Court Opinion

ID: 9950480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 13:03:02.164746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:19.016483
License: Public Domain

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       STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LAWRENCE
                LEE HENDERSON
                   (SC 20688)
             Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                   Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

                                  Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of home invasion in connection
   with an incident in which the defendant and another man kicked down
   the door to the victim’s apartment, physically assaulted the victim, and
   stole some of his belongings, the defendant appealed to this court. After
   closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury on home invasion,
   the other offenses with which the defendant had been charged, including
   burglary in the first degree, and certain lesser included offenses, includ-
   ing burglary in the third degree as a lesser included offense of burglary
   in the first degree. The jury did not reach a verdict after the first day
   of deliberations. Before the second day of deliberations began, however,
   the defendant was exposed to COVID-19, which he eventually con-
   tracted. As a result, jury deliberations were delayed for twenty-five days.
   During that time, two jurors became unavailable for the rescheduled
   proceedings and were replaced by alternate jurors. When the proceed-
   ings resumed, the court instructed that the remaining members of the
   original jury were to disregard their earlier deliberations and that the
   jury was to begin deliberations anew. Thereafter, the jury returned a
   verdict finding the defendant guilty of home invasion but not guilty of
   the other charges and the lesser included offenses. Defense counsel
   indicated that he had no objections to the verdict, which the court
   accepted. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, claiming that the
   defendant was prejudiced by the twenty-five day interruption in the jury
   deliberations. The court denied the motion and rendered judgment in
   accordance with the jury’s verdict. On the defendant’s appeal from the
   judgment of conviction, held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that this court should reverse
    his conviction of home invasion or grant him a new trial on that charge
    because the jury’s verdicts of guilty of home invasion and not guilty of
    the lesser included offense of burglary in the third degree were legally
    inconsistent:

   The defendant conceded that his challenge to the jury’s legally inconsis-
   tent verdicts was barred by this court’s decision in State v. Arroyo (292
   Conn. 558), in which this court held that legal inconsistency claims are
   unreviewable on appeal, this court declined the defendant’s invitation
   to overrule or modify Arroyo, insofar as that decision was consistent
   with United States Supreme Court precedent and that of the majority
   of other jurisdictions, and this court emphasized that any inconsistency
   in the jury’s verdicts must be addressed by the trial court and the parties
   before the jury has been discharged if anything is to be done about it.

   Moreover, this court rejected the defendant’s assertion that a trial court
   is obligated to seek consistency in jury verdicts sua sponte, as a court’s
   direction to the jury to resolve any inconsistency through further delibera-
   tions could result in another guilty finding that exposes a defendant to
   a lengthier sentence.

   In the present case, the legally inconsistent verdicts did not implicate
   the defendant’s constitutional rights, as nothing in the United States
   constitution prohibits a court from accepting inconsistencies between
   guilty and not guilty verdicts, and, because there was no constitutional
   issue at stake or any nonspeculative reason to conclude that the defen-
   dant was prejudiced by the jury’s legally inconsistent verdicts, this court
   would not upset those verdicts on appeal.

   Insofar as this court declined to overturn or modify its conclusion in
   Arroyo that there is no appellate remedy for inconsistent verdicts, the
   defendant’s alternative claim that the trial court committed plain error
   by accepting the jury’s inconsistent verdicts necessarily failed.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s
    motion for a mistrial:

   Although this court acknowledged the risk that pausing jury deliberations
   may increase the likelihood that jurors will forget the arguments of
   counsel and the trial court’s instructions, and that jurors will rush to a
   consensus in order to conclude deliberations, it also recognized the
   unprecedented circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and
   the efforts that the trial court made in obtaining input from the parties
   on how to proceed once the pandemic impacted the trial while seeking
   to protect the parties’ rights, which, taken together, led this court to
   conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
   defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial.

   Moreover, notwithstanding the defendant’s claim that the trial court
   jeopardized the integrity of the proceedings by failing to canvass the
   jurors to confirm that they had not investigated or discussed the case
   during the delay, the record demonstrated that the trial court was mindful
   of and responsive to the parties’ concerns during the delay, as the court
   considered, among other things, ways to conceal from the jury that it
   was the defendant who had tested positive for COVID-19 and the fact
   that he was incarcerated in the event that he were to appear remotely
   during the proceedings, how to notify the jury about scheduling changes,
   and having counsel review the language to be used when notifying the
   jurors of the delay.

   Furthermore, this court’s decision was in line with those of other jurisdic-
   tions, consistent with Connecticut case law concerning the management
   of trial delays, and, more specifically, in accord with the decisions of
   other jurisdictions addressing the legal impact of delays attributable to
   COVID-19, and, although a pause in jury deliberations can increase the
   likelihood that jurors may forget counsel’s arguments or rush to be
   done with their responsibilities, under the unprecedented circumstances
   presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, there always was the risk of delays
   from the outset of the trial due to the pandemic.
