Court Opinion

ID: 9446016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:43:58.662461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:29.637300
License: Public Domain

BASTIAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot agree that the conviction in this case should be reversed.
When Fenwick had completed his direct testimony, the Assistant United States Attorney commenced his cross-examination in the not unusual manner of showing convictions for prior offenses to affect Fenwick’s credit as a witness.1 Fenwick admitted the following convictions :
1. Convicted of attempted burglary 3rd degree and possession of burglary instruments; June 27, 1956.
2. Convicted of petty larceny; May 5, 1953.
3. Convicted of petty larceny; May 21, 1952.
4. Pleaded guilty to petty larceny; September 2, 1951.
Thereupon he was asked:
“And in this court, in Criminal No. 846-56, you were convicted of the same offense as you are being tried for today, possession of a check knowing that it was stolen, forgery and uttering?”
Upon objection being made to this question, a bench conference was held. To defense counsel’s statement at this bench conference that “ [y] ou cannot use a prior conviction and try to relate it to this one, to the one he is being tried for here” the trial judge responded by saying, correctly I think: “He is not trying to do that.” However, in any event, the question was left unanswered; and, after a recess taken at this point, the following question was asked:
“Now, in a case in this court in January, the case went to trial on the 23rd of January, 1957, which case I prosecuted against you, you were convicted of possession of a check, were you not, knowing that it was stolen, and you were also convicted of forgery and uttering?”
After the colloquy and answer [which are set forth in the majority opinion and not necessary to be repeated here], the cross-examination continued as to matters other than impeachment. Thus it will be seen that appellant was not charged with having engaged in a general scheme and that there was no attempt on the part of the prosecutor to tie appellant in with any such general scheme. He was charged with several separate, specified offenses.2 The ques*128tion, used by the majority as a basis for reversal, was introduced simply to affect appellant’s credibility, as were the other convictions, and for no other purpose.
I recognize, of course, that this court ruled, in Campbell v. United States, 1949, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 176 F.2d 45, 47, that it is “wholly illogical and unfair to permit a defendant to be interrogated about a previous conviction from which an appeal is pending.” However, in that case it was pointed out that reversal was not there required where such a question was asked:
“Moreover, the jury knew the petit larceny conviction was pending on appeal, and heard the appellant’s uncontradicted statement of allegedly newly-discovered evidence in the larceny case which would amount to a complete defense to that charge. It is our view, after studying the proof in its entirety, that no reasonable juror would have given more than the most cursory consideration to the larceny conviction, and that proof concerning it played no substantial part in bringing about the verdict.” 85 U.S.App.D.C. at page 136, 176 F.2d at page 48.
I feel that substantially the same can be said about the present case, and that the proof concerning the prior convictions “played no substantial part in bringing about the verdict” here.
There can be no doubt that the evidence of the conviction involved is not inadmissible simply because the crime involved was the same as that for which he was on trial.
Further, it is to be borne in mind that the conviction referred to in the question involved was in fact affirmed. It might well be that had that conviction been reversed, the conviction in this case might likewise have to be reversed for error in admitting that testimony.
I think it is a great mistake to reverse the conviction in this case and put upon the Government the necessity of a new trial when the same question may now be asked, particularly as it may not be possible to procure the witnesses who were available at the first trial. I therefore dissent

. § 14-305 D.C.Code (1951 Ed.): “No person sliall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of crime, but such fact may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or by evidence aliunde. * * * >>

. As a matter of fact, the court, in its charge, eliminated any possible question of a “continuous scheme.” The court said:
“This is a criminal charge, a six-count indictment charging this defendant, Mr. Fenwick, Joseph Frederick Fenwick, with having committed certain offenses with reference to two Government checks. All of those offenses are felonious and three of them have to do with the circumstances surrounding one check, three of them have to do with the circumstances surrounding the other check. It *128is just as if you were trying two separate indictments against this man. The two instances are not connected in any way, but it is within the rules of the criminal jurisprudence of this country that these two charges may be tried at the same time. That is for the purpose of saving time and expense both to the Government and to the defendant, so as to make it more convenient, but you must bear in mind that there are two separate and distinct instances; three centering on one check and three centering on the other.”
Again, in commenting on the fact that the testimony was largely that of accomplices, and that the testimony of accomplices is always to be received with great caution, the court carefully pointed out that the offenses were different and that no scheme was involved. The court said:
“The fact that there are two of those [accomplices] does not mean that one corroborates the other, as you will easily see when you consider that they are entirely different offenses. Doris Elaine Johnson didn’t know anything about the check that was taken into the clothing store, and Kay Glenn didn’t know anything about the check that was taken into the liquor store. Each one of them testified as to a certain check and therefore her testimony is uncorroborated. Doris Johnson’s testimony about the liquor store check is uncorroborated. Kay Glenn’s testimony about the clothing store check is uncorroborated.”