Court Opinion

ID: 9961673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 15:04:15.009841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:18.880781
License: Public Domain

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                         STATE OF FLORIDA
                         _____________________________

                                Case No. 6D23-509
                           Lower Tribunal No. 18-CF-306
                         _____________________________

                            CARLOS LORENZO GONZALEZ,

                                      Appellant,
                                           v.

                                  STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                       Appellee.
                         _____________________________

                Appeal from the Circuit Court for Highlands County.
                            Angela J. Cowden, Judge.

                                    April 19, 2024

STARGEL, J.

      Carlos Lorenzo Gonzalez appeals his conviction for second-degree murder

with a weapon.1 Gonzalez argues that reversal is necessary because (1) the trial

court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal when the State failed

to present sufficient evidence to prove the intent element of second-degree murder,

and (2) the trial court declined to instruct the jury on justifiable use of deadly force.

      1
       This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this
Court on January 1, 2023.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal without

further discussion. As to Gonzalez’s argument that the trial court erred by refusing

to give the requested portion of the jury instruction on justifiable use of deadly force,

we agree. While the evidence presented in support of Gonzalez’s theory of the case

was slight, we cannot find this error to be harmless because it goes to the heart of

his theory of defense, and a jury could have found reasonable doubt under the

requested instruction. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. Background

      After Gonzalez was charged with the murder of Martin Zuniga (“Zuniga”), a

jury trial was held wherein the State presented the testimony of Gonzalez’s wife,

Ana Bosque; two detectives; a deputy sheriff; and the medical examiner. Gonzalez

did not testify, nor did he present any witnesses. Bosque testified that Gonzalez and

she were planning a move to Key West, so Gonzalez went to an agricultural store to

find help with moving some boxes because of his recent pacemaker surgery.

Gonzalez found two men who agreed to assist, one of whom was Zuniga, and after

arriving back at the house, Gonzalez and the two men eventually began to drink beer

together. Later, one of the men wanted to leave and Gonzalez drove him back to the

store. Zuniga rode along.

      After Gonzalez and Zuniga returned to the house, they continued drinking

beer and rum. According to Bosque, Gonzalez and Zuniga were still drinking

                                           2
together when she went to bed around 8:00 p.m. Around 9:00 p.m., Gonzalez woke

Bosque up so she could make sure Zuniga left the house because Gonzalez had asked

him to leave. Bosque testified that Zuniga, who had been asleep on their couch,

refused to leave, so she threatened to call the police; Zuniga was quiet and groggy,

and she did not hear him say anything. Zuniga then struggled to walk to the door,

and, instead of taking the porch stairs as Bosque instructed, he went the other way,

fell off the porch, and landed on the ground outside.

      Bosque decided to call 911 because she wanted someone to come get Zuniga

out of her yard. She testified that it took law enforcement approximately fifteen

minutes to arrive at her home. During those fifteen minutes, Gonzalez was outside.

While she was waiting inside for the police, Bosque opened the front door and saw

Gonzalez outside holding a butcher knife—one she recognized as coming from her

kitchen drawer. When Gonzalez walked back inside, Bosque saw blood on the knife

and made a second call to 911. She told the dispatcher, “I have this guy in my yard.

He won’t leave. And he had a fight with my husband . . . .” She continued, “[H]e’s

been—he’s laying down on my ground. I keep telling him to leave, but he won’t

leave . . . and he just started fighting. He was punching my husband.”

      Bosque, who had not been drinking, testified that it appeared Gonzalez had

been drinking, and he was “a little bit angry because,” he had told her, “the guy had

punched him.” She acknowledged that she did not actually see nor hear any

                                         3
altercation even though the windows were open. After police arrived, Bosque saw

Zuniga lying in the same place he had landed when he had fallen off the porch earlier.

        Law enforcement found Zuniga in the front yard in a pool of blood with a stab

wound in his chest. No weapons were found on or near Zuniga. The first deputy to

arrive on scene asked Bosque what happened, and she stated, “My husband stabbed

him.”       Zuniga was transported by EMS to the hospital where he ultimately

succumbed to his injuries.

        Detective San Miguel testified as to Gonzalez’s statements to law

enforcement. When questioned by police, Gonzalez indicated that he hired Zuniga

and another man to help move boxes because he could not lift heavy items due to a

recent pacemaker implant surgery.2 Gonzalez brought the men to his residence to

show them the job, and they drank some beer. Gonzalez then took the other man

back to the store, but Zuniga returned with Gonzalez because he wanted to drink

more beer. Gonzalez believed Zuniga had also been drinking when he picked him

up from the store. After drinking more beer and various liquors at Gonzalez’s

residence, Zuniga wanted to stay the night on the couch, but Gonzalez refused, and

Bosque told him to leave.

       Gonzalez’s interview with police was done with Detective San Miguel, who
        2

provided Spanish translation.

                                          4
      Gonzalez told police that Zuniga got up and walked out the door, but when

Gonzalez went outside to make sure he was gone, Zuniga was sitting down, hiding

under the porch. When Gonzalez again told Zuniga to leave, Zuniga punched him

in the jaw, grabbed him by the throat, and threw him to the ground. Gonzalez went

inside, grabbed the knife, and came back out to scare Zuniga off, but Zuniga was

standing by a ladder and grabbed him by the throat again.

      When Gonzalez was asked what he did after Zuniga grabbed him by the throat,

Detective San Miguel stated that Gonzalez explained:

      [H]e was grabbing him by the throat and grabbing him and punching
      him at the same time, whenever he had the knife in his hands, so he just
      went up and stabbed him. He said that – he said that his jaw was hurting
      from where he was getting punched. He said he didn’t know what was
      up. It was like he was on something. He was just acting crazy. Just
      keeps saying he was laughing and crying and acting crazy. He swears
      on his grandmother’s life that he had to stab him, because the guy was
      starting to choke him. He wouldn’t let him go, and he would not leave.