       Argued October 19, 2023—officially released March 19, 2024

                            Procedural History

   Substitute information charging the defendant with
four counts of the crime of burglary in the first degree,
three counts each of the crimes of home invasion and
assault in the second degree, two counts of the crime
of robbery in the first degree and one count of the crime
of robbery in the second degree, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, where the
case was tried to the jury before Oliver, J.; thereafter,
the court granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment
of acquittal as to one count of assault in the second
degree; subsequently, the state filed an amended substi-
tute information charging the defendant with one count
each of home invasion, burglary in the first degree,
robbery in the second degree and assault in the second
degree; verdict and judgment of guilty of home invasion,
from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Pamela S. Nagy, supervisory assistant public defender,
for the appellant (defendant).
   Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor, state’s
attorney, and Kevin M. Shay, former senior assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
                          Opinion

   D’AURIA, J. In this direct appeal, the defendant, Law-
rence Lee Henderson, asks us (1) to reexamine our
decision in State v. Arroyo, 292 Conn. 558, 973 A.2d
1254 (2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 911, 130 S. Ct. 1296,
175 L. Ed. 2d 1086 (2010), holding that consistency in
verdicts is immaterial and legally inconsistent verdicts
are therefore not reviewable on appeal, and (2) to hold
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
declare a mistrial when he contracted COVID-19, which
resulted in a twenty-five day interruption in jury deliber-
ations. More specifically, the defendant first argues that
we should overrule or modify Arroyo because the jury’s
verdict finding him guilty of home invasion, in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (1), was legally
inconsistent with its verdict finding him not guilty of the
lesser included offense of burglary in the third degree,
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103, even though
the same facts and allegations underpinned both charges.1
He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a mistrial, in which he contended
that the twenty-five day pause after the jury began delib-
erating prejudiced him because of the risk that jurors would
be exposed to improper outside influences or would forget
evidence, counsel’s arguments or the trial court’s instruc-
tions. We disagree with both claims and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
   Our consideration of the defendant’s claims is framed
by the following procedural history, along with the fol-
lowing facts that the jury reasonably could have found.
The defendant and another man referred to as ‘‘Dro’’
knocked on John Pillarella’s apartment door in Middle-
town at about 11 p.m. on September 6, 2020, asking
Pillarella if someone named Gina was there. Pillarella
responded that Gina was not there and that the two
men were at the wrong apartment. Pillarella’s next door
neighbor was a drug dealer, and people often would
mistakenly knock on Pillarella’s door at all hours of the
night looking for his neighbor. Pillarella had not invited
any guests to his apartment that evening, so he assumed
that the defendant and Dro were looking for his neigh-
bor. Pillarella shut his apartment door, and the defen-
dant and Dro proceeded to kick it down. A struggle
ensued between the defendant and Pillarella, who
began bleeding heavily from his head. Meanwhile, Dro
went through the apartment and found Pillarella’s wal-
let. After Pillarella refused to disclose the PIN number
for his debit card, the defendant and Dro took ‘‘a few
dollars’’ from the wallet, along with two cell phones.
  After the defendant and Dro fled the scene, Pillarella
asked a neighbor for help. A person at the scene found
a police sergeant on patrol, who called for additional
police, medical aid, and a K-9 unit. Although the K-9
unit could not find Dro, they did find the defendant
hiding behind nearby bushes. Later, at the police sta-
tion, the defendant admitted that he had been looking
for drugs when he knocked on Pillarella’s door.
   In an amended long form information, the state
charged the defendant with one count each of home
invasion, in violation of § 53a-100aa (a) (1), burglary in
the first degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
101 (a) (3), robbery in the second degree, in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-135 (a) (1) (A), and assault
in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes
§ 53a-60 (a) (7). On September 21, 2021, after eight
months of pretrial incarceration, the defendant filed a
speedy trial motion. The trial court granted this motion
on September 29, 2021, and the case was tried to a jury
in October, 2021. The court instructed the jury to return
verdicts on each of the four charged counts and, if it
found the defendant not guilty of any of those charges,
to also return a verdict on the corresponding lesser
included offense for three of the four counts. Specifi-
cally, the court charged the jury on burglary in the
second degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
102, as a lesser included offense of home invasion;
burglary in the third degree, in violation of § 53a-103,
as a lesser included offense of burglary in the first
degree; and assault in the third degree, in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-61, as a lesser included offense
of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60
(a) (7). The court did not charge the jury on any lesser
included offense of robbery in the second degree. Both
parties agreed to the trial court’s jury instructions
regarding the lesser included offenses. Neither party
requested that the trial court instruct the jury about
any other lesser included offenses.
   After the defendant’s exposure to and ultimate con-
traction of the COVID-19 virus during trial, which resulted
in a twenty-five day interruption in jury deliberations,
the jury found the defendant guilty of home invasion
but not guilty of first degree burglary, second degree
burglary, third degree burglary, second degree robbery,
second degree assault, and third degree assault.2 Defense
counseldidnotobjecttothejury’sverdictpriortothecourt’s
acceptance of the verdict and its discharge of the jury.
The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of
fifteen years of imprisonment followed by ten years of
special parole. The defendant appealed directly to this
court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3). We
will discuss additional facts and procedural history as
necessary.
                             I
  We begin with the defendant’s claim that we should
vacate his home invasion conviction because the jury’s
guilty verdict on that count was legally inconsistent
with its not guilty verdict on the third degree burglary
count. The defendant argues that we should either
vacate the home invasion conviction or grant him a
new trial on that count because, as charged in this case,
the jury had to find him guilty of each of the elements
of third degree burglary before it could find him guilty
of home invasion, yet the jury found him not guilty of
third degree burglary and still found him guilty of home
invasion.3 The defendant concedes that Arroyo prevents
review of this claim on appeal and thus asks us to
overturn or modify Arroyo. Specifically, he contends
that we should overrule Arroyo and hold that inconsis-
tent verdicts are unreliable because they reflect mis-
take, confusion, jury nullification, or potential animus
toward the defendant, and that upholding unreliable
verdicts constitutes a miscarriage of justice.4 Alterna-
tively, the defendant argues that it was plain error for
the trial court to render judgment in accordance with
the jury’s verdict because the verdict was inconsistent
on its face and resulted in manifest injustice, as the
defendant stands convicted of home invasion despite
the jury’s finding that the state did not meet its burden
of proving the lesser included offense of third degree
burglary. See Practice Book § 60-5.
   The state maintains that logical and compelling rea-
sons underlie the Arroyo rule. The state argues that
reviewing inconsistent verdicts on appeal would require
that appellate courts speculate about the jury’s reason-
ing, despite long-standing policies discouraging such
conjecture. Further, the state contends that it would
be improper for the trial court, sua sponte, to send the
jury back to deliberate following an inconsistent verdict
because of the risk that the jury may find the defendant
guilty of additional charges. In the state’s view, only if
the defendant had requested that the trial court decline
to accept the jury’s inconsistent verdicts could the court
have sent the jury back for further deliberations. Finally,
the state argues that the trial court did not commit plain
error by accepting the inconsistent verdicts, as this
approach conforms with both Connecticut and United
States Supreme Court case law.
   We agree with the state and adhere to our conclusion
in Arroyo that there is no appellate remedy for an incon-
sistent verdict. If there is anything for the parties or
the trial court to do to address an inconsistency in a
jury’s verdict, it must be done before the jury has been
discharged. It follows necessarily that the trial court
did not commit plain error in accepting the verdicts in
this case.
   At the core of both parties’ arguments on this first
issue is our decision in Arroyo, in which we declared
that ‘‘claims of legal inconsistency between a conviction
and an acquittal are not reviewable.’’ State v. Arroyo,
supra, 292 Conn. 586. Explicitly stating that we found
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83
L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984), persuasive, we quoted Powell’s
reasoning at length: ‘‘[I]nconsistent verdicts . . .
should not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the
[prosecution] at the defendant’s expense. It is equally
possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly
reached its conclusion on the [greater] offense, and
then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived
at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense. But
in such situations the [prosecution] has no recourse if
it wishes to correct the jury’s error; the [prosecution]
is precluded from appealing or otherwise upsetting such
an acquittal by the [c]onstitution’s [d]ouble [j]eopardy
[c]lause.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Arroyo, supra, 585, quoting United
States v. Powell, supra, 65. On the other hand, ‘‘a crimi-
nal defendant already is afforded protection against
jury irrationality or error by the independent review of
the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial
and appellate courts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Arroyo, supra, 585, quoting United States
v. Powell, supra, 67. With this rationale in mind, we
must consider whether the defendant has advanced ‘‘the
most cogent reasons and inescapable logic’’ that would
compel us to overrule or modify Arroyo. (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. Salamon, 287 Conn.
509, 519, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008); see id. (discussing ‘‘the
significance of stare decisis to our system of jurispru-
dence’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
State v. Nash, 316 Conn. 651, 659, 114 A.3d 128 (2015);
State v. Ramirez, 292 Conn. 586, 590–91, 973 A.2d 1251
(2009). We conclude that he has not.
