Court Opinion

ID: 9730637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:19:10.039751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:02.822320
License: Public Domain

RATTIGAN, J.
I concur in affirmance of the judgment upon the ground that it is supported by the evidence, and by the controlling law, insofar as it establishes the state’s liability to respondents for the proximate results of the dangerous and defective condition of the Benicia-Martinez Bridge. I also agree that the trial court correctly denied the state’s motions for the joinder of General Motors Corporation, for nonsuit, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
However, I would affirm the judgment upon the independent basis that it is supported by the evidence, and by the controlling law, insofar as *489it establishes the state’s liability to respondents for the proximate results of Author Edgmon’s driving an automobile while he was a resident of the California Veterans Home (Home). I therefore dissent from the majority holding that “the judgment cannot be sustained”1 upon that basis.
I agree that “[t]here was evidence that a special relationship did exist between the responsible authorities at the California Veterans Home and Edgmon.” According to that evidence, the relationship was such that the authorities exercised an all-pervasive degree of control over Edgmon’s personal conduct. Their control reached virtually eveiy detail of his life as a resident veteran, including his absences from the Home and his use of the automobile which was involved in the fatal accident.2 The relationship accordingly imposed upon the authorities the duty to exercise ordinaiy care toward a “foreseeable victim” of the conduct controlled. (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434-435 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334]; Poncher v. Brackett (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 769, 772-773 [55 Cal.Rptr. 59]; Rest.2d Torts, §§315,319.)
The medical evidence supports the inference that the Home authorities had compelling cause to believe that Edgmon should not drive an automobile. It supports the further inference that any innocent highway user, including each of the respondents, was a “foreseeable victim” of his driving. (See Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co. (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d *49069, 73-74 [70 Cal.Rptr. 136] and cases there cited. See also Hergenrether v. East (1964) 61 Cal.2d 440, 442-446 [39 Cal.Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 164]; Syah v. Johnson (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 534, 539-545 [55 Cal.Rptr. 741].)
Other evidence (cited by the majority or by myself in fn. 2, ante) supports the inferences that the Home authorities could effectively have prevented Edgmon’s driving by denying him the privilege of maintaining his automobile on the Home grounds, or by denying him leave from the Home unless he refrained from driving. The management’s authority to have prevented him from driving was not dependent upon a “statute or regulation,” nor upon a “guardianship” or other “adjudication of incompetency.” Its existence is demonstrated by the total control which was exercised over him in all pertinent respects. (See fn. 2, ante.) The majority’s pejorative observation that appropriate preventive action would have been “paternalistic” cannot mean that the management was relieved of the duty to take it in the exercise of ordinary care. If “paternalistic” is the right word, it accurately describes both the purpose of the Veterans Home (see Mil. & Vet. Code, § 1012 et seq.) and the realities of its operation as shown by its regulations (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 12, §§ 500, 503-510) and by the evidence in this case.
The inference most reasonably supported by the evidence is that the Home authorities did absolutely nothing to prevent Edgmon from driving an automobile.3 Their inaction did not involve a “discretionary act” for which the state would be immune from tort liability under Government Code section 818.4, and the majority’s suggestion in this regard places the exercise of “discretion” at the wrong point in the pertinent chronology. The Home authorities exercised “discretion” when they accepted Edgmon as a resident in 1968, despite his 26-year history of disabling medical problems. Government Code section 818.4 did not insulate the state from liability for the subsequent failure of the authorities to exercise ordinary care in discharging the responsibilities they had assumed in the first instance. (Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 788-790, 793-798 [73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352]; McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 260-262 [74 *491Cal.Rptr. 389, 449 P.2d 453]; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, §§ 144-145, pp. 2440-2441; Comment (1975) 15 Santa Clara Law. 454, 467-468.)
I have thus far addressed only the Home authorities’ failure to have prevented Edgmon’s driving because the majority opinion exonerates their conduct in that respect alone: “ . . . the judgment cannot be sustained upon respondents’ theory that the state should have prevented Edgmon from driving an automobile.” (Italics added here.) Respondents’ “theory” of the state’s liability for the results of his driving is not so limited. The majority opinion summarizes the evidence that physicians at the Veterans Home had placed Edgmon on a regimen of depressant drugs which, in themselves, predictably impaired his ability to drive. Other evidence, not yet mentioned but also to be viewed in the light most favorable to respondents, supports these further inferences:
The depressant drugs were given to Edgmon in pill form. The use of some of them absolutely contraindicated his ingestion of any alcohol, even the slightest quantity, because it could aggravate their effect. None of the Home physicians warned him against using alcohol while he was taking the pills. One of the physicians, who knew these things or should have known them in the exercise of ordinary care, nevertheless put him on an additional drug which was in fluid form and contained alcohol. The physician did this in inexplicable ignorance of the fluid’s alcohol content, at a time when Edgmon was taking heavy dosages of the depressant pills. The fatal accident occurred three days later. At the time it occurred, Edgmon had a blood-alcohol content of .05 percent or more.4
These inferences add up to much more than mere passive negligence in the Home authorities’ failure to have “prevented” Edgmon from driving an automobile. In terms of the full dimensions of “respondents’ theory” of the state’s liability for the results of his driving on the fatal day, the inferences show active negligence in making him a dangerous —or more dangerous—driver in a custodial context which, unlike the conventional physician-patient relationship, permitted actual control of *492his conduct. In terms of proximate causation of the accident itself, these inferences were sufficient to support a determination by the juiy that his ingestion of the prescribed substances—the alcohol included—caused him to lose control of his automobile on the Benicia-Martinez Bridge.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment upon the independent basis that the fatal accident was proximately caused by the negligence of the authorities at the California Veterans Home.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 21, 1977. Rattigan, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 26, 1978. Bird, C. J., and Manuel, J., did not participate therein.

Here, and elsewhere unless my context indicates otherwise, I quote the majority opinion.

As additional background for this statement, I would supplement the majority’s review of the evidence as follows:
The Home regulations controlling the absence of residents on leave were rigidly enforced by nightly bed-checks. Other regulations controlled their conduct by prohibiting the private possession of alcohol on the Home grounds. These regulations were enforced by searching the residents’ persons or vehicles. Discipline imposed for the violation of some regulations, short of expulsion from the Home, included actual lockup confinement in its so-called “jail house.” Every resident was required to carry a “history card” on his person, and to present the card when seeking a pass to leave the grounds. Any “restrictions” on his conduct were to be entered on his card. No resident could be employed off the premises, nor could he operate a business there or elsewhere, without the written approval of the manager of the Home.
Automobiles owned or used by residents could be parked on the Home grounds only if the management approved. Approved vehicles were identified by bumper stickers and were subject to search for malfunction and contraband. Only about 5 percent of the Home’s 1,300 residents maintained their own automobiles under this system. Commercial bus transportation was available to all residents at discounted fares, and jitney service to and from the bus depot was provided.
Many residents—not including Edgmon—were prohibited from driving for medical or related reasons.

In this respect, the majority refer to “uncontradicted evidence supporting an'inference that a physician at the Home had warned Edgmon that he should not drive while he was under medication.” The “physician” mentioned was one of several who treated Edgmon at the Home. He testified in effect that it was his practice to give this warning to a patient in an appropriate case, but he admitted that he had no recollection of having given it to Edgmon and, In fact, no recollection of Edgmon as a patient or otherwise. There was thus “uncontradicted evidence” as stated, but the jury was warranted in refusing to draw the “inference” suggested.

The physician who prescribed the fluid testified that he thought it had an alcohol content of 15 percent to 18 percent. Respondents proved that it was 42 percent alcohol, which made it the equivalent of 84 proof liquor. The fluid was given to Edgmon on October 22, 1970. At or about that time, and as prescribed at the Veterans Home, he was taking 12 of the depressant pills each day. The accident occurred on October 25, 1970. Edgmon’s minimum blood-alcohol level of 0.5 percent, at the time, was established by evidence of laboratory testing after the accident.