Court Opinion

ID: 9411853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 07:00:23.291068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:15.612036
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SHELLY S. SMITH,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-1221-12-0349-W-6

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: July 27, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Shelly S. Smith, Monterey, California, pro se.

           Michael L. Halperin, Esquire, Monterey, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied her request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneo us findings of material fact;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s du e
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        The appellant was employed as an Assistant Professor in the Hebrew
     Department of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. Smith v.
     Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-12-0349-W-4, Appeal File
     (W-4 AF), Tab 18 at 14. In June 2008, she filed a complaint with the Office of
     Special Counsel (OSC) alleging reprisal for whistleblowing. Smith v. Department
     of the Army, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-12-0349-W-1, Initial Appeal File (W-1
     IAF), Tab 1 at 7-31. The appellant alleged in her OSC complaint that the agency
     took a series of personnel actions against her in reprisal for disclosures she made
     beginning in 2007. The appellant later amended her complaint and filed a second
     OSC complaint to allege additional acts of whistleblower reprisal.         Smith v.
     Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-12-0349-W-2, Appeal File
     (W-2 AF), Tab 4. OSC closed its investigation into the appellant’s complaints in
     January 2012, and the appellant timely filed this IRA appeal in March 2012. W-1
     IAF, Tab 1.
¶3        After holding a videoconference hearing over the course of 6 days in
     May 2017, the administrative judge issued an initial decision denying the
                                                                                            3

     appellant’s request for corrective action.       Smith v. Department of the Army,
     MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-12-0349-W-6, Appeal File (W-6 AF), Tab 55, Initial
     Decision (ID). 2 The administrative judge found that the appellant proved that she
     made a protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in some of the alleged
     retaliatory personnel actions, but that the agency proved by clear and convincing
     evidence that it would have taken those actions in the absence of the appellant’s
     disclosures. Id.
¶4         On petition for review, the appellant raises both procedural and substantive
     objections to the administrative judge’s handling of her appeal. Procedurally, she
     argues that the administrative judge erred in failing to delay the hearing for an
     additional 6 months, denying several of the appellant’s requested witnesses, and
     limiting the duration of the appellant’s own testimony during the hearing.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 5 at 3-4, 8-10, 12-14. She also accuses the
     agency of obstructing justice by failing to provide certain evidence to OSC. Id.
     at 5. Substantively, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in her
     credibility determinations and ignored evidence favorable to the appellant.           Id.
     at 5-12.   She also challenges, among other things, the administrative judge’s
     findings that she failed to exhaust one of her claims before OSC and that some of
     her alleged disclosures were not protected.        Id. at 10-47.    The appellant also
     accuses the administrative judge of pro-agency bias. Id. at 4, 10, 42-43. The
     agency has responded in opposition to the petition for review, PFR File, Tab 7,
     and the appellant has filed a reply, PFR File, Tab 10.
¶5         The appellant’s principal argument on review is that the administrative
     judge erred in failing to delay the hearing for an additional 6 months. She argues

     2
       The appeal was dismissed without prejudice a total of five times. In each case, the
     administrative judge dismissed the appeal at least in part in response to the appellant’s
     request for additional time to prepare for the hearing. W-1 IAF, Tab 23-24; W-2 AF,
     Tabs 12-13; Smith v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-12-0349-
     W-3, Appeal File, Tab 6; W-4 AF, Tab 15; Smith v. Department of the Army, MSPB
     Docket No. SF-1221-12-0349-W-5, Appeal File, Tab 14.
                                                                                      4

     that the administrative judge’s decision not to delay the hearing denied her due
     process and resulted in an evidentiary record that was not fully developed. PF R
     File, Tab 5 at 3-4. An administrative judge is authorized to postpone a hearing
     upon a showing of good cause, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.51(c), and the Board reviews an
     administrative judge’s decision to deny a postponement request under an abuse of
     discretion standard, see McCarthy v. International Boundary and Water
     Commission, 116 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶¶ 22-23 (2011), aff’d, 497 F. App’x 4 (Fed. Cir.
     2012). In denying the appellant’s postponement request, the administrative judge
     noted that she had already dismissed the appeal without prejudice five times and
     granted an additional postponement of more than a month.         W-6 AF, Tab 46
     at 1-2. We find no abuse of discretion in the administrative judge’s decision.
     The appellant had more than 5 years from the time she first filed her appeal to
     prepare for the hearing, and she has not established that she was entitled to an
     additional 6 months.
¶6        The appellant also argues on review that the administrative judge abused
     her discretion when she denied several of the appellant’s requested witnesses.
     PFR File, Tab 5 at 8-10. An administrative judge has wide discretion to control
     the proceedings, including the authority to exclude testimony she believes would
     be irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.   Vaughn v. Department of the
     Treasury, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 12 (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b). The Board has
     held that in order to obtain reversal of an initial decision on the ground that the
     administrative judge abused her discretion in excluding evidence, the petitioning
     party must show on review that relevant evidence, which could have affected the
     outcome, was disallowed.      Vaughn, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 12.       The appellant
     initially requested to call 31 witnesses, W-6 AF, Tab 27 at 42-49. During the
     prehearing conference, the appellant withdrew one of her requested witnesses.
     W-6 AF, Tab 39 at 4. The administrative judge approved 13 of the appellant’s 30
     remaining witnesses and identified 3 others as potential rebuttal witnesses . Id.
     The appellant’s vague assertions on review that the administrative judge erred in
                                                                                              5

