Court Opinion

ID: 9541204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:23:33.092132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:40.295672
License: Public Domain

FADELEY, J.,
dissenting.
I join fully in the dissent of Durham, J., and also wish to contribute the following points to the future discussion of this case, erroneously decided in my opinion.
As the majority points out, at trial the child contradicted witness Jenkins. Jenkins’ credibility was crucial on the points made in her testimony. If the trial had shown the pervasive nature of Jenkins’ falsehoods about her educational experience and background in the child abuse field, the statutory instruction to the jury — found in ORS 10.095(3), declaring that a witness found to be false in one part of her testimony should not be trusted to tell the truth in other parts of her testimony — would have struck the jury with its *123full force, probably altering the outcome of the case. In my opinion, application of that statutory admonition about false testimony to this case also makes the trial verdict of conviction unreliable and unfair, because it was arrived at without juror knowledge of the falsity.
At bottom, the decision of the trial court to deny the motion for a new trial turned on the premise that defendant should have sought a continuance, on some articulable basis, when she first suspected that Jenkins had lied about any part of her educational background. The trial court thus placed responsibility for the perjured testimony, and its effect, on the defendant who did not offer that testimony. In my opinion, it is the state’s responsibility to prove the case by credible testimony. The trial court excused the state from that responsibility.
The majority echoes and justifies this shift in responsibility from prosecution to defense by reading additional words into ORCP 64 B that are not found there. As a judge, I am not willing to employ blame-shifting as the “principled reasoning” that explains or justifies shifting the burden of proof to a criminal defendant. However, absent that blame-shifting explanation and the burden-shifting that is based on it, the result in this case would be seen as unlawful.
Moreover, the usual analysis for adding words to a statute is not followed here. This court requires an analysis based on PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), where words are to be added to a statute. Although that case was cited by the majority, the analysis that is directed by that case was not performed before the majority added the words “during trial” after the word “discovered” in the ORCP. See State v. Arnold, 320 Or 111, 117-18, 879 P2d 1272 (1994). Where is the stated ambiguity and, thereafter, the demonstration of legislative intent that would be required to allow that addition under the rule of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, supra?
I dissent.