Court Opinion

ID: 9716277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:33:03.674445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.338040
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: The majority’s refusal to limit the reporter’s privilege statute “to protect only those photographs depicting the identity of news sources” (323 Ill. App. 3d at 624) is a fundamental departure from the language of the statute and the existing case law. I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the trial court. The reporter’s privilege statute provides that “[n]o court may compel any person to disclose the source of any information obtained by a reporter” except after application to the court for an order divesting the privilege. (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/8—901 (West 1998). The court shall not order divestiture unless all other sources of information have been exhausted and disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the public interest. 735 ILCS 5/8— 907(2) (West 1998). In Palacio, we rejected the argument that mere assertion of the privilege made the procedural aspects of the reporter’s privilege statute applicable. “That statute does not *** constitute a wholesale ban on ever calling reporters to testify unless the trial court has complied with the divestment procedures ***.” (Emphasis in original.) Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 607 N.E.2d at 1383. In Palacio, defendant was shot while committing home invasion and arson. Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1082, 607 N.E.2d at 1377. During closing argument the prosecutor stated that “the truth of the matter is, he got shot one too few times.” (Emphasis omitted.) Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1087, 607 N.E.2d at 1380. In a posttrial motion, defendant argued the comment was intentional, and defendant quoted a newspaper article where the prosecutor had stated, “I’m not too sure [it was] wrong.” Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1098, 607 N.E.2d at 1387. Defendant attempted to call the reporter to confirm the conversation and perhaps testify whether the prosecutor made other statements. Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1099, 607 N.E.2d at 1388. We rejected the reporter’s claim that the reporter’s privilege statute applied. The privilege “is not without its limits; it applies only to circumstances in which someone seeks to compel a reporter to disclose the source of any information obtained by the reporter.” (Emphasis in original.) Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1093-94, 607 N.E.2d at 1384. We noted the appropriate concern was “about harassment of the press and efforts to disrupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources.” Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1093, 607 N.E.2d at 1384. Consider this hypothetical. A reporter witnesses a murder on a public street, writes down the license number of the car in which the murderer fled, and writes an article about the event. The prosecution attempts to call the reporter as a witness at a criminal trial, but the reporter refuses to testify, arguing that the prosecution must show that “all other available sources of information have been exhausted,” and “disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the public interest.” 735 ILCS 5/8—907(2) (West 1998). There is clearly no reporter’s privilege. Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 607 N.E.2d at 1383 (statute protects against disclosure of sources, not disclosure of information). Short of government harassment, the media must bear the same burden of producing evidence of criminal wrongdoing as any other citizen. People v. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill. 2d 177, 198-99, 724 N.E.2d 901, 914 (2000), quoting United States v. Smith, 135 E3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998). If a reporter refused to testify about a crime that he observed, we would force him to do so, even though he argued that he was being forced to disclose himself as the “source” of the information, and even though the notes he made of the event were a “means” of obtaining the information. The majority now abandons the holding in Palacio that the reporter’s privilege is “limited,” in favor of a broad holding that whenever a litigant seeks a photograph from a newspaper the litigant must first file an application for divestment of privilege. In Palacio, we “[d]ecline[d] to read out of section 8—901 *** the phrase ‘to disclose the source of any information.’ (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8—901.” Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 607 N.E.2d at 1383. The majority, however, does exactly that today: “By defining ‘source’ to include a ‘means,’ the legislature clearly intended the privilege to protect more than simply the names and identities of witnesses, informants, and other persons providing news to a reporter. We note the legislature did not limit the scope of section 8—901 of the Code by inserting either ‘the name of or ‘the identity of before ‘the source of any information.’ ” 323 Ill. App. 3d at 624. The majority notes that “source” is defined by the statute to mean “ ‘the person or means from or through which the news or information was obtained,’ ” and a photograph can be a “means.” (Emphasis omitted.) 323 Ill. App. 3d at 624, quoting 735 ILCS 5/8—902(c) (West 1998). The majority would accordingly allow a reporter to assert the privilege where the source of his information was a library book, even though there was no concern about identifying that source or disruption of the reporter’s relationship with that source. In some cases, disclosing the means by which information was obtained will “disclose the source of [the] information.” 735 ILCS 5/8—901 (West 1998). If a source has made a tape recording of a conversation between herself and a public figure, and turns the tape recording over to a reporter, disclosure of the means will also identify the source. If a source has made a photograph of herself and another individual at a location where the individual was not expected to be, disclosure of the photograph will also disclose the source of the information. In the present case, however, the source of the information was the crime scene. Turning over the photographs might disclose information known to the reporter/photographer, but it does not “disclose the source of any information” (735 ILCS 5/8—901 (West 1998)), nor does it “disrupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources” (Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1093, 607 N.E.2d at 1374). In the present case,. the photographs taken by the reporter were no different than notes made by a reporter of events observed by him. Absent disclosure of a source, the reporter’s privilege statute did not apply, and there was no need to file an application for divestment. Reporters have some protections even when the reporter’s privilege does not apply. The special witness doctrine applies to reporters. Palacio, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 1094-102, 607 N.E.2d at 1384-90. The trial court considered the special witness doctrine in this case, conducted a hearing, and issued a thoughtful order, concluding that the photographs should be turned over. At the present time, of course, there is no indication that the reporter/photographer will be called to testify. The rights of respondents have been fully protected in this case.