Court Opinion

ID: 9486160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:39:41.143104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:33.499598
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in pai’t and dissenting in part.
With respect to the jurisdictional point, I think that Diamond v. United States, 649 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.1981), supports the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 499 (establishing a case-by-ease balancing approach whereby, “[i]f the dangers of unwarranted adverse consequences to the individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of the records, then expunction is appropriate”). Although the majority suggests that separation of powers considerations preclude judicial expungement of agency records, it seems to me that the relation of the federal courts to law enforcement agencies is so close as to validate as a practical matter judicial surveillance of closely related agency files. Agency files essentially record events transpiring in the courts, with respect to which courts have a continuing interest. Practical considerations here should be of sufficient weight to override any theoretical separation of powers objections.
There is strong support in the case law for this position. See United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836, 96 S.Ct. 63, 46 L.Ed.2d 55 (1975) (“[I]t is fairly well established ... that courts do possess the power to expunge an arrest record ...”); see also Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741 (D.C.Cir.1969) (holding that D.C. Court of General Sessions had power to issue order regarding criminal arrest record in case which has been before the court); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 750 (5th Cir.1967) (ordering the expungement of records of arrests and convictions done to intimidate citizens of Selma, Alabama and interfere with their right to vote); United States v. Seasholtz, 376 F.Supp. 1288, 1289 (N.D.Okla.1974) (“There is authority that Federal Courts have equity power to expunge arrest records of individuals in extraordinary or extreme circumstances ... where justice requires.”); United States v. Dooley, 364 F.Supp. 75, 78 (E.D.Pa.1973) (“[T]he Federal Court does have the power to enter an order expunging arrest records of individuals who are arrested without probable cause, or for purposes of harassment, and in extraordinary circumstances where justice requires.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Rosen, 343 F.Supp. 804, 809 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (“[I]f law enforcement officials clearly abuse their discretion in the use of retained arrest records and other materials of identification, then the court might well order the return of such records or restrain such use.”); United States v. Kalish, 271 F.Supp. 968, 971 (D.P.R.1967) (ordering destruction of agency arrest records of movant who refused to submit to induction into the armed services where the movant surrendered voluntarily and challenged statute on advice of counsel).
Further, so far as I am aware, there is nothing in this court’s cases to the contrary *474except Scruggs v. United States, 929 F.2d 305, 307 (7th Cir.1991), and the discussion of jurisdiction in that case appears to be dictum. Id. (concluding that acquitted movant would not deserve expungement based on Constitution or statute suggested by court because he “has the proverbial record as long as an arm”). Given that no clear authority seems to require this court to disclaim jurisdiction in this case, as the majority holds, I think that the separation of powers approach unnecessarily ties the courts’ hands. For the above cases suggest that judicial intervention has been beneficial at least in extreme cases.
On the other hand, the case before , us does not present a strong case in justice and equity for expungement. In weighing the governmental interest in keeping accurate records for general law enforcement purposes against Janik’s privacy interest, it is not clear how Janik could prevail. Hence, although I believe we have the power to expunge in appropriate cases, this does not seem to be such a case. I therefore dissent as to the jurisdictional point only.