Court Opinion

ID: 9942950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 15:06:43.196725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:25.690510
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                   CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                        FEBRUARY 22, 2024
                                                                    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                 2024 ND 29

State of North Dakota,                                  Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Devin Louis Fischer,                                Defendant and Appellant

                                No. 20230239

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial
District, the Honorable Benjamen J. Johnson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Nathan K. Madden, Assistant State’s Attorney, Williston, ND, for plaintiff and
appellee; submitted on brief.

Richard E. Edinger, Fargo, ND, for for defendant and appellant.
                                State v. Fischer
                                 No. 20230239

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Devin Fischer appeals from a district court’s judgment and amended
judgment finding him guilty of reckless endangerment and terrorizing. Fischer
argues the court erred by implicitly accepting and then rejecting a binding plea
agreement, which required him to go to trial on the original charges. Fischer
also argues the district court judge was biased against him and erred in not
granting his motion to recuse. We affirm.

                                         I

[¶2] On January 9, 2022, Fischer attempted to enter the home of his
estranged wife but was unsuccessful. In the process, he fired four .38 caliber
rounds into a door lock and door jam. Fischer left the home and disposed of the
gun. The police later arrested Fischer and charged him with burglary, reckless
endangerment, terrorizing and tampering with physical evidence.

[¶3] In January 2023, the State and Fischer reached a plea agreement. The
agreement called for the State to dismiss the burglary, reckless endangerment,
tampering with physical evidence charges, and to amend the class C felony
terrorizing charge to class A misdemeanor menacing. On January 17, 2023, the
district court held a hearing to consider the plea deal.

[¶4] Midway through the hearing, the district court learned that several
individuals wanted to exercise their victim rights under N.D. Const. art. I,
§ 25(1)(g) and attend the court’s hearing. The court proceeded with the change
of plea, stating “[w]hat we’re going to do is we’ll deal with the guilty plea. We’ll
accept that, and then we’ll see [when] they’re going to be here and if we can
work it in to do the sentencing this afternoon or tomorrow, but we’ll just see
with that.”

[¶5] During the proceeding on January 17, 2023, the State notified the
district court that this was a binding plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11, which the
court acknowledged. That exchange included the following:

                                         1
      “The Court: Attorney Madden, this is binding under Rule 11?

      Mr. Madden: Yes.

      The Court: What that means, Mr. Fischer, is I have the authority
      to accept or reject the agreement. If I accept the agreement, I have
      to sentence you in accordance with it. If I reject the agreement,
      then I would allow you to withdraw your guilty plea and you can
      proceed to trial. Do you understand that?

      The Defendant: I understand.”

[¶6] The State orally amended the terrorizing charge to menacing. Fischer
pleaded guilty to the amended charge. The State provided a factual basis,
which Fischer agreed was “substantially true and correct and that’s why [he
was] pleading guilty to this offense of menacing here today[.]” That factual
basis included informing the court Fischer fired bullets into a locked door while
people were in the house. After a Rule 11 colloquy, the court found the guilty
plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, an adequate factual basis existed,
and accepted the guilty plea. The court “set aside the other counts till later”
and planned to return later in the day or the next day to hear from the victims
and for sentencing.

[¶7] The next day, January 18, 2023, the district court judge opened the
proceeding by stating, “This is a sentencing hearing. Defendant pled guilty
yesterday to Class A misdemeanor of menacing.” During the hearing three
individuals provided victim impact statements, and one of them played the
video of Fischer shooting the door and attempting to enter the home.

[¶8] After watching the video, the district court judge stated the evidence and
witnesses’ statements create a “felony.” He further stated, “[a]nd frankly, after
watching that video, if the video was offered, I don’t realistically see how he
would be found not guilty of all of those charges.” Subsequently, the court
rejected the plea agreement.

[¶9] On February 13, 2023, the district court conducted a pre-trial conference
where it heard from the State and Fischer about rejection of the plea

                                       2
agreement and Fischer’s claim the court was biased due to the statements
made by the judge during the proceeding on January 18. The court ruled that
the plea agreement was not accepted, the fact that 18 hours lapsed between
accepting the guilty plea and rejecting the plea agreement is not
determinative, and the judge would not grant the motion to recuse because he
made his statements in open court as part of the need to explain why he
rejected the plea agreement.

