Court Opinion

ID: 9840087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 05:07:58.085132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:27.896612
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

HARBOR XPRESS, LLC, and XPRESS                                     UNPUBLISHED
PROPERTIES, LLC,                                                   September 14, 2023

               Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                                  No. 364508
                                                                   St. Clair Circuit Court
YATOOMA OIL, LLC, and MICHAEL                                      LC No. 21-000055-CZ
YATOOMA,

               Defendants-Appellants,

and

LEASE CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

               Defendant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and MURRAY and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       In this action for breach of contract and fraud,1 defendants, Yatooma Oil, LLC (Yatooma
Oil) and Michael Yatooma (Michael), appeal as of right the trial court’s judgment following a
bench trial in favor of plaintiffs, Harbor Xpress, LLC, and Xpress Properties, LLC. We affirm.

                            I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On July 5, 2019, a “Management Fee Agreement” was executed between “YATOOMA
OIL, LLC, hereinafter called ‘Seller,’ . . . and Harbor Xpress, LLC . . . hereinafter called
‘Manager,’ desiring to arrange for the consignment and distribution of Seller’s petroleum products

1
 The claims of slander of title as well as defendant, Lease Corporation of America (LCA), were
dismissed from the litigation and are not pertinent to this appeal.

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from the premises located at 6349 Lapeer Road, Kimball, Michigan 48074 (the ‘Premises’)[.]”
This agreement provided in pertinent part:

       1. This Management Fee Agreement (the “Agreement”) shall be for a term of ten
       (10) years or the sale of 13,000,000 gallons of gasoline, whichever occurs later (the
       “Term”) and shall become effective on the first day the Premises is open for the
       sale of motor fuel and shall continue in effect until the Term described above is
       complete.

       2. Seller shall deliver to Manager at the Premises petroleum products, including
       gasoline, diesel, lubricants, and such other goods as may be agreed upon. Seller
       will fix the prices at which the products are to be dispensed by Manager which
       prices shall be competitive relative to the Premises’ market area according to
       industry practice.

Michael signed the agreement for the “Seller” and listed his title as “Manager,” and Antoin Akl
(Antoin), plaintiffs’ representative, signed the agreement for the “Manager” as identified in the
agreement and listed his title as “Authorized Member.”

      Also on July 5, 2019, these same two individuals signed a “First Amendment to
Management Fee Agreement.” This document provided, in pertinent part:

               Whereas, Seller and Manager are parties to a Management Fee Agreement
       dated July 5th , 2019 (the “Agreement”) whereby Manager manages the sale of
       Seller’s motor fuel on commission at the premises located at 6349 Lapeer Road,
       Kimball, Michigan (the “Premises”); and

              Whereas, the term of the Agreement is 10 years or the sale of 13,000,000
       gallons of gasoline, which ever [sic] occurs later; and

              Whereas, Seller has invested approximately $570,000 in petroleum storage
       and dispensing equipment at the Premises pursuant to the terms of an Investment
       Agreement between the Parties; and

              Whereas, Manager has requested the option to “buy out” of the Agreement
       and convert the relationship to a traditional Jobber/Dealer relationship and Seller
       has agreed to the request;

              NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the above and the terms set forth
       below, the Parties agree as follows:

       1. Paragraph 28 of the Agreement is deleted and replaced with the following:

       At any time during the Term of the Agreement, Manager my [sic] elect to “buy out”
       of the Agreement and the Improvement Agreement by: 1) paying Seller an amount
       equal to $0.0438 per gallon multiplied by the number of gallons of gasoline
       remaining on the minimum volume (i.e. 13,000,000 gallons minus gallons sold at
       the Premises prior to the buy out); and 2) executing a new Dealer Supply

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      Agreement and related agreements for the Premises for the remaining years and
      months of the Term on Seller’s customary terms and conditions. As an example, if
      Manager elects the buy out after 6,500,000 gallons of gasoline had been sold at the
      Premises under this Agreement, the buy out amount would be $284,700.00
      (6,500,000 x $0.0438 = $284,700.00).

      2. All other terms and conditions of the Agreement and Improvement Agreement
      remain in full force and effect.

       Again, on July 5, 2019, an “Improvement Agreement” was executed between Harbor
Xpress, LLC as the “Manager” and Yatooma Oil, LLC as “Yatooma.” This agreement set forth
the consideration and stated in relevant part:

      Now, Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing premises and the mutual
      promises and covenants hereinafter contained, the Parties agree as follows:

      1. Term. This Agreement is effective as to each Party on the first day the Retail
      Outlet begins the sale of motor fuel to the public and shall remain in effect until
      expiration of Management Fee Agreement (the “Term”), unless earlier terminated
      as provided for herein. As used in this Agreement, the term “Contract Year” means
      each period of 365/366 days during the term that commences on the first day of the
      Term.

      2. Investment. YATOOMA agrees to advance funds to purchase and install the
      equipment and image items set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto for amount set
      forth on Exhibit A, to be utilized to equip and image the Retail Outlet in accordance
      with Sunoco’s current image and identification standards established for “Branded
      Outlet”. Ownership and title to the Investments shall at all time remain with
      YATOOMA. The investment will be amortized on a straight line basis over
      120 months, 0% interest.

      The “Exhibit A” attached to the “Improvement Agreement” provides as follows:

                                         EXHIBIT A

                                       INVESTMENT

      EQUIPMENT / IMPROVEMENT                                      EST. COST

      Supply and install a complete motor fuel system[]            $450,000.00

      3 multi product dispensers                                   $ 50,000.00

      Sunoco image, including canopy, dispensers, paint            $ 10,000.00

      3 product LED price sign by Everbrite                        $ 25,000.00

      Labor for sign installation                                  $ 20,000.00

                                              -3-
       Dual commander with ruby 2 POS system                          $ 15,000.00

                                                                      $570,000.00

        At the bench trial, Ashley Akl (Akl), a representative of plaintiffs, Bradley Austin Bissett,
the chief credit officer for Tri-County Bank, and Michael testified regarding the parties’
agreements and financing. Akl testified that a bid to supply and install the gas station equipment
was received from Oscar W. Larson Company (Larson), and she believed that it would perform
the work. And, defendants represented that they were contributing $570,000 to the project
premised on Larson performing the work. However, Michael testified that it was his choice to
select the contractor because defendants provided the financing for that aspect of the project.
Michael selected the bid of $240,000 submitted by Dynamic Construction & Brothers, LLC
(Dynamic). Because of the use of Dynamic, defendants only contributed approximately $378,000
to the project, instead of the $570,000 identified in the contract. Nonetheless, Michael testified
that defendants were not obligated to invest the actual $570,000 because the documents used the
terms “approximately” or “estimated.”

        Akl testified that a payback agreement was executed that allowed defendants to recoup
their investment. Initially, it was proposed that the payback would require plaintiffs to sell
12,000,000 gallons. However, the ultimate agreement provided that 13,000,000 gallons of gas had
to be sold or ten years had to lapse, whichever was later. Akl testified that she would not have
agreed to those terms if she had known that defendants would only contribute $378,000 instead of
$570,000. In addition to denying the assertion that $570,000 must be invested by defendants,
Michael denied that the reduced investment of $378,000 had any bearing on the negotiation and
claimed that plaintiffs would receive the benefit of its reduced contribution if they exercised the
buyout provision.

         Bissett testified that Akl was able to secure financing through Tri-County Bank (the Bank).
However, the Bank insisted on occupying the first lien position to secure its interest. When a
Mortgagee Waiver was submitted to Akl and Bissett, Bissett discussed the proposed document
with the Bank President. They rejected a subordination of its interest and accordingly advised Akl.
Nonetheless, a lien search later revealed that the Mortgagee Waiver was executed but the
signatures of Akl and Bissett were forged. Michael also signed the Mortgagee Waiver, purportedly
as a witness, but he explained that the document was signed in conjunction with other financing
documents on his desk. Michael agreed that the lien placed on plaintiffs’ property as a result of
the Mortgagee Waiver should be discharged. The placement of the lien precluded plaintiffs from
seeking refinancing of the loan with the Bank. Additionally, there was no indication that
defendants disclosed that the majority of their investment was provided through financing by LCA,
and therefore, the Bank was not adequately apprised of the risks involved in the transaction. Bissett
testified that there were grounds to “call” the loan to the Akls, but the Bank had not done so because
payments were being made.

       Although the trial court did not expressly identify the cause of action that plaintiffs proved,
the opinion and decision indicated that it found defendants breached the contract and it opted to
reform the contract, rather than rescind it, stating in pertinent part:

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       Despite discussions that may have taken place about using Larson to provide the
       equipment necessary for the site, the contract the parties signed did not obligate
       Yatooma to use Larson. The Improvement Agreement only obligated Yatooma to
       advance funds to purchase and install the equipment and image items set forth on
       Exhibit A (attached to it) for the amount set forth on Exhibit A. This is clearly set
       forth in Paragraph 2 of the Improvement Agreement. What the Improvement
       Agreement did not specify was how Yatooma was to advance those funds. It only
       obligated Yatooma to advance them.

               However, as it turned out, Yatooma did not advance $570,000, the amount
       it agreed to advance, but advanced just over $378,000, nearly $200,000 less than
       the amount to which it had agreed. In addition, the First Amendment to the
       Management Fee Agreement stated that Yatooma “has invested approximately
       $570,000” in petroleum storage and dispensing equipment on the subject premises.
       The Court finds it more than coincidental that the First Amendment to the
       Management Fee Agreement and the Improvement Agreement, which were
       contemporaneous, both state that amount.

               The Management Fee Agreement, the First Amendment to the Management
       Fee Agreement, and the Improvement Agreement were all parts of the same
       transaction and should be read together. Their terms clearly state that Yatooma
       either had advanced or would advance $570,000, which it did not do.
       [Emphasis added.]

       Consequently, when it issued the judgment, the trial court did not enter a damage award in
favor of plaintiffs but revised the terms of the contract to reflect defendants’ reduced investment
and make plaintiffs whole, stating in relevant part:

             The agreements entered into by and between the parties, including [t]he
       Improvement Agreement, the Management Agreement and the First Amendment
       to Management agreement are hereby reformed as follows:

               A. The duration of the Management Fee Agreement and the terms of the
                  buyout contained within the First Amendment to the Management Fee
                  Agreement shall be and hereby are reformed, amended, recalculated and
                  reduced proportionately to reflect Defendant Yatooma Oil’s actual
                  investment of $378,000 rather than $570,000;

               B. Plaintiff Harbor Xpress, LLC is only required to sell 8,621,052.63
                  gallons of Defendant’s [sic] gasoline over a period of 6.6315 years,
                  rather than 13,000,000 gallons of Defendant’s gasoline over 10 years.

From this decision, defendants appeal.

                                 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       In Bayberry Group, Inc v Crystal Beach Condo Ass’n, 334 Mich App 385, 392; 964 846
(2020), this Court delineated the following standards applicable to a bench trial:

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               “This Court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in a bench trial for clear
       error and its conclusions of law de novo. A finding is clearly erroneous where,
       after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm
       conviction that a mistake has been made.” Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256
       Mich App 505, 512; 667 NW2d 379 (2003) (citations omitted). “The construction
       and interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law that we review
       de novo.” See Rossow v Brentwood Farms Dev, Inc, 251 Mich App 652, 658; 651
       NW2d 458 (2002). “The extent of a party’s rights [. . .] is a question of fact, and a
       trial court’s determination of those facts is reviewed for clear error. A trial court’s
       dispositional ruling on equitable matters, however, is subject to review de novo.”
       Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village of Dexter, 473 Mich 33, 40; 700 NW2d 364 (2005).

When an appellant fails to challenge the basis of the ruling by the trial court, we need not even
consider granting the party the relief requested. Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich
App 364, 381; 689 NW2d 145 (2004).

                                         III. ANALYSIS

         Defendants allege that the trial court erred in determining that fraudulent inducement was
established because it was Akl that provided the cost estimate of $570,000. Because the trial
court’s ruling was premised on the breach of contract, defendants failed to challenge the basis of
the trial court’s ruling and are not entitled to appellate relief.

       In McCoig Materials, LLC v Galui Constr, Inc, 295 Mich App 684, 694; 818 NW2d 410
(2012), this Court addressed the elements of a contract and its construction:

               “The essential elements of a contract are parties competent to contract, a
       proper subject matter, legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality
       of obligation.” Mallory v City of Detroit, 181 Mich App 121, 127; 449 NW2d 115
       (1989). Issues regarding the proper interpretation of a contract or the legal effect
       of a contractual clause are reviewed de novo. Fodale v Waste Mgt of Mich, Inc,
       271 Mich App 11, 16-17; 718 NW2d 827 (2006). When interpreting a contract, the
       examining court must ascertain the intent of the parties by evaluating the language
       of the contract in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. In re Egbert R
       Smith Trust, 480 Mich 19, 24; 745 NW2d 754 (2008). If the language of the
       contract is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written. Id. A contract
       is unambiguous, even if inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, when it fairly
       admits of but one interpretation. Holmes v Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 594; 760
       NW2d 300 (2008). Every word, phrase, and clause in a contract must be given
       effect and contract interpretation that would render any part of the contract
       surplusage or nugatory must be avoided. Woodington v Shookoohi, 288 Mich App
       352, 374; 792 NW2d 63 (2010).

To establish an action for breach of contract, a party must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that: (1) there was a contract; (2) the other party breached the contract; and (3) there
were damages incurred by the party claiming breach. Bayberry Group, Inc, 334 Mich App at 393.
Rescission is an appropriate remedy in a contract action when there is a material breach affecting

                                                -6-
a substantial or essential part of the contract. Holtzlander v Brownell, 182 Mich App 716, 721;
453 NW2d 295 (1990). A breach is material if the nonbreaching party does not obtain the
reasonably expected benefit. Id. at 722.

        “The general theory of reformation is that where there is clear evidence that both parties
reached an agreement, but as the result of mutual mistake, or mistake on the one side and fraud on
the other, the instrument does not express the true intent of the parties, equity will reform the
instrument so as to express what was actually intended.” Ross v Damm, 271 Mich 474, 48-481;
260 NW 750 (1935). “[C]ourts are required to proceed with the utmost caution in exercising
jurisdiction to reform written instruments.” Olsen v Porter, 213 Mich App 25, 28; 539 NW2d 523
(1995). Furthermore, in its sound discretion, a court may only grant equitable relief where a legal
remedy is not available. Tkachik v Mandeville, 487 Mich 38, 45; 790 NW2d 260 (2010). A remedy
at law precludes a suit in equity when the legal remedy is complete and ample, not doubtful and
uncertain. Id. A legal remedy at law precludes a suit in equity when the legal relief is as effectual
as the remedy that equity may grant under the circumstances. Id.

        Breach of contract damages are awarded to protect the expectation interest of the promisee.
See Burnside v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 208 Mich App 422, 429; 528 NW2d 749 (1995).
The remedy for the breach may be compensatory damages, damages that arise naturally from the
breach or those contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was made. Genesee Co Drain
Comm’r v Genesee Co, 504 Mich 410, 419; 934 NW2d 805 (2019). When the damage remedy
seeks to correct against one party’s retained benefit at the expense of another party, the technical
request is for restitution, not compensatory damages. See id. “Restitution restores a party who
yielded excessive and unjust benefits to his or her rightful position.” Id. (citation omitted).

        “The party asserting a breach of contract has the burden of proving its damages with
reasonable certainty, and may recover only those damages that are the direct, natural, and
proximate result of the breach.” Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App 505, 512; 667
NW2d 379 (2003). Expectancy damages or damages designed to make the complaining party
whole are generally awarded in common-law breach of contract actions. Frank W Lynch & Co v
Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 586 n 4; 624 NW2d 180 (2001). These damages encompass
those that naturally arise from the contractual breach or those that the parties contemplated at the
time the contract was made. Id.

        As noted, the essential elements of a contract are parties competent to contract, a proper
subject matter, legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation. McCoig
Materials, LLC, 295 Mich App at 694. When the parties dispute the interpretation of the contract,
the reviewing court must ascertain the parties’ intent from an examination of the plain language of
the contract. Id. This occurs by giving the contract terms their ordinary meaning. Id. An
unambiguous contract is enforced as written, even if inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, with
effect given to every word, phrase, and clause. Id.

        The “First Amendment to Management Fee Agreement” expressly provided that Yatooma
Oil ‘has invested approximately $570,000’ in petroleum storage and dispensing equipment” in the
project with plaintiffs. Additionally, the “Improvement Agreement” plainly stated that Yatooma
Oil agreed to “advance funds to purchase and install the equipment and storage image items set
forth on Exhibit A attached hereto[.]” A review of Exhibit A reveals that it also calculated the

                                                -7-
investment as an estimated “$570,000.” The use of the terms “approximately” and “estimated”
did not entitle defendants to reduce their contribution from $570,000 to $378,000. The
“Improvement Agreement” expressly stated that Yatooma Oil “agrees to advance funds to
purchase and install the equipment and image items set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto for
amount set forth on Exhibit A[.]”

        Thus, although there were references to “approximately” and “estimated,” the plain
language of the Improvement Agreement stated that defendants would advance funds to purchase
and install the equipment as set forth in Exhibit A, and Exhibit A identified the amount as
$570,000. The trial court commenced its opinion and decision after trial by noting that four causes
of action were raised in the complaint, including breach of contract and fraud in the inducement.
Although the trial court did not state which claim was proven by plaintiffs, it is apparent that the
trial court found that defendants breached the terms of the written contract. The trial court’s ruling,
as set forth in pertinent part below, substantiates the content of the contracts highlighted in this
opinion:

               Despite discussions that may have taken place about using Larson to
       provide the equipment necessary for the site, the contract the parties signed did not
       obligate Yatooma to use Larson. The Improvement Agreement only obligated
       Yatooma to advance funds to purchase and install the equipment and image items
       set forth on Exhibit A (attached to it) for the amount set forth on Exhibit A. This
       is clearly set forth in Paragraph 2 of the Improvement Agreement. What the
       Improvement Agreement did not specify was how Yatooma was to advance those
       funds. It only obligated Yatooma to advance them.

               However, as it turned out, Yatooma did not advance $570,000, the amount
       it agreed to advance, but advanced just over $378,000, nearly $200,000 less than
       the amount to which it had agreed. In addition, the First Amendment to the
       Management Fee Agreement stated that Yatooma “has invested approximately
       $570,000” in petroleum storage and dispensing equipment on the subject premises.
       The Court finds it more than coincidental that the First Amendment to the
       Management Fee Agreement and the Improvement Agreement, which were
       contemporaneous, both state that amount.

               The Management Fee Agreement, the First Amendment to the Management
       Fee Agreement, and the Improvement Agreement were all parts of the same
       transaction and should be read together. Their terms clearly state that Yatooma
       either had advanced or would advance $570,000, which it did not do.

         Although the trial court summarized the witnesses’ testimony at trial, including Akl’s
testimony about Michael’s representations regarding the investment amount, it is apparent from
the trial court’s ruling that it examined the contract documents signed by the parties and determined
that the plain language of those contracts revealed a commitment by defendants to expend
$570,000 on the project. And, because defendants did not expend that amount, it determined that
reformation, as opposed to rescission, was the appropriate remedy because rescission of the
contract between the parties would not relieve the Akls of their obligations with Tri-County Bank.

                                                 -8-
        But the trial court erred in classifying or identifying its remedy for breach of contract as
reformation. Reformation is an equitable remedy, and an equitable remedy is not available when
a remedy at law exists. Tkachik, 487 Mich at 45; Ross, 271 Mich at 480-481. Nevertheless, a
remedy for breach of contract may be compensatory damages, those that naturally arise from the
breach and that are technically known as restitution. Genesee Co Drain Comm’r, 504 Mich at 419.
Restitution is a damage remedy designed to correct one party’s retention of a benefit at the expense
of another, and restitution serves to restore a party who yielded unjust benefits to the rightful
position. Id.

        In the present case, the trial court determined that defendants agreed to provide $570,000
in funding in the contract documents. Despite that provision, defendants only expended $378,000.
Rather than award plaintiffs the difference between the amount promised and the amount
expended, the trial court reduced the gallons of gas that plaintiffs must sell and the duration of the
contractual period. Because the equitable remedy of reformation may be characterized as a legal
remedy of compensatory damages, the trial court did not err in its decision. And, in any event,
defendants failed to challenge the basis of the trial court’s ruling, the breach of contract. The claim
of error raised by defendants does not entitle them to appellate relief.

