Court Opinion

ID: 9964416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 22:00:39.119919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:25.507150
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                 v.

SHAMAR BETTS,
                                               Defendant-Appellant.
                    ____________________

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the
                    Central District of Illinois.
           No. 20-cr-20047 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.
                    ____________________

      ARGUED APRIL 8, 2022 — DECIDED APRIL 29, 2024
                ____________________

   Before WOOD, HAMILTON, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
    JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. During a weekend of na-
tional unrest after a police oﬃcer murdered George Floyd,
Shamar Betts posted a ﬂyer on Facebook calling on people to
bring posters, bricks, and bookbags to a “RIOT” at a mall in
Champaign, Illinois. The next day, a riot ensued and several
businesses were damaged. Betts was indicted for inciting a
riot in violation of the Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101. He
2                                       Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that the Anti-Riot
Act was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, but
the district court denied his motion. He then pled guilty. At
sentencing, the district court sentenced Betts to 48 months’
imprisonment and ordered him to pay $1,686,170.30 to 35
businesses under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
(MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
    Betts raises several issues on appeal. First, Betts asks us to
reconsider our court’s decision in United States v. Dellinger,
472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), upholding the Anti-Riot Act as
constitutional under the First Amendment. Absent a compel-
ling reason to do so however, we decline to overrule the case.
Betts’s challenge to the Anti-Riot Act for overbreadth is there-
fore foreclosed.
    Second, Betts argues that the district court erred in choos-
ing what sentencing guideline to apply by way of analogy to
his conviction under the Anti-Riot Act, which does not have
its own guideline. We join our sister circuits in holding that
the decision to apply a suﬃciently analogous guideline re-
quires an elements-based, ﬂexible approach, and we see no
error in the district court’s application of the property oﬀense
guideline to the Anti-Riot Act.
   Finally, Betts raises several challenges to the district
court’s order of restitution, including whether the Anti-Riot
Act is a covered oﬀense under the MVRA, which is an issue
of ﬁrst impression. We conclude, as our sister circuits have,
that the plain language of the MVRA supports that courts
may look to the underlying facts of an oﬀense to determine
whether a crime is an “oﬀense against property” as required
by statute. Based on this, Betts’s conviction under the Anti-
Riot Act qualiﬁes. But we agree with Betts’s other argument
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                       3

concerning restitution—that the government failed to meet its
burden showing that he directly and proximately caused
damages to all businesses included in the restitution order.
We therefore vacate the sentence with regard to the amount
of restitution ordered and remand for the limited purpose of
reconsidering the amount of restitution consistent with this
opinion.
                               I
    On May 30, 2020, Shamar Betts posted a ﬂyer on Facebook
that read: “RIOT @ MarketPlace Mall Time: 3 … Bring
friends& [sic] family, posters, bricks, bookbags etc. After the
mall we hitting the whole PROSPECT & NEIL.” The ﬂyer,
which was posted during a weekend of George Floyd pro-
tests, included an image of a burning car ﬂanked by people.
Along with the ﬂyer, Betts wrote: “I’m just the messenger.
We’re literally sitting on our ass watching the whole country
and even others ﬁght for our black rights … We gotta put
Champaign/Urbana on the map mfs gone hear and fear us
too.”
    The next day, Betts and a group of 50 to 75 people gathered
at Market Place Mall. At approximately 3:12 p.m., they began
damaging property and looting stores. Betts captured the riot
on Facebook Live telling his viewers “[l]ook what a n**** just
started … look what a n**** just started. We out here ….” In
another video, Betts is seen looting two stores: Macy’s and
Old Navy. The riot moved to other businesses on Prospect
Avenue and Neil Street. Betts participated in the riot for an
hour or so, but rioting apparently lasted until the early morn-
ing hours. By the next day, several businesses were damaged
and lost merchandise. As revealed in text messages to friends
and family, Betts proudly took credit for starting the riot.
4                                       Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

    Betts was later arrested and indicted for inciting a riot, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2101, the Anti-Riot Act. He ﬁled a mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment arguing, in part, that the Anti-
Riot Act was unconstitutionally overbroad in contravention of
the First Amendment. Because our court rejected a similar ar-
gument in United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.
1972), the district court denied his motion. Betts pled guilty.
    At sentencing, Betts asked the court to sentence him, as the
court must, according to the sentencing factors outlined in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), but without regard to any advisory sentenc-
ing guidelines (one of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors) be-
cause there is no guideline associated with the Anti-Riot Act.
The maximum prison sentence Betts could have received un-
der the Anti-Riot Act is 60 months. Betts requested a sentence
of time served, which at that point amounted to 12 months.
    Also at sentencing, Betts objected to any award of restitu-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, the Mandatory Victims Restitu-
tion Act. He argued that the MVRA was inapplicable to the
Anti-Riot Act because, under the categorical approach, the
Anti-Riot Act did not count as an “oﬀense against property”
or any other oﬀense category falling within the statute. Even
if the MVRA was applicable, he argued, the government
failed to show that his rioting directly and proximately
harmed the businesses the government identiﬁed—a task
which, Betts also argued, would be complicated, and thus fell
within the MVRA’s complexity exception.
   Over Betts’s objection, the district court chose to apply a
sentencing guideline that it deemed analogous to the Anti-
Riot Act: Section 2B1.1, which covers property damage and
theft. With this guideline, Betts’s advisory guidelines range
was 70–80 months although, again, the statute imposed a
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                        5

maximum of 60 months. The district court then sentenced
Betts to 48 months’ imprisonment, reduced to 36 months to
include credit for time served in state custody.
    The district court also determined that a violation of the
Anti-Riot Act qualiﬁed as an “oﬀense against property” un-
der the MVRA. In calculating restitution, the district court
concluded that the government met its burden as to causa-
tion, rejecting Betts’s position that the government had to
prove, at minimum, who caused the damage and whether
those individuals did so because of Betts’s Facebook post. The
government presented a spreadsheet listing 73 businesses
that were aﬀected during the riot, along with amounts for
property damage and stolen merchandise. The total was
$2,172,074.90. However, only forty-three of those businesses
could or were willing to substantiate their losses.
    The district court declined to apply the MVRA’s complex-
ity exception but acknowledged that there was an issue as to
scope, and that Betts could not be held responsible for all the
businesses listed on the government’s spreadsheet. The dis-
trict court noted that “[t]here is a valid question [] about
whether the people who showed up at the mall are the same
people that [Betts] reached out to or learned about his com-
munications.” The district court then decided that, based on
Betts’s ﬂyer, of the forty-three claimants who could or would
substantiate their losses, the district court would order resti-
tution only to those businesses “located at the mall or on Pro-
spect or Neil.” The district court ordered the parties to meet
and confer about which of the forty-three businesses fell
within the geographic scope of the district court’s restitution
order.
6                                      Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

