Court Opinion

ID: 9953545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:19:20.440526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:57.543476
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 15, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                                Court of Appeals
                                   NO. 2022-CA-0974-MR

CATHERINE M. STEPHENS                                                APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE ERIC JOSEPH HANER, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 15-CR-001560

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Catherine M. Stephens (“Stephens”) appeals from the Jefferson

Circuit Court’s order entered on July 7, 2022, which denied her motion for relief

pursuant to CR1 60.02(e) and (f), CR 60.03, and the Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. We affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
                                     I.   BACKGROUND

                   Stephens entered a Family Dollar located at 3036 Wilson Avenue in

      Louisville, Kentucky on May 28, 2015, where she proceeded to conceal

      multiple items in a large shopping bag. Record (“R.”) at 34. The assistant

      manager of the store attempted to stop Stephens after she triggered the store

      alarm as she left the store. Id. When the assistant manager confronted

      Stephens outside of the store, Stephens fired a handgun at the assistant manager

      wounding his ear. Id.

                   On June 8, 2015, Stephens was indicted for Criminal Attempt

      Murder,2 Robbery in the First Degree,3 and Possession of a Handgun by a

      Convicted Felon.4 R. at 1. Stephens entered into a plea agreement with the

      Commonwealth, under which Stephens would plead guilty but mentally ill to all

      the above charges with a recommended sentence of 15 years’ incarceration as a

      violent offender. R. at 87, 89. On March 1, 2017, the trial court entered final

      judgment against Stephens pursuant to the plea agreement.

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 507.020, 506.010, 506.110.
3
    KRS 515.020.
4
    KRS 527.040.

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                Stephens filed a motion pursuant to CR 60.02 on June 27, 2022, for

    sentence modification due to her suffering from glaucoma.5 R. at 100-05.

    Stephens also argued that her character and circumstances had changed. R. at

    100-05. On July 7, 2022, the trial court denied Stephens’ motion on the

    grounds that she was not entitled to relief under CR 60.02 based on her medical

    condition and that it had no power to grant medical parole. R. at 128-30. This

    appeal followed.

                               II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

               The standard of review concerning a trial court’s denial of a CR 60.02

motion is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Brown v. Commonwealth,

932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996); White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky.

App. 2000). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision

was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Therefore, the trial

court’s decision will be affirmed unless there is a showing of some “flagrant

miscarriage of justice.” Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky.

1983).

5
 This is Stephens’ first post-conviction motion. Stephens did not file a direct appeal or a motion
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42 before filing the current CR
60.02 motion.

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              Questions of constitutionality are reviewed de novo. Phon v.

Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 290 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted).

                                     III.    ANALYSIS

              Stephens argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it

denied her CR 60.02 motion because her glaucoma could be treated better outside

the prison. Further, Stephens argues she is entitled to relief under CR 60.03 and

the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Stephens also raises two

additional issues: (1) the prevalence of COVID-19 should allow for her release,

and (2) she received ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court proceedings.

Neither of these issues was argued before the trial court. Failure to raise those

issues before the trial court prevents our review of them on appeal.6 Henderson v.

Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Ky. 2014).

6
  Even assuming arguendo that the latter two arguments were brought properly on appeal, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Stephens’ motion for relief. “A defendant
who is in custody under sentence . . . is required to avail himself of RCr 11.42 as to any ground
of which he is aware, or should be aware, during the period when the remedy is available to
him.” McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997). The failure to raise issues
that could have and should have been raised on direct appeal or in an RCr 11.42 motion
precludes those issues from being raised in a CR 60.02 motion. Meece v. Commonwealth, 529
S.W.3d 281, 285-86 (Ky. 2017). Furthermore, “[a]ny motion under [RCr 11.42] shall be filed [in
the trial court] within three years after the judgment becomes final[.]” RCr 11.42. Even if
Stephens were to now file an RCr 11.42 motion arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, her
motion would be time barred because more than three years have passed since entry of a final
judgment.
         Additionally, this Court has held that the COVID-19 pandemic does not constitute a
defect in the trial proceedings which would provide grounds for relief under CR 60.02. See
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 640 S.W.3d 99, 102-03 (Ky. App. 2022); Martin v. Commonwealth,
639 S.W.3d 433, 434-36 (Ky. App. 2022) (holding that the threat of contracting COVID-19 is
not a proper reason for relief under CR 60.02).

                                              -4-
              Relief under CR 60.02 is reserved for addressing significant flaws in

trial or other court proceedings which lead to a miscarriage of justice. Wine v.

Commonwealth, 699 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Ky. App. 1985). CR 60.02(f) specifically

allows a court to grant a party relief from a final judgment for “any other reason of

an extraordinary nature justifying relief.” CR 60.02(f). The reasons for granting

relief from judgment under CR 60.02(f) must correlate to “some significant defect

in the trial proceedings or evidence at trial, etc., such that ‘a substantial miscarriage

of justice will result from the effect of the final judgment.’” Wine, 699 S.W.2d at

754 (quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1966)).

              In Wine, this Court determined that family hardships, or changes in

condition, did not qualify for relief under CR 60.02, emphasizing that uncertainty

would arise around final judgments if circumstances outside the trial proceedings

were deemed proper grounds for post-conviction relief. Id. This Court has

extended the holding of Wine to specifically include medical conditions as a

circumstance outside trial which does not qualify for relief under CR 60.02.

Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.3d 738, 739 (Ky. App. 2014) (holding “that

physical ailments of a defendant are not tantamount to trial defects and therefore

do not amount to claims of ‘an extraordinary nature justifying [CR 60.02]

relief.’”).

                                           -5-
             We further reject Stephens’ argument that she is entitled to relief

under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eighth

Amendment is violated “when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so

restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and

at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs – e.g., food, clothing,

shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.” Griffith v. Franklin County, Ky., 975

F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). While Stephens may not believe

she has been provided the absolute best care medically available, she has failed to

demonstrate that her care is not adequate for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.

             Additionally, the remedy for an Eighth Amendment violation is not

release from prison. See Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir.

1990). So even if Stephens had stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim and she

could bring this claim in a closed criminal case, release from prison is not an

available remedy under the Eighth Amendment.

             Finally, Stephens’ claim under CR 60.03 must also fail:

             Rule 60.02 shall not limit the power of any court to
             entertain an independent action to relieve a person from a
             judgment, order or proceeding on appropriate equitable
             grounds. Relief shall not be granted in an independent
             action if the ground of relief sought has been denied in
             a proceeding by motion under Rule 60.02, or would be
             barred because not brought in time under the
             provisions of that rule.

CR 60.03 (emphasis added).

                                          -6-
             The plain language of CR 60.03 requires a separate, independent

action, which Stephens did not file. And, because Stephens’ argument is based

upon the same core grounds that failed to satisfy CR 60.02, she is not entitled to

relief under CR 60.03. Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 888 (Ky. 2014).

                               IV.    CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the July 7, 2022, order of the

Jefferson Circuit Court denying Appellant relief pursuant to CR 60.02, CR 60.03,

and the Eighth Amendment.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Catherine Stephens, pro se                 Daniel Cameron
Pewee Valley, Kentucky                     Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Todd D. Ferguson
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

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