Court Opinion

ID: 9917449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:05:24.399098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:04.875320
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 5, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                             Court of Appeals
                                NO. 2023-CA-0056-MR

KEZIA MCCLAIN AND KESTON
MCCLAIN,1 ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE ESTATE OF KEZIA MCCLAIN,
DECEASED                                                                  APPELLANTS

                APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE TIMOTHY KALTENBACH, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 18-CI-00425

TREXIS INSURANCE
CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR TO
ALFA VISION INSURANCE
CORPORATION                                                                   APPELLEE

                                       OPINION
                                      AFFIRMING

                                     ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

1
 The notice of appeal incorrectly names Appellant Kestin McClain as “Keston.” The Court
utilizes the correct spelling, “Kestin,” as denoted in the record.
COMBS, JUDGE: Kestin McClain, administrator of the Estate of Kezia McClain,

appeals an order of the McCracken Circuit Court that denied his motion for revivor

and dismissed the underlying civil action. After our review, we affirm.

            In June 2017, Kezia McClain and Jeffrey Williams were involved in a

motor vehicle accident. Nearly a year later, McClain filed a negligence action

against Williams. Three years later, in May 2021, McClain filed a motion to

amend her complaint to include a claim against her insurer, Trexis Insurance

Corporation (Trexis), the Appellee, for underinsured motorist coverage. The

motion was granted, and Trexis filed its answer. Williams’s insurer tendered its

policy limits to McClain in settlement of her claims against him. Pursuant to Coots

v. Allstate, 853 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1993), McClain duly provided notice to Trexis of

the payment of those policy limits to settle her claims against Williams. The

claims against Williams were eventually dismissed by agreed order.

            On July 22, 2021, McClain’s counsel notified the court of McClain’s

death on July 11, 2021. McClain’s death was not associated with the motor

vehicle accident. Counsel indicated that a motion for revivor would follow

appointment of a personal representative. A few weeks later, on August 24, 2021,

Kestin McClain was appointed to serve as administrator of his mother’s estate.

However, no motion for substitution or revivor was filed.

                                        -2-
             After Trexis waived its right to substitute payment of Williams’s

liability policy limits, a period of discovery began. At every juncture, counsel for

the estate helped to facilitate Trexis’s attempt to secure copies of Kezia McClain’s

medical records from care providers. On several occasions, Trexis represented to

counsel that it was working to evaluate the claim and hoped that the matter could

be settled promptly. However, McClain’s care providers were slow to provide the

requested medical records. The circuit court eventually entered an order directing

the care providers to produce forthwith the records. In addition, the court imposed

sanctions against several care providers for their refusal to comply with subpoenas

duces tecum issued in May 2022.

             By October 2022, Trexis indicated to counsel and the administrator of

the estate that it had finally been able to compile McClain’s medical records. And

then within a few weeks, it filed its motion to dismiss. Trexis argued that the

failure of the estate’s administrator to revive the action within one year of Kezia

McClain’s death was fatal. In his response, the administrator of the estate argued

that Trexis was equitably estopped from asserting a motion to dismiss the action,

implying that the estate had been “lulled” into believing that the claim would be

paid. The administrator’s motion for revivor and for substitution of the plaintiff

was filed on November 10, 2022.

                                         -3-
             Trexis filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss. It contended

that it never made a material misrepresentation to anyone and that mere

cooperation between counsel was insufficient to toll the period for revivor. It

explained as follows:

             Trexis worked to investigate Ms. McClain’s medical care
             and potential damages, expressed a hope that settlement
             could be accomplished once that investigation was
             complete, and then engaged in brief negotiations before
             determining that reasonable settlement was unlikely and
             filing the present Motion to Dismiss. Trexis never said
             or did anything that could estop it from asserting a
             limitations defense, and it never sought to deter Plaintiff
             or Plaintiff’s counsel from taking the steps necessary to
             preserve the Estate’s claims against it.

Additionally, it responded to the administrator’s motion for revivor and argued that

the motion was untimely.

             After a hearing conducted December 9, 2022, the circuit court granted

the motion to dismiss filed by Trexis. In its order of December 27, 2022, the court

also denied as untimely the motion for revivor and substitution filed by the

administrator. This timely appeal followed.

