Court Opinion

ID: 9705012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:54:48.493532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:07.460517
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. In Schauer v. Whitehall Borough, 413 Pa. 6, 194 A.2d 318 (1963), we said:
While it is true that a municipality may abolish the office of chief of police and a presumption arises that the municipal officers have acted properly in so doing, where there is affirmative evidence of bad faith on the part of the municipality, a court is justified in disregarding such legislation. Mamallis v. Millbourne Borough, 401 Pa. 375, 378, 164 A.2d 209, 211 (1960).
In view of the affirmative evidence of bad faith presented in this case, the trial court was justified in disregarding resolution 82-9 of the Perkiomen Township Board which abolished the police department, and in ordering reinstatement of all of the police officers.
I can not agree with the notion espoused by the majority that because one of the consequences that resulted from the abolition of the police department was “the savings of substantial revenues,” further judicial inquiry is precluded. Every time a position or an entire department is abolished, it follows that money will be saved because the wages and other expenses associated with the position or department are eliminated. The question still remains whether the action was taken in good faith. The good faith or bad faith of municipal officials in such situations can not be reliability tested by looking only to whether their action resulted in a revenue savings. Municipal legislation enacted in bad faith may be nullified by a court regardless of whether it can be demonstrated that a savings resulted. In the present case, the evidence showed that the township realized a savings of approximately $73,000 as a result of the elimination of the police department. The lower court found nevertheless, that the supervisor’s failure to fund the township police department was not prompted primarily for economic reasons.
*607Additionally, I disagree with the majority in its holding that a court may only find bad faith: (1) where the abolition of a position or department is a subterfuge to avoid a court order, or (2) it is evidenced by the recreation of the same job or same department under a different name. There is nothing in Schauer v. Whitehall Borough, supra, that limits a finding of bad faith to the extent held by the majority.
In Schauer, the Whitehall Borough Council dismissed Willard Schauer from his position of chief of police. The chief filed suit in the County Court of Allegheny County seeking reinstatement. While the suit was pending in the county court, the borough council passed an ordinance abolishing the position of chief of police. Subsequently, the county court found that the dismissal was improper and ordered the chief to be reinstated. On appeal we affirmed.1 When the chief applied for reinstatement based upon the order of court, the borough refused citing the legislation that abolished the position of chief of police. We found the record there contained ample evidence to justify the finding that the ordinance abolishing the position of chief of police was adopted in bad faith by the borough. We said:
Lending credence to this finding is the fact that the action of the borough council was concurrent with pending litigation challenging the right of the borough council to dismiss Schauer from the same office in the first instance. An inference could properly be drawn that the passage of the ordinance under these circumstances was a subterfuge with the purpose of hedging against the possibility of a court ruling that the original dismissal was wrongful.
It is to be noted that the fact that the legislation in question was adopted while the chiefs challenge to his dismissal was pending in the county court was cited as evidence of bad faith and not as a prerequisite to a finding of bad faith.
In the present case there was sufficient evidence that the township supervisors were intent on finding a way to get *608rid of the chief of police. The board was counseled by the township solicitor that the courts would not permit the firing of the chief unless the discharge complied with the provisions of the Police Tenure Act.2 The solicitor advised the board that under the circumstances dismissal of the chief would not comply with that act. The solicitor advised further that in order to get rid of the chief, the board would have to abolish the entire police department and cite financial and budgetary reasons for the action. The township supervisors followed the solicitor’s advice and disbanded the entire police department to accomplish its real objective— discharge of the chief. This drastic action was adopted to avoid the very real probability that if the chief was simply discharged, he would file suit and be reinstated by the courts. This action exhibits bad faith on the part of the supervisors the same as it was bad faith in the Schauer case for the borough council of Whitehall to abolish the position of chief of police while a lawsuit was pending. In Schauer, we found that the action was taken as a subterfuge to hedge against the possibility of a court ruling that would require reinstatement of the discharged chief. In the instant case, the action was taken in order to completely avoid the almost certainty that if the chief was discharged, he would be reinstated by court order. In each instance the actions of the municipal officials constitute evidence of bad faith.
Additionally, the majority states that if the evidence does not establish that the action was taken to evade a court order, then there is only one other way to show bad faith. Citing our decision in Carey v. Altoona, 339 Pa. 541, 16 A.2d 1 (1940), the majority holds that unless the abolished position or department is substantially recreated, a court is precluded from inquiring into the motives of those who voted for the abolition. In other words, according to the majority, the only other circumstances that will demonstrate bad faith is evidence that the position or department eliminated by the municipal officers was later substantially *609recreated. In Schemer, we found bad faith without considering the question of substantial recreation of the abolished position. Whether an office or department is substantially recreated is evidence of bad faith and is not to be elevated to an essential requirement. Such action should be considered along with all other evidence bearing on the question of whether the municipal officials acted in bad faith.
I would hold that the evidence in this case amply shows that the lower court was justified in finding that the township supervisors acted in bad faith in eliminating the township police department. I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court upholding the lower court’s order directing reinstatement of all police officers.

. Schauer Dismissal Case, 401 Pa. 486, 165 A.2d 26 (1960).

. 53 P.S. § 811, et seq.