Court Opinion

ID: 9778349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:00:59.690548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:07.724100
License: Public Domain

DWYER, Judge,
dissenting.
I am in respectful disagreement with my brethren where they dismiss the timely filed petition to rehear of the State.
I would grant the petition for I think it contains merit that the inadequacy of proof as to the prior convictions of the appellant did not and do not involve a double jeopardy question.
The majority in denying the petition to rehear holds that to allow a retrial of appellant on the sole question to determine whether or not she is a repeated offender is barred by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), which is based, as I view it, on retrials barred solely on the basis of double jeopardy.
The proof at the bifurcated proceedings here was offered simply and solely to achieve enhanced punishment and had nothing whatsoever to do with guilt or innocence, for that had already been determined. With guilt already firmly established, the inadequacy of the State’s attempt to prove the prior convictions does not, as I view it, come within the penumbra of Burks v. United States, supra. I see little difference between the attempt at enhancement of punishment and proving prior convictions for the purpose of establishing the status of habituality. In other words, our Supreme Court has held the proving of prior convictions in habitual criminal proceedings does not involve double jeopardy. Pearson v. State, 521 S.W.2d 225 (Tenn.1975); Glasscock v. State, 570 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn.Cr.App.1978), certiorari denied August 28,1978. It is my belief that a remand and retrial on the question of prior convictions alone is not barred by any constitutional provision. Hence, Burks v. United States, supra, is not controlling. As Mr. Chief Justice Henry states in State v. Johnson, 569 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn.1978), “it is just that simple.”
I would therefore grant the petition to rehear and reverse my position in the original opinion and remand this record for a trial solely on whether the punishment should be enhanced.