Court Opinion

ID: 9380984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 18:07:02.308675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.928832
License: Public Domain

J-A28025-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KEITH PEASALL                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 956 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 17, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002647-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                            FILED MARCH 21, 2023

        Keith Peasall (“Peasall”)1 appeals from the order dismissing his petition

for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 2

Additionally, Peasall’s appellate counsel, Earl G. Kauffman, Esquire (“Attorney

Kauffman”), has filed a petition to withdraw from representation and an

accompanying brief styled pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967).2 We grant counsel’s petition and affirm the PCRA court’s order.

____________________________________________

1 The record reflects that the appellant’s actual name is Tremaine Millian;
however, he uses several aliases, including “Keith Peasall,” and also goes by
the nickname “Mukmin.” See N.T., 9/23/13, at 19-21.

2   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
2Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must proceed not
under Anders but under Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
1998), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A28025-22

       In 2011, Peasall was arrested in connection with the 2007 homicide of

Samere Taylor and charged with murder, possession of a firearm prohibited,

and related crimes. At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth presented

the testimony of Devonne Brinson, who testified that he witnessed Peasall

shoot Taylor in the back near the corner of Dickenson and Bouvier Streets in

South Philadelphia.       On the scheduled trial date of September 23, 2013,

following written and oral plea colloquies, Peasall entered a negotiated guilty

plea to murder of the third degree and possession of a firearm prohibited. The

Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosequi the remaining charges.                In

connection with his plea, Peasall admitted to killing Taylor and agreed with

the factual summary of the murder as read into the record by the

Commonwealth. See N.T., 9/23/13, at 37-38, 48-50. On that same date,

during his sentencing hearing, Peasall apologized to Taylor’s family for

murdering Taylor and stated that the shooting resulted from Peasall’s poor

judgment and decision-making following a meaningless verbal altercation with

Taylor. Id. at 48-52. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Peasall

to the negotiated aggregate sentence of eleven to twenty-two years in prison.

____________________________________________

banc). Although Anders and Turner/Finley are close cousins, bearing
similarities in that counsel is required to examine the record, present issues,
and request permission to withdraw, there are also significant differences, as
explained infra. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721-22
(Pa. Super. 2007).

                                           -2-
J-A28025-22

Peasall did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, a post-sentence

motion, or a direct appeal.

       On July 20, 2018, Peasall filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his first.

Therein, he averred that the Commonwealth made a deal with Brinson to give

him the lowest possible sentences (if not probation) on his open criminal cases

in exchange for Brinson providing false testimony against Peasall. See Pro Se

PCRA Petition, 7/20/18, at 7; see also id. at 8 (alleging a violation of Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).3 The court appointed Dennis I. Turner,

Esquire (“Attorney Turner”), as PCRA counsel. Attorney Turner filed a “no-

merit” letter pursuant to Turner/Finley, indicating that following his review,

he had determined that Peasall’s pro se petition was untimely, he could not

satisfy any timeliness exception, and that his issues lacked merit. On February

4, 2021, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to

dismiss the petition without a hearing. Peasall did not respond to the notice.

On February 20, 2021, Attorney Turner filed a motion to withdraw.

____________________________________________

3 In Brady, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violated due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. See Brady, 373
U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the duty to disclose
such evidence is applicable even if there has been no request by the accused,
see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and that the duty
encompasses impeachment evidence as well as directly exculpatory evidence,
see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).

                                           -3-
J-A28025-22

       In August 2021, George S. Yacoubian, Jr., Esquire (“Attorney

Yacoubian”) entered his appearance.4             In September 2021, Attorney

Yacoubian filed a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Turner/Finley wherein he

agreed with Attorney Turner’s assessment. In January and February 2022,

the PCRA court issued additional Rule 907 notices of its intent to dismiss the

petition. Peasall did not respond to the notices. On March 17, 2022, the PCRA

court entered an order dismissing Peasall’s pro se petition as untimely and

meritless. See Order, 3/17/22, at 1. The order also indicated that Attorney

Yacoubian was permitted to withdraw, and that new counsel would be

appointed for Peasall’s PCRA appeal. Id. Attorney Kauffman thereafter filed

a timely notice of appeal on Peasall’s behalf. The PCRA court ordered Peasall

to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement. In response, Attorney Kauffman

indicated that he would be filing an Anders brief in this Court. The PCRA

court did not file a Rule 1925(a) opinion. In this Court, Attorney Kauffman

has filed a petition to withdraw, and an accompanying brief styled pursuant to

Anders.

       At the outset of our review, we note that this case does not implicate

Anders.     As explained above, Anders applies to direct appeals whereas

Turner/Finley applies to PCRA cases.             This Court has explained the

____________________________________________

4The docket does not reflect any ruling by the PCRA court on Attorney Turner’s
motion to withdraw from representation.

                                           -4-
J-A28025-22

differences   between    the   requirements    imposed     by   Anders      and

Turner/Finley, as follows:

            Anders counsel is not permitted to withdraw unless the
      appeal is wholly frivolous, but Turner/Finley counsel is permitted
      to do so if the case lacks merit, even if it is not so anemic as to
      be deemed wholly frivolous. Also, Anders counsel must not argue
      against the client’s interests while Turner/Finley counsel must
      do so, articulating why the client’s claims have no merit.

            The heightened protection afforded to Anders appellants as
      compared to Turner/Finley petitioners/appellants arises because
      the right to counsel on direct appeal and the right to the direct
      appeal itself are constitutional ones. By comparison, a first-time
      PCRA petitioner’s right to counsel is born of rule, namely
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C), and that right does not spring from the
      federal or state constitutions.

Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 722 (citations omitted).

      Because an Anders brief provides greater protection to a defendant,

this Court may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley “no merit”

letter. See Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super.

2011). However, prior to addressing the merits of the issues raised for our

review, we must assess whether counsel’s filings satisfy the technical

requirements of Turner/Finley. See Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d

509, 510 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding that “prior to addressing the merits of

the appeal, we must review counsel’s compliance with the procedural

requirements for withdrawing as counsel”).

      Pursuant to Turner/Finley, independent review of the record by

competent counsel is required before withdrawal on collateral appeal is

permitted. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009),

                                     -5-
J-A28025-22

overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381,

401 (Pa. 2021) (abandoning Pitts’s approach as the sole procedure for

challenging PCRA counsel’s effectiveness).      In Pitts, our Supreme Court

explained that such independent review requires proof of:

      1. A “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel detailing the nature and
         extent of his review;

      2. The “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel listing each issue the
         petitioner wished to have reviewed;

      3. The PC[R]A counsel’s “explanation,” in the “no-merit” letter, of
         why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;

      4. The PC[R]A court conducting its own independent review of the
         record; and

      5. The PC[R]A court agreeing with counsel that the petition was
         meritless.

Id. (citation and brackets omitted). Further, counsel must also send a copy

of the “no-merit” letter to the petitioner, along with a copy of the petition to

withdraw, and inform the petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or to retain

new counsel. See Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 721. Substantial compliance with

the requirements to withdraw as counsel will satisfy the Turner/Finley

criteria.   See Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 947 (Pa.

Super. 2003). If the brief meets these requirements, we then conduct an

independent review of the petitioner’s issues. See Muzzy, 141 A.3d at 511.

      Our review discloses that Attorney Kauffman has substantially complied

with the above requirements.       In the Anders brief, Attorney Kauffman

detailed the nature and extent of his review of the case, listed each issue that

                                     -6-
J-A28025-22

Peasall wishes to have reviewed, and explained counsel’s reasoning for

concluding that each of the issues are meritless. See Anders’ Brief at 4-18.

Attorney Kauffman has provided this Court with a copy of a letter dated August

20, 2022, which he sent to Peasall informing him of counsel’s belief that

Peasall’s pro se petition was untimely filed, included no issues of arguable or

legal merit, and that the appeal was frivolous.      See Letter, 8/20/22, at

unnumbered 1. Attorney Kauffman also advised Peasall of his rights to retain

replacement counsel or proceed pro se. Id. The letter does not indicate that

a copy of the petition to withdraw or a copy of the Anders brief was attached

to the letter. Id. However, the petition to withdraw and the Anders brief

both contain a certificate of service which indicates that a copy of the

document was sent to Peasall on August 20, 2022. See Petition to Withdraw,

8/20/22, at unnumbered 3; see also Anders Brief, 8/20/22, at unnumbered

19. Thus, we conclude that Attorney Kauffman has substantially complied

with the requirements necessary to withdraw as counsel. See Karanicolas,

836 A.2d at 947. We now independently review Peasall’s claims to ascertain

whether they entitle him to relief.

      In the Anders’ brief, Attorney Kauffman listed the issues that Peasall

wished to raise, as follows:

      1. Whether [Peasall’s] PCRA petition was timely filed when it was
         filed approximately [four] years after [the] judgment of
         sentence [became final] and there was no applicable statutory
         exception.

                                      -7-
J-A28025-22

      2. Whether prosecuting attorneys knowingly, intelligently and
         willfully hid the fact that they made an agreement with . . .
         Brinson to testify falsely against [Peasall] in exchange for a
         lesser sentence.

      3. Whether [Peasall] entered the negotiated guilty plea out of
         extreme fear and under extreme duress because [he] did not
         have proof that the [District Attorney’s] Office made an
         agreement with . . . Brinson to testify falsely against [Peasall]
         in exchange for a lesser sentence in the open cases . . . Brinson
         had.

      4. Whether . . . Brinson did lie when asked if he had any
         agreement with the [District Attorney] in exchange for his
         testimony against [Peasall].

      5. Whether there was a Brady violation when the Commonwealth
         did not disclose the agreement.

      6. Whether [Peasall] is factually innocent of the crimes he plead
         guilty to when he did not shoot anyone, was not in possession
         of any firearm, and was on 18th and Marris at the time of the
         crime.

Anders’ Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted, issues reordered for

ease of disposition).

      Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

             We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in
      the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
      This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
      evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it
      is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This
      Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the
      record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
      factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
      findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
      afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
      petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
      novo and our scope of review plenary.

                                     -8-
J-A28025-22

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

      Under the PCRA, any petition “including a second or subsequent petition,

shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).     A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of the United States, and or at the

expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not

address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely

filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

      In the instant matter, Peasall’s judgment of sentence became final on

October 23, 2013, thirty days after the trial court entered the judgment of

sentence, and Peasall declined to file a notice of appeal to this Court. See

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Thus, Peasall had until

October 23, 2014 to file a timely PCRA petition.         See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1). The instant petition, filed on July 20, 2018, was filed nearly four

years after the judgment of sentence became final. Therefore, the instant

petition is facially untimely under the PCRA.

      Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the

petitioner can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), which provides:

                                     -9-
J-A28025-22

   (b) Time for filing petition.—

      (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
      subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
      judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:

          (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
          interference by government officials with the presentation of
          the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
          Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
          States;

          (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
          to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
          exercise of due diligence; or

          (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
          recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
          Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided
          in this section and has been held by that court to apply
          retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).       Any PCRA petition invoking one of these

exceptions “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have

been presented.”    Id. § 9545(b)(2).    If the petition is untimely and the

petitioner has not pleaded and proven a timeliness exception, the petition

must be dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition. See Commonwealth v.

Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      In the Anders brief, Attorney Kauffman indicates that Peasall sought to

invoke the “new fact” exception to the PCRA’s time bar as set forth in section

9545(b)(1)(ii), which provides the PCRA court with jurisdiction to consider an

untimely petition where the petitioner alleges and proves that the facts on

                                    - 10 -
J-A28025-22

which his claim is predicated were unknown to him and that he could not have

ascertained those facts by the exercise of due diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(1)(ii); see also Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-

72 (Pa. 2007). Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable

steps to protect his own interests. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d

1164, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2001). A petitioner must explain why he could not

have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. See

Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001).             This rule is

strictly enforced. See Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080

(Pa. Super 2010).

