Court Opinion

ID: 9914159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 18:02:03.082352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:25.655907
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/29/23 In re Andrea A. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re ANDREA A., a Person Coming Under the
    Juvenile Court Law.

    MERCED COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES                                                             F086567
    AGENCY,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. 21JP-00135D)
           Plaintiff and Respondent,

                    v.                                                                    OPINION
    MICHAEL M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. Donald J.
Proietti, Judge.
         Gregory M. Chappel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
         Forrest W. Hansen, County Counsel, and Ann Hanson, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and DeSantos, J.
       Appellant Michael M. (father) is the father of now six-year-old Andrea A., who is
the subject of this dependency case. Father challenges the juvenile court’s order issued at
a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 hearing that resulted in his parental
rights being terminated. Father contends the juvenile court and the Merced County
Human Services Agency (agency) failed to comply with the duty to inquire under the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law because extended family
members were not asked about the child’s possible Indian ancestry.2
       The agency concedes error and the parties have stipulated to an immediate limited
remand for the purpose of complying with the inquiry provisions of ICWA. For the
reasons discussed herein, we accept the agency’s concession of ICWA error. Consistent
with our decisions in In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 (K.H.) and In re E.C. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 123 (E.C.), we conclude “the error is prejudicial because neither the
agency nor the court gathered information sufficient to ensure a reliable finding that
ICWA does not apply and remanding for an adequate inquiry in the first instance is the
only meaningful way to safeguard the rights at issue. ([In re A.R. (2021)] 11 Cal.5th
[234,] 252–254.)” (K.H., at p. 591; accord, E.C., at pp. 157–158.) Accordingly, we
accept the stipulation, conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does
not apply, and remand with directions.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
       In October 2021, the agency filed a petition alleging the child and her
three siblings were described by section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (g), and (j). The

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise noted.
2      “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)
3      The sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA; therefore, we primarily restrict our facts
to those bearing on that issue.

                                             2.
allegations in the petition involved unsanitary home conditions and substance abuse by
mother, Selena M. (mother). The petition further alleged that father had been
incarcerated since 2019 and failed to provide care or support for the child. The agency’s
detention report indicated that mother and father had not been interviewed about potential
Indian ancestry. The report also noted that the juvenile court previously found ICWA
was not applicable as to father during dependency proceedings in 2014.
       At the detention hearing held on October 12, 2021, mother and father were not
present. The child was detained from mother’s custody, and a combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing was set for November 3, 2021. The agency’s jurisdiction and
disposition report recommended that the allegations in the petition be found true and
father be denied family reunification services pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivision (e)(1) due to his incarceration. Family reunification services were not
recommended for mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) because her
whereabouts were unknown. The child’s maternal aunt denied having any Indian
ancestry, but the agency had been unable to speak with mother and father.
       The agency sent notice to father at his correctional facility for the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. However, father refused to sign three separate “Prisoner’s Statement
Regarding Appearance at Hearing Affecting Parental Rights” forms (JV-451). Facility
staff indicated that father did not know the child, and he did not want to be bothered.
Mother and father were not present for the continued jurisdiction and disposition hearing
held on January 19, 2022. The juvenile court sustained the allegations of the petition,
denied family reunification services to mother and father, and set a section 366.26
hearing for May 11, 2022.
       On April 20, 2022, the juvenile court vacated the section 366.26 hearing because
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) required a status review to be completed in advance of a
section 366.26 hearing The agency’s report for the six-month review hearing
recommended that a section 366.26 hearing be set due to mother’s whereabouts

