Court Opinion

ID: 9882341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 20:03:57.577394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:16.335606
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/5/23 Bocchieri v. Farmers Insurance Exchange CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 BRETON BOCCHIERI,                                              B312632

      Plaintiff and Appellant                                   Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
      v.                                                        19STCV37299
 FARMERS INSURANCE
 EXCHANGE,

      Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Barbara M. Scheper, Judge. Affirmed.
     Pierce & Shearer and Andrew F. Pierce for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     Tharpe & Howell and Eric B. Kunkel for Defendant and
Respondent.
           _______________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION

      Plaintiff Breton Bocchieri appeals after summary judgment
was granted in favor of Bocchieri’s automobile insurance
provider, defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), in
Bocchieri’s action, which alleged breach of contract and breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing in connection with
Farmers’ handling of Bocchieri’s underinsured motorist (UIM)
claim. We affirm.

        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.    Factual Background1
       On October 22, 2011, Bocchieri was rear-ended by a UIM.
The California Highway Patrol Traffic Collision Report
concerning the incident found the UIM to be at fault. In July
2013, Bocchieri settled with the UIM’s insurer, Infinity Insurance
(Infinity). Infinity paid Bocchieri $15,000, the policy limit.
       Bocchieri was insured by Farmers and his policy (the
Policy) provided Bocchieri with UIM bodily injury coverage of
$250,000. The Policy also provided, in relevant part, that a
person claiming any coverage under the policy must: (1)
cooperate with Farmers and assist Farmers in any matter
concerning a claim or suit; (2) send Farmers promptly any legal
papers received relating to any claim or suit; (3) submit to
physical examinations at Farmers’ expense by doctors Farmers

1 The court found that Bocchieri’s disputes with certain facts in

Farmers’ separate statement were not supported by evidence to the
contrary or merely constituted evidentiary objections, and therefore
concluded that those facts were undisputed. We agree with the court
and likewise consider those facts to be undisputed.

                                    2
selects as often as Farmers may reasonably require; (4) authorize
Farmers to obtain medical and other records; (5) provide any
written proofs of loss Farmers requires; and (6) submit to
examination under oath upon Farmers’ request. The Policy
further provided: “If an insured person and we do not agree (1)
that the person is legally entitled to recover damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, or (2) as to the
amount of payment under this part, either [the] person or we
may demand that the issue be determined by arbitration. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] Formal demand for arbitration shall be filed in a court
of competent jurisdiction. The court shall be located in the county
and state of residence of the party making the demand. Demand
may also be made by sending a certified letter to the party
against whom arbitration is sought, with a return receipt as
evidence.”
        In July 2013, Bocchieri informed a Farmers claims
representative that he had settled with Infinity, but his injuries
exceeded the UIM’s policy limit. In August 2013, Bocchieri spoke
with another representative. Internal notes for the call state that
the representative requested the Infinity settlement documents
and Bocchieri said he would send them over. Bocchieri further
stated that he had severe headaches and was willing to sign a
medical authorization form. Bocchieri also stated that he had a
loss of earnings claim for the second year after the accident
because the injury held him back in his law practice.
        On an unspecified date, Bocchieri spoke with a Farmers
claims representative and offered to provide medical records “on
the condition that, once received, Farmers would review the
information and make an earnest reasonable evaluation and offer

                                  3
under [his] policy. Farmers, through its agents, accepted this
agreement.”
       On August 23, 2013, Farmers requested a signed medical
record authorization from Bocchieri, following Bocchieri’s claim
that he was suffering from continued and unresolved headaches
and back pain, which were causing loss of income. On September
23, 2013, Bocchieri returned the signed authorization and
identified two doctors, Dr. Sheps and Dr. Aufiero.
       On October 8, 2013, Bocchieri sent a formal demand for
UIM arbitration to Farmers via certified mail. The demand letter
stated that Bocchieri was granting Farmers an open extension as
to commencing arbitration subject to termination upon 30 days’
notice so that Bocchieri and Farmers could attempt to reach a
settlement. The next day, Bocchieri spoke with a claims
representative who informed him that Farmers needed proof of
the underlying settlement with Infinity. Farmers’ internal
records indicate that Bocchieri was “upset and said that no one
has ever explained this to him.” In his declaration, Bocchieri
stated that this was the first time that a Farmers representative
informed him that Farmers required the Infinity settlement
documents and that he informed the representative that he did
not have them. The representative he spoke with agreed to follow
up with Infinity concerning the settlement documents.
       In January 2014, Farmers field claims representative
Kenneth Spero began handling the matter. Spero noted in an
internal report that he “ordered insd records via prodoc” and
“tried to call [I]nfinity to get copy of underlying docs and proof of
payments on meds.”
       In February 2014, Spero noted in internal records that
Farmers had received partial medical records. These included

                                  4
MRI scans of Bocchieri’s spine, brain, and left shoulder taken
November 2011, June 2012, and July 2012, respectively. Spero
noted internally that it also “[a]ppears insd has been undergoing
a series of injections of Platelet Rich Plasma into his neck to
control his headache issue. Appears to be an ongoing problem.”
He wrote that additional medical records were pending, but
Bocchieri’s issues appeared to be pre-existing and that “[w]ithout
additional info. [i]t does not appear likely any of this tx is
accident related but otherwise due to clmt’s ongoing pre-accident
complaints.” Spero left reserves for the claim at $5,000 at that
time.
      Farmers sent four letters between March 10 and June 2,
2014, stating that Farmers was still awaiting complete medical
records from its copy service. Farmers also requested that
Bocchieri provide the underlying settlement documents with
Infinity. Farmers ultimately obtained the underlying settlement
documents from Infinity, including partial medical records and
reports for treatment Bocchieri received until December 31, 2013.
      In an internal report dated January 7, 2015, Spero wrote
that Bocchieri had informed Spero that he was still receiving
treatment and intended to claim loss of earnings. Spero also
wrote that Bocchieri was “going to be sending in additional meds
and supporting docs.” Farmers sent 10 letters between January 7
and September 3, 2015, requesting that Bocchieri provide
additional medical records for treatment received after January
2, 2014, as well as documentation for any lost wages claimed. In
his declaration, Bocchieri stated that he “did not have these
records as they resided with my providers.” There is no indication
that he told Farmers this or responded to Farmers’ letters until
September 2015.

