Court Opinion

ID: 9404108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 07:10:14.4211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:11.573694
License: Public Domain

In The
                               Court of Appeals
                      Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                     No. 07-22-00139-CR

                         JEFFERY TODD ARCHER, APPELLANT

                                              V.

                                  THE STATE OF TEXAS

                              On Appeal from the County Court
                                  Deaf Smith County, Texas,
                  Trial Court No. 21-0190, Honorable D.J. Wagner, Presiding

                                       June 14, 2023
                             MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       Section 30.05(a) of the Texas Penal Code defines criminal trespass to occur when,

among other things, a “person enters * * * on or in property of another * * * without effective

consent and the person [] had notice that the entry was forbidden . . . .” Per statute, notice

can be given through “fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders

or to contain livestock.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(b)(2). There is no dispute that

Appellant, Jeffery Todd Archer, crossed such a border fence and entered onto the
property owned by Raymond DeChant.                  Although DeChant testified he would have

provided Appellant consent to enter his land under other circumstances (i.e., if Appellant

had not been carrying a firearm), such conditions were not present here.

        Through three issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the

trial court’s refusal to submit two requested jury instructions, and the trial court’s failure to

grant a mistrial because of allegedly improper jury communication.                        We overrule

Appellant’s issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                             Background

        An information alleged that Appellant intentionally and knowingly entered onto

DeChant’s property without effective consent, that Appellant had notice the entry was

forbidden, and that at the time Appellant was carrying a handgun.1 The State did not

allege Appellant violated the law by remaining on DeChant’s property after being given

notice to depart, so we do not discuss that evidence here.2 Evidence at trial showed

Appellant and his family lived near Hereford, Texas, on property adjacent to DeChant’s.

A fence surrounded DeChant’s property, where he kept chickens, a calf, and a horse.

        1  See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a). See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(d)(3)(C)
(classifying an offense under section 30.05 a Class A misdemeanor if the accused carries a deadly weapon
during the commission of the offense); Ladouceur v. State, No. 05-12-00366-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS
7792, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 25, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating
“[c]riminal trespass is normally a Class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor
if the defendant carries a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.”) (cleaned up).

         2 See Martin v. State, No. 07-11-00102-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 2587, at *3–5 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Mar. 30, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that when the State
alleges only the elements of criminal trespass by entry, our review is therefore limited to that theory of
criminal liability).

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DeChant testified the fence was intended to contain his livestock, and said he considered

anyone who crossed over the fence to be an “intruder.”

       Appellant and his family owned a dog that occasionally ventured onto DeChant’s

property. DeChant told Appellant’s spouse he did not want the dog on his property. On

February 21, 2021, DeChant saw Appellant’s dog on his property eating one of his

chickens. DeChant shot and killed the dog. When Appellant learned the news, evidence

revealed he crossed the fence bordering DeChant’s property “screaming and hollering,”

while waving a holstered handgun. At some point, Appellant’s spouse also entered the

property. DeChant contacted the sheriff’s department, and Appellant was arrested for the

offense of criminal trespass.

       At trial, when asked if he had given Appellant permission to come onto his property

on February 21, DeChant responded, “Not that day. No I hadn’t.” DeChant later testified

he would have had no objection for Appellant to have entered his land except that

Appellant was carrying a firearm at the time. DeChant also said:

       •   When Appellant brought a gun onto his property, DeChant felt Appellant
           was there to harm him.

       •   Without Appellant’s presence to commit harm to DeChant, the two
           “would’ve sat down and visited.”

       •   DeChant would have allowed Appellant to come on his property to
           retrieve the dog if Appellant had asked and not brought a gun.

       •   DeChant agreed with the prosecutor’s statement that “if Mr. Archer had
           just come over and had a conversation with you, we would not be here
           today . . . .”

Other testimony at trial indicated that the families’ children had crossed the border fence

“many times” without complaint by DeChant.

