Court Opinion

ID: 9373216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:29.518356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.087182
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ISABEL RIOS-RIVERA,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                        NY-0752-16-0316-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                           DATE: November 17, 2022
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                   THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Marcos Gabriel Morales-Sbert, Esquire, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for the
            appellant.

           Ana M. Margarida, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     treated her separation as a removal action and affirmed that action .          For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review ,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administr ative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the field office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        On August 24, 2016, the appellant received notice of the agency’s decision
     to remove her effective August 26, 2016, from her Social Worker position, based
     on seven charges of alleged misconduct. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 4,
     Tab 9 at 13-15.     The appellant resigned, effective August 25, 2016, after
     receiving notice of the agency’s decision to remove her. IAF, Tab 9 at 13-15,
     Tab 15 at 13.
¶3        The appellant filed a Board appeal of the removal decision and did not
     request a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 1-6. She raised claims of harmful procedural
     error and a violation of her due process rights. IAF, Tab 10 at 3, Tab 12 at 2,
     Tabs 14, 19.
¶4        Based on the written record, the administrative judge issued an initial
     decision treating the appellant’s separation as a removal action, which she
     affirmed.   IAF, Tab 22, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 6, 25.      Specifically, the
     administrative judge sustained the charged misconduct, found a nexus between
     the sustained misconduct and the efficiency of the service, and determined that
     the penalty of removal was within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.       ID
     at 7-18, 20-25.    She further found that the appellant failed to prove her
     affirmative defense of harmful procedural error. ID at 18 -20.
¶5        The appellant has filed a petition for review challenging the initial decision
     and reasserting a violation of her due process rights. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response opposing her petition. PFR File,
     Tab 3.
                                                                                             3

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     This appeal must be remanded for a jurisdictional determination.
¶6           The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.            Maddox v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).            The appellant bears the
     burden of proving by preponderant evidence the Board’s jurisdiction over her
     appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). Generally, an appellant is entitled to a
     jurisdictional hearing if she raises nonfrivolous allegations 2 of Board jurisdiction.
     Edwards v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 307, ¶ 6 (2013).
¶7           There remains a question whether the Board has jurisdiction over this
     appeal. Although the parties have not raised this issue, PFR File, Tabs 1, 3, the
     issue of the Board’s jurisdiction may be raised at any time during a proceedi ng,
     Morgan v. Department of the Navy, 28 M.S.P.R. 477, 478 (1985). Further, the
     Board has inherent authority to determine whether a matter is withi n its
     jurisdiction.   Lloyd v. Small Business Administration, 96 M.S.P.R. 518, ¶ 16
     (2004). Therefore, we find that it is appropriate to raise the jurisdictional issue
     here.
¶8           The administrative judge found that, because the appellant resigned 1 day
     before the scheduled effective date of her removal, the Board has jurisdiction to
     adjudicate the agency’s removal action regardless of the voluntariness of her
     resignation.    ID at 6.   In so finding, the administrative judge cited 5 U.S.C.
     § 7701(j) and Mays v. Department of Transportation, 27 F.3d 1577, 1579-81
     (Fed. Cir. 1994). ID at 6. Section 7701(j) provides:
             In determining the appealability under this section of any case
             involving a removal from the service (other than the removal of a
             reemployed annuitant), neither an individual’s status under any
             retirement system established by or under Federal statute nor any

     2
       A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
     issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
                                                                                      4

            election made by such individual under any such system may be
            taken into account.
      The plain meaning of this provision is that the Board may not base its
      jurisdictional determination in a removal appeal on whether the appellant retired
      when faced with a final removal decision.              Paula v. Social Security
      Administration, 119 M.S.P.R. 138, ¶ 12 (2013). In Mays, 27 F.3d at 1579-81, our
      reviewing court held that the Board had jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(j) over
      the appellant’s removal appeal when she retired on the effective date of her
      removal.
¶9         However, we find that 5 U.S.C. § 7701(j) and the holding in Mays do not
      apply to the instant appeal because the appellant here did not retire but resigned
      prior to the effective date of her removal.     IAF, Tab 13 at 4, Tab 15 at 13;
      Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 111 M.S.P.R. 586, ¶ 41 (2009); see,
      e.g., Quiet v. Department of Transportation, 104 M.S.P.R. 292, ¶¶ 5, 9-10 (2006)
      (remanding the appellants’ appeals for the administrative judge to adjudicate
      them as involuntary resignation/constructive removal appeals when the record
      reflected that the appellants were separated from service as a result of their
      resignations prior to the effective date of the agency’s removal actions) . Thus,
      we find that the administrative judge erred in adjudicating the appellant’s
      resignation as a removal, and we vacate the initial decision.
¶10        An employee-initiated action, such as a resignation, is presumed to be
      voluntary and thus outside the Board’s jurisdiction.      Searcy v. Department of
      Commerce, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12 (2010). However, an employee may establish
      Board jurisdiction over an involuntary resignation as a constructive removal by
      proving that she lacked a meaningful choice in the matter and the agency’s
      wrongful actions deprived her of that choice.       Bean v. U.S. Postal Service,
      120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 7-8, 11 (2013). An employee can establish involuntariness
      by proving, for example, that the agency obtained the resignation through duress,
      coercion, misinformation, or deception.        Searcy, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12;
                                                                                             5

      Baldwin, 111 M.S.P.R. 586, ¶ 15. The fact that an employee is faced with the
      unpleasant choice of resigning or being subject to removal for cause does not
      rebut the presumed voluntariness of her ultimate choice of resignation. Schultz v.
      U.S. Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, “[i]f an employee
      can show that the agency knew [or should have known] that the reason for the
      threatened removal could not be substantiated, the threatened action by the
      agency is purely coercive.”       Id. at 1136-37.     Moreover, intolerable working
      conditions may render an action involuntary if the employee demonstra tes that the
      agency engaged in a course of action that made working conditions so difficult or
      unpleasant that a reasonable person in that employee’s position would have felt
      compelled to resign. Searcy, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12.
¶11         Here, the administrative judge did not issue a jurisdictional notice, and
      neither the initial decision nor the agency’s submissions put the appellant on
      notice that she might be required to prove Board jurisdiction over her resignation
      as a constructive removal.       IAF, Tabs 9, 15; see Burgess v. Merit Systems
      Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that an
      appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an
      appealable jurisdictional issue).      Therefore, we remand this appeal for the
      administrative judge to provide the appellant with notice of the jurisdictional
      requirements described above and an opportunity to establish jurisdiction. See,
      e.g., Burgess, 758 F.2d at 643-44. After apprising the appellant of the proper
      jurisdictional issues, the administrative judge shall provide her with an
      opportunity to request a jurisdictional hearing and to submit evidence and
      argument on those issues. 3

      3
        In her petition for review, the appellant reasserts her argument that the agency
      violated her due process rights. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-11; IAF, Tab 12 at 2, Tab 14 at 6,
      Tab 19. She also disputes the administrative judge’s findin gs regarding the charged
      misconduct, hearsay evidence, harmful procedural error, nexus, and the removal
      penalty. PFR File, Tab 1. We find it is inappropriate to decide these issues at this time
      when it is unclear that these claims are within the Board’s jurisdiction. See Evans v.
                                                                                             6

                                             ORDER
¶12         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the field office for
      further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                       /s/ for
                                                  Jennifer Everling
                                                  Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      Department of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 257, ¶ 5 (2013) (stating that the Board
      first must resolve the threshold issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of
      an appeal). The appellant may reraise her arguments on remand to the extent they are
      relevant in a constructive removal appeal.