Court Opinion

ID: 9908370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 17:01:30.573779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:09.716180
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RANDON L. MILLER,                           No. 22-16004

                Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No.
  v.                                        2:21-cv-00834-
                                              GMS-MTM
CITY OF SCOTTSDALE, a
municipal entity; CHRISTIAN
BAILEY, in his official and individual        OPINION
capacities,

                Defendants-Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                 for the District of Arizona
       G. Murray Snow, Chief District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted September 12, 2023
                    Phoenix, Arizona

                   Filed December 8, 2023

   Before: Ronald M. Gould, Andrew D. Hurwitz, and
           Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.

                 Opinion by Judge Gould;
               Concurrence by Judge Hurwitz;
                 Dissent by Judge Bumatay
2                 MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

                          SUMMARY *

        COVID-19 Executive Order Enforcement

    The panel affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of Scottsdale Police Officer Christian
Bailey and the City of Scottsdale in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action alleging constitutional violations arising from
plaintiff’s arrest and citation for violating a COVID-19
emergency executive order, which prohibited restaurants
from offering on-site dining.
    Arizona Governor Ducey issued four COVID-19
executive orders between March 19, 2020, and June 29,
2020, that among other things prohibited on-site dining (EO-
2020-09), included restaurants on a list of essential functions
that could remain open during the pandemic (EO 2020-12),
and required that notice and an opportunity to comply be
given prior to any enforcement action (EO 2020-
18). Plaintiff is the owner of Sushi Brokers, LLC, which
operates a sushi restaurant in Scottsdale, Arizona. On April
11, 2020, officers cited and arrested plaintiff for violating
Arizona Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) § 26-317, which makes
it a misdemeanor to violate emergency executive
orders. The charges were later dismissed. Plaintiff brought
suit alleging, among other things, retaliatory arrest, in
violation of the First Amendment, and false arrest, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                 MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE                 3

    The panel first noted that both retaliatory and false arrest
claims require showing the absence of probable cause. Here,
given that officers had observed on-site dining at the
restaurant and there were prior calls reporting violations,
Officer Bailey had probable cause to arrest plaintiff under
A.R.S. § 26-317 for violating an emergency order.
    The panel next rejected plaintiff’s argument that that the
warnings he received on March 27 and 28, 2020, did not
qualify under EO 2020-18’s notice requirement because they
occurred prior to EO 2020-18’s enactment. Holding that
there was no constitutional violation, the panel noted that
plaintiff was arrested for the exact same behavior for which
he had received previous warnings. He had sufficient notice
and opportunity to comply given the challenges presented by
the COVID-19 pandemic.
    Concurring, Judge Hurwitz agreed that a reasonable
officer with the knowledge that Officer Bailey possessed
would believe that plaintiff had violated EO 2020-09 and
therefore there was probable cause for the arrest. It did not
matter that plaintiff owned the restaurant through a limited
liability corporation if he was serving in-person
diners. Moreover, even accepting plaintiff’s argument that
EO 2020-18 superseded all previous orders and required
prior notice before any A.R.S. § 26-317 arrest or citation, the
result would not change. EO 2020-18 did not invalidate the
two prior warnings plaintiff received prior to his arrest that
he was violating the ban on in-person dining.
    Dissenting, Judge Bumatay would remand to the district
court to determine in the first instance what law governed at
the time of plaintiff’s arrest. If EO 2020-09 and EO 2020-
12 governed, then plaintiff did not violate the law because
those orders applied only to “restaurants” or “businesses”—
4               MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

not persons. Nevertheless, Officer Bailey’s legal mistake
about whether those orders applied to individuals was
reasonable. If EO 2020-18 was the governing law, then it
didn’t apply to plaintiff because he wasn’t afforded the
required notice. The March 27 and 28 warnings were
insufficient because they were made before EO 2020-18
went into effect. If Officer Bailey was required to rely on
2020-18, his mistake in believing plaintiff could be arrested
was not reasonable.

                        COUNSEL

Cameron A. Morgan (argued), Cameron Morgan Law,
Scottsdale, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Kathleen L. Wieneke (argued) and Laura A. Van Buren,
Wieneke Law Group, Tempe, Arizona, for Defendant-
Appellee.
                MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE                5

                         OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

    Before us is another case arising out of the early days of
the COVID-19 pandemic. In Seaplane Adventures, LLC v.
Cnty. of Marin, we recognized the COVID-19 pandemic was
“a threat unlike any in recent times,” and that “health
officials traditionally have broad discretion, through
legislation and upon review by courts, to take actions to stem
the transmission of a contagious disease.” 71 F.4th 724, 726,
730 (9th Cir. 2023). At issue here is the enforcement of a
governor’s emergency executive order enacted under the
guidance of health officials. The district court granted
summary judgment to Scottsdale Police Officer Christian
Bailey and the City of Scottsdale in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action, and we affirm.
                       I. Background
        A. Arizona’s COVID-19 Executive Orders
    On March 11, 2020, Arizona Governor Douglas A.
Ducey issued a Declaration of Emergency for the COVID-
19 pandemic, citing findings by the World Health
Organization, the United States Department of Health and
Human Services, and the Arizona Department of Health
Services. The declaration authorized the “Director of the
Arizona Department of Health Services to coordinate all
matters pertaining to the public health emergency response
of the State.” Governor Ducey subsequently issued four
executive orders relevant to this action.
6               MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

   Issued on March 19, 2020, Executive Order (“EO”)
2020-09 prohibited restaurants from offering on-site dining:

       Beginning at close of business on Friday,
       March 20, 2020, all restaurants in counties of
       the State with confirmed cases of COVID-19
       shall close access to on-site dining until
       further notice. Restaurants may continue
       serving the public through pick up, delivery,
       and drive-thru operations.

    Issued on March 23, 2020, EO 2020-12 included
restaurants on a list of “essential functions” that could
remain open during the pandemic. EO 2020-12 did not
supersede EO 2020-09’s prohibition against on-site dining:

       Restaurants        for     consumption        off-
       premises: Restaurants and other facilities
       that prepare and serve food, but only for
       consumption off-premises, through such
       means as in-house delivery, third-party
       delivery, drive-through curbside pick-up and
       carryout. . . . This order is consistent with and
       does not supersede Executive Order 2020-09.

    Issued on March 30, 2020, EO 2020-18 set forth a
physical distancing policy and enacted a notice requirement:
“Prior to any enforcement action being taken to enforce this
order in accordance with A.R.S. § 26-317, a person shall be
notified and given an opportunity to comply.”
                MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE               7

   Issued on June 29, 2020, EO 2020-43 specified that
enforcement actions could be taken against business entities:

       Notwithstanding any other law or executive
       order, this executive order allows law
       enforcement and any regulatory agency,
       pursuant to their regulatory authority, to take
       immediate enforcement action against any
       business that fails to follow this Executive
       Order or any guidance issued by the Arizona
       Department of Health Services relating to
       COVID-19 for the protection of the public
       health, safety and welfare . . . .

    On January 27, 2022, the Maricopa County Superior
Court held in an unrelated case that “[b]ecause E.O. 2020-
43 was directed only at establishments, and not the owners
or managers of establishments, [individuals] cannot be held
personally liable under A.R.S. § 26-317 for violating E.O.
2020-43.” Arizona v. Mahaffey, LC2021-000194-001, at *7
(Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct., Jan. 27, 2022).
                 B. Randon Miller’s Arrest
    Randon L. Miller is the owner of Sushi Brokers, LLC,
which operates a sushi restaurant in Scottsdale, Arizona.
Scottsdale police officers visited Miller on March 27 and 28,
2020 in response to complaints that Sushi Brokers was
violating EO 2020-09’s prohibition against on-site dining.
On April 10, 2020, Scottsdale police received a tip from a
caller who reported seeing at least fifteen people dining
inside Sushi Brokers. An officer went to Sushi Brokers that
evening and saw about ten people inside the establishment,
of whom four left without to-go food bags. The officer also
reported observing: (1) one man (likely Miller) walking
8                MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

inside with a glass of beer; (2) a woman eating inside with
chopsticks; and (3) two men drinking alcoholic beverages
outside who later went back inside.
    The next day, April 11, 2020, appellee Officer Christian
Bailey and six other officers visited Sushi Brokers to serve
Miller with a citation for violating Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) § 26-317, which makes it a class 1 misdemeanor
to violate emergency executive orders. Miller shouted
obscenities at Officer Bailey, who eventually managed to
serve the citation. When Officer Bailey began to leave,
Miller shouted at the officers. This led Officer Bailey to
arrest Miller for violation of a COVID-19 executive order
under A.R.S. § 26-317 and disorderly conduct under A.R.S.
§ 13-2904(A)(1). These charges were later dismissed.
                   C. Judicial Proceedings
    Miller brought the present Section 1983 action asserting,
as relevant here, claims of (1) retaliatory arrest, in violation
of the First Amendment; (2) false arrest, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; and (3) liability against the City of
Scottsdale under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Miller v. City of Scottsdale,
No. 2:21-cv-00834-GMS-MTM, at *3 (June 10, 2022), Dkt.
65. The district court granted defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, holding that (1) Officer Bailey had
probable cause to arrest Miller for violation of an executive
order; and (2) Miller “plead[ed] no facts and provide[d] no
evidence to support his Monell claim.” Id. at *11–13; This
timely appeal followed.
                   II. Standard of Review
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
“review de novo the grant of summary judgment.” Johnson
                    MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE                          9

v. Barr, 79 F.4th 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2023). “Viewing the
evidence and drawing all inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, we must determine
whether any genuine issues of material fact remain and
whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
substantive law.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961,
967 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
                        III. Probable Cause
    To prevail on any of his claims, Miller must demonstrate
that Officer Bailey lacked probable cause to arrest him. Both
retaliatory and false arrest claims require showing the
absence of probable cause. 1 Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1724 (A
“plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and
prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest.”); Atwater
v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (requiring
probable cause to establish a valid arrest). Similarly, without
showing an absence of probable cause, Miller cannot
establish a constitutional violation necessary to prevail on

1
  Miller relies on a narrow exception in Nieves v. Bartlett to argue that
he does not have to prove the absence of probable cause for his
retaliatory arrest claim. 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019). In Nieves, the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff does not have to prove the absence of probable
cause in “circumstances where officers have probable cause to make
arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.” Id. at 1727.
To invoke this exception, the Court held a plaintiff must present
“objective evidence” that he was “arrested when otherwise similarly
situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had
not been.” Id. Miller provides no objective evidence to support his claim
that individuals are rarely arrested after being released following a
citation. Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 62 (9th Cir. 2022) (stating
that, at minimum, the “objective evidence” must consist of local records
comparing the number of arrests to non-arrests for similar conduct or
citations made under a given statute).
10                 MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

his municipal liability claim under Monell. Sinclair v. City
of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 680 n.3 (9th Cir. 2023). 2
    In the context of a Section 1983 action, “[p]robable cause
to arrest exists when there is a ‘fair probability or substantial
chance of criminal activity’ by the arrestee based on the
totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time
of arrest.” Vanegas v. City of Pasadena, 46 F.4th 1159, 1164
(9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d
896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). This “is not a high bar:
It requires only the kind of fair probability on which
reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.”
Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014) (cleaned
up). For probable cause, officers may rely on information
gained by other officers under the “collective knowledge”
doctrine. United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1036–37
(9th Cir. 2007).
    Miller’s arrest report states that he was arrested for
violating a COVID-19 executive order on April 10, 2020. It
is undisputed that, before arresting Miller on April 11, 2020,
Officer Bailey was advised that police officers had visited
the restaurant on March 27 and 28, 2020 for possible
violations of EO 2020-09’s prohibition against on-site
dining, and that additional violations were observed on April
10, 2020. Miller also does not challenge the observations of

2
  Because we conclude that Officer Bailey had probable cause to arrest
Miller under A.R.S. § 26-317, we do not address whether the defendants
properly raised a qualified immunity defense in the district court or
whether Miller waived his arguments that there was no probable cause.
And because probable cause need only exist for one, rather than all, of
the offenses charged, we do not address whether there was probable
cause to arrest Miller for disorderly conduct. Blankenhorn v. City of
Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 473 (9th Cir. 2007).
                    MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE                      11

the officer who visited Sushi Brokers on the evening of April
10, 2020.
    Even taking as true Miller’s argument that some of the
people in the restaurant on April 10 were employees and not
patrons, no reasonable jury could conclude that Officer
Bailey lacked probable cause. Miller’s argument does not
account for the prior calls reporting violations or the
officer’s observations of four individuals leaving the
restaurant without to-go bags. Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059,
1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that anonymous tips
implicating defendant were “valuable”). The probable cause
inquiry turns not on whether there was a violation in fact, but
on whether a reasonable officer would conclude that there
was a fair probability of a violation. See id. at 1066–67
(noting that for probable cause, the detectives did not need
personal knowledge that the items “were actually stolen”);
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1147 (9th Cir.
2012) (stating that once probable cause is established,
officers do not have a duty to investigate further for
exculpatory evidence). The record demonstrates that Officer
Bailey undoubtedly had probable cause to arrest Miller
under A.R.S. § 26-317. 3
   IV. Executive Order 2020-18’s Notice Requirement
    Miller contends that he was not given notice and an
opportunity to comply as required under EO 2020-18. Miller
states that the officer visits and warnings on March 27 and

3
  Any requirement in EO 2020-43 that enforcement for violations of the
COVID-19 executive orders must be taken against businesses rather than
individuals is irrelevant because EO 2020-43 was enacted on June 29,
2020, after Miller’s arrest. Vanegas, 46 F.4th at 1164 (probable cause is
determined “based on the totality of the circumstances known to the
officers at the time of arrest”) (emphasis added).
12                  MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

28, 2020 do not qualify because they both occurred before
EO 2020-18’s enactment on March 30, 2020. Section 1983
actions generally cannot rest on a violation of state law,
“unless the right encompassed in the state statute is
guaranteed under the United States Constitution.”4 Moore
v. Marketplace Rest., Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1349 (7th Cir.
1985); accord Smith v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 887 F.3d
944, 952 (9th Cir. 2018). But we address Miller’s contention
because we construe it as a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Smith, 887 F.3d at 952
(“[S]tate laws can create liberty interests that are subject to
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). EO 2020-
18’s notice requirement created an interest in freedom from
citation or arrest without prior warning. See, e.g., Carlo v.
City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 498–99 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a California statute created a liberty interest in an
arrestee’s right to make phone calls).
    To determine whether Miller was afforded sufficient
procedural protections, we look at “(1) the private interest
affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the
probable value of any additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest.” Johnson v.
Ryan, 55 F.4th 1167, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing

4
  For this reason, we reject Miller’s contentions based on Arizona state
law. It is long settled that the requirement under A.R.S. § 13-3883 that
a misdemeanor be committed in an officer’s presence is not grounded in
the Fourth Amendment. Vanegas, 46 F.4th at 1165. Although at oral
argument Miller’s counsel cited Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.
348 (2015), we generally do not consider an argument not included in
the appellant’s opening brief. Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th
Cir. 1999). Moreover, Rodriguez is inapposite because it involves an
officer’s authority to extend a traffic stop to conduct tasks beyond those
“tied to the traffic infraction.” 575 U.S. at 354. Here, Miller was arrested
for the same violation for which he was cited.
                   MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE                     13

