Court Opinion

ID: 9475326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:24:02.765907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:22.036016
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Court appears correct in its general analysis of the statutory and regulatory provisions governing the Appeals Council’s standard of review, and that analysis is sufficient to decide the Shepherd case.
That general analysis and the facts as stated do not fully describe the problem in the Mullen case. In Mullen the Appeals Council clearly stated in both its letter to the claimant1 and in its decision2 that it *557was inquiring only as to whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
It is so well established as to be beyond dispute that an administrative agency must be held to the .standard that it applies, and claims to apply, in the case at hand. S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943) (“Since the decision of the Commission was explicitly based upon the applicability of principles of equity announced by courts, its validity must likewise be judged on that basis. The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which ... its action was based.”); S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (“A reviewing court ... must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”). Accord, Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962). Here, however, the Appeals Council appears to have employed a de novo standard of review despite saying otherwise. That, in my opinion, is ground for reversal.
The Appeals Council set out for itself in this case a “substantial evidence” standard of review, and it should be held to that standard in this case even though it could have employed the broader standard described in Judge Engel’s opinion. Administrative agencies are given broad discretion in performing their appointed tasks, but that discretion is disciplined in no small part by the requirement that they act consistently with their own rules and pronouncements. In this case, however, the Appeals Council is saying one thing and doing another. As Judge Engel states, had the Council actually applied a “substantial evidence” test, it would have had to uphold the AU’s opinion.
I would not permit the Council to deviate from the standard it expressed. Section 404.970(a) appears to permit the Appeals Council to adopt such a standard of review in individual cases, and I see no reason for us to deny benefits by enforcing a de novo standard where the agency has expressly limited its scope of review.

. In its letter to Mr. Mullen of July 10, 1982, the Appeals Council stated:
Dear Mr. Mullen:
In deciding to review that decision [of the Administrative Law Judge], the Appeals Council has applied section 404.970 which provides, in relevant part, that a case will be reviewed if the action, findings or conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge are not supported by substantial evidence.
The Appeals Council, from its review of the record, has concluded that the Administrative Law Judge’s findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. In reaching this conclusion, the Council considered all the medical evidence and the testimony adduced at the hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge's conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, absent persuasive evidence to the contrary, the Appeals Council is prepared to issue a decision finding that your impairments do not prevent you from engaging in any work activity____
You or your representatives may submit additional evidence or a further written statement as to the facts and the law in your case.
*557Sincerely yours,
[Signed]
Roland L. Vaughn, Jr.
Member, Appeals Council
[Signed]
William C. Taylor
Member, Appeals Council
(App. 133-36)

. After Mr. Mullen adduced additional evidence the Appeals Council in its decision of March ‘10, 1983, reversed the Administrative Law Judge holding as follows:
The Appeals Council reviewed this case on its own motion because the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the claimant’s maximum sustained work capacity is limited to sedentary work is not supported by substantial evidence.
(App. 8)