    The parties later submitted a joint restitution agreement
identifying twenty-six businesses that fell within the geo-
graphic scope, for a total of $1,374,729.57. But they disagreed
on the remaining twelve businesses, totaling $357,433.43 in
restitution. Betts argued that the remaining twelve businesses
were not “on Neil Street or Prospect Avenue,” whereas the
government argued that the district court’s order included all
businesses located in “the commercial district at Prospect Av-
enue and Neil Street.” After a hearing on the matter, the dis-
trict court mostly agreed with the government and, using In-
terstate 74 as a boundary line, ruled that nine of the twelve
disputed businesses were to be included in restitution. After
this ruling, Betts sought to withdraw the parties’ earlier joint
agreement on the basis that the businesses that he initially
agreed to no longer fell within the geographic scope of the
court’s order, but the court denied his request. The district
court ordered Betts to pay $1,686,170.30 in restitution to 35
businesses. Betts appealed.
                               II
    Betts presents several arguments on appeal. First, he ar-
gues that the district court’s order denying his motion to dis-
miss must be reversed because the Anti-Riot Act is unconsti-
tutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.
Second, he argues, in the alternative, that the case should be
remanded with instructions for the district court to resentence
him without an analogous oﬀense guideline. Third, he raises
several challenges to the district court’s order of restitution
under the MVRA, including the MVRA’s application to his
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                           7

conviction in the ﬁrst place. We review each of Betts’s argu-
ments in turn.
A. The Constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act
       1. Overbreadth Doctrine
    We review a constitutional challenge to a statute de novo.
United States v. Fredrickson, 996 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2021).
Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, “a statute
is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of pro-
tected speech.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292
(2008). But “the mere fact that one can conceive of some im-
permissible applications of a statute is not suﬃcient to render
it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Members of City
Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 800 (1984). For a facial overbreadth challenge to be suc-
cessful, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself
will signiﬁcantly compromise recognized First Amendment
protections of parties not before the court. Id.; see also New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982) (a claimant may attack an
overly broad statute even though the conduct of the person
making the attack is unprotected). If, however, a law captures
only a narrow band of speech unprotected by the First
Amendment, an overbreadth challenge is unlikely to succeed.
United States v. Hansen, 143 S. Ct. 1932, 1940 (2023).
    Application of the overbreadth doctrine is “strong medi-
cine” and, therefore, it should be employed sparingly and
only as a last resort. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973). We will not rely on the overbreadth doctrine if we can
instead construe the challenged statute in a way that avoids
any constitutional problems. Id. at 616; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769.
If the statute is not subject to a narrowing construction and is
8                                        Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

impermissibly overbroad, we then assess whether the uncon-
stitutional portion is severable. Ferber, 468 U.S. 769 at n.24.
Severance is a remedy that must be applied whenever possi-
ble. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005); see also
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–
29 (2006) (“[g]enerally speaking, when confronting a consti-
tutional ﬂaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the
problem,” severing any “problematic portions while leaving
the remainder intact”). A claimant bears the burden of
demonstrating that substantial overbreadth exists. Virginia v.
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (citation omitted).
                 i.   The Anti-Riot Act
    The Anti-Riot Act provides:
       (a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign com-
       merce or uses any facility of interstate or foreign
       commerce, including, but not limited to, the
       mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, or television,
       with intent--
              (1) to incite a riot; or
              (2) to organize, promote, encourage, par-
              ticipate in, or carry on a riot; or
              (3) to commit any act of violence in fur-
              therance of a riot; or
              (4) to aid or abet any person in inciting or
              participating in or carrying on a riot or
              committing any act of violence in fur-
              therance of a riot;
       and who either during the course of any such
       travel or use or thereafter performs or attempts
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                                         9

         to perform any other overt act for any purpose
         speciﬁed in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) 1 of
         this paragraph --- [s]hall be ﬁned under this ti-
         tle, or imprisoned not more than ﬁve years, or
         both.
18 U.S.C. § 2101(a). The Act deﬁnes “riot” in part as a public
disturbance involving:
         (1) an act or acts of violence by one or more per-
         sons part of an assemblage of three or more per-
         sons, which act or acts shall constitute a clear
         and present danger of, or shall result in, damage
         or injury to the property of any other person or
         to the person of any other individual ….
18 U.S.C. § 2102(a). The Act further provides:
         (b) As used in this chapter, the term “to incite a
         riot”, or “to organize, promote, encourage, par-
         ticipate in, or carry on a riot”, includes, but is
         not limited to, urging or instigating other per-
         sons to riot, but shall not be deemed to mean the
         mere oral or written (1) advocacy of ideas or (2)
         expression of belief, not involving advocacy of
         any act or acts of violence or assertion of the
         rightness of, or the right to commit, any such act
         or acts.

