Court Opinion

ID: 9839088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 17:04:25.52806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:56.026810
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/11/23 Diaz v. Hutchinson Aerospace & Industry CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 MIGUEL A. DIAZ et al.,                                        B313075

           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BC600200)
           v.
                                                               ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
 HUTCHINSON AEROSPACE &                                        AND DENYING PETITION
 INDUSTRY, INC.,                                               FOR REHEARING

           Defendant and Respondent.                            [Change in Judgment]

      IT IS ORDERED that the opinion filed in the above-
captioned matter on August 21, 2023, be modified as follows:
      Disposition on page 22: “The judgment is affirmed. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.”

     There is a change in judgment.
     The petition for rehearing filed by appellant on
September 5, 2023, is denied.

____________________________________________________________
STRATTON, P. J.          WILEY, J.        VIRAMONTES, J.
Filed 8/21/23 Diaz v. Hutchinson Aerospace & Industry CA2/8 (unmodified opinion)
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 MIGUEL A. DIAZ et al.,                                           B313075

           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. BC600200)
           v.

 HUTCHINSON AEROSPACE &
 INDUSTRY, INC.,

           Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment after jury verdict. David Sotelo,
Judge. Affirmed.
     Gusdorff Law, Janet Gusdorff; Turk & Associates and
Salim N. Turk for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
     AlvaradoSmith, Theodore E. Bacon and William M.
Hensley for Defendant and Respondent.

                            _____________________________
       Appellants Miguel Diaz and Jose Martinez appeal a
judgment following a jury verdict in favor of respondent
Hutchinson Aerospace & Industry, Inc., on claims of
(1) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5;
(2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (3) libel and
slander; (4) disability discrimination; and (5) harassment based
on disability. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on at-will employment because the
instruction was irrelevant, duplicative, and argumentative.
We conclude that the trial court did not err. We further conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary
rulings. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Miguel Diaz raises FAA compliance concerns
       Appellants Miguel Diaz and Jose Martinez worked for
respondent Hutchinson Aerospace & Industry, Inc., formerly
known as Barry Controls, (Hutchinson) located in Burbank,
California. Hutchinson overhauls and repairs aerospace parts
and sells them to airline companies. Hutchinson’s aerospace
manufacturing operations are regulated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).
       Diaz began working for Hutchinson as a technician in 2009
and elevated to Lead Technician in 2014. As part of his job
duties, he oversaw the overhaul process for aerospace parts, and
he supervised and trained other technicians. Diaz’s direct
supervisor was Edgar Mijangos.
       Sometime in January 2014, Diaz began noticing what he
believed to be FAA compliance issues. The FAA requires
Hutchinson to have protocols to trace products through
paperwork and reports that show the various steps a product

                                  2
went through during inspection and testing. Diaz reported to
Mijangos that Hutchinson was missing paperwork that created
traceability concerns. He later reported repeated missing
paperwork issues to Manufacturing Manager, Richard Rodriguez,
and Vice President of Operations, Pierre Acker.
       Diaz also complained that Hutchinson was prematurely
inflating sales numbers at the end of each month. Diaz testified
that his concerns were not resolved by April or May 2014, which
prompted him to notify General Manager, Neil O’Hara.
       Diaz testified that in or around May or June 2014, he
discovered a crack in a metal component that he believed was due
to Hutchinson skipping an inspection step that was required by
the FAA. Diaz confronted Mijangos because Diaz believed
Mijangos was responsible for skipping the required step. Diaz
also later e-mailed Acker.
       On or around June 6, 2014, Diaz met with the head of
human resources, Marie Dhaine, Acker, and Mijangos to discuss
his concerns. Acker told Diaz that it was fine to do inspection
steps in a different order so long as they are all completed in the
end.
       Diaz testified that on or around November 10, 2014, he
believed that Mijangos orchestrated falsified paperwork on some
parts, including a molded assembly part. Diaz then reported his
concerns to Acker and a sales representative, Greys Castanon.
Castanon then notified Dhaine and the human resources.
       At trial, Hutchinson’s witnesses testified that Hutchinson
investigated and remedied all of the violations Diaz complained
about.

