Court Opinion

ID: 9659470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:47:05.033821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:08.585344
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Judge,
dissenting.
Assume that it was error in this particular case for the trial judge to deny appellant’s motion for leave to file his motion for expert assistance ex parte. The question then arises: is it constitutional error, analyzed under Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(a), or non-constitutional error, analyzed under Rule 44.2(b)? The majority says that the error is constitutional in nature. Op. at fn 4.
Ake error is a violation of due process, but there was no Ake error in this ease—appellant was not denied an expert. The only way the error here could conceivably be considered to be constitutional would be if it somehow resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. But if the error is ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to prevail appellant must meet the second prong of Strickland, i.e., he must meet the burden of establishing harm. If he meets that prong, he has exceeded what he needs to prove under either (a) or (b) of the harmless error rule, and he gets relief. Appellant would actually be better off if this is non-constitutional error because in that case his burden is less than the burden imposed by the second prong of Strickland. But in any event, the error should not be analyzed, as it is by both the majority and Judge Mansfield, under R. 44.2(a).
If the error here is ineffective assistance of counsel, I would find that appellant has failed to carry his burden of showing harm under Strickland. If the error is a simple violation of the workproduet doctrine, I would find it harmless under R. 44.2(b).
I also disagree with the majority’s treatment of appellant’s first point of error. In my opinion, the law does not require proof of the corpus delicti of the underlying felony in a capital murder case. See Monterrubio v. State, 916 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), (Keller, J. dissenting.)