Court Opinion

ID: 9964902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 13:08:59.515587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:47.191397
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Cook, 2024-Ohio-1664.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                           HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                              :   APPEAL NO.    C-230235
                                                 TRIAL NO.     B-2002132
           Plaintiff-Appellee,               :

     vs.                                     :      O P I N I O N.

 SHAMIYA COOK,                               :

           Defendant-Appellant.              :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 1, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Bryan R. Perkins, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Shamiya Cook challenges her felonious-assault

conviction in two assignments of error, raising sufficiency and manifest-weight

challenges. Specifically, Cook relies on expert testimony to argue that she struck her

long-time abuser in a flight response and therefore did not act knowingly. But the trial

court was entitled to disagree with her expert’s opinion and reasonably found that the

surveillance footage undermined her expert’s conclusion. Because the evidence was

sufficient to sustain her conviction and our deference to the trial court’s credibility

determinations, we overrule her two assignments of error and affirm her conviction.

                              I. Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}   Dwayne Dickey, Cook’s long-time abuser, is the father of Cook’s child.

Sometime after midnight in May 2020, Dickey fought Cook in a gas station parking

lot. After Cook managed to escape Dickey and return to her SUV, she hit Dickey with

her vehicle, pinning him under a wheel. Cook was charged with felonious assault with

a deadly weapon in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and felonious assault in violation

of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1).

       {¶3}   At her bench trial, the state’s case consisted of Dickey’s testimony and

surveillance footage of the incident. For her part, Cook raised battered woman

syndrome as a defense.

                                    The state’s case

       {¶4}   Dickey testified that he and Cook have “one or two” children together.

He reluctantly testified that he was with Cook at a gas station, tried to get into a car,

and was struck by a vehicle. He explained that he sustained injuries to his leg.

       {¶5}   The surveillance footage shows the physical fight and eventual car crash.

It shows Cook pulling into the gas station alone and Dickey emerging from the back
                                          2
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

seat of his friend’s sedan. Cook walked off camera, and Dickey followed her. When the

two reentered the frame, Cook grasped Dickey’s sweatshirt, keeping him at arm’s

length. They wrestled and Dickey appeared to spit on Cook. Cook pushed Dickey away,

regrasping his sweatshirt. The two began to walk across the parking lot toward

Dickey’s friend’s sedan before Cook shoved Dickey for a second time. Dickey attacked

Cook, throwing multiple punches.

       {¶6}   The two continued to wrestle. Dickey punched Cook before she threw

him to the ground. She tried to retreat to her SUV, but Dickey ran toward her and

delivered another punch. The two wrestled next to her SUV before Cook was able to

create space between the two and reenter her SUV. With Cook in the driver seat and

the windows down, Dickey appears to have hurled a squeegee at Cook.

       {¶7}   Dickey ran toward his friend’s sedan before Cook veered around a gas

station pump and rapidly accelerated into a bollard and Dickey, pinning him under

the wheel of her SUV. Cook jumped out of her SUV and pushed the SUV off Dickey.

       {¶8}   On cross-examination, Dickey described his relationship with Cook,

which began when they were adolescents. The relationship began to sour and while

Dickey testified that the relationship was not abusive, he admitted that he committed

domestic violence “[p]robably just one time.” He acknowledged that he “used to” beat

her up. But that was in the past, according to Dickey.

       {¶9}   Cook’s counsel questioned Dickey about his criminal record, which

included three domestic-violence charges that the state dismissed or ignored.

       {¶10} According to Dickey, he was charged with domestic violence for hitting

Cook in the face with a cell phone in November 2020, which resulted in a trip to the

emergency room for Cook. At trial, he explained that she was “trying to take it from

me” and he simply lost his grip. Dickey also acknowledged that he was charged with
                                          3
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

domestic violence for harming Cook in 2018. Dickey admitted that he was charged

with punching another girlfriend but explained that she contacted police because he

“wasn’t doing what somebody didn’t want me to do.” In fact, Dickey explained that he

was charged with domestic violence because women “get mad.” According to Dickey,

       That’s where a lot of domestic violence charges come from. They make

       up something. They call the police, put you in jail. * * * They can just call

       the police and put a domestic violence on you to make sure you being

       pulled over or you’re going down the street and you’re going to jail for

       domestic violence.

                      Cook’s battered woman-syndrome defense

       A. Expert testimony

           1. Dr. Fischer described battered woman syndrome

       {¶11} In her defense, Cook called Dr. Karla Fischer to testify as an expert on

the psychological effects of domestic violence. Her expertise is “understanding the

normal consequences of domestic violence and how [it] change[s] people’s behavior

and feelings and thoughts.” She explained that “battered women’s syndrome,” or

battered person syndrome, is shorthand for the psychological effects of domestic

violence and is not a recognized diagnosis in the relevant edition of the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

       {¶12} Dr. Fischer identified “three general factors” of a battered person—a

“pattern of abuse,” “coercive control,” and “coping strategies that you would expect to

see from someone who is trying to deal with abuse and coercion.” She explained that

“[d]omestic violence changes people * * * how they behave, how they feel, how they

think about themselves, their relationships, and the background around them.” Dr.

Fischer testified that domestic-violence victims often do not seek external help. And
                                           4
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

when they do alert the authorities, it is common to see charges related to the domestic

violence dismissed.

       {¶13} Relevant here, Dr. Fischer explained that fight-or-flight reactions are

not conscious decisions, but the body’s response to perceived danger. The fight-or-

flight reaction is “System 1,” and “decisions, our cognitive weight of options and risks

and our strategy to engage in specific behavior” is “System 2.” In domestic-violence

cases, “usually the issue is someone who is reacting to danger in a fight or flight way.”

For a battered person, a “self-protection response refers to both System 1 and System

2 changes in the way that victims behave when they perceive danger.”

       {¶14} System 1 is “sort of an emergency situation in which the self-protection

response is either to fight or flight.” System 2 consists of “conscious decision-making,”

with victims “always trying to figure out how they can stop the violence from

happening in the future,” like therapy for their abusers or planned exit strategies. But

in the moment, a victim’s “visual perception is like a tunnel vision, you know, that

there is no damage, no peripheral vision because, again, the brain is focusing on the –

what the person needs to do to either fight or flight.” A fight-or-flight response is

automatic, akin to a person’s breath or heartbeat. It is a “survival instinct.”

           2. Dr. Fischer testified that the crash was a result of Cook’s flight response

       {¶15} Turning to Cook’s case, Dr. Fischer testified that she watched the video,

reviewed Dickey’s criminal history, and interviewed Cook over the course of four

hours. Dr. Fischer explained that there were several violent episodes at the gas station.

According to Fischer, Dickey was prone to physical and emotional abuse and described

a pattern of “abusive, intimidating, threatening, or manipulative” contact that

continued after the crash. Dr. Fischer testified that Cook was battered.

                                            5
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶16} Dr. Fischer was presented with a hypothetical fact pattern identical to

Cook’s relationship with Dickey and the crash in the case. Dr. Fischer testified that,

while the alleged vehicular assault could be seen as a deliberate decision, she believed

the crash was a product of the victim’s flight reaction. Considering the history between

the man and woman, Dr. Fischer agreed that crashing the SUV into the man was a

flight reaction “because she doesn’t really -- she’s -- she doesn’t have any other options

once she gets into her car to get away from the situation by flight in that she’s in her

car, that’s a vehicle that allows her to escape, and that’s flight.” Dr. Fischer also agreed

that the reaction is consistent with a physiological reaction that “the brain-based flight

response engenders.”

       {¶17} Dr. Fischer testified that Cook “did not intend to cause harm to Mr.

Dickey.” Later, she explained that Cook’s fight-or-flight response was activated

       [W]hen she got into her car and had to duck to keep him from hitting

       her over the head with a pipe and she hit the gas. Somewhere in those

       few seconds between crouching under the wheel of the car and hitting

       the gas, that’s when that – I think her – her trying to get to her car was

       a strategic, you know, decision. She’s trying to get away from him first

       by just getting to her car.

       B. Cook’s testimony

       {¶18} Cook testified in her defense. Her relationship with Dickey changed

when she became pregnant with their child. They frequently argued and Dickey began

stealing from Cook. She believed that after she became pregnant, “he felt like now I

got you to myself. Like, I don’t have to be in a relationship with you no more because

you a part of me.” She moved into an apartment, but “[i]t got worse” behind closed

                                             6
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

doors. During her pregnancy, he was physically violent—he hit her in the face with a

closed fist, beat her, and dragged her around the house.

       {¶19} She recalled many instances of abuse. He abused her in front of their

daughter and as Cook held their daughter. There were multiple fights at the Shell

station. If Cook went to the convenience store, Dickey “would be hanging out in front

of the store probably trying to steal drugs or doing whatever he was doing.” He would

make a comment, and following any pushback from Cook, “it would get physical.”

       {¶20} She recalled being assaulted by Dickey for her car keys and to use her

car. One time when Dickey dropped off Cook and their infant child at her sister’s

house, he started to drive away as Cook was removing their child from the car, nearly

causing their child to “fall out the car.” Another time, Dickey nearly hit Cook with a

car, speeding towards her but “as soon as he got close–like really close to me, he hit

the brakes, then stopped. * * * Screeched the brakes.” He also aimed a firearm at Cook

as she held their child. In addition to the physical violence, Cook described Dickey’s

emotionally manipulative behavior.

       {¶21} Turning to the date of the incident, Cook explained that she had a

protective order against Dickey, who was “fresh out of jail.” Cook contacted Dickey

about an issue with one of his friends. Dickey met Cook at the gas station and started

to argue. She “wasn’t really like aggressive toward him” and he was “out of character

because I feel like he was intoxicated.” He bit her, punched her, and hit her. When she

finally got back into her car, she was hit with a squeegee and she

       [d]ucked under my, like, steering wheel. I ducked under the wheel, and

       I hit the gas, and I tried to turn to the left towards the laundromat. And

       before you know it, I just hear a big, old boom. I hit the -- I hit the pole

       in front of the store and knocked it down.
                                            7
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶22} She denied trying to hit Dickey. On cross-examination, she testified that

she was “blacked out” and “wasn’t in my logical mind.” She explained that she was

thinking “just pull out, just pull out, I’ve been at this store since I’ve been like two.”

Cook explained that she knew “if I turned the wheel, either I’m going to accidentally

hit one of the * * * gas pumps or I’m going to pull straight out into the laundromat or

Harrison Avenue.” Her grandfather lived on a street off Harrison Avenue, and she had

to drive across the parking lot to get there.

       {¶23} She testified that, in the moment, she thought Dickey was “on the side

of me trying to hit me with a pole or something.” She did not see “him run, walk,

nothing away from my car.” She could not see where she was driving. She “blacked

out,” driving across the parking lot. After the crash, she got out of her SUV and “pulled

my truck off of him because he was no longer attacking me.” She jumped in a car

occupied by two bystanders and called 911 as she left the scene.

                The trial court found Cook guilty of felonious assault

       {¶24} The trial court found Cook guilty of both assault counts. It credited Dr.

Fischer with her explanation of battered woman syndrome and fight-or-flight

responses, but considered the surveillance footage “strong.” Specifically, the trial court

explained the surveillance footage made it “clear that Mr. Dickey, right before he was

hit by the car, had moved away from the car” and “Cook drove the car, turned the car

in the direction of him and accelerated and drove straight toward him and crashed into

him and ran him over.”

       {¶25} The trial court found that Cook “was not fleeing from abuse, but,

instead, she was able to form and execute the plan to drive, and to drive directly toward

and crash into and run over Mr. Dickey.”

                                            8
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶26} Recognizing that this finding was at odds with Dr. Fischer’s testimony

and expert opinion, the trial court reasoned:

       Dr. Fischer did not see the video that I saw, and she did not hear Ms.

       Cook’s testimony on direct and in cross that she had formed a plan and

       that she was executing her plan. In other words, she was not in the fight

       or flight system 1 reaction; she was in the system 2 planning reaction.

