Court Opinion

ID: 9731876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:00:38.106528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:21.690130
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy :
The single publication rule developed at common law and adopted by statute in this Commonwealth limits a plaintiff to a single cause of action for damages resulting from the publication of defamatory material. The problem in this case is one of determining for the purposes of the statute of limitations which act of publication is to be the “single publication” upon which the cause of action arises. I agree with the majority opinion that there is nothing in the Uniform Single Publication Act which states that the period of *231limitation begins to run on tbe date of first publication. That act does not speak at all to the limitations problem. It merely provides that “No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel . . . Recovery in any action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.” Act of August 21, 1953, P. L. 1242, §1, 12 P.S. §2090.1. Nor is there a sufficient body of decisional law interpreting the Act to dictate, in the interest of achieving uniformity, any particular answer to the question before the Court.
It is my view that the first publication of the alleged defamation in the state in which suit is brought should be taken as the single publication and so mark the date from which the statute runs. Such a rule would, I believe, provide the plaintiff with adequate flexibility; the action being transitory, the jurisdiction sued in would be a matter of plaintiff’s choice, reflecting his calculation of the convenience of the forum, the extent of the damages,1 and the substantive law under which the case would be tried. It would also protect a defamed person against the impossibility of recovering damages for an extensive libelous publication which reaches into his hometown, the statutory period for suit having previously run by virtue of a prior publication so limited in scope or so far removed from his domicile that the publication was unknown to the defamed person or would not have justified suit even had it been known.
Such a rule would equally serve the defendant’s legitimate interest in certainty, an interest which is reflected in Pennsylvania’s one-year statute of limita*232tions, now 257 year's old. At the same time, it would preserve the normal nexus between a Pennsylvania cause of action and the Pennsylvania statute of limitations.2 From the point of view of judicial administration, moreover, it would seem that such a rule would be easily comprehended and applied; the considerable problems in the area of multi-state defamation litigation underscore the need for such clarity. While I appreciate the careful balancing of interests which the majority opinion attempts, I doubt that the various interests involved in this or any similar case are adequately reconciled by a rule which would allow a plaintiff to choose any single act of publication—no matter how remote in place or in time from the first publication—as the date from which the statute is to run. Neither do I think the cause of relative certainty is advanced by a rule, such as that proposed by Justice Roberts, which focuses on such necessarily vague concepts as the plaintiff’s “stature”, or “community”, or a “major distribution”.
If the rule as here suggested be applied to the facts of this case, there is no difficulty in concluding that the first act of publication in this state occurred on March 14, 1964. The parties do not disagree that this was the date upon which the alleged defamatory ma*233terial was first placed on sale at newsstands in Philadelphia. This constituted an intentional communication to one other than the person defamed (see Restatement of Torts, §577; Gaetano v. Sharon Herald Co., 426 Pa. 179, 182, 231 A. 2d 753 (1967)), and there is no need here to consider the refinements of “publication” which are ably briefed by the parties. March 14, 1965 having been a Sunday, the filing of this action on March 15, 1965 was within the statute. Accordingly, I concur in the decision of the Court.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this concurring opinion.

 Under the rule here suggested, the damages suffered in all jurisdictions would necessarily have to be computed from the date of “single publication,” i.e., the date of first publication in the jurisdiction of suit.

 The rule here advocated would not cover the unlikely situation of a suit in Pennsylvania with respect to a libel which had never been published in Pennsylvania. In such a case, the Pennsylvania courts, applying the normal principles of conflict of laws, would have to look to the law of the place where the publication declared upon occurred to determine if it is a “single publication” state, either by common law or statute, and then apply the law of that jurisdiction as to whether the asserted cause of action is based on the correct publication. The statute of limitations to be applied in such a case would be that of the forum state, viz., Pennsylvania, subject of course to the possible application of the Pennsylvania “borrowing” statute, Act of June 26, 1895, P. L. 375, §1, 12 P.S.