Court Opinion

ID: 9926985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 22:07:03.229077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:30.506069
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion              5
                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    JAMIE MARIE CHITTENDEN,                             No. 85383-COA
                    Appellant.
                    vs.
                    JUSTICE COURT OF PAHRUMP
                                                                             NLED
                    TOWNSHIP,
                                                                             JAN 25 )_02:p
                    Respondent.
                                                                            ELI    TM A. ;- 3RO
                                                                         CLEP     SEME          -•   R1
                                                                        8Y
                                                                             HIEF DEPUT1 CLERK

                               Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for a writ
                   of mandamus. Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye County; Kimberly A.
                   Wanker, Judge.
                               Affirmed.

                   The Law Firm of Nathan L. Gent, PLLC, and Nathan L. Gent, Pahrump,
                   for Appellant.

                   Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Brian Kunzi, District
                   Attorney, and Bradley J. Richardson, Deputy District Attorney, Nye
                   County,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

                                                    OPINION

                   By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.:
                               In this decision, we address NRS 171.196(2)'s requirement that
                   a preliminary hearing be set within 15 days of a criminal defendant's initial

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                      appearance on a felony or gross misdemeanor charge unless good cause
                      exists for the delay.' We conclude that when deciding whether good cause
                      exists, the justice court must balance the defendant's constitutional right to
                      conditional pretrial liberty against the interests of the State and the needs
                      of the court. Further, the court must make findings on the record to justify
                      any delay of the preliminary hearing and undertake efforts to ensure that
                      the hearing is held as soon as practicable.
                                  In this case, appellant Jamie Marie Chittenden filed a petition
                      for a writ of mandamus in the district court seeking dismissal of the charges
                      against her because the justice court scheduled her preliminary hearing 76
                      days after her initial appearance, while she remained in custody. The
                      district court denied her petition because it found that good cause existed
                      for this extraordinary delay. Although we conclude that the district court
                      abused its discretion when it found good cause for the extreme delay in this
                      case, we nevertheless affirm the district court's denial of Chittenden's
                      petition for extraordinary writ relief on other grounds.
                                     PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
                                  In May 2022, a criminal complaint was filed against Chittenden
                      and four other codefendants, and a warrant for Chittenden's arrest was
                      issued. She was eventually arrested, and on July 28, 2022, Chittenden was
                      brought to appear before the Pahrurnp Justice Court. The complaint alleged
                      a total of sixteen counts against all codefendants, with five of those counts
                      against Chittenden. Specifically, she was charged with one count of forgery,
                      three counts of using another person's identifying information to harm or
                      impersonate another person, and one count of conspiracy.

                            We use the term preliminary hearing synonymously with
                            1
                      preliminary examination" as referenced in NRS 171.196(2).
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                               Chittenden, who appeared in custody for her initial appearance,
                   requested an own recognizance release or reduction in bail, which was set

                   in the warrant at $70,000. After the justice court denied these requests,
                   Chittenden invoked her right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days.
                   However, the justice of the peace set Chittenden's preliminary hearing for
                   October 12, 2022-76 days later.
                               Chittenden objected generally to the hearing setting as being
                   outside of the 15-day window but did not request any specific form of relief.
                   The justice court indicated that the October 12 date was "the soonest that
                   we could put on a case of this magnitude, with this many [co]defendants"
                   because otherwise,
                               this case is all gonna be bifurcated and you're gonna
                               have to have four separate or different judges, at
                               least, to hear it. Because if I hear her case, then I
                               can't hear any of the other ones, so that would have
                               to go to another judge. And whatever case he hears,
                               then he can't hear any of the other ones, so that
                               would have to go to another judge. Logistically, I
                               don't think that we can do it before then, because of
                               those problems that would arise if we tried to
                               bifurcate this case. And I'm not sure that the
                               [district attorney's] office wants to bifurcate this
                               case and have to pay four or five different times for
                               witnesses to appear.
                   The State opposed the bifurcation, and without further discussion, the
                   justice court left the preliminary hearing date unchanged.
                               Approximately one      month   after   her initial   appearance,
                   Chittenden petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus, arguing
                   that the justice court scheduled her preliminary hearing beyond 15 days

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                   without good cause in violation of NRS 171.196(2).2           The writ petition
                   requested that the district court compel the justice court to "follow the law
                   as set forth by NRS 171.196" and to dismiss Chittenden's case. Without
                   requiring a response from the State or hearing any argument from the
                   parties, the district court denied the petition. In its order, the district court
                   cited Shelton v. Lamb, 85 Nev. 618, 460 P.2d 156 (1969), and noted that the
                   court's calendar, pendency of other cases, public expense, health of the
                   judge, and convenience of the court are good causes for a continuance. Then,
                   the court summarily concluded that "[i]n this case, the Justice of the Peace
                   was within the parameters of the law to continue [Chittenden's]
                   preliminary hearing to October 12, 2022."
                                  On the day of her scheduled preliminary hearing, out of the five
                   codefendants charged in the case, only Chittenden appeared in the justice
                   court. She then unconditionally waived her preliminary hearing and agreed
                   to plead guilty to one count of forgery—a category D felony—and to pay
                   $2,950 in restitution. The parties also expressly stipulated on the record
                   that Chittenden had preserved for appellate review the issues raised in her
                   mandamus petition.        She was then released on her own recognizance.
                   Chittenden now appeals from the district court's order denying mandamus
                   relief.
                                                      ANALYSIS
                                  At the outset, we note that this case presents an unusual
                   procedural history. After the district court denied Chittenden's pretrial

