Court Opinion

ID: 9965697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 13:10:30.074468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.148574
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania              :
                                          :
                v.                        :   No. 415 C.D. 2021
                                          :   Argued: September 11, 2023
Richard A. Prentiss,                      :
                              Appellant   :

BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
                HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                               FILED: May 3, 2024

                Richard A. Prentiss appeals two orders of the Court of Common Pleas
of Clearfield County (trial court) convicting him of summary offenses under the
Game and Wildlife Code (Game Code).1 The first order convicted Prentiss of
“shooting on or across highways” in violation of Section 2504(a) of the Game Code,
34 Pa C.S. §2504(a), and sentenced him to pay a fine of $150 “for the benefit of
Clearfield County” plus costs of prosecution. Trial Court Order, 12/7/2020. The
second order convicted Prentiss of “unlawful taking or possession of game or
wildlife” in violation of Section 2307(a) of the Game Code, 34 Pa. C.S. §2307(a),
and sentenced him to pay a fine of $1,500 “for the benefit of Clearfield County” plus
costs of prosecution and “replacement costs” of $1,666.68 to the Commonwealth.
Trial Court Order, 12/7/2020. We affirm the trial court’s conviction for the violation
of Section 2504(a) of the Game Code and reverse the conviction for the violation of
Section 2307(a).        Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to determine an
appropriate sentence.

1
    34 Pa. C.S. §§101-2965.
                                    Background
             The Keystone Elk County Alliance is a non-profit organization that
preserves elk in Clearfield and Elk Counties. To raise funds, the Alliance conducts
an annual raffle, with the approval of the Pennsylvania Game Commission, for the
issuance of an early hunting license authorizing the kill of a single elk. In 2019,
Prentiss won the raffle, which also entitled him to professional guide services. Kim
Rensel and Gary Couteret, who are affiliated with Elk County Outfitters, volunteered
to provide these services to Prentiss for a period of seven days, beginning on
September 11, 2019.
             On the third day of hunting, September 13, 2019, Rensel “was guiding
Prentiss at different hunting locations.”      Trial Court Op. at 1.       Ben Gnan
accompanied them to film the hunt for potential use in a documentary. After leaving
their first planned location for hunting, Rensel drove Prentiss and Gnan to the second
planned location. As they were driving, “Rensel and Prentiss crossed paths with
Couteret,” who was traveling in a separate vehicle. Id. Couteret stopped his vehicle
on the road and told Rensel and Prentiss (who were still in the vehicle) that “there
were elk in the field around the corner.” Id. Couteret drove away, and Rensel parked
his vehicle on the side of the road. He and Prentiss walked across the road onto a
field. As they did, a herd of elk moved into that field from the woods, followed by
a large bull elk. At a point approximately 10 feet from the edge of the road, Prentiss
took several shots at the bull elk in the distance. The party later determined that the
shots had succeeded in killing the elk.
             On March 10, 2020, Prentiss, Rensel, and Couteret were each
separately cited by the Game Commission for their actions on September 13, 2019.
Prentiss was cited for shooting on or across a highway in violation of Section 2504(a)

                                          2
of the Game Code and for violating Section 2307(a) of the Game Code by aiding,
abetting, concealing, or taking wildlife contrary to a provision of the Game Code,
which provision was not named. After a hearing before the magisterial district judge,
Prentiss was found guilty.
                Prentiss appealed, and the trial court conducted a de novo trial on
September 28, 2020. At the outset of the trial, Prentiss’ counsel moved to dismiss
Prentiss’ charge for violating Section 2307(a) of the Game Code for the stated reason
that the citation lacked the specificity required by the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See PA.R.CRIM.P. 403(A)(6).2 The trial court did not rule on
the motion but stated that it would “take the defense objection under advisement.”
Notes of Testimony, 9/28/2020, at 6 (N.T. __); Reproduced Record at 9 (R.R. __).
                The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Gnan, the cameraman.
He testified that the plan for September 13, 2019, was for the party to “drive to a
specific location, get out and hunt at that location[.]” N.T. 14; R.R. 11. They went
first to a place called “Hoover plot” and because they did not “see anything there[,]”
they decided to move to the Kolovoski property, where “[they] had been the prior
two days[.]” N.T. 14; R.R. 11. Prentiss killed the bull elk on the Hoffman property,
which is “[a]cross the road” from the Kolovoski property. N.T. 17; R.R. 12. Gnan
filmed the conversation between the trucks of Couteret and Rensel while in the road
and the shooting of the bull elk, and the Commonwealth played Gnan’s video at the
trial. Gnan testified that the group’s conduct that day did not constitute road hunting.
                The Commonwealth also presented testimony of Mark Gritzer, a game
warden for the Game Commission, who offered his interpretation of Gnan’s video.

