Court Opinion

ID: 9538155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:31:20.959418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:34.733350
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION OF
CIRCUIT JUDGE FONG
WITH WHOM
RICHARDSON. C.J.. JOINS
I concur in part, and dissent in part.
One of the issues raised on appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in limiting plaintiff’s attempt to argue the historicál value of the Fourth Amendment during his closing argument. In my opinion, the trial issue goes deeper. Before deciding whether or not the trial court erred, scrutiny must be given to its latitude and discretion in allowing or disallowing oral arguments in general. Since it is undisputed that the trial court has wide latitude and discretion to allow oral arguments, it must, conversely follow that the trial court also has wide latitude and discretion to disallow oral argument. The majority opinion appears to give the trial court great latitude in allowing oral argument, but strictly would limit its authority in disallowing oral argument. Such result defeats its own purpose.
In the instant case, plaintiff’s counsel may have been innovative and, perhaps, even imaginative, in referring to the *404history of the constitutional rights at issue. Nonetheless, it was completely within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether the relation was relevant and permissible. I do not find on the record such argument to have been relevant or of material value to the sole issue of damages involved.
In Crews vs. Kansas City Public City Co., 341 Mo. 1090, 1105, 111 S.W. 2d 54, 62 (1937), the court said:
The whole matter of prejudicial argument was before the trial court, and the judge was in a position to know all that was said, how it was said, and all the surrounding circumstances of the trial. We are inclined to accept his ruling . . .
The subject of history is a never-ending one. Interesting as it may have been, the trial court could not have permitted plaintiff’s counsel to run the gamut of history, regardless of the difficulty of determining the value of constitutional violations.
In addition, the facts weigh heavy against the majority opinion. The jury returned a verdict against the City for trespass and violation of Fourth Amendment rights in the respective amounts of $25.00 and $15.00. The argument for the trespass damages obviously had no bearing on the argument for the constitutional damages, yet both damage awards were similar in amount. It stands more to reáson that the jury would have awarded the same $15.00 for the constitutional damages even if the trial court had permitted plaintiff’s counsel to argue at length. I cannot, with good reason, hold that the trial court committed a clear case of abuse of discretion or manifest injustice.
Therefore. I would reverse the lower court on issues I, II and IV, and affirm the lower court on issue HI.