Court Opinion

ID: 9459373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:18:52.40063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:08.490734
License: Public Domain

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part):
With the appeal now moot,1 and resultantly the need for its dismissal plain, the sole question remaining for our decision is the disposition which the District Court is to make of its order of January 26, 1971, to aspects of which the appeal is exclusively addressed. My views on this phase of the case differ significantly from those of my colleagues. I think appellees’ request that we direct the District Court to vacate the order should be denied as to the portions thereof which were not subjected to the appeal. But I also think United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,2 to which this circuit has long adhered, requires vacation of so much of the order as appellants sought to have us review. The court’s disposition of the present appeal leaves the order intact and that, I believe, is a clear departure from the wholesome practice which Munsingwear approved and which this court has adopted as its own. From such a disposition, I must respectfully dissent.
I
As Munsingwear reveals, the Supreme Court’s “established practice in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending . decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.”3 The objective of this procedure, the Court explains, is to “clear [] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminate [] a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.”4 Thus, “[w]hen that procedure is followed, the rights of all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which in the statutory scheme [is] only preliminary.”5
The practice noted in Munsingwear has found frequent acceptance in the federal circuits.6 In this jurisdiction, we have taken Munsingwear as a mandate. In Acheson v. Droesse,7 decided shortly after Munsingwear, we read the latter as “apparently intended by the Supreme Court to announce a rule for the guidance of the United States Courts of Appeals in disposing of cases *921which become moot pending appeal.”8 “[T]he language of the Supreme Court in the Munsingwear case,” we said, “clearly directs the Courts of Appeals that in all civil cases in the United States courts which become moot pending appeal, and in which a motion to dismiss as moot is accompanied by a motion, to direct that the judgment below be vacated, both motions should be granted.”9 And down through the years since Acheson, we have consistently adhered to that understanding.10
The opinion in Munsingwear makes clear, however, that a party ordinarily entitled to the relief Munsingwear affords may debar himself from obtaining it. There the Government had filed a two-count complaint against Munsingwear alleging violations of a regulation establishing maximum prices for commodities which it sold. The first count sought an injunction, and the second treble damages; and, by agreement and an order of the court, proceedings on the second count were held in abeyance pending final determination of the first-count claim for injunction. A similar arrangement was made in a separate suit for treble damages raising the same issues for a different period. The District Court held that the questioned prices complied with the regulation and entered a judgment of dismissal.11 The Government appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal the involved commodity was decontrolled. On Munsingwear’s motion, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for mootness, making no provision for vacation of the District Court’s judgment.12 Munsingwear then moved in the District Court for dismissal of the treble damage claims on the ground that the unreversed judgment of that court on the injunction phase was res judicata of those claims. The District Court granted the motion, the Court of Appeals affirmed,13 and the case then went to the Supreme Court.14
As the Court stated, had the Government insisted upon vacation of the District Court’s judgment when the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for mootness, it would have been entitled to a direction to that effect.15 But the Government did not pursue that course; it made no motion to vacate the judgment, but simply acquiesced in the dismissal. Consequently, the Court held, it was not entitled to relief — -in the form of an exception to the doctrine of res judicata — from the District Court’s judgment.16
It is against this backdrop that the disposition appropriate to the case at bar is to be fashioned. One question to be addressed is whether the situation presented falls within the general ambit of the Munsingwear doctrine. Another is whether the parties on either side of this appeal have disabled themselves from sharing in the benefits Munsingwear confers. To a consideration of these I now proceed.
II
The order subjected to this appeal— the order of January 26, 197117— favored appellants in some respects and *922appellees in others. To appellants’ detriment, it rejected the demand that the court direct repairs putting the premises in suit in habitable condition through the medium of a receivership or by imposition of that responsibility upon appellees.18 It was the refusal to grant the request in either alternative that appellants sought to have altered on this appeal. Now that the appeal must be dismissed for mootness, their entitlement under Munsingwear to vacation of those portions of the January 26 order appealed would normally follow. In my view, indeed it does.
I am mindful of the fact that appellants here, like the Government in Munsingwear,19 have not requested vacation of any part of the order, but that, I think, could hardly justify us in ignoring the teachings of Munsingwear. Long before Munsingwear was decided, the Supreme Court declared that the practice it was later to describe in Munsingwear was “the duty of the appellate court.”20 To such a duty Munsingwear took pains to itself advert.21 As a judge, I endeavor to discharge what by higher authority I am told is my plain duty whether I am asked by litigants to do so or not. I perceive no obstacle to discharge of our Munsingwear duty here simply because the court reviewed in Munsingwear omitted a response to it there.22 In sum, I would abide Munsingwear sua sponte.
I am mindful, too, that relitigation of the issues on which appellants lost in the District Court seems unlikely, but that does not argue effectively against an application of Munsingwear. That very consideration was advanced to us in Aeheson v. Droesse,23 where it was urged that we distinguish Munsingwear on that basis.24 We declined the invitation, pointing out that “among the cases cited by the Supreme Court in the” Munsingwear opinion25 “there are instances in which there was no possibility of further litigation of the issues between the parties in the case on appeal even arising, and yet the Court ordered the lower court’s judgment vacated.”26 The fact of the matter is that offtimes courts are not in position to know whether the controversy has ground to a definite halt or not, and this case is no exception.27 The better part of justice is *923to liberate the parties from the shackles of res judicata rather than hazard a guess as to what the future may hold.
Turning now to appellees’ motion that the January 26 order be vacated in its entirety, that relief in their favor is neither warranted nor possible. The appeal in this case brought before us for review only the parts of the order appellants complained of — the provisions which were unfavorable to them. Since appellees took no appeal from that order, two consequences disastrous to their request follow. In the first place, the unappealed portions of the order have long since become final,28 and we now lack jurisdiction to disturb them.29 In the second place, the Munsingwear doctrine was never intended to afford protection to parties in the position occupied by appellees. Their evident objective is to avoid the conelusiveness of the declaration of principles representing appellants’ partial victory in the District Court.30 But obviously, as an eminent author has stated, “[i]t would be quite destructive of the principle of judicial finality to put such a litigant in a position to destroy the collateral eonclusiveness of a judgment by destroying his *924own right to appeal.”31 Nothing in Munsingwear supports such an approach; rather, the rule is well settled that the operation of the doctrine of res judicata is unaffected by the fact that the party sought to be concluded did not appeal from the adversity wrought by the judgment.32 The situation as to appellees is not one in which the January 26 order should at their behest be vacated in toto “to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness,” as distinguished from failure to appeal, “from spawning any legal consequences.”33 It is only as to the rulings against appellants which have since become “unreviewable because of mootness . ”34 that vacation is called for, but as to them the call, in my view, is clear.

