Court Opinion

ID: 9893779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:03:55.347021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:29.677877
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/27/23 P. v. Jimenez CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          H048103
                                                                     (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                Super. Ct. No. C1653253)

             v.

 RAMIRO JIMENEZ,

             Defendant and Appellant.
         After defendant Ramiro Jimenez represented himself at trial, a jury found him
guilty on three counts of sexual acts with a minor under the age of 16. The trial court
imposed an aggregate term of three years in state prison.
         Among other claims, Jimenez contends he did not enter a valid waiver of his right
to counsel before the trial court granted his motion to represent himself under Faretta.1
         For the reasons below, we conclude this claim is meritorious, requiring automatic
reversal. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment. We do not reach the remaining
claims.
                              I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. Procedural Background
         The prosecution charged Jimenez with three counts: count 1—unlawful sexual
intercourse with a minor under 16 years of age (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (d))2;

         1
             Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
         2
             Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
count 2—sodomy with a person under 16 years of age (§ 286, subd. (b)(2)); and
count 3—oral copulation with a person under 16 years of age (former § 288a, subd.
(b)(2)). A jury found Jimenez guilty on all counts. The trial court denied probation and
imposed a term of three years in prison on count 1. The court imposed two-year terms
for each of counts 2 and 3 concurrent with the term on count 1.
   B. Facts of the Offenses
       The prosecution alleged Jimenez engaged in multiple sexual acts with a 15-year-
old girl, including intercourse, oral copulation, and sodomy, in 2013. Jimenez was 32 to
33 years old at the time.
       1. Mother’s Testimony
       Cecilia Doe, the girl’s mother, testified that she was working as a prostitute when
she met Jimenez for a paid date, whereupon they developed an ongoing friendship.
Cecilia and Jimenez got together around three or four times a week. A few months after
they met, Cecilia introduced Jimenez to her daughter, C.D., who had just turned 15.
Sometimes Cecilia and C.D. would sleep at Jimenez’s house, where all three shared a bed
with Cecilia in the middle to separate him from C.D.
       In October 2013, Cecilia and C.D. were arrested for shoplifting and Cecilia was
booked into jail. Cecilia told the police to contact Jimenez to pick up C.D. while Cecilia
remained in jail for about two weeks. Cecilia permitted C.D. to go to Jimenez’s home
during that time but did not intend for C.D. to spend the night there. Just before Cecilia
was released, she learned C.D. was spending some nights at Jimenez’s home.
       After Cecilia got out of jail in early December 2013, she saw text messages on
C.D.’s phone in which C.D. referred to having sex with “R.J.” in texts she had sent to a
friend. Cecilia believed “R.J.” was Jimenez. The prosecution introduced the text
messages into evidence.
       Cecilia testified that she confronted Jimenez with the text messages but he denied
they were true and asserted instead that C.D. was seeking attention. Cecilia only saw

                                             2
Jimenez on one more occasion while picking up a T.V. she had left with him. Cecilia
wrote a letter to Jimenez telling him to stay away from C.D., and that if he did not,
Cecilia would contact his wife and the district attorney. Cecilia did not confront C.D.
about the text messages right away, but about two months later, Cecilia asked her about
them, and C.D. admitted to having sex with Jimenez. Cecilia then contacted the police.
       2. Victim’s Testimony
       C.D. was 21 years old when she testified at trial. C.D. testified that she sometimes
went to Jimenez’s home while her mother was in jail in 2013. One night C.D. fell asleep
in Jimenez’s bed, and she woke up to find him in bed with her. C.D. then felt Jimenez’s
hands on her body, and he put his hand on her head to move it further down his body.
C.D. then performed oral sex on Jimenez, and they had vaginal intercourse. She did not
verbally agree to engage in sex with him, but at the time she felt it was consensual. She
was 15 years old when this occurred.
       C.D. testified that she and Jimenez engaged in sex on more than five occasions
while her mother was in jail. They engaged in vaginal intercourse, she performed oral
sex on him, and on one occasion he put his penis into her anus.
       3. Pretext Phone Call
       In March 2014, after Cecilia had contacted the police, C.D. agreed to make a
pretext phone call to Jimenez. The prosecution played a recording of the call for the jury.
At the start of the call, C.D. told Jimenez her mother had been acting “really funky
lately.” C.D. then asked Jimenez if he had told Cecilia that he and C.D. had sex.
Jimenez responded, “No. I did not tell her anything.” C.D. said she felt like Cecilia
found out about the sex, and C.D. asked Jimenez if he knew how Cecilia found out about
it. Jimenez responded, “I didn’t tell her anything about anything. I said nothing to
nobody about nothing. Quite honestly, the way that she came at me with stuff, I mean, I
don’t want anything to do with it, you know?” Jimenez said that Cecilia had shown him
the text messages. Jimenez again said, “I don’t want to have anything to do with it.”

                                             3
C.D. continued to ask Jimenez about his communications with Cecilia, and he repeatedly
asserted he had not said anything to anybody. Jimenez then said that when Cecilia
confronted him with the text messages, he told her he hadn’t done anything with C.D. He
subsequently stated, “I’m not admitting anything because quite honestly, it’s all bullshit
right now.”
       4. Jimenez’s Testimony
       In his defense, Jimenez testified in narrative fashion. He categorically denied
C.D.’s allegations, stating, “[T]here is absolutely no way that any of the accounts that
were described by [C.D.] could possibly be true.” Jimenez testified that he was suffering
from kidney stones throughout the majority of 2013, and he was taking medication that
eliminated his sex drive. Jimenez introduced his medical records into evidence. As to
the pretext phone call, Jimenez testified that, in the statements he made during the call, he
was simply denying that anything had actually happened. He explained he stated in the
call, “I didn’t tell [Cecilia] nothing,” because “[t]o me there was nothing to tell.”
                                        II. DISCUSSION
       Jimenez contends we must reverse the judgment because he did not enter a valid
Faretta waiver of his right to counsel. The Attorney General argues the record shows
Jimenez knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, such that the trial court
properly allowed him to represent himself. The Attorney General further argues that
even if the waiver was invalid, the error was harmless.
   A. Procedural Background3
       The prosecution first filed charges against Jimenez in 2014, but the victim refused
to testify and the prosecution dismissed the matter. The victim later recontacted the

       3
        Because we are required to “independently examine the entire record” to
determine whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waiver the right to counsel,
we include a detailed description of the events that led to Jimenez entering a Faretta
waiver. (People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 241 (Burgener).)

                                              4
prosecution after changing her mind, and the prosecution refiled the complaint in
December 2016. Jimenez retained private counsel, and a preliminary hearing was held in
February 2018. Jimenez was held to answer on the charges and the prosecution filed an
information in March 2018.
       Around May 2018, Jimenez retained another attorney, Holden Green, to replace
his prior attorney. Green filed two separate motions to dismiss but both were denied, and
in April 2019, the court set a trial date of July 8, 2019.
       In June 2019, Green filed a motion to continue the trial on the grounds that he was
scheduled to undergo throat surgery on August 1, 2019 and the scheduled July trial date
would interfere with his pre-operative appointments. He further asserted he needed time
to arrange for several defense witnesses to travel from out of state, and he claimed he had
court appearances in other matters scheduled during the week of the trial date set for this
case. The prosecution opposed the motion on the ground that Green had not shown good
cause. The prosecution argued the trial would be over before Green’s scheduled surgery
date and pointed out that Green had scheduled the other July court appearances back in
May, after the trial date for this case had already been set. At a hearing on the matter, the
trial court found no good cause for a continuance and denied the motion.
       The parties appeared before a different judge on the July 8, 2019 trial date, and
Green again moved for a continuance. The court noted that it had reviewed Green’s
previously denied motion and asked if counsel could set forth any new grounds for the
instant motion. First, Green claimed he had just learned of another out-of-state witness,
and although he had not yet talked to the witness, counsel needed time to arrange for
transportation. Second, Green asserted he had just provided new discovery to the
prosecutor—specifically, a transcript of the March 2014 pretext phone call between
Jimenez and the victim. Third, Green claimed he needed time to subpoena a witness who
had testified at the preliminary hearing in February 2018. Green also stated that, while he
did not want to discuss his health issues on the record, he would be required to take a

                                               5
drug the week before his surgery, and one side-effect would be “a severe cotton-mouth-
type activity” making it hard to speak. He further asserted he was “on call at Stanford”
with a headache issue, and the hospital might call him at any time with an immediate
appointment. As to the other scheduled court appearances, Green claimed he was unable
to schedule them for other times.
       The prosecutor objected on the grounds that the case was old; defense counsel
knew or should have known about the witnesses long ago; and Jimenez presented a
danger to public safety because he was out of custody while trial was pending. The
prosecutor said she already had her own transcript of the pretext phone call, and she
pointed out that the police reports from 2014 also included a transcription. Green
responded with a series of claims about the relevance of the evidence and witnesses he
proposed to investigate.
       The trial court rejected Green’s claims about the relevance of his proffered
witnesses and added, “[A]s far as I can tell, everything I’ve heard, you have absolutely no
basis for a delay in this trial.” But the court agreed to discuss Green’s health issues with
counsel off the record before ruling on the motion. After meeting in chambers, the court
memorialized the discussion on the record and stated that it accepted Green’s
representations about his preoperative appointments scheduled the week before surgery.
The court said it asked Green to provide information from his doctor concerning Green’s
anticipated health status after the surgery and how much time he would need to recover,
but Green refused to provide any such information. Green informed the court that his
pre-operative appointment was on July 29, and the court offered to set a schedule that
would conclude the trial before that date, but Green asserted that he was also suffering
from neurological “headache issues” that were affecting his “cognitive strength” and
ability to focus. Green stated Jimenez “deserves an attorney that is a hundred percent
well and a hundred percent prepared and a hundred percent ready to go so there are no
distractions for that period of time.”

                                              6
       The trial court ordered Green to provide documentation from his doctor providing
the dates of the pre-operative appointment and surgery, as well as the doctor’s opinion on
when Green would be medically able to proceed. The court ordered the parties to return
on July 17, 2019, and ordered Green to provide the doctor’s information by that date.
The court stated it would rule on the motion to continue and set a new trial schedule on
that date.
       The prosecutor responded that she was concerned about the additional delay,
adding that in the chambers discussion, “I heard multiple times today that Mr. Jimenez
would like to fire Mr. Green. And what I’m concerned about is that we’re going to be
coming back again, and that he’s going to attempt to delay this trial even longer.” The
court asked Jimenez to comment on whether he might fire Green, and Jimenez
responded, “Your Honor, I just want my attorney to be one hundred percent healthy to
represent me so I have the best chance at a defense possible.” The court reiterated that it
expected Green to provide documentation from his doctor on July 17 and stated, “If he
doesn’t, I will continue to continue the case until he provides that information.” As to
whether Jimenez wished to fire Green, Jimenez personally affirmed that he believed
Green was competent and he wanted Green to continue representing him provided the
court granted a continuance and Green was healthy to proceed.
       Green filed motions in limine that same day. Portions of the filing referenced the
facts of some other case apparently involving a residential burglary or trespass offense.
Other portions appeared to have been cut from a prior motion filed in another case and
pasted into this filing—literally as pieces of paper cut and pasted or taped onto the
filing—resulting in syntactic discontinuities, nonsensical arguments, and references to
nonexistent pleadings. One portion of the filing included multiple “motions” asserting in
various ways that “THE DEFENSE MUST BE ALLOWED TO ASK ON CROSS
EXAMINATION ANY WITNESS WHO MAY HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER
SEXUAL PARTNERS OVER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN WHO HAD SEXUAL

                                             7
ACTIVITY WITH VICTIM . . .” These motions were presented in the form of several
headings that restated the motion with minor variations, each typed entirely in a bold, all-
capitalized font, with no supporting argument for any of them. One of the headings
asserted the defense should be allowed to question the victim about these matters under
Evidence Code section 782 (setting forth procedures for establishing exceptions to the
inadmissibility of such evidence under the “Rape Shield Law”). But the filing failed to
include any of the foundational requirements for establishing such exceptions—e.g., an
affidavit filed under seal stating an offer of proof of the relevance of such evidence.
(Evid. Code, § 782, subd. (a).)4
       At the hearing on July 17, 2019, Green presented the court and the prosecutor with
a copy of a motion to disqualify the judge. Green claimed his papers included a note
from his doctor stating he would be unavailable until August 30. Green stated he wished
to file the motion under seal, but the court informed him he had not properly prepared it
for filing under seal. Green then stated he wished to file the motion publicly without the
doctor’s note, and Green offered a copy of the note for the court to review.5 Over
Green’s objection, the court set a trial date of August 26, 2019, and the court set a hearing
date of July 26 for the motion to disqualify. The prosecution then presented the victim,
who gave a statement on the record expressing her frustration with the repeated delays.
       On July 24, 2019, the trial court filed a written order striking the motion to
disqualify on the ground that Green’s motion failed to set forth any legal basis for
disqualification.
       At a hearing on July 26, 2019, the court explained why it ruled on the motion to
disqualify before the hearing had occurred, and the court maintained the August 26 trial

       4
         This court finds those portions of Green’s filing particularly disturbing. Absent
any offer of proof, we can discern only one reason for making such claims: to intimidate
the victim or otherwise dissuade her from testifying.
       5
         The record includes a filed copy of the motion to disqualify and two
accompanying declarations by Green, but the filings do not include the doctor’s note.

