Court Opinion

ID: 9900494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:24:04.443075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.484567
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                          CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                          E-filed: Jun 01 2023 03:09PM
                                                          Clerk Review: Jun 01 2023 03:09PM
                                                          Filing ID: 70119493
                                                          Case No.: 2022-SCC-0021-PET
                                                          Judy Aldan

                              IN THE
                      Supreme Court
                             OF THE

 Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

    IN RE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,
                         Petitioner,

                                v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA
                           ISLANDS,
                         Respondent,

                               AND

                    WILLIE CARNELL FRINK,
                 Respondent–Real Party in Interest

             Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0021-PET

          ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                       Cite as: 2023 MP 5

                       Decided June 1, 2023

               CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
              ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
                ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS

             Superior Court Criminal Action No. 22-0183
                Associate Judge Joseph N. Camacho
                          In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

MANGLOÑA, J.:
¶1       The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“Commonwealth”)
 petitions for a writ of mandamus to vacate the trial court’s finding of no probable
 cause in the case of Commonwealth v. Frink, which was dismissed after the trial
 court determined that the prosecution failed to demonstrate probable cause at the
 preliminary hearing. The petition also requests this Court to reinstate the charges
 and order the trial court to find that the Commonwealth demonstrated probable
 cause at the hearing. For the following reasons, we GRANT the Commonwealth’s
 petition to vacate the trial court’s dismissal and to reinstate the charges against
 Frink. The trial court shall make a determination of probable cause upon review
 of the transcript of the preliminary hearing, according to the standards set forth
 in this Order.
                      I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2      On November 11, 2022, two crew members of a military pre-positioning
 ship, Willie Carnell Frink (“Frink”), 40, and Dahlia Milsap (“Milsap”), 21, were
 on shore together on Saipan to get provisions for the ship. Frink informed her
 that he had rented a room at Hotel Americano and drove there to check in. After
 checking in, the two drove to Saipan World Resort in Susupe. While at the World
 Resort beach, Frink rubbed Milsap’s shoulders and offered to massage her, but
 she shrugged him off and declined.
¶3      They then left World Resort and drove to Aqua Resort in San Roque. At
 the pool area, Frink bought Milsap a beverage, and she began experiencing
 dizziness, blurred vision, and nausea after drinking it. The symptoms continued
 as they proceeded to dinner, where, after trying to eat, she requested to leave.
 They then drove back to Hotel Americano and went into the room. Her symptoms
 worsened, and she vomited in the bathroom. She showered, exited the bathroom,
 and sat on the bed. Frink began massaging her shoulders, but she attempted to
 shrug him off. Nonetheless, he pushed her down on the bed, straddled her with
 his legs, and put lotion on her back. She attempted to free herself but was
 unsuccessful, as she weighed approximately 110 pounds, and Frink weighed
 approximately 270 pounds.
¶4      Frink continued massaging toward the inner thighs and then removed her
 shorts and underwear. He removed his clothing, and she told him to stop; in
 response, he stated they were not “going all the way.” She attempted to put on
 her underwear, but as she did so, Frink took it off her, forced her legs apart, and
 began having sexual intercourse. Milsap reported she then blacked out. Upon
 regaining consciousness, she remembers laying on her stomach, with Frink
 saying that he was going to “clean up” and turning on the bathroom light. After
 only a few minutes, she asked to leave the hotel room.
¶5      At approximately 10:00 p.m., they drove from the hotel to a bar in
 Garapan, where they met with other crew members from the ship. At
 approximately 11:00 p.m., they returned to the launch boat, which brought them
 to the ship. Upon returning, they went to their separate rooms. The next morning,
                          In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

 Milsap reported the incident to the ship’s chief mate. The chief mate reported this
 to the ship’s captain, who ordered Frink to be confined to his room. The chief
 mate took Milsap to the hospital for a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
 examination. The examination identified a bruise on the left thigh. The next day,
 the ship’s captain reported the incident to DPS Detective Shannon A. Dela Cruz
 who was assigned to the case and interviewed Milsap twice.
¶6     On November 23, the Commonwealth filed an Information charging Frink
 with Sexual Assault in the First Degree, Sexual Assault in the Second Degree,
 Assault and Battery, and Disturbing the Peace. At the Preliminary Hearing, the
 court heard testimony from Detective Dela Cruz. After the hearing, the court
 found that the two “appeared friendly, not intoxicated, and appeared to be a
 couple.” The court found no probable cause to detain Frink and dismissed the
 charges without prejudice. The Commonwealth then filed a Petition for a Writ of
 Mandamus requesting this Court to order the trial court to vacate its finding of
 no probable cause and to reinstate the charges with a finding of probable cause.
                                II. JURISDICTION
¶7      The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus under
 Article IV, Section 3 of the NMI Constitution. Commonwealth v. Superior Court,
 2020 MP 22 ¶ 5.
                                  III. DISCUSSION
¶8      Writs of mandamus are extraordinary relief granted only in the most dire
 of circumstances. In re Ogumoro, 2015 MP 9 ¶ 9. This Court may grant a petition
 for a writ of mandamus when: (1) the party seeking the writ has no other adequate
 means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief desired; (2) the petitioner will
 be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctible on appeal; (3) the lower court’s
 order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) the lower court’s order is an oft-
 repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of applicable rules; and (5) the
 lower court’s order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first
 impression. In re Commonwealth, 2018 MP 8 ¶ 13 (citing Tenorio v. Superior
 Court, 1 NMI 1 (1989)). Petitioner must meet the third factor—whether the trial
 court’s order is clearly erroneous—for a writ to issue, but the other factors are
 weighed together. Id.
               A. The Superior Court’s Ruling is Clearly Erroneous
¶9      As the third factor is the most important, our analysis begins here. See id.
 (beginning discussion of a writ of mandamus with the third Tenorio factor). In
 applying this factor, we give high deference to the lower court’s decision, and a
 clearly erroneous finding requires a “firm conviction” that the trial court erred.
 In re Buckingham, 2012 MP 15 ¶ 10. A writ would not be appropriate if a
 “rational and substantial” legal argument favors the questioned ruling. Liu v.
 Commonwealth, 2006 MP 5 ¶ 17. The proper question is whether the trial court
 could rationally have ruled as it did. Id.
¶ 10    Our analysis of the trial court’s ruling starts with the law governing
  preliminary hearings. A preliminary hearing aims to determine whether there is
                          In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

 probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused
 committed it. Commonwealth v. Superior Court, 2020 MP 22 ¶ 7. Preliminary
 hearings are often viewed as a screening device to determine whether the alleged
 facts justify detaining a defendant awaiting trial. Id. Under the NMI Rules of
 Criminal Procedure, a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing if the
 defendant has been “substantially deprived of liberty.” NMI R. CRIM. P. 5.1. A
 preliminary hearing occurs after a defendant has been arrested. Id. R. 5. If the
 trial court finds probable cause at the preliminary hearing, the case can proceed
 to arraignment and trial. See id. R. 10.
¶ 11     Neither the NMI Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the statute governing
  preliminary hearings, 6 CMC § 6303, defines the legal standard that the trial court
  should use to find probable cause. In In re Commonwealth, 2018 MP 8, we
  looked to the United States Supreme Court, the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th Circuit Court
  of Appeals, the supreme courts of Utah, and Colorado, and the appellate courts
  of California and Wisconsin to flesh out the probable cause standard.
¶ 12       Under In re Commonwealth, the prosecution has the burden to produce
  believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged. Id. ¶ 17 (citing State
  v. Virgin, 137 P.3d 787, 792 (Utah 2006)). Probable cause is a reasonable belief
  that a crime has been committed and that the defendant committed it. State v.
  Regelman, 430 P.3d 946, 953 (Kan. 2018). At a preliminary hearing, the
  discretion of the court to weigh evidence and evaluate witness credibility is
  minimal: if the facts as presented by the prosecution are disputed, as in the
  present case, the court can disregard witness testimony for lack of credibility only
  if it is “implausible or incredible.” In re Commonwealth, 2018 MP 8 ¶ 17 (citing
  Johns v. Dist. Ct., 561 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. 1977). If the facts as presented by the
  prosecutor are not disputed by the defendant, courts are permitted to dismiss for
  lack of probable cause only if the facts presented are insufficient, as a matter of
  law, to satisfy the elements of the offense. Id. (citing State v. Cotton, 668 N.W.2d
  346, 352 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); Frazzini v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. Rptr. 32, 39
  (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)).
¶ 13     We further elaborated on this standard in Commonwealth, 2020 MP 22. In
  this case, which concerned prosecution for sexual abuse of a minor, the
  Commonwealth petitioned for a writ of mandamus to vacate a trial court order
  requiring the production of documents at a preliminary hearing. Id. ¶ 1. In
  granting the petition, we reaffirmed that—to justify a probable cause finding—
  the prosecution must produce only “believable evidence” of all the elements of
  the crime charged. Id. ¶ 24. The trial court is not to “make findings of fact
  regarding disputed evidence”; instead, the court looks only to whether the
  evidence presented, if believed, would suffice “as a matter of law to satisfy each
  element” of the offense. Id. In Commonwealth, we found this low threshold
  satisfied merely by the testimony, on direct examination, of the lead detective
  about conversations she had with DYS forensic examiners and with the victim’s
  family members. Id. ¶ 25 (“[T]he detective’s testimony based on interviews at
  which she was herself present would suffice to establish probable cause.”).
                            In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

¶ 14     The jurisdictions we relied on in Commonwealth, 2020 MP 22, and In re
  Commonwealth, 2018 MP 8, particularly Utah and Colorado, provide further
  details regarding the probable cause determination. A case from the Utah
  Supreme Court, State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300, 305 (2001), provides that, where the
  court is faced with “conflicting evidence,” it is not to “sift or weigh the evidence.”
  Instead, the trial court only asks whether the prosecution has presented
  “sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been
  committed and that the defendant committed it.” Id. at 306. The Utah case cited
  by this Court in Commonwealth, 2020 MP 22, is State v. Virgin, 137 P.3d 787
  (2006). This case provides helpful discussion of the extent to which a court is
  free to make credibility determinations. The Utah Supreme Court clarified that
  the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to “ferret out groundless and improvident
  prosecutions.” Id. at 792. A preliminary hearing is not a quasi-trial, and the
  prosecution is not obligated to produce evidence capable of supporting a finding
  of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In general, the court has “limited”
  authority to make credibility determinations. Id. at 793. They are to view the
  evidence “in a light most favorable to the prosecution, resolving all inferences in
  favor of the prosecution.” Id.; accord People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 221 (Colo.
  2000) (“During a preliminary hearing . . . [t]he court must view all evidence and
  draw all inferences in favor of the prosecution, and the court must not accept the
  defendant’s version of the facts over the legitimate inferences that can be drawn
  from the prosecution’s evidence.”). A trial court may disregard evidence for lack
  of credibility only if it is “so contradictory, inconsistent, or unbelievable that it is
  unreasonable to base belief of an element of the prosecutor’s claim on that
  evidence.” Virgin, 137 P.3d at 793.
¶ 15     In re Commonwealth, which held that the court may disregard witness
  testimony at a preliminary hearing only if it is “implausible or incredible,” relied
  on Johns v. Dist. Ct., a 1977 case from the Colorado Supreme Court. See In re
  Commonwealth, 2018 MP 8 ¶ 17. In Johns, a state patrolman was charged after
  threatening and menacing a private individual without cause. Johns, 561 P.2d 1,
  2 (Colo. 1977). After hearing testimony from the complainant at the preliminary
  examination, the court dismissed the charges, stating that the officer was justified
  in drawing his gun on the complainant. Id. 2–3. The Colorado Supreme Court
  held that the court improperly ruled on a question that should have been for the
  jury, namely, whether the officer was justified. Id. at 3. The supreme court
  reiterated an earlier holding that, at a preliminary hearing, “when there is a mere
  conflict in the testimony, a question of fact exists for the jury, and the judge must
  draw the inference favorable to the prosecution.” Id. (citing Hunter v. Dist. Ct.,
  543 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Colo. 1975). Like the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
  Virgin, the Colorado Supreme Court held that “a judge in a preliminary hearing
  has jurisdiction to consider the credibility of witnesses only when, as a matter of
  law, the testimony is implausible or incredible.” Id.; accord 137 P.3d 787, 793.
¶ 16    A Nebraska case, State v. Rossbach, 650 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (2002), is
  also on point for the matter at hand. In that case, a high school teacher was
  charged with the first-degree sexual assault of two minor students. At the
                          In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

