Court Opinion

ID: 9685240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:26:55.744197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:03.603969
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, J.
(dissenting). On April 11, 1974, Frank Belcher was injured in an accident caused by an uninsured motorist who hit the car in which Belcher was a passenger. From his host driver’s insurance company, Belcher collected $18,000. He then filed a demand for arbitration with his own insurance company, Aetna.
Aetna filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and a request for a temporary restraining order, based upon its contention that the "other insurance” clause in Belcher’s policy prevented Belcher from instituting a claim as to Aetna. On November 3, 1976, Aetna filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that the *183other insurance clause violated public policy since, at the time of the accident, the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act was still in effect. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Belcher on April 22, 1977. The court was thus allowing defendant Belcher to stack uninsured motorist benefits from two policies issued by different insurance companies.
In 1965, the Michigan Legislature passed MCL 500.3010; MSA 24.13010, which required uninsured motorist coverage. The purpose of MCL 500.3010 was to protect the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund from liability when uninsured motorist coverage was available. Blakeslee v Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan, 388 Mich 464; 201 NW2d 786 (1972).
MCL 500.3010 was repealed on October 1, 1973 by the enactment of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., MSA 24.13101 et seq., though the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund was allowed to remain in effect until July 26, 1974. It was during this interim period that Belcher sustained his injuries.
That the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund remained in effect for a period after MCL 500.3010 was repealed is not significant to the outcome of this case. The public policy with which the trial court concerns itself ceased with the repeal of MCL 500.3010.
In those cases in which the courts have found "other insurance” clauses invalid because they violated public policy, MCL 500.3010 was in effect. See, e.g., Blakeslee v Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan, supra. The objection to other insurance clauses has clearly been on the basis of statutory illegality—this was the public policy considered by the courts.
*184In Rowland v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 388 Mich 476; 201 NW2d 792 (1972), a case reported at the same time as Blakeslee, the Court chose to enforce the "other insurance” clause because, it found, the statute was not controlling. The insurance policy containing the clause had been issued before the effective date of the statute.
Rowland, therefore, did not consider any public policy considerations other than statutory illegality, such as claims against the uninsured motorist fund, which did exist at the time of the injury in Rowland. Any public policy arguments made were based on and originated solely from the statute. See Tierney, Insurance, 20 Wayne L Rev 471, 478 (1974).
"Other insurance” clauses have been specifically approved by our courts in times, like the present, when uninsured motorist coverage was not required. In Horr v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 379 Mich 562; 153 NW2d 655 (1967), the Michigan Supreme Court held that an "other insurance” clause precluded stacking of uninsured motorist benefits between two insurance companies. After finding no statutory or decisional law applicable, the Court attempted to determine the intent of the contracting parties in interpreting the "other insurance” clause. The Court gave the "other insurance” clause its literal meaning and used it to prorate the coverage between the two insurers.
Horr was followed by Arminski v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 23 Mich App 352; 178 NW2d 497 (1970), in which plaintiff was not allowed to stack two uninsured motorist provisions issued to him in a single policy. Arminski, like Horr, grew out of incidents which occurred before *185the statutory requirement of uninsured motorist coverage went into effect.
In Kozak v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 79 Mich App 777; 262 NW2d 904 (1977), the injuries occurred after the repeal of MCL 500.3010. Kozak, it must be noted, relied upon the law as it existed before the enactment of MCL 500.3010 (i.e., Horr and Arminski). In Kozak, the Court prohibited an insured from pyramiding his damages by stacking uninsured motorist coverage from multiple insurance policies issued by a single insurer. The Court found no considerations of public policy, such as existed by reason of the statute in Blakeslee.
I conclude, therefore, that when, as in Rowland, Horr, Arminski and Kozak, MCL 500.3010, which requires uninsured motorist coverage, is not in effect, there is no public policy which dictates that "other insurance” clauses be declared invalid. In cases arising out of pre-MCL 500.3010 situations (Rowland, Horr, Arminski) and in cases after the repeal of § 3010 (Kozak, which looked for guidance to pre-§ 3010 law), the courts have found other insurance clauses are enforceable. I, too, find the "other insurance” clause in defendant’s Aetna policy to be valid and enforceable.