Court Opinion

ID: 9946849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 17:01:03.812507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:41.633139
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13928    Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 03/01/2024   Page: 1 of 11

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                 No. 22-13928
                            ____________________

        WESLEY LEE COOK,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DAVID BELL,
        Oﬃcer, Individually and oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Lakeland Police Department,
        LAURA H. DUNN,
        as Personal Representative for the
        Estate of Paul Patrick Dunn,

                                                  Defendants-Appellants,

        PAUL DUNN et al.,
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                         22-13928

                                                                           Defendants.

                                 ____________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Middle District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-03051-TPB-SPF
                              ____________________

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Officer David Bell and the Estate of Officer Paul Dunn ap-
        peal the district court’s order denying summary judgment on qual-
        ified immunity grounds. After careful review and with the benefit
        of oral argument, we affirm in part and dismiss in part for lack of
        jurisdiction.
            I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
               On December 28, 2015, the Appellee, Wesley Lee Cook, had
        an argument with his girlfriend, Shannon Wood. As Wood was
        leaving the house, Cook grabbed her cell phone and backpack, so
        she left without them. Wood went to a nearby convenience store

        1 “[F]or summary judgment purposes, our analysis must begin with a descrip-

        tion of the facts in the light most favorable to the [non-movant].” Lee v. Ferraro,
        284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002). We accept these facts for summary-judg-
        ment purposes only. See Cox Adm’r US Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d
        1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994).
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        22-13928               Opinion of the Court                        3

        and called the police. Oﬃcers Dunn and Bell both responded to
        the call and went to meet Wood at the convenience store. Wood
        told the oﬃcers that Cook was a former law enforcement oﬃcer
        and that he had guns in the house. Dunn and Bell then went to
        Wood’s house to speak with Cook—both to retrieve Wood’s phone
        and bag, and to make sure there was not a domestic violence situ-
        ation on hand.
               Dunn got out of his car and approached Wood’s front door.
        Bell, who arrived in a separate car, also went to the front door.
        Dunn knocked on the door. Bell testiﬁed that Dunn announced
        himself as police; Cook recalls hearing no such identiﬁcation. The
        entrance to the house was what Bell described as a “fatal funnel,”
        meaning that there were walls on both sides of the door such that
        the oﬃcers could not stand to either side of the door—only directly
        in front of it. The oﬃcers, therefore, “backed up to a safe position”
        near the corner of the attached garage. Dunn took up post at the
        corner of the garage, “on the 90 where he’s facing the door.” Bell
        was positioned next to Dunn in the driveway, and he testiﬁed that
        he could not see the door. Cook, who had been sleeping but woke
        up to Dunn’s knocking, grabbed his (licensed) gun from the
        nightstand and walked to the front door. By the time he got to the
        door, the knocking had stopped. Cook stood inside to the left of
        the door, where a strip of 6–8-inch-wide windows ran the full
        height of the door and began to unlock the door. Bell heard the
        sound of the door handle moving and asked Dunn, “what is he do-
        ing? Is he fucking with the door?” Dunn turned around to look at
        Bell and said, “I don’t know,” then turned back to the door, yelled
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13928

        “Gun!” and drew his ﬁrearm. “The next thing [Bell] kn[e]w,” shots
        were ﬁred. Bell then realized he could not get past Dunn (towards
        the door) “because of the stance that [Dunn] took between the wall
        and the Explorer,” so Bell started running around the Explorer in-
        stead. As he ran around the SUV, Bell radioed out “Shots ﬁred,”
        and he heard a second volley of shots ring out. By the time he
        reached the far side of the SUV, Bell had drawn his gun and could
        see Cook standing in the doorway, naked, with a gun held loosely
        in his right hand, pointed down towards the ground. Bell ordered
        Cook to drop the gun, but he stopped when he heard Dunn giving
        the same command so that only one voice would be yelling. Cook
        complied and dropped his gun, and then he collapsed to the
        ground. Another oﬃcer who had arrived in the interim began ren-
        dering aid to Cook, who was bleeding from multiple gunshot
        wounds. Cook was taken to the hospital where he underwent sur-
        gery; he ultimately lost his left eye and suﬀered other permanent
        injuries. Cook’s blood-alcohol level was .28 at the time of the
        shooting, and he admitted that his intoxication, stress, and injuries
        all could have impaired his memory.
               During this incident, Bell never saw Cook step out of the
        house, advance towards the oﬃcers, or point his gun at the oﬃcers.
        Indeed, all of the blood from Cook’s wounds was inside the house,
        not outside. And the Lakeland Police Department investigators
        who handled this police-involved shooting determined there was
        no evidence that Cook had ever exited his home. Cook testiﬁed
        that, while he could not say with certainty that Dunn never spoke,
        Cook did not hear anyone give any commands, did not hear anyone
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        22-13928                 Opinion of the Court                              5

        say “gun,” and did not hear anyone identify himself as police. Bell,
        for his part, did not testify that Dunn gave any warnings or com-
        mands before he opened ﬁre.
                Cook ﬁled suit asserting multiple claims against Oﬃcers
        Dunn and Bell, along with other defendants who are not present in
        this appeal. He sued Dunn for excessive force and unlawful seizure
        under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II) and for assault and battery
        under Florida law (Count VII). As to Bell, Cook raised one claim
        for failure to intervene under § 1983 (Count III).
              On January 9, 2020, Dunn was killed in a motorcycle acci-
        dent. On Cook’s unopposed motion, the personal representative
        of Dunn’s estate eventually substituted for Dunn as defendant.
               After discovery, the Appellants moved for summary judg-
        ment on the basis of qualiﬁed immunity. 2 The district court held
        two hearings on the motion and ultimately entered an order deny-
        ing qualiﬁed immunity. In the order, the district court found that
        there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Dunn
        violated Cook’s constitutional rights and whether Bell had an op-
        portunity to intervene. The district court also concluded that
        Cook’s “right to be free from the use of deadly force while nonre-
        sistant in his own home was clearly established at the time of the
        shooting.” This timely appeal followed.

        2 The motion also raised other, unrelated arguments as to the other defend-

        ants. This appeal only addresses the qualified immunity issues as to Bell and
        Dunn.
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                 22-13928

                           II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
                We review jurisdictional issues de novo. Cavalieri v. Avior Air-
        lines C.A., 25 F.4th 843, 848 (11th Cir. 2022).
               This Court also reviews de novo an order denying summary
        judgment based on qualiﬁed immunity. See Helm v. Rainbow City,
        Alabama, 989 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2021). “When considering
        a motion for summary judgment, including one asserting qualiﬁed
        immunity, ‘courts must construe the facts and draw all inferences
        in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and when con-
        ﬂicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, [they must]
        credit the nonmoving party’s version.’” Feliciano v. City of Miami
        Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Davis v. Wil-
        liams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006)). “Summary judgment is
        appropriate if ‘the evidence before the court shows that there is no
        genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
        entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” McCullough v. Antolini,
        559 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami,
        52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)).
                                    III.   ANALYSIS
               We have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have juris-
        diction to hear an appeal. See Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d
        1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020). This Court usually has jurisdiction to
        review the decisions of a district court “only where the district
        court has disposed of all claims against all parties.” Hudson v. Hall,
        231 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As
        one exception to that general rule, we may hear “an interlocutory
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        22-13928                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

        appeal of the denial of qualified immunity where the disputed issue
        is whether the official’s conduct violated clearly established law.”
        Hudson, 231 F.3d at 1293 (quoting Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d
        1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000)). We may also hear appeals that raise
        mixed questions of law and fact. English v. City of Gainesville, 75
        F.4th 1151, 1155–56 (11th Cir. 2023). But we lack jurisdiction to
        hear an interlocutory appeal that asks only “whether the district
        court erred in determining that there was an issue of fact for trial
        about the defendant’s actions or inactions which, if they occurred,
        would violate clearly established law.” Id. In other words, we lack
        interlocutory jurisdiction “where the only issues appealed are evi-
        dentiary suﬃciency issues.” Id.
                Our two Appellants stand on diﬀerent footing. Dunn, for his
        part, presents a purely legal issue on appeal. He argues, in sum,
        that even when we accept Cook’s version of events, “[t]here was no
        materially similar case predating the shooting that would have put
        Dunn on notice that his actions were unconstitutional.” Because
        this challenge lies at the heart of the legal question of clearly estab-
        lished law, we have jurisdiction to hear Dunn’s interlocutory ap-
        peal. 3 See Hudson, 231 F.3d at 1293.

