Court Opinion

ID: 9476607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:00:22.298939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:28.088183
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BERLIN J. THEODORE,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        PH-0752-16-0303-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: August 4, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Berlin J. Theodore, Abington, Pennsylvania, pro se.

           Zlatko Jurisic, Esquire, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed the agency’s removal action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
     one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial
     decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was a Supply Systems Analyst, GS-2003-14, at the Defense
     Logistics Agency in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5
     at 15.   The agency removed him from Federal service based on two charges:
     (1) absence without leave (AWOL); and (2) unprofessional conduct. Id. at 83-88,
     95-98.
¶3         The first charge pertained to the appellant’s January 4, 2016 request for
     140 hours of leave for the period from January 25 through February 26, 2016,
     which comprised 40 hours of annual leave; 40 hours of sick leave ; and 60 hours
     of leave without pay (LWOP). Id. at 39, 63, 83. The appellant failed to respond
     adequately to multiple requests from his immediate supervisor to provide a reason
     for the extended period of leave and to submit medical documentation supporting
     the requested sick leave.    Id. at 36-39, 83-85.   Instead, the appellant told his
     supervisor by telephone that he was not comfortable discussing personal matters
     with her “due to the toxic nature of [their] relationship,” and that he would take
     LWOP for the entire period he requested if she would not grant his leave request.
     Id. at 37. The appellant opined that his supervisor was harassing him and abusing
                                                                                         3

     her authority, and he stated that he was prepared to discuss issues related to the
     requested leave, which he asserted fell under the Family and Medical Leave Act
     of 1993 (FMLA), only with another individual with the authority to resolve the
     matter. Id.
¶4         On January 20, 2016, the appellant submitted a new FMLA leave request
     for the entire period from January 25 through February 26, 2016. Id. at 37, 64.
     His supervisor replied, acknowledging the appellant’s invoking the FMLA, and
     explaining that the appellant had to provide administratively acceptable medical
     documentation supporting his request for leave under the FMLA before it could
     be approved.     Id. at 36-37.   She gave the appellant 15 calendar days from
     January 21, 2016, in which to provide administratively acceptable medical
     documentation. Id. at 36. She also explained that administratively acceptable
     medical documentation must include the following:        (1) the date the serious
     health condition commenced; (2) the probable duration of the condition, or a
     certification that the condition is a chronic or continuing condition with an
     unknown duration, and if episodic, the likely duration and frequency of the
     episodes of incapacity; and (3) the appropriate medical facts concerning the
     condition, including information on incapacitation, examination, or treatment that
     may be required. Id.
¶5         The     appellant   submitted   a   completed   FMLA       certification   form
     (Form WH-380-E) dated January 21, 2016.          Id. at 66-70.     The certification
     reflected treatment dates in 2009, 2010, 2014, and 2015 for several ailments, and
     noted that the appellant would be unable to perform his job functions while
     suffering from such conditions. Id. at 67. The certification also noted that the
     appellant’s condition would require follow-up treatment and that episodic
     flare-ups were possible, making it necessary for him to be absent from work up to
     three times per week for a duration of 1½ hours per episode. Id. at 68. The
     appellant’s absence from work began on January 25, 2016. IAF, Tab 1 at 12, 45,
     53, 56, 60.
                                                                                      4

¶6        On February 4, 2016, the appellant’s supervisor responded by email and by
     letter mailed to the appellant’s residence.       IAF, Tab 5 at 70-72.         She
     acknowledged receiving the health certification form, but explained that it did not
     call for the 4 consecutive weeks of FMLA leave that the appellant had requested,
     and instead supported only periodic leave, as detailed above.       Id. at 70, 72.
     However, she provisionally granted the appellant’s request for FMLA leave and
     gave him another 15 days in which to supplement his request with
     administratively acceptable medical documentation supporting the full 4-week
     absence he requested. Id.
¶7        On March 4, 2016, the supervisor sent the appellant another letter by mail
     and by email informing him that he would be charged AWOL for the period of his
     absence from January 25, 2016, until his return to duty because he had not
     responded to her February 2016 letter.     Id. at 73-76. On March 7, 2016, the
     appellant informed his supervisor by telephone that he had received her March 4,
     2016 letter and was undergoing additional medical testing.        Id. at 77.   The
     supervisor’s contemporaneous notes reflect that she reiterated to him that his
     documentation did not support the 4 weeks of FMLA leave that he had requested
     and that, as a result, he remained in an AWOL status. Id. The supervisor’s notes
     state that, when she asked the appellant when he would be returning to work, he
     simply replied, “I’m invoking FMLA.” Id. The supervisor again reminded the
     appellant to submit administratively acceptable documentation supporting his
     absence, and that he would remain in AWOL status unless he did so. Id. He
     responded by again invoking the FMLA and hanging up the telephone. Id.
¶8        The appellant returned to work on March 14, 2016, submitting a March 10,
     2016 letter from The Neurology Group that stated that he had been under doctors’
     care and evaluation since February 29, 2016. Id. at 78, 85. The letter further
     declared that the appellant was to avoid “stressful situations or stressful
     environment[s]” when he returned to work and that he might need additional
     intermittent days off to be completely evaluated. Id. The agency determined that
                                                                                            5

