Court Opinion

ID: 9897693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:23:48.817978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:40.451563
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Raphael and Callins

              SCOTT EDWARD PEASE
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0300-23-1                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                 OCTOBER 31, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
                                             Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge

                              (J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for
                              appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Jason D. Reed, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on
                              brief.

                     Scott Edward Pease appeals his two misdemeanor convictions for violating a protective

              order under Code § 16.1-253.2. He argues that the evidence failed to establish that he knew the

              protective order existed or that he violated the order. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of

              the trial court. The parties waived oral argument in this case. Code § 17.1-403(ii).

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     “Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence presented at

              trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Vay v.

              Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 236, 242 (2017) (quoting Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va.

              625, 629 (2009)). “This principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict

              with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Parks v.

Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)).

        On April 8, 2021, the Norfolk Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court awarded

Monica Harrison a preliminary protective order against her estranged husband, Pease, with a return

hearing set for April 22, 2021. The protective order indicated that at 8:45 a.m. on April 9, 2021,

Norfolk police personally served Pease with the order. At 9:25 a.m. the same day, Harrison

received a text message from the phone number 757-***-****: “Extended Stay America 1915

commerce Dr Hampton. By the way how was the wedding[.]” She received a second text at

9:38 a.m. from the same number: “What’s up Monica you having a bad day yet[.]” Harrison had

initially planned to stay at an Extended Stay America that day, but the hotel was fully booked. She

also had planned to attend a wedding, though she ultimately did not go.

        On April 15, 2021, Harrison received a message from Pease’s sister’s Facebook Messenger

that contained five separate videos of Pease speaking directly into the camera and complaining of

Harrison’s on-going divorce efforts, addressing Harrison as “you.” In one video, Pease mentioned

the protective order specifically, stating “I don’t want to go to court on the twenty-second. I just

want the order to be dropped.”

        On April 19, 2021, Harrison received five audio messages from the phone number

757-***-****. The messages addressed Harrison directly, referring to her as “you,” and

complaining about Harrison’s on-going divorce efforts. Recognizing his voice, Harrison identified

Pease as the speaker in the messages. On the same day, she received two text messages, both from

the same phone number that sent the audio messages. The first text message stated, “We could do

this the rite way with the girls we are there only hope to a good life[.]” The second message stated,

                if you were willing to go to your dad’s I would get a camper out there
                for the girls to sleep in get you a shed to put your storage items in a
                new computer to start all your stuff on I got [our son]’s got your tablet

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               I think [our son]’s got your tablet or is that the house still and you can
               start over there[.]

       Harrison discontinued the telephone number Pease had before their separation. She testified

that the content of the messages made it clear to her that Pease, and no one else, used the

757-***-**** number to contact her.

       At trial, Pease testified that he made the TikTok videos as a form of “therapy” and that he

had no intention of communicating directly with or sending those videos to Harrison. However, he

admitted that he addressed her directly in the videos. Pease testified that he sent the videos only to

his family members. He admitted to sending Harrison some messages before the protective order

was in place, but denied sending her anything after the date the police served the order.

       A jury convicted Pease of violating the protective order on April 9, 2021, and between April

15 and April 19, 2021. After hearing argument, the trial court sentenced Pease to 24 months of

incarceration. Before the trial court entered the order, Pease filed a motion to vacate the

convictions, arguing that the evidence failed to establish that Pease knew of the protective order or

that he sent the messages. The trial court denied Pease’s motion and entered the sentencing order.

This appeal follows.

                                             ANALYSIS

       Pease argues that the evidence failed to prove that he knew the protective order existed or

that he sent the messages to Harrison. We disagree.

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,
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228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

        “The fact finder, who has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, has the sole

responsibility to determine their credibility, the weight to be given their testimony, and the

inferences to be drawn from proven facts.” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 22 (2011)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor, 256 Va. 514, 518 (1998)). “In its role of judging witness

credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to

conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 388,

414 (2022) (quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10 (1998)).

        “Circumstantial evidence [presented during the course of the trial] is as competent and is

entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude

every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App.

459, 465 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Salcedo v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 525,

535 (2011)). “And ‘[w]hile no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of

many concurrent and related circumstances . . . may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a

conclusion.’” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 284, 297 (2017) (alterations in original)

(quoting Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479 (2005)).

        The jury, as factfinder, was entitled to conclude that Pease was personally served with the

protective order on April 9, 2021, at 8:45 a.m. This conclusion is supported by the service return

                                                  -4-
documented on the protective order. Less than an hour later, Harrison received two text messages

from the 757-***-**** number. The first message referenced both a location and an event where

Harrison had planned to be that day. The second message referred to her by name and asked if she

was having a “bad day.” The jury could infer that the sender knew of Harrison’s planned location

and activity, and then mocked her about having a “bad day.”

       Pease recorded five videos where he addressed Harrison as “you” and directly challenged

the protective order. He said that he wanted the protective order dropped and that he did not want to

attend the upcoming hearing. Harrison received the videos on April 15, 2021, through the Facebook

Messenger account of Pease’s sister.

       The same phone number used to contact Harrison on April 9, 2021, was again used on April

19, 2021, to send Harrison voice messages. In the messages, the speaker addressed Harrison

directly. Because she was familiar with her husband’s voice, Harrison was able to identify Pease as

the speaker. The jury had the opportunity to compare the speaker’s voice in the recordings to Pease

speaking during his testimony at trial and in the Facebook Messenger videos. Subsequent text

messages from the same phone number reference possible family arrangements involving Harrison,

the sender, and Harrison and Pease’s child.

       The direct and circumstantial evidence admitted is sufficient to support the conclusion

beyond a reasonable doubt that Pease knew of the protective order against him and that he

intentionally violated it, both on April 9, 2021, and on April 19, 2021, by contacting Harrison.1

Thus, Pease’s two convictions for violating a protective order were supported by the evidence, and

we do not disturb the judgment.

       1
         In seeking the “best and narrowest ground” to decide cases, we need not determine if
the videos from Pease’s sister’s Facebook messenger account constituted sufficient evidence of a
protective order violation. Foltz v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 107, 114 (2011). The evidence
that Pease consistently used the same phone number to contact Harrison on April 9, 2021, and
April 19, 2021, is sufficient to affirm the judgment.
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                                  CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                     Affirmed.

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