Court Opinion

ID: 9764933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:44:15.538466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:02.447501
License: Public Domain

CIRE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority.
County courts originally had exclusive jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings. Wilson v. Donna Irr. Dist. No. 1, 8 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1928, writ ref’d). In 1971, however, the Legislature enacted article 3266a, which states in part:
The district courts of all counties in the State shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the county courts at law in eminent domain cases. The county courts shall have no jurisdiction in eminent domain cases.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 3266a, § 1 (Supp.1978). That statutory provision clearly removes any impediment to the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction in eminent domain matters. When HL&P filed its action for declaratory relief in the district court prior to the institution of condemnation proceedings, the district court acquired dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of the county civil court at law. See Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Sup.1974). I believe that the cases cited in the majority opinion to the contrary are inapposite, since, with the exception of City of Garland v. Mayhew, 528 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1975, writ ref’d n. r. e.), they state the pre-1971 rule. The Mayhew case can be distinguished. There, suit was first brought in the county court at law.
I therefore respectfully dissent.