     disallowing additional witnesses do not show that their testimony would have
     been relevant, material, not repetitious, or that they could have affected the
     outcome. 3
¶7         The appellant accuses the agency of obstructing justice by withholding
     documents from OSC. PFR File, Tab 5 at 5. However, the appellant herself
     acknowledges that the agency provided the documents in question to OSC in
     April 2011, id., almost a year before OSC closed its investigation and
     approximately 6 years before the close of the record before the administrative
     judge.   Thus, even if the appellant is correct that the agency failed to timely
     produce the documents to OSC, she has not shown why that warrants a diffe rent
     outcome in this appeal.
¶8         The appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in her credibility
     determinations. PFR File, Tab 5 at 7, 10-12, 28-29, 31-32, 35, 36, 43, 44. When
     an administrative judge has held a hearing and has made credibility
     determinations that were explicitly or implicitly based on the witness’s demeanor
     while testifying, the Board must defer to those credibility determinations and may
     overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for
     doing so. Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372-73
     (Fed. Cir. 2016); Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
     2002). Here, the administrative judge appropriately relied on the factors set forth
     in Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), to assess the
     credibility of numerous witnesses as to various disputed factual matters . ID at 9,
     13, 16, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33-34, 37, 39, 42-43, 45, 48, 49, 54, 55, 61-62, 68. Given
     the administrative judge’s demeanor-based findings, we find that the appellant
     has failed to provide a “sufficiently sound” reason to disturb these conclusions.

     3
       Given the administrative judge’s wide discretion to control the proceedings, w e also
     find no abuse of discretion in the administrative judge’s decision to limit the appellant’s
     direct testimony to 4 hours.
                                                                                               6

¶9         In    addition   to   challenging   the     administrative     judge’s     credibility
      determinations, the appellant argues more generally that the administrative judge
      “ignored” or gave insufficient weight to relevant evidence and arrived at the
      wrong conclusions. PFR File, Tab 5 at 8-12, 14, 43. We find that her arguments
      amount to nothing more than a disagreement with the administrative judge’s
      conclusions, and we find no basis to disturb these findings, see, e.g., Crosby v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb
      the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
      drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v.
      Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
¶10        The administrative judge found that the Board lacked authority to consider
      one of the appellant’s alleged protected disclosures because the appellant failed to
      establish that she raised that disclosure before OSC. ID at 4 -5. The appellant
      challenges that finding on review and cites emails in support of her assertion that
      she exhausted the disclosure in question.          PFR File, Tab 5 at 5 -6, 48-51.
      However, none of the emails cited by the appellant actually discuss the disclosure
      at issue, and therefore we find that the appellant has not established that she
      exhausted that disclosure before OSC.
¶11        The appellant also accuses the administrative judge of pro -agency bias in
      her procedural and evidentiary rulings.        PFR File, Tab 5 at 4, 10, 42-43.         In
      making a claim of bias or prejudice against an administrative judge, a party must
      overcome    the   presumption    of   honesty     and   integrity    that     accompanies
      administrative adjudicators. Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R.
      382, 386 (1980). An administrative judge’s conduct during the course of a Board
      proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if the administrative judge’s
      comments or actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
      make fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d
      1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
      555 (1994)). The appellant’s arguments on review, which d o not relate to any
                                                                                            7

      extrajudicial conduct by the administrative judge, neither overcome the
      presumption of honesty and integrity that accompanies an administrative judge
      nor establish that she showed a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
      make fair judgment impossible.         See Scoggins v. Department of the Army,
      123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 19 (2016).
¶12         We have considered the appellant’s other arguments on review, but we
      conclude that a different outcome is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the
      initial decision.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
             You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which case s fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
             Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         8

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S .
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                  9

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                     10

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or a ny court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              11

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.