[¶10] On May 8, 2023, the district court convened a three-day trial where the
jury found Fischer guilty of terrorizing and reckless endangerment. The jury
found Fischer not guilty on the charges of burglary and tampering with
physical evidence. Fischer timely appealed in July 2023, and this Court
temporarily remanded to the lower court to correct the judgment.

                                       II

[¶11] Fischer argues the district court erred by rejecting his plea agreement
the day after expressly accepting his guilty plea to the amended charge of
menacing. The dispositive question is whether the court implicitly accepted the
plea agreement by accepting Fischer’s guilty plea to the reduced charge of
menacing.

[¶12] We first consider our standard of review, which neither party briefed as
required by N.D.R.App.P. 28(b)(7)(B). A district court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to accept or reject a guilty plea or a plea agreement. See
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“A court may reject a plea in
exercise of judicial discretion.”); U.S. v. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th
Cir. 2015) (“We review a district court’s decision not to accept a plea agreement
for abuse of sound discretion.”). This Court has not addressed the narrower
issue raised here about whether a court’s acceptance of a guilty plea constitutes
the implicit acceptance of an overall plea agreement. Therefore, we have no
precedent and look outward for guidance.

[¶13] North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 is adopted from, and is
similar to, F.R.Crim.P. 11. See N.D.R.Crim.P. 11, Explanatory Note. “[A]ny

                                        3
interpretation and construction placed upon identical or similar language by
the federal courts will be entitled to great weight in applying the rule to state
courts.” State v. Holy Bull, 238 N.W.2d 52, 55 (N.D. 1975). South Dakota also
has adopted a criminal rule of procedure that is modeled after federal rule 11.
State v. Hale, 2018 SD 9, ¶ 15, 907 N.W.2d 56. South Dakota Supreme Court
addressed the appropriate standard of review in a similar case, concluding,
“Whether the circuit court accepted a binding plea agreement is a question of
law reviewed de novo.” Id. at ¶ 11 (citing State v. Shumaker, 2010 SD 95, ¶ 5,
792 N.W.2d 174). A federal court similarly concluded, “Whether the district
court is required to enforce a plea agreement is a question of law, which we
review de novo.” U.S. v. Fagan, 996 F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1993). We agree
with these courts that the question whether a plea agreement was approved
requires application of law rather than exercise of discretion. Therefore, we
review Fischer’s question de novo.

[¶14] “Once the court has accepted a plea agreement, however, it is, as a
general rule, bound by the terms of that agreement.” U.S. v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d
392, 399 (7th Cir. 1996); see also U.S. v. Cunavelis, 969 F.2d 1419, 1422 (2d Cir.
1992) (if the court accepts the plea agreement, it must conform to the sentence
of that bargain); Fagan, 996 F.2d at 1012-14 (“once the district court accepts a
guilty plea, absent fraud or breach of the plea agreement by the defendant, the
court has no authority to vacate the guilty plea”); U.S. v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527,
1532-33 (11th Cir. 1992) (if the court accepted the plea agreements, the
defendant’s rights should be “redressed by specific performance of the plea
agreement in the form of evidentiary hearings before a different district court
judge”); U.S. v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 540 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Once a court has
accepted an agreement, however, there is no provision in the rules that allows
it to reject or modify the agreement.”).

[¶15] The entry of pleas and making of plea agreements is controlled by
N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. Rule 11(a) regulates entry of guilty, not guilty, and
conditional pleas. Id. Rule 11(b) regulates the advice judges must provide to
defendants, ensuring voluntariness, and requiring a factual basis containing
all elements of a crime before a guilty plea can be accepted. Id. Unlike Rule

                                        4
11(a) and (b) pertaining to pleas, Rule 11(c) regulates the use of plea
agreements. Id.

[¶16] Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(2) “[t]he parties must disclose the plea
agreement in open court when the plea is offered, unless the court for good
cause allows the parties to disclose the plea agreement in camera.” Here, the
parties and the district court complied with this portion of Rule 11 by disclosing
the agreement and its terms at the January 17, 2023 hearing.

[¶17] For a binding plea agreement like that offered here, “the court may
accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed
the presentence report.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3)(A). If the agreement is
accepted, the court “must inform the defendant that, to the extent the plea
agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) [forebear bringing or
dismiss other charges] or (C) [agreed upon sentence], the agreed disposition
will be included in the judgment.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(4). A court rejecting a
binding plea agreement must do as follows:

      “If the court rejects a plea agreement containing provisions of the
      type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court must do the
      following on the record and in open court:

      (A) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea agreement;

      (B) advise the defendant personally that the court is not required
      to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an
      opportunity to withdraw the plea; and

      (C) advise the defendant personally that if the plea is not
      withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case less favorably toward
      the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated.”

N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(5).

[¶18] Here, the district court’s proceedings and statements reflect uncertainty
whether it was accepting a guilty plea only or accepting (or rejecting) the plea
agreement. The court permitted the State to amend the terrorizing charge to

                                        5
menacing and provide a factual basis. For purposes of this appeal, we conclude
the court complied with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b) when accepting Fischer’s guilty
plea to the amended charge of menacing. However, when the court accepted
the guilty plea, it and the parties created the current issue on appeal by not
clearly establishing whether acceptance of the guilty plea constituted
acceptance of the plea agreement as a whole.

[¶19] All parties agree this is a novel issue in North Dakota. Fischer argues
our disposition should be guided by a South Dakota case holding that a court
which expressly or implicitly accepts a plea agreement is bound by the
agreement unless fraud has occurred. Hale, 2018 SD 9, ¶ 11.

[¶20] In Hale, the State and Hale made a plea deal in exchange for dismissing
charges, pleading guilty to a reduced charge, limited incarceration, and him
testifying against his co-defendants in a kidnapping case. 2018 SD 9, ¶ 2. At a
change of plea hearing, the circuit court found the defendant made the plea
knowingly and voluntarily and it was supported with a factual basis. Id. at ¶¶
3-4. The court accepted the guilty plea to the reduced offense of aggravated
assault, dismissed other pending charges, and agreed to sentence Hale
according to the agreement. Id. Dialogue between the court and Hale included
the following:

      “THE COURT: Okay. Knowing what you know now, would you like
      to go ahead and take the plea agreement?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”

Id. at ¶ 3.

[¶21] One week after Hale pleaded guilty, his co-defendants pleaded guilty.
Hale, 2018 SD 9, ¶ 5. Two weeks later during a hearing, the court ordered a
presentence investigation and told the State and Hale, via email, that it
intended to reject the plea agreement. Id. The State and Hale argued the court
accepted the plea agreement and Hale “cooperated in the prosecution of his
codefendants as required by the plea agreement.” Id. at ¶ 6. The circuit court
eventually rejected the plea agreement, explaining that while it “expressly

                                      6
accepted [Hale’s] plea at the plea hearing, it did not accept the plea
agreement—either expressly or impliedly.” Id. ¶ 7.

[¶22] The South Dakota Supreme Court determined the court implicitly
agreed to the plea agreement because the circuit court acted as if it accepted
the plea agreement and its actions led to the defendant giving up his rights,
including assisting in the prosecution of his co-defendants. Hale, 2018 SD 9,
¶¶ 17-18. Hale, by relying on the agreement and cooperating with the State to
secure his co-conspirators’ guilty pleas, gave up his “bargaining chip” and was
entitled to receive the benefit of this bargain. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19. The Supreme
Court held the court accepted the plea agreement and must sentence in
accordance with the plea agreement. Id. at ¶ 19.

[¶23] Our district court’s actions were different than the circuit court’s
proceedings in Hale. Therefore, we do not reach the same result as the South
Dakota Supreme Court. The courts in both cases accepted the defendants’
guilty pleas. 2018 SD 9, ¶ 4. Neither court specifically stated it was accepting
or rejecting the plea agreement. Id. at ¶ 7. In Hale, that omission was
significant because the court’s discussions with Hale at the change of plea
proceeding included him agreeing to accept “the plea agreement.” Id. at ¶ 19.
After Hale accepted the plea, and other charges were dismissed, the court did
not reject the plea agreement until weeks later. Id. at ¶ 7.

