Court Opinion

ID: 9897284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:40.211171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:55.615939
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               Sep 25 2023, 8:39 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                               Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                    and Tax Court

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Susan D. Rayl                                              Theodore E. Rokita
      Aaron J. Harshman                                          Attorney General of Indiana
      Morgan B. Brading                                          Catherine E. Brizzi
      Harshman Ponist Smith & Rayl                               Deputy Attorney General
      Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Theodore J. Canonge, Jr.,                                  September 25, 2023
      Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                 22A-CR-2451
              v.                                                 Appeal from the
                                                                 Hendricks Superior Court
      State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable
      Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Mark A. Smith, Judge
                                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                 32D04-2105-F3-8

                                      Opinion by Judge Foley
                                     Chief Judge Altice concurs.
                               Judge May dissents with separate opinion.

      Foley, Judge.

[1]   Theodore J. Canonge, Jr. (“Canonge”) challenges the denial of his motion to

      suppress evidence obtained from a vehicle search, where law enforcement
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023                           Page 1 of 19
      brought in a K-9 unit during a traffic stop and the dog alerted to the presence of

      contraband. He argues that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment

      because law enforcement prolonged the traffic stop and otherwise lacked

      independent reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff. Because we

      conclude that law enforcement had independent reasonable suspicion to

      conduct the dog sniff, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Canonge faces four drug-related charges stemming from the discovery of

      contraband in a vehicle he was driving. Canonge moved to suppress evidence

      obtained from a search of the vehicle. At a hearing on Canonge’s motion, the

      State presented evidence about a traffic stop conducted on April 22, 2021. The

      evidence included testimony from the officer who conducted the traffic stop,

      Officer Kevin Roach of the Avon Police Department (“Officer Roach”), and

      the officer who later brought his K-9 partner to the traffic stop, Officer Steven

      Kaspryzk of the Avon Police Department (“Officer Kaspryzk”). The evidence

      also included footage from a camera installed in Officer Roach’s police vehicle.

[3]   Officer Roach testified that he saw the driver of a Chevy Malibu commit

      multiple traffic violations, including changing lanes without proper signaling.

      He decided to conduct a traffic stop. When Officer Roach activated the lights

      of his patrol vehicle, he noticed “three (3) occupants moving about in the car,

      reaching in various locations and then continuously looking back at [his] patrol

      vehicle.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13. When the Chevy Malibu pulled over and stopped,

      Officer Roach “saw movements continue inside the vehicle,” with the
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023    Page 2 of 19
      “occupants reaching around[.]” Id. at 14. Officer Roach saw the occupants

      engaged in these movements “a few times at least.” Id. at 17. From Officer

      Roach’s vantage point, it seemed as though the occupants were “reaching

      down, across, . . . like in the floorboard area[.]” Id. at 18. As Officer Roach

      approached the vehicle, he observed “backpacks at the floorboard[.]” Id.

[4]   Before Officer Roach reached the front window to speak with the occupants, he

      noticed that the driver—Canonge—was already “reaching over” to hand

      documents to Officer Roach. Id. at 17. It seemed to Officer Roach that

      Canonge was “try[ing] to accelerate [sic] the stop” or “expediate [sic] the stop.”

      Id. When asked to clarify why it seemed as though Canonge “was trying to

      expedite the stop,” Officer Roach said: “It’s unusual for . . . a driver to present

      documentation before I even address them.” Id. Officer Roach testified that he

      had conducted “around five hundred” traffic stops. Id. at 12. Reflecting on that

      experience, Officer Roach remarked: “I don’t believe I’ve had another traffic

      stop where I have experienced that.” Id. at 17. Officer Roach also noted:

      “[S]ometimes [the driver] may have [the documentation] in their hands, but

      they are not reaching over to hand it [to] me before I address them.” Id.

[5]   Officer Roach took the documents from Canonge and asked the front-seat

      passenger for his identification. The front-seat passenger complied with the

      request. However, Officer Roach observed that the passenger “wouldn’t make

      eye contact” with him and “didn’t speak . . . when [Officer Roach] was talking

      to him[.]” Id. Officer Roach thought that the front-seat passenger’s conduct

      was “a little unusual.” Id. He also noticed that the front-seat passenger was

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023     Page 3 of 19
      “smoking a new cigarette, pretty rapidly,” which he “kn[e]w to be indicative of

      a stressful situation for someone.” Id. at 14. Officer Roach turned his attention

      to the backseat passenger, who “seemed really nervous” and was sitting

      completely still in “a statute[-]like state.” Id. at 17. Officer Roach requested

      identification and, before that passenger “had the opportunity to answer,”

      Canonge “interjected” and said that the passenger was a minor. Id. at 15.

