Court Opinion

ID: 9596817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:53:15.349043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:15.831770
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
This case marks a pivotal point in the direction this Court will follow in regard to divorce settlement agreements. Over my dissent, this Court has already allowed parties to circumvent the judicial process altogether by executing judicially-unsupervised contracts that resolve issues arising out of the dissolution of the marriage contract. Eickhoff v. Eickhoff, 263 Ga. 498 (435 SE2d 914) (1993). With the instant case this Court is now permitting parties, whose settlement agreement was incorporated into a divorce decree, to divest the trial court of all supervision over its decree by upholding a provision that places unfettered discretion over the unilateral termination of a judicially-sanctioned obligation, i.e., alimony, into the hands of one party to the decree. If this State wants to move in the direction of self-help divorces with the judiciary acting as a mere rubber-stamp license-fee collector, I believe it should be the Legislature that makes that decision, not this Court.
I find that the termination-upon-cohabitation provision in this case violates the public policy of this State, as expressed in our Constitution and our statutes. As the majority recognizes, the provision results in an implied waiver both of venue rights, see Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution (1983), and jury trial rights, see Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a), even though the contract fails to reflect that such waiver was “clearly intended and expressed by the person so waiving.” Garcia v. Garcia, 232 Ga. 869, 871 (209 SE2d 201) (1974).1 The provision directly contradicts the Legislature’s mandate set forth in OCGA § 19-6-19 (b).2 Last, but not least, the provision violates *782public policy by depriving the courts of their duty to oversee modification of their judgments.
Decided October 23, 1995.
Garland & Milam, Richard G. Milam, for appellant.
Smith, Welch & Studdard, J. Mark Brittain, for appellee.
While this Court has a long history of authorizing and, indeed, strongly encouraging the private settlement of family affairs, see, e.g., Trammell v. West, 224 Ga. 365 (1) (162 SE2d 353) (1968), we have not heretofore approved a divorce settlement agreement provision which divests the judiciary of its discretion, implicates constitutional rights, and conflicts with express statutory provisions. None of the case law cited by the majority justifies or supports its approval of this provision.3
Accordingly, while I concur in the affirmance of the one issue properly before the trial court, namely, the finding that Ralph Quillen was not in wilful contempt of court, I would reverse the trial court’s ruling retroactively terminating Ralph Quillen’s alimony obligation and would require him to file a modification action in the proper venue pursuant to OCGA § 19-6-19, with Elaine Quillen entitled, upon proper request, to a jury trial on the cohabitation issue.

 Ironically, the majority allows an implied pre-litigation waiver of the right to a jury trial in this divorce settlement agreement, although rejecting in purely commercial contracts those provisions which explicitly waive that right. See Ekereke v. Obong, 265 Ga. 728 (462 SE2d 372) (1995); American Southern Financial v. Yang, 264 Ga. 513 (448 SE2d 450) (1994); Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, 264 Ga. 339 (444 SE2d 799) (1994).

 The termination-upon-cohabitation provision conflicts with OCGA § 19-6-19 inasmuch as that statute requires the alimony-paying spouse to file a modification action “under the same rules of procedure applicable to divorce proceedings,” id. at (a); authorizes jury trials in modification actions, upon proper demand, see McElroy v. McElroy, 252 Ga. 553 (1) (314 SE2d 893) (1984); recognizes that cohabitation is merely a ground to modify alimony and disallows automatic termination or reduction of the alimony obligation, see Allen v. Allen, 265 Ga. 53 (2) (452 SE2d 767) (1995); and prohibits unilateral termination of alimony upon a *782claim of cohabitation. Hendrix v. Stone, 261 Ga. 874 (412 SE2d 536) (1992).

 The majority relies upon footnoted dicta in Kent v. Kent, 265 Ga. 211 (452 SE2d 764) (1995), a case in which the alimony-paying spouse did file, properly, a modification action to terminate his support payments to his ex-wife on the basis of her alleged cohabitation with a third party. Although the majority cites other cases in which this Court has approved some self-executing future modification provisions, the provisions in those cases are clearly distinguishable, in that those provisions were set forth so explicitly that subjective application was eliminated and the consequences thereof could be reviewed by the trial court before the provision was incorporated into the divorce decree. See, e.g., Weaver v. Jones, 260 Ga. 493 (3) (396 SE2d 890) (1990) and Pearce v. Pearce, 244 Ga. 69 (257 SE2d 904) (1979) (inversion clause cases where change was not as to amount of support but only as to person responsible for making the payment); Perry v. Perry, 265 Ga. 186 (454 SE2d 122) (1995) and Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, 251 Ga. 177 (1) (304 SE2d 65) (1983) (escalation clause cases where fixed base amount of support was awarded and variable future award was made contingent upon objective, specified changes). See also Fender v. Fender, 249 Ga. 765 (294 SE2d 472) (1982) (defining scope of modification actions).