Court Opinion

ID: 9571275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:26.398641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:40.305340
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because the motion to set aside the default judgment was not supported by an affidavit of merits.
I.
G-CR 1963, 520.4, provides that a motion to set aside a default judgment under rule 528 “shall be granted only if good cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed”. (Emphasis supplied.) We have recently held that the requirements that both good cause and a meritorious defense be shown are applicable where it is sought to set aside a default judgment on a ground set forth in GrCR 1963, 528.3.1
While trial judges enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment, that discretion can be invoked only by the defaulted defendant making the showing required by rule 520.4. Trial judges do not enjoy a general power of dispensation authorizing them to set aside defaults and default judgments.2
It is particularly important to enforce the requirement that a meritorious defense be shown in the present case because, as will appear, it is now no longer possible to obtain an adjudication on the merits of Paul Sheneman’s complaint for divorce and, thus, setting aside the judgment of divorce *19may place Doris Sheneman in a better position than she would be had she defended on the merits.
A judgment against a mentally incompetent person is not void, merely voidable.3 Even if Doris Sheneman was mentally ill at the time of the divorce, if she was competent when the grounds for divorce arose a judgment of divorce based on those grounds could properly be entered.4 The judge recognized this, but, I think erroneously, said that even if there were “good and adequate grounds” for divorce before she became mentally ill and even if the property settlement was “completely fair”, since she was not competent and was not represented the divorce judgment must be set aside because the procedure followed was not “conducive to a final decision as to whether or not the property settlement was in fact fair”.
But, the judge did more than merely reconsider the property settlement provisions of the judgment; he set the judgment aside in its entirety. Had he not set aside the judgment, had he set a time for a hearing focused on the fairness of the financial provisions and if the issue before us was whether a modification of those provisions was proper, a different question would be presented.5
The requirement that a meritorious defense be shown whenever it is sought to set aside a default judgment applies in divorce6 as well as in other civil cases.7 It applies as well where the judgment *20has been entered against a mentally incompetent person for whom a guardian ad litem has not been appointed8 and, also, where it is claimed that the judgment was procured by fraud.9 In innumerable cases10 the Michigan Supreme Court has ruled that a default judgment cannot be set aside unless an affidavit of merits, or its equity-side equivalent under the former practice, a sworn answer,11 is filed. Where the Court has observed that a judge may in his discretion open a default judgment, it has also commented regarding the necessity of the defendant showing that he has a meritorious defense.12
*21The testimonial hearing on Mrs. Sheneman’s motion to set aside the default judgment rendered against her did not focus on the question whether she had a meritorious defense. The witnesses testified concerning her inability to defend herself, not on the meritorious question. The judge’s opinion discusses only the capacity-to-defend question; he did not advert to the question whether Mrs. Sheneman had a meritorious defense nor did he say that she had shown that she had or might have a meritorious defense. On the contrary, he said that, “Very possibly good and adequate grounds existed before Mrs. Sheneman became mentally ill or at times when she was lucid and perhaps even Mr. Sheneman’s testimony at the time reflected this. Neither does it appear clearly that the property settlement incorporated into the judgment of divorce was inequitable. It may have been completely fair”. It is evident that it was the judge’s conclusion that, without regard to whether Mrs. Sheneman had a meritorious defense or whether the property settlement was in fact fair, it should be set aside because she was incapable of defending herself.
Since the hearing did not focus on the meritorious question — there was no testimony by any witness or other evidence offered on that question— and since the judge did not in his opinion find merit, but, on the contrary, set aside the default judgment without regard to whether there was a meritorious defense, I cannot agree with the statement in the majority opinion that the testimony of Mrs. Sheneman’s witnesses “may take the place of an affidavit of merits”.
In Schuman v. Schuman (1921), 217 Mich 184, cited by the majority, the defendant showed that he had a meritorious defense. In Seifert v. Keating (1955), 844 Mich 456, and Tyler v. Tyler (1957), *22348 Mich 169, the defendants’ motions to set aside default were accompanied by sworn answers.13 Thus, in all three cases, the court-rule requirements were complied with.14
A decision that the order appealed from should be reversed would not end this litigation, nor should it. Had the judge required the filing of an affidavit of merits, Mrs. Sheneman might have complied. She should not be deprived of an opportunity to do so because the judge did not insist upon it. Accordingly, I would remand with instructions that she be given an opportunity to file an affidavit of merits in support of her motion.15
II.
I now address myself to other issues which, no doubt, would arise again if the judge, after a proper showing of a meritorious defense, is moved to set aside the default judgment.
After 24 years of marriage the plaintiff husband commenced an action for divorce. His wife was duly served with a copy of the summons and complaint. She did not appear or answer and a default judgment of divorce was entered on November 2, 1967.16
*23The judgment awarded Paul Sheneman the tavern business which he operated and the real estate on which it was conducted and Doris Sheneman real estate in Kentucky, their former domicile. There was no provision for alimony.
After the judgment of divorce was entered, Paul Sheneman married Beverly Nowak on November 7, 1967. On December 4, 1967, after Doris moved to vacate the judgment of divorce and before the hearing on the motion, Paul committed suicide.
Again it is pertinent that the judgment of divorce entered in this case is not void, it is voidable.17 Thus, the marriage between Paul and Beverly was valid when entered into. When Paul died, Beverly was his lawfully-wedded wife, not Doris.
It is, as Paul Sheneman’s executor contends, a general rule that no judgment affecting marital status will be entered after the death of one of the parties. Thus, after the dissolution of the union by death, a judgment of divorce will not he entered even though pending divorce proceedings have reached an advanced stage before the death.18 Similarly, after the death of one of the parties, a judgment of divorce, including one obtained by default, will not ordinarily be set aside.19