Gonzalez later gave law enforcement different accounts of what led to Zuniga’s

stabbing. Gonzalez did not testify at trial, but his recorded statement given to the

detectives while at the scene was played for the jury.

      Law enforcement at the scene did not observe any injuries to Gonzalez, any

grass or dirt on him, any signs of a struggle in the yard at any of the locations

Gonzalez indicated an altercation took place, or any signs on Zuniga’s hands

indicating he had choked or punched anyone. An autopsy revealed that Zuniga’s

cause of death was a single eight-inch-deep stab wound to the chest. The medical

                                          5
examiner testified it would take “some force” to penetrate that deep in the middle of

Zuniga’s chest. The medical examiner further testified that Zuniga had no defensive

wounds and, based on the “in and out” nature of the wound, was not moving when

he was stabbed. However, Zuniga had a contusion on his head suggesting he had

fallen backward which, according to the medical examiner, was consistent with him

falling from the porch.

      The medical examiner also testified that Zuniga’s blood alcohol level was at

least .335—more than four times the legal limit—at the time blood was drawn,

which was at least ninety minutes after the stabbing. According to the medical

examiner, a blood alcohol level of .335 would probably have rendered Zuniga

comatose, unconscious, or asleep, and he would have had no purposeful movement.

When asked whether Zuniga could have fallen and hit his head after being stabbed,

the medical examiner stated, “He would not be walking with this level. I doubt that

he [was] walking with this level[] of alcohol.”

II. The Charge Conference and Jury Instructions

      During the charge conference, the State, defense, and the trial judge agreed

that Standard Jury Instruction 7.1, “Introduction to Homicide,” should be given to

the jury. Defense counsel submitted a written request to have Standard Jury

Instruction 3.6(f) read to the jury, but the written request simply included a printout

of six pages of standard instructions for various scenarios—not a document with

                                          6
specific information for this case; however, during the charge conference, defense

counsel stated that they were only asking the court to give the instructions on the

first page. The first page, in toto, reads as follows:

      It is a defense to the crime of second-degree murder with a weapon if
      the actions of (defendant) constituted the justifiable use of deadly force.
      “Deadly force” means force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
      “Great bodily harm” means great as distinguished from slight, trivial,
      minor or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.
      The use of deadly force is justifiable if defendant reasonably believed
      that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
      harm to himself while resisting any attempt to commit (applicable
      felony) upon him. 3

The instruction then directs the trial court to provide the elements of the applicable

felony that the victim is alleged to have attempted to commit. While there are more

sections of Instruction 3.6(f) that may be applicable to the facts of this case, defense

counsel only requested the first page of his submission be read to the jury.4

      3
         This is the applicable version of Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f) that was in
effect at the time of Gonzalez’s trial. This section is based on section 782.02, Florida
Statutes (1997), and the applicable felony Zuniga was allegedly attempting to
commit was aggravated battery.
       4
         While Gonzalez makes additional arguments that other portions of Standard
Jury Instruction 3.6(f) were applicable to his case and should have been given, as
noted above, defense counsel specifically advised the trial court that he only sought
the instructions on the first page of his written submission of the requested
instruction. Because no other portions of the instruction were requested during the
charge conference, and Gonzalez does not raise fundamental error, those additional
arguments are unpreserved for appellate review. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d
332, 338 (Fla. 1982) (“Except in cases of fundamental error, an appellate court will
not consider an issue unless it was presented to the lower court. Furthermore, in
order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must have been the specific

                                           7
      The trial judge denied Gonzalez’s motion to give the requested portion of

Instruction 3.6(f), finding that Instruction 7.1 contained sufficient instructions on the

justifiable use of deadly force based on the testimony and evidence and that the

requested portion of Instruction 3.6(f) would have been “duplicative.”             Since

Instruction 7.1 instructs that a homicide is justifiable “if necessarily done while

resisting an attempt to murder or commit a felony,” the trial court questioned defense

counsel regarding the applicable felony Gonzalez asserted that Zuniga was

attempting to commit against Gonzalez, and counsel responded that aggravated

battery would be applicable. The prosecutor inquired whether the jury would be

instructed that a punch to the face and/or grabbing of the throat is not a felony.

Defense counsel indicated he believed that the packet of jury instructions, aside from

his request for the portion of 3.6(f), was “sufficient” and he didn’t want to “start

adding issues that don’t exist.” The trial court responded:

      And I understand that as well, which is the reason I was concerned
      about using the justifiable use of deadly force, because the instruction
      requires the Court to insert the name and elements of the applicable
      felony, and a punch is a misdemeanor battery; a grabbing around the
      throat is a misdemeanor battery, because there is not any allegation that

contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.”
(citations omitted)). Moreover, even assuming the trial court had given the requested
portion of the Instruction 3.6(f), Gonzalez waived any error in the failure to give the
remainder of the instruction. See Armstrong v. State, 579 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1991)
(holding that by affirmatively requesting an abbreviated instruction on excusable
homicide, which the trial court gave, the defendant waived any claim of error in the
instruction).

                                           8
       any weapon was used or that there was a loss of consciousness or that
       it reached the level of being a felony.

No additional instructions were given, although the parties were permitted to argue

the differences between a battery and aggravated battery, provided they did not

misstate the law.

       At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Gonzalez guilty as charged of

second-degree murder with a weapon. The trial court adjudicated Gonzalez guilty

and sentenced him to life in prison.