1 The statute’s references to nonexistent subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), or (D),

is a scrivener’s error. It should instead be read as referring to paragraphs
(1) through (4) of subsection (a). See, e.g., United States Nat’l. Bank of Or. v.
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 462 (1993) (court may correct a
scrivener’s error).
10                                             Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

18 U.S.C. § 2102(b).
    Betts raises a host of challenges to the constitutionality of
the Anti-Riot Act. He argues that the “overt act” requirement
fails to pass the imminence test set forth by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which held that the First Amend-
ment prohibits speech that is: (1) directed at inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to incite or pro-
duce such action. Id. at 447. Betts contends that the Anti-Riot
Act criminalizes acts taken long before a crowd gathers or acts
that have only an attenuated connection to any riot, so long as
the individual acts with the required purpose laid out in 18
U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1)–(4). Betts also argues that the Act’s use of
the terms “organize, promote, encourage” and “urging” are
overbroad, and that the double negative raised in § 2102(b)
(“… but shall not be deemed to mean the mere oral or written
(1) advocacy of ideas or (2) expression of belief, not involving
advocacy”) punishes mere advocacy which is protected
speech. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
    Notably, Betts raises arguments that we considered and
rejected in United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.
1972). In Dellinger, we construed the Anti-Riot Act narrowly,
and concluded that the acts referred to in subsections
§ 2101(a)(1)–(4) were necessary overt acts and not merely
goals to which the overt acts contribute. Id. at 361–362. We
noted that this construction was supported by § 2101(b) 2

2 Section 2101(b) reads: “In any prosecution under this section, proof that

a defendant engaged or attempted to engage in one or more of the overt
acts described in subparagraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of paragraph (1) of sub-
section (a) and (1) has traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, or (2)
has use of or used any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                                     11

which refers to “one or more of the overt acts described in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (1) of subsec-
tion (a) ….” Id. at 362. Based on this narrow reading of the
statute, we saw no violation of Brandenburg’s imminence re-
quirement as far as this portion of the statute was concerned.
Id.; see also United States v. Rundo, 990 F.3d 709, 716 (9th Cir.
2021) (adopting Dellinger’s conclusion that the overt act re-
quirement refers to acts that fulﬁll the elements themselves,
and not mere steps towards, or related to, one or more of those
elements).
    We also concluded that the verbs “organize, promote, en-
courage” and “urging” required a close relationship to immi-
nent action. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 361–62. And while we
acknowledged that the double negative in the statute created
a serious problem, we explained that the drafters could have
included this language to forestall a First Amendment de-
fense in the case of a truly inciting, action-propelling speech.
Id. at 363. Based on our narrow construction, we rejected an
overbreadth challenge to the Anti-Riot Act.
    Betts asks us to revisit Dellinger and the Anti-Riot Act in
light of two out-of-circuit cases determining that the Anti-Riot
Act is unconstitutionally overbroad: United States v. Miselis,
972 F.3d 518, 537 (4th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Rundo,
990 F.3d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 2021). In Miselis, the Fourth Circuit
held that the words “encourage,” “promote,” and “urge”
were overbroad, and failed to bear the requisite relationship

but not limited to, mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, or television, to com-
municate with or broadcast to any person or group of persons prior to
such overt acts, such travel or use shall be admissible proof to establish
that such defendant traveled in or used such facility of interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2101(b).
12                                       Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

between speech and lawlessness. 972 F.3d at 537–38. In Rundo,
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis
and held that the word “organize” also punishes protected
speech. 990 F.3d at 717. Additionally, both courts held that the
use of the double negative in § 2102(b) punished advocacy
and was therefore overbroad. See Miselis, 972 F.3d at 539;
Rundo, 990 F.3d at 718. Betts wants us to follow the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits’ approach, at least the reasoning up until this
point.
    But we will not overturn circuit precedent “absent a com-
pelling reason.” Wilson v. Cook County, 937 F.3d 1028, 1035 (7th
Cir. 2019). “[P]rinciples of stare decisis require that we give
considerable weight to prior decisions unless and until they
have been overruled or undermined by the decisions of a
higher court, or other supervening developments, such as a
statutory overruling.” Id. (citations omitted). Neither the Su-
preme Court nor Congress has overruled Dellinger or found
the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutional for overbreadth.
    Nor do the decisions in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits pro-
vide a compelling reason to overrule Dellinger. Even if we
were inclined to revisit Dellinger, both sister circuits that Betts
wishes us to follow concluded that the overbroad portions of
the Anti-Riot Act could be severed. See Miselis, 972 F.3d at 537;
Rundo, 990 F.3d at 720; see also Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (sever
“problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact”).
In severing the overbroad portions, both courts left the re-
mainder of the statute intact, which includes the parts of the
statute relevant to Betts’s conduct. The indictment in this case,
after all, alleged that Betts violated all the subparts of
§ 2101(a). Betts pled guilty and admitted that he used facilities
of interstate commerce to incite a riot, and that he carried on
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                         13

and participated in the riot. Thus, either way—whether by
narrow construction or by severance—Betts is still subjected
to the Anti-Riot Act.
    We acknowledge, as we did in Dellinger nearly 50 years
ago, that the Anti-Riot Act presents some First Amendment
problems. See 472 F.2d at 362 (“We do not pretend to minimize
the ﬁrst amendment problems presented on the face of this
statute.”). And had it come before this court today, Dellinger
may have been decided diﬀerently, and potentially more in
line with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. We may one day re-
visit Dellinger, but today is not the day because Betts’s conduct
falls within the Anti-Riot Act no matter what mechanism we
use to remedy constitutional problems with the statute.
Dellinger remains good law, and Betts has not supplied a com-
pelling reason for us to overrule the decision. Dellinger there-
fore forecloses Betts’s overbreadth argument.
B. Analogous Guideline for the Anti-Riot Act
   We now turn to Betts’s sentencing arguments. We begin
with his challenge to the district court’s application of an anal-
ogous guideline to the Anti-Riot Act, which is a matter of ﬁrst
impression for our court.
    There is no sentencing guideline for the Anti-Riot Act. Sec-
tion 2X5.1 provides that if a felony oﬀense has no guideline,
then a court applies the guideline for the most analogous of-
fense. If there is no suﬃciently analogous guideline, courts
turn to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Id. The commentary to § 2X5.1
states:
       Many oﬀenses … are not listed in the Statutory
       Index or in any of the lists of Statutory Provi-
       sions that follow each oﬀense guideline.
14                                     Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

