Court Opinion

ID: 9793056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:41:33.45693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:11.525643
License: Public Domain

McGHEE, Justice (dissenting). I believe this case is controlled by Albright v. Albright, 1916, 21 N.M. 606, 157 P. 662, 664, where, in my opinion, a correct interpretation was given the statute in question here. There a daughter brought suit against her father to partition certain real property alleged to have been the separate estate of her mother at the time of her death, and which he claimed was community property. If it was separate property the daughter had an interest in it, but if it was community property the father was the sole owner by operation of law. The daughter then urged that what is now § 20-2-5, NMSA, 1953 precluded the rendition of a judgment'in favor of the father because of lack of corroboration. The court said: “This section of the statute has frequently been considered by the territorial and state Supreme Court * *. If the statute applied to this case, we would be required to hold that the testimony of the appellee was not sufficiently corroborated to warrant his recovery. But the statute does not apply. This is not a suit to establish any claim against the estate or against the heirs of the estate, but for the partition of real estate. Clearly this statute has no application to a suit between heirs for the partition of the real estate of their ancestor.” The present case, likewise, is not against an estate but one to determine the character and therefore the ownership of real and personal property standing in the name of the plaintiff; that is, whether it was the separate property of the plaintiff or community property of himself and his former wife. The statute is inapplicable to the present case and the uncorroborated evidence of the plaintiff, if believed, is sufficient to support the judgment in his behalf. The appellee, who is now 80. years old, should not be divested of his separate estate when the statute does not require it because after 50 years he is unable to offer corroborating evidence when his testimony is believable and was believed by the lower court. I do not believe the Vehn case is controlling here. That was a claim by Mrs. Vehn against her former husband’s estate based on an alleged oral contract, and in the trial and here the plaintiff claimed there was sufficient corroboration to avoid the statute. There was no claim the statute did not apply to such a suit. California has a statute which declares one who makes a claim against an estate is not a competent witness, but it is there held that it only applies to money claims. No such disqualification exists under their decisions against one who sues for specific performance, to enforce a trust, etc., or for the recovery of real or personal property, and it seems to me this court was thinking along the same line when the Albright case was decided. I believe the majority have given the statute an entirely too literal construction, and therefore dissent.