Court Opinion

ID: 9370874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 21:02:48.197179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:24.455255
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/14/23 P. v. Williams CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B318495

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                        SA094125

 WONE WILLIAMS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge. Affirmed.
      Michele A. Douglass, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Blake Armstrong, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________
         Wone Williams pleaded no contest to domestic violence.
The trial court placed Williams on probation and issued a 10-year
criminal protective order safeguarding the victim. While on
probation, Williams again pleaded no contest to the charge of
attempted murder of the same victim. While incarcerated for
this latest crime, he threatened the victim’s life. At the probation
violation hearing, Williams yelled and screamed when referring
to the victim. The court issued a new 10-year criminal protective
order and imposed prison time.
         On appeal, Williams challenges only the latter protective
order, arguing it exceeded the court’s authority. We affirm.
Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                   I
         In 2016, Williams pulled a pocketknife on his former
girlfriend during an argument and left a five-inch laceration on
her face. He was on probation at the time for a domestic violence
offense against the same woman. He pleaded no contest to
inflicting corporal injury on the mother of his child within seven
years of a prior domestic violence offense (section 273.5, subd.
(f)(1)).
         The court put Williams on probation and required him to
complete a 52-week domestic violence program. It issued a 10-
year protective order specifying the victim as the protected
person and read the order aloud to Williams. The court issued
the order as a condition of probation under section 1203.097 and
under section 273.5, subdivision (j). This is the 2016 protective
order. It expires on December 21, 2026.
         The court later learned Williams had tried to kill the same
victim in 2019, again while he was on probation. Court records
showed he had entered a no contest plea to attempted murder in

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March 2021 in a separate case and had received a seven-year
prison sentence.
       The court revoked probation and held a probation violation
hearing in February 2022. The victim spoke at the hearing and
said Williams continued to call and threaten her. After his most
recent conviction, he called from jail to say “when he gets out, he
was going to set [her] on fire and watch [her] burn.” She was “in
total fear.” He already had stabbed her 17 times.
       Williams grew angry after the victim spoke at the hearing.
He yelled and screamed.
       The court found Williams had failed to obey all laws and
had violated the conditions of his probation. It sentenced him to
16 months in state prison (consecutive to his other sentence) and
issued a new 10-year protective order under sections 136.2 and
273.5, subdivision (j). (Williams does not acknowledge the former
provision was a basis for the order, and the prosecution appears
to view it as inapplicable.) This is the 2022 protective order. It
expires on February 4, 2032.
       Williams’s counsel objected to this protective order. The
court explained the circumstances justifying the order and stated
its intent to issue a protective order for the longest term possible.
Earlier the court had noted Williams’s unruly behavior at the
hearing and his criminal history and had agreed “he’s
dangerous.”
                                   II
       Williams argues the trial court exceeded its authority in
issuing the 2022 protective order because the statute permits
only one order for a maximum term of 10 years issued at the time
of conviction and does not allow these orders to be “based solely
on a violation of probation.”

                                  3
      Williams cites no case supporting his reading of the statute,
and the prosecution admits it could not locate a case on point.
      We independently interpret a statute in a manner
consistent with the statute’s purpose. If possible, we read the
statute to conform to the spirit of the act. (People v.
Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205, 210; see also People
v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 709–710 (Vega).)
      The statute at issue provides:
      Upon conviction under subdivision (a), the sentencing
      court shall also consider issuing an order restraining
      the defendant from any contact with the victim,
      which may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined
      by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that
      the length of any restraining order be based upon the
      seriousness of the facts before the court, the
      probability of future violations, and the safety of the
      victim and their immediate family. This protective
      order may be issued by the court whether the
      defendant is sentenced to state prison or county jail,
      or if imposition of sentence is suspended and the
      defendant is placed on probation.
(§ 273.5, subd. (j).)
      The statute requires sentencing courts to consider a
restraining order against a defendant convicted of domestic
violence. It does not limit this requirement to the initial or
original sentencing. Nor does it prohibit a sentencing court from
issuing a restraining order after a probation violation. It says
nothing about successive restraining orders or situations where a
defendant is sentenced more than once.

                                 4
       In this case, there were two sentencing proceedings
separated by about five years. There is no apparent intent in the
statute to tie the sentencing court’s hands should a heightened
danger persist at a later sentencing. The statute authorized the
sentencing court to issue the 2022 protective order. It in fact
required the court to consider such an order. This reading is
consistent with the statute’s purpose, which is to protect domestic
violence victims and to deter this type of violence. (See Vega,
supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 710; People v. Mora (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 1349, 1355 [“The Legislature’s enactments reflect a
societal determination that domestic violence—once viewed as a
purely private matter in which the state was reluctant to
interfere—will no longer be tolerated.”].)
       This victim needed further protection. Between the two
sentencing proceedings in this case, Williams pleaded no contest
to attempting to murder her. His crimes against this victim were
escalating. A 52-week domestic violence program did not deter
him. While incarcerated after his latest conviction, he called to
threaten her life. He raged at her during the 2022 sentencing
hearing.
       A new 10-year protective order covering this victim was
appropriate and was consistent with the seriousness of the facts
here, the probability of future violations, and the victim’s safety.
(§ 273.5, subd. (j).)
       Contrary to Williams’s arguments, the 2022 protective
order was not “based solely on a violation of probation.” And the
court’s limited sentencing options following a probation violation
do not limit the options concerning protective orders.
///

                                 5
                       DISPOSITION
     We affirm the judgment.

                                     WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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