Court Opinion

ID: 9571262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:22.232268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:14.679484
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
This is an appeal of right from the grant of a summary judgment. The claim asserted is in the nature of a class action on behalf of the named plaintiff and all others (if any) similarly situated.
The common fact situation said to support the class action is that funds deposited with the clerk of the court of the Third Judicial Circuit were invested in interest-bearing accounts or securities *176and that the profit thereon was retained by the county rather than given to the "ultimate” owners of the funds. The common legal question is the claimed illegality of an order of the judges of the Third Circuit directing the investments and the payment of the interest into the general fund of Wayne County. The basis of relief seems to be, in general terms, that the questioned order is a revenue-raising measure which is beyond the judicial supervisory power of the judges over the administration of the courts of the county; a due-process question under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and though it is not specifically stated the complaint appears to sound in a theory of unjust enrichment, or possible breach of a custodial trust. We examine the issues.
Logically, we must first examine the viability of the asserted class action.
It is simply impossible to do this at appellate judicial level. In all but rare instances appellate courts are courts of review upon a record made in the court below. In this case we cannot properly exercise our appellate function because this first ground was not reached by the trial judge. We quote from his opinion.
"In view of the contents of this opinion, the question of whether a class action being appropriate or whether this suit as such for all other persons, if any, similarly situated is not reached.”
Patently, if there is no trial court holding and nothing but pleadings and briefs to aid us, it would be most ill-considered to speak to the issue decisionally.
We look now to the basis upon which the trial judge did pass, and upon which he founded his decision. Without lengthy excerpts from the opin*177ion, we think it fair to say that the trial court, quoting certain statutory authority, held that the asserted judicial remedy and the relief sought thereby was premature. In effect he said, "until you demonstrate to me that you have made a demand upon the governmental entity involved to furnish you an accounting of the funds said to have been illegally acquired, and demonstrate refusal to pay you what you claim is yours voluntarily the issue is not justiciable before me”. The position of the trial judge is not without merit. Plaintiff-appellant’s two first stated "Questions Involved” assert that she has the right to proceed immediately judically. This question is as difficult to pass upon at appellate level as the one immediately hereinbefore discussed. The record is totally inadequate. This will have to await disposition until we can discuss the Third Circuit order mentioned later herein. For as far as the record shows, there is no money "ultimately” belonging to the plaintiff that even got into an interest-bearing account or security and thus that the county was illegally (or legally) withholding from plaintiff or anyone else interest earned thereon. We eschew appellate speculation.
We turn now to the claimed constitutional infirmity of the Third Circuit’s order. It was entered on April 21, 1965. Again we decline to elongate this opinion either by including the order verbatim or by liberal direct quotation therefrom. We will set out some background that gave rise to its entry and the essence of its legal effect.
For some time, how long we do not know, monies deposited in court in Wayne County were kept in three accounts entitled: Register in Chancery Account; County Clerk Bond Account; and Clerk of the Circuit Court Account.
*178By the order of the Third Circuit judges all of the accounts were consolidated into one designated The Circuit Court Account, Edward N. Branigin, County Clerk.1
Additionally, the order directed the clerk, in his discretion, to invest and reinvest $150,000 from the total of the consolidated account into interest-bearing certificates of deposit and United States Treasury Bills. The order further provided that:
"[a]ll income realized on account of the investment made by the County Clerk pursuant to the terms hereof shall, when realized, be turned over and deposited to the General Fund of the County of Wayne.”
We are well aware of the administrative convenience of such an arrangement, but we must at least arch an appellate eyebrow at the scope of the order.
We find ourselves in an anomalous position as far as speaking directly to the claimed illegality of the order. This is because it is this very order that generated the funds that plaintiff and those said to be similarly circumstanced seek accounting for and payment from. As to amounts deposited for bond or bail a specific statute provides that:
"cash or securities received by any * * * clerk * * * shall be deposited in a special fund, * * * . Any interest accumulating upon such fund shall be paid into the general fund * * * of the county.” MCLA 765.17; MSA 28.904.
Except for this statute there is no obligation upon the county clerk to invest any custodial funds in interest-bearing securities or accounts. This is why we said earlier the asserted cause of action seems to rest upon the theory, at least in *179part, of unjust enrichment. To put it simply, the situation would seem to be that the clerk, absent order of the judges, need not have invested any custodial funds in interest-bearing accounts or securities, but since he did (legally or illegally) plaintiff claims the county cannot enrich itself unjustly by retaining the interest earned.
Since we must vacate the summary judgment as to the first two issues discussed — viz., the viability of the claimed class action, and the failure to make demand upon the county in the manner provided by statute, and the refusal pursuant thereto — we think it not amiss to add some comment, non-decisional, but mayhap very relevant.
We call the attention of the Third Circuit judges to a statute which may have been overlooked or not sufficiently distinguished as to its applicability to the matter under consideration.
"For any and all services relative to the receipt, safekeeping, putting out money, or purchasing, taking or transferring any security therefor, or collecting interest thereon, under the direction of the court, not herein specifically provided for, the clerk shall receive such allowance and compensation, and from such of the parties as the court may consider just and shall direct by an order, after notice to the parties to be charged therewith.” MCLA 600.2529(8); MSA 27A.2529(8).
We note that retention of interest in some cases might well exceed or be far less than the court might consider "just”. We think it not untoward that the Third Circuit bench reexamine promptly the order of 1965 which is under attack.
Gratuitously we add yet another comment. The class action so-called is a much needed tool to be employed in the interest of the individual litigant who by reason of his mini-size claim may be unable to retain counsel to press his cause. Per *180contra, the class action, real or spurious, is not a device to be employed to create a bonanza when a simple, easily assertable, alternate remedy is available. We hardly need add that we intimate no evaluation in this regard of the case at bar.
If our opinion herein, like some of the teachings of Socrates, asks more questions than it answers, we ascribe it to the nature of the problem posed, the order giving rise to the litigation, the conflicting statutes involved, and the absence of a reviewable record.
For the reasons herein discussed, we vacate the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. No costs, neither party having decisively prevailed.
Lesinski, C. J., concurred.

 Now Joseph B. Sullivan.