Court Opinion

ID: 9943585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 21:02:55.72188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:24.255416
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 P. v. Hill CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B322171

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. TA155815)
           v.

 JOSEPH TIMOTHY HILL,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Connie R. Quinones and Teresa P.
Magno, Judges. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded with directions.
      Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt C. Bloomfield and Seth P.
McCutcheon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
       Joseph Timothy Hill appeals the judgment entered
following a jury trial in which he was convicted as charged of one
count of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code1
section 187, subdivision (a) (count 1) and one count of possession
of a firearm by a felon in violation of section 29800, subdivision
(a)(1) (count 2). The jury further found true the allegation that
appellant personally used a firearm in the commission of the
murder. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) Appellant waived his right to a
jury trial on the prior conviction allegation, and in a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found that appellant had suffered a
prior conviction for active participation in a gang (§ 186.22, subd.
(a)), which qualified as a “strike” under the Three Strikes law.
(§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced
appellant to a term of 60 years to life in state prison, consisting of
25 years to life doubled for the strike on count 1, plus a
consecutive 10-year term for the weapon-use allegation, and two
years concurrent on count 2.
       Appellant contends the trial court violated his state and
federal constitutional rights by failing to suspend trial and
institute competency proceedings in accordance with sections
1368 and 1369. We disagree and affirm appellant’s conviction.
       Appellant further contends there was insufficient evidence
that his prior conviction for violation of section 186.22,
subdivision (a) qualifies as a strike under People v. Rodriguez
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125 (Rodriguez) and People v. Strike (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 143 (Strike). The People agree that reversal and
retrial of appellant’s prior serious felony conviction is required.
Accepting the parties’ agreement, we reverse the trial court’s true

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                  2
finding on the prior strike allegation, vacate the sentence, and
remand the matter for retrial of appellant’s prior serious felony
conviction.
                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       Kelvin Hillman repaired cars at his home in Los Angeles,
and appellant frequently brought a white Acura to Hillman’s
house for repairs. The registered owner of the Acura, appellant’s
girlfriend Erica Childress, sometimes accompanied appellant to
Hillman’s house.
       Surveillance videos from Hillman’s neighborhood showed a
white Acura on the street in front of Hillman’s house around 2:25
in the afternoon on September 17, 2021. Cell tower data recorded
appellant’s cell phone in the area of Hillman’s house at that time,
and cell phone records indicated the last call Hillman received on
his cell phone was from appellant’s cell phone at 2:24 p.m. when
the Acura was parked in front of Hillman’s house. In the videos,
Hillman can be seen walking from his house and crossing the
street to the Acura. He then opens the passenger door of the
Acura and appears to bend down as if to sit in the passenger seat.
After a slight movement of the passenger door, the Acura drives
away with the passenger door still open. No one can be seen in
the front passenger seat, and the door closes with the
acceleration of the car.
       That afternoon, Hillman’s niece, who lived nearby, heard a
“pop” followed by people yelling in the street in front of her house.
She went outside to find Hillman lying in a pool of blood in the
street. He was bleeding profusely, unresponsive, and did not
have a pulse. Hillman died as a result of a single gunshot fired to
the neck from inches away. The bullet had traveled from the left
side of the neck, left to right and slightly back to front, with an

                                 3
exit wound on the right cheek. The medical examiner who
performed the autopsy estimated that death occurred “rapidly,”
within seconds or minutes of the gunshot.
       About 30 minutes after Hillman was shot, surveillance
video showed appellant at a carwash getting the Acura washed.
During the carwash, a substance resembling blood can be seen
dripping down the passenger side door panel.
       That night, around 7:15 p.m., appellant went to a T-Mobile
store in Compton and changed his cell phone number from the
one he had at the time of the murder to a new number.
Surveillance video from the store showed appellant vigorously
cleaning his hands, between his fingers, and each of his nails, as
well as his face, neck, and the back of his head with the Clorox
wipes the store used to wipe down equipment and counters.
Appellant was not wearing a mask.
       Police stopped appellant driving the white Acura on
September 22, 2021. He was alone in the car. Appellant’s DNA
was on the driver’s door handle, steering wheel, and gearshift.
Gunshot residue was found throughout the car, a bullet hole was
located in the passenger door panel, and the bullet was recovered
from behind the door panel. Hillman’s blood was found inside the
Acura on the interior front passenger door panel. The Acura’s
carpeting appeared to have been vigorously scrubbed with
rubbing alcohol, and several empty bottles of rubbing alcohol
were found in the car along with a receipt for rubbing alcohol
from Stater Bros. Appellant can be seen on the Stater Bros.
surveillance video buying the rubbing alcohol on September 18,
2021. Finally, on September 20, 2021, appellant texted Childress
that he had found a buyer for the Acura. In another text he
asked her to buy him a ticket to Texas.

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                           DISCUSSION
  I. The Record Does Not Contain Substantial
       Evidence to Support a Reasonable Doubt as to
       Appellant’s Competence to Stand Trial
    A. Relevant proceedings
       On May 27, 2022, approximately a week before trial was
set to begin, defense counsel advised the trial court that he had
learned appellant was not taking his medications. Based on the
medication issue and conversations with appellant, defense
counsel declared a doubt as to appellant’s competence to stand
trial. Defense counsel explained that appellant did not seem to
understand the importance of the case or the ramifications of a
guilty verdict. He could not understand a need for further
investigation. “He started naming out names that had nothing to
do with the case. . . . [And] he’s not acting rashly [sic] to make a
rational decision.”
       The trial court asked defense counsel if appellant had been
able to assist with the defense in any way. Counsel responded
that he had not. When the court asked if appellant was simply
refusing to cooperate in his defense, counsel explained, “No, it [is]
not because he’s refusing, Your Honor. In his mind he thinks
that the defense is complete. He can’t understand that we
actually need to do more for the defense. So his ⎯ his
understanding of a defense is just the fact that [he] wasn’t there
and that’s it. So he’s not acting rashly [sic].” At this point,
appellant interjected, “I didn’t do it.”
       Observing that “there is a difference between someone just
saying they didn’t do it and not understanding the proceedings,”
the trial court asked counsel, “is he unable to communicate with
you about his case?” Counsel replied, “He is, Your Honor. He is

                                  5
unable to communicate with me about his case, Your Honor. He
can’t understand the process of the case, Your Honor. He can’t
understand ⎯ in his mind he’s thinking after preliminary
hearing that should be it. He ⎯ he just can’t communicate and
articulate a defense ⎯ helping me in any way with his defense.”
       The trial court then questioned appellant directly:
       “The Court: Mr. Hill, do you understand why you’re here
today?
       “The Defendant: Yes.
       “The Court: Why?
       “The Defendant: Trying to say that I did something that I
didn’t do.
       “The Court: What are you charged with?
       “The Defendant: I’m charged with murder.”
       The trial court asked appellant several times if he
understood “that [his] lawyer needs [time] to prepare so that he
can argue in front of a jury what [the] defense is.” Appellant
gave several nonresponsive answers before replying, “Yes, I
understand that he needs time.”
       The trial court addressed defense counsel: “So I’m sorry,
counsel, it doesn’t sound like he doesn’t understand what’s
happening. He’s just being stubborn and doesn’t want to let you
prepare for his case, to his detriment.” Counsel replied, “Again,
the rationale, again, his understanding is basically because he’s
off his meds, Your Honor. [¶] . . . [¶] And at worst, Your Honor,
if the court is not willing to declare a doubt, Your Honor, then I’m
asking the court to at least order his medication be sent to him.”
When counsel admitted not knowing what type of “mental health
meds” appellant needed, appellant explained, “It’s for depression.

                                 6
I ⎯ I had lost one of my family members and I was kind of
depressed so I seen a psychiatrist.”
       The trial court stated that the fact that he was seeing a
psychiatrist did not mean he did not understand the proceedings.
The court agreed to sign the medical order to provide appellant
with his medication, and explained to appellant that his attorney
was not ready for trial and was asking to put the case over to
allow him more time to prepare. Appellant responded, “It should
be nothing to be ready about.” The trial court then declared,
“Okay. Sounds like he’s being stubborn. That’s on him. . . . You
know when people go to trial not ready, that hurts their cases. It
hurts you.”
       The case was then transferred to the Honorable Teresa P.
Magno for trial. On June 7, 2022, Judge Magno confirmed with
appellant his desire to proceed to trial without waiving time. No
question of appellant’s competence to stand trial came up before
Judge Magno, and trial began on June 8, 2022.
    B. Legal principles
       “The constitutional guarantee of due process forbids a court
from trying or convicting a criminal defendant who is mentally
incompetent to stand trial.” (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th
219, 230 (Rodas); People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1030
(Bloom); U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15.)
Applying the constitutional standard, section 1367, subdivision
(a) specifies that “[a] defendant is incompetent to stand trial
when ‘as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental
disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of
the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a
defense in a rational manner.’ ” (People v. Parker (2022) 13
Cal.5th 1, 28 (Parker); Rodas, at p. 230; People v. Mickel (2016) 2

