Court Opinion

ID: 2964219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:22:19.096862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:52.608268
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2005

                                 STANLEY DIAZ-GANDIA,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                         MARIA ROSA DAPENA-THOMPSON, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                 [Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colon, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                              _____________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Rafael A. Oliveras Lopez de Victoria for appellant.
             ____________________________________
             Lorraine J. Riefkohl, Assistant Solicitor General, with whom
             ____________________
        Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Solicitor General, and Jacqueline Novas-Debien,
        ________________                         _______________________
        Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                    July 25, 1996
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR, Circuit  Judge.  This appeal  challenges a summary
                    CYR, Circuit  Judge.
                         ______________

          judgment dismissing  various claims  brought under  the Veteran's

          Reemployment Rights  Act of 1968  ("VRRA") against  the Right  to

          Work Administration  of the  Commonwealth of Puerto  Rico ("RWA")

          for allegedly  denying  plaintiff-appellant Stanley  Xavier  Diaz

          Gandia  ("Diaz") certain  incidents and advantages  of employment

          solely by reason of  his participation in the United  States Army

          Reserves.  We vacate  the district court judgment and  remand for

          further proceedings.  

                                          I
                                          I

                                     BACKGROUND1
                                     BACKGROUND
                                     __________

                    Appellant Diaz,  who possesses a  Bachelor's Degree  in

          Psychology  and a  Masters Degree  in Vocational  Counseling, was

          hired  by defendant-appellee RWA  in August  1980, as  an Occupa-

          tional  Counselor I in its  Bayamon Regional Office.   During the

          next  few  years he  was promoted  and transferred  several times

          before  attaining  the  classification  of   Personnel  Relations

          Counselor,  equivalent  to  Occupational  Counselor  III, at  the

          Central Office in San Juan.

                    In September  1986 Diaz  enlisted in the  United States

          Army and  entered on active  duty for approximately  nine months,

          receiving military leave pay  from the RWA as required  by Puerto

          Rico law.  P.R. Laws Ann.  tit. 25   2082.  Following his  honor-
                              
          ____________________

               1We  view all  competent evidence  and  attendant reasonable
          inferences in the light most favorable to Diaz, the party resist-
          ing summary judgment.  McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., Inc.,
                                 ______    _______________________________
          77 F.3d 540, 544  (1st Cir.), petition for cert.  filed, 64 U.S.-
                                        ________ ___ ____   _____
          L.W. 3808 (U.S. May 29, 1996) (No. 95-1929).  

                                          2

          able  discharge in May 1987,  he became an  active reservist with

          the 448th Engineer  Battalion at Fort Buchanan,  which meant that

          he remained on paid military leave from the  RWA until July 1987.

                    When Diaz reported for duty with the RWA at its Central

          Office  following  his  return from  active  duty  with  the Army

          Reserves, he  discovered that a person  with inferior educational

          qualifications  and  experience had  been  assigned  to fill  his

          position.  Nevertheless,  as directed, Diaz reported  for work as

          an Occupational Counselor  III in the  San Juan Regional  Office,

          located in the same building, where for one month he was assigned

          to a cubicle filled with boxes and office supplies but no desk or

          chair.   He complained to  the Office of  Reservist and Veteran's

          Affairs, and,  in  March 1988,  to the  Board of  Appeals of  the

          Commonwealth Personnel  Administration System,  all to  no avail.

          Approximately  two months  later, a  complaint to  the Employee's

          Association resulted in his reassignment to the Central Office as

          a Counselor in the Business Development Area.  

                    In  addition,  Diaz  was  reprimanded  unjustly  by his

          supervisors on two occasions upon his return from military leave.

          First,  he  states that  the Director  of  the San  Juan Regional

          Office, Aida Iris Castro Mundo, informed him that he wasted a lot

          of  time on military  exercises.   Following their  meeting, Diaz

          received  a  letter  from Castro  Mundo,  dated  April  15, 1988,

          advising that he needed  to improve his job performance  in light

          of  the fact  that  he had:    delayed assigning  cases  to other

                                          3

          counselors; refused to receive  cases after 3:30 p.m.; frequently

          absented himself  from his workplace during  office hours; failed

          to  complete  cases on  time; and  either  failed to  perform, or

          performed poorly, various other official responsibilities.   Diaz

          denies these accusations.  Second, at his  deposition Diaz testi-

          fied that he had been reprimanded unfairly by another supervisor,

          Jose  Figueroa,  for not  being at  his  work station  during the

          middle of a day following his  return from military training.  He

          explained his four-hour  absence on that occasion  as having been

          devoted to making  sure the RWA paid  him for the time he  was on

          military  leave.   Diaz further  states that  he received  no job

          description until July 1994, despite a promise six  years earlier

          that  he would receive one, and that his supervisors harassed him

          by evaluating his work performance absent a job description.  

