Court Opinion

ID: 9775354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:55:15.986442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:25.334560
License: Public Domain

*435Justice RICE
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In this case, we review the constitutionality of section 16-3-309(5), C.R.S. (2010), as applied to petitioner, David Lee Cropper.1 We hold that, based on Hingjos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo.2007), Cropper waived his confrontation rights and, therefore, the statute was constitutional as applied. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
After a jury trial, Cropper was convicted of second degree burglary and theft. Pursuant to Crim. P. 16, prior to trial, the prosecution provided Cropper a list of the witnesses that it planned to call at trial as experts in the area of forensic chemistry. Included in the list was a technician who prepared a report showing that a shoe-print left on a door that had been kicked in to obtain entry could have been from the same type of shoe that Cropper was wearing when he was apprehended.2 At trial, Cropper objected to the admission of this report because the technician who prepared it was not available to testify due to an out of state family emergency. Cropper contended that introduction of the report without testimony from the technician who prepared it violated his rights of confrontation and cross-examination.
Relying on the procedures set forth in section 16-3-809(5), the trial court found that Cropper had not notified the prosecution within the stated ten-day limit that he wished for the technician to testify and, for this reason, admitted the report. With the aid of supplemental briefing regarding the then recently decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, -- U.S. --, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 814 (2009), the court of appeals upheld the admission of the shoe-print report, holding that Cropper's failure to follow the procedural requirements in section 16-3-309(5) resulted in a waiver of his confrontation rights.
II. Analysis
A. The Right to Confrontation and Section 16-3-309(5)
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Likewise, the Colorado Constitution provides a criminal defendant the right "to meet the witnesses against him face to face." Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. Although this right is fundamental, it is not without limit, People v. Mojica-Simental, 73 P.3d 15, 19 (Colo.2003), and can be waived, Melendez, Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2584 n. 3. A defendant's counsel may waive his client's confrontation right. Taylor v. Ilinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) ("the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer's decision to forgo cross-examination"); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 511 (Colo.1984) ("[Dlefense counsel stands as captain of the ship. ... [Dlecisions committed to counsel include ... whether and how to conduct cross-examination ..." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). And, in some instances, defense counsel's inaction alone is sufficient to constitute a waiver. Melendes-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2534 n. 3. ("The right to confrontation may, of course, be waived, including by failure to object to the offending evidence. ...").
The Confrontation Clause is implicated when testimonial hearsay is admitted against a criminal defendant. To comply with the Confrontation Clause, testimonial hearsay may only be admitted if the declar-ant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the de-*436clarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have determined that forensic lab reports are testimonial hearsay subject to these confrontation clause requirements. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2582; Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.8d at 666-67. Therefore, for a forensic report such as the shoe-print analysis at issue in this case to be admitted, the defendant must, at some time, have an opportunity to cross-examine the technician who prepared it.
Section 16-8-309(5) recognizes this requirement. It states that:
Any report or copy thereof or the findings of the eriminalistiecs laboratory shall be received in evidence in any court, preliminary hearing, or grand jury proceeding in the same manner and with the same force and effect as if the employee or technician of the criminalistics laboratory who accomplished the requested analysis, comparison, or identification had testified in person. Any party may request that such employee or technician testify in person at a crimi-mal trial on behalf of the state before a jury or to the court, by notifying the wit-mess and other party at least ten days before the date of such eriminal trial.
§ 16-3-309(5) (emphasis added). Based on this statute, a criminal defendant may invoke his confrontation right by notifying the prosecution at least ten days prior to the date of trial that he wishes to exercise his opportunity to cross-examine the technician who prepared the report. Id.
In Mojica-Simental, we found that this procedure does not impose an undue burden on the defendant and adequately protects a defendant's right of confrontation. 73 P.3d at 18-20. Thus, we held that section 16-3-309(5) is constitutional on its face. Id. at 18. But, in dicta, we cautioned that section 16-3-309(5) could be applied unconstitutionally if the defendant's right of confrontation was not waived voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally. Id. at 20 (citation omitted). Specifically, we stated that there might be a constitutional problem "[if a defendant does not have actual notice of the requirements of the statute, or mistakenly fails to notify the prosecution to have the technician present to testify...." Id. at 20-21. We also listed a series of factors that a trial court might consider to determine if there was a valid waiver of the right of confrontation.3 Id.
In Hinojos-Mendoza, we reaffirmed the constitutionality of section 16-8-809(5) and acknowledged that the dicta in Mojica-Si-mental was misplaced because it was based on the mistaken assumption that a defendant can only waive his right of confrontation if he personally makes a knowing, voluntary, and intentional waiver. 169 P.3d at 669. Instead, we confirmed that defense counsel can waive a defendant's right to confront the technician who prepared a forensic report by not complying with the procedural requirements in section 16-8-309(5), even if the attorney is unaware of the statute or its requirements. Id. at 670 ("where a defendant ... is represented by counsel, the failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites of section 16-8-809(5) waives the defendant's right to confront the witness just as the decision to forgo eross-examination at trial would waive that right").