       Ms. Cook testified on direct that her intent was to flee. Ms. Cook testified

       on cross her plan was to drive out of the station. This testimony, under

       my theory of the defense is using the expert witness as to showing that

       she could not form the intent.

                                          ***

       The video undermines Ms. Cook’s testimony that she could not see

       where she was going, and that she was trying to go to Harrison Avenue,

       all she had to do was turn left and go out the exit at the gas station, and

       be on her way. She didn’t do that. She turned and headed directly

       toward Mr. Dickey, basically following him as he ran and also

       accelerating toward him until she crashed into him, ran him over, and

       hit the building. All of this was clear on State’s Exhibit 1 at 1:45:25

       through 1:45:29. This all happened roughly within a minute.

       {¶27} The trial court sentenced Cook to two to three years in prison on count

two, and merged count one into count two.

       {¶28} Cook appeals and challenges her conviction in two assignments of error.

                                II. Law and Analysis

       {¶29} In her first assignment of error, Cook argues that the state’s evidence

failed to establish that she knowingly struck Dickey with her SUV. In her second
                                         9
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

assignment of error, Cook contends that her conviction is against the manifest weight

of the evidence. While Cook argues these assignments together, “[s]ufficiency and

manifest weight are different legal concepts.” State v. Mack, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

109514, 2021-Ohio-1102, ¶ 17.

         The state’s evidence, if believed, proves that Cook acted knowingly

       {¶30} When determining whether the state presented sufficient evidence to

support a conviction, this court must consider “ ‘ “the probative evidence and

inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

[to see if] any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” State v. Sipple, 2021-Ohio-1319, 170 N.E.3d

1273, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. MacDonald, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180310,

2019-Ohio-3595, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d

717 (1st Dist.1983). This court “does not ask whether the evidence should be believed

or assess the evidence’s ‘credibility or effect in inducing belief’ ”; rather, the question

is “whether the evidence against [Cook], if believed, supports the conviction.”

(Emphasis in original.) State v. Jones, 166 Ohio St.3d 85, 2021-Ohio-3311, 182 N.E.3d

1161, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84

N.E.3d 993, ¶ 13.

       {¶31} To prove that Cook committed felonious assault in violation of R.C.

2901.11(A)(1), the evidence must show that she knowingly caused harm to Dickey. To

prove that Cook acted knowingly when she struck Dickey with her SUV, the evidence

must show that she was “aware that [her] conduct will probably cause a certain result

or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). We have explained,

“ ‘[b]ecause the intent of an accused person is only in his mind and is not ascertainable

by another, it cannot be proven by direct testimony of another person but must be
                                        10
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

determined from the surrounding facts and circumstances.’ ” State v. Hudson, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-170681, 2019-Ohio-3497, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d

555, 563, 763 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist.). Indeed, we consider “circumstantial evidence

surrounding these events to evaluate intent,” and presume that a person “ ‘intended

the natural, reasonable and probable consequences of their voluntary acts.’ ” State v.

Adams, 2019-Ohio-3597, 143 N.E.3d 1140, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Capone, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86281, 2006-Ohio-1537, ¶ 32.

       {¶32} Cook acknowledges that the surveillance footage shows Cook behind the

wheel of her SUV “follow[ing] Dickey’s path as he runs toward the building until finally

running him over.” And as the trial court noted, Cook testified that she intentionally

turned left to get to Harrison Ave, which suggests that she was operating the vehicle

with a level of intentionality. While Dr. Fisher opined that Cook’s actions were the

result of her flight response, “[a] trial court is not required to automatically accept

expert opinions offered from the witness stand.” State v. White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12,

2008-Ohio-1623, 885 N.E.2d 905, ¶ 71. When viewed in a light most favorable to the

state, a rational trier of fact could have found that Cook knowingly struck Dickey with

her SUV.

       {¶33} Because a rational trier of fact could have found that Cook acted

knowingly, we overrule Cook’s first assignment of error.

