Court Opinion

ID: 7817857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:42:37.863707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:39.051804
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice. I concur in all of the majority opinion except that part having to do with the rental contract for the building and premises. The chancellor found that there was no evidence that appellee had surrendered the premises to appellant, even though he stopped paying rent sometime in 1966. As stated by the chancellor, no evidence was offered that the rent was too high or out of line with rent being charged for like buildings and premises similarly located. The only reason for cancellation of this rental contract was the statement of the trial judge that it was tainted with fraud. The trial court and the majority have given appellee his full measure of damages for fraud. In addition, they are allowing him to have a partial rescission of the contract. That the rental contract was part of the whole contract is a matter not open to question. Thus, he has been fully compensated in damages on a recoupment and thereafter given a part of the remedy of cancellation as if he had sought rescission. Appellee had the choice of remedies.1 He chose recoupment which entitled him only to recover damages. The rule is well stated in Danielson v. Skidmore, 125 Ark. 572, 189 S.W. 57 and quoted in Held v. Mansur, 181 Ark. 876, 28 S.W. 2d 704, where the court said: “A person who has been induced to enter into a contract for the purchase of property by the false representations of the vendor concerning its quantity or quality may, at his election, pursue one of three remedies. First, he may cancel the contract and, by returning or offering to return the property purchased within a reasonable time, entitle himself to recover whatever he had paid upon the contract. In the second place, he may elect to retain the property and sue for the damages he has sustained by reason of the false representations of the vendor as to the land; and in this event the measure of the damages would be the difference between the real value of the property in its true condition and the price at which he purchased it. In the third place, to avoid a circuity of actions and a multiplicity of suits, he may plead such damages in an action for ’the purchase money, and is entitled to have the same recouped against the sum he had paid for the land. ’ ’ The rental for which appellee would subsequently become liable could not in any sense of the word be consequential damages for fraudulent inducement. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the contract was for the rental value of the property. Thus, there is nothing against which liability for rent can be offset, since the appellee has been awarded the full measure of his damages under the remedy he elected. I would modify the decree by disallowing the cancellation of the rental contract but would affirm it in all other respects. Brown, J., joins in this dissent.  The general rule in regard to the effect of this election of remedies in a case like this is stated in Lacey v. Edmunds Motor Company, 269 Ala. 398, 113 So. 2d 507 (1959). There it was said the buyer must elect between his remedies and may not combine them.