Court Opinion

ID: 9947418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 19:11:19.688224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:24.823308
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued February 27, 2024

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00860-CV
                           ———————————
                         ADRIENE SIBLEY, Appellant
                                        V.
                         PORT FREEPORT, Appellee

      On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 & Probate Court
                         Brazoria County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. CI61616

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellee Port Freeport initiated an eminent domain proceeding to acquire

fee simple title to a tract of land in Brazoria County, Texas to be used for

expansion of its facilities. A panel of three court-appointed special commissioners

adjudicated the case administratively, awarding $14,000.00 for the property.
Appellant Adriene Sibley filed objections to the commissioners’ award, converting

the case into a judicial proceeding to be heard by the trial court de novo. The trial

court set the case for trial. Sibley did not appear for trial and the trial court

rendered a post-answer default judgment.

       Sibley now appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Port Freeport.

She argues (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the special

commissioners did not issue notice of the condemnation hearing as required by

Section 21.016 of the Property Code and she was not served with the notice of

hearing, (2) the special commissioners lacked jurisdiction to condemn the mineral

estate of the property because the mineral estate was excluded in Port Freeport’s

petition for condemnation, (3) the trial court abused its discretion by concluding

that the sole issue before the court was compensation due the landowners for the

condemned property, and (4) the trial court lacked jurisdiction because of an “issue

of title.”

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                   Background

       Port Freeport (“Port”) filed an original statement and petition for

condemnation against the known and unknown heirs of Anna Laura Rossaw

seeking to acquire fee simple title to a tract of land in Brazoria County, Texas

                                         2
(“Property”) for expansion of the Port’s facilities.1 The Property consisted of a

vacant lot in Freeport, Texas identified in the petition as:

            Lot Thirteen (13) in Block Seven (7), Freeport Townsite in the
            City of Freeport, Brazoria County, Texas, according to the map or
            plat thereof recorded in Volume 2, Page 95 of the Plat Records of
            Brazoria County, Texas.

The Port “excluded from the estate to be condemned all the oil, gas and sulfur

which can be removed from beneath the Property . . . .” The Port did not name

Sibley in the original petition as a person with an interest in the Property.

      Pursuant to Section 21.014 of the Texas Property Code, the trial court

appointed three special commissioners “to assess damages occasioned by the

condemnation of Defendants’ property[.]”2 Sibley filed a petition in intervention

alleging she had an ownership interest in the Property. In an amended petition in

intervention, Sibley alleged she had an undivided two-fifths interest in the

Property.     In both her original and amended petitions in intervention, Sibley

1
      See TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.012(a) (“If an entity with eminent domain authority
      wants to acquire real property for public use but is unable to agree with the owner
      of the property on the amount of damages, the entity may begin a condemnation
      proceeding by filing a petition in the proper court.”).
2
      Section 21.014 of the Texas Property Code provides in part:
            The judge of a court in which a condemnation petition is filed or to
            which an eminent domain case is assigned shall, not later than the 30th
            calendar day after the petition is filed, appoint three disinterested real
            property owners who reside in the county as special commissioners to
            assess the damages of the owner of the property being condemned . . . .
      TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.014(a).

                                              3
identified her address as 4808 Fairmont Pkwy #101, Pasadena, Texas 77505, and

her email address as Adrienesibley77@gmail.com. The physical address is a post

office box.

      The Port filed its first amended statement and petition for condemnation

identifying Sibley, nineteen other individuals and taxing authorities, and an

attorney ad litem for the unknown owners of the Property as potentially having an

interest in the Property.      Like the original petition, the amended petition

specifically excluded the mineral estate from the Property being acquired.3

      The special commissioners set a hearing for July 30, 2021. The Port sent

notice of the hearing to Sibley by certified mail at the post office box Sibley

identified as her address in her petitions for intervention. The Port also attempted

personal service on Sibley by sending a process server to the residential address

Sibley identified in her filings in the case. In addition, the Port electronically

served Sibley at the email address she used for her court filings and for

communications with the Port’s counsel. Finally, the Port served Sibley through

citation by publication.

      The special commissioners held a hearing on July 31, 2021, as scheduled.

Sibley did not attend. Following the hearing, the special commissioners issued a

3
      The description of the Property is the same in the Port’s original and first amended
      statement and petition for condemnation.

