Court Opinion

ID: 9535491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:50:12.597398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:16.142600
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
dissenting. The majority today correctly holds that the marital privilege, see Evid. B. 23(2), generally precludes the prosecutor from commenting upon the failure of a criminal defendant to call his spouse to testify on his behalf. Nevertheless, it also rules that the defendant cannot avail himself of this doctrine because he “opened the door” to prosecutorial comment by utilizing an alibi defense. With respect to the latter holding, I agree with the Appellate Division that the facts of this case are not sufficient to support such a finding of waiver. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Under the majority’s view, whenever a defendant advances a defense which makes the testimony of his or her spouse relevant, he must call that spouse as a witness or be deemed to have “invited” the prosecutor to comment upon the failure to do so. Practically speaking, defendant will therefore be pressured into having the spouse take the stand in order to *197avoid any adverse inference.1 In effect, the marital privilege is rendered devoid of any significance. See, e.g., People v. Green, 47 Cal. 2d 209, 302 P. 2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1956); People v. Wilkes, 44 Cal. 2d 679, 284 P. 2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1955); State v. Wyatt, 276 S. W. 2d 86 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1955); State v. Brown, 14 Utah 2d 324, 383 P. 2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
The majority’s effort to bring this case within the scope of State v. Lowery, 49 N. J. 476 (1967), is unconvincing. The facts of that case are not even remotely similar to those of the matter at bar.2 In Lowery, defense counsel indicated on at least seven occasions that defendant’s wife would be called and that she would produce evidence favorable to defendant. Moreover, during his summation, defense counsel specifically informed the jurors that the failure to produce the wife as a witness might legally " ‘form some slight part of [their] consideration * * id. at 485 (emphasis in original), thus conceding — albeit incorrectly ■ — ■ its relevance to the jury’s decision-making process. Under such circumstances we were unable to conclude that the prosecutor’s comment upon the matter constituted prejudicial error. Id. at 486.
This case is a far cry from Lowery. Here, defendant did not tell the jury that he intended to call his wife as a witness or indicate in any way what the content of her testimony would be. Neither did he impliedly admit that the failure to produce her was a proper subject for jury con*198sideration. Rather, he merely stated that at the time of the incident he was at home with - his wife. Such facts are clearly insufficient to establish waiver. See, e. g., People v. Green, supra; People v. Wilkes, supra; State v. Wyatt, supra; State v. Brown, supra.
In an attempt to buttress its conclusion, the majority notes that defendant identified his wife as being present in the courtroom. Only by the wildest stretch of imagination, however, can this be understood as indicating the nature of her unproduced testimony. In any event, this information was elicited merely as part of defendant’s general background — e. g., address, marital status —• and was not, contrary to the majority’s implication, tied in with his alibi testimony. Thus, it adds nothing to the waiver analysis.
In my opinion the facts here demonstrated are wholly inadequate to support a holding that defendant waived the marital privilege. The concept of waiver, if it is to have any real meaning, must be made of sterner stuff. The rule as to marital privilege is clear — the prosecutor is precluded from commenting upon the failure of a criminal defendant to call his spouse to testify on his behalf.
Accordingly, I would affirm the Appellate Division and remand for a new trial.
Justice Handler joins in this opinion.
For reversal — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Clifford and Sohreiber — 5.
For affirmance — Justices Pashman and Handler — 2.

Moreover, it is not clear that defendant can always produce his spouse for testimony. The language of Evid. R. 23(2) appears to require the consent of both spouses before the marital privilege can be breached. Thus, it may be that defendant cannot compel an unwilling spouse to testify. See People v. Wilkes, 44 Cal. 2d 679, 284 P. 2d 481 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (interpreting similar statute as precluding compulsion of spouse). In such a case it would be clearly unfair to allow an adverse inference to be drawn by the jury.

Indeed, the Attorney General himself concedes that “Lowery is factually inapposite for use as the touchstone for analysis of the instant case * *