Court Opinion

ID: 9659100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:32:15.786579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:03.946734
License: Public Domain

CRIPPEN, Judge
(concurring specially).
Our lawful role in this case is remarkably limited. Our only duty is to determine whether or not the trial court erred in applying Minn.Stat. § 562.02 (1990), either in choosing to impose or in formulating the amount or conditions of a surety bond. The law does not permit us to issue an advisory opinion, a “holdpng],” on a question that is not before the court — the issue of whether in the future other taxpayers can maintain litigation on the same constitutional claims now unsuccessfully advanced by appellants.
Undoubtedly there is an ample audience for appellate court pronouncements on 1991 Minn. Laws ch. 350, the enactment that weaves a major public funding package into the financial planning of a large private business, Northwest Airlines. Countless Minnesotans have debated the merits of the legislation since it was first proposed and the intensity of public interest concerning the topic has been fueled by daily media reports on the financial health *309and welfare of Northwest. So why should this court not speak to the subject?
As a matter of fundamental law, we are empowered only to decide the case before us and no level of public interest can enlarge the scope of this appeal. The deliberate choice to decide a future case exceeds our jurisdiction and casts us in a role other than that of a court of law.
Anything said on future litigation is mere dicta, the volunteered expression of personal opinions of the author. Normally, dicta is a throwaway portion of a judicial opinion — truly little noted nor long remembered.1 In the decisionmaking process of an appellate court, colleagues of those who author extrajudicial advice normally can distance themselves from these actions in a short, separate opinion. If the court’s essential holding is unanimous, a brief concurring opinion can be employed to announce agreement on the end result. In this case, however, a different degree of response must occur in light of the unusual damage done by an advisory opinion:
1. An opinion inviting future lawsuits depends on conclusions that are flawed as a matter of law. For readers who believe chapter 350 is constitutionally impaired, such an opinion is a cruel hoax, a mistaken statement that the legislation can somehow be given constitutional scrutiny at this late date.2 For many it is bad news to learn that the time for a constitutional attack has passed, but that is an inescapable conclusion under existing Minnesota law. More particularly, this is the state of the law shaped by the provisions of Minn.Stat. § 562.02 and the Minnesota Supreme Court decision that defines its purpose (to encourage early presentation of taxpayer challenges on bond issue authorizations) and upholds its constitutionality. Gram v. Village of Shoreview, 259 Minn. 145, 106 N.W.2d 553 (1960).
2. Even more important, unless and until an advisory opinion inviting future lawsuits is corrected, or unless it is widely discredited by bond counsel and others in the investment community, the opinion stands as a legal cloud over all public bonds authorized by chapter 350. By broadcasting the threat of future litigation, an advisory opinion deliberately risks creating a de facto injunction prohibiting issuance and sale of these state bonds. Critics of the 1991 enactment may applaud this result, but misuse of the appellate decision-making process is never praiseworthy. None can be comforted to know that an intermediate appellate court panel can determine vital matters of law or policy by extrajudicial pronouncements on hypothetical, future cases. It has not been the experience of governance in America to find any profit or virtue in the notion that worthy ends justify unworthy means.
In sum, I respectfully disavow the notion of an advisory opinion on future lawsuits. A “hold[ing]” on another case is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, it depends on a misstatement of the law, and it injures both opponents and proponents of the Northwest financing legislation. Consistent with our limited standard of review, I write separately without stating or implying any opinion concerning the wisdom or the legality of chapter 350.
The review of law which follows is added to document conclusions already summarily stated.
I. Scope of review
This court is not empowered to anticipate occurrence of future challenges to 1991 Minn.Laws ch. 350 and “hold” that a suit similar to appellants’ lawsuit is necessary and appropriate in the future. Likewise, it *310is not our prerogative to suggest that this future litigation is essential to our system of democracy. Nor do we have license to declare that constitutional questions raised by appellants are important and have arguable merit. Nor can we imply that taxpayers’ concerns will eventually be vindicated.
