Court Opinion

ID: 9669904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:10:40.771136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:01.036084
License: Public Domain

GILDEA, J.
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in imposing an upward departure sentence. The district court’s decision to depart was based on facts Dettman admitted after he executed a knowing and voluntary waiver of his trial rights. I would reverse the court of appeals and uphold the sentence imposed.
In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court recognized that sentencing courts could use facts the defendant admitted in imposing sentence. 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The district court imposed an upward departure sentence in this case based on facts Dettman admitted. The majority concludes that Dettman’s admissions were not really admissions for Blakely purposes because he did not explicitly waive any right that Blakely gave him to have a jury decide the facts he had admitted. In my view the majority’s conclusion is wrong for two independent reasons. First, Blakely did not give Dettman any rights that he needed to waive. Second, if Blakely gave Dettman any rights, well-settled precedent compels the conclusion that Dettman’s waiver of his trial rights is valid notwithstanding the change in the sentencing procedures announced in Blakely.
I.
In Blakely, the Supreme Court said that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), for “facts admitted by the defendant”); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”). I believe the Supreme Court meant it when it said that sentencing courts could use “facts * * * admitted by the defendant” as a basis to depart without implicating the rule announced in Apprendi. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis omitted). In other words, if a fact has not been admitted by the defendant, the sentencing court may not use it as a basis to depart unless the fact has been found by a jury. Here, the fact was admitted and a jury finding was therefore not necessary for the sentencing court to use the fact as a basis to depart. In my view, the district court did precisely what the Supreme Court authorized.
Dettman waived his trial rights, including his right to remain silent and his right to a jury trial. Prior to accepting Dett-man’s guilty plea, the district court inquired to insure that Dettman understood these and all of his rights. Specifically, the district court asked if Dettman knew *657that there was no agreement regarding what his sentence would be, and
that at sentencing the actual sentence will be up to the judge who sentences you, * * * after hearing arguments from both sides and that both attorneys are free to make a motion for a downward departure from this guideline sentence and the prosecution is also free to make a motion for an upward departure?
Dettman responded that he understood. The judge then inquired to make sure that Dettman understood that “there are no guarantees about whether either of those motions would be granted and it’s possible that you could be sentenced to longer than 144 months?” Again Dettman indicated that he understood and stated that he wanted to proceed with his guilty plea.
Following the district court’s examination, Dettman admitted that he lured the victim to his apartment through a lie, restrained her, threatened to cut her throat if she was not quiet, engaged in multiple acts of sexual penetration without the victim’s consent, and that the victim feared for her safety. These admissions were beyond the elements of the offense to which Dettman pleaded guilty and accordingly, could be used to support an aggravated departure as long as the departure complied with the rule in Blakely.10
Before Blakely, trial courts in Minnesota based upward departures upon three types of facts: 1) a fact admitted by the defendant,11 2) a fact reflected in the jury ver-diet, and 8) a fact found by a judge without first obtaining the defendant’s waiver of a jury trial. In Blakely, the Supreme Court ruled that, under sentencing guidelines similar to Minnesota’s, the use of the third type of fact (a fact found by a judge without first obtaining the defendant’s waiver of a jury trial) violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Blakely did not change the law regarding the first two types of facts. An examination of Blakely confirms this result.
In Blakely, the defendant entered an Alford plea; he did not make factual admissions but merely admitted that the evidence the state had was sufficient to convict him. See State v. Blakely, 111 Wash. App. 851, 47 P.3d 149, 153 (2002), rev’d, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The Supreme Court thought it important to note that the defendant had admitted only to the elements of the crime to which he pleaded guilty — “but no other relevant facts.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531.
After the plea, the sentencing court imposed an upward departure, and not the sentence recommended in the plea agreement. The sentencing judge imposed an upward departure based not on any facts admitted by the defendant, but on the victim’s description of the crime. 542 U.S. at 300, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (“Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State recommended a sentence within the standard range of 49 to 53 months. After hearing [the victim’s] description of the kidnapping, however, the *658judge rejected the State’s recommendation and imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months * * Blakely objected and the court scheduled a sentencing hearing. Many witnesses testified during the three-day hearing, id., including Blakely who “took the opportunity to explain to the court his version of the events and the motivations of the witnesses against him.” 47 P.3d at 160. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge denied Blakely’s objection and “adhered to [the judge’s] .initial determination of deliberate cruelty.” 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Supreme Court reversed the departure in Blakely because “[t]he facts supporting [the sentencing court’s] finding [of deliberate cruelty] were neither admitted by [defendant] nor found by a jury.” Id. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531.12
In my view, the error in the majority’s reasoning is its contention that “[t]he use of a defendant’s statements to enhance his sentence thus entails a relinquishment of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of facts supporting an upward sentencing departure.” A defendant did not have the right to a jury determination of admitted sentencing factors before Blakely and neither Blakely nor its progeny have created such a right. Instead, in determining upward departures, defendants now have a right to. a jury determination of facts other than the two types of facts the Blakely court specifically said do not require a jury determination (i.e. facts admitted by the defendant or facts reflected in a jury verdict). Blakely did not change precedent that allowed a sentencing court to impose an aggravated departure based on facts the defendant has admitted.13
The majority argues that the Blakely admission exception “begs the question of what constitutes an ‘admission’ for Blakely purposes.” The Supreme Court, however, has provided the answer to the majority’s question. In articulating the admission exception in Blakely, 'the Supreme Court cited to its opinion in Apprendi. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348). In discussing admissions in Apprendi, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier case in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 227, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487-88,120 S.Ct. 2348. In describing its decision in Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court emphasized that because Almendarez-Torres had admitted a fact *659during his plea hearing, that fact could be used to increase Almendarez-Torres’ sentence without violating the rule announced in Apprendi. Apprendi 530 U.S. at 487-88, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Most importantly (for purposes of our analysis), the fact admitted during Almendarez-Torres’ plea was not an element of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Thus, to answer the majority’s question, at the very least, the Blakely admission exception applies to a fact admitted during a defendant’s plea hearing that is not an element of the crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty. This, of course, is exactly the circumstance of Dettman’s case.
Every federal circuit court of appeals has indicated that sentencing courts do not run afoul of Blakely or the Sixth Amendment when they rely on a defendant’s admissions of fact in sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo, 380 F.3d 274, 279 (6th Cir.2004) (“The sentence in the present case was based solely upon the facts admitted by [the defendant] as part of his guilty plea. Blakely therefore does not affect the validity of his sentence.”).14 Even though Dettman is arguing that a “right” based on the U.S. Constitution has been violated, the majority dismisses the federal cases without discussion, and relies instead on certain state cases.15 While it seems to me that the *660federal cases are more useful to an interpretation of what is purportedly a federal constitutional “right,” we need not even look outside our own jurisprudence to resolve this case.
In Shattuck, this court implicitly recognized that when the “guilty plea alone” supports an enhanced sentence, the rule in Blakely is not implicated. 704 N.W.2d at 131, 141-42 (Minn.2005); see also id. at 142 (“Blakely expressly permits a defendant to either stipulate to relevant facts or consent to judicial factfinding regarding sentencing factors.”). In State v. Barker, we specifically recognized “the Blakely admission exception.”16 705 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn.2005).
Finally, we relied on the “admission exception” in upholding an enhanced sentence in State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312 (Minn.2005). We expressly said that the defendant’s admissions could be used by the sentencing court in Leake. We began our analysis in Leake by discussing “the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi” Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 323. The question presented in Leake however could not be resolved merely by applying the prior conviction exception. The district court also reviewed the factual basis the defendant provided in pleading guilty to the prior criminal sexual conduct charge in determining that the crime was a “heinous crime.” We upheld this judicial determination under the Apprendi/Blakely rule because it was based on admissions made by the defendant. Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 324.17
The majority attempts to distinguish Leake, arguing that the use of the defen*661dant’s admissions was constitutional because those admissions were made within the context of the prior conviction exception to the Apprendi/Blakely rule. Nothing in Leake supports this limitation. We unqualifiedly said in Leake: “Under both Apprendi and Blakely, a defendant’s admissions can be used to determine sentencing enhancements.” Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 324. We also cited with approval the decisions from the federal circuits, including some of the federal cases cited supra, that hold that sentencing courts may rely on defendants’ factual admissions. See Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 325 (citing federal cases). Finally, the admissions in Leake were made as part of a guilty plea — -just as in this case.18 We did not condition the sentencing court’s reliance on these factual admissions on a finding that the defendant had waived a separate right to have a sentencing jury determine these facts. The defendant admitted to the facts as part of a guilty plea and the sentencing court in the later case was permitted to rely on those facts as the basis for imposing an enhanced sentence. The same result is warranted in this case. I would hold that Dettman’s admissions at his plea hearing were properly considered by the district court in determining whether to impose an upward sentencing departure.
II.
Even if Blakely gave Dettman a right to jury trial on sentencing factors, I would conclude that his waiver of his trial rights included this Blakely right. The majority bases its conclusion that the district court erred in imposing an upward departure on the assertion that “Dettman’s waiver of his right to a jury trial on the issue of guilt cannot be interpreted as a waiver of his right to a jury determination of aggravating sentencing factors.” The majority cites to our rule that waivers of the right to jury trial must be knowing and voluntary and articulated on the record. There is no dispute that Dettman made such a waiver in this case. In his Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty and independently on the record, Dettman gave up his trial rights, including his right to “trial by jury.” The dispute here is only about whether Dettman’s waiver was “knowing” as to any Blakely rights.
Because Dettman did not explicitly waive a jury finding of aggravating factors, the majority concludes that his waiver of his trial rights was unknowing and therefore ineffective as to any rights created by Blakely. Of course, Dettman could not have articulated a waiver of any Blakely rights since the “new rule” in Blakely would not be announced until six months after the district court accepted Dettman’s guilty plea. See State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Minn.2005). I believe the majority errs when it finds that Dett-man’s waiver cannot be viewed as knowing *662because he did not anticipate the rule announced in Blakely. The Supreme Court and lower federal courts uniformly recognize that a subsequent change in sentencing law does not render a defendant’s guilty plea invalid or make it “unknowing.” I would apply that principle here and conclude that Dettman’s waiver satisfies our rule requiring knowing and voluntary waivers of the right to jury trial.
The leading case from the Supreme Court on the question of whether changes in the law invalidate a guilty plea is Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents, a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.” Id. at 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (emphasis added and citation omitted).19 In a related opinion issued the same day, the Court stated:
It is no denigration of the right to trial to hold that when the defendant waives his state court remedies and admits his guilt, he does so under the law then existing; further, he assumes the risk of ordinary error in either his or his attorney’s assessment of the law and facts. Although he might have pleaded differently had later decided cases then been the law, he is bound by his plea and his conviction unless he can allege and prove serious derelictions on the part of counsel sufficient to show that his plea was not, after all, a knowing and intelligent act.
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).
More recently, the Court has confirmed its holding in Brady, stating “that the Constitution, in respect to a defendant’s awareness of relevant circumstances, does not require complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002). Specifically referenced as a “form of misapprehension” was the circumstance where a “defendant failed to anticipate a change in the law regarding relevant punishments.” Id. (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Given this clear and long-established precedent, it should be no surprise that every federal circuit court of appeals that has addressed the issue has concluded that the defendant’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent notwithstanding a subsequent change in the applicable sentencing law. For example, in United States v. Parsons, the defendant pleaded guilty to mail fraud and money laundering. 408 F.3d 519, 520 (8th Cir.2005). The defendant claimed “that the district court committed Sixth Amendment error by en*663hancing his sentence under the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines based on the amount of loss” attributable to his crimes. Parsons, 408 F.3d at 521. In addition to concluding that there was no error because Parsons had admitted to the amount of the loss, the Eighth Circuit also concluded that “the development in the law announced by Booker subsequent to Parsons’s guilty plea does not invalidate his plea.” Parsons, 408 F.3d at 521 (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463).20
These federal appellate cases recognize that the failure to anticipate a change in the law regarding sentencing does not, as a constitutional matter, undermine the validity of the defendant’s guilty plea.21 As the Sixth Circuit succinctly stated after reviewing the Supreme Court’s precedent,
the Court has explained that where developments in the law later expand a right that a defendant has waived in a plea agreement, the change in law does not suddenly make the plea involuntary or unknowing or otherwise undo its binding nature. A valid plea agreement, after all, requires knowledge of existing rights, not clairvoyance.
United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir.2005), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 145, 163 L.Ed.2d 144 (2005).
Dettman made his guilty plea fully aware of the charges against him, after advice from his counsel, and with a full understanding of the range of consequences he faced as a result of pleading guilty. The analysis in the federal cases compels the conclusion that Dettman’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
In the face of Brady and its progeny, the only way for the majority to conclude that Dettman’s waiver was not valid as to *664any Blakely rights would be to conclude that Dettman had two separate jury trial rights, one on the question of guilt and a separate one on sentencing factors. The majority cites no case that stands for that proposition.22
I would hold that Dettman’s plea does not become unknowing because of the new rule in Blakely.23
III.
A final issue remains unaddressed by the majority. Dettman alternatively argues that the facts admitted by him do not present substantial and compelling circumstances justifying an upward sentencing. This argument is without merit. Dettman’s express, knowing, and voluntary admission to multiple forms of sexually penetrating the victim amply supports the district court’s decision to depart. State v. Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn.1982); State v. Martinez, 319 N.W.2d 699, 700-01 (Minn.1982).
I would reverse the court of appeals and uphold the sentence originally imposed.
PAGE, Justice.
I join in part II of Justice Gildea’s dissent.