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         A jury found Appellant guilty of the charged offense and the trial court assessed

punishment at 180 days of confinement in the county jail, probated for one year, a fine of

$1,000, and court costs.

                                          Analysis

First Issue: Sufficiency of the Evidence

         By his first issue, Appellant argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence

that he entered the property of DeChant without his effective consent. Our sufficiency

determination is directed by the familiar standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

318–19 (1979). We view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to

determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Hooper v. State, 214

S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This standard gives full play to the trier of fact’s

responsibility of resolving conflicts in testimony, weighing evidence, and drawing

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of

witnesses and the weight, if any, given their testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893,

899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).        In a sufficiency review, “circumstantial

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d

at 13.

         Section 30.05(a) requires the State to prove that at the time Appellant entered onto

DeChant’s land on February 21, 2021, such entry was both “without effective consent”

                                              4
and that Appellant “had notice that the entry was forbidden . . . .” Notice that entry was

forbidden to Appellant is evidenced by the presence of the fence that surrounded

DeChant’s land, as well as his testimony that the fence was designed to exclude intruders

and contain livestock. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(b)(2); Salazar v. State, 284

S.W.3d 874, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“[I]f there is some sort of indication of a

separation of property in the form of a fence, a border, or even a sign, then the entrant

has explicit notice that entry is forbidden.”).

        The question of whether Appellant had “effective consent”3 to enter DeChant’s land

in spite of the fence required the jury to assess and resolve what Appellant accurately

characterizes as “equivocal” testimony by DeChant. On the one hand, DeChant testified

he had never given Appellant permission to come onto his property on February 21, 2021.

On the other hand, the jury received evidence about the past instances when family

members crossed the fence without incident,4 as well as DeChant’s testimony that he

would have not objected to Appellant entering his land if he hadn’t been carrying a firearm

at the time. Consistent with our adherence to a legal standard that recognizes the jury’s

role in resolving evidentiary conflicts, we find that the evidence was such that a rational

factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). Moreover, even

if we only considered DeChant’s testimony that he would have implicitly given permission

for Appellant to enter the land under other circumstances we could not find that DeChant

        3 According to the submitted jury charge, “‘Effective Consent’ means assent in fact whether express

or apparent[.]” See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(11).

        4   No evidence suggests these individuals carried a firearm at the time.

                                                      5
gave effective consent on February 21 because the condition (i.e., not carrying a

handgun) was not satisfied.

       We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

Second Issue: Requested Defensive Instructions

       At the charge conference, Appellant requested, and the trial court denied, jury

instructions based on subsections (d-3) and (f) of Penal Code section 30.05.             In

Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the trial court’s decision was in error. We

disagree.

       A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defensive issue raised by the

evidence if: (1) the defendant timely requests an instruction on that specific theory and

(2) the evidence raises that issue. Evans v. State, No. 07-14-00145-CR, 2015 Tex. App.

LEXIS 2724, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 23, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (citing Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630, 639 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003)). The evidence must touch upon each element of the defense. Holloman v. State,

948 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, no pet.). A trial court’s decision not to

include an instruction on a defensive issue in the charge is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant’s

requested submission. Reynolds v. State, 371 S.W.3d 511, 522 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d).

       We begin with Appellant’s complaint that the trial court erred in refusing to charge

the jury with an instruction consistent with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(d-3). In relevant

part, subsection (d-3) makes it a Class C misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed

                                              6
$200 if the defendant enters the property, land, or building with a firearm and the sole

basis for forbidding entry was the carrying of the firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 30.05(d-3). This subsection was added by the 87th Legislature and made applicable to

an offense committed on or after September 1, 2021.5 It is undisputed that the date of

the alleged criminal trespass for which Appellant was convicted occurred nearly seven

months before subsection (d-3)’s effective date. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing

to submit the instruction, even if it was for a different reason. See Johnson v. State, 490

S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (concerning evidentiary ruling).

