Court Opinion

ID: 9364791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 06:04:15.8353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.299059
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re HUBBARD/WILCOX, Minors.                                        January 19, 2023

                                                                     No. 361771
                                                                     Montcalm Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2020-000972-NA

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Respondent-mother appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c) (failure to rectify conditions),1 (g) (failure to
provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood that children will be harmed if
returned to parent). We affirm.

                                 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        In November 2020, respondent was arrested for possession of methamphetamines.
Following her release from jail, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) received
a complaint in December 2020 indicating that respondent was again using methamphetamines and
unable to care for her children. The trial court ordered the children’s removal so that respondent
could focus on her recovery. The DHHS initiated services for respondent, including sober living,
intensive outpatient therapy, a psychological evaluation, foster-care visitation support, trauma-
informed-parenting classes, random drug screens, dialectical and cognitive behavioral therapy,
individual counseling, domestic-violence support, and case management.

        Although respondent initially complied with her case service plan, she gradually began to
lapse in complying. In November 2021, the DHHS sought authorization of a petition to terminate

1
  Neither petitioner nor the trial court specified whether subparagraph (c)(i) (conditions of
adjudication continue to exist), subparagraph (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), or both
subparagraphs were the basis for termination. From the record, we find it clear that both
subparagraphs (c)(i) and (c)(ii) were implicated.

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respondent’s parental rights after she tested positive for alcohol. The trial court declined to
authorize the petition at the time because respondent was, for the most part, participating in
services. In February 2022, the DHHS renewed its request for authorization of a petition to
terminate respondent’s parental rights after she tested positive for alcohol and marijuana use. This
time the trial court agreed with the DHHS, authorizing the petition and ordering the initiation of
proceedings to terminate respondent’s parental rights. In June 2022, the trial court terminated
respondent’s parental rights to the children, concluding that statutory grounds existed to terminate
her parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Respondent now
appeals.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

        Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that clear and convincing
evidence was presented in support of the statutory grounds for termination and by finding that a
preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests. We note that respondent makes a broad argument in regard to the
statutory grounds for termination, failing to link any particular assertion to a specific statutory
ground. And the best-interests argument is cursory and lacks any recitation of authorities on the
factors to consider in judging a child’s best interests.

        In In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020), this Court set forth the
following framework with respect to appeals challenging the statutory grounds for termination and
the best-interests determination:

                If a trial court finds that a single statutory ground for termination has been
       established by clear and convincing evidence and that it has been proved by a
       preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best
       interests of a child, the court is mandated to terminate a respondent’s parental rights
       to that child. This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s ruling that a statutory
       ground for termination has been established and its ruling that termination is in the
       children’s best interests. A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a
       definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. When applying the
       clear error standard in parental termination cases, regard is to be given to the special
       opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared
       before it. [Quotation marks, citations, brackets, and ellipses omitted.]

          The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),
(c)(ii), (g), and (j), which authorize termination under the following circumstances:

              (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
       182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
       and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

              (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
       no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
       time considering the child’s age.

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               (ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s
       jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions,
       the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received
       notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the
       conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified
       within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

                                               * * *

               (g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so,
       fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
       expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
       reasonable time considering the child’s age.

                                               * * *

               (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
       child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of
       the parent.

        In the beginning of the protective proceedings, respondent complied with most aspects of
her case service plan. At the first two review hearings, the trial court found that respondent
complied with all but one requirement. But after a little less than a year, respondent began failing
to satisfy some requirements—requirements that were designed to address the barriers to
reunification such as emotional instability, mental health problems, domestic violence, substance
abuse, inadequate parenting skills, and criminal behavior. At the third and fourth review hearings,
the trial court found that respondent had failed to complete, and consequently benefit from,
dialectical behavior therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, and trauma-informed-parenting classes.
These requirements were meant to address the issues regarding mental health, emotional stability,
and parenting skills. Respondent participated in but failed to benefit from lessons offered to her.
For example, she attended parenting classes to develop parenting skills, but at visitations she failed
to embrace her role as an authority figure when discipline was appropriate and needed. Respondent
also failed to interact with the children in a manner that prevented an increase in their dysregulated
behaviors.

        At the termination hearing, several witnesses—expert and lay—testified about
respondent’s mental health, emotional stability, and parenting skills. There was testimony
concerning how respondent’s diagnoses led her into unstable relationships, to chronically act
impulsively, and to suffer feelings of fear and abandonment. Respondent’s decisions to enter
abusive relationships were extremely harmful to the children. One of her recognized disorders
caused respondent to automatically place her needs above the needs of the children and to make
choices solely on the basis of her own needs, causing her to neglect her responsibility as a parent.
An expert opined that respondent did not possess the ability to provide structure and direction for
the children. Although respondent made some progress, she did not progress enough to care for
the children. An expert opined that respondent would need to recognize her issues and participate
in constant and continuous therapy for at least two years before she could properly parent the
children. The children became dysregulated after visits, and respondent did not have the parenting

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skills to manage and control their conduct. Respondent’s noncompliance with her case service
plan prevented her from acquiring the skills necessary to address her trauma and her children’s
trauma.

