Court Opinion

ID: 9602460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:55:16.899172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:03.737365
License: Public Domain

Wright, C.J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. I agree in principle with the majority in saying "'The discipline to be imposed should depend upon the specific facts and circumstances of the case, should be fashioned in light of the purpose of lawyer discipline, and may take into account aggravating or mitigating circumstances.'" This, however, is not a case wherein the circumstances would justify leniency.
The respondent did commingle funds received by him in trust with personal funds, and he did convert trust funds to his own use. It seems to be some excuse that he only stole from friends. In In re Cary, 90 Wn.2d 762, 585 P.2d 1161 (1978), we specifically rejected a contention under similar circumstances that it was somehow different if the respondent therein stole only from his sisters. We said, in part, at page 765: "Respondent's familial relation . . . does not alter the ethical standards and responsibilities which he, as an attorney, was sworn to uphold." We ordered disbarment. May we ask, is it less wrong to steal from friends?
*407The majority also takes note of the fact that the funds were ultimately repaid. On numerous occasions we have rejected that as an excuse. In In re Grant, 4 Wn.2d 617, 622, 104 P.2d 602 (1940), we said, in part: "An attorney who uses funds of a client for his own benefit is not excused, even though he may repay or agree to repay such funds before disbarment proceedings against him are concluded." Further, at page 622, quoting from In re Gowan, 104 Wash. 166, 176 P. 7 (1918), we said:
"The chief consideration is not of a client who has already been offended, but, rather, that the exhibition of that wrong discovers the character of the attorney and his unfitness to be trusted; and, while the payment of the money fraudulently used releases the attorney from civil liability, it is not a purgation of his offense, nor does it prove that he has become a fit person to remain on the rolls."
(Citation omitted.)
In In re Batali, 85 Wn.2d 246, 251, 533 P.2d 843 (1975), we said:
We recently said in In re Deschane, 84 Wn.2d 514, 516, 527 P.2d 683 (1974):
Lawyers routinely process funds through their trust accounts, aggregating very substantial amounts. Without hesitation, clients and other parties to transactions entrust these funds to lawyers, often without documentation. Confidence in the bar demands that lawyers preserve the integrity of entrusted funds and that lawyers promptly, accurately and fully account for such funds. Virtually all lawyers fulfill these responsibilities. But when these duties are violated it is the court's solemn responsibility to mete out discipline appropriate to the seriousness of the offense.
Those few lawyers who mishandle trust funds, who fail to maintain complete records of trust funds and who fail to account and deliver funds as requested are reminded that disbarment is the usual result.
(Citations omitted.) We adhere to that recent pronouncement as it expresses a rule long in effect in this state.
*408The same result has been reached in even more recent cases. See In re Robinson, 89 Wn.2d 519, 573 P.2d 784 (1978); In re Gibson, 90 Wn.2d 440, 583 P.2d 633 (1978).
It is unthinkable that this respondent can escape disbarment. I would most certainly disbar.
Stafford and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Wright, C.J.