Court Opinion

ID: 9567158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:49:56.218339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:16.262012
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
1. In this case appellants admitted in their answers (filed December 22,1980) that they had received notice pursuant to Code Ann. § 20-506 by letter from the bank’s counsel, apparently on July 23,1980, well before the time these cases were filed on November 7, 1980. Newby v. Armour Agricultural Chem. Co., 119 Ga. App. 650 (3) (168 SE2d 652) (1969). Because appellants did not pay the amounts due on the subject notes within ten days of their having received the July 15 letters, the bank’s right in the event of a favorable judgment to recover 15% of the principal and interest due thereon as attorney fees was perfected at the expiration of the 10-day compliance period, on or about August 2, 1980. Woods v. State of Ga., 109 Ga. App. 225 (136 SE2d 18) (1964); see Browne v. Edwards, 122 Ga. 277 (50 SE 110) (1904).
Under the circumstances in this case the language in Paragraph 5 of the bank’s original complaint amounted to nothing more than gratuitous surplusage. The bank’s right to recover attorney fees as provided in the subject notes was perfected long before the instant cases were filed. Counsel for the bank apparently recognized this fact and amended the complaints accordingly. These amendments related back to the date the complaints were originally filed. Code Ann. § 81A-115 (c). Cf. Lang v. Hall, 25 Ga. App. 118 (3) (102 SE 877) (1920). While the bank could have probably elected not to pursue its right to attorney fees (see Code Ann. § 102-106), there is no evidence in the record that such a waiver was contemplated. In any event, assuming arguendo that such a waiver agreement could have been construed from the language of the bank’s original complaint, it was a naked promise, one without consideration. At the time these actions were filed, appellants were already obligated to pay attorney fees under the terms of the notes and by statute. Therefore, appellants’ reliance on the 10-day notice in the bank’s original complaint was not justifiable, and the bank was not estopped from amending its complaint to demand such payment. Accord, Ross & Williams v. Southern Exchange Bank, 38 Ga. App. 532 (1) (144 SE 338) (1928); Code Ann. §§ 38-114, 38-116. See Atlanta Nat. &c. Trust v. Tally, 243 Ga. 247 (253 SE2d 692) (1979).
2. The hearing on the bank’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was originally set for April 6,1981. However, due to illness of the trial judge, that hearing was cancelled. The record discloses no other notice setting a time for this matter to be heard. Nevertheless, *20on May 2,1981 the trial court granted the bank’s motion. Appellants filed motions in arrest of judgment1 and for new trial, contending that they were denied due process because they had received no notice of the hearing on the bank’s motion. Appellants’ motions were denied.
“The mere fact that counsel and his clients had no knowledge that the [motion had been set for hearing] is not in itself sufficient to support the grant of a new trial. The application [for new trial], although addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial judge (Code [Ann.] § 70-208), must be supported by a showing of some meritorious explanation of the absence, as well as a meritorious defense.” (Emphasis supplied.) Southern Ariz. School for Boys v. Morris, 123 Ga. App. 67, 68 (179 SE2d 548) (1970); Haralson County Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Hammock, 233 Ga. 381 (1) (211 SE2d 278) (1974). Since appellants have failed to show any meritorious defense in this case, the trial court did not abuse his discretion in denying appellants’ motion for new trial on this ground.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.

 The statute providing for a motion in arrest of judgment, Code Ann. § 110-702, has been repealed by the Civil Practice Act. Code Ann. § 81A-201 (jj). Relief from judgments in civil cases is now governed by Code Ann. § 81A-160.