Court Opinion

ID: 9707813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:21:52.540133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:38.223718
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BILANDIC, also specially concurring: I join in the majority opinion. I also agree with the observation of the dissent that “[m]y colleagues are decent and good people.” 185 Ill. 2d at 228. I hasten to add that my colleagues in the majority would return that compliment. In my view, the partial dissent by my learned colleague is a plea for abolition of the death penalty. This argument should be directed to the legislative branch, which has the power to modify or repeal a statute which it enacted. We must not overlook the fact that in addition to safeguards provided by the judicial branch, a defendant in a capital case has the additional protection of the executive branch (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, § 12). On January 16, 1996, executive clemency was granted to Guinevere A. Garcia. Prior to becoming a judge, Benjamin N. Cardozo argued against the death penalty because, “ ‘To me it is far from clear that weak-minded creatures would be more deterred by it than by some other form of punishment. Beyond and above all this, there is the ever-present chance of error. The risk is too great to be incurred by fallible mortals — a class large enough unfortunately to include judges, high and low.’ ” A. Kaufman, Cardozo 395 (1998) (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo). However, when he became a judge and had responsibility, “[h]e applied New York’s death penalty statutes and voted to affirm numerous death sentences.” A. Kaufman, Cardozo 396 (1998). The dissent eloquently expresses a personal conviction but does not address the sound and authoritative opinion of the majority. JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this special concurrence.