Court Opinion

ID: 9588272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:32:09.756154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:48.602583
License: Public Domain

BERNES, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion, but I respectfully disagree with the analysis in Division 3, which addresses the provision of the trial court’s order prohibiting any party from having overnight guests of the opposite sex during periods of physical custody of and/or visitation with T. A. S. or his sister. Because this prohibition is unenforceable under binding precedent of the Supreme Court of Georgia and this Court, I believe we are constrained to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing it upon the parties.
While a trial court has discretion in imposing restrictions upon visitation, that discretion is not unlimited. See, e.g., Maloof v. Maloof, 231 Ga. 811, 812 (6) (204 SE2d 162) (1974); Stewart v. Stewart, 245 Ga. App. 20,22 (2) (537 SE2d 157) (2000). “In exercising its discretion, the trial court is to consider such issues as the best interests of the children, and avoid placing unnecessarily burdensome limitations on the exercise of either parent’s right of visitation.” (Footnote omitted.) Durham v. Gipson, 261 Ga. App. 602, 607 (2) (583 SE2d 254) (2003).
Here, the trial court abused its discretion because the visitation restriction is unduly burdensome. As an initial matter, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the restriction is not “narrowly drawn to protect the children from exposure to certain conduct by either parent, i.e., having overnight stays with unrelated members of the opposite sex.” Rather, as written, the restriction is overly broad; for example, it would prohibit a parent from having an out-of-town married couple with whom he or she is friends from staying overnight at the parent’s home when the child is present.
In any event, such a restriction is not authorized where, as here, no evidence of present or future harm to the child was presented in the trial court. Indeed, during the trial of the case, this issue of overnight guests was never discussed. Nor was there any accusation or evidence presented that the parties involved had ever engaged in inappropriate behavior with members of the opposite sex in the child’s presence, or that the child had or likely would be harmed by *650exposure to such overnight guests.15 “In the absence of any evidence that exposure to a third party will have an adverse effect on the best interests of the children, a trial court abuses its discretion by prohibiting a parent from exercising his or her custodial rights in that person’s presence.” (Citation omitted.) Arnold v. Arnold, 275 Ga. 354 (566 SE2d 679) (2002). See also Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 274 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (551 SE2d 721) (2001) (reversing order prohibiting visitation in the presence of father’s cohabiting girlfriend when there was no record evidence that the relationship had or would likely have a deleterious effect on the children).16 In light of this precedent, I believe we must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the challenged visitation restriction. Arnold, 275 Ga. at 354; Brandenburg, 274 Ga. at 184 (1).
Decided March 27, 2008.
Celeste F. Brewer, for appellants.
Shaunda L. Williams, pro se.

 Compare Hansen v. Hansen, 650 S2d 917,918 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (affirming overnight visitation restrictions prohibiting the mother from allowing any unrelated male to spend the night while the child was visiting based on evidence that the “mother’s boyfriend [had] severely frightened the boy”) (punctuation omitted); Miller v. Hawkins, 549 S2d 102,103 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (lower court did not abuse discretion in prohibiting overnight visitation with the mother who had live-in companion when child exhibited signs consistent with sexual abuse); Simonson v. Simonson, 292 NW2d 12, 13 (Minn. 1980) (upholding restriction prohibiting visitation with mother when her boyfriend was present, based on her boyfriend’s prior convictions for sexual offenses); Robison v. Robison, 722 S2d 601,605 (Miss. 1998) (restrictions on overnight visitation upheld based upon undisputed testimony that child was visibly traumatized by visitation with father and girlfriend); Dilworth v. Dilworth, 685 NE2d 847, 849 (Ohio App. 1996) (reversing judgment for other reasons, hut noting that trial court’s order disallowing the mother from having her boyfriend spend the night in her home when the children were visiting was consistent with Ohio law, given father’s testimony that the children were confused about “a lot of different men . . . staying overnight with their mom” and that they would become “weepy,” would “start to cry,” and would suffer a “depressed mood” as a result); Dile v. Dile, 426 A2d 137, 142 (Pa. Super. 1981) (holding that mother could not exercise her visitation privileges when her boyfriend was present based on his prior convictions for multiple offenses, including armed robbery, assault, and battery).

 Cf. Hayes v. Hayes, 199 Ga. App. 132, 133 (404 SE2d 276) (1991) (affirming the trial court’s finding that there was no change in material circumstances justifying a modification in custody although both parents were involved in meretricious relationships, given that there was no evidence of harm to the child); Livesay v. Hilley, 190 Ga. App. 655,656-657 (2) (379 SE2d 557) (1989) (mother’s cohabitation provided no ground for modifying custody absent evidence of harm to the child).