Court Opinion

ID: 9959777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:10:32.396705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:53.093788
License: Public Domain

J-S09022-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  EFRAIN MIRANDA III                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1347 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 15, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-39-CR-0004165-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                               FILED APRIL 12, 2024

       Appellant Efrain Miranda, III, appeals pro se from the order denying his

motion to correct sentence. Appellant contends that the trial court imposed

an illegal sentence by failing to impose a recidivism risk reduction incentive1

(RRRI) minimum sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

       The trial court set forth the following procedural history:

       [Appellant] entered pleas of guilty on July 18, 2012, to ten (10)
       counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance
       (cocaine), conspiracy to commit possession with intent to deliver
       a controlled substance (cocaine), and corrupt organizations.[2]
       The plea agreement entailed a cap of the minimum aggregate
       sentence at twelve (12) years. On September 6, 2012, [the trial
       court] sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate term of state
       imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years nor more than
       twenty-nine (29) years. Additionally, the [trial court] did not
       make [Appellant] RRRI eligible. [Appellant] filed timely post-
____________________________________________

1 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 4501-4512.

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903 and 911(b)(1), respectively.
J-S09022-24

       sentence motions in the form of a motion for modification of
       sentence. [Appellant’s] post-sentence motions were thereafter
       denied on September 20, 2012. [Appellant did not file a direct
       appeal].

       Subsequently, on July 8, 2013, [Appellant] filed a motion for
       [relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act3 (PCRA)], as
       amended on or about August 19, 2013 and November 22, 2013.
       An evidentiary hearing relative to [Appellant’s] motion was
       conducted before [the PCRA court] on December 6, 2013.
       Subsequently, on December 10, 2013, [the PCRA court] denied
       [Appellant’s] requested relief. [Appellant] appealed on or about
       January 7, 2014. The Superior Court affirmed the [the PCRA
       court’s] judgment and sentence on December 23, 2014.
       [Commonwealth v. Miranda, 229 EDA 2014, 2014 WL
       10753724 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 23, 2014) (unpublished mem.)
       (Miranda I)]. An appeal requesting reinstatement of appellate
       rights followed on August 21, 2017. The Superior Court of
       Pennsylvania quashed [Appellant’s] appeal on October 23, 2017.
       Then, [Appellant] filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus based
       on lack of subject matter jurisdiction on December 8, 2017. [The
       PCRA court] denied [Appellant’s] petition on December 19, 2017.
       An appeal followed on January 4, 2018. The Superior Court of
       Pennsylvania affirmed the [PCRA court’s] order on November 20,
       2018. [Commonwealth v. Miranda, 263 EDA 2018, 2018 WL
       6058521 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 20, 2018) (unpublished mem.)
       (Miranda II)]. Then, on or about April 12, 2019, [Appellant] filed
       another petition for writ of habeas corpus based on lack of subject
       matter jurisdiction. [The PCRA court] denied said petition on April
       12, 2019. On August 28, 2020, [Appellant] filed a subsequent
       [PCRA petition]. After providing [Appellant] with a notice of intent
       to dismiss on September 14, 2020, and furnishing [Appellant] with
       an opportunity to respond, [the PCRA court] denied [Appellant’s]
       subsequent [PCRA petition] on October 20, 2020. [Appellant]
       timely appealed this decision. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
       affirmed [the PCRA court’s] judgment and decision on October 18,
       2021. [Commonwealth v. Miranda, 2196 EDA 2020, 2021 WL
       4839342 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 18, 2021) (unpublished mem.)
       (Miranda III)]. Thereafter, on February 4, 2022, [Appellant]
       filed a motion to clarify/correct sentence nunc pro tunc. [The
       PCRA court] denied said motion on February 22, 2022. An appeal
       followed on March 29, 2022 and the Superior Court of
____________________________________________

3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

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       Pennsylvania affirmed [the PCRA court’s] order on [November 15,
       2022. Commonwealth v. Miranda, 913 EDA 2022, 2022 WL
       16943294 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 15, 2022) (unpublished mem.)
       (Miranda IV)].

       Then, on February 28, 202[3], [Appellant] filed a motion to correct
       sentence to include RRRI minimum sentence. [The trial court]
       denied [Appellant’s] requested relief on March 14, 2023.
       Subsequently, on April 25, 2023, [Appellant] filed another motion
       to reconsider and modify sentence that [the trial court] denied on
       April 27, 2023. Thereafter, on May 10, 2023, [Appellant] filed
       another motion to correct sentence to include RRRI minimum
       sentence that [the trial court] denied on May 15, 2023.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/14/23, at 1-3 (some citations omitted and some formatting

altered).

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The trial court issued an opinion addressing Appellant’s

claim.

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

       Did the Commonwealth error [sic] by failing to impose a RRRI
       minimum sentence on an eligible offender?

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (formatting altered).

       Before we can review the merits of Appellant’s appeal, we must first

determine whether we have jurisdiction to do so. See Commonwealth v.

Parker, 173 A.3d 294, 296 (Pa. Super. 2017) (reiterating that an appellate

court may consider the issue of jurisdiction at any time). “It is well-settled

that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means of achieving post-conviction

relief.”    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citations omitted). “Challenges to the legality of a sentence are cognizable

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under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 204 A.3d 448, 451 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).      However, challenges to the legality of a

sentence are subject to the PCRA’s time limitations. See Commonwealth v.

Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 813-14 (Pa.2016).

      In the instant case, Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously

determined that he was not RRRI eligible at the time of his sentencing. See

Appellant’s Brief at 5-10. This Court has held that, “[i]t is legal error to fail to

impose a RRRI minimum [sentence] on an eligible offender. Separate from

legal error, [Commonwealth v. Robinson, 7 A.3d 868 (Pa. Super. 2010)],

also holds that it is an illegal sentence to fail to impose a RRRI minimum . . .

.”   Commonwealth v. Tobin, 89 A.3d 663, 670 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Accordingly, the PCRA is the sole remedy by which Appellant may pursue his

claim, and we shall treat Appellant’s motion as a PCRA petition.               See

Whiteman, 204 A.3d at 451; Taylor, 65 A.3d at 465.

      The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a threshold jurisdictional question.

See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014); see

also Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(stating that “no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition”

(citation omitted and emphasis omitted)).         “A PCRA petition, including a

second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the

petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves

one of the three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).”

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16 (Pa. 2012) (citation and footnote

                                       -4-
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omitted). A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct

review, or at the expiration of time for seeking such review. See id. at 17,

see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

       Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed more than one year after a

judgment of sentence becomes final if the petitioner pleads and proves one of

the following three statutory exceptions:

       (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
       interference by government officials with the presentation of the
       claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
       or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

       (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
       the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
       of due diligence; or

       (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
       by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
       of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
       has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petitioner asserting one of these exceptions

must file a petition within one year of the date the claim could have first been

presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).4

       It is the petitioner’s “burden to allege and prove that one of the

timeliness exceptions applies.”         Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d

____________________________________________

4 On October 24, 2018, the General Assembly amended Section 9545(b)(2)

and extended the time for filing a petition from sixty days to one year from
the date the claim could have been presented. See 2018 Pa.Legis.Serv.Act
2018-146 (S.B. 915), effective December 24, 2018. The amendment applies
only to claims arising one year before the effective date of this section,
December 24, 2017, or thereafter.

                                           -5-
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1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted and some formatting altered). If a

petition is untimely, and none of the timeliness exceptions are met, courts do

not have jurisdiction to address the substance of the underlying claims. See

Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016).

       Here, Appellant did not file a direct appeal from his judgment of

sentence.     Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on

October 22, 2012.5 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (stating that the judgment

of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking the review); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); Pa.R.Crim.P.

720(A)(2)(a).     Accordingly, Appellant had until October 22, 2013, to file a

timely PCRA petition.        See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).   Appellant’s instant

petition, filed on February 28, 2023, is therefore facially untimely.

       Further, Appellant did not argue an exception to the PCRA time bar in

his pro se motion to correct sentence. Therefore, because Appellant’s petition

is facially untimely and Appellant neither pled nor proved a timeliness

exception under the PCRA, he has failed to meet the jurisdictional threshold

for a court to consider the merits of his claim. See Miller, 102 A.3d at 992;

see also Ballance, 203 A.3d at 1031. Therefore, we do have jurisdiction to

review the merits of Appellant’s motion to correct sentence.            For these

reasons, we affirm.
____________________________________________

5 The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions on September 20,

2012. Because October 20, 2012 fell on a Saturday, Appellant could have
timely filed a notice of appeal on Monday, October 22, 2012. 1 Pa.C.S. §
1908.

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     Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 4/12/2024

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