                                              8
date. Green again objected to the trial date, asserting that his doctor had informed him he
would not be available until August 30.
       Jimenez then personally addressed the court and stated that if Green was not going
to be healthy and physically prepared to proceed at the start of trial, “[T]hen I have no
choice but to replace Mr. Green and would like to be sent to the public defender’s office,
if possible.” The court stated that the only doctor’s information it had received from
Green consisted of a one-page form “with a check mark and signature and some items on
it” that Green “allowed me to look at” before asking the court to give the document back
to him. The court added that the document had set forth a date of August 30, which was
a Friday, so the court set the trial date for August 26, the preceding Monday.
       The court then instructed Jimenez, “I can guarantee you, without reservation, if
your lawyer isn’t able to go forward with the trial, the case will be continued again.” The
court stated it had balanced Jimenez’s right to a fair trial with the victim’s interests in a
timely trial. The court further instructed Jimenez, “If the only reason you want to excuse
Mr. Green as your attorney because you’re not clear whether or not he’ll be medically
able to proceed, I’m telling you that will not occur.” The court reiterated that if Green
was not medically able to proceed, the court would grant another continuance. Jimenez
asked what would happen if Green simply did not appear, and the court informed
Jimenez there would no penalty and he would not go to trial at that point.
       After conferring privately with Green, Jimenez then informed the court, “I’d like
to go ahead and move forward with your public defender.” Jimenez confirmed that he
had privately retained Green and now wished to relieve him. The court stated, “You have
an absolute right to do so. Mr. Green will be relieved as your attorney of record.” The
court referred Jimenez to the public defender and set a hearing on July 31, 2019 for
identification of counsel. The court ordered Green to appear at the hearing and transfer
the discovery to the public defender.

                                               9
       At the hearing on July 31, 2019, the parties appeared before a different judge—the
Honorable Vanessa Zecher. Green appeared with Jimenez and informed Judge Zecher
that Jimenez had gone to the public defender’s office, who determined Jimenez did not
qualify. Green stated he would be on medical leave until August 30 and requested a
hearing after that date. When the court asked why Jimenez had been referred to the
public defender’s office, Green stated he was being relieved. The prosecutor added,
“Your Honor, I understand that the client wanted to fire Mr. Green.” The court asked
Jimenez to confirm this, and Jimenez did so, whereupon the court ordered Green relieved.
       The court asked Jimenez if he needed more time to seek a new attorney, and
Jimenez requested a month to do so. The court ordered him to return on August 14, 2019
for trial setting, and Jimenez responded, “[I]f I’m going to need to put together a
retainer,” he would prefer to apply the cost of repeated travel from his home in Texas—
$600 or $700 each week—toward attorney fees. The court declined to change the August
14 date. Green offered to remain in the case until Jimenez found a new attorney, but the
court informed Green he had already been relieved.
       Jimenez appeared without counsel at the August 14 hearing with Judge Zecher
presiding. A deputy public defender informed the court Jimenez had been interviewed by
the office on July 26 but he did not qualify for indigent representation. The court asked
Jimenez if he needed more time to find counsel, and he said he did. The court set the
next hearing date for August 28, 2019.
       The prosecution filed a “Victim’s Request for Trial Setting” on August 27, 2019
with a written statement by the victim stating her frustration with the repeated delays.
The prosecution’s filing set forth the procedural history of the matter and argued the
defense was intentionally delaying trial in the hopes the victim would give up and refuse
to cooperate with the prosecution.
       At the hearing on August 28, 2019, Jimenez again appeared without counsel
before Judge Zecher and stated he was still in the process of finding an attorney. He

                                             10
asserted he had contacted the “Modest Means” program and did not qualify for it.
Jimenez informed the court he had scheduled attorney consultations for the next day, and
added, “After that my only impediment will be the retainer and getting a quote for what
the amount will be for trial representation.” He requested another two weeks to find an
attorney. The court set another hearing for September 11 and informed Jimenez the court
would set a trial date at that time.
       On September 11, 2019, Jimenez appeared without counsel before Judge Zecher
and informed her he had not succeeded in finding an attorney. Jimenez then stated, “I’d
like to move forward to represent myself in this matter,” and he provided the court with a
completed Faretta waiver form.
       The seven-page, court-supplied waiver form is titled, “PETITION TO PROCEED
IN PROPRIA PERSONA (TO ACT AS MY OWN ATTORNEY)”. A section titled
“LEGAL RIGHTS” describes six constitutional trial rights, each prefaced by “I
understand that I have the right to . . . .” The right to appointed counsel is printed in bold
as follows: “I understand that I have the right to be represented by a lawyer at all stages
of the proceedings and, if I do not have funds to employ counsel, one will be appointed
for me by the Court.” Two paragraphs at the bottom of the page require the signee to
affirm that they personally desire to give up the right to appointed counsel and understand
they will be required to conduct their defense without counsel. Jimenez’s signature
appears below this section.
       In a section of the form for biographical information, Jimenez listed his age as 38,
and he stated he had graduated from high school and “National Mine Safety & Health
Academy.” His employment experience consisted of 16 years in the mining industry,
most recently as an “Area Safety Manager.” Two sections for listing any prior criminal
or civil matters involving self-representation were left blank.
       In two pages of the form, Jimenez initialed eleven separate paragraphs setting
forth the disadvantages of self-representation, including the fact that he would be

                                              11
required to follow various technical rules, conduct pretrial motions, examine witnesses,
make arguments, opening and closing statements, and so forth. He initialed an
advisement stating, “I understand that if I change my mind and decide I need an attorney,
depending on the stage of the proceedings, my request for an attorney may be denied.”
       In a section of the form for listing the charges, Jimenez listed them as “261.5d”,
“288a”, and 286c”. In a section for listing the possible penalties for a conviction, he
entered a minimum term of 16 months in state prison and a maximum term of 3 years.
This section of the form lists other potential penalties—county jail, state prison for life
with and without parole, and the death penalty—and the form instructs the defendant to
cross out those penalties that do not apply. None of the inapplicable penalties were
crossed out. The form supplies three blank lines for the defendant to respond to the
following prompt: “I am aware that there are certain legal defenses to the crime(s) with
which I am charged, and they are as follows:” This section was left blank.
       In a section of the form titled “COURT’S ADVICE AND
RECOMMENDATION”, Jimenez initialed the statement, “I understand that it is the
advice and recommendation of this court that I do not represent myself, and accept
counsel appointed by the Court.” His signature appears below. The judge’s signature
appears below a paragraph stating, “The Court has made inquiry into the defendant’s
educational background, training and knowledge, and based on that inquiry and the
advisement to the defendant of all of the above initialed statements, finds that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently gives up his/her right to counsel and may represent
himself/herself in all proceedings in this case.”
       Upon receiving the form from Jimenez, Judge Zecher looked at the form and
asked him if the initials and signatures on it were his. Jimenez affirmed they were. The
court noted that Jimenez had “some formal education” and advised him as follows: “I am
required to tell you that—as you have indicated in the form, it’s not a good idea to
represent yourself, given the level of experience that is present with the District

                                             12
Attorney’s Office. But I also tell you that you have the constitutional right to represent
yourself.” The court asked Jimenez if he understood that. Jimenez responded that he did
and he confirmed he still wished to proceed.
       Judge Zecher then asked Jimenez if the court had referred him to the public
defender’s office, and Jimenez confirmed he had been referred and said he did not qualify
for indigent representation or the “Modest Means” program. The court suggested that he
contact the county bar association for an attorney referral, and the court proposed giving
him a week to do so. Jimenez responded, “At this point, Your Honor, I just want the best
defense possible. I’ve had multiple attorneys on the matter. And from my vantage point
the prosecution has failed to provide any type of compelling evidence that proves beyond
a reasonable doubt the crimes that were committed. [¶] So I’m more than comfortable
moving forward.”
       The court then granted the Faretta motion. Immediately after granting the motion,
the court told Jimenez, “If at any time you decide to change your mind pretrial, please let
me know. And then once trial comes along we’ll talk. It’s a little different at that point
in terms of a request to no longer proceed as a self-represented litigant.” Jimenez
responded that he understood this advisement.
       The court then raised the matter of trial scheduling. The prosecutor requested a
trial date. She pointed out that the case was old, and asserted her belief that Jimenez had
been switching attorneys to delay the proceedings. The trial court stated it would set the
trial date “a little bit further out” to give Jimenez time to prepare and advised him,
“Know that if you come in in three months and you say, now I want an attorney, that may
not happen. You are now representing yourself.” Jimenez responded that he understood.
The court then orally set a status hearing for October 16, 2019 and a trial date of
November 18. Both parties agreed to this schedule.

                                             13
       Jimenez failed to appear at the status hearing on October 16. The court issued a
bench warrant and vacated the November 18 trial date.6 On November 15, 2019, attorney
Holden Green filed a request for calendar setting on behalf of Jimenez. The request
stated Jimenez had missed the status hearing “due to inadvertent neglect and would like
to produce a letter of reassumption and select a trial date.”
       The next hearing occurred on November 18, 2019 before Judge Zecher. Jimenez
appeared and told Judge Zecher he had missed the status hearing because the written
notice he had been provided on September 11 listed November 18 as the “next
appearance.”7 The court recalled the bench warrant and inquired about scheduling the
trial. The prosecutor requested that the case be put on the master trial calendar for
December 2. Jimenez then stated that he had been in contact with Holden Green, and that
Green was willing to represent him again if the court would set a hearing for
identification of counsel and trial setting on December 4. The prosecutor responded that
“the People have concerns about Mr. Green handling this case,” and argued that Jimenez
was once again engaging in tactics intended to delay the trial. Judge Zecher stated, “[S]o
the Court is familiar with the situation with Mr. Green. [¶] The fact that you did fire
Mr. Green, and now I’m hearing that he’s back in the mix. So I’m going to set a
December 2nd trial date. You may file a written motion to continue, and let me know the
reasons why and what has been done to date to prepare this case for trial. But a year and
a half is a long time. It is also unusual to fire your attorney while you’re in trial.” The
court instructed the parties to address any further issues in writing.
       The parties appeared before a different judge—the Honorable Matthew Harris—
on the December 2, 2019 trial date. Jimenez moved to withdraw his Faretta waiver and

       6
         As described below, the prosecutor subsequently informed a different judge that
she had asked the court to maintain the November 18 trial date.
       7
         The minute order for the September 11 hearing shows November 18, 2019
handwritten on a line labeled “NEXT APPEARANCE”. The October 16 date is
handwritten in a space above that line.

                                              14
requested that Holden Green be allowed to represent him. Jimenez asserted that Green
“had been removed from the case due to medical reasons, which would have prevented
him from being able to represent me in trial previously.” The prosecutor responded that a
continuance had been granted for Green to undergo his surgery and the case was set to go
to trial, at which point Jimenez fired him. The prosecution argued Jimenez was engaged
in delay tactics by changing attorneys, firing Green, representing himself, and now
seeking to have Green represent him again.
       Jimenez responded that he was not ready to go to trial, that Green had just given
him a transcript of the preliminary hearing, and that preparing for trial was “too much for
me to handle.” Jimenez added, “I have an understanding of facts and findings and what
the true facts of the matter are in this case, Your Honor, but the legalese, the motions, the
legal jargon, that’s far [a]field from my level of knowledge at this point.”
       When the court asked Jimenez why he had decided to represent himself, Jimenez
explained that the court had ordered Green to return before Green’s recovery period was
complete, and Jimenez did not want to be disadvantaged by an attorney who could not
use his voice. Jimenez stated that Green recontacted him around the middle of October
and informed Jimenez he was “medically cleared to go.” The court asked Jimenez if he
had filed a motion to continue. Jimenez asserted that he attempted to have Green file a
motion to continue but “it was blocked off” and Green could not file it. Jimenez stated he
now had a written motion for continuance ready to file, whereupon the court received it,
reviewed it, and filed it. The motion includes a declaration by Jimenez stating he needed
more time to prepare and arrange for an out-of-state witness to testify at trial; that he had
a new discovery request; and that Green had not been willing to send Jimenez “sensitive
material” by mail or e-mail. Jimenez requested that Green be allowed to resume
representation; that the court vacate the December 2 trial date; and that the court set
December 23, 2019 as a date for Green to appear. The prosecutor responded that all

                                             15
discovery was provided personally to Jimenez after he moved to represent himself, and
she again argued that Jimenez was engaged in delay tactics.
       Green, who was present at the hearing, attempted to address the court, but the
court twice instructed him, “Sit down and be quiet.” After reviewing the file, the court
asked Green if he was prepared to go to trial, and if not, by what date would he be
prepared. Green stated he was not prepared and he would be unable to go to trial until
February 17, 2020.
       Judge Harris stated, “I understand from Judge Zecher that this matter had already
proceeded to trial.” The prosecutor responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” The court continued,
“And that according to Judge Zecher, the defendant had fired Mr. Green during trial. I’m
trying to decide if a record exists such that I should exercise my discretion to make the
defendant go forward or not.” Judge Harris then asked the prosecutor for further
clarification on what had happened when the case was set for trial. The prosecutor
summarized the relevant history of the proceedings and stated that by the November 18
date, “[s]uddenly Mr. Green is back in the picture.” The prosecutor informed the court
she had been in another trial on the November 18 date, such that Jimenez’s case had
trailed it until the trial was completed at the end of November.
       Jimenez then offered his own summary of the case history and asserted again that
he relieved Green because he felt he could not go to trial with an incapacitated attorney,
at which point he was given time to find new counsel. Jimenez stated that the cost of
repeated travel from Texas was “kicking my tail in the dirt,” and he asserted, “I could not
put together the retainer for an attorney at that point in time. I felt I had no other choice
but to represent myself at that point in time. Otherwise, I was going to be coming every
two weeks with nothing to show to the Court at that point in time.” Jimenez pointed out
that he attempted to withdraw his Faretta waiver at the November 18 hearing but the
court denied it. Jimenez also stated that he could not afford the trial retainer for the
attorney who had represented him at the preliminary hearing.

                                              16
        After a recess, the trial court returned and questioned Jimenez about why he had
waited so long to bring Green back into the case. Jimenez stated Green had been “out of
commission” for six to eight weeks, after which Green was “out of the country for a
while.” Jimenez said he was not aware Green was available until Green contacted him at
the end of October.
        Judge Harris stated, “Judge Zecher represented to me, a few minutes ago,” that she
had not told Jimenez at the November 18 hearing that he had to represent himself. Judge
Harris stated Judge Zecher recalled saying something to the effect that, “ ‘If you want
Mr. Green, he needs to be ready to go on the trial date.’ ” When the court asked Jimenez
if he recalled Judge Zecher making this statement at the November 18 hearing, Jimenez
responded, “Not at all, Your Honor. Not at all.” Jimenez again denied Judge Zecher
made such a statement, and he denied he was attempting to delay the proceedings.
        The prosecutor stated Green had contacted her (the prosecutor) on November 11 to
inform her he was willing to resume representing Jimenez. She said she and Green
discussed the bench warrant that was outstanding at the time, and because it appeared
Jimenez had not intentionally missed the October 16 status hearing, the prosecutor did
not object to having the warrant recalled. The prosecutor told the court, “I actually
facilitated it so that we could keep the trial date on November 18th,” and she asserted that
she told Green they would be ready to go forward on November 18 “or soon thereafter”
once her trial in the other matter was complete. The court asked the prosecutor whether
November 18 was a trial date or a trial setting date, and the prosecutor asserted it was a
trial date.
        After summarizing his understanding of the procedural history, Judge Harris
denied Jimenez’s motion to withdraw the Faretta waiver and maintained the trial date.
The court found multiple factors supporting its ruling: that Jimenez had been given
sufficient time to find an attorney; that Jimenez had knowingly waived his right to
counsel; that he had sufficient time to prepare for trial; that Green had been given

                                             17
sufficient time to reappear; that the trial would be neither long nor complex; that Jimenez
appeared to be “very articulate and logical,” “[s]eems quite capable of representing
himself,” and “seems to have a firm grasp of the facts and procedures”; that the request to
withdraw the Faretta waiver was “most likely a delay tactic” without good cause; and
that further delay would be unfair to the victim.
       While Judge Harris was issuing the ruling, Green attempted to interject and inform
the court he could be available in December, but the court refused to recognize him.
Jimenez objected to the ruling and argued that at the time of his Faretta waiver, “Judge
Zecher explained to me that I had up to until the day before trial to inform the Court that I
had found an attorney; that I could do so as long as before trial.” Jimenez then accused
the prosecutor of keeping the trial date set to prevent him from retaining counsel, and he
asserted the record showed this. The hearing transcript indicates that the prosecutor
laughed and responded, “It is not on the record.”
       Judge Harris ordered the parties to return the next day, December 3, 2019, for a
hearing on in limine motions and jury selection. The prosecution filed its trial brief,
witness list, and motions in limine on that date, and Jimenez filed a motion to disqualify
Judge Harris. At the hearing, Jimenez reiterated his desire to retain counsel. The court
ordered the parties to return on December 12 for a ruling on the motion to disqualify and
advised them they could anticipate starting trial on December 16. Judge Harris informed
Jimenez he could use the time to prepare for trial and retain an attorney, but that he would
be required to represent himself if he did not have an attorney ready to proceed to trial.
       Jimenez appeared without counsel at the December 12, 2019 hearing. Jimenez
informed the court he had talked to an attorney, but the attorney was not available until
February 2020. The trial court denied and struck the motion to disqualify. The
prosecutor stated she had informed Jimenez she would be unavailable from December 23
to January 5 for a vacation. She estimated the trial would require one and one-half
weeks. Judge Harris expressed disappointment that Jimenez had not yet retained counsel,

                                             18
and Jimenez responded, “It’s a question of retainer and finances, Your Honor.” The
court told Jimenez, “[I]f it’s a money issue and you spent your money with Mr. Green,
that’s between you and him.” The court admonished Jimenez, “[U]nless you have an
attorney when we have the wheels of the trial begin, you’re on your own and you’re
going to represent yourself. We’re not waiting.” The court ordered the parties to return
on December 19 for motions in limine and set January 6, 2020 to begin jury selection.
The court instructed Jimenez that if he wished to be represented by counsel, he would
have to appear with an attorney ready to proceed at the motions hearing. Jimenez stated
he was in the process of raising money by selling his car and a “few high-dollar items I
have in my home, so I can secure counsel.”
       At the motions hearing on December 19, 2019, Jimenez appeared without counsel
but told the court that attorney Holden Green would be present and ready for trial on
January 6. Judge Harris stated that Jimenez was required to have an attorney who was
ready for this motions hearing, and he ordered Jimenez to represent himself. The court
then heard argument on motions in limine.
       On January 6, 2020, the court began jury selection and heard further argument on
motions in limine. The parties made opening statements and the prosecution began
presenting evidence the next day. Jimenez continued to represent himself throughout the
proceedings.
   B. Legal Principles
       Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when
they voluntarily and intelligently elect to do so. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 807.) The
right to counsel can be waived only if such waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
(People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 731.)
       “[B]efore a defendant may be allowed to proceed pro se, he [or she] must be
warned specifically of the hazards ahead.” (Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77, 88-89
(Iowa).) “ ‘A defendant seeking to represent himself “should be made aware of the

