Court Opinion

ID: 9539455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:04:35.51041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:50.086071
License: Public Domain

*232VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
concurring.
Petitioners argue generally that respondents “violated” ORS 250.125(1) and (2). I agree with the majority that, under this court’s narrow scope of review, none of petitioners’ theories for invalidating the financial impact estimate certified by respondents is a theory that this court may address and, therefore, that we should dismiss their petition. ORS 250.131(1).1 I write separately to articulate my concerns about this court’s scope of review.
As we have construed the relevant statutes, the role of this court in the statutory scheme is so limited as to be virtually meaningless. As a practical matter, we review solely to determine whether respondents have jumped through the prescribed procedural hoops. If so, the petition must be dismissed. If not, we only may send the estimate back and order the preparation of a second estimate. ORS 250.131 (3)(c). In that event, after correcting any procedural deficiency, respondents may, if they wish, certify the same estimate. If, on remand, respondents fail to jump through the prescribed procedural hoops, there is nothing this court (or anybody else for that matter) may do about it. ORS 250.131(3)(c);2 250.127(7).3
*233I have no quarrel with the legislature’s apparent decision to let respondents make the financial impact estimate without substantive review as to the correctness of the estimate by anyone. That is a constitutionally permissible policy choice for the legislature. For that matter, the legislature, if it had chosen to, could have expressly provided that there be no judicial review of the estimate. Moreover, the legislature, in its wisdom, could repeal the entire statutory scheme.
My concern is that this court’s role in the statutory scheme appears to be mere window dressing. I expect that, pursuant to their mandate, respondents will “estimate,” “prepare and file * * * estimates,” “consider” suggestions submitted at the Secretary of State’s hearing, conduct business in public, and in every other respect do their duty under the statutes. For that reason, I believe that a complaint under ORS 250.131 will rarely involve an alleged procedural violation. Rather, as is the case here, a complaint almost always will involve the amount of the estimate, something this court is not statutorily authorized to review. ORS 250.131(1). Even if we were to find that an estimate is incorrect, we have no authority to change it or to direct that respondents change it.
Accordingly, if a complaint is about substance, not procedure, this court will not entertain it. Thus, we will not review: whether an estimate should be prepared; the amount of an estimate; whether an estimate is correct or incorrect; whether an estimate correctly reflects the financial impact to cities, counties, and districts; whether the amounts included are direct or indirect; whether respondents must make their decision based on a record; whether there is evidence to support an estimate; whether respondents articulated a rationale (correct or incorrect) for an estimate; whether an estimate is in conflict with uncontradicted evidence submitted to respondents; whether an estimate is based on a factually or legally faulty premise; whether respondents acted arbitrarily or capriciously; whether an estimate is contrary to evidence at the hearing; or whether an estimate is based on evidence not addressed at the hearing or in public.
In the final analysis, except for procedural regularity, these statutes grant this court no power to act on a petition filed pursuant to ORS 250.131, even if we were to find *234in some other case malevolent, recalcitrant, or unenlightened officials. Thus, this court serves no meaningful role in protecting the public’s interest in the integrity of the financial impact estimate. If that is what the legislature intended, then it should repeal ORS 250.131 and end the charade of judicial review, which yields only a harvest of petitions that will be routinely and summarily dismissed by this court.
Fadeley, J., and Unis, J., join in this opinion.

 ORS 250.131(1) provides:
“Any person alleging that an estimate required under ORS 250.125 was prepared, filed or certified in violation of the procedures specified in ORS 250.125 or 250.127 may petition the Supreme Court seeking that the required procedures be followed and stating the reasons the estimate filed with the court does not satisfy the required procedures. No petition shall be allowed concerning the amount of the estimate or regarding whether an estimate should be prepared.” (Emphasis added.)

 ORS 250.131(3)(c) provides:
“If the court determines that the procedures described in ORS 250.125 and 250.127 were not satisfied, the court shall order the preparation of a second estimate, to be prepared, filed and certified as provided in ORS 250.125 and 250.127 except that:
(<* * * * *
“(c) An estimate shall be certified not later than seven days after the decision of the court. The procedures under which the second estimate is filed and certified may not be appealed.”

 ORS 250.127(7) provides:
“A failure to prepare, file or certify estimates under ORS 250.125, this section or ORS 250.131 shall not prevent the inclusion of the measure in the voters’ pamphlet or placement'of the measure on the ballot.”