Court Opinion

ID: 9915863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 21:00:38.237693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:16.045219
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188
RANDALL EWING and YASMANY GOMEZ,
                     Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants,
                                 v.

1645 W. FARRAGUT LLC,
                             Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
                    ____________________

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
        No. 1:16-cv-9930 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.
                    ____________________

   ARGUED SEPTEMBER 8, 2023 — DECIDED JANUARY 8, 2024
                ____________________

   Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and KIRSCH, Circuit
Judges.
   KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Randall Ewing and Yasmany Gomez
contracted with 1645 W. Farragut LLC (Farragut) to purchase
a house. At the time, the house was gutted and needed sub-
stantial work. Nonetheless, Ewing and Gomez moved for-
ward with the contract based on Farragut’s representation
that the house would be renovated and ready by closing. They
gave Farragut $117,500 in earnest money, but unbeknownst
2                                     Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

to Ewing and Gomez, the house was under a stop work order.
That order hindered their ability to obtain a mortgage by clos-
ing, and they requested to have their earnest money returned.
Farragut refused.
    Ewing and Gomez sued Farragut for breach of contract,
common law fraud, and fraud under the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act. The district court found Farragut liable for fraud
and breach of contract on summary judgment, and a jury
awarded Ewing and Gomez $905,000 in damages after trial.
Farragut then moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing
that it did not cause most of the damages, and moved for a
new trial based on various evidentiary and jury instruction
issues. The district court denied both motions, and Farragut
appealed. On cross appeal, Ewing and Gomez seek to reverse
the denial of their motions to amend the complaint to add Erik
Carrier (Farragut’s principal) to the case. Because the record
supports the damages awarded in this case, and because the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mo-
tion for a new trial and the motions to amend, we affirm.
                               I
    1645 W. Farragut LLC is a limited liability company
owned and controlled by Erik Carrier. In January 2016, Far-
ragut purchased a gutted house in Chicago, located at 1645
West Farragut Avenue. Farragut planned to renovate the
house and make improvements to its ﬂoorplan. In February
2016, a City of Chicago inspector discovered that Farragut
had impermissibly performed structural work on the house
without a permit. As a result, Farragut had to pause all con-
struction on the house. A proper permit was not obtained un-
til August 26, 2016, and a stop work order remained in eﬀect
until November 23, 2016.
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                     3

    Meanwhile, in March 2016, Appellees, Randall Ewing and
his husband, Yasmany Gomez, wished to relocate from Flor-
ida and wanted to buy a home in Chicago. They ﬁrst viewed
a house located at 1651 West Farragut Avenue but then
turned their attention next door to the gutted 1645 West Far-
ragut property because of its customizability. Appellees ex-
pressed interest in the property, and Farragut, through Car-
rier, stated that the renovation would be completed in six
months even though Carrier already knew construction had
been paused. Carrier even assured Appellees’ realtor that Far-
ragut had all the proper permits in place and that the house
complied with building codes.
    On April 17, 2016, Appellees and Farragut executed a con-
tract for the purchase of the house. The contract stated that
closing would occur on or around October 3, 2016, and that
Farragut had not received any notice of zoning or building
violations that had not been corrected. On May 2, 2016, the
parties executed a modiﬁcation to the purchase agreement,
which still contained Farragut’s misrepresentations. Under
the modiﬁcation, Appellees tendered $117,500 (ten percent of
the purchase price of the house) to be held in escrow by Far-
ragut’s realtor as earnest money.
    Under the contract’s mortgage contingency clause, Appel-
lees had until August 15, 2016, to either obtain a mortgage
commitment for the house or inform Farragut that they failed
to do so; Farragut then could obtain a mortgage commitment
on Appellees’ behalf. Appellees failed to obtain a mortgage
commitment by the requisite date, and they informed Far-
ragut. Farragut similarly failed to obtain a mortgage for both
Appellees, though one lender indicated a mortgage could be
obtained in Ewing’s name only; Appellees declined. On
4                                      Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

