Court Opinion

ID: 9952097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 18:02:10.581617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:38:02.319676
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/19/24 P. v . Rice CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085745
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF184747A)
                    v.

 DERRICK LAMONTE RICE,                                                                    OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John R.
Brownlee, Judge.
         Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Caely Fallini and
William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                     INTRODUCTION
       Appellant Derrick Lamonte Rice was convicted of attempted murder, assault with
a firearm, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The
jury found true that the attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated, and that
appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury.
In a bifurcated court trial, the trial court found true that appellant suffered two prior
serious felony convictions under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)1 and found true
various aggravating sentencing factors. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of
67 years to life consecutive to a determinate term of 10 years in state prison.
       On appeal, appellant claims there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
finding that the attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated, that his counsel was
prejudicially ineffective for failing to object to his statements to police which were
obtained in violation of Miranda,2 and that the trial court erroneously imposed two five-
year prior serious felony conviction enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
The People agree that one of the five-year enhancements under section 667, subdivision
(a)(1) should be stricken but reject appellant’s remaining claims.
       We agree with the parties and remand for the trial court to strike one of the five-
year prior serious felony conviction enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
and conduct a full resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
                               FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.     Prosecution Evidence
       On March 14, 2021, Officer Peter Lawson of the Bakersfield Police Department
was dispatched to 19th Street in the City of Bakersfield after being notified of a shooting
at that location. There was an indication that five shots were fired. Lawson’s body

1      Hereinafter, all undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2      Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

                                              2.
camera footage from March 14, 2021 while he responded to the intersection of 19th
Street and M Street was entered into evidence and played for the jury. Lawson did not
locate any shell casings in that area. Lawson explained that when a semi-automatic
firearm is shot, a shell casing is expelled. However, when a revolver is shot, the shell
casings are kept in the cylinder.
       Lawson also received a call about a gunshot victim that night and went to the
hospital to interview him. Lawson identified the victim as Deandre D. Lawson observed
a puncture wound on the front of Deandre D.’s right shoulder and a puncture wound on
the back of his shoulder. The injuries appeared consistent with a gunshot wound.
Photographs of the injuries were submitted into evidence. Deandre D.’s clothing also had
puncture holes at the right shoulder: one at the back of the shoulder, and two at the front
of the shoulder, indicating the bullet entered from the back, fragmented, and exited out
the front. Deandre D. told Lawson that he walked to the hospital. To Lawson’s
knowledge, that was the only shooting that had occurred that night.
       On March 18, 2021, Detective Christian Hernandez was assigned to investigate
the shooting that occurred on March 14, 2021 at the intersection of 19th Street and
M Street. Hernandez went to the location to look for any video surveillance of the
shooting. Hernandez was able to obtain surveillance video footage from American
Business Machines.
       Saretta Micciche was the operations director at American Business Machines.
Micciche oversaw the IT department, which handles the security cameras. There were 10
cameras at the 18th Street location, with four cameras facing towards 19th Street and
M Street. The cameras were motion activated, which recorded when triggered and then
saved the recording.
       Detective Hernandez was able to review surveillance video footage from
American Business Machines for March 14, 2021. Surveillance video from that date was
entered into evidence and played for the jury. The video showed a group of about three

