Court Opinion

ID: 9782247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:13:40.977117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:54.102429
License: Public Domain

EASTAUGH, Justice,
dissenting in part.
To illustrate my disagreement with what the court seems to say about the municipality's animal control ordinance, consider two leashed dogs, both walking with their masters on a municipal sidewalk. The first, without provocation, suddenly administers an aggressive bite to a pedestrian. The second clumsily and without aggression bumps into a pedestrian and knocks him down, causing a painful break in the skin. No doubt the municipality has a legitimate interest in the safety of both pedestrians, and can regulate the behavior of both animals.
It should be obvious that there are legally significant distinctions between the conduct, behavior, and mental states of the two animals. Likewise, there are legally significant distinctions between the probability and magnitude of risk each animal poses and between the consequences to their respective victims. But the subsection of the ordinance pertinent here, Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 17.40.020(A)(8), draws no such distinctions. It treats the aggressive biter the same as the clumsy oaf. It does so because subsection .020(A) classifies the aggressive biter the same as an animal that causes "physical injury" to any human, and because AMC 17.05.010 defines "physical injury" to include serapes, cuts, and "similar injuries."1
It is equally undiseriminating in requiring the same protective measures for each animal. Both the biter and the oaf must now wear muzzles when they are not on their owners' property,2 even though the oaf did not use his teeth or mouth (or even his paws).
I agree with most aspects of today's opinion but write separately to address two significant problems inherent in AMC 17.40.020(A)(8). Both raise questions about the rationality of the ordinance's behavioral classifications and the required remedial measures. And both problems make arbitrary enforcement likely, if not inevitable.
West tersely but adequately raises the classification issue by arguing that it makes "no sense" to classify Gummie as level three for having scratched the baby with his paws, without aggressively biting the infant. West also argues that physical injury "can flow from very minor to major without aggression or intent by the 'animal." He contends that "[the classification would be proper if the injury was aggressively caused which would clearly rule out incidental or accidental contact resulting from the dog stepping on, pushing, playing [with] or even licking a child." Because the hearing officer found that Gummie administered the marks with his mouth, and that there was thus a "bite," West's assertion that the scratches were pawmarks is unavailing absent clear error. West does not challenge the rationality of muzzling Gummie, even though he argues that Gummie must have used his paws, rather than his mouth. The essence of West's classification argument nonetheless remains viable because the ordinance treats the aggressive dog the same as the unaggressive dog. It treats the soft-mouthed retriever that accidently seratches someone with its teeth the same as the dog that aggressively bites its victim.3
West also contends that "aggressive" in AMC 17.40.020(A)(8) modifies both "bite" and "any physical injury."4 The court re*232jects that contention.5 Because West's reading is so obviously contrary to the plain words of the ordinance, I agree with the court's reading of the ordinance.
But West also argues that the reading the hearing officer and superior court gave the subsection, and thus the reading this court adopts today, "makes no sense." Because the subsection's text mandates the reading this court gives it here, West's argument necessarily raises the question whether the ordinance as written "makes sense." The court does not squarely hold that it does, but its opinion implies that the subsection rationally treats an animal that administers an "aggressive bite" the same as an animal that "causes any physical injury to any human.6 Thus, it asserts that reading the level three classification to include any physical injury to humans "fits logically" within the context of the classification.7
I disagree with this assertion. If future readers would regard this assertion as mere dictum, and would not be deterred from challenging the substance of the ordinance on grounds of irrationality, no further discussion would be needed. But there is a danger the court's words might be read by future courts, and by the municipality itself, as an endorsement of the subsection's validity. Moreover, there is a danger the court's words today would be read to apply even to animals whose behavior is unambiguously passive and innocent. And indeed, the seeming precision of the subsection's words, in context of the seemingly comprehensive ordinance, might give the appearance that the animal control law was carefully crafted.
The court asserts that the classification exceptions prevent the ordinance from being improperly applied.8 But no specific exception applies to the clumsy oaf that accidentally trips the pedestrian and causes physical injury. And the ordinance's general exception, AMC 17.40.020(B)(9), does not adequately mitigate the risk of misclassification. The general exception gives the animal control officer authority "to refrain from classifying an animal" even if it engaged in behavior specified in subsection .020(A) if the officer determines that "[the decision not to classify reasonably serves and promotes justice, fairness, and the purposes and intent of this title, the protection of public health, safety and welfare, and the humane care and treatment of animals."9 Because this exception fails to articulate a meaningful standard that could be used to evaluate whether a misclassification has occurred, I do not see how this exception mitigates the risk of misclassification.
This standardless exception also necessarily invites arbitrary enforcement. Perhaps the municipality would be reluctant to require the clumsy or exuberant animal to be muzzled, and would even be reluctant to classify it the same as the aggressive biter. But the general exception contains no principled basis for avoiding classifications that either are required by the plain words of subsection .020(A) or are consistent with the eight other exceptions in subsection .020(B), some of which contain limitations on the exceptions.
The other classification levels are equally flawed. For example, level four deals with unrestrained animals. There is no exception for the exuberant, unleashed dog that trips a hiker, causing a minor laceration; the ordinance mandates a level four classification for this animal, just as it does for an unleashed dog that aggressively bites.10
It is facially arbitrary and irrational to treat the aggressive animal the same as the nonaggressive animal, and to treat inadvertently caused injuries the same as those *233caused by aggression. I therefore dissent from the court's opinion to the extent it states that subsection .020(A)'s classification scheme makes sense or that classifying as level three an animal that unaggressively causes any physical injury fits "logically" within the "context" of the classification.

. The applicable definition does not distinguish between broken-skin injuries caused by paw, mouth, or exuberant behavior. It defines "physical injury" as "an impairment of physical condition or pain that is accompanied by scrapes, cuts, punctures or other evidence of similar injuries." AMC 17.05.010.

. AMC 17.40.040.

. The hearing officer found that Gummie administered a bite that was not aggressive.

. AMC 17.40.020(A)(3) provides:
A. Classifications. Subject to the authority of the chief animal control officer under subsection B below, an animal may be classified based on one of the following levels:
[[Image here]]
3. Level three behavior is established if an animal, while under restraint, inflicts an aggressive bite or causes any physical injury to any human.

. Op. at 228. p

. Op. at 228-29. ap

. Op. at 229. No

 Op. at 229-30. The court states that the nine exceptions "includ[e] injury resulting from the animal ... playing with the family that owns it." Op. at 229. There is no "playing" exception as such, and the exception for the owner and the owner's family expressly excludes "a minor who is not involved in training or competing with the animal." AMC 17.40.020(B)(8)(b). Consequent ly, the family dog that, without aggression, harms a family minor during play is not excepted.

. AMC 17.40.020(B)(9).

. AMC 17.40.020(A)(4)(a); AMC 17.40.020(B).