Court Opinion

ID: 9529071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:47:12.717378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:38.972359
License: Public Domain

Dissent
CARSON, J.
I disagree with the final paragraph of the opinion in this case. The decision of the Metropolitan'Board of Zoning Appeals was by two out of five members. The petition for Writ of Certiorari, among other things, attacked the legality of this decision. Under §53-979, Burns’ 1956 Replacement, paragraph 3, we find the following language:
“In passing upon the legality of the decision of the board of zoning appeals, the court may reverse or affirm, wholly- or in part, or may modify the decision of the board of zoning appeals brought up for review.”
In the case of Lyons v. Delaware Liquor Commission, 58 A. 2d 889, 895, in discussing the right of . the commission to change an order previously entered we find the following language:
“We think that the Commission’s power to make a decision implies a power to vacate it, where cause is shown, within a limited period. 43 Am. Jur. pp. 535 et seq. However, the power does not exist after the expiration of the ten-day period for taking an appeal.”
In 2 Am. .Jur, Administrative Law, §523, p. 335, we conclude the general rule to be as some courts have held that administrative agencies do not have the inherent power to re-open and re-consider orders on the theory that if such power were recognized there would be no limitation on the power and that it could be *416exercised at any time and there would be no end to litigation.
In 168 A.L.R., p. 127, under the subject of zoning we find that an administrative agency does not have authority to reconsider and re-open proceedings while judicial review is pending.
In the case of Citizens Street R. Co. v. Heath (1899), 154 Ind. 363 55 N. E. 107, our Supreme Court had before it an application for Writ of Certiorari to be issued to the clerk of the lower court to correct certain alleged errors and omissions in the record. The court pointed out that neither affidavits nor parol evidence will be . accepted or considered by the court for. the purpose of contradicting the verified petition for the writ. Extending this conclusion I feel that the "only thing which the Metropolitan Board could do in this case was to certify its record at the time of the filing of the petition for the writ and it had no jurisdiction in this case to amend or change that record before making its return to the order.
In the case of Riker v. Board of Standards & Appeals (1929), 225 App. Div. 570, 234 N. Y. S. 42, cited in 168 A. L. R., p. 127 the following language is set out:
“The granting of an order of certiorari to review the determination of a zoning board of appeals deprives the board of jurisdiction to take any further action in the matter.”
The Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals had entered an illegal order and had lost jurisdiction to change that order. The directive to the trial court should be a reversal of the trial court’s judgment and order to the trial court to enter a judgment to. the effect that the decision of the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals was illegal and that the order of the *417Marion County Board, of Zoning Appeals should be affirmed.
Note. — Reported in 209 N. E. 2d 36.