Court Opinion

ID: 9940423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 15:12:28.4734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:50.956778
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13465

                IN THE MATTER OF AN IMPOUNDED CASE.

         Suffolk.       December 4, 2023. - February 14, 2024.

     Present:       Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                              & Georges, JJ.1

                     Sealing.   Youthful Offender Act.

     Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for
the county of Suffolk on January 24, 2023.

     The case was reported by Lowy, J.

     Pauline Quirion for the petitioner.
     Nina L. Pomponio, Special Assistant Attorney General (Tonie
J. Ryan also present) for Commissioner of Probation.
     Paul M. Kominers, Kristen R. Gagalis, Tamara S. Wolfson,
Leon Smith, Virginia Benzan, David M. Siegel, & Susan Malouin,
for Citizens for Juvenile Justice & others, amici curiae,
submitted a brief.
     Afton M. Templin, Committee for Public Counsel Services,
for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

     1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case
and authored this opinion prior to his retirement.
                                                                    2

     LOWY, J.    This case requires us to determine which of the

two relevant sources for record sealing -- G. L. c. 276, § 100A

(§ 100A), the adult criminal record sealing statute, or G. L.

c. 276, § 100B (§ 100B), the juvenile delinquency sealing

statute -- governs the sealing of records from youthful offender

proceedings.    This appeal arises from the Commissioner of

Probation's (commissioner's) denial of the petitioner's request

that his youthful offender records be sealed pursuant to § 100B,

with the commissioner instead applying the adult criminal record

sealing statute, § 100A.    We conclude that § 100B, the juvenile

delinquency sealing statute, is the proper statute for the

sealing of records of youthful offenders.2,3

     Background.    In 2012, the petitioner was indicted on four

counts of witness intimidation and three counts of felony

extortion.     The Juvenile Court ordered pretrial probation with

respect to the extortion charges, which were later dismissed.

With respect to two of the witness intimidation charges, the

Juvenile Court adjudicated the petitioner a youthful offender

     2 This opinion exclusively concerns youthful offender
records in noncapital cases. Nothing in this opinion addresses
the issue of record sealing as it relates to capital cases.

     3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Citizens for
Juvenile Justice, the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, the
New England Law CORI Initiative, Northeast Legal Aid, and the
University of Massachusetts Law School Human Rights at Home
Clinic; and the youth advocacy division of the Committee for
Public Counsel Services.
                                                                   3

and ordered his commitment to the Department of Youth Services.

As to the other two witness intimidation charges, the Juvenile

Court adjudicated the petitioner a youthful offender and ordered

a seven-year probation sentence.   The petitioner sought the

sealing of his youthful offender records pursuant to § 100B in

late 2021, having satisfied the listed requirements under that

statute.4   The commissioner denied the petitioner's request in

early 2022, stating that the petitioner's youthful offender

adjudications fell under § 100A, the requirements of which the

petitioner had not met.5   The petitioner appealed from the denial

     4 In part, § 100B provides that "[a]ny person having a
record of entries of a delinquency court appearance in the
commonwealth . . . may . . . request that" his or her record be
sealed. Pursuant to § 100B, the commissioner must seal the
record of such an applicant provided the applicant satisfies
certain listed requirements. The relevant listed requirement of
§ 100B is that an applicant's court appearances and court
dispositions, including any period of supervision or probation,
must have been closed at least three years prior to the request.
The petitioner satisfies this requirement.

     5 In part, § 100A provides that "[a]ny person having a
record of criminal court appearances and dispositions in the
commonwealth . . . may . . . request that" his or her record be
sealed. Pursuant to § 100A, the commissioner must seal the
record of such an applicant provided the applicant satisfies
certain listed requirements. The relevant listed requirement of
§ 100A is that an applicant's court appearances and court
dispositions, including any period of custody, for any felony
record must have been closed at least seven years prior to the
request. Also relevant is that § 100A does not apply in cases
of convictions for witness intimidation charges; records of such
convictions generally cannot be sealed. See G. L. c. 268, §13B.
The petitioner has not satisfied the seven-year waiting period
requirement, and his records involve adjudications for witness
intimidation charges, which cannot be sealed under § 100A.
                                                                     4

of his request by way of a petition in the county court seeking

extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.    The single

justice reserved and reported the case to the full court without

decision.

