Court Opinion

ID: 9860615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:27:38.200742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:11.793078
License: Public Domain

Justice ALBIN,
concurring.
I concur with the majority that the out-of-court identification procedure and the identification charge to the jury in this case complied with constitutional norms, and concur with its resolution of the sentencing issues. I am also pleased that Justice LaVecchia’s thoughtful opinion has refined the identification charge to alert jurors to the inherent dangers associated with identification testimony. However, I continue to adhere to my dissent in State v. Herrera, 187 N.J. 493, 528, 902 A.2d 177 (2006), in which I stated that “[i]t is time for this Court to announce that the use of unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures violates the due process guarantees of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution.” The current standard permits highly suggestive identification procedures, however unnecessary, so long as a court later ratifies the identification as otherwise reliable. See id. at 506-07, 902 A.2d 177 (majority opinion). Because we recognize that misidentifications are the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions, I believe that this Court has an obligation to discourage law enforcement from using highly suggestive identification techniques, such as showups, when there is no exigency.
A showup — the displaying of only one suspect to a witness — “ ‘is particularly conducive to misidentification[ ],’ ” and for that reason the practice has “ ‘been widely condemned.’ ” Id. at 525-26, 902 A.2d 177 (Albin, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). One commentator has described the showup as “ ‘the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police.’ ” Id. at 525, 902 A.2d 177 (quoting Patrick M. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 28 (1965)). As I indicated in my dissent in Herrera, “[t]o a person whose fate depends on the accuracy of *82an identification, it is fundamentally unfair for the police to unnecessarily employ a technique that maximizes the potential for error.” Id. at 528, 902 A.2d 177.
The Court in Herrera did not dismiss out-of-hand my call for a new identification standard discouraging unnecessary showups, but rather concluded that the issue had not been properly raised at trial. The Court noted:
We have no reason to doubt that if defendant had raised these arguments before the trial court and submitted the current research in support of his request for a new standard for determining the admissibility of showup identification, a different record would have been made. The trial court would have received the evidence and made its decision, and the Appellate Division then would have had a full record to review. In that event, the arguments defendant now makes would be properly before us. In the absence of such a record, and in light of our consistent application of federal constitutional precedent in deciding the admissibility of identification evidence, we decline to adopt a new standard under our state constitution.
[Id. at 501, 902 A.2d 177 (majority opinion).]
In this case as well, defendant did not challenge the current identification standard that allows the unnecessary use of highly suggestive identification procedures such as the showup. Although I am prepared to address the issue now, I understand the Court’s reluctance to entertain a matter that has not been raised below. I anticipate that in an appropriate case the issue will be raised and a proper record developed so that the Court will have an opportunity to revisit a standard that, I fear, is responsible for increasing the number of misidentifications and wrongful convictions. I am nonetheless heartened that the Court today has taken a positive step toward addressing the general problem of mistaken identifications.
Because in this case I conclude that the showup was not an unnecessary identification procedure (the police had picked up defendant who fit the precise description given by the victim minutes earlier and could not continue to hold him unless the victim confirmed that he was the perpetrator), I would affirm the judgment of conviction.
*83Justice LONG joins in this opinion.
For affirmance in part/reversal in part/remandment — Chief Justice ZAZZALI and Justices LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS — 5.
For concurrence — Justices LONG and ALBIN — 2.