Court Opinion

ID: 9442947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:05:02.66655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:17.910380
License: Public Domain

CHASE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
If my brothers are right, it would seem both that recovery may now be had under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act as though it were a sort of Workmen’s Compensation Act providing, upon proof of injury, simply for the assessment of damages by a jury, and that hearsay is admissible to prove damages.
Nothing was shown to prove the appellant negligent but that the trap door was not partially opened when the foot pedal was stepped on and that the release mechanism was “rusty.” How “rusty” was not shown and, since it was more or less exposed to the weather, some rust was to be expected. However that may have been, the catch bolt did withdraw as it should, or else the appellee couldn’t have pulled up the door, and the only unusual occurrence was the failure of the mechanism to start the upward movement which might have been because the door was jammed so tight that no pressure which the lever could exert at the point of its contact could move *92it. Without more,. the jury could only speculate, as a matter of law, in finding a defect in the release mechanism. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 53 S.Ct. 391, 77 L.Ed. 819; Lynch v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 2 Cir., 58 F.2d 177. Moreover, the only change wrought by the supposed defect was the elimination of the aid of a facility for opening the door. Its absence put no one in danger and the appellant was free to let the door remain shut and to let the passengers use the steps on the adjacent car, or to open, or try to open, the door manually. That he would be hurt if he elected tp open the door by hand was such a remote possibility that it can hardly be called so foreseeable as to require precautionary measures by the employer to prevent either the occasion for manual opening or any conceivable consequences of it.
Consequently, the regular inspection and repair by the railroad, which were not shown to have been in any respect inadequate, discharged its duty to the appellant, in the absence of proof that after the door stuck the, railroad had had a fair chance to discover and.remedy that condition or the cause of any failure on the part of the release mechanism to overcome it. Even if it can be said that the release mechanism was proved to be out of repair, there was no evidence whatever either to show that the defect had been brought to the actual notice of the railroad or that the condition had existed long enough to charge it with constructive notice. Without some proof of either kind of notice, an essential element to show the railroad’s negligence was lacking, and its motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. Hatton v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 1 Cir., 261 F. 667; Schilling v. Delaware & H. R. Corporation, 2 Cir., 114 F.2d 69; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 8 Cir., 207 F. 521.
To hold that the letters, especially the one from one doctor to the other,, were admissible as records stamped with the likelihood of that accuracy which makes regular business entries admissible, under the federal statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732, and the similar state statutes cited, seems to be a rather complete disregard of what was decided in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645. We should, on the contrary, follow Masterson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 Cir., 182 F.2d 793, which preserves the safeguards which must be respected to determine correctly whether the statute applies.
I would reverse and remand.