Court Opinion

ID: 9474344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:55:09.837644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:02.374232
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur, but my understanding of the issue differs slightly from that of my colleagues, so I write a separate statement. The majority views the case solely from the standpoint of the California statute. The dispositive question, though, is the operation of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The statute provides that the United States shall be liable in tort “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances....” Id.
A focus on the federal statute discloses a plausible statutory argument in favor of the appellants. The policy of the Federal Tort Claims Act is to determine government liability in accordance with state law. Where licensing status is expressly incorporated into state tort law as ap element of liability, that would seem to require making certain assumptions respecting the regime that would prevail if the enclave were governed not only by California’s tort law but also by its liquor licensing scheme. To do otherwise would make liability turn on the fact that the activity occurred on federal property, a result Congress could not have intended when it enacted the Tort Claims Act. Under a generous application of that analysis, we could decide the case on the theory that had the servicemen’s club not been located on the naval weapons base, it would have a license, see Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 23300 (West 1985) (necessity of a license), for only in this way can we assess the liability of the government “in the same manner and the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
This analysis is not unlike that undertaken in cases involving unique governmen*1407tal functions. There, we seek to determine what liability state law attaches to similar activities undertaken by analogous entities subject to its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 819, 825 (9th Cir.1985) (considering the law enforcement function of military police; drawing analogy to the liability of state and municipal entities). In “like circumstances,” servicemen’s clubs under California’s jurisdiction would be required to hold a license, see Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code §§ 23425-23437 (West 1985) (providing for club licenses); the only reason the club was not licensed here was because of its federal status, the very fact the Federal Tort Claims Act seeks to make irrelevant.
I must, nevertheless, agree with the result reached by the majority, because the California legislature has displayed a penchant for drafting a narrow statute that requires, as a predicate to dramshop liability, an actual California licensee, not a hypothetical one. The majority is quite correct in citing Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal.3d 430, 174 Cal.Rptr. 500, 629 P.2d 8 (1981), for this proposition.
Given our decision, it is interesting to speculate what amendment the California legislature could adopt to overturn the result here, particularly if it wants to continue to reject the result in cases such as Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 16 Cal.3d 313, 128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719 cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859, 97 S.Ct. 159, 50 L.Ed.2d 136 (1976). That is for it to decide, however, and if it chooses to persist in retaining a statute that does not permit courts to apply a sensible rule to events the legislature obviously can not foresee, we cannot extricate it or the injured persons it refuses to compensate.
I am further dissuaded from finding liability under the theory discussed above since it was not advanced by appellants. Appellants’ counsel based his argument upon the California statute and said we should bend it to accommodate his clients. That, of course, we cannot do.
The result is unfortunate, but so is the California law. I concur.