Court Opinion

ID: 9779893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:56:09.387379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:44.461329
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant’s statement to the circuit court was insufficient to warrant an inquiry pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). I write separately because I believe we must also address defendant’s claim that the appellate court erred in holding, pursuant to People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1 (1991), that a defendant represented by privately retained counsel is not entitled to a Krankel inquiry. When interpreting Pecoraro, our appellate court has reached contradictory conclusions regarding the appointed counsel/private counsel issue. In People v. Shaw, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1092 (4th Dist. 2004), the appellate court noted that the defendant, “as in Pecoraro,” was represented by private counsel and held, similar to the appellate court below, that a Krankel inquiry was not required. In People v. Johnson, 227 Ill. App. 3d 800, 810 (1st Dist. 1992), on the other hand, the court stated: “[W]e do not believe Pecoraro stands for the proposition that a trial court is free to automatically deny a pro se request for new counsel simply because the defense counsel who was allegedly ineffective was privately retained.” The primary reason we allowed the petition for leave to appeal in the case at bar was to resolve the conflict in our appellate court on this issue. Yet, the majority makes no effort to do so. Instead, the majority assumes, without deciding, that Krankel applies to privately retained counsel since it addresses the merits of defendant’s claim on a factual basis. Rather than simply assuming that Krankel applies to privately retained counsel, I would address the conflict in the appellate court and clarify our holding in Pecoraro. In Pecoraro, the defendant filed posttrial motions, both pro se and through his counsel, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court denied the motions. On appeal, the defendant argued that, under Krankel, the trial court should have appointed other counsel to argue his motions alleging ineffective assistance. This court distinguished Krankel and held that it did not apply. The court stated: “Unlike Krankel, where defendant was represented by an appointed public defender at both trial and post-trial motions, defendant Pecoraro retained private counsel to represent him at trial and in post-trial motions. It was not within the trial court’s rubric of authority to advise or exercise any influence or control over the selection of counsel by defendant, who was able to, and did, choose counsel on his own accord. [Citation.] Moreover, the trial judge could not force defendant to retain counsel other than that chosen by defendant. [Citation.] Defendant and his counsel were the only parties who could have altered their attorney-client relationship. Defendant could have retained other counsel to represent him prior to the hearing of his post-trial motions.” Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d at 15. We concluded, “Krankel is a fairly fact-specific case, and the circumstances in the case at hand, where defendant retained his own private counsel and did not request that he be represented by other counsel, do not warrant the application of Krankel.” Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d at 15.3  As noted above, the appellate court has reached contradictory conclusions as to how to read Pecoraro. To read Pecoraro as distinguishing between appointed and retained counsel would create a conflict with Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980). In Sullivan, a habeas case, the respondent alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based on potential conflicts of interest arising from privately retained counsel’s representation of multiple defendants. The petitioners argued, in response, that the alleged failings of privately retained counsel could not provide the basis for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court rejected this argument. “A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms petitioner[s’] contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection than defendants for whom the State appoints counsel. We may assume with confidence that most counsel, whether retained or appointed, will protect the rights of an accused. But experience teaches that, in some cases, retained counsel will not provide adequate representation. The vital guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would stand for little if the often uninformed decision to retain a particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the defendant’s entitlement to constitutional protection. Since the State’s conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State in the defendant’s conviction, we see no basis for drawing a distinction between retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to defendants who must choose their own lawyers.” Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 344-45, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 100 S. Ct. at 1716. This holding was reaffirmed in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002), where the defendant, who was convicted of murder, alleged ineffective assistance because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial.4 In response to a dissenting justice’s suggestion “that a trial court must scrutinize representation by appointed counsel more closely than representation by retained counsel,” the Court cited Sullivan and stated: “But we have already rejected the notion that the Sixth Amendment draws such a distinction.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 n.2, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 302 n.2, 122 S. Ct. at 1242 n.2, citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 344, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 100 S. Ct. at 1716. To read Pecoraro as prohibiting a Krankel inquiry simply because counsel was retained would conflict with Supreme Court authority and would be a violation of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, I would resolve the conflict in the appellate court by clarifying that Pecoraro does not stand for the proposition that Krankel only applies to appointed counsel.   The dissenting justice disagreed, arguing it was “irrelevant” whether counsel was appointed or retained. “It is as equally inappropriate for private counsel to argue his incompetence at a post-trial hearing as it is for an appointed public defender.” (Emphasis in original.) Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d at 23 (Clark, J., dissenting).    The attorney had previously represented the murder victim.