Court Opinion

ID: 9384324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 16:00:51.676747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.737377
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12062   Document: 36-1    Date Filed: 04/03/2023   Page: 1 of 23

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-12062
                         ____________________

        STATE FARM       MUTUAL      AUTOMOBILE          INSURANCE
        COMPANY,
                                                     Plaintiff-Counter
                                                  Defendant-Appellee,
        versus
        ANNA BEVILACQUA SPANGLER,
        RICHARD DALE SPANGLER,

                                                 Defendants-Counter
                                                 Claimant-Appellants.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023    Page: 2 of 23

        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-12062

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00360-PGB-LRH
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
               Richard D. Spangler and his spouse Anna Spangler main-
        tained a car insurance policy (the “Policy”) with State Farm Mutual
        Automobile Insurance Company. While the Policy was in force,
        Anna was involved in an accident in which she was struck and in-
        jured by an uninsured driver of an electric motorized scooter. The
        Spanglers made a claim for her injuries under the Policy’s Unin-
        sured Motor Vehicle (“UM”) coverage. State Farm denied the claim
        on the ground that under the Policy the scooter was neither a “mo-
        tor vehicle” nor an “uninsured motor vehicle,” which the Policy
        defined as a “land motor vehicle.” State Farm sued the Spanglers,
        seeking a declaratory judgment that the Policy provided no cover-
        age. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court
        denied the Spanglers’ motion, granting summary judgment in part
        to State Farm. The district court concluded that a Florida statutory
USCA11 Case: 21-12062         Document: 36-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2023         Page: 3 of 23

        21-12062                   Opinion of the Court                               3

        definition of “motor vehicle” resolved the dispute in State Farm’s
        favor. 1
               On appeal, the Spanglers argue that because the Policy de-
        fines “uninsured motor vehicle” as a “land motor vehicle,” the
        plain and ordinary meaning of the term “land motor vehicle” dic-
        tates the scope of the Policy, and under the plain and ordinary
        meaning of the term, the scooter is a covered uninsured motor ve-
        hicle. After careful consideration, and with the benefit of oral argu-
        ment, we agree and therefore reverse the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment to State Farm. We conclude that the Policy de-
        fines “uninsured motor vehicle” more broadly than Florida insur-
        ance law requires. Because an insurer can provide more UM cov-
        erage than the law requires, we decline to disregard the Policy’s
        broader definition of uninsured motor vehicle in favor of a more
        limited statutory definition of motor vehicle.
                                 I.      BACKGROUND
               We begin by describing the relevant parts of the Policy. We
        then turn to the underlying accident involving the scooter, includ-
        ing the scooter’s specifications, and the litigation that followed.

        1 The parties agree that Florida law governs this diversity-jurisdiction action
        involving the interpretation of an insurance policy issued in Florida. See Hegel
        v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., 778 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 2015).
USCA11 Case: 21-12062         Document: 36-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2023        Page: 4 of 23

        4                         Opinion of the Court                      21-12062

        A.     The Insurance Policy
               State Farm issued to Richard Spangler State Farm Car Policy
        No. D580985594, which insured the Spanglers’ 2015 Nissan Al-
        tima. 2 The Policy included UM coverage with limits of $100,000
        per person and $300,000 per occurrence. Relevant to this dispute,
        under the Policy State Farm would “pay compensatory damages
        for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to recover from the
        owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle.” Doc. 1-1 at 25 3
        (emphasis omitted). According to the Policy, the “bodily injury for
        which [State Farm] will pay compensatory damages must be[] sus-
        tained by an insured [and] caused by an accident that involves the
        operation . . . of an uninsured motor vehicle.” Id. (emphasis omit-
        ted). In the section of the Policy pertaining to UM coverage,
        “[u]ninsured [m]otor [v]ehicle” was defined, in relevant part, as
        “land motor vehicle.” Id. at 24. The UM section of the Policy did
        not define “land motor vehicle.”
               The Policy’s general “Definitions” section established defini-
        tions of terms used throughout the Policy. The Policy specified that
        the definitions were to be used where a defined term appeared in
        boldface italics. The Definitions section defined a “[m]otor

        2 Richard Spangler was the named insured party on the Policy. The Policy
        included coverage for the spouse of the named insured party if the spouse pri-
        marily resided with the named insured. It is undisputed that Anna, as Richard’s
        spouse who primarily resided with him, was an insured party under the Policy.
        3 “Doc.” numbers refer to district court docket entries.
USCA11 Case: 21-12062      Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023     Page: 5 of 23

        21-12062               Opinion of the Court                         5

        [v]ehicle” as a “vehicle with four or more wheels that[] is self-pro-
        pelled and is of a type[] designed for; and [] required to be licensed
        for use on Florida highways.” Id. at 4. The term “land motor vehi-
        cle” was not defined in the Definitions section of the Policy, and
        the words “motor vehicle” within the term “land motor vehicle” in
        the UM section of the Policy appeared in plain typeface.
               The Policy also included an Amendatory Endorsement
        providing that an “[u]ninsured [m]otor [v]ehicle does not include a
        land motor vehicle . . . designed for use primarily off public roads
        except while on public roads.” Doc. 1-2 at 6. It is undisputed that
        the accident occurred on a public road.
        B.    The Accident with the Scooter
               While driving on a Florida highway in the insured Nissan
        Altima, Anna Spangler was struck by a driver operating a Razor
        Pocket Mod scooter. The Razor Pocket Mod was a “Miniature
        Electric Euro Style Scooter.” Doc. 35-1 at 19. The Razor Pocket
        Mod’s top speed was 15 mph. It had a 250-watt, single-speed motor
        powered by two 12-volt batteries, with a total battery life of 40
        minutes of continuous ride time. It was equipped with two spoked
        wheels with air-filled tires. The Razor Pocket Mod had twist-grip
        throttle controls and a hand-operated brake. It was manufactured
        without a taillight, brake lights, turn signals, or exterior mirrors,
        and no such equipment had been added. The scooter had no vehi-
        cle identification number or license tag, and it was not registered
        with the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehi-
        cles.
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023    Page: 6 of 23

        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-12062

               As a result of the accident with the Razor Pocket Mod, Anna
        suffered serious injuries to her neck, back, and knee, with surgery
        expected in the future. Her vehicle sustained a cracked headlight
        and fog light, crushed front bumper and fender, and cracked pas-
        senger side mirror. Tragically, the scooter’s driver, who was unin-
        sured, died at the scene. The Spanglers submitted a claim to State
        Farm for UM coverage in the amount of $100,000 as compensation
        for injuries Anna sustained in the accident. State Farm denied the
        claim on the ground that the Razor Pocket Mod was not an “unin-
        sured motor vehicle” under the Policy.
        C.    Procedural History
                State Farm brought this action seeking a declaratory judg-
        ment that the Policy did not cover the accident because the electric
        scooter was neither a “motor vehicle” nor an “uninsured motor ve-
        hicle” under the terms of the Policy. The Spanglers and State Farm
        cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. In
        support of its motion and in response to the Spanglers’ motion,
        State Farm argued that the definition of “motor vehicle” that ap-
        peared in the general Definitions section of the Policy applied to
        the UM section of the Policy and, under this definition, the Razor
        Pocket Mod was not a motor vehicle or an uninsured motor vehi-
        cle. State Farm argued further that the meaning of the Policy’s term
        “uninsured motor vehicle” should be interpreted consistently with
        the definition of “motor vehicle” that appeared in Florida Statutes
        § 324.021, also known as the Financial Responsibility Law (“FRL”).
        Under the FRL’s definition of “motor vehicle,” State Farm argued,
USCA11 Case: 21-12062      Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023     Page: 7 of 23

        21-12062               Opinion of the Court                         7

        the Razor Pocket Mod was not a motor vehicle and thus was not
        subject to Florida’s UM coverage requirements.
                In support of their motion and in opposition to State Farm’s
        motion, the Spanglers argued that the plain and ordinary meaning
        of the term “land motor vehicle”—the definition of “uninsured mo-
        tor vehicle” that appeared in the UM section of the Policy—should
        govern the dispute. Under the term’s plain and ordinary meaning,
        they maintained, the Razor Pocket Mod was an uninsured motor
        vehicle.
              The district court granted in part and denied in part State
        Farm’s summary judgment motion. In denying summary judg-
        ment in part, the district court concluded that the definition of
        “motor vehicle” that appeared in the general Definitions section of
        the Policy did not define the term as used in the section concerning
        UM coverage. In granting summary judgment in part, the district
        court nonetheless concluded that the Razor Pocket Mod was not
        an uninsured motor vehicle. The court denied the Spanglers’ cross-
        motion for summary judgment for the same reason. The district
        court entered final judgment in favor of State Farm for the same
        reason.
                To reach the conclusion that the scooter was not covered
        under the Policy, the district court relied on the FRL’s definition of
        “motor vehicle.” The FRL requires every Florida driver operating
        a motor vehicle on Florida’s public roads to maintain proof of “the
        ability to respond in damages for liability on account of accidents
        arising out of the use of [a] motor vehicle.” See Fla. Stat.
USCA11 Case: 21-12062         Document: 36-1   Date Filed: 04/03/2023      Page: 8 of 23

        8                        Opinion of the Court                21-12062

        § 324.022(1). Put simply, a driver of a motor vehicle must maintain
        liability insurance. The FRL defines the term “motor vehicle” as
        “[e]very self-propelled vehicle that is designed and required to be
        licensed for use upon a highway.” Id. § 324.021(1). Considering this
        definition, the district court determined that the Razor Pocket Mod
        was not a vehicle designed and required to be licensed for use upon
        a highway. Thus, the district court concluded, the Razor Pocket
        Mod was not a “motor vehicle” and, in turn, not an uninsured mo-
        tor vehicle, meaning UM coverage under the Policy was unavaila-
        ble to the Spanglers. The Spanglers timely appealed.
                        II.      STANDARDS OF REVIEW
               We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences
        in favor of the non-moving party. Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health
        Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). Summary judg-
        ment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no gen-
        uine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
        judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
               The interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of
        law, which we review de novo. LaFarge Corp. v. Travelers Indem.
        Co., 118 F.3d 1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1997). As a pure question of law,
        the interpretation of an insurance policy may be decided at the
        summary judgment stage. See Tech. Coating Applicators, Inc. v.
        U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 157 F.3d 843, 844–46 (11th Cir. 1998); Cole-
        man v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Inc., 517 So. 2d 686, 686–91 (Fla. 1988).
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023    Page: 9 of 23

        21-12062               Opinion of the Court                       9

                               III.   DISCUSSION
               On appeal, the Spanglers argue that the district court erred
        in granting summary judgment in part to State Farm and in deny-
        ing their motion for summary judgment because the court adopted
        the definition of “motor vehicle” found in the FRL to define the
        Policy term “land motor vehicle,” instead of discerning and apply-
        ing the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. We agree. To ex-
        plain why, we must first determine the scope and extent of the Pol-
        icy’s UM coverage. To do so, we start by reviewing Florida’s prin-
        ciples of contract interpretation. We then look to the plain and or-
        dinary meaning of the term “land motor vehicle” and apply this
        definition to the Spanglers’ claim. Lastly, we explain why the FRL’s
        definition of “motor vehicle” does not dictate the meaning of “land
        motor vehicle.”
        A.    Under Florida Law, the Term “Land Motor Vehicle” Is
              Given Its Plain and Ordinary Meaning.
               First, we must determine the scope and extent of the Policy’s
        UM coverage. Under Florida law, an insurance policy is a contract,
        and ordinary contract principles govern its interpretation and con-
        struction. Am. Strategic Ins. Co. v. Lucas-Solomon, 927 So. 2d 184,
        186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The scope and extent of a policy’s
        coverage is defined by the language and terms of the policy, and
        where the language of a policy is plain and unambiguous, the
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023     Page: 10 of 23

        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12062

        policy must be enforced as written. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orthopedic
        Specialists, 212 So. 3d 973, 975–76 (Fla. 2017).
               Although language in a policy is ambiguous if susceptible to
        more than one reasonable interpretation, the fact that a policy term
        is undefined does not necessarily mean the term is ambiguous.
        State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072,
        1076 (Fla. 1998). Instead, when a policy term is undefined, “com-
        mon everyday usage determines its meaning.” Nateman v. Hart-
        ford Cas. Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
        (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co.
        v. Macedo, 228 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 2017) (“When a term in an
        insurance policy is undefined, it should be given its plain and ordi-
        nary meaning . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
               The Policy at issue included UM coverage. The UM section
        of the Policy required State Farm to “pay compensatory damages
        for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to recover from the
        owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle.” Doc. 1-1 at 25 (em-
        phasis in original). Within the Policy’s UM section, “uninsured mo-
        tor vehicle” was defined, in relevant part, as “a land motor vehicle.”
        Id. at 24. The term “land motor vehicle” was not defined in the
        Policy.
               The term “motor vehicle” was defined in the Policy’s gen-
        eral Definitions section but not within its UM coverage section.
        And the Policy specified that the general definitions applied only
        where the terms appeared in boldface italics; the term “land motor
        vehicle” was not in bold typeface or italicized. We agree with the
USCA11 Case: 21-12062        Document: 36-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2023         Page: 11 of 23

        21-12062                   Opinion of the Court                               11

        district court that the Policy’s definition of “motor vehicle” appear-
        ing in the general Definitions section does not define the term as
        used in the UM section. State Farm does not challenge the district
        court’s conclusion on this issue. 4 Thus, the case turns on the mean-
        ing of the undefined term “land motor vehicle” and whether the
        Razor Pocket Mod falls within that meaning.
               Faced with an undefined term in the Policy, we defer to Flor-
        ida’s rules of contract construction, which instruct us to give the
        term its plain meaning as understood by the “[person]-on-the-
        street,” that is, the term’s plain and ordinary meaning. State Farm
        Fire & Cas. Co. v. Castillo, 829 So. 2d 242, 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
        2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). To find the plain and or-
        dinary meaning of a policy term, courts may “look to legal and non-
        legal dictionary definitions to determine such a meaning.” Gov’t
        Emps. Ins. Co., 228 So. 3d at 1113 (internal quotation marks omit-
        ted); see also Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swindal, 622 So.
        2d 467, 470 (Fla. 1993) (“Insurance contracts are construed in ac-
        cordance with the plain language of the policies as bargained for by
        the parties.”).

        4 Because State Farm has not cross-appealed the denial of summary judgment
        on this issue, we do not consider whether the meaning of the term “motor
        vehicle” that appears in the Policy’s general Definitions section is incorporated
        into the Policy’s UM coverage section, and in turn dictates the meaning of the
        term “uninsured motor vehicle” as it appears in the UM coverage section. In-
        stead, we focus on whether the Razor Pocket Mod is an “uninsured motor
        vehicle,” which the UM coverage section defines as a “land motor vehicle.”
USCA11 Case: 21-12062      Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023      Page: 12 of 23

        12                      Opinion of the Court                  21-12062

        B.     The Plain and Ordinary Meaning of “Land Motor Vehicle”
               Encompasses the Razor Pocket Mod Scooter.
               To determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the term
        “land motor vehicle,” we begin with the first word, “land.” “Land”
        means “[a]n immovable and indestructible three-dimensional area
        consisting of a portion of the earth’s surface, the space above and
        below the surface, and everything growing on or permanently af-
        fixed to it.” Land, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also
        Land, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.mer-
        riam-webster.com/dictionary/land (last visited Mar. 21, 2023)
        (“[T]he solid part of the surface of the earth[.]”). Put simply, land is
        the solid part of the earth. As such, the word “land” includes more
        than public roads and highways.
               Next, the word “motor”: “[A]ny of various power units that
        develop energy or impart motion[] such as[] a small compact en-
        gine[.]” Motor,         Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
        https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/motor (last vis-
        ited Mar. 21, 2023).
               Last, “vehicle”: “An instrument of transportation or convey-
        ance.” Vehicle, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Ve-
        hicle, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.mer-
        riam-webster.com/dictionary/vehicle (last visited Mar. 21, 2023)
        (“[A] means of carrying or transporting something[.]”). In other
        words, a vehicle is an object that carries or transports something.
               Putting the words together, a “land motor vehicle” is (1) a
        means of carrying or transporting something, (2) on the solid part
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1     Date Filed: 04/03/2023    Page: 13 of 23

        21-12062               Opinion of the Court                      13

        of the earth, while being (3) powered by an engine that imparts
        motion. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Kuntz, No. 2:19-CV-00113,
        2020 WL 7074554, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2020) (defining land mo-
        tor vehicle as a means of “carr[ying] or transport[ing] something
        over the solid part of the surface of the earth while being powered
        by a gasoline engine that imparts motion”); Trierweiler v. Frank-
        enmuth Mut. Ins. Co., 550 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
        (determining the definition of land motor vehicle to be “a vehicle
        with a motor that travels on land”). This meaning, derived from
        dictionary definitions, comports with the term’s plain meaning as
        it would be understood by a person on the street.
               Given the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “land mo-
        tor vehicle,” it is apparent that the term is broader than the term
        “motor vehicle” and encompasses more than vehicles designed for
        use on public roadways. In fact, the Policy’s Amendatory Endorse-
        ment states that “[u]ninsured [m]otor [v]ehicle does not include a
        land motor vehicle . . . designed for use primarily off public roads
        except while on public roads.” Doc. 1-2 at 6. The Endorsement ex-
        pressly contemplates that a land motor vehicle may be designed for
        off-road use. Though designed for off-road use, such a vehicle will
        be covered by the Policy’s UM coverage when it is being used on a
        public road (as the Razor Pocket Mod was here).
USCA11 Case: 21-12062        Document: 36-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2023         Page: 14 of 23

        14                         Opinion of the Court                       21-12062

               Further, the term “land motor vehicle” appears in the UM
        coverage section without further qualifications 5 or statements that
        would limit the term to vehicles designed primarily for operation
        on public roadways—despite the Policy’s inclusion of such limiting
        qualifications and statements elsewhere in the Policy. See Doc. 1-1
        at 4 (defining car as “a land motor vehicle with four or more
        wheels, designed for use primarily on public roads” (emphasis
        added)). Together with the fact that the Endorsement contem-
        plates that a land motor vehicle may be primarily designed for off-
        road use, the lack of limiting qualifications and statements further
        supports our conclusion that “land motor vehicle” has a broader
        meaning than motor vehicle. We now apply the plain and ordinary
        meaning of the term to the Razor Pocket Mod scooter.
               The Razor Pocket Mod was designed to transport a rider and
        personal items. It has spoked, inflatable wheels made for traveling
        on land. It is powered by two 12-volt batteries that provide electric-
        ity to a 250W motor. Thus, the Razor Pocket Mod scooter falls
        within the scope of the plain and ordinary meaning of a land motor
        vehicle. 6 Because the Razor Pocket Mod is a land motor vehicle,

        5 The Policy’s definition of uninsured motor vehicle includes qualifications
        regarding the ownership, maintenance, and use of the vehicle that are not rel-
        evant here.
        6 Our conclusion today is in line with other state courts’ interpretations of the
        term “land motor vehicle” as used in insurance policies. See, e.g., Thedin v.
        U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 703, 705–06 (N.D. 1994) (concluding
USCA11 Case: 21-12062        Document: 36-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2023        Page: 15 of 23

        21-12062                   Opinion of the Court                              15

        we conclude it is an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by the Pol-
        icy.
        C.     The FRL’s Definition of “Motor Vehicle” Does Not Dictate
               the Meaning of “Land Motor Vehicle” in the Policy.
                 State Farm argues that to determine whether the Razor
        Pocket Mod is an uninsured motor vehicle under the Policy, we
        must “determine[] whether it [is] a motor vehicle in the context
        of . . . Florida’s FRL.” Appellee’s Br. at 10. We disagree.
               Florida’s FRL requires an individual who operates a motor
        vehicle on Florida’s public streets and highways to “show proof of
        financial ability” to compensate for accidents as a “requisite” to op-
        erating a motor vehicle in Florida. Fla. Stat. § 324.011. Under the
        FRL, Florida motorists must maintain liability insurance 7 when

        that a farm combine was a land motor vehicle under the plain and ordinary
        meaning of the term even though a state statute provided a more limited def-
        inition of the term “motor vehicle”); Trierweiler, 550 N.W.2d at 579–80 (con-
        cluding that a farm tractor was a land motor vehicle under the plain and ordi-
        nary meaning of the term); Paskiewicz v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 834 N.W.2d
        866, 867–68 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that a child-sized four-wheel all-
        terrain vehicle operated by a three-year-old was a land motor vehicle under
        the plain and ordinary meaning of the term); Colwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
        Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 751, 751–52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (concluding that a minibike
        operated by an eight-year-old was a land motor vehicle under the plain and
        ordinary meaning of the term).
        7 The statute provides other ways in which an operator of a motor vehicle
        may prove his financial responsibility that are not relevant here. See Fla.
        Stat. § 324.031.
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023     Page: 16 of 23

