Court Opinion

ID: 9522119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:10.56183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:18.807744
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 45. concurring and dissenting. The majority correctly acknowledges that the standard-of-review issue in this case conceals “layers of complexity” previously unexamined by this Court. Ante, ¶ 8. I am pleased that we are finally acknowledging that in State v. Sprague, 2003 VT 20, ¶ 24, 175 Vt. 123, 824 A.2d 539, State v. Stevens, 2004 VT 23, ¶ 10, 176 Vt. 613, 848 A.2d 330 (mem.), and State v. Sole, 2009 VT 24, ¶23, 185 Vt. 504, 974 A.2d 587, we have overruled decades of standard-of-review jurisprudence with no recognition that we have done so and no analysis of the relative merit of our action. Unlike the majority, however, I would rule that our recent change of direction is wrong and misguided and return to the deferential standard of review that has served us well. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s standard-of-review holding. Under a deferential standard of review, I would affirm the district court’s decision.
¶ 46. My disagreement takes two forms. I think our change of direction was wrong in any Fourth Amendment case for reasons I state below.11 For purposes of this larger point, I conclude that this Court has the power to establish the standard of review, even for federal constitutional questions and even in the face of a contrary standard-of-review decision from the U.S. Supreme *372Court. I would follow a number of decisions from state supreme courts that have taken this position, and the view of many commentators. See Clark v. State, 287 S.W.3d 567, 572 (Ark. 2008); State v. Ford, 738 A.2d 937, 941 (N.H. 1999); State v. Brockman, 528 S.E.2d 661, 664-65 (S.C. 2000); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-71 (Utah 1993); see generally R. Coombs, A Third Parallel Primrose Path: The Supreme Court’s Repeated, Unexplained, and Still Growing Regulation of State Courts’ Criminal Appeals, 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev. 541, 551-52 (stating it is a mistake for state court to assume it is bound by U.S. Supreme Court decisions requiring de novo review). There is no controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent on this point.
¶ 47. My second disagreement is with the breadth of the majority holding and our earlier decisions. We have assumed that all motions to suppress should be decided on de novo review, without distinguishing between the underlying issues, see State v. Pitts, 2009 VT 51, ¶ 6, 186 Vt. 71, 978 A.2d 14, another indication that our recent standard-of-review decisions were hasty and only superficially considered. The majority has chosen not to reconsider these broad holdings, and they remain the law. There is no indication anywhere that the majority would change course as to other types of motions to suppress. -Thus, I find the majority’s assertion that this decision is only about the voluntariness of consent misleading.
¶ 48. As this case demonstrates, the issues underlying a motion to suppress can be very different, and the differences are significant for the question before us. As I argue below, even if some issues raised in motions to suppress should involve a de novo standard of review when they reach this Court, the issue of whether consent to search is voluntary should not be subject to de novo review. The decisions from other jurisdictions are overwhelmingly against de novo review in this instance, and I do not believe that the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt it even for the federal courts.
¶ 49. No act is more difficult for an appellate judge than to affirm a lower court decision the judge believes is wrong, and this decision should be viewed from that perspective. We are after all a higher court, and our view should prevail. The difficulty is enhanced if the decision involves an important constitutional right of a citizen. How can we fail to intervene if we believe that a litigant was the subject of an unreasonable and unlawful search and seizure?
*373¶ 50. We are, however, not omnipotent, and we have to accept that other judicial officers may have a better and more informed perspective on a case than we do. We develop limitations on our review responsibility with that point in mind. The central thesis of standards of review is that we should not allocate decisional responsibility based on power and stature, but instead on systems that best produce accurate and fair decisions of high quality. Those systems are not infallible either, and they occasionally produce results that appear to us to be wrong. As difficult as it may be to accept the apparently wrong decisions, overall the quality of decision-making is enhanced by the system.
¶ 51. We have a clear system of allocating decisional responsibility between the trial courts and the Supreme Court, and it has been developed and refined over hundreds of years. It best achieves accuracy and fairness in judicial decisions, and it best allocates limited resources. There is no evidence that it is in any sense broken or deficient, even when constitutional decisions are involved. We made a mistake in trying to “fix” it — a mistake we should correct today.
