Court Opinion

ID: 9788610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:12:36.849043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:06.352444
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, J.
dissents.
¶ 11 continue to adhere to the rationale we enunciated in Mayes v. State, 887 P.2d 1288 (Okl.Cr.1994) of our long-standing policy of not instructing the jury in a criminal case on the exercise of executive clemency. I do so in that I view it as a shield to the defendant to ensure objective consideration of the sentencing options presented to the jury. However, when that shield is sought to be used as a sword, and response is invited, the rule is waived and the prosecution should be able to respond to ensure the jury is fully informed as to the truth regarding the sentencing options presented. For that reason I must dissent to the decision to reverse and remand this case once again for re-sentencing.
¶ 2 In pre-trial motions, the defense moved to allow evidence of the sentencing option of life without the possibility of parole. The trial judge put them on notice that evidence could lead to the jury receiving evidence *1106regarding the constitutional powers of the Governor to commute sentences. During the course of trial, the Assistant District Attorney inquired of Emma Watts, Unit Manager in Appellant’s block, on cross-examination regarding credits Appellant earned and how those credits could be used. The defense failed to object to this entire line of questioning. Nothing was asked regarding commutation or life without parole. Then, upon direct examination of Ms. McCoy, Appellant’s Case Manager on H Unit, the defense brought forward as their final question the following exchange; “Q: If a man or woman is serving a sentence of life without parole they don’t get out, do they? A: No.” (2002 Trial Tr. 567). During the cross-examination of Ms. McCoy, after discussing credits, the Assistant District Attorney then asked her if she was familiar with the term “commutation” and what it meant. She responded that since the Parole Board makes the recommendation, case managers are not involved with it anymore. Once again, no objection was made to this entire line of questioning.
¶ 3 Once the defense asked the question “if a man or woman is serving a sentence of life without parole they don’t get .out, do they?” and failing to object to any of the questions by the State regarding commutation, the evidence and issue was before the jury. There was no error, and if there was, it was invited.
¶ 4 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) is not applicable to the facts of this case. In Simmons, the defendant was ineligible for parole under South Carolina law based upon his criminal record. However, the court rejected the defendant’s request to inform the jury of that aspect of the state law. Instead, the court instructed the jury that they were not to consider pardon or parole eligibility and that the terms life imprisonment and death sentence were to be understood in their plain and ordinary meaning.
¶ 5 In Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000), Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated:
Simmons created a workable rule. The parole-ineligibility instruction is required only when, assuming the jury fixes the sentence at life, the defendant is ineligible for parole under state law.
530 U.S. at 166, 120 S.Ct. at 2120.
¶ 6 In California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court held that specific jury instructions on executive clemency were constitutional, though states were equally free to withhold such information from the jury. Justice O’Connor wrote:
Finally, we emphasize that informing the jury of the Governor’s power to commute a sentence of life without possibility of parole was merely an accurate statement of a potential sentencing alternative. To describe the sentence as ‘life imprisonment without possibility of parole’ is simply inaccurate when, under state law, the Governor possesses authority to commute that sentence to a lesser sentence that includes the possibility of parole. The Briggs Instruction thus corrects a misconception and supplies the jury with accurate information for its deliberation in selecting an appropriate sentence.
463 U.S. at 1009, 103 S.Ct. at 3457-3458.
¶ 7 I do not advocate that Oklahoma go as far as California and adopt a jury instruction that informs the jury of the commutation process in every case. Only when the defense invites the full explanation of the constitutional clemency process should it be explained.
¶ 8 As we stated in Mayes:
The reason a court is generally prohibited from mentioning parole lies not in any incentive to keep jurors ignorant of its existence, but rather because it is a discretionary procedure exercised by the executive branch which pi*ovides for a condition subsequent to the conviction and sentence after the party has been incarcerated in the state penitentiary. In other words it is offered as a reward in the form of commutation for good behavior of the inmate after he has been convicted. To have a judge tell a jury how long any particular inmate will serve after his conviction is asking him to see into the future. It would be both unrealistic and unwise to burden the already overworked trial *1107judges of our state with the responsibility of being soothsayers.
887 P.2d at 1318 (internal citations omitted).
¶ 9 This is still true and the basis upon which we should continue to forbid the admission of evidence regarding parole. However, when that evidence is admitted, without objection then the jury should be fully informed as to all aspects of the system, including the constitutional provisions regarding commutation.
