Court Opinion

ID: 9561043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:01:43.134196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:29.957671
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. We dismiss Case No. A89A0527 for mootness. Our conclusion that the legal issues are moot is based on facts regarding certain court proceedings. An order was entered by this Court on April 28 ordering *334the parties to submit evidence that a senior lienholder had foreclosed on the plane. As illustrated by some of the cases cited, evidence has been taken directly by the appellate court.
The Appellate Practice Act, in OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (3) provides for dismissal where the questions have become moot but does not state how or where mootness is to be evidenced. However, it provides a procedure in subsection (d), which would allow the parties to submit the evidence to the trial court and be transmitted to this Court as part of the record by way of supplement. Any factual dispute would be resolvable in a hearing there.
Appellees have submitted uncertified copies of court documents. I recognize that some of the evidence appellees submitted is in the record we already had, having found it despite noncompliance with Rule 15 (c) (3) (ii), but I do not find Exhibits E through H.
Appellants do not provide any exhibits but do describe in their supplemental brief what happened post-trial. I assume that none of this is in the record because it is not referenced as required by the rule.
In three of the cases cited in the majority opinion there were un-controverted affidavits regarding mootness. In another there was a warranty deed attached to the motion. Major v. City of Atlanta, 198 Ga. 303 (31 SE2d 727) (1944), predated the Appellate Practice Act.
I recognize that Rule 15 (b) (1) says that appellee shall be held to have consented to a decision of the case on the statement of facts made by appellant if appellee does not show otherwise, and that “[e]xcept as controverted, the statement of facts by the appellant may be accepted by this Court as being prima facie true.” However, that does not mean that the statement of facts need not be supported by the record; rather, that this Court does not have to independently verify from the record everything appellant says is in it.
Appellants themselves question our ability to rule on mootness when certain relevant facts are not in the record: “While there have been indications from the appellees that the appellees do not consider themselves as having an in personam judgment against the appellants pursuant to the Special Judgment, there is no order so reflecting.”
Appellants challenge a conclusion of mootness for two reasons. While neither one of them may be valid, how can this Court reach a conclusion of mootness without a proper record? Allen v. Smith, 223 Ga. 265 (1) (154 SE2d 605) (1967), states that an appeal will be dismissed “where it appears” that the case has become moot. It must be properly and conclusively shown. Otherwise we must avoid dismissal. OCGA § 5-6-30.
2. I concur in the ruling in Division 3 solely for the reason that appellants waived the issue. I concur in Divisions 2, 4 and 5.
3. Contrary to the holding in Division 6, the verdict of the jury *335regarding fraud should be upheld. There was some evidence that when appellees entered into the contracts in the first place, Ring had no intention of paying anything for the airplane or the leaseback arrangement. The jury could also find that he never did pay anything, he induced appellees to work on it and spend money on it, he treated others the same way, he took the cavalier attitude “so sue me,” he thought he was protected by his superficial corporate setup, and he took the same name as the appellees’ corporation when it dissolved.
Decided July 14, 1989.
Lamberth, Bonapel, Cifelli & Wilson, J. Michael Lamberth, Therese G. Franzen, for appellants.
Robert F. Woodland, Jr., for appellees.
Sellers alleged fraud ab initio regarding Ring’s intent in entering into the contracts, and there is evidence by his clever actions after-wards that he did not contract in good faith. The jury is the best judge of that in this case. The law recognizes that fraud is subtle and that slight circumstances are enough to prove its existence. OCGA § 23-2-57. There is sufficient evidence of the elements of fraud, as listed in City Dodge v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 769, fn. 1 (208 SE2d 794) (1974).
Contrary to appellants’ position, sellers could sue and recover for fraud as well as for breach of contract. Rainwater Constr. Co. v. O’Connor, 129 Ga. App. 334, 336 (2) (199 SE2d 605) (1973).