Court Opinion

ID: 9941599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 16:10:19.916608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:47.682909
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                           No. 125,563

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                       RONALD L. DIES JR.,
                                           Appellee,

                                                  v.

                                        BRAD DIES, et al.,
                                          Defendants,

                                                 and

                                     JEANNE DIANE MCGINN
                                          Appellant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Marion District Court; COURTNEY D. BOEHM, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed February 16, 2024. Reversed and remanded.

       Joseph L. Uhlman, of Adrian & Pankratz, P.A., of Newton, for appellant.

       J. Robert Brookens, of Brookens Law Office, LLC, of Marion, for appellee.

Before WARNER, P.J., COBLE and PICKERING, JJ.

       PICKERING, J.: In 2012, Wells Fargo Bank, NA, initiated foreclosure proceedings
against Carol E. Dies after she defaulted on her mortgage. The property was foreclosed
and sold at a sheriff's sale, then sold one year later to Ricky L. McGinn, who subsequently
transferred it to Jeanne Diane McGinn. Almost a decade later, Ronald L. Dies Jr. (Dies
Jr.)—Carol's grandson—under a new civil case, moved to quiet title to a portion of the

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real property sold to Jeanne McGinn and later moved for summary judgment. Dies Jr.
claimed that his interest to the real property was superior to McGinn's because the
foreclosure process in 2012 violated the due process rights of Dies Jr.'s parents, who had
an interest in the foreclosed property. The district court granted Dies Jr.'s motion for
summary judgment, finding the 2012 foreclosure sale to McGinn was void.

       On appeal, McGinn offers several reasons why the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to Dies Jr. McGinn first contends that Dies Jr. lacks standing because
his due process challenge to the 2012 foreclosure action arises from his parents' rights, not
an injury he personally suffered. McGinn also argues that because Dies Jr. is attempting to
void the earlier foreclosure case, the plaintiff there—Wells Fargo—is a necessary party to
this case. Additionally, McGinn argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment in Dies Jr.'s favor because, among other reasons, Dies Jr. cannot use this lawsuit
to collaterally attack a final judgment in the earlier separate foreclosure case.

       We find McGinn's two procedural arguments are without merit. Dies Jr. purports to
hold title to the tract of land in question and thus has standing to present his quiet title
claim; likewise, Wells Fargo does not purport to have any title to that land and thus is not
a necessary party in this quiet title case. However, we agree with McGinn and find the
district court erred in granting the summary judgment. The original foreclosure action was
a final judgment and cannot be collaterally attacked in a separate quiet title claim. The
court erred in its ruling, which voided the foreclosure sale through a separate action. We
therefore reverse the district court's summary judgment ruling that had been made in Dies
Jr.'s favor and remand.

                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On January 28, 2022, Dies Jr. petitioned for quiet title of a tract of real estate in
Marion County. Initially, Dies Jr. made claims of adverse possession and named McGinn

                                                2
as one of multiple defendants who might claim an interest in that land. The parties in this
case do not dispute the extent of that property, but they do dispute who owns it.

       Dies Jr.'s grandmother, Carol E. Dies, purported to deed that tract of land to her son
and his wife—Dies Jr.'s parents—Ronald L. Dies (Dies Sr.) and Ruthann Dies, as joint
tenants in March 2011. This deed was recorded on March 30, 2011. At the time, however,
the tract was part of a larger property subject to a mortgage held by Wells Fargo.

       On January 31, 2012, Wells Fargo petitioned for foreclosure of that property,
including the tract at issue in this case. The foreclosure petition named "Carol E. Dies;
Harry J. Dies (Deceased); John Doe (real name unknown); Mary Doe (real name
unknown); and the unknown heirs, executors, administrators, devisees, trustees, creditors
and assigns of such of the defendants as may be deceased" as defendants. The foreclosure
petition did not specifically name Dies Sr. or Ruthann as parties, but it stated that
unidentified persons (John Doe and Mary Joe) were in possession of the property.

