Court Opinion

ID: 9808166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:29:25.699477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:36.568693
License: Public Domain

*194Waleer, J.,
concurring in result. Tbe conclusion of the Court that the plaintiffs’ cause of action' is barred by the statute of limitations is, in my opinion, correct, but I cannot assent to the proposition that the statute begins to. run when the ward becomes of age, or sui juris, as a ruling to that effect would be in conflict with an express provision of the law. As a general rule, it is true that the statute runs from the time that the infant attains a majority, but an action or proceeding by him against his guardian for an account and settlement of the trust has been made an exception to the rule. It is provided by section 1617 of The Code that every guardian shall, within twelve months from the date of his qualification or appointment, and annually thereafter, so long as any of the ward’s estate remains in his control, file in the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court an inventory and account, under oath, of the property received by him, and oí the investments made by him, and also of his receipts and disbursements for the past year in the form of debit and credit; and if he fails to render an account, or files an insufficient or unsatisfactory one, he may be compelled by order of the Clerk forthwith to file a full and satisfactory one; and by section 1619 it is provided that the guardian may be required to file his final account at any time after six months “from the ward’s coming to full age or the cessation of the guardianship, but such account may be filed voluntarily at any ■ time.” It thus appears that by statute the guardian is allowed six months after the ward is of full age within which to account and settle with him, and he may defer the settlement until the expiration of that time if he chooses to do so. No such provision has been made in the case of an executor or administrator, who is required to settle his administration at the end of two years after his qualification, for it is provided as to him that he shall file his final account for settlement at that time (The *195Code, section 1402), and that be “shall not hold or retain in his hands more of the deceased’s estate than amounts to his necessary charges and disbursements and such debts as he shall legally pay, but all such estate so remaining shall, immediately after the expiration of two years, be divided and delivered or paid to the person entitled thereto in law, or, in the case of an executor, under the will of the deceased.” The Code, section 1488.
An action against the sureties of a guardian must be brought by the ward within three years after the alleged breach of the bond. The Code, section 155, subsec. 6. This does not refer necessarily to the failure of the guardian to file his annual account, but to any breach of the bond for which the ward, or any person suing in his behalf, may recover damages.
In our case the breach alleged is that the guardian, after the wards were of age, failed to account and to settle by paying the amount due from him to each of them. This is the substantial breach, the failure to file the annual account being only a technical breach for which the damages would be nominal, unless a substantial injury could be shown. The cause of action, or, to be more accurate, the right of action (McLendon v. Comrs., 71 N. C., 38) accrued when the guardian failed to account and settle at the time fixed by law. It surely was not intended that the guardian should be required to settle, that is, to pay to his ward the amount due by him, until he has filed his final account, provided he does not defer the filing of the account beyond the time prescribed by the statute. The Legislature, for some good and sufficient reason, perhaps because his trust, unlike that of an administrator, may continue during a long period of time, has seen fit to allow a guardian six months after the ward has arrived at full age to put himself in a state of preparedness for a settlement and to file his final account. Whatever may have *196been the reason for it, we find it so written in the statute, and to the provision we must give full force and effect.
In order to show that it was not intended there should be a settlement until the time when the final account of the fiduciary is due, or, in other words, that the filing of the account should precede the settlement, we need refer only to several sections of The Code wherein that intention is manifested, premising that in this respect there is no difference between the law as to an executor or administrator and that as to a guardian.
Section 1402 provides that an executor or administrator “may be required to file his final account for settlement at any time after two years from his qualification,” and no executor or administrator shall retain after that time any of the deceased’s estate, except the amount of necessary charges and disbursements and of unpaid debts (section 1488). Legatees and distributees may sue to recover their legacies and distributive shares at any time after the lapse of two years from the qualification of the personal representative, unless he shall sooner file his final account for settlement. (Section 1510). An executor or administrator, who has filed his final account for settlement, may at any time thereafter petition for settlement of the estate committed to his charge. (Section 1525). Any guardian who wishes to resign must “exhibit his final account for settlement.” (Section 1608). These provisions of the statute show conclusively that the Legislature intended the final account always to precede the settlement. How can the ward or the Court know what is due, until after the final account has been filed.
As the guardian cannot therefore be called to account and required to pay over to his ward what is due from him to the latter until six months after the ward has reached his major*197ity, it follows that no action can be brought against him for that purpose until that time has expired.
In Cooper v. Cherry, 53 N. C., 323, it is said by Pearson, C. J., for the Court, to be the settled doctrine “that no statute of limitations can begin to run and become a bar until the cause of action accrues, for the plain reason that the Legislature cannot be supposed to intend to require a creditor to do an impossible act under pain of having his right of action barred.” The principle thus laid down applies as well to an action by a ward as to one by a distribu-tee or next of kin. The right of action therefore accrued to the wards, in this case, six months after they respectively became of age, and the statute commenced to run from that time and not from the time they reached their majority. It may make no practical difference in this case which time is fixed for the starting of the statute, as much more than three and a half years elapsed between the time the plaintiffs arrived at full age and the commencement of this action; but it may become very important hereafter, in cases in which time will be material, and it is well that the time from which the statute runs, the terminus a quo, should be definitely and correctly stated.
The case of Norman v. Walker, 101 N. C., 24, is not in point. It appeared in that case that more than three and one-half years had elapsed after the ward became of age and before the suit was commenced and the question was not therefore involved. The same may be said of Kennedy v. Cromwell, 108 N. C., 1. The Code, section 155 (6), provides that the action against the sureties of a guardian on his official bond shall be barred within three years after the breach thereof alleged. The breach in this case is the failure to account and settle at the proper time. I do not see why the principle settled by this Court, that the filing of the final account terminates the trust, does not apply. If the filing *198of tbe final account terminates the trust and sets the statute in motion, the failure to file it at the time when it is due must have the same effect. Vaughan v. Hines, 87 N. C., 445; Hodges v. Council, 86 N. C., 181; Ivy v. Rogers, 16 N. C., 58.
Douglas and CONNOR, JJ., concur in the concurring opinion.