Court Opinion

ID: 9715491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:07:02.178357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:35.311662
License: Public Domain

DARDEN, Judge,
dissenting.
After reviewing the record, I must agree with Judge Hoffs conclusions that "[the ree-ord of the probable cause hearing does not demonstrate that there was probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant for the hotel room," and that "[the State has failed to demonstrate that the 'good faith' exeeption . is applicable in this case." (R. 8). Specifically, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that "sufficient indicia of probable cause was evident" thereby rendering the good faith exception to the search warrant requirement applicable.
As noted by the majority, 1.0. 85-83-5-2(b) provides that an affidavit for probable cause may be based on hearsay if it: (1) contain[s] reliable information concerning the credibility of the source and of each of the declarant of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished; or (2) contain[s] information that establishes that the totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay.
The majority claims the telephonic application for a search warrant reveals that the informant here was credible because "[the informant had provided reliable information to Schmitt on four or five occasions in the past ..." However, the record indicates that on those four or five occasions, the informant had only given Schmitt information about Johnson concerning the present incident. The tenuous nature of the relationship between Schmitt and the informant is exemplified in Schmitt's testimony to the judge who issued the search warrant:
SCHMITT: My informant has given me information in the past that I have been able to check on and have been able to verify, and believe that, due to this, they are credible and reliable.
* * * "k *# *#
I've talked to this informant probably four to five times and the informant has given me information reference Glen Johnson and I've been able to confirm types of cars he is driving, where he has been staying and phone calls he has been making to, getting phone records.
THE COURT: Is all of the information that this informant has provided you is about Glen Johnson?
SCHMITT: And Kathy Case, yes. And it, all of it I have confirmed to be true.
(R. 27-28). There is absolutely no evidence Schmitt had worked with this particular informant on any other cases or that the informant had provided him with reliable information in the past. Thus, I do not believe the facts demonstrate a relationship between the informant and Schmitt substantial enough to establish the informant's eredibility.
Furthermore, I do not believe the information Schmitt presented in the telephonic application establishes a factual basis for probable cause. Rather, the information consists of unsubstantiated hearsay and unfounded conclusions. For example, there is no evidence indicating the informant declared that he or she had traveled to or from Anderson with Johnson, had witnesses or participated in the crime with Johnson, or had a conversation with Johnson wherein Johnson disclosed details concerning the crime. The record is totally devoid of any evidence that the informant personally observed the fruits of the crime in Johnson's possession or in the hotel room Johnson ocecupied. In other words, there is no indication the informant gave Schmitt any first-hand information or, in the alternative, an explanation of how, when and *415where the informant obtained his knowledge or information. See Bradley v. State, 609 N.E.2d 420 (Ind.1993); Doss v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).
. Moreover, the police failed to conduct any surveillance of Johnson's room in an attempt to corroborate the informant's information. As a result, conspicuously missing from Schmitt's report is any evidence of people coming and going from Johnson's room or any evidence of drugs actually being exchanged for money. Thus, I cannot agree that the totality of the cireumstances corroborated any important aspect of the informant's information. Those cireumstances cited by the majority do not corroborate Schmitt's representation to the judge who issued the search warrant that the informant supplied information indicating Johnson "is currently active in selling cocaine." (R. 25). Rather, the only cireumstance actually corroborated is the fact Johnson was staying at "a hotel" with a woman.
The good faith exception to the exelusion-ary rule is just that, an exception, which should not be routinely used to subvert the requirements for obtaining a proper search warrant based upon reasonable probable cause. Where the probable cause affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant is so lacking in indicia of reliability and probable cause, as in this case, it calls into question whether the police officer's reliance upon it was unreasonable as well as whether the issuing magistrate or judge was neutral and detached or had wholly abandoned their judicial role. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).
Further, I am less inclined to find that the good faith exception should be applied in this case where an experienced officer such as Officer Schmitt knew or should have known that because the informant lacked credibility and reliability, the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. See Bradley, supra at 424. I am well aware that ultimately the determination of probable cause must be made by the issuing authority rather than merely by the affiant. Madden v. State, 263 Ind. 223, 328 N.E.2d 727 (1975). However, where the evidence establishes that the officer "could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause," Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. at 3422, 82 L.Ed.2d at 701; Doss, supra, at 1048, then suppression remains an appropriate remedy.
I hereby respectfully dissent and would vote to affirm the trial court's suppression of the evidence.