Court Opinion

ID: 9465742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:54:20.547803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:20.597031
License: Public Domain

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
With great deference for my brethren in the majority, I cannot concur in their disposition of this appeal. I write briefly to explain my dissent.
The confrontation this ease presents seems typical of other such hostilities which arise when close relationships of trust and confidentiality break-up. The property line dispute between two long-time neighbors and the hotly contested divorce of two longtime marrieds often raise passions of the same intensity as arise when attorney and client end their professional relationship and there must be an accounting of the litigation proceeds of their shared victory. Those who once faced a common adversary together now face each other. When the smoke and din of this pitched battle clears, there remains only a finespun question of law which cannot possibly be answered to everyone’s complete satisfaction. The controlling issue presented here is whether the law of Florida recognizes the right of an attorney to retain funds under a retaining lien in excess of the actual amount of the maximum claim which the attorney makes against the client. Because I am not satisfied that the law of Florida is clearly settled, but not because I would have this Court reach one result over another, I dissent.
The majority is correct to note that appellants cite no Florida case which recognizes the right of a lawyer to retain money under a retaining lien in excess of the maximum claim which is made against the client. I do note that Appellees cite no Florida case which specifically forbids such a practice, and I have not found one among modern precedents or the ancient authorities there cited.1 The fundamental issue has not been definitively resolved by the sovereign courts of Florida.
The majority relies much upon Florida Bar v. Heller, 248 So.2d 644 (Fla.1961). I cannot. As the majority notes, that matter was an original proceeding to review a referee’s report recommending Heller’s disbarment. Heller had represented Pan American Surety Company. Though an order was entered in receivership discharging all of Pan American’s attorneys, Heller continued to represent the company in an appeal. When the Receiver learned of this continued representation, Heller was retained to continue to prosecute the appeal on behalf of the Receiver for an agreed one-third contingency fee. Heller collected $4,610 on behalf of Pan American but failed to turn the money over to the Receiver. The Receiver filed a petition for an order to require Heller to pay over the funds or show cause why he should not do so. In his response, Heller acknowledged that he had collected the $4,610, but he refused to turn over the recovery, less the fee, to the Receiver. He retained the money based on his one-third contingency fee claim and a claim against Pan American for $10,600.18 in fees which had not been paid him. The Circuit Judge ruled that Heller was not entitled to a lien on the $4,610, except for the agreed one-third contingency fee. The Circuit Judge ordered Heller to render an immediate accounting to the Receiver and turn over the recovery less the one-third fee. Heller filed an appeal and a supersedeas bond was fixed. When the insurance com*576pany named on the supersedeas bond went into receivership, the Circuit Judge ordered that Heller either post a substitute supersedeas bond or appear before the Circuit Court for a determination of whether he should be held in contempt. Because Heller was by then residing in Texas, a warrant of attachment of the person, issued when he took no action, was never served. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the final judgment which refused to allow the lien and required an accounting. The brief per curiam opinion merely states the result, without more. Heller v. State ex rel. Larson, 192 So.2d 501 (Fla.App.1966). The Supreme Court of Florida denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Heller v. State ex rel. Larson, 201 So.2d 461 (Fla.1967).
The focus of the Supreme Court of Florida was on the formal Bar disciplinary proceedings. The issue was narrowed by the Florida Bar, the complainant:
There is no evidence that Heller acted in bad faith in claiming his lien, when the matter was first presented to the Circuit Judge. The Florida Bar contends, however, that his conduct in failing to return the balance after final disposition of the case was such a conversion as to warrant disbarment.
248 So.2d at 646. With this narrow assertion on this equally narrow issue, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed:
Heller may have initially entertained a bona fide belief that he had a valid lien on the proceeds received by him in the [Pan American appeal] which would justify his retention of the same. This was a justiciable issue and Heller was entitled to have the issue decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. However, when the original supersedeas bond was can-celled due to receivership of the surety company, and the appellate courts held that he did not have a valid retaining lien on the funds, Heller was under an absolute obligation to either post a substitute supersedeas bond or pay the money to the Receiver. He did neither and continued to withhold funds belonging to his client, the Receiver.
Id. The Supreme Court of Florida ordered Heller suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
From this opinion, the majority concludes:
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court, although denying certiorari in Heller’s first appeal from the district court of appeal decision, made it apparent in the subsequent disbarment proceedings that it fully recognized that the court of appeal had held ‘that [Heller] did not have a valid retaining lien on the funds.’
Majority opinion at 574. This may be the meaning of this opinion. Perhaps, as the majority concludes, “under Florida law an attorney is not permitted to withhold payment to a client of his money over and above the maximum amount of the attorney’s claim against his client.” Id. On the other hand, perhaps Florida courts still recognize the retaining lien device but held that Heller did not make out a case because there was a specific agreement for a one-third fee or because the retaining lien only applies to papers in the possession of the attorney or because of some other, unexplained reason. I do not know. More importantly, I am not convinced that the majority does know or can know. The precedential force of the Heller case is simple. It is limited by the Supreme Court of Florida’s own understanding of the issue presented as I have already quoted: whether Heller’s failure to return the money after final disposition of his lien claim was such a conversion as to warrant disbarment. This is all that was decided. The majority reads the opinion to decide more, or at least in obiter dictum to decide more. Upon such a Pythian precedent, I cannot rely.2
Through the combined processes of Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332, and Removal of Cases from State Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441, a federal forum *577is the unlikely battleground for these litigants in a case involving a question of peculiar State concern. This appeal involves a consideration of the rights of members of The Florida Bar vis-a-vis their clients in fee disputes. The orderly functioning of the State Bar and the tradition of deference owed the State judiciary in such matters seemingly would require that the State Courts resolve such disputes and evolve the governing rules. Because such a course is available and because I believe that under “Our Federalism” 3 it is the best course to follow, I cannot join in the Court’s holding today. I would certify the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.4

