Court Opinion

ID: 9884020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:31:32.346812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:34.092134
License: Public Domain

COYNE, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. When Joseph Schaefer, who, with his wife, owned 70 percent of the shares of RSJ, Inc., d/b/a Jose’s American Bar & Grill, and who appears to have been the officer active in the day-to-day operation of the establishment, imposed on the female wait and bartender staff a new required uniform as a condition of continued employment at Jose’s, six employees filed discrimination charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. The six complainants, one male and five female, had either quit their jobs or been discharged for their opposition to the uniforms, which they considered indecently revealing. The new uniforms, which were modeled on “Hooters” waitress uniforms — an oversized tank top and undersized shorts — replaced Jose’s former waitress attire of white oxford cloth shirt and denim skirt. All five of the women alleged sex discrimination in violation of Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (1988). Two of the complainants, one man and one woman, alleged reprisal in violation, of Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 7.
The complaints were legitimate. After a hearing an administrative law judge found that RSJ, Inc., had engaged in sex discrimination and reprisal in violation of section 363.03; that Schaefer aided and abetted the violations and was a corporate officer responsible and personally liable for RSJ’s discriminatory practices. The ALJ awarded the complainants compensatory and punitive damages of $75,710. In addition, he awarded the MDHR attorney fees and assessed a civil penalty of $3,000.
It is not contended that the evidence does not support the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. No one disputes that the claimants’ charges were timely filed. And although Schaefer protests that the claimants did not charge him with aiding and abetting discrimination and reprisal, on at least one occasion, the MDHR’s notice that a charge had been filed was directed to Joe Schaefer, Owner Jose’s American Bar/Grill, so Schaefer is hardly in a position to contend that he did not understand that he was being charged as the actor. Despite the fact that the complainants met the statutory requirements for filing their claims, the fact that they proved *704their claims of sex discrimination and reprisal, and the further fact that the ALJ awarded compensatory and punitive damages of $75,710, the majority construes the statutory directive to the human rights commissioner to make a probable cause determination within 12 months after a charge is filed to deprive the claimants of their remedy. That, despite the absence of any showing of prejudice to the defendants.
One hardly needs to resort to canons of construction to discern the legislative intention expressed in Minn.Stat. § 363.06, subd. 4(1) (1994): the statute plainly imposes on the commissioner of human rights the duty to make prompt inquiry into the truth of allegations of discrimination and to decide within 1 year after a charge is filed whether there is probable cause to proceed further. But although the statute imposes a duty, it is silent with respect to the effect of the commissioner’s breach of duty. The statute provides neither remedy nor penalty for a failure to comply with the statutory mandate.
It may well be that the volume of charges filed pursuant to section 363.06 far outstripped legislative expectations so that the legislature simply did not consider the possibility that its apparently generous time limitation would not be met, or it may be that the legislature relied on the long-established rule that a statutory provision setting the time within which a public official is to perform a duty — a statutory provision designed to secure the efficient accomplishment of public business — is deemed directory even when couched in terms such as “shall” or “must.” Wenger v. Wenger, 200 Minn. 436, 440, 274 N.W. 517, 519 (1937). This court has uniformly reaffirmed the principle set out in Wenger. E.g., Benedictine Sisters Benevolent Ass’n v. Pettersen, 299 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Minn.1980); First Nat’l Bank v. Department of Commerce, 310 Minn. 127, 131-32, 245 N.W.2d 861, 864 (1976).
Nevertheless, the majority has embarked on the unprecedented and hazardous mission of judicially fashioning a remedy which finds no support in either the Minnesota Human Rights Act or Minnesota case law. Ruling that the commissioner loses jurisdiction over the claim if he or she fails to meet the statutory time frame for determining whether there is probable cause to credit the allegations of unfair discriminatory practices, the majority, in one fell swoop, rewards the dilatory bureaucrat by clearing from the desk all overage complaints and releases the offender from responsibility for carrying on unfair discriminatory practices. Only the hapless victim, who has filed a verified charge in full compliance with the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 363.06 (1994), is penalized.
In any event, I think it likely that the legislature will be shocked when it learns of the intention imputed to it by the majority. The majority’s remedy for bureaucratic transgression or, more accurately, inaction appears to be in direct contravention of the legislature’s directive for construction of the Human Rights Act. Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1994) provides as follows:
The provisions of this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the civil rights law or of any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age, disability, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, national origin, sexual orientation, or familial status; but, as to acts declared unfair by section 363.03, the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive.
Surely, the legislature could not be expected to anticipate that a rule of statutory construction considered well-established 59 years ago and uniformly followed until today would be jettisoned without warning. Equally certain is it that the legislature did not intend the Human Rights Act to become a trap for the unwary claimant and a vehicle for depriving a victim of unlawful discrimination of the right to assert a legitimate claim. Yet, that is the effect of the majority’s decision, for section 363.11 provides that once the claimant files a charge with the commissioner, the procedure provided by the Human Rights Act is exclusive.
For the foregoing reasons I would reaffirm once more the principle of statutory construction articulated in Wenger, reverse the *705court of appeals, and reinstate the ALJ’s order of October 24,1994.