Court Opinion

ID: 9949869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 19:09:06.540806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:20.794452
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                  Nicholas R. E. Brummett,                 FILED
                                        Appellant-Defendant           Mar 12 2024, 9:01 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                   v.                       and Tax Court

                                         State of Indiana,
                                          Appellee-Plaintiff

                                           March 12, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          23A-CR-1298
                            Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court
                             The Honorable Andrew Hopper, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                        48C03-2003-F2-735

                               Opinion by Judge Brown
                                Judge Bradford concurs.
                       Judge Vaidik dissents with separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024    Page 1 of 27
      Brown, Judge.

[1]   Nicholas R. E. Brummett appeals his conviction for possession of

      methamphetamine as a level 3 felony. 1 We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History

[2]   At 8:42 p.m. on March 21, 2020, Anderson Police Officer Brandon Reynolds

      was patrolling in an area known as a “high traffic area for narcotics” and

      noticed a silver car drive down an alley, stop at a stop sign, and it “seemed like

      it wanted to turn one (1) way and then turned another.” Transcript Volume I at

      57, 81. Officer Reynolds observed that the driver “seemed like [he] was lost or

      like [he] was looking for something,” in an area where “there’s a lot of drug

      activity,” which “caught [Officer Reynolds’s] eye.” Id. at 57. He observed that

      the vehicle turned without properly using the turn signal. Specifically, the

      vehicle stopped, the driver “then started his turn, and then clicked his turn

      signal on.” Id. at 58. Officer Reynolds observed that the vehicle which had

      been traveling south ultimately turned back north which “sort of set off another

      flag” for him. Id. The vehicle then drove south again.

[3]   Officer Reynolds initiated a traffic stop. The vehicle stopped, and Officer

      Reynolds approached Brummett who was the sole occupant and asked him if

      1
        The State notes that Brummett’s argument implicates the validity of only his conviction for
      methamphetamine. See Appellee’s Brief at 9 n.1. Brummett did not file a reply brief, and he has not
      developed an argument challenging his conviction for operating a vehicle as an habitual traffic violator as a
      level 6 felony.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024                                 Page 2 of 27
      he had his driver’s license. Brummett handed him an ID card and said he did

      not have a driver’s license. Officer Reynolds asked Brummett where he was

      going, and Brummett said he was going to the gas station “that was just up in

      front of [them] a couple blocks.” Id. at 119. Officer Reynolds asked Brummett

      if he was from Anderson, and Brummett answered affirmatively. Officer

      Reynolds found Brummett’s answer odd “because pretty much anybody from

      Anderson knows where thirty-second (32nd) and Columbus is and that gas

      station there.” Id. at 119-120. Officer Reynolds then asked him where he was

      coming from and if he was lost, and Brummett said he was coming from “a

      buddy’s house.” Id. at 61. Officer Reynolds asked him what his friend’s name

      was because he knew people in the area and “was going to try to help him out if

      he’s just a lost guy.” Id. Brummett “just like didn’t respond” and “just sort of

      sat there with his hands on the steering wheel and at that time like he was

      acting really nervous,” which made Officer Reynolds uncomfortable. Id.

      Officer Reynolds also observed that Brummett’s eyes “were making some pretty

      furtive movements,” id., and that he “just like kind of started freaking out a

      little bit.” Id. at 71.

[4]   Due to his safety concerns, Officer Reynolds asked Brummett to exit the

      vehicle. Officer Reynolds conducted a patdown, ran his hand across the

      outside of Brummett’s right pocket, felt “an item through plain feel that felt

      consistent to be a pretty large amount of crystal methamphetamine” and felt the

      same thing in a smaller quantity in Brummett’s left pocket. Id. at 123. He

      asked Brummett if he had meth in his pocket, Brummett said he did not know

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024       Page 3 of 27
      but also said that he could reach in and grab it for him, and Officer Reynolds

      told Brummett no. Officer Reynolds placed Brummett in handcuffs and

      retrieved the methamphetamine from his pockets. Officer Sean Brady arrived

      at the scene. 2 Officer Reynolds arranged for the vehicle to be towed, and he

      and Officer Brady conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. Officer

      Reynolds also ran a license check on Brummett and found that he was an

      habitual traffic violator.

