Court Opinion

ID: 9939525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 06:29:14.129696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:22.314227
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed February 8, 2024

                                        In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                     __________

                                 No. 11-22-00242-CR
                                     __________

          ARMANDO SAUZAMEDA MENDOZA, Appellant
                                           V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                            Midland County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. CR165346

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Appellant, Armando Sauzameda Mendoza, was arrested at a bar and charged
with resisting arrest, a Class A misdemeanor.           See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 38.03(a), (c) (West 2016). The jury found Appellant guilty, and, pursuant to the
parties’ agreement on punishment, the trial court assessed his punishment at a $1,000
fine. Appellant raises two issues on appeal: first, that the trial court erred in refusing
to include a mistake-of-fact instruction in the jury charge upon Appellant’s request,
and second, that the evidence was “legally insufficient to show that [Appellant] used
force ‘against’ the officer.” We first address the second issue on sufficiency of the
evidence. We reverse and remand for a new trial on Appellant’s first issue.
                                 Factual and Procedural History
        On April 28, 2018, Midland Police Officer Joel Covarrubio was providing
security while off duty at a bar in Midland County. Appellant was at the bar that
evening, and Officer Covarrubio testified that Appellant was involved in a
disturbance inside the bar. Appellant was escorted outside and Officer Covarrubio
testified that he warned Appellant to leave and when he did not leave, the officer
attempted to place him under arrest. Officer Covarrubio did not tell Appellant he
was under arrest at that time or at any point after. Appellant did not struggle or resist
arrest following the “take-down.”
        While Appellant admitted that he tried to stop Officer Covarrubio from
grabbing his wrists and “pulled it away,” Appellant testified that he did not know he
was being placed under arrest and only thought he was being told to leave the
premises. During the charge conference, Appellant’s counsel requested that the trial
court include a mistake-of-fact instruction and presented a proposed instruction, but
the trial court denied his request. The jury found Appellant guilty of resisting arrest
as charged in the information.
                                       Issue Two: Sufficiency
        Laying aside for the moment Appellant’s first issue—that of the trial court’s
refusal to give a mistake-of-fact instruction to the jury, in Appellant’s second issue,
he argues that the evidence of his “use of force against” the officer is legally
insufficient because “merely pulling away” is not adequate force.1 Appellant argues

        1
         In Appellant’s second issue he does not address, and we therefor do not address the issue of
Appellant’s mens rea in our evidentiary analysis. Instead, we focus upon the element of “using force against
the peace officer” per Section 38.03(a) of the Texas Penal Code.

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that because only pulling away is insufficient to constitute force, the verdict is
contrary to the evidence. We disagree.
                                Standard of Review
      We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288−89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d
729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895; Isassi v. State, 330
S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that
we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we must defer to the
factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded.
Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The Jackson standard is
deferential and accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our
judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999). Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferences are based
on the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light

                                         3
most favorable to the verdict. Clement v. State, 248 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences,
we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we
defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d
516, 525−26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
                            Applicable Law and Analysis
      To commit the offense of resisting arrest, a person must “intentionally prevent
or obstruct a person he knows is a peace officer . . . from effecting an arrest . . . by
using force against the peace officer.” See PENAL § 38.03(a). The Court of Criminal
Appeals has defined the phrase “by using force against a peace officer or another”
as some sort of “violence or physical aggression, or an immediate threat thereof, in
the direction of and/or into contact with, or in opposition or hostility to, a peace
officer or another.” Finley v. State, 484 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
(citing Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). Even
forcefully pulling away from an officer is enough to satisfy the “in opposition or
hostility to” a police officer requirement. Id.
      The force must occur while the officer is attempting to effectuate an arrest,
complete a search, or transport the actor. See PENAL § 38.03(a). In the context of
Section 38.03, “effecting an arrest” is not an easily ascertainable moment in time.
Black v. State, No. 04-12-00268-CR, 2013 WL 2368297, at *5 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio May 29, 2013, no pet.) (citing Lewis v. State, 30 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.)).          “Effecting an arrest” entails a process or
transaction and has a beginning and end, that must be determined based on the
circumstances.    Black, 2013 WL 2368297, at *5; Lewis, 30 S.W.3d at 512.
Importantly, the intentional use of force by the defendant must exist within that
transactional period. Black, 2013 WL 2368297, at *5; Lewis, 30 S.W.3d at 512.

                                           4
“The moment an officer begins his efforts to gain control or physically restrain an
individual until that individual is restrained or controlled, the officer is ‘effecting an
arrest.’” Black, 2013 WL 2368297, at *5 (citing Latham v. State, 128 S.W.3d 325,
329 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2004, no pet.)).
      Here, Appellant does not dispute on appeal that he did pull away from Officer
Covarrubio, and only argues that this act is not “force” under the law. First, the cases
cited by Appellant to support his position that pulling away is not “force” under the
law were all issued prior to the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Finley in 2016.
See Finley, 484 S.W.3d at 928 (where even pulling away from an officer is enough
to satisfy the “in opposition or hostility to” a peace officer requirement in the statute).
Second, the evidence presented at trial provides support for the State’s claim that
Appellant did pull away after Officer Covarrubio testified that he began the process
of arresting Appellant, but before the arrest was completed. Officer Covarrubio
testified that he attempted to take Appellant into custody, and when he grabbed
Appellant to do so, Appellant pulled away. Appellant testified that he did not know
he was being placed under arrest, but that testimony does not dispute that Appellant
pulled away from the officer during his efforts to arrest.
      Because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the evidence, the jury
could have determined that Appellant pulled away from the officer and that—at the
time Appellant pulled away—the officer was attempting to effect an arrest of
Appellant. See Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Thus,
under those circumstances, and assuming the required mens rea, the evidence is
sufficient to support that Appellant used the force necessary to support his
conviction. See Finley, 484 S.W.3d at 928. We overrule Appellant’s second issue.

                                            5
                    Issue One: Mistake-of-Fact Jury Instruction
      In Appellant’s first issue, he complains that the trial court improperly refused
his requested mistake-of-fact instruction. Appellant argues that if he was mistaken
about whether he was under arrest, it would negate the necessary mental culpability
for the offense. We agree.
                                 Standard of Review
      We review complaints of jury-charge error under a two-step process. See
Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Abdnor v. State, 871
S.W.2d 726, 731–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). First, we must determine whether
error exists in the trial court’s charge. Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 606 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013). Second, if there is an error, we are required to determine whether
the lack of the required instruction caused sufficient harm to require reversal of the
conviction. Id. As a defensive issue, the defendant must request a mistake-of-fact
instruction or object to its omission in the trial court’s charge to invoke the harm
analysis set forth in Almanza. Williams v. State, 662 S.W.3d 452, 460 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2021); Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (the trial
court does not commit error, and Almanza does not apply, when a trial court fails to
sua sponte instruct the jury on the defensive issue of mistake-of-fact); see Almanza v.
State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
      It is a defense to prosecution that the defendant “through mistake formed a
reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of
culpability required for commission of the offense.” PENAL § 8.02(a) (West 2021).
For this defense to apply, the defendant must have been mistaken about a specific
historical fact that, if true, would negate the mental state required for conviction.
See Celis v. State, 416 S.W.3d 419, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing to
Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that “an

