Court Opinion

ID: 9554634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 16:10:59.492413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:59.977552
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :           PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOSEPH FRANCESCO BENT                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1491 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 26, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-67-CR-0002499-2018

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                   FILED: AUGUST 9, 2023

       Joesph Francesco Bent appeals pro se from the order that dismissed his

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Also before

us is the Commonwealth’s motion to quash.                Upon review, we deny the

Commonwealth’s motion, vacate the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA

petition, and remand for further proceedings.

       Given our disposition, a detailed recitation of the facts underlying

Appellant’s convictions is unnecessary.            Suffice it to say that Appellant is

serving an aggregate sentence of fourteen and one-half to twenty-nine years

of imprisonment imposed after he was convicted of rape and other crimes at

a jury at a trial in which Appellant represented himself. On direct appeal, we

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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vacated a component of his sentence that did not disturb the overall

sentencing scheme, but otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentence. See

Commonwealth v. Bent, 258 A.3d 543 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential

decision). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme

Court, however he filed a praecipe to discontinue before the Court ruled upon

it.

       Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on September 9, 2021.1

Therein, he asserted that his waiver of trial counsel had not been knowing and

voluntary due to an inadequate colloquy, that his sentencing counsel had been

ineffective in failing to correct an error as to his prior record score, and that

the Commonwealth withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963).         The Honorable Craig T. Trebilcock, who presided at

Appellant’s trial and sentencing, appointed counsel and directed counsel to

discuss the petition with Appellant and file an amended petition or motion to

withdraw. See Order, 10/25/21.

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1  The petition was docketed on September 14, but it was postmarked on
September 9. Accordingly, the deemed filing date is September 9, 2021. See
Pa.R.A.P. 121(f) (“A pro se filing submitted by a person incarcerated in a
correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date of the prison postmark or
the date the filing was delivered to the prison authorities for purposes of
mailing as documented by a properly executed prisoner cash slip or other
reasonably verifiable evidence.”). We shall use the postmark date as the filing
date of Appellant’s pro se submissions hereafter. As for the filing of the PCRA
court’s orders, we utilize as the filing date the date on which the clerk of courts
served the document upon the parties. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1).

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       Appellant appeared remotely at a hearing on December 17, 2021. PCRA

counsel explained that after a thorough investigation and consultation with

Appellant, he concluded that the sentencing issue concerning the error in

Appellant’s prior record score was meritorious, but the other two lacked

merit.2 See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 12/17/21, at 2-3. PCRA counsel indicated

that, normally, he would file an amended petition stating only the meritorious

claim, but Appellant insisted on amending to add more issues and not to

discard any. Id. at 4. He continued:

              So without having permission from [Appellant] to amend
       that and discard the two meritless claims, I’m in an ethical bind
       where I cannot issue a letter because there is a legitimate issue,
       but I also do not have permission to amend the petition to reduce
       it to the one remaining claim with merit. I’m not sure how to
       proceed, Your Honor.

Id.

       The PCRA court then asked Appellant whether he wanted to argue the

claims counsel deemed meritless, and Appellant indicated that he wished to

do so that day. Id. at 5. The PCRA court directed Appellant to proceed to do

so, pro se, without permitting counsel to withdraw or conducting a colloquy

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998) (“When

a waiver of the right to counsel is sought at the post-conviction and appellate

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2 PCRA counsel indicated that sentencing counsel had acknowledged the error,
and that the Commonwealth stipulated that Appellant’s prior record score was
zero, not one, at the time he was sentenced. See N.T. PCRA Hearing,
12/17/21, at 3.

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stages, an on-the-record determination should be made that the waiver is a

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one.”). Appellant then objected because

he was not able to present his claims in person.          The court accordingly

indicated that it would reschedule the hearing to a time when Appellant could

be transported to court.   See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 12/17/21, at 5-6.

      The following week, Appellant submitted a pro se request to amend his

PCRA petition. See Motion to Amend, 12/22/21. Judge Trebilcock did not

rule on the motion before his term expired at the end of 2021, but did enter

a transportation order and schedule a PCRA hearing for March 18, 2022, to

take place before the Honorable Kathleen J. Pendergast, who presided over

the subsequent PCRA proceedings. On January 25, 2022, Appellant submitted

a pro se amended PCRA “brief” reasserting the claims that he did not validly

waive his right to counsel at trial, that counsel was ineffective in not objecting

to the use of an incorrect prior record score at sentencing, and that the

Commonwealth violated Brady.        See Amended Brief for Appellant’s PCRA,

1/25/22, at 3-14.     Appellant also added new claims contending that his

confrontation rights had been violated at trial and that Judge Trebilcock was

guilty of misconduct at sentencing. Id. at 1-2, 14-15.

      On March 15, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, citing

the deficiencies in Appellant’s pro se petition, noting that it is “incumbent upon

appointed counsel to rectify [Appellant’s] PCRA petition in amended form” to

raise the issue counsel deemed meritorious, and stressing that Appellant was

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not permitted to proceed with hybrid representation. See Motion to Dismiss,

3/15/22, at ¶¶ 9-11, 15, 20.

       The certified record does not contain a transcript for a hearing on

March 18, 2022.        Instead, there is an order dictated in the presence of

Appellant’s PCRA counsel and the Commonwealth. Therein, the PCRA court

found that Appellant’s PCRA petition was defective for the various reasons

cited by the Commonwealth and granted the Commonwealth’s motion to

dismiss. See Order, 3/18/22, at 2. The court stated that Appellant “asked

that counsel be excused,” and that Appellant “has been advised not only

extensively by Judge Trebilcock during a separate hearing but also today that

he’s bound by all Rules of Criminal Procedure and all Rules of Court, all

deadlines, etc., as it relates to a choice to represent himself.”3 Id.

       The PCRA court instructed Appellant to file an amended petition

pertaining to the sentencing issue that PCRA counsel had previously deemed

meritorious, indicating that it would dismiss that petition without a hearing if

it was not timely filed or did not correct the defects. Id. at 2-3. The court

further set timelines for PCRA counsel to provide Appellant with any necessary

documents and indicated that counsel’s representation would terminate as of

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3   The order does not reference in what hearing Judge Trebilcock had
colloquied Appellant as to his waiver of the right to PCRA counsel, nor does it
include the colloquy that the PCRA court conducted on that date. Hence, it is
unclear from the certified record whether Appellant waived his right following
a full Grazier hearing.

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5:00 p.m. on March 21, 2022. The order did not set a deadline for the timely

filing of the amended PCRA petition or contain all information pertinent to a

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss without a hearing.

       On March 21, 2022, PCRA counsel filed a notice of his compliance with

the PCRA court’s March 18 order, attaching a photograph of the stack of

documents that he provided to Appellant as well as a letter addressed to

Appellant. See Notice of Compliance, 3/21/22, at Exhibits A and B. In this

“No Merit Letter Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley on the Meritless

Issues,” counsel explained why he believed Appellant’s claims regarding

Brady evidence and the deficiencies in his trial-counsel-waiver colloquy lacked

merit, but indicated that the sentencing issue was meritorious and that he had

“reached an agreement with the District Attorney[’]s Office for a resentencing

based upon the error in your prior record score.”4 Id. at Exhibit A.

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4  We appreciate counsel’s dilemma as he elucidated it at the prior hearing
discussed above and his well-intentioned efforts to resolve it. However, for
the benefit of the criminal defense bar, we reiterate that PCRA counsel’s duty
is to either (1) amend a defective PCRA petition to raise claims he in is
professional judgment deems contain sufficient arguable merit, or (2) certify
that no meritorious issues exist. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Finley, 550
A.2d 213, 215 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Karanicolas,
836 A.2d 940, 946 (Pa.Super. 2003). If disagreements with the client
preclude the attorney from choosing one course of action or the other, counsel
may withdraw on that basis to allow the client to argue any and all claims he
wishes pro se or with private counsel. We have rejected as improper partial
no-merit briefs such as the one at issue here in which counsel argues against
his client as to a faction of the claims raised. See Commonwealth v.
Plummer, 236 A.3d 1069, 2020 WL 1548510 at *6 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       The next item on the docket is Appellant’s amended PCRA petition,