     According to Attorney Kauffman, Peasall claims that his petition is timely

because he was not aware of any deals that the Commonwealth made with

Brinson until July 12, 2018, approximately eight days before he filed his pro

se petition. Attorney Kauffman explains that this assertion is incorrect, as

Peasall was present in court on the day of his scheduled trial when the court

and the parties discussed Brinson’s criminal history and the possibility of a

benefit on his open criminal case for his cooperation with the Commonwealth.

Attorney Kauffman points out that this information was also discussed at the

preliminary hearing. On this basis, Attorney Kauffman concludes that Peasall

is unable to satisfy the due diligence requirement of the “new fact” exception

to the PCRA’s time bar.

                                    - 11 -
J-A28025-22

      Our review of the record discloses that Brinson testified at the

preliminary hearing that he has known both Peasall and Taylor since his youth,

and that in 2007, he witnessed Peasall shoot Taylor in the back at the corner

of Dickenson and Bouvier Streets in South Philadelphia as Taylor was running

away. See N.T., 2/29/12, at 6, 9-10, 14. Brinson indicated that the firearm

used by Peasall was a “black snub nose seven” revolver, possibly a .38 or a

.357. Id. at 46-48. Brinson explained that he did not inform police of the

murder committed by Peasall until November 2009, when Brinson was

“brought down on my previous matters concerning homicides.” Id. at 16. At

that time, Brinson provided a statement to police regarding the murder of

Taylor by Peasall in 2007. Id. at 17. Brinson admitted that he was currently

serving a sentence of five to ten years in prison for a firearms offense as well

as another sentence of five to ten years in prison for a violation. Id. at 22.

Brinson also admitted that he provided the November 2009 statement to

detectives about the murder prior to receiving his second sentence. Id. at

22. Brinson stated that although he had an open criminal case at the time he

provided his statement, the district attorney made no promises to him on his

open criminal case, Brinson was not hoping for a deal on his open case, and

his second prison sentence of five to ten years was not the result of any deal

with the district attorney.   Id.   The prosecutor indicated that Brinson had

received immunity regarding Taylor’s murder for his testimony against

Peasall. Id. at 28. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Brinson

                                     - 12 -
J-A28025-22

regarding whether his second sentence was the result of a deal with the

Commonwealth after he provided police with his statement in November 2009.

Id. at 25-27.

      On the scheduled trial date of September 23, 2013, the court conducted

a pretrial hearing on a motion in limine at which the prosecutor explained that

Brinson wrote a letter to the police in November 2009 wherein he indicated

that he had witnessed three different homicides and had information to

provide on those homicides.     See N.T., 9/23/13, at 3-4.     The prosecutor

further explained that, approximately one week later, Brinson provided his

statement to police. Id. The prosecutor indicated that, although Brinson had

indicated at the preliminary hearing that he was not hoping for a benefit on

his open criminal case, she was “sure” that he was hoping for such a benefit.

Id. at 13.

      Based on our review, we conclude that Peasall failed to establish the

“new facts” exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Peasall was present in court at

the preliminary hearing on February 29, 2012.       See N.T., 2/29/12, at 9

(wherein Brinson pointed at Peasall in the courtroom and identified him as the

individual who shot Taylor). As such, Peasall was aware on that date that

Brinson had an open criminal case when he provided his November 2009

statement to detectives. Peasall would also have known on that date that

Brinson lied and provided false testimony that Peasall committed Taylor’s

murder.      Further, given Brinson’s outright denial of any deal with the

                                    - 13 -
J-A28025-22

Commonwealth at the preliminary hearing and the prosecutor’s silence on this

line   of questioning,   Peasall should   have   exercised due    diligence   in

investigating whether Brinson provided false testimony at the preliminary

hearing as part of an undisclosed deal with the Commonwealth. However,

rather than exercising such due diligence, Peasall did nothing.

       Peasall was also present in court eighteen months later on his scheduled

trial date of September 23, 2013, when the prosecutor explained that Brinson

sent a letter to police in November 2009 indicating that he had information

regarding three homicides, and that the prosecutor believed that Brinson sent

the letter hoping for “a benefit” on his open criminal case. See N.T., 9/23/13,

at 13. The prosecutor also disclosed that Brinson sent a subsequent letter to

the Commonwealth indicating that he was “he wasn’t going to cooperate

anymore because he had not gotten what he wanted.” Id. at 13-14. Defense

counsel confirmed that a copy of Brinson’s letter to the Commonwealth was

provided to Peasall one week prior to trial. Id. at 13. Thus, the record is

clear that Peasall was aware on September 23, 2013, that Brinson was

cooperating with the Commonwealth, that he had expected some kind of

benefit from the Commonwealth, and that he was refusing to cooperate in

Peasall’s case because he did not receive the anticipated benefit. Accordingly,

Peasall failed to identify any “new fact” which was unknown to him and could

not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Thus, based

on our independent review, we conclude that the record supports the PCRA

                                     - 14 -
J-A28025-22

court’s determination that Peasall’s petition should be dismissed as untimely

is supported by the record.5

       We further conclude that, even if Peasall had satisfied the “new fact”

exception to the PCRA’s time bar, his issues are meritless. The statements

made by a criminal defendant during a plea colloquy bind the defendant. See

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002).

Thus, a defendant cannot assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that

contradict statements made at that time of the plea. See Commonwealth

v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding that a defendant

is bound by the statements he makes during his plea colloquy and may not

assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made

when he pled).

       Here, as explained above, Peasall completed both written and oral plea

colloquies in which he admitted to murdering Taylor.         See Written Plea

Colloquy, 9/23/13, at 1; see also N.T., 9/23/13, at 25-36. Indeed, prior to

conducting the oral colloquy, the trial court specifically advised Brinson that

“you are bound by the answers that you give me here in open court . . . [a]nd

what that means is that you’re forever stuck with the answers that you give

____________________________________________

5 Although we do not have the benefit of an opinion from the PCRA explaining
its determination that Peasall’s pro se petition should be dismissed as untimely
and meritless, see Order, 3/17/22, at 1, this Court may affirm the PCRA
court’s ruling on any valid basis appearing of record. See Commonwealth
v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 451 (Pa. Super. 2018).

                                          - 15 -
J-A28025-22

me.”    N.T., 9/23/13, at 27.       Peasall agreed with the Commonwealth’s

summary of the facts upon which the plea was based, including that in 2007,

Peasall fatally shot and killed Taylor by a single gunshot to his back. Id. at

37-38. Based on these colloquies, the trial court found Peasall’s negotiated

guilty plea to murder of the third degree and possession of a firearm prohibited

to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 38.

       The matter then immediately proceeded to a sentencing hearing at

which Peasall exercised his right of allocution.      See N.T., 9/23/13, at 48.

Peasall initially stated, “I stand here and I take full responsibility for my

actions . . . in the death of [Taylor].” Id. Peasall continued:

              I would like to also say to [Taylor’s] family, [his] mother,
       which I have always had a close relationship with – a friend for
       many years. We grew up together – that I know my words are
       not sufficient to replace her son. I hope that she can find in her
       heart the ability to forgive me for my actions because from day
       one of this incident . . . from day one – I’m sorry – of this incident,
       it has been eating at me like cancer.

Id. at 48-49. Peasall went on the explain that the murder occurred because

he reacted to a very petty and small verbal confrontation with Taylor and used

extremely poor judgment and decision-making in handling the situation. Id.

at 49-50.

       Here, Peasall is bound by his admission that he shot and killed Taylor.

See Muhammad, 794 A.2d at 384; see also Stork, 737 A.2d at 790-91.

Thus, his claims that he is innocent, that Brinson provided false testimony as

part of an undisclosed deal with the Commonwealth, and that the

                                       - 16 -
J-A28025-22

Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose exculpatory

evidence (i.e., an undisclosed deal with Brinson to provide false testimony),

are meritless. Accordingly, based on our independent review, we conclude

that the record supports the PCRA court’s determination that the issues Peasall

sought to raise are meritless.

      We therefore grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the PCRA

court order dismissing Peasall’s pro se petition.

      Petition granted. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023

                                     - 17 -