Court Opinion

ID: 9411801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 21:07:33.81496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:13.422134
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221330-U
                                             No. 1-22-1330
                                        Order filed July 27, 2023
                                                                                        Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
                                                IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                           FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
PENROD PREMIUM CONSIGNMENT CIGARS LTD.,                          )   Appeal from the
                                                                 )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellant,                                  )   Cook County.
                                                                 )
     v.                                                          )   No. 21 CH 433
                                                                 )
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, and MAURICE COX, in His                     )
Official Capacity as Commissioner of the City of Chicago         )
Department of Planning and Development, Historical               )
Preservation Division,                                           )   Honorable
                                                                 )   David B. Atkins,
           Defendants-Appellees.                                 )   Judge, presiding.

           PRESIDING JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices Rochford and Martin concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1        Held: Where plaintiff sued a municipality based on the placement of a screen wall built
                on the roof of a privately owned building in a landmark district, the circuit court
                correctly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for declaratory and mandamus relief
                because plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, lacked standing, and
                had no clear right to the relief sought.
No. 1-22-1330

¶2        The circuit court dismissed with prejudice the complaint of plaintiff, Penrod Premium

Consignment Cigars Ltd. (Penrod), that sought declaratory and mandamus relief against

defendants, the City of Chicago and Maurice Cox as Commissioner of the City of Chicago

Department of Planning and Development (collectively, the City), based on the placement of a

screen wall that was built on the roof of a privately owned landmark building near Penrod’s office.

¶3        On appeal, Penrod argues that it had standing to assert its claims and sufficiently pled

claims alleging violations of the building permit process and Penrod’s right to mandamus relief.

Penrod also argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion to amend its complaint.

¶4        For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.1

¶5                                        I. BACKGROUND

¶6        According to the well-pled allegations in the record, Penrod, a wholesale cigar distributor,

is located at 600 South Dearborn Street, in the Printer’s Row landmark district. In January 2020, a

building in the 600 block of South Federal Street (the South Federal building), also located in the

Printer’s Row landmark district, applied for a permit from the City’s Department of Buildings to

install a screen wall around rooftop cooling equipment. When the Department of Buildings

receives a permit application for a landmark building, it forwards the application to the commission

on Chicago landmarks (the Commission) for review. Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. § 2-120-740

(2023).

          1
          In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018),
this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.

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No. 1-22-1330

¶7     On June 4, 2020, the Commission, through its permit review committee, recommended

approval of the screen wall permit subject to certain conditions regarding the height and color of

the screen wall. On June 23, 2020, the Department of Buildings issued the permit. In a letter dated

July 16, 2020, the Commission notified the owner of the South Federal building that the screen

wall permit was conditionally approved, and that the Commission found that the project would

meet the criteria in the Commission’s rules and regulations and other applicable guidelines and

standards. After the project began, Penrod lodged complaints with the City’s nonemergency

services telephone number and the commissioner of the City’s department of planning and

development (DPD) about the screen wall, but Penrod was not satisfied with the responses.

¶8     On January 28, 2021, Penrod filed a complaint for declaratory and mandamus relief against

the City. In the declaratory judgment count, Penrod sought to void the Commission’s approval of

the permit application for the screen wall. According to Penrod, the Commission abused its

discretion when it determined that the screen wall would not adversely affect a significant feature

of a landmark building. In the mandamus counts, Penrod sought to compel (1) the Commission to

convene a hearing for public comment before its “final approval” of the screen wall, (2) the

Department of Buildings (which is not a defendant in this lawsuit) to revoke the permit for the

screen wall because the permit was issued without final approval from the Commission, and (3)

the Department of Buildings to enforce a permit certification signed by the building owner, Digital

Realty Trust, Inc. (which is not a defendant in this lawsuit), to tear down any construction that

exceeded what the Commission had approved and the Department of Buildings had permitted.

                                               -3-
No. 1-22-1330

¶9     The City moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 West 2020)), asserting in part that Penrod did not have

standing because it had no legally cognizable stake in the permitting process for the South Federal

building. The City also argued that Penrod failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, in part

because it should have appealed the issuance of the permit to the City’s building board of appeals

(BBA). Further, the City asserted that Penrod was not entitled to a writ of mandamus because the

Municipal Code did not require the Commission to hold a public hearing for the screen wall permit

application, and Penrod’s own allegations showed that the Commission followed the law. Attached

to the City’s motion were the written minutes of the June 4, 2020 meeting, which indicated that

the permit review committee unanimously approved the screen wall.

¶ 10   In response, Penrod asserted in part that the full Commission did not approve the permit

application and did not issue a written approval. Penrod attached an e-mail exchange with the

Department of Buildings regarding a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5

ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2020)) from Penrod’s counsel for a copy of the permit as approved for

the South Federal building. In the FOIA request, Penrod’s counsel stated that the permit “should

include a letter from the [D]epartment of Landmarks.” The Department of Buildings responded

that it “did not see a letter from Landmarks with the permit.”

¶ 11   On June 9, 2022, the circuit court granted the City’s motion to dismiss. The court ruled that

(1) the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Penrod’s complaint because Penrod did

not seek administrative remedies and file a complaint for judicial review within 35 days from the

date the administrative decision was served on the party affected, (2) Penrod did not have standing

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No. 1-22-1330

because it did not establish a personal claim or right in the proceedings, and (3) regarding the

mandamus counts, there was no clear right to relief and no clear duty for the City to act as Penrod

requested.

¶ 12    Penrod moved the court to reconsider its decision. Penrod also sought leave to amend its

complaint to add the Department of Buildings as a defendant. The circuit court denied both

motions, and Penrod timely appealed.

¶ 13                                        II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14    The circuit court dismissed Penrod's complaint under sections 2-619 and 2-615 of the Code.

Section 2-619(a)(9) permits dismissal of a claim when it is barred by “other affirmative matter

avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2020).

“Affirmative matter” means “a type of defense that either negates an alleged cause of action

completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact unsupported by

allegations of specific fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.” Krilich v. American

National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 563, 570 (2002). Lack of standing and

failure to exhaust administrative remedies are both affirmative matters that are grounds for

dismissal. Poulet v. H.F.O., L.L.C., 353 Ill. App. 3d 82, 90 (2004); Northern Trust Co. v. County

of Lake, 353 Ill. App. 3d 268, 277 (2004).

¶ 15    A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 challenges a complaint’s legal sufficiency based

on defects on the face of the complaint. O’Callaghan v. Satherlie, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152,

¶ 18. The question “is whether, taking all well-pleaded facts as true and considering them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts which, if proved, would

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No. 1-22-1330

entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Jackson v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 294 Ill. App.

3d 1, 9-10 (1997). Dismissal is proper if there is no set of facts that can be proved that would entitle

the plaintiff to recover. Signapori v. Jagaria, 2017 IL App (1st) 160937, ¶ 16.

¶ 16   Dismissals under sections 2-619 and 2-615 of the Code are reviewed de novo. Id.; Goral v.

Dart, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 27. The appellate court may affirm the judgment on any basis in the

record. Mullins v. Evans, 2021 IL App (1st) 191962, ¶ 25.

¶ 17                                  A. Permit Review Process

¶ 18   A discussion of the City’s permit review process is necessary for an understanding of the

issues on review. When the Department of Buildings receives a permit application for a landmark

building, it forwards the application to the Commission for review. Municipal Code of Chicago,

Ill. § 2-120-740 (2023). The Commission must approve in writing any permit for alteration,

construction, erection, or other work that takes place on a landmark building. Id. Within 15 days

of receiving a permit application, the Commission must “issue in writing a preliminary decision

approving or disapproving the application” and “notify the applicant and the appropriate city

department of its preliminary decision.” Id. § 2-120-760.

¶ 19   The Commission’s review process takes one of two tracks. The first track occurs if the

Commission, or the permit review committee acting on its behalf, preliminarily approves the

permit, which occurs if the Commission “finds that the proposed work will not adversely affect

any significant historical or architectural feature of the improvement or of the district, and is in

accord with the Standards for Rehabilitation set forth by the United States Secretary of the

Interior.” Id. § 2-120-770.3. There is no hearing, but the City alleges that members of the public

                                                 -6-
No. 1-22-1330

may offer verbal or written statements at meetings of the permit review committee. After a

preliminary approval, the permit application is returned to the Department of Buildings, which

reviews the application and issues the permit accordingly. Id. §§ 2-120-770, 14A-1-104.2, 14A-4-

401.3.