       Nonetheless, the speciﬁc guidelines that have
       been promulgated cover the type of criminal be-
       havior that most such oﬀenses proscribe. The
       court is required to determine if there is a suﬃ-
       ciently analogous oﬀense guideline, and, if so,
       to apply the guideline that is most analogous.
U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1 comment.
    To comply with § 2X5.1, a district court must ﬁrst deter-
mine whether any guideline is suﬃciently analogous to the
defendant’s crime of conviction. See United States v. Clark, 981
F.3d 1154, 1162 (10th Cir. 2020). To determine whether there
is a suﬃciently analogous guideline provision, courts have
typically considered three approaches. See United States v.
Jackson, 862 F.3d 365, 372 (3d Cir. 2017) (identifying the three
approaches). The ﬁrst approach is the elements-based ap-
proach. See id. Under an elements-based approach, a court
compares the elements of the defendant’s crime of conviction
to the elements of federal oﬀenses already covered by a spe-
ciﬁc guideline. Clark, 981 F.3d at 1162. The second approach is
the indictment-facts approach, where the district court com-
pares the guidelines to the facts alleged in the indictment. See
United States v. McEnry, 659 F.3d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (dis-
trict court erred when it based its choice “not on the elements
of the oﬀense or the facts alleged in the indictment, but on the
defendant’s particular relevant conduct and the risk it cre-
ated”); but see Jackson, 862 F.3d at 372–73 (indictment-facts
usually applies when more than one guideline is assigned to
a statute or when no guideline is assigned, but the court de-
termines more than one guideline is suﬃciently analogous,
and selects the most analogous). And the third approach is
known as the broad-circumstances approach, where the
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                                   15

district court considers all of the circumstances and makes
factual ﬁndings to support its ultimate selection. See Jackson,
862 F.3d at 372.
    Betts and the government agree that the elements-based
approach is the most appropriate for his case. The majority of
circuits that have decided the issue have also adopted this
approach. See Clark, 981 F.3d at 1162; Jackson, 862 F.3d at 374-
5; United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Osborne, 164 F.3d 434, 437–38 (8th Cir. 1999).
We now join those circuits in holding that courts should apply
the elements-based approach to decide whether a guideline is
suﬃciently analogous to the defendant’s crime of conviction.
This inquiry, however, should be “conducted in a ﬂexible and
open-ended fashion.” Jackson, 862 F.3d at 375. “While the
inquiry may still be ‘bounded by the elements of the oﬀense
of conviction,’ … a perfect match of elements is not necessary
(or even expected).” Id. at 376. “Instead, the proﬀered
guideline need only be within the same proverbial ‘ballpark’
as the oﬀense of conviction.” Id. Because the elements-based
approach is a purely legal approach, and the district court
need not consider the underlying facts, see United States v.
Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999), we will review a
district court’s determination as to whether there is a
“suﬃciently analogous” guideline to the defendant’s crime
de novo. See Osborne, 164 F.3d at 437–38. 3

3 We note that, in some cases, there is a second step: when there is more

than one sufficiently analogous guideline, the district court must then
choose the most analogous guideline. Appellate courts differ on whether
the district court’s decision at this step should be reviewed de novo or
given due deference. Osborne, 164 F.3d at 437–38 (noting the circuit split).
16                                           Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

    The district court concluded that § 2B1.1 was an analogous
guideline. Section 2B1.1 covers larceny, embezzlement, and
other forms of theft; oﬀenses involving stolen property; prop-
erty damage or destruction; fraud and deceit, forgery; and of-
fenses involving altered or counterfeit instruments other than
counterfeit bearer obligations of the United States. Id. Betts
takes issue with the district court’s application of § 2B1.1 as
an analogous guideline because, as he sees it, the Anti-Riot
Act does not have “property damage” as an element. Betts is
correct; the elements of an Anti-Riot Act oﬀense are:
        1. Using a facility of interstate commerce to;
        2. Organize, promote, encourage, participate
           in or carry on a riot; and
        3. Performing or attempting to perform an
           overt act in furtherance of that riot.
18 U.S.C. § 2101(a). But the elements-based approach does not
require the same exact elements. It need only be “suﬃciently
analogous” and not “a perfect match.” See, e.g., United States
v. Allard, 164 F.3d 1146, 1147 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
the involuntary manslaughter guideline was suﬃciently anal-
ogous to vehicular battery even though involuntary man-
slaughter requires death of the victim and vehicular battery
does not); see also United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173, 174 (3d
Cir. 2002) (possessing dangerous weapon guideline suﬃ-
ciently analogous—though not most analogous—to a crime of
conveying false information and threats about carrying explo-
sives on an airplane). In this context, the elements-based

This case does not involve more than one sufficiently analogous guideline,
so we decline to decide the appropriate standard of review for this second
step.
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                        17

approach must be “conducted in a ﬂexible and open-ended
fashion.” Jackson, 862 F.3d at 375. Here, the property damage
guideline is suﬃciently analogous to the Anti-Riot Act, which
does not include as an exact element property damage, but
does contemplate, or can involve, property damage. We there-
fore take no issue with the court’s application of § 2B1.1 as an
analogous guideline. As we see it, the guideline is in the same
“proverbial ‘ballpark’” as the Anti-Riot Act. Id. at 376.
C. Restitution under the Anti-Riot Act
    Finally, we address Betts’s arguments regarding restitu-
tion. We begin with the question of whether the MVRA covers
the Anti-Riot Act. Whether the MVRA covers the Anti-Riot
Act is a matter of statutory interpretation that we review de
novo. See United States v. Miller, 883 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir.
2018).
       1. Application of the MVRA
    Courts lack inherent authority to order restitution and
may do so only when authorized or required by statute. See
United States v. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 689 (7th Cir. 2016). The
MVRA requires a court to order restitution in “all sentencing
proceedings for convictions of … any oﬀense … that is … an
oﬀense against property under [Title 18] … including any of-
fense committed by fraud or deceit … [and] in which an iden-
tiﬁable victim or victims has suﬀered a physical injury or pe-
cuniary loss.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii), (B). The statute
does not deﬁne “an oﬀense against property,” and the Su-
preme Court has yet to address the issue. But all circuits to
have tackled the question have concluded that determining
what constitutes an “oﬀense against property” depends on
the facts and circumstances of the case. See, e.g., United States
18                                      Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