It cannot be questioned that a reviewing court “must limit itself to a consideration of only those issues that * * * were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” Thayer v. American Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Minn.1982); see also State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn. 89, 94, 25 N.W.2d 474, 477 (1946) (court “confined to a consideration of only those rights which are placed in issue by the pleadings”). Accordingly, a volunteered opinion concerning the viability of a future suit attacking chapter 350 is not a proper part of our review of trial court action in the proceedings at hand. This issue was never presented to the trial court and it is not part of the decision we are reviewing. In addition, none of the parties before us have raised this issue and there have been no detailed arguments presented on the topic. Rather, the only discourse on the subject occurred at oral arguments in a terse response to a question from the court that proved to be a predictor of an eventual advisory opinion.
Deliberate disregard of the necessary limitation on the scope of appellate review results in “obiter dicta:” expressions which “go beyond the facts before the court and therefore are the individual views of the author of the opinion and not binding in subsequent cases.” State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 246 Minn. 181, 208, 74 N.W.2d 249, 266 (1956).3
Courts have provided clear reasons for confining decisions to the case at hand and avoiding dicta. Id. at 209, 74 N.W.2d at 266 (observing that questions properly before the court and argued by counsel are “thoroughly investigated” and “deliberately considered”); see United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157, 81 S.Ct. 547, 554, 5 L.Ed.2d 476 (1961) (Supreme Court refuses to give opinion on issue which is not pressed before the Court because it does not have “that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect” of the issue). The dangers that accompany opinions which stray from the issues before the court have often been recognized:
I am extremely reluctant to decide anything except what is necessary for the special case, because I believe by long experience that judgments come with far more weight and gravity when they come upon points which the Judges are bound to decide, and I believe that obiter dicta, like the proverbial chickens of destiny, come home to roost sooner or later in a very uncomfortable way to the Judges who have uttered them, and are a great source of embarrassment in future cases.
Cooke v. New River Co., 38 Ch.D. 56, 70-71 (1888) (Bowen, L.J.), cited in Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214 n. 38, 70 S.Ct. 587, 595 n. 38, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950); see Opinion of the Justices, 57 Del. 264, 269-70, 198 A.2d 687, 690 (1964) (court outlines troublesome inconsistencies between previous advisory opinions and dicta in other cases and concludes “the instant case is a clear example of the consequences flowing from unnecessary and voluntary expressions upon constitutional issues by a prior court”).
It is also error to believe that simply labelling parts of an advisory opinion as a “holding” will remove the statements from the rule of obiter dictum. See Naftalin, 246 Minn, at 208, 74 N.W.2d at 266 (judicial expressions which go beyond the case *311presented are, by definition, obiter dicta). Calling these expressions a “holding” does not bring the issue of future lawsuits within the scope of our review. By any other name, these statements are an opinion volunteered on litigation which is not presently before the court. There is an equal fallacy in the idea that extrajudicial conclusions are within the scope of review if an appellate court simply states its conviction that it could not reach a conclusion to affirm without expressing these opinions. Stated in that fashion or otherwise, the comments and holdings are no more than a device to find fault with the law of the case; they are the dicta of protest.4 In the last analysis, discussion concerning a future suit is irrelevant to the resolution of the question of whether the surety bond requirement was proper. In fact, the choice of this court to address the topic of future suits will be the first occasion the issue has been raised by anyone associated with these proceedings.
II. Questionable application of law
Just as I would not express an opinion inviting a future lawsuit, I would withhold an alternative opinion. With this in mind, comment must be made to identify legal questions which cast serious doubt on the merits of an advisory holding inviting future lawsuits. As observed above, a volunteered holding premised on erroneous conclusions misleads those who would prefer to see chapter 350 challenged at this late date.
First, section 562.02 provides that when the required surety bond “is not filed within a reasonable time allowed therefor by the court, the action shall be dismissed with prejudice.” Minn.Stat. § 562.02; see Butkovich, v. O’Leary, 303 Minn. 535, 536, 225 N.W.2d 847, 848 (1975) (dismissal with prejudice is a final determination on the merits). This provision of the statute explicitly recognizes the need for finality concerning legal challenges to bond issues. See Gram, 259 Minn, at 147, 106 N.W.2d at 555.