III.   Analysis

       The trial judge determined that Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 “fully

encompasses the instruction to the jury so that they can understand Mr. Gonzalez’s

position that the killing was justifiable and lawful, if necessarily done while resisting

an attempt to murder or commit a felony upon himself . . . if that were what the jury

believed.” Gonzalez argues that the trial court’s decision to withhold the requested

instruction on justifiable use of deadly force constituted reversible error because the

given instruction on justifiable homicide did not identify the elements of the

applicable felony, attempted aggravated battery.5

       5
        Gonzalez argues that the trial court also erred by failing to give an instruction
on the duty to retreat. However, defense counsel specifically advised the trial court
that Gonzalez only sought the instructions on the first page of his written submission
of the requested instruction, which did not include language on the duty to retreat.
Because that instruction was not requested during the charge conference, this
argument is unpreserved. See Steinhorst, 412 So. 2d at 338.

                                           9
        Justifiable Homicide and Legal Standard for Jury Instructions

      “Florida law justifies the use of deadly force if someone ‘reasonably believes

that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or

great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent

commission of a forcible felony.’” Jackson v. State, 253 So. 3d 738, 740 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2018) (citing Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2)). However, “[i]n most cases, a person in

a fist fight lacks a sufficient justification to use deadly force.” Jackson, 253 So. 3d

at 740. Attempted aggravated battery is a third-degree felony. See § 777.04(4)(d)1,

Fla. Stat. (2017). Aggravated battery occurs when a person committing battery (1)

intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or

permanent disfigurement; or (2) uses a deadly weapon. § 784.045(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

(2017). Here, because Zuniga was unarmed, the only way an attempted aggravated

battery could have been committed upon Gonzalez was if Zuniga intentionally or

knowingly attempted to cause great bodily harm.

      “The question of self-defense is one of fact[] and is one for the jury to decide

where the facts are disputed.” Dias v. State, 812 So. 2d 487, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA

2002). A trial court’s decision to withhold “a proposed jury instruction is reviewed

under the abuse of discretion standard of review.” Aumuller v. State, 944 So. 2d

1137, 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Bozeman v. State, 714 So. 2d 570, 572

(Fla. 1st DCA 1998)). “Nevertheless, in a criminal proceeding, the trial court’s

                                          10
discretion is limited by the defendant’s right to have the jury instructed on any valid

theory of defense supported by record evidence.” Cliff Berry Inc. v. State, 116 So.

3d 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (citing Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 994 (Fla. 2006)).

“[A] defendant is ‘entitled to a jury instruction on his theory of the case if there is

any evidence to support it,’ no matter how flimsy that evidence might be.” Wright

v. State, 705 So. 2d 102, 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (quoting Garramone v. State, 636

So. 2d 869, 870 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)). While “[a] trial court is accorded broad

discretion in formulating appropriate jury instructions,” Barton Protective Svcs., Inc.

v. Faber, 745 So. 2d 968, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the “failure to give a requested

instruction constitutes reversible error if: (1) the requested instruction accurately

states the law; (2) the facts of the case support the instruction; and (3) the instruction

is necessary to allow the jury to properly resolve all issues in the case.” Elder v.

State, 296 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (citing Campbell v. State, 812 So. 2d

540, 544 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)).

      “In determining whether to give the requested instruction, the trial court

should consider the evidence in the main case without weighing the evidence.”

Rockerman v. State, 773 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). “The proper test is

whether the charge as a whole adequately presents the law upon the issues.” Kuba

v. Leb, 464 So. 2d 601, 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). “Reversible error occurs when an

instruction is not only an erroneous or incomplete statement of the law, but is also

                                           11
confusing or misleading.” Dockswell v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., 210 So. 3d 1201,

1214 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Gross v. Lyons, 721 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)).

      Further, to warrant a self-defense instruction, “the defendant does not have to

testify at trial; his or her statement to the police admitted into evidence may be

sufficient.” Sipple v. State, 972 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). “[I]f a jury

can reasonably infer from circumstantial evidence presented at trial that the

defendant had the state of mind necessary for self-defense, then the defendant is

entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense.” Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042,

1047 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (citing Johnson v. State, 634 So. 2d 1144, 1145 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1994)).

                   Justifiable Homicide’s Application to this Case

      The key differences between Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 and Standard Jury

Instruction 3.6(f) are as follows: Instruction 7.1 states that “[t]he killing of a human

being is justifiable homicide and lawful if necessarily done while resisting an attempt

to murder or commit a felony upon the defendant,” whereas the requested portion of

Instruction 3.6(f) states, in pertinent part: “The use of deadly force is justifiable if

defendant reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent imminent

death or great bodily harm to himself while resisting any attempt to commit

(applicable felony) upon him.” (Emphasis added).           The requested portion of

                                          12
Instruction 3.6(f) also includes the elements of aggravated battery as the applicable

attempted felony.

         Under the facts of this case, Standard Jury Instruction 7.1, on its own, was not

a complete statement of the applicable law concerning the justifiable use of deadly

force. If read alone, Instruction 7.1 could be understood to ask the jury to determine

whether the defendant was actually resisting an attempt to murder or commit a

felony upon him rather than whether the defendant reasonably believed that such

force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. Further, if the

requested instruction would have been given, the jury would have also had to

determine whether Zuniga’s acts of punching, grabbing by the throat, or “starting to

choke” Gonzalez constituted an attempt to commit an aggravated battery.

Accordingly, Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 is not duplicative of the requested portion

of Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f). In fact, under the circumstances of this case,

Instruction 7.1, on its own without being read together with Instruction 3.6(f), could

possibly confuse or mislead the jury as to the issue of the justifiable use of deadly

force.