. See, e. g., Chancey v. Bauer, 97 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1938); Cooper v. McNair, 49 F.2d 778 (S.D.Fla.1931); Winn v. City of Cocoa, 75 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1954); Scott v. Kirtley, 113 Fla. 637, 152 So. 721 (1933); Alyea v. Hampton, 112 Fla. 61, 150 So. 242 (1933); Goethel v. First Properties International, Ltd., 363 So.2d 1117 (Fla.App. 1978); Herold v. Hunt, 327 So.2d 240 (Fla.App.1976); Prunty v. State, 226 So.2d 448 (Fla.App.1969); Baya v. Price, 222 So.2d 253 (Fla.App. 1969); Wilkerson v. Olcott, 212 So.2d 119 (Fla.App.1968; St. Ana v. Wheeler Mattison Drugs, Inc., 129 So.2d 184 (Fla.App.1961); Cristiani v. Cristiani, 114 So.2d 726 (Fla.App. 1959); Billingham v. Theile, 107 So.2d 238 (Fla. App. 1958).

. The Greek god Apollo made his will known through a medium at Delphi, the famous Delphic Oracle, who was called the Pythia. When Apollo’s advice was sought, the Pythia descended into the oracular vault of the temple, the innermost sanctuary, where she took her position on a tripod. The Pythia was attended by a priest-interpreter, an exegete. Next, the *577chamber was filled with the fumes of burned barley, hemp and laurel leaves, and the Pythia fell Into a trance. When the priest questioned her, she talked incoherently. The priest took down what she said and her response was turned over to yet another priest who issued the final form of the oracle. There was yet another priest who explained the obscurities of the god’s response. See generally Mayerson, Classical Mythology in Literature, Art, and Music 123-24 (1971).
Not being as well-versed in Apollonian doctrine as the majority, I would not serve as exegete here. I would ask Apollo directly and certify the question.

. I borrow Mr. Justice Black’s heartfelt phrase. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).

. The much-extolled certification procedure is available here. See, e. g., Bornstein v. Citizens National Bank of Orlando, 564 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1977); Pokorny v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Largo, 563 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1977); Phillips v. Iglehart, 558 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1977).