        3 Because have jurisdiction to hear Dunn’s appeal of the Fourth Amendment

        claim, we also have jurisdiction over his appeal of Florida state-law immunity
        on Cook’s state-law claim, which tracks the same analysis. See Butler v. Gual-
        tieri, 41 F.4th 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Florida’s sovereign immunity law
        provides qualifying government officials with immunity from both suit and
        liability.” (citing Florida Highway Patrol v. Jackson, 288 So. 3d 1179, 1185 (Fla.
        2020)); English, 75 F.4th at 1156–57.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13928

               Bell, however, has raised the type of “evidentiary suﬃ-
        ciency” issue that we lack jurisdiction to hear in an interlocutory
        appeal. He argues, for example, that he “was not in a position to
        observe and evaluate Dunn’s use of force,” and that he “had no rea-
        sonable opportunity to intervene.” These are factual questions, not
        legal ones. For this reason, we lack jurisdiction to hear Bell’s inter-
        locutory appeal and, therefore, we dismiss the appeal as to Bell. See
        English, 75 F.4th at 1155–56.
                We turn, then, to Dunn’s appeal. Dunn argues that the
        district court erred in denying him qualified immunity because, in
        his view, it was not clearly established that his conduct violated
        Cook’s Fourth Amendment rights. “Qualified immunity offers
        complete protection for government officials sued in their
        individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly
        established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
        person would have known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346
        (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
        (1982)). By imposing liability only for violations of clearly
        established law, the defense of qualified immunity “balances two
        important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable
        when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
        officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
        perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
        231 (2009).
              To qualify for this immunity, an oﬃcer “must ﬁrst prove that
        he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when
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        22-13928                Opinion of the Court                          9

        the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188,
        1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479,
        1487 (11th Cir. 1991)). Once “the defendant establishes that he was
        acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the
        plaintiﬀ to show that qualiﬁed immunity is not appropriate.” Lee,
        284 F.3d at 1194. “To overcome a qualiﬁed immunity defense, the
        plaintiﬀ must make two showings.” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304,
        1311 (11th Cir. 2019). First, “the plaintiﬀ must establish that the
        defendant violated a constitutional right.” Griﬃn Indus., Inc. v. Irvin,
        496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007). Second, “the plaintiﬀ must
        show that the violation was clearly established.” Id. Courts are
        “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of
        the two prongs of the qualiﬁed immunity analysis should be ad-
        dressed ﬁrst.” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at
        236).
                “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a
        right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reason-
        able oﬃcer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he con-
        fronted.” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
        194, 202 (2001)). The defendant must have fair notice of his con-
        duct’s unconstitutionality, derived from one of the following
        sources: (1) obvious clarity; (2) broad holdings or statements of
        principle in case law that are not tied to particularized facts; or (3)
        fact-speciﬁc judicial precedents that are not readily distinguishable.
        Id. at 1350–51. “The critical inquiry is whether the law provided
        [the oﬃcer] with ‘fair warning’ that his conduct violated the [the
        plaintiﬀ’s rights].” McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1248 (11th Cir.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13928

        2007) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). In this Cir-
        cuit, only the “decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the
        United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the
        highest court of the pertinent state (here, the Supreme Court of
        Florida) can clearly establish the law.” Id. at 1237.
               “[I]n the end, we must still slosh our way through the fact-
        bound morass of ‘reasonableness.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383
        (2007). “[A]t the summary judgment stage,” however, “once we
        have determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences
        in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the rec-
        ord, the reasonableness of the oﬃcer’s actions . . . is a pure question
        of law.” Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (cleaned up and citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8).
               As the district court explained, when we take the facts in the
        light most favorable to Cook (as we are bound to do at this stage),
        Cook was doing nothing more than standing inside his own door-
        way when Dunn opened ﬁre on him. Viewing the evidence in the
        light most favorable to Cook, he was not suspected of having com-
        mitted a felony, nor was he ﬂeeing from oﬃcers or advancing to-
        wards them in a threatening way. As the district court observed,
        perhaps trial will reveal evidence that supports the oﬃcers’ claim
        that the force Dunn used was necessary, reasonable, and appropri-
        ate—and therefore did not violate Cook’s rights—but that is a ques-
        tion for a jury to resolve, not this court. We cannot say at this pro-
        cedural stage that Dunn is entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Cook’s
        excessive force claim.
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        22-13928                Opinion of the Court                      11

                For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order as to
        Dunn.
        AFFIRMED in part and DISMISSED in part.