     Discussion.   Where a case is reserved and reported by the

single justice, we do not need to decide if the case meets the

standard for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and instead may

proceed to the merits.   See Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 492 Mass.

61, 67 n.9 (2023) ("Where the single justice has exercised [his

or] her discretion to reserve and report the matter, we proceed

to adjudicate the merits").    The question presented by the

petitioner's appeal is whether youthful offender dispositions

may be sealed in a manner more like adult criminal records under

§ 100A or delinquency records under § 100B.    Because this is a

question of statutory interpretation, the standard of review is

de novo.    See Pembroke Hosp. v. D.L., 482 Mass. 346, 351 (2019).

"Legislative intent controls our interpretation of statutes."

Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535, 536 (2020).

Legislative intent can be gleaned by looking "to the words of

the statute, construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the

language, considered in connection with the cause of its

enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the

main object to be accomplished" (quotation and citation

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 61 (2017).    If
                                                                      5

the statutory language is clear, we conclude our analysis.      See

Montarvo, supra; Garvey, supra.     If the statutory language is

ambiguous, however, we then look to sources external to the

statute to determine legislative intent.     See Matter of E.C.,

479 Mass. 113, 118 (2018).

     1.   Plain text.   When interpreting a statute, we look first

to the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the statutory language

(citation omitted).     Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 279,

281 (2023).   See Care & Protection of Rashida, 488 Mass. 217,

225 (2021), S.C., 489 Mass. 128 (2022).     If specific terms

remain undefined under the statute, we may look to dictionary

definitions to understand a term's ordinary meaning.     See

Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 Mass. 589, 593 (2022); Harmon v.

Commissioner of Correction, 487 Mass. 470, 479 (2021) ("For

terms that are not 'technical,' we construe statutory words and

phrases in their 'common and approved usage'" [citation

omitted]).

     The relevant plain text of § 100A applies the statute to

"person[s] having a record of criminal court appearances and

dispositions."   The relevant plain text of § 100B applies the

statute to "person[s] having a record of entries of a

delinquency court appearance."     Neither statute references

youthful offender adjudications -- understandably, given that

the category of youthful offender was created in 1996, long
                                                                  6

after §§ 100A and 100B were passed.

     Where adult criminal records may be sealed under § 100A and

delinquency records may be sealed under § 100B, we are

unconvinced that the Legislature intended that a category of

offenders under age eighteen be deprived of the opportunity to

have their records sealed under at least certain circumstances.

See Commonwealth v. Rainey, 491 Mass. 632, 642 (2023) ("our

respect for the Legislature's considered judgment dictates that

we interpret the statute to be sensible, rejecting unreasonable

interpretations unless the clear meaning of the language

requires such an interpretation" [citation omitted]).

     We assume that the Legislature is aware of existing

statutes and thus interpret statutes in harmony with prior

enactments to promote a consistent body of law.   See Globe

Newspaper Co., petitioner, 461 Mass. 113, 117 (2011) ("In

interpreting a statute, we presume that when the Legislature

enacts a law it is aware of the statutory and common law that

governed the matter in which it legislates"); Commonwealth v.

Callahan, 440 Mass. 436, 440-441 (2003).   See also Montarvo, 486

Mass. at 541 ("The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the

prior state of the law as explicated by the decisions of this

court" [citation omitted]).   Accordingly, we agree with the

parties that either § 100A or § 100B permits sealing of youthful

offender records.
                                                                    7

     The petitioner contends that the "criminal court" language

of § 100A cannot apply to him because youthful offender

proceedings, which occur in the Juvenile Court, are not criminal

in nature.   Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 384 Mass.

784, 786 (1981) ("An adjudication concerning a juvenile is not,

of course, a conviction of [a] crime").   The petitioner likewise

contends that the phrase "delinquency court" in § 100B is

inclusive of youthful offender proceedings because "delinquency"

is often understood to encompass a wide range of adjudications

of individuals under eighteen years of age.   "[D]elinquency" and

"delinquency court" are undefined under the statute.     Black's

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines juvenile delinquency

broadly as "a juvenile's violation of the law," or more

specifically as behavior "by a minor . . . that would be

criminally punishable if the actor were an adult, but instead is

usu[ally] punished by special laws applying only to minors."

