Court Opinion

ID: 9926833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 19:00:47.539491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:03.804208
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50538        Document: 00517043919             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/25/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 23-50538
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                               January 25, 2024
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   Lisa Lewis-Watson,                                                                 Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Christine E. Wormuth, Secretary of the Army; John F. Bash,
   United States Attorney; Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General;
   Solicitor General of the United States,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                              USDC No. 5:22-CV-1289
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Lisa Lewis-Watson appeals claims related to her 2013 separation from
   employment with the Department of the Army and related loss of health
   insurance coverage, and her 2021 non-selections for two different federal
   jobs. The district court determined that her claims arising from her 2013

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-50538      Document: 00517043919           Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/25/2024

                                     No. 23-50538

   separation from employment were barred by res judicata, and that her claims
   arising from her 2021 employment non-selection were barred due to Lewis-
   Watson’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We AFFIRM.
                                          I.
          Lisa Lewis-Watson is a disabled, single mother who was previously
   employed by the Department of the Army. On July 18, 2013, Lewis-Watson
   was terminated from that position and placed on a 30-day administrative
   leave. At the end of those 30 days, Lewis-Watson’s employer-provided
   health insurance expired. Based on these events, as well as for non-selection
   for other federal employment positions, Lewis-Watson filed charges of
   discrimination against her former employer with the Equal Employment
   Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in 2014. The EEOC dismissed these
   claims, a decision which was affirmed on administrative appeal. Then, in
   2017, Lewis-Watson filed suit for wrongful termination, retaliation, and
   workplace discrimination in federal district court based on the same conduct
   as the 2014 EEOC charges. These claims were similarly dismissed on
   summary judgment, and those rulings were affirmed on appeal. See Watson v.
   Esper, 793 F. App’x 277, 279 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom Watson v.
   McCarthy, 140 S. Ct. 2808 (2020).
          In 2021, after the conclusion of her first lawsuit, Lewis-Watson
   applied for two federal employment positions. On February 9, 2021, Lewis-
   Watson applied for a medical-records specialist position with the Air Force
   Medical Readiness Agency at the Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio,
   Texas. On October 7, 2021, she applied for a medical-records administrator
   position with the Defense Health Agency in Falls Church, Virginia. Lewis-
   Watson was not selected for either position. Lewis-Watson never filed
   EEOC charges related to these 2021 non-selections. Rather, Lewis-Watson
   filed suit in federal district court on December 2, 2022, asserting, inter alia,

                                               2
Case: 23-50538         Document: 00517043919               Page: 3      Date Filed: 01/25/2024

                                          No. 23-50538

   claims for relief related to her 2013 separation from employment and related
   loss of health insurance coverage, and her 2021 employment non-selections. 1
   Adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court
   dismissed Lewis-Watson’s claims with prejudice, determining that her
   claims related to her 2013 separation from employment were barred by res
   judicata, and that her claims arising from her 2021 employment non-
   selections were barred due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
   Lewis-Watson timely appealed.
                                                II.
           “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
   for failure to state a claim.” Jeanty v. Big Bubba’s Bail Bonds, 72 F.4th 116,
   118–19 (5th Cir. 2023). Motions to dismiss evaluate the adequacy of the
   allegations in a complaint rather than the merits of the case, so we “accept[]
   all well-pleaded facts as true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable
   to the plaintiff.” Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673,
   675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hines v. Alldredge, 783 F.3d 197, 200–01 (5th
   Cir. 2015)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
                                               III.
                                                A.
           We begin with Lewis-Watson’s attempt to relitigate claims related to
   her 2013 separation from employment and related loss of insurance coverage.
   “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes

           _____________________
           1
              Lewis-Watson also challenged the October 2022 denial of her application for
   social security disability benefits. However, Lewis-Watson voluntarily conceded that the
   district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate her social security claim. The
   district court agreed and dismissed the social security claim without prejudice. Lewis-
   Watson does not appeal this determination.

                                                      3
Case: 23-50538      Document: 00517043919            Page: 4    Date Filed: 01/25/2024

                                      No. 23-50538

   the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have
   been raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). “[R]es
   judicata encompasses two separate but linked preclusive doctrines: (1) true
   res judicata or claim preclusion and (2) collateral estoppel or issue
   preclusion.” Hous. Pro. Towing Ass’n v. City of Houston, 812 F.3d 443, 447
   (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 466–
   67 (5th Cir. 2013)). True res judicata, the doctrine applicable here, “bars the
   litigation of claims that either have been litigated or should have been raised
   in an earlier suit.” Id. (quoting Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428
   F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005)).
            True res judicata precludes litigation when: “(1) the parties are
   identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a
   court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final
   judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was
   involved in both actions.” Comer, 718 F.3d at 467 (quoting Test Masters, 428
   F.3d at 571). Additionally, this court has adopted the “transactional test” to
   determine whether two cases involve the same claim. See Hous. Pro. Towing,
   812 F.3d at 447. “The transactional test focuses on whether the two cases are
   based on the same nucleus of operative facts.” Id. (internal citations and
   quotations omitted). “The nucleus of operative facts, rather than the type of
   relief requested, substantive theories advanced, or types of rights asserted,
   defines the claim.” United States v. Davenport, 484 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir.
   2007).
            Here, we agree with the district court that Lewis-Watson’s prior
   lawsuit precludes her from relitigating those issues in her current case. As to
   the first two prongs of true res judicata, the parties in both cases are identical,
   and Lewis-Watson does not challenge the prior court’s jurisdiction. As to the
   third prong, the district court in Lewis-Watson’s prior lawsuit granted
   summary judgment against Lewis-Watson, denied Lewis-Watson’s

                                               4
Case: 23-50538         Document: 00517043919               Page: 5       Date Filed: 01/25/2024

                                           No. 23-50538

   successive Rule 59 motions, and ultimately entered final judgment in the
   case. See Watson v. Esper, No. 5:17-CV-01280-OLG, 2019 WL 13254200
   (W.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2019). As noted, these decisions were upheld on
   successive appeals. Lewis-Watson contends that because the previous
   district court’s order did not specify whether the dismissals were with or
   without prejudice, we must assume they were without prejudice and that she
   is free to relitigate those issues. However, “a dismissal is presumed to be with
   prejudice unless the order explicitly states otherwise.” Fernandez-Montes v.
   Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, as the district
   court correctly concluded, “[t]his is as final as a final judgment can get.”
            Finally, prong four is likewise satisfied. Lewis-Watson herself
   concedes that her “claims are actually the same” as her prior lawsuit. In an
   attempt to resist res judicata’s preclusive effects, Lewis-Watson argues that
   she is now asserting additional injuries since the judgment in her prior case,
   and that she should be allowed to litigate these additional injuries. However,
   all of these injuries still stem from Lewis-Watson’s termination of
   employment and her loss of employer-provided health insurance. In other
   words, Lewis-Watson’s claims in both lawsuits revolve around the same set
   of interactions—i.e., the same nucleus of operative facts—between her ex-
   employer and herself. Therefore, under the transactional test, her prior
   lawsuit involved the “same claims” as her current lawsuit, and res judicata
   bars her current suit’s adjudication. 2
                                                B.

           _____________________
           2
             Lewis-Watson also cites Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 895 (2008), and argues
   that it provides an applicable exception to res judicata’s preclusive effect. However,
   Sturgell dealt with exceptions to the general rule regarding nonparty preclusion. See Sturgell,
   553 U.S. at 893. Here, Lewis-Watson was a party to both actions, rendering Sturgell
   inapplicable.

                                                      5
Case: 23-50538      Document: 00517043919           Page: 6    Date Filed: 01/25/2024

                                     No. 23-50538

          We now turn to Lewis-Watson’s claims related to her 2021
   employment non-selections. In order to assert Title VII claims in federal
   court, a plaintiff “must [first] exhaust administrative remedies” by filling a
   charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged violation and receiving
   a statutory notice of the right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Taylor v.
   Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs have
   “ninety days to file a civil action after receipt of such a notice from the
   EEOC.” See Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). “This
   requirement to file a lawsuit within the ninety-day limitation period is strictly
   construed.” Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379.
          Lewis-Watson does not argue that she satisfied these requirements.
   Rather, Lewis-Watson argues that she should not be required to exhaust
   administrative remedies because she previously raised non-selection claims
   before the EEOC in 2014. However, rather than excuse exhaustion, each
   allegedly discriminatory non-selection constituted a “discrete discriminatory
   act” that “start[ed] a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” See Nat’l
   R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). In short, Lewis-
   Watson was still required to exhaust administrative remedies related to her
   2021 non-selections, regardless of her prior administrative exhaustion in
   2014 related to other non-selection claims.
                                          IV.
          We find no reversible error in the district court’s decision to dismiss
   Lewis-Watson’s claims. AFFIRMED.

                                                6