   Legally inconsistent verdicts have vexed courts for
some time. See Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59,
60 (2d Cir. 1925). An undeniable tension exists when
appellate courts confront inconsistent verdicts on appeal
because they ‘‘present a situation where ‘error,’ in the
sense that the jury has not followed the court’s instruc-
tions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose
ox has been gored.’’ United States v. Powell, supra, 469
U.S. 65; see also Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390,
393, 52 S. Ct. 189, 76 L. Ed. 356 (1932) (‘‘[t]he most that
can be said . . . is that the verdict shows that either
in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak
their real conclusions, but that does not show that they
were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Having freshly considered
our precedent in response to the defendant’s arguments,
for the reasons stated in Powell and in our own case
law, we reaffirm our decision in Arroyo that appellate
courts cannot and should not review inconsistent ver-
dicts on appeal.
   Although the role of appellate courts is to remedy
legal errors, we are keenly aware of our limitations in
that pursuit. We have acknowledged the conundrum
that inconsistent jury determinations create on appeal:
‘‘[w]hen a jury has rendered legally inconsistent ver-
dicts, there is no way for the reviewing court to know
which charge the jury found to be supported by the
evidence.’’ State v. Chyung, 325 Conn. 236, 247, 157
A.3d 628 (2017). In most cases, we have no way of
knowing if the jury’s verdict was an unintentional error
or a conscious choice of lenity.5 See id., 247 n.7; see
also McElrath v. Georgia,          U.S.     , 144 S. Ct. 651,
659,     L. Ed. 2d     (2024) (‘‘[w]e have long recognized
that, while an acquittal might reflect a jury’s determina-
tion that the defendant is innocent of the crime charged,
such a verdict might also be the result of compromise,
compassion, lenity, or misunderstanding of the govern-
ing law’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), quoting
Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U.S. 5, 10, 137 S.
Ct. 352, 196 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2016). Reviewing inconsistent
verdicts on appeal risks unduly speculating about the
jury’s intent in delivering its decision, despite precedent
establishing that the court should not insert itself into
jury deliberations. See United States v. Powell, supra,
469 U.S. 66 (‘‘an individualized assessment [by a court]
of the reason for the inconsistency would be based
. . . on pure speculation, or would require inquiries
into the jury’s deliberations that courts generally will
not undertake’’).
   Both this court and the United States Supreme Court,
in settling on the rule that inconsistent verdicts are
unreviewable on appeal, have also taken account of
‘‘the [prosecution’s] inability to invoke review’’ of a
jury’s finding of not guilty under the United States con-
stitution’s double jeopardy clause once the trial court
accepts a verdict. Id., 66; accord State v. Arroyo, supra,
292 Conn. 585. Given the ‘‘uncertainty’’ inherent in try-
ing to explain simultaneous and inconsistent verdicts
of guilty and not guilty, and ‘‘the fact that the [prosecu-
tion] is precluded from challenging the acquittal, it is
hardly satisfactory to allow the defendant to receive a
new trial on the conviction as a matter of course. . . .
For us, the possibility that the inconsistent verdicts may
favor the criminal defendant as well as the [prosecution]
militates against review of such convictions at the
defendant’s behest.’’ (Citation omitted.) United States
v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. 65; see also State v. Arroyo,
supra, 585.
   Therefore, like the United States Supreme Court, we
have consistently maintained that the ‘‘inconsistency
of the verdicts is immaterial.’’ State v. Rosado, 178 Conn.
704, 708–709, 425 A.2d 108 (1979); see also State v.
Gaston, 198 Conn. 490, 493 n.1, 503 A.2d 1157 (1986).
In fact, ‘‘this court never has set aside a verdict on the
ground that a conviction on one charge was legally
or logically inconsistent with an acquittal on another
charge.’’ State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 583. Rather,
we have made clear that, ‘‘[w]hile symmetry of results
may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 257
Conn. 587, 603, 778 A.2d 875 (2001). As the defendant
concedes, Connecticut law pertaining to inconsistent
verdicts is in line with that of the majority of jurisdic-
tions.
    We are also mindful of a defendant’s precarious posi-
tion when a jury delivers an inconsistent verdict. It is
possible that, if the trial court focuses the jury’s atten-
tion on, and directs the jury to resolve, the inconsis-
tency, further deliberation might lead to another not
guilty finding. However, it is also possible that further
deliberation might result in another finding of guilt,
perhaps exposing the defendant to a lengthier sentence.
Given these stakes, we reject the defendant’s argument
that a trial court has an obligation to seek consistency
in the jury’s verdicts, sua sponte. In fact, it would be
error for the court to do so. Nor can we countenance
the state’s forcing the issue by requesting that the trial
court direct the jury to deliberate further in pursuit of
consistent verdicts. See Givens v. State, 449 Md. 433,
460, 144 A.3d 717 (2016) (‘‘When inconsistent verdicts
are rendered, the [trial court] may not, sua sponte, send
the jury back to resolve the inconsistency, because it
is the defendant who is entitled, should he [or she] so
wish, to accept the benefit of the inconsistent acquittal.
By the same token, the prosecutor may not ask to have
the jury sent back to resolve the inconsistency, because
it is the defendant, once again, who is entitled, should he
[or she] so wish, to accept the benefit of the inconsistent
acquittal.’’).
