Court Opinion

ID: 9377058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 19:02:52.782957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:11.544666
License: Public Domain

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                                                                Electronically Filed
                                                                Supreme Court
                                                                SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                                06-MAR-2023
                                                                08:13 AM
                                                                Dkt. 15 OP

             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

                            ---o0o---
________________________________________________________________

                           PHILLIP J. BARKER,
                     Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                      vs.

               CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, ADMINISTRATOR,
              HAWAIʻI CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA CENTER
                 Respondent/Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

                              SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

           CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
                 (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; 1CSP-XX-XXXXXXX)

                                MARCH 6, 2023

  RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.

                  OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.

                              I.   Introduction

       This is a statutory interpretation case.          We are called

upon to interpret Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 831-3.2(a)

(2014 & Supp. 2018), which allows for expungement of arrest

records.    It provides in relevant part:
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            § 831-3.2. Expungement orders
            (a) The . . . attorney general’s duly authorized
            representative . . . , upon written application from a
            person arrested for, or charged with but not convicted of a
            crime, . . . shall issue an expungement order annulling,
            canceling, and rescinding the record of arrest; provided
            that an expungement order shall not be issued:
                  . . . .
                  (2) For a period of five years after arrest or
                  citation in the case of a petty misdemeanor or
                  violation where conviction has not been obtained
                  because of a bail forfeiture[.]

       Phillip J. Barker (“Barker”) was arrested for harassment, a

petty misdemeanor.      He was eventually convicted of disorderly

conduct as a violation.       He then applied to the Hawaiʻi Criminal

Justice Data Center (“HCJDC”) for expungement of his arrest

record pursuant to HRS § 831-3.2.          He asserted that because HRS

§ 701-107(7) (2014) of the Hawaiʻi Penal Code provides that a

violation does not constitute a crime, he is entitled to

expungement based on the plain language of HRS § 831-3.2(a).

       The HCJDC denied his application, concluding that Barker

had been convicted of a “crime” within the meaning of HRS § 831-

3.2(a), pointing to HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2), which provides that an

expungement order shall not issue for five years after arrest

“in the case of a petty misdemeanor or violation where

conviction has not been obtained because of a bail

forfeiture[.]”

       Barker then sought an order from the Circuit Court of the

First Circuit (“circuit court”) to require the HCJDC to expunge

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his arrest record.          The circuit court1 granted judgment in favor

of the HCJDC.

          Barker appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals

(“ICA”), which affirmed the circuit court in a published

opinion.        See Barker v. Young, 151 Hawaiʻi 312, 511 P.3d 811

(App. 2022).        The ICA ruled it could not apply the Penal Code

definition of crime to HRS § 831-3.2(a) because of the language

in subsection (a)(2).          151 Hawaiʻi at 320, 511 P.3d at 819.

Essentially, the HCJDC, circuit court, and ICA all concluded

that inclusion of the word “violation” in HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2)

indicates a “violation” is a “crime” under HRS § 831-3.2(a).

          On certiorari, Barker asks “[w]hether the ICA gravely erred

in holding that the word ‘crime’ in [HRS § 831-3.2(a)] is

ambiguous such that the word includes violations?”

          Applying rules of statutory interpretation, we hold that

under the plain language of HRS §§ 831-3.2(a) and 701-107(7), a

person arrested for or charged with a crime (including a petty

misdemeanor), but convicted of a violation, is eligible for

arrest record expungement because a “violation” is not a

“crime.”2

1         The Honorable Bert I. Ayabe presided.

2     The statute allows expungement only of arrest records; conviction
records are not at issue.

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          We therefore vacate the circuit court’s order granting the

HCJDC’s motion for summary judgment and its final judgment, as

well as the ICA’s judgment on appeal, and we remand to the

circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                                  II.   Background

A.        HCJDC proceedings

          On October 7, 2017, Barker was arrested for harassment in

violation of HRS § 711-1106(1)(a) (2014), a petty misdemeanor.3

On November 21, 2017, Barker pled no contest and was found

guilty of the amended charge of disorderly conduct under HRS §

711-1101(1)(b) (2014), as a violation.4

3         HRS § 711-1106(1)(a) & (2) provide:

                (1) A person commits the offense of harassment if, with intent
                to harass, annoy, or alarm any other person, that person:

                       (a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches another
                       person in an offensive manner or subjects the other
                       person to offensive physical contact[.]
                       . . . .
                (2)   Harassment is a petty misdemeanor.

4         HRS § 711-1101(1)(b) & (3) provide:

                (1) A person commits the offense of disorderly conduct if, with
                intent to cause physical inconvenience or alarm by a member or
                members of the public, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the
                person:
                      . . . .
                      (b) Makes unreasonable noise . . . .
                . . . .
                (3) Disorderly conduct is a petty misdemeanor if it is the
                defendant’s intention to cause substantial harm or serious
                inconvenience, or if the defendant persists in disorderly conduct
                after reasonable warning or request to desist. Otherwise
                disorderly conduct is a violation.

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          On June 20, 2019, Barker submitted an application to the

HCJDC to have his harassment arrest record expunged pursuant to

HRS § 831-3.2.         Barker asserted that because he was found guilty

of a “violation” and not a “crime,” he is eligible for

expungement.        The HCJDC denied Barker’s application on the basis

that arrests resulting in convictions, even for violations, do

not qualify for expungement.

B.        Circuit court proceedings

          On October 19, 2020, Barker filed a first amended complaint

in circuit court.         Barker argued that under HRS § 701-107(5),5 a

violation does not constitute a crime, and therefore, Barker was

“not convicted of a crime” within the meaning of the expungement

statute.       Barker requested an order requiring the HCJDC to

expunge his record of arrest, or alternatively, a declaratory

judgment that he is entitled to have his arrest record expunged.

          Barker and the HCJDC then filed cross-motions for summary

judgment.        Barker argued that the only relevant definitions of

5         HRS § 701-107 provides in relevant part:

               (1) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of
               this State for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized
               constitutes a crime. Crimes are of three grades: felonies,
               misdemeanors, and petty misdemeanors. . . .
               . . . .
               (5) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of
               this State constitutes a violation if it is so designated in this
               Code or in the law defining the offense or if no other sentence
               than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty, is
               authorized upon conviction or if it is defined by a statute other
               than this Code which provides that the offense shall not
               constitute a crime. A violation does not constitute a crime, and
               conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any civil
               disability based on conviction of a criminal offense.

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“crime” and “violation” are found in HRS § 701-107 of the Hawaiʻi

Penal Code, which explicitly provides that “[a] violation does

not constitute a crime, and conviction of a violation shall not

give rise to any civil disability based on conviction of a

criminal offense.”      Barker asserted that the legislature could

have used the word “offense” in HRS § 831-3.2(a), which would

have included violations, but it did not.

       HCJDC argued that the definitions of “violation” and

“crime” in HRS § 701-107 are inapplicable to the expungement

statute.    The HCJDC maintained that the legislative history of

the expungement statute indicates an intent to “minimize or

abolish extrajudicial penalties which may confront a person who

has a record of arrest, even though such arrest did not lead to

conviction.”     HCJDC noted that Barker’s arrest for harassment

did lead to his conviction of a violation.

       The HCJDC also relied on HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2), which

provides that an expungement order shall not be issued “[f]or a

period of five years after arrest or citation in the case of a

petty misdemeanor or violation where conviction has not been

obtained because of a bail forfeiture[.]”           HCJDC posited that if

the legislature had intended “violation” and “crime” to be

defined as in the Hawaiʻi Penal Code, “it would follow that a

record of arrest or citation for a violation would always

qualify to be expunged regardless of whether the arrest or

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citation led to a conviction.”         HCJDC asserted it would be

illogical to require it to maintain records of violations if

they would subsequently be expunged irrespective of later

convictions.     Finally, citing Crime, Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019), the HCJDC contended the term “crime” in § 831-

3.2 should be interpreted according to its common legal

definition, which is an “act that the law makes punishable[.]”

       The circuit court agreed with the HCJDC.          It entered an

order denying Barker’s motion and granting HCJDC’s motion on

March 1, 2021.      It also entered its judgment on that day.

C.     ICA proceedings

       On March 3, 2021, Barker appealed to the ICA.           The parties’

briefs repeated arguments made in the circuit court.             In a

published opinion, the ICA affirmed the circuit court.              See

Barker, 151 Hawaiʻi 312, 511 P.3d 811.          The ICA concluded the

term “crime” in HRS § 831-3.2(a) is ambiguous.            151 Hawaiʻi at

317-18, 511 P.3d at 816-17.        The ICA ruled that it could not

apply the Penal Code definition of crime to HRS § 831-3.2

because of the language in subsection (a)(2) delaying

expungement eligibility for a “violation where conviction has

not been obtained because of a bail forfeiture[.]”             151 Hawaiʻi

at 318, 511 P.3d at 817 (quoting HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2)).              The ICA

also construed the intent of the expungement law as to allow

expungements only when there was no conviction.            151 Hawaiʻi at

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318-20, 511 P.3d at 817-19 (citing Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 21, in

1975 Senate Journal, at 859; Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 18, in 1975

House Journal, at 885).       The ICA concluded that interpreting the

term “crime” in HRS § 831-3.2(a) to include violations is

rational, reasonable, and consistent with legislative intent.

151 Hawaiʻi at 320, 511 P.3d at 819 (“A ‘rational, sensible[,]

and practicable interpretation of a statute is preferred to one

which is unreasonable or impracticable . . . .’” (quoting In re

Doe, 90 Hawaiʻi 246, 251, 978 P.2d 684, 689 (1999))).             Hence, the

ICA held that because Barker’s harassment arrest resulted in a

conviction for a violation, Barker does not meet the statutory

expungement criteria.       151 Hawaiʻi at 320-21, 511 P.3d at 819-20

(citing HRS § 831-3.2(a)).

D.     Certiorari proceedings

       Barker’s July 8, 2022 application presents one question:

whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the word “crime”

in HRS § 831-3.2(a) is ambiguous such that the word includes

violations?

       In addition to his previous arguments, Barker notes the

principle of statutory interpretation that “where the statutory

language is plain and unambiguous, [a court’s] sole duty is to

give effect [t]o its plain and obvious meaning.”             Barker further

argues that “[w]here there is no ambiguity in the language of a

statute, and the literal application of the language would not

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produce an absurd or unjust result . . . there is no room for

judicial construction[.]”

          Barker also points out that it is only the record of arrest

that he seeks to expunge, not the conviction.               He argues that

there is no ambiguity in the statute and that if the legislature

meant “crime” to mean “offense,” which includes crimes and

violations,6 then it would have used the word “offense” instead

of “crime” in HRS § 831-3.2(a).               Barker points out that the

statute has been amended eight times without the word “crime”

being changed to “offense.”

          Barker questions the logic of the ICA’s reasoning that

“crime” must include “violations” because HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2)

provides an exception for expungement in the case of violations

when there is bail forfeiture.7

                            III.   Standard of Review

          “Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewable

de novo.”        State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawaiʻi 383, 390, 219 P.3d 1170,

1177 (2009) (cleaned up).

          Our interpretation is shaped by the following rules:

                First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
                interpretation is the language of the statute itself.
                Second, where the statutory language is plain and
                unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain
                and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of

6     HRS § 701-102(1) (2014) provides, “No behavior constitutes an offense
unless it is a crime or violation under this Code or another statute of this
State.”

7         The HCJDC did not file a response to Barker’s application.

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            statutory construction is our foremost obligation to
            ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
            legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
            language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
            there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness
            or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an
            ambiguity exists.

            When there is ambiguity in a statute, “the meaning of the
            ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context,
            with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may
            be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning.”
            Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in
            determining legislative intent, such as legislative
            history, or the reason and spirit of the law.

Id. (cleaned up).

                                IV.   Discussion

       Whether Barker’s arrest record is eligible for expungement

is governed by HRS § 831-3.2, which provides in relevant part:

            § 831-3.2. Expungement orders
            (a) The . . . attorney general’s duly authorized
            representative . . . , upon written application from a
            person arrested for, or charged with but not convicted of a
            crime, . . . shall issue an expungement order annulling,
            canceling, and rescinding the record of arrest; provided
            that an expungement order shall not be issued:
                  . . . .
                  (2) For a period of five years after arrest or
                  citation in the case of a petty misdemeanor or
                  violation where conviction has not been obtained
                  because of a bail forfeiture[.]

       As noted in Section III above, statutory interpretation

begins with the premise that when statutory language is plain

and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain

and obvious meaning.       See Wheeler, 121 Hawaiʻi at 390, 219 P.3d

at 1177.

