Court Opinion

ID: 9943471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:01:09.302351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:08.153857
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3004     Document: 010111004602         Date Filed: 02/23/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                     FILED
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                         PUBLISH                                 Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          February 23, 2024

                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                              Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  CASSANDRA KINCAID,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                             No. 23-3004

  UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 500,
  KANSAS CITY, KANSAS,

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the District of Kansas
                           (D.C. No. 2:21-CV-02059-DDC)
                        _________________________________

 Dan Curry, Brown & Curry, LLC, Kansas City, Missouri (Anthony E. LaCroix, LaCroix
 Law Firm, LLC, Kansas City, Missouri, with him on the briefs) for Plaintiff-Appellant.

 Gregory P. Goheen, McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, Kansas, for
 Defendant-Appellee.
                      _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

 HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
                          _________________________________

        Plaintiff-Appellant Cassandra Kincaid appeals the district court’s grant of

 summary judgment on her claims of retaliatory harassment under two antidiscrimination

 statutes: Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Kincaid, a
Appellate Case: 23-3004     Document: 010111004602          Date Filed: 02/23/2024       Page: 2

 school administrator in Kansas City, Kansas, claims she was harassed by Defendant-

 Appellee Unified School District No. 500 (the District) in retaliation for her reporting a

 student-on-student sexual assault. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because

 we agree with the district court that she has not satisfied her burden of creating a genuine

 dispute of material fact that the reasons given for the alleged material adverse actions

 against her were pretextual, we affirm the district-court judgment.

        I.     BACKGROUND

               A.     Factual Background

        On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we review the

 evidence in the light most favorable to Kincaid, the nonmovant. See Hiatt v. Colo.

 Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 2017).

        During the events relevant to this appeal, Kincaid was an assistant principal at

 Central Middle School, a school within the District. Kincaid’s supervisor was Principal

 Fred Skretta, who began working at Central Middle School in the 2018–19 school year.

 Kincaid claims she suffered retaliation for reporting two incidents in early 2019. In

 February some girls at the school reported that a male special-education student had

 hugged them in the hallway, touched their bottoms, and made them uncomfortable.

 Kincaid made a note of the incident at the time in an older school database, but not in the

 school’s new “Infinite Campus” computer system. She did not discipline the male student

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 and told his guardian that no disciplinary record would be entered unless a second

 incident occurred.

        In March another female student reported that the same male student “pushed [her]

 up against a wall and grinded up against her with his private parts.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at

 127 (internal quotation marks omitted). Before letting Skretta know about the incident,

 Kincaid contacted the office of the District’s Director of Student Services and wrote up

 the student for sexual assault. She emailed Skretta about the assault later that day.

 Kincaid testified that she contacted Student Services before contacting Skretta because he

 was out of the building and she believed that she was following protocol. The next day,

 Kincaid entered information about both the sexual assault and the February incident in

 the Infinite Campus system. She also emailed district staff to set up a hearing for the male

 student and to inform them that he would serve a 10-day suspension; she did not include

 Skretta on her initial email but did copy him on the email chain the next business day.

        Earlier in March, before the sexual assault, Skretta had emailed Kincaid and the

 other assistant principal at the school to tell them that he would be “taking over the reigns

 [sic] for the overall supervision and evaluation of our special services” because the

 “stakes are simply too high for me, as building principal, not to be the direct leader at

 SPED [the special education program] at Central.” Id., Vol. 3 at 358. Kincaid asked in

 response if she had “done anything wrong” and was told by Skretta that she had not but

 that he “just had conversations with my higher-ups and know that, like I stated, SPED is

 very high stakes and as head principal, I really need to be running it.” Id. at 359 (internal

 quotation marks omitted). Skretta testified that he said the stakes were high because of

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 concerns communicated to him by his supervisors about the “discipline of special

 education students and being under the watch of the state for that” and “the over-

 suspension of special education kids in relation to other populations.” Id. at 579.

        The Monday after the sexual assault, Skretta sent both Kincaid and the other

 assistant principal an email informing them of a “[n]ew protocol”: “whenever there is an

 issue with a Sped kid who [would] potentially be given discipline, please involve me

 before making any decisions re. consequences (suspension, etc.).” Id., Vol. 1 at 130.

