Court Opinion

ID: 9679240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:45:05.494262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:11.638258
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
{concurring). Here the court majority seems to seek not to reach and resolve the question of whether a police officer, engaged in serving a valid arrest warrant, may resort to ruse or role-playing to secure the opening of a closed door and the placing of the person named in the warrant under arrest. If so, its reach exceeds its grasp.
Clearly, the majority has upheld an arrest procedure where the warrant-serving officer did identify himself or his mission when asked who was at the door.
As clearly, as the writer sees it, the majority has held valid an arrest, entry and seizure where the mumbled response, “Nicky,” and “Yeh, man, open the door,” led the defendant to expect someone other than a police officer to be at the door. He would hardly have left the eyedroppers and heroin packets in plain view from the door if he had even suspected that a law officer might be outside the closed door.
Also clear, as this writer reads the cases, if, instead of posing as a “Nicky Serencoben,” a friend or customer *483of the defendant, the warrant-serving officer had assumed the role of repairman or salesman, there would be no constitutional, statutory or other cloud by reason of the element of dissembling or deception involved.
A very nearly unanimous holding of courts reaching the question have held that a warrant-serving officer may assume an identity other than that of policeman about to serve a warrant. Most of the cases have arisen in jurisdictions, as under the Federal Code,1 or states like California,2 where the statutes require an officer, executing a warrant, to first give notice of his authority and purpose and then, only if he is refused admittance, may he “break open” any door or window. Wisconsin has no such statute. Even where there is such statute, the courts uniformly hold that an entry and arrest secured by ruse, in the absence of force, do not constitute a “breaking” and are constitutionally antiseptic.
Where a revenue agent, who had obtained a valid warrant for defendant’s arrest, gained admittance to defendant’s premises for the purpose of serving the warrant, the entry was held to be lawful, the arrest valid and search incident to such arrest permissible.3
Where narcotic agents had reliable information that the defendant was ready to sell narcotics to a man named Lacey, and placed themselves outside defendant’s hotel room, and when asked, “Who’s there?” had an agent, disguising his voice, answer, “It’s Lacey; open up,” the arrest, entry and resultant conviction were upheld even though the officers had no warrant.4
*484Where the arresting officers had a valid arrest warrant and, posing as telephone repairmen, were admitted to defendant’s premises without force, the entry, arrest and search of defendant’s person incident to such arrest were held valid, and evidence seized was held admissible.5
Where the arresting officer had a valid warrant for arrest to serve, and knocked on the door of defendant’s home and shouted, “Gas man” for the purpose of gaining admittance, the entry and arrest were found proper, the court finding no statutory bar or constitutional infirmity in the admitted use of a ruse to secure admittance.6
Where police officers, who had reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested had committed an offense within the officers’ presence, though without warrant for his arrest, had the manager of a motel announce that there was a telephone call for a female companion of defendant in the motel room, and, when the companion opened the door, entered and arrested the defendant, the entry, arrest and incidental search were held “. . . not violative of California law or the United States Constitution.” 7 In this case, the federal *485appeals court noted that “. . . The California Court of Appeal held that the police entry in this case was not unlawful merely because a ruse was employed. People v. Ponce, Crim. No. 10651 . . . People v. Quilon, 245 Cal. App. 2d 624, 628, 54 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1966) states the rule:
“‘[C] onstitutionally proscribed trickery is that in which an officer obtains entry by subterfuge to a place where he has no right to be. Stratagem in itself is not illegal; it may be used, for example, to gain entry in order to effect a lawful arrest.’ ” 8
In the case before us, we do not deal with a “breaking” or entry by force.9 We deal with the use of ruse, whether termed role-playing or deception, in order to accomplish the service of an arrest warrant. The cases cited make clear that “There is no constitutional mandate forbidding the use of deception in executing a valid arrest warrant.” 10 If, short of constitutional or statutory mandate, courts have right or reason to seek to set the public policy as to acceptable police procedure in this area, the case for permitting use of ruse in executing arrest warrants is convincing.
The public policy or purpose to be served in the execution of arrest warrants is that of serving the person named in the warrant in as safe, error-free and danger-avoiding manner as can be effected. For the warrant-*486serving officer to pose as someone other than an arresting officer may best serve the goal of avoiding error, lessening opportunities for escape and minimizing the likelihood of violent resistance. Many individuals are not enthusiastic about having legal papers served upon them. Process servers soon learn that some measure of role-playing is required if summons or subpoena are to be served with dispatch and accuracy. The game of process-dodging becomes a more dangerous sport when service includes placing the person served under arrest. Press-recorded incidents where police officers have been shot and killed while making routine arrests reveal the risks involved in placing persons under arrest. It is in the public interest that warrants be served in as safe and sure a manner as possible. Regard for the safety risk involved must include concern for the life and limb of the law officer given the assignment of placing a person named in a warrant under arrest. To hold that such law officer may not disguise his identity and mission until the warrant can be served and arrest made is to expose such officer to an increased, and unnecessarily so, risk of bodily harm or assassination while carrying out an official duty. Any claim of right of the person about to be served to escape through a rear door, to deny identity, to avoid confrontation, or even not to be surprised at finding the someone at the door is a police officer instead of a friend, customer or repairman, is clearly inferior, if it can be said to exist at all. We see no reason for not saying so now, instead of, as predictably will be the case, saying so later on.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley joins in this concurring opinion.

 Sec. 3109, Title 18, U. S. C.

 California Penal Code, sec. 844.

 Leahy v. United States (9th Cir. 1959), 272 Fed. 2d 487, 489, 490, the court holding, . . Misrepresentation of identity in order to gain admittance is not a breaking within the meaning of the statute, . . .” and “There is no constitutional mandate forbidding the use of deception in executing a valid arrest warrant. . . .”

 Dickey v. United States (9th Cir. 1964), 332 Fed. 2d 773, 778, the court finding no forcible entry under the federal statute and *484. . hence no necessity for the officers to notify Dickey [the defendant] of their authority and purpose before entering the apartment, . . .” despite what the court termed “. . . the employment of a ruse to obtain the full opening of the Dickeys’ door . . . .”

 Smith v. United States (5th Cir. 1966), 357 Fed. 2d 486, citing with approval Leahy v. United States, supra.

 United States v. Syler (7th Cir. 1970), 430 Fed. 2d 68, citing Leahy v. United States, supra, and other cases above summarized.

 Ponce v. Craven (9th Cir. 1969), 409 Fed. 2d 621, 626, the court holding, “. . . The employment of a ruse which results in the occupant of a dwelling voluntarily opening the door and thereby allowing officers to enter without announcement of purpose, is not a breaking ....
“The manner in which the police entered Ponce’s motel room and his subsequent arrest are not violative of California law or the United States Constitution.”

 Id. at page 626. On the importance of the officer’s right to be where he is at time of arrest or seizure, see Harris v. United States (1968), 390 U. S. 234, 236, 88 Sup. Ct. 992, 993, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067, stating, “. . . It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence. . . .”

 Morales v. State (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 96, 106, 170 N. W. 2d 684, deals with forceful entry. To quote the opinion, “The defendant also questions the force which was employed by the officer in breaking down the door to his apartment. . . .”

 Leahy v. United States, supra, footnote 3.