Court Opinion

ID: 9664688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:25:43.819151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:08.583476
License: Public Domain

NORVELL, Justice
(dissenting).
As to the analysis of this case, I am not in substantial disagreement with the majority. I feel, however, that my associates have failed to properly evaluate the circumstance that at the time the coercive order here questioned was entered, the plaintiff- had not been adjudgd in contempt of court.
This means that- whenever an order of the kind now before us is questioned, this Court upon an application for writ of mandamus must determine whether or not a constitutional immunity or something similar thereto is involved. In other words, we must necessarily decide whether or not the court below acted within its authorized jurisdiction in rendering the particular order. 58 Am.Jur. 38, Witnesses, § 29; Robertson v. Virginia, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352, 146 A.L.R. 966; Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Bowers, 181 Va. 542, 25 S.E.2d 361. My view is that this issue should be determined in contempt proceedings and a party should not be deprived of his privileges as a litigant “until his contempt has been adjudicated rightfully.” 17 C.J.S., Contempt, § 97, page 139.
The order of the district judge entered with reference to the completion of the deposition in this case is a drastic and unprecedented one. It provides that “this case be, and the same hereby is removed from the settings of the week of April 2, 1951, for another and later setting to be made by the court after such deposition has been completed, and after the defendants have had a reasonable time to make investigation for the preparation of the defense after the completion of such deposition.”
In the reply to the application for writ of mandamus, probably prepared by the attorneys in the case but signed and sworn to by the district judge, it is said: “That such order for the completion of the deposition was and is a proper and valid order. That so much of the order as removed the cause from the settings for the next following weeks, April 2, 1951, was proper for the enforcement of defendants’ right to have such deposition given by the opposing party, and that the portion of the order which provided that after removal for that week it should be ‘for another and later setting’ after completion of the deposition was likewise proper for the enforcement of defendants’ right to take such deposition as given him by law, and the action of removing same from the settings for such purpose was not illegal, unauthorized, arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, but was within the sound discretion of the court in order to secure to the defendants their right to take the deposition.”
This constitutes a bold assertion of the power and authority to employ a stay of proceedings as a sanction to compel the plaintiff to answer questions propounded by *321deposition prior to an adjudication of contempt.
It is my opinion idiat the part of the order providing in effect that the cause shall not be heard nor a setting thereof made until “after such deposition has been completed” is void as being beyond the authority of the court, and that the district judge should be instructed to proceed without reference to this void portion of his order. The part of the order referred to was not entered in accordance with the conceded power of the trial judge to control his docket, but was intended to force the litigant to answer questions under the penalty of having his suit never tried.
A district judge has and should have broad and ample powers to enforce his orders. However, the power to close the doors of the courthouse and refuse to proceed with a judicial hearing is a highly drastic sanction capable of abuse and resulting injustices. While this particular case may not present a question involving constitutional immunities or privileged communications, and the majority opinion, does not render this Court impotent to act in such case, it is nevertheless true that “illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.” 58 Am.Jur. 45, § 37.
Mere force of precedent may often be given a place of disproportionate importance in procedural matters and I do not believe a hundred-year-old method of doing a thing should necessarily be followed today. But a lack of precedent, particularly when it relates to the claimed existence of a broad discretionary governmental power should cause some hesitation and study, for, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Sweeney v. Jarvis, 6 Tex. 36, a discretion without effective limitation takes the form of an arbitrary as distinguished from a legal discretion, which was characterized by Lord Camden, as “the law of tyrants: always unknown, different in different men; casual; depending upon constitution, temper, passion.” 6 Tex. 4Q.
The particular sanction here invoked by the trial court has no basis in either constitutional or statutory enactment. I find no decision by a Texas appellate court which recognizes that such power exists in a district judge. We have apparently administered justice and maintained a form of juridic order from 1840, when Republic of Texas v. McCulloch, reported in Dallam Dig. 357, was decided, until the present time, without invoking or recognizing the power now asserted. It seems that if it now be necessary to place such power with' the district judge, it should be done' by a statutory jurisdictional enactment.
Contempt proceedings are effective to secure answers, regardless- of whether or not the witnesses be parties or interested in the lawsuit on trial. The procedure employed in this case would be effective only against a plaintiff or some person interested in obtaining a judgment of the court. When contempt proceedings are resorted to, the power, authority and jurisdiction of the court to enter the order may be tested by habeas corpus proceedings. 25 Am.Jur. 212-16, Habeas Corpus, §§ 92-97.
This cause seemingly resolves itself into a question of the nature of the proceedings in which it is to be determined whether an order directing that a particular question be answered is legal or is void as being beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Under the majority opinion, when a stay order is invoked by the trial judge, this issue would be determined by this Court upon application for writ of mandamus, wherein we would necessarily have to decide whether or not a constitutional immunity or something similar thereto was involved.
In my opinion, the better and safer procedure would be to determine these matters in a contempt proceeding where the authority of the court to issue the order might be tested by the writ of habeas corpus. In this way the use of a drastic order which fixes a penalty before violation and determination of guilt may be avoided.
I respectfully dissent.'