Court Opinion

ID: 9583461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:38:53.746203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:01.810651
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice,
dissenting:
My dissent is predicated on several grounds. First, I believe that the lower court abused its discretion in finding that the mother did not meet the primary caretaker standard under Garska v. McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981). Second, the trial court improperly gave weight to the six-year-old daughter’s desire to be with her father. Finally, I think that the trial court should have considered the impact of separating the two young children by dividing the custody of them between the parents.
Even a cursory review of the record makes it manifest that Mrs. Graham was the primary caretaker of both children. The daughter, Anne, was born in 1976, approximately three years after the parents were married. Mrs. Graham did not pursue gainful employment after Anne was born, except for a two and one-half month period in 1978 when she worked at a local library.
Prior to moving in 1977 from Ohio to Clay County, West Virginia, Mr. Graham taught school during the day and worked in the evening remodeling the home or with his brother in the latter’s junkyard business. He also attended night classes as well as the local basketball and football games. Much this same pattern occurred after his move to Clay County where he teaches at the Clay County High School and is its band director.
When the parties separated in June 1982, the daughter Anne was six years old. It is obvious to me that Mrs. Graham, who was home on a daily basis taking care of Anne while Mr. Graham worked, was Anne’s primary caretaker.
It may be that the trial court thought that Mr. Graham had become the primary caretaker by virtue of having physical custody of Anne for some months prior to the final divorce hearing. This custodial arrangement occurred because Mr. Graham took Anne away with him after visiting his wife and children in Ohio. Mrs. Graham had returned to her parent’s home in Ohio with the two children after the parties had separated in June. In Garska, 167 W.Va. at —, 278 S.E.2d at 363, we made it abundantly clear that: “[I]t is incumbent upon the circuit court to determine as a threshold question which parent was the primary caretaker parent before the domestic strife giving rise to the proceeding began.” (Emphasis added). Consequently, I believe that the majority is in error when it concludes that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that Mrs. Graham was the primary caretaker of Anne.
My second point of issue with the majority opinion is its utilization of the child’s *348preference to overcome the primary caretaker presumption. Admittedly, Garska recognized that this could be done, as indicated by this portion of Syllabus Point 7:
“Where there is a child under fourteen years of age, but sufficiently mature that he can intelligently express a voluntary preference for one parent, the trial judge is entitled to give that preference such weight as circumstances warrant, and where such child demonstrates a preference for the parent who is not the primary caretaker, the trial judge is entitled to conclude that the presumption in favor of the primary caretaker is rebutted.”
Much of this language was taken directly from J.B. v. A.B., 161 W.Va. 332, 340, 242 S.E.2d 248, 254 (1978), where in note 3, this language is found: “In West Virginia the principle is well settled that a child’s custody preference can be considered and given appropriate weight, when the child is of the age of discretion. State ex rel. Kiger v. Hancock, 153 W.Va. 404, 168 S.E.2d 798 (1969); Holstein v. Holstein, 152 W.Va. 119, 160 S.E.2d 177 (1968).”
In Kiger, this Court concluded that two children, ages ten and eleven, could not have their preference made controlling because of their age and immaturity. Whereas, in Holstein, a twelve-year-old boy’s preference was given some weight. This Court specifically noted that the trial court found that “he was a good student and was qualified to testify.” 152 W.Va. at 125, 160 S.E.2d at 182.
The problem in the present case is that the daughter was only six years old. There is nothing in the record to reveal under the language of Garska that she was “sufficiently mature that [she] can intelligently express a voluntary preference for one parent.” Syllabus Point 7, in part. In this case, the trial judge took the child into chambers, out of the presence of the parties and the court reporter. He then emerged and subsequently stated that Anne is a “daddy’s girl.” This does not ment our legal standard for giving weight to such a young child’s preference.1
