Court Opinion

ID: 9745695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 09:15:55.306477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:40.945444
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Majority Memorandum Opinion and Concurring Memorandum
Opinion filed August 24, 2023.

                                        In The

                      Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                                NO. 14-21-00551-CR

                    PATRICK ONIEL HOWARD, Appellant
                                           V.

                        THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                On Appeal from the 434th Judicial District Court
                           Fort Bend County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 21-DCR-095022

                  MEMORANDUM CONCURRING OPINION

      I concur in this Court’s judgment, but write separately to emphasize that the
right to a jury trial is a fundamental right in the United States and Texas Constitutions
that is of paramount importance. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 & amend. VI; Tex.
Const. art. I, § 15; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.12. In Texas, the Legislature
has specified how this right may be waived—a defendant may waive their
constitutional right to a jury in writing and in open court with the consent and
approval of the court. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.13(a). While precedential
authority provides that a statement in the judgment that an appellant has waived his
right to a jury trial is binding in the absence of direct proof of its falsity, see Johnson
v. State, 72 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Munguia v. State, 636 S.W.3d
750, 757–59 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d), I disagree that
waiver of such a fundamental and important right should be determined so easily
and without additional proof.

      Here, evidence in the record provided some additional proof of waiver and
provided no evidence of any decision by the defendant to the contrary. However, the
burden on the State of providing proof that a criminal defendant has voluntarily
waived his right to a jury in writing and in open court is not onerous. Alternatively,
the consequences of an improperly conducted trial in which the defendant has not
ultimately decided on whether he desires a jury or judge to sit in judgment of him
are immense and life-altering. In balancing the knowing and intentional waiver of
the right to a jury trial with the presumption of regularity and truthfulness of waiver
in a judgment of conviction, I believe the knowing and intentional waiver is of more
importance. Appellate courts should safeguard these fundamental constitutional
rights better by reviewing whether a criminal defendant waived their right to a jury
more closely, and appellate courts should require stricter proof of whether a
defendant has waived such a right. The State and the prosecution should not be
allowed to disregard or ignore the safeguards legally granted to a defendant and then
later be exempted from any consequence by relying upon the form wording in the
trial court’s judgment.

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                                              /s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Spain, Poissant, and Wilson. (Wilson, J., majority).

Do not publish—Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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