                                             19
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ [Citation].” [Citation.]
“No particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive
counsel and elect self-representation.” [Citation.] Rather, “the test is whether the record
as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-
representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.” [Citations.]’
[Citation.] Thus, ‘[a]s long as the record as a whole shows that the defendant understood
the dangers of self-representation, no particular form of warning is required.’
[Citations.]” (Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 241.)
       “The information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent
election, . . ., will depend on a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant’s
education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the
stage of the proceeding.” (Iowa, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 88.) “[R]ecognizing the enormous
importance and role that an attorney plays at a criminal trial, we have imposed the most
rigorous restrictions on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant, and the
procedures that must be observed, before permitting him [or her] to waive his right to
counsel at trial.” (Patterson v. Illinois (1988) 487 U.S. 285, 298 (Patterson).) A “more
searching or formal inquiry” is required before permitting an accused to waive the right
to counsel at trial than is required for less substantial stages of a criminal proceeding—
e.g., postindictment questioning. (Id. at pp. 299-300.)
       Although no single specific advisement by the trial court is required, the
California Supreme Court has identified a set of “suggested advisements and inquiries”
previously recommended in People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568. (People v.
Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070-1071 (Koontz).) As relevant here, these include
advisements that self-representation is almost always unwise and may be to the
defendant’s own detriment; that the defendant will receive no special indulgence by the
court and is required to follow all the technical rules of substantive law, criminal

                                             20
procedure and evidence in making motions and objections, presenting evidence and
argument, and conducting voir dire; and that the prosecution will be represented by a
trained professional who will give the defendant no quarter on account of his or her lack
of skill and experience. (Ibid.) Furthermore, the trial court should inquire into the
defendant’s education and familiarity with legal procedures, probing the defendant’s
understanding of the alternative to self-representation, and exploring the nature of the
proceedings, potential defenses and potential punishments. (Id. at p. 1071.) The trial
court should warn the defendant that, in the event of misbehavior or disruption, his or her
self-representation may be terminated. (Ibid.) Finally, the defendant should be advised
that he or she will not be able to claim inadequacy of representation. (Ibid.)
       “On appeal, we independently examine the entire record to determine whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel. [Citation.]”
(Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 241.) “ ‘Courts must indulge every reasonable
inference against waiver of the right to counsel. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Koontz, supra,
27 Cal.4th at p. 1069.) Review is not limited to the transcript of the hearing for the
Faretta motion. (Id. at p. 1070.) Our review includes proceedings that occurred after the
purported invocation of the right of self-representation. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15
Cal.4th 1, 24.)
   C. The Faretta Waiver Was Invalid
       Jimenez contends he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel,
and he identifies numerous factors in the record to support his claim. First, he argues the
trial court’s oral advisements given at the hearing on September 11, 2019 were
inadequate to warn him of the dangers and disadvantages in self-representation, among
other deficiencies. As to the Faretta waiver form Jimenez provided, he contends he
made numerous errors in his responses on the form that show he did not adequately read
or understand it and that he was mistaken about critical aspects of the case, including his
maximum exposure. Jimenez further contends the waiver was involuntary because he

                                             21
believed he was forced to represent himself due to Holden Green’s medical condition, his
inability to obtain a public defender, and his financial inability to retain private counsel.
       The Attorney General contends the trial court’s oral advisements together with
Jimenez’s execution of the Faretta waiver form show he adequately understood his trial
rights and the disadvantages of representing himself. As to voluntariness, the Attorney
General disputes Jimenez’s version of the procedural history. The Attorney General
argues the record shows Jimenez voluntarily relieved Green and chose to represent
himself despite Green’s asserted unavailability for trial.
       As a preliminary matter, we address whether Jimenez voluntarily chose to
represent himself. We cannot rule out a reasonable probability that Jimenez involuntarily
waived his to right to counsel. While the record holds some evidence that Holden Green
engaged in delay tactics at various times in the course of his representation, we do not
attribute those tactics to Jimenez personally. In the pretrial proceedings, Green filed
multiple unmeritorious motions to continue the trial or disqualify the judge, but at the
time of the Faretta waiver, Jimenez was no longer represented by Green. Moreover, the
record suggests Jimenez did not wish to represent himself immediately after Green was
relieved, as Jimenez first sought to obtain appointed counsel from the public defender’s
office. He did not move for self-representation until after the public defender’s office
found him financially ineligible for their services and Jimenez informed the court he was
“unsuccessful” in obtaining private counsel. Jimenez’s statements in subsequent
proceedings further support a finding that he did not act voluntarily, as he sought to
withdraw his Faretta waiver on the ground that he lacked the necessary expertise.
Jimenez asserted that while he understood the facts of the case, “the legalese, the
motions, the legal jargon, that’s far [a]field from my level of knowledge at this point.”
       But even assuming Jimenez acted voluntarily in waiving his right to counsel, that
does not by itself compel the further conclusion that Jimenez entered a valid waiver.
That would be so even if Jimenez had been motivated primarily by a desire to engage in

                                              22
delay tactics. Trial courts generally have the discretion to deny a request for self-
representation when the defendant merely seeks to delay the proceedings. (People v.
Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 626.) But the trial court here granted the request, and
the Attorney General contends the court did so properly. The issue on appeal is not
whether Jimenez had the right to move for self-representation, but whether he
intelligently waived his right to counsel in doing so.
       The Attorney General does not claim Jimenez deliberately entered an invalid
waiver for purposes of delay, and the record would not support such a conclusion. No
additional delay would have resulted from the entry of a valid waiver; the additional time
that would have been required for adequate advisements and inquiries was negligible.
Nor does the Attorney General contend the merits of the claim are incognizable on
grounds of forfeiture, estoppel, or invited error. Jimenez’s motives are relevant only
insofar as they might shed light on his understanding of the consequences and
complexities of self-representation, and the Attorney General makes no such argument.
As explained below, Jimenez’s subsequent attempts to withdraw his Faretta waiver and
obtain counsel suggest he was not aware of the risks of self-representation regardless of
his motives.
       Our review of the record as a whole shows Jimenez did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to counsel. Multiple factors and circumstances support this
conclusion. First, the context preceding his Faretta motion suggests Jimenez was ill-
prepared to understand the risks and consequences of self-representation in a jury trial.
The charges, evidence, and legal issues facing Jimenez were no more complex than those
in a typical felony case if assessed by an experienced attorney. But that degree of
complexity, involving rules of evidence and the strictures of the jury trial process are well
beyond the knowledge and level of skill of the average layperson. That Jimenez was
asserting the right to represent himself in a week-long jury trial as opposed to some less

