Court Opinion

ID: 9760476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:57:09.38009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.646406
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Justice,
concurring.
It is difficult to understand exactly what Ridgeway’s point is on the assignment of Judge Martin. The majority has interpreted it to be limited to the application of Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.053 (Vernon Supp. 1997) and such cases as Kellogg v. Martin, 810 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1991, orig. proceeding). These matters are cited by Ridgeway as authority on this point. Her point of error, however, reads as follows:
The hearings conducted by Judge William C. Martin, III on August 22, 1995, and August 25, 1995, together with any and all pronouncements made in connection therewith, are void.
Ridgeway also cites Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Ater, 845 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, orig. proceeding). Conduct about which Ridgeway complains is not based upon the challenge of an assigned judge, which is the area spoken to by Section 74.053.
The majority opinion accurately discusses Section 74.053 and cases involving the recu-sal of an assigned judge based upon a challenge by the parties. There was no challenge in the present case. The cases cited by the majority stand for the proposition that problems relating to a requested recusal under that rule are waived if not specifically objected to. It appears that Ridgeway instead should have cited the statutes dealing *500•with the assignment of judges, which is a much older procedure than the permitted challenge under Section 74.053. It would be appropriate to look at Sections 74.052, 74.054, 74.055, and 74.056 of the Government Code. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.052 (Vernon 1988), § 74.054 (Vernon Supp.1997), §§ 74.055, 74.056 (Vernon 1988 & Supp.1997).
The effect of an objection to an assigned judge is more in the nature of a recusal motion than a motion raising the judge’s disqualification2 from sitting in the ease. Texas Employment Comm’n v. Alvarez, 915 S.W.2d 161, 165-66 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding). On the other hand, the present case does not involve a challenge made to an assigned judge. Ridgeway has not challenged the decision on the basis that some error was made in not allowing her to exercise her recusal motion, but she challenges the judgment as void on the basis that the judge was not properly assigned and had no authority in the case. Unless there is a valid assignment of a visiting judge or retired judge, that judge has no more jurisdiction to hear the case than the waiter at the Dairy Queen.
In Houston General Ins. Co. v. Ater, the court held that the qualifications of a retired judge to serve on assignment is a jurisdictional question which cannot be waived and which can be raised at any time. Houston General Ins. Co. v. Ater, 843 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, orig. proceeding). (This Court followed the Ater decision in an unpublished opinion.)
In the present case, Ridgeway has challenged the validity of the appointment and asked this Court to declare that any judgment made by the assigned judge be declared void. This challenge was not waived by failure to object at the time of trial under the recusal objection of the Government Code. Therefore, I proceed to specifically address that issue.
Ridgeway does not contend that there was not an assignment, but rather contends that the assignment was invalid because the retired judge was assigned on a broad basis for a year to that court at the discretion of the regular judge of the court. Assignments are commonly accepted for specific cases or for time periods. Section 74.056(a) calls for the assignment to be “to hold special or regular terms of court.” It has never been held that the regular sitting judge was prohibited from hearing cases within the time period that an assigned judge was also sitting on other cases. This procedure is equivalent to leaving the matter to the trial judge’s discretion as to what cases the assigned judge sits upon. In effect, this appointment permits the assigned judge to sit on any case during that time period other than those cases that the regular sitting judge has chosen to hear. This is an acceptable form of assignment and is not invalid on this basis.
I concur with the opinion of the majority.

. When I authored the first bill providing for such recusals, I used the word disqualification. Chief Justice Joe Greenhill pointed out that disqualifications were jurisdictional and constitutional matters, and the legislation should use the word recusal. The Legislature later, however, unfortunately used the word disqualification.