         Gonzalez’s statements to police, though inconsistent, alleged that Zuniga

punched him and grabbed him by the throat, and at one point, started to choke him.

Additionally, there was testimony that Gonzalez recently had surgery to insert a

pacemaker, which would likely place him at a disadvantage in a physical altercation.

                                            13
See Montijo v. State, 61 So. 3d 424, 427 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (justifiable use of

deadly force instruction based on aggravated battery was merited where victim was

a large individual who followed defendant to restaurant parking lot after road rage

incident and was aggressive during the confrontation); Priestley v. State, 537 So. 2d

690, 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (noting trial court’s decision to give justifiable use of

deadly force instruction based on attempted aggravated battery where victim, who

was younger and physically fit, knocked defendant down and repeatedly hit

defendant while on top of him).6 Given Gonzalez’s presumed heightened state of

physical vulnerability and his testimony that Zuniga was starting to choke him, we

find that the evidence produced at trial, though slight, was sufficient to entitle

      6
         We recognize that the full Instruction 3.6(f) includes the following: “In
considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into account the relative physical
abilities and capacities of (defendant) and (victim).” However, that portion of the
instruction was not requested. Nevertheless, the relative physical abilities of
Gonzalez and Zuniga would be relevant to the jury’s determination of whether
Gonzalez “reasonably believed” that the use of deadly force was necessary.

      The question under this objective evaluation of a defendant’s conduct
      is whether, based on the circumstances as they appeared to the
      defendant at the time of the altercation, a reasonable and prudent person
      in the same position as the defendant would believe that the use of
      deadly force is necessary to prevent . . . the imminent commission of a
      forcible felony.

Bouie v. State, 292 So. 3d 471, 481 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citing Garcia v. State, 286
So. 3d 348 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)).

                                         14
Gonzalez to the requested portion of Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f), and the trial

court erred when it denied same.

                                Harmless Error Analysis

      Having determined it was error to refuse to give the requested portion of

Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f), it is necessary to determine whether such error was

harmless. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986) (“The harmless

error test . . . places the burden on the state, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the

verdict or, alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error

contributed to the conviction.”). “The harmless error analysis is applicable to jury

instructions.” Vila v. State, 74 So. 3d at 1113 (citing Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard,

269 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)). “[T]he question the harmless error test asks—

whether there is a reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict—is

ultimately dependent on the individual facts of each case.” Bullington v. State, 311

So. 3d 102, 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).

      The defense did not put on any testimony or introduce any evidence to refute

the State’s allegations. The only evidence that supported the defense’s theory of the

case is Gonzalez’s recorded statement given to law enforcement at the scene wherein

he provided conflicting and varying versions of how, where, and why the stabbing

occurred.

                                           15
      During closing arguments, defense counsel advised the jury that Gonzalez felt

he could have been killed or endured great bodily harm, and he had to stab Zuniga

because he was defending himself. Counsel further argued that Gonzalez definitely

felt his life was in danger because Zuniga was choking him, and he reminded the

jury to consider the fact that Gonzalez had recently had a pacemaker implanted.

Notwithstanding the remoteness that a different result may occur, our courts have

long held that the “[f]ailure to give a standard jury instruction is reversible error

when the omitted standard jury instruction goes to the heart of the defendant’s case.”

Arboleda v. State, 645 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

IV.   Conclusion

      While the evidence warranting the requested portion of Standard Jury

Instruction 3.6(f) was slight, it was nevertheless sufficient. We find that the error in

refusing to give the requested portion of the instruction goes to the heart of

Gonzalez’s theory of defense and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

WOZNIAK, J., concurs.
MIZE, J., concurring in result, with opinion.
                       _____________________________

  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
           AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
                        _____________________________

                                          16
MIZE, J., concurs in result, with opinion.

      I concur in the result reached in this case, which is to reverse Gonzalez’s

conviction and remand for a new trial. I would say more than the majority, and I

emphasize three points specifically.

I.    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense as a matter of
      right if there is any evidence at all to support the instruction.

      “Generally, a trial court’s decision to give or withhold a proposed jury

instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Vila v. State, 74 So. 3d 1110,

1112 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). “However, in a criminal proceeding, the trial court’s

discretion is narrower because a criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury

instructed on his or her theory of defense if there is any evidence to support the

theory and the theory is recognized as valid under Florida law.” Id. “The trial court

should not weigh the evidence when determining whether to give the requested

instruction.” Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042, 1047 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). “The

jury—not the trial judge—decides the weight of the evidence.” Id.; see also Vila, 74

So. 3d at 1112 (“In determining whether to give a requested instruction, the trial

court should consider the evidence presented without weighing the evidence, as the

latter is a task for the jury.”); Elder v. State, 296 So. 3d 440, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA

2020) (“In deciding whether to give a requested charge, a trial judge may not weigh

the evidence before him in determining whether the instruction is appropriate; it is

enough if the defense is suggested by the evidence presented. However disdainful

                                         17
the trial judge may feel about the merits of the defense from a factual standpoint is

beside the point.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotations, citations omitted)). “A

criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to his

or her theory of defense where there is any evidence to support it, no matter how

weak or flimsy.” Elder, 296 So. 3d at 444 (quoting Gregory v. State, 937 So. 2d 180,

182 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (emphasis in original)).

      In the specific context of self-defense, Florida’s courts have repeatedly

recognized that “[t]he question of self-defense is one of fact, and is one for the jury

to decide where the facts are disputed.” Vila, 74 So. 3d at 1112 (quoting Dias v. State,

812 So. 2d 487, 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)); see also Radler, 290 So. 3d at 91;

Spurgeon, 114 So. 3d at 1047. “If there is any evidence to support a theory of self-

defense, the trial court should give the requested instruction however flimsy the

evidence is which supports that theory or however weak or improbable the testimony

may have been.” Wagers v. State, 199 So. 3d 1116, 1117 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)

(quoting Arthur v. State, 717 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (internal

quotations, alterations omitted)); see also Taylor v. State, 410 So. 2d 1358, 1359 (Fla.