Id. at 1038.

     As the commissioner notes, however, the Legislature

maintains distinct categories of delinquent child and youthful

offender proceedings.   See G. L. c. 119, § 58 (describing

separate procedures for when juveniles are adjudicated

"delinquent child[ren]" versus "youthful offender[s]").

Accordingly, while the dictionary definition of delinquency is

expansive, it does not square with the Legislature's distinction
                                                                   8

between delinquent children and youthful offenders.   In sum, the

texts of § 100A and § 100B, neither of which contains any

reference to the category of youthful offender or otherwise

addresses youthful offender proceedings, are ambiguous on the

matter of the sealing of the petitioner's record.

     2.   Sources external to the statutes.   Where statutory

language is ambiguous, we turn to extrinsic sources to determine

the Legislature's probable intent as it pertains to the sealing

of youthful offender records.   See Harmon, 487 Mass. at 479.

Because neither the adult criminal record sealing statute nor

the juvenile delinquency sealing statute mentions youthful

offenders, and because we have concluded that the Legislature

intended for there to be a path for the sealing of youthful

offender adjudications, we are tasked with determining whether,

in the context of sealing records, the Legislature intended for

youthful offenders to be treated more like other juveniles or

more like adults based on extrinsic sources.

     The commissioner urges that we look to G. L. c. 119, § 60A

(§ 60A), which governs the "[i]nspection of records in youthful

offender and delinquency cases," to glean the Legislature's

intent with regard to the sealing of youthful offender

adjudications.   Under § 60A, the commissioner notes, youthful

offender proceedings are open to the public "in the same manner

and to the same extent as adult criminal court."    The
                                                                    9

commissioner argues that this statute suggests a broader

statutory scheme under which youthful offenders are to be

treated the same as adult criminal offenders.

     In contrast, the petitioner contends that § 60A reveals the

Legislature's intent that youthful offenders be treated more

like other juveniles than adults.   The statute states:

     "The records of a youthful offender proceeding conducted
     pursuant to an indictment shall be open to public
     inspection in the same manner and to the same extent as
     adult criminal court records. All other records of the
     court in cases of delinquency arising under [§§ 52 to 59],
     inclusive, shall be withheld from public inspection except
     with the consent of a justice of such court . . ."
     (emphasis added).

G. L. c. 119, § 60A.   The petitioner argues that the word

"other" indicates that the Legislature intended youthful

offender proceedings to be a subcategory of delinquency cases.

     Moreover, the petitioner directs the court to G. L. c. 119,

§ 53 (§ 53), which governs the interpretation of § 60A.      Section

53 instructs that § 60A "shall be liberally construed so

that . . . children brought before the court . . . shall be

treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid,

encouragement and guidance."    Section 53 further indicates that

"[p]roceedings against children under [§ 60A] shall not be

deemed criminal proceedings."   We agree with the petitioner that

§ 60A's likening of youthful offender records to delinquency

records by use of the word "other" and, more significantly,
                                                                      10

§ 53's overarching mandate that youthful offenders be treated as

children in need of aid are more indicative of the Legislature's

intent as to the sealing of youthful offender records than

§ 60A's "public inspection" directive that youthful offender

proceedings be open to the public.

     More broadly, the commissioner argues that the Legislature

provides for separate processes for delinquent children and

youthful offenders to hold youthful offenders more accountable

for more severe offenses, indicating its intent to treat

youthful offenders more like adults than delinquent children.

The Commonwealth initiates all delinquency proceedings by way of

complaints in the Juvenile Court, whereas the Commonwealth may

proceed by indictment in the Superior Court when a juvenile

qualifies as a youthful offender.    G. L. c. 119, §§ 52, 54.    An

indictment is required for a juvenile to be adjudicated a

youthful offender, which is not the case for delinquent

children.   See G. L. c. 119, § 54; Commonwealth v. Hampton, 64

Mass. App. Ct. 27, 34 (2005).   Should a juvenile be adjudicated

a youthful offender as opposed to a delinquent child, a judge

may sentence him or her as if he or she had been an adult.      See

G. L. c. 119, § 58.   But see Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432

Mass. 635, 641 (2000) ("At the same time, the provisions of the

1996 amendments did not eviscerate the longstanding principle

that the treatment of children who offend our laws are not
                                                                  11

criminal proceedings").

