Court Opinion

ID: 9749425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:42:56.312591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:46.949768
License: Public Domain

KERN, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
The majority reverses the determination by the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (DOES) that petitioner’s claim for disability compensation is barred by the time limitation contained in the Workers’ Compensation Act of 1979 (“the Act”), D.C.Code §§ 36-301 to 36-345 (1989 Repl), upon a point none of the parties raised, much less discussed in their briefs.
The facts are uncomplicated. Petitioner1 asserts that he incurred his injury in 1983, which he contends manifested itself in 1985, and does not dispute the fact that he filed his claim in 1988. Petitioner acknowledges that he was represented by counsel during a part of this time. The Act provides that “the right to compensation for disability ... shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within 1 year after the injury_” D.C.Code § 36-314(a) (1989 Repl.). The Council of the District of Columbia has expressly provided in the Act a single ground for the tolling of the running of its limitation proviso: where the employer, on notice of an injury, fails to file a required report of the injury within ten days, “the limitations in § 36-314(a) shall not begin to run against the claim of the injured employee” until the employer files with DOES such report. D.C.Code § 36 — 332(f) (1989 Repl.).
DOES found the date of the alleged injury to be 1983, the date the employer filed the report of the injury to be 1986, and the date petitioner filed his claim alleging he suffered an injury in “1983-1985” to be 1988. Based upon this chronology, DOES concluded that the one-year limitation the Act imposes upon claims was tolled until 1986, but that petitioner’s claim was still time-barred because more than one year elapsed between the time the employer filed the report of the injury (1986) and the time petitioner filed his claim (1988).2
Petitioner does not contend that his failure to file his claim timely resulted from his own ignorance or being lulled into inaction by his employer. Rather, petitioner contends, in his Petition for Review, that a claim was filed in 1985, and then adds in his brief, that his employer “did not timely file after being notified.” DOES found that petitioner filed his claim in 1988 and the evidence supports that finding. There is no evidence in the record indicating that petitioner filed a claim in 1985. Furthermore, DOES concluded, in compliance with the applicable law, that since intervenor-employer had not filed its report until 1986, the limitation did not begin to run until the time the employer’s report was filed. Thus, DOES afforded petitioner the remedy the statute provides for the situation where an employer fails to file its report within ten days of acquiring notice of an injury — a tolling but not a waiver of the statutory limitation. Therefore, petitioner presented no grounds for reversal.
*1020The majority does not take issue with the DOES findings and conclusion with respect to the issues that petitioner raised and the intervenor-employer and respondent addressed. Rather, it rules on issues not raised or briefed before this court. The majority states:
The petitioner ... contends in his brief that “no notifications” were sent, and that the employer “did not timely file.” Accordingly, the principal issue on appeal is whether the employee must receive notice of the date that the employer filed it’s report with the Agency before the one-year limitations period in D.C.Code § 36-314(a) could begin to run.[3]
Although the majority acknowledges “[t]he statute does not expressly require ... that the one-year limitations period shall not commence until the employee has received notice the employer has filed its report[,]” the majority reverses DOES because it “did not address whether petitioner received proper notice, in accordance with the [Act] ... that the employer had filed its report of injury.” The majority concludes that DOES must find that petitioner actually received notice that the employer filed its report before the statute of limitations can begin to run.4 This issue was not raised either in petitioner’s petition for review or in his brief. Furthermore, the issue was not raised in the Agency proceeding. Therefore, the issue is not properly before this court.
The second issue addressed by the majority was similarly not raised by the parties either in this court or before DOES. The majority seizes upon the language contained in § 36-332(g) of the Act that provides DOES “[o]n receiving the [injury] report [from the employer] shall notify the injured employee of the employee’s rights and obligations under [the Act].” The majority concludes from this language that the Council likely intended that the one-year limitation on filing a claim for injury it provided in the Act is tolled unless and until DOES notifies the employee of the one-year limitation.
As the majority acknowledges, the Act does not expressly toll the limitation of claims by employees against their employers on the ground advanced by the majority. Nowhere is it stated by the Council in the Act that a failure by DOES to provide notice of an employee’s obligation tolls the running of the Act’s limitation on claims against employers who have complied with the Act.5 Nor is there legislative history to support the majority’s interpretation.
These issues were not raised before DOES or in this court, nor have we had the benefit of input by DOES,6 the party most *1021affected by our ruling and the agency the Council has vested with primary responsibility to administer the Act. Under the particular circumstances, I would affirm the decision of DOES and refrain from interpreting the Act that DOES administers without first hearing its views. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. The record reflects that petitioner, a college graduate, is quite familiar with the litigation process, having participated at various times in another workers’ compensation case, a personal injury suit, and an equal employment complaint.

. The representative of the intervenor-employer testified that not until June 1986 had she received notice from the supervisor of petitioner that he claimed he incurred a work-related injury in 1983 which he asserted manifested itself in 1985. She testified that she filed the report with the Office of Workers’ Compensation at that time. She also immediately transmitted to petitioner a standard DOES form, "Form 7 or Notice of Accident or Injury!, 1” the purpose of which was ”[t]o let the employee explain ... what happened_” Although she sent petitioner a self-addressed envelope for petitioner’s return transmission, petitioner never responded. Thus, it is clear that in June 1986, petitioner was on notice that information supporting a claim was needed.

. When read in context, petitioner’s statements do not raise this issue. Petitioner asserted:
In 1988 I called Workman’s Compensation to find out about the case for scheduling. I was told that the Company never filed in 1985; consequently, no notifications were sent. At this time I began my contacts with Worker’s Compensation and C & P Legal. I also informed Ms. Hunter [the representative of in-tervenor] that Mr. Foster [petitioner’s supervisor] maliciously refused to report the case as told to him and Legal was never informed. I informed her that when I reported the case to my Manager, District and Medical Department that C & P had proper notification. It is my contention that the C & P did not timely file after being notified. It is also my contention that the Workman’s Compensation laws apply to employers as well as employees.

. The record reflects that the intervenor-em-ployer in 1986 filed a standard DOES form with DOES, denying that the alleged injury to petitioner was work-related. At that time, petitioner had counsel. This particular form is a part of the record, is denominated "Original,” contains the name and address of petitioner, and states in bold print on its face: "If you have not already filed an employee’s claim application form 7A DCWC, you must do so within one (1) year of the date of injury_” The majority speculates that petitioner never received a copy of this form and, apparently, that his counsel was unaware of the one-year limitation on a claim for disability. Petitioner did not so allege.

. See generally 2B A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 78.10 (1989) (purpose of limitation is “to protect the employer against claims too old to be successfully investigated and defended”). Cf. Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Worker's Comp. App. Board, 39 Cal.3d 57, 216 Cal.Rptr. 115, 702 P.2d 197 (1985) (statute of limitations tolled when employer breached its statutory duty to notify employee of his rights).

. DOES, which did not file a brief in the instant case but adopted the brief of the intervenor-em-ployer, should not be expected to anticipate and rebut arguments not raised on appeal. To con*1021clude otherwise would render meaningless the requirement that the grounds for appeal be set forth in the petition for review. See D.C.App. Rule 15(c).