Court Opinion

ID: 9697219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:08:49.995833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:30.001419
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, the trial court erred in denying appellant the jury trial guaranteed him by the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution.1 The pleadings and the record show *553that appellant’s claim involved, not merely equitable rights and remedies, but claims legal in character. Specifically, appellant claimed that appellee had agreed to a result-based fee which depended upon the result obtained rather than being related solely to the hours expended in rendering the services. He contended that his claim that there was such an agreement was supported by a long-term prior course of dealing with appellee, which considered the quality of the result obtained, related correspondence, and appellee’s assent to the arrangement in this case.2 At trial, appellant offered expert testimony to establish a reasonable result-based fee for his services. Having denied appellant a jury trial, the trial court sitting without a jury, resolved the factual dispute as to whether the parties had a value-based agreement against appellant.
Such issues as whether there was an agreement, and the terms of the agreement are “legal” in character, and can, and should be submitted to a jury. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223, 83 S.Ct. 609, 611, 9 L.Ed.2d 691 (1963) (suit to determine amount of fees owed to lawyer by client under a contingent fee agreement is “legal” action subject to jury trial);3 see also Maddox v. Jinkens, 66 App. D.C. 362, 363-64, 88 F.2d 744, 745-46 (attorney is entitled to sue at law upon claimed agreement for fee), cert, denied, 301 U.S. 699, 57 S.Ct. 929, 81 L.Ed. 1354 (1937). “The Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action.” Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538, 90 S.Ct. 733, 738, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970). Thus, where the issue in dispute is legal in nature, a constitutional right to trial by jury attaches. E.R.B., supra note 1, 496 A.2d at 611. The majority, apparently agreeing with these principles, acknowledges that an attorney has the right to have a jury determine (1) whether the client has agreed to pay attorney fees and (2) “the manner in which such fees are calculated.” 4 These are the very issues which appellant sought to have a jury determine in this case. Under the principles set forth in Simler and Maddox, appellant was entitled to the jury trial for which he made a timely demand.
This court’s opinion in Kudon v. f.m.e. Corp., 547 A.2d 976 (D.C.1988), upon which the trial court and the majority rely here, does not dictate otherwise. Kudon involved a suit for breach of contract in which the prevailing party sought an award of reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to a provision in the contract sued upon which provided for same. 547 A.2d at 977. Under such circumstances, the award of attorney’s fees is incident to the main claim, and viewed as more *554restitutional in nature, and thus as an equitable claim. Id. at 979 (citing A.G. Becker-Kipnis & Co. v. Letterman Commodities, 553 F.Supp. 118, 124 (N.D.Ill.1982)); see also Cheek v. McGowan Elec. Supply Co., 511 So.2d 977, 979 (Fla.1987) (contractual provision authorizing attorney’s fees is not part of the substantive claim because only intended to make the successful party whole). Relying on these and other eases, this court in Kudon determined that the request for attorney’s fees in this contractual fee-shifting case was “more in the nature of an equitable, rather than a legal, remedy.” Kudon, 547 A.2d at 979. Therefore, consistent with the rule that no constitutional right to a jury trial attaches when the issue is eqúitable in nature, see E.R.B., supra note 1, 496 A.2d at 611, this court rejected the assertion of the right to a jury trial upon the issue. It does not appear that this court had either the intention, or the occasion in Kudon, to reject the jury trial right for an attorney’s contractual claim for fees against his client which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Simler, supra, 372 U.S. at 223, 83 S.Ct. at 611, and upheld in this jurisdiction in Maddox, supra, 66 App. D.C. 362, 363-64, 88 F.2d at 745-46. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.

. The Seventh Amendment provides that:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
The Amendment is "fully applicable to courts established by Congress in the District of Colum-*553bía.” E.R.B. v. J.H.F., 496 A.2d 607, 610 n. 6 (D.C.1985).

.Appellant testified concerning the claimed agreement as follows:
Q. Tell us what you said and Dr. Tauber said?
A. Dr. Tauber had asked one of his employees to get his, Dr. Tauber’s car. And while we were waiting for the car to come around, pick up Dr. Tauber, I said, "Doctor, there hasn’t been a day that’s gone past that I haven't worked or thought about this case. And I think this would be a good time, if we can, to settle the question of my fee.” Shall I continue on?
Q. Yes?
A. And I said to him, "What I’m willing to do at this point, at this time of my life, is to use the settlement figure as a guideline to settle the case — to settle the matter of my fee.[”] And as I recall I said, “We will take the amount that I have recovered or been successful in obtaining for you at this point.” That was the dollar amount. And I would take 30 percent of that amount to — as compensation for my services. I said, "You will benefit for receiving a higher rental rate under the lease from here on in. And I wiE make no claim to that. You will get the benefit of that without any charge or claim by me on that. And I, as I say, just the percentage on what I have gotten for you to this point.” And I said, "How does that sound to you?”
And his answer was, “Fine.” He says lawyers usually take or charge a third, I don’t remember what verb he used, but that was the gist of it.' He was satisfied.

. In Simler, the respondent chaEenged the contingent fee contract as "the product of fraud and overreaching by the lawyer.” 372 U.S. at 223, 83 S.Ct. at 611. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that ”[t]he question[ ] involved ... traditional common-law issues which can be and should have been submitted to a jury under appropriate instructions as petitioner requested.” Id.

. Sec majority opinion at 551.