Court Opinion

ID: 9545819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:20:04.440282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:36.304357
License: Public Domain

Rose, J.,
dissenting:
The criteria set forth in Rogers v. State, 105 Nev. 230, 773 P.2d 1226 (1989), for determining whether a person is in actual physical control of a parked vehicle and the standards as were applied in Bullock v. State, 105 Nev. 326, 775 P.2d 225 (1989), coupled with a reasonable consideration of the two major policy considerations stated by the majority, lead me to conclude that Isom was not in actual physical control of her vehicle. Someone fast asleep, lying across the front seat of a car parked in a vacant parking lot should not be considered to be in actual physical control of the vehicle. I believe this to be so even if the vehicle’s headlights were on and the motor was running.
Isom’s car was parked in the lot of a closed garage. When officers observed the vehicle, it appeared that no one was in it. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers observed Isom lying on her side across the seat. According to the officers, most of her left side was in contact with the seat. She was very difficult to awaken. To her discredit, when awakened she attempted to start the vehicle and stated she wanted to go home.
I see no real difference from the facts of this case and those presented in Bullock. In Bullock, the vehicle was parked in the parking lot of a bar that apparently was open for business; and Bullock was in the driver’s seat in a reclined position. Here, Isom was lying across the front seat of a vehicle that was parked in a vacant parking lot of a closed business. Bullock did not attempt to drive his vehicle when awakened, but Isom did.
If there is a difference between Bullock and this case it is that Isom stated that she had driven her vehicle to the location that night. There is no evidence, however, to establish when she drove the vehicle to the vacant lot, or whether she was intoxicated when she did so. It could be that Isom realized she was too intoxicated to drive and pulled into the lot to remove her vehicle from the highway and to get some sleep. It also could be that she was not *396legally intoxicated when she pulled into the vacant lot, but thereafter proceeded to drink the beers at the location while in the vehicle. All of the foregoing, however, is mere speculation.
Other courts have warned against such speculation in cases involving whether an intoxicated person was in actual physical control of the vehicle. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 353 A.2d 256 (Md. 1976); State v. Stanford, 108 A.2d 516 (Vt. 1954). In each case, we are reminded that these are criminal cases, that the State has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that nothing is to be presumed about the conduct of the accused.
The majority opinion here clearly identifies two policy considerations that arise in cases such as this. The first is that if you drink and drive, there will be substantial criminal sanctions. The second is to encourage those people who realize their driving is impaired to pull from the roadway. The latter policy consideration is promoted by not imposing criminal sanctions on such conduct. When, however, such conduct is not encouraged to some degree, many will elect not to pull over, and will instead make a dash for home, hoping to be lucky in not having an accident or an encounter with law enforcement. While both policies are commendable, the majority opinion accepts the first but refuses to recognize the second.
I believe there should be equal recognition of both policies and the facts of each case should be analyzed accordingly. In this case, it is significant that Isom pulled off the highway and shoulder of the road and parked her vehicle in a vacant private lot. In that position, she had removed herself as a threat to the traveling public. Despite her commendable action, she is now punished.
For the reasons stated, I believe that Leanette Isom, sound asleep on the front seat of a vehicle parked in a vacant lot of a closed business, was not in actual physical control of the vehicle when arrested. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s opinion.1

 The Honorable Robert E. Rose, Justice, participated in the decision of this matter on the record, briefs and recording of the oral argument.