Court Opinion

ID: 9897391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:59.472365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:34.106477
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    May 19 2023, 10:14 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jonathan D. Harwell                                       Theodore E. Rokita
Harwell Legal Counsel LLC                                 Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                          Justin F. Roebel
                                                          Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                          General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James H. Higgason III,                                    May 19, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-2000
        v.                                                Appeal from the Lake County
                                                          Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Salvador Vasquez,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          45G01-2101-MR-6

                                Opinion by Judge May
                      Judge Foley and Senior Judge Najam concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023                             Page 1 of 33
[1]   James Harold Higgason III appeals his three convictions of murder. 1 He

      presents multiple issues for our review, which we restate as:

                 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
                 Higgason’s motion to dismiss based on the State’s twenty-three-
                 year delay in filing charges;

                 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
                 two recordings of phone calls between David Copley and
                 Higgason because:

                          2.1 the State laid insufficient foundation for the admission
                          of the digitized recording (“Digitized Recording”) of the
                          cassette tapes (“Cassette Tapes”) of Copley’s conversation
                          with Higgason; and

                          2.2 the Digitized Recording was not the best evidence
                          possible when the original Cassette Tapes were available;

                 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
                 Higgason’s request for mistrial; and

                 4. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
                 responded to a jury question without first notifying counsel.

      We affirm.

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023                Page 2 of 33
      Facts and Procedural History                                2

[2]   On January 18, 1998, Hammond police received a 911 call reporting three

      deceased individuals in a house at 4604 Torrence Avenue. When police arrived

      at the house, they found the bodies of Elva Tamez, Jerod Hodge, and sixteen-

      year-old T.R. All three victims had been severely beaten and suffered

      lacerations, skull fractures, and brain hemorrhages. Tamez had a broken

      fingernail, and Hodge had lacerations on his forearms and one hand, which

      were consistent with defensive wounds.

[3]   Detective Thomas Fielden of the Hammond Police Department was the lead

      investigator. One of Tamez’s neighbors, Donna Lushbaugh, told him she

      purchased drugs at the house the night before the murders. Lushbaugh told

      police she knew Higgason because she attended high school with him.

      Lushbaugh indicated she smoked cocaine with Higgason and David Copley

      that night and she saw Higgason trade a shotgun for cocaine that evening as

      well. In a subsequent statement, Higgason confirmed Lushbaugh’s presence at

      Tamez’s house that evening. Police found a Browning 12-gauge shotgun in the

      attic of Tamez’s house.

[4]   Another of Tamez’s neighbors, Anna Flores, saw “people moving in [Tamez’s]

      house” around “6:30, a quarter til 7:00” on the morning of January 18, 1998.

      2
        We held oral argument on this case on April 18, 2023, at Franklin College in Franklin, Indiana. We thank
      Franklin College and the Johnson County Bar Association for their hospitality. We also thank counsel for
      their able presentations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023                               Page 3 of 33
      (Tr. Vol. V at 127.) A city worker saw a “taller individual he said had an

      orange hat on and the shorter individual had a dark hoody [sic] -- wearing a

      dark hoody [sic]” in the area of Tamez’s house on the morning of January 18,

      1998. (Tr. Vol. IV at 93.) Copley later surrendered a dark hoodie to police and

      Higgason’s grandmother, Marlene Dodge, told police Higgason had an orange

      hat.

[5]   After police determined the shotgun found in Tamez’s house belonged to

      Higgason, he gave a statement to police. During that statement on February 9,

      1998, Higgason admitted he was at Tamez’s house several times on the night of

      January 17-18, 1998, to purchase cocaine, and he also admitted he traded his

      shotgun for cocaine. He told police he had been there with Copley and had

      seen Lushbaugh there. Higgason stated he traded the gun for $50.00 worth of

      cocaine, and then left and “that was the last time I was there.” (Ex. Vol. II at

      158.) Higgason told police, “I did not kill nobody.” (Id. at 162) (errors in

      original). On February 13, 1998, Copley gave a statement to police that was

      “pretty much consistent” with Higgason’s statement. (Tr. Vol. IV at 73.)

[6]   Several months later, Detective Fielden received a call from an FBI agent 3

      indicating Copley had told some of his family members that Copley “was

      having a problem with his conscious [sic] and that he was involved with – with

      these murders at 4604 Torrence.” (Id. at 74.) Officer Fielden spoke with

      3
       At the beginning of the investigation into the murders, the Hammond Police Department requested the
      FBI’s assistance in investigating the crimes.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023                             Page 4 of 33
      Copley on May 21, 1998, while Copley was in a rehabilitation program at a

      Salvation Army. Copley told Officer Fielden that Copley’s earlier statement

      was true, “except for the part of when him and James Higgason left.” (Id. at

      76.) Copley told Officer Fielden that instead of leaving, he and Higgason “were

      there all night” and “ended up killing . . . the two drug dealers to rob them of

      their cocaine and their money.” (Id.)

[7]   During trial, Copley testified that on January 17-18, 1998, he and Higgason had

      been at Tamez’s house “smoking crack . . . [for] probably five or six hours[.]”

      (Tr. Vol. V at 172.) Copley also testified he told police that in the early

      morning hours of January 18, 1998, Higgason asked Tamez to go outside and

      get Higgason some cigarettes. Higgason then locked the door of Tamez’s

      house. Higgason noticed Hodge and T.R. had fallen asleep. Higgason told

      Copley “he wanted to whack these guys . . . to take whatever money or drugs

      they had.” (Id. at 175.)

[8]   Higgason then grabbed a closet pole and handed Copley a board. Higgason

      then started to “whack” Hodge and T.R. with the closet pole, while saying

      “Die, motherfucker, die.” (Id. at 176.) Copley testified he hit Hodge and

      Higgason hit both T.R. and Hodge multiple times. Tamez began knocking at

      the door, and Higgason told Copley to let her in. Copley ran down the block

      but saw Higgason beat Tamez and kick the door shut. When Higgason later

      caught up with Copley, Higgason started taking off his bloody clothes and

      putting them in the trash. Higgason also used snow to remove blood from his

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023              Page 5 of 33
       body. Higgason told Copley to “keep [his] mouth shut” and that “loose lips

       sink ships.” (Id. at 178.)

[9]    The day after Copley gave his statement to police, they returned to the

       rehabilitation center and asked Copley to call Higgason. Copley signed a form

       giving the police consent to record the phone call and gave police Higgason’s

       telephone number. After attaching a suction cup microphone to the receiver,

       police recorded the phone call between Copley and Higgason on a cassette tape.

       Copley called Higgason at the home of Marlene Dodge, Higgason’s

       grandmother. Dodge answered the phone. Copley asked Dodge, “is Jim

       around?” (Ex. 36 at 1:28-9.) Dodge said he was, but he was sleeping. Copley

       asked Dodge to wake him up.

[10]   During the call, Copley told Higgason he was going to tell police what

       happened, and Higgason replied, “No, dude, . . . you are talking about life,

       dude, forever. You are talking about going in for life, dude.” (Ex. 36 at 03:19-

       27.) Higgason told Copley, “don’t worry about it” (id. at 3:49-50) because “we

       didn’t do it.” (Id. at 4:24-5.) Higgason told Copley that Higgason heard police

       speak with witness Lundsford and “they’re saying her times ain’t matched.”

       (Id. at 4:30-1) (errors in original). Higgason went on to state “there ain’t

       nobody that knows but me and you[.]” (Id. at 6:35-6.) When Copley continued

       to suggest Copley should confess to the police, Higgason told him a conviction

       would result in the “electric chair, bro” (id. at 12-11-2), and asked Copley “why

       you want to take me down, Dave? Why you want to hurt me like that?” (Id. at

       12:51-5.)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023          Page 6 of 33
[11]   Police returned to the rehabilitation center two days later and Copley again

       called Higgason using the same recording process. During this second call,

       Higgason answered the phone. Higgason reminded Copley that Higgason had

       an alibi because Dodge told police she knew Higgason was at her house the

       morning of January 18, 1998. Copley told Higgason that Copley had talked to

       Copley’s pastor and “told him everything really.” (Ex. 37 at 3:57-8.) Higgason

       said, “dude, I didn’t do it, I don’t remember doing it.” (Id. at 4:13-6.)

       Higgason told Copley to “get your head together, bro” (id. at 4:33-4), and

       stated, “I know we fucked up, we both fucked up, dude.” (Id. at 4:42-6.)

       Higgason later told Copley, “you should have never told anybody else, dude”

       (id. at 7:31-3), and “we can’t fucking go ahead and squeal on ourselves, bro.”

       (Id. at 08:04-6.) Higgason made additional statements, including “if I don’t

       want to go sit in prison for at least twenty years then I got to keep my mouth

       shut, that I gotta get out of this one” because “I dug a hole, dude, . . . with the

       dirt up to my neck” (Id. at 13:12-9) (errors in original). He also said, “the only

       way out is to get away with it and never do it again, and leave fucking shit

       alone, dude.” (Id. at 13:25-37) (errors in original). Detective Fielden gave the

       prosecutor’s office the fruits of his investigation several times during the initial

       investigatory period, but the prosecutor’s office did not charge anyone in

       connection with the murders at that time.

[12]   In 2008, various items collected from the crime scene were sent to the Indiana

       State Police laboratory for DNA testing. DNA testing of a sample of cells from

       Tamez’s fingernails showed Copley was a minor DNA contributor and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023            Page 7 of 33
       Higgason and Hodge could not be excluded as contributors. Police met with

       Higgason regarding the murders. Higgason again denied he was involved in the

       crime and told police he had heard James Williams, a local drug dealer who

       sold drugs out of Tamez’s house in 1998, committed the murders. The State

       did not prosecute any suspects for the murders at that time.

[13]   In 2020, the State Police conducted additional DNA testing on samples from

       three of Tamez’s other fingernails. The results from those samples indicated the

       DNA under Tamez’s fingernails likely came from Tamez, Copley, Higgason,

       and an unknown fourth person. Based thereon, on January 11, 2021, the State

       charged Higgason and Copley with three counts of murder and three counts of

       felony murder. On May 1, 2021, Copley and the State entered into plea

       agreement wherein Copley pled guilty to one count of murder in return for a

       “complete and detailed sworn statement about his involvement in the crime.”

       (Ex. Vol. II at 166.) The trial court sentenced Copley to forty-five years.

[14]   On May 3, 2022, Higgason filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him.

       He argued the evidence upon which the State based its charges against him was

       “virtually the same evidence it has had in its possession since 1998” and the

       “delay in filing the charges is really inexplicable.” (App. Vol. II at 41.)

       Higgason asserted that, because of the delay, he had “lost the ability to present

       a defense or his ability to present a defense has been significantly impaired . . .

       in violation of his right to a fair trial.” (Id. at 42.) Finally, Higgason contended

       his “inability to call [] witnesses to testify at a trial in this matter caused an

       actual and substantial prejudice to Mr. Higgasons’ [sic] right to a fair trial.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023              Page 8 of 33
       (Id.) In its response, the State noted the newly-discovered DNA evidence and

       Copley’s recent agreement to testify as part of his plea agreement. The State

       argued Higgason “had not demonstrated any clear prejudice to his defense.”

       (Id. at 48.)

[15]   At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Higgason entered into evidence a

       September 9, 1998, statement from Jack Wilson. In his statement to Detective

       Fielden, Wilson indicated Copley told Wilson “he beat them to death” and

       Copley’s “buddy[,]” presumably Higgason, “beat them too.” (Ex. Vol. II at

       50.) Higgason indicated Wilson could not be subpoenaed to testify because the

       State had not provided Wilson’s last known address to Higgason. Wilson’s

       statement, Higgason asserted, was “the exact type of evidence that could

       exonerate Mr. Higgason from these crimes charged.” (Tr. Vol. II at 184.)

       Additionally, Higgason noted two witnesses, Dodge and C.W. Smith, 4 had

       passed away in the interim twenty-three years between the crime and the filing

       of the State’s charges against him. Higgason argued the unavailability of these

       witnesses prejudiced him because without them he was unable to properly

       prepare a defense.

[16]   The State responded Higgason had not provided evidence to substantiate his

       claims of Wilson’s and Dodge’s unavailability, as he did not provide death

       certificates. Further, the State indicated a quick internet search revealed a

       4
           At some point during the initial investigation, Smith, Tamez’s boyfriend, was considered a suspect.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023                                   Page 9 of 33
       person named Jack Wilson with same middle name and date of birth as the

       Jack Wilson who provided the signed statement in 1998 was presently

       incarcerated in Michigan. The trial court found Higgason had not

       demonstrated “actual and substantial prejudice” in the delay and denied

       Higgason’s motion to dismiss. (Id. at 202.)

[17]   On May 23, 2022, the trial court began Higgason’s jury trial. During trial, the

       State offered into evidence the Digitized Recording of the Cassette Tapes that

       Detective Fielden had made of Copley’s two telephone calls with Higgason.

       Higgason objected, arguing the State did not properly provide a chain of

       custody for the Digitized Recording. The trial court allowed the State and

       Higgason to ask Forensic Video Technician Keisha Ricketts questions regarding

       the chain of custody of the Digitized Recordings. After that questioning, the

       trial court overruled Higgason’s objection. The trial court noted Higgason’s

       continuing objection to admission of the Digitized Recordings based on the

       chain of custody issue.

[18]   When the State offered the Digitized Recording of Copley’s first telephone

       conversation with Higgason, Higgason objected to the admission on the basis

       that the Digitized Recording was not the best evidence because the Cassette

       Tapes existed and should be admitted under the best evidence rule. The trial

       court denied the objection because Ricketts testified earlier in the trial that the

       Digitized Recording was an exact copy of the Cassette Tapes that Detective

       Fielden made of telephone conversations between Copley and a second party.

       Because of the poor quality of the Digitized Recording, the State provided the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023           Page 10 of 33
       jurors with a transcript of the Cassette Tapes, 5 and the trial court reminded

       jurors the Digitized Recording, not the transcript, was the evidence.

[19]   When providing the jury with the transcript, the trial court stated, “you have a -

       - a transcript of the original telephone call between the -- these two, your

       witness and the defendant.” (Tr. Vol. V at 202.) Higgason objected to the

       admission of the Digitized Recording again. He argued the trial court made an

       improper statement identifying Higgason as the other person on the phone call

       because there was no evidence at that time that would identify Higgason as the

       other person. The trial court overruled the objection, but stated to the jury,

       “[s]o, … to be clear – and to be very, very clear. Mr. Copley indicated that he

       made a phone call. He made a phone call at the request of Detective Fielden.

       This is the recorded phone call that the – that the witness has indicated he has

       reviewed and is about to play.” (Id. at 204.) The trial court clarified, “Earlier I

       said between the – the witness and the defendant. I did misspeak. I think the

       testimony thus far is it’s a recorded phone call that was done by Mr. Copley.”

       (Id.) The trial court then reemphasized to the jury that “[t]he transcript is only

       to assist you. If there’s any discrepancy between the transcript and the tape, it’s

       the tape that matters most.” (Id.) During admission of the portion of the

       5
        Detective Fielden did not testify regarding whether he made the transcript from the Cassette Tape or the
       Digitized Recording. Regarding the issue, the trial court stated, during the discussion surrounding the
       admissibility of the Digitized Recording that “I guess I’m presuming that he took this transcript from the
       original, not any enhancement.” (Tr. Vol. V at 201.)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023                                Page 11 of 33
       Digitized Recording containing the second call, Higgason objected

       “incorporat[ing] all of [his] previous arguments.” (Id. at 209.)

[20]   After the Digitized Recording was published to the jury and Copley testified

       that Higgason was the other person on the calls, Higgason requested a mistrial

       “based on the inference that the court has concluded that the . . . statements are

       attributable to Mr. Higgason.” (Id. at 218.) Higgason argued that “while I

       understand the Court gave a limiting instruction . . . it’s very difficult to unring

       that bell in front of this jury.” (Id.) Higgason stated the trial court’s earlier

       mischaracterization that the phone call was between Copley and Higgason was

       such that he could no longer receive a fair trial. The trial court denied

       Higgason’s request for a mistrial and stated it believed the jurors would follow

       its earlier admonishment to disregard the trial court’s statement that the

       recording was between Copley and Higgason. The trial court then recessed for

       the evening. Higgason renewed his request for a mistrial when the trial court

       convened the next morning. The trial court again denied Higgason’s motion

       for mistrial.

[21]   At the end of presentation of evidence by both parties, the jury went into

       deliberation. Approximately three hours later, the jury told the trial court it had

       reached a verdict. Before the trial court received the verdicts, it stated:

               During deliberations there were questions posed to the Court.
               The first question reads as follows: And I’ll read the question into
               the record, as well as the response. “Can we see the transcripts of
               Higgason’s statements, proffer agreement, and both Copley’s
               statements as submitted by the defense?” The response is, “The

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023            Page 12 of 33
               Court is in receipt of your question. All the evidence that was
               properly admitted is in your possession. The Court is not
               permitted to provide transcripts.