        16                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12062

        operating a motor vehicle on Florida’s roadways. Id. § 324.031.
        The FRL defines a “[m]otor vehicle” as “[e]very self-propelled ve-
        hicle that is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a
        highway.” Id. § 324.021(1). If an individual operates a self-propelled
        vehicle that is designed and required to be licensed for use upon a
        highway, that individual is required to maintain liability insurance.
                The FRL works in tandem with Florida’s Uninsured Motor-
        ist statute (“UM statute”). Id. § 627.727. The UM statute requires,
        in relevant part, that an insurer who offers motor vehicle liability
        insurance that covers bodily injury also must provide uninsured
        motor vehicle coverage, unless the insured expressly rejects UM
        coverage. Id. § 626.727(1). The purpose of the UM statute is to place
        a party injured by an uninsured motorist in the same position as if
        the uninsured motorist been insured as required by the FRL. See
        Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229, 237–38
        (Fla. 1971) (“[UM coverage under the UM statute] is statutorily in-
        tended to provide the reciprocal or mutual equivalent of automo-
        bile liability coverage prescribed by the Financial Responsibility
        Law . . . .”); Schoeck v. Allstate Ins. Co., 235 So. 3d 953, 956 (Fla.
        Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
                Taken together, the FRL and the UM statute require that an
        insurer, at a minimum and in relevant part, provide UM coverage
        (if the policy provides bodily injury coverage) for “motor vehicles”
        as defined by the FRL. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Becraft,
        501 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
USCA11 Case: 21-12062      Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023      Page: 17 of 23

        21-12062                Opinion of the Court                         17

               State Farm argues that when a term is undefined within a
        policy’s UM coverage, courts must look to the FRL. To support its
        argument, State Farm cites two Florida Supreme Court decisions:
        Grant v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 638 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1994),
        and Carguillo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 276 (Fla.
        1988). Neither Grant nor Carguillo changes our analysis, however.
        Both decisions stand only for the proposition that an insurer must
        provide UM coverage that is consistent with the purposes of the
        FRL and UM statute. Neither decision requires that an insurer only
        provide UM coverage for motor vehicles as defined by the FRL. To
        explain why, we briefly review the Florida Supreme Court’s deci-
        sions in Grant and Carguillo.
                In Grant, the issue before the Florida Supreme Court was
        whether a motorcycle was a motor vehicle under a car insurance
        policy. Grant, 638 So. 2d at 937. The insured’s motorcycle was not
        listed as a covered vehicle on the policy. Id. After an accident in-
        volving the motorcycle, the insured sought UM coverage for dam-
        age sustained while operating the motorcycle. Id. The insurer de-
        nied the claim because a policy exclusion barred coverage for inju-
        ries that occurred while the insured occupied “a motor vehi-
        cle . . . [that] was not insured for . . . coverage under [the] policy.”
        Id. (emphasis omitted). In response, the insured maintained that
        the motorcycle was not a motor vehicle; thus, he argued, the ex-
        clusion did not apply. Id.
               The Florida Supreme Court began by reviewing the policy
        at issue. Id. The no-fault coverage section of the policy defined the
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023    Page: 18 of 23