        Four days later, Skretta sent Kincaid a “formal letter of concern regarding

 processes related to Infinite Campus and entry of discipline records.” Id. at 131. He

 expressed his concern about how Kincaid had handled the February incident, saying that

 it was an “impropriety” to tell the male student’s guardian that no disciplinary record

 would be entered unless there was a second incident, and that because the student “has

 significant special needs, . . . it would have been appropriate to address his behaviors

 immediately following the first incident with more intensive and sustained consequential

 behavior support” than was provided. Id.

        Skretta’s letter of concern also addressed Kincaid’s handling of the sexual assault.

 It said it was “an error” on Kincaid’s part to have “communicated directly with Student

 Services about it rather than speaking with [Skretta] first,” as he “should always be

 informed of any incident that might be escalated beyond Central Middle School.” Id. He

 therefore wanted to “clarify” two points. Id. First, Skretta was “ultimately responsible for

 special education services at Central,” as he had already communicated to Kincaid, and

 he needed to exercise “supervision of everything related to supervision of special

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 education students and staff.” Id. That meant he must be involved before any “decisions

 re. consequences” were made regarding “a Special Education student who is potentially

 being given discipline.” Id. Second, when Kincaid had “concerns related to student

 discipline, whether . . . related to a special education or regular education student,”

 Skretta was to be “the first contact prior to contacting anyone at Student Services.” Id.

 Part of Kincaid’s “responsibility as an Assistant Principal” was to keep Skretta “fully

 informed, including incidents [Kincaid was] considering for escalation beyond Central

 Middle School.” Id. at 131–32. Skretta concluded by informing Kincaid that any “future

 concerns of this nature will lead to further disciplinary action, up to and including

 termination of employment.” Id. at 132.

        The letter of concern was placed in Kincaid’s personnel file. Skretta did not issue

 any other formal letters of concern to Kincaid or formally discipline her in any other way

 during the rest of his time at Central Middle School. Elizabeth Faircloth, a member of the

 District’s human-resources department who investigated Kincaid’s allegations, testified

 that a letter of concern was considered “non-disciplinary,” id., Vol. 3 at 483, although

 one of Skretta’s supervisors, Kristen Scott, testified that while she “kn[e]w it’s called a

 letter of concern, . . . if it’s going in the personnel file, to me it’s a letter of reprimand,”

 id. at 475. Faircloth recommended that the letter of concern be amended to be a letter of

 reprimand, because she thought Kincaid’s policy violations had been serious.

        Two days after receiving the letter of concern, Kincaid emailed a written

 complaint to the District’s human-resources department about Skretta’s behavior. The

 complaint alleged that “[f]or the last couple of months,” Kincaid had “felt singled out and

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 harassed” by Skretta, that it was unfair for Skretta to issue the letter of concern without

 stating what policy Kincaid violated in reporting the sexual assault, and that a reprimand

 for her handling of the February incident was unwarranted. Id., Vol. 1 at 135–36. The

 complaint also said that Skretta had scheduled a meeting with her to discuss the letter of

 concern but she would prefer not to meet with him alone. See id. at 136. Dr. Eva Tucker-

 Nevels, one of Skretta’s supervisors, attended the meeting. Kincaid testified that at the

 meeting Skretta was “very upset, very angry, and very curt,” and disagreed with Dr.

 Tucker-Nevels when she indicated the letter of concern would not go into Kincaid’s file.

 Id., Vol. 3 at 541.

        As described in more detail below, Kincaid claims that after her report of the

 sexual assault and her receipt of the letter of concern, “Skretta changed his behavior and

 became more aggressive with her,” with “[m]ost of his harassment of Kincaid

 beg[inning] after she made the report.” Aplt. Br. at 9. This alleged retaliatory harassment

 included singling Kincaid out for criticism, talking down to her, assigning her duties to

 the other assistant principal, requesting that she be transferred from his building, and

 excluding her from meetings.

               B.      Procedural History

        Kincaid filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

 Commission in November 2020, and filed suit in February 2021 after receiving a right-to-

 sue letter. Kincaid alleged retaliation under both Title VII and Title IX. The District

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 moved for summary judgment on all Kincaid’s claims, which the district court granted.

 The district court also denied Kincaid’s request to amend or modify the pretrial order.

        II.    ANALYSIS

               A.     Standard of Review

        We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

 same standard that the district court is to apply. See Hiatt, 858 F.3d at 1315. Viewing the

 evidence in the light most favorable to Kincaid, the nonmovant, we must determine

 whether a genuine issue of material fact exists in regard to her Title VII and Title IX

 claims. See id.

        Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who have

 opposed an “employment practice,” such as sex discrimination, made unlawful by that

 Title. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see Hiatt, 858 F.3d at 1315. Title IX has similarly been

 interpreted to prohibit retaliation against individuals for complaining of sex

 discrimination. See Hiatt, 858 F.3d at 1315.

        Because the parties agree that Kincaid presents only indirect evidence of

 retaliation, both her Title VII and Title IX claims are analyzed under the McDonnell

 Douglas burden-shifting framework. See id. at 1315–16 (citing McDonnell Douglas

 Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973)). Under McDonnell Douglas a plaintiff

 must first establish a prima facie case that the employer took a materially adverse action

 against her in retaliation for activity protected by the applicable statute. See Hiatt, 858

 F.3d at 1316. “The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, . . .

 nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. If the employer satisfies this burden, then

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 summary judgment is warranted unless the plaintiff can show there is a genuine issue of

 material fact as to whether the proffered reason is pretextual.” Id. (cleaned up).

               B.     Title IX Claim

        The district court ruled that reporting a student-on-student sexual assault

 constitutes protected activity under Title IX, a determination that the District does

 not challenge on appeal. The court also ruled that all but seven of the alleged

 employment actions taken by the District against Kincaid were not materially

 adverse. 1 On appeal Kincaid does not challenge that ruling. 2 In addition, she has

 abandoned her claim with respect to one of those seven actions. 3

        That leaves six allegedly material adverse employment actions. But we need

 address only three of them. The district court ruled that the District provided facially

 nonretaliatory reasons for each of these actions, yet Kincaid did not adequately argue

 in district court that the District’s explanations for three of the actions were

        1
           The district court used the descriptions of the adverse actions in Kincaid’s
 summary-judgment briefing, even though, as will be apparent as we discuss the
 adverse actions, the descriptions are often inaccurate.
         2
           In particular, Kincaid does not challenge on appeal the district court’s ruling
 that five actions allegedly taken by Skretta did not constitute materially adverse
 actions. Those actions were that he (1) “spoke down to [Kincaid] during 20
 meetings,” (2) “stopped talking to her,” (3) “pretended [Kincaid] was not there,”
 (4) “spoke angrily to [Kincaid] when she opposed the purportedly retaliatory
 reprimand,” and (5) “required her to be punctual but let her colleague come and go as
 she pleased.” Kincaid v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, 645 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1165 (D.
 Kan. 2022) (original brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
         3
           The claim that Kincaid does not pursue on appeal is that the District
 retaliated against her by not hiring her for a lead principal position she applied for.
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 pretextual. 4 See Rademacher v. Colo. Ass’n of Soil Conservation Dists. Med. Benefit

 Plan, 11 F.3d 1567, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Points raised but not argued below

 ordinarily will not be considered on appeal.”). Accordingly, we consider only those

 three employment actions determined by the district court to be materially adverse

 and for which Kincaid adequately challenged the explanation as pretextual 5: two

 emails Skretta sent to Kincaid asking that she keep him informed about 911 calls and

 fire alarms at Central, an email Skretta sent to his supervisors asking that Kincaid be

 transferred from the school, and the letter of concern. Unpersuaded by the challenges,

 we affirm the dismissal of the Title IX claim.

       4
           In district court Kincaid failed to adequately challenge as pretextual the
 District’s facially legitimate nonretaliatory justifications for the following three
 adverse actions: that Skretta “gave [Kincaid’s] duties to other employees to avoid
 her,” “deprived [Kincaid] of district information that undermined her ability to
 instruct her subordinates and parents,” and gave her a blank performance evaluation.
 Kincaid, 645 F. Supp. 3d at 1169–70 (original brackets and internal quotation marks
 omitted). In the section of her district-court brief addressing pretext, Kincaid asserted
 that the District did not provide a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for these three
 actions. (She does not press that assertion on appeal.) She did not, however, present
 an argument that the District’s justifications for those specific actions were
 pretextual.
         5
           We decline to consider Kincaid’s argument on appeal that the District’s
 justifications for Skretta’s alleged “verbal harassment” were pretextual. Aplt. Br. at
 21. That argument is based on evidence that Skretta “talked down” to Kincaid 20 to
 25 times, Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 504–05, behavior that the district court ruled, without
 challenge on appeal by Kincaid, did not constitute a materially adverse action. See
 footnote 2, supra. Thus, whether or not the reasons given for engaging in that
 behavior were pretextual, the conduct did not violate Title IX.
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                      1.     The fire-alarm and 911-call emails 6

