Court Opinion

ID: 9630292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:07:45.763674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:46.738478
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
dissenting:
The majority holds that the transportation utility fee created by an ordinance of the home rule city of Fort Collins is a valid special fee imposed upon owners or occupants of developed lots fronting city streets.1 I respectfully dissent because I believe that the transportation utility fee is an involuntary tax that cannot be characterized as a valid special fee or special assessment.
As the majority explains, a municipality has four principal ways of raising needed funds: ad valorem property taxes, excise taxes, special assessments, and special fees. Fort Collins’ transportation utility fee is not a valid ad valorem tax because it “is not based on the value of the developed lot subject to the fee.” Maj. op. at 309. It is not an excise tax because its payment is not a precondition of owning or occupying a developed lot fronting a city street or of exercising any other right or privilege. Maj. op. at 310.
The question is whether the transportation utility fee can be characterized as a valid special assessment or as a special fee. A special assessment is a device used to finance local public improvements. Reams v. City of Grand Junction, 676 P.2d 1189, 1193 (Colo.1984). “Property owners are specially assessed because the benefits they receive from the particular improvements are different from the benefits they enjoy in common with other property owners of the political subdivision.” Id. at 1194. To be valid, a special assessment “must specially benefit or enhance the value of the premises assessed in an amount at least equal to the burden imposed." Id.; accord City and County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 215, 235 P. 777, 779 (1925). In other words, the assessed property that actually benefits from the improvement must be charged. Pomroy v. Board of Public Water Works of Pueblo, 55 Colo. 476, 479, 136 P. 78, 80 (1913); B. Matthews, 1B Municipal Ordinances §§ 36.01-36.25 (2d ed. 1986) (hereinafter Municipal Ordinances). The amount assessed must be based on the increased value of the property, not on the cost of the improvement. Pomroy, 55 Colo. at 479, 136 P. at 80; E. McQuillin, 14 The Law of Municipal Corporations § 38.113 (3d ed. 1987). Projects often financed by special assessments include street pavements, sidewalks, water mains, sewer mains and street lighting. Municipal Ordinances §§ 36.01-36.25; see, e.g., Reams, 676 P.2d 1189 (elevated arterial roadway, sidewalks, curbs and gutters); Satter v. City of Littleton, 185 Colo. 90, 522 P.2d 95 (1974) (paving and repaving of specific streets). I agree with the majority that the transportation utility fee is not a valid special assessment because the revenues raised need not be used to increase the value of the particular properties assessed in an amount equal to or greater than the amount assessed. See maj. op. at 310.
A special fee, or utility fee, is a charge imposed upon persons or property in exchange for a particular government service that benefits the party paying the fee in a manner not shared by other members of society. Emerson College v. City of Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1984); O. Reynolds, Local Government Law § 105(1982); see Loup-Miller Constr. Co. v. City and County of Denver, 676 P.2d 1170, 1175 (Colo.1984) (holding that sewage service charges and sanitary sewer connection fees constituted special fees, not taxes); City of Arvada v. City and County of Denver, 663 P.2d 611, 614-15 (1983) (holding that development fee may be imposed on property owners connecting to city water system to create fund to maintain and improve that system); Western Heights Land Corp. v. City of Fort Collins, 146 Colo. 464, 362 P.2d 155 (1961) *313(holding that charges for water and sewer connections and service are valid fees). The essence of a special fee is that it is charged in exchange for a specific government service that is requested by an individual and directly benefits that individual.
The first characteristic of a special fee is that it is charged in exchange for a specific government service. See, e.g., Loup-Miller, 676 P.2d 1170 (sewage service and sanitary sewer connection fees); Western Heights, 146 Colo. 464, 362 P.2d 155 (water and sewer connections and service). A charge becomes a tax when it is used to finance or maintain traditional government functions. E.g., Ochs v. Town of Hot Sulphur Springs, 158 Colo. 456, 461, 407 P.2d 677, 680 (1965); City of North Little Rock v. Graham, 278 Ark. 547, 647 S.W.2d 452 (1983) (holding that three dollar per household, business and apartment residence “public safety fee” used to pay salaries for police and fire protection workers was a tax).
The second characteristic of a special fee is that it is voluntary. The service must, in some sense, be requested by the individual who is assessed the charge. E.g., National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 1148-49, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974); City of Vanceburg v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 571 F.2d 630, 644 n. 48 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818, 99 S.Ct. 79, 58 L.Ed.2d 108 (1978); Stewart v. Verde River Irrigation & Power Dist., 49 Ariz. 531, 68 P.2d 329, 334-35 (1937); Emerson College, 462 N.E.2d at 1105. The majority asserts, without explanation, that this line of cases is distinguishable because it arises in the context of a regulatory agency’s authority to charge for its services. Maj. op. at 311 n. 8. In fact, some cases in this line not cited by the majority in its discussion of voluntariness involve charges established by state statutes or local ordinances. See, e.g., Emerson College, 462 N.E.2d 1098; Stewart, 68 P.2d 329. Furthermore, the majority’s analysis acknowledges that mandatory taxes must meet certain constitutional or charter requirements, such as legislative approval, and that voluntary fees charged in exchange for services rendered need not. The voluntariness distinction between taxes, and fees remains relevant when determining whether a charge must meet additional requirements of a tax that do not apply to fees, such as the uniformity requirement.
The third characteristic of a special fee is that it is paid in exchange for a service that directly benefits the person paying the fee. The person paying the fee has “asked a public officer to perform certain services for him, which presumably bestow upon him a benefit not shared by other members of society.” Stewart, 68 P.2d at 335; accord Emerson College, 462 N.E.2d at 1105-06. For example, an individual pays a fee for sanitary sewer connection service and that person’s property is hooked up to the sewer system. See Loup-Miller, 676 P.2d 1170. The principle behind special fees is similar to that underlying special assessments: “[tjhose who benefit should bear the cost of providing the benefit.” A. Reynolds, supra, § 105.
Road maintenance expenditures are traditional governmental expenditures that benefit the public at large. See Ochs, 158 Colo. 456, 407 P.2d 677. The revenues from the fee at issue here are not restricted to providing maintenance of any particular streets. There is no necessary direct benefit derived by a property owner upon whom the fee is imposed that is not shared by other members of society. In short, the transportation utility fee has none of the essential characteristics of a special fee. In Ochs v. Hot Sulphur Springs, 158 Colo. 456, 407 P.2d 677 (1965), this court invalidated a similar “frontage tax.” The tax was assessed on property based on. the amount of street frontage and the revenue was allocated sixty percent to the street department fund and forty percent to the equipment fund. This court concluded that the tax was for a general purpose and was therefore invalid because it was not structured as an ad valorem tax.
In Zelinger v. City and County of Denver, 724 P.2d 1356 (Colo.1986), this court upheld a storm drainage fee that did not meet the traditional requirements of either a special assessment or a special fee. The *314storm drainage fee was assessed against all property owners based on the size of the property and the ratio of impervious to pervious surface area. Revenue generated by the fee was used to operate, maintain, improve and replace storm drainage facilities. This fee does not fall within the traditional special fee model. It was not a charge paid in exchange for a requested service. The court combined analysis from special assessment and special fee cases and determined that the property owners were sufficiently linked to the need for and the benefit of storm drainage facilities to permit the fee. I would extend the analysis of Zelinger no further.
The majority’s approach seems to allow any government service to be financed by a fee that bears some relationship to the benefit produced by the service. This approach undermines the constitutional requirements of ad valorem taxation. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
KIRSHBAUM, J., joins in this dissent.

. The majority holds, and I agree, that the "transfer" provision, allowing the city council to transfer excess revenues to any other city fund, makes the ordinance an impermissible tax, but that this provision is severable from the remainder of the ordinance.