                    No  other  negative  job evaluation  appears  in  Diaz'

          personnel  record.  Nonetheless, and  though in June  1988 he had

          been  designated a Counselor  of Special Projects  in the Central

          Office as  he requested, Diaz testified  that Supervisor Fernando

          Freses made  him uncomfortable with jokes about  the military and

          its exercises, and  that he so  informed Freses.   When asked  on

          deposition whether it  was a joke, Diaz replied:   "It was like a

          joke, but I did not know what  that would lead to.  Because maybe

          behind the words, well, there could be other intentions . . . ." 

                    Diaz  testified  that  his  desk  and  belongings  were

          relocated four times  before or  during military  leaves in  1991

          alone, though there was  no change in work duties.   For example,

                                          4

          in  July 1991, without warning and after submitting a request for

          military leave, his desk  was set apart from co-workers  until he

          complained to  his supervisor.   When he  returned from  military

          leave  the following month, however, his desk had been removed to

          the Training  Division on the same  floor.  Diaz was  told by the

          supervisor that this was  a temporary measure, necessitated by  a

          remodeling project.   But when  he returned from  leave again  in

          September 1991, after the remodeling had been completed, his desk

          had  been relocated  again, this  time to  the Payment  Division.

          Once  again he  was told  by  his supervisor  that  the move  was

          temporary.  Upon his return from military leave in November 1991,

          his desk was located in the Learning Program Division, ostensibly

          as an emergency measure related to space problems.  

                    The  remodeling  plans  for  the  Communal  Development

          Division included  no work  station for  Diaz,  even though  work

          stations were provided for  two co-workers who had  arrived after

          Diaz.2  As a  consequence, Diaz remained in the  Learning Program

          Division until the end of May  1992.  Finally, unlike all his co-

          workers in  the Learning  Program  Division and  in the  Communal

          Development Division, Diaz was not  provided a telephone.  Super-

          visor Jose Figueroa explained to Diaz in March 1992:  "Oh, you do

          not have  a  telephone  because the  day  the  telephone  company

          operator came you were in [sic] one of these [sic] damn  military

          leaves of yours."   In  late March 1992,  Diaz complained to  his

                              
          ____________________

               2In October 1989, the Special Projects Area became the
          Communal Development Division.  

                                          5

          supervisor  that all  his  work  duties  had been  reassigned  to

          others.  

                    Around the  same time, he complained  of migraine head-

          aches and the State  Insurance Fund ordered home rest  from April

          10 to  May 18, 1992.  Upon returning from medical leave, Diaz was

          given  no  work  assignment for  approximately  two  weeks.   The

          following month  he was  transferred to the  Participant Services

          Division in the Central Office, located on the tenth floor of the

          same  building.   After  protesting the  transfer and  requesting

          administrative review, he reported as directed to the Participant

          Services Division upon returning  from another military leave and

          was informed that there was no work for him to do.  Approximately

          one week later,  having been  given no work  assignment, he  com-

          plained to  the  State Insurance  Fund that  he was  experiencing

          insomnia, headaches and neck  and back pain.  A  private psychia-

          trist prescribed two weeks' rest.  Subsequently, another psychia-

          trist evaluated Diaz, concluding  that he suffered from dysthymia

          with anxiety somatization.3  

                    On  August 6,  1992, having been  assigned no  work for

          five consecutive weeks, during a ten-week period, Diaz received a

          copy  of a  letter, dated  July  24, 1992,  from  the manager  of

          Participant Services to the director of Occupational Orientation,

                              
          ____________________

               3Dysthymia:  "any  despondent mood  or depressive  tendency,
          often  associated  with  hypochondriasis."     Blakiston's  Gould
                                                         __________________
          Medical  Dictionary  420 (4th  ed.  1956).   Somatization:   "the
          ___________________
          neurotic  displacement  of  emotional conflicts  onto  the  body,
          resulting in various  physical symptoms  or complaints .  . .  ."
          Id. at 1266.
          ___

                                          6

          advising  that Diaz  should  be  given  work as  an  Occupational

          Counselor, at an unspecified grade level.  Only then was he given

          work  duties.  In  September 1992, he was  instructed to "read" a

          200-page  statute in three days, but found the task too demanding

          as he had  been prescribed  Prozac, then "something  else with  a

          lithium  base," and finally Xanac, by his psychiatrist.  At Diaz'

          request, the director of  Occupational Orientation later  reduced

          the assignment to twenty-five pages per day.  Diaz testified that

          other incidents  also made him "feel  very bad because .  . . all

          this mess, of the Army Reserve and the drills, this was all going

          to continue.   And this was going to be a  nightmare until I left

          the Army or  until I left this agency, this  was going to contin-

          ue."  

                    On July  16, 1993, Diaz filed  suit against defendants-

          appellees Maria Rosa Dapena-Thompson  and her successor, in their

          respective official capacities as the RWA director, alleging that

          he had been harassed,  denigrated, and persecuted after returning

          from military  leave for  required training  and drills  with his

          reserve  unit.   He  demanded  damages for  mental  and emotional

          suffering,  as well  as reclassification  in accordance  with RWA

          rules and regulations.  Shortly after filing the  complaint, Diaz

          was  promoted to Occupational Counselor  IV, the highest grade he

          has ever attained.  

                    In due course, defendants moved for summary judgment on

          the ground, inter  alia, that  there was  no trialworthy  dispute
                      _____  ____

          concerning whether  defendants had discriminated  against Diaz in

                                          7

          violation of the VRRA.  Diaz seasonably interposed opposition  to

          the motion for summary judgment.   Thereafter, the parties stipu-

          lated to certain   uncontested facts and consented to  proceed to

          final judgment before  a magistrate judge  in accordance with  28

          U.S.C. 636(c)(1) and (3) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.  Ultimately, the

          magistrate judge entered summary judgment for both defendants. 

                                          II
                                          II

                                     DISCUSSION4
                                     DISCUSSION
                                     __________

                    The VRRA is  to be liberally construed.   Alabama Power
                                                              _____________

          Co. v. Davis,  431 U.S. 581, 584  (1977); Bunnell v.  New England
          ___    _____                              _______     ___________

          Teamsters  & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 655 F.2d 451, 453 (1st
          _________________________________________

          Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982).  VRRA   2021(b)(3)
                      _____ ______

          provides  in pertinent  part that  "[a]ny person  [employed  by a

          State or political subdivision, or by a  private employer,] shall

          not be denied . . .  retention in employment, or any promotion or

          other incident or advantage of employment  because of any obliga-
          _____ ________ __ _________ __ __________

          tion as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces."  38

          U.S.C.    2021(b)(3) (emphasis added).5   Its legislative history
                              
          ____________________

               4We  review the summary judgment ruling de novo.  McCabe, 77
                                                       __ ____   ______
          F.3d at 544. 

               5Although Diaz cites to VRRA   2021(b)(1), which  relates to
          veteran's reemployment rights, the magistrate judge appropriately
                    ____________
          analyzed  the claim  under    2021(b)(3), which  pertains  to the
          rights  of  reservists.   In turn,     2022 establishes  a remedy
          against covered employers who fail to comply with   2021(b)(3): 

                    If any employer, who is a private employer or
                    __ ___
                    a  State  or  political subdivision  thereof,
                       _____  __  _________ ___________
                    fails  or refuses to  comply with  the provi-
                    _____             __  ______ ____
                    sions  of section . . . [2021](b)(3) . . . of
                              _______       ____________
                    this title,  the district  court . .  . shall
                                 ___ ________  _____        _____
                    have the power . . . to require such employer
                    ____ ___ _____       __ _______ ____ ________

                                          8

          likewise reflects that VRRA   2021(b)(3) "was enacted for the . .

          . limited  purpose of  protecting the  employee-reservist against

          discriminations like discharge and demotion,  motivated solely by
          _______________ ____ _________ ___ ________             ______

          reserve  status . . .  [and] the temptation  of employers to deny

          them the  same treatment afforded their  co-workers without mili-

          tary obligations."   Monroe v.  Standard Oil Co.,  452 U.S.  549,
                               ______     ________________

          559-600 (1981) (emphasis added).  

          A.   "Discriminations Like Discharge and Demotion"
          A.   "Discriminations Like Discharge and Demotion
                ___________________________________________

                    VRRA    2021(b)(3) is designed to  deter discriminatory

          employment actions "like discharge and demotion," id. at 559; see
                                                            __          ___

          also Carlson v.  New Hampshire  Dep't of Safety,  609 F.2d  1024,
          ____ _______     ______________________________

          1027  (1st Cir. 1979), cert.  denied, 446 U.S.  913 (1980), based
                                 _____  ______

          solely  on  the plaintiff-employee's  reservist responsibilities.

          Monroe, 452 U.S.  at 559.6   Since Diaz  was neither  discharged,
          ______

                              
          ____________________

                    to comply with such provisions and to compen-
                    __ ______                      ___ __ _______
                    sate  such person  for any  loss of  wages or
                    ____  ____ ______  ___ ___  ____ __  _____ __
                    benefits  suffered by reason  of such employ-
                    ________
                    er's  unlawful action.  Any such compensation
                    shall  be in  addition  to and  shall not  be
                    deemed to  diminish any of the  benefits pro-
                    vided for in such provisions. . . .  No State
                    statute  of limitations  shall  apply to  any
                    proceedings under this chapter.
            
          38 U.S.C.   2022 (emphasis added).  

               6On October 13, 1994,  the Uniformed Services Employment and
          Reemployment Rights  Act ("USERRA"), 38  U.S.C.    4301  et seq.,
                                                                   __ ____
          replaced the  VRRA.  Gummo v. Village of Depew, N.Y., 75 F.3d 98,
                               _____    ______________________
          105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3759, 3762 (U.S. May 13,
                         _____ ______
          1996)  (No. 95-1465).    Although Diaz  contends  on appeal  that
          USERRA   4311 retroactively  applies to his discrimination claim,
          he failed to raise this contention in the district court through-
          out  the  entire  8-month period  following  USERRA's  enactment.
          Consequently, we deem it waived.  See Credit Francais Int'l, S.A.
                                            ___ ___________________________
          v. Bio-Vita, Ltd., 78 F.3d 698, 709 (1st Cir. 1996).
             ______________

                                          9

          see Nereida-Gonzalez  v. Tirado-Delgado,  990 F.2d 701,  704 (1st
          ___ ________________     ______________

          Cir. 1993), nor  formally demoted, we first  determine whether he

          was subjected  to a discriminatory employment  action "like demo-

          tion."   See Monroe, 452  U.S. at 559-600.   Secondly, we inquire
                   ___ ______

          whether any such discriminatory employment action was  "motivated

          solely by [his] reserve status."  Id. at 559. 
                                            __

                    VRRA   2021(b)(3) was enacted "to protect potential and

          existing  reservists  from  policies that  deter  employees  from

          joining the reserves."   Boyle v.  Burke, 925 F.2d 497,  502 (1st
                                   _____     _____

          Cir. 1991); see also Gummo v. Village of Depew, N.Y., 75 F.3d 98,
                      ___ ____ _____    ______________________

          104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3759, 3762 (U.S. May 13,
                         _____ ______

          1996)  (No.  95-1465).   Although  appellees  contend that  their

          employment  actions  denied Diaz  no  "incident  or advantage  of

          employment"  within the meaning  of VRRA    2021(b)(3),  we think

          there can  be no question that  discriminatory employment actions

          "like demotion," including constructive demotion, based solely on

          reservist participation, constitute the very  sort of discrimina-

          tory conduct the Congress sought to deter under   2021(b)(3).  

                    We  have held that a state trooper was denied an "inci-

          dent  or advantage  of  employment" by  reason  of his  reservist

          training  and responsibilities  when he  was transferred  from an

          eight-hour  weekday shift  to  a nine-hour  shift which  included

          weekend duty.   Carlson, 609 F.2d  at 1027.  There  we noted that
                          _______

          "the [defendant-employer] would be  free to transfer plaintiff at

          any time, including  while his reserve  duties were in  progress,

          for reasons unrelated to his reserve obligations[,] but . . . not

                                          10

          . .  . to  [deny] him  . .  . a  previously  enjoyed incident  or

          advantage of employment"  based on his reserve  obligations.  Id.
                                                                        ___

          More  to the  present point,  Carlson made  clear that  the shift
                                        _______

          reassignment was  a  constructive demotion  because  it  required

          weekend work, as well as night work, and therefore constituted an

          employment action which might  deter a trooper from participating

          in  the  military reserves.   Id.   The  challenged reassignment,
                                        __

          based  solely  on reservist  obligations,  thus  violated VRRA   

          2021(b)(3).   Accordingly, the Carlson panel  ordered the trooper
                                         _______

          "restored to his former work assignment."  See id. (citing VRRA  
                                                     ___ ___

          2022).  

                    As an "outright demotion[] involve[s] reductions in pay

          and official rank," Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d
                              ___________________    ____________

          1209, 1218 n.8 (1st  Cir. 1989) (en banc), a  constructive reduc-

          tion in pay or rank ("constructive demotion") would constitute an

          employment  action sufficiently  "like demotion"  to satisfy  the

          severity standard imposed by Monroe, 452 U.S. at 559.   See Clark
                                       ______                     ___ _____

          v. Township of Falls, 890  F.2d 611, 618 (3d Cir.  1989) ("Actual
             _________________

          reduction in rank is effected by a change in job title.  When the

          . . . job title has not been altered . . , we must look to  other

          traditional indicia  of change in  rank to determine  whether the

          employee's rank  constructively has  been reduced.").   Suggested

          indicia for  determining  whether challenged  employment  actions

          constitute  a "constructive  demotion"  include duty  assignments

          normally  given to lower  level employees, substantial reductions

          in work responsibilities, "termination of privileges of rank, and

                                          11

          whether the changes  or restrictions  are temporary."   Id.   For
                                                                  __

          example, the trooper in Carlson was not formally reduced in rank,
                                  _______

          but  nonetheless underwent a constructive reduction  in rank as a

          result  of his assignment from  an eight-hour weekday  shift to a

          nine-hour  shift which included  weekend duty.   See Carlson, 609
                                                           ___ _______

          F.2d  at 1027.  Thus, reassignment to a substantially less favor-

          able  work  schedule deprived  Carlson  of a  privilege  of rank,

          resulting  in a  constructive demotion  because of  his reservist

          duties, in violation of VRRA    2021(b)(3).

                    The  summary  judgment record  discloses that  Diaz had

          been subjected  to adverse  changes in  work conditions  as well,

          upon return from  active duty with the Army  Reserves.  First, he

          lost  substantial privileges of rank,  in that he  was assigned a

          work  station, with no  desk or chair,  in a  cubicle filled with

          boxes  and office  supplies.   On four  occasions in  1991 alone,

          either before or during military leaves,  his desk and belongings

          were relocated apart  from all  his co-workers.   In early  1992,

          Diaz, alone among his co-workers,  was provided with no telephone

          whatsoever.  Second, Diaz'  job responsibilities had been reduced

          to the  point that by  early 1992  all his work  duties had  been
                                             ___

          assigned to others.  Thus, for five consecutive weeks during this

          period, Diaz  was given no work  duties at all.   Cf.  Agosto-de-
                                  __                        __   __________

          Feliciano, 889  F.2d  at 1219  (holding  that reduction  in  work
          _________

          duties  must extend  beyond a  "week or  two" before  it  will be

          considered sufficiently  severe to be actionable  in First Amend-

          ment "political  discrimination"  context); compare  Township  of
                                                      _______  ____________

                                          12

          Falls,  890  F.2d at  618 (holding  that  a partial  reduction in
          _____

          duties during six-week period constituted  temporary reassignment

          insufficient  to  support  procedural  due  process  claim  under

          Fourteenth Amendment).  Third, Diaz was "left in limbo" as to his

          actual rank, since he was without a job description for six years

          and given  no work responsibilities  for weeks at  a time.   Once

          work assignments resumed, moreover,  Diaz was not informed  as to

          their grade level.  

                    Viewing  the  competent  evidence, and  all  reasonable

          inferences  therefrom, in  the light most  favorable to  Diaz, we

          conclude that he  generated a trialworthy issue  of material fact

          as  to whether the cumulative effect  of these adverse employment

          actions  was enough "like demotion" to be actionable under VRRA  

          2021(b)(3).  A reasonable trier of fact could  find that Diaz was

          subjected to adverse work-condition  changes, extending over more

          than five years and amounting to constructive reductions in rank,

          that  could deter  continued  participation in  the military  re-

          serves.  Thus, Diaz made  out a prima facie case that he had been

          denied  "incident[s] or  advantage[s]  of employment"  within the

          meaning of VRRA   2021(b)(3).  

          B.   "Motivated Solely By Reserve Status"
          B.   "Motivated Solely By Reserve Status
                __________________________________

                    The  VRRA affords  recourse for  certain discriminatory

          employment  actions  against  employee-reservists  taken  "solely

          because of  their military  obligations."   Monroe,  452 U.S.  at
                                                      ______

                                          13

          565.7   As  there  is scant  evidence  that the  alleged  adverse

          employment actions against Diaz  were other than reservist-status

          based, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence,  if credit-

          ed,  to  meet the  second criterion  under  VRRA    2021(b)(3) as

          well.8 

                    Diaz  proffered  considerable  circumstantial  evidence
                                                   ______________

          that  the  challenged actions  were  motivated  by his  reservist

          obligations.    For example,  following  his  return from  active

          reserve duty in  1987, he was  assigned to a cubicle  filled with

          boxes  and office  supplies, with  no desk  or chair.   Again, in

          1991,  upon returning  from reserve  duty, he  underwent repeated

          relocations to  work stations apart  from all co-workers.   After

          returning  from reserve training in 1992, he was assigned no work

          responsibilities for five consecutive weeks.   See also supra  at
                                                         ___ ____ _____

                              
          ____________________

               7Even though the Monroe Court (5-4) was sharply divided, the
                                ______
          Justices were as one on the central question presented here.  All
          agreed,  at a minimum,  that VRRA    2021(b)(3) prohibits certain
          discriminatory  employment  actions motivated  by  the plaintiff-
          ______________
          employee's  reservist status.   Their disagreement concerned only
          whether reservists  are  entitled to  preferential  work-schedule
                                                ____________
          accommodations by reason of their military training responsibili-
          ties.  Diaz, on the other hand, alleges discriminatory employment
                                                  ______________
          actions based on his responsibilities as a reservist.

               8Upon remand, the district  court must determine whether any
          uncontroverted  material facts are to be deemed established.  See
                                                                        ___
          Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).  We note that the  exact burden allocation
          regimen appropriate  for application to  a VRRA claim  at summary
          judgment  has not been addressed  by the parties  or the district
          court.   Furthermore, though Diaz now contends that USERRA   4311
          applies  retroactively  to  the present  case,  he  made  no such
          contention  below, nor does he  now contend that  the USERRA pre-
          scribes  the burden  allocation  regimen for  these VRRA  claims.
          Consequently, we decline to volunteer our views on  these matters
          in the present vacuum.  See Credit Francais Int'l., S.A., 78 F.3d
                                  ___ ____________________________
          at 709. 

                                          14

          pp. 12-13. 

                    Diaz  also proffered  direct evidence  of a  reservist-
                                          ______

          based discriminatory animus on the part of the RWA, including his

          deposition  testimony that  Regional  Director  Castro-Mundo,  in

          demanding improved performance, criticized Diaz for wasting a lot

          of time  on official matters, including military exercises.  Diaz

          further  states that  Supervisor Figueroa  informed him  that the

          reason  Diaz had no  telephone was that  he was on  "one of those

          damn military  leaves" when the telephone  company representative

          came.  

                                          15

                    Viewed in  context, this  evidence cannot  be dismissed

          simply as "stray remarks in  the workplace . . . ,  statements by

          nondecisionmakers, or  statements by decisionmakers  unrelated to

          the decisional process itself,"  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
                                           ________________    _______

          U.S.  228, 277  (1989)  (O'Connor, J.,  concurring), particularly

          since these  statements are  attributed to supervisors  or office

          directors with apparent authority to affect Diaz' work conditions

          in a  significant  manner through  work-station,  work-condition,

          equipment, and  job assignments,  as well as  performance evalua-

          tions.    The statement  attributed  to  Supervisor Figueroa,  in

          particular, could support a fair inference that the discriminato-

          ry work conditions,  viz., the  total denial of  a telephone  and
                               ___

          work assignments, as well  as repeated work-station changes, were

          directly linked to Diaz' reservist status and responsibilities.  

                    Furthermore, for their part  defendants offer no expla-
                                                                  __

          nation  for not providing Diaz with either  a desk or a chair for

          an entire month following his return from military leave in 1987.

          As  for the disparaging remarks made to Diaz by Supervisor Freses

          in 1988, relating to the military and to Diaz' military exercises

          in  particular, the  defendants merely  point out  that Diaz  has

          acknowledged that these remarks took the outward form of "jokes."
                                                   _______ ____

          Thus, defendants tender  no compelling basis  upon which to  con-

          clude that a factfinder could not reasonably  infer a discrimina-

          tory reservist-based motivation  from the direct and  circumstan-

          tial evidence proffered by Diaz.  

                                          16

                    Similarly, defendants offer no explanation for refusing
                    

          to  assign Diaz work responsibilities  for a total  of five weeks

          during a ten-week period following his return from military leave

          in 1992, notwithstanding the fact that the manager of the Partic-

          ipant  Services Division, to which Diaz was assigned at the time,

          advised the Director of the Occupational Orientation Division, in

          writing, that "non-use of [Diaz] is  not productive nor advisable

          for the  best welfare of the  Occupational Orientation Division."

          To  this point,  therefore, defendants  have met  Diaz' competent

          direct  and  circumstantial evidence  with  neither  evidence nor

          explanation which would compel a reasonable trier of fact to find

          that the challenged employment  actions were not motivated solely

          by  Diaz'  reservist obligations.    Thus,  summary judgment  was

          precluded on the present record. 

          C.   Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
          C.   Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
               ___________________________

                    The Eleventh  Amendment immunity  defense to  the claim

          for damages  fails as well.   As  this court held  in Reopell  v.
                                                                _______

          Massachusetts, 936 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
          _____________                              ____  ______

          1004  (1991), Congress,  acting pursuant to  its War  Powers, see
                                                                        ___

          U.S. Const.  art. I,    8, "removed the Eleventh Amendment bar to

          damages  actions brought  under [the  VRRA] .  . .  ."   Since no

          subsequent development has undermined Reopell, we remain bound by
                                                _______

          it.   Williams v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir.),
                ________    _________________

          cert.  denied, 116  S. Ct.  51 (1995).9   Accordingly, defendants
          _____  ______
                              
          ____________________

               9The recent decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida  v. Flori-
                                       _________________________     ______
          da, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), which overrules Pennsylvania v. Union
          __                                          ____________    _____
          Gas Co.,  491 U.S.  1 (1989), and  holds that Congress  lacks the
          _______

                                          17

          are  not entitled  to Eleventh Amendment  immunity from  suit for

          compensatory damages under VRRA   2021(b)(3).

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    We therefore hold that an employee-reservist may assert

          a claim under VRRA    2021(b)(3) based on constructive  demotion,

          i.e., a discriminatory employment action, "like demotion," in the

          nature of a  constructive reduction in rank and  motivated solely

          by  participation  in the  reserves.    Furthermore, viewing  the

          competent evidence most favorably to Diaz, a reasonable trier  of

          fact  could find  that Diaz  was constructively  reduced in  rank

          based  solely on  his  reservist participation  and  obligations.

          Finally,  we conclude that the  Eleventh Amendment does not immu-

          nize defendants from suit under VRRA    2021(b)(3).  Accordingly,

          the district court judgment  is vacated and the case  is remanded

          for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

                    So ordered.  Costs to appellant.
                    So ordered.  Costs to appellant.
                    _______________________________

          

                              
          ____________________

          power  to abrogate  the Eleventh  Amendment under   the  Commerce
          Clause, does not control the War Powers analysis.   See CEH, Inc.
                                                              ___ _________
          v.  F/V Seafarer,  70 F.3d 694,  702 (1st  Cir. 1995)  ("[W]e are
              ____________
          hesitant  to ascribe to the Court a holding that goes well beyond
          any issue discussed there.").  

                                          18