[6]   Officer Roach returned to his vehicle and began “running identification, vehicle

      information, things of that nature.” Id. His investigatory steps included a

      criminal-history check through Indiana’s MyCase system, which revealed “a

      couple of drug charges” between Canonge and the other adult occupant. Id. at

      17. While Officer Roach was using the computer and “conducting [his] typical

      procedure with a traffic stop,” he contacted officers with K-9 partners to inquire

      about availability for a dog sniff. Id. at 34. One officer was Officer Kaspryzk,

      who was addressing a roadside hazard. Officer Kaspryzk said he would bring

      over his K-9 partner after finding someone else to address the hazard. Officer

      Roach began writing a warning “to fill time until [Officer Kaspryzk] got there.”

      Id. at 33. Officer Roach testified that he typically gave verbal warnings. When

      asked why he prepared a written warning on this occasion, he said: “I was

      waiting for an officer . . . the K-9 officer to arrive to conduct the sniff. So, in the

      meantime I was occupying my time by writing the warning.” Id. at 25.

[7]   Officer Kaspryzk arrived about thirteen minutes later, which was about twenty-

      one minutes into the traffic stop. When Officer Kaspryzk arrived, Officer

      Roach exited his patrol vehicle and directed Canonge and the others to step out

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023       Page 4 of 19
      of the Chevy Malibu. Officer Kaspryzk then walked around the vehicle with a

      K-9 unit certified in detecting the odors of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine,

      ecstasy, and marijuana. The dog gave a positive alert at the rear driver’s side

      door. At that point, Officer Roach searched the vehicle, locating items that he

      suspected consisted of cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana.

[8]   In lieu of oral arguments, Canonge and the State submitted briefs concerning

      the motion to suppress. Thereafter, on August 3, 2022, the trial court denied

      the motion. On September 6, 2022—more than thirty days later—Canonge

      moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. Following a hearing, the

      trial court granted the motion to certify. This Court later accepted jurisdiction. 1

      1
        In a footnote, the State directs us to Appellate Rule 14(B), which governs discretionary interlocutory
      appeals. The State points out that where a motion to certify was not filed within thirty days of the
      interlocutory order and the trial court intends to grant the motion, the trial court “shall make a finding that
      the certification is based on a showing of good cause” and “shall set forth the basis for that finding.” Ind.
      Appellate Rule 14(B)(1)(a). Asserting that the trial court did not identify good cause in granting Canonge’s
      belated motion to certify, the State directs us to caselaw for the proposition that, under the circumstances, we
      have discretion to dismiss the interlocutory appeal. Notably, the State falls short of requesting dismissal,
      potentially because—as Canonge points out in his Reply Brief—the CCS entry associated with the hearing on
      Canonge’s motion to certify shows that the State “d[id] not object” to the motion. Appellant’s App. Vol. II
      p. 11. Moreover, although the State directs us to noncompliance with aspects of Appellate Rule 14(B), it is
      not as though the State claims we lack jurisdiction. To the contrary, the State suggests that dismissal would
      be on “non-jurisdictional grounds” based on Canonge’s failure “to file a timely motion to certify” or “assert,
      and have the trial court find, good cause for a belated motion[.]” Appellee’s Br. p. 6 n.1.
      Ultimately, because the trial court certified its interlocutory order and this Court later accepted jurisdiction,
      we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to resolve this appeal. See App. R. 14(B) (“An appeal may be taken
      from . . . interlocutory orders if the trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction
      over the appeal.”) & 5(B) (generally providing that “[t]he Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction over
      appeals of interlocutory orders under Rule 14”). Further, because the State did not object to the motion to
      certify and does not directly seek dismissal, we elect to reach the merits. See, e.g., Cardosi v. State, 128 N.E.3d
      1277, 1284 n.3 (Ind. 2019) (noting the appellate preference to resolve cases on the merits whenever possible).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023                                 Page 5 of 19
       Discussion and Decision
[9]    According to Canonge, the trial court should have granted the motion to

       suppress evidence because the traffic stop resulted in an unreasonable seizure,

       contrary to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2

[10]   The Fourth Amendment provides the right to be free from “unreasonable

       searches and seizures”—a right that applies in Indiana because of the

       Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961). To

       safeguard this right, evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or

       seizure is generally excludable at trial. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371

       U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) (recognizing that evidence may be excluded as “fruit of

       the poisonous tree”). A defendant may seek to exclude evidence by challenging

       the constitutionality of a search or seizure through (1) a pre-trial motion to

       suppress or (2) a timely objection at trial. Ind. Criminal Rule 2.7(B). In this

       case, Canonge is appealing the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence.

[11]   When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence obtained through a warrantless

       search or seizure, the State bears the burden of proving the warrantless search

       or seizure was constitutional. Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind.

       2001). In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial

       court’s proximity to the evidence by “construing conflicting evidence in the

       2
        A traffic stop also implicates protections in Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. See Marshall v.
       State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019). Here, Canonge exclusively relies on the Fourth Amendment in
       challenging the denial of his motion to suppress.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023                              Page 6 of 19
       manner most favorable to the ruling.” M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind.

       2016). In conducting our review, we also consider “substantial and uncontested

       evidence favorable to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d

       362, 365 (Ind. 2014)). Evaluating the evidence in this way, we decide de novo

       the legal question of whether the search or seizure was constitutional. Bunnell v.

       State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1234 (Ind. 2021); M.O., 63 N.E.3d at 331.

[12]   Canonge asserts that the traffic stop resulted in an unconstitutional seizure

       because law enforcement prolonged the traffic stop to bring in the K-9 unit and

       conduct a dog sniff. Canonge contends that the prolongment was improper

       because law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff.

[13]   A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Marshall v. State, 117

       N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019). For a traffic stop to comply with the Fourth

       Amendment, a police officer must have a lawful basis to initiate the stop, which

       includes “observ[ing] a driver commit a traffic violation.” State v. Keck, 4

       N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ind. 2014). Even if there is a lawful basis to initiate the

       stop, the Fourth Amendment does not condone indefinite seizure. See generally,

       e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Indeed, “a seizure that is

       lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of

       execution”—including the length of the seizure—“unreasonably infringes

       interests protected by the Constitution.” Id. “[T]he tolerable duration of police

       inquiries . . . is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission[.]’” Rodriguez v. United

       States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). In the traffic-stop context, that mission is to

       “address the traffic violation that warranted the stop . . . and attend to related

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023      Page 7 of 19
       safety concerns[.]” Id. All in all, “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when

       tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—

       completed.” Id. Therefore, although a police officer “may conduct certain

       unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop,” the officer generally

       “may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop[.]” Id. at 355.

[14]   One potential unrelated check is to bring in a K-9 unit to conduct a dog sniff.

       See id.; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09 (noting that conducting a dog sniff generally

       does not amount to an unreasonable search). In this context, “[t]he critical

       question . . . is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues

       a ticket, . . . but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—

       ‘the stop[.]’” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357. In carrying out the traffic stop, an

       officer must act with reasonable diligence. See id. Thus, “[i]f an officer can

       complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time

       reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission.’” Id. (quoting Caballes,

       543 U.S. at 497) (alteration in original). Nonetheless, if the traffic stop is

       prolonged to conduct a dog sniff, the seizure is not per se unconstitutional. See

       id. Rather, the prolonged seizure is permissible as long as the officer has

       “reasonable suspicion . . . to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 355.

[15]   Because we resolve this appeal on other grounds, we need not decide whether

       Officer Roach prolonged the traffic stop so that Officer Kaspryzk could arrive

       with his K-9 partner. That is, assuming arguendo the traffic stop was prolonged,

       we focus on whether there was reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023      Page 8 of 19
       Cf., e.g., Kane v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 n.1 (Ind. 2012) (declining to reach

       an appellate argument when ultimately resolving the appeal on other grounds).

[16]   When an officer briefly detains a person for investigative purposes—e.g., to

       conduct a dog sniff—the Fourth Amendment “is satisfied if the officer’s action

       is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘may be

       afoot[.]’” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States

       v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). “[R]easonable suspicion is an ‘abstract’

       concept that cannot be reduced to ‘a neat set of legal rules[.]’” Kansas v. Glover,

       140 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2020) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). “[T]he essence

       of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances—the whole

       picture—must be taken into account.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417

       (1981). Ultimately, “[b]ased upon that whole picture[,] the detaining officer[]

       must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular

       person . . . of criminal activity.” Id. at 417–18. Put differently, “[t]he Fourth

       Amendment requires ‘some minimal level of objective justification’” to support

       detaining the individual. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466

       U.S. 210, 217 (1984)). Further, to have reasonable suspicion, the officer “must

       be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized

       suspicion’” or “hunch.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

[17]   As officers appraise the evolving circumstances, they may “draw on their own

       experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions

       about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an

       untrained person.’” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023    Page 9 of 19
       They may also apply ordinary common sense, drawing on “information that is

       accessible to people generally, not just some specialized subset of society.”

       Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1190. “A determination that reasonable suspicion

       exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534

       U.S. at 277. For example, an encounter with law enforcement might present

       conduct “susceptible of innocent explanation” when the conduct is viewed in

       isolation. Id. Yet, when “[t]aken together,” the totality of the circumstances

       “suffice[] to form a particularized and objective basis” to make detention

       “reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 277–78.

[18]   All in all, the necessary level of suspicion “is considerably less than proof of

       wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, which

       involves only “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be

       found,” id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Indeed, “[t]he

       reasonable suspicion inquiry ‘falls considerably short’ of 51% accuracy[.]’”

       Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1188 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). In short: “To be

       reasonable is not to be perfect[.]” Id. (quoting Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S.

       54, 60 (2014)) (alteration in original). And by requiring reasonableness—rather

       than insisting on perfection—the Fourth Amendment gives officers “fair leeway

       for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 61

       (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).

[19]   In challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, Canonge generally focuses

       on the observations Officer Roach included in his probable cause affidavit,

       directing us to favorable testimony indicating that the affidavit “would be a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023    Page 10 of 19
       better resource than [Officer Roach’s] memory at the time of the hearing[.]”

       Appellant’s App. p. 11. We must decline Canonge’s invitation to reweigh any

       conflicting evidence and, instead, consider the totality of the circumstances. 3

[20]   As to the totality of the circumstances, Officer Roach testified that he saw

       movements in the vehicle that began when he activated his police lights and

       continued when the vehicle stopped. To Officer Roach, the occupants seemed

       to be reaching toward the floorboard area while looking back toward Officer

       Roach. Video evidence corroborates the observations of movement, showing

       Canonge turned backward, at one point bent down and no longer visible

       through the rear windshield. Ex. A at 1:15–1:20. Officer Roach not only saw

       movements directed toward the floorboard, but also noticed at least one

       backpack there. Next, before Officer Roach approached to engage the

       occupants about the reason for the traffic stop, he saw that Canonge already

       had his arm extended to hand over documents. This conduct struck Officer

       Roach as unusual because, after conducting 500 or so traffic stops, no one else

       had seemingly tried to expedite a traffic stop in this manner. Furthermore, at

       one point, Canonge interjected to respond on a passenger’s behalf, as though

       Canonge was trying to control and expedite the encounter with Officer Roach.

       Canonge engaged in this conduct while the other passengers—who Officer

       3
        Because we resolve this case on other factors, we disregard evidence that Officer Roach consulted MyCase
       and discovered that the adult occupants of the vehicle at one point had undefined “charges” against them.
       We leave for another day whether this type of evidence supports a reasonable suspicion determination.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023                       Page 11 of 19
       Roach had just seen “reaching around” in the vehicle—seemed nervous. Tr.

       Vol. II p. 14.

[21]   Canonge focuses on whether there are potential innocent explanations for the

       observed conduct. For example, he argues that any “concern about the

       occupants’ nervousness when being pulled over by police does not give rise to

       reasonable suspicion because it is understandable that they would be nervous.”

       Appellant’s Br. p. 13. We note, however, that although “nervousness alone

       may not support reasonable suspicion,” nervousness “may be considered

       alongside other circumstances to support such a finding.” Guthery v. State, 180

       N.E.3d 339, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. In any case, we do not

       disagree with Canonge’s suggestion that, taken individually, each of Officer

       Roach’s observations may not give rise to reasonable suspicion. But a

       reviewing court does not consider these observations in isolation. See id. at 349.

[22]   Canonge compares his case to Wilson v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2006), trans. denied and Powers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 440 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2022). As for these types of comparisons, the United States Supreme Court has

       cautioned that caselaw is not necessarily instructive due to differences in the

       “factual ‘mosaic’ analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion determination” that

       “preclude one case from squarely controlling another[.]” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at

       275 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996)). Here, the cited

       cases are distinguishable in that, although each involves evidence of

       nervousness, neither involves evidence that a person reached toward a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023   Page 12 of 19
       container when the officer approached. Indeed, the Powers Court specifically

       noted the record “d[id] not reveal furtive movements[.]” 190 N.E.3d at 446.

[23]   Ultimately, Officer Roach observed specific behavior that, taken together, gave

       him a particularized and objective basis to suspect that criminal activity was

       afoot. Viewing those collective observations in light of Officer Roach’s

       professional experience—as we must—it was reasonable for Officer Roach to

       seize the occupants of the vehicle for a short time longer to conduct the

       minimally intrusive investigatory dog sniff. Thus, we conclude that the totality

       of the circumstances—the whole picture—provided reasonable suspicion to

       prolong the traffic stop to conduct the dog sniff. Cf. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (“A

       determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the

       possibility of innocent conduct.”). Canonge’s arguments to the contrary

       amount to requests to reweigh conflicting evidence, which we must decline.

       Cf., e.g., Reply Br. p. 12 (“Officer Roach admitted that what he described as

       ‘furtive movements’ really was [that] ‘their bodies were moving,’ and he merely

       presumed that movement to be reaching.” (quoting Tr. Vol. II pp. 27–28)).

[24]   Because any prolongment of the traffic stop was supported by reasonable

       suspicion, the otherwise-lawful seizure was “reasonable within the meaning of

       the Fourth Amendment.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277–78. Therefore, the trial court

       did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

[25]   Affirmed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023   Page 13 of 19
Altice, C.J., concurs.

May, J., dissents with separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023   Page 14 of 19
       May, Judge, dissenting.

[26]   I respectfully dissent. I would expressly hold Officer Roach unreasonably

       prolonged the traffic stop so that a dog sniff could occur, and I disagree with the

       majority’s decision to simply assume the stop was prolonged without

       addressing the issue. In addition, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that

       sufficient reasonable suspicion arose during the traffic stop to justify holding

       Canonge until a dog sniff could be performed. Therefore, I would reverse the

       trial court’s denial of Canonge’s motion to suppress.

       1. Length of Traffic Stop
[27]   In Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court of the United States explained that “a

       seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its

       manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the

       Constitution.” 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005). A traffic stop

       “justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can

       become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to

       complete that mission.” Id. “[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to

       handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s

       shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 350, 135

       S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015).

[28]   “The burden is on the State to show the time for the traffic stop was not

       increased due to the canine sweep.” Wilson v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1064, 1067

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In contrast to Caballes, where one officer performed the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023     Page 15 of 19
       dog sniff while the second officer wrote a traffic citation, 543 U.S. at 406, 125 S.

       Ct. at 836, Officer Roach held Canonge for approximately twenty minutes

       before a K-9 officer arrived, a longer period than the approximately ten to

       fifteen minutes Officer Roach testified a traffic stop typically takes. In addition,

       while Officer Roach ultimately did not issue any ticket to Canonge, Officer

       Roach testified that he only began writing a warning ticket “to fill time until

       [Officer Kaspryzk] got there.” (Tr. Vol. II at 33.) He began preparing the

       warning ticket not in reaction to Canonge’s traffic violation but because he

       “was waiting for an officer . . . the K-9 officer to arrive to conduct the sniff.”

       (Id. at 25.)     Where an officer explicitly admits the writing of a ticket was

       pretextual, I would explicitly hold that officer unreasonably prolonged the

       traffic stop beyond the time necessary to address the reason for the stop. See

       Wilson, 847 N.E.2d at 1067 (holding officer unreasonably prolonged traffic stop

       when he finished writing the warning tickets but continued to detain driver to

       allow police dog to arrive); see also Powers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 440, 445 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2022) (holding officer detained driver and passenger beyond the time

       necessary to complete the purpose of the traffic stop).

