Court Opinion

ID: 9742022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:05:27.396607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:27.850882
License: Public Domain

PEDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
This Court can give the Senate neither a binding nor advisory opinion.
In State v. Blaisdell, 22 N.D. 86, 132 N.W. 769 (1911), syllabus 1, this Court said:
“The people, through the Constitution of this state, have created three departments of government, each supreme in its own sphere.”
Later, in City of Carrington v. Foster County, 166 N.W.2d 377, 382 (N.D.1969), the Court explained that “ * * * there is an implied exclusion of each branch from the exercise of the functions of the others.” That ought to settle the question of whether the Senate would have to change its rules just because the Supreme Court said so — obviously our opinion would not be binding. The majority opinion correctly concludes that the record of the First Constitutional Convention discloses that a proposal that the Supreme Court render advisory opinions was specifically rejected.
In State ex rel. Olson v. Thompson, 248 N.W.2d 347 (N.D.1976), we prevented a district judge from interfering in a legislative function. It is true that the majority did not decide to do that because of the doctrine of séparation of powers. That is why I couldn’t concur in anything but the results in that case.
Kuhn v. Beede, 249 N.W.2d 230 (N.D.1976), involved the same basic dispute as Olson v. Thompson, supra, and resulted in a judicial determination of a question specifically reserved to the Legislature (who shall be seated) even though there were three objecting justices. Only two of the objections related to jurisdiction.
It is not uncommon to find yourself on the minority side when you believe that the judiciary cannot and should not attempt to settle every dispute that arises. See, for example, the following dissents: Justice Murphy in State ex rel. Palmer v. Perpich, 289 Minn. 149,182 N.W.2d 182 (1971), a case which happened to also involve voting rights of the lieutenant governor; Justice Stewart in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 559, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); and Justice Sand in Kuhn v. Beede, supra.
“Has the U.S. become a nation run by its courts rather than its legislators? Many experts think so, and the result is a legal quagmire.” Newsweek, January 10, 1977.
In the past the courts made special effort to decline jurisdiction in the area of legislative deliberations. Kerr v. Trego, 47 Penn.St.Rep. 292 (Wright 11) (Philadelphia 1864), involved a dispute between two groups, each of which organized a Common Council of the City of Philadelphia. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted a preliminary injunction because of the “immense importance” of the case which required the “speedy determination” of a “very unpleasant difficulty” in order to prevent a “great detriment of the public interest.”
That opinion, written by Chief Justice Lowrie, pointed out that not all wrongs can be redressed by the courts and that “ * * * all bodies, except the supreme legislature, are under law * *
“The courts can never apply it [the test of laws, custom and usage] to division in the supreme legislature, because that body is subject to no judicial authority, and cannot be.” Kerr v. Trego, supra.
Justice Nelson, concurring specially in State v. Essling, 268 Minn. 151, 128 N.W.2d *917307, 319 (1964), while discussing parliamentary rules, said: “They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body, and courts have no concern with their observance.”
“A rule of parliamentary law is a rule created and adopted by the legislative or deliberative body it is intended to govern. It is different from a provision of the constitution, which the people have set up as defining and limiting the powers and duties of the legislature.” 67 C.J.S. Parliamentary Law, § 1.
“ * * * the fact that it [the Legislature] violates one of the rules so adopted may not invalidate a measure passed in compliance with statute.” 67 C.J.S. Parliamentary Law, § 3(b).
“The courts will not disturb the ruling on a parliamentary question made by a deliberative body having all the necessary authority to make rules for its governance and acting within the scope of its powers.” 67 C.J.S. Parliamentary Law, § 6.
The question here is whether more than a dispute over parliamentary matters has been raised. As matters stood at four o’clock in the afternoon of January 28,1977, when this case was presented to us, there was no question of great public interest pending other than a great curiosity over which party would win the political dispute. The sovereignty of the State was not threatened nor were the franchises, prerogatives, or liberties of the people of North Dakota threatened. These are the rules for determining jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Steel v. Fabrick, 17 N.D. 532, 117 N.W. 860 (1908), and The Prerogative Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by former Chief Justice Thomas J. Burke, 32 N.D. Law Review 199.
We are apparently asked to determine that the public has such a vested interest in every bill that is introduced by the legislators which would warrant examination by this Court into matters such as how and why any bill may fail to become law, if that is its fate. The lieutenant governor does not assure us that he will vote “aye” on all tie votes. On those bills that become law by virtue of his tie-breaking vote, if there be any, we can test their validity when a proper case is brought in the courts.
The majority opinion gives great emphasis to events which have occurred subsequent to the presentation of this case to us. Additionally, at the eleventh hour, the attorney general urges that we be sure to take note of the turn of events, which raises great concern in his office. Because he has issued an advisory opinion which the Senate refuses to abide by, he wants the Court to issue an advisory opinion (which, in my opinion, the Senate can also ignore).
I do not intend to create an impression that under no circumstances should the Court intervene in the internal affairs of the legislative assembly or of the executive branch. It would, however, require a concern of momentous proportion. The federal courts’ experience with the Nixon Tape cases (D.C., 360 F.Supp. 1; 159 U.S.App.D.C. 58, 487 F.2d 700; 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039), illustrates the power of the court when the threat to government is great. In the absence of that kind of threat, the Court should exercise “utmost deference.” See U. S. v. Burr, 25 Fed.Cas. No. 14,694, p. 187.
The writ in this case should properly be denied, but without the advisory opinion.
Because the majority opinion, without saying so, apparently concludes that there is no jurisdictional question worthy of note, I am compelled to comment on the reasoning on the merits. The reliance upon contemporaneous and practical construction, almost to the exclusion of all other rules of interpretation, is faulty.
In Kuhn v. Beede, supra, the majority applied the rule that mandatory language takes precedence over directory language. We have often said that we would give deference to attorney general’s opinions which are based upon sound reasoning. Section 1-02-09, NDCC, contains a rule applicable to reconciliation of incompatible provisions in the Constitution. All of the rules of construction applicable to statutes are also applicable to the Constitution. See §§ 1-02-38 and 1-02-39, NDCC. Some of *918the rules were used in Walker v. Link, 232 N.W.2d 823 (N.D.1975), and in the cases cited therein.
If the question presented is of such significance as to warrant the exercise of this Court’s prerogative jurisdiction, then the question should be examined from every possible approach. The parties rushed the question to us without comprehensive research and analysis. They were pressured, as is this Court, to act quickly, before something catastrophic occurs. Apparently the worst that could happen has now happened — the Lieutenant Governor has violated Senate Rule 26. The Senators sought the advice (again) of the attorney general. This would appear to be their proper course of action. If this case were merely dismissed, the attorney general could prescribe a course to be followed. If it is an emergency situation, the attorney general is as qualified to give an “off-the-cuff” advisory opinion as is the Court. If a considered, long-range solution is necessary, Senator Holmberg’s proposal that the voters be allowed to decide upon a constitutional amendment is the proper course.