                                             3.
subjects being followed by a separate group of about three subjects. Hernandez noticed
that all the subjects came from around a corner where the Hart Hotel was located. In the
first group, one of the subjects wore a dark jacket with a hood and a second subject wore
a jacket with decals over a red sweatshirt with a hood. One of the subjects in the second
group had on a white hat and was wearing a white shirt and a dark colored jacket. The
subject wearing the white hat kept his hand in his waistband while he quickened his pace
to catch up to the first group. There appeared to be some communication between the
two groups, but the first group continued to walk away. Then, the subject with the white
hat removed his hand from his waistband revealing a firearm. He pointed the firearm at
the subject wearing the dark jacket with a hood first and fired one shot. The video
showed the subject wearing the jacket with decals move to the right until he was outside
the camera’s field of vision. The subject in the white hat turned and pointed the firearm
in the direction of the subject wearing the jacket with decals and fired three to four shots.
       After viewing the surveillance footage, Hernandez responded to the Hart Hotel
and made contact with Pruthviraj Zala and his parents. Zala’s parents leased the Hart
Hotel and lived there during the time of March 2021. Zala would visit them at the Hart
Hotel every day. There were 16 surveillance cameras at the hotel: some in the hallway,
some facing the main street and some facing the back. Zala explained that the cameras
are motion activated and that once they are triggered to record, the video recording is
saved for a month and a half. On March 18, 2021, when Hernandez arrived at the Hart
Hotel, Zala’s father showed him the surveillance videos from March 14, 2021 and Zala
uploaded the videos to a link for Hernandez. Hernandez recorded the video surveillance
with his department-issued phone in case the footage got lost or erased. Zala recognized
appellant in the surveillance video and said he went by the name Day Day.3 Zala had

3     Witness Regan White testified that she knew appellant from the Hart Hotel. She
knew appellant by the name Day Day.

                                              4.
seen appellant many times at the Hart Hotel and had spoken to him. The surveillance
video from the Hart Hotel was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
       Hernandez compared what the shooter was wearing in the American Business
Machines video and matched it to a subject in the Hart Hotel video wearing the same or
very similar clothing. Hernandez learned that appellant was at the Hart Hotel that day.
       Officer Cortez Summit responded to the Hart Hotel on March 18, 2021 to assist
with the apprehension of appellant. Summit’s body camera footage of the initial contact
and its accompanying transcript were admitted into evidence. Hernandez was present
during appellant’s arrest and later interviewed appellant at the police department.
Hernandez advised appellant of his Miranda rights, which appellant waived in order to
speak with Hernandez. The transcript and recording of the interview were entered into
evidence. The recording was played for the jury.
       Hernandez testified that neither appellant nor the victim were cooperative with the
investigation and refused to give Hernandez the identity of the other people in the video.
As such, Hernandez was not able to interview any of the witnesses. Neither appellant nor
the victim provided Hernandez with any explanation about what happened that night.
Hernandez met with the victim on March 23, 2021 in order to have him identify the
shooter out of a photographic lineup. Hernandez observed that the victim appeared
frightened. No one was selected from the lineup because the victim refused to
participate.
       Doctor Kian Amizian4 was the physician in charge of Deandre D.’s care in the
emergency room on March 14, 2021. Deandre D. had a one centimeter by one centimeter
wound at the back of his shoulder and a 1.5 centimeter by 1.5 centimeter wound at the
front of his shoulder. The wound was very close to the subclavian blood vessel, which is

4      Dr. Amizian spelled his name A-z-i-m-i-a-n, but it is recorded as Amizian
throughout the entire record. Therefore, we use the name Dr. Amizian for consistency of
the record.

                                             5.
the main branch that supplies blood to the arm, and the brachial plexus, which is a bundle
of nerves that goes into the arm and integrates all the parts of the arm. Dr. Amizian
considered Deandre D. to be “very, very lucky” that the bullet passed by these areas by
just a few centimeters. Dr. Amizian opined that the bullet most likely hit Deandre D.
from behind since the entry wound appeared to be on the back of the shoulder where the
wound was smaller and the exit wound was on the front where the wound was larger. No
other bullet hole wounds were located. An x-ray of Deandre D.’s shoulder revealed
multiple bullet fragments still inside the shoulder area, which are not typically removed.
No fragments were found in the chest area. Deandre D. also had an abrasion on his arm
from falling to the ground after he was shot.
       Deandre D.’s mother recognized her son, Deandre D., in the surveillance video
wearing his favorite jacket with the decals on it when he got shot. After the incident,
Deandre D.’s mother noticed the jacket had a hole on the right shoulder area.
II.    Verdict and Sentencing
       The jury found appellant guilty of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a),
count 1), finding true that it was willful, deliberate and premeditated (§ 189) and that
appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which caused great bodily
injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The jury also found appellant guilty of assault with a
firearm upon Deandre D. (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), count 2) and found true that appellant
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5) and personally inflicted great bodily injury upon
Deandre D. (§ 12022.7). Last, the jury found appellant guilty of being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), count 3) and being a felon in possession of
ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1), count 4).
       In a bifurcated court trial, the court found true that appellant suffered two prior
serious felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a) and found true several
aggravating sentencing factors. The court sentenced appellant to 42 years to life based on
count 1 and the two strike priors, which was enhanced by 25 years to life pursuant to