 preliminary hearing, the prosecution presented testimony demonstrating that the
 students drove to the defendant’s home after consuming alcohol at a party and
 that sexual intercourse then occurred. Id. at 245–46. The trial court dismissed the
 charges at the preliminary hearing, finding that the prosecution failed to establish
 probable cause. Id. at 247. Specifically, the court reasoned that, because the
 students consumed alcohol voluntarily and appeared to have had the capacity to
 travel to the defendant’s home, the prosecution failed to demonstrate probable
 cause that the defendant had subjected them to sexual intercourse without consent
 or in a state where they were incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct,
 as required by Nebraska’s sexual assault statute. Id. at 247; see also R.R.S. Neb.
 § 28-319.
¶ 17     On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had
  failed to apply the correct probable cause standard. The issue at a preliminary
  hearing is not whether the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable
  doubt; instead, it is “whether the State had adduced enough evidence, if believed
  by a trier of fact, that would show that a first degree sexual assault had been
  perpetrated and that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed the
  act.” Rossbach, 650 N.W.2d at 248 (emphasis added). The court concluded that
  the prosecution met this standard by presenting evidence that the students were
  intoxicated and that the defendant either knew or should have known of their
  intoxicated state when intercourse occurred. Id. at 250.
¶ 18     We are left with a firm conviction that the trial court erred in its analysis
  of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. The information charges
  sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second degree, assault and
  battery, and disturbing the peace. The lynchpin of all four charges is that Frink
  engaged in sexual intercourse with Milsap without her consent. “Without
  consent” is defined by 6 CMC § 1317(10) as “a person (A) with or without
  resisting, is coerced by the use of force against a person.” At the preliminary
  hearing, the prosecution presented evidence from Detective Shannon Dela Cruz,
  who was the lead detective on the case and who conducted interviews with the
  victim. She testified that Milsap and Frink were alone together in his hotel room
  and that the former was experiencing dizziness and nausea after drinking a
  beverage purchased for her by Frink. Frink then began to touch her shoulders
  despite her attempts to shrug him off, and he continued by pushing her down onto
  the bed and holding her in place by straddling her hips with his legs. Frink, who
  weighed approximately 270 pounds at the time of the incident, began to apply
  lotion to her back. According to Officer Dela Cruz’s testimony, Milsap was
  continually attempting to free herself from this position, but she was unable to
  do so by virtue of being approximately 110 pounds. Frink then proceeded to
  remove her shorts and underwear, and she told Frink that she wanted to stop. She
  attempted to put her underwear back on, but Frink forcibly removed it. Frink then
  forced her legs apart and began having sexual intercourse with her. In addition,
  the prosecution also presented evidence of bruising on the left thigh.
                             In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

