Court Opinion

ID: 9896010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:06:35.298355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:20.208902
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 22–1234

            Submitted October 10, 2023—Filed November 9, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellant,

vs.

CHASE ROBERT GRIFFIN,

      Appellee.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Mark F.

Schlenker, District Associate Judge.

      The State seeks review of an order suppressing evidence from a traffic stop.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
      May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General; Aaron James Rogers (argued) and Thomas

E. Bakke, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.

      Colin Murphy (argued) of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, PLC, West

Des Moines, for appellee.
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MAY, Justice.
      Chase Griffin’s rear license plate was shrouded with a tinted plastic cover.

The cover made it difficult for Iowa State Patrol troopers to read Griffin’s rear

license plate. The troopers stopped Griffin to warn him that the cover violated

Iowa law. During the stop, the troopers gained evidence that led to criminal

charges against Griffin. Griffin moved to suppress that evidence. Griffin argued

that his license plate cover did not violate Iowa law and, therefore, the traffic stop

was unconstitutional. The district court agreed. The State then asked us to

review that ruling.

      We conclude that the license plate cover violated an Iowa traffic statute.

Therefore, the traffic stop was not unconstitutional, and evidence from the stop

should not be suppressed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

      I. Factual and Procedural Background.

      We have reviewed de novo the record from the suppression hearing. Based

on that review, we find the following facts. At about 5:30 p.m. on February 19,

2022, Chase Griffin was driving an SUV on Highway 5 in Warren County. The

sky was clear, but it was getting close to sunset. Shadows darkened the highway.

      An Iowa State Patrol cruiser was also traveling on Highway 5. The troopers
were Sgt. Wade Major and Trooper Binh Nguyen. Trooper Nguyen was driving

while Sgt. Major occupied the passenger seat.

      The cruiser approached Griffin’s SUV from behind. Initially, it appeared to

Sgt. Major that “everything was black” on the rear of the SUV. At that point, he

“was unable to view [a] registration plate of any type” on the SUV. So Sgt. Major

directed Trooper Nguyen to get close, “within one to two car lengths.” As the

troopers pulled close to the SUV, they could see a rear plate, but it was shrouded

by a plastic cover. This cover appeared very dark. Because of the cover, the
plate’s registration information was difficult to read. Trooper Nguyen “could not
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fully, legibly read the numericals or letters” on the SUV’s rear plate. Sgt. Major

“was unable to provide letters or numbers” from the plate “to Trooper Nguyen.”

      Griffin turned onto the Fleur Drive exit. The troopers followed. They pulled

Griffin over on the exit ramp. The troopers planned to give Griffin a warning that

the dark cover on his rear license plate violated Iowa Code section 321.37 (2022).

      As Griffin’s SUV came to a stop, the cruiser rolled up close behind. At that

point, with one vehicle stopped right behind the other, the troopers could see the

SUV’s rear plate, but it was still difficult to read. Indeed, on the dashcam video,

the plate cannot be read at this point in the stop. We recognize, though, that this

is partially due to the limitations of video technology. Even so, we accept

Sgt. Major’s testimony that he couldn’t fully read the rear license plate until he

walked up to the SUV.

      The troopers approached the SUV’s driver’s-side window. As they

approached, the troopers were still planning to issue a warning for the license

plate cover. But then the troopers spoke with Griffin. During this interaction, the

troopers smelled alcohol. And the troopers observed two small children in the

SUV. More investigation followed.

      Griffin was charged with operating while intoxicated and two counts of
child endangerment. See Iowa Code § 321J.2; id. § 726.6. As trial approached,

Griffin moved to suppress evidence gained through the stop. Suppression was

required, Griffin argued, because the cover did not violate the Iowa Code and,

therefore, the stop was unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Griffin

and granted Griffin’s motion. The State then asked our court to grant

discretionary review. We granted the State’s request.

      II. Merits.

      A. Analysis. We begin with a brief overview of the relationship between
traffic laws, criminal procedure, and constitutional law. Both the United States
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Constitution and the Iowa Constitution protect the people against “unreasonable

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8 (searches and seizures).

A traffic stop is a “seizure” under both Constitutions. Berkemer v. McCarty,

468 U.S. 420, 436–37 (1984); State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Iowa 2013).

So if a traffic stop is unreasonable, the stop is unconstitutional. U.S. Const.

amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8 (searches and seizures). When that occurs,

courts can “suppress”—or exclude from trial—any evidence that law enforcement

gained through the traffic stop. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 293. We call this the

exclusionary rule. See State v. Burns, 988 N.W.2d 352, 373–74 (Iowa 2023)

(McDonald, J., concurring) (describing the history of the exclusionary rule).

      The exclusionary rule does not apply, though, unless a traffic stop is

unreasonable   and,   therefore,   unconstitutional.    And   “a   traffic   stop   is

reasonable”—and therefore constitutional—when there is probable cause “to

believe that the motorist violated a traffic law.” State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840,

845 (Iowa 2019) (emphasis added).

      As noted, the question here is whether a traffic violation justified the stop

of Griffin’s SUV. The State argues that the stop was justified because Griffin’s

plate cover violated two traffic statutes: Iowa Code sections 321.37 and 321.38.
See Iowa Code §§ 321.37–.38. Section 321.37 states in relevant part:

             1. Registration plates issued for a motor vehicle . . . shall be
      attached to the motor vehicle, one in the front and the other in the
      rear. . . .
            ....
             3. It is unlawful for the owner of a vehicle to place any frame
      around or over the registration plate which does not permit full view
      of all numerals and letters printed on the registration plate.

Id. § 321.37. Section 321.38 states in relevant part:

            Every registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened
      in a horizontal position to the vehicle for which it is issued so as to
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      prevent the plate from swinging and at a height of not less than
      twelve inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of the
      plate, in a place and position to be clearly visible and shall be
      maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be
      clearly legible.

Id. § 321.38.

      Our interpretation of statutes is guided by familiar principles. We focus on

the legislature’s words. Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 2020). We give

those words their ordinary meanings in light of the relevant context. State v.

Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362, 368 (Iowa 2014).

      Applying these principles here, we agree with the State that Griffin’s

license plate cover violated section 321.37. Section 321.37 prohibits vehicle

owners from “plac[ing] any frame . . . over the registration plate which does not

permit full view of all numerals and letters printed on the registration plate.”

Iowa Code § 321.37(3). Griffin’s license plate cover fit over the rear registration

plate, and it prevented a full view of the plate’s numerals and letters. Because of

the cover, the troopers had only a limited view of the numerals and letters. The

cover prevented the troopers from readily reading the plate’s numerals and

letters while traveling closely behind Griffin’s SUV. This violated section 321.37.

See id.
      Because Griffin’s license plate cover violated section 321.37, it was

reasonable for the troopers to stop Griffin’s SUV, the stop was not

unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule does not apply, there are no grounds to

suppress evidence from the stop, and, therefore, we must reverse the district

court’s order suppressing that evidence. We need not—and, therefore, we do

not—reach the separate question of whether Griffin’s license plate cover also

violated section 321.38.

      B. The District Court’s Reasoning. We have considered the district
court’s contrary view. The district court focused on State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d
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288. The district court read Tyler to mean that a tinted license plate cover cannot

violate section 321.37. We read Tyler differently. In Tyler, as here, a police officer

stopped a car because of a license plate cover. Id. at 290. The officer’s report

suggested that every tinted license plate cover violates section 321.37. Id. at 294.

We rejected this categorical view. See id. at 294–95. We clarified that section

321.37 does not categorically “proscribe tinted license plate covers.” Id. at 294.

