Court Opinion

ID: 9380778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 14:06:22.131375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.454226
License: Public Domain

[J-42-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                EASTERN DISTRICT

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                      :   No. 2 EAP 2022
                                                    :
                       Appellee                     :   Appeal from the Judgment of
                                                    :   Superior Court entered on
                                                    :   6/04/2021 at No. 1642 EDA 2020
               v.                                   :   (reargument denied 08/17/2021)
                                                    :   affirming the Order entered on
                                                    :   08/18/2020 in the Court of Common
 DONTEZ PERRIN,                                     :   Pleas, Philadelphia County, Criminal
                                                    :   Division at No. CP-51-CR-0003284-
                       Appellant                    :   2008.
                                                    :
                                                    :   ARGUED: September 13, 2022

                                   CONCURRING OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY                                          DECIDED: March 21, 2023

       I agree the trial court here was not required to accept the parties’ post-verdict

stipulation to the credibility of a witness, and accordingly join the Majority Opinion. I write

separately to address the additional question implicated by this case, but apparently left

open by the Majority, concerning whether trial courts, while not obligated to accept

proposed stipulations to witness credibility, nonetheless retain the discretion to do so.

See Majority Opinion at 13 n.7 (“We do not address the question of whether the trial court,

in its discretion, may accept a proposed stipulation as to witness credibility as that is not

the circumstance currently before the Court.”). In my view, Pennsylvania law forbids

stipulations to the credibility of witnesses, either before or after the verdict, and because

purported stipulations to witness credibility are invalid ab initio, trial courts may not accept

them under any circumstances.
       “A stipulation is a declaration that the fact agreed upon is proven.” Commonwealth

v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069, 1088 (Pa. 2001).          “A stipulation of facts is binding and

conclusive on a trial court, although the court may nonetheless draw its own legal

conclusions from those facts.” Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., 241 A.3d 600, 615 (Pa.

2020). There is no doubt “stipulations are highly favored in our judicial system[.]” Chao

v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2007). Among other benefits, stipulations

can streamline the factual issues before the court, eliminate the need for tedious proof,

expedite litigation, reduce costs to the court system, and minimize expenses to the

parties. See 83 C.J.S. Stipulations §2 (2022). Nonetheless, the ability of parties to

stipulate is not boundless. “[P]arties cannot stipulate to matters affecting the jurisdiction,

business, or convenience of the courts.” Northbrook Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 949

A.2d 333, 337 (Pa. 2008), citing Parsonese v. Midland Nat. Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814, 815

(Pa. 1998), and Foote v. Maryland Cas. Co., 186 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1962); accord Mader,

241 A.3d at 615 (“Under Pennsylvania law, litigants may limit the issues to be considered

by the court except for matters affecting the jurisdiction, business, or convenience of the

court.”)

       As an initial matter, witness credibility is not a fact subject to stipulation. A “fact”

is “[s]omething that actually exists; an aspect of reality[.]” Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(11th ed. 2019). “Credibility,” on the other hand, is “[t]he quality that makes something

(as a witness or some evidence) worthy of belief.” Credibility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(11th ed. 2019); see also 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses §917 (2023) (“Witness credibility is a

subjective, amorphous quality, often defined as much by the preconceptions of the

persons who perceive the witness as by the witness’s personal characteristics.”). It is

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axiomatic that a witness can appear worthy of belief, and thus be deemed credible,

without this actually being the case. Simply because a witness may give the impression

of being truthful does not, of course, make it so. When parties purport to stipulate to

witness credibility they are not agreeing to an objective fact, but rather a highly subjective

and vague quality that may or may not reflect reality. Indeed, the agreement to credibility

may say just as much (if not more) about the preconceptions and biases of those doing

the agreeing than it does the actual credibility of the witness. The indefinite characteristic

of credibility is not a fact amenable to stipulation.

       Moreover, a stipulation to witness credibility impermissibly invades the business of

the trial court. It is well-settled in this Commonwealth that assessing the credibility of

witnesses is within the exclusive province of the trial court, either acting on its own or

through a jury. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alston, 373 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. 1977) (“The

resolution of issues of credibility is within the province of the trial court.”); Commonwealth

v. Garvin, 293 A.2d 33, 39 (Pa. 1972) (“The law is well settled that it is the exclusive

province of the trier of facts to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be

accorded their testimony.”). If the parties simply stipulate to the credibility of a witness,

however, this freezes out the trial court entirely, and usurps the court’s sole prerogative

to decide questions of credibility. Importantly, the “bedrock principle that questions of

credibility are exclusively for the fact-finder[,]” Armbruster v. Horowitz, 813 A.2d 698, 703

(Pa. 2002), is not merely “a limitation on appellate courts” deciding credibility on a cold

record. Commonwealth’s Reply Brief to Brief of Amicus Curiae the Office of the Attorney

General at 3 n.1. This Court has never so held, nor is there any support for such a

construction. On the contrary, in the stipulation context, as on appeal, there is no firsthand

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evaluation of the witness’s in-court testimony under oath and subject to the crucible of

questioning, which is indispensable to an informed evaluation of credibility.            See

Commonwealth v. King, 990 A.2d 1172, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding judge “could not

possibly have made fully informed credibility determinations without observing the

demeanor of the witnesses”). A party stipulation to credibility, like appellate credibility-

finding, lacks the procedural safeguards essential to a proper assessment of the

credibility of a witness.

       Finally, barring credibility stipulations will not “unduly burden” the criminal justice

system.    Commonwealth’s Brief at 27.       Explicit stipulations to witness credibility, in

contrast to stipulations only inferentially implicating credibility which are beyond the scope

of this case, are hardly “routine” in this Commonwealth. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 16.

Quite the opposite, express credibility stipulations appear to be rare to the point of

nonexistent. Indeed, the parties fail to cite even a single Pennsylvania case involving

such a stipulation. Their reliance on Commonwealth v. Williams, 215 A.3d 1019 (Pa.

Super. 2019), is misplaced. In Williams, the parties stipulated “[t]he Commonwealth does

not stand behind the credibility of [Philadelphia Police] Officer [Reginald] Graham’s

testimony at Williams’[s] trial.” Williams, 215 A.3d at 1025. Thus, the stipulation in

Williams was not to the witness’s credibility, but the Commonwealth’s confidence in it.

Moreover, a formal investigation independent of the parties concluded Officer Graham

engaged in criminal conduct and lacked credibility. See Williams, 215 A.3d at 1028

(“Following Williams’ 2007 arrest, an investigation by the Philadelphia Police Board of

Inquiry determined that Graham engaged in criminal conduct as a police officer. . . . [T]he

Board of Inquiry found that Graham committed theft, prior to Williams’ trial, and then lied

                              [J-42-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 4
about it during the internal affairs investigation.”) (citation to record omitted). Further, the

Williams stipulation concerned testimony at a previous trial, not upcoming testimony at a

future proceeding. As the Majority correctly notes, there was no stipulation in Williams,

as there is here, that a witness would testify credibly (or incredibly for that matter) at a

forthcoming hearing or trial. See Majority Opinion at 9 (“Unlike the proposed stipulations

at issue herein, the stipulations in Williams did not assert a potential witness at an

evidentiary hearing would testify credibly.”); id. (“[T]here was no proposed stipulation to

witness credibility in Williams[.]”). In any event, to the extent Williams may be read to

endorse credibility stipulations, it runs headlong into, and is superseded by, this Court’s

precedents providing that only facts are amenable to stipulation and credibility

assessments are the exclusive prerogative of the trial court. Furthermore, while amicus,

perhaps in an abundance of caution, vaguely indicates stipulations to credibility may be

permissible “in limited and appropriate circumstances,” it does not specify what such

circumstances might entail or cite any authority endorsing this procedure. Brief for

Amicus Curiae the Office of Attorney General at 19.

       For the foregoing reasons, I believe stipulations to witness credibility are not, and

should not be, permitted in this Commonwealth. Hence, while I fully agree with the

Majority the trial court in this case did not err in refusing to accept the parties’ proposed

credibility stipulation, in my view no court in any context has the discretion to do otherwise.

       Justice Wecht joins this concurring opinion.

                              [J-42-2022] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 5