Court Opinion

ID: 9717001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:55:57.192019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:50.642646
License: Public Domain

Oliphaktt, J.
(concurring). I am in accord with the reasoning in the majority opinion as to the duty imposed on the appellant-railroad by the provisions of its charter and the relevant sections of the Railroad Statute, in particular R. S. 48:12-49; and further I am in accord with the conclusion that the costs and expenses of installing the facilities of the railroad in a new location should be borne by the Authority in accordance with the provisions of N. J. S. A. 27:12R-6.
The underlying dispute here is that the re-location as finally accomplished by the Authority, under N. J. S. A. 27:12R-6, does not provide room for any additional main track of the railroad. The section just cited states:
“In case of any such relocation or removal of facilities, as aforesaid, the public utility owning or operating the same, its successors or assigns, may maintain and operate such facilities, with the necessary appurtenances, in the new location or new locations, for as long a period, and upon the same terms and conditions, as it had the right to maintain and operate such facilities in their former location or locations.”
This being so I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority that if the railroad should later decide to increase its facilities “it will properly be required to do so at its own expense under the conditions then prevailing.” This conclusion forecloses an important question which cannot be decided on the record here presented. The railroad may or may not be entitled to compensation for this apparent present loss of its right to increase the size of its main line. I think the situation on a proper showing by the railroad would be controlled by the decision in National Docks, etc. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 57 N. J. L. 637, 641 (E. A. 1895). It was held in that case that where a crossing through a right-of-way of a railroad is sought by a condemnor, future demands upon *170that right-of-way, which are fairly and reasonably certain are to be regarded by the tribunal which determines the just compensation to be awarded in reaching its conclusions as to the damages in the taking. The Court of Errors and Appeals in that case held that proof should have been admitted and the question submitted to the jury whether the use of the defendants’ right-of-way, in the manner insisted upon, was fairly and with reasonable certainty to be anticipated and then to instruct the jury that if its answer to that question be in the affirmative the measure of damages was the cost to the defending-railroad of the construction of the additional abutments that would be necessary to accommodate more tracks on their main line.
The reasons underlying the conclusion in that case are that a right-of-way is a limited quantity of land which the Legislature has determined might reasonably be appropriated under the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain to answer the ordinary, increasing and emergent uses of the railway in a continued, convenient and safe accommodation of the public. Further, that the railroad acquired it and held it, not only for the present but for future use, in the public service, with which its very being, under the law, is impressed and therefore they had the right to show and the jury determine from the evidence whether the necessity for the suggested additional trackage was fairly and reasonably to be anticipated.
It is conceded in this case, and the majority opinion so concedes, that under the re-location of the railroad facilities as accomplished by the Authority it will be impossible for the railroad under existing conditions to increase its main line to two tracks without building an additional bridge or abutment which under their charter and the statutes above referred to they are required to do.
I think the railroad in a proper proceeding within the principles of the National Docks, etc. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. case, supra, was entitled to establish its rights to compensation if it can, and that it should not be foreclosed at this time by the decision of this court.
Oliphant, J., concurring in result.
*171For affirmance—Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant, Wacheneeld, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan—7.
For reversal—None.