        18                     Opinion of the Court                21-12062

        term “motor vehicle,” and the preface section of the policy defined
        the term “car” as “a land motor vehicle with four or more wheels,
        which is designed for use mainly on public roads.” Id. (internal quo-
        tation marks omitted). The UM section of the policy, however, did
        not define motor vehicle or car, despite using the term “motor ve-
        hicle.” Id. The Court determined that the definitions that appeared
        elsewhere in the policy were inapplicable to the policy’s UM cov-
        erage. Id. at 937–38. So, the Court was “compelled to search else-
        where for a sensible and appropriate definition” of the term “motor
        vehicle.” Id. at 937. The Court turned to the FRL and its definition
        of the term. Concluding that the FRL’s definition of “motor vehi-
        cle” comported with the plain meaning of the term, the Court de-
        termined that the motorcycle was a “motor vehicle” as that term
        was used in the UM section of the policy. Id. at 938.
                The dispute before us is distinguishable from Grant; thus,
        we see no reason to incorporate the FRL’s definition of “motor ve-
        hicle” into the Policy. In Grant, the policy’s UM coverage section
        did not define the term “motor vehicle.” The FRL readily defined
        the exact term at issue—motor vehicle—and so reliance on the
        FRL’s definition of motor vehicle was “sensible and appropriate.”
        Id. at 937. Here, the Policy’s UM section defined the term “unin-
        sured motor vehicle” as “land motor vehicle.” But the term “land
        motor vehicle” was not defined in the Policy; thus, unlike in Grant,
        the term at issue here is “land motor vehicle.” As we previously
        explained, the word “land” modifies the term “motor vehicle.” See
        Trierweiler, 550 N.W.2d at 579 (“We further note that the
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023    Page: 19 of 23

        21-12062               Opinion of the Court                       19

        exclusionary phrase defendant relies upon is ‘land motor vehicle’
        and not just ‘motor vehicle.’ The addition of the word ‘land’ must
        be accorded meaning[.]”). A motor vehicle as defined by the FRL is
        a vehicle designed for use on public roads. The use of the word
        “land,” then, as an “adjective modifying motor vehicle . . . must, by
        a plain reading, mean the vehicle anticipated [by the Policy] was
        more than a vehicle that would travel only on [public] roads.” Id.
        at 579–80. The word “land” expands the scope of the term “motor
        vehicle.” Thus, Grant does not control the definition of “land mo-
        tor vehicle.” State Farm points to no provision of Florida law that
        limits an insurer to providing UM coverage for motor vehicles that
        fall within the FRL’s definition of the term.
               Like Grant, Carguillo arose out of a motorcycle accident. In
        Carguillo, an insurer refused to pay its insured’s claim for UM cov-
        erage after the insured’s son was killed in an accident involving an
        uninsured motorcycle. Carguillo, 529 So. 2d at 277. The accident
        occurred on a dirt-bike trail. Id. The insurer denied UM coverage
        based on a policy exclusion providing that “[a]n uninsured motor
        vehicle [did] not include a land motor vehicle . . . designed for use
        mainly off public roads except while on public roads.” Id. Because
        the accident occurred off public roads, the insurer argued that the
        exclusion applied, and the insured argued that the exclusion was
        invalid under the FRL. Id.
                The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the
        insurer. Id. On appeal, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal
        certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023    Page: 20 of 23

        20                     Opinion of the Court                21-12062

        “Whether a vehicle designed primarily for off-road use can be ex-
        cluded from uninsured motorist coverage because it is not a motor
        vehicle within the definition of the [FRL]?” Id. at 277 (emphasis and
        internal quotation marks omitted). The Florida Supreme Court an-
        swered that the policy exclusion did not contravene the FRL or the
        UM statute. Id. at 278. The Court explained that the UM statute is
        “statutorily intended to provide the reciprocal or mutual equiva-
        lent of automobile liability coverage prescribed by the [FRL].” Id.
        (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, an insurer is
        only required to provide its insured with the same protection “as
        would have been provided if the tort-feasor had complied with the
        [FRL].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
                Because the FRL requires that a driver of a motor vehicle
        maintain a policy of liability insurance, the Court had to determine
        whether the motorcycle was a “motor vehicle” as defined by the
        FRL. If so, the driver of the uninsured motorcycle would have been
        required by the FRL to maintain liability insurance. And to satisfy
        the purpose behind the UM statute, the insurer would have to pro-
        vide at least the protection the insured would have received if the
        uninsured motorcycle had indeed maintained liability insurance. If
        the operator of the insured motorcycle was not required to main-
        tain liability insurance under the FRL (because the vehicle was not
        a motor vehicle as defined by the FRL) then the insurer’s policy
        exclusion, excluding coverage for the motorcycle, would not con-
        travene the FRL or the UM statute.
USCA11 Case: 21-12062     Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2023     Page: 21 of 23

        21-12062               Opinion of the Court                        21

                Critically, the Court was not called upon to define any term
        in the policy. Implicit in its decision was the understanding that the
        motorcycle was a land motor vehicle. The question was whether
        the motorcycle, a land motor vehicle, could be excluded from cov-
        erage when it was not being operated on a public road. That ques-
        tion is not before us today. Here, we must determine in the first
        instance whether the Razor Pocket Mod is a land motor vehicle.
        Therefore, Carguillo is relevant to this dispute only insofar as it
        stands for the proposition that a policy exclusion must be con-
        sistent with the purposes of the FRL and UM statute. Certainly,
        Florida courts may incorporate statutory limitations and require-
        ments into an insurance contract to determine a parties’ contrac-
        tual rights, Found. Health v. Westside EKG Assocs., 944 So. 2d 188,
        195 (Fla. 2006), but the FRL and UM statute prescribe only the min-
        imum requirements. Because State Farm has not defined the term
        “uninsured motor vehicle” in a way that fails to comply with the
        FRL or UM statute, we see no reason to redefine a Policy term by
        incorporating a statutory definition. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d at
        1076 (“[W]hen an insurer fails to define a term in a policy, the in-
        surer cannot take the position that there should be a narrow, re-
        strictive interpretation of the coverage provided.” (alteration
        adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although there is
        “no requirement that an insured be protected to a greater extent
        than that statutorily mandated,” Carguillo, 529 So. 2d at 278, there
        is no prohibition against greater coverage. If State Farm saw fit to
        exclude a vehicle such as the Razor Pocket Mod from UM cover-
        age, it could have done so—provided that such an exclusion would
USCA11 Case: 21-12062      Document: 36-1       Date Filed: 04/03/2023      Page: 22 of 23

        22                      Opinion of the Court                   21-12062

        not violate the minimum requirements of the FRL and the UM
        statute.
                And the Policy’s definition of the term “uninsured motor ve-
        hicle” as a “land motor vehicle” complies with Florida law. “It is
        well settled that, as a general rule, ‘parties are free to “contract-out”
        or “contract around” state or federal law with regard to an insur-
        ance contract, so long as there is nothing void as to public policy or
        statutory law about such a contract.’” Green v. Life & Health of
        Am., 704 So. 2d 1386, 1390 (Fla. 1998) (quoting King v. Allstate Ins.
        Co., 906 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1990)). Therefore, a policy may
        “provide[] all the coverage [a] statute demands, and more.” See Hill
        v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 375 S.E.2d 727, 729 (Va. 1989)
        (finding that, where an insurance policy broadly defined motor ve-
        hicle, a moped was a motor vehicle despite that the state’s “finan-
        cial responsibility law” excluded mopeds from its definition of mo-
        tor vehicle, reasoning that an insurer may offer “broader coverage
        than the minimum prescribed by law”).
               To sum up, neither Carguillo nor Grant requires that the
        FRL’s definition of “motor vehicle” be incorporated into a policy
        that defines “uninsured motor vehicle” more broadly. An insurer
        may provide more coverage than Florida law requires. Based on
        the plain language of the Policy, State Farm has done just that—
        provided more UM coverage than required by Florida law. Thus,
        because the plain meaning of the term “land motor vehicle” in-
        cludes the Razor Pocket Mod scooter, and we are unpersuaded by
        State Farm’s argument that the FRL’s definition of motor vehicle
USCA11 Case: 21-12062         Document: 36-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2023         Page: 23 of 23

        21-12062                   Opinion of the Court                                23

        determines the scope of the Policy, we conclude that the Razor
        Pocket Mod is an uninsured motor vehicle under the Policy.
                                   IV.     CONCLUSION
              The district court erred in granting final judgment to State
        Farm based on its conclusion that the Razor Pocket Mod was not a
        land motor vehicle and in turn not an uninsured motor vehicle. 8
        Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order granting State
        Farm’s motion for summary judgment and denying the Spangler’s
        motion for summary judgment.
                REVERSED.

        8 The Spanglers point out that if an insurance policy term is subject to differing
        interpretations, the term should be construed liberally in favor of the insured.
        Because the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “land motor vehicle” is
        not ambiguous, this rule is inapplicable. Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich
        Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 166 (Fla. 2003) (“The lack of a definition of an opera-
        tive term in a policy does not necessarily render the term ambiguous and in
        need of interpretation by the courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).