Court Opinion

ID: 9747452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:15:49.221133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:23.841878
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
Concurring:
Although I concur in the decision of the majority that this case must be remanded for a new penalty hearing, I strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “victim impact” testimony is not admissible at the penalty phase of a capital case.
As the majority so eloquently sets forth, prior to Payne,1 the United States Supreme Court had prohibited the use of “victim impact” testimony in capital eases as such testimony was considered to violate the Eighth Amendment. In Payne, the Court reversed its earlier position and declared that “victim impact” testimony is not violative of the Eighth Amendment. The Payne decision focused upon the role of the States in deciding what factors are to be relevant in a determination of the appropriate penalty in a capital case.
We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. There *272is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. at 2609.
In light of the decision in Payne, this court must now consider whether our capital sentencing scheme would permit the admission of relevant “victim impact” testimony. The pertinent part of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code necessary to such a consideration provides as follows:
(2) In the sentencing hearing, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances specified in subsections (d) and (e). Evidence of aggravating circumstances shall be limited to those circumstances specified in subsection (d).
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(a)(2) (emphasis added).2
The Majority reads the above section as limiting the admission of evidence at the penalty stage to only that which is specifically relevant to an enumerated aggravating or mitigating factor. I respectfully disagree and instead read the above language as empowering the trial court to allow the introduc*273tion of any evidence “relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed.”
In Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 555 A.2d 846 (1989), this court specifically rejected the argument that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2) limits the presentation of evidence to only those matters specifically enumerated as aggravating and mitigating factors. In that case, the defendant sought to introduce information to the jury about his character and background which would influence them in favor of a life sentence, and to prohibit the prosecution from rebutting that testimony and presenting evidence in contradiction to the defendant’s statements. The defendant based his argument on the language of § 9711(a)(2), claiming that the prosecution could only introduce evidence relevant to an enumerated aggravating or mitigating factor. This court rejected that argument:
We do not read the statute as limiting the scope of the sentencing hearing to this extent.... If matters relating to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were the only matters capable of being explored, the first phrase emphasized above would be surplusage, indeed, misleading surplusage. Such a reading would, of course, be contrary to the most basic rules of statutory construction.
Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. at 213, 555 A.2d at 858 (1989). The AbuJamal court then went on to explain that, although a sentence of death can only be imposed because of the factors enumerated within the statute, that does not require that the sentencing hearing be limited only to evidence going to one of the specific aggravating or mitigating factors. All relevant evidence, that does not unduly prejudice the defendant, should be admitted so that the jurors may have the benefit of as much information as possible when considering such a grave decision.3 Id. at 214, 555 A.2d at 859.
*274In non-capital cases a “victim impact” statement is a required portion of all pre-sentence investigation reports. See Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 1403 A(4). Further, the Pennsylvania legislature obviously considers “victim impact” testimony to be a relevant and important consideration in sentencing. The BASIC BILL OF RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS, 71 P.S. § 180-9.3, provides in part as follows:
Victims of crime have the following rights:
(5) To have the opportunity to offer prior comment on the sentencing of a defendant to include the submission of a written victim impact statement detailing the physical, psychological and economic effects of the crime on the victim and the victim’s family, which statement shall be considered by the judge when determining the defendant’s sentence.
The “victim” is defined at 71 P.S. § 180-9.1(3) to include: “A family member of a homicide victim, including stepbrothers or stepsisters, stepchildren, stepparents or a fiance.... ” (emphasis supplied).
In all non-capital sentencing hearings “victim impact” statements are .provided to the sentencing authority for consideration in the deliberative process which culminates in the imposition of a particular sentence upon a particular defendant as a result of the specific crime at issue. I can see no justification for requiring “victim impact” statements to be considered in non-capital cases and simultaneously prohibiting the consideration of such evidence in capital cases.4
“It is the province of the legislature to determine the punishment imposable for criminal conduct.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 40, 494 A.2d 354, 361 (1985), aff'd sub nom. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, [477] U.S. [79], 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed;2d 67 (1986) (citing cases). The legislature has enacted a statutory scheme so that a determination can be made as to whether the death penalty *275should be imposed in a given case. The statute embodies the legislature’s judgment as to what specific factors relating to the nature of the crime and the character and record of the accused should be considered in making that determination. The discretion of the sentencing body is thereby limited and channeled in a manner which we have held is adequate to prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death sentence. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, [500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983) ].
Commonwealth v. DeHart, 512 Pa. 235, 263, 516 A.2d 656, 671 (1986).
As it is clear that our legislature has decided that victim impact statements are a relevant consideration for the sentencing authority, and has authorized the trial court to allow the admission of all relevant information in a penalty phase hearing, I would conclude that “victim impact” testimony may be considered by the jury as relevant to their sentencing determination in a capital case.
In reaching this conclusion I find compelling the reasoning employed by Justice Souter in the concurring opinion in Payne:
To my knowledge, our legal tradition has never included a general rule that evidence of a crime’s effects on the victim and others is, standing alone, irrelevant to a sentencing determination of the defendant’s culpability. Indeed, ... criminal conduct has traditionally been categorized and penalized differently according to consequences not specifically intended, but determined in part by conditions unknown to a defendant when he acted.
Murder has foreseeable consequences. When it happens, it is always to distinct individuals, and after it happens other victims are left behind____ The fact that the defendant may not know the details of a victim’s life and characteristics, or the exact identities and needs of those who may *276survive, should not in any way obscure the further facts that death is always to a “unique” individual, and harm to some group of survivors is a consequence of a successful homicidal act so foreseeable as to be virtually inevitable.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 835 and 838, 111 S.Ct. at 2614 and 2615, 115 L.Ed.2d at 742 and 744.
Although I would hold that “victim impact” testimony is not, per se, prohibited during the penalty phase of a capital case, and is a relevant consideration, I am compelled to agree with the majority that a new sentencing hearing is required in the instant case. However, I reach this conclusion only because I believe that the instructions given to the jury regarding the “victim impact” testimony in the case at bar were inadequate, and, thus a new penalty hearing is required.

. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).

. I note that this section of the statute has recently been amended and that the amendment specifically authorizes the admission of "victim impact” testimony. The section as amended now reads:
(2) In the sentencing hearing, evidence concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim is admissible. Additionally, evidence may be presented as to any other matter that the court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed. Evidence shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances specified in subsections (d) and (e), and information concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim. Evidence of aggravating circumstances shall be limited to those circumstances specified in subsection (d).
The amendment was enacted October 11, 1995 to be effective 60 days thereafter; thus, it is not dispositive of appellant's claim. Further, I do not find the specific amendment of this section to alter my position on this issue, as we conclude that “victim impact” testimony is always a "relevant” consideration and within the scope of the sentencing scheme. I believe that the legislature’s amendment specifically referring to “victim impact” testimony merely clarifies the matter and makes this statute consistent with the legislative enactment at 71 P.S. § 180-9, titled Basic Bill of Rights For Victims.

. If “victim, impact” testimony is used by the Commonwealth to argue that the defendant should be put to death because of the impact the killing of this particular victim had upon his/her family, then the proffered “victim impact” testimony would be inadmissible as unduly inflammatory and beyond the scope of our decision in Abu-Jamal, and *274beyond the intent of the legislative scheme set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711.

. As noted in footnote 2 supra, the legislature has now amended 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (a)(2); with this amendment, section 9711(a)(2) is now wholly consistent with 71 P.S. § 180-9.3.