Court Opinion

ID: 9746121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:00:26.227088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:09.167435
License: Public Domain

KLINE, P. J.
I concur in the judgment because I agree it was proper to exclude evidence of the victim’s cocaine use and that Penal Code section 12022.551 is unamenable to judicial interpretation. I write separately, with respect to the latter issue, because I agree with appellant’s theory of the statute and believe it appropriate to explain why I nevertheless reject his argument.
*293As appellant correctly points out, section 12022.55 was designed to increase the punishment for a so-called “drive-by” shooting—that is, the discharge of a weapon from a moving vehicle in an area in which large numbers of people are likely to be present—and this case arguably does not involve such a shooting.
Gang-related drive-by shootings had become a significant social problem in California in 1987—indeed, an “epidemic”2—when section 12022.55 was enacted, and the statute was undoubtedly addressed to this problem. As stated in People v. Williams (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 601 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 583], “[t]he evil addressed [by section 12022.55] is . . . the number of victims who suffer great bodily injury from such a so-called 'drive-by.' ” (Id., at p. 604, italics added.) The Attorney General has elsewhere also acknowledged that when it enacted the statute, the Legislature had in mind the “scenario involved in a gang drive-by shooting.” (In re Jose D. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 582, 588 [268 Cal.Rptr. 364].)
Because section 12022.55 was enacted during a special session of the Legislature as an urgency measure (Assem. Bill No. 13, 1993-1994 First Ex. Sess.), there is little in the way of a direct legislative history.3 The most useful indication of the purpose of the statute is provided by the legislative history of a subsequent measure virtually identical to section 12022.55 in the most critical particular. During the 1995 session, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 9 (Stats. 1995, ch. 478) which submitted an initiative to popular vote. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10.) This initiative, which as Proposition 196 passed at the statewide election held on March 26, 1996, added intentional murder “perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle” to the list of special circumstances for first degree murder for which the death penalty or life without the possibility of parole is authorized. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(20).) Like section 12022.55, this new law does not explicitly state that the firearm must have been discharged in the course of a drive-by shooting or that the vehicle must have been moving or otherwise in use or located on a public street or highway at the time of the discharge. However, the author of the bill, Senator Ruben Ayala, and Gregory D. Totten, executive director of the California District Attorneys Association, which sponsored the measure, made clear in the ballot pamphlet that this was the legislative purpose. They stated as follows: ’’Murder by drive-by shooting has reached epidemic levels in California. [] An average of more than *294one young person under the age of 18 was a victim of a drive-by shooting in Los Angeles alone every week in 1991, according to a recent study in the New England Journal of Medicine; 36 of these youths died. [H The study found that drive-by shootings are no longer confined to the inner city, but have spread everywhere. Because the shooting is done from a moving vehicle, too often the victim is an unintended target—an innocent child, a high school student with no gang affiliation, a young mother who happens to live in a neighborhood targeted by drive-by shooters, or a harmless passer-by. [] It’s got to stop.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Primary Elec. (Mar. 26, 1996), argument in favor of Prop. 196, p. 26, second italics added.)
The case law applying section 12022.55 reflects a judicial understanding that this sentence enhancement was designed to achieve the same purpose. Section 12022.55 has been applied in 12 cases that resulted in a published appellate opinion. In none of these cases was the enhancement applied to the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle not then being used on a public street or highway. In all but two of the cases the defendants were declared or suspected gang members who discharged a firearm from a vehicle then in use on a public thoroughfare. (People v. Gonzales 49 Cal.App.4th 1823 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 293] review granted Mar. 28, 1996 (S051264) [shooting from moving truck]; People v. Rand (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 999 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 686], review den. [gang shooting from slowed vehicle]; People v. Ceja (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 78 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 475] [defendant “drove up” to victim and shot him]; People v. Mortera (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 861 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 782], review den. [gun fired from car while it repeatedly circled an intersection]; People v. Williams, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 601 [“gang-related drive-by shooting”]; People v. Alvarez (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 121 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 463], review den. [victims shot from truck “driving] slowly by them”]; People v. Dominguez (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 516 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 55], review den. [gang shooting from stopped car taking on a passenger]; People v. Gamez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 957 [286 Cal.Rptr. 894] [weapon discharged from moving truck]; In re Sergio R. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 588 [279 Cal.Rptr. 149], review den. [gang shooting from car “which was momentarily stopped”]; In re Jose D., supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 582 [discharge from car that “pulled up in front of house and parked for about a minute”].) In the two remaining cases the defendants shot at a peace officer during the stop of a vehicle following a chase on public streets. (People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354]; People v. Jones (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1303 [286 Cal.Rptr. 163].)
For the foregoing reasons, appellant argues that section 12022.55 should be held applicable only to the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle that is moving. Appellant emphasizes that “[w]hen language which is susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law, the policy of this state *295is to construe the statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstance of its application reasonably permit. The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of a statute.” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288], citing People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 848 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380]; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186]; In re Jeanice D. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 210, 217 [168 Cal.Rptr. 455, 617 P.2d 1087].)
