Court Opinion

ID: 9833437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:42:50.282431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:02.665222
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee, in his motion for rehearing, has called to our attention the case of Southern Casualty Company v. Morgan (Tex.Civ.App.) 299 S.W. 476, affirmed (Tex.Com.App.) 12 S.W.(2d) 200.
We are convinced from a reading of these two opinions that a municipal corporation, such as the City of Corpus Christi, may become a subscriber under the Workmen’s Compensation Law of Texas, provided the insurance is not carried in a mutual insurance concern. It also seems clear that even though a municipal corporation should carry’workmen’s compensation insurance in a mutual company, that, after the policy has been issued, the premiums paid, and the terms of the policy accepted by an employee, in a suit between an injured employee and the insurance company, such company would be estopped to plead that the insurance policy was void because the city had exceeded its authority in entering into the contract of insurance.
The fact that the city may become a .subscriber under the Workmen’s Compensation Law removes all doubt from our mind as to appellee’s petition being subject to general demurrer for its failure to either allege that the city was a subscriber under the Workmen’s Compensation Law or that appellee’s injury was the result of the negligence of the agents or employees of appellant, City of Corpus Christi. If the city may become a subscriber, there is no reason for any exception to the rule stated in article 8306, section 1, subdivision 4, R.C.S.1925; Davis v. W. T. Carter & Bro. (Tex.Civ.App.) 19 S.W.(2d) 336, 337 (writ refused) ; Hutton v. Burkett (Tex.Civ.App.) 18 S.W.(2d) 740; Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Matthews (Tex.Civ.App.) 20 S.W.(2d) 342.
The trial court found that the. statements by Dr. Watson, to the effect that appellee, Blakey, was well and able to go back to work, were not correct nor true, and that such statements, though innocently made, were sufficient to authorize the setting aside of the receipt and release signed by Blakey and his attorney.
The record does not show that Dr. Watson had any authority to make settlements for the insurance company. These statements were made by Dr. Watson some time before the release was signed, and it is not shown that they were pressed upon Blakey by any agent of the insurance company at the time of the settlement.
In 36 Tex.Jur. p. 813, § 15, it is said: “Where it is sought to set aside a release for personal injuries on the ground of fraudulent representations by the releasee’s physician, it must appear that the representations were made by a physician who was authorized to settle the claim (Chicago, R. I. & G. R. Co. v. Taylor [Tex.Civ.App.] 203 S.W. 90), or that they were fraudulently used by the releasee or his agent taking advantage of the claimant’s confidence in the physician’s judgment to effect a settlement (dis)advantageous to the injured person.” Cowan v. El Paso Elec. R. Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 271 S.W. 79; Gulf, C. & 5. F. R. Co. v. Huyett, 49 Tex.Civ.App. 395, 108 S.W. 502 (error refused).
We adhere to our original holding herein, and accordingly appellee’s motion for a rehearing will be overruled.