Court Opinion

ID: 9386427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:05:12.526102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.392262
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 23-0250
                               Filed April 12, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF M.N.,
Minor Child,

L.N., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, Linnea M.N. Nicol,

District Associate Judge.

      A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her now three-

year-old son. AFFIRMED.

      Kristin R. Schiller Herman, Calmar, for appellant mother.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Ed Bull, Assistant Attorney General, for

appellee State.

      Sarah Dooley-Rothman of Rothman Law Office, Independence, attorney

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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TABOR, Presiding Judge.

      A juvenile court terminated the legal relationship between M.N. and his

parents. Only the mother, Lindsay, appeals. She does not contest the State’s

proof of grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2022).

Instead, she argues termination of her parental rights was not in M.N.’s best

interests and, in fact, was harmful to him because of their close bond. See Iowa

Code § 232.116(2), (3)(c). She also asks for six more months to work toward

reunification. See id. § 232.104(2)(b).

      After an independent assessment of the record, we find the best-interests

factors favor terminating Lindsay’s parental rights.1 We also find any harm that

M.N. would suffer from the termination does not outweigh Lindsay’s inability to

meet his needs because of her substance-abuse and mental-health challenges.

Finally, the record does not support delaying permanency. Thus, we affirm the

termination order.

      I.     Facts and Prior Proceedings

      At his birth in February 2020, M.N. tested positive for methamphetamine,

amphetamines, and THC—an active ingredient in marijuana. Because of the

endangerment from these drugs, the Iowa Department of Health and Human

Services offered the family voluntary services.     But when Lindsay cut off

1 Our standard of review for termination decisions is de novo. In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). We give careful consideration to the juvenile court’s
factual findings and in-person observations, but we are not bound by them. See
In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). Our top priority is the child’s best
interests. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring
specially) (identifying safety and the need for a permanent home as the “defining
elements” in the best-interests determination).
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communication with the case manager, the department implemented a safety plan.

From April 2021 until August 2021, M.N. and his two half-siblings lived with Lindsay

at their maternal grandmother’s house. But that safety plan ended when Lindsay

declined to participate in random drug testing and was inconsistent with other

services.

      The State then sought to remove M.N. and the other two children from

Lindsay’s custody.2 But the court allowed M.N. to stay with Lindsay “if and when

she entered an in-patient substance abuse program” that permitted such a

placement. So Lindsay entered treatment that fall, joined by M.N. By November,

Lindsay was making positive strides. This progress prompted the court to consider

a trial in-home placement when she left the program. But her progress stalled in

December when she stopped participating in services. So the court approved

M.N.’s removal from parental custody in January 2022. The child has been with

the same foster family since then.

      To enable M.N.’s safe return home, the court required Lindsay to obtain

another substance-abuse evaluation and follow through with the evaluator’s

recommendations for treatment and testing. The court also expected Lindsay to

seek mental-health counseling. But Lindsay fell short of the court’s expectations.

She continued to test positive for methamphetamine. Even during her testimony

at the termination hearing in October 2022, the court noticed that Lindsay

displayed “short, jerky movements” and “tics” consistent with methamphetamine

use. During that emotional testimony, Lindsay acknowledged being her “own worst

2 The half-siblings, J.N. and R.N., remained with their grandmother. They are not
involved in this termination case.
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enemy.”3 But she also testified that she “accomplished a lot of stuff in the last few

months” and asked the juvenile court to delay permanency for six months.

       The court terminated Lindsay’s parental rights under Iowa Code section

232.116(1), paragraphs (h) and (l). The court also found termination was in M.N.’s

best interests and no permissive exceptions applied. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2),

(3). Lindsay now appeals that order.

       II.    Legal Analysis

       Best Interests.    Because Lindsay does not challenge the grounds for

termination, we start with the best-interests determination. Lindsay contends that

because she and M.N. share a strong bond, termination would not serve his

emotional needs.

       In deciding whether termination is in M.N.’s best interests, we give primary

consideration to his safety; to the placement that would best further his long-term

nurturing and growth; and to his physical, mental, and emotional condition and

needs. See id. § 232.116(2). We also consider whether he is integrated into a

family foster home, how long he has been in that placement, and the desirability

of maintaining that environment. Id. § 232.116(2)(b)(1).

       The juvenile court recognized that M.N. has a “meaningful” bond with his

mother. He enjoys visits with her. But even Lindsay acknowledged that time out

3 Lindsay also testified that she stopped having contact with her boyfriend Chad,
whom the juvenile court characterized as “a known drug user.” The court found
earlier that Lindsay had not been honest about discontinuing that relationship. The
court directed that if Lindsay continued their relationship, Chad would have to
participate in drug testing and family centered services. The guardian ad litem
believed that the “volatile relationship” between Chad and Lindsay negatively
impacted the child.
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of her care has diminished their connection: “I don’t have enough time ever to have

a bond back like we had because I get two hours a week.” The court also noted

that M.N. was integrated into his foster family and looked to them to fulfill his

physical and emotional needs. Considering Lindsay’s struggle for stability, the

court decided termination was in M.N.’s best interests.

      We reach the same conclusion.         As the guardian ad litem described,

Lindsay has “a serious substance abuse issue” that she has been unable to

address. “[M.N.], if he were to be returned to her care does face harm.” Because

he was “thriving” with the foster parents and they were ready to adopt, she

recommended termination of parental rights. We agree it is not in M.N.’s best

interests to postpone permanency in the hope that Lindsay will someday be able

to provide a stable home for him. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 41.

      Permissive      Exception.        Lindsay    next   invokes    Iowa    Code

section 232.116(3)(c), contending termination would harm M.N. because of the

closeness of the parent-child relationship. As discussed above, M.N. did enjoy a

bond with Lindsay. And nobody doubts the sincerity of her love for him. But

Lindsay has not proven that the loss of their admittedly waning bond would

outweigh her inability to provide for M.N.’s developing needs. See In re D.W., 791

N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010). We do not find clear and convincing evidence that

termination would harm M.N. based on the closeness of the relationship.

      Six-Month Delay. Finally, Lindsay believes that the juvenile court should

have delayed permanency under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b). She claims:

“A short extension would have given [her] the opportunity to continue with her

substance abuse and mental health treatment to allow for reunification.”
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      A court may deny termination and give a parent six more months to reunify

only if the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of that time. In re

W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021). The evidence does not support such an

optimistic prospect. Lindsay has not made the kind of progress necessary to

extend the permanency deadline. Thus, termination was appropriate.

      AFFIRMED.