Court Opinion

ID: 9674790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:35:29.142081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.680593
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
ONION, Presiding Judge.
These are appeals from convictions for attempted capital murder. Appellant entered guilty pleas to the two indictments in a bench trial, and the court assessed 30 years’ imprisonment in each case.
On appeal the Houston (14th) Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction, inter alia, held that amendments to the indictments contained no matters of substance within the meaning of Article 28.10, V.A.C. C.P., and even though the amendments came too late as matters of form under said statute, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances. See Howard v. State, 650 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1982).
We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine the correctness of the holding of the Court of Appeals relating to the amendments of the indiet- . ments.
The two indictments, omitting the formal parts, read in part as follows, alleging the appellant did:
“then and there unlawfully with intent to commit capital murder while in the course of committing and attempting to commit aggravated robbery of [complainant] attempt to cause the death of [complainant] by intentionally shooting [the complainant] with a gun.”
No motions to quash the indictments were filed or urged. There was no objection when the appellant waived reading of the indictment. After written waivers of trial by jury, the appellant entered pleas of guilty before the court on both offenses. The trial judge admonished the appellant as required by Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P. The State then offered its evidence. See Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. There were stipulations which were introduced including judicial confessions. The State then rested, and the record reflects:
“THE COURT: Anything on the merit Mr. McLean?
“MR. McLEAN (defense counsel): May it please the Court [the prosecutor] and I had agreed to an amendment to the indictment.
“THE COURT: It is amended on the pleas.
“MR. McLEAN: We would like it to be written in on the original indictment.
“THE COURT: All right, the Clerk will amend the indictment.”
After the court had found the appellant guilty on both indictments, appellant’s counsel stated again:
“[The prosecutor] and I have agreed to an amendment to the indictment in both causes and I stipulate to the amendment and I have no objection to the form of the indictment.”
The record does not reflect that the prosecutor either confirmed or denied the agreement. The statement of facts do not reveal what amendments the appellant sought. The original printed and typed indictments do have inked on or added in handwriting the following:
“to wit: a shotgun, such act committed amounting to more than mere preparation that tended but failed to effect the commission of the offense intended.”
Article 28.10, V.A.C.C.P., provides:
“Any matter of form in an indictment or information may be amended at any time before an announcement of ready for trial upon the merits by both parties, but not afterward. No matter of substance can be amended.”
*526Thus an amendment of an indictment may be made as to form if timely made before the announcement of ready by both parties. Burrell v. State, 526 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Roberts v. State, 489 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). See also Craig v. State, 480 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). After the trial commences, the indictment should not be amended as to form or substance. Burrell v. State, supra; Jackson v. State, 419 S.W.2d 370 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).
In the instant case the amendment was sought to be made for the first time after the State had rested its case. The indictment should not have been amended at this time as to either form or substance.
In Burrell this court wrote:
“In the early case of Calvin v. Texas, 25 Tex. 789 (1860), where an allegation of ownership was stricken by agreement between the district attorney and defense counsel the court noted the amendment involved substance and that neither counsel nor the district attorney and the prisoner, nor the trial court could materially alter the indictment in light of the statute (a forerunner of Article 28.10, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. containing the same wording). See also Schenk v. State, 76 Tex.Cr.R. 235, 174 S.W. 357 (1915).
“Jeters v. State, 128 Tex.Cr.R. 379, 82 S.W.2d 150 (1935), also made clear that an amendment cannot be made even if the parties consent. Morman v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 264, 75 S.W.2d 886 (1934); noted that an indictment cannot be legally amended as to substance, .... ”
We need not determine in the instant case whether the amendments were of form or substance, for the amendments, at the time made, could not be legally made even with the parties’ consent. The attempt at amendment of the indictments was a legal nullity.
The Court of Appeals found the indictments as originally returned were not fundamentally defective. The evidence supports appellant's guilty pleas to the original indictments. It is the appellant who at a belated time sought the amendments which had no legal effect. See Article 1.14, V.A.C.C.P.
The Court of Appeals’ judgment is affirmed.