Court Opinion

ID: 9812173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:37:31.585284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:24.892978
License: Public Domain

MekRimon, J.,
concurring. In my judgment, the equitable right of a creditor plaintiff to have the debtor defendant restrained from availing himself of the statute of limitation where the former forbore to sue until after the bar, at the request of the latter, and with the assurance and promise on his part, that he would not afterwards plead the statute of limitation, is in no way affected by the statute, (The Code, §172,) which provides, that “no acknowledgment or promise shall be received as evidence of a new and continuing contract, whereby to take the case out of the operation of this title, (that as to time of commencing action,) unless the same be contained in some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but this section shall not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest.”
The right is founded not upon a new promise on the part of the debtor to pay the debt barred, as contemplated by this statutory provision, but upon the ground that before the bar, he requested the creditor not to sue until after the bar, upon the assurance and promise of the debtor that he would not afterwards avail himself of the statute of limitation. In view of such assurance and promise given by the debtor, and received and acted upon by the creditor, it would be perfidious and iniquitous for the debtor to plead the statute, and a Court of Equity will not allow him thus to take advantage of, and reap benefit from his own fraud and wrong. And this is so in the same degree, whether the promise was made verbally or in writing.
In the case where the equitable right arises as above indicated, the assurance and promise are given before the bar arises In the case contemplated by the statutory provision above recited, the new promise to pay is made after the bar, and must be in writing to be effectual.
*155The equitable right thus arising, is distinctly recognized and upheld in Lyon v. Lyon, 8 Ired. Eq., 201; Daniel v. Commissioners, 74 N. C., 494; Haymore v. Commissioners, 85 N. C., 268; Barcroft v. Roberts, 91 N. C., 363, and other cases.
But the Court of Equity will not thus interfere indefinitely — it will do so only for a reasonable time — not exceeding an extension of the time equal to that prescribed by the statute of limitation. In this case, the plaintiff did not bring his action until more than eight years next after the bond sued upon matured as to the surety, the defendant-appellant. I therefore think he cannot recover, as to the surety; I would think otherwise, however, if the action had been brought within six years after such maturity of the-bond.
Error. Reversed.