Court Opinion

ID: 9418063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 21:03:56.044823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:32.038992
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/2/23
                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                  D080369

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                   (Super. Ct. No. CR40676)

 RAMON DEL RIO,

         Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Reversed.
       Daniel J. Kessler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson, Alan L. Amann and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                INTRODUCTION
       Ramon Del Rio appeals from the trial court’s decision to redesignate
robbery as the basis for his conviction after granting Del Rio’s petition to
vacate his two first degree murder convictions under Penal Code1

section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95).2 Del Rio contends the trial court
violated his due process rights because he had no notice the court might take
this action. He further argues the robbery conviction is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. We agree the lack of notice and
substantial evidence supporting the robbery conviction warrant reversal. We
therefore remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On June 16, 1977, the San Diego District Attorney filed an information
charging Del Rio with three counts of murder. The first two counts alleged

that Del Rio murdered Ronald W. and Helen R. in violation of section 187.3
In 1978, a jury convicted Del Rio of two counts of first degree murder, and the
trial court subsequently sentenced him to two concurrent, indeterminate life
terms in prison. This court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion.
(People v. Del Rio (May 16, 1979, 4 Crim. No. 8866).)
      Del Rio filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 in
January 2019. The trial court denied the petition. Del Rio appealed, and this
court reversed and remanded the case with directions to issue an order to
show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Del Rio (Aug. 5,
2021, D078225) [nonpub. opn.].)

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

2     Assembly Bill No. 200 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10) renumbered
section 1170.95 to 1172.6, effective June 30, 2022.

3     The third count was dismissed in August 1980, and is not at issue in
the instant appeal.

                                       2
      In their response to the trial court’s order to show cause, the People
explained that, because the transcript of the jury trial was no longer
available and section 1172.6 limited what other evidence was admissible at
the hearing, they were prevented from proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that Del Rio was ineligible for resentencing. Accordingly, the People
submitted that Del Rio was “entitled to relief pursuant to Penal Code
section [1172.6].” The responsive brief did not request that the trial court
redesignate robbery or any other underlying felony for resentencing purposes.
      At the evidentiary hearing, the People submitted because they did not
have a trial transcript. Based on this representation that the People did not
have any admissible evidence, the court stated, “I’m going to vacate the
conviction, and therefore, that means Mr. Del Rio will be released.” The
People then asked the court to reimpose any remaining charges and
resentence on those offenses. But they acknowledged that they were “kind of
in a quandary because the Court has to resentence on something that [sic] we
don’t have any evidence in front of us to do so.” The People then indicated
their view that, because they were technically in a resentencing phase, and
the court could thus rely on reliable hearsay evidence, the court should
consider the facts laid out in a February 2, 1978 probation officer’s report in
choosing an offense to redesignate.
      The trial court did not expressly address this argument, but it vacated
the now 45-year-old murder convictions and indicated it would sentence Del
Rio on a robbery conviction. Del Rio’s counsel objected on the grounds that
there was no evidence Del Rio was ever charged with robbery, no evidence
suggesting the theory behind the murder conviction, and no reliable evidence
that Del Rio was guilty of robbery. The court proceeded with redesignating
robbery as the basis for conviction, then resentenced Del Rio to a middle term

                                       3
of three years, with credit for time served, and imposed a parole term of up to

two years.4 After the court rendered its decision, Del Rio objected, “There
was no robbery, sir. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] There’s no reason to give me any kind of
sentence, you know, that I didn’t do. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I don’t understand.”
                                  DISCUSSION
                  A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
      Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§§ 2-4; 2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) narrowed liability for murder
under the felony-murder rule and natural and probable consequences
doctrines and “create[d] a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be
convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The result is that Senate Bill 1437
“ensure[s] that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant
in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1147.) As the Legislature
itself declared, the purpose of section 1172.6 was to “more equitably sentence
offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides” and comply
with the “bedrock principle of the law and of equity that a person should be
punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level of individual
culpability.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1; People v. Ramirez (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 923, 931.)
      When a trial court reviews a petition for resentencing, the court first
determines if the petitioner has shown a prima facie case for relief under the

