Court Opinion

ID: 9499529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:50:55.058038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:34.113800
License: Public Domain

CONCUR
MCKEE,

concurring

I join Judge Barry’s analysis and opinion. However, two concerns cause me to write separately. First, I am concerned that the certification the Government filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 may be disingenuous. Second, I think this case can be decided entirely on the basis of our decision in Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540 (3d Cir. 1995). However, given the apparent confusion arising from our decision in United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2002), I join Judge Barry in taking this opportunity to clarify our holding there.
*1025I. The Government’s Certification.
18 U.S.C. § 3731 allows the Government an interlocutory appeal of an order suppressing evidence if, and only if,- “the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 3731, P 2. The Government clearly did not take this appeal for purposes of delay, but I am skeptical of the claim that the evidence the District Court suppressed was “substantial proof of a fact material” to the charges against Laville, as it must be if we are to have jurisdiction over an interlocutory order.
Laville was charged with illegally bringing aliens into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)( 1 )(A)(I), doing so for financial gain in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), and conspiring to do so in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(v)(I). As the majority explains, after he was apprehended by Officer Santos, Laville said that he was from Dominica, and that he had been a crew member on the stranded boat. The day after he was apprehended, Santos was turned over to agents from Immigration Customs and Enforcement, and he repeated those statements to them. He added only that he thought he had landed on Tortola, an island in the British Virgin Islands. Those are the statements that the District Court suppressed, and that is the evidence that purportedly constitutes “substantial proof of a material fact” in Laville’s prosecution.
8 U.S.C. § 1324 makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly “bring ... [an alien] to the United States ... at a place other than a designated port of entry ....” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(I). The various subsections Laville was charged with violating specify penalties for bringing aliens into the United States, doing so for financial gain, or conspiring to do so. The citizenship or residence of the person who illegally brings aliens into the United States is irrelevant. A United States citizen can be convicted of illegally bringing aliens into the United States (and the related offenses) the same as a legal permanent resident or an illegal alien. The Government need only prove that a defendant brought illegal aliens into the United States at a location other than “a designated port of entry,” and that he/she did so knowingly. I therefore fail to see how Laville’s citizenship can acquire the materiality the Government has claimed by filing this appeal and the concomitant certification under § 3731. *1026Laville’s statement that he was a crew member is relevant because it establishes that he actually facilitated the passengers’ illegal arrival into the United States and creates an inference that he did so for financial gain (as a paid crew member). However, the Government did not need his post-arrest statements to establish that he was a crew member. As Judge Barry notes, several of the passengers identified Laville and a co-defendant as the boat’s operators. The post-arrest statements that are the subject of this interlocutory appeal may flush out a bit of detail and provide some colorful background, but they are certainly not “substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.” I therefore doubt that the § 3731 certification was afforded the consideration Congress intended. Rather, it appears to have been reflexively filed in order to challenge a ruling the Government disagreed with.
I realize that we are not in a position to understand all of the dynamics of this prosecution, and that there may be an explanation for the Government’s certifying that Laville’s apparently superfluous statements are material to his prosecution that is not evident on appeal. However, the record certainly does not suggest any such explanation, and the Government was not able to provide one when asked during oral argument.3
I also realize that we do not look behind the United States Attorney’s certification under § 3731, nor question its veracity. See Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 325, 45 V.I. 738 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The United States Attorney’s word is enough; the reviewing court does not consider the truth of the certification.”). Nevertheless, I think it is clear that the Congress did not intend the certification to function only as a procedural calisthenic that the Government can employ whenever it disagrees with the District Court’s suppression ruling. I hope that the Government has not regarded it as such here.
II. The Arrest Was Legal Even Under Virgin Islands Law.
As Judge Barry explains, the District Court concluded that Officer Santos did not have probable cause to arrest Laville for smuggling aliens. *1027The court believed that Santos had, at most, probable cause to believe Laville had entered the United States illegally in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Under Virgin Islands law, local law enforcement officers have authority to arrest for violations of federal immigration laws. See, e.g., United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, the court suppressed Laville’s statements because illegal entry into the United States is a misdemeanor. Under the law of the Virgin Islands, Officer Santos could not make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor unless the offense was committed in his presence.4 The District Court erroneously concluded that that requirement governed the admissibility of the suppressed evidence.
“The definition of ‘entry’ as applied for various purposes in our immigration laws was evolved judicially ...”, Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 453, 83 S. Ct. 1804, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1963). As used in immigration law, entry requires more than physical presence in the United States; it also requires freedom from official restraint. United States v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2000). The requirement that the alien be free from official restraint to accomplish an entry into the United States applies to the crime of illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325, as well as the crime of illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. See United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1954) (illegal re-entry); United States v. Gonzalez-Torres, 309 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 2002) (illegal entry and illegal re-entry); Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d at 1164-65 (illegal re-entry); United States v. Angeles-Mascote, 206 F.3d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 2000) (illegal re-entry).
In Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540 (3d Cir. 1995), we had to determine if an entry had been accomplished by aliens on a smuggling ship that ran aground off the coast of New York. Some of the 300 passengers on that ship managed to swim ashore before being apprehended, and we had to decide if their physical presence in New York effectuated an entry into the United States within the meaning of then-section 101 of the Immigration and Nationalities Act.5 The police *1028had responded immediately and they had cordoned off the area of the beach where the aliens had landed. None of the aliens ever left the beach area, and they were all arrested within thirty minutes of their arrival.
Quoting from the BIA’s decision in Matter of G-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 764, 768, Int. Dec. 3215, at 5-7 (BIA 1993), we explained that an entry into the United States requires: ‘“(1) crossing into the territorial limits of the United States; i. e., physical presence; (2)(a) inspection and admission by an immigration officer, or (b) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest entry point; and (3) freedom from official restraint.’” 68 F.3d at 1545. We held that the aliens never entered the United States because they never satisfied the third requirement; they were never free from official restraint. We explained:
When an alien attempts to enter the United States, the mere fact that he or she may have eluded the gaze of law enforcement for a brief period of time after having come upon United States territory is insufficient, in and of itself, to establish freedom from official restraint.
Id. at 1550. Thus, in Yang as here, none of the defendants was ever free from official restraint once they touched shore.
None of the petitioners ever left the beach area, which was teeming with law enforcement activity soon after the [the smuggling vessel] ran aground. Nor were any of the petitioners free to ... go at large and mix with the general population. Far from indistinguishably mixing with the general population, petitioners either were apprehended shortly after coming ashore, or were brought into custody as a result of immediate and intense law enforcement efforts. We therefore conclude[d] that the petitioners were never free from official restraint.
Id. (Ellipsis in original, internal citation omitted).
Although the police response here was not as intense as the response in Yang, I do not believe that the difference rises to the level of a legal, distinction for purposes of determining if Laville had managed an *1029“entry” under our immigration laws. Laville was never free to “go at large and mix with the general population,” he was “apprehended shortly after coming ashore,” and he was “brought into custody as a result of immediate and [relatively] intense law enforcement efforts.” Given the holding in Yang, the District Court should have concluded that the offense of illegal entry was committed in the presence of Officer Santos; it clearly was. Accordingly, Laville’s post-arrest statements should not have been suppressed.6

 For example, it is conceivable that the Cuban witnesses were either unavailable or uncooperative. In that event, Laville’s admission that he operated the boat would become crucial to the Government’s proof. However, nothing on this record suggests that is the case, and the Government offered no such explanation when queried about the certification during oral argument.

 5 V.I.C. § 3562 provides: “A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant delivered to him, or may, without a warrant, arrest a person — (1) for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.”

 Resolution of that issue determined the kind of hearing the aliens were entitled to. An alien who has “entered” the United States is entitled to a removal proceeding, while an alien who has not “entered” can be refused admission through a summary exclusion *1028proceeding. In a removal proceeding, the alien receives many advantages not available to an alien in an exclusion proceeding, including advance notice of the charges, appeal to an appellate court, and the right to a country of designation. Yang, 68 F.3d at 1547.

 As is evident from Judge Barry’s analysis, my discussion in no way suggests that the legality of Laville’s arrest turns on whether a misdemeanor was committed in Officer Santos’ presence. As Judge Barry explains, that Fourth Amendment inquiry turns on whether Officer Santos had probable cause to believe that Laville was committing a crime. It is not the fact that Laville was. committing a misdemeanor in the officer’s presence that validates this arrest. Rather, the totality of the circumstances, including Officer Santos’ reasonable suspicion when he saw Laville, establishes probable cause to arrest as required under the Fourth Amendment. That analysis can not be governed by local law.