Court Opinion

ID: 9401551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 16:09:35.495218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.353835
License: Public Domain

J-S15011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                             :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                             :
                v.                           :
                                             :
                                             :
 CHARLES LEROY WOOD                          :
                                             :
                       Appellant             :   No. 1343 MDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 1, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-08-CR-0000177-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 13, 2023

      Charles Leroy Wood appeals from the judgment of sentence of three to

ten years of incarceration, followed by three years of probation, imposed after

Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count each of incest of a minor and

corruption of minors. Counsel has filed an application to withdraw and brief

pursuant   to        Anders   v.   California,   386   U.S.   738   (1967),   and

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).                  We affirm the

judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s application to withdraw.

      By way of background, Appellant was charged with rape of a child, incest

of a minor, sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault of a child, endangering

the welfare of children, indecent exposure, corruption of minors, and indecent

assault of a person less than thirteen years of age based upon the abuse he

levied against his seven-year-old daughter during his periods of partial

physical custody of his minor children. Appellant pled no contest to incest of
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a minor and corruption of minors in exchange for dismissal of the remaining

charges.   Although Appellant’s specific sentence was not part of the plea

agreement, there was an agreement to standard range sentences and lifetime

sexual offender registration.   On September 1, 2022, the court sentenced

Appellant to two to six years of incarceration for incest of a minor, followed

by one to four years of incarceration for corruption of a minor.    The court

additionally imposed a consecutive, mandatory three-year period of probation

for incest of a minor. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.5(a) (“A person who is convicted

of [among other things, incest of a minor,] shall be sentenced to a mandatory

period of probation of three years consecutive to and in addition to any other

lawful sentence issued by the court.”). Appellant filed a post-sentence motion

for reconsideration of his sentence, which was denied.

      This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In this Court, Appellant’s counsel filed both an Anders brief

and a petition to withdraw as counsel. As such, the following legal principles

govern our review:

      Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders must file
      a petition averring that, after a conscientious examination of the
      record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Counsel
      must also file an Anders brief setting forth issues that might
      arguably support the appeal along with any other issues necessary
      for the effective appellate presentation thereof . . . .

      Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition
      and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to
      retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points
      worthy of this Court’s attention.

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       If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical requirements of
       Anders, this Court will deny the petition to withdraw and remand
       the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., directing counsel
       either to comply with Anders or file an advocate’s brief on
       Appellant’s behalf). By contrast, if counsel’s petition and brief
       satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our own review of the
       appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 720-21 (Pa.Super. 2007)

(cleaned up). Our Supreme Court further detailed counsel’s duties as follows:

       [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s
       petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the
       procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer
       to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports
       the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
       frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the
       appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
       record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have
       led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, supra at 361.

       Our examination of counsel’s petition to withdraw and Anders brief

reveals that, despite the brief’s terseness and lack of structure, counsel has

substantially complied with these technical requirements.1 Therefore, we now

proceed “‘to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an

independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly

frivolous.’” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1249 (Pa.Super.

2015) (quoting Santiago, supra at 354 n.5).

____________________________________________

1At the direction of this Court, counsel corrected his initial letter to Appellant
wherein he had misadvised Appellant that he could ask this Court to appoint
counsel to assist him in his appeal.

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      The sole issue counsel has identified that Appellant wishes to raise is

that “his sentence was ‘too harsh.’” Anders brief at 3. Appellant’s attack on

the alleged excessiveness of his sentence implicates the sentencing court’s

discretion. Thus, the following principles apply to our consideration of whether

review of the merits of his claim is warranted. “An appellant is not entitled to

the review of challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right.

Rather, an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A3d

1001, 1006-07 (Pa.Super. 2014).      To determine whether an appellant has

invoked our jurisdiction, we consider the following four factors:

      (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2)
      whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a
      motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether
      appellant’s brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a
      substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Id.

      Here, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion and notice of appeal.

Since we are considering this claim in the context of an Anders brief, counsel’s

failure to include a Pa.R.A.P. 20119(f) in the brief is not a fatal defect. See

Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 661 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“[W]e do

not consider counsel’s failure to submit a Rule 2119(f) statement as precluding

review of whether Appellant’s issue is frivolous.”). Based upon Appellant’s

post-sentence motion, Appellant has raised a substantial question as to

whether the trial court double-counted sentencing factors by considering the

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victim’s age and Appellant’s parental status when those factors were elements

of the crimes and therefore already accounted for in the offense gravity score.2

See Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“[A]

claim that the court double-counted factors already considered in the

sentencing guidelines raises a substantial question.” (cleaned up)). Based on

the foregoing, we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this claim.

       Our standard of review is well-settled. Since “sentencing is a matter

vested in the sound discretion of the trial court[, it] will not be disturbed on

appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d

995, 998 (Pa.Super. 2009) (cleaned up). Our review of the certified record

reveals that the court sentenced Appellant within the standard range of the

sentencing guidelines for each count and had the benefit of a PSI report. The

court imposed the sentences at the top end of the standard ranges based upon

the age of the victim and the serious nature of the offenses. Additionally, the

court considered Appellant’s relationship to the victim, in that as her father,

Appellant was in a position of trust and “depended on for protection,” but he

nonetheless “took advantage of that child and exploited her for his own selfish

reasons[.]”     N.T. Sentencing, 9/1/22, at 7-8.   In response to Appellant’s

allegation that this constituted impermissible double-counting of factors, the

court elaborated in its Rule 1925(a) opinion as follows:

____________________________________________

2 We disagree with counsel’s contention that Appellant cannot raise a
substantial question. See Anders brief at 4. We do, however, agree with
counsel’s conclusion that the claim is meritless, as discussed infra.

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       Indeed, the age of victim would be considered in the corruption of
       minor offense gravity score in that the crime protects minors
       under the age of eighteen years of age. Thus a victim could be
       one day of age to seventeen years 364 days of age. Here, the
       victim was seven years of age. Given the range of ages, it is
       appropriate to take into consideration the age of the victim when
       considering sentence for the crime of corruption of minors.
       Appellant also asserts the court inappropriately considered that
       Appellant was the father of the victim. The crime of incest
       includes “an ancestor or descendant, a brother or sister of the
       whole or half blood or an uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the whole
       blood.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302. Given the various relationships listed,
       it is appropriate to consider that the victim of incest was the
       seven-year-old daughter of Appellant.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at unnumbered 3 (cleaned up).

       We agree and discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

imposition of standard range sentences. Furthermore, our “simple review of

the record to ascertain if there appear[s] on its face to be arguably meritorious

issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated[,]” has revealed

no additional issues counsel failed to address.3          Commonwealth v.

Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc). Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

       Application of Jason G. Beardsley, Esquire, to withdraw as counsel is

granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

3We have conducted our review mindful of the fact that “upon entry of a [no-
contest] plea, a defendant waives all claims and defenses other than those
sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the plea, and what has
been termed the ‘legality’ of the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v.
Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268, 1275 (Pa. 2014).

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 06/13/2023

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