Court Opinion

ID: 9543070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:41:47.573501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:38.036484
License: Public Domain

WOLFE, Justice
(concurring).
I concur. In this particular case the plaintiff had paid $4,000. Had he paid nothing, the defendant could only have recovered what he was actually damaged by his default, had defendant himself been free from default. If defendant had defaulted the plaintiff would have been able to recover only his damages. It appears to be plainly inequitable for one on the receiving end of the transaction to keep all the money paid if it exceeds compensation for the harm done just because he is in the position of being on the receiving end.
Where a written contract for the sale of real estate contains a provision for forfeiture or a provision that installment payments made may be retained by the seller as liquidated damages, the courts determine whether the amounts received by the seller are greatly in excess of the fair rental value and any extra ordinary wear and tear and if so, treat it as a penalty and require remission. This is a de*600vice to do equity. I see no reason why we should not meet the situation openly and honestly and without benefit of subterfuge. So much for a simple case of purchase and sale of realty or personalty.
In this case there seems to have been so much cloudiness in the whole history of the transactions that it was doubtful from the evidence which party or whether both parties were not in default. The lower court hesitatingly found that the plaintiff only was in default. Therefore, if in a clear cut case of plaintiff’s default he is able to recover a definite excess paid, he should be able to do so in this case. This is an aggravation of a clear cut case. The defendant in this case asserted that his record was clear of defaults and the plaintiff was in default. Being in the advantageous position of having received the money, defendant was in the additional advantageous position of having only to remain passive and thrusting on the plaintiff the duty of proving his (plaintiff’s) compliance with the contract and his (defendant’s) default. He stood to lose nothing but had a chance to unjustly enrich himself by obtaining more than would compensate him for the harm done him. Coupling with this the fact that the whole oral agreement encompassed the duty of both parties to enter into a partnership arrangement, had there been no hitches which would probably have accentuated and prolonged the agony, there appears to be a good reason for a present dissociation of the careers of these parties which should be done on an equitable basis. Technically, the defendant, if free from default, could have forgiven plaintiff’s supposed default and insisted on plaintiff going through with the contract, but to require plaintiff to pay the additional money, and then réquire the defendant to follow with it a deed to plaintiff of an undivided half interest in defendant’s home in pursuance of the establishment of a partnership, would amount to tying these two together in an arrangement which would be definitely more difficult to unscramble. I am aware of the technical ability to play chess with the *601law — move, counter move and checkmate — each precisely correct according to the old conventional principles of contracts perhaps, but I like the principles laid down in the Restatement of the Law — set out in Mr. Justice Latimer’s opinion — and so I concur with his reasoning and his results.
McDONOUGH, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of WOLFE, J.