               The second question that came in reads as follows: “For our
               clarification, if we believe the defendant was present but did not
               inflict any blows on one or more of the counts being considered,
               would that be guilty or not guilty under Indiana law? This one I
               replied to as follows: “The Court is in receipt of your question.
               The Court is not permitted to answer this question.”

       (Tr. Vol. VII at 135-6.) The jury then returned guilty verdicts for all charges

       against Higgason. After the jury foreperson read the verdicts, Higgason

       renewed his motion for mistrial “on the grounds previously stated[,]” which the

       trial court denied. (Id. at 140.)

[22]   The trial court entered verdicts for the three murder charges, noting it

       “believe[d] [the felony murder counts] merge.” (Id.) On June 23, 2022,

       Higgason filed a motion to correct error, reasserting his objections and request

       for mistrial. Higgason also argued the trial court erred when it did not contact

       Higgason after the jury’s second question. On July 24, 2022, the trial court held

       a hearing on the motion to correct error and on Higgason’s sentence. The trial

       court denied Higgason’s motion to correct error. After testimony and argument

       presented by both parties, the trial court sentenced Higgason to 60 years for

       each murder, to be served consecutive to one another, for an aggregate sentence

       of 180 years.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023           Page 13 of 33
       Discussion
       1. Motion to Dismiss
[23]   Higgason argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss

       because the twenty-three-year delay between the crime and charging resulted in

       prejudice making a fair trial impossible. Our standard of review in cases

       involving a criminal defendant’s motion to dismiss is well-settled:

               A defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
               the evidence, all facts necessary to support a motion to dismiss.
               When a party appeals from a negative judgment, we will reverse
               the trial court’s ruling only if the evidence is without conflict and
               leads inescapably to the conclusion that the party was entitled to
               dismissal.

       Johnson v. State, 810 N.E.2d 772, 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (internal citations

       omitted), trans. denied. When examining a motion to dismiss for pre-indictment

       delay, our analysis is guided by our Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in

       Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171 (Ind. 2016), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 475 (2016):

               Although the prosecution can exercise discretion on when to
               bring charges, that discretion is not unlimited. The United States
               Supreme Court has recognized that a pre-indictment delay in
               prosecution can result in a Due Process Clause violation.
               Although statutes of limitations often operate to prevent too
               much delay before criminal charges are brought, even where a
               charge is brought within the statute of limitations, the particulars
               of the case may reveal that undue delay and resultant prejudice
               constitute a violation of due process. Despite this, the passage of
               time alone is not enough to establish prejudice. If it were, then
               the Constitution would serve as a functional statute of limitation.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023           Page 14 of 33
               Rather, the defendant has the burden of proving that he suffered actual
               and substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial, and upon meeting
               that burden must then demonstrate that the State had no justification for
               delay, which may be demonstrated by showing that the State
               delayed the indictment to gain a tactical advantage or for some
               other impermissible reason.

       Id. at 189-90 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). “[I]f

       the prosecution deliberately utilizes delay to strengthen its position by

       weakening that of the defense or otherwise impairs a defendant’s right to a fair

       trial, an inordinate pre-indictment delay may be found to violate a defendant’s

       due process rights. Johnson, 810 N.E.2d at 775.

[24]   In support of his argument that the State’s twenty-three-year delay in filing

       charges against him unduly prejudiced him, Higgason cites Barnett v. State, 867

       N.E.2d 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. In that case, Barnett, while

       incarcerated, got into a physical altercation with a fellow inmate, Ricky Combs,

       on January 26, 1993. Id. at 185. After the two men scuffled, Barnett stabbed

       Combs, who subsequently died. Id. Guards and several inmates saw the

       incident. Id. Because of his injuries, Barnett was taken to the prison infirmary,

       where he was questioned. Id. Barnett “claimed he did not mean to kill Combs

       and explained that on the night before, Combs had threatened to kill him in the

       morning.” Id.

[25]   The State did not file a charge against Barnett related to Combs’s murder until

       July 7, 2005, when the State charged Barnett with murder. Id. On February 27,

       2006, Barnett filed a motion to dismiss and argued the State’s delay in bringing

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023               Page 15 of 33
       charges violated his due process rights. Id. After a hearing, the trial court

       denied Barnett’s motion to dismiss because “it did not yet have enough

       evidence before it to decide whether Barnett’s right to a fair trial was at risk[.]”

       Id. at 186. Barnett was tried by jury the same day, and the jury returned a not

       guilty verdict as to the charge of murder and found Barnett guilty of the lesser-

       included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Id. The trial court entered a

       conviction of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced Barnett to thirty years

       imprisonment. Id.

[26]   On appeal, Barnett argued the State violated his due process rights when it

       delayed filing the charges against him in Combs’s murder for twelve years. Id.

       Regarding prejudice stemming from the delay, Barnett argued:

               The unjust delay by the State in bringing the charge against him
               impaired his ability to adequately defend himself because several
               key witnesses had died or were unable to be located for purposes
               of testifying at his trial. Furthermore, Barnett claims that his
               ability to cross-examine those witnesses who did testify was
               greatly diminished by the witnesses’ faded memories.

       Id. at 187. In determining whether Barnett demonstrated real and substantial

       prejudice, this court explained:

               [W]e grapple with the issue of whether Barnett was actually
               prejudiced by the delay due to missing and deceased witnesses, as
               well as an inability to effectively cross-examine witnesses. To
               require that the defendant show more specific prejudice than this
               would place an impossible burden on the appellant. More
               prejudice can only be demonstrated by showing what the
               testimony of those witnesses would have been. It is precisely the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023           Page 16 of 33
        lack of this opportunity that prejudices Barnett. Even where
        there are recorded statements, the potential for prejudice is not
        foreclosed because of the inability to challenge such statements.
        The prejudice lies in the defendant’s inability to conduct a proper
        investigation, to interview and depose eyewitnesses, and to
        prepare a proper defense.

Id. This court noted several witnesses were either deceased or could not be

located in 2005, including

        Ron Cook, the chief internal investigator at the Pendleton
        Correctional Facility; Dr. Chavez and Dr. Denny, the physicians
        on duty at the Facility at the time of the incident; Lou Curtis, a
        nurse, also on duty the morning of Combs’ death; Detective Greg
        Bell, the lead investigator from the Indiana State Police; and
        Daniel Row, another inmate on the G cellblock who gave a
        detailed interview about the events surrounding Combs’ death.

Id. at 187-8. Additionally, the twelve-year delay resulted in three witnesses

having “no recollection of the incident.” Id. Our court found Barnett was

prejudiced by the State’s twelve-year delay in bringing charges against him:

        There were apparently at least twenty inmates out of their cells
        and in the area when the incident occurred. Lack of key
        witnesses makes it more difficult for Barnett to support his claim
        of self-defense. Furthermore, in a shakedown of the areas after
        the incident, six knives were found. There is no evidence of who
        possessed those knives, no testimony from the person or persons
        who collected the knives, no DNA testing on the knives, and no
        medical testimony as to whether more than one knife was used in
        the stabbing or which knife caused the wound to the stomach
        which, according to the autopsy report, was the proximate cause
        of Combs’ death.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023         Page 17 of 33
       Id. at 188.

[27]   In finding prejudice, we stated, “[t]here is no explanation for why the

       prosecutor, now deceased, allowed a case to sit in his office for over a year and

       half without looking at it or why he returned it to the investigator instead of

       leaving it for his successor.” Id. Based thereon, we held “Barnett was clearly

       prejudiced by the State’s unexplained and unjustified delay – whether

       intentional or negligent – in bringing charges” and reversed Barnett’s

       conviction. Id.

[28]   Barnett is distinguishable from the case before us. Even assuming Higgason

       demonstrated actual and substantial prejudice 6 in the State’s twenty-three-year

       delay in charging Higgason, the State was justified in the delay and did not

       engage in the delay to gain a tactical advantage. The State needed additional

       evidence to charge Higgason and that evidence could not be gathered at the

       time of the crime. First, the parties do not dispute that DNA testing capabilities

       in 1998 were not what they are today. Ten years after the crime, investigators

       were able to test the DNA under Tamez’s fingernails and the results thereof

       indicated Higgason could not be excluded as a contributor. In 2020, after DNA

       testing had again become more refined, the DNA under Tamez’s fingernails

       6
        In Ackerman, our Indiana Supreme Court explicitly set forth two prongs – (1) actual and substantial
       prejudice stemming from the delay and (2) unjustifiable reason for delay such that the delay was used by the
       State to gain a tactical advantage – both of which must be satisfied for the trial court to grant a motion to
       dismiss for pre-trial delay in charging the defendant. Ackerman, 51 N.E.3d at 189-90. As we hold the State’s
       twenty-three-year delay was justifiable and not used to gain a tactical advantage, we need not determine
       whether Higgason was prejudiced by the delay.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023                                 Page 18 of 33
       was tested and the results indicated Higgason was a contributor to the DNA

       found there. Thus, while the DNA samples under Tamez’s fingernails were

       available in 1998, DNA testing in 1998 was not as advanced as it was in 2008

       and 2020. The 2008 and 2020 DNA results were new evidence unavailable in

       1998 and that evidence corroborated earlier statements regarding Higgason’s

       involvement in the triple murder. Thus the State had a justifiable explanation

       for its delay and the delay did not occur to gain a tactical advantage.

       2. Admission of Evidence
[29]   Higgason argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the

       Digitized Recordings of the original Cassette Tapes containing Copley’s

       telephone conversations with Higgason. Our standard of review regarding

       challenges to the admission of evidence at trial is well-settled:

               The general admission of evidence at trial is a matter we leave to
               the discretion of the trial court. We review these determinations
               for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is
               clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
               and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.

       Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation

       marks and citations omitted), trans. denied. Error in the admission of evidence is

       to be disregarded as harmless unless it affects the substantial rights of a party.

       Rush v. State, 881 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In determining whether

       an evidentiary ruling has affected an appellant’s substantial rights, we assess the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023          Page 19 of 33
       probable impact of the evidence on the jury. Montgomery v. State, 694 N.E.2d

       1137, 1140 (Ind. 1998).

       2.1 Foundation for Admission of Audio Tapes

[30]   Higgason argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the

       Digitized Recording of the Cassette Tapes, which contained Copley’s two

       phone calls with a second party, because the State did not lay a proper

       foundation for the admission of the Digitized Recordings. Our review of the

       admission of audio recordings is well-settled. “The foundational requirements

       for admission of a tape recording made in a non-custodial setting are: 1) that the

       recording is authentic and correct, 2) that it does not contain evidence

       otherwise inadmissible, and 3) that it be of such clarity as to be intelligible and

       enlightening to the jury.” McCollum v. State, 582 N.E.2d 804, 811-2 (Ind. 1991).