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). Miller
contends that to comply with due process, Scottsdale police
should have issued notice of his violation of EO 2020-09
following EO 2020-18’s enactment, despite having already
issued two prior warnings. We conclude there is nearly no
risk of erroneous deprivation or value of additional notice in
these circumstances. Miller was arrested for the exact same
behavior for which he had received previous warnings, and
all three instances involved enforcement of A.R.S. § 26-317,
the generic enforcement provision for executive orders
enacted during an emergency. 5
    The government’s interest is also significant. We
reiterate as a general rule of law that “in the midst of a
dangerous health emergency,” we must “ensure the proper
deference is given to local governmental officials.”
Seaplane Adventures, LLC, 71 F.4th at 726.              Law
enforcement officials enforcing laws enacted under the
guidance of public health officials are no exception. The
Supreme Court recognized in Jacobson v. Massachusetts
that “[t]he authority to determine for all what ought to be
done in such an emergency” can be appropriately granted “in
the first instance, to a board of health composed of persons
residing in the locality affected, and appointed, presumably,
because of their fitness to determine such questions.” 197
U.S. 11, 27 (1905). During pandemics like COVID-19, the
legislative and executive branches have broad powers and
discretion to carry out the recommendations of health

5
  The Declaration of Emergency for COVID-19 stated it was authorized
“pursuant to A.R.S. § 26-303(D) and in accordance with A.R.S. § 26-
301(15).” A.R.S. § 26-317 states, “Any person who violates any
provision of this chapter or who knowingly fails or refuses to obey any
lawful order or regulation issued as provided in this chapter shall be
guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor.”
14               MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

officials designed to protect “[t]he safety and the health of
the people.” Id. at 38; S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020) (Robert, C.J.,
concurring); see also Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020) (per curiam) (“Members of
this Court are not public health experts, and we should
respect the judgment of those with special expertise and
responsibility in this area.”); Slidewaters LLC v. Wash. State
Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 4 F.4th 747, 758 (9th Cir. 2021)
(“States are given ‘great leeway in adopting summary
procedures to protect public health and safety.’”) (quoting
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)).
     Such deference is at its height for measures taken, as
here, during the early stages of a pandemic, when local
governmental officials have limited knowledge about a
novel disease and yet must nonetheless act to prevent the loss
of lives. See Seaplane Adventures, LLC, 71 F.4th at 730–31
(“The passage of time and the resulting receding of a crisis
does not make us, as courts, competent to second guess what
the best avenue of action was for a state or local government
when the crisis was raging.”). Only where a legislative or
executive action has “no real or substantial relation” to the
public health and safety or is a “plain, palpable invasion of
rights secured by the fundamental law,” is it “the duty of the
courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the
Constitution.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. We conclude that
there was no constitutional violation here, much less a
“plain” or “palpable” one. Miller had sufficient notice and
opportunity to comply given the challenges presented by the
COVID-19 pandemic. See Clement v. City of Glendale, 518
F.3d 1090, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The government need
not give notice in an emergency, nor if notice would defeat
the entire point of the seizure, nor when the interest at stake
                MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE               15

is small relative to the burden that giving notice would
impose.”).
    The dissent erroneously concludes it is dispositive that
“the district court didn’t resolve whether 2020-09 and 2020-
12 stood on their own at the time of Miller’s arrest, or
whether 2020-18 applied.” EO 2020-18 states that it “builds
on actions the state has already taken, and further
memorializes some already in effect,” and refers to EO
2020-09 and 2020-12 in its preamble. Officer Bailey could
have relied on any of the three executive orders in arresting
Miller. Arresting Miller without additional notice following
the enactment of EO 2020-18 also does not implicate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. The dissent omits in its quotation of
McGill v. Shinn that the Ex Post Facto Clause “prohibits a
state from retroactively changing the definition of a crime to
make formerly innocent behavior illegal or increasing the
punishment for criminal acts.” 16 F.4th 666, 700–01 (9th
Cir. 2021) (emphasis added). EO 2020-18 did not change
the definition of nor increase the punishment for the crime
for which Miller was arrested: violating a prohibition against
on-site dining.
                       V. Conclusion
   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Miller’s
Section 1983 claims against Officer Bailey and the City of
Scottsdale.
   AFFIRMED.
16               MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:

     The issue in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is whether
Scottsdale Police Officer Christian Bailey had probable
cause to arrest Randon Miller on April 11, 2020, for
violating Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 26-317, which makes
it a class 1 misdemeanor to “knowingly fail[] or refuse[] to
obey any lawful order or regulation issued as provided in this
chapter.” The parties do not dispute that Arizona Governor
Douglas Ducey’s Executive Order (“EO”) 2020-09, which
prohibited “on-site dining” in restaurants at the outset of the
COVID-19 pandemic, was a lawful order “issued as
provided in this chapter.”
    As Judge Gould’s opinion makes clear, Officer Bailey
had ample cause to believe that on April 11, Miller was
serving meals in the restaurant he owned and operated, Sushi
Brokers. Officer Bailey also knew that other Scottsdale
police officers had visited the restaurant on March 27 and
28, and those officers had notified Miller that he was
violating EO 2020-09er. Thus, the question in this case is
whether Officer Bailey had probable cause to believe that
this set of facts established a violation of A.R.S. § 26-317.
    Miller argues that Officer Bailey lacked probable cause
for two reasons. First, he contends that EO 2020-09 only
applied to businesses, not individuals. Second, citing
another gubernatorial order, EO 2020-18, issued on March
30, 2020, which required that “[p]rior to any enforcement
action being taken to enforce this order in accordance with
A.R.S. § 26-317, a person shall be notified and given an
opportunity to comply,” Miller claims that he did not violate
§ 26-371 because he did not receive notice and an
opportunity to comply before the arrest. Miller argues that
the earlier warnings do not count because they came before
                MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE               17

EO 2020-18 was issued. Judge Gould’s opinion quite
correctly rejects both arguments.
    The starting point, as Judge Gould correctly notes, is
recognizing that establishing probable cause is “not a high
bar.” Op. at 10. We need not decide today whether Miller’s
legal arguments might have prevailed had he gone to trial for
violating the executive order. We do not require arresting
officers to parse the law with the fine-tooth comb that
appellate counsel can wield. Rather, the question is whether
a reasonable officer with the knowledge that Officer Bailey
possessed would believe that Miller had violated EO 2020-
09. See United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Probable cause to arrest exists when officers
have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information
sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed by the person
being arrested.”).
    I agree with Judge Gould that this undemanding standard
was met. As Miller argues, EO 2020-09 only stated that
“restaurants” could not allow in-person dining; it made no
specific mention of the individuals operating the restaurants.
But A.R.S. § 26-317 applies to “[a]ny person” who violates
an emergency executive order. It should not matter that
Miller owned the restaurant through a limited liability
corporation if he was serving in-person diners. An
individual operating a restaurant is not exempted from EO
2020-09 order simply because formal ownership of the
restaurant is in a corporation he alone controls. Indeed, even
had Officer Bailey been aware that Miller owns Sushi
Brokers through an LLC (something the record does not
indicate Bailey knew), the officer could surely have
reasonably believed that Miller, the sole shareholder in the
18               MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

corporation and the operator of the restaurant, was violating
the order against on-site dining.
    Miller’s other argument fares no better. As an initial
matter, it is not at all clear that the prior notice requirement
in EO 2020-18 applies to this case. EO 2020-18 did not
purport to supersede or replace any prior COVID-19
executive order. Indeed, its predominant distinguishing
feature from the prior executive orders directed at public
institutions and businesses was a requirement that individual
Arizona citizens “stay at home.” EO 2020-18’s notice
requirement thus seems best read as applying enforcement
of that “stay at home” order against individuals, rather than
requiring additional notice to business operators, who
already had been told of the requirement to cease in-person
dining in prior orders.
    But even if we were to accept Miller’s argument that EO
2020-18 superseded all previous orders and required prior
notice before any A.R.S. § 26-317 arrest or citation, the
result would not change. Miller had two warnings prior to
April 11 that he was violating the ban on in-person dining.
Even if EO 2020-18 somehow established an entirely new
offense, the executive order did not invalidate any prior
warnings. Nor is there an obvious reason to view the
warnings as elements of this supposed new offense; they are
at most just procedural steps required prior to enforcement.
    And, even if all of Miller’s complicated legal arguments
are accepted, surely Officer Bailey cannot be faulted for not
having concluded he could arrest Miller. The officer’s belief
that there was probable cause to cite and arrest Miller for
violation of EO 2020-09 was at the very least reasonable, see
Lopez, 482 F.3d at 1072, and that is all the law requires.
                 MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE               19

