Court Opinion

ID: 3125781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-10-16 15:15:45.465004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:53:23.368812
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-09-00393-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

MYRON DENARD LEGER,                                                          Appellant,

                                            v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                           Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 252nd District Court
                        of Jefferson County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Vela
             Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez

      Appellant, Myron Denard Leger, pleaded guilty to assault of a family member, a

third-degree felony. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 22.01(a)(1), (b) (Vernon Supp. 2009).

On October 20, 2008, the trial court deferred a finding of guilt, placed Leger on community

supervision for five years, and ordered him to pay various fees, including a $750 fine and

$215 in court costs. The State filed a motion to revoke and on June 1, 2009, Leger
pleaded “true” to four allegations of violations of the terms of his community supervision.1

The trial court adjudicated Leger guilty and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment in

the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and ordered him to

pay $635 in court costs. This appeal ensued.

        Leger’s appellate counsel, concluding that “there are no meritorious claims of

appeal,” filed an Anders brief, in which he reviewed the merits, or lack thereof, of the

appeal. We affirm.

                                              I. ANDERS BRIEF

        Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), Leger’s court-appointed

appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, stating that his review of the record

yielded no grounds or error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Although counsel’s

brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present a professional

evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced

on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In

Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel

finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and

set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex.

App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991).

        In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]

1978), Leger’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there are

no errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he has: (1)

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          Leger pleaded “true” to failing to report to the probation departm ent, failing to work faithfully at
suitable em ploym ent, providing a urine sam ple that showed the presence of the m etabolic by-product of
Phencyclidine, a controlled substance, and failing to provide verification of com pletion of com m unity service.
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examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) served a

copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on Leger, and (3) informed Leger of his

right to review the record and to file a pro se response.2 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744;

Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More

than an adequate period of time has passed, and Leger has not filed a pro se response.

See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

                                        II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

        Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

                                       III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

        In accordance with Anders, Leger’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to

withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman,
252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex. App.–Dallas

1995, no pet.) (noting that “[i]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must

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           The Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not com ply with the
rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court
those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case
presents any m eritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W .3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim . App. 2008) (quoting
W ilson v. State, 955 S.W .2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.–W aco 1997, no pet.)).
                                                     3
withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed

attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court

that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of

the opinion and judgment to Leger and to advise him of his right to file a petition for

discretionary review.3 See TEX . R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

                                                                ________________________
                                                                ROGELIO VALDEZ
                                                                Chief Justice

Do not publish.
TEX . R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered and filed the
25th day of March, 2010.

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            No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Leger wish to seek further review of this case by
the Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals, he m ust either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review
or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review m ust be filed within thirty
days from the date of either this opinion or the last tim ely m otion for rehearing that was overruled by this Court.
See T EX . R. A PP . P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review m ust be filed with this Court, after which it will
be forwarded to the Texas C ourt of C rim inal Appeals. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 68.3; 68.7. Any petition for
discretionary review should com ply with the requirem ents of rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 68.4.

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