Court Opinion

ID: 992423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:51:48.785044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:29.727572
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 96-4809

WILLIAM M. ELLIOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley.
Elizabeth V. Hallanan, Senior District Judge.
(CR-94-38)

Submitted: May 27, 1997

Decided: June 17, 1997

Before HALL, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Hunt L. Charach, Federal Public Defender, Edward H. Weis, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Stephen W.
Haynie, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

William M. Elliott appeals the 15-month sentence he received after
the district court revoked his supervised release. He contends that the
court plainly erred in imposing a sentence in excess of the sentencing
range set out in the Chapter 7 policy statements of the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines because, after the 1994 amendments to 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997), the Chapter 7 policy statements
are binding. Finding that the court did not commit plain error, we
affirm.

Elliott committed a Grade C violation of his supervised release; he
was in criminal history category I. His sentencing range under the
Chapter 7 policy statements was 5-11 months. USSG§§ 7B1.1,
7B1.4.* At the revocation hearing, Elliott's attorney agreed that the
court had authority to either impose a sentence of up to two years,
authorized pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) (West Supp. 1997), or
impose a sentence within the guideline range of 5-11 months. On
appeal, Elliott claims that the court was required to impose a sentence
within the range set out in the Chapter 7 policy statements because
the 1994 amendments to § 3553(a) made the Chapter 7 policy state-
ments binding.

Because Elliott made no objection to a sentence outside the recom-
mended range in the district court, we review for plain error. See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 52(b). A defendant is entitled to relief under Rule 52(b)
if an error occurred (1) which was plain, that is, one which is clear
under current law, (2) which prejudiced him in some way, and (3)
which "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings." United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 732-36
(1993).
_________________________________________________________________
*United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.
1995).

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In United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 640-42 (4th Cir. 1995), this
court held that the Chapter 7 policy statements"are now and always
have been non-binding, advisory guides to the district courts in super-
vised release revocation proceedings." Davis , 53 F.3d at 642. The
issue before the court in Davis was whether the Chapter 7 policy
statements were binding before the 1994 amendments took effect.
However, this court made clear its position that the policy statements
were also not binding after the 1994 amendments to§ 3553(a). See id.
and 639 n.1 (for cases to which the 1994 amendments apply, district
courts are merely to "consider" the Chapter 7 policy statements).

Elliott argues that the statement in Davis was mere dicta. He asserts
that the Chapter 7 policy statements are binding. The Ninth Circuit
has so held. See United States v. Plunkett, 94 F.3d 517, 519 (9th Cir.
1996). Other circuits have rejected the arguments made by Elliott. See
United States v. Cohen, 99 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1996), petition for
cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 22, 1997) (No. 96-7589); United States v.
Hofierka, 83 F.3d 357, 360-61 (11th Cir.), modified on other grounds,
92 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65
U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1997) (No. 96-6923); United States v.
Escamilla, 70 F.3d 835 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
64 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. Apr. 1, 1996) (No. 95-8171); United States
v. West, 59 F.3d 32, 34-37 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 64
U.S.L.W. 3348 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1995) (No. 95-6370).

At the very least, this authority demonstrates that the district court
did not commit plain error in imposing a sentence in excess of the
sentencing range set out in the Chapter 7 policy statements.

The sentence is therefore affirmed. We dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.

AFFIRMED

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