[5]   On March 23, 2020, the State charged Brummett with: Count I, dealing in

      methamphetamine as a level 2 felony; Count II, possession of

      methamphetamine as a level 3 felony; Count III, operating a vehicle as an

      habitual traffic violator as a level 6 felony; Count IV, unlawful possession of a

      syringe as a level 6 felony; Count V, carrying a handgun without a license as a

      2
        At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Reynolds testified: “I went ahead and asked him to exit
      the vehicle at that time. [T]ypically what I do before I have someone actually exit the vehicle, um I’ll you
      know, he told me he didn’t have a driver’s license, so he’s not going to be driving away from there, I would
      wait for my back up to actually show up before I get someone out of the vehicle. Um, but because of the
      safety concerns that I had um I felt like it was important to go ahead and get him out the [sic] vehicle that
      way I could try to separate him from the vehicle incase [sic] he wanted to try to take off in it or if he had
      some type of weapon or something try to separate him from that and just try to eliminate the threat, the
      potential security risk the best I could.” Transcript Volume I at 62. He later stated: “Yeah um at that time all
      the flags were going off. I was like okay like you know this guy has meth in his pockets. Um, this would
      explain some of his nervousness and everything so um I went ahead and put him into handcuffs then. Um,
      and I think around that time Officer Brady ended up showing up. Somewhere around there. He could’ve
      just before or just after that not exactly sure. And then I went in and retrieved the meth from his pockets.”
      Id. at 65. At trial, when asked what was the first thing he saw when he arrived on the scene, Officer Brady
      answered: “I saw um Officer Reynolds’ [sic] with his patrol commission with his lights on um, so I arrived on
      scene and spoke with him and asked what he needed.” Id. at 146. When asked what he did next, he
      answered: “Um, I just basically stood by, um while he was going back and forth between his car and doing
      things um, I know he did have the suspect contained in some capacity so I can’t remember where exactly I
      was, but I was just kind of waiting for him to tell me what to do next.” Id.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024                                 Page 4 of 27
      class A misdemeanor; and Count VI, possession of a controlled substance as a

      class A misdemeanor.

[6]   On February 23, 2022, Brummett filed a motion to suppress. On May 19, 2022,

      the court held a hearing. Officer Reynolds stated: “[A]t that time like you know

      he told me he didn’t have a driver’s license, so I was like okay a lot of people

      don’t have a driver’s license, but we’ll see why and everything else.” Id. at 60.

      On cross-examination, when asked for the reason for conducting a patdown,

      Officer Reynolds answered: “[I]n order to ensure that there was no type of

      weapon or anything that would be on his possession. So, safety.” Id. at 69.

      Brummett’s counsel asked: “Had he given you some reason to believe at that

      point that he would have a weapon on his person?” Id. Officer Reynolds

      answered: “Um I think it’s very common for most people to carry weapons. I

      myself almost have at least have a knife on my person and um a lot of people

      carry weapons.” Id. Defense counsel asked: “So, that was the reason you

      patted him down?” Id. Officer Reynolds answered: “Because well for safety

      and because um it’s very common for people to carry weapons.” Id. On

      redirect examination, the prosecutor asked if it was correct that Brummett’s

      behavior also led to the patdown. Officer Reynolds answered: “Oh yeah

      absolutely.” Id. On recross-examination, defense counsel asked if Brummett’s

      act of no longer talking and nervousness were the reason for the patdown, and

      Officer Reynolds answered: “Yeah those were things through my experiences . .

      . made me believe there might be a safety concern.” Id. at 72.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024        Page 5 of 27
[7]   On June 2, 2022, the State filed a brief in opposition to Brummett’s motion to

      suppress and argued that Officer Reynolds had concern for his safety and he

      was also aware that Brummett “did not have a valid driver’s license, which in

      and of itself is an arrestable offense under I.C. 9-24-18-1.” Appellant’s

      Appendix Volume II at 89.

[8]   On August 16, 2022, the court entered an order denying Brummett’s motion to

      suppress and stating that its “analysis turns on the key fact of the defendant’s

      commission of a crime. Before the defendant was searched the officer had

      knowledge of the defendant’s criminal activity, subjecting him to arrest and

      being taken into custody for operating a vehicle without a valid license.” Id. at

      97. On September 13, 2022, Brummett filed a motion to reconsider the order

      denying his motion to suppress. On September 28, 2022, the court held a

      hearing at which it stated that the motion to suppress remained denied. That

      same day, the court entered an order observing that the motion to suppress

      remained denied and stating in part:

              On direct examination [O]fficer Reynolds testified he asked the
              defendant if he had his driver’s license to which the defendant
              responded that he did not have drivers [sic] license. IC 9-24-18-1
              states an individual who knowingly or intentionally operates a
              motor vehicle upon a highway and has never received a valid
              driver’s license commits a Class C misdemeanor. The Defendant
              did not inform [O]fficer Reynolds that he had a license that was
              suspended, he stated he did not have a license. The officer then
              proceeded to ask the defendant to step out of the vehicle and
              conduct a search of his person.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024          Page 6 of 27
      Id. at 105.

[9]   On April 10, 2023, the court held a bench trial. The prosecutor moved to

      dismiss Counts I and VI, and the court granted the motion. The court

      incorporated the record from the suppression hearing. Officer Reynolds

      testified that the inventory search of the vehicle revealed a pistol, a bag with

      methamphetamine, pills, and needles. He testified he ran a license check on

      Brummett and found he had no handgun permit. He further testified that

      Brummett’s acting uncomfortable was a concern for him and that “[b]ased off

      my training and experience people who . . . are acting nervous and

      uncomfortable as he was . . . it can likely lead to a vehicle pursuit, a very

      dangerous situation for . . . him, for the public, and for myself.” Transcript

      Volume I at 122. After Officer Reynolds testified that he felt methamphetamine

      in Brummett’s pockets, defense counsel objected to further testimony based on

      the Fourth Amendment, the Indiana Constitution, and Terry v. Ohio. The court

      overruled the objection. The court also stated that its previous ruling on the

      motion to suppress was “based on all of the circumstances surrounding the

      stop.” Id. at 143. The court found Brummett guilty of Counts II and III and

      not guilty of Counts IV and V.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024         Page 7 of 27
       Discussion

[10]   Brummett cites the Fourth Amendment and argues that the trial court abused

       its discretion when it admitted the items seized during the patdown. 3 He does

       not challenge the propriety of the initial traffic stop based upon his failure to

       properly use his turn signal or Officer Reynolds’s request for him to exit the

       vehicle. Rather, he challenges only the subsequent patdown. He appears to

       argue that the search incident to arrest exception did not apply because Officer

       Reynolds did not have probable cause to believe an offense occurred relating to

       his driver’s license. He asserts that Officer Reynolds’s statement regarding his

       license status established that he was curious as to why he did not have a license

       and without the clear existence of probable cause the encounter was along the

       lines of a Terry stop. He also asserts that Officer Reynolds could not point to

       any specific reasonable inferences, or articulable facts that established any basis

       to perceive him as being armed. He further contends that Officer Reynolds

       “testified that upon feeling the item in [his] pocket he thought it to be

       methamphetamine, not a weapon of any kind,” and also states that Officer

       Reynolds “did not provide any testimony . . . that the item he felt in

       3
         Brummett cites Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. However, he does not make a separate
       analysis under the Indiana Constitution. We therefore address only his argument under the Fourth
       Amendment. See White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind. 2002) (“Because the defendant does not argue that
       the search and seizure provision in the Indiana Constitution requires a different analysis than the federal
       Fourth Amendment, his state constitutional claim is waived, and we consider only the federal claim.”) (citing
       Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 n.3 (Ind. 2002); Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 n.5 (Ind. 2000);
       Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010, 1015 n.4 (Ind. 1998); Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 430 n.1 (Ind. 1993)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024                                Page 8 of 27
       Brummett’s pocket was immediately apparent as contraband.” Appellant’s

       Brief at 13-14.

[11]   Generally, we review the trial court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of

       evidence for an abuse of discretion. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134 (Ind.

       1997), reh’g denied. We reverse only when the decision is clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386,

       390 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied. We may affirm a trial court’s decision regarding

       the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v.

       State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied. We review de novo a ruling

       on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we give deference to a trial

       court’s determination of the facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly

       erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008); see also Carpenter v.

       State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (holding that the ultimate determination

       of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we

       consider de novo). In ruling on admissibility following the denial of a motion to

       suppress, the trial court considers the foundational evidence presented at trial.

       Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1001. If the foundational evidence at trial is not the

       same as that presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court must make its

       decision based upon trial evidence and may consider hearing evidence only if it

       does not conflict with trial evidence. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 n.1

       (Ind. 2014). It also considers the evidence from the suppression hearing that is

       favorable to the defendant only to the extent it is uncontradicted at trial.

       Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1001.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024         Page 9 of 27
[12]   The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “[t]he right of people to be

       secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

       searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

       “As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

       “reasonableness.”’” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482

       (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943

       (2006)).

[13]   With respect to Brummett’s argument under the search incident to arrest

       exception, the United States Supreme Court has held that “[a] custodial arrest

       of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth

       Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires

       no additional justification.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.

       Ct. 467, 477 (1973). “It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the

       authority to search, and . . . in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search

       of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth

       Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” Id.

       “The making of a formal arrest is not determinative of the officers’ right to

       conduct a valid search incident to arrest.” Smith v. State, 256 Ind. 603, 608, 271

       N.E.2d 133, 137 (1971). See also VanPelt v. State, 760 N.E.2d 218, 223 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2001) (“The critical issue is not when the arrest occurs but whether there

       was probable cause to arrest at the time of the search. It is well settled that as

       long as probable cause exists to make the arrest, the fact that a suspect was not

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024          Page 10 of 27
       formally placed under arrest at the time of the search incident thereto will not

       invalidate the search.”), trans. denied.

