Court Opinion

ID: 9459799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:32:14.198089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:20.708503
License: Public Domain

ROBB, Circuit Judge:
In this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief the appellants challenge regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation and the Acting Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration. The regulations, issued under section 204 of the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 19661 (80 Stat. 729, 15 U.S.C. § 1424 (1970)) govern the sale and use of re-grooved tires.2 The complaint alleges that the regulations are (a) beyond the authority of the Administrator, (b) vague, uncertain and ambiguous, and (c) arbitrary, unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. On cross motions for summary judgment the District Court rejected these contentions and entered a judgment for the defendants.
Appellant National Association of Motor Bus Owners (NAMBO) is the national trade organization for the intercity bus industry. Its members engage in the transportation of persons and property in interstate commerce by motor vehicles pursuant to authority issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Appellant American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA), an intervenor in the District Court, is the national organization of the trucking industry. It is an affiliation of fifty-one state trucking associations whose members consist of for-hire and private motor carriers. Most of the for-hire carriers operate pursuant to authority issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The appellants American Transit Association (Transit), Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp. (Suburban), and City Transit Company (City Transit), also intervened in the District Court. Transit is a national voluntary trade association for the local transit industry.
City Transit operates motor buses exclusively in the intrastate transportation of passengers within and around the city of Dayton, Ohio, and in charter operations wholly within the state of Ohio and by local authorities in Ohio. City Transit purchases tire mileage from the B. F. Goodrich Company pursuant to a contract under which an employee of Goodrich, working in City Transit’s garages, regrooves tires used by City Transit.
Suburban operates motor buses exclusively in the intrastate transportation of passengers for compensation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and adjacent areas. It conducts its business under a Common Motor Carrier Certificate issued by the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin. The company regrooves its own bus tires for use on its own buses operating wholly in intrastate commerce within the state of Wisconsin.
I.
In order that the challenged regulations and the contentions of the parties may be viewed in focus a summary of the relevant parts of the statute and their legislative history is necessary.
On October 19, 1965, a tire safety bill was introduced in the Senate (S. 2669, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.). When reported out of committee as the “Tire Safety *1297Act of 1966” this bill provided, with respect to regrooved tires:
No person, firm, or corporation shall sell, offer for sale, or introduce for sale or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce any tire or motor vehicle equipped with any tire which has been regrooved, except that the Secretary may by order permit the sale of regrooved tires or motor vehicles equipped with such tires which he finds are designed and constructed in a manner consistent with the purposes of this Act. S.Rep. No. 1089, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1966).
The bill also, among other things, required the Secretary3 to promulgate minimum safety performance standards, maximum permissible load standards, and labeling requirements for tires, and to investigate the feasibility of grading requirements. (S.Rep. No. 1089, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-36, 40 (1966)). In the bill, “motor vehicle” was defined to mean “passenger cars and station wagons” other than certain special purpose vehicles such as racing cars. (Id. at 33). According to the Senate Commerce Committee, the regrooved tire provision was inserted into the bill because:
[T]he committee concluded that the practice of regrooving passenger car tires, in which an iron or tread design device is used to cut into the under-tread of a smooth tire carcass to produce a new tread design — a universally condemned practice — should be prohibited by this bill. However, the Secretary would be given the authority to permit the regrooving of any tires which he finds are designed and constructed so as to permit safe re-grooving. S.Rep. No. 1089, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
The tire safety bill was enacted by the Senate with the regrooved tire provision unchanged (112 Cong.Rec. 6925 (1966)). But neither this bill nor a tire safety bill introduced in the House of Representatives which contained a similar prohibition (H.R. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)) ever reached the House floor.
During the same session a traffic safety bill, a more comprehensive measure than the tire safety bills, was also before each House. The Senate version (S. 3005) authorized the promulgation of “motor vehicle safety standards” for “motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment”. (S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1966). The bill, which made no separate provision for tires, defined “motor vehicle” to mean:
[A]ny vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power primarily for use on the public roads, streets, and highways, other than (1) a vehicle subject to safety regulations under part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended (49 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), or under the Transportation of Explosives Act as amended (18 U.S.C. 831-835), and (2) a vehicle or ear operated exclusively on a rail or rails. S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1966).
