Court Opinion

ID: 9942976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 16:01:17.936362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:41.279525
License: Public Domain

23-638-cv
    Errato v. Seder

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                      SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR
AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
    City of New York, on the 22nd day of February, two thousand twenty-four.

    PRESENT:
               DENNIS JACOBS,
               DENNY CHIN,
               ALISON J. NATHAN,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    Robert M. Errato,

                           Plaintiff-Appellant,

                      v.                                      23-638

    Lauren T. Seder, Attorney, Campbell D.
    Barrett, Attorney, Jon T. Kukucka,
    Attorney, Johanna S. Katz, Gerard I.
    Adelman, in his individual capacity,
    Michael A. Albis, in his individual
    capacity, Barbara M. Quinn, in her
individual capacity, Leo Vincent Diana,
in his individual capacity, Edward
McCreery, III, State of Connecticut,

                 Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                           ROBERT M. ERRATO, pro se,
                                                   Hamden, CT.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES                           DAVID PAUL FRIEDMAN (Lorey
BARRETT, KUKUCKA, KATZ, &                          Rives Leddy, on the brief),
MCCREERY, III:                                     Murtha Cullina LLP, Stamford,
                                                   CT.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE                             Lauren T. Seder, pro se, Ojai,
SEDER:                                             CA.

FOR STATE DEFENDANTS-                              MICHAEL RONDON (Emily
APPELLEES:                                         Adams Gait, on the brief),
                                                   Assistant Attorneys General, for
                                                   William Tong, Attorney
                                                   General of Connecticut,
                                                   Hartford, CT.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District

of Connecticut (Nagala, J.).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,        IT     IS   HEREBY      ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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      A state court dissolution-of-marriage action between Plaintiff Robert Errato

and Defendant Lauren Seder ended in an award of attorney’s fees and alimony in

favor of Seder. After exhausting his state court appeals, unsuccessfully seeking to

modify the alimony order, and failing to obtain mandamus relief, see Seder v.

Errato, 272 A.3d 252 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022), cert. denied, 274 A.3d 868 (Conn. 2022);

Seder v. Errato, No. HHD-FA15-5039554-S, 2022 Conn. Super. LEXIS 663 (Conn.

Super. Ct. May 9, 2022); Seder v. Errato, No. HHD-FA15-5039554-S, Dkt. No. 673.10

(Conn. Super. Ct.), Errato brought this § 1983 lawsuit in federal district court.

Errato’s amended complaint accused various Defendants—Seder, several

attorneys, and Connecticut state judges as well as the State of Connecticut itself—

of violating his constitutional rights in connection with the state court action. He

sought both money damages and injunctive relief. Specifically, he asked the

district court to “set aside” the state court rulings and issue an order directing the

state court to “void” its rulings and “exercise its functions to prevent a failure of

justice.” Supplemental App’x at 356.

      The three sets of Defendants (Seder, the attorney defendants, and the state

defendants) separately moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). They raised

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a variety of defenses—among them, immunity, abstention doctrines, the statute of

limitations, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

      The district court granted the motions to dismiss, largely on the grounds of

judicial and Eleventh Amendment immunity, Rooker-Feldman, and lack of state

action. See generally Errato v. Seder, No. 22-cv-793, 2023 WL 2743284 (D. Conn. Mar.

31, 2023). The court acknowledged that the Defendants had not argued lack of

state action—the issue had been mentioned only in passing in the brief of the

attorney Defendants—but reasoned that the defect was stark and “any additional

briefing on this issue would be futile.” Id. at *5–6.