[14]   “The evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary for probable cause for

       an arrest to exist.” Roberts v. State, 599 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Ind. 1992), reh’g denied.

       “‘In addition, because the situations that officers face “in the course of

       executing their duties are more or less ambiguous,” probable cause allows for

       reasonable mistakes by the officer.’” Decker v. State, 19 N.E.3d 368, 377 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2014) (quoting United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2000)

       (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54

       (1975)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 915, 121 S. Ct. 271 (2000)), trans. denied. “[A]n

       officer may arrest a person if he has probable cause – meaning ‘knowledge of

       facts and circumstances which would warrant a man of reasonable caution to

       believe that the defendant committed the criminal act in question.’” Kelly v.

       State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d

       528, 536 (Ind. 1996) (quoting Bergfeld v. State, 531 N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind. 1988)),

       reh’g denied, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078, 118 S. Ct. 858 (1998)). “[A]n arresting

       officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the

       existence of probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S. Ct.

       588, 593 (2004). “That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest

       need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable

       cause.” Id. at 153, 125 S. Ct. at 594. “The amount of evidence necessary to

       meet the probable cause requirement is determined on a case-by-case basis, and

       the facts and circumstances need not relate to the same crime with which the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024         Page 11 of 27
       suspect is ultimately charged.” Ortiz v. State, 716 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Ind. 1999)

       (citations omitted).

[15]   Ind. Code § 9-24-18-1, which was cited in the State’s brief in opposition to the

       motion to suppress and the trial court’s September 28, 2022 order, is titled

       “Driving without a license” and provided at the time of the traffic stop that

       “[a]n individual, except an individual exempted under IC 9-24-1-7, who

       knowingly or intentionally operates a motor vehicle upon a highway and has

       never received a valid driver’s license commits a Class C misdemeanor” and

       that “[i]n a prosecution under this section, the burden is on the defendant to

       prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant . . . had been

       issued a driver’s license or permit that was valid . . . at the time of the alleged

       offense.” 4 Officer Reynolds testified that he asked Brummett if he had a valid

       driver’s license and Brummett merely handed him an ID card and said he did

       not have a driver’s license. We acknowledge that Ind. Code § 9-24-1-1 provided

       at the time of the traffic stop that “an individual must have a valid . . . driver’s

       license . . . or permit . . . to operate upon a highway the type of motor vehicle

       for which the driver’s license . . . was issued” and that “[a]n individual who

       violates this section commits a Class C infraction.” 5 However, mindful of the

       idea that the evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary for probable

       4
           Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 111-2021, § 77 (eff. Jan. 1, 2022).
       5
        Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 111-2021, § 34 (eff. Jan. 1, 2022); Pub. L. No. 211-2023, § 28 (eff.
       July 1, 2023).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024                             Page 12 of 27
       cause for an arrest to exist, we conclude that the facts and circumstances would

       warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that Brummett committed the

       act of driving without a license as a class C misdemeanor. Accordingly, we

       conclude that the search incident to arrest exception applies.

[16]   We pause to comment on the distinction between the infraction governed by

       Ind. Code § 9-24-1-1 and the misdemeanor governed by Ind. Code § 9-24-18-1.

       We acknowledge that the Indiana Supreme Court has noted in a case which did

       not discuss the search incident to arrest exception that “Indiana law permits a

       law enforcement officer to arrest without a warrant when he has probable cause

       to believe the person is committing a misdemeanor in the officer’s presence”

       and that “[i]t does not permit a warrantless ‘arrest,’ defined as ‘the taking of a

       person into custody, that he may be held to answer for a crime,’ for an

       infraction.” Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 333 n.6 (Ind. 2006) (citing Ind.

       Code § 35-33-1-1(A)(4) (1996); Ind. Code § 35-33-1-5 (1983); Ind. Code § 34-28-

       5-1 (setting forth the procedure for actions taken under this provision and

       declaring they “shall be conducted in accordance with the Indiana Rules of

       Trial Procedure.”). 6 This Court has previously discussed the impact of whether

       an infraction or a misdemeanor has occurred in analyzing a claim under the

       Fourth Amendment. In Kyles v. State, 888 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Ind. Ct. App.

