Court Opinion

ID: 9594817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:33:11.02698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:28.794540
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
With respect to Division 1, which addresses appellant’s second enumeration of error, he is not trying to raise unpreserved issues directly. He argues that counsel’s failure to object and certain other failures and actions should have alerted the trial court to the realization that counsel was not rendering effective assistance so that defendant was not receiving a fair trial. The majority concludes that any error was harmless because of the overwhelming evidence. But that is precisely part of what appellant complains of, i.e., that counsel fatally stipulated the strongly inculpatory Highland Institute report and failed to object to evidence of prior similar acts. If counsel’s performance was deficient in allowing into evidence the report, by stipulation, and the instances of other incidents, by failure to object, we would have to consider the evidence without this and without the evidence related to it, such as defendant’s explanations of these items.
The underlying question is whether it was demonstrated that *271counsel was constitutionally ineffective in the instances asserted, which is appellant’s first enumeration of error. I agree that he was not. As to the damaging Highland Institute report, counsel testified that he stipulated its admissibility after consulting with defendant; that he was well aware that it contained damaging evidence but that the testimony of the preparer of this report, who was unavailable due to surgery, could prove more damaging; that he told defendant that the State would probably seek a continuance if they did not stipulate the report; and that defendant insisted they proceed with trial. As to the similar incidents, they would have been admissible. With respect to character witnesses, counsel discussed this possibility with defendant but advised they “probably wouldn’t do him any good.” That was a matter of judgment and trial tactics that does not constitute ineffectiveness. Concerning the juror who possibly was related to the victim, counsel discussed the options with defendant. The court had given the options of a mistrial, proceeding with 11 jurors, or proceeding with the juror. Defendant chose the latter, relying on counsel’s knowledge of the juror and his satisfaction with the jury as a whole. None of this is constitutional deficiency in counsel’s professional performance.
Decided March 12, 1993 —
Reconsideration denied March 30, 1993
Dupree, Johnson & Poole, Hylton B. Dupree, Jr., A. Gregory Poole, for appellant.
Darrell E. Wilson, District Attorney, Brett W. Ladd, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Counsel not having been “ineffective” in the particulars claimed, appellant cannot fault the trial court either, for failing to insure a fair trial the results of which could be trusted.