Court Opinion

ID: 9466927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:32:47.578111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:02.812193
License: Public Domain

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
The requirements for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1792 have been misconstrued by the majority and erroneously applied to the facts in this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
My brothers correctly affirm defendant’s conviction of the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 111. Numerous cases clearly state that an unlimited number of otherwise innocuous objects may become dangerous weapons when used by one in attacking his fellow man.1 The majority goes astray when it cites this line of cases to support its affirmance of the conviction under § 1792. Citation of cases tried directly under § 1792 in no wise support the majority view. Quite the contrary, in U.S. v. Roche, 443 F.2d 98 (10th Cir. 1971), the weapon was a device designed for and capable of firing a cartridge and propelling a bullet. In U.S. v. Barnes, 569 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1978), the weapon was a stolen automobile antenna with a taped handle and a long sheath, and at the time of discovery the tip was being ground into a sharp knife-like point. Both of these were weapons “designed to kill, injure or disable" as required by the statute.
*351By enacting § 1792, Congress sought to preserve prison security by punishing the conveyance of weapons within the prison. As the majority notes, practically anything can be used as a weapon. Since Congress obviously could not punish the conveyance of all potential weapons, it addressed only those instruments which pose an objectively ascertainable threat to prison security.
The language of § 1792 demonstrates Congress’ intent to create an objective standard. The section specifically refers to “substance or thing designed to kill, injure or disable.” (emphasis added). Such language contemplates a substance or thing which is created or modified to inflict harm.
Today’s decision makes every prisoner who wears a belt buckle or carries a broom a potential violator of § 1792, with his ultimate guilt dependent upon his later conduct. I do not believe Congress intended to reach such an illogical result. Accordingly, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction under § 1792. I concur with the affirmation of the defendant’s conviction under §111.

. Counsel for defendant at oral argument conceded that the broomstick described in the evidence became a dangerous weapon when coupled with the assault and that his client was properly convicted under § 111.