Court Opinion

ID: 9845291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:18:28.913871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:59.912806
License: Public Domain

SPEAR, Justice
(special concurring dissent) .
I concur with the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Shepard except that I do not want to be understood to deem the question before this court as being trivial. As stated in Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953, 959 (U.S.D.C., N.D.Ohio, 1970):
“In the ages old conflict between the right of the individual to be himself, to be let alone, and the right of society to have reasonable peace and order, the stakes are too high to permit any simple or easy resolution of the dispute.”
I am also fully in accord with the author of Cordova, supra, when he wrote:
“It is obvious that the problem presented by the facts of this case [almost 4-square with the facts of the case at hand] cannot be solved by reference to cases concerned with the constitutional rights and liberties of adults. Children *42of necessity cannot be uncritically accorded these rights, and it is foolish to say that they can be.”
* * * “ ‘Some * * * seem to forget what the wise parent knows, for example, that children really are not adults. They do not come to life fully equipped with knowledge and wisdom, like Minerva springing full-panoplied from the brow of Jove. They are not like insects which are hatched complete with all the instincts they need to complete their life cycle. On the contrary, human children start life completely helpless, and must come to the rights and privileges of adulthood by slow degrees. In that process, restraints to which adults are not subject are absolutely essential. I defy anyone to look back at his own childhood without finding at least one occasion when he felt his liberty had been severely restricted. Yet, as adults we impose the same restrictions on our own children because maturity has shown us the reasons and necessities for restraint.’ ” 315 F.Supp. 953, 960. (Quoting in part, from the author’s article in Journal of the American Judicature Society, October, 1960, Vol. 44, p. 97.)
Thus I suggest that to properly resolve the issues presented in this case, we must resort to what used to be referred to as ■“common horse sense.”
The role of the state to children in school is a parental one often being described as one in loco parentis. However, the state should be a wise parent, not a foolish or indulgent one. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). It is incumbent upon the state through its regularly elected officers of the various school districts to promulgate reasonable rules governing the behavior of the students toward the school faculty and administrators and toward other students -while in attendance at the school.
I have carefully searched the record in this case and I find not one scintilla of evidence that the more specific rules promulgated by the principal of the Highlands High School under the general rules promulgated some ten years previously by the Board of Trustees of the school district were in any manner “unreasonable” or “arbitrary.” Yet one of the rules relative to the length of hair worn by male students was intentionally violated by Chris Murphy, the minor plaintiff and appellant in this action. ■;
I am certain it would have been a much easier course for the school authorities, in view of the position held by John Murphy (the minor’s father) in the school system in Pocatello, to have ignored this infraction for the remainder of the minor’s senior school year. However, to me it seems extremely important that our young people in high school be taught, among other things, how to live with others in everyday life. Where better than in high school (if they have not previously been taught at home) can young people be taught that no matter what station they may attain in life, either socially or economically, they are going to be subject to certain rules and regulations, many of which may not exactly please them. It is also important to teach these students at this impressionable age, that violation of those rules or regulations will most likely result in punishment or hardship.
It follows, of course, that such rules must necessarily be reasonable and contribute toward good order and discipline in the school, and there must be provided a procedure for review of any punishments meted out for infractions of those rules. Two of the administrators, both of whom had impressive records as teachers and school administrators, testified that the rule or policy concerning the length of hair on male students was good and justified. One expressed the reason for the rule as follows:
* * * “[Tjhe feeling [from the secondary principals in the city of Pocatello] was that gross deviations from normal student dress and haircut patterns tend to create distractions and disturbances and do have an unsatisfactory effect upon learning and conduct. * * * *43The principals felt that if a student’s appearance was a studied effort to draw attention to himself, then his presence in the classroom was just as disruptive as if he had made some verbal remark, rude remark of some type.”
Concerning the school rule on student dress, the other testified:
“It’s very basic; it’s a means by which we can adopt some standards and some control and live within the confines of the school building with 1,217 students and 66 staff members.”
As I have previously pointed out, there is a total lack of any evidence that this basic policy on student dress, which included the length of hair on male students, was unreasonable.
As for right of review, the appellants, both father and minor, as well as their attorney, were duly advised several times of the procedure to follow should an appeal or review of the suspension be desired. In the discipline section of the policy manual of the school district, provision is made for any suspension of a student by a principal to be reviewed first by the superintendent and then by the Board of Education. Appellants did not avail themselves of these administrative procedural reviews, but they were available and made known to them and their counsel.
Thus all requirements were met, and none of the minor appellant’s constitutional rights were trampled upon. He merely, for personal whims of his own, decided he would not obey a reasonable rule adopted by the proper school authorities. He was given every opportunity to comply, as he had the two previous years; and, when he intentionally refused to do so, he left the authorities no alternative except to suspend him.
I am in full accord with the main thrust of the dissenting opinion of Justice Shepard herein, and the basic theory or policy expressed in the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). Expressed succinctly, the courts of the land should not substitute themselves for the elected officials of the state in the realm of controlling the students in public supported schools. I join Justice Shepard in doubting the competency or adequacy of this court to substitute its judgment for the judgment of all the elected boards of trustees of all the school districts in the State of Idaho relative to rules and regulations dealing with “student dress” of students while attending their respective schools. Yet this is the effect of the majority opinion herein.
Therefore the order of the trial court denying appellants’ writ of mandamus and dismissing their petition should be affirmed.