v. Razzouk, 984 F.3d 181, 188 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]e look to the
manner in which [defendant] committed the crime and the
facts and circumstances of the crime.”); United States v. Ritchie,
858 F.3d 201, 208 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Collins, 854
F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Sawyer, 825
F.3d 287, 292–93 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Quarrell, 310
F.3d 664, 678 (10th Cir. 2002).
    Betts, however, argues for the categorical approach which,
if it applies, does not bring the Anti-Riot Act within the
MVRA’s purview. Betts argues that the MVRA uses the word
“oﬀense” which indicates that it is to be deﬁned by law and
the elements. He also argues that the relationship between the
MVRA and its discretionary counterpart, the Victim Witness
Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, supports that the
MVRA is drafted to apply to speciﬁc, narrow oﬀenses. Fi-
nally, Betts argues that other subsections of the MVRA require
a categorical approach, and so “oﬀense against property”
should be treated no diﬀerently.
    We start by brieﬂy addressing the relationship between
the MVRA and the VWPA. Unlike the MVRA, restitution un-
der the VWPA is discretionary and applies to a broader range
of oﬀenses, speciﬁcally those not covered by the MVRA. Be-
cause the VWPA is discretionary, a district court is allowed to
consider a defendant’s economic status in deciding whether
to impose restitution. The MVRA supplemented the VWPA
and made restitution mandatory for certain crimes enumer-
ated in the statute: crimes of violence, oﬀenses against prop-
erty, and other speciﬁc oﬀenses for speciﬁc federal statutes.
But the MVRA’s application to certain crimes does not trans-
late into requiring a categorical approach for all oﬀenses. Ra-
ther, we must start with the text of the actual statute to
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                        19

ascertain its meaning, see Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471
U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (“[T]he starting point in every case involv-
ing construction of a statute is the language itself.” (citations
omitted)), and in this case, determine whether the statute con-
tains any of the markers that typically signal Congress’s intent
for the statute to be construed categorically. See Nijhawan v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34–35 (2009) (apply categorical approach
when the statute “read naturally … refer[s] to a generic crime
as generally committed”).
   For this, Betts points to the statute’s use of the word “of-
fense” and, speciﬁcally, that the MVRA “shall apply in all sen-
tencing proceedings for convictions of … any oﬀense …” 18
U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1) (emphasis added). Betts is correct that the
word “oﬀense” may refer to a generic crime, but this is not the
only meaning. The word “oﬀense” may also refer to “the spe-
ciﬁc acts in which an oﬀender engaged on a speciﬁc occasion.”
Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 33–34. It is therefore not enough that
MVRA uses the word “oﬀense”—there must be some other
indication that the word “oﬀense” refers to a generic crime.
    The MVRA’s other subsections illustrate this point. For ex-
ample, the MVRA also applies to crimes of violence. A “crime
of violence” is deﬁned as “an oﬀense that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person or property of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (empha-
sis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i). The use of the word
“elements” necessitates a categorical approach. See Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (“This language requires us to
look to the elements and the nature of the oﬀense of convic-
tion, rather than to the particular facts relating to [the]
crime.”). But the MVRA’s reference to an “oﬀense against
property” does not include the word “elements” or any other
20                                      Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

indication suggesting a categorical approach. See Razzouk, 984
F.3d at 187–88 (“The contrast in these neighboring statutory
sections, enacted in a single bill, thus highlights that Congress
could have used such an ‘elements’ formulation when it de-
scribed an ‘oﬀense against property’; that it did not suggests
that we should treat the diﬀerence as intentional and signiﬁ-
cant.”); Collins, 854 F.3d at 1333–35 (declining the categorical
approach based on the absence of the word “elements” in the
deﬁnition of oﬀense against property). This diﬀerence be-
tween the two subsections indicates that Congress intended
for an “oﬀense against property” to cover a broader range of
prior oﬀenses than those reached by a “crime of violence.” See
Ritchie, 858 F.3d at 209.
    The text of the MVRA further supports this broad inter-
pretation. The MVRA speciﬁcally states that an “oﬀense
against property” includes “any oﬀense committed by fraud or
deceit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The
use of the word “committed” suggests that the manner of
commission is important when determining whether an of-
fense is one against property. See also Razzouk, 984 F.3d at 187
(citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–600 (1990) (the
use of “committed” suggests a focus on the manner of com-
mission)); Collins, 854 F.3d at 1334. Further, had Congress
wanted “oﬀenses against property” to refer to a categorical
approach, it would have included language in the statute to
indicate this. Congress knew how to do this when referring to
other subsections, so the fact that it did not do so for “oﬀenses
against property” appears to be intentional and factors
against a categorical based approach. See Razzouk, 984 F.3d at
188 (“Congress could reasonably have intended that courts
look to whether the crime in fact caused damage to a victim’s
interests in personal or other property so that the loss or
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                         21