October 16, 2016, Appellees’ counsel sent a letter to Farragut’s
counsel declaring the agreement null and void. In response,
Farragut terminated the contract and retained the $117,500 in
earnest money as liquidated damages because, according to
Farragut, Appellees had breached the contract by failing to
obtain a mortgage.
    As a result, on October 21, 2016, Appellees ﬁled this suit
seeking damages for breach of contract, common law fraud,
and fraud under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. Following
the close of discovery, Appellees moved to amend their com-
plaint to add Carrier as a defendant. That motion was denied.
At summary judgment, the district court found Farragut lia-
ble for fraud as a matter of law. Only the breach of contract
liability (both by Farragut and by Appellees) and damages is-
sues remained for trial, though Farragut’s fraud liability ren-
dered the breach of contract claim irrelevant for damages pur-
poses. The jury awarded Appellees $905,000 in fraud dam-
ages based on the retained earnest money, additional eco-
nomic damages, and emotional damages. After judgment was
entered, Appellees again moved to amend their complaint to
add Carrier as a defendant. The district court denied that mo-
tion too.
    Farragut then moved for judgment as a matter of law, as-
serting that Farragut’s fraud did not cause any additional
damage to Appellees aside from the loss of earnest money.
Farragut also moved for a new trial, pointing to various evi-
dentiary issues and claiming error in several jury instructions.
The district court denied both motions.
   Farragut now appeals the denial of its post-trial motions.
Pertinent to those motions, the parties agree that Illinois law
applies to Appellees’ underlying claims. On cross-appeal,
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                       5

Appellees seek review of the district court’s denial of both
motions to amend the complaint to add Carrier as a defend-
ant.
                               II
    Farragut does not contest its liability for fraud and breach
of contract, nor does it contest the $117,500 in damages based
on the retained earnest money. Instead, Farragut’s grievances
stem from the $787,500 in additional damages that were
awarded because Appellees did not acquire the house. In its
motion for judgment as a matter of law, Farragut argued, as it
does here, that its fraud did not cause Appellees to lose the
house and therefore did not cause additional damages apart
from the retained earnest money. Alternatively, Farragut
urges us to remand for a new trial because of several eviden-
tiary and jury instruction issues that purportedly led to an ex-
cessive damages award. These arguments are not persuasive.
We ﬁrst address the motion for judgment as a matter of law
before turning to the motion for a new trial.
                               A
    We review denial of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, con-
struing the trial evidence “strictly in favor of the party who
prevailed before the jury,” and determining whether a reason-
able jury would have “a legally suﬃcient evidentiary basis to
ﬁnd for the party on that issue.” Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v.
Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815, 822 (7th Cir. 2016)
(quotations omitted). “The court does not make credibility de-
terminations or weigh the evidence.” Passananti v. Cook
County, 689 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2012). Further, while we
review the entire record, we ignore all evidence favorable to
6                                      Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

the moving party if the jury was not required to believe it. Id.
(citation omitted).
    Farragut frames much of its appeal around loss causation,
but that theory is misplaced. “[L]oss causation is the causal
connection between the material misrepresentation and the
economic loss suﬀered by investors.” Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 808 (2011) (cleaned up). Far-
ragut’s argument does not ﬁt within this framework. The facts
here do not involve an investment in property made due to
fraud where the property’s value ultimately declined, leading
to “loss” damages. Rather, the crux of Farragut’s argument is
a traditional “but-for” dispute: that Farragut’s fraud did not
cause Appellees to lose the house. Farragut advances its argu-
ment by attributing the loss of the house to Appellees’ con-
duct rather than its own. For example, Farragut stresses that
Appellees could have obtained a mortgage in Ewing’s name
alone. That may be true, but that does not mean Farragut’s
fraud did not also cause the sale’s failure. Appellees had the
right to only consent to a mortgage in both of their names, and
there are many sensible ﬁnancial reasons a married couple
would do so. Moreover, the mortgage contingency clause in
the agreement required the “Buyer” to obtain a mortgage, and
throughout the agreement, the “Buyer” was listed as both
Ewing and Gomez.
    Although Farragut attempts to shift the blame for the fail-
ure of the deal to Appellees’ decision to declare the contract
null and void, Appellees only took that step because they
could not secure a mortgage commitment. The proper ques-
tion, then, is whether a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that Far-
ragut’s fraud caused Appellees to fail to secure that mortgage
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                       7

