Court Opinion

ID: 9721042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:47:17.660228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.995941
License: Public Domain

Liacos, C.J.
(dissenting). The court today rushes headlong into the wholesale rejection of a carefully crafted set of rules in this Commonwealth governing the admissibility of polygraph evidence. The court errs by giving not only blind, but also superficial, adherence to the rule enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Even assuming the validity of that rule, the court misapplies it in the case at hand. I would adhere to the extensive analysis of polygraph *213evidence set forth by the court in Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426 (1978). Therefore, I dissent.
The Frye rule has been oft-quoted and rarely justified in Massachusetts opinions. It is seductively simple to require “general acceptance” before admitting novel expert scientific testimony. One must question a rule which bars from the fact finder otherwise reliable probative evidence simply because the “relevant scientific community” has not yet adequately digested and approved of its foundation. See Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1223 & n.202 (1980). In my view, the courts, armed with the traditional tools of basic evidentiary principles, are well-equipped to handle admissibility questions without totally abdicating their judgment to scientific experts.
The Frye test has been roundly criticized by several commentators,1 and rejected by several courts.2 In addition to its inherently conservative nature, the difficulty in applying the Frye test has led to a malleable standard which glosses over crucial considerations. Who exactly comprises the “relevant scientific community” to which the court defers? As this very *214case demonstrates, the answer to this question may determine the outcome of the inquiry. What must be shown in order for an appellate court to find general acceptance? When must a court apply the Frye test? The opinion of the court leaves these questions unanswered. “When a witness testifies that he saw the defendant throw a rock at the victim, the inferences to be drawn from this testimony involve a number of principles of physics, but few courts would apply the Frye test.” 22 C.A. Wright & K.W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5168, at 87 n.10 (1978).
In Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426 (1978), while declining to overrule the Frye standard, this court identified a number of evidentiary and policy considerations which animated our decision to allow polygraph evidence to be admitted for limited purposes in limited circumstances. We took into account the probative value of the evidence, the potential for confusion or prejudice to the jury, intrusion into the jury function, and the consumption of time and use of trial resources. The Vitello analysis more honestly and effectively addresses the policy considerations involved in making the admissibility determination than does the slavish applicatian of the Frye test.
Even if we assume that the Frye test has some intrinsic value, the court misapplies the test today in order to reach its desired result. First, the court improperly has excluded a knowledgeable group of experts from its “relevant scientific community.” The court should have taken into account the views of polygraph examiners in determining whether the polygraph has been generally accepted. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 166, 170-171 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685,.689 (D.D.C), rev’d per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (S.D. Cal.), afFd per curiam, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973). There now exists an American Polygraph Association which has developed detailed standards for their members to follow. Sevilla, Polygraph 1984: Behind the Closed Door of Admissibility, 16 U.W.L.A.L. Rev. 5, 19 *215(1984). As Judge Fay, speaking for the Eleventh Circuit, wrote just a few months ago, “[sjince the Frye decision, tremendous advances have been made in polygraph instrumentation and technique. Better equipment is being used by more adequately trained polygraph administrators. Further, polygraph tests are used extensively by government agencies. Field investigative agencies such as the FBI, the Secret Service, military intelligence and law enforcement agencies use the polygraph.” Piccinonna, supra at 169-170. In the present case, by avoiding mention of the widespread acceptance of the polygraph, the court artificially limits its inquiry.
In Massachusetts, “the requirement of the Frye rule of general acceptability is satisfied ... if the principle is generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use.” Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 203 (1975), S.C., ante 135 (1989). The professional examiner, rather than the laboratory examiner, is generally given more credit by this court. 367 Mass, at 202. The “Frye standard does not require unanimity of view, only general acceptance; a degree of scientific divergence of view is inevitable.” Id. at 204 n.6. This court has “give[nj greater weight to those experts who have had direct and empirical experience in the field.” Id. The court should give significant weight to the judgment of experienced polygraph analysts, but it ignores this evidence completely.3
It is misleading for the court to claim nearly unanimous judicial support for its holding. As the court’s review of the nation’s jurisdictions reveals, numerous courts have allowed polygraph evidence in varying circumstances, ranging from *216admissibility as a matter of right to admissibility pursuant to a stipulation.4 At least one other court has allowed polygraph evidence for the limited purpose set forth in Vitello: for purposes of impeachment or corroboration in a criminal case. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 166, 174 (11th Cir. 1989).
In Commonwealth v. Vitello, supra, we struck a careful balance in our decision to allow polygraph evidence for limited purposes under limited circumstances. The court “did not think it wise to bar the polygraph completely from the judicial arena.” Id. at 453. I continue to adhere to that decision. With proper oversight and the appropriate use of judicial discretion by trial judges, the polygraph can serve as an effective tool in the truth-seeking process. I regret that the court has failed to recognize the wisdom of its prior decisions. I dissent.

 See, e.g., Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 595, 627-641 (1988); Note, The Use of Hypnosis in Criminal Trials, 21 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 635, 660-664 (1988). McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879, 915-916 (1982); Giannelli, supra at 1204-1231; Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 Hastings L.J. 917, 923 & n.38 (1975); Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 Utah L. Rev. 313 (1964); Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. 111. L.F. 1, 2-4; McCormick, Evidence § 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972).

 See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1980); State v. Hall, 297 N.W. 2d 80 (Iowa 1980); State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53 (1983); State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461 (1981); Phillips ex rel. Utah Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1977).

 In this case, the expert for the Commonwealth, Dr. Leonard Saxe, is “not specially trained or experienced in performing polygraph exams,” according to the motion judge. On the other hand, the motion judge found that Dr. David Raskin, one of the defense experts, “is skilled in the operation of the polygraph . . . [and] has performed over 700 exams and does training for the United States Secret Service and others.” The other expert, William LaParl, has administered more than 15,000 polygraph tests and has been called on to testify as an expert by the oEce of the district attorney for the Northern District. The court should have taken these facts into account in its general acceptance analysis.

 The court’s review of other jurisdictions’ treatment of polygraph evidence places undue emphasis on the existence or nonexistence of stipulations. In criminal cases, the primary purpose of the stipulation is to assure that the defendant’s constitutional rights have been preserved, as opposed to guaranteeing “fairness” to the prosecution. The waiver procedure established in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421 (1974), and elaborated on in Commonwealth v. Vitello, supra, serves essentially the same function as a stipulation: it ensures that a defendant is aware of the risks of agreeing to submit to a polygraph test, and allows the admission of polygraph evidence only on consent of the defendant. This consideration severely undercuts the court’s claim that there is a “nearly unanimous judicial consensus . . . that polygraphic evidence, at least in the absence of a pretest stipulation, ought not be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial for any purpose” (emphasis added). Ante at 210-211.