Court Opinion

ID: 9882825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:20:35.282581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:02.769687
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Miller v. NWD 355 McConnell, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-3374.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                 TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 Clint Miller,                                      :
                                                                        No. 22AP-725
                 Plaintiff-Appellant,               :                (C.P.C. No. 20CV-7457)

 v.                                                 :            (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

 NWD 355 McConnell LLC,                             :

                 Defendant-Appellee.                :

                                        D E C I S I O N

                                 Rendered on September 21, 2023

                 On brief: Henderson Mokhtari & Weatherly, and Al A.
                 Mokhtari for appellant. Argued: Al A. Mokhtari.

                 On brief: BakerHostetler, LLP, and Ali Haque for appellee.
                 Argued: Ali Haque.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
MENTEL, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Clint Miller, appeals from a November 9, 2022 decision
and entry denying his motion for reconsideration and granting the motion for summary
judgment of defendant-appellee, NWD 355 McConnell LLC (“NWD”). Appellant also
appeals from an August 9, 2021 entry granting NWD’s motion to stay discovery and motion
for protection order as well as a July 30, 2021 decision, granting in part and denying in part,
appellant’s motion for extension of time. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        {¶ 2} This is a refiled matter originating from a dispute over various parking
violations. NWD is a subsidiary of Nationwide Realty Investors, Ltd. (“NRI”), and the
owner of a parking garage in the Arena District located at 355 John H. McConnell Blvd.
(“Garage”). SP Plus, an independent contractor, entered into an agreement with NRI to
No. 22AP-725                                                                                              2

“administer, manage and operate” all parking operations at the Garage. (Feb. 12, 2021
NWD Mot. for Summ. Jgmt., Ex. A., Master Management Agreement at ¶ 1, 19.)1 SP Plus
agreed to patrol “all the parking facilities with a dedicated ticket writer at all times.” (NWD
Mot. for Summ. Jgmt., Ex. B, Arena District Ticket Enforcement at 10.) Pursuant to the SP
Plus Arena Ticketing Procedure, SP Plus also handled and organized all aspects of the
immobilization of vehicles in the Garage. The SP Plus Arena Ticketing Procedure provides
in relevant part:
                [T]he Standard Parking employee will apply the boot, put a
                violation notice on the vehicle with information about the
                violation and the proper contact number and apply a notice
                sticker on the vehicle * * *. The parking violator must contact
                Standard Parking directly to have the boot removed from their
                vehicle * * *. Payment * * * will be delivered to the Standard
                Parking regional office.

(Id. at 7.) Finally, SP Plus was responsible for collecting fines of violators and would
“contact the violator in hopes of collecting the charge before it is sent off to collections * * *.
If a ticket reaches 30 days past due it will be sent off [to] the Collection Agency.” (Id. at 6.)
SP Plus retained Citation Collection Services (“CCS”) to collect payments from drivers that
violated parking rules in the Garage. As acknowledged by appellant, the notices and
collection letters were sent by SP Plus or CCS. (See Nov. 17, 2020 Compl. at ¶ 10-17.)2
        {¶ 3} On January 2, 2019, appellant filed his initial complaint against NWD, SP
Plus, and CCS. Miller v. NWD 355 McConnell, LLC, Franklin C.P. No. 19CV000033 (Jan. 2,
2019). According to appellant, he was unlawfully fined for violating the parking rules of the
Garage, which resulted in the immobilization of his vehicle.3 On July 22, 2019, appellant
filed a notice of dismissal, pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a), dismissing with prejudice all
claims asserted against SP Plus. On August 15, 2019, NWD filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings claiming that appellant failed to allege any claims against NWD and forfeited

