Court Opinion

ID: 9718976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:39:15.479405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:03.766093
License: Public Domain

BELSON, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I concur, but I cannot join in the opinion of the court because I do not agree that appellant fairly can be held to have waived a claim of double jeopardy. The double jeopardy issue here involves merger of offenses. The legal analysis in merger is subtle and complex. It seems unreasonable to hold that appellant intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Indeed, controlling case law in this jurisdiction at the time of appellant’s trial suggested that a double jeopardy claim would not lie in a case like appellant’s where one was convicted of both grand larceny and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and concurrent sentences were imposed. See Evans v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 123, 232 F.2d 379, 380 (1956).
The cases cited by the majority for the proposition that a claim of double jeopardy cannot be raised for- the first time on appeal are distinguishable. In them, the claim arose either when there were successive prosecutions for the same offense, Mason v. United States, D.C.App., 346 A.2d 250, 252 (1975); United States v. Scott, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 324, 464 F.2d 832, 833 (1972), or when a trial was resumed after a motion for judgment of acquittal had been granted. In re J. A. H., D.C.App., 315 A.2d 825, 827 (1974).1 Moreover, this court has recognized a double jeopardy claim based upon merger of offenses when the claim was raised for the first time on appeal. Bail v. United States, D.C.App., 429 A.2d 1353 (1981).
Although I conclude that there was no waiver, I agree with the majority that we should not consider double jeopardy or merger. Appellant did not raise, either in the trial court or on this appeal, any such claim in connection with the fact that he was convicted and sentenced concurrently for both grand larceny and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The issue was addressed in oral argument only as the result of an inquiry by the court communicated to counsel by the clerk prior to the day of oral argument. Considering all the circumstances, including the fact that any collateral consequences to appellant are diminished by reason of his already being subject to sentencing as a repeat offender, I feel we should decline to address the matter in the exercise of our discretion. See Foster v. United States, D.C.App., 290 A.2d 176, 177 (1972), and cases cited therein.

. The holding of Christian v. United States, D.C.App., 394 A.2d 1, 38, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979), also cited by the majority, dealt with waiver of statutory rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, D.C.Code 1973 §§ 24-701 et seq.