Court Opinion

ID: 9561440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:09:52.834905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:48.636118
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I am in general agreement with the views expressed in Justice Kennard’s concurring and dissenting opinion.
However, I cannot embrace the ill-advised concession that the trial court’s order “did pose a potential for disruption of a function of the legislative branch” although the degree of potential disruption “is not great” and the purported infringement on the legislative function is “not substantial.” (Kennard, J., post, conc, and dis. opn. at pp. 710, 711.)
The theory of potential interference with legislative functions to any extent is inconsistent with the ultimate conclusion that the funds used for the emergency loan were “reasonably related” to the educational purposes of the legislation, and, indeed, “the trial court’s order furthered, rather than defeated, that valid legislative purpose.” As persuasively observed in footnote 2, the “funds were appropriated for purposes reasonably and closely related *706to the purpose for which the trial court ordered them to be used.” (Kennard, J., post, conc. and dis. opn. at p. 711.)
Under the foregoing circumstances—with which I agree—there cannot be some conceptual interference, even though “not great,” with the functions of the legislative branch.
With that caveat, I join the concurring and dissenting opinion.