      the letter was administratively acceptable to support his absence from
      February 29 through March 11, 2016, and approved his application for FMLA
      leave for that period. Id. at 79, 85. However, for the period from January 25
      through February 26, 2016, the agency changed the appellant’s provisional grant
      of FMLA leave to AWOL. Id. at 85.
¶9          The agency then proposed the appellant’s removal based on charges of
      AWOL and unprofessional conduct. Id. at 83-88. The latter charge pertained to
      his abruptly terminating the March 7, 2016 telephone call with his supervisor. Id.
      at 83. The agency removed the appellant, and he filed this Board appeal. Id.
      at 95-98; IAF, Tab 1. He did not request a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 1. During the
      proceeding before the administrative judge, the appellant did not dispute the
      substance of the charges, and instead he raised whistleblower retaliation as an
      affirmative defense.     Id. at 2; IAF, Tab 9.    He also claimed harassment and
      harmful procedural error in the agency’s decision to remove him, but as the
      administrative judge explained, the appellant did not specify the procedural defect
      or the allegedly harassing actions related to his removal. 2         IAF, Tab 1 at 2;
      Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 9.
¶10         The administrative judge sustained both charges, found that the agency
      established nexus, and determined that the penalty was reasonable. ID at 11-19.
      The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to prove his
      affirmative   defenses    of   harmful   procedural    error   and     retaliation   for
      whistleblowing. ID at 19-22.

      2
        The appellant’s harassment claim appears related to the agency’s requirement that he
      present administratively acceptable medical documentation supporting his request for
      FMLA leave, IAF, Tab 5 at 37, and also to his disagreements with agency officials
      regarding earlier leave requests, IAF, Tab 9 at 68-79. The appellant does not
      specifically assert harassment or harmful procedural error on review.
                                                                                          6

                                          ANALYSIS
      The administrative judge correctly concluded that the agency met its burden of
      proof as to the charges.
¶11         On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erroneously
      applied the law to the facts of this case and reached incorrect conclusions.
      Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6-7; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(b). He also
      asserts that the administrative judge should have found that he submitted
      sufficient medical documentation to justify granting his FMLA leave request.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. 3
¶12         We have reviewed the administrative judge’s analysis and conclude that he
      correctly found that the agency met its burden to prove by preponderant evidence
      the charges of AWOL and unprofessional conduct. ID at 10, 11 -17; see 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.56(b)(1)(ii). At the outset, we note that the administrative judge correctly
      indicated that the appellant did not deny the misconduct underlying the removal
      action. ID at 10. The record reflects that the agency gave the appellant multiple
      opportunities   in   which   to   present   administratively    acceptable   medical
      documentation, including two opportunities after he invoked the right to take
      leave under the FMLA. IAF, Tab 5 at 36-49, 63-64, 66-70, 72-74, 77-79, 83-85.
      Although he ultimately presented documentation that supported his FMLA leave
      request for the latter part of his absence, he failed to present documentation
      supporting his leave request for January 25 through February 26, 2016.             Id.
      at 78-79, 85.
¶13         When an employee requests leave to cover his absences, an AWOL charge
      will be sustained only if the agency establishes that his requests were properly
      denied.   Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 28 (2015),
      overruled on other grounds by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget,

      3
        On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s determination
      that the agency proved the second charge of unprofessional conduct, ID at 15 -17, and
      we find no reason to disturb that finding.
                                                                                      7