   The verdicts in the present case differ from those in
Chyung. In Chyung, we were confronted not with one
guilty verdict and one not guilty verdict but, rather,
with two contradictory guilty verdicts, each of which
required a finding of a mutually exclusive state of mind.
See State v. Chyung, supra, 325 Conn. 239–40 (jury
found defendant guilty of murder and manslaughter
in first degree with firearm). We held in Chyung that
inconsistent guilty verdicts are intolerable in part because
of ‘‘important constitutional due process implications
. . . .’’ Id., 253. In fact, it is these constitutional implica-
tions that help explain why we concluded in Chyung
that the defendant did not need to raise the issue of
inconsistent guilty verdicts before the jury was discharged
to be able to challenge the verdicts in a motion for a new
trial and then ultimately on appeal. Id., 253–54. Indeed,
we have entertained such claims under State v. Golding,
213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified
by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188
(2015), even if they were not raised in the trial court
at all. See State v. Chyung, supra, 249 n.9; see also State
v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 313, 630 A.2d 593 (1993)
(when defense neither objected to jury instructions on
offenses with mutually exclusive states of mind nor
objected to trial court’s acceptance of verdicts, court
reviewed unpreserved claim pursuant to Golding).
Finally, it is these constitutional implications that com-
pelled us to direct courts and counsel that, to avoid the
possibility that the verdicts will have to be vacated and
a new trial ordered, ‘‘either the defendant or the state
should object to the verdicts before the jury has been
discharged, so that the jury may be properly instructed
and continue its deliberations.’’ State v. Chyung, supra,
253.
   In contrast, inconsistent verdicts like those in the
present case and in Arroyo do not implicate a defen-
dant’s constitutional rights. Nothing in the federal con-
stitution prohibits a court from accepting the inconsis-
tencies between guilty and not guilty verdicts, as the
jury returned here. See United States v. Powell, supra,
469 U.S. 65. Because of this fundamental difference
between the verdicts at issue in Chyung and those we
confront in the present case, we reiterate today what we
have already indicated in Arroyo: with no constitutional
issue at stake, and without a nonspeculative reason by
which we can conclude that a defendant was preju-
diced, we will not upset inconsistent verdicts on appeal.
   In the present case, the parties do not dispute that
the jury returned legally inconsistent verdicts. See foot-
note 2 of this opinion. Therefore, the defendant’s claim
is not reviewable pursuant to Arroyo. More particularly,
we will not direct a judgment of acquittal or order a
new trial on the home invasion count, notwithstanding
the parties’ agreement that a guilty verdict on that count
and a not guilty verdict on the lesser offense of third
degree burglary are legally inconsistent. Any concern
about the verdicts or request for consistency should
have been raised before the trial court discharged the
jury. Following the jury’s announcement of its verdicts,
the trial court explicitly asked defense counsel whether
he had anything further to address before the court accepted
the verdicts. Because defense counsel responded that he
did not have anything else to discuss, we cannot give
further consideration to the defendant’s claim. See State
v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 583.
   Because we decline to overturn or modify Arroyo,
the defendant’s inconsistent verdicts claim also fails
under the plain error standard. See Practice Book § 60-
5. The plain error doctrine is an ‘‘extraordinary remedy,’’
to correct injustices that are of ‘‘monumental propor-
tion . . . .’’ State v. Myers, 290 Conn. 278, 289, 963 A.2d
11 (2009). On appeal, the court should find plain error
only when ‘‘the existence of the error is so obvious
that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public
confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id. The court gave defense counsel
the opportunity to raise any concerns before accepting
the verdicts, but he declined. In doing so, the trial court
followed Arroyo and Powell. Therefore, the court’s
acceptance of both the jury’s findings with respect to
home invasion and third degree burglary did not consti-
tute plain error.
                             II
  We now consider the defendant’s claim that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s
mistrial motion after the defendant’s exposure to and
contraction of the COVID-19 virus resulted in a twenty-
five day interruption in the jury’s deliberations. The follow-
ing facts are relevant to this claim.
  On September 20, 2021, amid the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the defendant filed a motion for a speedy trial,
which the trial court granted on September 29, 2021,
the first day the parties began selecting a jury. The
evidentiary portion of the trial began on October 12,
2021. The state presented twenty-one exhibits and
called five witnesses to testify. The defendant presented
no evidence.
   After both parties presented closing arguments on
Thursday, October 14, 2021, jury deliberations began
that day and lasted a few hours. At the end of the day,
the jury had not yet reached a verdict, and, because
earlier scheduling conflicts made it such that delibera-
tions could not resume that Friday, the trial adjourned
until Monday, October 18, 2021. However, before the
jury was to reconvene, the court was notified that, while
in the custody of the Department of Correction, the
defendant had come into close contact with someone
who had tested positive for COVID-19. The court
informed the parties that, under then existing protocols
to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the defendant would
need to be quarantined until at least October 27, 2021,
and, therefore, the court had to delay jury deliberations
until then. On October 26, 2021, the court reported
that, sometime in the interim, the defendant had tested
positive for COVID-19, forcing the trial court to continue
the pause in jury deliberations until November 8, 2021.
