Court Opinion

ID: 9744822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:17:38.279032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:52.111982
License: Public Domain

YEGAN, J.
In its petition for rehearing, the Attorney General says: “To elaborate on the Court’s metaphor, what is bad for the goose may be bad for the gander, not to mention richly deserved. But it may also harm the gosling . . . .’’In essence, the Attorney General claims that while the opinion may achieve fairness between the litigants, it may do financial harm to the child.
*863To be sure, in every child support case, the court should take into consideration the effect of its ruling on the children. We presume that the trial court, which fashioned the remedy that we affirm, took into consideration the financial impact that its ruling would have on the child. At the time it ruled, the trial court impliedly determined that no adverse financial effect would result and that father had adequate financial resources to support his son on his own. There is no reason for an appellate court to draw a contrary inference. Moreover, we also noted that this was not a case where government funds were being used to support the child. In this situation, the implied factual finding of the trial court is all the more compelling.
The Attorney General challenges the wisdom of our opinion, argues that it defeats the salutary goal of interstate child support collection, and requests that we withdraw publication so that the opinion will only apply to the parties. However, the law of setoff is well settled and it is too late in the day to question the equitable powers of the courts in the enforcement of judgements. The facts and circumstances of the presenting case are compelling, which the trial court obviously recognized. The principles of law put forth in support of the opinion are equally compelling. For these reasons, the request to decertify the opinion for publication is denied.
Should there be a material change of circumstances which necessitates trial court intervention, we presume that the trial court will once again attempt to achieve fairness between the parties, taking into consideration the then financial needs of the child.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
Stone (S. J.), P. J., and Gilbert, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 24, 1998. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.