Court Opinion

ID: 9732476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:22:38.661047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:50.520125
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice
(concurring in result).
Although I agree with the majority’s result, I disagree with its rationale.
For all of the reasons set forth in my special writing in Small v. McKennan Hospital, 437 N.W.2d 194, 204 (S.D.1989), I continue to urge that we abolish the distinctions of “trespasser,” “licensee” and “invitee” as the controlling factor in determining the standard of care owed by a land occupier to an entrant.
I continue to be persuaded by the special writing of Chief Justice Wuest1 in Hofer v. Meyer, 295 N.W.2d 333, 337 (S.D.1980). Additionally, I again quote from the learned and insightful conclusion in Comment, Premises Liability: A Proposal to Abrogate the Status Distinctions of “Trespasser,” “Licensee” and “Invitee” as Determinative of a Land Occupier’s Duty of Care Owed to an Entrant, 33 S.D.L.Rev. 66, 89 (1989), wherein it is stated:
The common law premises liability classification scheme, which graduates the duty of care owed by a land occupier to an entrant according to the entrant’s status of ‘trespasser,’ ‘licensee’ or ‘invitee,’ has outlived its useful purpose. Changes in social mores, humanitarian values and societal living arrangements warrant abrogation in South Dakota of the traditional status distinctions as determinative of the scope of duty of care owed by occupiers to entrants and compel adoption of the more progressive and flexible standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. Were the South Dakota Supreme Court to undo what the common law courts have done poorly, South Dakota would stand to gain much. Land occupiers must be admitted to full membership in the fellowship of those acknowledging adherence to the neighb-ourly duty of reasonable care.
Further, as Chief Justice Wuest said in Hofer, an entrant’s status should no longer be controlling. Rather, it is appropriately:
[0]nly one element among many to be considered in determining the landowner’s (or party responsible for the particular condition of the premises) liability under ordinary standards of negligence, with the duty of the landowner (or party responsible for the particular condition of the premises) being no more or no less than that of any other alleged tort-fea-sor. He must conduct himself as a reasonable man, under the circumstances, on land which he controls as well as in other places. Except in those cases where reasonable minds could not differ, whether he has done so, or not, is always a question for the finder of fact.
295 N.W.2d at 339.
I reiterate, as I did in Small, that our cases are outdated and antiquated. Like *157other jurisdictions,2 we need to reexamine these issues in light of more modern times.

. At that time he was a circuit judge sitting for a disqualified justice.

. As of 1988, "[alpproximately ten jurisdictions have completely abrogated the distinctions between ‘trespassers,’ ‘licensees,’ and ‘invitees’ as determinative of the scope of the duty of care owed by land occupiers to entrants.” See Comment, 33 S.D.L.Rev. supra at 79. (Research discloses no additional jurisdictions abrogating the distinctions.)
The states and cases abolishing the distinction are listed below. Webb v. Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 328 So.2d 367 (La.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 (1976), modifying, 47 A.D.2d 812, 366 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (1975); Mariorenzi v. Joseph Di Ponte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975); Smith v. Arbaugh Restaurant, 152 App.D.C. 86, 469 F.2d 97, cert, denied, 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2774, 37 L.Ed.2d 399 (1972); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971), affirming, 28 Colo.App. 400, 474 P.2d 796 (1970); Pickard v. Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968), vacating, 63 Cal.Rptr. 98 (Cal.App.1967).
The scope of duty of care characterized in these states is the duty of ordinary or reasonable care under the circumstances.
Another group of jurisdictions have abrogated the distinction between "licensees” and "invitees” and have retained the common law category of “trespasser.” These states have opted for the unitary standard of imposing a duty of reasonable care on the landowner with respect to persons lawfully on the premises. See Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn.1984); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me.1979); O’Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D.1977); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis.2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975); Hardin v. Harris, 507 S.W.2d 172 (Ky.1974); Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 691 (Fla.1973); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).