Court Opinion

ID: 9373181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:15.503608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.036541
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ROMMIE REQUENA,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DA-1221-16-0488-W-3

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: December 6, 2022
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Benjamin E. Wick, Esquire and Holly V. Franson, Esquire, Denver,
             Colorado, for the appellant.

           Grant Gardner, Laredo, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has filed a cross
     petition for review of the initial decision, which denied corrective action in this
     individual right of action (IRA) appeal.      For the reasons discussed below, we

     1
      A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     GRANT the petition for review, DENY the cross petition for review, VACATE
     the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the regional office for further
     adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant is a former Chief Customs and Border Protection Officer with
     the agency’s Customs and Border Protection at the Port of Laredo, Texas. She
     filed this IRA appeal alleging that, in reprisal for her protected disclosure and
     activity, the agency changed her job duties, created a hostile working
     environment, proposed her removal, reduced her in rank to a Supervisory
     Customs and Border Protection Officer, and suspended her for 30 days. Requena
     v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-16-0488-W-1,
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 6, 60-61, Tab 5 at 4-16; Requena v.
     Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-16-0488-W-3,
     Appeal File (W-3 AF), Tab 11 at 9, Tab 46 at 20. The appellant identified her
     protected disclosure as a May 8, 2012 email and meeting with her supervisors in
     which she alleged that their proposed changes to asset seizure records constituted
     falsification and could result in the loss of criminal prosecutions. IAF, Tab 5
     at 6; W-3 AF, Tab 11 at 4-5, Tab 46 at 20 n.22. She asserted that her protected
     activity consisted of complaints she filed with the Office of Special Counsel
     (OSC) in February 2014. IAF, Tab 5 at 6, 9; W-3 AF, Tab 11 at 7, Tab 46 at 20
     n.22. The agency based the reduction in rank and 30-day suspension on charges
     of   Misuse    of   the    Treasury    Enforcement     Communications      System
     (13 specifications) and Misuse of Position (1 specification). IAF, Tab 8 at 15-24.
¶3        During the proceedings before the administrative judge the appellant filed
     an October 10, 2016 motion to compel the discovery of evidence. IAF, Tab 17.
     The motion set forth the “reasons” in support of each discovery request and
     included a copy of a September 9, 2016 discovery request, as well as the agency’s
     September 29, 2016 answer to that request and the appellant’s October 5, 2016
                                                                                         3

     letter to the agency seeking to resolve the dispute.     Id. at 8-73, 83-93.      The
     administrative judge denied the motion to compel, finding it premature because
     the parties were working cooperatively to reduce or eliminate discovery conflicts.
     IAF, Tab 20 at 2. He indicated that he would “reopen a very brief window of
     time to reassert [the] motions to compel, if necessary, when the appeals are
     refiled.” Id. at 3. In a subsequently issued initial decision dismissing the appeal
     without prejudice, the administrative judge noted that, “upon refiling, all
     previously filed submissions will be made part of the refiled appeal,” and that
     “[u]pon refiling, any document submitted in this appeal should not be
     resubmitted.” IAF, Tab 22 at 3 & n.2.
¶4        On February 28, 2017, after the appeal had been dismissed without
     prejudice and refiled, the appellant again filed a motion to compel seeking
     complete responses to specific interrogatory numbers and d ocument request
     numbers from the discovery request she had previously filed in the initial appeal.
     Requena v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-16-
     0488-W-2, Appeal File (W-2 AF), Tab 5 at 4-5. The appellant asserted that the
     agency still had not provided complete discovery responses despite agreeing to do
     so, incorporated by reference the arguments she had raised in her October 10,
     2016 motion to compel, and attached email and other correspondence with the
     agency regarding discovery. Id. at 4, 5 n.4, 13-31, 39-60. The administrative
     judge denied that motion to compel as not in compliance with 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73,
     finding that “[b]ased on the record before me, I fin d the appellant failed to
     include a copy of the original discovery request and also failed to provide a
     statement showing that the information she seeks is discoverable.”        W -2 AF,
     Tab 12 at 2. The appellant filed a timely objection to the ruling. Id., Tab 13.
¶5        On September 25, 2017, however, the administrative judge granted the
     appellant’s motion for sanctions against the agency because it had failed to
     comply with a September 11, 2017 Board Order to produce certain documents
     that were not subject to a recognized privilege.     W-3 AF, Tab 30 at 4.         The
                                                                                           4

