Court Opinion

ID: 9797304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:18:07.177556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:22.748428
License: Public Domain

SERNA, Justice (specially concurring). {25} I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately only to emphasize the limited scope of the majority opinion and to provide additional guidance to trial courts on this issue. {26} As the majority and dissenting opinions in this case explain, trial courts must assess a number of factors in determining whether a show of authority transformed an otherwise consensual encounter into an investigatory stop. Based on the trial court’s suppression of the evidence, we view the evidence relating to these factors in a light most favorable to the ruling. This ease involves two armed, uniformed officers approaching two juveniles on an empty street at night after making visual contact with the juveniles and observing their movements for a period of time. Indulging all reasonable presumptions in favor of the district court’s ruling, we must presume that the district court inferred from these historical facts, based on context, based on the characteristics of the individuals being approached, and based on witness demeanor, that this constituted a threatening officer presence. I do not believe that such an inference could be characterized as clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence. Additionally, the officers made a focused inquiry about illegal activity and did not accept the juveniles’ failure to answer. We must again presume that the district court inferred that this line of questioning was accusatory and indicated to the juveniles that a response to the question was compulsory. Although there is no indication from the audiotape transcript of the suppression hearing that the officers used a coercive tone of voice, the trial court is in a better position to draw such inferences from the officers’ demeanor and the background facts, including the locality in which the encounter occurred, the officers’ pointed interest in Filemon M., the failure to advise Jason L. that he was not under arrest and was free to leave, and the use of commanding language to initiate the encounter. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (“[T]he subjective intent of the officers is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police conduct only to the extent that that intent has been conveyed to the person confronted.”). Thus, I believe that this finding is also supported by substantial evidence. {27} Of course, another district court could draw different inferences from these facts, especially considering that defendants bear the initial burden of demonstrating that a consensual encounter has been transformed into an investigatory stop by a show of authority, see State v. Baldonado, 115 N.M. 106, 110, 847 P.2d 751, 755 (Ct.App.1992). Thus, by holding that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court does not hold that the presence of two armed, uniformed officers constitutes a threatening presence as a matter of law. Compare United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1454 (10th Cir.1992) (“Defendant was outnumbered, and he knew it.”), overruled in part by United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir.1994) (en banc) (Little I), with United States v. Mixon, No. 98-3004, 1999 WL 436269, at *3 (10th Cir. June 29, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (“The plain-clothed officers approached Defendant and Mr. Rodriguez displaying their badges to identify themselves. The number of officers-two-matched the number of individuals being questioned-Defendant and Mr. Rodriguez. We cannot say that this constituted a threatening presence.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1066, 120 S.Ct. 624, 145 L.Ed.2d 517 (1999). Additionally, the Court does not create a per se rule that juveniles in general are more likely to feel coerced by police questioning. See Little I, 18 F.3d at 1505 n. 7 (“[Wjhat we reject are rules which state or imply that all women, all minorities, or all young people are always more vulnerable to coercion.”). Finally, the majority opinion does not and should not imply that this Court has created a per se rule that an officer’s question about criminal conduct, even if repeated after a failure to answer, constitutes coercive conduct. See United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir.1997) (rejecting a per se rule that particularized focus, incriminating questions, and a request for consent to search constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1499 (10th Cir.1996) (“Asking questions which may elicit incriminating answers is irrelevant to a determination of whether an encounter was consensual, although the manner in which the questions are asked is relevant; ‘accusatory, persistent, and intrusive’ questioning may turn an otherwise voluntary encounter into a coercive one if it conveys the message that compliance is required.”). Instead, we merely presume from the district court’s ruling that the court reasonably inferred from the specific factual context in this case that the questioning conveyed a message that a response was compelled at the time that the officer repeated the question concerning weapons. {28} Once these historical facts, accompanied by reasonable inferences and presumptions, have been established, the question of whether these facts rise to the level of a seizure invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo. Applying the historical facts, including the reasonable inferences of a threatening officer presence and coercive questioning, to the legal question of whether, under the totality of circumstances, a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the police encounter, I agree with the majority that the district court properly concluded that Jason L. was seized at the time the officers repeated the question about weapons. {29} I would emphasize, however, the limited scope of this legal conclusion. This conclusion is not based on the sole fact of a repeated question concerning criminal activity. As courts have observed, the legal question of seizure should be determined on the basis of the totality of circumstances and will only rarely rest on any single factor. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (rejecting a per se conclusion of a seizure based on the single factor of a confined location and stating, “We adhere to the rule that, in order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”); Glass, 128 F.3d at 1406 (“[Tjhis court has steadfastly refused to view any one of [the] factors as dispositive”). {30} Additionally, the Court does not conclude that Defendant was seized prior to the time that Officer McDaniel repeated the question about weapon possession. In other words, even accepting the district court’s determination of a threatening officer presence and, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the ruling, accepting that the officers ordered the juveniles to “come here,” asked what they were doing, and asked for the first time whether the boys had weapons, these facts do not amount to a seizure as a matter of law, Cf. Hernandez, 93 F.3d at 1499 (“A limited number of routine questions about travel plans and relationship to passengers, followed by a question about possession of contraband and a request to search, are not sufficient to render an otherwise consensual encounter coercive.”); United States v. Angell, 11 F.3d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir.1993) (“In the light of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that [the officer’s] actual language [of ‘Stay there’ or ‘Hold it right there’], although perhaps somewhat more peremptory than precatory in tone, did not convert what would clearly have been a consensual encounter into a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); Brown v. City of Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir.1999) (similar); United States v. Sanchez, 89 F.3d 715, 718 (10th Cir.1996) (similar); United States v. Polk, 97 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that the display of a badge for the second time and informing the individual that the officer is on narcotics detail does not, “standing alone, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure”). The totality of circumstances amounted to a seizure as a matter of law only when the officers, by repeating the question in the context of the encounter up until that time, conveyed the message to a reasonable person that a response was compulsory. {31} I would stress that, even with the district court’s inferences regarding the presence of the officers and the nature of the questioning, this case presents a very close question under the Fourth Amendment. See generally Glass, 128 F.3d at 1407 (discussing Bloom, in which the court held that a seizure occurred when two DEA agents, one of whom was uniformed and armed, confronted the defendant in a private train compartment, blocked the defendant’s exit, asked if he was carrying drugs, and asked for consent to search luggage, and stating that “[e]ven with the presence of these factors ... Bloom was a close case”). In future eases, the absence of even one of the relevant circumstances present in this ease might call for a different legal conclusion under federal law. See id. (discussing United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir.1994)). “[Characterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a ‘seizure,’ while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (Opinion of Stewart, J.). {32} I would finally like to point out that the majority opinion should not be interpreted as expressing any view as to whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Filemon M. Indeed, I agree with the dissent that, under the facts of this case, reasonable suspicion did exist with respect to Filemon M. prior to the frisk even though there was no particularized reasonable suspicion with respect to Jason L. at that time. I also agree with the dissent that, if Jason L. had not been seized by the officers prior to the frisk of Filemon M., the discovery of two firearms on Filemon M., combined with the close proximity of Jason L. to the officers, would sufficiently justify a limited pat-down of Jason L. for weapons in order to ensure officer safety. However, because I conclude that Jason L. was seized prior to the frisk of Filemon M., and thus prior to a credible threat to officer safety, I must agree with the majority that the district court properly granted Defendant’s motion to suppress.