Court Opinion

ID: 9941315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:16:01.010269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:31.557643
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0706-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DONG B. LIN, a/k/a DONG
BIAO LIN,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted on January 31, 2024 – Decided February 16, 2024

                   Before Judges Susswein and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 10-10-
                   1964.

                   Dong B. Lin, appellant pro se.

                   Raymond Scott Santiago, Monmouth County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Daniel Ian
                   Bornstein, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Dong B. Lin appeals from an August 17, 2022 order dismissing

a second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) contending his appellate and

first PCR counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Judge Richard W. English

found defendant's second PCR petition to be procedurally time-barred. Based

upon our review of the record and well-settled legal principles governing

limitations on filing PCR petitions, we affirm.

      The salient facts and procedural history were previously detailed in our

decision on defendant's first PCR petition, State v. Lin, No. A-0929-20 (App

Div. Dec. 28, 2021) (Lin II). We briefly set forth the facts material to our

determination of defendant's second PCR appeal.

      On June 16, 2010, defendant and co-defendant, Zeng Liang Chen, broke

into the home of a former employer in Freehold armed with a knife and brass

knuckles. Upon entering the home, they tied up the male victim with telephone

wire. Defendant proceeded to search the home for valuables and subsequently

found a female victim upstairs in bed. Defendant then stabbed the female victim

repeatedly through her bedding.       Upon hearing the male victim yelling

downstairs, defendant returned and stabbed him until his knife broke. Defendant

then found another knife in the home and used it to continue the attack. Both

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victims died from multiple stab wounds. Approximately an hour later, police

arrested defendant and co-defendant walking nearby.

      On January 8, 2014, defendant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree

murder, N.J.S.A. 20:11-3(a)(2) (counts two and three), and two counts of first-

degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (counts four and five). On May

5, 2015, Judge Anthony J. Mellaci, Jr., imposed the recommended sentence

negotiated by the parties: life imprisonment with an eighty-five percent parole

bar and five years of parole supervision upon release from incarceration on count

two pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and a

concurrent sentence of thirty years with no parole and five years of parole

supervision upon release from incarceration on count three. Defendant appealed

and we affirmed the entry of the judgment of conviction and sentence on April

12, 2018 in State v. Lin, No. A-4559-14 (App. Div. Apr. 12, 2018) (Lin I). On

October 24, 2018, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied defendant's petition

for certification. State v. Lin, 235 N.J. 456 (2018).

      On December 4, 2018 defendant filed his first PCR petition, alleging that

trial counsel was ineffective by misleading him into believing he would get a

thirty-year sentence without parole if he pled guilty. Defendant also alleged that

his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary.

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      On March 4, 2020, Judge Paul X. Escandon heard oral argument on

defendant's first PCR petition. On March 9, 2020, Judge Escandon denied that

petition in a written decision finding defendant failed to present a prima facie

case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found "defendant engaged

in colloquy with the [c]ourt indicating that plea counsel explained the

consequences of the plea, that he fully understood the plea, and that he was

satisfied with plea counsel's representations." Defendant appealed.

      On December 28, 2021, we affirmed Judge Escandon's decision and

concluded that defendant failed to set forth a prima facie case of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Lin II, slip op. at 16-17. In affirming, we determined

"[t]he court reasonably exercised its discretion to deny defendant an evidentiary

hearing under Rule 3:22-10 because defendant's ineffective assistance claim was

resolvable by reference to the plea record." Ibid. Defendant and his counsel,

with the aid of an interpreter, reviewed the plea together. Id. at 6. Defendant

confirmed he was pleading guilty "freely and voluntarily." Ibid. On May 3,

2022, the Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Lin, 250

N.J. 503 (2022).

      On July 1, 2022, defendant filed the second PCR petition which is the

subject of this appeal. On August 17, 2022, Judge English dismissed the second

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PCR petition pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) and (3). Judge English entered an

order stating that since defendant's first PCR petition was denied by the court

on March 9, 2020, defendant's second petition was time-barred under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(3), because it was not filed within 90 days of the date of the December 28,

2021 judgment on direct appeal. Judge English also found that defendant's PCR

petition was untimely pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), which required the second

PCR petition to be filed within one year of the March 9, 2020 denial of the first

petition. This appeal followed.

      Defendant raises the following arguments for our consideration:

            POINT I

            THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
            DEFENDANT'S SECOND PETITION FOR POST-
            CONVICTION RELIEF AS TIME BARRED AND
            THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR
            FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

            POINT II

            PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
            SHOWING SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE
            ORDER OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. State v.
            Preciose, 129 N.J 451 (1992); Rule 3:22-10.

            POINT III

            PETITIONER IS NOT PROCEDURALLY (OR
            OTHERWISE) BARRED FROM RAISING THE
            CLAIMS ADVANCED HEREIN.

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      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). The de novo standard also applies to

mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 420. Where an evidentiary hearing has

not been held, we "conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and

legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id. at 421.

      PCR "is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State

v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459

(1992)). It is the vehicle through which a defendant may, after conviction and

sentencing, challenge a judgment of conviction by raising issues that could not

have been raised on direct appeal and, therefore, "ensures that a defendant was

not unjustly convicted." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997).

      To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel,

defendant must satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which our Supreme Court adopted in

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). "First, the defendant must show . . . .

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'

guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment."       Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Defendant must then show counsel's "deficient

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performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. To show prejudice, defendant must

establish by "a reasonable probability" that the deficient performance

"materially contributed to defendant's conviction . . . ." Id. at 58.

      We need not address whether defendant's second PCR petition meets the

Strickland standard as we affirm Judge English's determination that defendant's

petition is time-barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) and (3).

      The rules governing PCR petitions are set forth in Rule 3:22. Second or

subsequent PCR petitions must comply with the requirements of Rule 3:22-4(b)

and Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). Rule 3:22-12(a)(3) requires a PCR petition to be filed

within ninety days of the date judgment is entered on direct appeal. To avoid

dismissal of a second—or subsequent—PCR petition, the petition must be

timely filed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). R. 3:22-4(b)(1). Rule 3:22-4(b) contains

no exceptions to the time-bar for second or subsequent PCR petitions. Rule

3:22-12(a)(2)(C) specifically provides "no second or subsequent petition shall

be filed more than one year after . . . the date of the denial of the first . . .

application for [PCR]" based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

      Defendant was required to file the second PCR petition before us within

one year of March 9, 2020, the date his first PCR petition was denied. However,

he did not file his second PCR petition until July 1, 2022, and, therefore, it is

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                                         7
time-barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C). The second petition could also be

deemed untimely under Rule 3:22-12(a)(3), because it was not filed within

ninety days of the date of the December 28, 2021 judgment on direct appeal.

      Because defendant's second PCR petition was not filed in accordance with

the time limitations proscribed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) and (3), dismissal was

mandatory. Therefore, we do not reach the substantive merits of the second

PCR petition.

      Affirmed.

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