Court Opinion

ID: 9671439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:36:37.569275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:40.573085
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Justice,
dissenting.
In my view, Rondos and Synder’s failure to request additional findings of fact relative to their affirmative defenses of collateral estop-pel and res judicata waived those defenses, and the judgment cannot be reversed on the basis of either. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Summary op Relevant Facts
The trial court included its findings and conclusions in its final judgment, contrary to Rule 299a.1 These findings do not include findings on any element of Rondos’ and Snyder’s affirmative defenses of collateral estop-pel and res judicata. Thereafter, Rondos and Snyder filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, but they failed to point out to the trial court that it had not made findings relative to these affirmative *826defenses, whether in their initial request, a request for additional findings under Rule 298, or otherwise. On appeal, however, Kon-dos and Snyder seek to reverse the trial court’s judgment on the basis of their affirmative defenses, and the majority does so on their collateral estoppel defense.
Discussion
When the trial court makes findings of fact and conclusions of law that “do not establish any element of [an affirmative defense], the party relying upon that defense must file a request for additional findings such as to avoid waiver of that defense on appeal.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nichols, 819 S.W.2d 900, 907 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied), cited in Levine v. Maverick County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 884 S.W.2d 790, 796 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied).
In this case, it is indisputable that the trial court’s findings of fact do not include any element of Kondos’ and Snyder’s collateral estoppel and res judicata affirmative defenses. The issue, therefore, is whether the trial court’s findings, contained as they are in the judgment, are effective and thus shift the burden to Kondos and Snyder to request additional findings under Rule 298 or are nullities so that Kondos’ and Snyder’s request for findings and conclusions is sufficient. In light of its judgment, the majority effectively holds in this case that findings included in a judgment are nullities; therefore, the burden did not shift to Kondos and Snyder to request additional findings on their affirmative defenses. It is on this point that I disagree.
Before the adoption of Rule 299a in 1990, this court held that, “although it a preferable practice to state [findings and conclusions] separately, it is not required.” Longoria v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 298, 304-05 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ); see also, e.g., Farr v. Sun World Sav. Ass’n, 810 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, no writ) (citing supporting authority from Third, Fifth, and Twelfth Courts of Appeals); see generally Ann Crawford McClure, Non-Jury Appeals Revisited, in State BaR of Texas Prof. Dev. Program, Advanced Appellate Practice Course V, V-21 (1996) (also noting contrary authority from the First and Thirteenth Courts of Appeals); cf. Black v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 835 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tex.1992) (in a different context, the supreme court stated that “[a]ppellate courts must give effect to the intended findings of the trial court if supported by the evidence, the record, and judgment”).
In 1990, however, the supreme court adopted Rule 299a, which provides:
Findings of fact shall not be recited in a judgment. If there is a conflict between findings of fact recited in a judgment in violation of this rule and findings of fact made pursuant to Rules 297 and 298, the latter findings will control for appellate purposes. Findings of fact shall be filed with the clerk of the court as a document or documents separate and apart from the judgment.
Since the adoption of Rule 299a, this court has not addressed the interplay between Rule 299a and Longoria. However, the majority apparently has determined (albeit sub silentio) that Rule 299a overrules Longoria. I, on the other hand, believe the two are consistent and complementary for two reasons. First, construing Rule 299a to recognize and give effect to findings contained in a judgment absent a conflict implements the anti-sandbagging policy underlying all preservation requirements and specifically Rule 52(a), Tex.R.App. P., which requires a party to make his complaint known to the trial court and obtain a ruling on that complaint. Second, this interpretation is consistent with the “legislative history” surrounding Rule 299a. See, e.g., R.K., M.D. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 841 n. 6 (Tex.1994) (using minutes of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee as aid in interpreting rule of evidence).
Rule 299a was initially drafted by the subcommittee with one and only one purpose in mind — to resolve conflicts between findings recited in a judgment and findings that are separately filed pursuant to Rules 297 and 298. See Minutes, Supreme Court Advisory Committee 170-217 (July 15, 1989). However, during the discussion of the subcommit*827tee’s proposal, the chairman stated “I think if the findings of fact are in the judgment and nobody complains, that they’re going to control on appeal. [They are] not going to be nullities.” Id. at 201. One member suggested otherwise, however, and the chairman reiterated “[t]hey’re not going to be ignored on appeal.” Id. Another member chimed in— effectively identifying the problem raised— that the rule was to be operative “only when there’s a conflict.” Id. at 202. The chairman agreed but stated that the proposed rule, as then drafted, rendered findings in a judgment nullities. Id. To clarify that the rule was to operate only in the event of a conflict, the chairman proposed what was ultimately adopted as the first two sentences of Rule 299a. See id. at 202-17.
Conclusion
To construe Rule 299a to render findings in a judgment nugatory in the absence of a conflict, as the majority does in this case, is contrary to the purpose of the rule, contrary to the intended effect of the rule, and contrary to Rule 52(a), Tex.R.App. P. For this reason, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s judgment reversing the trial court’s judgment and rendering judgment on a complaint that was never made known to either the trial court or opposing counsel.

. Unless otherwise noted, all rule references are to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.