Court Opinion

ID: 9713289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:12:49.677401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:17.989642
License: Public Domain

*378SULLIVAN, Justice,
concurring in result.
Donald Ray Wallace appeals from the dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief. These petitions relate to his 1982 conviction for murder for which he was sentenced to death. The appeal raises three types of issues.
First, Wallace contends that the second post-conviction trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the state on his contentions that the original trial was unfair because (i) he was intoxicated at the time of the crime, (ii) improper jury instructions were given during the penalty phase, and (iii) he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase and sentencing hearing.
The trial court properly dismissed both the intoxication and jury instruction contentions because, as Wallace readily admits in his brief, he did not present at trial the defense of intoxication (Brief for Appellant at 60), and he did not object at trial to the alleged defects in the jury instructions (Brief for Appellant at 61-62). In general, errors neither assigned at trial level nor argued on direct appeal are waived as grounds for post-conviction relief. Schiro v. State (1989), Ind., 533 N.E.2d 1201, 1204, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 910, 110 S.Ct. 268, 107 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989).
It was also proper for the trial court to dismiss the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the original trial’s penalty phase and sentencing hearing. The general rule is that if a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is an issue known and available at the time of direct appeal, it is waived for purposes of PCR proceedings if not presented during the direct appeal process. Johnson v. State (1986), Ind., 502 N.E.2d 90, 91. However, because appellate counsel on direct appeal was the same as trial counsel, that rule does not apply. As the Court of Appeals said in Davis v. State (1975), 164 Ind.App. 331, 334, 328 N.E.2d 768, 771 n. 1, if a defendant is represented by the same counsel at trial and in the direct appeal process but by different counsel when seeking post-conviction relief, there may be no waiver, and the post-conviction court may properly reach the merits of a claim of incompetent trial counsel for the first time in post-conviction proceedings.
The rule here is that the claim is waived if not included in the first petition for post-conviction relief Tillman v. State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 447, 448. In fact, Wallace did raise the issue of the competence of trial counsel in his first petition for post-conviction relief and this Court reviewed it on appeal. See Wallace v. State (1990), Ind., 553 N.E.2d 456, 472-73, cert. denied, 500 U.S. 948, 111 S.Ct. 2250, 114 L.Ed.2d 491 (1991). Having litigated this issue in the first post-conviction proceeding, it is now res judicata. Smith v. State (1993), Ind., 613 N.E.2d 412, 413, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1634, 128 L.Ed.2d 357 (1994).
Second, Wallace contends that the second post-conviction court erred in granting summary judgment for the State on his contention that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during his first post-conviction proceeding. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and in the direct appeal process, Indiana follows Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Steele v. State (1989), Ind., 536 N.E.2d 292, 293. Indeed, this was the standard applied by this court in Wallace’s first post-conviction proceeding. Wallace, 553 N.E.2d at 472. The standard is different, however, when reviewing counsel’s performance in the post-conviction process:
The right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is guaranteed by neither the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution nor art. 1, section 13 of the Constitution of Indiana. A petition for post-conviction relief is not generally regarded as a criminal proceeding and does not call for a public trial within the meaning of these constitutional provisions. It thus is not required that the constitutional standards be employed when judging the performance of counsel when prosecuting a post-conviction petition at the trial level or at the appellate level.
We therefore apply a lesser standard responsive more to the due course of law or due process of law principles which are at the heart of the civil post-conviction remedy. We adopt the standard that if *379counsel in fact appeared and represented the petitioner in a procedurally fair setting which resulted in a judgment of the court, it is not necessary to judge his performance by the rigorous standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington.
Baum v. State (1989), Ind., 583 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (citations omitted). It is apparent both from the affidavits submitted by Wallace to the trial court and from this court’s decision in Wallace’s first post-conviction proceeding that the standards of Baum were met in that case. Thus, it was appropriate for the trial court to dismiss the contention of ineffective assistance of counsel at the first post-conviction proceedings.
Third, Wallace contends that the second post-conviction court made procedural errors by (i) not making the findings required by Posl^Conviction Rule 1 § 12(g), (ii) not abiding by the time requirements of Trial Rule 56, and (iii) denying Wallace a neurological examination. As to the first two of these contentions, I find no error. No prejudice to Wallace is contended or even seriously documented by the slightly accelerated summary judgment procedures employed here. Furthermore, Wallace filed a substantial response to the state’s motion for summary judgment within the time period given. While I would have preferred a more detailed statement of the trial court’s reasons for dismissing, it should be clear from the foregoing that the basis for the trial court’s order was clearly established in the record. Smith, 613 N.E.2d at 414 (summary dismissal of second petition for post-conviction relief proper where second petition raised no new issues which had not been decided previously or which were not available to defendant in his two earlier appeals).
Finally, it was clearly within the trial court’s sound discretion to deny the neurological examination. Wallace sought the neurological examination in an effort to demonstrate both absence of intent and mitigation. These issues were available both at trial and in the first post-conviction proceeding and have been, therefore, waived or already decided. It should go without saying that the court was under no duty to authorize an examination under circumstances where the results would have only supported issues waived or already decided.
' For these reasons, I concur in affirming the judgment of the trial court that the specific grounds relied upon in this proceeding do not warrant relief from the convictions or the sentence of death.