1st DCA 1982) (“A defendant is entitled to his requested self-defense instruction

regardless of how weak or improbable his testimony may have been with respect to

the circumstances leading up to the battery.”); Wright v. State, 705 So. 2d 102, 104

(Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“[I]t is not the quantum or the quality of the proof as to self-

                                          18
defense that determines the requirement for giving the charge. If any evidence of a

substantial character is adduced . . . the element of self-defense becomes an issue,

and the jury, as the trier of the facts, should be duly charged as to the law thereon,

because it is the jury’s function to determine that issue.” (quoting Kilgore v. State,

271 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)) (emphasis in original); Radler, 290 So. 3d

at 91-92 (holding that even if there was no evidence of an overt act which could

reasonably have caused the defendant to fear that he would be subject to great bodily

harm, the combination of activities observed by the defendant prior to his use of

deadly force could provide sufficient evidence that the defendant reasonably

believed that he was in danger of great bodily harm such that the defendant was

entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense). “Where evidence presented at trial

supports an instruction on self-defense (use of deadly force as well as non-deadly

force), it is error not to give it.” Curington v. State, 704 So. 2d 1137, 1140 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1998).

      Additionally, in assessing whether there is any evidence to support a theory of

self-defense, no particular type of evidence is required. “[A] defendant is not

required to testify at trial to receive a jury instruction on self-defense.” Spurgeon,

114 So. 3d at 1047; see also Wright, 705 So. 2d at 104 (“To raise self-defense, a

defendant does not have to testify directly about his intent behind an act occurring

in the past, or that he made a conscious decision to defend himself in a certain way.”).

                                          19
“A defendant’s statements admitted into evidence at trial may be sufficient evidence

for a self-defense instruction. The cross-examination of State witnesses can also

support a claim of self-defense.” Spurgeon, 114 So. 3d at 1047; see also Jefferson v.

State, 264 So. 3d 1019, 1028 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). “Finally, if a jury can reasonably

infer from circumstantial evidence presented at trial that the defendant had the state

of mind necessary for self-defense, then the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction

on self-defense.” Spurgeon, 114 So. 3d at 1047 (citing Johnson v. State, 634 So. 2d

1144, 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); see also Jefferson, 264 So. 3d at 1028.

      In this case, as the majority opinion states, the evidence produced at trial was

sufficient to entitle Gonzalez to an instruction regarding self-defense. Gonzalez’s

statement given to police at the scene, if given credence by the jury, could have

served as a basis for the jury to find that a reasonable doubt existed as to whether

Gonzalez acted in lawful self-defense.

II.   Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 is not a substitute for a trial court giving
      the entirety of all applicable portions of Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f).
      When there is any evidence to support a theory of self-defense, the trial court

must give an instruction on self-defense and that instruction must be an accurate

statement of the law.

      “[T]he yard stick by which jury instructions are measured is clarity, for jurors

must understand fully the law that they are expected to apply fairly.” State v. Floyd,

186 So. 3d 1013, 1018 (Fla. 2016) (quoting Perriman v. State, 731 So. 2d 1243, 1246

                                          20
(Fla. 1999)).   “[T]rial courts should not give instructions that are confusing,

contradictory, or misleading.” Floyd, 186 So. 3d at 1018 (citing Butler v. State, 493

So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1986)). “[W]here an instruction is confusing or misleading,

prejudicial error occurs where the jury might reasonably have been misled and the

instruction caused them to arrive at a conclusion that it otherwise would not have

reached.” Brown v. State, 11 So. 3d 428, 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), approved sub nom.

Gutierrez v. State, 177 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Tinker v. State, 784 So. 2d

1198, 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)); Barthelemy v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 257 So. 3d

1029, 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“Reversible error occurs when an instruction is

not only an erroneous or incomplete statement of the law, but is also confusing or

misleading.” (quoting Gross v. Lyons, 721 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998))).

      Applying the foregoing standard, it is clear that Standard Jury Instruction 7.1

is never a substitute for a trial court giving the entirety of all portions of Standard

Jury Instruction 3.6(f) applicable to a particular case. The differences between the

two instructions are enormous, and Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 is never sufficient

in a case in which a jury instruction on self-defense is warranted. Comparing the

two instructions as they applied in this case illustrates the point well.

      Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 includes only a brief introduction to Justifiable

Homicide. Specifically, Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 states, in pertinent part:

      The killing of a human being is justifiable homicide and lawful if
      necessarily done while resisting an attempt to murder or commit a

                                           21
      felony upon the defendant, or to commit a felony in any dwelling house
      in which the defendant was at the time of the killing.

      Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f), which is the primary standard jury instruction

concerning the Justifiable Use of Deadly Force, includes significantly more

information. Instruction 3.6(f) provides in pertinent part:

      It is a defense to the crime of second-degree murder with a weapon if
      the actions of (defendant) constituted the justifiable use of deadly force.
      “Deadly force” means force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
      “Great bodily harm” means great as distinguished from slight, trivial,
      minor or moderate harm, and as such does not include mere bruises.

      The use of deadly force is justifiable if defendant reasonably believed
      that the force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
      harm to himself while resisting any attempt to commit (applicable
      felony) upon him. 7

      The instruction then calls for the trial court to provide the elements of the

applicable felony that the defendant alleges the victim attempted to commit.