¶ 52. I will start with the narrower point, that the question of whether consent to search is voluntary should not be subject to de novo review in this Court. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said explicitly, see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973), and we have echoed, “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined by the totality of all the surrounding circumstances,” State v. Sheehan, 171 Vt. 642, 643, 768 A.2d 1275, 1277 (2000) (mem.). Thus, under our long-standing precedents, we uphold the trial court’s finding of voluntariness if “it is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.” Id.; see also State v. Beckley, 157 Vt. 446, 450, 600 A.2d 294, 297 (1991) (‘We will uphold a trial court’s ruling on the voluntariness of a confession unless that conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is clearly erroneous.”); State v. Stanislaw, 153 Vt. 517, 532, 573 A.2d 286, 295 (1990) (discussing the voluntariness of confessions, this Court said, “the trial court’s findings must stand if they are supported by substantial credible evidence and are not clearly erroneous” (quotation omitted)); State v. Malinowski, 148 Vt. 517, 520, 536 A.2d 921, 923 (1987) (noting that in cases involving asserted waivers of Miranda rights, “it was for the trial court to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of *374the witnesses” and that therefore “the trial court’s findings must stand if they are supported by substantial credible evidence and are not clearly erroneous”); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 444, 450 A.2d 336, 344 (1982) (“Voluntariness [of consent] must be evaluated on a factual basis .... [T]he State has not met its burden on appeal, and . . . there are ample factual findings to support the trial court’s conclusion.”).
¶ 53. In this case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing in which one officer — but none of the occupants of the vehicle — testified. It found, based on that testimony and a police-vehicle videotape of some of the events, that the consent to search was voluntary. Under our traditional standard of review, we should affirm that decision.
¶ 54. Our long-standing standard of review was based fundamentally on a policy choice of who should make this type of decision. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985). The trial judge observes the witness and is positioned to develop the record to ensure that the relevant considerations can be contemplated. See Malinowski, 148 Vt. at 523-24, 536 A.2d at 925. The trial judge is in a better position to determine whether a defendant’s consent was voluntary under all the circumstances present. We have explained this over and over again in countless contexts.
¶ 55. The majority concludes, however, that there are reasons to eliminate any deferential standard of review for certain constitutional facts, particularly whether consent to search is voluntary. In making its analysis, the majority emphasizes the reasons for eliminating any deference, but largely ignores any contrary reasons. We are free to develop our own jurisprudence in this area, and if we consider all of the relevant reasons, we should stay with our traditional standard of review, which has served us well.
¶ 56. Before I explain the reasons for my position, I want to explain the state of the law. Although not quite saying so, the majority specifically points to two U.S. Supreme Court decisions as requiring de novo review in this case: Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995), and Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996). Thompson involves whether determining if a person is “in custody” for Miranda purposes is a question of fact for purposes of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and therefore “presumed to be correct” in the federal proceeding under that statute. The Court held that, under the statutory language, mixed questions of fact and law are legal and consid*375eration of those questions, including whether a person is “in custody,” is de novo. Thompson, 516 U.S. at 116. While Thompson may suggest the policy preferences of the Supreme Court, it is a statutory construction case that does not directly involve the issue before us. It is fundamentally about whether federal courts, particularly trial courts, should give deference to mixed fact-and-law determinations of state courts, not whether appellate courts should give deference to determinations of trial courts.
¶ 57. Ornelas is arguably closer because it involves Fourth Amendment issues and the proper standard of review. It held that the question of whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is present is reviewed under a modified de novo standard. Ornelas observed that “[articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible,” and that these are “fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695, 696. In this context, Ornelas found that de novo review was necessary because the results of “sweeping deference . . . would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law,” “legal rules for probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application,” and “de novo review tends to unify precedent.” Id. at 697. Although the Court adopted a form of de novo review, it modified it to provide a degree of deference to the trial judge and local law enforcement officers. The Court said that the reviewing court should “give due weight to inferences drawn from [historical] facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers,” and termed giving weight to those inferences “deference.” Id. at 699; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). I note that the majority has rejected this part of the opinion. Its explanation that this part of Ornelas is about historical facts is wrong. As the quoted language, says, the Court’s holding is about inferences drawn from historical facts — exactly the issue between the majority and this dissent.
¶ 58. We decided Sprague seven years after the Supreme Court decided Ornelas and, nevertheless, observed that “federal appellate courts uniformly apply a clearly erroneous standard to the voluntary-consent issue.” Sprague, 2003 VT 20, ¶ 24. The situation is close to the same today. 6 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.7(c), at 449 (4th ed. 2004) (“the great majority of courts take the position that the clearly erroneous standard is appropriate”); *376see, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 776 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We review a district court’s finding of voluntary consent for clear error.”); United States v. $231,930.00 in U.S. Currency, 614 F.3d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 2010) (‘We review the district court’s determination of whether a voluntary consent to a search was given under the clearly erroneous standard.” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 131 (2d Cir. 2006) (“In considering a challenge to a district court finding of consent, we are obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. We will not reverse a finding of voluntary consent except for clear error.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Typically, whether consent is voluntary turns on questions of fact, determinable from the totality of the circumstances. For that reason, a finding of voluntary consent (other than one based on an erroneous legal standard) is reviewable only for clear error, and the trial court’s credibility determinations ordinarily must be respected.” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 423 (4th Cir. 2002) (“When the government justifies a warrantless search under the ‘voluntary consent’ exception to the 4th Amendment’s warrant requirement, the district court’s factual determination as to whether consent to the search was actually given is reviewed for clear error.”); United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Whether voluntary consent was given is a question of fact, determined by the totality of the circumstances and reviewed for clear error.”); United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1998) (“This court will accept a finding of voluntary consent unless it is clearly erroneous.”); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 477 (9th Cir. 1994) (‘We review the district court’s finding that [defendant] voluntarily consented to the search for clear error. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.” (citation omitted)). I do not believe that this Court is required to follow Ornelas even for the issues directly involved in the decision — probable cause and reasonable suspicion. The federal courts are, however, bound by the review standard for Ornelas, but few have been willing to extend it to whether consent to a search is voluntary, a comparable Fourth Amendment 'issue.
¶ 59. The majority takes me to task for not acknowledging that there are contrary decisions. I readily acknowledge that fact but *377emphasize that the majority has adopted a rule supported by only a relatively small minority of courts around the country, a point the majority does not concede.
¶ 60. I suggest that there are three main reasons for the actions of the federal appellate courts in rejecting de novo review in these circumstances. The first is the placement of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in context. This rationale was adopted in United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1997), in refusing to apply Ornelas to a voluntariness-of-consent issue:
We decline Tompkins’ invitation to employ Ornelas’ two-tier standard when we review a district court’s determination whether consent to search was given voluntarily. The Supreme Court reiterated its deferential standard of review for Fourth Amendment voluntariness determinations in Ohio v. Robinette, a post-Ornelas decision. The Robinette Court noted that voluntariness of consent to search is a question of fact; as such, it does not trigger the de novo review mandated by the Supreme Court in Ornelas for mixed questions of law and fact. The Supreme Court’s refusal to depart from its established precedent, coupled "with the virtually monolithic position of the circuits in affording deferential review to voluntariness inquiries raised by consensual searches, persuades us that Tompkins’ reliance on Ornelas to mandate a change in our clear error standard of review is misplaced.
Id. at 120-21.
¶ 61. Second, and most important, the issue of whether consent to search is voluntary involves a determination of the defendant’s state of mind, which is a question of fact, as the Supreme Court has held over and over. It is no less a question of fact where the “fact” is not directly observable. Thus, it is the kind of question for which appellate courts routinely give deference to the trial courts. See Logan v. State, 773 So. 2d 338, 343 (Miss. 2000) (“[The trial court] observes the witnesses first hand, hears the evidence and then determines whether the consent was, in fact, voluntary or not.”); State v. King, 209 A.2d 110, 114 (N.J. 1965) (“The fact that the present case has to do with an ultimate finding of fact of constitutional dimension does not compel a different standard of appellate review. . . . [T]he determination whether consent was *378voluntarily given is a factual issue to be decided by the trial judge; and the appellate court should reverse only when it finds that determination to be dearly erroneous.”); McFadden v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Va. 1983) (“[V]oluntariness is a factual question. The determination of such issue by the trial court on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on review unless plainly wrong. Here, the factual decision turned on the credibility of witnesses — the law enforcement authorities versus the accused . . . .” (citation omitted)).
