Court Opinion

ID: 9939670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 13:09:46.12223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:45.747985
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania             :
                                         :
                v.                       : No. 473 C.D. 2020
                                         : Submitted: October 11, 2023
Frederick W. Karash,                     :
                               Appellant :

BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
                HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
                HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
                HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                     FILED: February 6, 2024

         Frederick W. Karash (Defendant) appeals pro se from the Court of Common
Pleas of Erie County’s (trial court) judgment of sentence following his summary
conviction for violating the Fish and Boat Code1 (the Code) by having an insufficient
number of life jackets known as personal floatation devices (PFDs) aboard his boat.
Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion and the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. After review, we affirm.
                                  BACKGROUND
         Around 7:30 p.m. on May 20, 2016, while patrolling Lake Erie, Officer James
Smolko (Officer Smolko), a waterways conservation officer (WCO) for the

1
    30 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-7314.
Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission (Commission), observed individuals
fishing from Defendant’s boat, which was a Sea Ray Cabin Cruiser approximately
22 feet in length. Trial Court Opinion, 12/24/18, (Op.), at 1; Notes of Testimony,
9/14/18, (N.T.) at 8, 22.2 Officer Smolko approached Defendant’s boat to conduct a
fishing license check. Op. at 1; N.T. at 9-10. At the time, Officer Smolko was
dressed in full uniform and driving a marked patrol boat. Op. at 1; N.T. at 6-7. Two
cadet trainees and another WCO were also on the patrol boat with Officer Smolko.
Id. Officer Smolko did not activate his patrol boat’s lights or sirens as he approached
Defendant’s boat. Op. at 1; N.T. at 9.
       Officer Smolko motored his patrol boat close to Defendant’s boat and
identified himself as a WCO. Op. at 1; N.T. at 10. Officer Smolko requested that
the people on board hold up their fishing licenses. Op. at 3; N.T. at 10. Pennsylvania
fishing licenses are small cards with images displayed on the front, which vary
between an outline of the keystone or the outline of a fish. N.T. at 12. The back of
the fishing license provides the license holder’s name and other identifying features.
Id. at 13. After confirming the individuals who were fishing possessed fishing
licenses, Officer Smolko informed Defendant he was going to conduct a safety
equipment inspection of the boat, as was ordinary for Officer Smolko following a
fishing license check. Op. at 3; N.T. at 13.
       Routinely, to conduct a safety equipment inspection, Officer Smolko would
check to ensure the boat carried sufficient life jackets or PFDs, and a Type 4
throwable device, which is a throwable seat cushion buoy.                      N.T. at 13-14.
Additionally, Officer Smolko would check for the visual distress signals, day and
night use flares or a distress flag, a fire extinguisher, and the boat’s registration. Id.

2
 N.T. refers to the transcript of the September 14, 2018 suppression hearing held before the trial
court.

                                                2
at 14.     Officer Smolko would not board boats to conduct safety equipment
inspections, but rather would request the owners or operators of the boats to show
him the equipment for his inspection. Op. at 4; N.T. at 17.
         Here, while conducting the safety equipment inspection of Defendant’s boat,
Officer Smolko requested Defendant hand everyone on board a wearable PFD so
Officer Smolko could determine whether the equipment was readily accessible, in
serviceable condition, and the appropriate size for the individuals on board. Op. at
5; N.T. at 26-27. While Defendant’s boat had five people on board, Defendant had
only four wearable PFDs. Op. at 5; N.T. at 15-16. After determining Defendant was
not in compliance with Section 97.1(b) of the Commission’s Regulations,3 which
requires a boater have at least one wearable PFD on board for each person, 58 Pa.
Code § 97.1(b), Officer Smolko took Defendant’s identification and drove away
from Defendant’s boat to do a vessel and license check through Erie County
dispatch. Op. at 5; N.T. at 17-18. At the end of the encounter, Officer Smolko gave
Defendant a wearable PFD from his patrol boat so Defendant could continue to boat
and return to the marina. Op. at 5; N.T. at 16. During the entire interaction between
Officer Smolko and Defendant, no WCOs boarded Defendant’s boat or tied the boats
together. Op. at 5; N.T. at 17. The encounter lasted between 30 and 40 minutes.
Op. at 6; N.T. at 17, 113.
         Officer Smolko issued a summary citation to Defendant for violating Section
97.1(b) of the Commission’s Regulations, 58 Pa. Code § 97.1(b). On June 23, 2016,
a magisterial district judge found Defendant guilty of the offense. Defendant
appealed to the trial court. Prior to the trial de novo, Defendant filed a suppression
motion arguing the stop constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the

3
 The Commission’s Regulations refer to Part II, relating to the Fish and Boat Commission, of
Title 58 of the Pennsylvania Administrative Code. See 58 Pa. Code §§ 51.1 – 119.8.

                                             3
federal and state constitutions. On September 9, 2016, the trial court conducted a
combined suppression hearing and trial.              The trial court denied Defendant’s
suppression motion, found him guilty, and sentenced him to a $75.00 fine.
Defendant appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. A divided three-judge
panel reversed Defendant’s conviction and found the stop violated his right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Commonwealth petitioned for
reargument, which the Superior Court granted, vacating the panel’s decision. On
May 30, 2018, the Superior Court, en banc, concluded deficiencies in the record
precluded its review and vacated Defendant’s judgment of sentence and remanded
for a new suppression hearing so the record could be properly developed.
       On September 14, 2018, the trial court held a suppression hearing and denied
Defendant’s motion to suppress. Subsequently, on May 6, 2019, the trial court held
a trial de novo and denied Defendant’s summary appeal, reimposing his sentence.
Defendant appealed to the Superior Court. On April 3, 2020, the Superior Court
transferred the case to this Court.
       On appeal to this Court, Defendant, pro se, challenges the denial of his
suppression motion and his conviction.4 Regarding the denial of his suppression

4
 For ease of reference and analysis, we have summarized Defendant’s challenges. In his brief,
Defendant asserts nine questions for review as follows:

       1 Did the Commonwealth meet its burden of proof?
       2 Was the Ruling of failure to suppress evidence by the lower court unconstitutional
       as applied by both the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Federal Constitution?
       Furthermore, was the law used to justify this intrusion properly interpreted and
       applied?
       3 Did the Commonwealth show that a special circumstance exists that would enable
       it to readily usurp the most basic of rights?
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                4
motion, Defendant argues he had a reasonable expectation of privacy on his boat and
Officer Smolko’s stop and detention of his boat was not supported by reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or a search warrant, and thus violated his right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure.              Defendant’s Br. at 8.        Regarding his
conviction, Defendant asserts the Commonwealth failed to prove Defendant did not
have the required number of PFDs aboard his boat. Id. at 7
       In response, the Commonwealth asserts the stop of Defendant’s boat and brief
inspection of the fishing licenses, and the subsequent safety inspection, were not
unreasonable, and thus did not violate either the state or federal constitutions.
Commonwealth’s Br. at 4-12. The Commonwealth points out Officer Smolko’s stop
of Defendant’s boat to conduct a fishing license check was not unreasonable as it
was his duty as a WCO and is required by the Code. Id. at 12-13. Similarly, the

       4 The Commonwealth uses the excuse of safety as the crux of its argument to justify
       intrusions on my liberty and privacy. Did the Commonwealth create a hazard to
       both myself and my passengers as well as the [WCOs] on board my vessel?
       5 It is not Contended that the search was done absent of reasonable suspicion and
       probable cause. Did the stop and search conducted of my boat meet the criteria of
       being a systematic check rather than an overreach of law enforcement done at the
       discretion of the officers in the [field]?
       6 Based on the testimony found credible by the lower court of the Commonwealth
       witness [Officer Smolko], did the Commonwealth contradict itself so egregiously
       as to leave the question of fact indeterminable?
       7 Should the Commonwealth Witnesses and the Prosecutors be prosecuted for the
       egregious behavior and blatant disregard for the rule of law based on the
       contradictory testimony of the Commonwealth witness and inability to honor
       his/their Constitutional oath?
       8 Did the Commonwealth prove that a less intrusive method of ensuring boater
       safety is not practical?
       9 Did Officer Smolko ignore previous edicts set forth by both the lower courts and
       the Superior Court in conducting searches/inspections of boats that lacked probable
       cause?

Defendant’s Br. at 5.

                                               5
Commonwealth asserts the safety equipment inspection of Defendant’s boat was not
unreasonable as boaters are required to possess certain safety equipment and the
Code sets forth the powers and duties of the WCOs, which includes stopping and
boarding any boat to inspect for compliance.             Id. at 13-15.     Finally, the
Commonwealth contends it produced sufficient evidence to prove Defendant failed
to have the required number of wearable PFDs aboard his boat. Id. at 17.
                                    DISCUSSION
                                 Suppression Motion
      First, we consider Defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his
suppression motion. When addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression
motion, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s factual findings
are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
trial court, we consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so much of the
Defendant’s evidence as is uncontradicted. Id. So long as the trial court’s factual
findings are supported by the record, we are bound by those findings and will reverse
the trial court’s decision only if its legal conclusions are erroneous. Id. To the extent
we address issues of law, our review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Beaman, 880
A.2d 578, 581 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted). In other words, we “are not bound by
the legal conclusions of the . . . lower court[].” EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of
Jefferson Hills, 208 A.3d 1010, 1025 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted).
      Because we are addressing a constitutional challenge, we begin by reviewing
the Fourth Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution, U.S. Const. amend.

                                           6
IV (Fourth Amendment), and its similar state counterpart, article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, § 8. The Fourth Amendment provides:

       The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
       effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
       violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
       supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
       to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.        Similarly article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides:

       The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
       possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant
       to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without
       describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause,
       supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.

Pa. Const. art. I, § 8.
       These constitutional provisions guarantee an individual’s freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, but they do so only in areas where an individual
has a protected privacy interest. Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 699
(Pa. 2014).     Where an individual does not have a reasonable and protected
expectation of privacy, neither the Fourth Amendment nor article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution is implicated. Id. Where there is not a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a place, a search or seizure cannot be deemed unreasonable,
even if the police lacked probable cause or a warrant. Commonwealth v. Edwards,
874 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Pa. Super. 2005). There is no dispute in this case that Officer
Smolko did not have reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant before
approaching Defendant’s boat to conduct a fishing license check or subsequent
safety equipment inspection. Whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of

                                           7
privacy in a boat on the water such that a WCO’s approach and stop of the boat to
conduct a fishing license check or safety equipment inspection, absent reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or a search warrant, violates the individual’s
constitutionally protected rights, is an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania. We
must determine (1) whether Defendant demonstrated he had a reasonable and
legitimate expectation of privacy which was infringed upon by Officer Smolko and
(2) whether Officer Smolko’s seizure of Defendant was constitutionally
“reasonable.” See Commonwealth v. Kane, 210 A.3d 324, 330 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citation and bracket omitted).
      We begin our analysis by considering Pennsylvania case law related to vehicle
seizures by law enforcement generally. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
determined that while individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy in their
vehicles than in their homes, occupants of vehicles do not forfeit all expectations of
privacy.   Commonwealth v. Maguire, 215 A.3d 566, 574 (Pa. 2019) (citation
omitted). When a law enforcement officer initiates a vehicle stop, the vehicle, as
well as the driver, are seized for purposes of the state and federal constitutions.
Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278, 287 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). For
such seizure to be constitutional, it must be reasonable. Id. To determine whether a
seizure that is less intrusive than a traditional arrest is “reasonable,” the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has directed reviewing courts to apply the Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47 (1979), three-prong balancing test. Beaman, 880 A.2d at 582. Under this test,
the court weighs “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree
to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference
with individual liberty.” Brown, 443 U.S. at 50. Under this standard, to be deemed
“reasonable,” the seizure ordinarily must have been supported by reasonable

                                            8
suspicion, based upon objective facts, that the individual was involved in criminal
activity. Id. at 51.
       However, while the general rule requires law enforcement have, at least,
reasonable suspicion to initiate a seizure, the existence of individualized suspicion
is not a requirement in every situation. Rather, Pennsylvania acknowledges an
exception to this general rule where law enforcement seizures are designed to serve
a governmental “special need.” Beaman, 880 A.2d at 582. For example, both the
United States Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have recognized,
under some circumstances, the constitutionality of roadblocks and checkpoints,
which effectively constitute suspicionless seizures.
       In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990), the
United States Supreme Court determined driving under the influence roadblocks
constitute a reasonable means of advancing the vital public interest in reducing
impaired driving deaths and injuries, while they involve only a modest intrusion on
the privacy and liberty of motorists. Therefore, the Court concluded that such
checkpoints do not offend the Fourth Amendment. Id. Similarly, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held “systematic, non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary checkpoints
do not offend the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Worthy, 957 A.2d
720, 724–25 (Pa. 2008) (citations omitted). Specifically, in Commonwealth v.
Blouse, 611 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa. 1992), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded
that checkpoints instituted to detect registration, licensing, and equipment violations
are consistent with article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, so long as
they are conducted in conformance with required guidelines. The Court noted
substantial compliance with these guidelines, as outlined below, is all that is required
to reduce the intrusiveness on the individual to a constitutionally acceptable level:

                                           9
      [T]he conduct of the roadblock itself can be such that it requires only a
      momentary stop to allow the police to make a brief but trained
      observation of a vehicle’s driver, without entailing any physical search
      of the vehicle or its occupants. To avoid unnecessary surprise to
      motorists, the existence of a roadblock can be so conducted as to be
      ascertainable from a reasonable distance or otherwise made knowable
      in advance. The possibility of arbitrary roadblocks can be significantly
      curtailed by the institution of certain safeguards. First the very decision
      to hold a . . . roadblock, as well as the decision as to its time and place,
      should be matters reserved for prior administrative approval, thus
      removing the determination of those matters from the discretion of
      police officers in the field. In this connection it is essential that the route
      selected for the roadblock be one which, based on local experience, is
      likely to be travelled by intoxicated drivers. The time of the roadblock
      should be governed by the same consideration. Additionally, the
      question of which vehicles to stop at the roadblock should not be left to
      the unfettered discretion of police officers at the scene, but instead
      should be in accordance with objective standards prefixed by
      administrative decision.

Id.   Therefore, Pennsylvania law acknowledges, under certain conditions,
suspicionless seizures of vehicles do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment
or article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
      While the courts of this Commonwealth have not yet had the opportunity to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution prohibit a WCO from approaching and detaining a boat
on the water to conduct a fishing license check and safety equipment inspection
absent reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a search warrant, other jurisdictions
have examined similar issues. Although we are not bound by decisions of courts of
other jurisdictions, when confronted with a question unaddressed by the courts of
this Commonwealth, we may use those decisions for guidance so long as they are
compatible with Pennsylvania law. M4 Holdings, LLC v. Lake Harmony Ests. Prop.
Owners’ Ass’n, 237 A.3d 1208, 1221 n.14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (citation omitted).

                                            10
         First, we examine the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United
States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1991). In Thompson, the United States
Coast Guard boarded the defendant’s boat to conduct a documents and safety
inspection. Id. While conducting the inspection, the Coast Guard found cocaine in
a storage compartment. Id.             Following his indictment for charges related to the
cocaine, the defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing the Coast Guard’s search
of his boat violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Id. In affirming the lower court’s denial of his suppression
motion, the court wrote: “[A]t sea, a person’s expectation of privacy may be severely
restricted compared with expectations of privacy on land.” Id. at 1064-65. The court
noted this lowered expectation of privacy is, at least in part, due to the statutory
authorization of the Coast Guard to board boats and conduct document and safety
inspections under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a),5 even without suspicion of criminal activity.

5
    Section 89(a), titled Law Enforcement, provides:

         The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
         seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States
         has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws
         of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers
         may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the
         operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board,
         examine the ship’s documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the
         vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. When from such inquiries,
         examination, inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the laws of the United
         States rendering a person liable to arrest is being, or has been committed, by any
         person, such person shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore, shall be immediately
         pursued and arrested on shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken;
         or, if it shall appear that a breach of the laws of the United States has been
         committed so as to render such vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on
         board of, or brought into the United States by, such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or
         so as to render such vessel liable to a fine or penalty and if necessary to secure such
         fine or penalty, such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be seized.
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  11
Id. Because the statute expressly granted the Coast Guard authority to board boats
and conduct inspections, the court concluded that an individual could not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in any area the Coast Guard was authorized to
inspect and safety check. Id. While the court noted the Coast Guard would not be
permitted to rummage through private areas, knapsacks, or duffel bags, it pointed
out that because the defendant did not know where the safety equipment was located,
the Coast Guard could actively search for the safety equipment in various parts of
the boat, including the storage compartment which contained items subject to
inspection like life jackets and sails. Id. at 1065.
         Next, in Schenekl v. State, 996 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex. App. 1999), the Court
of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth, addressed a similar issue. A game warden was
patrolling a lake in his marked patrol boat when he observed the defendant’s boat
pulling out of the marina. Id. By authority of Texas’s Parks and Wildlife Code,6 the
warden, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, stopped and boarded the
defendant’s boat for a water safety check. Id. After observing the defendant during
the safety check, the warden requested the defendant submit to sobriety tests, which
ultimately led the warden to arrest the defendant for boating while intoxicated. Id.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress before the trial court asserting the Parks
and Wildlife Code’s provision permitting a warden to stop and board a boat for a
water safety check without reasonable suspicion or probable cause violated the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In

14 U.S.C. § 89(a).

6
    Tex. Parks & Wild. Code §§ 1.001-355.003 (1975).

                                              12
affirming the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s suppression motion, the court
noted:

         The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures,
         only those that are deemed unreasonable . . . . However, under certain
         limited circumstances, searches and seizures conducted without
         individualized suspicion may be reasonable under the Fourth
         Amendment.

Id. at 309. While the court concluded the defendant had an expectation of privacy
in his boat, it observed, in comparison to a home, the expectation of privacy was
diminished. Id. at 310. The court explained:

         The scope and length of the detention here were not intrusive. The
         enforcement provision authorizes detention only for the purpose of
         ensuring compliance with the registration and safety requirements. The
         intrusion is minimal in scope because the search may only be directed
         at the safety items listed in the statute. Further, while the boat must
         carry several safety and registration items, only a brief visual inspection
         is necessary to determine compliance.

Id. The court ultimately concluded that in balancing the state’s “substantial interest
in recreational water safety against the intrusion involved, the enforcement provision
of [the Parks and Wildlife Code did] not authorize searches and seizures that violate
the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 311.
         Similarly, in State v. Pike, 532 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. App. 2000), a wildlife
resource commission officer stopped a boat to conduct a safety check. At the time
of the stop, the officer did not observe any illegal activity or activity which would
violate the rules or regulations of the wildlife resources commission. Id. at 545. The
officer never boarded the boat, but following the safety inspection, the officer
arrested the defendant for operating a motor vessel while impaired.               Id. The
defendant filed a motion for suppression, which the trial court granted concluding

                                             13
that the stop of defendant’s boat was not based upon any reasonable suspicion of
illegal activity and thus violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Id. The state appealed. The Court of Appeals of
North Carolina reversed noting that while the defendant had an expectation of
privacy in his boat, it was a diminished one. Id. Considering the practicalities of
the officer’s stop, the court explained:

      [I]t is impractical as well as perhaps, impossible to check that a vessel
      is complying with statutory safety regulations if the State is unable to
      verify that the requirements are being met while the vessel is at sea.
      Thus, we find it necessary that vessels be stopped in order to do safety
      checks (for fire extinguishers, life jackets and the like). . . . [T]he
      officers here never boarded defendant’s vessel to inspect it. Thus, their
      interference with defendant’s right to privacy was even less intrusive
      than in Schenekl. The question then becomes whether, in conducting
      their inspection of defendant’s vessel, the officers impermissibly
      detained defendant. We think not.

Id. at 548 (emphasis in original). The court ultimately concluded that under the
relevant statute authorizing an officer to stop a boat without probable cause for the
purpose of inspection, the officers’ stop was reasonable. Id. at 549.
      Furthermore, in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983),
the United States Supreme Court addressed whether customs officials violated the
Fourth Amendment when they boarded a boat without any suspicion of wrongdoing
to inspect documents, when acting under 19 U.S.C. § 1581, which provides:

      Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel
      . . . at any place in the United States . . . and examine the manifest and
      other documents and papers . . . and to this end may hail and stop such
      vessel . . . and use all necessary force to compel compliance.

The Court explained its conclusion that the government’s boarding of the boat did
not violate the Fourth Amendment as follows:

                                           14
      [H]ere[,] the First Congress clearly authorized the suspicionless
      boarding of vessels, reflecting its view that such boardings are not
      contrary to the Fourth Amendment; this gives the statute before us an
      impressive historical pedigree. Random stops without any articulable
      suspicion of vehicles away from the border are not permissible under
      the Fourth Amendment . . . but stops at fixed checkpoints or at
      roadblocks are. The nature of waterborne commerce in waters
      providing ready access to the open sea is sufficiently different from the
      nature of vehicular traffic on highways as to make possible alternatives
      to the sort of “stop” made in this case less likely to accomplish the
      obviously essential governmental purposes involved. The system of
      prescribed outward markings used by States for vehicle registration is
      also significantly different than the system of external markings on
      vessels, and the extent and type of documentation required by federal
      law is a good deal more variable and more complex than are the state
      vehicle registration laws. The nature of the governmental interest in
      assuring compliance with documentation requirements . . . are
      substantial; the type of intrusion made in this case, while not minimal,
      is limited. All of these factors lead us to conclude that the action of the
      . . . officers in stopping and boarding the [vessel] was “reasonable,” and
      was therefore consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 592-93 (internal citations omitted).
      Next, we turn to the law governing the authority of WCOs in Pennsylvania.
The Commission’s purpose is to administer and enforce the Code and other
Commonwealth laws relating to the “encouragement, promotion and development
of the fishery interests,” the “protection, propagation and distribution of fish,” the
“management of boating and the operation of boats,” and the “encouragement,
promotion and development of recreational boating.” 30 Pa.C.S. § 321. The
Commission promulgates the rules and regulations for the use and protection of the
lands and waters of the Commonwealth as it deems necessary or in the best interest
of the Commonwealth. 30 Pa.C.S. § 741(a). Additionally, the Commission is
authorized to implement regulations to “provide for the operation and navigation of
boats, including the rules of the road for boating, the ways, manner, methods and

                                          15
means of boating, [and] the management of boats and the use thereof.” 30 Pa.C.S.
§ 5123(a).      In relevant part, the Commission’s regulations may relate to the
“[p]rotection of the health and safety of persons on boats, towed by boats, or on, in
or along the waters of this Commonwealth[,]” as well as the “[e]quipment
requirements for boats, operators of boats, passengers on boats and persons towed
or pulled by boats.” 30 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a)(1). To enforce the Code and the
Commission’s regulations, the Commission appoints WCOs with law enforcement
powers who have the power and duty to “[e]nforce all laws of this Commonwealth
relating to fish and watercraft.” 30 Pa.C.S. § 901(a)(1).
       Regarding the Commonwealth’s fishing license requirements, no person over
16 years of age is permitted to fish in any waters without first obtaining a fishing
license, which is required to be kept about the person while fishing and shown upon
the request of any WCO. 30 Pa.C.S. § 2703. The license holder must also produce
additional identification upon a WCO’s request. Id. Thus, WCOs are statutorily
authorized to ensure any individual fishing in the Commonwealth’s waters has a
valid fishing license. See id.
       Further, regarding safety equipment inspections, Section 901(a)(10) of the
Code provides WCOs with authority to stop and board boats to inspect for
compliance with the Code’s provisions dealing with boats and boating. 30 Pa.C.S.
§ 901(a)(10). This section provides an exception, specifying when a boat is lying at
its regular mooring or berth,7 a WCO cannot board without the owner’s consent or a
search warrant. Id.

7
  According to Boats.net’s website, a “mooring is a catch-all term that can be used any time a boat
is secured to any permanent fixture. It can also refer to the area of water used for storing boats by
securing them to fixtures on the water’s bed.” Berthing is a term used “to differentiate and describe
the type of mooring that occurs. It generally refers to smaller watercraft moored for an indefinite
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                16
       Here, Defendant argues Officer Smolko violated his state and federal
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.                   Specifically,
Defendant accuses the Commonwealth of believing that “simply because [he]
choose[s] to captain a boat that [he] has foregone [his] right to a reasonable
expectation of privacy.” Defendant’s Br. at 8.8 While we agree Defendant had an
expectation of privacy in his boat, we determine that, consistent with Pennsylvania
law regarding vehicles generally, Defendant’s expectation of privacy on his boat was
a diminished one.
       In light of the statutory authority the legislature granted to WCOs, Defendant
has failed to demonstrate that he had a reasonable or legitimate expectation of
privacy infringed upon by Officer Smolko. There is no statutory provision in the
Code that requires a WCO have reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a search
warrant to conduct a fishing license check. The statutory language clearly requires
people who are fishing to show their license and identification to a WCO upon
request. Similarly, there is no statutory provision in the Code requiring a WCO have
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a search warrant to conduct a safety

period of time in an allocated space within a dock.” See https://www.boats.net/blog/mooring-
docking-berthing-anchoring-explained#:~:text=Whenever%20a%20boat%20is%20attached,secu
red%20to%20any%20permanent%20fixture (last visited 2/5/2024).

8
  Defendant contends that because the boat contains both a bed and a lavatory, any “reasonable
person would expect privacy in their own bed and bathroom.” Defendant’s Br. at 8. However, we
accept the facts as found by the trial court so long as they are supported by the record. See Jones,
988 A.2d at 654. Thus, insofar as Defendant’s arguments rely on factual assertions that were not
found credible by the trial court, we reject those arguments. Because the trial court found credible
Officer Smolko’s testimony that no WCOs boarded Defendant’s boat at any time during the
encounter, we need not address any assertion that WCOs infringed on Defendant’s privacy by
entering bedroom or lavatory areas of Defendant’s boat.

                                                17
equipment inspection.9 We find instructive the legislature’s decision to carve out an
exception to the general rule mandating that when a boat is at its regular mooring or
berth, a WCO cannot board without consent of the owner or a search warrant. See
30 Pa.C.S. § 901(a)(10). Otherwise, the Code grants WCOs the authority to “stop
and board boats for the purpose of inspection” to ensure compliance with the Code
and its related regulations. Id. In contrast, for violations unrelated to safety
inspections, the Code requires a WCO to have probable cause to stop and search a
boat. 30 Pa.C.S. § 901(a)(5). This reflects our legislature’s clear authorization of
the suspicionless boarding of boats to conduct safety equipment inspections.
       Given the legislature’s express grant of statutory authority for WCOs to check
fishing licenses, we, like the courts in Thompson, Schenekl, Pike, and Villamonte-
Marquez, conclude it would be unreasonable for any individual fishing in the
Commonwealth’s waters to expect privacy from WCOs who approach to conduct a
fishing license check. Likewise, because of the WCOs’ express statutory authority
to board boats to conduct safety equipment inspections, it would be unreasonable for
anyone to expect privacy in areas of the boat that are subject to a safety equipment
inspection. Because Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy from the
temporary detention of his boat while Officer Smolko conducted a fishing license
check and safety equipment inspection, where no WCOs boarded Defendant’s boat
or infringed on any areas of the boat where Defendant may have had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, there was no “unreasonable search or seizure” in violation of
either the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
       Moreover, even if we accepted Defendant’s assertion that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy from Officer Smolko’s detention to check for fishing licenses

9
 This is in contrast to 30 Pa.C.S. § 901(a)(5) which requires a WCO have probable cause that a
violation of Title 30 has occurred in order to conduct a stop to search vehicles or boats.

                                             18
and conduct a safety equipment inspection, Defendant’s claim would still fail. In
considering whether Officer Smolko’s actions violated Defendant’s right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure, we conduct a balancing analysis wherein the
intrusion on Defendant is balanced against the government’s promotion of legitimate
interests. Blouse, 611 A.2d at 1178. In balancing these opposing interests, our
primary concern is protecting individuals from arbitrary invasions at the unrestricted
discretion of law enforcement officers in the field. Id.
      The Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in preserving its natural
resources, as well as in the health, safety, and well-being of its citizens, including its
boaters. See Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 302-03
(1977) (noting the state has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens). Here,
Defendant had individuals fishing on his boat in plain view of WCOs patrolling Lake
Erie. Officer Smolko’s approach and request to view fishing licenses, without
boarding Defendant’s boat, was minimally intrusive and in furtherance of his duty
as a WCO to ensure compliance with the Code. Likewise, Officer Smolko’s safety
equipment inspection of Defendant’s boat was minimally intrusive. Even though by
statutory law, the WCOs had the power to board Defendant’s boat, they chose not to
do so. Rather, Officer Smolko stayed on his patrol boat and requested Defendant
show him the equipment for inspection. The entire interaction between Officer
Smolko and Defendant included a brief visual inspection, which lasted less than 40
minutes. Thus, the scope and the length of the detention were minimally intrusive.
We conclude Officer Smolko’s brief detention of Defendant’s boat to conduct a
fishing license check and safety equipment inspection constituted a reasonable
means of advancing the vital public interest in preserving the Commonwealth’s

                                           19
natural resources and ensuring boater safety, while involving only a minimal
intrusion on Defendant’s privacy or liberty.
      We reject Defendant’s assertions that there are “less intrusive methods” of
ensuring boater safety than the safety equipment inspection conducted in this case.
See Defendant’s Br. at 17.       Officer Smolko conducted the safety equipment
inspection in a minimally intrusive manner. Furthermore, by providing a PFD to
Defendant so that he and his passengers could continue to boat, Officer Smolko
made an effort to be less intrusive and disruptive to Defendant’s day. To that end,
this Court cannot envision any practical, less intrusive, way for WCOs to comply
with their statutory duty to conduct safety equipment inspections of boats on the
water than to briefly detain those boats to ensure they comply with safety equipment
requirements. A WCO must necessarily detain a boat on the water in order to
conduct fishing license checks and safety equipment inspections. In balancing the
Commonwealth’s legitimate interests in the safety of its citizens, including those
enjoying Pennsylvania’s waterways, against the minimal intrusion of Defendant’s
brief detention, Officer Smolko’s stop and detention of Defendant’s boat while he
conducted the fishing license check and safety equipment inspection was reasonable.
      Because Officer Smolko did not infringe into any area where Defendant
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution were not
triggered. Furthermore, even if we were to conclude Defendant maintained a
reasonable expectation of privacy from Officer Smolko’s brief detention, Officer
Smolko’s intrusion was minimal when balanced against the Commonwealth’s
legitimate interest in preserving its natural resources, as well as ensuring the safety
of its citizens utilizing Pennsylvania’s waterways. Therefore, we conclude the

                                          20
WCO’s brief, suspicionless detention of Defendant’s boat on the water to conduct a
fishing license check and safety equipment inspection did not violate Defendant’s
rights against unreasonable search and seizure under either the Fourth Amendment
or article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in denying Defendant’s suppression motion.
                               Sufficiency of the Evidence
       Next, we address Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction. Defendant argues the Commonwealth failed to meet its
burden of proof. Specifically, Defendant contends that because Officer Smolko did
not board his boat, Officer Smolko failed to inspect the safety equipment and failed
to prove the number of PFDs aboard his boat.10 Defendant’s Br. at 7.
       We review a sufficiency of the evidence claim as follows:

       We assess the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
       in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner. We must determine
       whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to have
       found every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
       applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
       our judgment for that of the fact[-]finder. In addition, we note that the
       facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
       preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
       defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence
       is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
       fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
       Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the
       crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
       evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must
       be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered.

10
 The irony of this argument does not escape the Court considering, in the same breath, Defendant
wanted an even lesser intrusion.

                                              21
Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 740-41 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal denied,
279 A.3d 508 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth bears the burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of a crime. Commonwealth
v. Hilbert, 382 A.2d 724, 729 (Pa. 1978). Further, the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt applies to summary offenses just as it does to other criminal
charges. Commonwealth v. A.D.B., 752 A.2d 438, 443 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (citation
omitted).
      Any person who violates a rule or regulation under the Code commits a
summary offense. See 30 Pa.C.S. § 2102. In this case, Officer Smolko cited
Defendant for violating Section 97.1 of the Commission’s Regulations, 58 Pa. Code
§ 97.1. In relevant part, Section 97.1(b) of the Commission’s Regulations provides
“[a] person may not use a boat unless at least one wearable PFD is on board for each
person.” Id. The regulation defines a PFD as “[a] life preserver that is approved by
the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard under 46 C.F.R Part 160 (relating
to lifesaving equipment).” 58 Pa. Code § 97.1(a). Additionally, Section 97.1(c) of
the Commission’s Regulations indicates a person “may not use a boat 16 feet or
more in length unless one throwable PFD is on board in addition to the total number
of PFDs required [for each person aboard the boat].” 58 Pa. Code § 97.1(c).
Regarding “throwable” versus “wearable” PFDs, the regulation specifies a
throwable PFD is “intended to be thrown to a person in the water.” 58 Pa. Code §
97.1(a). A PFD which is marked as throwable, Type IV, or Type V with Type IV
performance, is considered a throwable PFD. Id. Meanwhile, a wearable PFD is
“intended to be worn or otherwise attached to a person’s body. A PFD marked as
wearable, Type I, Type II, Type III, or Type V with Type (I, II, or III) performance

                                        22
is considered a wearable PFD.” Id.         The regulation specifies that “[u]nless
specifically marked otherwise, a wearable PFD is not a throwable PFD.” Id.
      Here, considering the trial court’s express credibility determinations and
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Officer
Smolko’s testimony established Defendant had four passengers on board his boat for
a total of five people, but only four wearable PFDs available. Because Section
97.1(b) of the Commission’s Regulations requires a boater have at least one
wearable PFD on board for each person on the boat, the trial court properly found
each element of the offense charged was supported by sufficient evidence to prove
Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Moreover, the trial court properly rejected Defendant’s argument the
throwable PFD on his 22-foot boat should have counted as a wearable PFD. Because
of the size of his boat and number of individuals aboard, the regulations required
Defendant have five wearable PFDs and one throwable PFD aboard his boat, and the
regulation specifies the two types of PFDs are not interchangeable. See 58 Pa. Code
§ 97.1(a)-(c). Therefore, the Commonwealth met its burden of proof, and the trial
court did not err or abuse its discretion by finding Defendant guilty of violating the
Code by having an insufficient number of wearable PFDs aboard his boat.
                                  CONCLUSION
      The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and we find no
error in its legal analysis. The trial court properly found the Commonwealth
produced evidence demonstrating Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy from the brief detention by Officer Smolko to conduct a fishing license
check and safety equipment inspection.        Further, when balanced against the
legitimate interests of the Commonwealth, any intrusion on Defendant’s expectation

                                         23
of privacy was minimal. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Defendant’s
motion to suppress. Further, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to
prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment of sentence.

                                            ______________________________
                                            STACY WALLACE, Judge

                                       24
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania         :
                                     :
            v.                       : No. 473 C.D. 2020
                                     :
Frederick W. Karash,                 :
                           Appellant :

                                ORDER

     AND NOW, this 6th day of February 2024, the Court of Common Pleas of
Erie County’s June 24, 2019 judgment of sentence is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                     ______________________________
                                     STACY WALLACE, Judge