[¶24] The United States Supreme Court also has considered and rejected the
argument that accepting a guilty plea results in acceptance of an associated
plea agreement. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997). In Hyde, a
defendant pleaded guilty to several federal fraud counts, consistent with a plea
agreement for dismissal of other charges. Id. at 671-72. The district court
accepted the guilty plea but deferred deciding whether to accept the plea
agreement. Id. at 672. The defendant attempted to withdraw his guilty pleas
before sentencing or the court’s decision whether to accept the plea agreement.
Id. at 672-73. The court denied defendant’s request, finding he had not
provided a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing the plea. Id. at 673. The court
ultimately accepted the plea agreement, entered judgment, and sentenced the
defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “if the court defers

                                       7
acceptance of a plea or of a plea agreement, the defendant may withdraw his
plea for any or no reason, until the time that the court does accept both the
plea and the agreement.” Id. at 673, 680.

[¶25] The United State Supreme Court held, “a defendant may not withdraw
his plea unless he shows a ‘fair and just reason’ under Rule 32(e).” Hyde, 520
U.S. at 671. Nothing in the text of Rule 11, which sets out the prerequisites to
accepting a guilty plea and plea agreement, supports the Court of Appeals’
holding. Id. at 674. That text shows that guilty pleas can be accepted while
plea agreements are deferred and “the acceptance of the two can be separated
in time.” Id. The Court further explained:

            “The Court of Appeals equated acceptance of the guilty plea
      with acceptance of the plea agreement, and deferral of the plea
      agreement with deferral of the guilty plea. Nothing in the text of
      Rule 11 supports these conclusions. In fact, the text shows that the
      opposite is true: Guilty pleas can be accepted while plea
      agreements are deferred, and the acceptance of the two can be
      separated in time.

             The prerequisites to accepting a guilty plea are set out in
      subdivisions (c) and (d) of Rule 11. Subdivision (c) says: ‘Before
      accepting a plea of guilty . . ., the court must address the defendant
      personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and
      determine that the defendant understands,’ numerous
      consequences of pleading guilty. For example, the court must
      ensure the defendant understands the maximum possible penalty
      that he may face by pleading guilty, Rule 11(c)(1), and the
      important constitutional rights he is waiving, including the right
      to a trial, Rules 11(c)(3), (4). Subdivision (d) says: ‘The court shall
      not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by addressing the
      defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is
      voluntary.’ The opening words of these two subdivisions are
      important: Together, they speak of steps a district court must take
      ‘before accepting a plea of guilty,’ and without which it ‘shall not
      accept a plea of guilty.’ Based on this language, we conclude that
      once the court has taken these steps, it may, in its discretion,
      accept a defendant’s guilty plea. The Court of Appeals would read
      an additional prerequisite into this list: A district court shall not

                                        8
      accept a plea of guilty without first accepting the plea agreement.
      But that ‘prerequisite’ is absent from the list set out in subdivisions
      (c) and (d), strongly suggesting that no such addition is
      warranted.”

Id.

[¶26] Here, while the record of proceedings on January 17 and 18, 2023, could
have been clearer about the district court’s intentions, the court conducted a
bifurcated proceeding for its consideration of the plea agreement. During those
proceedings the court accepted Fischer’s plea but did not dismiss the other
pending charges. Nor had the court fully considered the plea agreement’s
sentencing proposal on the first day due to a delay in hearing the victim impact
statements. After hearing the victims, the court was not satisfied with the
proposed sentence. The plea agreement was rejected. Unlike in Hale, here
Fischer was not prejudiced by rejection of the plea agreement because he did
not give up his “bargaining chip.” Like in Hyde, here the court separately
considered the guilty plea and the plea agreement, which it was permitted to
do. Therefore, on this record, and assuming without deciding a court can
implicitly accept a plea agreement, see N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(4) and (5), we
conclude the court accepted Fischer’s guilty plea but, by that action, did not
accept the plea agreement.

                                       III

[¶27] Fischer argues that even if this Court does not follow the holding in Hale,
his guilty plea to menacing should stand under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(5)(B). He
reasons the plea to menacing was accepted and only a defendant can seek to
withdraw an accepted guilty plea.

[¶28] Again, the parties did not provide a standard of review for this issue but,
like the former, it involves an interpretation of law that we review de novo.

[¶29] Rule 11(c)(5)(B), N.D.R.Crim.P., requires that the district court “advise
the defendant personally that the court is not required to follow the plea
agreement and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea.” Here,

                                        9
the court acknowledged, but did not advise, Fischer he could withdraw his plea.
However, Fischer does not cite any authority providing a remedy for a court’s
failure to provide this required advice. Additionally, we do not agree a
defendant can unilaterally choose to enjoy part of the bargained for plea
agreement without both him and the State being fully bound to all portions of
the agreement. See State v. Barber, 217 P.3d 346, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
(specific performance entitles the defendant to bind the State to the bargained
for recommendation, but does not bind the court). Therefore, the district court
did not err by rejecting Fischer’s guilty plea to the reduced charge of menacing
as part of rejecting the State’s agreement to reduce the terrorizing charge to
menacing as part of the larger agreement.

                                      IV

[¶30] Fischer argues the district court judge should have recused himself after
watching the video of him shooting the door and stating the evidence would
support a jury finding him guilty on all four counts.

[¶31] “We review the district court’s decision on a motion for recusal for an
abuse of discretion.” Rath v. Rath, 2018 ND 138, ¶ 25, 911 N.W.2d 919. “An
abuse of discretion may occur when the district court misinterprets or
misapplies the law, or when the district court acts in an arbitrary,
unreasonable, or capricious manner.” State v. Archambault, 2022 ND 198, ¶ 10,
982 N.W.2d 8.

[¶32] “A judge shall disqualify in any proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” N.D. Code of Judicial Conduct
2.11(A). “The law presumes a judge is unbiased and not prejudiced.” Lund v.
Lund, 2011 ND 53, ¶ 14, 795 N.W.2d 318. “The test for the appearance of
impartiality is one of reasonableness and recusal is not required in response to
spurious or vague charges of impartiality.” Id.

[¶33] “A judge shall not make any public statement that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or
impending in any court, or make any nonpublic statement that might

                                      10
substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.” N.D.C.J.C. 2.10(A). “When
making a recusal decision, a judge must determine whether a reasonable
person could, on the basis of all the facts, reasonably question the judge’s
impartiality.” Rath, 2018 ND 138, ¶ 25 (cleaned up). “Although a judge has a
duty to recuse when required by the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge also has
an equally strong duty not to recuse when the circumstances do not require
recusal.” Id.

[¶34] On January 18, 2023, during the initial sentencing hearing, the judge
stated, “[a]nd frankly, after watching that video, if the video was offered, I don’t
realistically see how he would be found not guilty of all of those charges.” He
did not make his comments in front of the jury but during a hearing where he
explained why he rejected Fischer’s plea agreement.

[¶35] During a February 2023 pre-trial conference, the judge found he did not
need to recuse himself because “the Judicial Code of Conduct refers to out-of-
court public statements, not in-court public statements.” He further stated
that, “explaining the judge’s decisions is part of my job, and a big part of
rejecting the agreement is basically my viewing of that evidence and
determining that the agreement, in its form, was not an appropriate—or the
punishment was not basically appropriate . . .” He continued, saying that his
comments should not be introduced during trial and that they would screen
jurors who are aware “of any proceedings” in this matter.

[¶36] In this case, the judge’s comments are like those in Archambault where
a judge stated outside the presence of the jury, “when your client gets in front
of a police officer, having been advised of his Miranda rights and having signed
a waiver of those rights and then confesses repeatedly to the offense, I think
he’s pretty much given up his presumption of innocence.” 2022 ND 198, ¶ 12.
This Court held the judge’s comments did not show bias because the jury did
not hear the comments nor use the comments in its deliberation. Id. at ¶ 13.
Here, the judge explained why he was rejecting the plea deal. The comments
were made before the court empaneled a jury, and the jury did not hear or use
the comments in its deliberation. The judge’s comments were a necessary part

                                        11
of explaining why he rejected the plea agreement and the judge did not abuse
his discretion in not recusing.

                                    V

[¶37] We affirm Fischer’s convictions for terrorizing and reckless
endangerment and the district court’s denial of Fischer’s motion to recuse.

[¶38] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

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