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instruction on mistake of fact is limited to any culpable mental state required for the
offense.”)). A defendant’s mistaken belief that his conduct was lawful is not a
mistake of fact for purposes of this defense. See Plummer v. State, 426 S.W.3d 122,
128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012), aff’d as modified, 410 S.W.3d 855 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013).
      Upon request, a defendant is entitled to a mistake-of-fact instruction if the
issue is raised by the evidence, even if that evidence is weak or controverted. Celis,
416 S.W.3d at 430; Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
But if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, does
not establish this defense, the instruction is not required. Flores v. State, 573 S.W.3d
864, 868 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d).
      If the trial court does err in refusing a mistake-of-fact instruction, we must
then determine whether the lack of the required instruction caused sufficient harm
to require reversal of the conviction. Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 460–61. If the
defendant preserved error by timely objecting to the trial court’s charge, we will
reverse if he demonstrates that he suffered some harm as a result of the trial court’s
error. Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Reeves v.
State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). To determine harm, we weigh
the following factors: (1) the jury charge as a whole, (2) the arguments of counsel,
(3) the entirety of the evidence, and (4) any other relevant factors present in the
record. Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 816. Under the “some harm” standard, reversal is
required if the error is “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant.” Almanza,
686 S.W.2d at 171. The standard thus requires a reviewing court to examine the
record to determine whether “actual, not just theoretical, harm” occurred. Id. at 174;
see Cornet v. State, 417 S.W.3d 446, 449–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Even under

                                           7
the “some harm” standard, an error will not lead to reversal if it is harmless. See
Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.
                             Applicable Law and Analysis
        Appellant argues that the trial court improperly refused the requested
mistake-of-fact instruction because Appellant did not possess the necessary
mens rea to commit the offense of resisting arrest, in that he had a mistaken belief
that he was not under arrest. Appellant successfully preserved the claimed error.
See Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 816; Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008).
       Under Section 38.03(a) of the Texas Penal Code, a person commits the offense
of resisting arrest, search, or transportation if:
              [H]e intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a
              peace officer or a person acting in a peace officer’s presence and
              at his direction from effecting an arrest, search, or transportation
              of the actor or another by using force against the peace officer or
              another.
PENAL § 38.03(a) (emphasis added). At trial, Appellant’s counsel objected to the
jury charge and requested—in part—the following instruction on mistake of fact:
              If you have found that the state has proved the offense beyond a
              reasonable doubt, you must next decide whether the state has
              proved the defendant did not make a mistake of fact constituting
              a defense.

              To decide the issue of mistake of fact, you must determine
              whether the state has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
              either --

              1. the defendant did not believe officers were trying to arrest him
                 when they initially grabbed at his hands; or

              2. the defendant’s belief that officer [sic] were not trying to
                 arrest him was not reasonable.

                                             8
             ....

             If you find that the state has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable
             doubt, either element 1 or 2 listed above, you must find the
             defendant “not guilty.”

The State responded that Appellant’s belief that the officers were not trying to arrest
him was a credibility determination reserved for the jury. The trial court refused to
include the instruction and noted Appellant’s exception to its ruling.
      A. Jury instruction on mistake-of-fact should have been given
      We conclude that Appellant was entitled to the instruction on mistake of fact
because he raised evidence that he did not know he was being placed under arrest at
the time he pulled away from Officer Covarrubio. See Allen, 253 S.W.3d at 267.
Appellant testified that he was not aware he was being placed under arrest, and
Officer Covarrubio testified he had not told Appellant he was being arrested. That
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, is sufficient to entitle
Appellant to a mistake-of-fact instruction. See Allen, 253 S.W.3d at 267; Flores,
573 S.W.3d at 868. The trial court should have granted Appellant’s request for a
mistake-of-fact instruction, and on appeal, the State concedes this error. See Celis,
416 S.W.3d at 430; Miller v. State, 815 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
      B. Sufficient harm to require reversal
      We next determine whether the lack of instruction caused sufficient harm to
require reversal. As we have said, we weigh the following factors when considering
whether the record shows that Appellant suffered “some harm”: (1) the jury charge
as a whole, (2) the arguments of counsel, (3) the entirety of the evidence, and (4) any
other relevant factors present in the record. Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 816. The “some
harm” standard is a low threshold. Navarro v. State, 469 S.W.3d 687, 700 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). Neither party bears the burden on
appeal to prove harm. Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 462 (Tex. Crim. App.

                                          9
2008). Appellant argues on appeal that the lack of a mistake-of-fact instruction was
fatally defective and harmful. 2
        The trial court’s charge permitted the jury to find that Appellant intended to
pull away from the officer, but it did not distinguish for the jury that, in pulling away,
if it found that Appellant did not reasonably believe that the officers’ actions were
to arrest him, but rather were merely to require him to leave the premises, it should
acquit the defendant.         In addition, nothing in the trial court’s charge suggests that
the jury could consider Appellant’s mistake-of-fact defense when determining
whether he was guilty of resisting arrest. See Holloway v. State, No. 03-22-00268-
CR, 2023 WL 4981603, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 4, 2023, pet. ref’d). Thus,
the first factor supports that Appellant suffered some harm by the trial court’s refusal
to include a mistake-of-fact instruction.
        Following the trial court’s refusal to include a mistake-of-fact instruction in
the jury charge, Appellant’s closing argument focused on whether Appellant
reasonably knew he was being arrested rather than simply removed from the bar.
Appellant stated that Paragraph No. 3 of the trial court’s charge, the definition of
“intentionally” was “the most important part of the case.” He argued that “[i]t is
impossible to cause the result of not -- for an officer to not arrest you if you don’t
know that the officer is trying to arrest you. That’s what this case comes down to.”
        The State argued intent as it related to Appellant’s counterforce, not as it
related to Appellant’s understanding of the officer’s efforts to arrest as opposed to
effectuate an exit from the bar premises. The State’s argument primarily linked the
mens rea to Appellant’s act of pulling away, but the argument of both parties was

        2
         Appellee argues that Appellant does not properly brief the harm suffered as a result of the error.
We independently assess the evidence according to the test laid out in Almanza when an appellant has
properly preserved his claim of jury charge error at trial. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

                                                    10
very short and, in the balance, this factor neither supports nor disputes that Appellant
suffered “some harm” without the mistake-of-fact instruction.
       The remaining two factors—the entirety of the evidence and any additional
relevant facts—support the conclusion that the lack of a mistake-of-fact instruction
caused Appellant to suffer at least some harm.             Officer Covarrubio testified that
after he escorted Appellant outside of the bar, he “warned” Appellant that he needed
to leave. Officer Covarrubio’s body camera footage3 indicates that the word “warn”
or “warning” was not used, nor was a potential consequence given by him for
Appellant’s refusal to leave in advance of his arrest; rather, Appellant was repeatedly
told to leave and was effectively blocked from reentering the bar. At no point during
this interaction did Officer Covarrubio tell Appellant that he was being placed under
arrest or that he would be arrested if he did not leave. Appellant testified that he did
not know he was being placed under arrest and that he thought he was being escorted
from the premises when he “pulled away” from Officer Covarrubio. Here, whether
Appellant reasonably did not believe that he was being arrested was the key issue in
the case. See Hill v. State, 765 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
            The testimony and video evidence could support a juror’s belief that
Appellant reasonably did not know that he was being placed under arrest at the
time—and therefore did not possess the required mens rea for the offense of resisting
arrest. As a result, factors three and four tend to support that Appellant suffered
some harm by the lack of instruction given in the trial court’s charge.
           Considering the Reeves factors in weighing the issue of harm, we conclude
that Appellant suffered some harm when the trial court refused to include the

       3
        The video from the body camera contains only about thirty-two seconds with audio before the
“take-down” of Appellant by the officers at the entrance of the bar.

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mistake-of-fact instruction in the jury charge. See Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 816; Hill,
765 S.W.2d at 797–98.
      We sustain Appellant’s first issue.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      The evidence was sufficient as to Appellant’s use of force. However, we
sustained Appellant’s first issue as to the mistake-of-fact jury instruction, we reverse
the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

                                                 W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                 JUSTICE

February 8, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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