Court Opinion

ID: 9521123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:58:01.572137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:49.374197
License: Public Domain

NEUMAN, Justice
(concurring specially)-
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of James Heard’s robbery conviction. I write specially because I am convinced it is unnecessary and unwise to overrule settled case law to do so.
The record amply supports the trial court’s finding that Heard assaulted the sales clerk to further his intended theft of cash from the store’s cash register. The question is whether the assault alternative on which the State relies for the robbery conviction, Iowa Code section 708.1(2), necessarily requires the State to prove more than Heard’s general criminal intent to commit the assault. The majority insists it must because, by definition, an assault is an act “intended” to place another in fear of immediate contact, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. See Iowa Code § 708.1(2). In my view, the legislature’s use of the word “intended” does no more than state the obvious: to be considered criminal, the offensive act must be intentional, not accidental. Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997).
This court has long held that general intent is distinguished from specific intent by whether or not the definition of the proscribed act requires proof of defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence. *233Eggman v. Scurr, 311 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 1981). Put another way,
[s]pecific intent is present when from the circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired the prohibited result. General intent exists when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender’s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire to have accomplished such result.
Id. at 80 (quoting State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Iowa 1976)); accord Bacon, 567 N.W.2d at 417. Applying this rule, the court in Redmon observed that “[t]he difference between an assault and an assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury is the specific intent to inflict an aggravated injury.” Redmon, 244 N.W.2d at 797. In Bacon, a domestic abuse case, we explained that assault defined by section 708.1 is a general-intent crime because
[i]f the prohibited result may reasonably follow from the offender’s act, the offender is guilty of assault regardless of whether or not the offender subjectively desired the prohibited result. The offender need only be aware that he or she was doing the act. In addition, the offender must have done the act voluntarily, not by mistake or accident. In determining general intent, the fact finder may, but is not required, to conclude that the offender intends the natural results of his or her acts.
Bacon, 567 N.W.2d at 417; accord State v. Ogan, 497 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Iowa 1993).
Here the assault on the clerk was of the simple variety, not aggravated. Yet the majority now concludes that the definition of simple assault found at section 708.1(2) meets the “intent to achieve some additional consequence” test of Eggman. I strongly disagree. No additional or further consequence is contemplated by the definition of simple assault beyond the offensive act itself. Without naming what additional consequence section 708.1(2) allegedly requires “to qualify as a specific-intent crime,” the majority merely says it is so and overrules all cases holding to the contrary.
The consequences of the majority’s action are not insignificant. If assault under section 708.1(2) now requires proof of a specific intent to place another in fear of offensive physical contact, several assault offenses will require proof of two different specific intent elements. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 708.2(1) (assault with intent to inflict serious injury), 708.3 (assault while participating in a felony), 708.3A(1) (assault on various officers and officials), 709.11 (assault with intent to commit sexual abuse). More troublesome perhaps is the decision’s effect on lesser-included offenses, already a source of confusion. If assault is a special-intent crime, it appears that the uniform instruction making it a lesser-included offense of the general-intent crimes of murder and sexual assault may be rendered obsolete. If that is not the case, will the defenses of intoxication or diminished capacity apply to the lesser offense but not the greater? Cf. State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa 2000) (defenses of intoxication and diminished capacity not available to defendant charged with second-degree murder).
Even more problematic is the impact of the majority’s decision on the prosecution of crimes routinely involving alcohol, such as bar fights and, more importantly, domestic violence. Statewide, such convictions numbered in excess of 8000 for fiscal year 2001. As already noted, the defenses of intoxication and diminished responsibility are not available to a defendant charged with a general-intent crime because the defenses are pertinent only to the specific-intent elements of a crime. Id. If simple assault is a specific-intent crime, those de*234fenses will be available. Given the cost and trouble of hiring experts to counter those defenses, however, it is evident that today’s decision will effectively eliminate the prosecution of assaults arising in the context of bar fights.
Of greater concern, permitting voluntary intoxication and diminished responsibility to be raised as defenses to domestic abuse assault will substantially undermine the protective purpose of our domestic abuse statutes, thereby contravening clear legislative intent. Cf. State v. Neuzil, 589 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Iowa 1999) (classification of stalking as general-intent crime requires proof of purposeful conduct but avoids substantial hurdle of proving defendant’s subjective intent, thereby permitting state intervention before harassment escalates to physical confrontation).
In short, I am convinced the court’s turnabout on the question of the intent required to prove assault is unnecessary in the context of this case and unsound from the standpoint of public policy. A legislative rewrite of the assault statute might remedy the problem in the long run,1 but confusion will reign in the meantime. Given the record before us, I see no reason to subject the bench, the bar and the public to that upheaval.
LARSON, J., joins this special concurrence.

. For example, Iowa Code section 708.1 l(2)(a), the stalking statute, proscribes "purposefully engaging] in a course of conduct" that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury, rather than using the "intended to place another in fear” language found in the assault statute, section 708.1(2). See Neuzil, 589 N.W.2d at 711 (proof of intent focuses on subjective motive whereas proof that a party engaged in proscribed conduct focuses solely on objective behavior).