Court Opinion

ID: 9591336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:03:41.106691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:09.822426
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I agree with the majority's interpretation of the universe of similar cases to be utilized in proportionality review under RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). Nevertheless, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Jeffries' death sentence is proportionate to the punishment imposed in similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant. Accordingly, I dissent.
The majority recognizes that we must follow the terms of the statute. The statute defines similar cases as:
cases reported in the Washington Reports or Washington Appellate Reports since January 1, 1965, in which the judge or jury considered the imposition of capital punishment regardless of whether it was imposed or executed, and cases in which reports have been filed with the supreme court under RCW 10.95.120. . ..
RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). RCW 10.95.120 requires the trial judge to file a report with the Supreme Court for every aggravated murder conviction. Thus, the universe of similar cases to he examined includes cases in which the death penalty was considered as well as cases in which the death penalty was not sought by the State.
In State v. Jeffries, 105 Wn.2d 398, 717 P.2d 722, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986) (Jeffries I), the majority concluded that similar cases did not include cases where the death penalty was not sought by the prosecutor. Thus, the proportionality review was based on only four cases in which the death penalty was imposed.
*505In State v. Harris, 106 Wn.2d 784, 725 P.2d 975 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987), the court, in doing proportionality review, noted three similar cases in which the death penalty had not been sought. In State v. Rupe, 108 Wn.2d 734, 743 P.2d 210 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988), the court explicitly stated that similar cases include cases where the prosecutor had not sought the death penalty.
Accordingly, Jeffries is before this court again for a new proportionality review. However, the majority still fails in its comparison of this case to similar cases.
The majority's comparison is faulty because it relies on State v. Rupe, supra, and State v. Rice, 110 Wn.2d 577, 757 P.2d 889 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3200 (1989). These two cases relied on Jeffries I to demonstrate that the death sentences imposed were not disproportionate. Since the proportionality review of Jeffries I is invalid because the universe of similar cases was incorrectly defined, the proportionality reviews in Rupe and Rice are called into doubt. The majority relies on cases that in turn relied on an invalid analysis, which analysis this present case is supposed to correct. The majority engages in circular argument by doing so. It is illogical to use Jeffries to prove the validity of Rice and Rupe and then use Rice and Rupe to prove the validity of Jeffries. This makes Jeffries self-justifying.
Moreover, it is difficult to see how Rice is similar in any respect to Jeffries for purposes of proportionality review. In Rice, the defendant stabbed and bludgeoned a family of four, including two children, and the jury found three aggravating circumstances as to each count of aggravated first degree murder. Although two of the aggravating circumstances found in Rice are the same as found in Jeffries, the court must take into consideration the defendant and the nature of the crime as well as the aggravating factors. The majority finds Rice similar on the basis of aggravating factors alone. Majority, at 491.
*506The majority again fails to consider the entire universe of similar cases. The majority mentions only Rupe and Rice as similar cases, and ignores all but one of the cases I outlined in my dissent in Jeffries I. Of the nine double-murder cases I described in that dissent, in seven, the death penalty was not sought, and in the other two, the jury found sufficient mitigating factors to merit leniency. See State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985) (execution slaying of two union reformers — death penalty not sought), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986); State v. Kincaid, 103 Wn.2d 304, 692 P.2d 823 (1985) (husband killed wife and sister-in-law after marital breakup — death penalty not sought); State v. Dictado, 102 Wn.2d 277, 687 P.2d 172 (1984) (execution slaying of two union reformers — death penalty not sought); State v. Carothers, 84 Wn.2d 256, 525 P.2d 731 (1974) (retired husband and wife shot — unanimous jury declined to impose death penalty); State v. Carey, 42 Wn. App. 840, 714 P.2d 708 (1986) (defendant convicted of arson murder of wife and son — death penalty not sought); State v. Martin, 41 Wn. App. 133, 703 P.2d 309 (defendant killed fiance's parents after she called off marriage — jury declined to impose death penalty), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1016 (1985); State v. Harris, King County cause 85-1-00093-1 (sentenced Aug. 25, 1986) (defendant killed fiance and a nurse, and attempted murder of two others— death penalty not sought); State v. Defrates, Mason County cause 84-1-00120-8 (sentenced Mar. 6, 1985) (defendant pleaded guilty to murder of sister-in-law and her brother— death penalty not sought); State v. Brown, King County cause 82-1-03429-7 (sentenced Apr. 13, 1983) (defendant killed common law wife and her uncle — death penalty not sought). The majority examines only State v. Kincaid, supra, and finds it not similar.
Since Jeffries I was decided, trial courts have filed with the Supreme Court seven reports of convictions by a jury of aggravated first degree murder where there were two victims. In four, the State did not seek the death penalty; in three, the jury could not agree on the death penalty. All *507seven defendants received life without the possibility of parole. See State v. Rice (Herbert), Yakima County cause 88-1-00427-2 (sentenced Jan. 5, 1990); State v. Sullens, Okanogan County cause 88-1-00195-1 (sentenced Sept. 15, 1989); State v. Hutchinson, Island County cause 87-1-00080-1 (sentenced July 17, 1989); State v. Baja, King County cause 88-1-03833-0 (sentenced Feb. 7, 1989); State v. Thompson, Grays Harbor County cause 88-1-00014-2 (sentenced Oct. 3, 1988); State v. Petersen, Pierce County cause 85-1-01855-1 (sentenced June 17, 1986); State v. Strandy, Clark County cause 85-1-00487-6 (sentenced Oct. 4,1985), aff'd, 49 Wn. App. 537, 745 P.2d 43 (1987).
Although these cases may or may not be in the appropriate universe of similar cases because of other factors, it is incumbent upon the court to review them to reach that initial determination of what universe is to be considered. This the majority fails to do.
The majority declines to look at what it calls "similar new murder cases." Majority, at 491. If by new murder cases, the majority means cases that were decided after Jeffries I, then Rice is also a new case that the majority should not consider. Rice's conviction and proportionality review occurred after Jeffries' conviction and first proportionality review. Although Rupe was convicted before Jeffries, his proportionality review occurred after Jeffries I. Thus, for purposes of proportionality review, Rupe is also a new case compared to Jeffries. Moreover, the statute does not differentiate between old and new murder cases. The statute requires the court to look at all cases reported since 1965 and all cases in which reports have been filed under RCW 10.95.120. RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). Presumably, this means all cases up to the point at which the proportionality review takes place. Thus, this court must look at all available cases, not just the ones that allow the court to reach the result it wants. The majority's comment that it need not go beyond Rupe and the cases used there to define the appropriate universe of similar cases is an abdication of the statutory duty.
*508For the reasons stated in my dissent in Jeffries I, the imposition of the death penalty in Jeffries' case is disproportionate to other multiple victim aggravated murder convictions.
The majority indulges in an examination of questionable similar cases that fails to take into account the appropriate universe of similar cases, or to create a principled methodology for conducting proportionality review. Therefore, I concur only with the majority's enunciation of the definition of the term "similar cases". I dissent from the majority's application of that definition to this case.