Court Opinion

ID: 9688099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:04:46.466425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:43.039375
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/24/23 P. v. Ramirez CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085380
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. 2066877)
                    v.

    JAIRO DARIO RAMIREZ,                                                                  OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Carrie M.
Stephens, Judge.
         Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and
Ivan P. Marrs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Levy, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and Snauffer, J.
        Defendant Jairo Dario Ramirez appeals from a December 5, 2022 order of the
Stanislaus County Superior Court denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code1 section 1172.6. Citing the “doctrine of absurd consequences,” he contends
“section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) should be construed as barring the prosecution from
using a defendant’s manslaughter plea against him at the evidentiary hearing.” We reject
Ramirez’s argument and affirm the order.
                                     BACKGROUND
        Ramirez and codefendant Timothy Fee were initially charged with the murder of
David H. (§ 187, subd. (a)), which occurred during the perpetration of a robbery and/or
kidnapping (§ 189, subd. (a)). The original information further alleged Ramirez (1) had
been released on bail prior to a judgment becoming final on an earlier felony offense
(§ 12022.1); and (2) served two prior separate prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
Subsequently, in an amended information, Ramirez was charged with voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a) [count I]) and robbery (§ 211 [count II]) and alleged to
have been released on bail prior to a judgment becoming final on an earlier felony
offense (§ 12022.1). He pled guilty to these counts and admitted the on-bail allegation.
The trial court imposed 11 years (the upper term) on count I and one year (one-third the
middle term) on count II plus two years for the on-bail enhancement.2
        On January 13, 2022, Ramirez filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former
section 1170.95, which has since been renumbered section 1172.6. (See Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) He marked the following checkboxes:

        1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Penal
Code.
        2 The record shows Ramirez also pled guilty to carrying a concealed dirk or
dagger (§ 21310) and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)) in two other cases. In each of those case, he received an eight-month
sentence.

                                              2.
       “1.    A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against me that
              allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,
              murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
              other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely
              on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under
              the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [Citation.]

       “2.    I was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
              following a trial or I accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which I
              could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.
              [Citation.]

       “3.    I could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
              because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective
              January 1, 2019. [Citation.]”
The parties agreed Ramirez’s petition set forth a prima facie case for relief and the trial
court issued an order to show cause.
       An evidentiary hearing commenced December 1, 2022, and lasted two days.
Among other things, the trial court admitted into evidence the transcript of Ramirez’s
change-of-plea hearing. The transcript recorded the following exchange:

               “THE COURT: . . . . What’s your plea . . . as charged in Count One
       of the first amended information, that on or about the 8th day of August,
       2016, at and in the County of Stanislaus, State of California, and prior to
       the filing of the information, you did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and
       without malice kill David H[.], a human being, upon a sudden quarrel and
       heat of passion? What’s your plea to that charge?

              “[RAMIREZ]: Guilty.”
Ultimately, the court denied appellant’s petition, finding “beyond a reasonable doubt
[Ramirez] would still be convicted of murder based on the facts under current law.” It
relied—in part—on the change-of-plea hearing transcript:

              “The charge alleged [Ramirez] willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
       without malice killed David H[.] upon a sudden quarrel and heat of passion.
       [Ramirez] entered a guilty plea to this charge in a court of law before a
       superior court judge with counsel by his side. [Ramirez] essentially
       admitted to being the actual killer. When he was asked by the judicial
       officer who took his plea if he was pleading guilty because he was in fact

                                              3.
       guilty, he answered yes. [¶] So the admission is what the Court is
       considering . . . . It was [Ramirez]’s admission in court that he was guilty
       of manslaughter by being the actual killer in a sudden quarrel and heat of
       passion.”3
                                      DISCUSSION
       On appeal, Ramirez argues “the trial court erred by using [his] manslaughter plea
against him at the section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing.” (Boldface &
capitalization omitted.) He acknowledges “the prosecution would seemingly be allowed
to use a defendant’s manslaughter plea against him at the evidentiary hearing” “under a
literal reading of the statute.” Nevertheless, Ramirez contends:

       “In enacting [Senate Bill No.] 775 [(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)], the
       Legislature decided to extend the benefits of section 1172.6 to those
       defendants who were induced to pled [sic] guilty to manslaughter in order
       to avoid being prosecuted for murder under a now-abrogated theory of
       murder liability. Once a prima facie case has been made and the trial court
       has issued an order to show cause, for a defendant’s manslaughter plea to
       then be turned around and used against him at a section 1172.6, subdivision
       (d)(3) evidentiary hearing would frustrate the Legislature’s entire purpose
       of expanding section 1172.6 to include defendants who were induced into
       pleading guilty to manslaughter to avoid the potential of a now-invalid
       murder conviction. Therefore, to avoid an absurd consequence that the
       Legislature did not intend, [Ramirez]’s manslaughter plea should not have
       been used against him at the evidentiary hearing.”
“The issue before us is, therefore, one of statutory interpretation. ‘Questions of statutory
interpretation . . . present questions of law, which we review de novo.’ [Citation.]”
(California State University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th
250, 265.)
I.     Section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)
       “Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill [No.] 1437 [(2017-
2018 Reg. Sess.)] ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable

       3 The court added “there is plenty of evidence to corroborate [Ramirez]’s
admission.”

                                             4.
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959, quoting Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) “Through the passage of Senate Bill [No.] 1437 the Legislature
effectively eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to
murder convictions, and reduced the scope of the felony-murder rule.” (People v. Prado
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 480, 487.) “To effectuate these changes, the Legislature amended
sections 188 and 189 . . . .” (Ibid.; see §§ 188, subd. (a)(3) [“Except as stated in
subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely
on his or her participation in a crime.”]; 189, subd. (e) [“A participant in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is
liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the
actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”].) Senate Bill No. 1437 also
“added [former] section 1170.95, which provides a procedure for convicted murderers
who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.”
(People v. Lewis, supra, at p. 959.)
       “In October 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 775 . . . , effective
January 1, 2022. . . . Senate Bill No. 775 amend[ed] subdivision (a) of [former] section
1170.95 to allow persons convicted of ‘attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine’ and manslaughter (in addition to those convicted of murder) to
seek relief from their convictions . . . .” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539,

                                               5.
544; see Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a) [“The Legislature finds and declares that this
legislation . . . [¶] . . . [c]larifies that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable
consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder
under the same theories.”]; People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 978 [Sen. Bill
No. 775 “expanded the scope of” Sen. Bill No. 1437’s changes].)
       “Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered [former] section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6 with no change in text.” (People v. Gonzalez (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 869,
871, fn. 1, citing Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10; accord, People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
709, 715, fn. 3.)
       A petitioner is entitled to relief under section 1172.6 if three conditions are
satisfied: (1) the prosecution “proceed[ed] under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1));
(2) “[t]he petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could
have been convicted of murder or attempted murder” (id., subd. (a)(2)); and (3) “[t]he
petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019” (id., subd. (a)(3)).
(Accord, People v. Watson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 474, 482 [former § 1170.95].)
       “After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.” (Ibid.) “Within 60 days
after the order to show cause has issued, the court shall hold a hearing to determine
whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and to recall

                                              6.
the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as
if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if
any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
       “At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden
of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by
the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of
evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court
may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible
under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed. The court may also consider the procedural history of the case recited
in any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a
preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872[4] shall be excluded from
the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to
the hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional
evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “If the prosecution
fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.)
II.    Overview of statutory interpretation
       “The court’s role in construing a statute is to ‘ascertain the intent of the
Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citations.] In determining the
Legislature’s intent, a court looks first to the words of the statute. [Citation.] ‘[I]t is the
language of the statute itself that has successfully braved the legislative gauntlet.’

       4 Section 872, subdivision (b) permits a finding of probable cause based in whole
or in part upon certain hearsay testimony by law enforcement officers having specified
experience or training.