4     The new abstract of judgment reflects that the trial court amended the
information to include a fourth count for robbery and then convicted Del Rio
of that charge.
                                         4
statute. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the petitioner meets the prima facie burden,
the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing
on the petition. (Id., subds. (c) & (d)(1); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 962.)
At this stage of the proceeding, the prosecution has the burden of proving
“beyond a reasonable doubt[ ] that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Martinez (2019) 31
Cal.App.5th 719, 724.)
      If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the court must
vacate the conviction and resentence the petitioner on the remaining charges.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “The petitioner’s conviction shall be redesignated as
the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing purposes if the
petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to this section, murder or attempted
murder was charged generically, and the target offense was not charged.”
(Id., subd. (e).) The newly resentenced petitioner shall be given credit for
time served but may be subjected to parole supervision for up to two years.
(Id., subd. (h).)
      The theory underlying the statute is that individuals not proven to
have had the requisite level of malice should be convicted of the underlying
felony supported by the evidence, not murder. This theory presupposes that
the evidence presented at trial clearly indicates what target offense the
petitioner committed, even if that offense was not charged. In many cases,
the jury reached a murder verdict but also found the defendant guilty of the
underlying felony beyond a reasonable doubt, so there is no question as to
which crime should be redesignated to support the conviction. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (d)(1) & (3).) But section 1172.6 does not provide guidance where, as
here, a jury did not find the defendant culpable of another offense, and the

                                        5
prosecution was unable to provide admissible evidence of any underlying
felonies at the resentencing hearing.
         B. The Trial Court Violated Del Rio’s Due Process Rights by
          Redesignating the Conviction as a Robbery Without Notice and
                           an Opportunity to be Heard

      Del Rio first contends the trial court violated his due process rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by redesignating the uncharged
and unadjudicated offense of robbery as the basis for his conviction, without
notice and an opportunity to be heard, and then resentencing him on the
robbery conviction. The People do not dispute that Del Rio was entitled to
notice, but they maintain that he did, in fact, receive appropriate notice that
he might be resentenced on the crime of robbery.
      “We review procedural due process claims de novo because ‘ “ ‘the
ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of
law.’ ” ’ ” (Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 57, 82.)
      In People v. Silva (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 505 (Silva), the First Appellate
District considered whether a petitioner was entitled to any due process
protections during the section 1172.6 redesignation and resentencing process.
(Silva, at p. 522.) It noted that “the resentencing judge retains much
discretion to impose a range of possible sentencing choices, and his or her
discretionary choices have a direct impact on the petitioner’s liberty interests,
depending on the choice of redesignated crime(s) and the structure of the
sentence imposed.” (Id. at p. 523.) For this reason, the court concluded “the
protections for ‘life, liberty, or property’ embodied in the due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments demand fundamental fairness in a
section [1172.6] resentencing.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court determined
that “a redesignation and resentencing procedure that abandons the most

                                        6
basic tenets of notice and an opportunity to be heard would be fundamentally
unfair and would violate due process.” (Ibid.)
      The Silva court held “that as a matter of procedural due process Silva
was entitled to know, reasonably in advance of the court resentencing him,
which crimes the prosecution sought to have redesignated as underlying
felonies, the length of sentence the prosecution proposed, and how that
recommended sentence was calculated.” (Silva, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
p. 523.) The People do not challenge application of this holding to the instant
appeal, and we agree this standard adequately protects Del Rio’s
constitutional rights.
      The question then is whether the People or the trial court provided
adequate notice in this case. The People submit that Del Rio received
appropriate notice because his counsel was aware prior to the resentencing
proceeding of a 1977 probation report regarding dismissed count three, the
1978 probation report, this court’s 1979 opinion in People v. Del Rio, supra,
4 Crim. No. 8866, and this court’s more recent opinion in People v. Del Rio,
supra, D078225. In the People’s view, the procedural history in this court’s
opinions in particular “ma[de] it clear that appellant was prosecuted on a
felony murder theory based on his participation in the robbery” and, thus,
Del Rio had adequate notice that the prosecution would seek resentencing
based on robbery.
      We are not persuaded by this argument. As the Silva court pointed
out, “[u]nless we assume the Legislature intended to enact a scheme forcing
the petitioner to guess what redesignated offense he faces, his right to avail
himself of the opportunity to offer ‘new or additional evidence’ at a [section
1172.6,] subdivision (d)(3) hearing—should he chose to do so—is meaningless
absent some form of notice. Notice is required so he may prepare to meet the

                                        7
arguments and evidence presented by the prosecution and to argue that a
different crime was the underlying felony or target offense.” (Silva, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at pp. 523-524.) Guess is precisely what the People asked Del
Rio to do. The People acknowledged in advance of the hearing that Del Rio
was entitled to relief because they did not have evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was ineligible for resentencing. But they did not
state an intention to redesignate any other offenses. As a result, Del Rio’s
counsel expressed the understanding that it would not be appropriate for the
court to resentence Del Rio based on other potential crimes.
      Even if Del Rio may have speculated that the People would seek to
designate robbery as the underlying felony supporting the conviction, and
even if mere speculation satisfied procedural due process requirements, the
People did not provide Del Rio notice as to (1) whether they would request
redesignation of robbery as to both murder victims or only one, (2) how long
the proposed sentence would be, or (3) how that recommended sentence
would be calculated. In Silva, the reviewing court concluded the prosecution
satisfied the notice requirement because the prosecutor provided Silva with
an updated resentencing memorandum nine days before the hearing. (Silva,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 525.) The memorandum detailed the
resentencing proposal and how the proposed 24-year sentence had been
calculated. (Ibid.) Silva’s counsel also had time to file a written response.
(Ibid.) In People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727, the parties agreed to
the underlying felony before the hearing. (Id. at p. 730.) Here, the People did
not serve a resentencing memorandum “reasonably in advance of the court
resentencing [Del Rio]” nor did they otherwise provide notice of “which crimes
the prosecution sought to have redesignated as underlying felonies, the

                                       8
length of sentence the prosecution proposed, and how that recommended
sentence was calculated.” (Silva, at p. 523.)
      The Silva court accounted for this eventuality in requiring that, “[i]f
the prosecution makes no resentencing recommendation, the court must
notify the petitioner in advance of its proposal for redesignation and
resentencing and must give him or her an opportunity to respond.” (Silva,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 523-524.) But the trial court in this case also
did not provide notice in advance of the hearing. Accordingly, we conclude
Del Rio did not receive any notice and the lack of notice violated his due
process rights.
      Although the People did not argue that any error was harmless, we
nonetheless conclude that it was not. “[B]efore a federal constitutional error
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, 24.) Where a defendant is convicted of a violent felony and
sentenced to probation without notice of the potential charge against him, we
cannot say the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This is
particularly true where, as we shall discuss, the conviction was not based on
substantial evidence.
  C. The Robbery Conviction Was Not Supported by Substantial Evidence
      The trial court did not make any factual findings at the section 1172.6
hearing before convicting Del Rio of robbery and imposing a revised sentence.
(C.f. Silva, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 530 [“[i]n cases in which the
underlying felony or target offense was never charged, the resentencing judge
necessarily must identify the appropriate redesignated offense and make
factual findings on the petitioner’s guilt” (italics added)].) The People
contend the implied finding that Del Rio committed robbery is nonetheless

                                        9
supported by substantial evidence because the procedural histories of our
prior appellate opinions and the factual recitation contained in the 1978
probation report make clear that no other offense aside from robbery could
have been the predicate for Del Rio’s murder convictions under a felony
murder theory. Although they acknowledge the probation report contains
hearsay evidence, the People argue the hearsay information is reliable, and
thus admissible for resentencing purposes.
      In reviewing for substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327,
357.) To constitute substantial evidence, the evidence must be “ ‘reasonable,
credible, and of solid value.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Unlike subdivision (d)(3) of section 1172.6, which specifies the types of
evidence the court may consider in determining whether the prosecution has
met its burden of proof on the murder or attempted murder conviction,
subdivision (e) does not clarify what evidence the court may rely upon in
determining which target offense to redesignate for resentencing purposes if
the target offense was not charged. (§ 1172.6, subds. (d) & (e).) The courts
that have addressed this question have concluded that the prosecution’s proof
of the underlying felony or target offense “must be found exclusively in the
record of conviction.” (Silva, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 527; People v.
Gonzales (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1174; In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
767, 775.)
      Ordinarily, a probation officer’s report is not part of the record of
conviction. (People v. Burnes (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1458 [confirming
that, because a probation report is not part of the record of conviction, “when
determining eligibility for resentencing, a probation report ‘cannot supply
facts involving circumstances of the offense itself’”].) Some courts have,

                                           10
however, allowed limited use of hearsay evidence from probation reports
when determining eligibility for resentencing under other resentencing
laws—but only if the hearsay information is reliable. (See People v. Hall
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 831, 838 (Hall) [holding reliable hearsay statements in
a probation report are admissible to show a petitioner is eligible for relief
under Proposition 64]; People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1095
(Sledge) [authorizing limited use of hearsay from probation reports during
Proposition 47 resentencing hearing “provided there is a substantial basis for
believing the hearsay information is reliable”].) The rationale for doing so is
that these propositions apply to sentencing, and both the United States
Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have held that convicted
defendants are not entitled to the same evidentiary protections at sentencing
as they are at trial. (Williams v. New York (1949) 337 U.S. 241, 246, 251;
People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 754-755.) Although sentencing
proceedings must still comply with due process notions of fundamental
fairness, a sentencing judge may consider hearsay evidence during this phase
of the proceedings. (Arbuckle, at pp. 754-755.) This leniency allows judges to
take into account factors described in the probation report, such as whether
the individual is a repeat offender or the influence of health or environmental
factors, in tailoring the sentence to the individual. (Williams, at pp. 247-250.)
In so doing, the “[r]eliability of the information considered by the court is the
key issue in determining fundamental fairness.” (Arbuckle, at pp. 754-755.)
      To the extent section 1172.6 bases the new sentence on a target offense
for which the defendant was convicted, it is a resentencing statute
comparable to Propositions 47 and 64 because it similarly reduces the
punishment for offenders if they could not have been found guilty, or would
have been convicted of a lesser offense, under the law as it currently stands.

                                       11
(See Sledge, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1092, 1094 [applying Proposition 47,
which provides for recall of a sentence if a prior felony conviction would have
been a misdemeanor had Proposition 47 had been in effect at the time of the
offense]; Hall, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 835-836 [explaining that
Proposition 64 allows the court to dismiss a felony conviction for
transportation of cannabis or redesignate it as a misdemeanor offense or an
infraction depending on the quantity of cannabis].) Under these
circumstances, it also logically makes sense to allow the sentencing court to
consult hearsay evidence to determine what other convictions the defendant
suffered and whether any of them qualifies as an underlying target offense
under section 1172.6 for resentencing purposes. But relying upon hearsay
evidence in a probation report, even reliable hearsay, as the entire factual
and evidentiary background supporting the conviction of an uncharged,
unproven offense seems categorically different. However, we need not decide
this issue because, in this case, even if the trial court could consider reliable
hearsay evidence in choosing an uncharged target offense to form the new
basis for conviction, the probation report here was neither admissible nor
reliable.
      The report is based on a summary of “numerous police reports on file
within the District Attorney’s files” and contains layers of hearsay. It states
that Ronald was found stripped to the waist and had been shot, stabbed, and
beaten. Helen was found in a different location with several apparent stab
wounds and possible gunshot wounds. Hotel staff said their room appeared
to have been ransacked, a blood spot was found on the bedspread, and
Ronald’s ring was found in a drawer.
      Ronald’s wife told the Pittsburgh Police Department that her husband
had taken $18,000 to $19,000 with him to San Diego to purchase narcotics.

                                        12
She said their contact was Del Rio. Customs agents subsequently
apprehended Del Rio at the international border in possession of one ounce of
heroin and receipts for vehicle and motorcycle parts totaling approximately
$6,000. The sellers of the items reportedly indicated that the purchases were
made using new $50 and $100 bills “similar to the bills that allegedly
[Ronald] had in his possession.” A ring someone identified as belonging to
Ronald was recovered from Del Rio’s girlfriend. According to other “reports,”
a nonfinal “neutronic analysis” of Del Rio’s hair noted it was microscopically
similar to hairs found in Ronald’s watchband.
      The People’s only basis for arguing this evidence is reliable is that the
transcript of the 1978 sentencing hearing showed that defense counsel
corrected several inaccuracies in the report but did not object to the above
factual statements. Initially, the mere fact that counsel had to correct factual
inaccuracies calls the report’s reliability into question. Further, Del Rio’s
counsel in 1978 may not have felt it necessary to challenge every factual
assertion in the report, given that the court had just conducted a jury trial
and, as the report itself states, “the Court [wa]s probably aware of all the
admissible evidence.” At that time, counsel’s focus would have been on the
probation report’s recommendation regarding sentencing and probation for
the murder convictions, not on the factual basis supporting an uncharged
robbery allegation. As the court in People v. Banda (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 349 noted in concluding that a probation report alone was not
reliable to prove the factual basis underlying the petitioner’s marijuana
cultivation conviction, “it was only submitted to for a limited purpose
[sentencing], a purpose that did not relate to the factual issue now
presented.” (Id. at p. 359.) The same is true here. Defense counsel’s failure

                                       13
to object to each and every factual discrepancy does not alone render the
entire probation report reliable and admissible.
      More importantly, the sentencing transcript the People rely upon to
show that the probation report is reliable is not even part of the record before
us on appeal. In a separately filed request for judicial notice, the People
request that we take judicial notice of the 1978 sentencing hearing transcript
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a), and Evidence Code
section 452, subdivision (d). Del Rio opposes. But “taking judicial notice only
establishe[s] the existence and content of the [lower court document], not the
truth of any factual statements contained therein. If offered for the truth,
those factual statements are hearsay and multiple hearsay.” (Sledge, supra,
7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.) The People did not request to augment the record
and without considering the truth of the statements contained in the
sentencing transcript, the document will not aid the People’s argument in
favor of this court considering the probation report. Nonetheless, we grant
the request because the transcript demonstrates that, to the extent the
resentencing court relied upon the probation report, it was not appropriate to
do so in a vacuum.
      Although we do not accept the facts of the sentencing transcript or the
probation report as admissible to support the robbery conviction, we discuss
them here to elucidate how the sentencing transcript fatally undermines the
reliability of the probation report. Most significantly, after defense counsel
highlighted numerous factual inaccuracies, at least one of which the
prosecutor conceded was error, the court asked the probation officer to
prepare a postsentencing probation report correcting the errors. The 1978
probation report proffered by the People as sufficient evidence of the robbery
conviction is not the final, corrected report. The prosecutor also explained

                                       14
that the hair found in Ronald’s watchband also had the same characteristics
of the victim so “the expert couldn’t make any finding one way or the other
whether it was Mr. Del Rio’s hair or not.” Because it was “neutral evidence,”
the prosecutor chose not to introduce it at trial. Thus, the probation report
also is not a reliable recitation of the facts presented at trial because it
contains evidence that is misleading and was not even introduced at trial.
For these reasons, we conclude the People have not demonstrated a
substantial basis for believing the hearsay information in the probation
report is reliable. (Sledge, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095.)
      This leaves no evidence in the record on appeal, substantial or
otherwise, supporting Del Rio’s robbery conviction. Accordingly, we must
reverse.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                         HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                                        15