Court Opinion

ID: 9391151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 09:08:51.548052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.743768
License: Public Domain

In the
                             Court of Appeals
                     Second Appellate District of Texas
                              at Fort Worth
                             ___________________________

                                  No. 02-22-00237-CR
                             ___________________________

                      JOSPEH 1 WILLIAM WHITESIDE, Appellant

                                                V.

                                   THE STATE OF TEXAS

                      On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1
                                 Tarrant County, Texas
                              Trial Court No. 1469885D

                        Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Walker, JJ.
                         Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel

       1
         Although we use Appellant’s name as set forth in the judgment, as explained in the opinion,
the correct spelling of Appellant’s first name is Joseph.
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Jospeh William Whiteside raises one issue on appeal contending that

the trial court abused its discretion by rendering judgment revoking his community

supervision. Specifically, Appellant contends that the State failed to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that he had violated the terms of his community

supervision. The record contains sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant had

violated at least one of the conditions that the State had alleged. Thus, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

      Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of burglary of a habitation and was

placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision for four years. The State

later filed a petition to proceed to adjudication, to which Appellant entered a plea of

true, and he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to three years’ confinement.

Appellant then filed a motion for shock probation. The trial court granted the motion

and rendered a judgment of conviction that suspended the sentence of confinement

and placed Appellant on community supervision for three years. One condition of

Appellant’s community supervision was that he “abstain from . . . consumption of any

alcoholic beverage.”

      The State subsequently filed a petition to revoke community supervision and

later a first amended petition. The amended petition alleged that Appellant had

violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision in the following ways:

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      1. [Appellant] committed the offense of Driving While Intoxicated 2nd
      on or about the 18th day of November 2020 in the County of Dallas and
      the State of Texas.

              2. [Appellant] consumed alcohol on or about November 18,
      2020.

           3.     [Appellant] committed the offense of DWI-MISD
      REPETITION on or about the 13th day of November 2021 in the
      County of Tarrant and the State of Texas.

             4. [Appellant] failed to submit to a breath test on or about
      November 13, 2021, as instructed by a peace officer or supervision
      officer.

             5. [Appellant] failed to submit a blood sample on or about
      November 13, 2021, as instructed by a peace officer or supervision
      officer.

              6. [Appellant] consumed alcohol on or about November 13,
      2021.

      The trial court conducted a contested revocation hearing at which Appellant

entered a plea of not true to the allegations in the State’s amended petition. After

hearing the evidence presented by the State and Appellant, the trial court found that

Appellant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, revoked his

community supervision, sentenced him to three years’ confinement, and rendered

judgment accordingly. Appellant then filed a notice of appeal.

      In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that the defendant violated at least one of the terms and conditions of

community supervision. Bryant v. State, 391 S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012);

Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The trial court is the

                                          3
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, and

we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Hacker v.

State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492,

493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

      A preponderance of the evidence is met if the greater weight of the credible

evidence creates a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of

probation. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. The preponderance of the evidence standard

“has been described as a review for whether there is ‘more than a scintilla’ of

evidence.” Holcomb v. State, No. 14-21-00718-CR, 2023 WL 415862, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (quoting Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865). If the State fails to meet its burden

of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion by revoking the community supervision.

Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94.

      As we must affirm the trial court’s judgment if there is proof of one of the

alleged violations, we will focus on the proof establishing that Appellant had

consumed alcohol on or about November 13, 2021. See generally Goode v. State, 685

S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 7, 1985, no pet.) (“It is well-settled

that sufficient proof of any one of the alleged violations of the condition[s] of

probation will support the court’s order to revoke probation.”). The State proved

that violation through the testimony of the arresting officer, an officer’s body-camera

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video, and the testimony of a forensic scientist employed by the Texas Department of

Public Safety in the alcohol volatile section of the department’s Garland Crime Lab.

      The arresting officer testified that, at the time of the incident, he was the DWI

officer for the Grapevine Police Department and that his job duties included

“look[ing] for intoxicated drivers on the roadway, respond[ing] to crashes, and

respond[ing] to called-in possible intoxicated drivers as well.” On November 13,

2021, the officer was called to a scene where he made contact with an individual

whom he identified as Appellant. Appellant’s vehicle had run out of gas, but he

admitted that he had been “driving the vehicle.”

      The State’s evidence included an officer’s body-camera video, which showed

Appellant speaking with the officer. When the officer asked Appellant where he was

coming from, Appellant responded, “Temptations,” which he agreed was a bar. The

officer asked Appellant how much he had to drink, and he said, “[N]ot too much.”

The officer told Appellant that he was over twenty-one and was allowed to drink.

When the officer told Appellant that he could smell “it” after the inquiry about

drinking, Appellant admitted that he had consumed three or four shots of tequila.

      The officer testified that he then administered standardized field-sobriety tests

to Appellant. Appellant demonstrated various clues of intoxication. The officer also

testified, “Just while talking to him, I could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic

beverage coming off his breath, speech was slurred at times, movements lethargic.”

According to the officer, Appellant refused to provide a breath sample, and the

                                          5
officer obtained a search warrant to conduct a blood draw. Appellant was taken to

Baylor Hospital in Grapevine where his blood was drawn by a nurse. The officer

identified State’s Exhibit 4 as Appellant’s blood-draw kit that was sent to the lab.

       The forensic scientist testified that she had tested the sample of Appellant’s

blood and had created a report of her analysis. The scientist’s analysis showed that

Appellant had a “blood[-]alcohol concentration [of] 0.141 grams of alcohol per 100

milliliters of blood.”

       On appeal, Appellant makes a number of tenuous challenges to the evidence

that showed that he had consumed alcohol:

       • With respect to the officer’s testimony that Appellant had demonstrated

          clues of intoxication and had exhibited various physical signs of having

          consumed alcohol, Appellant remarks that “[t]here could be other

          reasonable explanations for not passing [the sobriety tests] like previous

          injuries or overall tiredness.” Even if these hypotheticals undermine the

          officer’s opinion about Appellant’s failure to pass the sobriety tests, they do

          not explain the odor of alcohol on his breath.

       • With respect to his recorded discussion with the officer, Appellant posits:

                  The State also presented State’s Exhibit 1, which was the video
                  of that encounter with . . . Appellant. On the video Appellant
                  did say “we” were coming from [T]emptations and he had
                  three shots of tequila - but again - he did not say that it was
                  alcoholic tequila. It could have been nonalcoholic tequila.
                  There was no testimony or evidence that the tequila contained

                                            6
          alcohol, although there was a conversation directly after this
          response that is not discernable on the video due to traffic
          noise. [Record references omitted.]

          Appellant’s argument isolates the statements from the context in

   which they were made. Appellant ignores that the officer had asked him

   how much he had to drink; that Appellant had initially responded, “[N]ot

   too much”; and that after the officer stated to Appellant that he was twenty-

   one and could drink, Appellant said that he had consumed three or four

   shots of tequila. Even if such a thing as nonalcoholic tequila exists, the

   context of the conversation and Appellant’s responses demonstrate that the

   conversation involved Appellant’s consumption of alcohol.

• Finally, Appellant offers the following challenge to the proof of his blood-

   alcohol concentration contained in State’s Exhibit 5, the report prepared by

   the forensic scientist:

          As can be seen in the above testimony, [the forensic scientist]
          was clearly confused. She gave case number GAR-2111-17702
          but then said the laboratory case number on the report was a
          different case GAR-211-17702. She also stated that the
          toxicology report was for Joseph William Whiteside[,] but
          Appellant’s name is Jospeh William Whiteside in the
          indictment. The two exhibits did not match up. This infers an
          improper chain of custody. Was the expert testifying to the
          results from Appellant’s case or another? Here, because the
          expert misidentified the number on the exhibit, and possibly
          the name on the reports, the provenance of State[’]s Exhibits 4
          and 5 are called into question. [Record reference omitted.]

                                   7
       With respect to the case number on the report, in response to one

question before the one that Appellant challenges, the scientist had testified,

“I recognize [State’s Exhibit 5] as the Texas Department of Public Safety

alcohol volatile report with the laboratory Case No. GAR-2111-17702.”

When asked to link the sample of Appellant’s blood identified by the officer

to the report, the scientist stated, “I link both of these by the laboratory case

number that is on this evidence with GAR-211-17702 (sic) and my date and

initials on the label.” It is apparent that the scientist just omitted a number

in the identifier when she recited it the second time and was not talking

about a different case, was confused, or was testifying in a way that “called

into question” the chain of custody.

       As to Appellant’s name, the State’s brief included the following

footnote:

       Though much of the paperwork (including the indictment and
       judgment) submitted in this case has Appellant’s given name
       spelled “J-O-S-P-E-H,” the reporter[’]s record, wherein
       Appellant states that his “true and correct name is Joseph
       Whiteside,” makes clear that this is a clerical error and that
       Appellant’s name is “Joseph Whiteside.”

       Further, a host of documents in the clerk’s record that were prepared

by Appellant’s counsel spell his name as Joseph; this includes his notice of

appeal. Further, at no point did Appellant suggest to the trial court that

                                  8
          someone else’s blood was tested. A reasonable inference from the record is

          that the spelling is a typo.

      The officer’s and the scientist’s testimony are more than a scintilla of evidence

that Appellant violated the terms of his community supervision by consuming alcohol

on or about November 13, 2021.           Proof of this violation supports one of the

violations alleged by the State, and the trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by

revoking Appellant’s community supervision. 2

      Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue, and we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                      /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                      Dabney Bassel
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 27, 2023

      2
        Because proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any of the alleged
violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a
revocation order, see Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 & n.36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009),
we need not address Appellant’s remaining arguments challenging the evidence to
support the trial court’s findings that the allegations in the remaining paragraphs of
the State’s amended petition to revoke were true. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring
appellate court to address only issues necessary for disposition of appeal).

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