Court Opinion

ID: 9551019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:46:42.225438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:54.213733
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McWilliams
dissenting:
From a procedural standpoint I find myself in disagreement with the majority of this Court, and therefore I must dissent.
In an original proceeding instituted in this Court, Altobella alleges that in the district court of Jefferson County, on October 3, 1963, he was adjudged to be in contempt, summarily sentenced to ninety days in jail and then denied a stay of execution and a release on bond, and accordingly he asked “that citation issue forthwith to the respondent [the committing judge], commanding him to show cause why petitioner should not be released upon his existing recognizance pending final review of this matter.” It is observed that Altobella in his petition to this Court did not ask for a “final review of the matter” — only an order that he be released, until such time as the matter could be reviewed on its merits.
By appropriate order this Court commanded the respondent to show cause within seventy-two hours “why the relief requested in the prayer of said petition should not be granted.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*315Respondent within the time set by the Court filed an answer, asking that the petition be dismissed for the stated reason that Altobella was committed to jail for a “contempt [that] occurred in the presence of the Court”; that the court “has an inherent right to punish . . . [Altobella] forthwith”; and that Altobella “is not entitled to bail under a finding of contempt occurring within the presence of the court.”
It is on this state of the record that the majority of this Court do not order that Altobella be “released” pending “final review of the matter,” but rather proceed forthwith to make a “final review of the matter” and “void” the judgment of contempt. I disagree with this disposition of the matter.
The general rule is that this Court will not entertain original proceedings “where an adequate remedy is available by writ of error.” See Piper v. District Court, 147 Colo. 87, 364 P. (2d) 213. As illustrative of the fact that a judgment of contempt is subject to review by writ of error, see Brown v. Amen, 147 Colo. 468, 364 P. (2d) 735.
Hence, Altobella does have “an adequate remedy . . . available by writ of error,” i.e., the judgment of contempt is subject to review by writ of error, and in such appellate proceeding he undoubtedly would have the right to seek a stay of execution of his ninety-day jail sentence and ask that bail be set.
This being true, I am disinclined in an original proceeding and on the state of the record to pass on the merits of the judgment of contempt, which represents relief not sought by Altobella in his petition. I would therefore discharge the rule, without prejudice, to the right of Altobella to seek review and relief through writ or error.