2
 It states that, “[e]very citation shall contain: . . . (6) a citation of the specific section and subsection
of the statute or ordinance allegedly violated, together with a summary of the facts sufficient to
advise the defendant of the nature of the offense charged[.]” PA.R.CRIM.P. 403(A)(6).
                                                     3
He noted that Couteret told Rensel and Prentiss, while they were in their separate
vehicles, that there was a bull elk “in the woods” located “around the corner.” N.T.
24; R.R. 13. According to Gritzer, Rensel and Prentiss responded by parking the
vehicle to “get out to pursue that animal.” N.T. 24; R.R. 13. Gritzer estimated the
distance from Rensel’s vehicle to the intersection of Oak Hill Road and Hoffman
Road to be 52 yards. Gritzer noted, further, that as they crossed the road, Rensel
told Prentiss that “he cannot shoot across the road.” N.T. 27-28; R.R. 14. Gritzer
estimated that Prentiss took his first shot at the elk at approximately 10 feet from the
road’s edge “based on the location of the stop sign in the video footage.” N.T. 28;
R.R. 14. Gritzer believed that from the time of Prentiss’ exit from the vehicle to his
first shot at the elk, two minutes had passed.
             On cross-examination, Gritzer acknowledged that the area where the
shooting took place was known as a traditional breeding ground that “attracts a lot
of big bulls coming to that area to participate in the breeding situation.” N.T. 32;
R.R. 15. Gritzer also acknowledged that he arrived at the scene within minutes after
the elk was killed and did not see “anything wrong.” N.T. 31; R.R. 15. He initiated
his investigation only after receiving a copy of Gnan’s video several months later.
             Rensel testified. He explained that he and Prentiss “pre-planned each
location where [they] were going to go and look for the elk.” N.T. 47; R.R. 19. On
September 11, 2019, they went to the Kolovoski property where they saw the bull
elk that was shot two days later. They did not shoot the elk on the first day because
“the wind was wrong” and the elk “did not present himself for a shot.” N.T. 46;
R.R. 19.   On September 12, 2019, they went back to the same area and saw elk
traveling towards the “large field on the Kolovoski property.” N.T. 47; R.R. 19. On
September 13, 2019, Rensel and Prentiss first went to the Hoover property where

                                           4
they saw two smaller bull elk, which they chose not to take. Instead, they continued
hunting.
            Rensel testified as follows:

            [Counsel:] . . . And did you then go to another site?
            [Rensel:] Yes. It was about eight miles away, was the Kolovoski
            property.
            [Counsel:] Okay.
            [Rensel:] And knowing that [the elks] were traveling toward the
            large field the night before, not knowing if the big bull was there,
            we parked alongside that road and were going to access it from
            the far end, come up towards that field through that little access
            road.
            [Counsel:] That second location you went to, was that pre-
            planned/pre-determined?
            [Rensel:] Yes.
            ....
            [Counsel:] So tell the Court what happened as you were going up
            to that location.
            [Rensel:] We came across Oak Hill Church Road coming from
            Quehanna Highway. We come to a T on Hoffman Road, I
            believe that it is there, made a left. And at that point Mr. Couteret
            came up and said he had heard elk. I pulled over, as I was going
            to anyway.
            ....
            [Counsel:] Had you expected to see Mr. Couteret at that point at
            that location?
            [Rensel:] Sometimes we have – he knew I was going there, and
            he showed up knowing that I was going to be there. That’s all.
            [Counsel:] But there was no preplanning that he was going to
            meet you?
            [Rensel:] No, no. We went there knowing we were going to the
            Kolovoski property.

                                           5
               [Counsel:] Did you park where you intended to park?
               [Rensel:] Yes.