In Hinojos-Mendosa, the defendant argued that his right of confrontation was violated when he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine a technician who prepared a lab report that the prosecution entered into evidence. Id. at 664. The defendant's attorney did not follow the requirements set forth in section 16-8-309(5) and failed to request an opportunity for cross-examination before trial because he was unaware of the statute and its procedural requirements. Id. Because of our stated presumption that an attorney knows the applicable procedural rules, we held that defense counsel's failure to request live testimony from the technician was *437a valid waiver of the defendant's confrontation right even though the attorney did not have actual knowledge of section 16-3-309(5)'s requirements. Id. at 670.
B. Melendez-Diaz and Notice- and-Demand Statutes
In supporting its decision to classify forensic lab reports as testimonial hearsay, the Supreme Court discussed a category of state statutes, which it labeled as notice- and-demand statutes, that provide procedures similar to those in section 16-8-309(5). Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2540-41. As the Court stated, "[mlany States ... permit the defendant to assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause right after receiving notice of the prosecution's intent to use a forensic analyst's report." Id. (citations omitted). It clarified that a "defendant always has the burden of raising [a] Confrontation Clause objection [and] notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within which [a defendant] must do so." Id. at 2541. It then cited Hinojos-Mendoza for the proposition that it is permissible to require a defendant to ex-ereise his Confrontation Clause rights before trial with a parenthetical stating that "discuss[ed] and ap-provied of] Colorado's notice-and-demand provision." Id. Despite its discussion of Hi-nojos-Mendoza, the Supreme Court did not pass judgment on section 16-8-809(5).4
Although Cropper does not bring a facial challenge, he argues that section 16-3-309(5) is different than the notice-and-demand statutes that the Supreme Court discussed favorably in Melendes-Diaz because it does not require that the prosecution give pre-trial notice of its intent to introduce a forensic lab report without live testimony. This difference, Cropper contends, not only makes it incompatible with the dicta from Melendez-Diaz, but also goes against this Court's dicta in Mojica-Simental which stated that:
section 16-3~809(5) might be best utilized if the proponent of the lab report notifies the opposing party that it intends to introduce the lab report without a foundational lab technician witness, unless advised ten days before trial that the witness' presence is desired, and the parties discuss the matter, at some pre-trial opportunity, to ensure that all parties are in agreement as to whether the witness will be present.
73 P.3d at 21. We disagree and hold that providing the defense with a forensic lab report through discovery is sufficient to put the defendant on notice that, absent a specific request under section 16-8-309(5), the report can be introduced without live testimony.
C. Application to this Case
In this case, although Cropper did not have specific notice that the prosecution intended to proceed without live testimony, he did have notice that the prosecution intended to introduce the shoe-print report. Pursuant to Crim. P. 16, Part I(a)(1){III), a prosecutor is required to provide the defense with "[alny reports or statements of experts made in connection with the particular case, including results of ... scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons." The prosecution must provide these reports "as soon as practicable but not later than thirty days before trial." Crim. P. 16, Part I(b)(8).
The record reflects that the prosecution provided Cropper with the shoe-print report early in the discovery process. Although the prosecution included the technician in its list of experts who "are expected to testify in the area of forensic chemistry," 5 the prosecution introduced the report without the technician because he was out of state due to a family emergency.6 Regard*438less of any representations that the prosecution made that the technician would testify, Cropper had notice of the presence of the report and had an adequate opportunity to assert Cropper's confrontation rights and request that the technician be present for cross-examination.
The facts in this case are essentially the same as those in Hinojos-Mendoza. Thus, to reach our decision in this case, we need only look to and apply the same reasoning that we employed in Hinojos-Mendoga. Cropper's attorney did not avail herself of the opportunity to assert Cropper's confrontation rights by objecting to the introduction of the shoe-print report without live testimony within section 16-8-809(5)'s ten-day time limit because she did not understand section 16-3-309(5), its requirements, or its applicability.7
We decline Cropper's request that we apply the dicta from Mojica-Simental and thereby relax the requirements of section 16-3-309(5) because the defendant "d[id] not have actual notice of the requirements of the statute, or mistakenly failled] to notify the prosecution to have the technician present to testify...." 73 P.3d at 20-21. In Hinojos-Mendoza, we stated that "we presume that attorneys know the applicable rules of procedure" and found section 16-8-809(5) applicable despite the fact that the defendant's attorney did not know the applicable rules of procedure. 169 P.3d at 670 (citation omitted). Today, we apply Hinojos-Mendoza's holding and recognize that an attorney is expected to know the applicable rules of procedure.8 Further, we assume that when an attorney fails to comply with the procedural rules set forth in section 16-8-309(5) the attorney has made a decision to waive defendant's right of confrontation regardless of whether the attorney knew of or understood the statute or its requirements.9 Because Cropper's attorney did not follow these procedures, she waived Cropper's right of confrontation.
III. Conclusion
We hold that section 16-8-309(5) is constitutional as it was applied to Cropper. He received sufficient notice of the existence of the shoe-print report and the potential that it would be introduced at trial. His attorney's ignorance as to section 16-8-309(5)'s requirements does not alter our decision. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Justice MARTINEZ dissents, and Chief Justice BENDER joins in the dissent.

