It is unclear from the face of the form whether defendant elected to proceed without assigned counsel or whether defendant wished to proceed without any counsel and represent himself. At the very least this would suggest some level of confusion by the defendant.
Moreover, while the majority repeatedly states that the trial judge certified the waiver, an examination of the waiver indicates otherwise. Though the presiding judge signed the waiver, he failed to check either box in the certification section of the form indicating whether defendant elected to proceed without assigned counsel or whether defendant wished to proceed without all assistance of counsel. The form instructs the judge to check one of the two boxes. “[The] trial court ha[s] an affirmative obligation to be aware of and comply with all the provisions contained in the [AOC] forms.” Tevepaugh v. Tevepaugh, 135 N.C. App. 489, 493 n. 4, 521 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1999). Thus, the waiver form cannot be accorded the “presumption of regularity” asserted by the majority.
In addition, an examination of the record clearly indicates that the defendant signed the waiver of counsel form intending to retain counsel and not intending to proceed pro se. When asked about his waiver by the trial court, the defendant stated that when he executed the waiver, “[a]t that time, I was going to try to hire [a lawyer]. . . but ... he couldn’t take my case and by the time I got around to another lawyer, it was too late.” The court made no further inquiry and proceeded to trial. The court never inquired whether defendant wanted to represent himself, nor did he ever indicate he wanted to proceed pro se. “Statements of a desire not to be represented by court appointed counsel do not amount to expressions of an intention to represent oneself.” State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 339, 279 S.E.2d 788, 800 (1981).
Due to the irregularities in the waiver, we are unable to conclude that defendant clearly and unequivocally elected to proceed pro se as is constitutionally required. “Given the fundamental nature of the right to counsel, we ought not to indulge in the presumption that it has been waived by anything less than an express indication of such an intention.” Id. Therefore, it was error to allow defendant to pro*93ceed pro se absent an express desire to do so, and thus, he is entitled to a new trial. See State v. McCrowre, 312 N.C. 478, 322 S.E.2d 775 (1984) (error to allow defendant who had signed waiver of assigned counsel to proceed pro se where defendant gave no indication of wishing to represent himself).
Assuming arguendo that there had been a clear expression of intent to proceed pro se, defendant is nevertheless entitled to a new trial due to the court’s failure to conduct the inquiry required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 (2001). Again, due to the irregularities of the waiver, the majority’s reliance on the proposition that “[w]hen a defendant executes a written waiver which is in turn certified by the trial court, the waiver of counsel will be presumed to have been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, unless the rest of the record indicates otherwise[,]” is misplaced. Absent this presumption and the lack of transcription of the hearing in which the waiver was signed, the record fails to evidence that the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15-1242 have been met. This Court has long held that “[t]he record must affirmatively show that the [N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242] inquiry was made and that the defendant, by his answers,” voluntarily and with understanding of consequences, waived his right to counsel and elected to represent himself. State v. Callahan, 83 N.C. App. 323, 324, 350 S.E.2d 128, 129 (1986), disc. review denied, 319 N.C. 225, 353 S.E.2d 409 (1987). Moreover, the trial court’s inquiry must be thorough and “perfunctory questioning is not sufficient.” State v. Thomas, 331 N.C. 671, 674-75, 417 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1992) (citation omitted). Thus the examination of defendant by Judge Braswell before proceeding to trial does not satisfy the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242:
The Court: Mr. Kinlock, it appears as I have indicated to you before that you waived your right to a court appointed attorney.
Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: As you know, you have the right to hire your own lawyer. You have appeared in court this morning and it does not appear that a lawyer is with you. Have you hired a lawyer to represent you?
Defendant: No, sir. At that time, I was going to try to hire Doug Parsons. But he said he’s got so much in the courts he couldn’t take my case and by the time I got around to another lawyer, it was too late.
*94The Court: You have not hired a lawyer?
Defendant: No, sir. I have not hired a lawyer; couldn’t get to hire no one at that time.
The Court: Very well. I understand. Okay.
Mr. Butler: Thank you, Your Honor.
This inquiry fails to satisfy two of the three requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 that the trial court make thorough inquiry to ensure that defendant (1) understands and appreciates the consequences of his decision and; (2) comprehends the nature of the changes and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.
Because defendant never clearly and unequivocally expressed his intention to proceed pro se, the trial court erred in allowing him to do so. Defendant, in the case sub judice, is entitled to a new trial.