Court Opinion

ID: 9674548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:30:27.335216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.100415
License: Public Domain

Robert C. Compton, Special Justice. The Appellants assert that the Trial Court abused its discretion by refusing to grant their motion for an extension of time to file the record on appeal. On August 1,1986, the chancellor caused to be filed with the Clerk his “Memorandum and Judgment” granting Appellees’ summary motions and dismissing the complaints with prejudice. On August 29, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal. On November 24, the Appellants filed a Motion For an Extension of Time to File the Record on Appeal. On November 25, the Motion was argued. The Appellants had ordered the record, but, due to a backlog, the reporter had not commenced preparation of this record. The Chancellor denied the motion for an extension of time solely upon the basis that Appellants’ counsel had failed to serve a copy of the Notice of Appeal on opposing counsel.  This ruling by the Chancellor was both erroneous and an abuse of discretion.  It is erroneous under the provisions of A.R.A.P. Rule 3(b) and (f) which state: (b) An appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the court which entered the judgment, decree or order from which the appeal is taken. Failure of the appellant or cross appellant to take any further steps to secure review of the judgment or decree appealed from shall not affect the validity of the appeal or cross appeal, but shall be ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or cross appeal, (our italics) (f) A copy of the notice of appeal or cross-appeal shall be served by counsel for appellant or cross-appellant upon counsel for all other parties by any form of mail which requires a signed receipt. If a party is not represented by counsel, notice shall be mailed to such party at his last known address. Failure to serve notice shall not affect the validity of the appeal, (our italics) The wording could hardly be clearer, and we have often held that such irregularities in following the rules of appellate procedure, other than the failure to file timely notice of appeal and to lodge the record, are not fatal. Johnson v. Carpenter, 290 Ark. 255, 718 S.W.2d 434 (1986); Brady v. Alken, Inc., 273 Ark. 147, 617 S.W.2d 358 (1981); Davis v. Ralston Purina Co., 248 Ark. 14, 449 S.W.2d 709 (1970). Also, the Chancellor abused the discretion granted him by A.R.A.P. Rule 5(b) inasmuch as the reporter’s transcript had been ordered but not prepared and no reason was given for the denial of the motion to enlarge except the failure to serve a copy of the notice of appeal on opposing counsel. Even so, we must affirm.  When the Chancellor denied Appellants’ motion for enlargement of time, he effectively terminated the Appellants’ appeal. A.R.A.P. 2(a)(2) provides that an appeal may be taken from “an order which in effect determines the action . . . .” However, rather than taking an appeal, the Appellants elected, on November 26, to file in this Court their motion for Writ of Certiorari on the grounds that “The Court refused to enter an order granting an extension of time for his Court Reporter to prepare the transcript for an appeal of his decision of August 1, 1986 . . . .” The motion was filed pursuant to Rule 29.1 (i) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and the relief sought was for this Court to require “The Court Reporter to complete the record in this case so that Appellants may file same with this court.” On December 15, this Court entered its Order denying Appellants’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari to complete the record. On December 29, the Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying the Appellants’ motion for enlargement of time. The issue is whether the Appellants can first seek Certiorari and, being denied that Writ, then appeal.  This was decided in Bertig Bros. v. Independent Gin Co., 147 Ark. 581, 228 S.W. 392 (1921), where it is stated at page 584: Certiorari can not ordinarily be used as a substitute for appeal, but the aggrieved party has the election to test the validity of the judgment on its face, either by appeal or by certiorari; and if he adopts the latter remedy, he can not afterward resort to the former, for it is the duty of an appellate court, if it is found that a judgment is not void, to affirm it, which cuts off any further review by appeal. Remedy by certiorari is not one which may be had as of right, but it is only at the discretion of the court, and it would be the duty of the court to refuse that remedy if the aggrieved party could afterward prosecute an appeal and had that remedy in contemplation. The question falls within the general doctrine of election of remedies, and it is the duty of the party, where he has two remedies, one of which is limited in its scope and the other is general in its scope, to adopt, in the first instance, the remedy which will give complete relief; otherwise he is bound by his election to pursue the limited remedy, (our italics) See also W. Bryant, Certiorari In Arkansas 17 Ark. L. Rev. 163 (1963).  Having elected to seek certiorari, the Appellants cannot now appeal. Glaze, J., not participating. Purtle, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.