Court Opinion

ID: 9895985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 01:00:30.645377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:11.087953
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40592         Document: 00516961383             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/08/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                         FILED
                                                                                  November 8, 2023
                                       No. 21-40592
                                      ____________                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Reginald Stanly Strother,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Eastern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 1:19-CR-84-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          While Reginald Stanly Strother was serving a life sentence for a drug
   offense, he attempted to file fraudulent retaliatory liens against the judge who
   sentenced him and enlisted his elderly mother for help. A jury convicted
   Strother of filing false retaliatory liens against a federal judge, mail fraud, and
   related counts. He now appeals.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 21-40592

          Strother also has a pending motion for leave to file attachments to his
   reply brief. We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and DENY the
   motion.
                                         I
          In 2008, Strother was convicted of a drug-trafficking offense for which
   he is serving a life sentence. United States Federal District Judge Marcia
   Crone presided over his case. We affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.
   United States v. Strother, 387 F. App’x 508 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
          In 2013, the Jefferson County Clerk’s Office received a suspicious
   document titled “Claim of Lien” via certified mail. It listed Marcia A. Crone
   as the debtor and Reginald Stanly Strother as the requestor. Clerk’s Deputy
   Theresa Goodness reviewed the document and noticed several red flags.
   First, she knew Marcia Crone was a federal judge. And although the
   document claimed to be a “voluntary agreement,” it did not have Judge
   Crone’s notarized signature, which Goodness testified would be present if
   Judge Crone consented to the lien. Second, the document claimed that the
   lien arose out of Judge Crone’s “violation of oath of office and unlawful acts
   committed against the liberty interest of Reginald S. Strother” and that it was
   filed under the California Civil Code and “the fundamental commercial law
   that has existed nearly 2000 years.” Additionally, for the alleged violations,
   Strother sought a total of $50 million, an unusually large amount. Third, and
   finally, nothing suggested that a court issued the lien or that the lien arose
   from a judgment.
          The clerk’s office also received a second document from Strother,
   titled “Notice of Default.” The document said that Strother served Marcia
   Crone, debtor, with notice of her unconstitutional acts and that she had thirty
   days to remedy the $50 million default. Strother was listed as the sender. His
   return address was a P.O. Box in Pollock, Louisiana, where he was then

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   incarcerated. Strother’s handwritten notes, which instructed his mother on
   filing his lien, were also included with the documents he sent to the clerk’s
   office. After noticing the irregularities in Strother’s documents, the clerk’s
   office contacted the FBI.
            Strother attempted to file the liens three times. Each time, the clerk’s
   office declined to file them. As a result, Strother filed three lawsuits against
   the clerk’s office employees. He filed one suit against Goodness and two
   against Carolyn Guidry, another employee.
            On June 5, 2019, the Government indicted Strother for conspiring and
   attempting to file a false and retaliatory lien against Judge Crone’s residence,
   conspiring to commit mail fraud, and mail fraud.
            Trial began on September 29, 2020. Strother did not present a
   defense. A jury convicted him on all counts. He timely appealed and is
   proceeding pro se, as he did at trial. Accordingly, we construe his arguments
   liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam);
   McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
                                           II
            Strother makes five arguments on appeal: (1) that his Sixth
   Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) that the district court
   failed to correct the trial record; (3) that the district court improperly
   admitted witness testimony; (4) that the evidence of his fraudulent lawsuits
   was legally insufficient to convict him of mail fraud; and (5) that the
   indictment was constructively amended by the evidence at trial. None have
   merit.
                                           A
            First, Strother’s Sixth Amendment claim. Strother contends the
   Government violated his right to a speedy trial because its delay resulted in

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   the faded memory of his only witness. Strother raises this constitutional claim
   for the first time on appeal, so we review it for plain error.1 See United States
   v. Reagan, 725 F.3d 471, 487 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Puckett v. United States,
   556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
           To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a
   speedy trial, we evaluate four factors set out by Barker v. Wingo: “(1) the
   length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of
   his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Goodrum v.
   Quarterman, 547 F.3d 249, 257 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407
   U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
           “The first factor ‘is a triggering mechanism for determining whether
   the court is required to balance the remaining three Barker factors.’” United
   States v. Scully, 951 F.3d 656, 669 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
   omitted) (quoting United States v. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 230 (5th
   Cir. 2003)). To trigger a speedy trial analysis, Strother “‘must allege that the
   interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold’ that
   separates ordinary delay from ‘presumptively prejudicial delay.’” Amos v.
   Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Doggett v.
   United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992)).
           Because more than one year elapsed between Strother’s indictment
   and his trial, we analyze all three factors. See id. (“The bare minimum
   required to trigger a Barker analysis is one year.”). But the delay was only
   fifteen months, so this factor does not strongly favor Strother. Id. at 206–07

           _____________________
           1
            In the district court, Strother moved to dismiss his indictment under the Speedy
   Trial Act. The district court denied this motion, but Strother does not challenge that denial
   on appeal. See United States v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 304 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A
   claim under the Speedy Trial Act differs in some significant ways from a claim under the
   Sixth Amendment speedy trial clause.” (alterations omitted) (citation omitted)).

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   (“A delay must persist for at least eighteen months over and above that bare
   minimum for this factor to strongly favor the accused.”).
          We next consider the reasons for the delay. We assign different
   weights to different reasons. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. “A deliberate
   attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense [is] weighted heavily
   against the government.” Id. Neutral reasons, such as court overcrowding,
   are “weighted less heavily.” Id. “Valid reasons . . . justify the delay and will
   not be weighed against the government.” United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201,
   210 (5th Cir. 2007); Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
          Here, the delay resulted from Strother’s competency evaluation,
   COVID-19 court closures, and Strother’s numerous pretrial motions. The
   COVID-19 continuance is a neutral reason that weighs in Strother’s favor,
   but not heavily. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. The other two reasons do not
   weigh in his favor. As to the competency proceedings, Strother merely
   asserts that the competency evaluation was “absurd” and “foolish.” The
   record does not support this conclusory argument and does not show that the
   magistrate judge abused his discretion in ordering the competency
   evaluation. United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Whether
   ‘reasonable cause’ exists to put the court on notice that the defendant might
   be mentally incompetent is left to the sound discretion of the district
   court.”). After determining that Strother was competent to stand trial, the
   magistrate judge noted that, as of July 16, 2020, Strother had filed over forty
   pro se pretrial motions that sought relief ranging from discovery to
   substantive challenges to the indictment. So this reason does not weigh in his
   favor. See United States v. Wyers, 546 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1977).
          As to the third factor, because Strother asserted his right to a speedy
   trial in a motion for dismissal, this factor does not weigh in his favor. See Frye,

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   489 F.3d at 211–12 (“A motion for dismissal is not evidence that the
   defendant wants to be tried promptly.”); Barker, 407 U.S. at 534–35.
          Finally, prejudice. Because the first three factors, on the whole, do not
   heavily favor Strother, he has the burden of showing actual prejudice. See
   Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d at 230–31 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658).
   “‘Actual prejudice’ is assessed in light of the three following interests of the
   defendant: (1) ‘to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration’; (2) ‘to
   minimize anxiety and concern of the accused’; and (3) ‘to limit the possibility
   that the defense will be impaired.’” Amos, 646 F.3d at 208 (quoting United
   States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 433 (5th Cir. 2009)). Strother contends that
   he met this burden because his only witness’s memory was impaired by the
   passage of time, thus impairing his defense. His argument is unavailing.
          “[W]hile ‘faded memory may result in prejudice . . . . to constitute a
   speedy trial violation, the faded memory must substantially relate to a
   material issue.” United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1079 (5th Cir. 1983)
   (alteration in original) (quoting Jamerson v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.
   1982)). Here, it does not. Strother attempted to call FBI Special Agent Olivia
   Alley as his sole witness. The Government objected to her testimony, arguing
   that she had no knowledge of the lien. The court allowed her to testify outside
   the presence of the jury. Special Agent Alley’s brief testimony confirmed she
   knew nothing about the liens. Although she testified that she interviewed
   Strother in 2015 to ask him to stop filing the liens, she was not investigating
   the liens and knew nothing about their contents.
          Strother’s prejudice argument rests on one question he was not
   allowed to ask Special Agent Alley: “Do you remember me asking you if you
   had any evidence that the lien was false at that time?” The district court
   upheld the Government’s objection to this question, ruling that Strother was
   trying to get his own statement into evidence without taking the stand

