Court Opinion

ID: 9670875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:27:36.721591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.989404
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting in part).
Notwithstanding the serious breaches of conduct detailed in the majority opinion, I cannot agree with the sanctions imposed. Under any view of the facts Judge Eads’ conduct must be, as he freely concedes, condemned. But under the circumstances a reprimand would be sufficient and appropriate.
I have but slight disagreement with the majority’s factual summary. First, I do not think the record establishes that, during the period involved, Judge Eads used his office of chief judge to assign specific cases to himself. Trial assignments are not usually superintended by a chief judge. More often this detail is assigned to the court administrator or an assistant of that *552office. In some districts it is the province of the presiding judge. If the majority is suggesting that Judge Eads was bent on getting Simmons firm cases assigned to himself, I disagree.
The majority makes special mention of an incident when Judge Eads demonstrated a special interest in retaining the supervision of a matter that was to be tried to him. But this is not an unusual practice. As a matter of efficient court administration it is to be encouraged. When a judge becomes familiar with a case it is sometimes a policy — sometimes indeed the rule — that the same judge see it through to disposition. This makes it unnecessary for another judge to duplicate the efforts of the first in becoming acquainted with the dispute.
Perhaps the record was not made complete on these matters because, during the proceedings, there was in effect a change in the nature of the complaint. The complaint was filed by a layperson whom the majority identifies as Mary Brown. She did not even testify in the proceedings. If Mary Brown’s complaint had related to these matters perhaps a better record would have been made on assignment practices in the district.
One thing is crystal clear in the record. The Simmons firm sought recusal only on certain selected cases. Several members of the firm continued to argue motions and try cases before Judge Eads with no problems. Recusal is not available on selective demand of a law firm. These facts present a poor basis for making a refusal to recuse a ground for disciplining a judge.
None of the foregoing factual differences reach, or even approach, the point of justifying Judge Eads’ conduct in injecting himself in the private litigation of his friend. Although his conduct towards Jilek was wrong, other facts mentioned by the majority should weigh more heavily in the outcome.
Judge Eads is an outstanding trial judge. He has an enviable reputation for impeccable honesty and dedication to his calling. He has given more than twenty years of distinguished public service. The bizarre conduct here, no matter how wrong, is aberrant, wholly at odds with his record and reputation. While we of course are not awed by judicial rank in the imposition of appropriately severe sanctions, neither should we fear, when justice demands it to temper an inappropriate sanction. It seems to me that justice does demand a more moderate sanction for this one bad episode in an otherwise distinguished career. I agree with the reprimand but not the suspension.
LARSON, J., joins this dissent.