        The district court held that two emails Skretta sent to Kincaid in February

  2020—almost a year after Kincaid reported the sexual assault—could constitute

  materially adverse actions. Skretta sent Kincaid the first email after he learned about

  a fire alarm that had gone off at the school without his being notified. He asked that

  he be informed as soon as possible of any future fire alarms in the building. The

  second email, which was sent to both Kincaid and the other assistant principal,

  concerned an incident where 911 was called but Skretta was not informed; Skretta

  again asked to be told as soon as possible if someone at the school called 911. The

  district court dismissed Kincaid’s claim with respect to this action on the ground that

  the reasons contained in the emails themselves—that Skretta wanted to be informed

  about fire alarms and 911 calls at the school—were facially nonretaliatory reasons for

  which Kincaid failed to provide sufficient evidence of pretext.

        Without questioning the district court’s ground for dismissal, we think it more

  important to declare that the court was too generous in saying that the emails could

  constitute material adverse actions. An action is “materially adverse” in the context

  of a retaliation claim if the action “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker

  from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.

        6
          The district court described these adverse actions as follows: “Skretta blamed
  [Kincaid] for conduct that was not her fault, chronically found fault in her work.”
  Kincaid, 645 F. Supp. 3d at 1168 (original brackets and internal quotation marks
  omitted). The court found that this claim was based on the 911-call and fire-alarm
  emails, a determination Kincaid does not challenge on appeal.
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  Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). That

  definition was not satisfied here. The emails did not punish Kincaid; they simply asked

  Kincaid to communicate certain information in the future. This is standard fare in any

  bureaucracy. And the emails were sent almost a year after Kincaid reported the sexual

  assault. The prospect of receiving such emails many months in the future would not deter

  a reasonable person from reporting discrimination. We therefore affirm the dismissal of

  Kincaid’s claim with respect to this action on that ground. See Richison v. Ernest Grp.,

  Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We have long said that we may affirm on

  any basis supported by the record, even if it requires ruling on arguments not reached by

  the district court or even presented to us on appeal.”). We note that the District’s motion

  for summary judgment in district court disputed that these emails constituted material

  adverse actions, so Kincaid has had a fair opportunity to address the issue.

                       2.     Skretta’s request that Kincaid be transferred 7

         A little less than a year after Kincaid’s report of the sexual assault, Skretta

  requested to his supervisors that Kincaid be removed from his school because he did

  not trust her and felt she could not communicate with him, citing the fire-alarm

  incident and the sexual-assault report. Kincaid was never in fact transferred. The

         7
           The district court described this adverse action as follows: “Principal Skretta
  repeatedly requested that [Kincaid] be moved from his building, saying she could not
  be trusted and otherwise maligned her during the investigative process with irrelevant
  rumors.” Kincaid, 645 F. Supp 3d at 1170 (ellipses and internal quotation marks
  omitted). Skretta’s communications to his supervisors requesting Kincaid’s transfer
  were also the basis of Kincaid’s claim that he “maligned” her, so we need not address
  that issue separately from the request for her transfer itself. See id.
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  district court found that Skretta’s stated reasons for requesting her transfer were

  facially nonretaliatory.

         Kincaid’s only pretext argument that touches on this adverse action contends

  that the district court failed to draw all reasonable inferences in her favor as required

  at summary judgment. She argues that the district court should have inferred that part

  of the reason Skretta asked that she be transferred was that Kincaid reported the

  sexual assault. But Kincaid does not provide any evidence supporting that conclusion

  beyond her insistence in her appellate brief that the facially nondiscriminatory

  reasons for requesting her transfer were pretextual. That will not suffice. “Mere

  conjecture that the employer’s explanation is pretext is insufficient basis to defeat

  summary judgment.” Jencks v. Mod. Woodmen of Am., 479 F.3d 1261, 1267 (10th

  Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                       3.      Skretta’s letter of concern

         Kincaid focuses most of her pretext-related arguments on Skretta’s letter of

  concern, which the district court held constituted a materially adverse action. The District

  provided facially legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for the letter. Skretta said he thought

  that Kincaid had mishandled the February incident with the male student by not

  instituting more behavioral support and by telling his guardian that no discipline would

  be imposed unless the behavior reoccurred. And she had not reported the sexual assault to

  Skretta before taking it to Student Services, despite Skretta’s having told Kincaid that he

  was taking over special education because it was “very high stakes and as the head

  principal, I really need to be running it.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 359 ¶ 70. The district court

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  held that these were facially nonretaliatory reasons for issuing a letter of concern to

  “clarify” Skretta’s expectations going forward. Id., Vol. 1 at 131.

         Kincaid does not challenge the district court’s ruling that the explanation was

  facially nonretaliatory. But she claims it was pretextual. Her arguments, however, are

  insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

                              i.      The District’s treatment of similarly situated
                                      employees

         First, Kincaid argues that the District treated other similarly situated employees

  differently than it treated her and that this difference in treatment establishes that the

  reasons given for issuing the letter of concern were pretextual. True, “a plaintiff may . . .

  show pretext . . . by providing evidence that [s]he was treated differently from other

  similarly-situated, nonprotected employees who violated work rules of comparable

  seriousness.” Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1232 (10th Cir.

  2000). But Kincaid has identified no other employees who mishandled student

  misconduct by telling the student’s guardian that no discipline would be recorded when a

  more serious response was warranted or who failed to report a sexual assault (or, indeed,

  any other serious incident) to the head principal before reporting the incident beyond the

  school. Because she cannot point to another similarly situated employee “who violated

  work rules of comparable seriousness,” id., this argument for pretext fails.

                             ii.      The District’s investigation

         Kincaid next argues that the District failed to conduct a fair investigation into the

  conduct that led to the letter of concern. She claims that the District’s investigation was

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  improper because there was no investigation until November 2020, some 20 months after

  she first complained that the letter of concern was retaliatory. This court has at times

  found that an inadequate investigation into alleged misconduct by an employee can

  support an inference of pretext. See Ibrahim v. All. for Sustainable Energy, LLC, 994

  F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2021); Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 542

  (10th Cir. 2014). For example, if an employer claims that discipline of the employee was

  appropriate because an investigation showed the employee’s misconduct or dereliction of

  duty, the employee can point to defects in the investigation as indicating that the

  employer had no interest in finding out whether the employee was actually guilty as

  charged. See Ibrahim, 994 F.3d at 1199–1200. But Skretta’s letter of concern was not the

  result of the District’s investigation, which took place long after she received the letter.

  Kincaid has not explained how evidence regarding the quality of the District’s

  investigation can support an inference that Skretta’s reasons for issuing the letter of

  concern were pretextual.

                             iii.     Inconsistencies in the District’s justification for the
                                      letter of concern

          “Pretext can be shown by such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

  incoherence, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its

  action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence

  and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted [nonretaliatory]

  reasons.” Jencks, 479 F.3d at 1267 (internal quotation marks omitted). Kincaid

  claims that Skretta’s reasons for issuing the letter of concern possess “weaknesses

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  and implausibilities that tend to show pretext.” Aplt. Br. at 16. But she misstates the

  evidence in making her argument. While she claims that “Skretta did not announce

  any change in protocol” before issuing the letter of concern, id., it is undisputed that

  he in fact did announce, before the sexual assault, that he would be taking over the

  “overall supervision and evaluation” of the special-education department because he

  needed to be the “direct leader,” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 358. It is not inconsistent or

  implausible that the principal of the school and head of the special-education

  department would want to be consulted before special-education student disciplinary

  actions were reported outside the school, especially when he was told by his

  superiors that the district was concerned about the over-disciplining of special-

  education students. It is also not inconsistent for a leader to issue a letter of concern

  “clarify[ing]” his reasonable and foreseeable expectations without explicitly stating

  them beforehand. Id., Vol. 1 at 131 (letter of concern). Even if it would have been

  better to have previously announced more explicit policy expectations, when we

  consider an allegation of retaliatory harassment under Title IX, we do not “ask

  whether the employer’s reasons were wise, fair or correct.” Riggs v. AirTran

  Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1118 (10th Cir. 2007).

         Kincaid also argues that Skretta’s letter of concern accused her of “fail[ing] to

  document” the February incident even though she claims that she did document the

  incident in a separate reporting system, and that this inconsistency creates an

  inference of pretext. Aplt. Br. at 17. But the letter of concern does not accuse Kincaid

  of failing to document the February incident; what it does mention is that Kincaid

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  should have provided the student with more intensive support, and that it was

  improper to tell the student’s guardian that she “would not enter any discipline record

  unless a second incident occurred,” Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 131 (letter of concern),

  conduct she has never challenged. And though Kincaid claims the District “gave

  different, conflicting reasons” for the letter of concern, Aplt. Br. at 17–18, she does

  not state what those reasons were, so we cannot ourselves evaluate whether they were

  in fact conflicting. Instead, she merely supports her argument with a lengthy string

  citation to the record. But even when considering the briefs of pro se litigants, whose

  pleadings we view liberally, “the court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as

  the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v.

  Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). Much less will

  we take on that responsibility for a represented party. See Sawyers v. Norton, 962

  F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“arguments that are inadequately presented in an

  opening brief” are waived (internal quotation marks omitted)). Kincaid has failed to

  demonstrate any implausibilities or inconsistencies in the District’s facially

  nonretaliatory explanations for the letter of concern that would support an inference

  of pretext.

                          iv.       Disturbing procedural irregularities and failure to
                                    follow District policy

         Kincaid’s next two arguments are that “disturbing procedural irregularities”

  and “failure to follow [District] policy” in the issuance of the letter of concern should

  create an inference of pretext. Aplt. Br. at 18–19 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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  See Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002)

  (“Evidence of pretext may include . . . disturbing procedural irregularities (e.g.,

  falsifying or manipulating criteria).” (original ellipses and internal quotation marks

  omitted)); Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1230 (stating that a plaintiff may make a showing of

  pretext “with evidence that the defendant acted contrary to an unwritten policy or

  contrary to company practice when making the adverse employment decision

  affecting the plaintiff”).

         To support these propositions Kincaid points to testimony by Kristen Scott,

  one of Skretta’s supervisors, that it was District policy that any formal discipline

  needed to state which policies the employee violated, yet Skretta’s letter of concern

  failed to reference an explicit policy that had been in place at the time Kincaid

  contacted Student Services about the sexual assault. Kincaid also notes that Scott

  stated that she would not have issued the letter. Scott later clarified, however, that

  “that’s me personally how my leadership is and just following just sound practice.”

  Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 475. Scott also said that general District policies recognizing

  that a school’s principal is in charge of supervising and administering discipline

  could support Skretta’s issuing the letter of concern. And Elizabeth Faircloth, the

  District official who investigated Kincaid’s complaint about Skretta, testified that the

  letter did “not necessarily need” to state what policy Kincaid violated. Id. at 482.

         Kincaid argues that Scott’s testimony demonstrates that the letter of concern

  needed to indicate what policy Kincaid violated and, indeed, that it should never have

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  been issued at all. 8 She then argues that these procedural violations are sufficient to

  support an inference of pretext.

        Kincaid is correct that procedural irregularities by an employer can suggest

  that the employer’s stated reasons for taking adverse action against an employee are

  pretextual. Say, the employer contends that an employee’s termination was based on

  an evaluation of the employee’s performance. It is merely commonsense to infer that

  the explanation is pretextual if the evaluation of the employee bypassed standard

  procedures that protect an employee from unfair and biased decision-making. See,

  e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 1 F.4th 822, 832 (10th Cir. 2021) (in investigation of

  sexual-assault accusation against plaintiff, investigators interviewed all 11 witnesses

  provided by accuser but none of 5 witnesses provided by plaintiff); Whittington v.

  Nordam Grp. Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 994 (10th Cir. 2005) (all other employees were

  selected for a reduction in force by management team according to stated discipline

        8
           Kincaid also points to the meeting she had with Skretta and Dr. Tucker-
  Nevels where Skretta “in a hostile manner” insisted that the letter of concern go in
  Kincaid’s personnel file when his supervisor indicated it would not. Aplt. Br. at 18–
  19. But such common minor breaches of decorum cannot serve as procedural
  violations showing pretext. This court has repeatedly held that the antidiscrimination
  statutes “do[] not establish ‘a general civility code,’ Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
  Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998), for the workplace.” Morris v. City of Colo.
  Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 663–64 (10th Cir. 2012) (Title VII claim); see Anderson v.
  Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (in Americans with
  Disabilities Act (ADA) retaliation case, “recognizing that the ADA, like Title VII, is
  neither a general civility code nor a statute making actionable the ordinary
  tribulations of the workplace.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chisholm v. St.
  Marys City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 947 F.3d 342, 350 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Title IX, like
  Title VII, is not a ‘general civility code.’” (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81)). We will
  not impose such a civility code in the guise of requiring procedural regularity.
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  and performance criteria under which plaintiff would not have been included, but

  plaintiff alone was selected for inclusion on the sole judgment of his supervisor);

  Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1174 (10th Cir. 1998) (in age-

  discrimination case, employer adopted policy that it would not consider future

  potential of employees in deciding whether to terminate them in connection with a

  reduction in force but it then did consider future potential of younger staff).

         But an inference of pretext does not follow from every departure from standard

  procedure. See Fassbender v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 890 F.3d 875, 889 (10th Cir.

  2018) (The “mere fact that an employer failed to follow its own internal procedures

  does not necessarily suggest that the employer was motivated by illegal [retaliatory]

  intent or that the substantive reasons given by the employer for its employment

  decision were pretextual.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That is certainly the

  case here. The procedural irregularity alleged by Kincaid is the failure to include in

  the letter of concern a reference to an official District policy violated by Kincaid.

  According to Kincaid, this was not just a procedural lapse—a neglect to point to the

  official policy that Skretta was relying on. She contends that there was no such

  official policy.

         Kincaid appears to be saying that the explanation for the letter of concern that

  is provided in the letter itself must be pretextual because it is an improper ground for

  such a letter (the letter needed to be based on violation of a formal policy, and there

  was no such formal policy). What is missing from Kincaid’s argument, however, is

  any explanation of why this failure to cite an official policy implies that Skretta’s

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  explanation for issuing the letter may have been pretextual. The fact that the stated

  ground may have violated District policy does not show that the stated ground was

  insincere. Indeed, all the relevant evidence indicates that Skretta’s reason for issuing

  the letter, even if improper, was sincere. Any procedural irregularity in the issuance

  of the letter fails to support an inference of pretext.

                             v.       The district court’s refusal to draw inferences in
                                      Kincaid’s favor

         Kincaid claims that the district court erred by not applying the proper standard of

  review on summary judgment in that it did not draw all reasonable inferences in her

  favor. She argues that the court should have interpreted the letter of concern as

  disciplining her simply for reporting the sexual assault. But such a reading of the letter is

  plainly unreasonable. As it relates to the sexual assault, the letter reprimands her solely

  for failing to consult with Skretta before reporting the incident beyond the walls of the

  school. Although the court “must draw all factual inferences in favor of the nonmovant,

  those inferences must be reasonable.” Deherrera v. Decker Truck Line, Inc., 820 F.3d

  1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Kincaid’s request that the

  court draw an unreasonable inference is insufficient to defeat summary judgment on the

  pretext issue.

                       4.     Totality of the evidence

         Finally, Kincaid argues that the totality of the evidence supports a finding of

  pretext. See Orr v. City of Albuquerque, 531 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2008)

  (Gorsuch, J.) (explaining that courts are not to “look at each piece of evidence in

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  isolation; rather, in assessing whether plaintiffs have shown pretext, we are obliged

  to consider their evidence in its totality”). But as we have explained, none of the

  evidence she has adduced creates a genuine dispute of material fact about pretext,

  and considering it all together does nothing to alter that conclusion. See Bekkem v.

  Wilkie, 915 F.3d 1258, 1270–71 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[W]hile we here address

  Plaintiff’s arguments sequentially for ease of analysis, we have considered her

  evidence in its totality and find all of her evidence, taken as a whole, insufficient to

  permit an inference of pretext.”).

                C.     Title VII Claim

         The district court ruled that Kincaid’s reporting of the sexual assault was not

  activity protected from retaliation by Title VII because Kincaid was not challenging an

  employment practice of the District. Kincaid does not challenge this ruling on appeal.

  Rather, she contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing either to

  interpret the pretrial order broadly to encompass other instances of allegedly protected

  activity or to allow her to amend the pretrial order to include that additional protected

  activity. We seriously doubt that the district court abused its discretion in making these

  rulings, but we need not resolve the issue. Even if Kincaid did engage in activity

  protected by Title VII, she relies on the same allegations of retaliation as she does for her

  Title IX claim. Therefore, for the same reasons that we affirm the district court’s grant of

  summary judgment on Kincaid’s Title IX claim—namely, that the District provided

  nonretaliatory reasons for its materially adverse actions against Kincaid, and Kincaid

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  failed to produce evidence that the reasons were pretextual—we also affirm the district

  court’s grant of summary judgment on her Title VII claim.

        III.   CONCLUSION

        We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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