Court Opinion

ID: 9691930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:26:51.746772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:28.490691
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
“Under this court’s precedents, ... a presumption of disbarment rebuttable only by ‘compelling extenuating circumstances’ has heretofore been reserved for one class of intentionally dishonest conduct, that involving misappropriation of client funds.” In re Pennington, 921 A.2d 135, 141 (D.C.2007) (citing In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190 (D.C.1990) (en banc)).1 In Addams, this court found warranted this essentially per se rule2 because such a breach “betray[s] [the lawyer’s] highest trust” and “is so reprehensible, striking at the core of the attorney-client relationship, that the respondent must carry a very heavy burden in rebuttal.” Id. at 194, 198-99. Today, contrary to the recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility (Board), the panel majority adds to the cases warranting presumptive disbarment a new category of cases for which sanctions have been determined previously by application of well-established principles for imposing sanctions that address each case on its own terms. See, e.g., In re Elgin, 918 A.2d 362, 376-84 (D.C.2007) (outlining the guidelines for the determination of sanction in bar disciplinary cases and applying them); In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 17 (D.C.2005) (same). “Sound reasons no doubt can be offered for making all forms of intentional dishonesty presumptively sanctionable by disbarment, ... [b]ut the state of disciplinary law in this jurisdiction does not reach that far.... ” Pennington, 921 A.2d at 142 (citations omitted). While a per se rule may be easier to apply, it ultimately leads to inequitable results. See Berryman, supra note 2, 764 A.2d at 765 (noting that except for the Addams rule, which is too inflexible, disbarment would not be warranted in the Berryman case where a lengthy suspension would have met fully the objectives of the disciplinary system); In re Pierson, 690 A.2d 941, 951 (Judges Schwelb and *1202Ruiz concurring because of the Addams rule, but noting the inflexibility of the rule and apparent inequities in results as compared to other cases); see also Addams, 579 A.2d at 203 (Judge Ferren concurring and noting that the Board and the Court apparently recognize that a per se disbarment rule would be “inequitable and unworkable,” and questioning the adoption of a presumption so strong that it effectively eliminates the discretion of the Board and the Court necessary to deal fairly with the facts of each case). This difficult case is particularly ill-suited for the adoption of this new category of cases for presumptive disbarment treatment for at least three significant reasons, specifically: (1) the ultimate disbarment sanction is wholly inconsistent with sanctions imposed for similar cases involving attorney dishonesty and lying under oath; (2) the majority’s analogy to misappropriation eases is imperfect; and (3) the Board’s recommended sanction of a two-year suspension with the requirement of proof of fitness before reinstatement, based on established guidelines, falls within the range of acceptable outcomes and affords protection to the public, the courts and the profession. Therefore, I would adopt the Board’s recommendation, which is supported by Bar Counsel, and must respectfully dissent from the decision of my colleagues.3
A. Inconsistency of Disbarment with Cases Involving Similar or More Egregious Misconduct
“The imposition of sanctions in bar discipline, as with criminal punishment, is not an exact science but may depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular proceeding.” In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458, 463 (D.C.1994) (citing In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980)). Generally speaking, the magnitude of the transgression will bear some relationship to the severity of the disciplinary sanction imposed by the court. See Pennington, supra, 921 A.2d at 143 (rejecting the Board’s recommended disbarment sanction as “disproportionate to the gravity of [the] misconduct”); Goffe, 641 A.2d at 464 (recognizing that the outer limits of sanctions will increase when dishonesty of greater magnitude is presented to the court). We operate under rules that require us to seek to achieve consistent disciplinary sanctions for comparable misconduct. See D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 9(g)(1) (requiring the court to adopt the Board’s recommended sanction “unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted”). To impose differing sanctions for comparable misconduct would “bring about [an] asymmetry that [Rule XI, § 9(g)(1) ] was intended to avoid.” In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226, 230 (D.C.1986) (en banc) (discussing former Rule XI, § 7(3) to the same effect). The decisions of this court “serve as overall guidelines to assist in defining the permissible range of sanctions.” Goffe, 641 A.2d at 464. We adhere to this precept even if we are addressing cases that present new factual variations or cases where the court’s view of the seriousness of the charges differs from that of the Board. See Reback, 513 A.2d at 230-31. While the prior panel of this court viewed this case as one for which “there are no other cases of fully comparable conduct with which we must maintain consistency,”4 there are cases *1203sufficiently analogous to review in an effort to maintain some consistency and to enforce a general sense of equality in the sanction imposed. These include cases involving attorney dishonesty, false representations to a court or other tribunal, and/or lying under oath, including testimony in a disciplinary proceeding. A brief review of some of those cases involving similar misconduct will demonstrate that the imposition of the ultimate sanction of disbarment in this case exceeds the range of sanction for cases involving similar or more egregious misconduct, as the Board apparently concluded.
