Court Opinion

ID: 9406600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-01 18:10:25.142125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:31.608006
License: Public Domain

NUMBERS 13-22-00621-CR, 13-22-00622-CR

                        COURT OF APPEALS

               THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                 CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RAYMOND ELENO RODRIGUEZ JR.
A/K/A GREEN EYES,                                                  Appellant,

                                        v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                 Appellee.

               On appeal from the 105th District Court
                     of Kleberg County, Texas.

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
               Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

    Appellant Raymond Eleno Rodriguez Jr. a/k/a Green Eyes appeals two judgments
revoking his community supervision and adjudicating him guilty of five felony offenses, 1

each enhanced for punishment by Rodriguez’s multiple prior felony convictions. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d). The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to five concurrent thirty-

year prison terms. In both appeals, Rodriguez argues his sentences are grossly

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenses in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s

proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend VIII. In appellate

cause number 13-22-00621-CR, we affirm as modified. In appellate cause number 13-

22-00622-CR, we affirm.

                              I.      CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

A.      Standard of Review & Applicable Law

        The Eighth Amendment—made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment—prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments, which includes

extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Graham v. Florida, 560

U.S. 48, 58–60 (2010); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); id.

amend. XIV. An allegation of excessive or disproportionate punishment is a legal claim

based on a “narrow principle that does not require strict proportionality between the crime

and the sentence.” State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). A successful

        1 In appellate cause number 13-22-00621-CR, Rodriguez appeals his convictions for aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault of a public servant, possession of a controlled substance
in penalty group one in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams, and tampering with
evidence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2), 37.09; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 481.115(c). In appellate cause number 13-22-00622-CR, Rodriguez appeals a conviction for aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2).
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challenge to proportionality is exceedingly rare and requires a finding of “gross

disproportionality.” Id. at 322–23 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). To

determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, “a court must judge the

severity of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim, the

culpability of the offender, and the offender’s prior adjudicated and unadjudicated

offenses.” Id. at 323 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60). “In the rare case in which this

threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, the court should

then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders

in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other

jurisdictions.” Id. “If this comparative analysis validates an initial judgment that the

sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual.” Id.

      “Only twice has the Supreme Court held that a non-capital sentence imposed on

an adult was constitutionally disproportionate.” Id. (first citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.

277 (1983) (holding that life imprisonment without parole was a grossly disproportionate

sentence for the crime of uttering a no-account check for $100); and then citing Weems

v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that fifteen years punishment in a prison

camp was grossly disproportionate to the crime of falsifying a public record)). A trial

court’s discretion to assess punishment within the statutory range is essentially

unfettered. Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Generally,

punishment assessed within the statutory limits is not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See

Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet.

ref’d). Rodriguez was convicted of five felony offenses that were each enhanced for

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punishment pursuant to § 12.42(d) of the penal code, which provides:

       if it is shown on the trial of a felony offense other than a state jail felony
       punishable under Section 12.35(a) that the defendant has previously been
       finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony
       conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous
       conviction having become final, on conviction the defendant shall be
       punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for
       life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d). “Under this statute, sentence is imposed to reflect the

seriousness of [a defendant’s] most recent offense, not as it stands alone, but in light of

prior offenses.” Winchester v. State, 246 S.W.3d 386, 390 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008,

pet. ref’d) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980) (holding that a life sentence

under Texas’s recidivist statute was not cruel and unusual)).

B.     Preservation

       “[We] may not reverse a judgment of conviction without first addressing any issue

of error preservation.” Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(first citing Gipson v. State, 383 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); and then citing

Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). To preserve a

complaint that a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must

present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds

for the ruling desired. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Navarro v. State, 588 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2019, no pet.) (holding that to preserve a disproportionate-sentencing complaint, the

defendant must make a timely, specific objection in the trial court or raise the issue in a

motion for new trial); Toledo v. State, 519 S.W.3d 273, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

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Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (same).

C.     Analysis

       Rodriguez did not object in the trial court that his sentence was disproportionate to

the charged offenses or unconstitutional in any manner. Furthermore, the thirty-year

sentences falls within the lower end of the statutory punishment range for felony offenses

enhanced under the habitual felony offender statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 12.42(d) (life, or a term of twenty-five to ninety-nine years). Accordingly, we hold that

Rodriguez failed to preserve this complaint for our review. See Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at

927–28 (“Because the sentence imposed is within the punishment range and is not illegal,

we conclude that the rights [appellant] asserts for the first time on appeal are not so

fundamental as to have relieved him of the necessity of a timely, specific trial objection.”);

see also Winchester, 246 S.W.3d at 391 (holding that consecutive life sentences for a

habitual felony offender was not cruel and unusual punishment).

       Even if we were to address Rodriguez’s Eighth Amendment claim and assume a

threshold inference of disproportionality, he presented no evidence in the trial court, and

presents no argument on appeal, “compar[ing] [his] sentence with the sentences received

by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same

crime in other jurisdictions.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. Absent this comparative

analysis, we are unable to conclude that the sentences are grossly disproportionate. See

id.; see also Esquivel v. State, No. 13-21-00179-CR, 2022 WL 17492274, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 8, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge where appellant offered no

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comparative evidence of sentences received by other offenders). We overrule

Rodriguez’s sole issue in each appellate cause.

                                  II.    MODIFICATION

      In appellate cause number 13-22-00621-CR, Rodriguez pleaded guilty to

possession of a controlled substance in penalty group one in an amount of one gram or

more but less than four grams, which is a violation of Texas Health and Safety Code

§ 481.115(c). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c). Yet the trial court’s

judgment reflects a conviction under Texas Health and Safety Code § 481.116 which

governs possession of controlled substances in penalty group two. See id. § 481.116.

      We may modify incorrect judgments to make the record “speak the truth” when we

have the necessary information, and we may do so on our own motion. Asberry v. State,

813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d); see TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b).

We have the power to modify whatever the trial court could have corrected by a judgment

nunc pro tunc when the information necessary to correct the judgment appears in the

record. Ette v. State, 551 S.W.3d 783, 792 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017), aff’d, 559

S.W.3d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We conclude that the necessary information appears

in the record. See id. Therefore, we modify the trial court’s judgment in appellate cause

number 13-22-00621-CR to reflect a conviction under Texas Health and Safety Code

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§ 481.115(c).

                                  III.   CONCLUSION

       We affirm as modified the trial court’s judgment in appellate cause number 13-22-

00621-CR. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in appellate cause number 13-22-00622-

CR.

                                                            L. ARON PEÑA JR.
                                                            Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
29th day of June, 2023.

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