         Respondent argues that her participation in services showcased her ability to care for the
children and their needs and, at the same time, manage her own progress. Respondent further
contends that the doctors who testified lacked insight into her parenting skills because she had
shown empathy toward the children and a dedication to her recovery. The trial court acknowledged
respondent’s progress. In fact, the trial court commended her progress and recognized that
respondent had addressed her criminal behavior and the history of domestic violence. Nonetheless,
the trial court stressed that despite respondent’s attempts at addressing her other barriers, she would
need considerably more time to completely confront and conquer the issues concerning mental
health, emotional stability, and parenting skills. Respondent would need time to participate in the
therapy recommendations and benefit from them. But the amount of time recommended by the
medical professionals was not reasonable considering the children’s ages and needs. If the children
were returned to respondent’s care, it was very likely they would suffer harm, either emotionally
or psychologically, from the trauma caused by respondent’s unstructured and unstable lifestyle, or
suffer physical harm because of respondent’s failure to identify and address the children’s
significant ongoing medical needs. And, as an expert opined, if another removal occurred because
of respondent’s inability to properly parent, the children’s depression, dissociation, and anxiety
would worsen. Also, the children’s functioning would be interrupted because of their uncertainty
about the future.

         Contrary to respondent’s argument, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that she
failed to rectify the conditions of mental health, emotional stability, and parenting skills and that
there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify them within a reasonable time.
We conclude that under the totality of the evidence, the trial court did not clearly err by finding
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was proven by clear and convincing evidence under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii). Furthermore, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err by finding
that respondent failed to accomplish any meaningful change in her substance abuse problems and
that there was no reasonable likelihood that the substance abuse issues would be rectified within a
reasonable time considering the children’s ages. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). We also conclude that
the trial court did not clearly err by finding that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting
termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j).

        Respondent finally argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that the
preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests. Respondent contends that the trial court wrongfully dismissed the
possibility that respondent could improve her parenting skills and abilities from continued
participation in her services. With respect to the best-interest analysis, this Court in In re Mota,
334 Mich App at 321, observed:

               With respect to a child’s best interests, we focus on the child rather than the
       parent. In assessing a child’s best interests, a trial court may consider such factors
       as a child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
       permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the
       parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic

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       violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s
       visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the
       possibility of adoption. The trial court may also consider how long the child was in
       foster care or placed with relatives, along with the likelihood that the child could
       be returned to the parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all. [Quotation
       marks, citations, and brackets omitted.]

In addition, a trial court may consider a parent’s substance abuse problems in its best-interests
analysis. In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 89; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). “The trial court should weigh
all the evidence available to determine [a child’s] best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701,
713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

        The DHHS identified the following barriers to reunification: emotional instability, mental
health issues, domestic violence, substance abuse, inadequate parenting skills, and criminal
behavior. The trial court found that respondent completely addressed the domestic violence and
criminal behavior issues but failed to completely address the other barriers. The trial court stressed
that the experts, who had worked with respondent throughout this case, testified that respondent
failed to accept responsibility for the children’s trauma and minimized the consequences of her
role in exposing the children to domestic violence, substance abuse, and significant neglect.
Respondent also failed to care for the children’s substantial medical and dental needs. The children
participated, in varying degrees, in vision, speech, physical, and occupational therapy because their
development was so stunted. The children’s trauma negatively impacted their mental states and
expressions of emotion. One child preferred to express high levels of anger and aggression because
he internalized respondent’s behavior. Another child lived in a state of constant fear and danger
because he believed that respondent would not protect him. The last child lacked any emotional
control because he shouldered too many losses and saw significant violence.

        Respondent attended therapy and counseling to better her emotional stability and mental
health, but she still needed at least two more years of sessions before she could identify the
children’s triggers and then parent them through episodes of dysregulated behavior. At this time,
respondent is unable to address the children’s behavioral issues and provide them permanency;
consequently, the trial court correctly explained that any reunification could not be accomplished
in the near future. In addition, the children were in the process of recovering from medical neglect,
mental harm, and significant abuse. The medical professionals opined that respondent’s inability
to work through her trauma and handle her children’s trauma would only further harm the children.
In sum, we conclude that the children need stability and finality and that trial court did not clearly
err by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was in the children’s best interests.

       We affirm.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                              /s/ Jane E. Markey
                                                              /s/ James Robert Redford

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