                                 7
Cal.5th 181, 195 (Mickel) [a defendant who lacks “ ‘ “sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding . . . [or] a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him” ’ ” is
incompetent to stand trial].)
       During the pendency of a criminal action and prior to
judgment, if “a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the
mental competence of the defendant” (§ 1368, subd. (a)) and
defense counsel concurs (id., subd. (b)), the court must suspend
criminal proceedings and commence competency proceedings.
(Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 231.) This means the “accused has
the right ‘to a hearing on present sanity if he comes forward with
substantial evidence that he is incapable, because of mental
illness, of understanding the nature of the proceedings against
him or of assisting in his defense.’ ” (Ibid.)
       However, our Supreme Court has declared that “ ‘ “[t]he
decision whether to order a competency hearing rests within the
trial court’s discretion, and may be disturbed upon appeal ‘only
where a doubt as to [mental competence] may be said to appear
as a matter of law or where there is an abuse of discretion.’ . . .
On review, our inquiry is focused not on the subjective opinion of
the trial judge, but rather on whether there was substantial
evidence raising a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s
competence to stand trial.” ’ ” (Bloom, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 1030; Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 201–202 [“Only where the
court is presented with substantial evidence of mental
incompetence is a defendant ‘entitled to a section 1368 hearing as
a matter of right’ ”].) As the high court has explained, in this
context, substantial evidence of incompetence is “ ‘ “evidence that
raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant’s

                                 8
competence to stand trial.” ’ ” (Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 28;
People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 760 [“ ‘ “substantial
evidence for this purpose is evidence ‘that raises a reasonable or
bona fide doubt’ as to [the defendant’s] competence” ’ ”].)
       Evidence of incompetence may arise from several sources,
including the defendant’s demeanor or irrational behavior, as
well as a prior history of mental illness. (Bloom, supra, 12
Cal.5th at p. 1033; People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1033
(Mai).) But none of these factors is necessarily dispositive on the
issue. (Bloom, at pp. 1022–1033.) Indeed, “ ‘[t]o raise a doubt . . .
[courts] require more than “mere bizarre actions” or statements,
or even expert testimony that a defendant is psychopathic,
homicidal, or a danger to him- or herself and others.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1032; Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 31 [“ ‘ “[w]hen the trial
court’s declaration of a doubt is discretionary, it is clear that
‘more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions
[citation] or bizarre statements [citation] or . . . psychiatric
testimony . . . [of past] diagnos[e]s with little reference to
defendant’s ability to assist in his own defense’ ” ’ ”].)
       Moreover, “[a]n uncooperative defendant is not tantamount
to an incompetent one.” (Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 29.) And
while “[c]ounsel’s assertion of a belief in a client’s incompetence is
entitled to some weight . . . unless the court itself has declared a
doubt as to the defendant’s competence, and has asked for
counsel’s opinion on the subject, counsel’s assertion that his or
her client is or may be incompetent does not, in the absence of
substantial evidence to that effect, require the court to hold a
competency hearing.” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033; see also
People v. Hines (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 583, 604 (Hines) [“defense
counsel’s declaration of doubt about the defendant’s competence

                                  9
supports holding an incompetency hearing but isn’t sufficient to
require one”].)
       “Unless the record contains substantial evidence of present
mental incompetence, we review a trial court’s failure to initiate
the competency inquiry only for abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 575; Hines, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th
at p. 599 [“If the defendant has not presented substantial
evidence of incompetence, the decision of whether to order a full
competency hearing lies within the discretion of the trial court
(and we review the decision for abuse of discretion)”].) “ ‘[A]bsent
a showing of “incompetence” that is “substantial” as a matter of
law, the trial judge’s decision not to order a competency hearing
is entitled to great deference, because the trial court is in the best
position to observe the defendant during trial.’ ” (Parker, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 29, quoting Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033.)
And an appellate court will find an abuse of discretion only when
the trial court has “ ‘ “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th
623, 668.)
    C. Analysis
       While the record in this case shows appellant’s refusal to
waive time to allow defense counsel to conduct further
investigation, there appears no evidence to support the claim that
appellant was unable to understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings against him or to assist counsel in a rational manner
in the conduct of his defense.
       Defense counsel’s assertions that appellant was unable to
communicate about his case or assist in the defense and was not
acting rationally find no support in the record. No evidence

                                 10
regarding appellant’s mental condition, such as a mental
evaluation or medical report from a treating physician or mental
health expert, was offered. In the absence of “expert opinion from
a qualified and informed mental health expert, stating under
oath and with particularity that the defendant is incompetent, or
. . . some other substantial showing of incompetence that
supplements and supports [defense] counsel’s own opinion” of
incompetence, the trial court does not “have a nondiscretionary
obligation to suspend proceedings and hold a competency trial.”
(People v. Sattiewhite (2014) 59 Cal.4th 446, 465; cf. People v.
Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 87 (Wycoff) [professional opinion of
mental health expert presented in a formal report addressed to
the court stating detailed grounds for the conclusion that
defendant was incompetent to stand trial “constitute[d]
substantial evidence as a matter of law of defendant’s mental
incompetence”]; People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 270
[substantial evidence of incompetence is shown when “ ‘a
qualified mental health expert who has examined the defendant
“ ‘states under oath with particularity that in his professional
opinion the accused is, because of mental illness, incapable of
understanding the purpose or nature of the criminal proceedings
being taken against him or is incapable of assisting in his defense
or cooperating with counsel’ ” ’ ”].)
        Defense counsel’s representation to the court that appellant
was “off his meds” did not constitute substantial evidence of
mental incompetence sufficient to trigger the trial court’s duty to
suspend proceedings and initiate competency proceedings. (See
Bloom, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 1033 [trial court had no duty to
make inquiry into defendant’s psychiatric medication absent any
evidence that his competence depended on compliance with a

                                11
medication regimen].) When defense counsel admitted to being
unaware of what type of medication appellant had been taking or
what it was for, appellant explained that medication had been
prescribed to him for depression after the loss of a family
member. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly
concluded that the fact that appellant had received psychiatric
care for depression did not amount to substantial evidence of
incompetence to stand trial.
       We also reject appellant’s argument⎯made for the first
time on appeal⎯that the trial court had a duty to declare a doubt
and commence competency proceedings based on a prior finding
of incompetence and commitment of appellant under section 1370
from July 19 to September 28, 2000.
       Even if the trial court had been made aware that appellant
had been found incompetent at some time in the past, such a
remote, unexplained period of confinement to a mental hospital
would have been insufficient to compel the trial court to declare a
doubt as to appellant’s current ability to understand the
proceedings and assist in his defense. (See Bloom, supra, 12
Cal.5th at p. 1033 [“Although the trial court was aware that
[defendant] had a history of mental illness,” this fact, without
more, did not give “rise to a duty to suspend proceedings and
conduct a formal evaluation of [defendant’s] ability to understand
the proceedings against him and assist rationally in his own
defense”]; Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 202 [“even expert
testimony that a defendant is psychopathic, homicidal, or a
danger to him- or herself and others” may be insufficient to raise
a doubt regarding competency if the mental illness does not affect
the defendant’s understanding of the criminal proceedings or
hinder the ability to consult with counsel and assist in defense];

                                12
People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 508 [defendant must
present more than “a preexisting psychiatric condition that has
little bearing on the question of whether the defendant can assist
his defense counsel”].)
        Appellant argues that Wycoff, supra, 12 Cal.5th 58 is
analogous to the instant case and mandates reversal here. We
disagree. To the contrary, Wycoff demonstrates precisely why the
trial court here did not err in failing to proceed in accordance
with sections 1368 and 1369.
        In Wycoff, our Supreme Court held that the detailed and
uncontradicted report of an experienced mental health expert
who had examined the defendant constituted⎯as a matter of
law⎯substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetence to stand
trial, thus requiring competency proceedings in accordance with
sections 1368 and 1369. (Wycoff, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 84.) The
court found that Dr. Good, an expert in forensic psychology
chosen by the trial court, had given a credible and persuasive
opinion regarding defendant’s mental incompetence, “supported
by three interviews with defendant, a thorough psychiatric
history, appropriate psychological testing, and detailed reasoning
in which he made clear the factual basis for his conclusions.” (Id.
at p. 86.) The court found the thoroughness of the expert’s
analysis to be of particular significance: “Dr. Good described his
evaluation procedures in detail, summarized defendant’s
personal background, evaluated defendant’s mental status as of
the time of the examination, related in detail the factual basis for
his diagnosis, and set forth his diagnosis in cautious terms.”
(Ibid.)
        Because “Dr. Good’s opinion constitute[d] substantial
evidence as a matter of law of defendant’s mental incompetence,”

                                13
the court held that the trial court had erred in rejecting the
expert’s report and relying instead on its own experience
interacting with the defendant. (Wycoff, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
pp. 87, 88.)
       The instant case stands in stark contrast to the
circumstances in Wycoff. Here, the trial court was presented
with no diagnosis of mental illness, no psychological testing, no
expert evaluation, no expert report, and no expert opinion
regarding appellant’s mental competence. In short, there was no
evidence before the trial court in this case to suggest that
appellant was incapable of consulting with counsel and assisting
in his defense due to any kind of mental illness. Rather, the
evidence suggested at most that appellant was simply unwilling
to cooperate with defense counsel’s request for a delay of trial for
further investigation and preparation because he believed that
defense counsel had already had adequate time to prepare.
Appellant’s stubborn refusal to accept his counsel’s advice was
not substantial evidence of mental incompetence, and was
insufficient to require the trial court to institute a section 1369
competency proceeding. (See Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1034 [a
defendant’s refusal to cooperate with counsel does not by itself
constitute substantial evidence of incompetence].)
  II. Remand is Required to Determine Whether
       Appellant’s Prior Conviction Under
       Section 186.22 Qualifies as a Strike
       The parties agree that because there was insufficient
evidence presented at the bifurcated proceeding that appellant’s
prior conviction for gang participation (§ 186.22, subdivision (a))
qualifies as a “strike” under the “Three Strikes” law, the true
finding on appellant’s prior conviction allegation must be

                                 14
reversed, the sentence vacated, and the matter remanded for
retrial of the prior strike conviction. (See Strike, supra, 45
Cal.App.5th at pp. 146–147, 154; see also People v. Barragan
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239, 241 [reversal of a true finding on a
prior conviction allegation does not prevent retrial of the
enhancement].)
       In 2012, a majority of the California Supreme Court held
that section 186.22, subdivision (a) is violated only when a gang
member acts with another active member of the same gang in
committing a felony offense. (Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
p. 1128 (plur. opn. of Corrigan, J.); id. at p. 1139 (conc. opn. of
Baxter, J.).) The court in Strike held that this clarification of the
elements of section 186.22, subdivision (a) rendered the mere fact
of the “pre-Rodriguez conviction [for gang participation]
inconclusive on its face as to whether it qualified as a strike.”
(Strike, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 150.) Thus, in order to prove
the defendant’s 2007 conviction for violation of section 186.22,
subdivision (a) qualified as a prior strike conviction in the
defendant’s 2017 case, Strike held the prosecution was required
to demonstrate that all the elements of the section 186.22,
subdivision (a) offense as interpreted by Rodriguez had been
established⎯“including that [the defendant] committed a felony
offense with another member of his gang.” (Ibid.)
       Here during the trial on appellant’s priors, the prosecution
presented a certified prison packet from the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and a certified
“RAP” sheet to prove appellant’s prior strike conviction. While
these documents establish appellant’s 2001 conviction for a
violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a), none reveals whether

                                 15
appellant committed the gang participation offense with one or
more members of his gang, as required by Rodriguez.
       As respondent concedes, the appropriate remedy in this
instance is to reverse the trial court’s true finding that
appellant’s 2001 section 186.22, subdivision (a) conviction
qualifies as a strike, vacate the sentence, and remand for a new
trial on the enhancement based on the record of the prior
conviction. (Strike, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.)
                           DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s true finding on appellant’s prior strike
conviction is reversed and appellant’s sentence is vacated. The
matter is remanded for retrial of the prior conviction allegation
and resentencing. Following retrial, the trial court is directed to
resentence appellant and forward a certified copy of the amended
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, J.

      CHAVEZ, J.

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