Court Opinion

ID: 9838879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 16:09:04.334004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:25.921367
License: Public Domain

J-S30026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 MARTINA WESTCOTT                        :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :   No. 2559 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 7, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0000935-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                     FILED SEPTEMBER 8, 2023

     Martina Westcott appeals from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing her petition filed pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon

our review, we affirm on the basis of the opinion authored by the Honorable

Glenn B. Bronson.

     On June 18, 2018, Westcott pled guilty to third-degree murder and

related charges stemming from an incident in which she shot her paramour

as he drove his car, in which Westcott was a passenger. On October 9, 2018,

Westcott was sentenced to an aggregate term of 22 to 44 years’ incarceration.

This Court affirmed Westcott’s judgment of sentence, see Commonwealth

v. Westcott, 237 A.3d 419 (Pa. Super. 2020) (Table), and our Supreme Court

denied allowance of appeal. See id., 242 A.3d 635 (Pa. 2020) (Table).
J-S30026-23

      On May 11, 2021, Westcott filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The

court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition raising claims of

ineffectiveness of plea and sentencing counsel. On July 7, 2022, the PCRA

court held an evidentiary hearing solely on the issue of plea counsel’s

ineffectiveness, as Westcott had failed to proffer any evidence on her claim of

sentencing counsel’s ineffectiveness. On July 8, 2022, the PCRA court issued

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss.    Westcott filed a response in

which she proffered a mitigation report in support of her claim that sentencing

counsel was ineffective. On September 7, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed

Westcott’s petition. Westcott filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a

court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal. She raises the following claims for our review:

      1. Whether the [PCRA] court committed an error of law and
      abused its discretion by accepting [the testimony of sentencing
      counsel,] James Lloyd[,] III[, Esquire,] as a cure to [the
      ineffectiveness of plea] counsel, Trevan Borum[, Esquire,] when
      [] Westcott [did not] knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily
      enter[] her plea.

      2. Whether the [PCRA] court committed an error of law and
      abused its discretion by not vacating [Westcott’s] guilty plea,
      which was not made knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily[.]

Brief of Appellant, at 1.

      In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, “this Court is limited to

ascertaining whether the evidence supports the determination of the PCRA

court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.”     Commonwealth v.

Andrews, 158 A.3d 1260, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2017). In rendering our decision,

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we are bound by the credibility determinations of the PCRA court that are

supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Keaton, 82 A.3d 419, 425 (Pa.

2013).

     Westcott’s claims involve the ineffectiveness of her plea counsel. Where

ineffective assistance of counsel is pled, counsel is presumed effective, and

the petitioner bears the burden of proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth

v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2007). In order to obtain relief, a petitioner

must prove that counsel’s representation was deficient, and that she was

prejudiced thereby.    Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Specifically, a petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that:

     (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions
     lacked any reasonable basis, and (3) counsel’s actions prejudiced
     the petitioner. Counsel’s actions will not be found to have lacked
     a reasonable basis unless the petitioner establishes that an
     alternative not chosen by counsel offered a potential for success
     substantially greater than the course actually pursued. Prejudice
     means that, absent counsel’s conduct, there is a reasonable
     probability the outcome of the proceedings would have been
     different.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

     Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
     guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
     caused [A]ppellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. In
     determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly and
     intelligently, a reviewing court must review all of the
     circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea.

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Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted). In order to establish prejudice in the context of ineffectiveness of

plea counsel, a petitioner must establish that there was a reasonable

probability that she would have opted to go to trial rather than plead guilty

had she been given legally sound advice. Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74

A.3d 185, 199–200 (Pa. Super. 2013).

       Here, after reviewing the parties’ briefs, the certified record, and the

relevant case law, we conclude that Judge Bronson correctly disposes of

Westcott’s claims.       Specifically, Judge Bronson:   (1) found credible the

testimony of sentencing counsel, James Lloyd, Esquire, who stated that “he []

reviewed all of the forms of homicide with [Westcott], including manslaughter,

and had advised her of the option of moving to withdraw her guilty plea,”

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/16/22, at 10; (2) “found, as a fact, that [Westcott]

declined to move to withdraw her plea after a full explanation of all of the

options [by Attorney] Lloyd,” id.; and (3) concluded that, as a result of

Attorney Lloyd’s pre-sentencing advice and Westcott’s subsequent decision to

proceed with a plea, Westcott suffered no prejudice from plea counsel’s failure

to review with her defenses that could result in a verdict of voluntary or

involuntary manslaughter.1         Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of Judge

____________________________________________

1 Judge Bronson specifically stated that, had Westcott moved to withdraw her

guilty plea prior to sentencing on the basis that plea counsel had failed to
advise her of relevant defenses, he would have “unquestionably” granted the
motion. PCRA Court Opinion, 12/16/22, at 12.

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Bronson’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, and direct the parties to attach

a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/8/2023

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Circulated 08/16/2023 10:15 AM