. Dettman pleaded guilty to violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c) (2004), which requires sexual penetration under circumstances that “cause the complainant to have a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm.”

. See, e.g., Rairdon v. State, 557 N.W.2d 318, 321, 327 (Minn.1996) (upward departure based on defendant's admission during jury trial of beginning sexual abuse of daughter when she was eight and continuing abuse for five years); State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643, 645-47 (Minn.1981) (upward departure based on defendant's admissions made during guilty plea), overruled on other grounds by State v. Givens, 544 N.W.2d 774, 777 n. 4 (Minn.1996).

. The defendant in Apprendi similarly had not admitted the fact the sentencing court used to enhance his sentence. See 530 U.S. at 471, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (noting that defendant "took the stand himself [during the sentencing hearing], explaining that the incident was an unintended consequence of overindulgence in alcohol, denying that he was in any way biased against African-Americans.").

. The majority purports to rely on a portion of Blakely to support its conclusion "that an express waiver is required before a defendant’s admissions may be used to enhance his sentence.” The quotation from Blakely is:
When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial fact finding. If appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer judicial fact finding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The majority emphasizes the Court's use of the word "waivers" in the second sentence, but ignores the Court’s use of the disjunctives "either” and "or” in the first sentence, and it further ignores the Court’s recognition that "appropriate waivers” are required only for "judicial factfinding” — not when a defendant "stipulates to the relevant facts.” Dettman's admissions during his guilty plea are precisely the type of stipulation at issue in this discussion from Blakely.

. See also United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 520 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Burke, 431 F.3d 883, 889 (5th Cir.2005); United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1077-78 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Lechuga-Ponce, 407 F.3d 895, 896 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Bartram, 407 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir.2005) ("The district court did not err in its fact finding because the facts were based on the defendant’s own admissions [made at the sentencing hearing]. Therefore, we are of the opinion and hold the defendant’s argument under Blakely to be without merit.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 1374, 164 L.Ed.2d 82 (2006); United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 164 (3d Cir.2005); United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C.Cir.2005); United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir.2005) ("Because Shelton admitted to the facts that enhanced his sentence [during the plea colloquy and at the sentencing hearing], there is no Sixth Amendment violation under Booker in this case.”); United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir.2005) ("Because facts sufficient to support the sentence were admitted by the defendant [during the plea colloquy], his Sixth Amendment rights were not violated in this case.”); United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir.2005); United States v. Monsalve, 388 F.3d 71, 73 (2d Cir.2004) ("Defendant was sentenced solely on the basis of the drug quantity and type she freely and knowingly admitted in her plea agreement. * * * Thus, the constitutional requirement of a sentence based solely on facts admitted by the defendant set forth in Blakely has been satisfied.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1175, 125 S.Ct. 1387, 161 L.Ed.2d 157 (2005); United States v. Lucca, 377 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir.2004) (“No additional finding [beyond the facts defendant admitted as part of guilty plea] was required by the district court to justify the sentence of imprisonment * * *. Accordingly, Lucca's sentence was consistent with the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Blakely and Ap-prendi.”).

