Court Opinion

ID: 9722012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:14:31.587041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:30.063101
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(dissenting). The majority holds that the employment contract in the instant case created a landlord-tenant relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Because I would hold that no such relationship existed, I respectfully dissent.
I
An employee who occupies premises owned by his employer does not thereby become a tenant of the employer. As one commentator explains,
Employee occupancy of living quarters furnished by an employer may create a landlord-tenant relationship, or it may be only a license coextensive with employment. Generally, occupancy which is subsidiary and necessary to the efficient performance of the employee’s duties does not give rise to a landlord-tenant relation. [Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant, § 1:6, p 17.]
As the majority correctly observes, this Court has stated this rule on at least three occasions. See Lane v Au Sable Electric Co, 181 Mich 26, 32; 147 NW 546 (1914); Tucker v Burt, 152 Mich 68, 72; 115 NW 722 (1908); Alpine Twp School Dist No 11 v Batsche, 106 Mich 330, 332-333; 64 NW 196 (1895). In Lane, supra at 32, the Court quoted approvingly from Bowman v Bradley, 151 Pa 351, 360; 24 A 1062 (1892):
If the possession of the house be regarded as an incident of the hiring, the incident must fall with the principal. If it be regarded as part of the compensation for labor stipulated for, then the right to the compensation ceased when the labor was discontinued.
*610The distinction between a landlord-tenant relationship and that of master and servant "depends on the nature of the holding, whether it is exclusive and independent of, and in no way connected with, the service, or whether it is so connected, or is necessary for its performance.” 51C CJS, Landlord and Tenant, § 6(2), p 39.1 In order to find a landlord-tenant relationship, "it must appear either that the parties themselves did not treat the occupancy as an incident of the employment, or that it was expressly agreed that both relationships shall subsist simultaneously.” Maio v Borelli, 194 Misc 735, 736; 83 NYS2d 532 (1948).2 Thus, a number of courts have held that where a caretaker or superintendent is granted occupancy of the premises in exchange for his services, no tenancy is created. See Anderson v William J Davis, Inc, 553 A2d 648 (DC App, 1989); Kwong v Guido, 129 Misc 2d 211, 212-213; 492 NYS2d 678 (1985); Tursi v Esposito, 194 Misc 498; 86 NYS2d 702 (1949); Schuman v Zurawell, 24 NJ Misc 180; 47 A2d 560 (1946); Turner v Mertz, 55 App DC 177; 3 F2d 348 (1925). See also 2 Powell, Real Property, ¶ 221[3], p 16-33.
In Anderson, supra, the plaintiffs worked as maintenance men, and one was later named resident manager, in a building owned by the defendant. The two were allowed to share an apartment in the building as compensation for their services, but refused to vacate the apartment when their employment was terminated. Affirming summary judgment for the defendants, the court explained, 553 A2d 649:
*611Appellants in the case at bar were employed by the owners of the apartment building to perform services in the building. They did not pay rent, did not have a lease, and were allowed to occupy the employer-landowner’s apartment only as an incident to the services they provided. The conclusion is inescapable that they were servants, not tenants ....
Unlike the majority, I am not convinced that the "essential characteristics” of a landlord-tenant relationship are present in the case at bar. Ante at 605. The agreement by which plaintiff was allowed to occupy the apartment was labeled a "Contract of Employment,” rather than a lease. Clearly, plaintiff’s possession of the apartment was not "independent of the services he rendered.” Ante at 606. Rather, it was premised upon his employment as caretaker; as the majority recognizes, use of the apartment was the "sole and full compensation” for the labor of plaintiff. Neither plaintiff nor defendant could have any expectation that plaintiff’s use of the apartment would continue after the termination of his employment.3
It is clear that plaintiff’s occupation of the apartment, while perhaps not necessary to the performance of his duties under the contract, made the performance of those duties more *612convenient.4 Plaintiff’s duties included cleaning the building as needed, answering the telephone, and snow removal. The need for those services could arise at any time, and it is obvious that plaintiff’s round-the-clock presence enabled him to perform those duties more efficiently. Moreover, as the majority notes, "plaintiff’s presence on the property gave defendant the additional benefit of on-site, twenty-four hour security . . . .” Ante at 607.
In reaching the conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed in the case at bar, the majority relies on what it describes as "contrary authority,” Shaw v Hill, 79 Mich 86; 44 NW 422 (1889). Ante at 602. In Shaw, however, it is clear that the occupant of the land was not an employee of the landowner; rather, he took "possession” of the land under an agreement by which he would "make such improvements as he saw fit . . . .” Id. at 88. After he took possession, he cleared the land, built a house, and raised crops. While the Court stated that rent may be paid in services, id. at 89, nowhere did the Court find that the occupant was an employee of the landowner. In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff was an employee of defendant.
The majority also relies on two federal court decisions dealing with the rights of migrant farm workers, Folgueras v Hassle, 331 F Supp 615 (WD Mich, 1971), and Rodriguez v Berrybrook Farms, Inc, 672 F Supp 1009 (WD Mich, 1987). I find *613neither of these cases persuasive in the context of the case at bar. In Folgueras, the court found that the migrants were tenants under Michigan law in the context of "the right to invite and associate with guests of the tenant’s own choosing.” 331 F Supp 625. In Rodriguez the court, relying on Folgueras, found the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship in order to apply the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MCL 445.901 et seq.; MSA 19.418(1) et seq., to conditions at a labor camp.
Without expressing any disagreement with the results in those cases, I would echo the sentiments of the Supreme Court of New Jersey and "acknowledge that the realities of the relationship between the migrant worker and a farm labor service are unique and summon a judicial response unrestricted by conventional categories, such as employer-employee and landlord-tenant.” Vasquez v Glassboro Service Ass’n, Inc, 83 NJ 86, 106; 415 A2d 1156 (1980). Thus, I find minimal precedential value in Folgueras and Rodriguez.
Absent any indication that the parties intended to establish a landlord-tenant relationship, I would find that the relationship between them was simply that of employer and employee.
II
Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s conduct violated subsections 1 and 2 of MCL 600.2918; MSA 27A.2918.5 I would find that neither subsection affords plaintiff the relief he seeks._
*614Subsection 1 provides for the payment of treble damages and recovery of possession where "[a]ny person” is ejected or put out in a "forcible and unlawful manner” or "kept out, by force . . . .” At common law, where the relationship between the occupant and the landowner is that of master and servant rather than landlord and tenant, "on termination of employment, an employer could dispossess an employee who occupied premises incidental to his employment.” Vasquez, supra at 105. However, in Deroshia v Union Terminal Piers, 151 Mich App 715, 718; 391 NW2d 458 (1986), a panel of the Court of Appeals held that subsection 1 prohibited forcible self-help without regard to whether the occupier "was in rightful possession of the premises.”6
The self-help must still be forcible to give rise to treble damages under subsection 1. In an early case construing nearly identical language,7 Shaw v *615Hoffman, 25 Mich 162, 169 (1872), this Court explained:
[T]he entry or detainer must be riotous, or personal violence must be used or in some way threatened, or the conduct of the parties guilty of the entry or detainer must be such as in some way to inspire terror or alarm in the persons evicted or kept out; in other words, the force contemplated by the statute is not merely the force used against, or upon the property, but force used or threatened against persons as a means, or for the purpose of expelling or keeping out the prior possessor.
Changing the locks on a building does not constitute a forcible entry. In Patterson v Dombrowski, 337 Mich 557, 562; 60 NW2d 456 (1953), the defendants, using a key supplied by the builder, took possession of a house contrary to their agreement with the builder and changed the lock.8 Reversing a judgment for the builder, this Court stated:
It is conceded in this case that no actual force or violence occurred when the defendants took possession of the property nor during the time that they remained in possession. At no time was there a breach of the peace. Under such circumstances we are constrained to find that there was no forcible entry or detainer as contemplated by the statute ....
In this case, there is no allegation that defendants used force or threat of force to change the locks and bar plaintiff’s reentry. Thus, plaintiff has no cause of action under subsection 1.
*616Force is not a requirement for recovery under subsection 2, enacted in 1976,9 which allows a tenant to recover actual damages following a lockout or "removal, retention, or destruction of personal property” by the landlord. This section was added because "[s]ome persons believe that not only force, but any device which prevents a tenant from enjoying peaceful possession of the property which he/she possesses, should be deemed unlawful.” House Legislative Analysis, HB 4957, Third Analysis (December 22, 1976).
However, unlike § 2918(1), which applies to "[a]ny person,” § 2918(2) applies only to a "tenant.” Because Í would find that plaintiff in the case at bar was not a tenant of defendant dawc, I would also find that he may not recover under § 2918(2).
III
For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
Riley, J., concurred with Griffin, J.