                                           4
Decision and Award (“Award”) awarding the defendant landowners $14,000 in

damages for the Property as identified in the Port’s petition. The Award states:

      (1) We assess the damages to be paid by Plaintiff for the
      condemnation in the total amount of $14000.00 and we do award
      these damages to Defendants. (2) We award to Plaintiff all rights
      described and prayed for in Plaintiff’s First Amended Statement and
      Petition for Condemnation.

The Award of the special commissioners was filed with the trial court with notice

to the clerk of the court. The clerk was directed to “send notice of the Decision

and Award as provided in Section 21.040 of the Texas Property Code” to the

parties including “Adrienne Sibley [at] 4808 Fairmont Parkway #101, Pasadena,

Texas, 77505.”

      One month later, on August 21, 2021, Sibley filed written objections and

exceptions to the Award, arguing, among other things, that she had “not been

properly served with the Notice of Commissioners Hearing” and that she had not

entered an appearance in the case. Sibley acknowledged in her objections that her

interest in the Property included the interests of two individuals, Eddie Lewis and

Dushay Lewis, who she stated had been “properly served.” She argued that the

special commissioners had not applied “the correct measure of damages” to

determine the compensation to which she was entitled for the Property and the “oil,

gas and sulfur beneath the surface.” Sibley requested a jury trial to determine “just

and adequate compensation.”

                                         5
      The Port deposited the $14,000 award amount into the registry of the court.

Several of the named defendants moved to withdraw portions of the award

proportionate to their undivided interest in the Property. Sibley did not join in their

motions or separately move to withdraw funds. The trial court set the motions for

hearing. No response or objections were made to any of the motions to withdraw,

which the trial court subsequently granted.

      The Port served written discovery on Sibley on December 16, 2021. The

Port served Sibley with requests for admissions, including a request that Sibley

admit the “Special Commissioners issued a Notice of Hearing to defendants stating

the time, date, and place of the hearing.” (Emphasis in original.) The record lacks

any indicia that Sibley responded to the requests for admission.4

4
      The Port asserts in its brief that Sibley did not respond to the discovery and the
      trial court’s findings of fact state the same. Sibley claims in her reply brief that
      she was not served with requests for admissions, but according to the certificate of
      service on the request for admissions, she was served via electronic service and
      certified mail, return receipt requested at the physical and email addresses
      provided on Sibley’s petition in intervention. Sibley says she “did not open the
      email the [sic] contained the Request for Admissions therefore Sibley never
      received the admissions and had no duty to respond therefore the admissions
      cannot be the support that Sibley admitted that the Commissioners issued the
      notice of hearing.” To the extent Sibley argues that she received but did not open
      the request for admissions, she was effectively served with them when they
      arrived electronically, regardless of whether she opened the email. See Stettner v.
      Lewis & Maese Auction, LLC, 611 S.W.3d 102, 106 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
      Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (holding attorney’s month-long delay in opening email sent
      on June 29 “does not show that he did not receive notice” of summary judgment
      motions on June 29). See also TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a(b)(3) (“Electronic service is
                                           6
      On September 2, 2022, the trial court mailed a notice to all parties of record,

including Sibley, stating the case was set for trial on October 17, 2022.5 Sibley

emailed the court on October 13, 2022, stating she had filed timely objections to

the Award, but that “no citation was requested, served or waived by the Port.” She

claimed the trial court judge had “recused from the case” and that the

“Administrative stage ha[d] not ended.” The trial court responded via email that

same day, explaining that “[n]o voluntary recusal was made and no Motion to

Recuse was filed” and further that the “Objection to the Award end[ed] the

administrative phase of the condemnation case” and no citation was required. The

court concluded by stating the case was set for trial on October 17, 2022.

      Sibley did not appear for trial and the trial court entered a post-answer

default judgment.6 The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In its findings of fact, the trial court found Sibley had filed a petition in

intervention, lawful notice of the special commissioners’ hearing had been

provided to the named defendants, and Sibley had “timely filed objections to the

[A]ward, converting th[e] proceeding into a judicial case.” In its conclusions of

      complete on transmission of the document to the serving party’s electronic filing
      service provider.”).
5
      The trial court also emailed Sibley on October 11, 2023, stating the case was set
      for trial on October 17, 2022 at 9 a.m.
6
      Sibley states in her supplemental reply brief that she did not attend trial because
      “the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the proceedings.”