                                              6.
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), plus an additional 10 years for the two section 667,
subdivision (a) enhancements.

                                      DISCUSSION

I.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding that the Attempted Murder
       was Deliberate and Premeditated.
       Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support
the jury’s finding of first degree attempted murder. The People contend sufficient
evidence supports the jury’s finding that the attempted murder was deliberate and
premeditated. We agree with the People.

       A.     Relevant Factual and Procedural History
       Appellant was charged with attempted first degree murder on the theory that the
shooting of Deandre D. was committed willfully, deliberately and with premeditation.
       The jurors were instructed that to find appellant attempted to kill deliberately he
must have “carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing
the consequences, decided to kill.” The jurors were further instructed that to find that
appellant attempted to kill with premeditation he must have “decided to kill before
completing the act of attempted murder” and that appellant’s decision to kill must have
been “a cold, calculated decision to kill” rather than a decision made “rashly, impulsively,
or without careful consideration of the choice and its consequences.”
       The prosecution argued that evidence of premeditation and deliberation was
shown by appellant turning the corner and following the victim. The prosecution argued
that “[e]very step that [appellant] is taking towards [Deandre D.] is time he’s reflecting
and planning on what he’s going to do. Because remember, he has his firearm on him
and focus[] on how he walks as he’s approaching [Deandre D.].” “I want you to focus on
the number of times that [appellant] shoots and the number of times he tries to shoot.”

                                             7.
       B.     Standard of Review
       In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331
(Bolin); People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 578; see also Jackson v. Virginia
(1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319–320.) The question is whether “substantial evidence” supports
the jury’s decision. (People v. Johnson, at p. 576.) “ ‘Substantial evidence’ means that
evidence which, when viewed in light of the entire record, is of solid probative value,
maintains its credibility and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has
been justly determined.” (People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 149.) “While
substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of
logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’; inferences that are the result of mere
speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding.” (Kuhn v. Department of General
Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633, citations omitted; see People v. Redmond
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755 [evidence that raises even a strong suspicion of guilt is not
substantial evidence].)
       Reversal is unwarranted unless it appears “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is
there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (Bolin, supra, 18
Cal.4th at p. 331; People v. Redmond, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 755.)
       C.     Applicable Law
       “An attempted murder is premeditated and deliberate if it occurs ‘ “ ‘as the result
of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102, 121, quoting People v. Burney (2009) 47
Cal.4th 203, 235, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Robertson
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 981; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 118 (Jurado).)

