Court Opinion

ID: 9544230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:53:27.738711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:28.712307
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that application of a hybrid approach is desirable with regard to contempt proceedings when an attorney fails to hon- or a scheduled court appearance date. However, the majority opinion should not be construed to state that the prosecutor's absence from the courtroom is not conduct so as to trigger the sanctions allowable for direct contempt. When one's presence at a particular place at a particular time is required by law, that person's non-presence is conduct. Furthermore, that conduct occurs within the courtroom.
The principal value which I derive from the Yengo hybrid approach requiring factual inquiry is that it is directed to the determination of whether the absence is or is not "inexcusable". It may be said as a general proposition that criminal contempt will not lie, whether direct or indirect, without an element of willfulness. See In re Lemond (1980) 274 Ind. 505, 413 N.E.2d 228; Allison v. State ex rel. Allison (1963) 243 Ind. 489, 187 N.E.2d 565; Denny v. State ex inf. Brady (1982) 203 Ind. 682, 182 N.E. 313.
*499Whether the absence of Curtis at the time and place in question was or was not willful could not be determined without a factual inquiry. Such an inquiry was not conducted and for that reason the contempt determination is subject to reversal.
In my estimation, however, nothing is to be gained by a remand for further proceedings. The matters of record clearly reflect that both attorneys of record relied upon the trial court's own calendar, which did not reflect the trial setting. Notwithstanding that the prosecutor may have had the trial setting noted upon his personal calendar, I would hold that as a matter of law he was entitled to rely upon the court's own calendar and that, therefore, as a matter of law, the willfulness required for a contempt conviction was not present.
If the facts in the case before us permitted differing inferences with respect to the matter of willfulness, I would be in agreement with the majority opinion to the extent that it holds that the alleged contem-nor is entitled to a hearing and all other safeguards afforded by IC. 84-4-8-1 (Burns Code Ed.Supp.1992) and I.C. 34-4-7-8 (Burns Code ©d.1986). ©
I would reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the conviction and the punishment imposed.