Court Opinion

ID: 9673470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:12:23.359104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:34.917035
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
Concurring). I write separately to encourage the Court to address what, in my view, are serious shortcomings in the form and application of the current rule. In adopting the Rules of Professional Conduct in 1988, we departed from the traditional distinction regarding crimes involving moral turpitude. Although the rule as adopted did not otherwise differentiate between misdemeanors that might indicate unfitness to practice law, we did not indicate that any misdemeanor conviction, however attenuated, would constitute misconduct. On the contrary, the fact that the traditional language was abandoned is evidence that we contemplated a case-by-case evaluation of whether, from the vast array of misdemeanor offenses, a particular conviction reflects on fitness for the practice of law. Thus, while I am constrained to agree with the majority’s reading of the current rule, because misdemeanor offenses come in many varieties and degrees of severity, it is clear that the current rule is not well tailored to the overall purpose of the system.
I also agree with the majority that given that the disciplinary rules are to be liberally construed “for the protection of the public, the courts, and the legal *171profession,” ante at 165, MCR 9.120 and MRPC 8.4(b) should not be read as limitations on the commission, the board, or the Court. However, if the rules operate either to preclude a full evaluation of a pattern of behavior, or so as not to provide the profession with fair notice of the conduct to be considered, they are not adequate to the task. As this case indicates, if the panel does not examine all the proofs of unfitness, the public may not be adequately protected. On the other hand, because the rule precludes dismissal, we are foreclosed from assessing on appeal the nature of the misconduct and therefore unable to address and create a body of precedent giving guidance to the public and the profession.
It is not a satisfactory answer for this Court to say a rule is a rule. If the rules we have promulgated for disciplinary proceedings are not functioning as envisioned in real world applications, it is our responsibility, after allowing for input through publication and comment, to fairly and sensibly address the problem.1
For example, changes might include bifurcating the process for misdemeanors to allow a show-cause proceeding, MCR 9.120(B)(3), for misdemeanor convictions that involve offenses of violence, dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, breach of public or private trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice that reflect on the lawyer’s honesty, *172trastworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, as contemplated by the comment to MRPC 8.4(b), (c).2
*173Given respondent’s lack of notice, the show-cause approach as currently understood precludes the hearing panel from assessing the significance of other relevant conduct. Thus, disciplinary proceedings that include misdemeanor convictions that do not fall into the previous categories (including those in which the administrator relies on a pattern of conduct of such offenses as indicating an indifference to a lawyer’s legal obligations) might proceed under MCR 9.115.
At a minimum, any amendment should provide 1) fair notice to respondents, 2) the development of full proofs regarding fitness to practice, and 3) a vehicle permitting oversight by this Court of findings of misconduct to facilitate development of the parameters of professional misconduct reflecting unfitness to practice. While I, of course, do not suggest what answers are appropriate, the problem is clear and should be confronted.

 See Brashers v Jefferson, 402 Mich 399; 263 NW2d 243 (1978) (Court-proposed amendment to GCR 1963, 102, published for comment under GCR 1963, 933, as an appendix to the opinion); People v Straight, 430 Mich 418; 424 NW2d 257 (1988) (illustrating the need for this Court to consider an amendment of the Rules of Evidence regarding hearsay statements; accordingly, a proposed rule directed at this problem was ordered published).

 Other jurisdictions have made this distinction.
Arizona Rules for Discipline and Disability Proceedings. 17A Ariz Rev Stat Ann, Supreme Court Rules.
Rule 51. Grounds for Discipline
Grounds for discipline of members and non-members shall be misconduct occurring as follows:
(a) Conviction of a misdemeanor involving a serious crime or of any felony.
Rule 57. (a) Conviction of a felony or misdemeanor. A lawyer shall be disciplined as the facts warrant upon conviction of a misdemeanor involving a serious crime or any felony.
1. Definition. “Serious crime” means any crime, a necessary element of which, as determined by the statutory or common law definition of such crime, involves interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful extortion, misappropriation, theft or moral turpitude. A conspiracy, a solicitation of another or any attempt to commit a serious crime, is a serious crime.
Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Rule 1.06.
Q. “Professional Misconduct” includes:
8. Conviction of a Serious Crime, or being placed on probation for a Serious Crime with or without an abdication of guilt.
U. “Serious Crime” means barratry; any felony involving moral turpitude; any misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent or reckless misappropriation of money or other property; or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of another to commit any of the foregoing crimes.
Missouri Rules Governing the Missouri Bar and the Judiciary, Rule 5.21 Suspension for Criminal Activities.
(a) Upon the filing of an information directly in this Court by the chief disciplinary counsel that a lawyer admitted to practice in Missouri has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to or been found guilty of: (1) any felony of this state, any other state, or the United States; or (2) any misdemeanor of this state, any other state, or the United States involving interference with the administration of justice, *173false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft or moral turpitude; or (3) any misdemeanor involving attempt, conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any misdemeanor of this state, any other state, or the United States described above, whether sentence is imposed or not, this Court shall cause to be served on the lawyer an order to show cause why the lawyer should not be suspended from the practice of law ....