Court Opinion

ID: 9710465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:10:22.042397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.084665
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the trial court for the following reasons:
1. When the trial court record fails to establish a present intention to do harm or inflict fear of harm, a protection order must be reversed. Bjergum v. Bjergum, 392 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn.Ct.App.1986); see Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subds. 2(a), 4 (1984).
The record indicates appellant was physically abusive in 1981, before he attended a domestic abuse program. The existence of domestic abuse in the past, alone, however, does not support a protective order. Bjergum, 392 N.W.2d at 606. See also Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) (evidence of domestic abuse, the most recent incident of which had occurred four years previously, did not justify issuance of protective order where record was devoid *630of evidence of appellant’s present intention to do harm or inflict fear of harm).
Respondent alleges no incidents of physical harm to the children and none to herself since 1981. Further, I do not believe the record reflects, as alternatively required, any overt act indicating appellant’s intention to place respondent in fear of imminent physical harm. See Kass, 355 N.W.2d at 337.
Although appellant concedes having used abusive language toward respondent and having threatened her with a custody battle, there was no testimony at the hearing of specific threats. Respondent did not testify she was actually fearful for her safety or that of the children. She does not contend appellant ever threatened the children. The record does not support a protective order or supervised visitation as opposed to the liberal visitation ordered by the trial court in the dissolution matter.
2. The dissolution court that heard this matter in August, and had informed the parties orally what would be contained in the decree, was not the same court that issued the protective order. It seems incongruous that the domestic abuse court could make a better decision regarding danger to respondent and the children than the trial court that had just heard the dissolution proceedings, complete with investigation, but had not yet issued the final judgment and decree.
At oral argument, appellant’s counsel stated his client never moved for transfer of the domestic abuse matter to the dissolution trial court. He stated such a motion would have been fruitless given the method of court administration in Ramsey County. Appellant’s counsel did write the dissolution court and requested it to dismiss the domestic abuse order. Counsel stated that request was denied because the court did not think it had such authority.
There is no evidence any domestic abuse occurred after the dissolution hearing. The domestic abuse complaint should have gone to the dissolution court which had jurisdiction. See Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 3.