docketed on March 25, 2022, as “Pro Se Correspondence.” Therein, Appellant

raised his sentencing claim, among others.       See Amended PCRA Petition,

3/22/22, at 1-9.       On April 20, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a renewed

motion to dismiss, indicating that the PCRA court had given Appellant until

April 18, 2022, to file an amended petition but that he had “failed to file an

amended petition correcting the deficiencies in his original petition.”5

Renewed Motion to Dismiss, 4/20/22, at ¶¶ 12-13.

       By order of April 26, 2022, the PCRA court granted the Commonwealth’s

motion, indicating that Appellant “was ordered to file his amended PCRA

[p]etition by April 18, 2022,” but “failed to do so by that deadline.” Order,

4/26/22. The order did not advise Appellant of his right to appeal or the time

limits for doing so, and was not served upon him by certified mail, return

receipt requested. Cf. Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4) (“When the petition is dismissed

without a hearing, the judge promptly shall issue an order to that effect and

shall advise the defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the

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precedential decision) (citing Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d 286,
293 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

5   In its renewed motion, the Commonwealth elected not to mention its
stipulation that Appellant was sentenced using an incorrect prior record score
or its agreement that Appellant was entitled to sentencing relief purportedly
reached with A PCRA counsel prior to his withdrawal.

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right to appeal from the final order disposing of the petition and of the time

limits within which the appeal must be filed.”).

       On May 6, 2022, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration,

resubmitting his amended petition and pointing out that he had filed it on

March 22, 2022.        The PCRA court entered an order dated May 13, 2022,

denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration. The docket listed the order

as one denying the PCRA petition and reflected that it was served upon the

Commonwealth on May 16, 2022, but did not note service upon Appellant. On

June 22, 2022, Appellant filed a request for information on the status of his

reconsideration motion.       Obtaining no response, Appellant filed a notice of

appeal in this Court, which was marked as received by this Court on

September 1, 2022. This Court apparently forwarded it to the PCRA court in

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(4),6 but the clerk of courts docketed it as a

motion for reconsideration in the PCRA court filed on September 6, 2022. An

additional notice of appeal was filed on October 11, 2022, initiating the instant

appeal.

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6  “If a notice of appeal is mistakenly filed in an appellate court, or is otherwise
filed in an incorrect office within the unified judicial system, the clerk shall
immediately stamp it with the date of receipt and transmit it to the clerk of
the court which entered the order appealed from, and upon payment of an
additional filing fee the notice of appeal shall be deemed filed in the trial court
on the date originally filed.” Pa.R.A.P. 905(4).

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       The PCRA court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on November 30,

2022.7 In its opinion, the PCRA court offered as the basis of its dismissal the

thirty-day deadline for the filing of the amended petition that does not appear

in the March 18, 2022 order and its misapprehension that Appellant did not

file his amended petition before he refiled it on May 6, 2022. See PCRA Court

Opinion, 11/30/22, at 1-2.         The court further acknowledged its failure to

inform Appellant of his appeal rights when it dismissed his petition, but opined

that the error was harmless because Appellant did timely appeal on October

17, 2022. Id. at 2-3.

       This Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be

quashed as untimely given that it was filed in October and his PCRA petition

was dismissed in April. See Order, 12/15/22. Appellant responded to the

rule, noting the PCRA court’s failure to advise him of his appellate rights when

it dismissed the petition and the multiple defects in service of the PCRA court’s

orders. See Response to Rule to Show Cause, 12/22/22, at 1-2. This Court

discharged the rule and referred the issue to this merits panel for

consideration. See Order, 1/5/23.

       In the meantime, Appellant filed his brief advocating the merits of his

appeal. It is largely a rambling dissertation about the disadvantages a criminal

defendant faces navigating the criminal justice system. See Appellant’s brief

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7 The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
of errors complained of on appeal.

