Court Opinion

ID: 9855282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:22:21.721527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:32.802671
License: Public Domain

Bray, X,
dissenting.
I do not concur with the majority that the evidence “excluded any reasonable hypothesis” of defendant’s innocence and, respectfully, dissent.
*366It is well established that circumstantial evidence “ ‘must always be scanned with great caution . . . [and will] justify a verdict of guilty . . . [only if it] produce[s] upon a fair and unprejudiced mind a moral conviction of. . . guilt. . . beyond all reasonable doubt.’ ” Chrisman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 371, 377, 349 S.E.2d 899, 903 (1986) (quoting Dean v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 912, 914 (1879)). The facts “ ‘must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and . . . exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Varker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 445, 447, 417 S.E.2d 7, 8 (1992) (quoting Boothe v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 484, 492, 358 S.E.2d 740, 745 (1987)). If the evidence is “susceptible to two different interpretations,” the one which is “ ‘more favorable to the accused should be adopted unless it is untenable under all the facts and circumstances of the case.’” Varker, 14 Va. App. at 447, 417 S.E.2d at 8 (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 764, 772, 71 S.E.2d 73, 77 (1952)).
Here, the majority relies upon the presence of defendant’s finger and palm prints on the deposit slip as “sufficient evidence” to support the conviction. However, “fingerprint evidence, standing alone, is insufficient identification of criminal agency.” Henderson v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 811, 813, 213 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1975) (emphasis added). Such evidence “ ‘must be coupled with . . . other circumstances tending to reasonably exclude the hypothesis’ ” of innocence. Avent v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 474, 479, 164 S.E.2d 655, 659 (1968) (quoting McNeil v. State, 227 Md. 298, 300, 176 A.2d 338, 339 (1961)); see Turner v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 141, 148, 235 S.E.2d 357, 361 (1977).
The bank deposit bag was observed during the “late afternoon,” “laying [sic] in the street,” by Commonwealth witness Reynolds as he was “painting [his] house.” He “picked it up,” “put it next to the curb,” “just left [it] on the side of the street,” and notified the bank. “Within a half hour,” the police arrived. Reynolds directed them to the bag and Officer Terranova noticed the deposit slip nearby, also in the public street. The fingerprints were discovered by an “examiner,” who testified that only “touches” were necessary to leave the impressions. When asked if “touching with the palm would have to be more than a casual brushing,” the expert was unable to express an opinion.
Clearly, this evidence proves only that defendant once held the deposit slip in his hand. The time and circumstances of that possession are unknown and support no inference that defendant was a criminal *367agent involved in the robbery. See Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 215, 308 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984); Varker, 14 Va. App. at 447, 417 S.E.2d at 9; Nelson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 268, 271, 403 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1991). One need not look to the “imagination of. . . counsel,” Turner, 218 Va. at 148, 235 S.E.2d at 361, to find abundant evidence in this record which “supports a credible exculpatory explanation of the existence of fingerprints.” Henderson, 215 Va. at 813, 213 S.E.2d at 784. The apparently innocent discovery and handling of the bank bag by Reynolds makes the obvious point.
According the evidence in this record the appropriate consideration and weight, I find it insufficient as a matter of law to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and would reverse the conviction.