       6
        At the time of the traffic stop in the present case, Ind. Code § 35-33-1-1 provided that “[a] law enforcement
       officer may arrest a person when the officer has . . . probable cause to believe the person is committing or
       attempting to commit a misdemeanor in the officer’s presence.” (Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 175-
       2022, § 6 (eff. July 1, 2022); Pub. L. No. 112-2023, § 3 (eff. July 1, 2023)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024                              Page 13 of 27
2008), the defendant relied on Ind. Code § 35-33-1-1(a)(4), asserted that

possession of paraphernalia could be classified as an infraction, a misdemeanor,

or a felony depending on the circumstances, and argued that because the record

failed to demonstrate whether probable cause existed to classify the possession

as a misdemeanor or felony, the officer lacked authority to make a warrantless

arrest. This Court first noted that it was skeptical of the defendant’s argument

in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Moore, 553

U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008). 888 N.E.2d at 812. We observed:

        In Moore, the Court held that state regulation of officers’
        authority to make warrantless arrests does not alter the
        protections and remedies available under the Fourth
        Amendment. See [Moore, 128 S. Ct.] at 1607. In so holding, the
        Court reaffirmed the Fourth Amendment standard for
        warrantless arrests: “When officers have probable cause to
        believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the
        Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to
        search the suspect in order to safeguard evidence and ensure their
        own safety.” Id. at 1608. Although the Court did not explicitly
        state what type of crime would authorize a warrantless arrest, it
        suggested that the threshold is fairly low. See id. at 1604 (“In a
        long line of cases, we have said that when an officer has probable
        cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his
        presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in
        doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.” (citing, among
        other cases, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.
        Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001))).

Id. at 812-813. We ultimately held that, “[n]evertheless, we need not rely on

Moore because [the officer] had probable cause to believe [the defendant]

committed the offense of possession of paraphernalia as a Class A

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024         Page 14 of 27
       misdemeanor.” Id. at 813. We note Moore as well as at least one other case that

       addressed the issue. See United States v. Burtton, 599 F.3d 823, 828-830 (8th Cir.

       2010) (observing that, although Nebraska law prohibited officers from arresting

       an individual for violating the open container law, state law violations do not

       necessarily offend the Federal Constitution; observing that the defendant’s

       violation of the open container law constituted an “infraction,” not a

       misdemeanor; holding that the question was whether the commission of an

       “infraction” in the presence of officers supplied the officers with probable cause

       to arrest the defendant under the Fourth Amendment; discussing Moore; and

       concluding that the defendant “unquestionably committed a ‘minor crime’—

       violation of an open container law—in the presence of [the officer] when he was

       holding a 12-ounce plastic cup suspected of containing an alcoholic beverage in

       close proximity to a liquor bottle on the floor near” the defendant and, “[a]s a

       result, [the officer] had probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to arrest

       [the defendant] and conduct a search incident to arrest”), reh’g denied. Given

       our conclusion that the facts and circumstances would warrant a person of

       reasonable caution to believe that Brummett committed the act of driving

       without a license as a class C misdemeanor under Ind. Code § 9-24-18-1, we

       need not decide the impact of any distinction between an infraction and a

       misdemeanor upon a determination of probable cause.

[17]   Even assuming that the search incident to arrest exception does not apply, we

       cannot say reversal is warranted. Generally, “[a] routine traffic stop . . . is a

       relatively brief encounter and ‘is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . .

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024         Page 15 of 27
       than to a formal arrest.’” Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 791 (Ind. 2001)

       (quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488 (1998) (quoting

       Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984))). The

       United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968),

       explained that police officers may employ investigative techniques short of

       arrest on less than probable cause without violating Fourth Amendment

       interests. Id. at 792. The principal issue is whether the police action in question

       was reasonable under all the circumstances. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms,

       434 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1977)). “To determine whether an

       investigative stop was reasonable ‘our inquiry is a dual one—whether the

       officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably

       related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first

       place.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879).

[18]   To conduct a patdown during a Terry stop, an “officer need not be absolutely

       certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent

       man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that

       of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. “To

       determine whether an officer acted reasonably, we consider the specific,

       reasonable inferences that the officer, in light of his experience, can draw from

       the facts.” Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1205 (Ind. 2020) (citing Terry, 392

       U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2681 (2021). “In addition, a

       police officer ‘justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious

       behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024        Page 16 of 27
       the officer or to others,’ is entitled to conduct a limited patdown search of the

       suspect’s outer clothing to search for a weapon.” Jackson v. State, 669 N.E.2d

       744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S. Ct. 1868).

[19]   With respect to Brummett’s argument that a reasonably prudent person in the

       circumstances would not be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of

       others was in danger, we disagree. To the extent Brummett cites Hill v. State,

       956 N.E.2d 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, 7 we find that case

       distinguishable. In Hill, officers with the Anderson Police Department initiated

       a traffic stop, and an occupant of the stopped vehicle fled the scene on foot. 956

       N.E.2d at 175. Officer Keith Gaskill was in his patrol car nearby and heard a

       radio dispatch stating that a “light-skinned” black male had fled on foot from

       the traffic stop. Id. at 175-176. The dispatch also provided information that led

       Officer Gaskill “to the area of [the] 1600 block of Madison Avenue.” Id. at 176.

