Court Opinion

ID: 9778172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:34:42.535321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:04.340167
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that when circumstances create a “bona fide” doubt as to an accused’s competency to proceed with trial, due process of law requires the trial court to conduct a hearing on the question, whether requested or not.
Judge Turnage, in his opinion in the Court of Appeals, said:
“Much more closely akin to the factual situation in this case is Briggs v. State, 509 S.W.2d 154 (Mo.App.1974) in which this court considered a psychiatric report which stated petitioner had a mental disease and defect within the meaning of § 552.010, RSMo 1969, and at the same time found he had the capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense. This court held the report to be so irreconcilable that standing alone such report raised a bona fide doubt and cast a substantial suspicion upon petitioner’s mental fitness to proceed. This court further held the failure of the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine petitioner’s mental fitness to proceed constituted an abuse of discretion under Sub-Section 6 of § 552.020, RSMo 1969.
“The question in this case is whether or not the two reports of Dr. Marco were sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt as to Bryant’s competency and mental capacity to proceed on the charges pending against him and to intelligently assist his counsel. This court has concluded, as it did in Briggs, that the inconsistent and irreconcilable nature of the report required the court to sua sponte hold a hearing as provided in Sub-Section 6 of § 552.020 to determine the mental fitness of Bryant to proceed. This is based upon *47the finding of Dr. Marco on the one hand that Bryant was suffering from hysterical personality and hysterical neurosis dissociative type at the time of the report on January 10, 1974. There is nothing in the report of February 21, 1974, to indicate such diagnosis had been changed. Dr. Marco was careful to point out that hysterical personality and hysterical neurosis are both considered to be a mental disease or illness as defined in § 552.010.
“At the same time Dr. Marco stated Bryant was aware of the nature of the charges and was able to cooperate with his counsel and was, therefore, competent to stand trial. There is no explanation in either report to show how Bryant could be suffering from these mental diseases and defects and at the same time be competent to stand trial. In fact, other portions of the reports would seem to negative the conclusions as to Bryant’s competency, at least absent some explanation on the part of the psychiatrist. These include the finding that Bryant had a problem concerning his memory functioning and that under severe emotional stress he had difficulty in immediate recall and had amnestic states. A further observation in the report of February 21 adds to the doubt of Bryant’s capacity to proceed. Dr. Marco stated ‘although it appears that Mr. Bryant voluntarily confessed, I am struck by the enormity of his response to fear and the subsequent difficulty he has in talking to me about the events and the mental mechanisms of denial and suppression that are presently operating.’ In view of all of the opinions and observations stated by Dr. Marco in his two reports, this court is forced to conclude that such reports were so irreconcilable that they raised a bona fide doubt as to Bryant’s fitness to proceed.
“With the doubt thus raised, the court should have sua sponte held a hearing on Bryant’s mental ability to understand the nature of the charges and his ability to cooperate with his counsel. This was required under Pate * * * and Briggs."
In my opinion, the Briggs holding is sound, it follows the letter and spirit of Pate, and I would adopt it as the position of this Court. A hearing on a defendant’s competency to stand trial should be held sua sponte when a psychiatric report indicates that the defendant is competent to stand trial but also indicates he is suffering from a mental disease or defect under § 552.010, RSMo 1969. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeals that under the facts in this case, and the holding in Briggs, a bona fide doubt was raised as to appellant’s competency to stand trial and a hearing should have been held by the trial court sua sponte on this issue.
The judgment of the trial court is clearly erroneous. It should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate the original judgment and sentence. Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. 375, 387, 86 S.Ct. 386, 15 L.Ed.2d 815. The State would then be free to proceed further against appellant, assuming, of course, that he is then competent. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975).
I respectfully dissent.