     sanction limited the agency to presenting three witnesses at the hearing because
     of its “repeated inability to comply with Board orders.”                 Id.    In the
     aforementioned September 11, 2017 Order, the administrative judge had noted
     that, although he had afforded the agency an opportunity to establish that a
     recognized privilege applied to each document at issue and to cure any incorrectly
     asserted privilege, the agency had made only conclusory claims and thus failed to
     meet its burden. W-3 AF, Tab 23 at 1-2. He therefore ordered the agency to
     provide all documents to the appellant by September 13, 2017.           Id. at 2. The
     agency responded to that order by requesting that the administrative judge certify
     the issue for interlocutory appeal. W-3 AF, Tab 24 at 4-8. The agency asserted
     that it had produced privilege logs as required by the administrative judge, yet he
     refused to conduct an in camera inspection of the records despite the agency’s
     offer to do so. Id. at 6-7. The administrative judge denied the request to certify
     an interlocutory appeal, finding that the privilege logs were poorly formatted,
     disjointed, unusable, and failed to allege facts that could establish that a privilege
     existed for any document. W-3 AF, Tab 42 at 1-2. He therefore held that an in
     camera inspection was unnecessary and ruled that there were no important
     questions of law or policy requiring an interlocutory appeal such that an
     immediate ruling would materially advance the completion of the proceeding or
     avoid undue harm to a party or members of the public. Id. at 2-4.
¶6         The administrative judge found that the Board had jurisdiction over this
     IRA appeal. 2 W-2 AF, Tab 12 at 1-2; W-3 AF, Tab 46, Initial Decision (ID) at 1,
     20-21. After a hearing, however, he denied corrective action. ID at 2, 57. The

     2
       The administrative judge issued a separate initial decision dismissing for lack of
     jurisdiction the appellant’s adverse action appeal challenging her suspension and
     demotion, which had been joined with this appeal, upon finding that the appellant
     elected to seek corrective action from OSC before filing the adverse action appeal with
     the Board. W-3 AF, Tab 30 at 2 n.3; Requena v. Department of Homeland Security,
     DA-0752-16-0012-I-3, Initial Decision at 2, 7-14 (Oct. 3, 2017). The appellant’s
     petition for review of that initial decision has been separately addressed by the Board.
                                                                                       5

     administrative judge found that the May 8, 2012 disclosure was not protected
     because the appellant did not show that she reasonably believed that her
     disclosure evidenced wrongdoing covered b y 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). ID at 21-24.
     In this regard, the administrative judge found that a reasonable person would not
     infer any illegal purpose or violation of agency policy based upon the agen cy’s
     attempt to correct an improper accounting of seizure activity that occurred at the
     Port of Laredo. ID at 24, 27-29. He found that the agency did not attempt to
     make the change in secret, as the appellant had alleged, the agency was engaging
     in an interactive process to fix a reporting problem, and the agency instructed the
     appellant to add a management note to the changed seizure forms that explained
     why the change was being made and included the original information on the
     forms. ID at 24-27. The administrative judge held that the disclosure did not
     evidence an abuse of authority or gross mismanagement, and instead reflected a
     policy disagreement on how to make changes to seizure records to properly
     account for seizure totals at the Port of Laredo. ID at 29-34.
¶7        The administrative judge further found that the appellant engaged in
     protected activity by filing three OSC complaints that were a contributing factor
     in the proposed removal, the reduction in rank, and the 30-day suspension. ID
     at 35-37. Nevertheless, he found that the agency proved by clear and convincing
     evidence that it would have taken those actions in the absence of her protected
     activity. ID at 37. The administrative judge held that there was strong evidence
     to support the actions, there was weak evidence that the agency was motivated to
     retaliate against the appellant for her protected activity, and there was little
     evidence that the agency failed to discipline non-whistleblowers who engaged in
     the same type of misconduct. ID at 37-57.
                                                                                           6

