Court Opinion

ID: 9891446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 16:10:30.256875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:22.549295
License: Public Domain

J-S27009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 DASHAAN REGINALD SMITH                   :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 145 MDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 16, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-54-CR-0000642-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                     FILED OCTOBER 18, 2023

      Appellant, Dashaan Reginald Smith, appeals from the post-conviction

court’s January 16, 2023 order denying his timely-filed petition under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review,

we affirm.

      The PCRA court briefly summarized the pertinent facts and procedural

history of this case, as follows:

      [Appellant] appeared before this [c]ourt and entered a negotiated
      guilty plea for one count of Aggravated Harassment by Prisoner1
      on June 10, 2022. A second count of Disorderly Conduct was
      dismissed. He was sentenced to 27 … to 60 months in a state
      correctional institution to be served concurrent to Schuylkill
      County case No. 655-2019 and Philadelphia Case Nos. 3773-
      2014, 8433-2014 and 11428-2015. At the June 10, 2022 guilty
      plea hearing, the [c]ourt thoroughly colloquied [Appellant] on the
      written Memorandum of Plea Agreement which he reviewed,
      signed, and understood. The signed agreement made no mention
      of credit [for] time [served]. The [c]ourt also read [Appellant] his
      appellate rights, which [Appellant] acknowledged he understood.
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      A sentencing order memorializing the plea agreement was filed
      the same day. The [o]rder made no mention of credit time and
      [Appellant] filed neither a Motion for Reconsideration nor a Direct
      Appeal within the appropriate timeframe.
            1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2703.1.

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 1/16/23, at 1-2.

      On September 29, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se document entitled,

“Motion for Review Nunc Pro Tunc,” which the court properly treated as a PCRA

petition.    The court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on

November 3, 2022. Therein, Appellant argued that his trial counsel had acted

ineffectively by improperly advising Appellant that in exchange for pleading

guilty, he would not only receive a sentence that would run concurrently with

his Schuylkill and Philadelphia County cases, but that Appellant would also

receive credit for time served “back to the date of the incident.” Amended

PCRA Petition, 11/3/22, at 2 (unnumbered).

      The court conducted a PCRA hearing, at which the following testimony

was presented:

      [Appellant] testified … that while he knew his cases were being
      run concurrently at the time of the plea, he believed that he would
      have received time credit from either the date of the incident or
      the time bail was set and unable to be posted on this case in March
      of 2021[,] instead of starting his time only from the date he was
      sentenced. He testified that his plea counsel, … Adam Weaver,
      [Esq.,] failed to inform him of this[,] and had he known his
      minimum date would move, he would not have pled guilty to this
      case. [Appellant] was serving a state sentence at the time of the
      incident[,] and [at] the time bail was set and not posted. Although
      the subject sentence was to run concurrent to the state sentence
      he was serving, because there was no credit, his minimum
      sentence would automatically extend to September 10, 2024.

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      Attorney Adam Weaver also testified. He has been an attorney
      for approximately 14 years and has practiced criminal law for
      several years. He testified he is very familiar with time[-]credit
      matters concerning inmates and estimated this issue has been
      before him approximately 500 times. He has also represented
      clients on PCRA petitions with time credit issues.

      Attorney Weaver testified that he represented [Appellant] in two
      Schuylkill County cases, one of which went to trial and returned a
      split verdict[,] which was currently pending on appeal. He said
      the original offer in this particular case was 3-8 years[’
      imprisonment,] consecutive to his other Schuylkill County case
      and his Philadelphia County cases. Mental health evaluations were
      obtained and took some time, but at the last minute, he was able
      to negotiate a concurrent plea offer. Attorney Weaver testified
      that [Appellant] did not receive any credit on this case because,
      while he had not been able to post bail [in this case], he had been
      serving time on his other two cases. He testified that he explained
      the concurrent nature to [Appellant,] and that the time would not
      begin until the date he was sentenced. Attorney Weaver felt that
      [Appellant] understood this, referencing the 2019 and 2021
      competency exams he had conducted[,] and [he] felt confident
      [Appellant] understood the credit explanation.          He recalled
      discussing credit time while [Appellant] was in a holding cell
      during jury selection.

PCO at 2-3.

      Based on the testimony offered at the PCRA hearing, the court rejected

Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim, explaining as follows:

      [Appellant] alleges ineffective assistance of plea counsel. A
      criminal defendant has a right to effective counsel during the plea
      process. Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.
      Super. … 2002). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will
      be granted only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to
      enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Id. Where the plea is
      entered on the advice of counsel, “the voluntariness of the plea
      depends on whether counsel’s advice ‘was within the range of
      competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Id.
      [(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 … (1985)[)].

      First, [Appellant] alleges that plea counsel was ineffective for
      failing to properly explain the meaning and effect of a concurrent

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       sentence. However, Attorney Weaver was clear and credible in
       his testimony that he spent some time discussing the implications
       of a concurrent sentence and that [Appellant] would not receive
       credit time. The plea agreement itself is also devoid of any
       mention of credit time.

