Court Opinion

ID: 9894403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 18:04:19.123995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:40.418905
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/1/23 P. v. McCombs CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B325006

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. MA036496)
           v.

  KYLE LAMBERT MCCOMBS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Emily Cole, Judge. Affirmed.
      Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
       In 2007, a jury found Kyle McCombs guilty of voluntary
manslaughter with a true finding that a principal used a gun. In
2022, McCombs petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1172.6,2 which limits accomplice liability for murder. The
trial court denied the petition. McCombs appeals and contends
that he was convicted based on a theory under which implied
malice was improperly imputed to him. We disagree and affirm
the order.
                         BACKGROUND
       Eddie Wheston was shot and killed on January 28, 2005.3
That day, Wheston was at his apartment with two men,
identified as McCombs and Dwayne Harris. Wheston’s girlfriend
saw Wheston struggling with a man who held a gun, which she
did not recognize as belonging to Wheston, who also owned a gun.
The man shot Wheston, who died, having suffered seven gunshot
wounds. A witness saw McCombs and Harris flee the scene, both
holding guns. McCombs was treated at a hospital for a gunshot
wound.
       McCombs and Harris were jointly charged with and tried
for Wheston’s murder. In 2007, a jury found them not guilty of
first degree murder and deadlocked on lesser offenses. On
retrial, another jury found McCombs and Harris not guilty of
second degree murder but guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The

1
      All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
      Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
3
      We derive the facts regarding the crime from the opinion
affirming McCombs’s judgment of conviction, People v. McCombs
(Jan. 27, 2009, B199705) [nonpub. opn.].

                                 2
jury also found true the allegation that a principal was armed
with a gun (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
       In 2022, McCombs petitioned for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel for him, and the
People submitted opposition, which included the instructions
given to McCombs’s jury.
       The trial court denied the petition, finding that McCombs’s
jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. For reasons not relevant here,
the trial court also resentenced McCombs to 23 years in prison.
                         DISCUSSION
I.    Overview of Senate Bill No. 1437
       To the end of ensuring a person’s sentence is commensurate
with the person’s individual criminal culpability, Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) limited accomplice liability
under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and
eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959;
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) Senate Bill
No. 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e) (limiting application
of the felony-murder rule) and section 188, subdivision (a)(3)
(stating that “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime”). As amended by Senate Bill No. 775, effective January 1,

                                3
2022, these ameliorative changes to the law now expressly apply
to attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure, codified at
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or voluntary manslaughter under the former law to be
resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of those
crimes under the current law. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 959; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A
defendant commences that procedure by filing a petition
containing a declaration that, among other things, the defendant
could not presently be convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
voluntary manslaughter under the current law. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) If a petition establishes a prima
facie case for relief, the trial court must appoint counsel if
requested, issue an order to show cause, and hold an evidentiary
hearing. (Id. at pp. 708–709; § 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1).)
II.   Voluntary manslaughter and implied malice
       McCombs contends he established a prima facie case for
relief because his jury was instructed on aiding and abetting and
voluntary manslaughter in a manner that allowed the jury to
impute malice to him based solely on his participation in the
crime. To support this contention, he relies on People v. Powell
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell) and People v. Langi (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi). After discussing those cases, we explain
why we do not agree with their interpretation of the pertinent
instructions.
      A. Powell and Langi
      Powell and Langi examined the interplay between
instructions on aiding and abetting and second degree murder.

                                  4
Beginning with Powell, the jury in that case was instructed on
aiding and abetting with CALCRIM No. 401: “ ‘To prove that the
defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that
crime, the People must prove the following: [¶] 1. The
perpetrator committed the crime. [¶] 2. The defendant knew that
the perpetrator intended to commit the crime. [¶] 3. Before or
during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to
aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; and [¶] 4.
The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime. [¶] Someone aids and
abets a crime if he knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose,
and he specifically intends to and does in fact aid, facilitate,
promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of
that crime.’ ” (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 706–707.)
       The Powell jury was further instructed on malice murder
with CALCRIM No. 520, that there are two kinds of malice
aforethought, express and implied, either of which can establish
the state of mind required for murder. (Powell, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at pp. 707–708.) The instruction further provided
that the “ ‘defendant acted with express malice if he unlawfully
intended to kill. [¶] The defendant acted with implied malice if:
[¶] 1. He intentionally committed an act; 2. The natural and
probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life;
3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to
human life and 4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard
for human life.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Powell found that CALCRIM No. 401 was “not tailored for”
aiding and abetting an implied malice murder. Specifically,
CALCRIM No. 401 referred to an intent to aid and abet a crime.
However, the aider and abettor in fact needed to “intend the

                                5
commission of the perpetrator’s act, the natural and probable
consequences of which are dangerous to human life, intentionally
aid in the commission of that act and do so with conscious
disregard for human life.” (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at
p. 714.) Stated otherwise, CALCRIM No. 401 did not require the
aider and abettor to have known that the act aided and abetted
was life-threatening or require the aider and abettor to have
personally acted with conscious disregard to human life.
       Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972, applied Powell’s
reasoning in the section 1172.6 context. In that case, Langi and
three other men beat the victim, who died from head trauma
after falling and hitting his head during the assault. Langi’s jury
was instructed on aiding and abetting with CALJIC No. 3.01 and
on second degree murder with CALJIC No. 8.31.
       CALJIC No. 3.01, as given to Langi’s jury, stated that a
person aids and abets the commission of a crime when the person
(1) with knowledge of the perpetrator’s “unlawful purpose,” and
(2) with the “intent or purpose” of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the crime’s commission, (3) by act or advice aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the crime’s commission.
(Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)
       CALJIC No. 8.31, as given to Langi’s jury, stated that a
killing is a second degree murder if (1) the killing resulted from
an intentional act, (2) the act’s natural consequences are
dangerous to human life, and (3) the act was deliberately
performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life. When the killing is the direct result of
such an act, it is unnecessary to prove that the defendant
intended that the act would result in the person’s death. (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)

                                 6
       The jury found Langi guilty of second degree murder, and
the trial court summarily denied his subsequent section 1172.6
petition. On appeal, however, the appellate court found that the
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the
instructions permitted him to be found guilty of aiding and
abetting second degree murder by improperly imputing malice to
him and without finding he personally acted with malice. The
court explained that although the aiding and abetting instruction
stated that a person aids and abets a crime if the person acts
with knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and with
the intent or purpose to commit or encourage that crime, “the
second-degree-murder instruction specified that the direct
perpetrator of that crime need not act with the unlawful intent of
causing death.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) That
is, “while the perpetrator must have deliberately performed the
fatal act ‘with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life’ (CALJIC No. 8.31), his purpose may
have been only to strike or to injure, or conceivably only to
embarrass, the victim. Since the perpetrator’s purpose need not
have been to kill the victim, the aider and abettor’s knowledge of
that purpose similarly need not have been knowledge that the
perpetrator aimed to kill. If the perpetrator need not have had
‘murderous intent,’ certainly the aider and abettor need not have
had such an intent.” (Id. at pp. 982–983.) Under the instructions
given, the jury was entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as an
aider and abettor of second degree murder, Langi need only have
intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—
punching the victim—whether or not Langi intended to aid or
encourage the victim’s killing, and whether or not Langi
personally knew of and disregarded the risk of such a killing.

                                7
(Id. at p. 983.) In short, the instructions permitted the jury to
find that the aider and abettor intended to help the perpetrator
commit an act—an assault, for example—without the mental
state of conscious disregard for human life. Langi concluded that
the instructions should have been tailored to state that, to be
guilty as a direct aider and abettor of second degree murder, an
accomplice must have acted with the mental state of implied
malice. (Ibid.)
     B. The instructions did not allow the jury to impute malice
        to McCombs
      McCombs’s jury was instructed on aiding and
abetting, second degree murder, and voluntary
manslaughter. Like Langi’s jury, McCombs’s jury was
instructed on aiding and abetting via CALJIC No. 3.01 and
on second degree murder via CALJIC No. 8.31, although
the jury rejected second degree murder.4 The jury was also
instructed on voluntary manslaughter with CALJIC
No. 8.40, which contains the same language about implied
malice as in CALJIC No. 8.31:
     Every person who unlawfully kills another human
     being without malice aforethought but either with an
     intent to kill, or with conscious disregard for human

4
      McCombs’s jury was also instructed with CALJIC No. 3.00:
“Persons who are involved in committing a crime are referred to
as principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless of the
extent or manner of participation is equally guilty. Principals
include: 1. Those who directly and actively commit the act
constituting the crime, or 2. Those who aid and abet the
commission of the crime.”

                                8
     life, is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of
     Penal Code section 192, subdivision (a).
     There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred
     upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or in the
     actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to
     defend oneself or another person against imminent
     peril to life or great bodily injury.
     The phrase, “conscious disregard for life,” as used in
     this instruction, means that a killing results from the
     doing of an intentional act, the natural consequences
     of which are dangerous to life, which act was
     deliberately performed by a person who knows that his
     or her conduct endangers the life of another and who
     acts with conscious disregard for life.
     In order to prove this crime, each of the following
     elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A human being was
     killed; [¶] 2. The killing was unlawful; and [¶] 3. The
     perpetrator of the killing either intended to kill the
     alleged victim, or acted in conscious disregard for life;
     and [¶] 4. The perpetrator’s conduct resulted in the
     unlawful killing. [¶] A killing is unlawful, if it was
     neither justifiable nor excusable. (Brackets omitted.)

      CALJIC No. 8.40 thus tracks the second degree murder
instruction (CALJIC No. 8.31) insofar as it requires the
perpetrator to either to intend to kill or to act in conscious
disregard for human life. Accordingly, relying on Langi,
McCombs contends that the instructions allowed the jury to
convict him of voluntary manslaughter by imputing malice to
him. We do not agree.
      Langi interpreted CALJIC No. 3.01’s reference to “unlawful
purpose” to mean that the actual perpetrator’s unlawful purpose
may have been only to strike, injure or embarrass the victim—

                                9
unlawful purposes that presumably implicate something less
than an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for human life. To
be sure, in isolation “unlawful purpose” could mean something
other than intent, such as motive, which is what we understand
Langi to be saying. But such an interpretation divorces
“unlawful purpose” from its context. We do not, however, read
phrases in instructions in isolation. (People v. Burton (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 917, 925 [we interpret instructions as a whole].)
       Rather, CALJIC No. 3.01 uses the word “purpose” in two
places. The instruction states that a person aids and abets a
crime’s commission when the person with knowledge of the
(1) perpetrator’s “unlawful purpose” and (2) “[w]ith the intent or
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating” the crime’s
commission, by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the crime’s commission. (CALJIC No. 3.01, italics
added.) When CALJIC No. 3.01 uses “purpose” the second time,
it is as a synonym for “intent,” as the instruction refers to the
aider and abettor’s “intent or purpose.” There is no reason why
“purpose” would have a different meaning the first time it is used
in that instruction when it refers to the perpetrator’s “unlawful
purpose.” Rather, a rule of construction is that where a statute
(or, as here, a jury instruction) uses synonymous words or
phrases interchangeably, they should be understood to have the
same meaning. (Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11
Cal.5th 858, 866.) Therefore, “unlawful purpose” refers to the
actual perpetrator’s unlawful intent, which for voluntary
manslaughter is either an intent to kill or committing an act
knowing it is dangerous to human life and with conscious
disregard thereof.

                                10
       We do not read the instruction otherwise, as suggesting
McCombs could be liable for aiding and abetting voluntary
manslaughter despite knowing that Harris intended some other,
lesser “unlawful purpose.” There is no reason why a jury, as
Langi suggests, would think that “unlawful purpose” means
anything other than acting with an intent to kill or committing
an act with conscious disregard for human life. Indeed, our
California Supreme Court has rejected a similar interpretation of
the aiding and abetting instruction as that urged by Langi. In
People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 96, the defendant argued
that his jury was not properly instructed that torture and aiding
and abetting require specific intent. After quoting the standard
instruction on aiding and abetting, CALJIC No. 3.01, the court
said that the language “intent or purpose” in it was not
something different from or less than specific intent. (Hardy, at
p. 96; see also People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.) “If
anything, ‘purpose’ is a higher standard than ‘intent.’ ” (Hardy,
at p. 96.)
       Also, CALCRIM No. 3.01 required the aider and abettor to
know that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime. The
only crime charged here was murder, either second degree or
voluntary manslaughter. In this way, Langi is distinguishable
because the defendant in that case was also charged with and
found guilty of the crimes of robbery and battery. (Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) But here, the only crime charged,
murder, required one of two different intents: either intent to kill
or implied malice (conscious disregard). It is unclear how an
aider and abettor could know that the perpetrator intended to
commit a specific crime and help the perpetrator commit that
crime—which, it bears repeating, was here defined in CALJIC

                                11
No. 8.40 as requiring intent to kill or a conscious disregard for
human life—and yet not personally harbor the requisite mens
rea. As our California Supreme Court said in People v. McCoy
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123, where the only unlawful purpose
charged is an unlawful killing, “one cannot knowingly and
intentionally help another commit an unlawful killing without
acting with malice.”
       But even if we assumed that the instructions were not
properly tailored to aiding and abetting a voluntary
manslaughter, we fail to see, beyond a reasonable doubt, how it
mattered. When a trial court instructs on alternative theories of
guilt and at least one of those theories is legally erroneous when
given, we normally assess whether the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 24. (People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 851;
People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3.)
       Under the unique circumstances of this case, the People did
not distinguish between McCombs and Harris in terms of their
acts and mens reas. The way in which this case was charged,
tried, and resolved reflected this. The information alleged only
principal gun use enhancements, so the People never charged
either of them as the actual killer or with personal use of a gun.
The jury accordingly found McCombs and Harris guilty of only
principal gun use enhancements. And the People’s theory of the
case, expressed in closing argument, was that defendants and the
victim were involved in a narcotics transaction that went bad.
More important, the prosecutor said the evidence had not
necessarily shown exactly what happened in Wheston’s
apartment and who the shooter was. Indeed, it was possible that
McCombs and Harris both fired shots. But it did not matter

                               12
because both were equally guilty as principals. That is, both
were direct perpetrators with the same mental state. For all
intents and purposes, McCombs and Harris were
indistinguishable participants in the crime in terms of their acts
and intents. Beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury would not have
imputed Harris’s implied malice to McCombs.
                         DISPOSITION
     The order denying Kyle McCombs’s Penal Code section
1172.6 petition is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                          EDMON, P. J.

I concur:

                        ADAMS, J.

                                13
LAVIN, J., Concurring:

    The majority reaches the correct result and the order
denying the petition for resentencing should be affirmed. We
need not decide, however, whether People v. Langi (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 972 was correctly decided. Langi is
distinguishable because the defendant in that case was also
charged with and found guilty of the crimes of robbery and
battery. (Id. at p. 976.) The only crime charged in this case,
murder (either second degree or voluntary manslaughter),
required one of two different intents: either intent to kill or
implied malice (conscious disregard). And as noted by the
majority, since the only unlawful purpose charged here was
an unlawful killing, “one cannot knowingly and intentionally
help another commit an unlawful killing without acting with
malice.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123.)

                                           LAVIN, J.

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