Court Opinion

ID: 9640833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:16:33.793738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:52.277151
License: Public Domain

DODSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s disposition of the case. This concurrence is directed at the majority’s discussion of the appellant’s first point of error. By that point of error, the appellant challenges the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees on two grounds. First, that there is no foundation in law for the award of attorney’s fees in suits for conversion or damages to property. And second that there is insufficient evidence to allow the award of attorney’s fees.
In the first paragraph of the majority opinion we are told that Hysell’s action was for an alleged breach of a “Sale and Purchase Agreement.” Thus, the action is within the ambit of section 38.001(8) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code (Vernon 1986). Then, the majority determines that Hysell was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees because of his failure to comply with the notice requirements of section 38.002 of the Code. This determination is dispositive of the first point of error and the erroneous award of attorney’s fees. Had the discussion of the first point of error ended there, I would have no reason to concur. However, the majority engages in further discussions concerning the recovery of attorney’s fees in conversion actions which are said to be “depended upon the interpretation of a sales contract” and “sufficiently grounded on contract to support an award of attorney’s fees.” I consider those comments to be dictum, misleading and misstatements of the law.
It is elementary that attorney’s fees are recoverable if the claim is grounded on oral or written contract. Section 38.001(8). Otherwise, there is no recovery of attorney’s fees under this subsection. Either the claim is grounded on the contract or it is not. And we should not suggest that something less will comply with the statute.