                                              8.
“ ‘In this context, “premeditated” means “considered beforehand,” and “deliberate”
means “formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and
weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.” ’ ” (Jurado, at
p. 118; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080 [“ ‘Deliberation’ refers to careful
weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought
over in advance.”].) “ ‘ “ ‘The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the
extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold,
calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th
243, 282 (Gomez).) To prove the killing was “ ‘deliberate and premeditated,’ it is not
necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of
the defendant’s act.” (§ 189, subd. (d).)
       In order for a killing with malice aforethought to be first degree rather than second
degree murder, “ ‘[t]he intent to kill must be ... formed upon a pre-existing reflection’ ”
and have “been the subject of actual deliberation or forethought.” (People v. Thomas
(1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900–901.) Our Supreme Court has therefore held that “ ‘[a]
verdict of murder in the first degree ... [on a theory of a willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing] is proper only if the slayer killed “as a result of careful thought and
weighing of considerations; as a deliberate judgment or plan; carried on cooly and
steadily, [especially] according to a preconceived design.” ’ ” (People v. Anderson (1968)
70 Cal.2d 15, 26 (Anderson); People v. Caldwell (1955) 43 Cal.2d 864, 869.)
       In Anderson, our Supreme Court identified three categories of evidence relevant to
the question of whether a murder was deliberate and premeditated: “(1) facts about how
and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was
engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing—
what may be characterized as ‘planning’ activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s prior
relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a
‘motive’ to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or

                                               9.
(3), would in turn support an inference that the killing was the result of ‘a pre-existing
reflection’ and ‘careful thought and weighing of considerations’ rather than ‘mere
unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed’ [citation]; (3) facts about the nature of the
killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and
exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a ‘preconceived
design’ to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a ‘reason’ which the jury can
reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).” (See Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at
pp. 26–27.)
       The Anderson factors are not exclusive, nor are they invariably determinative.
(People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 850; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345,
368.) However, they do provide a useful analytical “framework” to guide a reviewing
court’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence regarding premeditation and
deliberation. (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517; see People v. Elliot (2005) 37
Cal.4th 453, 470–471 [“[a]pplying the Anderson factors” to determine sufficiency of the
evidence].) Evidence of planning, motive, and manner of killing are often relevant to the
determination of willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation. (Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th
at p. 282; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419–420, citing Anderson, supra,
70 Cal.2d at pp. 26–27; accord People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 424.)
“ ‘ “Anderson was simply intended to guide an appellate court’s assessment whether the
evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting
reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.]’’ ’ ” (Combs, at p. 850;
Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 331–332.)
       D.     Analysis
       Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that
the attempted murder was committed with deliberation and premeditation. Specifically,
appellant argues “there was no evidence that [he] planned the shooting in advance, no
evidence that he had any motive to kill the victim, and the manner of the attempted

                                             10.
killing—a few wild shots in the general direction of the victim—suggested an
‘unconscious or rash impulse hastily executed’ rather than a ‘preconceived design.’ ”
       To the contrary, upon review of the record, we conclude substantial evidence
supports the jury’s finding that the attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated.
(See People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 576, 578.) Premeditation is shown by the
fact that appellant chose to carry a concealed loaded firearm and then pursue Deandre D.
and his companions. Such actions support the inference that the shooting was
“ ‘considered beforehand.’ ” (See Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 118.) Appellant
appeared to speed up in order to catch up to Deandre D., which demonstrates
“ ‘ “preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” ’ ”
(See People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 235.)
       Appellant’s actions also show the attempted murder was “deliberate.” (See
Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 118.) Deliberation is shown by the evidence appellant
held onto a concealed loaded firearm while he followed and caught up to the victim, then
pulled the firearm out from his waistband and fired it. Appellant first aimed the firearm
at one of Deandre D.’s companions and fired one shot at him. Appellant then turned,
aimed the loaded firearm in Deandre D.’s direction and fired multiple shots, hitting
Deandre D. in his shoulder. The record shows there was enough time for appellant to
have carefully thought about and weighed considerations for and against the decision to
shoot at Deandre D. from when appellant followed Deandre D. to when he shot at
Deandre D. (See Jurado, at p. 118.) As our Supreme Court has held, “ ‘ “ ‘[t]he true test
is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may
follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly.’ ” ’ ” (Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 282; Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 332;
People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1127; People v. Thomas, supra, 25 Cal.2d at
p. 900.)

                                            11.
       Additionally, the record supports the three categories of evidence identified in
Anderson to guide our assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence regarding
premeditation and deliberation: planning activity, motive, and manner of killing. (Bolin,
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331; see Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26–27; People v.
Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 517.) We disagree with appellant that there was
insufficient evidence of planning. Here, evidence that appellant carried and concealed a
loaded firearm while he tracked and caught up to Deandre D. and his companions
supports an inference of planning. While we agree with appellant the record does not
show motive for the killing, the manner of killing, using the concealed loaded firearm to
shoot Deandre D., supports that the killing was accomplished by a “preconceived
design.” (See Anderson, at pp. 26–27.) “ ‘Anderson does not require that these factors be
present in some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight, nor is
the list exhaustive. Anderson was simply intended to guide an appellate court’s
assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the
result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.]’ ”
(Bolin, at pp. 331–332; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247.)
       We disagree with appellant that the facts of this case are similar to People v.
Rowland (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 1. In Rowland, the defendant was hanging out with a
group of people, including the victim, on a Friday night. After midnight, the defendant
drove the victim to the defendant’s apartment. (Id. at p. 6.) At one point, Williams, who
lived with the defendant, heard the sound of a female’s voice, some banging, and then the
sound of choking. (Id. at pp. 6–7.) Later, a neighbor saw the defendant place what
appeared to be a body wrapped in a blanket into a vehicle and drive away. (Id. at p. 7.)
The following Sunday morning, the body of the victim was discovered with an electrical
cord around her neck. (Ibid.) The court found there was minimal evidence of planning
and not enough of premeditation and deliberation absent evidence of motive or planning
directed towards the manner of killing. (Id. at p. 9.) Here, on the other hand, there was

                                            12.
strong evidence of planning, including the carrying of a concealed loaded firearm, and
the planning was directed towards the intended result, which was the shooting of
Deandre D.
       People v. Craig (1957) 49 Cal.2d 313 is also readily distinguished from the facts
of this case. The defendant in Craig told an attendant that “he would like to have a girl
because he would ‘like to have a little loving.’ ” That evening, the defendant went to a
bar and threatened a woman who refused to dance with him. (Id. at p. 315.) The
defendant left the bar with Martin, they stopped at an intersection, and then Martin left.
As Martin was leaving, he saw a woman approaching. (Id. at pp. 315–316.) The next
morning a woman’s dead body was discovered strangled to death. (Id. at p. 316.) The
court held that the record showed “a killing accomplished with great brutality, but [did]
not show any premeditation.” (Id. at p. 318.) The court relied on the fact that there was
nothing in the record showing the defendant had ever seen the victim before nor
“anything to show how the killing was accomplished.” (Ibid.) Here, as discussed above,
the record contains evidence of planning that is directly related to the manner of
attempted murder.
       We disagree with appellant’s attempt to label the shooting as a “ ‘random’ attack”
and therefore, not premeditated or deliberate. As discussed, the evidence shows appellant
had a plan by holding a loaded firearm as he followed the victim around the corner and
quickening his steps in order to catch up to him. Appellant is seen removing his hand
from his waistband, revealing the firearm, and then aiming and shooting at the first
victim, then pivoting and aiming again before shooting at Deandre D. The evidence does
not show a wild, random shooting as appellant suggests.
       We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the
attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated. (See People v. Wharton (1991) 53
Cal.3d 522, 546 [the relevant inquiry is whether “ ‘ “ ‘any rational trier of fact’ ” ’ ”
could have been so persuaded]; People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1020.)

                                              13.
II.    Defense Counsel was not Ineffective for not Objecting to the Admission of
       Appellant’s Statements to the Police.
       Appellant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to
object to the admission of his statements to the police on the grounds that the police did
not properly advise him of his right to an attorney under Miranda. The People disagree.
We conclude appellant fails to demonstrate his counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the admission of his statements to police under Miranda.
       A.     Relevant Procedural History
       In his written pretrial motion, appellant sought, among other things, to exclude his
confessions or admissions unless found to be admissible at an Evidence Code section 402
evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s counsel clarified at the hearing that the motion was for
“a[n] [Evidence Code section] 402 on the issue of Miranda.” The prosecutor noted that
the detective’s interview with appellant was recorded and transcribed. Appellant’s
counsel suggested that the parties and the court review the transcript of the interview to
determine whether an Evidence Code section 402 hearing was necessary to resolve the
Miranda issue. After reviewing the transcript of the interview, defense counsel indicated,
“I believe that [appellant] was properly Mirandized.” The court stated that “there doesn’t
appear to be a problem [with Miranda.]” Defense counsel said he would not object to the
admission of appellant’s interview statements.
       The relevant portion of the transcript of the detective advising appellant of his
Miranda rights is as follows:

       “DET. HERNANDEZ: … All right, [appellant], like I said, there’s some
       questions that we wanna ask you. But before we do that, I gotta read you
       your Miranda rights, ‘cause you are detained, okay?

       “[APPELLANT]: Okay.

       “DET. HERNANDEZ: All right, [appellant], you have the right to remain
       silent. You understand?

       “[APPELLANT]: Yes, I do.

                                             14.
       “DET. HERNANDEZ: Anything you say may be used against you in court.
       Do you understand?

       “[APPELLANT]: Yes.

       “DET. HERNANDEZ: You have the right to talk to an attorney before
       and—before any questioning. Do you understand?

       “[APPELLANT]: Yes.

       “DET. HERNANDEZ: If you cannot [sic] an attorney, one will be
       appointed to you free of charge. Do you understand?

       “[APPELLANT]: Yea, I do.

       “DET. HERNANDEZ: Okay, do you want to talk to me about why you
       think you’re here?

       “[APPELLANT]: I mean, I wanna know why. I mean … I really do wanna
       know why.”
       During the interview, appellant was asked about “Saturday night, leading into …
Sunday morning,” and appellant could not recall where he was during that time or
anything that happened during that time. Throughout the interview, appellant was
evasive with his responses—even after being told by the detective that “[w]e saw you on
camera, shooting a gun,” “[w]e talked to the people at the hotel[,] [c]onfirmed you were
there that night.” Appellant denied owning a firearm, denied trying to kill anyone and
denied shooting anyone.
       At trial, the recorded video of appellant’s interview at the police department was
played for the jury.

       B.     Relevant Law
       To establish ineffective assistance, appellant bears the burden of showing that
counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Appellant must also establish that
absent counsel’s error, it is reasonably probable that the verdict would have been more

                                            15.
favorable to him. (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1052–1053; see
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.)
       “When examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court defers to
counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption counsel acted within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th
986, 1009.) “It is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only
if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one,
or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Ibid.) “Failure to object rarely
constitutes constitutionally ineffective legal representation.” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29
Cal.4th 381, 424.)
       C.     Analysis
       Appellant contends that his Miranda advisement was inadequate because
Hernandez told him he had a right to counsel before, not during, the interrogation.
Appellant argues that the failure to fully advise a suspect of his Miranda rights violates
the state and federal constitutions and requires reversal. He notes Miranda held that the
suspect “ ‘must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to
have the lawyer with him during interrogation.’ ”
       Appellant fails to meet his burden of demonstrating his trial counsel was
ineffective. (See People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1052–1053.) As we
discuss below, we conclude the Miranda advisement given by police was adequate.
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile motions. (People v.
Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.)
       “[T]o counteract the coercive pressure inherent in custodial surroundings,
‘Miranda announced that police officers must warn a suspect prior to questioning that he

                                             16.
has a right to remain silent, and a right to the presence of an attorney. [Citation.] After
the warnings are given, if the suspect indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. [Citation.] Similarly, if the suspect states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. [Citation.] Critically,
however, a suspect can waive these rights.’ ” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405,
425, quoting Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 103–104.)
       Specifically, “[a suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” (Miranda, supra,
384 U.S. at p. 479; Florida v. Powell (2010) 559 U.S. 50, 59–60.) Precise language is not
required in order to comply with Miranda. (Florida v. Powell, at p. 60; California v.
Prysock (1981) 453 U.S. 355, 359 [no particular formulation] (Prysock).)
       At issue here is Miranda’s third warning which requires that “an individual held
for questioning ‘must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer
and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.’ ” (Florida v. Powell, supra, 559
U.S. at p. 60; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 471.) The inquiry of whether this right was
adequately conveyed is “ ‘simply whether the warnings reasonably “conve[y] to [a
suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.” ’ ” (Florida v. Powell, at p. 60; Duckworth v.
Eagan (1989) 492 U.S. 195, 203, quoting Prysock, supra, 453 U.S. at p. 361.)
       The following Supreme Court cases inform our decision here. In Prysock, an
officer informed the suspect of his right to a lawyer’s presence during questioning and of
his right to counsel being appointed at no cost. (Prysock, supra, 453 U.S. at pp. 356–
357.) The Court of Appeal held the advice inadequate to comply with Miranda because it
lacked an express statement that the appointment of an attorney would occur prior to the
impending interrogation. (Prysock, at pp. 358–359.) The United States Supreme Court
reversed, noting that “nothing in the warnings … suggested any limitation on the right to

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the presence of appointed counsel different from the clearly conveyed rights to a lawyer
in general, including the right ‘to a lawyer before [the suspect is] questioned, ... while [he
is] being questioned, and all during the questioning.’ ” (Id. at pp. 360–361.)
       In People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215 (Wash), the defendant contended his
Miranda warning was inadequate because it failed to inform him that he was entitled to
counsel during questioning. (Id. at p. 236.) The California Supreme Court held a
Miranda advisement informing the suspect of his right to have an attorney before
questioning “ ‘reasonably conveyed’ ” to a suspect his right to have an attorney present
during questioning. (Wash, at p. 237.) Wash reasoned that “[a]lthough the warning given
to defendant here deviated from the standard form … we are not persuaded … that the
language was so ambiguous or confusing as to lead defendant to believe that counsel
would be provided before questioning, and then summarily removed once questioning
began.” (Id. at p. 236; see also People v. Valdivia (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 657, 663–664
[admonition that the defendant had the right to counsel before questioning adequately
apprised the defendant of his Miranda rights].)
       Prysock and Wash are controlling here.5 Raising the same challenge, appellant
claims his Miranda advisement was inadequate because the officer told him he had a
right to counsel before the interrogation, but did not specify he had a right to have the
attorney present during the interrogation. Here, Hernandez informed appellant, “You
have the right to talk to an attorney before and—before any questioning.” Hernandez
informed appellant he had a right to talk to an attorney before questioning and did not say
that his right to an attorney would be limited in any way. Therefore, we are satisfied that

5       Appellant’s reliance on a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States
v. Noti (9th Cir. 1984) 731 F.2d 610 is not controlling. (See Forsyth v. Jones (1997) 57
Cal.App.4th 776, 782 [“decisions of the lower federal courts, while persuasive, are not
binding on [state courts]”].) Instead, we are bound by the California Supreme Court
decision in Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th 215. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

