Court Opinion

ID: 9667202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:38:12.4217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:35.925618
License: Public Domain

BLEIL, Justice.
Howard Rhea appeals his conviction of the aggravated sexual assault of his two-year-old daughter. He complains that the child’s videotaped statement should not have been admitted in evidence, raising the pivotal issue of whether the child was a competent witness. Because we conclude that the child was not a competent witness, admission of her videotaped statement violated Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp.1985). Therefore, we reverse the judgment.
In February 1984, Rhea and his wife separated and in March Shirley Rhea filed for divorce. On April 2, Shirley Rhea asked the Texas Department of Human Resources to investigate her husband for sexual abuse of their child which reportedly occurred March 11. As a part of an interview with the child and Shirley Rhea, Sann Cisco, a child protective specialist for the Department of Human Resources, caused to be prepared a videotaped interview of the child. Responding to specific questioning, usually with head nods, the child indicated that an incident of sexual abuse had occurred. When the child testified under oath at the trial, she said that she remembered nothing about the interview with Cisco and that Rhea did nothing which would be sexual abuse. The jury determined that on March 11, 1984, Howard Rhea committed aggravated sexual assault upon a child and assessed punishment at forty years confinement.
At trial, Sann Cisco testified to having prepared the videotaped interview. When the State offered the videotape into evidence as State’s Exhibit 1, Rhea’s attorney objected to its admission on the grounds that the child was an incompetent witness because she did not possess sufficient intellect to relate the transactions with respect to which she was interrogated and did not understand the obligation of the oath. Another ground for his objection was that the statements on the videotape resulted from questions calculated to lead to a particular statement. The court overruled the objection. After the court overruled Rhea’s objection to the videotape’s admissibility and ruled that the child was competent, Rhea’s attorney called the child to testify in accordance with Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.071, § 2(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.1985). Essentially, the child indicated that she did not recall the videotaped interview. She recalled little other than having taken a bath with her daddy.
The statutory basis for admitting videotaped interviews is found in Tex.Code Crim. Proc.Ann. art. 38.071, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1985). It provides that,
(а) The recording of an oral statement of the child made before the proceeding begins is admissible into evidence if:
(1) no attorney for either party was present when the statement was made;
(2) the recording is both visual and aural and is recorded on film or videotape or by other electronic means;
(3) the recording equipment was capable of making an accurate recording, the operator of the equipment was competent, and the recording is accurate and has not been altered;
(4) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement;
(5) every voice on the recording is identified;
(б) the person conducting the interview of the child in the recording is present at the proceeding and available to testify or be cross-examined by either party;
(7) the defendant or the attorney for the defendant is afforded an opportunity to view the recording before it is offered into evidence; and
(8) the child is available to testify.
*167(b) If the electronic recording of the oral statement of a child is admitted into evidence under this section, either party may call the child to testify, and the opposing party may cross-examine the child.1
Rhea maintains that because the child was not a competent witness, the requirement in Article 38.071, § 2(a)(8), that the child be available to testify, is not fulfilled. Ordinarily, whether a witness is competent rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Garcia v. State, 573 S.W.2d 12 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Fields v. State, 500 S.W.2d 500 (Tex.Crim.App.1973). The rule for determining the competency of a witness is found in Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 38.06 (Vernon 1979). It provides, in pertinent part, that all persons are competent to testify in criminal cases except:
Children or other persons who, after being examined by the court, appear not to possess sufficient intellect to relate transactions with respect to which they are interrogated, or who do not understand the obligation of the oath.
When Article 38.06 was first enacted in 1925, it merely codified existing case law. Child witnesses have long been required both, (1) to be able to give a clear recital of the events in question; and (2) to be aware that some sanction will attach to false swearing. Nicholas v. State, 99 Tex.Cr.R. 504, 270 S.W. 555 (1925); Valdez v. State, 71 Tex.Cr.R. 487, 160 S.W. 341 (1913); see also 1 R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence Civil and Criminal § 294 (Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980). The trial court, without articulating any specific findings, apparently determined that the child possessed sufficient intellect and understood the obligation of an oath because the child was found to be a competent witness. The trial court based its determinations upon the child’s responses to lengthy questioning by the court, which included the use of an E.T. doll and a teddy bear. The trial court questioned her extensively concerning what was correct and what was not, her capacity to recognize what was true, and her ability to understand and accurately relate present occurrences in court concerning the E.T. doll and teddy bear. In no manner did the child indicate an ability to relate past events. Most of the child’s responses were “uh-huh”, “huh-uh” or head nods. She demonstrated an ability to accurately relate facts pertaining to the doll and teddy bear and refused to accept incorrect answers concerning the doll and teddy bear. Typical of the child’s responses which led the court to determine her to be a competent witness, is the following (references to the child’s name are deleted):
Q. [W]hat is this? Who is this? Does this have a name? You are shaking your head no. Can you say no? What is this? Is this a chipmunk or is it a bear? What is it?
A. I don’t know what its name is.
Q. You haven’t given it a name? Is it yours?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You are shaking your head yes; is that right? And what name do you think you are going to give it? Is it a boy or girl?
A. It’s a girl.
Q. What are you going to call it?
A. Huh?
Q. How old are you? Three? Is that right? Good. Did you have a birthday party?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. No birthday party?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Have you ever had a birthday party where you had a cake with candles on it?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. You haven’t? What is this?
A. E.T.
*168Q. E.T.? I don’t keep up with all of the movies. Now I know what you are talking about. That’s E.T. Have you seen E.T. in the movies?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Have you seen E.T. on the television?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. I wonder what we call this? It needs a name, doesn’t it?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Everything needs a name. Can you think of a name we might call it?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. I want you to try to think of one and then tell me sometime what you have named it. Would you do that?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And you are three years old?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You are holding up three fingers. Can you say three?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Say three for me.
A. I know about three.
Q. You know about three? I’ll bet you do. And what were you before you were three? How many fingers were you? You are holding up three again? Weren’t you two, two fingers?
A. I was this many.
Q. Now you are holding up two and now you are three; is that right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. [D]o you always tell the truth?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. No? What does that mean? You don’t know When (sic) you hold your hands out like that? Do you know what the truth is?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. You don’t know? Do you know what a fib is?
A. No.
Q. Do you know what a lie is?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Do you always tell your momma things that happen?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. If she asks you?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. You don’t or you do?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Does that mean that you always tell her or that you don’t always tell her?
A. (Witness shrugs.)
Q. Do you ever make up stories?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. You don’t?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. You are shaking your head no?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. You don’t just make up something that didn’t happen?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. No? You’re shaking your head no. Do you mean no by that?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You’re shaking your head yes now. Would you tell something that had not happened? You’re shaking your head no; is that right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Good. Talk to me. Can you think of anything to tell me?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Okay. Tell me this; who did you spend last night with?
A. Big momma.
Q. And do you spend many nights with big momma?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And what about your mother, do you stay with your mother?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Who else lives there?
A. My Angie.
Q. Who is Angie?
A. My sister.
Q. Is she older than you are or younger? You are shaking your head no. How old is she? Do you know?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Well, is she bigger than you or is she smaller?
A. Huh-uh.
*169Q. You’re shaking your head no. Is she a baby?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. She’s not a baby? Is she — does she go to school?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You’re snaking your head yes; is that right? Does she go to school? How old is she?
A. (Witness shrugs.)
Q. Sho (sic) is holding you?
A. Mommie.
Q. And, mommie, can you tell me about her sister, Angie? How old is she?
MRS. RHEA: She’s eleven.
BY THE COURT:
Q. Is Angie good to you?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. She is a good sister?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You’re shaking your head yes, she is a good big sister. Do you all ever play together?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. What do you play?
A. Toys.
Q. What kind of toys? You’re holding up this little bear. Do you think that’s a bear?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. It’s not a kitty cat?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. It’s not a puppy dog?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. It’s not a lion?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. It’s not a tiger?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. What is it?
A. A teddy bear.
At this competency hearing, the defense attorney asked her about the truth.
Q. When you talk to your mommy do you always tell her the truth?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You never tell her a story?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Do you sometimes tell stories?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Do you know what the truth is? A. Huh-uh.
Q. Do you know what it means to tell a story?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Do you know the difference between telling the truth and telling a story? THE COURT: She is shaking her head "no."
Q. If you are playing and you break something at your house, a dish or something, do you tell your mommie that you did it?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Do you tell her you didn’t do it? A. (No response.)
Q. Do you get in trouble if you ever tell a story?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. You don’t get in trouble? Do you ever get a spanking if you tell a story? A. Huh-uh.
Q. My little girl does sometimes.
THE COURT: [D]id you ever get a spanking?
[THE WITNESS]: Huh-uh.
When ultimately called and sworn as a witness the court questioned her further about telling the truth.