       Officer Gaskill was driving slowly down an alley in that area when he saw a

       light-skinned black male pedestrian moving at a pace that “seemed quick[,] like

       he was leaving somewhere quickly.” Id. “[G]iven the distance and the

       direction of the traffic stop” from Officer Gaskill’s location, he surmised that

       the man might be the suspect police were seeking. Id. Officer Gaskill stopped

       his patrol car, exited the car, and approached the man, later identified as

       Dejuan Hill. Id. Officer Gaskill told Hill to stop and to walk towards him. Id.

       7
           Justice Sullivan and Justice David voted to grant the petition to transfer.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024                Page 17 of 27
       Hill reached into his pants’ pocket, but complied when Officer Gaskill

       instructed him to take his hand out of his pocket. Id. Officer Gaskill “felt” like

       Hill was preparing to flee. Id. Officer Gaskill described Hill’s actions as

       follows:

               He was looking around. I’ve seen a lot of people flee from me
               and other officers. He was looking around rapidly, continued to
               back away, and stuck his hand down in his pocket. I asked him
               to remove that, [and Hill was doing] what I would call cocking
               his body and looking around for an avenue. I don’t know if that
               explains it if you can visualize that but that’s what I’m familiar
               with when people are looking for a way to get away from my
               presence.

       Id. Officer Gaskill became suspicious of Hill given that he was a light-skinned

       black male who matched the description of the suspect; he was in a location

       consistent with where the suspect might be given information about the traffic

       stop and an address found on a pill bottle in the stopped car; and he gave

       inconsistent and nonsensical statements about his movements that evening. Id.

       Other officers arrived to assist Officer Gaskill, and Officer Gaskill still believed

       that Hill might flee. Id.

[20]   “Officer Gaskill conducted a pat-down search of Hill’s person, ostensibly for

       officer safety, which revealed a baggie containing a small amount of marijuana

       in Hill’s pants pocket.” Id. Officer Gaskill then arrested Hill and performed a

       second search incident to arrest. Id. No additional contraband was discovered.

       Id. Officer Gaskill transported Hill, who was in handcuffs, to the Muncie

       County Jail in the back of his patrol car. Id. En route, Officer Gaskill observed

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024         Page 18 of 27
       Hill making movements with his body that suggested to Officer Gaskill that Hill

       was removing contraband from his person. Id. Once they arrived at the jail and

       Hill exited the car, Officer Gaskill searched the back seat and found a small gun

       under the seat. Id. at 176-177. Hill appealed his conviction for unlawful

       possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a class B felony. Id. at 175.

[21]   On appeal, another panel of this Court agreed with Hill that the evidence did

       not support a determination that Officer Gaskill held a reasonable belief that

       Hill was armed and dangerous at the time of the patdown search. Id. at 177-

       178. The Court held:

               First, none of the information relating to the suspect who fled
               from the traffic stop indicated that he was armed or dangerous.
               Second, while Officer Gaskill testified that he “do[esn’t] like” it
               when a suspect puts his hand in his pocket, like Hill did, Hill
               complied when Officer Gaskill told him to remove his hand from
               the pocket. Transcript at 11. And when asked whether he had
               “some concern about whether [Hill] would have a weapon” in
               his pocket, Officer Gaskill replied only that he is generally
               “concerned about people with weapons.” Id.

               Finally, Officer Gaskill testified on redirect examination that his
               “motive” for the pat-down search was his “own safety” given the
               one instance of the hand in the pocket and the fact that Hill was
               “looking around and cocking his body, et[ ]cetera.” Id. at 40.
               But, again, Hill put his hand in his pocket one time and complied
               when Officer Gaskill instructed him to remove it. And, as for the
               “looking around and cocking his body,” Officer Gaskill had
               described those actions as indicative of Hill’s apparent desire to
               flee. Id. In fact, while Officer Gaskill seemed very concerned
               that Hill looked like he was going to flee, he did not testify to
               facts that would support a reasonable, objective belief that Hill

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024       Page 19 of 27
               was armed and dangerous. Officer Gaskill made no connection
               between the likelihood that Hill would flee with any likelihood
               that he would be armed and dangerous.

       Id. at 178. The Court observed that the State made no argument that the

       evidence was not fruit of the poisonous tree, and it held that the gun found in

       the back seat of the patrol car did not have an independent source and the

       connection between the illegal search and the discovery of the gun was not

       attenuated. Id. at 179. It concluded that the trial court abused its discretion

       when it admitted the gun into evidence and reversed Hill’s conviction. Id.

