Court Opinion

ID: 9378848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 19:02:29.85608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.304274
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/23 P. v. Leyva CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B320760
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. 2021005005)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Ventura County)

 v.

 JORGE ARMANDO LEYVA,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Jorge Armando Leyva appeals from the judgment after the
trial court sentenced him to three years in state prison for arson
of an inhabited structure. He contends: (1) his waiver of jury
trial was invalid, and (2) the trial court erred in ordering
restitution to the Oxnard Fire Department. Because the jury
waiver here was invalid, we reverse.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Leyva was charged with arson of an inhabited structure
                                                             1
(the Oxnard homeless shelter) (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b))
(count 1) and, for another incident, arson of property (§ 451, subd.
(d)) (count 2). The court found Leyva incompetent to stand trial
(§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)). Five months later, based on evaluations
of two doctors, the court found Leyva competent (§ 1370, subd.
(a)(1)(A)).
       Five months after the competency finding, defense counsel
told the court, “I discussed this matter with Mr. Leyva and he’s
going to waive jury at this time.” The court advised Leyva that
“if you need to talk to [defense counsel], you can.” No written
waiver form was used. Instead, the following colloquy occurred:
        “[Court]: All right. Mr. Leyva, you do have a right to a
jury trial in this case. Are you willing to waive your right to a
jury trial and instead of having your case decided by a jury of 12
individuals, you agree to have a judge decide and have a Court
trial instead?
       “[Leyva]: I’d rather have a judge.
       “[Court]: All right. And so that’s a yes, correct?
       “[Leyva]: Yes.
       “[Court]: You’d rather have a judge?
       “[Leyva]: Yes.
       “[Court]: And do you also understand that you have certain
Sixth Amendment rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses
where a jury would be the one determining credibility and weight
of evidence, but instead, by waiving your right to a jury trial, that
will be a judge making that decision? Do you understand that?
       “[Leyva]: Yes.

      1
       Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

                                 2
       “[Court]: All right. And you also understand if you were to
have a jury trial, you’d have a Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent and a jury would be told they couldn’t hold that against you
and they could not consider that in deliberating and weighing the
evidence? You’d still have that same right, but it wouldn’t be a
jury; it would be a judge? Do you understand that?
       “[Leyva]: Can I ask a question?
       “[Defense counsel]: Why don’t you ask me.
       “[Court]: Ask [defense counsel], please.
       “[Defense counsel]: Sorry, your Honor. Could the Court
repeat its last question?
        “[Court]: Sure. You understand that you’d have a Fifth
Amendment right where a jury would be told they could not hold
that against you and they couldn’t consider that?
        “[Leyva]: Yes, sir.
        “[Court]: And you’re giving up that right as far as having a
jury consider that, but you’d still have a Fifth Amendment right;
it would just be a judge. Do you understand that?
        “[Leyva]: Yes, sir.
        “[Court]: All right. I’ll show that the defendant has
knowingly, intelligently and understandingly waived his right to
a jury trial and instead is electing a Court trial to have a judicial
officer make those determinations.”
       The trial court found Leyva guilty of count 1 and not guilty
of count 2. It sentenced Leyva to the low term of three years in
state prison. Without objection, the court ordered Leyva to pay
restitution of $921.38 to the Oxnard Fire Department.
                            DISCUSSION
                             Jury waiver
       Leyva contends his waiver of jury trial was invalid. We

                                 3
agree.
         The federal and state constitutions guarantee the right to
trial by jury. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)
“The denial of a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial
constitutes structural error that requires reversal regardless of
the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.
[Citations.]” (People v. Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 420, 429.)
         A waiver of jury trial must be “ ‘knowing and intelligent,
that is, “ ‘ “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it,” ’ ” ’ ” and “ ‘voluntary “ ‘ “in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sivongxxay
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) Trial judges need not
follow a rigid formula or use any particular words to ensure that
a jury waiver is knowing and intelligent. (Id. at pp. 169-170.)
         “The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which
appellate courts review de novo.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13
Cal.4th 68, 80 [waiver of appeal]; People v. Morelos (2022) 13
Cal.5th 722, 735 [Faretta waiver].) A jury waiver is valid only
“ ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and
intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” (People v.
Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.)
(Daniels).) “The burden is on the party claiming the existence of
the waiver to prove it by evidence that does not leave the matter
to speculation, and doubtful cases will be resolved against a
waiver.” (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 500-501.)
         In 2017, our Supreme Court provided guidance for jury
waivers in criminal cases. “Going forward, we recommend that
trial courts advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury

                                   4
trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to
the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the
community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may
participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously
agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives
the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt
or innocence.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.)
        The trial court failed to heed that guidance here. Only one
of the four advisements was fully given, i.e., that a judge alone
would decide the case. The court advised that a jury consists of
“12 individuals” but “the record does not show whether [Leyva]
understood that a jury is comprised of individuals from the
community.” (People v. Jones, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 423.)
“ ‘ “[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the
interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the
community participation and shared responsibility that results
from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence.” ’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 432.)
        The court also did not advise Leyva of two significant rights
listed in Sivongxxay: that he could participate in jury selection
through his attorney, and that the jury verdict must be
unanimous. Counsel’s participation in jury selection is part of
providing an effective defense. (People v. Locklar (1978) 84
Cal.App.3d 224, 229.) The defendant has a right to participate in
jury selection by consulting with counsel. (See People v.
Kocontes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 787, 873-875 [right to consult
counsel during trial]; People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1059
[jury selection a “ ‘critical stage’ ” of trial, defendant has
“ ‘constitutional right to be present’ ”].) And the right to a

                                 5
unanimous verdict is an essential element of the right to jury
trial. (Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [140 S.Ct.
1390, 1396-1397, 206 L.Ed.2d 583]; People v. Traugott (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 492, 500.) While the failure to advise of either of
these rights does not automatically invalidate a jury waiver, their
absence combined with the lack of a “robust oral colloquy”
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169) shows the waiver was not
knowing and intelligent based on the totality of the
circumstances.
       Sivongxxay also recommended that trial courts take
“additional steps,” for example, “by asking whether the defendant
had an adequate opportunity to discuss the decision with his or
her attorney, by asking whether counsel explained to the
defendant the fundamental differences between a jury trial and a
bench trial, or by asking the defendant directly if he or she
understands or has any questions about the right being waived.”
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 169-170.) Defense counsel
here advised the court that he “discussed this matter with Mr.
Leyva,” but the court did not inquire whether counsel explained
the differences between a jury trial and a court trial, or whether
Leyva understood. (Cf. People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056,
1070-1071 [in two-hour discussion, attorney “fully explained”
difference between jury trial and court trial].) Leyva attempted
to ask a question of the court but was told to ask his attorney.
The record does not reflect that Leyva and his counsel took a
break from the proceedings to discuss his question, much less
that Leyva received an answer to his question. The court should
have directed Leyva and his counsel to take a break from the
proceedings to address Leyva’s question.
       A “ ‘defendant’s prior experience with the criminal justice

                                6
system’ is . . . ‘relevant to the question of whether he knowingly
waived constitutional rights.’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33
Cal.4th 353, 365.) At trial, and after Leyva had purportedly
waived a jury trial, Leyva’s criminal history summary (“rap
sheet”) and the court dockets from two previous felony cases were
admitted as relevant to aggravating circumstances. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2).) Although he had several prior
convictions, the record does not include the specific advisements
or waivers given to Leyva in those cases. The docket from a 2018
felony jury trial showed Leyva was present when his attorney
participated in jury selection. But we do not assume that Leyva
considered those proceedings when he waived jury here more
than three and half years later. This case is unlike Mosby, where
the defendant was aware of his trial rights when he admitted a
prior conviction because he “had just undergone a jury trial” on
the substantive offense. (Mosby, at p. 364.) Mosby relied on
United States v. Dawson (9th Cir. 1999) 193 F.3d 1107, 1110-
1111, where an incomplete advisement of rights was preceded
less than two months earlier by a full advisement in another
case. (See Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1002 (lead opn. of
Cuéllar, J.) [“only an attenuated connection, at best” with oral
advice for guilty pleas a decade earlier].)
       Other circumstances support our conclusion that the
prosecution has not established a valid waiver. No written
waiver form was used. While a written waiver is not required, it
can be helpful to establish the adequacy of a jury waiver. (See
People v. Weaver, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) Similarly, while
the absence of an express finding of voluntariness here does not
automatically invalidate a jury waiver (People v. Smith, supra,
110 Cal.App.4th at p. 502), the record does not include a factual

