Court Opinion

ID: 9637531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:09:15.489905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:57.296548
License: Public Domain

SAWTELLE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The record shows that the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the ev*98idence upon the theory that the defendant’s real residence was at Sandpoint and not at the place where' the search was made.
As I understand the majority opinion, it concedes that the trial court erred in' this respect, but sustains the verdict and judgment of guilty upon an entirely different theory, namely, that the officers were justified in making’the arrest, having probable cause to believe that a felony was being committed in their presence, and that the search was incidental to the arrest. The opinion states that “it must be conceded that the search of a dwelling house, as such, for a still is not authorized by the terms of the National Prohibition Act”; that the difficulty encountered in the record “arises from the fact that the officers do not expressly claim to have entered the premises for the purpose of making an arrest but asserted that their purpose was to ‘look for a still’ ”; and, further, “that it has been held that where the real intention of the officers in entering the premises was to make a search and not to make an arrest, the search is illegal although an arrest is actually made.”
A careful study of the record, portions of which are quoted in the opinion, convinces me that the officers proceeded to the premises in question for the definite and declared purpose of making a search thereof, that the search was an unlawful one, and that the entry and search were not incidental to the arrest, but, on the contrary, the arrest was incidental to the unlawful search. In this connection, see quotation in the majority opinion from Raniele v. United States (C. C. A.) 34 F.(2d) 877. The officers were examined and cross-examined as to their purpose in visiting the premises, and, be it said to their credit, they repeatedly, consistently, and truthfully testified that their purpose and intention were “to find the still if possible.” “We went up there to make an investigation of the place to see if the still was in operation.”
One of the officers further testified: “I knocked on the kitchen door and received no response, and I had a short conversation with Mr. Hester and I knocked again without receiving any response. Then I turned the door knob and the door was not locked. I opened the door far enough so I could see part of the still through the 'kitchen door. I then opened the door enough to pass through.”
As said by the Supreme Court in the ease of Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 32, 46 S. Ct. 4, 6, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A. L. R. 409:
“While the question has never been directly decided by this court, it has always been assumed that one’s house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624, et seq., 630; 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746; Weeks v. United States, supra [232 U. S. 393, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177]; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra [251 U. S. 391, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319]; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 308, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647. The protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to all equally—to those justly suspected or accused, as well as to the innocent. The search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws. Congress has never passed an act purporting to authorize the search of a house without a warrant. On the other hand, special limitations have been set about the obtaining of search warrants for that purpose. Thus, the National Prohibition Act, approved October. 28, 1919, c. 85, tit. 2, § 25, 41 Stat. 305, 315, provides that no search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor or is in part used for business purposes, such as store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, or boarding house. And later, to the end that government employees without a warrant shall not invade the homes of the people and violate the privacies of life, Congress made it a criminal offense, punishable by heavy penalties, for any officer, agent or employee of the United States engaged in the enforcement of any law to search a private dwelling house without a warrant directing such search. Act Nov. 23, 1921, c. 134, § 6, 42 Stat. 222, 223 [27 USCA §§ 53, 77]. Safeguards similar to the Fourth Amendment are deemed necessary and have been provided in the constitution or laws of every state of the Union. [See page 1268, Index Digest of state Constitutions (prepared for New York State Constitutional Convention Commission, 1915); also, section 8, c. 6, Consolidated Laws, New York, as amended by Laws 1923, c. 80.] We think there is no state statute authorizing the search of a house without a warrant; and in a number of state laws recently enacted for the enforcement of prohibition in respect of intoxicating liquors, there are provisions sim*99ilar to those in section 25 of the National Prohibition Act. Save in certain eases as incident to arrest, there is no sanction in the decisions of the courts, federal or state, for the search of a private dwelling house without a warrant. Absence of any judicial approval is persuasive authority that it is unlawful. See Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell, State Trials, 1030, 1066. Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause. See Temperani v. United States (C. C. A.) 299 F. 365; United States v. Rembert (D. C.) 284 F. 996, 1000; Connelly v. United States (D. C.) 275 F. 509; McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa, 368, 372, 98 N. W. 881, 65 L. R. A. 519, 101 Am. St. Rep. 323; People v. Margolis, 220 Mich. 431, 190 N. W. 306; Childers v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 848, 250 S. W. 106; State v. Warfield, 184 Wis. 56, 198 N. W. 854. The search of Frank Agnello’s house and seizure of the can of cocaine violated the Pourth Amendment.
“It is well settled that, when properly invoked, the Fifth Amendment protects every person from incrimination by the use of evidence obtained through search or seizure made in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Boyd v. United States [116 U. S. 630 et seq., 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746], supra; Weeks v. United States [232 U. S. 398, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177], supra; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States [251 U. S. 391, 392, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319], supra; Gouled v. United States [255 U. S. 306, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647], supra; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 316, 41 S. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654.”
The majority opinion holds that, notwithstanding the officers’ failure to testify that they went to the premises for the purpose of making an arrest, it must be presumed that they did so, and that it necessarily follows that the search was incidental to the arrest and therefore lawful.
It seems to me that it is going entirely too far to indulge in any such presumption. In fact, the testimony repels such a presumption and pushes it into the realm of speculation. If we are to indulge in presumption, would it not be more reasonable and consistent with the testimony to presume that the officers entered the premises to secure evidence upon which to base an application for the warrant of arrest? In view of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Carroll Case, 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, 39 A. L. R. 790, the express provision of section 25 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act, the Eourth Amendment, and the testimony in this case, I am of the view that the judgment should be reversed.
We are here dealing with a principle which is of far greater importance than the punishment of any particular individual. In Go-Bart Importing Co. et al. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357, 51 S. Ct. 153, 158, 75 L. Ed. 374, decided January 6, 1931, the Supreme Court said: “Since before the creation of our government, such [general] searches have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty. They are denounced in the constitutions or statutes of every State ip, the union. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A. L. R. 409. The need of protection against them is attested alike by history and present conditions. The Amendment is to be liberally construed and all owe the duty of vigilance for its effective enforcement lest there shall be impairment of the rights for the protection of which it was adopted. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 623, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746; Weeks v. United States [232 U. S. 389, 392, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177], supra.”