                                5
       On September 24, 2015, Bocchieri sent a letter to Farmers
demanding settlement of the claim for his policy limit of $250,000
and requesting a response by October 9, 2015. Bocchieri also
stated that he was no longer making a claim for lost wages “at
this time.” The letter also attached approximately 70 pages of
medical records. One of the reports from Dr. Aufiero noted that
Bocchieri had a previous MRI scan from 2006. A report on the
MRI scan performed in November 2011 also referred to a July
2006 MRI scan and stated that a central disk extrusion was “new
when compared to the 2006 study.” The 2006 MRI scan was not
included in the records that Bocchieri provided.
       In an internal report dated September 28, 2015, Spero
noted that the medical records reflected 41 chiropractic visits and
64 physical therapy visits, but no bills or records for those visits
were otherwise provided. Spero wrote: “As previously noted, insd
appears to have a long history of neck issues and recurrent
migraines. The meds and records we previously received from the
clmt suggest that the clmt had been receiving these similar kinds
of tx prior to the date of loss and it does not appear the accident
really exacerbated the condition. None of the ortho records
indicate the loss as having a factor in his condition. Ortho records
in file go back to March of 2010, more than 1.5 years prior to the
loss.” Spero estimated that the case had a potential value in
excess of $150,000 and recommended that Farmers request a “5–
10 year history pre-dating the date of loss and request all those
meds as well.”
       On October 1, 2015, Spero responded to Bocchieri’s letter.
He acknowledged receipt of the demand but stated that Farmers
was not in a position to accept or reject the demand at that time.
Spero stated that additional documents were required to

                                 6
complete Farmers’ investigation, including a 10-year medical
history including all physicians and medical facilities Bocchieri
had seen, including his primary care physician. Farmers also
requested a recorded statement from Bocchieri related to his
injuries and asked him to sign and return the attached medical
authorization. Farmers stated that it would order “all of
[Bocchieri’s] records going back the last 10 years, including all X-
rays and MRI films both before the loss and after for review.” The
attached “Authorization for Release of Health Information” asked
that Bocchieri identify health care providers who were authorized
“to disclose any and all of [his] Patient Information.” The
authorization also requested that he identify the provider’s
address and phone number as well as his treating physician.
Bocchieri stated in his declaration that he “promptly signed and
returned” the medical authorization. The authorization is not in
the record and Bocchieri does not identify any portion of Farmers’
internal records that reflect its receipt of this authorization or the
medical providers he identified.
       In internal records dated November 2, 2015, Tammie Hieb,
a special general adjuster for Farmers, noted that she had
reviewed the medical records and that “it is clear that the insured
has had long standing chronic neck pain AND headaches” for
which he had received various treatments “since 2006 wherein he
was involved in a MVA and sustained a significant whiplash
injury.”
       On November 2, 2015, Hieb emailed Bocchieri, informing
him that the claim had been reassigned to her due to the
significant causation and apportionment questions that existed
regarding Bocchieri’s “treatment, ongoing residuals and overall
damages” in light of Bocchieri’s “significant pre-existing

                                  7
condition.” Hieb’s email also noted that Farmers had yet to
receive a response to the October 1 letter outlining the additional
information needed to evaluate Bocchieri’s claim, and that the
matter had been referred to arbitration counsel “to assist in the
additional discovery needed in the event UIM arbitration is
ultimately necessary.”
       On May 23, 2016, arbitration counsel for Farmers served
written discovery on Bocchieri, who did not respond. Counsel for
Farmers also noticed a deposition for September 20, 2016, for
which Bocchieri did not appear. Bocchieri did not respond to
discovery requests through September 2017.
       In a November 2016 letter, Bocchieri wrote that his
litigation schedule prevented his cooperation and demanded a
stay of all action in the arbitration until he was available to
litigate it, after August 15, 2017.
       In the interim, Farmers consulted Dr. Charles D. Rosen, a
board-certified orthopedic surgeon, for an expert medical opinion
based on medical records it had been able to subpoena. On
September 29, 2017, Dr. Rosen issued a written report. He opined
that the November 2011 MRI showed evidence of an extruded
disc herniation. Dr. Rosen also reviewed an MRI scan taken in
2006, after Bocchieri’s first accident, which showed “no evidence
of any disc herniation, subluxations or soft-tissue injuries.” Dr.
Rosen noted that Bocchieri developed continued headaches after
the 2006 accident and that his treatment for these headaches
continued into 2011. Dr. Rosen concluded: “It appears that his
symptoms of neck pain that changed after the incident in
question for the worse are related to the disc herniation, but his
continued occipital pain as well as facet pain . . . for which he has
had injections is unrelated to the incident in question.” Dr. Rosen

                                 8
stated that future medical care would involve an anterior cervical
discectomy and fusion at the estimated cost of $50,000 to $75,000
as well as three months of rehabilitation and physical therapy.
He did not anticipate further treatment beyond that with respect
to the incident in question. Dr. Rosen also transcribed his review
of Bocchieri’s medical records, which dated from January 2006
through August 2017.
       Upon review of Dr. Rosen’s opinion, Farmers tendered the
Policy limit to Bocchieri, less the settlement of $15,000 he
received from Infinity.2 By October 18, 2017, Bocchieri had signed
a “UM/UIM TRUST AGREEMENT AND RELEASE IN FULL”
acknowledging his receipt of $235,000 and executing a release
applying to all claims and injuries arising out of the accident,
other than bad faith claims.
       Farmers’ person most knowledgeable, Todd Cereghino,
testified that Farmers normally obtained medical records in one
of two ways: “Either the person or their representative, their
attorney, will send in those to us, or they will provide a signed
medical authorization, and then we will request those records
that way.” Cereghino testified that it was his belief that medical
authorizations only last for a year. He had no knowledge of
whether Bocchieri delayed in returning medical authorization
forms sent to Farmers. Cereghino also did not recall whether
there were any medical records Farmers had requested from
Bocchieri that he had not provided as of September 2015, or
whether there had been attempts to calculate the cost of future
medical care prior to Dr. Rosen’s report.

2 Bocchieri does not argue he was entitled to more than $235,000 under

the Policy.

                                  9
       Cereghino testified that he did not know why a medical
expert was not given the records earlier. When asked whether
they could have been submitted in 2013 or 2014, Cereghino
replied that the question “assum[ed] that we had the information
that we needed, that he ultimately based his decision on, which
we did not have at the time.” He agreed that Farmers did not ask
any doctor to evaluate the injuries prior to litigation. When asked
whether there was a policy around that, Cereghino testified: “It’s
just a decision made in this particular case. Each claim is
different. There’s no specific policy for when or when not to use
an expert.” Cereghino further testified that, “if a claim goes to
litigation, then defense counsel will utilize a defense medical
expert, like in this case with Dr. Rosen. But usually, if it’s pre-
litigation, we do not utilize a defense medical expert or have films
reviewed.”
       Spero testified that, in 2013 or 2014, claims representatives
typically would not refer a medical report to a doctor unless that
claim had gone to litigation. However, he stated that there “may
be some circumstances where we feel that maybe what’s going on
with the MRIs don’t necessarily make sense with what happened
in the accident, so we might request that they — we might order
those and request that they be read by a doctor and see if they
concur with what the report says.” Spero did not recall asking
Bocchieri for medical authorizations that he did not provide but
stated that he “suspect[ed] the reason we asked him for another
one is it had expired or did not include the new providers.”
2.    Procedural Background
      Approximately two years after Bocchieri settled his UIM
claim, he filed a complaint against Farmers, alleging causes of
action for breach of contract and tortious breach of the implied

                                10
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Bocchieri alleged that
Farmers breached the contract “by failing to timely pay [his]
claim or process in a timely or reasonable manner.” He alleged
that Farmers tortiously breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by “[f]ailing to timely investigat[e] and
respond promptly to the insured’s claim,” “[p]lacing their
interests in ahead of the insured,” “[f]ailing to respond to
inquiries from the insured,” “[r]epeatedly asking for the same
documents,” and “[s]cheduling arbitration so as to disadvantage
[Bocchieri].” Bocchieri also alleged that Farmers acted in a
manner knowingly harmful to his rights, in violation of Civil
Code section 3294, and therefore sought punitive and exemplary
damages.
       Farmers subsequently moved for summary judgment, or in
the alternative, summary adjudication of the issues. The trial
court granted Farmers’ motion. With respect to the breach of
contract claim, the court stated that, in order to establish a
breach of contract claim, the policyholder must establish that
they were entitled to benefits under the relevant policy and those
benefits were not paid. Because the undisputed evidence showed
that Farmers paid all the insurance policy benefits to which
Bocchieri was entitled, the court concluded that the breach of
contract claim failed.
       With respect to the tortious breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing claim, the court concluded that the
undisputed facts show that there was a genuine dispute as to the
cause and severity of Bocchieri’s injuries in light of his previous
automobile accident in 2006. The court noted that Bocchieri
presented no evidence that Farmers had the 2006 MRI scan in its
possession since 2014. The first medical records received

                                11
indicated treatments predating the 2011 accident and “created a
question as to whether [Bocchieri] had pre-existing conditions
that were not caused or exacerbated by the 2011 accident.” At
this point, Spero left the reserves for the claim at $5,000. The
further medical records Farmers received in 2015 “changed the
entire complexion of the case.” Farmers assessed the value of the
case at $150,000.
      The court concluded that, based on the undisputed facts,
Farmers’ delay in paying Bocchieri was not unreasonable. When
Farmers attempted to complete its investigation into Bocchieri’s
medical history and obtain a sworn statement, Bocchieri failed to
respond. When Farmers resorted to arbitration to try and get the
necessary information, Bocchieri demanded that the action be
stayed. While the matter was stayed pursuant to Bocchieri’s
request, Farmers submitted the medical records to its expert, Dr.
Rosen, who confirmed that Bocchieri’s injuries were caused by
the 2011 accident and opined as to the cost associated with
continuing medical treatment. Farmers thereafter promptly paid
Bocchieri the policy limit.
      The court also sustained certain of Farmers’ objections to
the declaration submitted by Bocchieri. Specifically, the court
sustained objections to Bocchieri’s statements that: (1) Farmers
refused to settle his claim, “notwithstanding that liability on the
part of the underinsured motorist was open and shut” and “began
a pattern of bad faith delay and dilatory tactics which lasted
more than four years”; (2) Bocchieri repeatedly contacted
Farmers asking whether it would pay his claim and “Farmers’
claim adjusters repeatedly and over the course of the next several
years, repeatedly stated that they could not make a decision”;
(3) over the next four years, “Farmers repeatedly refused to even

                                12
process [his] claim on the merits claiming that it would take more
time without specific justification for the interminable and
ongoing delay,” its representatives failed to provide any
substantive reason for the delay, it sent repeated waivers even
though it had already received Bocchieri’s medical records, and it
refused to provide any evaluation and made no offer of
compromise, even though Bocchieri promptly signed every
waiver; (4) Bocchieri received a request for production of
documents and notice that arbitration had been initiated by
Farmers “notwithstanding its prior promise to evaluate the
claim, based on the medical records”; (5) Farmers sent numerous
requests for production “despite the fact that it already had in its
possession all of the documents sought in the requests and all
waivers requested regarding [Bocchieri’s] medical records”; and
(6) when Farmers decided to settle based on Dr. Rosen’s report,
“[n]o explanation for the delay was presented nor could there be
any explanation given that Farmers elected to settle the case
based on the information they had already had for years and
without the necessity to engage in baseless litigation.”
       The court overruled Bocchieri’s objections to Farmers’
evidence.
       Bocchieri moved for reconsideration, which the court
denied.3 The court entered judgment in March 2021. Bocchieri
timely appealed.

3 Bocchieri does not challenge the court’s ruling on the motion for

reconsideration on appeal.

                                   13
                          DISCUSSION

       Bocchieri contends that the court erred in granting
summary adjudication of his breach of contract cause of action
because he was “entitled to a timely investigation and payment
and . . . this did not occur,” in violation of Insurance Code section
790.03, and a violation of the Insurance Code is prima facie
evidence of a breach of contract. He further argues that he was
damaged by the breach of contract, notwithstanding that
Farmers paid the policy limit, because he was entitled to interest
on that amount. Bocchieri contends that the court erred in
granting summary adjudication of his bad faith claim because
there “were and are triable issues of fact that 1) Farmers was
unreasonable in adopting a policy that medical records would not
be reviewed by qualified individuals until litigation commenced;
and 2) that Farmers’ decision that Plaintiff’s claim was sufficient
for a six figure offer, and ultimately a policy limit offer, was
based entirely on medical information available to Farmers, and
in their files, many years before the offer was made.”
       Farmers contends that Bocchieri impermissibly relies on
evidence that was excluded by the court and that his arguments
with respect to both causes of action fail in the absence of this
evidence. Farmers also argues that Bocchieri fails to support his
contention that a violation of the Insurance Code constitutes a
breach of contract with law, that there is no private right of
action under Insurance Code section 790.03, and that Bocchieri’s
claim has no basis in the Policy. It also argues that Bocchieri is
not entitled to interest on his policy benefits under the law.
Finally, with respect to the bad faith claim, Farmers contends
that Bocchieri fails to establish that Farmers unreasonably
delayed when he identifies no evidence indicating when Farmers

                                 14
received the medical records that permitted Dr. Rosen’s analysis,
specifically the 2006 MRI scans. Farmers also disputes that any
alleged policy regarding referring medical records for doctor
review impacted the handling of Bocchieri’s claims under the
undisputed facts.
1.    Standard of Review
       The standard of review for summary judgment is well
established. The motion “shall be granted if all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc.4, § 437c, subd. (c).) A moving
defendant has met his burden of showing that a cause of action
has no merit by establishing that one or more elements of a cause
of action cannot be established or that there is a complete
defense. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
849–850; Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1196.)
       We independently review an order granting summary
judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25
Cal.4th 763, 768.) In performing our independent review of the
evidence, “we apply the same three-step analysis as the trial
court. First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings. Next,
we determine whether the moving party has established facts
justifying judgment in its favor. Finally, if the moving party has
carried its initial burden, we decide whether the opposing party

4 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

                                   15
has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material fact issue.”
(Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438.)
       In determining whether there are triable issues of material
fact, we consider all the evidence set forth by the parties, except
that to which objections have been made and properly sustained.
(§ 437c, subd. (c); Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th
317, 334.) We accept as true the facts supported by plaintiff’s
evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom (Sada v. Robert
F. Kennedy Medical Center (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138, 148),
resolving evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s favor
(Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 768).
       “Furthermore, our review is governed by a fundamental
principle of appellate procedure, namely, that ‘ “[a] judgment or
order of the lower court is presumed correct,” ’ and thus, ‘ “error
must be affirmatively shown.” ’ [Citation.] Under this principle,
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing error on appeal, even
though defendants had the burden of proving their right to
summary judgment before the trial court. [Citation.] For this
reason, our review is limited to contentions adequately raised
and supported in plaintiff’s brief.” (Arnold v. Dignity Health
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 412, 423.)
2.    Bocchieri has forfeited his challenge to the trial court’s
      evidentiary rulings.
      Bocchieri relies on portions of his declaration as to which
objections were sustained but does not challenge the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings. Before addressing whether the court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers, we must
determine what portion of Bocchieri’s proffered evidence we may
consider on appeal.

                                16
      In reviewing the court’s summary judgment ruling, we
generally consider all evidence set forth in the moving and
opposing papers except those matters as to which objections were
made and sustained. (§ 437c, subd. (c).) It is well established that
a party who fails to “attack the [trial court’s evidentiary] rulings
on appeal . . . forfeit[s] any contentions of error regarding them.
[Citation.]” (Frittelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 35, 41; accord, Lopez v. Baca (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th
1008, 1014–1015 [party waived “any issues concerning the
correctness of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings” by failing to
“challenge the trial court’s ruling sustaining . . . objections to
certain evidence offered in opposition to the summary judgment
motion”].) Thus, when an appellant fails to challenge evidentiary
rulings barring evidence submitted in support or opposition of
summary judgment, “we exclude this evidence from our review of
the summary judgment motion.” (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v.
New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1181.)
      A party cannot preserve its challenge to the court’s
evidentiary rulings simply by relying on the excluded evidence on
appeal. Bocchieri does not address any specific objections, nor
does he explain why the court abused its discretion in sustaining
them. “ ‘Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal
authority for the positions taken. “When an appellant fails to
raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
waived.” ’ [Citation.] ‘We are not bound to develop appellants’
argument for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal
argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the
contention as waived.’ [Citations.]” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.)

