Court Opinion

ID: 9718984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:39:27.713319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:03.845316
License: Public Domain

STANIFORTH, Acting P. J.
I respectfully dissent from part B of the majority’s opinion. Section 654 of the Penal Code1 prohibits more than one punishment for a single act or omission. McElrath’s infliction of great bodily injury involved one individual transaction. The majority’s affirmation of multiple enhancements for this single act is statutorily and constitutionally infirm.
I
Section 654 provides; “An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution of the same act or omission under any other.” The California Supreme Court has held a similar rule applicable to enhancement provisions. (In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 [130 Cal.Rptr. 719, 551 P.2d 23].)
*192Division Two of this court has also applied the section 654 limitation to enhancement provisions, holding a single infliction of great bodily injury may not enhance each underlying offense committed during the same transaction. (People v. Moringlane (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 811 [179 Cal.Rptr. 726].) The court expressly rejected the opposite conclusion in People v. Boerner (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 506 [174 Cal.Rptr. 629]. The Third and First Districts followed, also holding section 654 prevents the application of multiple sentencing enhancements for a single act. (People v. Carter (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 534 [193 Cal.Rptr. 193]; People v. Hopkins (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 110 [212 Cal.Rptr. 888].)
Culbreth explained the rationale behind this rule: “ ‘The Attorney General’s thesis, invoking three separate firearm penalties for a single occasion of firearm use, is inconsistent with the apparent objective of section 12022.5. A special deterrence against firearm use is its objective. The legislative theory is deterrence, whose power augments with each successive occasion. . . . Thus the statute envisions a single application of deterrent force for each occasion, hopefully to deter gun use on a future occasion. Where, as here, a single judgment imposes sentences for several crimes committed upon a single occasion, only one finding under section 12022.5 is permissible.’” (Culbreth, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 334, quoting People v. Johnson (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 1, 12 [112 Cal.Rptr. 834].) The purpose behind the enhancement statutes is deterrence. The deterrence value is not increased by imposing several enhancements for a single act.
II
Section 1170.1, subdivision (i), passed after Culbreth, permits unlimited use of enhancements in connection with specifically enumerated sex crimes. This subsection thus appears to allow the imposition of multiple enhancements for a single act, abrogating the rule in Culbreth and section 654. However, as the majority in the instant case correctly points out, the provisions of section 1170.1 do not. apply to a defendant sentenced under section 667.6, subdivision (c). The language of the latter section, indicating its provisions are to be applied, “[i]/i lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1” (italics added), implies the trial court must make a choice between sentencing under section 1170.1 and sentencing under section 667.6, subdivision (c). (People v. Carter, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d 534.)
The Court of Appeal in People v. Rodriguez (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 213 [206 Cal.Rptr. 563], said: “If the decision is to use consecutive sentences under section 1170.1, and enhancements are imposed under subdivision (i) of that section, they are to be full and separately served. This *193great range of sentencing choices affords the court the opportunity to make the sentence fit the crime and the criminal.
“Limits are set, however, and if section 667.6, subdivision (c) is used, the full force consecutive terms were deemed punishment enough and the provisions of section 1170.1, subdivision (i) were not made applicable. Had the Legislature wished to make subdivision (i) apply to a section 667.6, subdivision (c) sentencing, all it would have had to do is commence the section with the words ‘In lieu of the term provided in section 1170.1, subdivision (a), . . .’ However, it did not.
“The matter is not ambiguous, but if it were, we would be bound to resolve it in the defendant’s favor. [Citations.]” (Fn. omitted.)
The trial court in the present case made an express choice to sentence McElrath under the harsher sentencing provisions of section 667.6, subdivision (c), rather than section 1170.1. Hence, subdivision (i) of section 1170.1, allowing unlimited multiple enhancements, is not applicable to McElrath. Multiple enhancements cannot be imposed for McElrath’s single act of inflicting great bodily injury.
Furthermore, “a long-held rule of statutory construction is that ‘it is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication.’” (People v. Edwards (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 436 [172 Cal.Rptr. 652], affirmed in People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897 [184 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 647 P.2d 569], quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [122 P.2d 526]; Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92 [104 Cal.Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234].) Culbreth is still valid law with respect to a defendant sentenced under section 667.6, subdivision (c). (See People v. Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d 897.)
Ill
The majority relies on the language in section 12022.8 to impose four consecutive five-year sentencing enhancements on McElrath. These 20 extra years are imposed for McElrath’s infliction of great bodily injury on victim Cynthia in the course of committing four different counts of sexual assault. The trial court admitted McElrath committed only one act of great bodily injury. The majority fails to recognize only one act giving rise to an enhancement occurred.
Great bodily injury was extensively defined by the California Supreme Court in People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562 [146 Cal.Rptr. 859, 580 *194P.2d 274], In Caudillo, the court recognized the offenses committed against the victim (rape, oral copulation, sodomy) were “of such an outrageous, shocking and despicable nature that the victim suffered extreme humiliation and distress.” (Id., at p. 575.) However, the court held forcible rape alone was insufficient to constitute great bodily injury. (Id., at p. 587.) Furthermore, “the pyramiding of the sexual offenses of sodomy and oral copulation upon rape, without more, is insufficient to invoke the enhancement provision.” (Id., at p. 587.) The victim’s symptoms in Caudillo (gagging, vomiting, spitting, bowel evacuations and two superficial lacerations several inches long on the front and back of the neck) were insufficient to constitute great bodily injury. There was no apparent injury, laceration or hematoma to the sexual organs or anus. The victim did not testify to any pain resulting from the sexual acts, and the Supreme Court held the injuries could logically “only be described as constituting transitory and short-lived bodily distress.” (Id., at p. 588.)
Section 12022.7 describes great bodily injury as “a significant or substantial physical injury.” Before amendment of this section in 1977, the Legislature had attempted to list examples of great bodily injury: “(a) Prolonged loss of consciousness. [¶](b) Severe concussion. [¶](c) Protracted loss of any bodily member or organ. [¶](d) Protracted impairment of function of any bodily member or organ or bone. [¶](e) A wound or wounds requiring extensive suturing. [¶](f) Serious disfigurement. [¶](g) Severe physical pain inflicted by torture.”
While McElrath’s attack against Cynthia was certainly outrageous and despicable, I do not see four separate instances of great bodily injury. Therefore, I cannot agree that four separate five-year enhancements should have been imposed.
Forcing Cynthia to swallow a bottle of Tylenol, washed down with hydrogen peroxide, is certainly significant and substantial enough to constitute great bodily injury. However, this was the factual basis for finding McElrath guilty of attempted murder and imposing a 10-year sentence for this crime. The trial court has already punished McElrath for this act. Under section 654, the court could not impose a further sentencing enhancement for the same act.
When McElrath first entered Cynthia’s apartment, he struck her twice in the face. The first blow knocked her to the ground. These blows resulted in several cuts requiring stitches, and facial scars, requiring plastic surgery. I would agree these blows constituted great bodily injury. Section 12022.7, before amendment, included in its great bodily injury definition “A wound or wounds requiring extensive suturing” and “serious disfigurement.” *195Scars, particularly scars to the face, certainly reflect a significant and substantial bodily injury. For this reason, I would agree with the trial court’s imposition of one 12022.8 five-year sentencing enhancement for great bodily injury committed in violation of one of the enumerated sexual offenses.
However, after these initial blows there is no testimony indicating Mc-Elrath continued to inflict great bodily injury to Cynthia. I am not insensitive to the horrible humiliation and degradation a rape victim undergoes in a sexual assault. Certainly, injury occurred, physically, as well as emotionally and psychologically. However, there was no apparent injury, laceration or hematoma to the sexual organs or anus. Cynthia did not testify to any pain resulting from the sexual acts, and after the initial blows, McElrath committed several individual sexual crimes against Cynthia. Without more, these crimes do not constitute great bodily injury. “[P]ersonal repugnance toward these crimes cannot be a legitimate basis for rewriting the statute as it was adopted by the Legislature. It is precisely because emotions are so easily called into play in such situations that extra precaution must be taken so that this court follows the legislative intent and not our own predelictions or beliefs.” (People v. Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d 562, 589, conc. opn. of Chief Justice Bird.)
Caudillo holds rape and other sexual crimes, without more, cannot constitute great bodily injury. In the case at bar, besides the shocking sexual assaults against Cynthia, McElrath also struck Cynthia in the face. Because this assault was not punished under any other statute, and because it was so severe that it constituted significant and substantial bodily injury, I would affirm one five-year enhancement under section 12022.8. However, because this single assault was committed in connection with one, individual, criminal transaction, section 654 and the Culbreth rule prevents imposition of three more five-year enhancements.
IV
In In re Culbreth, supra, 17 Cal.3d 330, referring to sentencing enhancement for use of a deadly weapon, the California Supreme Court held, “if all the charged offenses are incident to one objective and effectively comprise an indivisible transaction, then section 12022.5 may be invoked only once.” (Id., at p. 333.) The Fifth District agreed: “As noted earlier, Culbreth holds that when there is a single course of conduct resulting in multiple victims, the use enhancement in Section 12022.5 may be invoked only once and not in accordance with the number of victims. That is, the multiplicity of sentences because of the multiplicity of victims does not engender multiplicity of weapon use. The rule applies to multiple offenses committed against a single victim. (People v. Ramirez (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 714, 729 *196. . . .)” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 214.) The First District explained: “Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of this section [654] depends on the intent and objective of the actor; if all offenses were incident to one objective, defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses, but not for more than one. [Citation.]” (People v. Hopkins, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d 110, 116.) (See also People v. Calhoun (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 117 [190 Cal.Rptr. 115].)
The trial court imposed great bodily injury enhancements for four criminal acts committed by McElrath against Cynthia: two counts of rape, one count of sodomy and one count of oral copulation. However, these four acts constituted one criminal transaction or course of conduct. All acts were committed with the intent and objective of inflicting sexual violence on victim Cynthia. All acts involved one victim. They occurred during one period of time. McElrath did not leave and reenter the house in between the criminal acts. He entered the house and then proceeded to commit these acts of sexual violence one after another. The several assaults reflect but one single transaction.
In People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64 [204 Cal.Rptr. 124], this court held multiple sentencing enhancements may be imposed under section 12022.3 for multiple sex offenses each committed with the use of a firearm or other deadly weapon. That case may be distinguished from the case at bar. McElrath committed only one act of great bodily injury. Punishment for this single act may be imposed only once. In Blevins, each sexual crime was committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Therefore, each use of the deadly weapon could be punished with an additional enhancement to the defendant’s sentence. Each use of the weapon reflected a new transaction and a new, divisible violation. Blevins, in effect, used the weapon three' different times. If McElrath had inflicted great bodily injury on Cynthia before or during each of his sexual assaults, multiple enhancements would obviously be appropriate. It is the fact he only committed one such violation that distinguishes this case from Blevins.
People v. Moringlane, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d 811, is on point. Defendant Moringlane was charged with murder, three counts of assault with intent to murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Enhancements for great bodily injury were imposed for all three of the assault counts even though only one great bodily injury occurred. This district reversed two of the three enhancements, holding “section 654 as interpreted prohibits the imposition of multiple enhancements for the single act of inflicting great bodily injury upon one person.” (Id., at p. 817.)
*197V
Finally, 20 years’ imprisonment for one act of great bodily injury may well constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of California Constitution, article I, section 6. The California Supreme Court recognized a punishment “may violate the constitutional prohibition not only if it is inflicted by a cruel and unusual method, but also if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], fn. omitted, citing In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410 [105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921].) In Lynch, the court identified three “techniques” to assist courts in identifying a punishment so disproportionate that it amounts to a cruel and unusual punishment. The first technique involves examining “the nature of the offense and/ or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society.” (Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 425.) The second technique is “to compare the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for different offenses which, by the same test, must be deemed more serious.” (Id., at p. 426.) The last technique, closely related to the second, is to compare “the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions having an identical or similar constitutional provision.” (Id., at p. 427.)
Applying the techniques to the case at bar, a compelling argument can be made that 20 years is cruel and unusual punishment for the offense committed. Admittedly, the nature of the offense and/or offender in the case at bar do not weigh in favor of a lesser sentence for McElrath. Indeed, the circumstances mentioned in Lynch (offender’s lack of danger to society, the nonviolent nature of the offense, the absence of a victim, the absence of aggravating circumstances) all weigh against McElrath.
However, turning to the second technique, if McElrath’s great bodily injury had been charged directly as a criminal violation instead of as an enhancing circumstance, he would have received one-fifth the number of years in prison. The maximum imprisonment for a battery resulting in serious bodily injury is four years. (§ 243, subd. (d).) The maximum penalty for an assault and battery with a deadly weapon or by force likely to produce great bodily injury is also four years. (§ 245, subd. (a).) Twenty years’ enhancement for these same crimes is clearly excessive punishment.
Furthermore, the crime of mayhem, which deprives a victim of a body part or which disables, disfigures or renders such a body part useless, holds a maximum imprisonment of six years. (§§ 203, 204.) Finally, it is significant the attempted murder charge against McElrath, for the forced ingestion of Tylenol and hydrogen peroxide, resulted in the upper term of nine years *198in prison. These offenses, resulting in injuries more serious than the injury inflicted by McElrath’s two blows, would receive penalties less than half as severe as the 20-year imprisonment sentence imposed upon McElrath.
This sentence is so grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed that it amounts to a cruel and unusual punishment. I would reverse the great bodily injury enhancements under section 12022.8 except for the single five-year enhancement. In all other respects, I concur with the majority.
The petitions of both parties for review by the Supreme Court were denied February 20, 1986.
Broussard, J., and Reynoso, J., were of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.

All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.