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   himself. Strother said he had no further questions and agreed that Special
   Agent Alley could be excused. Thus, even if Special Agent Alley knew the
   answer to Strother’s question, her testimony would not have been
   admissible. Strother has not shown actual prejudice.
          We conclude that Strother has not shown that he was denied his Sixth
   Amendment right to a speedy trial.
                                          B
          In a related challenge, Strother alleges that the district court erred by
   failing to correct the trial record under Federal Rule of Appellate
   Procedure 10(e).
          Rule 10(e)(1) provides that “[i]f any difference arises about whether
   the record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the difference
   must be submitted to and settled by that court and the record conformed
   accordingly.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(1). Strother moved to settle the
   record under Rule 10(e) in the district court, claiming that the transcript
   omitted Special Agent Alley’s response to his question about whether she
   remembered telling him that she did not have any information that his lien
   was false.
          After Strother filed his reply brief in this court, the district court
   issued an order denying Strother’s motion to correct the record, stating that
   it had conducted an in camera review of the audio recording from trial and
   found no discrepancies in the transcript. We take judicial notice of the district
   court’s ruling. United States v. Brandon, 965 F.3d 427, 430 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (“[W]e may take judicial notice of . . . matters of public record.” (alteration
   in original) (citation omitted)). And we find no error in the district court’s
   denial of Strother’s motion. See United States v. Smith, 493 F.2d 906, 907 (5th
   Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (“Rule 10(e) exists to allow the district court to
   conform the record to what happened, not to what did not.”). Although

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   Rule 10(e)(2) allows us to independently correct the record, we find no basis
   to do so.
          Strother has moved this court for leave to file exhibits to his reply
   brief, which include the digital audio recordings of the trial. In light of the
   district court’s order, the motion is DENIED. Strother’s motion is also
   DENIED in all other respects. He makes no argument for the only
   attachment that is not already part of the record.
                                         C
          Next, Strother contends that the district court erred in denying his
   motion to exclude Special Agent Michael Collier’s testimony under Federal
   Rules of Evidence 602 and 701. We review the district court’s evidentiary
   rulings for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless-error analysis. United
   States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590, 598 (5th Cir. 2014).
          Strother argues that, because Special Agent Collier lacked personal
   knowledge about Strother’s 2008 drug case, he could not testify to whether
   the claims in Strother’s liens were false. Strother argues that only three
   people could testify about the liens: Robert Strause, the officer who Strother
   alleges filed a complaint against him; Magistrate Judge Earl Hines; and Judge
   Crone. This argument is meritless. Under Rule 602, “[a] witness may testify
   to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that
   the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602.
   The Government met this burden. Special Agent Collier testified that, in
   2014, he began investigating Strother’s filings, which he received from
   Goodness. His testimony was based on his personal knowledge of his
   investigation of Strother’s criminal conduct.
          Strother next argues that Special Agent Collier’s testimony that the
   documents were “fraudulent” was an impermissible legal conclusion. Under
   Rule 701, a non-expert witness may offer opinion testimony so long as it is

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   “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly
   understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and
   (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within
   the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Lay witnesses are generally not
   allowed to give legal opinions. See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467,
   514 (5th Cir. 2011).
          Most of Special Agent Collier’s testimony was based on his own
   perceptions and involvement in the investigation of Strother’s liens. Cf.
   Akins, 746 F.3d at 598. But even if we assumed that the district court erred
   in admitting portions of Special Agent Collier’s testimony, his reference to
   the documents as “fraudulent” was harmless because the Government
   presented overwhelming evidence of the documents’ falsity and Strother’s
   guilt. See United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1283 (5th Cir. 1995).
   Judge Crone testified that she never consented to any lien drawn up by
   Strother. Indeed, she had never consented to a lien on her property other
   than her mortgage. No evidence of Judge Crone’s consent to the lien was
   presented at trial. Goodness testified that Judge Crone never came in to
   notarize the documents or told the clerk that she consented. Goodness also
   testified to a number of red flags with Strother’s lien, which prompted her to
   forward it to the FBI. She said that Strother’s documents resembled those
   that the FBI warned the clerk’s office to look out for.
                                         D
          Next, Strother contends that we must reverse his three convictions
   for mail fraud because each count was based on Strother’s lawsuits. We
   liberally construe his argument as challenging the legal sufficiency of his
   conviction. Strother moved for acquittal after the Government rested, so he
   has preserved this claim. We review this issue de novo. United States v.