                                17
      Accordingly, we predicate our analysis of the summary
judgment ruling on the evidence admitted in the trial court and
disregard Bocchieri’s references to statements in his declaration
that the court excluded.
3.    The trial court did not err in granting summary
      adjudication of the breach of contract cause of action.
       “Unreasonable delay in paying policy benefits or paying
less than the amount due is actionable withholding of benefits
which may constitute a breach of contract as well as bad faith
giving rise to damages in tort. [Citations.]” (Intergulf
Development LLC v. Superior Court (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 16,
20.)
       Bocchieri argues that Farmers breached the contract by
“failing to timely pay Plaintiff’s claim or process it in a timely
manner or reasonable manner.” The quoted language is from his
complaint, not the Policy. Bocchieri does not identify any
obligations in the Policy that Farmers breached. Rather,
Bocchieri asserts that the Insurance Code requires prompt
investigation into claims and payment of policy benefits (Ins.
Code, § 790.03, subd. (h)(3) & (5)) and that “[v]iolation of a
statute is prima facie evidence of a breach of contract.” Bocchieri
cites no authority in support of this contention in his opening
brief.
       In Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988)
46 Cal.3d 287, 304–305, the Supreme Court concluded that there
was no private right of action under Insurance Code section
790.03, subdivision (h). However, it “expressly held that ‘ . . . the
courts retain jurisdiction to impose civil damages or other
remedies against insurers in appropriate common law actions,
based on such traditional theories as fraud, infliction of emotional

                                 18
distress, and (as to the insured) either breach of contract or
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’
[Citation.] Thus, these common law claims remain as a firm legal
basis on which an insured may rely to seek redress against an
insurer.” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court
(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108, abrogated on another ground
by Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular
Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163.)
      The parties both argue that Moradi-Shalal supports their
positions. Farmers contends that, because there is no private
right of action under Insurance Code section 790.03, Bocchieri
cannot recover damages for a breach of this statute alone.
Bocchieri argues that federal cases have interpreted Moradi-
Shalal as stating that the violation of section 790.03 establishes a
breach of an insurance contract.
      In Lincoln General Ins. Co. v. Access Claims
Administrators, Inc. (E.D. Cal. 2009) 596 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1366,
on which Bocchieri relies, the relevant contract “required [the
insurer] to ‘[p]repare and file all reports and handle all claims in
accordance with established claims procedures and state
guidelines, assuring compliance with the Fair Claims Practice
Act, California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act and all other
applicable statutes and regulations.’ ” The court concluded that
the plaintiffs were not attempting to assert a cause of action
under the Insurance Code but were instead arguing that the
requirements of the Insurance Code were expressly integrated
into the contract and that the violation of the Insurance Code
therefore constituted a breach of contract. (Id. at p. 1367; see also
Berger v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2007) 476 F.Supp.2d
1174, 1177 [“plaintiffs must be required to do something more to

                                 19
allege a breach of contract claim than merely point to allegations
of a statutory violation”].) Thus, contrary to Bocchieri’s
contention, Lincoln does not stand for the proposition that the
provisions of the Insurance Code are integrated into all insurance
contracts or that a plaintiff need only claim a violation of the
Insurance Code to establish breach of contract.5
       Bocchieri fails to direct us to any California law supporting
that conduct that violates the Insurance Code is prima facie
evidence of a violation of an insurance contract, nor does he
identify any provision of the Policy that expressly integrates the
requirements of the Insurance Code, as in Lincoln. Absent an
affirmative showing that the facts and law support that a failure
to comply with Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h)(3)
and (5), constitutes a breach of the Policy, we cannot conclude
that the court erred in granting summary adjudication of the
breach of contract cause of action. (Arnold v. Dignity Health,
supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 423.)
       Accordingly, we need not determine whether there is a
dispute of material fact as to whether Farmers complied with
Insurance Code section 790.03. We also need not reach the
question of whether the absence of contract-related damages, on
which the court relied, provides another ground to affirm,6 or

5 In re National Western Life Ins. Deferred Annuities Litigation (S.D.

Cal. 2006) 467 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1078–1079, which Bocchieri cites, also
does not stand for this proposition.
6 See Case v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Inc. (2018) 30

Cal.App.5th 397, 402 [“In view of the requirement for contract-related
damages, an insurer may secure summary adjudication on the claim
when there are no unpaid policy benefits.”], citing Behnke v. State
Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1468.

                                   20
Bocchieri’s contention that he was damaged, notwithstanding
Farmers’ payment of the UIM limit under the Policy, because
Farmers is liable for interest on the benefits paid under Civil
Code section 3302.
4.    The trial court did not err in granting summary
      adjudication of the breach of implied covenant of good
      faith and fair dealing cause of action.
       “[T]o succeed on a claim for breach of the implied covenant,
the insured must show that ‘the insurer acted unreasonably or
without proper cause.’ [Citation.] The insured must show the
insurer’s conduct ‘demonstrates a failure or refusal to discharge
contractual responsibilities, prompted not by an honest mistake,
bad judgment or negligence but rather by a conscious and
deliberate act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common
purposes and disappoints the reasonable expectations of the
other party thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the
agreement.’ [Citation.]” (Mosley v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co.
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 417, 436.)
       “Before an insurer can be found to have acted in bad faith
for its delay or denial in the payment of policy benefits, it must be
shown that the insurer acted unreasonably or without proper
cause. Where there is a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability
under the policy for the claim asserted by the insured, there can
be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its
side of that dispute. [Citation.] Moreover, it must be remembered
that ‘an insurer is not required to pay every claim presented to it.
Besides the duty to deal fairly with the insured, the insurer also
has a duty to its other policyholders and to the stockholders (if it
is such a company) not to dissipate its reserves through the
payment of meritless claims. Such a practice inevitably would

                                 21
prejudice the insurance seeking public because of the necessity to
increase rates, and would finally drive the insurer out of
business. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072.)
       In other words, “ ‘[t]he mistaken [or erroneous] withholding
of policy benefits, if reasonable or if based on a legitimate dispute
as to the insurer’s liability under California law, does not expose
the insurer to bad faith liability.’ [Citations.] . . . [T]he
reasonableness of the insurer’s decisions and actions must be
evaluated as of the time that they were made; the evaluation
cannot fairly be made in the light of subsequent events that may
provide evidence of the insurer’s errors.” (Chateau Chamberay
Homeowners Assn. v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 335, 346–347.) Although an insurer’s bad faith is
ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by a jury by
considering the evidence of motive, intent and state of mind,
“ ‘the question becomes one of law . . . when, because there are no
conflicting inferences, reasonable minds could not differ.
[Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 350.)
       We agree with the court that, based on the undisputed
evidence, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Farmers did
not have a genuine dispute as to the cause of Bocchieri’s injuries.
Farmers’ review of Bocchieri’s medical records revealed that
Bocchieri had received treatment for headaches since before the
2011 accident and was involved in a prior automobile accident in
2006. Farmers was entitled to thoroughly investigate the claim
before resolving the claim. Dr. Rosen’s uncontested conclusion
that Bocchieri’s headaches were not attributable to the 2011
accident, whereas his neck pain was, demonstrate that the

                                 22
injuries for which Bocchieri was receiving ongoing treatment
were, in part, preexisting.
       Of course, “[t]he genuine dispute rule does not relieve an
insurer from its obligation to thoroughly and fairly investigate,
process and evaluate the insured’s claim.” (Wilson v. 21st Century
Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 723 (Wilson).) A fair investigation
means one without unreasonable delay.
       “There can be no ‘unreasonable delay’ until the insurer
receives adequate information to process the claim and reach an
agreement with the insureds.” (Globe Indemnity Co. v. Superior
Court (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 725, 731 (Globe Indemnity Co.).) In
Globe Indemnity Co., the insureds sued their insurer for bad faith
in connection with a claim made pursuant to their uninsured
motorist coverage after their daughter was injured while riding
as a passenger on a stolen motorcycle involved in a high-speed
police chase. (Id. at p. 727.) The policy excluded coverage for use
of a vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person was
entitled to do so. (Ibid.) The insureds and their attorney did not
cooperate with the insurer’s attempts to question the daughter,
and the daughter only appeared for a deposition months after the
insureds’ suit was filed. (Id. at p. 728.) When the daughter
testified during the deposition that she did not know the
motorcycle was stolen, the insurer, through its representative
present at the deposition, immediately acknowledged coverage.
(Ibid.)
       The trial court in Globe Indemnity Co. denied the insurer’s
motion for summary judgment and the insurer successfully
petitioned for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate
its order denying summary judgment or summary adjudication of
issues. (Globe Indemnity Co., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 728,

                                23
731–732.) The Court of Appeal concluded that “[t]he contractual
duty to pay policy proceeds did not arise until plaintiffs provided
the information necessary to allow [the insurer] to determine
whether the accident on the stolen motorcycle was covered under
the terms of the policy.” (Id. at p. 731.) The insurer “did not
receive adequate information to process the claim until after [the
plaintiffs’ daughter] submitted to examination under oath
pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy,” and thus the
insurer’s “delay in processing the claim was caused solely by
plaintiffs’ failure to provide information about [the plaintiffs’
daughter’s] knowledge or lack of knowledge that the motorcycle
was stolen.” (Ibid.)
      Bocchieri argues that Farmers had everything it needed to
evaluate his claim in 2014. In contrast, Farmers argues that it
was only by comparing the MRI scans from 2006 and 2011 that
Dr. Rosen was able to draw conclusions as to the cause of
Bocchieri’s symptoms and there is no evidence that Farmers had
the 2006 MRI scan as of 2014.
      The original medical authorization form signed by
Bocchieri in 2013 is not in the record. However, according to
Farmers’ internal records and Bocchieri’s declaration, Bocchieri
identified two doctors: Dr. Sheps and Dr. Aufiero. The medical
record summarized by Dr. Rosen in his report indicates that
Bocchieri began seeing Dr. Aufiero in June 2010 and Dr. Sheps in
November 2011. Thus, there is no evidence in the record from
which a jury could infer that Farmers’ initial order of medical
documents from Dr. Sheps and Dr. Aufiero included records from
other doctors for the years preceding the 2011 accident, including
the 2006 MRI scan. Rather, Farmers’ internal reports indicate
that, as of September 2015, it had obtained records going back to

                                24
only 2010 that suggested that Bocchieri had been involved in a
prior accident.
       The record indicates that Spero and Bocchieri spoke
sometime in January 2015 and that, pursuant to their discussion,
Bocchieri was “going to be sending in additional meds and
supporting docs.”7 It is also undisputed that Farmers sent 10
letters between January 7 and September 3, 2015, requesting
that Bocchieri provide additional medical records for treatment
received after January 2, 2014, as well as documentation for any
lost wages claimed. After telling Spero that he would provide
further relevant documentation, there is no evidence that
Bocchieri acknowledged Spero’s monthly requests at any point
before September 2015.
       In September 2015, Bocchieri provided further medical
records for treatments he had received between 2011 and 2015.
Based on its review of these records and previously received
records, Farmers concluded that it was likely that Bocchieri’s

7 At oral argument, counsel for Bocchieri emphasized a January 5,

2015 note in Farmers’ internal records stating that Cereghino had told
Bocchieri that Farmers “dropped the ball” in response to Bocchieri’s
complaints that he had not heard from Farmers since the prior
summer and that the claim was not resolved. Bocchieri did not,
however, rely on this evidence in the argument portion of his opening
brief or anywhere in his reply. In any event, Bocchieri does not identify
evidence supporting that Farmers had the information it needed to
evaluate the claim and delayed in acting on it by January 5, 2015, as is
necessary to create an inference of bad faith. (See Globe Indemnity Co.,
supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 731.) During his discussion with Cereghino
and a discussion with Spero two days later, Bocchieri also stated that
he intended to pursue a loss of earnings claim and that he would send
additional records and supporting documents, which further
undermines the assertion that Farmers had adequate information to
resolve the claim prior to that time but failed to do so.