. We granted certiorari to determine:
Whether the court of appeals erroneously concluded counsel's inaction under section 16-3-309(5) constituted a valid waiver of petitioner's state and federal confrontation rights under this Court's decision in Hinojos-Mendoza, contrary to well established federal and state law concerning the waiver of constitutional rights and this Court's decision in Mojica-Simental.

. The detective who ultimately testified about the report stated that a shoe-print analysis is not like a fingerprint analysis where there are unique prints for each individual. Instead, he testified that the report indicated that "it could be [the same shoe}, because, of course, there are other shoes like that out there ... that could have made the same mark."

. Specifically:
whether an attorney or a pro se litigant actually knew that he was required to notify the opposing party of his desire to have the witness present; the reasons why notice was late or was not given at all; the difficulty of acquiring the presence of the witness; the significance to the case of the report and of the testimony that would be elicited from the technician; and any other pertinent circumstances.
Mojica-Simental, 73 P.3d at 21.

. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hino-jos-Mendoza just four days after it released its decision in Melendez-Diaz. Hinojos-Mendoza v. Colorado, -- U.S. --, 129 S.Ct. 2856, 174 L.Ed.2d 600 (2009).

. Cropper argues that, based on this list, he expected the technician to testify. Only one of the six witnesses from that list actually testified at trial, Cropper did not object or claim bad faith as to the failure of the prosecution to make any of the other witnesses available.

. In addition to the original witness list that the prosecution provided pursuant to Crim. P. 16, the prosecution provided a "good faith witness list" the day of trial that contained the name of the technician. Cropper argues that the prosecu*438tion acted in bad faith by including the technician on that list and that he was justified in relying on this list. This reliance, regardless of its validity, did not affect Cropper's failure to comply with section 16~3-309(5). Because the list was delivered the day of trial, it would not have affected Cropper's ability to make a timely demand for the technician to be present.

. After Cropper's attorney objected to the introduction of the report, she explained her understanding of the statute to the judge:
My understanding is that that refers to, like a preliminary hearing and at trial we have a confrontational right, especially as to concluso-ry statements by wilnesses.
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The context of 16-3-309 talks about the destruction of evidence as far as the defendant's ability to have access to it.
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We think it's not applicable because we believe this statute, in particular, is-refers to basically the destruction of evidence and the potential for the defendant to have access to that evidence. Certainly this is not the situation where there's any inclination that Mr. Martinez, could not testify that-I think that's our primary objection.
The next day, Cropper's attorney elaborated on her objection in chambers and explained that:
When the Court had asked me if I filed a motion required by the subsection, I will tell the Court that I had no inclination whatsoever that there was a ten-day requirement that I had an affirmative obligation to basically demand that the District Attorney produce their witnesses.

. It is also important to note that section 16-3-309(5) is not a new statute. It has been in effect since 1984.

. This is not to say that a client would not have a colorable claim for malpractice against his or her attorney.