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the warnings given “ ‘reasonably conveyed’ ” his right to have an attorney present during
questioning. (See Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 237; see People v. Lujan (2001) 92
Cal.App.4th 1389, 1402 [“Wash stands for the proposition that there is sufficient
compliance with Miranda if the accused is advised of the right to have an attorney
present before questioning.”].)
       Consequently, any objection by defense counsel to admitting appellant’s
statements to the police under Miranda would have been futile. Counsel is not
ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile objections. (See People v. Thompson,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 122; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587 [“Counsel is
not required to proffer futile objections.”].)
       Even if appellant’s defense counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to
object, appellant fails to show any error prejudiced the outcome of the case. (See
Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687; People v. Hernandez, supra, 33
Cal.4th at pp. 1052–1053.) The evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelmingly strong.
Videos captured appellant following the victim around a corner, catching up to him,
pulling out a loaded firearm and then aiming and shooting at the victim. The evidence of
appellant’s identity was also extremely strong. Multiple witnesses who were familiar
with appellant identified him in the video leaving the Hart Hotel around the time of the
shooting. Hernandez was able to identify appellant as the shooter in the American
Business Machines video by matching his clothing to the Hart Hotel video.
       We also note that appellant’s statements to police are not prejudicial. It is
undisputed that appellant did not make any direct admission of guilt during his interview.
Appellant was mostly evasive and did not recall where he was the night of the shooting.
Appellant denied owning a firearm and denied shooting anyone. When questioned
directly about the shooting, appellant’s responses were: “I ain’t try to kill nobody,” “I’m
not trying to kill nobody” and “I didn’t shot [sic], man.” When considering the sequence

                                                 19.
of questions and responses together, it shows appellant consistently denied the officer’s
accusations that he shot anyone or tried to kill anyone.
       Regardless, appellant’s statements to police were not the focal point of the
prosecutor’s case. The only reference the prosecutor made to appellant’s interview, was
that appellant denied staying at the Hart Hotel. The focal point of the prosecutor’s case
rested on the videos. Therefore, even if appellant’s counsel should have objected to the
admission of his statements, it is not reasonably probable that the outcome would have
been more favorable to appellant. (See People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
pp. 1052–1053; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.)
       Therefore, appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

III.   Section 667, Subdivision (a) Enhancements
       Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it imposed two five-year
enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a). The People agree.
       A.      Relevant Factual Background
       The court found true that appellant had two prior serious felony convictions,
which were two first degree burglary (§ 459) plea convictions on November 4, 2003,
in Los Angeles County Superior Court case No. YA05545504. The record indicates that
the two burglary charges were from the same complaint and information and adjudicated
in the same proceeding, under the same case number.
       B.      Relevant Law
       Section 667, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “A person convicted of a serious felony
who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in this state or of any offense
committed in another jurisdiction that includes all of the elements of any serious felony,
shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a
five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried
separately.”

                                            20.
       The California Supreme Court has construed the phrase “brought and tried
separately” to mean that “the underlying proceedings must have been formally distinct,
from filing to adjudication of guilt.” (In re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131, 136; People v.
Ebner (1966) 64 Cal.2d 297, 304 [“prior felony proceedings must be totally separate, not
only during proceedings before trial but also as to those leading to the ultimate
adjudication of guilt”].)
       C.     Analysis
       As the People concede, appellant’s two prior serious felony burglary convictions
were charged and adjudicated in the same proceeding, under the same Los Angeles
County Superior Court case No. YA05545504. Since the two charges were not “brought
and tried separately” as required under section 667, subdivision (a), appellant was subject
to only one five-year enhancement, not two. (See In re Harris, supra, 49 Cal.3d at
p. 137.) Therefore, one of the two prior serious felony conviction enhancements under
section 667, subdivision (a) must be stricken. (See People v. Jones (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 1411, 1417; People v. Frausto (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 890, 903.)
       Our Supreme Court has held that “when part of a sentence is stricken on review,
on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial
court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ”
(People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668,
681; see, e.g., People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 [section 1172.75
requires full resentencing, not just striking an invalid enhancement].) Because striking a
five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement under section 667, subdivision
(a)(1) affects the calculation of the sentence, we must remand to the trial court for full
resentencing. (See Buycks, at p. 893.)

                                             21.
                                     DISPOSITION
       Appellant’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court to
(1) strike one of the five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancements under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), (2) conduct a full resentencing of appellant, and
(3) forward the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                         LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

DE SANTOS, J.

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