Court Opinion

ID: 9428142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:56.105834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:12.034064
License: Public Domain

Justice White,
dissenting.
The primary issue presented in the petition for certiorari was whether the Court of Appeals had properly interpreted the test articulated in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960), for determining whether an individual procured his citizenship by concealment or misrepresentation of a “material” fact. In Chaunt the Government sought to revoke an *527individual’s citizenship because he had not disclosed certain facts in his application for citizenship.1 Although Chaunt did not address the standard of materiality with respect to visa applications, the parties before this Court have assumed that the Chaunt test should be used to determine whether petitioner concealed material facts when he applied for a visa.2
Recognizing that the relevance of Chaunt to visa applications may be problematic, the majority turns to á wholly separate ground to decide this case, resting its decision on its interpretation of “adopted” § 2 (a) of the Displaced Persons Act (see ante, at 510, n. 31). I am reluctant to resolve the issue of whether Chaunt extends to visa applications, since the parties have neither briefed nor argued the point. However, I am equally reluctant to adopt the course chosen by the majority, for the language of § 2 (a) is not entirely unambiguous,3 and the parties have not addresed the proper interpretation of the statute.4 Under these circumstances, I would *528simply clarify the Chaunt materiality test and then remand to the Court of Appeals to review the District Court’s findings on petitioner’s concealment at the time he applied for citizenship.
In Chaunt the Court stated that to prove misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact the Government must prove by clear and convincing evidence
“either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship,” 364 U. S., at 355.5
Under the District Court’s interpretation of the second Chaunt test and that urged by petitioner, the Government would be required to prove that an investigation prompted by a complete, truthful response would have revealed facts justifying denial of citizenship.6 The Court of Appeals and the Government contend that under the second Chaunt test the Government must prove only that such an investigation might have led to the discovery of facts justifying denial of citizenship.7 In my opinion, the latter interpretation is correct.8 *529If the District Court’s interpretation were adopted, the Government would bear the heavy, and in many cases impossible, burden of proving the true facts that existed many years prior to the time the defendant applied for citizenship, whether it proceeded under the first or the second Chaunt test. This definition of “materiality,” by greatly improving the odds that concealment would be successful, would encourage applicants to withhold information, since the Government would often be unable to meet its burden by the time the concealment was discovered.
In this case, the Government alleged that when petitioner filled out his application for citizenship, he willfully concealed that he had served as an armed guard for the Germans during the war. Petitioner failed to disclose this information, although the application form required him to list his past or present membership in any organization in the United States or elsewhere, including foreign military service. Although the Government produced evidence to support a finding of materiality under its interpretation of the second Chaunt test,9 the District Court concluded that petitioner’s service as an armed guard for the Germans was immaterial under the District Court’s interpretation of Chaunt. It also found that the nondisclosure was not willful.10
*530The Court of Appeals failed to review this portion of the District Court’s opinion. Instead, it focused solely on whether petitioner had willfully concealed or misrepresented material facts when he applied for a visa. Therefore, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court to review the District Court’s application of the Chaunt test to petitioner’s concealment at the time he applied for citizenship.11

 Section 340 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U. S. C. § 1451 (a), quoted in pertinent part in the majority opinion, cante, at 493, n. 1, directs the Government to seek revocation of citizenship that was "procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.”

 Similarly, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals assumed that the Chaunt materiality test should be applied to the Government’s claim that petitioner concealed material information when he applied for a visa.

 The majority asserts that the plain language of the statute compels the conclusion that § 2 (a) excluded all those who assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations, even those who involuntarily assisted the enemy. The majority explains in a footnote that under § 2 (a) one must focus on whether the individual assisted the enemy in 'persecuting civil populations, ante, at 512-513, n. 34, rather than focusing on voluntariness. Yet one could argue that the words “assist” and “persecute” suggest that § 2 (a) would not apply to an individual whose actions were truly coerced.

 The Government did not contend that § 2 (a) of the Displaced Persons Act should be interpreted as excluding persons who involuntarily assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations. Rather, it argued that the *528finding that petitioner had “involuntarily” served as a concentration camp guard was clearly erroneous. It therefore urged us to affirm on the ground that the first Chaunt test had been satisfied.

 In Chaunt the Court also observed that complete, honest replies to all relevant questions are essential, not only because concealed facts might in and of themselves justify denial of citizenship but also because “disclosure of the true facts might have led to the discovery of other facts which would justify denial of citizenship.” 364 U. S., at 352-353.

 455 F. Supp. 893, 915-916 (SD Fla. 1978).

 597 F. 2d 946, 951 (CA5 1979).

 The Government should be required to prove that an investigation would have occurred if a truthful response had been given, and that the investigation might have uncovered facts justifying denial of citizenship. The defendant could rebut the Government’s showing that the investigation might have led to the discovery of facts justifying denial of citizenship by establishing that the underlying facts would not have justified denial of citizenship.

 The naturalization examiner who processed petitioner’s application testified at trial that if petitioner had disclosed his service as an armed guard with the Germans during the war, the examiner would not have made any recommendation regarding petitioner’s application for citizenship until an investigation had been conducted. He also testified that if the investigation had disclosed that petitioner had physicially hurt Jewish prisoners while serving as a guard at Treblinka, the examiner would have recommended that petitioner’s application for citizenship be denied, either on the ground that petitioner lacked good moral character or on the ground that he had not been properly admitted into the United States. Waterbury, Conn., Trial Transcript 147-148.

 The District Court decided that petitioner’s failure to disclose that he had served as an armed guard for the Germans was not willful, since “there would be strong reason in [petitioner’s] mind to view himself as a prisoner of war.” 455 F. Supp., at 917.

 I agree with the majority’s view that a district court does not have discretion to weigh equitable considerations in determining whether citizenship should be revoked.