Court Opinion

ID: 9392759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-06 00:00:36.597107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:48.582956
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60286         Document: 00516740088             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/05/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                      May 5, 2023
                                       No. 22-60286
                                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________
                                                                                           Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Samuel Wilson, III,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Mississippi
                                USDC No. 1:19-CR-96-6
                      ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          A jury convicted Samuel Wilson, III, of conspiracy to possess with
   intent to distribute methamphetamine and marijuana, possession with intent
   to distribute marijuana, and possession of firearms by a felon. Wilson alleges
   the district court erred in not first qualifying a law enforcement witness as an
   expert before allowing him to testify about the meaning of slang words used
   in the conspirators’ secretly recorded conversations. We find any error was

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                   No. 22-60286

   harmless. Wilson also argues there was error in calculating his Guidelines
   range. No error occurred, and we AFFIRM.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Samuel Wilson, III, was charged by a superseding indictment with a
   multitude of crimes, including, as relevant here, conspiracy to possess with
   intent to distribute methamphetamine and marijuana, possession with intent
   to distribute marijuana, and possession of firearms by a convicted felon.
   Wilson pled not guilty and proceeded to trial.
          In 2017, agents with the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) and the
   Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) — as well
   as other law enforcement officers — began investigating Jeremy Mairidith
   for drug trafficking in Tupelo, Mississippi.        During these undercover
   purchases, Mairidith used slang terms such as “three letter,” “cream,” and
   “ice” when referring to methamphetamine and used other slang terms when
   referring to marijuana and heroin.
          In November 2018, agents obtained court authorization to wiretap
   Mairidith’s telephones, and Mairidith emerged as a vital, direct link to the
   Gangster Disciple drug trafficking organization, and Wilson emerged as a
   participant.
          Considerable evidence was admitted at trial to support the charges
   against Wilson. We will describe only the evidence relevant to the issues on
   appeal. Special Agent Frank Elliott, a 32-year veteran of the ATF, testified
   that he led the investigation of Wilson and the Mairidith drug trafficking
   organization, that he was present every day in the wiretap room, and that he
   had heard Mairidith and Wilson speak frequently. Elliott testified that, in
   light of his review of the conversations, he concluded Wilson and Mairidith
   were conspiring to purchase and sell methamphetamine and marijuana. At
   the beginning of Elliott’s testimony regarding the calls, defense counsel

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   objected to Elliott’s interpretation. The prosecutor responded that he was
   not asking Elliott to interpret the calls, and the district court allowed Elliott’s
   testimony. Later, during the course of Elliott’s testimony, defense counsel
   stated he had “a continuing objection to opinion testimony, interpretation,
   that sort of thing[.]” The district court overruled the objection, stating it
   would allow Elliott to testify as to what he thought he heard on the taped
   conversations.
          Elliott testified regarding intercepted calls between Mairidith and a
   person called “Jug,” also known as Dmitri Kimble. During two calls, Kimble
   told Mairidith he was staying at a hotel in Tupelo with a “half a pound.”
   Kimble told Mairidith that “Burn One was going to come get some” —
   which was an alias for Wilson. A few days later, Elliott was monitoring the
   wiretap when he heard Wilson ask Mairidith if he got “right on the cream
   side,” and Mairidith responded, “Yes . . . [f]rom Jug.”
          The jury found Wilson guilty of conspiring to distribute
   methamphetamine and marijuana (count one), possessing with intent to
   distribute marijuana (count seven), and being a felon in possession of a
   firearm on November 28, 2018 (count 11). The district court sentenced
   Wilson to 262 months on the conspiracy charge; 120 months on the
   possession with intent to distribute charge, and 120 months on the felon in
   possession charge, served concurrently; and concurrent supervised release
   terms of five years, four years, and three years, respectively. Wilson filed a
   timely notice of appeal.
                                    DISCUSSION
          On appeal, Wilson contends the district court erred in admitting
   Elliott’s testimony related to his interpretations of drug-code jargon and
   other discussions he overheard during the numerous intercepted calls
   between Wilson and his coconspirators. Wilson argues that Elliott, who was

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   not properly offered or qualified as an expert witness, nevertheless gave
   expert testimony. Wilson notes that in a pretrial disclosure, the Government
   designated Elliott as an expert in narcotics and firearms investigations, not
   drug terminology.
          Relevant to this appeal, Wilson argues that Elliott improperly testified
   as an expert when he explained that “gas” means “marijuana, high-grade
   marijuana” and that “cream” means methamphetamine.
          It is questionable whether Wilson preserved his present evidentiary
   argument for appeal. We review properly “preserved objections regarding
   the admission of expert or lay testimony for abuse of discretion, subject to
   harmless error analysis.” United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 726 (5th Cir.
   2015). On the other hand, if a defendant’s “objection during trial is different
   from the theory he now raises on appeal,” plain error review applies. United
   States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2003).
          We need not decide the appropriate standard of review, because
   Wilson’s argument fails under either standard. We explain.
          I.     Expert versus lay witness testimony
          A witness who is properly qualified by the district court as an expert
   may state expert opinions if, among other requirements, “the expert’s
   scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
   to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid.
   702(a). A lay witness may offer an opinion so long as it is “(a) rationally
   based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the
   witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on
   scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
   702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701.

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          “The distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay
   testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while
   expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered
   only by specialists in the field.” United States v. Yanez Sosa, 513 F.3d 194,
   200 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotations marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
   Drug-code terminology is “a specialized body of knowledge, familiar only to
   those wise in the ways of the drug trade, and therefore a fit subject for expert
   testimony.” United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997). Even
   so, law enforcement officers may testify as lay witnesses about their opinions
   based upon first-hand observations in the specific case or the investigation at
   issue. See United States v. Hill, 63 F.4th 335, 356–57 (5th Cir. 2023).
          In summarizing these distinctions, we have explained that a particular
   drug enforcement agent’s testimony can fall into broad categories: “(1) the
   ‘coded’ meaning of specific words and terms commonly used in the drug
   trade; [and] (2) the meaning of specific words and terms used by the
   particular defendants in th[e] case.” Haines, 803 F.3d at 728. “[T]estimony
   in category (1) was permissible expert testimony [and] testimony in category
   (2) was not permissible as expert testimony, but was admissible as lay opinion
   testimony,” id., based upon the agent’s “personal knowledge of the
   investigation,” id. at 730.
          To the extent Elliott’s interpretations of the drug-related jargon relied
   upon his perceptions from his involvement in this case, the testimony is lay
   opinion testimony. See United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir.
   2001). To the extent Elliott’s testimony was based upon his experience or
   general knowledge of terms employed by drug traffickers, it is indicative of
   expert testimony. See Griffith, 118 F.3d at 321–22. Even if Elliott testified in
   part as an expert without first being properly qualified as an expert by the
   district court, evidentiary rulings are subject to harmless error review.
   United States v. Jackson, 636 F.3d 687, 692 (5th Cir. 2011).

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          As we indicated above, the potential expert opinion testimony from
   Elliott was only that he explained that “gas” means “marijuana, high-grade
   marijuana” and that “cream” means methamphetamine. To understand the
   effect of that testimony, we examine the permissible lay testimony by Elliott
   or other witnesses that supported that marijuana and methamphetamine
   were the drugs involved in the offense:

         Wilson delivered, at Mairidith’s request, eight ounces of
          methamphetamine to Stefanie Johnson, a member of the drug
          trafficking organization.
         Wilson later returned to Johnson’s house for payment after she sold
          the drugs.
         Johnson and Jason Henson, a DEA Task Agent, testified that
          “cream” refers to methamphetamine and that Mairidith routinely
          used that slang term and others when referring to methamphetamine
          to avoid detection by law enforcement.
         Recorded conversations revealed Wilson and Mairidith discussed
          cream, weed, and dope.
         After Wilson first was arrested, agents searching his trailer and vehicle
          discovered three firearms, which form the basis of the felon in
          conviction charge; packages containing 81.6 grams and 114.7 grams of
          marijuana; and digital scales.
          Admission of improper expert testimony will be harmless when that
   testimony is overwhelmed in its potential effect by other incriminating
   evidence. See United States v. Setser, 568 F.3d 482, 495 (5th Cir. 2009).
   Here, what may have been expert testimony was quite limited, while other
   evidence of the kind of drugs involved in the conspiracy was substantial and

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   unchallenged. Any errors made by the district court in admitting Elliott’s
   testimony under Rule 702 were harmless.2
           II.     Rule 403 standard
           Wilson also argues error under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. That
   rule states a court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
   substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
   prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
   time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
           Although Wilson relies on Rule 403 as an additional basis for
   excluding Elliott’s testimony, he cites little caselaw in support of his Rule 403
   argument. He primarily reiterates that Elliott’s dual-role testimony confused
   the jury and prejudiced his case because the district court failed to
   differentiate between his testimony as being that of an expert or lay witness.
   We find this argument fails because Elliott was not testifying as an expert,
   and to the extent he was, it was harmless.
           In support of his Rule 403 argument, Wilson identifies United States
   v. Haines, in which this court noted that mixed testimony can be grounds for
   prejudice under Rule 403. 803 F.3d at 730–31. In Haines, the court

           _____________________
           2
            Wilson also asserts that other portions of Elliott’s testimony were inadmissible
   because he improperly interpreted the motive behind certain actions and improperly
   opined as to the significance of certain statements. In that regard, Wilson identifies
   testimony where Elliott interpreted certain wiretapped conversations to mean that Wilson
   and Mairidith were purchasing drugs and planned to murder two confidential informants;
   where Elliott opined on Wilson’s emotions; where Elliott interpreted the term “hit a lick”
   to be drug-related; and where Elliott opined that another conversation showed Mairidith
   had participated in past criminal activity. We see no error. “[A]gents testifying as lay
   witnesses may testify about the significance of particular conduct or methods of operation
   unique to the drug business.” United States v. Staggers, 961 F.3d 745, 761 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, to the extent the testimony falls into this
   category of acceptable testimony, the district court did not err by admitting it. See id.

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   determined that an agent’s dual-role testimony, though potentially confusing
   to the jury and admitted in error, was harmless “because the record — even
   excluding those portions of [the agent’s] testimony in which his role was
   unclear — [was] replete with evidence” that supported the defendant’s
   conviction. Id. at 732–33. That is precisely what we have here. Thus,
   Wilson’s Rule 403 argument fails.
          III.   Sentencing
          Finally, Wilson argues the district court erred in determining his base
   offense level. This court reviews the district court’s interpretation and
   application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for
   clear error. United States v. Barfield, 941 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2019). The
   district court’s drug quantity calculation is a factual determination reviewed
   for clear error. Id. at 761–62. “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it
   is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id. at 761 (quotation marks and
   citation omitted).
          A district court determines the advisory Guidelines sentence for drug
   offenses based on the quantity of drugs involved in the offense. Id. at 762; see
   U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. In drug trafficking cases, that amount may include
   quantities involved in the defendant’s relevant conduct, and a district court
   may consider estimates of drug quantities where “the amount seized does
   not reflect the scale of the offense.” Barfield, 941 F.3d at 762 (quotation
   marks and citation omitted).
          Under Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) of the Guidelines, relevant conduct “in
   the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity” includes “all acts and
   omissions of others that were” “within the scope” of the joint activity, “in
   furtherance” of it, and “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant. Thus, for
   cases involving controlled substances, a defendant is accountable for all
   substances with which he was “directly involved” and for substances

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   “involved in transactions carried out by other participants, if those
   transactions were within the scope of, and in furtherance of, the jointly
   undertaken criminal activity and were reasonably foreseeable in connection
   with that criminal activity.” § 1B1.3, cmt. n.3(D); see United States v.
   Johnson, 14 F.4th 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 928 (2022).
          Here, the base offense level was determined by the amount of
   methamphetamine and marijuana involved in the entire offense.               An
   intercepted call between Mairidith and Kimble indicated that they negotiated
   the quantity and price of the methamphetamine and later met to complete
   the transaction, and that the purchase was reported to Wilson. Because
   Wilson offered no evidence showing the information was unreliable, it was
   reasonable for the district court to infer from these facts that Wilson should
   be held accountable for the disputed drug quantity. The “district court is
   permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the facts.” United States v.
   Muniz, 803 F.3d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 2015). There was no clear error regarding
   the district court’s drug quantity calculation.
          AFFIRMED.

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