                                7
basis to establish voluntariness such as an inquiry regarding
threats or promises made in exchange for waiving jury. (See
People v. Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 754; Daniels, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 988 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)
       In People v. Blancett (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1200 (Blancett),
we reversed an MDO commitment order on the ground that
Blancett’s jury trial waiver was not knowing and intelligent. As
in Blancett, the trial court here failed to “explain the significant
attributes or mechanics of a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 1206.) Nor did
the trial court inquire whether the defendant “had sufficient
opportunity to discuss the decision with his attorney, whether his
attorney explained the differences between a bench trial and a
jury trial, or whether [the defendant] had any questions about
the waiver.” (Ibid.) And, like Blancett, “we have no record of the
advisements [Leyva] received” in other criminal matters. (Ibid.)
       “Crowded dockets, constrained budgets, and overwhelming
caseloads for public attorneys create undeniable pressure to
speed criminal cases along” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p.
216), but “the trial court is not merely a passive receiver of an
attempted [jury] waiver. . . . The court’s obligation ‘to advise
[the] defendant of his right to [a] jury trial’ and to ‘determine
impartially whether [the] defendant’s waiver of jury trial was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary’ is a ‘constitutional
procedural duty.’ ” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 993.)
       Our Supreme Court has encouraged judges to engage in a
“robust oral colloquy” with criminal defendants to ensure they
are fully aware of the rights they give up when waiving the
constitutional right to a jury trial. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th
at p. 169.) The court recommended this include a discussion
about “the basic mechanics of a jury trial,” including the right to

                                 8
participate in jury selection through counsel and being advised
that all the jurors must agree for a verdict. (Id. at pp. 166, 169.)
Based on the record before us, there was no robust oral colloquy.
Thus, we cannot conclude based on the totality of the
circumstances that Leyva waived his right to a jury trial “with
full awareness of the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Blancett, supra, 15
Cal.App.5th at p. 1206.)
                             Restitution
       Leyva contends the trial court erred when it ordered him to
pay restitution to the Oxnard Fire Department for its costs in
fighting the fire. Because we reverse the judgment, we need not
determine whether the facts of the case authorized the restitution
order.
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     BALTODANO, J.

I concur:

            GILBERT, P. J.