                             2 NRS 171.196(2) provides that
                                                        if a defendant does not waive their
                   right to a preliminary hearing, "the magistrate shall hear the evidence
                   within 15 days, unless for good cause shown the magistrate extends such
                   time."
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                   petition for a writ of mandamus, she unconditionally waived her
                   preliminary hearing pursuant to negotiations but expressly reserved her
                   right to appeal the issue in her writ regarding the delay in her preliminary
                   hearing.   Before her sentencing hearing and before any judgment of
                   conviction was entered, Chittenden filed a timely notice of appeal that
                   challenged only the district court's order denying her writ petition. Neither
                   party challenges appellate jurisdiction in this case, but before we can
                   address the merits of Chittenden's appeal, we must first determine if the
                   matter is properly before us. See Mazzan v. State, 109 Nev. 1067, 1075, 863
                   P.2d 1035, 1040 (1993) ("Where no court rule or statute provides for an
                   appeal, no right to appeal exists.").
                   This court has jurisdiction over Chittenden's appeal, and the issue is capable
                   of repetition, yet evading review
                               We first conclude that this court has jurisdiction over
                   Chittenden's appeal from the district court's order denying mandamus. See
                   Ashokan v. State, Dep't of Ins., 109 Nev. 662, 665-66, 856 P.2d 241. 246
                   (1993) (providing that an appeal from a district court order denying a
                   pretrial petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy). NRS
                   2.090(2) provides that the Nevada Supreme Court "has jurisdiction to
                   review upon appeal . . . an order granting or refusing to grant an injunction
                   or rnandamus in the case provided for by law." NRS 177.015(3) states that
                   "[t]he defendant only may appeal frorn a final judgment or verdict in a
                   criminal case," and an order of the district court denying a writ of
                   rnandamus is a final judgment within the rneaning of NRS 177.015(3).
                   Ashokan, 109 Nev. at 665, 856 P.2d at 246; see also Round Hill Gen.
                   Intprovernent Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 604, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981)
                   ("When disputed factual issues are critical in demonstrating the propriety
                   of a writ of mandamus, the writ should be sought in the district court, with
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                   appeal from an adverse judgment to this court." (citing NRS 34.160, NRS
                   34.220, and NRS 34.310)).        Therefore, both NRS 2.090(2) and NRS
                   177.015(3) confer upon this court appellate jurisdiction over the district
                   court's order denying Chittenden's petition for a writ of mandamus.
                   Ashokan, 109 Nev. at 666, 856 P.2d at 246; Nev. Const. art. vI, § 4.
                                However, Chittenden's appeal challenges the delay of her
                   preliminary hearing without good cause, and a violation of NRS 171.196(2)
                   would have resulted in her unlawful confinement. See Shelton, 85 Nev. at
                   619, 460 P.2d at 157. We note that Chittenden's unconditional waiver of
                   her preliminary hearing and subsequent plea rendered any pretrial
                   detention issue moot. See generally Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct..
                   136 Nev. 155, 156, 460 P.3d 976, 980 (2020); see also Sheriff, Washoe Cnty.
                   v. Myles, 99 Nev. 817, 818, 672 P.2d 639, 639 (1983) (agreeing with the
                   petitioner that "any illegality in the [defendant's] detention was moot upon
                   the finding of probable cause and bind-over at the preliminary hearing").
                   Further, insofar as Chittenden sought writ relief directing the justice court
                   to "follow the law" and hold her preliminary hearing within 15 days, this
                   relief is no longer available.
                                Nonetheless, where an appeal is moot, this court may still
                   consider it "if it involves a matter of widespread importance that is capable
                   of repetition, yet evading review." Personhood Neu. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599,
                   602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010). The party seeking to overcome mootness
                   must show "that (1) the duration of the challenged action is relatively short,
                   (2) there is a likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future, and
                   (3) the matter is important." Bisch v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 129
                   Nev. 328, 334-35, 302 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2013); see also Valdez-Jimenez, 136
                   Nev. at 158, 460 P.3d at 982.

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                               The parties did not address mootness in their briefing.
                   However, IN ecause mootness is an element of justiciability and raises a
                   question as to our jurisdiction, we consider the matter sua sponte." Aguirre
                   u. S.S. Sohio Intrepid, 801 F.2d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1986). In doing so, we
                   conclude that, although Chittenden's appeal is moot, the issue presented
                   here is within the exception to the mootness doctrine.
                               As to the first factor, the 15-day window provided in NRS
                   171.196(2) is short in duration, such that a writ petition challenging an
                   allegedly unlawful delay is unlikely to be heard before that window expires.
                   Further, a challenge to an unlawful delay will become moot whenever a case
                   is resolved by dismissal, negotiation, or bind-over. See Gerstein v. Pugh,
                   420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975) ("Pretrial detention is by nature temporary,
                   and it is most unlikely that any given individual could have his
                   constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or
                   convicted.").
                               As to the second factor, we note that there were 32,787 new
                   felony and gross misdemeanor cases filed in Nevada's justice courts during
                   the 2023 fiscal year. 2023 Nev. Sup. Ct. Ann. Rep. app. tbl. B5-1. Given
                   that all criminal defendants charged by criminal complaint with a gross
                   misdemeanor or felony are statutorily entitled to a preliminary hearing,
                   there is a substantial likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future
                   based on the volume of cases alone. See NRS 171.196(1).
                               Finally, as to the third factor, the issue in this case is of
                   widespread importance. Nevada's appellate courts have not addressed the
                   subject of good cause to delay an initial preliminary hearing setting beyond
                   15 days since the 1970s. See Stevenson v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 92 Nev. 535,
                   536, 554 P.2d 255, 255 (1976). Our analysis of this issue will "affect many

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                   arrestees" and involves the defendant's constitutional right to conditional
                   pretrial liberty. Valdez-Jimenez, 136 Nev. at 160, 460 P.3d at 983; Johnston
                   v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 67, 518 P.3d 94, 102 (2022).
                   Further, deciding this issue "would provide guidance to judges" who are
                   tasked with determining a defendant's custody status and scheduling
                   critical hearings.   Valdez-Jimenez, 136 Nev. at 161, 460 P.3d at 983.
                   Therefore, because the issue presented in Chittenden's appeal is capable of
                   repetition, yet evading review, we choose to consider her issue on the merits
                   notwithstanding Chittenden's unconditional waiver of her preliminary
                   hearing. We now turn to the merits of Chittenden's claim.
                   The district court abused it.s discretion in finding good cause for Chittenden's
                   preliminary hearing delay
                               Chittenden argues that the district court erroneously denied
                   her petition for a writ of mandamus because the justice court set her
                   preliminary hearing beyond 15 days of her initial appearance without good
                   cause in violation of NRS 171.196(2). The State responds that the district
                   court correctly denied her writ petition because the justice court had good
                   cause to schedule her preliminary hearing 76 days after her initial
                   appearance due to the nature of the case and the court's calendar.
                               A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of
                   an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
                   station, NRS 34.160, or to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or
                   capricious exercise of discretion, Round Hill, 97 Nev. at 603-04, 637 P.2d at
                   536.   Chittenden argued in her writ petition that the justice court
                   manifestly abused its discretion when it "arbitrarily and capriciously" set
                   her preliminary hearing 76 days after her initial appearance without good
                   cause to do so in violation of NRS 171.196(2). In its order denying the writ,
                   the district court recited several of the potential grounds for good cause
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                   listed in Shelton and then summarily concluded that good cause existed in
                   this case, without explicitly identifying the good cause that justified the
                   extraordinarily lengthy delay.
                               We review an order denying a request for mandamus relief for
                   an abuse of discretion. Roller v. State, 122 Nev. 223, 226, 130 P.3d 653, 655
                   (2006). A justice court's assessment of good cause under NRS 171.196(2) is
                   likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See In re Search Warrants
                   (Little Darlings), 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 23, 535 P.3d 673, 678 (Ct. App. 2023)
                   (providing that Nevada's appellate courts have typically held that "good
                   cause" determinations are within the court's discretion). However, in this
                   case, even under a deferential standard of review, we conclude that the
                   district court abused its discretion in finding good cause for the delay of
                   Chittenden's preliminary hearing.
                               In Shelton, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed consolidated
                   appeals by two appellants who alleged that the justice court violated their
                   statutory right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days under NRS
                   171.196(2) by setting their hearings 17 and 18 days after the appellants'
                   respective initial appearances. 85 Nev. at 619-20, 460 P.2d at 157-58. In
                   examining whether good cause existed to delay the preliminary hearings,
                   the supreme court provided several possible grounds that could constitute
                   good cause, including the "condition of [the court's] calendar, the pendency
                   of other cases, public expense, and the convenience or health of judge, court
                   officers, and jurors." Id. at 620, 460 P.2d at 157. The court then concluded
                   that good cause existed for the minor delays in the appellants' preliminary
                   hearings. Id. Similarly, in Stevenson, 92 Nev. at 536, 554 P.2d at 255, the
                   supreme court found there was good cause to set the appellant's preliminary
                   hearing 19 days after his initial appearance and extended the potential

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                   grounds for good cause under NRS 171.196(2) to include overcrowded court
                   calendars.
                                Here, in contrast to the minor delays in Shelton and Stevenson,
                   the justice court set Chittenden's preliminary hearing 76 days after her
                   initial appearance in justice court, or 61 days beyond the statutory
                   threshold. This delay amounted to more than four times the 15-day window
                   provided for in NRS 171.196(2).
                                To justify the extensive delay in this case, the justice court
                   identified two grounds that it believed constituted good cause: (1) that
                   bifurcating the five codefendants into five separate preliminary hearings
                   would require five different justices of the peace to preside over the hearings
                   and (2) that having five separate preliminary hearings would cause undue
                   financial hardship on the State because it would "have to pay four or five
                   different times for witnesses to appear." On their face, these reasons
                   initially appear to comport with Shelton and Stevenson, which permit
                   consideration of the justice court's calendar and public expense. However,
                   these proffered good cause reasons for the delay were premised on mistakes
                   of law and fact and were unsupported by the record. In addition, the justice
                   court failed to consider Chittenden's constitutional interest in conditional
                   pretrial liberty when it scheduled her preliminary hearing 76 days after her
                   initial appearance, during which time Chittenden remained in custody after
                   her request for a release or reduction in bail was denied. Therefore, under
                   the circumstances of this case, the district court abused its discretion when
                   it found that the justice court had good cause to delay Chittenden's
                   preliminary hearing.

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                         The justice court's good cause determination was based on mistakes of
                         law and fact
                               The justice court's first given reason, that bifurcating
                   Chittenden's preliminary hearing would require separate preliminary
                   hearings for each of the five codefendants, with a different justice of the
                   peace to preside over each hearing, was legally incorrect. As a matter of
                   law, there was no requirement that the justice court bifurcate all five
                   codefendants into five separate preliminary hearings. For example, the
                   justice court could have held two or more separate hearings, with one for
                   the defendants who invoked their right to a speedy hearing and one for
                   those who waived that right.
                               Further, even if the justice court did hold five separate
                   preliminary hearings, presiding over one would not have required the
                   justice of the peace to disqualify himself from presiding over all others. "[A]
                   judge has a general duty to sit, unless a judicial canon, statute, or rule
                   requires the judge's disqualification." Millen v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 122
                   Nev. 1245, 1253, 148 P.3d 694, 700 (2006). This court also expects "judges,
                   including every one of our limited jurisdiction judges in the State of Nevada,
                   to disregard improper, inadmissible, or impalpable evidence and base their
                   findings and decisions only on admissible evidence." Canarelli v. Eighth
                   Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 109, 506 P.3d 334, 339 (2022); see also State,
                   Dep't of Highways v. Campbell, 80 Nev. 23, 33, 388 P.2d 733, 738 (1964)
                   ("[W]here inadmissible evidence has been received by the court, sitting
                   without a jury, and there is other substantial evidence upon which the court
                   based its findings, the court will be presumed to have disregarded the
                   improper evidence."); Randell v. State, 109 Nev. 5, 7, 846 P.2d 278, 280
                   (1993) (stating that judges "spend much of their professional lives
                   separating the wheat from the chaff' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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                               Generally, "what a judge learns in his official capacity does not
                   result in disqualification." Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 1007, 923 P.2d
                   1102, 1119 (1996). To be disqualified, it must be shown that a bias stems
                   "from an extrajudicial source and result[s] in an opinion on the merits on
                   some basis other than what the judge learned from participation in the
                   case," Whitehead v. Nev. Comm'n on Jucl. Discipline, 110 Nev. 380, 428 n.45,
                   873 P.2d 946, 976 n.45 (1994), or that the judge learns something during
                   the course of performing judicial duties and "forms an opinion that displays
                   a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
                   impossible," Canarelli, 138 Nev. at 109, 506 P.3d at 339 (internal quotation
                   marks omitted).
                               Here, anything the justice of the peace would have learned from
                   a preliminary hearing would have been in his official capacity, and he would
                   not have been inherently disqualified from sitting in successive preliminary
                   hearings in the same underlying case. Indeed, we note that the same justice
                   of the peace would presumably hear similar information about the case
                   whether he presided over a single preliminary hearing or over two or more
                   different hearings. Accordingly, the justice court's belief that holding more
                   than one preliminary hearing in this case would require hearings before
                   multiple other justices of the peace is without legal basis.
                               The justice court's second given reason for              delaying
                   Chittenden's preliminary hearing—that having separate preliminary
                   hearings would place an undue financial burden on the State—is also
                   untenable in these circumstances. "The preliminary examination is not
                   intended to be a mini-triar Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 936, 10 13.3d
                   836, 841 (2000). The State set forth no factual basis for the justice court to
                   conclude that bifurcating Chittenden's hearing would have caused any

