Court Opinion

ID: 9946999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 21:00:54.214877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.733771
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4524      Doc: 25         Filed: 02/29/2024     Pg: 1 of 4

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 23-4524

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        RANDY STEPHEN HUMPHREY,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
        Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:22-cr-00053-GMG-RWT-1)

        Submitted: February 27, 2024                                 Decided: February 29, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: David O. Schles, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID SCHLES, Charleston, West
        Virginia, for Appellant. Lara Kay Omps-Botteicher, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4524      Doc: 25          Filed: 02/29/2024     Pg: 2 of 4

        PER CURIAM:

               Randy Stephen Humphrey pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

        possession with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

        § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).     The district court sentenced Humphrey to 151 months’

        imprisonment—the bottom of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal,

        Humphrey’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

        (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning: (1) whether

        the district court correctly applied a leadership enhancement under U.S. Sentencing

        Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(a) (2021); (2) whether the district court plainly erred in

        designating Humphrey a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1; and (3) whether the district

        court should have varied downward from the Guidelines range when sentencing

        Humphrey. Humphrey was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he

        has not done so. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal as to the first and third

        issues pursuant to the appellate waiver in Humphrey’s plea agreement. For the reasons

        explained below, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

               “We review an appellate waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is

        enforceable” and “will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls

        within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir.

        2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon review of the record, including the plea

        agreement and the transcript of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we conclude that

        Humphrey knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and

        sentence excepting only a challenge to his career offender designation and claims of

                                                      2
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4524       Doc: 25         Filed: 02/29/2024      Pg: 3 of 4

        ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, we grant the

        Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal as to Humphrey’s arguments that

        the district court erred in applying the leadership enhancement and that the district court

        should have varied downward from the Guidelines range when sentencing him.

               As for Humphrey’s challenge to his career offender designation, which the appellate

        waiver does not cover, we review that issue for plain error because Humphrey failed to

        raise it in the district court. See United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 509-10 (4th Cir.

        2013) (explaining plain-error standard and reviewing career offender designation for plain

        error where defendant did not contest it in district court). And we are satisfied that the

        district court did not plainly err in designating Humphrey a career offender based on the

        nature of the instant offense and Humphrey’s prior felony convictions for possession with

        intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and unlawful assault,

        in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(a). See United States v. Groves, 65 F.4th 166, 174

        (4th Cir.) (holding that “a § 841(a)(1) distribution offense is not categorically disqualified

        from being treated as a ‘controlled substance offense’” for purposes of career offender

        enhancement), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 336 (2023); United States v. Covington, 880 F.3d

        129, 135 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that “unlawful wounding,” in violation of W. Va. Code

        § 61-2-9(a), is “crime of violence” for purposes of career offender enhancement). *

               *
                Although Humphrey was convicted of “unlawful assault,” in violation of W. Va.
        Code § 61-2-9(a), that offense is identical to the “unlawful wounding” offense that we
        considered in Covington. See State v. Maichle, 895 S.E.2d 181, 184, 187 (W. Va. 2023)
        (using “assault” and “wound” interchangeably in analyzing W. Va. Code § 61-2-9(a));
        (Continued)
                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4524         Doc: 25      Filed: 02/29/2024      Pg: 4 of 4

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We thus grant the Government’s motion to

        dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal as to two of the sentencing issues that Anders counsel

        has raised on appeal. We also affirm the district court’s judgment in all other respects. At

        this juncture, we deny Humphrey’s counsel’s request to withdraw made in the Anders brief.

               This court requires that counsel inform Humphrey, in writing, of the right to petition

        the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Humphrey requests that a

        petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel

        may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

        state that a copy thereof was served on Humphrey.

               We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                               AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                               DISMISSED IN PART

        United States v. Cobbs, 274 F. Supp. 3d 390, 394 & n.3 (S.D.W. Va. 2017) (explaining that
        “unlawful wounding” is also called “unlawful assault” in context of § 61-2-9(a)).

                                                     4