THE COURT: We will play some more games if you will tell us the truth. Do you remember how you told me the truth a little bit ago when we were playing our game?
THE WITNESS: That’s a pumpkin.
THE COURT: A what?
THE WITNESS: A pumpkin.
THE COURT: Well, great. That’s a good pumpkin.
THE WITNESS: I wrote it for you.
THE COURT: Thank you. You can really draw good. That’s good.
THE WITNESS: It’s only a pumpkin.
THE COURT: Are you going to answer our questions for us?
THE WITNESS: What questions?
*170THE COURT: We are going to play a game and we are going to let you answer some questions. Can you do that for us?
THE WITNESS: I guess so.
We conclude that the court erred in determining that the witness was competent because the child’s testimony indicates that she did not possess sufficient intellect to relate transactions about which she was questioned when placed under oath as a witness.
Now we consider whether the child was able to understand the obligation of the oath. We do not require that a child know the meaning of “obligation” or “oath”. The obligation to tell the truth may take many forms, but the child must recognize a requirement to tell the truth and know that some penalty attaches when the truth is not told. This obligation may be that if a witness lies, the bad man or devil will get him, Mason v. State, 2 Tex. App. 192 (1877); he can be sent to prison, Smith v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 273, 164 S.W. 838 (1913); or, it is wrong (to lie), Powell v. State, 100 Tex.Cr.R. 541, 271 S.W. 915 (1925). Conversely, when a child has utterly not understood the obligation of the oath, he has been held not to be a competent witness. Jimenez v. State, 103 Tex. Cr.R. 163, 280 S.W. 829 (1925); Mays v. State, 58 Tex.Cr.R. 651, 127 S.W. 546 (1910); Williams v. State, 12 Tex.App. 127 (1882). Our courts have continued to require this understanding of the obligation of the oath. Provost v. State, 514 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); Fields v. State, supra.
This child said that she did not know the meaning of the truth, a fib, a lie, or what it means to tell a story. During the trial court’s questioning, the child’s inconsistent answers indicated that she had absolutely no understanding of the concept of truth. Not only did the child not understand the difference between the truth and a lie, she did not know that she had an obligation to tell the truth. She was asked only two questions concerning whether she knew she would be punished if she testified falsely. She responded no to each question. Her testimony indicates that she is simply too immature to understand what it is to tell the truth or that there is such a thing as an obligation to do so.
Historically, children under the age of four have been viewed as being too young to be competent witnesses. In a case in which the testimony of a four-year-old child who did not understand the obligation of an oath was held inadmissible, the Court of Criminal Appeals, quoting from Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, stated that
To permit a child under four years of age to be sworn and examined as a witness would be to trifle with public justice.... Four years has been assigned as the minimum age, but after this age the question of admissibility is to be decided by the court.
Jimenez v. State, supra. Today, however, courts generally agree that there is no precise age limit which determines the competency of a child witness. In so holding, the Supreme Court in Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 16 S.Ct. 93, 40 L.Ed. 244 (1895), concluded, “While no one would think of calling as a witness an infant only two or three years old, there is no precise age which determines the question of competency.”
Under the present circumstances, we further conclude that the trial court erred in determining that the child was a competent witness because of her inability to understand the obligation of an oath. When, as here, a determination that the witness is competent is made with little, if any, evidence of the required sufficient intellect and no evidence of an understanding of the oath, the limits of the trial court’s discretion are exceeded.
Since the child is not available to testify, due to her incompetence, the requirements of Article 38.071 concerning the admissibility of the videotaped statement *171were not fulfilled. The court erred in overruling the objection to the exhibit.2
The child’s answers on the videotape were arguably given in response to questions calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement. However, because we have concluded that the child was not a competent witness and thus, that the use of the videotape was error, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the videotaped statement was in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to a particular statement.
Rhea additionally challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Excluding the videotape, scarcely any evidence remains to support the verdict. Without that evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause to that court.

. Because Rhea does not directly challenge the constitutionality of Article 38.071, we do not consider that issue. However, courts of appeals have differed on this question. Compare Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, no pet.) and Powell v. State, 694 S.W.2d 416 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1985, no pet.), holding the statute unconstitutional; with Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. granted), holding otherwise.

. We do not address the question of a defendant’s fundamental right to be confronted with witnesses against him as guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Were this child a competent witness but lacking any memory of the event, we would squarely face that issue. See generally, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).