                                          ANALYSIS
     The appellant’s petition for review is granted.
¶8         The appellant asserts that the administrative judge abused his discretion in
     denying her motion to compel. 3 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 5 at 38. The
     appellant contends that she understood, when filing her February 28, 2017 motion
     to compel, that “the discovery requests and statement on discoverability had been
     included in her prior pleadings,” and she incorporated them by reference into her
     later-filed motion in order to promote efficiency. Id. at 39. She claims that the
     erroneous denial of her motion to compel prejudiced her because the information
     she sought was relevant to her appeal. Id. at 40.
¶9         Administrative judges have broad discretion in discovery matters, and
     absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, the Board will not substitute its
     judgment for that of the administrative judge. McLaughlin v. U.S. Postal Service,
     55 M.S.P.R. 192, 201 (1992). Further, an administrative judge may generally
     waive a Board regulation for good cause shown.           5 C.F.R. § 1201.12.     Under
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(c)(1)(i), a motion to compel shall include a copy of the
     original request and a statement showing that the information sought is
     discoverable. Nevertheless, the appellant had already submitted these documents

     3
       The appellant also asserts that the administrative judge improperly relied upon
     evidence submitted by the agency after the hearing and thereby did not afford her an
     opportunity to question witnesses regarding that evidence. PFR File, Tab 5 at 24 -26.
     At the end of the hearing, the administrative judge kept the record open and permitted
     the agency to submit this evidence. Hearing Transcript, Volume 2 at 482-87. The
     appellant raised no objection to that procedure and had an opportunity to respond to the
     evidence after the agency submitted it to her. Id.; see W-3 AF, Tab 39 at 12 n.4,
     Tab 40. Under these circumstances, she has shown no error in the administrative
     judge’s reliance on this evidence. See Langford v. Department of the Treasury,
     73 M.S.P.R. 129, 138 (1997) (finding that an appellant cannot wait until after an
     adjudication is complete to object for the first time to an administrative judge’s
     hearing-related rulings); cf. Schucker v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
     401 F.3d 1347, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (vacating and remanding a Board decision
     when the administrative judge, in an appeal based on the written record, refused t o
     consider rebuttal evidence without providing an explanation for that refusal, such as a
     party’s failure to object to a deadline set by the administrative judge).
                                                                                       7

      into the record and referenced them in her renewed motion to compel, and the
      administrative judge had specifically notified the parties that any docum ent
      previously submitted in the appeal should not be resubmitted upon refiling. IAF,
      Tab 22 at 3 & n.2.
¶10        At least some of the discovery requests appear, on their face, to be
      reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.72(a); see Mc Grath v. Department of the Army, 83 M.S.P.R. 48, ¶ 7
      (1999) (holding that what constitutes relevant information in discovery is to be
      liberally interpreted, and resolving any uncertainty in favor of the movant absent
      undue delay or hardship). For example, the appellant requested that the agen cy
      identify any and all actions taken as a result of her disclosure and protected
      activity, as well as the date on which any employee learned of her disclosure and
      protected activity, the name of such employee, and how the employee learned of
      those matters. W-2 AF, Tab 5 at 5; IAF, Tab 17 at 44. She also requested a
      description   of   each   and   every   occasion   on   which   agency   employees
      communicated with each other regarding the appellant’s disclosure and protected
      activity. IAF, Tab 17 at 44. She requested the production of documents relating
      or referring to her disclosure and OSC complaints, as well as her reduction in
      rank. Id. at 47-48. The information requested appears reasonably calculated to
      lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding, among other things,
      whether the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in a
      personnel action and any motive to retaliate. See Salerno v. Department of the
      Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶¶ 5, 14 n.8 (2016).
¶11        Under these circumstances, we find that the administrative judge abused his
      discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to compel based on a determination
      that the motion did not include a copy of the original discovery request and a
      statement showing that the information sought was discoverable. See Baird v.
      Department of the Army, 517 F.3d 1345, 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding that
      the administrative judge abused his discretion in refusing to compel discovery
                                                                                             8

