Court Opinion

ID: 9439894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:50:51.364605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:40.330961
License: Public Domain

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that D’Arcy’s failure to call John Womum, when examined in isolation, did not violate the Sixth Amendment. I strongly disagree, however, that the complained of acts and decisions of D’Arey, when viewed in the aggregate, “f[ell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and constituted “sound trial strategy.” See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Furthermore, I am convinced that, but for D’Arcy’s unsound performance, “there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. I therefore dissent from the majority opinion. In explaining my dissent, I shall limit myself to three points not made in the extremely thorough and well-reasoned report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Bowler, the relevant portion of which I attach as an appendix to my dissent. See Matthews v. Rakiey, Civil Action No. 90-12111-WF (D.Mass. filed March 17, 1993). Magistrate Judge Bowler’s opinion combines an accurate exposition of the facts with a correct statement of the applicable legal principles.

I.

The majority opinion makes clear that D’Arcy declined to submit irrefutable evidence, readily available to him, that Barbosa waited - eighty-one days to report the rape and that Barbosa testified untruthfully as to when she first informed the police and her sister-in-law that she had been raped. In considering whether D’Arcy’s inaction was substandard under Strickland’s first prong, the majority employs a false assumption. The majority excuses D’Arcy’s tactics in part by pointing out that he pursued a misidentifi-eation defense (the “dreadlocks defense”) and did not really challenge Barbosa’s rape allegation. See ante at 917 (“Matthew’s primary defense remained that Barbosa had picked out the wrong assailant, and not that she had not been attacked at all. While Barbosa’s delay in reporting that she was raped might have affected the jury’s assessment of her overall credibility as a witness, we think this would be much more likely if the primary issue had been consent. Here, the primary issue, and the heart of the defense’s theory,, was not whether a crime occurred but rather who committed it.”). It then concludes that, in the context of the misidentification/dread-loeks defense, D’Arcy’s failure to expose the glaring inconsistencies in Barbosa’s testimony and prior statements was not “beyond the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 917-18.
Obviously, this fine of reasoning tacitly assumes the soundness of D’Arcy’s decision not to question whether Barbosa had in fact been raped. Such an assumption is not warranted in this ease for the following reasons. First, the two defenses would not have been inconsistent. There would have been nothing inherently- suspect about arguing that Barbosa had identified the wrong man and that she had not been, or may not have been, *920raped. Second, there was significant evidence tending to undermine Barbosa’s account of the sexual assault. Had the jury been fully apprised of the irregularities surrounding the reporting of the rape charge, it may well have concluded that it could not convict Matthews of rape beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, D’Arcy did argue to the jury, albeit as an afterthought, that Barbosa may not have been raped. See id. at 914 (excerpting portions of closing argument where D’Arcy asks the jury to consider whether a rape took place). In view of this last fact alone, I am puzzled by the majority’s conclusion that D’Arcy’s refusal to buttress his argument with significant supporting evidence constituted “sound trial tactics.” D’Arcy ultimately thought the “rape may not have happened” theory worth arguing; how then could it not have been worth supporting with evidence that was available?
I do not think that the existence of one reasonable defense strategy, without more, establishes constitutionally effective representation.

II.

I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, within the confines of the misiden-tification/dreadlock defense, D’Arcy’s failure to impeach Barbosa passed constitutional muster. The case hinged on Barbosa’s credibility as a witness, and I simply do not see how it could have been “sound” for D’Arcy to fail to demonstrate to the jury that Barbosa had testified untruthfully on several very important matters (including when she first informed the police and her sister-in-law that she had been raped). He certainly could have done so sensitively and without suggesting improper motive on Barbosa’s part. The omitted impeachment evidence could have been easily introduced as further confirmation of that which D’Arcy had already suggested to the jury: the trauma of awakening to find an intruder in the room quite reasonably rendered suspect Barbosa’s powers of perception and recall.
This leads to a second point. The majority, in my opinion, gives too much credence to certain ageist and sexist assumptions — that it would be improper to question closely (and risk arousing the emotions of) a young female sexual assault victim, and that the jury cannot rise above its sympathy for young female sexual assault victims and do its assigned job — that heavily informed D’Arcy’s performance and decision-making. Along these lines, I note the majority’s conclusion that Barbosa’s age “render[s] her failure to report the rape immediately all the more explicable.” Id. at 917. The explicability vel non of Barbosa’s failure to report the rape immediately — as well as Barbosa’s failure to testify truthfully about when she first reported the rape — had vital bearing on Barbosa’s credibility. It should have been left to the jury’s consideration after argument by counsel. In my opinion, a reviewing court has no business explaining this failure away, without citation to supporting authority, as an understandable by-product of youth.
While counsel must tread carefully in questioning the alleged victim in cases such as this, counsel cannot abdicate the constitutional responsibilities of a defense attorney. The record amply demonstrates that D’Arcy was more concerned with the young victim’s emotional state than providing his client with a vigorous defense, and that his hands-off approach to the case led to a constitutionally-defective performance. The sentiments that prompted D’Arcy’s ineffectiveness may be understandable. They cannot, however, be tolerated in our criminal justice system.

III.

The majority opinion does not discuss D’Arcy’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument, and Magistrate Judge Bowler evaluates this failure only insofar as the argument mischaracterized the evidence. I think it important to note that the closing contained both an improper appeal to the jury to act other than as a dispassionate arbiter of the facts and an improper and inflammatory appeal to the jury’s emotions. Neither type of argument is permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 573 (1st Cir.1994) (prosecutor may not ask jury to act other than as a dispassionate arbiter of the facts); Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 527 (1st Cir.1993) (prosecutor may not inflame the prejudices and passions of the jury).
Here, the prosecutor told the jury: “Keep that picture of [Barbosa] in your mind. Those were not crocodile tears that came out *921of her eyes. Those were genuine tears based on honesty and certainty. Brenda Barbosa came to this court to seek justice, and you can give her justice. She is the victim.” See ante at 915. Perhaps because the concept of “tears of certainty” is new to me, I regard the first three sentences of the quotation as an ill-concealed and inflammatory entreaty for jury sympathy. And the last two sentences of the quotation are at worst an appeal for vengeance and at best a request that the jury do something other than dispassionately judge the facts for itself.
In a case as close as this one, these improper arguments could have made a real difference. D’Arcy’s failure to object to them was another error in the long line of trial mistakes that show his incompetency beyond cavil.
APPENDIX
United States District Court District of Massachusetts
LLOYD MATTHEWS, Petitioner,5 v. PAUL RAKIEY, Superintendent at M.C.I.-Walpole, Respondent.
Civil Action No. 90-12111-WF.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: PETITIONER’S WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOCKET ENTRY # 23)
March 17, 1993.
BOWLER, United States Magistrate Judge.
* * * * *

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Testimony at trial, taken from the state court record, is as follows.6 On direct examination, the victim testified that she awakened in her bed at 8:30 a.m. on May 15,1986, when she “heard the door squeak.” (Tr. 2-19). She had the opportunity to “look right at [the] face” of her unknown assailant who had a knife in his hand. (Tr. 2-19 & 25). The assailant climbed on top of her and, when she began to cry, told her “to be quiet ‘or I’ll kill you.’ ”7 (Tr. 2-19).
The victim further testified that the assailant “touched me on my breasts” and inserted a finger in “my vagina.” (Tr. 2-20). The Boston Police Incident Report (“the incident report”), dated May 15,1986,10:25 a.m., fails to note a sexual assault.8 According to a subsequent police report filed by Detective Ingersoll, the victim first mentioned the above sexual assault at “the probable cause hearing in Roxbury District Court.”9 (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. B; Tr. 2-27). The probable cause hearing apparently took place in August 1986, approximately 81 days after the incident.10
According to the victim’s testimony, the assailant, still armed with a knife, then pinned her to a wall while he looked through the house. She was alone in the house at the time of the incident. Although she did not see an accomplice, she testified that the as*922sailant was not alone and that there were “two of them.” (Tr. 2-22 & 40). After searching the house, the assailant left, taking with him a leather coat belonging to the victim.11 (Tr. 2-21-22).
The victim then testified that she went to the home of her sister-in-law, who lived nearby,12 and related her story.13 She telephoned the police who arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and compiled the incident report. (Tr. 2-22-24).
On the afternoon of May 15, 1986, the victim went to the Boston Police Department, District 2, in Roxbury. After viewing an array of 600 to 700 photographs, she identified petitioner as the assailant. Detective Ingersoll conducted the photographic array. Before viewing the photographs, the victim described the assailant as “about five eleven, and he had dreadlocks, braided, with a hat.” (Tr. 2-26, 31, 33, 46 & 49). The incident report fails to mention the assailant as having a dreadlocks hairstyle. Nor did trial counsel question the victim about this discrepancy.14
In identifying the assailant from the photographic array, trial counsel elicited from the victim that she could never forget the face of her assailant and, after viewing a photograph of petitioner for half a second, told the jury that “I just knew right after I seen his picture. I knew that that was him.” (Tr. 2-35; see also, Tr. 2-42, 1. 13-15). At several points during cross examination, trial counsel advised the victim to relax. (Tr. 2-33 & 39). Trial counsel completed his cross examination without exploring her prior inconsistent statements or pointing out other discrepancies contained in her testimony.15 The prosecutor then rested the Commonwealth’s case.
At a bench conference immediately thereafter, trial counsel stated that petitioner was “more than vociferous” in urging trial counsel to recall the victim concerning discrepancies in her testimony. Disagreeing with his client, trial counsel opted for a different “strategy,” explaining to the trial judge that it was “a disadvantage when you try to cross examine young ladies because the fact that she’s highly emotional.” (Tr. 2-62).
When petitioner took the stand, he denied ever being in the victim’s house or bedroom on May 15, 1986. (Tr. 2-71). He testified that he regularly worked at Crossing Auto-body Shop (“the shop”) in Roxbury. Petitioner further testified that from April through July 1986 he refurbished a 1980 Lincoln automobile at the shop with a friend, Christopher Cross. Petitioner also testified that he regularly opened the shop every day at 7:30 a.m. (Tr. 2-64-69 & 84). At the time of trial, however, he could not specifically recall where he was at 8:30 a.m. on May 15, *9231986. (Tr. 2-66). Trial counsel conducted a relatively brief direct examination.
Petitioner’s close friend, John Wornum, who presently resides in Georgia, was a “part-owner” of the shop in July of 1988. (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. H). He was in Georgia at the time of trial and, according to his July 1988 affidavit, agreed to testify on petitioner’s behalf. Trial counsel failed to notify him of petitioner’s trial. He avers that, had he known of petitioner’s trial, he would have testified that petitioner regularly worked at his shop in May of 1986 and that on “a Thursday” petitioner “would have been working in ... the shop.”16 (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. H).
On cross examination of petitioner, the prosecutor pointed out that neither John Wornum, Rufus Wornum, who ran the shop in John Wornum’s absence, nor Christopher Cross, were in the courtroom to verify petitioner’s story of being at the shop at 8:30 a.m. on May 15,1986. (Tr. 2-88). Petitioner explained that John Wornum was in Georgia, Rufus Wornum was “running the shop” and Christopher Cross was in the marines. (Tr. 2-88). The prosecutor emphasized these “missing witnesses” in closing argument. (Tr. 3-31).
After examination of petitioner, trial counsel rested his case. (Tr. 2-92). Trial counsel did not produce any character witnesses. Nor did trial counsel move for a continuance at the outset of trial in order to secure the testimony of petitioner’s alibi witness, John Wornum.17
Trial counsel’s closing argument focused on recapitulating the events of May 15, 1986, and the trial testimony. As posited by trial counsel, the jury had to decide whether the victim was telling the truth. (Tr. 3-7). Rather than focusing on the victim’s credibility or her identifications of petitioner, ■ trial counsel cautioned the jury to consider Detective Ingersoll’s conduct and the eircum-stances of petitioner’s arrest 13 days after the photographic identification in the context of the phrase “fair play.” (Tr. 3-8-12 & 14-15). He surmised that, had the arrest taken place immediately after the photographic identification, petitioner could have readily corroborated his whereabouts at 8:30 a.m. on May 15, 1986. Trial counsel then stated the following:
I suggest you could side with [the victim]. Difficult job for myself to cross examine a young girl in a case like this, because I could put one of my family in that position, anyone.
The main thing is that gentlemen have a tough time trying to probe into intimate matters with females. The fact is that this fourteen year olders (sic) was at the brink of breaking up and getting hysterical.
(Tr. 3-12). (Emphasis Added).
Trial counsel further argued that the victim was hysterical at the time she identified petitioner’s photograph and essentially chose the first photograph she viewed of a male with a dreadlocks hairstyle. At this point, the trial judge, upon objection, interrupted trial counsel’s argument to advise the jury they were to consider only their recollection of the evidence.
Trial counsel then argued that petitioner was telling the truth because, in lieu of testifying that he knew he was at the garage on May 15, 1986, petitioner stated he “usually” worked at the garage. He then committed what petitioner now argues were additional and rather grievous errors, i.e., he again sided with the victim and, referring to the photographic identification procedure, opined there was nothing wrong. In fact, he reiterated, without qualification, the victim’s positive identification of petitioner. Trial counsel argued as follows:18
All the evidence that you heard was a fourteen year old girl. Believe me, a fourteen year old girl has all the rights of everybody. If something happened to *924her — fortunately she’s made a pretty good recovery because she testified as a forthright young lady. She’s going to school. She wasn’t going to school though the day that this incident is alleged to take place. She said she overslept. She was home alone.
But she picked out a picture, and that picture has lived with [petitioner] since late May of ’86. A picture is worth a thousand words, you’ve heard.
Well, you heard Detective Ingersoll say, ‘She looked at 6, 700 pictures, etc., and she was by herself, and then she picked out the picture.’
Everything regarding how the picture was picked out I suggest was done according Hoyle. There was no prompting or anything. Detective Ingersoll, an experienced police officer for many years over in the Roxbury District.
He testified that he just wanted her to pick out something. As a matter of fact, he asked her after she picked out [petitioner’s] picture, ‘Do you want to go a little further?’ She said, ‘No, no, that’s the one. I’m definitely sure,’ with the dreadlocks.
I suggest that the dreadlocks are why [petitioner] is here.
(Tr. 3-18-19). (Emphasis Added).
Trial counsel then characterized the victim as an hysterical young girl and pointed out that she did not immediately describe the sexual assault to her sister-in-law or to the police.19 He then returned to the argument that petitioner’s arrest occurred approximately 13 days after the May 15, 1986, incident, thereby eroding his ability to remember his specific actions on May 15, 1986. He argued that petitioner was telling the truth and, despite the stigma of his dreadlocks hairstyle, continues to wear his hair in this style. (Tr. 2-20-25).
As pointed out by the prosecution in closing argument, petitioner did not produce several “missing witnesses”, in particular, John Wornum, Rufus Wornum and Christopher Cross. (Tr. .3-31). He argued, without objection, that “Brenda Barbosa came to this court to seek justice, and you can give her justice. She is the victim.” Nor did trial counsel object to the prosecution’s incorrect summary of the victim’s initial description of petitioner to the police as a “Black man, medium build, medium complexion, dreadlocks, the kind of hair that is customarily worn by people who come from Trinidad or Jamaica. Pretty accurate description.”20 (Tr. 3-28).
Turning to the jury charge, it did not include an instruction that a victim may be honestly mistaken in the identification of her assailant in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 302, 391 N.E.2d 889 (1979). Nor did trial counsel request such an instruction (Tr. 3-49), although the trial judge anticipated he might give a Rodriguez instruction to the jury should they have a question (Tr. 3-52 & 55).21 The trial judge did, however, caution the jury “to consider whether the party had the opportunity to make the observation.” (Tr. 3-37).

DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) established a two prong standard in evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment. First, petitioner must show that trial “‘counsel’s performance was deficient’ and ‘the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’ ” Bryant v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364, 369 (1st Cir.), cert. den., 477 U.S. 907, 106 S.Ct. 3281, 91 L.Ed.2d 570 (1986) (quoting Strickland). A deficient performance is one that falls below “an objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional *925norms when considering all the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Clark v. Moran, 749 F.Supp. 1186, 1199 (D.R.I.1990), affm’d, 942 F.2d 24 (1st Cir.1991).
It is important to emphasize that petitioner bears a “heavy burden.” Whitman v. Ventetuolo, 781 F.Supp. 95, 99 (D.R.I.1991). There is a presumption that trial “counsel ‘rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’ ” Pilchak v. Camper, 741 F.Supp. 782, 792 (W.D.Mo.1990), affm’d, 935 F.2d 145 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting Strickland). This court must make “every effort ... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Clark v. Moran, 749 F.Supp. at 1199-1200 (quoting Strickland; emphasis added).
Under the second prong, it is the burden of petitioner to show there is a “reasonable possibility that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 1201; accord Patterson v. Dahm, 769 F.Supp. 1103, 1107-1108 (D.Neb.1991). Moreover, not ‘“every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the proceeding.’ ” Virella v. United States, 750 F.Supp. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y.1990).
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. Thus, this court is not bound by the eonclusion(s) of the state court(s) that counsel rendered effective assistance. Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir.1988). Succinctly explained, “the presumption of correctness accorded the factual determinations of the state court ... applies to the historical facts underlying the attorney’s performance but not the ultimate conclusion as to whether or not effective assistance has been rendered.” Patterson v. Dahm, 769 F.Supp. at 1108 (quoting Kellogg v. Scurr, 741 F.2d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir.1984)); see Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092, 1100 (4th Cir.1990), cert. den., 499 U.S. 913, 111 S.Ct. 1123, 113 L.Ed.2d 231 (1991) (discussing § 2254(d)); see also Clark v. Moran, 749 F.Supp. at 1191 (state court’s findings on ineffective assistance of counsel are not binding ón federal court).
With the exception of the probable cause hearing, the facts underlying petitioner’s claim are reliably determined from the record and capable of accurate reconstruction. See generally, Perron v. Perrin, 742 F.2d 669, 672 (1st Cir.1984) (noting that ineffective assistance of counsel claim could be reconstructed from the record and that evidentiary hearing was therefore unnecessary; nor, apparently, did parties request an evidentiary hearing). Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution this court set an evidentiary hearing. Despite the notice of an evidentiary hearing sent to both parties, neither respondent nor petitioner chose to present additional evidence at the January 15, 1993, hearing.
This court now examines the specific claims which make up petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
A. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Impeach The Victim
Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to impeach the victim with her prior inconsistent statements and descriptions of the May 15, 1986, incident. Specifically, trial counsel completely failed to question the victim about why she neglected to mention her assailant’s dreadlocks hairstyle to the police when they first arrived at 273 Norfolk Avenue on the morning of May 15, 1986. The incident report does not mention a dreadlocks hairstyle.
In closing argument, trial counsel focused on the fact that petitioner had not altered his hairstyle since the May 15, 1986,' incident despite the stigma attached to his hairstyle. This argument misses the mark. Petitioner’s hairstyle is a particularly salient physical feature of his appearance! Trial counsel never asked the victim why she failed to immediately mention this salient feature to the police when they arrived at at 273 Norfolk Avenue.
Similarly, trial counsel neglected to adequately question the victim about her delay in relating her story of a sexual assault to the *926police.22 The record reflects she did not mention the sexual assault to her sister-in-law or to Detective Williams before she viewed the photographic array. Nor does the incident report describe a sexual assault. Apparently, it was not until the probable cause hearing that the victim first mentioned the sexual assault. Trial counsel’s failure to adequately explore this lengthy lapse of time with the victim on cross examination presents a glaring omission which negatively impacts his entire performance.
Nor does trial counsel’s abbreviated and oblique reference to this lengthy delay in closing argument cure his error. In closing argument, trial counsel stated that the victim did not tell anyone she had a “physical disability” on the day of the incident and he questioned whether the sexual assault ever “really happened.” (Tr. 3-17, 1. 14-18; Tr. 3-20, 1. 15-20). Trial counsel did not, however, develop this argument for the jury.
In addition, trial counsel failed to question the victim about the variance in her statements regarding: (1) whether the assailant took her leather coat; and (2) her opportunity to view the assailant when he entered her room.23 The above errors collectively provide strong evidence of unreasonable and unprofessional judgment.
Respondent nevertheless correctly points out that ineffective trial strategy is not the equivalent of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Patterson v. Dahm, 769 F.Supp. at 1110; see also Rankin v. Roberts, 788 F.Supp. 521, 524 (D.Kan.1992) (counsel’s failure to spend time with client, to cross examine witnesses and to make effective opening and closing arguments of appropriate length deemed matter of trial strategy). It is also petitioner’s burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (citations omitted).
The Appeals Court stated that trial counsel’s:
strategy, expressed at the bench (Tr. II 61-62), was reasonable in the circumstances. He developed inconsistencies in the victim’s story through cross examination of the victim (Tr. II 36-37) ... but chose not to undermine his defense strategy by suggesting that she had previously failed to mention the defendant’s dreadlocks. It also was a reasonable decision on his part not to appear to be badgering or harassing an already upset victim in front of the jury.24
(Docket Entry # 15, Ex. D). As noted by petitioner (Docket Entry # 15, pp. 16-17), the cross examination cited above by the Appeals Court (Tr. 2-36-37, 1. 12-13) actually demonstrates that trial counsel failed to impeach the victim.25 Furthermore, if trial counsel’s strategy was not to badger the victim in front of the jury, why then did trial counsel simply avoid a detailed cross exami*927nation of the victim and offer into evidence the incident report?26 Trial counsel’s disregard of vital impeachment evidence in a case where the primary evidence consists of the victim’s word against that of petitioner is both misguided and lacking in professional judgment.
A review of the historical facts demonstrates to this court that trial counsel’s hesitancy to cross examine the victim was not based on trial strategy. Rather, trial counsel’s “strategy” in not cross examining the victim appears based on his personal discomfort in cross examining a female about a sexual assault.27 While understandable, a man’s liberty was at stake and the victim’s failure to mention the sexual assault until August of 1986 constituted a critical discrepancy in her story as did her failure to initially mention the dreadlocks hairstyle of the assailant to the police.
Turning to the prejudice component of the Strickland test, the victim’s credibility was not a minor matter. Both the accuracy and consistency of the victim’s identifications of petitioner were significant matters, particularly in light of the limited number of witnesses and evidence presented. See Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1179 (5th Cir.1985). Trial counsel himself characterized this as “primarily an identity type of case.” (Tr. 2-61). Nevertheless,, trial counsel failed to call into question the victim’s credibility by adequately exploring her delay in reporting the sexual assault; her description of the assailant’s dreadlocks hairstyle; her description of being awake when the assailant entered her room; and her assertion that the assailant took her leather coat. Rather, trial counsel conducted an extremely limited cross examination of the victim which, despite the shortness in length, managed to elicit additional confirmatory statements regarding her identification of petitioner’s photograph.
B. Trial Counsel’s Closing Argument
Petitioner maintains that trial counsel’s closing argument was inadequate and misdirected. Despite petitioner’s heavy burden, this court concurs.
At the outset of his closing argument, trial counsel focused on whether petitioner received “fair play” because of the delay in his arrest and the circumstances surrounding his arrest. (Tr. 3-8-12 & 14-15). This initial focus ignores the critical evidence concerning the victim’s credibility and the strength of her identifications.
Instead, trial counsel attempted to cloth the victim as an emotionally distraught girl who, in order to feel vindicated, chose the first photograph she viewed depicting an individual with a dreadlocks hairstyle.28 Not mentioning the victim’s failure to initially describe the assailant as having a dreadlocks hairstyle arguably fits within this “strategy,” as noted by the Appeals Court. What does not fit within this strategy, however, is trial counsel’s failure to emphasize the victim’s delay in reporting the sexual assault29 and his failure to explore the victim’s inconsistent descriptions concerning the leather coat and her opportunity to view the assailant. More*928over, if the victim was emotionally distraught and hysterical, why did trial counsel simultaneously describe her as a forthright witness?
Not only was trial counsel’s “strategy” misplaced but it ignored the strenuous urging of his client to identify the discrepancies contained in the victim’s testimony (Tr. 2-61). Consequently, although it is petitioner’s burden to overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s action might be sound trial strategy, United States v. Simone, 931 F.2d 1186, 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. den., 502 U.S. 981, 112 S.Ct. 584, 116 L.Ed.2d 609 (1991) (trial counsel’s closing argument in following strategy did not fall below objective standard of reasonableness), when placed in the context of the entire closing argument, trial counsel’s strategy was misguided, at best.
When discussing the victim, he suggested to the jury that they “could side with [the victim]” and that she was “forthright.” These comments, viewed in the context of the particular quotation and of the entire argument, show a significant lack of professional judgment and reduced the effectiveness of trial counsel’s “strategy” of depicting the victim as a highly emotional young woman who chose the first photograph she viewed containing a dreadlocks hairstyle. In discussing the photographic identification, trial counsel reiterated the victim’s positive and unequivocal identification of petitioner as the assailant as well as the correctness of the procedure.
Nor can the above errors be viewed as innocent in their effect upon the jury. Had trial counsel marshalled the victim’s incompatible descriptions for the jury in his closing argument, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.
C. Failure to Produce Alibi Witness
Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to summons his only alibi witness or move for a continuance in order to secure the witness’ attendance at trial. Petitioner learned his case was set for trial on or about May 12, 1986, the day before trial commenced. (Tr. 2-66). He avers he informed trial counsel that John Wornum would testify on his behalf. (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. G). John Wornum avers that he would have testified that petitioner regularly worked at his shop in May 1986 and that at 8:30 a.m. on a Thursday morning, petitioner “would have been working in the yard or in the shop.” (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. H). John Wornum additionally avers that trial counsel never contacted him to testify despite his understanding that trial counsel would contact him at the appropriate time. (Id.).
The Appeals Court concluded, albeit not in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that trial counsel’s failure to call John Wornum as a witness would not have deprived petitioner of a substantial defense. (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. D). This court respectfully disagrees with this conclusion. The Appeals Court also noted that John Wornum’s affidavit failed to state that he had a specific memory of May 15,1986, or documentary evidence to support his contentions. (Id.). While this court accepts this factual finding regarding the content of the affidavit, the affidavit cannot be so easily discounted. Rather, the affidavit provides strong evidence that John Wornum would have corroborated petitioner’s defense that he was not at the scene of the crime.
One of petitioner’s principal defenses was that he was not in the victim’s bedroom at 8:30 a.m. on May 15, 1986. He consistently claimed he was at work although he had no specific memory of his actions on May 15, 1986. John Wornum’s testimony was vital to this defense. The prosecutor repeatedly noted his absence for the jury. (Tr. 2-88 & 3-31).
Trial counsel’s unexplained failure to contact John Wornum or to move for a continuance in order to secure his testimony was deficient and, under the circumstances, prejudicial. Although presumably pressed for time because of the short trial notice, trial counsel could have moved for a continuance. There is also no evidence that trial counsel made any attempt to contact John Wornum in advance or during petitioner’s trial. Such *929actions left the jury with little evidence to support petitioner’s self serving testimony.
In a case decided before Strickland but nevertheless opposite to the case at bar, the court found that counsel was ineffective in failing to call an alibi witness when the entire case consisted of the personal identification of defendant by two victims of the armed robbery. Wilson v. Cowan, 578 F.2d 166, 168 (6th Cir.1978).30 Although the jury had the benefit of petitioner’s testimony, trial counsel’s failure to call John Wornum to the witness stand nevertheless deprived the jury of a valuable opportunity to hear crucial evidence. See Id. at 168. This is particularly true in light of the limited nature of the evidence presented, including the lack of exhibits offered by trial counsel into the record and the lack of character witnesses to testify on petitioner’s behalf and the jury’s awareness of the absence of “missing witnesses”.
D. Trial Preparation and Overall Performance
Petitioner next argues that trial counsel’s preparation and performance at trial fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Under the circumstances, trial counsel had little time to prepare for trial. This does not, however, excuse trial counsel’s apparent failure to review the transcripts of the probable cause hearing or his failure throughout the direct examination of the victim to object to the prosecutor’s leading questions.
Turning to the latter, failure to object at trial to leading questions is generally considered a tactical decision. Pilchak v. Camper, 741 F.Supp. 782, 793 (W.D.Mo.1990). In this case, the direct examination of the victim presents a series of leading questions without objection.31 (Tr. 2-19-22). Standing alone, this court might presume that trial counsel chose not to alienate the jury with repeated interruptions. In the context of trial counsel’s other errors, however, his failure to object is more troubling.
Petitioner also complains that trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s mischarac-terization of the evidence in closing argument. Interruptions during closing argument are often avoided as a matter of professional courtesy, although the prosecutor showed no such professional courtesy. This court, however, does not place particular emphasis on trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s misstatements of fact in closing argument inasmuch as the trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury that it was their recollection of the evidence which was controlling. (Tr. 3-9-10, 13-14 & 36-37).
Turning to the failure to obtain transcripts of the probable cause hearing, this court is somewhat limited by the record.32 Although such a failure would evidence inadequate preparation, there is no showing of prejudice *930given the absence of adequate proof as to the testimony at the hearing.
In closing, this court has given a great deal of thought and perpension to trial counsel’s actions and inactions. It is the culmination of errors taken as a whole which, under the circumstances, establishes trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in this case. In short, trial counsel failed to impeach the victim in a case where the jury obviously based its verdict on the victim’s story. Trial counsel failed to marshal the facts during a rather disjointed closing argument which focused in large part on the fairness of petitioner’s arrest. Finally, trial counsel failed to secure the testimony of petitioner’s only alibi witness, John Wornum. While counsel has no obligation to render a sterling performance, counsel does have an obligation to render a reasonable performance under prevailing professional norms. Based on the foregoing reasons, this court finds that petitioner has shown that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
E. Prejudice
Such ineffective assistance on the part of trial counsel was also highly prejudicial. This ease consisted primarily of the victim’s testimony against that of petitioner. Without producing petitioner’s alibi witness nor any character witnesses, trial counsel left petitioner to present his own version of the facts to the jury without collateral support. Nor did trial counsel fully attempt to discredit the victim’s testimony with her prior inconsistent statements or her delay in reporting the sexual assault. There is no indication in the trial record that trial counsel offered into evidence the incident report or the subsequent police report, so that the jury could compare the discrepancies between the victim’s prior descriptions and her subsequent testimony in court.
To state the obvious, there were no witnesses to the May 15, 1986, incident other than the victim and the assailant. Impeachment evidence therefore becomes all the more vital. The jury is entitled to consider this evidence. It is also entitled to consider the testimony of petitioner’s only alibi witness. The Sixth Amendment demands no less. Had the jury considered this evidence, heard the testimony of John Wornum and heard an effective closing argument marshaling these discrepancies, there is a strong possibility that, but for trial counsel’s errors in neglecting to present this evidence, the result of petitioner’s trial would have been different. These cumulative errors taken as a whole are sufficient to undermine this court’s confidence in the jury verdict.

CONCLUSION

It is therefore RECOMMENDED33 that the writ of habeas corpus be ALLOWED unless respondent, on behalf of the Commonwealth, promptly elects to grant petitioner a new trial.
Stephen Hrones and Murray Kuhn for the petitioner.
Linda Nutting Murphy for the defendant.

. Petitioner was bom in Trinidad, West Indies, and had lived in the Boston area for a period of 13 years. (Tr. 2-64).

. Arguments are highlighted in the footnotes.

. In contrast to her court testimony, the Boston Police Incident Report issued on May 15, 1986, 10:25 a.m., states that the victim told the reporting officer that "while she was sleeping the suspect entered the victim’s bedroom and jumped on top of her.” (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. A). (Emphasis added). As elaborated infra, petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to impeach the victim with this prior inconsistent statement that she had a more limited opportunity to view the assailant.

. Again, petitioner complains that trial counsel failed to impeach the victim concerning this discrepancy.

. Petitioner points out that trial counsel neither objected nor requested an instruction when the prosecutor referred to petitioner as being present at the probable cause hearing. (Tr. 2-27 & 80-81). Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, because the prosecutor did not refer specifically to petitioner’s failure to testify or to offer evidence at the probable cause hearing, section 23 of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278 is inapposite. Moreover, as noted by the Appeals Court (Docket Entry #15, Ex. D), the trial judge instructed the jury concerning the criminal process (Tr. 3-39 — 40).

. Petitioner repeats his allegation that trial counsel failed to impeach the victim regarding her estimated 81-day delay in reporting the sexual assault.

. Petitioner complains that trial counsel failed to impeach the victim with her contrary statement before the grand jury. When asked during grand jury proceedings whether the assailant took her coat with him, she replied "I don’t really know, but he must have took it because I couldn't find it; I looked for it; I asked my sister if she let someone use it; she said, no.” (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. C, p. 8). (Emphasis Added). In fact, trial counsel made no attempt to impeach the victim on this issue.

. The Boston Police Incident Report (Docket Entry #15, Ex. A) notes the victim's address as 275 Norfolk Avenue and the address of the interview as 273 Norfolk Avenue.

. Petitioner contends that trial counsel again neglected to impeach the victim with her failure to mention the sexual assault to her sister-in-law.

. Again, petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to effectively cross examine the victim by asking her why she neglected to mention the assailant’s dreadlocks hairstyle initially to the police who arrived at the scene of the incident.

. The record does reflect that trial counsel asked the victim if she told Detective Ingersoll about the sexual assault. When the victim answered “no” but that she told the police and "[fit's right in the report”, trial counsel failed to challenge her statements. (Tr. 2-37).

. Petitioner argues that trial counsel's failure to contact his only alibi witness in order to corroborate his story constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

. Again, petitioner characterizes trial counsel's failure to move for a continuance as ineffective assistance of counsel.

.For context, this court reproduces the entire quotation.

. As noted by respondent, trial counsel also managed to elicit from Detective Ingersoll that petitioner's photograph “could have been" the first photograph viewed by the victim depicting a male with a dreadlocks hairstyle. (Tr. 2-55).

. Detective Ingersoll characterized the incident report as providing only a “vague description” of the assailant. (Tr. 2-49).

.Petitioner argues that trial counsel's failure to request such an instruction provides one more example of his ineffective performance. The trial judge also intimated, albeit in an oblique manner, that trial counsel was not treating his case with an appropriate degree of seriousness. (Tr. 3-53).

. Although trial counsel asked the victim if she told Detective Ingersoll about the sexual assault, he left unchallenged her statements that she initially told the police about the sexual assault and that it was in the incident report. (Tr. 2-37).

. In addition, petitioner asserts, on information and belief, that the victim's testimony at the probable cause hearing contains a number of statements inconsistent with her trial testimony and that trial counsel neglected to impeach the victim with these prior inconsistent statements. (Docket Entry # 15, p. 23). Tapes of the probable cause hearing are, however, apparently unavailable. Nor did petitioner produce an affidavit depicting the particular statements. Consequently, as discussed infra, this argument is unavailing.

. The Appeals Court additionally stated that trial counsel's strategy was to “stress the point that the victim identified the defendant solely because he had dreadlocks, as did her assailant.” (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. D).

.During cross examination, trial counsel elicited the statement from the victim that she told the police about the sexual assault when the incident first happened. Trial counsel neglected at this point to impeach the victim with the incident report which directly contradicts her trial testimony. Testimony is as follows:
Q. But you didn't tell [Detective Ingersoll] about the fact that this man touched your private parts?
A. No, hut I told the other cops when they came.
Q. When?
A. When it first happened, the cops that came over to the house. It’s right in the report.
(Tr. 2-37).

. This court is somewhat limited by the record. In particular, this court lacks a copy of the state court exhibit list. A review of the trial transcripts shows no reference to the admission of the incident report as an exhibit. In the event this court is incorrect in its assumption, either party is invited to come forth with additional evidence regarding admission of the incident report within ten days of receipt of this Order.

. Trial counsel stated to the trial judge that, "It's a disadvantage when you try to examine young ladies because of the fact that she’s highly emotional.” (Tr. 2-62). Similarly, to the jury during closing argument, he stated that:
Difficult job for myself to cross-examine a young girl in a case like this, because I could put one of my family in that position, anyone ... The main thing is that gentlemen have a tough time trying to probe into intimate matters with females. The fact is that this fourteen year olders (sic) was at the brink of breaking up and getting hysterical.
(Tr. 3-12).

. Trial counsel also noted gaps in the testimony but failed to identify the specific gaps for the jury. (Tr. 3-20). Nor does the record reflect that the jury had the incident report to view the discrepancies.

. As previously noted, trial counsel's reference to the victim's delay in voicing the sexual assault was brief and, without developing this argument, he summarily proceeded to discuss the fairness and delay surrounding petitioner's arrest. (Tr. 3-20-23).

. Cf. Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.1988) (trial counsel's promise to produce expert witness in opening statement and subsequent failure to call witness was ineffective and prejudicial as a matter of law). The First Circuit, however, noted they “might have no quarrel with counsel's” failure to call the expert witness "had that matter stood alone” without the reference during counsel's opening statement. Id. at 18.

. Direct examination proceeded as follows:
Q. Now, I’m going to further direct your attention to about 8:30 in the morning. You were in bed asleep at that time, weren't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you awakened by something?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Would you tell us what that was?
A. A man.
Q. A man came into your bedroom?
A. Yes.
Q. What did this man do?
A. He came in my room, and I heard the door squeak. When I looked up, I seen him. He had a knife in his hand.
Q. This was daylight, wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you had the opportunity to look right at his face, didn’t you?
A. Yes....
(Tr. 2-18-19).

.Respondent did not produce an affidavit to the effect that trial counsel obtained and read the transcripts of the probable cause hearing. Neither respondent nor petitioner produced any witnesses at the January 15, 1993, hearing. Petitioner avers that the only opportunity he had to explain his case to trial counsel was a 15 minute conversation shortly before jury selection. (Docket Entry # 15, Ex. G).

. See Rule 8(b)(3) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of receipt of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made and the basis for such objection. Any party may respond to another parly's objections within ten days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the district court's order. United States v. Escoboza Vega, 678 F.2d 376, 378-79 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1986).