Court Opinion

ID: 9891480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 18:03:41.411308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:05.485055
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/18/23 P. v. Chappell CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                                  2d Crim. No. B325387
                                                                           (Super. Ct. No. CR22466)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                 (Ventura County)

v.

ERIC LEE CHAPPELL,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      Eric Lee Chappell appeals an order entered after the trial
court denied his motion to initiate a proceeding pursuant to
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to preserve
youth-related mitigation evidence to use at a future youth
offender parole hearing. (Pen. Code, § 3051.)1 We conclude that
the court properly rejected Chappell’s constitutional arguments
that he has been denied equal protection of the law and affirm.
(People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 199-200; People v.

         1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 774-782; In re Williams (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 427, 433-439.)
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       This appeal involves the underlying murder and robbery of
Keith Wehry, a cashier at a Port Hueneme gasoline station.
Chappell, a former employee at the gasoline station, had been
dismissed from employment several days earlier. On April l2,
1987, Chappell, then 18 years 11 months old, shot Wehry three
times at close range with a sawed-off shotgun. Chappell then
took $200 cash from the cash register and fled.
       In 1988, a jury convicted Chappell of first degree murder
and found that he committed the murder while engaged in a
robbery. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) [special
circumstance].) The jury also convicted him of second degree
robbery and found that he personally used a firearm during
commission of the crimes. (§§ 211, 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)(B).) For
the special circumstance murder, the trial court sentenced
Chappell to the mandated life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP) plus two years consecutive for the firearm enhancement.
The court also imposed sentence on the robbery as well as
unrelated crimes relating to Chappell’s theft of the shotgun. We
affirmed the conviction in People v. Chappell (Sept. 7, 1989,
B035576) [nonpub. opn.].
       On October 31, 2022, Chappell filed a motion in propria
persona requesting a Franklin hearing and appointment of
counsel pursuant to section 1203.01. The trial court summarily
denied the motion deciding that Chappell was statutorily
ineligible because he was 18 years old when he committed the
Wehry murder and received a LWOP sentence for the crime.
(§ 3051, subd. (h), post.) The court also rejected Chappell’s

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constitutional challenge, relying upon the many appellate
decisions rejecting the same arguments.
                           DISCUSSION
       Chappell appeals and contends that section 3051,
subdivision (h), which makes young adults sentenced to LWOP
ineligible for youth offender parole hearings, violates equal
protection of the law. He points out that a young adult offender
serving a lengthy non-LWOP sentence may receive a Franklin
hearing. In part, Chappell relies upon People v. Hardin (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 273, 287-288, review granted January 11, 2023,
S277487, that the purpose of section 3051 is not to assess
culpability or measure punishment, but to account for
neuroscience research that the human brain continues to develop
into a person’s mid-20’s, particularly the portions affecting
judgment and decision making. Chappell also asserts that he has
participated in many educational, vocational, and charitable
endeavors during his LWOP imprisonment, has matured and
rehabilitated, and is a model inmate.
       Chappell argues that section 3051, subdivision (h), denying
him a youth offender parole hearing, violates his state and
federal constitutional rights affording equal protection of the law
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California
Constitution. He asserts that the equal protection analysis must
consider the ameliorative purpose of section 3051 – to account for
the continuing brain and personality development of both
juvenile and young adult offenders. We review his claim de novo.
(Samples v. Brown (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 787, 799
[interpretation of a statute and determination of its
constitutionality are questions of law].)

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      Section 3051 provides a parole eligibility mechanism for
juvenile offenders. (People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326,
345-346.) When first enacted in 2013, section 3051 applied only
to juvenile offenders sentenced to indeterminate life terms with
the possibility of parole and not juvenile offenders sentenced to
LWOP or those over 18 years at the time of the offense. (Former
§ 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b); Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) The
Legislature later amended section 3051 to extend eligibility to
youthful offenders under the age of 23, then later to age 25.
(Former § 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b); Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1; Stats.
2017, ch. 675, § 1.) Our Supreme Court in People v. Franklin,
supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, 269, established a procedure by which an
inmate may be entitled to a hearing to preserve evidence for a
future parole hearing regarding the impact of the inmate’s youth
in the commission of the crime.
      Section 3051, subdivision (h), however, provides: “This
section shall not apply to cases . . . in which an individual is
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
controlling offense that was committed after the person had
attained 18 years of age.” “Controlling offense” refers to “the
offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed
the longest term of imprisonment.” (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B).)
Chappell’s argument is one that many reviewing courts have
considered and rejected. We join those decisions.
      The state and federal Constitutions extend to persons the
equal protection of the law. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal.
Const., art. 1, § 7; People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287.)
An equal protection challenge requires a showing that the
government has adopted a classification affecting two or more
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. (People v.

                                  4
Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836.) We then inquire whether
the disparate treatment of two similarly situated groups is
justified by a constitutionally sufficient state interest. (Ibid.)
Here the classification is subject to the minimum equal protection
standard of rational basis review. (People v. Turnage (2012) 55
Cal.4th 62, 74 [statutes not involving suspect classes like race or
national origin or impinging on fundamental rights subject to
minimum equal protection standard of rational basis review].)
       Pursuant to the rational basis review, equal protection of
the law is denied only where there is no rational relationship
between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose. (People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th 62,
74.) “To successfully challenge a law on equal protection
grounds, the defendant must negate ‘ “ ‘every conceivable basis’ ” ’
on which ‘the disputed statutory disparity’ might be supported.
[Citation.] ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, “[e]qual
protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess
the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law.” ’ ” (People v. Acosta,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 769. 778.)
       Rational basis review requires courts to ask whether the
state adopted a classification affecting two or more groups that
are similarly situated in an unequal manner, and whether the
challenged classification ultimately bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose. (People v. Chatman, supra, 4
Cal.5th 277, 289.) A classification in a statute is presumed
rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the
unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable. (Ibid.)
       We reject Chappell’s contention that those who are 18 to 25
years old when sentenced to LWOP are similarly situated to
those who are 18 to 25 years old when sentenced to life with the

                                 5
possibility of parole, for purposes of a Franklin hearing. (People
v. Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 199 [LWOP and non-
LWOP offenders are not similarly situated because only the
former committed special circumstance murder]; In re Williams,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 435 [persons convicted of different
crimes are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes
and can be punished differently].)
       Similar situation aside, however, Chappell’s claim also fails
because there is a rational basis for different treatment of the two
groups. The distinction between these two groups is rational
given the level of culpability necessary to convict a defendant of a
first degree murder with special circumstances. It is the
prerogative and duty of the Legislature to recognize degrees of
culpability when drafting punishment for crime. (People v.
Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th 821, 840.) Equal protection analysis
does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of the law. (People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th
62, 74.) The Legislature has “broad latitude to define crimes,
separate them into degrees, and assign them different
punishments based on its view of the crimes’ comparative gravity
and on policy objectives like deterrence, retribution, and
incapacitation.” (People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193,
205.)
       We disagree with People v. Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th
273, that the different treatment here violates equal protection.
We agree with the majority of courts that decided that a rational
basis exists to distinguish between young offenders who are
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole and those who are
not, for purposes of a Franklin hearing. The Legislature has
rationally judged special circumstance murder to be more severe

                                 6
and more deserving of lifetime punishment than nonspecial
circumstance first degree murder. (In re Williams, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th 427,436.)
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment (order) is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             CODY, J.

                               7
                  Michele M. Castillo, Judge

              Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

      Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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