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

    It is undoubtably true, as my colleagues take pains to
point out, that the COVID-19 pandemic was a danger to
public health and safety. When faced with threats to the
public wellbeing, States may rightfully respond to the
emergency. Even so, the Constitution does not simply lay
dormant during those times. “The rights enshrined by the
Constitution persist in times of crisis and tranquility.”
Tandon v. Newsom, 992 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2021)
(Bumatay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Simply put, an emergency does not authorize government
officials to abandon the protections of the Constitution.
    This case tests these concepts in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. Over three weeks in March 2020, the
Governor of Arizona issued three COVID-19-related
emergency orders. First, on March 19, Executive Order
2020-09 prohibited “restaurants” from offering on-site
dining. Office of Governor Douglas A. Ducey, Executive
Order 2020-09 § 2 (Mar. 19, 2020). Second, on March 23,
Executive Order 2020-12 classified “restaurants for
consumption off-premises” as essential businesses. Office
of Governor Douglas A. Ducey, Executive Order 2020-12
§ 3(e)(xiii) (Mar. 23, 2020). Finally, on March 30,
Executive Order 2020-18 ordered residents to stay at home
unless for an authorized purpose. Office of Governor
Douglas A. Ducey, Executive Order 2020-18 (Mar. 30,
2020). Importantly, this order required that “a person shall
be notified and given an opportunity to comply” before “any
enforcement action” may take place. Id. § 14.
   Given the dizzying speed of all these orders, confusion
was bound to happen.
20              MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

                             I.
                             A.
    On April 11, 2020, Scottsdale Police Officer Bailey
arrested Randon Miller, a restaurant owner, for violating the
COVID-19 mandates. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 26-317
(prohibiting “knowingly fail[ing] or refus[ing] to obey any
lawful [emergency] order”). But it’s unclear what order
governed at the time of Miller’s arrest. The City of
Scottsdale asserts that 2020-09 and 2020-12 alone justified
the arrest. Miller contends that the newest order, 2020-18,
was the applicable one. To add confusion to the matter, the
district court seemingly conflated 2020-09 and 2020-18. It
held that Miller was arrested under 2020-09, but erroneously
thought     2020-18’s      notice-and-opportunity-to-comply
requirement fell under that order. For its part, the majority
simply says that Officer Bailey could have picked whatever
Executive Order he wanted to enforce.
    And nobody has a cogent explanation for why their
position on which order or orders apply is the right one. On
this basis alone, I would remand to the district court to
determine in the first instance what law governed at the time
of Miller’s arrest.
                             B.
    No matter the order, however, Officer Bailey had no
legal basis to arrest Miller under § 26-317.
    If 2020-09 and 2020-12 governed, then Miller did not
violate the law because those orders applied only to
“restaurants” or “businesses”—not persons. The City of
Scottsdale conceded as much at oral argument.
                MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE               21

    But, if 2020-18 was the governing law, then it didn’t
apply to Miller because he wasn’t afforded the required
notice. Recall that 2020-18 directs that notice and an
opportunity to comply be given before enforcement. See
2020-18 § 14. No such notice and opportunity were given.
While Miller received warnings on March 27 and 28, those
warnings came before 2020-18 went into effect. Indeed, the
order required notice and opportunity to comply with “this
order”—meaning that only warnings made after 2020-18’s
March 31 effective date count. See 2020-18 § 14.
   So, in either case, Miller should not have been arrested.
                             II.
    But these legal errors don’t end the inquiry. That’s
because “the Fourth Amendment protects officers who make
reasonable mistakes about whether the law supports an
arrest.” Vanegas v. City of Pasadena, 46 F.4th 1159, 1169–
70 (9th Cir. 2022) (Bumatay, J., concurring) (emphasis
added) (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66
(2014)). So not all mistakes of law are treated the same. If
Officer Bailey made a reasonable mistake of law, then the
City of Scottsdale and Officer Bailey are entitled to
dismissal of Miller’s § 1983 charges. If not, this case should
proceed.
     What law governed at the time of Miller’s arrest makes
all the difference here.
                             A.
    Assuming only 2020-09 and 2020-12 governed, like my
colleagues, I would hold that Officer Bailey’s legal mistake
about whether those orders applied to individuals was
reasonable. Officer Bailey was dealing with a novel set of
orders, which had not yet been interpreted by any court. See
22               MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