The record in Gram underscores the fundamental necessity of finality. The affidavit of Peter Popovich, bond counsel for the Village of Shoreview and later Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, explained that without a certification that “there is no litigation pending or threatened * * * no financial institutions, banks, or other investment dealers will accept delivery of said bonds or purchase the same.” Popovich also emphasized “it is most important” in the bond trade that “any question of litigation be eliminated by the time of the sale of any bond issue” so that the “cloud cast upon [the] proposed bond issue” can be removed. The record in the instant case is replete with similar testimony that an unqualified bond counsel opinion cannot be given as long as there is a viable legal challenge to the validity of the bonds and the constitutionality of chapter 350. (See Richey Aff. at 2).5
A pretended affirmance of the trial court effectively undermines the purpose and effect of section 562.02 if it also invites future litigation as a method to avoid the provision of the statute calling for dismissal of suits “with prejudice.” This action disregards the clear intent of the legislature. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1990) (every law “shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions;” when words of a law are clear and free from all ambiguity, “the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit”). Instead of removing the cloud upon the validity of the bond authorization, *312the court seeds a storm of controversy with its forecast of future challenges to chapter 350.
Second, it is improper to conclude that taxpayers can wait until after bonds are issued and then assert constitutional challenges to the enabling legislation. No one disputes that individuals who assert that their constitutional rights have been violated “must raise the objection at the earliest available opportunity.” Adelman v. Onischuk, 271 Minn. 216, 231, 135 N.W.2d 670, 680, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 382 U.S. 108, 86 S.Ct. 257, 15 L.Ed.2d 192 (1965). Moreover, the passing of time may well prevent a suit because of various defenses, such as laches, notwithstanding contrary assertions. See Schulz v. State, 151 Misc.2d 594, 610-11, 582 N.Y.S.2d 355, 365-66 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1992) (court applied laches in action challenging issuance of bonds by government assistance corporation); Lopp v. Peninsula Sch. Disk No. 401, 90 Wash.2d 754, 758-62, 585 P.2d 801, 803-05 (1978) (court rejected argument that laches could not bar a public interest lawsuit and held that the suit was barred by laches).
In Schulz, the court stated that the essential element in laches is “delay prejudicial to the opposing party” and observed that delays as short as six months may be inexcusable. Schulz, 151 Misc.2d at 610-11, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 365. Thereafter, the court found a constitutional challenge to a bond issue barred under the doctrine of laches, even though the challenge was brought less than two years after the challenged statute authorizing the bonds was passed:
While the total * * * bond authorization of $4.7 billion has not yet been all issued and sold, a ruling of unconstitutionality would seriously and deleteriously affect the interest of the bond holders who, in good faith, have already purchased * * * $2.4 billion, and would undo the carefully crafted and presumptively constitutional, fiscal plan of the State to provide fiscal assistance to local government.
Id. at 611, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 366. The instant case closely parallels Schulz in this respect, and because Minnesota law recognizes that finality is critical in bond cases, I am convinced the conclusion that there “is certainly no bar of laches in this case” is suspect.
Third, an invitation for future challenges directly conflicts with the supreme court’s observation that the statute should have the “salutary effect” of encouraging any challengers to commence an action “before any substantial damage will result from a delay in the prosecution of the project.” Gram, 259 Minn, at 154,106 N.W.2d at 559 (emphasis added); cf. Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 107 F.2d 484, 488-89 (4th Cir.1939) (“it was in the interest of all parties” that question of law concerning loan and grant to a county for construction of a power plant “be authoritatively settled before moneys were advanced and expenditures made ”) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 667, 60 S.Ct. 608, 84 L.Ed. 1014 (1940).
Fourth, an opinion urging later challenges evidently assumes that Minn.Stat. § 562.02 cannot be used to limit a suit once bonds are issued. This assumption is erroneous because there is nothing in the statute which precludes its application once bonds are issued. Rather, the statute applies to any suit brought in any court questioning the validity of any action “taken or proposed to be taken” by the public body. Minn.Stat. § 562.02 (emphasis added); see Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (“every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions”). If respondents could show a potential for damages in a future action, we have identified no reason why the trial court could not exercise its discretion and require another surety bond pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 562.02, even though such a bond requirement may effectively eliminate judicial review. See Gram, 259 Minn, at 153-54, 106 N.W.2d at 558-59 (delay in bringing action may justify imposition of substantial surety bond requirement).
Fifth, there is no merit in the argument that if a future suit were not possible, then Minn.Stat. § 562.02 may be unconstitutional. This argument directly contradicts the explicit holding of Gram: “We fail to see *313any constitutional barrier, either under the Federal or state constitutions, to the power of the legislature to enact the statute under consideration.” Id. at 154, 106 N.W.2d at 559 (emphasis added). The court reached this conclusion after an extensive discussion concerning the potential deprivation of a person’s right to bring a lawsuit. Id. at 149-54, 106 N.W.2d at 556-59. This court is in no position to question either the wisdom or authority of the decision in Gram, and any attempt to do so is unwarranted.
Sixth, it is incorrect to contend that it would be an abuse of discretion to impose a surety bond requirement if a future lawsuit were not possible. This contention misconstrues the statute and ignores the precedents established by our courts.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that Minn.Stat. § 562.02 is intended to serve particular purposes, viz., discouraging vexatious or unnecessarily duplica-tive lawsuits. The supreme court has recognized this statutory purpose as a reflection of the standard to be employed by the court when asked to apply the statute. Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power Co., 281 Minn. 43, 46, 160 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1968) (purpose of section 562.02 is to discourage “vexatious lawsuits by irresponsible litigants”). This development of a standard for application of this section was refined in Kilowatt Org. (TKO), Inc. v. Department of Energy, Planning & Dev., 336 N.W.2d 529 (Minn.1983). (“Application of section 562.02 was consistent with the legislative goal of permitting public projects to advance by discouraging needlessly duplicative proceedings” even where litigant was not “irresponsible.” Id. at 532.) Germane to the trial court’s holding in this case, the supreme court has also stated that the statute protects taxpayers against inordinate delays in the implementation of legislative acts. See Gram, 259 Minn, at 154, 106 N.W.2d at 559.
These supreme court holdings suggest that the trial court’s exercise of discretion should focus on a determination of whether a suit is either (1) lacking in merit, (2) duplicative, or (3) unnecessarily delayed. Given any of these circumstances, nothing in the statute or in the supreme court’s decisions suggests that some other standards may compel the trial court to refrain from application of the statute.
Seventh, any reliance on the “certain remedy” provision of the Minnesota Constitution is misplaced. This section was not intended to eliminate the ability of courts to impose costs even if litigants cannot afford them. See Gram, 259 Minn, at 149-54, 106 N.W.2d at 556-59; see also Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 208, 68 N.W. 53, 54 (1896) (litigant does not have the right to conduct his suit in court without costs); cf. TKO, 336 N.W.2d at 532-33 (court expressly ruled that dismissal of suit with prejudice was proper even though it effectively blocked judicial review).
Eighth, and finally, the notion that an advisory holding was agreed to by the parties is troublesome. The issue was never before the trial court and none of the parties raised the issue before this court. At oral argument, the parties never agreed to waive any time-barring defenses or the use of Minn.Stat. § 562.02 in the future. Rather there was initial speculation, in response to a question at oral argument, that the plaintiffs could have brought their suit after the bonds had been issued. In addition, even if the parties had “agreed” to allow a later suit, such an agreement should not influence the court. See State v. Colsch, 284 N.W.2d 839, 842 (Minn.1979) (even if a party requests an advisory opinion, “such advisory opinions are not sanctioned by this court”); cf. In re Estate of Peterson, 202 Minn. 31, 40, 277 N.W. 529, 534 (1938) (consent of parties to litigate cannot confer jurisdiction upon appellate court). Finally, the present appellants could not bring the action and there is no legal authority prohibiting respondents from seeking a similar dismissal of a new suit.
III. Impact on issuance of bonds
As stated in the beginning, among the dangers of an advisory opinion on future lawsuits is the fact that it wrongfully encumbers the issuance or sale of future bonds authorized by chapter 350. Al*314though the court’s expressions may not be “binding authority,” such advance approval of future challenges will have the unmistakable effect of reducing, if not destroying, the marketability of these bonds. Ironically, this means that the very evil which the trial court (and this court in affirming) appears to guard against — the imposition of a de facto injunction against the issuance of public bonds — likely becomes a reality because of an advisory opinion. In essence, an advisory opinion constitutes a deliberate urging that the proverbial chickens of destiny come home to roost. See Cooke, 38 Ch. D. at 70-71.
Undoubtedly, legal controversies concerning the validity of bond issues may have the effect of a de facto injunction, preventing any issuance of bonds. Gram, 259 Minn, at 153-54, 106 N.W.2d at 559 (bonds cannot be issued until litigation “is at an end”). The Gram court noted that this result is dictated by the “customary requirement” that before bonds can be delivered, bond counsel must issue an opinion stating that “no litigation [is] pending or threatened.” Id. at 147, 154, 106 N.W.2d at 555, 559 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 P.Supp. 54, 62 (D.Minn.1971) (“no-litigation certificate” reflects absence of litigation which may impair marketability of bonds and “is essential to a successful sale” of bonds), remanded on other grounds, 410 U.S. 366, 93 S.Ct. 1022, 35 L.Ed.2d 359 (1973); Alaska Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 555 P.2d 262, 267-68 (Alaska 1976) (“ ‘clean’ opinion from bond counsel about the availability of debt service coverage is crucial to the marketability” of bonds).
Rather than just addressing the merits of the surety bond requirement, an advisory opinion on future litigation openly encourages doubts about the validity of chapter 350. For practical purposes, as this court must understand, there is not a shade of difference between that advisory opinion and a full reversal of the trial court’s decision. In sum, we have no warrant to send a signal to bond purchasers that these bonds are subject to future attack. This threat to the validity of the bonds will have the likely effect of prohibiting the issuance of bonds. See Gram, 259 Minn, at 147,106 N.W.2d at 555 (threat of litigation impairs bond opinion).
IV. The trial court’s proper exercise of discretion
The primary issue in the case still requires brief attention. The trial court explained its surety bond decision by observing that initiation of these proceedings was unduly delayed. We should affirm this rationale of the court. An affirmance based on a much broader construction of section 562.02 is unnecessary and conflicts with prior supreme court decisions.
As stated earlier, the supreme court has developed standards governing a trial court’s order for a surety bond pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 562.02: Litigants challenging the issuance of public bonds should be required to post a surety bond when there is a threat of damages and the suit is either vexatious, unnecessarily duplicative or if initiation of the proceedings was unduly delayed. The trial court followed this standard and based its imposition of the surety bond requirement on the conclusion that damages would result from the pendency of the litigation and that the litigation had been unnecessarily delayed until March 1992 in an attempt to interfere with the issuance of bonds.
It is proposed that we disregard this reasoned application of Minn.Stat. § 562.02 and conclude that the trial court’s order requiring a bond was justified because a surety bond requirement under Minn.Stat. § 562.02 may be imposed whenever the evidence shows a risk of damages. Thus, it is said that the statute’s “harsh effect is to foreclose judicial review if the issues cannot be resolved on the merits before the public suffers ‘any substantial damage.’ ” It is unnecessary for the court to express such a broad application of Minn.Stat. § 562.02 because the trial court found there was a special reason to apply the section in appellants’ suit. The court’s finding that appellants unnecessarily delayed instituting suit establishes one of the limited circumstances for use of the section *315indicates finding of unnecessary delay and the absence of an abuse of discretion.6
It cannot be doubted that a justiciable conflict must exist before courts have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a statute. St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Marzitelli, 258 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn.1977); Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 390-91, 61 N.W.2d 508, 513 (1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 949, 74 S.Ct. 680, 98 L.Ed. 1096 (1954). However, courts will entertain challenges to statutes which have not yet been applied if it appears that the statute will “inexorably lead” to an alleged injury. The Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140-43, 95 S.Ct. 335, 357-58, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974) (where inevitability of statute’s operation against person is patent “it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect”); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group (MPIRG) v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F.Supp. 925, 928 (D.Minn.) (statute contemplates procedure which will “inexorably” lead to injury), transferred, 718 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir.1983), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 468 U.S. 1205, 104 S.Ct. 3574, 82 L.Ed.2d 872 (1984).7
In MPIRG, the court allowed a nonprofit corporation to challenge the constitutionality of a system linking student aid with draft registration even though no student had been denied federal aid under the statute and the Secretary of Education had not yet issued regulations governing the matter. MPIRG, 557 F.Supp. at 928-29. Significantly, the court stated that the plaintiff’s attack was “on [the] face” of the statute and therefore the case did not need “individualized facts” and there was no need to wait for a certain impact. Id. at 929. Moreover, in Regional Rail, the Court found that there was no better time to evaluate the validity of the statute because no more settled facts would arise until immediately before the challenged transaction and there were serious risks associated with delaying a decision until the statute was applied. Regional Rail, 419 U.S. at 144-45, 95 S.Ct. at 359 (challenged transaction would be practically irreversible).
*316The trial court was within its discretion when it determined that appellants should have brought their suit at an earlier time. First, chapter 350 is specific and detailed, and the enactment clearly authorizes the issuance of bonds and the application of bond proceeds for an airline enterprise. 1991 Minn.Laws ch. 350. Appellants’ constitutional challenges address the statute on its face, do not depend upon an application of the statute, and could have been resolved shortly after the statute was enacted in May 1991.8 Second, similar to Regional Rail and MPIRG, implementation of the allegedly offensive parts of chapter 350 was clearly imminent no later than November 1991 when Northwest and the state entered into a preliminary agreement detailing most of the financing arrangements.9 Third, similar to Regional Rail, delay in the instant case was imprudent because of the practical problems involved if chapter 350 were declared invalid in any manner after the bonds were issued and construction had begun. Fourth, under Gram the taxpayer has the burden to challenge the issuance of public bonds as soon as possible. Gram, 259 Minn, at 154, 106 N.W.2d at 559. Gram demonstrates that Minnesota public policy, at least as to government authorization of bond issues, dictates early resolution of taxpayer disputes. Finally, appellants have not demonstrated how the absence of the March 1992 agreement would have made an earlier suit impossible or implausible.
For these reasons, a far-reaching application of Minn.Stat. § 562.02 is unnecessary.
V. Conclusion
We cannot rewrite Minn.Stat. § 562.02, substituting our judgment for that of the legislature. Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 329, 24 N.W.2d 244, 254 (1946). In addition, unless and until it is modified, we must accept the unqualified decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court that this statute offends neither the Minnesota Constitution nor the Constitution of the United States. Gram, 259 Minn, at 154, 106 N.W.2d at 559. Finally, the scope of our review does not allow us to address either the merits of appellants’ complaint or the validity of a future suit. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court on the limited ground that the court was within its discretion when it determined that appellants should have brought their suit earlier.
Accordingly, I concur in affirming the trial court but I do not join in the majority opinion of this court.

. Dicta is always deserving of its own reward— simply being ignored. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1662, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (language unnecessary to decision "cannot be considered binding authority”); State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 246 Minn. 181, 209, 74 N.W.2d 249, 266 (1956) (obiter dictum, being a statement of the judge on an issue not deliberately investigated, not entitled to the same respect as questions actually before the court and argued by counsel).

. Compare Nitz v. Nitz, 456 N.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Minn.App.1990) with Nitz v. David Nitz, Inc., 403 N.W.2d 652, 654 n. 3 (Minn.App.1987) (comparison of cases demonstrates the detrimental reliance which can be created by dicta inviting future lawsuits).

. See also McCluskey v. Industrial Comm’n, 80 Ariz. 255, 258, 296 P.2d 443, 445 (1956) (matters unnecessary for decision are dicta and should be avoided, leaving questions for when "actual cases raise such issues1’); State ex rel. Smith v. Carey, 49 Del. 143, 147, 112 A.2d 26, 28 (1955) (expression of dicta is ordinarily to be avoided, and "certainly a court should refrain from dicta upon constitutional questions1’); Waste Recovery Coop, of Minn. v. County of Hennepin, 475 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn.App.1991) (court declined ruling on issue scarcely mentioned in trial court because doing so "would be tantamount to an advisory opinion”), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 9, 1991).

. I am not averse to reform of the present scheme of law surrounding application of Minn. Stat. § 562.02, nor would I object to harmless dicta asking that the scheme of the law be reviewed. It is quite another thing, however, to usurp the reform function by considering a case that is not before us, and then offering an indefensible legal conclusion on the topic.

. Counsel for the state advised this court at oral argument that the $270 million Metropolitan Airport Commission bonds were issued on April 23, 1992, only after a qualified bond opinion was issued. The bond opinion reportedly stated that (1) no action was currently pending on the merits, and (2) the standard of review on this appeal was "abuse of discretion” and “it was not likely" that this case would go back to the trial court on the merits. Significantly, counsel indicated that the remaining bonds could not be issued with such a qualified opinion.

. It is not explained why, on the one hand, we should lament application of Minn.Stat. § 562.02 where the bond requirement may preclude judicial review of a taxpayers’ constitutional challenge to the authorization of public bonds; but on the other hand, we should permit the "harsh effect” of the statute to apply whenever damage is shown, thus putting aside application of standards established in supreme court decisions. Evidently, the latter construction of the law is meant to serve the former lament. If application of the statute is sufficiently harsh, this may be seen as a reason to find another means to curb its use — or a reason to question the wisdom of the Gram court in upholding the constitutionality of section 562.-02. Or perhaps a harsh version of the statute conveniently rids the case of the trial court’s concern about delay, a consideration that would likely threaten future suits that repeat the challenge asserted here.
However, harsh effects of the statute are diminished if it is applied in the more limited fashion suggested in prior supreme court decisions. In addition, the statute explicitly prescribes the trial court’s discretionary role since the court "may require” a surety bond "in such amount as the court may determine,” even though the court has previously determined that damages may result from the pendency of the litigation. Minn.Stat. § 562.02. In fact, the supreme court in Gram specifically noted that the potentially "onerous” implications of a bond requirement under Minn.Stat. § 562.02 were greatly reduced because the statute is discretionary, unlike the mandatory security provisions for temporary injunctions then contained in Minn.Stat. § 585.04 (1960). Gram, 259 Minn, at 153, 106 N.W.2d at 559.
Precedents furnish evidence that a trial court has the discretion not to impose a surety bond requirement, even when there may be damages. See Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc. v. Metropolitan Council, 289 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Minn.1979) (trial court’s discretionary denial of motion for bond under Minn.Stat. § 562.02 was not appealed or questioned); Adelman, 271 Minn, at 225, 135 N.W.2d at 677 (trial court’s discretionary denial of motion for bond under Minn.Stat. § 562.02 was not appealed or questioned).

. It must be noted that there is no legal authority for the proposition that a citizen does not have to sue until a project is “complete in its shape and size.” In fact, this statement is contrary to settled law in Minnesota concerning justiciability, which only requires: (1) the definite and concrete assertion of rights, (2) the contest of rights must affect the legal relations of the parties, (3) the parties must have adverse interests, and (4) the parties must seek specific relief and not just an advisory opinion. Marzi-telli, 258 N.W.2d at 587-88.

. While the portion of appellants’ suit challenging the March 1992 determinations concerning compliance with chapter 350 could not have been resolved prior to their existence, the urgency of judicial review is greatly diminished because these issues are not constitutional challenges. In addition, appellants have not proposed on appeal that the compliance issues should be heard except in the event their constitutional claims are litigated. Moreover, judicial review of the policy evaluations are inherently limited and may well be "needlessly duplica-tive.” See TKO, 336 N.W.2d at 532.

. Significantly, counsel for the state noted at oral arguments that if the suit had been brought in November 1991, after the preliminary agreement had been worked out, there would have been little chance of establishing damages under Minn.Stat. § 562.02.