commitment. Based on the evidence in the record, the answer
is unequivocally yes.
   First, based on meetings with several mortgage brokers,
Ewing testiﬁed that he and Gomez had diﬃculty obtaining a
mortgage commitment by the required contract date because
the “home wasn’t ready to be lived in” and because they
“couldn’t get a mortgage until the home was ready.” Next, a
mortgage broker, Matthew Hoppe, testiﬁed that, for the type
of mortgage Appellees needed, a mortgage commitment
could not be provided while the house was still gutted. Relat-
edly, the jury heard testimony that Farragut’s refusal to return
the $117,500 in earnest money, which it kept for ﬁve years,
prevented Appellees from having the liquid assets to go out
and purchase another home.
    In sum, while Appellees believed, based on Farragut’s
fraudulent misrepresentations in March 2016, that construc-
tion was ongoing and the house would be completed by the
October closing date, the house in fact remained gutted with
a stop work order in eﬀect until November; a proper mort-
gage commitment could not be secured on a gutted house;
and Appellees therefore terminated the contract. A reasonable
jury could ﬁnd that Farragut’s fraud caused Appellees to not
acquire the house, resulting in the additional damages
awarded. The district court properly rejected Farragut’s mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law.
                               B
    Next, Farragut seeks a new trial based on purportedly er-
roneous jury instructions, excessive damages, and other mis-
cellaneous evidentiary issues. The standard of review for a
denial of a motion for a new trial is abuse of discretion.
8                                       Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2004). Under
an abuse of discretion standard, this court “shall not second-
guess the decision of a trial judge that is in conformity with
established legal principles and, in terms of its application of
those principles to the facts of the case, is within the range of
options from which one would expect a reasonable trial judge
to select.” Liu v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 302 F.3d 749, 754 (7th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Reg'l Transp.
Auth., 125 F.3d 420, 431 (7th Cir. 1997)). “We reverse only if
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages
are excessive, or if for other reasons the trial was not fair to
the moving party.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 610 F.3d
434, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).
                               1
    Farragut’s first bucket of arguments contests three jury in-
structions: (1) the damages instruction; (2) the liquidated
damages instruction; and (3) Instruction 1.04, which provided
the jury with the district court’s summary judgment findings.
After summarizing the applicable law, we address each in
turn.
    “In a diversity case, federal law guides our review of jury
instructions.” Stutzman v. CRST, Inc., 997 F.2d 291, 293 (7th
Cir. 1993). “In order to obtain a new trial based on an incorrect
jury instruction, an appellant must establish both that the in-
structions failed to properly state the law and that he was
prejudiced by the error because the jury was likely to be mis-
led or confused.” Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir.
2015) (cleaned up). Whether an instruction stated incorrect
law is reviewed de novo, Patrick v. City of Chicago, 974 F.3d
824, 834 (7th Cir. 2020), but that review is not automatic.
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                          9

