Court Opinion

ID: 9767361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:17:29.960435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:30.782876
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
GRAVES, Presiding Judge.
Appellant has filed two lengthy briefs in this court asking for a rehearing herein and for a reversal of this cause, all of which are but a reiteration of his original brief and argument with the exception of one claimed newly discovered point which was not offered in the first hearing in this matter.
We adhere to our views as expressed in the original opinion herein and will attempt to write briefly on the new proposition which is raised, as follows: It is claimed that appellant, who was charged herein as an accomplice to robbery, under the facts, should have been charged as a principal rather than an accomplice.
We are of the opinioin that the facts, as presented here, to a certain extent, would bear out appellant’s contention relative to his principalship except for the fact that there seem to be lacking cogent elements of a principalship, as follows: (1) the actual presence of the accused on the scene of the robbery at the time of the commission of the offense, and (2) the actual performance of an act by the appellant relative to such conspiracy at the time of the commission of such robbery. Herein, it is not shown that he was present, or kept watch, or that he did any act in furtherance of the robbery at the time of its commission so as to make him a principal therein. As we see it, the question as to the constructive presence of the appellant is not in the case.
*179“Any person who advises or agrees to the commission of an offense and who is present when the same is committed is a principal whether he aid or not in the illegal act.” (Italics supplied.)
Article 70 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
“An accomplice is one who is not present at the commission of an offense, but who, before the act is done, advises, commands or encourages another to commit the offense; or
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“Who prepares arms or aid of any kind, prior to the commission of an offense, for the purpose of assisting the principal in the execution of the same.” (Italics supplied.)
Under the facts of this case, we find appellant at the time of the commission of the offense busily engaged in his place of business and daily avocation where he usually stayed. Appellant seems to have been doing absolutely nothing in furtherance thereof at the time of the commisison of this offense, and was surprised by the rapidity with which the two thieves had executed that which he had previously commanded and encouraged them to do in the commission of such offense.
The charge here alleged is that the appellant, though not present at the time of the commission of the offense, had prior thereto advised, commanded and encouraged others to commit it. The proof established the charge, and also established that, in accordance with the conspiracy agreement, the appellant received the fruits of the crime and had control over their disposition, except that the co-conspirators were to share in the fruits of the sale after the disposition of the stolen property; and the cited case of Johnson v. State, 151 Tex. Cr. R. 192, 206 S.W. (2d) 605, holds that in such event the accused was an accomplice rather than a principal.
Believing that appellant was correctly charged and proven as an accomplice, the motion for a rehearing will be overruled.