Court Opinion

ID: 9838196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 17:01:27.151571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:53.284733
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     SEP 5 2023

                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                  MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERTO LOPEZ-GOMEZ, AKA Raul           No. 17-71197
Lopez-Vieyra, AKA Felipe Miranda Ramos,
AKA Felipe Rigoberto Ramos Miranda;     Agency Nos. A205-512-285
DEYLIS YESENIA MORALES-                             A206-725-980
VELASQUEZ; GELBER ARONI MORALES,                    A206-725-975

                   Petitioners,                      MEMORANDUM*
     v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
                   Respondent.

                        On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                            Board of Immigration Appeals
                                  Submitted June 7, 2023**
                                    Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, HAMILTON,*** and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

          Petitioners Roberto Lopez-Gomez, his wife Deylis Yesenia Morales-

Velasquez, and their son Gelber Aroni Morales—all citizens of Guatemala—

petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
  The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
***
  The Honorable David F. Hamilton, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
dismissing their appeal from a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying

their respective applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“Torture Convention”).1 We have

jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252,

and § 2242(d) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231 note. See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1690–91 (2020). We review

the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial

evidence. See Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the

latter standard, the “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition.

      1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioners’

membership in their proposed particular social group—viz., “Guatemalan citizens

who are in danger of being harmed where there is no protection from the

government or the police”2—was not “one central reason” for their alleged

1
  Lopez-Gomez and Morales-Velasquez have each filed individual applications for
asylum, withholding, and protection under the Torture Convention. Morales-
Velasquez is also listed as a rider on her husband’s asylum application, and Aroni
Morales is listed as a rider on both of his parents’ applications. Since Lopez-
Gomez and Morales-Velasquez rely on the same set of evidence, our merits
analysis is essentially the same for all Petitioners with respect to the respective
relief for which they may be considered.
2
 This was the only social group that Petitioners raised in their brief before the
BIA. To the extent that Petitioners’ opening brief in this court attempts to raise a

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persecution, as required to establish a claim for asylum. See Barajas-Romero v.

Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2017).

      Petitioners’ evidence of their past persecution in Guatemala consisted of

(1) a note left on the floor of Lopez-Gomez’s home demanding money and

threatening to kidnap Lopez-Gomez if he did not comply; (2) a threatening follow-

up phone call again demanding the money; (3) a roadway robbery in which Lopez-

Gomez and his family were forced to hand over cash and jewelry; (4) an

unsuccessful attempt by “thieves” to force open the door at Lopez-Gomez’s

parents’ home (an incident during which no one was harmed); and (5) an incident

in which Lopez-Gomez’s father heard someone moving around in “the back of the

house,” but “nothing happened.”

      When asked by the IJ “what was motivating the people who robbed you,”

Lopez-Gomez responded “I have no idea but over there this happens often.” When

asked by the IJ “what was motivating” the people who left the “note on the floor

demanding money,” Lopez-Gomez responded, “I believe that it is because they

thought we had money.” He also stated that it was “[b]ecause also when I had

been here before I had bought a piece of property and I had an automobile that I

new or modified proposed social group, the Government’s answering brief has
properly raised Petitioners’ failure to exhaust such claims before the agency. We
therefore decline to consider them. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411,
423 (2023) (stating that, although the INA’s exhaustion requirement is not
jurisdictional, it will be enforced if not waived or forfeited by the Government).

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had bought.” When asked what motivated the person who called him on the

phone, Lopez-Gomez responded, “I truly have no idea of what motivated him.”

When Morales-Velasquez was asked the same question about the motivation

behind the phone call, she responded, “perhaps they thought that we have money.

That’s my only thought.” When asked about the motivation of the “thieves” who

tried to enter Lopez-Gomez’s parents’ home, Lopez-Gomez responded, “[t]here’s a

lot of crime and they just look around for a place to rob. These are people that

don’t work. And they just think about robbing and harming humanity.” Finally,

when asked about the motivation of the people who were in the back of Lopez-

Gomez’s father’s home during the incident when “nothing happened,” Lopez-

Gomez responded that the unknown intruders may have been there to “request the

money” or “to kidnap us according to what they had said.” When asked by the IJ

if he was referring to “the money that they previously had demanded that you

didn’t pay,” Lopez-Gomez responded “[y]es.”

      Because Petitioners themselves testified that their alleged persecutors were

motivated by money (and did not testify as to any other potential ground for their

alleged persecution), the agency permissibly concluded that the evidence “does not

indicate that the unknown individuals were motivated by any purpose other than

their desire for money,” and that “the only motivation provided” by Petitioners’

testimony “was the unknown individuals’ desire to obtain money” (emphasis

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added). For similar reasons, the agency properly concluded that any future harm

that Petitioners fear would likewise be “motivated by a general criminal desire to

obtain their money.” The lack of nexus to a protected ground forecloses

Petitioners’ claims for asylum. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th

Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated

by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected

ground.”).

      2. With respect to the issue of nexus, the BIA erred in stating that, because

“the respondents did not demonstrate eligibility for asylum, they necessarily failed

to meet the higher burden required for withholding of removal.” The “a reason”

nexus standard for withholding of removal imposes a lower burden on Petitioners

than the “one central reason” nexus standard for asylum. See Barajas-Romero,

846 F.3d at 360. Petitioners, however, have forfeited this issue by failing to raise it

in their opening brief before this court. See Friends of Yosemite Valley v.

Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008). In any event, where (as here)

the BIA explicitly concludes that there is no nexus at all between a protected

ground and a petitioner’s alleged persecution, remand would be “an idle and

useless formality,” because the BIA has already resolved the dispositive nexus

issue against the Petitioners under any applicable legal standard. Singh v. Barr,

935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see also Santos-Ponce v.

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Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2021).

      3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s rejection of Petitioners’

claims under the Torture Convention. “[T]he burden of proof is on the petitioner

‘to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if

removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Kamalthas v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d

1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th

Cir. 2021). Petitioners do not allege that they have been tortured in the past. See

Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Past torture is the first

factor we consider in evaluating the likelihood of future torture because past

conduct frequently tells us much about how an individual or a government will

behave in the future.”). Petitioners have failed to point to any other evidence in the

record that would compel the conclusion that Petitioners face a greater than 50

percent chance of torture if they return to Guatemala.3

      Petition for review DENIED.

3
 Petitioners make a conclusory assertion that the agency proceedings violated due
process. “[B]y failing to develop the argument in [their] opening brief,
[Petitioners] forfeited it.” Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 959 (9th Cir.
2021).

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