      This timely appeal followed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

issues, as well as the remaining facts and procedural history, which we recount

here only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

      “We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Palmer v. Amazon.com,

Inc., 51 F.4th 491, 503 (2d Cir. 2022). To state a claim and survive dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible

claim for relief, but “conclusory allegations” or “legal conclusions couched as

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factual allegations” need not be accepted as true. Noto v. 22nd Century Grp., Inc.,

35 F.4th 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2022). Finally, we construe a complaint filed pro se

“liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests.” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d

119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

      Having reviewed the district court’s decision, we agree that dismissal was

warranted substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court in its

thorough and well-reasoned order. Because Errato identified harms arising from

a state court judgment and directly asked the district court to review the judgment

and set it aside, the district court correctly concluded that Rooker-Feldman barred

his claims. See Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2023). Rooker-Feldman

applies if four conditions are met:

      (1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff
      complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the
      plaintiff invites review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the
      state judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings
      commenced.

Id. at 68 (quoting Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d

Cir. 2014)). Each of those conditions is satisfied here and Errato’s argument that

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he does not seek to overturn his state court judgment is belied by his complaint. 1

       Even if Rooker-Feldman did not bar Errato’s claims, they would fail for

additional reasons. The judicial Defendants acting in their judicial capacity are

protected from suit for damages by absolute judicial immunity, see Butcher v.

Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 2020), and from suit for injunctive relief by statute,

see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (allowing injunctive relief against judicial officers only when

“a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”); Montero

v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999). The State of Connecticut is protected by

Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Vengalattore v. Cornell Univ., 36 F.4th 87, 112

(2d Cir. 2022). Errato’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.

       We also agree with the district court that the complaint failed to plead that

Seder and the attorney Defendants were state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Under § 1983, constitutional torts are actionable against only state actors

or private parties acting under the color of state law. Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d

1To the extent that any ongoing post-judgment proceedings in state court affect the applicability
of Rooker-Feldman here, see Hunter, 75 F.4th at 65 (clarifying that the doctrine applies when a
federal suit is filed after state proceedings have ended), the district court correctly concluded that,
alternatively, abstention was warranted under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Sprint
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013). See Cavanaugh v. Geballe, 28 F.4th 428, 434 (2d Cir. 2022)
(“[F]ederal courts should refrain from interfering with core state court civil administrative
processes, powers, and functions that allow the state courts to adjudicate the matters before them
and enforce their judgments.”).
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78, 84 (2d Cir. 2014). To state a claim against a private party under § 1983, the

complaint must plausibly allege that the private party acted in concert with a state

actor to commit an unconstitutional act. Id. While Errato argues that he has made

this showing, his factual allegations were the kind of “legal conclusions

masquerading as factual conclusions,” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104

(2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), that “fail[] the plausibility test,” Trump v. Vance,

977 F.3d 198, 214 (2d Cir. 2020).

      Moreover, in this context, the district court did not err by raising the issue

on its own, without affording Errato an opportunity to be heard on it. State action

is an essential element of a § 1983 claim that a plaintiff “must allege.” Buon v.

Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2023). Errato failed to do so, and nothing in his

submissions or his oral argument before this Court suggests meritorious

arguments that he was prevented from raising in district court. See Fitzgerald v.

First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that

“district courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte”). In any case,

reversal on this basis would not be warranted here, where the parties have been

able to fully brief this purely legal issue on appeal. See McGinty v. New York, 251

F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2001).

                                          7
       Finally, Errato has forfeited any argument that the district court erred in

dismissing his complaint without leave to amend by not raising the issue in his

opening brief.       See, e.g., Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1993)

(“Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief.”).

       We have considered Errato’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are

without merit. 2 For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.

                                              FOR THE COURT:
                                              Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

2To the extent Errato has attempted to bring any state-law claim for fraud against Seder and the
attorney Defendants separate from his § 1983 claim, we agree with the district court that the claim
would be barred by the litigation privilege under Connecticut law. See Simms v. Seaman, 69 A.3d
880, 906 (Conn. 2013) (“[A]ttorneys are protected by the litigation privilege against claims of fraud
for their conduct during judicial proceedings.”); Tyler v. Tatoian, 137 A.3d 801, 807 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2016) (concluding that the litigation privilege “extends to bar claims of fraud against a party
opponent”), cert. denied, 135 A.3d 710 (Conn. 2016).
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