Court Opinion

ID: 9945208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 16:01:27.336463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.748454
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-3338
                        ___________________________

   The Arc of Iowa; Charmaine Alexander, Individually and on behalf of C.B.;
  Johnathan Craig, Individually and on behalf of E.C. on behalf of J.C.; Michelle
 Croft, Individually and on behalf of J.J.B.; Amanda Devereaux, Individually and
 on behalf of P.D.; Carissa Froyum Roise, Individually and on behalf of H.J.F.R.;
Lidija Geest, Individually and on behalf of K.G.; Melissa Hadden, Individually and
  on behalf of V.M.H.; Lisa Hardisty Sithonnorath, Individually and on behalf of
    A.S.; Rebekah Stewart, Individually and on behalf of E.M.S.; Heather Lynn
   Preston, Individually and on behalf of M.P. on behalf of S.P.; Erin Vercande,
                         Individually and on behalf of S.V.

                                      Plaintiffs - Appellees

                                         v.

Kimberly Reynolds, In her official capacity as Governor of Iowa; Ann Lebo, In her
       official capacity as Director of the Iowa Department of Education

                                    Defendants - Appellants

 Ankeny Community School District; Council Bluffs Community School District;
  Davenport Community School District; Decorah Community School District;
   Denver Community School District; Des Moines Public Schools; Iowa City
  Community School District; Johnston Community School District; Linn Mar
       Community School District; Waterloo Community School District

                                            Defendants

                            ------------------------------
  American Academy of Pediatrics; Iowa Chapter of the American Academy of
                                 Pediatrics

                                 Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s)
                                  ____________

                      Appeal from United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
                                  ____________

                           Submitted: January 10, 2024
                            Filed: February 27, 2024
                                 ____________

Before BENTON, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

       The Arc of Iowa and Iowa parents whose children have disabilities
(“Plaintiffs”) commenced this action to enjoin enforcement of Iowa Code § 280.31,
which prohibits mask requirements in schools unless otherwise required by law.
This Court previously vacated as moot a preliminary injunction issued by the district
court, finding the circumstances and conditions surrounding COVID-19 vastly differ
than when the injunction was issued. The ARC of Iowa v. Reynolds, 33 F.4th 1042
(8th Cir. 2022). The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

      On remand, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment and issued two declarations: (1) “the phrase ‘other provision[s] of law’ as
is used in Iowa Code section 280.31 includes Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act;” and (2) “Iowa
Code section 280.31 cannot be cited as the only basis to deny a student’s request for
reasonable modification or accommodation made under Title II of the ADA or
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act that includes requiring others to wear masks.”

                                         -2-
       Iowa Governor Kimberly Reynolds and Iowa Department of Education
Director Ann Lebo appeal, raising three claims: (1) Plaintiffs have not satisfied the
exhaustion requirements imposed by the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”),
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; (2) Plaintiffs lack standing; and (3) the relief granted by
the district court was unnecessary and improper. The school districts did not appeal.1

       Because there is “[n]o principle more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper
role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court
jurisdiction” to decide only actual cases or controversies, we begin with the issue of
standing. McNaught v. Nolen, 76 F.4th 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Sch. of
the Ozarks, Inc. v. Biden, 41 F.4th 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2022)). The existence of
standing is a legal issue that we review de novo. Dalton v. NPC Int’l, Inc., 932 F.3d
693, 695 (8th Cir. 2019). The “irreducible constitutional minimum” required to
establish standing involves three elements: (1) the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact,
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U.S. 330, 338 (2016). Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking federal court jurisdiction,
bear the burden of establishing these elements. Id.

       Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the first element. To establish standing,
Plaintiffs must show they suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent. Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 929
(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that to meet the injury requirement, the injury must be “both
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical”). “[A] person exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue forward-
looking, injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring, at least so long as the
risk of harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

      1
        At argument, Plaintiffs asserted “rights” that it believed schools should be
given with regard to masking in schools. Given Plaintiffs’ arguments, the crux of
any dispute (if there is one) appears to perhaps be between the State and the school
districts. Since the school districts did not appeal and are not a party before us, the
precise nature of any ongoing dispute is unclear to us.
                                           -3-
594 U.S. 413, 435 (2021). If the risk is too speculative, Article III standing is
lacking. Id. at 437-38 (determining that “plaintiffs did not factually establish a
sufficient risk of future harm to support Article III standing” because the risk that
misleading credit information would be disseminated to third parties was too
speculative).

       We find persuasive the First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits that have determined
the general risks associated with COVID-19, even though COVID-19 remains an
ever-present concern in society, are not enough to show “imminent and substantial”
harm for standing. See Roe v. Healey, 78 F.4th 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2023) (determining
parents of students with disabilities lacked standing to seek prospective declaratory
or injunctive relief prohibiting closure of in-person education due to COVID-19);
R.K. by and through J.K. v. Lee, 53 F.4th 995, 999 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that to
constitute concrete injury, falling ill from COVID-19 due to a lack of universal
masking is too speculative); E.T. v. Paxton, 41 F.4th 709, 716 (5th Cir. 2022)
(finding the plaintiffs increased risk of contracting COVID-19 is insufficient to
demonstrate an impending future injury, particularly since the odds of contracting
COVID-19 and suffering complications are speculative and the time, if ever, when
it would occur is uncertain). Here, because Plaintiffs have only alleged the potential
risk of severe illness should they contract COVID-19 at school, the risk of harm is
too speculative to satisfy the injury in fact element.

       Even if Plaintiffs could show injury in fact, they cannot carry their burden to
establish traceability. Article III requires a showing of “a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of
some third party not before the court.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992) (cleaned up). The defendants before us are the Governor of Iowa
and the Iowa Director of the Department of Education. In Disability Rights South
Carolina v. McMaster, parents of students with disabilities who attended South
Carolina public school challenged a state law that prohibited school districts from
using appropriated funds to impose mask mandates. 24 F.4th 893 (4th Cir. 2022).
                                         -4-
The Fourth Circuit found the parents lacked standing to sue the Governor or
Attorney General because the alleged injuries were not fairly traceable to their
conduct and an order enjoining enforcement of the law would not redress the claimed
injuries because the law does not prohibit a school district from imposing a mask
mandate. Id. at 901-904. As in McMaster, Plaintiffs here have not shown that either
the Governor or the Director of the Department of Education have a duty to enforce
Iowa Code § 280.31 or that they have attempted to enforce the law in a manner that
has directly affected them. Further, Iowa Code § 280.31 does not prohibit a school
from complying with disability laws, nor have Plaintiffs alleged that a school denied
their request for masking as a reasonable accommodation tailored to their child’s
situation. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of a case or controversy
that invokes federal court jurisdiction.

       For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s order and remand with
instructions to dismiss this action for lack of standing.
                        ______________________________

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