damage could be estimated and payment of restitution or-
dered.”); Ritchie, 858 F.3d at 210 (“Congress could not have
intended to exclude from the broad, mandatory reach of the
MVRA those unfortunate victims who suﬀer property loss as
a result of an oﬀense that doesn’t contain as an element a ref-
erence to ‘property.’”). We therefore join our sister circuits in
concluding that, based on the plain language of the MVRA,
courts may consider the facts and circumstances of the under-
lying conviction to determine whether an oﬀense is one
against property.
    Other circuits that have applied the facts and
circumstances-based approach have found that an oﬀense
against property may include a range of diﬀerent oﬀenses
that involve property. An oﬀense against property may
include crimes where the defendant had an intent to destroy
property. See, e.g., Quarrell, 310 F.3d at 678 (conspiracy to
violate Archaeological Resources Protection Act qualiﬁed
because while not every conspiracy involved an oﬀense
against property, the defendants in the case knowingly and
voluntarily damaged the land). It may also include oﬀenses
where the crime results in physical harm to property. See, e.g.,
Sawyer, 825 F.3d at 292 (defendant’s conviction for conspiracy
to violate the Clean Air Act was an oﬀense against property
because it resulted in asbestos contamination to nearly 300
acres of land); United States v. Brock-Davis, 504 F.3d 991, 993,
996–98 (9th Cir. 2007) (ordering defendant convicted of
conspiracy to manufacture meth to pay restitution to motel
owner forced to remediate a motel room in which defendant
cooked meth). And it may even include crimes involving no
property damage at all. See, e.g., United States v. Luis, 765 F.3d
1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that “oﬀense against
property” means infringing on a victim’s property interest).
22                                     Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

    Here, Betts incited a riot for the purpose of looting and
damaging property. Indeed, the ﬂyer he posted on Facebook
told people to bring “bricks” and “bookbags,” and pictured a
burning car. In sum, Betts’s incitement of property damage
and looting qualiﬁes as an oﬀense against property.
       2. Victims, Causation, and Complexity Exception under
          the MVRA
    Betts next argues that the 35 businesses he was ordered to
pay restitution to were not victims under the MVRA because
the government failed to prove that he directly and proxi-
mately caused them damage. Betts also argues that the issue
of causation involves complex issues of fact that would pro-
long sentencing, so the district court erred in not applying the
MVRA’s complexity exception. We review the district court’s
restitution decisions for abuse of discretion. See United States
v. Wyatt, 9 F.4th 440, 452 (7th Cir. 2021).
    The purpose of the MVRA is to ensure victims are com-
pensated for the full amount of their losses caused by a de-
fendant’s criminal conduct. See Hughey v. United States, 495
U.S. 411, 420 (1990); United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937, 943
(7th Cir. 2012). The MVRA deﬁnes “victim” as any person:
       directly and proximately harmed as a result of
       the commission of an oﬀense for which restitu-
       tion may be ordered including, in the case of an
       oﬀense that involves as an element a scheme,
       conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any
       person directly harmed by the defendant’s
       criminal conduct in the course of the scheme,
       conspiracy, or pattern.
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                                     23

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). 4 Courts are authorized to order resti-
tution to persons other than a “victim” only “if agreed to by
the parties in a plea agreement.” Id. § 3663A(a)(3).
    To determine whether a victim’s actual losses are “directly
and proximately” caused by the oﬀense of conviction as set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2), courts look at both cause-in-
fact (but-for causation) and proximate cause. United States v.
Clark, 787 F.3d 451, 463 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United States v.
Goodrich, 12 F.4th 219, 229 (2d Cir. 2021). Under but-for causa-
tion, a defendant’s conviction must have been a necessary fac-
tor in bringing about the victim’s harm. Goodrich, 12 F.4th at
229. For proximate cause, the harm alleged must have a “suf-
ﬁciently close connection to the conduct,” which is evaluated
based on whether the harm was “foreseeable” to a defendant.
Robers v. United States, 572 U.S. 639, 645 (2014); see United States
v. Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046, 1054 (7th Cir. 2003). The government
bears the burden of showing causation by a preponderance of
the evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).
    If determining complex issues of fact related to causation
would unduly “complicate or prolong the sentencing pro-
cess,” the MVRA allows, but does not require, the district
court to choose not to award restitution. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(c)(3)(B). The purpose of the so-called complexity ex-
ception is to ensure that sentencing courts do not “become

4 We note, “[t]he provisions of the VWPA and the MVRA are nearly iden-

tical in authorizing an award of restitution.” United States v. Randle, 324
F.3d 550, 555 n.2 (7th Cir. 2003). “Because of the similarity of the statutory
language in the VWPA and MVRA, court decisions interpreting the lan-
guage of the VWPA are helpful in construing the language of the MVRA.”
Id. at 556 n.3.
24                                      Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

embroiled in intricate issues of proof” and that the “process
of determining an appropriate order of restitution be stream-
lined.” United States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted). The complexity exception requires a bal-
ancing test: To determine whether it applies, a court “must
weigh the need to provide restitution to a victim against the
burden on the sentencing process posed by determining com-
plex issues of fact.” United States v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481, 486
(7th Cir. 2014).
   We ﬁrst address Betts’s argument regarding the geo-
graphic scope of the restitution award. Betts claims, and we
agree, that the district court impermissibly included busi-
nesses far from where Betts had reason to foresee damages
being inﬂicted by the riot he incited.
    During a hearing on August 19, 2021, the district court
found that there was suﬃcient evidence that the riot Betts in-
cited directly and proximately caused damages to the busi-
nesses at Market Place Mall. We take no issue with that ﬁnd-
ing. Betts sent out a call for a riot at Market Place Mall at 3
p.m. That is exactly what came to pass.
    Beyond the businesses at the mall, there is a question
about which businesses should be included in the restitution
order. The district court grappled with this question during
the August 19 hearing before indicating that it would order
restitution for businesses “located at the mall or on Prospect
or Neil.” The court ordered the government and Betts to con-
fer and come to an agreement about which businesses identi-
ﬁed by the government ﬁt within the court’s geographic
boundaries as previewed on August 19. Betts agreed to in-
clude businesses located anywhere in the city with an address
on either Prospect or Neil believing that is what the court
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                        25

intended when it said restitution should include businesses
“located … on Neil Street or on Prospect Avenue.” Mean-
while, Betts disputed that those businesses outside of the mall
that did not have an address on either Prospect or Neil should
be included, regardless of their proximity to the mall, again
citing the district court’s order that businesses be “lo-
cated … on Neil Street or on Prospect Avenue.” The govern-
ment, for its part, argued that any business “located in the
area of the Market Place Mall and the commercial areas at Neil
Street and Prospect Avenue” were within the scope of the
court’s August 19 order.
    The court reconvened with the parties on October 15, 2021,
for a hearing “to make a ﬁnal ruling on the issue of restitu-
tion.” The district court, addressing the disputed businesses,
included those north of I-74 while disallowing those south of
the highway. In so doing the district court seemed to agree
with the government that any damaged businesses in the vi-
cinity of the commercial district at the intersection of Prospect
and Neil, bounded to the east by Market Place Mall and to the
south by I-74, should be included in the restitution order. In
our view, though it may have been permissible to draw the
line elsewhere, the district court’s approach was reasonable
because Betts’s ﬂyer makes clear that he intended the rioters
to move from the mall to the Prospect and Neil area. It is rea-
sonably foreseeable that the rioters would damage stores in
the immediate vicinity while doing so.
   Upon hearing for the ﬁrst time that the court would use I-
74 as the boundary, Betts sought to reopen consideration of
the businesses that he had agreed to because they had an ad-
dress on one of the two streets—many, after all, were far from
the vicinity of the Prospect and Neil intersection. The district
26                                      Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

court denied the objection noting that “as far as [the court’s]
concerned, it’s too late for that.” Betts now challenges the dis-
trict court’s denial of his objection.
    On appeal, the government argues that the district court
had no obligation to reconsider businesses that Betts had al-
ready agreed should be within the scope of its restitution or-
der. But Betts was right to believe that the district court had
changed the parameters of its restitution order between the
August 19 and October 15 hearings. At no point during the
August 19 hearing did the court indicate that I-74 was a line
of demarcation for the prospective restitution order. Had the
court done so, Betts likely never would have consented to the
inclusion of any businesses to the south of the highway, far
from the Prospect and Neil intersection—a position Betts at-
tempted to explain to the district court.
    Given the changed landscape, the district court should
have allowed Betts to withdraw his consent. Upon doing so,
the district court then should have excluded from its ﬁnal res-
titution order all businesses south of the highway. When Betts
called for rioters to continue from Market Place Mall to the
area of Prospect and Neil just to the east, he had reason to be-
lieve that the riot he incited would cause damage to busi-
nesses at or near the intersection of Prospect and Neil. What
he did not have reason to foresee is that other businesses,
some more than an hour’s walk from the areas he drew rioters
to, would be damaged. He therefore did not proximately
cause the damage to those businesses.
   Further, there is little evidence that Betts directly caused
damage to businesses scattered throughout the city, far from
the mall or the Prospect and Neil intersection. The govern-
ment argues there is evidence that all businesses damaged
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                        27

that day were “harmed by the riot he incited and participated
in.” The government reasons that rioting was unprecedented
in Champaign, so the rioting that occurred anywhere in the
city must have been prompted by Betts. But it is the unprece-
dented nature of events that calls for restraint when imposing
a restitution order in this case. There were similar scenes
throughout the country that weekend, many in areas where
riots were equally unprecedented. Indeed, an oﬃcer that re-
sponded to the looting in Champaign agreed that the nation-
wide unrest was “a very unique circumstance.” It is possible
many people in Champaign intended to join the national un-
rest regardless of Betts’s actions. We therefore cannot agree
that Betts can be held to have directly caused damage that oc-
curred anywhere in the city, far outside the time and places
indicated on his ﬂyer.
    In some cases, after our review, we are able to order the
district court to enter a speciﬁc restitution amount on remand.
We are unable to do so here because the documentation that
some businesses provided to substantiate their losses during
the riot strikes us as insuﬃcient. The government presented
the district court with a spreadsheet of 73 businesses that ap-
parently suﬀered losses. The spreadsheet included the name
and address of each business, and the amount of damage each
business purportedly sustained in terms of property damage
and lost or stolen merchandize. But presenting a spreadsheet
is not enough to establish causation on Betts’s part. See, e.g.,
United States v. Menza, 137 F.3d 533, 539 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
government must provide the district court with more than
just the general invoices submitted by [the purported victims]
ostensibly identifying the amount of their losses.”); see also
United States v. Ferdman, 779 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2015)
(courts should not “dispense with the necessity of proof []
28                                      Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

mandated by the MVRA and simply ‘rubber stamp’ a victim’s
claim of loss”); United States v. Steele, 897 F.3d 606, 614 (4th
Cir. 2018) (agent testimony undercut loss estimate where the
agent testiﬁed that he took victims word for it). The govern-
ment is required to show that each identiﬁed business suﬀered
damages because of Betts’s incitement of a riot. See, e.g., United
States v. White, 883 F.3d 983, 992 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The amount
of restitution is ‘limited to the actual losses caused by the spe-
ciﬁc conduct underlying the oﬀense.’” (citation omitted));
Ferdman, 779 F.3d at 1133 (“Speculation and rough justice are
not permitted.” (citation omitted)).
    FBI Agent Andrew Huckstadt, who created the spread-
sheet, testiﬁed that he and other agents called several busi-
nesses aﬀected by looting. Ultimately, many of those busi-
nesses provided the FBI with records detailing their losses
and can therefore be included in the ﬁnal restitution order.
For example, the evidence presented to the district court in-
cluded invoices submitted by TJ Maxx for work done to repair
damaged property. Likewise, Old Navy provided very spe-
ciﬁc auditing results from its loss prevention activities detail-
ing what items were stolen and the cost of those items. This is
likely enough for their inclusion in the ﬁnal restitution order,
as both businesses are within the geographic scope of restitu-
tion.
   But we are not so certain about the evidence presented by
other businesses within the geographic scope of restitution.
For example, Macy’s sent a series of emails to law enforce-
ment in which employees stated that the store lost $408,000 in
merchandise. But, unlike TJ Maxx or Old Navy, Macy’s pro-
vided no documentation substantiating or otherwise detail-
ing its claim. The claimed losses by Macy’s, and those
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                       29