       Argument was also presented that credit should be given from the
       date of the incident to the date of sentencing, as [Appellant] was
       unable to post bail during that time. However, he was already
       serving two separate state prison sentences when the incident
       occurred[,] and has been incarcerated the entire time. Under
       Pa.R.Crim.P. 705(B), “when a sentence is imposed on a defendant
       who is sentenced for another offense, the judge shall state
       whether the offense shall run concurrently or consecutively. If the
       sentence is to run concurrently, the sentence shall commence
       from the date of imposition unless otherwise ordered by the
       judge.” Furthermore, while the rule has slightly changed in more
       recent years, the Commonwealth Court has been clear that under
       the previous version of this rule, “a sentencing judge cannot direct
       that a sentence commence on a date prior to the date of
       sentencing when the defendant is serving time on an unrelated
       charge.” Doxsey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.,
       674 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Pa. [Cmwlth.] 1996).[1] Even if the [c]ourt
       had the discretion to provide credit time for [Appellant’s] pre-
       sentence incarceration, it was not [i]n the plea agreement and not
       addressed at the time of sentencing. Considering the last[-]
       minute nature of the plea offer changing from consecutive to
       concurrent, it’s questionable whether this would have even been
       agreeable to the Commonwealth.

Id. at 3-4. Accordingly, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant’s

petition.

____________________________________________

1 Decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding upon this Court, but

may serve as persuasive authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2) (unreported
memorandum opinions of the Commonwealth Court filed after January 15,
2008, may be cited as persuasive authority); Commonwealth v. Bowers,
185 A.3d 358, 362 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating that Commonwealth Court
decisions are not binding on this Court but may be used as persuasive
authority).

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        Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he timely complied with

the PCRA court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. The court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on March

2, 2023, stating that it was relying on the rationale set forth in its January 16,

2023 opinion accompanying its order denying Appellant’s petition.         Herein,

Appellant states one issue for our review: “Whether [Appellant] should be

awarded time credit for days he spent in jail without bail[,] especially since

his sentence was to run concurrent with another sentence?” Appellant’s Brief

at 4.

        Preliminarily, we note that:

        “In reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA
        relief, an appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether the
        record supports the determination of the PCRA court and whether
        the ruling is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, …
        966 A.2d 523, 532 ([Pa.] 2009). We pay great deference to the
        findings of the PCRA court, “but its legal determinations are
        subject to our plenary review.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810 (Pa. Super. 2013).

        Here, Appellant’s entire argument on appeal consists of the following

paragraph:

        A defendant must be given credit for any days spent in custody
        prior to the imposition of sentence, but only if such commitment
        is on the offense for which sentence is imposed.
        Com[monwealth]         v.   Infante,    63    A.3d    358[  (Pa.]
        Super.[]2013[)]. While [Appellant] was in custody for a prior
        offense, he was also being held on bail. There is no case law or
        statute which precludes him from also earning time credit on a
        new case while serving a prior sentence when bail is imposed. He
        certainly was being confined on the offense for which the new
        sentence was imposed. It would appear that the jurisdiction that

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      set bail was at least preserving that option for consideration.
      Unfortunately, it was not considered[,] as his attorney testified at
      the PCRA hearing that he was not aware that bail had been set for
      his client. In fact, he was shocked to find out his client did have
      bail on this case. (N.T.[,] 12/16/22, [at] 15…). It is unknown if
      the District Attorney knew that bail had been set. Because the
      parties agreed on a concurrent sentence[,] and because
      [Appellant] was being held on bail for the case at hand, the days
      he spent in jail with bail set on this case should be credited to this
      sentence as well.

Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.

      Initially, Appellant clearly omits any discussion of the only claim he

raised before the PCRA court, which was that his plea counsel acted

ineffectively by not advising him that he would not receive credit for time

served from the date of his instant offense. Thus, he has waived any claim

that the court erred in denying this ineffectiveness claim.

      We also observe that Appellant could have raised his time-credit

argument before the sentencing court, or on direct appeal, yet he failed to do

so. Nevertheless, we will address Appellant’s argument that he is entitled to

credit for time served in this case, as “[a] claim asserting that the trial court

failed to award credit for time served implicates the legality of the sentence.”

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 967 A.2d 1001, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2009)). “[A]

challenge to the legality of sentence cannot be waived.” Commonwealth v.

Dickson, 918 A.2d 95, 99 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).

      Appellant seems to contend that he is entitled to credit for time he

served from the point that bail was set in this case, as he could not post that

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bail and, therefore, he “certainly was being confined on the offense for which

the new sentence was imposed.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. However, Appellant

does not refute that at that same time, he was also confined on — and

receiving credit for — his unrelated charges in Schuylkill and Philadelphia

Counties. As the PCRA court pointed out, Rule 708(B) directs that a sentence

imposed to run concurrently with another sentence “shall commence from the

date of imposition unless otherwise ordered by the judge.”          Pa.R.Crim.P.

708(B).    Moreover, the Doxsey Court persuasively declared that “a

sentencing judge cannot direct that a sentence commence on a date prior to

the date of sentencing when the defendant is serving time on an unrelated

charge.” Doxsey, 674 A.2d at 1175. Thus, Appellant has failed to convince

us that he is entitled to double credit for the time served between his failure

to post bail and his sentencing in this case. Accordingly, we discern no error

in the PCRA court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/18/2023

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