                                               7.
[Citation.]” (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215; see California State
University, Fresno Assn., Inc. v. County of Fresno, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 266 [“ ‘ “It
is that [statutory] language which has been lobbied for, lobbied against, studied,
proposed, drafted, restudied, redrafted, voted on in committee, amended, reamended,
analyzed, reanalyzed, voted on by two houses of the Legislature, sent to a conference
committee, and, after perhaps more lobbying, debate and analysis, finally signed ‘into
law’ by the Governor. The same care and scrutiny does not befall the committee reports,
caucus analyses, authors’ statements, legislative counsel digests and other documents
which make up a statute’s ‘legislative history.’ ” ’ ”].) “When looking to the words of the
statute, a court gives the language its usual, ordinary meaning. [Citations.] If there is no
ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain
meaning of the statute governs. [Citations.]” (People v. Snook, supra, at p. 1215.)
       “An exception exists to the plain meaning rule. A court is not required to follow
the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would frustrate the manifest purpose of the
legislation as a whole or otherwise lead to absurd results. [Citations.] However, the
absurdity exception requires much more than showing that troubling consequences may
potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach
would have been wiser or better. [Citations.] Rather, ‘[t]o justify departing from a literal
reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the
Legislature could not have intended them.’ [Citation.] Moreover, our courts have wisely
cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most
sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of
powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not sit as a “super-legislature.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Switzer v. Wood (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 116, 129; accord,
People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 625-626; see People v. Bell (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 315, 351-352 [“ ‘Each time the judiciary utilizes the “absurd result” rule, a

                                             8.
little piece is stripped from the written rule of law and confidence in legislative
enactments is lessened. . . .’ ”].)
III.   Analysis
       The admissibility of evidence at a section 1172.6 hearing “shall be governed by
the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at
any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)),
and “may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate
opinion” (ibid.). “The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional
evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (Ibid.) “However, hearsay evidence that was
admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be
excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to
another exception to the hearsay rule.” (Ibid.; see People v. Flores (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 420, 444 [“Under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle of
statutory interpretation, ‘the presence of express exceptions ordinarily implies that
additional exceptions are not contemplated.’ ”].) Nothing in the statutory language
prohibits a trial court from admitting and considering a change-of-plea hearing transcript.
(See People v. Abarca (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1347, 1350-1351 [reporter’s transcript of
change-of-plea hearing admissible under Evid. Code, § 1280’s official records exception
to hearsay rule].) Ramirez himself concedes the point.
       Furthermore, we disagree with Ramirez’s assertion the admission of the change-
of-plea hearing transcript would frustrate the manifest purpose of section 1172.6 as a
whole or otherwise lead to absurd results. Senate Bill No. 1437 details the purpose of the
resentencing scheme is “to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their
involvement in homicides” so as to uphold “a bedrock principle of the law and of equity
that a person should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level
of individual culpability” and facilitate “the reduction of prison overcrowding, which

                                              9.
partially results from lengthy sentences that are not commensurate with the culpability of
the individual.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subds. (b), (d), (e).) “So the focus is on
examining the truth of what happened to evaluate whether to reduce an individual’s
sentence so the punishment fits the crime.” (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
575, 587.) “That takes facts.” (Ibid.) Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), as drafted,
presents minimal evidentiary restrictions, giving courts latitude to assess a variety of
materials. Such leeway may be explained—in part—by the fact section 1172.6 “applies
to convictions by plea, not just jury trials” (People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688,
699), and the “record often available in cases resolved by plea” “[is] limited” (ibid.). “It
would contravene th[e] goal of individualizing punishment for courts to blind themselves
to the individualized facts of the case.” (People v. Mitchell, supra, at p. 587.) Thus, to
allow courts to consider transcripts and the like furnishing “a valuable source of
information about a particular defendant’s actions, and thus potentially important in the
work of aligning individual punishment with individual culpability” (id. at pp. 587-588),
“is not a consequence so extreme that it qualifies as absurd” (People v. Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 626). We refuse to countenance the proposition a change-of-plea
hearing transcript containing a defendant’s admission he personally killed the victim
must be disregarded at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The order denying Ramirez’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                             10.