Court Opinion

ID: 9844467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:03:17.496186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:35.645058
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, habe-as corpus is not available as a means to force compliance with existing statutory procedures.
The petitioner was committed to the state hospital pursuant to provisions of the Criminal Code, following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The Criminal Code provides that a person found not responsible for a crime by reason of insanity shall be committed until he is found to be eligible for release. § 16-8-105(4), 8 C.R.S. (1978). Release may be obtained only when the person committed “has no mental condition which would be likely to cause him to be dangerous to himself or others or to the community in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 16-8-120(1), 8 C.R.S. (1978).
Once committed under the statute, a person found not guilty by reason of insanity remains subject to the supervision of the committing court. The court is empowered, for example, to order a release hearing, and may grant a full or conditional release, and “may order any additional or supplemental examination, investigation, or study which it deems necessary to a proper consideration of the question of eligibility for release.” §§ 16-8-115(1) & (2), 8 C.R.S. (1983 Supp.); cf. Parks v. District Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029 (1972) (court which commits a person adjudged incompetent to stand trial retains jurisdiction to oversee his commitment and to protect his constitutional rights). As part of the court’s supervision over the commitment, it is also empowered to enjoin any actual mistreatment and require correction of any conditions that are contrary to the purpose of the commitment. Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.1979). The court also has the inherent power to enforce its remedial orders in contempt proceedings. Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964).
The Criminal Code is similar to the civil commitment statute in providing that the commitment shall be for purposes of “care and psychiatric treatment.” See § 16 — 8— 105(4), 8 C.R.S. (1978); People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Colo.1981); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Standard 7-10.8, Commentary (1984); cf §§ 27-10-101 & 27-10-116, 11 C.R.S. (1982). However, the statutory procedures governing civil commitment, treatment, and release differ from the post-trial procedures which govern a person found not guilty by reason of insanity under the Criminal Code.
An insanity adjudication results in a presumptive continuation of the state of mental incapacity until it has been shown that sanity has been restored. Chavez, 629 P.2d at 1048. Persons who have committed criminal acts but who are not criminally responsible by reason of insanity are committed for their own protection and for the protection of the public, and such public safety considerations justify distinct standards governing commitment and release. 629 P.2d at 1052-53; see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983). The essential difference between the criminal and civil procedures is recognized in the provisions in the civil commitment statute which expressly limit the scope of the various procedures and protections to persons committed pur*226suant to Article 27. See, e.g., § 27-10-113 (availability of habeas corpus to any person detained “pursuant to this article”); § 27-10-116(l)(a) (right to treatment for persons committed “under any of the provisions of this article”). Authorities providing procedures and remedies for persons civilly committed are not applicable to commitments pursuant to the Criminal Code.
In this case, the district court found that the petitioner’s assertion that hospital officials had failed to provide treatment did not bring him within the ambit of the habeas corpus statute which permits habeas relief following lawful confinement when a subsequent act or omission entitles a party to discharge. § 13-45-103(2)(b), 6 C.R.S. (1978). In discharging the writ of habeas corpus, the court concluded that, having been committed under the Criminal Code, petitioner could be released from custody only when he met the statutory criteria specified in section 16-8-120. The court stated that any allegations of lack of treatment could and should be directed to the attention of the committing court.
The majority now holds that the petitioner’s allegations of lack of treatment are cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus, however, is to determine whether a person is unlawfully confined. Ryan v. Cronin, 191 Colo. 487, 553 P.2d 754 (1976). The essence of habeas corpus is an attack upon the legality or duration of confinement, and the function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d at 892.
Colorado’s habeas corpus statute, which we must interpret in this case, provides that a person in custody may allege in his petition “any fact to show either that the imprisonment or detention is unlawful or that he is then entitled to his discharge ....” §§ 13-45-103(1) & (2), 6 C.R.S. (1973) (emphasis supplied). The only relief which may be afforded under the statute is the discharge of the petitioner. The relief afforded by the majority invades the province of the legislature and creates a judicial remedy for those who question the treatment they receive after being found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity.
In my view, a writ of habeas corpus is not available to force compliance with statutory duties and procedures by directing state hospital officials to provide particular care and treatment to their patients. Granville v. Hunt, 411 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.1969); see also United States v. Sisneros, 599 F.2d 946 (10th Cir.1979); Cognato v. Ciccone, 558 F.2d 512 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974, 98 S.Ct. 530, 54 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977). A habeas corpus proceeding is not a proper method to challenge conditions of confinement, including lack of treatment, when other forms of relief are available. See, e.g., Brown v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 795, 204 S.E.2d 137 (1974) (inmate grievances must first be raised within the department of corrections and, upon an adverse determination, through the courts in the nature of mandamus or injunction; ha-beas corpus is not available); People ex rel. Willis v. Department of Corrections, 51 Ill.2d 382, 282 N.E.2d 716 (1972) (allegations of lack of treatment are to be addressed through comprehensive administrative program undertaken by department of corrections; habeas corpus is unavailable).
Petitioner alleges that, since his confinement at the state hospital, he has received no instruction in “ordinary social skills” and no treatment or training with regard to “street survival.” Under the statute, however, the petitioner is entitled to release when he is no longer a danger to himself or to others or to the community in the reasonably foreseeable future. § 16-8-120(1), 8 C.R.S. (1978). The petitioner does not allege that the treatment which is being provided is not directed to the statutory criteria for release. In a proper case, a petitioner can obtain an order directing that he be provided treatment, but the court cannot direct what treatment should be offered. In re: Question Concerning Judicial Review, 199 Colo. 463, 610 P.2d 1340 (1980). If the state hospital in this case failed to comply with its duty to pro*227vide the type of care and treatment to the petitioner that is required by the statute, relief in the nature of mandamus was available through the committing court, by virtue of the court’s continuing jurisdiction over the petitioner. See Lamm v. Barber, 192 Colo. 511, 565 P.2d 538 (1977); Board of County Commissioner v. Edwards, 171 Colo. 499, 468 P.2d 857 (1970) (writ of mandamus is justified where a statutory duty has not been complied with or a statutory responsibility has not been met).
I cannot agree that, absent habeas corpus, the petitioner would be left without the opportunity to obtain relief from his present conditions. I would therefore affirm the discharge of the writ of habeas corpus.
I am authorized to say that Justice RO-VIRA joiqs me in this dissent.