Court Opinion

ID: 9899830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 19:01:48.670233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:51.488544
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        NOV 17 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIER OLVERA-GONZALEZ,                         No.    22-757

                Petitioner,                     Agency No. A208-081-758

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                          Submitted November 14, 2023**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: PARKER,*** BYBEE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Javier Olvera-Gonzalez (“Petitioner” or “Olvera-Gonzalez”), a

native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a March 25, 2022 Board of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge
for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial by an immigration

judge (“IJ”) of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Olvera-Gonzalez contends that,

as a gay man, he fears future persecution based on his membership in a particular

social group. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny

the petition.

      Where, as here, the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision and adds

reasoning of its own, we review the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions together. Husyev v.

Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2008). This Court reviews the BIA’s legal

conclusions de novo. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2020).

We review denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief under the

deferential substantial evidence standard. Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007

(9th Cir. 2017). We also review “factual findings, including adverse credibility

determinations, for substantial evidence.” Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789

(9th Cir. 2014). The substantial evidence standard is “extremely

deferential.” Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Monjaraz-Munoz v. INS, 327 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2003)); Garland v. Ming Dai,

141 S. Ct. 1669, 1677 (2021) (substantial evidence review is “highly deferential”)

(quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020)). “Under the substantial

evidence standard, administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

                                         2
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Zehatye

v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (internal

quotations omitted).

      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts in these

immigration proceedings. Considering the totality of the circumstances and all

relevant factors, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s

determination that Petitioner Olvera-Gonzalez did not testify credibly before the IJ.

See Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc); 8 U.S.C. §

1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (setting forth relevant factors for consideration in a credibility

determination, including the “internal consistency of each such statement,” and the

“consistency of such statements with other evidence of record”). We also conclude

that the agency did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioner’s

conviction for assault with a deadly weapon without a firearm but likely to produce

great bodily injury, in violation of section 245(a)(1) of the California Penal Code,

constituted a particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for withholding of

removal relief, and that Petitioner waived his arguments in favor of relief under the

Convention Against Torture.

      First, we conclude that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was supported by

substantial evidence and that the BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s denial of

Petitioner’s relief on this ground. After considering Olvera-Gonzalez’s requests

                                           3
for relief, the IJ identified significant differences within Olvera-Gonzalez’s asylum

application, initial declaration, supplemental declaration, and testimony to find that

he was not credible. For example, the IJ highlighted that Petitioner’s accounts of

when and how frequently he was sexually abused by family members while he

resided in Mexico—as well as his accounts of which sibling(s) perpetrated such

abuse—differed markedly throughout the proceedings. The IJ also found that

Petitioner was “not credible due to his testimony about his conviction for assault

with a deadly weapon” because he “denied that he even assaulted his partner, much

less that he assaulted him with a deadly weapon.”

      Petitioner provided explanations for the alleged inconsistencies, but the IJ

reasonably rejected his explanations. See Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1092-93

(9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the IJ must consider a petitioner’s explanation for

any inconsistency that supports an adverse credibility determination). For

example, Petitioner asserted that he did not believe he was allowed to add further

incidents to his supplemental declaration. But the IJ determined that his

explanation was unreasonable given the numerous opportunities Petitioner had to

amend and supplement his statements. And although Petitioner alleged that he did

not commit the underlying elements of the crime for which he was convicted, the

IJ reasonably found his testimony not credible because Petitioner failed to provide

the requested police report. The IJ’s adverse credibility determination based on

                                          4
these inconsistencies is supported by substantial evidence.

      The IJ further based its adverse credibility determination on Olvera-

Gonzalez’s demeanor—a determination we must give special deference “because

IJs are in the best position to assess demeanor and other credibility cues that we

cannot readily access on review.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th

Cir. 2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (an IJ may base an adverse credibility

determination on the “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness” of the applicant); see

also Ling Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The need for

deference is particularly strong in the context of demeanor assessments.”). The

record does not compel the conclusion that the IJ’s assessment of Petitioner’s

demeanor was erroneous.

      The BIA, in affirming that IJ’s decision, pointed to inconsistencies within

Petitioner’s accounts of the sexual abuse he faced by family members, his domestic

violence conviction, and his failure to submit the requested police report to the IJ.

It concluded that the IJ “did not clearly err in finding that the respondent

embellished his claim on the day of the hearing, noting how the respondent’s

testimony was markedly different than the personal declaration.” This

determination was again supported by substantial evidence, given the significant

differences between Petitioner’s asylum application, initial declaration,

supplemental declaration, and testimony and the agency’s reasonable rejection of

                                           5
Petitioner’s explanations.

      Second, we conclude that the agency did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that Olvera-Gonzalez committed a particularly serious crime

(“PSC”)—having been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of

California Penal Code § 245(a)(1)—and was therefore ineligible for withholding of

removal relief. Withholding of removal is unavailable to a non-citizen if they have

been convicted of a particularly serious crime. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8

C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). A crime is categorically considered particularly serious if

it is an aggravated felony for which the non-citizen was sentenced to at least five

years’ imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv). However, for those offenders

who were not sentenced to more than five years’ imprisonment, an IJ can find

within its discretion that the offender has committed a PSC on a case-by-case

basis, “notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed.” Id.; see Anaya-Ortiz v.

Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 2010). Indeed, “[i]f the elements of [the]

offense are found to potentially bring it within the ambit of a particularly serious

crime, all reliable information that is relevant to the determination may be

considered.” Matter of G-G-S-, 26 I&N. Dec. 339, 343 (BIA 2014), vacated and

remanded on other grounds, 892 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2018).

      We review the determination that a petitioner committed a “particularly

serious crime” for abuse of discretion. Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th

                                          6
Cir. 2014). “[O]ur review is limited to ensuring that the agency relied on the

appropriate factors and proper evidence to reach this conclusion.” Bare v. Barr,

975 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted). Olvera-Gonzalez asserts that the IJ erred in finding that “by its nature,

assault with a dangerous weapon raises the possibility that it constituted a

particularly serious crime” and that the IJ only found so “because he ordered the

Petitioner to file the police report related to this offense, and [Petitioner] failed to

do so for ‘good reason.’” However, as the Government notes, it was Petitioner’s

burden to demonstrate that his conviction did not constitute a PSC so as to

disqualify him from withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)(i).

Thus, the IJ did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioner’s conviction

for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245(a)(1) of the California

Penal Code constituted a PSC, nor did the BIA apply the incorrect legal standard in

affirming this determination.

      Third, we conclude that Petitioner abandoned his challenge to the IJ’s denial

of his CAT application because he provides no meaningful argument in his brief

for why he should be eligible for CAT protection. Specifically, Petitioner failed to

provide “citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.”

Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. App.

P. 28(a)(6)). And even if the claim is not abandoned, Petitioner’s only allegation

                                            7
of error—that the IJ exclusively considered the Mexican human rights report—is

not supported by the record.

      PETITION DENIED

                                       8