Court Opinion

ID: 9498469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:18:25.033899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:51.172239
License: Public Domain

SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that portion of the court’s opinion which holds that counsel’s failure to investigate mitigating evidence constitutes constitutionally deficient performance. I must dissent, however, from the court’s conclusion in Part II.D that the state court’s affirmance of the death penalty violated constitutional standards. I agree with the district court’s determination that Summerlin failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance, he would have received a lesser sentence. Because I would also affirm the district court on the two issues the court does not reach today, I would affirm the judgment of the district court denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
I must also dissent from the court’s conclusion that counsel’s failure to “contact or interview” the prosecution’s rebuttal witnesses constitutes constitutionally deficient performance. Because this portion of the court’s opinion approves the type of “per se” rule regarding attorney performance that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), precludes, I must respectfully dissent from that portion of Part II.A as well.
I
To prevail under Strickland, Summerlin must “affirmatively prove prejudice,” which requires showing more than just the possibility that counsel’s performance prejudiced the outcome. Instead, Summerlin must demonstrate “a reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance, he would have received a lesser sentence. Id. at 691, 6930-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
A
In my view, Summerlin has not met this burden. I agree with the district court that practically all the mitigating evidence was in fact before the sentencing judge. The presentence report and Dr. Tatro’s psychological report described Summer-lin’s childhood—specifically noting his alcoholic mother’s proclivity to beat Summer-lin so severely and consistently that he preferred juvenile detention to home—and his father’s lengthy incarceration and shooting death in an armed robbery. The court cites only two new pieces of evidence regarding Summerlin’s childhood: ammonia and electroshock treatments. While tragic, these additional details would not have significantly added to the sentencing judge’s picture of Summerlin’s childhood.
Similarly, the sentencing judge was aware of substantially all the evidence regarding Summerlin’s mental difficulties. Dr. Tatro’s report described Summerlin’s illiteracy, dyslexia, and his symptoms consistent with paranoid personality disorder. Though the report did not mention temporal lobe seizure disorder, it explained that Summerlin had borderline personality disorder and an organic brain impairment that “may well underlie some of the difficulty he has with keeping his impulses under control.”
Finally, counsel’s failure to present evidence within his possession of the circumstances surrounding Summerlin’s prior felony conviction is irrelevant to the question of prejudice. The court does not hold— nor can it—that this omission, unrelated to counsel’s failure to investigate, was constitutional error. Even if it were, the addition of this evidence, along with the small amount of new mental health and social history evidence, would not create a “rea*645sonable probability” that the sentencing judge would have reached a different result. The prior conviction, regardless of the circumstances surrounding it, qualified as a statutory aggravating factor under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703 at the time.
Thus, in spite of Summerlin’s counsel’s constitutionally deficient investigation, practically all the available mitigation evidence that counsel would have uncovered through a reasonable investigation was already before the sentencing judge. In my view, therefore, Summerlin does not satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. I would affirm the district court’s determination that Summerlin failed to prove prejudice.
B
I would also affirm the district court’s determination of two additional issues the court does not reach today because of its analysis of the prejudice issue.
As to the conflict of interest claim, I would affirm the district court’s determination, for the reasons expressed in the three-judge panel opinion, that Summerlin was not prejudiced by the brief romantic encounter between the prosecutor and Summerlin’s first attorney. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 930-941 (9th Cir.2001), withdrawn, 281 F.3d 836 (2002). As to the state trial court’s impairment, I would affirm the district court’s determination, for the reasons expressed in Judge Kozinski’s dissent from the three-judge panel opinion on this point, that the sen-. tencing judge’s purported marijuana addiction did not affect his performance in Sum-merlin’s case. Id. at 957-964. Because the state court’s affirmance of the death penalty did not violate constitutional standards, I am satisfied that the district court properly denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
II
I must also dissent from the portion of the court’s opinion that characterizes counsel’s failure to contact or to interview Dr. Bendheim and Dr. Tuchler as constitutionally deficient performance. The court cites Rompilla v. Beard, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), to support the proposition that counsel’s decision neither to contact nor to interview the prosecution’s rebuttal witnesses fell below the constitutional threshold for ineffective assistance.
With respect, Rompilla does not support such a view. In Rompilla, the Supreme Court found constitutionally deficient performance where defense counsel failed to review a prior conviction case file that represented the core of the prosecution’s aggravation case. Defense counsel knew the prosecution planned to present details from the case file—including the rape victim’s trial testimony—yet failed to review the easily available file in order to counter the prosecution’s aggravation argument. Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2464. By contrast, Summerlin’s counsel, in spite of his other failings, did not fail to familiarize himself with the prosecution’s aggravation evidence. The prosecution’s only aggravating evidence was Summerlin’s prior felony conviction. As the court notes, Summer-lin’s counsel knew well the details of this prosecution.
Summerlin’s counsel’s failure to “contact or interview” Dr. Bendheim and Dr. Tuchler-—-the prosecution’s rebuttal witnesses—does not constitute constitutionally deficient performance. Counsel had obtained the doctors’ reports that formed the basis of their testimony. He also cross examined the doctors based on the conclusions in their reports and elicited them to concede several points in Sum-merlin’s favor. The mere fact that coun*646sel did not take the further step of contacting the doctors prior to the hearing does not render his performance constitutionally deficient. There is simply no showing that counsel would have learned anything more of relevance from personal contact with these doctors than what he had learned from their reports.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against the creation of “specific guidelines” or “checklist[s] for judicial evaluation of attorney performance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Unfortunately, the court ignores this warning today.