Instruction 3.6(f) then continues:

      (Defendant) was justified in using deadly force if he reasonably
      believed that such force was necessary to prevent imminent death or
      great bodily harm to himself or the imminent commission of (applicable
      forcible felony listed in § 776.08, Fla. Stat.) against himself. If
      defendant was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in a

      7
         This is the version of Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f) that was in effect at
the time of Gonzalez’s trial. Instruction 3.6(f) has since been amended slightly, but
none of the amendments are material to this case. The instruction is stated as it
would have been read at trial given the circumstances of this case. This portion of
the instruction is based on section 782.02, Florida Statutes (1997). The applicable
felony that Gonzalez argued that Zuniga attempted to commit was aggravated
battery.

                                          22
      place he had a right to be, then he had no duty to retreat and had the
      right to stand his ground.8

      The instruction then calls for the trial court to provide the elements of the

applicable felony that the defendant alleges the victim was about to commit, if

applicable. The instruction then continues:

      In deciding whether defendant was justified in the use of deadly force,
      you must consider the circumstances by which he was surrounded at
      the time the force was used. The danger need not have been actual;
      however, to justify the use of deadly force, the appearance of danger
      must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person
      under the same circumstances would have believed that the danger
      could be avoided only through the use of that force. Based upon
      appearances, defendant must have actually believed that the danger was
      real. However, the defendant had no duty to retreat if he was not
      otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in a place where he had
      a right to be.

      After other portions of Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f) that are not relevant to

this case, the instruction continues as follows:

      If you find that (defendant), who because of threats or prior difficulties
      with (victim), had reasonable grounds to believe that he was in danger
      of death or great bodily harm at the hands of victim, you may consider
      this fact in determining whether the actions of (defendant) were those
      of a reasonable person.

      8
         This portion of the instruction is based on sections 776.012(2) and
776.031(2), Florida Statutes (2014). The Standard Instruction states that this portion
of the instruction applies when the defendant is not in a dwelling or residence or
when the defendant was in a dwelling or residence but had no right to be there. In
this case, the altercation occurred on Gonzalez’s property but not in a dwelling.
There are other portions of Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f) that are not relevant to
this case.

                                          23
      If you find that at the time of the alleged second-degree murder with a
      weapon, (defendant) knew that (victim) had committed an act or acts of
      violence, you may consider that fact in determining whether
      (defendant) reasonably believed it was necessary for him to use deadly
      force.

      In considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into account the
      relative physical abilities and capacities of (defendant) and (victim).

      If in your consideration of the issue of self-defense you have a
      reasonable doubt on the question of whether (defendant) was justified
      in the use of deadly force, you should find him not guilty.

      However, if from the evidence you are convinced beyond a reasonable
      doubt that (defendant) was not justified in the use of deadly force, you
      should find him guilty if all of the elements of the charge have been
      proved.

      To understand why Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f) is required and Standard

Jury Instruction 7.1 is woefully inadequate, it is useful to set forth the applicable law

concerning the justifiable use of deadly force. The Florida Statutes contain multiple

provisions concerning the use of deadly force in self-defense, three of which are

relevant to this case. First, Section 776.012, Florida Statutes, entitled “Use or

threatened use of force in defense of person,” provides in pertinent part:

      A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or
      she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is
      necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or
      herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible
      felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance
      with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to
      stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the
      deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where
      he or she has a right to be.

                                           24
§ 776.012(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). Section 776.031, Florida Statutes, entitled “Use or

threatened use of force in defense of property,” provides in pertinent part:

      A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force only if
      he or she reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent
      the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or
      threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does
      not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if
      the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged
      in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.

§ 776.031(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). Finally, within Chapter 782 of the Florida Statutes,

which governs homicide, Section 782.02, entitled “Justifiable use of deadly force,”,

provides:

      The use of deadly force is justifiable when a person is resisting any
      attempt to murder such person or to commit any felony upon him or her
      or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person shall be.

§782.02, Fla. Stat. (1997).

      Each of these statutes provides a separate possible legal basis upon which the

use of deadly force may be justified. Both sections 776.012(2) and 776.031(2) apply

when a person “reasonably believes” that certain circumstances are present. In the

case of section 776.012(2), the person must reasonably believe “that using or

threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily

harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a

forcible felony.” In the case of section 776.031(2), the person must reasonably

believe “that such conduct is necessary to prevent the imminent commission of a

                                          25
forcible felony.” Because these statutes apply when a person “reasonably believes”

that the required circumstances are present, Florida courts have made clear that while

reasonableness is an objective standard, whether the person’s belief was objectively

reasonable must be determined from the point of view of the person at the time the

person used the deadly force. See Oquendo v. State, 357 So. 3d 214, 217 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2023) (“The conduct of a person acting in self defense is measured by an

objective standard, but the standard must be applied to the facts and circumstances

as they appeared at the time of the altercation to the one acting in self defense.”

(quoting Shreiteh v. State, 987 So. 2d 761, 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008))); State v.

Quevedo, 357 So. 3d 1249, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“Thus the objective standard

of what is reasonable must be measured in light of the facts and circumstances as

they appeared and were known to the individual defendant.”); Cummings v. State,

310 So. 3d 155, 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (“The question under this objective

evaluation of a defendant’s conduct is whether, based on the circumstances as they

appeared to the defendant at the time of the altercation, a reasonable and prudent

person in the same position as the defendant would believe that the use of deadly

force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm or the imminent

commission of a forcible felony.” (quoting Bouie v. State, 292 So. 3d 471, 481 (Fla.

