Court Opinion

ID: 9908550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-09 18:10:05.324312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:14.978431
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00493-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JOSE MANUEL AVENDANO QUIN
A/K/A JOSE QUIN,                                                            Appellant,

                                           v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                          Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 93rd District Court
                         of Hidalgo County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and Peña
          Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

      Appellant Jose Manuel Avendano Quin a/k/a Jose Quin was convicted of six

counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of continuous sexual abuse

of a young child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02, 22.021. Each count is a first-degree

felony. Id. §§ 21.02(h), 22.021(e). Quin was sentenced to ten years’ confinement as to
the six aggravated sexual assault counts and twenty-five years’ confinement as to the

continuous sexual abuse count, with the sentences running concurrently. By two issues,

Quin argues: (1) the jury charge instructions contained fundamental error and violated his

right to a fair and impartial trial, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) report. We affirm.

                                         I.      BACKGROUND

        Sam,1 the minor child in this case, was eight years old at the time of the alleged

abuse. Sam and her four siblings went to stay with Quin and his family on August 7, 2020,

after Sam’s mother was detained and jailed at a Hidalgo border crossing station. Quin’s

then-wife, Sara Gutierrez, was friends with Sam’s mother and picked up the children from

their home. Quin typically watched the children during the day because he worked in the

morning and his wife worked in the evening. Gutierrez testified that she worked at a

bakery, and she would “rest” for two days and work the other days of the week.

        Sam and her two youngest siblings stayed with Quin, Gutierrez, and their three

children until about October 1, 2020. Sam’s two eldest siblings moved in with their father,

Luis Fernando Moreno, a couple weeks after their mother’s arrest. Sam and the two

youngest siblings had a different father, and they went to live with their maternal aunt,

Felicia Segura, around October 1. About a month after living with Segura, Sam moved in

with her two older siblings at Moreno’s, and her two youngest siblings went to live with

Segura’s sister. Sam and her siblings were reunited with their mother in December 2020.2

         1 To protect the identity of the minor child, we refer to her by the pseudonym given to her in the

indictment. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be
treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).
       2 Sam’s mother testified at trial that she was arrested due to a domestic violence allegation made

by Sam’s father.

                                                    2
       Segura was the outcry witness. She testified that after the children moved out of

her home, she often called the children to check on them. On November 18, 2020, she

went to Moreno’s home to take the children some school supplies. Sam and her eldest

sister ran out of the house in tears when she arrived. Segura consoled them and asked

them what was going on, but Sam was quiet and would not respond to Segura. Sam

eventually told Segura that Quin had touched her while she lived at his house. When

asked where she was touched, Sam pointed to her breast and vagina. Segura asked her

if he touched her “in the private part” to which Sam responded that he put his private part

in her and “it hurt.” Sam told her it happened “a lot of times” and he would take her clothes

off and put her on the bed in his bedroom. Segura then took Sam to the local police station

and met with Officer Luis Carlos Martinez. Officer Martinez interviewed Segura and

gathered information about Quin and where the alleged abuse took place. He also

contacted the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (CPS) and

recommended that Sam obtain a sexual assault examination at a local hospital. Segura

took Sam to the hospital the next day, and then a few days later, she took Sam to the

Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) to be interviewed and examined by a forensic nurse.

       Cynthia Gomez, a SANE or forensic nurse with the CAC, examined Sam. The

State offered Gomez’s SANE report into evidence. Quin’s trial counsel objected to the

written portion of her report documenting what Sam told her about the abuse, arguing that

it was inadmissible hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the

report. The statement in the SANE report read in pertinent part:

       I asked her, “Can you tell me why you’re here today?” . . . . “Patient
       responds: [“]Because a man ‘me toco,’ well, he was—he touch[ed] me, and
       he started to kiss me in my private parts with his tongue [going] inside here
       (point[s] to female sexual organ) and his finger, too, (point[s] to female

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       sexual organ[])[.] His name was José. He is the husband of my mom’s
       friend. He put his part, the part that men pee from inside of mine (points to
       female sexual organ).

               He did that, and that’s it. He would take off my clothes, my shirt and
       my shorts and my underwear, too. He would start to put his part inside mine,
       and he would do it almost every day when his wife was working. He would
       put his part that he pees from inside of mine (points to female sexual organ).
       This was when my mom went to jail, and my older brothers went to live with
       [their] dad. I stayed with my younger siblings, him and his wife and his wife’s
       daughters. . . . He would kiss me, and he would put his tongue inside my
       mouth. He told me to touch his part where he pees with my hand.”

       After Sam’s mother was released from jail, she enrolled Sam in weekly therapy

sessions at the CAC. Sam’s counselor, Daniella Barrios, testified at trial. Barrios

diagnosed Sam “with adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and

conduct.” Barrios worked with Sam over the course of the appointments to create a

“trauma narrative” to help process the alleged abuse. Barrio read Sam’s “trauma

narrative” into evidence without objection, including, in relevant part:

       The lady that was her friend, my mom’s friend, and her husband, they went
       to pick us up at our home and they took us to their apartment. I was very
       nervous because I didn’t know them. It was nighttime. And we were sleeping
       on the mattress. Several days went by, and the abuse started.

              First, he started touching me on my private parts. I was very scared,
       and I didn’t know why he was doing that. After that day, the abuse
       continued.

              Chapter 4: Enclosed abuse. I was playing as teachers and students
       with [two of Sam’s siblings] and the three—and his three children and the
       lady. He called me, and he took me to his room when the lady was working.
       He started to put his private parts on mine. My body was telling me that I
       had to do something, but I was afraid. I was afraid for him to do something.

               I was feeling physical pain on my lower part. Then he stopped doing
       it, and he let me go out there and play. And he called [one of my sisters] to
       the room, and he closed the door. I believe they were just talking because
       they were there just for a minute. When my sister got out of the room, I
       asked him what happened, what did he tell her. She said nothing, that he
       just talked to her and that he told her something. I asked her for security.

                                             4
       The jury heard the testimony of Sam, who was nine years old at the time of trial.

When asked why she was there, she answered, “Because of the thing that happened.”

Sam was largely nonresponsive or would answer “I don’t know” or “I don’t remember” to

the State’s questions about the abuse. For example, the State asked Sam what happened

to her, and Sam did not respond. When the State asked her why she was not able to

answer, she responded “I think because I don’t remember.” Sam could also not testify to

how often the abuse occurred:

       [State]:      Do you know how many times something like this happened?
                     [Referring to the sexual abuse]

       [Sam]:        No.

       [State]:      Was it more than one time?

       [Sam]:        Yes.

       [State]:      Did it happen all on one day or did it happen on different days?

       [Defense objects and objection is overruled]

       [Sam]:        I don’t remember.

Sam testified that “the thing that happened,” referring to the abuse, took place at

Gutierrez’s house and Gutierrez’s room. When asked who was in the room when “that

thing happened,” she said she did not remember. The State introduced diagrams of a boy

and girl to assist Sam with her testimony. After circling the genitals in both diagrams, she

testified that the part she uses to “pee”, her “bottom” area, and her “chee chee” or breasts,

had been touched by “[t]he man” and she clarified that the man was Gutierrez’s husband.

                                             5
       The jury convicted Quin on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-

five years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02, 22.021. This appeal

followed.

                                   II.    CHARGE ERROR

       By his first issue, Quin contends the court’s charge to the jury contained error as

to count seven, continuous sexual abuse of a child.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       We review an alleged jury charge error for abuse of discretion. See Wesbrook v.

State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If we find error, we then analyze that

error for harm. Id. The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the

error was preserved. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)); Hernandez v. State, 533

S.W.3d 472, 481 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. ref’d). If the defendant

preserved the alleged error, then we must reverse if we find “some harm.” Jordan, 593

S.W.3d at 346 (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).

       Quin’s trial counsel did not object to any portion of the indictment and did not object

to the jury charge instructions during the jury charge conference. Therefore, Quin did not

preserve error. Id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Where, as here, error was not preserved, we

reverse only if that “error is fundamental—that is, the error creates egregious harm.”

Powell v. State, 252 S.W.3d 742, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)

(citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171). Egregious harm “occurs when the error created

such harm that the appellant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial.” Chambers v. State,

580 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). When considering whether a defendant

                                              6
suffered egregious harm, we consider: (1) the entire jury charge; (2) the state of the

evidence; (3) the argument of counsel; and (4) any other relevant information revealed by

the trial record. Gonzalez v. State, 610 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).3

        Following the presentation of evidence in a felony case, the court must provide a

written charge to the jury “distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case.” TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14. Quin challenges the jury charge instructions for continuous

sexual abuse of a young child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02. A person over the age

of seventeen commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if, “during

a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of

sexual abuse” against a child younger than fourteen years of age. Id. Courts have

interpreted this language to mean that there must be at least thirty days in between the

first and last act of sexual abuse. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 340 S.W.3d 41, 50–51 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

B.      Analysis

        Quin argues that the application paragraph for count seven erroneously allowed

the jury to convict him regardless of whether the predicate acts occurred at least thirty

days apart. The instructions stated in pertinent part:

        Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the
        Defendant, JOSE MANUEL AVENDANO QUIN, did then and there, in

        3 Quin’s brief argues that the jury charge contained “fundamental error” because the error denied

him “the fair and impartial trial to which defendants are entitled” under the Texas and United States
Constitutions. He implies that, if there is fundamental error, he is entitled to a new trial regardless of whether
the issue was preserved because his constitutional rights have been infringed. He argues in the alternative
that the charge contained “egregious error,” and we should analyze the error for harm. However, the proper
standard of review is to determine whether the alleged error was preserved and then apply the requisite
harm analysis. See Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Phillips v. State, 463
S.W.3d 59, 64–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
“[W]e will not reverse for unpreserved error unless the defendant shows that the error was ‘fundamental’
and that he suffered ‘egregious harm.’” Martinez v. State, 662 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2018, pet. ref’d) (citing Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 816).

                                                        7
       Hidalgo County, Texas, during a period that was 30 or more days in
       duration, to-wit: from on or about AUGUST 8, 2020, through on or about
       OCTOBER 1, 2020, when the defendant was 17 years of age or older,
       commit two or more acts of sexual abuse against SAM, a pseudonym, a
       child younger than 14 years of age, namely, indecency with a child by
       contact and aggravated sexual assault of a child, then you will find the
       Defendant guilty of the offense of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child as
       charged in this indictment.

(Emphasis added). Quin contends that the emphasized language is erroneous because

the use of “to-wit” merely emphasized that “August 8, 2020, through on or about October

1, 2020” is a time period that is thirty or more days in duration.

       Quin relies on Smith v. State to argue that the jury instructions are erroneous. 340

S.W.3d 41. In Smith, the application paragraph instructed the jury to find appellant guilty

of continuous sexual abuse of a child “if two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred on or

about the 1st day of December, 2007, through the 1st day of September, 2008, which

said time period being a period that was 30 days or more in duration.” Smith, 340 S.W.3d

at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court in Smith concluded this instruction was

erroneous because it did not clearly specify that the jury had to find that the last act of

sexual abuse occurred at least thirty days after the first act. Id. at 50–51. The court

subsequently held that the jury instruction did not egregiously harm the appellant. Id. at

53. Quin argues the jury charge instructions in this case contain error because, like in

Smith, the jury was able to sentence him without finding that the predicate acts occurred

at least thirty days apart.4

       We assume, without deciding, that the jury charge instructions were erroneous.

See id. at 50–51; see also Pelcastre v. State, 654 S.W.3d 579, 587–88 (Tex. App.—

       4 We note that Quin does not argue how the jury charge should have been written.

                                                 8
Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d) (holding similar instructions describing the durational

element for continuous child sexual abuse erroneous); Lewis v. State, No. 06-21-00021-

CR, 2022 WL 630288, at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 4, 2022) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (same); Turner v. State, 573 S.W.3d 455, 462 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (same); Jimenez v. State, No. 07-13-00303-CR, 2015 WL

6522867, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 26, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (same).

       In turning to the harm analysis, we consider whether the error in the jury charge

instructions, if any, caused egregious harm. See Pelcastre, 654 S.W.3d at 588–90; see

also Lewis, 2022 WL 630288, at *7; Turner, 573 S.W.3d at 463–64; Jimenez, 2015 WL

6522867, at *6–7. First, the State mitigated any confusion of the durational element during

voir dire and its closing argument. When explaining the offense of continuous sexual

abuse of a child on voir dire, the State’s trial counsel stated that, “The bottom line is that

the crime has been going [on] during a period of 30 or more days.” When explaining the

durational element again in closing argument, the State’s counsel explained that they “just

[had] to prove that [the sexual abuse] happened for more than 30 days.”

       Second, though Sam could not testify to how long or how often the abuse had

occurred, the jury could infer from the evidence presented at trial that the abuse occurred

throughout the time she stayed at Quin’s home from August to October 2020. The jury

heard evidence that Quin was often alone with the children because Gutierrez worked

from about 2:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., and Gutierrez worked about five days a week. The

SANE report indicated that Sam said the abuse occurred “almost every day when

[Gutierrez] was working.” The jury also heard from Segura, who testified that Sam said

                                              9
the abuse happened “a lot of times” when she was living at Quin’s house. Furthermore,

the jury heard from Barrios, who read Sam’s “trauma narrative” into evidence. It stated

that the abuse started several days after arriving at Quin’s home and “the abuse

continued.” The jury could infer from the evidence presented at trial that thirty or more

days elapsed between the first and last acts of abuse.

       Lastly, Quin’s defensive theory at trial was that he did not abuse Sam and she was

lying about the abuse. Quin did not testify and did not call any witnesses at trial. By

rendering guilty verdicts, the jury obviously rejected this theory. It is therefore highly

unlikely that a more specific instruction regarding the durational element of continuous

sexual abuse would have changed the result. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592,

611 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“[B]y its implicit rejection of appellant’s defenses in finding

him guilty, the jury necessarily signaled its disbelief in this testimony as lacking in

credibility. . . .”); Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (noting

the assessment of credibility of defensive evidence is “solely within the jury’s province

and the jury is free to accept or reject the defensive evidence”; “[a] jury verdict of guilty is

an implicit finding rejecting the defendant’s self-defense theory”).

       Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the jury charge instructions did not

cause egregious harm. The record indicates that any confusion from the application

paragraph of the jury charge instructions was mitigated by the State’s explanation of the

charge to the jury and was rendered harmless by the evidence introduced at trial. Quin’s

first issue is overruled.

                                              10
                                  III.   SANE REPORT

       By his last issue, Quin argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

SANE report over his trial counsel’s hearsay objection.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Under this

standard, we may not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless it “falls outside the zone

of reasonable disagreement.” Id. at 83 (citations omitted).

       “Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). Hearsay is generally inadmissible, but Texas Rule of

Evidence 803(4) provides that statements made for, and that are reasonably pertinent to,

medical diagnosis or treatment are not excluded by the rule against hearsay. Id. 802,

803(4). “This [hearsay] exception is based on the assumption that the patient understands

the importance of being truthful with the medical personnel involved to receive an

accurate diagnosis and treatment.” Franklin v. State, 459 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting Bautista v. State, 189 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2006, pet. ref’d)).

       “Texas courts have held that statements by a suspected victim of child abuse as

to the causation and source of the child’s injuries are admissible under rule 803(4).”

Horner v. State, 129 S.W.3d 210, 220 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, pet.

ref’d) (quoting Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164, 183 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2001, pet. dism’d)). “[U]nlike ordinary medical problems, the treatment of child abuse

includes removing the child from the abusive setting. Thus, the identity of the abuser is

                                            11
pertinent to the medical treatment of the child.” Id. (quoting Fleming v. State, 819 S.W.2d

237, 247 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d)).

       The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has observed that “it seems only natural to

presume that adults, and even children of a sufficient age or apparent maturity, will have

an implicit awareness that the doctor’s questions are designed to elicit accurate

information and that veracity will serve their best interest.” Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d

571, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Thus, we may infer from the record that a victim knew

it was important to tell a SANE the truth in order to obtain medical treatment or diagnosis,

and we examine the record only for evidence that would negate such an awareness. See

id.; Franklin, 459 S.W.3d at 677.

B.     Analysis

       Quin argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the report from

Gomez because the report included inadmissible hearsay from Sam. Quin contends the

hearsay was not admissible under Rule 803(4) because “there was no showing that the

declarant/complainant was aware that the statements were made for the purpose of

medical diagnosis or treatment and that proper diagnosis or treatment depend[ed] upon

the veracity of such statements.” See TEX. R. EVID. 803(4). The hearsay at issue was a

statement made by a victim to a forensic nurse during a sexual assault examination. We

therefore presume that Sam understood that veracity served her best interest in

answering Gomez’s questions during her exam, and we look to evidence in the record

that would negate that awareness. See Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589.

       When asked about her appointment with Gomez and if she told Gomez “the truth

about what happened,” Sam testified that she could not remember. However, she also

                                            12
testified that she told her oldest sister, Segura, and Barrios the truth about the abuse.

Furthermore, evidence showed that Segura took Sam to the CAC a few days after her

outcry. Gomez testified that she was the SANE or forensic nurse who examined Sam for

signs of abuse. She told the jury that she described the medical exam procedure to Sam

and Segura. Gomez also detailed the way she obtains consent from the patient to proceed

with the exam. She asked Sam why she was there that day, and Sam told her it was

because a man had touched her. The SANE report indicated that Sam “appear[ed] alert

and oriented to time, person, place, and situation” during the exam.

       We find the court could have reasonably concluded from Gomez’s testimony that

Sam made the statements to Gomez for the purpose of receiving medical treatment for

sexual abuse and appreciated that the effectiveness of the treatment depended on the

accuracy of the information she provided. See Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 886

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d) (concluding that the court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the SANE report because the nurse testified that the complainant’s

statements “enabled her to know where to look on [the complainant’s] body for injuries

and to help diagnose any medical condition”); Franklin, 459 S.W.3d at 677–78

(concluding that there was sufficient evidence that the complainants understood the need

to be truthful for the medical examination because the nurse identified herself to them,

explained why she was meeting with them, and detailed the procedures of the

examination to them); Horner, 129 S.W.3d at 220 (concluding that the nurse’s testimony

that she believed complainant understood the purpose in talking with her about the abuse

was sufficient to indicate that the complainant made truthful statements for the purpose

of receiving treatment).

                                           13
      We conclude the admission of the complained-of testimony was not error because

it was admissible under the medical-diagnosis-or-treatment exception to the hearsay rule.

See TEX. R. EVID. 803(4). Quin’s second issue is overruled.

                                   IV.    CONCLUSION

      The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                              DORI CONTRERAS
                                                              Chief Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
7th day of December, 2023.

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