Court Opinion

ID: 9559306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:26:23.020119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:33.405677
License: Public Domain

WOLFE, Chief Justice.
I concur in the results. In the main opinion it is stated:
“it is undoubtedly true that he [the trial court] may grant a mistrial if he believes the incident may have or probably influenced the jury, to the prejudice of either party. If he concludes that the conduct probably did, that is, that it is more likely than not, that it did prejudice the jury, the mistrial should be granted.”
The first and second sentences of the quotation appear contradictory in that it is first stated that the trial court may grant a mistrial if he believes the incident “probably” influenced the jury, but secondly, that a mistrial should be granted if the trial court concludes the incident “probably did” influence the jury. The latter statement is correct and in accordance with our holding in Skeen v. Skeen, 76 Utah 32, 287 P. 320. I assume that is the rule Mr. Justice Crockett intends to follow;
I do not concur in Mr. Justice Crockett’s inferred characterization of Mr. Barker as a “wiseacre” or in the attribution to him of a belief that one class of litigants is always right. While it is true that Mr. Barker did state that
“my experience is that * * * they [insurance companies] are very fair and where there is a settlement due they make it”
*368and
“1 have yet to see a fair case where the insurance company hasn’t settled where there is a settlement due,”
he later stated,
“If Z. C. M. I. are insured and this has undoubtedly been brought to the insurance company’s attention and they refuse settlement I feel that they would have some ground for it.”
Taking these statements as a whole, I think their fair import is that based on his experience with insurance companies, Mr. Barker believed they settled claims presented to them unless they had some justifiable ground for refusing to do so. While Mr. Barker should have been more direct in answering the questions asked him by the court, I think his lengthy answers were prompted by doubt in his mind whether he should serve on the panel and an honest desire to disclose what was in his mind in order that the court might help him determine whether he could act impartially.
As for the contention of the appellant that Mr. Barker’s statements on voir dire examination prejudiced the jurors against him [the appellant] I agree with Mr. Justice Crockett that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. In fact, had the jury found in favor of the appellant, the respondent might be here contending Mr. Barker’s statements prejudiced the jury against it since he disclosed the likelihood that Z. C. M. I. was insured.
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the result.