Court Opinion

ID: 9754169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:47:21.63474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:50.098511
License: Public Domain

ORTH, J.,
dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion because I think the arrest of the appellant ivas valid. The general rule is firmly established that a warrantless arrest by a police officer is valid wliere he has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been or is being committed in his presence or view and that the arrestee is the misdemeanant. Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515, 522; Thompson v. State, 4 Md. App. 31, 37; Salmon v. State, 2 Md. App. 513, 522. The majority correctly state the rule of probable cause as a “non-technical conception of a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, requiring less evidence for such belief than would justify conviction but more evidence than that which would arouse a mere suspicion,” quoting Edwardsen v. State, 243 Md. 131 at 136. That is, whether, at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, by his seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting or smelling 1 were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused was committing a misdemeanor in his presence or view. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, cited in Edwardsen. Md. Code, (1967 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 341(a) provides that if any person shall steal, take or carry away personal goods of another under the value of $100 and being thereof convicted, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. An essential element of larceny at common law is the asportation of the property, that is a carrying away, at least to some extent. Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes (6th Ed.) *374§ 12.05, pp. 736-741; Perkins, Criminal Law, (1957) ch. 4, § IE, pp. 221-223. This requirement is not eliminated by the Maryland statute; on the contrary § 341 makes it a misdemeanor to steal, take or carry away personal property of another. In Worthington v. State, 58 Md. 403, 409, involving a common law larceny, the court stated that at common law, every asportation is a new taking.
In the instant case the issue on which the majority reversed was the admission of evidence seized by a search as a result of the arrest. As they found that the arrest was not valid, it necessarily followed that the search was unreasonable, and as the search was unreasonable, it was error not to exclude evidence obtained thereby. I agree that the facts and circumstances did not justify the arresting officer to believe that a felony had been committed for he could not properly conclude merely from what he observed that the baby carriage and the articles therein were of a value of $100 or upwards. Code, supra, Art. 27, § 340. But recognizing that probable cause is more than suspicion and possibility but less than demonstration and certainty, I have no difficulty in finding that the officer had reasonable grounds for belief that the appellant was in the process of carrying away the personal goods of another within the proscription of Code, supra, Art. 27, § 341. At 4:45 A.M. the officer saw the appellant pushing a baby carriage in a primarily commercial area of Baltimore City. The officer testified:
“As I reached the intersection of Hamilton and Park Avenue, I looked directly across the street, which is a parking lot which goes — the asphalt goes right up to the rear of the buildings to the rear of the 200 block of West Franklin Street. At that time about half-way up the block I observed a man pushing a baby carriage. I deemed it necessary because of the time of the morning to investigate.
As I proceeded across the parking lot, the man had turned south on Tyson Street, heading towards the 200 block of Franklin. As I came to Tyson Street and looked south, the man had gone; so was the baby carriage.
*3751 went south on Tyson to Franklin and as I hit the intersection of Tyson and Franklin Street, the man and the baby carriage was going out Franklin Street. I got out of the automobile and proceeded west on Franklin Street * * *
As I proceeded west on P'ranklin Street on foot, T observed the man and the baby carriage inside the hallway of the vestibule of the commercial premises of 214 West Franklin Street. As I approached him, I asked him what his name was and what he was doing there and I also looked at the baby carriage, at which time I observed there was a price tag on the baby carriage for $7.50. I could see visually cans of coffee and crackers and some clothing strewed about and boxes of costume jewelry. * * *
I asked him what his name was and he told me his name was Samuel Brown. I asked him where he lived and he told me that it wasn’t any of my business; that he didn’t have to tell me that. I asked him where he got this property at. Pie said he found it in the rear alley. I also observed at this point that the defendant, Samuel Brown, the man sitting over there with the brawn jacket on at the trial table, was breathing heavy as if to have been running.”
He then placed him under arrest. In light of the circumstances under which the officer observed the appellant — the time of day, the location, what the appellant was doing, how he was doing it, his actions upon being observed of proceeding into a vestibule of a commercial building, the price tag on the baby carriage, the miscellaneous variety of articles within the carriage, his completely unsatisfactory explanation of his presence and his possession of the articles — to say that those circumstances, observed by the officer, were not sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the appellant was carrying away the personal goods of another, and thus, at the time, committing the misdemeanor of petit larceny in the presence of the officer, is completely unjustified. I do not see how a prudent and reasonably cautious man could believe other than that the appel*376lant was a thief caught flagrante delicto. I cannot find the actions of the appellant so “consistent with innocent travel 'on a public thoroughfare” as to preclude this belief. I think it immaterial that the officer was not aware, at the time of the arrest, that the baby carriage and its contents had in fact been stolen from the church shortly before. Of course, that the property was in fact stolen would have to be proved to establish the corpus delicti on the issue of innocence or guilt but the issue here is not innocence or guilt but probable cause for the arrest. Probable cause need not be sufficient to justify a conviction. As asportation of stolen goods is a necessary element of larceny, it is clear that the officer had reason to believe that the misdemeanor was being committed in his presence. To attain this belief it is not required that he actually see the initial taking; seeing the carrying away, proscribed by the statute, was sufficient. In assessing the validity of the arrest under the rule, the essential ingredient is that probable cause existed within the knowledge of the arresting officer, and not that he necessarily construed that knowledge correctly. Nor is the offense of which the arrestee is subsequently charged or convicted controlling. Simms v. State, 4 Md. App. 160, 167. The majority make the bald assertion that no misdemeanor was committed in the presence of the arresting officer and brush aside consideration of the asportation of the property as resting on “the same unsupportable inference” which they rejected as to receiving stolen goods. I do not agree. The elements required of receiving stolen goods — that they were stolen by some one else and received by the accused both with knowledge that they had been stolen and with fraudulent intent, are not elements of petit larceny; the accused cannot be at the same time both the thief and the receiver. Fletcher v. State, 231 Md. 190.
As the majority state, the line between probability and suspicion must be drawn on a case by case basis and where it will be drawn can only be determined after a careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case. I have no difficulty in this case upon such analysis in determining where the line should be drawn. The application of the facts here to the rules of law relied on by the majority leads me to the unescapable conclusion that the arrest of the appellant was valid. Therefore the *377search was reasonable and evidence seized thereby was properly admissible.
As I find no merit in the other two contentions presented on appeal by the appellant, I would affirm the judgment.
Judge Anderson has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissent.