Court Opinion

ID: 9858479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:25:27.157588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:37.813465
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Once again the State, through its local district attorney, having gratuitously deviate ed from the explicit definition of an offense prescribed by the State, through its Legislative Department, seeks remedial exoneration from the State, through its Judicial Department. See Langston & Sjodin v. State, 855 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).1 This time we will accommodate the State.
The gist of “criminal trespass” is entering or remaining on “property of another ” without “effective consent.” V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 30.05(a).2
The term “another” is indeed defined as “a person other than the actor,” id., § 1.07(a)(4); yet, the majority reads certain dicta in Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812, at 815-816 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), to permit the scrivener to use “equivalent” words that convey “the same meaning or include the sense of the statutory word(s),” slip opinion at 2; Article 21.17, V.A.C.C.P. It seems to me, however, that merely knowing the meaning of “another” is not adequate illumination to provide sufficient enlightenment and clear *386understanding of the complete statutory term at issue: “property of another.”
We are informed that the present statute is “a restatement of art. 1377c [Penal Code 1926, as amended in 1971] in terms that fit the structure of the Penal Code.” Practice Commentary — 1973. That is to say, the Legislature desired to dress old law in new garb.
The former statutes and earlier cases obviously presuppose that “property of another” contemplates “ownership” in the sense of “belonging to,” “possessed by” or “held by” some person other than the alleged trespasser who is bereft of any such “ownership.”
Former article 1377c was the first general proscription of criminal trespass; earlier statutes denounced more particular invasions. All were couched in similar terms, however. Common denominators were “the land [or enclosed lands] of another” and lack of consent from “another,” variously identified as “the owner, or some person exercising possession for the owner,” or “the owner, proprietor or agent in charge thereof.” See former article 1377c; article 1377 (Penal Code 1926), and its predecessors; see, e.g., Hancock v. State, 363 S.W.2d 273, at 276 (Tex.Cr.App.1962); Zigler v. State, 172 Tex.Crim. 644, 362 S.W.2d 109, at 110-111 (1962); Haltzgraft v. State, 23 Tex.App. 404, 6 S.W. 117 (1887) (enclosed and posted land of another; must allege lack of consent by owner, et cetera); see also Langston v. State, supra, 865 S.W.2d at 722, n. 1 (Clinton, J., concurring) (statutory phrase used in sense of “owning” such real property).
Furthermore, at all relevant times the applicable code of criminal procedure provided that in describing real property, as pertinent here, “the name of the owner, occupant or claimant thereof’ shall be sufficient. Article 21.09, V.A.C.C.P. See and compare Franks v. State, 688 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (applies to real estate alleged qua object of offense).
Unlike Langston v. State, supra, here we confront simply a charging instrument that the courts below found failed to state an offense under § 30.05(a)(2). That subsection requires “notice to depart” and failing to do so. Under subsection (b)(2)(A) “notice” means “an oral or written communication by the oumer or someone with apparent authority to act for the oumer.”
In keeping with the intendment of the term “property of another” in § 30.05(a) combined with the prescription of a sufficient description of real property in Article 21.09, V.A.C.C.P., in my judgment the information may be reasonably and fairly read to allege that appellee remained on the property of Norman Whitlock (“another”), the owner thereof. Thus the information states an offense, regardless of what the proof may be shown with respect to “ownership” of the respective parties. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, supra, at 334-335; State v. Staley, supra, at 535.
For these reasons founded in law, rather than what emphemeral notions of “common sense” may or may not dictate, I too would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court.

. The pleader in this cause, as well as in Lang-ston and other cases cited below, appears to have drawn the respective charging instruments from the form suggested in 2 Texas Annotated Penal Statutes (Branch’s 3d Edition) § 30.05, at 387, viz:
"did then and there knowingly and intentionally enter and remain on property, without the effective consent of (name) the owner, the said (defendant’s name) having received notice to depart but failing to do so.”
Note also that the suggested charge would inform the jury that a person commits an offense if, without effective consent, he enters or remains on property of another and he received notice to depart but failed to do so. Ibid. The application paragraph, however, is framed in terms almost identical to those alleged in the charging instrument, except it does not require the jury to find the named complainant is "the owner.” Id., at 388.
See also: Palmer v. State, 764 S.W.2d 332, at 333 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1988), no PDR; Davis v. State, 799 S.W.2d 398, at 400 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1990), PDR refused; State v. Staley, 814 S.W.2d 534, at 535 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1991), PDR refused; Vanderburg v. State, 843 S.W.2d 286, at 287-288 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1992), no PDR.

. All emphasis throughout this opinion is mine unless otherwise indicated.