[22]   Unlike in Hill where, when asked whether he had “some concern about

       whether [Hill] would have a weapon” in his pocket, Officer Gaskill replied only

       that he was generally “concerned about people with weapons,” 956 N.E.2d at

       178, the record in the present case indicates that Officer Reynolds relied upon

       Brummett’s behavior. Officer Reynolds testified that he had safety concerns at

       the time Brummett was still in the vehicle and asked Brummett to exit the

       vehicle due to these concerns. He also stated: “[T]hrough my experience, my

       training and everything it . . . made me seem to think he was contemplating his

       next move . . . which in that situation I’ve had you know vehicles take off and

       then there’s a vehicle pursuant [sic] or a door open and a foot chase or a fight or

       something like that.” Transcript Volume I at 61-62.                  On cross-examination,

       when asked for the reason for conducting a patdown, he answered: “[I]n order

       to ensure that there was no type of weapon or anything that would be on his

       possession. So, safety.” Id. at 69. While on cross-examination Officer

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024                 Page 20 of 27
       Reynolds mentioned that it was very common for people to carry weapons, the

       prosecutor asked if it was correct that Brummett’s behavior also led to the

       patdown, and Officer Reynolds answered: “Oh yeah absolutely.” Id. at 71.

[23]   We also find that Brummett’s behavior was different than Hill’s behavior,

       which included merely moving at a pace that seemed quick, looking around,

       placing his hand in his pocket, cocking his body, complying when Officer

       Gaskill instructed him to remove his hand from his pocket, and giving

       inconsistent statements about his movements. Hill, 956 N.E.2d at 176.

       Brummett failed to respond to Officer Reynolds’s questions, “sat there with his

       hands on the steering wheel,” acted “really nervous,” made furtive movements

       with his eyes, and “started freaking out.” Transcript Volume I at 61, 71. We

       also note that other officers arrived to assist Officer Gaskill in Hill before he

       conducted the patdown search of Hill’s person, see Hill, 956 N.E.2d at 176,

       while other officers had not arrived at the time Officer Reynolds conducted a

       patdown of Brummett. Further, unlike in Hill, Officer Reynolds testified that

       he was patrolling “a known high traffic area for narcotics.” Transcript Volume

       I at 81. We conclude that a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances

       would be warranted in the belief that their safety or that of others was in danger

       and we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence

       following the patdown. 8

       8
         To the extent Brummett asserts that Officer Reynolds “did not provide any testimony . . . that the item he
       felt in Brummett’s pocket was immediately apparent as contraband,” Appellant’s Brief at 14, we note that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024                               Page 21 of 27
[24]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Brummett’s conviction.

[25]   Affirmed.

       Bradford, J., concurs.

       Vaidik, J., dissents with separate opinion.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Paul J. Podlejski
       Anderson, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana
       Catherine E. Brizzi
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Officer Reynolds testified that he ran his hand across the outside of Brummett’s right pocket, felt “an item
       through plain feel that felt consistent to be a pretty large amount of crystal methamphetamine” and felt the
       same thing in a smaller quantity in Brummett’s left pocket. Transcript Volume I at 123.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024                               Page 22 of 27
       Vaidik, Judge, dissenting.

[26]   I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the trial court

       properly admitted the methamphetamine found on Brummett’s person because

       the search was either a valid protective search for weapons under Terry v. Ohio,

       392 U.S. 1 (1968), or a valid search incident to arrest. Because I do not believe

       that the State met its burden of proving that either exception to the warrant

       requirement applied, I would reverse Brummett’s conviction for Level 3 felony

       possession of methamphetamine.

[27]   Before trial, Brummett moved to suppress the methamphetamine found on his

       person, arguing that Officer Reynolds didn’t have reasonable fear that he was

       armed and dangerous as required by Terry. Under Terry, “an officer may, if he

       has reasonable fear that a suspect is armed and dangerous, frisk the outer

       clothing of that suspect to try to find weapons.” Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d

       1199, 1205 (Ind. 2020) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). The State filed a response

       in which it only argued that this was a valid protective search for weapons

       under Terry.

[28]   At the suppression hearing, Officer Reynolds testified that when he pulled

       Brummett over for turning without properly signaling, Brummett said he didn’t

       have a valid driver’s license. Tr. pp. 68, 119. Officer Reynolds said that before

       he ran Brummett’s information, he asked Brummett to exit his car and patted

       him down, finding methamphetamine in his pockets. As the majority points

       out, Officer Reynolds used all the right words to justify his pat down: Brummett

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024       Page 23 of 27
       was driving in an area known for “drug activity,” was “really nervous” and

       “freaking out a little bit,” and made “some pretty furtive” eye movements. Id. at

       57, 61, 71. Based on this, Officer Reynolds said he felt “uncomfortable” and

       had “safety concerns.” Id. at 61, 62. But Officer Reynolds also testified that he

       patted Brummett down because it was his practice to pat everyone down:

               Um, I went ahead [and did] the same thing I would do you
               know anytime I get someone out of the vehicle, especially if
               there’s a safety concern, I want to make sure they don’t have any
               weapons or anything on him. So, I went ahead and did an out[er]
               clothing pat down.

