Court Opinion

ID: 9763435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:45:02.201535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:43.059121
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The standard of review in a case where the defendant claims he was improperly restricted on voir dire is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The propriety of the question that the defendant sought to ask is determinative of the issue. Id. A question is proper if it seeks to discover a juror’s views on an issue applicable to the case. Id.
In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider parole:
[Y]ou are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.
Further, the trial court specifically admonished the jury during voir dire, as follows:
We have a doctrine of separation of powers under our constitution and that sounds kind of stiff and long winded ... [its] a long way of telling you that we can’t talk about what the executive branch is doing. We can’t talk about the Board of Pardons and Paroles. I can’t tell you anything about it.
The lesson of the trial court’s jury instructions, as well as a plethora of cases dealing with alleged “Rose error,” 1 is: the less said about the parole law, the better. In my opinion, parole was not an “issue applicable to the case,” and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request to voir dire regarding parole.
I would overrule appellant’s points of error one through four, and would consider the remaining points of error.

. Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).