However, and on this the majority and I are in agreement, if a judgment of divorce is entered while both parties are living, it may he the subject of *24continuing legal struggles. If the judgment reserves the question of alimony, a motion for alimony may he entertained after the husband’s death.20 The estate of a deceased defendant husband was permitted to prosecute an appeal from a divorce judgment after his death “in view of the fact that property rights are involved”.21 Similarly, in a case where the wife died after obtaining a divorce, it was held that her death did not end the litigation and that her personal representative could defend against the husband’s appeal.22 It has also been held that the personal representative of a deceased wife may pursue her appeal seeking a larger share of the property than was awarded in the judgment: “litigation of this character, insofar as it involves property rights, survives the death of one of the parties litigant”.23
The concept that where property rights are in dispute litigation may continue after the death of one of the parties has also been recognized in cases where, as here, it was sought to vacate a judgment of divorce. In Allen v. Allen (1954), 341 Mich 543, 548, the Michigan Supreme Court set aside a divorce judgment entered almost three years before the defendant husband’s death, saying that neither the remarriage of the plaintiff wife nor the death of the defendant barred “reopening the case or setting aside the decree on the ground of fraud on the court,24 insofar as it involved property rights”.25
*25While remarriage of one of the parties does not preclude setting a divorce judgment aside,26 it is a factor to be considered. In such a case the courts will proceed with great caution27 and will exercise their discretion depending on the facts of the particular case.28 Similarly, where the merits of a plaintiff’s action for divorce cannot be litigated because he is dead,29 caution should be exercised both to protect the new spouse and any offspring of the new union and to avoid putting the former spouse in a better position than she would have been in had she appeared and defended. Both factors, remarriage and death, are present in this case.
III.
If the judgment of divorce is set aside, there remains the question: what is the marital status of the two wives!
Our society is organized on the tenet that a man can have but one wife. But that premise does not dissolve the difficult problem which confronts a court of justice in this case. If the judgment of divorce is set aside, the marriage of Paul and Doris *26cannot be reinstated — be is dead. If the vacation of the judgment is, nevertheless, regarded as restoring Doris’ marital status, this should not denigrate Paul’s marriage with Beverly — perfectly valid when contracted30 — who, thereupon, in the eyes of the law, as well as in a larger sense, became his wife and who was his wife when he died. For all that appears in this record, the second marriage was entered into in good faith by Beverly and is entitled to full recognition.
The apparent assumption of the cases is that if the first marriage is reinstated the second marriage is automatically dissolved.31 That might be the preferable result if there is a first marriage relationship that can possibly be reinstated;32 although it is to be doubted whether many divorced persons who have remarried will leave their new mates and return to their former spouses simply because a court has entered an order vacating a decree of divorce. Nevertheless, even if pursuit of that elusive objective is thought to be worth the destruction of the second marriage, where, as here, the marriage relationship cannot be restored, it seems *27quixotic to insist that Paul was not married to Beverly when he died because, when this litigation ends, it may be decided that an erroneous judgment was entered.
Under the circumstances it may be wiser to recognize, as much as it goes against the grain, that a man may indeed have two wives. Or, if it sounds better, a man cannot have two wives, but two women can have wife status in respect to the same man.33 It is untidy, but it is clearly more realistic and probably more just.
Recognizing that a man who contracts a second marriage may find himself with two wives if the judgment dissolving his first marriage is set aside, permits both wives to claim support as wives and the children of both marriages to be regarded as legitimate offspring. The awkward situation of two wives occurred not because Paul violated the law but because, and again I proceed on the assumption that the divorce is properly set aside, our imperfect adjudicative process allowed an erroneous judgment to be entered. And even if Paul is partially, or even wholly, to be blamed for what occurred, that is not a good reason for punishing a new and blameless wife or, in another case, children of the new union.
Society’s rules would, of course, be offended if a husband sought to live with more than one wife. That would present a problem with which we are not now confronted. Our concern that a man should not be in a position to claim the right to live with more than one woman as his lawful wife should *28not deter us, in a case such as this, from treating both lawfully-wedded wives as entitled to support and a share of his property.
Where the husband is dead we need not conjure up the problem that he might seek to exercise his conjugal rights with both wives. While that might possibly occur in another case, it is just as likely that the husband will only wish to live with or be welcomed by one of the wives. In this case, the husband decided to live with neither of them and committed suicide when confronted with the problem.
In some jurisdictions a good-faith putative marriage is recognized despite impediments to its full validity.34 In other jurisdictions the courts have by various techniques provided for the support of, or for the transfer of a portion of the property accumulated during the second “marriage” to, the innocent second “wife”.35
A putative wife’s clearest remedy may be an action for breach of implied warranty or misrepresentation against her spouse or, in this case, his estate.36 It is ironic that Doris’ success in having *29the judgment of divorce set aside warrants Beverly’s legal action. Beverly’s claim as a judgment creditor might take priority over the rights of Doris and other heirs to distributive shares. But Beverly probably would not have a right of action against Paul’s estate if the relief awarded Doris is confined to modification of the financial terms of the divorce judgment and Beverly’s status as his wife remains unaffected.
There is room for flexibility in the administration of the law within the framework of competing doctrines.37 Our jurisprudence has achieved sufficient maturity so that any appropriate adjustments in the sharing of Paul’s estate38 might be made without treating the second and lawful marriage, brief as it was, as if it never occurred.

 Sylvania Savings Bank v. Turner (1970), 27 Mich App 640.

 See Petersen v. Wayne Circuit Judge (1928), 243 Mich 600; Low v. Mills (1886), 61 Mich 35, 43, 45; Kelso v. Kelso (1962), 78 Nev 99 (369 P2d 668).

 Great Lakes Realty Corporation v. Peters (1953), 336 Mich 325, 332; Cohen v. Home Life Insurance Co. (1935), 273 Mich 469, 472.

 See Vial v. Vial (1963), 369 Mich 534.

 See Wayne Creamery v. Suyak (1968), 10 Mich App 41, 52.

 Paynton v. Paynton (1916), 194 Mich 504, 508. See, generally, 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 439, p 563; Schrader v. Schrader (1966), 242 Or 526 (410 P2d 1017); Kelso v. Kelso, supra, fn 2.

 See Hartman v. Roberts-Walby Enterprises, Incorporated (1969), 17 Mich App 724; McDonald v. Kersten (1970), 24 Mich App 681; Rencsok v. Rencsok (1969), 16 Mich App 643.

 Home Life Insurance Co. v. Cohen (1936), 278 Mich 169, 172.
If the defendant is not able, because of mental incompetence, to file a supporting affidavit, then someone else, having knowledge of the facts, can file the affidavit. Cf. Hartman v. Roberts-Walby Enterprises, Incorporated, supra, p 729.

 Sylvania Savings Bank v. Turner, fn 1, supra; Stradley v. Circuit Judge (1893), 96 Mich 287, 290.

 See Feierabend v. Manistee Circuit Judge (1931), 253 Mich 115, 116; Hews v. Hews (1906), 145 Mich 247, 255; McGurrin Sales Agency v. Jackson Circuit Judge (1921), 215 Mich 214, 218, 221; Ross v. St. Clair Circuit Judge (1939), 291 Mich 70, 72; Paynton v. Paynton (1916), 194 Mich 504, 508; Emery v. Airth (1914), 180 Mich 433, 438; Walsh v. Wayne Circuit Judge (1889), 76 Mich 470; Stradley v. Circuit Judge, supra; Abstract and Title Guaranty Co. v. Williams (1962), 367 Mich 620, 624; Hart v. Lindsay (1842), Walk Chanc 72, 74; Thayer v. Swift (1844), Walk Chanc (Mich) 384, 386; Smith v. Saginaw City Bank, Harr Chanc (Mich) 426.
See, also, Hartman v. Roberts-Welby Enterprises, Incorporated (1969), 17 Mich App 724, 727; Rencsok v. Rencsok (1969), 16 Mich App 643.
Similarly, see Gillett v. Arnt (Cir Ct, 1869), 1 Mich NP 201; Carton v. Day (1909), 157 Mich 43, 44; Bank of Michigan v. Williams, Harr Chanc (Mich) 219; Stockton v. Williams, Harr Chanc (Mich) 241, 242.

 Under the former court rule (Court Rule No 28, [1945]), it was necessary to file an affidavit of merits in support of a motion to set aside a default in an action at law; in suits in equity the defendant was required to “proffer a sworn answer showing a defense on the merits to the whole or a part of the plaintiff’s case.”

 See Orlich v. Houghton Circuit Judge (1929), 246 Mich 487, 489; Seifert v. Keating (1955), 344 Mich 456; McDonough v. General Motors Corporation (1967), 6 Mich App 239; Rhodes v. Rhodes (1966), 3 Mich App 396, 402.

 See fn 11.

 As to the two cases cited in the quotation from 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 187, in Home Life Insurance Co. v. Cohen (1936), 278 Mich 169, 172, the Court specifically pointed out, in affirming the trial judge’s decision not to set aside the default, that the defendant had failed to show that she had a meritorious defense. In Curtis v. Curtis (1930), 250 Mich 105, the defendant showed a possible meritorious defense, namely, cohabitation of the parties after filing of the suit for divorce.

 Cf. Wayne Creamery v. Suyakc (1968), 10 Mich App 41, 53.

 Three and a half weeks later, on November 28, 1967, Doris Sheneman moved to vacate the judgment claiming that because of her mental condition, which was well known to Paul Sheneman, she was not competent to represent or protect herself in the action and, thus, a guardian ad litem should have been appointed to represent her. See GCR 1963, 520.2(2), 201.5. After a hearing, at which Doris *23Sheneman, the adult daughter of the parties and other witnesses, including a physician, testified, the judge found that Doris Sheneman was not competent to attend to her affairs and entered an order setting aside the default judgment of divorce.

 See eases cited in fn 3.

 See Seibly v. Circuit Judge (1895), 105 Mich 584, 586; Heck v. Bailey (1918), 204 Mich 54; Wilson v. Wilson (1889), 73 Mich 620. See, also, Crockett v. Consolidated Paper Co. (1937), 281 Mich 571; contrast Hess v. Pettigrew (1933), 261 Mich 618. See, generally, 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 435, p 559.

 Zoellner v. Zoellner (1881), 46 Mich 511, 513. See, generally, 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 469, p 592.

 Seibly v. Circuit Judge (1895), 105 Mich 584, 586. Cf. Braffett v. Braffett (1944), 308 Mich 506.

 Listh v. Listh (1951), 329 Mich 579, 581.

 Hagerty v. Hagerty (1923), 222 Mich 166, 168.

 Workman v. Peterson (1950), 327 Mich 456, 458.

 Cf. Curtis v. Curtis (1930), 250 Mich 105, 109; see McDonald v. Kersten (1970), 24 Mich App 681.

 Contrast Zoellner v. Zoellner (1881), 46 Mich 511, 514, concerning the form of the remedy in such a ease.

 See Allen v. Allen (1954), 341 Mich 543; Czyzewski v. Czyzewski (1943), 304 Mich 402, 404; Lantinga v. Lantinga (1947), 318 Mich 78, 81; Curtis v. Curtis (1930), 250 Mich 105, 109.

 See 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), Authors’ Comments, p 181; Osborne v. Osborne (1962), 60 Wash 2d 163 (372 P2d 538); Hemphill v. Quigg (Mo, 1962), 355 SW2d 57.
Cf. Zirkalos v. Zirkalos (1949), 326 Mich 420; Livingston v. Livingston (1936), 276 Mich 399; Hess v. Pettigrew (1933), 261 Mich 618; Zoellner v. Zoellner (1881), 46 Mich 511; Carlisle v. Carlisle (1893), 96 Mich 128.

 Paynton v. Paynton (1916), 194 Mich 504, 507; 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 466, pp 589, 590.

 Cf. 3 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), Authors’ Comments, p 181; Osborne v. Osborne, supra; Hemphill v. Quigg, supra.
One of the reasons frequently advanced for setting aside a default judgment is that the courts favor adjudication on the merits; that is not feasible in this case.

 Paul’s marriage to Beverly did not violate the statute regarding solemnization of marriages; that statute provides: “No marriage shall be contracted whilst either of the parties has a former wife or husband living, unless the marriage with such former wife or husband shall have been dissolved.” MCLA § 551.5 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 25.5). Paul’s marriage to Doris had been dissolved when he married Beverly.
Nor was the second relationship polygamous (see MCLA § 750.439 [Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.694]) or adulterous (see MCLA § 750.29 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.218]).

 See Mazzei v. Cantales (1955), 142 Conn 173 (112 A2d 205).
The need to protect an innocent first spouse from an improper divorce is apparently regarded as more deserving of protection than the need of an innocent second spouse and offspring of the second marriage to protection from re-establishment of the dissolved union.

 It is more -likely that the reason for the rule preferring the first marriage even after a remarriage following a valid but voidable divorce is historical. Among the threads of anglo-saxon law is a preference for neat categories and the primogenial.

 It is reported that Pope Clement VII proposed to Henry VIII that if he would desist in his efforts to have his marriage with Catherine dissolved he would be allowed to take a second wife; and that there was precedent for this dispensation. Henry IV of Castile had been allowed, because his first wife was childless, to marry a second time, without dissolving the first marriage. See Pollard, Henry VIII (Harper & Row ed 1966), pp 166, 167.

 35 Am Jur, Marriage, § 52, p 215.

 35 Am Jur, Marriage, § 53, p 216; Walker v. Walker (1951), 330 Mich 332, 336 (31 ALR2d 1250); Anno: Rights and remedies in respect of property accumulated by man and woman living together in illicit relations or under void marriage, 31 ALR2d 1255.
Cf. Sledd v. State Compensation Commission (1932), 111 W Va 509 (163 SE 12, 13; 80 ALR 1424); Buck v. Buck (1967), 19 Utah 2d 161 (427 P2d 954).

 Upon entering into a marriage ceremony each party impliedly warrants and represents that he is free to marry. 2 Cooley on Torts (4th ed), § 177, p 44. See, also, 35 Am Jur, Marriage, § 242, p 343; Anno: Liability of one putative spouse to other for wrongfully inducing entry with or cohabitation under illegal, void, or nonexistent marriage, 72 ALR2d 956.
The right of action is not restricted to cases of deliberate fraud as in Sears v. Wegner (1907), 150 Mich 388. In Michigan, in an action for damages for misrepresentation, it is not a defense that the representation was innocently made in the good faith belief that it was true. Irwin v. Carlton (1963), 369 Mich 92. There is no sound reason why this rule should be restricted to commercial transactions; the intimate relationship here involved is entitled to at least as much protection. Cf. McGhee v. McGhee (1960), 82 Idaho 367 (353 P2d *29760, 762). Also cf. Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed), § 102, pp 713, 725. As Dean Prosser points ont, whether the action against an agent for breach of an implied representation or warranty of authority is founded on a contract or tort theory the defendant’s liability does not depend on proof of his knowledge of the falsity of the representation or warranty.
The heart balm act (MOLA § 551.301 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 25.191]), abolishing the action for breach of a contract to marry, does not bar an action based on the illegality of a marriage. Tuck v. Tuck (1964), 14 NY2d 341 (200 NE2d 554); Morris v. MacNab (1957), 25 NJ 271 (135 A2d 657).

 See Van Haltern v. Van Haltern (1958), 351 Mich 286; Buck v. Buck (1967), 19 Utah 2d 161 (427 P2d 954).

 As to insurance, social security and pension rights, they may perhaps be ordered to be shared or, if that appears to present intractable difficulties, adjustment in the property sharing could be made to compensate for advantages flowing to one spouse in preference to another by virtue of her enjoying "widow” status. I understand, although I have no authority to cite, that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, has, in some cases, authorized full payment "to more than one woman as the surviving spouse where both meet the definition set forth in 42 USC § 416(h)(1) (A).