Court Opinion

ID: 9671553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:39:00.696078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:10.712755
License: Public Domain

Carretón Harris, Chief Justice (dissenting). I am not in accord with the conclusion by the majority that this case must be reversed because error was committed in giving to the jury Instruction No. I, and I very much disagree with the finding that there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of whether the words spoken were true. The sole testimony relating to the contact between Colonel Armstrong and Robert L. Moore is as follows: “Q. Now, Mr. Moore, can you tell the jury when you got out of the car and walked up to Mr. Armstrong’s, who introduced you? A. Mr. Simons introduced me to Col. Armstrong as a member of the Airport Commission. Q. Did you thinlc (my emphasis) at that time you were looking for building plans? A. I thought we were going to the Airport Commissioner’s house to get a set of plans for the building. Q. Who told you that? A. I wouldn’t say that I was told. I wasn’t told why we were going there but since I had gone to Harold’s1 house in the first place to look at the plans and he didn’t show them to me there then I assumed (my emphasis) that'we.were going to Col. Armstrong’s house to see the plans. Q. When you got to Col. Armstrong’s house what was said? A. I was introduced to his wife and we went straight on out the glass doors to the back of the house to this sun deck or patio. Q. What transpired when you got out there— A. He said what I— Q. Who said? A. Col. Armstrong said ‘what I wanted was to take this hand rail off’ he said ‘I will probably use it later on another patio at the foot of the steps.’ He said, ‘I want a roof built over it and I want it screened in and fixed to where it will be a screened in patio. Q. Did he tell you what kind of roof he wanted you to use? A. I asked him specifically. I said, ‘What type structure are you talking about? I said, ‘Do you want wolmanized lumber, something of a lifetime construction or do you want to go the cheaper route or what do you want do you want fiberglass room or do you want shingles?’ and he said, ‘I am leaving all that up to you.’ Q. Then, what did you do ? A. We went back through the house outside. He told us the side gate would be open that I could come and go and that if there was no one at home I could come and go and he went back in the house and we got in the car and left.” This is all that is revealed by the transcript as to any contact between Armstrong and Moore; in fact, Mr. Moore stated that this was the only time he had ever seen Colonel Armstrong. Based on prior conversations with Simons (which were properly held by the trial court to be inadmissible) and the fact that Colonel Armstrong did not ask what the repair work would cost, Moore decided that he was being propositioned to do the work free of charge to Armstrong, (apparently the latter would use his influence as a member of the Airport Commission to assist Moore in being awarded the contract for the work at. the airport) and the private work for appellee would then be included in the bill to the city. Thereafter, Moore told Dr. McMillion, in effect, that appellee had tried to make a ‘ ‘ deal ’ ’ with him. This, then, is the sum total of the evidence upon which Dr. McMillion based his charge that appellee was dishonest, and appellant steadfastly refused to alter that opinion, although he had only met Armstrong, and knew nothing about him. One circumstance that makes the charge so “far-fetched” is that Armstrong ivas not even a member of the Airport Commission at the time that Moore went to the Colonel's home. The conversation at the home took place on April 19, 1962, and appellee became a member of the Airport Commission on May 10,1962. In fact, the work was done on appellee’s house by another contractor, and paid for, before Armstrong ever became a member of the Commission. The record reflects a check given by Armstrong to J. C. Cartwright in the amount of $280.00 on May 8, 1962. I think it can be said, without fear of contradiction, that if Colonel Armstrong had been convicted of soliciting a bribe on the basis of the testimony offered in this case, every member of this court would unhesitatingly have voted to reverse such conviction because of a complete lack of evidence. Considering the fact that McMillion made his accusation concerning appellee to other members of the Commission individually, before making it at the Commission meeting, I have some doubt that he was entitled to the defense of "conditional privilege,” but even if entitled to that defense, it does not appear, under the circumstances, that the court’s instruction was prejudicial. I should mention one of the general rules relating to privileged defamatory communications. In Arkansas Associated Telephone Company v. Blankenship, 211 Ark. 645, 201 S. W. 2d 1019, this court, quoting 36 C.J., Page 1248, stated: 4 4 4 The protection of the privilege may be lost by the manner of its exercise, although the belief in the truth of the charge exists. The privilege does not protect any unnecessary defamation. In order for a communication to be privileged, the party making it must be careful to go no farther than his interest or his duties require. Where the party exceeds his privilege and the communication complained of goes beyond what the occasion demands that he should publish, and is unnecessarily defamatory of plaintiff, he will not be protected, and the fact that a duty, a common interest, or a confidential relation existed to a limited degree is not a defense, even though he acted in good faith.’ ” In this state, the qualified or conditional privilege can be destroyed by malice, and the malice necessary to destroy a qualified privilege can, in addition to 4 4 malice in fact” (hate, vindictiveness, animosity) consist of such reckless disregard of the rights of another as to constitute the equivalent of ill will. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 345 S. W. 2d 34. Let it be remembered that the jury was not compelled by the instruction in question to establish damages of $5,500.00. A verdict for $1.00, or other nominal amount, could have been returned, but, in addition to fixing the sum of $5,000.00 compensatory damages, the jury returned a verdict of $500.00 as punitive damages, and, in doing so, necessarily found that Dr. McMillion had acted ivith malice. This meant that the jury found either that McMillion’s charge was wanton and reckless, or that he acted with actual malice. In Erwin v. Milligan, 188 Ark. 658, 67 S. W. 2d 592, this court said: “The court submitted to the jury, in the case of Mrs. Milligan against the appellant, the question of punitive damages. Punitive damages are damages imposed by ivay of punishment,2a and are given for the loss sustained. It is generally said that punitive damages are awarded in view of the supposed aggravation of the injury to the feelings of the plaintiff by the wanton or reckless act of the defendant. ”2b  The finding of the jury in the instant case is not difficult to understand under the testimony presented. Even after the meager evidence (to my way of thinking, no evidence) had been discussed in the Commission meeting, appellant refused to “back up,” but continued to insist that, “I believe you did it,” and, “I still think it happened.” The doctor stated that he would not serve on the same commission with a man of Armstrong’s character, and that Armstrong would resign or he would resign, and if he (appellant) resigned, he would make known what had happened. In fact, at the trial,- the doctor stated that he still adhered to the view expressed. Since the jury found malice to have existed, I cannot see how appellant was prejudiced by the instruction. The situation bears some similarity to our holding in Weatherford v. George, 229 Ark. 536, 317 S. W. 2d 147. In that case, involving a collision between vehicles, the appellant was found by the jury to be 100% negligent, and appellee accordingly guilty of no negligence. On appeal to this court, appellant vigorously contended that the trial court had erred in not submitting a particular instruction that he requested, relative to appellee’s negligence being the proximate cause of the accident. In rejecting this contention, we said: “It certainly follows, that if the jury found George guilty of no negligence whatever, they would not have found that negligence on his part was the proximate-cause of the mishap. Accordingly, even if the failure to give the instruction was error, the verdict rendered by the jury had the effect of healing or remission. ’ ’ Under the same reasoning, even if appellant was entitled to have the defense of conditional privilege submitted to the jury, Such defense could have been of no aid, for the jury found malice — and awarded punitive damages — and when the jury found malice, the asserted defense of conditional privilege was wiped out. Of course, this finding "also nullified appellant’s contention of “good faith,” for irrespective of Dr. McMillion’s belief in the truth of his accusation, the jury found, at the least, that he had acted with conscious indifference and reckless disregard of the rights of appellee. Solomon, reputed to have been the wisest man who ever lived, said, “A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches . . ,”3  Aside from the fact that to accuse a man of a specific act of dishonesty, or a crime, is slander per se, the record establishes that McMillion’s charges raised doubts in the minds of some of his fellow commissioners as to appellee’s integrity. For instance, Commissioner Bowker stated, “It makes anybody stop and think * * * I am saying it makes you stop and wonder.” Commissioner Allen testified: “It is hard for anybody to set here and hear accusations made or remarks made about anybody without being impressed one way or the other. As to whether that caused me to say right away, ‘well I believe he is dishonest.’ No. Did it put a doubt in my mind whether he could have done it. Yes, but now whether to say he was dishonest just like Mr. Bowker said it makes you stop and think.” * * * “Q. The only reason you could possible have for thinking he did do it was that Dr. McMillion had accused him of doing it and Mr. Moore said Lt. Col. Armstrong permitted him to look at his house? A. That is about it. ” Eddie Holland, Chairman of the Airport Commission, in response to the question as to whether he had any reason to believe Colonel Armstrong to be a dishonest man, stated: “No, sir. I have no reason other than what I heard Mr. Moore say and being connected with the Airport Commission I was impressed and I felt like the commission should do something about it. I felt it had happened.” The unfortunate aspect about an accusation that reflects upon one’s character, is that, even if totally untrue, and perhaps not really believed by the recipients of the information, such remarks almost invariably leave a question in the minds of the hearers, and every time the accused person’s name is mentioned, the accusation is remembered, and the mental reaction, consciously or subconsciously, is — “I wonder”. As stated, I cannot agree that there is any testimony that would substantiate the truth of the charge, and the finding of malice cured any defect that might have existed under the court’s instruction. I therefore respectfully dissent.' Robinson and Holt, JJ., join in this dissent.   Referring to Simons.    Emphasis supplied.   ‘Proverbs 22:1.