Court Opinion

ID: 9594796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:33:04.344798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:27.387152
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent for two reasons, one is procedural, the other substantive.
Procedurally, the majority does not accurately state the record. The whole premise of the majority's holding is that it can ignore, for lack of evidence, a finding of fact. There Is No Assignment of Error to Any Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law. Two of the briefs call specific attention to this failure to assign error to any finding of fact or conclusion. The majority ignores this challenge.
What were those crucial findings of fact which have become verities in this appeal?
The question must first be put in context. The case arises from the statement by the deputy prosecutor at the time of defendant's plea, to wit:
The reason for the reduction in the plea [sic] is because of absent witnesses who are unable to be found who are essential to the prosecution.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 2 (Nov. 1, 1985).
The trial court entered these unchallenged findings:
III.
All three [essential] witnesses had repeatedly told Mr. Roche [deputy prosecutor] that they would be present at the trial.
IV.
Lila McMahon [one of the essential witnesses] had been subpoenaed for the trial and had told Mr. Roche and Mr. Miller, attorney for the defendant, that she *43would be present at the trial. The subpoena was in the clerk's file.
VII.
Mr. Miller [defense attorney] did not correct this statement of Mr. Roche in open court before Judge Sauriol. Mr. Miller knew that all three witnesses had said they would be present and that Lila McMahon had been subpoenaed for the trial and had said that she would appear at that time.
The court then entered this conclusion of law:
V.
Mr. Miller [defense attorney] was required by R.C.W. 9.94A.090 to advise Judge Sauriol that the witnesses would be present and had indicated that they would be present. Defense counsel is required by this statute to correct any obvious misrepresentations by the prosecuting attorney relative to the request to the court for a reduction of the plea and an approval of a plea agreement.
The majority is content to rely on appellant's assertion in his brief that the trial judge found no fault on the part of appellant nor his attorney. Majority, at 39-40. Brief of Appellant, at 1. The facts are that Judge Brown made the following comments which obviously led to his findings and conclusions:
I certainly feel that a defense attorney can't sit there, or stand there I should say, and allow a court to be given information which that particular attorney knows is inaccurate. And to that extent I'm sorry Mr. Miller isn't here, because it sounds like I am saying something when he isn't here, and I know he doesn't think I do that. But, I'm satisfied that Mr. Miller was aware that these witnesses were present and would testify.
... To that extent I'm satisfied that he [Miller] allowed Mr. Roche to misinform the Court, and his responsibility, in my opinion, was to clear up that misunderstanding before the Court.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 21-22 (June 13, 1986).
So, to that extent, it's my opinion when we look at the speedy trial, that the defense was involved in this to the extent that they allowed the Court to be misinformed. So *44the fact that Mr. Schaupp's matter was handled the way it was, to a certain extent, was contributed to by Mr. Miller, as Mr. Schaupp's defense counsel.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 22-23 (June 13, 1986).
Contrary to the majority's conclusion from its search of the record, it is clear that defense counsel and the deputy prosecutor met with witness McMahon, described as the most essential prosecution witness, 2 weeks before the plea taking. The witness never said she would not be available to testify. She was under subpoena. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 25-30 (May 12, 1986).
It is obvious from the judge's comments that the trial court was aware of the significance of defense counsel's actions, nonactions and responsibility. The judge also was careful about the content of the findings and conclusions. He stated: "Now, I've reviewed them [the findings and conclusions]. I'm satisfied they're accurate." Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 2 (July 3, 1986).
This case and the majority opinion once again demonstrate the essential need to assign error to a finding or conclusion, set it out and reference the record. RAP 10.3(g) and RAP 10.4(c) were not complied with by appellant and are ignored by the majority. Thus, respondents were not put to the burden of combing the record and supplying evidence and inferences therefrom which support the findings and conclusions. This posture undermines the integrity of the trial court proceedings and deprives this court of material assistance in reviewing an extensive record. The majority compounds the error by ignoring salient portions of the record.
Consequently, I believe the majority's whole conclusion collapses because it is based upon a faulty and false premise.
I also disagree with the substantive statements of the majority, in this factual context, that there must be fraud, fault or wrongdoing on the part of the defendant or his attorney. Majority, at 39. There is some merit to the *45majority's concept, but its statements are so ill defined that it is unclear what it is holding.
The statute places an affirmative duty on the prosecutor and the defendant (through his counsel in most cases). RCW 9.94A.090(1) provides in part:
If a plea agreement has been reached by the prosecutor and the defendant . . . they shall at the time of the defendant's plea state to the court, on the record, the nature of the agreement and the reasons for the agreement.
(Italics mine.) The majority's suggestion or perhaps holding that there must be affirmative evidence of fraud or fault is not warranted. Because of the mandate of the statute the defendant and his attorney embrace the prosecutor's statement of reasons for the agreement. If defense counsel knows of material error or misrepresentations in the prosecutor's statement of reasons, defense counsel cannot sit silently while the court is misled. Thus, State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wn.2d 579, 564 P.2d 799 (1977), relied upon by the majority, is not on point. On this record, it is an established verity that defense counsel know the true status of the witnesses. If we follow the appellate rules, that is beyond challenge.
It is these facts, found by the trial court and unchallenged, which put upon the defendant's counsel the burden to comply with the statute. He had an affirmative duty to state reasons for the agreement. He chose to sit silently, thereby endorsing the prosecutor's statements. He should be thereby bound.
I would affirm.
Andersen, J., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tern., concur with Brachtenbach, J.