     The petitioner argues that the Legislature provides for a

separate Juvenile Court system to maintain a distinction between

minors and adults facing charges, indicating its intent to treat

youthful offenders more like delinquent children than adults.

While youthful offender adjudications, compared to delinquency

adjudications, allow for harsher sentencing for more serious

offenses such as firearms offenses or those involving the

infliction or threat of serious bodily harm, the distinction

between these two kinds of adjudications "affects only

sentencing."     Commonwealth v. Dale D., 431 Mass. 757, 761

(2000).   See G. L. c. 119, § 54.    Although youthful offender

proceedings are begun by indictment, "the Juvenile Court retains

jurisdiction over a juvenile in noncapital cases whether the

juvenile is indicted as a youthful offender or proceeded against

by complaint."    Dale D., supra, citing G. L. c. 263, § 4, and

G. L. c. 119, § 58.    We find this latter fact persuasive.

     As we have consistently recognized, the Juvenile Court is a

"forum[] in which, to the extent possible, the best interests of

the child serve to guide disposition" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 466 (2012).     "[A]n

adjudication of a juvenile as a youthful offender subjects him

[or her] to more severe penalties, including State prison

sentences, see G. L. c. 119, § 58, but it does not transform his
                                                                  12

illegal act from an act of delinquency into a crime, and does

not change the statutory obligation to treat him 'as far as

practicable' as a child 'in need of aid, encouragement and

guidance' rather than as a criminal."    Commonwealth v. Anderson,

461 Mass. 616, 630, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012), citing

G. L. c. 119, § 53.

     Furthermore, a scheme that forces juveniles who meet the

standard for record sealing under § 100B to wait considerably

longer before they may pursue record sealing under § 100A, or

otherwise accept that their record can never be sealed under

§ 100A, fails to aid, encourage, and guide children and instead

may interfere with their capacity to thrive.   See Globe

Newspaper Co. v. District Attorney for the Middle Dist., 439

Mass. 374, 384 (2003) ("ready access to a defendant's prior

criminal record might frustrate a defendant's access to

employment, housing, and social contacts necessary to [his or

her] rehabilitation").   The petitioner's records involving

witness intimidation charges, for example, could not be sealed

pursuant to § 100A, even if he requested sealing after waiting

the longer seven-year period.    That certain children could never

have their records sealed does not accord with the Legislature's

intent that the best interests of the child be prioritized in

Juvenile Court dispositions.    Thus, we agree with the petitioner

that the Legislature's maintenance of a separate Juvenile Court
                                                                  13

system reflects its intention to treat juveniles tried in that

system differently from adults.

     After review of the text of §§ 100A and 100B and an

analysis of legislative intent as to youthful offender

adjudications as revealed in §§ 53 and 60A and more broadly, we

conclude that the Legislature intended that, in the context of

record sealing, youthful offender adjudications be treated more

like delinquency adjudications than adult criminal

adjudications.

     Conclusion.   In sum, we conclude that, in the absence of

further legislative guidance, § 100B's process is most

consistent with the directive of the Legislature to aid,

encourage, and guide juveniles, including youthful offenders.

Accordingly, we hold that it was error for the commissioner to

refuse to seal the petitioner's Juvenile Court records pursuant

to § 100B, given that the petitioner has satisfied all listed

requirements and the statute mandates sealing in such instances.

The case is remanded to the county court for the entry of a

judgment in favor of the petitioner.6

     6 Because we allow the petitioner's request for relief
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, we need not address his request
for mandamus relief pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 5. Likewise,
because we decide for the petitioner on statutory interpretation
grounds, we need not address the petitioner's arguments whether
the commissioner's interpretation of the sealing laws violated
the equal protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and art. 1 of the Massachusetts
                                                                 14

                                   So ordered.

Declaration of Rights or is otherwise repugnant to the laws of
the Commonwealth.