                                   25
injuries were due to a preexisting condition and that it needed
further information to determine whether that was the case.
Farmers requested a recorded statement from Bocchieri related
to his injuries and asked him to sign and return the attached
medical authorization so that it could order “all of [Bocchieri’s]
records going back the last 10 years, including all X-rays and
MRI films both before the loss and after for review.” Although
Bocchieri stated in his declaration that he “promptly signed and
returned” the authorization, the authorization is not part of the
record and his declaration fails to identify the date on which he
returned the document to Farmers. Bocchieri’s vague statement
that he acted promptly does not create a material dispute as to
whether he failed to respond to Spero’s letter by November 2,
2015, as Hieb stated in her email. (See Sinai Memorial Chapel v.
Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190, 196–197 [“[A]n issue of fact is
not raised by ‘cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory assertions’
[citation]. . . . ‘[W]hile the court in determining a motion for
summary judgment does not “try” the case, the court is bound to
consider the competency of the evidence presented.’ [Citation.]”.)
       However, we accept that Bocchieri signed and returned the
document. Nevertheless, there is no evidence supporting that he
identified all relevant health care providers for the 10 years
preceding the 2011 accident, including the doctors who referred
him for the 2006 MRI scans or the radiologists. Bocchieri did not
dispute that Dr. Rosen’s report was “based only on the medical
records that [Farmers] was able to subpoena,” as opposed to
records it was able to obtain pursuant to a medical authorization.
       There is also no evidence in the record indicating at what
point between November 2015 and September 2017 Farmers
obtained records for the 10-year period predating 2011, which its

                                26
representatives believed were necessary to investigate the claim
and on which Dr. Rosen ultimately relied. However, it is
undisputed that Bocchieri did not submit to the requested
examination under oath as required by the Policy; that Farmers’
arbitration counsel issued discovery requests to which Bocchieri
did not respond between June 2016 and September 2017; that, in
November 2016, Bocchieri demanded a nine-month stay of
proceedings in the arbitration until August 2017; that, in the
interim, Farmers referred the medical records it was able to
subpoena to Dr. Rosen; that Dr. Rosen issued his medical opinion
in September 2017, in which he opined that Bocchieri’s injuries
were due in part to the 2011 accident; and that, by October 2017,
Farmers settled for Bocchieri’s UIM policy limit.
       We conclude that Farmers met its initial burden of showing
that the undisputed evidence does not permit the conclusion that
it consciously and deliberately failed to discharge its contractual
responsibilities. (Mosley v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co., supra, 49
Cal.App.5th at p. 436.). The burden therefore shifted to Bocchieri
to identify evidence establishing a dispute of material fact as to
when Farmers “receive[d] adequate information to process the
claim and reach an agreement with the insureds” and whether its
payment of the Policy limit in 2017 was unreasonable. (Globe
Indemnity Co., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 731.)
       Bocchieri contends that Farmers fails to present evidence
that the 2006 MRI scan was necessary to Dr. Rosen’s conclusion
or that a doctor could not have concluded that he was entitled to
his Policy limit without the 2006 MRI scan. However, Farmers
had the right and obligation to thoroughly investigate its genuine
dispute as to the cause of Bocchieri’s injuries. (Wilson, supra, 42
Cal.4th at p. 723.) He cites no authority for the proposition that

                                27
the investigation of a genuine dispute is only reasonable if it
results in an outcome that would not have otherwise been
reached. Moreover, Bocchieri conceded in his opening brief that
Dr. Rosen reached his conclusions “based on reviewing Bocchieri’s
2006 and 2011 MRIs.”
       Bocchieri also argues that the 2011 MRI scan report refers
to the 2006 MRI scan and the 2011 MRI scan was in Farmers’
possession since early 2014. He therefore argues that, if the 2006
MRI scan was necessary to Dr. Rosen’s opinion, Farmers acted in
an unreasonable and dilatory manner in not requesting it at that
time. However, as noted above, “the reasonableness of the
insurer’s decisions and actions must be evaluated as of the time
that they were made; the evaluation cannot fairly be made in the
light of subsequent events that may provide evidence of the
insurer’s errors.” (Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v.
Associated Internat. Ins. Co., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 346–
347.) Bocchieri’s evidence demonstrates that Farmers decided to
seek records for the 10 years preceding the accident because its
review of Bocchieri’s medical records, including those received in
September 2015, indicated that Bocchieri received treatments for
headaches prior to the 2011 accident and had been involved in an
automobile accident in 2006, not because it belatedly noticed the
reference to the 2006 MRI scan in the 2011 MRI scan report. The
fact that the 2006 MRI scan ultimately proved to be among the
most relevant evidence for Dr. Rosen’s review does not permit the
inference that Farmers was unreasonable for seeking other
medical records for the period preceding the 2011 accident.
       Bocchieri contends that we must construe the absence of
evidence as to when Farmers obtained the 2006 MRI scan in his
favor. Although we draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving

                               28
party, “ ‘[a]n issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of
evidence. It is not created by “speculation, conjecture,
imagination or guess work.” [Citation.]’ ” (Brown v. Ransweiler
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 525.) In other words, “ ‘[w]hen
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is based on
inferences, those inferences must be reasonably deducible from
the evidence . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Advent, Inc. v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 443, 459.)
The only inference permitted by Bocchieri’s evidence is that
Farmers did not have medical records predating 2010 as of
September 28, 2015. In the absence of any evidence that
Bocchieri identified the relevant doctors for the 2006 MRI scans
in his 2015 authorization, we cannot speculate that Farmers
could have or did obtain the 2006 MRI scan before Bocchieri
stopped cooperating with Farmers.
       Bocchieri acknowledges that the undisputed facts indicate
that he did not comply with his obligations under the Policy,8 but

8 Bocchieri characterizes his noncompliance as not “immediately

respond[ing] to every single, redundant inquiry letter he received from
the insurer’s letter-generating computers.” However, Bocchieri fails to
cite evidence supporting that Farmers’ requests were redundant. His
statements to this effect in his declaration were excluded and thus
cannot be relied upon on appeal. In any event, that conclusory claim is
insufficient to create a dispute of material fact. (See Sinai Memorial
Chapel v. Dudler, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 196–197.) The
undisputed evidence establishes that Farmers received records
reflecting medical treatment received through December 2013 and
subsequently made requests for records reflecting medical treatment
received after January 2, 2014, as well as documentation supporting
any lost wages claimed. There is no indication in the record that
Farmers already had those materials, or that Farmers’ subsequent

