Court Opinion

ID: 9479131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:09:09.722771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:50.678294
License: Public Domain

NICHOLS, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result.
1. When accused persons are siblings, as here, or otherwise linked by natural affection, the last thing they may want is a defense in which counsel for each tries to blame a crime on the other. Moreover, a unified defense under a single head may actually be more effective, and separate counsel, each zealously striving to implicate the other’s client, may be inimical to both. The budgets of hard-pressed public defenders is also for consideration. The mere possibility that one defendant might turn state’s evidence against another is always theoretically present, but it must not be allowed always to preclude the possibility of a unified defense managed in the interests of both. If a plea bargain turning one against the other is a real possibility, and needs to be explored in the interests of either accused, a different situation presents itself. Counsel who, without both client’s informed consent, actually negotiates towards such a bargain, violates a constitutional right and the rules of ethics besides. The problem is, when to draw the line, and I do not see how counsel can draw it without some inquiries to inform himself whether the possibility of a plea bargain in the interest of one to the detriment of the other is a real possibility.
As I read Ruffin v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 748 (11th Cir.1985), there were actual plea bargain negotiations in which counsel offered client Brown’s testimony against client Ruffin. Here a plea bargain was always impossible because neither defendant would implicate the other and both insisted they were not at the scene of the crime at all. Nor would the state consider one with Gene, whom it desired to put to death, as the principal offender. Recognizing as I do that counsel Murphy needed to explore the possibility of a plea bargain enough to know if a constitutional and ethical requirement for separate representation existed, I cannot conclude there was a violation on his part merely because he may have talked about a possible plea bargain with someone and established there could be none. The possibility could not have impaired his performance because he knew, or learned, there was none, only impossibility.
2. The faulty instructions on intent were:
I charge you that the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of his will, but this presumption may be rebutted.
I charge you that a person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts, but this presumption may be rebutted.
That these instructions were faulty is not to be disputed in this court in view of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), but Danny was not prejudiced because his “felony murder” conviction did not require intent to kill. Moreover, the defense of both was that they were elsewhere and they had no part in killing Bostick. There was no doubt *1470from the condition of the corpse that whoever killed Bostick did so with intent. The Supreme Court in Francis v. Franklin lays great stress on the fact that the accused, admitting he fired the fatal shot, denied he intended to kill. The majority held that intent was clearly in issue and reserved decision on whether “error” in an instruction can ever be “harmless.” 471 U.S. at 324, 105 S.Ct. at 1976. As four Justices even so dissented, it is clear the case cannot be read to go beyond its facts. This court has held that error in an instruction about intent can be harmless if intent is not a genuine issue. Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc). There is no dispute here that if Gene and Danny were the killers, Gene wielded the weapon.
3. I am persuaded the above disposes of the constitutional issues in the case and there is no need to go into all the matters discussed in the court’s opinion. I am reluctant to contribute to circuit law more than I need to justify an affirmance, and therefore concur in the result only.