Court Opinion

ID: 9751231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:15:29.928267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:40.067875
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the result. Unlike the majority, I do not discern any ambiguity or inconsistency in the discussion of summary judgment in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493] (Aguilar). One cannot infer from Aguilar, as the majority asserts, “that, at the summary judgment stage, if there are equally conflicting inferences to be drawn from the evidence, the moving defendant is entitled to the benefit of that conflict and the motion must be granted.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 881.) The majority opinion appears to confuse Aguilar’s discussion of the plaintiff’s burden of production in opposing summary judgment with Aguilar’s standard for granting summary judgment.
In Aguilar, the Supreme Court said that “[i]f a party moving for summary judgment in any action, including an antitrust action for unlawful conspiracy, would prevail at trial without submission of any issue of material *889fact to a trier of fact for determination, then he should prevail on summary judgment.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) To establish his entitlement to summary judgment, “if a defendant moves for summary judgment . . . , he must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact not to find any underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 851.)
When the defendant has presented such evidence, the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The extent of this burden depends on the burden that the party would bear at trial. (Id. at p. 851.) In Aguilar, the plaintiff would have borne the burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence on her causes of action at trial. (Id. at pp. 861, 866.) Therefore, to prevent the entry of summary judgment against her, she would have had to “present evidence that would [have] allow[ed] a reasonable jury to find [an antitrust] conspiracy more likely than not.” (Id. at p. 862.)
When the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence—as it is here—the plaintiff’s burden cannot be met by the production of evidence that merely demonstrates that the matter sought to be established is as likely as it is unlikely. The Supreme Court quoted that “ ‘when the evidence is in equipoise on a matter that a party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, summary judgment will be granted against that party.’ ” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 857, fn. 27.) For example, if the court concludes that notwithstanding that the evidence and inferences therefrom may be in “equipoise,” a reasonable fact finder could not conclude that a plaintiff has established its case by a preponderance of the evidence, then summary judgment will be granted against the plaintiff. Contrary to the majority’s intimation, this proposition is not an assertion that equally conflicting evidence entitles defendant to summary judgment. It is merely a statement that a plaintiff, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, needs to meet its burden to make a prima facie showing of a triable issue of fact by submitting evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could decide in favor of that plaintiff. As the Supreme Court stated, “But if the court determines that all of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, and all of the inferences drawn therefrom, show and imply unlawful conspiracy only as likely as permissible competition or even less likely, it must then grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, even apart from any evidence presented by the defendants or any inferences drawn therefrom, because a reasonable trier of fact could not find for the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 857.)
This position does not suggest that in connection with a summary judgment motion the court weighs the evidence or inferences as a trier of fact. *890(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 856.) As the Supreme Court also quoted, “‘[Assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether a reasonable juror could find that the plaintiff has satisfied his burden of persuasion is a traditional judicial function.’ ” (Id. at p. 856, fn. 26.) In Aguilar, as in many antitrust cases, the evidence consisted of undisputed economic facts with conflicting inferences, thereby facilitating such an assessment by the court. (Id. at pp. 839, 862-866.) Because the evidence submitted by the plaintiff was insufficient to satisfy her burden of production, summary judgment was proper. (Id. at p. 862 [“Aguilar did not carry the burden of production shifted onto her shoulders to make a prima facie showing of the presence of an unlawful conspiracy’’].) The Supreme Court emphasized that a summary judgment cannot be granted on the basis of a weighing of evidence or resolution of conflicting, material facts. (Id. at p. 856.) Thus, for example, if the credibility of witnesses was determinative, summary judgment would be inappropriate.
Aguilar clearly points out that in any type of case—not just an antitrust case—if the evidence before the court and inferences therefrom, whether conflicting or not, show that a reasonable fact finder cannot conclude that a party should prevail, then summary judgment is appropriate against that party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 855, 857.)