Court Opinion

ID: 9851160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:08:15.837659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:50.130395
License: Public Domain

*355VOGEL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent, as I did in the earlier appeal involving the same parties, Edgeley Education Assn, v. Edgeley Public School Dist. No. 3, 231 N.W.2d 826 (N.D.1975), and in Dickinson Education Assn. v. Dickinson Public School Dist. No. 1, 252 N.W.2d 205 (N.D.1977).
In the present case, the majority recognizes that the facts are parallel to the facts in the Dickinson case, supra. My reasons for dissenting in the present case are set forth at length in the dissent in that case and in the dissent in the Edgeley case, and I will not repeat them here.
I must add, however, that I deplore the tendency of this court and some trial courts to condone clear violations of applicable law by school districts by finding such violations “harmless” or otherwise excusing them. In the case now before us, the trial court found that the issuance of individual contracts to teachers represented by an association was “improper,” but “not to be considered an act of bad faith for the purpose of this case.” The majority approves.
As I stated in my dissents referred to above, to me it is clear that such conduct by the School District constitutes bad-faith bargaining as a matter of law.