    Any party wishing to contest a jury instruction must dis-
tinctly state at trial “the matter objected to and the grounds for
the objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1) (emphasis added). “The
objection must be specific enough that the nature of the error
is brought into focus. … There are no formal requirements,
but pragmatically speaking the district court must be made
aware of the error prior to instructing the jury, so that the
judge can fix the problem before the case goes to the jury.”
Schobert v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 729–30 (7th Cir.
2002) (citations omitted). “Consistency is required as well; to
preserve the objection, the party must state the same grounds
when objecting to the jury instruction as it does in its motion
for a new trial or on appeal.” Id. at 730.
     Failure to preserve a jury instruction objection does not
necessarily end the analysis. “If a party fail[s] to object
properly to an instruction, an appellate court ‘may consider a
plain error in the instructions that has not been preserved as
required by Rule 51(d)(1) if the error affects substantial
rights.’” Walker v. Groot, 867 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 2017) (quot-
ing Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2)). “Especially in civil cases, plain-
error review of jury instructions is quite limited and discre-
tionary, and reserved for exceptional circumstances.” Id.
(cleaned up). “Application of Rule 51(d)(2) requires that
(1) there must be an error; (2) the error must be plain; (3) the
error must affect substantial rights; and (4) the error must se-
riously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of ju-
dicial proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up).
   There is a difference, however, between merely forfeiting
an objection and waiving an objection. See Henry v. Hulett, 969
F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (distinguishing waiver
and forfeiture). While forfeiting an objection still allows for
10                                      Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

plain error review under Rule 51, a party is not entitled to any
review if it waived an objection to the instruction, for instance,
by inviting the purported error. See United States v. Muskov-
sky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1329 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Initially, we note that
if the district court’s instruction was error, it was error that
was invited by the Defendants. … Where error is invited, not
even plain error permits reversal.”); see also 21 Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 2558 (3d ed. 1998) (“[A] party who requests a jury instruc-
tion cannot complain if the instruction, or one substantially
like it, is given by the trial judge.”).
                                i
   Farragut’s most substantive jury instruction argument
pertains to the damages instruction. The damages instruction
asked the jury to consider the following factors when deter-
mining damages resulting from Farragut’s fraud:
       1. Increased cost to purchase a home;
       2. Costs to rent a comparable property in Chi-
          cago following termination of the contract to
          compensate them for the loss of use of the
          property up until the present. …
       3. Costs incidental to performing the contract,
          such as required trips to and from Florida to
          Chicago to make required contract deci-
          sions;
       4. Emotional distress;
       5. Actual costs Randall Ewing and Yasmany
          Gomez incurred to rent in Chicago, IL fol-
          lowing the breach. …
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                         11

Farragut objects to every factor as inconsistent with the law.
We address the factors piecemeal.
    First, we reject Farragut’s objections to factors 3 (costs in-
cidental to performing the contract) and 4 (emotional dam-
ages) on the merits. Incidental out-of-pocket losses resulting
from fraud are recoverable under Illinois law, Roboserve, Inc.
v. Kato Kagaku Co., 78 F.3d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying
Illinois law), and Ewing testified that he and Gomez spent ap-
proximately $2,000 to perform the contract. Emotional dam-
ages are also recoverable in Illinois for intentional torts. See
Cruthis v. Firstar Bank, N.A., 822 N.E.2d 454, 467 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004). On appeal, Farragut does not dispute that emotional
damages are recoverable but insists that the instruction failed
to instruct the jury on the severity needed for emotional dam-
ages to be awarded. Of course, additional detail in the instruc-
tion could have been helpful, but the omission did not create
a misstatement of the law. And Farragut itself requested that
emotional distress by itself be the only words that the jury
sees. Accordingly, factors 3 and 4 of the damages instruction
were proper.
    Farragut waived any objection to factors 1 (increased cost
to purchase a home) and 5 (actual rental cost) by including
them in its own proposed instructions and inviting the pur-
ported error. Farragut does not dispute that it included fac-
tors 1 and 5 in its own proposed instructions but urges this
court to review for plain error under Rule 51(d)(2). As dis-
cussed above, we will not review for plain error when the ob-
jecting party waives its objection and invites the error.
   Finally, as to factor 2 (cost to rent a comparable property),
while Farragut did not waive its objection, it failed to properly
preserve it, resulting in forfeiture. Namely, on appeal,
12                                      Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

Farragut objects to factor 2 because it argues loss of use dam-
ages are not recoverable under Illinois law when a plaintiff
does not actually own the property in question. However,
Farragut never objected to factor 2 on this ground at trial or
in its motion for a new trial. Because preservation under Rule
51 requires consistency as to the grounds for the objection,
Schobert, 304 F.3d at 730, Farragut failed to preserve its objec-
tion to factor 2.
    Because Farragut only forfeited its objection, we may still
review the instruction as to factor 2 for plain error. Here, Far-
ragut fails to meet that exceedingly high threshold. Quite
simply, any error here was not plain. The Supreme Court has
stated, “‘Plain’ is synonymous with ‘clear’ or, equivalently,
‘obvious.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Far-
ragut did not identify, nor could this court find, an Illinois
case directly on point to Farragut’s objection that would ren-
der any purported error in factor 2 obvious. Nor does this in-
struction present an exceptional circumstance that would jus-
tify plain error reversal in a civil case. See Walker, 867 F.3d at
803. Farragut makes no developed argument to the contrary.
    Farragut had ample time and opportunity to raise its pre-
sent concerns with the damages instruction. Factors 3 and 4
stated the correct law. Farragut invited any purported error
as to factors 1 and 5. And as to factor 2, even if the district
court erred, that error was not plain.
                                ii
   Farragut next complains that it was prejudiced by the liq-
uidated damages instruction. For context, the contract be-
tween Farragut and Appellees contained a liquidated dam-
ages provision that stated, “If Purchaser materially defaults
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                        13

on any of the terms and conditions contained in this Purchase
and Sale Agreement, then all payments made by Purchaser
shall be retained by Seller as liquidated damages, and not as
a penalty, and this Agreement shall thereupon become null
and void.” Before trial, in a motion in limine, Farragut had
asked the district court to permit evidence of the liquidated
damages provision to rebut allegations of bad faith. The dis-
trict court denied that motion.
    Nonetheless, during trial, Farragut questioned Ewing
about the provision. Appellees objected on the ground that
the cross-examination flouted the ruling on the motion in
limine, and a long colloquy ensued. During that exchange,
Farragut’s counsel stated, “When we [discussed the motion in
limine], we finally agreed to resolve it by a limiting instruc-
tion. … [I]t was our understanding from your ruling that in
the course of how it came up, it was in the contract. As long
as we said you made the decision already that it was no longer
enforceable and that the jury certainly couldn’t take into ac-
count that somehow 1645 West Farragut could keep the
money because the liquidated damages provision was not in
effect … .”
    Farragut’s counsel thus seemingly agreed to resolve the
dispute by having the district court instruct the jury that
(1) the liquidated damages provision was found unenforcea-
ble and (2) the provision did not excuse Farragut’s retention
of the earnest money. The district court did just that: “So, once
again, I've determined that the clause was not an enforceable
penalty, even though it was there in the contract, but you can-
not consider whether that clause excused any of [Farragut’s]
actions towards the [Appellees].” After the district court read
the limiting instruction and asked the parties if “that
14                                      Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

complete[s] it,” Farragut’s counsel responded affirmatively,
thus waiving any objection at this stage. Farragut’s assertion
that its motion in limine preserved its objection is mistaken;
that motion did not contemplate the limiting instruction at is-
sue, which was the proposed solution to the underlying dis-
pute.
     Regardless, Farragut makes no compelling argument as
to prejudice. It does not appeal the district court’s unenforce-
ability ruling, and the limiting instruction simply summa-
rized that ruling. The instruction did not, as Farragut sug-
gests, instruct the jury that Farragut intended from the outset
to punish Appellees. Rather, the instruction merely stated
that, when drafted, the clause would punish Appellees for not
completing the contract. That statement is objectively true,
and the district court did not abuse its discretion in reading it
to the jury.
                               iii
     In one final effort to contest the jury instructions, Far-
ragut argues that the timing of Instruction 1.04 prejudiced its
case. Instruction 1.04 provided the jury with the district
court’s summary judgment findings. Farragut does not object
to the substance of the instruction and only argues that the
timing of the instruction (just before Ewing testified) bol-
stered Ewing’s testimony and otherwise misled the jury.
    “District judges have wide discretion to manage their pro-
ceedings … .” Rainey v. Taylor, 941 F.3d 243, 247 (7th Cir.
2019). Of course, there will be instances where the timing of
an instruction prejudices a party. This is not such a case. The
instruction simply listed undisputed facts. And any prejudice
is completely speculative. See Lange v. City of Oconto, 28 F.4th
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                          15

