Court Opinion

ID: 9549666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:22:56.01287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:41.884997
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting)—The state has failed to prove the fourth element of the crime of negligent homicide in instruction No. 4, that recklessness or intoxication was the direct and proximate cause of the death.
In Annotation, 99 A. L. R. 772, entitled “Wrongful or illegal act as proximate cause of death,” the general rule is said to be:
“In order that a person may be guilty of a criminal homicide arising from the negligent operation of an automobile or its use for an unlawful purpose or in violation of law, it is uniformly held that it must be shown that such negligent operation, or use for an unlawful purpose or in violation of law, was the direct and proximate cause of the death; that is, that there was present a causal connection between the act and the death.”
This court in State v. McDaniels, 30 Wn. (2d) 76, 190 P. (2d) 705, recognizing this rule, said at p. 89:
“ . . . it is true that in a prosecution for negligent homicide, under Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. 7A, § 6360-120 [now codified as RCW 46.56.040], the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of death ...”
The lack of proximate cause is best illustrated by the opinion of the trial judge rendered on the motion to arrest judgment.
“Under this statute, the ‘proximate result’ alluded to must undoubtedly mean the direct and efficient product or consequence of liquorish or reckless driving.
“The question is: Was there any evidence that the liquor, or recklessness, was the direct, efficient and producing cause of death?
“I think the question must be answered in the negative *337as to both propositions. First, in my opinion, there is no evidence of reckless driving at the time and point of impact. Second, although there is evidence of alcoholic influence, there is no evidence that such condition in any manner directly and efficiently contributed to cause the accident. Under the evidence in this case, taking it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the most sober driver would or could have done no more or less. There is, at most, a bare inference that the liquorish driving caused the accident, and that inference only because death occurred from impact with the defendant’s car. There is no showing of anything that the defendant did or failed to do which caused this accident. This is not the case where a deceased was struck in a crosswalk, where he had a right to be. He was at a place where any driver was entitled to assume and expect him not to be. There is no evidence of a single act of negligence on the part of the defendant, which directly contributed to cause the accident.
“It seems to me that reasonable minds cannot differ upon these concepts. It was error to have denied the defendant’s challenge at the close of the state’s case. It was the duty of the court to rule, as a matter of law, that there was no proof in any degree, as to the defendant’s acts or omissions being the proximate cause of death.
“In an effort to verify this logical and legalistic interpretation, I asked myself, ‘Could or would any reasonable, careful driver (of total abstinence) have done anything more or different than the defendant did under the same and similar circumstances and conditions?’ My answer is, T do not know what it could be.’ Again: This case is not unlike that of a pedestrian being dropped from the sky, immediately in front of an automobile, with no opportunity for a reasonable, careful driver to avoid the accident. In such a situation, would the mere fact that the driver was under the influence be the proximate cause of death? I believe not.”
This is a criminal statute and should be strictly construed.
The state having failed to prove one of the elements of the crime charged, I would affirm.
Finley, C. J., and Hunter, J., concur with Rosellini, J.
March 2, 1962. Petition for rehearing denied.