               We defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations

       {¶34} Cook’s arguments are better tailored to her second assignment of error,

where she argues that her conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

She claims that expert testimony established that she did not knowingly drive her SUV

into Dickey and the trial court’s findings otherwise were the result of flawed reasoning

and a misunderstanding of her expert.
                                          11
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶35} When a defendant claims her conviction is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, we must review “ ‘ “the entire record, weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses and determine

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and

a new trial ordered.” ’ ” State v. Morris, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220073, 2022-Ohio-

4597, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Bailey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140129, 2015-Ohio-2997,

¶ 59, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In doing

so, we afford deference to the trial court “on the issue of witness credibility unless it is

patently apparent that the trier of fact lost its way in arriving at its verdict.” Id., citing

Bailey at ¶ 63. We will reverse a conviction in “ ‘exceptional cases in which the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Sipple, 2021-Ohio-1319, 170 N.E.3d 1273, at

¶ 7, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717.

       {¶36} Cook begins with an emphasis on her testimony that she was unaware

that Dickey was in front of her SUV as she ducked under the steering wheel. To be

sure, she testified that she could not see where she was driving, did not intentionally

strike him with her car, and did not expect to hit Dickey. But, as the trial court

explained, Cook’s SUV follows a direct path toward Dickey. And “ ‘[t]he trier of fact is

in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

to the evidence presented.’ ” State v. Bullock, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-210256 and

C-210257, 2022-Ohio-925, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Carson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

180336, 2019-Ohio-4550, ¶ 16.

       {¶37} Cook challenges the trial court’s reasoning that Dr. Fischer did not view

the surveillance video that was played in court and its disagreement about whether

                                             12
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Cook operated the SUV out of a flight response. Cook insists that there was only one

video and therefore Dr. Fischer’s testimony should be afforded more weight.

       {¶38} There is only one video in the record. But Dr. Fischer unequivocally

testified that she watched footage showing the events from “a different vantage point.”

She explained that “the angle that I saw was to the rear of these individual[s]. So you’re

sort of looking at them as if they’re in front of you, not – and they’re moving, you know,

from the – near side of the car backwards.” When she watched the footage admitted

into evidence in court, she explained “[i]t looks very different though, the driving into

him than the other video does” and that, in the other footage:

       You actually see the angle of her car kind of drift off towards the store,

       whereas, the angle on this surveillance video, because its [sic] not from

       the back, it’s from the side, makes the way the car drove onto the side

       look very different.

In fact, Cook’s testimony also suggests the existence of additional footage. Cook was

shown the gas-station footage at trial and explained, “I’ve seen this video, but I more

so seen the other video.”

       {¶39} Finally, Cook maintains that the evidence contains no expert testimony

refuting Dr. Fischer’s conclusion that Cook operated the vehicle as a flight response,

making it “improper for the court to conclude” otherwise. But again, “[e]xpert

testimony, even when uncontradicted, is not necessarily conclusive.” State v.

Dickerson, 45 Ohio St.3d 206, 210, 543 N.E.2d 1250 (1989); State v. McBride, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-200443, 2023 Ohio App. LEXIS 29 (Jan.6, 2023) (“[A] trial court is

not required to automatically accept an expert opinion.”). While “expert opinion ‘may

not be arbitrarily ignored, and some reason must be objectively present for ignoring

expert opinion testimony,’ ” the surveillance footage and Cook’s testimony undermine
                                           13
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Dr. Fischer’s testimony that Cook did not knowingly drive across the parking lot and

strike Dickey. See State v. White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12, 2008-Ohio-1623, 885 N.E.2d 905,

¶ 71, quoting United States v. Hall, 583 F.2d 1288, 1294 (5th Cir.1978). In this regard,

“ ‘[a] verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the finder of

fact chose to believe the State’s [evidence] rather than the defendant’s version of the

events.’ ” State v. Green, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-22-13, 2023-Ohio-4360, ¶ 136, quoting

State v. Martinez, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0054, 2013-Ohio-3189, ¶ 16.

       {¶40} Because we defer to the trial court’s credibility determination, Cook’s

conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We overrule her second

assignment of error.

                                     III. Conclusion

       {¶41} We overrule Cook’s two assignments of error and affirm her conviction.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.

WINKLER and KINSLEY, JJ., concur.

Please note:

               The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

                                             14