Court Opinion

ID: 9743109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:25:35.930021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:39.331287
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER, dissenting: Were this the simple common law action sounding in contract in which a contract between the parties is alleged along with allegations of a breach and resulting damages, as is raged by plaintiffs, I could agree that Federal labor preemption does not apply. Here the majority has acknowledged that the claim of contract violation is enmeshed and closely linked with allegations regarding working agreements which have been terminated by agreement of the parties, collective bargaining steps previously taken by their union on plaintiffs’ behalf and the defendant having engaged in that bargaining and defendants’ unilateral implementation of their final negotiating position. As a result the trial court would be forced to analyze various Federal statutes and policies central to the labor scheme to determine what if any contract is in existence, and to instruct the requested jury in those particular fields. From the allegations it could be reasonably concluded that plaintiffs hope to try defendants before a jury for an alleged breach of contract arising from alleged unfair labor practice since collective bargaining has created an impasse. Regardless of what has been decided as to the intent of Congress, to be implied or stated by the cases, from its enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §151 et seq.), no one has ever suggested that the effect of its enactments in the labor field were to give State courts a right to review the action of the National Labor Relations Board in refusing to issue a complaint for an alleged unfair labor practice, in this case on an alleged failure to bargain in good faith, even though the refusal to issue a complaint is not res judicata. The allegations of this complaint are certainly “arguably” within the scope of N. L. R. A. and the fact that in San Diego Building Trades Council, Local 202 v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 79 S. Ct. 773, exceptions to preemption were recognized, does not make Garmon inapplicable to this case of a factual situation not embraced in the pronounced exception. Numerous other United States Supreme Court cases (see Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Com., 427 U.S. 137, 49 L. Ed. 2d 396, 96 S. Ct. 2548; Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton; 377 U.S. 252, 12 L. Ed. 2d 280, 84 S. Ct. 1253 NLRB v. Insurance Agents International Union, 361 U. S. 477, 4 L. Ed. 2d 454, 80 S. Ct. 419; May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U. S. 376, 90 L. Ed. 145, 66 S. Ct. 468; and Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 678, 88 L. Ed. 1007, 64 S. Ct. 830), while not in point in every aspect are sufficiently similar to the case at hand to place the conduct of which plaintiffs complain within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act and the preemption doctrine. Illinois courts have not been hesitant to follow the preemption doctrine and have consistently followed the Garmon rule. In People v. Federal Tool and Plastics, 62 Ill. 2d 549, 344 N.E.2d 1, our supreme court found Morton controlling. In Gust G. Larson & Sons, Inc. v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Local Union No. 1220, 66 Ill. App. 2d 146, 213 N.E.2d 100, the court relied on Garmon as well as other Federal cases supporting preemption. A similar situation arose in International Union v. Star Products Co., 16 Ill. App. 2d 321, 148 N.E.2d 43 (1st Dist. 1958). There, plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action requesting a finding that a purported collective bargaining agreement was valid from its inception. The trial court dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction on the ground of preemption. At the appellate court, plaintiff argued that its suit was based on a common law breach of contract and that the doctrine of preemption has no application with respect to breaches of contract. Commenting on plaintiff’s argument, the appellate court noted: “However, all through its brief plaintiff seeks to make it appear that its suit is a simple common-law action for the enforcement of ‘the simple and historical remedy of an action for breach of contract.’ The insistent use of the term ‘breach of contract’ to characterize the gravamen of the action is obviously adopted because it has been held that the National Labor Relations Board is not concerned with questions of contract breach; * * (16 Ill. App. 2d 321, 324, 148 N.E.2d 43, 45.) The appellate court recognized that the trial court would be forced to examine various NLRA provisions (among which was 8(a)(5)) to decide the validity of the agreement. The appellate court found the plaintiff’s cause of action thus preempted. At the injunction hearing the only evidence advanced was presumably intended to show that duress and economic coercion were being applied to plaintiffs in order to secure the conversion agreements which were required if plaintiffs chose to convert from commissioned agent to jobber status. In order to establish duress or economic coercion, it is necessary for a party to establish conduct which constitutes a “threat” sufficient to meet the standards set forth by our supreme court in Kaplan v. Kaplan, 25 Ill. 2d 181, 182 N.E.2d 706. Furthermore, as a matter of law duress cannot be established where the alleged “threat” leaves a party a choice as to whether he would do the thing or perform the act said to be performed under duress (Joyce v. Year Investments, Inc., 45 Ill. App. 2d 310, 196 N.E.2d 24), or where the alleged threat contemplates conduct which the exerting party can lawfully take (Fabert Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1966)). In the evidence offered, including the testimony of plaintiffs’ counsel, there is no evidence of threat or conduct which would leave plaintiffs “bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making of a contract” and all the evidence is that plaintiffs had a choice. As a result the court below had no sufficient basis to warrant the issuance of injunctive relief, either in law or fact. Irreparable harm was neither pleaded or proved. For these reasons I would reverse.