825, 841 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Mere speculation that the jury might
have decided the case differently if given the proper instruc-
tion is insufficient to establish prejudice.”) (quotation omit-
ted).
                                2
    Farragut next makes two evidentiary arguments that it be-
lieves warrant a new trial. Both are meritless.
    First, Farragut asserts that the district court abused its dis-
cretion by admitting a homophobic statement made by Car-
rier, where he referred to Appellees as “fruit cups.” Farragut
believes (1) the statement was irrelevant under Federal Rule
of Evidence 401 and (2) even if relevant, its probative value
was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice requiring
exclusion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
    In this case, Appellees could pursue punitive damages on
their claims, Tully v. McLean, 948 N.E.2d 714, 729 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011) (permitting punitive damages in torts if malice or will-
fulness can be shown), and the district court explicitly al-
lowed them to do so, noting the “high probative value” of the
“fruit cups” statement. Consequently, Appellees relied on the
statement at trial to show that Farragut committed the fraud
with homophobic malice toward them. That, alone, was
enough for relevance. See United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901,
907 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A party faces a significant obstacle in ar-
guing that evidence should be barred because it is not rele-
vant, given that the Supreme Court has stated that there is a
‘low threshold’ for establishing that evidence is relevant.”)
(quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004)). The dis-
trict court’s ultimate granting of Farragut’s motion for a di-
rected verdict on punitive damages did not retroactively
16                                       Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

render the “fruit cups” statement irrelevant; it only meant Ap-
pellees failed to present sufficient evidence to submit the issue
to the jury.
    Farragut’s Rule 403 argument likewise fails. We give spe-
cial deference to Rule 403 findings and will not substitute our
opinion for that of the trial judge merely because we might
have ruled differently. Id. Here, the evidence was particularly
probative of Carrier’s potential animosity toward Appellees.
See United States v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he more probative the evidence, the more the court will
tolerate some risk of prejudice … .”) (quoting United States v.
Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994)). And the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a single ref-
erence to Appellees as “fruit cups” was not prejudicial
enough to sway the jury, particularly when the prejudice
(homophobia) was itself central to the purpose of the evi-
dence. See United States v. Hanna, 630 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir.
2010) (noting that we routinely reject Rule 403 challenges
when the defendant is “being prosecuted for exactly what the
evidence depicts”) (cleaned up).
    As for Appellees’ references to the “fruit cups” statement
in closing argument (after the district court had granted a di-
rected verdict on punitive damages), Farragut failed to object
to these at trial. True, a definitive ruling in a motion in limine
typically preserves an objection for appeal, Wilson v. Williams,
182 F.3d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), but here, the district
court’s motion in limine ruling was far from definitive, hav-
ing been denied solely because the statement was probative
of punitive damages. Once punitive damages were no longer
at issue, Farragut should have objected to Appellees’ further
references to the statement. Moreover, Appellees proposed a
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                        17

