Court Opinion

ID: 9718917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:37:42.938887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:03.464851
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice,
with whom McKU-SICK, C. J., joins, concurring.
I concur in the result reached and the reasoning employed in the majority opinion. I write separately in order to articulate what I believe is an important distinction between this case and those cases involving challenges to traverse jurors.
This Court has noted that “[i]t would seem self-evident that a criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury, whether it be grand or traverse.” State v. Warren, Me., 312 A.2d 535, 539 (1973). The contours of the requirement of impartiality in the case of either grand or traverse juries can only.be ascertained, however, by taking into account the distinct functions of these two bodies. By parsing the word “impartial” in the context of the historically-based functions and purposes of the grand and traverse juries, I submit that it becomes readily apparent that the concept of impartiality imposes quite different requirements upon the mind-set of grand jurors than it does upon that of traverse jurors.
The differing functions of the grand and traverse juries were aptly explained in United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 912, 77 S.Ct. 661, 1 L.Ed.2d 665 (1957), a case involving a claim to quash an indictment on the basis of exposure of grand jurors to pre-indictment publicity about the offense. In that decision, Judge Medina observed:
But we are not dealing here with alleged bias or prejudice by a petit jury, caused by widespread publicity during or just prior to a trial of the issues, as was the case in Meyer v. Cadwalader, C.C.E.D.Pa., 49 F. 32 and Griffin v. United States, 3 Cir., 295 F. 437. In such a situation much would depend upon the character of the publicity, proof that it was of such a nature as to be likely to make an impression on the jurors, and the steps taken by the trial judge to mitigate or remove its effect. Instructions that jurors must avoid reading newspapers or listening to or looking at radio and television commentators and that their verdict must be based solely on the evidence introduced in the case in court, will generally suffice. But there must be a careful appraisal of the possibility or likelihood of extraneous influence. And, indeed, there is good sense in this, since petit jurors must remain passive spectators of the court room drama.
But a Grand Jury is not confined to a passive role, but may and often should proceed on its own initiative. 4 Stanford L.Rev. 68, 69, 77-8; Dession, From Indictment to Information, 42 Yale L.J. 163, 176. That it is induced to such action by newspaper reports forms a continuum with its historic function of ferreting out crime and corruption, and is in no way inconsistent with its duty to decide on and in accordance with the evidence adduced before it.
236 F.2d at 593 quoted in United States v. Myers, 510 F.Supp. 323, 325 (E.D.N.Y.1980) and United States v. Mandel, 415 F.Supp. 1033, 1062-63 (D.Md.1976); see State v. Winsett, Del., 200 A.2d 692, 693-94 (1964). Indeed, it is a well-accepted principle that a grand juror’s prior opinion as to the guilt of the accused or his interest in the prosecution does not serve to disqualify him from service.
The theory is that a grand jury is an accusatory, not a judicial, body and, as such, has the right and duty to act on its *381own information, however acquired. Moreover, the oath taken by grand jurors contemplates that they may be called upon to act in the cases of both enemies and friends and, since grand jurors live in the vicinity of the place where the crime was committed, it may be assumed in many instances that they know better than others the character of the parties and of the witnesses.
1 Wharton’s Criminal Procedure § 197 (12th ed. 1974) (footnotes omitted). Traverse jurors are not permitted the same degree of bias or interest. See Lewisohn v. State, Me., 433 A.2d 351, 355 (1981) (traverse juror must lay aside his opinion or impression and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court); Christian v. State, Me., 268 A.2d 620, 624 (1970) (juror “should be impartial, indifferent and under no bias or prejudice”). Compare 15 M.R.S.A. § 1252 (grand juror shall present no man for envy, hatred or malice; present things as they come to your knowledge) with 15 M.R.S.A. § 1254 (juror shall give verdict “according to law and evidence given you"). Thus, fair treatment for “one after whom the mob and public passion are in full pursuit,” Beck v. Washington, 36 U.S. 541, 587, 82 S.Ct. 955, 979, 8 L.Ed.2d 98, 128 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see majority opinion, slip op. at 8, does not require a fully dispassionate, objective, unbiased, unprejudiced weighing of the evidence, as would be required of a traverse juror. Rather, it is sufficient if a grand jury is committed to the idea that an individual subject to grand jury investigation should not be put to the rigors and burden of prosecution for no reason other than the mob sentiment and public passion against him; that he not be presented for prosecution solely because of “envy, hatred or malice....” See 15 M.R.S.A. § 1252.
In this case, the majority observes:
The publicity of which Haberski complains, however, was not so invidious as to arouse public vindictiveness which would preclude impartial consideration .... The receipt of such knowledge by the public, however, would not arouse public indignation to such a degree that the citizenry would thereafter irrationally demand retribution. Such information simply is not of such a nature as to preclude subsequent rational and impartial consideration.
449 A.2d at 377. (emphasis added.)
I agree with this characterization of the publicity at issue in this appeal. The publicity was not of so extreme a character as to incapacitate a grand juror from properly carrying out his assigned function.