Court Opinion

ID: 9577508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:35:40.233331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:43.170594
License: Public Domain

Ness, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the mandates of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. (2d) 69 (1986). The solicitor exercised four of his five peremptory challenges against members of the black race. After appellant objected and established a prima facie case under Batson, the solicitor explained the striking of the black júrors as follows: juror Miranda Smith was unemployed; juror Gwendolyn Johnson was an employee of the Department of Mental Health; and juror Billy Wilson was the same age and sex as appellant and had a possible criminal record. The solicitor also stated he had striken juror Joseph Bright for the same reason he had struck juror Billy Wilson. It was later determined that juror Joseph Bright had never been selected for this jury, and juror Robert W. Smith, a black juror, had been stricken without explanation.
The solicitor’s explanation of racial neutrality “need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause,” but it must be “neutral,” “related to the case to be tried,” and “must be a ‘clear and reasonably specific,’ explanation of.. [the solicitor’s] ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” Batson, 106 S. Ct. 1723, 1724 and fn. 20. See also, State v. Lewis, 293 S. C. 107, 359 S. E. (2d) 66 (1987). It would be impossible to set forth a laundry list of acceptable and unacceptable explanations under Batson-1 Each strike must *76necessarily be examined in light of the circumstances under which it is exercised, including an examination of the explanations offered for other peremptory strikes. Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 357 S. E. (2d) 792 (1987).
Here, the solicitor asserted that he struck juror Wilson because Wilson was the same age and sex as appellant. However, the solicitor accepted a white juror who was also the same age and sex of appellant. It is apparent this explanation was not sufficiently racially neutral to satisfy the equal protection dictates of Batson. See, Garrett v. Morris, 815 F. (2d) 509 (8th Cir. 1987) [prosecutor’s asserted reason for excluding black prospective jurors was a pretext for racial discrimination in light of prosecutor’s decision not to strike white jurors who differed in no significant way from black jurors who were excused.].
The solicitor also asserted that he struck juror Wilson because of a “possible criminal record.” The trial judge questioned the solicitor in great detail about the basis for this explanation; however, the record reflects that the solicitor could not establish his basis for the assertion of a “possible criminal record” rested upon anything other than speculation.
In my opinion, the solicitor did not sufficiently rebut the prima facie showing of racially discriminatory peremptory strikes as to juror Wilson. Therefore, it is not necessary to examine the explanations of racial neutrality offered as to the other jurors.2 Reversal is required because of the discriminatory challenge of Wilson.
Members of this Court have informally voiced their disagreement with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Batson v. Kentucky. The Court should not be permitted, *77however, to circumvent the mandates of that decision by accepting any and all explanations offered by solicitors for use of peremptory challenges, however weak they may be. “ ‘Rubber stamp’ approval of all nonraeial explanations, no matter how whimsical or fanciful, would cripple Batson’s commitment to ‘ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because- of his race.” State v. Butler, 731 S. W. (2d) 265 (Mo. Ct. App. W. Dist. 1987).
My dissent in this opinion should not be interpreted as a philosophical disagreement with the other members of this court on the logic of the Batson holding; rather, it should be seen only as a realization that the decision is binding on this court.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

 Courts are already struggling to identify acceptable and unacceptable explanations for the striking of black jurors. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 812 F. (2d) 1483 (4th Cir. 1987) [explanation sufficient where juror may have attended defendant’s church and may have read inflammatory articles about the case.]; United States v. Forbes, 816 F. (2d) 1006 (5th Cir. 1987) [explanation sufficient where juror’s son was “in legal trouble”].

 The solicitor explained that he struck unemployed because a great number of criminal defendants come from “chronically unemployed backgrounds.” He also said that he routinely struck employees of the Department of Mental Health because his experience with them as jurors had “generally ... been bad.” The trial judge noted that these were “not very good explanations,” but concluded they were not racially discriminatory. We note that once a defendant establishes a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a neutral explanation for the strike of each member of the defendant’s race. State v. Jones, 293 S. C. 54, 358 S. E. (2d) 701 (1987). See also, United States v. Blake, 819 F. (2d) 71 (4th Cir. 1987).