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   Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We review questions of law and
   application of statutes de novo.”).
          Relying on United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1208 (11th Cir.
   2002), Strother argues that filing lawsuits “is an ordinary litigation practice”
   that cannot be criminalized. His conviction, he contends, “undermine[s] the
   policies of access and finality that animate our legal system.” Id. at 1208. In
   Pendergraft, the defendants were charged with mail fraud for attaching false
   affidavits to a motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. The indictment alleged
   that the affidavits and motion were filed in furtherance of a scheme to extort
   a settlement. Id. Although the court expressed a policy concern that
   “prosecuting litigation activities as federal crimes would undermine the
   policies of access and finality that animate our legal system,” it held that the
   false affidavits did not constitute mail fraud because there was no intent to
   deceive or scheme to defraud—the defendants knew the affidavits would not
   deceive the recipient. Id.; see United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 889–91 (11th
   Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Pendergraft and noting its policy concerns “were
   simply dicta”); see also United States v. Cuya, 724 F. App’x 720, 724 (11th
   Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Lee, 427 F.3d at 724).
          In Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., we said that in the civil-
   RICO context, absent evidence of corruption or criminal activity, we agreed
   with our sister circuit about the policy concerns underlying the prosecution
   of litigation activities. 833 F.3d 512, 525 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Pendergraft,
   297 F.3d at 1208). But here, there is ample evidence of corruption or criminal
   activity. The Government was required to prove “(1) a scheme to defraud;
   (2) the use of the mails to execute the scheme; and (3) the specific intent to
   defraud.” United States v. Traxler, 764 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 2014). It was
   undisputed that Strother used the mails. The evidence showed that Strother
   and his mother participated in a scheme to file fraudulent liens against Judge
   Crone in retaliation for his sentence. In furtherance of the scheme, Strother

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   sued the clerk’s office employees to induce them to file the false liens, seeking
   hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages. The jury determined that these
   documents were mailed with the intent to defraud the clerk’s office into filing
   his fraudulent liens. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain his
   convictions.
                                                E
           Finally, Strother argues that Count Three of the indictment was
   constructively amended at trial by the admission of “evidence of a general
   warranty deed” that was not alleged in the indictment. We review this issue
   de novo.2 United States v. Thompson, 647 F.3d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 2011).
           “The Fifth Amendment ‘guarantees criminal defendants a right to be
   tried solely on allegations in an indictment returned by the grand jury.’”
   United States v. Chaker, 820 F.3d 204, 210 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted);
   Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215–18 (1960). Only the grand jury may
   broaden or modify an indictment. Thompson, 647 F.3d at 184. “Not all
   variations between allegation and proof, however, rise to the level of a
   constructive amendment . . . .” Id. An indictment is constructively amended
   when “the court ‘permits the defendant to be convicted upon a factual basis
   that effectively modifies an essential element of the offense charged’ or upon
   ‘a materially different theory or set of facts than that which [the defendant]

           _____________________
           2
             The Government asserts that Strother did not raise this issue in the district court,
   so plain-error review applies. Strother contends that he raised his argument in a motion to
   suppress evidence relating to the general warranty deed. In his motion, Strother argued that
   the evidence of the general warranty deed was irrelevant to the foreclosure sale and should
   be suppressed “to avoid a possible conviction for an offense not charged in the
   indictment.” The district court denied the motion. We need not resolve this issue because
   his claim fails even under de novo review.

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   was charged.’” Chaker, 820 F.3d at 210 (alteration in original) (quoting
   United States v. McMillan, 600 F.3d 434, 451 (5th Cir. 2010)).
          Count Three of the indictment charged Strother with filing false
   retaliatory liens. It alleged that he attempted to file a “Notice of Foreclosure
   Sale,” which listed Judge Crone as the debtor and stated that her property in
   Beaumont, Texas, would be “sold at auction to the highest bidder on the
   steps of the Los Angeles County Courthouse in California.” At trial, the jury
   heard a recording of a phone call in which Strother instructed his mother to
   file a warranty deed in his name after the foreclosure sale. He contends that
   the mention of the warranty deed was a constructive amendment because the
   deed was not mentioned in the indictment.
          Mention of the general warranty deed neither modified an essential
   element of mail fraud nor allowed the jury to convict Strother on a materially
   different theory or set of facts. See Chaker, 820 F.3d at 210. The evidence
   showed that Strother mailed the notice of foreclosure sale to the clerk’s office
   and that Strother instructed his co-conspirator to file the warranty deed in
   his name after the foreclosure sale. Thus, the warranty deed was merely the
   final completion of the foreclosure process, not an amendment to the
   indictment for which the jury convicted Strother on an alternate basis. Cf.
   Thompson, 647 F.3d at 184.
          The judgment is AFFIRMED.

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