Court Opinion

ID: 9742798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:20:32.787383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:36.726585
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
concurring.
I agree that Stumpff’s opinion was improperly before the jury. Nevertheless, certain statements in the majority opinion are incomplete and, therefore, inaccurate interpretations of the Nebraska Evidence Rules.
In cases such as that before us, the trial court must ask itself two preliminary questions: (1) Will the expert opinion assist the trier of fact? (Rule 702, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-702 (Reissue 1979)); and (2) Is the witness qualified as an expert? (Rule 104(1), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-104(1) (Reissue 1979)). See, Loftin and Woodard, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Normile, 587 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1979).
If the answers to those preliminary questions are in the affirmative, Rule 705(1), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-705(1) (Reissue 1979), permits admission of the expert’s opinion or inference without an in-court prior disclosure of underlying facts or data, unless the judge requires otherwise. In the absence of judicial request for underlying facts or data, a witness found by the court to be qualified as an expert may, without any further development of facts, express an opinion in the field wherein the witness has expertise. After admission of the expert’s *339opinion, the burden rests with the adversary to cross-examine and develop the underlying facts or absence of facts which exposes any weakness in the expert’s opinion. In this posture a jury determines what weight is due an expert’s opinion. However, if direct, cross, or redirect examination of the expert discloses an inadequate basis for an expert’s opinion, the “opinion” may be stricken as mere guesswork, conjecture, or speculation. For example, in Clearwater Corp. v. City of Lincoln, 202 Neb. 796, 277 N.W.2d 236 (1979), we held that, on proper objection and motion to strike, an expert’s opinion should have been stricken where an expert, basing his opinion on the presence of a gravel supply to be mined from an appraised property, gave an opinion about the value of real estate but on further direct and cross-examination showed the availability and extent of gravel deposits to be conjectural or speculative.
During voir dire in chambers before he gave his opinion as evidence for the jury, Stumpff categorically stated that the prerequisite for confabulation is neurological damage to the brain through (1) a level of alcohol producing “alcoholic blackout” or (2) a blow on the head. Stumpff acknowledged he had not determined whether McConnell drank enough alcohol to reach the level where a “blackout” occurs. There was no evidence of a blow to McConnell’s head. Consequently, in the course of his in-chambers examination, Stumpff conclusively demonstrated that he had no basis for his opinion. While testifying before the jury, Stumpff was not rehabilitated to regenerate an opinion on confabulation and should not have been permitted to express his opinion to the jury. When the majority indicates that an expert’s opinion is properly admitted only when “the basis of the opinion and the facts on which it is based are before the jury and the opposing party has had an opportunity to cross-examine the expert,” such a standard for admissibility is not supported by, and in fact conflicts with, the Nebraska Evidence Rules.
The majority restricts an expert’s opinion to those situations “when all the factors necessary to draw a conclusion are in evidence,” which expression is dicta and dangerous dicta at that. Such restriction would resurrect the requirement of a *340hypothetical question — an evidentiary format no longer necessary but permissible under the Nebraska Evidence Rules. Also, Rule 703 of the Nebraska Evidence Rules permits an expert to base his opinion or inference on facts or data perceived by the expert or made known to him at or before the hearing, including the type of facts or data reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences, which “facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.” The evidentiary issue here relates to Stumpff’s acknowledged absence of a foundation for his opinion, not the necessity of other adduced evidence as a premise for an expert’s opinion.
The trial court should have excluded Stumpff’s opinion as a result of his demonstrated inadequate basis for the opinion he expressed.
Krivosha, C. J., and White, J., join in this concurrence.