Court Opinion

ID: 9931005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 01:01:46.774992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:25.338015
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/24 P. v. Sanchez CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E080633

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FSB21002616)

 TONY CARLOS SANCHEZ,                                                    OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Kory E.

Mathewson, Judge. Affirmed.

         William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Elana

Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                                  1
          A jury found defendant and appellant Tony Carlos Sanchez guilty of disobeying a

court order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (a)(4), count 3).1 The court sentenced defendant to

180 days in jail with credit for time served of 301 days. The court also issued a criminal

protective order (CPO) protecting the victim, defendant’s mother, from contact with

defendant.

          On appeal, defendant contends the court was not authorized to issue a CPO under

section 136.2 because defendant’s conviction did not involve domestic violence. We

affirm.

                    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          On July 9, 2021, the People filed a felony complaint in case No. FSB21002616

charging defendant with criminal threats (§ 422, count 1) and alleged he committed the

offense with the use of a deadly weapon (§12022, subd. (b)(1)). On August 5, 2021, the

court issued a CPO under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), protecting the victim. On

August 17, 2021, the People charged defendant by felony information in case

No. FSB21002616 as charged in the complaint.

          On December 15, 2022, the People filed a motion to consolidate trial in case

Nos. FSB21002616 and FSB22002497; the latter case added an additional count of

criminal threats and a count of disobeying a court order. (§ 166, subd. (a)(4).) On

January 3, 2023, the court granted the motion to consolidate the cases.

          1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

                                                   2
       On January 4, 2023, the People filed a first amended information charging

defendant with two counts of criminal threats (§ 422, counts 1 & 2) and one count of

disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4), count 3). The People also alleged that in

defendant’s commission of the count 1 offense, he personally used a deadly weapon.

(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)

       At trial, the victim testified that in 2021 she lived with defendant and his three

children. Defendant became more aggressive over time, fighting both verbally and

physically with the victim and his children. “He would always say that he was going to

kill me.”

       One day, he told her he would kill her with a sharpened switchblade that he wore

on a chain around his neck. He made the threats while sharpening the knife.

       The victim “was very much afraid.” He made her fear for her personal safety.

She believed that he was capable of killing her.

       She called the police. After the incident she requested a CPO against defendant

because she did not want him to return to her home.

       In 2022, another incident with defendant occurred: “I was at my house sitting on

my sofa just resting, and I did not lock the front door, and then all of a sudden I got

startled because I saw somebody came in, which I did not recognize who it was because

he looked completely different.” Defendant was angry at her; for two hours she told him

to leave.

                                                   3
       Defendant went to the kitchen and grabbed a knife. “He didn’t say anything.”

“He just kept showing me the knife.” “[H]e would grab the knife . . . trying to intimidate

me.” “I felt worried and I felt frightened.” She called the police and told them she had a

restraining order against defendant.

       An officer testified he was dispatched to the victim’s residence on July 7, 2021.

“She seemed very distraught; in my opinion, afraid; and she was crying at the time.” She

said she feared defendant.

       Another officer testified he was dispatched to the victim’s residence on August 15,

2022, in reference to a violation of a court order. The victim “seemed very distraught.

She was scared and appeared to be frightened.” “She was shaky—she was shaking. Her

eyes were a little watery. It appeared she had been crying. She just kind of seemed really

nervous.”

       The officer located a knife. He contacted defendant, who was the restrained party

in a CPO issued to protect the victim. The officer arrested defendant.

       The court granted defendant’s motion under section 1118.1 to dismiss count 2.2

The jury acquitted defendant of the count 1 offense. It found him guilty on count 3.

       At sentencing, the People noted that the victim wanted defendant to stay away

from her home: “She would like the Court to issue another restraining order if that is

possible, to get a new CPO.”

       2 The court denied the motion as to counts 1 and 3.

                                                4
       The court observed, “the Court’s tentative is to sentence the defendant to credit for

time served which is 301 days per district attorney’s numbers. The max is 180. So

defendant is in excess of the maximum sentence. Consequently, the Court cannot put

[defendant] on probation. It would be terminal. So I cannot put any terms; however, I

can issue a CPO and that . . . is the Court’s intention to do that.”

       Defense counsel objected “to any CPO being issued, given that he’s not going to

be on probation. I think the proper avenue for any restraining order at this point by [the

victim] would be go to the family court and make those appropriate affidavits and

findings be made by a judge in order to issue any kind of restraining order at this point.”

“Not only that, we request a termination of the CPO that was previously issued, as that

CPO was issued related to Count 1. Count 1 he’s been fully acquitted of so that CPO

should be terminated and we don’t think the Court should or has the authority to issue

any new CPO, given that he’s going to be sentenced to the maximum as a terminal

disposition.”

       The court replied that it agreed with defense counsel as to the first CPO: “That

will be terminated; however, the CPO that the Court made reference to in its tentative can

issue in light of the conviction for disobeying a court order and despite the fact that the

disposition will be terminal.” The court asked the People whether it could issue a

                                                  5
domestic violence CPO now since the underlying CPO was not domestic violence

related.3

       The People responded, “I believe the fact that testimony came out during the trial

that they were cohabitating would bring this under the [domestic violence] statute, as that

is one of—in looking at [domestic violence], one of those is that they were cohabitating.

Based on the facts of the case, it appears that, at least, you know, in 2021, they were

cohabitating. So my argument would be that it would be applicable as a [domestic

violence] CPO based on that.”

       The court sentenced defendant to 180 days with credit for 301 days: “This is a

terminal disposition, [defendant]. Meaning that you are not on probation given the

amount of time that you’ve served.” “However, the Court is going to issue a criminal

protective order. This order is new and supersedes the previous order that was pending

while you were trying your case.”

                                     II. DISCUSSION

       Defendant contends the court was not authorized to issue a CPO under section

136.2 as part of defendant’s terminal sentence because neither defendant’s conviction for

violating a court order nor the underlying restraining order involved domestic violence.

       3 To the extent the order that the jury convicted defendant of violating was the
underlying CPO, the court’s statement that it was not domestic violence related is partly
contradicted by the fact that the court issued it pursuant to section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1), as that is the box checked on the order. Of course, the court
technically could not have issued a CPO pursuant to section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), at
that point in time because defendant had yet to be convicted of any crime, let alone one
involving domestic violence.
                                                 6
The People respond that the court properly issued the CPO because this was a domestic

violence case; however, the People maintain the court should have issued the CPO

pursuant to section 136.2, subdivision (i)(l). We agree with the People.

       “Section 136.2 permits the trial court in a criminal case to protect a witness or a

victim by issuing a protective order. [Citation.] ‘Under section 136.2 . . . , during the

pendency of a criminal proceeding when the court has a “good cause belief that harm to,

or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely

to occur,” the court is authorized to issue a restraining order.’ [Citation.] But orders

issued under this section are of a limited duration. The trial court has jurisdiction to issue

one only during ‘“the pendency of [a] criminal action”’ before it. [Citation.]” (People v.

Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 382, fn. omitted.)

       “[I]n 2011, the Legislature responded to this restrictive judicial construction by

creating an exception to the preconviction limitation of a section 136.2 restraining order

for domestic violence cases. (Stats. 2011, ch. 155, § 1.) Effective January 1, 2012, the

Legislature added section 136.2, subdivision (i) to the statutory scheme so that a 10-year

postconviction protective order would be permissible when a defendant was convicted of

a domestic violence offense.” (People v. Beckemeyer (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 461, 465,

fn. omitted.)

       “When a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic

violence, as defined in Section 13700 or in Section 6211 of the Family Code . . . the

court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the defendant

                                                  7
from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order may be valid for up to 10 years,

as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court regardless

of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison or a county jail, whether the

defendant is subject to mandatory supervision, or whether imposition of sentence is

suspended and the defendant is placed on probation. . . . It is the intent of the Legislature

in enacting this subdivision that the duration of a restraining order issued by the court be

based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of future

violations, and the safety of a victim and the victim’s immediate family.” (§ 136.2,

subd. (i)(l))

       Domestic violence is abuse perpetrated against any person related by

consanguinity or affinity within the second degree. (Fam. Code, § 6211, subd. (f).)

“[P]arent and child are related in the first degree of lineal kinship or consanguinity, . . .”

(Prob. Code, § 13, subd. (b).) Abuse includes engaging “in any behavior that has been or

could be enjoined . . . .” (Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (a)(4)) “Abuse is not limited to the

actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (b); see N.T. v.

H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 603 [Reversing court that denied restraining order based

on incorrect conclusion that violations of a temporary restraining order were not acts of

abuse.]; see People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 607-608 [Defendant’s acts of

surveilling the victim and disturbing the peace could form the basis of a conviction for a

violation of section 166, holding defendant in contempt for violating a criminal protective

order for crimes of domestic violence.].)

                                                   8
          “‘“We imply all findings necessary to support the judgment, and our review is

limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support these implied

findings.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Therman (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1279

[Defendant’s conviction for false imprisonment supported an implied finding by the trial

court that defendant committed domestic abuse against the victim such that a protective

order was authorized.].) “We presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that

the trial court knew and applied the correct statutory and case law. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

          Here, the court properly issued the CPO. Defendant and his mother were related

in the first degree of consanguinity. (Fam. Code, § 6211, subd. (f); Prob. Code, § 13,

subd. (b).) The jury found him guilty of violating the CPO, which purported to protect

the victim, defendant’s mother, with whom he lived at the time the first CPO issued.

(Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (b); N.T. v. H.T., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 603; People v.

Sorden, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 607-608.)

          The People specifically argued in favor of the court’s issuance of a CPO because

the victim had requested one. She did not want defendant returning to her home. The

People noted that the testimony at trial reflected defendant and the victim were

cohabitating when the court issued the underlying CPO. The court observed that

defendant and the victim were “familial in nature[.]” Thus, sufficient evidence supported

the court’s determination that defendant’s act of violating the CPO qualified as an act of

domestic violence, warranting issuance of a CPO pursuant to section 136.2, subdivision

(i)(1).

                                                  9
       Defendant argues that because the underlying CPO was not domestic violence

related, the court could not issue a new domestic violence CPO for violating the

underlying order.4 We disagree. As discussed, ante, substantial evidence supports the

court’s determination that defendant’s violation of the underlying CPO was an act of

domestic violence.

       Defendant also argues that because the court only checked the box reflecting that

the CPO was issued pursuant to section 136.2, but not the box reflecting that it was more

specially issued pursuant to section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), the order should be stricken.

We disagree.

       First, the fact that the court did not also check the more specific box on the CPO

indicating it was issued pursuant to section 136, subdivision (i)(1), does not invalidate the

order. (People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 158 [“It is not the content or format

of the Judicial Council form that determines the propriety of the challenged protective

order, but the authorizing statute.”].) Second, the form itself reads “Criminal Protective

Order – Domestic Violence.” (Italics added.) Third, the court expressly stated that it was

issuing a domestic violence CPO. (See People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89 [The

order “‘does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add

to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.’”].) Thus, the CPO was

obviously issued pursuant to subdivision (i)(1) of section 136.2 because that is the only

authority under which the court could have issued the order. (People v. Therman (2015)

       4 See footnote three ante.

                                                10
236 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1279 [“We presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,

that the trial court knew and applied the correct statutory and case law. [Citation.]”].)

       Although the better practice would be to have checked both boxes reflecting that

the CPO was issued under, generally, section 136.2, and, more specifically, subdivision

(i)(l), the failure to check the latter box does not invalidate the order. Sufficient evidence

supported the court’s issuance of the CPO.

                                    III. DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                 McKINSTER
                                                                                             J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                         P. J.

RAPHAEL
                            J.

                                                 11