       The foreclosure petition alleged Harry and Carol Dies executed a mortgage on the
property in April 2004. Wells Fargo held a recorded mortgage on the property, and the
mortgage was guaranteed by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Wells Fargo sought to
foreclose on the property because the Dieses defaulted on their payments and thus failed
to comply with the terms of the mortgage.

       Wells Fargo personally served Carol Dies and residentially served John Doe and
Mary Doe on Vernon Avenue in Lehigh. Additionally, Wells Fargo published notice of
the foreclosure in the newspaper of record.

       Wells Fargo prevailed on its foreclosure action, and a public auction was held.
Following the public auction, a sheriff's deed was issued to the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs then filed a special warranty deed on December

                                              3
13, 2013, which conveyed the challenged property to Ricky L. McGinn. A few years later,
Ricky conveyed the same property to Jeanne McGinn—the defendant and appellant
here—by a general warranty deed.

       More than seven years passed. Then, in July 2021, Dies Sr. executed a transfer-on-
death deed for the tract in question here, transferring his interest in that property to Dies
Jr. upon his death. Dies Sr. died about one month later. After his father's death, Dies Jr.
filed a new lawsuit—this quiet title action—seeking to determine who owned the
challenged tract of land and naming McGinn and others people who might claim an
interest in the property.

       Dies Jr. initially claimed that he should be granted title through adverse possession,
as he and his parents had continued to claim title to the property after the 2012 foreclosure
action. McGinn moved to dismiss the petition, arguing Dies Jr. could not show an adverse
or false belief of ownership to the land. She also argued that even assuming Dies Jr.'s
claims were true, he could not bring an adverse possession action until 2027 because the
property was foreclosed in 2012, and a successful adverse possession claim requires 15
years of open, adverse possession. The same filing included McGinn's answer to Dies Jr.'s
petition.

       About three weeks after McGinn filed her motion to dismiss, Dies Jr. filed an
amended petition that presented a different reason why the court should find he owned the
tract. Dies Jr. contended that Wells Fargo failed to make a reasonable effort in the 2012
foreclosure case to notify Dies Sr. and Ruthann—the parties to whom Carol Dies
conveyed the challenged property in 2011—of the pending foreclosure of the same
property. He argued that the deed from his grandmother to his parents was properly
recorded, yet Wells Fargo made no reasonable effort to determine the names and
residences of all owners or interested parties to the real estate subject to foreclosure,
including Dies Sr. and Ruthann, in violation of K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-307(c).

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       Three days later—before McGinn or any other party responded to the amended
petition—Dies Jr. moved for summary judgment on the same grounds. In his motion, he
argued the interests of Dies Sr. and Ruthann "were disregarded or flagrantly ignored"
when Wells Fargo failed to make a reasonable effort to ascertain their names as interested
parties. Dies Jr. then argued no genuine issues of material facts existed and, therefore, he
was entitled to summary judgment.

       In April 2022, McGinn filed an amended motion to dismiss and amended answer,
arguing Dies Jr. failed to join Wells Fargo as a necessary party and his claims were time
barred. She also opposed Dies Jr.'s motion for summary judgment for several reasons. She
asserted his motion did not comply with Supreme Court Rule 141 (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at
223) because he did not follow the procedural guidelines; the motion was not timely
because it was filed before any answer or discovery; and his relief could not be granted
because his claim concerned Wells Fargo, not McGinn.

       On April 20, 2022, Dies Jr. responded to McGinn's motion to dismiss and amended
his motion for summary judgment. The portion labeled as his amended motion for
summary judgment seemingly attempted to cure his Rule 141 procedural errors, including
amendments to provide descriptive statements and references to evidence attached as
exhibits. McGinn responded that judgment was inappropriate for the reasons she had
previously asserted.

       The district court held a hearing on McGinn's motion to dismiss and took the matter
under advisement. About three weeks later, the court denied McGinn's motion. In doing
so, the court found that Wells Fargo was not a necessary party to this quiet title action
because Dies Jr. "seeks no redress against Wells Fargo."

       After the district court handed down this ruling, Dies Jr. proceeded to file several
amendments and additions to his summary judgment motion. These included an

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"Additional and Supplemental Memorandum to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment" on June 6, 2022, and a "Second Supplemental Memorandum to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment" on June 20, 2022. And on July 19, 2022—the same day
as the hearing on his summary judgment motion—Dies Jr. filed two new documents:
"Plaintiff's Brief on Motion for Summary Judgment" and "Exhibit Clarifications."

       McGinn objected to the late filings, arguing they were "more evidence to the fact
that we have issues of material fact that still need to be determined and discovered."
McGinn also argued summary judgment was improper because material facts were
disputed and Dies Jr. was improperly relying on inferences and controverted facts to
conclude the foreclosure was defective. Dies Jr. argued there were no genuine issues of
material fact because Wells Fargo could have conducted a diligent search and found Carol
conveyed the property 11 months before Wells Fargo filed the foreclosure action.

       On August 5, 2022, the district court issued a written ruling granting Dies Jr.'s
motion for summary judgment and essentially voiding the 2012 foreclosure judgment. The
district court found the deed conveying the property from Carol to Dies Sr. "was
ascertainable and available for review and discovery by Wells Fargo by examining the
records in the office of the Marion County Register of Deeds." It also found Wells Fargo
failed in its duty to make reasonable efforts to determine the names and residences of all
interested parties of the challenged real estate. The district court concluded "the facts
clearly established a denial of due process" and, therefore, the foreclosure action and
resulting deed conveyances "are all void as they pertain to the real estate that is the subject
of this case." The district court held: "The interests of Ronald L. Dies and Ruthann Dies
were disregarded. Therefore, their right to the real estate and Plaintiff's interests in said
real estate is [sic] superior to any claim of Jeanne Diane McGinn."

       As for McGinn's defenses, the district court found the parties had the opportunity to
investigate and complete discovery since the case was filed on January 28, 2022, almost

                                               6
six months before the hearing on Dies Jr.'s motion for summary judgment. The district
court further found there were no genuine issues of material fact: "There is nothing left to
speculate regarding the process of the foreclosure in [2012], nor the method in which
Ronald L. Dies Jr., the Plaintiff, came to own the property which is the subject of this
case."

         McGinn appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

         McGinn challenges the district court's decision in four ways. First, she argues the
court erred when it granted judgment to Dies Jr. because he lacked standing to assert his
parents' due process rights. Second, she argues that even if Dies Jr. has standing, the
district court should have granted her motion to dismiss because Wells Fargo was a
necessary party, given Dies Jr.'s efforts to void the 2012 foreclosure. In her third and
fourth arguments, she claims summary judgment was inappropriate for several reasons,
including that Dies Jr. should not be able to collaterally attack the final judgment through
a quiet title action.

I.       DIES JR. HAS STANDING TO ADVANCE HIS QUIET TITLE CLAIM

         McGinn argues Dies Jr. lacks standing to advance his central claim in this quiet
title action—that Wells Fargo violated his parents' due process rights during the 2012
foreclosure action by failing to provide them with proper notice of the foreclosure.
Essentially, McGinn argues that Dies Jr. lacks standing because he is attempting to assert
the due process rights of his parents and, thus, cannot show that he personally suffered a
cognizable injury related to the alleged foreclosure misconduct.

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       McGinn concedes this issue was not raised below. McGinn states that we can
consider this issue for the first time on appeal because it is a question of law and standing
can be raised for the first time on appeal. In response, Dies Jr. does not argue in his brief
against us considering this issue.