 See also Davis v Long, 45 ND 581; 178 NW 936 (1920); 14 ALR 796; Tatro v Lehouiller, 147 Vt 151; 513 A2d 610 (1986).

 Some courts have recognized a presumption "that the occupancy of premises by an employee was not that of a tenant.” Anderson v William J Davis, Inc, 553 A2d 648, 649 (DC App, 1989). See also Turner v Mertz, 55 App DC 177; 3 F2d 348 (1925).

 See 1 Restatement Property, 2d, § 1.2, illustration 4, p 11:
A janitor in an apartment building is given an apartment in the basement so that he will be available to service the building on a 24-hour basis. Neither the landlord nor the janitor would normally contemplate that the janitor, upon being discharged, would be entitled to notice which the landlord must give an ordinary tenant before removing him from the premises.

 See Bowman v Bradley, supra at 361:
It is not necessary that occupation of a house, or apartments, should be a necessary incident to the service to be performed in order that the right to continue in possession should end with the service. It is enough if such occupation is convenient for the purposes of the service and was obtained by reason of the contract of hiring.

 (1) Any person who is ejected or put out of any lands or tenements in a forcible and unlawful manner, or being out is afterwards held and kept out, by force, if he prevails, is entitled to recover 3 times the amount of his actual damages or $200.00, whichever is greater, in addition to recovering possession.
(2) Any tenant in possession of premises whose possessory interest has been unlawfully interfered with by the owner, lessor, licensor, or their agents shall he entitled to recover the *614amount of Ms actual damages or $200.00, whichever is greater, for each occurrence and, where possession has been lost, to recover possession. Unlawful interference with a possessory interest shall include:
(a) The use of force or threat of force.
(b) The removal, retention, or destruction of personal property of the possessor.
(c) A change, alteration, or addition to the locks or other security devices on the property without forthwith providing keys or other unlocking devices to the person in possession.

 The panel cited Gallant v Miles, 200 Mich 532; 166 NW 1009 (1918), in support of this holding. However, the Gallant Court was interpretmg a related but separate statute, 1915 CL 13229, that prohibited forcible entry onto land.

 1857 CL 4717:
If any person shall be ejected or put out of any lands or tenements in a forcible and unlawful manner, or being put out, be afterwards holden and kept out by force, or with strong hand, he shall be entitled to maintain an action of trespass, and shall recover therein three times the amount of damages assessed by the jury or a Justice of the Peace in the cases provided by law.

 The plaintiffs sought recovery of possession:
When any forcible entry shall be made, or when an entry shall be made in a peaceable manner, and the possession shall be unlawfully held by force, the person entitled to the premises may be restored to the possession thereof, in the manner hereinafter provided. [1948 CL 630.2.]

 1976 PA 300.