1 The Master Management Agreement required SP Plus to “[s]upervise and direct operations of the Premises

as the parking facilities and render the usual and customary services incidental thereto.” (NWD Mot. for
Summ. Jgmt., Ex. A., Master Management Agreement at ¶ 3a.)
2 Appellant acknowledged in his complaint that SP Plus was responsible for the issuance of tickets,

immobilization of vehicles, and collecting fines.
3 Appellant’s complaint does not specify the date he parked his vehicle in the Garage or when the ticket was

issued. However, the record indicates that on the evening of September 19, 2017, appellant rented a spot at
the Garage. On September 20, 2017, SP Plus placed a boot on appellant’s vehicle for exceeding the allotted
time limit by 16 hours.
No. 22AP-725                                                                              3

its vicarious liability claim when he dismissed SP Plus with prejudice. On November 18,
2019, appellant filed a notice of voluntary dismissal against the remaining parties. On
November 21, 2019, appellant filed an amended notice of voluntary dismissal that stated
while all claims brought against CCS were with prejudice, the claims alleged against NWD
were without prejudice.
       {¶ 4} On November 17, 2020, appellant refiled his complaint asserting causes of
action for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment,
extortion, conversion, punitive damages, violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices
Act, and vicarious liability. While SP Plus and CCS are extensively discussed in the refiled
complaint, appellant only named NWD and “John Does One Through Five” as defendants
in the case. (Compl. at 1.)
       {¶ 5} On February 12, 2021, NWD filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
that appellant’s claims fail as a matter of law because he has not asserted any causes of
action directly against NWD, and by dismissing SP Plus and CCS with prejudice, he cannot
succeed in his vicarious liability claim. On March 12, 2021, appellant filed a motion for
extension of time seeking 120 days to conduct discovery to respond to NWD’s motion for
summary judgment. On March 25, 2021, NWD filed a memorandum in opposition
contending that a motion for summary judgment may be filed at any time, and appellant
has failed to specify, under Civ.R. 56(F), why he cannot present sufficient evidence to
oppose the motion for summary judgment. On July 30, 2021, the trial court denied in part
and granted in part appellant’s motion for an extension of time. The trial court allowed
appellant 28 days from the date of the entry, instead of the 120 days as requested, to
respond to NWD’s motion for summary judgment.
       {¶ 6} On March 30, 2021, NWD filed a motion to stay discovery and motion for
protective order pending the resolution of its motion for summary judgment. On April 13,
2021, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to NWD’s motion to stay discovery. On
August 9, 2021, the trial court granted NWD’s motion to stay discovery and motion for
protective order pending the outcome of NWD’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant
filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on August 27,
2021. A reply brief was filed on September 10, 2021. Also on August 27, 2021, appellant
filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s denial in part of his motion for
No. 22AP-725                                                                               4

extension of time and motion to stay discovery. NWD filed a memorandum in opposition
on September 10, 2021.
       {¶ 7} On November 9, 2022, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for
reconsideration and granted NWD’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant filed a
timely appeal.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
       {¶ 8} Appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
              [I.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
              DENYING IN PART APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
              EXTENSION OF TIME.

              [II.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
              GRANTING APPELLEE’S MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY
              AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER.

              [III.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
              APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
       A. Appellant’s First and Second Assignments of Error
       {¶ 9} We begin by addressing appellant’s failure to file a brief that conforms to the
Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. “The burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on
appeal rests with the party asserting error.” Lundeen v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist.
No. 12AP-629, 2013-Ohio-112, ¶ 16, citing State ex rel. Petro v. Gold, 166 Ohio App.3d 371,
2006-Ohio-943, ¶ 51 (10th Dist.), citing App.R. 9 and 16(A)(7).            As set forth in
App.R. 16(A)(7), an appellant’s brief must “present a separate argument containing its
contentions with respect to each assignment of error.” Wells v. Michael, 10th Dist. No.
05AP-1353, 2006-Ohio-5871, ¶ 18. Here, appellant has failed to offer separate arguments
in support of his three assignments of error. Instead, appellant provides five sections of
arguments that are not clearly tied to a corresponding assignment of error. “ ‘[T]his court
rules on assignments of error only, and will not address mere arguments.’ ” Rider v. Dir.,
Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-854, 2017-Ohio-8716, ¶ 7,
quoting Ellinger v. Ho, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1079, 2010-Ohio-553, ¶ 70, citing In re Estate
of Taris, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1264, 2005-Ohio-1516, ¶ 5. App.R. 12(A)(2) permits an
appellate court to disregard an assignment of error presented for review that “fails to argue
No. 22AP-725                                                                                5

the assignment separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).” It is not the duty
of a reviewing court to “ ‘root * * * out’ ” whether an argument exists to support an
assignment of error. Reid v. Plainsboro Partners, III, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-442, 2010-Ohio-
4373, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Breckenridge, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-95, 2009-Ohio-3620, ¶ 10.
In the interest of justice and judicial economy, however, we will address appellant’s
assignments of error insofar as we are able to connect them to appellant’s arguments
presented in his brief.

       {¶ 10} In appellant’s first assignment of error, he contends that the trial court
abused its discretion granting in part and denying in part his Civ.R. 56(F) motion for
extension of time to conduct discovery. Appellant’s second assignment of error argues the
trial court abused its discretion granting NWD’s motion to stay discovery and motion for
protective order. As these assignments of error are intertwined, we will address them
together.
       {¶ 11} There is a wide scope of permissible discovery in civil matters. Civ.R. 26(B)(1)
provides:
              Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
              matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
              proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
              importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
              controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information,
              the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in
              resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
              proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information
              within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in
              evidence to be discoverable.

       {¶ 12} However, a party’s efforts to conduct discovery may be interrupted as a
motion for summary judgment can be filed at “any time, * * * with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part of the claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or declaratory judgment action.” Civ.R. 56(B); see also Loc.R.
53 (“Counsel shall file their summary judgment motions at the earliest practical date in the
course of litigation.”). Once a motion for summary judgment is filed, Civ.R. 56(F) provides
a mechanism for the nonmoving party to receive additional time to pursue discovery that
could assist in responding to the motion. Jacobs v. Jones, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-930, 2011-
No. 22AP-725                                                                                                6

Ohio-3313, ¶ 58, citing Hahn v. Groveport, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-27, 2007-Ohio-5559, ¶ 30,
citing Gates Mills Invest. Co. v. Pepper Pike, 59 Ohio App.2d 155, 168 (8th Dist.1978).4
Civ.R. 56(F) requires the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to provide an
affidavit with sufficient basis to explain why they cannot provide sufficient facts by affidavit
to support its opposition. Jacobs at ¶ 58. “ ‘Mere allegations requesting a continuance for
the purpose of discovery are not sufficient reasons why a party cannot present affidavits in
opposition to the motion for summary judgment.’ ” Jacobs at ¶ 58, quoting Hahn at ¶ 30.
The party requesting relief under Civ.R. 56(F) bears the burden to demonstrate that the
need for a continuance is warranted. Huntington Natl. Bank v. Bywood, Inc., 10th Dist.
No. 12AP-994, 2013-Ohio-2780, ¶ 7.
        {¶ 13} The party responding to purportedly improper discovery requests may either
move for a protective order under Civ.R. 26(C)5 or use the objection procedure provided
under the discovery method at issue. Anderson v. Bright Horizons Children’s Ctrs., LLC,
10th Dist. No. 20AP-291, 2022-Ohio-1031, ¶ 90, citing Civ.R. 26, Staff Notes (July 1, 1970
Amendment); see also id., citing Civ.R. 34, Staff Notes (1970) (“The party served with the
requests has corollary burdens. Because he is subject to Rule 37 sanctions, he must object,
and he must, if he desires, seek a protective order under Rule 26(C).”).
        {¶ 14} The trial court holds broad discretion over discovery matters. MA Equip.
Leasing I, LLC v. Tilton, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-564, 2012-Ohio-4668, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel.
Citizens for Open, Responsive & Accountable Govt. v. Register, 116 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-
Ohio-5542, ¶ 18. An appellate court, therefore, will generally review the trial court’s
decision to grant a motion to stay discovery and motion for protective order, pursuant to
Civ.R. 26, under an abuse of discretion analysis. State ex rel. Keller v. Columbus, 164 Ohio
App.3d 648, 2005-Ohio-6500, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.); Coon v. OhioHealth Corp., 3d Dist. No. 9-

4 Civ.R. 56(F) reads as follows:

                 Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion for
                 summary judgment that the party cannot for sufficient reasons stated
                 present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court
                 may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
                 permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such
                 other order as is just.

5 Civ.R. 26(C) states “[u]pon motion by any party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for

good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make any order that justice requires to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”
No. 22AP-725                                                                                7

22-41, 2023-Ohio-492, ¶ 25, citing Randall v. Cantwell Mach. Co., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-
786, 2013-Ohio-2744, ¶ 11. Similarly, the trial court’s ruling on a Civ.R. 56(F) motion for
extension of time will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Bywood, Inc. at ¶ 6,
citing Glimcher v. Reinhorn, 68 Ohio App.3d 131, 138 (10th Dist.1991). An abuse of
discretion occurs when a trial court’s ruling is “unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
       {¶ 15} In appellant’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion for an extension of time, counsel for
appellant filed an affidavit that attested additional time is required to conduct depositions
of NWD’s corporate representative, one or more employee/authorized agents of NWD, and
NRI’s director of real estate, Bart Barok. Appellant wrote that once those depositions are
taken, additional written discovery might also be necessary, as well as additional
depositions, before he may respond to the motion for summary judgment. According to
appellant, without these depositions he cannot present all the facts essential to oppose
NWD’s motion for summary judgment. In response, NWD argued that appellant’s motion
should be denied because appellant has failed to meet his burden in identifying the exact
discovery needed and how it would directly allow him to rebut the facts raised by NWD in
its motion for summary judgment.
       {¶ 16} Upon review, appellant’s counsel’s affidavit amounts to a general request for
additional time to conduct depositions and written discovery.          The affidavit fails to
sufficiently explain how the depositions would aid in opposing the motion for summary
judgment. See Han v. Univ. of Dayton, 2d Dist. No. 26343, 2015-Ohio-346, ¶ 27 (finding
the denial of Civ.R. 56(F) motion reasonable as the moving party failed to describe how
depositions would assist in opposing summary judgment). The mere act of requesting a
continuance to conduct discovery is not sufficient justification for why a party cannot
present affidavits in opposition for a summary judgment. Bywood, Inc. at ¶ 8, citing
Jefferson Golf & Country Club v. Leonard, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-434, 2011-Ohio-6829, ¶ 42;
see also Tallis v. Woodrun Place Unit Owners’ Assn., 10th Dist. No. 05AP-969, 2006-Ohio-
3267, ¶ 33. Here, while appellant’s counsel provided an affidavit that asserted a general
need to take depositions to assess the credibility of Barok, he failed to provide any specific
information as to why further discovery was necessary or why he cannot present facts
No. 22AP-725                                                                                                 8

essential to opposing the summary judgment motion through competing affidavits.6 Fields
v. Buehrer, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-724, 2014-Ohio-1382, ¶ 12, quoting Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Ryan, 189 Ohio App.3d 560, 2010-Ohio-4601, ¶ 100 (10th Dist.) (writing the moving
party seeking an extension “ ‘must aver in an affidavit a particularized factual basis that
explains why further discovery is necessary.’ ”). The affidavit also fails to explain how
additional discovery will assist to either show or negate a fact relevant to the issue raised in
NWD’s motion for summary judgment. Brown v. Miller, 11th Dist. No. 2012-G-3055, 2012-
Ohio-5223, ¶ 21. Though appellant makes several arguments in his brief as to what he
would have sought from Barok and other witnesses at deposition, these arguments were
conspicuously absent from the affidavit filed with his motion for extension of time. We are
limited to what was presented to the trial court at the time the motion was considered.
        {¶ 17} We also note that appellant failed to pursue other methods of obtaining
discovery. Barok’s affidavit addressed several factual allegations in this case that appellant
could have contested in a competing affidavit. There is also no evidence that appellant
requested affidavits or other evidence from non-parties, SP Plus or CCS. Appellant had
several months to pursue discovery from these non-parties before the stay was in place but
elected not to do so.
        {¶ 18} This court has found that a trial court does not abuse its discretion denying a
request for a continuance under Civ.R. 56(F) where the party seeking the continuance did
not sustain his burden of demonstrating the continuance was warranted for further
discovery. Jacobs at ¶ 59, citing Hahn at ¶ 37. While the trial court could have taken a far
more hard-lined approach and outright denied the motion for extension of time, it
permitted appellant 28 more days to file a memorandum in opposition, which effectively
restarting the response period from the date of entry.
        {¶ 19} Appellant cites Smith v. Klein, 23 Ohio App.3d 146 (8th Dist.1985) as
analogous to the instant case. A brief review is instructive.

6 We note that appellant filed a second affidavit in his motion for reconsideration that expounded on his

previous Civ.R. 56(F) arguments. However, appellant appears to have abandoned this issue as he has failed to
assert that the trial court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration and limits his assignment of error
solely to the denial of the motion for extension of time. While appellant’s conclusion mentions reversal of the
motion for reconsideration, this is entirely inadequate to expand the scope of our review. Accordingly, we will
limit our analysis solely to the affidavit filed with his motion for extension of time.
No. 22AP-725                                                                                 9

       {¶ 20} In Klein, the complaint concerned claims for defamation as well as
intentional and malicious inference with an employment relationship. Id. at 147. During
the discovery process, Klein’s counsel refused on two occasions to allow his client to answer
questions during deposition and unilaterally terminated one of the depositions. Id. at 147,
150. Klein proceeded to move for summary judgment in the case. Id. at 147. Smith filed a
motion to compel discovery and motion to stay ruling on the motion for summary judgment
pending the outcome of the discovery dispute. Id. The trial court denied Smith’s motions
and granted summary judgment for Klein. Id. The Eighth District Court of Appeals
reversed finding that the trial court’s refusal to allow discovery of evidence essential to the
nonmoving party’s response to a motion for summary judgment was an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 151.
       {¶ 21} The facts in Klein and the instant case are quite distinct. First, Klein was
decided nearly 30 years before this case was filed and makes no mention of Civ.R. 56(F).
Regardless, the questions that Klein was precluded from answering, as well as abrupt
termination of the deposition, were far more particularized concerns than appellant’s
general claims to take depositions of Barok and NWD’s corporate representative.
       {¶ 22} As a final point, appellant should not lose sight of the standard of review at
play. Abuse of discretion review accounts for multiple reasonable outcomes. Yates v.
Hassell, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-588, 2012-Ohio-328, ¶ 14 (finding the trial court did not abuse
its discretion as there were “multiple reasonable bases for denying appellants’ motion for
leave * * *, none of which were arbitrary or capricious”). Even in cases where the panel
might find one approach better, that does not make the trial court’s resolution an abuse of
discretion. “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would
support that decision. It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue
de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive.” (Emphasis
deleted.) AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50
Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). Under an abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court is not
permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio
St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34. Because we find appellant failed to aver in his affidavit,
through particularized facts, why additional time was required to conduct discovery, we
No. 22AP-725                                                                               10

find it reasonable that the trial court did not allow the full extension of time requested by
appellant to respond to the motion for summary judgment.
       {¶ 23} As for the Civ.R. 26(C) order, this court has consistently found a trial court
acts within its discretion when it stays discovery pending the resolution of a dispositive
motion. See, e.g., Thomson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-782, 2010-
Ohio-416, ¶ 32, citing Watley v. Wilkinson, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1039, 2004-Ohio-5062,
¶ 18, citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Wiles v. Miller, 10th Dist. No.
12AP-989, 2013-Ohio-3625, ¶ 42. Because NWD’s motion for summary judgment was
pending and appellant failed to adequately explain how additional discovery would help
him respond to the dispositive motion, the trial court’s grant of the protective order was not
an abuse of discretion.
       {¶ 24} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
       B. Appellant’s Third Assignment of Error
       {¶ 25} In appellant’s third assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred
by granting NWD’s motion for summary judgment.
       {¶ 26} In determining whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment,
an appellate court must review the evidence according to Civ.R. 56 as well as applicable
case law. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Patino, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-278, 2020-Ohio-466, ¶ 22.
“Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates that: (1) there is no
genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.” (Internal
quotations and citation omitted.) DN Reynoldsburg, LLC v. Maurices Inc., 10th Dist. No.
20AP-57, 2022-Ohio-949, ¶ 16; see also Transtar Elec. v. A.E.M. Elec. Servs. Corp., 140
Ohio St.3d 193, 2014-Ohio-3095, ¶ 8. When considering a motion for summary judgment,
a court must resolve all questions and construe the evidence in favor of the nonmoving
party. Maxwell v. Lombardi, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-556, 2022-Ohio-1686, ¶ 16, citing 2454
Cleveland, LLC v. TWA, LLC, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-157, 2020-Ohio-362, ¶ 8, citing Pilz v.
Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-240, 2004-Ohio-4040, ¶ 8.
       {¶ 27} As set forth in Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party bears the initial burden of
informing the trial court of the grounds for the motion and identifying those parts of the
No. 22AP-725                                                                                 11