                                 9
YEGAN, J., Dissenting:
       I respectfully dissent. This meaningless reversal is an
exaltation of form over substance. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, I would conclude Leyva knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. In People v.
Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151 (Sivongxxay), our Supreme
Court “offer[ed] some general guidance” and “recommend[ed] that
trial courts advise a defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury
trial in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to
the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the
community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may
participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously
agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives
the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt
or innocence.” (Id. at p. 169.) The Court also suggested that the
trial court ask the defendant if he has had an adequate
opportunity to discuss the decision with his lawyer and if he has
any questions. (Id. at pp. 169-170.)
       In concluding that the jury waiver here was invalid, the
majority contends, “[t]he trial court failed to heed [the] guidance”
provided by Sivongxxay because “[o]nly one of the four
advisement was fully given,” i.e., that the judge alone would
decide the case. (Maj. opn. ante, at pp. 4-5.) But the guidelines
provided in Sivongxxay are not mandatory. Indeed, the Supreme
Court “emphasize[d] that [its] guidance [was] not intended to
limit trial courts to a narrow or rigid colloquy.” (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 170.) Instead, the Court reiterated that “a
trial court’s adaptation of or departure from the recommended
colloquy in an individual case will not necessarily render an
ensuing jury waiver invalid.” (Ibid.)
       The jury waiver in this case is not a “barebones colloquy”
like that in People v. Blancett (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1200. There,
the trial court “asked only if Blancett was ‘okay’ with a court trial
instead of a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 1206, italics added.) In addition
to the “stark colloquy,” we considered the lack of evidence that
Blancett had discussed his jury trial right and waiver with
counsel, his inexperience with the criminal justice system, and
his lack of familiarity with the MDO (mentally disordered
offender) proceedings. (Id. at pp. 1206-1207.) This case is unlike
Blancett because the trial court’s advisements here, taken
together with Leyva’s prior jury trial experience as indicated in
the record, demonstrate that he was aware that (1) a jury is made
up of 12 members of the community, (2) he could participate in
jury selection through his attorney, and (3) by waiving his right
to a jury trial, the judge would decide his guilt or innocence.
       Although the trial court did not advise Leyva that a jury
verdict must be unanimous, our Supreme Court has “never
insisted that a jury waiver colloquy invariably must discuss . . .
the unanimity requirement . . . for an ensuing waiver to be
knowing and intelligent.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p.
168.)
       The record also reflects that Leyva had the opportunity to
discuss the matter of waiver with his attorney both before and
during the hearing, which also satisfied one of the “additional
steps” recommended in Sivongxxay to ensure that a defendant
comprehends what the jury trial right entails. (Sivongxxay,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.)
       Nevertheless, the majority concludes that Leyva was not
advised of “‘the basic mechanics of a jury trial.’” (Maj. opn. ante,
p. 8.) For example, the majority contends “the [trial] court did

                                  2
not inquire whether counsel explained the differences between a
jury trial and a court trial, or whether Leyva understood.” (Id. at
p. 6.) The majority also contends that “[t]he record does not
reflect that Leyva and his counsel took a break from the
proceedings to discuss his question [during the waiver colloquy],
much less that Leyva received an answer to his question.” (Ibid.)
       First, the record does not show that Leyva’s question went
unanswered. Second, the majority overlooks the crucial role of
counsel. “Counsel is presumed competent and informed as to
applicable constitutional and state law . . . . Counsel . . . can be
expected, where necessary or advisable, to consult with the client
about jury trial concerns.” (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1081, 1105; People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 996 (lead opn.
of Cuéllar, J.) [“Counsel plays a crucial part in transmitting
information to the client [about waiver of the right to a jury trial].
Time and time again, our precedent has recognized as much,
incorporating within the totality of relevant circumstances not
only the fact of representation by counsel, but also record
references to discussions between counsel and defendant”];
Daniels, at p. 999 [“Courts generally rely on counsel to transmit
to defendants critical information about whether to waive the
jury trial right and the consequences of waiving it”].)
       Here, the record reflects that counsel expressly informed
the trial court that she “discussed this matter with Mr. Leyva”
and that he is “going to waive jury at this time.” When the trial
court informed Leyva that he had a right to a jury trial decided
by 12 individuals, Leyva responded that he would “rather have a
judge.” The relevant circumstances here, including the colloquy,
Leyva’s prior trial experience, and the fact that he was
represented by counsel, support the trial court’s finding that

                                  3
Leyva knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial.
       The majority also relies on “[o]ther circumstances” to
support its conclusion that “the prosecution has not established a
valid waiver,” specifically, the lack of a written waiver form and
the absence of an express finding of voluntariness. (Maj. opn.
ante, p. 7.) But the law has not mandated any specific method for
finding a valid waiver. Rather, reviewing courts must examine
the totality of the circumstances. (See Sivongxxay, supra, 3
Cal.5th at pp. 167, 169 [“eschew[ing] any rigid formula or
particular form of words that a trial court must use in taking a
jury waiver”]; People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 502
[no requirement that the court make an express finding that
waiver was knowing and voluntary].)
      Considering the totality of the circumstances here, I would
conclude Leyva’s jury waiver was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     YEGAN, J.

                                 4
                    Derek D. Malan, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.