Court Opinion

ID: 9769488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:52:32.429174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:04.583851
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that a trial court may rescind its order granting a new trial. But while the majority gives numerous policy reasons in support of such action, they never explore what I view as the only important legal question here — where does a trial court derive its authority to so act?
In Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), we suggested a court’s power to act must be authorized by a specific source: 1
Unless the power or authority of a court to perform a contemplated act can be found in the Constitution or laws enacted thereunder, it is without jurisdiction and its acts without validity.
But this is surely too narrow a view as it would be seem to require that lawmakers contemplate every permissible action a trial court may take and specifically provide for it. We have since recognized that, in addition to express grants of power conferred by constitution, statute, or common law, courts have inherent and implied powers which provide a much broader foundation upon which to act. State v. Johnson, 821 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(eiting with favor Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.1979)). Implied authority arises from specific grants of power. Id. Inherent powers may be “call[ed] upon to aid in the exercise of jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, or in the preservation of its independence and integrity.” Id.; Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398-99; see also Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922, 932-33 & fn. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(daily application of law to facts is duty and inherent power of judiciary).
The majority relies heavily on Rodriguez v. State, 852 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), in support of holding that Matthews should be overruled. In doing so, they point to Rodriguez’ express criticism of the rule in Matthews. The majority misses the more important assumption underlying the Court’s holding in Rodriguez — that a court has inherent power to correct, modify, vacate, or amend its own rulings. In other words, so long as the court does not by its ruling divest itself of jurisdiction or exceed a statutory time table, it can simply change its mind on a *729ruling. The ability to do so is a necessary function of an efficient judiciary. See Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398 & fn. 1 (citing dozens of cases where “Texas courts have recognized or utilized their inherent powers ... to change, set aside or otherwise control their judgments”). Certainly, if the trial court perceives it has made a mistake, it ought to be able to correct itself in an effort to avoid a potentially reversible error.
And this is the ease regardless of whether a trial court has granted a motion for new trial or denied it. Nothing in the Court’s holding should be taken as suggesting it is limited to a trial court’s reconsideration of its granting of a new trial. The ability to reconsider its ruling is limited, however, by the court’s retention of jurisdiction or statutory authority over the matter. As recognized by the majority, the court’s authority to rescind its order expires upon the 75 days provided for by the rules. Tex.R.App. PROC. 21.8 (trial court must rule on motion for new trial within 75 days after imposing or suspending sentence). In addition, a court’s jurisdiction may, before the expiration of the 75 days, be severed by the filing of an appeal of one of the parties. Tex.R.App. Proc. 26.2 (defendant has 90 days to appeal; State has 15 days to perfect appeal). For instance, if the trial court grants a defendant’s motion for new trial and the State timely appeals that order within 15 days, Tex.Code GRIM. PROC. 44.01(a)(3), the trial court has lost its jurisdiction over the cause and has no authority to change its ruling.
With these comments, I concur.
BAIRD, J., joins.

. In Garcia, the trial court dismissed the indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, then later reinstated the cause. We held that upon the dismissal of the indictment, the trial court lost jurisdiction and thus had no authority to reinstate the cause, citing Matthews v. State, 40 Tex.Crim. 316, 50 S.W. 368 (1899), the case overruled by the majority today, and stating "[t]he reasoning of [Matthews] has equal application to the [case] before us[.]”