record that establish the absence of a material fact. Lundeen v. Graff, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-
32, 2015-Ohio-4462, ¶ 11, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). The
moving party cannot meet this initial burden with a conclusory declaration that the
nonmoving party has no evidence to support its case; the moving party must identify
specific evidence, as listed in Civ.R. 56(C), affirmatively demonstrating that the nonmoving
party has no evidence to support their claims. Oliver v. Fox’s Food, LLC et al., 10th Dist.
No. 22AP-73, 2023-Ohio-1551, ¶ 9, citing Dresher at 293. Once the moving party satisfies
this initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party does not
respond, by affidavit or other evidence as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, with particular
facts demonstrating that a genuine issue exists in the case. Oliver at ¶ 9, citing Dresher at
293; Civ.R. 56(E). When the evidence offered supports contradictory inferences, the court
reviewing a summary judgment motion may not weigh the evidence. DN Reynoldsburg,
LLC at ¶ 17, citing Thyssen Krupp Elevator Corp. v. Constr. Plus, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-
788, 2010-Ohio-1649, ¶ 20.
       {¶ 28} This court considers a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment
under a de novo standard of review. Blazek v. Ohio Bar Liab. Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 22AP-
473, 2023-Ohio-1722, ¶ 14. “[D]e novo appellate review means that the court of appeals
independently reviews the record and affords no deference to the trial court’s decision.”
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Maxwell at ¶ 17. Therefore, we must engage
in an independent review of the record as we stand in the same shoes as the trial court.
Scott v. Harrisburg Petroleum, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-413, 2020-Ohio-3431, ¶ 6,
citing Jones v. Shelly Co., 106 Ohio App.3d 440, 445 (5th Dist.1994).
       {¶ 29} At the outset, we note that while appellant asserts a general assignment of
error that the trial court erred in granting NWD’s motion for summary judgment, he fails
to make any mention in his brief, let alone argument, concerning causes of action for
fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, extortion,
conversion, punitive damages, violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Instead,
appellant limits his analysis solely to his vicarious liability claim. (See Appellant’s Brief at
24-29.) The same was true at oral arguments where counsel focused his discussion on his
claim for vicarious liability. Because appellant has failed to set forth any arguments with
respect to fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment,
No. 22AP-725                                                                                                12

extortion, conversion, punitive damages, or violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices
Act, we will forego any analysis concerning the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on
such claims. App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7). Prox v. Cleveland Steel Container Corp.,
11th Dist. No. 2005-T-0045, 2006-Ohio-2770, ¶ 16, citing House v. Kirtland Capital
Partners, 158 Ohio App.3d 68, 2004-Ohio-3688, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.) (finding that because
appellant has failed to provide any arguments with respect to his claim of wrongful
discharge, a reviewing court may decline to provide any analysis concerning the court’s
grant of summary judgment on that particular cause of action).
        {¶ 30} Appellant alleges the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as,
despite settlement and dismissal with prejudice of agents, SP Plus and CCS, he may still
bring a vicarious liability claim against the principal, NWD. We disagree.7
        {¶ 31} An employer or principal can generally be held vicariously liable for the torts
of its employees or agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Moore v. Mount
Carmel Health Sys., 10th Dist. No. 2017APE-10-754, 2020-Ohio-6695, ¶ 24, citing Clark
v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438 (1994), citing Councell
v. Douglas, 163 Ohio St. 292, 295-96 (1955). While the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not extend to an employer’s vicarious liability for a tort committed by an independent
contractor, “under [a] theory [for] agency by estoppel, courts have used the concept of a
fictional agency relationship to impose vicarious liability on principals for the acts of their
independent contractors.” Clawson v. Heights Chiropractic Physicians, LLC, __ Ohio
St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4154, ¶ 14, citing Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-
4559, ¶ 18-19; Staples v. Ohio Health Corp., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-591, 2020-Ohio-4578,
¶ 21.
        {¶ 32} It is well-established that if the agent is released from liability, through
settlement and release or a favorable judgment, the secondary liability of the principal is
extinguished. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594,
2009-Ohio-3601, ¶ 22. See also Griswold v. Med. College of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 96API01-

