Court Opinion

ID: 9729413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:34:18.867479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:57.697764
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the decision of the trial court insofar as it held that Universal’s garage liability policy provided coverage for Snyder, who was test-driving the vehicle, and that the garage policy was primary and Snyder’s Allstate policy was excess. I would reverse the decision that the policy limits were $500,000, and hold instead that the limits were $20,000 per person, $40,000 per accident, and $15,000 property damage, as required by the mandatory insurance law, section 7—601(a) of the Code. 625 ILCS 5/7—601(a) (West 1998). The general rule, where one person operates the vehicle of another, is that the automobile liability policy issued to the owner is primary, and the policy issued to the driver is excess. State Farm, 182 Ill. 2d at 246, 695 N.E.2d at 851. The question becomes more complicated when a customer is involved in an accident while test-driving a vehicle offered for sale by a car dealer. The garage liability insurers who insure the car dealers have consistently argued that their policies should at most be excess, and they have regularly changed their policies to try to achieve that result. The supreme court, however, has not been sympathetic. See Steinberg v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 79, 84-85, 650 N.E.2d 14, 18 (1995) (Cook, J., dissenting). Garage liability insurers recognize the possibility they may be ordered to afford coverage. The policy here provides that, if the insurer is required to afford coverage to permissive users, “the most WE will pay is that portion of such limits needed to comply with the minimum limits provision law in the jurisdiction where the OCCURRENCE took place.” State Farm recently reaffirmed the position that there is coverage and the garage liability policy is primary where a car is test-driven, relying on the statutory requirement that “no owner shall permit another person to operate *** a motor vehicle *** unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy” (625 ILCS 5/7—601(a) (West 1996)) and the statutory requirement that an “owner’s policy” insure the person named therein “ ‘and any other person using or responsible for the use of such motor vehicle or vehicles with the express or implied permission of the insured.’ ” State Farm, 182 Ill. 2d at 244, 695 N.E.2d at 850, quoting 625 ILCS 5/7—317(b)(2) (West 1996). The quoted sections are found in chapter 7, the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law. Section 7—601 is found in article VI, “Mandatory Insurance.” Section 7—317 is found in article III, “Proof of Financial Responsibility for the Future.” Section 7—601(a) provides that the insurance policy it refers to, the owner’s policy, “shall be issued in amounts no less than the minimum amounts set *** under [sjection 7—203.” 625 ILCS 5/7—601(a) (West 1998). Section 7—203 requires limits of $20,000/$40,000 and $15,000. 625 ILCS 5/7—203 (West 1998). Section 7—203 is found along with sections 7—601(a) and 7—203 in chapter 7, under article II, “Security Following Accident.” The majority argues that the policy limits for this statutorily required coverage are at least $100,000/$300,000 and $50,000, the limits required by section 5—101(b)(6) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/5— 101(b)(6) (West 1998)). Section 5—101 is found in chapter 5, “Dealers, Transporters, Wreckers[,] and Rebuilders,” in article I, “Dealers.” These statutory provisions dealing with new and used car dealers, however, do not require the coverage of permissive users. The supreme court in State Farm relied on the mandatory insurance provisions of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law to find omnibus coverage, because neither the “New Car Dealers Act” (625 ILCS 5/5—101 (West 1998)) nor the “Used Car Dealers Act” (625 ILCS 5/5—102 (West 1998)) requires the furnishing of omnibus coverage. In fact, the insurer in State Farm argued that it was only required to comply with the dealers acts, which did not require omnibus coverage. State Farm, 182 Ill. 2d at 245, 695 N.E.2d at 851 (exemption where insured complied with other laws, “applies only when the insurance required by law provides the type of coverage required under the mandatory insurance statute”). It is inconsistent to rely on one statute to impose coverage, but then ignore the limits required by that statute, and look to the limits of another statute which would not require coverage at all. The majority relies on the First District’s decision in Deere, which based its decision on its view of public policy. The First District saw no reason why, when a dealership’s employee was driving the insured automobile, the limits should be higher than when a customer of the dealership was driving the same automobile. Deere, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 377-78, 698 N.E.2d at 639-40. I respectfully disagree with Deere. A court must not rewrite statutes to make them consistent with the court’s idea of orderliness and public policy (Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 394-95, 712 N.E.2d 298, 305 (1998)), nor should a court rewrite insurance policies (Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Intercounty Title Co., 287 Ill. App. 3d 647, 651, 678 N.E.2d 723, 725 (1997)). If it were our task to achieve consistency, why should the customer have higher mandatory limits while he is test-driving the car under the dealer’s policy than he does under his own policy after he has purchased the vehicle and is driving it home? Insurance is generally designed to protect the insured who paid for it, not the public at large. Interference with freedom of contract between the insurer and the insured is an exceptional thing and should be limited, if it is engaged in at all. The legislature is much better equipped to analyze these questions than are we, and we should respect the legislature’s decision. Deere also argued that the dealership in that case had filed a certificate of insurance with the Secretary of State, as required by section 5—101(b), stating that it had procured a policy which included garage liability limits of $500,000 per accident, limits in excess of those required by statute. Deere argued that because the dealership had “obligated itself to a $500,000 limit in its certificate of insurance,” it “cannot now be heard to deny the coverage amount it contracted for to limit the same to either $20,000 or $100,000.” Deere, 298 111. App. 3d at 379, 698 N.E.2d at 640. It is not surprising that the certificate of insurance did not attempt to limit the coverage for permissive users to $20,000. The insurance policy in question purported not to cover permissive users at all, as allowed by section 5—101(b). Furthermore, a certificate that states there are limits of $500,000 per accident is not inconsistent with a policy that imposes a lower limit per person. Finally, the idea that policy provisions not set out in a certificate of insurance cannot stand makes no sense. A certificate of insurance simply provides a brief statement that coverage exists. Deere will require, in the future, that the policy itself be filed as the certificate of insurance.