Court Opinion

ID: 9648284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:12:42.262485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:58.344924
License: Public Domain

HILL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
This is a conviction for possession of a controlled substance. The undisputed record reflects that at trial the results of the testing performed on the material found in Adams’ possession were presented through the testimony of Frank Shiller, the Director of the Fort Worth Crime Lab.
Shiller testified concerning the results of a lab report made by Harold Loveless, a former employee of the crime lab. In addition to the testimony set forth in the majority opinion, Shiller gave the following additional testimony:
STATE’S ATTORNEY: And did you ever find anything lacking in Mr. Loveless’ procedures or performances?
MR. SHILLER: No, I can’t say that nothing was ever not returned for incompleteness. That’s over a period of time.
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DEFENSE ATTORNEY: But, on the other hand, you do also have to rely upon Mr. Loveless to make a correct record as far as your interpretation here today; is that correct?
MR. SHILLER: Yes.
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STATE’S ATTORNEY: Is there any reason why we should not rely on Mr. Loveless’ accuracy in that regard?
MR. SHILLER: No, ma’am.
In summary, Shiller testified that there was no basis for questioning the accuracy of Mr. Loveless’s work. In fact, Mr. Loveless had been relieved of his duties pending an investigation of charges that he was tampering with substances submitted to the lab for testing. He had submitted his resignation shortly before trial. Although Mr. Loveless had not been convicted or even charged with any felony or offense involving moral turpitude, the supporting basis for the accusations would provide a basis for questioning the accuracy of Mr. Loveless’s work.
The State learned the true facts during the trial, but did not reveal the information to Adam’s counsel until after the trial.
The United States Supreme Court has held that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 765-66, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). The result is the same when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. Id. Suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. When the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule. Id. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766. A new trial is required if the evidence is material and if the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury. Id.
I would hold that the evidence is material. The lab report, which was introduced through the testimony of Mr. Shiller, not Mr. Loveless, formed the very basis of the State’s case against Mr. Adams. Because of the fact that the report was introduced under the public records exception to the hearsay rule, the defense was unable to question Mr. Loveless concerning the report. Rule 803(8) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence provides that such reports are admissible, “unless the sources of *630information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Although Mr. Loveless had previously been relieved of his duties, presumably because of questions as to his trustworthiness, the State was representing to the judge and jury that there was no reason to question the accuracy of his work. The trial judge, therefore, did not have accurate information upon which to base his rulings on Adams’ objections to Mr. Shiller’s testimony as to the results of Loveless’s tests. Additionally, the jury was given false information to use in considering the accuracy of the report. The State did not correct the inaccuracy. There is at least a reasonable likelihood that the uncorrected false testimony could have affected the judgment of the judge or the jury, or both.
The majority deals with this issue as though it were a mere failure to disclose exculpatory testimony to the defendant as condemned in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The error in that analysis lies in the fact that this is not a mere case of nondisclosure, but instead is a case of false misrepresentation as to the credibility and reliability of evidence so material that the prosecution ultimately relies on its validity. The cases and tests relied upon by the majority are not relevant to our inquiry since none seems to involve false material evidence which the State allows to go uncorrected.
I would sustain point of error number two and reverse and remand for a trial in which the judge, jury, and defendant are not given an uncorreeted, false view of the material evidence.