Court Opinion

ID: 9635233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:43:07.91043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:56.019911
License: Public Domain

WALKER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority denies the mandamus request; however, I would conditionally grant same. My view of this matter is that Joe Williams, the plaintiff in the underlying action and the real party in interest, does not present a justiciable issue to this Court. The trial court order authorized plaintiff to depose Mr. Daley on the limited questions of whether Mr. Daley left the mediation prior to its conclusion and whether he (Mr. Daley) left the mediation without the mediator’s permission. Mr. Daley filed his affidavit with the trial court admitting that he left prior to the conclusion of mediation, but not stating whether his leaving was with or without permission of the mediator. Regarding whether Mr. Daley left without permission appears to be adequately covered by the affidavit of Veronica Carmona Czuchna, attorney for Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, who was in attendance during the entire mediation. In her affidavit, Ms. Czuchna stated as follows:
I attended the mediation from 9:00 a.m. until approximately 4:30 p.m., when the mediator excused the parties. At approximately 1:30 p.m., while in a separate caucus of the mediation with the mediator, Daniel Ducote, and while in my presence, Paul Daley informed Mr. Ducote that he would need to leave the mediation at approximately 2:30 p.m. in *920order to catch a flight. Later, during another separate caucus with the mediator and in my presence, Mr. Daley again informed the mediator that he would need to leave the mediation at approximately 2:30 p.m. Mr. Daley departed the mediation at approximately 2:45 p.m. I accompanied Mr. Daley to his vehicle in order to retrieve my luggage from his car and place it in the vehicle of Mr. David Grove. As I accompanied Mr. Daley out of our mediation caucus room, I informed Mr. Ducote, who was standing in the hallway with Jonathan Juhan, counsel for Intervenors, and Zona Jones, counsel for Plaintiff, that I was going to the parking lot and would return within a few minutes.
Prior to his departure from the mediation, Mr. Daley gave me authority to offer Lumbermens’ policy limits and to decide whether insurance payments should be made by Lumbermens on behalf of Donald Ray Arnold, Jr. in excess of policy limits. After Mr. Daley’s departure from the mediation, I offered Lumbermens’ policy limits on behalf of Donald Ray Arnold, Jr. to the two In-tervenors and to Plaintiff. Mr. Arnold and Lumbermens reached a tentative settlement agreement with the two In-tervenors within policy limits, but were unable to reach an agreement with Plaintiff Williams.
This testimony is unrebutted. Now, what legal purpose is to be served by deposing Mr. Daley on these two questions? As a matter of law, no contempt proceedings could result from such limited deposition. This is not to say I agree in toto with the general position Mr. Daley takes in support of his mandamus request.
The Legislature wisely enacted the ADR statutes and the overall benefits are apparent. However, cases such as the present one raise the following question: Who is in control of the ADR process? Was it legislative intent to allow the use of the process for gamesmanship, diversion, or stalling, pending more serious concerns such as jury selection? The credible answer to this question is “No.” The clear intent of the ADR statutes is to create a controlled atmosphere wherein parties may resolve their legal disputes, with the emphasis being on the words “parties” and “controlled.” I would venture that in most ADR matters, the “parties” are anxious to resolve their differences whereas those less directly involved may take a more aloof view of the proceedings. For example, Mr. Daley positions that, because of his status as a “non-party” (employee of Lumbermens), the Court has no power through Chapter 154 to compel his attendance. Technically, Mr. Daley is correct for the Court has no jurisdictional authority over him personally. That is not the case regarding Mr. Daley’s employer, Lumber-mens Insurance Company, for, indeed, the Court has necessary authority to order the attendance of those persons or entities having authority to settle, whether that be the attorneys, the parties, or those holding the settlement purse strings. Otherwise, the legislative purpose for enacting Chapter 154 is defeated, i.e., “It is the policy of this state to encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes.... ” Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 154.002 (Vernon 1997). Further, “[i]t is the responsibility of all trial and appellate courts and their court administrators to carry out the policy under § 154.002.” Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 154.003 (Vernon 1997). To effectively carry out the intent and purpose of the ADR statute, courts are necessarily endowed with the power to control the ADR process to prevent misuse or abuse of such process. Effectuating the process implies the application of full judicial authority to guarantee the credibility of the process, especially where the parties have agreed to seek, through ADR, an amicable termination of the judicial process.
Though Mr. Daley did not have to personally attend the mediation, Lumbermens did — either by sending a representative with full authority to settle outside policy limits, or by providing said authority to its *921attorney. In either circumstance, the person was required to remain through the full mediation session. In the instant case, the evidence is undisputed that a representative from Lumbermens, with full authority to settle in excess of policy limits, was present for the entire mediation session, as initially ordered by the trial court.
While mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. See Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex.1993). As such, “[a] court of equity will not require the doing of a useless thing; nor will it lend its powers to accomplish a useless purpose[.]” Boman v. Gibbs, 443 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1969, writ ref d n.r.e.). As I read the entire record brought before this Court, I cannot ignore that the basis for the order to depose Mr. Daley is to ultimately determine whether he, or the defendants in the underlying litigation, should be held in contempt of court for having allegedly violated the trial court’s order to mediate. Nothing in the record before this Court indicates that the trial court’s order to mediate was violated in connection with Mr. Daley’s departure from the mediation session. Therefore, regardless of how he would answer the two questions framed by the trial court’s order to depose him, contempt simply would not ultimately he. Thus, I stand on the time-tested maxim, “lex non praecipit inutilia, quia inutilis labor stultus,” which translates as “the law commands not useless things, because useless labor is foolish.” Black’s Law Dictionary 912 (6th ed.1990). Because, as I view the record before us, the trial court’s order to depose Mr. Daley is a “useless thing,” I would conditionally grant Mr. Daley’s mandamus request, conditioned on the assumption that the trial court would voluntarily withdraw its order. Since the majority takes the opposite view, I dissent.