Court Opinion

ID: 9475278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:22:12.176669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:37.033526
License: Public Domain

ALARCON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s analysis in Parts I, II, III, and IV of the opinion. I respectfully dissent from their view that parents subject to conflicting state child custody decrees may not seek relief in federal court to determine which decree is valid and enforceable under section 1738A of the PKPA. The majority has concluded that (1) Congress did not intend federal courts to have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim under the PKPA in federal court, and (2) strong policies reflected in the “domestic relations” exception to diversity jurisdiction counsel against recognizing a federal cause of action enforceable in federal court under the PKPA.
The majority’s construction of the PKPA directly conflicts with the holdings of three circuits. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.1986); Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.1985); Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.1984). These courts have concluded that the *1560PKPA confers subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts to determine which of two states may properly exercise jurisdiction over a child custody dispute in accord with the standards set forth in the PKPA. McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1475; Heartfield, 749 F.2d at 1141; Flood, 727 F.2d at 312-13.
The majority’s interpretation of the PKPA would convert an act of Congress into barren rhetoric. My examination of the legislative history of the PKPA has convinced me that the well-reasoned analyses of the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits are consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the PKPA. I would reverse the order of dismissal of this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and direct the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether California or Louisiana has jurisdiction over this child custody matter.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PKPA
The majority states that the legislative history of the PKPA reveals that Congress did not intend to create a cause of action in federal court for the enforcement of section 1738A. I disagree. I am persuaded after reading the legislative history of the Act that the drafters of the PKPA intended to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce compliance with section 1738A through the vehicles of declaratory and injunctive relief. A contrary construction of section 1738A would make state compliance with its provisions optional — a result which Congress could not have intended.
Section 1738A imposes on the states a federal duty, under standards derived from the UCCJA, to give full faith and credit to the custody decrees of other states. Joint Hearing, supra, at 48 (statement of Paul Michel, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice); Addendum to Joint Hearing, supra, at 103 (letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to Representative Peter Rodino). The legislative history demonstrates that Congress sought to enact a federal law to address an interstate problem which the states, acting on their own, appear powerless to resolve. See Joint Hearing, supra, at 4 (statement of Senator Alan Cranston) (“Although legal custody issues relating to divorce and child-custody matters have traditionally been within the domain of the States and not the Federal Government, it is within the province of the Federal Government to resolve problems that are interstate in origin and which the States, acting independently, seem unable to resolve”); id. at 7 (statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop) (“While the traditional role of State law must be preserved in intrastate cases, we at the Federal level have a compelling responsibility to take the necessary and appropriate steps to assist States in resolving the complicated interstate ... eases which they have been unable to adequately address themselves”); id. at 20 (statement of Congressman Robert Duncan) (“Though I would prefer to have this question addressed at the State level, it has not been____ We must not fear to use the Federal Government at an appropriate level when necessary”).
The majority states that “the colloquy leading to the rejection of proposals by Congressman Fish to grant federal courts jurisdiction to enforce custody decrees ... strongly suggests that section 1738A should not be read as providing a cause of action in federal court.” I believe the majority has misinterpreted Congress’ intent in rejecting Congressman Fish’s proposed amendments. The discussion cited by the majority reflects an intent by Congress not to eliminate the judicially created “domestic relations” exception to diversity jurisdiction by enacting 1738A. Specifically, Congressman Fish proposed to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to authorize diversity jurisdiction in custody cases and to eliminate the $10,000 minimum amount in controversy requirement. See Parental Kidnapping: Hearing on H.R. 1290 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) (Statement of Congressman Hamilton Fish, *1561Jr.). Congressman Fish’s bill would have conferred jurisdiction on federal courts to enforce state custody decrees in the first instance. There is a significant distinction between the creation of a federal forum for custody cases in the first instance, and the delineation of enforceable federal standards applicable to determine which state court may exercise its jurisdiction over a custody dispute. It does not necessarily follow, as the majority reasons, that because Congress rejected the notion that the federal courts should determine which parent should be awarded the custody of a child, that Congress also intended to exclude any role for federal courts in determining which of two states properly exercised its jurisdiction to award custody of a child.