¶ 19     Frink’s actions constitute “use of force” that coerced Milsap and resulted
  in sexual intercourse. At the preliminary hearing, counsel for defendant appeared
  to misinterpret the requirements of Section 1317(10): “without consent means . .
  . threat of death or kidnapping . . . coercion or force.” Appendix to Petition
  (“Appendix”) at 164. He continued, “[sexual assault in the first degree] is so
  inappropriate in a he said/she said case, two people in a hotel room together, and
  can this Court know?” Id. at 165. In the absence of “injury to her vagina,” counsel
  argued, there is no way for the prosecution to show probable cause of sexual
  assault.
¶ 20     Contrary to defendant’s assertions, cases from other jurisdictions make
  clear that the use of force requirement of “without consent” statutes can be met
  where a defendant uses force to pin a victim down and prevent her from escaping,
  even if more extreme actions such as slapping or choking do not occur. In the
  Texas case of Gonzales v. State, 2 S.W.3d 411, 414–15 (Tx. App. 1999) the
  defendant challenged his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the
  prosecution had failed to show use of force. 1 The victim testified that the
  defendant “threw” or “laid” her on the couch and laid on top of her, preventing
  her from moving. Id. at 415. Like in the Frink case, the victim was unable to
  escape due to a significant weight difference between her and the defendant. Id.
  at 413, 415. The Texas Court of Appeals found this to satisfy the force
  requirement: “[t]here is no requirement that a certain amount of force be used,
  only that it is used.” Accordingly, the conviction was upheld. Id. at 412.
¶ 21      Moreover, by dismissing the charges, the trial court made an improper
  credibility determination regarding Officer Dela Cruz’s testimony and the
  victim’s statements upon which that testimony was based. Under Virgin, 137
  P.3d at 793, the court at a preliminary hearing is to view the evidence in a light
  most favorable to the prosecution. It may discount evidence and testimony for
  lack of credibility only where it is “so contradictory, inconsistent, or unbelievable
  that is unreasonable to base belief” on that evidence. Id. The California Supreme
  Court holds that “to reject the prosecution evidence at the probable cause stage,
  either the evidence presented must be inherently implausible, the witness must
  be conclusively impeached, or the demeanor of the witness must be so poor that
  no reasonable person would find them credible.” Cooley v. Superior Court, 127
  Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 200 (Cal. 2002).
¶ 22     Here, Officer Dela Cruz’s testimony about the details of the alleged sexual
  assault were not contradicted by any other evidence presented at the hearing.
  While a jury sitting at trial may or may not believe the victim’s account, the trial
  court was not entitled, at this early stage in the proceedings, to discount testimony
  alleging a prima facie case for sexual assault. See In re Commonwealth, 2018
  MP 8 ¶ 17 (holding that the court at a preliminary hearing may disregard witness

1
    Texas law, like NMI law, defines sexual assault as penetration without consent. Tex.
    Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a). “Without consent” is where the defendant “compels the
    other person to submit or participate by the use of physical force, violence, or coercion.”
    Id. § 22.011(b).
                          In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

 testimony only where it is “implausible or incredible”). At the preliminary
 hearing, the court improperly accepted the defendant’s version of the events over
 the prosecution’s without showing that the prosecution’s version was so
 contradictory, inconsistent, or unbelievable so as to render belief in it
 unreasonable. See People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 221 (Colo. 2000) (“The court [at
 a preliminary hearing] must view all evidence and draw all inferences in favor of
 the prosecution, and the court must not accept the defendant’s version of the facts
 over the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from the prosecution’s
 evidence.”). If believed by a jury, the Commonwealth’s evidence would properly
 result in a finding that the defendant committed the charged offenses. See State
 v. Rossbach, 650 N.W.2d 248–49 (Neb. 2002).
¶ 23     We find that the third Tenorio factor is met in this case because the trial
  court’s ruling is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. The court failed to analyze
  whether the prosecution had successfully presented “believable evidence of all
  the elements of the crime charged,” as required by Commonwealth, 2020 MP 22
  ¶ 24. Instead, the court impermissibly elevated the burden of proof and
  discredited the prosecution’s witnesses, thereby going beyond the limited scope
  of a preliminary hearing. See id. (“the judge at [a preliminary hearing] does not
  make findings of fact regarding disputed evidence, merely whether the
  prosecution has met its burden to show evidence that, if believed, suffices as a
  matter of law to satisfy each element of the charged offense.”). Indeed, we have
  already held that a detective’s testimony about conversations with a sexual
  assault victim can suffice to establish probable cause, even without corroborating
  physical evidence. See id. ¶ 25 (“Here, [Officer Dela Cruz’s] testimony on direct
  examination meets that bar [of probable cause] without reference to any tangible
  materials or documents.”). By dismissing the charges, the trial court ignored
  precedent and conflated the preliminary hearing standard with the standard of
  guilt applicable at trial. See Virgin, 137 P.3d at 792. We are left with a firm
  conviction that the trial court erred and that no substantial legal argument can be
  made in favor of its ruling. In re Buckingham, 2012 MP 15 ¶ 10; Liu v.
  Commonwealth, 2006 MP 5 ¶ 19.
              B. The Prosecution Has No Other Means to Obtain Relief
¶ 24     Regarding the remaining Tenorio factors, Frink concedes that the first
  factor—whether the party seeking the writ has other means, such as a direct
  appeal, to obtain the desired relief—lies in favor of the prosecution in this case.
  Respondent’s Answering Brief to Commonwealth’s Petition for Writ of
  Mandamus, at 12 (“Mr. Frink concedes the proesecution [sic] has no other means
  to obtain relief such as a direct appeal.”). The prosecution cannot appeal the
  ruling because a determination of probable cause is not a final judgment granting
  jurisdiction for an appeal. Commonwealth v. Crisostimo, 2005 MP 18 ¶ 17.
                   C. The Prosecution Will Be Damaged in a
                        Way Not Correctable on Appeal
¶ 25    The second factor is whether the prosecution will be damaged or
  prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal if the writ does not issue.
                           In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

