Court Opinion

ID: 9908473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 20:02:16.184657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:12.285773
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/8/23
                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                  D082219

       Plaintiff and Respondent,

       v.                                    (Super. Ct. No. BAF1501107)

ROBERT OTTO CARTER, JR.,

       Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Randall S. Stamen, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
       Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Melissa A. Mandel, Warren J. Williams and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Robert Carter, Jr. appeals the denial of his request for a full

resentencing under recently enacted Penal Code section 1172.75. 1 Although

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
noted.
the trial court recalled Carter for resentencing under section 1172.75 and
struck his one-year prior prison term from his sentence, the court declined to
conduct a full resentencing under the new law. The court found that it did
not have the authority to do so because Carter was originally sentenced
pursuant to a plea agreement. Carter contends that this was in error. We
agree that section 1172.75 required the trial court to conduct a full
resentencing, and that the People are not entitled to withdraw their assent to
the plea bargain if the trial court further reduces Carter’s sentence on
resentencing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court
for a full resentencing.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In November 2015, the People filed a complaint alleging that Carter
committed two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and one
count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)), specifically, a
machete. The People further alleged that Carter served a prior prison term
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and was convicted of a strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (c) and
(e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
      In April 2016, the complaint was amended to add a second count of
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)) and a great bodily injury
allegation (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). At that time, Carter pled guilty to both
counts of assault with a deadly weapon and admitted the great bodily injury
allegation, the prison prior, and the strike prior. The parties stipulated to a
12-year sentence under the plea agreement, calculated as follows: for the first
count of assault with a deadly weapon, the middle term of three years,
doubled to six years due to the strike prior; for the second count of assault
with a deadly weapon, one-third the middle term of three years (one year),
doubled to two years due to the strike prior, run consecutively; for the great

                                        2
bodily injury enhancement, an additional and consecutive term of three
years; and for the prison-prior enhancement, an additional and consecutive
term of one year. In May 2016, the trial court accepted and imposed the
stipulated sentence.
      In October 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation referred Carter’s case to the trial court for recall and
resentencing under newly enacted section 1172.75, subdivision (b). The
People filed an opposition to resentencing under section 1172.75, arguing
that although the court had to strike the one-year prison prior from Carter’s
sentence, it had no discretion to conduct a full resentencing because there
had been a stipulated sentence per the parties’ plea agreement. Carter filed
a response to the People’s opposition, arguing that a full resentencing was
mandatory under section 1172.75 and the court was required to apply all new
sentencing laws that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.
Carter also filed a motion to strike his strike prior (People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497), which the People opposed.
      In March 2023, after holding a hearing, the trial court issued a written
resentencing order. The court concluded that Carter’s prison prior under
section 667.5, subdivision (b) was invalid and ordered it stricken. The court
acknowledged that Carter “ha[d] taken advantage of the rehabilitative
aspects of incarceration, earning several certificates of completion and letters
of appreciation,” and stated that if Carter’s “conviction and sentencing were
not the product of an accepted plea bargain, the court could take [his]
achievements into account at a full resentencing hearing.” However, the
court agreed with the People that it did not have the authority to modify the
negotiated sentence beyond striking the prison prior. The court found that to
do so where the “defendant’s sentence was the product of a plea bargain

                                        3
would divest the People of the benefit of their bargain.” For the same reason,
the court concluded it did not have the authority to strike Carter’s strike
prior, and it therefore denied his Romero motion.
      At the resentencing hearing, the court ordered Carter’s prison prior
stricken, stated that all other terms of his sentence would remain intact, and
sentenced him to 11 years in state prison.
      Carter timely filed a notice of appeal.
                                 DISCUSSION
      The parties agree that the trial court properly struck Carter’s prison
prior from his sentence. The only issues before us are (1) whether the court
erred in finding that it did not have discretion under section 1172.75 to fully
resentence Carter because his sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea
agreement, and (2) if so, whether the prosecution may withdraw its assent to
the plea bargain if the trial court further reduces Carter’s sentence on
resentencing.
A. Governing Law
      Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial
courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an
allegation the defendant had served a prior prison term and had not
remained free of custody for at least five years. (People v. Burgess (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 375, 379–380 (Burgess).) Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill
No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136) amended section 667.5 by
limiting the enhancement to only prior prison terms served for sexually
violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) Enhancements based on prior
prison terms served for other offenses became legally invalid. (Burgess, at
pp. 379–380.)

                                       4
      In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 483), which, among other things, made the changes
implemented by Senate Bill 136 retroactive. (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th
at p. 380.) Senate Bill 483 added former section 1171.1, later renumbered as

section 1172.75 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12), to the Penal Code. 2 (Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, §§ 1, 3.) Penal Code section 1172.75 provides that “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a
prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of
Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (Pen.
Code, § 1172.75, subd. (a).) It further provides that if a currently
incarcerated defendant is serving a sentence that includes such a legally
invalid enhancement, “the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the
defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).)
      The statute provides specific instructions for the resentencing under
section 1172.75. (See People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399
(Monroe).) First, the resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the
one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing
pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one
originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) Second, the trial court “shall

2     Senate Bill 483 also added section 1171, later renumbered as section
1172.7 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 11), which made the changes previously
implemented by Senate Bill No. 180 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 180)
retroactive as well. Senate Bill 180 amended Health and Safety Code section
11370.2 to invalidate most three-year drug-prior sentence enhancements
imposed before January 1, 2018. (Stats. 2017, ch. 677, § 1; see also Pen.
Code, § 1172.7, subd. (a).)
                                        5
apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Third, the court “may consider postconviction
factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects
whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that
continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3).) Fourth, “[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term,
the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there
are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd.
(d)(4).) Finally, the court “shall appoint counsel” for the resentencing.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(5).)
      The Legislature declared in an uncodified statement of intent in Senate
Bill 483 “that in order to ensure equal justice and address systemic racial
bias in sentencing, it is the intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply
Senate Bill 180 of the 2017–18 Regular Session and Senate Bill 136 of the
2019–20 Regular Session to all persons currently serving a term of
incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence enhancements. It is
the intent of the Legislature that any changes to a sentence as a result of the
act that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to
rescind a plea agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)

                                        6
B. Standard of Review
      We review issues of statutory construction de novo. (People v.
Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123.) Our fundamental task in
interpreting a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to
effectuate its purpose. (Ibid.) We begin with the text of the statute and give
the words their usual meaning while construing them in light of the statutory
framework as a whole. (Ibid.) If the statutory language is unambiguous,
then its plain meaning controls. (Ibid.) If the language “permits more than
one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy. [Citation.] The wider
historical circumstances of a law’s enactment may assist in ascertaining
legislative intent, supplying context for otherwise ambiguous language.”
(People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 976 (Prudholme), internal
quotation marks omitted.)
      “In considering the purpose of legislation, statements of the intent of
the enacting body contained in a preamble, while not conclusive, are entitled
to consideration.” (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1280.) Although
such uncodified statements do not confer power, they “properly may be
utilized as an aid in construing a statute.” (Ibid.) The Legislature’s
statement of intent in Senate Bill 483 is found within the preamble, or what
the Supreme Court has also referred to as a “ ‘plus section’ ”—“a provision of
a bill that is not intended to be a substantive part of the code section or
general law that the bill enacts, but to express the Legislature’s view on some
aspect of the operation or effect of the bill.” (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th
846, 858, fn. 13 (Allen).)

                                        7
C. Analysis
      Carter argues that simply striking the one-year enhancement imposed
under the repealed portion of former section 667.5, subdivision (b) deprives
him of his right to full resentencing under the changes in the law that
resulted from the enactment of Senate Bill 483. According to Carter, the
language of section 1172.75 and Senate Bill 483 demonstrate the
Legislature’s intent to apply the full-resentencing provisions of section
1172.75 to all sentences, whether stipulated or not. We agree.
      We turn first to the language of the statute itself. Section 1172.75
provides that “[i]f the court determines that [a defendant’s] current judgment
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall
the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), italics
added.) The statute also provides that, when resentencing, the “court shall
apply . . . any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for
judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2), italics added.) “By its
plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the
trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (Monroe, supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at p. 402; see also People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893
[when a sentence is subject to recall, “the resentencing court has jurisdiction
to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to
the recall”].) Nothing in section 1172.75 indicates that sentences resulting
from a plea agreement are exempt from its provisions.
      The People concede that the plain language of section 1172.75
“appear[s] to give trial courts the authority to fully resentence” without
making any exception for plea bargains or stipulated sentences. Yet the
People contend that “where a defendant received a stipulated sentence, a