                                             23
complicated proceeding required the trial court to conduct a “more searching or formal
inquiry.” (Patterson, supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 299-300.)
       Although Jimenez had appeared before Judge Zecher on several occasions prior to
her ruling on his Faretta motion, she had limited personal interaction with him. Another
judge accurately characterized Jimenez as “very articulate and logical,” but he had no
formal legal training, little or no relevant postsecondary education, and had never
represented himself in any civil or criminal matter. His only criminal history consisted of
a misdemeanor conviction for issuing a bad check. He stated he was a high school
graduate, he had attended a mine safety academy, and his sole employment experience
consisted of his work as a safety manager in the mining industry.8
       Furthermore, Jimenez had no counsel for five weeks before the Faretta hearing.
Green appeared with Jimenez at the hearing July 31, 2019 to inform the court Jimenez
did not qualify for a public defender, but when Green offered to remain in the case until
Jimenez found counsel, Judge Zecher informed Green he had already been relieved.
Jimenez appeared at the next two hearings without counsel, and he still had no counsel
when he entered his Faretta waiver on September 11. As a result, he had no attorney to
review the waiver form with him or assist him in completing it. All this context weighs
against the conclusion that Jimenez was acting with sufficient awareness of the dangers
of self-representation at the time of the Faretta hearing.
       Second, the transcript of the Faretta hearing and the content of the submitted
waiver form show the court’s advisements and inquiries were insufficient to ensure
Jimenez entered a valid waiver. After Jimenez submitted the waiver form, Judge Zecher
stated she was looking at the form and confirmed with Jimenez that the signatures and
initials on it were his. She noted that Jimenez had “some formal education” and issued a
single warning: “I am required to tell you that—as you have indicated in the form, it’s

       8
         The probation report states Jimenez had a high school GED from 2000 and some
college at Middle Tennessee State in addition to his training at the mining academy.

                                             24
not a good idea to represent yourself, given the level of experience that is present with the
District Attorney’s Office.” She then advised Jimenez he also had the constitutional right
to represent himself and she confirmed that he understood what she had told him.
Viewed in isolation, the oral advisement failed to ensure Jimenez understood the risks
and disadvantages of representing himself in a jury trial. The court made no inquiries
into Jimenez’s understanding of the case or the law, and she issued none of the other
numerous “suggested advisements and inquiries” listed by the California Supreme Court
in Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pages 1070 to 1071.
         The Attorney General relies heavily on the Faretta waiver form Jimenez executed
to argue he knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel. It is true that the
preprinted text of the form thoroughly sets forth most of the advisements listed in Koontz,
and Jimenez does not dispute that he signed and initialed it. But the Attorney General’s
position suffers from several defects.
         First, the court never asked Jimenez if he had actually read and understood the
form, and he had no counsel to review the form with him at the hearing. As detailed
below, Jimenez made several errors in filling out the form and left some portions blank.
And in at least one critical respect—the section requiring the defendant to state the
maximum penalty for the charges—Jimenez supplied the wrong answer. Had the court
reviewed the completed form with him, or if the court had confirmed that he reviewed it
with counsel, his answers likely would have been different, as would the outcome of this
claim.
         A trial court’s failure to question a defendant about his or her responses on a
Faretta waiver form does not necessarily invalidate a waiver, particularly if there are no
indications the defendant failed to understand what he or she was reading and signing.
(People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 709, overruled on another ground in People v.
Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912.) Here, however, the record holds such indications.

                                               25
       In a section requiring the defendant to state the charges, Jimenez wrote down
incorrect penal code sections with no substantive description of the charges. In a section
for defendant to respond to the prompt, “I am aware that there are certain legal defenses
to the crime(s) with which I am charged, and they are as follows,” Jimenez left the
section blank. A section concerning penalties for a conviction listed several potential
penalties and instructed the defendant to cross out all inapplicable penalties, but Jimenez
did not cross out any of the inapplicable penalties, suggesting he had not carefully read
the instruction or did not understand which penalties might be inapplicable.
       As to the penalties that were applicable in this case, Jimenez incorrectly responded
that the maximum sentence was three years in state prison. His actual exposure was five
years four months in state prison. The trial court never mentioned this error at the
Faretta hearing and never informed Jimenez of his actual maximum exposure. The
failure to inform a defendant of the maximum penalty for a conviction may render a
Faretta waiver invalid in some circumstances. “[T]he court should satisfy itself that the
defendant understands the nature of the charges against him, though there is a split of
authority in California as to whether the court must also specifically advise the defendant
of the maximum penal consequences of conviction.” (People v. Ruffin (2017) 12
Cal.App.5th 536, 544 (Ruffin).) Here the trial court here not only failed to advise
Jimenez of his maximum exposure, it failed to correct him when he supplied the court
with a waiver form erroneously stating his maximum exposure.
       The Attorney General argues the record nonetheless supports an inference that
Jimenez was aware of his maximum exposure. The Attorney General points out that the
prosecutor stated the maximum sentence was five years four months at a subsequent
hearing, but that hearing occurred more than three months after the Faretta hearing. The
charging documents filed in 2016 and 2018 listed the range of penalties applicable to
each charge, but few laypersons would know how to compute the maximum sentence
from that information. Moreover, none of this explains why Jimenez listed an incorrect

                                            26
maximum penalty on the waiver form, or why the trial court failed to inform him of the
correct penalty.
       We also find it significant that Jimenez left blank a section of the form instructing
him to list legal defenses he was aware of, suggesting he did not read that section, had no
awareness of what his defenses might be, or both. He made statements at the Faretta
hearing further showing a lack of awareness in this regard. He asserted he wanted to
represent himself in part because, “I just want the best defense possible.” A more
diligent judge would have responded to this by advising Jimenez he was unlikely to get
the best defense by representing himself. Jimenez then stated, “[F]rom my vantage point
the prosecution has failed to provide any type of compelling evidence that proves beyond
a reasonable doubt the crimes that were committed.” His stated vantage point evinced
considerable ignorance about the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, which included
the prospect of consistent allegations of sexual conduct from a young witness,
corroborated by her contemporaneous text messages and a recorded pretext call in which
Jimenez repeatedly uttered inculpatory statements. While a trial court is not required to
advise a defendant on the specific strengths of the prosecution’s case, Jimenez’s
statements reflected a lack of awareness about the nature of the evidence he would have
to litigate and the consequences of any failure to do so competently.
       The record suggests Jimenez was insufficiently aware of another serious risk: that
he would be unable to withdraw his Faretta waiver in subsequent proceedings. The
Attorney General points out that Jimenez initialed a warning on the waiver form stating,
“I understand that if I change my mind and decide I need an attorney, depending on the
stage of the proceedings, my request for an attorney may be denied.” That advisement is
proper, but even if Jimenez read and understood it, the trial court made statements likely
to undercut his appreciation for the risk that requests for counsel would be denied.
Immediately after granting the Faretta motion, the court told Jimenez, “If at any time you
decide to change your mind pretrial, please let me know. And then once trial comes

                                             27
along we’ll talk. It’s a little different at that point in terms of a request to no longer
proceed as a self-represented litigant.” Judge Zecher later added, “Know that if you
come in in three months and you say, now I want an attorney, that may not happen,” but
she subsequently denied his request for counsel two months and one week later on
November 18, 2019.
       Having made those statements, the court did not accurately inform Jimenez about
the point at which requesting an attorney would become more difficult or what
circumstances would make it less likely. The court’s statements likely gave Jimenez the
impression he would be allowed to withdraw his Faretta waiver at least until “trial comes
along”.9 The subsequent proceedings support an inference Jimenez was ill-informed
about those risks because he attempted and failed to withdraw his Faretta waiver
multiple times. While we do not hold that the trial court was specifically required to
advise Jimenez those attempts were likely to fail based the circumstances the court later
cited in denying them, the trial court’s statements risked giving Jimenez the opposite
impression.
       To support his claim, Jimenez relies on Ruffin, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th 536. Ruffin
moved to represent himself at trial after the court granted defense counsel a continuance.
In response, the court told Ruffin, “ ‘You are not that stupid. You have one of the best
lawyers in the county.’ ” (Id. at p. 540.) The court urged Ruffin’s father, who was
present in court, to talk to Ruffin, adding, “He has a good lawyer. He doesn’t know how

       9
         Subsequent events compounded the ambiguity when a dispute arose about
whether November 18, 2019—when Jimenez first requested counsel again—was
effectively a “trial date” for purposes of timely requesting an attorney. After the trial
court vacated that trial date, the prosecutor asserted she told Green she was arranging to
have it maintained, but Jimenez was still representing himself at that point and the record
does not clearly show whether he received notice of the change. On the other hand, these
events were largely a consequence of Jimenez failing to appear for the status hearing in
October. In any event, we do not rely on the precise timing of these events for our
analysis.

                                               28
to be a lawyer.” (Ibid.) After a recess, Ruffin remained undeterred and provided the
court with an initialed, signed Faretta waiver form. After confirming the initials and
signature were Ruffin’s, the court asked him if he had any questions, and Ruffin said he
did not. The court then granted the Faretta motion without determining whether Ruffin
had read and understood the form, and without asking Ruffin about ambiguities in his
responses on the form regarding the charges against him. Nothing in the form or the oral
exchange advised Ruffin of the penal consequences of a conviction. After he represented
himself at trial, the jury found him guilty.
       Based on these circumstances, the Court of Appeal held the waiver was invalid
because the trial court had failed to adequately advise Ruffin of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation. (Ruffin, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 539.) The
Court of Appeal found the trial court’s oral statement to Ruffin that, “You are not that
stupid,” along with the statements to Ruffin’s father, had advised Ruffin “in substance,
that it was unwise for him to represent himself.” (Id. at p. 546.) But the Court of Appeal
held this lone oral warning was insufficient without any further advisements, and the
Court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that Ruffin’s execution of the waiver
form showed his waiver was knowing and voluntary. (Ibid.) “[E]ven when a waiver
form is completed, the court’s duty remains to ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the
right to counsel is knowing and voluntary.” (Id. at pp. 548-549.) The Court of Appeal
held the record showed the waiver was invalid notwithstanding the executed waiver form
because the trial court failed to ascertain that Ruffin had actually read and understood it,
and the trial court failed to inquire about the ambiguities in his responses regarding the
nature of the charges against him.
       Ruffin is on point and we find its reasoning persuasive. Like the trial court in
Ruffin, the court here issued a brief oral advisement informing Jimenez it was “not a good
idea” to represent himself given the prosecution’s expertise, but the court issued no other
verbal warnings and failed to make additional inquiries sufficient to ensure a valid

                                               29
waiver. And like the trial court in Ruffin, the court here confirmed Jimenez had signed
and initialed the form, but the court failed to determine whether he actually read and
understood it. Furthermore, as in Ruffin, the court here failed to inquire about
deficiencies in Jimenez’s responses to the written waiver form, including an erroneous
response about the maximum penalty for a conviction. Finally, as in Ruffin, the trial
court here failed to advise Jimenez of the correct maximum penalty.
       We acknowledge the trial court was placed in a difficult position, largely as a
consequence of Holden Green’s failure to represent Jimenez in a professional manner.
But the court had other options in response to Jimenez’s unsuccessful attempts to retain
new counsel prior to his moving for self-representation. Given Jimenez’s expressed
desire to be represented by counsel, the trial court could have ordered the public defender
to represent him or appointed counsel. (See, e.g., § 987.2.)
       For the reasons above, we conclude Jimenez did not enter a knowing and
intelligent Faretta waiver and suffered a deprivation of the right to counsel at trial as a
consequence. The Attorney General argues any error in the waiver was harmless, but the
California Supreme Court has held this to be “structural error” requiring automatic
reversal. (People v. Waldon (2023) 14 Cal.5th 288, 310.) Accordingly, we will reverse
the judgment.
       Jimenez raises four additional claims: First, he contends the trial court erred by
denying his motions to withdraw the Faretta waiver and allow counsel to resume
representation. Second, he contends the trial court erred by relieving attorney Holden
Green as counsel. Third, he contends the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel
and or determine Jimenez’s financial eligibility for indigent representation. Fourth, he
contends cumulative prejudice from multiple errors requires reversal. Because we
conclude that the deprivation of counsel from the invalid Faretta waiver requires
automatic reversal, we do not reach these claims.

                                             30
                            III.   DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.

                                   31
                                  _______________________________
                                   Greenwood, P. J.

 WE CONCUR:

_______________________________
  Grover, J.

_______________________________
  Danner, J.

People v. Jimenez
H048103