[31]   Regarding the factors set forth in McCollum, Higgason contends the State “did

       not prove that the [Digitized Recording] played to jury was authentic and

       correct” because “the detective, who made the [Cassette Tape] recordings,

       could not recognize them when asked.” (Br. of Appellant at 18.) Next,

       Higgason contends the Digitized Recordings contained statements from Copley

       that were inadmissible hearsay because they did not fall under the hearsay

       exception contained in Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d), which allows for the

       admission of a party-opponent. Further, Higgason asserts the State entered into

       evidence the Digitized Recording because the Cassette Tape “was of such

       limited clarity[.]” (Id.) Finally, Higgason argues the State further complicated

       matters and called into question the authenticity of the Digitized Recording
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023           Page 20 of 33
       when it “presented to the jury a transcript the detective made from the original,

       not-introduced recording [Cassette Tape], and not a transcript made from the

       audio [Digitized Recording] published to the jury.” (Id.) Thus, Higgason

       argues, the Digitized Recording was inadmissible and the trial court abused its

       discretion when it admitted it into evidence.

[32]   We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the

       Digitized Recording into evidence because every factor of the McCollum test is

       satisfied. First, regarding the authenticity of the tapes, Ricketts testified she

       listened to the Cassette Tapes when she digitized them and the digitization did

       not “change any of the words.” (Tr. Vol. V at 110.) Additionally, Copley’s

       statements on the Cassette Tapes were not inadmissible hearsay because they

       provided context for what the State purported were Higgason’s comments on

       the call. See Hendricks v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1123, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (in a

       recording of a call between the defendant and his co-conspirator, statements

       made by defendant’s co-conspirator were admissible under the hearsay

       exception contained in Ind. Evid. R. 801(d) because they were not admitted for

       the truth of the matter asserted and instead to provide context for the

       defendant’s statements on the call). Finally, while the Cassette Tapes have

       certainly aged, the clarity of the Digitized Recording of those Cassette Tapes is

       sufficient because “[p]erfect quality is not required; rather, we require only that,

       taken as a whole, the recording must be of such clarity that it does not lead the

       jury to speculate about its contents.” Hall v. State, 897 N.E.2d 979, 981 (Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023           Page 21 of 33
       Ct. App. 2008). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

       admitted the Digitized Recording into evidence.

       2.2 Best Evidence

[33]   Higgason also argues the trial court abused its discretion when it entered the

       Digitized Recording of the calls between Copley and Higgason because the

       Cassette Tapes of the calls were available and thus the best evidence. The best

       evidence rule states: “An original writing, recording, or photograph is required

       in order to prove its content unless these rules or a statute provides otherwise.”

       Indiana Rule of Evidence 1002.

               The purpose of [the best evidence] rule is to assure that the trier
               of the facts had submitted to it the evidence upon any issue that
               will best enable it to arrive at the truth . . . . [I]t excludes all
               testimony of the contents of such instruments when the
               instrument itself is available and could be examined by the jury.

       Pinkerton v. State, 258 Ind. 610, 620-21, 283 N.E.2d 376, 382 (1972). Higgason

       claims the Cassette Tapes should have been admitted under the best evidence

       rule because they were true and accurate depictions of Copley’s phone calls

       with Higgason and the State did not lay the proper foundation to prove the

       Digitized Recording was a direct copy of the Cassette Tapes.

[34]   However, pursuant to Evidence Rule 1003, a “duplicate is admissible to the

       same extent as an original unless a genuine question is raised about the

       original’s authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the

       duplicate.” Additionally, “the party opposing the admission of a duplicate

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023           Page 22 of 33
       bears the burden of showing the existence of a genuine issue as to authenticity,

       and the challenge must be more than hypothetical.” Arlton v. Schraut, 936

       N.E.2d 831, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.

[35]   At trial, Ricketts testified the contents of the Digitized Recording were the same

       as those on the Cassette Tapes. She noted the Cassette Tapes were digitized

       because “a lot of people don’t have ways to play cassette tapes anymore” and

       the digitization can make the contents of the Cassette Tapes something

       “someone can actually use like now and from decade to decade.” (Tr. Vol. V at

       113.) In addition to Ricketts’s testimony, Copley also testified the Digitized

       Recording accurately reflected the contents of his calls with a second party he

       testified was Higgason. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not

       abuse its discretion when it did not admit the Cassette Tapes pursuant to the

       best evidence rule because the Digitized Recording was properly admitted

       under Evidence Rule 1003. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 182 N.E.3d 936, 938

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted a

       cell phone recording of a surveillance video because the creator of the cell

       phone video testified the video was a true and accurate copy of the original

       surveillance video).

       3. Mistrial
[36]   Higgason argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request

       for mistrial because the trial court’s statement identifying Higgason as the

       second person on the calls with Copley placed him in grave peril of an unfair

       trial. A mistrial is an “extreme remedy that is warranted only when less severe
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023        Page 23 of 33
       remedies will not satisfactorily correct the error.” Francis v. State, 758 N.E.2d

       528, 532 (Ind. 2001). “On appeal, the trial judge’s discretion in determining

       whether to grant a mistrial is afforded great deference because the judge is in the

       best position to gauge the surrounding circumstances of an event and its impact

       on the jury.” McManus v. State, 814 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind. 2004), reh’g denied.

[37]   “When determining whether a mistrial is warranted, we consider whether the

       defendant was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have

       been subjected; the gravity of the peril is determined by the probable persuasive

       effect on the jury’s decision.” James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 22 (Ind. 1993). A

       timely and accurate admonition is presumed to cure any error in the admission

       of evidence. Owens v. State, 937 N.E.2d 880, 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g

       denied. Because of that presumption, reversible error will seldom be found if the

       trial court has admonished the jury to disregard a statement made during the

       proceedings. Warren v. State, 757 N.E.2d 995, 999 (Ind. 2001). When the trial

       court admonishes the jury, we also presume “the jury followed the trial court’s

       admonishment and that the excluded testimony played no part in the jury’s

       deliberation.” Francis, 758 N.E.2d at 532.

