Court Opinion

ID: 9554009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:39:14.272617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:47.127313
License: Public Domain

Leavitt, L,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the alleged error concerning violation of the attorney-client privilege is susceptible to a harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). However, unlike the majority, I conclude that this error was harmless and the judgment therefore need not be reversed. The test in such cases is whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the evidence did not contribute to appellant’s conviction. See id. at 24.
Appellant originally sought to be represented by Roland Robinson and initially consulted with Robinson; however, at trial Mark Wolf represented appellant. Appellant voluntarily took the stand and testified on direct examination about the contents of the conversations he had with Wolf on two occasions. The district court then made a ruling that by mentioning this on direct examination he had waived his attorney-client privilege. It is unclear whether the district court ordered the privilege waived as to Wolf only or as to both Wolf and Robinson. The next day the prosecutor began questioning appellant on cross-examination by asking, “Did you tell your attorneys . . . ?” He then recited facts favorable to the state’s case. The prosecutor could have asked the same questions by simply stating, “Is it true . . . ?” He then could have recited facts favorable to the state.
The rule established in Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 701, 941 P.2d 459, 474 (1997), requires that before a waiver occurs the witness’s answers must be “ ‘wide enough in scope and deep enough in substance to constitute a “significant part of the communication.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 642, 648 (Cal. 1984) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Travelers *128Ins. Companies v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 871, 876 (Ct. App. 1983))). It is clear in this instance that appellant did not waive the privilege because he did not testify about “ ‘a significant part of the communication.’ ” Id. (quoting Travelers, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 876).
Cross-examination of witnesses is limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of a witness. NRS 50.115(2).1 Therefore, it was proper for the prosecutor during cross-examination to ask questions concerning appellant’s testimony about what happened the night of the shooting to test his credibility. Although the prosecutor prefaced his questions with, “Did you tell your attorney ...?,” he was merely pointing out the differences between appellant’s testimony and the state’s version of what occurred. Appellant told other people different versions of what happened that night.
Appellant fled the jurisdiction after posting bail and was only caught after being the subject of the national television program, America’s Most Wanted. He has threatened witnesses who testified against him in his previous felony trials, declaring that he would kill them. He placed a rifle in the vagina of one victim and threatened to kill her. The victim in this case was killed “execution style”2 while she was so drunk she had fallen off a barstool, and a friend had to bring her home because she could not walk straight. Appellant’s claim of accidental shooting is diminished by his failure to call an ambulance. Instead, he grabbed his clothes, the keys to the truck, and fled to California in an attempt to set up an alibi defense.
This court must examine the alleged errors to determine if they were so harmless that the verdict would be the same beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue of guilt and innocence is not even close in this case. Appellant admitted killing Logan, but claimed it was an accident. The jury found otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. The gravity of the crime requires close examination of any alleged errors, but appellant’s admission under oath that he killed Logan, outweighs any alleged error. Further the condition of Logan *129before the killing made it unlikely that she would have struggled with appellant, and finally the testimony of experts indicates Logan was killed “execution style.” “[The] evidence against [appellant was] substantial enough to convict him in an otherwise fair trial, and . . . [t]he verdict would have been the same in the absence of [any alleged] error.” Homick v. State, 112 Nev. 304, 316, 913 P.2d 1280, 1288 (1996).3 “Appellant is not entitled to a perfect trial, but only to a fair trial, which he received.’ ’ Ennis v. State, 91 Nev. 530, 533, 539 P.2d 114, 115 (1975) (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974)). The conviction and sentence by the jury should be affirmed.

NRS 50.115(2) reads: “Cross-examination is limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness, unless the judge in the exercise of discretion permits inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.”

The bullet entered below the right ear and exited above the left eye. An expended bullet was discovered under her head where her body was found on the floor. An expert witness testified that the entry wound to Logan’s head indicated the muzzle of the weapon was next to her skin when fired. There was also testimony that the exit wound was made while her head was in contact with a solid object.

Other alleged errors by the trial judge concerning rulings on evidence are without merit and will not be considered here.