       Id. at 63 (emphases added). And when asked if Brummett had given him a

       reason to believe that he had a weapon on his person, Officer Reynolds

       responded:

               Um I think it’s very common for most people to carry weapons. I
               myself . . . have at least . . . a knife on my person and um a lot of
               people carry weapons.

       Id. at 69.

[29]   After taking the matter under advisement for over two months, the trial court

       denied Brummett’s motion to suppress. In doing so, it did not find that Officer

       Reynolds had reasonable fear that Brummett was armed and dangerous and

       therefore conducted a valid protective search for weapons. Instead, the court

       determined that the search was justified as a search incident to arrest, which

       was a basis neither party argued. This leads me to only one conclusion: the trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024         Page 24 of 27
       court didn’t believe Officer Reynolds when he said that Brummett was

       “freaking out,” “really nervous,” and making “furtive eye movements.” Rather,

       the trial court believed Officer Reynolds when he said that he pats down

       everyone he gets out of their vehicle. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 956 N.E.2d 174, 178

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that a general concern that people carry weapons

       does not authorize a protective search for weapons under Terry), trans. denied;

       I.G. v. State, 177 N.E.3d 75, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that a police

       officer’s practice to pat everyone down does not satisfy the pat-down

       exception).

[30]   Despite the trial court’s rejection of Officer Reynolds’s testimony, the majority

       finds that this was a valid protective search for weapons under Terry. In doing

       so, the majority is necessarily re-judging Officer Reynolds’s credibility, which

       we may not do. See Washington v. State, 922 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2010). In case after case, we faithfully follow the time-honored rule of appellate

       judging: don’t second guess a trial court’s credibility determination. We adhere

       to this precept even though sometimes we must suspend our disbelief.

       Whatever the consequence, we are bound to defer to the trial court on whom to

       believe or disbelieve. Because the trial court did not believe Officer Reynolds’s

       testimony, I cannot agree to affirm the admission of the methamphetamine on

       the basis that Officer Reynolds conducted a valid protective search for weapons

       under Terry.

[31]   This, then, leaves the trial court’s reasoning for admitting the drugs: the search-

       incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. According to this

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024        Page 25 of 27
       exception, “once a lawful arrest has been made, authorities may conduct a full

       search of the arrestee for weapons or concealed evidence.” Edwards v. State, 759

       N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. 2001) (quotation omitted). “[A]s long as probable cause

       exists to make an arrest, the fact that a suspect was not formally placed under

       arrest at the time of the search incident thereto will not invalidate the search.”

       I.G., 177 N.E.3d at 78 (quotation omitted); see also VanPelt v. State, 760 N.E.2d

       218, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“The critical issue is not when the arrest occurs

       but whether there was probable cause to arrest at the time of the search.”), trans.

       denied. “Probable cause to arrest arises when, at the time of the arrest, the

       arresting officer knows of facts and circumstances that would warrant a person

       of reasonable caution to believe that the defendant committed the criminal act

       in question.” I.G., 177 N.E.3d at 78.

[32]   As an initial matter, I am skeptical of the State’s claim that this exception

       applies. At the suppression hearing, Officer Reynolds didn’t testify that he was

       arresting or planning to arrest Brummett or that he performed a full search,

       which is what a search incident to arrest entails. Rather, he testified that he

       performed a limited search for weapons. This is presumably why the State did

       not argue the search-incident-to-arrest exception below.

[33]   But even if the State had argued this exception below, I do not believe that it

       applies. Indiana Code section 9-24-1-1 provides that operating a motor vehicle

       without a valid license—which Officer Brummett testified that Brummett

       admitted to—is an infraction, not a misdemeanor. According to Indiana Code

       section 35-33-1-1(a)(4), a police officer may arrest a person when the officer has

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024        Page 26 of 27
       probable cause to believe that the person is committing or attempting to commit

       a misdemeanor—not an infraction—in the officer’s presence. See also Taylor v.

       State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 333 n.6 (Ind. 2006).

[34]   It is true that Indiana Code section 9-24-18-1 provides that it is a Class C

       misdemeanor for a person to knowingly or intentionally operate a motor

       vehicle without ever receiving a valid driver’s license. However, there was no

       indication at the time of the search that Brummett had never received a driver’s

       license. Rather, the indication was that he didn’t have a valid one. See Tr. p.

       119 (“I asked him at that time if he had a valid driver’s license, and he said no

       he didn’t.”); see also id. at 68. As such, I believe the State failed to prove that the

       search-incident-to-arrest exception applied. I would therefore reverse

       Brummett’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1298 | March 12, 2024           Page 27 of 27