Court Opinion

ID: 9906511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 11:23:42.484563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:35.076882
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-22-00277-CR
     ___________________________

  ERIC DEMOND MCNEIL, Appellant

                    V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3
           Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 1751507R

   Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       A jury convicted Appellant Eric McNeil of aggravated sexual assault and

assessed his punishment at six years’ confinement.1 The trial court sentenced him

accordingly. McNeil argues in three issues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient

to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by admitting graphic drawings

into evidence. We affirm.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

       J.J., 2 a former prostitute, testified at trial that on June 2, 2019, she was walking

home after she purchased and then used crack cocaine. She said that a car stopped

and the driver asked her where she was going. She responded that she was going

home and trying to get a beer. According to J.J., the man in the car, who was later

identified as McNeil, gave her money for a beer. McNeil asked J.J. if she wanted a

ride, and she got in his car.

       J.J. testified that after she got in McNeil’s car, he asked her, “[W]hat’s your

head game like.” J.J. understood that he was asking for oral sex, but she testified that

she had no intention of prostituting that night. However, J.J. did not believe that

       1
        The jury also convicted McNeil of aggravated assault as alleged in Count 2 of
the indictment. At the punishment phase of the trial, the State abandoned Count 2 of
the indictment.

       We use initials to protect the complainant’s identity. See 2nd Tex. App. (Fort
       2

Worth) Loc. R. 7; McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1982).

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performing oral sex was optional because McNeil had a gun pointed at her. J.J.

testified that McNeil ejaculated in her mouth, and then he gave her some water to

drink and told her to get out of the car. J.J. spit the water and ejaculate on the

sidewalk after she got out of the car. J.J. called 9-1-1 to report what had happened to

her.

       The Fort Worth police responded to the call and were able to collect a sample

from the spot on the sidewalk to submit for DNA testing. Detective Andrew Owen

testified at trial that the investigation was paused for a while because they ran out of

leads. Sometime later, the police received information that linked McNeil to the

DNA evidence collected at the scene. Detective Owen drove by McNeil’s residence

and observed a vehicle that matched the description given by J.J. The police picked

up McNeil on an outstanding traffic warrant and obtained a sample of McNeil’s

DNA, which matched that collected on the sidewalk at the crime scene.

       McNeil testified at trial that he had been driving around looking to pick up a

prostitute. According to McNeil, there was a young lady who flagged down his car

and asked to get in after he pulled up next to her. McNeil said that he asked her if she

was working, and she had him prove that he was not a police officer. McNeil asked

her, “[W]hat’s your head game like,” meaning that he wanted oral sex. She told

McNeil that it would be $30, but they agreed on $20 when he told her that was all the

money he had. The lady told McNeil that he could not ejaculate in her mouth.

McNeil acknowledged that he had a gun in his vehicle but said that he offered to put

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it in the backseat. McNeil testified that he did not put his hand on the gun or touch

the gun. McNeil paid the lady the $20, and she performed oral sex on him. McNeil

said that he ejaculated in her mouth, and she got a drink of water and spit it out. The

lady then demanded more money because he had ejaculated in her mouth, but McNeil

refused to give her more money.

                     II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

         In his first issue, McNeil contends that the evidence is insufficient to support

his conviction for aggravated sexual assault.

                               A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Federal due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt

every element of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S. Ct.

2781, 2787 (1979); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Jackson standard of review, which

is explained below, is the “only standard that a reviewing court should apply in

determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal

offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d

126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).          “[W]e review the sufficiency of the evidence

establishing the elements of a criminal offense under the single sufficiency standard

set out in Jackson v. Virginia.” Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014).

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       In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319,

99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The

factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our

judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine

whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the cumulative force of the

evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State,

569 S.W.3d 593, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232

(Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage

in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the

evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences

in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at

608.

                                    B. ANALYSIS

       A person commits the offense of aggravated sexual assault if he intentionally or

knowingly causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by the sexual organ

of the actor without that person’s consent and by acts or words places the victim in

fear that death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping would imminently be inflicted on

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any person, or uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the same criminal episode.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(A)(ii), (iv).