                                3
II.   Martinez requests accommodations for his
      workplace injury and complains about FAA
      violations
      Appellant Jose Martinez began working for Hutchinson in
2013 assisting repair technicians in the repair station. On or
around March 31, 2014, Martinez was injured during an off-site
delivery. Martinez then suffered an additional injury due to the
medication he took for his workplace injury. Hutchinson
accommodated his medical restrictions at work for the two
injuries. Martinez’s doctor then authorized him to work over
eight hours and Martinez asked to work overtime as an
accommodation. However, Dhaine testified that overtime was
something based on company needs and not as an
accommodation.
      Sometime in May or June 2014, Martinez complained to
O’Hara and Castanon that there was paperwork missing from the
repair station which could constitute a potential FAA violation.
Martinez testified that he told O’Hara, Acker, and Castanon that
Mijangos was responsible for the missing paperwork. O’Hara
then forwarded Martinez’s e-mail about the missing paperwork to
Acker.
      Soon after, Hutchinson disciplined Martinez for working
overtime. Dhaine told Mijangos to not let Martinez work
overtime in the future.
III. Hutchinson terminates appellants for timecard fraud
      On November 25, 2014, Mijangos accused both Diaz and
Martinez of timecard fraud. Mijangos said he observed Diaz was
not at his work station until 6:15 a.m. when his timecard showed
he was clocked in at 5:48 a.m. Dhaine also observed Martinez
enter the parking lot 20 to 30 minutes after he clocked in.

                               4
Human Resources suspended Diaz and Martinez while
Hutchinson conducted an investigation, and determined that
Diaz and Martinez had several discrepancies between their badge
swipe and clock-in times. Mijangos also reported to Dhaine that
on November 14, 2014, he noticed that Diaz was clocked in but
that his car was not in the parking lot. Acker, Dhaine, and
Hutchinson’s Chief Executive Officer, Grant Hintze, then made
the decision to terminate Diaz and Martinez.
IV. Relevant procedural history and events at trial
       Appellants filed a lawsuit against Hutchinson for:
(1) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5;
(2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (3) libel
and slander. Martinez also sued Hutchinson for disability
discrimination and harassment.
       In February 2020, the trial took place. The court instructed
the jury on defendant’s special instruction No. 3. Appellants’
trial counsel objected to it as inappropriate and misleading
because the first sentence defined at-will employment.
       Over Appellants’ objections, the court excluded evidence of
a sexual harassment report and investigation concerning
Mijangos. The report and investigation were the subject of
Hutchinson’s motion in limine No. 4. The motion was argued on
December 9, 2019, with the trial court taking it under
submission. At trial, the trial court excluded the evidence as not
relevant. The trial court, however, allowed Appellants to read in
portions of the sexual harassment investigation to show that
Dhaine believed Appellants were trying to sabotage Mijangos.
       The trial court also excluded statements by Hutchinson’s
Quality Manager, Mark Crawford, as hearsay. When Diaz
confronted Crawford with his suspicion that paperwork for the

                                 5
molded assemblies on engine isolators was fabricated, Diaz
sought to testify that Crawford replied, “well Edgar [Mijangos]
said it would be okay.” Appellants also sought to introduce
Crawford’s response to Diaz asking Crawford how he could sign-
off on the molded assemblies: “I just used a pre-existing
inspection on the computer and referenced the isolator PIR’s.”
The trial court excluded the statements as hearsay.
       The trial court further excluded evidence related to
Hutchinson’s expert witness Rodney Doss’s alleged bias as more
prejudicial than probative. Appellants sought to introduce
evidence that Doss was the president of an airline repair shop
five years prior to the trial, and was involved in terminating
employee who had raised FAA compliance issues based on
allegations of timecard fraud.
       After deliberating for approximately 137 minutes, the jury
returned the following verdicts: As to Diaz’s wrongful discharge
claim—Diaz’s whistleblower complaints were not a substantial
motivating reason for Hutchinson’s discharge decision by a 10-2
vote. As to Diaz’s retaliation claim—Diaz’s whistleblower
disclosures were not a contributing factor in Hutchinson’s
discharge decision by a 9-3 vote. As to Diaz’s libel and slander
claim—Hutchinson did not use reasonable care in determining
the truth or falsity of the timecard fraud statement (“Plaintiff
had been suspended for alleged time card fraud”) by a 12-0 vote,
but the statement did not injure Diaz in his occupation by a 12-0
vote.
       As to Martinez’s wrongful discharge claim—his
whistleblower complaints were not a substantial motivating
reason for Hutchinson’s discharge decision by a 11-1 vote. As to
Martinez’s retaliation claim—Martinez did not disclose a

