Court Opinion

ID: 9761240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:35:23.034237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:21.367844
License: Public Domain

CHADICK, Chief Justice
(concurring).
On consideration of the entire record, I think the judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed, except that portion thereof reading as follows :
“III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants, A. T. Hay, Chairman, J. C. Crownover, James Ward, Glenn Moses, James H. Thomas, and J. B. Rochelle, III, Members of the Board of Trustees of the Texarkana School District, be enjoined and directed to adopt guidelines for the discipline of the students attending the schools within the Texarkana Independent School District which guidelines must be positive and definite, and that copies of the said guidelines shall be furnished to each student with directions that the said guidelines shall be read by the student and delivered by the student to his parents.”
In other words, I would reverse and render as to the matter covered by the copied paragraph and delete such order from the judgment and affirm the Trial Court’s judgment as modified. Briefly, my reason for so doing is compelled by the posture of the parties, both in the trial court and on appeal, and the consequent reduction their positions impose on the scope of review or revision this Court may undertake.
The statement of the nature of the case in appellants’ briefs concludes with these two paragraphs, to-wit:
“The appellants herein are not seeking to have the injunction granted by the trial court set aside or dissolved, insofar as the students who were involved in this case, either as named plaintiffs or as class plaintiffs, are concerned.
“This appeal involves only the questions of the procedural due process to be followed in the future concerning similar disruptive activities, and the legal sufficiency of the guidelines handed down by the School District concerning such activities.”
The appellees’ brief directs this Court’s particular attention to these two paragraphs in the appellants’ brief, but does not comment on the significance or the effect thereof. The judgment grants nothing but injunctive relief to the complainants, that is, to the named plaintiffs and the class plaintiffs, except in the incidental matter of taxing costs. Though put in doubt as to the intent of the quoted statement by its broad and general nature, I feel the statement should not dispose of the case, as the prayer in the appellants’ brief, as does the *740fact that a brief was filed, indicates that the appellants did intend to reserve certain questions for review. The prayer is as follows :
“WHEREFORE, appellants pray that this Honorable Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold:
“(a) That procedural due process was followed by the principal and assistant principals in the hearings and investigation of each student who appeared before them;
“(b) That procedural due process was followed by the Board of Trustees as to each student who appeared before the Board of Trustees, other than the students, David Campbell and Craig Lewis;
“(c) That procedural due process was not followed by the Board of Trustees as to David Campbell and Craig Lewis only by reason of the fact that there was not substantial evidence as to their having participated in group violence;
“(d) That the Statement of Policy, commonly called the ‘guidelines’ laid down by the Board of Trustees, is not vague and indefinite and in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
“(e) That the trial court was in error in granting a permanent injunction as to all of the named plaintiffs except David Campbell and Craig Lewis; and,
“(f) That the trial court was in error in granting a permanent injunction as to the class plaintiffs.
Appellants further pray that this court dissolve the permanent injunction issued by the trial court, except insofar as the defendants were enjoined: (a) from suspending the named plaintiffs and the class plaintiffs (as to all of whom ⅛⅞ question is moot), and, (b) from in any way interfering with the completion by them of their education for the Spring Semester for the year 1971.
“Appellants further pray that this cause be remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter final judgment therein in accordance with the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals * *
Though I recognize the need to curtail and condense this expression of my views, nevertheless, I must point to this further anomaly in the posture of the parties. The following, which I take to have the dignity of a stipulation, appears in the statement of facts:
“MR. PATTON: Your Honor, before the defense puts on any witnesses, on behalf of all the plaintiffs, we’d like to move that the testimony on the behalf of the defense be limited to that type of testimony which would tend to rebut due process violation.
“MR. RAFFAELLI: I have no objection to that, if they will limit their testimony to the same thing and not ask this court to make specific findings as to whether or not the evidence was sufficient to justify the expulsion or suspension of any one student. That’s what I moved in the beginning.
“THE COURT: Yes, I don’t propose to make such a finding.”
On its face, this appears to be a stipulation by counsel for the plaintiffs, acquiesced in by the trial judge, that individual or several relief for a particular plaintiff was not to be an issue in the case and judgment of that nature would not be entered at conclusion of the trial. Such being the agreement, the suit became at that point an action to vindicate the rights of the group, and to afford the group or class joint rather than several relief, if relief was in order. Perusal of the record and the judgment entered confirms that the trial court pursued this theory to the end, and I understand the judgment to only intend joint relief to the group as a whole.
The appellants have a point of error questioning the propriety of a class action *741judgment, and the appellees counter that a class action judgment is permissible. I would sustain the appellants’ point to the extent previously stated. The Texas class action rule (Tex.R.Civ.P. 42) was, I understand, the Federal rule verbatim when adopted. The Federal rule was changed in 1966 so that Federal courts might, when the facts warranted it, entertain and render judgment granting relief to a class in cases such as this, that is, in a spurious* class action. See Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 Federal Rules Decisions, 169 (at page 175). Prior to the Federal rule change, a judgment for relief in a spurious class action, as is the Texas class action rule now, was several in its nature and was binding only on the named parties and intervenors, and therefore, not res ju-dicata to any except named parties and in-tervenors in the lawsuit. See Prof. Wright’s article just cited, and 1 McDonald’s Texas Civil Practice, “Parties”, Sec. 3.34.1.
As I understand it, the trial judge undertook to render a judgment granting relief to a group constituting a class of persons similarly situated, and the trial court did not intend to grant individual, separate or several relief to a particular person. With this view of the record and the restriction placed on the appeal by the appellants’ brief, I have reached the conclusion formerly stated that the only portion of the judgment that should be reversed is the paragraph enjoining and directing the school board to adopt guidelines, etc. The quoted stipulation barred several relief, and the pleadings and proof precluded joint class relief. When the stipulation putting individual actions aside is given effect, this record, in my opinion, does not show school policy and procedures were constitutionally defective or were unconstitutionally applied to the complainants as an adversary class.
I understand Judge Ray’s order to be in harmony with the disposition of the appeal that I suggest, so I concur in such order.

 Unfortunate terminology has been employed by legal writers to differentiate between the class actions authorized by Rule 42. These are said to be true, hybrid, and spurious. The latter term, spurious, does not denigrate or taint the perfectly respectable pleading herein.