       J.J. testified that McNeil pointed a gun at her and forced her to perform oral

sex on him without her consent. Although McNeil testified that he paid J.J. to

perform oral sex making the encounter consensual, the jury was entitled to resolve

any conflicts in the testimony, and we must defer to the jury’s resolution. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793. This is not a case in which no rational juror could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.

at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. We overrule the first issue.

                            III. ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS

       In his second and third issues, McNeil argues that the trial court erred by

admitting three exhibits.

                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

       We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse

of discretion standard. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003);

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). We

will not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the record

shows a clear abuse of discretion. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. An abuse of discretion

occurs only when the trial court’s decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that

zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.               Id.   If the trial court’s

evidentiary ruling is correct on any applicable theory of law, we will not disturb it even

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if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its correct ruling. De la Paz v. State,

279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Qualls v. State, 547 S.W.3d 663, 675 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d).

      Rule 403 provides that the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly

presenting cumulative evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 403. “Rule 403 favors the admission

of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence is more

probative than prejudicial.” James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 546–47 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2021, no pet.) (first citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389; and then citing Emich

v. State, No. 02-18-00059-CR, 2019 WL 311153, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Jan. 24, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). Because of this

presumption, it is the burden of the party opposing the admission of the evidence to

show that the evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by one or more

of the dangers listed in Rule 403. James, 623 S.W.3d at 547.

                                   B. DISCUSSION

      During its cross-examination, the State questioned McNeil about writing erotic

poetry. The State then offered as evidence two exhibits from McNeil’s Facebook

page that depicted poems written by McNeil. Included with the poems were two

drawings—the first was of a mostly nude man and woman in bed together and the

second was of a mostly nude man and woman embracing. McNeil objected to the

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introduction of the exhibits based upon relevance and also complained that the

exhibits were not provided prior to trial, and violated Rule 403. The State then

offered another exhibit that included a poem written by McNeill about rage that

included an image of an object being destroyed by fire. McNeil made the same

objections to this exhibit. The trial court overruled McNeil’s objections.

      McNeil argues on appeal that the exhibits were inadmissible because the State

failed to lay the proper predicate. To properly preserve error under Rule 33.1 of the

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, a complaint must have been “made to the trial

court by a timely request, objection, or motion that . . . stated the grounds for the

ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity

to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were

apparent from the context.” Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Further, the record must

reflect that the trial court ruled on the objection either expressly or implicitly or

“refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and the complaining party

objected to the refusal.” Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2). McNeil did not challenge the

admission of the exhibits at trial on predicate grounds, and the trial court did not rule

on an objection for failing to lay the proper predicate. McNeil has not preserved this

complaint for review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

      McNeil also argues that the trial court erred by overruling his Rule 403

objection to each of the three exhibits. McNeil’s general Rule 403 objection did not

identify for the trial court which of the five distinct grounds in Rule 403 for excluding

                                           8
evidence precluded the admission of the exhibits, and, therefore, his objection was

insufficient to preserve his complaint for review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Checo

v. State, 402 S.W.3d 440, 451 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d);

Andrews v. State, No. 02-17-00052-CR, 2018 WL 3385661 at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth July 12, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

      Moreover, we would reach the same conclusion even if McNeil had preserved

the error. To determine whether evidence is admissible in the face of a Rule 403

objection, the trial court must conduct a balancing test. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at

389; see Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed that when undertaking a Rule 403

analysis, courts must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of

evidence and (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of

the evidence to suggest a decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the

evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency that a

jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence would

give it undue weight, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will

consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.

Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42.

      Once a Rule 403 objection is invoked, the trial judge has no discretion whether

to engage in the balancing test required by that rule. Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186,

195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). However, a trial court is not required to sua sponte place

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into the record any findings it makes or conclusions it draws when engaging in this

test, and McNeil did not request the trial court to make the findings on the record. Id.

The trial court is presumed to engage in the required balancing test once Rule 403 is

invoked. Id. at 195–96.

      The images were not inflammatory, and there is nothing to suggest an

improper verdict based upon the exhibits’ admission. There is further nothing to

suggest that the exhibits would confuse the jury or distract from the main issues. The

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits. We overrule McNeil’s

second and third issues on appeal.

                                IV. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled McNeil’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      /s/ Brian Walker

                                                      Brian Walker
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: November 30, 2023

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