Court Opinion

ID: 9831301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:00:24.138058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:33.680206
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4728

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        SANTOS ENRIQUE HERRERA-REYES, agent of Ricardo Lorenzana Diaz,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Richmond. David J. Novak, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00052-DJN-1)

        Submitted: August 29, 2023                                        Decided: August 31, 2023

        Before KING, AGEE, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, Nia Ayanna Vidal, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE
        OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica
        D. Aber, United States Attorney, Shea Matthew Gibbons, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Santos Enrique Herrera-Reyes appeals his 24-month, upward-variant revocation

        sentence. He argues that his sentence is plainly unreasonable because the district court

        based his sentence predominately on an impermissible sentencing factor—the seriousness

        of the violations. We affirm.

               “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

        supervised release. [We] will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory

        maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436

        (4th Cir. 2020). Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,

        [we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively

        unreasonable,” id., evaluating “the same procedural and substantive considerations that

        guide our review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture

        than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370,

        373 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “Only if a sentence is either procedurally or substantively

        unreasonable is a determination then made as to whether the sentence is plainly

        unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Patterson,

        957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately

        explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding

        Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United

        States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        When fashioning an appropriate revocation sentence, “the court should sanction primarily

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        the defendant’s breach of trust.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b).

        While the court must also consider certain enumerated factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

        excluded from that list is “the need for the sentence . . . to reflect the seriousness of the

        offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”

        18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); see id. § 3583(e). We have recognized, however, that the

        “§ 3553(a)(2)(A) [factors] are intertwined with the factors courts are expressly authorized

        to consider under § 3583(e).” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 2013).

        Thus, although the district court may not base a revocation sentence “predominately” on

        the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such considerations does not render a

        revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are relevant to, and

        considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 642.

               We conclude that the district court did not predominately sentence Herrera-Reyes

        based on the seriousness of the violations. During the revocation hearing, the court

        repeatedly expressed regret for previously sentencing Herrera-Reyes to time served, as he

        committed the new offenses only five days after his release. Thus, while the court

        described the violations as serious, it is apparent that the court’s “concern with [Herrera-

        Reyes’] breach of trust . . . far outweighed any other concerns and provided independent

        justification for the sentence.” United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2012).

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               Because Herrera-Reyes’ sentence is not plainly unreasonable, we affirm the district

        court’s judgment. ∗ We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

        are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

               ∗
                  Herrera-Reyes did not object to the district court’s consideration of an
        impermissible factor. But because his sentence is not plainly unreasonable, we need not
        address whether any error affected his substantial rights or seriously affected the fairness,
        integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Lemon,
        777 F.3d 170, 172-73 (4th Cir. 2015) (reviewing unpreserved challenge to consideration
        of impermissible factor for plain error).

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