. Mootness follows, not necessarily from appellants’ involuntary vacation of their apartments, see Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 139 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 433 F.2d 497 (1970), reviewed on the merits, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 17, 463 F.2d 853 (1972); cf. Gaddis v. Dixie Realty Co., 136 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 420 F.2d 245 (1969), but from the impossibility, under the circumstances described in the majority opinion, of their ever regaining occupancy.

. 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950).

. Id. at 39, 71 S.Ct. at 106 (footnote omitted).

. Id. at 40, 71 S.Ct. at 107.

. Id.

. See Lumus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 E.2d 915, 931-932 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911, 81 S.Ct. 274, 5 L.Ed.2d 225 (1960); Bodkin v. United States, 226 F.2d 55, 56 (2d Cir. 1959); Industrial Dev. Co. v. Thompson, 231 F.2d 825, 828-829 (8th Cir. 1956); Sawyer v. Pioneer Mill Co., 300 F.2d 200, 201-202 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814, 83 S.Ct. 24, 9 L.Ed.2d 55 (1962).

. 90 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 197 F.2d 574 (1952).

. Id. at 146, 197 F.2d at 577.

. Id. at 147, 197 F.2d at 578. See text, infra at notes 19-22.

. See Schoop v. Mitchell, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 405, 406, 444 F.2d 863, 864, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988, 91 S.Ct. 1663, 29 L.Ed.2d 154 (1971); Cadillac Pub. Co. v. Summerfield, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 344, 267 F.2d 620, 621 (1958); Anderson v. Morgan, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 67, 263 F.2d 903, 904, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 846, 80 S.Ct. 99, 4 L.Ed.2d 84 (1959); Dulles v. Nathan, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 190, 192, 225 F.2d 29, 31 (1955).

. Bowles v. Munsingwear, Inc., 63 F.Supp. 933, 938 (D.Minn.1945).

. Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F.2d 125, 127-128 (8th Cir. 1947).

. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 178 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1949).

. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., supra note 2.

. 340 U.S. at 40, 71 S.Ct. 104.

. Id. at 40-41, 71 S.Ct. 104.

. Masszonia v. Washington, 321 F.Supp. 965 (D.D.C.1971).

. Id. at 970-971.

. See text supra at notes 15-16.

. “Where it appears upon appeal that the controversy has become entirely moot, it is the duty of the appellate court to set aside the decree below and to remand the case with directions to dismiss.” Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 267, 57 S.Ct. 202, 205, 81 L.Ed. 178 (1936) (Citations omitted).

. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., supra note 2, 340 U.S. at 39-40, 71 S.Ct. 104.