“Rather,” we explained, section 321.37 proscribes “any frame or cover ‘which

does not permit full view of all numerals and letters printed on the registration

plate.’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Iowa Code § 321.37(3) (2009)). That is the

situation here: Because Griffin’s cover did not permit full view for the troopers,

Griffin’s cover violated section 321.37.

      C.    Griffin’s   Arguments.     We      have   considered   all   of   Griffin’s

counterarguments. We mention four of them here.

      First, like the district court, Griffin reads Tyler to preclude a finding that

a tinted license plate cover could violate Iowa law. See id. at 294–95. As already

explained, we do not read Tyler so broadly. See id.

      Second, Griffin suggests that if an officer makes a mistake of law when

describing the reasons for a stop, the stop is unconstitutional under Tyler. See
id. And a mistake of law occurred here, Griffin argues, because Sgt. Major

supposedly said that tinted license plate covers are categorically prohibited. And

Trooper Nguyen said something similar in his written report, Griffin claims.

      We disagree on both factual and legal grounds. On the factual front, we

view the record differently than Griffin does. Of course, Griffin is right that both

Sgt. Major and Trooper Nguyen mentioned the tinted nature of Griffin’s plate

cover. But neither of them suggested that tinting alone automatically violates

Iowa law. Rather, they both properly focused on the fact that the tinting made
the plate difficult to read.
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      On the legal front, we disagree with Griffin’s view concerning mistakes of

law. It is true that—at least under the Iowa Constitution—“a mistake of law is

not sufficient to justify a stop.” Id. at 294 (emphasis added). But cf. Heien v. North

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57 (2014) (holding that a reasonable “mistake of law can

. . . give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under

the Fourth Amendment”). This does not mean, however, that an otherwise

justified stop loses its justification simply because an officer misunderstands or

mischaracterizes the scope or meaning of a statute. See Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at

295 (“[T]he State is not limited to the reasons stated by the investigating officer

in determining whether either probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed

for the stop.”). And, as explained, the stop of Griffin was justified because

Griffin’s license plate cover violated section 321.37. The stop was still justified

even if, as Griffin suggests, the troopers’ explanations of the law were incomplete

or erroneous.

      Third, we have considered Griffin’s suggestion that his plate cover and,

therefore, the legitimacy of the stop should be judged on the basis of a photo of

the SUV that Griffin submitted during the suppression hearing. We disagree.

Griffin took the photo about three days after the traffic stop. The photo appears
to have been taken in a residential driveway. The photo shows the SUV at close

range at a dead stop in full light. The photo does not show what the SUV looked

like at highway speeds on a shadow-shrouded road at about 5:30 p.m. on

February 19, 2022. The photo does not show what Sgt. Major and Trooper

Nguyen saw or could have seen when they made their decision to stop Griffin.

Indeed, at the suppression hearing, Griffin’s counsel acknowledged that “the

photo was not offered to depict . . . how” Griffin’s SUV “appeared to the officers.”

So we do not think the photo should drive our analysis.
                                         8

      Finally, we have considered Griffin’s argument that because the troopers

could read the plate after Griffin’s vehicle pulled to a stop, the troopers were not

justified in continuing the stop by approaching the driver’s-side door. We

disagree. As explained, Griffin’s license plate cover violated sections 321.37

because it made the plate difficult to read when the troopers were traveling

closely behind Griffin’s SUV. See Iowa Code § 321.37. The violation occurred

then—when the troopers were traveling closely behind Griffin at highway speed.

And so the violation was complete well before Griffin’s vehicle stopped. Once

Griffin stopped, the troopers would have been justified in ticketing Griffin for the

violation or, as they planned to do, simply issuing him a warning for the violation.

Regardless, the troopers were fully justified in approaching the driver’s-side door

and talking with Griffin. And so the troopers were fully justified in gathering the

incriminating evidence that they observed during and after that encounter.

      III. Conclusion.

      The district court erred in granting Griffin’s motion to suppress. We

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.