Court Opinion

ID: 9760598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:03:17.008379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:13.995144
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing
McDonald, judge.
Appellant in his motion for rehearing again contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence elicited from Bruce Hamilton Kennard and that this court erred in not so holding.
While we remain convinced of the soundness of our original opinion in this cause and that the present contention of appellant was properly disposed of therein, we do feel that due to the gravity of the punishment imposed a more thorough discussion of our position will be proper.
The record from appellant’s hearing on his motion for new trial reflects that witness Kennard had been questioned by someone from the District Attorney’s Office, prior to the main trial of this cause. During this questioning it was elicited from Kennard that he was of the opinion that appellant was “crazy.” Kennard was not called to testify during said main trial.
It is contended that this amounted to a deliberate suppression of evidence of appellant’s insanity by counsel for the State. Reliance is had upon Ashley v. State, 5 Cir., 319 F.2d 80, in so contending.
We can find no merit in this assertion.
In Ashley, supra, the evidence the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded should have been disclosed was that of two doctors who had examined Ashley at the request of the state, and concluded he was insane and had informed the prosecuting officer of this fact.
In the Ashley opinion Judge Tuttle cited United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 3 Cir., 221 F.2d 763, wherein the following is found:
“It seems likely that many situations will arise in which a prosecutor can fairly keep to himself his knowledge of available testimony which he views as mistaken or false. But there are other circumstances in which a prosecutor must, or certainly should know that even testimony which he honestly disbelieves is of a type or from a source which in all probability would make it very persuasive to a fair mind*491ed jury. This is notably true of testimony of a police officer, and most certainly of an arresting officer, favorable to a contention of the accused person.”
In the case at bar, six persons who were or had been fellow prisoners of appellant testified as to his mental condition, and there is no showing that the testimony of Kennard, also a fellow prisoner, would have varied in any degree from that so elicited. The instant case is easily distinguished from Ashley, supra, as in Ashley, the suppressed evidence was that of two medical doctors appointed by the State to examine the accused while in the case at bar, the evidence was that of an untrained felon who would have testified substantially as had six other fellow prisoners of appellant. Thus Kennard’s testimony was not such as “ * * * in all probability would be persuasive to a fair minded jury.”
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.