Court Opinion

ID: 9427342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:20:27.28891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:06.481554
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Marshall,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
It is well established under Title VII that claims of employment discrimination because of race may arise in two different *582ways. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335-336, n. 15 (1977). An individual may allege that he has been subjected to “disparate treatment” because of his race, or that he has been the victim of a facially neutral practice having a “disparate impact” on his racial group. The Court today concludes that the Court of Appeals was correct in treating this as a disparate-treatment case controlled by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973).
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment discrimination through disparate treatment by showing
“(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.” Id., at 802 (footnote omitted).
Once a plaintiff has made out this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer who must prove that he had a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiff's] rejection.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals properly held that respondents had made out a prima facie case of employment discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. Once respondents had established their prima facie case, the question for the court was then whether petitioner had carried its burden of proving that respondents were rejected on the basis of legitimate nondiscriminatory considerations. The court, however, failed properly to address that question and instead focused on what other hiring practices petitioner might employ. I therefore agree with the Court that we must remand the case to the Court of Appeals so that it can address, under the appropriate standards, whether petitioner had rebutted respondents’ prima facie showing of disparate treatment. I also agree that on remand *583the Court of Appeals is to address the other theories of liability which respondents have presented. See ante, at 580, and n. 9.
Where the Title VII claim is that a facially neutral employment practice actually falls more harshly on one racial group, thus having a disparate impact on that group, our cases establish a different way of proving the claim. See, e. g., Teamsters, supra, at 336 n. 15, 349; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 329 (1977); General Electric Co, v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 137 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 422, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 430-432 (1971). As set out by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., to establish a prima facie case on a disparate-impact claim, a plaintiff need not show that the employer had a discriminatory intent but need only demonstrate that a particular practice in actuality “operates to exclude Negroes.” Id., at 431.
Once the plaintiff has established the disparate impact of the practice, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the practice has “a manifest relationship to the employment in question.” Id., at 432. The “touchstone is business necessity,” id., at 431, and the practice “must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge.” Dothard v. Rawlinson, supra, at 332 n. 14. Under this principle, a practice of limiting jobs to those with prior experience working in an industry or for a particular person, or to those who hear about jobs by word of mouth would be invalid if the practice in actuality impacts-more harshly on a group protected under Title VII, unless the practice can be justified by business necessity.
There is nothing in today’s opinion that is inconsistent with this approach or with our prior decisions. I must dissent, however, from the Court’s apparent decision, see ante, at 575, to foreclose on remand further litigation on the Griggs question of whether petitioner’s hiring practices had a disparate impact. *584Respondents claim that petitioner’s practice of hiring from a list of those who had previously worked for the foreman foreclosed Negroes from consideration for the vast majority of jobs. Although the foreman also hired a considerable number of Negroes through other methods, respondents assert that the use of other methods to augment the representation of Negroes in the work force does not answer whether the primary hiring practice is discriminatory.
It is clear that an employer cannot be relieved of responsibility for past discriminatory practices merely by undertaking affirmative action to obtain proportional representation in his work force. As the Court said in Teamsters, and reaffirms today,- a "company’s later changes in its hiring and promotion policies could be of little comfort to the victims of the earlier . . . discrimination, and could not erase its previous illegal conduct or its obligation to afford relief to those who suffered because of it.” 431 U. S., at 341-342; ante, at 579. Therefore, it is at least an open question whether the hiring of workers primarily from a list of past employees would, under Griggs, violate Title VII where the list contains no Negroes but the company uses additional methods of hiring to increase the numbers of Negroes hired.*
The Court today apparently assumes that the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s findings that petitioner’s hiring practice had no disparate impact. I cannot agree with that assumption. Because the Court of Appeals disposed of this case under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, it had no occasion to address those findings of the District Court pertaining to disparate impact. Although the Court of Appeals did discuss Griggs in its opinion, 551 F. 2d 1085, 1089-1090 (1977), as I read that discussion the court was merely rejecting petitioner’s argument that it could defeat respondents’ *585McDonnell Douglas claim by showing that the work force had a large percentage of Negro members. I express no view on the issue of whether respondents’ claim should prevail on the facts presented here since that question is not presently before us, but I believe that respondents’ opportunity to make their claim should not be foreclosed by this Court.

Of course, the Court leaves open on remand the issue of whether Furnco’s use of the list violated Title VII under a disparate-treatment theory. See ante, at 581 n. 9.