Court Opinion

ID: 9575577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:14:59.038793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:33.614508
License: Public Domain

Brower, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the court. My disagreement with the court is in the application of the law to the facts in this particular case. The case against Wayne County was brought July 23, 1952. The decision of this court in Olson v. County of Wayne, 157 Neb. 213, 59 N. W. 2d 400, was decided June 19, 1953. To my mind this court in that case decided that condition of the road or bridge was not the proximate *384cause of the plaintiffs injury and rather pointedly suggested that the negligence of the driver was the proximate cause. On April 2, 1954, Merlin Olson, by his next friend, started his action against Thomas Shellington, the insured’s son. At the suggestion of defendant’s counsel made by letter to the company, it sought the opinion of Mr. Guy Chambers, an eminent lawyer, particularly qualified in personal injury actions, as to the liability of the defendant about the middle of September 1954. The portion of the letter of the defendant’s counsel suggesting the reference made after consulting the defendant Thomas Shellington is in these words: “Considering that Tom Shellington is a minor, and not a very bright minor at that, it is doubtful if he understands why he is not liable to the injuries to Merlin Olson or to any other passengers in the automobile which he was driving. We would therefore like to visit with you about the possibility of securing an opinion from a recognized authority on negligence law to the effect that Tom Shellington is not liable for any injuries to the guests in the car, and that we are therefore not being unreasonable in refusing to settle this case within the limits of the policy. It would seem that such an opinion would be of much more value to show our good faith in the handling of this claim than any statement from young Shellington to the effect that he doesn’t believe he is liable for the injuries to Merlin Olson. When Mr. Head returns from his vacation, we would like to take that matter up with him.”
This portion of the letter to my mind is susceptible of different meanings. One might be that the company was not attempting to negotiate any settlement and intended in all events to stand pat and sought the advice of counsel wholly as a defense to a suit of the present nature well knowing the minor defendant was not very bright and not convinced of his not being liable for the plaintiff’s injuries; further, that counsel writing the letter anticipated an adverse judgment in the case as early *385as 1954. Mr. Chambers, after studying the files of the defendant herein with respect to the accident and the evidence in the case against the County of Wayne, gave his opinion that Shellington was not guilty of gross negligence and the plaintiff guest could not recover. Neither Mr. Chambers nor anyone else was ever consulted again in spite of the fact that subsequent events in my opinion increasingly pointed to the ultimate liability of the defendant Shellington. This is a case for injuries that the defendant’s vice president handling claims, himself a lawyer, conceded would substantiate a verdict of at least $100,000, if liability was established. On March 18, 1955, the jury returned the verdict for $24,000 after the trial court by its instructions had submitted the issue of Shellington’s gross negligence to the jury. The verdict was set aside because of the special finding or notation on the verdict that defendant was guilty of “slight negligence.” On appeal to this court the defendant contended the case should have been dismissed on his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was no evidence of gross negligence. This court sustained the trial court in granting a new trial but refused to dismiss the case. Its opinion, Olson v. Shellington, 167 Neb. 564, 94 N. W. 2d 20, indicates clearly that an issue of gross negligence sufficient to submit to the jury was shown in the first trial. Defendant argues that another jury might well have held that the negligence was only slight. This is true of course but it might on the other hand indicate a jury would on a subsequent trial find for the plaintiff on the issue of gross negligence and under circumstances not rendering their verdict assailable. That the defendant itself realized the situation was grave is to my mind shown to a considerable extent by its raising the reserve for this risk from time to time. On the report of the accident it was $1,500. Later it was raised to $4,000. On June 23, 1953, after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Olson v. County of Wayne, supra, it was *386raised to $9,000. In December 1958, it was raised to $10,000, the full limits of the policy, though all other liability appeared to be barred by limitations except this one cause. During practically the whole of the period this suit was pending in district court up to and after the time of the trial court’s overruling the defendant’s motion to dismiss at the second trial of the case, it could have been settled for the $10,000, the limit of defendant’s insurance. The insured at all times demanded the settlement. The matter of negotiation and settlement was, as provided by the policy, in the exclusive hands of the defendant insurance company herein. It neither accepted the offer for settlement of the claim for the full amount of its policy limits nor. explored the possibility of a lesser settlement by counter negotiation. Its negotiation consisted of one word “no,” except on one occasion on which it refused to answer at all and didn’t inform its. insured that an offer was made at that time. After the last judgment for $50,000 and before the appeal therefrom by Shellington to this court, the company which had reassured the defendant for all loss over $5,000, plus half of the cost, suggested there might still be a settlement affected and advised it should be attempted. The reinsurer pointed out in its letter that more than a year and a half before the expense of litigation had then exceeded $4,300, and that the ensuing expense had no doubt considerably augmented that amount. The defendant’s vice president made no attempt to settle until after the judgment of $50,000 was pending on appeal to this court and then according to him because of the suggestion of the co-insurer only. Defendant’s vice president to my mind in his testimony considered the continuation of the litigation to be a matter of principle and gave little thought to the rights of the assured, the extent of the damage, nor the amount of the expense.
There is to my mind clearly sufficient evidence of *387bad faith on the part of the defendant to authorize the issue to be submitted to the jury.
I am authorized to state Judge Spencer concurs in this dissent.