Court Opinion

ID: 9782357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:24:57.789266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:57.311175
License: Public Domain

NEHRING, Judge,
concurring in the result:
[29 I concur in the opinion of Chief Justice Durham. I write separately to calm those who may fear that the "avenues for establishing voluntariness" of a defendant's absence from a sentencing hearing will prove to be congested avenues contributing to gridlock for all concerned, especially prosecutors. The Chief Justice has attempted to allay anxiety by correctly observing that where a voluntariness inquiry is conducted, the exercise is unlikely to prove unduly strenuous. I submit, however, that because sentencing in absentia is, for many sound reasons, a seldom used practice, the legal principles which we announce today and the procedures which they compel will be stored in the closets of trial judges and retrieved only on unusual occasions.
{30 As a practical matter, few, if any, economies are realized by in absentia sentencing. The occasions when a prosecutor has forewarning that a defendant will not be present for sentencing are rare. It would make little sense for a prosecutor, therefore, to appear at a sentencing hearing prepared to carry his burden on the voluntariness of a defendant's absence. The inevitable result would be continuance of the sentencing hearing. Where, as in the case of Mr. Wanosik, the in absentia sentence is harsher than that recommended in the presentence report, the defendant is likely to request a hearing to challenge it. There is, therefore, little if any efficiency to be gained by sentencing a defendant in absentia.
[31 Crime victims have a statutory right to appear and be heard at sentencing. A defendant's failure to appear for sentencing for whatever reason may be particularly distressing for victims. Nevertheless, the objective of permitting a victim to appear and be heard at sentencing is served in large measure by having the victim's words, be they of merey or condemnation, fall on the ears of the defendant himself,
32 In short, I concur in the view of the Chief Justice concerning the seope of necessary safeguards for a practice which should, except in highly unusual cireumstances, continue to be avoided by trial judges.
133 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT and Justice PARRISH concur in the concurring opinion of Judge NEHRING.