Court Opinion

ID: 9523289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:38:20.084455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:49.908418
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting: I dissent. The majority have accurately set forth the standard of review and then refused to follow it. That standard is “whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). Under this standard of review, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 232 (1997). It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. People v. Kotlarz, 193 Ill. 2d 272, 298 (2000). The majority rely on the holding in People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d 820 (1997), in correctly holding that the defendant knowingly possessed the heroin recovered in the plastic bag. The majority comment that “[t]he defendant in Smith did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to his intent to deliver.” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 111. While this statement is true, both the majority and the dissent addressed the sufficiency of the evidence as to the defendant’s intent to deliver. In Smith, the police testified that they observed the defendant on two occasions retrieve something from the ground and then hand something to his codefendant. In turn, the codefendant handed those two unknown objects to individuals who gave money to the codefendant. As here, the two apparent “buyers” were not stopped by the police. The police recovered seven packets from a wine bottle cap. The packets were found to contain a total of 1.13 grams of cocaine. The police recovered $80 from the codefendant. People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 822. The dissenting justice said there was “a reasonable doubt that defendant or [codefendant] ever received cash in exchange for packets of narcotics.” People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 827 (McNulty, J., dissenting). The majority addressed the dissent and found that the evidence was not so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. People v. Smith, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 824. Clearly, the holding in Smith supports affirming the verdict in the instant case. Indeed, the fact that Cooper was seen making hand-to-hand deliveries to four individuals and money was recovered from his person demonstrates that the evidence in the instant case was much stronger than that in Smith. The majority rely on the holdings in People v. Neylon, 327 Ill. App. 3d 300 (2002), and People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397 (1995), for the proposition that “[i]n a case involving unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, ‘intent is a mental state seldom susceptible of direct proof but which must be inferred from circumstantial evidence.’ People v. Neylon, 327 Ill. App. 3d 300, 310 (2002),” also citing People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 111. In Neylon, police were given consent to search a home after they responded to a call of “shots fired.” In the home, inside a dresser drawer, the police recovered a plastic bag containing 12.8 grams of cocaine in one bag and cannabis in two other bags. There was absolutely no evidence that the defendant was seen selling drugs. Consequently, the State’s prosecution of defendant for possession with intent to deliver relied entirely upon circumstantial evidence. Similarly, in Robinson, the police had received several anonymous phone calls complaining of drug sales at an apartment building. The police then observed approximately a dozen people coming in and out of the doorway to that building over a 20-minute time period. The police went to defendant’s apartment and knocked on the door, identifying themselves as police. The defendant was observed throwing a bag outside a side window. That bag contained 36 packets of cocaine and 4 packets of PCP. Again, as in Neylon, there was no evidence that the defendant was seen selling narcotics. The supreme court recited the above evidence and held “the appellate court erroneously reversed the defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver. Forty individual parcels, containing two different types of narcotics, and the other circumstantial evidence in this case were sufficient to support the jury’s verdict [of guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver].” People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 414. In the instant case, the defendant’s intent to deliver narcotics was proven by direct proof. Consequently, cases discussing factors to consider when there is only circumstantial evidence to prove intent are inapposite. The factors that support a circumstantial case of intent to deliver will almost never be present in cases involving the sale of narcotics in the numerous open-air drug markets set up on the streets of Chicago. The trial courts adjudicate thousands of these cases every year and this court reviews hundreds of these cases. The doses are sold in very small packages, often weighing less than one-tenth of a gram; if the sellers possess more than one gram of narcotics, they are subject to being convicted of a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2000)); the purity of the drugs is usually very poor; the seller has no need to possess a large amount of money; the sellers do not usually possess guns, as to do so would subject them to armed violence charges (720 ILCS 5/33A — 2, 33A — 3 (West 2000)); there is no reason for the sellers to possess drug paraphernalia such as scales; and the sellers sell to pedestrians and people in autos, so there is no need to use cell phones or beepers. If the defendant had sold an undercover police officer a package containing a small amount of narcotics, none of the above factors would be present. This does not mean that the absence of the above factors would support an inference that the defendant was not guilty of delivering the narcotics or not guilty of possessing with intent to deliver any narcotics found on his person after making the sale. The majority criticize the holdings of this court in People v. Williams, 331 Ill. App. 3d 662 (2002), and People v. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d 607 (2001), where this court found evidence that was almost identical to that in the instant case to be sufficient to support a verdict of guilty for possession with intent to deliver. The majority disagree with these holdings because “where the police surveillance fails to describe the object that is allegedly ‘sold’ and the defendant is found only in possession of a very small amount of contraband and very little money, we cannot rely on circumstantial evidence to fill in the blanks.” (Emphasis in original.) 337 Ill. App. 3d at 113. Of course, this reasoning is flawed in that there was direct evidence of drug sales in Williams and Little, just as in this case. I think it is interesting that the majority cite our supreme court’s holding in People v. Jones, 174 Ill. 2d 427 (1996), for the majority’s assertion that it is mere speculation “that Cooper gave the four alleged buyers heroin, when it is possible that the four items that he handed to the individuals were innocuous.” 337 Ill. App. 3d at 113. This is exactly the reasoning used by one of the divisions of this court in People v. Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d 321 (2000), but the majority do not cite Jackson, Perhaps this failure can be explained by the Jackson court’s explanation that, in that case, the defendant’s conviction was based on the observation of a single transaction. The court said it might have reached a different conclusion had the State introduced evidence that “more than a single customer approached [the] defendant, gave him money and received an object from [the third person] after a nod by defendant in his direction.” People v. Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 325. Of course, in the instant case, the police saw Cooper make four hand-to-hand deliveries to individuals for which he received money. Therefore, the holding in Jackson supports affirmance in this case. The court in Little discussed the holding in Jackson and concluded: “While a theoretical possibility exists that ‘there was something innocuous’ in defendant’s clothing that was handed to the two individuals, we do not believe that possibility precluded the trier of fact in this case from drawing an inference which is reasonably supported by the totality of the circumstances.” People v. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 618. In rejecting the well-reasoned holding in Little, the majority strongly rely on the fact that the police were unable to describe the object that was sold to the four customers who were not arrested. This assertion does not withstand scrutiny. Does the majority hold that if the police testified that the defendant handed the customers small plastic bags or small tinfoil packets, this would be sufficient evidence to affirm the defendant’s conviction? If so, why? The bags or foil packets could contain “something innocuous.” Under the majority’s rationale, no conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver based on the scenario present in the instant case could ever stand, unless the customers were arrested and narcotics recovered from their person. Such a requirement is not only contrary to common sense and Illinois law, it could lead to greatly increasing the number of arrests of narcotics users. What benefit could possibly be gained by such a course of action? Finally, whether Cooper sold the customers narcotics or something “innocuous” is really irrelevant. Cooper, like the defendants in Little, Smith, Williams and Jackson, was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He was not charged with delivery of a controlled substance. As long as Cooper possessed the nine packets of drugs (which the majority have held that he did) with the intent to sell any of those nine packets, Cooper was guilty of possession with intent to deliver. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the conviction of the defendant.