      that should have been produced earlier, even though the discovery request was
      made during the hearing); cf. McLaughlin, 55 M.S.P.R. at 201 (finding no error in
      the administrative judge’s waiver of the requirements of 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(c)
      based upon the agency’s compelling interest in deposing the appellant).
¶12         Because the administrative judge is in the best position to rule on discovery
      matters, we vacate the initial decision and remand the appeal. See Seattle Times
      Co., et al. v. Rhinehart et al., 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“The trial court is in the
      best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of the parties
      affected by discovery.”); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(4) (authorizing administrative
      judges to rule on discovery motions); cf. In re Uriarte, 93 M.S.P.R. 183, ¶ 10
      (2002) (finding that the administrative judge was in the best position to resolve
      the question of whether the appellant had satisfied the test for obtaining a
      protective order, as well as the resolution of related discovery requests). The
      administrative judge shall therefore rule on the merits of the appellant’s motion to
      compel.    If the administrative judge’s ruling on that motion leads to the
      production of additional relevant evidence in support of the appellant’s claims,
      the appellant shall be entitled to a further hearing.           See Baird, 517 F.3d
      at 1351-52; Mc Grath, 83 M.S.P.R. 48, ¶ 20. The administrative judge shall then
      issue a new initial decision taking into consideration any e vidence and arguments
      advanced after ruling on the motion to compel, insofar as they raise matters not
      already fully decided. 4     See Mc Grath, 83 M.S.P.R. 48, ¶ 20; Johnson v.
      Department of the Treasury, 8 M.S.P.R. 170, 175-76 (1981).

      4
        The appellant asserts that the administrative judge made erroneous factual and legal
      findings that were material to the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 5 at 26-33. On
      remand, the administrative judge shall take into consideration these allegations, as well
      as the agency’s response to the allegations, in making his findings. See Fox v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 81 M.S.P.R. 522, ¶ 17 (1999) (directing the administrative judge to
      address on remand arguments raised by the appellant on review); Spithaler v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (requiring an initial decision to
      identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of
      credibility, and include conclusions of law and legal reasoning, as well as the
      authorities on which that reasoning rests).
                                                                                       9

¶13         Finally, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge should have
      granted her renewed motion for sanctions, which would have precluded the
      agency from asserting its affirmative defense to her whistleblower claim. PFR
      File, Tab 5 at 41-43.     The appellant contends that the imposed sanction of
      limiting the agency to three witnesses “did not remedy the harm that Appellant
      suffered as a result of the Agency’s failure to comply with its discovery
      obligations in this appeal,” and that the documents sought “may contain direct
      evidence of whistleblower retaliation.” Id. at 41-42.
¶14         In response to the appellant’s renewed motion for sanctions, which she filed
      after the administrative judge had imposed the sanction of limiting the number of
      agency witnesses, W-3 AF, Tab 26 at 9-11, the administrative judge found that
      the appellant had failed to justify additional sanctions and denied the motion, ID
      at 2 n.2. An administrative judge may impose sanctions upon a party for failure
      to comply with an order, provided that the sanction is necessary to serve the ends
      of justice.   5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(a).   Sanctions should be imposed only when a
      party has failed to exercise basic due diligence in complying with an order or has
      exhibited negligence or bad faith in its efforts to comply.         Armstrong v.
      Department of Justice, 107 M.S.P.R. 375, ¶ 25 (2007), overruled on other
      grounds by Edwards v. Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9.            In determining
      whether sanctions are appropriate, good faith efforts short of full compliance
      must be considered.     Id.   The imposition of sanctions is a matter within the
      administrative judge’s sound discretion, and absent a showing that such discretion
      has been abused, his determination will not be found to constitu te reversible
      error. Smets v. Department of the Navy, 117 M.S.P.R. 164, ¶ 11 (2011), aff’d per
      curiam, 498 F. App’x 1 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
¶15         The appellant does not identify on review the nature of the information she
      sought below, nor does she explain how the sanction she seeks is necessary to
      serve the ends of justice. Moreover, the documents in question appear related to
      a discovery dispute involving claims of privilege raised by the agency, which
                                                                                     10