   Also on October 26, 2021, defense counsel orally
moved for a mistrial, asserting that a delay of twenty-
five days during jury deliberations prejudiced the defen-
dant because the jury might not be able to remember
the court’s detailed jury instructions or the arguments
advanced by both parties. The court asked defense
counsel how to reconcile the defendant’s initial speedy
trial motion with the motion for a mistrial. Defense
counsel responded that the speedy trial motion should
not bear on the court’s decision regarding the mistrial
motion because of the unusual circumstances pre-
sented.
   The state countered that the speedy trial motion was
relevant to the court’s consideration of the mistrial
motion because the defendant had filed the speedy trial
motion while the pandemic was ongoing. The state rea-
soned that the defendant knew that there was always
a risk of trial delays due to the pandemic. The state
also argued that no legal error had occurred because
the situation at hand did not involve the affirmative
conduct of a trial participant, as required by Practice
Book § 42-43. Finally, the state emphasized that the risk
of the jury’s forgetting key arguments of counsel was
minimized by the fact that the evidence took only a
few days to present, and a key piece of evidence—a
recording of a police interview with the defendant,
which was played during the trial—was available for
the jury to view again during deliberations.
   The court denied the motion for a mistrial, explaining
that the defense had failed to show either substantial
or irreparable prejudice because of the delay in jury
deliberations. The court stressed that, in some trials,
delays take place but that not all delays prejudice the
defendant. Also, under these circumstances, by the time
the defense moved for a mistrial, the court had already
learned of one juror’s unavailability for the rescheduled
proceedings. Therefore, the trial court reasoned, delib-
erations would have to start anew anyhow, ameliorating
concerns that the jury would rely on its initial discus-
sions a few weeks earlier in an effort to finish its trial
obligations. Last, the court emphasized that the jury
would have the court’s instructions for reference and
would be able to view the defendant’s police interview
again, if necessary.
   When the jury reconvened on November 8, 2021, an
additional member of the original jury had been excused
because he was unavailable for the rescheduled trial
dates, and, therefore, two alternate jurors participated
in the reconvened deliberations. As it had indicated it
would, the court instructed the jury that, with two new
panel members joining for deliberations, ‘‘[e]ach mem-
ber of the original deliberating jury must set aside and
disregard whatever may have occurred’’ and ‘‘start [the]
deliberations over again.’’ The trial court also explained
that, because of the delay in deliberations, the jury
could request to review a recording of any witness’
testimony, if needed. Later that day, the jury returned
its verdict, finding the defendant guilty of home invasion
and not guilty of the other charges, as well as the three
lesser included offenses.
   The defendant argues that the trial court should have
granted the mistrial motion because the twenty-five day
interruption in the jury’s deliberations prejudiced him.
The defendant claims that a lengthy delay at such a
critical point in the trial inevitably caused jurors to forget
counsel’s arguments as well as the court’s instructions.
Last, the defendant contends that the trial court jeopard-
ized the integrity of the proceedings by failing to canvass
the jurors upon reconvening to ensure that they were
prepared to begin deliberations anew with the two alter-
nate jurors and to confirm that they had not investigated
or discussed the case in the interim.
  The state contends that the defendant’s concerns are
speculative and that he has not identified any conduct
indicating that factors external to the case undermined
the verdicts. Rather, the state argues that the trial court
acted within its discretion when it denied the mistrial
motion, navigating the unprecedented challenges posed
by a worldwide pandemic and searching for a way to
continue the proceedings safely while remaining cogni-
zant of both parties’ rights and concerns.6
   ‘‘Upon motion of a defendant, the judicial authority
may declare a mistrial at any time during the trial if
there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in
the proceedings, or any conduct inside or outside the
courtroom, which results in substantial and irreparable
prejudice to the defendant’s case.’’ Practice Book § 42-
43. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a
mistrial under the abuse of discretion standard. See,
e.g., State v. Peeler, 271 Conn. 338, 415–16, 857 A.2d
808 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 845, 126 S. Ct. 94, 163
L. Ed. 2d 110 (2005). When reviewing a ruling on a
mistrial motion, we must ask whether the trial court
considered the totality of the circumstances in arriving
at its decision. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 295 Conn.
1, 9, 988 A.2d 276 (2010) (because power to declare
mistrial ‘‘ought to be used with the greatest caution,’’
trial judges must ‘‘tak[e] all the circumstances into con-
sideration’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further,
our review ‘‘must take into account the trial judge’s supe-
rior opportunity to assess the proceedings over which he
or she has personally presided.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Holley, 327 Conn. 576, 628, 175 A.3d
514 (2018).
   The risks inherent in an interruption of jury delibera-
tions are not lost on us. We appreciate the defendant’s
argument that, despite the best efforts of the trial court
and counsel for both parties, pausing jury deliberations
may increase the likelihood that jurors will forget the
nuances of each party’s arguments or tempt jurors to rush
to a consensus and be done with deliberations once and
for all. See, e.g., People v. Breceda, 76 Cal. App. 5th 71,
95, 290 Cal. Rptr. 3d 899 (2022) (acknowledging risks
created by interruption of more than seventy days during
trial but reasoning that, ‘‘although the delay was long, it
was unavoidable due to the pandemic’’), review denied,
California Supreme Court, Docket No. S274137 (June 15,
2022). We recognize these risks, but we also recognize the
unprecedented circumstances presented by the COVID-
19 pandemic. Throughout this period of uncertainty, just
as there were innumerable disruptions in government and
in society generally, there was always a risk of COVID-
19 infections causing delays from the outset of the trial.
This reality, combined with the trial court’s efforts to
obtain input from both parties on how to proceed once the
pandemic did in fact impact the trial while it assiduously
sought to protect the rights of both parties, leads us to
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion for a mistrial. We observe that the
defense failed to make any showing of prejudice or raise
any serious suspicion of identifiable harm resulting from
the delay.
  Although the defendant suggests that it would have
been ideal for the trial court to canvass each juror when the
jurors reconvened to ensure that they had not discussed
the case or investigated it on their own, the record demon-
strates that the trial court was mindful of and responsive
to concerns from both parties as they navigated the
deliberations delay. These efforts included, but were
not limited to, discussing hybrid trial options,7 ways to
conceal that the defendant was incarcerated if he were
to appear remotely and was the person who had tested
positive for COVID-19, how to notify the jury about the
scheduling change, and having counsel review the spe-
cific language the courtroom clerk would use when notify-
ing jurors about the trial delay.
   Our decision today is consistent with Connecticut case
law concerning a court’s management of trial delays,
which stresses the importance of considering the cir-
cumstances of each case in their entirety when determin-
ing whether the trial court properly exercised its discre-
tion in ruling on a mistrial motion. See State v. Gonzalez,
315 Conn. 564, 582–85, 109 A.3d 453 (‘‘[i]n light of all
the circumstances,’’ trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in excusing two jurors and beginning deliberations
anew sixteen days after close of evidence), cert. denied,
577 U.S. 843, 136 S. Ct. 84, 193 L. Ed. 2d 73 (2015). Our
conclusion is in line with the decisions of other courts
across the nation that have also had to grapple with
the legal impact of delays attributable to the pandemic.
See, e.g., People v. Breceda, supra, 76 Cal. App. 5th 95
(trial court’s pausing proceedings for more than seventy
days was not an abuse of discretion because COVID-
19 pandemic provided good cause, and defendant failed
to demonstrate actual prejudice from delay); State v.
Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691, 701–702 (Iowa 2023) (trial court
did not abuse its discretion by continuing proceedings
for nine days due to juror’s having tested positive for
COVID-19, as defendant’s concerns about jury rushing
through deliberations and forgetting evidence were specu-
lative); see also United States v. Frazier, 625 F. Supp.
3d 752, 755 (M.D. Tenn. 2022) (District Court denied
motion for mistrial despite COVID-19 having delayed
trial at least four times, reasoning that, ‘‘to the extent
that [the] [d]efendants complain about jurors forgetting
the testimony of witnesses due to the mere passage of
time, the same argument could have been made had the
trial proceeded without any hiccups, or in any lengthy
trial for that matter’’). Given all of the circumstances
surrounding the present case, including the precautions
taken by the trial court, we cannot say under governing
case law that the trial court abused its discretion.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
    This court has previously described three separate categories of ‘‘claims
involving an inconsistency between a conviction and an acquittal’’: (1) factu-
ally inconsistent verdicts, which occur when ‘‘the jury found that evidence
that was insufficient to support a set of facts necessary to convict on one
offense was sufficient to support the same set of facts necessary to convict
on another offense’’; State v. Arroyo, supra, 292 Conn. 580–81; (2) legally
inconsistent verdicts, which involve a ‘‘conviction of one offense and an
acquittal of a lesser included offense’’; id., 581; and (3) logically inconsistent
verdicts, which are verdicts that imply that ‘‘the jury’s conclusion was not
reasonably and logically reached.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
578. In Arroyo, we determined that factual, legal, and logical inconsistencies
that may arise between convictions and acquittals are all permissible. See
id., 583–84. The defendant in the present case has used the phrase ‘‘legally
inconsistent verdicts’’ to describe his conviction of home invasion and acquit-
tal of third degree burglary. Because of our disposition of this argument,
and because the parties do not dispute that the jury’s verdicts were inconsis-
tent, we need not categorize the jury’s verdicts.