. It will be noted that it was the Court of Appeals, Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., supra note 12, 162 F.2d at 127-128, not the Supreme Court, that dismissed the appeal without vacating the judgment appealed from.

. Supra note 7.

. 90 U.S.App.D.C. at 146-147, 197 F.2d at 576-577.

. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., supra note 2, 340 U.S. at 39-40 n. 2, 71 S.Ct. at 106.

. Acheson v. Droesse, supra note 7, 90 U.S.App.D.C. at 147, 197 F.2d at 577. The cases to which we referred were Brownlow v. Schwarts, 261 U.S. 216, 43 S.Ct. 263, 67 L.Ed. 620 (1923), and Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468, 37 S.Ct. 208, 61 L.Ed. 441 (1917).

. While appellants have thus far invoked only' equitable remedies, the possibility of relief of a different character is not foreclosed. And, as the District Court’s findings vividly attest, there is much that can be complained about. The apartment complex in which they resided was permitted to operate for eight years without a certificate of occupancy, and for two years within an apartment house license, Masszonia v. Washington, 315 F.Supp. 529, 531-532 (D.D.C.1970); Masszonia v. Washington, supra note 17, 321 F.Supp. at 967, and during those periods the premises deteriorated appallingly. In the words of the District Court, “ [a]s of May, 1970, the housing inspectors noted over 1,000 violations of the Housing Code on the premises in question, reflecting the general intolerable conditions that have *923existed for many years, unattended and unabated. ... In addition, the owner's rental of these structures was apparently contrary to law, and the authorities, who were aware of the situation, tolerated noncompliance.” Masszonia v. Washington, supra, 315 F.Supp. at 531. See also Masszonia v. Washington, supra note 17, 321 F.Supp. at 968. “These violations,” the court was later to add, “are so numerous, extensive and substantial that the buildings constitute a danger to the health and safety of the occupants.” Masszonia v. Washington, supra, note 17, 321 F.Supp. at 968.
Even after the premises degenerated to this unsavory condition, the occupants’ woes continued to increase. The corporate landlord walked out on the 66 families then residing in the complex and the corporate officers could not be located. Id. at 967. But for the intervention of the District Court, the occupants would have been without basic utility services from mid-1970 onward. See Masszonia v. Washington, supra, 315 F.Supp. at 532-533. Matters finally worsened to the point that they had no choice but to move out.
The original and primary transgression producing this shameful state of affairs was the landlord’s. But those legally charged with the duty of supervising leased housing in the District of Columbia do not appear to be free from blame. In this very litigation, “[t]he Corporation Counsel . . . point[ed] out that there are perhaps some 100,000 persons living in the District under conditions quite comparable to those which this complaint portrays.” Masszonia v. Washington, supra, 315 F.Supp. at 532. “Enforcement of the housing laws and regulations,” the court declared, “would have prevented the present situation from arising.” Id.
The consequences of this lack of enforcement have fallen upon the group most dependent upon their local government for protection, for, as the District Court found, the named plaintiff in the litigation is “a disabled, low income welfare recipient, representing a class that is best described as generally Tow income with at least twenty-six (26) public assistance recipients. . . . ” Masszonia v. Washington, supra note 17, 321 F.Supp. at 966.
In these circumstances, T cannot say that these hapless victims of official indifference would not have justiciable complaints against the public servants responsible for their plight. My colleagues, however, leave standing the adverse rulings of the District Court which appellants endeavored to have reviewed on this appeal. Since I am unable to say that those rulings might not bar any effort undertaken hereafter, I would vacate them.

. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a). See also cases cited infra note 29.

. Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 405 at 413, 473 F.2d 118 at 124 (1972); Weedon v. Gaden, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 5, 419 F.2d 303, 307 (1969); Lord v. Helmandollar, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 168, 170, 348 F.2d 780, 782 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 928, 86 S.Ct. 929, 15 L.Ed.2d 847 (1966); Whitehead v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 109 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 206, 285 F.2d 282, 286 (1961); Slater v. Peyser, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 315, 200 F.2d 360, 361 (1952); Randolph v. Randolph, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 170, 172, 198 F.2d 956, 958 (1952).

. See Masszonia v. Washington, supra note 17, 321 F.Supp. at 970-971.

. IB Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.416 [6] at 2327 (2d ed. 1965).

. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., supra note 2, 340 U.S. at 39, 41, 71 S.Ct. 104; Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 189-190, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947); Hubbell v. United States, 171 U.S. 203, 206-209, 18 S.Ct. 828, 43 L.Ed. 136 (1898); Wilson’s Ex’r v. Deen, 121 U.S. 525, 532-534, 7 S.Ct. 1004, 30 L.Ed. 980 (1887).

. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., supra note 2, 340 U.S. at 41, 71 S.Ct. 104, 107.

. Id.