Court Opinion

ID: 9833054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:24:20.64565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:58.646898
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It is provided in the State Banking Act (articles 370, 371, R. S. 1925):
“Art. 370. Inspection — The Commissioner, as soon as practicable after taking charge of such [closed] bank, shall ascertain by a thorough examination into the affairs its *1108actual financial condition. If lie is satisfied that it cannot resume business or liquidate' its indebtedness to the satisfaction of all its creditors, he shall report the fact of its insolvency to the Attorney General.
“Art. 371. Liquidating o/Ttcer. — -Immediately upon- the receipt of such notice; the Attorney General shall institute proceedings for the appointment of a receiver to take' charge of such bank and to wind up the affairs and business thereof for the benefit of its depositors, creditors and stockholders. The court, or the judge thereof in vacation, shall immediately appoint said receiver. Complaint or opposition of the bank or its officers subsequently may be heard in open court. Until a receiver is appointed, the Commissioner may appoint a competent person to take charge of the affairs of such insolvent bank. If a State bank or bank and trust company comes voluntarily into the hands of the Commissioner, no receiver shall be appointed, and the Commissioner shall appoint a competent person in lieu thereof.”
It is insisted by appellants in their motion for rehearing, that the provision in article 371, that “complaint or opposition of the bank or its officers 'Subsequently may be heard in open court,” vested appellants, acting individually as officers of the bank, with authority to bring the suit. That provision, however, gives such authority only after the Attorney General has instituted proceedings and the district court has appointed a receiver for the insolvent bank, which is not the case here.
The banking commissioner has not notified the Attorney Genteral of the closing of the bank, the Attorney General has instituted no proceedings, the district court has appointed no receiver, as appellants contend was the only lawful course available under the law. In this state of facts, specifically and affirmatively set up by appellants, it is apparent that appellants’ remedy, if any, lies in a mandamus proceeding by the bank to compel the state officials named to proceed under the statute, if they have not done so. The matter of administering an insolvent state bank is now a purely statutory proceeding, which excludes all other means of effecting such administration, and parties at interest may invoke the aid of the courts to force the appropriate authorities to pursue the processes prescribed by the statute. If the facts in this case are such as to authorize or require the appointment of a receiver of the bank involved, such appointment must be made ■ at the instance of the Attorney General, through the process prescribed in articles 370 and 371, and may not be procured by the direct action of aggrieved individuals, as was sought in this case.
Appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled,