Court Opinion

ID: 9742443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:13:59.263731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:44.768610
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: I agree with the majority that Montgomery’s 10-year time limit should be calculated in relation to the date of defendant’s trial. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence in this case was closely balanced and, therefore, that the error in this case was reversible. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s judgment affirming the reversal of defendant’s convictions and remanding for a new trial. The evidence at defendant’s bench trial was as follows. Officer John Lewis testified for the State that, on March 9, 2000, he was working undercover at 4429 South Federal Street in Chicago. Around 10:20 a.m., Officer Lewis took the north stairwell to the fourth floor of the building, where he was met by defendant. Defendant was standing with two other individuals. Defendant was wearing a blue leather jacket and blue jeans. Defendant asked Officer Lewis if he wanted “white,” which Officer Lewis knew referred to heroin. Officer Lewis told defendant that he wanted one and gave defendant a prerecorded $10 bill. Defendant gave Officer Lewis a tinfoil packet that was later tested and identified as heroin. Officer Lewis then left the building and radioed the physical and clothing description of defendant. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, Officer William McKenna brought defendant out of the building. Officer Lewis identified defendant as the person who had sold him the heroin. Officer McKenna later returned Officer Lewis’ $10 prerecorded fund to him. Officer Deon Boyd testified that on March 9, 2000, he was working undercover at 4429 South Federal Street in Chicago. When he entered the building, several persons in the corridor directed Officer Boyd to the fourth-floor stairwell. When he reached the fourth floor, Officer Boyd saw a line of individuals purchasing narcotics. Officer Lewis was leaving when Officer Boyd got in line. Officer Boyd testified that when he got to the front of the line, he was face to face with defendant. Officer Boyd told defendant “Let me get two,” meaning two packages of narcotics. Officer Boyd gave defendant a $20 prerecorded bill, and defendant gave Officer Boyd two tinfoil packets. The parties stipulated that those packages tested positive for the presence of heroin. Officer Boyd then returned to his undercover vehicle and radioed defendant’s description to the enforcement team. Officer McKenna brought defendant out of the building. Officer McKenna subsequently gave Officer Boyd his $20 in prerecorded funds. Officer Boyd believed that two or three other arrests were made simultaneously with defendant’s arrest. Officer Boyd testified that an individual named Kohler Parks was arrested with defendant. Defendant testified that on March 9, 2000, he was living at 4429 South Federal Street, apartment 902. Defendant testified that he was arrested on March 9, 2000, but denied that he had made any narcotics deliveries to any police officer, and denied that he was in possession of any money from drug sales. Defendant said that he was arrested with more than 15 other persons. Defendant said that he knew of Kohler Parks, but denied that he knew him personally. Defendant stated that on the day he was arrested, he was walking down the stairs to pick up his son from school. Defendant said that as he was walking down the stairs, he was sprayed in the face with mace and was jumped on, and then heard someone identify himself as a police officer. On cross-examination, defendant testified that all he remembered was coming down the stairs and being sprayed with mace. Defendant said that he was by himself in the stairwell when he was maced. Defendant did not know what floor he was on when he was maced. In finding defendant guilty, the trial court recounted the testimony of the police officers, then discussed defendant’s testimony. The trial court stated: “The defense argues that th[r]ough the confusion here the officers didn’t make the purchase from [defendant], [Defendant] has testified he just came out of his house walking downstairs or running the [sic] down the stairs and he is maced. He doesn’t say who maces him, where the mace was at, but that’s all he remembers. I believe he used the term ‘All I can remember’ at least six times. He testifies that the next thing he remembers really is being downstairs being separated into — from the paddy wagon into a squad — a car he said. He does know Kohler Parks, but he doesn’t remember seeing that individual.” Based upon the preceding evidence, the majority finds that the trial in this case was a contest of credibility and that, therefore, the evidence was closely balanced. The majority notes that the two officers testified that defendant sold them heroin, while defendant claimed that he was walking down the stairwell to pick up his son from school when he was maced and arrested. The majority finds that, “[g]iven these opposing versions of events, and the fact that no extrinsic evidence was presented to corroborate or contradict either version, the trial court’s finding of guilty necessarily involved the court’s assessment of the credibility of the two officers against that of defendant.” 229 Ill. 2d at 607. The majority finds that “defendant’s erroneously admitted incompetent prior conviction was the State’s only successful attack on defendant’s testimony.” 229 Ill. 2d at 607. The majority concludes that the trial court was faced with two credible versions of events, and moments after erroneously admitting incompetent evidence for the purposes of impeaching defendant’s credibility, the court concluded that it believed the officers’ version of events. 229 Ill. 2d at 608. The majority therefore affirms the reversal of defendant’s conviction and remandment for a new trial. In reaching its conclusion, the majority has improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trier of fact and has reweighed the evidence. It is well settled that it is the function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses, to determine the appropriate weight of the testimony, and to resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 211 (2004). A trier of fact is “not required to accept any possible explanation compatible with the defendant’s innocence and elevate it to the status of reasonable doubt” (People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 206 (1990)), nor is reversal warranted simply because a defendant claims that a witness was not credible (Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 211-12). Thus, a trier of fact may disregard exculpatory accounts or other evidence that tends to support or be consistent with a defendant’s innocence and rest its decision instead on circumstantial evidence of guilt presented by the State. People v. Locascio, 106 Ill. 2d 529, 537 (1985). Here, the trial court determined that the two police officers were credible and that defendant was not. Based upon the record, it is clear that the trial court could find that defendant was not a credible witness even absent the admission of his prior conviction. Although the majority believes that the erroneously admitted prior conviction convinced the trial court that the officers were more credible than defendant, it is clear from the trial court’s statement that it was defendant’s testimony, particularly his repeated lack of recall, that convinced the trial court that defendant was not credible. In contrast to defendant’s general denial and lack of recall, the testimony of the officers was consistent concerning the events surrounding defendant’s arrest. Both officers testified that they purchased heroin from defendant using prerecorded bills, then returned to their undercover vehicles and radioed defendant’s description to the enforcement team. Each officer saw Officer McKenna bring defendant out of the building, and each officer identified defendant as the individual that sold him heroin. Officer McKenna later returned the prerecorded bills to the officers. The mere fact that defendant testified to a version of events that contradicted the police officers did not render the evidence in this case closely balanced. I also note that, as further support for its finding that the evidence was closely balanced, the majority suggests that the trial court did not accurately remember defendant’s testimony. In a footnote, the majority states that “the trial court’s view of defendant’s credibility apparently clouded its memory of defendant’s testimony” because the trial court stated that defendant testified he knew Kohler Parks, while defendant “clearly denied knowing Parks.” 229 Ill. 2d at 608 n.4. In fact, defendant testified that he “knew of” Kohler Parks, but denied knowing him personally. Given defendant’s testimony that he “knew of” Kohler Parks, I disagree with the majority that the trial court’s memory of defendant’s testimony was “clouded.” Whether evidence is closely balanced necessarily is determined on a case-by-case basis. The majority, however, effectively has created a rule holding that if the evidence at trial involves a contest of credibility, and the defendant testifies contrary to the prosecution’s witnesses, the evidence will always be closely balanced. Based upon the facts of this case, I believe that the trial court properly determined that the police officers were credible and that defendant was not. Therefore, I would find that the evidence was not closely balanced and that the error in admitting defendant’s prior conviction was harmless error. Consequently, I would affirm defendant’s conviction. For that reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s judgment affirming the reversal of defendant’s conviction and remanding for a new trial. JUSTICES CARMAN and KARMEIER join in this dissent.