Court Opinion

ID: 9552781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:16:37.775667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:57.255699
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting)—The majority assumes no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred in this case because probable cause existed to arrest appellant Bonds and, second, asserts this is a case of first impression considering the "application of the exclusionary rule where the arresting officers violate, not statutes of this state, but statutes of a neighboring state.'' Majority opinion, at 10. I disagree with both of these conclusions. The seizure of Bonds in Oregon and his rendition into this state violated both the Fourth Amendment and the laws of the states of Washington and Oregon. His confession, obtained as a result of these illegal acts, should have been suppressed under authority of both the federal and state constitutions.
I
The majority begins its analysis by stating "the arrest met the standards of reasonableness prescribed by the Fourth Amendment" because the arrest, while warrantless, was based on probable cause. Majority opinion, at 9. While the United States Supreme Court has stated a preference for arrest warrants when practicable, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964), failure to obtain an arrest warrant (which could easily have been done in *23this case) does not violate the Fourth Amendment where probable cause exists for the arrest. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976). The officers in this case not only arrested Bonds, they spirited him into this state from Oregon. The majority states in perfunctory fashion, "The improper interstate rendition was merely incidental to the arrest and represented no new intrusion into defendant's privacy." Majority opinion, at 14. While Bonds' illegal arrest may not have violated the Fourth Amendment, his illegal rendition into this state most certainly did.
In Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 58 L. Ed. 2d 521, 99 S. Ct. 530 (1978), the Supreme Court required a judicial finding of probable cause to justify extradition of an individual. While the majority did not discuss the Fourth Amendment, three concurring Justices identified the Fourth Amendment as the constitutional basis for requiring a judicial finding of probable cause. The concurring Justices interpreted the majority opinion, as I think one must, as assuming the Fourth Amendment applies to extradition arrests without addressing that assumption. 439 U.S. at 293 n.3. Authoritative federal cases have been less timid in finding explicitly that the Fourth Amendment applies to extradition arrests. Kirkland v. Preston, 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Ierardi v. Gunter, 528 F.2d 929 (1st Cir. 1976). The Doran holding struck a balance between the extradition clause's requirements of expedition and the Fourth Amendment's safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures. 439 U.S. at 298.
If the Fourth Amendment applies to legal extradition procedures, it must as well apply to illegal acts of extradition. The implication of the majority's perfunctory treatment of Bonds' illegal rendition as "incidental" to the arrest and thus not significant for Fourth Amendment purposes is to give police officers an incentive to illegally spirit criminal suspects into this state to circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. By illegally rendering Bonds into this state without benefit of a judicial finding of *24probable cause, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment. Michigan v. Doran, supra; Kirkland v. Preston, supra; Ierardi v. Gunter, supra.
II
Even if I were to assume that the federal constitution does not command the above result, state law cited by the majority most certainly does.
The majority correctly surmises that this state has applied the exclusionary rule beyond the scope of federal law. Our state constitution provides:
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.
(Italics mine.) Const, art. 1, § 7. We have consistently applied the exclusionary rule where probable cause exists but evidence has been obtained "without authority of law." See State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom Cy. District Court, 92 Wn.2d 35, 593 P.2d 546 (1979); State v. Johnson, 71 Wn.2d 239, 427 P.2d 705 (1967); Pasco v. Titus, 26 Wn. App. 412, 613 P.2d 181 (1980). See also State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978); State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948); State v. Krieg, 7 Wn. App. 20, 497 P.2d 621 (1972). These cases stand for the proposition that where a statute imposes requirements for arrest, even where probable cause exists, we will suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an arrest that fails to follow those legal requirements. Most jurisdictions suppress evidence obtained in a search incident to an arrest which is illegal only in the sense that it is contrary to a state provision on when an arrest warrant is required. See United States v. Bonds, 422 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Conway, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 316 N.E.2d 757 (1974); Commonwealth v. Brown, 225 Pa. Super. 289, 302 A.2d 475 (1973); State v. Haigh, 112 R.I. 740, 315 A.2d 431 (1974); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1, at 232 (1978).
The majority distinguishes the above authorities by viewing this case as one of first impression involving the application of the exclusionary rule when the arresting offi*25cers violate only a neighboring state's laws. This is incorrect.
Both the majority and the State concede the arrest and rendition of Bonds violated Oregon's laws. Since the police officers who arrested Bonds had probable cause to believe he had committed a felony in Washington, the majority concludes the officers "satisfied the criterion by which this state judges the reasonableness of arrests." Majority opinion, at 13. I agree with the majority that such probable cause would make the arrest legal in this state if it occurred in this state. But the arrest occurred in Oregon and the laws of Washington provide no legal authority for such an arrest. Private citizens may arrest a suspect in this state without a warrant upon probable cause that a felony has been committed, but no such Washington authority exists for arrests outside the state.
The power of police officers to arrest is solely a function of statutory authority. Washington's arrest statute permits arrests only in this state. RCW 10.31.100, 10.34.010. Indeed, the Legislature does not have the authority to empower police officers to act under color of law outside the state's boundaries. The out-of-state apprehension of a suspect may occur only by authority of the state in which the individual is apprehended. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.225 (law governing arrests by private persons); Or. Rev. Stat. § 133-.430 (law governing fresh pursuit); Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.805 (law governing extradition arrest). It is conceded by the majority that Bonds' arrest in Oregon did not comply with any of these laws. What the majority fails to recognize is that such arrest in Oregon also violated Washington law since no Washington statute can or does authorize arrests outside this state. The arrest by the officers in this case was quite simply "without authority of law" under both Oregon and Washington laws.
In addition to Bonds' unlawful arrest under Oregon and Washington laws, his extradition to this state violated both states' laws. As with arrest, the Legislature may not empower officers to bring individuals to this state after *26their seizure out of state without the cooperation and authority of other states and their laws. Extradition from Oregon to Washington may occur only by virtue of RCW 10.34.030, providing that agents may be appointed by the Governor to demand the return of persons "charged with a felony or any other crime in this state", and Oregon's Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, providing for a response to this state's demand. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 133.743-133.992. The officers in this case complied with neither law. For extradition to occur lawfully, an individual must be "charged" with a crime in the state for which extradition is sought. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.803; RCW 10.88.320, 10.34.030. A private person may make an extradition arrest without a warrant in both Oregon and Washington, but such individual must have "reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of another state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ..." (Italics mine.) Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.805; RCW 10.88.330. While Bonds could have been charged with a crime and the officers had sufficient time to obtain an arrest warrant, no such charge was filed nor warrant obtained. Thus in apprehending Bonds and spiriting him into this state, both Oregon law (Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.805) and Washington law (RCW 10.34.030) were violated.
Both Oregon and Washington laws anticipate expedited procedures before a court after one is apprehended for purposes of extradition. RCW 10.34.030 provides for agents "to accept the voluntary surrender of any such person who has waived extradition", and Oregon law provides:
[T]hat nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit the right of the accused person to submit voluntarily to the custody of such agent or agents for return without formality to the demanding state.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.843(2). See also RCW 10.88.430. The State contends no extradition law has been violated since Bonds waived extradition by consenting to his return. Not even the majority is brave enough to consider voluntary Bonds' consent to go with the officers. Such an assertion is *27preposterous in light of the majority's acknowledgment that such voluntariness was manifested by Bonds' being escorted by the elbow and told not to run. Even if Bonds' consent were voluntary, it would not purge the illegality of the prior arrest. See People v. Jacobs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 447, 385 N.E.2d 137 (1979). On close examination, neither would it purge the illegality of the extradition under Washington and Oregon laws. Both states permit the voluntary return of a fugitive, but ROW 10.34.030 establishes the prerequisite that the person be "charged" and the Oregon law allows for a return "voluntarily" and "without formality" only after a demand has been made. Bonds had not been charged with a crime prior to his seizure and rendition, nor had this state made a demand for his removal. Both Washington and Oregon laws were violated, and even a voluntary consent in this case would not have legitimized Bonds' rendition into this state.
Having identified the ways in which the officers' seizure and rendition of Bonds violated both Washington and Oregon laws, I think resolution of this case is controlled by the state authorities the majority attempts to distinguish. See State ex rel. McDonald v. Whatcom Cy. District Court, supra; State v. Johnson, supra; Pasco v. Titus, supra. Both Oregon and Washington laws reflect the requirement of a charge filed against an individual before that individual may be legally extradited. Only where an out-of-state officer is in fresh pursuit of a suspect may he or she arrest outside state boundaries without a preexisting charge against the suspect. Bonds had not been charged with a crime nor had an arrest warrant issued at the time the officers unlawfully seized him. Such unlawful seizure of Bonds dictates suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of such unlawful acts.
The State contends that defendant's confession was sufficiently attenuated from any prior illegality to preclude the application of the exclusionary rule. In support of this contention, the State points out that defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights prior to questioning and was *28permitted to have his foster father present throughout the interrogation. The United States Supreme Court has set forth three factors to guide lower courts in determining attenuation: (1) the temporal proximity of arrest and confession; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975).
In this case, the first and third factors obviously favor suppression. Moreover, the intervening events relied upon by the State in connection with the second factor are not sufficient to purge defendant's confession of an illegal taint. The giving of a Miranda warning does not, in and of itself, constitute attenuation. Brown v. Illinois, supra; State v. Byers, 88 Wn.2d 1, 559 P.2d 1334 (1977). The presence of the foster father does not appear to be significant in light of the fact that he was not permitted to engage in any kind of private discussion with the defendant prior to the questioning. Cf. Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1965) (opportunity to meet with attorney prior to questioning constitutes sufficient attenuation). The defendant's confession should have been suppressed. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537, 100 S. Ct. 1244 (1980).
The seizure of Bonds in Oregon and his removal to this state violated both the Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 7 of our state constitution. Bonds' confession was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegality to justify denial of suppression. The above analysis precludes reaching the balancing test the majority creates for addressing its matter of first impression.2 Such analysis also renders *29superfluous the majority's admonition that the court will exercise its supervisory powers to suppress evidence if such police misconduct were to become habitual. While well meaning, such an admonition is merely empty rhetoric in the face of a constitutional directive to suppress evidence in this case.
Ill
Finally, I concur with the majority's result in dealing with the admissibility of Dr. Parvaresh's testimony. I agree the attorney-client privilege was waived when the defendant placed Dr. Parvaresh on the stand at the declination hearing. The doctor's information was no longer confidential after that time. This seems to have been the position of the trial court in denying Bonds' motion in limine. Majority opinion, at 18. The majority goes further than the trial court in holding "the attorney-client privilege should not extend to the testimony of a psychiatrist when the issue of insanity is raised by the defense." Majority opinion, at 22.1 disagree with this broad (and for purposes of this case unnecessary) assertion. An attorney must have the freedom to consult with and the defendant must feel free to communicate with a psychiatrist retained for the purposes of facilitating the attorney-client relationship. If the prosecution could call such a psychiatrist when the defendant raises the insanity defense even when such psychiatrist is not called as a witness at any prior proceeding of the case, the attorney-client relationship would be substantially inhibited. See, e.g., City & Cy. of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951); State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421 (1979); United States ex rel. *30Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977).
Williams, J., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tem., concur with Utter, J.
Brachtenbach, C.J., concurs with Utter, J., as to part III.
Reconsideration denied January 26, 1983.

 The balance struck by the majority nevertheless bears comment. The majority feels "alternative deterrents" to suppression exist in "this case"; namely, civil remedies against police officers. I submit such alternatives always exist, and we have heretofore found such alternatives inadequate. The burden of proof in such civil cases is not an easy one. See Hooker v. Woody, 95 Wn.2d 822, 631 P.2d 372 (1981). I can quote no better source than (then) Judge Pearson himself in a case where the Court of Appeals suppressed evidence stemming from an illegal arrest *29(for failure to give statutory warnings): "no remedy is presently available for enforcement of the statutory requirements, except to exclude the evidence unlawfully obtained." State v. Krieg, 7 Wn. App. 20, 26, 497 P.2d 621 (1972). As to the costs of suppression, I find the majority's discussion much too conclusory. The issue of suppression is usually consequential, or generally it will not reach us. While the confession might have been important, the majority discusses circumstantial evidence the prosecutor possessed, and there is simply no discussion of other evidence the prosecution may use in developing its case on remand.