Court Opinion

ID: 9834455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:36:19.268664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:15.669242
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Counsel for appellee have filed an able argument on motion for rehearing. They insist that we have held against the weight of authority, in deciding that the giving of the checks in controversy did not constitute an equitable assignment, and did not confer rights upon the check holders superior to .those of the garnishing creditor. The insistence is also made that even if proof of an agreement or the intention of the parties to assign the fund was necessary, as held by us, we should indulge the presumption that the trial court impliedly so found. This upon the ground that appellant did not request additional findings nor complain of the omission of the court in this respect.
We are now of the opinion, however, that it is quite immaterial what the rule of the law merchant or the common law was, upon the question of what was necessary to constitute an assignment. The basis of this conclusion is that we misinterpreted the meaning and effect of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act of the Thirty-Sixth Legislature. A more mature consideration of the terms of that statute has convinced us that it is decisive of the case and adversely to appellee.
Article 6001-A, § 185, provides:
“A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a cheek.”
Section 127 is as follows:
“A bill of itself does not operate as an assignment of the funds in the hands of the drawee available for the payment thereof, and the drawee is not liable on the bill unless and until he accepts the same.”
Section 189:
“A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder, unless and until it accepts or certifies the check.”
Section 132 is also pertinent, and reads:
“The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer. The acceptance must be in writing and signed by the drawee. It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money.”
This act has not been construed by any of the appellate courts of this state, as far as we are aware, but in First Nat. Bank v. Hargis Bank & Trust Co., 170 Ky. 690, 186 S. W. 471, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky said that the Negotiable Instruments Law-had then been adopted by 38 states and had been given a practically uniform application. The court held that, in the absence of .acceptance or certification, there was no assignment of the fund upon which the cheek was .drawn. Such, also, was the holding of thé same court in Boswell v. Bank, 123 Ky. 485, 96 S. W. 797. The question was also considered by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Kaesemeyer v. Smith, 22 Idaho, 1, 123 Pac. *1002943, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 100, and it was held that a cheek given prior to the service of a writ of garnishment,' but paid by the garnishee afteiMt had been served with the writ, did not operate as an assignment of the funds of the drawer on deposit with the bank. This is the exact question before us, and' the holding was based upon similar provisions of the statute.
Having adopted the Negotiable Instruments Law from other states, we likewise adopt the interpretation previously placed thereon by the courts of the sister states; at least, such is the presumption. But we may add that we think the statute is plain and unambiguous, and prescribes a legal standard for determining when an assignment results by which we are bound. Doubtless the Legislature had in mind the conflict of decisions and meant to set the question at rest.
Since, under the plain provisions of the statute, there was no assignment of the checks in question, the bank was not liable to the holders when it voluntarily paid their checks. If it was not liable to them, then it was still indebted to the drawer of the checks, the depositor, when the garnishment was served. Under the findings of the court, it was so indebted, and we conclude that the rights of the garnishing creditor were superior and legally impounded the funds.
There is no pretense that the garnishee bank accepted or certified the checks or any of them, before the writ was served, nor any room for an implied finding to that effect, under the pleadings and issues made.
We conclude that the judgment should be reversed and here rendered for appellant, and that the appellee bank is not entitled to attorney’s fees. Therefore, upon our own motion, our former judgment is set aside and judgment rendered as above indicated.
Reversed and rendered.