Court Opinion

ID: 9755682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:46:54.199532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:10.123617
License: Public Domain

Jacobs, J.
(dissenting). In 1953 the petitioner suffered a compensable accident while at work. A piece of lead entered his eye and it has never been removed because the doctors consider it too dangerous to do so. In 1955 he was awarded partial permanent disability compensation amounting to $780 and when his eye worsened he was awarded $225 additional compensation in 1957. In due time he filed a petition for further compensation claiming that the condition of his eye had deteriorated since the 1957 award. He testified that his eye is getting worse, that it aches and becomes red, and, that he is afraid of losing his vision entirely. The respondent’s doctors testified that from the medical viewpoint the petitioner’s eye had not worsened *211since the 1957 award. They also expressed the opinion that it would not worsen in the future. But they cannot be certain and the petitioner is apparently convinced that it is worsening, and that further attention will be needed. He believes that in such eventuality the respondent should fairly be obliged to pay the necessary medical, surgical and hospital expenditures and requests a judicial direction to that end. It seems to me that under the compelling circumstances presented, he is entitled at least to such restricted measure of protection. Cf. R. S. 34:15-15; Howard v. Harwood’s Restaurant Co., 40 N. J. Super. 564, 573 (Essex Cty. Ct. 1956), affirmed 43 N. J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 1957), aff’d 25 N. J. 72 (1957).
The petitioner’s proceeding was instituted by him within the two-year period referred to in N. J. S. A. 34:15-27 and the granting of the relief he seeks would further the broad objectives of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The majority opinion apparently acknowledges that under appropriate circumstances there is statutory basis for the entry of an order for the payment of medical and related disbursements which may be incurred well after the expiration of the two-year period. However, it takes the position that the granting of such relief in the ordinary case would unduly entail administrative and practical difficulties and would run counter to the purposes underlying the basic statutory limitation in the act. Assuming all of this, I do not find this case to be the ordinary case. Cf. Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N. J. 434 (1961). The petitioner admittedly has a foreign object in his eye as the result of an industrial accident. He is naturally sensitive to it, is constantly aware of its presence, and is convinced that further treatment will be required. It is entirely likely that his concern and the symptomatic effects will continue and that he will, at the very least, be subjected from time to time to the costs of medical soothing agents. In the light of these special circumstances and the very strong considerations of justice supporting the petitioner’s limited request, the counter arguments would appear *212to fade into insignificance. Cf. Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Co., supra.
Proeedurally, the handling of the matter presents no difficulty. The Division’s order could readily be modified to embody a suitable provision dealing with such medical, surgical and hospital expenditures as may become necessary in the future and expressly reserving jurisdiction to entertain proceedings thereunder. The courts of our State have a discretionary power to reserve jurisdiction where the true interests of justice so dictate and comparable authority in the Division may be recognized within the broad principles expressed in Air-Way Branches, Inc. v. Board of Review, 10 N. J. 609, 614 (1952). See Estelle v. Board of Education of Red Bank, 14 N. J. 256, 261 (1954); Stone v. Dugan Brothers of New Jersey, 1 N. J. Super. 13, 17 (App. Div. 1948); but see Diehl v. New Jersey Power & Light Co., 4 N. J. Super. 175, 177 (App. Div. 1949). Cf. In re Hunnewell, 220 Mass. 351, 353, 107 N. E. 934, 935 (1915), where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in dealing with a compensation order embodying a particular reservation of jurisdiction, had this to say:
“There is nothing in the words of our act which prevents the Board from pursuing this course. The procedure should be flexible and adapted to the direct accomplishment of the aim of the act, with as little formality or hampering restriction as is consistent with the preservation of the real rights of the parties and the doing of justice according to terms of the act. It is within the power of the Board to decide that for a time compensation shall be suspended but not ended, with reservation of leave to the employe to apply for further payments under the act, provided this course in its opinion is required by the facts.”
I vote to modify the judgment below in conformity with the views expressed in the foregoing dissenting opinion. Justice Sohettino joins me.
For affirmance— Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Francis, Proctor, Hall and Haneman — 5.
For modification — Justices Jacobs and Schettino — 2.