      2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25. The agency may require an employee who requests
      FMLA leave to provide administratively acceptable documentation supporting the
      request.     5 U.S.C. § 6383(a); 5 C.F.R. § 630.1208.   Such documentation must
      include the following:     (1) the date the serious health condition commenced;
      (2) the probable duration of the serious health condition, or a statement
      specifying that the serious health condition is a chronic or continuing condition
      with an unknown duration, whether the patient is presently incapacitated, an d the
      likely duration and frequency of episodes of incapacity; and (3) the appropriate
      medical facts within the knowledge of the health care provider regarding the
      serious health condition, including a general statement as to the incapacitation,
      examination, or treatment that may be required by a health care provider.
      5 C.F.R. § 630.1208(b)(1)-(3). Documentation that fails to inform the agency of
      such information is administratively insufficient to support a request for medical
      leave.     Lawley v. Department of the Treasury, 84 M.S.P.R. 253, ¶ 23 (1999).
      Here, we find that the appellant’s documentation did not provide sufficient
      information to support his absences prior to February 29, 2016. We thus agree
      with the administrative judge that the agency proved the charge of AWOL for a
      period of approximately 4 weeks from January 25 through February 26, 2016.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 85.

      The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to prove his
      allegation of whistleblowing.
¶14            On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge failed to
      recognize the pattern of whistleblowing retaliation that predated the events
      immediately leading to his removal.       PFR File, Tab 1 at 6.     The agency’s
      retaliatory actions, he alleges, include changing his telework schedule,
      transferring him to Philadelphia, and denying his leave requests. Id.; IAF, Tab 9
      at 13-15. As for the appellant’s whistleblowing claim, he stated that his first
      alleged disclosure pertained to a suggestion he made to the agency’s telework
      coordinator in November 2014 regarding ways in which the agency could improve
                                                                                        8

      its telework readiness reporting information.     IAF, Tab 9 at 5, 20-25.       His
      suggestions were forwarded to the appropriate personnel but were not adopted.
      Id. at 5. A few days later, his then-supervisor denied his request for an additional
      telework day each week, and he also received notice that he was no longer
      eligible for situational telework. Id. at 5-6, 29-31. At the time, he worked at Fort
      Belvoir, Virginia, but telecommuted from his family home in Philadelphia,
      Pennsylvania, on Mondays and Fridays. Id. at 5-6. The supervisor advised the
      appellant that he could transfer to a position in Philadelphia and he did so. Id.
      at 6. Several weeks after the transfer, the appellant came under new second -level
      supervision. Id. at 7-8; IAF, Tab 11 at 7. Thereafter, he alleged, the agency
      retaliated against him because of this and other disclosures when his new
      second-level supervisor denied his leave requests and rescinded his existing
      situational telework agreement. IAF, Tab 9 at 9-11, 13-15, 65-79.
¶15        The appellant’s second alleged disclosure concerned his assessment of the
      agency’s audit readiness efforts regarding the Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI).
      Id. at 7-9, Attachment D. The appellant alleged to have made this disclosure to
      various agency officials between January and March 2015, including his new
      second-level supervisor. 4 Id.; IAF, Tab 11 at 7-10. The agency contended that
      the appellant’s assessment was neither new nor controversial and that it did not
      reveal any potentially embarrassing information about agency operations and
      systems. IAF, Tab 11 at 8-9.
¶16        The administrative judge found that the appellant’s first alleged disclosure
      amounted to discussing generally a proposed policy that the agency rejected in
      favor of an existing policy. ID at 21-22. As for the second alleged disclosure,
      the administrative judge found that the appellant could not have reasonably
      believed he was disclosing information within one of the categories of

      4
       The second-level supervisor was unable to determine if she had received this item
      when the appellant claimed to have sent it. IAF, Tab 11 at 7.
                                                                                           9

      wrongdoing set forth in the statute. ID at 22; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The
      administrative judge thus found that the appellant did not make a protected
      disclosure under the statute. ID at 20-22.
¶17         We agree with the administrative judge’s findings.           The appellant, by
      proposing a new policy about potentially improving telework reporting
      information and a new plan dealing with assessing the agency’s audit readiness
      efforts concerning the VMI section of the agency’s inventory reconciliation
      effort, seemed dissatisfied with the agency’s existing policies and/or plans on
      those issues.   However, his purely subjective allegations of wrongdoing are
      insufficient to constitute a reasonable belief that the agenc y official’s actions here
      regarding those policies and/or plans represent an abuse of authority, gross
      mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, or a violation of law, rule, or regulation.
      Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Rebstock
      Consolidation v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 12
      (2015) (holding that vague, conclusory, and unsupported allegations do not
      satisfy the Board’s nonfrivolous pleading standard). When, as here, an alleged
      whistleblower is merely expressing disagreement with fairly debatabl e policy
      decisions, or decisions plainly within managerial discretion, his disclosures do
      not fall within those defined as protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).            Cf.
      O’Donnell v. Department of Agriculture, 120 M.S.P.R. 94, ¶ 14 (2013) (holding
      that the appellant’s alleged protected disclosure was “exactly the type of fairly
      debatable policy dispute that does not constitute whistleblowing”), aff’d, 561 F.
      App’x 926 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 5

      The Board will not consider the appellant’s new argument on review.
¶18         The appellant does not challenge on review the administrative judge’s
      finding that he failed to make protected disclosures. Instead, the appellant asserts

      5
       We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                         10

      that he is providing new and material evidence, which he alleges shows that he
      made an additional disclosure or disclosures as early as April 2012 of which the
      deciding official was aware. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).
      The appellant alleges that these disclosures would have embarrassed the agency
      and, because he made them, his immediate supervisors were transferred to other
      positions, and he was placed under a new second-level supervisor.          PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 8-9. He asserts that his new second-level supervisor “was then allowed
      to retaliate and [harass him] leading to his dismissal” and to prevent him from
      making further disclosures to the agency Inspector General. Id.
¶19         The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time
      in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material
      evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence.        Banks v.
      Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). The materials that the
      appellant submitted on review include email messages dated between March 13,
      2012, and March 27, 2014; a memorandum entitled “SITREP for Audit Readiness
      Support,” dated September 3, 2015; an undated organizational chart; and an
      undated outline labeled “Found in March.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-30. These
      documents appear to pertain to an earlier disclosure or disclosures that the
      appellant did not raise below during the proceedings before the administrative
      judge. Id. at 7-11. All of these items predate the July 7, 2016 close of the record.
      IAF, Tab 7 at 1. The appellant has not alleged that they were unavailable to him
      despite his due diligence before the record closed, and indeed, he originated or
      received the email messages he submitted with his petition for review. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 14-20. We thus decline to consider his new argument and evidence on
      review. 6

      6
       Additionally, the appellant submitted on review a partial copy of a pleading he filed
      while this appeal was pending before the administrative judge. Compare PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 31-44, with IAF, Tab 9 at 4-18. The Board does not consider such submissions
                                                                                           11

      The administrative judge properly determined that the penalty of removal was
      warranted and promotes the efficiency of the service.
¶20         Finally, the appellant argues that the administrative judge “abused his
      discretion in deciding in favor of the agency” and in determining that removal
      was an appropriate penalty. PFR File, Tab 1.
¶21         Generally, choosing a penalty for employee misconduct is left to the
      agency’s discretion.    Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1251-52 (Fed. Cir.
      1999).   The Board lacks the authority to determine what penalty the agency
      should have selected. Instead, the Board must assess if the agency balanced the
      relevant Douglas factors 7 and selected a penalty that was within the “bounds of
      reasonableness.” Hayes v. Department of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1540 (Fed.
      Cir. 1984). The Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine
      if the agency considered all the relevant factors and exercised management
      discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness.           Douglas v. Veterans
      Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981).
¶22         In sustaining the removal, the administrative judge noted that the deciding
      official appropriately considered all of the Douglas factors in assessing which
      penalty to impose.       ID at 18.       The administrative judge reviewed the
      circumstances of the four comparators, and noted that the agency r emoved two
      employees for shorter periods of AWOL than the amount of AWOL accrued by
      the appellant and gave lesser penalties to two employees who had substantially
      less AWOL than the appellant and that, as to one of those employees, he had no
      prior disciplinary record, unlike the appellant. ID at 18-19. The administrative
      judge concluded that removal was justified here, particularly given that the Board

      to be new evidence. Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980)
      (holding that evidence that is already a part of the record is not new).
      7
        In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board
      identified factors that are relevant to consider in determining the appropriateness of a
      penalty.
                                                                                           12

      has consistently upheld removals for absences as long as the appellant’s.            ID
      at 19.     We find that, because the agency considered and balanced all of the
      relevant Douglas factors, the administrative judge did not err in finding that the
      removal penalty was reasonable. Given the totality of the circumstances, we find
      that the administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in affirming the
      appellant’s removal for the sustained misconduct.
¶23            Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the administrative judge’s
      initial decision.

                                 NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
               You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.     If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
               Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

      8
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        13

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                14

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                      15

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2 302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9    The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction .
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              16

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.