¶ 20     Appeals under the first track proceed as follows. The BBA hears appeals from decisions

and determinations of the commissioner of buildings or his designee “relating to the issuance of a

permit or work done under a permit.” Id. §§ 14A-1-103.2, 14A-10-1005.l. The BBA is authorized

to affirm, reverse, or modify a permit-related decision or determination. Id. § 14A-10-1005.l.l.

                “Any person who is desiring review of a decision or determination of the building

         official2 pertaining to a permit or permit application must file a written appeal petition, on

         a form to be provided, with the chair of the [BBA], within 21 days after the decision or

         determination to be reviewed has been issued by the building official. The appeal petition

         must be accompanied by all supporting information the petitioner wishes to be considered

         by the [BBA]. The petitioner must also deliver a copy of the appeal petition and supporting

         information to the building official and, if the petitioner is not the permit applicant, to the

         permit applicant. Petitions must be delivered in person or by U.S. Mail with delivery

         confirmation.” Id. § 14A-10-1005.4.

“The building official may allow an untimely appeal petition to be considered by the [BBA]. In

such case, the [BBA] will have full jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter.” Id. § 14A-10-

         2
         The term “building official” means “the Commissioner of Buildings or the Commissioner’s
authorized representative.

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No. 1-22-1330

1005.4.2. “A copy of all orders, decisions, or determinations of the [BBA] must be mailed to the

petitioner, the permit applicant, and the building official.” Id. § 14A-10-1005.8. “All decisions and

findings of the [BBA] *** will, in all instances, be the final administrative determination and will

be subject to review by a court as by law, may be provided.” Id. § 14A-10- 1005.10.

¶ 21   The second track occurs if the Commission preliminarily disapproves the permit. If the

Commission “finds that the proposed work will adversely affect or destroy any significant

historical or architectural feature of the improvement or the district,” or does not comply with the

standards established by the Secretary of the Interior (id. § 2-120-780), the permit applicant may

request an informal conference (id. § 2-120-790), and if that does not resolve the matter, then the

Commission holds a public hearing on the permit application (id. § 2-120-800). Among others,

any person, organization, or legal entity within 500 feet of the landmark building or within the

landmark district may become a party to the public hearing. Id. § 2-120-680. Penrod refers to this

status as a “party by request.” After the hearing, the Commission issues in writing a final

administrative decision approving or disapproving the permit application, and its decision may be

appealed to the Circuit Court of Cook County under the Administrative Review Law. Id. §§ 2-

120-800, 2-120-810.

¶ 22   Here, Penrod had no right to a hearing as a party by request because the Commission

proceeded according to the first track, where it preliminarily approved the permit at the permit

review committee meeting on June 4, 2020. The Municipal Code makes plain that a person or

entity in Penrod’s position has no right to be a party to a permit application proceeding unless the

                                                -8-
No. 1-22-1330

Commission preliminarily disapproves the permit application and the matter proceeds to a public

hearing. That did not happen here.

¶ 23                            B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

¶ 24      First, we address the City’s argument that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider any of

Penrod’s claims based on the decision of the Department of Buildings to issue the permit, which

Penrod complains was done without the requisite written approval from the Commission. The City

argues that any claim based on the decision of the Department of Buildings fails because Penrod

did not exhaust its administrative remedies before it filed a complaint in the circuit court.

¶ 25      A party aggrieved by an administrative decision must first pursue all available

administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Midland Hotel Corp. v. Director of

Employment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d 312, 319 (1996). The exhaustion requirement allows the

administrative agency to use its expertise, fully develop and consider the facts of the case, and

grant relief to the aggrieved party, making judicial review unnecessary. Canel v. Topinka, 212 Ill.