2d DCA 2020))); Viera v. State, 163 So. 3d 602, 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“[T]he

objective standard . . . requires the court to determine whether, based on

                                         26
circumstances as they appeared to the defendant when he or she acted, a reasonable

and prudent person situated in the same circumstances and knowing what the

defendant knew would have used the same force as did the defendant.”); Mobley v.

State, 132 So. 3d 1160, 1164–65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“That standard requires the

court to determine whether, based on circumstances as they appeared to the

defendant when he or she acted, a reasonable and prudent person situated in the same

circumstances and knowing what the defendant knew would have used the same

force as did the defendant.”); Price v. Gray’s Guard Serv., Inc., 298 So. 2d 461, 464

(Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (“The conduct of a person acting in self defense is measured by

an objective standard, but the standard must be applied to the facts and circumstances

as they appeared at the time of the altercation to the one acting in self defense. A

person acting in self defense is not held to the same course of conduct which might

have been expected had he been afforded an opportunity of cool thought as to

possibilities, probabilities and alternatives.”).

      At the charging conference in this case, the trial judge repeatedly questioned

Gonzalez’s counsel regarding what applicable felony Gonzalez asserted that Zuniga

was attempting to commit against Gonzalez. However, the commission of a felony

against Gonzalez was not the only circumstance which could have justified his use

of deadly force. As explained above, section 776.012(2), Florida Statutes, provides

that “[a] person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she

                                           27
reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent

imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent

the imminent commission of a forcible felony.” (emphasis added). Therefore, if

Gonzalez reasonably believed that using deadly force was necessary to prevent death

or great bodily harm to himself, he was justified in using deadly force to prevent

such harm whether or not Zuniga was attempting to commit a forcible felony against

Gonzalez. If Gonzalez reasonably believed that using deadly force was necessary to

prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony, that could provide an

additional or alternative justification for the use of deadly force, but a reasonable

belief that deadly force was necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony

is not necessary where the defendant had a reasonable belief that using deadly force

was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself.

      Moreover, whether Gonzalez had a reasonable belief that using deadly force

was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself was required to be

judged from Gonzalez’s perspective at the time that he stabbed Zuniga. In this case,

Gonzalez told police that: (1) Zuniga grabbed Gonzalez by the throat and punched

Gonzalez in the jaw multiple times; (2) Zuniga was choking Gonzalez and would

not let go; and (3) due to Zuniga choking and beating Gonzalez, he had to stab

Zuniga to defend himself. At this time, Gonzalez was also in a reduced physical

capacity and a heightened state of physical vulnerability after having recently had

                                          28
surgery and having a pacemaker installed in his heart. In determining whether a

reasonable doubt existed as to whether Gonzalez’s belief was reasonable, the jury

was entitled to take into account the relative physical abilities of Gonzalez and

Zuniga because Gonzalez’s reduced physical capacity and heightened vulnerability

to physical harm were known to Gonzalez at the time that he stabbed Zuniga. See

Fla. Std. Crim. Jury Instr. 3.6(f) (“In considering the issue of self-defense, you may

take into account the relative physical abilities and capacities of (defendant) and

(victim).”); Floyd, 186 So. 3d at 1020–21 (holding that Standard Jury Instruction

3.6(f) correctly states the law regarding the justifiable use of deadly force). Given

Gonzalez’s heightened state of physical vulnerability and his testimony that Zuniga

was grabbing him by the throat, choking him, punching him in the jaw and beating

him, a jury could have concluded that a reasonable doubt existed as to whether

Gonzalez possessed a reasonable belief that his use of deadly force was necessary to

prevent death or great bodily harm to himself.

      As noted in the majority opinion, the trial judge recognized at the charging

conference that Gonzalez was entitled to an instruction on the justifiable use of

deadly force, but the trial judge determined that Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 was

an accurate statement of the law regarding the justifiable use of deadly force and that

Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f) would have been duplicative. This was error,

because on its own, Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 was not an accurate statement of

                                          29
the applicable law concerning the justifiable use of deadly force and, in fact, was

incomplete, confusing and misleading.

      The differences between Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 and Standard Jury

Instruction 3.6(f), and the deficiencies in Instruction 7.1, are obvious from even a

cursory reading of both instructions. To begin with, Instruction 7.1 does not instruct

the jury, in accordance with the statutes detailed above, that a person is justified in

using deadly force if the person reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary

to prevent imminent death 9 or great bodily harm to himself.

      Additionally, unlike Instruction 3.6(f), Instruction 7.1 does not inform the jury

that the issue of self-defense is determined from the point of view of the defendant

at the time the defendant used deadly force, including taking into account the relative

physical differences between the two parties that were known to the defendant when

the defendant used deadly force. On its own, without being read together with

Instruction 3.6(f), Instruction 7.1 in fact could be read to instruct the jury that the

issue of self-defense is not determined from the point of view of the defendant.

Instruction 7.1 states that “[t]he killing of a human being is justifiable homicide and

lawful if necessarily done while resisting an attempt to murder or commit a felony

upon the defendant.” This instruction could be understood to ask the jury to

      9
        While Instruction 7.1 references “murder,” “murder” is a narrower category
than “death.” A person who commits voluntary manslaughter imposes death on the
victim but does not commit “murder.”

                                          30
determine whether the defendant was actually resisting a murder or felony rather

than whether the defendant reasonably believed that he was resisting a murder or

felony. 10

       Instruction 7.1 also fails to inform the jury that Gonzalez had no duty to retreat

if he was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity and was in a place he had a right

to be. In fact, Instruction 7.1 could be read to imply that Gonzalez did have a duty

to retreat. Again, Instruction 7.1 states that “[t]he killing of a human being is

justifiable homicide and lawful if necessarily done while resisting an attempt to

murder or commit a felony upon the defendant.” (emphasis added). The use of the

term “necessarily” in Instruction 7.1, without being read together with Instruction

3.6(f), could have caused the jury to conclude that Gonzalez had a duty to retreat

because his use of deadly force was not necessary if he had the ability to retreat in

safety.