[38]   “Because the trial court evaluates first-hand the relevant facts and

       circumstances at issue and their impact on the jury, it is in the best position to

       evaluate whether a mistrial is warranted. We accordingly review the trial

       court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.” Weisheit v.

       State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 15 (Ind. 2015) (internal citations omitted), reh’g denied, cert.

       denied 136 S. Ct. 901 (2016). The court abuses its discretion when its decision is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023           Page 24 of 33
       “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the

       court.” Vaughn v. State, 971 N.E.2d 63, 68 (Ind. 2012).

[39]   During trial, because of the poor quality of the contents of the Digitized

       Recording, the trial court allowed the jury to view a transcript prepared by

       Detective Fielden from the Cassette Tapes of the phone calls between Copley

       and a second person Copley identified as Higgason. The transcript was not

       offered into evidence. When providing the jury with the transcript, the trial

       court stated, “you have a -- a transcript of the original telephone call between

       the -- these two, your witness and the defendant.” (Tr. Vol. V at 202.)

       Higgason objected, arguing the trial court’s statement positively identifying

       Higgason as the other person on the phone call with Copley was

       “inappropriate” and that determination was “within the province of the jury”

       and not the trial court. (Id. at 203.) In response, the trial court told the jury:

               So to -- to be clear -- and -- to be very very clear. Mr. Copley
               indicated that he made a phone call. He made a phone call at the
               request of Detective Fielden. This is the recorded phone call that
               the -- that the witness has indicated that he has reviewed and is
               about to play.

               Earlier I said between the -- the witness and the defendant. I did
               misspeak. I think the testimony thus far is it’s a recorded phone
               call that was done by Mr. Copley.

       (Id. at 204-5.)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023           Page 25 of 33
[40]   The State then questioned Copley about the contents of the phone calls and

       Copley identified Higgason as the second person on both phone calls. Shortly

       thereafter, Higgason moved for a mistrial. He argued:

               [W]e believe a mistrial would be appropriate based upon the
               inference that the Court has concluded that the -- the statements
               are attributable to Mr. Higgason.

               And while I understand the Court gave a limiting instruction as
               to that, I think it’s very difficult to unring that bell in front of this
               jury.

               Now they have it in their mind that the Court presiding over the
               trial believes that that is Mr. Higgason on that. Whereas the only
               person who’s ever identified him is Mr. Copley. . . . But now that
               the Court has sort of emphasized that this is between Mr. Copley
               and the defendant, the defense doesn’t believe that Mr. Higgason
               can receive a fair trial at this point. That that information can’t
               be unrung.

               And so respectfully, Judge, we are moving for a mistrial based
               upon that statement to the jury.

       (Id. at 218.) The trial court denied Higgason’s request for mistrial:

               All right. I -- I will not grant a mistrial under -- under these
               circumstances. You brought it to my attention I may have
               misspoke. I informed the jury that I did misspeak. And I
               informed the jury what the testimony was thus far correctly as
               testified by -- by Copley. I asked them to disregard the comment
               I made about who was on the other side of the phone. By giving
               them that admonishment, there’s a presumption that they will
               follow the court instruction to them. And that certainly given
               that admonishment is not a basis for a mistrial.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023               Page 26 of 33
       (Id. at 219.) After the denial, the court recessed for the day. The next day when

       court convened, Higgason renewed his request for mistrial on the same grounds

       as the day before. The trial court denied his request for mistrial.

[41]   Higgason argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion

       for mistrial because he “was placed in grave peril when the trial court told the

       jury that Higgason was on the tape, an issue that was greatly disputed. The trial

       court took a highly contested issue out of the hands of the parties and informed

       the jury it was Higgason on the tape.” (Br. of Appellant at 14.) Higgason

       asserts in doing so, the trial court, “a neutral arbiter[,]” improperly commented

       on the “veracity of disputed evidence.” (Id.)

[42]   We hold the trial court’s inadvertent reference to the identity of the second

       party on Copley’s phone calls did not place Higgason in grave peril of an unfair

       trial because (1) the comment was brief, (2) subsequent evidence supported the

       statement, and (3) the trial court gave proper admonishments to cure the error.

       To the first point, that is, the prejudicial nature of the short statement the trial

       court made regarding this issue, the State relies on Szpyrka v. State, 550 N.E.2d

       316 (Ind. 1990). In Szpyrka, a police officer, who was a witness for the State,

       testified he “went to the Calumet City Police Department and picked up a

       photo of Thomas Szpyrka.” Id. at 317-8. Szpyrka objected and asked for a

       mistrial, arguing the statement “improperly indicated to the jury that appellant

       had a criminal record.” Id. at 318. The trial court admonished the jury to

       disregard the statement and denied Szpyrka’s motion for mistrial. Id. In

       affirming the denial, our Indiana Supreme Court noted “it stretches the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023            Page 27 of 33
       credulity to believe that the jury could have been swayed to such an extent that

       except for the improper remark by the police officer appellant would have been

       acquitted.” Id. The State contends the same is true here, and we agree.

       Higgason has not demonstrated that, but for trial court’s passing comment

       regarding the identity of the other person on Copley’s phone call, the jury

       would have reached a different verdict.

[43]   Regarding the second point, that subsequent evidence supported the trial court’s

       brief statement, Higgason did not request a mistrial until after the admission of

       the Digitized Recording and Copley’s testimony in which he identified

       Higgason as the other party to the phone calls. Copley testified the other

       person on the phone call was “Jimmy” and he knew Higgason’s voice because

       Copley had “known him for a while.” (Tr. Vol. V at 205.) Copley identified

       the other person on the phone call as Higgason, the person in the courtroom at

       defense table. Thus, the State contends, there was evidence to suggest

       Higgason was the other party on the phone call, and we agree.