¶ 10 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this Court has never held evidence of this type cannot be admitted, if invited. I find it of interest that in citing to 65 U.Cin.L.Rev.1051 (1997)1 the majority fails to cite the last sentence of the article which states, “[ejourts should employ a per se prohibition against any evidence, argument, or instruction on the governor’s clemency powers unless the defendant chooses to raise the issue.” Id. at 1091 (emphasis added). It is a universally recognized principle in the law that invited error is not error and the opposing party has the right to respond. See Hooper v. State, 947 P.2d 1090, 1100, (Okl.Cr. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 943, 118 S.Ct. 2353, 141 L.Ed.2d 722 (1998), Staggs v. State, 719 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Okl.Cr.1986), Goodrich v. State, 553 P.2d 219, 222 (Okl.Cr.1976). That is what happened in this case.
¶ 11 Therefore, as Appellant injected the issue of commutation into the trial, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the issue. The jury instruction in this case is not grounds for reversal and remand for resen-tencing.
¶ 12 This brings us to the content of the instructions given by Judge Skaggs. A review of both instructions reveal that each was a true statement of the law of the State of Oklahoma and an accurate definition of terms in clear and concise language. An instruction on commutation is not contained in The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions — Criminal (2d) (OUJI-CR). Pursuant to the order entered by this Court on April 4,1996, adopting amendments to the second edition, trial judges were directed, “[wjhenever OUJI-CR does not contain an instruction on a subject on which the court determines that the jury should be instructed, the instruction given on that subject should be simple, brief, impartial and free from argument.” Judge Skaggs followed that directive to the letter and provided the required guidance to the jury. Under the special facts of this case, there is no error either in the procedure or the instructions.
¶ 13 I also find error in the Court’s discussion of the scope of opinion testimony by expert testimony. The recitation of the holding of Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655 (Okl. Cr.1991), is somewhat disingenuous. While in that particular case it is correct, the issue was the truthfulness of a child witness. However, as to the scope of testimony for an expert witness, this Court stated:
Therefore, this Court accepts the accommodation syndrome as reliable scientific evidence provided that such syndrome is testified to by an expert that is (1) subject to cross-examination, (2) that the expert testifies as to the basis for such testimony, (the general acceptance in the scientific community and his knowledge of the syndrome), and (3) that the expert testifies only as to the background and nature of the syndrome and does not state an opinion as to whether or not the particular child suffers from the syndrome but leaves that to the jury.
806 P.2d at 660.
¶ 14 These guidelines regarding the methodology and scope of expert testimony comport with and follow ABA guidelines. See Standard 7-6.6, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards. See also White v. State, 973 P.2d 306, 314 (Okl.Cr.1998) (Lumpkin, J: Specially Concur); Hooks v. State, 862 P.2d 1273, 1278-79 (OM.Cr.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1870, 128 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994); Moore v. State, 788 P.2d 387, 399 (OM.Cr.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 227, 112 L.Ed.2d 182 (1990). To paraphrase these cases, expert opinions should be barred from *1108admission when they merely tell the jury what result to reach. The role of the expert is merely to describe the factors relevant to a defendant’s alleged particular condition. The jury will then apply the facts in evidence to those factors to determine if the condition/syndrome has been proven.
¶ 15 In this ease the jury rejected the continuing threat aggravator and any evidence Dr. Kinsey could have given would only have gone to that issue. I do not find error in the trial judge’s rulings based on Davenport and any perceived error by the failure of the defense to go forward with the witness based on those rulings is harmless due to the jury failing to find the continuing threat aggravator. However, it will continue to be an ongoing challenge for trial judges, as the gatekeepers under Daubert2, Kumho Tire3, and Taylor4 to validate relevant experts and reliable science to determine admissibility of evidence in capital cases. I point this out for the sole reason it appears there has been a loss of focus as to why expert testimony is allowed in the trial of a case. Section 2702 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code provides, “If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise” (emphasis added). As the Evidence Code specifically points out, the experts are not the evidence but collateral to the evidence already presented. However, it appears in the areas of sociology and psychology the reverse is true, and it is in direct conflict with § 2702 of the Evidence Code and Standard 7-6.6 of the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards. It is for that reason I question the admissibility of Dr. Kinsey’s testimony in the first place. Granted, due to the limited record it is difficult to determine what the scope of that testimony would have been. Regardless, based on this record, I find no error, and would affirm the judgment and sentence.
¶ 16 I am authorized to state Judge LILE joins in this dissent.

. Blaine LeCesne, Tipping the Scales Toward Death: Instructing Capital Jurors on the Possibility of Executive Clemency

. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).

. 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 ' (1999).

. 889 P.2d 319 (Okl.Cr.1995).