Court Opinion

ID: 9776478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:37:21.88797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.139625
License: Public Domain

OPINION
EVANS, Chief Justice.
Mrs. M. Yvonne Blankenship brought this personal injury action against the County of Galveston under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. secs. 101.001-101.109 (Vernon Supp. 1989), alleging that she slipped and fell while on the stairway of the Galveston Seawall. The trial court granted the County’s motion for a take-nothing summary judgment. Mrs. Blankenship appeals.
In Mrs. Blankenship’s petition, she alleged that in April 1986, while she was attempting to descend the stairway of the Galveston Seawall, she slipped on algae that had grown on the granite rocks located at the base of the stairway. She contended that the algae growth was a natural condition of the premises, that it created an “ultra-hazardous slippery condition,” and that it involved an unreasonable risk to her as a licensee of the premises. She alleged that the County should have realized this risk and had reason to believe that she, as its licensee, would not have discovered it. She further asserted that the County had failed to provide warning notices of the dangerous condition, despite the fact that similar warnings were placed along rock groins extending out into the water in other locations along the beach.
An agreed statement of facts was submitted to the trial court as part of the summary judgment record. The parties stipulated: (1) on April 26, 1986, Mrs. Blankenship slipped and fell, breaking her ankle, after descending stairs from the top of the Galveston Seawall to the rocks below; (2) the attached photograph showed the steps, the granite rocks located at their base, and the encroaching sea waters; (3) Mrs. Blankenship fell because of the presence of slippery, wet algae growth located on the rocks at the base of the stairs; (4) the County owns the seawall and the granite blocks where Mrs. Blankenship fell; and (5) there were no signs or other warnings of the conditions at the base of the stairs.
In Mrs. Blankenship’s first point of error, she argues that the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment because the summary judgment record shows a genuine issue of material fact regarding her status on the County’s property. In her brief, Mrs. Blankenship recognized the limitation on the County’s liability for a claim arising from a “premise defect” under Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. sec. 101.022. Under that section, the County *441owes a premise defect claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant has paid for the use of the premises.
In her brief, Mrs. Blankenship contends there is a fact question about whether she paid for the use of the premises, arguing that she paid taxes, and contributed to the “community funds” through purchases made in and around the seawall area.
We overrule Mrs. Blankenship’s contention. Mrs. Blankenship alleged in her petition that she was on the County’s premises as a “licensee.” On oral submission, Mrs. Blankenship conceded that this allegation constituted a judicial admission that established her status as a licensee on the prem-
ises. See Major v. Loy, 155 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1941, no writ).
In Mrs. Blankenship’s second and third points of error, she contends that the summary judgment record contains genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the condition of the premises constituted a “special defect,” within the meaning of section 101.022. If such a “special defect” existed, then the County, having constructive notice of the defect, was required to warn her of the dangerous condition.
Mrs. Blankenship stipulated on oral submission that her second and third points of error rest solely on her claim that the condition constituted a “special defect.” Thus, we are not concerned on this appeal with any other issue that would constitute an exception to the County’s immunity from liability.
Mrs. Blankenship contends that the issue of whether the allegedly dangerous condition constituted a “special defect” within the meaning of the Texas Tort Claims Act presents an issue of fact, which the trial court erroneously determined as a matter of law.
Whether a particular set of circumstances creates a “dangerous condition” has usually been held to present a fact issue for the jury. See State v. McBride; 601 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of Austin v. Cooksey, 561 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 570 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.1978). But whether a particular dangerous condition constitutes a “special defect,” within the meaning of the Texas Tort Claims Act, usually has been decided by the courts as a matter of law. See Turvey v. City of Houston, 602 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex.1980); County of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex.1978); Payne v. City of Galveston, 772 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], 1989, writ pending) (en banc) (not yet reported); Chappell v. Dwyer, 611 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1981, no writ); McBride, 601 S.W.2d at 558; State Highway Dept. of Hwys. v. Carson, 599 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Miranda v. State, 591 S.W.2d 568, 568 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1979, no writ); Sutton v. State Highway Dept., 549 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Harris County v. Dowleam, 489 S.W.2d 140, 147 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
We find only one appellate holding that a special defect is a fact issue for the jury. See Park v. Troy Dodson Constr. Co., 761 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1988, n.w.h.). We do not follow the rationale of Park because we feel compelled to follow the long line of decisions that have determined the issue to be one of law. We consider these holdings to be in line with the established rule that a question involving statutory interpretation must be decided by the court. See Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.1982).
Mrs. Blankenship cites the original panel opinion of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Payne v. City of Galveston, No. B-14-87-00793-CV (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], August 18, 1988, no writ). That panel opinion was later withdrawn, and an en banc opinion of the court filed May 11, 1989, was substituted in lieu thereof, 772 S.W.2d 473. As we read the court’s en banc opinion, the majority of the court concluded that the particular set of circumstances did not, as a matter of law, constitute a special defect within the meaning of *442the statute. According to our reading of the case, this was a legal decision that only the court could make. We recognize that one of the two dissenting opinions in Payne does lend some support to Mrs. Blankenship’s contention, but for the reasons stated, we choose not to follow that rationale.
We accordingly hold that the trial court did not err in ruling, as a matter of law, that the condition alleged was not a “special defect” within the meaning of section 101.22. The condition was certainly not an “excavation or obstruction” on a highway, road, or street, which constitute a “special defect” under the express terms of the statute. Neither do we construe the condition to be a “special defect” under the rule of ejusdem generis. See County of Harris, 573 S.W.2d at 179. Thus, we hold that the trial court properly rendered the summary judgment in favor of the County of Galveston.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
O’CONNOR, J., concurs.