7 We note that appellant’s complaint alleges that NWD is vicariously liable through the actions of “John Does

One Through Five.” However, NWD makes no mention of other parties that could be considered John Doe in
his filings with the trial court and in his brief with this court. Moreover, appellant’s argument addresses the
viability of a claim after settlement, which would imply that his claim is based on the conduct of the prior
defendants in the case, SP Plus and CCS. Accordingly, we will consider this argument as it concerns the
dismissed parties, SP Plus and CCS.
No. 22AP-725                                                                                13

66, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2534, *3 (June 18, 1996) (“Once the primary tortfeasors were
released, no liability for those secondarily responsible was possible.”); Faieta v. World
Harvest Church, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-527, 2008-Ohio-6959, ¶ 54, citing Comer at ¶ 21.
“[T]here can be no vicarious liability imputed to a principal, if there is no liability on the
part of the agent.” Id., citing Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183 (1940). The justification
behind this rule is to protect the indemnification rights of the principal against the agent
who bears the primary liability.      Weiler v. Knox Community Hosp., 5th Dist. No.
20CA000018, 2021-Ohio-2098, ¶ 26. “ ‘It logically follows that release of the employee
from liability would thwart the employer’s ability to seek reimbursement from the
employee for payments made to the plaintiff by destroying the employer’s subrogation
rights.’ ” Id., quoting Comer at ¶ 24. Because appellant has settled and dismissed with
prejudice all claims against the agents, SP Plus and CCS, vicarious liability against the
principal, NWD, is extinguished.
       {¶ 33} Appellant posits that Comer was a narrow decision limited to “liability of a
hospital for actions of an independent contract physician.” (Appellant’s Brief at 25.)
Appellant’s argument, however, misses the mark as the rule that settlement and release of
an agent from liability exonerates the principal from vicarious liability is not limited solely
to the Comer decision.
       {¶ 34} In Clawson, the Supreme Court of Ohio provided additional analysis on this
topic when it considered whether a patient could pursue a claim of chiropractic malpractice
against a chiropractor’s employer, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, if the statute
of limitations had expired on the chiropractor’s direct liability for the purported
malpractice. The Clawson court wrote that in recognizing the right that a plaintiff may hold
an employer liable for the wrongful act of its employees “ ‘[s]ettlement with and release of
the servant will exonerate the master.’ ”       Clawson at ¶ 13, quoting Losito at 188.
“ ‘Otherwise, the master would be deprived of his right of reimbursement from the servant,
if the claim after settlement with the servant could be enforced against the master.’ ” Id.
The Clawson court went on to restate its holdings in Comer and Wuerth writing:
              [In Wuerth] we cited our statement in Losito that a settlement
              with and release of an employee from liability exonerates the
              employer. Wuerth at ¶ 22, citing Losito, 136 Ohio St. at 188, 24
              N.E.2d 705. We also cited our statement in Comer that “ ‘[i]f
No. 22AP-725                                                                                                14

                 there is no liability assigned to the agent, it logically follows
                 that there can be no liability imposed upon the principal for
                 the agent’s actions.’ ” (Emphasis added in Comer.) Wuerth at
                 ¶ 22, quoting, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833
                 N.E.2d 712, at ¶ 20. That rule, we emphasized, is not limited to
                 claims based on the doctrine of respondeat superior but also
                 applies to other types of vicarious liability. Id. at ¶ 23.

Clawson at ¶ 21.
        {¶ 35} The Clawson court ultimately reversed the judgment of the Second District
Court of Appeal finding that the patient was precluded from bringing a respondeat superior
cause of action against the employer as the statute of limitations had expired on the
underlying malpractice claim. While there was some disagreement among the justices over
the resolution of Clawson, both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that
settlement and release of the agent extinguishes the secondary liability of the principal.8 In
fact, this point is restated in the decision on four separate occasions. See Clawson at ¶ 13,
21, 37 (Brunner, J., dissenting), 41 (Brunner, J., dissenting).
        {¶ 36} Appellant cites a series of Ohio cases for the proposition that an injured party
has a right to sue an employer for the actions of an employee regardless of whether the
employee was named as a party to the suit.9 These cases, however, are factually distinct as
they either concern instances where the primarily negligent parties were employees, rather
than independent contractors, or involve cases where the agent was not included in the
complaint based on immunity or the expiration of the statute of limitations. None of the
cited cases support appellant’s claim that an injured party, after settlement and release of