The trial court should have made an initial finding on the child’s maturity and ability to make a voluntary preference. Next, at a minimum, the trial court should have summarized its finding on the record or had the court reporter transcribe the in camera proceeding and permit the parties to comment on it. Although this issue is not raised by the appellant, it is a troublesome area in domestic relations law, i.e., how to handle testimony of a child’s preference. Our statute with regard to awarding custody is silent on the procedural aspects. W.Va.Code, 48-2-15.
There is merit in permitting the trial judge to conduct a neutral in camera interview on the preference question after a favorable resolution of the maturity or competency issue, as outlined by the New York Court of Appeals in Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270, 272, 247 N.E.2d 659, 660, 299 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (1969):
“It requires no great knowledge of child psychology to recognize that a child, already suffering from the trauma of a broken home, should not be placed in the position of having its relationship with either parent further jeopardized by having to publicly relate its difficulties with them or be required to openly choose between them.”
It should be noted, however, that in Lincoln the court concluded: “We are confident that the Trial Judges recognize the difficulties and will not use any information, which has not been previously mentioned and is adverse to either parent, without in some way checking on its accuracy during the course of the open hearing.” 24 N.Y.2d at 273, 247 N.E.2d at 661, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 845. Many courts have approved of trial judges discussing custody preferences with children in camera without the parents or their counsel present, provided procedures designed to protect the parents’ rights are followed. See also Bailey v. Bailey, 3 Ariz.App. 138, 412 P.2d 480 (1966); Spence v. Levi, 133 Ga.App. 581, *349211 S.E.2d 622 (1974); Fohr v. Fohr, 75 Ill.App.3d 575, 31 Ill.Dec. 171, 394 N.E.2d 87 (1979); Marshall v. Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364, 302 A.2d 682 (1973); Lesauskis v. Lesauskis, 111 Mich.App. 811, 314 N.W.2d 767 (1981); Callen v. Gill, 7 N.J. 312, 81 A.2d 495 (1951); Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J.Super. 267, 372 A.2d 629 (1977); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 954 (1965). Cf. S.L.M. v. J.M., 174 W.Va. 46, 321 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1984). Contra Gennarini v. Gennarini, 2 Conn.App. 132, 477 A.2d 674 (1984).2
Where both parties consent to the judge’s interview, there is obviously no problem. Where consent cannot be obtained, it would appear advisable to have a record made of the in camera hearing and to permit the parties to have access to the record by way of an accurate or verbatim summary. A further opportunity should then be afforded for either party to contradict the accuracy of the facts given at the in camera hearing.
Finally, a comment is needed on the split custody of the two children. I do not find where we have had occasion to discuss this matter. New York’s highest court has summarized the generally accepted rule in Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1264, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 662 (1982):
“Finally, this court has long recognized that it is often in the child’s best interests to continue to live with his siblings. While this, too, is not an absolute, the stability and companionship to be gained from keeping the children together is an important factor for the court to consider. ‘Close familial relationships are much to be encouraged.’ ... ‘Young brothers and sisters need each other’s strengths and association in their everyday and often common experiences, and to separate them, unnecessarily, is likely to be traumatic and harmful.’ ” (Citations omitted).
See also Theriot v. Huval, 413 So.2d 337 (La.App.1982); Cochenour v. Cochenour, 642 S.W.2d 402 (Mo.App.1982). Courts have recognized that separation of siblings may be warranted in certain situations where it clearly is in the best interest of the child, such as where a mature child specifies a strong preference for one parent coupled with some animosity toward the other. Williams v. Williams, 655 P.2d 652 (Utah 1982). In the present case, no such facts were demonstrated.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice McGRAW joins me in this dissent.

. A fuller treatment of this issue is contained in Siegel and Hurley, The Role of the Child's Prefer-ertce in Custody Proceedings, 11 Family L.Q. 1 (1977).

. A comprehensive article on this subject is found in Jones, Judicial Questioning of Children in Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 18 Family L.Q. 43 (1984).