Court Opinion

ID: 9849440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:40:11.485205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:24.217338
License: Public Domain

Banke, Judge,
dissenting.
While I am sympathetic to the result reached by the majority, I do not believe that it can be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s response to our certified question in this case. Striving for equal justice between the parties, as I see it, I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
As noted in the majority opinion, the Supreme Court has ruled that the award of a bad faith penalty and attorney fees made pursuant to Code Ann. § 56-1206 must be affirmed "if there is any evidence to support it unless it can be said as a matter of law that there was a reasonable defense which vindicates the good faith of the insurer.” Colonial Life &c. Co. v. McClain, 243 Ga. 263, 265 (253 SE2d 745) (1979). It is well settled that the reasonableness of the insurer’s defense is to be judged solely by the strength or weakness of its defense at trial, and not by preliminary proofs. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751, 765 (12 SE 18) (1890); Interstate *887Life &c. Co. v. Williamson, 220 Ga. 323, 325 (138 SE2d 668) (1964).
I believe that a reasonable defense was presented in this case. The controlling issue at trial was whether the plaintiffs disability resulted purely from an automobile accident or whether some pre-existing condition or infirmity contributed to it. The plaintiff offered the testimony of two physicians on this point and the defendant that of one physician. Of the three, only the defendant’s witness, who was the plaintiff’s family physician, had seen the plaintiff before as well as after the accident. He testified that immediately prior to the accident the plaintiff was suffering from a variety of ailments, among them osteoarthritis. When he saw the plaintiff a few weeks later, after the accident, the plaintiff reported basically the same complaints that he had expressed previously, i.e., pain in his neck and hands. The doctor testified that the only change which he perceived in the plaintiff was that after the accident he was wearing a neck collar. Furthermore, he stated unequivocally that in his opinion the accident was not the sole cause of the plaintiffs disability but rather contributed to it by aggravating the pre-existing arthritic condition of his neck. Contrary to the assertion appearing in the majority opinion, the doctor did not renounce this opinion or equivocate about it on cross examination. He merely agreed with counsel for the plaintiff that a leg brace and neck collar which the plaintiff was required to wear after the accident made him "disabled to perform the duties of a truck driver.” This, of course, begs the central question of whether the pre-existing arthritis contributed to the need for the collar and brace.
The testimony of the plaintiffs experts, of course, generally supported his case. However, one of them stated on cross examination that the plaintiff had a pre-existing syphilitic condition which could have had a "bearing” on his disability, and the other testified that an advanced case of osteoarthritis "could have been a contributing factor.” In my opinion, these statements, together with the family physician’s testimony, provided reasonable support for the insurance company’s defense at trial, even though the jury as fact finder was certainly entitled to *888reject this evidence and find for the plaintiff. Of course, the jury also found that the company had acted in bad faith in discontinuing payments. However, it is by no means clear that this finding was based on a determination that the company’s defense at trial was unreasonable. The plaintiff introduced evidence showing that the company initially gave an altogether frivolous reason for discontinuing payments and that the pre-existing condition defense was not discovered until later. Given the court’s charge on the issue, which is quoted in the majority opinion, the jury may well have based its finding of a bad faith refusal to pay on this evidence. However, as noted previously, the Supreme Court has ruled that the existence of bad faith in refusing to pay a claim is to be judged solely by the strength or weakness of the defense presented at trial and not by preliminary proofs.
In summary, I believe that the evidence introduced at trial established a reasonable defense to the merits of the plaintiffs claim. Therefore, I would reverse the award of the bad faith penalty and attorney fees in accordance with the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in response to our certified question in this case.
I am authorized to state that Judge Birdsong joins in this dissent.