Court Opinion

ID: 9684871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:17:00.153035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:00.773061
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting on state’s motion for rehearing.
Appellant was convicted of forgery and the trial judge assessed punishment at three years confinement. Tex. Penal Code § 32.21. The Court of Appeals remanded appellant’s case for a healing on appellant’s untimely motion for new trial. Oldham v. State, 889 S.W.2d 461 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994). After due consideration, we dismissed the State’s petition for discretionary review.1 Oldham v. State, 977 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). Because a majority of the Court sustains the State’s motion for rehearing, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Appellant was represented by retained counsel at trial. On the twenty-eighth day *364after sentencing, appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal and requested the appointment of counsel for her appeal. The trial judge complied, and sixty-two days after sentence was imposed and thirty-three days after the deadline for filing a motion for new trial, an attorney was appointed to represent appellant. In points of error twelve through fifteen, appellant contended she was denied her constitutional right to counsel during a critical stage of the judicial proceedings. Id., 889 S.W.2d at 462. The Court of Appeals agreed.
To reach its holding, the Court of Appeals first concluded appellant was denied the right to counsel. Id., at 462 (citing Ward v. State, 740 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex.Cr.App.1987)). The Court then, relying upon Trevino v. State, 565 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Cox v. State, 797 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990); and, Callis v. State, 756 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988); held that appointment of an attorney after the time period for filing a motion for new trial expires was a denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. Oldham, 889 S.W.2d at 463. See, Cox, 797 S.W.2d at 959, and, Callis, 756 S.W.2d at 827. The Court concluded that “good cause” was shown under Tex.R.App. P. 2(a) to suspend the time constraints for filing a motion for new trial under Tex.R.App. P. 31(a). Oldham, 889 S.W.2d at 463. The Court held:
The type of order required by Trevino reinstates jurisdiction in the trial court and returns appellant to the point after judgment and assessment of sentence, but before imposition of sentence and filing of notice of appeal. Therefore, since the appeal must be set aside to allow appellant to file her motion for new trial, this case cannot remain in this Court. For this reason, we must issue a mandate disposing of this appeal.
If appellant’s motion for new trial is granted, then her case will be retried. If the motion is denied, the trial court should pronounce sentence and appellant may give notice of appeal within ninety days after sentencing. After appellant files her timely notice of appeal, the case will be refiled in the appellate court.
Accordingly, the sentence and notice of appeal are set aside and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the motion for new trial and for the orderly conduct of subsequent post-trial proceedings, in accordance with this opinion.
Ibid, (citations omitted).
II.
In Trevino, 565 S.W.2d at 938, the defendant was denied the right to counsel at the hearing oh his motion for new trial. We held the proper remedy was to return the case to that point where the defendant was denied counsel:.
... Because in the instant case appellant was denied counsel at a stage of the review process prior to sentence and notice of appeal, we set aside the sentence and notice of appeal and return the cause for a hearing on the motion for new trial and an orderly course of subsequent events. In the event appellant’s motion for new trial is denied, sentence should then be pronounced and notice of appeal may be given. ...
The sentence and notice of appeal are set aside and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the motion for new trial and for the orderly conduct of subsequent post-trial proceedings.
Id., 565 S.W.2d at 941.
In Connor v. State, 877 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.Cr.App.1994), the defendant was represented by retained counsel and pled guilty. After sentence was imposed, the trial judge received two letters from the defendant alleging his plea was involuntary. The trial judge treated the letters as a motion for new trial and held a hearing. The defendant was not represented by an attorney at this hearing because he “had not had time to hire an attorney.” Id., 877 S.W.2d at 326. We held that a motion for new trial is a critical stage of the proceedings and that appellant was entitled to be represented by an attorney. Ibid.2 After we vacated and remanded the *365case to the Court of Appeals to reconsider the defendant’s right to an attorney, id., 877 S.W.2d at 327, that Court, in an unpublished opinion, remanded the ease to the trial court and returned the defendant to the point in which he was denied counsel. Connor v. State, (Tex.App.—Austin, Nos. 3-89-229-CR, 3-89-230-CR, 3-89-231-CR, delivered December 7, 1994) (unpublished).3
In Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), the defendant was represented by a retained counsel at trial. Following his conviction, the defendant informed his attorney that he wished to appeal, but was indigent. The attorney did not agree to represent the defendant and took no action to preserve the defendant’s right to appeal. Id., 757 S.W.2d at 371. Because the defendant was denied his light of appeal, we vacated the judgment and remanded the ease to the trial court with instructions to assure the defendant was represented by counsel and permitted to file a notice of appeal. Id., 757 S.W.2d at 374-375.
The instant ease is controlled by Trevino, Connor and Axel because appellant was denied the assistance of an attorney at a critical stage of the proceedings.4 Thus, like the defendant in Axel, “this presumptively indigent [defendant] did not receive any practical assistance of counsel in protecting and preserving [her] appellate rights.” Axel, 757 S.W.2d at 374. And, as in Trevino and Axel, when the Court of Appeals determined appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment required that appellant be returned to that point in the proceedings where the denial occurred. In its attempt to return appellant to that point in the proceedings where she was denied counsel, the Court of Appeals imprecise language purported to “suspend” the rules, “abate” and “remand” the case. Oldham, 889 S.W.2d at 463. However, this action was unnecessary when the Court determined appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Our holdings in Trevino and Axel rely upon constitutional principles, not the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const, art. VI. cl. 2. Therefore, whether the Court of Appeals could, under Rule 2, suspend the túne limitations and allow appellant to file a motion for new trial, is immaterial. Appellant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated and Rule 2 may not operate to deny or prevent the remedy to a constitutional violation. See, State v. McPherson, 851 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex.Cr.App.1992)(The Eighth Amendment takes precedence over Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07 § 1(a).); and, Whitmore v. State, 570 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (“[I]n some cases where an accused’s constitutional rights are in conflict with a valid procedural rule of law the procedural rule must yield to the superior constitutional right.”). In other words, representation by counsel at this critical stage of the trial is a fundamental right in our system of justice that takes precedence over procedural rules. Simply stated, this is not a Rule 2 case.
*366III.
Our judicial power does not include the power to issue advisory opinions. Ex parte Ruiz, 750 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (“It is well-established that this Court is without constitutional or statutory authority to ... render advisory opinions-”); Armstrong v. State, 805 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); and, Tex. Const. art. V, §§ 1 and 5. In Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784, 803 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (opinion on rehearing), we held that “[a]n advisory opinion results when a court attempts to decide an issue that does not arise from an actual controversy capable of final adjudication_” Ibid. See, Gonzales v. State, 864 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (Baird, J., concurring) (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. State, 81 S.W.2d 1064, 1077 (Tex. Civ.App.—Austin 1935)) (“An advisory opinion is one which ‘adjudicates nothing and is binding on no one.’ ”). Stated differently, an opinion which does not “finally adjudicate” the matters before the Court is advisory. While the majority’s gratuitous discussion of Rule 2 purports to resolve an issue in this case, it is not an issue capable of final adjudication because, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the Sixth Amendment violation must take precedence. Therefore, the majority’s discussion of Rule 2 is nothing more than obiter dictum and its entire opinion is only advisory.5
With these comments, I respectfully dissent.