. At least one state explicitly agrees with the conclusion of the Federal circuits, with others impliedly agreeing. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 829 N.E.2d 12, 17 (Ind.2005) ("We do not see how the Sixth Amendment is implicated or endangered by permitting judges to use aggravators to enhance sentences so long as the underlying facts supporting the aggra-vator are found by a jury or admitted by a defendant.”); see also State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256, 265 (N.C.2005), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 2546, — L.Ed.2d — (2006); State v. Ose, 156 Wash.2d 140, 124 P.3d 635, 639 (2005); cf. Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 719, 723 (Colo.2005) (concluding that "facts admitted by the defendant” may be used as aggravating factors and describing such facts as ''Blakely-compliant”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 654, 163 L.Ed.2d 529 (2005). In my view, the state cases the majority cites are not helpful to the question presented here. The majority relies on the split opin*660ion from the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Isaacks, 133 P.3d 1190 (Colo.2006). Isaacks is so factually distinguishable from this case as to make its reasoning inapposite. In Isaacks the sentencing court, in imposing an upward departure, did not rely on statements the defendant made during a guilty plea. Rather, the court used statements in a presentence report and the defendant's failure to object to these statements to find aggravating facts. The court held that reliance on such statements conflicted with Blakely and the Colorado Supreme Court's earlier decision in Lopez, 113 P.3d at 723, which recognized that admissions by a defendant could provide the basis for judicial fact finding on aggravating factors. Isaacks, 133 P.3d at 1192. ("[W]e hold that a defendant’s failure to object to facts in a presentence report does not constitute an admission for purposes of Blakely and Lopez unless the defendant makes a constitutionally sufficient waiver of his right to a jury trial on the facts contained in the report.”). The majority also cites a decision from the Oregon Supreme Court, State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157, 118 P.3d 236 (2005). While the defendant in Harris admitted that he had prior juvenile adjudications, he specifically objected to the use of the juvenile adjudications as a basis to enhance his sentence. Id. at 245. "As a result” of the defendant’s objection, the Harris court could "not say, based upon the record before us, that defendant’s acknowledgement of a prior juvenile adjudication in filling out his guilty plea amounted to either an admission or a knowing waiver of his jury trial right for sentencing purposes.” Id. As the Oregon intermediate appellate court recognized, the rationale of Harris does not apply where a defendant has "admitted all of the facts necessary to justify” an enhanced sentence. State v. Herrera-Lopez, 204 Or.App. 188, 129 P.3d 238, 242 (2006) (distinguishing Harris and noting that "[d]efendant’s guilty plea and his colloquy with the court amount to admissions of that fact. Thus, under a straightforward application of the Blakely rule as restated in Booker, the trial court’s sentence was not unconstitutional.”).

. As the majority acknowledges, Barker’s agreement "in concept” with the approach the court of appeals adopted in State v. Hagen, 690 N.W.2d 155 (Minn.App.2004), was dicta. See State v. Barker, 705 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Minn.2005).

. To the extent the district court relied on the victim's testimony as a basis to enhance, we held this "was error as it does not meet the requirements of Blakely.” Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 325 n. 9.