2d 311, 320-21 (2004). When an agency has made a final decision, courts may review the decision

through statutory or common law procedures. Dubin v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490, 497

(1989). The exhaustion requirement applies when an agency has exclusive jurisdiction over an

action. Village of South Elgin v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 348 Ill. App. 3d 929, 935

(2004).

¶ 26      As discussed above, the permit application at issue here proceeded under the first track,

where the Commission issued a preliminary approval of the application and sent it back to the

Department of Buildings to conduct its own review of the application. Then, on June 23, 2020, the

                                                 -9-
No. 1-22-1330

Department of Buildings issued the permit for the screen wall. If Penrod believed that the

Department of Buildings improperly issued the permit, then Penrod had to bring that matter to the

BBA before filing a complaint in the circuit court. See Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. § 14A-10-

1005.4 (2023). Although Penrod was required to file that written appeal petition with the BBA

within 21 days after the Department of Buildings issued the permit, the commissioner of buildings

or his authorized representative may allow an untimely appeal petition to be considered by the

BBA. See id.

¶ 27   The BBA had exclusive jurisdiction to address Penrod’s claim that the Department of

Buildings issued the permit for the screen wall without first receiving the Commission’s approval

in writing. The BBA hears appeals from decisions and determinations of the commissioner of

buildings or his designee “relating to the issuance of a permit or work done under a permit.” Id.

§§ 14A-10-1005.l; 14A-1-103.2. The BBA is authorized to affirm, reverse, or modify a permit-

related decision or determination. Id. § 14A-10-1005.l.l. And, as explained above, anyone who

seeks review of a permit-related decision must file a written appeal with the BBA. Id. § 14A-10-

1005.4. Penrod’s claim that the Department of Buildings issued the permit without first receiving

the Commission’s approval in writing falls within the BBA’s ambit. Because Penrod did not

exhaust its administrative remedies, Penrod’s claims based on the Department of Building’s

issuance of the permit were correctly dismissed.

¶ 28                                       C. Standing

¶ 29   Penrod argues that the circuit court erroneously dismissed the complaint due to lack of

standing because Penrod’s claim of an improperly denied hearing was a legally cognizable interest.

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No. 1-22-1330

Specifically, Penrod alleges that, as a property owner within 500 feet of the South Federal building,

Penrod would have qualified as a party by request and therefore been entitled to a Commission

hearing if the City had not abused its discretion by recommending preliminary approval of the

rooftop screen wall. Penrod argues that it has a procedural right and standing to see that the

landmark laws governing the Printer’s Row landmark district are properly executed. According to

Penrod, the Printer’s Row landmark district is a publicly owned facility because it has streets, bike

paths, sidewalks and parks. Penrod asserts that its taxes in part contribute to defray the City’s costs

of free permit processing, so Penrod has standing as a taxpayer to bring suit, even in the absence

of a statute, to enforce the equitable interest in public property, of which Penrod claims is being

illegally disposed. Penrod asserts that the City’s preliminary approval recommendation of the

alteration of the roofline along Federal Street directly injured Penrod’s property by reducing the

amount of light and air that reached the street.

¶ 30   Standing requires “some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest.” Greer v. Illinois

Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492 (1988). The claimed injury must be distinct

and palpable, fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions, and substantially likely to be prevented or

redressed by the grant of the requested relief. Id. at 492-93. A distinct and palpable injury refers

to an injury that cannot be characterized as “a generalized grievance common to all members of

the public.” Id. at 494. Illinois law on the issue of standing is more liberal than federal law, and

“State courts are generally more willing than Federal courts to recognize standing on the part of

any plaintiff who shows that he is in fact aggrieved by an administrative decision.” Id. at 491.

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No. 1-22-1330

¶ 31   For a declaratory judgment action, “there must be an actual controversy between adverse

parties, with the party requesting the declaration possessing some personal claim, status, or right

which is capable of being affected by the grant of such relief.” Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493. Similarly,

a plaintiff seeking a writ of mandamus must establish a “ ‘sufficiently protectable interest pursuant

to statute or common law which is alleged to be injured.’ ” Cedarhurst of Bethalto Real Estate,

LLC v. Village of Bethalto, 2018 IL App (5th) 170309, ¶ 31 (quoting Hill v. Butler, 107 Ill. App.

3d 721, 725 (1982)).

¶ 32    “[A] prospective party cannot gain standing merely through a self-proclaimed concern

about an issue, no matter how sincere.” Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois v. City of

Chicago, 125 Ill. 2d 164, 175 (1988). Furthermore, where the prospective party is neither the owner

of the private property in question nor even an owner of adjoining property, aesthetic interests,

like the ability to view a private property from a public street, “while not to be disregarded, are not

controlling on the question of standing.” Id. (two organizations concerned with landmarks and

architecture did not have a legally cognizable stake in the City’s decision to rescind a privately

owned building’s landmark designation where the two organizations did not own the building or

an adjoining property). In addition, Illinois courts do not “recognize as a basis for standing an

alleged right to participate in a public hearing for participation’s sake *** where *** a municipality

has bestowed that alleged procedural right apparently not as a legal entitlement but as a tool to

assist the municipality in performing its legislative function.” Id.

¶ 33   None of Penrod’s claimed injuries supports standing. Penrod alleged that it was denied a

hearing on the permit at which it could have participated as a “party by request.” But Penrod had

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No. 1-22-1330

no right to a hearing based on that status under the Commission’s permit review process. As

discussed above, the Commission’s review process followed the first track, where the

Commission’s permit review committee preliminarily approved the permit because the

Commission found “that the proposed work will not adversely affect any significant historical or

architectural feature of the improvement or of the district, and is in accord with the Standards for

Rehabilitation set forth by the United States Secretary of the Interior.” Municipal Code of Chicago,

Ill. § 2-120-770 (2023). Consequently, no hearing was held.

¶ 34   The Municipal Code makes plain that a person or entity in Penrod’s position has no right

to be a party to a permit application proceeding unless the Commission preliminarily disapproves

the permit application and the matter proceeds to a public hearing. That did not happen here.

Therefore, as a matter of law, Penrod could not have been injured by any denial of a hearing as a

party by request. And without a legally cognizable injury, Penrod lacks standing. In the end,

Penrod seeks “to participate in a public hearing for participation’s sake,” which is not a basis for

standing. Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois, 125 Ill. 2d at 175.

¶ 35   Besides its claimed inability to participate in a hearing that was not legally required to

occur, Penrod alleges no injury to itself. Instead, the thrust of its complaint is that the Commission

ignored the guidelines that apply to landmark buildings. This amounts to an objection to the screen

wall’s appearance, which does not provide standing. In its complaint, Penrod alleged that the

Commission ignored the provision that additions to roofs that change characteristic roof shapes

and lines will not be approved. Penrod also asserted that the materials used to construct the screen

wall conflicted with the masonry exterior of the other buildings in the landmark district. Penrod

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No. 1-22-1330

further contended that the screen wall improperly acted as “a sign board visible from the public

way.”

¶ 36    The Illinois Supreme Court has squarely rejected appearance-based concerns as a basis for

standing. In Landmarks Preservation Council of Illinois, the court held that two organizations

concerned with landmarks and architecture did not have standing to challenge the City’s decision

to rescind a building’s landmark designation. The organizations’ “only interest appear[ed] to be

the ability to view this private property from a public street.” 125 Ill. 2d at 175. The organizations’

aesthetic interests were “not controlling on the question of standing.” Id. The organizations did not

own the subject building or an adjoining building. Id. Like the organizations in Landmarks

Preservation Council, Penrod’s only interest is that a building in its vicinity has installed a screen

wall that Penrod does not like. Penrod does not own the building in question or any adjoining

building. Penrod’s lawsuit amounts to nothing more than a private entity’s objection to the

appearance of a privately-owned building. It is not situated any differently, for standing purposes,

than any other occupant of a building in the vicinity. Penrod does not have a legally cognizable

interest at stake.

¶ 37    Penrod’s remaining contentions—that the landmark district is a publicly owned facility and

has streets, bike paths, sidewalks, and a park; the permit process is publicly funded, and Penrod

has an interest in seeing that laws are followed—also do not supply standing. These are not distinct

and palpable injuries, but generalized grievances that are common to all members of the public.

Alliance for the Great Lakes v. Department of Natural Resources, 2020 IL App (1st) 182587, ¶ 32

(distinct and palpable injuries are those that cannot be characterized as generalized grievances

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No. 1-22-1330

common to all members of the public). Streets, bike paths, sidewalks, and parks are not unique to

the Printer’s Row landmark district. And all landmark-related permits go through the same process.

Penrod occupies no different position than any other person or entity that objects to the appearance

of a nearby building, so Penrod does not have standing.

¶ 38   Penrod’s reliance on Martini v. Netsch, 272 Ill. App. 3d 693 (1995), does not advance its

position. There, the plaintiff had standing to “[seek] relief from the alleged misuse of tax revenue

to fund elective abortions at Cook County Hospital.” Id. at 696. The court stated that, as a taxpayer,

the plaintiff had the right to enforce her equitable interest in public resources allegedly being used

for an illegal purpose at a public facility. Id. Here, however, no public funds were misused for an

illegal purpose. Again, the South Federal building is privately-owned, and no public resources

were used to erect the screen wall. The Commission’s only role was to perform its lawful,

ordinance-mandated review of a permit for whether the screen wall was appropriate under the

City’s requirements for landmark districts. Any use of public funds for that purpose was lawful

and, therefore, not misappropriated for an illegal purpose. Further, although Penrod disagrees with

how the Commission weighed the relevant guidelines, there is no indication that anything improper

occurred. Penrod did not suffer a distinct and palpable injury and does not have standing to assert

any of its claims.

¶ 39   We conclude that the circuit court did not err when it ruled that Penrod lacked standing.

Penrod has an office in the vicinity of the South Federal building and is complaining about the

process between the South Federal Building and the City that resulted in a permit for a screen wall

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No. 1-22-1330

that Penrod evidently dislikes. Penrod has no personal legal interest or right in that process, and

no cognizable injury.

¶ 40                                     D. Mandamus Relief

¶ 41    Penrod also failed to state a claim for mandamus relief. The mandamus counts in Penrod’s

complaint sought to compel (1) the Commission to convene a hearing for public comment before

finally approving or disapproving the screen wall, (2) the Department of Buildings to revoke the

permit for the screen wall because there was no final approval from the Commission, and (3) the

Department of Buildings to enforce the permit certification signed by the owner of the South

Federal building that it would tear down any construction that exceeded what was approved by the

Commission and permitted by the Department. None of the counts meet the requirements for a

writ of mandamus.

¶ 42    Mandamus is an extreme remedy that is used to enforce, “ ‘as a matter of right, a public

officer’s performance of his *** official duties where no exercise of discretion on the officer’s part

is involved.’ ” Ryan v. City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st) 181777, ¶ 12 (quoting Perkins v. Quinn,

2012 IL App (1st) 113165, ¶ 18). No rights can be acquired in a mandamus proceeding, since the

purpose of a mandamus proceeding is to enforce rights that are already vested. Kramer v. City of

Chicago, 58 Ill. App. 3d 592, 598 (1978). The three necessary elements for mandamus relief are

(1) a clear, affirmative right to relief, (2) a clear duty of the public official to act, and (3) a clear

authority in the public official to comply with the writ. Ryan, 2019 IL App (1st) 181777, ¶ 13. The

plaintiff has the burden to establish every material fact necessary to show the plain duty of the

defendant. Illinois Wood Energy Partners, L.P. v. County of Cook, 281 Ill. App. 3d 841, 852

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(1995). “Mandamus is never awarded in a doubtful case.” Kramer, 58 Ill. App. 3d at 599. Further,

though mandamus can compel the exercise of a public official’s discretion (Burnidge Brothers

Almora Heights, Inc. v. Wiese, 142 Ill. App. 3d 486, 490 (1986)), mandamus cannot be used to

direct a public official to reach a particular decision or exercise his discretion in a particular way,

even if the judgment or discretion was erroneously exercised (Pate v. Wiseman, 2019 IL App (1st)

190449, ¶ 25).

