Court Opinion

ID: 9693420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:40:57.226152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:46.211133
License: Public Domain

D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
(dissenting). I would reverse upon the ground that the comments made by the trial judge to the jury, and set forth in the majority opinion, completely foreclosed the rereading of testimony to the jury during deliberations and hence was a violation of the doctrine expressed in People v Henry Smith, 396 Mich 109; 240 NW2d 202 (1976), and People v Howe, 392 Mich 670; 221 NW2d 350 (1974).
The majority’s attempt to analogize the instruction in the instant case to that contained in People v Rodriguez, 103 Mich App 161; 302 NW2d 630 (1981), in my opinion is misplaced. In Rodriguez the trial judge stated "this judge is not inclined after you go into deliberation to have testimony read back in any way”. (Emphasis supplied.) In the case at bar the trial judge stated, "Sometimes after jurors begin deliberating I receive a note in which they say, 'We would like to hear the testimony of John James again.’ I routinely deny that motion because to do so * * *”. (Emphasis supplied.)
According to Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (G & C Merriam Co, 1974), there appears to be a vast difference between the words "inclined” and "routine”. "Inclined” is defined as having inclination, disposition or tending. "Routine” is defined as a regular course of procedure. In short, the former means nothing more than a tendency. Such a word as it was used in Rodriguez would not effectively foreclose the right of the jury to have testimony reread and the Supreme Court, in adopting Judge Cavanagh’s dissent therein, properly so held. However, by using the words "routinely deny”, as did . the judge in the case at bar, *92the jury was effectively foreclosed from asking that testimony be reread since by the use of such terms the judge effectively told the jury that as a regular course of procedure such a request would be denied. Such is different from telling a jury that the judge has a tendency to deny such requests. In short, in one instance the judge is telling the jury that he leans to denial and in the other that as a matter of course he does deny. There is a difference.
Accordingly, I would reverse defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.