Court Opinion

ID: 9476303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:52:31.780762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:14.359100
License: Public Domain

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Implementation of the congressional ban on “arbitrage bonds” embodied in Section 103(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code is a complicated and delicate matter, as the length and detail of Judge Robinson’s scholarly opinion demonstrate. For two closely related reasons, I cannot join that opinion.
First, I substantially agree with the reasoning of the Tax Court in this matter. See City of Tucson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 767 (1982). The Commissioner’s conclusion that sinking fund financing of municipal bonds effectively allows bond proceeds indirectly to replace funds used to acquire higher yield securities indirectly seems to me an eminently reasonable position.
Second, the courts have consistently recognized that the Internal Revenue Service should be given a fair amount of breathing space in its implementation of the Internal Revenue Code’s convoluted nooks and crannies. See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533, 98 S.Ct. 841, 845, 55 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). No more complex and arcane a statute exists than the IRC. When, as here, IRS has taken a reasonable, albeit broad, view of the meaning of one of the Code’s provisions, we should defer to that view.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.