       We next examine Appellant’s complaint that the trial court erred in refusing to

submit a jury instruction consistent with Subsection (f) of section 30.05. Appellant points

to the record evidence that he was alleged to have waved the handgun while still in its

holster, and that the arresting officer testified to performing a background check on

Appellant and discovering Appellant possessed a concealed handgun license. This

necessitates an examination of the text of Section 30.05(f), which states:

       It is a defense to prosecution under this section [30.05] that:

            (1) the basis on which entry on the property or land or in the building was
            forbidden is that entry with a handgun was forbidden; and

            (2) the person was carrying:

                 (A) a license issued under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government
                 Code, to carry a handgun; and

                 (B) a handgun:

                        (i) in a concealed manner; or

       5   Act of May 24, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 809 §§ 17, 28, 29, 2021 TEX. GEN LAWS 1960, 1966,
1972–73.

                                                   7
                         (ii) in a [shoulder or belt] holster.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(f).6

          There is no doubt that Appellant was carrying his handgun at the time, but was he

carrying his license? The verb “carry” is not defined by statute, so we look to its ordinary

meaning as aided by dictionary definitions. Webster’s dictionary offers two definitions

that are potentially applicable in this context: (1) “to get possession or control of : capture”

(e.g., she “carried off the prize”); and (2) “to wear or have on one’s person” (e.g., “Police

officers carry guns.”). Both definitions involve having physical possession and asportation

of an item. CARRY, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://tinyurl.com/565y28ue (accessed

on June 7, 2023). Black’s Law Dictionary offers similar meanings, but also includes a

definition that encompasses figuratively possessing or holding contractual rights, as in

“the decedent did not carry life insurance.” CARRY, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019).      This definition could potentially be extended to include instances when an

individual held a recognized right (e.g., a license) even if it was not within one’s physical

possession at the time.

          We believe the proper definition, in line with principles of statutory consistency,

requires that an individual asserting an affirmative defense under section 30.05(f) present

evidence that he physically possessed the license at the time he entered the land. The

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has described this tool of statutory construction in more

detail:

         6 The version of subsection (f) of section 30.05 in effect at the time of the offense pertained to a

person carrying a handgun in a concealed manner; or in a shoulder or belt holster. See Act of May 24,
2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 809 §§ 17, 28, 29, 2021 Tex. Gen Laws 1960, 1966, 1972–73. We find this
difference to be irrelevant for the reasons stated herein.

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         [A] word or phrase that is used within a single statute generally bears the
         same meaning throughout that statute and that when a second statute
         refers to the first statute, words or phrases within the first statute will bear
         their same meaning in the second statute. As the United States Supreme
         Court has stated, “the normal rule of statutory construction” is that
         “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to
         have the same meaning.” Although that presumption may give way if the
         legislature has clearly intended a different result, we are unable to find
         any clear indication that the legislature intended that the term “previously
         convicted” in Section 508.149(a) carry an entirely different meaning for
         purposes of good-time credits under Section 508.283(c) than it does for
         purposes of determining eligibility for release on mandatory supervision.

Ex parte Keller, 173 S.W.3d 492, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (footnotes omitted).

       To return to the relevant language, section 30.05(f) requires that the individual be

“carrying” two things: (A) a license issued under Chapter 411 of the Government Code,

and (B) a handgun. Reading the term “carry” to mean anything less than physical

possession of the item would render a different meaning depending on whether one was

reading subsection (f)(2)(A) or subsection (f)(2)(B). Put another way, equating “carrying”

under section 30.05(f) with merely holding a recognized right would potentially criminalize

conduct never intended under sections 30.05 and 30.06. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 30.05(d)(3)(C) (making it a Class A misdemeanor if the individual “carries” a deadly

weapon during the commission of the offense); § 30.06(a) (trespass by license holder

who “carries” a concealed handgun). See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 30.05(f-1

through f-4), 30.05(e-1 through e-4) (articulating affirmative defenses that distinguish

carrying a firearm from storing one).

