Court Opinion

ID: 9679880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:12:06.827161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:22.935429
License: Public Domain

Melvin Mayfield, Judge, dissenting. The appellant-claimant in this workers’ compensation case sustdned a severe injury to his lower back and neck in a work-related automobile accident when he was rear-ended on August 28, 1989, while employed by Voss Air Conditioning. Eventually surgicd intervention was required on appellant’s lower back, and he finally joint-petitioned the claim for over $12,000. On September 4, 1991, while working for appellee Pierce Brothers Construction, appellant agdn hurt his back. He suffered a ligamentous strdn and stretching of scar tissue. He filed this claim and the administrative law judge held he was entided to a 30 percent permanent partid disabifity. He held Pierce Brothers liable for a 4 percent permanent physicd impdrment and the Second Injury Fund responsible for a 16 percent permanent partid disabifity. He dso awarded medicd benefits and attorney’s fees. The Commission reversed and made the following findings: A preponderance of the credible evidence indicates that the alleged incident that occurred in 1991 was a recurrence of the 1989 injury. Thus, the Second Injury Fund is not liable. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence of an increase [sic] disability to hold respondent employer liable [for] any additional benefits. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. Furthermore, it should be noted that claimant is presently working. Although claimant contends that he is enti-ded to wage loss, a review of the evidence indicates that claimant has set himself up to earn less than minimal wage so that he can continue to receive $632 per month in social security benefits. While claimant should be commended for returning to work, claimant should not receive wage loss compensation where he is deliberately contributing to his loss of wage earning capacity. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. I think we should reverse and remand because the Commission’s opinion does not make sufficient findings that will allow us to conduct a meaningful review of the decision made. I will point out the problems in that regard, but want to first cite some authority for the rule that requires sufficient findings. In Clark v. Peabody Testing Service, 265 Ark. 489, 507, 579 S.W.2d 360, 369 (1979), the Arkansas Supreme Court said: “We do not deem a full recitation of the evidence to be required, so long as the commission’s findings include a statement of those facts the commission finds to be established by the evidence in sufficient detail that . . . the reviewing court may perform its function to determine whether the commission’s findings as to the existence or non-existence of the essential facts are or are not supported by the evidence.” And in Cagle Fabricating and Steel, Inc. v. Patterson, 309 Ark. 365, 369, 830 S.W.2d 857, 859 (1992), the court cited Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 26 Ark. App. 51, 759 S.W.2d 578 (1988), and said that case “held that the Commission’s decision did not make specific findings that an appellate court could review.” The Arkansas Supreme Court then said the Commission’s language in Cagle was “similar to that used in Jones in that it is conclusory and does not detail or analyze the facts upon which it is based.” See also Wright v. American Transportation, 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107 (1986); Hardin v. Southern Compress Co., 34 Ark. App. 208, 810 S.W.2d 501 (1991); and Cook v. Alcoa, 35 Ark. App. 16, 20-21, 811 S.W.2d 329, 332 (1991), where we said, “In appeals from the Commission, we cannot indulge the presumption used in appeals from trial courts . . . that even if the court is correct for the wrong reason, we will affirm if the judgment is correct.” In the instant case, the injury sustained by the appellant in 1989 while employed by Voss Air Conditioning had been joint-petitioned, so if the 1991 incident, which occurred while working for Pierce Brothers, was a recurrence of the 1989 injury — as the Commission found — then Voss would not be liable because of the joint-petition settlement, and the Second Injury Fund would not be liable because there was no second injury to cause that liability to “kick in.” Thus, I wonder why the Commission holds “there is insufficient evidence of an increase [sic] disability to hold respondent employer liable [for] any additional benefits.” There is only one employer who is a party in this case — Pierce Brothers Construction — and if the incident which occurred while appellant was working for that employer was a recurrence and not an aggravation — or new injury — then Pierce was clearly not liable, Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond, 7 Ark. App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983), and the Commission’s finding of “insufficient evidence of an increase disability” to hold Pierce liable is indeed a mysterious finding. Of course, if we were free to indulge in the presumption used when reviewing appeals from trial courts, we could probably square the uneven findings, but that is not our role in appeals from the Commission, and we should remand when the language used by the Commission is not sufficient for us to make a meaningful review of the Commission’s decision. In addition, the last paragraph of the Commission’s decision concerns wage-loss disability in regard to appellant’s acceptance of a wage which was less than he could earn. Again, if the 1991 injury was a recurrence of the 1989 injury, then there can be no liability on the 1991 employer for the 1989 injury because there would be no liability on the 1991 employer for wage-loss disability caused solely by the 1989 injury. But if the Commission is actually adjudicating wage-loss disability in this case, I think the finding that the appellant is not entitled to it because “he is deliberately contributing to his loss of wage earning capacity” overlooks the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-522 (Repl. 1996), which provides in subsection (b) that if an injured employee has returned to work at wages equal to or greater than his average weekly wage at the time of the injury, he shall not be entitled to a wage-loss disability in addition to ins physical impairment rating; however, as provided in subsection (c) it is the burden of the employer or his insurance carrier to prove the conditions set out in (b). For a general discussion of this statute, see Belcher v. Holiday Inn, 43 Ark. App. 157, 868 S.W.2d 87 (1993); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. McGinnis, 37 Ark. App. 91, 824 S.W.2d 406 (1992); Cook v. ALCOA, 35 Ark. App. 16, 811 S.W.2d 329 (1991). Therefore, while there might be evidence which would support the denial of wage-loss disability, the findings set out in the last paragraph of the Commission’s decision do not meet the requirements discussed above for sufficient factual findings that will allow us to make a meaningful review of the Commission’s decision. I would reverse and remand to the Commission with directions that it make sufficient findings of fact that will enable us to review those findings and determine if they support the Commission’s decision. Therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion.