Court Opinion

ID: 9742159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:07:46.817809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:07.621182
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: The question this case presents is whether a defendant must move to withdraw her guilty plea before appealing her sentence in a case like this, in which the State dismissed a pending charge against defendant in exchange for her guilty plea to another charge, but in which the parties reached no agreement regarding sentencing. Following the supreme court’s teachings in Evans, Clark, and Linder, and consistent with our holding in Catron, we should hold that the Evans rule does apply here — that is, that a negotiated plea agreement occurred in this case, requiring defendant to move to withdraw her guilty plea, not just move to reconsider sentence, before she can appeal her sentence. Accordingly, we should dismiss the appeal. Because the majority opinion addresses defendant’s appeal on the merits, I respectfully dissent. The crux of the majority’s holding is its rejection of the idea that the State gives something up when it agrees to dismiss a charge in exchange for a defendant’s guilty plea without an agreement regarding either (1) the sentence the trial court will impose or (2) a cap on that sentence. The supreme court has never so held, and I disagree with the majority’s holding for the following reasons. The majority states that it “must acknowledge the fact that the State cannot always prove all of the charges that it files.” 308 Ill. App. 3d at 524. The trouble with this assessment is that it presumes the opposite is true — that is, that the State routinely files charges it cannot prove and that any charge it agrees to dismiss is meritless. In reality, the trial court does not know — and cannot know — which charges the State could prove and which charges it could not prove if a trial were held. Although, in a given case, the State cannot prove all of the charges originally filed, surely the State has given something of benefit to the defendant when it dismisses charges that it could have proved. Yet, a rule governing trial court admonitions to be given after a defendant has pleaded guilty cannot be premised on whether the State dismissed “good” charges or questionable ones. Because neither the trial court, this court, nor even (in most cases) the defendant can know the answer to that question, the rule must apply across the board. And that rule should be one that presumes all charges are filed in good faith and that dismissals made in exchange for guilty pleas are “negotiated” within the meaning of Evans. Contrary to the majority’s assertion that, under such a rule, “one must assume a defendant’s guilt to argue that the State has actually conceded something of value” (308 Ill. App. 3d at 525), all one must assume is that the State may have conceded something of value. Under the majority’s holding, an irrebuttable presumption exists that, in all cases, the State has conceded nothing of value — a. position that is demonstrably false. When a defendant appeals a guilty plea in violation of the Evans rule, the appellate court must dismiss that appeal. The supreme court in Linder was clear on this point: “Where a defendant fails to comply with the motion requirements of Rule 604(d), as these defendants did, the appellate court must dismiss the appeal (People v. Jamison, 181 Ill. 2d 24, 28-29 [, 690 N.E.2d 995, 997] (1998)), leaving the Post-Conviction Hearing Act [(725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 1996))] as the defendant’s only recourse (People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469, 471[, 665 N.E.2d 823, 824] (1996)).” Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74, 708 N.E.2d at 1173. Although defendant concedes that the rule from Evans and Linder applies to the negotiated guilty plea she entered, she nonetheless contends that the trial court’s post-guilty-plea admonitions were deficient. Specifically, defendant claims the court was duty-bound to inform her that, in order to challenge her sentence on appeal, she needed to first move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment, not just file a motion to reconsider. The problem with this argument is that the trial court, in its post-guilty-plea admonitions, complied fully with Rule 605(b) as presently written, and defendant does not even contend otherwise. Thus, defendant’s argument amounts to an attack on the adequacy of Rule 605(b) itself. In effect, defendant is arguing that the rule the supreme court has promulgated regarding admonitions for defendants who plead guilty, if followed, results in the denial of due process. This conclusion is not one we can reach. Thus, I disagree with the Second District’s opinion in Knowles, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 475, 710 N.E.2d at 1240, where that court, after concluding that the defendant should have filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and not just a motion to reconsider sentence before taking his appeal, wrote the following: “Since the trial court advised defendant that he could file either a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a motion to reconsider his sentence, fundamental fairness requires that we remand the cause with directions for the trial court to admonish defendant of his right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the consequences thereof, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)).” Although the Second District’s concerns are understandable, the remedy used in Knowles does not comport with the directions of the supreme court in Linder, particularly when the trial court’s admonitions fully comply with the requirements of Rule 605(b). As some have suggested, Rule 605(b) might be improved if it contained an explicit provision regarding negotiated pleas, containing the Evans rule verbatim within the body of Rule 605(b) itself. However, any modification of that rule must come from the supreme court, not this court.