The Third Circuit made a comprehensive analysis of the legislative history of section 1738A in Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 310-12. It concluded that Congress must have intended the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to extend to such actions, as any other result would “render § 1738A virtually nugatory by so restricting the availability of a federal forum that state compliance with the legislation would become optional.” Id. at 312. The court summarized its conclusions regarding the import of the legislative history and congressional purpose behind section 1738A as follows:
While it is clear that Congress did not want federal courts making custody determinations, and while it is also clear that Congress did not want federal courts enforcing custody decrees in the first instance, it is nevertheless apparent that Congress meant to create new federal law governing state court enforcement and modification of custody decrees. By enacting one set of rules binding all the states, Congress sought to eliminate the inconsistency and close the loopholes that encouraged child snatching under the old system in which each state exercised unreviewable power to modify decrees. Absent some tribunal capable of enjoining violations of the strict and uniform requirements of § 1738A, the Congressional policy underlying the enactment would be thwarted.
Id. at 310; accord Heartfield, 749 F.2d at 1141 (“When the courts of two states assert that they have jurisdiction over a custody determination, it is clear that Congress’ purpose in enacting the Act would be thwarted without some means of determining which state has the right to exercise its jurisdiction under the terms of the Act.”); McDougald, 786 F.2d at 1475 (“an action seeking an authoritative federal construction of section 1738A to resolve a conflict concerning the validity of state court custody orders may be maintained in federal district court”); see also DiRuggiero, 743 F.2d at 1015 (claims alleging a violation of section 1738A arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 if they allege injury caused by inconsistent interstate custody decrees); Wyman v. Larner, 624 F.Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.Ind. 1985) (“Federal courts have jurisdiction under the PKPA ... to determine which of two inconsistent state court custody decrees is valid”); Martinez v. Reed, 623 F.Supp. 1050, 1051-52 (E.D.La.1985) (a federal district court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction over a claim brought under the PKPA), affd without opinion, 783 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.1986). My independent examination of section 1738A’s legislative history leads me to the same conclusion.
The legislative history of the PKPA shows that Congress sought to leave untouched a state’s traditional role in deciding custody disputes while at the same time providing a nationwide standard for the assertion of state jurisdiction. In so doing, Congress created a mechanism for federal intervention to resolve interstate conflicts in enacting section 1738A. See Joint Hearing, supra, at 19 (statement of Congressman Robert Duncan) (“The proposal we consider today is a paradigm of the problem of maintaining a Federal balance”); Joint Hearing, supra, at 145 (statement of Professor Russell Coombs, former member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Professor of Law at Rut*1562gers University) (section 1738A was enacted to provide “an adequate mechanism to insure that [UCCJA standards] are interpreted and applied by the States with such uniformity that parents will perceive no legal advantage in [child-snatching]”).
The majority’s construction of section 1738A will so restrict the enforceability of the rights created by section 1738A in this circuit so as to deny a meaningful remedy to litigants confronted with two conflicting state custody decrees. Heartfield, 749 F.2d at 1140; see Flood, 727 F.2d at 312 (“ ‘To take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself’ ”) (quoting Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303, 5 S.Ct. 903, 921, 29 L.Ed. 185 (1885)). The interpretation given to section 1738A by the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits fosters congressional intent and avoids the pitfall of a literal application of the statute as a toothless declaration of unenforceable platitudes.
II. THE “DOMESTIC RELATIONS” EXCEPTION TO DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
The majority states that because federal courts “could not avoid becoming involved in the merits of the underlying [custody] dispute” by asserting subject matter jurisdiction to decide which of two conflicting state court decrees is valid under the PKPA, “the PKPA must be interpreted in light of the strong policies reflected in the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction____” I disagree.
The longstanding bar to federal diversity jurisdiction in domestic relations matters has no application to an action predicated on federal question jurisdiction. “[T]he domestic relations exception per se applies only to actions in diversity.” Flood, 727 F.2d at 307 (citing C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3609, at 662 (1975)). The law in this circuit, until today, has also recognized the pertinent distinction between applying the domestic relations exception to diversity actions and withholding it in federal question actions: “[D]omestic relations cases are within the Article IIJ judicial power of the federal courts, but outside the power bestowed by Congress in the diversity statute.” Csibi, 670 F.2d at 136 n. 4. Stated another way, “as a jurisdictional bar, the domestic relations exception does not apply to cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Flood, 727 F.2d at 308 (footnote omitted).
The domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction has no application to cases arising under the PKPA. “The domestic relations exception to the jurisdictional grant has been given a narrow construction.” McIntyre v. McIntyre, 771 F.2d 1316, 1317 (9th Cir.1985) (citing Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam)); see also 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3609, at 471 (1984) (hereinafter Wright, Miller & Cooper). Only those actions most closely resembling historically “ecclesiastical” actions have been considered outside a federal court’s jurisdiction.1 Csibi, 670 F.2d at 137. This court in Buechold articulated the test for subject matter jurisdiction in domestic relations actions. Id. The federal courts “must decline jurisdiction of cases concerning domestic relations when the primary issue concerns the status of parent and child or husband and wife.” Buechold, 401 F.2d at 372 (citations omitted). “It follows that the *1563exception to jurisdiction arises in those cases where a federal court is asked to grant a decree of divorce or annulment, or to grant custody or fix payments for support, the rationale being that those actions are close to the historical concept of an ecclesiastical action and peculiarly within the province of the state courts.” McIntyre, 771 F.2d at 1317-18 (citing Csibi, 670 F.2d at 137).
In a case arising under section 1738A, the primary issue is not the status of parent and child, i.e., the federal court is not asked to enter a child custody decree or to enforce an interstate custody decree, but rather, the inquiry is limited to the question of determining which state has failed to comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites of section 1738A. Section 1738A makes clear that only one state at a time may properly exercise custody jurisdiction. If two states concurrently render custody decrees, one state has asserted jurisdiction in violation of federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738A(f), (g); see Flood, 727 F.2d at 310. In an action under the PKPA in federal court, the district court is not asked to make an award of custody or visitation. Instead, the district court is called upon to identify which state has jurisdiction under the standards set forth in section 1738A. This task requires only a preliminary inquiry into jurisdictional facts. DiRuggiero, 743 F.2d at 1019-20; Flood, 727 F.2d at 310. The court in DiRuggiero carefully spelled out the distinction between making custody awards in the first instance and the resolution of interstate disputes over the validity of competing custody decrees:
The contemporary purpose of the domestic-relations exception rests on functional considerations. An award in the first instance of divorce, alimony, child custody, visitation, or support requires the exercise of an informed discretion, discretion in which local institutions are expert and with which federal courts are unfamiliar. Such awards require continuing supervision over large numbers of cases, for which the federal courts are ill-equipped. Unlike local institutions, the federal courts are not supplemented by a professional social service staff. And on a more theoretical plane, the discretionary standards for an award of support, alimony, custody, or visitation are so amorphous and flexible that the federal courts could not predict with any confidence that their application of state law would duplicate the result that would be obtained at the state level.
These considerations are absent in interstate disputes over the validity of competing custody decrees. In that circumstance we are not asked to make an award of custody, visitation, or support in the first instance. Rather, the federal courts must ascertain which of two competing state custody awards is paramount under federal and state law. As we held in Flood v. Braaten, this determination “requires only a preliminary inquiry into jurisdictional facts.” 727 F.2d at 310.
DiRuggiero, 743 F.2d at 1019-20 (emphasis added).
The majority’s reliance upon Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C.Cir.1982) is misplaced. In Bennett, the court was presented with two narrow issues: whether a federal court has jurisdiction to grant monetary or prospective injunctive relief in a tort action based upon a parental kidnapping. Id. at 1042-43. As to injunctive relief, the plaintiff sought an order “directing and enjoining the defendant from any interference with the custody rights of the plaintiff” over the children. Id. at 1041. The court examined the legislative history of the PKPA and found that Congress deliberately omitted the creation of a direct role for the federal courts in determining child custody. Id. at 1043-44 & n. 6. Because a grant of prospective injunctive relief would have required an inquiry into the interests of the children — an inquiry precluded by the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction — the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to issue such an order. Id. at 1042-44.
The Bennett court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend to alter the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction *1564and to confer on federal courts the power to determine the custody of children has no bearing on or relationship to the enforcement of a valid state custody decree through the vehicles of declaratory relief and limited injunctive relief. See Flood, 727 F.2d at 312 n. 27; Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1045 (Edwards, J., dissenting in part). I would conclude that a district court may exercise its jurisdiction under section 1738A to enforce compliance with the PKPA’s provisions through declaratory relief and narrowly circumscribed injunctive relief.
I would REVERSE the judgment of the district court.

. The domestic relations exception originated from early judicial construction of the diversity statute now codified in 28 U.S.C. 1332. Csibi, 670 F.2d at 136 & n. 5. The originally enacted diversity statute in 1789 conferred jurisdiction over " ‘suits of a civil nature in law or in equity.’ " Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3609, at 460. That statutory description was construed to exclude domestic relations and probate matters which were heard in ecclestiastical courts at the time the diversity statute was drafted. Id.; Csibi, 670 F.2d at 136. Although the Revised Judicial Code of 1948, Act of June 25, 1948, § 1331, 62 Stat. 869 at 930, substituted the broader term "civil actions” in its description of diversity jurisdiction, the domestic relations exception has persisted because the courts have . found it supported by sound policy. Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3609, at 460-61.