       For all of these reasons, Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 was not an accurate

statement of the law of self-defense as it applied to this case.

III.   Gonzalez did not forfeit his right to self-defense by exiting his house to
       confront Zuniga with a knife.
       I discuss this point separately to highlight its importance. In addition to all of

the foregoing reasons that Instruction 7.1 was inadequate, the use of the word

       10
          Also, as explained above, resisting a murder or felony are not the only
justifications for the use of deadly force.

                                           31
“necessarily” in Instruction 7.1 could also have led the jury to believe that the fact

that Gonzalez went into his house and came back out of the house with a knife to

confront Zuniga negated Gonzalez’s right to use deadly force. After all, it was not

“necessary” for Gonzalez to come back out of his house armed with a knife after he

had safely retreated into his home. However, under the United States Constitution

and the laws of the State of Florida, Gonzalez was not required to stay in his home

while Zuniga trespassed on Gonzalez’s property. Gonzalez was entitled to confront

Zuniga as a trespasser. Gonzalez going into his house and coming back out to

confront Zuniga with a knife did not negate Gonzalez’s right to use deadly force if

he had a reasonable belief that such force was necessary to prevent death or great

bodily harm to himself.

      The United States Constitution guarantees an individual right to keep and bear

arms. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). “Central to this right, as the Supreme

Court explained in Heller, is the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use

arms in defense of hearth and home.” Burns v. State, 361 So. 3d 372, 376 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2023) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (internal quotations omitted)).

      Knives are arms. See State v. Montalvo, 162 A.3d 270, 284 (2017); State v.

DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165, 190-97 (2014); David B. Kopel, Clayton E. Cramer, &

Joseph Edward Olson, Knives and the Second Amendment, 47 U. Mich. J. L. Reform

167, 214 (2013).

                                         32
       Florida grants an individual state constitutional right to bear arms, Art I, §

8(a), Fla. Const., and also an explicit statutory right to “own, possess and lawfully

use . . . weapons,” including knives, at a person’s “home or place of business”

without any restriction against the open carrying of such weapons or any requirement

to obtain a permit. § 790.25(3)(n), Fla. Stat. (2006)11; § 790.001(13), Fla. Stat.

(2016) (defining “weapon” for purposes of Chapter 790, Florida Statutes, to include

knives) 12; see also Burns, 361 So. 3d at 377. Thus, an individual in Florida has an

explicit statutory right to openly carry a knife (or firearm) on his or her own home

property.

       Pursuant to Section 790.25(3)(n) and the Constitutions of Florida and the

United States, Gonzalez had the right to openly carry his knife on his own home

property as he demanded that Zuniga leave his property. Additionally, once Zuniga

refused to leave Gonzalez’s property after being asked to do so, Zuniga became a

trespasser, thereby justifying Gonzalez’s right to use non-deadly force, including his

constitutional and statutory right to openly carry or display his knife, to assist him

in terminating the trespass. See Burns, 361 So. 3d at 377 (citing § 776.031(1), Fla.

       11
          This is the version of the statute that was in effect on the night of the incident
at issue in this case. Section 790.25 has since been amended but the statutory right
of an individual to “own, possess and lawfully use . . . weapons” at a person’s “home
or place of business” remains in subsection 2(n) of the amended statute.
       12
          This is the version of the statute that was in effect on the night of the incident
at issue in this case. Section 790.001 has since been amended, but the definition of
“weapon” has not changed. See § 790.001(20), Fla. Stat. (2023).

                                            33
Stat. (2020) (justifying the use or threatened use of non-deadly force, “when and to

the extent” necessary, “to prevent or terminate” another’s “trespass on” the non-

dwelling portions of one’s “real” or “personal property”)); Howard v. State, 698 So.

2d 923, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that the display of a knife, without more,

is non-deadly force, not deadly force); see also Cunningham v. State, 159 So. 3d 275,

277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (stating that, as a matter of law, “the mere display of a gun

is not deadly force.” (emphasis in original)).

      While it certainly may not have been advisable for Gonzalez to go back

outside with a knife after he had already safely entered his home, he was within his

legal rights to do so and he did not forfeit his legal right to use deadly force if he had

a reasonable belief that such force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily

harm to himself. What actually happened after Gonzalez went back outside and

whether Gonzalez had a reasonable belief that his use of deadly force was necessary

to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or the commission of a felony

against himself was a question for the jury to resolve after being properly instructed

on the justifiable use of deadly force, which Standard Jury Instruction 7.1 did not

accomplish.

IV.   Conclusion.

      Gonzalez was entitled to a jury instruction concerning self-defense as a matter

of right because there was evidence in the record to support a theory of self-defense.

                                           34
The standard jury instruction approved by the Florida Supreme Court for self-

defense is Instruction 3.6(f), and the trial court erred by failing to give it. Standard

Jury Instruction 7.1 is not “duplicative” of Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f). In fact,

Instruction 7.1, on its own without being read together with Instruction 3.6(f), is

woefully inadequate. Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f) provides a complete and

accurate instruction regarding the justifiable use of deadly force, and trial courts err

by refusing to give the instruction in cases in which there is any evidence to support

a theory of self-defense. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached in this case,

which is to reverse Gonzalez’s conviction and remand this case to the trial court to

conduct a new trial. On remand, if the complete Standard Jury Instruction 3.6(f) is

requested, it should be given.

                        _____________________________

Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public
Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Coombs Cline, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
          AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED

                                          35