Court Opinion

ID: 9531179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:08:26.357308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:21.589482
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: Although this appeal concerns a negligence verdict against a tavern owner, it does not involve any issue under the Dramshop Act. One patron of a tavern was stabbed and killed by another patron. The decedent’s children brought a wrongful death action against the tavern owner alleging negligence. The jury returned a verdict of $30,000 in favor of plaintiffs. As is noted in the majority opinion, this appeal is addressed to only two issues: First, whether a showing was made that decedent had exercised due care for his own safety; and, almost the same issue stated differently, whether the decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The majority opinion concludes both issues in favor of the plaintiffs. I dissent. A recitation of the situation as it existed on the day of the stabbing will illustrate, I hope, why I dissent. Gale Peterson and James Jenkins were shooting pool and drinking in the Central Tap in Abingdon. As the day wore on they became inebriated. The men were pugnacious, arguing steadily. The record does not indicate why. During this wrangling, on three separate occasions, Jenkins pulled a knife on Peterson. On two such occasions the defendant barkeeper intervened telling Jenkins to put the knife away. Peterson had been threatening to beat Jenkins, and told him if he put the knife away he would do so. Jenkins pulled the knife again. Defendant told him to get out. As Jenkins exited, Peterson again baited Jenkins, threatening him with a beating. Jenkins turned, walked up to Peterson, and killed him with a single thrust of his knife. We admonish jurors that in considering the evidence they are not required to set aside their own observations and experience in the affairs of life. (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 1.04 (2d ed. 1971).) Should appellate courts be held to a lesser standard? It defies everyday knowledge to conclude decedent did not knowingly expose himself to personal harm and grave danger. His repeated ranting that he would beat Jenkins was not only unreasonable but extreme. Peterson was aware before the stabbing that Jenkins had three times threateningly brandished the knife. This display came during the course of a verbal clash which was ongoing and petulant. Regardless, Peterson continued to bait Jenkins. If the tavern owner had a duty to remove Jenkins from the premises, then decedent had no less an obligation to prevent injury to himself by ceasing his taunting assertions. The majority’s comment that decedent need not be “super-perfect” says nothing at all, let alone anything new. Nobody is perfect. We all know that. The conduct of an individual and his personal responsibility for his own safety is measured by what an ordinary man would do under the circumstances. To say “* 0 * no reasonable person would have expected that Jenkins would have retaliated with violence ” ” *” is preposterous. Defendant and his wife thought Jenkins pulling the kniti was serious enough to tell him to leave the tavern, after he had twice been told to put the knife away. The fact that Mr. Peterson could not heed the peril because of his drunkenness does not alter the standard of care upon which his responsibility to prevent harm to himself is adjudicated. Yet, even if one allows for Mr. Peterson’s personal alcoholic state, it is quite evident that he was aware that Jenkins was armed, pugnacious and dangerous. Because Gale Peterson was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, judgment should be entered for the defendant.