Standard of Review

               "Standing is a jurisdictional question whereby courts determine whether a plaintiff
       has alleged a sufficient stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of
       jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on the plaintiff's behalf.
       Because standing implicates the court's jurisdiction to hear a case, the existence of
       standing is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited." Board
       of Sumner County Comm’rs v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 745, Syl ¶ 1, 189 P.3d 494 (2008).

Because standing is a part of subject matter jurisdiction, "the issue may be raised by the
parties or the court at any time. Vorhees v. Baltazar, 283 Kan. 389, 397, 153 P.3d 1227
(2007)." U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. McConnell, 48 Kan. App. 2d 892, 897, 305 P.3d 1
(2013). In considering whether a party has standing, a court determines whether a party
"'has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant
invocation of jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or
her behalf.'" Bremby, 286 Kan. at 750-51.

Analysis

       McGinn contends that Dies Jr. lacks standing because he is filing the quiet-title
claim as a third party—asserting his parents' claim of a due-process violation on their
behalf. Dies Jr. responds that in his quiet-title action against McGinn, he is invoking
K.S.A. 60-1002, which provides a "right of action" for "quieting or determining title or
interest in property." Under K.S.A. 60-1002(a): "An action may be brought by any person
claiming title or interest in personal or real property, including oil and gas leases, mineral

                                                      8
or royalty interests, against any person who claims an estate or interest therein adverse to
him or her, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim." "Ordinarily a quiet title
action is brought to remove a cloud from the title." Ford v. Sewell, 188 Kan. 767, 771, 366
P.2d 285 (1961).

       K.S.A. 60-1002(a) identifies the personal stake that the party bringing a quiet-title
action must claim: title or interest in personal or real property, including oil and gas
leases, mineral or royalty interests. On a basic level, "in order to properly bring a quiet
title action pursuant to [K.S.A. 60-1002], a person must claim 'title or interest' in the real
property." Dubowy v. Baier, 856 F. Supp. 1491, 1497 (D. Kan. 1994). Likewise, "[t]he
person against whom the action is brought must 'claim[] an estate or interest therein which
is adverse to that of the owner' who filed the action, and '[t]he action may be brought for
the purpose of determining such adverse claims.' LaBarge v. City of Concordia, 23 Kan.
App. 2d 8, 927 P.2d 487, 494 (1996)." Leathers v. Leathers, 856 F.3d 729, 747-48 (10th
Cir. 2017); see also Ford v. Willits, 9 Kan. App. 2d 735, 740, 688 P.2d 1230 (1984), aff'd
237 Kan. 13, 697 P.2d 834 (1985) (plaintiffs who were successor trustees who brought
quiet title action on behalf of trust had standing because they were "the real parties in
interest" and thus had standing to bring action on behalf of trust).

       Dies Jr. asserts that he has standing because the purpose of a quiet title action is to
"clarify and correct [the] errors." We agree. Dies Jr. asserts that he is the owner of the tract
in question by way of the transfer-on-death deed from his father. Because Dies Jr. purports
to have title to that land, he has standing to bring this quiet title action to determine the
rightful owner of that property.

                                                9
II.    THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING WELLS FARGO
       WAS NOT A NECESSARY PARTY

       McGinn alternatively argues the district court should have dismissed Dies Jr.'s
quiet title action for a different reason. She asserts that Wells Fargo is a necessary party
under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-219(a)(1) because Dies Jr. is essentially trying to void the
2012 foreclosure by Wells Fargo.

       We review the denial of a motion to join a necessary party under K.S.A. 60-219(a)
under an abuse of discretion standard. Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, Syl.
¶ 1, 216 P.3d 158 (2009). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on
an error of fact. Biglow v. Eidenberg, 308 Kan. 873, 893, 424 P.3d 515 (2018).

       District Court's Rulings on Wells Fargo as a Necessary Party

       At the district court, McGinn moved to dismiss the action, stating that Dies Jr.
should have joined Wells Fargo as a necessary party. In its May 25, 2022 order, the court
viewed McGinn's argument with the understanding that Dies Jr. was still proceeding under
the theory of adverse possession. Under this lens, the court stated that Wells Fargo was
not a necessary party: "While Plaintiff alleges Wells Fargo NA failed to make a
reasonable search as required in K.S.A. 60-307(c), Plaintiff seeks no redress against Wells
Fargo."