businesses whose documentation likewise proves inade-
quate, should not be included in a restitution order on re-
mand without the district court suﬃciently explaining its rea-
sons for accepting the claimed loss amounts. Menza, 137 F.3d
at 538 (asking district court to clarify its reasoning on remand
where it provided an “inadequate explanation and insuﬃ-
cient reasoning as to why [it] accepted, on their face” invoices
submitted by the prosecution).
    We acknowledge, as we have done before, that “[d]eter-
mining who are victims and the amount of loss are often not
easy tasks for the district court.” United States v. Randle, 324
F.3d 550, 558 (7th Cir. 2003). From the beginning, the district
court recognized that there were diﬃcult issues related to
scope and a valid question about whether the people who ri-
oted were the same people who Betts reached out to or who
learned about his communications. The district court then or-
dered restitution because it found that Betts, in inciting, par-
ticipating in, and carrying on a riot, caused damage to busi-
nesses at Market Place Mall and to businesses in the vicinity
of Prospect Avenue and Neil Street north of I-74. After all,
Betts’s ﬂyer noted that rioters would meet at the Market Place
Mall and after, move to “the whole PROSPECT & NEIL.”
While the district court’s ﬁnding was acceptable, it should not
have included stores outside of those locations. Further, the
government, as we noted above, still had to show that each
business was a victim as statutorily required, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(a)(2), because “[o[]rdering restitution beyond [what
a defendant] may have caused exceeds the statutory authority
that Congress has given courts ….” United States v. Burns, 843
F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2016). The government needed to do
more than present the court with unsubstantiated assertions
of damages from businesses. See generally Wyatt, 9 F.4th at 452
30                                             Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

(no reversible error where the district court “did not simply
accept the government’s proposed restitution ﬁgures”);
United States v. Henoud, 81 F.3d 484, 490 (4th Cir. 1996) (busi-
ness records from the victim company and testimony of com-
pany employee suﬃcient to meet preponderance of the evi-
dence). We therefore vacate the sentence regarding the
amount of restitution ordered and remand for the limited
purpose of reevaluating that amount based on the evidence
already presented. 5
                                    III
   For the reasons stated above, Betts’s conviction and sen-
tence of imprisonment are aﬃrmed. But we VACATE the sen-
tence with regard to the restitution ordered and REMAND for
the limited purpose of revaluating the amount of restitution.

5 Because the government had a chance to present evidence at the sentenc-

ing and subsequent restitution hearings, we do not see fit to remand to
give the government yet another chance to meet its burden by presenting
new or updated evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Fair, 699 F.3d 508, 518
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (“No special circumstances are present that would war-
rant reopening the record on restitution in [defendant’s] case. The govern-
ment’s burden to prove actual loss under the MVRA was well-established
before sentencing … [t]he government was allowed to present evidence
… whether the government had offered evidence demonstrating actual
loss was the central issue addressed during the parties’ restitution discus-
sion at the sentencing hearing.”).
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                         31

    HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part. I concur in all but one part of the majority
opinion. I agree that we should affirm Betts’ conviction and
prison sentence and that the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act applies to Betts’ conviction under the Anti-Riot Act, all for
the reasons explained in the majority opinion. I respectfully
dissent, however, from the portion of the opinion and
judgment vacating and remanding the district court’s
restitution order.
    The general standard is that the defendant should be
ordered to pay restitution for losses “directly and
proximately” caused by his offense of conviction. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(a)(2). The factual issues were difficult here, especially
given the nature of the defendant’s crime. He intended to start
a riot. He could not control its scope any more than an arsonist
can control a fire in dry wildlands on a windy day. The harms
caused were foreseeable and intended. Betts celebrated and
boasted of the widespread damage.
    We review the district court’s factual findings for clear
error and its ultimate restitution decision for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Wyatt, 9 F.4th 440, 452 (7th Cir.
2021). Reasonable judges could have held Betts liable for
either larger or smaller sums, corresponding to either larger
or smaller geographic areas, than the district court found
here. I would defer to Judge Mihm’s discretionary judgments
on how and where to draw lines ordering restitution by Betts.
I see little value in remanding to seek further refinement of
those estimates and judgment calls.
   Since a remand is being ordered, though, I would allow
the district court to exercise its discretion to decide the scope
of further proceedings and in particular whether to allow
32                                      Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157

additional evidence. Contrary to the view expressed in the
majority’s footnote 5, the scope of the government’s burden
to prove loss and causation in a riot case—with its prospects
for widespread and uncontrollable damage—was not and still
is not well established. Cf. United States v. Fair, 699 F.3d 508,
514 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cited by majority, addressing
government’s burden to prove loss in “cases involving
copyright infringement and fraudulent sales”).
    Finally, regarding the “complexity” exception to the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(c)(3)(B), I would raise a threshold question: whether
a convicted defendant should ever be entitled, as a matter of
right, to invoke a district court’s refusal to apply the exception
as an error, at least in the absence of prejudicial delay. The
exception was written to balance victims’ interests in
restitution against the burden on the judicial system of sorting
out unusually complex problems, especially in time to include
restitution as part of the criminal sentence. E.g., United States
v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 2014). Any “unnecessary
delay” in imposing sentence is already prohibited by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id., citing Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(b)(1). Whether to invoke the complexity exception
is best left to the district court’s sound discretion.
    We and other circuits have previously entertained the
merits of defendants’ arguments claiming error based on this
exception. See Malone, 747 F.3d at 487–88; accord, e.g., United
States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2013); United
States v. Wirth, 719 F.3d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 2013). But the
complexity exception was not written to reward convicted
defendants for having committed crimes in ways that make
restitution unusually difficult to calculate. The opinions in
Nos. 21-2572 & 21-3157                                      33

Malone and these other cases have not addressed the obvious
moral hazard posed by entertaining such a challenge. At the
same time, Malone and the other cases also did not actually
reverse any restitution awards on a defendant’s argument
that he was entitled to the benefit of the exception. Before a
court considers vacating a restitution award on such a theory,
I hope it will first consider whether the defendant is entitled
to invoke a district court’s refusal to apply the complexity
exception as a potential error.