Court Opinion

ID: 9709465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:48:23.12151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:49.136328
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, specially concurring: Although I concur in the result reached in this case, I do not agree with the reasoning of the opinion. I would hold that by failing to raise the alleged constitutional error in the trial court the right to raise it on review has been forfeited. For the reasons stated below, the error would not constitute plain error and any discussion of harmless error is unnecessary. We are dealing here with error that has been waived by not properly calling it to the attention of the trial court and preserving it for review. Were it not for the plain error exception to the waiver rule, the unobjected-to trial error would not be before this court. Therefore, in considering whether the unobjected-to trial error falls within the exception to the waiver rule, it is not necessary to determine that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even though the error may have been of constitutional dimension. Although usually referred to as “waiver,” failure to object to trial errors more appropriately could be termed a procedural default. In any event, when the trial error has not been properly preserved, we do not evaluate it in the usual sense, but we determine whether the right to raise the error on review, constitutional error as well as other trial error (People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280), has been waived or forfeited. It is not necessary to apply the harmless-error or harmless-error-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test. There are two facets of plain error, both of which require a reviewing court to consider a trial error even in the absence of an attempt by the defendant to bring it to the attention of the trial court. First, a significant purpose of the plain error rule is to afford certain protections to the defendant. If a serious injustice has been done to a defendant, it should be corrected. To this end the strength or the weakness of the evidence against him is relevant. (3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal sec. 856, at 374 (1969).) Thus this court has held that in a criminal case where the evidence is closely balanced a court of review may consider errors that have not been properly preserved for review. (People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280; People v. Bradley (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 597; People v. Nowak (1939), 372 Ill. 381.) When the evidence is closely balanced, there is the possibility that an innocent person may have been convicted because of some error which is obvious in the record, but which was not properly preserved for review. In order to prevent such a serious miscarriage of justice, a court of review may consider the error. However, in doing so the court will look at the record only to see if the evidence is “closely balanced.” If it is not, the reason for considering the error in the absence of its preservation is not present. There is no need to apply the harmless error test or, if the error involves a constitutional right (Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824), the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test. The other facet of plain error concerns the protection and preservation of the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. (3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal sec. 856, at 374 (1969).) In considering this aspect of plain error, it is questioned whether the harmless error doctrine has any relevance, even harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. In Screws v. United States (1945), 325 U.S. 91, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 65 S. Ct. 1031, Mr. Justice Douglas stated: “And where the error is so fundamental as not to submit to the jury the essential ingredients of the only offense on which the conviction could rest, we think it is necessary to take note of it on our own motion. Even those guilty of the most heinous offenses are entitled to a fair trial. Whatever the degree of guilt, those charged with a federal crime are entitled to be tried by the standards of guilt which Congress has prescribed.” (Emphasis added.) 325 U.S. 91, 107, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 1506, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 1038. Professor Wright states: “It is not a miscarriage of justice to convict a guilty man, but if he is convicted in a way inconsistent with the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings, then the courts should invoke the plain error rule in order to protect their own public reputation.” 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal sec. 856, at 374 (1969). In considering this aspect of plain error, it has been held that the rule should be invoked only in exceptional circumstances to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. (United States v. Musquiz (5th Cir. 1971), 445 F.2d 963; United States v. Vaughan (2d Cir. 1971), 443 F.2d 92; Davis v. United States (9th Cir. 1970), 425 F.2d 673; Marshall v. United States (9th Cir. 1969), 409 F.2d 925.) It is in this context that we must view the previous statements of this court concerning plain error. In People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280, 283, this court quoted from People v. Burson (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 360, 370, stating: “ ‘The court may *** take notice of errors appearing upon the record which deprived the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial, although no exceptions were preserved ***.’” The case of People v. Burson, from which this language was taken, is illustrative of the nature of the error which should be considered under the plain error rule as “depriving the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial.” In Burson this court found that the record raised serious doubts as to the defendant’s sanity and that the defendant’s counsel had suggested the defendant’s insanity at the time of trial. This court stated that the trial and sentencing of an individual charged with a criminal offense while insane is a violation of due process of law. Therefore, although the question had not been properly preserved and argued, the court did not permit the waiver rule to operate to deprive the accused of his constitutional right to due process. The court then stated the language quoted above. It is also in this light that we must interpret the language of our Rule 615(a) (58 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)), which provides that “[p] lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” (Emphasis added.) Thus I believe that under this second aspect of the plain error rule, the errors that will be considered as not having been waived, although not properly preserved, are those that are so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process that they cannot be waived or forfeited by the failure to raise them in the trial court. I also believe that, being so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process, they must be considered by the court regardless of the guilt of the defendant and therefore the harmless error test, even harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, is not relevant. In this case, although the error complained of involves a constitutional right, it is not of such a fundamental nature that the plain error rule must be invoked to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. Also, as the majority opinion indicates by applying the harmless error rule, the evidence is not closely balanced. Therefore, it is not necessary for the error to be considered as plain error in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. For these reasons I concur in the result reached by the majority; however, I consider the question of harmless error to be irrelevant.