Court Opinion

ID: 9727307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:30:14.734706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:35.953336
License: Public Domain

*82Vanderbilt, C. J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority of the court. In effect they are overruling, without mentioning it, State v. Bove, 98 N. J. L. 350 (Sup. Ct. 1922), affirmed per curiam, 98 N. J. L. 576 (E. & A. 1923). In that case the defendant appealed to our former Supreme Court from a judgment of conviction of the crime of selling lottery tickets. Among other things he argued that the trial court erred in refusing to charge certain requests to the effect that the testimony of the defendant’s accomplices should be viewed with the closest scrutiny and also in refusing a request to charge that there could be no conviction without corroboration of the accomplices’ testimony. Mr. Justice Parker in his opinion for a unanimous court disposed of both contentions saying:
“The answer to this is that the charging of such requests is discretionary with the court. State v. Byer, 39 N. J. L. 598. And as to the legal necessity of corroboration, the rue is that it is not legally necessary, and has been so decided in a number of oases, many of them recent.”
I fail to see any reason for overruling this holding that such a charge as to the testimony of accomplices rests in the discretion of the trial judge.
, The promise of immunity does not invariably destroy the truthfulness of a witness’ testimony:
“The promise of immunity, then, being the essential element of distrust, but not being invariably made, no invariable rule should be fixed as though it had been made. Moreover, if made, its influence must vary infinitely with the nature of the charge and the personality of the accomplice. Finally, credibility is a matter of elusive variety, and it is impossible and anachronistic to determine in advance that, with or without promise, a given man’s story must be distrusted.” 7 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) § 2057.
Here, moreover, ou cross examination both witnesses admitted that they were hopeful of leniency for testifying on behalf of the State. The trial judge charged the jury as to the credibility of witnesses:
*83“Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, with questions of fact, the weight of the evidence, the credibility you will give to any witness sworn in the case, the inferences that you will draw from the proof, and the conclusions that you will ultimately draw from the proof, the Court has nothing to do. These are matters entirely within your province, which you, as jurors, must determine for yourselves. As sole judges of the facts, you are to determine the credibility of the witnesses. In determining whether or not a witness is worthy of belief, and therefore credible, you may take into consideration the appearance and the demeanor of the witness, the manner in which he or she may have testified, their interest in the outcome of the trial, and you may also consider which is the more reasonable, the more logical, and the more probable story.”
Obviously the jury was aware of the possibility that the testimony of the accomplices might be unreliable and that its duty as the trier of the facts was to evaluate their testimony in this light.
I can see no reversible error and accordingly I would affirm the judgment below.
I am authorized to say that Oliphant and Jacobs, JJ., join in this dissent.
For reversal — Justices Heher, Wacheneeld, Burling and Brennan — 4.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Oliphant and Jacobs — 3.