limiting instruction on the issue, but Farragut rejected it, no
longer believing it necessary. See Common v. City of Chicago,
661 F.3d 940, 946 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A party who declines the
opportunity to have a limiting instruction, waives the right to
claim that he has been prejudiced by evidence that is other-
wise relevant and admissible.”). In any event, Farragut fails
to show how it was prejudiced by Appellees’ references to the
“fruit cup” statement in closing argument when the jury had
already heard that statement earlier in the trial when it was
relevant. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a new trial on this basis.
    Farragut also seeks a new trial based on a violation of the
“golden rule.” Appellees stated in closing argument, “And
I’m sure that every one of you, if you were in the process of
buying your dream home, would want to know if all physical
work on the premises had ground to a halt … .” Of course,
“[a]n appeal to the jury to imagine itself in the plaintiff’s po-
sition is impermissible … .” Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d
1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1985). And Farragut timely objected.
However, in its discretion, the district court rejected Far-
ragut’s curative instruction to avoid drawing any more atten-
tion to the trivial statement. The district court’s reasoning was
sound. The problematic statement was only a morsel of Ap-
pellees’ closing argument, and Farragut fails to show any re-
sulting prejudice.
                               3
   Alternatively, Farragut seeks remittitur of the damages
award. “[W]hen a federal jury awards compensatory dam-
ages in a state-law claim, state law determines whether that
award is excessive.” Rainey v. Taylor, 941 F.3d 243, 253 (7th
Cir. 2019). “Under Illinois law it’s neither necessary nor
18                                       Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

appropriate to evaluate a jury’s compensatory award against
awards in similar cases; a comparative analysis is not part of
the state framework.” Id. Instead, “remittitur is appropriate
‘only when a jury’s award [1] falls outside the range of fair
and reasonable compensation, [2] appears to be the result of
passion or prejudice, or [3] is so large that it shocks the judicial
conscience.’” Id. (quoting Klingelhoets v. Charlton-Perrin, 983
N.E.2d 1095, 1113 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013)). On the other hand, re-
mittitur is not appropriate if the award is reasonably sup-
ported by the facts. Id. “The determination of damages is a
question reserved to the trier of fact, and a reviewing court
will not lightly substitute its opinion for the judgment ren-
dered in the trial court.” Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d
621, 628 (Ill. 1997).
    First, the damages award falls within the range of fair and
reasonable compensation. Farragut’s fraud led to two crucial
events: (1) it caused Appellees to fail to secure a mortgage and
purchase the house; and (2) it induced Appellees to turn over
a significant portion of their savings ($117,500), which was not
returned for five years. The jury heard evidence supporting a
damages award of $905,000 based on this fraud, including
loss of use damages (based on a $6,000 monthly market rental
value), the increased value of the home over five years, vari-
ous travel expenses resulting from the fraud, emotional dam-
ages, and the $117,500 in earnest money lost.
    Farragut specifically complains about the emotional dam-
ages award. Because the jury awarded damages as a lump
sum, we cannot discern exactly how much of the award was
allocated to emotional damages, though the parties estimate
the sum was approximately $235,500. Regardless, Appellees
presented enough evidence to support emotional damages.
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                       19

Appellees’ testimony described how this ordeal (1) impacted
their marriage, (2) reduced their ability to purchase a dream
home by tying up their finances for five years, and (3) exacer-
bated Gomez’s anxiety disorder. This court will not reverse
the district judge’s decision under an abuse of discretion
standard when the judge and jury sat in the best position to
assess witness credibility. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans.,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 (1996) (“Trial judges have the unique
opportunity to consider the evidence in the living courtroom
context, while appellate judges see only the cold paper rec-
ord.”) (quotations omitted).
    Next, Farragut fails to show that the damages award re-
sulted from passion or prejudice. Farragut points predomi-
nantly to the homophobic “fruit cups” statement to support
its argument. True, Appellees’ counsel emphasized Carrier’s
homophobia as part of their litigation strategy. But that is not
enough, particularly when the emphasis was pertinent to po-
tential punitive damages. Farragut’s concerns could have
been addressed with limiting instructions at trial, but as we
noted previously, Farragut rejected this proposed solution.
More importantly, the jury heard more than enough evidence
to award the damages that it did based on the record rather
than any purported passion or prejudice.
    Finally, the damages award does not shock the judicial
conscience. Farragut protests Appellees’ windfall: Appellees
will recover damages amounting to almost the full value of
the house they planned to purchase, despite only spending
$117,500. But this is not solely a breach of contract case. This
is a fraud case. The jury heard evidence that Farragut’s fraud
caused damage to Appellees in several ways, and the sum
correspondingly calculated does not shock the conscience.
20                                     Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