                                              3.
remaining unknown. At the six-month review hearing, the court found that mother’s
whereabouts were unknown, and a section 366.26 hearing was set for September 12,
2022.
        Father made his first appearance at the initial section 366.26 hearing by video, and
he was appointed counsel. He indicated that he previously provided support for the child
and considered her to be his child. The juvenile court noted the previous ICWA finding
from the dependency proceedings in 2014, and it asked if father had learned any new
information regarding the family’s ancestry. Father responded that the paternal
grandfather disclosed Navajo ancestry, but the paternal grandfather and great-grandfather
were deceased. The paternal grandmother was identified as a person who might have
more information about the family’s possible Indian ancestry.
        The juvenile court directed father to fill out ICWA-020 and ICWA-030 forms to
provide information for a determination on the applicability of ICWA. The court noted
that follow up should be completed to determine if his mother or another family member
could provide any information regarding Indian ancestry, but it did not find that there was
reason to believe the child might be an Indian child. The hearing was continued at the
agency’s request to allow for the completion of the agency’s report. After additional
continuances for the completion of the report and genetic testing, a continued
section 366.26 hearing was held on January 9, 2023. Father was found to be the
biological father of the child, and he reported a release date from custody in
October 2023.
        In its section 366.26 report, filed on March 22, 2023, the agency recommended
that the juvenile court terminate the parental rights of mother and father and order a
permanent plan of adoption for the child. The child was placed with a sibling, and their
care provider was committed to providing a permanent plan of adoption for the child and
sibling. The ICWA status section of the report documented the maternal grandmother’s

                                             4.
denial of Indian ancestry, and the social worker left a voicemail for the paternal
grandmother to inquire about ICWA on the date the report was filed.
       On May 8, 2023, father’s counsel filed a section 388 petition requesting an order
of reunification services. The juvenile court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for the date
of the pending section 366.26 hearing. After further continuances, the combined
section 388 and section 366.26 hearing proceeded on May 16, 2023, with father present
by video. Father testified in support of his request for reunification services, but the
juvenile court ultimately denied his section 388 petition. After hearing additional
testimony from father and argument from counsel, the juvenile court followed the
agency’s recommendation and terminated the parental rights of mother and father and
selected a plan of adoption.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Father contends there were extended family members, including the paternal
grandmother, the agency could have interviewed regarding the child’s Indian ancestry but
did not. Therefore, he argues, the agency failed to fulfill its duty of inquiry under ICWA
and the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not apply. The agency concedes this
point and we concur.
       A. Applicable Law
       ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect Indian children and to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum
federal standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow before removing
an Indian child from his or her family. (25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re Isaiah W. (2016)
1 Cal.5th 1, 7–8.) In any “proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child’s
tribe … have a right to intervene” (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)), and may petition the court to
invalidate any foster care placement of an Indian child made in violation of ICWA (25
U.S.C. § 1914; see § 224, subd. (e)). An “ ‘Indian child’ ” is defined in ICWA as an

                                              5.
unmarried individual under 18 years of age who is either (1) a member of a federally
recognized Indian tribe, or (2) eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe and
is the biological child of a member of a federally recognized tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)
& (8); see § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal definitions].)
       In every dependency proceeding, the agency and the juvenile court have an
“affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian
child .…” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a);4 see § 224.2, subd. (a); In re W.B. (2012)
55 Cal.4th 30, 53; In re Gabriel G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1165.) The continuing
duty to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child “can be divided into
three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to
provide formal ICWA notice.” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)
       The initial duty to inquire arises at the referral stage when the reporting party is
asked whether it has “any information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (a).) Once a child is received into temporary custody, the initial duty to inquire
includes asking the child, parents, legal guardian, extended family members, and others
who have an interest in the child whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.
(§§ 224.2, subd. (b), 306, subd. (b).) The juvenile court has a duty at the first appearance
of each parent to ask whether he or she “knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) The court must also require each parent to complete
form ICWA-020. (Rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).)
       Next, a duty of further inquiry arises when the agency or the juvenile court has
“reason to believe” the proceedings involve an Indian child but “does not have sufficient
information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (e).) As recently clarified by the Legislature, a “reason to believe” exists
when the juvenile court or agency “has information suggesting that either the parent of

