Court Opinion

ID: 9619590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:30:01.494017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:42.616950
License: Public Domain

JEFFREY W. BATES, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the principal opinion. I write separately only to explain why I disagree with the assertion in the dissenting opinion that the result reached in the case at bar is based upon an incorrect application of the rales of civil procedure governing the time for filing a notice of appeal.
As the principal opinion correctly notes, the appellants attempted to appeal from an interlocutory order in a probate proceeding. Prior to 1978, an appeal from an interlocutory order authorized by § 472.160.1(1)-(13) had to be taken within 30 days after the decision was made. § 472.180 RSMo (1969). Thus, the appeal time ran from the entry of the order. Id. In 1978, § 472.180 was amended to require that all appeals be taken “within the time prescribed by the rales of civil procedure relating to appeals.” § 472.180 RSMo (1978).
Rule 81.04 specifies that a notice of appeal must be filed “not later than ten days after the judgment or order appealed from becomes final.” I can find no provision in the rales of civil procedure which specifies when an order is deemed final for purposes of appeal. Forhan, Burg and Kemp all hold that an interlocutory probate order, appealable pursuant to § 472.160, is final upon entry. In re Estate of Forhan, 149 S.W.3d 537, 542 (Mo.App.2004); In re Estate of Burg, 68 S.W.3d 543, 544-45 (Mo.App.2001); Kemp v. Balboa, 959 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Mo.App.1997). Under that analysis, the appellants’ notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed 25 days after the order became final. According to the dissenting opinion, this conclusion is flawed because the finality of an interlocutory order should be determined by also applying the provisions of Rule 81.05. For the following reasons, I believe that argument is unsound.
It is evident from reviewing the plain language of Rule 81.05 that it applies only to judgments.1 Since the interlocutory order entered in the case at bar did not adjudicate the rights of all parties and issues in the case, it does not constitute a final judgment that is appealable pursuant to § 472.160.1(14). See, e.g., In re Estate of Hoskins, 996 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Mo.App. 1999); In re Estate of Buder, 781 S.W.2d *751259, 260 (Mo.App.1989); Smith v. Snodgrass, 747 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Mo.App.1988). Thus, a simple textual analysis of Rule 81.05 does not support its use here.
In Desterbecque, I believe we went awry by eschewing such a textual analysis in favor of the more “logical” approach of simply treating an order as a judgment, so as to permit Rule 81.05 to be used in computing the order’s finality. In re Estate of Desterbecque, 800 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Mo.App.1990).2 By doing so, we failed to give appropriate consideration to the reasons why Rule 81.05 delays the finality of a judgment in a civil case.
The purpose of Rule 81.05 is to determine when a judgment becomes final. If no timely, authorized after-trial motions are filed, a judgment becomes final 30 days after entry. Rule 81.05(a)(1). This delay in finality corresponds to the time period during which the trial court has the opportunity to exercise its retained authority, pursuant to Rule 75.01, to “vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its judgment. ...” Once that time period elapses, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the judgment. See Fortner v. Fortner, 166 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Mo.App.2005). If a timely, authorized after-trial motion is filed, a judgment becomes final on the earlier of: (1) 90 days from the date the last such motion was filed; or (2) the date when the last such motion is ruled. Rule 81.05. As before, this delay in finality corresponds to the time period during which the trial court continues to have jurisdiction to grant relief for grounds raised in the motion(s). See Massman Constr. Co. v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 914 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Mo. banc 1996); McCombs v. Joplin 66 Fairgrounds, Inc., 925 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Mo.App.1996). Thus, the initial 30-day delay in finality, as well as the additional delay of up to 90 more days, is intended to delimit the point in time at which a trial court loses control over its judgment, regardless of whether an appeal is taken.
The incorporation of this jurisdictional limitation into Rule 81.05 should have no bearing on how one computes the time for filing a notice of appeal from an interlocutory probate order that is permissively appealable pursuant to § 472.160.1(1)-(13) because no similar, automatic loss of jurisdiction takes place. Unless an appeal is taken, the trial court in a probate proceeding retains jurisdiction, for good cause, to vacate or modify its orders at any point prior to the expiration of the time for appealing from the order of final distribution of a decedent’s estate. See § 472.150. Indeed, even if an interlocutory appeal is attempted, the court has the discretionary authority to stay the appeal until the decree of final distribution and to require that it be heard along with any other appeals from the final order of distribution. See § 472.190.
Another conceptual difficulty presented by the application of Rule 81.05 to an appeal from an interlocutory order is the notion that the finality of such an order could be significantly delayed if an “authorized after-trial motion” is filed.3 See *752Rule 81.05(a). The application of this rule could permit the timely filing of a notice of appeal from an interlocutory, appealable probate order up to 120 days after its entry. I find that result inconsistent with the purpose of § 472.160.1(1)-(13), which is intended to allow expedited appeals from such orders. In re Estate of Forhan, 149 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Mo.App.2004).
Finally, it is worthy of note that Rule 74.01(a) defines the word “Judgment” as used in the rules of civil procedure to include “any order from which an appeal lies.” Resort to this rule, however, is not authorized here. Rule 41.01 lists the rules of civil procedure which apply to probate proceedings, and Rule 74.01 is not among them. Rule 41.01(b). While the judge may order that other civil rules apply, a specific order to that effect is required. Id. No such order was entered in the case at bar. Accordingly, Rule 74.01 cannot be applied in this probate proceeding. See State ex rel. Baldwin v. Dandurand, 785 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Mo. banc 1990); State ex rel. Estate of Perry v. Roper, 168 S.W.3d 577, 582 n. 4 (Mo.App.2005); Care and Treatment of Burgess v. State, 34 S.W.3d 430, 432 (Mo.App.2000). Because the rulings appealed in this case do not dispose of all claims and all parties, there is no judgment to which the provisions of Rule 81.05 could apply.

. As Judge Shrum points out in his dissenting opinion, In the Matter of Sweeney, 899 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Mo.App.1995), holds that Rule 81.05 does apply to an appeal from a final judgment in a probate proceeding. I have no quarrel with that holding. The difference is that the instant appeal was taken from an interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment. Therefore, Sweeney does not apply.

. Each of the cases cited to support that holding actually involved an appeal from a final judgment, rather than an interlocutory order. Id.

. Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 390, 392 n. 1 (Mo. banc 1993), lists the following authorized after-trial motions: "a motion to dismiss without prejudice after the introduction of evidence is commenced under Rule 67.01; a motion for a directed verdict under Rule 72.01(a); a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 72.01(b); a motion to amend the judgment, Rule 73.01(a)(3); a motion for relief from judgment or order under Rule 74.06(a) and (b), but see, Rule 74.06(c); and a motion for a new trial under Rule 78.” Id. To determine when an appeal must be filed, all of *752these motions are treated as a motion for new trial. Id.