A useful starting place is the Board’s review of the range of sanctions imposed by this court for cases involving dishonesty and misrepresentation. See In re Jackson, 650 A.2d 675, 678-79 (D.C.1994) (appendix). The sanctions imposed in the cases that the Board identified for the Court in Jackson (recounted here in the margin) ranged from public censure to a suspension for a year.5 In Goffe, supra, this court made clear that the absence of prior cases imposing a greater suspension than one year for attorney dishonesty did not mean that term to be a ceiling: “Mather, it simply evidences that no such example of attorney dishonesty of the magnitude of that demonstrated here has previously been presented to this court.” 641 A.2d at 464. In Goffe, this court disbarred the attorney where his “egregious” misconduct involved “not only a pattern of dishonesty and lying but blatant fabrication and creation of evidence.” Id. at 460. Goffe “manufactured evidence for use before the IRS, lied under oath to the Tax Court, and continued to lie about his actions to the Hearing Committee.” Id. at 465. He forged signatures and falsely notarized documents to gain an economic *1204benefit. Id. In rejecting the Board’s recommendation of a one-year suspension with a requirement of proof of fitness in favor of disbarment, the Court explained that what distinguished the case most from those preceding it is “the repeated resort not only to false testimony but to the actual manufacture and use of false documentary evidence in official matters.” Id. at 464. Cleaver-Bascombe’s case is in marked contrast to Goffe. Respondent’s single episode of misconduct, although undeniably serious, dishonest, and aggravated by her subsequent failure to acknowledge it, must necessarily be viewed, as the Board apparently does, as less egregious than Goffe’s, thereby warranting a lesser sanction.
Other cases should be examined in order to assess fairly respondent’s case against those for which lesser sanctions than disbarment have been found by this court to be warranted. This court imposed a six-month suspension with a restitution requirement in a case where the attorney used his client’s credit card for his own personal expenses without her authorization, damaged the client’s credit rating by failing to pay for the charges, made an undisclosed settlement for the account ■with the bank, and failed to abide by the settlement terms.6 Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 366-72. In spite of the fact that the attorney essentially used his client’s (money) credit card for his own personal use without her authorization for such expenditures, committed various other violations in the course of his representation, and made an insufficient showing of remorse by failing to repay the client $5000 he admittedly owed her, this court gave consideration to his lack of a prior disciplinary record and personal family circumstances and imposed only the brief six-month suspension with a restitution requirement. Id. at 383-84. Misuse of a client’s money falls within a category which is typically subject to more severe sanctions. Addams, supra, 579 A.2d at 198 (“Simply put, where client funds are involved, a more stringent rule is appropriate.”). One can reasonably question why the first offender attorney in Elgin, who essentially took his client’s money without right and without remorse, was viewed to warrant a sanction of only six months and restitution, while the first offender attorney in this case is viewed as warranting the ultimate sanction of disbarment.
Among cases cited in footnote 5 covering cases involving dishonesty and false representations, two others should be examined further for comparison with the sanction being imposed upon respondent here. In Schneider, the attorney was disciplined for violating DR 1-102(A)(4) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) for knowingly submitting false travel reports on eight separate occasions to his law firm and deliberately falsifying the amounts on his credit card receipts by altering them to increase the amount shown. Schneider, supra note 5, 553 A.2d at 209, 211. The alterations did in fact deceive the firm and potentially the client who would ultimately *1205have to pay. Id. at 209. This court imposed only a thirty-day suspension for Schneider, citing as mitigating factors the attorney’s remorse, cooperation with Bar Counsel, his newness to the Bar, and his clean record since. Id. at 212. Some consideration was given to Schneider’s claim that he was only engaged in a short-cut method of obtaining reimbursement to which he thought himself entitled. Id. at 211. While respondent in this case does not have the same mitigating factors, she has some of them. Like Schneider, she has no prior disciplinary record, and no post-disciplinary violation has been reported. According to the Hearing Committee and the Board, respondent had rendered services for which she could have recovered the compensation without any misrepresentation on her voucher. Any differential warranted because respondent has fewer mitigating factors and more aggravating factors can be reflected in the length of the suspension and fitness requirement recommended by the Board and Bar Counsel. The question is whether respondent’s misconduct warrants the wide disparity between the sanction she will receive and that imposed in the Schneider case. I think not.
Further review should also be made of this court’s decision in Sandground, where this court imposed a ninety-day suspension for an attorney who violated DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (7)7 where the attorney assisted the client in concealing information about his funds in connection with discovery requests in a divorce action. Sandground, supra note 5, 542 A.2d at 1243. Significantly, this court noted that “Sandground’s knowing participation went to the heart of the controversy between [his client] and his wife and threatened to defraud [the wife].” Id. at 1248. His misconduct involved dishonesty in a judicial proceeding and “threatened to advance the pecuniary interests of a personal friend at the expense of his friend’s wife.” Id. at 1249. Originally, Sandground also gave false information to Bar Counsel about the transaction. Id. at 1245. The question is again whether respondent’s attempt to recover for her services by falsifying her CJA voucher is so different and so much more egregious than the violation in Sand-ground that it deserves the extreme sanction of disbarment, while this court imposed only a ninety-day suspension on Sandground. I think that the only fair answer is no.
There is one case involving a violation of one of the comparable disciplinary rules coupled with lying before the hearing committee which is instructive. The attorney, who was disciplined for conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, like respondent here, also gave false testimony before the Hearing Committee. Thompson, supra note 5, 538 A.2d at 248. In Thompson, the attorney’s discipline arose out of his “knowingly assisting in the presentation of false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in support of the application of his client for status as a permanent resident alien.” Id. at 247. The attorney had a record of prior discipline, unlike respondent in this case, yet he was suspended for only one year for his misconduct. Id. Some cases in which more severe sanctions were imposed for lying under oath involved more aggravated circumstances or were the subject of mandatory disbarment by statute. See, e.g., In re Mann, 883 A.2d 887 (D.C.2005) (indefinite suspension for offenses including lying under oath, fraud *1206and other criminal conduct in a reciprocal discipline case); In re White, 698 A.2d 483 (D.C.1997) (disbarment under D.C.Code § 11-2503 where the attorney was convicted of passport fraud (willfully and knowingly making false statements in application for a U.S. passport), a crime of moral turpitude); Goffe, supra, 641 A.2d at 465 (disbarment where the attorney “manufactured evidence for use before the IRS, lied under oath to the Tax Court, and continued to lie about his actions to the Hearing Committee”). Respondent’s case is more like Thompson, than these other cases involving giving false testimony, and therefore, reference should be made to Thompson in determining her sanction.
B. Imperfect Analogy to Misappropriation Cases
While respondent’s attempt to secure a fee from the court by false representations is extremely serious, it is not of the Addams variety which represents the reprehensible “breach of trust to the client.” See Addams, 579 A.2d at 198-99. As we explained subsequently,
A clear rational basis exists for this conclusion that attorneys who knowingly misappropriate client funds stand in a different position than attorneys who commit other acts involving dishonesty. As we also stated in Addams, the intentional misappropriation of client funds “stnke[s] at the core of the attomey-client relationship ” by undermining the public’s faith that attorneys will fulfill their duties as fiduciaries with regard to the host of financial transactions that require a client to entrust funds to his attorney.... For this reason, “[t]he appearance of a tolerant attitude toward known embezzlers would undermine public confidence in the integrity of the profession and of the legal system whose functioning depends on lawyers.”
In re Dulansey, 606 A.2d 189, 190-91 (D.C.1992) (quoting Addams, 579 A.2d at 193) (emphasis added). Respondent’s misconduct involved no breach of trust to her client, and therefore, does not fit into this framework. Although an argument can be made that a lawyer’s attempt to secure funds by fraud or deceit from any source should be subject to the Addams rule, our precedents have not taken us there. See Pennington, supra, 921 A.2d at 141. To do so in this case will result in a disparate sanction for respondent as compared with other attorneys who have been disciplined for similar misconduct. See, e.g., Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 375, 384 (six-month suspension and $5000 in restitution for attorney who used client’s credit card for personal expenses); Schneider, supra note 5, 553 A.2d at 207, 209, 212 (thirty-day suspension for attorney who falsified credit receipts to obtain reimbursement from law firm for expenses that stood to be charged to the client).
C. The Board’s Recommended Sanction Meets the Objectives of Attorney Discipline
Respondent’s misconduct is based upon a single episode in which she submitted for payment a voucher seeking compensation under the Criminal Justice Act for services, some of which she knew that she had not rendered.8 In doing so, respondent violated four disciplinary rules, 1.5(a), 3.3(a)(1), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). The conduct leading to these disciplinary violations is quite serious in itself, a factor for consider*1207ation in determining sanction. See Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 376. The Board has also found that respondent gave false testimony at the disciplinary hearing when she supported a voucher that she knew was not accurate, particularly her testimony concerning a jail visit which she had to know had not taken place. Failure to acknowledge the wrongful conduct is an appropriate factor for consideration in determining sanction. Id. In considering this additional factor, the Board has recommended a longer suspension than it had previously and determined that a fitness requirement is in order. Here, the Board states that it takes its cue from Cleaver-Bascombe I, where the Court stated:
Where an attorney has deliberately falsified a voucher and sought compensation for work that he or she has not devoted to the case, that attorney’s fitness to practice is called into serious question. This is especially true if the attorney has compounded his or her initial fraud by testifying falsely during the resulting disciplinary proceedings.
892 A.2d at 398; see also Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 22.
In making its sanction recommendation, the Board found substantial similarities between this case and In re Parshall, 878 A.2d 1253 (D.C.2005). In Parshall, this Court suspended an attorney for eighteen months for submitting a false status report to a court and attaching fabricated documents to support the report. The Board recommended, and the Court accepted its recommendation, for an eighteen-month suspension in light of the presence of several mitigating factors, including the absence of prior disciplinary problems, the attorneys expressed regrets for his actions, cooperation with Bar Counsel, voluntary participation in pro bono programs, and representation of indigents. Id. at 1254, 1254 n. 4. In Parshall, this Court found the length of the suspension to be within the range of sanctions this Court has imposed for similar misconduct.9 Id. at 1255 (citations omitted). I agree with the Board that Parshall has persuasive similarities. The Board recommended a longer sanction because in Parshall, unlike here, the attorney expressed regret for the misconduct and cooperated with the Office of Bar Counsel. Respondent identifies some mitigating factors in her favor, including the absence of prior discipline or prejudice to her client. “[T]he fact an attorney has had no prior disciplinary sanctions imposed in the past is ‘highly relevant and material’ to the determination of appropriate sanction.” Reback, supra, 513 A.2d at 231 (quoting In re Cope, 455 A.2d 1357, 1361 (D.C.1983)). While such factors are appropriate for consideration, see Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 376, respondent does not identify as many mitigating factors as the attorney in Parshall. There is also the aggravating factor of respondent’s failure to acknowledge her misconduct. In light of her false testimony at the hearing concerning her voucher, the Board also recommends a longer suspension than in Parshall and a requirement of fitness before reinstatement. Under the circumstances, the Board’s recommendation for a two-year suspension appears to be warranted.10
*1208Proof that an attorney has violated the disciplinary rules, thereby warranting a substantial period of suspension, is not necessarily sufficient to justify a fitness requirement. Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 22. To justify imposition of a fitness requirement, there must be clear and convincing evidence in the record of the proceeding that calls into question respondent’s fitness to practice law. Id. at 24. In making the recommendation for a fitness requirement in this case, the Board states that it takes its direction from the majority’s opinion in Cleaver-Bascombe I. Here, the Board found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent submitted a voucher to the Court for services that she knew she had not rendered and aggravated her misconduct in doing so by testifying falsely about it at the disciplinary hearing. The Board’s findings support its recommendation for a fitness requirement.11 This requirement is directed toward assuring “that [the attorney’s] ‘resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar or to the administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest.’ ” Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 22 (citation omitted).12 The Board has determined after careful consideration that a lengthy suspension with a fitness requirement will be sufficient to protect the public, the courts, and the integrity of the profession.13 The Board’s recommended sanction falls within the range of acceptable outcomes; therefore, we should adopt it. See Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 376.

. In Addams, this court held that "[w]hen a member of the bar is found to have betrayed his high trust by embezzling funds entrusted to him, disbannent should ordinarily follow as a matter of course.” Addams, 579 A.2d at 193.

. See In re Berryman, 764 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C.2000) (citation omitted) (recognizing that "[o]ur misappropriation rule 'does not require scienter; rather, it is essentially a per se offense' ") (citation omitted).

. If the panel majority’s opinion represents only a fact-specific holding (see footnote 13, supra), then the sanction it imposes is extremely inconsistent with comparable cases, as discussed infra.

. See In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396, 402 (D.C.2006) (Cleaver-Bascombe I). However, the court remanded the case to the Board, and therefore, did not decide the question of sanction.

. The Board reported:
Public censure was ordered for false statements on a resume. In re Hadzi-Antich, 497 A.2d 1062 (D.C.1985). A thirty-day suspension was ordered for making three separate misrepresentations to a court; In re Rosen, 481 A.2d 451 (D.C.1984), and for falsification of travel expenses by a law firm associate, In re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206 (D.C.1989) (Newman, J., dissenting, would have censured the lawyer). A sixty-day suspension was ordered for misrepresentation to a court to avoid disqualification for conflict of interest. In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C.1990). A ninety-day suspension was ordered for lying about salary on an application for a bank loan, In re Kennedy, 542 A.2d 1225 (D.C.1998); for false interrogatory answer and lying at a deposition by an attorney acting pro se, In re Thomas, No. M-94-81 (D.C. March 1, 1982) (unpublished); and for helping a divorce client hide assets via a false interrogatory answer, In re Sandground, 542 A.2d 1242 (D.C.1988). A six-month suspension was ordered for forging a client’s signature on a complaint and then having it notarized, In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226 (D.C.1986) (Newman, J., dissenting, would have imposed a suspension of one year and a day and a fitness requirement), and for making false statements to a bank on behalf of a client and lying under oath regarding the conduct, In re Greenspan, 578 A.2d 1156 (D.C.1990) (fitness requirement also imposed due to “significant record of prior discipline”). A one-year suspension was imposed for false, sworn testimony to the government regarding an attorney's role in a stock purchase, In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919 (D.C.1987); for assisting a client to make false statements on an immigration application, In re Thompson, 538 A.2d 247 (D.C.1987); and for making illegal campaign contributions, In re Wild, 361 A.2d 182 (D.C.1976) (respondent also convicted of misdemeanor violation based on same conduct).
Jackson, supra, 650 A.2d at 678-79 (appendix). In Jackson, respondent was found to have violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (dishonesty and misrepresentation) by filing two tax returns with the IRS claiming substantial deductions for which there was no documentation. Id. at 677. Finding the case roughly equivalent to those where six months was imposed, the Board recommended, and the court imposed, a six-month suspension. Id.

. In the course of his misconduct, respondent violated the following disciplinary rules: Rule 1.5(b) (by failing to explain adequately the basis for his legal fees); 1.7(b)(4) (by representing a client where his "professional judgment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be adversely affected by ... the lawyer's own financial business, ... or personal interests”); Rule 1.2(a) (requiring the lawyer to abide by client's decision to accept a settlement); Rule 1.3(b) (requiring that the lawyer not intentionally prejudice or damage the client's case); Rule 1.4(a) (requiring that the lawyer keep client reasonably informed about a matter); Rule 1.8(a) (prohibiting an attorney from acquiring a pecuniary interest adverse to his client); Rule 8.4(d) (by filing an answer and settling the lawsuit without proper disclosure to the client). Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 374-75.

. These rules respectively cover: "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and the prohibition against assisting a client with illegal or fraudulent conduct. DR 1-102(A)(4),(5) and (7).

. The Board found that "the record does not support a finding that Respondent billed for a greater amount of time than she actually spent on the extradition matter in question. But what the record does support is the finding that Respondent's description of her specific activities in the voucher was false."

. Parshall was a reciprocal discipline case in which the Court imposed a substantially greater sanction than that imposed by Maryland. Parshall, 878 A.2d at 1254.

. An examination of cases from other jurisdictions shows that a wide range of sanctions has been imposed on attorneys who have submitted fraudulent payment requests for representing indigent defendants. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa 2004) (two-year suspension); In re Goldman, 11 A.D.3d 178, 784 N.Y.S.2d 496 (N.Y.App.Div.2004) (three-year suspension); In re Perrone, *1208565 Pa. 563, 777 A.2d 413 (2001) (disbarment); In re Stone, 230 A.D.2d 481, 657 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (one-year suspension). The Board's recommendation falls within this range of sanctions.

. ''[T]o justify requiring a suspended attorney to prove fitness as a condition of reinstatement, the record in the disciplinary proceeding must contain clear and convincing evidence that casts serious doubt on the attorney’s continuing fitness to practice law.” Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 6.

. We have observed previously that this process itself could take some eighteen months to two years. See Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 23 (quoting In re Edwards, 870 A.2d 90, 97 (D.C.2005)) (observing that a fitness requirement "may have the practical effect of greatly prolonging — even tripling or quadrupling — a respondent's period of suspension”); In re Bettis, 855 A.2d 282, 288 n. 12 (D.C.2004) (indicating Bar Counsel's representation that the review process for proof of fitness could take one and a half to two years).

."The length of a period of suspension reflects the gravity of the attorney’s misconduct and is fixed with the aim of individual correction as well as general deterrence.” Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 23.