   The district judge and the jury had front row seats to ex-
amine the parties’ testimony and weigh the evidence. With
that perspective in mind, we find that remittitur is unwar-
ranted.
                              III
   Having resolved Farragut’s appeal, we turn to Appellees’
request to add Carrier to the case. Some context is useful here.
   Discovery began in early 2017 and was scheduled to end
on August 3, 2018. Developments during discovery led Ap-
pellees to seek leave to ﬁle an amended complaint. However,
Appellees ﬁled their motion on September 11, 2018, more than
a month after discovery closed. The district court denied that
motion.
    Consequently, in June 2019, Appellees ﬁled a separate
lawsuit against Carrier and D’Aprile Properties, LLC (Car-
rier’s real estate employer) that asserted the same claims as
those sought to be added in the ﬁrst motion to amend. Ewing
v. Carrier, No. 19-cv-03791, 2021 WL 4244753 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
17, 2021). That case was dismissed on claim preclusion
grounds by a diﬀerent district judge. Id. at *3–4. Appellees ap-
pealed the dismissal, and we vacated the judgment, remand-
ing the case to the district court with instructions to transfer
the case to Judge Coleman. Ewing v. Carrier, 35 F.4th 592, 594
(7th Cir. 2022). Judge Coleman then stayed that case pending
the resolution of this appeal.
    Fearing Farragut’s undercapitalization, Appellees ﬁled a
second motion to amend to add Carrier after ﬁnal judgment
was entered. The district court denied that motion as well.
Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188                                           21

                                 A
    Our precedent gives signiﬁcant deference to district courts
when they deny motions for leave to ﬁle amended pleadings.
We review the district court’s decision under the highly def-
erential abuse of discretion standard, reversing only if the dis-
trict court refused to grant the leave “without any justifying
reason.” Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Brunt v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 284 F.3d 715, 720 (7th
Cir. 2002)).
    The dismissal of the ﬁrst motion to amend can be quickly
aﬃrmed under this standard. The district court was not per-
suaded by Appellees’ reasons for delay and further concluded
that an amended complaint would cause undue prejudice in
light of the court’s scheduling order. The district court
properly justiﬁed its ruling, explaining that the addition of
new parties and new claims well after discovery had closed
would result in a new, time-consuming, and expensive dis-
covery process that would prejudice Farragut and the newly
added parties.
    Appellees ﬁled their second motion after ﬁnal judgment.
“[I]t is ‘well settled that after a ﬁnal judgment, a plaintiﬀ may
amend a complaint under Rule 15(a) only with leave of court
after a motion under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) has been made
and the judgment has been set aside or vacated.’” Vesely v. Armslist
LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. Miller, 966 F.2d 1178, 1179 (7th Cir.
1992)). Appellees erroneously rely on Nelson v. Adams USA,
Inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000), for the proposition that parties can be
added post-judgment so long as the party is served with a
complaint and granted the opportunity to respond. A plaintiﬀ
made an identical argument in Fogel v. Gordon & Glickson, P.C.,
22                                     Nos. 22-2267 & 22-2188

393 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2004). Rejecting that argument, we
stated, “What Nelson actually h[eld] is that Rule 15(a), govern-
ing the amending of complaints, cannot be used after ﬁnal
judgment has been entered to add another party to the judg-
ment. The case does not suggest that a party can ignore the
limitations that Rules 59(e) and 60(b) place on motions to
amend ﬁnal judgments.” Id. at 733. And under our precedent,
“Rule 59(e) allows a court to alter or amend a judgment only
if the petitioner can demonstrate a manifest error of law or
present newly discovered evidence.” Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517
F.3d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 2008).
    Aside from a single line stating they were bringing their
motion to amend under Rule 59, Appellees did not otherwise
support their request to set aside or amend the judgment. The
district court reasonably denied the motion on that ground
                                                     AFFIRMED