Court Opinion

ID: 9959112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 18:01:01.031835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:28.286878
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 10 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATEO JESUS-PEDRO,                              No.    21-70104

                Petitioner,                     Agency No. A097-610-816

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                    Argued and Submitted November 16, 2022
                              Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,**
District Judge.

      Mateo Jesus-Pedro (“Jesus-Pedro”), a native and citizen of Guatemala,

appeals from a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming

the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for withholding of removal

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s

reasoning, we review both decisions.” Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291,

1293 (9th Cir. 2018). Reviewing the factual findings of the BIA and IJ for

substantial evidence and their legal conclusions de novo, see Flores Molina v.

Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022), we grant in part and deny in part the

petition for review.

      1.     Contrary to Jesus-Pedro’s argument, the BIA and the IJ applied the

correct legal standard in denying his withholding claim. A person seeking

withholding of removal must show that “his life or freedom will be threatened in

his home country, [and] also that the threat is ‘because of’ one of the five listed

reasons”—race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 2017)

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)). Congress amended the

asylum statute to require that a protected ground be “at least one central reason”

for the applicant’s persecution, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), but made no such

amendment to the withholding statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C). We have

interpreted Congress’s different treatment of the two statutes as establishing

distinct legal standards. See Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 358–59. Specifically, a

petitioner seeking withholding of removal must show that his protected ground was

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a reason, not one central reason for the persecution. Id. at 360.

      While the BIA stated only that Jesus-Pedro failed to establish “the requisite

nexus” between the claimed persecution and particular social group, it cited to

Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 360, in which we held that the withholding statute’s

“‘a reason’ standard is a less demanding standard than ‘one central reason’” under

the asylum statute. The IJ acknowledged that the one central reason standard does

not apply here and that Jesus-Pedro need only show that the protected ground was

“a reason” for the alleged harm. Because “the BIA recognized that different

standards could be relevant in adjudicating claims of persecution under the two

separate statutes,” Martinez-Sanchez v. INS, 794 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the correct legal standard was

applied to the withholding claim.

      2.     The BIA and IJ failed to adequately address Jesus-Pedro’s argument

that he established a nexus between past or feared future persecution and his

proposed particular social group based on familial ties to his father. “IJs and the

BIA are not free to ignore arguments raised by a petitioner.” Sagaydak v.

Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). We have held that the BIA and IJ’s

failure to address an argument raised by a petitioner can constitute reversible error.

See id. This occurred here.

      Specifically, the BIA and IJ incorrectly characterized the nexus between

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Jesus-Pedro’s claimed persecution and his proposed particular social group.

Moreover, the BIA and IJ failed to analyze whether Jesus-Pedro’s proposed

particular social group is cognizable. The BIA cited to Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d

1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), and Matter of A-B-I, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 339 (A.G.

2018), superseded by Matter of A-B-III, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021), which

concern whether victims of gang violence can establish nexus based on

membership in a particular social group. The BIA then disposed of Jesus-Pedro’s

proposed particular social group in a footnote, stating that “[i]n light of [the]

holding [that Jesus-Pedro failed to establish nexus], we do not address whether the

proposed family-based particular social group is cognizable.” But Jesus-Pedro did

not claim to be part of a particular social group related to victims of crime or

opposition to gang recruitment.

      The BIA also failed to clearly state its reasoning for denying Jesus-Pedro’s

withholding claim so as to permit our review. “Due process and this court’s

precedent require a minimum degree of clarity in dispositive reasoning and in the

treatment of a properly raised argument.” Su Hwa She v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958,

963 (9th Cir. 2010), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Ming Dai

v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 858, 867 n.8 (9th Cir. 2018). Although the substantial

evidence standard of review is “highly deferential,” Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078,

1080 (9th Cir. 1998), we have emphasized that the BIA must “announce its

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decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard

and thought and not merely reacted.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      In the BIA’s decision, more than half the paragraph disposing of the

withholding claim is devoted to a string citation of case law regarding an irrelevant

issue—whether victims of crimes or gang opponents can form a cognizable

particular social group. Only one sentence refers to the particulars of Jesus-Pedro’s

case (“The applicant fears harm in Guatemala by gang members and claims

membership in a family-based particular social group.”).

      Nor did the IJ’s decision provide sufficiently clear reasoning. The IJ’s

determination of Jesus-Pedro’s withholding claim focused on whether “opposition

to gang members or gang recruitment” could form a nexus to a protected ground

and whether “victims of crime” could be a cognizable social group. The IJ’s order

stated it did not believe Jesus-Pedro “was being targeted by the gang members

because he is a member of a particular family. The gang members were extorting

him because they are criminals.” The IJ did not support this holding with specific

reasons, evidence, or citations to the record.

      We have granted petitions and remanded to the BIA for failure to analyze

whether a family-based particular social group is cognizable. See, e.g., Rios v.

Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the BIA’s failure to

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address whether petitioner’s claimed membership in a social group comprising his

family members is cognizable was “a failure that constitutes error and requires

remand”). Accordingly, we grant in part the petition and remand to the BIA to

determine whether Jesus-Pedro’s claimed particular social groups—“immediate

family members of Alfredo Nicolas Jesus Leon” and “children of United States

permanent residents”—are cognizable.

      3.     Jesus-Pedro has waived review of the denial of CAT protection by

failing to raise his CAT claim in his opening brief. “Issues raised in a brief that are

not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.” Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94

F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996). “We address only issues which are argued

specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.” Chadd v. United States, 794

F.3d 1104, 1110 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Jesus-Pedro declined to file an optional reply brief, in which he could

have answered the Attorney General’s arguments regarding the CAT claim.

Moreover, Jesus-Pedro joined the Attorney General’s motion to this Court to

submit the case on the briefs without oral argument. Because none of these actions

by Jesus-Pedro demonstrate an intent to raise his claim for CAT protection to this

Court, the issue is waived.

      PETITION GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, AND

REMANDED. Each party shall bear its own costs. See Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4).

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