Court Opinion

ID: 9672147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:49:48.008049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:14.629397
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice
(concurring).
I quote the following from the brief of appellant:
“An abundance of caution prompted this appeal. Appellant is of the opinion that the judgment entered on November 5, 1968 may be interlocutory, but in view of opinions of the Supreme Court ‘and other courts in which the terms “separate trial” and “severance” have been treated as synonymous,’ Kansas University Endowment Ass’n v. King [162 Tex. 599], 350 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Tex.Sup. 1961), Appellant perfected this appeal, preferring to have an order of dismissal from this court than a later decision that the trial court entered an erroneous order of severance and the judgment is final.
Appellee’s motion was made ‘pursuant to Rule 174’ and requested ‘a separate trial on the issues’ of the right to condemn a portion of the tract and the City’s exercise of the power of eminent domain being excessive and arbitrary. The trial court ordered ‘that a separate trial be held on’ such issues. A severance is made under authority of Rule 41, T.R.C.P., and separate trials of issues are pursuant to Rule 174, T.R.C.P. Kansas University Endowment Ass’n vs. King, supra. The language of the motion orders separate trials of issues, not severance, and the motion was made pursuant to Rule 174.
Since the judgment does not dispose of all issues in the cause, it is not final unless an order of severance was entered. Steeple Oil & Gas Corporation vs. Amend, 394 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.Sup.1965); Pan-American Petroleum Corporation vs. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Company [159 Tex. 550] 324 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Sup.1959); Palmer vs. D.O.K.K. Benevolent & Insurance Ass’n, 334 S.W. 2d 149 (Tex.Sup.1960); Coastal States Crude Gathering Company vs. Strauch [160 Tex. 513], 410 S.W.2d 945 (Corp. Ch. Civ.App. 1967).
Iley vs. Hughes [158 Tex. 362], 311 S.W.2d 648 [85 A.L.R.2d 1] (Tex.Sup. 1958) would seem to dictate that the judgment here is interlocutory. After trial before a jury in a personal injury action in which the jury answered the liability issues, but did not answer the damage issue, the trial court granted an interlocutory judgment on the issue of liability and ordered a separate trial on the damage issues. After holding that the trial court erred in ordering a separate trial on the issues of liability and damage, the Supreme Court refused to compel the district judge to set aside the *344order on the ground that Iley had an adequate remedy of appeal after the trial on the damage issues.
Under the foregoing authorities, it appears that the order is interlocutory. In view of opinions using the terms ‘separate trial’ and ‘severance’ interchangeably, however the decisions in Schieffer vs. Patterson, 433 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.Sup.1968) and Pierce vs. Reynolds [160 Tex. 198], 429 [329] S.W.2d 76 (Tex.Sup.1959) indicate only one safe course for Appellant. Schieffer and Pierce hold that a judgment entered pursuant to an erroneous order of severance is final and appealable. The cause of action here is not subject to severance because it involves only one cause of action, but if the order of the trial court should be construed to be an order of severance, the judgment entered is final despite the error in the order.
To avoid risk, Appellant has presented this brief.”
I quote Appellee’s reply to the foregoing:
“Appellee does not challenge the power of the appellate courts to decide this appeal. Appellee points out to this Court that a condemnation case is quite different from other types of cases. Although not squarely in point because a different issue was involved, in the case of City of Houston vs. Culmore [154 Tex. 376], 278 S.W.2d 825 (Tex.Sup.1955), the Supreme Court held that the amount of consequential damages suffered as a result of condemnation could be tried separately from the issue of ownership, and the same was true with regard to the appeal of the ownership issue. The Court stated:
‘While it is not desirable to try cases piecemeal, it is not possible to preserve the certain rights of the City to condemn and also the equally certain rights of respondents to consequential damages in any other way than by such trial.’ 278 S.W.2d at p. 829.
In Iley vs. Hughes, 311 S.W.2d 648 (Tex.Sup.1958), cited in appellant’s Brief, p. 59, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that certain issues not involving personal injury could be tried separately. In Wright v. Wright [154 Tex. 138], 274 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Sup.1955), the Supreme Court upheld the separate trial and appeal of one issue in a will case. Appellee believes that the rationale of the above cases supports the appeal in this case.”
I do not wish to add to the comments made by me in Schieffer v. Patterson, Tex.Civ.App., 440 S.W.2d 124, 1.c. 127, no writ.
I concur in the opinion of the Court.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING