Court Opinion

ID: 9555926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:01:17.91797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:52.066793
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50234         Document: 00516858355             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/15/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                  August 15, 2023
                                       No. 22-50234                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Lizandro Guia-Lopez,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:21-CR-158-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Schroeder, District
   Judge. *
   Per Curiam: †

          _____________________
          *
             United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
   designation.
          †
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50234      Document: 00516858355           Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/15/2023

                                     No. 22-50234

          A jury convicted Lizandro Guia-Lopez of conspiracy to transport and
   transportation of illegal aliens. Guia-Lopez alleges constitutional violations,
   error in the jury instructions, and that the admission of certain evidence de-
   prived him of due process. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

                                I. Background

                              A. Factual Background

          Guia-Lopez was charged in a two-count superseding indictment with
   (a) conspiracy to transport illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C.
   § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I) & (B)(i) and (b) transportation of illegal aliens for
   financial gain in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) & (B)(i).
          On February 28, 2021, Border Patrol Agent Ryland Brown pulled over
   a black Chevy Equinox on suspicion of possible alien smuggling due to
   indicators such as mud and handprints, a low suspension, obstructions in the
   vehicle, and its “high rate of speed.” Upon stopping the vehicle he saw Guia-
   Lopez as the driver, codefendant Yesenia Romero in the front passenger seat,
   and six passengers in the passenger and cargo areas. Agent Brown believed
   that the six individuals in the backseat and cargo area had illegally crossed the
   border because they were wet, muddy, nervous, sweating, and unable to
   provide documentation as to their legal status.
          Homeland      Security   Investigations    Agent    Anthony      Golando
   interviewed Romero and Guia-Lopez after they were arrested. Romero
   waived her Miranda rights and provided her account of what transpired and
   Guia-Lopez’s involvement. Guia-Lopez refused to execute the waiver of
   rights form and stated he did not wish to speak with Agent Golando. Shortly
   thereafter, Agent Golando asked Guia-Lopez if he would consent to a search

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   of his cellphone. Guia-Lopez read and signed a consent form to search his
   cellphone and wrote his cellphone password at the top of the form.
                            B. Procedural Background

          On May 26, 2021, the district court conducted a hearing on Guia-
   Lopez’s motion to suppress the passcode and contents of his cellphone.
   After finding Guia-Lopez’s Fifth Amendment invocation of the right to
   remain silent had not been fully honored, the district court granted Guia-
   Lopez’s motion in part by suppressing the passcode that Guia-Lopez had
   given to Agent Golando. The district court, however, denied the portion of
   Guia-Lopez’s motion requesting the suppression of Guia-Lopez’s consent
   and the messages found on the cellphone.
          Trial was held in November 2021. The jury found Guia-Lopez guilty
   of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens and transportation of illegal aliens.
   Guia-Lopez was sentenced to twenty-four months of imprisonment followed
   by three years of supervised release. Guia-Lopez timely noticed and filed this
   appeal.
                               II. Jurisdiction

          We have jurisdiction because Appellant challenges a final judgment.
   18 U.S.C. § 3742; 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
                                III. Discussion

   C. A. The Jury Instructions Did Not Constructively Amend the Indict-
                                    ment

          The first dispute between the parties is whether the jury instructions
   allowed Guia-Lopez to be convicted on a theory that was broader than the
   one charged in the indictment. We determine there was no plain error in the
   jury instructions and affirm the district court’s ruling.

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                                   No. 22-50234

         The first count of the indictment charged, in relevant part:
                 On or about February 28, 2021, in the Western District
                           of Texas, the Defendants,
                           LIZANDRO GUIA-LOPEZ (1)
                              YESENIA ROMERO (2)
         did knowingly and intentionally combine, conspire,
         confederate, and agree with others known and unknown to the
         Grand Jury, to commit the following offense against the United
         States: to transport and move within the United States, and
         attempt to transport and move within the United States . . .
         certain aliens who had entered and remained in the United
         States in violation of law . . . .
   Guia-Lopez relies on United States v. Sanders to argue that the indictment’s
   use of the term “with others” required the Government to show that Guia-
   Lopez and Romero did not just conspire with each other. See 966 F.3d 397
   (5th Cir. 2020). Guia-Lopez argues that the jury instructions constructively
   amended the indictment because the jury was only required to find Guia-
   Lopez and Romero conspired with each other.
         The Government argues that the jury instructions did not broaden the
   indictment because an “indictment count that alleges in the conjunctive a
   number of means of committing a crime can support a conviction if any of the
   alleged means are proved.” See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136
   (1985). The Government argues that the indictment charges several
   conjunctive acts—including a conspiracy between those “known to the
   grand jury,” i.e., Guia-Lopez and Romero. The Government argues that the
   language of the indictment allows the Government to prove its case in the
   disjunctive by showing a conspiracy “involving Guia-Lopez and Romero or
   Guia-Lopez and Cruz.” See United States v. Davis, 995 F.3d 1161, 1167 (10th

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                                     No. 22-50234

   Cir. 2021). The Government also argues Guia-Lopez has not shown that the
   alleged error affected his substantial rights.
          The parties agree this issue is subject to plain-error review because
   there was no challenge to the jury instructions. We have the discretion to
   remedy an error that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
   reputation of judicial proceedings” if it is shown that “(1) there is an ‘error,’
   (2) that is ‘clear or obvious,’ and (3) that error ‘affected the appellant's
   substantial rights.’” United States v. Green, 47 F.4th 279, 288 (5th Cir.
   2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 747 (2023), and cert. denied sub nom. Selgas v.
   United States, 143 S. Ct. 1058 (2023) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556
   U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). “A jury instruction must: (1) correctly state the law,
   (2) clearly instruct the jurors, and (3) be factually supportable.” Id. at 294
   (quoting United States v. Fairley, 880 F.3d 198, 208 (5th Cir. 2018)). “Error
   in a charge is plain only when, considering the entire charge and evidence
   presented against the defendant, there is a likelihood of a grave miscarriage
   of justice.” Id. (citing United States v. McClatchy, 249 F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir.
   2001)). In other words, jury instructions amount to plain error when they
   “could have meant the difference between acquittal and conviction.” Id. at
   294 (quoting Fairley, 880 F.3d at 208).
          There is no plain error here. There is no dispute that the jury
   instructions correctly stated the law to the jury. Instead, Guia-Lopez argues
   the indictment requires “both named defendants . . . [to] knowingly and
   intentionally combine, conspire, confederate and agree with others known
   and unknown to the Grand Jury,” but the jury instructions allowed the
   Government to prove that Guia-Lopez and Romero conspired “with each
   other.” But Appellant’s argument ignores the language and conjunctive
   nature of the indictment. See Miller, 471 U.S. at 136; see also, United States v.
   Hoeffner, 626 F.3d 857, 864 (5th Cir. 2010) (determining charges plead
   conjunctively in the indictment could be proved in the disjunctive).

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          Sanders reinforces our opinion. In Sanders, we interpreted the
   indictment to require the defendant to know the victims were minors based
   on the plain language of the indictment. 966 F.3d at 406–07 (considering how
   an “objective reader” would understand the indictment). Here, an objective
   reader would understand the indictment to include an allegation that Guia-
   Lopez conspired with Romero. The plain language shows the indictment
   includes conjunctive charges that would allow the government to prove its
   case in the disjunctive by showing that Guia-Lopez conspired with Romero,
   who was known to the grand jury, or with others unknown to the grand jury.
   Although the language of the indictment and the jury instructions is not
   identical here, the jury instructions did not broaden or constructively amend
   the indictment.
          In Sanders we also considered how indictments with similar language
   had been interpreted. Id. Given the language of the indictment and the
   Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of a similar indictment in Davis, Appellant’s
   proposed interpretation does not reflect how an “objective reader” would
   understand the charge at issue in this appeal. See Davis, 995 F.3d at 1167. In
   Davis, the indictment read:
          From as early as in or about June 2018 to the date of this
          [i]ndictment, in the Northern District of Oklahoma and
          elsewhere, the defendants, AMY LEE DAVIS, CARLOS
          BANEGAS, and CINDY DAVIS, together and with others
          known and unknown to the [g]rand [j]ury, did willfully,
          knowingly, and intentionally combine, conspire, confederate,
          and agree, each with the other, to commit offenses against the
          United States as follows . . . .
   Id. at 1165 (alterations in original) (emphasis added). In Davis, the defendant-
   appellant argued that the jury charge broadened the indictment because the
   indictment limited the scope of the alleged conspiracy by specifically naming
   the codefendants. Id. at 1167. There, the Tenth Circuit determined that the

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   language of the indictment charged in the conjunctive but “the government
   could prove its case in the disjunctive by showing that [the defendant-
   appellant] conspired with [at least one of the defendant-appellant’s
   codefendants at trial] or with another individual or individuals.”                    Id.
   (emphasis in original).
           Guia-Lopez argues Davis is inapplicable here because the indictment
   in Davis expressly charged that the defendants conspired “each with the
   other,” whereas here the indictment does not include such language. But
   this ignores the difference in the plain language of the indictment here and
   the indictment in Davis. The term “each with the other” was important in
   Davis because the indictment’s use of the word “together” modified the
   indictment such that the codefendants were excluded from the term “others
   known . . . to the [g]rand [j]ury.” See 995 F.3d at 1165. Here, the term “with
   others known. . . to the Grand Jury” is less limiting than the language of Davis
   because the language of the indictment does not group Guia-Lopez and
   Romero “together.”
           For these reasons, there was no plain error because the jury
   instructions were consistent with the plain language of the indictment. 1
      D. B. The Denial of the Motion to Suppress the Contents of Guia-
                        Lopez’s Cellphone is Affirmed

           A central dispute between the parties is whether the district court
   erred in denying Guia-Lopez’s motion to suppress the contents of his

           _____________________
           1
            Even if the variance between the indictment and the jury instructions had been an
   error, such error would not have substantially affected Guia-Lopez’s rights because there
   was no material variance between the indictment and the evidence at trial that Guia-Lopez
   conspired with others known or unknown to the grand jury (e.g., “Cruz” and/or the
   “guide”). See United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 432 (5th Cir. 2010).

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   cellphone. We determine the district court did not err in its factual findings
   and affirm the district court’s ruling.
           This Court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal
   conclusions de novo when considering an appeal of the denial of a motion to
   suppress. United States v. Coulter, 41 F.4th 451, 456 (5th Cir. 2022). During
   such a review, we evaluate “evidence in the light most favorable to the party
   that prevailed in the district court” and will “uphold the district court’s
   ruling on the motion if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support
   it.” Id. (cleaned up).
           Guia-Lopez’s appeal primarily argues the district court erred in
   denying his motion to suppress because the “fruits of the poisonous tree”—
   the text messages found on his cellphone after the Fifth Amendment
   violation—do not comprise physical evidence but are instead testimonial in
   nature. 2 Guia-Lopez argues that the text messages are testimonial and should
   have been suppressed because they contain incriminating information, such
   as evidence tending to prove Guia-Lopez owned the cellphone and authored
   messages therein.
           The Government does not challenge the district court’s finding that
   Guia-Lopez was subject to custodial interrogation at the time he provided
   consent and his passcode. The Government instead argues the evidence was
   admissible as the “physical fruit” of a voluntary, uncoerced statement. The
   Government argues that the text messages are admissible without violating
   the Fifth Amendment because they are not coerced statements. See Fisher v.
   United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976); United States v. Oloyede, 933 F.3d

           _____________________
           2
             Guia-Lopez also briefed a Fourth Amendment challenge on appeal, which we
   decline to consider because he waived this argument during the motion to suppress hearing
   before the district court.

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   302, 308–10 (4th Cir. 2019). The Government also argues that the text
   messages cannot be considered compelled testimonial evidence because the
   text messages were sent, received, and recorded “prior to and independent
   of Guia-Lopez’[s] interactions with Agent Golando or any enforcement
   officer.” The Government additionally argues that even if Guia-Lopez’s
   consent and provision of his passcode was testimonial, the “fruit of that
   voluntary communication” was admissible because he voluntarily consented
   to the search and voluntarily provided his passcode.
          We address Guia-Lopez’s primary argument in his opening brief
   first—that the text messages themselves qualify for Fifth Amendment
   protection. “To qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
   incrimination, a communication must be (1) testimonial in character, (2)
   incriminating, and (3) compelled.” United States v. Velasquez, 881 F.3d 314,
   337 (5th Cir. 2018). A communication that is testimonial in character “must
   itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
   information.” Id. (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)).
   But even evidence that is testimonial in character and incriminating is not
   subject to Fifth Amendment protections if it is not a product of government
   compulsion. See id. For example, an individual who voluntarily decides to
   tattoo incriminating gang-related symbols onto his body cannot claim Fifth
   Amendment protections for those tattoos because they are not a product of
   government compulsion. Id. at 338–39.
          The text messages at issue are testimonial in nature and incriminating.
   But the text messages were not compelled in the sense that the Government
   did not compel Guia-Lopez to write, send, or record these text messages.
   The Fifth Amendment is not a “general protector of privacy”—it “protects
   against ‘compelled self-incrimination, not (the disclosure of) private
   information.’” Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422
   U.S.   225,   233    n.7   (1975)).   Accordingly,     Guia-Lopez’s   private

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   communications—the text messages—should not themselves be afforded
   Fifth Amendment protection. See id.
           The real issues presented in this appeal—whether Guia-Lopez’s
   consent to search and his passcode were obtained in violation of his Fifth
   Amendment right to remain silent and whether the text messages are the
   “fruits” of a constitutional violation that should be suppressed—were
   addressed more fully in Guia-Lopez’s reply brief. 3 Guia-Lopez’s negative
   response to Agent Golando’s invitation to talk was a sufficient invocation of
   his right to remain silent. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (2010)
   (stating that “simple, unambiguous statements” such as an individual stating
   “that he did not want to talk with the police” are sufficient to invoke the
   “right to cut off questioning”). Accordingly, the questioning of Guia-Lopez
   should have ceased. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74 (1996). 4
           Because Guia-Lopez invoked his right to remain silent, whether his
   statements should be suppressed turns on whether the police “scrupulously
   honored” his right to cut off questioning. Gutierrez v. Stephens, 590 F. App’x
   371, 376 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.

           _____________________
           3
             The failure to adequately brief an issue in an opening brief constitutes a waiver of
   that argument. United States v. Fernandez, 48 F.4th 405, 412 (5th Cir. 2022). It is a close
   call whether these issues were adequately presented in Guia-Lopez’s opening brief. We
   exercise our discretion to address these issues on the merits because they were referenced
   in Guia-Lopez’s opening brief and were more fully addressed in Guia-Lopez’s reply in
   response to the Government’s arguments.
           4
             Guia-Lopez argues his response of “No” also invoked the right to counsel. But
   invoking the right to remain silent is not equivalent to invoking the right to counsel. See,
   e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74 (noting the difference between invoking the right to
   remain silent and the right to counsel). Guia-Lopez’s response did not unequivocally
   invoke his right to counsel. See id.; see also Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381 (“In the context of
   invoking the Miranda right to counsel . . . a suspect must do so ‘unambiguously.’”).

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   96, 104 (1975)). To determine whether this right was scrupulously honored,
   the Court considers the specific facts of each case, including
          (1) whether the suspect was advised prior to initial
          interrogation that he was under no obligation to answer
          question [sic]; (2) whether the suspect was advised of his right
          to remain silent prior to the reinterrogation; (3) the length of
          time between the two interrogations; (4) whether the second
          interrogation was restricted to a crime that had not been the
          subject of earlier interrogation; and (5) whether the suspect’s
          first invocation of rights was honored.
   Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarado-Saldivar, 62 F.3d 697, 699 (5th Cir.
   1995)). Upon review of the record, we affirm the district court’s analysis of
   these factors. The district court correctly applied the law to the facts to find
   that Guia-Lopez’s right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored.
          An interrogation comprises “words or actions” by the police that the
   “police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
   from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). Not every
   communication during custody seeks incriminating responses. See id. at 300.
   Here, the “responses” sought by Agent Golando during the continued
   questioning were (1) Guia-Lopez’s consent to search and (2) the password.
          Guia-Lopez asserts that asking for consent to search his cellphone
   comprised an interrogation because Agent Golando knew there would be
   incriminating information on Guia-Lopez’s cellphone.             But we have
   repeatedly determined asking for consent to search a mobile phone does not
   seek testimonial evidence as defined by the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g.,
   United States v. Venegas, 594 F. App’x 822, 826–27 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding a
   “statement granting ‘consent to a search . . . is neither testimonial nor
   communicative in the Fifth Amendment sense’”). Accordingly, the district
   court appropriately denied Guia-Lopez’s motion to suppress Guia-Lopez’s

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   consent. Using the same reasoning, the district court was correct to suppress
   the passcode because asking Guia-Lopez to write down his password was a
   Fifth Amendment violation because this request was likely to, and did, result
   in testimonial evidence that implicitly showed Guia-Lopez’s ownership of
   the phone.
          Suppression of a testimonial statement obtained in violation of the
   Fifth Amendment can alone be a sufficient remedy, even when that
   statement leads to additional evidence. See United States v. Gonzalez-Garcia,
   708 F.3d 682, 687 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing United States v. Green, 272 F.3d
   748 (5th Cir. 2001), which suppressed statements obtained in violation of the
   Fifth Amendment but did not go so far as to state the “fruit” of those
   statements—firearms—should be suppressed). But Guia-Lopez argues that
   the constitutional violation here makes the text messages inadmissible fruits
   of the poisonous tree.      The Government relies on Patane to show
   admissibility, arguing the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause
   “cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained
   as a result of voluntary statements.” United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630,
   637 (2004) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
          Guia-Lopez does not argue he was coerced, but the possibility of
   coercion is present here because questioning continued after he invoked his
   right to remain silent. “To permit the continuation of custodial interrogation
   after a momentary cessation” would allow police “to undermine the will of
   the person being questioned.” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102; Michigan v. Tucker,
   417 U.S. 433, 448 (1974) (“Cases which involve the Self-Incrimination
   Clause must, by definition, involve an element of coercion, since the Clause
   provides only that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against
   himself.”). Miranda violations are distinguishable from “actual violations of
   the Due Process Clause or the Self–Incrimination Clause,” which apply the
   “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine as a deterrence. See Patane, 542 U.S.

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   at 642; see also id. at 631 (“[T]he [Self-Incrimination] Clause contains its own
   exclusionary rule that automatically protects those subjected to coercive
   police interrogations from the use of their involuntary statements (or
   evidence derived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal trial.”).
          When a constitutional violation occurs, “[t]he exclusionary rule
   reaches not only the evidence uncovered as a direct result of the violation,
   but also evidence indirectly derived from it—so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous
   tree.’” United States v. Mendez, 885 F.3d 899, 909 (5th Cir. 2018). But the
   exclusionary rule applies only “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its
   substantial social costs.” Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016) (quoting
   Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). Thus, the exclusionary rule
   considers the reliability of the evidence, whether the evidence was obtained
   from severe pressures, and whether suppression is an appropriate sanction.
   See id.; see also Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448–49 (finding suppression inappropriate
   because there was no evidence of “severe pressures,” nor was there a fact
   issue as to whether the evidence itself was untrustworthy).
          Here, the deterrence benefits would not outweigh the substantial
   social costs of suppressing the text messages. The district court correctly
   found the text messages admissible despite the Fifth Amendment violation
   because Guia-Lopez provided his consent and passcode based on his free and
   rational choice and not because of offensive coercive tactics. See Tucker, 417
   U.S. at 448–49 (discussing offensive coercive tactics ranging from third-
   degree torture, prolonged isolation and “endless” interrogations). Even
   though Agent Golando violated Guia-Lopez’s Fifth Amendment right, Agent
   Golando mitigated any coercion present from that violation by offering
   renewed warnings about Guia-Lopez’s right to consent. As discussed, the
   trustworthiness of the content of these messages is not in question because
   the text messages were not the result of government coercion. Accordingly,
   suppressing these text messages does not serve a valid or useful purpose. See

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   id. at 446 (“[T]he law . . . cannot realistically require that policemen
   investigating serious crimes make no errors whatsoever. . . . Before we
   penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether the sanction
   serves a valid and useful purpose.”).
          Moreover, knowledge of and access to these text messages was not an
   “exploitation” of the alleged constitutional violations. Nix v. Williams, 467
   U.S. 431, 442 (1984) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488
   (1963)). At the time of the alleged constitutional violations, Agent Golando
   had already found Guia-Lopez’s cellphone and interviewed Romero. Guia-
   Lopez admits Agent Golando “knew that there would be incriminating
   information on [Guia-Lopez’s] phone before he . . . interviewed [Guia-
   Lopez].” In addition, the Government proffered evidence that even if it had
   not obtained the password, it would have discovered these text messages
   inevitably using “GrayKey” or “Cellebrite.” 5 Accordingly, exclusion of
   these text messages, which Agent Golando knew about from an independent
   source and would have eventually been discovered, “would have ‘add[ed]
   nothing’ to either the integrity or fairness of [Guia-Lopez’s] criminal trial.”
   Nix, 467 U.S. at 446.
          Accordingly, the district court did not err in admitting the contents of
   the text messages.
     E. C. Admission of Agent Juarez’s Opinion Testimony Was Not Im-
                                    proper

          Guia-Lopez further argues the district court abused its discretion by
   allowing Agent Juarez to testify about WhatsApp exchanges that occurred

          _____________________
          5
           Although Agent Golando admitted that using GrayKey is “not guaranteed” the
   Government showed Cellebrite software was eventually able to extract the contents of
   Guia-Lopez’s cellphone.

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   between February 18, 2021, and February 28, 2021. Guia-Lopez first argues
   Agent Juarez improperly opined on the ultimate issue and offered improper
   lay opinion testimony. In addition, Guia-Lopez argues Agent Juarez’s
   testimony about messages exchanged prior to the February 28, 2021, incident
   prejudicially conflated the charged acts with events that occurred before that,
   in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We determine there was no
   abuse of discretion and affirm the district court’s ruling.
          The conversations between Guia-Lopez and “Cruz” were contained
   in Government’s Exhibit 20C, which was admitted without objection. Agent
   Juarez read these texts into the record and was then asked for his conclusion
   based on his “training and experience.” Agent Juarez testified:
          I arrived at the conclusion that Cruz is the person that was
          directing the smuggling attempt. And he was providing
          instructions. And you can follow it for ten days from February
          18th to the day he was arrested on February 28th where he’s
          providing instructions, directions on where to transport, how
          much to charge for each individual, when to start and when to
          end as far as his movements go.
          Guia-Lopez objected to this testimony on the ground that it went to
   the “ultimate issue.” The district court overruled this objection because the
   testimony was based on Agent Juarez’s “training and experience . . . .” Guia-
   Lopez also preserved Rule 403 objections to this testimony to the extent
   Agent Juarez discussed previous events. The district court overruled the
   Rule 403 objection and, per Rule 404(b), provided a limiting instruction that
   the jury could only consider the other acts to determine Defendant’s state of
   mind, motive, intent, or knowledge.
          The Government followed a similar strategy with Government’s
   Exhibit 20D, which comprised a series of text exchanges between Guia-

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                                          No. 22-50234

   Lopez and other parties on February 28, 2021. After this series of text
   messages was read into the record, Agent Juarez testified:
           Q. Based on your training and experience and your
           investigation in this case, what did you conclude that this
           conversation was about?
           A. This is the person in the group that might be the guide that
           is coordinating with the Defendant.
   Guia-Lopez alleges he did not lodge a contemporaneous objection to this
   testimony because “the trial judge had already ruled that Agent Juarez could
   give opinion testimony on the meaning of the text exchanges.” But this
   distorts the objection made by Guia-Lopez. Although Guia-Lopez is correct
   that he need not repeat his “ultimate issue” objection because it was
   overruled, 6 Guia-Lopez’s previous objection was limited to the “ultimate
   issue.” At trial, Guia-Lopez failed to raise the objection he now argues—that
   Agent Juarez’s testimony was improper lay opinion because of his lack of
   “extensive” experience in this case.
           We review Guia-Lopez’s “ultimate issue” and Rule 403 arguments
   for an abuse of discretion, subject to harmless error. See United States v.
   Cowards, 24 F.4th 409, 411 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Properly preserved evidentiary
   rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”). “A trial court abuses its
   discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly
   erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United States v. Jackson, 636 F.3d
   687, 692 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Yanez Sosa, 513 F.3d 194,

           _____________________
           6
              Renewing the “ultimate issue” objection after the trial judge had made a ruling
   on a nearly identical question related to nearly identical evidence would only serve to “be
   a needless provocation to the trial judge, not to mention a distracting interruption during
   the trial.” United States v. Lara, 23 F.4th 459, 474 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2790
   (2022) (citations omitted).

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   200 (5th Cir. 2008)). An evidentiary “error is harmless unless it had
   substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
   verdict.” United States v. Spivey, 506 F. App’x 332, 333 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (quoting United States v. Lowery, 135 F.3d 957, 959 (5th Cir. 1998)).
          To determine the admissibility of the pre–February 28, 2021,
   messages under Rule 403 we apply a two-part test: (1) “the extrinsic offense
   evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character,” and
   (2) “the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially
   outweighed by its undue prejudice and must meet the other requirements of
   [R]ule 403.” United States v. Ortega, 478 F. App’x 871, 874–75 (5th Cir.
   2012) (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898,
   911 (5th Cir.1978)).
          Guia-Lopez acknowledges this evidence of his prior acts is probative
   of motive and intent. Accordingly, the first part of the test is easily satisfied.
   See id. at 875 (finding text messages sent after charged act were relevant
   because they supported an inference of knowledge of illegal narcotics).
          Guia-Lopez instead focuses on the second part of the test, arguing the
   probative value of the evidence of other acts is substantially outweighed by
   prejudice because Agent Juarez’s testimony made it impossible for the jurors
   to separate the charged offense from previous offenses. Upon review of the
   evidence and testimony in question, we disagree. Agent Juarez’s testimony
   was based on dated text messages that would allow a juror to separate past
   events from the charged events easily. Moreover, the district court took the
   additional cautionary measure of providing the jury with a limiting
   instruction that explicitly stated as follows:
          You must not consider Defendant’s other acts in deciding if the
          Defendant’s committed the acts charged in this indictment.
          You may however consider this evidence for other limited
          purposes . . . [such as] whether the Defendant had the state of

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                                   No. 22-50234

         mind, motive, intent, or knowledge necessary to commit the
         crime charged in the indictment.
         For these reasons, the prejudicial effect of these text messages did not
   substantially outweigh their probative value and the district court did not
   abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b).
         Guia-Lopez also argues Agent Juarez offered improper opinion
   testimony as to the ultimate issue of Guia-Lopez’s state of mind. The
   Government responds that the first contested opinion does not go to Guia-
   Lopez’s state of mind but instead explained who Cruz was and how the
   Government believed Cruz was involved. The second contested opinion
   likewise explained who the Government believed Guia-Lopez was
   communicating with on February 28, 2021. Guia-Lopez argues that Agent
   Juarez usurped the jury’s role because he proffered opinions based on text
   messages that used simple, common words.
         Guia-Lopez cites United States v. Hill for the proposition that the type
   of opinion offered by Agent Juarez should have been admissible only to
   explain the meaning of code words. See 63 F.4th 335, 356 (5th Cir. 2023).
   But even Hill discusses precedent that an investigating agent may explain
   “the relationships between the people the agent is investigating.” Id.
   (quoting United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 729 (5th Cir. 2015)). Here,
   Agent Juarez’s testimony aided the jury by explaining with whom the
   Government believed Guia-Lopez was communicating in these text
   messages—a “guide” and “the person directing the smuggling attempt”—
   not Guia-Lopez’s state of mind. While Agent Juarez arguably should have
   avoided use of the word “smuggling,” there was no error here because Agent
   Juarez never directly commented on Guia-Lopez’s state of mind. See United
   States v. Dvorin, 817 F.3d 438, 448 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding the use of terms
   like “fraud,” “fraudulent checks,” and “conspiracy” were not errors

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                                     No. 22-50234

   because the testifying agent did not comment on the defendant’s state of
   mind).
            Finally, Guia-Lopez also offers a new argument that Agent Juarez’s
   testimony was improper lay opinion because he did not have “extensive
   involvement” in investigating the alleged conspiracy. As mentioned above,
   Guia-Lopez did not preserve this objection at trial.
            “Objections to the admission of evidence must be of such a specific
   character as to indicate distinctly the grounds upon which the party relies, so
   as to give the other side full opportunity to obviate them at the time, if under
   any circumstances, that can be done.” Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v.
   Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 552 (5th Cir. 1968) (quoting Noonan v. Caledonia Gold
   Mining Co., 121 U.S. 393, 400 (1887)). “It is fundamental that where an
   objection is specific it is deemed to be limited to the ground or grounds
   specified and it does not cover others not specified.” Id. (quoting Knight v.
   Loveman, Joseph & Loeb, Inc., 217 F.2d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 1954)). Guia-
   Lopez’s “ultimate issue” objection did not disclose an argument that Agent
   Juarez was not qualified to offer the testimony at issue based on his lack of
   involvement in the investigation. It was Guia-Lopez’s burden to preserve
   this issue for review by providing the district court an opportunity to correct
   or mitigate this perceived error. See United States v. Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405
   F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 2005).
            Accordingly, we perform a plain-error review of Guia-Lopez’s
   “extensive involvement” argument because Guia-Lopez failed to make this
   objection at trial. Under plain-error review, the appellant must show that:
   “(1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear or obvious; (3) the error
   affected his or her substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affect[ed] the
   fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings such that we

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                                       No. 22-50234

   should exercise our discretion to reverse.” Lara, 23 F.4th at 475 (quoting
   United States v. Oti, 872 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017)).
          Guia-Lopez argues that Agent Juarez’s involvement in the
   investigation was limited because he had only been the case agent for two
   weeks. In fairness, two weeks is a short time. But there was no clear error
   here. Agent Juarez, who has been a special agent with Homeland Security
   since 2008, became the case agent sometime after Agent Golando was
   transferred to another location out of state. Agent Juarez was intimately
   familiar with these messages: he performed the forensic examination of Guia-
   Lopez’s phone and translated the contested messages from Spanish to
   English.    Moreover, Agent Juarez interviewed Romero, Guia-Lopez’s
   codefendant. Based on the simplicity of the evidence before him, including
   Romero’s testimony, the contents of the phone and the details of Guia-
   Lopez’s arrest, it is reasonable that a seasoned special agent would need no
   more than a short period of time to investigate and form an opinion based on
   his training and experience. Thus, there was no plain error here. 7
          For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s admission of these
   text messages and Agent Juarez’s testimony.
      F. D. Government’s Exhibit 10 Did Not Violate the Confrontation
                                   Clause

          Guia-Lopez also argues Government’s Exhibit 10, a redacted version
   of the Form G166F “Report of Investigation,” violates the Confrontation
   Clause, contains hearsay, and impermissibly usurped the role of the jury by

          _____________________
          7
            Moreover, even if Agent Juarez’s testimony had introduced some error, such an
   error would be harmless because his testimony was cumulative of other testimony in the
   record, such as Agent Golando’s and Romero’s testimony as well as the text messages
   themselves.

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                                    No. 22-50234

   presenting prejudicial conclusory statements. We review the admission of
   this form for plain error because Government’s Exhibit 10 was admitted
   without objection. We determine there was no error and affirm the district
   court’s ruling.
          First, Guia-Lopez argues that the admission of this exhibit violated the
   Confrontation Clause because the Government used the custodian of
   records, Agent Lujan, to admit the exhibit rather than the drafter of the
   report, Agent Brown. Guia-Lopez argues the Government “purposefully
   avoided introducing Exhibit 10 through [Agent] Brown,” who had testified
   earlier, to “effectively deprive[]” Guia-Lopez of an opportunity to cross-
   examine Agent Brown about the report. The Government argues that Agent
   Brown testified at trial and that Guia-Lopez made no effort to recall him after
   the admission of Government’s Exhibit 10.
          Allowing the custodian of records to sponsor this exhibit was not plain
   error. Form G-166F is a public record that was not created for the purpose
   of establishing or proving some fact at trial. See United States v. Noria, 945
   F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2019). Agent Lujan testified that the form is kept in
   the ordinary course of business, at or reasonably near the time of the event,
   by an employee with actual knowledge—in this case, Agent Brown. Thus,
   the unredacted portions of the G-166F form are not testimonial because they
   were “created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the
   purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial.” Id. (quoting Melendez-
   Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009)). Moreover, most of the
   information contested by Guia-Lopez comprises biographical information,
   such as the identities of certain individuals, their citizenship, and their

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                                      No. 22-50234

   birthplace, which further comprises non-testimonial information that does
   not violate the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 850. 8
          To the extent that Guia-Lopez argues Agent Brown was the
   unavailable declarant, there was no violation of the Confrontation Clause.
   Guia-Lopez admits “the record clearly establishes that [Agent] Ryland
   Brown, the author of G166, was available to testify and did testify.” Guia-
   Lopez proffers no argument showing Agent Brown was unavailable and does
   not argue he could not have recalled Agent Brown after Government’s
   Exhibit 10 was admitted.
          Guia-Lopez also challenges the report’s identification of (i) Guia-
   Lopez as a principal in a “failed 2 on 6 smuggling attempt”; (ii) the
   destination of Odessa; (iii) the fact that the arrests occurred ten miles north
   of Presidio, Texas; and (iv) the use of the word “SMUGGLED” with regard
   to the six individuals named on pages two and three of the exhibit. Guia-
   Lopez alleges each of these facts could only be ascertained through hearsay
   and argues the exhibit and Agent Lujan’s repeated references to
   “smuggling” were highly prejudicial. Guia-Lopez fails to persuasively argue
   that the location of the arrest and the names and citizenship of the individuals
   in the vehicle constitute hearsay. Evidence was presented at trial that showed
   such information was ascertainable without relying on hearsay.
          Guia-Lopez is correct, however, that Agent Brown’s report may
   contain hearsay with respect to the fact that the crossing took place at Fort
   Leaton. Although it does not appear that cumulative evidence that the
   crossing took place at Fort Leaton was introduced during trial, evidence was
   introduced to show an illegal crossing took place. Thus, the introduction of

          _____________________
          8
             At trial, Guia-Lopez’s counsel admitted that the Government’s Exhibit 10 is
   arguably a business form and “it would be a hard press for an objection on that.”

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                                     No. 22-50234

   the exact location of the alleged crossing was not prejudicial and did not
   provide evidence that affected Guia-Lopez’s ultimate conviction. See United
   States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 336 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 463
   (2022), and cert. denied sub nom. Peters v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 462 (2022),
   and cert. denied sub nom. Owney v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 602 (2023), and
   cert. denied sub nom. Neville v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 603 (2023)
   (determining possible hearsay violations were harmless because even if the
   alleged hearsay evidence had not been admitted the prosecution had ample
   evidence of conspiracy).
          For these reasons, there was no plain error in the admission of
   Government’s Exhibit 10.
    G. E. Guia-Lopez’s Due Process Was Not Affected by Cumulative Er-
                                    rors

          The district court did not commit reversible error in its resolution of
   any of the issues presented in this case. Accordingly, “there are no errors
   that we could aggregate to find cumulative error.” United States v. Herman,
   997 F.3d 251, 275 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 787 (2022) (quoting
   United States v. Eghobor, 812, F.3d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 2015)).
                                  Conclusion

          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
   denying Guia-Lopez’s motion to suppress. We further determine Guia-
   Lopez is not entitled to a new trial because there was no reversible error.

                                          23