Court Opinion

ID: 9781255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:26:09.82905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:22.668539
License: Public Domain

Mikell, Judge,
concurring specially.
I respectfully disagree with the case law, which the majority correctly cites just before beginning its Division 1, and which controls this appeal. I urge our Supreme Court to reconsider those *822precedents which decree the rules for deciding the appeal of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence as having been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.40
The rule I object to states that whenever the evidence in the trial court was “undisputed” or “uncontroverted,” the review on appeal is de novo. Where testimonial evidence has been adduced in the trial court, de novo review should not be applied by the appellate courts, because only the trial court has seen the demeanor of the witnesses as they take the oath and as they testify. When we apply de novo review, we second-guess the trial court based on a cold record.
But the main problem with de novo review in these cases is that the evidence is almost never undisputed. The evidence in a motion to suppress is undisputed only when it is stipulated. When the evidence depends in any way on testimony, even the uncontradicted testimony of a single witness, as in the case at bar, then the evidence is disputed; de novo review is not appropriate; and our standard of review should be “clearly erroneous.”41
1. The reason “undisputed” evidence is really “disputed” evidence is found in an ancient Georgia rule of law. For 15 years in superior court and state court, I instructed juries that they could believe or disbelieve all or any part of the testimony of any witness. This particular instruction was taken verbatim from the suggested pattern jury instruction.42
I am on even firmer ground when I assert that the superior court judges’ rule applies with equal force when a trial judge sits alone, *823without a jury, as the trier of fact.43 The rule should apply when the trial judge conducts a bench trial; hears a petition for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction; or hears a child custody dispute, a petition for bail bond, or a motion to suppress evidence.44 The two dissenters in the leading case, Tate v. State,45 relied on the venerable rule that the unimpeached, uncontroverted testimony of a sworn witness may not be “disregarded.”46 But there are controlling precedents which hold that the venerable rule means that the trier of fact must consider the testimony of a witness but is not required to believe it.47
The idea that a different rule from that enunciated in Tate applies to motions to suppress originated in the oft-cited decision in Vansant v. State.48 Vansant asserted that when the evidence in the trial court was undisputed, and no question of credibility was presented, then the standard of review on appeal is de novo.49 As argued above, however, a question of credibility always arises, and the evidence is never undisputed, when the evidence is testimonial.
To promulgate this special rule for the review of motions to suppress, the Vansant majority relied on a footnote in an important decision, State v. Davis.50 The defendant, Troy Anthony Davis, was accused of murdering a police officer in Savannah. His two-decade-long fight to evade his death sentence has attracted world-wide publicity.
*824Despite the high-profile nature of the police investigation, the trial judge suppressed highly-incriminating evidence seized from Davis’s residence. The state appealed. The Supreme Court of Georgia, following the traditional rule, gave deference to the trial judge’s decision and affirmed.51 But in a footnote, later relied on by the Vansant majority, the Davis court speculated that a “different” standard of review might apply when the evidence was “undisputed.”52 This footnote is dictum by its terms. And the precedential authority of the Davis footnote is further weakened by the fact that the authority cited is introduced with a significant warning, the signal “See generally.” Technically speaking, this signal means that what follows does not support the point asserted in the text but merely contains information which might shed light on the subject.53 The footnote in Davis is surely the most slender reed ever leaned upon by an appellate court when making a major change in a well-settled rule of law. And neither the state nor the federal decisions mentioned in the Davis footnote address the key points, that (1) testimony is never undisputed, and (2) it makes no sense to have a different rule for review of motions to suppress than, for example, bench trials.
2. Another shortcoming of the Vansant rule, founded on the footnote in Davis, is that it cleverly sidesteps the tried-and-proven precept that, on appeal, all inferences are to be drawn to support the decision of the trier of fact.54 For example, in the case at bar, whether or not the accused was “in custody” at the time he made statements about the type of gun he had fired and led the officers into the house (telling them about the balky doorknob) was an inference to be drawn from all the circumstances. These circumstances included the handcuffs,55 the number of officers present, their “tactical” approach to the garage (i.e., with guns drawn), the reassuring statements by the officers, etc. The trial court drew that inference one way and the majority today draws it a different way.
3. The majority, by the way, often raises the issue of whether or not the defendant was at various times under arrest. But the critical factual inference for determining if the Miranda warnings should *825have been given is whether the defendant is in custody, not whether or not he has been arrested.56
Decided July 13, 2011.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Ann B. Harris, John R. Edwards, Amelia G. Pray, Anna G. Cross, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
Thomas E. Griner, for appellee.
In conclusion, I concur with the majority and with all that is there written because I believe the majority’s analysis is mandated by controlling precedent. But I do urge our Supreme Court to reconsider and overrule that precedent, especially the decision in Vansant v. State, an opinion which has caused 17 years of mischief.

 Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 225 (3) (498 SE2d 262) (1998); Kehinde v. State, 236 Ga. App. 400, 401 (512 SE2d 311) (1999).

 E.g., Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 507 (604 SE2d 171) (2004), affirming State v. Silva, 263 Ga. App. 371 (587 SE2d 762) (2003) (whole court); Walker v. State, 299 Ga. App. 788 (683 SE2d 867) (2009); Wilson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 136 (666 SE2d 573) (2008); Snyder v. State, 284 Ga. App. 350, 351 (643 SE2d 861) (2007), reversed on other grounds, Snyder v. State, 283 Ga. 211 (657 SE2d 834) (2008).

 In Georgia, the “clearly erroneous” standard is identical to the “any evidence” standard. E.g., Hanson v. Kent, 263 Ga. 124 (2) (428 SE2d 785) (1993). Accord Turpin v. Todd, 271 Ga. 386, 390 (519 SE2d 678) (1999). The federal rule is different. A “mere scintilla” of evidence on one side will not suffice. See Brescher v. Von Stein, 904 F2d 572, 578 (11th Cir. 1990) (in evaluating motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, “[a] mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury”) (citation omitted).

 See Massengale v. State, 264 Ga. 51-52 (2) (a) (441 SE2d 238) (1994) (jury charge given hy trial court was fair and complete where it included language that “the jury may believe or disbelieve all or any part of the testimony of any witness”). See also Council of Superior Court Judges, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. I: Civil Cases (5th ed. 2007), § 00.050 (“You may believe or disbelieve all or any part of the testimony of any witness”); OCGA § 24-4-4 (facts jury may consider in determining where preponderance of evidence lies). “The rules stated in [OCGA § 24-4-4] and given in charge are applicable in determining the credibility of witnesses” in a criminal case. (Citation omitted.) Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 113 (13) (26 SE2d 263) (1943), overruled in part on other grounds, Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 85-86 (2) (90 SE2d 664) (1955).

 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286, 289 (2) (702 SE2d 888) (2010); Chaffin v. Community Loan &c. Co., 67 Ga. App. 410 (20 SE2d 435) (1942); State v. Betsill, 144 Ga. App. 267, 268 (2) (240 SE2d 781) (1977).

 Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) (440 SE2d 646) (1994). Much of my argument was made in a scholarly dissent by Judge Barnes in 2003. Silva, supra, 263 Ga. App. at 373 (Barnes, J., dissenting). Her argument has been greatly strengthened by the 2010 decision in Miller, supra.

 Supra at 58-60.

 Id. at 59 (Carley, J., dissenting).

 The rule that the uncontradicted testimony of unimpeached witnesses can not lawfully be arbitrarily disregarded does not mean that the jury are obliged to believe testimony which under the facts and circumstances disclosed they in fact discredit, but means that they are to consider the testimony of every witness who is sworn, and not arbitrarily disregard the testimony of any witness.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Caldwell v. Caldwell, 59 Ga. App. 637, 643 (1 SE2d 764) (1939); accord Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516, 519 (130 SE2d 790) (1963) (whole court) (“There is a difference in arbitrarily or capriciously disregarding testimony and in disbelieving it upon a consideration of all circumstances arising from the evidence”) (emphasis in original), cited in State v. Hester, 268 Ga. App. 501, 505 (602 SE2d 271) (2004) (whole court) (affirming trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress). See also Tate, supra at 56 (3) (“trier of fact is not obligated to believe a witness even if the testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony”) (citation omitted); Pantone v. Pantone, 206 Ga. 305, 312 (57 SE2d 77) (1950). See generally Agnor’s Ga. Evidence (2010-2011) § 18:6.

 264 Ga. 319 (443 SE2d 474) (1994).

 Id. at 320 (1).

 261 Ga. 225 (404 SE2d 100) (1991), cited in Vansant, supra.

 Davis, supra at 226-227.

 Id. at 226, n. 1.

 The Harvard Law Review Assn., The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (17th ed. 2000), Rule 1.2 (d), p. 24 (“See generally” indicates that the “[c]ited authority presents helpful background material related to the proposition” stated).

 See, e.g., In the Interest of E. G., 286 Ga. App. 137 (648 SE2d 699) (2007).

 The fact that a suspect is handcuffed does not demand a finding that he was under arrest, nor does it vitiate consent to further questioning. But the obvious corollary is that handcuffs do not prevent a contrary finding. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. 185, 187 (2) (640 SE2d 1) (2006).