Court Opinion

ID: 9468544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:17:22.56188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:54.954769
License: Public Domain

MESKILL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
The majority reduces the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to an “abstract formality” that must yield when a trial judge “reasonably concludes that there is a distinct possibility” that a defendant was responsible for the disappearance of government evidence. Because I believe the Double Jeopardy Clause is not so fragile, I dissent.
This is the type of case which evokes the statement “hard cases make bad law.” The majority implicitly recognizes that the record cannot support a finding that appellant Mastrangelo was involved in Bennett’s killing “under a preponderance of the evidence or some lesser evidentiary standard[,]” but concludes that no such showing is required. The majority cites no authority, and none exists, for its rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause falls to the trial court’s reasonable conclusion that there is a distinct possibility that the defendant participated in the disappearance of government evidence. Instead, my brothers rely on statements in Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978), and United States v. Grasso, 600 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1979), to the effect that an appellate court must accord substantial deference to a trial court’s judgment on manifest necessity. I accept these statements but not the conclusion that they support an affirmance here.
I fully agree that “[a] great deal of discretion must ... be vested in the trial judge, who is usually best situated to determine the degree of necessity for the declaration of a mistrial when an unexpected event occurs during a trial.” Dunkerley v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1978). “This, however, does not end the inquiry .... We must satisfy ourselves that the trial court exercised ‘sound discretion.’ ” United States v. Grasso, 600 F.2d at 344 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 835). See also Dunkerley v. Hogan, 579 F.2d at 145-48 (holding that the trial judge did not exercise “sound discretion”). Arizona taught us that the “strictest scrutiny is appropriate when the basis for the mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution evidence . . . . ” 434 U.S. at 508, 98 S.Ct. at 832. Moreover,
in view of the importance of the [defendant’s right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal], and the fact that it is frustrated by any mistrial, the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar. His burden is a heavy one. The prosecutor must demonstrate “manifest necessity” for any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant.
The words “manifest necessity” appropriately characterize the magnitude of the prosecutor’s burden. . . . Nevertheless, those words do not describe a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge. Indeed, it is manifest that the key word “necessity” cannot be interpreted literally; instead, contrary to the teaching of Webster, we assume that there are degrees of necessity and we require a “high degree” before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate.
Id. at 505-06, 98 S.Ct. at 830-31 (footnotes omitted).
The majority, in permitting the protections of the Fifth Amendment to be defeated by a reasonable conclusion that there is a “distinct possibility” that the defendant was somehow connected with the disappearance of government evidence, ignores the “heavy burden” and “high degree” standards enunciated in Arizona. The crux of the majority opinion is that it would be *954“impracticable in the situation of the killing of a key witness to reach any well-founded determination about the true course of events . . . . ” It may well be impracticable to make such a determination, but I cannot accept the conclusion in this case that impracticability justifies relieving the government of its “heavy burden” to show that the denial of an important constitutional protection is highly necessary.
The majority is properly concerned with “society’s interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 509, 98 S.Ct. at 832. It has long been the rule that the trial court should weigh the defendant’s “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal” against society’s interest in “fair trials designed to end in just judgments.” Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949). But in United States v. Glover, 506 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1974), this Court weighed similar facts and concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred reprosecution. The majority’s tortured analysis of the standard of proof for finding that Mastrangelo was involved in the killing of a witness is designed to distinguish this case from Glover.
Like the instant case, Glover involved the declaration of a mistrial in a multidefen-dant trial. Glover was tried jointly with three codefendants for conspiracy to violate the federal narcotics laws. After almost five days of trial, the government informed the court that it intended to introduce evidence of admissions by Glover. The judge immediately recognized that this evidence might not be admissible against Glover’s codefendants and asked all parties to brief and argue the issue. After considering the arguments, the judge ruled that Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), and its progeny prohibited introduction of the proffered evidence against Glover’s codefendants. He then granted the government’s motion for severance of Glover and declared a mistrial as to Glover.
Glover moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that a subsequent trial would violate his right to protection against double jeopardy. The trial court denied this motion and Glover was tried and convicted. On appeal, this Court held that Glover’s motion to dismiss should have been granted because the declaration of a mistrial as to him was not supported by manifest necessity. “The rationale of Glover was that retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because it did not provide the involuntarily severed defendant with any advantage, but merely helped his codefendants and the Government.” United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 944-45 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980).
It cannot seriously be contended that the declaration of a mistrial in the instant case was for the benefit of Mastrangelo. The government concedes that had the trial continued without introduction of the tape, it would have been unable to present even a prima facie case against Mastrangelo. As in Glover, the trial court here declared a mistrial to protect a codefendant from prejudice without diminishing the government’s chances of obtaining a conviction against the severed defendant. Glover controls the instant case and requires reversal of the trial court’s finding of manifest necessity.
Had the trial court lacked reasonable alternatives to declaring a mistrial, I would agree that manifest necessity existed and that Glover would not control.1 But this *955was not the case. The trial court could have reversed its ruling on the admissibility of the taped conversation between Mastran-gelo and Bennett, protecting against prejudice to Dazzo either by redacting the allegedly threatening portions of the conversation or by giving a curative instruction to the jury. The majority recognizes this as a reasonable alternative and even suggests that it would have preferred this option. Once again, however, the majority retreats behind the statement that the trial court’s decision must be accorded “the highest deference.” In doing so, the majority ignores the fact that “the basis for the mistrial [was] the unavailability of critical prosecution evidence . . .. ” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 508, 98 S.Ct. at 832. Thus, in evaluating the trial court’s exercise of discretion, “the strictest scrutiny is appropriate . . . .” Id. The majority’s search for reasons to affirm the trial court’s ruling is plainly inconsistent with the strict scrutiny that Arizona prescribes.
The fact that the case against Dazzo was strong and essentially complete should not diminish Mastrangelo’s right to have his trial concluded before his first jury when it is not even arguable that the mistrial was for his benefit and when there is no reasonable basis for concluding that he caused the government’s evidence to disappear.
I believe that when viable alternatives to declaring the mistrial are available, and when the mistrial is neither for the defendant’s benefit nor demonstrably caused by the defendant, a court should be slow to reject the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. This is especially true when the court is confronted with the conflicting interests of codefendants. As Judge Gurfein wrote for this Court in Glover:
a permissive attitude toward mistrials in multiple defendant conspiracy cases could lead to an erosion, bit by bit, of the double jeopardy provision — an undesirable result ....
506 F.2d at 298. I believe that the majority opinion is a substantial step in that erosion.

. In addition to distinguishing Glover on the ground that Mastrangelo can be held responsible for Bennett’s death, the majority suggests that Glover might also be distinguished because the government could easily have avoided the mistrial in that case by acting more carefully. The majority implies that it is an open question whether the absence of prosecu-torial misconduct or error will vitiate a double jeopardy claim when a mistrial was declared over the defendant’s objection, even when the defendant did not cause the problem that precipitated the mistrial.
In Dunkerley v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1978), this Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial of a defendant following the declaration of a mistrial prompted by the hospitalization of the defendant with a partially collapsed lung. This Court ruled that the mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity *955because a continuance could have been granted for the 7 to 10 days during which the defendant was expected to be hospitalized. There was no suggestion that either the defendant or the government was in any way responsible for creating the need for the mistrial.
Therefore, where viable alternatives are available, the absence of prosecutorial misconduct or error should not alone defeat a subsequent double jeopardy claim.