Court Opinion

ID: 9517057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:02:26.602294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:11.911871
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the part of the majority opinion which holds that under section 2 — 1001(a)(2)(i) of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2— 1001(a)(2)(i) (West 2002)), each plaintiff in a multiple-plaintiff civil case is entitled to one motion for substitution of judge as of right. Contrary to the argument made by Justice Appleton, the payment of one filing fee is not made because “the plaintiffs — no matter how many individuals — are one party.” 355 Ill. App. 3d at 503 (Appleton, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, the statutes pertaining to filing fees either base the fee on the nature of the action itself or recognize that each individual plaintiff in a lawsuit is a “party” and exempt payment by more than one party. For example, the fees of the clerk of the circuit court are based on the population of the county in which the action is filed and on the nature of the action. See 705 ILCS 105/27.1, 27.1a, 27.2, 27.2a (West 2002). Further, numerous statutes require the payment of a fee by “each party” upon filing with the exception that “no additional fee shall be required if more than one party is represented in a single pleading, paper[,] or other appearance.” 55 ILCS 5/5 — 1103 (West 2002) (court-security fee); 705 ILCS 105/27.3a (court-automation fee), 27.3c (document-storage fee) (West 2002). Clearly, joined plaintiffs are not viewed as one party, and therefore each party is entitled to one substitution of judge without cause under the plain language of section 2 — 1001(a)(2)(i) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1001 (a)(2)(i) (West 2002)). Such interpretation will not wreak havoc on the administration of justice. Justice Appleton points to the situation where 1,001 litigants would be entitled to a change of judge. 355 Ill. App. 3d at 504 (Appleton, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, the class action statutes (735 ILCS 5/2 — 801 through 2 — 806 (West 2002)) provide the means for a party to sue as a representative of a class where, among other requirements, the “class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 801(1) (West 2002). In such cases, only the named representative(s) would be considered a “party” entitled to a substitution of judge as a matter of right. I dissent, however, from the majority’s holding affirming the dismissal of the complaints of each of the remaining 16 plaintiffs. The majority argues that the trial court’s orders entered after the improper denial of Zimmer’s motion for substitution of judge are null and void only as to Zimmer and not the remaining 16 plaintiffs. I disagree. Once a proper motion for substitution of judge is brought, any and all orders entered after the motion for substitution should have been granted are a nullity. In re Dominique F., 145 Ill. 2d 311, 324, 583 N.E.2d 555, 561 (1991); Rodisch v. Commacho-Esparza, 309 Ill. App. 3d 346, 351-52, 722 N.E.2d 326, 330 (1999) (granting a new trial after the judge improperly denied the plaintiffs motion for substitution of judge); see also, e.g., In re Petition of C.M.A., 306 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1067, 715 N.E.2d 674, 679 (1999) (holding that “once a motion for substitution of judge for cause is brought, the judge loses all power and authority over the case”). As such, any orders entered after the improper denial of Zimmer’s motion for substitution of judge were null and void. The majority’s result leads to a separation of Zimmer’s case from that of his coplaintiffs, contrary to the wishes of the plaintiffs who brought suit together and which does not further the administration of justice.