Court Opinion

ID: 9644438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:56:30.868838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:03.213268
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached by three of my colleagues that the lower court order be vacated and the case remanded. However, I disagree that a fair and impartial hearing *358could not be held in Montgomery County by a judge sitting on the Court of Common Pleas there.
The parties, Joy Armor (now Stanziani) and David Armor, were divorced in October, 1976. Mr. Armor was ordered to pay $75.00 per week for the support of his two minor children. At the time of this first order, Mr. Armor was earning approximately $170.00 per week and was a full time graduate student at Bryn Mawr. In January, 1977, the father petitioned for a modification of the order. He testified that both his parents had been seriously ill and were forced to sell the Armor Business Machine Company where he had previously worked part-time while attending school. The loss of this part-time employment decreased his weekly earnings to $140.00. Joy Armor who had recently married Judge Joseph Stanziani, a member of the bench of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, counterfiled a petition for an increase in the support. At the time of the hearing on the petitions to decrease and increase the support, the new Mrs. Stanziani was represented by her attorney who was the County Controller of Montgomery County. David Armor moved for a change of venue due to the alleged appearance of impropriety caused by the County Controller representing Mrs. Stanziani and the fact that her husband was a colleague of any judge who would hear the case in that county. The change of venue was denied and the hearing on the modification of the support order proceeded. The lower court judge found there was not a significant change in circumstances shown to reduce or increase the support order.
I.
The first issue is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing a change of venue where one party is the wife of a judge on the same bench and where she is represented by the County Controller. Generally, an order denying a motion for a change of venue is interlocutory and non-appealable absent the showing of extraordinary circumstances. Hauser v. Goldstein, 434 Pa. 84, 252 A.2d 616 *359(1969). However, such a denial is reviewable on appeal from a final decree which is adverse or prejudicial to the appellant. Valley Traction Company’s Case, 236 Pa. 451, 84 A.2d 829 (1912).
The power to grant or refuse a change of venue is not inherent in the courts, but is governed by statute.1 Section 113 of the statute states a change of venue may be granted
“Whenever it shall be made to appear to the court that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county in which any such cause is pending.” 12 P.S. § 113 III.
Appellant contends that since the County Controller who represented Mrs. Stanziani reviews and approves disbursements in Montgomery County, an appearance of impropriety occurred in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Appellant argues further that any judge in Montgomery County who heard the case could be biased due to the fact the suit involved the wife of one of his colleagues on the bench.
In order for the change of venue to be granted, a party must show evidence that there is bias, prejudice or unfairness present. Crawford’s Estate, 307 Pa. 102, 160 A. 585 (1931). Judge Cirillo, who presided at the hearings on the modification of the support order, commented on the record that the County Controller who represented Mrs. Stanziani had appeared before him approximately 70 times and lost at least half these cases. He stated further that he was only a casual acquaintance of Mrs. Stanziani, having met her once, and felt he could be impartial in his disposition of the case.
On the record before us in this case, I conclude the petition for change of venue was properly dismissed. This is consistent with the directive set by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515, 364 A.2d 312 (1976). There, the presiding judge was an acquaintance of the victim in a murder prosecution. The Court said the judge’s mere acquaintance with the victim could not give rise to an *360appearance of impropriety, bias or prejudice against the defendant. Also,
“it would be an unworkable rule which demanded that a trial judge recuse himself whenever an acquaintance was a party to or had an interest in the controversy. Such a rule ignores that judges throughout the Commonwealth know and are known by many people, some of whom may eventually be the victims of a crime, and assumes that no judge can remain impartial when presiding in such a case ...” 468 Pa. at 525, 364 A.2d at 318.
Hence I conclude there is insufficient evidence to raise an appearance of impropriety or that a fair and impartial trial could not be heard in Montgomery County.
II.
The substantive issue in the case is whether the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to reduce the amount of the support order. Appellate review of this issue is limited to determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the decision of the lower court. Of course, a party seeking modification of a support order must demonstrate such a material and substantial change in circumstances that warrant a modification. Commonwealth ex rel. Hall v. Hall, 243 Pa.Super. 162, 364 A.2d 500 (1976); Schuster v. Schuster, 226 Pa.Super. 542, 323 A.2d 760 (1974). A decision to reduce a support order must be based on facts in the record that show a permanent change requiring a modification of the order. Bell v. Bell, 228 Pa.Super. 280, 283, 323 A.2d 267, 269 (1974).
At the time of the first support hearing, appellant was a full time graduate student with weekly earnings totalling $170.00.2 Appellant’s ex-wife had taught school, then worked part time for the Montgomery County Home-Makers Service earning $2.65 per hour. The alleged change in *361circumstances was that appellant had lost his part-time job at his parents’ business and that appellee had married Judge Stanziani, moved into his home, quit her job, and enjoyed a higher standard of living than she had prior to her marriage to the Judge.
The lower court found that appellant’s loss of income due to the sale of his parents’ business did not meet the standard of being permanent and substantial enough to warrant a modification in the support order. His loss of income was only temporary until his schooling was complete. The fact that he was a full time graduate student was a voluntary, temporary change in which he placed himself. In the language of Comm. ex rel. Snively v. Snively, 206 Pa.Super. 278, 282, 212 A.2d 905 (1965):
“His praiseworthy ambition to obtain an education, which may well work to the eventual advantage of his [children], cannot be realized at the expense of his obligation to support [his children] . . . .”
Thus, since appellant’s earning capacity was greater than his actual earnings at the time of the hearing, Comm. ex rel. Goichman v. Goichman, 226 Pa.Super. 311, 316 A.2d 653 (1973), and he did prove a substantial and permanent change in circumstances, I agree with this conclusion in the lower court’s opinion.
Appellant argues further, however, that after the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsylvania, the duty of child support rests equally on both parents. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974); White v. White, 226 Pa.Super. 499, 313 A.2d 776 (1973). Hence the earning capacity of the mother must also be considered in defraying the father’s support obligation. In this case, the mother remarried, quit her job and ceased to contribute to the support of her children. Based on these facts, appellant asks us to change the support law to read that any remarriage under these facts is a permanent change in circumstances and that the stepparent is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the support responsibility.
*362There is nothing in our present support law that requires a new spouse to support minor children from a prior marriage. Nor do I feel such an extension should be made. Instead, the precedent established by this court is that the proper inquiry is the extent to which the new spouse’s income defrays the family expenses. Comm. ex rel. Hall v. Hall, supra; Comm. ex rel. Travitsky v. Travitsky, 230 Pa.Super. 435, 326 A.2d 883 (1974). In this case although there was testimony concerning Judge Stanziani’s income, there is no indication in the lower court’s opinion that the hearing judge took into consideration the extent to which this income may have defrayed the support expenses of the Armor children. The exhibit introduced by Mrs. Stanziani showed the percentage of expenses that are necessary to support the two Armor children based on the lifestyle set by her new marriage. The support order cannot be based totally on her new status in life without considering the extent to which Judge Stanziani’s income defrays those expenses.3
Accordingly I would remand for a new hearing specifically limited to the examination of the extent to which the hew spouse’s income defrays the expenses of rearing the two minor children.

. Act of March 30, 1875, P.L. 35, § 1; 1878, May 25, P.L. 154; 1909, March 18, P.L. 37, § 1 et seq.; 12 P.S. §§ 111-120.

. He received $420 per month in veterans benefits to defray his educational expenses. He worked part time at his parents’ business, earning $4.00 per hour; he also played in a group earning $25.00 per booking. Appellant had previously been a pilot for a commercial airline, a youth counselor, and held a B.A. in physical education.

. Cf. Comm. ex rel. Balph v. Balph, 210 Pa.Super. 244, 232 A.2d 76 (1967); Comm. ex rel. Yeats v. Yeats, 168 Pa.Super. 550, 79 A.2d 793 (1951).