The bill was passed by the Senate without substantial change. (112 Cong.Rec. 14256 (1966)).
' The traffic safety bill on the House side (H.R. 13228) differed in certain respects from the Senate provision. First, it contained a separate title on tire safety, designated as Title II. This title provided that standards promulgated in Title I (which, as in the Senate bill, dealt generally with vehicle and equipment safety standards) require that tires be properly labeled and, further, that all new ears be equipped with tires which are adequate when the vehicle is fully loaded. The Secretary was also di*1298rected to establish a tire grading system (H.Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966)). The tire safety title did not deal specifically with regrooved tires.
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce explained the need for a separate title pertaining to tires:
In a number of bills which have been introduced in both Houses as well as in a bill which has passed the Senate (S. 2669) the necessity for standards for tires was considered as an independent problem and without reference to its relationship to the total traffic safety problem. S. 2669 is confined only to the improvement of tires for passenger cars and station wagons. The committee decided that although tires are a highly important part of the total traffic safety problem they are, nevertheless, an integral part of it and should be dealt with in the context of the total problem and not in a piecemeal fashion. Therefore it is neither necessary nor desirable to grant separate authority for the establishment of standards for this one item of motor vehicle equipment when the Secretary has full authority to issue standards as to tires (as well as any other item of motor vehicle equipment) under title I of the reported bill. However, the committee did feel that it was necessary to emphasize this aspect of the safety problem and to establish certain specific requirements which should be contained in the Secretary’s standards on tires. These requirements are set forth in section 201, and deal only with information to be given to consumers. The Secretary’s authority to establish standards as to tire performance is contained in title I, and in establishing these standards he will have to consider distinctions between new tires and retreads. H.Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1966).
The house bill also contained a broader definition of “motor vehicle” than the Senate bill. Specifically, section 102(3) defined “motor vehicle” as:
. . . any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways, except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails. H.Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
According to the Committee, the exemption was removed for vehicles subject to part II of the Interstate Commerce Act or the Transportation of Explosives Act because “[t]here appeared to be no way to determine with any certainty which vehicles would be subject to the standards and which would be exempt”. (H. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1966)). However, to avoid conflicting regulations the Committee inserted as section 103(g) of Title I:
. . . a requirement that in prescribing safety regulations the Interstate Commerce Commission will not adopt or continue in effect any regulation on safety which is different from a safety standard issued under this title. The Interstate Commerce Commission, however, after manufacture, can impose a higher standard of safety performance on a motor vehicle subject to this jurisdiction. H.Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966).
This bill was passed by the House with these provisions substantially intact. (112 Cong.Rec. 19673 (1966)).
The Senate then requested a conference. (112 Cong.Rec. 19863 (1966)). Senator Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, explained on the floor why a conference was required :
In clarifying the scope of truck standards, in spelling out detailed requirements for tire safety standards * * *, the House Amendments represent constructive effort greatly in the public interest.
There are, however, several desirable features in the Senate bill which are not fully reflected in the House *1299version. * * * [E.g.], [t]he desirability of prohibiting tire regrooving. ,4 112 Cong.Rec. 19862-63 (1966).
In conference Title II of the House bill, the tire title, was expanded to include, among other things, a regrooved tire prohibition almost identical with the one contained in the original Senate tire bill (H.Rep. No. 1919, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 13 (1966)). The broad definition of “motor vehicle”, contained in Title I of the House bill, was retained. (Id. at 2). Senator Magnuson, in submitting the conference report to the Senate, said:
The House Members accepted * * * the prohibition — taken from the Senate tire bill — against the regrooving of tires. 112 Cong.Rec. 21487 (1966).
Reporting to the House, Mr. Staggers stated:
The House definition [of motor vehicle] covers all vehicles, including trucks and buses. The definition in the Senate version was more restrictive and was interpreted as not including trucks and buses. The managers for the Senate receded. 112 Cong.Rec. 21349 (1966).
