Court Opinion

ID: 9889227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 23:03:11.325491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:12.772922
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23 P. v. Moore CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098124

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 21FE000045)

           v.

 BOBBY EUGENE MOORE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         After defendant Bobby Eugene Moore pled no contest to possessing an assault
weapon, the trial court imposed an electronics search condition as part of its grant of
probation. Defendant now argues that this probation condition is unreasonable and
unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.
                         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         Police had been monitoring defendant’s social media accounts when they observed
a post showing defendant holding a Norinco SKS assault rifle. The rifle was
subsequently located during a search of defendant’s residence. Defendant was charged

                                                             1
with possession of an assault weapon, carrying a concealed firearm within a vehicle, and
carrying a loaded firearm in public. It was further alleged that each of the offenses was
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
       Defendant pled no contest to possession of an assault weapon. The trial court
granted formal probation for two years and ordered defendant to serve 240 days in county
jail. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that defendant sought to serve his
county jail time on a sheriff’s alternative program and to have his probation transferred to
Las Vegas, Nevada, where defendant resides. The court initially responded that the 240-
day sentence could not be transferred out of state, but defense counsel ultimately
persuaded the court that it could be. The court ordered defendant to “[s]erve 240 days in
the county jail. . . . I am going to order that you be allowed to serve this on a sheriff’s
alternative program. And the [sic] that may be done in Clark County, Nevada.” The
court also struck the probation condition that defendant could “not leave the State of
California, at any time, without first securing permission from [defendant’s] probation
officer.”
       An electronics search condition was imposed as part of defendant’s probation.
That condition provides, in relevant part, that “[d]efendant shall submit his/her person,
place, property, automobile, electronic storage devices, and any object under his/her
control, including but not limited to cell phones and computers, to search and seizure by
any law enforcement officer or probation officer, any time of the day or night, with or
without a warrant, with or without his/her presence or further consent.”
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends that the imposed electronics search condition is unreasonable
under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, superseded by statute on another ground as
stated in People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403, fn. 6, and unconstitutionally
overbroad. The People argue that defendant has forfeited his claims by failing to assert a
timely objection below. We agree with the People. When a defendant fails to object in

                                              2
the trial court on the ground that a probation condition is unreasonable under Lent, he
cannot raise the issue on appeal. (See People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-238;
People v. Gonzalez (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 960, 978 [“It is well established that a
defendant may not raise a Lent challenge for the first time on appeal”].)
       As to defendant’s overbreadth claim, we recognize that certain facial
constitutional challenges to a probation condition may be raised for the first time on
appeal. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888.) But this exception to forfeiture
only applies to claims that present “ ‘pure questions of law that can be resolved without
regard to the sentencing record in the trial court.’ ” (Id. at p. 884.) As-applied
constitutional challenges may still be forfeited if not previously raised. (Id. at p. 889; see
also People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946.) Here, defendant argues that the
electronics search condition is overbroad “because there is no indication in the record that
[defendant]’s possession of the firearm in question was in any way facilitated by or
related to the use of a cell phone, computer, or other electronic device.” This is a classic
as-applied claim. Because defendant’s overbreadth challenge does not present a pure
question of law, his failure to object below forfeits the issue on appeal.1
       Anticipating our conclusion that his claims are forfeited, defendant also argues
that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the electronics
search condition below. “[T]o establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, . . .
defendant must show his . . . counsel’s performance was deficient and that [he] suffered
prejudice as a result.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198; see Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692.) If either element of the ineffective

1       Defendant’s reasonableness challenge under People v. Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481
is also an as-applied challenge, as defendant argues that the electronic search condition is
insufficiently related to the crime that he was convicted of. Therefore, even if the
exception to forfeiture for facial constitutional challenges could apply to a Lent claim, it
would not apply to defendant’s claim in this case.

                                              3
assistance of counsel analysis has not been proven, the defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance fails. (Strickland, at p. 697.) We presume that “counsel’s actions fall within
the broad range of reasonableness, and [we] afford ‘great deference to counsel’s tactical
decisions.’ ” (Mickel, at p. 198.)
       As our Supreme Court has observed, “certain practical constraints make it more
difficult to address ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal rather than in the
context of a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198.)
This is because “[t]he record on appeal may not explain why counsel chose to act as he or
she did. Under those circumstances, a reviewing court has no basis on which to
determine whether counsel had a legitimate reason for making a particular decision, or
whether counsel’s actions or failure to take certain actions were objectively
unreasonable.” (Ibid.) We will reverse only “if there is affirmative evidence that counsel
had ‘ “ ‘no rational tactical purpose’ ” ’ for an act[] or omission.” (Ibid.) If “ ‘ “the
record on appeal sheds no light on why [trial] counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged,” ’ ” an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected
“ ‘ “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one” ’ ” or there
“ ‘ “could be no satisfactory explanation.” ’ ” (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997)
15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) A defendant thus bears a difficult burden when asserting an
ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. (Mickel, at p. 198.)
       Here, defense counsel did not explain, and was not asked to explain, the failure to
object to the electronics search condition. But there are at least two possible tactical
reasons for not objecting. First, counsel had already negotiated an extremely favorable
disposition for defendant and could have reasonably concluded that the trial court would
not have entertained an objection to the probation condition. Second, trial counsel sought
to convince the court that defendant could serve his county jail sentence in a sheriff’s
alternate work program in defendant’s home state of Nevada. Counsel could have made
a reasonable tactical decision to forgo any challenge to the probation conditions in order

                                               4
to have a better chance of convincing the court to agree to this arrangement. On the
present record, because there are conceivable reasons counsel would decline to object to
the electronic search condition, we cannot find ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 /s/
                                                 ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
HULL, J.

                                             5