       2. Reasonable Suspicion
[29]   Nonetheless, as the majority notes, a prolonged traffic stop is not per se

       unconstitutional if the officer has reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the

       individual. Slip op. at ¶ 14. As we explained in Crabtree v. State:

               The reasonable suspicion requirement of the Fourth Amendment
               is satisfied if the facts known to the officer at the moment of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023      Page 16 of 19
               stop are such that a person of reasonable caution would believe
               that the action taken was appropriate. In other words, the
               requirement is satisfied where the facts known to the officer,
               together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts,
               would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal
               activity has occurred or is about to occur. Reasonable suspicion
               entails something more than an inchoate and unparticularized
               suspicion or hunch, but considerably less than proof of
               wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.

       762 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (internal citation and quotation

       marks omitted).

[30]   Because, in my opinion, the evidence rises to nothing more than an inchoate

       and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, I disagree with the majority’s

       conclusion that Officer Roach had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic

       stop to conduct the dog sniff. In Wilson, we held the officer did not have

       reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop even though the officer observed

       that the driver “was ‘very nervous.’ His ‘hands were shaking’ and he was

       ‘having trouble getting his license and vehicle registration.’” 847 N.E.2d at

       1066 (internal citation to record omitted). Likewise, in Powers, we held the

       officer lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop even though both

       the driver and passenger exhibited “nervous behavior.” 190 N.E.3d at 446.

[31]   Here, while Officer Roach stated “[t]he passenger in the back seemed really

       nervous,” (Tr. Vol. II at 17), Officer Roach also testified that he did not observe

       any signs of drug use by anyone in the vehicle. He did not smell any illegal

       substances or observe any threatening movements. The occupants of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023   Page 17 of 19
       vehicle also were not sweating, fumbling with materials, or visibly shaking.

       One of the things Officer Roach found unusual, which the majority relies upon

       in concluding that there was reasonable suspicion, was that “before Officer

       Roach approached to engage the occupants about the reason for the traffic stop,

       he saw that Canonge already had his arm extended to hand over documents.”

       Slip op. at ¶ 20. However, I see absolutely nothing suspicious in a motorist

       having ready the documents the motorist knows the officer is going to request

       for inspection. It also is not unusual that occupants of a vehicle will look back

       after an officer turns on his patrol lights or that some movement will occur

       inside the vehicle as the motorist retrieves those documents.

[32]   The majority distinguishes Wilson and Powers by stating “that, although each

       involves evidence of nervousness, neither involves evidence that a person

       reached toward a container when the officer approached.” Slip. op. at ¶ 22.

       There is nothing unusual about having a backpack or laundry detergent

       container in one’s vehicle, nor is it suspicious to access or rearrange those items

       or similar items while driving. Even though Officer Roach answered

       affirmatively when asked if he saw “furtive movements,” Officer Roach

       clarified that what he saw was the occupants’ “bodies were moving” and he

       assumed they were reaching for something. (Tr. Vol. II at 27-28.) He could not

       see the occupants’ hands, and thus, he did not actually observe them concealing

       anything. See B.R. v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1173, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)

       (“Neither shaking nor being visibly nervous is ‘furtive.’ To establish that a

       suspect has engaged in furtive movements, the act must connote evasion or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023   Page 18 of 19
concealment.”). Body movement around a container cannot be all that is

needed to transform an ordinary traffic stop into a situation where the officer

has reasonable suspicion of drug possession. Such a holding dramatically

lowers the bar of what is required for an officer to indefinitely detain a motorist

pending the arrival of a K-9 officer. As our Indiana Supreme Court observed in

State v. Quirk, “a combination of irrelevant conduct and innocent conduct,

without more, cannot be transformed into a suspicious conglomeration.” 842

N.E.2d 334, 343 (Ind. 2006). That, I fear, is what the majority does here, and

therefore, I would hold that Officer Roach did not have the requisite reasonable

suspicion to prolong the traffic stop of Canonge, and I would reverse the trial

court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2451 | September 25, 2023   Page 19 of 19