N.T. 48-49; R.R. 19-20 (emphasis added). Rensel stated that he did not see any elk
while in his vehicle or hear any “bugling.” N.T. 56-57; R.R. 21-22. Rensel
explained that because Prentiss had “physical limitations” and “walked with a
cane[,]” they were “limited to how far he can go and how fast he can go.” N.T. 50;
R.R. 20. Rensel testified that the property where they “had actually harvested the
animal” belonged to “Mr. Hoffman,” and they paid him a fee for harvesting. N.T.
51; R.R. 20.
               Prentiss testified on his behalf. He explained that Elk County Outfitters
picked places to hunt where he “can get out and just get into wherever [they are]
going to hunt because [he] can’t walk up the mountains and down the other side like
they do with the normal hunt.” N.T. 60; R.R. 22. The plan for September 13, 2019,
was to “try another spot” before going back to the “original property [they] hunted
on the past two days,” i.e., the Kolovoski property. N.T. 61; R.R. 23. Prentiss
testified that they went back to the Kolovoski property because he “liked the size of
the bull that [he had] seen the first day when [they] were there” and believed it might
“be hanging out” there. N.T. 68; R.R. 24. With respect to the shooting in question,
Prentiss testified that he did not load his rifle until he “stepped on to the other side”
of the road where they had parked. N.T. 63; R.R. 23.
                                 Trial Court Decision
               By order of December 7, 2020, the trial court found Prentiss guilty of
the charges under Sections 2307(a) and 2504(a) of the Game Code and sentenced
him to pay total fines of $1,650, plus costs of prosecution, and to pay “replacement
costs” of $1,666.68 to the Commonwealth. Trial Court Order, 12/7/2020.

                                            6
               In its opinion, the trial court rejected Prentiss’ argument that the citation
for violation of Section 2307(a) of the Game Code did not satisfy Pennsylvania Rule
of Criminal Procedure 403(A)(6). The court found that “looking at the citations [as
a whole],” it provided sufficient notice of the nature of the offense. Trial Court Op.
at 3; R.R. 29. Accordingly, the trial court refused to dismiss the charge.
               The trial court next considered the charge for violation of Section
2504(a) of the Game Code, which prohibits shooting at a wild animal “within 25
yards of the traveled portion of the public highway” after “alighting from a motor
vehicle[.]”    34 Pa. C.S. §2504(a).           Prentiss shot the bull elk while standing
approximately 10 feet from the edge of the public highway and within 2 minutes of
leaving his vehicle. Distinguishing Prentiss’ conduct from that which was held
lawful in Commonwealth v. Payne, 995 A.2d 1239 (Pa. Super. 2010), the trial court
concluded that Prentiss engaged in unlawful “road hunting,” which is “dangerous
behavior to other users of the highway” and prohibited under Section 2504(a) of the
Game Code. Trial Court Op. at 5; R.R. 31. Conceding that the “[c]ourts have yet to
determine a bright[-]line rule of road hunting,” the trial court nevertheless declined
to apply the rule of lenity against the Commonwealth. Trial Court Op. at 7; R.R. 33.
               Prentiss appealed to this Court.
                                             Appeal
               On appeal,3 Prentiss raises three issues for our consideration, which we
combine into two for clarity. First, Prentiss argues that the trial court erred by not

3
  “Our standard of review when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a conviction for a
summary offense is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial, together with all reasonable
inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier of fact could have
found that each element of the [offense] charged was supported by evidence and inferences
sufficient in law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Austin, 846 A.2d

                                                 7
dismissing the Section 2307(a) charge because the citation did not allege the basic
elements of the offense and, thus, failed to satisfy the requirements of Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 403(A)(6). Second, Prentiss argues that the trial court
erred in holding the Commonwealth’s evidence sufficient to convict him of “road
hunting” as prohibited by Section 2504(a). Alternatively, Prentiss contends the trial
court was required, and failed, to apply the rule of lenity against the Commonwealth
because the “road hunting” provisions in the Game Code are unclear, as
acknowledged by the trial court. We address the issues seriatim.
                           Section 2307(a) of the Game Code
              Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, a citation for
violation of the Game Code must provide notice of the offense. See PA.R.CRIM.P.
403(A)(6). Relying on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Redovan, 227
A.3d 453 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020), Prentiss argues that his citation was “fatally
defective” on the Section 2307(a) charge, because it contained only a “boilerplate
recitation of the statute” without a specific reference to which provision of the Game
Code was relevant to the charge of unlawful possession. Prentiss Brief at 13. As
such, it did set forth the basic elements of the offense.
              The Commonwealth responds that its citation was adequate because it
recited the date, approximate time, and location of the bull elk incident. In any case,
the Commonwealth contends that Prentiss did not suffer “actual prejudice,” which
is required for a summary citation to be dismissed for defects therein.
Commonwealth Brief at 6 (citing Borough of Walnutport v. Dennis, 114 A.3d 11, 21
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)).