                                       8
scenario not mentioned in the statute, these provisions conflict with section
1192.5” and “section 1192.5 controls.”
      We disagree. Section 1192.5 provides that upon acceptance of a plea
agreement by the parties and approval by the court, “the court may not
proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea.” (§ 1192.5, subd.
(b), italics added.) Although the court may “withdraw its approval in the
light of further consideration of the matter” (§ 1192.5, subds. (c)–(d)), “long-
standing law limits the court’s unilateral authority to strike an enhancement
yet maintain other provisions of the plea bargain” (People v. Stamps (2020) 9
Cal.5th 685, 701 (Stamps)). Thus, where a defendant has received a
stipulated sentence and a new ameliorative law creates a retroactive right to
be resentenced, it “create[s] a statutory ambiguity with section 1192.5”
regarding “how the law should be applied retroactively to existing plea
agreements.” (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 973–974.)
      The Supreme Court recently resolved similar ambiguities in Stamps
and Prudholme, two cases that “involved the intersection of this statutory
scheme of plea bargaining and the retroactivity rule” of In re Estrada (1965)
63 Cal.2d 740. (Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In Stamps, the
defendant pled guilty, and the parties agreed to a nine-year stipulated
sentence, which included a mandatory five-year enhancement for a prior
serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a); see Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 693.) While that case was on appeal, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013),
which “removed provisions that prohibited a trial court from striking a
serious felony enhancement in furtherance of justice under section 1385.”
(Stamps, at p. 700.) The defendant argued that Senate Bill 1393 applied
retroactively to his plea bargain, and his case must therefore be remanded to

                                         9
permit the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the
enhancement from his stipulated sentence. (Id. at p. 698.) The Supreme
Court explained that “to justify a remand for the court to consider striking
his serious felony enhancement while maintaining the remainder of his
bargain, defendant must establish not only that Senate Bill 1393 applies
retroactively, but that, in enacting that provision, the Legislature intended to
overturn long-standing law that a court cannot unilaterally modify an
agreed-upon term by striking portions of it under section 1385.” (Id. at
p. 701.)
      After analyzing the bill’s legislative history, the Stamps court was “not
persuaded that the Legislature intended” such a result. (Stamps, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 701.) The court found that although the “Legislature may have
intended to modify the sentencing scheme, . . . the legislative history [of
Senate Bill 1393] does not demonstrate any intent to overturn existing law
regarding a court’s lack of authority to unilaterally modify a plea agreement.
Indeed, none of the legislative history materials mention plea agreements at
all.” (Stamps, at p. 702.)
      The court distinguished the language at issue in Stamps from that in
its earlier decision in Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984 (Harris),
which considered the effect of Proposition 47 on convictions, including those
resulting from plea agreements. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 702–703.)
Proposition 47 reduced certain nonviolent crimes from felonies to
misdemeanors and created a resentencing petition procedure applicable to
those “ ‘serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea. . . .’ ”
(Stamps, at pp. 702–703, quoting Harris, at p. 991; see also § 1170.18, subd.
(a).) Harris rejected the People’s claim that they should be permitted to
withdraw from a plea agreement where the defendant successfully petitioned

                                         10
for resentencing under Proposition 47, explaining that “[b]y expressly
mentioning convictions by plea, Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all
eligible defendants.” (Harris, at pp. 991–993.) Indeed, the “resentencing
process that Proposition 47 established would often prove meaningless if the
prosecution could respond to a successful resentencing petition by
withdrawing from an underlying plea agreement and reinstating the original
charges filed against the petitioner.” (Id. at p. 992.)
      The Stamps court, on the other hand, concluded that “[n]othing in the
language and legislative history of Senate Bill 1393 suggests an intent to
modify section 1192.5’s mandate that ‘the court may not proceed as to the
plea other than as specified in the plea’ without the consent of the parties. . . .
That Senate Bill 1393 is silent regarding pleas and provides no express
mechanism for relief undercuts any suggestion that the Legislature intended
to create special rules for plea cases involving serious felony enhancements.”
(Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 704.) Accordingly, the court determined that
the proper remedy for Stamps was a limited remand of his case to allow him
to seek relief under Senate Bill 1393 with the understanding that, should the
trial court exercise its discretion to strike the serious felony enhancement,
the People would be entitled to withdraw from the plea agreement. (Id. at
pp. 707–708.)
      The court considered a different statute in Prudholme. There, the
defendant’s appeal was pending when the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill
No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950). (See Stats. 2020,
ch. 328, § 2, amending Pen. Code, § 1203.1; Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 964.) The defendant argued that the new law applied retroactively and
required his probation term to be reduced to two years but that the terms of
his plea agreement should otherwise remain in place. (Prudholme, at p. 964.)

                                        11
The Supreme Court again analyzed the bill’s language, its legislative history,
and its intersection with section 1192.5 to determine the remedy for
retroactive application of the bill in plea bargain cases. (Id. at pp. 975–977.)
The court agreed with the defendant that “employing the Stamps procedure
and allowing the prosecution to withdraw from the plea agreement would
appear contrary to the purposes underlying the new law,” which included
reducing the length of probation to increase probationary effectiveness and
reducing the likelihood of incarceration for minor probation violations. (Id. at
p. 977.) But like Senate Bill 1393 in Stamps, Assembly Bill 1950 “made no
mention of the legislative intent regarding an application to pleas,” and the
“level of clarity” present in Harris therefore did not exist in Prudholme. (Id.
at pp. 973, 975.) The court was thus required to analyze the legislative
history of Assembly Bill 1950 to determine the Legislature’s intent. The
court determined that “the Legislature intended that its new limitations on
the maximum term of probation in amended section 1203.1 should be applied
to existing, nonfinal plea agreements while otherwise maintaining the
remainder of the bargain.” (Id. at p. 979.) The court therefore concluded that
the proper remedy was to modify the judgment to reflect the new
probationary term of two years. (Ibid.)
      Here, unlike in Stamps and Prudholme, there is no question as to the
retroactivity of Senate Bill 483. By its terms, the bill applies exclusively to
sentence enhancements imposed before January 1, 2020 (§ 1172.75, subd.
(a)), and the Legislature specified in its statement of intent “that in order to
ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing, it is the
intent of the Legislature to retroactively apply Senate Bill 180 of the 2017–18
Regular Session and Senate Bill 136 of the 2019–20 Regular Session to all

                                       12
persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these
repealed sentence enhancements” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1).
      As in Stamps and Prudholme, however, the application of section
1172.75 to plea bargain cases creates a statutory ambiguity when considered
in conjunction with section 1192.5, and the parties disagree as to the

Legislature’s intent in passing Senate Bill 483. 3 Carter argues that the
Legislature intended to allow all eligible defendants to be resentenced under
section 1172.75 regardless of whether their previous sentence resulted from a
plea agreement. The People contend that the Legislature did not intend for
the full-resentencing provisions of section 1172.75 to apply to stipulated
sentences. They argue that although the Legislature expressed its intention
for trial courts to strike invalid prison-prior enhancements from stipulated
sentences resulting from plea agreements, it expressed no such intention to
alter the remainder of the plea agreements. Alternatively, the People argue
that if Carter is entitled to full resentencing, and the trial court reduces the
sentence beyond just striking the prison prior, they are entitled to withdraw
their assent to the plea agreement and presumably reinstate the original
charges against Carter.
      The First District Court of Appeal, Division One recently addressed
this issue. (People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562 (Coddington).)
In Coddington, the defendant contended that section 1172.75 entitled him to
full resentencing to seek further reductions of his sentence, which was
imposed pursuant to a plea agreement, beyond just striking the one-year

3     The parties rely on Senate Bill 483’s legislative history but neither has
requested judicial notice of any legislative materials. On our own motion, we
take judicial notice of the legislative history materials cited in this opinion
under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (c) and 459. (See Gananian v.
Wagstaffe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1541, fn. 9.)
                                       13
prison-prior enhancement. (Id. at p. 567.) The appellate court agreed with
the defendant on this point, concluding that he was permitted to seek further
sentencing relief on remand “since the statute requires . . . the trial court to
apply ‘ “any other changes in law that reduce sentences.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 568,
quoting Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
      However, the court relied on Stamps to further conclude that although
Coddington must be provided the opportunity to seek a full resentencing
under section 1172.75, he would do so with the understanding “that if the
court on remand indicates it is inclined to further reduce Coddington’s
sentence, the prosecution may withdraw its assent to the plea agreement.”
(Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 565.) The Coddington court
determined that “[a]lthough the Legislature clearly intended that the
striking of a sentencing enhancement for a prior prison term would not
provide a basis for rescinding a plea agreement, this intent cannot be
understood to govern other possible sentence reductions merely because they
happen to occur during the same resentencing.” (Ibid.) The court reviewed
the legislative history and concluded that certain legislative “statements
indicate a clear intent to ‘overturn long-standing law that a court cannot
unilaterally modify an agreed-upon term.’ ” (Id. at p. 572, quoting Stamps,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 701.) According to the Coddington court, however,
those legislative statements “were limited to the context of prison priors.”
(Ibid.)
      We agree with the Coddington court that a defendant eligible for
removal of a prison prior under section 1172.75 must be provided an
opportunity for full resentencing to argue for further relief under any other
ameliorative changes in law that reduce sentences, regardless of whether
their sentence resulted from a plea agreement. (Coddington, supra, 96

                                       14
Cal.App.5th at p. 568; Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402; § 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) Where we part ways with Coddington, however, is on the
question of whether the prosecution is then entitled to withdraw from the
parties’ plea agreement should the trial court choose to exercise its discretion
in further reducing the defendant’s sentence beyond merely striking the one-
year prison-prior enhancement. We conclude that the answer is no.
      The Coddington court observed, as we have, that when the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill 483, “it specifically declared in an uncodified section that
it was ‘the intent of the Legislature that any changes to a sentence as a result
of the act that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court
to rescind a plea agreement.’ ” (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 570,
quoting Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1; see also Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 702–704 [entering a plea agreement does not insulate the parties from a
law the legislature expressly intends to apply to them].) The court then
stated: “The trial court here followed Senate Bill No. 483’s clear directive in
striking the prison prior but otherwise leaving intact the plea agreement.”
(Coddington, at p. 570.)
      But the court did not explain where it found this “clear directive,” and
we do not see it. The statement of legislative intent in Senate Bill 483 does
not differentiate between a sentence reduced by removal of the prison-prior
enhancement and a sentence reduced due to other resentencing decisions
made by the trial court. Instead, it broadly refers to “any changes” to the
sentence resulting under the new law and then states that those changes do
not give the prosecution a right to withdraw from a plea agreement. (Stats.
2021, ch. 728, § 1.) Nor does the statutory language or legislative history
make such a distinction. In fact, the statute does not even allow a court to
merely strike a legally invalid prison-prior enhancement. Instead, section

                                       15
1172.75 is structured solely as a resentencing law—the only relief it
authorizes is for the court to “recall the sentence and resentence the
defendant” under current sentencing laws if the judgment includes a now-
invalid prison-prior enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) We will not infer an
intent not expressed in the Legislature’s language. (See Cornette v.
Department of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73–74 [“A court may not
rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting language, to make it
conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed.”].)
      In our view, the Legislature’s clear directive is that any reduction of the
defendant’s sentence on resentencing shall not be a basis for the prosecutor
or the court to withdraw from a plea agreement. The Legislature expressly
stated that “any changes to a sentence as a result of the act that added this
section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea
agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1, italics added.) The all-inclusive phrase
“any changes to a sentence as a result of the act” (ibid.) can only be
understood to include changes resulting from the law’s resentencing
provision, which provides for full resentencing and states that it “shall result
in a lesser sentence” unless it would endanger public safety and “shall not
result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1).)
      The language at issue here is closer to that in Harris, which expressly
mentioned plea agreements, than to the provision and legislative history
materials in Stamps or Prudholme, which did not. The Supreme Court
concluded in Harris that “[b]y expressly mentioning convictions by plea,
Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all eligible defendants.” (Harris, supra,
1 Cal.5th at pp. 991–993.) The same is true here. The statement of intent in
the “plus section” of Senate Bill 483, which expressed the Legislature’s view

                                        16
on the effect of the bill (see Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 858, fn. 13),
expressly mentions plea agreements and prohibits both the court and the
prosecution from rescinding the plea agreement based on any change to the
sentence resulting from the law. And as in Harris, the “resentencing process”
established by section 1172.75 “would often prove meaningless if the
prosecution could respond to a successful resentencing petition by
withdrawing from an underlying plea agreement and reinstating the original
charges filed against the petitioner.” (Harris, at p. 992.)
      Additional legislative history materials are consistent with our
interpretation of the Legislature’s intent here. The Assembly Committee on
Public Safety’s analysis of Senate Bill 483 emphasized the bill author’s
statement “that long prison and jail sentences have no positive impact on
public safety, but are demonstrably injurious to families and communities—
particularly Black, Latino, and Native Americans in the United States and in
California.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–

2022 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 2021, p. 3.) 4 It also included a section titled “Effect
on Guilty Pleas,” which expressly stated that the “legislative intent [is] that
its provision for retroactive application and resentencing applies to guilty plea
cases. This would include those in which there may have been a negotiated
disposition.” (Id. at p. 4, italics added.) The report went on to quote the
Supreme Court’s holding in Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 66, 71, 73
that “plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the reserve power of the

4     The Senate Committee on Public Safety’s report further explained that
those released after incarceration “face significant barriers to finding jobs
and housing. Family members of incarcerated people struggle with crushing
debt from court costs, visitation and telephone fees, and diminished income.
The longer the sentence, the more severe these problems tend to be, and the
tougher it is for societal reintegration.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on
Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 27, 2021, p. 3, italics added.)
                                         17
state to amend the law”; the fact that “parties enter into a plea agreement
thus does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that
the Legislature has intended to apply to them”; and it therefore follows “that
requiring the parties’ compliance with changes in the law made retroactive to
them does not violate the terms of the plea agreement.” (Assem. Com. on
Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 2021,
p. 4.) The Committee’s report also confirmed the “Legislative intent that any
changes to a sentence as a result of these provisions is not a basis for a
prosecutor or a court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Id. at p. 2.) Like the
uncodified statement, this language did not distinguish between the removal
of prison priors and other potential sentence reductions.
      Several other legislative committee reports on Senate Bill 483 also
noted the Legislature’s intent to prohibit rescission of a plea agreement based
on any change in sentence resulting from the law. (See Senate Third Reading
on Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 1, 2021, p. 2
[the bill “[s]tates Legislative intent that any changes to a sentence as a result
of these provisions is not a basis for a prosecutor or a court to rescind a plea
agreement.”]; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill
No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 1, 2021, p. 4 [same].)
      The Coddington court did not mention these committee reports, but it
cited to the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for Senate Bill 483 as stating “that
the legislation would declare prison priors ‘to be legally invalid’ and would
state the intent of the Legislature to prohibit the rescission of a plea
agreement based on eliminating them.” (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 571–572, italics added.) But the actual language of the Legislative
Counsel’s Digest is broader than what Coddington suggested. Consistent
with the bill’s uncodified statement of intent and the legislative committee

                                       18
reports, it explained: “The bill would state the intent of the Legislature to
prohibit a prosecutor or court from rescinding a plea agreement based on a
change in sentence as a result of this measure.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen.
Bill 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2021, ch. 728.) The Legislative
Counsel’s Digest also specifically mentioned the bill’s resentencing provisions
and its requirement “that the resentencing result in a lesser sentence, unless
the court finds that a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (Ibid.)
We therefore conclude that the legislative history of Senate Bill 483 supports

our view of a broader legislative intent. 5
      We disagree with Coddington that this result is equivalent to finding
that the provisions of section 1172.75 “overrule Stamps as to the resentencing
of all enhancements of all defendants who accepted a prison prior under a
plea deal.” (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 571.) This is not a
matter of “overruling” Stamps. Stamps involved a different statute, with
different statutory language and legislative history. As Stamps itself made
clear, the question of how an ameliorative statute applies to plea-bargained
sentences is one of legislative intent. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 701–

5      The People also argue that the deletion of language from a prior version
of Senate Bill 483 declaring the affected enhancements to be legally invalid
“regardless of whether the sentence was imposed after trial or open or
negotiated plea” demonstrates the Legislature rejected such a provision.
(Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended July 7, 2021 and
July 15, 2021.) The deletion of this language does not support the People’s
position for two reasons. First, the final version of the bill still includes
language explicitly referencing plea agreements. The Legislature may have
simply found this additional language to be unnecessary because the rest of
the bill already made clear that the statute applies to guilty pleas. Second,
the People concede that Carter’s prison prior enhancement is legally invalid
under section 1172.75 even though (1) it was imposed after a guilty plea, and
(2) the statute as enacted did not include the deleted language. Thus, the
People’s reliance on the prior version of Senate Bill 483 does not assist them.
                                        19
702.) Stamps had nothing to say about the legislative intent behind section
1172.75.
      The People also argue that even assuming the Legislature intended to
apply the full-resentencing provisions of section 1172.75 to stipulated
sentences, effectuating that intent violates the federal and state contracts
clauses. We conclude that the People do not have standing to assert such a
violation.
      The United States and California Constitutions’ contracts clauses
“prohibit states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.”
(People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1068, citing U.S. Const.,
art. I, § 10, cl. 1 & Cal. Const., art. I, § 9 [rejecting defendant’s contracts
clause challenge to plea agreement].) However, these prohibitions “do not
prevent the legislature from changing the contractual rights of its political
subdivisions acting in a governmental capacity,” because “there can be no
impairment of contracts upon a voluntary relinquishment by the state of any
contractual rights it may have acquired.” (County of Alameda v. Janssen
(1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 284 (Janssen).) It is thus a “well-established rule that
subordinate political entities, as ‘creatures’ of the state, may not challenge
state action as violating the entities’ rights” under the contracts clause.
(Star-Kist Foods v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1, 6 (Star-Kist
Foods); see also Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1987) 188
Cal.App.3d 952, 966–967 (Cox Cable) [because city was political subdivision
of the State and acting in its governmental capacity, it had no standing to
claim contract impairment “in opposition to acts of the State Legislature”].)
      This well-established rule applies here. A county district attorney acts
as an agent of the State of California when prosecuting crimes. (People v.
The North River Ins. Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 797, 806; see also § 684 [“A

                                         20
criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the people of the State of
California, as a party . . . .”].) Thus, a plea bargain such as the one between
Carter and the People is essentially a contract entered into by the district
attorney on behalf of the state. (See People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th
1355, 1360 [“like the parties to a private contract, the state and the
defendant are bound by the [plea] agreement as between themselves”].) It
follows that when the People enter into a contract on behalf of the state, they
cannot later assert that the state has unconstitutionally passed a law
impairing that contract. (See Janssen, supra, 16 Cal.2d at p. 284.) As a
representative of the state acting in its governmental capacity, the district
attorney therefore “has no standing to raise the defense of impairment of
contract[.]” (Cox Cable, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 967; see also Star-Kist
Foods, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 6.)
      In sum, we determine that, in enacting Senate Bill 483, the Legislature
intended that the full resentencing procedure in section 1172.75 should be
applied to all sentences, including stipulated sentences imposed as part of a
plea bargain, and that the prosecution may not withdraw from the plea
bargain if the court imposes a lower sentence on resentencing. The trial
court therefore erred in refusing to resentence Carter beyond striking his
one-year prison prior.

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                                DISPOSITION
      The order is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

                                                            BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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