The bill, as amended in conference, was enacted by both houses as the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. (112 Cong.Rec. 21353, 21492; Pub.L. 89-563, Sept. 9, 1966, 80 Stat. 718-730).
II.
Title I of the Act is captioned “Motor Vehicle Safety Standards”. A motor vehicle safety standard is defined by section 102(2) as “a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance, which is practicable, which meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which provides objective criteria.” (15 U.S.C. § 1391(2)). Section 102(4) (15 U.S.C. § 1391(4)) provides that “‘Motor vehicle equipment’ means any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as originally manufactured or any similar part or component manufactured or sold for replacement or improvement of such system, part, or component or as any accessory, or addition to the motor vehicle. if
Section 103(a) (15 U.S.C. § 1392(a)) directs the Secretary to “establish by order” standards as defined in section 102(2). Section 103(b) (15 U.S.C. § 1392(b)) specifies that the “Administrative Procedure Act shall apply to all orders establishing, amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle safety standard under this title.’’ (Emphasis added). Section 103(f) directs that in prescribing standards the Secretary shall consider relevant available motor vehicle safety data, consult with the Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission and other agencies and “consider whether any such proposed standard is reasonable, practicable and appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment for which it is prescribed; and . . . consider the extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes of this Act.” (15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)).
Section 108(a)(1) (15 U.S.C. § 1397(a)) provides that “No person shall —(1) manufacture for sale, sell, offer for sale, or introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment' manufactured on or after the date any applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standard takes effect under this title unless it is in conformity with such standard except as provided in subsection (b) of this section. . . .” (Emphasis added). Section 108(b)(1) stipulates that the prohibition of section 108(a)(1) “shall not apply to the sale, the offer for sale, or the introduction or delivery for introduction in interstate commerce of any motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment after the first pur*1300chase of it in good faith for purposes other than resale. . . .” (15 U.S.C. § 1397(b)(1)).
Section 109(a) (15 U.S.C. § 1398(a)) authorizes the imposition of a civil penalty not exceeding $1,000 for each violation of any provision of section 108 or any regulation issued thereunder, except that the maximum penalty for any related series of violations shall not exceed $400,000.
Section 110(a) confers jurisdiction on United States District Courts “to restrain violations of this title, or to restrain the sale, offer for sale, or the introduction or delivery for introduction, in interstate commerce, or the importation into the United States, of any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment which is determined, prior to the first purchase of such vehicle in good faith for purposes other than resale, not to conform to applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards prescribed pursuant to this title . . . (15 U.S.C. § 1399(a)) (Emphasis added). Section 119 (15 U.S.C. § 1407) authorizes the Secretary “to issue, amend, and revoke such rules and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out this title." (Emphasis added).
Title II of the Act is captioned “Tire Safety”. Section 201 (15 U.S.C.'§ 1421) of this Title directs that “In all standards for pneumatic tires established under title I of this Act, the Secretary shall require that tires subject thereto” be labeled with certain specified safety information. (Emphasis added). Section 202 provides: “In standards established under title I of this Act the Secretary shall require that each motor vehicle be equipped by the manufacturer or by the purchaser thereof at the time of the first purchase thereof in good faith for purposes other than resale with tires which meet the maximum permissible load standards when such vehicle is fully loaded with the maximum number of passengers it is designed to carry and a reasonable amount of luggage.” (15 U.S.C. § 1422) (Emphasis added). Section 203 directs the Secretary “through standards established under title I of this Act” to prescribe by order and publish in the Federal Register a uniform quality grading system for motor vehicle tires. (15 U.S.C. § 1423) (Emphasis added).
Section 204(a) and (b) (15 U.S.C. § 1424(a) and (b)) provide:
(a) No person shall sell, offer for sale, or introduce for sale or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, any tire or motor vehicle equipped with any tire which has been regrooved, except that the Secretary may by order permit the sale of re-grooved tires and motor vehicles equipped with regrooved tires which he finds are designed and constructed in a manner consistent with the purposes of this Act.
(b) Violations of this section shall be subject to civil penalties and injunction in accordance with sections 109 and 110 of this Act.
Section 206 (15 U.S.C. § 1426, 84 Stat. 263) directs the Secretary to establish “safety standards under title I” for tire carcasses .which can be retreaded. (Emphasis added).
Purporting to act pursuant to the authority of sections 204(a) and 1195 of the Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1424(a), 1407) the Administrator published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to establish “criteria to govern the use of regrooved tires.” (33 Fed.Reg. 8603 (1968)). Interested persons were invited to participate in the making of the proposed regulations by submitting data, views or arguments.6 Thereafter the regulations were published (34 Fed.Reg. 1149, 1150 (1969)) and became effective April 1, 1969. (34 Fed.Reg. 3687, 3688 (1969)).
*1301They now appear at 49 C.F.R. § 569.1, et seq. (1972).
The regulations challenged by appellants are:
(a) Regrooved Tires: No person shall sell, offer for sale, or introduce for sale or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce regrooved tires produced by removing rubber from the surface of a worn tire tread to generate a new tread pattern unless the tires conform to [certain specified requirements].
* * -X- -X- -X- *-
(b) Any person who regrooves tires and leases them to owners or operators of motor vehicles and any person who regrooves his own tires for use on motor vehicles is considered to be a person delivering for introduction into interstate commerce within the meaning of this part. 49 C.F.R. § 569.7.
III.
The appellants, in their brief, attack the regulations on several grounds. (1) They say that the Act contemplates the issuance of Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, taking into account the factors and considerations specified in section 103 of Title I, and that accordingly, the Secretary should have promulgated such standards for regrooved tires, instead of issuing a regulation under section 204 in Title II. Noting that the Secretary may proceed under section 204 “by order” they argue that the “only provision in the Act for orders is section 103 [of Title I] which authorizes the Administrator to issue Federal standards ‘by order’ ”. (2) Contending that the Act applies only to manufacturers, distributors and dealers and not to consumers such as themselves, they invoke the “first purchase” exemptions appearing or implicit in sections 108(b), 109 and 110. (3) They argue that section 204 does not apply to carriers subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. (4) They say that motor carriers who regroove their own tires and use them on their own vehicles do not “deliver” them for introduction in interstate commerce. (5) Finally, Suburban and City Transit contend that since they operate wholly in intrastate commerce they are not subject to regulation under the Act. We are not persuaded by any of these arguments.
We think the authority of the Secretary under section 204(a) of Title II is independent of his authority to establish safety standards under section 103 of Title I. Section 103 by its terms applies only to orders establishing standards under Title I. Section 204(a) does not in terms refer to Title I, but the other operative sections of Title II are specifically keyed to “standards established under title I.” (Sections 201, 202, 203, 206; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1421, 1422, 1423, 1426). Standards under section 103 must be “practicable * * * meet the need for motor vehicle safety, * * * and stated in objective terms.” On the other hand section 204(a) sets up its own standards for regrooved tires: their sale may be permitted only if they are “designed and constructed in a manner consistent with the purposes of this Act.” Those purposes are “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.” (Section 1; 15 U.S.C. § 1381). Thus, even though the requirements of section 204(a) are not “practicable” — that is, even though it is not “practicable” to produce a regrooved tire that meets those requirements — the use of regrooved tires is still prohibited.
The appellants argue that they are immune from regulation under section 204 because they are subject to safety regulations promulgated under the Interstate Commerce Act. (49 U.S. C. § 301 et seq.). In support of their argument the appellants point to section 205 of the Safety Act which provides that in the event of conflict between the requirements of orders or regulations issued by the Administrator, applicable to tires, and orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission, the provisions of orders or regulations by the Administrator *1302shall prevail. The appellants contend that since no provision was made for conflicts between the Administrator and the Interstate Commerce Commission, we must conclude that Congress did not intend section 204 to apply to carriers subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. Congress thought no conflict could arise, say the appellants, because it was not intended that section 204 should apply to carriers subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. We cannot accept the inference drawn by the appellants. Section 204 applies to “any tire or motor vehicle equipped with any tire which has been regrooved. ...” As we have seen, the conference version of the bill, which was finally enacted, expanded the definition of motor vehicle to include “all vehicles, including trucks and buses”. Moreover, since bus and truck operators are major users of regrooved tires it would be unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to exempt them from the prohibition of section 204. We note also that the appellants do not claim that any conflicts in the regulations now exist; and we think the likelihood of conflicts is remote since both the Motor Vehicle Safety Act and section 204 of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 304) are now administered by the Department of Transportation. See 49 U. S.C. § 1655(e)(6)(C).
The appellants contend that by regrooving their own tires and using them on their own vehicles they do not “deliver” the tires for introduction within the meaning of section 204. They invoke the dictionary definition of “deliver” as meaning to give, transfer; yield possession or control of; make or hand over; send to an intended destination. From this they argue that a person cannot make a delivery to himself and that “delivery for introduction” must mean delivery by a manufacturer, wholesaler, or dealer to a wholesaler, dealer, or user pursuant to a sale. If the appellants’ argument is correct, then the word “deliver” in section 204 is unnecessary, for such transactions by a manufacturer, wholesaler or dealer would be covered by the word “sale”. We hold, however, that the word “deliver” in the context of the statute cannot be so narrowly and legalistically construed, and that, in using the word, Congress was referring not to a transfer of legal possession or control, but to any physical transfer or movement of a regrooved tire for the purpose of introducing it in interstate commerce. A person who regrooves his own tires and thereafter moves them to his garage or terminal for use on motor vehicles is therefore within the intendment of the statute, and subject to regulation thereunder.
The “first purchase” exception upon which the appellants rely appears in two sections of Title I. Section 108(b)(1) exempts from the prohibitions of section 108(a)(1) a purchaser in good faith for purposes other than resale. A similar provision in section 110(a) exempts a first purchaser from the injunctive jurisdiction of the district courts. The appellants argue that since they buy their tires “for purposes other than resale” they are exempted from the coverage of the Act. We do not agree.
Both section 108(b)(1) and section 110(a), which appear in Title I of the Act, refer and are keyed to violations or other sections of that title. They do not relate to violations of Title II, in which section 204 appears, and we find nothing to indicate that Congress intended the first purchase exception to be carried over to section 204. We are fortified in this conclusion by the obvious purpose of Congress in enacting section 204, which was to prohibit the use of regrooved tires in interstate commerce, whether that use was by the first purchaser or by anyone else.
Appellants advance the theory that the “first purchase” exception is applicable to regrooved tires because section 204(b) provides that “violations of this section shall be subject to civil penalties and injunction in accordance with sections 109 and 110 of this Act.” Section 109 stipulates the civil penalties *1303that may be levied for violations of section 108, which contains the “first purchase” exception. Section 110 is a dual grant of jurisdiction to the district courts (1) to restrain violations of Title I, or (2) to restrain “the sale, offer for sale, or introduction or delivery for introduction” of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment prior to first purchase and not conforming “to applicable Federal motor vehicle standards prescribed pursuant to this title. . . .” This second grant, containing the first purchase exception, is predicated upon the applicable motor vehicle standards issued under section 103 and is not keyed to section 204. However, the first grant, permitting injunctive relief against statutory violations, is readily transferable to section 204 and conveys equitable jurisdiction over violations of section 204(a). We think that the reference in section 204(b) to sections 109 and 110 is merely an indication of the procedure and penalties available for the enforcement of section 204(a); it is not a limitation on the sweep of section 204(a).
IY.
The contentions of Suburban and City Transit present more difficulty. By affidavits filed in the District Court and not traversed by the Administrator on the motion for summary judgment, they assert that they operate motor buses exclusively in the intrastate transportation of passengers. They contend that since their operations are not in interstate commerce they do not come within the scope of the Act. The Administrator responds that the roads upon which the buses of the two companies travel “are within the stream of interstate commerce”, that the buses “intermingle with interstate traffic” and that a defective tire on such a bus could interfere with traffic in interstate commerce. Accordingly, says the Administrator, he “was plainly justified in determining that a person who places a tire on a bus which will travel on such a road has placed it in ‘interstate commerce’ ”.
In substance the Administrator’s argument is that his regulation is justified because a defective tire on a bus operating in intrastate commerce may affect interstate commerce. The flaw that I find in the Administrator’s argument is that the statute (Section 102(9); 15 U.S.C. § 1391(9)) defines “interstate commerce” as “commerce between any place in a State and any place in another State, or between places in the same State through another State.” On its face the statute does not relate to activities which merely affect interstate commerce, and I think it cannot be so broadly construed. Had Congress intended to include such activities in its definition it would have said so. Cf. Texas International Airlines v. CAB, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 473 F.2d 1150 (1972).7
Although I am not impressed by the Administrator’s response to the argument of the intrastate bus companies I think his regulation may be sustained on another ground. Interstate commerce “is an intensely practical concept drawn from the normal and accepted course of business”. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 231, 67 S.Ct. 1560, 1567, 91 L.Ed. 2010 (1947). As a practical matter I think it not an irrational conclusion that any bus, even though presently engaged in intrastate transportation, is likely at some time to cross state lines. A bus may be driven across state lines without authority of its owner, or it may be chartered, leased or sold for use in transporting persons across state lines. In short, it is not unreasonable to conclude that a bus and its tires may travel beyond the bounds of its usual habitat. Thus, although a bus tire may never in fact have crossed a state line it would nevertheless be subject to the proscription of the Act because the *1304Administrator has rationally presumed, as a matter of law, that the tire will travel interstate at some future date. If this were not so, and the prohibition of section 204 were unenforceable against the owner of any buses normally operated in intrastate commerce, the statute would be substantially ineffectual.
V.
Having rejected the appellants’ many challenges to the regulations we turn finally to one specific flaw which we believe invalidates them in part. Section 204 allows the Administrator to permit only the sale of regrooved tires. This is the position of the appellants in their brief, and was conceded by the government at oral argument. Yet, the Administrator’s regulation purports to authorize not only the sale of regrooved tires but also their delivery for introduction into interstate commerce. We are constrained to conclude that in permitting more than the sale of regrooved tires the Administrator’s regulation exceeds his authority, and the District Court should have held it to be invalid. If the statute is to this extent defective Congress may amend it, but it is not for us to do so. “It is not for us * * * to try to avoid the conclusion that Congress did not mean what it said. Arguments of policy are relevant when for example a statute has an hiatus that must be filled or there are ambiguities in the legislative language that must be resolved. But when Congress, though perhaps mistakenly or inadvertently, has used language which plainly brings a subject matter into a statute, its word is final — save for questions of constitutional power which have not even been intimated here.” Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 64, 73 S.Ct. 580, 583, 97 L.Ed. 821 (1953). In this respect therefore the judgment of the District Court is reversed; in all other respects it is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

. References in this opinion to particular provisions of the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act are made according to those found in the original Act, cited in Pub.L. 89-563, Title II, § 204, Sept. 9, 1966, 80 Stat. 718.

. Section 204(c) of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 1424(c) (1970)), defines a regrooved tire as “a tire on which a new tread has been produced by cutting into the tread of a worn tire.”

. The bill, as introduced and later enacted, vested the administrative functions in the Secretary of Commerce. These duties were thereafter transferred to the Secretary of Transportation (49 U.S.C. 1655 (a) (6) (A)) who, in turn, delegated his authority to the Federal Highway Administrator, 49 C.F.R. § 1.4(e) (3) (1) (1970), and later, to the Director of the • National Highway Safety Bureau, 49 C.F.R. § 151 (1971). The authority now rests in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1.51(a) (1972).

. Here, Senator Magnuson apparently was referring to the Senate tire bill rather than to the comprehensive traffic safety bill being debated.

. The Administrator’s rulemaking must stand on the authority granted in section 204(a) since section 119, the “necessary rules and regulations” clause, is by its very terms not applicable to the tire safety title of the Act.

. The appellants were among those submitting comments and arguments.

. The proscription against regrooved tires contained in section 204(a) is not against their mere “introduction” in interstate commerce. The language that Congress used prohibited (in interstate commerce) the sale, offer for sale, introduction for sale, and the delivery for introduction of regrooved tires.