       HRS § 831-3.2(a) provides that a person arrested for but

not convicted of a crime is eligible for an arrest record

expungement.     Barker was charged with harassment, a petty

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misdemeanor.     He was convicted of disorderly conduct as a

violation.     Under HRS § 701-107, a petty misdemeanor is a crime,

but a violation is not.       Barker was therefore “charged with but

not convicted of a crime[.]”        See HRS § 831-3.2(a).       Hence, he

is eligible for expungement of his arrest record.

       The exception in HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2) does not create an

ambiguity as to the plain language of HRS § 831-3.2(a).              HRS §

831-3.2(a)(2) provides that if there is no conviction on a petty

misdemeanor or violation charge because of a bail forfeiture

(non-appearance in court), an expungement order cannot issue

until five years from the date of arrest or citation.              State v.

Vallesteros, 84 Hawaiʻi 295, 933 P.2d 632 (1997), held that

police officers “may arrest those who commit violations, not

just crimes, in the officers’ presence[,]” “but only insofar as

the offense is not a traffic-related violation.”             84 Hawaiʻi at

301, 933 P.2d at 638.       But pursuant to HRS § 831-3.2(a), if

there is a conviction on a charged violation, an arrest record

based on that conviction is still eligible for expungement.

       The rules of statutory interpretation require us to apply a

plain language analysis when statutory language is clear.               Only

when there is an ambiguity in a statute are we to resort to

other methods of statutory interpretation.           As we said in State

v. Obrero, 151 Hawaiʻi 472, 517 P.3d 755 (2022):

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            The in pari materia canon of statutory interpretation is a
            useful tool for interpreting ambiguous or doubtful
            statutes. But it should not be used to muddle the meaning
            of unequivocal, but inconvenient, black letter law. Our
            rule is “What is clear in one statute may be called upon in
            aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” It is not:
            “What is clear in one statute may be called upon to create
            doubt in another.”

151 Hawaiʻi at 479, 517 P.3d at 762 (cleaned up).

       Hence, what is clear in HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2) may not be

called upon to create doubt in HRS § 831-3.2(a).             Only “when

there is ambiguity in a statute,” then, “the meaning of the

ambiguous words may be sought by” applying other methods of

statutory interpretation, such as the in pari materia canon, or

by “resort[ing] to extrinsic aids in determining legislative

intent, such as legislative history, or the reason and spirit of

the law.”     Wheeler, 121 Hawai‘i at 390, 219 P.3d at 1177 (cleaned

up).   HRS § 831-3.2(a)(2) is equally clear.           It provides that if

there is no conviction on a petty misdemeanor or violation

charge because of a bail forfeiture (non-appearance in court),

an expungement order cannot issue until five years from the date

of arrest or citation.

       Finally, we appreciate the concern expressed by the HCJDC

that interpreting the term “crime” in HRS § 831-3.2(a) as

excluding “violations” would seemingly preclude a person

arrested for and then convicted of a violation from obtaining

expungement of an arrest record.           That issue, however, is not

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before us at this time.8          Today, we address the issue before us

and hold that under the plain language of HRS §§ 831-3.2(a) and

701-107(7), a person arrested for or charged with a crime

(including a petty misdemeanor) but convicted of a violation is

eligible for expungement because a “violation” is not a “crime.”

                                  V.   Conclusion

          Under the plain language of HRS §§ 831-3.2(a) and 701-

107(7), a person arrested for or charged with a crime, but

convicted of a violation, is eligible for arrest record

expungement because a “violation” is not a “crime.”

          We therefore vacate the circuit court’s order granting the

HCJDC’s motion for summary judgment and its final judgment, as

well as the ICA’s judgment on appeal, and we remand to the

circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

Earle A. Partington                           /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
                                              /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Candace J. Park
for respondent                                /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

                                              /s/ Michael D. Wilson

                                              /s/ Todd W. Eddins

8     If such a case were to arise, other rules of statutory interpretation
could be triggered. For example, “[i]f a literal construction of statutory
language would produce an absurd result, we presume that result was not
intended and construe the statute in accord with its underlying legislative
intent.” State v. Abella, 145 Hawaiʻi 541, 552, 454 P.3d 482, 493 (2019)
(citation omitted).

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