¶ 43   Regarding the first mandamus count, Penrod had no right to a Commission hearing. As

explained above, the Commission is required to hold a public hearing only if it preliminarily

disapproves a permit application. Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. § 2-120-800 (2023). Here, the

Commission preliminarily approved the screen wall permit, so no hearing was required. Moreover,

the decision to preliminarily approve or disapprove a permit application is a discretionary one. The

Commission applies its discretion to assess a variety of factors, determining whether the proposed

work would adversely affect significant or architectural features and is consistent with certain

federal standards. Id. § 2-120-770. The Commission applied its discretion in this case, and

Penrod’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Commission’s discretionary process is not a basis

for mandamus relief. Penrod’s mandamus count against the Commission was properly dismissed.

¶ 44   Penrod’s next count for mandamus relief sought to compel the Department of Buildings to

revoke the permit for the screen wall because the Commission did not issue a “final approval.” In

its complaint, Penrod stated that after eliciting public comments on a permit application, the

Commission must review the application for adverse effects and make what it calls a “final

determination.” Penrod appears to refer to the process that occurs after a preliminary disapproval,

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No. 1-22-1330

which can include a hearing. See id. § 2-120-800. Again, no hearing was required here, where

there was a preliminary approval.

¶ 45   If Penrod is asserting that the permit must be revoked because the Commission did not

issue the required written approval, Penrod also has no right to relief. The Municipal Code does

not mandate a particular format for written approval. In the circuit court, Penrod posited that the

Commission was supposed to transmit a letter to the Department of Buildings. But Penrod

identifies no source of a clear right to a letter. And here, the preliminary approval was reflected in

the written minutes of the permit review committee meeting where the screen wall was considered.

Mandamus relief against the Department was correctly denied.

¶ 46   Last, Penrod does not have a clear right to relief and the Department of Buildings does not

have a clear duty to act to enforce the permit certification signed by the owner of the South Federal

building and require the removal of the structure. The ordinance that describes permit certifications

and the text of the permit certification itself make this clear. The ordinance states that a signatory

to a permit certification statement “acknowledges the penalties that may attach” if the work

exceeds the scope of the permit. Id. § 14A-4-401.3.4. Penalties are therefore a possibility, not a

certainty. Thus, the certification signed for the screen wall permit states that if the work exceeds

the scope of the permit,

       “I can and will be severely punished ***. I can have my permit revoked; be ordered to stop

       all work on the project; fined up to $5,000.00 per day; imprisoned for up to six months;

       required to do up to 100 hours of community service; required to tear down at my own

       expense all completed work; and, in addition to other penalties provided by law, required

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       to reimburse the City up to three times any damages incurred for providing any false or

       inaccurate information in this building permit application.”

¶ 47   As an initial matter, Penrod did not even allege that the work on the screen wall exceeded

the scope of the permit that was issued; rather, Penrod asserted only that the permit should not

have been approved in the first place. Regardless, nothing in the ordinance guarantees that an

owner will be required to remove noncompliant construction. And mandamus cannot be ordered

when it “depends upon the cooperation or approval of a third person who is not before the court.”

Wiese, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 490-91. The building owner, Digital Realty Trust, Inc., is not a party to

this lawsuit. Penrod does not have a clear right to relief, and it identifies no clear duty for the City

to act. The circuit court correctly dismissed the mandamus counts on this basis as well.

¶ 48                             E. Leave to Amend the Complaint

¶ 49   Penrod argues that the circuit court should have allowed it to amend its complaint to add

the Department of Buildings as a party.

¶ 50   The circuit court’s ruling on an amendment to a pleading is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of D.T.W. & S.L.W., 2011 IL App (1st) 111225, ¶ 107. Ordinarily, a

court applies a multi-factor analysis to determine whether to allow leave to amend a complaint,

but a court “may begin and end [its] analysis with the observation that it is never an abuse of

discretion to deny leave to amend when the proposed amendment would be futile.” Malacina v.

Cook County Sheriffs Merit Board, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893, ¶ 40. Allowing Penrod to add the

Department of Buildings as a defendant would have not changed the court’s ruling that dismissed

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Penrod’s complaint because Penrod failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, lacked standing,

and failed to state a claim for mandamus. The circuit court properly denied leave to amend.

¶ 51                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 52   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 53   Affirmed.

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