798, 800 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). In reviewing a question of statutory construction, our scope of
review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo. Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,
977 A.2d 1132, 1142 (Pa. 2009).
                                               8
             Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right . . . to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him[.]” PA. CONST. art. I, §9. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 403(A)(6) states:
             (A) Every citation shall contain:
             ....
                   (6) a citation of the specific section and subsection of the
                   statute or ordinance allegedly violated, together with a
                   summary of the facts sufficient to advise the defendant of
                   the nature of the offense charged[.]

PA.R.CRIM.P. 403(A)(6) (emphasis added).
             “[T]he essential elements of a summary offense must be set forth in the
citation so that the defendant has fair notice of the nature of the unlawful act for
which he is charged.” Commonwealth v. Nicely, 988 A.2d 799, 806 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Borriello, 696 A.2d 1215, 1217 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1997)). Stated otherwise, a “defendant should not have to guess which charges have
been placed against him. If charges in an indictment are not clear and explicit a
defendant cannot properly defend against them.” Borough of Walnutport, 114 A.3d
at 20 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 289 A.2d 153, 155 (Pa. Super. 1972)).
             A defect in a criminal citation is not necessarily fatal to the
Commonwealth’s prosecution. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide as follows:
             A defendant shall not be discharged nor shall a case be dismissed
             because of a defect in the form or content of a complaint, citation,
             summons, or warrant, or a defect in the procedures of these rules,
             unless the defendant raises the defect before the conclusion of
             the trial in a summary case or before the conclusion of the
             preliminary hearing in a court case, and the defect is prejudicial
             to the rights of the defendant.

                                          9
PA.R.CRIM.P. 109 (emphasis added). A defect is not prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant “where the content of the citation, taken as a whole, sufficiently notifies
the defendant as to the nature of the summary offense or where the defect or omission
does not involve the basic elements of the offense charged.” Borough of Walnutport,
114 A.3d at 21 (emphasis added).
               In Redovan, 227 A.3d 453, the defendant was charged with hunting
over bait, in violation of Section 2308(a)(8) of the Game Code,4 which prohibits “the
use of any artificial or natural bait, salt, chemical, mineral or other food as an
enticement for game or wildlife . . . .” Redovan, 227 A.3d at 455. The citation did
not specify the type of bait used. After trial, the court found the defendant guilty of
hunting over bait that consisted of corn.
               On appeal, we reversed the conviction. We held, inter alia, that the
citation did not conform to PA.R.CRIM.P. 403(A)(6) because it did not specify

4
 It states:
        (a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in this title, it is unlawful for any
        person to hunt or aid, abet, assist or conspire to hunt any game or wildlife through
        the use of:
        ....
                (8) Any artificial or natural bait, hay, grain, fruit, nut, salt, chemical,
                mineral or other food as an enticement for game or wildlife, regardless of
                kind and quantity, or take advantage of any such area or food or bait prior
                to 30 days after the removal of such material and its residue. Nothing
                contained in this subsection shall pertain to normal or accepted farming,
                habitat management practices, oil and gas drilling, mining, forest
                management activities or other legitimate commercial or industrial
                practices. Upon discovery of such baited areas, whether prosecution is
                contemplated or not, the commission may cause a reasonable area
                surrounding the enticement to be posted against hunting or taking game or
                wildlife. The posters shall remain for 30 days after complete removal of the
                bait.
34 Pa. C.S. §2308(a)(8) (emphasis added).
                                                10
whether the illegal conduct was for the use of salt or corn as bait. The game warden
had indicated to the defendant that he would be cited for using salt as bait. Redovan,
227 A.3d at 457. However, he was convicted of using corn.
              In Commonwealth v. Halstead, 79 A.3d 1240 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), this
Court considered a challenge to a citation for defective windows and other structures
in violation of a property maintenance ordinance. We held that the citation provided
adequate notice for the windows but not for other structures, such as deteriorated
roof joists, because they were not specified in the citation. We reversed the
conviction.
              By contrast, in Borough of Walnutport, 114 A.3d 11, this Court
affirmed the conviction for nonpayment of garbage removal service invoices in
violation of the municipal solid waste ordinance. The property owner challenged
the citation as defective because it did not identify the date of the offense; whether
he resided at the property; or whether he used the garbage removal service. We
rejected this challenge. The citation stated that “the defendant failed to pay the
garbage bill for the garbage removal services provided to the property[,]” and the
ordinance did not require residency or actual use of the service.5 Id. at 21 (citation
omitted). The lack of a date in the citation was held not prejudicial because the
record established that the borough had mailed the invoices and posted notices of

