Court Opinion

ID: 9706659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:48:51.659565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.297299
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen,
In October 1965, the appellant, Samuel Moody, was convicted by a jury in Lehigh County of murder in *41the first degree and the punishment was fixed at life imprisonment. Following denial of a motion for a new trial, judgment of sentence was imposed as the jury directed. This appeal followed.
The single question raised is whether or not the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a written confession given by Moody to the police.
From the testimony offered by the Commonwealth, the following pertinent facts appear t1 At about 6 p.m. on December 31, 1964, Moody killed his wife by firing three bullets from a .38 caliber revolver into her back. At about 6:38 p.m. a city police sergeant, William G-latfeller, received a phone call in his office informing him of the shooting. He proceeded by police car in the direction of the address where the shooting occurred. While en route he received via radio a description of the person suspected of committing the crime. Shortly thereafter he saw Moody, who fitted the description, at a public street intersection. With the assistance of another policeman who arrived on the scene he took Moody into custody. Moody was immediately told that he was “under arrest.” He was searched, handcuffed and taken to the police station.
At about 7 p.m., Arthur Allender, a police detective, received a call at home to report to police headquarters immediately. When he arrived, Moody was seated in a “cell corridor” behind a locked door. Admittedly he was not free to leave. Allender escorted Moody into Ms office and, after asking him his name, address and *42employment, inquired “what happened?” Moody unhesitatingly replied, “I shot my wife.” Then Robert E. Sperling, the captain of the city detectives, who also had been summoned from his home, arrived on the scene. After Moody was informed who Sperling was, Sperling asked him what happened. Moody replied, “Mr. Sperling, I’m going to tell you the truth. I shot my wife.” Sperling then interrupted Moody and advised him “that anything he said could be used against him; that he need not say anything and he had a right to remain silent.” Moody replied, “I want to get it off my chest. I want to tell the truth. I shot my wife.”
Shortly thereafter Moody was subjected to questions concerning the details of the crime which, together with his answers, were written down in longhand and typewritten. The recorded typewritten statement was then read to Moody and signed by him. Immediately before this particular questioning began, Sperling explained to Moody that he need not make a formal statement, but that if he did so “it would be of his own free will, without any promises, inducements or threats, being fully aware anything he said could be used against him. . . .” It is the admission of this statement in evidence that is assigned as error.
Since the instant trial occurred prior to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), the absence of all the procedural safeguards required under that decision in order to secure one’s privilege against self-incrimination during police questioning does not in itself constitutionally proscribe evidentiary use of this statement. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S. Ct. 1761 (1966); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966). However, since the trial was subsequent to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964), the statement is not admissible in evidence unless the Commonwealth establishes *43that all of the procedural safeguards required by that decision before police custodial questioning commences were first employed.
Under Escobedo, before custodial interrogation is initiated, warnings must be given to the person questioned that he has a right to remain silent and that if he does speak, anything he says can be used against him, Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A. 2d 765 (1967).2 Otherwise anything said stemming from such questioning may not be used as evidence.
Since it is conceded that the warnings required by Escobedo were not given to Moody before any questioning was initiated and before the first incriminating admissions were made to Officers Allender and Sperling, evidentiary use thereof ordinarily would be constitutionally proscribed.3 Under Escobedo, supra, as explicated by Miranda, supra, these warnings must be given before custodial interrogation is initiated. And “custodial interrogation” occurs if a person is questioned after being “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612 (Emphasis added.) The argument of the Commonwealth that *44Moody was not “in custody” at the time is untenable. Moody was clearly in custody from the moment he was apprehended and all of the subsequent police questioning constituted “custodial interrogation.” See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168 (1959).
The central question for decision is whether or not the written statement given by Moody after he received all of the warnings of constitutional rights Escobedo requires4 stemmed from the first illegal questioning and is therefore “the fruit of the poisonous tree,” or whether the attending circumstances were such as to remove the taint of the initial illegality. We conclude that the latter is so.
A confession secured after the person involved has been adequately advised of his constitutional rights is not rendered inadmissible ipso facto because an earlier confession or inculpatory admission was made in the absence of a warning of these rights, Evans v. United States, 375 F. 2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v. Hickey, 247 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1965).5 While the United States Supreme Court has not considered the exact factual situation this case presents,6 *8its decisions concerning the exclusion of valid confessions made following violations by the police of rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are analogous and applicable.
In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963), the scope of taint resulting from vio*45lations of the Fourth Amendment was considered. The court stated: “We need not hold that all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Eather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” Id. at 487-488, 83 S. Ct. at 417.7 See also Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 228 A. 2d 661, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 875, 88 S. Ct. 168 (1967). Comment Scope of Taint under Exclusionary Eule of the Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 570 (1966).
Applying the above standard enunciated in Wong Sun, supra, it is clear to us that the written statement now challenged was not the result of the exploitation of any prior illegality, but was the product of Moody’s own purge of conscience.
The statement was truly voluntary8 and spontaneous. As explained by Moody: “I want to get it off my chest.” It is also significant to note that at trial Moody testified that when he was apprehended he was on Ms way to city hall where the police headquarters is located.
Judgment affirmed.

 During the trial, before the confession involved was allowed in evidence, a hearing was held in the absence of the jury on defendant’s motion to suppress, in accordance with Pa. R. Crim. P. 323-324. At this hearing police witnesses testified as to the circumstances under which the confession was obtained. This testimony was later repeated before the jury. For the purpose of determining the admissibility of this evidence, we accept the Commonwealth’s evidence as true.

 The position of Moody’s counsel that under Escobedo, the person questioned also must be provided with an attorney during the questioning or at least must be fully advised beforehand of his right to such assistance is incorrect. See Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 423 Pa. 432, 224 A. 2d 625 (1966) and Commonwealth v. Walker, 428 Pa. 244, 236 A. 2d 765 (1968). Under Escobedo, a person is not unconstitutionally deprived of the assistance of counsel during police questioning unless such assistance is requested. Admittedly no request was made in this case.

 The admissibility of these particular admissions is not raised in this appeal. Nevertheless, we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt and we rule that the evidentiary use thereof was harmless error since evidence thereof was clearly cumulative to the subsequent written confession which we rule was properly admitted in evidence. See infra.

 Moody did not deny at trial that these warnings were given.

 This may not be so if the earlier admissions or confession was the product of coercion. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S. Ct. 844 (1958); Commonwealth v. Coyle, 427 Pa. 72, 76 n.3, 233 A. 2d 542, 544 n.3 (1967).

 However, compare United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 67 S. Ct. 1394 (1947); Evans v. United States, 375 F. 2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967); Cotton v. United States, 371 F. 2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Hickey, 247 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1965).

 In earlier decisions the court seemed to apply other standards. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182 (1920), and Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266 (1939).

 Even under Moody’s own testimony a claim of involuntariness would not be supported.