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                   hardship. including an undue financial burden, on the State. Cf. Lee v.
                   Sheriff of Clark Cnty., 85 Nev. 379, 380, 455 P.2d 623, 624 (1969) ("The
                   burden is upon the state to demonstrate good cause why appellant did not
                   receive a preliminary hearing within 15 days as required by NRS
                   171.196(2)."). The State did not address how many witnesses it required,
                   where those witnesses were located, or what additional expense would be
                   incurred in having separate hearings.3 Chittenden was also named in less
                   than one-third of the charges filed, which suggests that the State would not
                   have been required to present all of the same evidence or witnesses at the
                   codefendants' preliminary hearings.
                                 Therefore, we conclude that the justice court's decision to delay
                   Chittenden's preliminary hearing 76 days from her initial appearance on
                   these grounds was patently unreasonable and a manifest abuse of
                   discretion. Insofar as the district court determined that the justice court's
                   stated reasons constituted good cause under Shelton, it also abused its
                   discretion.
                         The justice court also failed to consider Chittenden's constitutional
                         right to conditional pretrial liberty
                                 As noted above, Shelton provided a nonexhaustive list of
                   potential reasons that could establish good cause to delay a preliminary
                   hearing beyond 15 days under NRS 171.196(2). However, when Shelton
                   was decided in 1969, the preliminary hearing was not yet recognized as a
                   critical stage in the proceedings. See Victoria v. Young, 80 Nev. 279, 284,
                   392 P.2d 509, 512 (1964) (concluding that the preliminary hearing is not a
                   critical stage in the proceedings), overruled on other grounds by Shelby v.

                         3We also note that the record indicates the elderly victim in this case
                   had passed away prior to Chittenden's initial appearance.
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                   Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 82 Nev. 204, 211, 414, P.3d 942, 945-46 (1966). Because
                   the preliminary hearing was not considered a critical stage, the hearing had
                   few constitutional implications beyond a limited right to counsel. Compare
                   Messrnore v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 153, 154-55, 413 P.2d 306, 306-07 (1966)
                   (holding that an unrepresented defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were
                   violated only because witness testimony taken during the preliminary
                   hearing was introduced at trial), with Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314,
                   326, 91 P.3d 16, 25 (2004) (recognizing that Sixth Amendment rights attach
                   at the time that "adversarial proceedings" commence, including preliminary
                   hearings); see also Patterson v. State, 129 Nev. 168, 174, 298 P.3d 433, 437
                   (2013) (recognizing the preliminary hearing as a critical stage in the
                   proceedings). As a result, the potential good cause grounds identified in
                   Shelton did not take into account the constitutional rights of the accused,
                   nor did it address how a lengthy delay might impact those constitutional
                   rights.
                               While Shelton's list of potential grounds to find good cause
                   remains good law, the Nevada Supreme Court recently recognized that
                   Iplretrial release and detention decisions implicate a liberty interest—
                   conditional pretrial liberty—that is entitled to procedural due process
                   protections." Johnston, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 67, 518 P.3d at 102 (quoting
                   Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 297 (3d Cir. 2018)).             The court
                   acknowledged. this fundamental pretrial liberty interest attaches after
                   arrest. See Valdez-Jimenez, 136 Nev. at 162, 460 P.3d at 984 (citing United
                   States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987), for the proposition that "the
                   individual's strong interest in liberty" is "fundamental"). The court then
                   recognized that this constitutional interest is not limited to a defendant's
                   initial arrest, but also applies when a defendant is later remanded into

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                   custody pending a hearing to determine their custody status. See Johnston,
                   138 Nev., Adv. Op. 67, 518 P.3d at 102. In light of Johnston and Valdez-
                   Jimenez, we necessarily conclude that the right to conditional pretrial
                   liberty applies to defendants awaiting their preliminary hearings, which
                   also may involve Iplretrial release and detention decisions" based on the
                   justice court's probable cause findings. Id.
                               We recognize, however, that there has been no clear guidance
                   on how this constitutional right applies to a defendant's statutory right to a
                   preliminary hearing within 15 days. We therefore take this opportunity to
                   clarify how the defendant's constitutional rights articulated in Johnston
                   and Valdez-Jimenez impact the justice court's determination of good cause
                   for a delay under NRS 171.196(2), and we conclude that the court must
                   balance the constitutional rights of the defendant against the interests of
                   the State and the needs of the court when evaluating good cause.
                               Though a preliminary hearing itself is not a constitutional
                   mandate,' a defendant's detention pending their preliminary hearing
                   nonetheless implicates their constitutional interest in conditional pretrial
                   liberty and must be considered in the justice court's evaluation of good cause
                   for a delay under NRS 171.196(2). Johnston, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 67, 518
                   P.3d at 102 ("The timing of a hearing, if one is required, is often of
                   fundamental importance for due process."); see also Thompson v. State, 86
                   Nev. 682, 683, 475 P.2d 96, 97 (1970) ("Statutes prescribing filing tinles and

                         "Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 418, 442 P.2d 916, 918 (1968) ("There
                   is no Constitutional right to a preliminary hearing."), superseded by statute
                   on other grounds as stated in Davis v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 93 Nev. 511, 512,
                   569 P.2d 402, 403 (1977).
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                   trial dates serve as protection against oppression of people accused of
                   crimes.").

                                Therefore, when evaluating good cause to set a preliminary
                   hearing beyond 15 days from the initial appearance, justice courts must
                   consider the defendant's custody status and any applicable conditions of
                   pretrial release. The court must also consider the length of the anticipated

                   delay. See Chavez v. Dist. Ct., 648 P.2d 658, 660 (Colo. 1982) (finding that
                   relief in the form of ease-ending sanctions was warranted when the
                   appellant remained in custody for over a month due to the prosecution's lack
                   of preparedness where Colorado law required a preliminary hearing within
                   30 days); cf. Shelton, 85 Nev. at 619, 460 P.2,1 at 156-57 (affirming
                   preliminary hearing settings 2 and 3 days beyond the 15-day statutory
                   threshold); Stevenson, 92 Nev. at 536, 554 P.3d at 256 (affirming a
                   preliminary hearing setting 4 days beyond the 15-day statutory threshold).
                                An extensive delay beyond the initial 15 days, such as
                   Chittenden's, will more substantially impact a defendant's constitutional
                   rights, particularly when the defendant remains incarcerated. See McGee
                   v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 86 Nev. 421, 423, 470 P.2d 132, 133 (1970) (noting
                   that pretrial detention during "the pendency of a criminal charge may
                   subject an accused to public scorn, deprive him of his employment and
                   curtail his speech and associations"). On the other hand, longer delays can
                   more easily be justified when the defendant is neither detained nor subject
                   to onerous conditions of pretrial release, and so the justice court may
                   readdress the defendant's custody status contemporaneously with its good
                   cause analysis. Cf. NRS 178.499(1) (permitting the justice court, upon its
                   own motion, to increase the amount of bail for good cause); Salaiscooper u.

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                   Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 117 Nev. 892, 900-01, 34 P.3d 509, 515 (2001) ("The
                   justice courts have express authority to consider constitutional issues[J").
                               However, when considering a delay's impact on the defendant's
                   constitutional rights, the justice court must "balanc[e] the interest of the
                   State against fundamental fairness to a defendant with the added
                   ingredient of the orderly functioning of the court system."           State v.
                   Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (Haw. 1982) (quoting State v. Braunsdorf, 297
                   N.W.2d 808, 817 (Wis. 1980) (Day, J., dissenting)); see also Bullock v.
                   Superior Ct. of Contra Costa Cnty., 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 714 (Ct. App.
                   2020) (balancing due process interests in a timely preliminary hearing
                   against the specific risks of COVID-19).
                               The    Nevada    Supreme       Court   has   already   recognized
                   circumstances where the State would be entitled to a continuance of the
                   preliminary hearing. See, e.g., Hill u. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 85 Nev. 234, 235,
                   452 P.2d 918, 919 (1969) (recognizing that good cause to continue a
                   preliminary hearing may exist when a subpoenaed witness is unavailable).
                   We see no reason why the anticipated unavailability of a witness, and other
                   grounds that may constitute good cause for a continuance, should not also
                   be relevant considerations when initially setting a preliminary hearing.
                   Further, as already established by Shelton, the justice court may take into
                   account the needs of the court when determining whether good cause exists
                   for a delay, including the court's calendar and the pendency of other cases.
                   85 Nev. at 620, 460 P.2d at 157; Stevenson, 92 Nev. at 537, 554 P.3d at 255.5

                         5We note that a defendant may waive the right to a preliminary
                   hearing within 15 days, see NRS 171.196(2), in which case a good cause
                   analysis is not required.
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                                   What constitutes good cause to set a preliminary hearing
                   outside 15 days under NRS 171.196(2) is not subject to a bright-line rule

                   and will vary based on the facts and circumstances of each case.            See
                   Shelton, 85 Nev. at 620, 460 P.2d at 157. However, the justice court must
                   make findings of fact as to what constitutes good cause so that the reviewing
                   court is not left to speculate as to the justice court's reasoning. Bullock, 264
                   Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714; see also State v. Ruscetta, 123 Nev. 299, 304, 163 P.3d
                   451, 455 (2007) ("Although certain facts may be inferred from the district
                   court's ruling, we decline to speculate about the factual inferences drawn by
                   the district court." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                                   Thus, "[t]he record must reflect that the [delay] was reasonable
                   in both purpose and length" when the justice court determines that a delay
                   is justified.    State v. Martin, 384 N.E.2d 239, 242 (Ohio 1978) (internal
                   quotation marks omitted).        And there should be a "nexus between the
                   [reason for the delay] and the purported need to delay the hearing."
                   Bullock, 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714. Therefore, when finding that good cause

                   exists to set a preliminary hearing beyond 15 days, the justice court must
                   make findings, either in writing or on the record, as to why the delay is
                   justified and should also undertake efforts to set the preliminary hearing as
                   soon as possible after the 15-day period.
                                   In this case, the justice court manifestly abused its discretion
                   by failing to consider Chittenden's constitutional interest in conditional
                   pretrial liberty when evaluating good cause for the delay. Prior to setting
                   her preliminary hearing, the court denied Chittenden's request for a release

                   or reduction in bail, and so Chittenden remained in custody for more than
                   two months before the State was required to meet its statutory burden to
                   prove "that there [was] probable cause to believe that an offense has been

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                   committed and that [Chittenden] committed it." NRS 171.206. The 61-day
                   delay in this case was extraordinary, particularly when compared with the
                   two-, three-, and four-day delays deemed justified in Shelton and Stevenson.
                   In fact, by setting her preliminary hearing 76 days from the date of the
                   initial appearance, the justice court delayed Chittenden's preliminary
                   hearing beyond the time that she would have been statutorily entitled to a
                   trial. See NRS 178.556 (providing that the court may dismiss a case if the

                   accused is not brought to trial within 60 days after the arraignment on an
                   indictment or information). Further, the record does not reflect that the
                   court made any efforts to set Chittenden's hearing within 15 days or as soon
                   as possible thereafter.6
                               Although       the   justice    court's   good   cause   determination
                   addressed its own interest regarding the pendency of other cases and the
                   court's calendar as well as the State's interest in avoiding unnecessary
                   public expense, as detailed above, the court's justifications for the delay
                   were premised on mistakes of law and fact. When balancing Chittenden's

                   strong constitutional interest against the interests of the State and court in

                         "The State argues on appeal that, even in the absence of good cause,
                   Chittenden was required to show that the delay prejudiced her. We
                   disagree.     Notably, the State relied on authorities addressing a
                   constitutional speedy trial claim, including Barker u. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
                   (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). However, unlike
                   a constitutional speedy trial violation where the defendant is required to
                   demonstrate prejudice, see Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, a defendant is not
                   required to show prejudice when asserting a statutory violation of NRS
                   171.196(2), which places the burden exclusively on the State to establish
                   good cause for the delay, Lee, 85 Nev. at 380, 455 P.2d at 624. Nevada has
                   not previously required a defendant to show prejudice if the State fails to
                   satisfy its burden to establish good cause under NRS 171.196(2), and we
                   decline to impose such a requirement here.
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                   this case, the proffered good cause was plainly inadequate to justify the 61-
                   day delay, and the district court abused its discretion in finding otherwise.
                   See Round Hill, 97 Nev. at 603-04, 637 P.2d at 536.
                   Other grounds support the denial of the petition for a writ of mandamus
                               While we agree with Chittenden that there was no good cause
                   to justify the delay in her preliminary hearing, her petition for a writ of
                   mandamus sought remedies that the district court could not provide. As
                   noted above, a writ of mandamus is only available to compel the
                   performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an
                   office, trust, or station, or to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or
                   capricious exercise of discretion. Id. at 604, 637 P.2d at 536; NRS 34.160.
                   In her writ petition, Chittenden requested that the district court compel the
                   justice court both to "follow the law as set forth by NRS 171.196" and to
                   dismiss the case.
                               Chittenden's first request for relief, that the district court
                   compel the justice court to "follow the law," would hnve required the justice
                   court to set her preliminary hearing within 15 days under NRS 171.196(2).
                   When initially setting a preliminary hearing, NRS 171.196(2) provides that
                   the magistrate "shall" set the hearing within 15 days unless the time is
                   extended for good cause, and thus, assuming there is no good cause for a
                   delay, the statute reflects a nondiscretionary obligation. See Markowitz v.
                   Saxon Special Servicing, 129 Nev. 660, 665, 310 P.3d 569, 572 (2013) ("The
                   word 'shall' is generally regarded as mandatory."). Because the statute is
                   mandatory, mandamus could arguably apply to compel the justice court to
                   set a preliminary hearing within 15 days under NRS 171.196(2). However,
                   in this case, Chittenden's request was moot; her hearing could not have been

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                     set within 15 days because Chittenden waited a month after her initial
                     appearance to file the writ petition.7

                                    That left Chittenden's request for dismissal as the only viable
                     request for relief that remained. However, Chittenden failed to request
                     dismissal in the justice court in the first instance.      "Mandamus lies to
                     correct clear error or an arbitrary abuse of discretion by the [justice] court,

                     a standard that requires adequate presentation of the issue to the [justice]
                     court for decision in the first instance." PN II, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
                     No. 71051, 2016 WL 5400225 (Nev. Sept. 16, 2016) (Order Denying Petition
                     for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition) (internal citations omitted) (citing
                     United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 384 P.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining
                     to consider as a basis for mandamus an argument not presented to the lower
                     court)); see also Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 2009)
                     ("It would be most inappropriate for this court to address issues . . . by the
                     extraordinary writ of mandamus before the [lower] court has dealt with
                     them."). The district court in this case could not have properly compelled
                     the justice court to grant Chittenden's request for dismissal because
                     Chittenden neither requested dismissal in the justice court in the first
                     instance, nor was the justice court required to dismiss her case sua sponte.
                     See Sheriff, Clark Cnty. v. Hatch, 100 Nev. 664, 666 n.I, 691 P.2d 499, 450
                     n.1 (1984).8

                            7We note that Chittenden's writ petition did not request to revisit her

                     bail or custody status.

                           8 There is no statutorily mandated dismissal remedy for a violation of
                     NRS 171.196(2). Cf. NRS 178.556(1) (providing that the district court "may
                     dismiss the complaint" or "indictment or information" for an unnecessary
                     trial delay). As the Nevada Legislature has expressly provided a dismissal

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                               Further, insofar as Chittenden requested that the district court
                   compel the justice court to dismiss her case because the delay in her

                   preliminary hearing resulted in her unlawful detention, Chittenden's
                   request for relief was not properly raised in a mandamus writ petition.
                   Rather, the appropriate vehicle to challenge unlawful detention resulting
                   frorn an alleged violation of NRS 171.196(2) is a petition for a writ of habeas

                   corpus.   Id. ("[W]here an accused is detained unlawfully by reason of
                   violation of jurisdictional procedural requirements, denial of a speedy trial,
                   or other proper grounds, a district court may review the legality of the
                   detention on habeas corpus."). Although "[a] pretrial writ of habeas corpus
                   is not the proper avenue to challenge a discretionary ruling," Stctte v.
                   Nelson, 118 Nev. 399, 404, 46 P.3d 1232, 1235 (2002), as noted above, NRS
                   171.196(2) obligates the justice court to set the preliminary hearing within
                   15 days in the absence of good cause for a delay. Thus, Chittenden's request
                   to dismiss her case due to her unlawful detention should have been raised
                   in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

                   remedy for improper delays that violate a defendant's statutory right to a
                   speedy trial, the absence of a similar statutory remedy for an improper
                   delay before a preliminary hearing is presumed intentional. See State, Dep't
                   of Tax'n v. DaimlerChryster Servs. N. Arn., LLC, 121 Nev. 541, 548, 119 P.3d
                   135, 139 (2005) ("Nevada law also provides that the omissions of subject
                   matters from statutory provisions are presumed to have been intentional.").
                   However, dismissal without prejudice has been recognized as a
                   discretionary remedy in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Sheriff, Clark
                   Cnty. v. Blackmore, 99 Nev. 827, 829, 673 P.2d 137, 138 (1983) (providing
                   that a magistrate's dismissal at the preliminary hearing is without
                   prejudice unless the prosecution acted in a willful or consciously indifferent
                   manner); McNair t). Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 89 Nev. 434, 439, 514 P.2d 1175,
                   1178 (1973) (noting the prosecution's acknowledgment that the "justice of
                   the peace correctly denied the State's motion for continuance and dismissed
                   its complaint against appellant").
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                                Therefore, the district court properly denied her petition for a
                    writ of mandamus, albeit on other grounds. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294,

                    298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) ("If a judgment or order of a trial court reaches
                    the right result, although it is based on an incorrect ground, the judgment
                    or order will be affirmed on appeal.").
                                                   CONCLUSION
                                In summary, we conclude that good cause did not exist to delay
                    Chittenden's preliminary hearing for an additional 61 days beyond the 15-
                    day threshold as set forth in NRS 171.196(2). Insofar as the district court
                    found that good cause existed for the delay, the district court abused its
                    discretion. Further, the justice court manifestly abused its discretion in
                    failing to consider Chittenden's constitutional right to conditional pretrial
                    liberty when it delayed her preliminary hearing, during which time
                    Chittenden remained in custody.
                                When evaluating whether there is good cause to delay an initial
                    preliminary hearing setting beyond 15 days, justice courts must balance the
                    defendant's constitutional rights against the interests of the State and the
                    needs of the court. And we hold that justice courts must make findings as
                    to why a delay is justified and must undertake efforts to ensure that the
                    preliminary hearing is held as soon as possible thereafter.
                                Even though we conclude that good cause did not exist for the
                    delay in this case, the district court properly denied Chittenden's petition
                    for a writ of mandamus because the two forms of relief she requested were

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«.” 194714 •400F.
                        unavailable to her. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision,
                        albeit on other grounds.

                        We concur:

                                                        ,   C.J.
                        Gifpbons

                            d
                        Bulla
                             i   roodaisssommea,....,       J.

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