 Commonwealth, 2020 MP 22 ¶ 10. The prosecution argues this factor is met
 because, since it cannot appeal the court’s ruling, it cannot correct the court’s
 erroneous ruling. The defendant and the trial court disagree, claiming that,
 because the dismissal without prejudice means the prosecution is free to re-file
 the charges.
¶ 26      This case parallels In re Commonwealth, 2015 MP 7. In that case, a
  defendant was charged with several counts of sexual misconduct. Id. ¶ 1. After
  the preliminary hearing, the trial court found no probable cause for Sexual
  Assault in the First Degree, reasoning that the statute was inapplicable as a matter
  of law because the victim was 16 years old and the perpetrator was 18. Id. Like
  in this case, the Commonwealth petitioned for a writ of mandamus. Id. In
  analyzing the second Tenorio factor, we first noted that a determination of no
  probable cause is not a final judgment and that the prosecution remained free to
  re-file. Id. ¶ 19. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the prosecution had been
  damaged in a way not correctable on appeal: “re-filing will likely prove futile
  because the finding of no probable cause was premised on an erroneous
  interpretation of the law . . . the trial court’s brief clearly shows that it will not
  reconsider and change its interpretation of the law.” Id.
¶ 27      In another recent mandamus case, the trial court dismissed a prosecution
  for assault and battery without prejudice after an initial appearance, reasoning
  that the criminal complaint was deficient because it had an electronic signature.
  In re Commonwealth, 2022 MP 5 ¶¶ 4–5. The Commonwealth then petitioned
  for a writ of mandamus. We find that the Commonwealth had been damaged in
  a way not correctable on appeal. Id. ¶ 14. While the prosecution remained free to
  re-file the case, the issue of whether electronic signatures are valid would evade
  review; if the Commonwealth were to use an electronic signature, the case would
  be dismissed, and, if the Commonwealth used a physical signature, the issue
  would not be addressed. Accordingly, the appeal process could not correct the
  court’s error, meaning that issuing a writ of mandamus would be appropriate. Id.
  ¶ 15.
¶ 28     As in these previous mandamus cases, the prosecution may re-file the
  charges. However, the prosecution will be hard-pressed to gather sufficient
  evidence to overcome the erroneous probable cause interpretation the trial court
  applied. The defendant is unlikely to serve as a source for additional evidence;
  he invoked his right to remain silent when approached by Officer Dela Cruz, and
  he has left the Commonwealth. See Appendix at 31; Petition, at 18. The victim
  has already spoken—twice—with Dela Cruz and given the full details of her
  account. Moreover, Dela Cruz has testified to the results of the Sexual Assault
  Nurse Examination as well as to conversations she had with the ship captain and
  the officer to whom the victim first reported the incident. See Appendix at 29-30.
  As a result, there are few, if any, individuals with personal knowledge of the
  incident who could provide additional evidence at another preliminary hearing.
¶ 29    The trial court’s erroneous application of the probable cause standard has
  rendered the prosecution essentially unable to proceed with this case. All
                            In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

 available medical testimony has already been brought to the court’s attention
 through Officer Dela Cruz’s. In addition, the details of the alleged sexual assault
 have already been presented to the court, and there are no additional witnesses
 with knowledge of that incident that could be called to testify. Accordingly, like
 in In re Commonwealth, 2015 MP 7 ¶ 19, re-filing the charges would likely be
 “futile.”
¶ 30     The Superior Court’s Answer in this case demonstrates that it remains
  committed to its erroneous interpretation of the probable cause standard. The
  court argues that “there was no credible evidence brought before the Court that
  would support a finding of Probable Cause that Frink committed sexual
  intercourse with Milsap without her consent.” Answer, at 7. This statement
  ignores the testimony presented at the hearing that Frink forcibly thrust the
  victim’s legs apart, removed her clothing, and prevented her from escaping by
  pinning her to the mattress. See supra ¶¶ 3-4. The trial court’s position contradicts
  binding precedent from this Court and the highly persuasive body of law from
  other states, all of which clearly provide that a trial court is not to make credibility
  determinations at the preliminary hearing phase. See Commonwealth, 2020 MP
  22 ¶ 24 (“The judge at this stage does not make findings of fact regarding
  disputed evidence, merely whether the prosecution has met its burden to show
  evidence that, if believed, suffices as a matter of law to satisfy each element of
  the charged offense.”); Virgin, 138 P.3d at 793 (“[M]agistrates [at a preliminary
  hearing] must leave all the weighing of credible but conflicting evidence to the
  trier of fact and must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
  prosecution, resolving all inferences in favor of the prosecution.”). Because the
  trial court has already rejected the credibility of Milsap’s account, re-filing the
  case would likely lead to dismissal at the preliminary hearing stage once again.
  We hold that the second Tenorio factor weighs in favor of the prosecution.
               D. The Superior Court’s Order is an Oft-Repeated Error
¶ 31     The fourth Tenorio factor is whether the lower court’s order is an oft-
  repeated error or manifests a persistent disregard of applicable rules. In re
  Commonwealth, 2022 MP 5 ¶ 11. This is not the first time the Commonwealth
  has sought a writ of mandamus following dismissal at the preliminary hearing
  stage. See In re Commonwealth, 2018 MP 8. Indeed, we previously granted
  mandamus relief in prior cases dealing with other aspects of preliminary
  hearings. In Commonwealth, 2020 MP 22, this Court found clear error in ordering
  the production of all relevant material for presentation at a preliminary hearing
  because the order amounted to an improper creation of an “expansive” right that
  had no basis in the plain language of the statute or its legislative history. Id. ¶ 20.
  Additionally, in In re Commonwealth, 2015 MP 7, this Court issued a writ of
  mandamus correcting an erroneous interpretation of the Commonwealth’s sexual
  assault statutes. That case involved the dismissal of charges after the preliminary
  hearing, mistakenly concluding that legislative amendments precluded
  prosecution where the offender is eighteen years old and the victim is sixteen.
  Id. ¶ 1. This case marks yet another instance of an erroneous ruling after a
                          In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

 preliminary hearing in a sexual assault prosecution. Accordingly, we hold that
 the fourth factor favors the Commonwealth.
           E. The Superior Court’s Order Raises Important Issues of Law
¶ 32     The final Tenorio factor is whether the lower court’s order raises new and
  important problems, or issues of law of first impression. Commonwealth, 2020
  MP 22 ¶ 10 (citing Tenorio v. Superior Court, 1 NMI 1 9–10 (1989)). While we
  have issued rulings detailing the proper scope and focus of preliminary hearings,
  see 2020 MP 22; 2018 MP 8, those cases dealt with the interpretation of statutes
  covering discovery and the elements of sexual abuse of a minor. The current case
  goes to the heart of the probable cause standard. It requires this Court to
  determine how the trial court should evaluate prosecutions where facts are
  disputed. It also gives an opportunity to explain further the extent to which the
  trial court at a preliminary hearing can weigh evidence and evaluate witness
  credibility. Consequently, the fifth and final Tenorio factor is satisfied.
              F. The Commonwealth’s Arguments Concerning Bias and
                 Improper Admission of Testimony are Without Merit
¶ 33     We find the prosecution’s other assignments of error to be without merit.
  The prosecution contends that the court demonstrated “bias” by “coaching”
  defense counsel to file for a Franks hearing. Petition, at 14. The full exchange is
  as follows:
        The Court: Mr. Thompson, based on just initial portions of the
        testimony and some of the testimonies from the officer in regards to
        the arrest warrant—I’m saying this so Ms. Demapan also hears it—
        I know it’s short for you. Are you probably going to eat lunch, both
        of you counsels. I would encourage for you to come back at lease
        [sic] maybe have an opportunity to review what is sometimes
        referred to as a Franks hearing, because I’m hearing that between
        this preliminary, which has a different objective, right, whether or
        not there’s probable cause. But, a Franks hearing is different. I
        know it’s been awhile but I do remember back then DPS, now this
        chief (indiscernible) went to a similar one like that. I think Judge
        Govendo was the one who presided that, so can—read up on it so
        you—
        Mr. Thompson: Mm-mm.
        The Court: Okay. I can only decide the preliminary hearing, because
        that’s in front of me, but I’ll leave it up to you whether you want
        to—
        Mr. Thompson: Thank you, Your Honor.
        The Court:--file something to that effect.
        Appendix, at 55–56.
                           In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

 The Commonwealth does not contend that this exchange, standing alone,
 constitutes an error warranting mandamus relief. Instead, it argues that the
 comments demonstrate the court’s skepticism toward Officer Dela Cruz’s
 testimony, thereby providing further reason for this Court to hold that the trial
 court made an improper credibility determination. However, the Commonwealth
 did not cite any caselaw or otherwise elaborate on the standard applicable to this
 claim. Because the Commonwealth did not substantiate its argument on this point
 and because this matter does not affect our conclusion that mandamus relief is
 warranted under the Tenorio factors, we decline to address this issue.
¶ 34     In addition, the Commonwealth contends for the first time in its petition
  that the trial court erred in not excluding the testimony of the Defendant’s private
  investigator, who testified to conversations he had with individuals who saw
  Frink and Milsap that night and to physical evidence he observed in the hotel
  room. In general, this Court does not review arguments raised for the first time
  on appeal, Demapan v. Bank of Guam, 2006 MP 16 ¶ 9, and the Commonwealth
  has failed to show that any of the “narrow exceptions” to this rule should apply
  here. See id.
¶ 35     We conclude that the trial court’s Order Finding No Probable Cause on
  Counts I-V, dated November 23rd, 2022 should be vacated under our authority
  to issue writs of mandamus. See NMI SUP. CT. R. 21. Since that Order dismissed
  the charges against Frink, its vacatur means that the charges are reinstated.
  Nonetheless, we decline to issue a finding of probable cause. Such a
  determination falls within the ambit of the trial court. In Commonwealth, we
  issued a writ of mandamus after the trial court erred in issuing an impermissibly
  overbroad discovery order. 2020 MP 22 ¶ 29. In that case, we vacated the
  discovery order but remanded for another preliminary hearing. Id. A subsequent
  hearing was necessary to ensure compliance with the evidentiary disclosure
  standards announced in our decision. See id. Here, however, another preliminary
  hearing would be largely duplicative of the previous hearing: presumably, the
  same witnesses would be called, substantially similar questions would be asked,
  and the same evidence would be evaluated. This Court is sensitive to the concerns
  of judicial economy, which seeks to preserve “efficiency in the operation of the
  courts and the judicial system; especially, the efficient management of litigation
  so as to minimize duplication of effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary’s time
  and resources.” Joeten Motor Co. v. Guerrero, 2020 MP 14 ¶ 17. Upon review
  of the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the trial court is to make a probable
  cause determination according to the evidence already presented and the
  standards articulated in this Order.
                                 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 36    For the foregoing reasons, the Commonwealth’s Petition for a writ of
  mandamus is GRANTED, and the trial court’s Order Finding No Probable Cause
  on Counts I–V is VACATED. Accordingly, the charges against Frink are reinstated
  and the trial court shall, without further delay, evaluate probable cause in a
  manner consistent with this Order.
                             In re Commonwealth, 2023 MP 5

         SO ORDERED this 1st day of June, 2023.

/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice

 /s/
JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
Associate Justice

/s/
PERRY B. INOS
Associate Justice
                                         COUNSEL

J. Robert Glass, Jr., Saipan, MP, for Petitioner.

Colin M. Thompson, Saipan, MP, for Respondent.

                                          NOTICE

This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any
event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication,
the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715,
fax (670) 236–9702, e–mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.com.