. The majority also contends that Leake is distinguishable because the admissions relied on were simply admissions to the elements of the offense and Leake had properly waived his right to a jury trial on the question of his guilt or innocence as to that charge. The majority's reading of the Blakely admission exception seems to be that it covers only a defendant’s admissions to elements of the crime. Such a reading would render the exception a nullity in Minnesota because “[t]he reasons used for departing must not themselves be elements of the underlying crime.” State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 378-79 (Minn.2005). This reading would also have rendered the exception a nullity in Blakely itself, because as the Supreme Court mentioned, Washington also disallowed departures to be based on elements of the underlying crime. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citing State v. Gore, 143 Wash.2d 288, 21 P.3d 262, 277 (2001), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 110 P.3d 192 (2005)). I do not believe that the Supreme Court’s careful discussion of admissions was surplusage.

. The Court later characterized the defendant’s plea in Brady as:
intelligent because, although later judicial decisions indicated that at the time of his plea he did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision, he was advised by competent counsel, was in control of his mental faculties, and was made aware of the nature of the charge against him.
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

. See also United States v. Roque, 421 F.3d 118, 119 (2d Cir.2005) (citing Brady and holding that the defendant could "not withdraw his plea as unintelligent, involuntary, or otherwise illegal, based solely on changes in federal law effected by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in [United States v. Booker].”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 1094, 163 L.Ed.2d 908 (2006); United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151-53 (4th Cir.2005) ("the issuance of Booker after the plea agreement was reached does not render Johnson's plea unknowing or involuntary”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 461, 163 L.Ed.2d 350 (2005); United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir.2005) ("The Supreme Court has explained that where subsequent developments in the law expand a right that a defendant has waived in a plea agreement, that change does not make the plea involuntary or unknowing or otherwise undo its binding nature.”); United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.2005) ("Supreme Court precedent is quite explicit that as part of a plea agreement, criminal defendants may waive both rights in existence and those that result from unanticipated later judicial determinations.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 550, 163 L.Ed.2d 466 (2005); United States v. Sahlin, 399 F.3d 27, 31 n. 3 (1st Cir.2005) (“Brady also makes clear that a subsequent judicial decision changing the relevant sentencing law does not permit an attack on whether the plea was knowing.”).

. The majority cites nothing from our own jurisprudence that supports a conclusion that our understanding of the scope of a guilty plea varies from the Supreme Court’s rule articulated in Brady and McMann. Moreover, while we do not appear to have addressed the issue in the context of sentencing, we have followed the Supreme Court's formulation of the rule in other contexts. See, e.g., State v. Danaher, 293 Minn. 435, 436, 197 N.W.2d 425, 426 n. 2 (1972) ("Waiving trial involves a risk that an attorney’s assessment of the law or facts might later prove to be erroneous.”) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)); McLaughlin v. State, 291 Minn. 277, 280, 190 N.W.2d 867, 870 (1971) (noting that “[t]he logic advanced in McMann is compelling.”).

. Blakely itself seems to recognize that the constitution guarantees the defendant one right to a jury trial. My reading is based on the exchange between Justice Scalia (for the majority) and Justice Breyer (in dissent), where the majority agreed with Justice Breyer that the “States are not required to give defendants the option of waiving jury trial on some elements but not others.” 542 U.S. at 310 n. 12, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Blakely also does not prevent a state from giving defendants a separate jury trial on sentencing factors, and I note that as a matter of public policy, I think it preferable post-Apprendi and Blakely for defendants who desire to forego their trial rights to execute separate waivers of a jury finding on guilt and a jury finding on sentencing factors. I do not believe, however, that my public policy preferences shed any light on the constitutional question raised by Dett-man.

. To conclude otherwise effectively withdraws Dettman’s guilty plea or rewrites the plea agreement the parties reached. I do not believe this court should do either. As the Tenth Circuit said, "The essence of plea agreements * * * is that they represent a bargained-for understanding between the government and criminal defendants in which each side foregoes certain rights and assumes certain risks in exchange for a degree of certainty as to the outcome of criminal matters.” Porter, 405 F.3d at 1145. One of the risks that Dettman assumed was the risk that the Supreme Court would announce what we have described as a "new rule.” Houston, 702 N.W.2d at 273. Because Dettman assumed that risk, his right to a trial by jury is validly foregone and his guilty plea should be upheld as negotiated by the parties and accepted by the district court.