                                6
potential whistleblower violation to a Hutchinson employee with
authority to investigate by a 12-0 vote. As to Martinez’s libel and
slander claims—Hutchinson did not use reasonable care in
determining the truth or falsity of the timecard fraud statement
(“Plaintiff Martinez had been suspended for alleged time card
fraud,” or “Plaintiff Martinez has been terminated for timecard
fraud”) by a 12-0 vote, but the statement did not injure Diaz in
his occupation by a 12-0 vote. As to Martinez’s disability
discrimination claim—Martinez’s disability was not a substantial
motivating reason for Hutchinson’s termination decision by a 12-
0 vote. As to Martinez’s disability harassment claim—Martinez
was not subject to unwanted harassing conduct by Hutchinson
based on his disability by a 12-0 vote.
      On January 25, 2021, the court entered judgment against
Appellants. Appellants then timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
I.    The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on
      defendant’s special instruction No. 3
      Over Appellants’ objection, the trial court gave defendant’s
special instruction No. 3. Appellants contend that the first
sentence defining California Labor Code section 2922 (at-will
employment) was error because it was irrelevant, duplicative,
and argumentative. We conclude that there was no error and
therefore do not address prejudice.
      The court instructed the jury: “California Labor Code
Section 2922 states, ‘an employment, having no specified term,
may be terminated at the will of either party on no notice to the
other. If plaintiffs prove that their disclosure of information of an
unlawful act was a contributing factor to their discharge,
Hutchinson is not liable if it proves by clear and convincing

                                 7
evidence that it would have discharged plaintiffs anyway at the
time for legitimate and independent reasons.’ ”
         A.    Applicable law
               a.    Labor Code section 1102.5
         California Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b),
California’s whistleblower statute, provides:
         “An employer . . . shall not retaliate against an employee
for disclosing information . . . to a person with authority over the
employee or another employee who has the authority to
investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance
. . . if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the
information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a
violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or
regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is
part of the employee’s job duties.” (Ibid.)
         The California Supreme Court recently clarified that claims
brought under section 1102.5 follow a two-step burden-shifting
process. (See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022)
12 Cal. 5th 703, 718.) First, plaintiff must establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that retaliation for an employee’s
protected activities was a contributing factor in a contested
employment action. (Ibid.) Second, and only if a plaintiff has
made the required showing, the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would
have taken the action in question for legitimate, independent
reasons even had the plaintiff not engaged in protected activity.
(Ibid.)

                                 8
            b.      Wrongful termination in violation of
                    FEHA and public policy
       An employer who hires an employee “at will” may discharge
that employee for any reason except for “performing an act that
public policy would encourage, or for refusing to do something
that public policy would condemn.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1090 (Gantt), overruled on other grounds;
Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66 (Green);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172;
Lab. Code, § 2922 [defining at-will employment].) To avoid
“judicial policymaking,” however, this limitation on discharging
employees in violation of public policy is confined to public
policies that (1) are codified and “tethered” to a constitutional or
statutory provision; (2) “inure[] to the benefit of the public”;
(3) are “fundamental” and “substantial”; and (4) are “well-
established.” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880,
889–890; Gantt, at p. 1095; Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256.)
       In this case, Appellants’ claims for wrongful termination
rest on the public policy condemning retaliation against an
employee for reporting conduct that he “has reasonable cause to
believe” constitutes “a violation of state or federal” law (Lab.
Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b)), namely FAA violations. The public
policy against retaliating against whistleblowers is sufficiently
“fundamental” to support a claim for wrongful termination. (See,
e.g., Green, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 76–77 [so holding].)
       Additionally, Martinez premises his wrongful termination
claim on his disability discrimination claim. California’s Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) makes it an unlawful
employment practice to discharge or discriminate against