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at 1-3. However, Appellant eventually complains that he is entitled to relief

based upon the irregularities in docketing and service highlighted above, such

as the fact that he filed his amended petition in March, not May 2022, and he

filed a notice of appeal in September after he received no response to his

request for information. Id. at 5.

       The Commonwealth responded with a motion to quash this appeal based

upon Appellant’s failure to conform his brief to the Rules of Appellate

Procedure.     This Court deferred the quashal request to this panel.          The

Commonwealth then submitted a letter to this Court advising us that it would

file no response in addition to its motion to quash.8

       Before we consider the Commonwealth’s motion, we must address the

timeliness of this appeal, as it implicates our jurisdiction.          See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (Pa. 2014). Based upon

Pa.R.A.P. 905, noted supra, Appellant’s appeal was filed on September 1,

2022, despite the failure of the clerks of courts to properly docket it as a notice

of appeal and proceed accordingly. See id. The ruling Appellant wishes to

challenge is the dismissal of his PCRA petition on April 26, 2022. As such, the

appeal is facially untimely.

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8  Appellant moved to dismiss all charges against him with prejudice and to
release him from custody based upon the Commonwealth’s refusal to file a
brief. That motion was promptly denied by per curiam order.

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      However, as detailed in our recitation of the procedural history of these

proceedings, the appealed-from order did not advise Appellant of his right to

appeal or the time limits for doing so and was not served upon him as required

by Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4). A PCRA court’s failure to comply with Rule 907(4) is

patently a “breakdown in the PCRA court's operations.” Commonwealth v.

Burgos, 262 A.3d 553, 2021 WL 3721807 at *4 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-

precedential decision) (citing Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157

(Pa.Super. 2019) (collecting cases)). Such breakdowns excuse the untimely

filing of a notice of appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940

A.2d 493, 499 (Pa.Super. 2007) (holding that the trial courts failure to comply

with the requirements of Rule 720 regarding advising a defendant’s appellate

rights in an order denying a post-sentence motion constitutes a breakdown

that excuses the untimely filing of a notice of appeal). Consequently, we have

jurisdiction over this appeal.

      Turning to the Commonwealth’s motion to quash, we agree with the

Commonwealth that Appellant’s brief bears little resemblance to a brief of

appellant as envisioned by Pa.R.A.P. 2111 and 2114-32. While Pa.R.A.P. 2101

provides that we may quash or dismiss an appeal if briefing defects are

“substantial,” if the defects do not impede our review, we are not required to

so sanction a party. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Levy, 83 A.3d 457, 461

n.2 (Pa.Super. 2013).     Here, as we have indicated above, we are able to

discern the PCRA court’s errors of which Appellant complains, and he has cited

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relevant authority and portions of the record.        Therefore, we deny the

Commonwealth’s motion to quash.

      Thus, we are prepared to address the propriety of the PCRA court’s

dismissal order, mindful of the following:

             The standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA
      petition is whether that determination is supported by the
      evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s
      findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the
      findings in the certified record. Further, a PCRA court has
      discretion to dismiss a PCRA petition without a hearing if the court
      is satisfied that there are no genuine issues concerning any
      material fact; that the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction
      collateral relief; and that no legitimate purpose would be served
      by further proceedings.

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 223 A.3d 274, 277 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

      Our in-depth discussion of the PCRA proceedings in this case renders

Appellant’s entitlement to relief obvious.     The PCRA court concluded the

proceedings because it found that Appellant did not timely file an amended

petition.   The record belies that finding.   Appellant indeed filed his pro se

amended petition no later than March 25, 2022, well within the unwritten

thirty-day deadline that the PCRA court apparently discussed at the March 18,

2022 hearing, but did not include it in the order that was filed of record. Since

the court’s ruling was founded on a factual finding unsupported by the certified

record, it cannot stand.

      Therefore, we vacate the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s

PCRA petition.    The trial court shall review Appellant’s amended petition,

including the sentencing claim that the Commonwealth previously agreed

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warrants further action, and dispose of the petition as it deems appropriate,

adhering to the mandates of Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 and 908.

     Motion to quash denied. Order vacated. Case remanded for further

proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2023

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