Court Opinion

ID: 9386078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 14:05:18.325598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:01.191321
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-543

                            TESSA WOLFE & another1

                                       vs.

                          JOHN BUDZYNA & another.2

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       On appeal from an order of the Superior Court, the

 individual defendants claim error in the denial of their motion

 for summary judgment, which sought dismissal of the claims

 against them on the basis of immunity under G. L. c. 231, § 85W

 (the Charitable Immunity Statute).3          We conclude that genuine

 disputes of material fact precluded entry of summary judgment

 and affirm.

 1 Austin Davy.
 2 James Solomon. The amended complaint also named Daniel
 Antonelli as a defendant, but the claims against him were
 dismissed with prejudice in the trial court and he is not part
 of this appeal.
 3 Because the Charitable Immunity Statute provides qualified

 immunity from suit and not simply from liability, "an order
 denying a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment
 brought by a volunteer for a nonprofit organization based on the
 defense of charitable immunity is subject to interlocutory
 appeal as of right." Lynch v. Crawford, 483 Mass. 631, 640
 (2019).
     A party is entitled to summary judgment where the moving

party "shows that, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, 'there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.'"     Lynch v. Crawford, 483 Mass.

631, 641 (2019), quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended,

436 Mass. 1404 (2002).   The moving party may satisfy this burden

either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an

essential element of the opposing party's case or by

demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable

expectation of proving an essential element of the case at

trial.   Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass.

805, 809 (1991).   Our review of the denial of a motion for

summary judgment is de novo.     See Gennari v. Reading Pub. Sch.,

77 Mass. App. Ct. 762, 763 (2010).

    The Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148, imposes

liability for unpaid wages on an employer, as well as on the

employer's president and treasurer.       See Segal v. Genitrix, LLC,

478 Mass. 551, 558 (2017).     The Charitable Immunity Statute

protects uncompensated officers of a nonprofit organization from

liability for civil damages "as a result of any acts or

omissions related solely to the performance of his duties as an

officer."   G. L. c. 231, § 85W.       It does not, however, protect

acts or omissions "intentionally designed to harm" or that are

                                   2
"grossly negligent . . . which result in harm to the person."4

Id.

      In the present case, the undisputed facts in the record

reveal the following.    Boston Children's Theater, Inc. (BCT), a

nonprofit organization, struggled financially for several years

leading up to its declaration of bankruptcy, resulting in unpaid

wages owed to the plaintiffs.5   Defendants James Solomon and John

Budzyna served as treasurers for BCT; Solomon also served as

president.    Neither was compensated for their service.   The

essential elements of a Wage Act claim and of a Charitable

Immunity Statute defense are therefore met.

      The parties differ on whether the individual defendants'

actions could be construed to support an intent to harm the

plaintiffs.   Both defendants were aware that BCT employees were

owed wages and yet continued to work.    While Budzyna was serving

as BCT treasurer, BCT's executive director regularly sent him a

monthly list of vendors to be paid; Budzyna then used an

electronic banking program to approve payments to those vendors.6

4 The plaintiffs did not allege any grossly negligent actions by
the defendants in their opposition to the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, so we consider only whether the defendants
acted with an intent to harm.
5 BCT was named as a defendant in the plaintiffs' original

complaint, but the claims against it were stayed after it filed
a suggestion of bankruptcy. The plaintiffs later filed an
amended complaint that did not name BCT as a defendant.
6 BCT's former executive director is not a party to this suit.

                                  3
For several months in which Budzyna approved payments to outside

vendors, he was aware that BCT employees, including the

plaintiffs, were still owed back wages.   Budzyna also told BCT's

unpaid employees, including at least one of the plaintiffs, that

he and the board were "working on" addressing unpaid wages, and

that he would do what he could to ensure that the wages were

paid.

     Like Budzyna, Solomon had control over BCT's expenses while

serving as treasurer and interim president, and directed that

funds be used to repay vendors and donors instead of employees.

Solomon also told BCT employees, including the plaintiffs, that

he was "working on" getting them paid.7   Although Solomon

informed the BCT board that BCT would not be able to make

payroll, he did not inform the plaintiffs.   Despite

acknowledging that the plaintiffs continued to work without pay

after bringing their payroll concerns to him, Solomon did not

file an insurance claim to cover unpaid wages until November

2019, shortly before BCT filed for bankruptcy and after BCT had

consistently struggled to make payroll for several months.

7 Solomon told another BCT employee in an e-mail message to "have
faith that while you do the excellent job I am told you do, I
will be working with [the executive director] to make sure the
money is there, not only for you to be paid on time, but for you
to receive the back-pay that no one should have to wait for!"

                                4
     Though Budzyna and Solomon claim that merely allowing or

encouraging employees to continue working without pay does not

show an intent to harm, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld denial

of summary judgment on very similar facts in Lynch v. Crawford,

483 Mass. 631 (2019).8   In Lynch, former employees of a

financially struggling nonprofit organization brought Wage Act

claims against the former president.     483 Mass. at 632.   The

president had personally promised employees that they would be

paid, while he was aware that the organization would not make

payroll and chose to direct funds to outside vendors instead of

to employees.    Id. at 642.   The Court held that those actions

constituted "an intentional design to harm employees by failing

to pay them the wages they were due."     Id. at 644.

     As in Lynch, in the present case both Budzyna and Solomon

were aware that BCT would not timely make payroll, and that the

funds necessary to do so would not be forthcoming, based on

BCT's financial circumstances.    Cf. Lynch, 483 Mass. at 642.

Both Budzyna and Solomon personally assured employees that they

would be paid.    Both Budzyna and Solomon directed funds be paid

8 The defendants' contention that their expressed interest in,
and efforts toward, seeing that the plaintiffs get paid all
wages owed negates an "intent to harm," imports a malice
standard that is not supported either by the language of the
statute or by caselaw. See Lynch, 483 Mass. at 644 (jury could
find that defendant's actions in encouraging employees to work
and assuring them payment was forthcoming showed intentional
design to harm).

                                  5
to vendors rather than to pay the plaintiffs' back wages.9     The

evidence in the summary judgment record, viewed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiffs and drawing all reasonable

inferences in their favor, presents a triable question of fact

whether the defendants, as treasurers and president of BCT,

"acted with an intentional design to harm employees by failing

to pay them the wages they were due."   Lynch, supra at 644.

Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the defendants' motion

for summary judgment.

                                    So ordered.

                                    By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                      Rubin & Massing, JJ.10),

                                    Clerk

Entered:   April 11, 2023.

9 We acknowledge that the defendants' decision to pay certain
bills (such as for rent) was understandable, in that some
payments were necessary to preserve the viability of the
business as a whole, and that failure to preserve the business
would result in a complete inability to pay wages to employees.
10 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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