¶ 62. Not only is the question one of fact, it is a question of historical fact. The court must determine whether the consent to search was voluntary at the time it was given. This awareness is important because, in my judgment, the majority has created an artificial and unworkable distinction under which questions of historical fact are reviewed deferentially under a clearly erroneous standard, except when they are not, as in this case.
¶ 63. There are important differences between the question before this Court and those before the Supreme Court in Ornelas and Thompson. In Thompson, the issue was whether the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when he was interrogated. 516 U.S. at 107. In Ornelas, the issues were whether police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle and probable cause to conduct a warrantless search. 517 U.S. at 695. In each case, the standards the Court created to resolve the issues were purely objective. See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112 (articulating the standard as whether “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave”); see also Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (reciting reasonable suspicion standard as whether there is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity; for probable cause to search as whether the “known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found”). On these questions the perspective of the trial judge in hearing the evidence and seeing the witnesses is of lesser importance because the questions do not involve the defendant’s state of mind, but instead the state of mind of a theoretical reasonable person. See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 113-14 (explaining that trial court credibility determinations are not involved in deciding whether reasonable person would feel free to terminate the interrogation and leave). Under these circumstances, there is less reason to give deference to the trial court’s conclusion.
*379¶ 64. The issue in this case — whether defendant’s consent to search was voluntary — is almost entirely subjective, based on all the relevant circumstances. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229-30 (describing all the surrounding circumstances a court must consider including the “possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents”; the object of the inquiry is “the nature of a person’s subjective understanding”); United States v. Zaleski, 559 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185 (D. Conn. 2008) (in determining voluntariness, the court “does not apply an objective standard”); Basnueva v. United States, 874 A.2d 363, 369 (D.C. 2005) (“test is subjective”).12 The majority’s holding that voluntariness is an objective inquiry is a direct warring with Schneckloth, the controlling Supreme Court case, and is unwise. I understand that some courts have adopted the majority’s rule, apparently based primarily on Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991), a case that does not address whether voluntariness of consent is determined under an objective or subjective standard. In my view, these decisions are wrongly decided to the extent they generally decide that voluntariness of consent is always determined under an objective standard.
¶ 65. The trial judge’s perspective in seeing and hearing the witnesses is very important in determining the actual state of mind of the defendant. Factual findings made from that perspective deserve deference and should not be reviewed de novo by appellate judges on a cold record.
¶ 66. A related difference involves the nature of the standards being applied. The standards in Thompson and Ornelas involve legal terminology that can be understood only in the context of *380the many court decisions defining it and the origin and purposes of the standards. The Court observed in Ornelas that “[articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible,” and that these were “fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed.” 517 U.S. at 695-96. I do not think that either of these observations fairly applies to a determination of whether a consent to search is voluntary. Voluntariness should be determined primarily from the evidence and the common sense meaning of the word and not from appellate opinions. The perspective of the trial judge should play an important role in evaluating that evidence.
¶ 67. For related reasons, I do not believe that this case is controlled by Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), which involved the voluntariness of a confession. Miller, like Thompson, involves the proper construction of the federal habeas corpus act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), specifically whether a state court determination that a confession is voluntary “shall be presumed to be correct” in a federal habeas corpus action. 474 U.S. at 105-06. Contrary to the majority position, it does not contain a holding that appellate courts should review de novo trial court determinations of voluntariness. It does state that the U.S. Supreme Court has historically done so in appeals taken on certiorari from state courts. Id. at 110-11.
¶ 68. Miller contains important analysis that is inconsistent with the majority’s position. First, the Court noted that while the state court conclusion on voluntariness is not presumed to be correct under § 2254(d), the federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding should “give great weight to the considered conclusions of a coequal state judiciary.” Id. at 112. Thus, Miller should not be cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court favored giving no weight to the state court determination of voluntariness in a de novo review. Indeed, like Ornelas, the decision actually supports giving some deference to state court decisions.
¶ 69. Second, the Court made a number of observations that support deferential review in this case. It noted, “that an issue involves an inquiry into state of mind is not at all inconsistent with treating it as a question of fact.” Id. at 113. It added that “an issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question.” Id. The Court noted that the factfiaw distinction “at times has turned *381on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.” Id. at 114. All of these observations cut against de novo review in this case.