                                           7
law, the trial court concluded that Sibley had “invoked th[e] Court’s jurisdiction by

filing objections to the award, and the matter [was] properly before [the court].” It

further concluded that by failing to object to withdrawal of the funds from the

court’s registry, the “Defendants [had] waived any objection to the Court’s

jurisdiction,” and that “the sole issue [before the court] in th[e] condemnation case

[was] compensation due to the landowners.”7

      The trial court entered its final judgment on October 24, 2022. The trial

court awarded the Property to the Port, reserved to the defendants “all the oil, gas

and sulfur which can be removed from beneath the Property,” and awarded

$14,000 to the defendants.

      Sibley now appeals from the final judgment.

                                   Applicable Law

A.    Condemnation Proceedings

      Texas condemnation proceedings consist of two separate phases: one

administrative phase and one judicial phase. In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1, 493 S.W.3d

538, 542 (Tex. 2016); Harris Cnty. Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 61 v. Magellan

Pipeline Co., L.P., 649 S.W.3d 630, 633 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022,

pet. denied) (“In Texas, condemnation proceedings are conducted in two phases—

an administrative phase, and, if necessary, a judicial phase.”) (citing City of Tyler

7
      The appellate record does not contain a reporter’s record from the trial.

                                            8
v. Beck, 196 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tex. 2006)). During the administrative phase, the

trial court appoints special commissioners to conduct a hearing, gather evidence,

and determine “just compensation for the landowner.” In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1.,

493 S.W.3d at 541. The special commissioners then submit their award to the

court. This process “is essentially an official, compulsory mediation of the value

dispute with the goal of avoiding a trial.” 8 Id. at 542.

      The second phase, the judicial portion, commences “following a proper

objection to the commissioners’ award.”          Id. at 543.   The filing of “timely

objections invokes the jurisdiction of the trial court and transforms the

administrative proceeding into a pending cause.” John v. State, 826 S.W.2d 138,

141 n.5 (Tex. 1992) (citing Pearson v. State, 315 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. 1958));

see also Magellan Pipeline, 649 S.W.3d at 633 n.2 (“Any party dissatisfied with

[the special commissioners’] award may file an objection, which begins the

judicial phase of the proceeding.”). During the judicial part of a condemnation

proceeding, the special commissioners’ award is vacated and the trial court

conducts a trial de novo “in which the entire case is presented as if there had been

no previous trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.3; see also In re State, 85 S.W.3d 871, 876

8
      Sibley’s petition in intervention was filed during the administrative phase of the
      proceeding. In that respect, it appears her filing was improper. See Patrick Media
      Grp., Inc. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 879 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. App.—Eastland
      1994, writ denied) (observing that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60, which
      governs interventions, does not apply to administrative phase of condemnation
      proceedings).

                                           9
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.) (citing Elliott v. Joseph, 351 S.W.2d 879, 880

(Tex. 1961)). Objections “wip[e] out entirely the award of the commissioners and

preven[t] any judgment from being entered based upon such an award.” Enbridge

Pipelines (E. Tex.) L.P. v. Saratoga Timber Co., Ltd., No. 13-14-00381-CV, 2017

WL 2807382, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 29, 2017, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (quoting In re State, 85 S.W.3d at 877).

      It is well-settled that in condemnation proceedings, “the right to appeal by

trial de novo affords a party an adequate remedy for any error occurring in the

administrative phase of the proceeding.” In re State, 85 S.W.3d at 876. “The

Texas Supreme Court has long held that the right of appeal and trial de novo

affords a party adequate relief for any errors occurring in the proceedings before

the special commissioners ‘up to and including the award of the special

commissioners.’” City of Dall. v. Martin, 711 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing Tonahill v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 446 S.W.2d 301,

302 (Tex. 1969)).

B.    Service of Notice of the Hearing

      Section 21.016(d) of the Property Code governs the provision of notice of a

special commissioners’ hearing. It provides that notice may be served:

      (1)   by delivering a copy of the notice to the party or to the party’s
            agent or attorney;

                                         10
       (2)    if the property being condemned belongs to a deceased’s estate
              or to a minor or other legally disabled person and the person or
              estate has a legal representative, by delivering a copy of the
              notice to the legal representative; or

       (3)    if the property being condemned belongs to a nonresident of
              this state and there has been no personal service on the owner,
              if the identity or the residence of the property owner is
              unknown, or if the property owner avoids service of notice by
              hiding, by publication in the same manner as service of citation
              by publication in other civil cases in the district courts or
              county courts at law.

TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.016(d).

                                         Discussion

A.     Special Commissioners’ Hearing

       In her first issue, Sibley argues the special commissioners lacked jurisdiction

over her and her two-fifths interest in the Property because the commissioners did

not issue the notice of hearing as required by Texas Property Code Section

21.016(a), she was not served with the notice of hearing as required by Section

21.016(b), and she “did not intentionally waive the notice of the hearing.”

Consequently, she argues, the Award is void. And because the Award is void,

there was no condemnation to appeal to the trial court and thus her (own filed)

objections to the special commissioners’ Award were “invalid and did not invoke

the . . . jurisdiction of the trial court.”

       We do not have jurisdiction to decide moot issues.           See Heckman v.

Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012).            When Sibley filed her

                                              11
objections to the special commissioners’ Award, the Award was vacated and

annulled, and the trial court acquired jurisdiction to hear the case de novo “as if

there had been no previous trial.” Id. At that moment, any error that occurred

during the administrative phase became moot. See In re State, 85 S.W.3d at 876

(“In the judicial phase, the trial court’s actions relating to the administrative phase,

as a general rule, become moot.         Moreover, any error occurring during the

administrative phase that affects the judicial phase typically can be reviewed in the

trial de novo.”) (citations omitted); see also PR Invs. & Specialty Retailers, Inc. v.

State, 251 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Tex. 2008) (observing that after objections are filed

and proceeding becomes judicial, “the proceedings that occurred before the special

commissioners are not considered, and the case is tried to the [trial] court de

novo.”).

      Thus, to the extent Sibley complains on appeal about any non-jurisdictional

procedural defect pertaining to the special commissioners’ hearing, we hold those

issues are moot and not properly before this Court. See City of Hous. v. Bankers

Mortg. Co., 514 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref’d

n.r.e.) (holding that after objections to special commissioners’ award are filed,

county court’s jurisdiction “could not be defeated by the showing of [a non-

                                          12
jurisdictional] irregularity in the proceedings before the Special Commissioners”);9

cf. Gioffredi v. Retreat at Riverstone, No. 01-21-00627-CV, 2022 WL 17981570,

at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(holding after county court’s de novo review of justice court’s judgment, “[a]ny

non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities in the Justice Court became a nullity, and

any challenge based on such errors or irregularities is moot”).

B.    Trial de Novo

        1.    Sibley’s Objections are Valid

      Sibley timely filed objections to the commissioners’ Award.            Thus, the

condemnation proceeding entered the judicial phase, the Award was set aside, and

subject matter jurisdiction was conferred on the trial court to conduct a trial de

novo. See In re State, 85 S.W.3d at 876. In addition, when Sibley filed her

objections, the trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over her. See Beck, 196

S.W.3d at 787 (noting parties who filed objections to special commissioners’

award invoked judicial process “and the court acquired in personam jurisdiction

over them”); Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 179

(Tex. 2004) (“Any party may object to the special commissioners’ findings, and if

9
      A previous version of the condemnation statute was in effect when City of Hous. v.
      Bankers Mortg. Co., 514 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974,
      writ ref’d n.r.e.) was decided, but its holding is pertinent here.
                                          13
there are objections, ‘the court shall cite the adverse party and try the case in the

same manner as other civil causes.’”) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.018).

        Sibley argues that her objections were invalid and did not invoke the trial

court’s jurisdiction because the Property was not condemned in the administrative

proceeding and thus, she had no “statutory authority” to file objections to the

special commissioners’ award. Sibley’s argument is premised on her contention

that the special commissioners did not issue the notice of hearing or serve Sibley

with notice of the hearing, as required. She argues that as a result of these

deficiencies, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute and its judgment is

void.

        We are not aware of any exceptions to the rule that properly filed objections

to a special commissioners’ award ends the administrative phase and confers both

subject matter and personal jurisdiction on the trial court. Nor has Sibley cited any

authority that refutes this rule.10 On the contrary, at least one appellate court has

held that once objections are filed, they cannot be withdrawn. See State v. Carlton,

901 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ) (“[O]nce objections are

filed and citation is served on the condemnor, ‘the Special Commissioners’ award

cannot be reinstated.’”) (quoting Amason v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 682 S.W.2d

10
        The only authorities Sibley cites in support concern proper notice or service of a
        condemnation suit.

                                            14
240, 242 (Tex. 1985)).11, 12 Moreover, as discussed below, we reject Sibley’s

contentions that she was not properly served. We thus reject Sibley’s arguments

that her filed objections were invalid. We hold the trial court had jurisdiction over

Sibley and over the proceeding.

        2.    Lack of Service

      Sibley argued in her objections that she was “not properly served with

notice” of the special commissioners’ hearing. Assuming without deciding that

Sibley’s service arguments are properly before this Court, Sibley’s arguments are

not meritorious.

      According to Sibley, it is “undisputed and the evidence in the Clerk’s

Record shows . . . that Sibley was not served with proper notice of hearing[.]” The

Port argues it served Sibley with the notice of the hearing electronically and via

11
      In State v. Carlton, 901 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ), the
      condemnee moved the trial court to withdraw the objections to the special
      commissioners’ award he filed two and a half years earlier. Id. at 737. The trial
      court dismissed the objections and rendered judgment on the special
      commissioners’ award. Id. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding
      that “a condemnee who contests the special commissioners’ award by filing
      objections may not withdraw such objections and unilaterally cause the award to
      be reinstated after service of citation on the condemnor.” Id. at 740.
12
      However, if the objecting party does not serve the opposing party with citation of
      the objections within a reasonable time, “the trial court should dismiss the
      objections for want of prosecution and reinstate the special commissioners’
      award.” City of Tyler v. Beck, 196 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tex. 2006). There is no
      allegation here that Sibley’s objections were not properly or timely served on the
      Port.

                                          15
certified mail, return receipt requested at the email address and physical address

Sibley used when she appeared in the case by filing a petition in intervention.13, 14

The Port also attempted twice to deliver service through a process server. On May

27, 2021, the process server was sent to the Fairmont Parkway address in Sibley’s

petition in intervention, only to learn the address was at a mailbox store. The

process server stated in his affidavit that he “[s]poke to employee who stated

[Sibley] has an active box but does not come here very often.” And on June 2,

2021, a process server was sent to an address that Sibley later used in her

objections to the special commissioners’ determination. There, the process server

spoke to a male “who refused to identify himself and stated [Sibley does not] live

here. He refused to answer my questions and closed the door on me.” Finally, the

Port asserts it served Sibley through citation by publication.

       Sibley does not cite any portion of the record to support her argument that

she was not properly served via publication. Indeed, the record supports the Port’s

argument that Sibley was served through publication. Sibley argues in her reply

brief that

13
       See TEX. R. CIV. P. 57 (“A party not represented by an attorney shall sign his
       pleadings, state his address, telephone number, email address, and, if available, fax
       number.” ).
14
       Although the certificates of service state Sibley was served electronically and/or
       by certified mail, return receipt requested, the Port states in its brief that Sibley
       was served in both manners.

                                            16
      Sibley disputed that Sibley was served with notice of hearing via
      publication and the record shows that the unknown heirs were served
      by publication and Sibley is a named defendant therefore Sibley was
      not served by publication.

This argument lacks merit.

      Service by publication is appropriate in four alternative circumstances. It

applies when (1) the property being condemned belongs to a nonresident of this

state and there has been no personal service on the owner, (2) the identity of the

property owner is unknown, (3) the residence of the property owner is unknown, or

(4) the property owner avoids service of notice by hiding. TEX. PROP. CODE

§ 21.016(d)(3). While options (1) and (2) are not applicable here, options (3) and

(4) were implicated. Sibley states in her reply brief that she “did not receive notice

of hearing by certified mail and [she] did not open or refused to sign for any

certified mail sent to a mail service that was an incorrect address.”           After

attempting service on the address Sibley identified in her petition in intervention,

the process server attempted to deliver the notice of hearing at the address Sibley

identified in subsequent pleadings. He was told at the door of the second address

that Sibley did not live there. Thus, either Sibley avoided service of notice at the

correct address, or her residence was unknown. Either way, service by publication

was appropriate. Id.

                                         17
      We conclude Sibley was properly served by publication with the special

commissioners’ hearing.15

       3.   Improper Notice

      Sibley argues that the notice of hearing was defective because the statute

requires the commissioners to issue the notice. Because the notice was issued by

the Port and not the commissioners, Sibley argues the notice was deficient.

Sibley’s argument is based on Section 21.016(a) of the Texas Property Code,

which provides:

      Each party in an eminent domain proceeding is entitled to written
      notice issued by the special commissioners informing the party of the
      time and place of the hearing.

TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.016(a).

      Sibley did not complain in the trial court, as she does on appeal, that the

notice of the commissioners’ hearing was flawed because it was issued by the Port

15
      We disagree with the Port’s contention that service of the notice of hearing was
      deemed admitted by Sibley’s failure to respond to requests for admissions. The
      Port served Sibley with requestions for admissions. In one request, the Port
      requested Sibley admit that the “Notice of Hearing was served on [Sibley] through
      the email address listed on [Sibley’s] pleadings filed in this case,
      Adrienesibley77@gmail.com.” Section 21.016 of the Property Code does not
      identify service via email as a proper method of service of notice of a special
      commissioners hearing, so the request cannot result in a deemed admission that
      service was properly effected. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.016(d); cf. Boyter v.
      MCR Constr. Co., 673 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d
      n.r.e.) (holding request for admission of inadmissible opinion may not be deemed
      admitted); Powell v. City of McKinney, 711 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. App.—Dallas
      1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding request for admission that is not relevant to
      material issues of fact cannot support summary judgment).

                                          18
and not “by the special commissioners.”16 The issue was thus not preserved for

our review. See Seiler v. Intrastate Gathering Corp., 730 S.W.2d 133, 137–38

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ) (noting that when objections to special

commissioners’ award are filed, “[i]t is at this point that a condemnee must assert

challenges to the condemnor’s authority to condemn, and jurisdictional

irregularities in the procedure as well as contesting the amount of damages

awarded.”), overruled on other grounds by Schumann v. City of Schertz, 100

S.W.3d 361 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.).

      Any error that occurs during the administrative phase that affects the judicial

phase “typically can be reviewed in the trial de novo.” In re State, 85 S.W.3d at

876 (“Texas courts have routinely held that the right to appeal by trial de novo

affords a party an adequate remedy for any error occurring in the administrative

phase of the proceeding.”). But any perceived defect in the administrative phase

must be objected to in the trial court, or it is waived. Anderson v. Clajon Gas Co.,

677 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (“Procedural

irregularities in proceedings before the commissioners must be challenged on

direct appeal at the trial court level. They are waived if not properly preserved for

appellate review.”) (citing PGP Gas Products v. Fariss, 620 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.

16
      Sibley stated in her objections, “The Special Commissioners had no authority to
      adjudicate the interest of the Defendant that was not properly served with notice of
      hearing and the proceeding is ineffectual as to the interest of the Defendant.”

                                           19
1981)); see also Holloway v. Matagorda Cnty., 686 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Tex. 1985)

(“Complaints as to procedural irregularities in a condemnation case ‘must be

preserved at the trial court level by motion, exception, objection, plea in

abatement, or some other vehicle.’”) (citing PGP Gas Products, 620 S.W.2d at

560).

        Because Sibley did not object in the trial court to the manner of issuance of

the hearing notice, she waived her issue. See PGP Gas Products, Inc., 620 S.W.2d

at 561 (holding objections to procedural irregularities in administrative

proceedings may be waived).

        We overrule Sibley’s first issue.

C.      The Description of the Property

        In her second issue, Sibley argues the Award “did not assess damages or

condemn the property interest that was described in the Port’s Amended Statement

and Petition for Condemnation,” and that the Port has ‘“taken’ unlawful possession

of fee simple title to the property including the mineral estate[.]”17              Sibley’s

complaint apparently stems from the background section of the Award, which

17
        Sibley objected in the trial court that the commissioners “failed to determine
        adequate compensation to which the Defendant is entitled for the Defendant’s oil,
        gas and sulfur beneath the surface that the Plaintiff specifically condemn[s] in the
        petition . . . because the appraisal evidence specifically state[s] that the valuation
        of any mineral estate is excluded from the valuation of the real property[.]”

                                              20
states the Port “sought to condemn fee simple title to a tract of land” and described

the Property as

          Lot Thirteen (13) in Block Seven (7), Freeport Townsite in the City of
          Freeport, Brazoria County, Texas, according to the map or plat thereof
          recorded in Volume 2, Page 95 of the Plat Records of Brazoria
          County, Texas.

          We do not believe the background section of the Award, which describes the

appointment of the special commissioners and the hearing, reflects the special

commissioners’ ruling. Rather, the special commissioners’ ruling in the Award

states:

          We hereby state in writing as required by law the amount of damages
          due to Defendants by reason of Plaintiff’s condemnation as follows:
          (1) We assess the damages to be paid by Plaintiff for the
          condemnation in the total amount of $14000.00 and we do award
          these damages to Defendants. (2) We award to Plaintiff all rights
          described and prayed for in Plaintiff’s First Amended Statement and
          Petition for Condemnation.

(Emphasis added.)          The Port’s first amended statement and petition for

condemnation described the property and expressly

          . . . excluded from the estate to be condemned all the oil, gas and
          sulfur which can be removed from beneath the Property without any
          right whatsoever remaining to the owner of such oil, gas and sulfur of
          ingress or egress to or from the surface of the Property for the purpose
          of exploring, developing, drilling, or mining of the same.

Thus, contrary to Sibley’s argument, the Property’s mineral estate was excluded

from the special commissioners’ Award.

                                            21
      More to the point, when Sibley filed her objections to the Award, the

objections “wip[ed] out entirely the award of the commissioners and preven[ted]

any judgment from being entered based upon such an award.” Enbridge Pipelines,

2017 WL 2807382, at *2 (quoting In re State, 85 S.W.3d at 877). Thus, even had

the Award improperly disposed of the Property’s mineral estate, the Award was

vacated and there is thus nothing for us to review as it concerns the Award.

      We overrule Sibley’s second issue.

D.    The Trial Court’s Determination of Compensation

      In its Conclusion of Law No. 13, the trial court concluded:

      As there is no challenge to the powers and rights of [Port] to acquire
      the property being taken, the sole issue in this condemnation case is
      compensation due to the landowners.

In her third issue, Sibley argues the trial court abused its discretion in determining

the sole issue in the case was compensation.18

      In support of her argument, Sibley argues the Port cannot prove that notice

of the special commissioners’ hearing was properly issued and served on her, that

the condemnation proceeding was lawful or that the trial court had jurisdiction

over her and her two-fifths interest in the Property. Sibley states that the clerk’s

record supports her argument, but she cites only to the special commissioners’

decision, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the notice of the

18
      Sibley does not complain on appeal about the amount of the compensation
      awarded by the trial court.

                                         22
special commissioners’ hearing, and the affidavit of the process server, none of

which supports her argument. We have already disposed of Sibley’s arguments

regarding notice, service, and jurisdiction, so we need not revisit them.

         Sibley also complains about the trial court’s Conclusion of Law No. 11,

which states in part:

         [B]y withdrawing the award proceeds from the Registry of the Court,
         or having notice of the motions to withdraw, by allowing these
         withdrawals, Defendants have waived any objection to the Court’s
         jurisdiction in this matter.

Sibley argues that because the condemnation of her interest in the Property was

void, she had no reason to object to the withdrawal of funds from the court’s

registry.19 She further argues that she was not served with the motions to withdraw

funds.     Because the clerk’s record does not include the motions, we cannot

ascertain whether Sibley was served with them. However, we presume she was.

“[A]bsent a complete record on appeal, [the court of appeals] must presume the

omitted [items] supported the trial court’s judgment.” See Gallagher v. Fire Ins.

Exch., 950 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex. 1997) (quoting Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of

Gonzalez, 820 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex. 1991)); Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227,

230 (Tex. 2002) (same).

19
         Sibley argues she had “no justiciable interest” in the funds deposited in the court
         registry because the commissioners’ condemnation of the Property was void.

                                             23
      Regardless, Sibley did not request amended or additional findings of fact or

conclusions of law in the trial court. She thus waived the right to complain about

the trial court’s findings and conclusions on appeal. Chatterjee v. Banerjea, No.

05-18-01035-CV, 2019 WL 3886655, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 19, 2019, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Dall. Morning News Co. v. Bd. of Trustees of Dall. Indep.

Sch. Dist., 861 S.W.2d 532, 538 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied)); see also

Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140, 150 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no

pet.) (“By failing to request additional findings and conclusions, Mr. Smith waived

his right to complain on appeal about any error he assumes the court made.”); cf.

Williams v. Gillespie, 346 S.W.3d 727, 732 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)

(“When findings of fact are obtained, they define and limit the issues upon which

[an appellate] court can affirm.”); Univex Int’l, Inc. v. Morrow, No. 05-91-00008-

CV, 1992 WL 5634, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 10, 1992, no writ) (not

designated for publication) (“The parties’ failure to timely request additional

findings of fact and conclusions of law that will support their theory of recovery

constitutes waiver and presents nothing for the appellate court to review on

appeal.”).20

20
      See also Occidental Chem. Corp. v. ETC NGL Transp., LLC, 425 S.W.3d 354, 367
      (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d) (“[W]here a party fails to
      request additional or amended findings after the court files its original findings,
      the party waives the right to complain on appeal that the findings were not full and
                                           24
      We note there is no reporter’s record from the trial in the appellate record.

Thus, we presume it would have supported the trial court’s judgment. See In re

Guardianship of Berry, 105 S.W.3d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, no

pet.) (“Absent a reporter’s record of the trial . . . we must presume that the missing

record supports the trial court’s ruling.”); Sanadco Inc. v. Hegar, No. 03-14-

00771-CV, 2015 WL 4072091, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 3, 2015, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (“Without a reporter’s record, we have no way to determine what

evidence, if any, was adduced at the hearing and, therefore, whether the trial court

abused its discretion. . . . We therefore assume the underlying proceeding was

properly conducted and that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s

decision.”); cf. In re United Prod. & Const. Services, Inc., No. 14-10-00023-CV,

2010 WL 454948, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 11, 2010, no pet.

(mem. op.) (“Absent a reporter’s record of the hearing, we must presume the

evidence before the trial court was adequate to support its denial of relator’s

motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.”).

      We overrule Sibley’s third issue.

E.    Issue of Title

      Sibley argues for the first time in her supplemental reply brief that the trial

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of an “issue of title.” While issues

      complete or that the court failed to enter additional findings of fact.”) (citation
      omitted).

                                          25
generally must be raised in an opening brief, jurisdictional challenges cannot be

waived and may be raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Rusk State Hosp.

v. Black, 379 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2010) (considering trial court’s

jurisdiction, which appellant challenged for first time in reply brief), aff’d, 392

S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012); City of Hous. v. Hous. Firefighters’ Relief & Ret. Fund,

196 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (same). We

thus consider Sibley’s jurisdictional argument.21

       Sibley argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the condemnation

proceeding because the trial court adjudicated an “issue of title,” which Brazoria

County’s county courts at law lack jurisdiction to consider and must transfer to a

district court. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.002 (“If an eminent domain case is

pending in a county court at law and the court determines that the case involves an

issue of title or any other matter that cannot be fully adjudicated in that court, the

judge shall transfer the case to a district court.”).

       The record does not indicate that the trial court adjudicated an issue of title

in its trial de novo. Neither Sibley’s objections to the Award nor her petition in

intervention referred to an issue of title. Indeed, in its Conclusion of Law No. 13,

the trial court concluded that compensation for the Property was the only issue

before the trial court:

21
       We grant Sibley’s motion for leave to file a supplemental reply brief.
                                            26
      As there is no challenge to the powers and rights of [Port] to acquire
      the property being taken, the sole issue in this condemnation case is
      compensation due to the landowners.

We thus conclude an “issue of title” was not before the trial court.22

      We overrule Sibley’s fourth issue.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas-Molloy.

22
      Sibley appears to rely on a docket entry in support of her argument. But the
      docket entry to which she refers does not indicate that an issue of title was
      resolved in the trial court. And because do not have a reporter’s record, we cannot
      ascertain whether an issue of title was addressed during trial.
                                           27