                                 9
employees in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
because of a physical or mental disability or medical condition.
(Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) “The FEHA’s provisions may
provide the policy basis for a claim for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy.” (Zamora v. Security Industry
Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 31.)
       For wrongful termination claims, when a plaintiff has
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination or
retaliation was a substantial factor motivating his or her
termination, the employer is entitled to demonstrate that
legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reasons would
have led it to make the same decision at the time. (Harris v. City
of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 214–215.) “If the
employer proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have made the same decision for lawful reasons, then the
plaintiff cannot be awarded damages, backpay, or an order of
reinstatement.” (Id. at p. 241.)
               c.    Jury instructions and standard of review
       “Upon request, a party in a civil case is entitled to correct,
nonargumentative jury instructions on every theory of the case
that is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] The trial
court has no duty to instruct on its own motion, nor is it obligated
to modify proposed instructions to make them complete or
correct.” (Maureen K. v. Tuschka (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 519,
526.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “A reviewing court must review the evidence [in the
light] most favorable to the contention that the requested
instruction is applicable since the parties are entitled to an
instruction thereon if the evidence so viewed could establish the
elements of the theory presented.” ’ ” ’ ” (DeWitt v. Monterey Ins.
Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 233, 240.)

                                 10
       We determine whether a jury instruction is a correct
statement of law under the independent or de novo standard of
review. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) “ ‘Review of
the adequacy of instructions is based on whether the trial court
“fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law.” ’ ” (People v.
Turner (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 882, 887.)
       It is error to give an instruction that is a correct statement
of law in the abstract but “ ‘ “is not within the issues developed by
the evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom. And if it is
likely to mislead the jury the error is prejudicial.” ’ ” (Veronese v.
Lucasfilm Ltd. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1, 25; DeGeorge v.
Crimmins (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 544, 547.)
       B.     The court did not err in instructing the jury on
              special instruction No. 3
       The Labor Code section 2922 legal statement in special
instruction No. 3 was both a correct statement of law and
relevant because it was within the issues developed by the
evidence. The instruction stated the baseline status of
Appellants’ employment and was couched within the shifting
burden standard for Labor Code section 1102.5 whistleblower
retaliation. Hutchinson’s theory was that Appellants were fired
for nonillegal reasons: namely timecard fraud. “[T]he starting
point for all employment cases is the presumption of at-will
employment. [Labor Code section] 2922 provides that ‘[a]n
employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the
will of either party on notice to the other.’ The tort of wrongful
termination in violation of public policy is an exception to the
statute.” (Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California,
Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 107.) It was undisputed that
Appellants were at-will employees and that Hutchinson

                                 11
terminated their employment. Hutchinson presented evidence
that Appellants were terminated for timecard fraud rather than
their complaints concerning FAA violations or for Martinez’s
disability. As the trial court stated in response to Appellants’
trial counsel, the first sentence stated the “baseline for
employment” and indicated that “labor can be terminated legally
and properly at any time unless there is a specified term. But it
may not be when you have claims such as the ones that you have
here.” Notably, the trial court did not give a standalone Labor
Code section 2922 instruction and contextualized it within the
code’s section 1102.5 claim. Hutchinson’s evidence and trial
theory directly raised the question of legal versus illegal grounds
for terminating at-will employment, and the instruction was
therefore relevant and a correct statement of the law.
       Special instruction No. 3 was also not argumentative or
duplicative. The instruction did not “[go] too elaborately into the
particular facts relied on by [Hutchinson].” (Morgan v. J-M
Manufacturing Company, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1088.)
Rather, it “[stated the] rules of law generally, rather than
elaborate matters of evidence.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the first
sentence defining Labor Code section 2922 was not duplicative of
the proceeding sentences about the shifting burden standard and
Hutchinson’s affirmative defense. As discussed above, the first
sentence merely set forth the baseline for employment. The jury
instruction was therefore proper.
       Appellants cite no cases where it was error to instruct on
at-will employment under similar facts and claims. Appellants
primarily rely on Rosenfeld v. Abraham Joshua Heschel Day
School, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 886. But that case did not
deal with instructional error and only held that the trial court did

                                12
not err in admitting plaintiff’s employment contract to determine
the terms of her tenured status. (Id. at pp. 897–899.) Appellants’
remaining authorities are either nonbinding or cite to general
propositions of law on at-will employment or instructional error.
As such, Appellants’ claims of instructional error are
unpersuasive.
       Accordingly, the trial court did not err in providing the jury
with special instruction No. 3.
II.    The trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings
       Appellants also challenge several of the trial court’s rulings
on the admission or exclusion of evidence. As discussed below,
we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its
evidentiary rulings.
       A.    Standard of review
       “Broadly speaking, an appellate court reviews any ruling by
a trial court as to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
discretion.” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201.)
The trial court’s “discretion is only abused where there is a clear
showing [it] exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered.” (People v. DeJesus (1995)
38 Cal.App.4th 1, 32.) We may affirm the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling if it “was correct on any ground.” (People v.
Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 582 (Geier), overruled on other
grounds as stated in People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186,
1220.)

                                 13
      B.     The trial court’s exclusion of evidence related
             to Hutchinson’s investigation of sexual
             harassment allegations against Mijangos was
             not an abuse of discretion
       Appellants argue that the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of a sexual harassment investigation concerning
Mijangos, because it would have shown that Hutchinson handled
the investigation and discipline of Mijangos more favorably.
Appellants also argue that evidence related to the sexual
harassment investigation would show Mijangos’s retaliatory
intent and motive to fabricate timecard fraud allegations.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding this
evidence.
       Appellants fail to establish that the sexual harassment
investigation would be admissible as comparator evidence.
“To be probative, comparative data must be directed at showing
disparate treatment between employees who are similarly
situated to the plaintiff in all relevant respects.” (Gupta v.
Trustees of California State University (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 510,
519–520.) “In general, ‘individuals are similarly situated when
they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.’ ” (Id. at
p. 520.)
       Here, Mijangos was not similarly situated to Diaz and
Martinez. Hutchinson investigated Mijangos for sexual
harassment allegations, while it investigated Diaz and Martinez
for timecard fraud. (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th
317, 369 [plaintiff in discrimination case failed to show pretext
through statistical data on employees that were not “similar or
comparable”].) Further, Diaz was the lead technician in
Hutchinson’s repair station, and Martinez was an assistant to

                               14
repair technicians in Hutchinson’s parts department. Mijangos
was an accountable manager in Hutchinson’s repair station.
      Appellants fail to cite to any authority that supports their
contention for finding comparator evidence under such dissimilar
conduct, as well as dissimilar positions. The evidence related to
sexual harassment investigation is therefore not admissible as
probative comparator evidence.
      Nor is the sexual harassment evidence admissible to prove
Mijangos’s motive, intent, preparation, plan, or knowledge under
Evidence Code section 1101, subd. (b). Appellants rely on
Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87 for the proposition
that the evidence showing Mijangos believed Diaz was behind the
sexual harassment allegations is probative of Mijangos
fabricating timecard fraud allegations in retaliation. In Pantoja,
the court held the jury should have been allowed to hear “me too”
evidence concerning harassing activity against female employees
other than the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 92.) “The ‘me-too’ doctrine,
however, does not permit a plaintiff to present evidence of
discrimination against employees outside of the plaintiff’s
protected class to show discrimination or harassment against the
plaintiff.” (Pinter-Brown v. Regents of University of California
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 55, 96.) Here, Appellants are improperly
attempting to present evidence of Mijangos’s alleged harassment
based on sex to show discrimination and harassment against
them based on their whistleblowing activities. As such, the
evidence is not probative of Mijangos’s retaliatory intent and
motive.
      Evidence Code section 352 allows the trial court to exclude
otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission

                               15
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” “A trial court’s discretionary ruling
under this statute ‘ “must not be disturbed on appeal except on a
showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th
584, 634–635.) Appellants contend that the trial court abused its
discretion by not engaging in an Evidence Code section 352
analysis because it stated that the evidence was not relevant and
therefore did not determine whether its probative value was
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
       Even if “the trial court did not expressly base its ruling on
Evidence Code section 352, we review the ruling, not the court’s
reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we
affirm.” (Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 582). As discussed above,
the evidence related to the sexual harassment investigation had
minimal probative value given that it did not constitute
comparator evidence or evidence of motive or intent. Further, the
trial court allowed Appellants to read in portions of the report
that would be probative of Mijangos’s retaliatory intent:
       “Q. And Ms. Dhaine, after the June 6th meeting with
Mr. Diaz, Mr. Martinez, and the rest of management, you
prepared words that state, ‘As a side note, we’ve had issues in the
past few weeks with Miguel Diaz and another employee who are
trying to sabotage Edgar’s (Mijangos’s) authority. Both the VP of
Operations and I are aware of the situation and are managing it
with these—Miguel Diaz and the other employee.’
       “Those are your words?
       “A. That is part of the report I wrote, yes.”

                                16
       Admission of the entire sexual harassment investigation
would “necessitate an undue consumption of time and risk
confusing the issues.” (Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24
Cal.App.5th 855, 867.) Introduction of such evidence “would have
led to a trial within a trial” of the sexual harassment allegations
against Mijangos. (Id. at p. 868.) Further, the sexual
harassment allegations are “of such nature as to inflame the
emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the information, not
to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant.” (People
v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 439.) Accordingly, we find no
error in the trial court’s ruling excluding any evidence of sexual
harassment allegations against Mijangos.
       C.     The trial court’s exclusion of the Crawford
              statement was not an abuse of discretion
       Appellants argue that Crawford’s statements were not
hearsay because they qualified as operative facts and prove
Crawford’s knowledge. They further argue that even if the
statements were hearsay, they would fall under the state of mind
and corporate admission exceptions to the hearsay rule. We
reject these contentions and conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.
       Diaz sought to testify about a conversation that he had
with Crawford when Diaz told Crawford that he thought his
paperwork for the molded assemblies on engine isolators was
being fabricated. Crawford responded, “well Edgar [Mijangos]
said it would be o.k.” Appellants also sought to introduce
Crawford’s response to Diaz asking Crawford how he could sign-
off on the molded assemblies: “I just used a pre-existing
inspection on the computer and referenced the isolator PIR’s.”
The trial court excluded the statements as hearsay.

                                17
        “ ‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and
that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid.
Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) It is generally inadmissible unless an
exception to the rule applies. (Id., subd. (b)).
        When evidence contains multiple levels of out-of-court
statements, each level must be analyzed separately to determine
whether it is hearsay or nonhearsay, and if hearsay, whether
each level falls within a hearsay exception. (Evid. Code, § 1201.)
        Under the operative facts doctrine, “[i]f a fact in
controversy is whether certain words were spoken or written and
not whether the words were true, evidence that these words were
spoken or written is admissible as nonhearsay evidence.” (People
v. Fields (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1068.) For example,
contractual words, such as acceptance of an offer, will make a
binding contract even if the speaker had no intention to be bound.
(See State of Oregon v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th
1550, 1555, fn.1, disapproved on other grounds in Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 465,
fn. 8.)
        Appellants argue that the statements are operative facts to
prove their theory that Mijangos directed Crawford to falsify
paperwork and then concocted timecard fraud accusation in
retaliation after he was caught. But that reason goes directly to
the truth of the matter asserted in Crawford’s statement:
whether Mijangos said it was permissible to falsify paperwork to
prove that Mijangos was directing employees to fabricate
documents. As such, the statements do not qualify as operative
facts.

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       We further reject Appellants’ contention that Crawford’s
statements were admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section
1250 as evidence of the state of mind of Mijangos to show that he
had a “lackadaisical attitude towards traceability requirements
and intent to neglect policy and procedure” as well as “explains
his act of accusing [Appellants] of timecard fraud.” “[T]hat
exception applies only to statements offered to show the state of
mind of the declarant.” (People v. Luo (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 673,
677; accord, Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1).) Here, Crawford
was the declarant as to what Mijangos said to him, and Diaz
attempted to testify as to what Mijangos said to Crawford.
This was impermissible double hearsay because as discussed
above, it was offered to prove that Mijangos was committing FAA
violations. Thus, Appellants are incorrect that Crawford’s
statements are admissible to show Mijangos’s state of mind.
       Appellants also claim that the statements are relevant to
establish Crawford’s knowledge without any further explanation.
Even assuming Appellants are attempting to establish that
Crawford had knowledge about alleged FAA violations at
Hutchinson, the jury already found that Appellants had a
reasonable belief that there were FAA violations at Hutchinson.
Appellants have the burden of proving the trial court abused its
discretion. In carrying this burden, Appellants must support
each assertion with argument, legal authority, and citations to
the record. (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207;
City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–
287; Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) We may
and do “disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported
by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to

                               19
adopt.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam, at p. 287.) We thus reject
Appellants’ assertion that Crawford’s statements are admissible
to prove his knowledge.
       Finally, the statements do not qualify as authorized
corporate admissions. “ ‘Evidence of a statement offered against
a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: [¶]
(a) The statement was made by a person authorized by the party
to make a statement or statements for him concerning the subject
matter of the statement; and [¶] (b) The evidence is offered either
after admission of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of such
authority or, in the court’s discretion as to the order of proof,
subject to the admission of such evidence.’ ” (O’Neill v. Novartis
Consumer Health, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1403
(O’Neill).) Job title alone is insufficient to show authority to
speak on behalf of a company. (Ibid. [affirming trial court’s
exclusion of meeting minutes signed by defendant’s director of
regulatory affairs based on lack of evidence that he had authority
to speak].) “The determination generally ‘requires an
examination of the nature of the employee’s usual and customary
authority, the nature of the statement in relation to that
authority, and the particular relevance or purpose of the
statement.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Appellants presented no evidence of Crawford’s authority
to make a statement on behalf of the company other than his title
as quality manager. Appellants do not cite to any trial testimony
to establish Crawford’s authority and only cite to their trial brief.
“Although place in an employer’s hierarchy is important in
determining authority to speak, [Crawford’s] title, without more,
is not sufficient to show he had authority to make admissions on
behalf of a company.” (O'Neill, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at

                                 20
p. 1403.) “In the absence of the necessary foundation for an
authorized admission, the court properly excluded this evidence.”
(Ibid.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding Crawford’s statements.
       D.    The trial court’s exclusion of evidence related
             to Hutchinson’s expert witness’s alleged bias
             was not an abuse of discretion
       Appellants argue that the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of Hutchinson’s expert witness Robert Doss’s alleged
bias because Doss was the president of an airline repair shop five
years prior to the trial, and was involved in terminating
employee who had raised FAA compliance issues based on
allegations of timecard fraud. We conclude that the trial court
did not err in excluding testimony related to this event as more
prejudicial than probative.
       As discussed above, Evidence Code section 352 grants a
trial judge discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will necessitate undue consumption of time, or create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury. (Ibid.) Appellants do not dispute that Doss
only testified as to FAA compliance issues at Hutchinson and not
whether the timecard fraud allegations against Appellants had
any merit. On appeal, Appellants fail to show how Doss’s
testimony is relevant when the jury found that Appellants had a
reasonable belief there were FAA violations at Hutchinson. As
such, the jury did not agree with Doss’s testimony and believed
Appellants on this issue. Further, admitting evidence related to
Doss’s alleged bias would have resulted in a “trial within a trial”
about the termination incident Doss was involved with five years

                                 21
ago. (See People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 930 [evidence
with limited probative value properly excluded where
presentation would result in time-consuming “mini-trial”].)
Accordingly, the trial court was not “arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd” in excluding this evidence on the basis that it
would have unduly consumed time and confused the jury. (People
v. Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 634.)

                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Hutchinson is awarded costs on
appeal.

                                         VIRAMONTES, J.
     We concur:

           STRATTON, P. J.

           WILEY, J.

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