¶ 70. Finally, the Court noted the uniqueness of determining whether a confession is voluntary, noting that it has two components: (1) “whether the techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means”; and (2) “whether the defendant’s will was in fact overborne.” Id. at 116. The presence of the first component distinguishes the confession cases from others where voluntariness of an act is in question. Indeed, the Court specifically noted that “assessments of credibility and demeanor are not crucial to the proper resolution of the ultimate issue of ‘voluntariness’ ” with respect to confessions, id., I believe, because of the first component. I do not think that generalization is accurate with respect to the voluntariness of a consent to search.
¶ 71. The third reason that the controlling precedents are against de novo review is that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in requiring de novo review, applying it to some mixed questions of fact and law and not to others, even though the others involve constitutional questions. See B. Adamson, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) as an Ideological Weapon?, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1025, 1064 (2007) (“Put bluntly, it is difficult to discern a principled reason why this inconsistency exists.”). The majority’s holding that all motions to suppress are reviewed de novo finds no support in the Supreme Court decisions. Even after Ornelas, and even if we were employing an objective standard, and even if we called the determination of voluntariness a mixed question of fact and law rather than a question of fact, it is unpredictable whether the Supreme Court would apply de novo review to the voluntariness of consent. Under these circumstances, it should not be unexpected that the federal courts of appeal have not changed the nature of their appellate review in determining whether consent to search is voluntary.
¶ 72. The situation is the same for the state appellate courts and for the same reason. A majority of states with supreme court decisions on this issue continue to maintain that great deference must be given to a trial court’s determination of whether consent *382was voluntary.13 See, e.g., Chism v. State, 853 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Ark. 1993) (“We affirm a finding of voluntariness [of consent] unless that finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.”); People v. James, 561 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Cal. 1977) (“The question of the voluntariness of the consent is to be determined in the first instance by the trier of fact .... The power to judge credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal . . . the trial court’s findings . . . must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (quotation omitted)); People v. Brazzel, 18 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Colo. 2001) (“We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact on the issue of voluntary consent, unless they are clearly erroneous.”); State v. Cobb, 743 A.2d 1, 27 (Conn. *3831999) (“Whether there was valid consent to a search is a factual question that will not be lightly overturned on appeal. The state has the burden to establish the voluntariness of the consent, and the trial court’s finding in that regard will not be upset by this court unless clearly erroneous.” (quotation omitted)); Knight v. State, 690 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 1996) (“The trial judge’s determination that a defendant’s consent was voluntary will not be set aside on appeal unless that finding is clearly erroneous.”); State v. Ganal, 917 P.2d 370, 380 (Haw. 1996) (“On appellate review, the findings of a trier of fact regarding the validity of a consent to search must be upheld unless clearly erroneous.”); People v. Pitman, 813 N.E.2d 93, 109 (Ill. 2004) (“When the evidence on the issue of consent is conflicting, this court will uphold the circuit court’s finding unless it is clearly unreasonable.”); Pate v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Ky. 2007) (‘Whether consent is the result of express or implied coercion is a question of fact . . . and thus, we must defer to the trial court’s finding if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Wilson, 467 So. 2d 503, 518 (La. 1985) (“The voluntariness of defendant’s consent to search is a question of fact to be determined by the trial judge under the facts and circumstances surrounding each case and the trial court’s determinations as to the credibility of witnesses is to be accorded great weight on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Carr, 936 N.E.2d 883, 890 (Mass. 2010) (“Because a finding of voluntariness is a question of fact, it should not be reversed absent clear error by the judge.”); Logan, 773 So. 2d at 343 (“When [the trial court’s voluntary consent] ruling is contested on appeal, an appellate court may set aside that ruling only if that court is satisfied that the trial court was manifestly wrong in so deciding.”); State v. Patch, 702 A.2d 1278, 1282 (N.H. 1997) (“In reviewing a trial court’s finding of voluntary consent, we will not overturn the finding unless it is without support in the record.” (quotation omitted)); King, 209 A.2d at 114 (“[T]he determination whether consent was voluntarily given is a factual issue to be decided by the trial judge; and the appellate court should reverse only when it finds that determination to be clearly erroneous.”); State v. Paul T., 1999-NMSC-037, ¶ 28, 993 P.2d 74 (“Whether consent was voluntarily given is a factual question, and the trial court’s determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is not supported by substantial evidence.”); State v. Genre, 2006 ND 77, ¶ 30, 712 N.W.2d 624 *384(“Voluntariness is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court, and because the trial court is in a superior position to judge credibility and weight, we show great deference to the trial court’s determination of voluntariness.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Leigh, 2008 SD 53, ¶ 16, 753 N.W.2d 398 (noting that trial court found no valid consent, and that supreme court would not reverse “even if we were convinced that the opposite finding would have been made had we been the fact finders, unless in light of the entire record we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made” (quotation and alteration omitted)); McFadden, 300 S.E.2d at 926 (“The determination of [voluntariness] by the trial court on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on review unless plainly wrong.”); State v. Buck, 294 S.E.2d 281, 285 (W. Va. 1982) (“[A] trial court’s decision regarding the voluntariness [of consent to search] will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or clearly against the weight of the evidence.” (quotation omitted)).