             On appeal, the estate’s administrator argues that the court erred by

failing to conclude that the motion for revivor and substitution was untimely as a

result of excusable neglect; that Trexis violated its duty of good faith and fair

dealing; and that Trexis was equitably estopped from pursuing dismissal of the

action. We disagree with each of these contentions.

                                          -4-
                KRS2 395.278 provides that application to revive an action in the

name of the plaintiff’s representative must be made within one year of the death

of the deceased party. The statute constitutes a statute of limitation that is not

subject to extension. Hardin County v Wilkerson, 255 S.W.3d 923 (Ky. 2008).

Nevertheless, the estate’s administrator argues that the circuit court erred by failing

to apply provisions of our rules of civil procedure to permit revivor even after the

expiration of the period of limitation. He contends that timely revivor is subject to

the provisions of CR3 6.02, which provides that for good cause shown (including

excusable neglect), the court may permit an act to be done even after the time

specified has expired.

                Our revival statute “has always been strictly construed.” Daniel v.

Fourth & Market, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Ky. 1968). The one-year limitation

period established by the provisions of KRS 395.278 is not subject to enlargement

under CR 6.02 regardless of whether the failure to revive within that time resulted

from excusable neglect. Id. “[T]he period set forth in the statute is mandatory and

not subject to enlargement.” Hammons v. Tremco, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Ky.

1994). Kezia McClain’s claim against Trexis was subject to revivor by timely

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -5-
substitution of her estate’s administrator as a party. When timely revivor was not

undertaken, her claim was subject to dismissal.

             In the alternative, the administrator argues that the provisions of CR

25.01 should apply to permit an untimely substitution of parties. CR 25.01

provides, in part: “[i]f a party dies during the pendency of an action and the claim

is not thereby extinguished, the court, within the period allowed by law, may order

substitution of the proper parties. If substitution is not so made, the action may be

dismissed as to the deceased party.” (Emphasis added.) The word “may” in the

rule has been construed specifically “not as arrogating to the courts a discretionary

authority, but as recognizing and allowing for those instances in which the right to

have the action dismissed has been lost, as by waiver, estoppel, or consent.”

Daniel, 445 S.W.2d at 701.

             The administrator contends that Trexis lost the right to require the

timely revivor of the action because statements made by Trexis’s counsel and its

claims adjuster “lulled us into a false belief that Trexis actually wanted to settle the

underinsured motorist claim.” The administrator explains that “[t]hey claimed that

it should take ‘only a few weeks’ to obtain the medical records they wanted . . . .

Instead, they dragged out the process for over a year . . . .”

             However, Trexis had no reason to believe that the civil action would

not be revived while it conducted discovery. It had no basis to assume that the

                                          -6-
administrator would not comply with the clear and unequivocal statutory duty to

revive the action. As noted earlier, counsel for Kezia McClain expressly

represented to Trexis and to the court just days after her passing that a motion for

revivor would follow appointment of a personal representative. Kezia’s son,

Kestin McClain, was appointed to act as administrator of the estate within weeks

of her death. Yet no attempt to revive the action was ever made.

            On the other hand, it was not reasonable for the administrator to fail to

perform his duty to revive by relying on Trexis’s statements that it would collect

and evaluate the decedent’s medical records in an attempt to settle the claim.

Trexis’s statements could not be deemed -- either legally or logically -- to

constitute an inducement for the administrator not to fulfill his statutory duty. The

administrator was wholly aware of the prolonged struggle to procure those records.

The duty to revive was readily apparent. Thus, the trial court did not err by

concluding that equitable estoppel did not apply under the circumstances.

             Finally, we are unpersuaded that the duty of good faith and fair

dealing imposed upon Trexis as an insurer provided an equitable basis upon which

to extend the limitation period established by the provisions of KRS 395.278. The

administrator’s failure to revive the action could not reasonably be attributed to the

actions or statements of Trexis. Moreover, the issue of whether Trexis’s decision

to pursue dismissal of the action under the circumstances might constitute an unfair

                                         -7-
claims settlement practice is not before us. That issue is the subject of a separate

civil action pending in the circuit court.

             We affirm the order of dismissal of the McCracken Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Roger W. Lofton                              James R. Coltharp, Jr.
 Paducah, Kentucky                            Paducah, Kentucky

                                             -8-