Court Opinion

ID: 9897055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:06:22.468205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:39.288259
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                               FOURTH DISTRICT

          MEHMET TATLICI, individually and as assignee of
        BEDRIYE TATLICI, and as Administrator ad Litem of the
              ESTATE OF MEHMET SALIH TATLICI,
                    Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                       v.

                  NURTEN TATLICI and UGUR TATLICI,
                      Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

                              No. 4D2022-0615

                             [November 8, 2023]

   Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Bradley G. Harper, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 50-2009-CA-030873-XXXX-MB.

  Robert J. Hauser of Sniffen & Spellman P.A., West Palm Beach, for
appellant/cross-appellee.

  Manuel Farach of Mrachek, Fitzgerald, Rose, Konopka, Thomas &
Weiss, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees/cross-appellants.

WARNER, J.

    Appellant secured a default against appellees for liability on his
complaint for conversion, fraudulent transfer, and contribution. Yet, prior
to the start of the trial on damages, the court dismissed appellant’s claim
for contribution 1 and at the close of appellant’s case, the trial court
directed a verdict for appellees on appellant’s claims for conversion.
Appellant’s fraudulent transfer claims were submitted to the jury, which
returned a verdict for appellant.

   Appellant appeals the dismissal of the contribution claim and the
directed verdict on the conversion claims. Appellees cross-appeal the
default judgment and the verdict on the fraudulent transfer. We reverse
the directed verdict and the dismissal because appellant was entitled to
rely on the default. We affirm as to the cross-appeal.

1 This claim is based on Turkish law and more fully discussed in the opinion.
    This case involves protracted litigation after the death of a wealthy
Turkish businessman. The dispute on appeal is between the deceased’s
older son (from the deceased’s marriage to his former wife) opposing the
deceased’s younger son (from the deceased’s marriage to his widow) and
the widow. Under Turkish law, the sons each had a vested share of the
estate. The former wife, now deceased, had claimed that she had unpaid
alimony and assets owed to her from the divorce with the deceased some
thirty years past, which rights she had assigned to the older son for this
litigation.

    The older son (appellant) was appointed administrator ad litem of the
deceased’s estate in Florida to obtain money damages for the claimed
conversion of assets by the younger son and the widow (appellees).
Appellant, as his mother’s assignee, also sought to recover on his mother’s
claims against appellees for the decedent’s transfers of Florida properties
to appellees after the former wife received the divorce judgment. Appellant
originally filed suit in 2009.

   After multiple amendments, the complaint consisted of separate counts
against appellees for the fraudulent transfer of assets which they obtained
after the former wife’s divorce judgment; separate counts against appellees
for conversion of assets taken from the decedent’s estate; and a single
count for “Tenkiz Davasi,” a Turkish law cause of action for contributions
which the decedent made to Florida properties held in the widow’s name
against the widow. Appellees answered without asserting any challenge to
personal jurisdiction or the Florida forum.

   After appellees violated several court orders and failed to comply with
lesser sanctions, the trial court struck their pleadings and entered a
default against them on liability. We reject appellees’ cross-appeal of the
default and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
entering the default as a sanction, as appellees willfully and
contumaciously disregarded the trial court’s multiple orders.

    Based upon the default, the parties proceeded to trial on damages.2
Prior to the trial’s commencement, the court dismissed appellant’s count
for “Tenkiz Davasi,” concluding that the Turkish law count did not state a
civil cause of action under Florida law. Then, at trial, after appellant rested
his damages case, appellees moved for a directed verdict on the remaining
counts for conversion and fraudulent transfer. The court granted a

2 By the time of trial, a different judge was presiding over the case than the judge

who had entered the default.

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directed verdict on the conversion counts, concluding that appellant’s
allegations and proof did not show that the estate owned the property in
question. The court allowed the fraudulent transfer counts to be reached
by the jury, which rendered a verdict for appellant and awarded
$623,453.87 in damages. The court entered judgment, and appellant filed
his appeal from the directed verdict on the conversion counts and from the
dismissal on the “Tenkiz Davasi” contribution count. Appellees cross-
appealed the default as already discussed and the fraudulent transfer
verdict.

   The standard for reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed
verdict is de novo. Meruelo v. Mark Andrew of Palm Beaches, Ltd., 12 So.
3d 247, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Similarly, the standard of review on
appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss is de novo. U.S. Project Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Parc Royale E. Dev., Inc., 861 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

                                Conversion

    The trial court entered a default as a sanction against appellees as to
all counts alleged in appellant’s complaint. The court also struck all of
appellees’ pleadings and entered a judgment on liability. “When a default
is entered, the defaulting party admits all well-pled factual allegations of
the complaint. Likewise, a default terminates the defending party’s right
to further defend, except to contest the amount of unliquidated damages.”
Kotlyar v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co., 192 So. 3d 562, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Phadael v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 83 So.
3d 893, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). “However, it is well established a default
judgment for damages cannot be affirmed where the underlying complaint
does not contain sufficient allegations to sustain the claim of damage.”
Ellish v. Richard, 622 So. 2d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); see also N.
Am. Accident Ins. Co. v Moreland, 53 So. 635, 637 (Fla. 1910) (“A judgment
by default properly entered against parties sui juris operates as an
admission by the defendants of the truth of the definite and certain
allegations and the fair inferences and conclusions of fact to be drawn from
the allegations of the declaration. . . . Whether the admitted allegations
state a cause of action is for the court to determine.”).

   “Conversion is defined as ‘an act of dominion wrongfully asserted over,
and inconsistent with, another’s possessory rights in personal property.’”
Joseph v. Chanin, 940 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting
Goodwin v. Alexatos, 584 So. 2d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)). The
cause of action accrues when the property’s wrongful holder “refus[es] to
surrender the possession of the subject personalty after demand for

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possession by one entitled thereto.” Id. at 487 (quoting Murrell v. Trio
Towing Serv., Inc., 294 So. 2d 331, 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)).

   Counts III and IV of appellant’s complaint alleged causes of action for
conversion against appellees. Specifically, the complaint alleged that
pursuant to Turkish law, assets belonging to appellees were estate assets,
thus establishing appellant’s right to possession as the estate’s
administrator. The complaint alleged that appellees had wrongfully
withdrawn funds from several bank accounts and a business that
belonged to the estate, and further alleged that appellees had refused to
return the funds when appellant, as administrator ad litem, demanded the
funds. These allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action for
conversion, and were admitted as fact due to the default. Kotlyar, 192 So.
3d at 565. 3

    This case is similar to DG Sports Agency, LLC v. First Round
Management, LLC, 174 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), where the plaintiff
had secured a clerk’s default on the defendant in a breach of contract case.
Id. at 543. At the damages trial, the court directed a verdict on liability,
finding that the plaintiff had breached the agreement first and questioning
the contract’s validity. Id. at 544. On appeal, this court reversed,
concluding that the trial court improperly ruled on issues of liability which
the default had foreclosed. Id. at 545.

   Just as in DG, the default in this case foreclosed appellees’ ability to
defend themselves against appellant’s conversion counts.             Because
appellant’s pleading was sufficient to allege causes of action for conversion
against appellees, the court erred in directing a verdict on those counts.

                Claim of Contribution under Turkish Law

   In his capacity as the estate’s administrator ad litem, appellant also
made a claim against the widow for a money judgment based upon the
Turkish law of “Tenkiz Davasi,” which was a claim for contribution.
According to the allegations of the complaint, under Articles 225 and 227
of the Turkish Civil Code, after one spouse dies, both spouses’ shared
property is liquidated with each spouse taking the value of his or her
contributions to acquisition or improvements of the shared property. The
complaint alleged that decedent had not been reimbursed for his
contributions, which included specific businesses and properties in
Florida. Earlier in the proceedings, the widow had moved to dismiss this

3 Appellant also claimed that appellees converted some real property, but that

claim was withdrawn at trial.

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claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss, although it questioned whether Turkey was a more
appropriate forum for a cause of action. However, appellees never moved
to dismiss the complaint based on forum non conveniens.

   The widow filed another motion to dismiss the claim before trial. She
argued that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a
cause of action under Turkish property law. Appellant argued that the
claim was properly brought here, because some of the property that was
the subject of the claim was located in Florida.

  The trial court dismissed the contribution claim, finding that Turkish
Law did not create a Florida civil cause of action. We conclude this too
was error.

    Appellant filed suit as the administrator ad litem of the decedent’s
estate for the purpose of filing claims on the estate’s behalf against the
widow and second son. See § 733.308, Fla. Stat. (2012); Fla. Prob. R.
5.120(a). When a court appoints an administrator ad litem, “[t]he
appointee becomes solely responsible to the estate for the administration
of that portion of its affairs entrusted to him by the court, and thus
supplants in that regard the authority of the personal representative, who
continues to be responsible for the administration of all other aspects of
the estate’s business.” Woolf v. Reed, 389 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA
1980). Thus, as administrator ad litem, appellant had authority to file suit
to recover monies owed to the estate, which was what appellant sought in
the contribution claim—to recover the decedent’s contributions to certain
Florida assets to which the estate was entitled under Turkish law. In
essence, the claim is akin to a suit for an accounting of the monies the
decedent paid for the purchase and upkeep of the properties.

    That the contribution action is based upon the estate’s substantive
right to such relief under Turkish law does not preclude its enforcement
in an action for a money judgment in Florida. The right to contribution
from the widow for assets acquired in her name is governed by the law of
parties’ domicile when that right was acquired. See Quintana v. Ordono,
195 So. 2d 577, 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (one spouse’s interests “in
movables acquired by the other during the marriage are determined by the
law of the domicile of the parties when the movables are acquired”)
(citation omitted), cert. discharged, 202 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1967); In re Estate
of Nicole Santos, 648 So. 2d 277, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (same).

   Here, the estate seeks money to compensate it for the decedent’s
contributions to property; it does not seek the property itself. In In re

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Siegel’s Estate, 350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), we held that a note
and mortgage were movables, and the law of the decedent holder’s domicile
should apply to its disposition, because the note and mortgage did not
create an estate in land. Id. at 91. Similarly here, the decedent’s right of
contribution in the widow’s assets does not create an estate in land.
Therefore, the assets are movables and, as such, are governed by the laws
of Turkey, the domicile of both the decedent and his widow.

   Thus, Turkish law applies to the claim for contribution. Application of
Turkish law was admitted by the default, as was the estate’s right to seek
contribution for the decedent’s payments in the acquisition and
maintenance of the properties. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
dismissing the claim.

                                Conclusion

    Because we conclude that the complaint stated a cause of action for
conversion, the trial court erred in entering a directed verdict on liability
for appellees when a default on liability had been entered. The court also
erred in dismissing appellant’s cause of action for contribution, as
appellant was entitled to bring the action as an administrator ad litem
seeking to recover monies due to the estate. For these claims, we reverse
and remand for a new trial on damages. As to the issues on cross-appeal,
we affirm.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

MAY and FORST, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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