Court Opinion

ID: 9849170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:35:40.599258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:04.818680
License: Public Domain

¶ 1 KAUGER, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom SUMMERS, Vice Chief Justice, joins:
¶2 The majority holds that a federally recognized Indian tribe conducting economic activity in OHahoma may be sued in state court “on the same terms as any other person.”1 It equates the legal status of an Indian nation with that of a “private party.”2 In maHng the classification, the majority relies upon what it characterizes as the history of the diminishment of Indian sovereignty in OHahoma. However, the question of the viability of tribal sovereignty is not presented. Rather, this cause revolves around the issue of waiver — whether the language of the promissory note and security agreement providing that nothing “subjects or limits the sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe of OHa-homa” was sufficient to subject the Tribe to suit in state court. I dissent, because: 1) the Tribe did not clearly waive its sovereign immunity; 2) OHahoma has not met the con-gressionally imposed conditions necessary to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes and nations; and 3) the evidence does not support a finding that Indian sovereignty in OHahoma has been “diminished.”
I.
¶ 3 WAIVER OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY.
¶4 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106, the Supreme Court stated a well-settled principle — “that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed.’ ”3 Indian tribes exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. Suits against Indian tribes are barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.4 Engaging in extra-territorial commercial activity does not strip an Indian tribe of its rights to assert sovereign immunity and to enjoin state court proceedings.5 Although the majority attempts to undermine the efficacy of OHa-homa’s failure to comply with the steps necessary to make it a P.L. 280 state, there is no contention that there has been a “congressional abrogation” of immunity. Therefore, *97if the Kiowa Indian Tribe is to be summoned into state court to answer for damages, it must have made a “clear waiver” of its sovereign status. Despite the language of the security agreement, indicating that the lender is entitled to exercise any and all rights and remedies provided in the Uniform Commercial Code, the Tribe did not definitively waive its sovereign immunity to suit in state court. Instead, the language of the promissory note and security agreement, providing that nothing will subject or limit the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, is an express reservation of its sovereign status.
II.
¶ 5 OKLAHOMA — P.L. 280 AND “INDIAN COUNTRY”
¶ 6 Based upon a statement by a prior Governor carrying no precedential value and its assertion that the term Indian country as defined in the congressional crimes act6 is inapplicable in Oklahoma, the majority finds that Oklahoma’s status as a disclaimer state under P.L. 280 is irrelevant in determining whether there is immunity for the Tribe’s economic activity. I disagree.
¶ 7 Consistent with Congress’ plenary role with respect to Indians and their lands, the Enabling Act of the State of Oklahoma,7 in its recitation of the conditions of statehood, prohibits limiting or impairing rights of persons or property associated with Indians. The Oklahoma Const, art. 1, § 3 disclaims forever all right and title to all lands owned or held by any Indian, tribe or nation.8 In 1953, Congress provided an avenue for states to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction under P.L. 280.9 Pursuant to P.L. 280, some states were required to assume mandatory *98jurisdiction over Indian tribes.10 In passing P.L. 280, Congress could easily have expressed its intent to grant the listed states complete jurisdiction over its resident tribes. Its failure to do so was a purposeful decision to reserve to the federal government jurisdiction over the tribes themselves.11 In states not specifically listed and whose enabling acts contained Indian restrictions similar to Oklahoma’s, affirmative action was required to assume jurisdiction through either constitutional amendment or statutory enactment.12
¶ 8 The states which exercise jurisdiction under P.L. 280 fall into two categories: 1) those who were required to assume jurisdiction under the statute — Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin; 13 and 2) those who have taken the prescribed steps necessary to assume jurisdiction either by constitutional amendment or statutory amendment14 — Washington,15 Montana,16 and Idaho.17 Oklahoma is conspicuously absent from the list of states exercising P.L. 280 jurisdiction.
¶9 Despite the language of Oklahoma’s enabling legislation, specifically protecting the rights of Native Americans in Indian Territory,18 section 6 of P.L. 280, 67 Stat. 590 (1953) provides:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the ease may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as the case may be.”
Oklahoma has not amended its Constitution, nor has it complied with the conditions set forth in P.L. 280 to invoke jurisdiction over Indian tribes. It also has not assumed economic responsibility for tribal services currently provided by Indian nations, i.e., health care, indigent relief, road improvements, etc. The majority’s reliance on a statement by Governor Johnston Murray, who served from 1951 to 1955, for the proposition that adoption of P.L. 280 in Oklahoma would make no difference to Native Americans in Oklahoma *99is unconvincing. Had the state passed legislation or amended its constitution in conjunction with the federal statute — -which it has not, civil and criminal jurisdiction could have been extended over Indian country. However, the window has closed on Oklahoma’s opportunity to assume jurisdiction under P.L. 280 as originally enacted. The portion of the federal statute allowing for the assumption of jurisdiction was repealed in 1968.19
¶ 10 In Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred Oklahoma from collecting taxes on the sale of goods to Native Americans on tribal land. The Court also held that although Oklahoma could tax goods sold' to non-Indians, it could not enforce its right by bringing a lawsuit against the tribe — the tribe’s sovereign immunity barred a suit in district court. Although the Supreme Court stated that its decision relating to the state’s right to tax was not based on prior cases arising in P.L. 280 states, it did recognize that an election under P.L. 280 would have allowed the state to assume jurisdiction over civil causes of action in Indian country.20 Therefore, Oklahoma’s failure to act pursuant to the statute does affect — contrary to the majority’s assertion — the extent of its jurisdiction in relation to Indian tribes and nations.
¶ 11 Title 57 O.S.1991 § 509.5 provides that Oklahoma assumes both the civil and criminal jurisdiction with respect to all criminal offenses and civil causes of action over Indian Country land if the state has entered into an agreement with the applicable tribal authority for the use of its land as an inmate work center.21 This Court will not assume that the Legislature acts in vain in promulgating a statute.22 Nevertheless, if Oklahoma had extended its jurisdiction as a P.L. 280 state, the enactment of a statute similar to § 509.5 would be a “vain act” — unnecessary because the state would already have jurisdiction over the lands involved.
¶ 12 The majority states that the history of this state in relation to its Native American inhabitants has been “obscured” at least *100in part by the definition of Indian Country found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1985). Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1985) defines Indian County as:
“Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term ‘Indian country’, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state; and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.”
This is the precise language used by Oklahoma’s Legislature to define Indian Country in 68 O.S.Supp.1996 § 500.3(35) ,23 Additionally, the statute also provides that:
“The term shall also include the definition of Indian country as found in 18 U.S.C., Section 1151.”
The same language is used to define “Indian Country” in 68 O.S.Supp.1993 §§ 348 and 425 except that the reference to the federal statute is omitted. In Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453, 115 S.Ct. 2214, 2217, 132 L.Ed.2d 400 (1995) and in Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123, 113 S.Ct. 1985, 1991, 124 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993), the Supreme Court defined “Indian Country” as including “formal and informal reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments, whether restricted or held in trust by the United States.” Contrary to the majority’s assertion that Oklahoma history has been blurred by the use of the definition of Indian Country found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1985), it would appear that the Oklahoma Legislature has specifically embraced the definition in 68 O.S.Supp.1996 § 500.3(35) and in 68 O.S.Supp.1993 §§ 348 and 425. The Supreme Court has also found the definition specifically applicable to tribal lands in our state.
¶ 13 Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed the definition of “Indian County” in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998). Venetie involved the tribe’s attempt to tax improvements on land conveyed to privately owned corporations made up of Native American shareholders. The land had been conveyed to the private corporations as a part of a settlement executed pursuant to the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA). The corporations took title to the land in fee simple without federal restriction or supervision. The Supreme Court considered only whether these conveyances fell under the “dependent Indian communities” portion of the definition of “Indian Country.” The Court held, as it had in earlier cases,24 that for property to be a portion of a dependent Indian community, it must: 1) be set aside by the federal government for the use of the Indians as Indian land; and 2) be under federal superintendence. In Venetie, neither condition existed. Therefore, the land was not subject to taxation by the tribe. The Supreme Court specifically provided that any modification of the current definition of Indian Country found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 would have to be made by Congress.25
III.
¶ 14 INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN OKLAHOMA