¶ 73. I agree with the substantial majority of state and federal courts that apply deferential review to a determination of whether consent to search is voluntary. For the reasons given, I do not believe that the U.S. Supreme Court would rule that review of such voluntariness rulings should be de novo. For the additional reasons discussed in the next section of this dissent, I would not follow a contrary U.S. Supreme Court decision if it occurred.
¶ 74. Having stated my position on the narrow question before us, I turn to the broader question of whether we should ever use a de novo standard of review for motions to suppress based on constitutional claims, my response to the broad holding of the majority. In my view, we should not adopt a de novo review standard for multiple reasons.
¶ 75. First, there are no persuasive reasons why we should abandon deferential review of fact questions that determine constitutional rights while maintaining such review for other comparable questions. As discussed above, whether consent to search is voluntary is a question of fact involving a determination of the state of mind of the person who gave consent. Constitutional rights are important, but the consequence of the decision to the litigants may be no less great in other contexts where we defer to the trial judge’s expertise and superior position in evaluating the evidence. Because our deference policy is based on the superior position of the trial judge to evaluate the evidence, a de *385novo standard necessarily lessens the quality of the decision making. There is no evidence that fact-finding by this Court will result in better or more accurate decisions than those by trial judges. The whole point of our standard-of-review jurisprudence is that it will not. Thus, we are in the internally inconsistent position of reducing the quality of fact-finding because the facts involved are particularly important.
¶ 76. It is hard to see the majority decision as anything other than a negative assessment of the quality of fact-finding by trial courts with respect to federal constitutional questions.14 I see nothing in our decisions, or the many records we read, to support this assessment.
¶ 77. It is also important to recognize that the alternative to de novo review is not ineffective review. We operated under a deferential standard of review for many, many years and were able to ensure that the full requirements of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were implemented. Giving deference to a trial court’s factual determination does not mean that we will uphold it if it is not supported by the evidence or that we will affirm conclusions that are inconsistent with applicable legal standards. A good example of this point is our decision in State v. Roberts, 160 Vt. 385, 388-90, 631 A.2d 835, 837-38 (1993), where defendant challenged successfully an inculpatory statement made to a police officer because the officer stated that the judge would probably consider the statement in determining the amount of bail. After explaining that the trial court’s rulings on voluntariness will be upheld “unless . . . unsupported by the evidence or clearly erroneous,” id. at 388, 631 A.2d at 837, this Court reversed the suppression of the statement because “[providing factual information regarding defendant’s situation does not render the confession involuntary.” Id. at 389-90, 631 A.2d at 838.
¶ 78. Under the majority standard, the one actor whose analysis of the evidence is irrelevant is the trial judge. The result is that *386no one will evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses and the inferences that can be made from their presentation. That loss is very significant in a case like this because defendant’s claims are that the statements and actions of the officer were coercive, and that officer’s testimony is the record before us. Because only their ultimate conclusion matters, trial judges have no incentive to provide a detailed analysis of the evidence where there is de novo review, and they are less likely to do so. As I discussed above, not even the U.S. Supreme Court has gone that far in reducing the role of the trial court. Ornelas held that appellate courts should “give due weight to inferences drawn from [historical] facts by resident judges.” 517 U.S. at 699. The majority ignores that part of the Ornelas holding in requiring full de novo review.