4      All rule references refer to the California Rules of Court.

                                              6.
the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”
(Id., subd. (e)(1).)
       If there is a reason to believe an Indian child is involved, the juvenile court or the
agency “shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and
shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Further inquiry
includes, but is not limited to, “[i]nterviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended
family members,” and contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the State Department of
Social Services, and the tribes and any other person who may have information.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)–(C).)
       The final duty component arises when the court or agency has “ ‘reason to
know’ ” the child is an Indian child. (In re D.F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 567.) A
“reason to know” exists if one of the following circumstances is present: “(1) A person
having an interest in the child … informs the court that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶]
(2) The residence … of the child [or] the child’s parents … is on a reservation or in an
Alaska Native village[;] [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding … informs the court
that it has discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (4) The
child … gives the court reason to know that the child is an Indian child[;] [¶] (5) The
court is informed that the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court[; or] [¶] (6) The
court is informed that either parent or the child possess[es] an identification card
indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)–(6).)
       If the juvenile court makes a finding that proper and adequate further inquiry and
due diligence have been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child, the court may make a finding that the ICWA does not apply, subject to
reversal if the court subsequently receives information providing reason to believe the
child is an Indian child. If the court receives such information, it must direct the social
worker or probation officer to conduct further inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)

                                              7.
       B. Standard of Review
       “The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on
two elemental determinations, ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143.) First, “[t]he court must find there is ‘no
reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,’ which is dependent upon whether
any of the six circumstances set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply.” (K.H., at
p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., at p. 143.) Second, “[t]he juvenile
court must … find a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence .…’ ” (K.H.,
at p. 601.)
       Under the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘a reviewing court should “not reweigh
the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.”
[Citation.] The determinations should “be upheld if … supported by substantial
evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court
might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” ’ [Citations.] The
standard recognizes that ‘[t]rial courts “generally are in a better position to evaluate and
weigh the evidence” than appellate courts’ [citation], and ‘an appellate court should
accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence in the record’ [citation]. ‘[I]f a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make
credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer.’ ” (K.H.,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.)
       The juvenile court’s finding on the second element, however, “is ultimately
discretionary because it requires the juvenile court to ‘engage in a delicate balancing of’
various factors in assessing whether the agency’s inquiry was proper and adequate within
the context of ICWA and California law, and whether the agency acted with due
diligence.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 640; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143; Ezequiel G. (2022) 81

                                              8.
Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid standard and review the
court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of discretion. (K.H., at p. 601;
accord, E.C., at pp. 143–144; Ezequiel G., at pp. 1004–1005.)
       “ ‘Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different [from review for substantial
evidence], focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard.
A court abuses its discretion only when “ ‘ “the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ”
[Citation.] But “ ‘ “[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court[.]” ’ ” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of
determination under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to
be very pronounced.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord, E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at pp. 143–144.)
       “Review of the juvenile court’s findings under the foregoing standards is
deferential, but ‘ “an appellate court [nevertheless] exercises its independent judgment to
determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ [Citations.] Where the material
facts are undisputed, courts have applied independent review to determine whether
ICWA’s requirements were satisfied.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.)
       C. Analysis
       Pursuant to its duty under section 224.2, the agency asked father whether he had
any Indian heritage. The child’s father claimed potential Indian ancestry through a
Navajo tribe, and he identified the paternal grandmother as an individual who may have
additional information about the family’s Indian ancestry. The child’s maternal aunt and
grandmother both denied any Indian ancestry existed on the child’s maternal side. Based
upon this information, the juvenile court found there was no reason to believe the child
was an Indian child. The agency’s duty of inquiry, however, did not end with asking

                                               9.
father and maternal relatives. The agency was also required to attempt contact with
paternal relatives having potential knowledge of Indian ancestry.
       Extended family members include adults who are the children’s stepparents,
grandparents, siblings, brothers- or sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and
first or second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).) There was at least
one additional extended family member, a paternal grandmother, who the agency had
been directed to contact in September 2022. The only attempt to contact the paternal
grandmother was documented six months later through a single voicemail on the date the
section 366.26 report was filed.
       Under the circumstances, we conclude the agency did not fulfill its statutory duty
of inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) As a result, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did
not apply was not supported by substantial evidence that the agency conducted an
adequate, proper, and duly diligent inquiry, and its contrary conclusion was an abuse of
discretion. Because the failure in this case concerned the agency’s duty of initial inquiry,
only state law is involved. “Where a violation is of only state law, we may not reverse
unless we find that the error was prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [‘No judgment
shall be set aside … unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice’].)” (In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.)
       “ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must
clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of
justice’ [citations], and California law generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage
of justice requirement ‘as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it
reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but
for the error.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 606–607.)