                                  29
contends that any non-compliance with the Policy does not excuse
bad faith conduct by the insurer. We agree. Our Supreme Court
has stated that “the duty of good faith and fair dealing on the
part of defendant insurance companies is an absolute one. At the
same time, we do not say that the parties cannot define, by the
terms of the contract, their respective obligations and duties. We
say merely that no matter how those duties are stated, the
nonperformance by one party of its contractual duties cannot
excuse a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by the
other party while the contract between them is in effect and not
rescinded.” (Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566,
578.)
       However, on this record, a trier of fact could not reasonably
infer that Farmers had all the medical records it needed to
evaluate the claim as of 2014, delayed its investigation and
payment of the claim, and then sought to justify its dilatory
conduct based on Bocchieri’s noncompliance with the Policy.
Farmers has put forward undisputed evidence that its delay in
paying out the Policy resulted from Bocchieri’s failure or delay to
provide it with information it needed to investigate his claim. By
failing to identify evidence showing when Farmers obtained
medical records for the years preceding the 2011 accident, or
reasonably could have done so, Bocchieri has failed to
demonstrate the existence of a triable, material fact as to
whether Farmers deliberately refused to discharge its contractual
responsibilities.

request for a ten-year medical history was redundant of information it
already had in its possession.

                                  30
       Bocchieri also argues that there is a dispute of material fact
as to whether Farmers unreasonably delayed in paying out his
policy because Cereghino, Farmers’ person most knowledgeable,
testified that he had no knowledge of whether Bocchieri failed to
timely return authorizations or provide records that Farmers
requested as of September 2015. We are not persuaded that
Cereghino’s lack of knowledge constitutes a concession of the
truth of these facts or creates a dispute of material fact when
there is no dispute that Dr. Rosen’s report was based on medical
records that Farmers subpoenaed, rather than records that it
obtained pursuant to a medical authorization.
       Bocchieri also argues there was a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because “it is Farmers[’]
policy not to have anybody with medical knowledge evaluate a
serious injury of this nature unless Farmers is sued.” Brehm v.
21st Century Ins. Co. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1242,
establishes that, although an insurer has an absolute right to
demand arbitration when it fails to reach an agreement with the
insured, “[a]n insurer’s duty to thoroughly investigate and fairly
evaluate its insured’s UIM claim, so forcefully recognized in
Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pages 720 to 723, has no meaning”
unless there is also “an implied obligation to honestly assess [the
insured’s] claim and to make a reasonable effort to resolve any
dispute with him as to the amount of his damages before
invoking that right.”
       We are not persuaded that the evidence, even when viewed
in Bocchieri’s favor, establishes an “absolute policy that there
would be no physician review prior to arbitration.” Although
Cereghino and Spero testified that medical records “usually” or
“typically” are not sent for a doctor’s review until a case has gone

                                 31
to litigation, Cereghino further testified that “[t]here’s no specific
policy for when or when not to use an expert” and “[e]ach claim is
different.” He also stated that the decision not to refer the
medical records to a doctor prior to litigation was “just a decision
made in this particular case.” Bocchieri does not present any
evidence supporting the inference that Farmers’ usual practice
was a de facto policy—that is, that Farmers never referred
medical records for doctor review prior to arbitration.
        In any event, the undisputed evidence establishes that it
was Bocchieri who demanded arbitration, not Farmers. In
October 2013, Bocchieri made a formal demand for uninsured
motorist arbitration by certified mail, as the Policy required.
Over two years later, Hieb stated in an email that Farmers was
referring the matter to arbitration counsel to assist with
discovery “in the event UIM Arbitration is ultimately necessary.”
This was not a demand for arbitration in the manner required by
the Policy. That is, Farmers neither filed a formal demand in a
court of competent jurisdiction nor sent a certified letter
demanding arbitration. While it is possible that arbitration
counsel subsequently made a demand in the manner set forth in
the Policy, Bocchieri does not identify any such demand in the
record. At most, Bocchieri’s evidence suggests that Farmers’
arbitration counsel initiated proceedings sometime around
November 2016, when Bocchieri wrote in a letter: “After sitting
on its laurels for almost five years, it is inconceivable that
Farmers would rush to arbitration at the worst possible time
without calling its insured and working out an amenable
mutually agreeable schedule.”
        The test of whether an insurer acts reasonably is judged by
an objective standard and an insurer’s subjective state of mind is

                                  32
immaterial. (FEI Enterprises, Inc. v. Yoon (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
790, 803; accord, Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of
New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1238–1239 [“bad faith is
to be determined solely by objective unreasonability”].) Assuming
Farmers had the asserted policy of never sending records to
doctors for review prior to litigation, its subjective bad faith is
irrelevant when, objectively, it did not demand arbitration
pursuant to that policy. Even if we were to consider the initiation
of an arbitration proceeding sometime around November 2016 as
the relevant demand for arbitration, Farmers submitted
undisputed evidence that Bocchieri ceased to cooperate with its
requests prior to this time. As discussed, Bocchieri has not
identified evidence creating a material dispute of fact as to
whether Farmers had the records it needed to fairly evaluate the
claim at that time.
       In sum, “even though the court [in summary judgment
proceedings] may not weigh the plaintiff’s evidence or inferences
against the defendants’ as though it were sitting as the trier of
fact, it must nevertheless determine what any evidence or
inference could show or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 856.)
Bocchieri has not demonstrated through facts or inferences that
the alleged wrongful conduct by Farmers was more likely to have
occurred than was any permissible conduct. (Id. at p. 857.)
       Since we have determined the court did not err as a matter
of law in finding a lack of unreasonable delay and granting
summary adjudication of Bocchieri’s claim for the tortious breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, we are not
required to discuss Bocchieri’s further contention that he is
entitled to punitive damages. (See Behnke v. State Farm General

                                33
Ins. Co., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1470 [“Without tort
liability, there can be no liability for punitive damages.”].)

                                 34
                        DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed. Farmers shall recover its costs
on appeal.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                   LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

     EDMON, P. J.

     ADAMS, J.

                               35