5
 The municipal solid waste ordinance stated as follows:
      The legal and/or equitable owner(s) of the real estate containing a residential
      establishment shall be responsible to pay, and shall pay, the fees, fines and penalties
      as may be imposed pursuant to the provisions of this article. A residential
      establishment is exempt from this section only if it is an unoccupied dwelling unit
      as defined pursuant to this article.
Borough of Walnutport, 114 A.3d at 21 (quoting Walnutport Borough Solid Waste Ordinance,
Ordinance No. 2011-05, Section 16, enacted May 12, 2011) (emphasis added).
                                             11
the fees owed on the door of the property. Lest there be any doubt, the owner
stipulated that he did not pay the invoices in question.
               Section 2307(a) of the Game Code sets forth the elements of the offense
as follows:
               (a) General rule.--It is unlawful for any person to aid, abet,
               attempt or conspire to hunt for or take or possess, use, transport
               or conceal any game or wildlife unlawfully taken or not properly
               marked or any part thereof, or to hunt for, trap, take, kill,
               transport, conceal, possess or use any game or wildlife contrary
               to the provisions of this title.

34 Pa. C.S. §2307(a) (emphasis added). Section 2307(a) lists numerous activities,
from aiding and abetting to trapping, transporting, concealing, possessing, and using
game in a manner “contrary to the provisions of this title.” Id. These activities, on
their own, are not unlawful under Section 2307(a); rather, these activities must be
unlawful under another provision of the Game Code in order for the Commonwealth
to establish a violation of Section 2307(a). Stated otherwise, Section 2307(a)
depends upon another provision of the Game Code to have efficacy. It does not
stand alone.
               Here, the Game Commission’s citation was based, presumably, upon
Prentiss’ taking or possession of game “contrary to the provisions of this title.” 34
Pa. C.S. §2307(a). Prentiss argues that the citation was inadequate because it did
not specify which provision “of this title” was implicated and whether the alleged
unlawful conduct was aiding, concealing, transporting, possessing, or hunting. We
agree.
               The Game Commission used a standard citation form with a number of
boxes to be filled out. On the Section 2307(a) citation, boxes 20-21 state as follows:
               Charge[:] Unlawful Taking or Possession of Game or Wildlife

                                           12
             Nature of Offense[:] The defendant did unlawfully, aid, abet,
             attempt or conspire to hunt for or take or possess, use, transport
             or conceal any game or wildlife unlawfully taken or not properly
             marked or any part thereof or hunt for, take, kill, transport,
             possess or use game or wildlife contrary to the title. To wit: bull
             elk.
R.R. 4 (emphasis added). Other boxes on the citation form were filled out as follows:

             Date of Offense[:] 09/13/2019
             Location of Offense[:] Intersection of Oak Hill Road & Paul
             Hoffman Road
             Time[:] (Approx) 0724
             County[:] Clearfield
             City-Twp-Boro[:] Karthaus
             34 Pa. C.S. Sec. 2307 Sub. Sec. (a)
             Confidential Information Section[:] . . . . Commonwealth
             requesting replacement cost for resource as per 34 Pa. C.S.
             Section 925(l) and 58 Pa. Code Section 131.8 - $5,000[.]
             Evidence seizure tag #48527-antlers/meat & evidence seizure tag
             # 83529-(2) video flash drives depicting hunt subject guided by
             Elk County Outfitters guide Kim Rensel & Gary Couteret
R.R. 4.

