Court Opinion

ID: 9394053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 05:04:41.137644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.261816
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     May 11, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 360151
                                                                     Ionia Circuit Court
KHALIL KWALI-AL WILLIAMS,                                            LC No. 2020-018187-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and MURRAY and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant-appellant, Khalil Kwali-Al Williams, appeals as of right his sentence following
his jury trial conviction of possession of a weapon by a prisoner, MCL 800.283(4). The trial court
sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 40 months to 15 years’
imprisonment, which is to run consecutively to the sentence that defendant was serving at the time
of the offense. On appeal, defendant’s sole argument is that he is entitled to resentencing because
his waiver of in-person sentencing was ineffective as it was made on the basis of incorrect
information. But, even if defendant’s waiver was made in error, he has not established that the
error affected his substantial rights. We affirm.

                         I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        This case arises out of a physical altercation that occurred at the Michigan Reformatory in
Ionia, Michigan. While the prisoners were being released from their cells to eat breakfast,
defendant attacked another prisoner with a prison-made weapon, which consisted of a sharpened
piece of metal with cloth, such as a towel, for a handle. The prisoner suffered puncture wounds to
his face, arm, and back.

        A jury found defendant guilty. At sentencing, defendant appeared via Zoom because a
COVID-19 outbreak at the prison prevented his transport to the courthouse. The trial court asked
defense counsel whether defendant agreed to attending sentencing via Zoom. Defense counsel
explained that, although defendant preferred to attend in person, he agreed to participate remotely.
The trial court asked defendant directly whether he wanted to adjourn so that he could appear in

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person. The court warned that rescheduling would take time and that defendant would not receive
“any type of credit” until he was sentenced. Defendant stated that his sentencing could proceed.

        After sentencing, defendant moved for resentencing, arguing that the waiver of his right to
attend in person was invalid because his decision was made on the basis of inaccurate information.
Specifically, defendant asserted that he was under the impression that he would not receive any
credit toward the sentence that he was already serving or his new sentence until he was sentenced
for the new conviction; at sentencing, however, defendant received no credit against either his
exisiting or new consecutive sentence. After holding the hearing for resentencing, the trial court
denied the motion.

       This appeal followed.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

                     A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

        This case involves a constitutional sentencing issue, not a claim concerning guideline
scoring or information considered at sentencing. See People v Anderson, ___ Mich App ___, ___;
___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 354860 rel’d 3/31/2022); slip op at 5 (stating that a criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to be present during sentencing). To properly preserve a
constitutional sentencing claim, a defendant must object at sentencing. See People v Lockridge,
498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015) (explaining that because the defendant did not object
to the scoring of the offense variables on constitutional grounds at sentencing, review was for plain
error affecting substantial rights). As a result, because defendant waived his right to be present at
the sentencing hearing, and then moved for resentencing on the basis that his waiver was invalid,
his claim that he was denied his constitutional right to be present at sentencing is unpreserved.

        Unpreserved constitutional claims are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights.
Anderson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. “Under the plain-error rule, defendant bears the
burden to prove: 1) an error occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and 3) the plain
error affected substantial rights, i.e., prejudiced defendant by affecting the outcome of the
proceedings.” Id. If defendant satisfies those three requirements, we must determine whether the
plain error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings
independent of defendant’s innocence. Id.

              B. WAIVER OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE DURING SENTENCING

        “A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at any stage of a trial during
which substantial rights might be adversely affected, including during sentencing.” Id. at ___; slip
op at 5. MCR 6.006 is the Michigan Court Rule that concerns video and audio proceedings in
criminal cases. At the time that defendant was sentenced,1 MCR 6.006(A), as amended May 22,

1
   Defendant was sentenced on January 4, 2022. MCR 6.006 was extensively amended on
August 10, 2022, and those amendments became effective on September 9, 2022 (510 Mich xxxiv
- xxxviii).

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2019, 503 Mich cclxxxiii (2019), detailed the use of interactive video technology in a situation in
which the defendant is located in another location:

               District and circuit courts may use two-way interactive video technology to
       conduct the following proceedings between a courtroom and a prison, jail, or other
       location: initial arraignments on the warrant or complaint, probable cause
       conferences, arraignments on the information, pretrial conferences, pleas,
       sentencings for misdemeanor offenses, show cause hearings, waivers and
       adjournments of extradition, referrals for forensic determination of competency,
       waivers adjournments of preliminary examinations, and hearings on postjudgment
       motions to amend restitution. [Emphasis added.]