Heien, 574 U.S. at 68 (concluding that a mistake of law was
reasonable when an ambiguous law “had never been
previously construed by [the State’s] appellate courts”).
And holding restaurant owners or operators criminally liable
for what happens within their restaurants seems legally
feasible under Arizona law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-306
(“A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an
offense which such person performs or causes to be
performed in the name of or in behalf of an enterprise to the
same extent as if such conduct were performed in such
person’s own name or behalf.”). But see State v. Angelo, 800
P.2d 11, 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that corporate
officers could not be prosecuted under a tax statute imposing
obligations on a corporation).
   So I can’t say that Officer Bailey acted objectively
unreasonably in believing that Miller could be arrested under
2020-09 and 2020-12.
                              B.
    On the other hand, if Officer Bailey was required to rely
on 2020-18, his mistake was not reasonable.
    First, it would violate 2020-18’s unambiguous text. The
order requires that, “[p]rior to any enforcement action being
taken to enforce this order,” a person “be notified and given
an opportunity to comply.” 2020-18 § 14. That means
Miller must have received notice under “this order”—
meaning under 2020-18 alone. It’s uncontested that Miller
never received such notice. The March 27 and 28 warnings
couldn’t satisfy notice because they were made before the
order went into effect. Thus, the failure to follow this
straightforward textual requirement makes it not “a really
difficult or very hard question of statutory interpretation,” to
                 MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE                23

which we should grant officers some leeway. See Heien, 574
U.S. at 70 (Kagan, J., concurring) (simplified).
     Second, beyond the text, applying 2020-18 here would
unreasonably implicate the prohibition on ex post facto laws.
It is a fundamental tenet of criminal punishment that “[n]o
State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.” U.S. Const.
art. I, § 10.        Under that Clause, States may not
“retroactively . . . make formerly innocent behavior illegal.”
See McGill v. Shinn, 16 F.4th 666, 700–01 (9th Cir. 2021).
Finding probable cause for Miller’s arrest here would raise
ex post facto concerns.
    Executive Order 2020-18 increased the burden on the
government to prosecute individuals who violate the
COVID-19 mandates. It changed the law to require the
government to prove that a person violated the prohibition
on on-site dining at restaurants after being warned and given
an opportunity to comply. By the time of his arrest on
April 11, Miller never received any warnings to comply with
2020-18. The only warnings he received came before 2020-
18’s effective date. So, to arrest him under 2020-18 would
affect Miller’s “substantial rights” and “disadvantage”
Miller by relieving the government of its higher burden and
require applying the law “to actions that pre-date its
enactment.” Id. at 701 (defining ex post facto laws).
Reading the law to apply retroactively is a mistake orders of
magnitude greater than simply misreading a confusing
statute. Cf. Heien, 574 U.S. at 68.
    Applying 2020-18 to the facts here would both do
potential harm to a foundational constitutional protection
and disregard the unambiguous text of the order. So, if
2020-18 applied, Officer Bailey’s legal error was not
objectively reasonable under these facts.
24                MILLER V. CITY OF SCOTTSDALE

                               III.
    Because the district court didn’t resolve whether 2020-
09 and 2020-12 stood on their own at the time of Miller’s
arrest, or whether 2020-18 applied, I would vacate the grant
of summary judgment and remand for reconsideration.
     I thus respectfully dissent.