The problem with this argument, and the reason I reject it, is that it rests on the assumption that section 12022.55 is truly ambiguous as to whether it applies to the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle not then in use. Certainly there is no facial ambiguity, in the sense that the term “motor vehicle,” or any other words in the statute are “capable of being construed in two different ways by reasonably well informed people,” which is the test conventionally used to determine ambiguity. (2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992) § 45.02, pp. 5-7, § 46.04, p. 99.) Most reasonable people would agree that a “motor vehicle” is a self-propelled device used for the transportion of people or goods upon a street or highway, other than a device used exclusively upon rails or tracks. This common understanding of what constitutes a “motor vehicle,” which is consistent with pertinent statutory definitions (see Veh. Code, §§ 415, 670), does not depend on whether the vehicle is moving at any particular time, and has even been employed to describe a vehicle that is temporarily inoperable. (Arrellano v. Moreno (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 877, 882 [109 Cal.Rptr. 421].)
The asserted ambiguity in section 12022.55 arises not from the language of the statute but by considering that reasonably clear language in the light of the apparent legislative purpose. This is not, however, the sort of ambiguity that calls for judicial interpretation. Courts inquire as to the legislative purpose to resolve ambiguity, not to create it. The fact that section 12022.55 has a broader reach than may have been necessary to achieve its purpose does not mean it is unclear. The ambiguity that warrants judicial interpretation must be inherent in the statute itself or in the entire scheme of which it is part. Thus, while courts sometimes reject the so-called “plain meaning" of words in a statute, they do so only where the literal meaning would either frustrate the statutory purpose (see, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 263 [104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049]; Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 605, 617 [200 Cal.Rptr. 575]) or lead to absurd results. (See, e.g., People v. Fulton (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 91, 102 [201 Cal.Rptr. 879].) That is not the case here.
Application of section 12022.55 to the discharge of a firearm from a vehicle not then being operated would not defeat or obstruct the legislative *296purpose because it is not inconsistent with application of the enhancement to conventional drive-by shootings; nor would such application be patently absurd, as a vehicle provides a redoubt that might facilitate the commission of criminal acts even if it is not at that moment being used for transportation.4 Thus, because appellant cannot demonstrate “that the natural and customary import of the statute’s language is either ‘repugnant to the general purview of the act,’ or for some other compelling reason, should be disregarded, this court must give effect to the statute’s ‘plain meaning.’ ” (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 218-219 [188 Cal.Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317], quoting 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973) § 46.01, p. 49.)5
Appellant’s contention that section 12022.55 is not plain on its face, and that the limitation he urges may therefore be judicially implied, rests primarily on In re Jose D, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d 582. But the determination in that case centered on a distinctive issue not present here. The question in Jose D. was whether section 12022.55 applied to a person who was in the vehicle from which the firearm was discharged but did not personally discharge the weapon and was culpable of the underlying offense only as an aider and abettor. The general rule regarding this question is that “ ‘if a statute is intended to impose a derivative liability on some person other than the actor, there must be some legislative direction that it is to be applied to persons who do not themselves commit the proscribed act.’” (219 Cal.App.3d at p. 587, quoting People v. Walker (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 241 [133 Cal.Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306].) Due to its presumed awareness of this “basic rule,” the court observed, “ ‘the Legislature has been quite explicit *297when it intends an enhancement provision to apply to a defendant even though he himself does not commit the proscribed act.’ ” (Jose D., supra, at p. 587, quoting People v. Piper (1986) 42 Cal.3d 471, 477 [229 Cal.Rptr. 125, 722 P.2d 899].) Therefore, because section 12022.55 did not explicitly impose an increased punishment on one merely present in a vehicle from which a firearm was discharged, it did not apply derivatively.
The failure of the Legislature to expressly indicate whether section 12022.55 applies to the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle not then in use does not pertain to the question of derivative liability at issue in Jose D., nor relate to the subject of any established judicial presumption the Legislature can overcome only by speaking explicitly. (See, e.g., In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948] [which holds that when a statute mitigating punishment becomes effective after the commission of the prohibited act but before final judgment the lesser punishment provided by the new law is to be imposed in the absence of an express statement to the contrary by the Legislature].) The silence of section 12022.55 as to this matter therefore provides no basis upon which we may presume a meaning not apparent on the face of the statute.
Because it does not serve the purpose of section 12022.55, the imposition of a five-year sentence enhancement on a defendant who discharges a firearm from a vehicle not then in use on or near a public street or highway was probably not anticipated by the Legislature, which might therefore wish to reconsider the overinclusiveness of the statute. The failure of the Legislature to anticipate the gratuitously broad application the statute may have cannot, however, influence our assessment of its ambit. As has been noted, “if [the Legislature] has made a choice of language which fairly brings a given situation within a statute, it is unimportant that the particular application may not have been contemplated by the legislators.” (Barr v. United States (1944) 324 U.S. 83, 90 [89 L.Ed. 765, 771, 65 S.Ct. 522]; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. United States (C.C.P.A. 1974) 504 F.2d 1400, 1402.) It is similarly unimportant whether a court believes the unanticipated application is sensible or just. Where, as here, the reasonably clear meaning of the statute is neither incompatible with its purpose nor absurd, we may not disregard it.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 27, 1996, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 4, 1996.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

See Hutson et al., The Epidemic of Gang-Related Homicides in Los Angeles County From 1979 Through 1994 (Oct. 4, 1995) 274 J. Am. Med. Assn. 1031.

However, the urgency clause which accompanied the measure that became section 12022.55 explains that it is essential that the bill take effect immediately “in order to deter persons from violent acts upon our public streets and highways . . . .” (Stats. 1987, ch. 1147, § 5, p. 4060, italics added.)

The United States Supreme Court has, for example, “specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile. ‘According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings—A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. (1963).’ Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3 [32 L.Ed.2d 612, 618, 92 S.Ct. 1921] (1972).” (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 110 [54 L.Ed.2d 331, 336-337, 98 S.Ct. 330].)

Defendant has staked his appeal on questions of statutory construction and not any claim that the statute may be unconstitutional on its face or as applied to him. He does not contend, for instance, that the statute is fatally overinclusive for punishing conduct not within the apparent legislative purpose, or is underinclusive for excluding conduct which may appear materially indistinguishable from included conduct. (See Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855, 876-877 [106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212, 66 A.L.R.3d 505]; cf. United States v. McDougherty (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 569, 572 [federal enhancement for distribution of drugs within 1,000 feet of elementary school]; United States v. Thornton (9th Cir. 1990) 901 F.2d 738, 740 [same].) Overinclusiveness may or may not appear in the statute’s facial applicability to shootings in which the defendant’s presence in a car was mere happenstance. As for underinclusiveness, I confess bewilderment at the statute’s exclusion of shootings in which the victim is “an occupant of a motor vehicle.” (§ 12022.55.) Like the majority, however, I express no opinion on how such challenges might fare should they be properly raised in another case.