8 Justice Brunner, joined by Justices Donnelly and Stewart, dissented from the majority writing that Clawson

should be able to pursue her cause of action for vicarious liability against the employer for the negligence of
the chiropractor despite the statute of limitations barring a direct claim against the chiropractor for
malpractice.
9 Holland v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 3d Dist. No. 17-07-12, 2008-Ohio-1487; Taylor v. Belmont Community

Hosp., 7th Dist. No. 09 BE 30, 2010-Ohio-3986; Tisdale v. Toledo Hosp., 197 Ohio App.3d 316, 2012-Ohio-
1110 (6th Dist.); Edwards v. Ohio Inst. of Cardiac Care, 2d Dist. No. 2006 CA 74, 2007-Ohio-1333; Schelling
v. Humphrey, 123 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-4175; and State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common
Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 198, 2010-Ohio-3299. While we are able to distinguish the above cases on factual
grounds, we note that the Supreme Court in Clawson took issue with the Taylor and Tisdale courts’
interpretation of the scope and meaning of Wuerth. Clawson rejected the interpretations in Taylor and
Tisdale that “Wuerth is limited to claims arising out of the negligence of a partner/part owner, as opposed to
a traditional employee.” Clawson at ¶ 26. While not expressly overruled, it is worth considering whether
Taylor and Tisdale remain good law.
No. 22AP-725                                                                                   15

an independent contractor from a case, may bring a vicarious liability cause of action
against a principal.
       {¶ 37} In the interest of completeness, we will briefly address the two remaining
arguments presented in appellant’s brief as they apply to appellant’s third assignment of
error. First, appellant argues that “the trial court abused its discretion by relying upon
arguments and purported evidence from a voluntarily dismissed case.” (Appellant’s Brief
at 21.) While the appellant generally claims that the trial court improperly considered
evidence, he fails to identify what evidence was improper and how the trial court
impermissibly used those documents in its decision. As appellant has only asserted error
in the trial court’s resolution of the vicarious liability claim, we will provide limited analysis
on that issue.
       {¶ 38} The record reveals that the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment
as to appellant’s vicarious liability claim makes no reference to any exhibits relied upon in
making its decision. The only exhibits that might relate to this claim would be the inclusion
of NWD’s notices of dismissal filed in the first case. However, we need not address whether
the inclusion of these notices was proper as we may take judicial notice of a dismissal entry
that is available on the internet. State ex rel. Rojas v. Page, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-506, 2022-
Ohio-2226, ¶ 15, citing Draughon v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. No. 16CA3528, 2016-Ohio-5364,
¶ 26, citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8,
10; see also Rojas, citing Giannelli, 1 Baldwin’s, Ohio Practice Evidence, Section 201.6 (3d
Ed.2015) (“noting that the rule generally precluding a court from taking judicial notice of
other cases has been relaxed if the record is accessible on the internet”); Lane v. U.S. Bank
N.A., 10th Dist. No. 22AP-358, 2023-Ohio-1552, ¶ 2, citing Ltd. Invest. Group Corp. v.
Huntington Natl. Bank, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-61, 2022-Ohio-3657, ¶ 46, citing State v.
Estridge, 2d Dist. No. 2021-CA-25, 2022-Ohio-208, ¶ 12, fn. 1. Because the notices of
dismissal were readily available on the internet, we take judicial notice of them.
Accordingly, appellant’s argument is without merit.
       {¶ 39} Finally, appellant contends that NWD erroneously argued that alternative
pleadings or theories of recovery is not permissible. Again, appellant fails to identify how
the trial court erred as to this issue or what cause of action this argument is intended to
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address. Regarding the vicarious liability claim, appellant’s complaint only alleges claims
against “John Does One Through Five.” However, appellant has failed to identify any other
parties, outside SP Plus and CCS, that could be considered agents to NWD. Throughout the
case, appellant, either expressly or through implication in his briefs and filings, represented
that SP Plus and CCS were the primarily liable parties. As such, we are not persuaded that
alternative pleadings or theories of recovery were somehow denied to appellant at any point
concerning his claim for vicarious liability.
       {¶ 40} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 41} Having overruled appellant’s three assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                         Judgment affirmed.
                     BEATTY BLUNT, P.J. and DORRIAN, J., concur.
                                     _____________