        Despite the trial court’s conclusion that defendants did not satisfy the contractual terms,
defendants submit that the trial court improperly found fraudulent inducement. Although
fraudulent inducement was not the basis of the trial court’s ruling, see Derderian, 263 Mich App
at 381, we conclude that this challenge fails.

        To establish fraud in the inducement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant
made a material representation; (2) it was false; (3) the defendant knew the representation was
false when made or made it recklessly without knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion;
(4) the defendant’s representation was made with the intention that the plaintiff act upon it; (5) the
plaintiff’s actions relied upon the representation; and (6) the plaintiff suffered damages. Custom
Data Solutions, Inc v Preferred Capital, Inc, 274 Mich App 239, 243; 733 NW2d 102 (2006)
(citation omitted). In Michigan, fraud is not presumed but must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. Deschane v Klug, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket
No. 360677), slip op at 6. Fraud cannot be perpetrated on a party who has full knowledge that a
representation is to the contrary. Titan Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547, 555 n 4; 817 NW2d 562
(2012).

        Defendants contend that the trial court erred in finding fraud in the inducement because
Michael did not make a false representation, and the $570,000 was proffered by Akl. However,
there was an e-mail exchange between plaintiffs’ attorney, Mark Davidson, and defendants’
attorney, Clifford A. Knaggs, about Exhibit A. In the e-mail, Davidson questioned the $120,000
in charges for equipment, claiming that the Akls understood those items were customarily provided
free of charge. In response, Knaggs rejected the contention that the equipment was free and stated
that the “entire $570,000.00 investment amount is subject to amortization and payback.” Davidson
also noted that the Akls objected to any waiver of rights if foreclosure proceedings were
commenced. However, Knaggs responded that the provision must remain because “Yatooma is a
lender of over a half million dollars and must retain the full range of remedies.”

                                                 -9-
         Moreover, there was an e-mail exchange between Akl and Michael on July 2, 2019. Akl
initially wrote to Michael on July 1, 2019, with questions about pricing and supply in light of
discussions with plaintiffs’ attorney and other industry people. On July 2, 2019, Michael wrote
back that defendants were unwilling to make any changes to the current agreement. He stated that
the gas would not be sold below cost to match the competition, they could not monopolize prices,
and there would be a payment to plaintiffs if fuel failed to be delivered to them under certain
circumstances. Michael seemingly explained that defendants would not agree to any changes to
the agreement because “[w]e are spending $550,000 in your location[.]”2

        We reject defendants’ contention that fraud was not established by clear and convincing
evidence. The contractual agreements as well as the correspondence between the parties and their
attorneys demonstrated that defendants represented, at various times, that they were investing
between $500,000 and $570,000. Akl testified that initially the contractual agreement only
required a sale of 12,000,000 gallons to payback defendants’ investment. However, she noted that
the amount was increased to 13,000,000 gallons to reflect defendants’ increasing investment.
Additionally, Akl testified that she guaranteed Tri-County Bank’s first lien position and refused to
sign a Mortgagee Waiver. Nonetheless, the Mortgagee Waiver was purportedly signed by Akl and
Bissett, but they denied signing the documents and noted misspellings in their name or corporate
identification. The evidence presented did not establish that only the Akls proffered and relied on
the investment amount of $570,000. Defendant’s claim of error is not supported by the evidence.3

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Anica Letica
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                              /s/ Sima G. Patel

2
 The consideration of this parol evidence was not precluded because it did not vary the terms of a
written agreement or demonstrate that an agreement was not integrated. See UAW-GM Human
Resource Ctr v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich App 486, 503-504; 579 NW2d 411 (1998).
3
  Defendants also raised the issue of involuntary dismissal. Although the position was announced
in the statement of questions presented, defendants failed to raise the issue in the text of their
appellate brief, and they failed to address the merits of the issue and cite appropriate authority in
support. See Woods v SLB Prop Mgmt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622, 626-627; 750 NW2d 228 (2008).
Therefore, the issue was abandoned. Id.

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