Court Opinion

ID: 9893783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:03:56.187132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:07.750011
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/30/23 Bastani v. Aghabeigi CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 MIKE BASTANI,                                                       B317157

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct.
           v.                                                        No. BC264973)

 BIJAN AGHABEIGI et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Yolanda Orozco, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Kenneth Gaugh and Kenneth Gaugh for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Semnar & Hartman, Babak Semnar, and Jared M.
Hartman for Defendants and Respondents.
                      ——————————
      Plaintiff and appellant Mike Bastani appeals from an order
vacating and setting aside judgments against defendants and
respondents Bijan Aghabeigi and PCH Enterprises (PCH).
Bastani sued Aghabeigi and PCH in 2001, and a default
judgment was entered against them in 2002. When Bastani
obtained a writ of execution 19 years later, Aghabeigi,
individually and as president of PCH, moved to set aside and
vacate the judgments under Code of Civil Procedure1 section 473
on the grounds that he was never properly served with the
summons and complaint. The trial court granted the motion and
dismissed the action under section 583.210.
      Bastani appeals, arguing the trial court abused its
discretion in granting the motion to vacate the judgment and
dismissing the action. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm
the order.
                        BACKGROUND
      On December 31, 2001, Bastani filed a complaint against
Aghabeigi and PCH, alleging various causes of action including
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and infliction of emotional
distress. On March 13, 2002, Bastani filed proofs of service of
summons on Aghabeigi and PCH. On the proofs of service of
summons, a registered process server attested that he personally
served Aghabeigi at 24508 Park Granada, No. 202, Calabasas,
California on January 24, 2002. Thereafter, the clerk entered
default against Aghabeigi and PCH.
      On November 5, 2003, the judgments were entered against
Aghabeigi and PCH in the amount of $75,537.75 plus interest.
On August 15, 2012, the judgments were renewed in the amount
of $137,851.72. On June 17, 2021, Bastani applied for an

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

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abstract of judgment and filed several writs of execution in
various California counties.
       On September 17, 2021, Aghabeigi and PCH moved to set
aside the judgments. Aghabeigi claimed he had no notice of the
lawsuit because the complaint and summons were never served
on him, therefore, the judgments were void. Aghabeigi asserted
the proofs of service were fraudulent because the address where
he was purportedly served did not exist. He argued the address
was a single-family home, which had never been subdivided into
separate unit numbers. Aghabeigi also claimed he first became
aware of the lawsuit and judgments when his bank notified him
that it had received a notice of levy under writ of execution.
       In support of his motion, Aghabeigi provided several
supporting declarations and exhibits to show that he was never
served, including: his own declaration that he never lived at the
subject address; his former neighbor’s declaration, stating
Aghabeigi lived in Agoura Hills, California, between June 2001
and July 2002 (the period of time when Aghabeigi was allegedly
served); and his brother-in-law’s declaration, stating that he, not
Aghabeigi, lived at 24508 Park Granada, Calabasas, California,
the address was a single-family home in a gated community, the
address had never been subdivided into separate units, and there
was no record of a process server entering the community on the
date of service. Aghabeigi also attached several exhibits
establishing his address history, which showed that he never
lived at the 24508 Park Granada address. Finally, he provided a
declaration from a real estate broker, who provided extensive
documentation regarding the property history for 24508 Park
Granada, showing that it had never been subdivided into
separate units.

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       Bastani opposed the motion and provided a bankruptcy
filing signed by Aghabeigi as president of Headland Mortgage
Company, Inc., which listed the mailing address as 24508 Park
Granada, No. 202, Calabasas, California.
       The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
       Bastani appealed.
                          DISCUSSION
      Section 473, subdivision (b), authorizes the trial court to
vacate a default judgment entered against a party as a result of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. “The statute
‘contains both mandatory and discretionary provisions,’ but only
the discretionary provision is at issue.” (County of San
Bernardino v. Mancini (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1102–1103.)
“A void judgment may be challenged at any time. [Citations.]
A judgment may be void on the face of the record or void for lack
of proper service.” (Yeung v. Soos (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 576,
582.) “If service of summons was not made or was improper, and
actual notice was not received, the default judgment is void for
lack of personal jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) A default judgment may be
set aside if the party requesting relief did not have notice of the
action due to service at an incorrect address. (Moghaddam v.
Bone (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 283, 288.)
      We review the trial court’s discretionary decision to set
aside or vacate a default judgment under section 473,
subdivision (b), for an abuse of discretion. (County of San
Bernardino v. Mancini, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 1103.) “The
abuse of discretion standard . . . measures whether, given the
established evidence, the act of the lower tribunal falls within the
permissible range of options set by the legal criteria.”
(Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Bd. (1991)

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233 Cal.App.3d 813, 831.) In determining whether there has
been an abuse of discretion, we do not reweigh evidence or
determine witness credibility. (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450.) “ ‘When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ ”
(Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272.)
      Here, we find no abuse of discretion. The trial court
properly vacated the judgments after considering the parties’
evidence and arguments, and finding Aghabeigi met his burden
to show by a preponderance of the evidence he was never
properly served with the summons and complaint either
individually or as president of PCH. Nothing else was required.
      Bastani raises several arguments on appeal, none of which
have merit.
      First, Bastani argues Aghabeigi did not overcome Evidence
Code section 647’s rebuttable presumption that he was properly
served. The return of a registered process server “upon process
or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of
producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return.” (Ibid.;
American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199
Cal.App.4th 383, 390.) While Bastani acknowledges the
presumption is rebuttable, he ignores the evidence Aghabeigi was
never properly served, which effectively rebutted the
presumption. To the extent Bastani argues the evidence was
insufficient given his own competing evidence, this is insufficient
to demonstrate an abuse of discretion on appeal as we do not
reweigh evidence or determine witness credibility. (Whyte v.
Schlage Lock Co., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450.)

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      Second, Bastani argues the trial court applied the wrong
standard, determining whether he effectively served Aghabeigi
based on the rules governing substitute service, which requires
“leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s
dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or
usual mailing address.” (§ 415.20, subd. (b).) According to
Bastani, because Aghabeigi was personally served, whether the
process server noted the correct address was immaterial.
However, the question before the trial court was not whether the
process server effected substitute or personal service, rather, the
issue was whether Aghabeigi was served at all. In light of all the
evidence, the nonexistent unit number at 24508 Park Granada
was only one fact of many that supported the trial court’s
determination.
      Lastly, citing Palm Property Investments, LLC v. Yadegar
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419 (Palm Property Investments),
Bastani argues that Aghabeigi’s bare denial is insufficient to
overcome Evidence Code section 647’s presumption of service.
(Palm Property Investments, at p. 1428.) However, as previously
stated, Aghabeigi’s denial was supported by other evidence in the
form of declarations and exhibits. In any event, Palm Property
Investments does not support Bastani’s argument. There, the
court held the defendants’ allegations denying service in their
answer to the complaint were insufficient to overcome Evidence
Code section 647’s presumption, however, the court recognized
the defendants could still present evidence to rebut the
presumption at trial. (Palm Property Investments, at p. 1428.)
Here, Aghabeigi’s denial was not just an allegation contained in a
pleading, but a contested issue of fact that was decided on the
merits by the trial court.

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      Accordingly, Bastani has failed to show an abuse of
discretion.
                        DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs
on appeal.

                                    VIRAMONTES, J.

     WE CONCUR:

                 GRIMES, Acting P. J.

                 WILEY, J.

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