Court Opinion

ID: 9688011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:57:04.989263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:34.155520
License: Public Domain

Danhof, P. J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority because I believe they have misunderstood the function of the appellate court in reviewing decisions of the Work*683men’s Compensation Appeal Board. MCLA 413.12; MSA 17.186, states:
“The findings of fact made by the compensation commission acting within its powers, shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive, but the supreme court shall have power to review questions of law involved in any final decision or determination of said compensation commission.”
Recently the Supreme Court in Koschay v Barnett Pontiac, Inc, 386 Mich 223 (1971), carefully restated the function of an appellate court. They said at p 225: “The question whether a workman is injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment may be a question of law or one primarily of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact.” Applying that standard to the instant case, we find that whether plaintiff suffered a compensable injury became, by the proofs, a question of fact. In Koschay, supra, the Supreme Court said at p 226:
“The appeal board therefore, depending upon its view of such proofs, was entitled to conclude either way; that the claimant’s disability was compensable, that is, work-connected, or that it was not. The board found against the burden-bearing claimant. Now that he is here for judicial review, he must to sustain his appeal establish to our satisfaction that there was no question of fact and that the proof entitled him to an award as a matter of law. There is no alternative; no room as we shall see for contention that the appeal board reached its conclusion without supporting proof or permissible inference from proof.
“In that regard his situation is much more difficult on appeal than it would have been had the board found factually what it expressly said it could not.”
The Supreme Court then recited the decision of the appeal board in Koschay. The last two para*684graphs of said decision are of particular importance. Koschay, p 229.
“ ‘The record does not adequately establish plaintiff’s continued disability and we find that whatever disability he may still have is not causally connected with his employment. We say this whether approached as a Part VII injury or under Sec. 1, Part II with application of Zaremba v Chrysler Corporation, 377 Mich 226 (1966), because we cannot find that plaintiff was doing normal work in a normal way and that particular work activity precipitated the heart attack. No condition of employment here occasioned injury and disability.
“ ‘After careful review of the entire voluminous record we are unable to find that plaintiff-appellee received a personal injury arising out' of and in the course of his employment by the defendant-appellant on May 18,1966.’ ”
Note the similarity to the instant case where the majority of the appeal board said:
“Based upon the inability of a number of attending physicians to diagnose the nature and cause of plaintiff’s symptomatology and in agreement with Dr. Moore’s diagnosis it is our opinion that Mrs. Lamb’s pain which has persisted unabated since January 19, 1968, had its origin in a pre-existing emotional distress which manifested itself in her present symptomatology. We find no evidence in the file of this case which would allow us to determine that Mrs. Lamb’s emotional distress either had its origin or was aggravated in any manner by her work at John’s Tavern. We therefore find that any disability that Mrs. Lamb may presently suffer is not causally related to her work.”
In Koschay, supra, p 230, the Supreme Court said further,
*685“The primary function of the appeal hoard is that of finding what to it are the controlling facts. It is plain from its opinion that the hoard reached understandable conclusion that there was no proof persuasive enough to sustain the plaintiff’s burden of making a prima facie case of right to an award. * * * Too, the board must have known that it, the appointed fact-finder in workmen’s compensation cases, was not obliged to accept or extend verity to any expert opinion and that all it needed to say about Dr. Winkler’s opinions was that the facts offered to support them were too weak.”
Applying the above to the instant case I discern no distinguishing features which will allow us to remand this matter for further determination by the appeal board. While the facts could have been set forth in more detail,1 it is my opinion that the appeal board made a factual determination and that there was no proof persuasive enough to sustain the plaintiff’s burden of making a prima facie case of a right to award.
I would therefore affirm.

 See Koschay, p 230, wherein the Supreme Court advised the appeal board to concentrate on its fact-finding duties.