¶ 79. Second, a de novo standard of review wastes limited judicial resources and increases the number of appeals. The standard of review is a significant factor in determining whether to appeal a trial court decision. G. Somerville, Standards of Appellate Review, 15 Litig. 23, 24-25 (1989). A very limited standard of review makes reversal of the trial court decision unlikely; de novo review means that there is no presumption of affirmance. The decision on a suppression motion to exclude evidence obtained in a search and seizure is often determinative of when the State can obtain a conviction. The overwhelming majority of our criminal cases involve publicly funded lawyers who are less concerned with the cost of an appeal than the potential results. With no presumption that the trial court decision is correct, they have every incentive to appeal in virtually all cases. A de novo appeal rule will increase the number of appeals and increase the waste from duplicative adjudications. I do not see this as a positive effect.
¶ 80. The third reason responds directly to the asserted reason for de novo review in Fourth Amendment cases. The Supreme Court in Ornelas reasoned that de novo review is “necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles.” 517 U.S. at 697, and added that “de novo review tends to unify precedent and will come closer to providing law enforcement officers with a defined ‘set of rules.’ ” Id. (quotation omitted). The Court admitted, however, that for legal standards that involve multi-faceted analysis, one case is rarely precedent for another. Id. at 698.
¶ 81. The Supreme Court’s analysis minimizes the effectiveness of deferential review to ensure the fair application of legal *387principles and the full consideration of all relevant factors. Deferential review does not mean no review, as I discussed above using our decision in State v. Roberts as the example. We give no deference in determining the applicable law and in being sure it is applied. We give no deference if the trial court’s conclusion is not supported by its findings or if the findings are inadequate. Even where we give deference to the trial court’s conclusion, we may reverse that conclusion if we conclude that the trial court went beyond its discretion. In my opinion, our traditional standard of review results in a defined set of rules for guidance of trial courts and law enforcement officials. The whole point of deferential review is for the appellate court “to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697.
¶ 82. In my opinion, the improved results of de novo review are wishful thinking even if we ignore the loss of the perspective of the judicial officer who heard and saw the evidence. The Court argued that different results from different trial judges on the same facts “would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law.” Id. The same criticism can be made of different appellate judges who, put in the role of fact-finder, will reach a different result from small variations in facts; and, of course, the makeup of appellate courts will change. Since we adopted de novo review of decisions on motions to suppress, many of our decisions have been divided, a not unexpected result where the Justices are acting as trial judges. As examples of the three-to-two decisions, see State v. Muntean, 2010 VT 88, 189 Vt. 50, 12 A.3d 518; State v. Ford, 2010 VT 39, 188 Vt. 17, 998 A.2d 684; State v. Pitts, 2009 VT 51; State v. Pontbriand, 2005 VT 20, 178 Vt. 120, 878 A.2d 227; State v. Jestice, 2004 VT 65, 177 Vt. 513, 861 A.2d 1060 (mem.). The content of these decisions also underscores my view that it is wishful thinking that de novo appeal decisions will give greater guidance to law enforcement than deferential review decisions. For example, in her dissent (which I joined) in Pontbriand, Justice Johnson noted that in some cases “no single factor is enough to overbear an individual’s will, but the aggregate effect of many subtle, exploitive techniques is a coercive environment powerful enough to elicit an involuntary confession” and described thirteen nonexclusive factors the Colorado Supreme Court had adopted as relevant to a totality of the circumstances inquiry. 2005 VT 20, ¶ 36. As long as we must apply global standards like the totality of circumstances, I doubt our opinions on de novo review give any *388better guidance to persons who must apply our decisions in their everyday conduct.
¶ 83. The Supreme Court admitted as much in Ornelas, noting that under multi-faceted substantive standards, “one determination will seldom be a useful ‘precedent’ for another,” quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n.11 (1983), but noting occasional exceptions to this rule. 517 U.S. at 698. The presence of occasional exceptions hardly justifies a review standard built around giving law enforcement a set of rules with which to work. See id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not understand why we should allow the exception to frame the rule”).
¶ 84. To summarize, I would hold that we made a mistake in changing our standard of review of trial court suppression decisions to de novo review. Having joined in the mistake, I urge that we correct it. It was particularly a mistake to make such an important decision with little analysis. It was also a mistake on the merits of the question. I think that mistake should be corrected specifically for cases deciding whether consent to search was given voluntarily. I would go further, however, and return to our preexisting standard of review for decisions on motions to suppress asserting constitutional violations. Full consideration of the question, which we failed to do when we changed the standard of review, does not support de novo appellate review. Even if we adopt de novo review, we should specifically adopt and apply the deference component contained in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Accordingly, I dissent from this part of the majority decision.
¶ 85. I agree with the majority’s result in this case, but would reach that result based primarily on the conclusion that the trial court’s determination that the consent to search was voluntary was not clearly erroneous. I do not disagree with the majority’s analysis, except in one critical respect. Relying upon an inapplicable holding from Sprague, 2003 VT 20, ¶ 28, the majority states that the voluntariness of consent is determined by an objective standard: “whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances would . . . have felt free to refuse [consent].” Ante, ¶ 32. Contrary to this formulation, the standard is subjective and requires us to determine whether defendant’s consent was voluntarily given in fact. See supra, ¶ 63. While the difference of standard is not determinative in this case, I believe it is a significant shift that we should not adopt.

 Since this is a case decided under the Fourth Amendment, I have limited my discussion to federal constitutional questions. We have also apparently chosen to adopt a de novo standard of review for criminal procedure cases decided under the Vermont Constitution. Again, I believe this change of standard of review is unwise and, in any event, overbroad. I will leave explanation of this position to a future case.

 As I discuss infra, the majority holds that we decided to the contrary in Sprague. Ante, ¶¶ 25, 32. That characterization of Sprague is wrong. One of the subsidiary questions in Sprague was whether the defendant was seized, and we explained the federal objective seizure standard — “ ‘whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” Sprague, 2003 VT 20, ¶ 26 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991)). We applied that standard to the defendant’s circumstances, holding that where the defendant’s position in the police ear was coerced under the Bostick objective standard, that circumstance should be considered in determining whether the defendant’s consent was voluntary. See id. ¶ 28. This is not a holding that voluntariness is determined generally under an objective standard. The majority’s characterizing it so is another example of the hasty and superficial analysis that is in the recent standard-of-review decisions. The point allegedly decided required detailed analysis in light of the United States Supreme Court decisions, an analysis missing from Sprague.

 In addition, numerous state appellate courts grant significant deference to the trial court on the issue of voluntary consent. See, e.g., Kennedy v. State, 640 So. 2d 22, 25 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (“When the evidence pertaining to the voluntariness of a consent is conflicting, the trial court is in the best position to determine consent or lack thereof. ... On appeal, this court will not disturb the trial court’s finding unless we are convinced that the conclusion is palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (quotation omitted)); Punguk v. State, 784 P.2d 246, 247 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (“The voluntariness of a consent to search is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court from the totality of the circumstances in each case. ... [A] trial court’s finding of consent to search must be accepted on appeal unless clearly erroneous.”); State v. Swanson, 838 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (“The trial court’s factual determinations on the issue of giving consent will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. . . . [W]e conclude that the trial court’s determination that defendant voluntarily consented to the search was not clearly erroneous.”); State v. Breed, 917 So. 2d 206, 209 (Pla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“The voluntariness of the consent to search is a question for the trial court and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is clearly erroneous.”); Corley v. State, 512 S.E.2d 41, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“Normally we would rely upon the decision of the fact finder to determine the issue of consent, and if there was any evidence to support that finding the appellate court would not reverse such finding.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Reynolds, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008) (‘Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is an issue of fact, and we therefore defer to the trial court’s findings as to voluntariness.”); State v. Jones, 932 N.E.2d 904, 917 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (“Even though the state’s burden of proof [for voluntary consent] is ‘clear and convincing,’ this standard of review is highly deferential, and the presence of only some competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s finding requires us to affirm it.” (quotation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Merbah, 411 A.2d 244, 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (recognizing that lower court was not convinced that police action created coercive atmosphere that would render consent involuntary, and stating that “[g]reat deference should be given to the lower court’s decision in light of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and thereby assess credibility”).

 I am amazed that the majority resists this assessment. If the de novo standard of review is not based on an evaluation of the trial court’s fact-finding on constitutional issues, why did we abandon hundreds of years of precedent to abruptly say that we will give no deference to a trial judge’s fact-finding for certain factual issues? If that is not the motivation for the majority’s ruling, why do we refuse to give even the deference called for in Ornelas? In the end, the only real rationale for the holding is that we trust ourselves to do constitutional fact-finding, but do not trust trial judges enough to give any deference to their findings.