Court Opinion

ID: 9569967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:18:59.404382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:28.234435
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. OCGA § 9-11-13 (a), which requires compulsory counterclaims be asserted in an action by the opposing party on the same matter, is dispositive of this case. A compulsory counterclaim is one which “arises out of the [same] transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties. . . .” OCGA § 9-11-13 (a). This phrase is to be given “a broad and realistic interpretation by the courts. Thus, the test to be applied in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory is whether there is a logical relationship between the claim advanced by the plaintiff and the claim asserted by the defendant. [Cit.] Any claim that is logically related to another claim that is being sued on is properly the basis for a compulsory counterclaim. 3 Moore’s Federal Practice ... § 13.13.” P & J Truck Lines v. Canal Ins. Co., 148 Ga. App. 3, 4 (251 SE2d 72). Hooks’ basis of action arose out of the same transaction that was the subject matter of the prior action by the bank. And, not only is there a logical relationship between the two but there is a necessary relationship. Hooks’ instant action for damages is for a negligent failure of the bank to procure credit life insurance on his wife, who was a co-maker of the note sued on by the bank in the first action, and the cost of the life insurance was included in the amount *869represented by the note, until it was determined that life insurance could not be obtained. There can be no doubt that both actions arose out of the same transaction.
Res judicata is not applicable to this action but it is involved in the reason for Rule 13 of the CPA requiring compulsory counterclaims to be asserted in the principal action by the opposing party. Professor Moore explained that Rule 13, our OCGA § 9-11-13, was enacted to provide for uniformity because “[i]t has been argued that there is no need for a compulsory counterclaim, on the ground that the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel more equitably serve the same function.” The instant case is a prime reason why the rule serves an invaluable function because in the bank’s action, defendant Hooks, rather than face judgment which could exceed the amount due on the note, paid off the amount due on the note and the bank dismissed its action. Res judicata would not apply to Hooks because no decision was obtained by a court of competent jurisdiction. Boozer v. Higdon, 252 Ga. 276 (313 SE2d 100). However, the voluntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) “terminates the action” (Page v. Holiday Inns, 245 Ga. 12, 13 (262 SE2d 783)) and the principle of accord and satisfaction is applicable and would preclude the bank from further prosecution of its former claim ($15,651.10, plus interest, costs of the action, and $100,000 in damages) as the bank accepted the lesser sum of $15,651.10 in satisfaction of its demands and dismissed its action. This is an accord and satisfaction. State Farm Fire &c. Co. v. Fordham, 148 Ga. App. 48, 52 (250 SE2d 843); Tinsley v. Beeler, 134 Ga. App. 514 (215 SE2d 280); 1 EGL 136, Accord & Satisfaction, § 7. Once the accord is accepted as satisfaction, it “is a bar to all actions on this account.” Woodstock Road Invest. Prop. v. Lacy, 149 Ga. App. 593 (1) (254 SE2d 910); Rivers v. Cole Corp., 209 Ga. 406, 408 (73 SE2d 196).
Because Hooks’ cause of action for the alleged negligence of the bank arose out of the same transaction as that of the action by the bank against Hooks, it is a compulsory counterclaim. Davis & Shulman, Ga. Practice & Procedure, § 10-4. If Hooks had intended to assert such a claim against the bank, it was necessary that it be asserted in the action brought by the bank. Under OCGA § 9-11-13 (a), where a compulsory counterclaim is involved, “a party may not decline to litigate in the original action and seek to bring a separate suit.” Myers v. United Ser. Auto. Assn., 130 Ga. App. 357, 360 (203 SE2d 304); accord Teague v. First Bank &c. Co., 244 Ga. 360, 361 (260 SE2d 72).
The bank’s acceptance of Hooks’ compromise offer to discharge its action precludes the bank from further action in asserting its allegations of costs and damages arising from that transaction. So also should Hooks be precluded. His failure to plead his compulsory counterclaim in the original action forbids his bringing a second action to *870assert that claim. P & J Truck Lines v. Canal Ins. Co., supra; Brittany Apts. v. Chapman, 141 Ga. App. 168 (233 SE2d 27).
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court; I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier and Judge Pope join in this dissent.