. We originally granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine:
1. Whose burden is it to show that an appellant was or was not abandoned by trial counsel during a critical stage of the prosecution?
2. May an appellate court suspend application of the rules of appellate procedure without any firm basis in the record for finding good cause?

. The majority correctly states "this Court has yet to address the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to counsel during the time limit for filing a motion for new trial in preparing the motion,” *365Ante at 361. However, in reliance upon Trevino, this Court flatly held, without limitation, that: "The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that a motion for new trial is a 'critical stage’ at which a defendant is entitled to representation by counsel.” Connor v. State, 877 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex.Cr.App.1994)(citing Trevino v. State, 565 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex.Cr.App.1978))("Without a doubt the hearing on a motion for new trial is a critical stage of the proceedings. It is the only opportunity to present to the trial court certain matters that may warrant a new trial, and to make a record on those matters for appellate review.”)

. I recognize that Tex. Rule of App. Proc. 47.7 forbids the citation of an unpublished opinion as authority. However, this citation is solely to inform the reader of the action taken by the Court of Appeals in order to complete the history of the case after our published opinion.

. The majority's reliance upon State v. Gana, 931 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) is misplaced. A constitutional deprivation takes precedence over any procedural rule. See Sixth Amendment discussion infra.

. In State v. Adams, 930 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), we asked the First Court of Appeals to consider whether a court of appeals may, under Rule 2, suspend the time limits of Rule 31 and allow a defendant to file an "out-of-time” motion for new trial. Id., 930 S.W.2d at 92. Relying upon Driggers v. State, 940 S.W.2d 699, 706-08 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1996, pet ref'd), the First Court of Appeals held the trial court did have jurisdiction to conduct a hearing on the defendants’ motions for new trial. State v. Adams, Nos. 01-92-00194-CR, 01-92-00195-CR, 1998 WL 12695 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 15, 1998)(not designated for publication).