Court Opinion

ID: 9518339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:50:23.046346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:34.955219
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, P. J.
(dissenting). Defendant’s first contention presents a novel issue heretofore undecided by the appellate courts of this state. Defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed because the attorney who was originally appointed to represent him at the trial level served as an assistant prosecutor pursuant to the provisions of MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801 during the time he was representing defendant. My colleagues find that no reversible error here occurred because defendant was not prejudiced. I respectfully disagree. It is my belief that actual prejudice to a defendant need not be shown in such circumstances.
The prosecuting attorney of a county is empowered by MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801 to appoint an assistant prosecuting attorney with the consent of the circuit judge of the circuit in which the county is located. An assistant prosecuting attorney appointed pursuant to the above provision may perform any and all duties pertaining to the office of the prosecutor, but is also subject to the same legal disqualifications and disabilities as the prosecuting attorney, MCLA 49.42; MSA 5.802, one of which is contained in MCLA 776.14; MSA 28.1271 and provides:
*350"It shall be unlawful for any prosecuting attorney of this state to defend or assist in the defense of any person charged with crime within the county of which he is prosecuting attorney.”
In the case at bar, the facts elicited during the hearing on defendant’s motions clearly show that the above statute was violated. Defendant’s attorney at the trial level was appointed to represent him on November 19, 1971 and, thereafter, on February 9, 1972, was appointed to act as an assistant prosecuting attorney and did, in fact, act in a prosecutorial capacity while still defending defendant. It is my considered opinion that this alone requires the reversal of defendant’s conviction.
The purpose of MCLA 776.14; MSA 28.1271 is to avoid the possibility of any conflict of interest or the appearance of any impropriety in this area by the imposition of a flat prohibition against prosecuting attorneys and, by MCLA 49.42; MSA 5.802, assistant prosecuting attorneys appointed under MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801 from defending or assisting in the defense of any person charged with a crime in their county. The statute does not prohibit doing so solely in cases where a conflict is likely to arise, but, rather, prohibits doing so in all cases where the defendant is charged in their county. By containing such an absolute prohibition, the statute, by eliminating any appearance of impropriety, serves to foster confidence on the part of the people of this state that the decisions of the prosecutor, in which discretion plays such a large role, will be made in an unbiased and professional manner. In the case at bar the record is clear, as my colleagues have found, that defendant’s cause was in no way prejudiced by the conduct of his *351trial attorney. Viewing the statute in the manner set forth above, however, it is clear that a defendant need not establish prejudice to his cause when the above statute comes into play. The test is whether defendant’s counsel was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, appointed under MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801, in the county in which defendant was charged at any time during his representation of defendant. If he was, the purposes of the statute can only be served by reversing a conviction so obtained.1
The prosecutor argues that defendant waived whatever rights he had under the statute when he elected to continue with his trial attorney after being informed of the appointment. My colleagues also feel this has some effect. I disagree. The statute contains an absolute prohibition against a prosecuting attorney or, by MCLA 49.42; MSA 5.802, an assistant prosecuting attorney appointed under MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801 from serving in such a capacity. As discussed earlier, the statute is designed not only for the protection of a defendant but also to serve other purposes unrelated to those which would inure to a particular defendant. Under these circumstances I do not believe the statute is one which can be waived by a criminal defendant. The burden is not on a defendant under these circumstances to approve or disapprove of his attorney continuing to represent him, but, rather, the burden is placed on the attorney himself. An attorney, when faced with a situation where the statute comes into play, has no other choice but to either withdraw from his criminal *352cases and ask the court for a substitution or refuse the appointment. No other alternative is available.
The prosecutor also argues that the prohibition contained in MCLA 776.14; MSA 28.1271 has no application in this case because defendant’s trial attorney was appointed an assistant prosecuting attorney under MCLA 776.18; MSA 28.1273 rather than MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801. The prosecutor’s claim in this regard, however, is belied by the letter of appointment, bearing the signature of both the Chippewa County Prosecuting Attorney and the circuit court judge, in which the appointment was stated to be pursuant to MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801.
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse defendant’s conviction and remand the case to the trial court.

 We are not asked to decide and I express no opinion as to what remedy should be applied in a situation where a defendant’s attorney was appointed as an assistant prosecutor under MCLA 49.41; MSA 5.801 after defendant’s trial is complete or his guilty plea accepted but before defendant is sentenced.