Court Opinion

ID: 9647649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:43:51.380582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:51.597812
License: Public Domain

CoNCUKRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
JUDGE Dl-Salle:
I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion and order which sustains Mansfield State College’s Preliminary Objections. While I might generally agree with the majority’s treatment of the retroactivity issues, I believe that the facts of this case compel the opposite result with respect to Mansfield State College, and for the reasons herein given, would not reach those issues.
In light of the Supreme Court’s order in Brungard v. Hartman and Mansfield State College, Pa. , 394 A.2d 1265 (1978), vacating our order dismissing Karen Brungard’s complaint, and, citing Mayle, remanding for proceedings consistent with its opinion, I fail to see how Ms. Brungard can be treated differently than Mr. Mayle.
In Mayle, the Supreme Court, after abrogating the doctrine of sovereign immunity, reversed our order dismissing Mayle’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings. The obvious effect of that action is that the case will be tried just as it would have been had sovereign immunity never existed. Brungard was argued before the Supreme Court at about the same *30time as Mayle was, and indeed is specifically referred to in Mayle as a related case.1 By acting in Brungard exactly as it did in Mayle, it seems clear to me that the Supreme Court intended that Brungard proceed to trial as well. Assuming Mr. Mayle has a remedy, Ms. Brungard must also.
I would adopt the view urged by Mr. Justice Harlan in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (separate opinion), wherein he argued that all pending cases be decided under the law most recently enunciated. He pertinently said:
Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pro-' ouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule [is indefensible]. . . .
Refusal to apply new constitutional rules to all cases arising on direct review may well substantially deter those whose financial resources are barely sufficient to withstand the costs of litigating to this Court, or attorneys who are willing to make sacrifices to perform their professional obligation in its broadest sense, from asserting rights bottomed on constitutional interpretations different from those currently prevailing in this Court. More importantly, it tends to cut this Court loose from the force of precedent, allowing us to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis, a force which ought properly to bear on the judicial resolution of any legal problem.
Id. at 679-81 (citations omitted).
*31In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court gave retroactive application to a rule requiring a state to establish all elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Justice Powell, concurring, advocated Justice Harlan’s theory, writing:
When the Court declines to hold a new constitutional rule retroactive, one chance beneficiary — the lucky individual whose case was chosen as the occasion for announcing the new principle — enjoys retroactive application, while others similarly situated have their claims adjudicated under the old doctrine. This hardly comports with the ideal of ‘administration of justice with an even hand.’
Id. at 247 (footnote and citation omitted). See also Harlin v. Missouri, U.S. , 99 S. Ct. 709 (1979); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
It seems grossly unfair and inequitable to allow Mr. Mayle to recover while denying that same remedy to someone who is not only similarly situated but who has received from the Supreme Court an identical remand order.2 Our Supreme Court, in remanding Brungard in light of Mayle, has apparently adopted Justice Harlan’s approach, and in my judgment, the effect of today’s ruling is to ignore the clear import of that remand order. I know of no legal theory that supports this novel approach.
1 would dismiss Mansfield State College’s preliminary objections.

 See footnote No. 34.

 In enacting Act 152 the Legislature, in Section 5(B) announced its desire to assure “the development of a consistent body of law, an orderly and uniform management of litigation and to prevent inequities . . . that would otherwise be caused by the lack of identical restrictions, limitations, procedural requirements and the application of the other provisions of this Act.” I believe that we should be no less vigilant.