       In the district court's August 5, 2022 order, the court confirmed its earlier denial to
join Wells Fargo as a necessary party under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-212(b)(7). Specifically,
the court stated: "Plaintiff makes no claim that his ownership comes through Wells Fargo,
and the Court has previously found that Wells Fargo is not a necessary party." The court
further stated that whether McGinn had "a cause of action or claim against Wells Fargo,

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the Secretary of Veterans Affair[s], or Ricky L. McGinn is not a subject of this case. That
is a separate cause of action."

Analysis

       We begin our analysis under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-219(a)(1), which states:

       "A person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party if:
               "(A) In that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among
       existing parties; or
               "(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
       situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
                    (i) As a practical matter, impair or impede the person's ability to protect the
                    interest; or
                    (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
                    multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest."

       McGinn's argument fails to explain why Wells Fargo is necessary or why this case
cannot be resolved without joining Wells Fargo. McGinn cites subsection (A) as a ground
for arguing Wells Fargo is a required party, yet she presents no argument related to the
applicability of that subsection and how, in Wells Fargo's absence, "the court cannot
accord complete relief among existing parties." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-219(a)(1)(A).
Rather, on appeal, she seems to solely argue Wells Fargo is a required party because
Wells Fargo's claimed interest in the real estate leaves her, an existing party, "subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations because
of the interest" under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-219(a)(1)(B)(ii). In response, Dies Jr. argues
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-219 is not applicable because it "is relevant only if complete relief
can be obtained from that 'necessary' party."

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          In Ford v. Willits, 9 Kan. App. 2d 735, the successor trustees, under a quiet title
action, sued Willits, the purchaser of the mineral rights at a tax-foreclosure sale, asserting
that the tax foreclosure sale should be found void because the Board of Jefferson County
Commissioners and Jefferson County Abstract Company had failed to properly notify
them in that action. The successor trustees did not assert that the parties responsible for
notifying them of the tax foreclosure sale should be joined as defendants, and the opinion
does not indicate that Willits moved for the district court to join them as defendants.
Rather, Willits filed a third-party action against the Board and the abstract company under
K.S.A. 79-2804b, a procedure unique to tax foreclosures.

          The tax foreclosure procedure in Ford differs from a typical mortgage foreclosure
action in many ways. But the broader principle regarding necessary (previously called
indispensable) parties holds true. Ford shows that McGinn could file a third-party action
against Wells Fargo for indemnification or other damages incurred, but Wells Fargo was
not a necessary party in the quiet title action. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-219(a)(1)(B) states
that the required party must be joined if "that person claims an interest related to the
subject of the action." Wells Fargo does not claim an interest in this quiet title action. See
Newman v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 14 Kan. App. 2d 648, 654, 804 P.2d 353
(1990) (finding a person was not an indispensable party when he was "neither an owner
nor a supposed owner of the land in question and he does not claim an interest in the
land").

          Wells Fargo is not an owner or supposed owner of the tract in question here, nor
has Wells Fargo claimed an interest in that property. Thus, the district court did not err
when it found Wells Fargo was not a necessary party in this quiet title case.

                                                12
III.   THE DISTRICT COURT DID ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

       In her remaining arguments on appeal, McGinn offers several reasons why she
believes the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Dies Jr. We need not
address all those arguments here, as we find one dispositive. Namely, McGinn asserts the
trial court erred by allowing Dies Jr. to collaterally attack, and ultimately void, the final
judgment in the 2012 foreclosure case. We agree and reverse the district court's judgment.

Standard of review

       The standard of review for appeal from an order of summary judgment is well-
settled:

       "Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
       interrogatories, admissions on file, and supporting affidavits show that no genuine issue
       exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
       law. The district court must resolve all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the
       evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing summary
       judgment, a party must produce evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In
       order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to
       the conclusive issue in the case. Appellate courts apply the same rules and, where they
       find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence,
       summary judgment is inappropriate. Appellate review of the legal effect of undisputed
       facts is de novo." GFTLenexa, LLC v. City of Lenexa, 310 Kan. 976, 981-82, 453 P.3d 304
       (2019).

Analysis

       McGinn argues the district court erred by essentially reopening the 2012
foreclosure judgment in a separate civil case. We agree. In Kansas, it is "settled law" that

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       "when a mortgage on real property is foreclosed, and the property is sold and the sale
       confirmed, such confirmation is res judicata and becomes a final and binding judgment of
       the court, subject only to the right of appeal, which cannot be collaterally attacked after the
       time for appeal has passed and after the term of court has changed, except in accordance
       with the civil code." National Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Kemp, 184 Kan. 648, 656, 339 P.2d
       368 (1959).

Moore v. McPherson, 106 Kan. 268, 187 P. 884 (1920); see also 59A C.J.S., Mortgages
§ 1152 ("Confirmation of a mortgage-foreclosure sale is a final judgment which, when not
appealed from or vacated or set aside in a direct proceeding, is binding on the parties and
their privies and conclusive as to the regularity of the proceedings so as to preclude a
collateral attack thereon. It passes at least equitable title to the purchaser.").

       McGinn cites McFadden v. McFadden, 187 Kan. 398, 357 P.2d 751 (1960), to
illustrate this principle. There, the plaintiffs attempted to challenge a prior judgment
through a quiet title action. The McFadden court emphatically stated: "It is a well-
established rule that where a court . . . renders a judgment within its competency, such
judgment is final and conclusive, unless corrected or modified on appeal." 187 Kan. at
402.

       McGinn also asserts that because the foreclosure judgment is final, "such orders
cannot be redressed by another court in a different cause of action." She cites Cross v.
Hodges, 124 Kan. 672, 261 P. 585 (1927), which speaks to the finality of the judgment of
a district court in a prior case. The Hodges court explained that objections by the
defendant of whether the plaintiff vendors had tendered a good and merchantable title to
the defendant "had been effectively disposed of in prior litigation," and thus the interests
of all concerned in the property "had been defined, determined, and concluded." 124 Kan.
672, Syl. Accordingly, McGinn argues, the district court should not have permitted Dies
Jr. to challenge the foreclosure mortgage in a separate cause of action. As these cases have
shown, the 2012 foreclosure judgment was final and binding.

                                                    14
         In seeking to collaterally attack the final and binding judgment, Dies Jr. relies upon
cases regarding quiet title actions in tax-foreclosure cases. Likewise, in its order, the
district court relies on Chapin v. Aylward, 204 Kan. 448, 464 P.2d 177 (1970), in support
of its decision. But Chapin, and similar cases such as Ford v. Willits, 9 Kan. App. 2d 735,
all relate to readdressing tax foreclosure judgments. K.S.A. 79-2804b allows limited
collateral attacks in these cases for a limited period of time. See Pierce v. Board of
Leavenworth County Comm'rs, 200 Kan. 74, 79, 434 P.2d 858 (1967). But that procedure
is not available in cases that do not involve tax foreclosures. Consequently, that procedure
and the cases discussing it are not available to attack the 2012 foreclosure action by Wells
Fargo.

         Moreover, we note that Dies Jr.'s attempt to collaterally attack the final judgment
while seeking a clean title improperly relies on diminishing McGinn's title, rather than
proving the soundness of his claim. In a quiet title action: "To prevail, the plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his own title, and not the weakness of his adversary's title." Ford v.
Willits, 9 Kan. App. 2d at 745. The plaintiff has the "burden of proof to show superior
title." Beams v. Werth, 200 Kan. 532, 543, 438 P.2d 957 (1968). Here Dies Jr.'s quiet title
claim only challenges McGinn's title without establishing the strength of his own title; his
claim improperly attacks McGinn's title. See Crone v. Nuss, 46 Kan. App. 2d 436, 451,
263 P.3d 809 (2011) (finding plaintiff "inappropriately" attacked landowner's title under
quiet title action).

         We therefore agree with McGinn's argument that Dies Jr.'s quiet title action is not
the proper means to challenge McGinn's title to the real property. The better vehicle to
challenge the alleged due process violation in the 2012 foreclosure case is under K.S.A.
2022 Supp. 60-260(b)(4), which provides an avenue for seeking relief from a final
judgment when "the judgment is void." See Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hatton,
156 Kan. 673, Syl. ¶ 2, 135 P.2d 559 (1943) ("When a judgment has been entered in a
case and has become final, it cannot be collaterally attacked in a subsequent proceeding

                                               15
unless it appears that the judgment is void."). Whether Dies Jr. would be permitted,
several years later, to reopen and intervene in that case, is at best questionable at this
point. But it is also academic, as Dies Jr. has not sought to intervene in that previous
proceeding. What he could not do is what he tried to do here—collaterally challenge that
long-final judgment by way of a separate lawsuit. The district court erred as a matter of
law when it allowed him to do so and entered summary judgment in his favor.

       Before closing, we pause to note one other reason why the court's grant of
summary judgment was improper. Kansas courts have long emphasized that in most cases,
courts should not take up motions for summary judgment before discovery is complete. As
McGinn notes, discovery had not yet been completed before the district court declared
summary judgment in Dies Jr.'s favor. In fact, the district court had only recently ruled on
McGinn's motion to dismiss.

       Under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-226(b)(1), all relevant, nonprivileged material is
discoverable, and all material that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible material is discoverable. The district court only lists four facts in its order
granting summary judgment; the facts include nothing about whether, for example, Dies
Jr.'s parents were ever actually served with notice of the foreclosure or actually knew
about the foreclosure—matters central to a due-process claim in that case. Nor do the facts
note that a final judgment was entered in the foreclosure case in 2012. And the district
court drew inferences from the limited facts provided in favor of Dies Jr.—a judicial
action directly contrary to the summary judgment framework. See GFTLenexa, LLC v.
City of Lenexa, 310 Kan. at 981-82.

       Given the limited nature of the discovery that occurred here, it is not surprising that
the uncontroverted facts are minimal in nature. Discovery seemed very rushed and
included only the submitted exhibits. These problems were exacerbated by Dies Jr.'s
multiple motion and amended motion filings—all within a short span of weeks—which

                                               16
demonstrate the wisdom of a more methodical approach. Courts are understandably wary
of summary judgment rulings made when the discovery has not yet been completed. See
Lawrence v. Deemy, 204 Kan. 299, 302, 461 P.2d 770 (1969) ("'Summary judgment
should not be entered if there remains a genuine issue of a material fact, nor where the
opposing party is proceeding with due diligence with his pretrial discovery but has not had
an opportunity to complete it.'"); Med James, Inc. v. Barnes, 31 Kan. App. 2d 89, 96, 61
P.3d 86 (2003) ("Summary judgment is generally improper when discovery is incomplete.
Bell v. Kansas City, Kansas, Housing Authority, 268 Kan. 208, 220, 992 P.2d 1233
[1999]."). This case illustrates why such premature motions are often inappropriate.

       The 2012 foreclosure action resulted in a final judgment, binding on the parties to
that case and on litigants in future cases—including in this case. If Dies Jr. seeks to
challenge that judgment, the only potential remedy lies in seeking to amend that judgment
in the 2012 foreclosure case. The district court erred when it allowed him to collaterally
attack that earlier decision in a separate quiet title action. Thus, we find the district court
erred in granting summary judgment in Dies Jr.'s favor.

       Reversed and remanded.

                                               17