                                             10.
       However, in In re A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th 234, the Supreme Court “recognized that
while we generally apply a Watson[5] likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, a
merits-based outcome-focused test is not always appropriate because it cannot always
adequately measure the relevant harm. [Citation.] In other words, where the injury
caused by the error is unrelated to an outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of
prejudice to such an outcome misplaces the measure, at the expense of the rights the law
in question was designed to protect.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, italics
omitted.)
       As we explained in K.H., “ ‘ICWA compliance presents a unique situation .…’ ”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) “ICWA is not directed at reaching, or
protecting, a specific outcome on the merits.” (Id. at p. 609.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he purpose of
ICWA and related California statutes is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it
to determine whether the child is an Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to
intervene in the proceedings’ [citation], and an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the
information gathering upon which the court’s ICWA determination will rest.” (Id. at
p. 608.) Yet, “while the appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the
burden of gathering information in compliance with ICWA [citations], and parents may
raise the claim of error for the first time on appeal.” (Ibid.) Further, the ultimate
determination whether a child is an Indian child rests with the tribe, not with a parent, the
agency, or the juvenile court. (K.H., at p. 596.)
       “[I]f the inquiry is inadequate at the outset, the likelihood that the opportunity to
gather relevant information will present itself later in the proceeding declines
precipitously.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.) Thus, “the relevant injury under
ICWA is not tied to whether the appealing parent can demonstrate to the juvenile court or
a reviewing court a likelihood of success on the merits of whether a child is an Indian

5      People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

                                             11.
child[, under a standard Watson analysis]. The relevant rights under ICWA belong to
Indian tribes and they have a statutory right to receive notice where an Indian child may
be involved so that they may make that determination. It necessarily follows that [in the
context of ICWA and consistent with A.R.,] the prejudice to those rights lies in the failure
to gather and record the very information the juvenile court needs to ensure accuracy in
determining whether further inquiry or notice is required, and whether ICWA does or
does not apply. Many cases do not proceed beyond the inquiry at the first stage in the
compliance process and, therefore, ensuring adequacy and accuracy at this first step is
critical if the rights of tribes under ICWA and California law are to be meaningfully
safeguarded, as was intended by Congress and our state Legislature.” (Id. at p. 591.)
       As we explained in K.H., “where the opportunity to gather the relevant
information critical to determining whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost
because there has not been adequate inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is
generally the only effective safeguard.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 610.) Here,
the agency’s inquiry, limited only to father, a maternal aunt, and the maternal
grandmother “fell well short of that required to gather the information needed to
meaningfully safeguard the rights of the tribes, as intended under ICWA and California
law.” (Id. at p. 620.) “Where a record is silent or nearly silent with respect to an ICWA
inquiry at the first step, a finding of harmlessness necessarily rests on speculation” and
“is at odds with the statutory protections that ICWA and California law intend to afford
Indian children and Indian tribes.” (Id. at p. 611.) Therefore, the error is prejudicial.
       Before reversing or vacating a judgment based upon a stipulation of the parties, an
appellate court must find “both of the following: [¶] (A) There is no reasonable
possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the
reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion
of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the
availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” (Code

                                             12.
Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).) Because this case would be subject to reversal to permit
compliance with ICWA and corresponding California statutes and rules absent the
parties’ stipulation, a stipulated remand advances the interests identified by Code of Civil
Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). (See In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
376, 379–382.) Thus, we accept the parties’ joint stipulation for a limited remand for the
purpose of complying with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and an immediate issuance of
the remittitur.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order the agency to
comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2,
subdivisions (b) and (e), and rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an adequate
inquiry was made consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds that ICWA
applies, the court shall proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If
the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate its ICWA
finding. In all other respects, the court’s order terminating father’s parental rights is
affirmed. By stipulation of the parties, the Clerk/Executive Officer of this court is
directed to issue the remittitur immediately. (Rule 8.272(c)(1).)

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