Court Opinion

ID: 9898127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:38.927627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:43.332290
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                         Washington State
                                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Division Two

                                                                                         October 24, 2023

      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No. 57033-5-II

                                Respondent,

         v.                                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

    CATLIN J. KNUTSON,

                                Appellant.

        CHE, J. ⎯ Catlin J. Knutson1 appeals the trial court’s imposition of the $500 victim

penalty assessment (VPA) under former RCW 7.68.035 (2018). A jury convicted Knutson of

third degree theft and third degree assault. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated

that Knutson was indigent and imposed only the $500 VPA. But, in its judgment and sentence,

the trial court did not expressly find that Knutson was indigent under RCW 10.01.160(3).

        We hold that a newly enacted statutory provision precludes imposing the VPA on an

indigent defendant and remand for the trial court to expressly determine in the judgment and

sentence whether Knutson is indigent under RCW 10.01.160(3) and to reconsider imposition of

the VPA based on that determination.

1
  Various spellings of Knutson’s name appear throughout the record. See CP at 89, 93-94
(spelling the defendant’s name as “Caitlin”). We use the spelling as it appears on Knutson’s
judgment and sentence.
No. 57033-5-II

                                             FACTS

        In March 2022, the State charged Knutson with third degree theft and third degree

assault. A jury found Knutson guilty of both crimes. Knutson generally requested that the court

waive any discretionary fees because of her indigency. At the time of sentencing, Knutson had

been homeless for five to six years. She had also been unemployed for approximately five years.

        Recognizing that Knutson “has limited ability to meet her legal financial obligations,

either now or in the future,” the trial court “only impose[d] the mandatory $500 crime victims’

fund.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 297-98. The trial court went on to say that Knutson was indigent,

specifically in relation to conditions of community custody, and it waived fees related to

community custody. But the trial court did not expressly find indigency under RCW

10.01.160(3) on the judgment and sentence.

        Knutson appeals the imposition of the $500 VPA.

                                           ANALYSIS

        Knutson argues that the trial court erred by imposing the VPA because it constitutes an

unconstitutionally excessive fine as to Knutson due to her indigency. We remand for the trial

court to address the VPA issue in light of the recent statutory amendment.

        Former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) mandated that the trial court impose the VPA on any person

convicted of a crime without regard to one’s ability to pay. The legislature amended RCW

7.68.035 in 2023. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1. Effective July 1, 2023, RCW 7.68.035(4)

prohibits the trial court from imposing the $500 VPA “if the court finds that the defendant, at the

time of sentencing, is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3).” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, §

1(4).

                                                 2
No. 57033-5-II

       A defendant is indigent under RCW 10.01.160(3) if the defendant:

       (a) Meets the criteria defined in RCW 10.101.010(3) (a) through (c); (b) is homeless
       or mentally ill as defined in RCW 71.24.025; (c) has household income above 125
       percent of the federal poverty guidelines and has recurring basic living costs, as
       defined in RCW 10.101.010, that render the defendant without the financial ability
       to pay; or (d) has other compelling circumstances that exist that demonstrate an
       inability to pay.

To that end, RCW 10.101.010(3) defines “indigent” in sections (a) through (c) as follows:

       a person who, at any stage of a court proceeding, is:

               (a) Receiving one of the following types of public assistance: Temporary
       assistance for needy families, aged, blind, or disabled assistance benefits, medical
       care services under RCW 74.09.035, pregnant women assistance benefits, poverty-
       related veterans' benefits, food stamps or food stamp benefits transferred
       electronically, refugee resettlement benefits, medicaid, or supplemental security
       income; or

               (b) Involuntarily committed to a public mental health facility; or

              (c) Receiving an annual income, after taxes, of one hundred twenty-five
       percent or less of the current federally established poverty level.

       The costs imposed under former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) are not considered final if the case

is still pending on review when the amendment became effective. State v. Ellis, __ Wn. App. __,

530 P.3d 1048, 1057 (2023).

       Although the amended RCW 7.68.035 took effect after Knutson was sentenced, it applies

to Knutson because this case is on direct appeal. See Ellis, 530 P.3d at 1057. Given the

enactment of a new statutory provision that specifically takes into consideration the situation of

indigent defendants, we need not decide whether the imposition of the VPA violates the

excessive fines clause.

       At the time of sentencing, the trial court doubted Knutson’s “ability to meet her legal

financial obligations.” RP at 297. Knutson had been homeless for five to six years and jobless

                                                 3
No. 57033-5-II

for around five years. Although the trial court determined—at the sentencing hearing—that

Knutson was “indigent” and waived all discretionary fees, the trial court did not expressly find

that Knutson was indigent under RCW 10.01.160(3) in the judgment and sentence. RP at 297-

98. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to expressly determine in the judgment and

sentence if Knutson is indigent under RCW 10.01.160(3) and to reconsider imposing the VPA in

light of that determination and the amendment to RCW 7.68.035.

                                         CONCLUSION

        We remand to the trial court to reconsider the imposition of the $500 VPA.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                    Che, J.
 We concur:

 Lee, J.

 Cruser, A.C.J.

                                                4