On the other hand, according to MCR 6.006(E), as amended July 26, 2021, 507 Mich xcv-xcvi
(2021),

               Notwithstanding any other provision in this rule, until further order of the
       Court, AO No. 2012-7 is suspended and trial courts are required to use remote
       participation technology (videoconferencing under MCR 2.407 or telephone
       conferencing under MCR 2.406) to the greatest extent possible. Any such
       proceedings shall comply with the requirements set forth in MCR 2.407(G).

In pertinent part, MCR 2.407(G)(3) requires the court to “[e]nsure that any such proceedings are
consistent with a party’s Constitutional rights . . . .”

        Possession of a weapon by a prisoner is a felony. MCL 777.17g. In People v Heller, 316
Mich App 314, 318; 891 NW2d 541 (2016), this Court held that criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to personally appear at their felony sentencing hearings and that a virtual
appearance was an inadequate substitute. Addressing the purposes of sentencing, this Court
explained:

       The imposition of punishment in a criminal case affects the most fundamental
       human rights: life and liberty. Our court rules and common law invest sentencing
       with profound significance, for this grave moment in the criminal process often
       seals a defendant’s fate or dictates the contours of his or her future. Individualized
       sentencing furthers the goal of rehabilitation by respecting the inherent dignity of
       each person the law deprives of freedom, civil rights, or property. A defendant’s
       right to allocute before sentence is passed—to look a judge in the eye in a public
       courtroom while making his or her plea—stems from our legal tradition’s centuries-
       old recognition of a defendant’s personhood, even at the moment he or she is
       condemned to prison. Sentencing is an intensely human process—after all, we are
       dealing not with machines and equipment, but with human lives. [Id. at 318-319
       (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

This Court concluded that video sentencing presented the following problems:

       Sentencing by video dehumanizes the defendant who participates from a jail
       location, unable to privately communicate with his or her counsel and likely unable
       to visualize all the participants in the courtroom. Moreover, a courtroom is more

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       than a location with seats for a judge, jury, witnesses, defendant, prosecutor,
       defense counsel and public observers[.] The courtroom setting provides a dignity
       essential to the process of criminal adjudication. Isolating a defendant from that
       setting during what may be the most decisive moment of his or her life clashes with
       the judge’s duty to acknowledge the humanity of even a convicted felon. [Id. at 319
       (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).]

        In this case, defendant was sentenced via Zoom because a COVID-19 outbreak at the prison
prevented his transfer to the courthouse. This case is unique from other similar cases because
defendant agreed to be sentenced via Zoom. Compare with Anderson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip
at 4 (stating that the defendant failed to object to appearing for sentencing via Zoom). After
sentencing and on appeal, defendant asserts that his waiver of his right to appear in person was
invalid because it was made on the basis of incorrect information. We believe that this assertion
is without merit.

        Defendant argues that he agreed to the remote sentencing because adjourning the hearing
would take time and he was under the impression, based upon the court’s statement regarding “any
type of credit,” that he would not receive any credit toward the sentence he was already serving or
his new sentence. But, defense counsel communicated defendant’s agreement to sentencing via
Zoom before the trial court made any mention about credit. Defense counsel stated that defendant
agreed to be sentenced via Zoom although he preferred to be there in person. The trial court then
offered to adjourn the hearing, but it warned that adjournment would delay sentencing and that
defendant would not receive any type of credit until he was sentenced. The court again asked
defendant whether he agreed to be sentenced via Zoom, and defendant responded that the
sentencing could proceed. At the hearing concerning the motion for resentencing, the trial court
appreciated the argument that its statement involving credit was unclear, but it stated that the court
was referring to the case in which defendant was being sentenced. The court expressed its belief
that defendant understood and agreed to proceed via Zoom. As a result, the record does not support
defendant’s assertion that he made the decision to proceed on the basis of an alleged
misunderstanding concerning credit.

        In any event, even if defendant’s waiver was invalid, he has failed to establish that any
error affected the outcome of the proceedings. See id. at ____; slip at 6. Indeed, defendant does
not explain how conducting the proceeding via Zoom negatively impacted his sentence. For
example, he does not identify any further evidence or argument that he would have presented had
he appeared in person. He also does not challenge the accuracy or validity of his sentence. See
id. at ____; slip at 7.

        Moreover, defendant does not claim that any other anomalies occurred at his sentencing.
Defense counsel identified corrections to the presentence investigation report (PSIR) and presented
argument on defendant’s behalf. Defendant made a statement, and the trial court asked him
questions. The court praised defendant for making changes and explained its reasons for the
sentence that it imposed, which was within the guidelines and five months less than the PSIR
recommendation of three years and nine months (45 months). As a result, there is no indication
that defendant’s sentence would have been different if he were present in person. Accordingly,

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defendant has failed to establish that any error in his waiver affected his substantial rights. See id.
at ___; slip op at 8.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Jane E. Markey
                                                               /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                               /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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