   Our case law has also distinguished between ‘‘inconsistent verdicts,’’
which the trial court may accept, and ‘‘inconsistent convictions,’’ which the
trial court may not accept. Inconsistent verdicts refer to jury findings of
guilty and not guilty that contradict each other. Inconsistent convictions
arise, for example, when the jury finds the defendant guilty of multiple
offenses, ‘‘each of which requires a mutually exclusive and inconsistent
state of mind as an essential element for conviction . . . .’’ State v. King,
216 Conn. 585, 594, 583 A.2d 896 (1990); see State v. Arroyo, supra, 292
Conn. 583 n.21 (‘‘our holding is limited to cases involving an apparent
inconsistency between a conviction and an acquittal and does not apply
to inconsistent convictions’’ (emphasis in original)); State v. Knight, 266
Conn. 658, 667, 835 A.2d 47 (2003) (‘‘[T]he defendant was convicted of one
offense and acquitted of the other. [Because the court is] not dealing with
a situation in which the defendant is convicted of two offenses, and one
conviction negates the other, the verdicts are not legally inconsistent in the
usual sense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also United States
v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69 n.8, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1984) (in case
involving inconsistent verdicts, court made clear that ‘‘[n]othing in [its]
opinion is intended to decide the proper resolution of a situation where a
defendant is convicted of two crimes, where a guilty verdict on one count
logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other’’); State v. DeCaro, 252
Conn. 229, 242, 244 n.13, 745 A.2d 800 (2000) (distinguishing between cases
in which ‘‘a verdict of guilty on one count . . . appeared to be inconsistent
with a verdict of acquittal on another count,’’ and cases involving verdicts
that contradict each other or create a ‘‘legal impossibility’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
   2
     Both parties agreed that the trial court would instruct the jury that third
degree burglary was a lesser included offense of first degree burglary. The
court did not charge the jury that third degree burglary was also a lesser
included offense of home invasion. The state concedes on appeal that third
degree burglary is a lesser included offense of home invasion, even though
the trial court did not charge the jury to that effect. We accept the state’s
concession without further examination, along with the legal conclusion
that follows from it, namely, that the jury’s verdicts of guilty of home invasion
and not guilty of third degree burglary were legally inconsistent.
   3
     The jury found the defendant not guilty of first degree and third degree
burglary. Because the jury found the defendant guilty of home invasion,
consistent with the court’s instructions, the jury did not consider the second
degree burglary charge.
   4
     As Powell makes clear, the United States constitution does not require
appellate review of inconsistent verdicts. Because no other source of law
prohibits our courts from accepting inconsistent verdicts, we, like the United
States Supreme Court, essentially adopted the rule in Arroyo pursuant to
‘‘our supervisory powers over the . . . criminal process.’’ United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1984).
   5
     Because of the way that the parties agreed that the trial court would
charge the jury, the present case is not the archetypal inconsistent verdict
case. In particular, the trial court did not directly charge the jury that third
degree burglary was a lesser included offense of home invasion. Instead, it
charged that second degree burglary was a lesser included offense of home
invasion and that third degree burglary was a lesser included offense of
first degree burglary. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to infer either
that the jury was confused, that the jury consciously contravened the court’s
instructions, or that the jury was undertaking a conscious choice of lenity.
   6
     As we deliver this opinion, the health concerns posed by COVID-19,
while debated by some, remain part of the public consciousness. We pause
to describe the surrounding events that gave rise to the trial delay. COVID-
19, also known as coronavirus, is a ‘‘respiratory disease caused by a virus
that is transmitted easily from person to person and can result in serious
illness or death.’’ Casey v. Lamont, 338 Conn. 479, 482, 258 A.3d 647 (2021).
In 2020, the virus spread rapidly, eventually amounting to a global pandemic.
See id., 482–83. Government officials in Connecticut and virtually every-
where else ordered lockdowns and other measures to ‘‘abate the rate of
infection . . . .’’ Id., 482. At the height of the pandemic, many governmental
operations had to be curtailed significantly, including jury trials. See State
v. Washington, 345 Conn. 258, 285, 284 A.3d 280 (2022). Although ultimately
not dispositive of the defendant’s claim of error, it should be lost on no one
that, during this lengthy pandemic, when jury trials resumed, court staff,
jurors, witnesses, and attorneys all put their health at risk to honor the
rights of defendants to be tried by a jury of their peers.
   7
     The state proposed multiple ways to continue the proceedings while the
defendant was quarantined, such as remote access via videoconference or
by bringing him to the courthouse wearing an N95 mask. The defendant
declined the option of participating in the proceedings through a video call.
Ultimately, the trial court decided to postpone the trial until the defendant
could personally appear in the courtroom safely while the jury deliberated.