Court Opinion

ID: 9454124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:36:58.12468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:58.795168
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
Appellant, Cordie Mae Paylor, was tried and convicted of the crime of manslaughter and sentenced to a term of one to five years. It is from that verdict and judgment she appeals.
At about six o’clock in the evening of January 8, 1966, the appellant and her common-law husband, the deceased, arrived at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Roland Smith, the appellant’s brother-in-law and sister. Upon entering, there was some conversation and drinking before dinner. After eating, Mr. Smith went into the bedroom to rest. The deceased, James Arthur Pearce, and the appellant then began to argue over the issue of which of them was to pay a furniture bill. The deceased struck the defendant as she attempted to get a drink of water and a tussle ensued. Thereupon the deceased was stabbed in the chest with a knife taken from the stove. During the struggle, Mrs. Smith ran to get her husband to break up the fight and upon re-entering the room she saw appellant with the knife in her hand. The deceased’s shirt was bloody. Mr. Pearce died later that evening, the cause of death being a stab wound in the pulmonary artery.
Mrs. Smith was the Government’s main witness. She testified on direct examination that the deceased “ *' * * follow*1264ed her (the defendant) and grabbed her by the neck, around the neck and I seen (sic) he was choking her. * * * ” At this point the prosecution, at the bench, claimed surprise, based upon a statement of the witness given to the police shortly after the incident and also upon an interview of the witness prior to coming into court. The trial judge advised the prosecutor to show the witness her statement with the hope of refreshing her recollection. After reading the statement (which makes no mention of the fact that Mr. Pearce choked the defendant) the witness again testified that the deceased choked Mrs. Paylor. Again a bench conference was requested and the court permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine the witness as to “material discrepancies” between what was being said from the stand and what she told the detective on January 8, 1966.
During cross-examination the witness admitted that what she told the police was incorrect because she was “rushed” and “under the influence of alcohol too.” Again a bench conference was called and the trial judge expressed concern over the inconsistencies and agreed with counsel that if permitted to continue in this manner, the witness might very well “hang” the defendant.
With this in mind and with the consent of both counsel, the jury was excused and the witness admonished that it was the business of the court to uncover the truth and that lying could only “dig a hole for the defendant.” Further that it was what the witness herself remembered and not what someone had told her that concerned the court. The trial judge went on to specifically point out to the witness that it was important to tell only what she saw and to refrain from supplying that which she did not see, and that to tell the assistant United States’ Attorney that her statement to the police was untrue, if it was in fact true, would harm her sister. Finally, the trial judge attempted to make it clear that he did not want her to say any prior statement was false unless it was, in fact, not true.
In considering whether these instructions, in the light of the circumstances surrounding them, amounted to error, we conclude that they were designed to elicit from the witness the truth of the occurrence and were not an attempt to coerce the witness into abandoning her present testimony. Further, with reference to the words of the trial judge in intimating that the witness might “hang” the defendant, we conclude that he spoke with respect to the inconsistencies of the testimony and not with respect to the issue relating to self-defense.
It is unfortunate that the trial judge used the words “hang the defendant” and that it might well be that they were misunderstood by the witness. However, it is clear that upon resuming the stand, before the jury, the witness testified that it was her present recollection that her statement to the police, one and a half hours after the incident, was correct and that her statement from the stand concerning the choking of the defendant was incorrect. This testimony seems to arise out of an attempt on the part of the witness to act in accordance with the instructions of the trial judge to tell the truth and not out of a fear of coercion on the part of the court or prosecutor.
Having considered this question we feel that there was no manifest error on the part of the trial judge which worked to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant.
There is another approach to our review of this proceeding which we believe also justifies and requires affirmation of the trial court. Inherent in the trial of every criminal case is the existence of a broad area wherein the trial judge is required to exercise his discretion to assure that the ultimate outcome of each case is fair both to the defendant and to the prosecution. “The goal of a criminal trial is the disposition of the charge in accordance with the truth.” Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (1965). The experienced and knowledgeable trial judge in this case was, we believe, properly acting within the area reserved to his discretion *1265when he undertook to emphasize to this witness the imperative importance of her truthful testimony. “The experienced trial judge has a sensitivity in this regard which normally can be relied upon to strike a reasonable balance between the interests of the defendant and the public. * * * The matter is, we reiterate, one for the exercise of discretion ; and, as is generally in accord with sound judicial administration, that discretion is to be accorded a respect appropriately reflective of the inescapable remoteness of appellate review.” Luck v. United States, supra at 769. While we were in Luck referring to the exercise of discretion with reference to another trial problem, we feel our above quoted statements are equally applicable to the present case.
We have also considered the other points raised on this appeal and conclude that there was ample evidence to submit the question of guilt or innocence to the jury. They chose the former. We do not disturb their choice.
Affirmed.