       We find no evidence that at the time Appellant entered DeChant’s property he

carried his handgun license as required by subsection (f)(2)(A). While the arresting

deputy’s background check showed that Appellant was a handgun licensee, nothing of

                                              9
record shows at the time in question it was in his physical possession. The trial court,

accordingly, did not abuse its discretion by refusing to submit Appellant’s requested

subsection (f) instruction.

       Appellant’s second issue is overruled.

Third Issue: Improper Jury Communication

       We end with Appellant’s third complaint: that the trial court should have granted

his motion for mistrial due to improper communications by a trial spectator with a juror.

We overrule the issue.

       On the morning of the third day of trial, the trial court received testimony from a

deputy sheriff that he heard a spectator tell a juror to “look it through.” The juror allegedly

did not respond. Juror Lucio was also brought into the courtroom. She stated that on the

preceding day, “I walked out of the restroom, and [the spectator] just said, ‘You’re really

pretty.’ And I said, ‘Thanks,’ and I walked off. So that’s it.” When the spectator was

questioned, her account of the exchange was that she saw three female jurors near the

restroom, and said, “‘Hello. How are you? Good to see you. It’s a beautiful day. I wish

D.J. would turn on the air conditioner.’” The spectator denied saying to one of the jurors,

“‘You need to look it through’ or ‘Consider the facts.’”

       The court then explained that it “had the bailiff question the jury and we were told

the same thing as we were told this morning.” Appellant’s counsel argued he was left “in

a bad situation” because he did not know what the bailiff said to the jury, but the bailiff

was not questioned in open court. After Appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial, the trial

                                              10
court offered to bring in each juror one-by-one for questioning, and to replace juror Lucio

with an alternate. Appellant’s counsel declined both proposals.

       Thereafter, the court’s charge to the jury included the following instructions:

          In deliberating upon this case, you must not refer to nor discuss any
          matter not in evidence before you. No juror may lawfully relate to any
          others any fact or circumstances of which he/she may have knowledge
          or information not introduced in evidence. Neither any nor all of the jurors
          may lawfully consider or discuss anything else so far as the evidence is
          concerned except the evidence introduced by the parties, admitted by
          the Court and not withdrawn from your consideration.

          No one has any authority to communicate with you except the officer who
          has you in charge. During your deliberations in this case, you must not
          consider, discuss, nor relate any matters not in evidence before you. You
          should not consider nor mention any personal knowledge or information
          you may have about any fact or person connected with this case which
          is not shown by the evidence.

       A mistrial is an appropriate remedy in “extreme circumstances” for a narrow class

of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. See Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009) (citing Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for abused discretion. See Ocon, 284

S.W.3d at 884. The denial of the motion for mistrial must be upheld if, when viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the denial, it was within the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Id.; Alcoser v. State, No. 07-18-00032-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5722,

at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 9, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication).

       A mistrial is used to halt proceedings when the error is so prejudicial that it makes

the expenditure of further time and expense wasteful and futile. Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at

884 (citing Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). It should be granted

                                             11
only in instances where the record demonstrates the occurrence of an objectionable event

so inflammatory that curative instructions would likely fail to prevent the jury from being

unfairly prejudiced against the defendant. Mason v. State, Nos. 07-19-00066-CR, 07-19-

00067-CR, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 5929, at *15 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 29, 2020, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We examine whether the trial court

explored less drastic alternatives, including jury instructions and questioning the jury

about the extent of any prejudice. See Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 612 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016).

       The record provides no clear indication about what juror Lucio heard from the

spectator. Moreover, there is no record indication whether the bailiff, acting at the court’s

direction, transmitted any new information about the case to the jury. Based on our

consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we hold

that the denial of Appellant’s motion for mistrial was within the zone of reasonable

disagreement, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Appellant’s third

issue is overruled.

                                        Conclusion

       Having overruled Appellant’s three issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(a).

                                                         Lawrence M. Doss
                                                             Justice

Do not publish.

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