             The citation summarized the text of Section 2307(a) and added two
words: “bull elk.” R.R. 4. The citation then identified the place, date, and time of
the bull elk incident and the Game Commission’s seizure of “antlers/meat” and flash
drives “depicting hunt subject.” Id. However, as in Redovan, the citation lacked the
requisite specificity. It did not specify the nature of the conduct, whether hunting,
concealing, or transporting, and it did not identify the provisions “of this title” to
which this conduct was “contrary.” 34 Pa. C.S. §2307(a). Prentiss was left guessing.

                                         13
             The Commonwealth argues that Prentiss did not suffer prejudice. If
Prentiss did not understand the Section 2307(a) charge before the magisterial district
judge’s hearing, he certainly understood the particulars by the time of the trial court
hearing. We reject this argument, which reduces the magisterial district judge’s
hearing to a dress rehearsal. The Commonwealth’s argument empties the citation of
meaning and places no burden on the prosecution to set the bounds of its case in
advance of the magisterial district judge’s hearing.
             Actual prejudice is found where the content of the citation does not
notify the defendant “as to the nature of the summary offense” or where the defect
or omission involves “the basic elements of the offense charged.” Borough of
Walnutport, 114 A.3d at 21. This is what occurred here. The citation for the Section
2307(a) charge did not inform Prentiss whether he aided, abetted, possessed,
concealed, or transported game, and how this conduct was contrary to an unnamed
provision “of this title.” 34 Pa. C.S. §2307(a). The lacunae in Prentiss’ citation were
neither trivial nor irrelevant, as in Borough of Walnutport.
             We conclude, and hold, that as in Redovan, 227 A.3d 453, the citation
for violation of Section 2307(a) of the Game Code was inadequate under
PA.R.CRIM.P. 403(A)(6). We reverse the trial court’s determination that Prentiss
violated Section 2307(a) of the Game Code because this charge should have been
dismissed.
                        Section 2504(a) of the Game Code
             Prentiss argues, next, that the trial court erred by convicting him of
“road hunting” under Section 2504(a) of the Game Code. Relying on the Superior
Court’s holding in Payne, 995 A.2d 1239, Prentiss argues that the Commonwealth
did not prove a violation of Section 2504(a). It did not show that he “quickly”

                                          14
emerged from the vehicle and “scramble[d]” to “shoot at game observed from the
highway,” which is the conduct proscribed by Section 2504(a), as it has been
construed in Payne, 995 A.2d at 1241-42. Prentiss and his party did not observe any
elk from their vehicle; they parked the vehicle at the pre-planned location; and they
did not see any elk until they crossed the highway and entered the field. Further, no
one was in the vicinity, let alone traveling on the two-lane, unpaved township road,
when Prentiss fired his rifle.
             The Commonwealth concedes that Payne involved a hunter shooting a
wild animal less than 25 yards from the road but argues that Payne is distinguishable.
There, approximately 45 minutes transpired between the defendant’s exit from the
vehicle and his shot at the deer. Here, Prentiss and Rensel “immediately pull[ed]
over” after receiving information from Couteret that game was in the area, and
Prentiss took his first shot at the elk approximately two minutes after leaving the
vehicle. Commonwealth Brief at 16.

             We start with a review of Section 2504 of the Game Code. It states as
follows:
             (a) General rule.--It is unlawful for any person to shoot at any
             game or wildlife while it is on a public highway or on a highway
             open to use or used by the public or to shoot across a public
             highway or a highway or roadway open to use or used by the
             public unless the line of fire is high enough above the elevation
             of the highway to preclude any danger to the users of the
             highway. It shall be unlawful for any person, after alighting
             from a motor vehicle being driven on or stopped on or along a
             public highway or road open to public travel, to shoot at any wild
             bird or wild animal while the person doing the shooting is within
             25 yards of the traveled portion of the public highway or road
             open to public travel.
             (b) Penalty.--A violation of this section is a summary offense of
             the fourth degree.
                                         15
34 Pa. C.S. §2504 (emphasis added). Here, Prentiss was charged for conduct set
forth in the second sentence, which prohibits a hunter “after alighting from a motor
vehicle being driven on or stopped on or along a public highway . . . to shoot at any
. . . wild animal while the person doing the shooting is within 25 yards of the traveled
portion of the public highway or road open to public travel.” 34 Pa. C.S. §2504(a).
              In Payne, the defendant parked his vehicle along a public road, walked
75 feet, and took up a position 18 feet from the edge of the road. From that position,
he shot a deer “about 35 feet ‘into the woods.’” Payne, 995 A.2d at 1240 (citation
omitted). Forty-five minutes elapsed between the parking of the hunter’s vehicle
and his shot. The defendant appealed his conviction to the Superior Court, arguing
that Section 2504(a) permits a hunter to discharge his weapon within 25 yards of the
public road where, as in his case, the hunter has not recently alighted from a motor
vehicle.
              The Superior Court sustained the appeal, holding that the trial court
erred in its interpretation of Section 2504(a). It held that the defendant’s conduct
did not constitute alighting from a motor vehicle to shoot a wild animal, which is the
conduct Section 2504(a) of the Game Code prohibits. Payne, 995 A.2d at 1242.
Reading the two sentences of Section 2504(a) together, the Superior Court reasoned
as follows:
              In interpreting the second sentence of section 2504, we must
              conclude that the General Assembly intended to alleviate the
              same concerns, i.e., shooting on or across highways in a manner
              that poses a danger to users of the highway. The plain language
              of the second sentence of section 2504(a) indicates an intent by
              the General Assembly to preclude the practice of road hunting,
              i.e., the situation in which a hunter or hunters who are driving or
              riding in a vehicle on a public highway spot wildlife or game,
              alight from the vehicle, and shoot at the game when the hunter is
              “within 25 yards of the traveled portion of the public highway
                                          16
             . . . .” 34 Pa. C.S.[] §2504(a). Although the General Assembly
             did not use language setting forth a time limit on the word
             “alighting,” the clear tenor of the language was to prohibit road
             hunting, which, as described, is a reckless practice that may
             endanger users of the highway. A hunter who quickly emerges
             from a vehicle, and scrambles to shoot at game observed from
             the highway, while within 25 yards of the highway, engages in
             dangerous behavior to other users of the highway.

Payne, 995 A.2d at 1241-42 (emphasis added). Because the defendant “shot the deer
while it was on the same side of the road as where [he] was standing,” the defendant
did not shoot over the highway. Id. at 1242. Further, the defendant’s conduct “did
not constitute road hunting, and did not endanger any user of the highway, as section
2504 requires.” Id.
             Prentiss argues that Payne established that to violate Section 2504, the
defendant must “immediately fire a shot upon exiting the vehicle.” Prentiss Brief at
18. Stated otherwise, a person may “legally hunt within 25 yards of the traveled
portion of a public highway if he has not recently alighted from a motor vehicle.”
Payne, 995 A.2d at 1240 (emphasis added).                Prentiss argues that the
Commonwealth’s evidence did not make this showing.
             The Superior Court construed Section 2504(a) to prohibit “reckless”
hunting, where a hunter “quickly emerges from a vehicle, and scrambles to shoot at
game observed from the highway,” which endangers those on the highway. Payne,
995 A.2d at 1241-42. Payne is the only appellate court decision to construe Section
2504(a) of the Game Code and has been in effect since 2010. The Superior Court
employed several well-established principles of statutory construction in reaching
its conclusion. It held that both sentences in Section 2504(a) must be construed
together and, as such, establish the legislative intent to preclude any “danger to the
users of the highway.” Payne, 995 A.2d at 1241. Because the Superior Court found

                                         17
the words of Section 2504(a) “not explicit,” it was guided by the principles set forth
in the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 appropriate for that situation. Payne, 995
A.2d at 1240. See also 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(c).6 Accordingly, the Superior Court
concluded that “the object to be attained” by Section 2504(a) of the Game Code was
the prohibition of “road hunting” that can “endanger users of the highway.” Payne,
995 A.2d at 1242.
                 Using the Superior Court’s construction of Section 2504(a), Prentiss
argues that he did not endanger anyone on the township road, and the Game
Commission does not so argue.                 However, we reject the Superior Court’s
construction of Section 2504(a) as permitting a hunter to be standing within 25 yards
from a road when he takes a shot at a wild animal, at least in some circumstances.
To the contrary, we believe Section 2504(a) prohibits a hunter so positioned from
shooting at a wild animal without regard to how much time has elapsed since the
hunter has alighted from a vehicle.
                 Section 2504(a) of the Game Code does not limit its proscription to
“reckless” hunting, where a hunter “quickly emerges from a vehicle, and scrambles

6
    It states:
           (c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General
           Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
                 (1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
                 (2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
                 (3) The mischief to be remedied.
               (4) The object to be attained.
               (5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar
               subjects.
               (6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
               (7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
               (8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
1 Pa. C.S. §1921(c) (emphasis added).
                                                 18
to shoot at game observed from the highway, while within 25 yards of the
highway[.]” Payne, 995 A.2d at 1241-42. While preventing danger to “users of the
highway” may be one object to be attained, Section 2504(a) does not base its
proscription on actual endangerment of any user of the highway.
             Prentiss argues that the rule of lenity requires that this Court set aside
the conviction. He contends that Section 2504(a) is not clear on what conduct is
proscribed and, thus, must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. The
Statutory Construction Act of 1972 provides that penal provisions “shall be strictly
construed[.]” 1 Pa. C.S. §1928(b)(1). Consistent with this statutory requirement is
the common law rule of lenity, which provides that
             [a]mbiguities should and will be construed against the
             government. This principle has its foundation in the rule of lenity
             that provides that any ambiguity in a criminal statute will be
             construed in favor of the defendant. The rule of lenity requires a
             clear and unequivocal warning in language that people
             generally would understand, as to what actions would expose
             them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be.

McGrath v. Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Board of
Nursing, 146 A.3d 310, 316 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Richards v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole, 20 A.3d 596, 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (emphasis in
original and added)).
             In Commonwealth v. Rosario, 294 A.3d 338 (Pa. 2023), our Supreme
Court applied both statutory construction principles and the rule of lenity to hold that
a defendant may not be penalized for violation of a probation sentence he has not
begun to serve. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the rule of lenity has limits. It does not require “that the words of a penal statute be
given their narrowest possible meaning or that legislative intent be disregarded.” Id.

                                          19
at 350 (quoting Commonwealth v. Nevels, 235 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. 2020)). Courts
must first use the tools of statutory construction when considering the meaning of a
penal provision. The rule of lenity applies only “at the end of the process of
construing what [the legislature] has expressed, [if] there is grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty in the statute.” Rosario, 294 A.3d at 350 (quoting Shaw v. United States,
580 U.S. 63, 71 (2016)).
              We conclude that after using applicable principles of statutory
construction, we are not left with a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty.” Rosario,
294 A.3d at 350. The phrase “alighting from a motor vehicle” adds little to the
prohibition against shooting “within 25 yards of the traveled portion of the public
highway or road open to public travel.” 34 Pa. C.S. §2504(a). However, the phrase
does not render Section 2504(a) sufficiently ambiguous or uncertain to trigger the
rule of lenity.
              We hold that Section 2504(a) states a bright-line rule. It prohibits any
person, after exiting a motor vehicle at any time earlier that day, from shooting at a
game animal while positioned within 25 yards of the traveled portion of the public
road. 34 Pa. C.S. §2504(a). There are no exceptions for the passage of some
appropriate length of time after the hunter leaves the vehicle or where his shot does
not endanger anyone on the road. Here, after alighting from his vehicle, Prentiss
was standing within 25 yards from the edge of the road when he shot the elk. This
violated Section 2504(a) of the Game Code. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
order that the Commonwealth’s evidence demonstrated that Prentiss violated
Section 2504(a) of the Game Code.

                                          20
                                    Conclusion
             For the above-stated reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order on the
violation of Section 2307(a) of the Game Code and affirm its order on the violation
of Section 2504(a) of the Game Code.           Because this Court adopts a new
interpretation of Section 2504(a), which is contrary to the Superior Court’s
longstanding interpretation in Payne, we remand the matter to the trial court to
consider the appropriate sentence, if any, for Prentiss’ violation of Section 2504(a)
of the Game Code.

                          ____________________________________________
                          MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

                                         21
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania             :
                                         :
            v.                           :   No. 415 C.D. 2021
                                         :
Richard A. Prentiss,                     :
                         Appellant       :

                                     ORDER

            AND NOW, this 3rd day of May, 2024, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Clearfield County in the above-captioned matter, dated December
7, 2020, convicting Richard A. Prentiss of violating Section 2307(a) of the Game
and Wildlife Code, 34 Pa. C.S. §2307(a), is REVERSED. The order of same date
convicting Richard A. Prentiss of violating Section 2504(a) of the Game and
Wildlife Code, 34 Pa. C.S. §2504(a), is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED
for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.
            Jurisdiction relinquished.

                         ____________________________________________
                         MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita