Court Opinion

ID: 9742529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:15:26.108173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:33.230038
License: Public Domain

T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I agree that evidence of the length of sentence, the place of confinement, or the time of parole are all irrelevant to credibility.
Any former decisions of this Court, which are to the contrary, ought to be overruled in a case properly presenting the issue. The issue is not presented here because no objection was made to the irrelevant testimony. In that respect, this case is to be distinguished from People v White, 26 Mich App 35; 181 NW2d 803 (1970), where the objection was clearly made, and the trial court ruled erroneously.
The distinction between this case and White is not casual. It lies at the heart of the functions of both trial judges and appellate courts.
When a trial judge makes an error in a ruling upon an objection to irrelevant evidence, the appellate court performs its traditional function in ordering reversal and new trial.
*276But what error does the trial court commit when irrelevant evidence is received without objection? What should a trial judge have done?
Should he object?
Should he order the testimony stricken and instruct the jury that it is irrelevant?
Should he reprimand counsel for asking the question or opposing counsel for failing to object?
Should he excuse the jury and make a separate record establishing that the failure to object was strategic and deliberate?
Should he declare a mistrial sua sponte? (And, if so, does jeopardy attach?)
The Canons of Judicial Ethics require a trial judge to avoid interference in the trial of causes, except in rare instances to prevent miscarriage of justice.
The expanding notion in this Court that a trial judge in a criminal case has some overriding duty to step into the breach whenever he feels that defense counsel needs help is a dangerous departure from our established jurisprudence.
It is difficult to suppose that the concept can be limited to the protection of the defendant. Certainly, the people are also entitled to a fair trial. If a previously convicted prosecution witness were cross-examined by defense counsel concerning the details of his incarceration, without objection from the prosecutor, would not the trial judge be obligated to intrude?
Haying thus undertaken the burden, sans objection, to keep all irrelevant matter from the jury, from whatever source, the role of the trial judge in a criminal case is completely transformed. He is no longer the impartial referee in an adversary proceeding. He becomes the censor who must, upon pain of reversal, pass judgment upon the *277admissibility of every question asked by either lawyer. The judge becomes the central figure in the trial. He is, in effect, the inquisitor. Being obligated to interfere with cqunsel’s questioning without invitation or objection, his silence denotes approval of the relevance and admissibility of every question asked.
Being required to assume responsibility for every question posed, trial judges will reasonably expect an opportunity to consider the propriety of each question before it is heard by the jury.
When the trial judge has thus assumed the rolé of inquisitor, he will bear the responsibility for successful as well as errorless prosecution. And, in that day, who will stand between the prisoner at the bar and his interrogator?
M. S. Coleman, J., concurred with T. E. Brennan, J.