¶ 15 The majority does not explain how Indian sovereignty in Oklahoma has been *101adversely affected by: 1) the recognition in the United States Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 326 of Indian tribes’ commercial equality to that of a foreign nation or a state; 2 recent cases promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in which the sovereignty of Oklahoma Indian tribes has been recognized;27 3) federal law28 and Oklahoma statutes identifying Indian tribes as sovereigns;29 4) federal and state statutes acknowledging the existence of “Indian Country”; 30 4) Oklahoma statutory law defining “Indian County” to include the definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and coextensive with the language used in cases promulgated by the United States Supreme Court;31 5) the Legislature’s recognition *102that tribal sovereignty prohibits suits against Indian tribes for taxes on tobacco or motor fuel taxes and its authorization for compacts between the state and the tribes as “sovereign parties” for the collection of taxes;32 6) this Court’s grant of full faith and credit to tribal courts33 and the Legislature’s affirmation of our authority to do so;34 7) the inclusion by the Legislature of Indian tribes in the Revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S.Supp.1997 § 1601, et seq.;’35 giving this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals the power to certify questions of law to federally recognized Indian tribal governments36 and the power to answer questions certified to the respective court by tribal courts37 on the same grounds *103that questions of law may be certified or answered if another state, Canada or Mexico is involved; 8) the federal government’s grant of full faith and credit to protection orders38 and to child support orders39 issued by tribal courts; 9) the United States’ grant of concurrent jurisdiction to Indian tribes to enforce its regulations relating to civil penalties for trespass on Indian agricultural lands40 and for trespass on Indian forest lands41 — upon request, the federal govemment is required to defer to tribal prosecutions of trespass actions on agricultural and forest lands and 25 U.S.C. § 3713 specifically provides that nothing is intended “to diminish the sovereign authority of Indian tribes with respect to trespass;” 10) the recognition of the sovereign status of Indian tribes and nations through legislative resolution;42 and 11) the acknowledgment of a government-to-government relationship by executive declaration.43 Clearly, the failure of legislation *104introduced in Congress to adopt this Court’s interpretation of the law in Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma (Hoover I), 909 P.2d 59 (Okla.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188, 116 S.Ct. 1675, 134 L.Ed.2d 779 (1996),44 and the Oklahoma Legislature’s passage of S.B. No. 482,45 which would have overruled Hoover I had it not been vetoed by the Governor46, is strong evidence that the law-making bodies on the national and on the state level realize that Indian tribal sovereignty exists and that it is a viable part of our nation’s law. The *105United States Constitution, eases promulgated by the United States Supreme Court, state and federal statutory law, state-tribal relations demonstrated by the execution of state compacts, court rules and statutory, enactments granting full faith and credit to tribal judgments and allowing certification of questions from tribal courts, the federal government’s acknowledgment of concurrent jurisdiction in some instances, legislative resolution and executive proclamation, provide overwhelming support for the viability of tribal sovereign immunity.47
CONCLUSION
¶ 16 The majority’s opinion is focused on the assimilation of the Indian population. While the assimilationist policy prevailing at the beginning of the century must be considered in analyzing statutes which were enacted at that time, courts construing Indian legislation must keep in mind that present federal policy favors the strengthening of tribal self-government.48 In order for the majority’s reasoning to be upheld, it will be necessary for the United States Supreme Court to overrule its cases on requiring an express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity—Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); and United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969) — and its cases relating to “Indian country” and recognizing tribal sovereign immunity — Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1968); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 115 S.Ct. 2214, 132 L.Ed.2d 400 (1995); and Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 113 S.Ct. 1985, 124 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993).
¶ 17 Although I agree that sovereign immunity is not an absolute shield against all suits for damages against tribal authorities in state court, jurisdiction may not be asserted absent a clear waiver of immunity.49 No such waiver appears here. I dissent from the majority’s intimation that Oklahoma’s failure to assert its jurisdiction under P.L. 280 is inconsequential in causes involving jurisdiction over suits involving Indian tribes and nations and its insinuation that “Indian County” is something less than the definitions adopted by the Legislature and specifically applied to Oklahoma by the United States Supreme Court. Finally, the overwhelming evidence supports the existence of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity in Oklahoma. '
¶ 18 Indian policy is made by Congress and it is interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998), the Supreme Court reiterated, in an unanimous opinion, that if “the concept of Indian country should be modified” is it for Congress to do so. Until Congress chooses to change the law or the Supreme Court interprets existing law in a different manner — which it has refused to do in regard to the definition of “Indian Country,” the position taken by the majority is just not the law today. If it is tomorrow — if the Congress amends statutory enactments or the Supreme Court applies a *106different interpretation — then my dissent will be moot.

. Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma (Hoover II), 1998 OK 23, ¶ 2, — P.2d -.

. Id. at ¶ 38.

. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501-02, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969).

. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, note 27 infra; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 810, 116 S.Ct. 57, 133 L.Ed.2d 21.

. Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, see note 4, supra; In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.1992); Federico v. Capital Gaming Int’l Inc., 888 F.Supp. 354 (D.R.I.1995); Elliott v. Capital Int'l Bank & Trust, Ltd., 870 F.Supp. 733 (E.D.Texas 1994), aff'd, 102 F.3d 549; North Sea Products Ltd. v. Clipper Seafoods, Co., 92 Wash.2d 236, 595 P.2d 938 (1979).

. The Major Crimes Act of 1948 is codified at 18 U.S.C.§ 1151.

. The Enabling Act of the State of Oklahoma provides in pertinent part:
"... That the inhabitants of all that part of the area of the United States now constituting the Territory of Oklahoma and the Indian Territory, as at present described, may adopt a constitution and become the State of Oklahoma, as hereinafter provided: Provided, that nothing containing the said constitution shall be construed to limit or impair the rights of persons of property pertaining to the Indians of said Territories (so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished) or to limit or affect the authority of the Government of the United States to make any law or regulations respecting such Indians, their lands, property or other rights by treaties, agreement, law or otherwise, which it could have been competent to make if this Act had never passed....”

. The Okla. Const, art. 1, § 3 provides:
"The people inhabiting the State do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title in or to any unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or nation; and that until the title to any such public land shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal, and control of the United States. Land belonging to citizens of the United States residing without the limits of the State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the land belonging to residents thereof. No taxes shall be imposed by the State on lands or property belonging to or which may hereafter be purchased by the United States or reserved for its use.”

.Section 2 of P.L. 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1953) provides:
"Sec. 2. Title 18, United States Code, is hereby amended by inserting in chapter 53 thereof immediately after section 1161 a new section, to be designated as section 1162, as follows: § 1162. State jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the Indian country
(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State, and the criminal laws of such State shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State:
State of Indian country affected
California ■ All Indian country within the State
Minnesota All Indian country within the State except the Red Lake Reservation
Nebraska All Indian country within the State
Oregon All Indian country within the State, except the Warm Springs Reservation
Wisconsin All Indian country within the State, except the Menominee Reservation
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the *98United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.
(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section.”

. Id.

. Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservation, 171 Cal.Rptr. 733, 115 Cal.App.3d 853 (Cal.App.4.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831, 102 S.Ct. 129, 70 L.Ed.2d 109.

. Section 6 of P.L. 280, 67 Stat. 590 (1953), provides:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as the case may be.”

. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1360(1984).

. Section 6 of Act, Aug. 15, 1953, see note 12, supra.

. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 473-74, 99 S.Ct. 740, 748, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979) [Statutory enactment.].

. State v. Haskins, 269 Mont. 202, 887 P.2d 1189, 1194 (1994) [Statutory enactment.].

. State v. Marek, 112 Idaho 860, 736 P.2d 1314, 1320 (1987) [Statutory enactment.].

. See note 7, supra.

. Act Aug. 15, 1953, c. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 590, which gave consent of the United States to any other State not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil cause of action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this section and section 1162 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, by legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof, was repealed by section 403(b) .of Pub.L. 90-284, Title IV, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79, such repeal not to affect any cession of jurisdiction made pursuant to such section prior to its repeal.

. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, see note 27 infra, providing at p. 513, 111 S.Ct. at p. 911:
"Neither Moe nor Colville depended upon the State's assertion of jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Those cases stand for the proposition that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not prevent a State from requiring Indian retailers doing business on tribal reservations to collect a state-imposed cigarette tax on their sales to nonmembers of the Tribe. Colville’s only reference to Public Law 280 related to a concession that the statute did not furnish a basis for taxing sales to tribe members .... Public Law 280 merely permits a State to assume jurisdiction over 'civil causes of action’ in Indian country. We have never held that Public Law 280 is independently sufficient to confer authority on a State to extend the full range of its regulatory authority, including taxation, over Indians and Indian res-ervations_ Thus, it is simply incorrect to conclude that Public Law 280 was the essential (yet unspoken) basis for this Court’s decision in Colville.” . [Citations of authority omitted.]

. Title 57 O.S.1991 § 509.5 provides in pertinent part:
"Inmate work centers in Indian County land— Civil and criminal jurisdiction — Expiration, cancellation or termination of agreement A. Pursuant to applicable federal law, the State of Oklahoma assumes both the civil and criminal jurisdiction with respect to all criminal offenses and civil cause of actions over Indian Country land wherein the state has entered into an agreement with the applicable tribes or other appropriate authority for use of said land as an inmate work center as established in Section 563 of Title 57 of the Oklahoma Statutes

. Oklahoma Ass'n for Equitable Taxation v. City of Oklahoma City, 1995 OK 62, 901 P.2d 800, 804; TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, 1992 OK 31, 829 P.2d 15, 20; Farris v. Cannon, 1982 OK 88, 649 P.2d 529, 532; Moral Ins. Co. v. Cooksey, 1955 OK 179, 285 P.2d 223, 227.

. Title 68 O.S.Supp.1996 § 500.3(35), see note 31, infra.

. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46, 34 S.Ct. 1, 5-6, 58 L.Ed. 107 (1913); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449, 34 S.Ct. 396, 399, 58 L.Ed. 676 (1914); United States v.. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538-39, 58 S.Ct. 286, 287-88, 82 L.Ed. 410(1938).

.The Supreme Court’s opinion in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998) provides in its last paragraph:
"... [W]e are not free to ignore that requirement as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
Whether the concept of Indian country should be modified is a question entirely for Congress.”

. The United States Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 provides:
"Regulation of Commerce To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”

. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 464-65, 115 S.Ct. 2214, 2223, 132 L.Ed.2d 400 (1995) [Treaty provisions provided for tribal sovereignty within Indian country.]; Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123, 113 S.Ct. 1985, 1991, 124 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993), rehearing denied, 509 U.S. 933, 113 S.Ct. 3066, 125 L.Ed.2d 748 (1993) [Federal District Court ordered on remand to consider factors relating to cause “against the backdrop of Indian sovereignty.”]; Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991) [Suits against Indian tribes barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.].

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (1993) provides in pertinent part:
"The Congress finds and declares that—
(1) there is a govemment-to-govemment relationship between the United States and each Indian tribe;
(2) the United States has a trust responsibility to each tribal government that includes the protection of the sovereignty of each tribal government;
(3) Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the exercise of administrative authorities, has recognized the self-determination, self-reliance, and inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes;
... (5) tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments ...”

. Title 68 O.S.Supp.1996 § 500.63 provides in pertinent part:
"... (A)(1) Some Indian tribes within the State of Oklahoma are engaged in the retail sales of motor fuels at locations within their sovereign territories; ...
(4) It is mutually beneficial to the State of Oklahoma and the federally recognized Indian tribes of this state, exercising their sovereign powers, to enter contracts as set forth in subsection B of this section, for the purpose of limiting litigation on the issue of state government taxation of motor fuel sales made by Indian tribes....
(C)(10) Both the State of Oklahoma and the accepting Indian tribe recognize, respect and accept the fact that under applicable laws each is a sovereign with dominion over their respective territories and governments. By entering into this proposed intergovernmental contractual relationship, neither the state nor the tribe has, in any way, caused the other’s sovereignty to be diminished....”
Title 68 O.S.Supp.1992 § 346 provides in pertinent part:
"... (A)(2) The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity prohibits the State of Oklahoma from bringing a lawsuit against an Indian tribe or nation to compel the tribe or nation to collect state taxes on sales made in Indian country to either members or nonmembers of the tribe or nation without a waiver of immunity by the tribe or nation or congressional abrogation of the doctrine; and
... C. The Governor is authorized by this enactment to enter into cigarette and tobacco products tax compacts on behalf of the State of Oklahoma with the federally recognized Indian tribes or nations of this state. The compacts shall set forth the terms of agreement between the sovereign parties regulating sale of cigarettes and tobacco products by the tribes or nations or their licensees in Indian country-”

. Title 68 O.S.Supp.1996 §§ 500.3 and 500.63 [Referring to "Indian County” in the context of motor fuel tax compacts.]; 68 O.S.Supp.1993 §§ 346, 348 and 425 [Referring to "Indian County” in relation to cigarette and tobacco compacts.]; 57 O.S.1991 § 509.5 [Providing for the location of inmate work centers in "Indian Country."].

. Title 68 O.S.Supp.1996 § 500.3(35) provides: " ‘Indian country' means:
a. land held in trust by the United States of America for the benefit of a federally recognized Indian tribe or nation;
b. all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation;
c. all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired terri*102tory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state; and
d. all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including individual allotments held in trust'by the United States or allotments owned in fee by individual Indians subject to federal law restrictions regarding disposition of said allotments and including rights-of-way running through the same.
The term shall also include the definition of Indian country as found in 18 U.S.C., Section 1151."
The same language is used to define "Indian Country” in 68 O.S.Supp.1993 §§ 348 and 425 except that the reference to the federal statute is omitted. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1985) provides;
"Indian country defined
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term 'Indian country', as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state; and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.”
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, see note 27, 515 U.S. at 453, 115 S.Ct. at 2217, supra; Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, see note 27, 508 U.S. at 123, 113 S.Ct. at 1991, supra, defining "Indian Country” as including "formal and informal reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments, whether restricted or held in trust by the United States.”

. Title 68 O.S.Supp.1996 § 500.63, see note 30, supra; 68 O.S.Supp.1992 § 346, see note 30, supra.

. Rule 30, Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, 12 O.S.Supp.1994 Ch. 2, App., provides in pertinent part:
"... B. Recognition of Tribal Judgments — Full faith and Credit
The district courts of the State of Oklahoma shall grant full faith and credit and cause to be enforced any tribal judgment where the tribal court that issued the judgment grants reciprocity to judgments of the courts of the State of Oklahoma, provided, a tribal court judgment shall receive no greater effect or full faith and credit under this rule than would a similar or comparable judgment of a sister state...."

. Title 12 O.S.Supp.1992 § 728 provides:
"A. This act affirms the power of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma to issue standards for extending full faith and credit to the records and judicial proceedings of any court of any federally recognized Indian nation, tribe, band or political subdivision thereof, including courts of Indian offenses.
B. In issuing any such standard the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma may extend such recognition in whole or in part to such type or types of judgments of the tribal courts as it deems appropriate where tribal courts agree to grant reciprocity of judgments of the courts of the State of Oklahoma in such tribal courts.”

. Title 20 O.S.Supp.1997 § 1601.1 provides in pertinent part:
"... (2) 'Tribe' means a tribe, band, or village of native Americans which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.”

. Tide 20 O.S.Supp.1997 § 1601.2 provides:
"Power to Certify. The Supreme Court or the Court of Criminal Appeals of this state, on the motion of a party to pending litigation or on its own motion, may certify a question of law to the highest court of another state, or of a federally recognized Indian tribal government, or of Canada, a Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state if:
1. The pending litigation involves a question to be decided under the law of the other jurisdiction;
2. The answer to the question may be determinative of an issue in the pending litigation; and
3. The question is one for which an answer is not provided by a controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of the other jurisdiction.”

. Title 20 O.S.Supp.1997 § 1602 provides:
“Power to Answer. The Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the *103United States, or by an appellate court of another state, or of a federally recognized Indian tribal government, or of Canada, a Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state, if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling decision of the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals, constitutional provision, or statute of this state.”

. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994) provides in pertinent part:
"Full faith and credit given to protection orders
(A) Full faith and credit. — Any protection order issued that is consistent with subsection (b) of this section by the court of one State or Indian tribe (the issuing State or Indian tribe) shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another State or Indian tribe (the enforcing State or Indian tribe) and enforced as if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe....”

. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1997) provides in pertinent part:
"Full faith and credit for child support orders
(a) General rule. — The appropriate authorities of each State—
(1) shall enforce according to its terms a child support order made consistently with this section by a court of another State; and
(2) shall not seek or make a modification of such an order except in accordance with subsections (e), (f), and (i).
(b) Definitions. — In this section:
... ‘State’ means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the territories and possessions of the United States, and Indian country (as defined in section 1151 of title 19)-”

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 3106 (1990) provides in pertinent part:
"Forest trespass ...
(c) Concurrent jurisdiction
Indian tribes which adopt the regulations promulgated by the secretary pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall have concurrent civil jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this section and the regulation promulgated thereunder. The Bureau of Indian Affairs and other agencies of the Federal Government shall, at the request of the tribe, defer to tribal prosecutions of forest trespass cases. Tribal court judgments regarding forest trespass shall be entitled to full faith and credit in Federal and State courts to the same extent as a Federal court judgment obtained under this section.”

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 3713 (1993) provides in pertinent part:
“Indian agricultural lands trespass ...
(c) Concurrent jurisdiction Indian tribes which adopt the regulations promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the United States to enforce the provisions of this section and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The Bureau and other agencies of the Federal Government shall, at the request of the tribal government, defer to tribal prosecutions of Indian agricultural land trespass cases. Tribal court judgments regarding agricultural trespass shall be entitled to full faith and credit in Federal and State courts to the same extent as a Federal court judgment obtained under this section. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to diminish the sovereign authority of Indian tribes with respect to trespass.”

. S.C.Res. No. 62, adopted by the Senate on May 3, 1994, and by the House of Representatives on May 23, 1994, provides in pertinent part:
"... WHEREAS, the State of Oklahoma recognizes that the sovereign status of Indian tribes and nations and the special relationship that exists between the tribes and nations and the federal government are valuable assets that provide opportunities that would enhance the quality of life for all citizens of this state ...”

. Executive Declaration dated April 26, 1989, and signed by Governor Henry Bellman provides in pertinent part:
"WHEREAS, the state of Oklahoma has the distinct honor of having more resident Indian Tribal Governments and Native Americans than any other state; and
WHEREAS, the Oklahoma Legislature and Governor have taken a leadership role in pro*104moting govemment-to-govemment relations with the Indian tribes and nations by establishing the Joint Committee on State/Tribal relations ...”

.H.R. 2107 from the 1st session of the 105th Congress provides in pertinent part:
"AN ACT
Making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1998, and for other purposes ...

TRIBAL PRIORITY ALLOCATION LIMITATION

SEC. 120. The receipt by an Indian Tribe of tribal priority allocations funding from the Bureau of Indian Affairs 'Operation of Indian Programs' account under this Act shall—

(1) waive any claim of immunity by that Indian tube;

(2) subject that Indian tribe to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and grant the consent of the United States to the maintenance of suit and jurisdiction of such courts irrespective of the issue of tribal immunity; and

(3) grant United States district courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions brought by or against any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States ...."

Debate on the Senate floor in relation to the above quoted section was held on September 16, 1997. The relevant debate was as follows:
"Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I will move to section 120.
EXCEPTED COMMITTEE AMENDMENT BEGINNING ON PAGE 55, LINE 11
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question before the Senate is the excepted committee amendment beginning on page 55, line 11. The text of the excepted committee amendment is as follows:
—[The text of the above § 120, this note supra, was read into the record.]—
Mr. CAMPBELL. I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendment referred to as section 120, beginning on page 55, line 11, be withdrawn.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The excepted committee amendment beginning on page 55, line 11, was withdrawn.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, I wasn’t going to speak to that, but I might make one comment. As I read the language of the bill, there were so many unanswered questions. One that came to mind was this. As I understand section 120, tribes who did not want to give up their sovereign immunity would be denied Federal funds. If they did willingly give up Federal funds, then they would not have had to give up their sovereign immunity, which seemed strange to me because the tribes that are the most destitute and therefore the most dependent on Federal help, would have been the ones who would have had to give up immunity and therefore would have been sued more, where the very few, perhaps 1 out of 100, who do have a casino and have some money, simply would have said we don’t want Federal money, we have enough; therefore, their immunity would have been intact. It seems that paradox should be the thing that we discuss in a proper forum, which is the committee legislation.
With that, I have no further comments, Mr. President. I yield the floor....”
Legislation has been introduced in Congress this session which, if passed, would subject Indian tribes to suit in federal district court for failure to collect taxes on tobacco products. See, S. 1691, American Indian Equal Justice Act.

. S.B. No. 482 passed by the Senate on May 23, 1997, and by the House on May 28, 1997, provides:
"SECTION 1. NEW LAW. A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma Statutes as Section 90 of Title 20, unless there is created a duplication in numbering reads as follows:
A. The district courts of this state shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution and laws of this state and the Constitution and laws of the United States.
B. The State of Oklahoma recognizes the sovereign immunity of federally recognized Indian tribes. Such immunity shall not be a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction by the district courts of this state in the following cases:
1. Any case involving a contract or compact when the tribe has clearly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity by:
a. A resolution adopted by the governing body of the tribe, or
b. A written provision in the contract or compact at issue; or
2. Any case where the exercise of sovereign immunily has been abrogated by Congress or by a treaty with the United States.”

. The Governor’s veto came after the close of the first session of the 46th legislative session on June 12, 1997.

.Recently, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 880, 139 L.Ed.2d 868 (1998), in which the Tenth Circuit Court held that tribal courts had the first opportunity to determine jurisdiction in civil actions involving non-Indian activities on tribal lands. The cause involves massive litigation relating to cancer caused by exposure to radioactive materials dumped on tribal lands by an energy company based in Oklahoma City.

. Estate of Johnson, 178 Cal.Rptr. 823, 125 Cal.App.3d 1044 (Cal.App. 1.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828, 103 S.Ct. 63, 74 L.Ed.2d 65.

. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, note 27, supra; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, see note 4, supra; Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, see note 4, supra.