Court Opinion

ID: 9704339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:31:50.513226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:33.430619
License: Public Domain

SAND, Justice
(special concurrence).
The state of the record of this case, particularly as to whether or not the snowbound vehicle in question was on a private or a public road is weak and leaves much to be desired, yet, in my opinion, this is a crucial fact.
The testimony refers to it as a road, without any adjectives, and in one instance the officer was asked by the prosecutor, “Patrolman Lynch, is this a road, a public road at point V?”, to which the patrolman replied, “I wouldn’t say for sure if it is a public road or a private road. I couldn’t say for sure.” However, in the presentation and argument before the trial court on the suppression hearing, the prosecutor stated, “The car — the defendant was not on a public highway. It was on private property. It was operable.”
During oral argument before this Court, the prosecutor expressed reservations whether or not the road in question was public or private, which leaves me with the impression that the prosecutor might have thought that possibly some portion of the road was private, that at a certain point the road was considered private, as distinguished from public. It raises the further question whether or not the prosecutor is attempting to distinguish between a public highway and a public road, or public lane, which I don’t think is material. The crucial or material fact is whether or not the road, of whatever nature, was private or public, regardless of whether it is called a lane, a road, a thoroughfare, a street, a highway, *272an interstate, or by any other comparable name.
The testimony indicates that there were houses along the road in question. This could leave the suggestion that the road was a public road, or at least was a road shared by a number of residents. Unfortunately, this fact alone, without any further description of the road or its use, is not sufficient from which a firm conclusion can be made on the question of fact whether or not the road was private or public. An examination of the diagram made and introduced at the trial as Exhibit I does not resolve the question.
Under the circumstances as we have here, where the evidence in the record is meager, and where the prosecutor represented to the court on a material issue which could be considered as an admission, that the road in question was private, I am inclined to reason that this constitutes sufficient justification to conclude that the road in question was private.
Having reached this conclusion, the case law as developed by the United States Supreme Court on United States constitutional questions, and as set out fully in the majority opinion, applies to State courts until such time as the United States Supreme Court rules differently.1
The prosecutor, in the presentation and oral argument before the trial court on suppression hearing, also stated, “The testimony of the officer is uncontroverted. They did not go into the car looking for the contraband. They went into the car looking for the identification of its owner.” There was no indication that the officers were looking for a stolen vehicle. The record does not suggest that the police were looking for a VIN (Vehicle Identification Number), and none was reported by the officer who “searched” the car.
The collective purpose stated by the officer for the “search” of the car was “to find out who the vehicle was registered to,” or to try to find out “whose it was” without further valid reasons under these circumstances does not justify the “search,” in my view.
This information could have been obtained from the license tag or license number through the Motor Vehicle Registrar’s office or microfilmed information on this subject which is available in police departments. Once the person in whose name the vehicle was registered was known, it would have been a relatively simple process to find out if such person was the owner and, if so, did he give permission to anyone to use the car; and, if so, to whom; or if it had been stolen; or if he had sold the car and, if he did, to whom. The testimony as a whole does not disclose that a justifiable need existed for the “search” of the car without a warrant.
I, therefore, agree with the majority opinion. Having reached this conclusion, I do not believe any further comment is necessary, particularly as to the “green substance, plant material.” If the “search” otherwise were valid I would not, without a further showing of compelling reasons, consider objectionable the evidence as to what was found, including the “green substance, plant material,” merely because it was identified as green plant material.
PAULSON, J., concurs.

. The recent cases of Stone, Warden v. Powell, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d -, Supreme Court of the United States, decided July 6, 1976; and United States v. Janis, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d -, Supreme Court of the United States, decided July 6, 1976, together with their footnotes, indicate that there is a need for revision of some case law and that a change may be in the process of developing, but until this occurs we must abide by the current decisions, even though a substantial number of legal scholars and writers are questioning or doubting that the exclusionary rule is accomplishing its stated purpose and whether the societal cost is worth the rule.