[44]   Regarding the third point, the trial court provided an appropriate

       admonishment. The trial court stated to the jury that it misspoke and that the

       evidence before the jury at that time, before Copley’s testimony, did not

       positively identify the other party to the call. Additionally, during jury

       instructions the trial court reminded the jury, “[n]othing the Court says or does

       is intended to recommend what facts or what verdict you should find” and “[i]t

       is your duty to determine the facts from the testimony and evidence admitted by

       the Court and given in your presence, and you should disregard any and all

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023         Page 28 of 33
       information that you may derive from any other source.” (App. Vol. II at 89,

       116.) Based thereon, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion

       when it denied Higgason’s motion for mistrial. See Weisheit, 26 N.E.3d at 20

       (“When the jury is properly instructed, we will presume they followed such

       instructions.”) (quoting Duncanson v. State, 509 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ind. 1987)),

       and see Francis, 758 N.E.2d at 532 (we presume the jury follows a trial court’s

       admonishment).

       4. Jury Question
[45]   Higgason argues the trial court erred when it did not notify counsel that the jury

       submitted two questions to the trial court after retiring for deliberations.

       Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6 provides:

               If, after the jury retires for deliberation:

                        (1) there is a disagreement among the jurors as to any part
                        of the testimony, or

                        (2) the jury desires to be informed as to any point of law
                        arising in the case;

               the jury may request the officer to conduct them into court,
               where the information required shall be given in the presence of,
               or after notice to, the parties or the attorneys representing the
               parties.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023              Page 29 of 33
       Our Indiana Supreme Court has provided the proper procedure for trial courts

       to follow when a deliberating jury makes a request for additional guidance

       during its deliberations. In that situation, the trial court should

               notify the parties so they may be present in court and informed of
               the court’s proposed response to the jury before the judge ever
               communicates with the jury. When this procedure is not
               followed, it is an ex parte communication and such
               communications between the judge and the jury without
               informing the defendant are forbidden. However, although an ex
               parte communication creates a presumption of error, such
               presumption is rebuttable and does not constitute per se grounds
               for reversal. When a trial judge responds to the jury’s request by
               denying it, any inference of prejudice is rebutted and any error
               deemed harmless.

       Pendergrass v. State, 702 N.E.2d 716, 719-20 (Ind. 1998) (citations and emphasis

       omitted).

[46]   During deliberations, the jury sent two questions to the trial court. Higgason

       argues the jury’s second question regarding whether they could return a guilty

       verdict as to murder “if we believe the defendant was present but did not inflict

       any blows on one or more of the counts being considered” was a request to be

       informed as to any point of law arising in the case and thus counsel should have

       been present in the courtroom for the trial court’s answer to that question in

       open court. (Br. of Appellant at 23) (quoting Tr. Vol. VII at 136). Because he

       argues counsel was not notified of the question and the trial court did not follow

       proper procedure, Higgason asserts his convictions should be reversed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023        Page 30 of 33
[47]   As an initial matter, Higgason’s argument is waived because he did not make

       an objection at trial. See Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013)

       (failure to object to an issue at trial waives that issue from appellate review). In

       his reply brief, 7 Higgason acknowledges his argument is waived for failure to

       make a contemporaneous objection. Waiver notwithstanding, we hold any

       error in failing to follow the procedure set forth in Indiana Code section 34-36-

       1-6 is harmless.

[48]   Harmless error, by definition, is “an error that does not affect the substantial

       rights of a party.” Lander v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1208, 1213 (Ind. 2002). Where an

       error is harmless, we may not grant relief or reverse on appeal. App. R. 66. In

       support of its argument that any error in the trial court’s procedure regarding

       the jury’s second question was harmless, the State cites Stephenson v. State, 742

       N.E.2d 463 (Ind. 2001), in which our Indiana Supreme Court held the trial

       court’s communication with the jury regarding the jury’s request to review

       evidence for a second time was harmless because Stephenson did not

       demonstrate how that communication resulted in prejudice to Stephenson. Id.

       at 492.

       7
         In his reply brief, Higgason argues the trial court committed fundamental error. He raised this argument for
       the first time in his reply brief and it is well-settled that a party on appeal waives any argument presented for
       the first time in its reply brief. See Akin v. Simons, 180 Ne.3d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (stating same).
       However, waiver notwithstanding, and as we conclude in this section, any error was harmless and thus
       cannot be fundamental error. See Smith v. State, 190 N.E.3d 462, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“harmless error
       cannot be considered fundamental”), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023                                   Page 31 of 33
[49]   Here, Higgason did not explain on appeal how he was prejudiced by the trial

       court’s alleged error. Further, multiple witnesses put Higgason at the scene of

       the crime, Copley testified Higgason committed the murders with Copley, and

       the Digitized Recording included statements that suggest Higgason committed

       the murders. Thus, if the trial court did err in failing to notify counsel pursuant

       to Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6, the error was harmless because Higgason

       did not demonstrate he was prejudiced by the trial court’s alleged error and

       there existed sufficient evidence to convict Higgason of the triple murder.

       Conclusion
[50]   We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

       Higgason’s motion to dismiss because the State’s delay in prosecuting him for

       the murders was justified by the advances in science and not motivated by an

       attempt to prejudice Higgason. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion when it admitted the Digitized Recording of the phone calls between

       Copley and Higgason. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when

       it denied Higgason’s motion for mistrial. Finally, any error in the trial court’s

       decision to not notify counsel when the jury asked a question about Higgason’s

       culpability was harmless because Higgason did not establish prejudice and there

       was sufficient evidence to convict Higgason of the murders of Tamez, T.R., and

       Hodge. Accordingly, we affirm Higgason’s convictions.

[51]   Affirmed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023          Page 32 of 33
Foley, J., and Najam, Sr. J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2000 | May 19, 2023   Page 33 of 33