      offered to submit the disputed documents to the administrative judge for an in
      camera review or produce them subject to a protective order. W -3 AF, Tab 24
      at 6, Tab 34 at 4- 9. The administrative judge, however, did not conduct an in
      camera review or enter a protective order.           Based on all of the above
      circumstances, the appellant has not shown a failure by the agency to exercise
      basic due diligence or bad faith warranting the sanction she suggests, nor has she
      otherwise shown an abuse of discretion by the administrative judge in denying her
      motion.   The cases relied upon by the appellant are distinguishable from this
      appeal. See Armstrong, 107 M.S.P.R. 375, ¶¶ 25, 27-28, 32 (finding no abuse of
      discretion by the administrative judge in barring the agency from asserting its
      IRA affirmative defense when it failed to produce documents despite the
      administrative judge having entered a protective order and denied its request for
      an extension of time to assert a privilege claim); Montgomery v. Department of
      the Army, 80 M.S.P.R. 435, ¶¶ 3-5, 9-10, 16-17 (1998) (finding no abuse of
      discretion in imposing sanctions when the agency failed to produce documents for
      an in camera inspection and respond to repeated telephone messages from the
      administrative judge).

      The agency’s conditional cross petition for review is denied .
¶16         The agency asserts that, if the Board grants the appellant’s petition for
      review, the Board should also find that the administrative judge’s imposition of
      sanctions by limiting the number of witnesses it could call at the hearing was
      unsupported and severely prejudicial. PFR File, Tab 9 at 13, 15-16. The agency
      contends that, although it produced a privilege log as requ ired by the
      administrative judge, presented arguments on the privileges it asserted, and
      offered the records for an in camera review or subject to a protective order, the
      administrative judge did not review the records in camera, make substantive
      rulings, or permit it to correct any deficiencies in its submission, but instead
      sanctioned it for asserting legally cognizable privileges. Id. at 15.
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¶17        As set forth above, the imposition of sanctions is a matter within the
      administrative judge’s sound discretion.       Smets, 117 M.S.P.R. 164, ¶ 11.
      Although the agency states why it believes the administrative judge’s actions
      were erroneous and makes a general statement that it was prejudiced by those
      actions, it does not articulate what the excluded witnesses would have testified to
      or explain how their testimony would affect the result reached in this case. Thus,
      the agency has not established that any alleged abuse of discretion or error by the
      administrative judge was prejudicial. See Butler v. Department of the Air Force,
      73 M.S.P.R. 313, 318 (1997); Best v. Department of the Navy, 59 M.S.P.R. 670,
      673 (1993); Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984);
      see also Jones v. Department of Health & Human Services , 119 M.S.P.R. 355,
      ¶ 18 (holding that the Board will not find reversible error in an administrative
      judge’s discovery rulings absent an abuse of discretion that prejudiced the party’s
      substantive rights), aff’d, 544 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
¶18        Accordingly, we deny the agency’s cross petition for review.

                                           ORDER
¶19        For the reasons discussed above, we VACATE the initial decision and
      REMAND this case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance
      with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.