Court Opinion

ID: 9792322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:27:06.310442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.044741
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
The product of the majority opinion is that accountability with respect to compliance with the laws relating to the sale of intoxicating beverages and the transfer of liquor licenses is excused. I do not think that result is appropriate, and I dissent.
The major premise of the majority opinion is that no duty is owed to third persons by a vendor of real property under a contract for deed and, since the Howshars were vendors of real property under a contract for deed, they owed no duty to the Dubrays. The majority opinion eschews any reference to Scranton v. Whitlock, 389 P.2d 1015 (Wyo.1964). Yet the thrust of Scranton is that, because of the violation of Wyo.Stat. § 12-4— 601(b) (1986), the very contract upon which the Howshars rely for protection from liability is “illegal, void, and unenforceable.” Scranton, 389 P.2d at 1018. As it might apply to the facts of this ease, in which the liquor license was held by someone other than the owner of the building in which it was used, Scranton was reaffirmed in Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Dev. Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39 (Wyo.1985).
My primary concern, however, is with the application of the statutory provisions relating to local licenses for the sale of alcoholic and malt beverages and the transfers of such licenses. In this regard, it is clear the county liquor license for the Sugar Hill Restaurant and Lounge was issued to Edward G. Howshar. It never was transferred to Alice Carabajal in connection with the sale of the business. Wyo.Stat. § 12-4-103 (1986) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A license or permit authorized by this title shall not be held by, issued or transferred to:
***.***
(iii) Any person who does not own the building in which the sales room is located or hold a written lease for the period for which the license will be effective containing an agreement by the lessor that alcoholic or malt beverages may be sold upon the leased premises, except as provided by paragraph (iv) of this subsection * * *. (Emphasis added.)
Wyo.Stat. § 12-8-101 (1986) makes violation of any provision of the title a misdemeanor. In this instance, either the Howshars were in violation of the law because they held a license without owning the building in which the sales room was located; they were aiding' and. abetting a violation of the law by Cara-bajal for selling liquor without a license; or Carabajal was the Howshars’ agent in the operation of the Sugar Hill Restaurant and Lounge. I would rather assume that any unlawful activity was not intended or undertaken, and Carabajal was the Howshars’ agent. Since the complaint encompasses an adequate allegation of agency, the liability of the Howshars should be submitted to trial like any liability of Carabajal.
My understanding of our prior decisions in this area is that we have adopted a policy that demands accountability by the vendor of alcoholic beverages. White v. HA, Inc., 782 P.2d 1125 (Wyo.1989); Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106 (Wyo.1987); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo.1983); Fisher v. Robbins, 78 Wyo. 50, 319 P.2d 116 (Wyo.1957). In Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d at 412, we described “a duty to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances.” In the seminal case of Fisher, 319 P.2d at 126, we said:
We do not intend that anything which we have said should be considered as placing us in disagreement with the many well-considered statements from reputable authorities as to the high degree of care which must be exercised by those maintaining places for public patronage, and especially for that class of establishments where experience has shown disturbances of more or less violent character are more likely to occur. This is, of course, particularly true with respect to barrooms and *30other similar places where intoxicating liquors are consumed, for it is common knowledge that the use of intoxicants frequently unduly excites the tempers, emotions and actions of those who indulge in them.
Apparently, the trial court applied this rule with respect to Carabajal. If the issue of liability is to be tried as to Carabajal, it follows that the vicarious liability of the Howshars must also be tried.
Applying the accountability of a vendor to the holder of the liquor license constitutes an appropriate extension of our policy, particularly in an instance such as this in which the only lawful utilization of the license would constitute the vendor the agent of the holder of the license. I cannot agree the case is appropriately resolved under rules relating to the ownership of real property, and I dissent from the decision of the majority.
I would reverse the case and remand it to the district court for trial on the question of the vicarious liability of the holder of the liquor license.